- 
 
 1 ' ' ' 
 
 
djorndl ICaui €>rtjnol library 
 
[A Catalogue of New Law Works may be obtained gratis upon application to 8. & H.] 
 
 SXKVENs AND HAYNKS' LAW PUBLICATIONS. 
 Seventh Edition, in 8vo, price 21*. cloth, 
 
 BALDWINS TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF BANK- 
 
 hUllCY and BILLS OF SALE. With an Appendix, containing the Bankruptcy 
 Acts, 1SS3-1S90; General Rules, Forms, Scale of Costs and Fees of 1886-1890; Rules 
 under s. \±2 of 18SS ; Deeds of Arrangement Acts, Rules and Forms, 1887-1890; 
 Board of Trade and Court Orders; Debtors Acts, 1869, 1878, Rules and Forms, 1889- 
 1895 ; Bills of Sale Acts, 1878-1891, &c, &c. By Edward T. Baldwin, M.A., 
 Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 In 8co, Eleventh Edition, price 21 s. cloth, 
 SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY. Eleventh Edition. 
 By Archibald Brown, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 In Svo, Fifth Edition, price 28s. cloth, 
 
 MAYNE'S TREATISE "ON DAMAGES. Fifth Edition. By 
 
 John D. Mayne, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law ; and His Honour Judge 
 Lumley Smith, Q.C. 
 
 Si-vcnth Edition, in Svo, price lis. cloth, 
 
 A MANUAL OF THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME 
 
 COURT of Judicature in the QUEEN'S BENCH and CHANCERY Divi- 
 sions ; intended for the Use of Students and the Profession. Seventh Edition. By 
 John Indermaur, Solicitor. 
 
 Second Edition, in crown Svo, price 12*. 6d. cloth, 
 THE BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883. With Notes explaining its 
 
 Operation and Showing wherein it Differs from the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. The 
 Consolidated Bankruptcy Rules and Forms, 1886 ; the Debtors Act, 1869, so far as 
 applicable to Bankruptcy Matters, with Rules and Forms thereunder ; the Bills of 
 Sale Acts, 1878 and 1882 ; Board of Trade Circulars and Forms, and Lost of Official 
 Receivers ; Scale of Costs, Fees, and Percentages, 1886 ; Orders of the Bankruptcy 
 Judge ; Notes of all the Cases under the Act ; and a Copious Index. By William 
 Hazlitt, Esq., Senior Registrar in Bankruptcy, and Richard Ringwood, M.A., of 
 the Middle Temple, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 Fourth Edition, in royal 8vo, price 40*. cloth, 
 
 THE JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND PRACTICE OF THE 
 
 SUPREME COURT, chiefly in respect to Actions assigned to the CHANCERY 
 DIVISION. Fourth Edition. By Loftus Leigh Pemberton, One of the Registrars 
 of the Supreme Court of Judicature. 
 
 Third Edition, in 8vo, price 86s. cloth, 
 
 THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF. LITEM- 
 
 TURE and ART; including that of the Drama, Music, Engraving, Sculpture, 
 Painting, Photography, and ornamental and useful Designs : together with INTER- 
 NATIONAL and FOREIGN COPYRIGHT, with the Statutes relating thereto, and 
 references to the English and American decisions. Third Edition. Considerably 
 enlarged. By W. A. Copinger, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 Second Edition. One Volwme, Svo, price 28*. cloth, 
 
 A SELECTION OF PRECEDENTS OF PLEADING 
 
 UNDER THE JUDICATURE ACTS IN THE COMMON LAW AND CHANCERY 
 DIVISIONS. With Notes Explanatory of the Different Causes of Action and Grounds 
 of Defence; and an Introductory Treatise on the Present Rules and Principles of 
 Pleading, as illustrated by the various decisions down to the present time. Second 
 Edition. By M. W. Mattinson and S. C. Macaskie, of Gray's Inn, Barristers-at-Law. 
 
 Third Edition. In One Volwme, royal Svo, price 38s. cloth, 
 
 THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND COMPANIES., a 
 
 Treatise on the Doctrine of ULTRA VIRES : Being an Investigation of the Principles 
 which limit th.e Capacities, Powers, and Liabilities of Corporations, and more especially 
 of Joint Stock Companies. By Seward Bricb, M.A., LL.D., of the Inner Temple, 
 one of Her Majesty's Counsel. 
 
 Seventh Edition, in Svo, price 20s. cloth, 
 
 HARRIS' PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW. intended 
 
 as a lucid Exposition of the Subject for the Use of Students and the Profession. 
 Seventh Edition. By C. L. Attenborough, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 [See Catalogue at end of this Volume.] 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924022357242 
 
Cornell University Library 
 KD 1949.R58 1898 
 
 Outlines of the law of torts / 
 
 3 1924 022 357 242 
 
 OUTLINES 
 
 OF THE 
 
 LAW OF TORTS 
 
OUTLINES 
 
 LAW OF TOETS. 
 
 RICHARD RJNGWOOD, Esq., M.A, 
 
 OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE AND N.E. CIRCUIT J BARRISTER- AT-LA.W ; 
 
 LATE SCHOLAR OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN, AND FIRST SENIOR MODERATOR ; 
 
 AUTHOR OF "THE PRINCIPLES OF BANKRUPTCY," EDITOR OF "THE BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883,' 
 
 AND LATE LECTURER ON COMMON LAW TO THE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY. 
 
 tljirfc Edition. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 STEVENS AND HAYNES 
 ftato lublisfjms, 
 
 BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 1898. 
 
BRADBURY, AGNKW, & CO. LD., PRINTERS, 
 LONDON AND TONBRIDGE. 
 
PEEFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. 
 
 In this Edition many fresh cases of importance have 
 been added. The judgment of the House of Lords 
 in Allen v. Flood, and its effect on previous cases, 
 have been dealt with. The text of the Workmen's 
 Compensation Act, 1897, has been given in full and 
 explained, and the decisions on the Employers 
 Liability Act, 1880, have been noted. Lastly, greater 
 attention has been paid to the valuable judgments of 
 the Irish Courts. 
 
 E. E. 
 
 Temple, 
 February, 1898. 
 
PEEFACE TO THE FIEST EDITION. 
 
 Having had the honour of being appointed Lecturer 
 on Common Law by the Council of the Incorporated 
 Law Society, I in the present year delivered, before 
 the Students at the Law Institution, a Course of 
 Lectures on the Law of Torts. These Lectures 
 form the groundwork of the present volume, which 
 is now published at the request of many Students, 
 and by the permission of the Council. 
 
 R. E. 
 
 November, 1887. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PREFACE . 
 
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 TABLE OF CASES 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Torts Generally. 
 Introductory 
 
 Felonies .... 
 Effect of death on torts 
 
 of bankruptcy on torts 
 Torts committed abroad . 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 9 
 
 13 
 
 24 
 
 26 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Toets to the Person . 
 Assault 
 Battery ...... 
 
 Defences to an action for assault and battery 
 False imprisonment .... 
 
 Justification of arrest or imprisonment 
 Arrests authorized by statute 
 
 common law 
 Arrest on magistrate's warrant . 
 Liability of judges, magistrates, &c. . 
 Contempt of court .... 
 
 Nuisances to health or comfort . 
 
 29 
 29 
 30 
 31 
 36 
 37 
 37 
 39 
 40 
 40 
 41 
 41 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Malicious Injuries .... 
 
 (1) Malicious abuse of legal process 
 
 Malicious arrests 
 
 prosecution . 
 Corporations .... 
 Maliciously presenting winding-up petition . 
 
 procuring adjudication of bankruptcy 
 Maintenance ... ... 
 
 (2) Other malicious injuries ...... 
 
 Inducing persons to commit breach of contract . 
 Malicious injuries to man's property or trade 
 
 Slander of title 
 
 Malicious falsehood as to man's trade . 
 
 Threats as to patents ... . . 
 
 PAGE 
 
 44 
 44 
 45 
 46 
 54 
 55 
 56 
 56 
 56 
 ' 56 
 59 
 60 
 60 
 61 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Touts in respect of Family and Domestic Relations 
 Torts to marital rights ..... 
 Abduction .... 
 Adultery . 
 
 Beating or ill-using a wife 
 Torts to parental rights 
 Torts in respect of domestic relations 
 
 Enticing away a servant, employe, or apprentice 
 
 Injuries to servant 
 
 children capable of rendering service 
 servant through breach of contract 
 causing death 
 Seduction 
 
 63 
 63 
 63 
 63 
 64 
 64 
 64 
 64 
 65 
 65 
 66 
 67 
 67 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Torts to Property 
 
 Trespass to land 
 
 Continuing trespass . 
 
 Trespass ab initio 
 
 Who may sue for trespass . 
 
 Tenants in common . 
 
 Eights of reversioner 
 
 Eights of owner of subsoil 
 
 Eight to adjacent and subjacent support 
 
 Justification of trespass to land 
 
 69 
 71 
 72 
 73 
 74 
 75 
 76 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 XI 
 
 Torts to Property— continued. 
 
 Nuisances to property .... 
 
 in the exercise of statutory powers 
 Liability of lessor and lessee for nuisance 
 Waste ... 
 Trespass to personalty .... 
 
 SO 
 87 
 88 
 90 
 92 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Negligence 
 
 What is ... 
 
 Whom to sue .... 
 
 Who may sue 
 
 Guests, trespassers 
 
 Things in themselves dangerous 
 
 Burden of proof .... 
 
 as to contributory negligence 
 Functions of judge and jury 
 Miscellaneous negligence cases 
 Structures reasonably safe . 
 Invitation to danger . 
 Contributory negligence . 
 Identification 
 Liability of statutory bodies 
 
 15 
 95 
 97 
 101 
 107 
 108 
 109 
 112 
 113 
 115 
 120 
 120 
 123 
 125 
 127 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Fraud and Deceit 
 
 Rescission of contract 
 
 Statements by persons best qualified to give information 
 Untrue statements not believed to be true made for fraudu 
 lent purpose ........ 
 
 Plaintiff must be damnified by misrepresentations 
 
 Where person discovers his representation to be untrue 
 
 Concealment of material facts . 
 
 To whom representation made . 
 
 Summary of law 
 
 Cases subsequent to Derry v. Peek 
 
 Directors' Liability Act, 1890 . 
 
 Statements by persons best qualified to give information 
 
 Agent contracting without authority .... 
 
 Liability of principal for fraud of agent . 
 Misrepresentation by innocent agent .... 
 
 Fraudulent representations as to person's credit . 
 
 129 
 130 
 131 
 
 131 
 135 
 137 
 133 
 138 
 143 
 144 
 145 
 146 
 148 
 149 
 153 
 155 
 
XII CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Slander and Libel . . 157 
 
 Slander, special damage 157 
 
 "Words actionable without proof of special damage . . 160 
 
 Libel ... 164 
 
 Intention of person using words .... 166 
 
 Publication 168 
 
 Justification of libel in civil proceedings .... 170 
 
 criminal proceedings . . . 172 
 
 Absolute privilege 174 
 
 Qualified privilege 177 
 
 Injunction. . . ...... 181 
 
 CHAPTEE IX. 
 
 Who may Commit Torts and Torts by Agents .... 182 
 
 Married women ..... • 182 
 
 Infants . . 188 
 
 Master and servant ........ 189 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Who may Commit Torts and Torts by Agents (continued) 
 Fraud by servants or agents 
 Partners ... 
 
 Eatification of torts 
 
 Liability of servants or agents for torts 
 
 Independent contractors . 
 
 Damage caused by animals 
 
 Master's liability to servant for torts . 
 
 Employers' Liability Act, 1880 . 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 . 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 207 
 207 
 207 
 208 
 208 
 211 
 218 
 222 
 226 
 231 
 
 Damages in Actions for Tort . .... 248 
 
 Remoteness of damage . . .... 257 
 
 Special damages 261 
 
 Vindictive damages 261 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Limitation of Actions for_Tort 262 
 
 INDEX. ... 268 
 
LIST OF ABBEEYIATIONS. 
 
 A. &E. 
 
 Adolphus & Ellis. 
 
 Adm. 
 
 Admiralty. 
 
 App. Cas. 
 
 Law Reports, Appeal Cases. 
 
 Am. 
 
 Arnold. 
 
 B. & Ad. 
 
 Barnewall & Adolphus. 
 
 B. & Al. 
 
 Barnewall & Alderson. 
 
 B. & C. 
 
 Barnewall & Cresswell. 
 
 B. & P. N. R. 
 
 Bosanquet & Puller, New Reports. 
 
 B. &S. 
 
 Best & Smith. 
 
 Bing. 
 
 Bingham. 
 
 Bkcy. 
 
 Bankruptcy. 
 
 Bio. P. C. 
 
 Brown's Parliamentary Cases. 
 
 Buller's N. P. 
 
 Buller's Nisi Priiis. 
 
 Bui. & L. 
 
 Bullen & Leake. 
 
 Burr. 
 
 Burrow's Reports. 
 
 C. B. 
 
 Common Bench Reports. 
 
 C. C. E. 
 
 Crown Cases Reserved (Law Reports). 
 
 C. & J. 
 
 Crompton & Jervis. 
 
 C. &K. 
 
 Carrington & Eirwan. 
 
 C. L. R. 
 
 Common Law Reports. 
 
 C. M. & R. 
 
 Crompton, Meeson, & Roscoe. 
 
 C. P. 
 
 Common Pleas (Law Reports, Law Journal), 
 
 C. P. D. 
 
 Common Pleas Division (Law Reports). 
 
 C. & P. 
 
 Carrington & Payne. 
 
 Gamp. 
 
 Campbell. 
 
 Car. & M. 
 
 Carrington & Marsliman. 
 
 Cf. 
 
 confer, compare. 
 
 Ch. 
 
 Chancery (Law Reports, Law Journal). 
 
 Ch. D. 
 
 Chancery Division (Law Reports). 
 
XIV LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. 
 
 CI. & F. 
 
 Clark & Finnelly. 
 
 
 Co. 
 
 Coke. 
 
 
 Cowp. 
 
 Cowper. 
 
 
 Cox C. C. 
 
 Cox's Criminal Cases. 
 
 
 Cro. Car. 
 
 Croke tempore Charles I. 
 
 
 Cro. Eliz. 
 
 Croke tempore Elizabeth. 
 
 
 D. &L. 
 
 Dowling & Lowndes. 
 
 
 D. & M. 
 
 Davison & Merivale. 
 
 
 D., N. S. 
 
 Dowling, New Series. 
 
 
 D., P. C. 
 
 Dowling's Practice Cases. 
 
 
 D. &R. 
 
 Dowling & Ryland. 
 
 
 Danv. 
 
 Danvers. 
 
 
 IV G. F. & J. 
 
 De Gex, Fisher, & Jones. 
 
 
 De G. M. & G. 
 
 Do Gex, Macnaghten, & Gordon. 
 
 
 Deac. 
 
 Deacon. 
 
 
 dim. 
 
 dissenliente, dissenting. 
 
 
 Dougl, 
 
 Douglas. 
 
 
 E. &B. 
 
 Ellis & Blackburn. 
 
 
 E. B. & E. 
 
 Ellis, Blackburn, & Ellis. 
 
 
 E. &E. 
 
 Ellis & Ellis. 
 
 
 Bj. 
 
 Equity (Law Reports). 
 
 
 Eq. Rep. 
 
 Equity Reports. 
 
 
 Esp. 
 
 Espinasse. 
 
 
 Ex. 
 
 Exchequer Reports, Exchequer (Law Reports, Law 
 
 
 .Tournal). 
 
 
 Ex. D. 
 
 Exchequer Division (Law Reports). 
 
 
 F. &F. 
 
 Foster & Finlason. 
 
 
 F. N. B. 
 
 Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium. 
 
 
 Fort. 
 
 Fortescue. 
 
 
 G. &D. 
 
 Gale & Davison. 
 
 
 Gift 
 
 Giffard. 
 
 
 H. &C. 
 
 Hurlstone & Coltman. 
 
 
 H. &H. 
 
 Horn & Hurlstone. 
 
 
 H. of L. Cas. 
 
 House of Lords Cases. 
 
 
 H. & N. 
 
 Hurlstone & Norman, 
 
 
 H. &R. 
 
 Harrison & Rutherford, 
 
 
 H. & "W. 
 
 Harrison & "Wollaston. 
 
 
 Hob. 
 
 Hobart. 
 
 

 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 Ir. 
 
 Irish. 
 
 J. &H. 
 
 Johnson & Hemming. 
 
 J. P. 
 
 Justice of the Peace. 
 
 Jur. 
 
 Jurist. 
 
 XV 
 
 Keb. Keble. 
 
 L. J. Law Journal, New Series. 
 
 L. R. Law Reports. 
 
 L. T. Law Times Reports, New Series. 
 
 Leon. Leonard. 
 
 Lev. Levinz. 
 
 M. & A. Montagu & Ayrton. 
 
 M. C. Magistrates' Cases (Law Journal). 
 
 M. & G. Manning & Granger. 
 
 M. & P. Moore & Payne. 
 
 M. & R. Moody & Robinson. 
 
 M. & S. Maule & Selwyn. 
 
 M. & Scott Moore & Scott. 
 
 M. & AY. Meeson & Welsby. 
 
 Macq. Macqueen (Scotch). 
 
 Marsh. Marshall. 
 
 Mod. Modern Reports. 
 
 Moore P. C. C. Moore's Privy Council Cases. 
 
 N. C. New Cases. 
 
 N. & M. Neville & Manning. 
 
 N. R. New Reports. 
 
 N. S. New Series. 
 
 0. S. Old Series. 
 
 P. A. 1890. Partnership Act, 1890. 
 
 P. C. Privy Council (Law Reports, Law Journal). 
 
 P. D. Probate Division (Law Reports). 
 
 P. D. & A. Probate, Divorce, & Admiralty (Law Journal). 
 
 P & D. Perry & Davison. 
 
 Q. B. Queen's Bench Reports, Queen's Bench (Law Reports, 
 
 Law Journal). 
 
 Q. B. D. Queen's Bench Division (Law Reports). 
 
XVI 
 
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. 
 
 R. S. C. 
 
 Rules of the Supreme Court. 
 
 Railw. Cas. 
 
 Railway Cases. 
 
 Raym., Ld. 
 
 Lord Raymond. 
 
 Salk. 
 
 Salkeld. 
 
 Saund. 
 
 Saunders. 
 
 S. C. 
 
 Same ease. 
 
 So. 
 
 Scotch. 
 
 Sid. 
 
 Siderfin. 
 
 Sm. L. C. 
 
 Smith's Leading Cases. 
 
 Stark. 
 
 Starkie. 
 
 Sumn. Rep. 
 
 Sumner's Reports (American). 
 
 T. L. R. 
 
 Times' Law Reports. 
 
 Taunt. 
 
 Taunton. 
 
 Tyr. 
 
 Tyrwhitt. 
 
 Tyr. & G. 
 
 Tyrwhitt & Granger. 
 
 Veiitr. 
 
 Ventris. 
 
 Vern. 
 
 Vernon. 
 
 Ves. 
 
 Vesey. 
 
 Vin. Abr. 
 
 Viner's Abridgment. 
 
 W. R. 
 
 Weekly Reporter. 
 
 Wils. 
 
 "Wilson. 
 
 "Winch. 
 
 Winch's Reports. 
 
 Wm. Bl. 
 
 William Blackstone. 
 
 "Wms. Saund. 
 
 Williams' Notes to Saunders' Reports, 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Abrahams v. Deakin ([1891] 1 Q. B. 516 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 238 ; 63 
 
 L. T. 690 ; 39 \\\ R. 183) 205 
 
 Abrath v. North-Eastern Railway Co. (11 App. Cas. 217 ; 55 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 457 ; 55 L. T. 63 ; 2 Times Law Reports, 41 6; 50 J. P. 659) 50, 55 
 Adam v. Newbigging (13 App. Cas. 308 ; 57 L. J. P. C. 88 ; 59 L. T. 
 
 106) 131 
 
 Adams v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. (L. R. 4 C. P. 739 ; 
 
 38 L. J. C. P. 277 ; 20 L. T. 850 ; 17 W. R. 884) . . !>7 
 
 Adamson v. Jarvis (4 Bing. 66 ; 12 Moore, 241) ' . . . . 209 
 Alabaster v. Harness ([1894] 2 Q. B. 897 ; on appeal (1895) 1 Q. B. 
 
 339 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 76 ; 71 L. T. 740 ; 43 W. R. 196) . . 56 
 Aldworth v. Stewart (4 F. & F. 957 ; 14 L. T. 862) ... 31 
 
 Alexander v. Jenkins ([1892] 1 Q. B. 797 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 634 ; 
 
 66 L. T. 391 ; 40 "tt T . R. 546) ... ... 162 
 
 Alexander v. North-Eastern Railway Co. (6 B. & S. 240 ; 34 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 152 ; 11 Jnr. N. S. 619 ; 13 W. R. 651) . . .172 
 
 Allen v. Flood ( [1898] App. Cas. 1 ; 67 L. J., Q. B. 119 ; 77 L. T. 
 
 717 ; 46 "W. R. 258 ; reversing Flood v. Jackson) . 56—60, 255 
 Allen v. London and South-Western Railway Co. (L. K. 6 Q. B. 65 ; 
 
 40 L. J. Q. B. 55 ; 23 L. T. 612 ; 19 W. R. 127 ; 11 Cox C. C. 
 
 621) . . . . . . .204 
 
 Allsop v. Allsop (5 H. & N. 534 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 315 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 
 
 433) 29, 158 
 
 Alton v. Midland Railway Co. (19 C. B. N. S. 213 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 
 
 292 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 672 ; 12 L. T. 703 ; 13 W. R. 918) 65, 100, 117 
 American Braided Wire Co. v. Thomson (44 Ch. D. 274 ; 59 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 425 ; 62 L. T. 616) . . . . 257 
 
 Anderson v. Gorrie ([1895] 1 Q. B. 668 ; 71 L. T. 382 ; 14 R. 79) . 9 
 
 Andrews v. Askey (8 C. & P. 7) 261 
 
 Andrews v. Marris (1 Q. B. 3 ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 225 ; 1 G. & D. 268) 210 
 Andrews v. Mockford ([1896] 1 Q. B. 372 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 302 ; 
 
 73 L. T. 726) 141 
 
 Andrews v. Nott Bower ( [1895] 1 Q. B. 888 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 536 ; 
 
 72 L. T. 530 ; 43 W. R. 582) 179 
 
 R.T. & 
 
XV111 , TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Angus v. Clifford ([1891] 2 Ch. 449; 60 L. J. Ch. 443 ; 65 L. T. 
 
 274 ; 39 W. R. 498) 145 
 
 Anthony v. Haney (8 Bing. 186 ; 1 M. & Scott, 300) ... 77 
 Applebee v. Percy (L. R. 9 C. P. 647 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 365 ; 30 L. T. 
 
 785 ; 22 W. R. 704) . .... .222 
 
 Appleby v. Franklin (17 Q. B. D. 93 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 129 ; 54 L. T. 
 
 135 ; 34 W. R. 231 ; 2 Times Law Reports, 170) . . 12, 13 
 
 Arkwright v. Newbold (17 Ch. D. 301 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 372 ; 44 L. T. 
 
 393 ; 29 W. R. 455) 138 
 
 Armory v. Delarairie (1 Strange, 504 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 343) ... 94 
 Armstrong v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. (L. R. 10 Ex. 
 
 47 ; 44 L. J. Ex. 89 ; 33 L. T. 228 ; 23 W. R. 295) . . 126 
 
 Arnison v. Smith (41 Ch. D. 98 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 645 ; 61 L. T. 63 ; 
 
 37 W. R. 393) . ... . 136, 138, 142 
 
 Ashby v. White (2 Ld. Raym. 938 ; Holt, 524 ; 6 Mod. 45 ; 1 Salk. 
 
 19 ; 3 Salk. 17 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 231) .... 2, 248, 255 
 
 Ashton i, Spiers and Pond (9 T. L. R. 606) 202 
 
 Attack v. Bramwell (3 B. & S. 520 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 146 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 892 ; 7 L. T. 740 ; 11 W. R. 309) 70 
 
 Attorney-General v. Tomline (14 Ch. D. 58 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 377 ; 42 
 
 L. T. 880 ; 28 "\V. R. 870) 84 
 
 Austin v. Dowling (L. R. 5 C. P. 534 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 260 ; 22 L. T. 
 
 721 ; 18 W. K. 1003) 46 
 
 Austin v. Great "Western Railway Co. (L. R. 2 Q. B. 442 ; 8 B. & S. 
 
 327 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 201 ; 15 W. R, 863 ; 16 L. T. 320) . . 100 
 Ayre v. Craven (2 A. & E. 2 ; 4 N. & M. 220) . . . .162 
 
 Backhouse v. Bonomi (9 H. of L. Cas. 503 ; 34 L. J. Q. B. 181 ; 
 
 7 Jur. N. S. 809 ; 4 L. T. 754 ; 9 W. R. 769 ; affirming Bonomi 
 
 ■v. Backhouse, E. B. & E. 622 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 378 ; 5 Jur. 1ST. S. 
 
 1345) ... .... 75, 76, 263 
 
 Baddeley v. Granville (36 W. R. 63 ; 3 Times Law Reports, 
 
 759) ... . . 224 
 
 Bahia and San Francisco Railway Co., In re (L. R. 3 Q. B. 584 ; 37 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 176 ; 16 W. R. 862) .... 146 
 
 Bailiffs of Romney Marsh i. Trinity House (5 L. R. Ex. 204 ; 39 
 
 L. J. Ex. 163 ; 22 L. T. 446 ; IS W. R. 869 ; affirmed 7 L. R. 
 
 Ex. 247 ; 41 L. J. Ex. 106) 96, 252 
 
 Baird v. Williamson (15 C. B. K S. 376 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 101 ; 10 
 
 Jur. N. S. 152 ; 9 L. T. 412 ; 12 W. R. 150) . . 83, 84 
 
 Baker v. Carriek ( [1894] 1 Q. B. 838 ; 03 L. J. Q. B. 399 ; 70 L. T. 
 
 366 ; 42 W. R. 338) • .179 
 
 Baker v. Sebright (13 Ch. D. 179 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 65 ; 41 L. T. 614 ; 
 
 28 W. R. 177) . ... . . 92 
 
 Baldwin v. Casella (L. R. 7 Ex. 325 ; 41 L. J. Ex. 167 ; 26 L. T. 
 
 707 ; 21 W. R. 16) . 221 
 
TABLE OF CASES. XIX 
 
 PAOE 
 
 Balkis Consolidated C<>. v. Tomkinson ( [1893] App. Cas. 396 ; 63 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 134 ; 69 L. T. 598 ; 42 W. R. 204 ; 1 R. 178) . 147 
 Ball, E.i-p., In re Shepherd(10 Cli. D. 667 ; 48 L.'J. Bkcy. 57 ; 40 
 
 L. T. 141 ; 27 W. R. 563 ; 14 Cox C. C. 237) ... 10, 12 
 Ballard r. Tomlinson (29 Ch. D. 115 ; 54 L. J. Oh. 454 ; 52 L. T. 
 
 942 ; 33 W. R. 533 ; 49 J. P. 692 ; 1 Times Law Reports, 270) 86 
 Bamford v. Turnley (3 B. & S. 62 ; 31 L. J. Q. B. 286 ; 9 Jar. N. S. 
 
 377) . 81 
 
 Bank of New South Wales v. Owston (4 App. Cas. 270 ; 48 L. J. P. C. 
 
 25 . 40 L. T. 500) .... . . 199 
 
 Barber v. Houston (14 L. R. (Ir.), 273 ; 18 L. R. (Ir.), 475) . . 266 
 Barber v. Penley (9 T. L. R. 359 ; [1893] 2 Ch. 447 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 
 
 623 ; 68 L. T. 662 ; 3 R. 489) 81, 87 
 
 Barker v. Braham (2 Win. Bl. 866 ; 3 Wils. 396) .... 41 
 Barker r. Furlong ( [1891] 2 Ch. 172 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 368 ; 64 L. T. 411 ; 
 
 39 W. R. 621) . .209 
 
 Barnardiston r. Chapman (4 East, 121 (n) ; Buller's N. P. 34) . . 73 
 Barnes r. Bruddel (1 Lev. 261 : 1 Ventr. 4 ; 2 Keb. 451 ; 1 Sid. 396) . 15S 
 Barnes v. Ward (9 C. B. 392 ; 3 C. & K. 661 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 195 ; 14 
 
 Jur. 334) .108 
 
 Barrow r. Lewellin (Hob. 62) 168 
 
 Barry v. Croskey (2 J. & H. 1) 141 
 
 Barton v. Forth Staffordshire Railway Co. (38 Ch. D. 458 ; 57 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 800 ; 58 L. T. 549 ; 36 W. R. 754) 267 
 
 Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid (3 Maeq. H. of L. Cas. 266 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 
 
 767) 189 
 
 Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank(L. R. 2 Ex. 259 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 
 
 147) . . . . 150,207 
 
 Basebe v. Matthews (L. K. 2 C. P. 684 ; 36 L. J. M. C. 93 ; 16 L. T. 
 
 417 ; 15 W. R. 839) 47 
 
 Baseley r. Clarkson (3 Lev. 37) .69 
 
 Baxter r. Taylor (4 B. & Ad. 72 ; K & II. 13) .... 73 
 
 Bayley v. Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincoln Railway Co. (L. R. 
 
 8 C. P. 148 ; 42 L. J. C. P. 78 ; 28 L. T. 366) . . .199 
 
 Beaumont v. Greathead (2 C. B. 494 ; 3 D. & L. 631 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 
 
 130) 248 
 
 Beasley v. Roney ([1891] 1 Q. B. 509 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 408 ; 65 L. T. 
 
 153 ; 39 W. R. 415) 184 
 
 Beckham v. Drake (2 H. of L. Cas. 570 ; 13 Jur. 921 ; affirming 
 
 8 II. & W. 84tf ; 11 M. & W. 315 ; 7 Jur. 204 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 486) 25 
 Beckwith-u. Philby (6 B. & C. 635 ; 9 D. & R. 487) ... 39 
 
 Beckwith v. Shordike (4 Burr. 2092) 221 
 
 Beddall v. Maitland (17 Ch. D. 174 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 401 ; 44 L. T. 248 ; 
 
 29 W. R. 484) 33, 34, 71, 77 
 
 Bedford v. McKowl (3 Esp. 119) 261 
 
 Bell v. Great Northern Railway Co. (26 L. E. (Ir.) Ex. D. 428) . 260 
 Bellamy v. Burch (16 M. & W. 590) 161 
 
 b 2 
 
XX TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAOR 
 
 Bellamys Wells (60 L. J. Ch. 166 ; 63 L. T. 635 ; 39 W. R. 158) 87 
 
 Bennett v. Bayes (5 H. & N. 391 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 224 ; 2 L. T. 156 ; 
 
 8 W. R. 320) ... 210 
 
 Bernina, The (12 P. D. 58 ; 56 L. J. P. D. & A. 17 ; 56 L. T. 258 ; 
 
 35 W. R. 315 ; 3 Times Law Reports, 310) . . . 126, 127 
 Berriiiger v. Great Eastern Railway Co. (4 C. P. D. 163 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 
 
 400 ; 27 W. R. 681) .65 
 
 Bertlion r. Cartwright (2 Esp. 480) 63 
 
 Bertie v. Beaumont (16 East, 33) .... . 71 
 
 Bird v. Jones (7 Q. B. 742 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 82 ; 9 Jur. 870) . . 36 
 Bishop v. Balkis Consolidated Co. (25 Q. B. D. 77, 512 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 565 ; 63 L. T. 601 ; 39 W. R. 99 ; 2 Meg. 292) ... 147 
 
 Black v. Christchurch Finance Co. ( [1894] App. Cas. 48 ; 
 
 63 L. J. P. C. 32 ; 70 L. T. 77) 216- 
 
 Blackham v. Pugh (2 C. B. 611 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 290) . . . 179- 
 Blake v. Midland Railway Co. (18 Q. B. 93 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 233 ; 16 
 
 Jur. 562) . . . .... 16, 17 
 
 Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (11 Ex. 781 ; 2 L. J. Ex. 212 ; 
 
 2 Jur. N. S. 333) . . . . . 95 
 
 Bolch v. Smith (7 H. & N. 736 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 201; 8 Jur. N. S. 197 ; 
 
 10 W. R. 387) ... 108 
 
 Bolingbroke v. Swindon Local Board (L. R. 9 C. P. 575 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 
 
 287 ; 30 L. T. 723 ; 23 W. R. 47) 205- 
 
 Bonnard v. Ferryman ( [1891] 2 Ch. 269 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 617 ; 65 L. T. 
 
 506 ; 39 W. R. 435) ... 181 
 
 Bonomi v. Backhouse (see Backhouse v. Bonoini) . . 75, 76, 263 
 
 Boorman v. Brown (see Brown v. Boorman) . . . . 5, 6, 97 
 Booth v. Arnold ([1895] 1 Q. B. 571 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 443 ; 72 L. T. 
 
 310; 43 W. R. 360). . . . . . 162 
 
 Bound v. Lawrence ( [1892] 1 Q. B. 226 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 21 ; 65 
 
 L. T. 844; 40 W. R. 1) ... .... 229 
 
 Bowen v. Anderson ( [1894] 1 Q. B. 164 ; 42 W. R. 236) ... 89- 
 Bowen v. Hall (6 Q. B. D. 333 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 305 ; 44 L. T. 75 ; 
 
 29 W. R. 367 ; 45 J. P. 373) 58, 255 
 
 Bower v. Peate (1 Q. B. D. 321 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 446 ; 35 L. T. 321) 214, 
 
 215 
 Bowker v. Evans (15 Q. B. I>. 565 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 421 ; 53 L. T. 
 
 801 ; 33 W. R. 695) 13 
 
 Bowles' Case (11 Co. 79 b) 91 
 
 Bowlston v. Hardy (2 Cro. Eliz. 547 ; 5 Co. 104 b) . . . . 220 
 Bowyer v. Cook (4 C. B. 236 ; 4 D. & L. 816 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 322 ; 
 
 11 Jur. 333) . 69 
 
 Box v. Jubb (4 Ex. D. 76 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 417 ; 41 L. T. 97 ; 27 W. R. 
 
 415). . 85 
 
 Boyd v. Great Northern Railway of Ireland ( [1895] 2 Ir. R. 555) . 7 
 Brabant v. King ( [1895] App. Cas. 632 ; 64 L. J. P. C. 161 ; 72 
 
 L. T. 785 ; 44 W. R. 157) 128 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXI 
 
 Bradlaugh t: Erskiue (47 L. T. 618 ; 31 W. R. 365) 
 
 Bradlaugh v. Gossett (12 Q. B. D. 217 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 209 ; 50 
 
 L. T. 620 ; 32 W. R, 552) 
 
 Bradlaugh v. Xewdegate (11 it. B. D. 1 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 454 ; 31 
 
 V. R. 792) . ' . 
 
 Bradshaw v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. (L. R. 10 (.'. Y. 
 
 ISO; 44 L. J. C. P. 148; 31 L. T. 847) ... 
 Brannigan v. Robinson ( [1892] 1 Q. B. 344 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 202 ; 
 
 66 L. T. 647) 
 
 Bree r. Marescaux (7 Q. B. D. 434 ; 50 L. J. Q, B. 676 ; 44 L. T. 
 
 765 ; 29 W. R. 858) 
 
 Bridges v. North London Railway Co. (L. R. 7 H. of L. 213 ; 43 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 151 ; 30 L. T. 844 ; 23 W. R. 62) . 
 Brine r. Great Western Railway Co. (2 B. & S. 402 ; 31 L. J. Q. B. 
 101 ; 6 L. T. 50 ; 10 W. R. 341 ; S Jur. N. S. 410) . 
 
 Bristow v. Eastman (1 Esp. 172 ; Peake, 223) 
 
 British Mutual Banking Co. v. Charnwood (18 Q. B. D. 714 ; 
 56 L. J. Q. B. 449 ; 35 "W. R. 590 ; 3 Times Law Reports, 
 
 498) 
 
 British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mozambique (10 
 T. L. R. 7 ; [1893] App. Cas. 602 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 70 ; 
 69 L. J. 64 ; reversing Companhia de Mozambique v. British 
 South Africa Company [1892] 2 Q. B. 358 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 
 643 ; 66 L. T. 773 ; 40 W. R, 650) . 
 Broad v. Ham or How (5 Bing. N. C. 722 ; 8 Scott, 40) . 
 Bromage v. Prosser (4 B. & C. 247 ; 6 D. & R. 296 ; 1 C. 
 
 475) 
 
 Brooke, Ex p., In re Newman (3 Ch. D. 494 ; 25 W. R. 261) 
 Brown v. Boorman (11 CI. & F. 1 ; affirming Boorman v. Brown, 
 
 3 Q. B. 311 ; 2 G. & D. 793) .... 
 Brown v. Giles (1 C. & P. 118) .... 
 Brown *. Hawkes ( [1891] 2 Q. B. 718 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 332 ; 61 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 151 ; 65 L. T. 108) 
 Brown v. Robins (4 H. & N". 186 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 520) 
 Brown v. Smith (13 C. B. 596 ; 1 C. L. R. 4 ; 22 L. J. C. P 
 
 17 Jur. 807) 
 
 Brownlie v. Campbell (5 App. Cas. 925) . 
 Brunsden v. Humphrey (11 Q. B. D, 712 ; 52 L. J. Q. B 
 affirmed 14 Q. B. D. 141 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 476 ; 51 L. T, 
 
 32 W. R. 944 ; 49 J. V, 47) 
 
 Bullard v. Harrison (4 M. & S. 387) .... 
 
 Bulling v. Read (11 Q. B. 904) 
 
 Burnard v. Haggis (14 C. B. N". S. 45 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 189 ; 
 
 N. S. 1325 ; 8 L. T. 320 ; 11 W. R. 644) 
 Buron v. Denman (2 Ex. 167) 
 
 Burrowes v. Lock (10 Ves. 47u) 
 
 Burton r. Henson (10 M. & W. 105) .... 
 
 & P. 
 52, 
 
 5, 6 
 
 151 ; 
 
 137, 138, 
 756 ; 
 529; 
 
 PAG !■: 
 
 32 
 
 32 
 56 
 
 18 
 
 22S 
 
 259 
 
 121 
 
 128 
 188 
 
 207 
 
 28 
 48 
 
 177 
 25 
 
 , 97 
 221 
 
 53 
 
 76 
 
 163 
 146 
 
 Jur. 
 
 131. 
 
 262 
 79 
 79 
 
 188 
 32 
 
 146 
 32 
 
XX11 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Byne v. Moore (5 Taunt. 187 ; 1 Marsh. 12) . . . . 45, 54 
 
 Byrne v. Boadle (2 H. & C. 722 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 13 ; 9 L. T. 450 ; 12 
 
 "W. R. 279) . . . . ... 110 
 
 Calder v. Halkett (3 Moore P. C. C. 28) .... 40 
 
 Caledonian Railway Co. u. Mulholland ([1898] App. Cas. 216). . 105 
 Caledonian Railway Co. v. Sprott(2 Macq. H. of L. Cas. 449 ; 2 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 623) . . . . ... 76 
 
 Calliope, The ( [1891] App. Cas. 11 ; 60 L. J. P. D. & A. 28 ; 63 
 
 L. T. 781 ; 39 W. R. 64) . . 105 
 
 Cameron v. Nystrom ( [1893] App. Cas. 308 ; 68 L. T. 772) . . 225 
 Cann v. Willson (39 Ch. D. 39 ; 57 L. J. Ch. 1034 ; 59 L. T. 723 ; 
 
 37 AV. R. 23) 106, 144 
 
 Capel v. Powell (17 C. B. W. S. 743 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 168 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1255 ; 11 L. T. 421) ... . 182, 183 
 
 Capital and Counties Bank v. Henry (7 App. Cas. 741 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 232 ; 47 L. T. 662 ; 31 W. R. 157 ; 47 J. P. 214) 164, 166, 167, 177 
 Carrington v. Taylor (11 East, 571) ... . 59 
 
 Oarslake v. Mapledoram (2 T. R. 473) . . ... 161 
 
 Carter v. Drysdale (12 Q. B. D. 91 ; 32 W. E. 171) . . .231 
 
 Cartwright, In re, Avis v. Newman (41 Ch. D. 532 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 
 
 590 ; 60 L. T. 891 ; 37 W. R. 612) 92 
 
 Central Railway Co. of Venezuela v. Kisch (L. R. 2 H. of L. 99 ; 30 
 
 L. J. Ch. 849 ; 16 L. T. 500 ; 15 W. R. 821) . . .136 
 
 Chaffers v. Goldsmid ( [1894] 1 Q. B. 186 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 59 ; 70 
 
 L. T. 24 ; 42 W. R. 239 ; 58 J. P. 212 ; 10 R. 19) . . . 4 
 Chamberlain *. Boyd (11 Q. B. D. 407 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 277 ; 48 L. T. 
 
 328 ; 31 W. R. 572 ; 47 J. P. 372) . .... 158 
 
 Chamberlain v. Williamson (2 M. & S. 408) ... 17 
 
 Charles v. Taylor (3 C. P. I). 492 ; 38 L. T. 773 ; 27 W. R. 32) . 225 
 Chasemore v. Richards (7 H. of L. Cas. 349 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 81 ; 5 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 873 ; 7 W. R. 685) 86 
 
 Chatterton v. Secretary of State for India ([1895] 2 Q. B. 189 ; 64 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 676) ; 72 L. T. 858 ; 14 R. 504) . . . .177 
 Child v. Affleck (9 B. & C. 403 ; 4 U. & R. 338) . . 178 
 
 Child v. Hearn (L. R. 9 Ex. 176 ; 43 L. J. Ex. 100 ; 22 "W. R. 864) 178 
 Christie v. Davey ([1893] 1 Ch. 316 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 439) . . 42, 81 
 
 Christopherson v. Bare (11 Q. B. 473 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 109 ; 13 Jur. 374) 30 
 City of Lincoln, The (15 P. D. 15 ; 59 L. J. P. D. & A. 1 ; 62 L. T. 
 
 49 ; 38 W. R. 345) 256 
 
 Clark v. Chambers (3 Q. B. D. 327 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 427 ; 38 L. T. 
 
 454 ; 26 W. E. 613) . . . . . ' . 7, 8, 253 
 Clarke v. Dickson (6 C. B. N. S. 453 ; 28 L. J. C. P. 225 ; 5 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1029 ; 7 "W. R. 443) .... . 142 
 Clark v. Molyneux (3 Q. B. D. 237 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 230 ; 37 L. T. 
 
 694 ; 26 W. R. 104 ; 14 Cox C. CIO) .... 181 
 
TABLE OF CASES. XX111 
 
 PACK 
 
 Clarke v. Holmes (7 H. & N. 937 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 356 ; 9 L. T. 178 ; 
 
 5 Jot. N. S. 992 ; 10 W. R. 405 ; affirming Holmes v. Clarke, 
 
 6 H. & N. 349 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 135 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 397 ; 3 L. T. 
 
 675 ; 9 W. K. 419) 223 
 
 Clarke v. Taylor (2 Bing. N. C. 654 ; 3 Scott, 95 ; 2 Hodges, 65) . 172 
 Clarkson v. Musgrave (9 Q. B. D. 386 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 525 ; 31 
 
 W. R. 47) 231 
 
 Clayards v. Dethick (12 Q. B. 439) 121 
 
 Cleary v. Booth ( [1893] 1 Q. B. 465 ; 62 L. J. M. C. 87 ; 68 L. T. 
 
 349) 31 
 
 Clifton v. Bury (4 Times Law Reports, 87) 68 
 
 Clutterbuck v. Chaffers (1 Stark. 471) 168 
 
 Clydesdale Bank v. Paton ( [1896] App. Cas. 381 ; 65 L. J. P. C. 
 
 73 ; 74 L. T. 738) 156 
 
 Cobb v. Great Western Railway Co. ( [1893] 1 Q. B. 459 ; 62 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 335 ; 68 L. T. 483 ; 41 W. R. 275 ; in H. of L. [1894] 
 
 App. Cas. 419 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 629 ; 71 L. T. 161) . . 116, 118 
 Cobbett v. Grey (4 Ex. 729 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 107) .... 29 
 Cochrane v. Rymill (40 L. T. 744 ; 27 W. R. 776) . . . .209 
 Cockle v. London and Sou th-Eastern Railway Co. (L. R. 7 C. P. 321 
 
 41 L. J. C. P. 140 ; 27 L. T. 320 ; 20 W. R. 754) . 
 Cockcroft v. Smith (11 Mod. 43 ; 2 Salk. 642 ; Holt, 699) . 
 Codd v. Cabe (1 Ex. D. 352 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 101 ; 34 L. T. 453 ; 1 
 
 Cox C. C. 202) ... .... 
 
 Coggs v. Bernard (1 Sm. L. C. 167) 
 
 Colchester (Mayor of) v. Brooke (7 Q. B. 339 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 173 
 
 10 Jur. 610) ' . 
 
 Cole v. Greene (1 Lev. 309) (see Greene v. Cole) 
 
 Collard v. Marshall ( [1892] 1 Oh. 571 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 268 ; 66 L. T. 
 
 248 ; 40 W. R. 473) 
 
 Collen v. "Wright (8 E. & B. 647 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 215 ; 4 Jur. N. S 
 
 357 ; affirming 7 E. & B. 301 ; 26 L. J.-Q. B. 147 ; 3 Jur. N. S 
 
 121 
 31 
 
 40 
 93 
 
 79 
 90 
 
 181 
 
 148 
 41 
 32 
 
 Collett v. Foster (2 H. & N. 356 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 412) 
 
 Collier v. Hicks (2 B. & Ad. 663) ...... 
 
 Companhia de Mozambique v. British South Africa Co. ( [1892] 2 
 
 Q. B. 358 ; 8 T. L. R. 542 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 663 ; 66 L. T. 773 ; 
 
 40 W. R. 650 ; reversed in H. of L. [1893] App. Cas. 692 ; 10 
 
 T. L. R. 7) (see British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de 
 
 Mozambique) . 28 
 
 Consolidated Co. v. Curtis ( [1892] 1 Q. B. 495 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 325 ; 
 
 40 W. R. 426) . . 209 
 
 Cook i'. North Metropolitan Tramways Co. (18 Q. B. D. 683 ; 56 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 309 ; 56 L. T. 448 ; 35 W. R. 577) . . . .230 
 Cooper v. Crabtree (20 Ch. D. 589 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 544 ; 47 L. T. 5 ; 
 
 30 W. R. 649 ; 46 J. P. 628) . .... 71, 74 
 Cooper v. Harding (7 Q. B. 928 ; 9 Jur. 777) 41 
 
XXIV TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Cooper v. Lawson (8 A. & E. 746 ; 1 P. & D. 15 ; 1 "W. W. & H. 601 ; 
 
 2 Jur. 919) .... 172 
 
 Corby v. Hill (4 C. B. N. S. 556 ; 27 L. J..C. P. 218) . . .107 
 Cornfoot v. Fowke (6 M. & W. 358 ; 4 Jur. 919) . . . .153 
 Costar v. Hetherington (1 E. & B. 802 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 198 ; 5 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 985) .... ..... 34 
 
 Cotes v. Michill (3 Lev. 20) . 41 
 
 Cotton v. Wood (8 C. B. N. S. 568 ; 29 L. J. C. P. 333 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 
 
 168) ... 109 
 
 Coupe Co. v. Maddick ( [1891] 2 Q. B. 413 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 676 ; 65 
 
 L. T. 489) . 93, 194 
 
 Courtenay v. Earle (10 C. B. 73 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 7 ; 15 Jur. 15) . 5 
 Coward v. Baddeley (4 H. & N. 478 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 260 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 
 
 414) . 30 
 
 Cox v. Burbidge (13 C. B. K S. 430 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 89 ; 9 Jur. K S. 
 
 970 ; 11 W. R. 435) " 118,219,259 
 
 Cox v. Glue (5 C. B. 533 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 162 ; 12 Jur. 185) . . 75 
 Cox v. Great Western Railway Co. (9 Q. B. D. 106 ; 30 W. R. 
 
 816) ... 229 
 
 Coyle v. Great Northern Railway Company of Ireland (20 L. R. (Ir.), 
 
 409 125 
 
 Crafter v. Metropolitan Railway Co. (L. R. 1 C. P. 300 ; 35 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 132 ; 12 Jur. N". S. 272 ; 14 W. R. 334; 1 H. & R. 164) . 120 
 
 Crawshay v. Thompson (4 M. & G. 357) 132, 133 
 
 Cripps v. Judge (13 Q. B. D. 583 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 517 ; 51 L. T. 182 ; 
 
 33 W. K. 35) 227 
 
 Croft v. Alison (4 B. & Al. 590) 194 
 
 Crowhurst v. Amersham Burial Board (4 Ex. D. 5 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 109 ; 
 
 39 L. T. 355 ; 27 W. R. 95) . 86 
 
 Crumbie r. Walkend Local Board ( [1891] 1 Q. B. 503 ; 60 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 392 ; 64 L. T. 490) 263 
 
 Cuddington v. Wilkins (Hob. 67) 160 
 
 Dalton v. Angus (6 App. Cas. 740 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 689 ; 44 L. T. 
 
 844 ; 30 W. R. 191). ... ... 76, 214 
 
 Dalton i, South-Eastern Railway Co. (4 C. B. N". S. 296 ; 27 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 227 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 711) 16 
 
 Daly v. Dublin, Wicklow, and Wexford Railway Co. (30 L. R. (Ir.) 
 
 514) 18 
 
 Dalyell v. Tyrer (E. B. & E. 899 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 52 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 
 
 335) 98 
 
 Daniels - u . Fielding (16 M. & W. 200 ; 4 D. & L. 329 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 
 
 153 ; 10 Jur. 1061) 46 
 
 Darbishire v. Darbishire and Baird (62 L. T. 664 ; 54 J. P. 408) . 63 
 Darley Main Colliery Co. r. Mitchell (11 App. Cas. 127 ; 55 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 529 ; 54 L. T. 882 ; 2 Times Law Reports, 301) . 262, 263 
 
TABLE OF CASES. XXV 
 
 Dashwood e. Magniac ( [1891] 3 Ch. 306 ; 60 L. J. Oh, 809 ; 65 
 
 L- T. 811) 91 
 
 Davey v. London and South-Western Railway Co. (11 Q. B. D. 213 : 
 
 52 L. J. Q. B. 665 ; affirmed 12 Q. B. D. 70 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 5S) V>2 
 
 Davies v. Davies (38 Ch. D. 499 ; 57 L. J. Ch. 1093 ; 58 L. T. 514 ; 
 
 36 W. R. 399) 92 
 
 Davies r. Mann (10 M. & W. 546 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 10 ; 6 Jur. 954) . 123 
 Davies and Wife v. Solomon (L. R. 7 Q. B. 112 ; 41 L. J. Q. B. 10 ; 
 
 25 L. T. 799 ; 20 W. R. 167) 249 
 
 Davies v. Williams (10 Q. B. 725 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 369 ; 11 Jur. 750) 66 
 Davies v. Williams (16 Q. B. 546 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 330 ; 15 Jur. 752) 79 
 
 Davis v. Burrell (10 C. B. 821 ; 15 Jur. 658) 34 
 
 Davis v. Gardiner (4 Co. 16 b ; Popham, 36) 158 
 
 Davison v. Wilson (11 Q. B. 890; 17 L. J. Q. B. 196 ; 12 Jur. 647) 77 
 Dawkins v. Paulet (L. R. 5 Q. B. 94 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 53 ; 21 L. T. 
 
 584 ; 18 W. R. 336) 9, 176 
 
 Dawkins v. Rokeby (L. R. 7 H. of L. 744 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 8 ; 33 
 
 L. T. 196 ; 23 W. R. 931) .... . 175,176 
 
 Dean v. Taylor (11 Ex. 68) 32 
 
 De Ciespigny v. Wellesley (5 Bing. 392 ; 2 M. & P. 695) . . .169 
 De Francesco i: Barnum (43 Ch. D. 165 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 63 ; 63 L. T. 
 
 438 ; 39 W. R. 5) 64 
 
 De Francesco v. Barnum (45 Ch. D. 490) 64 
 
 De Francesco v. Barnum (63 L. T. 514) 64 
 
 Defries r, Davis (1 Bing. N. C. 692 ; 1 Scott, 594 ; 3 D. P. C. 629 ; 
 
 1 Hodges, 103) 1^8 
 
 Degg v. Midland Railway Co. (1 H. & M. 773 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 171 ; 3 
 
 Jur. N. S. 395) 95, 225 
 
 Delacroix v. Thevenot (2 Stark. 63) 169 
 
 Delaney v. Dublin United Tramways Co. (30 L. R. (Ir.), 725) . 125 
 
 Denton -o. Great Northern Railway Co. (5 E. & B. 860 ; 25 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 129 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 185) 133, 139 
 
 Der'ry v. Peek (14 App. Cas. 337 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 864 ; 61 L. T. 265 ; 
 
 38 "W. R. 33 ; 54 J. P. 148 ; 1 Meg. 292) 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 
 
 134, 135, 137, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146 
 Dews 11. Riley (11 C. B. 434 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 264 ; 15 Jur. 1159) . 210 
 Dickinson u. North-Eastern Railway Co. (2 H. & C. 735 ; 33 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 91 ; 9 L. T. 299 ; 12 W. R. 52) ... 
 
 812 
 
 15 
 
 136 
 
 30 
 
 Dicks v. Brooks (13 Ch. D. 654 ; 15 Ch. D. 22 ; 49 L. J. Ch 
 43 L. T. 71 ; 29 W. R. 87) 
 
 Dobell v. Stephens (3 B. & C. 623 ; 5 D. & R. 490) 
 
 Dodwell v. Burford (1 Mod. 24 ; 1 Sid. 433) . 
 
 Doherty v. Allman (3 App. Cas. 709 ; 39 L. T. 129 ; 26 W. R. 513) 90, 
 
 92 
 
 Donovan v. Laing ( [1893] 1 Q. B. 629 ; 68 L. T. 512 ; 41 W. R. 
 
 455) 191, 193 
 
XXVI TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Doswell v. Impey (1 B. & C. 163) 40 
 
 Doughty r. Firbank (10 Q. B. D. 358 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 480 ;48 L. T. 530) 229 
 
 Downshire v. Sandys (6 Ves. 107) 91 
 
 Doyley v. Roberts (3 Bing. N. C. 835; 5 Scott, 40; 3 Hodges, 154) 163 
 Dublin, Wicklow, and Wexford Railway Co. v. Slattery (3 App. Cas. 
 
 1155 ; 39 L. T. 365 ; 27 W. R. 191) .... 114, 122 
 
 Dubois v. Keats (11 A. & E. 329 ; 3 P. & D. 306 ; 4 Jur. 148) . . 53 
 Dubost v. Beresford (2 Camp. 511) . . .... 157 
 
 Dyer v. Munday ([1895] 1 Q. B. 742 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 448 ; 72 L. T. 
 
 448 ; 43 W. R. 440) 36, 199 
 
 Eastern Counties Railway v. Broom (6 Ex. 314 ; 6 Railw. Cas. 
 
 743 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 196 ; 15 Jur. 297) .... 55 
 
 Edgingtou v. Fitzmaurice (29 Ch. D. 459 ; 55 L. J. Oh. 650 ; 53 L. T. 
 
 369 ; 33 W. R. 911 ; 50 J. P. 52) . 129, 142 
 
 Edwards v. London and North-Western Railway Co. (L. R. 5 C. P. 
 
 445 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 241 ; 22 L. T. 656 ; 18 W. R. 834) . 204, 208 
 Edwards v. Midland Railway Co. (6 Q. B. D. 287 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 281 ; 43 L. T. 694 ; 29 W. R, 609 ; 45 J. P. 374) ... 55 
 Edwick or Edridge v. Hawkes (18 Ch. D. 199 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 577 ; 45 
 
 L. T. 168 ; 29 W. R. 913) .... .33 
 
 Elkington & Co. v. Hiirter ([1892] 2 Ch. 452 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 514 ; 
 
 66 L. T. 764) 148 
 
 Elliott, Ex p. (3 M. & A. 110 ; 2 Deac. 172) . . . . 10, 11 
 Elliott v. Hall or Nailstone Colliery Co. (15 Q. B. D. 315 ; 54 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 518 ; 34 W. R. 16) . . . . ... 105 
 
 Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co. (L. R. 10 C. P. 10 ; 44 L. J. C. P. 24 ; 31 
 
 L. T. 483 ; 23 W. R, 246) 119 
 
 Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Consumers' Co. (2 E. & B. 767 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 42 ; 18 Jur. 146) 212 
 
 Ernbrey v. Owen (6 Ex. 353 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 212 ; 15 Jur. 633) . . 2 
 Engelharttf. Farrant ([1897] 1 Q. B. 240; 66 L. J. Q. B. 122; 75 
 
 L. T. 617 ; 45 W. R. 179) 7 
 
 Evans v. Edmonds (13 C. B. 777 ; 1 C. L. R. 653 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 211; 
 
 17 Jur. 883) . ' 134 
 
 Evans v, Walton (L. R. 2 C. P. 615 ; 36 L. J. C. P. 307 ; 17 L. T. 92 ; 
 
 15 W. R. 1062) 66 
 
 Farrer v. Nelson (15 Q. B. D. 258 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 385 ; 52 L. T. 
 
 766 ; 33 W. R. 800) 220 
 
 Filburn v. People's Palace Co. (25 Q. B. D. 258 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 471 ; 
 
 38 W. R. 706) 219 
 
 Finlay v. Chirney (20 Q. B. D. 494 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 247 ; 58 L. T. 
 
 664 ; 36 W. R. 534) . . 17 
 
 Firbank v. Humphreys (18 Q. B. D. 54 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 57 ; 56 L. T. 
 
 36 ; 35 W. R. 92 ; 3 Times Law Reports, 49) . . . .148 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXVU 
 
 7 Jur 
 
 J. Q. B. 665 ; 73 L. T 
 
 Flood . 
 
 M. & W. 540 ; 1 D. N. S. 
 
 131 
 ; 5 
 
 Firth v. Bowling Iron Co. (3 C. P. D. 254 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 358 ; 
 
 3S L. T. 569 ; 26 V. R. 558) 
 
 Fitzgerald v. Xorthcote (4 F. & F. 656) . 
 
 Fitzjohn i: Mackinder (9 C. B. N. S. 505 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 
 
 X S. 12S3 ; 4 L. T. 149 ; 9 W. R. 477) . 
 Flood r. Jackson ([1895] 2 Q. B. 21 ; 64 L 
 
 161 ; 43 W. R. 453). See now Allen v. 
 Forde v. Skinner (4 C. & P. 239) 
 Foster v. Charles (7 Bing. 105) 
 Fouldes or Foulds v. Willoughby 
 
 Jur. 534) .... 
 
 Foulger r. Newcorob (L. R. 2 Ex. 327 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 169 ; 16 L. T. 
 
 595 ; 15 W. R. 1181) ... .... 
 
 Foulkes v. Metropolitan District Railway Co. (4 C. 
 
 L. J. C. P. 555 ; 41 L. T. 95 ; affirmed 5 C. 
 
 L. J. C. P. 361 ; 42 L. T. 345 ; 28 W. R. 526) . 
 Fountain v. Boodle (3 Q. B. 5 ; 2 G. & D. 455) 
 
 Fox v. Gaunt (3 B. & Ad. 798) 
 
 Francis v. Coekrell (L. IX. 5 Q. B. 184 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 113 
 
 203 ; 18 W. R. 668 ; affirmed L. R. 5 Q. B. 501 ; 39 L, 
 
 291 ; 23 L. T. 466 ; 18 V. R. 1205) . 
 
 P. D. 
 P. D. 
 
 267 
 157 
 
 48 
 49 
 
 31 
 
 54 
 
 58 
 
 30 
 
 135 
 
 93 
 
 163 
 
 65, 98 
 178 
 
 ;21L. 
 J. Q. 
 
 216, 217, 218 
 
 Franklin v. South-Eastern Railway Co. (3 H. & N. 211 ;. 
 
 565) 
 
 Freeman r. Cooke (2 Ex. 654) .... 
 
 4 Jur. N. S. 
 
 16 
 
 146 
 
 Gallwey v. Marshall (9 Ex. 295 ; 2 C. L. R. 399 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 78) 
 Gandy v. Jubber (5 B. & S. 485 ; 9 B. & S. 15 ; 13 W. R. 1022) 
 
 Gargrave r. Smith (1 Salk. 221) 
 
 Gautret v. Egerton (L. R. 2 C. P. 371 ; 36 L. J. C. P. 191 ; 16 L. T 
 
 17; 15 W. R. 638) 
 
 Geddis r. Proprietors of Brann Reservoir (3 App. Cas. 430, 455 
 
 2 L. R. (Ir.) 118) 8i 
 
 Gee v. Metropolitan Railway Co. (L. R. 8 Q. B. 161 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 105 ; 28 L. T. 282 ; 21 W. R. 584) . . ... 
 
 George .. Skivington (L. R. 5 Ex. 1 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 8 ; 21 L. T. 495) 
 
 Gibbs v. Great Western Railway Co. (12 Q. B. D. 208 ; 11 Q. B. D. 
 
 22 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 543 ; 48 L. T. 640 ; 31 W. R. 722 ; 32 
 
 W. R. 329) ... . . 
 
 Gibbs v. Guild (9 Q. B. D. 59 ; 8 <}. B. D. 296 ; 51 L. J. 
 
 46 L. T. 248 ; 30 W. R. 407, 591) . 
 Giles v. Walker (24 Q. B. D. 656 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 416 ; 62 
 
 38 W. R. 782 ; 54 J. P. 599) . . .< 
 Glasier v. Rolls (42 Ch. D. 436 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 820 ; 38 W 
 Godefroy v. Jay (7 Bing. 413 ; 5 M. & P. 284) . 
 Goff v. Great Northern Railway Co. (3 E. & E 672 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 
 148 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 286 ; 3 L. T. 850) 
 
 Q. B. 313 ; 
 L. T. 933 ; 
 R. 113) . 
 
 161 
 89 
 70 
 
 107 
 
 127 
 
 97 
 108 
 
 229 
 
 266 
 
 83 
 
 145 
 
 97 
 
 54, 199, 201 
 
XXV111 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 93 
 256 
 
 27 
 
 71 
 
 37 
 
 222 
 
 214 
 
 250 
 
 41 
 
 189 
 
 55 
 92 
 
 Gordon v. Harper (7 T. R. 9 ; 2 Esp. 465) .... 
 Gracie, The t: The Argentina (14 App. Cas. 519 ; 61 L. T. 706) 
 Graliam v. Massey ; In re Hawthorne (23 Ch. D. 743 ; 52 L. J. Ch 
 
 750 ; 48 L. T. 701 ; 32 W. R. 147) 
 
 Graham v. Peat (1 East, 244) 
 
 Grainger v. Hill (4 Bing. N. C. 212) 
 
 Grange v, Silcoek (13 T. L. R. 565) 
 
 Gray v. Pullen (5 B. & S. 970 ; 34 L. J. Q. B. 265 ; 11 L. T. 569 ; 13 
 
 W. K. 257) 
 
 Grebert-Borgnis v. Nugent (15 Q. B. D. 85 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 511) 
 Green v. Elgie (5 Q. B. 99 ; S Jur. 187) .... 
 
 Green v. Greenbank (2 Marsh. 485) 
 
 Green r. London General Omnibus Co. (7 C. B. K S. 290 ; 29 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 13 : 6 Jur. N. S. 228 ; 2 L. T. 95 ; 8 W. R. 88) 
 Greene v. Cole (2 Wms. Saunders. 252) {see Cole v. Greene) 
 Greenvvell v. Low Beechburn Coal Co. ( [1897] 2 Q. B. 165 ; 65 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 643 ; 76 L. T. 759) 
 
 Gregory v. Piper (9 B. & C. 591 ; 4 M. & R. 500) . 
 
 Griffiths v. Dudley (9 Q. B. D. 357 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 543 ; 47 L. T 
 
 10 ; 30 "W. R. 797 ; 46 J. P. 711) . 17, 231, 236 
 
 Griffiths v. Gidlow (3 H. & N. 648 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 404) . 
 Griffiths v. Lewis (7 Q. B. 61 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 370 ; 9 Jur. 370) 
 Griffiths v. London and St. Katherine's Dock Co. (13 Q. B. D. 259 
 
 53 L. J. Q. B. 504 ; 51 L. T. 533 ; 33 W. R. 35 ; 49 J. P. 100 
 
 affirming 12 Q. B. D. 493 ; 50 L. T. 75 ; 32 "W. R. 831 ; 48 
 
 J. P. 328) . 222 
 
 Grinham v. Willey (4 H. & N. 496) ; 28 L. J. Ex. 242 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 
 
 444 ; 7 W. R. 463 . . . . . . . .39 
 
 Guerrier In re, Ex p. Leslie (see Ex p. Leslie) . . . 13 
 
 Gwilliam v. Twist ( [1895] 2 Q. B. 84 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 474 ; 72 L. T. 
 
 579 ; 43 W. R. 566) 189 
 
 Gwinnell v. Earner (L. R. 10 C. P. 658 ; 32 L. T. 835) ... 90 
 
 225 
 163 
 
 Hadley v. Baxendale (9 Ex. 341 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 179 ; 18 Jur. 358 
 
 2 C. L. R. 517) 
 
 Hall v. Hollander (4 B. & C. 660 ; 7 D. & R. 133) . 
 
 Bailey, The (L. R. 2 P. C. 193 ; 37 L. J. Adm. 33 ; 18 L. T. 879 
 
 16 \Y. R. 998 ; 5 Moore P. C. C. N. S. 262) . 
 Halsey v. Brotherhood (15 Ch. D. 514 ; 19 Ch. D. 386 ; 49 L. J. Ch 
 
 786 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 233 ; 43 L. T. 366 ; 45 L. T. 640 ; 30 W. R. 
 
 279) 
 
 Hammaek v. White (11 C. B. N. S. 588 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 129 ; 8 Jur 
 
 1ST. S. 796 ; 5 L. T. 676 ; 10 W. R. 230) .... 
 Hammersmith Railway Co. -o. Brand (L. R. 4 H. of L. 171 ; 38 L. J, 
 
 Q. B. 265 ; 21 L. T. 238 ; 18 W. R. 12) . 
 Hammond v. Bussey (20 Q. B. D. 79 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 58) 
 
 250 
 65 
 
 27 
 
 60 
 
 109 
 
 S8 
 250 
 
35 
 
 8, 216 
 
 103 
 36 
 71 
 
 0-> 
 
 165 
 
 S, 179 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Hancock r. Somes (1 E. & E. 795 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 196 ; 5 Jur. N. S 
 
 9S3) 
 
 Hardaker v. Idle District Council ( [1896] 1 Q. B. 335 ; 65 L. J. Q. B 
 
 363 ; 74 L. T. 69 ; 44 VT. R. 323 ; 60 J. P. 196) . 
 Hardcastle r. South Yorkshire Railway Co. (4 H. & N. 67 ; 28 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 139 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 150) 
 
 Harding r. King (6 C. k P. 427) .... 
 Harker r. Birkbeck (1 "\V. Bl. 4S2 ; 3 Burr. 1556) . 
 Harnett v. Maitland (16 M. & \V. 257 ; 4 D. & L. 545 ; 16 L. J Ex 
 
 134) 
 
 Harris r. Brisco (17 Q. B. D. 504 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 423 ; 55 L. T. 14 
 
 34 "ft*. R. 729) . 
 
 Harris r. "Warre (4 C. P. D. 125 : 48 L. J. C. P. 310 ; 40 L. 1. 429 
 
 27 \Y. R. 461) 
 
 Harrison c. Bush (5 E. & B. 344 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 25 ; 1 Jur. N S 
 
 8«) ... 17 
 
 Harrison v. Duke of Rutland ( [1893] 1 Q. B. 142) . 
 
 Harrison v. Southwark, &c, Co. ([1891] 2 Ch. 409; 60 L. .1. Cli 
 
 630 ; 64 L. T. 864) 
 
 Hart r. Bassett (4 Vin. Abr. 519 ; Sir Thomas Jones, 156) 
 Hartley r. Cook (9 Bing. 728 ; 3 M. & Scott, 230 ; 5 C. k P. 44] 
 Hatchard v. Megc (18 Q. B. D. 771 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 397 ; 56 L. T. 
 
 662 ; 35 "W*. R. 576) 
 
 Harvey v. Brydges (14 M. k "W. 437 ; 3 D. & L. 55 ; 14 L. J. Ex 
 
 272 ; 9 Jur. 759 ; affirmed 1 Ex. 261) .... 
 Hawthorne, In re (see Graham v. Massey) . . . \ . 
 
 Heap v. Hartley (42 Ch. D. 461 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 790 ; 61 L. T. 538 
 
 38 "ft*. R. 136) 
 
 Heaven v. Pender (11 Q. B. D. 503 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 702 ; 49 L. T 
 
 357 ; 47 J. P. 709) 101, 105, 108, 144, 217 
 
 Hebditch v. Macllwaine ( [1894] 2 Q. B. 54 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 587 
 
 70 L. T. 826 ; 42 W. R. 422) ... 
 Hedley v. Pinkney ( [1892] 1 Q. B. 58 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 179 ; 66 
 
 L. T. 71 ; 40 W. R. 113 ; 56 J. P. 308 ; 7 Asp. M. C. 135) 
 Henderson v. Preston (21 Q. B. D. 362 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 607 ; 59 L. T 
 
 334 ; 36 W. R. 834) 
 
 Hermann Loog v. Bean (26 Ch. D. 306 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 1128 ; 51 L. T 
 
 442 ; 32 "W. R. 994) 
 
 Heme v. Benbow (4 Taunt. 764) 
 
 Heske v. Samuelson (12 Q. B. D. 30 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 45 ; 49 L. T. 
 
 474 ; 32 W. R. 595) 
 
 Hewlett v. Cruchley (5 Taunt. 277) .... 
 
 Hicks u. Faulkner (8 Q. B. D. 167 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 268 ; 30 W. R. 
 
 545 ; affirmed 46 L. T. 127 ; 46 J. P. 420) . 46, 48, 49, 52, 53 
 Hiort v. Bott (L. R. 9 Ex. 86 ; 43 L. J. Ex. 81 ; 30 L. T. 25 ; 22 
 
 W. R. 414) 93 
 
 Hoby v. Built (3 B. & Ad. 350) 97 
 
 SI 
 
 19 
 
 34 
 27 
 
 180 
 225 
 
 41 
 
 181 
 92 
 
 227 
 51 
 
XXX TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Hogg v. Ward (3 H. & N. 417 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 443 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 885 ; 
 
 6 W. R. 595) -39 
 
 Hole v. Barlow (4 C. B. N. S. 334 ; 27 L. J. C. P. 207 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 
 
 1019) 81 
 
 Hole v. Sittingboume and Sheerness Railway Co. (6 H. & N. 488 ; 
 
 30 L. J. Ex. 81 ; 3 L. T. 750 ; 9 W. R. 274) . . . .213 
 Hollins v. Fowler (L. R. 7 H. of L. 757 ; 44 L. J. Q. B. 169 ; 33 
 
 L. T. 73) 209 
 
 Holmes v. Bagge (1 E. & B. 782 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 301 ; 17 Jur. 1095) 32 
 Holmes v. Clarke (see Clarke v. Holmes) . . ... 223 
 
 Holmes v. Wilson (10 A. & E. 503) 69 
 
 Honywood v. Honywood (L. R. 18 Eq. 306 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 652 ; 30 
 
 L. T. 671 ; 22 W. R. 749) 91 
 
 Hooper v. Lane (10 Q. B. 546 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 189; affirmed 6 
 
 H. of L. Cas. 443 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 75 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 1026) . 41 
 Hooper v. London and North-Western Railway Co. (50 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 103 ; 43 L. T. 570 ; 29 W. R. 241) 98 
 
 Hopkins v. Crowe (4 A. & E. 774 ; 2 H. & W. 21 ; 7 C. & P. 373) . 39 
 Houlden v. Smith (14 Q. B. 841 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 170 ; 14 Jur. 598) 40 
 Houldsworth i. City of Glasgow Bank (5 App Cas. 317 ; 42 L. T. 
 
 194 ; 28 W. R. 677) 152 
 
 Howard v. Gossett (10 Q. B. 359 ; at Nisi prius, Car. & M. 380) . 32 
 Howe v. Finch (17 Q. B. D. 187 ; 34 W. R. 593) . . . .228 
 
 Howell i. Jackson (6 C. & P. 723) 32 
 
 Hudson v. Roberts (6 Ex. 697 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 299) . . . .219 
 Hughes r. Percival (8 App. Cas. 443 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 719 ; 49 L. T. 
 
 189 ; 31 W. R. 725 ; 47 J. P. 772) (see Percival v. 
 
 Hughes) . 214, 215 
 
 Huttleyu Simmons ([1898] 1 Q. B. 181) ... .58 
 
 Humphries v. Brogden(12Q. B. 739 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 10 ; 15 Jur. 124)75,76 
 Hunt v. Great Northern Railway Co. ( [1891] 2 Q. B. 189 ; [1891] 
 
 1 Q. B. 601 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 498) 178, 230 
 
 Husey r. Bayley (11 T. L. R. 221) 42 
 
 Hutchinson *. York, Newcastle, and Berwick Railway Co. (5 Ex. 
 
 343 ; 6 Railw. Cas. 580 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 296) .... 
 Hydraulic Engineering Co. v. McHaffie (4 Q. B. D. 670 ; 27 W. R. 
 
 221) 
 
 225 
 250 
 
 iNBERMAtra v. Dames (L. R. 1 C. P. 274 ; 1 H. & R. 243 ; 12 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 432 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 184 ; 14 L. T. 484 ; 14 W. R. 586 ; 
 
 affirmed L. R. 2 C. P. 311 ; 36 L. J. C. P. 181 ; 16 L. T. 293 ; 
 
 15 W. R. 434) . ... 103, 104, 106 
 
 Ingram v. Lawson (5 Bing. N. C. 66 ; 6 Scott, 775 ; 7 D. P. C. 125 ; 
 
 1 Arn. 387 ; 3 Jur. 73 ; on appeal, 6 Bing. N. C. 212 ; 8 Scott, 
 
 471 ; 4 Jur. 151 ; at Nisi prim, 9 C. & P. 326) . . .171 
 Ivay v. Hedges (9 Q. B. D. 80) 107 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXXI 
 
 4 D. & L. 
 
 45 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 
 C. P. 221 
 338 ; 76 
 
 219 
 27 
 72, 73 
 L. T. 
 
 21 
 
 188 
 
 J. P. C. 11 ; 63 
 
 32 L. T 
 
 110 
 
 Jackson v. Couutenat (8 E. & B. 8 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 37 ; 3 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 8S9) 31 
 
 Jackson v. Pesked (1 M. & S. 234) 73 
 
 Jackson v. Smithson {15 M. & W. 
 
 311) .... 
 
 Jacobs r. Seward (L. R. 5 H. of L. 464 ; 41 L. J 
 
 L. T. 1S5) 
 Jenks ,. Clifden ( [1897] 1 Ch. 694 ; 66 L. J. Ch 
 
 382; 45 W. R.-424) 
 
 Jennings v. Rundall (8 T. R. 335) . 
 
 Jenoure v. Delmege ( [1891] App. Cas. 73; 60 L. 
 
 L. T. 814 ; 39 W. R. 388) 
 Jesser v. Gifford (4 Burr. 2141 ; 3 Leon. 209) 
 Job v. Potton (L. R. 20 Eq. 84 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 262 
 
 23 "W. R. 588) . 
 Joel v. Morison (6 C. & P. 501) 
 Johnson v. Emerson (L. R. 6 Ex. 329 ; 40 L. J. Ex. 201 ; 25 L. I' 
 
 337) .... 
 
 Johnson v. Lindsay ( [1891] App. Cas. 371 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 90 ; 65 
 
 L. T. 97 ; 40 W. R. 405) . 
 Johnstone r. Sutton (1 T. R. 510 ; affirmed 1 T. R. 784 ; 1 
 
 P. C. 76) . 
 Joliffe v. Baker (11 Q. B. D. 255 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 609 ; 48 L. T 
 
 32 "W. R. 59 ; 47 J. P. 678) . 
 Jones v. Chapman (2 Ex. 803 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 456) 
 Jones jj. Chappell (L. R. 20 Eq. 539 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 
 Jones v. Foley ( [1891] 1 Q. B. 730 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 464 ; 64 L. I 
 
 538; 39 W. R. 510) 
 
 Jones v. Jones (1 H. & C. 1 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 506) 
 
 Jones v. Mayor of Liverpool (14 Q. B. D. 890 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 345 
 
 33 W. R. 551 ; 49 J. P. 311) 
 
 Jones v. Simes (43 Ch. D. 607 ; 59 L. J. Ch. 351 ; 62 L. T. 447) 
 
 658) . 
 
 Bro 
 
 177 
 74 
 
 72 
 
 196 
 
 56 
 
 225 
 
 53 
 
 137 
 72 
 90 
 
 34, 70 
 79 
 
 191 
 15 
 
 Kearney v. Lloyd (26 L. R. (Ir. ), 268) 58 
 
 Kearney v. London, Brighton, and South-Coast Railway Co. (L. R. 
 
 5 Q. B. 411 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 200 ; 22 L. T. 886 ; 18 W. R. 
 
 1000 ; affirmed L. R. 6 Q. B. 759 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 285 ; 24 
 
 L. T. 913 ; 20 W. R. 24) Ill 
 
 Kelly v. Metropolitan Railway Co. ( [1895] 1 Q. B. 944 ; 64 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 568 ; 72 L. T. 551 ; 43 W. R. 497) .... 101, 118 
 Keeble v. Hickeringill (11 Mod. 74 ; Holt, 14 ; 11 East, 574) . . 4, 59 
 Keen v. MiUwall Dock Co. (8 Q. B. D. 482 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 277 ; 46 
 
 L. T. 472 ; 30 "W. K. 503) 231, 236 
 
 Kellard v. Rooke (19 Q. B. D. 585 ; 21 Q. B. D. 367 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 599 ; 36 W. R. 335, 875 ; 52 J. P. 38, 820) . . . .230 
 Kellaway v. Bury (66 L. T. 599 ; 8 T. L. R. 433) , 44 
 
XXXH TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Kent v. Corn-age (55 J. P. 264) 55 
 
 Kerrison v. Smith ( [1897] 2 Q. B. 455 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 762) . . 78 
 Ember v. Press Association ( [1893J 1 Q. B. 65 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 152 ; 
 
 67 L. T. 515 ; 41 W. R. 17) 180 
 
 Kirk u. Todd (21 Ch. D. 484 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 224 ; 47 L. T. 676 ; 31 
 
 W. R. 69) 21 
 
 Knight v. Gibbs (1 A. k E. 43 ; 3 ST. & M. 467) . . . .249 
 
 Lake v. King (1 Saund. 132 ; 1 Lev. 240 : 2 Keb. 361, 462, 659, 
 
 664, 801, 832 ; 1 Sid. 414 ; 1 Mod. 58 ; Hardres, 470 ; 1 Danv. 
 
 196) 175 
 
 Lamb v. Burnett (1 C. & J. 291 ; 1 Tyr. 265) 31 
 
 Lambert v. Stroother (Willes, 218) 71 
 
 Lambton v. Cox ( [1894] 3 Ch. 163 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 929 ; 71 L. T. 
 
 385; 43 W. R. 5) . 42 
 
 Lambton r. Hellish ( [1894] 3 Ch. 163 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 929 ; 71 L. T. 
 
 385 ; 43 W. R. 5) 42 
 
 Lane v. Capsey ( [1891] 3 Ch. 411 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 55 ; 65 L. T. 375 ; 
 
 40 W. E. 87) . . . 43, 79 
 
 Lane v. Cox ( [1897] 1 Q. B. 415 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 193 ; 76 L. T. 
 
 135 ; 45 W. R. 261) . 89, 218 
 
 Langridge v. Levy (2 M. & W. 519 ; 4 M. & W. 337) . 108, 109, 139 1 
 Latter v. Braddell (50 L. J. Q. B. 448 ; 44 L. T. 369 ; 29 W. R. 
 
 366 ; 45 J. P. 520 ; affirming 50 L. J. Q. B. 166 ; 43 L. T. 
 
 605 ; 29 "W. R. 239 ; 45 J. P. 112) 31 
 
 Lawless v. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton and Oil Co. (L. R. 4 Q. B. 
 
 262 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 129 ; 17 W. R. 498 ; 10 B. & S. 
 
 226) .... 179 
 
 Lawrence v. Norreys (15 App. Cas. 210 ; 62 L. T. 706 ; 38 "W. R. 
 
 753) 44 
 
 Lawrence v. Obee (1 Stark. 22) ... . . 68 
 
 Lax v. Corporation of Darlington (5 Ex. D. 28 ; 49 L. J. Ex. 105 ; 
 
 41 L. T. 489 ; 28 W. R. 221 ; 44 J. P. 312) . . . 106, 121 
 
 Lee v. Nixey (63 L. T. 285) . 97 
 
 Lee v. Riley (18 C. B. N. S. 722 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 212 ; 11 Jur. N". S. 
 
 822 ; 13 W, R. 774) .... 68, 118, 219, 221, 260 
 
 Leewerd v. Basilee (1 Salk. 407 ; 3 Salk. 46 ; 1 Ld. P.aym. 62) . 31 
 Leggott v. Great Northern Railway (1 Q. B. D. 599 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 557 ; 35 L. T. 334 ; 24 W. R. 784) IS 
 
 LeLievreu Gould ([1893] 1 Q. B. 491) . . . 106,108,144,145 
 Lemmon v. Webb ([1895] App. Cas. 1 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 205 ; 71 L. T. 
 
 647) . ... .... 79 
 
 Leslie, Ex p., In re Guerrier (20 Ch. D. 131 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 689 ; 46 
 
 L. T. 548 ; 30 W. R. 344 ; 15 Cox C. C. 125) . . .13- 
 
 Lewis i: London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Co. (L. R. 9 Q. B. 
 
 66 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 8 ; 29 L. T. 397 ; 22 W. R. 153) . . 121 
 
TABLE OF CASES. XXXU1 
 
 I'M IK 
 
 :52 
 
 Lewis v. Owen ([1894] 1 Q. B. 102) 41 
 
 Leycroft v. Dunker (Cro. Car. 317 ; Sir W. Jones, 321 ; Hutton 125) 163 
 Leyman !>. Latimer (3 Ex. D. 352 ; 47 L. J. Ex. 470 ; 37 L. T. 819 ; 
 
 26 W. R. 305) 161 
 
 Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. (1 H. & C. 526 ; 32 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 34 ; 7 L. T. 427 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 255 ; 11 W. E. 149) . 194 
 
 Lister v. Perryman (L. R. 4 H. of L. 521 ; 39 L. J. Ex. 177 ; 23 
 
 L. T. 269 ; 19 AV. R. 9) 48, 49, 50 
 
 Liverpool Adelphi Loan Association v. Fairhurst (9 Ex. 422 ; 2 
 
 C. L. R. 512 ; 23 L. J. Ex, 163 ; 18 Jur. 191) . . . .182 
 Lock v. Ashton (12 Q. B. 871 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 76 ; 13 Jur. 167) . 46 
 Longmeid c. Holliday (20 L. J. Ex. 430 ; 6 Ex. 761) . 108, 109 
 
 Longmore v. Great "Western Railway Co. (19 C. B. N\ S. 183). 120 
 
 Low v. Bouverie ( [1891] 3 Ch. 82 ; 60 L. J. Cli. 594 ; 65 L. T. 533 ; 
 
 40 W. R. 50) 144,145,146,147 
 
 Lows v. Telford (1 App. Cas. 414 ; 13 Cox C. C. 226 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 
 
 613 ; 35 L. T. 69) . . . . 34 
 
 Ludgater v. Love (44 L. T. 694 ; 45 J. P. 600) . . . .153 
 Lumley v. Gye (2 E. & B. 216 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 463 ; 1 W. E. 432 ; 
 
 17 Jur. S27) 58, 254, 255 
 
 Lynch v. Knight (9 H. of L. Cas. 577 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 724 ; 5 L. T. 
 
 291) 157, 158, 159, 259 
 
 Lynch v. Nurdin (1 Q. B. 29 ; 4 P. & D. 672 : 3 Jur. 797) 
 
 Lynde v. Anglo-Italian Hemp Spinning Co. ( [1896] 1 Ch. 178 ; 65 
 
 L. J. Ch. 96 ; 73 L. T. 502) ... ... 131 
 
 McCord i: Cammell & Co. ( [1896] App. Cas. 57 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 202; 73 L. T. 634; 60 J. P. 180) 229 
 
 Macdougall v. Knight (25 Q. B. D. 1 ; 17 Q. B. D. 636 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 464 ; 55 L. T. 274 ; 38 W. R. 553 ; 14 A. C. 194 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 537 ; 60 L. T. 762 ; 38 W. R. 44) 180 
 
 Machado v. Fontes ( [1897] 2 Q. B. 231 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 542 ; 45 
 
 W. R. 565) 26 
 
 Mackay v. Commercial Bank of New Brunswick (L. R. 5 P. C. 394 ; 
 
 43 L. J. P. C. 31 ; 30 L. T. 180 ; 22 W. K. 473) . .' . 151 
 MeGiffin v. Palmer's Shipbuilding Co. (10 Q. P.. D. 5 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 25; 47 L. T. 346; 31 W. R. 118) . 227 
 
 MayfairProperty Co. v. Johnston ( [1894] 1 Ch. 508 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 399 ; 
 
 70 L. T. 485) 74 
 
 M'Laughlin v. Pryor (4 M. & G. 48 ; 4 Scott N. R. 655 ; Car. & M. 
 
 354) 191 
 
 M'Pherson v. Daniels (10 B. & C. 263 ; 5 M. & R. 251) . . .170 
 Mangan v. Atterton (L. R. 1 Ex. 239 ; 35 L. J. Ex. 161 ; 14 L. T. 
 
 411 ; 14 W. R. 771 ; 1 H. & C. 388) 252 
 
 Manzoni v. Douglas (6 (). B. D. 145 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 289 ; 29 W. R. 
 
 425 ; 45 J. P. 391) 1 10 
 
 E.T. C 
 
XXXIV TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Marsh v. Joseph ( [1897] 1 Ch. 213 ; 66 L. J. Ch. 128 ; 75 L. T. 558 ; 
 
 45 W. R. 209) 207 
 
 Marsh v. Keating (1 Bing. N. C. 198 ; 1 Scott, 5) . . . .10 
 Marshall v. York, Newcastle, and Berwick Railway Co. (11 C. B. N. S. 
 
 655 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 34 ; 16 Jur. 124) . 99, 117 
 
 Masper v. Brown (1 C. P. D. 97 ; 45 L. J. C.-P. 203 ; 34 L. T. 254 ; 
 
 24 W. R. 369) 35, 36 
 
 Mathews v. Biddulph (4 Scott, N. R. 54 ; 3 M. & G. 390) . . 39 
 May v. Burdett (9 Q. B. 101 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 64 ; 10 Jur. 692) . 219 
 
 Mayhew v. Suttle (4 E. & B. 347 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 54 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 303) 71 
 Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles ([1895] App. Cas. 587 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 
 
 759 ; 73 L. T. 353 ; 44 W. B. 190) 86 
 
 Mears v. London and South-Western Railway Co. (11 C. B.. 1ST. S. 
 
 850 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 220 ; 6 L. T. 190) 93 
 
 Medhurst v. Balam (cited in Siderrin, 397) ... .158 
 
 Menibery v. Great Western Railway Co. (14 App. Cas. 179 ; 58 
 
 L. J. H. L. 563 ; 61 L. T. 566 ; 38 W. R. 145). . . .223 
 Merest v. Harvey (5 Taunt. 442 ; 1 Marsh. 139) . . . .261 
 Merivale v. Carson (20 Q. B. D. 275 ; 58 L. T. 331 ; 36 W. R. 231) . 181 
 Mersey Docks Trustees v. Cxibbs (L. R. 1 H. of L. 93) . . .128 
 Metropolitan Asylum District u Hill (6 App. Cas. 193 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 353 ; 44 L. T. 653 ; 29 W. R. 617) . . .88 
 
 Metropolitan Bank v. Pooley (10 App. Cas. 210 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 449 ; 
 
 53 L. T. 163 ; 33 W. R. 709) . 56 
 
 Metropolitan Railway Co. v. Jackson (3 App. Cas. 1 93 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 
 
 303 ; 37 L. T. 679 ; 26 W. R. 175) . . . 96,114,115,122 
 
 Meux ... Cobley ([1892] 2 Ch. 253; 61 L. J. Ch. 449 ; 66 L. T. 
 
 86) . 90 
 
 Meux v. Great Eastern Railway Co. ([1895] 2 Q. B. 387 ; 64 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 657 ; 73 L. T. 247 ; 43 W. R. 680) . ... 65 
 
 Midland Insurance Co. v. Smith (6 Q. B. D. 561 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 329 ; 45 L. T. 411 ; 29 W. R. 850 ; 45 J. P. 699) . . 13 
 
 Mill v. Hawker (L. R. 10 Ex. 92 ; 44 L. J. Ex. 49 ; 33 L. T. 177 ; 
 
 24 W. R. 348 ; affirming L. R. 9 Ex. 309 ; 43 L. J. Ex. 129 ; 
 
 30 L. T. 894 ; 22 W. R. 26) 210 
 
 Miller v. David (L. R. 9 C. P. 118 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 84 ; 30 L. T. 58 ; 
 
 22 W. R. 332) 163 
 
 Miller v Dell ( [1891] 1 Q. B. 468 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 404 ; 63 L. T. 693 ; 
 
 39 W. E. 342) .267 
 
 Miller v. Hancock ( [1893] 2 Q. B. 177 ; 69 L. T. 214 ; 41 W. R. 578) 89 
 Milligan v. Wedge (12 A. & E. 737 ; 4 P. & D. 714) . . . .211 
 Mi s v. Armstrong (13 App. Cas. 1 ; 56 L. J. P. D. & A. 17 ; 58 
 
 L. T. 423 ; 36 W. R. 870 ; 12 P. D. 58 ; 57 L. J. P. D. & A. 65 ; 
 
 56 L. T. 258) 125 
 
 Mills v. Graham (1 B. & P. N. R. 140) 188 
 
 Milward v. Midland Railway Co. (14 Q. B. D. 68 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 202 ; 52 L. T. 255 ; 33 W. R. 366) 228 
 
TABLE OF CASES. XXXV 
 
 Mitchell v. Jenkins (5 B. & Ad. 588 ; 2 N. & M. 301) . . 52, 53 
 
 Mogul Steamship Co. ,*. McGregor, Gow & Co. ([1892] App. Cas. 25 ; 
 
 61 L. J. Q. B. 295 ; 66 L. T. 1 ; 40 W. R. 337) . . 58, 59 
 
 Monson v. Tussauds ( [1894] 1 Q. B. 671 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 454 ; 70 
 
 L. T. 355 ; 58 J. P. ^54) ' . . 157, 181 
 
 Moorcock, The (13 P. D. 157 ; 14 P. D. 64 ; 58 L. J. P. D. & A. 
 
 15, 73 ; 59 L. T. 872; 60 L. T. 654; 37 W. R. 31, 439) . . 105 
 Moore v. Metropolitan Railway Co. (L. It. 8 Q. B. 36 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 23 ; 27 L. T. 579 ; 21 W. R. 145) 201, 203 
 
 Morgan u. London General Omnibus Co. (13 Q. B. D. 832 ; 12 
 
 Q. B. D. 201 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 352 ; 51 L. T. 213 ; 32 W. R. 
 
 416, 759) . 230 
 
 Mostyn v. Fabrigas (1 Sin. L. C. 628 ; Cowp. 161) ... 26 
 
 Monntney v. AVatton (2 B. & Ad. 673) 171 
 
 Mowbray v. Merryweather ( [1895] 2 Q. B. 640 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 50 ; 
 
 73 L. T. 459 ; 44 W. R. 49) ^56 
 
 M. Moxham, The (L. R. 1 P. D. 107 ; 46 L. J. Adm. 17 ; 34 L. T. 
 
 559 ; 24 "W. R. 650) 26, 27 
 
 Moyle v. Jenkins (8 Q. B. D. 116 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 112 ; 30 W. R. 
 
 324) 231, 236 
 
 Mulligan v. Cole (L. R. 10 Q. B. 549 ; 44 L. J. Q. B. 153 ; 33 L. T. 
 
 12) . 165 
 
 Munster v. Lamb (11 Q. B. D. 588 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 726 ; 49 L. T. 
 
 252 ; 32 AA T . R. 243 ; 47 J. P. 805) . . . . 9, 176 
 
 Murray v. Carrie (L. R. 6 C. P. 24 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 26 ; 23 L. T. 557 ; 
 
 19 AV. R. 104) ... 191 
 
 Murray v. Hall (7 C. B. 441 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 161 ; 13 Jur. 262) . 72 
 
 National Exchange Co. of Glasgow v. Drew (2 Maoq. 103) . 154 
 National Mercantile Bank v. Rymill (44 L. T. 767). . . .209 
 Nelson i: Liverpool Brewery Co. (2 (.'. P. D. 311 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 
 
 675 ; 25 W. R. 877) 90 
 
 Nevill v. Fine Art and General Insurance Co. ([1897] App. Cas. 68 ; 
 
 66 L. J. Q. B. 195 ; 75 L. T. 606 ; 61 J. P. 500) . . 168, 177 
 Newman, In re, Ex p. Brooke (see Brooke, Ex p.) .... 25 
 Newton v. Harland (1 M. & G. 644 ; 1 Scott, N. R. 474) . . .£ 33 
 Nichols u. Marsland (2 Ex. D. 1 ; 4 L. J. Ex. 174 ; 35 L. T. 725 ; 
 
 25 W. R. 173). . H 85 
 
 Nicolls v. Bastard (2 C. M. & R. 659 ; 1 Tyr. & G. 156 ; 1 Gale 
 
 295) ... 93 
 
 Noden v. Johnson (16 Q. B. 218 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 95 ; 15 Jur. 424) . 31 
 TSoelv. Redruth Foundry Co. ([1896] 1 Q. B. 453 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 330 ; 74 L. T. 196 ; 44 W. R. 407) '231 
 
 North- Eastern Railway Co, v. Wanless (L. R. 7 H. of L. 12 ; 43 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 185 ; 30 L. T. 275 ; 22 W. R. 561) . . 122, 125 
 
 C 2 
 
XXXVI 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Oakey v. Dalton (35 C. D. 700 ; 56 L. J. Gh. 823 ; 57 L. T. 18 ; 
 
 35 "W. R. 709) ... 20 
 
 O'Brien v. Clement (15 M. & W. 435 ; 3 D. k L. 676 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 
 
 285 ; 10 Jnr. 395) . 157 
 
 Osborne v. Chooqueel ( [1896] 2 Q. B. 109 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 534 ; 74 
 
 L. T. 786 ; 44 W. R. 575) 221 
 
 Osborn v. Gillett (L. R. 8 Ex. 88 ; 42 L. J. Ex. 53 ; 28 L. T. 197 ; 
 
 21 W. R. 409) ... . . 12, 66 
 
 Osborne v. Jackson (11 Q. B. D. 619 ; 48 L. T. 642) . . 230 
 
 Ottos Kopje Diamond Mines, In re ([1893] 1 Ch. 618 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 
 
 166 ; 68 L. T. 138 ; 41 W. R. 258) 147 
 
 Overton v. Freeman (11 C. B. 867 ; 8 C. & K. 52 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 
 
 52 ; 16 Jur. 65) 211 
 
 Paley v. Gaenett (16 Q. B. D. 52 ; 34 W. R. 295) . . .228 
 Parkins v. Scott (1 H. & C. 153 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 331 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 
 
 593 ; 6 L. T. 394 ; 10 "W. R. 562) . ... 258 
 
 Parmiter v. Coupland (6 M. & W. 105 ; 4 Jur. 701) . . 164 
 
 Parry v. Smith (4 C. P. D. 325 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 731 ; 41 L. T. 93 ; 
 
 27 ^y. R. 801) . 105, 108 
 
 Parsons v. Lloyd (2 Wm. Bl. 845 ; 3 Wils. 341) ., . . .41 
 Partridge v. Scott (3 M. & W. 220 ; 1 H. & H. 31) . . . . 76 
 Pasley v. Freeman (3 T. R. 51 ; 2 Sm. L. C. 74) . . . . 155 
 
 Patrick v. Colerick (3 M. & "W. 483) 77 
 
 Peacock v. Nicholson (11 T. L. R. 225) 30, 110 
 
 Pedley r. Morris (65 L. T. 526 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 21 ; 40 W. R. 42) . 
 Peebles u. Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council ([1896] 2 Q. B. 
 
 159 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 499 ; 74 L. T. 721 ; 44 W. R. 513 ; 60 J. P. 
 
 516 ; S. C. [1897] 1 Q. B. 625 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 392 ; 76 L. T. 
 
 315 ; 45 W. R. 454) 
 
 Peek v. Deny (37 Ch. D. 541 ; 57 L. J. Ch. 347 ; 59 L. T. 78 ; 36 
 
 W. R. 899) {see Deny v. Peek) .... 
 Peek v. Gurney (L. R. 6 H. of L. 377 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 19 ; 22 W. R. 
 
 29) 22, 133, 134, 138, 139 
 
 Penn v. Ward (2 C. M. & R. 338) . .... 
 
 Percival v. Hughes (9 Q. B. D. 441 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 388 ; 46 
 
 677) (see Hughes v. Percival) .... 
 Phillips v. Barnett (1 Q. B. D. 436 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 177 ; 24 ^Y. R. 345) 
 
 Phillips v. Eyre (L. R. 4 Q. B. 225 ; 9 B. & S. 343 ; 38 L. J. 
 
 113 ; 19 L. T. 770 ; 17 W. B. 375 ; affirmed 6 Q. B 
 
 B. & S. 1004 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 28 ; 22 L. T. 869) 
 Phillips v. Homfray (24 Ch. D. 439 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 833 ; 49 L. T. 5 ; 
 
 32 "W. R. 6 ; 11 A. C. 466 ; S. C. [1892] 1 Ch. 465 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 
 
 210 ; 66 L. T. 657 ; S. C. 11 App. Cas. 466) . 22, 23, 24, 92 
 Pickard v. Sears (6 A. & E. 469) 146 
 
 34 L. 
 
 T. 
 
 214, 
 T. 
 
 B. 
 10 
 
 176 
 
 17 _ 
 
 143 
 
 149 
 31 
 
 215 
 
 185 
 
 2G 
 
TABLE OF CASES. XXXV11 
 
 I'AOE 
 
 Piekard v. Smith (10 C. B. N. S. 470 ; 4 L. T. 470) . . 211, 213 
 Pickering e. Rudd (1 Stark. 56 ; 4 Camp. 219) ... 68 
 
 Pike v. Carter (?, Biug. 78 ; 10 Moore, 376) 40 
 
 Pittard v. Oliver ([1891] 1 Q. B. 474 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 219 ; 64 L. T. 
 
 75S ; 39 W. li. 311) ... ... 178 
 
 Polhill i: Walter (3 B. & Ad. 114) .... 132, 135, 110, 142 
 
 Polkinhorn c. Wright (8 Q. B 197 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 70 ; 10 Jur. 11) . 33 
 Pollen or Pollon v. Brewer (7 C. B. N. S. 371 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 509) 33 
 
 Ponting v. Noakes ([1894] 2 Q. B. 281 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 549 ; 70 
 
 L. T. 842 ; 42 W. R. 506) 87 
 
 Poulton v. London and South-Western Railway Co. (L. R. 2 Q. B. 
 
 534 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 294 ; 17 L. T. 11 ; 8 B. & S. 616) . 198, 200, 
 
 202, 204 
 Pounder v. North- Eastern Railway Co. ( [1892] 1 Q. B. 385 ; 61 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 136 ; 65 L. T. 679 ; 40 W. R. 189) . . . 117, 118 
 Powys v. Blagrave (4 T)e G. M. & G. 448 ; 2 W. R. 700 ; affirming 
 
 Kay, 495 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 142 ; 2 W. R. 359 ; 18 Jur. N. S. 462 ; 
 
 28 L. T. O. S. 37 ; 2 Eq. Rep. 395) 92 
 
 Prentice v. Harrison (4 Q. B. 852 ; D. & M. 50 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 315 ; 
 
 7 Jur. 580) 41 
 
 Pretty v. Bickmore (L. R. 8 C. P. 401 ; 28 L. T. 704 ; 21 W. R. 
 
 733) . .90 
 
 Price v. Seeley (10 CI. & F. 28) 39 
 
 Pryce v. Belcher (4 C. B. 866 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 264 ; 3 C. B. 58 ; 4 
 
 D. & L. 238 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 305 ; 11 Jur. 675) ... 4 
 Pughi;. London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Co. ([1896] 2 
 
 Q. B. 248 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 531 ; 74 L. T. 724 ; 44 W. R. 277) . 260 
 Pulling v. Great Eastern Railway Co. (9 Q. B. D. 110 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 453 ; 30 \V~. R. 798 ; 46 J. P. 615) .... 18, 19 
 
 Pullman v. Hill and Co. ([1891] 1 Q. B. 524 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 299 ; 
 
 64 L. T. 691 ; 39 W. R. 263) 169 
 
 Pym v. Great Northern Railway Co. (2 B. & S. 759 ; 31 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 249 ; 8 Jur. N". S. 819 ; 6 L. T. 537 ; 10 W. R. 737 ; affirmed 4 
 
 B. & S. 396 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 377 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 199 ; 11 W. R. 
 
 922) 16 
 
 Qtjarman ii. Burnett (6 M. & W. 499 ; 4 Jur. 969) . . 189, 190 
 Quartz Hill Mining Co. v. Eyre (11 Q. B. D. 674 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 488 ; 49 L. T. 249 ; 31 W. R. 668) .... 44, 45, 54, 56 
 
 Radley v. London and North-Western Railway Co. (1 App. 
 
 Cas. 754 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 573 ; 35 L. T. 637 ; 25 W. R. 147) . 12 
 Ramsay v. Margrett ([1894] 2 Q. B. 18 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 513 ; 70 
 
 L. T. 788 ; 1 Man. 184) • . 72 
 
 Ramsay v. Quinn (8 Ir. Pep. C. L. 322) . . ... 225 
 
XXXV111 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE". 
 
 Bapson v. Cubitt (9 M. & W. 710 ; Car. & M. 64 ; 6 Jur. 606) . 211 
 EatclifTe v. Evans ([1892] 2 Q. B. 524 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 535 ; 66 L. T. 
 
 794 ; 40 W. R. 578) . . . . . 60, 61, 259, 261 
 
 Eavenga v. Macintosh (2 B. & C. 693 ; 4 D. & K. 107 ; 1 C. & P. 
 
 204) .51 
 
 Bawling* v. Till (3 M. & W. 28 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 6) . . . 30- 
 
 Eayner v. Mitchell (2 C. P. D. 357 ; 25 W. B. 633) . . .198 
 
 Eayson v. South London Tramways Co. ([1893] 2 Q. B. 304) . 55, 201 
 
 Eea v. Sheward (2 M. & W. 424) IT 
 
 Bead v. Coker (13 C. B. 850 ; 9 C. L. R. 746 ; 22 L. J. C P. 201 ; 
 
 17 Jur. 190) 29- 
 
 Eead v. Edwards (17 C. B. ~S. S. 245 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 31 ; 11 L. T. 
 
 311) ' 221 
 
 Read v. Great Eastern Railway Co. (L. E. 3 Q. B. 555 ; 18 L. T. 82 ; 
 
 16 W. E. 1040) 17 
 
 Beadhead v. Midland Railway Co. (L. R. 2 Q. B. 412 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 101 ; 16 L. T. 485 ; 15 \X. E. 831 ; 8 B. & S. 371 ; affirmed 
 
 L. R. 4 Q. B. 379 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 169 ; 17 W. E. 737 ; 9 B. & S. 
 
 519) . . . ... .217 
 
 Bedgrave v. Hurd (20 Ch. D. 1 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 113 ; 45 L. T. 485 ; 
 
 30 AV. B. 251) .... 136: 
 
 Read v. Nutt (24 Q. B. D. 669 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 311 ; 62 L. T. 635 ; 
 
 3S W. E. 621) 35 
 
 Beedie v. London and North- Western Eailway Co. (4 Ex. 244 ; 20 
 
 L. J. Ex. 65) 213 
 
 Beese Eiver Silver Mining Co. v. Smith (L. E. 4 H. of L. 64 ; 39 
 
 L. J. Ch. 849) . 134 
 
 Eeg. r. Carden (5 Q. B. D. 1 ; 49 L. J. M. C. 1 ; 41 L. T. 504 ; 2S 
 
 W. E. 133 ; 44 J. P. 119 ; 14 Cox C. C. 359) .... 173 
 Eeg. v. Coney (8 Q. B. D. 534 ; 51 L. J. M. C. 66 ; 46 L. T. 307 ; 
 
 30 W. E. 678 ; 46 J. P. 404 ; 15 Cox C. C. 46) 31 
 
 Eeg. %.. Jackson ( [1891] 1 Q. B. 671 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 346 ; 64 L. T. 
 
 679 ; 39 W. E. 407) .63 
 
 Eeg. r. Judge of Brompton County Court ( [1893] 2 Q. B. 195 ; 62 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 604 ; 68 L. T. 829 ; 41 W. E. 648) ... 41 
 
 Eeg. ,. Lefroy (L. E. 8 Q. B. 134 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 121 ; 28 L. T. 
 
 132 ; 21 W. R. 332) . . . - 41 
 
 Reg. v. Mayor of London (16 Q. B. D. 772 ; 53 L. J. M. C. 118 ; 54 
 
 L. T. 761 ; 34 W. R. 544) 184 
 
 Eeg. v. Miles (24 Q. B. D. 423 ; 59 L. J. M. C. 56 ; 62 L. T. 572 ; 
 
 38 W. E. 334 ; 54 J. P. 549 ; 17 Cox C. C.) . . ' . .35 
 Eeg. v. Morris (L. E. 1 C. C. E. 90 ; 36 L. J. M. C. 84 ; 16 L. T. 
 
 636 ; 15 W. R. 990 ; 10 Cox C. C. 480) . . . . 35, 3 
 Reg. v. Pratt (4 E. & B. 860 ; 24 L. J. M. C. 113 ; 25 L. T. O. S. 
 
 65 ; 1 Dears C. C. 502 ; 1 Jur. N". S. 681 ; 3 Com. L. Rep. 686) 69> 
 Eeg. v.' Tyler ([1891] 2 Q. B. 588 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 38; 65 L. T. 
 
 662) 55- 
 
TABLE OF CASES. XXXIX 
 
 Reiuhart v. Mentasti (42 Ch. D. 6S5 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 787 ; 61 L. T. 
 
 32S ; 38 AV. R. 10) 81 
 
 Revis v. Smith (18 C. B. 126 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 195 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 614) 9 
 
 Rex v. Cveevy (1 M. & S. 273) 175 
 
 Res v. Commissioners of Pagham (8 B. & C. 355 ; 2 M. & R. 468) . 1 
 Rex v. Rosewell (2 Salk. 459) .... ... 79 
 
 Rex !'. Skinner (Lofft, 55) 175 
 
 Reynell i: Sprye (1 D. M. & G. 656 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 633) . . .137 
 Reynolds -v. Clarke (2 Raym. 1399 ; 8 Mod. 272 ; Fort. 212) . 68 
 
 Riding v. Smith (1 Ex. D. 91 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 281 ; 34 L. T. 500 ; 24 
 
 W. R. 487) 258 . 
 
 Roberts and Wife v. Roberts (5 B. & S. 384 ; 33 L. J. Q. B. 249 ; 10 
 
 Jul-. ST. S. 1027 ; 10 L. T. 602 ; 12 W. R. 909) . .158, 249 
 Roberts v. Smith (2 H. & N. 213 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 319 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 
 
 469) 005 
 
 Robinson v. Jones (L. R. 4 Ex. (Ir.), 391) 168 
 
 obinson v. Eilvert (41 Ch. D. 28 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 392 ; 61 L. T. 60 ; 
 
 37 W. R. 545) 81 
 
 Robson v. North-Eastern Railway Co. (L. R. 10 Q. B. 271 ; 44 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 112 ; 32 L. T. 551 ; 23 W. R. 791 ; affirmed 2 Q. B. D. 
 
 85 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 50 ; 35 L. T. 535 ; 25 W. R. 418) . . 121 
 Roe v. Birkenhead Railway Co. (7 Ex. 36 ; 6 Railw. Cas. 795 ; 21 
 
 L. J. Ex. 9) 208 
 
 Roope v. D'Avigdor (10 Q. B. D. 412 ; 48 L. T. 761 ; 47 J. P. 248) 12 
 Rose v. North Eastern Railway Co. (2 Ex. D. 248 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 374 ; 
 
 35 L. T. 693 ; 25 W. R. 205) 121 
 
 Rourke v. "White Moss Colliery Co. (1 C. P. D. 556 ; 35 L. T. 16u ; 
 
 affirmed 2 C. P. D. 205 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 283 ; 36 L. T. 49 ; 25 
 
 AV. R. 263) 193 
 
 Royal Aquarium Society, Ltd. v. Parkinson ([1892] 1 Q. B. 431 ; 61 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 409 ; 66 L. T. 513 ; 40 W. R. 450) . . 176, 177 
 
 Rylands v. Fletcher (L. R. 3 H. of L. 330 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 161 ; 19 
 
 ,L. T. 220) 81 
 
 Sadlek v. Gkeat Western Eailway Co. ([1895] 2 Q. B. 688; 
 
 [1896] App. Cas. 450 ; 74 L. T. 561 ; 45 W. R. 51) . . 43 
 St. Helens Smelting Co. v. Tipping (11 H. of L. Cas. 642 ; 35 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 66 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 785 ; 12 L. T. 776 ; 13 W. R. 1083) 80, 81 
 
 Sanders v. Teape (51 L. T. 263) 221 
 
 Sandford v. Clark (21 Q. B. D. 398 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 507 ; 59 L. T. 
 
 226 ; 37 W. R. 28 ; 52 J. P. 773) 89 
 
 Sanitary Commissioners of Gibraltar v. Orfila (15 App. Cas. 400) . 128 
 
 Saunders v. Edwards (1 Sid. 95) 265 
 
 Savile v. Roberts (1 Raym. 374 ; 12 Mod. 208 ; 1 Salk. 13) . . 45 
 Scholfield u. Londesborough ([1896] App. Cas. 514 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 593 ; 75 L. T. 254 ; 45 W. R. 124) 106 
 
xl TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sehules v. Brook (63 L. T. 837) 106, 108 
 
 Scott v. Dixon (29 L. J. Ex., at p. 62 >i.) 139 
 
 Scott v. London and St. Katherine Dock Co. (3 H. & C. 596 ; 34 
 
 L. J. Ex. 220 ; 11 Jnr. N". S. 204 ; 13 L. T. 148 ; 13 W. E. 
 
 410) . ... 110 
 
 Scott v. Matthew Brown (51 L. T. 746 ; W. N. [1884] 209) . . 34 
 Scott v. Shepherd (2 Win. Bl. 892 ; 3 Wils. 403 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 438) 8, 251 
 Scott v. Stansfield (L. R. 3 Ex. 220 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 155 ; 18 L. T. 
 
 572; 16 W. R. 911) ... . .175 
 
 Seaman v. Netherclift (2 C. P. D. 53 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 158 ; 35 L. T. 
 
 784 ; 25 W. R. 159) 9, 176 
 
 Searle v. Laverick (L. R. 9 Q. B. 122 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 43 ; 30 L. T. 
 
 89 ; 22 W. R. 367) . 218 
 
 Searle u. Lindsay (11 C. B. N. S. 429 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 106 ; 8 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 746 ; 5 L. T. 427 ; 10 W. R. 89) . ... 225 
 
 Senior v. Ward (1 E. & E. 385 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 139 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 
 
 172 ; 7 W. E. 261) . . 224 
 
 Seroka v. Kattenberg (17 Q. B. D. 177 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 375 ; 54 
 
 L. T. 649 ; 34 W. R. 542) . .... 188 
 
 Seward r. Vera Cruz (10 App. Cas. 59 ; 54 L. J. P. D. & A. 9 ; 52 
 
 L. T. 474 ; 33 W. R. 477) . . . . . 16 
 
 Seymour v. Greenwood (6 H. & N. 359 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 189 ; 9 W. R. 
 
 518 ; affirmed 7H.&N. 355 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 327 ; 4 L. T. 833 ; 
 
 9 W. R. 785) ... ... . 200 
 
 Shaffers v. General Steam Navigation Co. (10 Q. B. D. 356 : 52 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 260 ; 48 L. T. 228 ; 31 W. R. 656) ... .230 
 
 Sharp v. Powell (L. R. 7 C. P. 253 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 95 ; 26 L. T. 436 ; 
 
 20 W. R, 584) 7, 8, 250, 251, 260 
 
 Shelter v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. ( [1895] 1 Ch. 287 ; 64 
 
 L. J. Ch. 216 ; 72 L. T. 34 ; 43 W. R. 238) . . .43 
 
 Shepherd, In re, Ex p. Ball {see Ball, Exp.) ... 10, 12 
 
 Shipwick «. Blanchard (6 T. R. 298) 93 
 
 Silverton v. Marriott (59 L. T. 61) . . . . . . 214 
 
 Simpson v. Savage (1 C. B. N. S. 347 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 50 ; 3 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 161) . . 74 
 
 Siner v. Great Western Railway Co. (L. R. 3 Ex. 150 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 
 
 98 ; affirmed L. R. 4 Ex. 117 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 67 ; 20 L. T. 114 ; 
 
 17 W. R. 417) 121 
 
 Six Carpenters' Case (8 Co. 146 a ; 1 Sm. L. C. 127) ... 69 
 Skinner v. London, Brighton, and South-Coast Railway Co. (5 Ex. 
 
 787 ; 15 Jur. 299) ... 110 
 
 Skinner & Co. v. Shew & Co. ( [1893] 1 Ch. 413 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 196 ; 
 
 67 L. T. 696 ; 41 W. R. 217) 61 
 
 Slim v. Croucher (1 De G. F. & J. 518 ; 2 Giff. 37 ; 29 L. J. C. P. 
 
 273 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 190, 437) 131, 146 
 
 Smith v. Baker ( [1891] App. Cas. 325 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 683 ; 65 L. T. 
 
 467 ; 40 W. R. 392) 223, 226, 227 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xli 
 
 Smith v. Chadwick (20 Ch. D. 27 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 597 ; 46 L. T. 702 ; 
 
 30 TV. R. 661 ; affirmed 9 App. Cas. 187 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 873 ; 
 
 50 L. T. 697 ; 32 TV. R. 687) .... 129, 136, 142, 14:! 
 Smith v. Kenrick (7 C. B. 515 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 172 ; 13 Jul-. 362) . 83, 84 
 Smith v. London and South-Western Railway Co. (L. R. 5 C. P. 98 ; 
 
 39 L. J. C. P. 6S ; 21 L. T. 668 ; 18 TV. R. 343) ... 95 
 Smith v. .South-Eastern Railway Co. ( [1896] 1 Q. B. 178 ; 65 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 219 ; 73 L. T. 614 ; 44 TV. R. 291) 113 
 
 Smith v. Sydney (L. R. 5 Q. B. 203 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 144 ; 22 L. T. 
 
 16; IS TV. R. 628) 41 
 
 Snowdon v. Baines (25 Q. B. L\ 193; 59 L. J. Q. B. 325; 38 TV. R. 744) 228 
 Somerville v. Hawkins (10 C. B. 583 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 131 ; 15 Jur. 
 
 450 ; 16 L. T. O. S. 283) 178 
 
 Southcote v. Stanley (1 H. & N. 247 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 339) . . .108 
 South Hetton Coal Co. v. North-Eastern News Association ( [1894] 
 
 1 Q. B. 133) 
 
 Speight v. Gosney (60 L. J. Q. B. 231) . . ... 
 
 Stanley «. Powell ([1891] 1 Q. B. 86 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 52; 63 L. T. 
 
 809 ; 39 TV. R. 76 ; 55 J. P. 327) 30, 
 
 Stephens v. Elwall (4 M. & S. 259) 
 
 Stephens v. Myers (4 C. & P. 349) 
 
 Stevens v. Midland Counties Railway Co. (10 Ex. 352 ; 2 C. L. R. 
 
 1300 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 328 ; 18 Jur. 932) 
 Steward v. Gromett (7 C. B. N. S. 191 ; 29 L. J. C. P. 170 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 776) 
 Stiles v. Cardiff Steam Navigation Co. (33 L. J. Q. B. 310 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1199 ; 10 L. T. 844 ; 12 TV. R. 1080) 
 Stimson v. Farnham (L. R. 7 Q. B. 175 ; 41 L. J. Q. B. 52 ; 25 L. T. 
 
 747 ; 20 TV. R. 183) 
 Stone v. Cartwright (6 T. R. 411) 
 Stone v. Hyde (9 Q. B. D. 76 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 452 ; 46 L. T. 421 ; 30 
 
 TV. R. 816) . 
 Storey v. Ashton (L. R. 4 Q. B. 476 ; 38 L. J. Q. B 
 
 727 ; 10 B. & S. 337) 
 Stuart v. Bell ( [1891] 2 Q. B. 341 ; 60 L. J. Q. B 
 
 633 ; 39 TV. R. 612) . 
 Sturt v. Blagg (10 Q. B. 906) . 
 Sutton v. Buck (2 Taunt. 302) 
 Swift v. Jewsbury (L. R. 9 Q. B. 301 ; 43 L. J. Q, 
 
 31 ; 22 TV. R. 319) 
 
 Swire v. Francis (3 App. Cas. 106 ; 47 L. J. P. C. 18 
 
 165 
 170 
 
 110 
 
 209 
 
 29 
 
 52 
 
 47 
 
 222 
 
 250 
 
 211 
 
 . 231 
 223 ; 17 TV. R. 
 
 93, 194, 197 
 577 ; 64 L. T. 
 
 . 178 
 . 166 
 93 
 B. 56 ; 30 L. T. 
 
 . 152, 156 
 37 L. T. 554) 151, 152 
 
 Tarry v. Ashton (1 Q. B. D. 314 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 260 ; 34 L. T. 
 
 97 ; 24 W. R. 581) 214 
 
 Tate v. Latham and Son ( [1897] 1 Q. B. 502 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 349 ; 76 
 
 L. T. 336 ; 45 TV. R. 400) 228, 230 
 
Xlii TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Taylor v. Ashton (11 M. & "W. 401 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 363 ; 7 Jur. 978) . 134 
 Taylor v. Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Co. 
 
 ( [1895] 1 Q. B. 134 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 6 ; 71 L. T. 596 ; 43 
 
 W. R. 120) ■ 65, 101, 117 
 
 Taylor v. Whitehead (2 Dougl. 475) 79 
 
 Temperton v. Russell ( [1893] 1 Q. B. 715) 58 
 
 Tenant v. Goldwin (1 Salk. 360) 86 
 
 Terry v. Hutchinson (L. R. 3 Q. B. 599 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 257 ; 18 
 
 L. T. 521 ; 16 W. R. 932 ; 9 B. & S. 487) .... 66 
 Tharpe v. Stallwood (5 M. & G. 760 ; 6 Scott, 715) .... 14 
 Thomas v. Quartermaine (17 Q. B. D. 414 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 439 ; 55 
 
 L. T. 360 ; 34 W. R. 741 ; 51 J. P. 85 ; 2 Times'Law Reports, 
 
 796 ; affirmed 18 Q. B. D. 685 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 340 ; 3 Times 
 
 Law Reports, 495; 35 W. R. 555; 51 J. P. 516) 121,223, 
 
 224, 227 
 
 Thomas r. Sorrell (Vaughan, 330) 77 
 
 Tomkinson v. Balkis Consolidated Co. ([1891] 2 Q. B. 614; 
 
 60 L. J. Q. B. 558 ; affirmed [1893] App. Cas. 396 ; 64 L. T. 
 
 816 ; 41 W. R. 693) 147 
 
 Tompson v. Dashwood (11 Q. B. D. 43 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 425 ; 48 
 
 L. T. 913) 180 
 
 Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massaui (14 Ch. D. 763 ; 41 L. T. 543 ; 
 
 42 L. T. 851 ; 28 W. R. 966) 60 
 
 Thorne v. Heard ([1895] App. Cas. 495 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 652 ; 73 L. T. 
 
 291 ; 44 W. E. 155) 266 
 
 Thorogood v. Bryan (8 C. B. 115 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 336) . . 125, 126 
 Thorpe v. Brumfitt (L. R. 8 Ch. 650) .... .43 
 
 Thrussell v. Handyside (20 Q. B. D. 359 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 347 ; 58 
 
 L. T. 344) . 105 
 
 Timothy v. Simpson (1 C. M. & R. 757 ; 5 Tyr. 244 ; 6 C. & P. 
 
 499) 32, 39 
 
 Todd v. Flight (9 C. B. N. S. 377 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 21 ; 3 L. T. 325 ; 
 
 9 W. R. 145) 89 
 
 Todd v. Hawkins (2 M. & R. 20 ; 8 C. & P. 888) . . . .179 
 Tolhausen v. Davies (59 L. T. 436 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 392 ; affirmed 
 
 58 L. J. Q. B. 98) 107 
 
 Toogood«. Spyring (1 C. M. & R. 181 ; 4 Tyr. 582). . . 177, 179 
 
 Torriano v. Young (6 C. & P. 8) 92 
 
 Trollope v. London Building Trades Federation (72 L. T. 342) . 181 
 
 Tuberville v. Savage (1 Mod. 3 ; 2 Keb. 545) 30 
 
 Tucker v. Newman (11 A. & E. 40 ; 3 P. & D. 14 ; 3 Jur. 1145) . 74 
 Tuff v, Warman (2 C. B. N. S. 740 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 263 ; affirmed 
 
 5 C. B. N. S. 573 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 222 ; 27 L. J. C. P. 322) . 124 
 
 Turner v. Hockey (56 L. J. Q. B. 301) 209 
 
 Turner v. Stallibrass [(1898] 1 Q. B. 56) 101 
 
 Twycross v. Grant (4 C. P. D. 40 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 39 L. T. 681 ; 
 
 27 W. R. 87 ; affirming 47 L. J. C. P. 676) ... 19, 22 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xliii 
 
 Udell v. Atherton (7 H. & N. 172 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 337 ; 7 Jur 
 N. S. 777 ; 4 L. T. 797) 
 
 Union Steamship Co. v. Claridge ([1894] App. Cas. 185 ; 63 L. J 
 P. C. 56 ; 70 L. T. 177) 
 
 United Horseshoe Co. v. Stewart (13 App. Cas. 401 ; 59 L. T. 561) 
 
 150 
 
 192 
 257 
 
 Vane v. Barnard (2 Vera. 738 ; 1 T. R. 56, n.) . . . .91 
 
 Vaughan v. Hampson (33 L. T. 15) 77 
 
 Vicars r. Wileocks (8 East, 1 ; 2 Sm. L. C. 506) . . . 159, 255- 
 Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas (13 App. Cas. 222 ; 
 
 57 L. J. P. C. 69 ; 58 L. T. 390) 260 
 
 Vine r. Saunders (4 Bing N. C. 96 ; 5 Scott, 359 ; 6 D. P. C. 233 ; 
 
 3 Hodges, 291 ; 2 Jur. 136) . . . " . . . . 183 
 
 Wainford v. Heyl (L. R. 20 Eq. 321 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 567 ; 33 L. T 
 
 1S2 
 
 12& 
 
 113 
 
 228 
 42 
 
 155 ; 23 W. R. 848) 
 
 Vv T aite v. North-Eastern Railway Co. (E. B. & E. 719 ; 27 L. J. Q. B 
 
 417 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 1300 ; affirmed E. B. & E. 728 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 258 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 936 ; 7 W. R. 311) .... 
 Wakelin v. London and South- Western Railway Co. (12 App. Cas 
 
 41 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 229 ; 55 L. T. 709) .... 
 Walsh v. Whiteley (21 Q. B. D. 371 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 586 ; 36 W. R, 
 
 876) 
 
 Walter v. Selfe (4 De G. & Sm. 322) 
 
 Ward v. Hobbs (4 App. Cas. 13 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 40 L. T. 273) 8 
 Ward v. Weeks (7 Bing. 211 ; 4 M. & P. 796) .... 257, 259 
 
 Waring v. MeCaldin (Ir. Rep. 7 C. L. 282) 180 
 
 Warner r. Riddiford (4 C. B. N". S. 180) 37 
 
 Wason, Ex p. (L. R. 4 Q. B. 573 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 302 ; 40 L. J. M. C. 
 
 168 ; 17 W. R. 881) 174 
 
 Wason v. Walter (L. R. 4 Q. B. 73 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 34 ; 19 L. T. 
 
 409 ; 17 W. R. 169 ; 8 B. & S. 671) 175 
 
 Watkin v. Hall (L. R. 3 Q. B. 396 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 125 ; 18 L. T. 
 
 561 ; 16 W. R. 857 ; 9 B. & S. 279) 169, 170 
 
 Watson v. Holliday (20 Ch. D. 780 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 906 ; 46 L. T. 
 
 878 ; 30 W. R. 747 ; affirmed 31 W. R. 536 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 543 ; 
 
 48 L. T. 545) 25 
 
 Weaver v. Bush (8 T. R. 78) 32, 33 
 
 Webb v. Beavan (11 Q. B. D. 609 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 544 ; 49 L. T. 
 
 201) " 16(> 
 
 Webb v. Portland Manufacturing Co. (3 Sumn. Rep. 189) 
 
 Webliu •„. Ballard (17 Q. B. D. 122 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 395 ; 54 L. T. 
 
 532 ; 34 W. R. 455) 227 
 
 Webster v. Watts (11 Q. B. 311 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 73 ; 12 Jur. 243) . 
 Weir v. Bell (3 Ex. D. 238 ; 47 L. J. Ex. 704 ; 38 L. T. 929 ; 26 
 
 W. R. 746) 129,143 
 
xliv TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Weldonu. De Bathe (14 Q. B. D. 339 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 113 ; 33 W. R. 
 
 328) 185 
 
 Weldon v. Neal (51 L. T. 289) 266 
 
 Welfare v. London, Brighton, and South-Coast Railway Co. (L. R. 
 
 4 Q. B. 693 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 241 ; 20 L. T. 743 ; 17 W. R. 
 
 1065) 119 
 
 Widler v. London, Brighton, and South-Coast Railway Co. (L. R. 
 
 9 C. P. 126 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 137 ; 29 L. T. 888 ; 22 W. R. 
 
 302) .121 
 
 Wellock v, Constantine (2 H. & C. 146 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 285 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 232 ; 7 L. T. 751) .10 
 
 Wells v. Abrahams (L R. 7 Q. B. 554 ; 41 L. J. Q. B. 306 ; 26 L. T. 
 
 326 ; 20 W. R. 659) 9, 10, 12 
 
 Wenman v. Ash (13 C. B. 836 ; 1 C. L. R. 592 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 190 ; 
 
 17 Jur. 579) 169 
 
 Western Bank of Scotland v. Addie (L. R. 1 H. of L. So. 145) 130, 142, 
 
 152 
 AVhalley v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. (13 Q. B. D. 131 ; 
 
 53 L. J. Q. B. 285 ; 50 L. T. 472 ; 32 W. R. 711) ... 84 
 Wharton v. Brook (1 Ventr. 21 ; Cro. Car. 211 ; 2 Keble, 489) . 162 
 
 Whatman v. Pearson (L. R. 3 C. P. 422) 197 
 
 Whitaker v. Forbes (1 C. P. D. 51 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 140 ; 33 L. T. 
 
 582 ; 24 W. R. 241) 27 
 
 White v. Mellin ([1895] App. Cas. 154 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 308 ; 72 L. T. 
 
 334 ; 43 W. R. 353) 60, 61 
 
 Whiteley v. Pepper (2 Q. B. 1). 276 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 436 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 588 ; 25 W. R. 607) 214 
 
 Whitfield v. South-Eastern Railway Co. (E. B. & E. 115 ; 27 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 229 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 688) 55 
 
 Whitwham v. Westminster Brynibo Coal and Coke Co. ([1896] 2 Ch. 
 
 538 ; 65 L. J. Ch. 741 ; 74 L. T. 804 ; 44 W. R. 698) . . 257 
 AVild v. Waygood ( [1892] 1 Q. B. 783 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 391 ; 66 L. T. 
 
 309 ; 40 W. R. 501) . 229 
 
 Wilkinson v. Downton ([1897] 2 Q. B. 57 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 493 ; 76 
 
 L. T. 493 ; 45 W. R. 525) ... ... 261 
 
 Wilkinson v. Haygarth (12 Q. B. 837 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 103 ; 11 Jur. 
 
 104) .... 72 
 
 Willans v. Taylor (3 M. & P. 350 ; 6 Bing. 183 ; affirmed sub rum. 
 
 Taylor v. Willans, 2 B. & A. 845) 52 
 
 Willetts v. Watt & Co. ([1892] 2 Q. B. 92 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 540 ; 66 
 
 L. T. 818 ; 40 W. R. 497) 227 
 
 Williams v. Clough (3 H. & N. 258 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 325) . . .223 
 Williams v. Great Western Railway Co. (L. R. 9 Ex. 157 ; 43 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 105 ; 22 W. R. 531) 113 
 
 Williams v. Jones (Lee, Cas. temp. Hardw. 298 ; 2 Str. 1049) . . 30 
 Williams v. Mostyn (4 M. & W. 145 ; 7 D. P. C. 38 ; 2 Jur. 645) . 249 
 Williams v. Smith (14 C. B. N. S. 596) 41, 46 
 
TABLE OF GASES. xlv 
 
 Williamson r. Freer (L. R. 9 C. P. 393 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 161 ; 30 
 
 L. T. 332 ; 22 W. R. 878) 168 
 
 Wiljis t\ Maclaehlan (1 Ex. D. 376 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 689) . . 40 
 Wilson !■. Newberry (L. E. 7 Q. B. 31 ; 41 L. J., Q. B. 31 ; 25 
 
 L. T. 698 ; 20 W. R. Ill) 86 
 
 Wilson v. Tumman (6 M. & G. 236 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 894 ; 1 D. &L. 
 
 513 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 306) 208 
 
 Winter r. Baker (3 T. L. R. 569) 89 
 
 Winterbottom v. Derby (L. R. 2 Ex. 316 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 194 ; 16 
 
 L. T. 771 ; 16 W. R, 15) 6 
 
 Winterbottom v. Wright (10 M. & W. 109) 104 
 
 Winterburn v. Brooks (2 C. & K. 16) 31 
 
 Wood ?•. Gray ([1892] App. Cas. 576 ; 67 L. T. 628) ... 17 
 Wood r. Leadbitter (13 M. & W. 838 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 161) . 77, 78 
 Woodhouse v. Walker (5 Q. B. D. 404 ; 49 L. J. Q. B. 609 ; 42 L. T. 
 
 770 ; 28 W. R. 765 ; 44 J. P. 666) 20, 92 
 
 Woodley v. Metropolitan Railway Co. (2 Ex. D. 384 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 
 
 521) . . 223 
 
 Woodward v. Lander (6 G. & P. 548) 179 
 
 Worth v. Gilling (L. R. 2 C. P. 1) 221 
 
 Wren v. Weild (L. R. 4 Q. B. 730 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 327 ; 10 B. & S. 
 
 51; 20 L. T. 1007) .... .... 60 
 
 Wright v. London and North-Western Railway Co. (1 Q. B. D. 252 ; 
 
 45 L. J. Q. B. 570 ; 33 L. T. 830) 225 
 
 Yaeboeough v. Bank of England (16 East, 6) . . . .55 
 Yarmouth v. France (19 Q. B. D. 647 ; 57 L. J. Q. B. 7 ; 36 W. R. 
 
 281 ; 4 Times Law Reports 1) 223, 227 
 
 Tellowly v. Gower (11 Ex. 274 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 289) .... 92 
 
O U T LINES 
 
 LAAV OF TORTS 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY : TORTS GENERALLY. 
 
 A tort is treated in the Common Law Procedure Act, chap. i. 
 1852, as a wrong independent of contract (a), but if Tort dt ,fi ne( j 
 such an expression be regarded as a definition, it is of 
 course of but little help towards the analysis of a tort. 
 Though our judges have shown a reluctance to commit 
 themselves to any definition of the word, yet there are 
 a few eases which will be of material assistance in deter- 
 mining what amounts to a tort or wrong for which a 
 remedy can be obtained by an action. "If," says 
 Bayley, J., " a man sustains damage by the wrongful 
 s act of another, he is entitled to a remedy ; but to give 
 him that title two things must concur — damage to him- 
 self, and a wrong committed by the other. That he 
 may have sustained damage is not of itself sufficient "(b). 
 As may be gathered from the concluding portion of the 
 judgment, a party who seeks redress for the wrongful 
 act of another should not only shew that the act was 
 wrongful, but that thereby some injury has been done 
 to some right of his own. But " actual perceptible injuria sine 
 damage is not indispensable as the foundation of an rf <™"° actiou- 
 
 (a) See schedule B. 
 
 (//) ll'X v. Commissioners nf Paghctm, 8 B. & C. 355, at }'. ?62. 
 
 R.T. 
 
2 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, i. ac tion ; it is sufficient to shew the violation of aright, 
 in which case the law will presume damage ; injuria 
 sine damno is actionable, as was laid down in the case 
 of Ashby v. White .(c) by Lord Holt, and in many sub- 
 sequent cases (d). In Ashby v. White Lord Holt laid 
 down that a man who had a right to vote at an elec- 
 tion for a member of Parliament might" maintain an 
 action against the returning officer for refusing to record 
 his vote, though the person for whom he offered to 
 vote was elected. The learned judge, in the course of 
 his celebrated judgment, says: " Surely every injury 
 imports a damage, though it does not cost the party one 
 farthing, and it is impossible to prove the contrary, for 
 a damage is not merely pecuniary, but an injury imports 
 a damage, when a man is thereby hindered of his right. 
 ... If a man gives another a cuff on the ear, though 
 it cost him nothing, no, not so much as a little 
 diachylon, yet he shall have his action, for it is a per- 
 sonal injury. So a man shall have an action against 
 another for riding over his ground, though it do him 
 no damage ; for it is an invasion of his property, and 
 the other has no right to come there." 
 
 In an American case (e) , referred to with approval by 
 Bayley, J. (/),Mr. Justice Story lays down the following 
 proposition : — 
 
 " I can very well understand that no action lies in a 
 case where there is damnum absque injuria — that is, 
 where there is a damage done without any wrong or 
 violation of any right of the plaintiff. But I am not 
 able to understand how it can correctly be said, in a 
 legal sense, that an action will not lie, even in case of 
 a wrong or violation of a right, unless it is followed by 
 some perceptible damage which can be established as 
 a matter of fact ; in other words, that injuria sine damno 
 
 (c) 2 Lil. Ray in. 938 ; 1 Sin. L. C. 231. 
 
 (d) Emhr/iy v. Owm, 6 Ex. 353, 363. 
 
 (c) If'cbh v. I'liiilaiid ilanufacturinij Company, 3 Sunim. Rep. 189. 
 (f)Embrey v. Ou.ru, 6 Ex. at p. 368. 
 
TORTS GENERALLY. 3 
 
 is not actionable. On the contrary, from my earliest chap, i. 
 
 reading I have considered it laid up among the very 
 
 elements of the common law, that, wherever there is a 
 
 wrong, there is a remedy to redress it ; and that every 
 
 injury imports damage in the nature of it ; and, if no 
 
 other damage is established, the party injured is entitled 
 
 to a verdict for nominal damages. A fortiori, this 
 
 doctrine applies where there is not only a violation of a 
 
 right of the plaintiff, but the act of the defendant, if 
 
 continued, may become the foundation, by lapse of time, 
 
 of an adverse right in the defendant ; for then it assumes 
 
 the character, not merely of a violation of a right, 
 
 tending to diminish its value, but it goes to the absolute 
 
 destruction and extinguishment of it. Under such 
 
 circumstances, unless the party injured can protect 
 
 his right from such a violation, by an action, it is plain 
 
 that it may be lost or destroyed without any possible 
 
 remedial redress. In my judgment, the common law 
 
 countenances no such inconsistency, not to call it by 
 
 a stronger name. Actual perceptible damage is not 
 
 indispensable as the foundation of an action. The law 
 
 tolerates no further inquiry than whether there has 
 
 been the violation of a right. If so, the party injured 
 
 is entitled to maintain his action for nominal damages 
 
 in vindication of his right, if no other damages are fit 
 
 and proper to remunerate him." 
 
 It is clear, therefore, that where a man commits a 
 wrongful act in violation of some legal right of another 
 — whether it be his right to personal security, his 
 right to be left undisturbed in the possession of his 
 property, or his right to enjoy his good reputation, or 
 any other right — the wrongdoer may be held liable 
 in an action, though no appreciable damage may have 
 been caused through his act ; in other words, injuria 
 sine damno — damnum being understood as meaning 
 mere loss — is actionable. But, on the other hand, 
 where there is simply a damnum absque injuria — that Damnum 
 is to say, where a man sustains a loss, but it is not noUotiwXf 
 
 B 2 
 
1 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, i. caused by any wrongful act done in violation of his 
 legal rights, by another person — no action can be 
 brought. 
 
 The following cases illustrate the principle that a 
 loss is not actionable where no right has been 
 violated : — 
 
 An action was brought against the returning officer 
 of a borough for refusing to reckon the plaintiff's vote 
 amongst those given at an election for the borough. 
 According to the state of the law at that time, the 
 plaintiff, though he was on the register, had in fact 
 lost the right to vote by reason of non-residence, but 
 the defendant, whose only duty was to satisfy himself 
 as to the identity of the person claiming to vcte. and 
 that he had not voted before at that election, wilfully, 
 but not maliciously, instituted an inquiry into the 
 plaintiffs right to vote, and upon the plaintiff appear- 
 ing not to be duly qualified in point of residence, 
 refused to count his vote. The plaintiff thereupon 
 brought his action, but he failed on the ground that 
 no right had been violated, because, by virtue of the 
 Act of Parliament he had no right to vote (g). So- 
 too, though a subject may have a right to present a 
 petition to Parliament, he has no right to compel any 
 individual member, even the member who represents 
 his own constituency, to present the petition (/i) . 
 
 Again, if a person has a successful school with a 
 large number of pupils, but the school gradually 
 declines in consequence of a rival and better establish- 
 ment of the same kind being set up in the neighbour- 
 hood, no action for the pecuniary loss thereby caused 
 can be maintained against the proprietor of the rival 
 school, for he has done no wrongful act in violation of 
 the other's rights (i). So, again, the owner of a piece 
 of land may build a wall thereon, so as to block up 
 
 (</) Pryce v. Belcher, 3 C. B. 58 ; 4 C. B. 866. 
 
 (h) Chafers v. Golchmid, (1894) 1 Q. B. 186. 
 
 (i) See Kecble v. Hickcringill, 11 East, at p. 574,-5 (n). 
 
TOUTS GENERALLY. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 the windows of a new house built on adjoining land, 
 if the owner of the house has not got, by grant or 
 prescription, a right to the light so excluded. 
 
 The foregoing remarks will assist in the understand- Actions ex 
 ing of one large class of the actions brought in the ^ctl^ 
 Queen's Bench Division. They are sometimes called tractu dis- 
 actions ex delicto, or actions arising out of tort, as lgl1 
 distinguished from actions ex contractu, that is to say, 
 arising from contract. That is the main division of 
 common-law actions, but at the same time it may be 
 observed that even before the recent Judicature Eules, 
 under which one is not obliged to lay his action in any 
 particular form, the line dividing these two classes of 
 actions was not very sharp or distinct. For example, in 
 many cases, though a contract had been made between 
 the plaintiff and the defendant, and afterwards broken, 
 the action was not necessarily cast in the form of an 
 action ex contractu. In the case oi Broun v. Boorman (k), 
 Lord Campbell says : " Wherever there is a contract, 
 and something to be done in the course of the employ- 
 ment which is the subject of that contract, if there is a 
 breach of duty in the course of that employment, the 
 plaintiff may either recover in tort or in contract ; " 
 that is to say, "where there is an employment, which 
 employment itself creates a duty, an action on the case 
 will lie for a breach of that duty, although it may 
 consist in doing something contrary to an agreement 
 made in the course of such employment by the party 
 upon whom such duty is cast " (I). In such cases the 
 principle appears to be that the contract creates a duty, 
 and the neglect to perform that duty, or the non-feas- 
 ance, is a ground of action for a tort (in) . To illustrate 
 this : Suppose a solicitor be employed to transact 
 certain business, and he does not transact it, or does it 
 negligently. In that case the action against him might 
 be either an action ex contractu, for breach of contract, 
 
 (A) 11 C. & F. 1, at p. 44. 
 
 (I) See per Jervis, C.J. : ConrUuay v. Earle, 10 C. B. 73, at p. 83. 
 
 (m) Per Tindal, C.J. : Boorman v. Brown, 3 (j. B. at p. 526. 
 
OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 Public wrong : 
 Remedy • 
 (1) by indict- 
 ment. 
 
 by action. 
 
 I - or an action e.r delicto, for breach of duty in not tran- 
 sacting, or in transacting negligently, the business 
 which he had undertaken (n) . Cases of this kind are 
 classified by some writers as quasi torts. 
 
 We have now seen that where there has been an 
 injuria, or wrongful act, or omission, whereby a per- 
 son's right has been violated, an action for damages 
 will lie. But if the right which has been violated is 
 not peculiar to any one individual, but common to all 
 the public, an action cannot be maintained by any 
 person who has not suffered some damage beyond the 
 rest of the public, but the appropriate remedy in such 
 a case is to present an indictment against the wrong- 
 doer. Thus, for example, in Winterbottom v. Lord 
 Derby (o), the plaintiff brought an action against the 
 defendant for the obstruction of a public footway ; but 
 judgment went against him, because he was unable to 
 shew that' he had suffered any more inconvenience or 
 loss than the rest of the public, having simply proved 
 that he had sometimes been delayed in removing the 
 obstruction, and sometimes obliged to turn aside by 
 another way. " If,'' says Chief Baron Kelly, in 
 delivering judgment, " we were to hold that everybody 
 who merely walked up to the obstruction, or who chose 
 to incur some expenses in removing it, might bring his 
 action on the case for being obstructed, there would 
 really be no limit to the number of actions which might- 
 be brought." But if in the case just mentioned the 
 plaintiff, being ignorant of the obstruction, walked 
 against it or into it, and broke his leg, an action could 
 no doubt have been successfully maintained. Nor in 
 such a case would an action necessarily have failed by 
 reason of the fact that between the placing of the 
 obstruction on the highway by the defendant and the 
 damage to the plaintiff there was an intervening act 
 by a third person, e.g., the moving of the obstruction 
 
 (v) See Boorman v. Brmen, ubi supra. 
 (<>) L. R. 2 Ex. 316. 
 
TORTS GENERALLY. 
 
 a few yards, if the defendant might have anticipated ch ap, i . 
 that mischie'f in some way might arise from what he 
 did (p). Again, in Hart v. Bassett(q), the plaintiff, a 
 farmer of tithes, was prevented, by the defendant's 
 obstruction of a highway, from carrying them home, 
 and the obstruction was attended with considerable 
 loss to the plaintiff. He had to take tithe, and he was 
 liable to an action if he allowed the tithe to be injured 
 on the ground, or if it was not taken within a reason- 
 able time. Consequently, he was obliged, by reason 
 of the obstruction, to spend extra money in the dis- 
 charge of his lawful business, and so he suffered 
 peculiar pecuniary damage, and therefore had a right 
 of action (/•). 
 
 Secondly, though a person may have done a wrong- 
 ful act, and though damage to another may be traced 
 from it, yet if such damage be not the natural or 
 probable consequence of such wrongful act, no redress 
 can be had by action. This may be seen from the 
 case of Sharp v. Powell (s). In that case the defendant's 
 servant (in breach of the Police Act, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, 
 s. 54), washed a van in a public street in London, and 
 allowed the waste water to run down a gutter towards 
 a grating leading to the sewer about twenty-five yards 
 off. In consequence of the extreme severity of the 
 weather the grating was obstructed by ice, and the 
 water flowed over a portion of the roadway, which 
 was badly paved and uneven, and it there became 
 frozen. There was no evidence that the defendant 
 knew of the grating being obstructed. The plaintiff's 
 horse, whilst being led past the spot, slipped upon 
 
 Remoteness of 
 damage. 
 
 (p) See Clark v. Chambers, 3 Q. B. D. 327, 338, cited post, 
 Chap. XI. p. 253 : see also Engelhart v. Farrant, (1897) 1 Q. B. 240. 
 
 (q) 1 L. Raym. 486 ; L. R 2 Ex. p. 321. 
 
 (r) In Boyd v. Great Northern Railway Company of Ireland, Irish 
 Rep. (1895) 2 I. R. 555, a member of the public, who, by the defendants' 
 negligence, was delayed for an unreasonable time at a level crossing 
 over a highway, and thereby sustained damage, was held entitled to 
 an action. 
 
 (a) L. R. 7 C. P. 253. 
 
herd 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, i. t^ i ce anc i broke its leg. The plaintiff thereupon 
 brought an action against the defendant for the loss 
 of his horse, but a judgment of nonsuit against him 
 was upheld, on the ground that the breaking of the 
 horse's leg was a consequence too remote to be attri- 
 buted to the wrongful act of the defendant. Chief 
 Justice Bovill, in his judgment, says: "Where there 
 is no reason to expect it and no knowledge in the 
 person doing the wrongful act that such a state of 
 things exists as to render the damage probable, if 
 injury does result to a third person it is generally 
 considered that the wrongful act is not the proximate 
 cause of the injury, so as to render the wrongdoer 
 liable to an action " (t). The well-known case of 
 Scott v. Shep- Scott v. Shepherd («) will give some assistance in 
 deciding what events may be held to be the probable 
 consequences of a wrongful act. In that case the 
 defendant threw a lighted squib into a market-house 
 where there was a large number of people. The squib 
 fell upon the stall of one Yates, who sold gingerbread. 
 Thereupon, one Willis, an assistant of Yates, in order 
 to prevent injury to himself and the gingerbread, threw 
 the lighted squib across the market-house, where it 
 fell upon the stall of one Kyal ; and Eyal, who also 
 sold gingerbread, instantly, and to save his own goods 
 from being injured, took up the lighted squib from his 
 stall, and threw it to another part of the market-house, 
 and in so doing hit the plaintiff in the face, and, the 
 squib thereupon bursting, the plaintiff's eye was put 
 out. The Court held that the defendant, though the 
 
 (t) Perhaps the defendant might have succeeded on another ground, 
 namely, that what he did was only wrongful by reason of the statute, 
 and that the mischief caused by him was not the kind of mischief aimed 
 at by the statute, which made it wrong to do certain acts "to the 
 annoyance of the inhabitants or passengers''- see Wanly. Hobos, i 
 App. Cas. 13. The mere washing of the van in the street was not 
 wrongful so far as plaintiff was concerned, but the obstruction of the 
 highway in Clark v. Chambers, 3 Q. B. D. 327, supra, was wrongful 
 against all who had occasion to pass along the highway. Sharp v. 
 Pvirril seems to have been approved by the Court of Appeal in Hard- 
 Baker v. Idle District Council, (189G) 1 Q. B. 335, 350. 
 
 (a) 1 Sm. L. G. 13?. 
 
TORTS GENERALLY. 9 
 
 injury was not immediately caused by him, was liable chap, i. 
 to the plaintiff, on the ground that the natural and 
 probable consequence of his act was injury to some- 
 body, and that what the intermediate parties, Willis 
 and Eyal, did was by necessity, and that necessity 
 was imposed on them by the defendant. 
 
 There is still a third class of cases where, though .Unices, &.<., 
 there has been a wrongful act done in violation of a chrumsu^s 
 person's right, there is no right of action. So long as r i,otliCt ed from 
 a judge acts within his jurisdiction, no action can ^j°" s<K 
 be brought against him, however maliciously he may 
 act in the performance of his duties (.r). So, too, a 
 witness cannot be held liable, in an action of slander, 
 for what he says in the witness-box with reference to 
 the inquiry on which he has been called to give 
 evidence, even though he wilfully go out of his way 
 to commit perjury (y) ; and a similar rule prevails 
 with regard to statements made by an advocate in 
 the conduct of a case (z) . 
 
 Felonies. — With regard to torts which are also 
 felonies, the law is in a very curious, and perhaps we 
 should say unsatisfactory, state. It will be found laid 
 down in many text-books that, where a person has 
 committed a felony whereby another person is injured, 
 the injured party cannot recover damages in a civil 
 action till he has first done his duty to his country by 
 prosecuting the felon. " No doubt," says Cockhurn, 
 C.J., "it has been long established as the law of 
 England that where an injury amounts to an infringe- 
 ment of the civil rights of an individual, and at the 
 same time to a felonious wrong, the civil remedy — that 
 is, the right of redress by action — is suspended until 
 the party inflicting the injury has been prosecuted " («) . 
 
 (■g) Ilevis v. Smith, 18 C. B. 126 ; JJauiciiis v. Paald, L. R. 5 Q. B. 
 91 ; Anderson v. Ourrk, (1895) 1 Q. Ji. 668. 
 (y) Seaman v. jVe//terc/i/l, 2 C. P. D. 53. 
 (z) Marnier v. Lamb, 11 <j. B. D. 588. 
 (a) Wells v. Abrahams, L. R. 7 <j. B. 551. 
 
 State of the 
 law as regards 
 civil remedy 
 where wrong- 
 ful act 
 amounts to 
 felony. 
 
10 . OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Again, in Ex parte Ball, In re Shepherd (b) , Braniwell, 
 L.J., says : " The law on this subject is in a remarkable 
 state. For three hundred years it has been said, in 
 various ways, by judges, many of the greatest emin- 
 ence, without intimating a doubt except in one instance, 
 that there is some impediment to the maintenance of 
 an action for a debt arising in this way. The doubt is 
 that which was not so much expressed by Mr. Justice 
 Blackburn in Wells v. Abrahams (c) as to be inferred 
 from what he said. But, though such an opinion has 
 been entertained and expressed for all this time, there 
 are but two cases in which it has operated to prevent 
 the debt being enforced. These two cases are Wellock 
 v. Constantine (d) and Ex parte Elliott "(e). Then his 
 lordship, in dealing with the opinion, expressed for 
 centuries, that the felonious origin of a debt is in some 
 way an impediment to its enforcement, asks, In what 
 way ? and says : " I can only think of four possible 
 ways — (1) That no cause of action arises at all out of 
 a felony ; (2) that it does not arise till prosecution ; 
 (3) that it arises on the act, but is suspended till 
 prosecution ; (4) that there is neither defence to, nor 
 suspension of, the claim by, or at the instance of, the 
 felon debtor, but that the Court, of its own motion, or 
 on the suggestion of the Crown, should stay proceedings 
 till public justice is satisfied. It must be admitted 
 that there are great difficulties in the way of each of 
 these theories. That the first is not true is shewn by 
 Marsh v. Keating (_/), where it was held that, prosecu- 
 tion being impossible, a felony gave rise to a recoverable 
 debt. It is difficult to suppose that the second supposed 
 solution of the problem is correct. That would be to 
 make the cause of action the act of the felon plus a 
 prosecution. The cause of action would not arise till 
 
 (b) 10 Ch. D. 667, at p. 671. 
 
 (c) Ubi supra. 
 
 (d) 2 H. & C. 146. 
 
 (e) 3 M. & A. 110. 
 (/) 1 Bing. N. C. 198. 
 
TORTS GENERALLY. 11 
 
 after both. Till then the Statute of Limitations would chap, i. 
 not run. In such a case as the present, or where the 
 felon had died, it would be impossible. And it is to be 
 observed that it is never suggested that the cause of 
 action is the debt and the prosecution. The third 
 possible way is attended by difficulties. The suspen- 
 sion of a cause of action is a thing nearly unknown to 
 the law. It exists where a negotiable instrument is 
 given for a debt, and in cases of compositions with 
 creditors, and these were not held till after much doubt 
 and contest. There may be other instances. And 
 what is to happen ? Is the Statute of Limitations to 
 run? Suppose a debtor or his representative sue the 
 creditor, is his set-off suspended ? Then how is the 
 defence of impediment to be set up ? By plea ? That 
 would be contrary to the rule, ' Nemo allegans suam 
 turpitudinem est audiendus.' Besides, it would be 
 absurd to suppose that the debtor himself ever would 
 so plead, and face the consequences. Then, is the 
 fourth solution right ? Nobody ever heard of such a 
 thing. Nobody, in any case or book, ever suggested 
 it till Mr. Justice Blackburn did as a possibility. Is it 
 left to the Court to find it out on the pleadings ? If 
 it appears on the trial, is the judge to discharge the 
 jury ? How is the Crown to know of it ? There are 
 difficulties, then, in all the possible ways in which 
 one can suppose this impediment to be set up to the 
 prosecution of an action. But, again, suppose it can 
 be, what is the result ? It has been held that, when 
 the felon is executed for another felony, the claim may 
 be maintained. What is to happen when he dies a 
 natural death, when he goes beyond the jurisdiction, 
 when there is a prosecution and an acquittal from 
 collusion or carelessness by some prosecutor other than 
 the party injured? All these cases create great diffi- 
 culties to my mind in the application of this alleged 
 law, and go a long way to justify Mr. Justice Black- 
 burn's doubt. Still, after the continued expression of 
 opinion, and the cases of Ex 'parte Elliott and Wellock 
 
12 OUTLINES OK TORTS. 
 
 chap . x - v. Constaiitiiw, I should hesitate to say that there is no 
 practical law as alleged by the respondent." 
 
 It is clear, from Wells v. Abrahams {(f), that a judge 
 cannot refuse to try an action because the evidence at 
 the trial tends to shew that the defendant has com- 
 mitted a felony in connection with the subject-matter 
 of the action. Again, a statement of claim is not 
 demurrable on the ground that it shews the cause of 
 action to be a felony for which the felon has not been 
 prosecuted (//) , whether the action be brought against 
 the felon or against another, e.g., his master. 
 If the Court has power to strike out a statement of 
 claim, or part of one, which shews on its face that 
 it is sought to make the defendant liable civilly for 
 a felony for which he has not been prosecuted, it is 
 at all events clear that this cannot be done where 
 the felony has not been committed upon or against the 
 plaintiff. Thus, in Appleby v. Fniuliin (i), a paragraph 
 of the statement of claim in an action for seduction 
 alleged that the defendant administered noxious drugs 
 to the plaintiff's daughter for an unlawful purpose, and 
 the Court refused to strike out the paragraph, the 
 plaintiff not being the person upon whom the felony was 
 committed, and so having no duty to prosecute. But a 
 statement of claim which shews that the tort complained 
 of is a felony committed upon or against the plaintiff 
 may, it would seem, be struck out (A:). If the felon 
 become bankrupt, assuming that the person upon or 
 against whom the felony has been committed cannot 
 prove in the bankruptcy in respect thereof until after a 
 prosecution, yet should he also become bankrupt, the 
 disability will not extend to his trustee, who represents 
 his creditors (I) . There are two other authorities which 
 may be usefully referred to on this subject generally, 
 
 (g) L. R. 7 <■}. B. 55 J. 
 
 [h) Eoopc v. D'Avigdor, 10 Q. B. D. 412; Osbom v. Gillett, L. B. 
 8 Ex. b8. 
 
 (i) 17 Q. B. D. 93 ; see 11. S. C. Onl. xix. ,. 27. 
 
 (k) Applchi) v. Franklin, 17 <i. B. D. 93. 
 
 (/) Ej: parte Ball, In re Shepherd, 10 Ch. D. 667 ; see post, p. 24. 
 
TORTS <: eneraj.lv. 13 
 
 namely, K ,r parte Leslie, In re (hierrier^m), and Midland chap.j. 
 Insurance Company v. Smith (n), where the cases are 
 reviewed by the late Mr. Justice Watkin Williams. On 
 the whole, from a perusal of the authorities referred to, 
 one may come to the conclusion that if the old rule 
 of law under discussion still exists, it is 'difficult for a 
 defendant to avail himself of it, except perhaps by 
 applying to strike out a statement of claim complaining 
 of a tort which by the statement appears to be a felony 
 committed upon or against the plaintiff (o). 
 
 Effect of Death on Torts — Let us next consider 
 how a right of action for a tort may be affected by the 
 death either of the party injured or of the tort-feasor. It 
 was a principle of the common law that if an injury was 
 done either to the person or property of another, for 
 which damages only could be recovered in satisfaction, 
 the action died with the person to whom or by whom the 
 wrong was done. In other words, where the action was 
 for a tort done to the person or property of another, the 
 rule was "Actio personalis moritur cum persona" (p). 
 And the rule still exists in cases not falling within 
 some one qf the following exceptions. Thus the parties 
 to an action for a tort agreed that the action should be 
 referred to arbitration, and that if before the making 
 of the award either of the parties should die, the award 
 should be delivered to his personal representative. 
 After the hearing, and before the award was made, the 
 plaintiff died, and his executors took up the award, 
 but it was held that the cause of action died with the 
 plaintiff, and that the stipulation as to the delivery of 
 the award to the respective personal representatives 
 was futile (</). The first modification of the rule was 
 made by 4 Edw. III. c. 7, which runs as follows : — 4 Edw III. 
 " Whereas in times past executors have not had actions 
 for a trespass done to their testators, as of the goods 
 
 C. I. 
 
 (m) 20 Ch. D. 131. («) 6 I). B. D. £61. 
 
 (e) A/)j//i'Iiji v. Franklin, supin. 
 
 (p) Seu Williams on Executors, 9th erl, p. 007. 
 
 (q) Boickcr v. Emus, 15 <». B. D. 565. 
 
14 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, i. an d chattels of the same testators carried away in their 
 life, and so such trespasses have hitherto remained 
 unpunished ; it is enacted, that the executors in such 
 cases shall have an action against the trespassers, and 
 recover their damages in like manner as they, whose 
 executors they be, would have had if they were in life." 
 
 This was followed by the 25 Edw. III. stat. 5, 
 which extended to the executors of executors the 
 remedy given to executors by the former Act. 
 Administrators have also been held to come within 
 its equity (r). This Act of 4 Edw. III. c. 7, being 
 remedial, has always been expounded liberally, and 
 so, as Mr. Justice Williams puts it, " an executor or 
 administrator shall now have the same action for any 
 injury done to the personal estate of the deceased, in 
 his lifetime, whereby it has become less beneficial to the 
 c.recntor or administrator, as the deceased himself 
 might have had, whatever the form of the action 
 may be " (s). 
 
 The statute 4 Edw. III. did not, however, give a 
 right of action for injuries done to the freehold or to 
 the person of the testator or intestate ; but, as will 
 presently be seen, later statutes to some extent 
 Where injury remedied this. The first of these, 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, 
 hold of person a ^ er reciting in s. 2 that there is no remedy provided 
 whosubse- by law for injuries to the real estate of any person 
 quen y les. deceased, committed in his lifetime, enacts (s. 2) that 
 " an action of trespass, or trespass on the case, as the 
 case may be, may be maintained by the executors or 
 administrators of any person deceased for any injury 
 to the real estate of such person, committed in his 
 lifetime, for which an action might have been main- 
 tained by such person, so as such injury shall have 
 been committed within six calendar months before 
 the death of such deceased person, and provided such 
 
 (r) Tharpe v. Stallwood, 5 M. & G. 760. 
 (s) Williams on Executors, 9th ed. p. 698. 
 
TORTS GENERALLY. 15 
 
 action shall be brought within one year after the c hap, i. 
 death of such person; and the damages, when 
 recovered, shall be part of the personal estate of such 
 person " (t). 
 
 Another statute, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, commonly Lord Camp- 
 known as Lord Campbell's Act, gives a right of action beUs Aot " 
 for injuries to the person in cases where those injuries 
 have resulted in the death of the person injured. It 
 enacts that, " whensoever the death of a person shall 
 be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the 
 act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had 
 not ensued) have entitled the party injured to main- 
 tain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, 
 then, and in every such case, the person who would 
 have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be 
 liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the 
 death of the person injured, and although the death 
 shall have been caused under such circumstances as 
 amount in law to felony." An action brought under 
 this Act is to be for the benefit of the wife, husband, 
 parent, and child of the person whose death shall 
 have been so caused, and it is left to the jury to 
 divide any damages that they may give in such 
 manner as they may think proper. The word 
 " parent " in the Act includes father and mother, 
 grandfather and grandmother, stepfather and step- 
 mother, whilst " child " includes son and daughter, 
 grandson and granddaughter, stepson and step- 
 daughter (s. 5), but not an illegitimate child («). 
 
 As to the amount of damages recoverable in actions 
 under this statute, it has been held that the measure 
 of damages is the pecuniary loss which the persons 
 on whose behalf the action has been brought have 
 sustained by the death of the deceased ; but the jury 
 are not to give damages for the pain and suffering 
 
 (t) As to equitable remedies surviving to an heir or devisee, see 
 Jones v. Simes, 43 Oh. JD. 607. 
 
 (u.) Dickinson v. Xurt.k-Easte.rn Railway Company, 2 H. & C. 735. 
 
16 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 endured by him, nor for the mental anguish felt by his 
 family, nor for the funeral or mourning expenses (.r). 
 Not only may damages be given for the actual 
 pecuniary loss sustained, but the reasonable expecta- 
 tion of pecuniary advantage from the prolongation of 
 the life which has been brought to an end by the 
 wrongful act, neglect, or default, is to be taken into 
 account (?/). 
 
 An action under this Act must be commenced within 
 twelve calendar months after the death of the deceased, 
 and the plaintiff must, with his statement of claim, 
 deliver to the defendant full particulars of the person 
 or persons on whose behalf the action is brought, and 
 the nature of the claim in respect of which damages are 
 sought to be recovered (ss. 3, 4). 
 
 If there should be no executor or administrator, or if 
 no action shall have been brought by the executor or 
 administrator within six months after the date of the 
 death, then, by a later Act (27 & 28 Vict. c. 95), the 
 action may be brought by and in the name of the 
 persons for whose benefit such action would have been 
 if it had been brought in the name of the executor or 
 administrator. 
 
 Lord Campbell's Act, strictly speaking, may be said 
 to give a new cause of action, because the action is- 
 given in substance, not to the person representing in 
 point of estate the deceased (who would naturally repre- 
 sent him as to all his own rights of action which could 
 survive) , but to certain members of his family ; and not- 
 only so, but the action is not one which the deceased 
 could have brought if he had survived the injury, for 
 death is essentially the cause of action (z) . But though 
 this be so, yet if the deceased has in his lifetime 
 
 {x) Franklin v. South-Eastern Railway Company, 3 H. & X. 211 ; 
 Dalt.on v. Smith- Ea stem Railway Company, 4 C. B. X. S. 296 ; Uhih" 
 \. iliitlu.nd Raiheay Company, 18 Q. B. 93. 
 
 (u) Pi/rn v. Great Northern Railway Company, 2 B. & S. 759 ; 4 
 B. & S.396. 
 
 (s) Seward v. "Vera Cruz," 10 App. C;i.-. 59. 
 
TORTS GENERALLY. 
 
 17 
 
 accepted a sum of money from the wrongdoer in 
 full satisfaction and discharge of his claim for the 
 injuries which caused his death, or has otherwise put 
 it out of his power to sue, his representatives or family 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 will have no right 
 Campbell's Act (a). 
 
 to bring an action under Lord 
 
 Again, it will be seen hereafter that in cases coming 
 under the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, or the Work- 
 men's (Compensation for Accidents) Act, 1897, proceed- 
 ings may be taken in respect of personal injuries which 
 result in a workman's death (b). 
 
 The rule of law, " Actio personalis moritur cum 
 persona," does not apply to breaches of contractual or 
 statutory (c) duty which have caused loss to the personal 
 estate of a deceased person, but it applies to torts and 
 to breaches of contract (d) which have not caused such 
 loss (e) : Thus, an action brought by an administrator 
 for a breach of a promise of marriage to the intestate 
 was held not maintainable, as no special damage to 
 the personal estate of the intestate was alleged (/). 
 And, conversely, such an action will not lie against the 
 personal representatives of a deceased promisor, unless 
 special damage be alleged, and in that case it will be 
 confined to the claim for such special damage (<-/) . It 
 need hardly be mentioned that in actions for breach of 
 promise of marriage vindictive and exemplary damages 
 are often given as a solatium for the wounded personal 
 feelings of the plaintiff (A). 
 
 (a) Read v. Great Eastern Railway Company, L. R. 3 Q. B. 555 ; 
 Griffiths v. Dudley, 9 Q. B. D. 357 (see post, Chap. X.) ; ef. Blake v. 
 Midland Railway Company, IS Q. B. 93. As to Scotland, see Wood v. 
 Gray, (1892) App. Cas. 576. 
 
 (b) Sea post, pp. 226, 2S3. 
 
 (<■) Peebles v. Uswaldtwistle Urban District Council, (1896) 2 Q. B. 159. 
 See S. C. (1897) 1 Q. B. 625. 
 
 (rf) Express or implied, e.g., an implied contract by a solicitor 
 or surgeon to use reasonable professional skill and diligence. See 
 Chamberlain v. Williamson, infra, at p. 415. 
 
 (e) See Williams on Executors, 9th ed. p. 709. 
 
 (/) Chamberlain, v. Williamson, 2 11. & S. 408. 
 
 (g) Finlay v. Chirney, 20 Q. B. D. 494. 
 
 (h) Chamberlain v. Williamson, ubi supra. 
 
 R.T. C 
 
 "Actio per- 
 sonalis 
 moritur cum 
 persona " : 
 Application 
 of maxim 
 where wrong 
 arises ex con- 
 tractu. 
 
18 
 
 OUTLINES OF TOETS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 There may "be 
 two actions 
 where there 
 has been a 
 breach of 
 contract. 
 
 Bnt not where 
 there has been 
 a mere per- 
 sonal tort. 
 
 Where damage to the personal estate of a deceased 
 person resulting from a breach of contract can be shewn, 
 an executor or administrator may have two actions — 
 one in respect of that damage, and the other under 
 Lord Campbell's Act, for the pecuniary loss caused to 
 the family of the deceased by reason of his death. Thus, 
 in Bradshaw v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Com- 
 pany (i), where a passenger on a railway was injured by 
 the company's negligence, and, after an interval, died in 
 consequence of the injury, it was held that his executrix 
 might recover, in an action for breach of contract (to 
 carry with due care) against the company, the damage 
 to his personal estate arising in his lifetime from medical 
 expenses and loss occasioned by his inability to attend 
 to business. This decision, though questioned, was 
 followed in Leggottv. Great Northern Railway (k) , where 
 the deceased, a season-ticket holder on the defendants' 
 railway, was killed by their negligence. 
 
 In each of the cases just referred to, the duty for 
 breach of which the action was brought arose out of 
 contract, and the action was in substance for breach of 
 contract to use due care towards the passenger. In a 
 later case (/), the plaintiff sued as the administratrix 
 of her husband, who, whilst crossing the defendants' 
 railway at a level crossing, was, through the negligence 
 of the defendants, run over by an engine, and sustained 
 personal injuries which prevented him from following 
 his occupation and earning wages, and caused him to 
 incur expenses for medical attendance and nursing, 
 whereby his personal estate was diminished in value. 
 A demurrer to the statement of claim was allowed by a 
 Divisional Court, who, pointing out that the action was 
 not in any way founded on contract, held that the 
 maxim "Actio personalis moritur cum persona" applied, 
 as the tort complained of was an injury to the person 
 
 (i) L. R. 10 C. P. 189. 
 
 (Ic) 1 Q. B. D. 599 ; see also Daly v. Dublin, Wichlow and Wexford 
 Railway Company, 30 L. B. Ir. 514. 
 
 (1) Pulling v. Great Eastern Railway Company, 9 Q. B. D. HO. 
 
TOUTS GENERALLY. 19 
 
 arising from the defendant's negligence, and there was chap, i. 
 no authority for the, proposition that, because in conse- 
 quence of such injury the person injured is put to 
 expense, the case could be brought within the category 
 of cases to which the statute of Edward III. applies. 
 The earlier case of Twycross v. Grant (m) was referred 
 to, where Brett, L.J., says : " Wherever a breach of con- 
 tract or a tort has been committed in the lifetime of a 
 testator, his executor is entitled to maintain an action, 
 if it is shewn upon the face of the proceedings that an 
 injury has accrued to the personal estate." As to this, 
 Denman, J"., in Palling v. Great Eastern Railway 
 Company, uhi supra, said : " Some of the expressions used 
 by the judges in the case of Ttcycross v. Grant, seem no 
 doubt to go to considerable lengths, but those expres- 
 sions must be construed with reference to the cause 
 of action in that case," which was a fraudulent suppres- 
 sion of certain contracts in a prospectus issued by the 
 promoters of a company, and not a mere personal tort. 
 
 In a recent case (>i) the distinction between a mere 
 personal tort and one which • causes damage to the 
 deceased plaintiff's personal estate stands out very 
 clearly. 
 
 In this case the plaintiff was a wine merchant, the 
 registered proprietor of a trade-mark, and a dealer in a 
 brand of champagne introduced by himself, which was 
 known as the " Delmonico " champagne. The defen- 
 dants published a statement to the effect that wine 
 advertised as the "Delmonico" champagne could not 
 be the wine it was represented to be, as no champagne 
 of that description was genuine unless the name of 
 Messrs. Delbeck & Co. was on the labels. The plain- 
 tiff brought an action for libel and for damage to 
 his trade or business occasioned by the publication 
 of such libel, and died after the commencement of 
 the action. On the continuance of the action by 
 
 <m) 4 C. P. D. 40. 
 
 In) Hatchard v. Mege and others, 18 Q. B. D. 771. 
 
 c 2 
 
20 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Action against 
 representa- 
 tives of de- 
 ceased 
 persons. 
 
 the personal representative of the deceased, it was held 
 that, so far as the action was for defamation, either 
 of private character or of a person in relation to his 
 trade, it came to an end on the death of the plaintiff; 
 but that so far as the action was for the publication 
 of a false and malicious statement, causing damage 
 to the plaintiff's personal estate — i.e., to the trade- 
 mark or brand under which the champagne was sold 
 — it could be continued by the personal representa- 
 tive (o) . 
 
 We have already dealt with 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, 
 s. 2, so far as it allows actions to be brought by the 
 executors or administrators of a deceased person for 
 injuries done to his real estate before his death. The 
 same section allows actions to be brought against the 
 executors or administrators of a deceased person who 
 has committed in his lifetime an injury either against 
 the real or the personal estate of another person. It 
 enacts that " an action of trespass, or trespass on the 
 case, as the case may be, may be maintained against the 
 executors or administrators of any person deceased for 
 any wrong committed by him in his lifetime to another 
 in respect of his property, real or personal, so as such 
 injury shall have been committed within six calendar 
 months before snch person's death, and so as such 
 action shall be brought within six calendar months 
 after such executors or administrators shall have 
 taken upon themselves the administration of the 
 estate and effects of such person ; and the damages 
 to be recovered in such action shall be payable in like 
 order of administration as the simple contract debts 
 of such person " (p). 
 
 In a very recent case a person more than six months 
 before he died completed a building which obstructed 
 the plaintiff's ancient lights : an action brought by 
 
 (o) See also Oakey v. Daltun, 35 Ch. D. 700. 
 
 (p) See Woodhouse v. Walker, 5 Q. B. D. 404 (action for permissive 
 waste against executor of deceased tenant for life who was bound to 
 repair by the instrument creating the estate : see post, p. 92). 
 
TORTS GENERALLY. 21 
 
 the plaintiff against the administrators of such person, chap, i. 
 ■within six months of the death, was held maintainable, 
 the obstruction being a continuing wrong existing at 
 the date of the death (q). 
 
 If the testator or intestate, against whom an action 
 
 has been brought for wrongs committed against the 
 
 real or personal property of another, should die during 
 
 the pendency of the action, then the action cannot be 
 
 revived against his representatives unless the wrongs 
 
 were committed within six calendar months before the 
 
 death of the deceased. Thus, in Kirk v. Todd (r) the 
 
 plaintiff brought his action for damages and an 
 
 injunction against the firm of Todd & Co. for fouling 
 
 a certain stream which flowed by the plaintiff's 
 
 premises. The firm consisted of Todd alone, who 
 
 died more than six months after the commencement 
 
 •of the action, and the action was continued against 
 
 his executors. Yice-Chancellor Bacon dismissed the 
 
 action, and the Court of Appeal upheld this decision, 
 
 Jessel, M.K., saying : " This was an action on a 
 
 simple tort. It did not appear that the defendant 
 
 had got any benefit by fouling the plaintiff's stream ; 
 
 he had only injured the plaintiff. As I understand 
 
 the rule at common law, it was this — you could not 
 
 sue executors for a wrong committed by their testator 
 
 for which you could only recover unliquidated 
 
 damages. That rule has never been altered, except 
 
 by the Act 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, which allowed the 
 
 •executors to be sued in certain cases, but with the 
 
 limitation that the injury must have been committed 
 
 not more than six months before the death of the 
 
 testator. That was not so here ; therefore the statute 
 
 did not apply, and the rule of the common law 
 
 remained in its simplicity" (s). 
 
 (q) Jenksv. Clifden, (1897) 1 Ch. 694. 
 
 (r) 21 Ch. D. 484. 
 
 (s) Ibid. p. 488. If the nuisance were a continuing one existing at 
 the date of the death, might not the plaintiff have maintained an action 
 brought against the executors ? See Jenks v. Clifden, ubi supra. 
 
22 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Actions, not 
 for a tort, 
 but for the 
 recovery of 
 property. 
 
 Taking the converse case to Twycross v. Grant, supra, 
 it is submitted that an action would lie against the 
 executor of a deceased promoter in respect of a 
 fraudulent omission or statement in a prospectus of a 
 company in which the plaintiff was induced to take 
 shares to his loss, provided that the "injury" was 
 committed within six months before the death and 
 the action is brought within the time prescribed by 
 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, s. 2 (t). 
 
 Apart, however, from the statute 3 & 4 Will. IV. 
 c. 42, a remedy for a wrongful act can be pursued 
 against the estate of a deceased person by whom the 
 act has been committed, when property, or the proceeds 
 of property, belonging to another have been appro- 
 priated by the deceased person ; in other words, the 
 action in such cases, though arising out of a wrongful 
 act, does not die with the person. But hereon a very 
 nice question arises — namely, whether the principle 
 thus enunciated is limited to cases in which property, 
 or the proceeds of property, have been appropriated 
 by, the deceased person, or whether it applies to a case 
 in which the deceased person has derived any other 
 benefit from his wrongdoing than property, or the 
 proceeds of property : whether, for example, it applies 
 to a case in which the benefit derived has not been in 
 the form of an actual acquisition of property, but of 
 a saving of expenditure which must otherwise have 
 been incurred by the wrongdoer ; where, for instance, 
 the deceased wrongfully used, for the carriage of 
 minerals, certain roads and passages under another 
 person's -farm, and so saved himself expenditure 
 which he would otherwise have incurred : see per 
 Baggallay, L.J., diss., in Phillips v. Homfray (u). In 
 
 (t) Of., however, Peek v. Gurney, L. R. 6 H. of L. 377, at p. 393, 
 where the reason given for the dismissal of an action against the 
 executor of a deceased promoter was that " his estate derived no 
 benefit from the misrepresentation." It is submitted that this is 
 unnecessary where the injury is committed and the action brought by 
 an allottee within the times mentioned in the above section — a state of 
 facts which did not exist in reek v. Gurney. 
 
 (m) 21 Ch. D. 439. 
 
TORTS GENERALLY. 23 
 
 the case just cited the majority of the Court of Appeal chap, i. 
 (Cotton and Bowen, L.JJ.) held that "property, or 
 the proceeds or value, which, in the lifetime of the 
 wrongdoer, could have been recovered from him, can 
 be traced after his death to his assets, and recaptured 
 by the rightful owner there (,r). But it is not every 
 wrongful act by which a wrongdoer indirectly benefits 
 that falls under this head, if the benefit does not 
 consist in the acquisition of property, or its proceeds 
 or value. Where there is nothing among the assets 
 of the deceased that in law or in equity belongs to the 
 plaintiff, and the damages which have been done to 
 him are unliquidated and uncertain, the executors of 
 a wrongdoer cannot be sued merely because it was 
 worth the wrongdoer's while to commit the act which 
 is complained of, and an indirect benefit may have 
 been reaped thereby. Two illustrations can be given 
 of the above distinction with regard to the liability of 
 executors. The produce, proceeds, or value of waste, 
 equitable or legal, committed by a tenant for life, can 
 be followed into the hands of his executors, and 
 retaken from them. If he has wrongly cut timber, 
 the timber, or its proceeds or value, can be followed. 
 But no action for waste — permissive or voluntary — as 
 such, lies against the executors of a tenant for life. 
 By non-repairing a house, or by ploughing up ancient 
 meadow, the tenant for life may have indirectly 
 benefited himself or saved his own pocket. But 
 neither law nor equity recognises, in this indirect 
 benefit which he may have received, any ground for 
 proceedings against his executors. A second illus- 
 tration may be given of the distinction we have 
 referred to. The rents or the produce or profits of 
 land, which had wrongly been received by a person 
 other than the rightful owner (as a rule, and subject 
 to certain exceptions that we need not now discuss), 
 
 (x) Interest at 4 per cent, from the date of death may also be 
 recovered : see Phillips v. Homfray, (1892) 1 Ch. 465 (a later stage of 
 S. C). 
 
24 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, i. ma y kg pursued by the rightful owner, and recovered 
 from the wrongdoer, or, if he is dead, from his 
 estate. But there is a sense in which the term 
 ' profits ' is used, with reference to land, to represent 
 the unliquidated damages recoverable in respect of a 
 trespass, as when an action for mesne profits is main- 
 tained to recover, not the rents or produce of land or 
 their natural equivalent, but compensation for the 
 bare possession wrongfully taken and held of the land 
 itself. An action for mesne profits in this narrower 
 sense will not lie at common law and apart from 
 statute against executors, and no account would be 
 decreed in equity, except in a case where the profits 
 were either property, or the produce or profits or value 
 of property, actually received. This line of demar- 
 cation has drawn itself in conformity with the 
 classification of forms of action known to the English 
 law. As long as the maxim ' Actio personalis moritur 
 cum persona ' is preserved by the law of this country, 
 the line drawn is neither inconvenient nor unreason- 
 able. If every wrongful act which was attended 
 consequentially and indirectly -with advantage to 
 the wrongdoer, or his pocket, were to warrant an 
 action against executors, it would be impossible to 
 know when executors were liable or not, and the 
 maxim would in fact become a mere source of litiga- 
 tion." Baggallay, L.J., was unable to agree with the 
 learned Lords Justices who drew the fine distinctions 
 indicated in the above extract from their joint judg- 
 ment, and who held that the executors of the deceased 
 were not liable for the indirect benefit received by 
 his estate by reason of the wrongful use by him in 
 his lifetime of certain roads and passages under the 
 plaintiff's land (y). 
 
 Effect of Bankruptcy on Torts. — The bankruptcy 
 of the tortfeasor, or of the person against whom the 
 
 (y) An appeal to the H. of L. against the judgment was dismissed as 
 being out of time; 11 App. Cas. 466 : see also S. C.(1892) 1 Ch. 465. 
 
TORTS GENERALLY. 25 
 
 tort has been committed, may next be considered. If chap, i. 
 the tortfeasor should become bankrupt, then, as a 
 rule, a proof or claim in respect of the tort cannot be 
 made against his estate, for by s. 37 of the Bankruptcy 
 Act, 1883, "Demands in the nature of unliquidated 
 damages arising otherwise than by reason of a 
 contract, promise, or breach of trust, shall not be 
 provable in bankruptcy." As such demands are not 
 provable, the bankrupt will of course remain liable in 
 respect of them, notwithstanding his discharge (s. 30). 
 If, however, the damages recoverable for a tort become 
 liquidated by a judgment before the date of the 
 receiving order, they will be provable, but they do 
 not become liquidated by a verdict only (z). Again, 
 though the infringement of a patent is no doubt a 
 tort, still as the amount of profits recoverable by the 
 patentee for such infringement is not so much in the 
 nature of damages as of money had and received to 
 his use, such amount may be proved for in the bank- 
 ruptcy of the infringer (a). 
 
 If the person against whom the tort has been com- 
 mitted should become bankrupt, then the property that 
 will pass to his trustee in bankruptcy will include (inter 
 alia) " all such property as may belong to, or be vested 
 in, the bankrupt, at the commencement of the bank- 
 ruptcy, or may be acquired by, or devolve on, him 
 before his discharge " : Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 44. 
 The definition of property given by s. 168 is very wide, 
 and a trustee in bankruptcy may, as a rule, bring an 
 action for a breach of contract or for a tort causing 
 damage to the estate. But a right of action for a tort 
 of a personal nature, such as a libel, slander, or assault, 
 will not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy. For in these 
 cases the injury to the bankrupt's person or feelings is 
 the primary and essential cause of action (&). 
 
 (z) In re Newman, Ex parte Brooke, 3 Ch. D. 494. 
 
 (a) Watson v. Holliday, 20 Ch. D. 780 ; affirmed 31 W. R. 536. 
 
 (b) See Beckham v. Drake, 8 M. & W. 846; 11 M. & W. 315 ; 2 H. 
 ofL. Cas. 579. 
 
26 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Mostyn v. 
 Fabrigas. 
 
 (1) The wroii£ 
 must not 
 be justifiable 
 abroad. 
 
 (2) The wrong 
 must be 
 actionable 
 according to 
 Enelish law. 
 
 Torts committed Abroad. — Now suppose that a tort 
 has been committed abroad, can an action in respect 
 of it be brought in this country by the injured party ? 
 The well-known case of Mostyn v. Fabrigas (c) which 
 is to be found in Smith's Leading Cases, shews that 
 under certain circumstances such an action may be 
 brought. The first condition to the right of bringing 
 the action is that the act must not have been justi- 
 fiable by the law of the place where it was done. If 
 the defendant would not be liable abroad, civilly or 
 criminally, for the act, the plaintiff cannot maintain 
 an action here in respect of it (d) . To give a recent 
 example. In The M. Mo.rltam(e), an English company, 
 possessed of a pier in a port in Spam, instituted a cause 
 of damage against an English ship for negligently 
 damaging the pier. The shipowners by their answer 
 pleaded that, by the law of Spain, the master and 
 mariners of the ship, and not the owners, were liable 
 for negligent navigation, and it was held, reversing 
 the decision of the judge of the Probate, Divorce, and 
 Admiralty Division, that the case was governed by the 
 law of Spain, and that that part of their answer ought 
 not to be struck out. Phillips v. Eyre (/) may also be 
 referred to on this point. There, an action for assault 
 and false imprisonment in Jamaica, was brought against 
 the Governor of Jamaica, and it was held that an Act of 
 Indemnity, retrospective in its nature, passed by the 
 Legislature of the island, and assented to by the Crown, 
 for acts done in good faith after the proclamation of 
 martial law in the suppression of a rebellion, had 
 effect outside the limits of Jamaica, so as to prevent 
 an action being brought in England. 
 
 In the second place, it is essential to the bringing of 
 an action in this country for a tort committed abroad, 
 that the act complained of must be a tort according to 
 
 (c) 1 Cowp. 161 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 572. 
 
 (cl) Machado v. Fon/cs, (1»97) 2 Q. B. 231. 
 
 (e) 1 P. D. 43, 107. 
 
 (/) L. U. 4 Q. B. 225 ; 6 Q. B. 1. 
 
TORTS GENERALLY. 27 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 English law. This may be illustrated by the case of 
 The Hallcy (_</), where proceedings were instituted, in 
 the then High Court of Admiralty in England, by 
 the owners of a Norwegian barque against a British 
 steamer for damages for a collision which took place in 
 Belgian waters by the alleged negligent and improper 
 navigation of the vessel. The owner of the steamship 
 pleaded that the vessel was in charge of a pilot whom 
 they were compelled by the Belgian law to employ. 
 The owners of the barque replied that by the Belgian 
 law it is provided that the owners of a ship which has 
 done damage to another by collision are liable for 
 the damage, notwithstanding that the vessel was in 
 charge of a compulsory pilot, and although the damage 
 was occasioned by his negligence or want of skill. The 
 Privy Council, however, held that an English Court 
 will not enforce a foreign municipal law so as to give a 
 remedy in the shape of damages in respect of an act 
 which according to its own principles imposes no 
 liability on the person from whom the damages are 
 claimed. 
 
 It was formerly a question whether there is a third (3) The wrong 
 
 condition to the right of bringing in the United must not be in 
 
 ■ -i i respect of land 
 
 Kingdom an action for a tort committed abroad, and situate abroad. 
 
 that is, that the tort should be to the person or to 
 
 personal property, and not to real property. In The 
 
 M. Moxham (h) the point was left undecided, owing 
 
 to an agreement of the parties that objection to the 
 
 jurisdiction on this ground should not be set up. 
 
 But it has now been held that, notwithstanding the 
 
 abolition of local venues, the Courts of this country 
 
 have no jurisdiction to try an action relating to land 
 
 situate in a foreign country against a defendant within 
 
 the jurisdiction, whether the remedy sought be a 
 
 declaration of title to such land, or an injunction 
 
 (g) L. B. 2 P. C. 193. 
 
 (h) Ubi supra; see and ef. Whitakcr v. lories, 1 C. P. D. 51 ; In re 
 Hawthorne, Graham v. Massay, 23 Ch. D. 743. 
 
28 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 to restrain a trespass thereon, or damages for such 
 trespass (i) . 
 
 Where the defendant to an action for a tort com- 
 mitted abroad is out of the jurisdiction, then, before 
 leave can be obtained to serve a writ of summons 
 on him, it must be shewn that he is domiciled or 
 ordinarily resident within the jurisdiction (k). 
 
 (i) British South Africa Company v. Compauhia de Mozambique, 
 (1893) App. Cas. 602, reversing Companhia de Mocambique v. British 
 South Africa Company, (1892) 2 Q. B. 358 ; see also R. S. C. Ord. 
 xxxvi. r. 1, abolishing' local venues. 
 
 (k) See R. S. C. Ord. xi. r. 1 (c). 
 
( 29 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE II. 
 
 TOETS TO THE PERSON. 
 
 Eights of personal security and liberty consist in the chap. ii. 
 right to the enjoyment of life, limbs, and bodily health, 
 and in a man's right to move his body from place to 
 place at his pleasure, so far as he can do so consistently 
 with his legal obligations (a). These rights, however, 
 are often infringed by assault, battery, false imprison- 
 ment, or nuisances to health or comfort, which we 
 shall treat in their order. 
 
 Assault. — This is an attempt or offer to beat a 
 person without touching him ; as if one lifts up his 
 cane or his fist in a threatening manner at another, 
 or strikes at him but misses him. For such inchoate 
 violence an action may be brought in which damages 
 may be recovered (see Blackstone, Commentaries, 
 vol. iii. p. 120). But it is not every threat where 
 there is no actual personal violence that constitutes 
 an assault ; there must in all cases be the means 
 of carrying the threat into effect (b) . There must, in 
 fact, be a threat of violence exhibiting an intention 
 to assault and a present ability to carry the threat 
 into execution (c). If, for instance, a sword is 
 nourished at such a distance that it would be 
 impossible to hurt any person, it would not be an 
 assault (d). Again, where a man put his hand upon 
 his sword and said, "If it were not assize time, I 
 would not take such language from you," there was 
 
 (a) Addison on Torts, p. 3. 
 
 (6) Per Tindal, C.J., Stephens v. Myers, 4 C. & P. 349. 
 
 (c) See Mead v. Coker, 13 C. B. 850, at p. 860. 
 
 [d) See Allsop v. Allsop, 5 H. & N. 534 ; see also Cobbett v. Grey, 
 4 Kx. 729, at p. 744. 
 
30 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, ii. no assault, as his words shewed that he did not mean 
 to strike (<?) . 
 
 Battery. — Any injury whatsoever, be it never so 
 small, being actually done to the person of a man in 
 an angry, revengeful, rude, or insolent manner, as by 
 spitting in his face, or in any way touching him in 
 anger, or violently jostling him out of the way, would 
 amount to a battery in the eye of the law (/). In 
 practice, it may be observed that the term " battery " 
 is now seldom used, " assault " being often used as 
 including a battery. The following are a few instances 
 of batteries : — Wrongfully cutting off a person's hair 
 without his consent (cj) ; striking a person's horse so 
 that it runs away and throws him to the ground (h) ; 
 by threats or violence causing a female to be medically 
 examined against her will (i). But every laying on of 
 hands is not a battery : for the party's intention must 
 be considered ; as people will sometimes, by way of 
 joke or in friendship, clap a man on the back (k). 
 And so, too, there is no battery where one touches 
 another for the purpose of calling his attention to 
 something (I) . And where the act alleged to be a 
 battery was neither intentional nor the result of 
 negligence, an action will not lie. Thus, A. fired at 
 a bird, and a pellet from his gun glanced off the 
 branch of a tree and hit B. in the eye : A. did not 
 intend this result, and the jury found that he was not 
 negligent : held, that an action could not be main- 
 tained by B. against A. (in). Again, a person cannot 
 recover damages for a battery where the act com- 
 plained of was done by his own permission («), though 
 
 (e) Tuierville v. Savage, 1 Mod. 3. 
 
 (/) See Hawkins, Pleas of the Grown, vol. i. p. 110 ; see also 
 Iiitwlitigs v. Till, 3 M. & "W. 28. 
 
 {g) Fordo v. Skinner, 4 C. & P. 239. 
 
 (A) Dodwcll v. Burford, 1 Mod. 24. 
 
 (i) Latter v. Braddell, 50 L. J. Q. B. 166, 448. 
 
 (k) Williams v. Jones, Lee, Cas. temp. Hard. 298. 
 
 (I) Coward v. Baddeley, 28 L. J. Ex. 260. 
 
 (to) Stanley v. Poivell, (1891) 1 Q. B. 86 : see also Peacock v. 
 Nicholson, 11 T. L. R. 225. 
 
 (n) Ohristophcrson v. Bare, 11 Q. B. 473. 
 
TORTS TO THE PERSON. 31 
 
 it may be that criminal proceedings may be taken for chap, ii. 
 it if the act is injurious to the public. A prize-fight, 
 for instance, is illegal, and the parties to it may be 
 prosecuted for batteries (or, to use the more usual 
 word, assaults), upon each other, and every person 
 aiding or abetting therein is also guilty of an 
 assault (o). 
 
 Other Defences to an Action for Assault and Son assault 
 
 Battery. — A party assaulted is entitled to defend demesne. 
 himself, and on being sued for an assault, may plead 
 son assault demesne, or that he acted in self-defence. 
 But " if a man strike another, who does not imme- 
 diately afterwards resent it, but takes his opportunity, 
 and then some time afterwards falls upon him and 
 beats him, in this case son assault demesne is no good 
 plea ; neither ought a man in case of a small assault 
 to give a violent or unsuitable return . . . for hitting 
 a man a little blow with a little stick on the shoulder 
 is not a reason for him to draw a sword and cut and 
 hew the other " (p). 
 
 Secondly, an assault committed in defending one's Assault com 
 
 wife or husband, children, parents, or one's master, fe n Ce f n wif ~ 
 
 is justifiable (q). and others. 
 
 Thirdly, a parent may reasonably chastise his Reasonable 
 
 child, a schoolmaster his scholar, and a master his childfenMid 
 
 apprentice (r). And a master of a ship may similarly others. 
 in a case of necessity inflict summary punishment 
 upon a member of the crew, or a passenger (s). 
 
 Fourthly, a minister or other person in the possession Removal of 
 •" ,11 • , -i ,^ intruders and 
 
 of a vestry-room may remove therefrom an intruder (f) ; disorderly 
 
 ■churchwardens may remove from a church persons persons. 
 
 (o) See Jiegina v. Coney, 8 Q. B. D. 534. 
 
 (p) Cockroft v. Smith, 11 Mod. 43. 
 
 (q) Leev:erd v. Basilee, 1 Salk. 407 ; 3 Salk. 46. 
 
 (*•) See Hawkins. Fleas of the Crown, 150 ; Wintcrbum v. Brooks, 
 2 C. & K. 16 ; Fihjjrrald v. Norlhcote, 4 F. & F. 656 ; Penn v. Ward, 
 2 C. 31. & R. 338 ; Cleary v. Booth, (1893) 1 Q. B. 465. 
 
 (*) See Lamb v. Burnett, 1 C. & J. 291 ; Aldworth v. Stewart, 
 4 F. & F. 957 ; Nodm v. Johnson, 16 Q. B. 218. 
 
 (t) Jaekson v. Courtenay, 8 E. & B. 8. 
 
32 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 Assault com- 
 mitted by 
 authority of 
 Government 
 on a foreigner. 
 
 chap, ii. wri0 i n t er f ere or are about to interfere with the decent 
 and proper celebration of divine service (w) ; persons 
 disturbing the proceedings in a court of justice may 
 be removed by direction of the judge (x), and dis- 
 orderly persons may be turned out of a public-house 
 or shop (y) . 
 
 In all such cases, however, it must not be forgotten 
 that there should first be a request to depart, and if 
 that be not complied with no more force than is 
 necessary should be used (z) . 
 
 Fifthly, where an act injurious to the person or 
 property of some person, who is not at the time of 
 the act a subject of the Queen, is done either by the 
 prior command of her Majesty's Government, or with 
 its subsequent ratification, there can be no redress for 
 it in our Courts against the person who does the act. 
 This being an "Act of State" can only be called in 
 question by war, or by an appeal to the justice of the 
 State itself. This doctrine as to Acts of State only 
 applies to acts which affect foreigners, and there can 
 be no such thing as an Act of State between the 
 Sovereign and her own subjects (a). 
 
 Assault by Sixthly, there is no redress for an act done by the 
 
 Parliament. order of either House of Parliament, relating to its 
 
 own internal concerns, or in the exercise of discipline 
 
 over its own members (b) . 
 
 Assault com- Seventhly, an assault may be justified where it is 
 defence "f committed in defence of one's property, and is not 
 property. excessive (c). 
 
 (u) Hartley v. Cook, 9 Bing. 728 ; Burton v. Benson, 10 M. & W. 105. 
 
 (x) Collier v. Sicks, 2 B. & Ad. 663. 
 
 (y) Webster v. Watts, 11 Q. B. 311 ; Howell v. Jackson, 6 C. & P. 
 723' ; Timothy v. Simpson, 6 C. & P. 499. 
 
 (z) Dean v. Taylor, 11 Ex. 68. 
 
 {a) Huron v. Venman, 2 Ex. 167 (trespass) ; Stephen's Hist, of 
 Crim. Law, vol. ii. p. 65. 
 
 (6) Bradlaughv. Gossett, 12 Q. B. D. 271 : see also Botoardv. Gossett, 
 10 Q. B. 359 ; Bradlaugh v. Erskine, 47 L. T. 618. 
 
 (c) Wearer v. Bush, 8T. R.78; and see Holmes v. Bagge, 1 E. &B. 782. 
 
TORTS TO THE PERSON. 33 
 
 entry. 
 
 If the rightful owner is in possession of his land he chap, ii. 
 may by force resist an attempt of another to enter Forcible 
 forcibly, but where the other has entered peaceably, 
 the rightful owner in possession should first request 
 him to leave (d). But where the rightful owner is 
 out of possession, though entitled to it, it is not quite 
 clear, on the authorities, what his rights and liabilities 
 would be should he attempt to regain possession with- 
 out the aid of the law. There is no doubt that by 
 the statute 5 Eich. II. stat. 1. c. 8, a forcible entry is 
 an indictable offence, and it would appear that "if 
 one enters peaceably, and when he is come in, useth 
 violence, this is a forcible entry" (e). 
 
 And it has been held that a licence given by a tenant 
 to his landlord to eject him on a specified day, without 
 process of law, is void as contravening the provisions 
 of the statute of Eichard (/). It is not so clear, how- 
 ever, what rights of action (if any) the person wrong- 
 fully in possession may have. But the effect of the 
 authorities, taking them as a whole, would seem to be 
 as follows : — Where a person is wrongfully in possession 
 he can recover no damages for the entry, or for mere 
 eviction (unaccompanied by anything amounting to 
 an assault or other wrong), because the possession is 
 not legally his, and he can recover no damages for the 
 force used in the entry, because, though the statute of 
 Eichard II. creates a crime, it gives no civil remedy (<r/). 
 But in respect of independent wrongful acts which 
 are done in the course of, or after, the forcible entry, 
 such as an assault or damage to furniture, a right of 
 action does arise, because the person doing them 
 cannot allege that the acts were lawful, unless justified 
 
 (d) Weaver v. Bush, 8 T. R. 78 ; Polkinhom v. Wright, 8 Q. B. 
 
 197. 
 
 (b) Viner's Abridgment : Forcible Entry (A) ; Edvud: v. Hawlcex, 
 
 18 Ch. D. 1P9. 
 
 (/) Edwick v. Hau-lces, 18 Ch. D. 199. 
 
 (g) Pollen v. Brewer, 7 C. B. N. S. 371 ; Beddfdl v. Slaitland, 17 
 Ch. D. 174, 189. 
 
 R.T. D 
 
34 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Where pro- 
 ceedings have 
 already been 
 taken for 
 same assault. 
 
 by a lawful entry; and he cannot plead that he has 
 a lawful possession (h). 
 
 Lastly, it is sometimes a good defence to an action 
 for assault and battery, that proceedings in respect of 
 it have been taken before magistrates, and that such 
 proceedings have been dismissed, and a certificate to 
 that effect given to the defendant, or that he has been 
 convicted, and has paid the fine or suffered the punish- 
 ment meted out to him. This is the effect of 24 & 25 
 Vict. c. 100, ss. 42 — 45. The first of these sections 
 enables two justices to deal with a case of common 
 assault or battery ; s. 43, with aggravated assaults 
 upon boys under fourteen, or upon females. Then, by 
 s. 44, if the justices, on the hearing of any such case 
 on- the merits, shall deem the offence not to be proved, or 
 shall find the assault or battery to have been justified, 
 or so trifling as not to merit any punishment, and 
 shall accordingly dismiss the complaint, they are to 
 deliver forthwith — i.e., upon the application of the 
 party entitled, not forthwith upon the dismissal of 
 the complaint (i) — a certificate stating the fact of such 
 dismissal to the person against whom the charge of 
 assault was preferred ; and by s. 45, if such person 
 shall have obtained such certificate, or, having been 
 convicted, shall have paid the whole amount adjudged 
 to be paid, or shall have suffered the imprisonment 
 with hard labour awarded, "in every such case he 
 shall be released from all further or other proceedings, 
 civil or criminal, for the same cause." 
 
 The granting of the certificate of dismissal above 
 referred to is a ministerial and not a judicial act, and 
 it lies not within the discretion of the justices to refuse 
 
 (A) See Eeddall v. Maitland, 17 Ch. D. 174, where Fry, J., relies on 
 Mioton.v. Harland, 1 11. & G. 644 ; cf. Scott v. Matthew Brown, 51 
 L. T. 746 ; Jonesv. Foley, (1891) 1 Q. B. 730. It is right to say that the 
 authority of KcirUm v. Harland has been on more than one occasion 
 questioned ; see Harvey v. ISrydges, 14 M. & V. 437 ; Davis v. Burrell, 
 10 C. B. 821, at ]i. 825 ; Lous v. Telford, 1 App. Cas. 414, at p. 4:i6. 
 
 (t) Gostar v. Rctherinyton, 28 L. J. M. C. 19S. 
 
TORTS TO THE PERSON. 35 
 
 it (k). But it can only be granted under s. 44, supra, chap, ii. 
 where there has been a hearing on the merits, so that 
 if a prosecutor does not appear, and offers no evidence, 
 a certificate obtained by the person charged will not be 
 a defence to a subsequent action (/) . 
 
 The word "cause" at the end of s. 45 of 24 & 25 
 Yict. c. 100, does not mean cause of action, but is 
 equivalent to " assault," and so in Masper and Wife v. 
 Brown (m), where the defendant assaulted the female 
 plaintiff, and for such assault was fined by the justices 
 under the statute, and paid the fine, it was held that 
 an action by the husband in respect of the conse- 
 quential damage to himself (such as loss of the wife's 
 society, medical expenses, &c), by reason of the assault 
 on his wife, was barred by the 45th section, and that 
 that section had released the defendant from all 
 further proceedings by any person. 
 
 In the previous case of The Queen v. Morris (n), 
 which was not cited, the Court for Crown Cases 
 Eeserved (Kelly, C.B., dissenting) held that a con- 
 viction for assault by justices, at the instance of 
 the person assaulted, and imprisonment consequent 
 thereon, are not, either at common law or under s. 45 
 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, a bar to an indictment for 
 manslaughter of the person assaulted, should he sub- 
 sequently die from the effects of the assault. There the 
 Court, pointing out that the word " act " was not the 
 word used, interpreted the word " cause " as meaning 
 " accusation " or "charge," and said that the cause 
 for the indictment for manslaughter comprehended 
 more than the cause in the former summons before 
 the justices, for that it comprehended the death of 
 the party assaulted. With reference to these cases, 
 
 (k) Hancock v. Somes, 1 E. & E. 795 (a decision under 9 Geo. IV. 
 c. 31, ss. 27, 28). 
 
 (I) Meed v. Nutt, 24 Q. B. D. 669 ; see Meg. v. Miles, 38 W. R. 334. 
 
 (m) 1 C. P. D. 97. 
 
 (n) L. E. 1 C. C. E. 90. 
 
 D 2 
 
36 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, ii. Stephen, J., says (o) : "In Beg. v. Morris (p), followed 
 in Masper v. Brown (q), it was held that these words 
 [in s. 45] mean subsequent proceedings for an assault, 
 and that they do not mean to cover subsequent pro- 
 ceedings for the act constituting the assault." 
 
 A master may be responsible for an act of his 
 servant done in the course of the servant's employ- 
 ment, though it may amount to a crime ; and a release 
 obtained by the servant under the above statute will 
 not discharge the master from civil liability (?■)■ 
 
 Where a defendant intends to avail himself of the 
 provisions of the section, he ought to plead it (*) . 
 
 False Imprisonment. 
 
 Definition. — False imprisonment is a restraint on 
 the liberty of a person without lawful cause, either by 
 confinement in a prison or a house or elsewhere, or 
 even by forcibly detaining him in the streets against 
 his will : Bird v. Junes (t). The case just cited, how- 
 ever, shows that, to constitute an imprisonment, there 
 must be a total restraint on the liberty of a person for 
 however short a time, and not merely a partial obstruc- 
 tion of his will, whatever inconvenience it may bring 
 on him. "A prison may have its boundary large or 
 narrow, visible and tangible, or, though real, still in the 
 conception only ; it may itself be movable or fixed, 
 but a boundary it must have, and that boundary the 
 party imprisoned must be prevented from passing ; he 
 must be prevented from leaving that place within the. 
 ambit of which the party imprisoning would confine 
 him, except by prison-breach": per Coleridge, J., at 
 p. 744. In that case a part of a public highway 
 (Hammersmith Bridge) was appropriated for seats to- 
 
 (o) Digest of Crin.inal Law, 3rd ej. p. 183. 
 
 (p) Ubi supra. 
 
 (q) Ubi su])ra. 
 
 (r) Dyer v. itundaij, (1895) 1 Q. B. 742. 
 
 (s) K. S. C. Ord. xix. r. 15 ; Harding v. King, 6 C. & P. 427. 
 
 (t) 7 Q. B. 742. 
 
TORTS TO THE PERSON. 87 
 
 view a boat-race on the river, and separated for that ohap. ii. 
 purpose from the carriage-way by a temporary fence. 
 The plaintiff desired to enter this part, and was opposed 
 by the defendant ; but after a struggle, during which 
 no permanent detention of his person took place, he 
 got into the enclosure. Two policemen were then 
 stationed to prevent, and they prevented, him from 
 passing onwards, but he was allowed to remain where 
 he was or to go back if he chose. Under these circum- 
 stances, the Court (diss. Denman, C.J.) held, on the 
 grounds above stated, that there was no imprisonment, 
 and that whether the plaintiff had or had not a right 
 to pass along inside the fence. 
 
 But if a person manifests his intention to arrest 
 another, actual contact is not always necessary. 
 Thus, "if the bailiff who has a process against one, 
 says to him, when he is on horseback or in a coach, 
 ' You are my prisoner ; I have a writ against you,' 
 upon which he submits, turns back or goes with him, 
 though the bailiff never touched him, yet it is an arrest, 
 because he submitted to the process "(it). 
 
 Justification of Arrest or Imprisonment. — An 
 
 arrest or imprisonment may be justified if authorised 
 by law or the warrant of a competent tribunal. 
 
 Arrests authorised bij Statute. — (1) By 5 Geo. IV. 
 c. 83, s. 6, any one may apprehend a person who shall 
 be found offending against that Act, which was passed 
 for the punishment of idle and disorderly persons, and 
 rogues and vagabonds. 
 
 (2) By 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, ss. 63 — 66, any metropolitan 
 police-constable may arrest, without warrant, inter 
 alios, (a) offenders against the Act whose names and 
 residences cannot be obtained, (b) idle and suspicious 
 persons, (c) persons charged with committing an aggra- 
 vated assault, (d) persons found committing any offence 
 
 ) Buller's Nisi Prius, adopted by the Court in Grainger v. 
 ig. N. C. 212 ; Warner v. lliddiford, i (J. B. N. S. 180. 
 
38 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, ii. punishable either upon indictment or as a misdemeanour 
 upon summary conviction under the Act ; and a similar 
 power of arrest is given to the owner of the property on 
 which such persons are found committing the offence, 
 and the servant or agent of such owner. 
 
 (3) By 14 & 15 Vict. c. 19, s. 11, any one may 
 apprehend any person who shall be found committing 
 any indictable offence in the night. 
 
 (4) By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96 (Larceny Act), s. 103, 
 persons found committing offences under the Act may 
 be immediately apprehended by any person without a 
 warrant ; and by s. 104 a constable may apprehend 
 without warrant any one whom he finds lying or 
 loitering in any place during the night, and whom he 
 has good cause to suspect has committed, or is about to 
 commit, any felony against the Act. 
 
 (5) By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97 (Malicious Injuries to 
 Property Act), s. 61, any person committing any 
 offence against that Act may be apprehended without 
 a warrant by a constable, or the owner of the property, 
 or his servant or agent. 
 
 (6) By 35 & 36 Vict. c. 93 (Pawnbrokers' Act), 
 s. 34, a pawnbroker may apprehend any person who 
 does not satisfactorily account for the means whereby 
 he became possessed of an article which he offers in 
 pawn, or who gives false information as to whether the 
 article is his own or not, or as to his name or address, 
 or whom he reasonably suspects is trying to pawn a 
 stolen article. 
 
 (7) By 52 & 53 Vict. c. 57 (Regulation of Railways 
 Act, 1889), s. 5, a passenger may be arrested if having 
 failed to produce, or if requested to deliver up, a ticket 
 shewing that his fare is paid, or to pay his fare, he 
 refuses on request by an officer or servant of the rail- 
 way company to give his name and address (x). See 
 
 (x) See also 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, s. 103 (repealed in part), ss. 104 and 154. 
 As to tramways, see The Tramways Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 78), 
 ss. 51 and 52. There are a few other statutes, besides those mentioned 
 above, which give a power to arrest. 
 
TORTS TO THE PERSON. 
 
 39 
 
 also 23 & '24 Vict. c. 32, ss. 2, 3, as to arrest of persons chap, ii. 
 making- a disturbance in a church, chapel, churchyard, 
 or burial-ground. 
 
 Arrests authorised by Common Late. — Any person (1) Breach of 
 may arrest one if he sees him committing a breach of the peace- 
 the peace, or if he has reasonable grounds to believe 
 that a breach of the peace which has been committed 
 will be renewed (y). But a private individual is not 
 justified in arresting another on mere suspicion that he 
 has committed a misdemeanour (z). 
 
 A private individual is not justified in causing the (2) Felonies, 
 arrest of any person for a felony unless he can shew 
 that a felony has been committed, and that there is a 
 reasonable ground of suspicion against such person, but 
 a constable may arrest a person upon a reasonable 
 ground of suspicion that he has committed a felony, 
 even though none has been committed (a) . If the 
 grounds are unreasonable, the arrest will be unlawful. 
 And so, if, on a charge of felony made to a constable, 
 it ought to have appeared to him, from the lapse of 
 time or other circumstances, doubtful whether a felony 
 had been committed, and that there was no reason for 
 suspecting the person charged, the constable will be 
 liable for false imprisonment (b). But, in general, if 
 one comes to a constable and charges another with 
 felony, the constable is bound to arrest (b), and the 
 person who has made the charge, if it be unfounded, 
 may be liable in an action for false imprisonment (c). 
 But if a person simply gives certain information to a 
 constable, upon which the constable makes an arrest, 
 such person will not be liable to such an action, even 
 though he should subsequently sign the charge-sheet 
 at the police-station (d). 
 
 (y) Timothy v. Simpson, 1 C. M. & R 757 ; Price v. Secly, 10 CI. & 
 F. 28. 
 
 (2) Mathews v. Biddulph, 4 Scott, N. R. 54 ; Fox v. Gaunt, 3 B. & 
 Ad. 7S8. 
 
 (a) Beckwith v. Philby, 6 B. & C. 635. 
 
 (b) Hogg v. Ward, 3 H. &N. 417. 
 
 (c) Hopkins v. Crowe, 4 A. & E. 774. 
 
 (d) QHnham v. WilUy, 4 H. & N. 496. 
 
40 OUTLINES OF TOUTS. 
 
 chap, ii. Arrest on Magistrate's Warrant. — Where a con- 
 stable is armed with the warrant of a magistrate, he 
 will not be liable to an action for making an arrest 
 of the person named therein, even though there be a 
 defect of jurisdiction in the magistrate, unless the 
 constable, after a written demand for a perusal and 
 copy of the warrant, refuse or neglect for six days to 
 comply with such demand (24 Geo. II. c. 44, s. 6). 
 But, whenever a warrant is issued for the arrest of a 
 person for an offence less than felony, it is the duty of 
 the constable to have the warrant in his possession at 
 the time of making the arrest, to be produced if called 
 for(<<). 
 
 Liability of Judges, Magistrates, and Others. — 
 
 " The general rule of law as to actions of trespass 
 against persons having a limited authority ... is 
 plain and clear. If they do any act beyond the limit 
 of their authority, they thereby subject themselves to 
 an action of trespass ; but if the act done be within 
 the limit of their authority, although it may be done 
 through an erroneous or mistaken judgment, they are 
 not thereby liable to such action " (/). But a judge ox- 
 magistrate is not liable for exceeding his jurisdiction, 
 unless he knew or had the means of knowing facts 
 which would shew him such excess of jurisdiction (</). 
 Where, however, he exceeds his jurisdiction through a 
 misapprehension, not of fact, but of law, he is liable (h). 
 
 Next, as to the liability of parties or their solicitors 
 who initiate proceedings under which a person is 
 arrested, e.g., attached for contempt, the law seems to 
 be shortly as follows : — If the proceedings are subse- 
 
 («) Codd v. Cabe, 1 Ex. D. 352. 
 
 (/) Dosu-ellv. Impcy, 1 B. & C. 163, at p. 169. A revising barrister 
 has statutory jurisdiction to expel from his Court any person who inter- 
 rupts the business of Ms Court, or disobeys his lawful orders ; but this 
 will not justify his expulsion of a person who, in his opinion, at the 
 previous year's Court, wrongfully withheld certain material documents : 
 Willis v. Maclachlan, 1 Ex. D. 376. 
 
 {<;) Pile v. Carter, 3 Bing. 78 ; adder v. Ballet, 3 Moo. P. C. 23. 
 
 (A) Boulden v. b'mith, 14 Q. B. 841. 
 
TORTS TO THE l'EKSON. 41 
 
 quently set aside as void, or for irregularity, by reason, chap, ii. 
 for instance, that they were taken in violation of good 
 faith, or that material facts were concealed from the 
 Court, the solicitor who has taken them, as well as his 
 client, may be liable to an action for false imprison- 
 ment. But they will not be so liable if the order or 
 judgment of the Court be set aside or reversed on the 
 ground of error (A. 
 
 A sheriff, who is a ministerial officer, may act under 
 a writ or process which is irregular, or erroneous, till 
 it be set aside (/<■) ; but if it be altogether void, or 
 invalid, he may be liable (I). 
 
 Again, a governor of a prison may safely obey a 
 warrant of imprisonment, valid on its face and issued 
 by a court of competent jurisdiction (m). 
 
 Contempt of Court — A Superior court of record 
 may fine or imprison persons for contempt of Court, 
 but the jurisdiction in this respect of a County Court is 
 practically limited to cases where the contempt is com- 
 mitted in face of the Court {n). By the County Courts 
 Act, 1888, if a person wilfully insults the judge, or any 
 juror, witness or officer of the Court, during his sitting 
 or attendance in Court, or in going to or returning from 
 the Court, or wilfully interrupts the proceedings in 
 Court, or misbehaves himself therein, he may by order 
 of the judge be fined or imprisoned (o). 
 
 Nuisances to Health or Comfort. 
 Actionable nuisances may be of various kinds, such, 
 for instance, as those which affect one's bodily health or 
 
 (<) >See Parsons v. Lloyd, 2 Wm. Bl. 845 ; Barker v. Brahani, 2 Win. 
 Bl. 866 ; Green v. EUjie, 5 Q. B. 99 ; Cooper v. Harding, 7 IJ. B. 92S ; 
 Cullett v. Foster, 2 H. & H. 356 ; Williams v. Smith, 14 C. B. N. S. 
 596 : Smith v. Sydney, L. R. 5 Q. B. 203. 
 
 (£■) Cotes v. Michill, 3 Lev. 20 ; Prentice v. Harrison, i Q. B. 852. 
 
 (Ij Hooper v. Lane, 10 Q. B. 546. 
 
 (m) Henderson v. Preston, 21 (). IJ. D. 362. 
 
 (») Reg. v. Lefroy, L. K. 8 Q. B. 134 ; Reg. v. Judge of Brompton 
 County Court, (1893) 2 Q. B. 195. 
 
 (o) 51 i: 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 162. As to assaults on officers of the 
 Court, acdrebcue of goods levied, see s. 48 ; Lewis v. Ouitn, (1S9 4) 
 1 O. B. 102. 
 
42 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, ii. comfort ; public nuisances, such as the obstruction of 
 a highway, which cause special damage to an indivi- 
 dual^) ; and nuisances which have an injurious effect 
 on one's property, which will be discussed hereafter (q). 
 As to the first, not everything which causes annoyance 
 is actionable. One has to put this question : " Ought 
 this inconvenience to be considered in fact as more 
 than fanciful, more than one of mere delicacy or 
 fastidiousness, as an inconvenience materially inter- 
 fering with the ordinary comfort, physically, of human 
 existence, not merely according to elegant or dainty 
 modes and habits of living, but according to plain and 
 sober and simple notions among the English people" (?•)• 
 The question is thus in part one of fact and one 
 depending on all the circumstances and on the reason- 
 able discretion of the tribunal which has to decide it. 
 What would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would 
 not necessarily be a nuisance in Whitechapel, where 
 the conditions of life are different (s) ; one has to 
 a certain extent to adapt himself to his surroundings. 
 A., a teacher of music in a London house separated by 
 a rather unsubstantial party wall from a house occupied 
 by B., will not be restrained from reasonably using his 
 house, at seasonable hours, for teaching and practice ; 
 but if B., in retaliation and to annoy A., produces 
 unmusical and discordant noises, he may be restrained 
 by injunction (t). And so may C, the proprietor of a 
 merry-go-round, who produces by the noise of his 
 steam-organ a maddening effect on D., who lives in a 
 neighbouring dwelling-house : and if, instead of C, 
 there were E. and F., each emitting feebler sounds 
 from his hand-organ, but contributing his quantum of 
 noise till the whole amounts to a nuisance, they also 
 may be restrained (u). 
 
 (23) See ante, p. 6. 
 (q) See post, Chap. T. 
 
 (r) See Walter v. Sdfe, 4 De G. & Sm. 322. 
 (s) See Husey v. Bauley, 11 T. L. R. 221. 
 {) Christie v. Dairy, (1893) 1 Ch. 316. 
 
 Lainbton v. ildlhh, Lamblon v. Cox, (1894) 3 Ch. 163. 
 
TORTS TO THE PEKSOX. 43 
 
 Where two or more independent tortfeasors commit chap, ii. 
 a nuisance, it is possible, but not certain, that they 
 may be made co-defendants in one action, if an in- 
 junction is the only remedy sought against them : 
 but it is clear that where damages are claimed against 
 them they cannot be sued in one action (x). 
 
 Instead of bringing an action for an injunction or 
 damages a person aggrieved may, as we shall see, in 
 certain cases, abate a nuisance (y) ; and the right to 
 abate may exist, and be exercised, even in cases where 
 the Court has refused an injunction (.?). If a case for 
 an injunction be made out, yet as a general rule 
 damages will be given instead of an injunction, if 
 
 (1) the injury to the plaintiff's legal rights is small, and 
 
 (2) is one capable of being estimated in money, and 
 
 (3) is one which can be adequately compensated by 
 a small sum of money, and (4) the case is one in 
 which it would be oppressive to the defendant to 
 grant an injunction (a). 
 
 (x) See and cf. Ord. xvi. r. 4 ; Thorpe v. Brumfitt, L. R. 8 Ch. 650 ; 
 Sadler v. Great Western liailiauj Company, (181)5) 2 Q. B. 688 ; (1896) 
 App. Cas. 450. 
 
 (h) See post, p. 79. See also Nuisances to Property, post, Chap. V. 
 
 (:) See Lane v. Capscy, (1891) 3 Ch. 411. 
 
 (a) Shelter v. City of London Elcetrie Lighting Company, (1895) 
 1 Ch. 2S7." 
 
( 44 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE III. 
 
 MALICIOUS INJURIES. 
 
 I. Malicious Abuse of Legal Process. 
 chap, in. " j N the present day, and according to our present 
 law, the bringing of an ordinary action, however 
 maliciously, and however great the want of reasonable 
 and probable cause, will not support a subsequent 
 action for malicious prosecution " (a). But the Court 
 has an inherent power to stay or dismiss an action 
 which is clearly shewn to be frivolous or vexatious, 
 or to strike out a statement of claim which discloses 
 on its face no reasonable cause of action (b). 
 
 The reason why the subsequent action cannot be 
 maintained seems to be this : There are three sorts of 
 damage any one of which will support an action 
 for malicious prosecution — namely (1) damage to a 
 man's fame, as if the matter whereof he is accused be 
 scandalous ; (2) secondly, damage done to the person, 
 as where a man is put in danger to lose his life, or limb, 
 or liberty ; (3) the third sort of damage which will 
 support such an action is damage to a man's property, 
 as where he is forced to expend his money in necessary 
 charges to acquit himself of the crime of which he 
 is accused (c). Now the bringing of an ordinary action 
 maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause 
 does not necessarily involve any one of these three heads 
 
 (a) Per Boweu, L.J., Quartz Hill Mining Company v. Eyre, 11 
 Q. B. D. 674, at p. 690. 
 
 (6) See Latcrauce v. Norreys, 15 App. Cas. 210 ; Kcllaway v. Bury, 
 66 L. T. 599 ; R. 8. C. Old. xxv. i. 4. 
 
 (c) bee Savile v. Soberts, 1 Raym. 374, and Quartz Sill Gold Mining 
 Company v. Eyre, 11 Q. B. D. 674, at p. 689 ; cf. Byne v. Moore, 
 5 Taunt. 187. 
 
MALICIOUS INJURIES. 45* 
 
 of damage so as to enable the defendant to bring a chap. hi. 
 
 '& 
 
 mesne 
 process. 
 
 subsequent action against the plaintiff. At the trial 
 his fame will be cleared if it deserves to be; the 
 bringing of the action involves no injury to his person ; 
 nor, thirdly, is there necessarily any damage to his 
 property, as if he succeeds he will be awarded the costs 
 of the action if he deserves them (</). 
 
 But although the bringing of an action maliciously 
 and without reasonable or probable cause does not 
 give a cause of action to the defendant as it does not 
 necessarily or naturally involve damage, there are legal 
 proceedings which do necessarily and naturally involve 
 damage, and which when taken falsely and maliciously 
 and without reasonable or probable cause lay the 
 foundation of an action. Proceedings of this kind will 
 now be briefly dealt with. 
 
 Malicious Arrests. — By 32 & 33 Vict. C. 62, S. 6, Arrest on 
 it is enacted that where the plaintiff in any action in 
 a superior court, in which, if brought before the com- 
 mencement of the Act, the defendant would have been 
 liable to arrest, proves at any time before final judg- 
 ment by evidence on oath, to the satisfaction of a judge, 
 (1) that he has a good cause of action against the 
 defendant to the amount of £50 or upwards, (2) that 
 there is probable cause for believing that the defen- 
 dant is about to quit England unless apprehended, and 
 (3) that the absence of the defendant from England will 
 materially prejudice the plaintiff in the prosecution of 
 his action, the judge may order the defendant to be 
 arrested and imprisoned for a period not exceeding 
 six months, unless he gives security, not exceeding the 
 amount claimed in the action, that he will not leave 
 England without the leave of the Court. An action may 
 be brought for maliciously procuring an arrest under 
 this section if the party procuring it has imposed on 
 the judge by some false statement, some suggestio falsi 
 or siqjpressio veri, and has thereby satisfied him, not 
 
 (d) Quartz Hill Gold Mining Company v. Eyre, ubi supra. 
 
46 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 only as to the existence of the debt to the requisite 
 amount, but also that there is reasonable ground' 
 for supposing that the debtor is about to quit the 
 country. But if, without any such fraud or falsehood, 
 a plaintiff, upon an affidavit, fairly stating the facts, 
 satisfies a judge that the defendant is about to quit 
 the country, and so obtains an order for an arrest, 
 he will not be liable to an action for such arrest, 
 even though the order should be subsequently set 
 aside (e). 
 
 Onus of prov- Malicious Prosecution. — There is one well-recog- 
 
 ing absence of -. -,. ,. ,. , , ,. » „ , 
 
 reasonable nised distinction between an action tor false lmprison- 
 cause on ment and an action for malicious prosecution — namely, 
 
 that in the former the onus lies upon the defendant to 
 plead and prove affirmatively the existence of reason- 
 able cause as his justification, whereas in an action for 
 malicious prosecution the plaintiff must allege and 
 prove affirmatively its non-existence (/). A person may 
 become liable to an action for false imprisonment by 
 setting a ministerial officer, such as a police-constable, 
 in motion, but by setting a judicial officer in motion he 
 may render himself liable to an action for malicious 
 prosecution (g), and consequently, in an action for 
 false imprisonment, damages cannot be recovered for 
 a remand ordered by the magistrate, this being the 
 act of a judicial officer (/*). A County Court has now 
 jurisdiction to entertain actions for malicious prosecu- 
 tions as well as actions for false imprisonment (i) . 
 
 A plaintiff to succeed in an action for malicious 
 prosecution must prove three things : (1) that the pro- 
 ceedings terminated in his favour if from their nature 
 they were capable of such termination, (2) absence of 
 reasonable and probable cause, and (3) malice. 
 
 (e) Daniels v. Fielding, 16 M. & W. 200 ; see also Williams v. Smith, 
 14 C. B. N. S. 596, at p. 623. 
 
 (/) Sicks v. Faulkner, 8 Q. B. D. 167. 
 (</) Austin v. Bowling, L. R. 5 0. P. 534. 
 (h) Lock v. Ashton, 12 Q. B. 871. 
 (i) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 56. 
 
MALICIOUS INJURIES. 
 
 47 
 
 (1) Termination of the Proceedings in Plaintiff's CHAP, in. 
 Favour.— With regard to the first of these three essen- 
 tial conditions, it has been held that it even applies to 
 a case where the plaintiff has been summarily convicted 
 under a statute giving no right of appeal. The reason 
 of the condition or rule generally is, that if, in the 
 proceedings complained of, the decision was against 
 the plaintiff, and was still unreversed, it would not 
 be consistent with the principles upon which law is 
 administered for another Court, not being a court of 
 appeal, to hold that the decision was come to without 
 reasonable and probable cause. And if a Court were 
 to yield to the argument that in a particular case there 
 was no right of appeal, it would be constituting itself a 
 court of appeal in a matter where the Legislature has 
 thought fit to declare that there should be no appeal (k). 
 But proof of the termination of the proceedings in 
 plaintiff's favour may be dispensed with if they are not 
 capable of so terminating : where, for example, under 
 the old law, a person procured another to be bound 
 over by justices to keep the peace, the latter not being 
 allowed to controvert the statement made against 
 him (I). This, however, is not so now, as such a 
 proceeding is no longer ex parte (m) . 
 
 (2) Absence of Reasonable and Probable Cause. — In 
 
 the determination of the question whether or not the 
 
 plaintiff has discharged the onus which lies on him of 
 
 shewing that the defendant had not reasonable and 
 
 probable cause for the prosecution instituted by him, 
 
 it is a rule of law that the jury must find the facts on Jury to find 
 
 which the question of reasonable and probable cause f aot , s >.J ud s e 
 i • i decide on 
 
 depends, and the judge is then to decide whether the facts so found, 
 facts so found constitute reasonable and probable cause : 
 Lister v. Perry man (n). The House of Lords, in the 
 
 L. E. 2 0. P. 684. 
 supra; Steward v. Gromett, 7 C. B. N. S. 
 
 (k) Basibi v. Matthews 
 (I) BnMbi v. Matthew. 
 191, 206. 
 
 (m) See Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. u. 49), s. 25 
 {n) L. R. 4 H. of L. 521. 
 
48 
 
 OUTLINES OF TOUTS. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Reasonable 
 and probable 
 cause — 
 what is. 
 
 case just cited, quoted with approval the words of 
 Tiudal, C. J., in Broad v. Ham (o) : ■' In order to justify 
 a defendant there must be a reasonable cause, such as 
 would operate on the mind of a discreet man ; there 
 must also be a probable cause such as would operate 
 on the mind of a reasonable man ; at all events, such 
 as would operate on the mind of the party making the 
 charge ; otherwise there is no probable cause for 
 him." In the case of Hicks v. Faulkner (p), Hawkins, 
 J., uses language somewhat similar, though more 
 amplified: "Now I should define reasonable and 
 probable cause to be an honest belief in the guilt of 
 the accused based upon a full conviction, founded upon 
 reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of 
 circumstances which, assuming them to be true, would 
 reasonably lead any ordinarily prudent and cautious 
 man, placed in the position of the accuser, to the 
 conclusion that the person charged was probably guilty 
 of the crime imputed. There must be — first, an honest 
 belief of the accuser in the guilt of the accused ; 
 secondly, such belief must be based on an honest con- 
 viction of the existence of the circumstances which 
 led the accuser to that conclusion ; thirdly, such 
 secondly mentioned belief must be based upon reason- 
 able grounds (by this I mean such grounds as would 
 lead any fairly cautious man in the defendant's situa- 
 tion so to believe) ; fourthly, the circumstances so 
 believed and relied on by the accuser must be such as 
 to amount to reasonable ground for belief in the guilt 
 of the accused." One or two cases may well be cited 
 as examples of what will amount to reasonable and 
 probable cause. In Lister v. Perryman (q), an action 
 for false imprisonment, it appeared that Lister was the 
 owner of a rifle which was left in the care of his coach- 
 man, Hinton. The rifle had been seen and admired by 
 Perryman, who said that he should like to have one 
 
 (o) 5 Bing. N. C. 722. 
 (p) 8 Q. B. D. 167, at p. 171. 
 '(q) L. R. 4 H. of L. 521. 
 
 ( 
 
MALICIOUS INJURIES. 49 
 
 like it. This was mentioned (after the rifle had been CHAP - IIT - 
 
 stolen) to Lister by Hinton, who also told him that 
 
 Kobinson, the coachman of a near neighbour, said he 
 
 had seen the rifle in a barn belonging to Perryman's 
 
 father ; that Perryman, hearing of this, offered to, and 
 
 did, take Hinton and Eobinson to the barn and shewed 
 
 them a gun (which was not Lister's), and that Eobinson 
 
 said that that was not the gun he had previously seen 
 
 in the barn. Lister thereupon, and before he had seen 
 
 Eobinson, gave Perryman into custody on the charge 
 
 of stealing the rifle. Perryman was tried and acquitted, 
 
 and then brought an action for false imprisonment. 
 
 The House of Lords held, that Lister had acted on 
 
 reasonable and probable cause, inasmuch as he had 
 
 acted on the information of a trustworthy servant, who 
 
 had told him that he had gone with Eobinson to 
 
 the accused, and that Eobinson, in the presence of 
 
 the. accused, repeated the accusation which he had 
 
 previously made. 
 
 In Hicks v. Faulkner (r) the facts were these : — At 
 the hearing of a plaint in the county court to recover 
 rent, the tenant's son was called as a witness, and 
 swore that he had given up the key of the premises 
 to the landlord before the rent accrued due. This 
 the landlord denied, and he subsequently prosecuted 
 the witness for perjury. The witness, having been 
 acquitted, brought an action against the landlord for 
 malicious prosecution. At the trial the plaintiff and 
 defendant repeated their evidence as to the key. The 
 defendant's evidence was corroborated by his diary. 
 The learned judge at the trial directed the jury alter- 
 natively {inter alia) that if they thought the matter was 
 left in such doubt that they could not arrive at a con- 
 clusion as to which of the parties was speaking correctly, 
 then the plaintiff had not made out his case, and the 
 defendant was entitled to a verdict ; but that, on the 
 other hand, if they came to the conclusion that the 
 
 (r) 8 Q. B. D. 167. 
 R.T. B 
 
50 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 plaintiff did, in fact, deliver up the key as he swore, but 
 that the defendant, owing to a treacherous memory, had 
 forgotten the occurrence, and went on with the prose- 
 cution, honestly believing that the plaintiff had sworn 
 falsely and corruptly, the jury would not be justified in 
 saying that the defendant maliciously, and without 
 reasonable or probable cause, prosecuted the plaintiff, 
 and the defendant would be entitled to their verdict. 
 The jury found a verdict for the defendant, and, upon a 
 motion for a new trial, it was held that this direction 
 was right, and that as a person may reasonably institute 
 a prosecution upon information given him by another 
 which he honestly believes to be true (s), so a man 
 may not unreasonably rely on his own memory, if he 
 never knew it before to be treacherous. But, of 
 course, each case must be judged by its own circum- 
 stances, and it would be unreasonable to rely either 
 on an informant known to be untrustworthy, or a 
 memory known to be unreliable, without substantial 
 confirmation. 
 
 The most recent case of importance on the subject 
 of reasonable and probable cause is Abrath v. North- 
 Eastern Railway Company (t). There one McMann 
 had recovered from the defendants, who were the 
 respondents, a large sum of money as compensation 
 for personal injuries in respect of a railway collision. 
 Certain information having been given to the directors 
 of the company, they caused inquiries to be made by 
 their solicitor. The results of those inquiries were 
 laid before counsel, who advised that the appellant, 
 Dr. Abrath, should be prosecuted for conspiring with 
 McMann to defraud the company by falsely pretending 
 that McMann had been injured in the collision, and 
 by artificially manufacturing symptoms of injury. 
 The respondents thereupon prosecuted the appellant, 
 who, having been acquitted, sued the respondents for 
 
 (s) See e.g. , Lister v. Ferryman, ubi supra, 
 (t) 11 App. Cas. 247. 
 
MALICIOUS INJURIES. 51 
 
 malicious prosecution. The House of Lords upheld chap, hi. 
 the direction of Cave, J., who told the jury that it was 
 for the plaintiff to establish a want of reasonable and 
 probable cause, and malice, and to shew that the 
 defendants had not taken reasonable care to inform 
 themselves of the true facts of the case, and asked the 
 jury whether they were satisfied that the defendants 
 did take such care and honestly believed in the case 
 laid before the magistrates. 
 
 If a person, having taken reasonable care to ascer- Where pro- 
 tain the true facts of a case, lays them all fairly before taketTunder 
 counsel, and acts bond fide upon the opinion given advice of 
 by that counsel (however erroneous that opinion may 
 be), he is not in general liable to an action for 
 malicious prosecution (») . But he may be so if he does 
 not act bona fide on the opinion, or does not believe 
 that he has a case for a prosecution (h), or does not 
 lay all the facts before counsel, or selects one under 
 whose ignorance he hopes to shelter his malice [x). 
 
 (3) Malice. — We now come to the third essential 
 which a plaintiff in such an action as we have been 
 discussing has to prove — namely, malice on the part of 
 the defendant. This is a question entirely for the con- Malice, a 
 sideration of the jury, as the question of reasonable ^Jfiiiry ° r 
 .and probable cause is one for the judge upon the facts 
 found by them. " In order to support such an action," 
 says Tindal, C.J., "there must be a concurrence of 
 malice in the defendant and want of probable cause. 
 Malice alone is not sufficient, because a person actuated 
 by the plainest malice may nevertheless have a justi- 
 fiable reason for prosecution. On the other hand, 
 the substantiating the accusation is not essential to 
 exonerate the accuser from liability to an action ; for 
 he may have had good reason to make the charge, and 
 yet be compelled to abandon the prosecution by the 
 ■death or absence of witnesses, or the difficulty of pro- 
 
 (u) Sati'nrja v. Mackintosh, 2 B. & C. 693 ; cf. Hewlett v. Cruchlcy, 
 5 Taunt. 277. 
 
 (x) Hewlett v. Cruchley, supra. 
 
 E 2 
 
52 
 
 OUTLINES OF TOETS. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Malice, 
 is? 
 
 what 
 
 ducing adequate legal proof. The law, therefore, only 
 renders him responsible where malice is combined with 
 want of probable cause. What shall amount to such 
 a combination of malice and want of probable cause is 
 so much a matter of fact in each individual case as to 
 render it impossible to lay down any general rule on 
 the subject ; but there ought to be enough to satisfy a 
 reasonable man that the accuser had no ground for 
 proceeding but his desire to injure the accused " (y). 
 As to what amounts to malice, it has been laid down 
 that " any motive other than that of simply instituting 
 a prosecution for the purpose of bringing a person to 
 justice is a malicious motive on the part of the person 
 who acts in that way " (z). Hawkins, J., in the case 
 already referred to, Hicks v. Faulkner (a), puts it in a 
 slightly different way: "The malice necessary to be 
 established is not even malice in law, such as may be 
 assumed from the intentional doing of a wrongful 
 act (b) ; but malice in fact — mains animus — indicating 
 that the party was actuated either by spite or ill-will 
 towards an individual, or by indirect or improper 
 motives, though these may be wholly unconnected with 
 any uncharitable feeling towards anybody." It is clear,, 
 then, that it is a question to be determined by the 
 jury, whether the defendant was or was not actuated 
 by spite or ill-will, or an indirect or improper motive. 
 
 It is sometimes laid down that though malice will 
 not shew that there is. a want of reasonable and 
 probable cause, yet, when there is no reasonable or 
 probable cause, it is for the jury to infer malice from 
 the facts proved (v) . But this must not be misunder- 
 stood. The question of reasonable and probable cause 
 
 Taylor, 6 Bing. 183, at p. 186 ; affirmed 2 15. & Ad. 
 Railway Ctmpany, 10 Ex. 352, 
 
 (y) Willans v 
 845. 
 
 iz) Stevens v. Midland Count 
 356 ; see also Mitchell v. Jenkins, 5 B. & Ad. 5 
 
 {a) 8 (). B. D. 167, 175. 
 
 (b) Brumage v. Prosser, 4 B. & C. at p. 255 
 
 (c) Johnstone v. Sutlon, 1 T. B. 510, 545 : 
 B. &Ad. 588. 
 
 Mitchell 
 
 Jfltl'i 
 
MALICIOUS INJURIES. 53 
 
 is, as we have seen, a question for the judge, and if the chap, hi. 
 jury agree with the judge that there was no reasonable 
 or probable cause, they may, if they choose, infer there- 
 from that there was malice ; but they are not bound to . 
 do so, as they may come to the conclusion that the 
 defendant acted honestly and without ill-will, or any 
 other motive or desire than to do what he bond Jide 
 believed to be right in the interests of justice (d). And 
 where a jury find that the defendant honestly believed 
 in the charge made by him, they ought not to infer 
 malice if there is no evidence of it beyond the absence 
 of reasonable and probable cause (e) . 
 
 Where Defendant icas Bound orer to Prosecute. — A 
 prosecution may be malicious, though the defendant 
 was bound over to prosecute, if the defendant made 
 the charge maliciously and without reasonable and 
 probable cause (/) . So, too, a person who prosecutes 
 another ought to abandon the prosecution at the earliest 
 opportunity when convinced of the innocence of the 
 person prosecuted. Thus where a defendant in an 
 action in a county court knowingly and falsely swore 
 that the signature to an acknowledgment was signed by 
 the plaintiff, which was denied by the plaintiff, and 
 the judge thereupon, believing that the plaintiff had 
 committed perjury, committed him for trial, and bound 
 over the defendant to prosecute, and the defendant 
 accordingly appeared before the grand jury and re- 
 peated his false evidence before them, and the plaintiff 
 was tried and acquitted, it was held that he had a 
 good cause of action against the defendant. Cockburn, 
 C.J., in giving judgment, said : " In my opinion . . . 
 a prosecution, though in the outset not malicious, . . . 
 may nevertheless become malicious in any of the 
 stages thrdugh which it has to pass if the prose- 
 cutor, having acquired positive knowledge of the 
 innocence of the accused, perseveres malo animo in the 
 
 (d) Hicks v. Faulkner, 8 (,>. B. D. 167. 
 «?) Broiva v. Hawkes, (1891) 2 <J. B. 718. 
 (/) Dubois v. Keats, 1 1 A. & E. 329. 
 
54 OUTLINES OF TOETS. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 prosecution with the intention of procuring per nefas 
 a conviction of the accused " (g). 
 
 (4) Damage. — If in an action for malicious prosecu- 
 tion no damage of the first or second sort mentioned 
 above is necessarily involved, the plaintiff should be 
 prepared with evidence that by reason of the prose- 
 cution he has suffered in pocket (h) . Thus a plaintiff, 
 who in an action for maliciously indicting him for an 
 assault only gave in evidence the indictment which 
 had been drawn against him, and presented to the 
 grand jury and ignored by them, was non-suited (i). 
 
 Corporations. — It is curious to find that at the 
 present day there should be any doubt as to whether 
 an action for malicious prosecution can be sustained 
 against a corporation aggregate. That such a cor- 
 poration may be liable in an action of trover was 
 clearly laid down in Yarboroughv. Bank of England (k) . 
 Again, in Eastern Counties Railway v. Broom (I) it 
 was held that an action for assault and battery would 
 lie against a corporation if it could authorise the act 
 complained of, and it was done by their authority. 
 So actions for false imprisonment, for malicious libel, 
 for maliciously obstructing a person in his business, 
 have been held to lie against corporations or com- 
 panies (m). But in Stevens v. Midland Railway 
 Company (n) Alderson, B., expressed an opinion that 
 an action for malicious prosecution would not lie 
 against a corporation aggregate, for that " in order 
 to support the action it must be shewn that the 
 defendant was actuated by a motive in his mind, and 
 
 (g) FitzJohn v. Mackinder, 9 C. B. N. S. 505. 
 
 (h) Ante, p. 44. 
 
 (i) Byne v. Moore, 5 Taunt. 187 ; cf. Quartz Hill Gold Mining 
 Company v. Eyre, 11 Q. B. D. 674, at p. 691. 
 
 (k) 16 East, 6. 
 
 (I) 6 Ex. 314. 
 
 (m) Goff v. Great Northern Railway Company, 3 E. & E. 672 ; 
 Whitfield v. South-Eastern Railway Company, E. B. & E. 115 ; Green 
 v. London General Omnibus Company, 7 C. B. N. S. 290. 
 
 (») 10 Ex. 352. 
 
MALICIOUS INJURIES. 55 
 
 a corporation has no mind." The other judges of the ohap. hi. 
 Court, however, declined to commit themselves to this 
 proposition, and it was disapproved in Green v. London 
 General Omnibus Company (o) and Edwards v. Midland 
 Railway Company (p). On the other hand, in Abrath v. 
 North-Eastern Railway Company (q), Lord Bramwell 
 maintained that no such action will lie against a cor- 
 poration. No argument, however, on the point took 
 place, and the current of authority is opposed to the 
 dietum of his lordship (»•). 
 
 Maliciously presenting a Winding-up Petition. — 
 
 On the principles above indicated, an action will lie 
 against a person who, falsely and maliciously, and 
 without reasonable or probable cause, presents a 
 petition to wind-up a trading company, for the com- 
 pany's credit must be injured by the presentation and 
 advertisement of the petition (s) . 
 
 Maliciously procuring an Adjudication of Bank- 
 ruptcy. — So, too, an action may be maintained against 
 a person who, maliciously and without reasonable or 
 probable cause, procures an adjudication of bankruptcy 
 against another (t) ; but in such a case the action will 
 not lie unless the adjudication has been set aside (it). 
 It has been said that the presentation of a bankruptcy 
 petition against a trader under the circumstances 
 above stated would be actionable (x) ; but as bank- 
 ruptcy petitions are heard in chambers, and are not 
 advertised, the statement may possibly bear further 
 discussion. 
 
 (o) Vbi supra. 
 
 (p) 6 Q. B. D. 287 ; see also Kent v. Courage, 55 J. P. 264. 
 
 (?) 11 App. Cas. 247. 
 
 (/•) See Reg. v. Tyler and The International Commercial Company, 
 Limited, (1891) 2 Q. B. 588 ; liayson v. South London Tramways 
 Company, (1893) 2 Q. B. 304 (action for malicious prosecution). 
 
 (s) Quartz Bill Gold Mining Company v. Eyre, 11 Q. B. D. 674. 
 
 (t) Metropolitan Bank v. Fooley, 10 App. Cas. 210. 
 
 (u) lb. See ante, p. 47. 
 
 (x) Quartz Hill Gold Mining Company v. Eyre, supra, citing Johnson 
 v. Emerson, L. K. 6 Ex. 329. 
 
56 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, in. Maintenance. — "Maintenance," says Blackstone, 
 "is an officious intermeddling in a suit which in no 
 way belongs to one by maintaining or assisting either 
 party with money or otherwise to prosecute or defend 
 it" (y). It is in fact a criminal act, and an action 
 may be brought by the party damnified against the 
 person who has committed such criminal act (z). " A 
 man may, however, maintain the suit of his near 
 kinsman, servant, or poor neighbour, out of charity 
 and compassion, with impunity " (a) ; so " main- 
 tenance " of this kind is not actionable (b). A man is 
 not guilty of maintenance if he has, or, on reasonable 
 grounds, bond fide believes that he has a common 
 interest in the subject-matter of the action, or " the 
 thing in variance," or in a material issue raised in the 
 action. Thus, "if a tenant in tail or for life be 
 impleaded, he in remainder or reversion may lawfully 
 maintain the defence of the suit with his own 
 money" (c). But a man has no common interest in 
 an action merely because in it his character and 
 actions will be unavoidably made the subject of very 
 free comment. Thus T. brought^ an action for a libel, 
 which reflected not only upon himself but upon H. 
 The latter advised him to bring the action, and 
 employed his own solicitor to conduct it. The 
 defendant succeeded, but was unable to get the costs 
 from T. : held, in an action for maintenance against 
 H., that H. was liable for such costs (<■). 
 
 II. Other Malicious Injuries. 
 Maliciously inducing a person to commit a 
 Breach of Contract. — Since the decision in the House 
 of Lords in Allen v. Flood, reversing the judgment of 
 
 (?/) Bl. Coram. Bk. 4, c. 10, s. 12. 
 
 (z) Bradlaugh v. Neivder/ate, 11 Q. B. D. 1 ; Metropolitan Bank v. 
 Pooley, 10 App. Cas. 210, 218. 
 
 (a) Bl. Comm. uhi sujira, 
 
 (5) Harris v. Brisco, 17 Q. B. D. 504. 
 
 (e) Alabaster v. Harness, (1894) 2 Q. B. 897 ; (1895), 1 Q. B. 339. 
 The judgment will shew the risk which solicitors may run in bringing 
 "speculative " actions. 
 
MALICIOUS INJURIES. 57 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 the Court of Appeal ((f) , it must now be taken to be 
 the rule that the existence of a bad motive when the Jihnv. 
 act complained of is not in itself illegal, will not make ~ lu " tL 
 that act a civil wrong for which reparation is due. The 
 cases of malicious prosecution and libel and slander 
 are apparent rather than real exceptions. The person 
 against whom the criminal law is put in motion without 
 reasonable and probable cause is prima facie wronged, 
 hut the law, from considerations of public policy and 
 lest men should be deterred from prosecuting persons 
 on proper occasions, saves the prosecutor from liability 
 for what was prima facie a wrongful act, if he acted in 
 good faith and without an evil motive. So, too, a man 
 who defames another by false allegations is liable 
 to an action, however good his motive and however 
 honestly he believes in the truth of the allegations. 
 But here again there are certain occasions which the 
 law on grounds of public policy regards as privileged, 
 and where the false and defamatory statement is made 
 on one of such occasions the author of it is excused if 
 he acted bond fide and not from a bad motive. But 
 the i list of an acfeortj for libel and slander is that the 
 statement was false- and defamatory, and of an action 
 for malicious prosecution, that criminal proceedings 
 were taken against the plaintiff without reasonable and 
 probable cause. 
 
 In Allen v. Flood (sup.), the delegate of a trade 
 union induced employers not to retain in their employ- 
 ment the plaintiffs, who were not members of the 
 union, by stating that unless they were sent away the 
 union men would be called out. The employers, who 
 were not bound to retain the plaintiffs, but would have 
 done so but for the threat, discharged them. There 
 was evidence that the object of the delegate was to 
 punish the plaintiffs for having formerly acted contrary 
 to the rules of the union, and the jury found that he 
 
 (d) (1898) App. Cas. 1 ; reversing Mood v. Jackson, (1895) 2 
 Q. B. 81. 
 
58 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 acted maliciously, in the sense that he had an indirect 
 object of doing mischief to the plaintiffs. It was held, 
 that as no legal right of the plaintiffs had been violated, 
 the existence of a bad motive could not give a cause of 
 action. It will be observed that the employers were 
 not induced to do an unlawful act or actionable wrong, 
 as the plaintiffs were merely engaged by the day, and 
 this distinguishes the case from cases like Lumley v. 
 Gye (e) , where the third person was induced to commit 
 a breach of contract. Again, the decision in Allen v. 
 Flood does not affect cases where an act done by a third 
 party, though within his rights, has been induced by 
 illegal means directed against that third party, such as 
 fraud or violence, or by an unlawful conspiracy. It 
 has since been held that a conspiracy (not criminal) 
 to do a certain act, and the doing of it, are not action- 
 able, unless the act, if done by an individual, would 
 constitute a civil injury to another (ee). 
 
 The effect of Allen v. Flood on previous cases is as 
 follows: Lumley v. Gye (sup.) and Bon-en v. Hall(J), 
 so far as they decide that a man who wilfully and 
 knowing that he is procuring a breach of contract 
 (whether it be one of personal service or not), procures 
 a party to commit such a breach, is liable to an action, 
 are not affected by Allen v. Flood, but they are open 
 to review hereafter in the House of Lords. They 
 cannot, however, be supported on the ground men- 
 tioned in the latter of them that the gist of an 
 action of this kind is that the persuasion was used for 
 the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff or bene- 
 fiting the defendant at the plaintiff's expense. The 
 Court in Bowen v. Hall appears to have wrongly 
 interpreted the word " maliciously " in Lumley v. Gye, 
 a word which does not in law necessarily imply an 
 evil motive: see Allen v. Flood, pp. 123-4. 
 
 (c) 2 E. & B. 216. 
 
 (ce) Huttley /. Simmons, (1898)1 Q, B. 181 : cf. Allen v. Flood, at 
 p. 140. 
 
 (/) 6 Q. B. D. 333 ; see also Tc?npertonv. Kussell, (1893) 1 Q. B. 715. 
 
MALICIOUS INJURIES. 59 
 
 Malicious injury to u Person's Property or CHAP. III. 
 
 Trade. — Again, it seems to have been thought from 
 certain dicta of the Court of Appeal in Mogul Steamship 
 Co. v. McGregor, Goiv and Co. (g), that an act not 
 otherwise wrongful becomes so if it interferes with 
 another's trade or employment. A case before Lord 
 Holt was believed to give some support to this proposi- 
 tion. There the plaintiff alleged that his "decoy" 
 was disturbed by the defendant having fired guns near 
 it, and so driven away the wild-fowl, with the intention 
 and effect of injuring the plaintiff's trade. Holt, C.J., 
 held that the action well lay, for that the use of a 
 "decoy" is a lawful trade, and that he who hinders 
 another in his trade or livelihood is liable to an action 
 if the injury is caused by " a violent or malicious act ; " 
 but it was added that the defendant might, if he had 
 chosen, have set up a decoy of his own on his own 
 ground (h) . The House of Lords in Allen v. Flood do not 
 expressly overrule this case,but suggest that the decision 
 in it may have been justified on the ground that what 
 the defendant did amounted to a " nuisance." The ex- 
 tent to which efforts may be made to capture another's 
 trade is shewn by the Mogul Steamship Co.'s Case, 
 already referred to. There the defendants, who 
 were owners of ships trading between China and 
 Europe, with a view to obtain for themselves a 
 monopoly of the homeward tea trade and thereby to 
 keep up the rate of freight, formed themselves into 
 an association, and agreed that the division of cargoes 
 and the rates of freight should be a matter of arrange- 
 ment, that they would allow a rebate of 5 per cent, to 
 all shippers who shipped only with members of the 
 association, and that agents of members should be 
 prohibited from acting in the interest of competing 
 
 (g) 23 Q. B. D. 598 ; see in H. of L. (1892), App. Cas. 25 ; see also 
 Kearney v. Lloyd, 26 L. B. (Ir.) 268. 
 
 (h) KeebU v. Hidceringill, 11 Mod. 74, 131 ; 11 East, 574 (n). 
 Allen v. flood overrules Carringlon v. Taylor, 11 East, 571, where a 
 defendant, who was within his rights in shooting wild-fowl in a creek 
 of the sea, disturbed, by the noise of his shooting, the wild-fowl in the 
 plaintiff's decoy. 
 
60 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, in . shipowners. Any member might withdraw from the 
 association on giving notice. The plaintiffs were not 
 allowed to become members of the association, and 
 could not carry cargoes at remunerative rates as the 
 association had reduced the rates to a point at which 
 there could be no profit, and so the plaintiffs were 
 damaged. It was held, however, that an action in 
 respect of such damage would not lie, for what the 
 defendants had done was done with a view of keeping 
 the trade in their own hands, and they had not used 
 unlawful means, such as misrepresentation or com- 
 pulsion. It will be observed that as pointed out in 
 Allen v. Flood (p. 140) the object of the defendants was 
 to induce shippers to contract with them, and not with 
 the plaintiffs, and so to benefit themselves at the 
 expense of the plaintiffs. 
 
 Slander of Title. — An unfounded assertion that the 
 owner of real property has no title to it — if made under 
 such circumstances that the law would imply malice, or 
 if express malice be proved and special damage be 
 shewn — as, for instance, that a bargain to sell the land 
 has been lost — is held to give a cause of action. This 
 is slander of title properly so called ; but a similar rule 
 applies where a false' and malicious assertion relates to 
 goods, and damage arises from the loss of a bargain to 
 sell them (I). But where a person claims a right in 
 himself which he intends to enforce against a purchaser, 
 he is entitled, and indeed ought, to give the intending 
 purchaser warning of such intention, and an action 
 will not lie for giving such warning, unless it can be 
 shewn either that the threat was made mala fide, only 
 with the intent to injure the vendor, and without any 
 intention to follow it up by an action, or that the cir- 
 cumstances were such as to make the bringing of an 
 action altogether wrongful (m). 
 
 (1) Wren v. Wield, L. R. 4 Q. B. 730. 
 
 (to) Ibid. See also Thorley's Cattle Food Company v. Massam, 14 Ch. D. 
 763 ; Dicks v. Brooks, 15 Ch. D. 22 ; Halsey v. Brotherhood, 19 Ch. D. 
 386. 
 
MALICIOUS INJURIES. 01 
 
 Malicious Falsehood affecting a Man's Trade CHAP. III. 
 
 Analogous to an action for slander of title is an action 
 for a malicious falsehood concerning one's trade or 
 business by which special damage has been caused. 
 Thus, an action was successfully brought against a 
 defendant who falsely and maliciously published of the 
 plaintiff that he had ceased to carry on his business 
 whereby the plaintiff suffered damage (;?.). The gist 
 of the action is special damage, and the plaintiff must 
 prove this, and also that the representation complained 
 of was untrue, and in disparagement of his goods («). 
 Thus a defendant sold the plaintiff's "Infant's Food," 
 affixing to plaintiff's wrappers a label stating that 
 defendant's food for infants was far more nutritious 
 and healthful than any other. It was not proved that 
 the statement was untrue, or that the plaintiff had 
 sustained damage : held, that the action must fail (p) . 
 But it is doubtful if in any case an action lies where 
 A. says that his goods are better than B.'s, or where 
 he says that they are better in this or in that way (p) . 
 
 As to Special Damage. — In actions of the kind 
 now under discussion special damage must be proved. 
 There is some ambiguity in the term " special 
 damage," but for the present purpose it does not 
 necessarily mean particular, as distinguished from 
 and beyond general damage, but actual loss which has 
 in fact occurred. Thus a plaintiff proved, as the result 
 of a false and malicious statement respecting his 
 business, not a loss of particular customers, but a 
 general falling off in business, and that was held 
 sufficient (q). 
 
 As to Patents. — With regard to patents, s. 32 of the 
 Patents Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883 (?■), altered 
 the law. By that section an action will lie against any 
 
 (m) Matdiffe v. Mam, (1892) 2 Q. B. 524. 
 (o) White v. Mc/ICn, (1895) App. Cbs. 154. 
 (p) While v. Mellin, ubi supra, 
 (q) Eatcliffe v. Evnai, (1892) 2 Q. B. 524. 
 (?•) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57. 
 
62 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 person who threatens another, by circulars, advertise- 
 ments or otherwise, with legal proceedings or liability 
 in respect of the manufacture, use, sale or purchase of 
 any invention, unless the matter to which the threat 
 applies is in fact an infringement of the legal rights of 
 the threatener, or unless he forthwith brings an action 
 to shew the validity of the threat ; and it will be no 
 defence to such action to say that the threat was made 
 bona fide or on a privileged occasion (s). 
 
 (s) Skinner <fc Co. v. Shew & Co., (1893) 1 Ch. 413. S. C. (1894) 
 1 Ch. 581. 
 
( 68 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 TOETS IN RESPECT OF FAMILY AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS. 
 
 Torts to Marital Mights. — The injuries that may CHAP. IV. 
 
 be offered to a person, considered as a husband, are 
 principally three : (1) Abduction, or taking away a 
 man's wife; (2) Adultery, or criminal conversation with 
 her; (3) Beating or otherwise abusing her (a). 
 
 Abduction. — By the common law a husband is 
 entitled to recover damages against such as take away 
 his wife by force or fraud. And he has a similar right 
 of action against any one who persuades or entices the 
 wife to live separate from him without a sufficient 
 cause (a). Ill treatment on the part of the husband, 
 whereby the wife is forced to leave the house through 
 fear of bodily injuries, is such " sufficient " cause (b). 
 
 Adulterij. — For this the law gave to the husband a 
 writ of trespass ri et armis against the adulterer. The 
 action of criminal conversation was abolished by 20 & 21 
 Vict. c. 85 (The Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act), 
 s. 59. But by s. 33 of that Act it is provided that any 
 husband may, either in a petition for dissolution of 
 marriage, or for judicial separation, or in a petition 
 limited to such object only, claim damages from any 
 person on the ground of his having committed adultery 
 with the wife of such petitioner. The damages to be 
 recovered on such petition are in all cases to be ascer- 
 tained by a jury, and after the verdict the Court has 
 power to direct in what manner such damages shall be 
 
 (a) Black. Comm. III. 139. Where a wife refuses to live with her 
 husband he is not entitled to keep her in confinement to compel her to 
 do so : Reg. v. Jackson, (1891) 1 Q. B. 671. 
 
 [b) Berthon v. Cartwright, 2 Esp. 480. 
 
64 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 paid or applied, and to direct that the whole or any part 
 thereof shall be settled for the benefit of the children 
 (if any) of the marriage, or as a provision for the 
 maintenance of the wife. 
 
 The amount of damages is not to be measured by the 
 co-respondent's wealth, but by the injury (if any) which 
 the husband has sustained through the co-respondent's 
 act (c) . 
 
 Beating or otherwise ill-usiiifi a Wife. — For this at 
 common law an action may be brought in the names of 
 the husband and wife jointly. But if the mal-treatment 
 be "very enormous," so that thereby the husband is 
 deprived for any time of the company and assistance of 
 his wife, the law then gives him a separate remedy by 
 an action for damages for such mal-treatment, " j>er 
 quod consortium amisit" (d) . As to the first of these two 
 actions s. 2 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 
 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75), provides that a married woman 
 shall be capable of suing and being sued, in tort, in all 
 respects as if she was a feme sole, and her husband 
 need nut be joined with her as plaintiff or defendant, 
 or be made a party to any action or other legal proceed- 
 ing brought by or taken against her. 
 
 Torts to Parental Eights. — For the abduction of 
 children the common law gave a remedy by action of 
 trespass ri et arm is, deJUio {veljilia) rapto vel abdueto (e) ; 
 and for injuries to children a remedy to the parent was 
 developed through a fiction of service due from child 
 to parent, and this will be dealt with under the next 
 heading. 
 
 Torts in liespect of Domestic Relations. — Black- 
 stone(/) mentions two kinds of injuries: (1) Betaining 
 a man's hired servant before his time is expired ; 
 
 (c) Darbishire v. Darbiskire and Baird, 62 L. T. 664. 
 
 (d) Black. Comm. III. 140. 
 
 (e) Ibid. There were doubts, with which Blackstone, however, did 
 not agree, whether such an action lay whore children other than the 
 heir were abducted. 
 
 (/) Comm. III. 141. 
 
TORTS IN RESPECT OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS. 65 
 
 (•2) Beating or confining him in such a manner that he chap, iv. 
 is unable to perform his work. 
 
 (1) As to the first of these, the retention, to be 
 actionable, must be with notice of the existing contract 
 of service (g) , and an action may also be brought for 
 enticing away a man's servant. This head of injury 
 is not confined to the case of master and servant, but 
 will include that of employer and employed (h). 
 
 Where a deed of apprenticeship is entered into with 
 an infant, the master's remedy, if the infant misbehave 
 himself, is to correct him or complain to a justice of 
 the peace to have him punished ; but no action can 
 be brought against the infant on his covenants in the 
 deed of apprenticeship ; and so a covenant not to enter, 
 during the term of apprenticeship, into the employ- 
 ment of any person save the master will not be enforced 
 by an injunction against the infant or against a third 
 person who takes him into his employment (i). And 
 if such a deed of apprenticeship is unreasonable, and 
 therefore not binding upon the infant, an action will 
 not lie against a third person for enticing the infant 
 away from his master's service (fc). 
 
 (2) Injuries to a servant. — "In this case," says 
 Blackstone(f), "besides the action of battery or im- 
 prisonment which the servant himself may have against 
 the aggressor, the master also, as a recompense for his 
 immediate loss, may maintain an action of trespass vi 
 et armis ; in which he must allege and prove the 
 special damage he has sustained by the beating of his 
 servant, per quod servitium amisit, and then the jury 
 will make him a proportionable pecuniary satisfaction." 
 
 Injuries to children capable of rendering service. — If a 
 child living with its parent is capable of performing 
 
 (g) F. N. B. 167 ; Winch. 51. 
 
 (h) Dc Francesco v. Barnum, 63 L. T. 514. 
 
 (i) S. C. 43 Ch. D. 165. 
 
 (k) S. C. 45 Oh. D. 490. 
 
 (Z) Comm. III. 142. 
 
 R.T. F 
 
66 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 acts of service, the parent may have a similar right of 
 action for injuries done to the child to that which a 
 master has for injuries done to his servant (m). 
 
 Injuries arising through breach of contract. — Where 
 an injury to a servant, or a child capable of performing 
 acts of service, arises ex delicto, the law is clear that 
 the master or parent may have a right to bring an 
 action (n). But where the injury arises from a breach 
 of contract entered into with the servant there is some 
 authority for saying that the master or parent has no 
 right of action (o). But in the case which appears to 
 decide this the action was brought by the master 
 against a railway company, from whom the servant had 
 purchased his ticket, and the case was decided on 
 demurrer to a declaration in which it was averred that 
 the right of the servant, for whose injuries the master 
 was suing the company, was founded on contract, and 
 this was taken as the premiss on which the case had 
 to be decided. The master of course was not a party 
 to the contract (p) . The actual decision in the case 
 would therefore seem to be right, though the judgment 
 would perhaps at the present day not be supported, 
 and it is submitted now that if a master were to frame 
 his action in tort, alleging an act of misfeasance, 
 whereby the servant who was lawfully in the defen- 
 dant's train was injured to the master's loss, a good 
 cause of action would be shewn (q) . Possibly, too, it 
 
 (mi) Hall v. Hollander, 4 B. & C. 660. 
 
 (n) Berrhujcr v. Great Eastern Railway Company, 4 C. P. D. 163, 
 where the action was against a railway company from whom the servant 
 had not taken his ticket. 
 
 (o) Alton v. Midland Railway Company, 19 C. B. N. S. 213. See post, 
 p. 100. 
 
 (p) See Taylor v. Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway 
 Company (1895), 1 Q. B. 134, 140. 
 
 (q) See last note ; see also Fovlkes v. Metropolitan District Raihcay 
 Company, 5 C. P. D. 157 ; Meur. v. Great Eastern Railway Company 
 (1895), 2 Q. B. 387. In this case plaintiff's servant took a ticket from 
 defendants, and his portmanteau was accepted by them as personal 
 luggage. It contained his livery, which was the property of the plaintiff. 
 Through an act of misfeasance on the part of the defendants' porter the 
 livery was destroyed : held, that the defendants were liable to the 
 plaintiff for the tortious act of the porter. 
 
TORTS IN RESPECT OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS. 67 
 
 might be necessary to allege that the servant was at chap, iv. 
 the time engaged in his master's business, as other- 
 wise the damage might be too remote. 
 
 Injuries causing death.— A master, or parent, cannot 
 maintain an action against a wrongdoer for injuries 
 causing the immediate death of his servant, or child 
 capable of performing acts of service (r). 
 
 Seduction. — To intermeddle with the relations be- 
 tween master and servant, or to deprive any person 
 of the services of another to which he is entitled, may 
 amount to a tortious act for which an action will lie. 
 The remedy for seduction is founded on this principle, 
 for, while no relief can be obtained by an action on 
 behalf of the person seduced, her master, if able to 
 prove any loss of service as resulting from the seduc- 
 tion, may recover damages from the wrongdoer. The 
 services, even of the slightest kind, which are due 
 from a child to a parent or person in loco parentis, are 
 sufficient to support the action ; or, as put by Bovill, 
 C.J. (s), "no proof of service is necessary beyond the 
 services implied from the daughter's living in her 
 father's house as a member of his family." But where 
 the person seduced is in the service of another at the 
 time of the seduction, a parent cannot maintain an 
 action, notwithstanding that loss of service subsequently 
 accrued to the parent as a consequence (t) . However, 
 the bare right to the service is sufficient. For example : 
 the plaintiff's daughter left his house and went into 
 service. Her master dismissed her at a day's notice, 
 and the next day, on her way home, the defendant 
 seduced her. Here, as the real service was put an end 
 to by the master, and as the girl intended to return 
 home, the right of the father to her services revived, 
 and this mere right, without proof of actual service, 
 was held sufficient to support an action (u). 
 
 (r) Osborn v. Gillett, L. R. 8 Ex. 88 (Braniwell, B., diss.). 
 
 \s) Evans v. Walton, L. R. 2 C. P. 615. 
 
 (t) Dairies v. Williams, 10 Q. B. 725. 
 
 («) Terry v. Hutchinson, L. E. 3 Q. B. 599. 
 
 F 2 
 
( 68 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE V. 
 
 TOETS TO PBOPEETY. 
 
 chap. v. Toets committed in respect of land may come under 
 various heads, amongst the most important of which 
 are trespass, nuisance, waste. 
 
 Trespass to 
 land — what ? 
 
 A trespass to land has been defined as an entry 
 upon, or any direct and immediate interference with 
 the possession of, the land (a). It is sometimes called 
 trespass quare clausum /regit, as distinguished from 
 trespass to the person, such as a battery or false 
 imprisonment, and trespass to goods, such as taking 
 away another's chattels, or doing some direct and im- 
 mediate injury to them. It is, of course, a trespass to 
 enter upon, or to walk or ride upon, another's land. 
 So also it is a trespass to drive nails into a person's 
 wall, or to place stones or rubbish against it (b) , to fire 
 shot or bullets into another's field (c), or, perhaps, even 
 to fire a gun or rifle over the field (d). 
 
 Again, a man may commit a trespass by mowing 
 down a person's meadow, or by pouring water into his 
 yard (e), or by allowing domestic animals belonging to 
 him to stray into his neighbour's ground (/). 
 
 And if a man goes into a highway, the soil of which 
 is vested in another, not for the purpose of using it as 
 a highway, but solely for the purpose of interfering 
 
 a) See Bill. & L. 3rd ed. p. 415. 
 (6) Lawrence v. Obce, 1 Stark. 22 ; Gregory v. Piper, 9 B. & C. 591. 
 
 (c) Pickering v. Buthl, 1 Stark. 56. 
 
 (d) This would appear to be a legal grievance, if not technically a, 
 trespass ; Clifton v. LSury, Times L. R. vol. 4, p. 8. 
 
 (e) Reynolds v Clarke, 2 Ravin. 1399. 
 (/) Lee v. Pdley, 18 C. B. N. S. 722. 
 
TORTS TO PROPERTY. 69 
 
 with that other's enjoyment of his own property, he is chap, v. 
 
 a trespasser (g). 
 
 It will be no answer to an action that the trespass 
 complained of was involuntary and by mistake, as, 
 for example, where the defendant, in mowing his own 
 grass, mowed by mistake a little of his neighbour's, 
 which was growing alongside (h). 
 
 Continuing Tresjmss — Every continuance of a 
 trespass is a fresh trespass, and an action may be 
 brought in respect of it. Thus, where the defendants, 
 the trustees of a turnpike road, built buttresses to 
 support it on the plaintiff's land, and the plaintiff 
 thereupon sued them in trespass for such erection, 
 and accepted a sum of money paid into court in full 
 satisfaction of the trespass, and thereafter gave the 
 defendants notice to remove the buttresses, it was held 
 that the defendants, upon their refusal to do so, were 
 liable in another action for keeping and continuing the 
 buttresses upon the land (i). 
 
 Trespass ah Initio. — Sometimes, though the original 
 entry upon land may not have been wrongful or have 
 amounted to a trespass, it may become so by the 
 defendant's subsequent conduct. This will appear from 
 the well-known Six Carpenters' case (k). In that case 
 the defendants, six carpenters, entered the plaintiff's 
 house, which was a common wine-tavern, and called 
 for a quart of wine, and paid for the same. They were 
 then at their request served with another quart of wine, 
 but refused to pay for the same, whereupon the plaintiff 
 brought an action of trespass. The Court held that 
 under the circumstances an action of trespass would 
 not lie, and laid down the following rules : — 
 
 (g) Harrison y. Duke of Rutland (1893), 1 Q. B. 142 ; see also 
 Beg. v. Pratt, 4 E. & B. 860. 
 
 (h) Baseley v. Clarkson, 3 Lev. 37. 
 
 (i) Holmes v. Wilson, 10 A. & E. 503 ; see also Boioyer v. Cook, 
 4 C. B. 236. 
 
 (k) 8 Co. 146 a ; 1 8m. L. C. 127. 
 
70 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, v. (i) "Where a man abuses an authority or licence given 
 him by the law, he becomes a trespasser ab initio. 
 
 (2) Where a man abuses an authority or licence given 
 him by another party, he may be punished for such 
 abuse, but he is not a trespasser ab initio. 
 
 (3) A mere non-feasance {i.e., an omission to do 
 something) cannot make a person who has had an 
 authority or licence given him by the law, a trespasser 
 ab initio. 
 
 Under the third of these rules the six carpenters were 
 held not liable in trespass, though they would have been 
 liable in an action for the price of the wine. 
 
 One consequence of the first of the above rules was 
 that if a landlord, lawfully entering upon premises for 
 the purpose of making a distress, committed an abuse 
 of this right given him by the law — e.g., by converting 
 the goods to his own use — he became a trespasser ab 
 initio (I) ; but by a remedial statute, the 11 Geo. II. 
 c. 19, s. 19, it is enacted that where a distress is made 
 for rent justly due, but, through the mistake of the 
 landlord or his bailiff or agent, some irregularity- or 
 unlawful act has been afterwards done, the distress 
 itself shall not be therefore deemed to be unlawful, nor 
 the party making it a trespasser ab initio; but the party 
 aggrieved by such unlawful act or irregularity may 
 recover full satisfaction for the special damage which he 
 may have sustained thereby, and no more, in an action 
 of trespass or on the case, together with his full costs. 
 
 This statute will not give any protection to a land- 
 lord to whom rent is due in respect of premises, if he 
 effects an entry in a way not permitted by the law (as, 
 for instance, where he breaks open a window in order 
 to get in), and in such a case he will be liable to the 
 tenant for the full value of the goods taken, without 
 deducting the rent for which the seizure was made (m) . 
 
 (1) Gargrave v. Smith, 1 Salk. 221. 
 
 (m) Attack v. Bramwcll, 3 B. & S. 520 ; see and cf. Jones v. Foley. 
 (1891), 1 Q. B. 730. 
 
TORTS TO PROPERTY. 71 
 
 A subsequent statute of the same reign (17 Geo. II. chap, v. 
 c. 88), by s. 8 gave a similar protection to overseers of 
 the poor making distresses for money justly due for the 
 relief of the poor, where any subsequent irregularity 
 was committed by the parties distraining. 
 
 Vlio may sue for Trespass. — Trespass is a posses- 
 sory action founded merely on the possession of land, 
 and it is not at all necessary that the right should 
 come into question (n) . In other words, whoever is in 
 possession may maintain an action of trespass against 
 a wrongdoer to his possession (o) . So it was held in 
 Graham v. Peat (p) that a person in possession of glebe 
 land under a lease void by 13 Eliz. c. 20(g), by reason 
 of the rector's non-residence, might maintain an action 
 of trespass against a wrongdoer. Actual personal occu- 
 pation is not necessary to enable a person to bring an 
 action of trespass, as an occupation by his servant will 
 be sufficient (?•). But a person who has let the land to 
 a tenant who is in occupation cannot maintain an action 
 of trespass (s), though, as we shall see, he may sue a 
 wrongdoer if his reversion has been injured. Though, 
 however, a person in possession of land, even if he be 
 not legally entitled thereto, may maintain an action of 
 trespass against a wrongdoer, yet he will not be able to 
 do so against the rightful owner. Thus, in Beddall v. 
 Maitland (t) it was laid down that though a forcible 
 entry upon land may be punishable as a crime under 
 5 Eich. II. stat. 1, c. 8, yet a person wrongfully in 
 possession cannot recover damages against the rightful 
 owner for a forcible entry — for the entry, because the 
 possession is not legally his, and for the force used 
 therein, because the statute, whilst it creates a crime, 
 gives no civil remedy. 
 
 (n) Lambert v. Stroolher, Willes, 218, 221. 
 (o) Harker v. Birkbeck, 3 Burr. 1556, at p. 1563. 
 (p) l'East, 244. 
 
 \q) Now repealed as to this point. 
 
 (r) See Bertie v. Beaumont, 16 East, 33 ; Mayhew v. Suttle, 4 E. & B. 
 347. 
 
 (s) Cooper v. Crabtree, 20 Ch. D. 589. 
 (t) 17 Ch. D. 174. 
 
72 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 ohap. v. « a s soon as a person is entitled to possession, and 
 enters in the assertion of that possession, or, which is 
 exactly the same thing, any other person enters by 
 command of that lawful owner so entitled to possession, 
 the law immediately vests the actual possession in the 
 person who has so entered. If there are two persons 
 in a field, each asserting that the field is his, and each 
 doing some act in the assertion of the right of posses- 
 sion, and if the question is, Which of those two is in 
 actual possession ? I answer, The person who has the 
 title is in actual possession, and the other person is a 
 trespasser. . . . Then that is to be determined, as it 
 seems to me, by the fact of the title, each having the 
 same apparent actual possession ; — the question as to 
 which of the two really is in possession is determined 
 by the fact of the possession following the title, that is, 
 by the law, which makes it follow the title "(«). 
 
 Tenants in Common. — With regard to tenants in 
 common, it is settled law that, unless there be an actual 
 ouster of one tenant in common by another, trespass 
 will not lie by the one against the other so far as the 
 land is concerned (x). But if one tenant in common 
 expel his co-tenant, trespass will lie (y). So, too, if a 
 co-tenant should dig up and carry away tbe soil of the 
 premises in which there is a co-tenancy (z). But the 
 rights of the co-tenants will to some extent depend 
 upon the nature of the property. Thus, for example, 
 a tenant in common of a coal-mine is entitled to dig 
 and carry away the coal, for otherwise he could not 
 enjoy his share of the common property. The only 
 restriction upon him is that he must not appropriate 
 to himself more than his share (a). 
 
 (u) Per Maule, J., Jones v. Chapman, 2 Ex. 803, 821. This principle 
 may, it would seem, be applied also to personal chattels, the situation 
 of which is consistent with their being in possession of either of two 
 persons : Ramsay v. Margrett (1894), 2 Q. B. 18, 27. 
 
 (x) Jacobs v. Seward, L. R. 5 H. L. 464. 
 
 \y) Murray v. Hall, 7 C. B. 441. 
 
 («) Wilkinson v. Haygarth, 12 Q. B. 837. 
 
 (a) Job v. Potion, L. R. 20 ISq. 84. 
 
TORTS TO PROPERTY. 73 
 
 In the same way, as regards chattels, the cases in chap, v. 
 which trover would lie against a tenant in common 
 are reducible to this. They are cases in ^\■hich some- 
 thing has been done which has destroyed the common 
 property, or where there has been a direct and positive 
 exclusion of the co-tenant from the common property, 
 he seeking to exercise his rights therein, and being 
 denied the exercise of those rights. Thus, where a 
 ship was taken possession of and sent to sea by one 
 tenant in common without the consent of his co-tenant, 
 and lost, it was held that the property was destroyed 
 by the act of one tenant in common, and that there- 
 fore trover would lie in respect of his co-tenant's 
 share (b) . 
 
 Sights of Reversioner. — Trespass being a posses- 
 sory action, to use the old nomenclature, it is, or 
 ought to be, brought by the person in possession. 
 The reversioner, however, is not without his remedy, 
 and has a right of action, which, under the old 
 system of pleading, would have been an action on the 
 case, against a wrongdoer by whom his reversion has 
 been damaged. But unless there has been damage 
 to the reversion, or some act done by which it will 
 necessarily be damaged, he will not be entitled to 
 sue (c) . Thus, a reversioner cannot maintain an action Reversioner 
 against a stranger for merely entering upon his land cannot mam- 
 held by a tenant upon lease, though the entry be trespassuniess 
 made in exercise of an alleged right of way, such an ^a^^ed 11 
 act during the tenancy not being necessarily injurious 
 to the reversion, for the assertion of a right of way 
 over land whilst it is out on lease would not be 
 evidence of a right against the reversioner (d) . But 
 where a window was obstructed by the erection of a 
 wall on the adjoining premises, it was held that the 
 reversioner was entitled to a verdict and to recover 
 
 (b) Barnardiston v. Chapman, Bull. N. P. 34 ; 4 East, 121 n. ; see 
 Jacobs v. Seward, ubi supra. 
 .(c) Jackson v. PesJced, 1 M. & S. 234. 
 (d) Baxter v. Taylor, 4 B. & Ad. 72. 
 
74 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 damages, for there the obstruction was of a permanent 
 character, and would remain unless something were 
 done to remedy the mischief (e) . And so building a 
 roof with eaves which discharge rain-water by a spout 
 into adjoining premises is an injury for which the 
 landlord of such premises may successfully sue as 
 reversioner whilst they are under demise, if the jury 
 think there is damage to the reversion (/). But 
 where a reversioner sued for injury to his reversion 
 by the erection of workshops and a forge and chimney 
 on land adjoining his houses in the occupation of his 
 tenants, and for smoke which issued from the chimney, 
 and noise caused by the forge, and it was proved that 
 the chimney was built by the defendant's landlord, 
 and that the smoke issued from it in consequence of 
 the fires lighted by the defendant for the purposes of 
 his trade, and that the plaintiff's tenants gave notice 
 to quit, it was held that there was no evidence to 
 prove injury to the reversion, for that, to entitle the 
 plaintiff to maintain the action, the injury complained 
 of must be of a permanent character, and the only 
 act chargeable to the defendant — namely, the lighting 
 of the fires — was not in its nature permanent (</). 
 
 Hights of Owner of Subsoil. — A person entitled to, 
 and possessed of, the subsoil, may maintain an action 
 of trespass against a party who digs holes in it, 
 although other persons may for the time being have 
 exclusive right to the possession of the surface. Thus, 
 where plaintiffs were seised in fee of certain fields, 
 and had exclusive possession thereof during a certain 
 portion of the year, but the burgesses of Derby had 
 exclusive possession of them for the remainder of the 
 year for the purposes of turning in their horses and 
 cattle, and the defendant, at certain races held on the 
 
 (e) Jesser v. Gifford, 4 Burr. 2141. See also May/air Property Com- 
 pany v. Johnston (1894), 1 Cli. 508 (placing foundations of a wall in a 
 person's land). 
 
 (/) Tucker v. Kncman, 11 A. k E. 40. 
 
 ((/) Simpson v. Savage, 1 C. B. N. S. 347. See Cooper v. Crabtrcc, 
 20 Ch. D. 589. 
 
TORTS TO PROPERTY. 75 
 
 fields during the latter of these two periods, erected a chap, v. 
 booth, the posts of which were inserted some depth 
 into the soil, it was held that though the plaintiffs 
 could not maintain an action of trespass against a 
 person who merely rode over the surface, they might 
 maintain such action for the insertion of the posts (h). 
 
 Might to Adjacent and Subjacent Support. — A 
 
 right to lateral support from adjoining soil is not, like 
 the support of one building by another, supposed to 
 be gained by grant, but is a right of property passing 
 with the soil. If the owner of two adjoining closes 
 conveys away one of them, the alienee, without any 
 grant for that purpose, is entitled to the lateral 
 support of the other close the very instant the con- 
 veyance is executed, as much as after the expiration 
 of twenty years or any longer period. Pari ratione, 
 where there are separate freeholds, from the surface 
 of the land and the minerals belonging to different 
 owners, the owner of the surface, whilst it is unin- 
 cumbered by buildings and in its natural state, is 
 entitled to have it supported by the subjacent mineral 
 strata. Those strata may of course be removed by 
 the owner of them, so that a sufficient support for the 
 surface is left ; but if the surface subsides and is 
 injured by the removal of those strata (although, on 
 the supposition that the surface and the minerals 
 belong to the same owner, the operation may not 
 have been conducted negligently, nor contrary to 
 the custom of the country), the owner of the surface 
 may maintain an action against the owner of the 
 minerals for the damage sustained by the subsi- 
 dence (/). This natural right of support, in the 
 absence of any express grant, reservation, or covenant, 
 exists generally, without reference to the nature of 
 the strata, or the difficulty of propping up the sur- , 
 face, or the comparative value of the surface and the 
 
 (h) Cox v. Glue, 5 C. B. 533. 
 
 (»') Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739, at p. 744 ; see also Back- 
 house v. Bonomi, 9 H. of L. 503. 
 
76 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, v, minerals (&). If the land be not in its natural state, 
 but have buildings erected upon it for which no 
 right of support has been acquired, an adjacent or 
 subjacent owner is not liable for removing soil on 
 his own property, and so causing those buildings to 
 fall (I) . But the natural right of support for the soil 
 remains notwithstanding the erection of the buildings, 
 and if the land would have subsided by reason of the 
 removal of its natural support, whether the buildings 
 were on it or not, the owner so removing the support 
 will be liable for the damages caused thereby (m). 
 
 " The right, therefore, to support of land and the 
 right to support of buildings stand upon different 
 footings as to the mode of acquiring them, the former 
 being prima facie a right of property, analogous to the 
 flow of a natural river, or of air, though there may be 
 cases in which it would be sustained as a matter of 
 grant (n), whilst the latter must be founded upon 
 prescription or grant, express or implied ; but the 
 character of the rights, tvhen acquired, is in each case the 
 same " (o). It is unnecessary to discuss here whether 
 the right of support to a house is, as Lord Selborne 
 thought, an easement, and within s. 2 of the Prescrip- 
 tion Act (2 & 3 Will. IY. c. 71), or whether, as Lord 
 Penzance seemed to think in the last cited case, such 
 a right may be maintained after a lapse of twenty 
 years, under the authority of a long series of cases, 
 which on no satisfactory legal ground can be justified. 
 
 Justification of Trespass to Land. — The justifica- 
 tions which may be pleaded in an action of trespass to 
 land are (inter alia) : — 
 
 (k) Humphries v. JBrogden, ubi supra. 
 
 (I) See and cf. Partridge v. Scott, 3 M. & W. 220 ; Dalton v. Angus, 
 6 App. Cas. 740. 
 
 (m) Brown v. Robins, 4 H. & N. 186. Semble, a lessee of a mine is 
 not responsible to the surface owner for subsidence caused by the 
 workings of his predecessor in title prior to the date of the lease : 
 Greenwell v. Low Beechburn Coal Company (1897), 2 Q. B. 165. 
 
 (n) See Caledonian Railway Company v. Sprot, 2 Maeq. 449. 
 
 (o) Per Willes, J., in Bonomi v. Backhouse, E. B. & E. 646, at p. 654 ; 
 approved by Lord Selborne, C, in Dalton v. Angus, ubi supra. 
 
TORTS TO PROPERTY. 
 
 Libcnim teneinentum : in other words, that at the 
 
 77 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 time of the alleged trespass the land was the freehold (i) Liberie™, 
 of the defendant {p). 
 
 That the defendant entered upon the plaintiff's land ( 2 ) Entry to 
 to retake his goods, which had been placed there by the pos it goods. 
 plaintiff {q) or feloniously stolen (r) , or to deposit there 
 the plaintiff's own goods, which he had wrongfully 
 placed on the defendant's land (s) : but it is no justifi- 
 cation to enter upon land to retake one's goods simply 
 because they are there (£). 
 
 Leave and licence may justify a trespass. A mere (?) Leave and 
 
 * . llC611C6 
 
 licence, however, is revocable ; but that which is called 
 a licence is often something more than a licence ; it 
 often comprises or is connected with a grant, and then 
 the party who has given it cannot in general revoke it 
 so as to defeat his grant, to which it was incident («). 
 Again, it appears that " a licence under seal (pro- 
 vided it be a mere licence) is as revocable as a licence 
 by parol, and, on the other hand, a licence by parol 
 coupled with a grant is as irrevocable as a licence by 
 deed, provided only that the grant is of a nature 
 capable of being made by parol. But where there is a 
 licence by parol coupled with a parol grant, or pre- 
 tended grant, of something which is incapable of being 
 granted otherwise than by deed, there the licence is a 
 mere licence ; it is not an incident to a valid grant, and 
 it is therefore revocable. Thus, a licence by A. to hunt 
 in his park, whether given by deed or by parol, is 
 revocable. It merely renders the act of hunting lawful, 
 which without the licence would have been unlawful. 
 If the licence be, as put by Vaughan, O.J. {x), a licence 
 
 (p) Davison v. Wilson, 11 Q. B. 890; Beddall v. Mailland, 17 
 Ch. D. 174. 
 
 (q) Patrick v. Colerick, 3 M. & W. 483. 
 
 (r) Anthony v. Ha.ney, 8 Bing. 186. 
 
 (s) Eea v. Sheward, 2 M. & W. 424. 
 
 (t) Anthony v. Haney, ubi supra. 
 
 (u) See Wood v. LeacHiittcr, 13 M. & W. 838 ; see also Vaughan v. 
 Mampson. 33 L. T. 15 ; Heap v. Hartley, 42 Ch. D. at p. 470. 
 
 (x) In Thomas v. Sorrell, Yaugh. 330, at p. 351. 
 
78 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, v. no t only to hunt, but also to take away the deer when 
 killed to his own use, this is in truth a grant of the 
 deer, with a licence annexed to come on the land ; and 
 supposing the grant of the deer to be good, then the 
 licence would be irrevocable by the party who had 
 given it ; he would be estopped from defeating his own 
 grant, or act in the nature of a grant. But suppose 
 the case of a parol licence to come on my lands, and 
 there to make a watercourse to flow on the lands of 
 the licensee. In such a case there is no valid grant of 
 the watercourse, and the licence remains a mere licence, 
 and therefore capable of being revoked. On the other 
 hand, if such a licence were granted by deed, then the 
 question would be, on the construction of the deed, 
 whether it amounted to a grant of the watercourse ; 
 and if it did, then the licence would be irrevocable "(y). 
 
 In connection with this subject, it should be noticed 
 that though a licence be revocable yet there may be 
 cases where, on its revocation, the licensor may be 
 liable for a breach of contract. A. orally agreed with 
 B. to let him his wall for bill-posting at so much a 
 year. B. erected a hoarding, posted bills, and made 
 several payments. A., after notice, pulled clown the 
 hoarding. Though the licence was revocable, B. had 
 a right of action for breach of contract (z). 
 
 (4) Entries to Again, trespass on another's premises is justifiable 
 
 pay 'money " if a man comes thither to demand or pay money there 
 
 to execute payable, or to execute in a legal manner the process 
 
 kw° e &c.° of the law. Also a man may justify entering an inn 
 
 or public-house without the leave of the owner first 
 
 specially asked, because where a man professes the 
 
 keeping of such inn or public-house he thereby gives a 
 
 general licence to any person to enter his doors. So a 
 
 landlord may justify an entry to distrain for rent, a 
 
 commoner to attend his cattle commoning on another's 
 
 (y) Wood v. LeadMtter, uhi supra. 
 
 (;) Kerrison v. Smith (1897), 2 Q. B. 445, per Diy. Court : leave to 
 appeal was given. 
 
TORTS TO PROPERTY. 
 
 79 
 
 land, and a reversioner to see if any waste be com- chap. v. 
 mitted on the estate, for the apparent necessity of the 
 thing" (a). 
 
 Again, where highways or ways of necessity have (5) Where 
 become impassable, it is for the public good that people plf^u. im " 
 should be allowed to pass over the adjoining land ; but 
 there is no such privilege in the case of a private right 
 •of way where the road has become impassable, for the 
 grantee of such a private right of way must be confined 
 strictly to what has been granted to him (6) . 
 
 Entry upon another's land may sometimes be justified 
 where the object is to abate an existing nuisance, if 
 such abatement can be effected without a breach of 
 the peace (c). In such a case, notice of the nuisance 
 and a request to abate it should be given to the person 
 on whose land it is. If such notice be given and 
 request made, the nuisance may be abated, even if it 
 be a house inhabited at the time (d). Thus, a com- 
 moner, after such notice and request, may pull down 
 a building, even though inhabited, which has been 
 wrongfully erected on the common, and which prevents 
 him from exercising his right as fully as he otherwise 
 might have done (e). 
 
 (6) Abatement 
 of nuisance. 
 
 However, as the abatement of a nuisance is very 
 likely to lead to a breach of the peace, this remedy is 
 
 (a) 3 Blackstone, Comm. 212. 
 
 (b) Taylor y. Whitehead, 2 Dougl. 475 ; Bullard v. Harrison, 4 
 M. & S. 387. 
 
 (c) See Bacon's Abridgement : Nuisance (C) ; 3 Blackstone, Comm. 5 ; 
 Bex v. Rosevell, 2 Salk. 459 ; Mayor of Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q. B. 
 339, at p. 377. 
 
 (d) Varies v. Williams, 16 Q. B. 546 ; see Lane v. Capsey (1891), 
 3 Ch. 411. 
 
 (e) II 'id. ; Jones v. Jones, 1 H. & C. 1 . But it seems that a man may 
 jpull down without notice a. building on his own land, even though a 
 trespasser be in it at the time ; Burling v. Bead, 11 (). B. 904. And 
 he may without notice, provided he does not trespass on his neighbour's 
 .and, cut the branches of his neighbour's tree, so far as they overhang 
 his own land, even though they have done so for over twenty years : 
 Zcmmon v. Webb (1895), App. Cas. 1. 
 
80 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 rarely resorted to ; but, instead of it, the party injured 
 brings an action, and having served a writ, applies at 
 once for an injunction against the continuing of the 
 nuisance. 
 
 Distinction 
 between nui- 
 sance causing 
 injury to pro- 
 perty and nui- 
 sance causing 
 personal dis- 
 comfort. 
 
 Nuisances to Property. — In discussing the ques- 
 tion of nuisances, it is very desirable to mark the 
 difference between an action brought for a nuisance on 
 the ground that the alleged nuisance produces m aterial 
 injury to property, and an action brought for a nuisance 
 on the ground that what is alleged to be a nuisance is 
 productive of sensible personal discomfort (/). With 
 regard to the latter, whether something which causes 
 us personal inconvenience or discomposes or injuriously 
 affects our senses or nerves may or may not be deno- 
 minated a nuisance must depend greatly upon the 
 circumstances of the locality where the thing com- 
 plained of actually takes place. If a man lives in a 
 street where there are numerous shops, and a shop is 
 opened next door which is carried on in a fair and 
 reasonable way, he cannot complain because to himself 
 individually there may arise much discomfort from the 
 trade carried on in that shop. So, too, a person must 
 submit to a greater quantity of smoke in a manufac- 
 turing town than in a country village {g) . But when a 
 trade or business is carried on by one person in the 
 neighbourhood of another, and the result of that trade 
 or business is a material injury to property, then there 
 arises a very different consideration, for every man, 
 unless enjoying rights obtained by prescription or 
 agreement, is bound to use his own property in such 
 a way as not to injure the property of his neighbours, 
 and if he causes a nuisance of such a kind as to sensibly 
 diminish the value of his neighbour's property, he must 
 be answerable for it. And so a person commits an 
 actionable nuisance if he carries on smelting-works, 
 
 (/) See as to latter, ante, p. 41 • See abatement of nuisance, 
 supra. 
 
 {c/) St. Helens Smelting Company v. Tipping, 11 H. of L. Cas. 642. 
 
TORTS TO PROPERTY. 
 
 81 
 
 V. 
 
 the vapours from which destroy the herbage and trees chap. 
 on the land of an adjoining owner (/(). 
 
 It used to be thought that if a man knew there was 
 a nuisance, and went and lived near it, he could not 
 recover damages, because it was said that it was he 
 that went to the nuisance and not the nuisance to him. 
 That, however, is not the law now (?'). 
 
 The general principle underlying cases of this class 
 is that every man is bound to use his own property in 
 such a way as not to injure his neighbour's (" Sic utere " Sic utere 
 tuo ut alienum non lsedas"). This principle may be alienum non 
 further illustrated by that class of cases of which l<»das." 
 Ei/lands v. Fletcher (k) is perhaps the most important. 
 In that case Fletcher was the lessee of mines, and 
 Kylands, who was the owner of a mill standing on land 
 adjoining that under which the mines were worked, 
 wished to construct a reservoir, and employed compe- 
 tent persons to construct it. Underneath the piece of 
 land on which it was proposed to construct the reser- 
 voir there were certain old and disused mining shafts. 
 The vertical shafts had been filled up with soil and 
 rubbish, and it does not appear that any one knew of 
 them or of the horizontal shafts communicating with 
 them. Fletcher, in the course of working his mine, 
 had gradually worked through the seams of coal, and 
 so came into contact with the old and disused shafts 
 underneath Kylands' land. In that state of things the 
 reservoir was constructed. Afterwards, when it was 
 filled or partly filled with water, the weight of the 
 water, bearing upon the disused vertical shafts, broke 
 through them and into the horizontal workings, and 
 thence into Fletcher's mine, which was flooded, and 
 thereby damage was caused. The House of Lords, in 
 
 (h) St Helens Smelling Company v. Tipping, ubi supra ; see also 
 and cf. Robinson v. /divert, 41 Cb. D. 28 ; Jicinhart v. 3/entasti, 42 
 Ch. D. 685 ; Harrison v. Southwark, die, Company (1891), 2 Ch. 409; 
 Christie v. Davey (1893), 1 Ch. 316 ; Barber v. Penleij, 9 T. L. R. 359. 
 
 (i) Hole v. Barlow, 4 C. B. N. S. 334, which was overruled on 
 another point in Bamford v. Turnley, 3 B. & S. 66. 
 
 (k) L. R. 3 H. L. 330. 
 
 R.T. G 
 
82 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 determining that an action for this damage might be 
 maintained, laid down two important principles : first, 
 that the' owner or occupier of land may lawfully use it 
 for any purpose for which it might in the ordinary 
 course of the enjoyment of land be used; and if in 
 what may be called the natural user of that land there 
 is formed an accumulation of water either on the sur- 
 face or underground, and if by the operation of the 
 laws of nature that accumulation passes into the land 
 of a neighbour, the latter cannot complain. His only 
 course is to erect a barrier for his own protection. 
 Owner of B u t ; secondly, if an owner or occupier, not stopping 
 stores what is a * the natural use of his land, desires to use it for a 
 likely to cause purpose which may be termed a non-natural use — e.g., 
 so at Ms " for the purpose of introducing into it something which 
 peril. was n ot i n or U p 0n it i n its natural condition, for the 
 
 purpose, say, of introducing water either above or 
 below ground in quantities and in a manner not the 
 result of any work or operation on or under the land 
 — and if, in consequence of his doing so, or in conse- 
 quence of any imperfection in the mode of his doing 
 so, the water escapes and passes into his neighbour's 
 land, then what has been done has been done at his 
 peril; and if the water escapes into adjacent or sub- 
 jacent land, causing damage, he will be answerable for 
 it. This second principle is perhaps put more clearly 
 by Blackburn, J., in the court below, quoted with 
 approval by the Lord Chancellor (Lord'Cairns) : 
 
 " We think that the true rule of law is, that the 
 person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land 
 and collects and keeps there anything likely to do 
 mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; 
 aud, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable 
 for all the damage which is the natural consequence 
 of its escape. He can excuse himself by shewing that 
 the escape was owing to the plaintiff's default, or 
 perhaps that the escape was the consequence of vis 
 major or the act of God ; but, as nothing of this sort 
 
TORTS TO PROPERTY. 83 
 
 exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse chap, v. 
 ■would be sufficient. The general rule, as above stated, 
 seems on principle just. The person whose grass or 
 corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his 
 neighbour, or whose mine is flooded by the water 
 from his neighbour's reservoir, or whose cellar is 
 invaded by the filth of his neighbour's privy, or whose 
 habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and 
 noisome vapours of his neighbour's alkali-works, is 
 ■damnified without any fault of his own ; and it seems 
 but reasonable and just that the neighbour who has 
 brought something on his own property (which was 
 not naturally there) , harmless to others so long as it is 
 ■confined to his own property, but which he knows 
 will be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour's, 
 should be obliged to make good the damage which 
 ■ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own 
 property. But for his act in bringing it there no 
 mischief could have accrued, and it seems but just 
 that he should at his peril keep it there so that no 
 mischief may accrue, or answer for the natural and 
 anticipated consequence. And upon authority, this 
 we think is established to be the law, whether the 
 things so brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or 
 stenches " (I). 
 
 The two principles just mentioned may be further 
 illustrated by Smith v. Kenrick (m) and Baird v. Wil- 
 liamson (n). In the former, the owner of a coal-mine 
 on the higher level worked out the whole of his coal, 
 leaving no barrier between his mine and the mine on 
 the lower level, so that the water percolating through 
 the upper mine flowed into the lower, and obstructed 
 the owner of it in getting his coal. But it was held 
 that the plaintiff, the owner of the lower mine, had no 
 ground of complaint against the defendant, the owner 
 of the upper mine. For the latter had a right to 
 
 (l) L. R. 3 H. L. 330, at p. 339 ; cf. Qiles v. Walker, 24 q. B. D. 
 656 (thistles). 
 (m) 7 C. B. 515. 
 (n) 15 C. B. N. S. 376. 
 
 G 2 
 
84 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, v. remove all his coal, and was under no obligation to 
 protect the plaintiff against the damage sustained by 
 him, which was occasioned by the natural percolation 
 of water from the upper strata. It may, however, be 
 remarked that the principle of Smith v. Kenrich is not 
 applicable where the owner of the foreshore removes a 
 natural barrier against incursions of the sea, and so 
 causes damage to an adjoining landowner ; for the 
 Crown is bound to protect the realm from such incur- 
 sions, and its grantee must not do any act which will 
 let the sea in (o). And where, owing to an extraordi- 
 nary flood, a large body of water pressed against and 
 endangered a railway embankment, it was held that 
 the railway company were not entitled to cut holes in 
 the embankment so as to send the water on to their 
 neighbour's land. This would not be using the em- 
 bankment in the ordinary way ; but, of course, the 
 railway company might have defended themselves 
 beforehand against the incursion of the flood, or 
 have allowed it simply to percolate through the earth 
 to the adjoining land (p). 
 
 In Baird v. Williamson (q) the defendant, the owner 
 of the upper mine, did not merely suffer the water to' 
 flow through his mine without leaving a barrier between 
 it and the mine below, but for his own purposes 
 pumped up quantities of water which passed into the 
 plaintiff's mine, in addition to that which 'would have 
 naturally reached it, and so caused him damage. 
 Though this was done without negligence, and in the 
 due working of his mine, he was held responsible for 
 the damage so caused. The damage in the former 
 case may be, says Lord Cranworth, treated as having 
 arisen from the act of God ; in the latter, from the act 
 of the defendant. 
 
 (o) Attorney-General v. Tomline, 14 Ch. D. 58. 
 
 (p) TFhollcy v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, 13- 
 }. B. D. 131. 
 (q) Ubi supra. 
 
TORTS TO PROPERTY. 85 
 
 In Xichols v. Mttrslaii<l(r) the defendant had formed chap, v. 
 ornamental reservoirs by means of a stream flowing 
 through his land. These had existed for a number of 
 rears without having done any harm, but an extraor- 
 dinary rainfall having taken place, the artificial banks 
 of the reservoirs gave way, and the water, thus suddenly 
 let loose, rushed down the stream and carried away 
 four county bridges. The jury found that there was 
 no negligence in the construction or the maintenance 
 of the reservoirs, but that the flood was so great 
 that it could not reasonably have been anticipated, 
 although, if it had been anticipated, the effect might 
 have been prevented. This the Court of Appeal held 
 to be a finding that the escape of the water was owing 
 to the act of God, and the defendant was so released 
 from liability. 
 
 Box v. Jubb (s) was another case of storage of water 
 in a reservoir, and the defendants were held not 
 answerable for the damage caused to the plaintiff's 
 premises by the overflowing of the reservoir, such over- 
 flow having been caused, partly by the emptying of a 
 large reservoir above the defendants' premises belong- 
 ing to a third person, over whom the defendants had no 
 control, and partly by an obstruction in the water- 
 course below the defendants' premises, caused by 
 circumstances over which they had no control, and 
 without their knowledge. The Court held that the 
 defendants were not liable, for that what had taken 
 place was caused by a stranger over whom, and at a 
 spot where, they had no control. Whether this was 
 called vis major or the unlawful act of a stranger was 
 immaterial ; the defendants could not be held liable 
 for what they had no means of preventing. 
 
 Again, the right to subterranean water running in 
 no defined channel is a natural right incident to the 
 ownership of land, and if the owner of land draws off 
 for his own purposes all the water beneath it, as well 
 
 (r) 2 Ex. D. 1. (*) 4 Ex. D. 76. 
 
86 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, v. as that which, coming from his neighbour's land, re- 
 places it, he is only exercising a natural right incident 
 to his ownership, and his neighbour cannot complain, 
 though left without any water (t). But if he uses his 
 land in a non -natural way, for example, by putting 
 filth on it in such a position and in such a way that it 
 gets down to the water-bearing strata, and so pollutes 
 his neighbour's wells, then the latter will have a right 
 of action against him for the damage so caused (h). 
 " He whose dirt it is must keep it in that it may not 
 trespass" (x). In cases of this kind the "trespass" 
 or " escape " of the noxious thing is material, as may 
 be seen from the following illustrations. In Firth v. 
 Boidinri Iron Company (y) the defendants' predecessors 
 had fenced their land with wire rope, which the defen- 
 dants allowed to remain. From long exposure the 
 strands of the wire became decayed, and pieces of it 
 fell on the plaintiff's adjoining pasture, and one of his 
 cows swallowed a piece and died : the defendants were 
 held liable. So were persons who planted on their 
 own land a yew tree, which projected over a neighbour's 
 land, whose horse ate of it and died (z). But where a 
 declaration merely charged that "the defendant was 
 possessed of^ yew trees, the clippings of which he 
 knew to be poisonous," it was held that such an 
 allegation of fact did not support a duty to take care 
 to prevent the clippings from being put, possibly by 
 a stranger, on his neighbour's land, where horses and 
 cattle might eat them (a). Again, plaintiff and defen- 
 dant occupied adjoining fields separated by a ditch, 
 the plaintiff's boundary being the edge of the ditch. 
 A yew tree on defendant's land projected partly over 
 the ditch, but not over or up to the plaintiff's boundary, 
 and the plaintiff's horse ate of it and died. The 
 
 (t) Chasemore v. Hichards, 7 H. of L. Cas. 349. His motive is 
 immaterial : Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles (1895), App. Cas. 587. 
 (u) Ballard v. Tomlinxm, 29 Ch. D. 115. 
 (a;) Tenant v. Goklwin, 1 Salk. 360. 
 (2/) 3 C. P. D. 254. 
 
 (.i) Crowhurst v. Amcrsham Burial Board,, i Ex. D. 5. 
 (a) Wilson v. Nowbcrry, L. R. 7 Q. B. 31. 
 
TOKTS TO PROPERTY. 87 
 
 defendants were not liable to fence against their chap, v. 
 neighbour's horses or cattle, and there being thus 
 no duty on them to prevent their neighbour's horse 
 from having access to the tree they were held entitled 
 to judgment (b). 
 
 Apart from any question of the " escape " of a 
 nuisance, if a man does within his premises what is 
 likely to cause, and does cause, a nuisance outside, he 
 is responsible to his neighbour who is thereby injured. 
 Thus, where the performance of a popular play causes 
 large crowds to assemble near the theatre before the 
 opening of the doors, so that access to the neighbouring 
 houses is obstructed, the lessee of the theatre may be 
 responsible for the nuisance (c). And where boxing 
 entertainments were carried on at a club at night, 
 attracting to the club noisy crowds, an injunction was 
 granted to restrain noise from cabs and carriages 
 going to and from the club between midnight and 
 7 a.m. (d). 
 
 Xnisaiices in the exercise of Statutory Powers (e). 
 — This is a subject which cannot be fully treated 
 without reference to the wording of particular statutes 
 which authorise works which may infringe the rights 
 of individuals. These statutes as a rule provide com- 
 pensation for those whose rights may be infringed 
 by the execution of the works, but if they do not, still 
 the works if expressly authorised may be carried out. 
 The following general propositions are applicable : 
 (1) " Where Parliament has given express powers to 
 construct certain buildings or works according to 
 plans and specifications upon a particular site, and 
 for a specific purpose, the use of these works or 
 buildings in the manner contemplated and sanctioned 
 by the Act, cannot, except in so far as negligent, be 
 
 (J) Panting v. Makes (1894), 2 Q. B. 281. 
 
 (c) Barber v. Penley (1893), 2 Ch. 247 (Charley's Aunt), a useful 
 case on nuisances by crowds. 
 
 (d) Bellamy v. Wells, 39 W. R. 158. 
 
 (e) See post, p. 127. 
 
88 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, v. restrained by injunction, although such use may 
 constitute a nuisance at common law ; and no com- 
 pensation is due in respect of injury to private rights, 
 unless the Act provides for such compensation being 
 made"(/). Or to put it in another way: "If the 
 legislature directs that a thing shall ' at all events ' 
 be done, the doing of which, if not authorised by the 
 legislature, would entitle any one to an action, the 
 right of action is taken away. . . . The legislature 
 has very often interfered with the rights of persons, 
 but in modern times it has generally given compensa- 
 tion to those injured ; and if no compensation is given, 
 it affords a reason, though not a conclusive one, for 
 thinking that the intention of the legislature was, not 
 that the thing should be done at all events, but only 
 that it should be done, if it could be done, without 
 injury to others "(g) . (2) Though no action will lie 
 for doing that which the legislature has authorised 
 if it be done without negligence, although it occasions 
 damage to an individual, yet an action will lie for 
 doing that which the legislature has authorised if it 
 be done negligently (/i). (3) " "Where the terms of the 
 statute are not imperative, but permissive, when it is 
 left to the discretion of the persons empowered to deter- 
 mine whether the general power committed to them 
 shall be put into execution or not, I think the fair 
 inference is that the legislature intended that discre- 
 tion to be exercised in strict conformity with private 
 rights, and did not intend to confer licence to commit 
 nuisance in any place which might be selected for the 
 purpose " (i). 
 
 Liability of Lessor and Lessee for Nuisance. — 
 
 Where a house or other building is a nuisance, it is 
 sometimes a nice question whether the landlord or the 
 
 (/) Metropolitan Asylum District v. Hill, 6 App. Cas. 193, 211. 
 
 (g) Ibid.; Hammersmith Railway Company v. Brand, L. R. 4 H. of L. 
 171, 215. 
 
 (h) Geddis v. Proprietors of Bann Reservoir, 3 App. Cas. 430, 455. 
 
 (i) Per Lord Watson, Metropolitan Asylum District v '. Hill, ubi supra, 
 at p. 213 (erection of small-pox hospital). 
 
TORTS TO PROPERTY. 89 
 
 tenant is the person answerable for such nuisance, c hap, v. 
 
 If the landlord lets the premises when the nuisance Landlord, 
 
 exists, and the damage happens afterwards through when liable. 
 
 no fault of the tenant, to a person to whom the 
 
 landlord owes a duty, e.g., one of the public using the 
 
 highway near the house, or a next-door neighbour, 
 
 the landlord will be liable (A;). The ground of the 
 
 decision in Todd v. Flii/lit has been stated to be that 
 
 the landlord did an act authorising the continuance 
 
 of the nuisance — namely, letting the premises when 
 
 he knew them to be in a dangerous state. Again, 
 
 where a landlord let the offices of a building in the 
 
 City to various tenants, the staircase remaining in his 
 
 own possession and control, he was held liable to A., 
 
 who, having occasion to visit one of the tenants on 
 
 business, sustained personal injuries owing to the 
 
 defective state of the staircase (I). But to make the 
 
 landlord liable he must owe a duty to the injured 
 
 person. Thus, where a landlord let an unfurnished 
 
 house to A., it being in a bad state of repair, and 
 
 there being no agreement as to the repairs, and 
 
 afterwards B., who was doing certain work for A., 
 
 was injured by reason of the defective state of the 
 
 house, it was held that in the absence of contract the 
 
 landlord owed no duty to A. or to those whom he 
 
 brought into the house, and that B. could not recover 
 
 damages in an action against the landlord {in). There 
 
 the relation between the landlord and the tenant was 
 
 one of contract, and the contract imposed no duty to 
 
 repair. If the landlord lets the premises to a tenant Tenant, when 
 
 who covenants to keep them in repair, the landlord liaWe - 
 
 cannot be said to authorise the continuance of the 
 
 (k) Todd v. Flight, 9 C. B. N. S. 377 ; cf. Lane v. Cox (1897). 
 1 Q. B. 415 ; see also Gandy v. Jubber, 5 B. & S. 485, 9 B. & S. 15 ; 
 Winter v. Baker, 3 T. L. R. 569. In the case of a weekly tenancy the 
 landlord will not be considered to re-let the premises every week, some 
 notice to determine such a tenancy being necessary : Bowen v. Anderson 
 (1894), 1 Q. B. 164. overruling on this point Sandford v. Clarke, 
 21 Q. B. D. 398. 
 
 (1) Miller v. Sancoek (1893), 2 Q. B. 177. 
 
 (m) Lane v. Cox (1897), 1 Q. B. 415. 
 
90 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, v. nuisance, and he will not be liable for damages 
 resulting from it, but the tenant will (n) . Possibly, 
 indeed, if the landlord at the time of the demise knew 
 of the defect and did nothing to remedy it, he may be 
 liable also, to one to whom he owes a duty; but it 
 would seem that if the burden of repair is cast upon 
 the tenant, the duty of the landlord ceases (o). The 
 tenant as a general rule is the person prima facie 
 liable (p). 
 
 Waste — 
 voluntary, 
 permissive, or 
 equitable. 
 
 Waste. — "Waste may be defined to be the committing 
 of any destruction in houses or lands by a tenant for 
 life or for years to the damage of the heir or of him 
 in reversion or remainder (q). It may be voluntary 
 or permissive, or, thirdly, may be what is known in 
 modern times as equitable. Voluntary waste may be 
 committed by pulling down or prostrating houses, or 
 cutting down timber trees, or by acts of a similar 
 kind; permissive waste is suffering houses to be 
 unroofed or otherwise to fall into decay. It has 
 been laid down as a general rule that the law will 
 not allow that to be waste which is not in any way 
 prejudicial to the inheritance (q), and if a jury give 
 merely nominal damages in an action for waste, judg- 
 ment will be entered for the defendant (r) ; and so the 
 erection of buildings which improve the value of land 
 is not waste. But waste may be committed by changing 
 the character of the property or destroying evidence 
 of the owner's title (s) — e.g., by the conversion of a 
 brewery bringing in £120 a year into other houses let 
 for £200 a year (t). Again, waste may be committed 
 by the conversion of arable land into wood land, or 
 rice versa, or by the conversion of meadow land into 
 
 (n) Pretty v. Bickmore, L. R. 8 C. P. 401. 
 (o) Gwinnell v. Earner, L. R. 10 C. P. 658. 
 
 ( p) Ibid. ; and Ndson v. Liverpool Brewery Company, 2 C. P. D. 311. 
 (q) See Bacon's Abridgement, sub nom. ; see also Meux v. Gobley 
 (1892), 2 Ch. 253. 
 
 (r) Doherly v. AUman, 3 App. Gas. 709. 
 (s) Jones v. Chappell, L. K. 20 Eq. 539. 
 (t) Cole v. Greene, 1 Lev. 309. 
 
TORTS TO PROPERTY. 
 
 91 
 
 arable, or by the cutting down of timber, or by digging ch ap, v. 
 for gravel, lime, clay, brick-earth, or stone, except in 
 places already open, or by opening new mines («). 
 Timber means oak, ash, and elm twenty years old or 
 upwards, provided they are not too old to be usable ; 
 but by special custom other trees may be timber in 
 particular localities, such as beeches in Buckingham- 
 shire and birches in Berkshire (,r) . It is now provided The Settled 
 by the Settled Land Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 38), ^ 8 ™ 2 dAot ' 
 s. 35, sub-s. 1, that where a tenant for life is 
 impeachable for waste in respect of timber, and there 
 is on the settled land timber ripe and fit for cutting, 
 he may, on obtaining the consent of the trustees of 
 the settlement or an order of the Court, cut and sell 
 that timber or any part of it. Of the net proceeds of 
 the sale three-fourths are to be set aside as capital 
 money arising under the Act, and the other fourth 
 part is to go as rents and profits. 
 
 If a tenant for life is expressly made not impeach- 
 able for waste, he may cut down timber in a husband- 
 like manner for his own use, and commit other 
 waste (y) ; but he may not do acts which will destroy 
 the estate — for example, pull down the family mansion, 
 or cut down avenues or ornamental timber, or young- 
 trees not fit for timber, which acts are termed equitable 
 waste, for the Court of Chancery, administering equity, 
 restrained such aets(.z). The Judicature Act, 1873 
 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), by s. 25, sub-s. 3, now expressly 
 provides that " an estate for life without impeachment 
 for waste shall not confer, or be deemed to have con- 
 ferred, upon the tenant for life any legal right to 
 commit waste of the description known as equitable 
 waste, unless an intention to confer such right shall 
 
 (u) Bacon's Abridgement, ubi supra, 
 
 (x) Ibid. ; Honywood v. Honywood, L 
 vjood v. Magniac (1891), 3 Ch. 306. 
 
 (y) 2 Blackstone's Commentaries, 283 
 79(b). 
 
 (z) Blackstone, ubi supra ; Vane v. Barnard, or Parnard, 2 Vern. 
 738 ; Downshire v. Sandys, 6 Ves. 107. 
 
 R. 18 Eq. 306 ; see Dash- 
 Lewis Bowie's case, 11 Rep. 
 
92 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Law as to 
 
 permissive 
 
 waste. 
 
 expressly appear by the instrument creating such 
 estate." But a tenant for life without impeachment 
 for waste may cut and sell ornamental timber which 
 is injuring and hindering the growth of other orna- 
 mental timber (a). 
 
 With regard to permissive waste it has been held 
 that an action does not lie for such waste against a 
 tenant at will who has not covenanted to repair (b), 
 nor against a tenant from year to year (c), nor against 
 a tenant for life who is not bound by the instrument 
 creating the estate to repair (d) . According to a 
 recent decision a tenant for years is liable for per- 
 missive waste (e), but in view of the conflicting state 
 of the authorities the point cannot be considered as 
 clear (/). 
 
 But a Court of equity will not, in the exercise of its 
 discretionary jurisdiction, interfere to prevent by in- 
 junction permissive waste, but will leave the party 
 aggrieved to his remedy at law (g) ; nor will it grant 
 an injunction against meliorating or improving waste — 
 for example, building a valuable house on the land (h). 
 
 Trespass to Personalty. — An injury to the personal 
 property of another is actionable, and where the 
 property is destroyed, or the owner is wrongfully 
 deprived of its possession, it is said to be " converted 
 to the use " of the wrongdoer, in which case an action 
 will lie for damages, or for the return of the property 
 with damages for its detention. Such actions were 
 
 {a) Baker v. Sebright, 13 Ch. D. 179. 
 
 (6) Harnett v. Maitland, 16 M. & W. 257. 
 
 (c) Torriano v. Young, 6 C. & P. 8. 
 
 (d) See and ef. Woodhouse v. Walker, 5 Q. B. D. 404 ; Phillips v, 
 Homfray, 24 Ch. D. 439, at p. 455 ; In re Cartwright, Avis v. Newman, 
 41 Ch. D. 532. 
 
 (e) Barnes v. Davics, 38 Ch. D. 499. 
 
 (/) See and cf. Yellowly v. Gower, 11 Ex. 274, 294 ; Torriano v. 
 Young, supra ; ffernev. Bembow, 4 Taun. 764 ; notes to Green v. Cole, 
 2 Wms. Saunders 252 ; Woodhouse v. Walker, 5 Q. B. D. 404 ; In re 
 Cartvright, supra. 
 
 (g) Poicysv. Blagrave, 4 D. G. M. & G. 448. 
 
 (h) Doherty v. Allman, 3 App. Cas. 709. 
 
conversion. 
 
 TORTS TO PROPERTY. 93 
 
 formerly known as actions of Trover and actions of chap, v. 
 Detinue. The gist, of the action of trover was that Trover and 
 the defendant had " converted to his own use. or to 
 the use of some one other than the plaintiff (i), or 
 wrongfully deprived the plaintiff of his personal 
 chattels (k). To maintain such an action the plaintiff 
 should have a right of property in the thing converted, 
 and also a right of possession (I). It is not, however, 
 necessary that the plaintiff should have a right of 
 general property in the chattels. Thus, a bailee who 
 has a special property in the chattels bailed to him 
 may maintain an action of trover against a person who 
 wrongfully deprives him of the possession of them (m) ; 
 and if the bailment be of such a kind as not to exclude 
 the absolute owner's {i.e., the bailor's) right to the 
 immediate possession, either the bailor or the bailee 
 may bring the action (n). Again, the bailor of a 
 chattel which is out on hire for an unexpired term, 
 though he has not the right to the immediate possession 
 of the chattel, may maintain an action against a third 
 person for any permanent injury thereto (o). More- 
 over, the finder of a lost chattel, though he does not 
 by such finding acquire an absolute property or 
 ^ownership in the chattel, has such a property in it as 
 will enable him to keep it against all the world but the 
 rightful owner, and consequently he may maintain an 
 
 (i) Shipicick v. Blanchard, 6 T. R. 298 ; F.ouldcs v. JFilltmghby, 8 
 M. & W. at p. 257. 
 
 (k) Hiort v. Bolt, L. R. 9 Ex. 86, at p. 89. 
 
 (1) Gordon v. Harper, 7 T. R. 9. 
 
 (m) Sutton v. Buck, 2 Taunt. 302. 
 
 (n) Kicolls v. Bastard, % C. M. & R. 659. 
 
 (o) Mcars v. London and South- Western Railway Company, 11 
 C. B. X. S. 850; cf. , however, Coupe Company v. Maddick (1891), 2 
 Q. B. 4 13, where it was held by Cave and Charles, JJ. , that the letter of 
 a horse and carriage, which were damaged bythe negligence of the hirer's 
 servant, had no right of action against the latter. It is respectfully sub- 
 mitted that this judgment, or rather dictum, may require re-considera- 
 tion. It wasalso held that the hirer was answerable for thedamage caused 
 by his servant, though the servant was not at the time acting in the 
 course of his employment as servant. Hut is not this extending the 
 obligation of a bailee for hire, which is, that he use ordinary careP 
 Cogcjs v. Bernard, 1 Sra. L. C. ; see an article hereon, Law Mag. and 
 Rev., vol. 17, p. 97 ; see also Storey v. Ashton, L. R. 4 Q. B. 476, 
 post, p. 197. 
 
94 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Wrongdoer 
 cannot set up 
 jus tertii. 
 
 action of trover against any person who wrongfully 
 takes it from him. Thus, in a well-known case (p) a 
 chimney-sweeper's boy found a jewel, which he carried 
 to the shop of a goldsmith ; an apprentice, under 
 pretence of weighing it, took out the stones, and telling 
 his master that it came to three-halfpence, the master 
 offered that sum to the boy ; this the boy refused to 
 take, and insisted upon the return of the jewel, which 
 was handed back to him without the stones. In an 
 action of trover against the master for the return of 
 the stones, the plaintiff was held entitled to succeed, 
 and the master was not permitted to set up in his 
 defence the right of the true owner, bare possession 
 being a sufficient title against a mere wrongdoer. 
 
 (j?) Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Sm. L. C. 385. 
 
( 95 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 Just as each man must use his own property in such chap. vi. 
 a, way as not to do any damage to his neighbour's, so 
 it is the duty of every one to use such care in his daily 
 life and in the conduct of his business as an ordinarily 
 careful man would use in order to avoid doing harm 
 to, or bringing loss upon, another person. The omis- 
 sion to use such care may render him liable to an 
 action for negligence. Negligence has been denned to 
 be " the omission to do something which a reasonable 
 man, guided upon those considerations which or- 
 dinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would 
 do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable 
 man would not do " (a). " There is no absolute or 
 intrinsic negligence ; it is always relative to some 
 circumstances of time, place, or person. It is not 
 negligent or wrong for a man to fire at a mark in his 
 own grounds at a distance from others, or to ride very 
 rapidly in his own park ; but it is wrong so to fire near 
 to, and so to ride on, the public highway ; and though 
 the quality of the act is not altered, it is wrong in 
 whoever does it, and so far it is as though it were 
 intrinsically wrong "(b). 
 
 It is obvious that no man can complain of the omis- 
 sion by another to shew the care of an ordinarily 
 prudent man, except he has thereby been damaged. 
 
 It is also clear that no action will lie for such want Negligence 
 of care if the damage sustained be too remote ; in other must be P roxi- 
 
 mate cause of 
 
 (a) Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Company, 11 Ex. 781 ; Smith 
 v. London and South- Western Railway Company, L. R. 5 C. P. 98. 
 
 (b) Per Bramwell, B., in Begrj v. Midland Railway Company, 1 
 H. & 2S T . 773, 781. 
 
 damage. 
 
96 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vi. words, negligence, to render a person liable, must be 
 the causa causans or the proximate cause of the injury, 
 and not merely a causa sine qua non (c). As Lord 
 Cairns puts it in Metropolitan Railway Company v. 
 Jackson (d) : " The negligence must in some way 
 connect itself, or be connected by evidence with the 
 accident. It must be, if I might invent an expression 
 founded upon a phrase in the civil law, incuria dans 
 locum injurite." To illustrate this : The door of a 
 carriage in which the plaintiff was being carried as 
 a passenger on the defendants' railway flew open 
 several times through the negligence of the defendants. 
 There was room in the carriage for the plaintiff to sit 
 away from the door, and the train would have stopped 
 at a station in three minutes. The plaintiff shut the 
 door three times. The door opened again, and the 
 plaintiff in endeavouring to shut it for the fourth 
 time, fell out of the train and was injured. The train 
 stopped at three stations between the time when the 
 door first flew open and the occurrence of the accident. 
 In this state of facts the Court held that the defen- 
 dants, though undoubtedly guilty of negligence, and 
 though but for their negligence the accident would 
 never have happened, were not liable to the plaintiff, 
 for that their negligence was not the immediate nor 
 the efficient cause of the accident, that cause being the 
 act of the plaintiff in trying to shut the door and rest- 
 ing a part of his body against it. If the negligence of 
 the defendants had necessitated the act of the plaintiff, 
 then he might have succeeded, but it was not so, as. 
 he might simply have taken a seat in another part of 
 the compartment. The rule on this point is well laid 
 down in the judgment of Montague Smith, J. : "If 
 the negligence of a railway company puts a passenger 
 in a situation of alternative danger : that is to say, if 
 he will be in danger by remaining still, and in danger 
 
 (c) Bailiffs of Romncy Marsh v. Trinity House L. R. 5 Ex 204 
 Ex. 247. ' 
 {d) 3 App. Cas. 193, at p. 198. 
 
NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 97 
 
 if he attempts to escape, then, if he attempts to escape, CHAP - VI - 
 any injury that he may sustain in so doing is a con- 
 sequence of the company's negligence ; but if he is 
 only suffering some inconvenience, and, to avoid that, 
 he voluntarily runs into danger, and injury ensues, 
 that cannot be said to be the result of the company's 
 negligence. It is hardly necessary to say that, though 
 I use the words ' danger ' and 'inconvenience,' yet, if 
 the inconvenience is very great, and the danger run in 
 avoiding it very slight, it may not be unreasonable to 
 incur that danger "(e). These remarks should be 
 read in the light of the subsequent case of Gee v. 
 Metropolitan Railway Company (/), where the plaintiff 
 recovered damages for injuries received, the facts being 
 that he was leaning against the door of his compart- 
 ment, and fell out owing to the door suddenly flying 
 open. There the plaintiff was justified in concluding 
 that the railway porters had done their duty by 
 fastening the door. 
 
 There are many cases in which, as has already been Breach of 
 explained, under the same circumstances and facts, an i°"*[y°*„ 
 action for breach of contract or an action in the nature breach of 
 of an action for tort — e.g., for negligence — may indif- y ' 
 f erently be brought (g) . 
 
 Thus, if a solicitor be employed to defend an action, 
 he impliedly contracts that he will use ordinary care, 
 skill, and diligence in so doing, and if he fail to do so, 
 he may be sued for a breach of his contract ; but under 
 the same circumstances, if he has been negligent in 
 defending the action, he may be sued for the breach 
 of his duty to his client to use such care, skill, and 
 diligence (h). 
 
 JFftom to sue. — Difficult questions arise as to who 
 may properly be parties to an action where a contract 
 
 (e) Adams v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, L. R. 
 4 C. P. 739, at p. 742 ; see also Lee v. Nixey, 63 L. T. 285. 
 
 (/) L. R. 8 Q. B. 161. 
 
 (g) Brown v. Boorman, 11 C. & F. 1 ; ante, p. 56. 
 
 (h) See Holy v. Built, 3 B. & Ad. 350 ; Qodefroy v. Jay, 7 Bing. 
 413. 
 
 K.T. H 
 
98 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vi. nag b een entered into and some misfeasance has oc- 
 curred in the course of the carrying out of that contract. 
 In the first place, it is clear that one party to the con- 
 tract may in certain cases sue the other party for a 
 breach of contract, and in the same facts and circum- 
 stances sue a third party for a tort. Thus, in Daly ell v. 
 Tyrer (?) the plaintiff had made a contract with a public 
 ferryman under which the latter was bound to carry 
 him daily for a certain period ; the ferryman, being 
 unable upon a particular day to work the ferry, hired of 
 the defendant a boat and crew for the purpose, and, an 
 accident having occurred to the plaintiff through the 
 mismanagement of a rope by the crew, it was held that 
 the plaintiff was entitled to sue the defendant, for that 
 he was lawfully upon the defendant's boat with his 
 consent as a passenger, and it was the duty of the defen- 
 dant to navigate his boat with reasonable care. This 
 authority was recognized in the later case of Foulkes v. 
 Metropolittin District Railicay Company (k). In that 
 case the defendants had running powers between Ham- 
 mersmith, a station on their own line, and Eichmond, 
 a station on the London and South-Western Company's 
 line. The plaintiff took a ticket from Eichmond to 
 Hammersmith and back, which was issued to him by a 
 clerk of the London and South-Western Company. On 
 his return journey he travelled in a train belonging to 
 the defendants and driven by their servants. Owing to 
 the carriage in which the plaintiff was being unsuited to 
 the Eichmond platform, the plaintiff fell on alighting, 
 and was injured. The Court of Appeal, affirming the 
 decision of the Court below, and without deciding whether 
 there was any contract of carriage between the plaintiff 
 and the defendants, held (the jury having found that 
 the defendants were guilty of negligence) that the 
 defendants were liable to the plaintiff. As they had 
 received him as a passenger, it was their duty to take 
 
 (i) E. B. & E. 899. 
 
 (7c) 4 C. P. D. 207 ; 5 C. P. D. 157 ; followed in Hooper v. London, 
 and North-Western Railway Company, 50 L. J. Q. B. 103. 
 
NEGLIGENCE. 99 
 
 reasonable care not to expose him to danger, and for chap, vi. 
 that purpose they should either have adapted the foot- 
 board of their carriage to the platform, or have arranged 
 for an alteration to be made in the platform itself. 
 Lopes, J., in the course of his judgment in the Court 
 below, says : " Take this illustration : Kail way A. 
 issues tickets for Railway A. and Railway B. The 
 traffic is sometimes worked by carriages and servants 
 belonging to Railway A. and sometimes by carriages 
 and servants belonging to Railway B. A passenger 
 takes a ticket from Railway A. and gets into a carriage 
 belonging to Railway B., drawn by Railway B.'s 
 engines and manned by Railway B.'s servants. The 
 passenger traverses some portion of Railway B.'s line ; 
 an accident is caused by the negligence of Railway B.'s 
 servants, and through some defect in Railway B.'s 
 carriages not being properly adapted to the exigencies 
 of the traffic. Now, although not necessary perhaps 
 to go that length for the decision of this case, I think 
 that according to the authorities the passenger could 
 sue either Railway A. or Railway B. He could sue 
 Railway A. on the contract arising from the ticket 
 issued by the company to carry him the whole distance 
 with reasonable care or caution, or he could sue 
 Railway B. as the immediate authors of the negli- 
 gence, on the implied contract or undertaking which 
 would arise from his having been received into the 
 carriage, or from his having been invited to go into 
 the carriage, of Railway B., and become a passenger 
 on the railway." 
 
 Secondly, the same facts and circumstances may 
 render A. liable to B. for a breach of contract, and to 
 C. for a tort. 
 
 Thus, in Marshall v. York, Newcastle, and Berwick 
 Railway Company (I) the plaintiff and his master 
 travelled by the defendants' railway from Darlington 
 
 I 1 L. J, C. P. 34. 
 
 H '2 
 
100 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vi. to London. The master took and paid for tickets for 
 himself and the plaintiff. The plaintiff's luggage was 
 lost through the default of the defendants, and it was 
 held that they were liable to him in an action brought 
 in his own name. The Court did not think it necessary 
 in this case to decide whether any contract had been 
 made between the plaintiff and the defendants or not, 
 but held that the defendants were liable to him, on the 
 ground that there was -a duty incumbent upon them, 
 he being a passenger, to carry him and his luggage 
 safely. As a contract had been made with the master, 
 it seems clear that he also might have sued the com- 
 pany for damages naturally resulting from the breach 
 of it. Again, in Austin v. Great Western Railway 
 Company (m) the plaintiff's mother, carrying in her 
 arms' the plaintiff, aged three years and two months, 
 which was slightly in excess of the age at which 
 children are entitled to be carried free, took a ticket 
 for herself on the defendants' railway, but did not 
 take one for the child. In the course of the journey 
 the plaintiff was injured through the negligence of the 
 defendants' servants. The mother had not been asked 
 the age of the child, and had no intention to defraud 
 the defendants. These facts were held to give the 
 plaintiff a good cause of action against the defendants 
 — by Cockburn, C.J., and Shee and Lush, J. J., on 
 the ground that there was one entire contract to carry 
 the mother and child, and by Blackburn, J., because 
 the child, without fault, and through an honest mis- 
 take on the mother's part, was taken into the train by 
 the defendants' servants and received as a passenger, 
 and thereupon a duty was imposed upon them that 
 they should take reasonable care to carry him safely («) . 
 
 (m) L. E. 2 Q. B. 442. 
 
 (n) There being a duty to take reasonable care to carry safely a person 
 received as a passenger, it may be doubted if Alton v. Midland Railway 
 Company, 19 C. B. N. S. 213, cited ants, p. 65, laysdown thelaw correctly, 
 though the actual decision in that case may have been quite right. An 
 action by a passenger against a railway company in respect of injuries 
 caused by the negligence of the company's servants, is, though the 
 passenger has taken a ticket, an action of tort within s. 116 of the 
 
misfeasance of 
 contracting 
 
 NEGLIGENCE. 101 
 
 But who are the persons entitled to sue on the chap, vi. 
 ground that there has been a breach of duty by another 
 towards them ? In the case of railway companies and 
 innkeepers, who receive persons into their trains or 
 hotels, there is plainly a duty to use due care in pro- 
 tecting the lives of such persons, by whomsoever the 
 contract has been made. But it is not clear in general Where 
 in what cases a person who is a stranger to a contract ^ntract is 
 between A. and B., and who is injured through the injured by 
 misfeasance of one of the contracting parties by some 
 thing which has occurred in connection with the party. 
 carrying out of the contract, is entitled to sue. In the 
 case of Heaven v. Pender (o) a proposition of law on this 
 point was laid down in very wide terms by Brett, M.I!. 
 (now Lord Esher), but the learned Lords Justices 
 (Cotton and Bowen) did not assent to it. In that case 
 the defendant, a dock-owner, let out the dock for the 
 repair of ships, and provided for use in the dock the 
 staging necessary for the painting of the outside of 
 ships. Under a contract with a ship-owner, he supplied 
 and put up such staging outside a ship in his dock. 
 The plaintiff was a workman in the employment of a 
 ship-painter who had contracted with the ship-owner to 
 paint the outside of the ship, and in order to do the 
 painting the plaintiff went on the staging and used it. 
 "Whilst he was so there, one of the ropes by which the 
 staging was slung, being unfit for use when supplied 
 by the defendant, broke, and, by reason thereof, the 
 plaintiff fell into the dock and was injured. That the 
 staging was, through the neglect of the defendant's 
 servants to use ordinary care, supplied in a state 
 unsafe for use, was not denied ; but the question was 
 whether the defendant, the dock-owner, owed any duty 
 to the plaintiff to use ordinary care to see that the 
 
 County Courts Act, 1888, so that where such a plaintiff recovered £20 
 damages in the High Court he was allowed High Court costs, whereas 
 had the action been one of contract County Court costs only would 
 have been allowed : see and cf. Taylor v. Manchester, Sheffield, and 
 Lincolnshire Railway Company (1895), 1 Q. B. 134 ; Kelly v. Metro- 
 politan Railway Company (1895), 1 Q. B. 944 ; Turner v. Stalhbrass 
 (1898), 1 Q. B. 56. (o) 11 Q. B. D. 503. , 
 
102 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vi. staging was reasonably secure. On this point the 
 observations of Brett, M.E., are well worthy of atten- 
 tion, and as to the first part of them there is no question. 
 He says, at p. 507 : " Want of attention amounting to 
 a want of ordinary care is not a good cause of action, 
 although injury ensue from such want, unless the 
 person charged with such want of ordinary care had a 
 duty to the person complaining to use ordinary care in 
 respect, of the matter called in question. Actionable 
 negligence consists in the neglect of the use of ordinary 
 care or hkill towards a person to whom the defendant' 
 owes the duty of observing ordinary care and skill, by 
 which neglect the plaintiff, without contributory negli- 
 gence on his part, has suffered injury to his person 
 or property. The question in this case is whether 
 the defendant owed such a duty to the plaintiff. 
 
 " If a person contracts with another to use ordinary 
 care or skill towards him or his property, the obligation 
 need not be considered in the light of a duty : it is an 
 obligation of contract. It is undoubted, however, that 
 there may be the obligation of such a duty from one 
 person to another, although there is no contract 
 between them with regard to such duty. Two drivers 
 meeting have no contract with each other, but under 
 certain circumstances they have a reciprocal duty 
 towards each other. So two ships navigating the 
 sea. So a railway company which has contracted 
 with one person to carry another has no contract with 
 the person carried, but has a duty towards that person. 
 So the owner or occupier of a house or land who 
 permits a person or persons to come to his house or 
 land has no contract with such person or persons, but 
 has a duty towards him or them. It should be observed 
 that the existence of a contract between two persons 
 does not prevent the existence of the suggested duty 
 between them being also raised by law independently 
 of the contract, by the facts with regard to which the 
 contract is made, and to which it applies an exactly 
 similar but a contract duty." 
 
NEGLIGENCE. 103 
 
 His lordship then mentioned a few of the instances chap, vi. 
 in which there is such a duty raised by law. There is 
 such a duty in the case of two drivers or two ships 
 coming from opposite directions. So is there in the 
 case of a railway company carrying a passenger with 
 whom they have entered into no contract, and in the 
 case of a person who opens a shop, thus impliedly 
 inviting the public to enter and buy such articles as 
 they require (p) . But is there any large proposition 
 which will cover all these and similar cases ? The 
 Master of the Rolls thinks that there is, and that the 
 proposition which the cases suggest is this : that 
 " whenever one person is by circumstances placed in 
 such a position with regard to another that every one 
 of ordinary sense who did think would at once 
 recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and 
 skill in his own conduct with regard to those circum- 
 stances he would cause danger of injury to the person 
 or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary 
 care and skill to avoid such danger " (q). Under this 
 proposition, according to his lordship, would come the 
 case of goods, &c, supplied to be used immediately 
 by a particular person or persons, or one of a class of 
 persons, where it would be obvious to the person 
 supplying, if he thought at all, that the goods would 
 in all probability be used at once by such persons 
 before there could be a reasonable opportunity for 
 discovering any defect which might exist, and where 
 the thing supplied would be of such a nature that a 
 neglect of ordinary care or skill as to its condition or 
 the manner of supplying it would probably cause 
 danger to the person or property of the person for 
 whose use it was supplied, and who was about to use 
 it. But it would exclude the case in which the goods 
 are supplied under circumstances in which it would 
 be a chance by whom they would be used, or whether 
 they would be used or not, or whether they would be 
 
 {p) Seelndermaur v. Dames, L. R. 1 C. P. 274, 2 C. P. 311. 
 (?) 11 Q. B. D., at p. 509. 
 
104 OUTLINES OF TOUTS. 
 
 chap, vi. US ed before there would probably be means of 
 observing any defect, or where the goods would be of 
 such a nature that a want of care or skill as to their 
 condition, or the manner of supplying them, would 
 not probably produce danger of injury to person or 
 property. Lords Justices Cotton and Bowen declined 
 to concur in the proposition laid down by the learned 
 Master of the Eolls, but held, as he did, that the 
 defendant was liable to the plaintiff for the injuries he 
 had sustained ; but the ground of such liability, in 
 their view, was that the defendant being a person who 
 received ships into his dock for the purpose of repairs, 
 and provided them with staging for the work to be 
 executed upon them, all who came for the purpose of 
 repairing or painting the ships were there for a 
 business in which the defendant was interested, and 
 must be considered as having been invited by the 
 defendant to use the dock and all appliances provided 
 by him as incident to the use of the clock. This, it 
 will be remembered, was in substance the ground on 
 which the case of Indermaur v. Dames {r) was decided 
 in favour of the plaintiff. 
 
 It is certainly not easy to reconcile the proposition 
 of law laid down by the Master of the Eolls with the 
 judgment in the older case of Winterbottom v. 
 Wright (s). In that case the plaintiff was a coachman 
 in the emploj'ment of certain persons who had 
 contracted with the Postmaster-General to convey the 
 mail-coach along a certain line of route, and to supply 
 horses and coachmen for that purpose. The defendant 
 had contracted with the Postmaster-General to supply 
 the mail-coach, and to keep it in a proper state of 
 repair. The coach, it was alleged, through some 
 latent defects, became unsafe, and by its breaking 
 down the plaintiff was seriously injured. The Court 
 of Exchequer held that the plaintiff was not entitled 
 
 (r) Ubi supra. 
 
 (s) 10 M. & W. 109. See now the cases cited on p. 105, post. 
 
NEGLIGENCE. 105 
 
 to recover, Lord Abinger saying, " Unless we confine chap, vi. 
 the operation of such contracts as this to the parties 
 who entered, into them, the most absurd and out- 
 rageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, 
 would ensue." The explanation given of this case by 
 Brett, M.E., is that it was decided on what was 
 equivalent to a general demurrer to the declaration, 
 and that the declaration did not shew that the 
 defendant, if he had thought about it, must have 
 known, or ought to have known, that the coach would 
 be necessarily or probably driven by the plaintiff, or 
 by any class of which he could be said to be one, or 
 that it would be so driven within any time which 
 would make it probable that the defect would not be 
 observed. The declaration, moreover, relied too 
 much on contracts entered into with other persons 
 than the plaintiff. Perhaps it may also be said that 
 the declaration, when closely examined, does not 
 clearly allege that the defendant was negligent in 
 supplying the coach, or knew of its defects. The 
 judgment of Brett, M.B., should be carefully read 
 where his lordship explains how the previous cases 
 may be brought under, or are not inconsistent with, 
 the proposition laid down by him. As will be seen, 
 the judgment of Lords Justices Cotton and Bowen 
 was founded on the " doctrine of invitation," as it 
 may be called, which will be dealt with presently. 
 
 It should be mentioned that the dictum of Brett, 
 M.B., was approved by Hawkins, J., in a later case (i), 
 but attempts having been made to give too wide an 
 operation to the decision in Heaven v. Pender, it has 
 recently been pointed out by the Court of Appeal that 
 all that that case decided was that a duty to take care 
 arises when the person or property of one is in such 
 proximity to the person or property of another that, if 
 
 (t) Thrusscllv. Handyside, 20 Q. B. D. 3f>9 ; see also Elliott v. Hall, 
 15 Q. B. D. 315 ; The Moorcock, 13 P. D. 157; 14 P. D. 64; The 
 Calliope (1891), App. Cas. 11 ; and the earlier case of Parry v. Smith, 
 4 C. V. D. 325. Cf. Caledonian My. Co. v. Mulholland (1898), App. 
 Cas. 216. 
 
106 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vi. d ue care b e no t; taken, damage may be done by the 
 one to the other (it). For instance, mere negligent 
 misrepresentation by A., on which B. acts to his 
 prejudice, will not give B. a cause of action against A., 
 where A. owes no duty towards B. A surveyor 
 appointed by a building owner to give certificates as 
 the building progressed, gave certificates which were 
 inaccurate, but on the faith of which certain mort- 
 gagees advanced moneys to the builder which they 
 would not have advanced but for the certificates, and 
 were thereby damnified. There was, however, no 
 contractual relation between the mortgagees and the 
 surveyor, and so it was held that he owed no duty 
 to them to exercise care in giving certificates, and was 
 not liable to them in damages. Again, as mere 
 negligent misrepresentation is not fraud, an action of 
 deceit or fraud would not lie against him (x). 
 
 In the well-known case of Indermaur v. Dames (y), 
 above referred to, it was, in substance, laid down that 
 all persons who go to the premises of another, not as 
 mere volunteers, or licensees, or guests, or servants, 
 or persons whose employment is such that danger 
 may be considered as bargained for, but who go upon 
 business which concerns that other person, and upon 
 his invitation, express or implied, are entitled to 
 expect that, using reasonable care on their own part 
 for their own safety, he will on his part use reason- 
 able care to prevent damage from unusual danger 
 which he knows, or ought to know. But it is other- 
 wise in the case of persons who are not " invited " in 
 
 The doctrine 
 of " invita- 
 tion. " 
 
 (it) Lc Licvre v. Gould (1893), 1 Q. B. 491. overruling C'ami v. 
 Willson, 39 Ch. D. 39, and approving Scholes v. Brook, 63 L. T. 837. 
 
 (x) Lc Licvre v. Gould, supra. See also and cf. Scholfield v. Londcs- 
 borough (1896), App. Cas. 514. As to action for deceit or fraud, see 
 post, chap. vii. 
 
 (y) L. R. 1 C. P. 274, 2 C. P. 311 ; see also 2Jost, p. 120. See also 
 Lax v. Corporation of Darlington, where the damage was not to the 
 plaintiff but to his property. The defendants, who were the owners of 
 a market and received the tolls, put up in it some low railings which 
 were dangerous. Plaintiffs cow, in trying to jump them, was spiked, 
 and subsequently died from its injuries. Defendants were held liable 
 for its value. 
 
NEGLIGENCE. 107 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 the sense just mentioned. Thus, a bare licensee 
 cannot make the licensor responsible because he has Licensee, 
 sustained some injury through a defect in the 
 premises upon which he is licensed to go. He must, 
 in fact, take them as he finds them (-). But if there 
 is anything amounting to fraud in the conduct of the 
 licensor (-), or if he lays a " trap " for those who may 
 come upon the premises, he may be answerable for 
 injuries caused thereby (a). But in general a licensor 
 is not bound to keep premises in repair for bare 
 licensees. Thus, a mere licence to a lodger to use the 
 leaden roof of a house as a drying-place for his clothes 
 does not impose upon the landlord any duty to keep 
 the railing round the roof in repair (b). 
 
 But the owner of premises must not be guilty of 
 active negligence towards a licensee, if he knows that 
 the latter is, or is likely to be, on his premises. He may, 
 for instance, in ordinary circumstances, leave a horse 
 and cart unattended in his own field ; but if he knows, 
 that a licensee is or is likely to be there, and that the 
 leaving of the horse and cart unattended may pro- 
 bably cause injury to the licensee, the latter, if injured 
 by the horse running away, may have a right of 
 action (c). 
 
 Guests. — A guest stands in the same position as a 
 mere licensee. His host, if he knowingly allows him 
 to fall into some hidden danger, may have to answer 
 for any injuries sustained thereby ; but he is not 
 answerable for injuries caused by defects in the con- 
 struction of premises, or by their being in want of 
 repair. Thus, a guest who, on leaving the house of 
 his host, was cut by a loose pane of glass which fell 
 upon him as he was opening a door, was held to have 
 no good cause of action, the reason given being that a 
 guest or person voluntarily entering a house becomes 
 
 (z) Gautret v. Egerion L. K. 2 C. P. 371. 
 
 (a) Corby v. Hill, i C. B. N. S. f 56. 
 
 (lyivay v. Hedges, 9 Q. B. D. 80. 
 
 (c) Toihaiisen v. Davics, 59 L. T. 436 ; affirmed, 58 L. J. Q. B. 98. 
 
108 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vi. an i nm ate and one of the i&mily pro hac vice, and so is 
 precluded from bringing an action (d). 
 
 Trespassers. — There is still less liability on the 
 part of an occupier of land or a house towards a tres- 
 passer, and an action cannot be maintained by a person 
 who, trespassing upon another's land, falls into a pit 
 and thereby sustains injuries (e). But there may be a 
 liability where the pit is so near a public highway that 
 a person passing along the highway and using ordinary 
 care falls into it (/). 
 
 Things in themselves dangerous. — Analogous to 
 the duty laid down in Heaven v. Pender, supra, there 
 is a duty to use the greatest care when a person has 
 or uses or deals with highly dangerous things, which, 
 unless such care is exercised, are calculated to cause 
 injury to bystanders or others into whose hands they 
 may get (g) . Thus, a gas-fitter was employed by the 
 plaintiff's master to repair a meter. To do so, he took 
 away the meter replacing it temporarily by a flexible 
 tube which connected the inlet pipe with the others. 
 The plaintiff in the course of his duties went to the cellar 
 with a light, whereupon an explosion took place, and 
 he was injured. The jury found negligence on the 
 part of the gas-fitter, and on these facts the plaintiff 
 was held to have a good cause of action against 
 him (li) . 
 
 This case perhaps goes somewhat further than George 
 v. Skicington (i), where, in an action by husband and 
 wife, a declaration alleging that the defendant sold to 
 
 (d) Southcote v. Stanley, 1 H. & N. 247. 
 
 (c) See Hardcasth v. South Yorkshire Railway Company, 1 H. i If . 
 67 ; Bolch v. Smith, 7 H. & W. 736. 
 
 (/) Barnes v. Ward, 9 C. B. 392. 
 
 (y) See Lungmeid \. Holliday, 20 L. J. Ex. 430 ; Parry t . Smith, 
 4 C. P. D. 328 ; Seholes v. Brook, 63 L. T. 837 ; Lc Licire v. Gould 
 (1893), 1 Q. B. 491, 602. 
 
 (h) Barry v. Smith, supra. 
 
 (i) L. R. 5 Ex. 1. This case followed Zavgridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 
 519 ; 4 M. & W. 337 (a defective gun sold to a father lor the use of his 
 son, the plaintiff), there being this difference, that there fraud, and 
 not negligence, was alleged, see post, p. 109. 
 
NEGLIGENCE. 109 
 
 the husband for the use, as the defendant knew, of the chap, vi. 
 wife, a deleterious hairwash, which had been negli- 
 gently compounded by the defendant, and which had 
 injured the wife, disclosed a good cause of action in 
 her favour. In this case negligence was alleged, and 
 in Langridge v. Levy (J), fraud, and in each the person 
 for whom, as the defendant' knew, the article was 
 bought, was held to have a right of action. This dis- 
 tinguishes them from such cases as Longmeid v. Holli- 
 day(k). There, defendant sold to A. for his use and 
 that of his wife, the plaintiff, a lamp which he war- 
 ranted to be sound, but which was so badly constructed 
 that it exploded and injured the plaintiff. The defen- 
 dant did not manufacture the lamp, and there was no 
 evidence that he knew of its defects. There being 
 therefore no maid fides or negligence, the plaintiff, who 
 was not a party to the contract, had no cause of action 
 against defendant. 
 
 Burden of Proof. — In actions brought for negli- 
 gence, the burden of proving such negligence rests 
 upon the plaintiff, and " where the evidence is equally 
 ■consistent — either with the existence or non-existence 
 of negligence — it is not competent to the judge to 
 leave the matter to the jury " (I). Thus, where a man 
 bought a horse at Tattersall's, and upon the next day 
 took it out for the purpose of trying it, and whilst in 
 Finsbury Circus, a much-frequented thoroughfare, the 
 horse, from some unexplained reason, swerved aside 
 upon the footpath, in spite of the owner's efforts to 
 hold it in, and killed a man, it was held that these 
 facts disclosed no evidence of negligence which could 
 be submitted to the jury (m). If in this case it had 
 been proved that the defendant was unskilful as a 
 rider, or knew that the horse was vicious or unmanage- 
 able, the result might have been different (m) . 
 
 (j) See note (?'), p. 108. 
 
 (k) 20 L. J. Ex. 430. 
 
 (I) Cotton v. Wood, 8 C. B. N. S. 568. 
 
 (m) Hammock v. White, 11 C. B. N. S. 588. 
 
110 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vi. The ruling in the case just referred to was upheld in 
 Manzoni v. Douglas (n), where also it was held that 
 there was no evidence of negligence to submit to the 
 jury. In that case a horse drawing a brougham, under 
 the care of the defendant's coachman, in a public street 
 in London, suddenly, and without any explainable 
 cause, bolted, and, notwithstanding the efforts of the 
 driver to control him, swerved aside upon the footpath 
 and injured the plaintiff. To hold that the mere fact 
 of a horse bolting is per se evidence of negligence was 
 described by the Court as " mere reckless guess- 
 work " (o). 
 
 Mes ipsa, 
 loquitur. 
 
 But although a plaintiff is bound to give reasonable 
 evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant, 
 yet there are certain cases of which it may be said res 
 ipsa loquitur — that is to say, cases in which the Court 
 would hold that the mere fact of the accident having 
 happened is evidence of negligence. Thus, the fact 
 of a collision between two trains belonging to the same 
 company is prima facie some evidence of negligence 
 on the company's part (j>). So if a person is walking 
 along the street past a flour-merchant's shop, and a 
 barrel of flour falls upon him from a warehouse over the 
 shop, the fact of its so falling is prima facie evidence of 
 negligence, and the person who is injured by it is not 
 bound to call witnesses from the warehouse to prove 
 negligence (q). In Scott v. London and St. Kutherine 
 Dock Company if) , the plaintiff, an officer of the 
 Customs, whilst in discharge of his duty, was passing 
 in front of a warehouse in the dock, and six bags of 
 sugar fell upon him. The Court, in holding that there 
 was upon these facts sufficient evidence of negligence 
 
 (») 6 Q. B. D. 145. 
 
 (o) For other instances of "inevitable accidents" see Stanlei/ v. 
 Powell (1891), 1 Q. B. 86; Peacock v. Nicholson, 11 T. L. R. 222; 
 cited ante. p. 30. 
 
 (p) Skinner v. London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company, 
 5 Ex. 787. 
 
 (q) Byrne v. Boodle, 2 H. & C. 722. 
 
 (?■) 3 H. & C. 596. 
 
NEGLIGENCE. Ill 
 
 to be submitted to the jury, said: "Where the thing chap, vi. 
 is shewn to be under the management of the defendant 
 or his servants, and the accident is such as in the 
 ordinary course of things does not happen if those who 
 have the management use proper care, it affords 
 reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by 
 the defendant, that the accident arose from want of 
 care." 
 
 Kearney v. London, Brighton, and South Coast Rail- 
 way Company (s) is another case illustrating the same 
 doctrine. In that case, as the plaintiff was passing 
 along a public road under a railway bridge belonging 
 to the defendants, a brick fell from the top of one of 
 the pilasters on which one of the girders of the bridge 
 rested, and injured the plaintiff. A train had passed 
 over the bridge immediately before the accident. The 
 plaintiff also proved that other bricks had fallen out 
 since the accident. The Court of Exchequer Chamber, 
 affirming the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, 
 held that these facts afforded prima facie evidence of 
 negligence on the part of the defendants, because, if a 
 bridge is kept in proper repair, a brick does not, in the 
 ordinary course of events, fall suddenly out. In the 
 Court below Cockburn, C.J., said: "My own opinion 
 is that this is a case to which the principle res ipsa 
 loquitur is applicable, though it is certainly as weak a 
 case as can well be conceived in which that maxim 
 could be taken to apply. But I think the maxim is 
 applicable, and my reason for sa}"ing so is this : — The 
 company who have constructed this bridge were bound 
 to construct it in a proper manner, and to use all reason- 
 able care and diligence in keeping it in such a state of 
 repair that no damage from its defective condition 
 should occur to those who passed under it, the public 
 having a right to pass under it. Now, we have the 
 fact that a brick falls out of the structure, and injures 
 the plaintiff. The proximate cause appears to have 
 
 {s) L. R. 5 Q. B. 411, 6 y. B. 759. 
 
112 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 been the looseness of the brick, and the vibration of a 
 train passing over the bridge acting upon the defective 
 condition of the brick. It is clear, therefore, that the 
 structure in reference to this brick was out of repair. 
 It is clear that it was incumbent on the defendants to 
 use reasonable care and diligence, and I think the brick 
 being loose affords prima facie a presumption that they 
 had not used reasonable care and diligence. It is true 
 that it is possible that, from changes in the tempera- 
 ture, a brick might get into the condition in which this 
 brickwork appears to have been, from causes operating 
 so speedily as to prevent the possibility of any diligence 
 and care applied to such a purpose intervening in due 
 time so as to prevent an accident. But, inasmuch as 
 our experience of these things is that bricks do not fall 
 out when brickwork is kept in a proper state of repair, 
 I think, where an accident of this sort happens, the 
 presumption is that it is not the frost of a single night, 
 or of many nights, that would cause such a change in 
 the state of this brickwork as that a brick would fall 
 out in this way ; and it must be presumed that there 
 was not that inspection and that care on the part of 
 the defendants which it was their duty to apply. On 
 the other hand, I admit most readily that a very little 
 evidence would have sufficed to rebut the presumption 
 which arises from the manifestly defective state of this 
 brickwork." 
 
 Burden of T 'roof as to Contributory Negligence. — 
 
 As will appear hereafter, a plaintiff's contributory negli- 
 gence may under certain circumstances be a good defence 
 to an action for negligence brought by him. Suffice it to 
 say, at present, that the onus of proving affirmatively 
 that there was contributory negligence on the part of 
 the plaintiff rests, in the first instance, upon the defen- 
 dant, and, in the absence of evidence tending to that 
 conclusion, the plaintiff is not bound to prove the 
 negative ; but cases may occur in which, contributory 
 negligence being admitted by a plaintiff, or proved by 
 his witnesses whilst establishing negligence against a 
 
XEliLKiENCE. 113 
 
 defendant, there will be nothing left for the jury to chap, vi. 
 decide, there being no contest of fact(i). Thus a rail- 
 way company complied with the statutory duty of 
 erecting hand-gates where the line crossed on the level 
 a public footpath. The dead body of a man was found 
 on the line near the crossing. It was admitted that 
 he was struck by the engine, but there was nothing to 
 shew whether he negligently ran against it, or whether 
 the company's servants negligently ran him down : 
 held, that, even assuming negligence on the part of 
 the company's servants, there was no evidence that 
 it led to the man's death (t). But there was evidence 
 of negligence for a jury where a child at a similar 
 crossing was found with its foot cut off by a passing 
 tram, it being shewn that the railway company had 
 not complied with their statutory duty of erecting 
 gates which would have served as a warning to those 
 about to cross the line {u). And there was evidence 
 for the jury in a later case where a man was killed by 
 a train at a spot where the line crossed a highway 
 protected with gates, as the deceased might be held 
 justified in assuming that it was safe to cross the line, 
 by reason of the fact that the signalman, to whom he 
 had been speaking, neither warned him of an approach- 
 ing train, nor left his house to signal it, as he was 
 bound and accustomed to do (x). 
 
 Functions of the Judge and of the Jury. — "In 
 
 actions for negligence the judge has a certain, duty to 
 discharge, and the jurors have another and a different 
 duty. The judge has to say whether any facts have 
 been established by evidence from which negligence may 
 be reasonably inferred, the jurors have to say whether, 
 from those facts, when submitted to them, negligence 
 
 ought to he inferred It would be a serious 
 
 inroad on the province of the jury if, in a case where 
 
 (t) SeeWakclin v. Loudon and South- Western Railway Company, 12 
 App. Cas. 41. 
 
 (u) Williams v. Great Western Raihray Company, L. R. 9 Ex. 157. 
 \x) Smith v. So%dh-Easte.rn IUiihraij Company (1896), 1 Q. B. 178. 
 
 R.T. I 
 
114 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vi. there are facts from which negligence may reasonably 
 be inferred, the judge were to withdraw the case from 
 the jury upon the ground that, in his opinion, negli- 
 gence ought not to be inferred ; and it would, on the 
 other hand, place in the hands of the jurors a power 
 which might be exercised in the most arbitrary manner 
 if they were at liberty to hold that negligence might 
 be inferred from any state of facts whatever " (y). 
 
 If there is conflicting evidence on a question of fact, 
 the judge is bound to leave it to the jury, whatever may 
 be his own opinion of the value of that evidence. He 
 may declare negatively that there is no evidence to go 
 to the jury, but not affirmatively that a certain issue is 
 proved: Dublin, Widdoiu, and Wexford Railway Com- 
 pany v. Slattern (z). In the case just now mentioned 
 the husband of the respondent, the plaintiff in the 
 action, attempted to cross the line of the railway com- 
 pany at night, at a spot where persons were in the 
 habit of crossing it with the acquiescence of the com- 
 pany. At the time when he attempted to cross it, 
 there was a train standing still on the up line in such 
 a position as to prevent a person on the line behind it 
 from seeing anything approaching on the down line. 
 The respondent's husband came from behind the train 
 on the up line, and, on passing, on to the down rails, 
 was struck by an express train, and killed. It was 
 proved that it was the duty of the drivers of express 
 trains on the company's line to whistle on passing every 
 station. Two or three witnesses for the plaintiff gave 
 evidence that they did not hear the whistle, but the 
 engine-driver, and other witnesses to the number of 
 ten, stated positively that whistling did take place. It 
 was also proved that the train carried lights, and 
 might have been seen by the deceased before he passed 
 on to the down line. Upon this evidence the House 
 
 (y) Metropolitan Railway Company v. Jackson, 3 App. Cas. 193, per 
 Lord Cairns, at p. 197 ; see the cases cited ante, p. 109. 
 (2) 3 App. Cas. 1155. 
 
NEGLIGENCE. 115 
 
 of Lords lield that the learned judge at the trial had chap, vi. 
 acted rightly in not withdrawing the case from the jury. 
 ' ' When once a plaintiff has adduced such evidence as, 
 if uncontradicted, would justify and sustain a verdict, 
 no amount of contradictory evidence will justify the 
 withdrawal of the case from the jury " (a). 
 
 Miscellaneous Xefjlif/ence Cases — A fewcases maybe Causa 
 cited to shew the application of the principles above laid eailsans - 
 down. In Metropolitan Hallway Company v. Jackson (b), 
 already referred to, the facts were shortly these : — 
 The respondent, the plaintiff in the action, was a 
 passenger on the company's railway. The compart- 
 ment in which he travelled was quite full before the 
 train arrived at Gower Street Station. There three 
 persons forced themselves in, but, there being no seats 
 vacant, they were obliged to remain standing. At the 
 next station, Portland Eoad, there was a rush of fresh 
 passengers. The door of the compartment in which the 
 plaintiff sat was opened by some persons who looked 
 into it, saw it full, and shut the door. Then others 
 came, opened the door again, and some of them tried 
 to get into the carriage. The plaintiff rose from his 
 seat to prevent them. Whilst he was standing with his 
 hands and arms extended, the train moved forward, 
 and the plaintiff, to save himself from falling, put his 
 hand upon the edge of the door of the carriage. At 
 that moment, the train being about to enter a tunnel, 
 a railway porter came up, pushed away the persons 
 who were trying to get in, and slammed the door to, 
 severely crushing the plaintiff's thumb. Now, here 
 there was no doubt negligence on the part of the 
 company's servants in allowing more passengers than 
 the proper number to get in at Gower Street Station ; 
 and it may have been also negligence, if they saw 
 these supernumerary passengers, or if they ought to 
 have seen them, at Portland Eoad Station, not to have 
 
 [a) Per Lord Hatherley, who dissented from the majority of the 
 Lords, but not on this point (p. 1168). 
 
 (b) 3 App. Cas. 193. 
 
 I 2 
 
116 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vi. removed them. But the evidence did not shew that 
 the overcrowding had any effect on the movements of 
 the plaintiff, or made him less a master of his actions 
 when he stood up or when he fell forward. The porter 
 had only done his duty in shutting the door as the 
 train was approaching the tunnel, and it was not 
 those inside who had opened it, but those outside who- 
 were trying to get in. Accordingly, the House of 
 Lords held that no negligence connected — that is, 
 connected proximately — with the accident had been 
 proved, and that the learned judge at the trial ought 
 to have withdrawn the case from the jury, or, mother 
 words, that the negligence of the company was not the 
 causa causans of the accident. 
 
 In the recent case of Cobb v. Great Western Railway 
 Company (c), the plaintiff, a passenger, claimed to 
 recover from the defendants a sum of money of which 
 he had been robbed, owing, as he alleged, to the defen- 
 dants' negligence in allowing the carriage in which he 
 travelled to be overcrowded. Negligence there was, no- 
 doubt, in permitting the overcrowding, but it was held 
 that the action must fail because it was not the ordinary 
 or probable result of such negligence that a passenger 
 should be robbed. 
 
 In the same case an allegation in the statement of 
 claim which in substance came to this — that the defen- 
 dants after the plaintiff had been robbed refused to- 
 detain the train until he had complained to the police, 
 and his complaint had been inquired into by them — was- 
 held to disclose no cause of action ; though one may 
 . gather from the judgments that the decision would have 
 been otherwise if there had been a specific allegation 
 that the plaintiff was ready to give certain persons 
 into the custody of the police, who were on the spot, 
 and ready to deal with the charge of robbery and take 
 such persons into custody, but that he was prevented 
 from doing so by the defendants. 
 
 (c) (1893), 1 Q. B. 459 ; in H. of L. (1894), App. Cas. 419. 
 
NEOUflEXCE. 117 
 
 It is unfortunate that the decision turned, to some chap, yi. 
 extent at least, on a point of pleading, but so far as it 
 goes it throws some doubt on the correctness of the 
 judgment in Pounder v. Xorth-Ensteru Hallway Coin- 
 pan;/ (d), delivered a few months previously. In that 
 case, the plaintiff, a passenger on the defendants' 
 railway, was a man who was obnoxious to the pitmen 
 of a certain colliery district. This fact was not known 
 to the defendants at the time he took his ticket, but 
 before the train started he was, in the hearing of the 
 defendants' servants, threatened with violence by a 
 number of pitmen, and was placed by the defendants' 
 servants in a carriage into which several pitmen rushed, 
 greatly overcrowding it. The defendants' servants, 
 though applied to by the plaintiff, did not get the pit- 
 men out or provide another carriage for the plaintiff, 
 and the result was that he was assaulted throughout 
 the whole of his journey, and nothing was done to 
 protect him, though he complained to the guard at each 
 station, and though it would appear that the company's 
 ordinary staff were well able to protect the plaintiff. 
 A Divisional Court (A. L. Smith and Mathew, JJ.), 
 held that the defendants were not liable, as there was 
 no evidence of a breach of duty by the defendants 
 arising out of the contract for carriage : that, in fact, 
 the defendants' duty arose out of the contract, and was 
 to be determined by the facts known to the contracting 
 parties at the time of the contract. 
 
 It is submitted, with deference, that the judgment 
 in this case was wrong in resting too much on what 
 was supposed to be in . the minds of the parties at 
 the time of the contract. When a railway company 
 receive a passenger they have a duty, apart from 
 any contract, to take reasonable care to convey him 
 safely (e), and it is submitted that they commit a breach 
 
 (d) (1S92), 1 Q. B. 385, 
 
 (e) Sri' and rf. Marshall v. York, <bc, Railway Company, 21 
 L. J. (J. P. 34 ; Alton v. Midland llailtcai/ Company, 19 G. B. N. S. 
 213 ; Taylor v. Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire, Railway Company 
 
118 
 
 OUTLINES OF TOKTS. 
 
 chap, vi. f sucn duty in neglecting, under the circumstances 
 above set forth, to use ordinary and reasonable efforts 
 to provide for the passenger's safety. Indeed Lord 
 Esher, M.E., in Cobb v. Great Western Railway Com- 
 pany (supra) in deciding against the plaintiff in that 
 case says : "It is not alleged that the plaintiff was 
 being ill-used or assaulted in the train, and that that 
 fact being known to the defendants' servants they did 
 not interfere to protect him. That would be a different 
 case." (f). 
 
 Damage by- 
 horses. 
 
 A horse, owing to its owner's negligence, strayed on 
 to a public highway in which a child was playing, and 
 there kicked and hurt the child. The owner was held 
 not liable ; for even if there was any evidence of negli- 
 gence on the part of the owner in letting his horse 
 stray into the road, this negligence could not be con- 
 nected with the act of the horse in kicking the child 
 without anything to account for it. The act was not 
 one which an ordinary horse, not of a peculiarly vicious 
 temper, would commit, and the Court thought that, to 
 sustain the action, the plaintiff should have shewn that 
 the owner, the defendant, knew that the horse had 
 committed, or was likely to commit, such an act (g). 
 
 But where, through the defective state of a gate 
 which the defendant was bound to keep in repair, the 
 defendant's mare strayed from his farm into an occu- 
 pation road, and thence into the plaintiff's field, where 
 it kicked the plaintiff's horse, the defendant was held 
 liable for the mischief done (h) . The ground of the 
 distinction would seem to be that the latter of these 
 cases was, in substance, an action for trespass, in 
 respect of which the defendant was clearly liable to the 
 plaintiff, and the only question was as to the remoteness 
 
 (1895), 1 Q. B. 134; Kelly v. Metropolitan Eaihaiy Company, Ibid., 
 944, ante, pp. 100, 101. 
 
 (/) In the H. of L. Lord Selborne questioned Pounder's case, whilst 
 Lord Morris seemed to agree with it. 
 
 (?) Cox v. Bnrbidqe. 13 C. B. N". S. 430. 
 
 (h) Zee v. Riley, 18 C. B. N. S. 722. 
 
NEGLIGENCE. 119 
 
 of the damage. The accident which occurred was said chap, vi. 
 to be the natural consequence of two horses meeting 
 under the circumstances mentioned, and no question 
 properly arose as to the ferocious temper of the mare 
 or the defendant's knowledge thereof. 
 
 This case was followed in Ellis v. Lqftus Iron Com- 
 pany (('), where, the defendants' horse having injured 
 the plaintiffs mare by biting and kicking her through 
 the fence separating the plaintiff's land from the 
 defendants', it was held that there was a trespass by 
 the act of the defendants' horse for which the defendants 
 were liable, apart from any question of negligence on 
 their part. 
 
 To the cases already cited illustrating the principle Res w sa 
 of res ipsa loquitur, the case of Welfare v. London, applicable? 
 Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company (k) may 
 well be added. There the plaintiff was lawfully on the 
 premises of the railway company, and, having made 
 some inquiries respecting the departure of trains, was 
 directed by a porter of the defendants to look at a time- 
 bill which was posted on the wall of the station under- 
 neath a portico. Whilst the plaintiff was engaged in 
 looking at the time-bill, a plank and a roll of zinc 
 suddenly fell down upon him through a hole in the 
 roof of the portico, severely injuring him. Upon look- 
 up, the plaintiff saw the legs of a man protruding 
 through the hole. The plaintiff sued the company for 
 negligence, but was nonsuited, and it was held properly 
 so ; for, in the first place, there was nothing to shew 
 that the man on the roof was a servant of the defendants, 
 the presumption being rather that he was the servant 
 of some builder or other contractor who had contracted 
 to repair the roof. In the second place, to the sug- 
 gestion that there was negligence on the part of the 
 defendants in allowing a person to go on the roof when 
 it was in an insecure condition, or not sufficiently 
 
 (i) L. R. 10 C. P. 10. 
 (k) L. R. 4 Q. B. 694. 
 
120 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vi. strong to bear his weight, it was answered that there 
 was nothing in the evidence to shew that the company 
 knew that the roof was in so insecure a state as not to 
 be able to bear the weight of a man upon it. 
 
 Structures reasonably safe. — It is difficult to 
 succeed in what virtually may be termed an attempt 
 to convict our predecessors of negligence ; and where 
 an article or appliance has been long in general use, it 
 will not be enough, for the purpose of shewing negli- 
 gence, that another article or appliance of an approved 
 kind might be used. Thus, where a staircase about six 
 feet wide belonging to a railway was nosed with brass, 
 but the brass, from constant use, had become slippery, 
 and the plaintiff slipped upon the stairs and was hurt, 
 it was held that there was no evidence of negligence to 
 go to the jury, although two experts stated that the 
 staircase was dangerous, principally by reason of the 
 nosing of brass, oiie of them suggesting that lead would 
 be safer (I). "We must take that evidence," says 
 Willes, J., " with the common experience which every 
 one has. We all know that brass is a material which 
 is commonly used for the nosing of stairs in public 
 offices, steamboats on the river, and other places of 
 much resort." Longviore v. Great Western Railway 
 Company (in), relied on by the plaintiff, was dis- 
 tinguished, on the ground that there the danger arose 
 from the circumstance of a rail being placed at the side 
 of some steps upon a wooden bridge, which apparently 
 afforded protection to persons using the • bridge, but 
 which in reality afforded no protection in the event of 
 an accidental slip, there being a dangerous aperture 
 beneath it through which a person might easily fall. 
 
 Invitation to Danger — Numerous instances may 
 be given where a person, induced to do a dangerous 
 act by the negligence of another, may recover damages 
 
 (l) Crafter v. Metropolitan Railway Comjjany, L. R. 1 C. P. 300. 
 (m) 19 C. B. N. S. 183. 
 
XEOUOENCE. 121 
 
 for injuries thereby sustained. A not unusual case of chap, vi. 
 this kind is where a railway train overshoots the plat- 
 form. The mere overshooting of a platform is not 
 evidence of negligence, nor is the calling out of the 
 name of the station before the train has come to a 
 standstill (n). But when a train does overshoot a 
 platform the railway company ought to take measures 
 for the safety of the passengers in the carriages beyond 
 the platform. This may be done by either backing the 
 train, and in the meantime telling the passengers to 
 keep their seats, or by assisting out of the train such 
 as require assistance. And if they bring a train to a 
 standstill at a place at which it is unsafe for a passenger 
 to alight under circumstances which warrant the pas- 
 senger in believing that it is intended that he shall get 
 out, and that he may therefore do so with safety, and 
 no warning of his danger be given, that is evidence of 
 negligence for which, if injury ensues, an action may 
 be brought (o) . And even if the passenger sees the 
 danger, but is satisfied that the train is about to move 
 on without being in the first place backed, and that no 
 one is coming to his assistance, he is not bound to 
 wait till he reaches the next station, but may descend, 
 using proper care, and, if he be injured whilst so doing, 
 the company may be liable (})). To a like effect is the 
 earlier case of Clay arch v. Dethick (q) , with which, 
 however, should be read the judgment of Bramwell, B., 
 in Lax v. Corporation of Darliii/jton (r). 
 
 Again, railway companies are bound, under 8 & 9 
 Yict. c. 20, s. 47, where a railway crosses a public 
 
 (n) Lewis v. London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Company, L. R. 
 9 Q. B. 66 ; Wetter v. London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway 
 Company, L. R. 9 C. P. 126. See also Siner v. Great Western Railway 
 Company, L. R. 3 Ex. 150, 4 Ex. 117 ; Bridges v. North London Rail- 
 way Company, L. R. 7 H. of L. 213. See also ante, p. 106. 
 
 (o) Cockle v. London and South-Eastem Railway Company, L. R. 7 
 C. P. 321. 
 
 (p) Robson v. North-Eastern Railway Company, 2 Q. B. D. 85 ; 
 Rose v. North Eastern Railway Company, 2 Ex. D. 248. 
 
 (q) 12 Q. B. 439. 
 
 (r) 5 Ex. D. 28, ante, p. 106 ; see also Thomas v Quartermaine, 17 
 Q. B. D. 417 ; 18 Q. B. D. 685 ; and post, chap. x. 
 
122 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 highway, to make and maintain proper gates across 
 the highway on each side of the railway, and to 
 employ persons to open and shut them. Such gates 
 are to be kept shut except when horses, cattle, carts, 
 or carriages have to go across the railway. If such 
 gates are left open, there is what is equivalent to a 
 notice to the public that the line is safe for crossing ; 
 and where a person, after such notice, attempts to 
 cross, and is knocked down by a passing train, he may 
 hold tbe company answerable in damages, even if he 
 might have seen the train coming, but, being in a 
 position more or less embarrassing, did not use his 
 faculties so clearly as he might have done under other 
 circumstances (s) . 
 
 But people must use every care in crossing a rail- 
 way, and "if a railway train which ought to whistle 
 when passing through a station were to pass through 
 without whistling, and a man were, in broad daylight, 
 and without anything, either in the structure of the 
 line or otherwise, to obstruct his view, to cross in 
 front of the advancing train and to be killed, I should 
 think the judge ought to tell the jury that it was the 
 folly and recklessness of the man, and not the care- 
 lessness of the company, which caused his death. 
 This would be an example of what was spoken of in 
 this House [the House of Lords] , in the case of 
 Metropolitan Railway Company v. Jackson (t), as an 
 incuria, but not an incuria dans locum injuria. The 
 jury could not be allowed to connect the careless- 
 ness in not whistling with the accident to the man 
 who rushed, with his eyes open, on to his own 
 destruction " (u). 
 
 (s) North- Eastern Railway Company v. Wanless, L. E. 7 H. of L. 12, 
 where the plaintiffs attention was occupied with another train which 
 had passed by. 
 
 (0 3 App. Cas. 193. 
 
 (u) Per Lord Cairns, C, in Dublin, Wir.klow, and Wexford Railway 
 Company v. Slattery, 3 App. Cas. 1155 ; see Darey v. London and 
 South -West 'mi Railway Company, 12 Q. B. D. 70. 
 
NEGLIGENCE. 123 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Contributory Negligence. 
 
 This brings us to the question of contributory 
 negligence to which some reference has already been 
 made (.<■). We have seen that the negligence for which 
 a person may recover damages must be the causa 
 caitsans of the injury sustained, and if his own negli- 
 gence was the causa causans, or the direct cause of the 
 injury, he cannot successfully claim damages from 
 another who may have been negligent also, but whose 
 negligence was not the direct cause of the injury (y). 
 If a person sees a man furiously driving along a 
 narrow road, and, making no effort to escape the 
 approaching danger, allows himself to be run over, he 
 may fail to obtain compensation ; but, on the other 
 hand, if a man is lying on a road drunk or asleep, 
 this is no doubt negligence on his part, but he may 
 nevertheless be entitled to compensation for injuries 
 received if the driver of a carriage, seeing his condition, 
 makes no effort to avoid him, but drives over him. A 
 few cases may be given by way of illustration. In 
 Davics v. Mann (z) the plaintiff, having fettered the 
 forefeet of his donkey, turned it into a public highway, 
 and, whilst the donkey was grazing on the side of the 
 road, the defendant's waggon, drawn by three horses, 
 coming down a slight descent at a smartish pace, 
 knocked down the donkey, and, the wheels passing- 
 over it, it died soon afterwards. The jury were 
 directed (and the direction was upheld by the Court) 
 that, notwithstanding the conduct of the plaintiff in 
 fettering the animal so as to prevent it from getting 
 out of the way of carriages passing along the highway, 
 they should find a verdict for the plaintiff, " if they 
 thought that the accident might hav.e been avoided 
 by the exercise of ordinary care on the part of the 
 
 (x) See ante, p. 112. 
 
 (y) See the passage already quoted from the judgment of Lord 
 Cairns, C. , in Dublin, <fcc. , Railway Company v. Slaltcry, 3 App. Cas. 
 1155, ante, p. 96. 
 
 (z) 10 M. & W. 546. 
 
124 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vi. defendant." Tvff _v, Warman{a) is another well- 
 known case. The action was brought against a 
 Thames pilot for an injury to the plaintiff's barge in 
 consequence of a collision with a vessel under the 
 charge of the defendant. The defence was that the 
 plaintiff, having been guilty of contributory negligence 
 in not keeping a look-out, could not recover. The 
 learned judge told the jury, in summing up, that if the 
 parties on one vessel had a look-out, and still persisted 
 in a course which would inflict an injury, then they 
 were liable, though there was no look-out on the 
 other vessel, for that would not be the direct cause of 
 the injury. He further directed them that, if they 
 thought the accident had been partly caused by the 
 plaintiff's own negligence, they should find for the 
 defendant ; but that if they thought the barge was 
 injured by the negligence of the defendant, and that 
 the negligence of the plaintiff did not " directly " 
 contribute thereto, the plaintiff was entitled to recover. 
 This was upheld in the Common Pleas and Exchequer 
 Chamber, Wightman, J., saying in the latter court : 
 " It appears to us that the proper question for the 
 jury in this case, and indeed in all others of the like 
 kind, is, whether the damage was occasioned entirely 
 by the negligence and improper conduct of the 
 defendant, or whether the plaintiff himself so far 
 contributed to the misfortune by his own negligence 
 or want of ordinary and common care and caution 
 that, but for such negligence or want of ordinary and 
 common care and caution on his part, the misfortune 
 would not have happened. In the first case the 
 plaintiff would be entitled to recover ; in the latter, 
 not, as, but for his own fault, the misfortune would 
 not have happened. Mere negligence or want of 
 ordinary care and caution would not, however, dis- 
 entitle him to recover, unless it were such that, but 
 for that negligence or want of ordinary care and 
 caution the misfortune could not have happened, nor 
 
 [a) 2 0. B. N. S. 740, 5 C. B. K S. 573. 
 
NEGLIGENCE. 125 
 
 if the defendant might, by the exercise of care on his ch ap, yi. 
 part, have avoided the consequences of the neglect or 
 carelessness of the plaintiff." See also Radley v. 
 London and North-Western Railway Company (h), 
 where the House of Lords very clearly laid down the 
 law on the subject. 
 
 Identification. — It remains to add a few words on Tiwrogood v. 
 what is known as the "doctrine of identification." aXtrine of 
 In Tiwrogood v. Bryan (c) the doctrine of contributory identification, 
 negligence was pushed so far that it was laid down 
 that, in the case of a collision between two omnibuses, 
 whereby a passenger in one omnibus is injured, the 
 negligence of the driver of the omnibus in which he is 
 riding may be set up by way of defence to an action 
 by the passenger against the owner of the other 
 omnibus ; or, in other words, that, as regards contribu- 
 tory negligence, the • passenger must be considered as 
 " identified " with the driver of the omnibus in which 
 he voluntarily became a passenger. The judgments in 
 the case, as interpreted by Lord Esher, M.E., in The 
 Bernina (d), " all amount to saying that, by what the 
 plaintiff did, he made the driver his agent, so as to 
 be liable for his acts, as if he, the plaintiff, had him- 
 self done those acts." In the later case of Waite v. 
 North -Easter n Railway Company (e) it was held that 
 
 (b) 1 App. Cas. 754. See also Ooyle v. Great Northern Railway 
 Com [a i. ay of Ireland, 20 L. R. (Ir. ), 409; and Delaney v. Dublin 
 United Tramways Company, 30 L. R. (Ir. ), 725, where the majority of 
 the Court of Appeal reversing the Ex. Div., gave judgment for the 
 defendants. . There a drunken passenger attempted to force his way on 
 to a tramcar, and had both feet on the step. Being gently pushed off 
 by the conductor, whilst the car was in motion, he sustained injuries. 
 The case cannot, it is submitted, be considered quite satisfactory. 
 Ought not the conductor, as the man was on the. car, to have stopped 
 the car before removing him ? Perhaps it may best be defended on the 
 ground that by reason of the plaintiffs conduct he was put into such 
 an embarrassing position that he could not at the moment use his 
 faculties calmly and clearly, a contention which, conversely, a plaintiff 
 may sometimes raise with reference to the defendant's conduct, when 
 contributory negligence is set up against the plaintiff : See North- 
 Eastern Railway Company v. Wanless, L. R. 7 H. of L. 12, ante, p. 122. 
 
 (c) 8 C. B. 115. 
 
 Id) 12 P. D. 58, at p. 68 ; affirmed in H. of L. sub nam. Mills v. 
 Armstrong, 13 App. Cas. 1. 
 
 (c) E. B. & E. 719. 
 
126 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 The Bernina 
 overruling 
 Thorogood v. 
 Bryan. 
 
 a child of five years, with regard to contributory negli- 
 gence, was identified with its grandmother who accom- 
 panied it, though it could not be said that there was 
 any selection of its companion, or an act of volition on 
 the part of the child. That case, however, was not 
 decided on the doctrine of Thorogood v. Bryan, but 
 rather on the ground that "when a child of such 
 tender and imbecile age is brought to a railway station, 
 or to any conveyance, for the purpose of being carried, 
 and is wholly unable to take care of itself, the contract 
 of conveyance is on the implied condition that the 
 child is to be conveyed subject to due and proper care 
 on the part of the person having it in charge." Lord 
 Bramwell, however (/), held the decision in Waite's 
 case to be wrong, and could not distinguish it from 
 Thorogood v. Bryan. Thorogood v. Bryan was followed 
 in Armstrong v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway 
 Company {g), but it was at last overruled in the case 
 of The Bernina (h), which decided that where A. is 
 injured by the combined negligence of B. and C, he 
 may sue both of them or one of them ; and that if he 
 sues one of them, the contributory negligence of the 
 other will be no defence, unless A. stands in the 
 relation of principal or master to that other. In that 
 case a collision occurred between the steamers Bernina 
 and Bush-ire, both vessels being in fault. An engineer 
 and a passenger on board the Bushire were, owing to 
 the collision, drowned. The engineer had nothing to 
 do with the navigation of the vessel. The repre- 
 sentatives of the drowned persons brought actions, 
 under Lord Campbell's Act (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93), against 
 the owners of the Bernina, and it was held by the 
 Court of Appeal that the deceased persons were not to 
 be deemed "identified" with those in charge of the 
 Bushire, these latter being neither their servants nor 
 agents, and that, consequently, the negligence of those 
 
 (/) 13 App. Cas. pp. 15, 16. 
 
 (g) L. R. 10 Ex. 47 ; see also Child v. Beam, L. R. 9 Ex. 176. 
 
 (A.) Ubi supra. 
 
the law. 
 
 NEGLIGENCE. 127 
 
 in charge of the Bushire was no defence to an action chap, vi. 
 brought by the representatives of the deceased persons 
 against the owners of the Bernina(i). 
 
 The law, therefore, stands in this way : — (1) A., with- Summary of 
 out fault of his own, is injured by the negligence of B. 
 — then B. is liable to A. (2) A., by his own fault, is 
 injured by B., without fault on his part — then B. is not 
 liable to A. (3) A. is injured by B., by the fault more 
 or less of both combined — then the following further 
 distinctions have to be made : (a) if, notwithstanding 
 B.'s negligence, A., with reasonable care, could have 
 avoided the injury, he cannot sue B. ; (b) if, notwith- 
 standing A.'s negligence, B., with reasonable care, could 
 have avoided injuring A., A. can sue B. ; (c) if there 
 has been as much want of reasonable care on A.'s part 
 as on B.'s, or, in other words, if the'proximate cause of 
 the injury is the want of reasonable care on both sides, 
 A. cannot sue B., for here the injury has been caused 
 by A.'s own carelessness and B.'s negligence, and the 
 two combined give no cause of action. Now, substitute 
 in the foregoing cases B. and C. for B., and, unless C. is 
 A.'s agent or servant, there will be no difference in the 
 result, except that A. will have two persons, instead of 
 one, liable to him. Seethe judgment of Lindley, L.J., 
 in The Bernina (k). 
 
 Liability of Bodies created by Statute. (I) — "It is 
 now thoroughly well established that no action will lie 
 for doing that which the Legislature has authorised, if 
 it be done without negligence, although it does occasion 
 damage to anyone ; but an action does lie for doing 
 that which the Legislature has authorised, if it be done 
 negligently" (m). In other words, a distinction must 
 be drawn " between damage from works authorised by 
 
 (£) It was also held that actions under Lord Campbell's Act are not 
 Admiralty actions, and are not affected by the Judicature Act, 1873, 
 s. 25, and therefore that the Admiralty rule as to half damages does not 
 apply to them. 
 
 (k) Ubi supra. 
 
 (T) See Nuisances in the exercise of Statutory Powers, ante, p. 87. 
 
 (m) Geddis v. Proprietors of Bann Reservoir, 3 App. Cas. 430, 455. 
 
128 OUTLINES OP TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 statutes, where the party generally is to have compen- 
 sation (i.i'., such as may be allowed by the statutes), 
 and the authority is a bar to an action, and damage by 
 reason of the works being negligently done, as to which 
 the o wner ' s remedy by way of action remains ' ' (71) . "In 
 every case the liability of a body created by statute 
 must be determined upon a true interpretation of the 
 statutes under which it is created. The proper rule of 
 construction of such statutes is, that, in the absence of 
 something to shew a contrary intention, the Legislature 
 intended that the body, the creature of the statute, shall 
 have the same duties, and that its funds shall be 
 rendered subject to the same liabilities as the general 
 law would impose on a private person doing the same 
 things " (0). Commissioners and other public trustees, 
 though they have no pecuniary interest in the trust 
 which they administer, cannot therefore escape liability 
 when they are negligent in the active execution of their 
 powers. But in the case of mere non-feasance no claim 
 for reparation will lie, except at the instance of a person 
 who can shew that the statute or ordinance under which 
 they act imposed upon them a duty towards himself 
 which they negligently failed to perform (p), or that 
 they are under contract with him for remuneration (q). 
 
 (n) Brine v. Great Western Railway Company, 2 B. & S. 402. 
 
 (o) Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L. R. 1 H. of L. 93, at pp. 104, 
 109. 
 
 (pi) Sanitary Commissioners of Gibraltar v. Orfila, 15 App. Cas. 
 400, 411. 
 
 (q) Brabant v. King (1895), App. Cas. 632. 
 
( 129 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 FRAUD AND DECEIT. 
 
 Fraud and Deceit. — Fraud, accompanied by 
 damage, may be the ground of an action. "Fraud 
 without damage, or damage without fraud, gives no 
 cause of action ; but where these two occur, an action 
 lies ' ' (a) . Much confusion has been caused in con- 
 nection with this subject by reason of the use of the 
 words " legal fraud " and " moral fraud." However, 
 it may now be said that no distinction can be drawn 
 between legal and moral fraud ; or, in other words, 
 that, where actionable fraud is alleged against a 
 person, there must, to enable a person to succeed 
 in an action against him, be actual fraud (b). 
 Possibly the judges who first spoke of fraud in law, 
 or legal fraud, did not mean to exclude the existence 
 of fraud in fact, but only of an intention to defraud 
 or injure, which intention, as we shall see, is not 
 necessary for an action of fraud or deceit (c). But in 
 more modern times such actions have been held 
 maintainable, erroneously as Derry v. Peek explains, 
 although the statements complained of were not 
 shewn to be made fraudulently otherwise than by 
 shewing that they were made " without any reason- 
 able ground for believing" them (d). The foundation 
 of this erroneous view seems to have been a passage 
 in the judgment of Lord Chelmsford in Western Bank 
 
 (a) Per Croke, J., 3 Buls. 95 ; Smith v. Chadwiclc, 9 App. Cas. 187, 
 at p. 197. 
 
 (b) See Weir v. Bell, 3 Ex. D. 238 ; Derry v. Peck, 14 App. Cas. 337, 
 at p. 372. 
 
 (c) See Derry v. Peel-, supra, pp. 372, 374. 
 
 (d) See e.g., Edgington v. Fitzmauricc, 29 Ch. D. 459, 481 (1885), 
 ami Peek v. Derry, in Court of Appeal, 37 Ch. D. 541, pp. 568, 582 
 (1887). 
 
 E.T. K 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
130 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP.JVH. of Scotland v. Addie(e), where he says: "If an 
 untrue statement is made, founded upon a belief 
 which is destitute of all reasonable grounds, or which 
 the least enquiry would immediately correct, I do not 
 see that it is not fairly and correctly characterised as 
 misrepresentation and deceit." This view of the law 
 was at once dissented from by< Lord Cranworth 
 (p. 168), and finally by the House of Lords in Derry 
 v. Peek(f), where Lord Herschell says: "I think 
 there is here some confusion between that which is 
 evidence of fraud and that which constitutes it. A 
 consideration of the grounds of belief is, no doubt, an 
 important aid in ascertaining whether the belief was 
 really entertained. A man's mere assertion that he 
 believed the statement he made to be true, is not 
 accepted as conclusive proof that he did so. There 
 may be such an absence of reasonable ground for his 
 belief as, in spite of his assertion, to carry conviction 
 to the mind that he had not really the belief which 
 he alleges. If the learned lord intended to go further, 
 as apparently he did, and to say that, though the 
 belief was really entertained, yet if there were no 
 reasonable grounds for it, the person making the 
 statement was guilty of fraud in the same way as if he 
 had known what he stated to be false, I say, with all 
 respect, that the previous authorities afford no warrant 
 for the view that an action of deceit would lie under 
 such circumstances." 
 
 Rescission of Contract. — Before dealing further with 
 the action of deceit or fraud, there are two classes of 
 actions which may be mentioned for the purpose of 
 excluding them from consideration for the present. 
 The first of these are actions where rescission of a con- 
 tract is claimed. In such an action it is not necessary 
 to prove fraud. Misrepresentation will be sufficient ; 
 and if the plaintiff can prove misrepresentation 
 
 (e) L. R. 1 H. of L. Sc. 145, 162. 
 (/) Supra ; see pp. 368, 369, 374. 
 
FRAUD AND DECEIT. 131 
 
 inducing the contract, he will be entitled to a rescis- chap, vii. 
 sion, provided restitutio in inter/ram on his part has 
 not become impossible (g). It is beyond the scope of 
 this treatise to deal further with this class of actions. 
 
 Actions for Statements made by Persons best qualified 
 to give Information. — The second class of actions which 
 may be mentioned for the purpose of being put aside 
 for the moment are actions brought against persons 
 within whose special province it lies to know a par- 
 ticular fact, and who have given an erroneous answer 
 to an enquiry made with regard to it by a person 
 desirous of ascertaining the fact for the purpose of 
 determining his course accordingly (7i). Whether, 
 since the decision of the House of Lords in Derry v. 
 Peek, such actions are now maintainable without 
 actual fraud, and, if so, upon what grounds, will be a 
 matter for consideration at a subsequent page (?')• 
 
 Fraud and Deceit continued. — It is hardly neces- 
 sary to say that an action of fraud or deceit is a 
 common law action, and must be decided on the same 
 principles, whether it be brought in the Chancery 
 Division or in the Queen's Bench Division, there 
 being no such thing as an equitable action of fraud or 
 deceit (k) . For the better understanding of the 
 action, a few of the early authorities may be usefully 
 referred to. 
 
 In Foster v. Charles (I) it was contended that the 
 defendant was not liable, even though the representa- 
 tion he made was false to his knowledge, because he 
 had no intention of defrauding or injuring the 
 plaintiff. But the Court held otherwise, Tindal, C.J., 
 saying: "It is fraud in law if a party makes 
 
 {g) See Adam v. Jfewbigging, 13 App. Cas. 30S ; Derry v. Peek, 
 14 App. Cas. 337, 359. See also Lynde v. Anglo-Italian Hemp- 
 Spinning Company (1896), 1 Ch. 178. 
 
 (A) See e.g., Burrowes v. Lock, 10 Ves. 470 ; Slim v. Croucher, 1 
 De G. F. & J. 518. 
 
 (i) See post, p. 146. 
 
 (k) Derry v. Peek, ubi supra, at p. 360. 
 
 (I) 7 Bing. 105. 
 
 K 2 
 
132 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 representations which he knows to be false and injury 
 ensues, although the motives from which the repre- 
 sentations proceeded may not have been bad." The 
 expression "fraud in law" in this passage does not 
 mean that there was no fraud in fact, but is manifestly 
 used in relation to the argument that the defendant 
 was not actuated by a desire to defraud or injure the 
 person to whom the representations were made (■;«)- 
 So, too, in a later case («) " fraud in law " was said to 
 consist " in knowingly asserting that which is false to 
 the injury of another." 
 
 Of the doctrine laid down in Foster v. Charles (o), a 
 well-known illustration may be given. A bill of 
 exchange, drawn upon A. B., is presented for accept- 
 ance at the office of the drawee in his absence. C. D., 
 who occupies the same office as the drawee, being told 
 by the payee that the bill is all right, and that it will 
 be protested if not accepted, and that thereby expense 
 will be caused, and believing that the acceptance will 
 be sanctioned by the drawee, accepts the bill per 
 procuration of the drawee. The payee then indorses 
 the bill away. The drawee will not be liable upon it, 
 for he never authorised the acceptance, but C. D. will 
 be liable to the indorsees, having, by the unauthorised 
 acceptance of the bill per procuration of the drawee, 
 made a representation which he knew to be untrue, 
 and which was intended by him, or was calculated, to 
 induce another to act on the faith of it in such a way 
 that he might incur damage, and that damage has 
 been incurred {p). In that case, according to the 
 finding of the jury, there was no fraud in the sense of 
 a corrupt or improper motive on the part of the 
 defendant who had accepted the bill ; but the Court, 
 agreed with the contention raised on behalf of the 
 plaintiff that in order to maintain this species of 
 
 (m) See Derry v. Peek, ubi supra, at p. 36o. 
 (it) Crawsliay v. Thompson, i M. & G. 357. 
 (o) Supra, 
 (p) Polhill v. Walter, 3 B. & Ad. 114. 
 
FRAUD AND DECEIT. 133 
 
 action it is not necessary to prove that the false chap, vii. 
 representation was made from a corrupt motive of 
 gain to the defendant or a wicked motive of injury to 
 the plaintiff ; and that it is enough if a representation 
 is made which the party making it knows to be 
 untrue, and which is intended by him, or which from 
 the mode in which it is made is calculated, to induce 
 another to act on the faith of it in such a way that he 
 may incur damage, and that damage is actually 
 incurred (</). In a subsequent case Maule, J., puts 
 the point pithily: "If a wrong be done by a false 
 representation of a party who knows such representa- 
 tion to be false, the law will infer an intention to 
 injure. That is the effect of Polhill v. Walter " (r). 
 
 Denton v. Great Northern Railway Company (s) is 
 another useful case. There the defendants advertised 
 in a monthly time-table that a train would leave Peter- 
 borough at 7 p.m. for the conveyance of passengers to 
 Hull. The latter part of the journey would have to be 
 accomplished over the line of the North -Eastern Kail- 
 way Company. That company had, however, ceased 
 to run the train to Hull which would convey thither 
 passengers leaving Peterborough at 7 p.m., and had 
 given notice thereof to the defendants, who, nevertheless, 
 made no alteration in their time-table. The plaintiff, 
 relying on the time-table, proceeded to Peterborough 
 in order to take a ticket at 7 p.m., but found that there 
 was no train to convey him to Hull. He incurred 
 expense, and the defendants were held liable, as they 
 had knowingly made an untrue statement upon which 
 the plaintiff was induced to act. 
 
 But a person may be liable to an action for deceit Untrue state- 
 though he did not know the facts stated by him to be J^nts, not 
 
 u6llGV6Ci tO 06 
 
 untrue. It will be sufficient if he has stated facts true, made for 
 
 a fraudulent 
 
 (q) See also Derri/ v. Peck, ubi supra, at p. 366. purpose. 
 
 (r) Crairshay v. Thompson, 4 M. k G. 857 ; see also Peekv. Ourncy, 
 
 L. li. 6 H. of L. 377, especially the dictum of Lord Cairns at p. 409, 
 
 explained in Dcrryy. Peek, 14 App. Cas. at p. 371. 
 (s) 5 E. & B. 860. 
 
134 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 Dicta of Lord 
 Cairns. 
 
 chap, vii. which were untrue for a fraudulent purpose, he at the 
 same time not belierinr/ those facts to be true (t). " If 
 a man, having no knowledge whatever on the subject, 
 takes upon himself to represent a certain state of facts 
 to exist, he does so at his peril ; and if it be done either 
 with a view to secure some benefit to himself or to 
 deceive a third person, he is in law guilty of a fraud, 
 for he takes upon himself to warrant his own belief of 
 the truth of that which he so asserts " (u). The foun- 
 dation of the above proposition is that a person who 
 makes a statement which he intends another to act on 
 must be taken to warrant his belief in its truth. He 
 knows that the person to whom the statement is made 
 will understand, if not that he who makes it knons, yet 
 at least that he believes, it to be true. And if he has 
 no such belief he is as much guilty of fraud as if he 
 made any other representation which he knew to be 
 false, or did not believe to be true (a;). Much to the 
 same effect is the well-known dictum of Lord Cairns (y) : 
 " If persons take upon themselves to make assertions 
 as to which they are ignorant whether they are true or 
 untrue, they must, in a civil point of view, be held as 
 responsible as if they had asserted that which they 
 knew to be untrue." The case in which this dictum 
 is to be found is one dealing with the rescission of a 
 contract ; but the dictum is equally applicable to an 
 action of deceit if it be interpreted to mean, as it must 
 mean, that the persons referred to were conscious 
 when making the assertions that they \^ere ignorant 
 whether they were true or untrue (z). 
 
 Peek v. Gurney (a) contains some other observations 
 of the same learned lord on this subject which require a 
 word of explanation. That was an action against direc- 
 tors of a company by a person who alleged that he had 
 
 (0 Taylor v. Ashton, 11 M. & W. 401. 
 (m) Evans v. Edmunds, 13 C. B. 777, per Maule, J. 
 (x) See JJerry v. Peck, 14 App. Cas. at p. 368. 
 
 (y) Reese River Silver Milling Company v. Smith, L. E. 4 H. of L. 
 64, at p. 79. 
 
 (;) See Derry v. Peck, 14 App. Cas. at p. 371. 
 (a) L. K. 6 H. of L. 377, at p. 409. 
 
FRAUD AND DECEIT. 
 
 135 
 
 been deceived and misled by untrue representations 
 contained in the prospectus of the company. His lord- 
 ship, after alluding to the fact that the defendants had 
 been acquitted of fraud on a criminal charge, said : 
 " But in a civil proceeding of this kind all that your 
 lordships have to examine is the question, was there, 
 or was there not, misrepresentation in point of fact '? 
 If there was, however innocent the motives may have 
 been, your lordships will be obliged to arrive at the 
 consequences which properly would result from what 
 was done." In this case it was clear that if there had 
 been a false statement of fact it had been knowingly 
 made. Lord Cairns did not mean that in an action of 
 deceit the only question to be considered was whether 
 or not there was misrepresentation in point of fact. 
 What he meant was, that in such a case motive was 
 immaterial : that it mattered not that there was no 
 design to mislead or defraud the public if a false repre- 
 sentation were knowingly made, and this was simply 
 affirming the law laid down in Foster v. Charles (b) , 
 and Polhill v. Walter (e) , and other cases (d) . 
 
 Plaintiff' must shew that he acted on the false 
 representation and was thereby damnified. — The 
 
 plaintiff in an action of deceit must not only shew that 
 the defendant made an untrue statement or representa- 
 tion knowingly, or not believing in its truth, but also 
 that the statement or representation was acted on by 
 the plaintiff and caused damage : for, as has been 
 sh^wn, fraud without damage gives no cause of action. 
 If a person has not acted upon the representations 
 made to him, he has not sustained damage by reason 
 of them. That he has sustained damage by so acting- 
 is a fact which must be proved by the plaintiff. It is 
 not an inference of law in any case that a person has 
 acted upon a representation made to him, though there 
 may be cases in which it would be a fair inference of 
 
 (b) 7 Bing. 105 ; ante, p. 131. 
 
 (c) 3 B & Ad. 114 ; ante, p. 132. 
 
 (d) Per Lord Herschell, in Derry v. Peelt, 14 App. Cas. at p. 371. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Representa- 
 tion must be 
 untrue in fact, 
 and must be 
 acted on by 
 the plaintiff 
 to his damage. 
 
136 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Misrepresen- 
 tation must be 
 material. 
 
 Where repre- 
 sentation am- 
 biguous. 
 
 Opportunity 
 of investiga- 
 tion by person 
 to whom 
 representation 
 made. 
 
 fact that he has done so — if, for example, it is proved 
 that a representation has been made to him with a view 
 to induce him to enter into a contract, and the represen- 
 tation is of such a nature as to induce a person to enter 
 into such a contract, and he has entered into it (e). 
 
 If a representation have been made of so unimportant 
 a character that it cannot have produced any effect, an 
 action for deceit will not lie ; the representation must 
 be an inducing cause to a plaintiff's conduct, and for 
 that purpose it must be material, and have produced 
 an effect on his mind. If the representation be equally 
 capable of two meanings, it will be incumbent on a 
 plaintiff to shew that he interpreted it in the sense 
 which was false, and that he was thereby misled (/). 
 
 It has been held that the mere, fact that a party 
 has the opportunity of investigating and ascertaining 
 whether a representation is true or false is not sufficient 
 to deprive him of his right to rely on a false represen- 
 tation as a defence to an action for specific performance, 
 and that to take away his title to be relieved from a 
 contract on the ground that the representation was un- 
 true, it must be shewn either that he had knowledge of 
 facts contrary to the representation, or that he stated 
 in terms, or shewed clearly by his conduct, that he did 
 not rely upon the representation (g) . So, too, in 
 Central Railway Company of Venezuela v. Kisch (h) it 
 was laid down that, where there has been any fraudu- 
 lent misrepresentation or wilful concealment by which 
 a person has been induced to enter into a contract, it 
 is no answer to his claim to be relieved from it to tell 
 him that he might have known the truth by proper 
 inquiry. These are decisions in equity, but the same 
 doctrine would apply where a common law action of 
 deceit is brought (i). 
 
 (e) See Smith v. Chadwick, 20 Ch. D. 
 v. Smith, 41 Ch. D. 348, 369. 
 
 (/) Smithy. Chadwick, ubi supra, 
 (g) Kcdgrave v. Surd, 20 Ch. D. 1. 
 (A) L. R. 2. H. of L. 99. 
 (i) Dobcll v. Steverus, 3 B. & C. 623. 
 
 9 App. Cas. 187 ; Amison 
 
FRAUD AND DECEIT. 137 
 
 " Although means of knowledge are, as was pointed chap, vii. 
 out by Lord Blackburn in Brow/die v. Caiitphell (k) a Opportunity 
 very different thing from knowledge, yet (says Lord SytS'on 
 Herschell) , if I thought that a person making a false making repre- 
 statement had shut his eyes to the facts, or purposely Sfmtation - 
 abstained from enquiring into them, I should hold 
 that honest belief was absent, and that he was just as 
 fraudulent as if he had knowingly stated that which 
 was false " (I). 
 
 Vliere a Person discovers his Representation to where person 
 be Untrue. — If a statement or representation has making the 
 been made in the bond-fide belief that it is true, and akc'^rf tlrat 
 the party who has made it afterwards comes to find it is not true. 
 out that it is untrue, and discovers what he should 
 have said, he ought, as a matter of honesty, to disclose 
 his fresh information to a person to whom he has 
 made, and who is acting upon, his statement or repre- 
 sentation. His failure to do so would, at least in the 
 case where another is, on the faith of the statement 
 or representation, about to enter into a contract with 
 him, amount to a fraud (m). There was no doubt 
 that this was a well-established rule in equity, and, 
 if it was not so at common law, yet, as s. 25 (11) of 
 the Judicature Act, 1873, makes the rules of equity 
 prevail where there is any variance between them and 
 the rules of common law with reference to the same 
 matter, it would seem that the rule in equity would 
 apply to the common law action of deceit (it). 
 
 Correction of Misrepresentation by a Subsequent 
 Statement. — If A. knowingly makes an untrue state- 
 ment, and B. acts on it, then if A. wishes to correct 
 it, he should inform B. in clear terms that there was 
 a misrepresentation, and offer to refund any money 
 which B. paid in reliance on it. This, possibly, may 
 
 (k) 5 App. Cas. at p. 652. 
 
 (Z) See Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. at p. 376. 
 
 (m) See Reyncll v. Sprye, 1 D. M. & G. 656, 708 ; Brownlie v. 
 Campbell, 5 App. Cas. 925, 950. 
 
 («) See Redgrave v. Hurd, 20 Ch. D. 1 ; but cf. Arkwright v. A'ew- 
 bold, 17 Ch. D. 301, and Joliffe v. Baker, 11 Q. B. D. 255. 
 
138 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vii. (J away with the effect of the mispresentation. But 
 the correction must be explicit (o). Thus, directors -of 
 a company falsely stated in the prospectus inviting 
 applications for debenture stock that £200,000 share 
 capital -had been "subscribed," whereas, in fact, it 
 had only been allotted in fully paid up shares to the 
 contractors. After the allotment of the debenture 
 stock the directors sent to the allottees a circular 
 stating, among other matters, the real facts about the 
 share capital, but not stating that there had been a 
 misrepresentation, or informing the allottees that they 
 could get back their money. The company proved a 
 complete failure, and allottees, who had applied for 
 the debenture stock relying on the prospectus (including 
 those who paid instalments falling due after the issue 
 of the circular), were held to have a good cause of 
 action against the directors (o). 
 
 Concealment 
 of material 
 facts. 
 
 Representa- 
 tion need not 
 "be made to the 
 plaintiff him- . 
 self. 
 
 Concealment of Material Facts. — The mere non- 
 disclosure of material facts may be a good ground for 
 setting aside a contract. But that was not sufficient 
 for the common law action of deceit. For an action 
 in the nature of an action for misrepresentation, says 
 Lord Cairns, " there must, in my opinion, be some 
 active misstatement of fact, or, at all events, such a 
 partial and fragmentary statement of fact as that the 
 withholding of that which is not stated makes that 
 which is stated absolutely false " {p). And, notwith- 
 standing s. 25, sub-s. 11, of the Judicature Act, 1873, 
 this has been held to be still the law (q). 
 
 To whom Representation made. — To enable a 
 plaintiff to succeed in an action of deceit it is not 
 necessary that the representation complained of, and 
 on which he has acted to his damage, should have 
 been made expressly to himself. It will be sufficient 
 
 (o) Ami son v. Smith, 41 Ch. D. 348. 
 lp) Peek v. Gurncy, L. K. 6 H. of L. 377, at p. 403. 
 (?) Arkwright v. AewboM, 17 Ch. D. 301, 318, 320 ; cf., however, 
 Brownlie v. Campbell, 5 App, Cas. at p. 950. 
 
FRAUD AND DECEIT. J 39. 
 
 if he is one of a ehtsx who are intended to act on it, chap. vii. 
 or if it is intended that any one to whom it comes 
 should act on it. Denton v. Great Northern liaihrai/ 
 Company (>•), already referred to, is an authority 
 for this. 
 
 So, too, is Scott v. Dixon (s), referred to with 
 approval in Peek v. Gumey (t). There an action was 
 brought against a director of a banking company for 
 falsely, fraudulently, and deceitfully publishing and 
 representing to the plaintiffs that a dividend was 
 about to be paid out of the profits which were 
 sufficient for payment of the dividend, and that the 
 shares were a safe investment for money. The plain- 
 tiffs bought their shares upon the faith of a report 
 made by the directors to the shareholders, which 
 contained the false representations. Copies of this 
 report were left at the bank, and were to be had 
 by sharebrokers or any persons applying for them 
 who were desirous of information with regard to the 
 affairs of the bank with a view to the purchase of 
 shares. The plaintiffs purchased at the bank, through 
 their broker, a copy of the report. The Court of 
 Queen's Bench held that, there being positive evidence 
 that the report was to be bought by any person who 
 thought of becoming a purchaser of shares, and that it 
 came into the hands of the plaintiffs in this manner, 
 and that by the perusal of it they were induced to buy 
 shares in the bank, there was a publication to the 
 plaintiffs in the sense of the declaration. "I do not 
 doubt," says Lord Chelmsford, " the propriety of this 
 decision. The report, though originally made to the 
 shareholders, was intended for the information of all 
 persons who were disposed to deal in shares ; and the 
 representation must be regarded as having been 
 made, not indirectly, but directly to each person who 
 
 (r) 5 E. & B. 860, ante, p. 133. See also Langridqe v. Levy, 
 211. & \V. 419 ; 4 Jl. & W. 337, ante, p. 108. 
 (s) 29 L. J. Ex. at p. 62, n. 
 (t) L. R. 6 H. of L. 377, ante, p. 134. 
 
140 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap. vii. obtained the report from the bank, where it was 
 publicly announced it was to be bought, in the same 
 manner as if it had been personally delivered to him 
 by the director." 
 
 Again, in Polhill v. Walter (u) it was held that the 
 defendant, by his unauthorised acceptance of the bill 
 of exchange on behalf of the drawee, must be taken 
 to have intended that all persons should give credit to 
 the acceptance, and thereby act upon the faith of his 
 representation, because that, in the ordinary course of 
 business, was its natural and necessary result. 
 
 How far lia- 
 bility for a 
 fraudulent 
 prospectus 
 extends. 
 
 If the promoters of a company issue a prospectus 
 containing misrepresentations of material facts, per- 
 sons who are induced to become allottees of the 
 shares of the company upon the faith of such mis- 
 representations may hold the promoters liable for the 
 damages which they have sustained by taking the 
 shares. But, as a rule, liability for misrepresenta- 
 tions in the prospectus would ■ exist only towards the 
 original allottees of the shares who have relied on it, 
 and subsequent purchasers of shares in the market 
 cannot fasten upon the promoters responsibility for 
 such misrepresentations (x). Lord Cairns, in the 
 course of his judgment in this case, refers with 
 approval to Barry v. Croskey {y) , where the following 
 concise statement occurs : First, " Every man must 
 be held responsible for the consequences of a false 
 representation made by him to another, upon which 
 that other acts, and, so acting, is injured or damnified ; 
 secondly, every man must be held responsible for the 
 consequences of a false representation made by him 
 to another, upon which a third person acts, and, so 
 acting, is injured or damnified, provided it appear 
 that such false representation was made with the 
 intent that it should be acted on by such third person 
 
 (m) 3 B. & Ad. 114 ; ante, p. 132. 
 
 (x) Peek v. Chmwy, h. R. 6 H. of L. 377. 
 
 (y) 2 J. & H. 1, at p. 22. 
 
FRAUD AND DECEIT. 141 
 
 in the manner that occasions the injury or loss." chap, vii. 
 And, thirdly, he continues : " But, to bring it within 
 the principle, the injury, I apprehend, must be the 
 immediate and not the remote consequence of the 
 representation thus made. To render a man respon- 
 sible for the consequences of a false representation 
 made by him to another, upon which a third person 
 acts, and, so acting, is injured or damnified, it must 
 appear that such false representation was made with 
 the direct intent that it should be acted upon by such 
 third person in the manner that occasions the injury 
 or loss." Generally, therefore, a purchaser of shares 
 in the market, having nothing to connect him with 
 the misrepresentations made in a prospectus which is 
 issued for the purpose of inviting persons to become 
 allottees of shares, cannot recover damages against 
 those who have issued the prospectus. He may, 
 indeed, in one case succeed, and that is where he can 
 shew some direct connection between himself and 
 those who have issued the prospectus („~) , or if they 
 have done something to induce him to believe the 
 fraudulent misrepresentations in the prospectus, and 
 thereupon purchase shares in the market. Thus, 
 A. and B. issued a prospectus of a company containing 
 fraudulent misrepresentations, and subsequently, after 
 the allotment (which was not successful), caused to be 
 published a statement which they knew to be false, 
 with a view to induce those who had seen the pro- 
 spectus to buy shares in the market; C. having read 
 the published statement, and believing that it con- 
 firmed what was stated in the prospectus (which he 
 had received), purchased some of the shares, which 
 were worthless; held, that he had a good cause of 
 action against A. and B. (a). 
 
 Summary. — What is requisite for an action of deceit 
 having been set forth in the preceding pages, it may 
 
 (z) See Barry v. Croskey, 2 J. & H. 1. 
 
 (a) Amlrewsv. Mockford (1896), 1 Q. B. 372. 
 
142 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Statement by 
 Bowen, L.J. 
 
 be useful, at this stage, to give the late Lord Justice 
 Bowen's brief summary of the law on the subject (b) : — 
 
 " This is an action for deceit, in which the plaintiff 
 complains that he was induced to take certain deben- 
 tures by the misrepresentations of the defendants, and 
 that he sustained damage thereby. The loss which 
 the plaintiff sustained is not disputed. In order to 
 sustain his action, he must first prove that there was a 
 statement as to facts which was false, and, secondly, 
 that it was false to the knowledge of the defendants, 
 or that they made it not caring whether it was true 
 or false. For it is immaterial whether they made the 
 statement knowing it to be untrue, or recklessly with- 
 out caring whether it was true or not, because to make 
 a statement recklessly for the purpose of influencing 
 another person is dishonest. It is also clear that it 
 is wholly immaterial with what object the lie is told. 
 That is laid down in Lord Blackburn's judgment in 
 Smith v. Chadirick (c), but it is material that the 
 defendant should intend that it should be relied on by 
 the person to whom he makes it (d) . But, lastly, when 
 you have proved that the statement was false, you 
 must further shew that the plaintiff has acted upon 
 it, and has sustained damage by so doing. You must 
 shew that the statement was either the sole cause of 
 the plaintiff's act, or materially contributed to his so 
 acting. So the law is laid down in Clarke v. Dickson (e), 
 and that is the law which we have now to apply." 
 
 The dictum of Lord Chelmsford to which reference 
 has already been made (/) seems to have induced 
 certain judges to hold, before the judgment of the 
 
 (b) See Edgington v. Fitzmauricc, 29 Ch. D. 459, 481 ; see also 
 Arnisonv. Smith, 41 Ch. D. 348. 
 
 (c) 9 App. Cas. 201. 
 
 (d) See as to this, Polhill v. Walter, 3 B. & Ad. 114 ; Derry v. Peek, 
 14 App. Cas. at p. 366 ; ante, p. 132. 
 
 (a) 6 C. B. N. S. 453. 
 
 (/) See Western Bank of Scotland v. Addie, L. E. 1 H. of L. Sc. 
 45, 162 ; ante, p. 130. 
 
FRAUD AND DECEIT. 143 
 
 House of Lords in Berry v. Peek (g), that in an action chap, vii. 
 of deceit it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to 
 prove actual fraud, if he shewed that the defendant 
 had " no reasonable grounds for believing " to be true 
 the statement made by him and acted on by the 
 plaintiff to his damage Qi). Cotton, L.J., in Peek v. 
 Derry (i) laid down that there is a duty cast on 
 directors of companies and other persons who make 
 statements to be acted on by third persons to take 
 care that the statements are not false, and that they 
 have " reasonable grounds " for believing those state- 
 ments to be true, and that if a man makes a false 
 statement to induce others to act on it, without reason- 
 able grounds to suppose it to be true, and without 
 taking care to ascertain whether it is true, he is liable 
 civilly as much as a person who commits what is 
 usually called fraud, and tells an untruth knowing it 
 to be an untruth. This view was, as has been shewn, 
 held to be wrong by the House of Lords in Derry v. 
 Peek. In the course of a long speech Lord Herschell Lok1 Her- 
 summarises the law as follows : " First, in order to mary of an 
 sustain an action of deceit there must be fraud, and action of 
 nothing short of that will suffice. Secondly, fraud is 
 proved when it is shewn that a false representation 
 has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in 
 its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true 
 or false. Although I have treated the second and 
 third as distinct cases, I think the third is but an 
 instance of the second : for one who makes a state- 
 ment under such circumstances can have no real 
 belief in the truth of what he states. To prevent a 
 false statement being fraudulent, there must, I think, 
 always be an honest belief in its truth. And this 
 probably covers the whole ground, for one who know- 
 ingly alleges that which is false has obviously no such 
 
 (g) 14 App. Gas. 337. 
 
 (A) See Weir v. Bell, 3 Ex. D. 238, per Cotton, L.J. ; Smith v. 
 Chadwuk, 20 Ch. D. 27, 44 ; Peek v. Derry (in C. of App.), 37 Ch. D. 
 541. 
 
 (i) Tfbiswpra. 
 
144 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vii. honest belief. Thirdly, if fraud be proved, the motive 
 of the person guilty of it is immaterial. It matters 
 not that there was no intention to cheat or injure the 
 person to whom the statement was made " (k). 
 
 Cases subse- The case of Dern/ v. Peek in the House of Lords has 
 
 T e pcek Der71J been founcl to De on e of great importance. Besides 
 shewing that for an action of deceit there must be 
 fraud, that is, a wilful lie, or " wicked indifference," it 
 also shews ..that (in the absence of contract) an action 
 will not lie for mere negligent misrepresentation (I) . 
 The decision may be traced in many recent cases. For 
 example : Mortgagees of a builder's interest in a 
 building agreement made advances to him on the faith 
 of certificates of a surveyor that certain specified stages 
 in the progress of the buildings had been reached. The 
 surveyor was not appointed by the mortgagees, nor 
 was there any contractual relation between him and 
 them. Owing to the surveyor's negligence the certifi- 
 cates contained untrue statements as to the progress of 
 the buildings, but there was no fraud on his part. The 
 mortgagees, who had made advances beyond the value 
 of the work done, sought to make the surveyor liable 
 for their loss, on the ground that he knew, or ought to 
 have known, that the certificates might be used for the 
 purpose of obtaining advances, and that on the prin- 
 ciples laid down in Heaven v. Pender (m) the surveyor 
 owed a duty to those into whose hands the certificates 
 might come. It was held that in the absence of contract 
 there was no such duty ; that though, according to 
 Heaven v. Pender, and cases of that class, the owner 
 of dangerous chattels, or the owner of premises in a 
 dangerous condition, may owe a duty to those who 
 come into proximity to them, yet what a man writes 
 on paper is not like a dangerous instrument, and in 
 
 (7c.) See 14 App. Cas. at p. 37+. 
 
 (1) See Lc Licvre v. Gould (1893), 1 Q. B. 491, at pp. 498, 500-1; 
 Loiv v. Bowcerie, (1S91), 3 Ch. 82, at p. 105. 
 
 (m) 11 Q. B. D. 503 ; ante, p. 101 ; Conn v. TI'Mson, 39 Ch. D. 39 
 (now overruled by the case under discussion), was also relied on. 
 
FRAUD AND DECEIT. 145 
 
 the absence of fraud or contract lie is not liable for chap, vii. 
 negligence in so writing (n). 
 
 It is important to notice that the decision of the Change m the 
 House of Lords in Berry v. Peek (o) has, by the ^Z-nj^Pccl: 
 Directors Liability Act, 1890 OO been modified, so far 
 as regards directors and promoters of companies 
 and other persons who authorise the issue of pro- 
 spectuses asking for subscriptions to the companies. 
 Where after the passing of that Act (which was on the Directors 
 18th of August, 1890), a prospectus is issued inviting Liability Act, 
 persons to subscribe for shares, debentures or stock in 
 a company, the directors and promoters of the company 
 and others who have authorised the issue of the 
 prospectus, are liable to compensate subscribers who 
 have sustained loss by reason of untrue statements in, 
 or referred to in, the prospectus, unless it is proved (a) 
 with respect to untrue statements which do not 
 purport to be made on the authority of an expert 
 or public official document, that they believed and 
 had " reasonable ground to believe " them to be true ; 
 and (b) with respect to untrue statements purporting 
 to be statements by or contained in a report or valu- 
 ation of an expert, that they fairly represent such 
 statements or were fairly copied from such report and 
 valuation : but this will not avail those who authorise 
 the issue of the prospectus if it be proved that they 
 had no "reasonable ground to believe" that the 
 expert was competent to make the statements, report, 
 or valuation ; and (c) with respect to untrue state- 
 ments that purport to be statements of a public official 
 or contained in a public official document, that they 
 fairly represent what was so stated, or what appears 
 in such document : Or, secondly, unless it is proved 
 that any such director withdrew his consent, before 
 the issue of the prospectus, to be a director, and that 
 
 ())) Le Licvre v. Gould, supra. For other cases following Derry v. 
 Peek; supra; see ' Olasier v. Ihlh, 42 Ch. D. 436 (1889); Angus v. 
 Clifford (1891), 2 Cli. 449 ; Low v. Bouvcric (1891), 3 Ch. 82. 
 
 (o) 14 App. Cas. 337. 
 
 (p) 53 & 54 Vict. c. 64. 
 
 K.T. L 
 
146 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vii. the prospectus was issued without his consent, or that 
 it was issued without his knowledge or consent, and 
 that he forthwith gave public notice of that fact on 
 becoming aware of its issue, or that after its issue and 
 before allotment he, on becoming aware of untrue 
 statements in it, gave public notice of the withdrawal 
 of his consent thereto, and of the reason for such 
 withdrawal. 
 
 Statements 
 made by per- 
 sons with 
 special oppor- 
 tunities of 
 knowledge. 
 
 It should be mentioned that the House of Lords 
 in Derry v. Peek (q) did not profess to overrule cases 
 like Burroires v. Lock (r), and Slim v. Croucher (s), and 
 Lord Selborne, in 1880, appeared to consider these 
 two cases good law (£). But it has now been held by 
 the Court of Appeal (it) that Slim v. Croucher must be 
 considered overruled, and that the decision in Burrowes 
 v. Lock can only be upheld on the ground of estoppel 
 or possibly of fraud. In this last-mentioned case the 
 plaintiff was the assignee of one of several residuary 
 legatees for his share of the residue of a testator's 
 estate, whilst the defendants were the plaintiff's 
 assignor and the trustee of his share of the residue. 
 The trustee had informed the plaintiff that this share 
 was unincumbered, whereas, in fact, it was not, and 
 by the decree he was ordered to pay to the plaintiff 
 the full amount of the share, without deducting the 
 incumbrance. Though estoppel is not a cause of 
 action it is a rule of evidence which precludes a person 
 from denying the truth of a statement previously 
 made by him, and the trustee in this case, even if he 
 had acted honestly, which seemed doubtful, was 
 estopped from denying that the share was unin- 
 cumbered (.«■)• In Slim v. Croucher a person who was 
 
 (2) 14 App. Cas. 337 ; see ante, p. 131. 
 
 (r) 10 Ves. 470. 
 
 (s) 1 T>-i G. F. & J. 518. 
 
 (t) See Brownlie v. Campbell, 5 App. Cas. 925, at p. 935. 
 
 (u) (1891) 3 Ch. 82. 
 
 (a:) Of. with the judgments in Low v. Bouverie, ubi supra, the 
 speeches of the Lords in Brounlie v. Campbell, ubi supra. As to 
 Estoppel see Pickard v. Sears, 6 A. & E. 469 ; Freeman v. Cooke, 
 2 Ex. 654 ; In re Bahia and San Francisco Railway Company, L. R. 
 
FRAUD AND DECEIT. 
 
 147 
 
 asked to lend money on the security of a lease, which chap, vii. 
 the borrower said he was entitled to have granted to 
 him, made enquiries of the lessor, and received from 
 him an assurance that he was agreeable to grant to 
 the borrower a peppercorn lease of the property in 
 question. In fact, he had already granted the lease, 
 and the borrower had mortgaged it ; but the lessor 
 had forgotten the previous grant. The money having 
 been lent on the faith of this statement the lessor was 
 directed to repay it with interest and costs. It has 
 now been held that in this case, there being no fraud, 
 and the doctrine of estoppel not being applicable, as 
 an action for specific performance could not be main- 
 tained by the lender against the lessor, the decision 
 cannot be upheld, except possibly on the ground of 
 warranty (?/) . 
 
 In Low v. Bouverin (y) B., who was entitled under a 
 settlement to a life-interest in a trust-fund, applied to 
 the plaintiff for a loan on the security of such interest, 
 and referred him to the defendant, one of the trustees 
 of the settlement, for information as to his position. 
 The plaintiff wrote to the defendant asking if B.'s 
 life-interest was subject to any incumbrances, but not 
 stating that B. had applied for an advance. The 
 defendant replied that the life-interest was subject to 
 certain incumbrances which he mentioned, but he did 
 not say that there were no others. The plaintiff then 
 made an advance to B. on the security of the life- 
 interest. He afterwards found that there were other 
 incumbrances prior to his own on the life-interest, 
 besides those which the defendant had mentioned, and 
 his security thus became worthless. It was admitted 
 by the plaintiff that the defendant had forgotten these 
 
 3 Q. B. 584. A company is not estopped by a "certification " stating 
 that a share certificate has been lodged ; Bishop v. BoJlis Cn/isolitltitnl 
 Company, 25 Q. B. I). 77, 512 ; but it is by a "share certificate" ; 
 Tomliinson v. Ball-is Cmim/irhdcil Gumpn h'ij (1891), 2 (). B. 614 ; 
 In H. of L. (1893), App. Cas. 396 ; In re, Ottos Kopje Diamond Mines 
 (1893), 1 Ch. 618. 
 
 (y) See Low v. Bouveric (1891), 3 Oh. 82. 
 
 L 2 
 
148 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vii. -when replying to his enquiry. The plaintiff sought to 
 make the defendant liable for the amount due on the 
 security, alleging that the advance was made on the 
 faith of his representations. The action failed : of 
 fraud it was admitted there was none : as to breach of 
 duty, it was held to be no part of a trustee's duty to 
 give such information to a cestui que trust as will 
 enable him to squander or anticipate his fortune, and 
 a purchaser of his interest cannot be in a better 
 position : again, the facts did not amount to a contract 
 of warranty : lastly, there was no estoppel, for the 
 defendant's statement was consistent with the view 
 that the incumbrances mentioned by him were all 
 that he remembered. If he had given a positive 
 assurance that there were no others, and the plaintiff, 
 relying on that, had lent his money, he could not, 
 upon the plaintiff afterwards taking proceedings against 
 him to realise his security, be heard to say that there 
 were other incumbrances which he had forgotten. 
 
 Agent con- 
 tracting with- 
 out authority. 
 
 Agent Contracting without Authority. — There is 
 a well-known class of cases in which persons profess- 
 ing to act as agents have been held liable to make 
 good their representations, or, rather, to pay the 
 damages caused by them, not on the ground that 
 those representations were fraudulent or even reckless, 
 but rather on the ground that the persons have 
 entered into an implied warranty that they had 
 authority to make them. In other words, though, 
 as a general rule, an action for damages will not lie 
 against a person who honestly makes a representation 
 which misleads another, yet it is well established that 
 where an agent assumes an authority which he does 
 not possess, and induces another to deal with him 
 upon the faith that he has the authority which he 
 assumes, he must pay for the damage which he 
 thereby causes (z). Thus in Collcn v. Wright (z), the 
 
 (z) See Firhank v. Humphries, 18 Q. B. D. 54, following Collcn v. 
 Wright, 7 E. & B. 301, 8 E. & B. 647. Cf. Elkington <S: Company v. 
 77«rf<-f(1892), 2 Oh. 452. 
 
FRAUD AND DECEIT. . 149 
 
 defendant, who was agent of Gardner, entered into chap, vii. 
 an agreement, as such agent, with the plaintiff for the 
 lease to him, for a certain number of years, of land 
 belonging to Gardner. Both the plaintiff and Wright 
 believed that the latter had authority from Gardner 
 to enter into such agreement on his behalf, but there 
 was no such authority, and Gardner repudiated the 
 agreement. Wright's executors were held liable for 
 the damages caused by their testator's assumption of 
 authority to act as agent, on the ground that "a 
 person who induces another to contract with him as 
 the agent of a third party, by an unqualified assertion 
 of his being authorised to act as such agent, is 
 answerable, to the person who so contracts, for any 
 damages which he may sustain by reason of the 
 
 assertion of authority being untrue The fact 
 
 that the professed agent honestly thinks that he has 
 authority affects the moral character of his act ; but 
 his moral innocence, so far as the person whom he 
 has induced to contract is concerned, in no way aids 
 such person or alleviates the inconvenience and damage 
 which he sustains. The obligation arising in such a 
 case is well expressed by saying that a person, pro- 
 fessing to contract as agent for another, impliedly, if Liability de- 
 not expressly, undertakes to or promises the person impiiecUaii- 
 who enters into such contract upon the faith of the tract. 
 professed agent being duly authorised, that the 
 authority which he professes to have does, in point of 
 fact, exist." It will be observed that the liability in 
 such a case as that of Collen v. Wright, arises ex con- 
 tractu, and not ex delicto. Indeed, if it were a pure 
 case of tort, from which no benefit had been derived 
 by Wright's estate, the executors could not have been 
 held responsible for it (a) . 
 
 Liability of a Principal for the Fraud of his Principal 
 Agent. — The extent of a principal's liability for the innocent, 
 iraud of his agent has been much discussed in our ifn£ 
 
 (a) Peek v. Gm-ney, L. R. 6 H. of L. 377 ; see ante, p. 18. 
 
150 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vii. courts. The difficulties connected with the question 
 reached an acute phase in the case of Udell v. Ather- 
 ton (b), where the Court, consisting of four judges, 
 was equally divided. In that case an agent, employed 
 to sell timber on commission, made false and fraudu- 
 lent representations as to the quality of a log of 
 mahogany, which he knew to be unsound, to the 
 plaintiff, with whom he was negotiating for the sale 
 of it. By these representations the plaintiff was in- 
 duced to buy the log, for a sum exceeding its real 
 value. The principal neither authorised nor knew of 
 the fraudulent conduct of the agent. The purchaser, 
 having cut up the log, discovered its unsoundness, 
 and brought an action of deceit against the principal. 
 He was nonsuited at the trial, and, the Court in banc 
 being equally divided, the nonsuit stood. 
 
 lSaruick v. English Joint-Stock Bank (c) materially 
 helps to solve the difficulties that have arisen on this 
 point. The plaintiff in that case, who had for some 
 time supplied a customer of the bank with oats, on 
 credit, for carrying out a Government contract, refused 
 to continue to do so unless he got a satisfactory 
 guarantee from the bank. Thereupon the manager 
 gave a guarantee that the customer's cheques in 
 favour of the plaintiff, in payment for the oats 
 supplied, should be paid on receipt of the Government 
 money in priority to any other payment, "except to 
 this bank." The customer then owed the bank 
 £12,000, a fact which was in no way communicated to 
 the plaintiff, and the whole of the Government cheque 
 paid in by the customer to his account was appro- 
 priated by the bank, so that a cheque which he gave 
 the plaintiff was dishonoured. The Court held that 
 there was evidence of fraud on the part of the 
 manager to go before a jury, and that the bank would 
 be liable for such fraud. Willes, J., delivering the 
 
 (b) 7 H. &X. 172. 
 
 (c) L. R. 2 Ex. 259. 
 
FRAUD AND DECEIT. 151 
 
 judgment of himself and six other judges, said : chap, vii. 
 
 " With respect to the question whether a principal 
 
 is answerable for the act of his agent, in the course of 
 
 his master's business and for his master's benefit, no 
 
 sensible distinction can be drawn between the case of 
 
 fraud and the case of any other wrong. The general 
 
 rule is, that the master is answerable for every such 
 
 wrong of the servant or agent as is committed in the 
 
 course of the service and for the master's benefit, though 
 
 no express command or privity of the master be 
 
 proved. The principle is acted upon every day in 
 
 running-down cases. It has been applied also to 
 
 direct trespasses to goods." Having given other 
 
 instances of its application, the learned judge 
 
 proceeds : " In all these cases it may be said, as it 
 
 was said here, that the principal has not authorised the 
 
 act. It is true he has not authorised the particular act, 
 
 but he has put the agent in his place to do that class of 
 
 acts, and he must be answerable for the manner in which 
 
 that agent has conducted himself in doing the business 
 
 which it was the act of the master to place him in." 
 
 The judgment in this case was expressly approved 
 by the Privy Council in Mackay v. Commercial Bank of 
 New Brunswick (d). There an officer of a banking 
 corporation, whose duty it was to obtain the accept- 
 ance of bills of exchange in which the bank was 
 interested, fraudulently, but without the knowledge of 
 the president or directors of the bank, made a false 
 representation to the plaintiff, which induced him to 
 accept a bill in which the bank was interested, and 
 which he was afterwards obliged to pay, and it was 
 held that he could recover, in an action brought 
 against the bank, damages for misrepresentation. To 
 the same effect is Swire v. Francis, also in the Privy 
 Council (e) ; and the principle on which Bar wick v. 
 English Joint-Stock Banking Company (/) was decided 
 
 (d) L. E. 5 P. C. 394. 
 
 (e) 3 App. Cas. 106. 
 (/) Vbi supra. 
 
152 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 was again affirmed by the House of Lords in Hoidds- 
 tcorth v. City of Glasgoiv Bank(g). There are no 
 doubt what at first sight would appear to fee dicta 
 inconsistent with this principle in Western Bank of 
 Scotland^ v. Addie(h), but we may gather from the 
 judgments in the case just now referred to that those 
 dicta should be confined to cases of a similar class to 
 Addie's, where a member of an incorporated company, 
 who is, still a member and liable as a contributory, 
 and for whom the time for rescission of the contract 
 by which he became a member has gone by, seeks to 
 charge the company with a fraud of its directors or 
 agents. In such a case it is impossible for him, as 
 one member of the company, to throw upon the rest 
 of the members the burden of bearing the aliquot 
 share due from him for payment of the whole of the 
 debts and liabilities of the company. 
 
 Must the Principal, to be liable, derive Benefit 
 from the Fraud of the Agent? — Some expressions 
 in the leading cases above referred to, and in others, 
 may seem to shew that there is some doubt upon this 
 point (i). But it is submitted that it is not necessary 
 to shew that the principal sought to be made respon- 
 sible has actually received any benefit from his agent's 
 fraud. In Barwick's case the master is said to be 
 answerable for every such wrong of the servant or 
 agent as is committed in the course of the service and 
 for the master's benefit, and nothing is said indicating 
 that some benefit must have been actually received. 
 Again, in Swire v. Francis (k), the agent, whilst acting 
 in the course of his employment, committed a fraud, 
 for which the principal was held answerable, although 
 he received no benefit whatever from the fraud, the 
 agent having himself obtained the fruits of it. 
 
 (g) 5 App. Cas. 317. 
 
 (h) L. R. 1 H. ofL. (So.), 145. 
 
 (i) See and cf. Western Bank of Scotland v. Addie, L. R. 1 H. of L. 
 (Sc), 145 ; Swift V. Jewsbury, L. R. 9 Q. B. 301, at p. 312; Moulds- 
 worth v. City of Glasgoiv Sank, 5 App. Cas. 317, at pp. 328, 329. 
 
 (&) 3 App. Cas. 106. 
 
FRAUD AND DECEIT. 153 
 
 Liability of a Principal irliose Agent innocently CHAP. vil. 
 maJ.es a Misrepresentation on which Another is Untrue repre- 
 
 i minced to act. — Is a principal liable for a repre- scntation by 
 sentation, innocently made by his agent, which is not ^"°™ nt 
 true, when the principal knows the real truth '? In 
 answer to this, it is, in the first place, clear that if 
 the principal purposely employs an agent ignorant of 
 the truth, in order that such agent may innocently 
 make a false statement, believing it to be true, and 
 may so deceive the party with whom he is dealing, 
 the principal will be guilty of a fraud, and a person 
 who has entered into a contract on the faith of the 
 statement cannot be held to it by the principal (I). 
 In the latter of the two cases here cited a son, sent by 
 his father to sell some sheep, represented, as he had 
 authority to do, that they were sound, but they were 
 unsound. The father fraudulently concealed from 
 the son that the sheep were unsound, and intended 
 that the son should sell them at the best price, and 
 for that purpose represent them to be sound. The 
 father was held liable in an action by reason of the 
 misrepresentations which he had fraudulently author- 
 ised the son to make. 
 
 Cornfoot v. Foicke{m) is a well-known case, but 
 likely to mislead. The plaintiff employed an agent to 
 let a house. He knew, but the agent did not, that the 
 adjoining house was one of bad character. The 
 agent, in answer to a question by the defendant, 
 stated that there was nothing objectionable about the 
 adjoining house. Thereupon the defendant agreed to 
 become tenant of the house, but afterwards, having 
 discovered the character of the next house, he refused 
 to take possession. He was sued for breach of con- 
 tract, and succeeded in obtaining a verdict, but the 
 verdict was set aside, the Court holding it a mis- 
 direction to tell the jury that the principal could not 
 
 (l) Cornfoot v. Fowke, 6 M. & W. 358 ; Ludgater v. Love, 44 L. T. 
 694. 
 
 (m) 6 M. & W. 358. 
 
154 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vii. enforce a contract procured by the false representation 
 of his agent, and that the representation made by the 
 plaintiff 's agent had the same effect as if made by the 
 plaintiff himself. The case really turned upon a 
 point of pleading, the defendant having directly 
 charged the plaintiff with fraud. At all events, it 
 has been severely criticised, especially by Lord St. 
 Leonards in National Exchange Company of Glasgow 
 v. Drew («.), where he says : 
 
 "Now, supposing there had been in that case no 
 allegation of fraud, but it had been put simply on the 
 ground of misrepresentation, it was not denied in the 
 course of the judgment, as I understand it, that if a 
 principal, with knowledge of a fact which was 
 material to the value of the property, employed an 
 agent, whom he knew to be ignorant of the fact, for 
 the purpose of concealing it, he could not avail 
 himself of that concealment, and he would be 
 
 responsible But I should take the liberty of 
 
 going a good deal further. I should say that if in 
 that case fraud had not been alleged, but it had been 
 put upon misrepresentation, and the fact were that a 
 man knowing that there is so serious a nuisance 
 affecting a house, as to diminish its value in such a 
 way that no man of respectability could live in it, 
 takes care himself not to make the contract, but leaves 
 it to an agent whom he has no reason to suppose is 
 aware of the fact ; and if, in the course of the treaty 
 for the contract, the agent, being asked if such a fact 
 existed, states positively, No, and the contract is 
 executed in silence upon that point, because the 
 purchaser's or the tenant's vigilance has been lulled 
 to sleep upon it, and he believes the representation 
 
 made to him by the agent I should hope 
 
 the law of England would reach a case of that sort. 
 .... When, upon a matter so material to the value 
 of the property, he left it to his agent to make the 
 
 (n) 2 Mr.cq. 103, at p. 145. 
 
FRAUD AXH DECEIT. 155 
 
 representation without informing him of so important chap, vii. 
 a fact within his own knowledge, the agent making a 
 false representation of that fact would bind the prin- 
 cipal, and thus impeach the validity of the contract." 
 Fraudulent Representations as to a Person's 
 Credit.— By s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II. 
 c. 3) it was enacted {inter alia) that "no action shall 
 be brought whereby to charge the defendant upon any 
 special promise to answer for the debt, default, or 
 miscarriages of another person unless the agree- 
 ment upon which such action shall be brought, or 
 some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, 
 and signed by the party to be charged therewith, 
 or some other person thereunto by him lawfully 
 authorised." This statute therefore required, and still 
 requires, that a guarantee, to be actionable, must be in 
 writing, and signed by the defendant or his authorised 
 agent. Many years, however, after its passing, a case 
 was decided which threatened to make considerable 
 encroachments upon it. If a person were verbally to 
 guarantee payment of a debt about to be contracted by 
 another, this could not per se make him liable to an 
 action. But notwithstanding the statute he might 
 make use of expressions containing representations as 
 to that other person's credit and solvency, upon which 
 he could be sued in an action, not of contract, as upon 
 a guarantee, but of tort. And such an action was 
 brought in 1789, the declaration of which stated that 
 the defendant, intending to deceive and defraud the 
 plaintiffs, wrongfully and deceitfully encouraged them 
 to sell goods to one Falch on credit, and for that 
 purpose falsely, deceitfully, and fraudulently asserted 
 to the plaintiffs that the said Falch was a person who 
 might be safely trusted, whereby the plaintiffs were 
 induced to sell him goods on credit, but that he was 
 not, as the defendant well knew, a person who might 
 be safely trusted. That was the well-known case of 
 Pasley v. Freeman (o), where it was held that the 
 
 (o) 3 T. It. 51 ; 2 Sm. L. C. 
 
156 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, vii. plaintiffs were entitled to succeed in their action. In 
 consequence of that and other cases, s. 6 of 9 Geo. IV. 
 c. 14, which is commonly known as Lord Tenterden's 
 Act, was passed, by which -it was enacted that "No 
 action shall be brought whereby to charge any person 
 upon or by reason of any representation or assurance 
 made or given concerning or relating to the character, 
 conduct, credit, ability, trade, or dealings of any other 
 person, to the intent or purpose that such other person 
 may obtain credit, money, or goods upon, unless such 
 representation or assurance be made in writing, signed 
 by the party to be charged therewith " (p). 
 
 It will be observed that under this statute signature 
 by an agent is not sufficient to fix any one except 
 himself with liability. Thus, in Swift v. Jeicsbury (q), 
 a customer of a bank requested its manager to make 
 inquiries respecting the solvency of a person who 
 banked at another bank, and who wished to obtain 
 goods on credit from the customer. The manager of 
 the other bank wrote an answer, signing his letter, 
 and giving an account of the person's solvency which 
 he knew to be false. Upon the faith of it goods were 
 supplied on credit, but were never paid for. It was 
 held that the manager, who made such false state- 
 ment, but not the bank, was liable. 
 
 (p) See and cf. Scotch Act, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 60, s. 6, and Clydesdale 
 Bank v. Paton (1896), App. Cas. 381. 
 (q) L. R. 9 Q. B. 301. 
 
( 157 ) 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 SLANDER AND LIBEL. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 Formerly the word slander embraced not only spoken 
 
 but written defamation (a) ; but in modern days it is Distinction 
 
 confined to defamatory and false words spoken of t » stw i eeI1 
 
 ,■,,-,., slander and 
 
 another to his damage. libel. 
 
 To constitute a libel the false and defamatory matter 
 must be written or printed or put into some form, such 
 as a painting (b). 
 
 Except in cases where the law presumes damage, an 
 action for slander cannot be maintained without proof 
 by the plaintiff of special damage. 
 
 Thus, as Lord Campbell regretted in Lynch v. 
 Knight (c), according to the unsatisfactory state of 
 our law at that time, an imputation by words, however 
 gross, on an occasion however public, upon the chastity 
 of a modest matron or a pure virgin, was not action- 
 able without proof that it had actually produced special 
 temporal damage to her (d). 
 
 Special Damage. — The special damage that has to As to what 
 be proved, where the law does not presume damage, s*™^ an* 
 must be temporal, and not too remote. action. 
 
 Thus, for example, under the former state of the 
 law, a wife might have maintained an action against 
 a third person for defamatory words occasioning to 
 
 (a) See Bacon's Abridgement : Slander. 
 
 (b) O'Brien v. Clement, 15 M. & W. 435 ; Du Bost v. Beresford, 
 2 Camp. 511. See Monsonv. Tussnuds (1894), 1 Q. B. 671. 
 
 (c) 9 H. of L. Cas. 577, at p. 593. 
 
 (d) There was an exception to this in the case of such slanders 
 littered within the jurisdiction of the local courts of the City of London 
 and Bristol. 
 
158 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap. viii. her the loss of the consortium or conjugal society of 
 her husband, but the words must have been such that 
 the loss of the consortium would follow as a natural 
 and reasonable consequence (e). And where words 
 were spoken imputing unchastity to a woman, and by 
 reason thereof she was excluded from a private society 
 and congregation of Protestant dissenters, of which 
 she was a member, and was unable to obtain a 
 certificate without which she could not become a 
 member of another society of the same kind, it was 
 held that sufficient special damage had not been 
 shown (/). Nor would illness occasioned by a false 
 charge of unchastity, verbally made, have been suffi- 
 cient (g) . But if by reason of such a slander a woman 
 lost her marriage (//), or were deprived of the gratuitous 
 hospitality of her friends (i) , an action would have 
 lain, but not for the loss of their society simply (/,) . 
 But, as we shall see, it is not now necessary to prove 
 special damage in this class of actions. 
 
 Chamberlain v. Boi/d (/) is a useful case on the 
 question of special damage and remoteness of damage. 
 In that case the plaintiff was a defeated candidate for 
 election to a club. Subsequently to such defeat of 
 the plaintiff a meeting of the members was called to 
 consider proposed alterations in the rules with regard 
 to the election of new members. The defendant 
 thereupon, it was alleged in the Statement of Claim, 
 uttered defamatory statements respecting the plaintiff, 
 whereby he induced, or contributed to induce, a 
 majority of the members of the club to retain the 
 rules under which the plaintiff had been defeated, and 
 so prevented the plaintiff from again seeking to be 
 
 (e) Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. of L. 577 ; but see the judgment of Lord 
 Wensleydale. 
 
 (/) Roberts and Wife v. Roberts, 5 B. & S. 384. 
 
 {g) Allsop v. AUsop, 5 H. & N. 534. 
 
 (h) lJuvis v. Gardiner, Coke, Rep. part iv. 16 b. 
 
 (i) Davics and Il- r ife v. Solomon, L. R. 7 Q. B. 112. 
 
 (kj Mnlhurst v. Bulam, 1 Sid. 397 ; Barnes v. Bruddel, 1 Lev. 261. 
 
 (Z) 11 Q. B. D. 507. 
 
SLANDER AND LIBEL. 159 
 
 elected to the club. The Statement of Claim was chap.viii. 
 successfully demurred to on tw.o grounds. The first 
 ground was, that the damage alleged was unsubstantial 
 and shadowy, and incapable of being estimated in 
 money. Possibly, as the Court points out, the member- 
 ship of a club may be a matter of temporal advantage, 
 and the deprivation of it may be an injury or damage 
 of which the law will take cognisance ; but it was not 
 alleged that the defendant's words prevented the 
 election of the plaintiff, but only that they contributed 
 to induce a majority of the members to retain the 
 rules under which the plaintiff had once been defeated. 
 The second ground on which the demurrer was held 
 good was, that the alleged damage was too remote. 
 The Court held that it was almost absurd to suppose 
 that, because the members of a club believed that the 
 plaintiff had misconducted himself at a club in Mel- 
 bourne (as was alleged by the defendant), they would 
 refuse to alter their rules as to the mode of election. 
 
 In considering the question of special damage some 
 reference should be made to the leading case of T 
 
 G 
 
 i cars 
 
 v. Wilcocks (m) , and to the subsequent modifications 
 of the law as there laid down. In that case it was 
 held that in proving special damage to maintain an 
 action of slander, it is not sufficient to prove a mere 
 wrongful act of a third person induced by the slander, 
 such as that he dismissed the plaintiff from his 
 employment ; but that the special damage must be the 
 " legal and natural " consequence of the slander. That 
 this rule is too restricted, and that a slanderer may be 
 liable for the consequences to the plaintiff of a third 
 person's illegal act, where he might have anticipated 
 that such illegal act would follow from his slanderous 
 words, may be gathered from Lynch v. Kni//ht(n), 
 To make the words actionable by reason of special 
 damage, the consequence must be such as, taking 
 
 (m) 8 East 1, 2 Sm. L. C. 50fi. 
 (n) 9 H. of L. Cas. 577, at p. 600. 
 
160 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap. viii. human nature as it is, with its infirmities, and having 
 regard to the relationship of the parties concerned, 
 might fairly and reasonably have been anticipated and 
 feared would follow from the speaking of the words — 
 not what would reasonably follow, or what we might 
 think ought to follow. 
 
 Defamatory Words actionable without Proof of 
 Special Damage. — Words imputing a crime, words 
 imputing a contagious disease of such a character as 
 to exclude a person from society, words reflecting on 
 a man in his profession, trade, or business, or some 
 office held by him, and words imputing unchastity to 
 a woman or girl, are actionable without proof of 
 special damage. 
 
 (1) Words 
 imputing a 
 crime. 
 
 Where the words impute a crime, it is not necessary 
 that the offence imputed should be an indictable one, 
 as is sometimes stated in text-books ; indeed, if it 
 were so, a difficulty would arise from the fact that 
 many offences which were formerly dealt with by in- 
 dictment are now disposed of summarily by magis- 
 trates. But the correct rule seems to be, that it is 
 actionable slander to say of a person that he has done 
 something for which he can be made to suffer cor- 
 porally, though it is not actionable to say that he has 
 done something which may render him liable to the 
 mere infliction of a fine (o). 
 
 As will be seen hereafter, the truth of a slander or 
 libel will be a good defence to an action for damages 
 brought in respect of it. But where a person has 
 suffered his punishment, or has been pardoned for a. 
 crime formerly committed by him, it is no longer 
 justifiable to impute to him that crime. Thus in 
 Cuddiiif/ton v. Wilkins (/>), the plaintiff sued the de- 
 fendant for calling him " a thief." The defendant 
 justified by pleading that the plaintiff had stolen six 
 
 (o) Wehb v. Beavan, 11 Q. B. D. 609. 
 \p) Hob. 67, 81. 
 
SLANDER AND LIBEL. 161 
 
 CHAP.VIII. 
 
 sheep. The plaintiff set up a general pardon of 7 
 James I., and succeeded in his action, though the de- 
 fendant knew not of the pardon, "for there is no cause 
 to favour idle and injurious words." Again, to write 
 of the editor of a newspaper that he is " a convicted 
 felon" and "a felon editor," was held not justifiable, 
 where the conviction had taken place many years 
 previously, and the punishment therefor had been 
 endured (q) . 
 
 Words imputing a contagious disease, to be action- (2) Words 
 able without proof of special damage, must impute *3!a<>ious' 
 that at the time of the uttering of the words the per- disease, 
 son referred to had a contagious disease of such a 
 character as to exclude him from society, and words 
 imputing that he at some time had such a disease will 
 not per se be sufficient foundation for an action (?•). 
 
 Imputations on a Man in the irai/ of his Pro- (3) Words 
 fession, Trade, Business, or Office. — In order that casting im- 
 
 ... . . putations on 
 
 such words may be actionable per se, it is necessary, a man in the 
 
 in the first place, that the person concerning whom wa y of . nis 
 r r D profession, 
 
 they were uttered was, at the time they were so trade, office, 
 uttered, carrying on his profession, trade, or business, orbusiness - 
 or filling his office (s). In the latter case, a declara- 
 tion for slander, by charging a clergyman in holy 
 orders with immorality, was held bad, because it did 
 not shew special damage, or that the clergyman held 
 at the time some benefice or office producing temporal 
 emolument. 
 
 It is important to bear in mind the distinction 
 between what is actionable in the case of an office of 
 honour or credit (such as a town councillor's), and 
 what in the case of an office of profit. Where an 
 imputation is made, not of misconduct in an office of 
 honour or credit which a man holds, but of unfitness 
 
 (q) Layman v. Latimer, 3 Ex. D. 352. 
 (r) Carslake v. Mapledoram, 2 T. R. 473. 
 
 (s) Bellamy v. Lurch, 16 M. & W. 590 ; Gallwey v. Marshall, 9 Ex. 
 295. 
 
 R.T. M 
 
162 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap.viii. f or that office, an action will not lie unless the con- 
 duct charged be of such a kind that by reason of 
 it he could be removed from or deprived of that office. 
 Thus, to say of a town councillor that he is habitually 
 drunk and not fit to be in the council, would not be 
 actionable without special damage (t) . But words 
 imputing misconduct, such as dishonesty, or malver- 
 sation or want of integrity in a public office of honour 
 or credit, whether one of profit or not, are actionable 
 without special damage, and that too whether there is 
 a power of removal from the office for such misconduct 
 or not (it). 
 
 Again, an imputation on a man in the way of his 
 profession, trade, business, or office, must, to be 
 actionable without special damage, touch him in his 
 profession, trade, business, or office. Thus, where a 
 person verbally said respecting the clerk of a gas com- 
 pany that he was a person of gross immorality, and 
 thereby unfit to hold his situation, it was held that 
 the words were not actionable, because the imputation 
 contained in them did not imply the want of any of 
 those qualities which a clerk ought to possess, such 
 as honesty, or capacity, or fidelity. On the same 
 principle, a physician has failed to obtain redress for 
 a charge of adultery made against him, where nothing 
 was alleged in the declaration to connect the imputa- 
 tion with his professional conduct (r) ; and it has been 
 held not actionable to impute prostitution to a school- 
 mistress (y) , though possibly (even without the Slander 
 of Women Act, 1891), no such outrageous decision 
 would be upheld at the present day. 
 
 When it was said of a solicitor, " he has defrauded 
 his creditors, and has been horsewhipped off the 
 course at Doncaster," the solicitor failed to obtain 
 
 (t) Alexander v. Jenkins (1S92), 1 Q. B. 797. 
 (u) Booth v. Arnold (1895), 1 Q. B. 571. 
 (x) Ayre v. Craven, 2 A. & E. '£. 
 (y) See Wharton v. Brook, 1 Yentr. 21. 
 
SLANDER AND LIBEL. 163 
 
 redress, as the jury found that, though the words had ch ap.viii. 
 a tendency to injure him morally and professionally, 
 they were not spoken of him in his business of a 
 solicitor (z) . 
 
 And where the defendant said of the plaintiff, who 
 was a working stonemason, "He was the ringleader 
 of the nine hours' system," " he has ruined the town 
 by bringing about the nine hours' system," " he has 
 stopped several good jobs from being carried out by 
 being the ringleader of the system at Llanelly," it was 
 held that an action was not maintainable, for the 
 words were not actionable in themselves, and not con- 
 nected with the plaintiff's trade either by averment or 
 by necessary implication (<<)• 
 
 But it is actionable to say of a justice of the peace, 
 ■" He hath taken money of a thief to keep him from 
 gaol," or "I never could have justice of him, but 
 always injustice," or " he is a partial justice," or " he 
 wrests the law and perverts justice to serve his own 
 turn" (b). So is it actionable to say of a solicitor 
 "that he is grossly ignorant of law, or that he deceives 
 those who trust him (c) ; or of a physician, that he is 
 a quacksalver or a mountebank (d) ; or of a game- 
 keeper, that he trapped foxes (e) ; or of a person 
 engaged in trade that he has been, or is, or is 
 about to become, a bankrupt, or is unable to pay his 
 debts (/). 
 
 It is also actionable to say of a trader that he uses 
 false weights or measures, adulterates his goods, or is 
 guilty of other malpractices (g) . 
 
 (z) Doyley v. Huberts, 3 Bing. N. C. 
 
 (a) Miller v. JJavid, L. R. 9 C. P. 118. 
 
 (b) Comyus, Digest, vol. i. p. 373 ; Action upon the Case for 
 Defamation, D. 15. 
 
 (c) Ibid. D. 24. 
 
 (d) Ihiil. D. 23. 
 
 (e) F'lulfftr v. jYewcomb, L. R. 3 Ex. 327. 
 
 (/) Corny ns, Digest, ubi supra, D. 25 ; Leycroft v. Dunlxr, Go. Car. 
 317 ; Bfowib v. Smith, 13 C. B. 506. 
 
 (g) Comyns, Digest, ubi supra, D. 26, 27 ; Griffitlis v. Lewis, 7 
 •Q. B. 61. 
 
 M 2 
 
164 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap.viii. By the Slander of Women Act, 1891 (h), special 
 (4) Slander of damage is no longer necessary- to render actionable 
 """'"• words spoken and published which impute unchastity 
 
 or adultery to any woman or girl, but the plaintiff is 
 not to recover more costs than damages, unless the 
 judge certifies that there was reasonable ground for 
 bringing the action. 
 
 Plaintiff Libel. — A fifth case in which a plaintiff is not 
 
 special * Pr ° Ve obliged to prove special damage in order to succeed in 
 damage. an action against a person who has defamed him is 
 
 where the defamatory matter is in writing or print, 
 or otherwise put into some permanent and visible 
 form. It is needless now to inquire into the cause of 
 the distinction between slander and libel, and why in 
 so many cases an action may be maintained for a. 
 written slander which could not be maintained for the 
 words if they had been merely spoken. Some of the 
 reasons given will not to some minds seem very satis- 
 factory ; for instance — (1) that a libel is permanent, 
 and may circulate amongst innumerable hands ; 
 ('2) that it shews greater malignity on the part of its- 
 author than a slander ; or (3) that it is more likely 
 to lead to a breach of the peace (i). 
 
 Libel— defini- Libel has been defined as "a publication, without 
 tl0U ' justification or lawful excuse, which is calculated to 
 
 injure the reputation of another by exposing him to 
 hatred, contempt, or ridicule " (k). In a more recent 
 case (I), Lord Blackburn says: "A libel for which an 
 action will lie is defined to be a written statement, 
 published without lawful justification or excuse, calcu- 
 lated to convey to those to whom it is published an 
 imputation on the plaintiffs, injurious to them in 
 their trade, or holding them up to hatred, contempt,, 
 or ridicule." 
 
 (h) 54 & 55 Vict. e. 51. The Act is not applicable to Scotland. 
 
 (i) See Folkard on Slander and Libel, 4th ed., p. 154. 
 
 (h) Pur, niter v. Coupland, 6 M. & W. 105. 
 
 (1) Capital and Counties Bank v. Benty, 7 App. C'as. 741. at p. 771. 
 
SLANDER AND LIBEL. 165 
 
 ' ' Although a corporation cannot maintain an action chap.viii. 
 for libel in respect of anything reflecting upon them Action by 
 personally, yet they can maintain an action for a libel Coi 'P oratlon - 
 reflecting on the management of their trade or busi- 
 ness, and this without alleging or proving special 
 damage " (»()• For example, a corporation cannot 
 sue in respect of a charge of murder, or adultery, or 
 corruption, or assault, because a corporation cannot 
 be guilty of these things, although the individuals 
 composing the corporation may be : but a corporation 
 may sue in respect of a libel calculated to injure them 
 in the way of their business (in). 
 
 The plaintiff in an action for libel or slander ought 
 to set out in his statement of claim the very words 
 which have been used, and it will not be sufficient to 
 describe them by their usual substance and effect (n). 
 
 It is for the plaintiff (or for the prosecutor where Plaintiff must 
 criminal proceedings are taken for a libel), to make i ,ro \ e that 
 out that the words complained of bear the meaning libellous, 
 which he attributes to them (o) . Thus an action 
 was brought for the following alleged libel pub- 
 lished in a newspaper: — "Walsall Science and Art 
 Institute. — The public are respectfully informed that 
 Mr. Mulligan's connection with the institute has 
 ceased, and that he is not authorised to receive sub- 
 scriptions on its behalf." The innuendo or meaning 
 ascribed by the plaintiff to these words was that the 
 plaintiff had falsely pretended to be authorised to 
 receive subscriptions on behalf of the institute. A 
 nonsuit was directed, and was afterwards upheld by 
 the Court on the ground that the advertisement was 
 not capable of the defamatory meaning attributed to 
 it by the plaintiff. 
 
 With regard to the innuendo or meaning given by Functions of 
 the plaintiff to the words he complains of, the separate ^|_ e and 
 
 jury- 
 
 (m) South Hetton Coal Company, Limited v. North Eastern News 
 Association, Limited (1894), 1 Q. B. 133, at p. 141. 
 (n) Harris v. Warrt, i V. P. D. 125. 
 (o) See Mulligan v. Cole, L. R. 10 Q. B. 549. 
 
166 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap. viii. functions of the judge and jury must not be lost sight 
 of. " It is the duty of the judge to say whether a 
 publication is capable of the meaning ascribed to it by 
 an innuendo ; but when the judge is satisfied of that, 
 it must be left to the jury to say whether the publica- 
 tion has the meaning so ascribed to it " (p). " If the 
 judge, taking into account the manner and the occa- 
 sion of the publication, and all other facts which are 
 properly in evidence, is not satisfied that the words are 
 capable of the meaning ascribed to them, then it is 
 not his duty to leave the question raised by the 
 innuendo to the jury. In deciding on the question 
 whether the words are capable of that meaning, he 
 ought not, in my [i.e., Lord Selborne's] opinion, to 
 take into account any mere conjectures, which a 
 person reading the document might possibly form, as 
 to some out of various motives or reasons which 
 might have actuated the writer, unless there is some- 
 thing in the document itself, or in other facts properly 
 in evidence, which to a reasonable mind would 
 suggest, as implied in the publication, those particular 
 motives or reasons " (q). Thus, in an action of libel 
 or slander, if the defendant can get either the Court 
 or the jury to be in his favour, he succeeds. The 
 prosecutor or the plaintiff cannot succeed unless he 
 gets both the Court and the jury to decide for him (r).. 
 And if words may bear other interpretations as fairly 
 as the libellous one which the plaintiff or prosecutor 
 attributes to them, he cannot succeed in his action or 
 prosecution. " It is unreasonable that when there are 
 a number of good interpretations, the only bad one 
 should be seized upon to give a defamatory sense to- 
 the document " (s). 
 
 Intention of Person usUuj the Words. — In con- 
 struing words, to see whether they are libellous or 
 
 [ji) Start v. Blcujtj, 10 Q. B. at p. 90S. 
 
 (q) Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty, 7 App. Cas. 711, 744. 
 
 (r) Ibid. 776. 
 
 (s) J bid. 786. 
 
SLANDER AND LIBEL. 167 
 
 not, the Court, where nothing is alleged to give them chaf.viii. 
 an extended sense, will put that meaning on them 
 which the words would be understood by ordinary 
 persons to bear, and say whether the words so under- 
 stood are calculated to convey an injurious imputation. 
 The question is not whether the defendant intended to 
 convey that imputation ; for if he, without excuse or 
 justification, did what he knew, or ought to have 
 known, was calculated to injure the plaintiff, he must 
 (at least civilly) be responsible for the consequences, 
 though his object might have been to injure a person 
 other than the plaintiff, or though he may have written 
 in levity only. " No one can cast about firebrands 
 and death, and then escape from being responsible by 
 saying he was in sport " (t). 
 
 The facts in the case of the Capital and Counties 
 Bank v. Henty (u), already mentioned, will illustrate 
 the rule above laid down. The defendants, Henty and 
 Sons, were in the habit of receiving from their cus- 
 tomers cheques on various branches of the plaintiff 
 bank, which the plaintiff bank cashed, for the con- 
 venience of the defendants, at a particular branch at 
 the place where the defendants carried on their business. 
 A new manager having been appointed to that branch, 
 the defendants had a misunderstanding with him as 
 to the cashing of such cheques, and thereupon sent a 
 printed circular to a large number of their customers, 
 who knew nothing of this misunderstanding, in the 
 following words : " Messrs. Henty & Sons hereby give 
 notice that they will not receive in payment cheques 
 drawn on any of the branches of the Capital and 
 Counties Bank." This circular became known to some 
 other persons, and there was a run on the bank, and 
 loss sustained. The bank accordingly brought an 
 action for libel, alleging, by way of innuendo, in 
 their Statement of Claim, that the circular imputed 
 
 {t) Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty, 7 App. Cas. at p. 772. 
 (u) 7 App. Cas. 711. 
 
168 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap. viii. that they were not to be relied upon to meet the 
 cheques drawn on them, and that their position was 
 such that they were not to be trusted to cash the 
 cheques of their customers. The House of Lords 
 (Lord Penzance dissenting), affirming the judgment of 
 the Court of Appeal, held that the case ought not to 
 have been left to the jury, for the words in themselves 
 did not bear the libellous meaning ascribed to them, 
 nor would reasonable men collect such a meaning 
 from them. So, too, where an insurance company on 
 a privileged occasion wrote a circular stating that the 
 agency of A. had been closed by the directors, and 
 sent it to those who had insured at that agency, giving 
 them directions where to apply in future, it was held 
 that there was no libel (x). 
 
 Publication. — As there is no slander till the de- 
 famatory words are uttered, so there is no libel for 
 which an action can be brought till the libel has been 
 published. Such publication must be to at least one 
 person other than the plaintiff in an action (though in 
 the case of an indictment, publication to the party 
 himself may be sufficient) (y), and so if the libellous 
 matter be delivered in a sealed letter to the plaintiff, 
 there is no publication sufficient for an action (z) . Nor 
 is there if it is handed, folded up, but unsealed, to a 
 third person for delivery to the plaintiff, and such 
 third person so delivers it without reading it himself 
 or suffering any one else to read it (a) . But if the 
 libellous matter be sent by telegraph or on the back 
 of a postcard addressed to the plaintiff, there will 
 necessarily be publication (b) . And there was held to 
 be evidence of publication where the defendant, know- 
 ing that the plaintiff's letters were in his absence 
 
 (as) Nevill v. Fine Art and General Insurance Company (1897), App. 
 Cas. 68. 
 
 (y) Clutterbuck v. Chaffers, 1 Stark. 471. 
 
 (z) Barrow v. Levrllin, Hob. 62. 
 
 (a.) Clutterbuck v. Chaffers, 1 Stark. 471. 
 
 (b) Williamsons. Freer, L. R. 9 C. P. 393 ; Robinson v. Jones, L. R. 
 4 Ex. (Ir.), 391. 
 
SLANDER AND LIBEL. 169 
 
 opened by his clerk, sent a libellous letter, directed to chap.viii. 
 
 the defendant, which was opened b} r the clerk (c). 
 
 Where libellous matter, dictated by a merchant to a 
 
 shorthand clerk and type-written hy him, is sent by 
 
 letter to a firm, and the letter is opened by a clerk 
 
 in the ordinary course of business, there is a double 
 
 publication, and, as will be seen hereafter, privilege 
 
 cannot be relied on by the libeller, for neither clerk 
 
 has an interest in seeing the libellous matter (d). But 
 
 where a solicitor, acting on behalf of a client, sent to 
 
 the plaintiff a libellous letter, which he had dictated 
 
 to his shorthand clerk, and which was copied by another 
 
 clerk into the letter book, it was held that though 
 
 there was publication to the two clerks the occasion 
 
 was privileged. If the solicitor had written direct to 
 
 the plaintiff there would clearly have been privilege, 
 
 for he would have been acting for and in the interest 
 
 of his client, and the publication to his two clerks was 
 
 reasonably necessary and usual in the course of his 
 
 business (e). The sending of a libel to the plaintiff's 
 
 wife is as much a publication as if it were sent to a 
 
 stranger (/) ; and it is submitted, notwithstanding 
 
 the doubt expressed by Jervis, C.J., in the case last 
 
 mentioned, that there is sufficient publication if a libel 
 
 on a wife is sent to her husband. 
 
 Repetition. — Prima facie, the repetition of a libel 
 or slander is actionable, nor will it be any justification 
 that the person guilty of such repetition gives the name 
 of the person who originally published the defamatory 
 matter (,9) . In JVatkiu v. Hall (g) the plaintiff was 
 the chairman of the South-Eastern Eailway Company, 
 and the defendant, with reference to him and to a fall 
 in the shares of the company, used the following 
 
 (c) Delacroix v. TJievenot, 2 Stark. 63. 
 
 (d) Pullman v. Hill <fc Company (1891), 1 Q. B. 524. 
 
 (e) Boxius v. Goblet Freres and others (1894), 1 Q. B. 842 (Malice 
 was negatived). 
 
 (/) Wcnman v. Ash, 13 C. B. 836. 
 
 (g) De Crespigny v. IVellcslnj, 5 Bing. 392 ; M'Pherson v. Daniels, 
 10 B. & C. 263 ; Watkin v. Hall, L. K. 3 Q. B. 396. 
 
170 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap. viii. words : " You have heard what has caused the fall ; I 
 mean the rumour about the South-E astern chairman 
 having failed." A plea that the defendant meant, and 
 was understood by the b) r standers to mean, that there 
 was a rumour current on the Stock Exchange about 
 the chairman of the company having failed, and not 
 that the plaintiff had become insolvent, and that there 
 was such a rumour current, was held to be bad, for 
 that the existence of the rumour did not justify the 
 repetition of the slander contained in it, unless it were 
 shewn that the defendant believed it to be true, and 
 that he spoke the words on a privileged occasion, 
 " It is no justification to a person, in giving currency 
 to that which is injurious to the character of another, 
 for him to say that he heard the statement made by 
 another person. If he justifies at all, he must shew 
 that he made the communication under circumstances 
 that gave it a privileged character, that he was justi- 
 fied in making that privileged communication, or that 
 the words themselves, when he spoke the words, were 
 true"(/i). 
 
 Truth of libel 
 may be 
 pleaded in 
 defence. 
 
 Justification of a Libel irfiere Civil Proceedings 
 hare been taken. — If a plaintiff seeks to recover 
 damages for defamatory matter uttered or spoken of 
 him, the defendant may set up in his defence that the 
 defamatory matter was true, and such a defence, if 
 pleaded and fully proved, will enable him to succeed 
 at the trial; "for the law will not permit a man to 
 recover damages in respect of an injury to a character 
 which he either does not, or ought not to, possess " (i). 
 The truth is an answer to the action, not because it 
 negatives malice on the part of the defendant (for a 
 person may wrongfully and maliciously utter libellous 
 matter, though true, and thereby subject himself to an 
 indictment), but because it shews that the plaintiff is 
 
 (/<) Per Lush, J., Watkinx, Hall, -ubi supra ; cf. Speight v. Gosney, 
 60 L. J. Q. B. -l-il. 
 
 (?) iiri'hcrson v. Daniels, 10 B. & ,C. 263, at p. 272. 
 
SLANDER AND LIBEL. 171 
 
 not entitled to recover damages (k). But a defendant chap.viii. 
 who means to rely on such a defence must specially 
 plead it, and prove it in every material particular. 
 Thus, for example, in Mimntney v. Walton (/), the 
 libel complained of, and which had been published in 
 a newspaper, was as follows : " Horse-stealer. — Charles 
 Mountney, a native of Derby, was taken into custody 
 in this town on Saturday night, on suspicion of having 
 stolen a grey horse, the property of Mr. Thos. Adder- 
 ley, of Stone, Shropshire. Information was given to 
 Mr. Bowdler, solicitor, who happened to be constable 
 for the night, that such a character was at the White 
 Horse, Frankwell. Mr. Bowdler, with Hay ward, the 
 police officer, went in search of him, and found him 
 asleep hi bed. Hay ward awoke him, and asked him 
 where he left the grey horse. He immediately an- 
 swered, ' Chester ' ; but on looking round, and observing 
 who put the question, he denied all knowledge of the 
 horse." The innuendo put on the words was that the 
 defendant meant to charge, the plaintiff with stealing 
 the horse. The defendant set up the truth of the 
 libel except as to the word " horse-stealer." The plain- 
 tiff demurred to the plea, and the demurrer was upheld, 
 as the gist of the libel was contained in the w 7 ord 
 "horse-stealer," which the defendant did not justify. 
 
 So where, the plaintiff's ship being advertised for 
 freight and passengers, the defendant published in the 
 Times that she was unseaworthy, and had been bought 
 by Jews to take out convicts ; and the defendant, upon 
 an action of libel being brought against bim, pleaded 
 to the whole declaration that the ship had been shewn 
 to be unseaworthy, but made no reference to her 
 having been sold to Jews to take out convicts ; it was 
 held that the plea could not be supported as an answer 
 to the whole libel (ro) . 
 
 (k) mi. 
 
 (1) 2 B. & Ad. 673. 
 
 (m) Ift'jrant, v. Lawson, 5 King. N. C. 66. 
 
172 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 "Where libel 
 consists partly 
 of undoubted 
 fact and partly 
 of comment 
 thereon. 
 
 But it will be a question for the jury whether the 
 statement charged as libellous is substantially true, 
 and a slight inaccuracy, such as stating that a person 
 was sentenced to three weeks' imprisonment, when the 
 sentence was only for a fortnight, will not necessarily 
 enable the party complaining of it to succeed in an 
 action (n). 
 
 Again, a libel may consist partly of undoubted fact 
 and partly of comment, and though it often happens 
 that the whole sting and injury of the libel are in the 
 comment, yet there are cases where the inference is so 
 fair, that if you prove the fact, you prove the correct- 
 ness of the comment. If, for instance, the publication 
 were, " He murdered his father, and therefore is a 
 disgrace to human nature," the latter words would be 
 a fair comment on the previous ones, and nothing 
 material could turn upon them in an action. But if 
 the comment infer a new fact, the defendant must 
 abide by that inference of fact, and the fairness or 
 unfairness of the comment must be determined by the 
 jury(o). 
 
 Although a justification of a libel must be complete, 
 yet where a libel contains several distinct charges, a 
 defendant may plead the truth of one or any more of 
 these charges, but he may be liable in damages for any 
 which he has omitted to justify (p). 
 
 Justification of a Libel where Criminal Proceed- 
 ings hare been taken — Although, as we have seen, 
 a plaintiff cannot recover damages in a civil court for 
 a libel which has been proved to be true, yet it was 
 formerly no defence to an indictment or criminal 
 information for a libel that the libel was true. Indeed, 
 it was formerly a maxim that " the greater the truth 
 
 (n) Alexander v. North-Eastern Railway Company, 6 B. & S. 240. 
 
 (o) Cmijirr v. Lawson, 8 A. & E. 746, 753. 
 
 {p) Clarice v. Taylor, 2 Bing. N. C. 654. "Where justification is 
 pleaded the facts on which reliance is placed in support of the plea 
 must be set out ; Zierenberg v. Labouclure (1893), 2 Q. B. 183. 
 
SLANDER AND LIBEL. 173 
 
 the greater the libel," for a libel that was true was c hap.viii. 
 even more likely to provoke a person to a breach of Application of 
 the peace than one which was false. But now, by max j m ' " The 
 
 xi/-. i 11, t •> , greater the 
 
 Lord Campbell s Libel Act, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, it is truth the 
 
 provided that on the trial of any indictment or informa- ^f" the 
 
 tion for a defamatory libel, the defendant may plead 
 
 the truth of the matters charged, that their publication 
 
 was for the public benefit, and the facts by reason of 
 
 which he alleges that such publication was for the 
 
 public benefit (sec. 6) ; so that even still where criminal 
 
 proceedings are taken for a libel, the truth will not be 
 
 an answer unless the publication of the libel was also 
 
 for the public benefit. All the statutory conditions Publication of 
 
 must be fulfilled before the truth can become a defence, ^{he public 
 
 And so the only stage at which evidence of the truth benefit. 
 
 can be received is when a plea drawn in accordance 
 
 with the requirements of the statute has been put in, 
 
 or, in other words, at the trial of the indictment. For 
 
 this reason it has been held that magistrates at 
 
 the hearing in the police court have no jurisdiction to 
 
 admit evidence of the truth of the libel, their duty 
 
 being simply to determine whether the case is one 
 
 which they ought to send for trial (q). If, however, Libel in news- 
 
 the libel complained of be in a newspaper, magistrates l' a P er - 
 
 may receive evidence as to the publication being for 
 
 the public benefit, and as to the truth of the libel, and 
 
 as to the report being fair and accurate, and published 
 
 without malice, and as to other matters which might 
 
 be given in evidence on the defence of a person charged 
 
 in an indictment, and if the magistrates are of opinion, 
 
 after hearing such evidence, that there is a strong or 
 
 probable presumption that a jury would acquit the 
 
 person charged, they may dismiss the case (r). No 
 
 criminal prosecution can be commenced against the 
 
 proprietor, publisher, editor, or any person responsible 
 
 for the publication of a newspaper, for any libel 
 
 published in it, unless an order shall have been first 
 
 (q) Jia/ina v. Garden, 5 (J. IS. D. 1. 
 (r) 44 & 45 Vict. c. b'O, s. 4. 
 
174 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap.viii. obtained from a judge in chambers, notice of the 
 application for which must be given to the person 
 accused (s). 
 
 Privilege. — It may often be a good defence to an 
 action for libel or slander that the libel was written or 
 the slander uttered on an occasion which was privi- 
 leged ; that is, when the circumstances afforded the 
 defendant an excuse sufficient in the eye of the law 
 for writing the libel or uttering the slander. In some 
 cases this privilege is absolute, and when clearly estab- 
 lished is a complete defence ; in other cases it is only 
 qualified, and will not be a good defence if the plaintiff 
 succeed in proving actual malice. 
 
 I. Absolute Privilege. — The cases of absolute 
 privilege may generally be summarised under the heads 
 of parliamentary proceedings, judicial proceedings, 
 military or naval proceedings, and communications on 
 state matters made by one minister to another, or to 
 the Crown. 
 
 (a) Parlia- 
 mentary pro- 
 ceedings. 
 
 Statements made by members of either House of 
 Parliament in their places in the House, though such 
 statements may be untrue to their knowledge, cannot 
 be made the foundation of civil or criminal proceedings, 
 however injurious they may be to the interests of a 
 third person. And a conspiracy to make such state- 
 ments would not make the persons guilty of it amenable 
 to the criminal law (t). But though a member of 
 Parliament may in his place in the House say boldly 
 and fearlessly whatever he thinks may produce an 
 effect, and cannot be made answerable in an action of 
 slander for words so spoken, yet he is liable for what 
 he says elsewhere, and he may be sued for subse- 
 quently publishing defamatory matter uttered in the 
 House, even though such publication ^Yere for the 
 purpose of correcting a newspaper version of his 
 
 (s) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 64, s. 8. 
 
 it) Ex parte Wasmx, L. R. 4 Q. B. 573. 
 
SLANDER AND LIBEL. 175 
 
 words («)• But if a speech delivered in Parliament chap.viii. 
 were bondfdc published by a member for the informa- 
 tion of his constituents, it would be privileged (x). 
 
 A petition to Parliament is also absolutely privi- 
 leged (>/), and by 3 & 4 Vict. c. 9, complete protection 
 is given to persons who, acting by order or under the 
 authority of either House of Parliament, publish 
 such reports, papers, votes, or proceedings of that 
 House as it may have deemed fit or necessary to be 
 published. 
 
 It has been laid down in general terms that " neither (j) judicial 
 party, witness, counsel, jury, or judge can be put to proceedings, 
 •answer civilly or criminally for words spoken in 
 ■office " (z). Accordingly, the Court quashed an indict- 
 ment against a justice of the peace for saying to the 
 grand jury at sessions: "You have not done your 
 duty ; you have disobeyed my commands ; you are a 
 seditious, scandalous, corrupt, and perjured jury " (z). 
 With regard to a judge, it has been well established by 
 a series of decisions that no action will lie against him 
 for any words spoken by him whilst sitting in his 
 judicial capacity in a court of justice, even though the 
 plaintiff alleges that the words were spoken maliciously, 
 and without reasonable or probable cause («) ; and so 
 an action for slander was held to be not maintain- 
 able where a judge was alleged to have said to the 
 plaintiff, " You are a harpy, preying on the vitals of 
 the poor " (a). 
 
 But a meeting of the London County Council for 
 granting music and dancing licences is a meeting for 
 performing administrative and not judicial functions, 
 ,and so statements made thereat by a member are not 
 .absolutely privileged. Such member is only entitled 
 
 («) Rex v. Greece;/, 1 II. & S. 273. 
 (x) See IVason v. Waller, L. R. 4 Q. B. 73, at p. 95. 
 (y) Lake v. King., 1 Mod. 58. 
 
 z) Rex v. Skinner, Lofft, 55 ; see also Dawkins v. Rokcby, L. E. 
 ;7 H. of L. 744. 
 
 (d) See Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3 Ex. 220. 
 
176 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap. viii. to the qualified privilege which exists where a state- 
 ment is made on a privileged occasion, bond fide, and 
 without malice (6). 
 
 Advocates. 
 
 Witnesses. 
 
 (c) Military or 
 naval pro- 
 ceedings. 
 
 Words spoken by an advocate before a court of 
 justice with reference to and in the course of a judicial 
 inquiry, though uttered maliciously — that is to say, not 
 with the object of supporting his client's case — and 
 without any justification, or from personal ill-will to- 
 wards the person defamed, and irrelevant to the issues 
 of fact before the Court, are absolutely privileged, and 
 no action can be brought in respect of them (c). 
 
 The evidence of a witness given in a court of justice 
 with reference to the inquiry or case which is there 
 proceeding, even if it be malicious, is privileged, and a 
 civil action cannot be brought in respect of it ; but he 
 is not necessarily protected if he states something 
 altogether out of the character and sphere of a witness, 
 or dehors the matter in hand. Thus, for example, if 
 whilst the witness is in the box a man were to come 
 in at the door, and the witness were to exclaim, " That 
 man picked my pocket," such an expression as that, 
 made without reference to the matter in hand, would 
 hardly be privileged (d) . 
 
 The same immunity from actions which is given to 
 witnesses before the ordinary courts of justice is ex- 
 tended to military or naval men, so far as relates to> 
 the evidence given and the reports handed in by them 
 as witnesses relative to the subject of inquiry before a. 
 court-martial or other properly constituted court of in- 
 quiry held to consider some matter of naval or military 
 discipline (e). 
 
 (b) Royal Aquarium Society, Limited v. Parkinson (1892), 1 Q. B. 
 431. 
 
 (c) Minister v. Lamb, 11 Q. B. D. 588 ; see also Pedlcy v. Morris, 
 65 L. T. 526, where written objections to a solicitor's bill of costs were 
 held privileged. 
 
 (d) Seaman v. Netherclift, 1 C. P. D. 540, 2 C. P. D. 53. 
 
 (e) See Dawkins v. Rokeby, L. R. 7 H. of L. 744 ; see also Dawkins- 
 v. Paulet, L. R. 5 Q. 13. 94. 
 
SLANDER AND LIBEL. 177 
 
 Lastly, for reasons of public policy, every comrnuni- chap.viii. 
 
 cation relating to state matters, made by one minister (d) Matters of 
 
 to another, or to the Crown, is absolutely privi- state ' 
 leged(/). 
 
 II. Qualified Privilege. — In cases of absolute pri- 
 vilege, as we have seen, even the existence of actual 
 malice, or malice in fact, will not destroy the protection 
 given by such privilege. But there are cases where 
 the privilege is only cpaalified ; that is to say, it affords 
 prima facie a protection to a defendant sued for 
 defamation, so that a plaintiff, in order to render the 
 defendant liable for such defamation, must prove actual 
 malice. Malice in law exists where there is a wrongful Malice in law. 
 act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse (<y) ; 
 and it is implied where a person is libelled, or 
 where slander of an actionable kind is uttered against 
 him. But if the occasion of the libel or slander be pri- 
 vileged, the presumption of malice is rebutted, and the 
 onus of proving malice in fact lies on the plaintiff (/;). Malice in fact. 
 Even a finding of the jury that the privilege has 
 been exceeded will not be sufficient for the plaintiff 
 unless they also find malice (/). Perhaps the most 
 succinct exposition of the law on this subject will be 
 found in the judgment of Parke, B., in Toogood v. 
 Spiffing (k) : "In general, an action lies for the 
 malicious publication of statements which are false 
 in fact and injurious to the character of another 
 (within the well-known limits as to verbal slander), 
 and the law considers such publication as malicious 
 unless it is fairly made by a person in the discharge 
 of some public or private duty, whether legal or 
 
 (/) ChaUerton v. Sear/an/ of State, for India (1895), 2 Q. B. 189. 
 
 (g) Bromage v. Prossrr. i B. & C. 247. 
 
 (h) Ibid. ; Capital and Counties Banli v. Re?ily, 7 App. Cas. 741 ; 
 Jenoure v. Delmege (1891), App. Cas. 73. A jury may infer malice 
 where from anger or some other wrong motive a person makes a defama- 
 tory statement, without caring whether it is true or not; lloyal 
 Aquarium Society, Limited, v. Parkinson (1892), 1 Q. B. 481. 
 
 (i) Nevill v. Fine Art avd General Insurance Company (1897), App. 
 Cas. 68. 
 
 (£) 1 C. M. &R. 181, 193. 
 
 E.T. N 
 
178 ' OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap.viii. moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters 
 where his interest is concerned. In such cases the 
 occasion prevents the inference of malice which the 
 law draws from unauthorised communications, and 
 affords a qualified defence, depending upon the ab- 
 sence of actual malice. If fairly warranted by any 
 reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, 
 such communications are protected for the common 
 convenience and welfare of society, and the law has 
 not restricted the right to make them within any 
 narrow limits " {I). Thus, an action cannot be main- 
 tained against a master for a character which he has 
 fairly and honestly given of his servant to those who 
 made inquiries of him ; but if it be proved that he 
 maliciously gave a bad character when the servant 
 deserved a good one, he will be liable to an action (m). 
 He may also warn his other servants not to associate 
 with a servant whom he has dismissed on suspicion of 
 dishonesty (n). And where a railway company, which 
 had dismissed a guard for gross neglect of duty, pub- 
 lished his name in a monthly circular addressed to 
 their servants, stating therein the fact of his dismissal, 
 and the ground of such dismissal, it was held that 
 such publication was privileged (o) . 
 
 Statements made without malice and in the honest 
 belief of their truth by a member of a Board of 
 Guardians at a meeting of the Board, concerning their 
 clerk, in a discussion as to his accounts, are privileged, 
 notwithstanding the fact that reporters, in accordance 
 with the Board's usual custom, are allowed to be 
 present (p). And where a borough head constable, in 
 pursuance of the directions of the magistrates, given 
 to facilitate business at the annual licensing meeting, 
 issued to all persons having business at the meeting 
 
 {I) See also Harrison v. Bush, 5 E. & B. 344; Stuart v. Bell (1891), 
 2 Q. B. 341. 
 
 (m) Child v. Affleck, 9 B. & C. 403 ; Fountain v. Boodle, 3 Q. B. 5. 
 (n) Somcrville v. Hawkins, 10 C. B. 583. 
 
 (o) Hunt v. Great Northern Railway Company (1891), 2 Q. B. 189 
 (p) Pittard v. Oliver (1891), 1 Q. B. 474. 
 
SLANDER AND LIBEL. 179 
 
 CHAP.VIII. 
 
 a copy of his report made to the magistrates, stating 
 his grounds of objection to the renewal of licences, it 
 was held that the publication of the report in this way- 
 was on a privileged occasion (q) . 
 
 Again, a communication fairly and honestly made 
 in protection of one's own interests will be privileged ; 
 so a man who believed that his debtor had committed 
 an act of bankruptcy and left his place, was held justi- 
 fied in giving auctioneers who were about to sell his 
 debtor's goods notice of such act of bankruptcy (r). 
 And if the communication when made by him would 
 be privileged, so would it be if made by his solicitor 
 acting for him in the matter (s) . A tenant of a house 
 may complain to the landlord of the conduct of a 
 workman whom the landlord has sent to do repairs (t). 
 
 So, too, communications may be privileged from the 
 confidential relationship existing between two persons. 
 Thus, a lady may be warned by a near relation of the 
 character of her suitor (u) ; and a report sent by the 
 directors of a company to the shareholders, which con- 
 tains a statement by the auditors that the accounts 
 have been badly kept by u the secretary, is prima facie 
 privileged (x) . 
 
 Further, a man who has suffered a grievance at the 
 hands of a public official may complain to the proper 
 authorities (#). 
 
 To support a defence of privilege it must be shewn 
 that the person to whom a defamatory statement is 
 published had an interest or duty in the matter with 
 
 (q) Andrews v. Nott Bower (1895), 1 Q. B. 888. 
 
 Ir) Blac/cham v. Pucjh, 2 C. B. 611. 
 
 (s) Baker v. Carrick (1891), 1 Q. B. 838. See as to publication by 
 solicitor, ante, p. 169. 
 
 (t) Toogood v. Sparing, 1 C. M. & R. 181. 
 
 (u) Todd v. Hawkins, 2 M. & Rob. 20. 
 
 (x) Lawless v. Anglo -Egyptian Cotton and Oil Company, L. R. 4 Q. B. 
 262. 
 
 (y) See Harrison v. Bush, 5 E. & B. 344 ; Woodward v. Lander, 
 
 6 C. & P. 548. 
 
 N 2 
 
180 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap.viii. w hich the statement deals : it will not be sufficient 
 that the author of the statement reasonably believed 
 in the existence of such interest or duty. Thus, a 
 ratepayer who writes to a Board of Guardians that A. 
 secured his election as guardian by treating or other 
 improper means cannot set up privilege because the 
 guardians are not the persons to take action in the 
 matter (z). Again, if A. writes a letter which he 
 intends to send to B., and which would be privileged 
 if so sent, but by mistake he puts it into an envelope 
 directed to C, who is not interested in its subject- 
 matter, and who reads it, A. cannot, it seems, suc- 
 cessfully set up privilege («) . 
 
 Publication of The publication without malice of an accurate report 
 ceedii)gs P1 ° °f what has been said or done in a judicial proceed- 
 ing in a court of justice is a privileged publication, 
 although what was said or done would, but for the 
 privilege, be libellous against an individual and action- 
 able at his suit, and this is true although what is pub- 
 lished purports to be, and is, a report not of the whole 
 judicial proceeding, but only of a separate part of it, 
 if the report of that part is an accurate report thereof 
 and published without malice (b). So, too, the publi- 
 cation without malice of an accurate report of a judicial 
 proceeding, which is ex parte and preliminary only 
 {e.g., an application to magistrates for the issue of a 
 summons for perjury), but which is held in open 
 court, is privileged (c). With regard to a libel pub- 
 lished in a newspaper, a recent Act specially enacts 
 that a fair and accurate report in a newspaper of pro- 
 ceedings publicly heard before any Court exercising 
 
 (z) Hcbclitch v. Marlliatine (1894), 2 Q. B. 54, disapproving tlie 
 dictum of Fitzgerald, B., in the Irish case of Warinq v. McC'ahhn, 
 Ir. Rep. 7 C. L. 282. 
 
 (a) Hebditrh v. J/acIhcainc, supra, disapproving Tompson v. Dash- 
 wood, 11 Q. B. D. 43. 
 
 (6) jUaaloiigollv. Knight, 25 Q. B. D. 1, at p. 7, where certain dicta 
 of the H. of L. in the previous case of the same name (14 App. Cas. 194), 
 which see, are discussed. 
 
 (c) Kimber v. Press Association (1893), 1 Q. B. 65. 
 
SLANDER AND LIBEL. 181 
 
 CHAP.VIII. 
 
 judicial authority shall, if published contemporaneously 
 ■with such proceedings, be privileged (d) . 
 
 In the case of a criticism on a published book or Criticism on 
 play there is no privilege, so that the author in b °° k s s or 
 bringing an action for libel has not to prove actual 
 malice. The question in such a case will be, Does 
 the criticism overstep the limits of fair comment ? (e) . 
 
 When the judge has decided that the occasion was 
 privileged, the onus, as has been seen, will be on the 
 plaintiff to shew that the defendant was actuated by 
 malice, or did not honestly believe in the truth of the 
 statement which he made. If the defendant did so 
 believe in it, it will be immaterial that he had not 
 reasonable grounds for such belief (/) . 
 
 Injunction to restrain Publication of Libel. — The 
 
 Court has jurisdiction to restrain by an injunction, 
 even by an interlocutory one, the publication of a 
 libel. But an interlocutory injunction ought only 
 to be granted in the clearest cases, " where any jury 
 would say that the matter complained of was libellous, 
 and where, if the jury did not so find, the Court would 
 set aside the verdict as unreasonable " (g). The juris- 
 diction is not confined to libels affecting a man's trade 
 or business (h). 
 
 (d) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 64, s. 3 ; see also 44 & 45 Vict. c. 60. 
 
 (e) Mcrivala v. Carson, 20 O. B. D. 275. 
 
 (/) Clark v. Molyneuj; 3 <>. B. D. 237 ; sec ante, p. 177. 
 
 (g) Bonnard v. ferryman (1891), 2 Ch. 269 ; Collard v. Marshall 
 (1892), 1 Ch. 571 ; see also Trollopev. London Building Trades Federa- 
 tion, 72 L. T. 342. Lord Halsbury in Monson v. Tussauds (1894), 
 1 y. B. 671, did not agree that this was an absolute rule limiting the 
 jurisdiction of the Court to grant an injunction. As to restraining 
 slander see Hermann Loog v. Bean, 26 Ch. D. 306. 
 
 (h) Monson v. Tussauds, ubi supra. 
 
( 182 
 
 CHAPTEE IX. 
 
 "WHO MAY COMMIT TOETS AND TOETS BY AGENTS. 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 Liability of 
 husband for 
 wife's torts. 
 
 Married Women. — At common law a husband was 
 liable for his wife's torts, whether committed before 
 or after marriage (a) ; and in Bacon's Abridgement of 
 the Law (b) we find that "the husband is by law 
 answerable for all actions for which his wife stood 
 attached at the time of the coverture, and also for all 
 her torts and trespasses during coverture, in which 
 cases the action must be against them both ; for if she 
 alone were sued, it might be the means of making 
 the husband's property liable without giving him an 
 opportunity of defending himself." Jessel, M.E., 
 also says in Wainford v. Heyl (c) (decided in 1875) : 
 " Strictly speaking, a married woman cannot commit 
 torts ; they are torts of her husband, and therefore 
 she creates as against her husband a liability." 
 Whether this dictum of that very learned judge may 
 not be a little too wide it is unnecessary to discuss. 
 Possibly all that was meant by it was that the hus- 
 band was the person ultimately responsible for the 
 torts committed by the wife. Thus, for example, in 
 an older case — The Liverpool Adelphi Loan Association 
 v. Fairhurst (d), (decided in 1854) — Pollock, C.B., 
 said : " A feme covert is undoubtedly responsible for 
 all torts committed by her during coverture, and the 
 husband must be joined as a defendant. They are 
 liable, therefore, for frauds committed by her on any 
 
 (a) Chitty, Pleadings, 7th ed. vol. i. p. 104. 
 
 (b) Baron and Feme, tit. (L). 
 
 (c) L. R. 20 Eq. 321. 
 
 (d) 9 Ex. 422 ; see also C'apel v. Powell, 17 C. B. 1ST. S. 743, per 
 Erie, C.J. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 
 
 183 
 
 person as for any other personal wrongs." But, as is chap, ix. 
 
 there shewn, there was no liability if the fraud was 
 
 directly connected with a breach of contract by the 
 
 wife, e.g., where the wife contracting with a third 
 
 person represented to him that she was unmarried. 
 
 The wife, however, became solely responsible for her 
 
 torts where the husband had abjured the realm, or 
 
 was banished (e) ; and so, too, where the parties were 
 
 divorced or judicially separated under 20 & 21 Vict. 
 
 c. 85, s. 26, or where the wife obtained a protection 
 
 order under s. 21 of that Act. And it has been held 
 
 that, where a dissolution of marriage has taken place, 
 
 the husband cannot be joined in an action for a tort 
 
 committed by the wife during the marriage (/) . 
 
 Where a tort was committed by a husband and wife 
 
 jointly, both were sued (g). 
 
 The husband being, then, liable at common law for 
 his wife's torts committed before or after marriage, 
 let us see how recent legislation affects his position. 
 The Married "Women's Property Act, 1870, did not The Married 
 touch this question, though it did enact (s. 12) that a Z,™^^ 1 '' 
 husband married after the passing of the Act (August 1870, 1874. 
 9, 1870), should not be liable for his wife's ante- 
 nuptial debts. Then came the Amending Act of 1874 
 (37 & 38Yict. c. 50), which repealed that provision as 
 to husbands married after the passing of that Act, and 
 enacted that husbands and wives married after the 
 passing of that Act might be jointly sued for such 
 debts. It also enacted by s. 2, that, in an action 
 for the wife's ante-nuptial debts, or for damages for 
 torts committed by her before marriage, or for 
 breaches of contracts made by her before marriage, 
 the husband should be liable for the debts or damages 
 to the extent of certain assets, which may be roughly 
 described as property brought to him by his wife. 
 
 (e) Bacon's Abridgement : Baron and Feme, tit. (M). 
 (/) C'apel v. Powell, 17 C. B. N. S. 743. 
 (g) Vine v. Saunders, 4 Bing. N. C. 96. 
 
184 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 Married 
 "Women's Pro- 
 perty Act, 
 1882. 
 
 Eights and 
 liabilities of 
 married 
 
 We now come to the Act of 1882, which by s. 22 
 repeals the two preceding Acts, with the proviso that 
 such repeal is not to affect any act done or right 
 acquired while either of such Acts was in force, or the 
 rights and liabilities of any husband or wife, married 
 before the commencement of this last Act, to sue or 
 be sued under the provisions of the repealed Acts in 
 respect of debts, contracts, or torts in respect of which 
 any such right or liability shall have accrued to or 
 against such husband or wife before the commence- 
 ment of this Act. By s. 1, sub-s. 2, of the Act of 
 1882, it is enacted that "a married woman shall be 
 capable of entering into, and rendering herself liable 
 in respect of and to the extent of her separate property 
 on any contract, and of suing and being sued, either 
 in contract, or in tort, or otherwise, in all respects as 
 if she were a feme sole, and her husband 'need not' 
 be joined with her as plaintiff or defendant, or be 
 made a party to any action or other legal proceeding, 
 brought by or taken against her ; and any damages 
 or costs recovered by her in any such action or pro- 
 ceeding shall be her separate property (h) ; and any 
 damages or costs recovered against her in any such 
 action or proceeding shall be payable out of her 
 separate property, and not otherwise" (i). 
 
 S. 12 gives to every married woman the same 
 civil and criminal remedies against all persons, 
 including her husband, " for the protection and 
 security of her own separate property," as if such 
 property belonged to her as a, feme sole, but with this 
 exception she cannot sue her husband for a tort. 
 The section does not empower him to sue her (k). 
 
 (h) This is so, whether she sues alone or jointly with her husband : 
 Beasley v. Money (1891), 1 Q. B. 509. 
 
 (i) By the M. W. P. Act, 1893, the Court may in any action or pro- 
 ceeding instituted by a married woman order payment of the opposite 
 party's costs out of property which is subject to a restraint on antici- 
 pation. 
 
 (k) She cannot prosecute her husband for a personal libel : Reg. v. 
 Mayor of London, 16 Q. B. D. 772. And it would appear that, if 
 divorced, she cannot sue her husband for a personal tort committed 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 185 
 
 Let us now look at s. 13, which deals (inter alia) chap, ix. 
 with the wife's ante-nuptial torts. That section Ante-nuptial 
 enacts that " a woman after her marriage shall con- torts - 
 tinue to be liable in respect of, and to the extent of, 
 her separate property, for all debts contracted and all 
 contracts entered into or wrongs committed by her 
 before her marriage, including any sums for which 
 she may be liable as a contributory, either before or 
 after she has been placed on the list of contributories, 
 under and by virtue of the Acts relating to joint-stock 
 companies ; and she may be sued for any such debt 
 and for any liability in damages or otherwise under 
 any such contract or in respect of any such wrong ; 
 and all sums recovered against her in respect thereof, 
 or for any costs relating thereto, shall be payable out 
 of her separate property ; and as between her and her 
 husband, unless there be any contract between them 
 to the contrary, her separate property shall be deemed 
 to be primarily liable for all such debts, contracts, or 
 wrongs, and for all damages and costs recovered in 
 respect thereof : provided always that nothing in this 
 Act shall operate to increase or diminish the liability 
 of any woman, married before the commencement of 
 this Act for any such debt, contract or wrong as afore- 
 said, except as to any separate property to which she 
 may become entitled by virtue of this Act, and to 
 which she would not have been entitled for her 
 separate use under the Acts hereby repealed, or 
 otherwise, if this Act had not passed." 
 
 The 14th section deals with the liability of a Husband 
 husband for the ante-nuptial debts, contracts, or torts antenuptial 
 of the wife, enacting that " a husband shall be liable debts, con- 
 fer the debts of his wife contracted, and for all con- "f^ 0113 
 tracts entered into and wrongs committed by her, certain extent. 
 
 during coverture : Phillips v. Barnett, 1 Q. B. D. 436. If a husband 
 has a right to enter a house, the separate property of his wife, against 
 her will, which is not clear, he cannot delegate this right, and a third 
 person, who by the authority of the husband enters the house, may be 
 sued in trespass by her : Wclclon v. De Bathe, 14 Q. B. D. 339. 
 
186 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, ix. before marriage, including any liabilities to which she 
 may be so subject under the Acts relating to joint- 
 stock companies as aforesaid, to the extent of all 
 property whatsoever belonging to his wife which he 
 shall have acquired or become entitled to from or 
 through his wife, after deducting therefrom any 
 payments made by him, and any sums for which 
 judgment may have been bond fide recovered against 
 him in any proceeding at law in respect of any such 
 debts, contracts, or wrongs for or in respect of which 
 his wife was liable before her marriage as aforesaid ; 
 but he shall not be liable for the same any further 
 or otherwise ; and any Court in which a husband 
 shall be sued for any such debt [sic] shall have 
 power to direct any inquiry or proceeding which it 
 may think proper for the purpose of ascertaining the 
 nature, amount, or value of such property : provided 
 always that- nothing in this Act contained shall 
 operate to increase or diminish the liability of any 
 husband, married before the commencement of this 
 Act, for or in respect of any such debt or other 
 liability of his wife as aforesaid." 
 
 Procedure. The procedure in actions for these ante-nuptial 
 
 liabilities of the wife is prescribed by s. 15. "A 
 husband and wife may be jointly sued in respect of 
 any such debt or other liability (whether by contract 
 or for any wrong) contracted or incurred by the wife 
 before marriage as aforesaid, if the plaintiff in the 
 action shall seek to establish his claim, either wholly 
 or in part, against both of them ; and if in any such 
 action, or in any action brought in respect of any 
 such debt or liability against the husband alone, it is 
 not found that the husband is liable in respect of any 
 property of the wife so acquired by him, or to which 
 he shall have become so entitled as aforesaid, he shall 
 have judgment for his costs of defence, whatever may 
 be the result of the action against the wife if jointly 
 sued with him ; and in any such action against hus- 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 187 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 1882. 
 
 band and wife jointly, if it appears that the husband 
 is liable for the debt or damages recovered, or any 
 part thereof, the judgment to the extent of the 
 amount for which the husband is liable shall be a 
 joint judgment against the husband personally, and 
 against the wife as to her separate property ; and as 
 to the residue, if any, of such debt and damages, the 
 judgment shall be a separate judgment against the 
 wife as to her separate property only." 
 
 The effect, then, of sections 13, 14, and 15, of the Act Effect of the 
 of 1882 is, that where a marriage has taken place on women's 
 or after the commencement of the Act — that is, on or Property Act, 
 after January 1, 1883 — the wife is liable for her ante- 
 nuptial debts, contracts, or torts, and may be sued for 
 them, and all sums recovered against her are to be 
 paid out of her separate property ; the husband is also 
 liable for them, but not beyond the amount of the 
 property which he has acquired or become entitled to 
 from or through his wife ; and in actions for these ante- 
 nuptial debts, contracts, or torts of the wife, the husband 
 may be sued jointly with the wife or alone ; if it is not 
 found that the husband is liable, he may have judg- 
 ment for his costs ; if it is found that he is liable for 
 the amount recovered, or part thereof, and he is sued 
 jointly with the wife, the judgment, to the extent of 
 the amount for which he is liable, shall be a joint one 
 against the husband personally, and against the wife 
 as to her separate property, there being a separate 
 judgment for any further amount recovered against 
 the wife as to her separate estate. 
 
 With regard to torts committed by or against a 
 wife during marriage, s. 1, sub-s. 2, of the Act of 
 1882, as we have seen, shews that she may be sued 
 or sue in respect of them as a feme sole ; that her 
 husband need not be joined with her as plaintiff or 
 defendant ; and that any damages or costs recovered 
 against her in such actions are payable out of her 
 separate estate, and not otherwise. This sub-section, 
 
188 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, ix. however, does not do away with the common law 
 liability of a husband for the torts of his wife com- 
 mitted during marriage, but merely enables a person 
 to sue the wife alone if he chooses to do so (I) . 
 
 Infants. — As a general rule, infants are liable for 
 
 torts (m) : thus, an action can be maintained against 
 an infant for a slander (n) ; or for wrongfully 
 detaining another's goods which have improperly come 
 into his possession (o) ; or for money embezzled (p), 
 where the action, though in form an action ex contractu, 
 was held to be in substance one ex delicto. But if an 
 action, though framed in tort, is really founded on 
 contract, it cannot succeed against an infant. There- 
 fore, where an infant hired a horse for a ride, and 
 injured it by immoderate riding, an action for the 
 injury caused by such immoderate riding was held 
 not to lie, Lord Kenyon saying: "If it were in the 
 power of a plaintiff to convert that which arises out of 
 a contract into a tort, there would be an end of that 
 protection which the law affords to infants" (q). If, 
 however, the wrongful act is outside the object and 
 purpose of the contract, or forbidden by it, an action 
 may be brought for it. Thus, where an infant, a 
 Cambridge undergraduate, hired a mare for riding, 
 for seven shillings, and was told that she was not fit 
 for jumping (the charge for an animal so fit being one 
 guinea), and the infant lent the mare to a friend, who, 
 in trying to force the mare over a fence, transfixed 
 her to a stake and killed her, it was held that the 
 infant was liable, and that he had committed a trespass 
 just as much as if he had gone into a field and taken 
 out the mare and killed her (r) . 
 
 (Z) Seroka v. Kaltenberg, 17 Q. B. D. 177. 
 (to) See Bacon's Abridgement : Infant (H.). 
 (») Dp fries v. Davis, 1 Bing. N. C. 692. 
 (o) Mills v. Graham, 1 B. & P. N. R. 140. 
 (p) Bristvii) v. Eastman, 1 Esp. 172. 
 (q) Joinings v. Rundall, 8 T. R. 335. 
 (?•) Barnard v. Haggis, 14 C. B. N. S. 45. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 189 
 
 Again, where a contract is induced by the false chap, ix. 
 representations of an infant, an action of deceit will 
 not lie against him. Therefore, where A. was induced 
 to exchange mares with B. (an infant) by B.'s falsely 
 and fraudulently warranting his mare to be sound, 
 whereas it was not sound, an action by A. against B. 
 for deceit failed on demurrer to the declaration, the 
 Court saying that, where the substantial ground of 
 action rests on promises, the plaintiff cannot, by 
 changing the form of action, render a person liable 
 who would not have been liable on his promise (s). 
 
 Jlastei- and Servant. — Upon the principle that 
 " qui facit per alium facit per se," the master is 
 responsible for the acts of his servants ; and that 
 person is undoubtedly liable who stood in the relation 
 of master to the wrongdoer — he who selected him as Common law 
 his servant, from the knowledge of or belief in his skill jJinster^fbr 
 and care, and who could remove him for misconduct, torts of 
 and whose orders he was bound to receive and obey ; 
 and whether such servant has been appointed by the 
 master directly, or intermediately through the inter- 
 vention of an agent authorised by him to appoint 
 servants for him, can make no difference (t). 
 
 If we want a reason for a rule so obviously founded 
 on principles of justice, we may find one in the remarks 
 of Lord Cranworth in Bartonshill Coal Company v. 
 Bcid (u), where he says: "Where an injury is occa- 
 sioned to any one by the negligence of another, if the 
 person injured seeks to charge with its consequences 
 any person other than him who actually caused the 
 damage, it lies on the person injured to shew that the 
 circumstances were such as to make some other person 
 responsible. In general, it is sufficient for this pur- 
 pose to shew that the person whose neglect caused 
 
 (s) Green v. GreenbanJc, 2 Mar. 485. 
 
 (t) Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499. As to appointment of 
 "agent of necessity " see Gwilliam v. Twist (1895), 2 Q. B. 84. 
 [u) 3 Macii. H. of L. Cas. 266, at p. 282. 
 
 st 1 waul 
 
190 OUTLINES OF TOETS. 
 
 chap, ix. the injury was, at the time when it was occasioned, 
 acting, not on his own account, but in the course of 
 his employment as a servant in the business of a 
 master, and that the damage resulted from the ser- 
 vant so employed not having conducted his master's 
 business with due care. In such a case the maxim 
 ' Eespondeat superior ' prevails, and the master is 
 responsible. 
 
 "Thus, if a servant, driving his master's carriage 
 along the highway, carelessly runs over a bystander, 
 or if a gamekeeper, employed to kill game, carelessly 
 fires at a hare so as to shoot a person passing on the 
 ground, or if a workman, employed by a builder in 
 building a house, negligently throws a stone or brick 
 from a scaffold and so hurts a passer-by — in all these 
 cases (and instances might be multiplied indefinitely), 
 the person injured has a right to treat the wrongful or 
 careless act as the act of the master. If the master 
 himself had driven his carriage improperly, or fired 
 carelessly, or negligently thrown the stone or brick, he 
 would have been directly responsible, and the law does 
 not permit him to escape liability because the act 
 complained of was not done with his own hand. He 
 is considered as bound to guarantee third persons 
 against all hurt arising from the carelessness of him- 
 self or of those acting under his orders in the course 
 of his business." 
 
 "But the liability by virtue of the principle of the 
 relation of master and servant must cease where the 
 relation itself ceases to exist ; and no other person 
 than the master of such servant can be liable, on the 
 simple ground that the servant is the servant of 
 another, and his act the act of another ; consequently, 
 a third person entering into a contract with the master, 
 which does not raise the relation of master and servant 
 at all, is not thereby rendered liable." This is well 
 shewn by the old case of Quarman v. Bxirnett{x). 
 
 (x) 6 M. & W. 499. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 191 
 
 There the owners of a carriage were in the habit of CHAP - IX - 
 hiring horses from the same person to draw it for a 
 day or drive, and the owner of the horses provided a 
 driver, through whose negligence an injury was done 
 to a third party, and it was held that the owners of 
 the carriage were not liable for such injury. It was 
 also held that it made no difference that the owners 
 of the carriage had always been driven by the same 
 driver, or that they had always paid him a fixed sum 
 for each drive, or that they had provided him with a 
 livery which he left at their house at the end of each 
 drive, and that the injury in question was occasioned 
 by his leaving the horses whilst so depositing the 
 livery in their house. But if in a case of this kind 
 the person who has entered into the arrangement 
 with the livery-stable keeper were to assent to the 
 wrongful act of the driver whereby the injury was 
 done, or give encouragement to its being done, and 
 thus become dominus pro tempore, he would be liable 
 for its consequences (y) . The authority of these cases 
 has been recognized in Jones v. Mayor of Liverpool (z), 
 where it was held that a corporation owning water- 
 carts drawn by horses belonging to a contractor, in 
 whose employment the drivers also were, was not liable 
 for an injury caused to a person by the negligence of 
 one of the drivers. 
 
 No man can serve two masters, but a man may be 
 in the permanent employment of one person and yet 
 for a particular job be to all intents and purposes the 
 servant of another, so as to render that other liable 
 for his wrongful acts. Thus, in Murray v. Currie (a) 
 the defendant, who was the owner of a ship, employed 
 a stevedore to unload his vessel. The stevedore em- 
 ployed his own labourers, amongst whom was the 
 plaintiff, and also one of the defendant's crew named 
 Davis, whom he paid, and over whom he had entire 
 
 (y) M'Laughlin. v. Pri/or, 4 M. & G. 48. 
 
 (s) 14 Q. B. D. 890. See Donovan v. Laing (1893), 1 Q. B. 629, 633. 
 
 \a) L. E. 6 C. P. 24. Cf. now p. 237, post. 
 
192 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, ix. control, to assist them in unloading. The plaintiff, 
 whilst engaged in the work, was injured by the negli- 
 gence of Davis, and thereupon brought an action 
 against the defendant. The defendant was not liable, 
 as Davis was, for the time, doing the work of an 
 independent contractor — the stevedore — and altogether 
 under his control. Brett, J., said: "I apprehend it 
 to be a true principle of law that if I lend my servant 
 to a contractor, who is to have the sole control and 
 superintendence of the work contracted for, the in- 
 dependent contractor is alone liable for any wrongful 
 act done by the servant whilst so employed. The 
 servant is doing, not my work, but the work of the 
 independent contractor " (b) . It is well also to bear 
 in mind that, in ascertaining who is liable for the act 
 of a wrongdoer, one must look to the wrongdoer him- 
 self, or to the first person in the ascending line, who 
 is the employer, and has control over the work (c) . 
 The payment of wages will not decide whose servant 
 the wrongdoer is. Thus, a colliery company, having 
 begun sinking a shaft in their colliery, for which pur- 
 pose they had fixed an engine near the mouth of the 
 shaft, agreed with one Whittle for the sinking and 
 excavating at a certain price per yard, Whittle to find 
 all the labour, and the company to provide and place 
 at the disposal of Whittle the necessary engine-power, 
 ropes, and hoppets, with an engineer (who was em- 
 ployed and paid by the company), to work the engine, 
 the engine and engineer to be under the control of 
 Whittle. The plaintiff, who was one of the men 
 employed and paid by Whittle, whilst working at the 
 bottom of the shaft, was injured by the negligence of 
 the engineer. In an action by the plaintiff against, 
 the company, it was held that, though the engineer 
 remained the general servant of the company, and 
 
 (6) The defendant no doubt would have been liable if he had 
 retained control over Davis : Union Steamship Company v. Claridgc 
 (1894), App. Cas. 185. 
 
 (c) See per Willes, J., L. R. 6 C. P. at p. 27. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 193 
 
 was paid by them, yet, as he was under the orders and chap , ix. 
 control of Whittle at the time the injury was inflicted, 
 he was acting as the servant of Whittle and not of the 
 company, and so the company were not liable (tZ). 
 If, however, the agreement had been that whereas 
 Whittle was to sink the shaft, and get away the soil, 
 and do all the necessary work to make a proper shaft, 
 yet that incidentally to this work the defendants had 
 undertaken to do part of it themselves by means of 
 their machinery and servants — so that this part of the 
 work would have been carried on independently of 
 Whittle, and not under his control — the defendants 
 would have been liable (d). 
 
 In a later case the defendants contracted to lend a 
 crane with a man in charge of it to a firm engaged in 
 loading a ship. The man in charge of the crane 
 received orders from the firm or 'their servants as to 
 the working of the crane and the defendants had no 
 control in the matter. Owing to the negligence of 
 this man the plaintiff, a servant of the firm, was 
 struck and injured. It was held that, though the 
 man in charge remained the general servant of the 
 defendants, yet as they had parted with the power of 
 controlling him in the working of the crane they were 
 not liable for the consequences of his negligence. It 
 was further held that it is immaterial in such a case 
 whether a servant has been lent for a consideration 
 or gratuitously (e). If the case had been that owing 
 to the neglect of the man in charge the crane had 
 been allowed to get out of order, and thereby the 
 plaintiff was injured, the defendants might have been 
 liable (e). 
 
 The above cases will probably be sufficient to enable 
 one to determine — provided, of course, that the true 
 facts are known — whether or not the relation of 
 
 (d) Rourk-c v. White Moss Colliery Company, 2 C. P. D. 205. 
 («) Donovan v. Laing (1893), 1 Q. B. 629. 
 
 E.T. ° 
 
194 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 IX - master and servant exists between a man, who has 
 injured another by a wrongful or negligent act, 
 and a person whom it is proposed to sue for the 
 injuries sustained by reason of that act. 
 
 How liability 
 
 of master for 
 torts of 
 servant is 
 determined. 
 
 At the same time it is clear that a master is not 
 responsible for every act of his servant, and, in 
 determining his responsibility, the main point to be 
 kept in view is whether the act done was done in the 
 course of the servant's employment (/) . Take the 
 case, for instance, of a coachman. If a servant, 
 driving a carriage, in order to effect some purpose of 
 his own, wantonly strike the horses of another person 
 and cause an accident, the master will not be liable. 
 But if, in order to perform his master's orders, he 
 strikes, but injudiciously, and in order to extricate 
 himself from a difficulty, that will be negligent and 
 careless conduct for which the master will be liable, 
 being an act done in pursuance of the servant's 
 employment (g). The master may be responsible for 
 such an act though he has expressly forbidden the 
 servant to do it. In Limpus v. The London General 
 Omnibus Company (h) the plaintiff sued the defendants 
 for damage caused to his omnibus by the defen- 
 dants' driver obstructing the plaintiff's driver as 
 he was attempting to pass him on the road (a 
 species of annoyance known in London as " nursing"), 
 and thereby upsetting and damaging the plaintiff's 
 omnibus. There was no doubt that the defendants' 
 driver was acting contrary to orders, as one of the 
 regulations of the company, to which he was bound 
 to conform, directed him to drive his horses at a 
 steady pace, endeavouring as nearly as possible to 
 work in conformity with the time-list, and not on any 
 account to race with or obstruct any other omnibus, 
 or hinder or annoy the driver or conductor thereof in 
 
 (/) See Storey v. Ashton, L. R. 4 Q. B. 476 ; see and cf. Coupi 
 Company v. Maddick (1891), 2 Q. B. 413, ante, p. 93. 
 (q) Croft v. Alison, 4 B. & Al. 590. 
 (h) 1 H. & C. 526. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 195 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 his business, -whether that omnibus were one belong- 
 ing to the company or otherwise. The learned judge 
 in substance told the jury that if the defendants' 
 driver acted carelessly, recklessly, wantonly, and im- 
 properly, but in the course of his service and employ- 
 ment, and in doing that which he believed to be for 
 the interests of the defendants, the defendants would 
 be responsible for his acts, and that the instructions 
 given to the driver were immaterial ; but that, if the 
 true character of the driver's act was that it was an 
 act of his own, and done to effect a purpose of his 
 own, the defendants were not responsible. The jury 
 returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the Court held 
 that the direction of the learned judge was right. If 
 a master were to be absolved from liability merely 
 because he has told his servant not to do a particular 
 act, he might equally absolve himself from liability 
 for acts of the servant, though done in the course of 
 his employment, by telling him never to break the law. 
 
 In judging whether an act is in the course of the 
 servant's employment, one must consider what the 
 nature of the employment is. In the case just men- 
 tioned, the scope of the driver's employment was not 
 merely to drive the omnibus from terminus to termi- 
 nus but to use it in every way that would be right and 
 proper, exercising his discretion for the picking up of 
 traffic and the forwarding of his masters' interests. 
 Of course, every act supposed to be done by a servant 
 for the interests of the master is not necessarily done 
 in the course of his employment. A footman might 
 think, and think rightly, that it was for the interest 
 •of his master that he should get on the box and drive 
 the carriage, but no one would say that to do so was 
 in the scope of the footman's employment, and that 
 the master was responsible for the wilful act of the 
 footman in taking charge of the horses. 
 
 "What has been said up to this may, perhaps, be 
 summed up in these words : — A master is responsible 
 
 o 'A 
 
196 OUTLINES OP TORTS. 
 
 chap, ix. f or the act of his servant, even if it be wilful, reckless, 
 or improper, provided that the act is the act of the 
 servant done within the scope of his employment, and 
 in executing the matter for which he was engaged at 
 the time ; but if the true character of the act of the 
 servant be that it was an act of his own, and done in 
 order to effect a purpose of his own, the master is not 
 liable for it. 
 
 So far, the rule seems clear enough. But in its 
 application the Courts have drawn distinctions of so 
 fine a character that there are many cases which at 
 first sight it may seem difficult to bring within it. No 
 doubt the difficulties in these cases arise to a great 
 extent from this, that it is a question of fact whether 
 a servant, when he did the tortious act complained of, 
 Was acting within the scope of his employment and in 
 the execution of his master's business, or whether the 
 act was an act of his own, and done in order to effect 
 a purpose of his own. Let us take a few of the best 
 known of these in order of date. In Joel v. Moiison (£) 
 the. action was brought for injuries sustained by the 
 plaintiff, who was knocked down in Bishopsgate Street, 
 in the City of London, by the defendant's cart. The 
 defence set up was, that at the time of the accident and 
 for some time before and after it the cart was driven 
 between Burton Crescent and Finchley, and did not go 
 into the City at all. Parke, B., in summing up the 
 case, said: "If the servants, being on their master's 
 business, took a detour to call upon a friend, the master 
 will be responsible. If you think the servants lent 
 the cart to a person who' was driving without the 
 defendant's knowledge, he will not be responsible. Or 
 if you think that the young man who was driving 
 took the cart surreptitiously, and was not at the time 
 employed on his master's business, the defendant will 
 not be liable. The master is only liable where the 
 servant is acting in the course of his employment. 
 
 (i) 6 0. k P. 501 (1834). 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 197 
 
 If he was going out of his way against his master's chap, ix. 
 implied commands, when driving on his master's 
 business, he will make his master liable; but if he was 
 going on a frolic of his own, without being at all on 
 his master's business, the master will not be liable." 
 
 In Whatman v. Pearson (k) the defendant, a 
 contractor under a district board, was engaged in 
 constructing a sewer, and employed men with horses 
 and carts. The men so employed were allowed an 
 hour for dinner, but were not permitted to go home to 
 dine or to leave their horses and carts. One of the 
 men, contrary to his instructions, went home to dinner 
 at a place about a quarter of a mile out of the line of 
 his work, and left his horse unattended in the street 
 before his house. "Whilst the driver was absent at 
 his dinner, the horse ran away, and damaged certain 
 railings belonging to the plaintiff. The jury having 
 found that the driver was at the time acting in the 
 course of his employment, it was held by the Court 
 that they were justified in so finding, as it was clearly 
 within the general scope of his authority to conduct 
 the horse and cart during the day. 
 
 In the next case, Storey v. Ashton (I), the master 
 escaped liability for his servant's negligence. There 
 the defendant, a wine-merchant, sent his carman and 
 clerk with a horse and cart to deliver some wine and 
 bring back some empty bottles. On their return, 
 when about a quarter of a mile from the defendant's 
 offices, the carman, instead of performing his duty, 
 which was to drive to the defendant's offices, deposit 
 the bottles, and take the horse and cart to stables in 
 the neighbourhood, was induced by the clerk (it being 
 after business hours) to drive in quite another direction 
 on business of the clerk's, and while they were thus 
 driving the plaintiff was run over by the negligence 
 of the carman. On these facts it was held that the 
 
 (/:) L. R. 3 C. P. 422 (1868). 
 (I) L. R. 4 Q. B. 476 (1869). 
 
198 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, ix. defendant was not liable, for that the carman was not 
 doing the act, in doing which he had been guilty 
 of negligence, in the course of his employment as 
 servant. "His employment was to deliver the wine 
 and carry the empty bottles home ; and if he had been 
 merely going a roundabout way home the master 
 would have been liable ; but he had started on an 
 entirely new journey, on his own or his fellow- 
 servant's account, and could not in any way be said 
 to be carrying out his master's employment." 
 
 Liability of 
 master where 
 he leaves 
 servants dis- 
 cretion to do 
 or not to do 
 certain acts. 
 
 The latest case which need be mentioned shews that 
 if a servant take out his master's horse and cart 
 without the knowledge or permission of his master, 
 and not upon his master's business, but for some 
 other purpose, the mere fact that he subsequently does 
 something in the course of his usual employment — 
 e.g., by collecting a few empty casks for his master on 
 his return homewards — will not convert the journey 
 undertaken for purposes outside his employment into 
 a journey made in the ordinary course of his employ- 
 ment, so as to render his master responsible for his 
 negligence (hi). 
 
 We now come to consider a different branch of this 
 subject — namely, how far the master is liable for the 
 acts of a servant whom he authorises to do acts of 
 a certain class, and to whom he necessarily leaves a 
 certain discretion as to the time when, and the manner 
 in which, any such act is to be done. In most of the 
 cases upon this subject the actions have been brought 
 against railway companies, but of course the state- 
 ment of the law laid down as regards them will be 
 applicable to ordinary cases of master and servant. 
 The general rule is laid down by Blackburn, J., 
 in Poulton v. London and South-Western Railway 
 Company (ri) : "There can be no question, since the 
 
 (m) Rayncr v. Mit.-ltell, 2 C. P. D. 357 (1877). 
 (») L. R. 2 Q. B. 534. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 199 
 
 decision of the case of Goff v. Great Northern Railway c hap, ix. 
 
 Company (o), that where a railway company or any 
 
 other body (for it does not matter whether it is a 
 
 railway company or not) have upon the spot a person 
 
 acting as their agent, that is evidence to go to the 
 
 jury that that person has authority from them to do 
 
 all those things on their behalf which are right and 
 
 proper in the exigencies of their business — all such 
 
 things as somebody must make up his mind on behalf 
 
 of the company whether they should be done or not ; 
 
 and the fact that the company are absent, and the 
 
 person is there to manage their affairs, is prima facie 
 
 evidence that he was clothed with authority to do all 
 
 that was right and proper ; and if he happens to 
 
 make a mistake or commits an excess whilst acting 
 
 within the scope of his authority, his employers are 
 
 responsible for it." 
 
 What is the scope of his authority is, of course, 
 a question of fact(^p). But it is essential to bear in 
 mind that, though a servant may, whilst acting in 
 the performance of the general duty cast upon him, 
 neglect the particular direction as to the mode of 
 doing it, and in so doing commit a tortious act, he 
 will none the less be acting within the scope of his 
 employment (q) ; and this may be so though the act 
 be a criminal act (r) . 
 
 In Bayley's case, just referred to, the plaintiff, who 
 was travelling to Macclesfield by the defendants' rail- 
 way, was injured by being violently pulled out of a 
 carriage, just after the train had started, by one of the 
 defendants' porters, who thought, but erroneously as 
 it turned out, that the plaintiff was in the wrong train. 
 The defendants' rules directed their porters not to 
 suffer passengers to get into or out of trains in motion, 
 
 (o) 3 E. & E. 672. 
 
 (p) Bank of Sscw South Wales v. Owston, 4 App. Cas. 270. 
 {q) See per Kelly, C.B., in Bayley v. Manchester, Sheffield, and 
 Lincolnshire Railtray Company, L. R. 8 C. P. 148, at p. 153. 
 (r) JDyerv. Munday (1895), 1 l t >. B. 742, ante, p. 36. 
 
200 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, ix. an( j to do all in their power to promote the comfort 
 of the passengers and the interests of the company. 
 It was also proved to be the duty of the porters to 
 prevent passengers from going by the wrong trains 
 as far as they could do so, but they were forbidden 
 to remove passengers from such wrong trains. The 
 defendants were held liable for the injuries sustained 
 by the plaintiff, on the ground that the porter was 
 acting within the scope of his authority, however much 
 he abused such authority, and however improperly 
 and blunderingly he acted. 
 
 If, however, the servant or agent clothed with such 
 authority as we have just mentioned does some tortious 
 act which is outside the scope of that authority, or 
 which the master or principal would have had no 
 power to do himself, and has not specially authorised, 
 the master or principal will not be answerable for it (s). 
 
 Let us now illustrate these rules by a few cases, 
 taking those first in which the master has been held 
 responsible for the servant's act. 
 
 Cases in which 
 master is held 
 liable for torts 
 of servant. 
 
 In Seymour v. Grecmcood (t), the conductor of an 
 omnibus removed from the omnibus a passenger whom 
 he considered to be drunken, and used such un- 
 necessary violence in doing so that the passenger was 
 seriously injured. It was held that his master, by 
 giving him authority to remove an offending passenger, 
 necessarily gave him also authority to judge for him- 
 self who should be considered an offending passenger ; 
 so that, even if he came to a wrong conclusion as to 
 the conduct of the passenger, his master would be 
 answerable. 
 
 Again, take the case of an arrest of a supposed 
 offender by an officer of a railway company. If a 
 passenger having failed to produce, or, if requested, to 
 
 (s) Poulton v. London and South- Western Railway Company, L. E. 
 2 Q. B. 534. 
 
 (t) 6 H. & N. 359 ; 7 H. & N. 355. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 201 
 
 deliver up, a ticket shewing that his fare is paid, or ch ap, ix. 
 to pa}- his fare, refuses, on request by an officer or 
 servant of the company, to give his name and address, 
 he may be detained by an officer of the company or a 
 constable till he can be brought before a justice (?()• 
 In the ordinary course of affairs the company must 
 decide whether they will submit to what they believe 
 to be an imposition, or use this summary power for 
 their protection : and as, from the nature of the case, 
 the decision whether a particular passenger shall be 
 arrested or not must be made without delay, and as 
 the case may not be of unfrequent occurrence, it is a 
 reasonable inference that, in the conduct of their 
 business, the company have on the spot officers with 
 authority to determine, without the delay attending 
 on convening the directors, whether the servants of 
 the company shall or shall not on the company's 
 behalf apprehend a person accused of this offence (x) . 
 So where (before the repeal of the somewhat similar 
 provisions of s. 103 of 8 & 9 Yict. c. 20), a police- 
 inspector in the employment of a railway company 
 ordered the apprehension of a passenger whom he 
 erroneously supposed to have travelled without having 
 paid his fare, with intent to avoid payment thereof, 
 the company were held liable (x). 
 
 Again, in Moore v. Metropolitan Railway Company (;(/), 
 the plaintiff, who had been wrongly arrested by the 
 defendants' inspector, under s. 104 of the Act just 
 referred to (8 & 9 Vict. c. 20), for a supposed offence 
 under the now repealed s. 103, succeeded in an action 
 against the company for false imprisonment, on the 
 ground that the arrest was within the scope of the 
 
 («) See 52 & 53 Vict. c. 57, s. 5, replacing repealed provisions of 
 8 ii. 9 Vict. c. 20, s. 103. 
 
 (x) Goff v. Great Northern Railway Company, 30 L. J. Q. B. 148, a 
 decision under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, s. 103, the bulk of which was repealed 
 in 1892. See now 52 & 53 Vict. c. 57, s. 5, supra. As to Tramways, 
 see 33 i; 34 Vict. c. 78, ss. 51, 52, and 56; Raysonv. South London 
 Tramways Company (1893), 2 Q. B. 304. 
 
 (y) L. R. 8 Q. B. 36. 
 
202 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, ix. inspector's authority to promote the interests of the 
 company and protect them from the fraud specified in 
 s. 103, and that, if that fraud had been committed, 
 the arrest would have been lawful (z). 
 
 In the latest case on the subject it was held that 
 the manager of a restaurant has implied authority 
 from his employers to give into custody persons who 
 are acting in a riotous or disorderly way in the 
 restaurant, and if he blunders in so doing his em- 
 ployers are liable (a). 
 
 Cases in which Having now dealt with cases in which a master has 
 master held \, een held liable for the acts of a servant who, author- 
 
 not liable for , . . 
 
 torts of ised to do acts of a certain class, blunders or exceeds 
 
 servant. his authority whilst professing to do such acts, let us 
 
 next mention a few cases in which the master has 
 
 been held not liable, and see in what way they are to 
 
 be distinguished from those we have dealt with. 
 
 Poulton v. London and South-Western Railway Com- 
 pany (b) will be found very instructive on this point. 
 There the plaintiff, having taken a horse to an agri- 
 cultural show by the defendants' railway, was entitled, 
 under arrangements advertised by the defendants, to 
 take the horse back free of charge on the production 
 of a certificate. The plaintiff accordingly produced a 
 certificate, and the horse was put into a box without 
 payment or booking, and the plaintiff, having taken a 
 ticket for himself, proceeded by the same train. At 
 the end of the journey the station-master demanded 
 payment for the carriage of the horse. This the 
 plaintiff refused to pay, explaining the arrangements 
 which the company had made. By the orders of the 
 station-master he was then detained in custody by two 
 policemen, until it was ascertained by telegraph that 
 
 (z) See note (y) on p. 201. 
 
 (a) Ashlon v. Spiers and Pond, 9 T. L. K. 606 ; this, though the 
 Licensing Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. o. 94), s. 18, only provides for the 
 expulsion of such persons. 
 
 (ft) L. B. 2 Q. B. 534. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 203 
 
 all was right. The plaintiff then brought an action chap, ix. 
 against the company for false imprisonment, and the 
 question arose, were the defendants liable? The 
 Court held that they were not. But how is this case 
 to be distinguished from those already mentioned — • 
 e.g., from Moore v. Metropolitan Railway Company? (c) 
 In both cases the officers professed to be acting and 
 intended to act in the interest of their respective 
 employers, and in neither case was any express 
 authority given to do the act complained of. The 
 distinction is this. In Moore v. Metropolitan Railway 
 Company if the offence which the officer supposed to 
 have been committed — namely, travelling without 
 having previously paid the proper fare, with intent 
 to avoid payment thereof — had been committed, the 
 company would have had power to arrest, and there- 
 fore it was to be assumed that the officer had implied 
 authority to arrest the plaintiff on their behalf (see 
 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20. ss. 103, 104 ; s. 103 is now in part 
 repealed : pp. 201, 202, ante) ; but in Poulton's case, 
 even supposing the plaintiff was not entitled to have 
 his horse carried free, and had improperly got the 
 defendants to carry him without having paid for his 
 carriage, the defendants could not legally detain the 
 plaintiff, though they might, under s. 97 of 8 & 9 Vict. 
 c. 20, detain and sell the horse. It could not then 
 be assumed that the station-master had any implied 
 authority from the defendants to do an act which they 
 had no authority to do themselves. Therefore the 
 plaintiff's remedy, if any, was against the station- 
 master, and not against the company. 
 
 Again, where a person does an act which is clearly 
 outside the authority given him by his master, the 
 master, though the act be done for his benefit, will 
 not, in the absence of ratification, be liable for it. 
 
 Thus, it has been held that a foreman porter in the 
 service of a railway company, who, in the absence of 
 
 (c) L. R. 8 Q. B. 36 
 
204 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 the station-master, is in charge of the station, has no 
 implied authority to give in charge a person whom he 
 suspects of stealing the company's property, and if 
 he gives in charge an innocent person, the company 
 are not liable (d). The ratio decidendi in this case is 
 well set out by Brett, J. : "I will assume that Holmes 
 (the foreman porter) was the person who had the con- 
 trol of the station-yard, so as to have the control of 
 anything done there in the ordinary course of business ; 
 but I think that this was not so done. It was pointed 
 out by Blackburn, J., in Poulton v. London and South- 
 western Railway Company (e), that it is not enough 
 that the act should be for the benefit of the master, 
 but it must be in the ordinary course of business, in 
 order that an authority to do it may be implied. In 
 the case of a person being arrested for breaking the 
 company's bye-laws, it may well be said that this is 
 the way in which the company carry on their business, 
 and similarly, if an officer be appointed expressly to 
 watch the company's property. I should think, if he 
 took an innocent person into custody on the charge of 
 stealing, it might well be said that the company were 
 liable ; but in this case the company had not, I think, 
 authorised Holmes to protect their goods by giving 
 into custody any one he thought right, and it was not 
 their ordinary way of carrying on their business." 
 Keating, J., also suggested that Holmes might have 
 acted from a sense of the duty which rests on every 
 one to give in charge a person who, he thinks, is com- 
 mitting a felony, and, if that were so, his conduct 
 would in no way be connected with the defendants. 
 
 The case of Allen v. London and South- Western 
 Railway Company (J ) further illustrates the general 
 proposition that, in considering whether an act is 
 within the scope of a servant's authority so as to bind 
 
 (d) Edwards v. London and North- Western Railway Company, L. B. 
 5 0. P. 445. 
 
 (c) L. E. 2 Q. B. 534. 
 (/) L. E. 6 Q B. 65.1 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 205 
 
 his master, one must consider what exactly the ser- chap, ix. 
 rant's duties are. In that case a booking-clerk in the 
 employment of the defendants, whose duties were to 
 issue tickets to passengers, to receive the money for 
 such tickets, and to keep it in a till under his charge, 
 gave into custody a person whom he alleged to have 
 attempted to rob the till. The charge of attempted 
 robbery was dismissed, and thereupon the defendants 
 were sued for assault and false imprisonment. The 
 Court held that the defendants were not liable for the 
 act of their clerk, for that such act was not done for 
 the purpose of protecting the property placed in his 
 charge, or of recovering it back, but was an act done 
 for the purpose of punishing a supposed offender for 
 something already done. There is no implied autho- 
 rity in a person having the custody of property to take 
 such steps as he thinks fit to punish a person whom 
 he supposes to have done something with reference to 
 the property which he has not done. In such a case 
 the act of punishing the offender is not anything done 
 with reference to the property ; it is done merely for 
 the purpose of vindicating justice. But it seems 
 tolerably clear that, if a person in charge of a till 
 cannot prevent another from robbing it, otherwise 
 than by giving him into custody, or if he has reason 
 to believe that the money has been actually stolen, 
 and that he can get it back by giving the thief into 
 custody, and he does so give him into custody with 
 that view, he will be held to have acted within his 
 implied authority (g). 
 
 One more case, by way of illustration, may be cited 
 on this subject. In Bolingbroke v. The Local Board 
 of Swindon (h), the defendants, who were in the occu- 
 pation of a sewage farm, had given full power for the 
 management of the farm in the most beneficial manner 
 to one Buchan. A ditch ran between the farm and 
 
 (</) See per Blackburn, J., L. R. 6 Q. B. 65 ; see also Abraham* v. 
 Deakin (1891), 1 Q. B. 516. 
 (/i) L. K. 9 C. P. 575. 
 
206 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, ix. the plaintiff's land. In order to render such ditch 
 more capable of carrying off the drainage of the farm, 
 Buchan wrongfully went upon the plaintiff's land, and 
 pared away his side of the ditch, and cut down so 
 much of the brushwood and underwood on the 
 plaintiff's side as impeded the flow of the drainage 
 along the ditch. An action for trespass was there- 
 upon brought against the defendants, but it failed, 
 on the ground that the authority expressly given to 
 Buchan to manage the farm in the most beneficial 
 manner could not be extended so as to imply an 
 authority to trespass upon another person's land for 
 that purpose, and to do an act which the defendants 
 themselves would have had no right to do. 
 
( 207 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE X. 
 
 WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS AND TORTS BY 
 
 agents — {continued). 
 
 Frauds by Servants or Agents. — The subject of chap. x. 
 fraud and deceit has been discussed in a previous 
 chapter. Suffice it to say here, that as to the liability 
 of a master or principal for the fraud of a servant 
 or agent, the law may be regarded as settled by the 
 judgment of the Court in Barwick v. English Joint 
 Stock Bank (a), where it is said: "With respect to 
 the question whether a principal is answerable for the 
 act of his agent in the course of his master's business, 
 and for his master's benefit, no sensible distinction 
 can be drawn between the case of fraud and the case of 
 any other wrong. The general rule is that the master 
 is answerable for every such wrong of the servant or 
 agent as is committed in the course of the service and 
 for the master's benefit, though no express command 
 or privity of the master be proved." But where the 
 wrongful act is done by an agent or servant, not for 
 his principal or master, but for his own private ends, 
 the principal or master is not liable (6) . 
 
 Partners. — It follows from the principles of agency, 
 coupled with the doctrine that each partner is the 
 agent of the firm for the purpose of carrying on its 
 business in the usual way, that a partnership is liable 
 in damages for the torts of any one of its members in 
 conducting the business of the partnership (c). So, 
 too, as regards fraud — (1) Where one partner, acting 
 
 (a) L. B. 2 Ex. 259, at p. 265. 
 
 (b) British Mutual Banking Company v. Chamv;ood Forest Railway 
 Company, 18 Q. B. D. 714 ; Marsh v. Joseph (1897), 1 Ch. 213. 
 
 (c) See Lindley Partnership, 6th e<J., 159 ; P. A. 1890, s. 10. 
 
208 OUTLINES OF TORTS 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 within the scope of his authority, as evidenced by the 
 business of the firm, obtains money, and misapplies it, 
 the firm is answerable for it. (2) Where the firm in 
 the course of its business receives money belonging to 
 other people, and one of the partners misapplies that 
 money whilst it is in the custody of the firm, the firm 
 must make it good. (3) But if a partner, in the course 
 of some transaction unconnected with the business of 
 the firm, obtains money and then misapplies it, the 
 firm is not thereby, without more, liable to make good 
 the loss (d). 
 
 Ratification of Torts. — A person not originally 
 liable for a tort committed by his servant or agent 
 may become liable by ratification of it. In Wilson v. 
 Tummnn(e), Tindal, C.J., says: "That an act done, 
 for another, by a person not assuming to act for himself, 
 but for such other person, though without any prece- 
 dent authority whatever, becomes the act of the prin- 
 cipal if subsequently ratified by him, is the known and 
 well-established rule of law. In that case, the principal 
 is bound by the act, whether it be for his detriment or 
 his advantage, and whether it be founded on a tort or 
 a contract, to the same extent as by, and with all the 
 consequences which follow from, the same act done by 
 his previous authority." Two things, therefore, are 
 necessary in order that a person may be liable for a 
 tort by the doctrine of ratification — (1) The tortfeasor 
 must at the time have assumed to act on his behalf ; 
 (2) He must have subsequently ratified the act of the 
 tortfeasor. In order that there may be a valid rati- 
 fication, there must be both a knowledge of the fact 
 to be ratified and an intention to ratify it (/) . 
 
 Liability of Servants or Agents for Torts, — An 
 
 agent or servant cannot escape liability for a tortious 
 
 (d) Lindley, Partnership, 6th ed., 166. 
 
 (e) 6 M. & G. 236, 242. 
 
 (/) Edwanh v. London and North- IV&stern Railway Company, L. R. 
 5 C. P. 445, 449 ; Hoe v. Birkenhead, dr., Railway Company, 7 Ex. 36 ; 
 Marsh v. Joseph (1897), 1 Ch. 213. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 209 
 
 act by shewing that he did it for some one else. In chap, x . 
 other words, an agent or servant is personally respon- 
 sible for his own misfeasances and positive wrongs, 
 whether he has committed them intentionally, or ignor- 
 antly, by the authority of his principal or master ; for 
 the latter could not confer upon him any authority to 
 commit a tort upon the rights or property of another (</). 
 Thus, if A. delivers his horse to a blacksmith, and he 
 delivers him to another blacksmith, who wantonly 
 lames him, A. may have an action against the latter 
 (though A. did not authorise the bailment), for he is 
 a wrongdoer (h). So if an auctioneer be employed by 
 a sheriff to sell goods which have been unlawfull} 7 
 seized upon an execution (as if the goods did not belong 
 to the execution debtor), the auctioneer who sells may 
 be liable to an action for conversion equally with the 
 sheriff (i). And so is he liable where he sells and de- 
 livers for the grantor of a bill of sale the goods com- 
 prised therein (k) . This may be taken as an example 
 of the general rule, re-affirmed in the House of Lords, 
 that " any person who, however innocently, obtains 
 possession of the goods of a person who has been 
 fraudulently deprived of them, and disposes of them, 
 whether for his own benefit or that of any other per sop, 
 is guilty of a conversion" (I). But if in such a case 
 the auctioneer does not .sell or give any title to the 
 goods, but acts as a mere intermediary or conduit-pipe 
 in delivering possession of the goods, he will not be 
 guilty of a conversion (m). 
 
 A still stronger example of the general rule that a 
 man who has done a wrong is responsible for that 
 
 (g) See Story on Agency, § 311 ; Stephens v. El wall, 4 M. & S. 259. 
 
 (h) Rolle's Abridgement : Action sur case, p. 90, O. 2, 1. 20. 
 
 (i) See Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66 : Cochrane v. lit) mill, 40 
 L. T. 744. 
 
 (k) Consolidated Company v. Curtis (1S92), 1 Q. B. 495; explaining 
 Turner v. Hockey, 56 L. J. 0. B. 301, and following Barkery, Furlomj 
 (1891), 2 Oh. 172. 
 ■ (Z) Hnllins v. Foxier, L. II. 7 H. of L. 757, at p. 795. 
 
 (?») National. Mercantile Bank v. llymill, 44 L. T. 767 ; Consolidated 
 Company v. Curtis, supra. 
 
 E.T. P 
 
210 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, x. wron g is furnished by Mill v. Hawker (n), where a 
 surveyor of a highway board, who by 25 & 26 Vict, 
 c. 61, s. 16, was bound in all respects to conform to the 
 orders of the board in the execution of his duties, re- 
 moved by their direction a lock from a gate placed by 
 the plaintiff across a path which the board alleged to be 
 a highway, and which the plaintiff contended was not. 
 The board, in directing the surveyor to remove the 
 gate, acted without jurisdiction, and it was held in the 
 Exchequer Chamber that the surveyor was liable for 
 the unlawful act of removing the gate, and that the 
 effect of s. 16, just referred to, was that it made him 
 the executive officer of the board, and any orders which 
 he might receive to carry out their lawful duties were 
 orders which he was bound to obey, but that he was 
 not justified in obeying orders which were not of that 
 description. 
 
 But mere ministerial officers of a court of justice, 
 whose duty it is to carry into effect the orders of the 
 Court, are not responsible to third parties for properly 
 carrying out such orders, although the orders made by 
 the Court, and upon which they have acted, may be 
 bad (o). 
 
 Again, where a mere intermediate agent employs a 
 person on behalf of the principal, the intermediate 
 agent is not liable for that person's tortious acts, and 
 the action must be brought against that person or 
 against the principal (p). Thus, a messenger who 
 simply delivers a letter, not knowing what is in it, is 
 not responsible for the orders it contains ; and if a 
 servant were sent with a message to a broker and 
 said, " My master desires you to distrain for rent due 
 to him," he would not be the person ordering the 
 making of the distress (q). So, too, a servant or agent 
 is not liable for the tortious acts of labourers whom he 
 
 («) L. E. 10 Ex. 92. 
 
 (o) Mill v. Smoker, L. E. 10 Ex. 92 ; Andrews v. Marris, 1 Q. B 
 3 ; Dews v. Riley, 11 C. B. 434. 
 
 (j>) See Story on Agency, § 313 ; Bennett v. Bayes, 5 H. & N. 391. 
 (q) Bennett v. Bayes, %ibi supra. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 211 
 
 has hired for his master or principal, unless indeed he chap, x. 
 has particularly ordered those acts to be done (r). 
 
 Independent, Contractors. — Though a person may Principal, as 
 he responsible for the tortious acts of his servants ^tlZhLlov' 
 acting in the course of their employment, he is not, as torts of" inde- 
 a general rule, responsible for the tortious acts of a tract™" C ° n " 
 person who is not his servant, but an independent employed by 
 contractor, or the servants of that person. " If an 
 independent contractor is employed to do a lawful 
 act, and in the course of the work he or his servants 
 commit some casual act of wrong or negligence, the 
 employer is not answerable " (s) . Thus, a butcher 
 bought a bullock and employed a licensed drover 
 to drive the animal to his slaughter-house. The 
 drover employed a boy to drive the bullock 
 along with some others. Owing to the boy's 
 negligence, mischief was done by the bullock, but 
 it was held that the butcher was not answerable 
 for it, he having employed a person exercising an 
 independent employment, through the negligence of 
 whose servant the mischief was occasioned. Accord- 
 ing to Coleridge, J., the butcher would not have 
 been liable if the drover himself had been guilty of 
 "the negligence (t). In another case, the defendant, a 
 builder, had contracted with the committee of a club 
 to make alterations in a club-bouse, and then con- 
 tracted with a gasfitter for the doing of that part of 
 the work which related to the gas-fittings. Through the 
 negligence of the gasfitter or his servants an explosion 
 took place and caused injury to the plaintiff, and 
 it was held that the defendant was not responsible 
 for such injury, but that the gasfitter was(w). 
 
 Another example of the general rule will be found 
 in Overton v. Freeman (x). In that case, A. contracted 
 
 (r) Stone v. Cartwriqht, 6 T. R. 411. 
 
 \s) Pickard v. Smith, 10 C. B. N. S. 470, at p. 480. 
 
 (t) MilKgan v. Wedge, 12 A. & E. 737. 
 
 \u) Rapson v. Cubitt, 9)1. & W. 710. 
 
 (*) 1 i C. B. 867. 
 
 P 2 
 
212 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 except (1) 
 where the act 
 ordered to be 
 done is unlaw- 
 ful ; 
 
 or (2) where 
 the work is 
 done in an 
 imperfect or 
 improper 
 manner : 
 
 with a parish to do certain paving, and entered into a 
 sub-contract with B. to lay down the paving, the 
 materials being supplied by A., and brought to the 
 spot in his carts. Preparatory to the paving, the 
 stones were laid by B.'s labourers on the pathway, 
 and left unguarded there during the night. The 
 plaintiff fell over the stones and broke his leg, 
 and thereupon brought an action against A. : held,, 
 that he was not liable, as the negligence was the 
 negligence of the servants of B., an independent con- 
 tractor. But it was intimated that if the defendant 
 had been present and directed or sanctioned the 
 doing of the act complained of, he would have been 
 responsible. 
 
 It remains now to see what exceptions there are to 
 the general rule above stated which releases a person 
 from responsibility for the torts of an independent, 
 contractor. 
 
 (1) In the first place, the general rule only applies 
 where the act ordered to be done is a lawful act, and 
 so a person who employs another to do an unlawful 
 act will be liable for damage resulting from the doing 
 of such unlawful act. For example, a gas company 
 contracted with one Watson for the laying down of 
 gas-pipes in the streets of Sheffield, but they had nO' 
 special powers to lay down such pipes in the streets. 
 Watson's workmen left on one of the streets a heap of 
 stones and earth, dug out of one of the trenches which 
 they had made for the gas-pipes. The plaintiff 
 stumbled over the heap and was injured, and it was 
 held that the gas company were liable to him in 
 damages (y). 
 
 (2) Though the thing contracted to be done for the 
 employer be not unlawful, ,yet if the damage is caused 
 by the doing of that in an imperfect or improper 
 manner, and is not caused by negligence collateral to 
 
 {y) Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Consumers' Company, 2 E. & B. 767. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 213 
 
 the contract, the employer will be liable. Thus, a c hap, x. 
 
 railway company were authorised by Act of Parliament 
 
 to construct a swing bridge over a navigable river, and 
 
 the Act provided that they should not detain vessels 
 
 navigating beyond a certain time. They employed a 
 
 contractor to construct the bridge in conformity with 
 
 the Act, but, before the work was completed, the 
 
 bridge, through some defect in its construction, could 
 
 not be opened, and the plaintiff's vessel was detained 
 
 for a long time, and the railway company were 
 
 in consequence held responsible (z). But where 
 
 defendants employed a contractor to build a bridge, 
 
 and one of his men carelessly let a stone fall on the 
 
 plaintiff, the defendants were not liable for this 
 
 collateral or casual negligence (a). 
 
 (3) "Where a person causes something to be done, °r (3) where a 
 the doing of which casts on him a duty, he cannot the^mpfoyoT 
 escape from the responsibility attaching to him of 
 seeing that duty performed, by delegating it to a 
 contractor. The case of Hole v. Sittingbourue, &c, 
 Railway Company (b) may be cited as an illustration of 
 this rule also. 
 
 So also in Pickard v. Smith (c), the defendant had a 
 coal-cellar opening by a trap-door in a platform where 
 passengers by a railway might lawfully walk. He 
 employed a coal-merchant to put coals into the cellar, 
 and, owing to the servants of the coal-merchant 
 leaving the trap-door open, the plaintiff was injured. 
 The defendant was held responsible, as there was a 
 duty upon him, as the occupier of the cellar, if he 
 caused the trap-door to be opened, to take reasonable 
 precautions not to injure persons using the platform, 
 and he could not escape responsibility by shifting that 
 duty to another person. But the coal-merchant also 
 
 (s) Hole, v. Sittingbournc and Sheerness Railway Company, 6 H. & N. 
 488. 
 
 (a) Reedi/f v. London and Korth- Western Railway Company, 4 Ex 
 244 ; 20 L. J. fix. 65. 
 
 (ft) Vbi m-pra. 
 
 (c) 10 C. B. N. S. 4/0. 
 
214 
 
 OUTLINES OF TOKTS. 
 
 chap, x. might have been made answerable for the negligence 
 of his servants (d). 
 
 Again, in Tarry v. Ashton (e) it was held by the 
 majority of the Court that where a person maintains 
 a lamp projecting over the highway for his own 
 purposes it is his duty to maintain it so as not to be 
 dangerous to the public, and he cannot get rid of his 
 liability for not having kept it in repair, by shewing 
 that he had employed a competent person to put it 
 into repair (/). And if the owner of land becomes 
 aware of a state of things existing on his premises, 
 caused though it may be by the act of a stranger, 
 which is a source of risk and danger, a duty is 
 imposed on him to guard against that risk and 
 danger (g). 
 
 or (4) where, (4) Where a man orders work to be executed, from 
 
 nature^ the wn i° n m the natural course of things injurious conse- 
 
 act, injurious quences to his neighbour must be expected to arise, 
 
 are Hkdyto 8 unless means are adopted by which such consequences 
 
 arise ; ' may be prevented, he must see that those means are 
 
 adopted, and cannot relieve himself of responsibility 
 
 by employing some one else, whether a contractor or 
 
 another person, to do what is necessary {h). 
 
 Plaintiff and defendant were respective owners of 
 two adjoining houses, plaintiff being entitled to the 
 support for his house of the defendant's soil. Defen- 
 dant contracted with a builder to pull down his house, 
 excavate the foundations, and rebuild it, the builder 
 undertaking to shore up and support the plaintiff's 
 house and make good any damage caused by the 
 works. The plaintiff's house was injured owing to 
 
 (rf) Whiteleijv. Pepper, 2 Q. B. D. 276. 
 
 (e) 1 Q. B. D. 314. 
 
 (/) See also Gray v. PtiZlen, 5 B. & S. 970 ; Dalton v. Angus, 
 6 App. Cas. 740, 829. 
 
 (g) Silvertonv. Marriott, 59 L. T. 61. 
 
 (h) Bower v. Peatc, 1 Q. B. D. 321. See Dalton v. Angus, 6 App. 
 Cas. 740 ; and cf. Hughes v. Percival, 8 App. Cas. 443. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 215 
 
 the insufficient measures taken by the builder to chap. x. 
 support it, and it was held, on the principle just 
 stated, that the defendant was liable for such 
 injury (/). 
 
 Again, the defendant was the owner of a house 
 standing at the corner of two streets between a house 
 belonging to the plaintiff and a house occupied by one 
 Barron. The defendant employed a competent archi- 
 tect and competent builders to rebuild his house, 
 which was to be a storey higher than the old one, and 
 the basement was to be somewhat lower. When the 
 house was nearly finished, the builder's workmen, for 
 the purpose of fixing a staircase, negligently, and 
 without the knowledge of the defendant or his archi- 
 tect, cut into an old portion of the party-wall, which 
 had not been rebuilt, dividing the defendant's house 
 from Barron's, in consequence of which the defendant's 
 house fell, and the fall dragged over the party-wall 
 between it and the plaintiff's house, and so injured 
 the plaintiff's house. The cutting into the first-named 
 party- wall was not authorised by the contract between 
 the defendant and the builders. Under these circum- 
 stances, it was held that a duty lay upon the defendant 
 in rebuilding his house to see that reasonable care and 
 skill were exercised in those operations which involved 
 risk to the plaintiff (but not so that he should be an 
 insurer), and that he could not get rid of his responsi- 
 bility by transferring that duty to another (j). 
 
 In one of the most recent cases on the subject, a 
 district council employed a contractor to construct a 
 sewer for them, and in consequence of his negligence 
 in doing the work a gas main was broken, and gas 
 escaping from it eventually found its way to the house 
 where the plaintiffs lived, and an explosion took place, 
 which caused injuries to them. The council were held 
 
 {i) Boiccr v. Pcate, ubi supra. 
 
 (j) Pcrcival v. Hughes, 9 Q. B. D. 441 ; in H. of L., Hughes t. 
 Pcrcival, 8 .App. Cas. 443. 
 
216 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 responsible as they had not taken reasonable precau- 
 tions to guard against the risks involved in digging 
 near gas-pipes (k). 
 
 On consideration, it will appear that there are many- 
 cases which may indifferently be placed either under 
 exception (3) or (4). 
 
 or (5) where (5) A fifth exception may perhaps be mentioned, 
 
 plied warranty an ^ that is that, where, in a contract for valuable 
 
 bytheprin- consideration, there is an implied warranty that due 
 
 cSe has^eeiT care an( ^ s ^ n ^ have been exercised in the construction 
 
 exercised. of a building or the making of an article so as to 
 
 make them reasonably fit for the purpose required, 
 
 responsibility cannot be got rid of by shewing that 
 
 any negligence in the construction of the building or 
 
 article was the negligence of an independent contractor. 
 
 Thus, in Francis v. Cockrell (I), the defendant, 
 acting on behalf of himself and others interested in 
 certain races, entered into a contract with certain 
 builders for the erection of a grand stand for the 
 purpose of viewing the races, and the defendant 
 employed a person who received five shillings (to be 
 appropriated to the race fund) from every person 
 admitted to the stand. The builders were competent 
 persons to employ for the erection of such a stand, 
 but it was negligently and improperly constructed 
 (though not to the knowledge of the defendant), and, 
 in consequence, it fell, and injured the plaintiff, who 
 was one of the persons admitted. The Court held 
 that an action was maintainable for such injuries by 
 the plaintiff against the defendant, notwithstanding 
 the fact that the defendant was free from negligence 
 himself, and had employed competent builders, on the 
 ground that there was an implied contract between 
 
 (h) Hardaker v. Idle District Council (1896), 1 Q. B. 335. See the 
 judgment of A. L. Smith, L.J. ; that of Lindley, L.J., refers to breach 
 of duty, without dwelling particularly on the dangerous nature of the 
 work. For another illustration see Black v. Christchurch Finance 
 Company (1894), App. Cas. 48. 
 
 (I) L. E. 5 Q. B. 184, 501. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 217 
 
 the plaintiff and the defendant that the stand, which ^ c hap, x. 
 
 had been let to the plaintiff and others for five shillings 
 
 apiece, was reasonably fit for the purpose for which it 
 
 was intended, subject only to this, that the defendant 
 
 did hot contract against latent defects which could not 
 
 be discovered by ordinary and reasonable modes of 
 
 examination. 
 
 This case follows Iieadliead v. Midland Railway 
 Company (in), where it was held that a general carrier 
 for hire (such as a railway company), impliedly con- 
 tracts or is bound to use due care (including in that 
 term skill and foresight), in everything that concerns 
 the safe carriage of passengers, and the making, pro- 
 curing, and using of the carriages, but he does not 
 impliedly warrant that the carriages are perfect and 
 free from latent defects which could not be discovered 
 by ordinary skill, care, or foresight, nor is any such 
 duty cast on him by the law. 
 
 Francis v. Cockrell (n) may perhaps come under 
 exception (3), as may be seen from the judgment of 
 Cleasby, B. (o), which was based upon the ground 
 that the defendant had committed a breach of duty, 
 and not upon the ground that he had broken an 
 implied warranty, a point to which Brett, M.B., calls 
 attention in Heaven v. Pender (p). 
 
 " Warranties implied by law are for the most part 
 founded on the presumed intention of the parties, and 
 ought certainly to be founded on reason, and with a 
 just regard to the interests of the party who is supposed 
 to give the warranty, as well as of the party to whom 
 it is supposed to be given " (q). And so, where a 
 person deposited two carriages with a livery-stable 
 keeper, to be kept by him for reward, and the livery- 
 
 (m) L. E. 2 Q.- B. 412, L. E. 4 Q. B. 379. 
 (n) Ubi supra, 
 (o) L. R. 5 Q. B. at p. 514. 
 (p) 11 Q. B. D. 503, at p. 513. 
 
 (q) Readhead v. Midland Railway Company, L. R. 4 Q. B. at p. 392 ; 
 Francis v. Gockrell, L. R. 5 Q. B. at p. 193. 
 
218 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 stable keeper placed them in a shed which he had 
 employed a competent builder to erect, but which was 
 blown down by a high wind, whereby the carriages 
 were damaged, it was held that, if the livery-stable 
 keeper, who was a mere bailee for hire, had done all 
 that an ordinarily careful man would do in the employ- 
 ment of the builder and the keeping of the carriages, 
 he would be exempt from liability for damage caused 
 by the negligence or improper conduct of the builder 
 of which he had no notice (r). The Court distinguished 
 this case from Francis v. Cockrell (s) by saying that, 
 in that case, the defendant occupied a position analo- 
 gous to that of a common carrier of passengers, whilst, 
 in the case under consideration, the defendant was a 
 mere private bailee, whose implied warranty would 
 not be so extensive (?•). 
 
 or (6) in cases (6) A sixth exception to the general rule is con- 
 Workmen's tained in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 
 Compensation which will be dealt with hereafter (t). 
 
 Act, 1897. 
 
 Damage caused by Animals. — We may next deal 
 with the question of the liability of the owner of 
 animals for damage caused by them. In the first 
 place, a distinction must be drawn between animals 
 that are ferce naturm and those that are mansuetce 
 naturce, though this distinction will be found to 
 disappear where a person has knowledge of the 
 mischievous propensities of one of the latter class 
 of animals. Leaving out of consideration for the 
 present mere trespasses by animals, the law will be 
 found very succinctly laid down in Hale, Pleas of the 
 Crown, vol. i. p. 430 : 
 
 "1. If the owner have notice of the quality of his 
 beast, and it doth anybody hurt, he is chargeable with 
 an action for it. 
 
 (r) Searle v. Zaverick, L. R. 9 Q. B. 122. See also Lane v. Cox 
 (1897), 1 Q. B. 415 (where unfurnished house let, no implied warranty 
 as to its condition). 
 
 is) Ubi supra. {!,) See pod, p. 231. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 219' 
 
 " 2. Though he have no particular notice that he chap, x. 
 did any such thing before, yet, if it be a beast that is 
 Jene natnne, as a lion, a bear, or a wolf, yea, an ape 
 or a monkey [or an elephant («)], if he get loose and do 
 harm to any person, the owner is liable to an action 
 for the damage ; and so I knew it adjudged in Andrew 
 Baker's ease, whose child was bit by a monkey who 
 broke his chain and got loose. 
 
 " 3. And therefore, in case of such a wild beast, or 
 in case of a bull or cow that doth damage, where the 
 owner knows of it, he must at his peril keep him up 
 safe from doing hurt, for, though he use his diligence 
 to keep him up, if he escape and do harm the owner 
 is liable to answer in damages." 
 
 Leaving out cases of trespass, therefore, there is Animals 
 no difference, so far as the liability of the owner is ZTuZ^re- 
 concerned, between an animal ferte natune and one sponsibility of 
 which, to the knowledge of the owner, has broken knZedgtof 
 through the tameness of its nature (x). Thus, where mischievous 
 the owner of a bull, who knew that the animal would P ro l Densit y- 
 run at anything red, drove it through the public 
 streets, and it attacked and injured a person who 
 wore a red handkerchief, the owner was held respon- 
 sible for the injury so caused (y). But where a horse 
 strayed on to a highway, and there kicked a child, 
 the owner was held not liable, there being nothing to 
 shew that he knew that the horse was vicious, and 
 the Court being of opinion that it was not in the 
 ordinary course of a horse's nature to do the act 
 complained of (z) . 
 
 Trespasses by Animals — Where animals fene 
 natural such as are not usually kept in confinement 
 are encouraged to settle upon the land of A., and, 
 
 (u) Filburn v. People's Palace Company, 25 Q. B. D. 258. 
 (x) Jackson v. Smithson, 15 M. & W. 563 ; May v. Burdett, 9 Q. B. 
 101. 
 (y) Hudson v. Roberts, 6 Ex. 697. 
 (:) Cox v. Burbidge, 13 C. B. N. S. 430 ; cf. Lcc v. Riley, infra. 
 
220 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, x. passing thence, trespass upon and damage B.'s crops, 
 A. is not liable, as the animals cease to be his when 
 they leave his land ; B.'s remedy, therefore, is to shoot 
 or otherwise destroy the animals. Thus, a person 
 who made two coney-burrows in his land, and put 
 coneys in them, which increased to a great number, 
 was held not liable for damage done by them to the 
 crops of his neighbour (a) . It may be that this decision 
 would nowadays be held to infringe the maxim, " Sic 
 utere tuo ot alienum non laedas ; " but, at all events, 
 it would not cover a case where a man brings to or 
 rears upon his land an extraordinary quantity of 
 game, such as pheasants, which do damage to his 
 neighbour (b) . 
 
 With regard to damages caused by the trespass of 
 animals, domestic, or mansuetce natures, such as cattle, 
 horses, and the like, the owner is responsible if such 
 damages are not too remote, and, in such a case, the 
 question as to the owner's knowledge of the propensity 
 of the animals does not arise : see Comyns' Digest, 
 Trespass (C). See also Lee v. Riley (c), where, through 
 the defect of a gate which the defendant was bound to 
 repair, his horse strayed from his farm and got into 
 an occupation road, and thence into the plaintiff's field, 
 where it kicked the plaintiff's horse, breaking its leg. 
 The defendant was liable, because what had happened 
 was a proximate consequence of his negligence. Negli- 
 gence, however, in such a case, is not necessary, for in 
 Ellis v. Loftus Iron Company (d) the defendants' horse 
 having injured the plaintiff's mare by kicking and 
 biting her through a fence separating the plaintiff's 
 land from the defendants', the defendants /were held 
 answerable, as there was an act of trespass (some part 
 of the horse's body having been over the boundary), 
 and as the damages were not too remote. 
 
 (a) Bou-hton v. Hardy, 2 Cro. Eliz. 547. 
 
 (b) Farrcr v. Nelson, 15 Q. B. D. 258. 
 
 (c) 18 C. B. N. S. 722. 
 
 (d) L. K. 10 C. P. 10. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 
 
 221 
 
 Dogs — The common usage of mankind allows dogs c hap, x. 
 a certain amount of liberty, and where a person's dog 
 commits an unauthorised trespass — for example, jumps 
 off the road into a field without its master's consent — 
 the owner is not liable (e). Again, in the recent case 
 of Sanders v. Teapc(f), where a dog, not known by 
 its owner to be mischievous, playing with other dogs, 
 jumped over a wall and fell upon the back of a person 
 who was working in a deep hole at the other side, and 
 injured him, it was held that there was no trespass for 
 which the owner was responsible. But it is otherwise 
 with authorised trespasses, and so where A. with his 
 gun and dog trespassed on the plaintiff's land, and 
 the dog killed a deer, A. was responsible (<y). And an 
 action for the destruction of game will lie against 
 the owner of a dog which to his knowledge has a 
 propensity for hunting game on its own account if 
 he allow it to be at large in the neighbourhood of a 
 place where game is kept (h) . 
 
 Passing now from mere trespasses, it may be laid 
 down that the owner of a dog is liable for any mischief 
 it does, provided there is proof of the owner's know- 
 ledge of the dog's propensity to do such mischief («). 
 In the case of bites by a dog, it will not be necessary 
 to shew that he has on a former occasion actually 
 bitten some one ; it will be sufficient to prove that the 
 dog had, to its owner's knowledge, evinced a savage 
 disposition by attempting to bite mankind (k); but it 
 will not be sufficient to prove that the owner knew that 
 it had bitten, or attempted to bite, another animal (I). 
 The knowledge of the persons appointed by the 
 owner to keep a dog is the owner's knowledge (m) ; 
 
 («) Brown v. Giles, 1 C. & P. 118 ; ef. Read v. Edminh, 17 C. B. 
 ]N T . S. 245. 
 
 (/) 51 L. T. 263. 
 
 (g) Beckwith v. Shordike, 4 Burr. 2092. 
 
 (A) Zee v. Biley, 18 C. B. N". S. 722. 
 
 (i) Sanders v. TmpC, 51 L. T. '163. 
 
 (k) Worth v. GUliwj, L. R. 2 C. P. 1. 
 
 (1) Osborne v. Clwcqueel (1896), 2 Q. B. 109. 
 
 {'in) Baldwin v. Casclla, L. li. 7 Ex. 325. 
 
 Scienter a to 
 dogs. 
 
'222 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 3P"H°' 
 
 chap, x. an( j so i s the knowledge of the persons who have 
 the control of the place where the dog is kept, or who 
 manage the business carried on there (n) ; but the 
 knowledge of a mere servant not appointed to keep the 
 dog will not be sufficient (o). For injuries inflicted on 
 cattle or sheep by a dog, the owner is answerable, even 
 though he had no knowledge of the dog's mischievous 
 propensity (p) ; and this is so, though the cattle or 
 sheep may have been trespassing on the owner's 
 land (q) . 
 
 Master's Liability to Servants for Torts. — A 
 
 master's liability to third persons for the torts of him- 
 self or his servants has already been dealt with. His 
 liability to his servants will now be considered, first 
 as it stands at common law, secondly, as it has 
 been modified by the Employers' Liability Act, 1880 
 (43 & 44 Vict. c. 42), which came into force the 1st 
 of January, 1880, and has been renewed from year to 
 year from the date of its expiration in 1887, and, 
 thirdly, as it has been modified by the Workmen's 
 Compensation Act, 1897, which comes into force on the 
 1st of July, 1898 (60 & 61 Vict. c. 37). These two 
 Acts, however, as we shall see, apply only to certain 
 specific classes of workmen mentioned in them. 
 
 Liability of It is clear that at common law, and under the 
 
 servant. ° Employers' Liability Act, if a master knowingly puts 
 his servant to work on that which is unsafe, whether 
 it be plant, machinery, or premises, and the servant 
 does not know it to be unsafe and is hurt thereby, the 
 latter has a cause of action (r) ; but the master is not 
 liable if the servant enters his employment with full 
 
 (to) Stiles v. Cardiff Steam Navigation Company, 33 L. J. Q. B. 310 ; 
 Applebee v. Percy, L. E. 9 C. P. 647. 
 
 (o) Ibid. 
 
 lp) 28 & 29 Vict. c. 60. 
 
 (q) Grange v. Silcock, 13 T. L. H. 565. 
 
 (r) Griffiths v. London ami St. Kafherine Docks Company, 13 Q. B. D. 
 259. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 223 
 
 knowledge of the danger, and chooses to risk it (s), or chap, x. 
 if the servant chooses to continue in his employment 
 after danger has arisen (t), and when he knows that 
 the inevitable consequence of his doing so will be that 
 personal injury will befall him. If, for instance, 
 a man agrees to take part in operations necessitating 
 the production of fumes injurious to health, he cannot 
 recover damages for bodily suffering arising there- 
 from, and if he knows that owing to a defect in the 
 machinery at which he is employed he cannot perform 
 the required operation without losing a limb he may 
 probably be equally unable to recover damages for 
 such loss. In such cases the maxim, " Volenti non fit 
 injuria," applies. But " Scienti mm fit injuria " is not 
 the same as " Volenti non fit injuria," and the mere 
 knowledge of a risk which exists through the negligence 
 of an employer and which may or may not result in 
 injury, does not, necessarily preclude a workman from 
 recovering damages for such injury. In such a case 
 a person who relies on the maxim " Volenti non fit 
 injuria " must shew a consent to the particular thing 
 done ; and the question whether a workman must be 
 taken to have agreed that the risk of injury befalling 
 him was to be his and not his employer's is a question 
 of fact and not of law(«). Thus a servant does not 
 disentitle himself to relief if, when danger arises (e.g., 
 from the fencing of machinery breaking down), he 
 complains to his master and the master promises to 
 remedy the defect, and thereupon the servant, whilst 
 continuing at work in the reasonable expectation that 
 the master will do so, meets with an accident (x). 
 
 (s) Holmes v. Clarke, 6 H. & N. 349; on appeal, Clarice v. Holmes, 
 7 H. & N. 937; see also Williams v. Clough, 3 H. & N. 258, cases 
 before the Act. 
 
 (t) Woodley v. Metropolitan Railway Company, 2 Ex. D. 384 ; Smith v. 
 Baker (1891), App. Cas. 325, a case under the Employers' Liability- 
 Act ; where Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q. B. D. 685, is commented 
 on ; see also Yarmouth v. France, 19 Q. B. D. 647 ; and Mcmbery v. 
 Great Western Railway Company, 14 App. Cas. 179, where servant of 
 sub-contractor knew the dangerous nature of his work. 
 
 (it) Smith v. Baker, ubi supra, pp. 336, 360-7. 
 
 (x) Clarke v. Holmes, supra. 
 
224 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 Master may 
 set up contri- 
 butory negli- 
 gence of ser- 
 vant as a 
 defence. 
 
 The contributory negligence of the servant may be 
 set up in an action brought by him against his master 
 (see ante, p. 123). Thus, in Senior v. Ward (y) the 
 plaintiff's deceased husband, a coal -miner employed 
 by the defendant, knew that the statutory rules as to 
 testing the rope used with the cage for letting down 
 the miners had been habitually violated, and on the 
 morning when he met his fatal injury had been told 
 by the banksman, when about to descend into the pit 
 with the other miners, that they ought to wait to have 
 the rope examined before descending, a fire having 
 taken place the previous night. This warning was 
 disregarded, and the rope (which had been damaged 
 by the fire) broke, and the plaintiff's husband was 
 killed. Under these circumstances, it was held that 
 the contributory negligence of the plaintiff's husband 
 was a bar to her succeeding in the action. In a 
 somewhat similar case (z) , however, it has been recently 
 held that where there has been a breach by a master 
 of a statutory obligation (such as testing ropes) the 
 maxim " Volenti non fit injuria" does not apply : but 
 whether in case of such a breach a master would be 
 precluded from setting up contributory negligence of 
 the servant (which is quite a different thing) may be 
 a question (a) . 
 
 Injury to a Servant through the Negligence of 
 a Fellow-servant. — Before the Employers' Liability 
 Act, 1880, came into force, it was well-established law 
 that a master was not in general responsible to one 
 servant for an injury occasioned to him by the negli- 
 gence of a fellow-servant while they were acting in 
 one common service, as the servant was understood to' 
 have undertaken, when he entered his employment, to 
 run the risk of such negligence amongst other risks of 
 the service. But this was subject to the qualification 
 
 (y) 1 El. & El. 385. 
 
 (z) Badddcy v. Granville, 19 Q. B. D. 423. 
 
 (a) Btuhidey v. Granville, uhi supra; 2'homas v. Quartermaine, ubi 
 supra. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 225 
 
 that the master had taken reasonable care to protect chap, x. 
 
 him from risk by associating him only with persons 
 
 of ordinary care and skill (b), and to provide proper 
 
 machinery for the work to be done (c). The master 
 
 was also bound to take care that his own personal 
 
 interference did not bring about the injury complained 
 
 of(rf). 
 
 A definition of the rule as to common service may Common ser- 
 be found in Charles v. Taylor, 3 C. P. D. 492, where, vice ~ what is - 
 at p. 496, Brett, M.E., says : " When the two servants 
 are servants of the same master, and where the service 
 of each will bring them so far to work in the same 
 place and at the same time that the negligence of one 
 in what he is doing as part of the work which he is 
 bound to do may injure the other whilst doing the 
 work which he is bound to do, the master is not liable 
 to the one servant for the injury of the other." There 
 must not only be common employment, but common 
 employment under the master whose servant was 
 guilty of negligence (e) . The captain and crew of a 
 ship, both being employed by the owners, are in 
 common employment (/) . 
 
 The rule will apply even where a person is only 
 temporarily or for a particular occasion in the service 
 of another (e) ; and where a person volunteers to assist 
 the servant of another in his work (g) ; but where such 
 assistance is given with the consent of the employer 
 by a third party, in a matter of common interest 
 to both, the rule will not apply — where, for example, 
 a person assists the porters at a railway station in order 
 to get delivery of his goods (h) . 
 
 (b) Hutchinson v. York, etc., Railway Company, 5 Ex. 343. 
 
 (c) Searle v. Lindsay, 11 C. B. N. S. 429. 
 
 (d) Roberts v. Smith, 2 H. & N. 213 ; Griffiths v. Gidlviv, 3 H. & K648. 
 
 (e) Johnson v. Lindsay, (1891) App. Cas. 371 ; Cameron v. Xyslrom, 
 (1893) App. Cas, 308. 
 
 (/) Hedley v. I'inkwy. (1894) App. Cas. 222, where the Irish case 
 of Ramsay v. Quinn, 8 Ir. Kep. C. L. 322, was disapproved. 
 
 (g) Degg v. Midland Hallway Company, 1 H. & N. 773. 
 
 (A! Wright v. London and Xorth Western Railway Company, 1 
 Q. B. D. 252. 
 
 R.T. Q 
 
226 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. X. Employers' Liability Act, 1880. — The main, 
 although Hot the sole, object of this Act was to 
 place masters who do not, upon the same footing 
 of responsibility with those who do, personally super- 
 intend their works and workmen, by making them 
 answerable for the negligence of those persons to whom 
 they intrust the duty of superintendence, as if it were 
 their own. In effecting this object the Legislature 
 in many instances enacted what were acknowledged 
 principles of the common law(i). The substance of 
 the Act is as follows : 
 
 S. 1. Where after the commencement of the Act, 
 personal injury is caused to a workman (k) — 
 
 (1.) By reason of any defect in the condition 
 of the ways, works, machinery, or plant con- 
 nected with or used in the business of the 
 employer ; or 
 
 (2.) By reason of the negligence of any person 
 in the service of the employer "who has any 
 superintendence entrusted to him " whilst in the 
 exercise of any such superintendence ; or 
 
 (3.) By reason of the negligence of any person 
 in the service of the employer to whose orders or 
 directions the workman at the time of the injury 
 was bound to conform, and did conform, where 
 such injury resulted from his having so con- 
 formed ; or 
 
 (4.) By reason of the act or omission of any 
 person in the service of the employer done or 
 made in obedience to the rules or bye-laws of 
 the employer, or in obedience to particular in- 
 structions given by any person delegated with 
 the authority of the employer in that behalf ; or 
 
 (5.) By reason of the negligence of any person 
 in the service of the employer who has the charge 
 
 (i) Smith v. Baker, vM supra, at p. 354. 
 (k) See s. 8, post. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 227 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 or control of any signal, points, locomotive 
 engine, or train upon a railway, 
 
 in any of such cases the workman, or, in case the 
 injury results in death, the personal representatives of 
 the workman, and any persons entitled in case of 
 death, shall have the same right of compensation and 
 remedies against the employer as if the workman had 
 not been a workman of, nor in the service of, the 
 employer, nor engaged in his work. 
 
 The following decisions on the various sub-sections Decisions on 
 of s. 1, with which must be read s. 2, are material : LiabiHtyActt 
 
 Sub-s. 1. There may be a defect in the condition " 
 of machinery where a machine, though not defective 
 in its construction, is, in the circumstances in which it 
 is used, calculated to cause injury (l). A horse may 
 be " plant " within the sub-section, and if the horse is 
 vicious its vice may be a "defect" (m). A "way" 
 need not be marked out by metes or bounds or 
 habitually used as a way : any space which a work- 
 man may have to traverse for the purposes of his 
 -work may be a " way " (n). A defect in a way within 
 sub-s. 1 means a defect of a chronic character, and 
 not a defect arising from negligent user, and so when 
 an obstacle was negligently allowed to project into a 
 way this was held not to be a defect within the sub- 
 section ; nor was the temporary removal of the lid of 
 a catch-pit in a " way," which catch-pit had for some 
 years been kept covered (o) . In these two cases, 
 however, the workman might have had a remedy under 
 sub-s. 2, if there was negligence on the part of 
 any superintendent (o) . In the catch-pit case the lid 
 
 (I) ffeske v. Samuelson, 12 Q. B. D. 30 ; Cripps v. Judge, 13 Q. B. D. 
 583 ; Weblin v. Ballard, 17 Q. B. D. 122 ; but as to this last cas cf. 
 Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q. B. D. 685, at p. 699 ; see also Smithy. 
 Baker, (1891) App. Cas. 325. 
 
 (m) Yarmouth v. France, 19 Q. B. D. 647. 
 
 (n) Willetts v. Watt & Co., (1892) 2 Q. B. D. 92. 
 
 (o) McGiffin v. Palmer's Shipbuilding, &c, Company, 10 Q, B. D. 5 ; 
 Willetts v. Watt &• Co., ubi supra. 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 OUTLINES OF TOUTS. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 would seem to have been properly removed (p) : but 
 where the movable guard of dangerous machinery had 
 been improperly removed there was evidence of a 
 defect (p). The mere fact that a machine is dangerous 
 to a workman employed to work with it does not 
 shew that there is a defect in it (q) , but much will 
 depend on findings of fact : thus, where the roller of 
 a jute machine was in several sections, instead of one 
 piece, and the spaces between the sections got occa- 
 sionally clogged with jute, which it was usual to 
 remove with the hand, and the plaintiff put three 
 fingers in, so removing the jute, the employer was held 
 liable, on the finding of the jury, for a defect in the 
 machine known to him (r) . 
 
 The word "works" means works already com- 
 pleted, and not works which on completion will be 
 connected with or used in the business of the em- 
 ployer (s) : but ground which an employer has con- 
 tracted to clear of old buildings and to cover with 
 new, may be considered his " works " (£). 
 
 Sub-s. 2. See notes on s. 8, post, p. 228. 
 
 Sub-s. 3. The orders or directions need not be 
 express, but may be implied from the circumstances (u) . 
 The sub-section will not be applicable if A. merely 
 tells B. what work he has to do, but does not exercise 
 control over him by telling him where or at what 
 time or how to do it (x) . It is not necessary to shew 
 that the plaintiff's injury arose from an order which 
 was negligent in itself, or that the conformity to the 
 order was the causa causans of the injury: but the 
 injury must have been the result of the negligence of 
 
 (p) See Tate v. Latham and Son, (1897) 1 Q. B. 502. 
 
 (q) Walsh v. IVMtehif, 21 Q. B. D. 371. 
 
 (r) Foley v. Garnett, 16 Q. B. D. 52. 
 
 (s) Howex. Finch, 17 Q. B. D. 187. 
 
 it) Smmiiijanv. Robinson, (1892) 1 Q. B. 344. 
 
 (it) Milward v. Midland Hallway Company, 14 Q. B. D. 68. 
 
 (.!■) Snowden v. Fames, 25 Q. B. D. 193. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 229 
 
 the person giving the order, and of the plaintiff con- c hap, x. 
 forming to such order (y) . 
 
 Sub-s. 5. The word " railway " is not confined to 
 railways belonging to railway companies (z). A series 
 of trucks on a railway without a locomotive engine 
 may constitute a " train upon a railway : " and a 
 person whose duty it is to move them by means of a 
 stationary hydraulic engine and a capstan may be a 
 person who has the charge or control of such a train (a). 
 " A person who has charge or control of a train " does 
 not necessarily cease to have charge, because some of 
 the waggons are uncoupled to be separately dealt 
 with, and the person left in charge of those waggons 
 may also fall within these words (b). But a person 
 cannot be said to have charge or control of " points " 
 on a railway whose duty, acting under an inspector, is 
 to clean, oil, and adjust them (c). 
 
 By s. 8, " workman " means a railway servant and 
 any person to whom the Employers and Workmen 
 Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Yict. c. 90), applies— viz., one 
 who, being a labourer, servant in husbandry, journey- 
 man, artificer, handicraftsman, miner, or otherwise 
 engaged in manual labour, has entered into a con- 
 tract, express or implied, oral or otherwise, with an 
 employer (but not a domestic or menial servant). A 
 person will not be deemed to be engaged in manual 
 labour within the meaning of the Employers' 
 Liability Act where such labour is not his real and 
 substantial employment, but merely incidental or 
 ancillary thereto (d). Thus, a grocer's assistant whose 
 duty is to serve customers in a shop is not within the 
 Act, though he has also certain duties involving , 
 manual labour, such as making up parcels, and carry- 
 ing them from the shop to a cart at the door (d). So 
 
 (y) Wild v. Waygood. (1892) 1 Q. B. 783. 
 (2) Doughty v. Firhank, 10 Q. B. D. 358. 
 
 (a) Cot v. Great ll'esteru, Ilailway Company, 9 Q. B. D. 106. 
 
 (b) ikCord v. Cam well d- Co., (1896) App. Cas. 67. 
 
 (c) Gibbs v. Great Western Hallway Company, 12 Q. B. D. 208. 
 
 (d) Bound v. Lawrence, (1892) 1 Q. B. 226. 
 
230 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, x. a l S o the conductor of an omnibus (e), the driver of a, 
 tramcar (/), and the guard of a goods' train (g) are 
 excluded from the benefit of the Act. 
 
 " A person who has superintendence entrusted to 
 him " means a person whose sole or principal duty is 
 that of superintendence, and who is not ordinarily 
 engaged in manual labour (s. 8) (h) . But the fact 
 that such superintendent, when negligent, is volun- 
 tarily assisting in manual labour, will not release the 
 employer from liability (i). 
 
 S. 2. A workman will not be entitled to any right 
 of compensation or remedy under the Act in a case 
 under s. 1, sub-s. 1, unless the defect there mentioned 
 arose from, or had not been discovered or remedied 
 owing to, the negligence of the employer, or of some 
 person in the service of the employer, and entrusted 
 by him with the duty of seeing that the ways, works, 
 machinery or plant were in proper condition (k) . Nor 
 will he have such right under sub-s. 4 of s. 1 unless the 
 injury resulted from some impropriety or defect in 
 the rules, bye-laws, or instructions therein mentioned ; 
 but rules sanctioned by a department of State or Act 
 of Parliament will not be deemed improper or defective : 
 nor, again, in any case where the workman knew of 
 the defect or negligence which caused his injury, and 
 failed within a reasonable time to give information of 
 it to the employer or some person superior to himself 
 in the service of the employer, unless he was aware 
 that the employer or such superior already knew of 
 such defect or negligence. 
 
 (e) Morgan v. London General Omnibus Company, ] 3 Q. B. D. 832. 
 
 (/) Coolt v. North Metropolitan Tramways Company, 18 Q. B. D. 683. 
 
 (g) Sunt v. Great Northern Maihvay Company, (1891) 1 Q. B. 601. 
 
 (7i) For cases where persons were held to be ordinarily engaged in 
 manual labour and not superintendents, see Shaffers v. General Steam 
 Navigation Company, 10 Q. B. D. 356, and Kellard v. Sooke 21 
 Q. B. D. 367. 
 
 (i) Osborne v. Jackson, 11 Q. B. D. 619. 
 
 (k) See Tate v. Latham and Son, (1897) 1 Q. B. 502. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 231 
 
 Actions under this Act are to be brought in the chap, x. 
 county court (s. 6), and must be commenced within 
 six months from the occurrence of the accident causing 
 the injury, or, in case of death, within twelve months 
 from the death ; but the action must be preceded by 
 a notice that the injury has been sustained, which 
 must be given within six weeks, and state tbe name and 
 address of the person injured and the cause of the 
 injury, and the date when it was sustained, and be 
 served on the employer (I). In the case of death, the 
 want of such notice shall not be a bar to the action if 
 the judge shall be of opinion that there was a reason- 
 able excuse for such want of notice (s. 4) . 
 
 The amount of compensation recoverable under the 
 Act is limited to the amount of the estimated earnings, 
 during tbe three years preceding the injury, of a 
 person in the same grade employed during those years 
 in the like employment and in the same district as 
 the injured workman : subject to the deduction there- 
 from of any penalty or part of a penalty which may 
 have been paid in pursuance of any other Act to the 
 workmen or his representatives in respect of the same 
 cause of action (ss. 3 and 5). An apprentice cannot 
 take into account what he would be able to earn if he 
 were out of his apprenticeship, nor the value of the 
 tuition given him (m). 
 
 It has been held that an employer and workman 
 may contract themselves out of the Act (n). 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1807 — We now 
 
 come to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 
 which comes into force on July 1, 1898, and as 
 regards certain employments referred to in s. 7 
 creates a revolution in our law. By that section the 
 
 (l) Ss. 6 and 7 ; as to sufficiency of notice, see Moyle v. Jenkins, 
 8 Q. B. D. 116 ; Keen v. Milhvall Dock Company, 8 Q. B. D. 482 ; 
 Stone v. Hyde, 9 Q. B. D. 76 ; Clarkson v. Musgrave, 9 Q. B. D. S86 ; 
 Carter v. Drysdale, 12 Q. B. D. 91. 
 
 (m) Noel v. Redruth Foundry Company, (1896) 1 Q. B. 453. 
 
 (n) Griffiths v. Lord Dudley, 9 Q. B. D. 357. 
 
232 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 Effect of the 
 Act. 
 
 Act is to apply only to an employment by the " under- 
 takers " as denned therein on or in or about a railway, 
 factory, mine, quarry, engineering work, or certain 
 buildings exceeding thirty feet in height. 
 
 The broad features of the Act, where applicable, are 
 as follows : — 
 
 (1.) The doctrine of common employment (see ante, 
 p. 224) is abolished. 
 
 (2.) The employer is liable to pay compensation 
 where personal injury by accident arising out of and 
 in the course of a workman's employment is caused to 
 the workman, though neither the employer nor those 
 for whom he is responsible have been guilty of 
 negligence. 
 
 (3.) The defence of contributory negligence is 
 practically abolished, the nearest approach to it 
 being s. 1, sub-s. 2 (c) : "If it is proved that the 
 injury to the workman is attributable to the serious 
 and wilful misconduct of that workman, any com- 
 pensation claimed in respect of that injury shall be 
 disallowed." 
 
 (4.) Where there is a sub-contract with an inde- 
 pendent contractor for the execution of works 
 coming within the trade or business of the head con- 
 tractor or "undertaker" as defined by s. 7, the head 
 contractor or undertaker may be liable to pay 
 compensation for accidents to the workmen employed 
 by the independent contractor, but has the right of 
 indemnity mentioned in s. 4 : see also s. 6 as to 
 strangers. 
 
 (5.) Employers and workmen coming within the 
 Act cannot contract themselves out of it except by a 
 scheme sanctioned by the Eegistrar of Friendly 
 Societies : ss. 3 and 9. 
 
 (6.) The liability to pay compensation and the 
 amount thereof are to be determined by arbitration. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 233 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 (7.) A "workman" includes every person engaged 
 in an employment to which the Act applies, whether, 
 by way of manual labour or otherwise ; and where 
 injuries result in his death the benefits of the Act go 
 to his representatives or dependants or others entitled 
 to compensation. " Dependants " mean in England 
 or Ireland such persons specified in the Fatal Acci- 
 dents Act, 1846 (generally known as Lord Campbell's 
 Act : see ante, p. 15), as were wholly or in part depen- 
 dent on the earnings of the workman at the time of his 
 death : and in Scotland those who were so dependent 
 and would by the law of Scotland be entitled to sue 
 the employer for damages or solatium in respect of 
 the death. 
 
 (8.) An employer is not liable under the Act for an 
 injury which does not disable the workman for at 
 least two weeks from earning full wages. 
 
 (9.) Where an injury is caused by the personal 
 negligence or wilful act of the employer, or of some 
 person for whose act or default he is responsible, the 
 workman may claim compensation under the Act, or 
 take the proceedings that were open to him at the 
 commencement of the Act. 
 
 (10.) Where an employer becomes bankrupt or 
 compounds or arranges with his creditors, or if the 
 employer is a company winding-up has commenced, 
 an injured workman has a first charge on any money 
 payable to the employer under an insurance against 
 liability under the Act : s. 5. 
 
 The schedules to the Act regulate the scale of com- 
 pensation allowed in cases under the Act, and the 
 procedure in arbitrations. 
 
 The Act is as follows : — 
 
 Wokkmen's Compensation Act, 1897. 
 
 1. — (1.) If in any employment to which this Act applies Liability of 
 
 personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of certi J m 
 
 i 7 ■ j ^ i i • i , „ employers to 
 
 the employment is caused to a workman, his employer shall, workmen for 
 
 injuries. 
 
234 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 subject as herein-after mentioned, be liable to pay compen- 
 sation in accordance with the First Schedule to this Act. 
 
 (2.) Provided that :— 
 
 (a.) The employer shall not be liable under this Act in 
 respect of any injury which does not disable the work- 
 man for a period of at least two weeks from earning 
 full wages at the work at which he was employed ; 
 
 (b.) Wheu the injury was caused by the personal negli- 
 gence or wilful act of the employer, or of some person 
 for whose act or default the employer is responsible, 
 nothing in this Act shall affect any civil liability of 
 the employer, but in that case the workman may, 
 at his option, either claim compensation under this 
 Act, or take the same proceedings as were open to 
 him before the commencement of this Act ; but the 
 employer shall not be liable to pay compensation for 
 injury to a workman by accident arising out of and 
 in the course of the employment both independently 
 of and also under this Act, and shall not be liable to 
 any proceedings independently of this Act, except 
 in case of such personal negligence or wilful act as 
 aforesaid ; 
 
 (c.) If it is proved that the injury to a workman is 
 attributable to the serious and wilful misconduct 
 of that workman, any compensation claimed in respect 
 of that injury shall be disallowed. 
 
 (3.) If any question arises in any proceedings under this 
 Act as to the liability to pay compensation under this Act 
 (including any question as to whether the employment is one 
 to which this Act applies), or as to the amount or duration 
 of compensation under this Act, the question, if not settled 
 by agreement, shall, subject to the provisions of the First 
 Schedule to this Act, be settled by arbitration, in accordance 
 with the Second Schedule to this Act. 
 
 (4.) If, within the time herein-after in this Act limited for 
 taking proceedings, an action is brought to recover damages 
 independently of this Act for injury caused by any accident, 
 and it is determined in such action that the injury is one for 
 which the employer is not liable in such action, but that 
 he would have been liable to pay compensation under the 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 235 
 
 provisions of this Act, the action shall be dismissed ; but the CHAP. X. 
 Court in which the action is tried shall, if the plaintiff shall 
 so choose, proceed to assess such compensation, and shall be 
 at liberty to deduct from such compensation all the costs 
 which, in its judgment, have been caused by the plaintiff 
 bringing the action instead of proceeding under this Act. 
 
 In any proceeding under this sub-section, when the Court 
 assesses the compensation it shall give a certificate of the 
 compensation it has awarded and the directions it has given 
 as to the deduction for costs, and such certificate shall have 
 the force and effect of an award under this Act. 
 
 (5.) Nothing in this Act shall affect any proceeding for a 
 fine under the enactments relating to mines or factories, or 
 the application of any such fine, but if any such fine, or any 
 part thereof, has been applied for the benefit of the person 
 injured, the amount so applied shall be taken into account 
 in estimating the compensation under this Act (o). 
 
 2. — (1.) Proceedings for the recovery under this Act of Time for 
 
 compensation for an iniurv shall not be maintainable unless takn ?S P ro " 
 r ■' . ceedmgs. 
 
 notice of the accident has been given as soon as practicable 
 after the happening thereof and before the workman has 
 voluntarily left the employment in which he was injured, 
 and unless the claim for compensation with respect to such 
 accident has been made within six months from the occur- 
 rence of the accident causing the injury, or, in case of death, 
 within six months from the time of death. Provided always 
 that the want of or any defect or inaccuracy in such notice 
 shall not be a bar to the maintenance of such proceedings, 
 if it is found in the proceedings for settling the claim that 
 the employer is not prejudiced in his defence by the want, 
 defect, or inaccuracy, or that such want, defect, or inaccuracy 
 was occasioned by mistake or other reasonable cause. 
 
 (2.) Notice in respect of an injury under this Act shall 
 give the name and address of the person injured, and shall 
 state in ordinary language the cause of the injury and the 
 date at which it was sustained, and shall be served on the 
 
 (o) S. 1, sub-s. 2 (b) reserves to a workman the right to take 
 proceedings under the Employers' Liability Act, or at Common Law in 
 the cases mentioned in the sub-section, whilst sub-s. 4 provides for 
 cases where proceedings are wrongly taken outside the present Act. 
 
236 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. X. employer, or, if there is more than one employer, upon one 
 of such employers (p). 
 
 (3.) The notice may be served by delivering the same to 
 or at the residence or place of business of the person on whom 
 it is to be served. 
 
 (4.) The notice may also be served by post by a registered 
 letter addressed to the person on whom it is to be served at 
 his last known place of residence or place of business, and if 
 served by post shall be deemed to have been served at the 
 ■ time when the letter containing the same would have been 
 delivered in the ordinary course of post, and in proving the 
 service of such notice it shall be sufficient to prove that the 
 notice was properly addressed and registered. 
 
 (5.) AVhere the employer is a body of persons corporate 
 or unincorporate, the notice may also be served by delivering 
 the same at, or by sending it by post in a registered letter 
 addressed to the employer at, the office, or, if there be more 
 than one office, any one of the offices of such body. 
 
 Contracting 
 •out. 
 
 3._{1.) If the Kegistrar of Friendly Societies, after taking 
 steps to ascertain the views of the employer and workmen, 
 certifies that any scheme of compensation, benefit, or 
 insurance for the workmen of an employer in any employ- 
 ment, whether or not such scheme includes other employers 
 and their workmen, is on the whole not less favourable to 
 the general body of workmen and their dependants than the 
 provisions of this Act, the employer may, until the certificate 
 is revoked, contract with any of those workmen that the 
 provisions of the scheme shall be substituted for the pro- 
 visions of this Act, and thereupon the employer shall be 
 liable only in accordance with the scheme, but, save as 
 aforesaid, this Act shall apply notwithstanding any contract 
 to the contrary made after the commencement of this 
 Act (q). 
 
 , (2.) The registrar may give a certificate to expire at the 
 end of a limited period not less than five years. 
 
 (p) The notice should be in writing : see subsequent sub-sections ; 
 see also Moyle v. Jenkins, 8 Q. B. D. 116 ; Keen v. Milhvall Dock 
 Company, 8 Q. B. I). 482. 
 
 (q) This is the only mode in which parties can contract themselves 
 out of the Act: cf., as to Employers' Liability Act, Griffitlis v. Lord 
 Dudley, 9 Q. B. D. 357, ante, p. 231. See also s. 9, post. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 
 
 237 
 
 (3.) No scheme shall be so certified which contains an obli- CHAP. X. 
 gation upon the workmen to join the scheme as a condition 
 of their hiring. 
 
 (4.) If complaint is made to the Registrar of Friendly 
 Societies by or on behalf of the workmen of any employer 
 that the provisions of any scheme are no longer on the whole 
 so favourable to the general body of workmen of such employer 
 and their dependants as the provisions of this Act, or that 
 the provisions of such scheme are being violated, or that the 
 scheme is not being fairly administered, or that satisfactory 
 reasons exist for revoking the certificate, the registrar shall 
 examine into the complaint, and, if satisfied that good cause 
 exists for such complaint, shall, unless the cause of complaint 
 is removed, revoke the certificate. 
 
 (5.) When a certificate is revoked or expires any moneys' 
 or securities held for the purpose of the scheme shall be 
 distributed as may be arranged between the employer and 
 workmen, or as may be determined by the Registrar of 
 Friendly Societies in the event of a difference of opinion. 
 
 (6.) Whenever a scheme has been certified as aforesaid, it 
 shall be the duty of the employer to answer all such inquiries 
 and to furnish all such accounts in regard to the scheme as 
 may be made or required by the Registrar of Friendly 
 Societies. 
 
 (7.) The Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies shall include 
 in bis annual report the particulars of the proceedings of 
 the Registrar under this Act. 
 
 4. Where, in an employment to which this Act applies, Sub-con- 
 the undertakers as herein-after defined contract with any 
 person for the execution by or under such contractor of any 
 work, and the undertakers would, if such work were executed 
 by workmen immediately employed by them, be liable to 
 pay compensation under this Act to those workmen in respect 
 of any accident arising out of and in the course of their 
 employment, the undertakers shall be liable to pay to any 
 workman employed in the execution of the work any com- 
 pensation which is payable to the workman (whether under 
 this Act or in respect of personal negligence or wilful act 
 independently of this Act) by such contractor, or would be so 
 payable if such contractor were an employer to whom this 
 Act applies. 
 
238 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 Compensa- 
 tion to work- 
 men in case 
 of bank- 
 ruptcy of 
 employer. 
 
 Recovery of 
 damages 
 from 
 stranger. 
 
 Provided that the undertakers shall be entitled to be 
 indemnified by any other person who would have been 
 liable independently of this section. 
 
 This section shall not apply to any contract with any 
 person for the execution by or under such contractor of any 
 work which is merely ancillary or incidental to, and is no 
 part of, or process in, the trade or business carried on by 
 such undertakers respectively (r). 
 
 5. — (1.) Where any employer becomes liable under this 
 Act to pay compensation in respect of any accident, and is 
 entitled to any sum from insurers in respect of the amount 
 due to a workman under such liability, then in the event of 
 the employer becoming bankrupt, or making a composition 
 or arrangement with his creditors, or if the employer is a 
 company of the company having commenced to be wound up, 
 such workman shall have a first charge upon the sum afore- 
 said for the amount so due, and the judge of the county 
 court may direct the insurers to pay such sum into the Post 
 Office Savings Bank in the name of the registrar of such 
 court, and order the same to be invested or applied in 
 accordance with the provisions of the First Schedule hereto 
 with reference to the investment in the Post Office Savings 
 Bank of any sum allotted as compensation, and those pro- 
 visions shall apply accordingly. 
 
 (2.) In the application of this section to Scotland, the 
 words " have a first charge upon" shall mean "be preferen- 
 tially entitled to." 
 
 6. Where the injury for which compensation is payable 
 under this Act was caused under circumstances creating a 
 legal liability (s) in some person other than the employer to 
 
 (?•) This section makes an "undertaker" as defined by s. 7, or 
 ultimate employer, liable for injuries to workmen employed by a sub- 
 contractor to do work within the ordinary trade or business of the 
 "un lertaker," in cases where the undertaker would have been liable 
 under the Act, if he himself had employed the workmen, and where 
 the sub-contractor is liable, or would have been liable if he were an 
 employer to whom the Act applied. The undertaker, however, is 
 entitled to be indemnified by any person who would have been liable 
 independently of the section ; e.g. , a negligent stranger, or the sub- 
 contractor himself, if negligent, or if liable as an employer to whom the 
 Act applies. Of course the section makes a great change in the law. 
 
 (s) " Le_;al liability" would appear to mean a liability apart from 
 the Act: e.g., that of a stranger, by whos» negligence an employer's 
 workman is injured. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 239 
 
 pay damages in respect thereof, the workman may, at his CHAP. X. 
 option, proceed, either at law against that person to recover 
 damages, or against his employer for compensation under 
 this Act, hut not against both, and if compensation be 
 paid under this Act, the employer shall be entitled to be 
 indemnified by the said other person. 
 
 7. — (1.) This Act shall apply only to employment by the Application 
 
 undertakers as herein-after defined, on or in or about a < ? f „ A 9* and 
 ., . . uennraons. 
 
 railway, tactory, mine, quarry, or engineering work, and to 
 
 employment by the undertakers as hereinafter defined on in 
 or about any building which exceeds thirty feet in height, 
 and is cither being constructed or repaired by means of a 
 scaffolding, or being demolished, or on which machinery 
 driven by steam, water, or other mechanical power, is being 
 used for the purpose of the construction, repair, or demoli- 
 tion thereof. 
 
 (2.) In this Act; — 
 
 " Railway" means the railway of any railway company 
 
 to which the Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. 
 
 applies, and includes a light railway made under the c- 48, 
 
 Light Railways Act, 1896; and "railway" and 59 & 60 Vict. 
 
 " railway company " have the same meaning as in c - is - 
 the said Acts of 1873 and 1896 : 
 
 " Factory " has the same meaning as in the Factory and 
 Workshop Acts, 1878 to 1891 (t), and also includes 
 any dock, wharf, quay, warehouse, machinery, or 
 plant, to which any provision of the Factory Acts 
 is applied by the Factory and Workshop Act, 1895, 58 & 59 Vict. 
 and every laundry worked by steam, water, or other c ' 
 mechanical power : 
 
 " Mine " means a mine to which the Coal Mines 50 & 51 Vict. 
 Regulation Act, 1887, or the Metalliferous Mines c " 58 ' 
 Regulation Act, 1872, applies : ^5 & 3fl Vict 
 
 "Quarry" means a quarry under the Quarries 57 & 58 Vict. 
 Act, 1894: o. 42. 
 
 (t) These Acts are The Factory and Workshop Act, 1878 (41 & 42 
 Vict. c. 16) ; The Factory and Workshop Ant, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. 
 c. 53) ; The Cotton Cloth Factories Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 62) ; 
 The Factory and Workshop Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 75). 
 
240 'OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. X. "Engineering work" means any work of construction 
 
 or alteration or repair of a railroad, harbour, dock, 
 canal, or sewer, and includes any other work for 
 the construction, alteration, or repair of which 
 machinery driven by steam, water, or other 
 mechanical power is used : 
 " Undertakers " in the case of a railway means the 
 railway company ; in the case of a factory, quarry, 
 or laundry means the occupier thereof within the 
 meaning of the Factory and Workshop Acts, 1878 to 
 1895; in the case of a mine means the owner 
 thereof within the meaning of the Coal Mines 
 Kegulation Act, 1887, or the Metalliferous Mines 
 Regulation Act, 1872, as the case may be, and in 
 the case of an engineering work means the person 
 undertaking the construction, alteration, or repair ; 
 and in the case of a building means the persons 
 undertaking the construction, repair, or demolition : 
 
 " Employer " includes any body of persons corporate or 
 unincorporate and the legal personal representative 
 of a deceased employer : 
 
 " Workman " includes every person who is engaged in 
 an employment to which this Act applies, whether by 
 way of manual labour or otherwise, and whether his 
 agreement is one of service or apprenticeship or 
 otherwise, and is expressed or implied, is oral or 
 in writing. Any reference to a workman who has 
 been injured shall, where the workman is dead, 
 include a reference to his legal personal representa- 
 tive or to his dependants, or other person to whom 
 compensation is payable (w). 
 
 " Dependants " means — 
 
 (a.) in England and Ireland, such members of the 
 
 workman's family specified in the Fatal Accidents 
 
 9 & 10 Vict. Act, 1846, as were wholly or in part dependent 
 
 c - 93 - upon the earnings of the workman at the time 
 
 of his death (x) ; and 
 
 (m) The definition of " workman '' is wider than that in the 
 Employers' Liability Act : see ante, p. 229. 
 
 (x) Eor this (Lord Campbell's) Act, see ante, y. 15. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 
 
 241 
 
 (b) in Scotland, such of the persons entitled 
 according to the law of Scotland to sue the 
 employer for damages or solatium in respect 
 of the death of the workman, as were wholly 
 or in part dependent upon the earnings of the 
 workman at the time of his death. 
 (3.) A workman employed in a factory which is a ship- 
 building yard shall not be excluded from this Act by reason 
 only that the accident arose outside the yard in the course 
 of his work upon a vessel in any dock, river, or tidal water 
 near the yard. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 8. — (1.) This Act shall not apply to persons in the naval Application to 
 
 or military service of the Crown, but otherwise shall apply 
 to any employment by or under the Crown to which this 
 Act would apply if the employer were a private person. 
 
 (2.) The Treasury may, by warrant laid before Parlia- 
 ment, modify for the purposes of this Act their warrant 
 made under section one of the Superannuation Act, 1887, 
 and notwithstanding anything in that Act, or any such 
 warrant, may frame a scheme with a view to its being- 
 certified by the Registrar of Friendly Societies under 
 this Act. 
 
 workmen in 
 employment 
 of Crown. 
 
 50 & 51 Vict, 
 c. 67. 
 
 9. — Any contract existing at the commencement of this 
 Act, whereby a workman relinquishes any right to compensa- 
 tion from the employer for personal injury arising out of 
 and in the course of his employment, shall not, for the 
 purposes of this Act, be deemed to continue after the time 
 at which the workman's contract of service would determine 
 if notice of the determination thereof we're given at the 
 commencement of this Act (y). 
 
 Provision as 
 to existing 
 contracts. 
 
 10. — (1.) This Act shall come into operation on the first Commence- 
 
 day of July one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight. ment of Act 
 
 (2.) This Act may be cited as the Workmen's Compensa- t jy e _ 
 tion Act, 1897. 
 
 (»/) Of. sect. 3. 
 
 E.T. 
 
242 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 Sections 1, 5. 
 
 SCHEDULES. 
 
 FIEST SCHEDULE. 
 
 Scale axd Coxditioxs of Compensation. 
 
 Scale. 
 
 (1.) The amount of compensation under this Act shall be — 
 
 (a) where death results from the injury — 
 
 (i.) if the workman leaves any dependants wholly de- 
 pendent upon his earnings at the time of his death, 
 a sum equal to his earnings in the employment of the 
 same employer during the three years next preceding 
 the injury, or the sum of one hundred and fifty pounds, 
 whichever of those sums is the larger, but not ex- 
 ceeding in any case three hundred pounds, provided 
 that the amount of any weekly payments made under 
 this Act shall be deducted from such sum, and if the 
 period of the workman's employment by the said 
 employer has been less than the said three years, then 
 the amount of his earnings during the said three years 
 shall be deemed to be 156 times his average weekly 
 earnings during the period of his actual employment 
 under the said employer ; 
 
 (ii.) if the workman does not leave any such dependants, 
 but leaves any dependants in part dependent upon his 
 earnings at the time of his death, such sum, not ex- 
 ceeding in any case the amount payable under the fore- 
 going provisions, as may be agreed upon, or, in default 
 of agreement, may be determined, on arbitration under 
 this Act, to be reasonable and proportionate to the 
 injury to the said dependants ; and 
 
 (iii.) if he leaves no dependants, the reasonable expenses 
 of his medical attendance and burial, not exceeding 
 ten pounds ; 
 
 (b) where total or partial incapacity for work results from 
 the injury, a weekly payment during the incapacity after 
 the second week not exceeding fifty per cent, of his 
 average weekly earnings during the previous twelve 
 months, if he has been so long employed, but if not, then 
 for any less period during which he has been in the 
 employment of the same employer, such weekly payment 
 not to exceed one pound. 
 
 (2.) In fixing the amount of the weekly payment, regard 
 shall be had to the difference between the amount of the 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TORTS. 243 
 
 average weekly earnings of the workman before the accident CHAP. X. 
 and the average amount which he is able to earn after the ~ 
 accident, and to any payment not being wages which he may 
 receive from the employer in respect of his injury during the 
 period of his incapacity. 
 
 (3.) "Where a workman has given notice of an accident, he 
 shall, if so required by the employer, submit himself for 
 examination by a duly qualified medical practitioner provided 
 and paid by the employer, and if he refuses to submit him- 
 self to such examination, or in any way obstructs the same, 
 his right to compensation, and any proceeding under this Act 
 in relation to compensation, shall be suspended until such 
 examination takes place. 
 
 (4.) The payment shall, in case of death, be made to the 
 legal personal representative of the workman, or, if he has no 
 legal personal representative, to or for the benefit of his depend- 
 ants, or, if he leaves no dependants, to the person to whom the 
 expenses are due ; and if made to the legal personal repre- 
 sentative shall be paid by him to or for "the benefit of the 
 dependants or other person entitled thereto under this Act. 
 
 (5.) Any question as to who is a dependant, or as to the 
 amount payable to each dependant, shall, in default of agree- 
 ment, be settled by arbitration under this Act. 
 
 (6.) The sum allotted as compensation to a dependant may 
 be invested or otherwise applied for the benefit of the person 
 entitled thereto, as agreed, or as ordered by the committee or 
 ■other arbitrator. 
 
 (7.) Any sum which is agreed or is ordered by the committee 
 •or arbitrator to be invested may be invested in whole or in part 
 in the Post Office Savings Bank by the registrar of the county 
 ■court in his name as registrar. 
 
 (8.) Any sum to be so invested may be invested in the 
 purchase of an annuity from the National Debt Commissioners 
 through the Post Office Savings Bank, or be accepted by the 
 Postmaster- General as a deposit in the name of the registrar as 
 such, and the provisions of any statute or regulations respecting 
 the limits of deposits in savings bank, and the declaration to be 
 made by a depositor, shall not apply to such sums. 
 
 (9.) No part of any money invested in the name of the 
 Tegistrar of any county court in the Post Office Savings Bank 
 under this Act shall be paid out, except upon authority 
 addressed to the Postmaster-General by the Treasury or by the 
 judge of the county court. 
 
 (10.) Any person deriving any benefit from any moneys 
 invested in a post office savings bank under the provisions of 
 this Act may, nevertheless, open an account in a post office 
 savings bank or in any other savings bank in his own name 
 
 B 2 
 
244 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. X. without being liable to any penalties imposed by any statute or 
 regulations in respect of the opening of accounts in two savings 
 banks, or of two accounts in the same savings bank. 
 
 (11.) Any workman receiving weekly payments under this- 
 Act shall, if so required by the employer, or by any person by 
 whom the employer is entitled under this Act to be indemnified, 
 from time to time submit himself for examination by a duly 
 qualified, medical practitioner provided and paid by the 
 employer, or such other person ; but if the workman objects 
 to an examination by that medical practitioner, or is dissatisfied 
 by the certificate of such practitioner upon his condition when 
 communicated to him, he may submit himself for examination 
 to one of the medical practitioners appointed for the purposes 
 of this Act, as mentioned in the Second Schedule to this Act, 
 and the certificate of that medical practitioner as to the con- 
 dition of the workman at the time of the examination shall be 
 given to the employer and workman, and shall be conclusive 
 evidence of that condition. If the workman refuses to submit 
 himself to such, examination, or in any way obstructs the same, 
 his right to such weekly payments shall be suspended until 
 such examination has taken place. 
 
 (12.) Any weekl y payment ma3 r be reviewed at the request either 
 of the employer or of trie workman, and on such review may be 
 ended, diminished or increased, subject to the maximum above 
 provided, and the amount of payment shall, in default of agree- 
 ment, be settled by arbitration under this Act. 
 
 (13.) Where any weekly payment has been continued for not 
 less than six months, the liabilitj- therefor may, on the applica- 
 tion by or on behalf of the employer, be redeemed -by the pa y- 
 rnent of a lump sum, to be settled, in default of agreement, by 
 arbitration under this Act, and such lump sum may be ordered 
 by the committee or arbitrator to be invested or otherwise 
 applied as above mentioned. 
 
 (14.) A weekly payment, or a sum paid by way of redemption 
 thereof, shall not be capable of being assigned, charged, or 
 attached, and shall not pass to any other person by operation of 
 law, nor shall any claim be set off against the same. 
 
 (15.) Where a scheme certified under this Act provides for 
 
 payment of compensation b}' a friendly society, the provisions 
 
 of the proviso to the first subsection of section eight, section; 
 
 sixteen, and section forty-one of the Friendly Societies Act, 
 
 59 & 60 Vict. 1896, shall not apply to such society in respect of such scheme. 
 
 "• 25, (16-) I n the application of this schedule to Scotland the- 
 
 expression " registrar of the county court" means " sheriff clerk 
 
 of the county," and "judge of the county court " means " sheriff ." 
 
 (17.) In the application of this Act to Ireland the provisions 
 
 5 g 'of the County Officers and Courts (Ireland) Act, 1877, with 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TOUTS. 
 
 245 
 
 Tespect to money deposited in the Post Office Savings Bank CHAP. X. 
 under that Act shall apply to money invested in the Post Office 
 Savings Bank under this Act. 
 
 SECOND SCHEDULE. Section 1. 
 
 Arbitration. 
 
 The following provisions shall apply for settling any matter 
 -which under this Act is to be settled by arbitration : — 
 
 (1.) If any committee, representative of an employer and his 
 -workman, exists with power to settle matters under this Act in 
 the case of the employer and workmen, the matter shall, unless 
 either party objects, by notice in writing sent to the other party 
 before the committee meet to consider the matter, be settled by 
 the arbitration of such committee, or be referred by them in 
 their discretion to arbitration as hereinafter provided. 
 
 (2.) If either party so objects, or there is no such committee, 
 or the committee so refers the matter or fails to settle the matter 
 within three months from the date of the claim, the matter shall 
 be settled by a single arbitrator agreed or. by the parties, or in 
 the absence of agreement by the county court judge, according 
 to the procedure prescribed by rules of the court, or if in 
 England the Lord Chancellor so authorises, according to the 
 like procedure, by a single arbitrator appointed by such county 
 court judge. 
 
 (3.) Any arbitrator appointed by the county court judge 
 shall, for the purposes of this Act, have all the powers of a 
 county court judge, and shall be paid out of moneys to be pro- 
 vided by Parliament in accordance with regulations to be made 
 by the Treasury. 
 
 (4.) The Arbitration Act, 1889, shall not apply to any 52 & 53 Vict, 
 arbitration under this Act; but an arbitrator may, if he thinks c. 49. 
 fit, submit any question of law for the decision of the county 
 ■court judge, and the decision of the judge on any question of 
 law, either on such submission, or in any case where he himself 
 settles the matter under this Act, shall be final, unless within 
 the time and in accordance with the conditions prescribed by 
 rules of the Supreme Court either party appeals to the Court of 
 Appeal ; and the county court judge, or the arbitrator appointed 
 by him, shall, for the purpose of an arbitration under this Act, 
 have the same powers of procuring the attendance of witnesses 
 and the production of documents as if the claim for compensa- 
 tion had been made by plaint in the county court. 
 
 (0.) Rules of court may make provision for the appearance in 
 any arbitration under this Act of any party by some other 
 person. 
 
246 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 CHAP. X. (6.) The costs of and incident to the arbitration and proceed- 
 ings connected therewith shall be in the discretion of the 
 arbitrator. The costs, whether before an arbitrator or in the 
 county court, shall not exceed the limit prescribed by rules of 
 court, and shall be taxed in manner prescribed by those rules. 
 
 (7.) In the case of the death or refusal or inability to act of 
 an arbitrator, a Judge of the High Couit at Chambers may, on 
 the application of any party, appoint a new arbitrator. 
 
 (8.) Where the amount of compensation under this Act shall 
 have been ascertained, or any weekly payment varied, or any 
 other matter decided, under this Act, either by a committee or 
 by an arbitrator or by agreement, a memorandum thereof shall 
 be sent, in manner prescribed by rules of court, by the said com- 
 mittee or arbitrator, or by any party interested, to the registrar 
 of the county court for the district in which any person entitled 
 to such compensation resides, who shall, subject to such rules, 
 on being satisfied as to its genuineness, record such memorandum 
 in a special register without fee, and thereupon the , said 
 memorandum shall for all purposes be enforceable as a county 
 court judgment. Provided that the county court judge may 
 at any time rectify such register. 
 
 (9.) Where any matter under this Act is to be done in a 
 county court, or by to or before the judge or registrar of a 
 count}' court, then, unless the contrary intention appear, the 
 same shall, subject to rules of court, be done in, or by to or 
 before the judge or registrar of, the county court of the district 
 in which all the parties concerned reside, or if they reside in 
 different districts the district in which the accident out of which 
 the said matter arose occurred, without prejudice to any transfer- 
 in manner provided by rules of court. 
 
 (10.) The duty of a county court judge under this Act, or of 
 an arbitrator appointed by him, shall, subject to rules of court, 
 be part of the duties of the county court, and the officers of the 
 court shall act accordingly, and rules of court may be made 
 both for any purpose for which this Act authorises rules of 
 court to be made, and also generally for carrying into effect 
 this Act so far as it affects the county court, or an arbitrator- 
 appointed by the judge of the county court, and proceedings in 
 the county court or before any such arbitrator, and such rules 
 may, in England, be made by the five judges of the county 
 courts appointed for the making of rules under section one 
 51 & 52 Vict, hundred and sixty-four of the County Courts Act, 1888, and 
 c. 43. when allowed by the Lord Chancellor, as provided by that 
 
 section, shall have full effect without any further consent. 
 
 (11.) No court fee shall be payable by any party in respect 
 of any proceeding under this Act in the county court prior to 
 the award. 
 
WHO MAY COMMIT TOUTS. 247 
 
 (12.) Any sum awarded as compensation shall be paid on the CHAP. X. 
 receipt of the person to whom it is payable under any agree- 
 ment or award, and his solicitor or agent shall not be entitled 
 to recover from him, or to claim a lien on, or' deduct any 
 amount for costs from, the said sum awarded, except such sum 
 as may be awarded by the arbitrator or county court judge, on 
 an application made by either party to determine the amount of 
 costs to be paid to the said solicitor or agent, such sum to be 
 awarded subject to taxation and to the scale of costs prescribed 
 by rules of court. 
 
 (13.) The Secretary of State may appoint legally qualified 
 medical practitioners for the purpose of this Act, and any com- 
 mittee, arbitrator, or judge may, subject to regulations made 
 by the Secretary of State and the Treasury, appoint any such 
 practitioner to report on any matter which seems material to 
 any question arising in the arbitration ; and the expense of any 
 such medical practitioner shall, subject to Treasury regulations, 
 be paid out of moneys to be provided by Parliament. 
 
 (14.) In the application of this schedule to Scotland — 
 (a.) " Sheriff " shall be substituted for " county court judge," 
 "sheriff court " for " county court," " action " for "plaint," 
 "sheriff clerk" for "registrar of the county court," and 
 " act of sederunt" for "rules of court " : 
 (b.) Any award or agreement as to compensation under this 
 Act may be competently recorded for execution in the 
 books of council and session or sheriff court books, arid 
 shall be enforceable in like manner as a recorded decree 
 arbitral : 
 (c.) Any application to the sheriff as arbitrator shall be heard, 
 tried, and determined summarily in the manner provided 
 by the fifty - second section of the Sheriff Courts (Scot- 
 land) Act, 1876, save only that parties may be represented 39 & 40 Vict, 
 by any person authorised in writing to appear for them, 0. 70. 
 and subject to the declaration that it shall be competent to 
 either party within the time and in accordance with the 
 conditions prescribed by act of sederunt to require the 
 sheriff to state a case on any question of law determined by 
 him, and his decision thereon in such case may be sub- 
 mitted to either division of the Court of Session, who may 
 hear and determine the same finally, and remit to the 
 sheriff with instruction as to the judgment to be pronounced. 
 (15.) Paragraphs four and seven of this schedule shall not 
 apply to Scotland. 
 
 (16.) In the application of this schedule to Ireland the 
 expression " county court judge" shall include the recorder of 
 any city or town. 
 
( 248 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE XL 
 
 DAMAGES IN ACTIONS FOE TOET. 
 
 chap. xi. The damages that may be recovered in actions for 
 tort may be (1) nominal, (2) substantial or ordinary, 
 or (3) vindictive or exemplary. " ' Nominal damages ' 
 means a sum of money that may be spoken of, but that 
 has no existence in point of quantity" (a). Nominal 
 damages may be recovered in many cases where there 
 is no pecuniary loss, for, as Lord Holt says in Ashby 
 v. White (b) : "A damage is not merely pecuniary, but 
 every injury imports a damage when a man is thereby 
 hindered of his right. As in an action for slanderous 
 words, though a man does not lose a penny by reason 
 of the speaking of them, yet he shall have an action. 
 So if a man gives another a cuff on the ear, though it 
 cost him nothing — no, not so much as a little diachylon 
 — yet he shall have his action, for it is a personal 
 injury. So a man shall have an action against another 
 for riding over his ground, for it is an invasion of his 
 property, and the other has no right to come there." 
 In the majority of cases of simple trespass upon land, 
 probably there is no pecuniary damage that can be 
 appreciated ; and yet the plaintiff who complains of 
 the trespass would be entitled to nominal damages, 
 as there are all the ingredients of a tort in the act 
 of the defendant trespasser. 
 
 In some cases 
 damage must 
 be proved. 
 
 There are, however, certain cases in which a person 
 cannot be said to have sustained any actionable wrong 
 unless there is some pecuniary damage. Thus, as 
 pointed out by Lord Holt in the passage which has 
 
 (a) Beaumont v. Greathead, 2 C. B. 494, 499. 
 (6) 2 Ld. Raym. 938 ; I Sm. L. C. 268. 
 
DAMAGES IN ACTIONS FOR TORT, 249 
 
 been cited, a man may have an action for slanderous chap. xi. 
 words though they do not cause him the loss of a 
 penny ; yet this must be taken to refer to words that 
 are actionable in themselves — the various classes of 
 which have been already given — and in which the law 
 implies damage. But when the defamatory words 
 complained of are not actionable in themselves, the 
 person of whom they have been said must, in order to 
 succeed in an action for slander, allege and shew that, 
 by reason of the words uttered, he has lost some 
 material temporal advantage (c). In other words, in 
 such a case damage is the gist of the action, and the 
 plaintiff has to allege and prove, not general, but 
 special damage, such as the loss of a situation or of 
 the gratuitous hospitality of some particular person or 
 persons (d). 
 
 Actions against sheriffs for neglect of duty afford 
 another instance where actual damage has to be shewn 
 to enable a plaintiff to succeed. Where a person has 
 obtained a judgment agaiDst A. B., he has a right to 
 the services of the sheriff in the execution of a writ of 
 Ji. fa. against the goods and chattels of A. B. in order 
 to obtain the fruits of his judgment. But this right 
 would seem to be a qualified and not an absolute 
 one. Before the abolition of imprisonment for debt, 
 a creditor who had obtained a judgment against his 
 debtor, and who had charged the debtor in execution, 
 had an absolute right to have the body of his debtor 
 in gaol every hour till the debt was paid (e). But as 
 regards the execution of a writ of fi. fa. against the 
 goods and chattels of a judgment debtor, the right of the 
 judgment creditor is to be saved from loss by the sheriff's 
 delay ; and if — assuming the sheriff had promptly 
 put the writ into execution — the judgment creditor 
 would have obtained nothing thereby, by reason, for 
 
 (c) See Roberts and Wife v. Roberts, 5 B. & S. 384 ; ante, p. 158. 
 
 (d) See Knight v. Gibbs, 1 A. & E. 43 ; Davies and Wife v. Solomon, 
 L. R. 7 Q. B. 112. 
 
 (e) See Williams v. Mostyn, 4 M. & W. 145, 153. 
 
250 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap. xi. instance, of the debtor having no goods on which a 
 levy could be made, no wrong could have been done to 
 the creditor by delay on the part of the sheriff, and so 
 the sheriff could not be made answerable in damages 
 to him. And if the goods in the execution debtor's 
 house are no longer the debtor's at the time when the - 
 sheriff ought to make a seizure under a writ of ft. fa., 
 but have been assigned to a third party by a valid 
 bill of sale, the judgment creditor can be in no wise 
 damnified by a neglect of the sheriff to seize the goods, 
 or by the abandonment of them after a seizure, and 
 so he cannot recover even nominal damages against 
 the sheriff (/). 
 
 (1) In cases 
 of contract. 
 
 (2) In cases 
 of tort. 
 
 Measure of Damages. — First, with regard to the 
 measure of damages in cases of contract, the general 
 rule is that, " where two parties have made a contract 
 which one of them has broken, the damages which the 
 other party ought to receive in respect of such breach 
 of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably 
 be considered either arising naturally — i.e., according 
 to the usual course of things — from such breach of 
 contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed 
 to have been in the contemplation of both parties at 
 the time they made the contract as the probable result 
 of the breach of it " (g). 
 
 Somewhat similar principles apply in cases of tort, 
 though, as regards the quantum of damages, much will 
 of course depend upon whether the jury, under all the 
 circumstances of each particular case, including the 
 conduct of the parties, are disposed to be liberal to 
 the plaintiff at the defendant's expense, or otherwise. 
 Thus, in Sharp v. Powell (h), Bovill, C.J., says : " No 
 doubt, one who commits a wrongful act is responsible 
 
 (/) See Stimson v. frarnham, L. R. 7 Q. B. 175. 
 
 (g) Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 354; see also Hydraulic 
 Engineering Co. v. McHaffie, 4 Q. B. t). 670 ; Grebert-Borgnis v. 
 Nugent, 15 Q. B. D. 85 ; Hammond v. Bussey, 20 Q. B. D. 79. As to 
 measure of damages uuder the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, see sects. 50-54. 
 
 (h) I,. R. 7 C. P. 253, 258, ante, p. 7. 
 
DAMAGES IN ACTIONS FOR TORT. 251 
 
 for the ordinary consequences which are likely to result OH4- p -_ XI ^ 
 therefrom ; but, generally speaking, he is not liable 
 for damage which is not the natural or ordinary con- 
 sequence of such an act, unless it be shewn that he 
 knows, or has reasonable means of knowing, that con- 
 sequences not naturally resulting from the act are, by 
 reason of some existing cause, likely to intervene so as 
 to occasion damage to a third person." 
 
 The oft-cited case of Scott v. Shepherd (i) will be 
 useful in considering the question of liability for a 
 tortious act. In that case the original thrower of the 
 lighted squib was held liable in damages to the person 
 who was injured by its bursting, although two other 
 persons, to protect themselves and their wares, gave a 
 new motion to the squib after it had left the thrower's 
 hands. The Court considered that those two persons 
 were not free agents in the matter, as they acted under 
 a compulsive necessitj* for their own safety and self- 
 preservation, and so that an action for trespass (which 
 was the form of action used, where damage sustained 
 was the " direct " consequence of a tortious act) would 
 lie against the original thrower. 
 
 But can a person who commits a tortious act be 
 liable for the " natural " (or, as some judges prefer to 
 say, the " probable ") (k) and ordinary consequences 
 of his act, where there is the intervention of a free 
 agent between his act and the damage? It is clear 
 that he may be so liable if the act is of such a nature 
 that injurious consequences might have been anticipated 
 from it. 
 
 A few cases may be cited in support of this pro- 
 position. The owner of a horse and cart left them 
 unattended in the street. The plaintiff, a child of 
 seven years of age, playing in the street with other 
 boys, was getting into the cart, when one of them made 
 the horse move on. The plaintiff was thrown down, and 
 
 (») 2 Wm. Bl. 892 ; 1 Sra. L. C. 438. 
 
 \k) See per Grove, J., in Sharp v. Pox-ell, L. R. 7 C. P. 253. 
 
252 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, xi. the wheel of the cart went over his leg and fractured 
 it, whereupon an action was brought on his behalf 
 against the owner. It was urged by the defendant 
 that the mischief was not produced by the mere negli- 
 gence of his servant, but at most by that negligence 
 in combination with two other causes : first, the advance 
 of the horse in consequence of his being excited by one 
 of the boys ; and, secondly, the plaintiff's improper 
 conduct in mounting the cart. On the former of these 
 two causes the Court did not think it necessary to dwell 
 at any length; "for," said Lord Denman in delivering 
 judgment, "if I am guilty of negligence in leaving 
 anything dangerous in a place where I know it to be 
 extremely probable that some other person will unjusti- 
 fiably set it in motion to the injury of a third, and if 
 that injury should be so brought about, I presume that 
 the sufferer might have redress by action against both 
 or either of the two., but unquestionably against the 
 first. If, for example, a gamekeeper, returning from 
 his daily exercise, should rear his loaded gun against 
 a wall in the playground of schoolboys, whom he knew 
 to be in the habit of pointing toys in the shape of 
 guns at one another, and one of these should playfully 
 fire it off at a schoolfellow, and maim him, I think it 
 will not be doubted that the gamekeeper must answer 
 in damages to the wounded party." As to the plain- 
 tiff's improper conduct in mounting the cart, the Court 
 did not think that that debarred him from succeeding 
 in the action, for that the real cause of the accident 
 was the negligence of the defendant's servant ; and 
 the plaintiff, though he acted without prudence or 
 thought, had shewn these qualities in as great a degree 
 as he could be expected to possess them (I). 
 
 In The Bailiffs o/Romiiey Marsh v. Trinity House (m), 
 a cutter belonging to the defendants, owing to the 
 
 (l) Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29 ; but cf. Mangan v. Atterton, L. R. 
 1 Ex. 239. See also Shiqlclon v. Eastern Counties Railway Company 
 (1859), 7 C. B. N. S. 287. 
 
 (m) L. K. 5 Ex. 204, 7 Ex. 247. 
 
DAMAGES IN ACTIONS FOR TORT. 253 
 
 negligence of the captain and crew, grounded upon chap. 2CU 
 a sandbank within three-quarters of a mile of a wall 
 owned and kept in repair by the plaintiffs, the imme- 
 diate effect of which was that the vessel became 
 unmanageable and beyond the control of the crew. 
 It was then blowing hard, and there was a flood tide, 
 and so the vessel was driven with great violence 
 against the wall, causing considerable damage to it. 
 The defendants were held liable, for the negligence 
 of their captain and crew was considered to be the 
 causa causaus, and not merely the causa sine qua mm 
 of the damage. In other words, the vessel struck 
 the bank through their negligence, and as it there 
 became unmanageable, the inevitable result, owing 
 to the state of the wind and tide, was, that it must 
 be driven against the plaintiffs' sea-wall, and con- 
 sequently the defendants were liable for the damage 
 done. 
 
 Another and perhaps stronger case is Clark v. 
 Chambers («), where the defendant unlawfully blocked 
 up a carriage road by placing an obstruction across 
 it. Part of this obstruction consisted of a barrier 
 armed with spikes, called cheraux dc frisc. Some 
 persons, without the defendant's knowledge, removed 
 the cheraux de /rise barrier, and placed it in an up- 
 right position on the footpath. The plaintiff, on a 
 very dark night, was lawfully passing along the road 
 upon which the obstruction had been erected. He 
 felt his way safely in the middle of the road through 
 the opening caused by the removal of the cheraux 
 de /rise, and having done this, being wholly unaware 
 that there was any obstruction on the footpath, he 
 turned on to the latter, intending to walk along it 
 the rest of the way. He had only advanced two or 
 three steps when his eye came into collision with 
 one of the chevaux de /rise spikes, and was put out. 
 The defendant was held answerable in damages to 
 
 (n) 3 Q. B. D. 327, 338. See ante, p. 7. 
 
254 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 ■CHAP. XI. 
 
 "Where wrong- 
 ful act of de- 
 fendant in- 
 duces third 
 party to com- 
 mit a tort. 
 
 the plaintiff, for " a man who unlawfully places an 
 obstruction across either a public or a private way 
 may anticipate the removal of the obstruction, by 
 some one entitled to use the way, as a thing likely 
 to happen ; and if this should be done, the probability 
 is, that the obstruction so removed will, instead of 
 being carried away altogether, be placed somewhere 
 near. Thus, if the obstruction be on the carriage- 
 way, it will very likely be placed, as was the case here, 
 on the footpath." With regard to the quantum of 
 damages to be awarded in such a case, of course that 
 would be a question essentially for the jury, and the 
 Court would rarely interfere with the amount awarded 
 by them. 
 
 Suppose the wrongful act of A. B. induces C. D. to 
 commit another wrongful act, for which CD. may be 
 sued by the plaintiff, can A. B. be also made answer- 
 able in damages to the plaintiff? It is clear that in 
 some cases, of which Linnleyv. Gyc (o) is a conspicuous 
 example, this may be so. It is well-established law 
 that an action will lie by a master against a person 
 who wrongfully procures that a servant should unlaw- 
 fully break his contract with him. But Lumley v. Gye 
 goes somewhat further than this, for there it was held 
 that the principle is not confined to cases where there 
 is the relationship of master and servant strictly so 
 called, and on demurrer it was decided by the majority 
 of the Court that an action lay against the defendant 
 for maliciously procuring Miss Wagner (who had agreed 
 "with the plaintiff to perform and sing at his theatre, 
 and nowhere else, for a certain time) to break her 
 contract, and not to perform and sing at the- plaintiff's 
 theatre during that time. The plaintiff's rights, in 
 fact, were violated by the defendant having maliciously 
 procured Miss Wagner to break her contract, and the 
 plaintiff suffered temporal loss or damage, which was 
 the natural and probable result of the defendant's 
 
 (o) 2 E. & B. 216. See ante, Chap. III. 
 
DAMAGES IN ACTIONS FOR TORT. 255 
 
 wrongful act. The decision in Lmnley v. Gi/c was chap, xi. 
 followed in a later case by the Court of Appeal {p), 
 when Brett, L.J., delivering the judgment of himself 
 and Lord Chancellor Selborne (Lord Coleridge, C.J., 
 dissenting), said: "Whenever a man does an act 
 which, in fact and in law, is a wrongful act, and such 
 an act as may, as a natural and probable consequence 
 of it, produce injury to another, and which in the 
 particular case does produce such an injury, an action 
 on the case will lie. This is the proposition to be 
 adduced from Ashby v. White (q). If these conditions 
 are satisfied, the action does not the less lie because 
 the natural and probable consequence of the act com- 
 plained of is an act done by a third person, or because 
 such act so done by the third person is a breach of 
 duty or contract by him, or an act illegal on his part, 
 or an act otherwise imposing an actionable liability on 
 him. It has been said that the law implies that the 
 act of the third party, being one which he has free 
 will and power to do or not to do, is his own wilful 
 act, and therefore is not the natural or probable result 
 of the defendant's act. In many cases that may be 
 so ; but if the law is so to imply in every case, it will 
 be an implication contrary to manifest truth and fact. 
 It has been said that if the act of the third person is a 
 breach of duty or contract by him, or is an act which 
 it is illegal for him to do, the law will not recognise 
 that it is a natural or probable consequence of the 
 defendant's act. Again, if that were so held in all 
 •cases, the law would in some refuse to recognise what 
 is manifestly true in fact. If the judgment of Lord 
 Ellenborough in Vicars v. Wilcocks (r) requires this 
 doctrine for its support, it is, in our opinion, wrong." 
 
 Allen v. Flood (rr), shews that the dicta in Bowen v. 
 Hall go too far, and that the existence of an evil 
 
 (p) Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. D. 333, 337 ; cf. Allen v. Flood, infra. 
 
 (q) 1 Sm. L. C. 268. 
 
 (r) 8 East, 1 ; 2 Sm. L. C. 577. 
 
 (rr) (1898) App. Cas. 1, cited ante, Chap. III. 
 
as to damages. 
 
 256 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, xi. motive does not render a man liable for an act not in 
 itself unlawful. 
 
 A few more recent cases may be added. It is not 
 Recent cases out of " the ordinary course of things " that a steam- 
 ship whilst prosecuting one voyage should have secured 
 employment for another adventure, and so, if it be 
 damaged in a collision, the owners may recover the 
 fair and ordinary earnings of such a vessel on such 
 an adventure (s). 
 
 By the negligent navigation of a steamship a collision 
 with a barque took place, and the . latter lost her 
 steering compass, charts, log and log-glass. The 
 captain made for a port of safety as best he could, but 
 owing to the loss of the above requisites for navigation, 
 and without any negligence on the part of the captain 
 or crew, the barque grounded and was necessarily 
 abandoned ; the grounding of the barque was held 
 to be a natural and reasonable consequence of the 
 collision (t) . 
 
 Where a manufacturer's patent is infringed he may 
 claim either (1) An account of profits made by the 
 infringer, or (2) Damages for loss caused by the 
 infringer who competes with the manufacturer by 
 selling the same class of goods as his in the same 
 market. In the former case it is material to consider 
 how much of the patent was appropriated, so as to see 
 what proportion of the infringer's net profits was 
 attributable to its use. In the latter case the question 
 is, What is the injury done to the manufacturer by 
 the illegal sales of the infringer, and it is immaterial 
 whether the profits of the infringer have been large or 
 small, or whether he has infringed only a small part of 
 
 (s) The Grade v. The Argentine/, 14 App. Cas. 519. 
 
 (t) Tlif City of Lincoln, 15 P. D. 15. See also Moivbray v. Mcrry- 
 weathcr(lS95), 2 Q. B. 640. (Defendant supplied plaintifi'swith defective 
 chain, whereby plaintiffs' workman injured : defendant liable to 
 plaintiff for damages paid to workman.) 
 
DAMAGES IN ACTIONS FOR TOKT. 257 
 
 the invention. If the manufacturer, by reason of the chap. xi. 
 illegal competition, has been . compelled to reduce his 
 prices, the loss thereby caused may be included in the 
 damages, due allowance being made for increased sales 
 caused by such reduction, or by the connection and 
 exertions of the infringer (u). 
 
 "Where A. wrongfully makes use of B.'s land, e.g., 
 for tipping spoil, B. is entitled to damages, first, for 
 the diminution in the value of his land, and, secondly, 
 for the use which A. has made of it (x). 
 
 Remoteness of Damage.— There is another phrase, 
 often used, denning the limits of a plaintiff's rights 
 against a defendant, and that is that the damage for 
 which he seeks compensation must not be too remote, 
 though this in reality is but another form of stating 
 that the damage, to enable a plaintiff to succeed in an 
 action, must be the natural or probable consequence of 
 the defendant's act. Thus, in Ward v. Waeks (?/), the 
 plaintiff sued the defendant for uttering of him the 
 following words : " He is a rogue and a swindler ; I 
 know enough about him to hang him : " and alleged 
 in his declaration as special damage that one Bryer, 
 who was about to supply him with goods on credit 
 necessary for the carrying on of his business as a 
 general shopkeeper, refused to do so. The evidence 
 was, that the defendant had spoken the words to one Repetition of 
 Bryce, and that Bryce had repeated them to Bryer, ^J a'^urai 
 who thereupon refused to trust the plaintiff. Upon and probable 
 
 ,, . ., i. j j n • rj. j consequence of 
 
 this a nonsuit was entered, and this was atterwards its utterance. 
 upheld, on the ground that, though every man must be 
 taken to be answerable for the necessary consequences 
 of his own wrongful acts, yet that the spontaneous and 
 
 (m) United Horseshoe, <£r., Co. v. Stewart, 13 App. Cas. 401, as 
 explained in American ilraiilcd Wire Co. v. Thomson, 44 Ch. D. 274. 
 
 (x) Wkilvhitm v. Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Company 
 (1896) 2 Ch. 533. 
 
 (y) 7 Bing. 211. 
 
 E.T. S 
 
258 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, xi. unauthorised repetition of the slander could not be 
 considered as the necessary consequence of the original 
 uttering of the words. What the plaintiff ought to 
 have proved, but failed to prove, was, either that Bryer 
 was present and heard the defendant make the repre- 
 sentation to some person, or, at the very least, that 
 when the defendant made such representation, he 
 directed it to be communicated to Bryer. 
 
 The case just cited was followed in Parkins v. Scott (z), 
 where the defendant's wife, in the presence of other 
 persons, but in the absence of the plaintiff, addressed 
 certain words to the plaintiff's wife, imputing adultery 
 to her. The plaintiff's wife repeated the words to her 
 husband, who thereupon refused to cohabit with her. 
 In an action by the plaintiff and his wife against the 
 defendant and his wife, the Court directed a nonsuit to 
 be entered, because the male plaintiff had not been 
 present when the slander was uttered, and the utterer 
 had not authorised its repetition (a) . 
 
 So far the rule seems clear enough ; but the case of 
 Fading v. Smitli (b) has created some difficulty on the 
 subject. In that case a declaration was held good, 
 which in substance stated that the plaintiff carried on 
 business as a grocer and draper, and was assisted in 
 the conduct of his business by his wife; and that the 
 defendant falsely and maliciously published of the 
 plaintiff's wife, in relation to the business, that she had 
 committed adultery, whereby the plaintiff ^Yas injured 
 in his business and sustained [special] damage. Now, 
 here the plaintiff was unable to give any evidence that 
 any of the persons who heard the defendant uttering 
 the statement had ceased to resort to his shop, so 
 
 (z) i*H. & C. 153. 
 
 («) We are, of course, here dealing with remoteness of damage. It 
 has already been pointed out that since 54 & 55 Vict. c. 51, ante, p. 164. 
 a woman in bringing an action for words imputing uuohastity or 
 adultery to her, has not to prove special damage. 
 
 {b) l'Ex. D. 91. 
 
DAMAGES IN ACTIONS FOR TORT. 259 
 
 that the harm done may have been caused by the chap. xi. 
 unauthorised repetition of the statement. Evidence 
 was, however, given of a general falling-off in the 
 profits of the business. If the decision in that case 
 be right, it would seem to be so on the ground that 
 the action was not so much an action for slander (for 
 the plaintiff himself was not slandered) as an action 
 " on the case" for a wrongful act done by the defen- 
 dant, whereby the plaintiff was injured in his business. 
 See especially the judgment of Kelly, C.B., according 
 to which it would appear to be that if a statement were 
 made — not a slander, but something else — calculated 
 to injure the shopkeeper in the way of his trade ; as, 
 for instance, a statement that one of his shopmen was 
 suffering from an infectious disease, such as scarlet 
 fever ; this would operate to prevent people coming to 
 the shop, and an action could be maintained on the 
 ground that a statement had been made to the public 
 which would have the effect of preventing their 
 resorting to his shop and buying goods of him (c). 
 
 In connection with this subject one cannot help 
 ■saying that, though the doctrine laid down in IVardv. 
 Weeks is accepted by the Court of Appeal (d), the 
 ■speeches of some of the Lords in Lynch v. Knight (e) 
 would give ground for hoping that the doctrine would 
 not receive the approval of the highest tribunal. It 
 may be wrong to repeat a slander, but, taking human 
 nature as it is, is it not the ordinary and probable 
 consequence of its utterance that it will be repeated, 
 and should not the original utterer therefore be liable ? 
 
 Other cases already cited may be referred to as useful 
 guides when it is wished to ascertain whether the 
 damage complained of is or is not too remote to be 
 laid to the charge of a defendant. Thus, in Cox v. 
 
 (c) See also the judgment of Bowen, L.J., in Ratcliffe v. Evans, 
 <1892), 2 Q. B. 524, at p. 534; see ante, p. 61. 
 
 (d) See Bree v. Marescaux, 7 Q. B. D. 434. 
 
 (e) 9 H. of L. Cas. 577 ; see ante, p. 157. 
 
 s 2 
 
260 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, xi. Burbidge (/) the owner of a horse, which was allowed 
 by his negligence to stray upon the public highway, 
 where it kicked a child, was not made to answer in 
 damages, there being nothing to shew that the owner 
 knew that the horse was of a vicious disposition. But 
 in Lee v. Riley (g), where the defendant's mare, escaping 
 through a gate which he had neglected to keep in 
 repair, into the plaintiff's field, kicked and injured 
 the plaintiff's horse, the defendant was made answer- 
 able, as the damage was not too remote, but was a, 
 consequence which was ordinary or probable. 
 
 Again, Sharpe v. Powell (h) is another instance of a. 
 defendant having been held not liable for remote con- 
 sequences flowing from his wrongful act. There defen- 
 dant's servant, contrary to the provisions of a Police 
 Act, washed a van in the public street, and allowed 
 the water to run down a gutter towards a grating ; 
 but the grating being obstructed by ice (a fact which 
 was not brought home to the knowledge of the defen- 
 dant or his servant), the water spread for some feet, 
 over the roadway, forming a sheet of ice, upon which 
 the plaintiff's horse fell and broke its knee. The- 
 natural consequence of the act of the defendant's 
 servant would be that the water would run down the. 
 gutter and pass through the grating into the sewer. 
 The stoppage was caused by an obstruction at the 
 grating, which was not shewn to have been known to- 
 the defendant, and for which he was not responsible. 
 
 Where, owing to defendant's negligence, a collision 
 with a railway train almost took place, but did not. 
 actually, damages for a nervous shock or mental 
 injury caused by fright at such impending collision 
 were held too remote (i). 
 
 (/') 13 C. B. N. S. 430. 
 
 (g) 18 C. B. N. S. 722. 
 
 (h) L. R, 7 C. P. 253 ; see ante, p. 250. 
 
 (i) Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 ;, 
 disapproved, however, in Bell v. Great Northern llailwaij Company, 
 26 L. R. (Ir.) Ex. D. 428. See also Pugh v. London, Brighton and. 
 
DAMAGES IN ACTIONS FOR TORT. 261 
 
 Special Damages — The adjective " special" is often chap, xi. 
 used in relation to damages, but not always with exactly 
 the same meaning. Where a legal right has been dis- 
 turbed the law presumes some damage, and the particu- 
 lar damage (beyond such general damage) , which a party 
 may recover, if he properly claims it in his pleadings, 
 is called " special damage." But when no legal right 
 (apart from the damage done) has been disturbed, 
 then the damage done is the wrong, and the term 
 " special damage," when used of this damage, denotes 
 the actual and temporal loss which has in fact occurred. 
 Again, the term " special damage " is used in actions 
 brought for a public nuisance, such as the obstruction 
 of a highway, to denote that actual and particular 
 loss which a plaintiff must prove that he has sustained 
 beyond what is sustained by the general public — if 
 his action is to be supported, such particular loss being, 
 as is obvious, the cause of action (k). 
 
 Vindictive or Exemplary Damages. — Little need 
 be said as to damages of this description, which are 
 awarded by juries where there has been a violation of 
 personal freedom, or where insults have accompanied 
 the tort committed, or the defendant's conduct has 
 been of a particularly gross nature (I) . In seduction, 
 for example, the ground of the action is, of course, loss 
 of service, and the service which the plaintiff can prove 
 may be very slight ; but yet the jury may, and often 
 do, take into account all that the parent may feel 
 irom the nature of the injury to his child, and so 
 not only the wounded feelings but also the dishonour 
 resulting from the defendant's act may form part of 
 the estimate of damages (;«)• 
 
 South Coast Railway Company (1896), 2 Q. B. 248 (illness owing to 
 nervous shock from (right held to come under insurance against 
 accidents) ; Wilkinson v. Downton (1897), 2 Q. B. 57 (damages recovered 
 for nervous shock caused by defendant's practical juke). 
 
 (k) Ratdiffe v. Evans (18~92), 2 Q. B. 524, at p. 528 ; ante, p. 61. 
 
 {1) See Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442. 
 
 (m) Bedford v. M'Kowl, 3 Esp. 119 j Andrews v. Askey, 8C.4P. 7. 
 
( 262 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE XII. 
 
 LIMITATION OF ACTIONS FOE TORT. 
 
 chap. xii. In considering the question of damages for a tort and 
 the Statutes of Limitations, one must bear in mind, 
 that " it is a rule that when a thing directly wrongful 
 in itself is done to a man, in itself a cause of action, 
 he must, if he sues in respect of it, do so once and 
 for all ; as, if he is beaten or wounded, if he sues, he 
 must sue for all his damage, past, present, or future, 
 certain or contingent. He cannot maintain an action 
 for a broken arm, and subsequently for a broken rib, 
 though he did not know of it when he commenced his 
 first action. But if he sustained two injuries from a 
 blow, one to his person and another to his property — 
 as, for instance, damage to a watch — there is no doubt 
 that he could maintain two actions in respect of the 
 
 one blow If he became bankrupt, the right in 
 
 respect of the watch would vest in his trustee ; that 
 
 for damage to his person would remain in him 
 
 The same would be true of an action for consequen- 
 tial damages. A man slandered or libelled by words 
 actionable in themselves must sue, if at all, for all 
 his damage in one action " (a). But suppose a slander 
 were of such a kind that an action for it could not be 
 maintained until damage had resulted from it, then 
 it would seem that an action would lie every time a 
 damage accrued from it. " For example," continues 
 Lord Bramwell, " A. says to B. that C. is a swindler ; 
 B. refuses to enter into a contract with C. ; C. has a 
 cause of action against A. D., who was present and 
 
 (a) Per Lord Bramwell in Darlcy Main Colliery Company v. Mitchell, 
 11 App. Cas. 127. at p. 145 ; see Brunsden v. Humphrey, 14 Q. B. D. 
 141. 
 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS FOR TORT. 263 
 
 heard it, also refuses to make such a contract ; surely chap. xii. 
 another action would lie. And so one would think if 
 B. subsequently refuses another contract." 
 
 Let us now consider a different class of cases, where 
 the act which causes the damage is not in itself wrong- 
 ful. In that case, the cause of action will not accrue 
 till the damage occurs. This can best be illustrated 
 by the case where one man is the owner of land and 
 another the owner of the minerals beneath the land. 
 By the judgments of the House of Lords in the two 
 cases of Backhouse v. Bonomi (b), and Barley Main 
 Colliery Company v. Mitchell (c), the law on the subject 
 is now quite clear. 
 
 (1) The owner of the surface has a natural and 
 legal right to the undisturbed enjoyment of that 
 surface in the absence of any binding agreement to 
 the contrary. 
 
 (2) The owner of the subjacent minerals may ex- 
 cavate and remove them to the utmost extent, but 
 should exercise that right so as not to disturb the 
 lawful enjoyment of the owner of the surface. 
 
 (3) The excavation and removal of the minerals do 
 not per se constitute any actionable invasion of the 
 right of the owner of the surface, although subsequent 
 events shew that no adequate supports have been left 
 to maintain the surface. 
 
 (4) But when, in consequence of not leaving or pro- 
 viding sufficient supports, a disturbance of the surface 
 takes place, that disturbance is an invasion of the right 
 of the owner of the surface, and constitutes his cause 
 of action. 
 
 These four propositions will be found in the speech 
 of Lord Fitzgerald in Barley Main Colliery Company v. 
 
 (ft) 9 H. of L. Cas. 503. 
 
 (c) 11 App. Cas. 127 ; followed in Crumbie v. Wallsend Local Board 
 (1891), 1 Q. B. 503. 
 
264 
 
 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 chap, xii. Mitchell (d). In that case the appellants, the Colliery 
 Company, who were the lessees of coal under the 
 respondent's land, worked the coal so as to cause a 
 subsidence of the land and injury to the houses 
 ' thereon in 1868. For the injury thus caused they 
 made compensation and executed certain repairs. They 
 never worked the coal after 1868 ; but in 1882 a 
 further subsidence took place, causing further injury. 
 There would have been no further subsidence if an 
 adjoining owner had not worked his coal (which he 
 did in 1881), or if the appellants had left sufficient 
 support under the respondent's land. The working by 
 the adjoining owner caused "a creep," and a further 
 subsidence of the land. Under these circumstances it 
 was held by the House of Lords (Lord Blackburn dis- 
 senting) that the cause of action in respect of the 
 further subsidence did not arise till that subsidence 
 occurred, and that the respondent could maintain an 
 action for the damage thereby caused, although more 
 than six years had elapsed since the last working by 
 the appellants. As stated in the judgment, there was 
 a complete cause of action in 1868, in respect of which 
 compensation was given, but there was a liability to 
 further disturbance of the surface of the land. The 
 appellants permitted that state of things to continue 
 without taking any steps to prevent the occurrence 
 of any future injury. A fresh subsidence took place, 
 causing a new and further disturbance of the respon- 
 dent's enjoyment, which gave him a new and distinct 
 cause of action. 
 
 Periods al- 
 lowed for 
 bringing ac- 
 tions for torts. 
 
 It now remains to set out the periods allowed by 
 statute for bringing actions of tort. The principal 
 statute on the subject is 21 Jac. I. c. 16, the effect of 
 s. 3 of which is, that an action for slander (subject to 
 what has been said where the slander is not action- 
 able without proof of special damage) must be brought 
 
 (d) Ubi supra. 
 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS FOB TORT. 265 
 
 within two years from the speaking of the words (e) ; chap, xii. 
 actions for assault, battery, wounding, or imprisonment 
 must be brought within four years after the cause of 
 action has arisen ; whilst the period allowed for bring- 
 ing actions for trespass to land or to goods, detinue, 
 trover, replevin, libel, and other actions on the case 
 not otherwise dealt with, is six years. 
 
 By 24 Geo. II. c. 44, s. 8, actions against constables 
 for acts done by them acting under a justice's warrant, 
 and by 11 & 12 Yict. c. 44, s. 8, actions against justices 
 for acts done by them acting as justices, must be brought 
 within six months. 
 
 By 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, s. 2, where injuries 
 have been done to the real estate of a deceased person 
 within six months before his death, his representatives 
 have only twelve months from his death to sue there- 
 for ; and by the same section, where a deceased person 
 has, within six months of his death, committed injury 
 to the real or personal estate of another, his repre- 
 sentatives can only be sued within a period of six 
 months from the time they take upon themselves the 
 administration of his estate. 
 
 The period for bringing actions under Lord Camp- 
 bell's Act (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93), where a person's death 
 has been caused by the wrongful act of another, is 
 limited to twelve months ; and the periods allowed by 
 the Employers' Liability Act (43 & 44 Vict. c. 42), 
 for bringing actions under that Act, are six months 
 from the occurrence of the accident causing the injury, 
 or, in case of death, twelve months from the time of 
 death. 
 
 By the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, an 56 & 57 vict. 
 action, prosecution, or other proceeding against any °- 6] - 
 person for any act done, in pursuance, or execution, 
 
 (e) Where the words are actionable per se : if special damage neces- 
 sary, the time runs from the time the special damage accrues : Saunders 
 v. Edwards, 1 Sid. 95. 
 
266 OUTLINES OF TORTS. 
 
 c hap, xii. or intended execution, of any Act of Parliament, or 
 of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any 
 alleged neglect or default in the execution of such 
 Act, duty, or authority, must be instituted within six 
 months next after the act, neglect, or default com- 
 plained of, or, in the case of a continuance of injury 
 or damage, within six months next after the ceasing 
 thereof. 
 
 Further By the above-mentioned 21 Jac. I. c. 16, s. 7, it 
 
 of "eruin CaSe was provided that in the case of a person who at the 
 disabilities. date of the accrual of a cause of action to him or 
 her was under age, a feme covert, non compos mentis, 
 imprisoned or beyond the seas, the statute was not 
 to run till the removal of the disability. But now by 
 s. 10 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 
 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97), this provision is abolished as 
 regards persons imprisoned or beyond the seas ; and 
 it would seem to be abolished as regards a feme covert 
 also, as the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, by 
 s. 1, sub-s. 2, enables a married woman to sue in tort 
 as if she were a, feme sole (/). 
 
 The operation of the Statutes of Limitations is also 
 qualified by a well-known rule borrowed from the Courts 
 of Equity, namely, that where the existence of a cause 
 of action has been actively concealed from the person 
 who ought to take advantage of it by the fraud of the 
 person who creates it, such person shall not take 
 advantage of the wrong which he himself has done, 
 and so a fresh cause of action accrues from the 
 moment that the fraud is discovered (g). 
 
 The Statutes will not begin to run till there is a 
 complete cause of action. Thus, a railway company, 
 
 (/) See Weldon v. Neal, 51 L. T. 289. 
 
 (g) See and of. Gibbs v. Guild, 9 Q. B. D. 59 ; Barber v. Houston, 
 14 L. R. (Ir.), 273 ; 18 L. E, (Ir.), 475 ; Thome v. Heard (1895), App. 
 Cas. 495. 
 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS FOR TORT. 267 
 
 in consequence of a forged transfer, registered rail- chap. xii. 
 way stock belonging to A. in the name of another 
 person. The forgery was afterwards discovered, and 
 the company informed of it, but they refused to treat 
 A. as the stockholder : held that the cause of action 
 was not complete until such refusal took place (h). 
 Again, a lease belonging to the plaintiff was fraudu- 
 lently taken from him by his son, and deposited, 
 without the plaintiff's knowledge, with B., in 1881, 
 as security for a loan. B. held the lease without 
 knowledge of the fraud, and became bankrupt, where- 
 upon his trustee, in 1889, assigned the debt to the 
 defendant, and handed over the lease to him. The 
 plaintiff subsequently demanded the lease from the 
 defendant, and on his refusal to return it, brought 
 an action for it, to which action the defendant 
 pleaded the Statute of Limitation. It was held that 
 the Statute began to run only from the time when 
 the plaintiff had a complete cause of action against 
 the defendant (viz., the date of the demand and 
 refusal), irrespective of the question whether he had 
 a complete cause of action against B., and so that the 
 Statute was no answer to the action (i) . 
 
 (h) Barton, v. North Staffordshire Railway Company, 38 Ch. D. 458. 
 (i) Miller v. Dell (1891), 1 Q. B. 468. 
 
INDEX 
 
 ABATEMENT, 
 
 of nuisance sometimes justification of trespass, 79 
 
 by commoner, 79 
 other remedies where abatement may cause breach of peace, 
 79 
 
 ABDUCTION, 62 
 
 ABEOAD, 
 
 torts committed, 26 
 
 ACCIDENT, 233. See Negligence. 
 
 ADTJLTEB.Y, 62 
 
 ACTION, 
 
 for violation of a right, 1 — 3 
 
 public wrong, 6 
 need not be cast in particular form, 5 
 ex delicto and ex contractu distinguished, 4, 5 
 
 where contract creates duty, 5, 97, 117 
 as to suspension of, where tort amounts to felony, 9 
 no, where proceedings already taken for same assault, 33 
 by or against married woman, 182 — 188 
 as to joinder of husband, 184, 187 
 under Employers' Liability Act, 1880: 226 
 for tort, limitation of. See Statute of Limitations. 
 none, till damage accrues, where act not wrongful, i>er se, 263 
 
 ADMINISTRATOR. See Executor. 
 
 may sue for injuries to intestate's personalty, 13, 14 
 
 ADVOCATE, 
 
 statements of, in conduct of case, absolutely privileged, 9, 176 
 
 AGENT, 
 
 fraud or representations of, liability of principal for, 155 
 
 personally liable for torts, 208 — 210 
 
 but mere immediate or ministerial agent not so liable, 210 
 
270 INDEX. 
 
 AGENT — continued. 
 
 contracting without authority, liable on implied contract, 148 
 
 each partner agent of firm, 207 
 
 signature of, will not bind principal under Tenterden's Act, 
 
 156 
 " agent of necessity," 189 
 
 ANIMALS. See Horse. 
 
 ferce naturae and mansuetw naturae, 218 
 
 trespass by, 220 
 
 dogs, liability of owner for damage done by, 221 
 
 APPRENTICE, 31, 64 
 
 ARREST, 36—40 
 
 justified by warrant of competent tribunal, 37, 40 
 constable not liable for, on magistrate's warrant, 40 
 authorised by statute, 37 — 39 
 
 of rogues and vagabonds, by constable without warrant, 37 
 persons committing indictable offence at night, 38 
 making disturbance in church, 39 
 under Larceny Act, 38 
 
 Malicious Injuries to Property Act, 38 
 by pawnbroker, 38 
 
 railway companies, 38 
 tramway companies, 38 
 authorised by common law, 39 
 
 by private person, to prevent breach of peace, 39 
 
 for felony, 39 
 by constable, for felony or misdemeanour, 39 
 malicious arrests, 40, 45 
 
 liability of judges, magistrates, 40 
 
 solicitors and others for, 40 
 on mesne process, 45 
 for contempt of court, 41 
 
 ASSAULT, 29—35 
 
 what constitutes, 29 
 
 " battery" usually termed an assault, 29 
 
 action for, does not pass to trustee in bankruptcy, 25 
 
 time limited for bringing, 265 
 defences to an action for, 30 — 33 
 plea of son assault demesne, 31 
 where committed in defence of wife and others, 31 
 
 property, 32 
 on foreigner by authority of Govern- 
 ment, 32 
 
INDEX. 271 
 
 ASSAULT— continued. 
 
 defences to an action for— continued. 
 
 reasonable castigation of children and others, 31 
 removal of intruders and disorderly persons, 31, 32 
 where proceedings already taken for same assault, 34 
 assault by order of Parliament, 32 
 
 ATTOENEY. See Solicitor. ' 
 
 AUCTIONEER, 
 
 when liable for conversion, 209 
 
 BAILOR, 
 
 of chattel, when he may sue for injury thereto, 93 
 
 BAILEE, 
 
 may sue for conversion, when, 93 
 liability of, 93 
 
 BANKRUPTCY, 
 
 effect of, on torts, 24 
 
 unliquidated damages for torts, when not provable in, 25 
 
 right of action for personal torts does not pass to trustee 
 
 m, 25 
 maliciously procuring adjudication of, 56 
 
 BARRISTER. See Advocate. 
 
 BATTERY. See Assault. 
 
 BUILDING, 
 
 right to support for, how acquired, 75, 76 
 pulling down or prostrating, is voluntary waste, 90 
 permitting to fall into decay, is permissive waste, 90 
 erection of, which improves value of land is not waste, 90 
 
 CAMPBELL'S ACT, LORD, 15—17, 233, 240 
 actions under, for whose benefit, 15 
 who may bring, 16 
 not Admiralty actions, 127 
 damages, amount of, recoverable under, 15 
 among whom jury may divide, 15 
 time within which action may be brought, 16 
 where deceased has accepted satisfaction for injuries, 16 
 
 CARRIERS. See Railway Company. 
 
 CHASTITY, 
 
 imputation upon, when actionable. 157, 164 
 
272 INDEX. 
 
 CHATTELS, 
 
 trespass to, 92 
 
 conversion of, 93 
 
 finder of, is entitled to possession against all but true owner, 93 
 
 entry on land to retake or deposit, 77 
 
 CHILDREN, 
 
 injuries to, or seduction of, 64 
 
 COLLISION, 
 
 between trains of same company evidence of negligence, 107 
 
 COMPANY. See Corporation. 
 
 liability of promoters for fraudulent prospectus, 139 — 141, 14,'> 
 
 CONSTABLE, 
 
 may arrest without warrant, when, 37 — 39 
 
 on suspicion of felony, 39 
 liable for false imprisonment, when, 39 
 
 not when armed with warrant, 40 
 
 CONTEMPT OP COURT, 41 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. See Negligence. 
 
 CONTRACT, 
 
 rescission of, for misrepresentation, 130 
 
 maliciously inducing persons to commit breach of, a tort, 57 
 
 breach of, involving breach of duty, 65 
 
 torts founded on, 5, 18, 97—106, 117, 188 
 
 CONVERSION, 92—94 
 what is, 92—94 
 
 who may bring action for, 93, 94 
 time limited for' bringing action for, 265 
 by tenant in common, 73 
 auctioneer, 209 
 
 CORPORATION, 
 
 liability of, for torts, 54 
 
 as to right to bring action for libel, 165 
 
 COUNTY COURT, 
 
 may commit for contempt, when, 41 
 
 actions under Employers' Liability Act to be brought in, 231 
 
 DAMAGE. See Damages. 
 ever}' injury imports, 2, 3 
 
 actual, not indispensable to found action, 1 — 3 
 not actionable where no right violated, 1 — 3, 249 
 
INDEX. 273 
 
 DAMAGE— continued. 
 
 where probable consequence of act, 7. S 
 
 remoteness of, 7, 104, 257 
 
 caused by vis major, defendant not liable for, 812 
 
 DAMAGES. See Damage ; Measure of Damages. 
 recoverable for violation of a right, 3 
 under Lord Campbell's Act, 15, 127 
 
 among whom jury may divide, 15 
 none for pain and suffering, 16 
 recovered by married woman, her separate property, 184 
 
 against married woman, how payable, 184 
 nominal, 248 
 ordinary, 248 
 vindictive, 248, 261 
 special, 61, 261 
 
 in action for slander, 157 — 160 
 what defamatory words actionable without proof of, 160 — 164 
 in action for malicious prosecution, 54 
 
 libel, plaintiff need not prove, 164 
 against sheriffs, 249 
 where wrongful act induces third party to commit a tort, 5S 
 remoteness of, 7, 84, 257 
 
 DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA, 
 not actionable, 2 — 4 
 
 DANGEBOUS, 
 
 things in themselves, 108 
 
 DEATH, 
 
 effect of, on torts, 13 — 24 
 
 action under Lord Campbell's Act, 13 — 17 
 
 of workman, liability of employer for, 227, 235 
 
 proceedings within certain time from, 231, 235 
 injuries to servant causing, 66 
 
 DECEIT. See Faxse Representation; Fraud. 
 action of, 129, 142, 143 
 
 DEFAMATION, 157. See Libel; Slander. 
 
 DIRECTORS, 
 
 liable to purchaser of shares for false representations, 139 — 
 
 140 
 liability for prospectus under Directors' Liability Act, 1890 : 
 145 
 DIRECTORS' LIABILITY ACT, 1890 : 145 
 
 R.T. T 
 
274 INDEX. 
 
 DISTRESS, 
 
 wrongful, makes landlord a trespasser, 70 
 by overseers of the poor, 71 
 
 DOGS, 221. See Animals. 
 
 DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 
 torts in respect of, 63 
 
 DUTY, 
 
 breach of, a tort, 5, 98, 105 
 
 of innkeeper to protect guests, 101 
 
 railway companies, 98 — 102 
 
 trustees as to giving information to cestui que trust, 148 
 
 EASEMENT. See Support. 
 
 EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT, 1880: 226-231. See Work- 
 men's Compensation Act, 1897. 
 meaning of " workman," 230 
 
 " superintendence,'' 230 
 actions under, to be brought in County Court, 231 
 
 within six months of injury, 231 
 twelve months of death, 231 
 notice of intention to bring action, 231 
 workman may contract himself out of, 231 
 renewed from year to year, 222 
 
 EQUITY, 
 
 rules of, to prevail where in conflict with common law, 137 
 
 ESTOPPEL, 146 
 
 EVIDENCE, 
 
 in action for negligence, 109 — 112 
 
 EXECUTOR, 
 
 may sue for injuries to testator's personal estate, 13, 14 
 
 real estate, 14 
 of executor may sue for such injuries, 14 
 right of action of, under Lord Campbell's Act, 15 
 has no action for mere personal tort, 18 
 may have two actions where bleach of contract, 18 
 action against, for torts committed by testator, 20 
 
 the recover}' of property, 22 
 cannot be sued at common law for unliquidated damages, 24 
 
 PALSE IMPRISONMENT, 36—41. See Arrest. 
 what constitutes, 36 
 by servant, liability of master, 200 — 7 
 
INDEX. 275 
 
 FALSE IMrBISONMENT— continued. 
 
 action for, for setting ministerial officer in motion, 46 
 
 against constable, 39 
 damages cannot be recovered for a remand, 46 
 time limited for bringing action, 265 
 
 EALSE BEPEESENTATION. See Fraud. 
 where ambiguous, 136 
 
 plaintiff has opportunity of investigation, 136 
 defendant has no knowledge, 134 
 
 is best quab'fied to give information, 146 
 subsequently discovers its untruth, 137 
 rescission, 130 
 
 in prospectus of company, 138, 140, 141 
 by servant or agent, 149, 150, 207 
 
 agent contracting without authority, 148 
 liability of innocent principal, 149 
 where principal derives no benefit from it, 152 
 innocent agent, where principal has knowledge, 153 
 as to a person's credit, 155 
 
 FELONY, 
 
 as to civil remedy where tort amounts to, 9 — 13 
 
 damages under Lord Campbell's Act where death amounts to, 
 
 15 
 arrest for, by private person, 39 
 
 on suspicion of, by constable, 39 
 warrant of arrest for, 40 
 
 EINDEB, 
 
 of chattel, rights of, 93 
 
 EOECIBLE ENTBY, 
 by landlord, 33 
 one wrongfully in possession cannot sue rightful owner for, 33 
 
 EEATTD. Hre Ealse Bepeesentatiox. 
 what constitutes, 129, 142, 143 
 no distinction between "legal" and "moral," 129 
 
 action for, without damage, 129, 135, 142 
 what plaintiff must prove to support action for, 142, 143 
 untrue statements, not believed to be true, made for a 
 
 fraudulent purpose, 133 
 misrepresentation must be acted on by plaintiff to his damage, 
 
 129, 135 
 material, 136 
 where representation ambiguous, 136 
 
 T 2 
 
276 INDEX. 
 
 FEAUD — continued. 
 
 where opportunity of investigation, 136 
 
 where person discovers his representation untrue, 137 
 
 to whom representation made, 138 
 
 fraudulent prospectus, 138, 140, 141 
 
 concealment of material facts, 138 
 
 where no dishonest motive, 132 
 
 erroneous statements by persons with special means of 
 
 knowledge, 146 
 by servants or agents, 149, 207 
 
 partners, 207 
 
 infant, 188—189 
 
 GOODS. See Chattels. 
 
 GUEST, 
 
 injuries to, liability of host for, 107 
 
 HIGHWAY, 
 
 where impassable, right to pass over adjoining land, 79 
 obstruction of, 6 
 
 HOESE, 
 
 damage by, 197, 220 
 
 left unattended in highway, 197 
 
 allowing to stray when negligence, 118 
 
 HUSBAND. See Married Woman. 
 
 common law liability of, for wife's torts, 182 
 
 effects of recent legislation on, 183 — 188- 
 as to torts of wife when divorced or judicially separated, 183 
 liable for wife's antenuptial debts or torts, to what extent, 
 
 185—187 
 need not be joined in action against wife, 184, 187 
 costs of, in action against, for wife's antenuptial torts, 186 
 torts in respect of marital rights, 62 
 
 IDENTIFICATION, 
 doctrine of, 125 
 
 IMPE1SONMENT. See Arrest ; False Imprisonment. 
 on mesne process, 45 
 
 INDEPENDENT CONTEACTOE, 211, 232, 237 
 
 INDICTMENT, 
 
 for public wrong, 5 
 libel, 172 
 
INDEX. 277 
 
 INFANT, 
 
 generally liable for torts, 1S8 
 
 action e.r contractu cannot be maintained against, 188 
 even if contract induced by fraud, 189 
 
 INJUNCTION, 
 
 none to restrain meliorating or permissive waste, 92 
 against continuance of nuisance, 42, 43, 80 
 publication of libel or slander, 181 
 
 IXJUHIA SINE DAMXO, 
 actionable, 1 — 3 
 
 INJITKY, 
 
 imports damage, 2, 3 
 
 INNKEEPEE, 
 
 duty of, to protect guests, 101 
 
 INVITATION, 
 
 doctrine of, 106 
 
 JUDGE, 
 
 not liable to action when acting in performance of duties, 9 
 
 for words spoken in judicial proceedings, 
 175 
 liable for torts when acting beyond limits of authority, 40 
 functions of, in actions for negligence, 113 
 defamation, 16G 
 malicious prosecution, 48 
 
 JUS TERTII, 
 
 wrongdoer cannot set up, 94 
 
 LANDLOBD, 
 
 forcible entry by, 33 
 
 when liable for nuisance on demised premises, 88 — 90 
 
 distress by, 70 
 
 LEAVE AND LICENCE, 
 
 in justification of trespass, 77 
 
 LEVEL CEOSSINGS, 
 
 duties of railway companies as to, 121, 122 
 
 LIBEL, 
 
 what constitutes, 157, 164 
 
 distinguished from slander, 157 
 
 on corporation, 165 
 
 actionable without proof of damage, 164 
 
278 INDEX. 
 
 LIBEL — continued. 
 
 action for, does not pass to trustee in bankruptcy, 25 
 
 onus of proving words libellous on plaintiff, 165 
 
 where words capable of different meanings, 165 — 168 
 
 intention of person using words, 1 66 
 
 functions of judge and jury in action for, 166 
 
 repetition of, actionable, 169 
 
 plea of privilege, 174. See Privilege. 
 
 fair report of judicial proceedings, 180 
 
 criminal proceedings against proprietor, &c, of newspaper, 173 
 
 publication of, 168 
 
 on postcard or telegram, sufficient, 168 
 
 to plaintiff's wife, sufficient, 169 
 
 plaintiff alone, when not sufficient to support action, 
 168—169 
 justification of, where civil proceedings taken, 170 
 
 truth, of, must be specially pleaded, 171 
 
 where libel partly undoubted fact, partly comment, 172 
 justification of, where criminal proceedings taken, 172 
 
 publication must be for public benefit, 173 
 
 justification before magistrates, 173 
 time limited for bringing action of, 265 
 injunction against publication of, 181 
 
 LICENCE, 
 
 when irrevocable, 77 
 
 LICENSEE, 
 
 liability of licensor for injuries to, 107 
 
 LIMITATIONS. See Statutes of Limitations. 
 
 MAGISTRATES, 
 
 liable for torts when acting beyond limits of authority, 40 1 
 
 MAINTENANCE, 56 
 
 MALICE, 
 
 in law and in fact, 52, 58, 177 
 malicious arrests, 40, 45 
 in action for malicious prosecution, 52 
 of corporations, 54 
 
 will rebut qualified privilege in action of defamation, 177 
 but not absolute privilege, 174 — 177 
 
 MALICIOUS INJTTEIES, 
 
 malicious abuse of legal process, 44 
 arrests, 40, 45 
 
INDEX. 279 
 
 MALICIOUS INJURIES— continue,!. 
 
 malicious prosecution, 46. See Malicious Prosecution. 
 presentation of winding-up petition, 55 
 bankruptcy proceedings, 56 
 injury to property or trade discussed, 58 
 falsehood affecting a man's trade, 60 
 
 maliciously inducing a person to commit breach of contract, 58 
 
 maintenance, 56 
 
 slander of title, 60 
 
 as to patents, 61 
 
 MALICIOUS PEOSECUTION, 46—55 
 
 what plaintiff must 2>rove tu maintain action, 47 
 
 (1) termination of proceedings in his favour, 47 
 
 (2) absence of reasonable and probable cause, 48 
 
 reasonable and probable cause, what is, 48 
 jury to find facts, judge to decide on facts so found, 
 48 
 
 (3) malice, 51 
 
 (4) damage, 54 
 
 action for, lies for setting judicial officer in motion, 46 
 
 against corporation, 54 
 where defendant was bound over to prosecute, 54 
 
 MAEITAL EIGHTS. 
 
 torts in respect of, 62 s 
 
 MAEEIED WOMAN. See Husband ; Maeeied Women's Pro- 
 peety Act ; Marital Eights. 
 how far liable for torts at common law, 182, 183 
 may now sue or be sued in contract or in tort, 184 
 how far liable for antenuptial debts and torts, 185 
 as to torts committed during marriage by or against, 185 
 damages recovered by, or against, 184 
 
 MAEEIED WOMEN'S PEOPEETY ACT (1882), 184, 187 
 repeal of preceding Acts, 184 
 liability of wife for antenuptial torts under, 185 
 
 husband for wife's antenuptial torts under, 185 
 general effect of ss. 13 — 15 of, 187 
 procedure under, 186 
 
 MAEEIED WOMEN'S PEOPEETY ACT (1893), 184 
 
 MASTEE AND SEEVANT, 189—207. See Employers' Liability 
 Act ; Peincipax and Agent. 
 relation of, how determined, 189 — 193 
 
280 INDEX. 
 
 MASTEE AND SERVANT— continued, 
 master liable for torts of servant, 36, 189 
 
 where act done is within scope of employment, 194 
 , scope of employment a question of J* act, 199 
 where he leaves servant discretionary powers, 198 
 where master liable, instances, 200 
 
 not liable, instances, 202 
 master's liability to servant for torts, 222 
 
 for injuries caused by fellow-servant, 
 
 224 
 under Workmen's Compensation 
 Act, 231 
 master may set up contributory negligence in defence, 224 
 how far he may do so under Workmen's Compensation Act, 232 
 master may sue for seduction of servant, 66 
 master's action for injuries to servant, 65 
 torts in respect of domestic relations, 63 
 liability of servant or agent for torts, 208 
 
 MAXIMS, 
 
 Actio personalis moritur cum persona, 13, 17 
 
 Nemo allegans suam turpitudinem est audiendus, 11 
 
 Qui facit per alium, facit per se, 189 
 
 Res ipso, loquitur, 110, 119 
 
 Respondeat superior, 190 
 
 Sic utere tuo ut ulienum non Iw.das, 81, 220 
 
 The greater the truth, the greater the libel, 172, 173 
 
 Volenti non fit injuria, 223 
 
 MEASURE OE DAMAGES, 
 
 in cases of contract and tort, 250 
 
 MINOE. See Ineant. 
 
 MISDEMEANOUR, 
 
 private person may not arrest on suspicion of, 39 
 warrant of arrest for, 40 
 
 MISEEPEESENTATION. See False Eepresentation. 
 
 NEGLIGENCE, 95—128 
 defined, 95, 101 
 " relative " not "absolute," 95 
 must be proximate cause of damage, 95, 
 not actionable without damage, 95 
 
 where a contract imposes a duty towards third persons, 101 — 109 
 the doctrine of " invitation," 106 
 
INDEX. 281 
 
 NEGLIGENCE— contin ued. 
 
 burden of proof in action fur, 109, 112 
 evidence consistent with existence or non-existence of, 109 
 happening of accident p rinu I facie evidence of, 109 — 112 
 as to contributory negligence, 112, 224 
 functions.of judge and jury, 113 
 tvhom to sue for, 97 
 
 of servant, when master liable for, 189 
 causing death, action for, 15 
 action for, under Employers' Liability Act, 226 
 by licensee, 107 
 guest, 107 
 trespasser, 108 
 of railway company, 96—100, 110—122 
 where train overshoots platform, 121 
 
 gates left open at level crossing, 122 
 collisions between trains of same company, 107 
 of solicitor, 5, 97 
 ferryman, 98 
 
 independent contractor, 211 — 218, 237 
 in allowing horse to stray, 118 
 
 structures reasonably safe, accidents resulting from, 120 
 invitation to danger arising from defendant's, 120 
 contributory negligence, 112, 123, 224, 232 
 of child, 126 
 
 servant, 224 
 the doctrine of " identification" exploded, 125 
 summary of the law of, 127 
 
 NOISE, 42, 87 
 
 reversioner cannot sue for nuisance arising from, 74 
 
 NOTICE, 
 
 of injury, under Employers' Liability Act, 231 
 injury under Workmen's Compensation Act, 235 
 intention to abate nuisance, when necessaiy, 79 
 
 NUISANCE, 
 
 to property, 80 — 88 
 
 action by reversioner for, 73 
 to health or comfort, 41 
 where person goes to a, 81 
 liability of landlord for, 88—90 
 
 tenant for, 88—90 
 public, plaintiff in action for, must show special damage, 6 
 nuisances in the exercise of statutory powers, 87, 127 
 
282 INDEX. 
 
 NUISANCE— continued, 
 remedies for — 
 
 indictment for public, 6 
 abatement of, 79 
 
 when notice necessary, 79 
 injunction against, 42, 80 
 
 OMNIBUS, 
 
 passenger wrongfully removed by conductor from, 200 
 " nursing " by, a tort, 194 
 
 PARENT, 
 
 meaning of, under Lord Campbell's Act, 15 
 reasonable castigation of children by, 31 
 action for seduction of child by, 66 
 injuries to child, 64, 65 
 
 PARENTAL RIGHTS, 
 torts in respect of, 63 
 
 PARTNER, 
 
 each, agent of firm, 207 
 
 when firm liable for torts of, 207 
 
 not liable for torts of, 208 
 
 PATENT, 
 
 infringement of, by bankrupt, 25 
 
 threats as to, 61 
 
 damages for infringement of, 256 
 
 PAWNBROKER, 
 
 may arrest persons suspected of pawning stolen article, 38 
 
 PERSON, 
 
 torts to, 30 
 
 PERSONALTY, 
 
 trespass to, 92 — 94 
 
 POSSESSION, 
 
 affords good title against wrongdoer, 93 
 
 PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. See Mastek and Servant. 
 liability of principal for fraud of agent, 149 
 where principal innocent, 149 
 
 derives no benefit, 152 
 has knowledge, and agent not, 153 
 ratification of agent's torts by principal, 208 
 
INDEX. 283 
 
 PRINCIPAL AND AGENT— continued 
 
 jirincijMtl not liable for independent contractor's torts, 211 
 except (1) where act ordered to be done is unlawful, 212 
 or (2) work done imperfectly or improperly, 212 
 
 (3) duty is cast on employer, 213 
 
 (4) injurious consequences likely to arise, 214 
 
 (5) there is an implied warranty by principal, 216 
 
 (6) Workmen's Compensation Act applies, 218 
 not liable for agent's signature under Lord Tenterden's Act, 156 
 
 PEISON, 
 
 as to liability of governor of, 41 
 PRIVILEGE, 
 
 in action of slander or libel, 174 
 
 absolute, 174 
 
 (a) in parliamentary proceedings, 174 
 
 (b) judicial proceedings, 9, 175 
 
 of advocates, 9, 176 
 witnesses, 9, 176 
 fair report in newspaper, 180 
 
 (c) in military or naval courts, 176 
 
 meeting of London County Council, not judicial, 174 
 qualified, 177—181 
 
 rebutted by proof of malice in fact, 177 
 
 onus of proving malice on plaintiff, 177 
 
 character of servant, 178 
 
 protection of defendant's interests, 179 
 
 statements made by member of Board of Guardians, 7 178 
 
 confidential relationship between persons, 179 
 
 publication of judicial proceedings, 180 
 
 no privilege for criticism on books or plays, 181 
 
 PROPERTY, 
 
 torts to, 68—94 
 
 meaning of, under Bankruptcy Act, 1883 : 25 
 
 malicious injuries to, arrest of offenders causing, 38 
 
 assault committed in defence of, 32 
 
 nuisances to, 80 
 
 PROSECUTION. See Malicious Prosecution. 
 
 PROSPECTUS OF COMPANY, 138—141. See Fraud. 
 
 RAILWAY COMPANY, 
 
 actions against, under Lord Campbell's Act, 15 — 17 
 liability of , for torts of servants, 198 — 205 
 
 where passenger wrongfully pulled out of train, 199 
 
284 INDEX. 
 
 BAIL WAY COMPANY— continued. 
 
 liability of , for torts of servants — continued. 
 
 where passenger wrongfully arrested, 200 — 202 
 forworkofindependentcontraotorimproperlydone, 212, 237 
 duty of, in conveyance of passengers and luggage, 100 
 action of malicious prosecution against, 55 
 negligence of — 
 
 wbere passenger leans against door of compartment, 97 
 platform unsuited to carriage, 98 
 servant injured for whom master took ticket, 99 
 gates left open at level crossing, 121, 122 
 person killed while crossing line, 113 
 not liable, when, 114 — 117 
 
 RATIFICATION, 208 
 
 REMOTENESS OP DAMAGE, 7, 257—260 
 
 REPRESENTATION. See Paise Representation ; Fraud. 
 
 RESCISSION OF CONTRACT, 130 
 
 REVERSIONER, 
 
 may sue for trespass, if reversion damaged, 73 
 waste, when, 90 
 
 RIGHT, 
 
 violation of, without actual damage, will support action, 1 — 3 
 no action where no violation of, 2 — 4 
 
 SCHOOLMASTER, 
 
 may reasonably chastise pupils, 31 
 
 SEDUCTION, 66 
 
 who may bring action, 66 
 evidence as to loss of service, 66 
 
 the bare right to service sufficient, 66 
 
 SERVANT. See Master and Servant. 
 
 liable for torts in carrying out master's orders, 208 
 
 except (1) ministerial officers in a court of justice, 210 
 or (2) a mere intermediate agent, 210 
 when master not liable to, for negligence of fellow-servant, 224 
 fraud by, 149, 208 
 contributory negligence of, 224, 234 
 maliciously inducing, to leave master's service, a tort, 58 
 injuries to, 65 
 
 master's right of action for, 65, 66 
 
INDEX. 285 
 
 SHAEES IN COMPANY, 
 
 is company estopped by " certification," or " certificate" of I" 147 
 SHEBIFF, 
 
 liability of, 41 
 
 damage must be proved in actions against, 249 
 
 SLANDEE, 157. See Libel. 
 differs from libel, bow, 157 
 
 ■what wvrds not actionable ivithout proof of special damage, 157 
 as to what damage will support an action of, 157 — 160 
 special damage must be natural result of, 157 — 160 
 repetition of, whether a natural consequence of, 257 
 luhat words actionable without proof of special damage, 160 — 163 
 words imputing a crime, 160 
 
 contagious disease, 161 
 uncbastity to women, 164 
 on a man in tbe way of his profession, trade, or business, 161 
 privilege as a defence in action of, 174, 177. See Privilege. 
 action for, does not pass to trustee in bankruptcy, 25 
 
 against infant, 188 
 plea of truth of slander, 170 — 174 
 time limited for bringing action, 264 
 
 SLANDEE OP TITLE, 60 
 
 SOLICITOE, 
 
 negligence of, 5 
 
 liability of, for malicious arrest, 41 
 libel, 169 
 
 STATUTORY BODIES, 
 liability of, 87, 127 
 
 STATUTES, 
 
 4 Ed. III. c. 7 (Administration of Estates; Damages), 13, 14 
 25 Ed. III. c. 5 (Administration of Estates), 14 
 
 5 Eich. II. c. 8 (Forcible Entry), 33, 71 
 13 Eliz. c. 20 (Benefice, Repealed), 71 
 
 21 Jac. I. c. 16, s. 3 (Statute of Limitations), 264 
 
 29 Car. II. c. 3, s. 4 (Statute of Frauds), 155 
 
 11 Geo. II. c. 19, s. 19 (Landlord and Tenant), 70 
 
 17 Geo. II. c. 38, s. 8 (Poor), 71 
 
 24 Geo. II. c. 44, ss. 6, 8 (Constable; Limitation of Time), 40, 
 
 265 
 5 Geo. IV. c. 83, s. 6 (Vagrant Act), 37 
 9 Geo. IV. c. 14, s. 6 (Lord Tenterden's Act), 156 
 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 71, s. 2 (Prescription Act), 76 
 
286 INDEX. 
 
 STATUTES— continued. 
 
 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, s. 2 (Administration of Estates; Limitation 
 of Time), 14, 20—22, 265 
 
 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, ss. 54, 63—66 (Police Act), 7, 37 
 
 3 & 4 Vict. c. 9 (Publication of Parliamentary Papers), 175 
 6 & 7 Vict. 96, s. 6 (Lord Campbell's Libel Act), 173 
 
 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, ss. 47, 97, 103, 104, 154 (Eailway Clauses Act), 
 38, 121, 201, 203 
 
 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (Lord Campbell's Act), 15, 127 
 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44 (Action against Justices), 265 
 
 14 & 15 Vict. c. 19, s. 11 (Arrest; Criminal Law), 38 
 
 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, sch. B. (Common Law Procedure Act, 1852), 1 
 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, ss. 21, 26, 33, 59 (Married Woman), 62, 183 
 
 23 & 24 Vict. c. 32, ss. 2, 3 (Brawling; Eeligious Worship), 38 
 
 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, ss. 103, 104 (Larceny Act), 38 
 
 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 61 (Malicious Injuries to Property Act), 
 38 
 
 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, ss. 42—45 (Offences against the Person), 34 
 
 25 & 26 Vict. c. 61, s. 16 (Highways), 210 
 
 27 & 28 Vict. u. 95 (Administration of Estates), 16 
 
 28 & 29 Vict. c. 60 (Dogs), 222 
 
 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, s. 6 (Debtors Act), 45 
 
 33 & 34 Vict. c. 78, ss. 51—52 (Tramways Act, 1870), 38, 201 
 33 & 34 Vict. c. 93, s. 12 (Married Women's Prop. Act, 1870), 
 
 183 
 35 & 36 Vict. c. 93, s. 34 (Pawnbrokers Act), 38 
 
 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94, s. 18 (Licensing Act, 1872), 202 
 
 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 25 (Judicature Act, 1873), 91, 137—138 
 
 37 & 38 Vict. c. 50, s. 2 (Married Woman), 183 
 
 38 & 39 Vict. c. 90 (Employers and Workmen Act), 229 
 
 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 25 (Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879), 47 
 
 43 & 44 Vict. c. 42, ss. 1—8 (Employers' Liability Act, 1880), 
 222 
 
 44 & 45 Vict. c. 60 (Newspaper Libel), 173, 181 
 
 45 & 46 Vict. c. 38, s. 35 (Settled Land Act, 1882), 91 
 
 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, ss. 1, 2, 13—15, 22 (M. W. Property Act, 
 1882), 184, 266 
 
 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, ss. 30, 37, 44, 168 (Bankruptcy Act, 1883), 
 25 
 
 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, *. 32 (Patents, Designs, &c. Act, 1883), 61 
 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43 (County Courts Act, 1888), 41, 47 
 
 51 & 52 Vict. c. 64 (Newspaper Libel), 174, 1S1 
 
 52 & 53 Vict. c. 57, s. 5 (Regulation of Railways Act, 1889), 38, 
 201 
 
 53 & 54 Vict. c. 64 (Directors' Liability Act, 1890), 145 
 
INDEX. 287 
 
 STATUTES— continued. 
 
 54 & 55 Vict. c. 51 (Slander of Women Act, 1891), 162, 164 
 56 it 57 Vict. o. 61 (Public Authorities Protection Act), 265 
 56 & 57 Vict. c. 63 (Married "Women's Property, 1893), 184 
 60 & 61 Vict. c. 37 (Accidents to Workmen), 218, 222 
 60 & 61 Vict. c. 54 (Expiring Laws Continuance Act), 222 
 
 STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, 
 
 run from time when right of action accrues, 264, 266 
 in actions of slander, 264 
 
 assault, battery, or imprisonment, 265 
 trespass, detinue, replevin, trover, and libel, 265 
 against constables, 265 
 in actions for injuries to real estate of deceased person, 14, 265 
 against public authorities, 265 
 under Lord Campbell's Act, 15, 265 
 Employers' Liability Act, 265 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 235 
 
 SUBSOIL, 
 
 rights of owner of, 74 
 
 SUPPOET, 
 
 of land, right to adjacent and subjacent, 75, 76 
 buildings, founded on prescription or grant, 76 
 
 TENANT, 
 
 for life, liability of, for waste, 91, 92 
 
 for years, from year to year, or at will, and permissive waste, 
 
 92 
 liability of, for nuisance, 88 — 91 
 
 TENANT IN COMMON, 
 
 liability of, for trespass, 72 
 
 conversion, 73 
 
 TOETS, 
 
 definition, 1 
 analysis of, 1 — 4 
 quasi-tort, what, 6 
 effect of death on, 13 — 24 
 ratification of, 208 
 
 committed abroad, when action lies for, 26 — 28 
 tort must be unjustifiable abroad, 26 
 
 actionable in England, 26 
 no action lies for torts to real property abroad, 27 
 defendant if out of the jurisdiction must be domiciled or 
 usually resident within jurisdiction, 28 
 
288 INDEX. 
 
 TORTFEASORS, 
 
 suing two or more, in one action, 43 
 
 TRADE, 
 
 libel on man in the way of his, 161 
 
 malicious injuries to man's, when actionable, 58 
 
 TRESPASS, 
 
 by animals, 118, 219 
 to land, 68—79 
 
 what is, 68, 69 
 
 continuing trespass, 69 
 
 trespass ah initio, 69 
 
 where landlord distrains through mistake, 70 
 
 who may sue for, 71 
 
 rights of reversioner to sue for, 73 
 owner of sub-soil, 74 
 
 removal of adjacent and subjacent support, 75 
 
 by tenant in common, 72 
 justification of, 76 — 79 
 
 liherum tenementum, 77 
 
 leave and licence, 77 
 
 entry to retake or deposit goods, 77 
 
 entry to demand or pay money, &c, 78 
 
 where highway impassable, 79 
 
 to abate nuisance, 79 
 
 to personalty, 92 — 94 
 
 by tenant in common, 72 
 
 TRESPASSER, 
 
 generally without remedy for injuries caused by negligence 
 108 
 
 TROVER. See Conversion. 
 
 VIS MAJOR, 
 
 defendant not liable for damage caused by, 82 
 
 WARRANTY, 
 
 implied warranty, 147, 148 
 
 WASTE, 90—92 
 
 voluntary, 90, 91 
 
 equitable, 90, 91 
 
 permissive, 92 
 
 by tenant for life under Settled Land Act, 91 
 
 WIPE. See Married Woman ; Marital Rights. 
 
INDEX. 289 
 
 WINDING-UP PETITION, 
 maliciously presenting, 55 
 
 WITNESS, 
 
 protected by privilege from action for slander, 9, 176 
 
 " WORKMAN,", 229, 240 
 
 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 189*7 : 222, 231 
 
 WRONG, 
 
 public, remedy by indictment, 6 
 action, 6 
 
 THE END. 
 
 BRADBUBY, AONEW, & CO. LD., PRINTERS, LONDON AND TONBRIDGE. 
 
 E.T. U 
 
Telegraphic Address : "POLYGRAPHY, LONDON. 1 
 
 A CATALOGUE 
 
 OF 
 
 LAW WORKS 
 
 PUBLISHED AND SOLD BY 
 
 Stevens & Haynes, 
 
 fafo f uWsjjers, goahsfllfrs # <%orim, 
 
 1 3, BELL YARD. TEMPLE BAR, 
 
 LON DON. 
 
 BOOKS BOUND IN THE BEST BINDINGS. ..'„■'..' 
 
 Works in all Classes of Literature supplied, to Order. 
 
 FOREIGN BOOKS IMPORTED. 
 
 LIBRARIES VALUED FOR PROBATE, PARTNERSHIP, 
 AND OTHER PURPOSES. 
 
 LIBRARIES OR SMALL COLLECTIONS OF BOOKS PURCHASED. 
 
 A large Stock of Reports of the various Courts of England, Ireland, 
 and Scotland, always on hand. 
 
 Catalogues and Estimates Furnished, and Orders Promptly Executed. 
 
 NOTE.— 7*0 avoid co nfusing our firm with any of a similar name, 
 we beg to notif y that we have no comtexion whatever with any 
 other, h ouse of business, and we respectfully request that Corre- 
 sponden ts will take special care to direct all communicbtipns to 
 the above names aitd address. 
 
STEVENS cV HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. < 
 
 PAGE 
 
 ABSTRACT DRAWING— 
 
 Scott , 32 
 
 ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS— 
 
 Walker and Elgood 18 
 
 ADMINISTRATORS— 
 
 Walker 6 
 
 ADMIRALTY LAW— 
 
 Kay 17 
 
 Smith . , 23 
 
 AFFILIATION— 
 
 Martin 7 
 
 ARBITRATION— 
 
 Slater 7 
 
 BANKRUPTCY— 
 
 Baldwin IS 
 
 Hazlitt 29 
 
 Indermaur (Question & Answer) 28 
 Ringwood 15, 29 
 
 BAR EXAMINATION JOURNAL 39 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 40 
 
 BILLS OF EXCHANGE— 
 
 Willis 14 
 
 BILLS OF LADING— 
 
 Campbell , 9 
 
 Kay 17 
 
 BILLS OF SALE— 
 
 Baldwin IS 
 
 Indermaur 28 
 
 Ringwood 15 
 
 BUILDING CONTRACTS— 
 
 Hudson .12 
 
 CAPITAL TUNISHMENT— 
 
 Copinger 42 
 
 CARRIERS— 
 
 See RAILWAY LAW. 
 „ SHIPMASTERS, 
 
 CHANCERY DIVISION, Practice of— 
 Brown's Edition of Snell ... 22 
 
 Indermaur 25 
 
 Williams 7 
 
 And see EQUITY. 
 
 CHARITABLE TRUSTS— 
 
 Cooke 10 
 
 Whiteford 33 
 
 CHURCH AND CLERGY— 
 
 Brice 9 
 
 CIVIL LAW— See ROMAN LAW. 
 
 CLUB LAW— 
 
 Wertheimer 32 
 
 CODES— Argles 32 
 
 COLLISIONS AT SEA— Kay . ■ . 17 
 
 COLONIAL LAW— 
 
 Cape Colony 38 
 
 Forsyth, . 14 
 
 Tarring- . ... ... . . . 41 
 
 COMMERCIAL AGENCY— 
 
 Campbell 9 
 
 COMMERCIAL LAW— 
 
 Hurst and Cecil ...... II 
 
 COMMON LAW— 
 
 Indermaur 24 
 
 COMPANIES LAW— 
 
 Brice 16 
 
 Buckley 17 
 
 Reilly's Reports 29 
 
 Smith 39 
 
 Watts 47 
 
 COMPENSATION— 
 
 Browne , . . 19 
 
 Lloyd 13 
 
 COMPULSORY PURCHASE— 
 
 Browne. 19 
 
 CONSTABLES— 
 
 See POLICE GUIDE. 
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND 
 HISTORY— 
 
 Forsyth ........ 14 
 
 Taswell-Langmead 21 
 
 Thomas .28 
 
 CONSULAR JURISDICTION— 
 
 Tarring 42 
 
 CONVEYANCING— 
 
 Copinger, Title Deeds ... 45 
 Copinger, Precedents in , , . 40 
 Deane, Principles of 23 
 
 COPYRIGHT— 
 
 Copinger 45 
 
 CORPORATIONS— 
 
 Brice ......... 16 
 
 Browne . 19 
 
 COSTS, Crown Office- 
 Short 41 
 
 COVENANTS FOR TITLE— 
 
 Copinger • • 45 
 
 CREW OF A SHIP— 
 
 Kay 17 
 
 CRIMINAL LAW— 
 
 Copinger . 42 
 
 Harris 27 
 
 CROWN LAW— 
 
 Forsyth 14 
 
 Hall 30 
 
 Kelyng 35 
 
 Taswell-Langmead 21 
 
 Thomas 28 
 
 CROWN OFFICE RULES— 
 
 Short 10 
 
 CROWN PRACTICE— 
 
 Corner 10 
 
 Short and Mellor 10 
 
 CUSTOM AND USAGE— 
 
 Browne 19 
 
 Mayne 38 
 
 DAMAGES— 
 
 Mayne ....,..,. 11 
 
 DICTIONARIES— 
 
 Brown 26 
 
STEVENS &» HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS-"'"'"""*'- 
 
 DIGESTS— page 
 
 Law Magazine Quarterly Digest . 37 
 Menzies' Digest of Cape Reports. 38 
 
 DISCOVERY— Peile 7 
 
 DIVORCE— Harrison 23 
 
 DOMESTIC RELATIONS— 
 
 Eversley 9 
 
 DOMICIL— See PRIVATE INTER- 
 NATIONAL LAW. 
 
 DUTCH LAW 38 
 
 ECCLESIASTICAL LAW— 
 
 Brice 9 
 
 Smith 23 
 
 EDUCATION ACTS— 
 
 See MAGISTERIAL LAW. 
 
 ELECTION LAW and PETITIONS— 
 
 Hardcastle 33 
 
 O'Malley and Hardcastle ... 33 
 Seager 47 
 
 EQUITY— 
 
 Blyth 22 
 
 Choyce Cases 35 
 
 Pemberton 32 
 
 Snell 22 
 
 Story 43 
 
 Williams . , 7 
 
 EVIDENCE— 
 
 Phipson 20 
 
 EXAMINATION OF STUDENTS— 
 Bar Examination Journal ... 39 
 
 Indermaur 24 and 25 
 
 Intermediate LL.B 21 
 
 EXECUTORS— 
 
 Walker and- Elgood 6 
 
 EXTRADITION— 
 
 Clarke 45 
 
 " See MAGISTERIAL LAW. 
 
 FACTORIES— 
 
 See MAGISTERIAL LAW. 
 
 FISHERIES— 
 
 See MAGISTERIAL LAW. 
 
 FIXTURES— Brown 33 
 
 FOREIGN LAW— 
 
 Argles 32 
 
 Dutch Law 3" 
 
 Foote 36 
 
 Pavitt 32 
 
 FORESHORE— 
 
 Moore 3° 
 
 FORGERY— See MAGISTERIAL LAW. 
 
 FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES— 
 May 29 
 
 GAIUS INSTITUTES— 
 
 Harris 20 
 
 GAME LAWS— 
 
 See MAGISTERIAL LAW. 
 
 GUARDIAN AND WARD— 
 
 Eversley 9 
 
 HACKNEY CARRIAGES— 
 See MAGISTERIAL LAW. 
 
 HINDU LAW— 
 
 Coghlan 28 
 
 Cunningham 38 and 42 
 
 Mayne 3^ 
 
 HISTORY— 
 
 Taswell-Langmead ..... 21 
 
 HUSBAND AND WIFE— 
 
 Eversley 9 
 
 INDEX TO PRECEDENTS— 
 
 Copinger 4° 
 
 INFANTS— 
 
 Eversley 9 
 
 Simpson -43 
 
 INJUNCTIONS— 
 
 Joyce 44 
 
 INSTITUTE OF THE LAW— 
 
 Brown's Law Dictionary . . , 26 
 
 INSURANCE— 
 
 Porter ° 
 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW— 
 
 Clarke 45 
 
 Cobbett 43 
 
 Foote 36 
 
 Law Magazine 37 
 
 INTERROGATORIES— 
 
 Peile 7 
 
 INTOXICATING LIQUORS— 
 See MAGISTERIAL LAW. 
 
 JOINT STOCK COMPANIES— 
 See COMPANIES. 
 
 JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS— 
 
 Pemberton 18 
 
 JUDICATURE ACTS-^ 
 
 Cunningham and Mattinson . . 7 
 
 Indermaur 25 
 
 Kelke 6 
 
 JURISPRUDENCE— 
 
 Forsyth «4 
 
 Salmond "3 
 
 JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES— 
 
 Campbell 47 
 
 Harris 20 
 
 LANDLORD AND TENANT— 
 
 Foa " 
 
 LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDA- 
 TION ACT— 
 
 Lloyd 13 
 
 LATIN MAXIMS 28 
 
 LAW DICTIONARY— 
 
 Brown 26 
 
 LAW MAGAZINE and REVIEW . 37 
 
 LEADING CASES— 
 
 Common Law 25 
 
 Constitutional Law . . . , , 28 
 Equity and Conveyancing ... 25 
 
 Hindu Law 28 
 
 International Law 43 
 
 LEADING STATUTES— 
 
 Thomas .....,.', 28 
 
 B 2 
 
STEVENS &> HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS-"""""*^ 
 
 PAGE 
 
 LEASES— 
 
 Copinger .' . 45 
 
 LEGACY AND SUCCESSION— 
 
 Hanson 10 
 
 LEGITIMACY AND MARRIAGE— 
 
 See PRIVATE INTERNA- 
 TIONAL LAW. 
 LICENSES— ^MAGISTERIAL LAW. 
 LIFE ASSURANCE— 
 
 Buckley 17 
 
 Reilly 29 
 
 LIMITATION OF ACTIONS— 
 
 Banning 42 
 
 LUNACY— 
 
 Renton 10 
 
 Williams 7 
 
 MAGISTERIAL LAW— 
 
 'Greenwood and Martin .... 46 
 MAJNE'S (Sir H.), WORKS OF— 
 
 , Evans' Theories and Criticisms . 20 
 MAINTENANCE AND DESERTION. 
 
 .Martin 7 
 
 MARRIAGE and LEGITIMACY— 
 
 Foote 36 
 
 MARRIED WOMEN'S PRO- 
 PERTY ACTS— 
 
 Brown's Edition of Griffith . . 40 
 MASTER AND SERVANT— 
 
 Eversley 9 
 
 MERCANTILE LAW 32 
 
 Campbell 9 
 
 Duncan 33 
 
 Hurst and Cecil 11 
 
 Slater 7 
 
 See SHIPMASTERS. 
 MERCHANDISE MARKS— 
 
 Daniel 42 
 
 MINES— 
 
 Harris 47 
 
 MONEY LENDERS— 
 
 Be'llot arid Willis .' .... 11 
 MORTMAIN— 
 
 See CHARITABLE TRUSTS. 
 NATIONALITY— .&<< PRIVATE IN- 
 TERNATIONAL LAW. 
 NEGLIGENCE— 
 
 -Beven .• 8 
 
 Campbell 40 
 
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS— 
 
 Willis 14 
 
 NEWSPAPER LIBEL— 
 
 Elliott 14 
 
 OBLIGATIONS— 
 
 "Brown's Savigny 20 
 
 PARENT AND CHILD— 
 
 Eversley 9 
 
 PARLIAMENT— 
 
 Taswell-Langfnead 21 
 
 Thbm'as . . 28 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PARTITION— 
 
 Walker 43 
 
 PASSENGERS— 
 
 See MAGISTERIAL LAW. 
 „ RAILWAY LAW. 
 PASSENGERS AT SEA— 
 
 Kay 17 
 
 PATENTS— 
 
 Daniel 42 
 
 Frost 12 
 
 PAWNBROKERS— 
 
 See MAGISTERIAL LAW. 
 PETITIONS IN CHANCERY AND 
 LUNACY— 
 
 Williams 7 
 
 PILOTS— 
 
 Kay 17 
 
 police Guide— 
 
 Greenwood and Martin .... 46 
 POLLUTION OF RIVERS— 
 
 Higgins 30 
 
 PRACTICE BOOKS— 
 
 Bankruptcy • 15 
 
 Companies Law .• .• . . 29 and 39 
 
 Compensation 13 
 
 Compulsory -Purchase .... 19 
 
 Conveyancing 45 
 
 Damages ........ 31 
 
 Ecclesiastical Law 9 
 
 Election Petitions 33 
 
 Equity ...... 7, 22 and 32 
 
 .Injunctions 44 
 
 Magisterial 46 
 
 Pleading, Precedents of ... 7 
 
 Railways ........ 14 
 
 Railway Commission .... 19 
 
 Rating .... 19 
 
 Supreme Court of Judicature . . 25 
 
 PRACTICE STATUTES, ORDERS 
 AND RULES— 
 
 Emden II 
 
 PRECEDENTS OF PLEADING— 
 
 Cunningham and Mattinson . . 7 
 
 Mattinson and Macaskie . . . 7 
 
 PRIMOGENITURE^ 
 
 Lloyd 13 
 
 PRINCIPLES— 
 
 Brice (Corporations) 16 
 
 Browne (Ratihg) 19 
 
 Deane (Conveyancing) .... 23 
 
 Harris (Criminal Law) .... 27 
 
 Houston ^Mercantile) .... 32 
 
 Indermaur (Common Law) . . 24 
 
 Joyce (Injunctions) 44 
 
 Ringwobd (Bankruptcy) . , , 15 
 
 Snell (Equity) 22 
 
 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW— 
 
 Foole 36 
 
STEVENS dr> HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS-"*"***"* 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PROBATE— 
 
 Hanson. ........ 10 
 
 Harrison 23 
 
 PROMOTERS— 
 
 Watts 47 
 
 PUBLIC WORSHIP— 
 
 Brice 33 
 
 QUARTER SESSIONS— 
 
 Smith (F.J.) ....... 6 
 
 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION, Practice 
 of— 
 
 Indermaur 25 
 
 QUESTIONS FOR STUDENTS— 
 
 Aldred 21 
 
 Bar Examination Journal ... 39 
 
 Indermaur 25 
 
 Waite 22 
 
 RAILWAYS— 
 
 Browne 19 
 
 Godefroi and Shortt . . , . . 47 
 
 RATING— 
 
 Browne 19 
 
 REAL PROPERTY— 
 
 Deane 23 
 
 Edwards 16 
 
 Tarring 26 
 
 RECORDS— 
 
 Inner Temple ....,, 1 1 
 
 REGISTRATION— 
 
 Elliott (Newspaper) .... 14 
 
 Seager (Parliamentary) .... 47 
 
 REPORTS— 
 
 Bellewe 34 
 
 Brooke 35 
 
 Choyce Cases 35 
 
 Cooke 35 
 
 Cunningham 34 
 
 Election Petitions ....,• 33 
 
 Finlason 32 
 
 Gibbs, Seymour Will Case . . 10 
 
 Kelyng, John 35 
 
 Kelynge, William 35 
 
 Reilly 29 
 
 Shower (Cases in Parliament) . 34 
 
 ROMAN DUTCH LAW— 
 
 Van Leeuwen 38 
 
 ROMAN LAW— 
 
 Brown's Analysis of Savigny . . 20 
 
 Campbell ..,.,... 47 
 
 Harris 20 
 
 Salkowski 14 
 
 Whitfield 14 
 
 SALVAGE— 
 
 Jones 47 
 
 Kay 17 
 
 SAVINGS BANKS— 
 
 Forbes 18 
 
 SCINT ILLAE JURIS— 
 
 Darling (C. J.) 18 
 
 SEA SHORE— 'acb 
 
 Hall 3 o 
 
 Moore 30 
 
 SHIPMASTERS AND SEAMEN— 
 
 Kay 17 
 
 SOCIETIES— 
 
 Set CORPORATIONS. 
 STAGE CARRIAGES— 
 
 See MAGISTERIAL LAW. 
 STAMP DUTIES— 
 
 Copinger 40 and 45 
 
 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS— 
 
 Banning 42 
 
 STATUTES— 
 
 Craies 9 
 
 Hardcastle 9 
 
 Marcy 26 
 
 Thomas 28 
 
 STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU— 
 
 Campbell 9 
 
 Houston 32 
 
 Kay ,17 
 
 STUDENTS' BOOKS . 20—28, 39, 47 
 SUCCESSION DUTIES— 
 
 Hanson 10 
 
 SUCCESSION LAWS- 
 
 Lloyd 13 
 
 SUPREME COURT OF JUDICA- 
 TURE, Practice of— 
 
 Cunningham and Mattinson . . 7 
 
 Indermaur 25 
 
 TELEGRAPHS— 
 
 See MAGISTERIAL LAW. 
 TITLE DEEDS— 
 
 Copinger 45 
 
 TORTS— 
 
 Ringwood .13 
 
 TRADE MARKS— 
 
 Daniel ......... 42 
 
 TREASON— 
 
 Kelyng 35 
 
 Taswell-Langmead ..... 21 
 TRIALS— Bartlett, A. (Murder) . . 32 
 
 Queen v. Gurney 32 
 
 ULTRA VIRES— 
 
 Brice 16 
 
 USAGES AND CUSTOMS— 
 
 Browne 19 
 
 Mayne 38 
 
 VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES— 
 
 May 29 
 
 WATER COURSES— 
 
 Higgins ... jo 
 
 WILLS, CONSTRUCTION OF— 
 
 Gibbs, Report of Wallace v. 
 Attorney-General ..... to 
 WORKING CLASSES, Housing of— 
 
 Lloyd . , 13 
 
6 STEVENS & HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR, 
 
 Third Edition, in 8vo. Just Ready, 
 
 THE LAWS OF INSURANCE: 
 
 jFtre, lltfe, accfoent, anti fflfuarantee. 
 
 EMBODYING 
 
 CASES IN THE ENGLISH, SCOTCH, IRISH, AMERICAN, AND 
 CANADIAN COURTS. 
 
 By JAMES BIGGS PORTER, 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE AND SOUTH EASTERN CIRCUIT, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 ASSISTED BY 
 
 W. FEILDEN CRAIES, M.A., 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE AND WESTERN CIRCUIT, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 " In reviewing the first edition of this book we expressed an opinion that it was a painstaking and 
 useful work. Its utility has been shown by the speedy appearance of the present edition, and the labour 
 of its authors is still apparent to anyone who will glance through its pages. ' — Solicitors' Journal. 
 
 " The success of the first edition proves its value. It is clearly and concisely compiled, and upwards of 
 1,500 cases are quoted." — Laiv Times. 
 
 " Mr. Porter's useful book on insurance law has reached a second edition in less than three years, which 
 is not common in a book of this class. The fact is, that in taking up insurance law in all its branches, 
 
 except marine insurance, he hits upon a popular subject Mr. Porter well fills the gap thus 
 
 made for him, and he has called to his aid a useful coadjutor in the person of Mr. Craies."— Law Journal. 
 
 " When writing on the first edition in 1884, we ventured to predict for Mr. Porter's work a great success. 
 We spoke in terms of unqualified commendation concerning the lucidity of the author's style, the thorough- 
 ness of his work and his happy gift of narrowing down broad and diffusive subjects into a small space. 
 Practical experience of the contents of the volume during the past three years has, we may say, fully con- 
 firmed our favourable views." — Insurance Record. 
 
 In Royal i2mo, price 20.?., cloth, 
 
 QUARTER SESSIONS PRACTICE, 
 
 A VADE ME CUM OF GENERAL PRACTICE IN APPELLATE AND 
 CIVIL CASES AT QUARTER SESSIONS. 
 
 By FREDERICK JAMES SMITH, 
 
 OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW, AND RECORDER OF MARGATE. 
 
 Third Edition. In one volume, 8vo, price 21s., cloth, 
 
 A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW RELATING TO 
 
 EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, with an Appendix of 
 
 Statutes, Annotated by means of References to the Text. By W. Gregory 
 Walker, B.A., Barrister-at-Law, and Edgar J. Elgood, B.C.L., M.A., 
 Barrister-at-Law. Third Edition by E.J. Elgood, B.C.L., M.A. 
 
 "We highly approve of Mr. Walker's arrange- 
 ment. .... The Notes are full, and as far as we 
 have been able to ascertain, carefully and accurately 
 
 compiled We can commend it as bearing 
 
 on its face evidence of skilful and careful labour, 
 
 and we anticipate that it will be found a very 
 
 ceptable subsi " 
 of the much esteemed and valued Williams."— 
 
 acceptable substitute for the ponderous tomes 
 of the mucr 
 Law Times. 
 
 " Mr. Walker is fortunate in his choice of a sub- 
 ject, and the power of treating it succinctly ; for 
 the ponderous tomes of Williams, however satisfac- 
 tory as an authority, are necessarily inconvenient 
 
 for reference as well as expensive On the 
 
 whole we are inclined to think the book a good and 
 useful one." — Law Journal.' 
 
 In royal i2mo, price 4-5"., cloth, 
 A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF 
 
 PRACTICE UNDER THE JUDICATURE ACTS AND RULES, 
 
 AND THE CASES DECIDED IN THE CHANCERY AND COMMON LAW DIVISIONS 
 
 FROM NOVEMBER 1875 TO AUGUST 1880. 
 
 By W. H. HASTINGS KELKE, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. 
 
STEVENS &> HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 7 
 
 Second Edition, in 8vo, price ()s., cloth, 
 
 THE LAW OF MAINTENANCE AND DESERTION, 
 
 ,:AKD THE ORDERS OF THE JUSTICES THEREON. Second 
 >/ ^ditiorti including the LAW OF AFFILIATION and BASTARDY. With 
 an Appendix of Statutes and Forms, including trie Summary Jurisdiction (Married 
 Womens') Act of, 1895. By Temple Chevali.ier Martin, Chief Clerk of the 
 Lambeth Police Court, Editor of the "Magisterial and Police Guide," &c, and 
 George Temple Martin, M.A., of Lincoln s Inn, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 Third Edition. Crown 8vo, in preparation, 
 
 THE LAW OF ARBITRATION AND AWARDS ; 
 
 With Appendix containing Lord Denman's ARBITRATION BILL, AND 
 STATUTES RELATING TO ARBITRATION, and a collection of Forms 
 and Index. Second Edition. With a Supplement containing an Abstract of the 
 Arbitration Act, 1889. By Joshua Slater, of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. 
 *** The Supplement can be had separately, price 6d. 
 
 In crown 8vo, price 6s., cloth, 
 
 THE PRINCIPLES OF MERCANTILE LAW. By 
 
 Joshua Slater, of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. 
 In Svo, price 12s., cloth, 
 
 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF DISCOVERY in 
 
 the SUPREME COURT of JUSTICE. With an Appendix of Forms, 
 Orders, &c, and an Addenda giving the Alterations under the 
 New Rules of Practice. By Clarence J. Peile, of the Inner Temple, 
 Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 In one volume, 8vo, price l8.r., cloth, 
 THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO 
 
 PETITIONS IN CHANCERY AND LUNACY, 
 
 Including THE SETTLED ESTATES ACT, LANDS CLAUSES ACT, 
 TRUSTEE ACT, WINDING-UP PETITIONS, PETITIONS RELATING 
 TO SOLICITORS, INFANTS, Etc., Etc. With an Appendix of. Forms 
 and Precedents. By Sydney E. Williams, Barrister-at-Law 
 
 Second Edition, in 8vo, price 28s., cloth, 
 
 A SELECTION OF PRECEDENTS OF PLEADING 
 
 UNDER THE JUDICATURE ACTS IN THE COMMON LAW DTVTSIONS. 
 
 With Notes explanatory of the different Causes of Action and Grounds of Defence ; and 
 
 an Introductory Treatise on the Present Rules and Principles of Pleading as 
 
 illustrated by the various Decisions down to the Present Time. 
 
 By J. CUNNINGHAM and M. W. MATTINSON. 
 
 SECOND EDITION. 
 
 BY MILES WALKER MATTINSON, of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law, and 
 
 STUART CUNNINGHAM MACASKIE, of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 REVIEWS. 
 
 1 ' The notes are very pertinent and satisfactory : the introductory chapters ou the present systemof pleading 
 are excellent, and the precedents will be found very useful."— Irish Law Times. _ ; 
 
 "A work which, in the compass of a single portable volume, contains a brief Ireatise on the Principles 
 and Rules of Pleading, and a carefully annotated body of Forms which have to a great extent gone through 
 the entirely separate sifting processes of Chambers Court, and Judges Chambers, cannot fail to he a most 
 useful companion in the Practitioner's daily routine."— Law Magazine and Review, 
 
STEVENS & HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 Second Edition, in two volumes, royal 8vo, price 70s. , cloth. 
 
 NEGLIGENCE IN LAW 
 
 Being tjie Second Edition of "Principles of the Law of Negligence," 
 Re-arranged and Re-written. 
 
 By THOMAS BEVEN, 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW J AUTHOR OF " THE LAW OF EMPLOYERS* LIABILITY 
 FOR, THE NEGLIGENCE OF SERVANTS CAUSING INJURY- TO FELLOW-SERVANTS." 
 
 REVIEWS. 
 
 " These volumes, says Mr. JBeven in the preface, maybe regarded as a second edition ot his ' Principles 
 of the Law of Negligence,' in so far as the subjects treated of in both books are the same ; and the 
 materials collected in the one have been used without reserve in the other. As to anything beyond this, 
 he continues, the present is a new work. The arrangement is altogether different from that previously 
 adopted. Nearly a half of the contents of these volumes is absolutely new, and of the remainder there 
 is very little which has not been materially modified, if not in substance, yet in expression. 
 
 "Upon its first appearance, the 'Principles of the Law of Negligence' was at once recognized as a 
 work of the highest importance, and the ability and industry which Mr. Beven had brought to bear upon 
 his task laid the profession under no ordinary obligation. _ The service which he then rendered has been 
 greatly increased by the production of this second edition, and the book deserves a place in the first 
 rank among authoritative expositions of the law. 
 
 ' ' The chief characteristic of Mr. Beven 's method is thoroughness. He is not himself in a hurry, and 
 it is certainly useless for his readers to be so. The law is to be found in his pages, and, when found, it is 
 clearly enunciated ; but it is always deduced from a full and discriminating examination of multitudinous 
 cases — English and American — and readers must be content to survey, leisurely and cautiously, with Mr. 
 Beven, the whole field of judicial exposition, and to follow his own careful and elaborate criticism, if they 
 would gain the full benefit of the results at which he arrives. The book is not meant to be taken up 
 for a hasty reference, and often the lawyer may find it more convenient to resort to a treatise more concise. 
 On the other hand, it will be an invaluable companion in the consideration of any matter which requires 
 research, and the style and arrangement aie such that, whether the book is used for purposes of business or 
 of general study, it cannot fail to prove deeply interesting. . . . 
 
 "The above account is but a sketch of Mr. Beven's great work. It is impossible within the present 
 limits to give an adequate idea of the variety of topics which are included, of the learning and patience with 
 which they are discussed. Negligence may only be an aspect of the law ; but the treatment here 
 accorded to it throws into prominence a host of questions of the utmost Importance, both practically and 
 theoretically. By his contribution to the due understanding of these Mr. Beven has placed the profes- 
 sion under a lasting obligation, an obligation which no reader of his work will fail to realize." — Solicitors 1 
 Journal* 
 
 "The book upon which this is founded, and which is in a measure a former edition of the present 
 volumes, has marie Mr. Beven an authority on the subject of the law of negligence. He has, in writing 
 these volumes, made full use of his former labours ; but he claims that in reality the present work is a 
 new one, and his claim is justified. . . . Just occasionally a well-written and ably-conceived law 
 book is published, and such a one is this of Mr. Beven's. We think that to compare it with other books 
 on the subject would be impossible ; it stands easily the best book on the subject. In clear exposition of 
 law, for good classification of subject-matter, for accuracy of detail, and for every arrangement to facili- 
 tate reference it cannot be beaten. We may congratulate Mr. Beven upon the accomplishment of his 
 laborious task ; he has given to the profession a valuable work, and one which will enhance his reputation 
 as a writer on the Law of Negligence." — Law Journal^ August 3, 1895. 
 
 " Hehas treated the- well-known subject of Negligence in a scientific way, and has not been content with 
 merely collecting, in more or less relevant positions, a number of cases which anyone could find for himself 
 in any Digest of Law Reports, but has endeavoured to reduce from the chaos of decided cases a systematic 
 study of the subject, with clear enunciations of the principles he finds governing the various decisions. In 
 the arrangement of the book the author has been very happy in his method, a by no means easy task in the 
 treatment of a subject in which each branch of it in reality overlaps another. ... A good index and 
 clear type increase the value of a book which will without doubt receive the hearty commendation of the 
 profession as a successful completion of the author's ambitious task." — Law Times. 
 
 " In respect of the style of treatment of the subject, the book must be highly commended. It will be of 
 service to every lawyer who wishes rather to get an intelligent understanding of the L,aw of Negligence, 
 than merely to find correct and reliable legal propositions for practical use, and that whether he be a student 
 or a practitioner. To the student the work is valuable for the searching and well-sustained discussion of the 
 cases ; and to the practitioner there are presented all the cases that bear on most points for which he may 
 be in search of authority. One of the chief merits of the work is, that all the available authority on each 
 point is collected and so arranged that it can be easily found." — juridical Review* 
 
 " Contains evidence of much serious work, and ought to receive a fair trial at the hands of the profes- 
 sion." — Law Quarterly Review. 
 
STEVENS &> HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 Second Edition, in royal 8vo, price 38^., cloth, 
 
 THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 
 
 INCLUDING 
 
 HUSBAND AND WIFE: PARENT AND CHILD: GUARDIAN AND 
 WARD : INFANTS : AND MASTER AND SERVANT. 
 
 By WILLIAM PINDER EVERSLEY, B.C.L., M.A., 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 "We are glad to see a second edition of Mr. Eversley's useful work. There is a convenience in having 
 the various subjects of which it treats collected in one volume, while at the same time each is handled 
 with such fulness as to give the reader all the information he could expect in a separate volume. Mr. 
 Eversley states the law with the most painstaking thoroughness, and has made an exhaustive survey of 
 all the relevant statutes and cases. . . Great care has been taken to make the present edition complete 
 and accurate, and a very full index adds to its utility." — So/icztors' Journal. 
 
 " Important statutes and cases have come into operation since the first edition, and this has induced 
 Mr. Eversley to give the contracts of married women separate treatment. Careful revision to date now 
 makes this treatise comprehensive and thoroughly reliable." — Law Times. 
 
 "This is an important and almost a leading treatise on domestic law. The former edition was received 
 with merited favour. Its value has become well known, and now, after an interval of eleven years, the 
 learned author has brought out a second edition." — Lazv Journal. 
 
 "It is only necessary to refer to Mr. Eversley' s learned and scholarlike work on 'The Domestic Rela- 
 tions,' a book which, though technically belonging to the forbidding ranks of ' Law Books,' is yet full of 
 human interest, and written, moreover, in the English language." — Edinburgh Review. 
 
 Second Edition, in one volume, royal 8vo, price 32*., cloth, 
 THE LAW RELATING TO THE 
 
 SALE OF GOODS AND COMMERCIAL AGENCY. 
 
 SECOND EDITION. 
 By ROBERT CAMPBELL, M.A., 
 
 of Lincoln's inn, barrister-at-law; advocate of the scotch bar. 
 author of the " law of negligence," etc. 
 
 "An accurate, careful, and exhaustive handbook on the subject with which it deals. The excellent 
 index deserves a special word of commendation." — Law Quarterly Review, 
 
 " We can, therefore, repeat what we said when reviewing the first edition— that the hook is a contribu- 
 tion of value to the subject treated of, and that the writer deals with his subject carefully and fully."— 
 Law Journal. 
 
 Second Edition, in one volume, 8vo, price 28^., cloth, 
 A TREATISE ON 
 
 THE CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF 
 STATUTE LAW. 
 
 WITH APPENDICES CONTAINING WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS USED IN STATUTES 
 
 WHICH HAVE BEEN JUDICIALLY OR STATUTABLY CONSTRUED, AND 
 
 THE POPULAR AND SHORT TITLES OF CERTAIN STATUTES. 
 
 By HENRY HARDCASTLE, Barrister-at-law. 
 SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED, by W. F. CRAIES, 
 
 BARRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 " The result of Mr. Craies' industry is a sound and good piece of work, the new light thrown 
 on the subject since 1879 having been blended with the old in a thoroughly workmanlike 
 manner. Though less a student's manual than a practitioner's text book, it is the sort of 
 volume an intelligent perusal of which would educate a student better than the reading of 
 much substantial law. "— Saturday Review. 
 
10 STEVENS &■> HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 Fourth Edition, in 8vo, price 30X., cloth, 
 
 HANSON'S DEATH DUTIES; being the Fourth- Edition of 
 
 the Acts relating to Estate Duty Finance, Probate, Legacy, and Succession 
 Duties. Comprising the 36 Geo. III. c. 52; 45 Geo. III. c. 28; 55 Geo. III. 
 c. 184; and 16 & 17 Vict. c. 51; the Customs and Inland Revenue Acts, 
 43 Vict. c. 14; and 44 Vict. c. 12; also the New Estate Duty Finance Acts, 
 57 & 58 Vict. c. 30, and 59 & 60 Vict. c. 28 ; with an Introduction, 
 Copious Notes, and References to all the Decided Cases in England, Scot- 
 land, and Ireland. An Appendix and a full Index. By Alfred Hanson, of 
 the Middle Temple, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, Comptroller of Legacy and Suc- 
 cession Duties. Fourth Edition by Lewis T. Dibdin, M.A., D.C.L., and 
 F. H. L. Errinoton, M.A., Barrislers-at-Law. 
 
 " It is remarkable how surely a realty good legal reputation with the Profession, and all Jnterested 
 treatise finds favour with the Profession. The late 
 Mr. Hanson's edition of the Acts relating to " Ins- 
 tate, Probate, Legacy and Succession Duties," is 
 one of these .... The passing of the Finance 
 Acts of 1894 and 1896 have caused the introduction 
 of new matter. We recognise a decided improve- 
 ment in the work, which we think will enhance its 
 
 Iii one Volume, royal Svo, price 50J. net, 
 
 THE LAW AND PRACTICE IN LUNACY; with 
 
 the Lunacy Acts, 1890-91 (Consolidated and Annotated) ; the Rules ol Lunacy 
 Commissioners; the Idiots Act, 1886; the Vacating of Seats Act, 1886; the 
 Rules in Lunacy ; the Lancashire County (Asylums and other powers) Act, 1891 ; 
 the Inebriates Act, 1S79 and 1888 (Consolidated and Annotated) ; the Criminal 
 Lunacy Acts, 1800-1S84 ; and a Collection of Forms, Precedents, &c. By A. 
 Wood Renton, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 In Svo, price 3CV., cloth, 
 
 THE PRACTICE ON THE CROWN SIDE 
 
 Of the Queen's Bench Division of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice 
 
 (Founded on Corner's Crown Office Practice), including 
 Ari'EALs from Inferior Courts; with Appendices of Ul*les and Forms, 
 
 By F. H. SHORT, Chief Clerk of the Crown Office, and 
 
 FRANCIS HAMILTON MELLOR, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 in a somewhat difficult subject."— Law Times. 
 
 " Of all the various treatises on the subject to 
 which the recent Acts have given birth, the one 
 under review strikes us as the fullest and best, and 
 we heartily recommend it to all seeking instruction 
 on these difficult statutes." — Irish Law limes. 
 
 In 8vo, price I2.r. , cloth, 
 
 THE CROWN OFFICE RULES AND FORMS, 1886. 
 
 The Supreme Court of Judicature Acts and Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, relating to 
 the Practice on the Crown side of the Queen's Bench Division ; including Appeals 
 from Inferior Courts, Tables of Court Fees, Scales of Costs ; together with Notes, 
 .. Cases,- and a Full Index. By F. II. SHORT, Chief Clerk of the Crown Office. 
 
 In royal 8vo, 1877, price iar., cloth, 
 
 THE CASE OF LORD HENRY SEYMOUR'S WILL 
 
 (WALLACE v. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL). 
 
 Reported by FREDERICK WAYMOUTH GIBBS, C.B., Barrister-at-Law, 
 
 I. ATE FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE. 
 
 In 8vo, 1S67, price lbs., cloth, 
 
 CHARITABLE TRUSTS ACTS, 1853, 1855, 1860; 
 
 THE CHARITY COMMISSIONERS' JURISDICTION ACT, 1862; 
 THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHARITIES ACTS: 
 Together with a Collection of Statutes relating to or affecting Charities, including the 
 Mortmain Acts, Notes of Cases from 1853 to the present time, Forms of Decla- 
 rations' of Trust, Conditions of Sale, and Conveyance of Charity Land, and a 
 : very copious Index. Second Edition. 
 By HUGH COOKE and R G. IIARWOOD, of the Charity Commission. 
 
STEVENS &> HAYNE-S, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 11 
 
 Just Published, Demy 8vo, 152 pp. Price Js. 6J. 
 
 THE LAW RELATING 
 
 UNCONSCIONABLE BARGAINS 
 
 1 
 
 MONEY-LENDERS. 
 
 NCLUDING the History of Usury to the Repeal of the Usury Laws, with Appendices, 
 containing a Digest of Cases, Annotated ; relating to Unconscionable Bargains, 
 Statutes, and Forms for the use of Practitioners. By H,UGH I-I. L. Bellot, M.A., 
 B.C.L., and R. James Willis, Barristers-at-La\v. 
 
 INNER TEMPLE RECORDS. A Calendar of the. 
 
 Edited by F. A. Inuerwick, Q.C. Vol. I., 21 Hen. VII. (15051—45 Eliz. 
 (1603). Imperial Svo. Roxburghe binding. 1896. 2CU, net. 
 
 In one Volume, Svo, price 20.?., cloth, 
 THE 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF COMMERCIAL LAW; 
 
 WITH AN APPENDIX OF STATUTES, ANNOTATED BY MEANS OF 
 REFERENCES TO THE TEXT. 
 
 Bvr JOSEPH HURST and LORD ROBERT CECIL, 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTERS-AT-LAW. 
 
 ''Their compendium, we believe, will be found a really useful volume, one fur the lawyer and the 
 business man to keep at his elbow, and which, if not giving them all that they require, will place in their 
 hands the key to the richer and more elaborate treasures of the Law which lie in larger and more exhaus- 
 tive works." — Law Times. 
 
 "The object of the authors of this work, they tell us in their preface, is to state, within a moderate 
 compass, the principles of commercial law. Very considerable pains have obviously been expended on the 
 task, and the book is In many respects a very serviceable one." — Law Journal, 
 
 Second Edition, in royal Svo, price 25^., cloth, 
 THE 
 
 RELATIONSHIP OF LANDLORD AND TENANT. 
 
 By EDGAR FOA, 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER- AT-LAW. 
 
 "Will be found of much value to practitioners, and when a second edition has given the author the 
 opportunity of reconsidering and carefully revising his statements indetail, we think it will take its place 
 as a very good treatise on the modern law of landlord and tenant." — Solicitors' Journal. 
 
 " Mr. Foa is a bold man to undertake the exposition of a branch of law so full of difficulties and encum- 
 bered by so many decisions as the Law of Landlord and Tenant. But his boldness is justified by the 
 excellent arrangement and by the lucid statements which characterise his book.'' — Law Quarterly Review. 
 
 "Mr. Foa's is a compact work, treating (1) of the creation of the relationship; (2) the incidents of 
 creation (distress) and determination of the relationship ; (3) modes and incidents of determination. We 
 commend it to the attention of the Profession and predict for Foa on Landlord and Tenant a very useful 
 and very permanent future." — Laiv Times. 
 
 "We have nothing but praise for the work, and we shall be astonished if it does not take rank in 
 course of time as 'one of the best— if not the best — work for every-day practice on the' subject of Landlord 
 and Tenant."— Law Notes. 
 
 "Without making any invidious comparison with existing works on the subject, we may frankly say 
 that Mr. Foa's work indisputably possesses merit. . . . Our verdict on the book must be a decidedly 
 favourable one." — Law Students' Journal. 
 
 " * The Relationship of Landlord and Tenant,' written by Mr. Edgar Foa, Barrister-at-Law, affords a 
 striking instance of accuracy and lucidity of statement. The volume should be found useful hot only by 
 lawyers but by landlords and tenants themselves, the Jaw in each particular being stated with a simplicity 
 and clearness which bring it within the grasp of the lay mind."— Law Gazette. 
 
12 STEVENS &° HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 Second Edition. In royal 8vo, in the Press, 
 A TREATISE ON THE 
 
 LAW AND PRACTICE 
 
 RELATING TO 
 
 LETTERS PATENT for INVENTIONS. 
 
 WITH AN 
 
 APPENDIX OF STATUTES, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION, 
 RULES, FORMS AND PRECEDENTS, ORDERS, &c. 
 
 By ROBERT FROST, B.Sc. (Lond.), 
 
 FELLO\y OF THE CHEMICAL SOCIETY J OF LINCOLN'S INN, ESQUIRE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 " In our view a good piece of work may create a demand, and without disparaging existing literature 
 upon the subject of patents, we think the care and skill with which the volume by Mr. Frost has been 
 compiled entitles it to recognition at the hands of the profession. . . . Judging Mr. Frost on this 
 ground, we find him completely satisfactory. A careful examination of the entire volume satisfies us that 
 great care and much labour have been devoted to the production of this treatise, and we think that patent 
 agents, solicitors, the bar and the bench, may confidently turn for guidance and instruction to the pages 
 of Mr. Frost." — Law Times. 
 
 " Few practice books contain so much in so reasonable a space, and we repeat that it will be found 
 generally useful by practitioners in this important branch of the law. ... A capital index concludes 
 the book." — Law Journal. 
 
 " The book is, as it professes to be, a treatise on patent law and practice, the several topics being con- 
 veniently arranged and discussed in the thirteen chapters which form the body of the work, to which 
 are appended statutes, rules, and forms. The statements of the law, so far as we have been able to test 
 them, appear to be clear and accurate, and the author's style is pleasant and good. . . . The book is 
 a good one, and will make its way. The index is better than usual. Both paper and type are also 
 excellent." — Solicitors* Journal. 
 
 Second Edition, In two volumes, royal Svo, price 50.?., cloth, 
 
 A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE 
 
 LAW OF BUILDING AND 
 ENGINEERING CONTRACTS, 
 
 And of the DUTIES and LIABILITIES of ENGINEERS, ARCHITECTS, 
 SURVEYORS and VALUERS, 
 
 WITH AN APPENDIX OF PRECEDENTS, 
 
 ANNOTATED BY MEANS OF REFERENCE TO THE TEXT AND TO CONTRACTS 
 
 IN USE. 
 
 AND AN APPENDIX OF UNREPORTED CASES 
 
 ON BUILDING AND ENGINEERING CONTRACTS. 
 By ALFRED A. HUDSON, 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 " This is a book of great elaboration and completeness. It appears from the preface that the author has 
 the twofold qualification of technical knowledge of building, gained as an architect, and devotion to the 
 legal aspects of building, engineering, and shipbuilding contracts since he became a member of the bar. 
 .... The list of cases cited covers fifty large pages, and they include, not merely English, but American 
 
 and Colonial decisions The book as a whole represents a large amount of well-directed labour, and 
 
 it ought to become the standard work on its subject." — Solicitors' Journal. 
 
 " A very full index completes the book. Mr. Hudson has struck out a new line for himself, and pro- 
 duced a work of considerable merit, and one which will probably be found indispensable by practitioners, 
 inasmuch as it contains a great deal that is not to be found elsewhere. »The Table of Cases refers to all 
 the reports." — Law Journal. 
 
 " Mr. Hudson, having abandoned his profession of an architect to become a barrister, hit upon the idea 
 of writing this work, and he has done it with a thoroughness which every houseowner would like to see 
 
 bestowed upon modern houses The Index and Table of Cases reveal a vast amount of industry 
 
 expended upon detail, and we shall be much surprised if Mr. Hudson does not reap the reward of his 
 labours, by obtaining a large and appreciative public."— Law Times. 
 
STEVENS & HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 13 
 
 Third Edition. In 8vo. Just ready, 
 
 OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF TORTS. 
 
 By RICHARD RINGWOOD, M.A., 
 
 OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW ; AUTHOR OF "PRINCIPLES OF BANKRUPTCY," &C, 
 AND LECTURER ON COMMON LAW TO THE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY. 
 
 I 
 
 "This is a work by the well-known author of a student's book on Bankruptcy. Its groundwork is a 
 series of lectures delivered in 1887 by Mr. Ringwood, as lecturer appointed by the Incorporated Law 
 Society. It is clear, concise, well and intelligently written and one rises from its perusal with feelings of 
 pleasure. . . . After perusing the entire work, we can conscientiously recommend it to students." — 
 Law Students' Journal. 
 
 " The work is one we well recommend to law students, and the able way in which it is written reflects 
 much credit upon the author." — Law Times. 
 
 "Mr. Ringwood's book is a plain and straightforward introduction to this branch of the law." — Law 
 Journal. 
 
 %* Prescribed as a text-book by the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland. 
 
 Sixth Edition, in 8vo, price 21s., cloth, 
 
 THE LAW OF COMPENSATION FOR LANDS, HOUSES, ftc. 
 
 UNDER THE LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACTS, THE RAILWAYS 
 
 CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACTS, THE PUBLIC HEALTH ACT, 1875 ; 
 
 THE HOUSING OF THE WORKING CLASSES ACT, 1890; 
 
 THE METROPOLIS LOCAL MANAGEMENT ACT 
 
 AND OTHER ACTS, , 
 
 WITH A FULL COLLECTION OF FORMS AND PRECEDENTS. 
 By EYRE LLOYD, 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 SIXTH EDITION. 
 By W. J. BROOKS, 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 " In providing- the legal profession with- a book which contains the decisions of the Courts of Law and 
 Equity upon the various statutes relating' to the Law of Compensation, Mr. Eyre Lloyd has long since 
 left all competitors in the distance, and his book may now be considered the standard work upon the sub- 
 ject. The plan of Mr. Lloyds book is generally known, audits lucidity is appreciated; the present quite 
 fulfils all t 'he promises of the preceding editions, and contains in addition to otlter matter a complete set 
 qffortns tinder the Artisans and Labourers Act, 1875, and specimens of Bills oj Costs , which will be found 
 a novel feature* extremely useful to legal practitioners." — Justice of the Peace. 
 
 In 8vo, price Js., cloth, 
 
 THE SUCCESSION LAWS OF CHRISTIAN COUNTRIES, 
 
 WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF PRIMOGENITURE 
 AS IT EXISTS IN ENGLAND. 
 
 By EYRE LLOYD, B.A., Barrister-at-Law. 
 In crown 8vo, price 6s. , cloth, 
 
 ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL HISTORY. 
 
 By JOHN W. SALMOND, M.A., LL.B. (Lond.), 
 
 A BARRISTER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND. 
 
 In crown 8vo, price 6s., cloth. 
 
 THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 By JOHN W. SALMOND, M.A., LL.B., 
 
 BARKISTER-AT-LAW ; AUTHOR OF "ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL HISTORY. 
 
14 STEVENS & HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR, 
 
 In 8vo, price "js. 6ci., cloth, 
 
 THE LAW OF 
 
 NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES. 
 
 CONTAINED IN A COURSE OF SIX LECTURES. 
 Delivered by WILLIAM WILLIS, Esq., Q.C, 
 
 AT THE REQUEST OF 
 
 THE COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION. 
 
 In one large vol., 8vo, price 32s., cloth, 
 
 INSTITUTES AND HISTORY OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW, 
 
 WITH CATENA OF TEXTS. 
 
 By Dr. CARL SALKOWSKI, Professor of Laws, Konigsberg. 
 Translated and Edited by E. E. Whitfield, M.A. (Oxon.). 
 
 In 8vo, price 4s. 6d., cloth, 
 THE 
 
 NEWSPAPER LIBEL AND REGISTRATION ACT, 1881. 
 
 WITH A STATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIBEL AS AFFECTING 
 PROPRIETORS, PUBLISHERS, and EDITORS OF NEWSPAPERS. 
 
 By G. ELLIOTT, Barrister-at-Law, of the Inner Temple. 
 
 In one volume, royal 8vo, 
 
 CASES AND OPINIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 
 
 AND VARIOUS POINTS OF ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 COLLECTED AND DIGESTED FROM OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 
 
 . AND OTHER SOURCES. 
 
 WITH NOTES. 
 
 By WILLIAM FORSYTH, M.A., M.P., Q.C, 
 
 STANDING COUNSEL TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN COUNCIL OF INDIA, 
 
 Author of " Hortensius," " History of Trial by Jury," "Life of Cicero," etc., 
 late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge* 
 
STEVENS &• I/A YATES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 15 
 
 Sixth Edition, in 8vo, price io.c 6ii, cloth, 
 
 THE PRINCIPLES OF BANKRUPTCY. 
 
 WITH AN APPENDIX, 
 
 CONTAINING 
 
 THE CONSOLIDATED RULES OF 1886, 1890 & 1891, SCALE OF 
 
 COSTS, AND THE BILLS OF SALE ACTS, 1878, 1882, 1890 & 
 
 1891, AND THE RULES THEREUNDER; THE DEEDS OF 
 
 ARRANGEMENT ACT, 1887, AND THE RULES THEREUNDER. 
 
 By RICHARD RINGWOOD, M.A., 
 
 OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW J LATE SCHOLAR OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN. 
 
 " We welcome a new edition of this excellent student's book. We have written favourably of it in 
 reviewing previous editions, and every good word we have written we would now reiterate and perhaps 
 even more so. . . . In conclusion, we congratulate Mr. Ringwood on this edition, and have no 
 hesitation in saying that it is a capital student's book." — Law Students' Journal. 
 
 " This edition is a considerable improvement on the first, and although chiefly writLen for the use of 
 Students, the work will be found useful to the practitioner." — Law Times. 
 
 Seventh Edition, in 8vo, price 2is,, cloth, 
 
 A TREATISE UPON 
 
 THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 
 
 AND 
 
 BILLS OF SALE. 
 
 WITH AN APPENDIX 
 
 CONTAINING 
 
 THE BANKRUPTCY ACTS, 1883— 1890; GENERAL RULES, 
 
 FORMS, SCALE OF COSTS AND FEES ; 
 
 RULES UNDER S. 122 OF 1888; DEEDS OF ARRANGEMENT ACTS, 
 
 1887— 1890; RULES AND FORMS ; BOARD OF TRADE AND 
 
 COURT ORDERS ; DEBTORS ACTS, 1869, 1878 ; RULES and FORMS; 
 
 BILLS OF SALE ACTS, 1878— 1891, Etc., Etc. 
 
 By EDWARD T. BALDWIN, M.A., 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 "The seven editions simply record the constant progress of case growth and statute law. It is a 
 remarkably useful compendium."— Law Times, July 20, 1895. ,,,,,,„ , _ 
 
 " As a well-arranged and complete collection of case law this book should be found orgreat use.' —Law 
 Journal, July 20, 1895. 
 
 " Carefully brought down to fate."— Solicitors Journal, November 9, 189s. 
 
 " We have always considered the work an admirable one, and the present edition is quite up to the 
 previous high standard of excellence. We know of no better book on bankruptcy for the practitioner's 
 library."— Law Students' journal, August, 1895. 
 
 " Practitioners may, we feel sure, safely rely on its accuracy. A distinct acquisition for reference 
 purposes to the shelf of any practitioner."— Lam Notes. 
 
16 STEVENS &> HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 Third Edition, in one vol., price 2Qs., cloth, 
 
 A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF 
 PROPERTY IN LAND. 
 
 FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION. 
 
 THIRD EDITION WITH ADDENDA, GIVING THE LAND TRANSFER 
 ACT, 1897, WITH REFERENCES TO THE TEXT. 
 
 By WILLIAM DOUGLAS EDWARDS, LL.B., 
 
 of Lincoln's inn, bakrister-at-law. 
 
 '"Mr. Edwards* treatise on the Law of Real Property is marked by excellency of arrangement and 
 
 conciseness of statement We are glad to see, by the appearance of successive editions, that the 
 
 merits of the book are appreciated." — Solicitors' Journal. 
 
 " So excellent is the arrangement that we know of no better compendium upon the subject of which it 
 treats." — Law Times. 
 
 "We welcome the third edition of Mr. Edwards' book. It has by this time secured a first place 
 amongst students' books on Real Property, both by its admirable arrangement of topics and by the 
 clearness of its statements. The present edition incorporates the Statutes and Cases for 1896." — 
 Cambridge Review. 
 
 "An established place in legal literature is occupied by Mr. W. D. Edwards' ' Compendium of the Law 
 of Property in Land,' the third edition of which has just been published." — The Globe. 
 
 " We consider it one of the best works published on Real Property Law." — Law Students' Journal. 
 
 " Another excellent compendium which has entered a second edition is Mr. Edwards' ' Compendium of 
 the Law of Property in Land.' No work on English law is written more perspicuously." — Law Times. 
 
 " The author has the merit of being a sound lawyer, a merit perhaps not always possessed by the 
 authors of legal text-books for students." — Law Quarterly Review. 
 
 "Altogether it is a work for which we are indebted to the author, and is worthy of the improved 
 notions of law which the study of jurisprudence is bringing to the front." — Solicitors 1 Journal. 
 
 Third Edition, royal 8vo, price 38^., cloth, 
 THE 
 
 LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND COMPANIES. 
 
 A TREATISE ON THE DOCTRINE OF 
 
 ULTRA VIRES: 
 
 BEING 
 
 An Investigation of the Principles which Limit the Capacities, Powers, and Liabilities of 
 CORPORATIONS, 
 
 AND MORE ESPECIALLY OF 
 
 JOINT STOCK COMPANIES. 
 By SEWARD BRICE, M.A., LL.D., London, 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE, ONE OF HER MAJESTY'S COUNSEL. 
 
 THIRD EDITION. 
 
 REVISED THROUGHOUT AND ENLARGED, AND CONTAINING THE 
 UNITED STATES AND COLONIAL DECISIONS. 
 
 EEVIEWB. 
 
 '. . . . On the whole, we consider Air. B rice's exhaustive work a valuable addition to Ike literature oj 
 ike profession." — Saturday Review. 
 
 "It is the Law of Corporations that Mr. Brice treats of (and treats of more fully, and at the same 
 time more scientifically, than any work with which we are acquainted), not the law of principal and 
 agent ; and Mr. Brice does not do his book justice by giving it so vague a title."— Law Journal. 
 
 "On this doctrine, first introduced in the Common Law Courts in East Anglian Railway Co. v. 
 Eastern Counties Railway Co., Brice on Ultra Vires may be read with advantage." — Judgment of 
 Lord Justice Bramwell, in the Case of Evershed v. L. &= N. W. Ry. Co. (L. R., 3 Q. B. Div. ml). 
 
STEVENS &* HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 17 
 
 Seventh Edition, in royal 8vo, price 36*., cloth, 
 
 BUCKLEY ON THE COMPANIES ACTS. 
 
 THE LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE COMPANIES ACTS, 1862 to 1893; and 
 
 THE LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANIES ACTS, 1870 to 1872 ; including 
 
 THE COMPANIES (MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION) ACT; 
 
 THE COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) ACT, and the 
 
 DIRECTORS' LIABILITY ACT. 
 
 & localise on the j/ato of Joint cStock Companies. 
 
 CONTAINING THE STATUTES, WITH THE RULES, ORDERS, AND 
 
 FORMS, TO REGULATE PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 SEVENTH EDITION BY THE AUTHOR, and 
 A. C. CLAUSON, Esq., M.A., 
 
 OF LINCOLN'S INN, BAKRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 Second Edition, with Supplement, in royal 8vo, price 46.J., cloth. 
 THE LAW RELATING TO 
 
 SHIPMASTERS AND SEAMEN. 
 
 THEIR APPOINTMENT, DUTIES, POWERS, RIGHTS, LIABILITIES 
 
 AND REMEDIES, 
 
 By the late JOSEPH KAY, Esq., M.A., Q.C. 
 
 Second Edition. 
 
 WITH A SUPPLEMENT 
 
 Comprising THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894, the Rules of 
 
 Court made thereunder, and the {proposed) Regulations for 
 
 Preventing Collisions at Sea. 
 
 By the Hon. J. W. MANSFIELD, M.A., and 
 
 G. W. DUNCAN, Esq., B.A., 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTERS-AT-LAW. 
 
 REVIEWS OF THE SECOND EDITION: 
 
 " It will, however, be a valuable book of refer- 
 ence for any lawyer desiring to look up a point 
 connected with the rights and duties of a ship- 
 master or a seaman— the list of cases cited covers 
 nearly seventy pages — while any shipmaster, ship- 
 agent or consul who mrsters this edition will be 
 well posted up. . . - We hope this new 
 
 Edition will be quickly appreciated, for the 
 
 Editors have carried out an arduous task carefullv 
 and well."-— LawJonmal y April, 1894. 
 
 " It has had practical and expert knowledge 
 brought to bear upon it, while the case law is 
 brought down to a very late date. Considerable 
 improvement has been made in the index." — Law 
 Times i April, 1894. 
 
 In royal 8vo, price ioj. $*£, cloth, 
 
 THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894; 
 
 With the Rules of Court made thereunder. Being a Supplement to KAY'S LAW 
 RELATING TO SHIPMASTERS AND SEAMEN. To which are added the 
 (proposed) Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. With Notes. By Hon. J. 
 W. Mansfield, M.A., and G. W. Duncan, B.A., of the Inner Temple, Barristers- 
 at-Law. 
 
18 
 
 STEVENS &° HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 Fourth Edition, in royal 8vo, price 40.J., cloth; 
 
 THE JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, AND PRACTICE OF 
 THE SUPREME COURT, 
 
 CHIEFLY in RESPECT to ACTIONS ASSIGNED to the CHANCERY DIVISION. 
 
 By LOFTUS LEIGH PEMBERTON, 
 
 One of the registrars of the Supreme Court of Judicature ; and Author of " The Practice 
 
 in Equity by way of Revivor and Supplement." 
 
 "The work under notice ought to be of considerable service to the profession The forms 
 
 throughout the work — and they are the most important element in it — appear to us to be accurate, and of 
 the most approved type. This fact alone will commend the new edition to practitioners in the Chancery 
 Division. _ There is a useful table of the Lord Chancellors and Judges at the beginning of the book, and a 
 very full index-.concludes it." — Laiv Times. 
 
 In demy i2mo, price 5-r. , 
 
 THE STATUTORY LAW RELATING TO TRUSTEE 
 
 SAVINGS BANKS (1863—1891), together with the Treasury Regu- 
 lations (1888 — 1889), and the Scheme for the Appointment of the Inspection 
 Committee of Trustee Savings Banks. By Urquhart A. Forbes, of Lincoln's 
 Inn, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, Author of " The Law Relating to Savings Banks ;" 
 the "Law of Savings Banks since 1878;" and joint Author of "The Law 
 Relating to Water. " 
 
 In demy 121110, price 6s., cloth, 
 
 THE LAW OF SAVINGS BANKS SINCE 1878; 
 
 With a Digest of Decisions made by the Chief Registrar and Assistant Registrars of 
 Friendly Societies from 1878 to 1882, being a Supplement to the Law relating to 
 Trustee and Post Office Savings Banks. 
 
 By U. A. FORBES, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. 
 %* The complete work can be had, price lor. 6d., cloth. 
 
 In 8vo, price 15^., cloth, 
 THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO 
 
 THE ADMINISTRATION OF DECEASED PERSONS 
 
 BY THE CHANCERY DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE; 
 
 WITH AN ADDENDA giving the alterations effected by the NEW EULES of 1883, 
 
 And an APPENDIX OF ORDERS AND FORMS, Annotated by 
 
 References to the Text. 
 
 By W. GREGORY WALKER and EDGAR J. ELGOOD, 
 
 of Lincoln's inn, barristers-at-law. 
 
 *' In this volume the most important branch of 
 the administrative business of the Chancery Divi- 
 sion is treated with conciseness and care. Judging 
 from the admirable clearness of expression which 
 characterises the entire work, and the labour which 
 has evidently been bestowed on every detail, we do 
 not think that a literary executorship could have 
 devolved upon a more able and conscientious repre- 
 sentative .... Useful chapters are introduced 
 in their appropriate places, dealing with the 
 
 1 Parties to administration actions,' ' The proofs of 
 claims in Chambers,' and * The cost of adminis- 
 tration actions.' To the last-mentioned chapter we 
 gladly accord special praise, as a clear and succinct 
 summary of the law, from which, so far as we have 
 tested it, no proposition of any importance has been 
 omitted . . . . An elaborately constructed table 
 of cases, with references in separate columns to all 
 the reports, and a fairly good index, much increase 
 the utility of the work." — Solicitors' JournaL 
 
 In Foolscap 8vo, superfine paper, bound in Vellum, price 3-r. &£ «*'• 
 *** A limited number of copies have been printed upon large paper, price J?. 6d. net. 
 
 SCINTILLAE JURIS. ; 
 
 CHARLES J. DARLING, Q.C., M.P. With a Frontispiece and Colophon by 
 Frank Lockwood, Q.C., M.P. Fourth Edition (Enlarged). 
 
 " * Scintillae Juris;* is that little bundle of humorous essays on law and cognate matters which, since the 
 day of its first appearance, some years ago, has been the delight of legal circles. ... It has a quality 
 of style which suggests much study of Bacon in his lighter vein. Its best essays would not be unworthy of 
 the Essays, and if read out, one by one, before a blindfolded connoisseur, might often be assigned to that 
 wonderful book." — Daily News. 
 
STEVENS & HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 19 
 
 Second Edition, in 8vo, price 25^., cloth, 
 THE PRINCIPLES OF 
 
 THE LAW OF RATING OF HEREDITAMENTS 
 
 IN THE OCCUPATION OF COMPANIES. 
 By J. H. BALFOUR BROWNE, 
 
 OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, Q.C., 
 
 And D. N. McNAUGHTON, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 that such a work is much needed; and we are sure 
 that all those who are interested in, or have to do 
 with, public rating, will find it of great service. 
 Much credit is therefore due to Mr. Browne for his 
 able_ treatise — a work which his experience as 
 Registrar of the Railway Commission peculiarly 
 qualified him to undertake." — Law Magazine. 
 
 "The tables and specimen valuations which are 
 printed in an appendix to this volume will be of 
 gteat service to the parish authorities, and to the 
 legal practitioners who may have to deal with the 
 rating of those properties which are in the occupa- 
 tion of Companies, and we congratulate Mr. Browne 
 on the production of a clear and concise book of 
 the system of Company Rating. There is no doubt 
 
 In 8vo, 1875, price *}s. 6d., cloth, 
 
 THE LAW OF USAGES & CUSTOMS : 
 
 %. |mtical fab ftraci. 
 By J. H. BALFOUR BRJ3WNE, 
 
 OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, Q.C. 
 
 " We look upon this treatise as a valuable addition to works written on the Science of Law." — Canada 
 Law Journal. 
 
 "Asa tract upon a very troublesome department of Law it is admirable — the principles laid down are 
 sound, the illustrations are well chosen, and the decisions and dicta are harmonised so far as possible and 
 distinguished when necessary." — Irish Law Times. 
 
 "As a book of reference we know of none so comprehensive dealing with this particular branch of 
 Common Law. .... In this way the book is invaluable to the practitioner." — Law Magazine. 
 
 In one volume, 8vo, 1875, price i8j., cloth, 
 
 THE PRACTICE BEFORE THE RAILWAY COMMISSIONERS 
 
 UNDER THE REGULATION OF RAILWAY ACTS, 1873 & 1874 ; 
 With the Amended General Orders of the Commissioners, Schedule of Forms, and Table 
 of Fees : together with the Law of Undue Preference, the Law of the Jurisdiction 
 of the Railway Commissioners, Notes of their Decisions and Orders, Precedents of 
 Forms of Applications, Answers and Replies, and Appendices of Statutes and Cases. 
 
 By J. H. BALFOUR BROWNE, 
 
 OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, Q.C. 
 
 " Mr. Browne's book is handy and convenient in 
 form, and well arranged for the purpose of refer- 
 ence : its treatment of the subject is fully and 
 carefully worked out : it is, so far as we have been 
 able to test it, accurate and trustworthy. It is the 
 
 work of a man of capable legal attainments, and by 
 official position intimate with his subject ; and we 
 therefore think that it cannot fail to meet a real 
 want and to prove of service to the legal profession 
 and the public." — Law Magazine. ■ 
 
 In 8vo, 1876, price 7 J. 6</., cloth, 
 
 ON THE COMPULSORY PURCHASE OF THE UNDERTAKINGS 
 OF COMPANIES BY CORPORATIONS, 
 
 And the Practice in Relation to the Passage of Bills for Compulsory Purchase through 
 Parliament. By J. H. Balfour Browne, of the Middle Temple, Q.C. 
 
 both by the promoters and opponents, and as this 
 was the first time in which the principle of com- 
 pulsory purchase was definitely recognised, there 
 can be no doubt that it will long be regarded as a 
 leading case. As a matter of course, many inci- 
 
 "This is a work of considerable importance to all 
 Municipal Corporations, and it is hardly too much to 
 say that every member of these bodies should have 
 a copy by him for constant reference. Probably at 
 no very distant date the property of all the existing 
 gas and water companies will pass under municipal 
 control, and therefore it is exceedingly desirable 
 that the principles and conditions under which such 
 transfers ought to be made should be clearly under- 
 stood. This task is made easy by the present volume. 
 The stimulus for the publication of such a work 
 was given by the action of the Parliamentary 
 Committee which last session passed the preamble 
 of the 'Stockton and Middlesborough Corporations 
 Water Bill, 1876.' The volume accordingly con- 
 tains a full report of the case as it was presented 
 
 dental points of interest arose during the progress 
 of the case. Thus, besides the main question of 
 compulsory purchase, and the question as to whether 
 there was or was not any precedent fpr the Bill, the 
 questions of water compensations, of appeals from 
 one Committee to another, and other kindred sub- 
 jects Were discussed. These are all treated at leegth 
 by the Author in the body of the work, which is 
 thus a complete legal compendium on the large 
 subject with which it so ably deals." 
 
20 
 
 STEVENS &> HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 In 8vo, price 5.;., cloth, 
 
 THEORIES AND CRITICISMS OF SIR HENRY MAINE, 
 
 By MORGAN O. EVANS, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 Contained in his six works, "Ancient Law," 
 "' "Village Comi 
 which works have to be studied for the various examina 
 
 Early Law and Customs," " Early 
 History of Institutions," "Village Communities," "International Law," and 
 
 "Popular Government, 
 tions. 
 
 Second Edition, in crown 8vo. Just ready, 
 
 THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 
 
 By S. L. PHIPSON, M.A., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 " This book condenses a head of law into a 
 comparatively small compass — a class of literary 
 undertaking to which every encouragement should 
 be given. . . . The volume is most portable, most 
 compendious, and as far as we have been able to 
 examine it, as accurate as any law book can be 
 expected to be." — Law Times. 
 
 : We are of opinion that Mr. Phipson has pro- 
 duced a book which will be found very serviceable, 
 not only for practitioners, but also for students. 
 We have tried it in a good many places,_and we 
 find that it is well brought .down to date." — Law 
 Journal. 
 
 In 8vo, 1872, price 7^. 6d., cloth, 
 AN EPITOME AND ANALYSIS OF 
 
 SAVIGNY'S TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS IN ROMAN LAW. 
 
 By ARCHIBALD BROWN, M.A 
 
 EDIN. AND OXON., AND B.C.L. OXON., OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW, 
 
 the French translation consisting of two volumes, 
 with some five hundred pages apiece, as compared 
 with Mr. Brown's thin volume of a hundred and 
 fifty pages, At the same time the pith of Von 
 Savlgny's matter seems to be very successfully pre- 
 served, nothing which might be useful to the 
 English reader being apparently omitted." — Law 
 jfo?imal. 
 
 " Mr. Archibald Brown deserves the thanks 
 of all interested in the science of Law, whether 
 as a study or a practice, for his edition of 
 Herr von Savigny's great work on 'Obligations.' 
 Mr. Brown has undertaken a double task — the 
 translation of his author, and the analysis of -his 
 author's matter. That he has succeeded in reducing 
 the bulk of the original will be seen at a glance ; 
 
 THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW. 
 
 Second Edition, in crown 8vo, price 6s,, cloth, 
 A CONCISE DIGEST OF THE 
 
 INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND JUSTINIAN. 
 
 With copious References arranged in Parallel Columns, also Chronological and 
 
 Analytical Tables, Lists of Laws, &°c. &*c. 
 
 Primarily designed for the Use of Students preparing for Examination at 
 
 Oxford, Cambridge, and the Inns of Court. 
 
 By SEYMOUR F. HARRIS, B.C.L., M.A, 
 
 WORCESTER COLLEGE, OXFORD,' AND THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW j 
 AUTHOR OF " UNIVERSITIES AND LEGAL EDUCATION." 
 
 ' ' Mr. Harris's digest ought to have very great success among law students both in the 
 Inns of Court and the Universities. His book gives evidence of praiseworthy accuracy 
 and laborious condensation."- — Law Journal. 
 
 " This book contains a summary in English of the elements of Roman Law as contained 
 in the works of Gains and Justinian, and is so arranged that the reader can at once see 
 ■what are the opinions of either of these two writers on each point. From the vay exact 
 and accurate references to titles and sections given he can at once refer to the original 
 writers. The concise manner in which Mr. Harris has arranged his digest will render 
 it most useful, not only to the students for whom it was originally written, but also to those 
 persons who, though they have not the time to wade through the larger treatises of Paste, 
 Sanders, Ortolan, and others, yet desire to obtain some knowledge of Roman Law." — 
 Oxford and Cambridge Undergraduates' Journal. 
 
 ' ' Mr. Harris deserves the credit of having produced an epitome which will be of service 
 to those numerous students who have no time or sufficient ability to analyse the Institutes 
 for themselves." — Law Times. 
 
WORKS FOR LAW STUDENTS. 21 
 
 Fifth Edition, in crown 8vo, price 15^., cloth, 
 
 ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: 
 
 FROM THE TEUTONIC INVASION TO THE PRESENT TIME. 
 
 5*st5iuJ) as a Ifxt-book for ^tubfiita anb other*, 
 
 By T. P. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, B.C.L., 
 
 OF LINCOLN'S INN, BARRISTER- AT- LAW, FORMERLY VINERIAN SCHOLAR IN THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 AND LATE PROFESSOR OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HISTORY, 
 
 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON. 
 
 Fifth Edition, Revised throughout, with Notes, 
 By Philip A. AshWorth, 
 
 bAKKISTER-AT-LAW J TRANSLATOR OF GNEIST'S " HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION." 
 
 "We heartily commend this valuable book to the study of all, whether Conservative or Liberal in 
 politics, who desire to take an intelligent part in public life."— 7V*t' New Saturday. 
 
 " * Taswell-Langmead ' has long been popular with candidates for examination in Constitutional 
 History, and the present edition should render it even more so. It is now, in our opinion, the ideal 
 students' book upon the subject." — Law JVotes. 
 
 "Mr. Carmichael has performed his allotted task with credit to himself, and the high standard of 
 excellence attained by Taswell -Lang mead's treatise is worthily maintained. This, the third edition, will 
 be found as useful as its predecessors to the large class of readers and students who seek, in its pages 
 accurate knowledge of the history of the constitution." — Law Times. 
 
 "To the student of constitutional law this work will be invaluable The book is remarkable 
 
 for the raciness and vigour of its style. The editorial contributions of Mr. Carmichael are judicious, and 
 add much to the value of the work." — Scottish Law Review. 
 
 "The work will continue to hold the field as the best class-book on the subject." — Contemporary Review. 
 
 " The book is well known as an admirable introduction to the study of constitutional law for students at 
 
 law Mr. Carmichael appears to have done the work of editing, made necessary by the death 
 
 of Mr. Taswell- Langmead, with care and judgment."- — Law Journal. 
 
 *' The work before us it would be hardly possible to praise too highly. In style, arrangement, clearness, 
 and size, it would be difficult to find anything better on the real history of England, the history of its 
 constitutional growth as a complete story, than this volume." — Boston (W.S.) Literary World. 
 
 "As it now stands, we should find it hard to name a better text-book on English Constitutional 
 History. " — Solicitors* Journal. 
 
 " Mr. Taswell- Langmead's compendium of the rise and development of the English Constitution has 
 
 evidently supplied a want The present Edition is greatly improved. . . . We have no hesitation in 
 
 saying that it is a thoroughly good and useful work." — Spectator. 
 
 " It is a safe, careful, praiseworthy digest and manual of all constitutional history and law." — Globe. 
 
 " The volume on English Constitutional History, by Mr. Taswell- Langmead } is exactly what such a 
 history should be." — Standard. 
 
 " Mr. Taswell- Langmead has thoroughly grasped the bearings of his subject. It is, however, in dealing 
 with that chief subject of constitutional history — parliamentary government — that the work exhibits its 
 great superiority over its rivals." — Academy. 
 
 Second Edition, in 8vo, price 6s. , cloth, 
 
 HANDBOOK TO THE INTERMEDIATE AND 
 FINAL LL.B. OF LONDON UNIVERSITY ; 
 
 (PASS AND HONOURS), 
 
 Including A COMPLETE SUMMARY OF "AUSTIN'S JURISPRUDENCE," 
 and the EXAMINATION PAPERS of LATE YEARS in ALL BRANCHES. 
 
 By a B.A., LL.B. (Lond.). 
 In crown Svo, price 3s. ; or Interleaved for Notes, price 4*., 
 
 CONTRACT LAW. 
 
 QUESTIONS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. With Notes to ihe 
 Answers. Founded on "Anson" " Chitty," and "Pollock." 
 
 By Philip Foster Aldred, D.C.L., Hertford College and Gray's Inn. 
 
22 WORKS FOR LAW STUDENTS. 
 
 Eleventh Edition, in 8vo, price 21s., cloth, 
 
 THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY. 
 
 INTENDED FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION. 
 By EDMUND H. T. SNELL, 
 
 OF THK MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARR1STER-AT-LAW, 
 
 ELEVENTH EDITION. 
 By ARCHIBALD BROWN, M.A. Edin, & Oxon., & B.C.L. Oxon., 
 
 OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRI5TER-AT-LAW ; AUTHOR OF "A NEW LAW DICTIONARY," 
 "AN ANALYSIS OF SAVIGNY ON OBLIGATIONS," AND THE " LAW OF FIXTURES." 
 
 REVIEWS. 
 
 "The Eleventh Edition of ' Snell's Equity ' is remarkable in one respect, viz., the learned editor has, as 
 he tells us in his preface, actually succeeded in diminishing the size of the book. It is the Eighth Edition 
 which has passed through the able hands of Mr. Archibald Brown, and the deserved reputation of the 
 work has certainly not suffered any loss in the process. In the present edition the book is well brought 
 up to date. . . . The printing and get-up of the book are excellent and the index is good." — Law Journal. 
 
 " This is the Eighth Edition of this student's text-book which the present editor has brought out. . . 
 the book is a good introduction to Equity, and is additionally useful by having a full index." — Solicitors 
 Journal. 
 
 " The book remains what it always has been, the indispensable guide to the beginner of the study of 
 Equity, without ceasing to be above the notice ot the more experienced student." — Oxford Magazine. 
 
 " Whether to the beginner in the study of the principles of Equity, or to the practising lawyer in the 
 hurry of work, it can be unhesitatingly recommended as a standard and invaluable treatise." — Cambridge 
 Review. 
 
 "This work on the ' Principles of Equity' has, since the publication of the First Edition, been 
 recognised as the best elementary treatise on the subject, and it would not be necessary to say more of 
 this Edition, than to mention the fact of its publication, were it not for the fact that the author, Mr. Snell, 
 is dead, and the late Editions have been brought out under the care of Mr. Brown. It seldom happens 
 that a new editor is able to improve on the work of his predecessor in its plan or its details. But in the 
 case of the present work we find that each edition is a manifest improvement on the former ones, and well 
 as Mr. Snell did his work we discover that Mr. Brown has done it better."— Irish Laiv Times. 
 
 " This is now unquestionably the standard book on Equity for students." — Saturday Review. 
 
 " We know of no better introduction to the Principles of Equity? — 
 Canada Law Journal. 
 
 Fifth Edition, in 8vo, price 6s., cloth, 
 
 AN ANALYSIS OF SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF 
 
 EQUITY. Founded on the Eleventh Edition. With Notes thereon. 
 
 By E. E. Blyth, LL.D., Solicitor. 
 
 *' Mr. Blyth's book will undoubted^ be very useful to readers of Snell." — Law Times. 
 (< This is an admirable analysis of a good treatise ; read with Snell, this little book will be found very 
 profitable to the student." — Law Journal. 
 
 In 8vo, price 2s. t sewed, 
 
 QUESTIONS ON EQUITY. 
 
 FOR STUDENTS PREPARING FOR EXAMINATION. 
 
 FOUNDED ON THE NINTH EDITION OF 
 
 SNELL'S "PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY." 
 By W. T. WAITE, 
 
 BARRISTER AT-LAW, HOLT SCHOLAR OF THE HONOURABLE SOCIETY OF GRAV's INN. 
 
WORKS FOR LAW STUDENTS. 
 
 23 
 
 Second Edition, in one volume, 8vo, price i8j., cloth, 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF CONVEYANCING. 
 
 AN ELEMENTARY WORK FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS. 
 By HENRY C. DEANE, 
 
 of Lincoln's inn, barrister-at-law, sometime lecturer to the incorporated law society 
 
 of the united kingdom. 
 
 ki We hope to see this book, like SneWs Equity, a standard class-book in all Lazv Schools 
 where English law is taught" — Canada Law Journal. 
 
 " In the parts which have been re-written, Mr. 
 Deane has preserved the same pleasant style marked 
 by simplicity and lucidity which distinguished his 
 first edition. After ' Williams on Real Property,' 
 there is no book which we should so strongly 
 recommend to the student entering upon Real Pro- 
 perty Law as Mr. Deane's 'Principles of Convey- 
 ancing,' and the high character which the first 
 edition attained has been fully kept up in this 
 second." — Lmv Journal. 
 
 " We like the work, it is well written and is an 
 excellent student's book, and being only just pub- 
 lished, it has the great advantage of having in it all 
 the recent important enactments relating to convey- 
 ancing. It possesses also an excellent index." — 
 Law Students' Journal. 
 
 "Will be found of great use to students entering 
 upon the difficulties of Real Property Law. It has 
 an unusually exhaustive index covering some fifty 
 pages." — Law Times. 
 
 Fourth Edition, in 8vo, price 10s. , cloth, 
 
 A SUMMARY OF THE 
 
 LAW & PRACTICE IN ADMIRALTY. 
 
 FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS. 
 By EUSTACE SMITH, 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE; AUTHOR OF "A SUMMARY OF COMPANY LAW." 
 
 "The book is well arranged, and forms a good introduction to the subject. "Solicitors' Journal. 
 
 " It is, however, in our opinion, a well and carefully -written little work, and should be in the hands of 
 every student who is taking up Admiralty Law at the Final."— Lain Students' Journal. 
 
 " Mr. Smith has a happy knack of compressing a large amount of useful matter in a small compass. The 
 present work will doubtless be received with satisfaction equal to that with which his previous Summary ' 
 has been met."— Oxford and Cambridge Undergraduates' Journal. 
 
 Fourth Edition, in 8vo, price Ss. , cloth, 
 A SUMMARY OF THE 
 
 LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS. 
 
 FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS. 
 By EUSTACE SMITH, 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE; AUTHOR OF "A SUMMARY OF COMPANY LAW " AND "a SUMMARY OF 
 THE LAW AND PRACTICE IN ADMIRALTY." 
 
 " His object has been, as he tells us in his preface, to give the student and general reader a fair outline 
 of the scope and extent of ecclesiastical law, of the principles on which it is founded, of the Courts by 
 which it is enforced, and the procedure by which these Courts are regulated. We think the book well 
 fulfils its object. Its value is much enhanced by a profuse citation of authorities for the propositions 
 contained in it."— Bar Examination Journal. 
 
 Fourth Edition, in 8vo, price ys. 6d., cloth, 
 
 AN EPITOME OF THE LAWS OF PROBATE AND DIVORCE. 
 
 FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS FOR HONOURS EXAMINATION. 
 By J. CARTER HARRISON, Solicitor. 
 
 " The work is considerably enlarged, and we think improved, and will be found of great assistance to 
 students."— Law Students' Journal. 
 
21 WORKS FOR LAW STUDENTS. 
 
 Seventh Edition. In one volume, 8vo, price 20s. , cloth, 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMON LAW. 
 
 INTENDED FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION. 
 SEVENTH EDITION. 
 
 By JOHN INDERMAUR, Solicitor, 
 
 AUTHOR OF "A MANUAL OF THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT," 
 " EPITOMES OF LEADING CASES," AND OTHER WORKS. 
 
 "The student will find in Mr. Indermaur's book a safe and clear guide to the Prin- 
 ciples of Common Law." — Law Journal, 1892. 
 
 "The present edition of this elementary treatise has been in general edited with praise- 
 worthy care. The provisions of the statutes affecting the subjects discussed, which have 
 been passed since the publication of the last edition, are clearly summarised, and the effect 
 of the leading cases is generally very well given. In the difficult task of selecting and 
 distinguishing principle from detail, Mr. Indermaur has been very successful ; the leading 
 principles are clearly brought out, and very judiciously illustrated."— Solicitors' Journal, 
 
 "The work is acknowledged to be one of the best written and most useful elementary 
 works for Law Students that has been published." — Law Times. 
 
 " The praise which we were enabled to bestow upon Mr. Indermaur's very useful com- 
 pilation on its first appearance has been justified by a demand for a second edition."— 
 Law Magazine, 
 
 " We were able, four years ago, to praise the first edition of Mr. Indermaur's book as 
 likely to be of use to students in acquiring the elements of the law of torts and contracts. 
 The second edition maintains the character of the book." — Law Journal. 
 
 "Mr. Indermaur renders even law light reading. He not only possesses the faculty 
 of judicious selection, but of lucid exposition and felicitous illustration. And while his 
 works are all thus characterised, his ' Principles of the Common Law ' especially displays 
 those features. That it has already reached a second edition, testifies that our estimate of 
 the work on its first appearance was not unduly favourable, highly as we then signified 
 approval ; nor needs it that we should add anything to that estimate in reference to the 
 general scope and execution of the work. It only remains to say, that the present edition 
 evinces that every care has been taken to insure thorough accuracy, while including all 
 the modifications in the law that have taken place since the original publication ; and that 
 the references to the Irish decisions which have been now introduced are calculated to 
 render the work of greater utility to practitioners and students, both English and Irish." 
 — Irish Law Times. 
 
 " This work, the author tells us in his Preface, is written mainly with a view to the 
 examinations of the Incorporated Law Society ; but we think it is likely to attain a wider 
 usefulness. It seems, so far as we can judge from the farts we have examined, to be a 
 careful and clear outline of the principles of the common law,. It is very readable ; and 
 not only students, but many practitioners and the pttblic might benefit by a perusal of Us 
 pages. " — Solicitors' Journal. 
 
WORKS FOR LAW STUDENTS. 25 
 
 Seventh Edition, in 8vo, price i+r., cloth, 
 
 4 MANUAL OF THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE, 
 
 IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH AND CHANCERY DIVISIONS. 
 
 Seventh Edition. 
 Ittttnded for the use of Students and the Profession. 
 By John Indermaur, Solicitor. 
 
 " Mr. Indermaur has brought out a sixth edition of his excellent ( Manual of Practice ' at a very 
 opportune time, for he has been able to incorporate the effect of the new Rules of Court which came into 
 force last November, the Trustee Act, 1893, and Rules, and the Supreme Court Fund Rules, 1893, as 
 well as that of other Acts of earlier date. A very complete revision of the work has, of course, been 
 necessary, and Mr. Indermaur, assisted by Mr. Thwaites, has effected this with his usual thoroughness 
 and careful attention to details. The book is well known and valued by students, but practitioners also 
 find it handy in many cases where reference to the bulkier * White Book' is unnecessary."— Law Times, 
 February, 1894. 
 
 " This well-known students' book may very well be consulted by practitioners, as it contains a considerable 
 amount of reliable information on the practice of the Court. It is written so as to include the new Rules, 
 and a supplemental note deals with the alterations made in Rule XI. by the Judges in January last. The 
 praise which we gave to previous editions is quite due to the present issue." — Laiv yourual, February \ 1894. 
 
 Eighth Edition, in 8vo, price 6s., cloth, 
 
 AN EPITOME OF LEADING COMMON LAW CASES; 
 
 WITH SOME SHORT NOTES THEREON. 
 Chiefly intended as a Guide to " Smith's Leading Cases." By John Indermaur, 
 
 Solicitor (Clifford's Inn Prizeman, Michaelmas Term, 1872). 
 " We have received the third edition of the ' Epitome of Leading Common Law Cases,' by Mr. Inder- 
 maur, Solicitor. The first edition of this work was published in February, 1874, the second in April, 1874; 
 and now we have a third edition dated September, 1875. No better proof of the value of this book can be 
 furnished than the fact that in less than three years it has reached a third edition." — Law Journal. 
 
 Eighth Edition, in 8vo, price 6s., cloth, 
 
 AN EPITOME OF LEADING CONVEYANCING AND EQUITY CASES; 
 
 WITH SOME SHORT NOTES THEREON, FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS. 
 By John Indermaur, Solicitor, Author of "An Epitome of Leading 
 Common Law Cases.'' 
 "We have received the second edition of Mr. Indermaur's very useful Epitome of Leading Convey- 
 ancing and Equity Cases. The work is very well done." — Law Times. 
 
 "The Epitome well deserves the continued patronage of the class — Students — for whom it is especially 
 intended. Mr. Ind ermaur will soon be known as the ' Students' Friend.' " — Canada Law Journal. 
 
 Sixth Edition, 8vo, price 6s., cloth, 
 
 THE ARTICLED CLERK'S GUIDE TO AND 
 SELF-PREPARATION FOR THE FINAL EXAMINATION. 
 
 Containing a Complete Course of Study, with Books to Read, List of Statutes, Cases, 
 
 Test Questions, &c, and intended for the use of those Articled Clerks who read 
 
 by themselves. By John Indermaur, Solicitor. 
 
 "In this edition Mr. Indermaur extends his counsels to the whole period from the Intermediate 
 
 examination to the Final. His advice is practical and sensible : and if the course of study he recommends 
 
 is intelligently followed, the articled clerk will have laid in a store of legal knowledge more than sufficient 
 
 to carry him through the Final Examination." — Solicitors' Journal. 
 
 Now ready, Fifth Edition, in 8vo, price \os., cloth, 
 
 THE ARTICLED CLERK'S GUIDE TO AND SELF- 
 PREPARATION FOR THE INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATION, 
 
 As it now exists on Stephen's Commentaries. Containing a complete course of Study, 
 with Statutes, Questions, and Advice. Also a complete Selected Digest of the 
 whole of the Questions and Answers set at the Examinations on those parts of 
 " Stephen " now examined on, embracing a period of fourteen and a half years 
 (58 Examinations), inclusive of the Examination in April, 1894, &c. &c, and 
 intended for the use of all Articled Clerks who have not yet passed the Inter- 
 mediate Examination. By John Indermaur, Author of " Principles of Com- 
 mon Law," and other works. 
 
 In 8vo, 1875, P"ce 6.r., cloth, 
 
 THE STUDENTS' GUIDE TO THE JUDICATURE ACTS, 
 
 AND THE RULES THEREUNDER: 
 
 Being a book of Questions and Answers intended for the use of Law Students. 
 
 By John Indermaur, Solicitor. 
 
26 WORK'S FOR LAW STUDENTS. 
 
 Fifth Edition, in crown 8vo, price \2s. 6d., cloth, 
 
 AN EPITOME OF CONVEYANCING STATUTES, 
 
 Extending from 13 Edw. I. to the End of 55 & 56 Victoria. Filth 
 Edition, with Short Notes. By George Nichols Marcy, of Lincoln's Inn, 
 Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 Second Edition, in 8vo, 
 
 A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, 
 
 AND INSTITUTE OF THE WHOLE LAW ; 
 
 EMBRACING FRENCH AND LATIN TERMS AND REFERENCES TO THE 
 AUTHORITIES, CASES, AND STATUTES. 
 
 SECOND EDITION, revised throughout, and considerably enlarged. 
 By ARCHIBALD BROWN, 
 
 M,A. ED1K. AND OXON., AND B.C.L. OXON., OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW ; AUTHOR OF 
 THE "LAW OF FIXTURES," "ANALYSIS OF SAVIGNY's OBLIGATIONS IN ROMAN LAW," ETC. 
 
 Reviews of the Second Edition. 
 
 ' ' So far as we have been able to examine the work, it seems to have been most carefully 
 and accurately executed, the present Edition, besides containing much new matter, having 
 been thoroughly revised in consequence of the recent changes in the law ; and we have no 
 doubt whatever that it-vill be found extremely useful, not only to students and practitioners, 
 but to public men, and men of letters." — Irish Law Times. 
 
 "Mr. Brown has revised his Dictionary, and adapted it to the changes effected by the 
 Judicature Acts, and it now constitutes a very useful work to put into the hands of any 
 student or articled clerk, and a work which the practitioner will find of value for reference." 
 — Solicitors' Journal, 
 
 " It will prove a reliable guide to law students, and a handy book of reference for 
 practitioners." — Law Times. 
 
 In royal 8vo, price 5^, cloth, 
 
 ANALYTICAL TABLES 
 
 OF 
 
 THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY; 
 
 Drawn up chiefly from STEPHEN'S BLACKSTONE, with Notes. 
 By C. J. TARRING, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Table I. Tenures. 
 
 ,, II. Estates, according to quantity of 
 
 Tenants' Interest. 
 „ III. Estates, according to the time at 
 
 which the Interest is to be enjoyed. 
 ,, IV. Estates, according to the number and 
 
 connection of the Tenants. 
 
 Table V. Uses. 
 
 ,, VI. Acquisition of Estates in land of 
 
 freehold tenure. 
 ,, VII. Incorporeal Hereditaments. 
 ,, VIII. Incorporeal Hereditaments. 
 
 "Great care and considerable skill have been shown in the compilation of these tables which will be 
 found of much service to students of the Law of Real Property." — Laiv Times. 
 
WORKS FOR LAW STUDENTS. 27 
 
 Seventh Edition, in 8vo, price 20s., cloth, 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW. 
 
 INTENDED AS A LUCID EXPOSITION OF THE SUBJECT FOR 
 THE USE OF STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION. 
 
 By SEYMOUR F. HARRIS, B.C.L., M.A. (Oxon.), 
 
 AUTHOR OF "A CONCISE DIGEST OF THE INSTITUTES OF CAIUS AND JUSTINIAN." 
 
 SEVENTH EDITION. 
 By C. L. ATTENBOROUGH, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 REVIEWS. 
 
 11 Messrs. Stevens & Haynes have just issued the Seventh Edition of their well known text-book, 
 ' Harris's Principles of the Criminal Law.' For the present edition Mr. Charles L. Atlenborough, 
 of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law, is responsible. He has brought the work up to date, and 
 ensured for it a further career of usefulness as the leading student's text-book upon the Criminal 
 Law." — Law Times. 
 
 *' This work is pretty well known as one designed for the student who is preparing for examination, 
 and for the help of young practitioners. Among articled clerks it has long enjoyed a popularity which 
 is not likely to be interfered with. . . . We have been carefully through the new edition and can 
 cordially commend it." — Law Student's Journal. 
 
 "The book must be good, and must meet a demand, and Harris's Criminal Law remains as it has 
 always been, an excellent work for obtaining that kind of theoretical knowledge of the criminal law 
 which is so useful at the University Examinations of Oxford and Cambridge." — Law Notes. 
 
 t( The characteristic of the present Edition is the restoration to the book of the character of ( a concise 
 exposition ' proclaimed by the title-page. Mr. Attenborough has carefully pruned away the excrescences 
 which had arisen in successive editions, and has improved the work both as regards terseness and clearness 
 of exposition. In both respects it is now an excellent student's book. The text is very well broken up 
 into headings and paragraphs, with short marginal notes — the importance of which, for the convenience 
 of the student, is too often overlooked." — Solicitors' "Journal. 
 
 " The favourable opinion we expressed of the first edition of this work appears to have 
 been justified by the reception it has met with. Looking through this new Edition, we see 
 no reason to modify the praise we bestowed on the former Edition. The recent cases have 
 been added and the provisions of the Summary furisdiction Act are noticed in the chapter 
 relating to Summary Convictions. The book is one of the best manuals of Criminal Law 
 for the student." — Solicitors' Journal. 
 
 " There is no lack of Works on Ciiminal Law, but there was room for such a useful 
 handbook of 'Principles as Mr. Seymour Harris has supplied. Accustomed, by his previous 
 labours, to the task of analysing the law, Mr. Ha?'ris has brought to bear upon his present 
 work qualifications well adapted to secure the successful accomplishment of the object which 
 he had set before him. That object is not an ambitious one, jor it does not pretend to soai 
 above utility to the young practitioner and the student. For both these classes, and for the 
 yet wider class who may require a book of reference on the subject, Mr. Harris has produced 
 a clear and convenient Epitome of the Law." — Law Magazine and Review. 
 
 *' This work purports to contain ' a concise exposition of the nature of crime, the various offences punish- 
 able by the English law, the law of criminal procedure, and the law of summary convictions,' with tables 
 of offences, punishments, and statutes. The work is divided into four books. Book I. treats of crime, its 
 divisions and essentials ; of persons capable of committing crimes ; and of principals and accessories. 
 Book II. deals with offences of a public nature ; offences against private persons ; and offences against the 
 property of individuals. Each crime is discussed in its turn, with as much brevity as could well be used 
 consistently with a proper explanation of the legal characteristics of the several offences. Book III. 
 explains criminal procedure, including the jurisdiction of Courts, and the various steps in the apprehension 
 and trial of criminals from arrest to punishment. This part of the work is extremely well done, the 
 description of the trial being excellent, and thoroughly calculated to impress the mind of the uninitiated. 
 Book IV. contains a short sketch of ' summary^ convictions before magistrates out of quarter sessions.' The 
 table of offences at the end of the volume is most useful, and there is a very full index. Altogether we 
 must congratulate Mr. Harris on his adventure." — Law Journal. 
 
28 WORKS FOR LAW STUDENTS. 
 
 Second Edition, in crown 8vo, price $s. 6d., cloth, 
 
 THE STUDENTS' GUIDE TO BANKRUPTCY; 
 
 Being a Complete Digest of the Law of Bankruptcy in the shape of Questions and 
 Answers, and comprising all Questions asked at the Solicitors' Final Examinations 
 in Bankruptcy since the Bankruptcy Act, 1 883, and all important Decisions since 
 that Act. By John Indermaur, Solicitor, Author of " Principles of Common 
 Law,"&c. &c. 
 
 In !2mo, price $s. 6V., cloth, 
 
 A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF SALE, 
 
 FOR THE USE OF LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS, AND THE PUBLIC. 
 
 Embracing the Acts of 1878 and 1882. Part I.— Of Bills of Sale generally. Part II.— 
 Of the Execution, Attestation, and Registration of Bills of Sale and satisfaction 
 thereof. Part III.— Of the Effects of Bills of Sale as against Creditors. Part IV. 
 — Of Seizing under, and Enforcing Bills of Sale. Appendix, Forms, Acts, &c. 
 By John Indermaur, Solicitor. 
 
 " The object of the book is thoroughly practical. Those who want to be told exactly what to do and 
 where to go when they are registering a bill of sale will find the necessary information in this little book." 
 — Law Journal. 
 
 Second Edition, in 8vo, price 4s., cloth, 
 
 A COLLECTION OF LATIN MAXIMS & PHRASES. 
 
 LITERALLY TRANSLATED. 
 
 INTENDED FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS FOR ALL LEGAL EXAMINATIONS. 
 
 Second Edition, by J. N. COTTERELL, Solicitor. 
 
 " The book seems admirably adapted as a book of reference for students who come across a Latin maxim 
 in their reading." — Law Journal. 
 
 In one volume, 8vo, price <js., cloth, 
 
 LEADING STATUTES SUMMARISED, 
 
 FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS. 
 By ERNEST C. THOMAS, 
 
 BACON SCHOLAR OF THE HON. SOCIETY OF GRAY'S INN, LATE SCHOLAR OF TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD; 
 AUTHOR OF " LEADING CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW BRIEFLY STATED." 
 
 Second Edition, in 8vo, enlarged, price 6s., cloth, 
 
 LEADING CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
 Briefly Stated, with Introduction and Notes. 
 By ERNEST C. THOMAS, 
 
 BACON SCHOLAR OF THE HON. SOCIETY OF GRAY'S INN, LATE SCHOLAR OF TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD. 
 
 " Mr. E. C. Thomas has put together in a slim octavo a digest of the principal cases illustrating Con- 
 stitutional Law, that is to say, all questions as to the rights or authority of the Crown or persons under it, 
 as regards not merely the constitution and structure given to the governing body, but also the mode in 
 which the sovereign power is to be exercised. In an introductory essay Mr. Thomas gives a very clear and 
 intelligent survey of the genera 1 functions of the Executive, and the principles by which they are regulated ; 
 and then follows a summary of leading cases." — Saturday Review. 
 
 " Mr. Thomas gives a sensible introduction and a brief epitome of the familiar leading cases." — Law 
 Times. 
 
 In 8vo, price 8s. t cloth, 
 
 AN EPITOME OF HINDU LAW CASES. With 
 
 Short Notes thereon. And Introductory Chapters on Sources of Law, Marriage, 
 Adoption, Partition, and Succession. By William M. P. Coghlan, Bombay 
 Civil Service, late Judge and Sessions Judge of Tanna. 
 
STEVENS &> HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 29 
 
 Second Edition, in crown 8vo, price 12s. 6d., cloth, 
 
 THE BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883, 
 
 With Notes of all the Cases decided under the Act ; 
 The CONSOLIDATED RULES and FORMS, 1886 ; The Debtors Act, 1869, so 
 
 FAR AS APPLICABLE TO BANKRUPTCY MATTERS, WITH RULES AND FORMS 
 THEREUNDER ; THE BILLS OF SALE ACTS, 1878 AND l882 ; 
 
 Board of Trade Circulars and Forms, and List of Official Receivers ; Scale of Costs, 
 Fees, and Percentages, 1886 ; Orders of the Bankruptcy Judge of the High 
 Court ; and a Copious Index. 
 
 BY WILLIAM HAZLITT, ESQ., and RICHARD RINGWOOD, M.A., 
 
 SENIOR REGISTRAR IN BANKRUPTCY, OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, ESQ., BARRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 Second Edition, by R. RINGWOOD, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 "This is a very handy edition of the Act and Rules The cross references and marginal 
 
 referenqes to corresponding provisions of the Act of 1869 are exceedingly useful There is a very 
 
 full index, and the book is admirably printed." — Solicitors' Journal. 
 
 Part I., price *]$. 6d, y sewed, 
 
 LORD WESTBURY'S DECISIONS IN THE 
 
 EUROPEAN ARBITRATION. Reported by Francis S. Reilly, 
 of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 Parts I., II., and III., price 25*., sewed, 
 
 LORD CAIRNS'S DECISIONS IN THE ALBERT 
 
 ARBITRATION. Reported by Francis S. Reilly, of Lincoln's Inn, 
 Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 Second Edition, in royal 8vo, price 30J. , cloth, 
 A TREATISE ON 
 
 THE STATUTES OF ELIZABETH AGAINST 
 FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES. 
 
 The Bills of Sale Acts 1878 and 1882 and the LAW OF VOLUNTARY 
 DISPOSITIONS OF PROPERTY. 
 
 By the late H. W. MAY, B.A. (Ch. Ch. Oxford). 
 
 Second Edition, thoroughly revised and enlarged, by S. Worthington Worthington, 
 of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law ; Editor of the " Married Women's 
 Property Acts," 5th edition, by the late J. R. Griffith. 
 
 "Mr. Worthington's \vork appears to have been 
 
 conscientious and exhaustive." — Saturday Review. 
 
 Examining Mr. May's book, we find it con- 
 
 " In conclusion, we can heartily recommend this 
 book to dur readers, not only to those who are in 
 large practice, and who merely want a classified 
 list of cases, but to those who have both the desire 
 and the leisure to enter upon a systematic study of 
 our law."— Solicitors' Journal. 
 
 "As Mr Worthington points out, since Mr. May 
 wrote, the 'Bills of Sale Acts' of 1878 and 1882 
 have been passed ; the ' Married Women's Property 
 Act, 1882 '(making settlements by married women 
 void as against creditors in cases in which similar 
 settlements by a man would be void), and the 
 ' Bankruptcy Act, 1883.' These Acts and the deci- 
 sions upon them have been handled by Mr. Worth- 
 ington in a manner which shows that he is master 
 of his subject, and not a slavish copyist of sections 
 and head-notes, which is a vicious " propensity of 
 many modern compilers of text-books. His Table 
 of Cases (with reference to all the. reports), is 
 admirable, and his Index most exhaustive. — Law 
 
 Times. , . ■ 
 
 "The results of the authorities appear to be 
 eiven well and tersely, and the treatise will, we 
 Sunk, be found a convenient and trustworthy book 
 of reference."— Law Journal. 
 
 structed with an intelligence and precision which 
 render it entirely worthy of being accepted as a 
 guide in this confessedly difficult subject. The 
 subject is an involved one, but with clean and clear 
 handling it is here presented as clearly as it could 
 be. . . . On the whole, he has produced a very 
 useful book of an exceptionally scientific character." 
 — Solicitors 1 Journal. 
 
 " The subject and the work are both very good. 
 The former is well chosen, new, and interesting ; 
 the latter has the quality which always distin- 
 guishes original research from borrowed labours." 
 — American Law Review. 
 
 "We are happy to welcome his(Mr. May's)work 
 as an addition to the, we regret to say, brief cata- 
 logue of law books conscientiously executed. We 
 can corroborate his own. description of his labours, 
 ' that no pains have been spared to make the book 
 as concise and practical as possible, without doing 
 so at the expense of perspicuity, or by the omission 
 of any important points."' — Law Times. 
 
30 
 
 STEVENS &• HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 In one volume, medium 8vo, price 38^., cloth ; or in half-roxburgh, 42s., 
 
 A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE 
 
 AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO. 
 
 With a Hitherto Unpublished Treatise by Lord Hale, Lord Hale's 
 " De Jure Maris," and the Third Edition of Hall's Essay on the 
 
 RIGHTS OF THE CROWN IN THE SEA-SHORE. 
 
 With Notes, and an Appendix relating to Fisheries. 
 
 By STUART A. MOORE, F.S.A., 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER- AT-LAW. 
 
 "This work is nominally a third edition of the 
 late Mr. Hall's essay on the rights of the Crown in 
 the Sea-shore, but in reality is an absolutely new 
 production, for out of some 900 odd pages Hall's 
 essay takes up but 227. Mr. Moore has written a 
 book of great importance, which should mark an 
 epoch in the history of the rights of the Crown and 
 the subject in the Utus maris, or foreshore of the 
 kingdom. Hall's treatise (with Loveland's notes) is 
 set out with fresh notes by the present editor, who 
 is anything but kindly disposed towards his author, 
 for his notes are nothing but a series of exposures 
 of what he deems to be Hall's errors and misrepre- 
 sentations. Mr. Moore admits his book to be a 
 brief for the opposite side of the contention sup- 
 ported by Hall, and a more vigorous and argu- 
 mentative treatise we have scarcely ever seen. Its 
 arguments are clearly and broadly disclosed, and 
 supported by a wealth of facts and cases which 
 show the research of the learned author to have 
 been most full and elaborate. . . . There is no 
 doubt that this is an important work, which must 
 have a considerable influence on that branch of the 
 law with which it deals. That law is contained in 
 ancient and most inaccessible records ; these have 
 now been brought to light, and it may well be 
 that important results to the subject may flow 
 therefrom. The Profession, not to say the general 
 public, owe the learned author a deep debt of 
 gratitude for providing ready to hand such a 
 
 wealth of materials for founding and building up 
 arguments. Mr. Stuart Moore has written a work 
 which must, unless his contentions are utterly un- 
 founded, at once become the standard text-book on 
 the law of the Sea-shore." — Law Times, Dec. 1st. 
 
 " Mr. Stuart Moore in his valuable work on the 
 Foreshore." — The Times. 
 
 " Mr. Stuart Moore's work on the title of the 
 Crown to the land around the coast of England 
 lying between the high and low water mark is 
 something more than an ordinary law book. It is 
 a history, and a very interesting one, of such land 
 and the rights exercised over it from the earliest 
 times to the present day ; and a careful study of 
 the facts contained in the book and of the argu- 
 ments brought forward can scarcely fail to convince 
 the reader of the inaccuracy of the theory, now so 
 constantly put forward by the Crown, that without 
 the existence of special evidence to the contrary, 
 the land which adjoins riparian property, and 
 which is covered at high tide, belongs to the 
 Crown and not to the owner of the adjoining 
 manor. The list which Mr. Moore gives of places 
 where the question of foreshore has been already 
 raised, and of those as to which evidence on the 
 subject exists amongst the public records, is valu- 
 able, though by no means exhaustive ; and the 
 book should certainly find a place in the library of 
 the lord of every riparian manor." — Morning Post. 
 
 In one volume, 8vo, price izr., cloth, 
 A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO THE 
 
 POLLUTION AND OBSTRUCTION OF WATER COURSES 
 
 Together with a Brief Summary of the Various Sources of Rivers 
 
 Pollution. 
 
 By CLEMENT HIGGINS, M.A., F.C.S., 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE, 11ARRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 11 As a compendium of the law upon a special 
 and rather intricate subject, this treatise cannot 
 but prove of great practical value, and more 
 especially to those who have to advise upon the 
 institution of proceedings under the Rivers Pollu- 
 tion Prevention Act, 1876, or to adjudicate upon 
 those proceedings when brought." — Irish Law 
 Tunes. 
 
 "We can recommend Mr. Higgins' Manual as 
 the best guide we possess." — Public Health. 
 
 " County; Court Judges, Sanitary Authorities, 
 and Riparian Owners will find in Mr. Higgins 1 
 Treatise a valuable aid in obtaining a clear notion 
 of the Law on the Subject. Mr. Higgins has 
 accomplished a work for which he will readily be 
 recognised as having special fitness on account of 
 
 his practical acquaintance both with the scientific 
 and the legal aspects of his subject." — Law Maga- 
 zine and Review. 
 
 ' ( The volume is very carefully arranged through- 
 out, and will prove of great utility both to miners 
 and to owners of land on the banks of rivers.' — 
 The Mining Journal. 
 t " Mr. Higgins writes tersely and dearly, while 
 his facts are so well arranged that it is a pleasure 
 to refer to his book for information ; and altogether 
 the work is one which will be found very useful by 
 
 all interested in the subject to which it relates." 
 
 JSngineer. 
 
 "A compact and convenient manual of the law 
 on ' the subject to which it relates." — Solicitors' 
 Journal. 
 
STEVENS &> HA YATES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 31 
 
 In 8vo, Fifth Edition, price 2&., cloth. 
 
 MAYNE'S TREATISE 
 
 ON 
 
 THE LAW OF DAMAGES. 
 
 FIFTH EDITION. 
 REVISED AND PARTLY REWRITTEN. 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN D. MAYNE, 
 
 Of THE INNER TEMPLE, BARKISTER-AT-LAW ; 
 
 AND 
 
 His Honor Judge LUMLEY SMITH, Q.C. 
 
 " ' Mayne on Damages ' has now become almost a classic, and it is one of the books which 
 we cannot afford to have up to date. We are therefore pleased to have a new Edition, and 
 one so well written as that before us. With the authors we regret the increasing size of the 
 volume, but bulk in such a case is better than incompleteness. Every lawyer in practice 
 should have this book, full as it is of practical learning on all branches of the Common Law. 
 The work is unique, and this Edition, like its predecessors, is indispensable." — Law Journal, 
 April, 1894. 
 
 " Few books have been better kept up to the current law than this treatise. The earlier part , 
 of the book was remodelled in the last edition, and in the present edition the chapter on 
 Penalties and Liquidated Damages has been rewritten, no doubt in consequence of, or with 
 regard to, the elaborate and exhaustive judgment of the late Master of the Rolls in Wallis v. 
 Smith (3 1 W. R. 214 ; L. R. 21 Ch. D. 243). The treatment of the subject by the authors is 
 admirably clear and concise. Upon the point involved in Wallis v. Smith they say : ' The 
 result is that an agreement with various covenants of different importance is not to be governed 
 by any inflexible rule peculiar to itself, but is to be dealt with as coming under the general rule, 
 that the intention of the parties themselves is to be considered. If they have said that in the 
 case of any breach a fixed sum is to be paid, then they will be kept to their agreement, unless 
 it would lead to such an absurdity or injustice that it must be assumed that they did not mean 
 what they said.' This is a very fair summary of the judgments in Wallis v. Smith, especially 
 of that of Lord Justice Cotton ; and it supplies the nearest approach which can be given at 
 present to a rule for practical guidance. We can heartily commend this as a carefully edited 
 edition of a thoroughly good book." — Solicitors' Journal. 
 
 " Duringthe twenty-two years which have elapsed since the publication of this well-known 
 work, its reputation has been steouiily growing, and it has long since become the recognised 
 authority on the important subject of which it treats." — Law Magazine and Review. 
 
 "This edition of what has become a standard 
 work has the advantage of appearing under the 
 supervision of the original author as well as of 
 Mr. Lumley Smith, the editor of the second edition. 
 The result is most satisfactory. ^ Mr. Lumley 
 Smith's edition was ably and conscientiously pre- 
 pared, and we are glad to find that the reader still 
 enjoys the benefit of his accuracy and learning. 
 At the same time the book has doubtless been 
 improved by the reappearance of its author as co- 
 editor. The earlier part, indeed, has been to a 
 considerable extent entirely rewritten. 
 
 " Mr. Mayne's remarks on damages in actions of 
 tort arc brief. We agree with him that in such 
 actions the courts are governed by far looser prin- 
 ciples than in contracts ; indeed, sometimes it is 
 impossible to say they are governed by any prin- 
 ciples at all. In actions for injuries to the person or 
 reputation, for example, a judge cannot do more 
 than give a general direction to the jury to give 
 
 what the facts proved in their judgment required. 
 And, according to the better opinion, they may give 
 damages 'for example's sake,' and mulct a rich 
 man more heavily than a poor one. In actions for 
 injuries to property, however, ' vindictive ' or 
 'exemplary' damages cannot, except in very rare 
 cases, be awarded, but must be limited, as in con- 
 tract, to the actual harm sustained. 
 
 " It to needless to comment upon the arrangement 
 of the subjects in this edition, in which no alteration 
 has been made. The editors modestly express a 
 hope that all the English as well as the principal 
 Irish decisions up to the date have been included, 
 and we believe from our own examination that the 
 hope is well founded. We may regret that, warned 
 by the growing bulk of the book, the editors have 
 not included any fresh American cases, but we feel 
 that the omission was unavoidable. We should add 
 that the whole work has been thoroughly revised," — 
 Solicitors* Journal. 
 
 , " This text-book is so well knozun, not only as the highest authority on the subject treated 
 of but as one of the best text-books ever written, that it would be idle for us to speak of it 
 in the words of commendation that it deserves. It is work that no practising ' la wyer can 
 do without. "—Canada Law Journal. 
 
32 STEVENS &> HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 In crown 8vo, price 4s. 6ti., cloth, 
 
 ABSTRACT DRAWING. Containing Instructions on 
 
 the Drawing of Abstracts of Title, and an Illustrative Appendix. By C. E. Scott, 
 Solicitor. 
 
 "This little book is intended for the assistance of those who have the framing of abstracts of title 
 entrusted to their care. It contains a number of useful rules, and an illustrative-appendix."— Law Times. 
 
 " A handy book for all articled clerks." — Law Students' Journal. 
 
 " Solicitors who have articled clerks would save themselves much trouble if they furnished their clerks 
 with a copy of this little book before putting them on to draft an abstract of a heap of title deeds."— Law 
 Notes. 
 
 " The book ought to be perused by all law students and articled clerks." — Red Tape. 
 
 Second Edition, in crown 8vo, price Js., cloth, 
 
 THE LAW RELATING TO CLUBS. 
 
 Bv the late JOHN WERTHEIMER, Barrister-at-Law. 
 Second Edition, by A. W. CHASTER, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 " This is a very neat little book on an interesting 
 subject. The law is accurately and well expressed." 
 — Law Journal. 
 
 " This is a very handy and complete little work. 
 This excellent little treatise should lie on the table 
 of every club." — Pump Court. 
 
 "A convenient handbook, drawn up with great 
 judgment and perspicuity."— Morning Post. 
 
 " Both useful and interesting to those interested 
 in club management." — Law Times, 
 
 " Mr. Wertheimer's history of the cases is com- 
 plete and well arranged." — Saturday Review. 
 
 In 8vo, price 2s. t sewed, 
 
 TABLE of the FOREIGN MERCANTILE LAWS and CODES 
 
 in Force in the Principal States of EUROPE and AMERICA. By Charles 
 Lyon-Caen, Professeur agrege a la Faculte de Droit de Paris ; Professeur a 
 l'Ecole litre des Sciences politiques. Translated by Napoleon Argles, 
 Solicitor, Paris. 
 
 In 8vo, price is., sewed, 
 
 A GUIDE TO THE FRENCH LAWS OF 1889, ON NATION- 
 ALITY and MILITARY SERVICE, as affecting British Subjects. By A. 
 Pavitt, Solicitor, Paris. 
 
 In one volume, demy 8vo, price los. 6d., cloth, 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU, 
 
 RETENTION, and DELIVERY. By John Houston, of the Middle Temple, 
 Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 In 8vo, price los. , cloth, 
 
 THE TRIAL OF ADELAIDE BARTLETT FOR 
 
 MURDER ; Complete and Revised Report. Edited by Edward Beal, B.A., 
 of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. With a Preface by Edward Clarke, 
 Q.C., M.P. 
 
 In 8vo, price iar. 6d. , cloth, 
 A REPORT OF THE CASE OF 
 
 THE QUEEN v. GURNEY AND OTHERS, 
 
 In the Court of Queen's Bench before the Lord Chief Justice Cockburn. With Intro- 
 duction, containing History of the Case, and Examination of the Cases at Law 
 and Equity applicable to it. By W. F. Finlason, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 In royal 8vo, price ioj. 6d., cloth, 
 
 THE PRACTICE OF EQUITY BY WAY OF REYIYOR AND SUPPLEMENT. 
 
 With Forms of Orders and Appendix of Bills. By Loftus Leigh Pemberton, 
 of the Chancery Registrar's Office. 
 
STEVENS &> SAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 88 
 
 In 8vo, price 12s. 6d., cloth, 
 
 THE ANNUAL DIGEST OF MERCANTILE 
 CASES FOR THE YEARS 1885 AND 1886. 
 
 Being a Digest of the Decisions of the English, Scotch and Irish Courts 
 on Matters relating to Commerce. 
 
 By JAMES A. DUNCAN, M.A., LL.B., Trin. Coll., Camb., 
 
 AND OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 In 8vo, 1878, price 6s., cloth, 
 THE 
 
 LAW RELATING TO CHARITIES, 
 
 especially with reference to the validity and construction of 
 
 CHARITABLE BEQUESTS AND CONVEYANCES. 
 
 By FERDINAND M. WHITEFORD, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 Vols. I., II., III., IV., and V., Part I., price 5/. 7s. 
 REPORTS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE 
 
 JUDGES FOR THE TRIAL OF ELECTION PETITIONS 
 
 IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND. 
 
 PURSUANT TO THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS ACT, 1868. 
 By EDWARD LOUGHLIN O'MALLEY and HENRY HARDCASTLE. 
 
 * # * Vol. IV. Part III. and all after are Edited by ]. S. Sandars and A. P. P. Keep, 
 
 Barrisiers-at- Laiu. 
 
 In 8vo, price \2s. , cloth, 
 
 THE LAW OF FIXTURES, in the principal relation of 
 
 Landlord and Tenant, and in all other or general relations. Fourth Edition. 
 By Archibald Brown, M.A. Edin. and Oxon., and B. C.L. Oxon., of the 
 Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 In one volume, 8vo, price 28^., cloth, 
 
 THE LAW RELATING TO PUBLIC WORSHIP ; 
 
 With special reference to Matters of Ritual and Ornamentation, and the Means of 
 Securing the Due Observance thereof, and containing in extenso, with Notes and 
 References, The Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874 ; The Church Discipline 
 Act; the various Acts of Uniformity; the Liturgies of 1549, 1552, and 1539, 
 compared with the Present Rubric ; the Canons ; the Articles ; and the Injunc- 
 tions, Advertisements, and other Original Documents of Legal Authority. By 
 Seward Brice, LL.D., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
34 STEVENS &> HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 (Stclitns ani) ^pagtus' cSerica of gJrprinta of tht ffiarlj) gJUyorttt'a. 
 SIR BARTHOLOMEW SHOWER'S PARLIAMENTARY CASES. 
 
 In 8vo, 1876, price 4/. 4s., best calf binding, 
 
 SHOWER'S CASES IN PARLIAMENT 
 
 RESOLVED AND ADJUDGED UPON PETITIONS 0> WRITS OF ERROR. 
 
 FOURTH EDITION. 
 
 CONTAINING ADDITIONAL CASES NOT HITHERTO REPORTED. 
 
 REVISED AND EDITED EY 
 
 RICHARD LOVELAND LOVELAND, 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW J EDITOR OF " KELYNG'S CROWN CASES,'' AND 
 "HALL'S ESSAY ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CROWN IN THE SEASHORE." 
 
 " Messrs. Stevens & Haynes, the successful publishers of the Reprints of Bellewe, 
 Cooke, Cunningham, Brookes's New Cases, Choyce Cases in Chancery, William Kelynge 
 and Kelyng's Crown Cases, determined to issue a new or fourth Edition of Shower's Cases 
 in Parliament. 
 
 " The volume, although beautifully printed on old-fashioned Paper, in old-fashioned 
 type, instead of being in the quarto is in the more convenient octavo form, and contains 
 several additional cases not to be found in any of the previous editions of the work. 
 
 " These are all cases of importance, worthy of being ushered into the light of the 
 world by enterprising publishers. 
 
 "Shower's Cases are models for reporters, even in our day. The statements of the 
 case, the argumentsof counsel, andthe opinions of the Judges, are all clearly and ably given. . 
 
 " This new edition with an old face of these valuable reports, under the able editorship 
 of R. L. Loveland, Esq., should, in the language of the advertisement, 'be welcomed by 
 the profession, as well as enable the custodians of public libraries to complete or add to 
 their series of English Law Reports.'" — Canada Law Journal. 
 
 BELLEWE'S CASES, T. RICHARD II. 
 
 In 8vo, 1869, price 3/. 3s., bound in calf antique, 
 
 LES ANS DU ROY RICHARD LE SECOND. 
 
 Collect' ensembl' hors les abridgments de Statham, Fitzherbert et Brooke. Per 
 Richard Bellewe, de Lincolns Inne. 1585. Reprinted from the Original 
 
 Edition. 
 
 " No public library in the world, where English 
 law finds a place, should be without a copy of this 
 edition of Bellewe." — Canada Law Journal, 
 
 " We have here z. facsimile edition of Bellewe, 
 and it is really the most beautiful and admirable 
 reprint that has appeared at any time. It is a 
 perfect gem of antique printing, and forms a most 
 interesting monument of our early legal history. 
 It belongs to the same class of works as the Year 
 Book of Edward I. and other similar works which 
 have been printed in our own time under the 
 auspices of the Master of the Rolls ; but is far 
 superior to any of them, and is in this respect 
 
 highly creditable to the spirit and enterprise of 
 private publishers. The work is an important link 
 in our legal history ; there are no year books of the 
 reign of Richard II., and Bellewe supplied theonly 
 substitute by carefully extracting and collecting all 
 the cases he could find, and he did it in the most 
 convenient form— that of alphabetical arrangement 
 in the order of subjects, so that the work is a digest 
 as well as a book of law reports. It is in fact a 
 collection of cases of the reign of Richard II., 
 arranged according to their subjects in alphabetical 
 order. It is therefore one of the most intelligible 
 and interesting legal memorials of the Middle 
 Ages." — Laiv Times. 
 
 CUNNINGHAM'S REPORTS. 
 
 In 8vo, 1 87 1, price 3/. 3^., calf antique, 
 Cunningham's (T.) Reports in K. B., 7 to 10 Geo. II.; to which is prefixed a Proposal 
 for rendering the Laws of England clear and certain, humbly offered to the 
 Consideration of both Houses of Parliament. Third edition, with numerous 
 Corrections. By Thomas Townsend Bucknill, Barrister -at- Law. 
 " The instructive chapter which precedes the 
 cases, entitled ' A proposal for rendering the Laws 
 of England clear and certain,' gives the volume a 
 
 degree of peculiar interest, independent of the value 
 of many of the reported cases. That chapter begins 
 with words which ought, for the information of 
 every people, to be printed in letters of gold. They 
 are as follows : ' Nothing conduces more to the 
 
 peace and prosperity of every nation than good 
 laws and the due execution of them.' The history 
 of the civil law is then rapidly traced', Next a 
 history is given of English Reporters, beginning 
 with the reporters of the Year Books from 1 Edw. 
 III. to 12 Hen. VIII. — being near 200 years — and 
 afterwards to the time of the author." — Canada 
 'Law Journal. 
 
STEVENS &* HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 35 
 
 cStcbcns snu gjajmcs' Jstvirs of gicpvints of the (S.uljj gkjxrrtcrs. 
 CHOYCE CASES IN CHANCERY. 
 
 In Svo, 1870, price 2/. 2.r., calf antique, 
 
 THE PEAOTIOE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY. 
 
 With the Nature of the several Offices belonging to that Court. And the Reports of 
 many Cases wherein Relief hath been there had, and where denyed. 
 
 "This volume, in paper, type, and binding (like 'Bellewe's Cases') is a fac-simi!e of the antique edition. 
 All who buy the one should buy the other."— Canada Law Journal. 
 
 In 8vo, 1872, price 3/. 3*., calf antique, 
 
 SIR G. COOKE'S COMMON PLEAS REPORTS 
 
 IN THE REIGNS OF QUEEN ANNE, AND KINGS GEORGE I. and II. 
 
 The Third Edition, with Additional Cases and References contained in the Notes 
 taken from L. C. J. Eyre's MSS. by Mr. Justice Nares, edited by Thomas 
 Townsend Bucknill, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 " Law books never can die or remain long dead 
 so long as Stevens and Haynes are willing to con- 
 tinue them or revive them when dead. It is cer- 
 tainly surprising to see with what facial accuracy 
 
 an old volume of Reports maybe produced by these 
 modern publishers, whose good taste isonlyequalled 
 by their enterprise." — Canada Law Journal. 
 
 BROOKE'S NEW CASES WITH MARCH'S TRANSLATION. 
 
 In Svo, 1873, price 4/. 4s., calf antique, 
 Brooke's (Sir Robert) New Cases in the time of Henry VIII., Edward VI., and 
 Queen Mary, collected out of Brooke's Abridgement, and arranged under years, 
 with a table, together with March's (John) Translation of Brooke's New Cases 
 in the time of Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Queen Mary, collected out of 
 Brooke's Abridgement, and reduced alphabetically under their proper heads and 
 titles, with a table of the principal matters. In one handsome volume. 8vo. 1873- 
 
 "Both the original and the translation having 
 long been very scarce, and the mispaging and other 
 errors in March's translation making a new and 
 corrected edition peculiarly desirable, Messrs. 
 
 Stevens and Haynes have reprinted the two books 
 in one volume uniform with the preceding volumes 
 of the series of Early Reports." — Canada Law 
 Journal. 
 
 KELYNGE'S (W.) REPORTS. 
 
 In 8vo, 1873, price 4/. 4s., calf antique, 
 Kelynge's (William) Reports of Cases in Chancery, the King's Bench, &c, from the 
 3rd to the 9th year of his late Majesty King George II., during which time Lord 
 King was Chancellor, and the Lords Raymond and Hardwicke were Chief 
 Justices of England. To which are added, seventy New Cases not in the First 
 Edition. Third Edition. In one handsome volume. 8vo. 1873. 
 
 KELYNG'S (SIR JOHN) CROWN CASES. 
 
 In 8vo, 1873, price 4/. 4^., calf antique, 
 KelyNG's (Sir J.) Reports of Divers Cases in Pleas of the Crown in the Reign of King 
 Charles II., with Directions to Justices of the Peace, and others; to which are 
 added, Three Modern Cases, viz., Armstrong and Lisle, the King and Plummer, 
 the Queen and Mawgridge. Third Edition, containing several additional Cases 
 never before printed, together with a Treatise upon the Law and Proceed- 
 ings in Cases of High Treason, first published in 1793. The whole carefully 
 revised and edited by Richard Loveland Loveland, of the Inner Temple, 
 Barrister-at-Law. 
 "We look upon this volume as one of the most goodservicerenderedby Messrs. StevensandHaynes 
 imtjortant and valuable of the unique reprints of to the profession. . . . Should occasion arise, the 
 «):.„ StevensandHaynes. Little do we know Crown prosecutor, as well as counsel for the prisoner, 
 nftKt! mines of legal wealth that lie buried in the will find in this volume a complete voile mecnm of 
 old law books But a careful examination, either of the law of high treason and proceedings in relation 
 the reports or of the treatise embodied in the volume thereto."— Canada Lam Journal. 
 now before us, will give the reader some idea of the 
 
36 STEVENS &• HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 Second Edition, in 8vo, price 26.r., cloth, 
 A CONCISE TREATISE ON 
 
 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL' JURISPRUDENCE, 
 
 BASED ON THE DECISIONS IN THE ENGLISH COURTS. 
 By JOHN ALDERSON FOOTE, 
 
 of Lincoln's inn, barrister- at-law ; chancellor's legal medallist and senior vvhewell scholar 
 
 of international law, cambridge university, 1873 j senior student in jurisprudence 
 
 and roman law, inns of court examination, hilary term, 1874. 
 
 41 This work seems to us likely to prove of considerable use to all English lawyers who have to deal with 
 questions of private international law. Since the publication of Mr. Westlake's valuable treatise, twenty 
 years ago, the judicial decisions of English courts bearing upon different parts of this subject have greatly 
 increased in number, and it is full time that these decisions should be examined, and that the conclusions 
 to be deduced from them should be systematically set forth in a treatise. Moreover, Mr. Foote has done 
 this well." — Solicitors' Journal. 
 
 " Mr. Foote has done his work very well, and the book will be useful to all who have to deal with the 
 class of cases in which English law alone is not sufficient to settle the question." — Saturday Review > t 
 March 8, 1879. 
 
 " The author's object has been to reduce into order the mass of materials already accumulated in the 
 shape of explanation and actual decision on the interesting matter of which he treats ; and to construct a 
 framework of private international law, not from the dicta of jurists so much as from judicial decisions in 
 English Courts which have superseded them. And it is here, in compiling and arranging in a concise 
 form this valuable material, that Mr. Foote 's wide range of knowledge and legal acumen bear such good 
 fruit. As a guide and assistant to the student of international law, the whole treatise will be invaluable : 
 while a table of cases and a general index will enable him to find what he wants without trouble." — 
 Standard. 
 
 1 ' The recent decisions on points of international law (and there have been a large number since Westlake's 
 publication) have been well stated. So far as we have observed, no case of any importance has been 
 omitted, and the leading cases have been fully analysed. The author does not hesitate to criticise the 
 grounds of a decision when these appear to him to conflict with the proper rule of law. Most of his 
 
 criticisms seem to us very just On the whole, we can recommend Mr. Foote's treatise as a useful 
 
 addition to our text-books, and we expect it will rapidly find its way into the hands of practising lawyers." 
 — The Journal of Jurisprudence and Scottish Law Magazine. 
 
 " Mr. Foote has evidently borne closely in mind the needs of Students of Jurisprudence as well as those 
 of the Practitioners. For both, the fact that his work is almost entirely one of Case-law will commend 
 it as one useful alike in Chambers and in Court." — Law Magazine and Review. 
 
 "Mr. Foote's book will be useful to the student One of the best points of Mr. Foote's book 
 
 is the * Continuous Summary,' which occupies about thirty pages, and is divided into four parts — Persons* 
 Property, Acts, and Procedure. Mr. Foote remarks that these summaries are not in any way intended as 
 an attempt at codification. However that may be, they are a digest which reflects high credit on the 
 author's assiduity and capacity. They are ' meant merely to guide the student ; ' but they will do much 
 more than guide him. They will enable him to get such a grasp of the subject as will render the reading 
 of the text easy and fruitful." — Law Journal. 
 
 "This book is well adapted to be used both as a text-book for students and a book of reference for 
 practising barristers." — Bar Examination Journal. 
 
 "This is a book which supplies the want which has long been felt for a really good modern treatise on 
 Private International Law adapted to the every-day requirements of the English Practitioner. The 
 whole volume, although designed for the use of the practitioner, is so moderate in size — an octavo of 500 
 pages only — and the arrangement and development of the subject so well conceived and executed, that it 
 will amply repay perusal by those whose immediate object may be not the actual decisions of a knotty 
 point but the satisfactory disposal of an examination paper." — Oxford and Cambridge Undergraduates 1 
 Journal. 
 
 "Since the publication, some twenty years ago, of Mr. Westlake's Treatise, Mr. Foote's book is, in 
 our opinion, the best work on private international law which has appeared in the English language. . .' . i 
 The work is executed with much ability, and will doubtless be found of great value by all persons who 
 have to consider questions on private international law." — Athenteum, 
 
STEVENS &> HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 37 
 
 THE 
 
 3Uto JMagajtne anti 3&ebteto, 
 
 AND 
 
 QUARTERLY DIGEST OF ALL REPORTED CASES. 
 
 Price FIVE SHILLINGS each Number. 
 
 No. CCXV1II. (Vol. I, No. I. of the New Quarterly Series.) November, 1875. 
 
 No. CCXIX. (Vol. I, 4th Series No. II.) February, 1876. 
 
 N.B. — These tzuo Numbers are out of print. 
 
 No. CCXX. (Vol. 1, 4 th Series No. III.) For May, 1876, 
 
 No. CCXXI. (Vol. 1, 4th Series No. IV.) For August, 1876. 
 
 Nos. CCXXII. to CCXLIX. (Vol. 2, 4th Series, to Vol. 8, 4th Series, Nos. V. to XXXII.) 
 November, 1876, to August, 1883. 
 
 Nos. CCL. to CCLIII. (Vol. 9, 4th Series, Nos. XXXIII. to XXXVI.), 
 November, 1883, to August, 1884. 
 
 Nos. CCLIV. to CCLVII. (Vol. 9, 4th Series, Nos. XXXVII. to XL.), 
 November, 1884, to August, 1885. 
 
 Nos. CCLVIII. to CCLXI. (Vol. X., 4th Series, Nos. XLI. to XLIV), 
 November, 1885, to August, 1886. 
 
 Nos. CCLXII. to CCLXV. (Vol. XL, 4 th Series, Nos. XLV. to XLVIIL), 
 November, 1886, to August, 1887. 
 
 Nos. CCLXVI. to CCLXIX. (Vol. XII., 4th Series, Nos. XLIX. to LIL), 
 November, 1887, to August, 1888. 
 
 Nos. CCLXX. to CCLXXIII. (Vol. XIII. , 4th Series, Nos. LIII. to LVI.), 
 November, 1888, to August, 1889. 
 
 Nos. CCLXXIV. to CCLXXVII. (Vol. XIV, 4th Series, Nos. LVII. toLX.), 
 November, 1889, to' August, 1890. 
 
 Nos. CCLXXVIII. to CCLXXXI. (Vol. XV., 4th Series, Nos. LXI. to LXIV.), 
 November, 1890, to August, 1891. 
 
 Nos. CCLXXXII. to CCLXXXV. (Vol. XVI., 4th Series, Nos. LXV. to LXVIII.), 
 November, 1891, to August, 1892. 
 
 Nos. CCLXXXVI. to CCLXXXIX. (Vol. XVII., 4th Series, Nos. LXIX. to LXXIL), 
 November, 1892, to August, 1 893. 
 
 Nos. CCXC. to CCXCIII. (Vol. XVIII., 4th Series, Nos, LXXIII. to LXXVI.), 
 November, 1893, to August, 1894. 
 
 Nos. CCXCIV. to CCXCVII. (Vol. XIX., 4th Series, Nos. LXXVII. to LXXX.), 
 November, 1894, to August, 1895. 
 
 Nos. CCXCVIII. to CCCV. (Vols. XX. & XXL, 4th Series, Nos. LXXXI. toLXXXVIII. ), 
 November, 1895, to August, 1897. 
 
 An Annual Subscription of 20s., paid in advance to the Publishers, will 
 secure the receipt of the LAW MAGAZINE, free by post, within the 
 United Kingdom, or for 24s. to the Colonies and Abroad. 
 
38 STEVENS &■ HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 Fifth Edition, revised and enlarged, 8vo, price 32.?. net. 
 
 A TREATISE ON HINDU LAW AND USAGE. 
 
 By John D. Mayne, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law, Author of " A Treatise on 
 
 Damages," &c. 
 
 " A new work from the pen of so established an authority as Mr. Mayne cannot fail to be welcome to 
 the legal profession. In his present volume the late Officiating Advocate-General at Madras has drawn 
 upon the stores of his long experience in Southern India, and has produced a work of value alike to the 
 practitioner at the Indian Bar, or at home, in appeal cases, and to the scientific jurist. 
 
 "To all who, whether as practitioners or administrators, or as students of the science of jurisprudence, 
 desire a thoughtful and suggestive work of reference on Hindu Law and Usage, we heartily recommend 
 the careful perusal of Mr. Mayne's valuable treatise." — Law Magazine and JRevietu. 
 
 In 8vo, 1877, price l$s., cloth, 
 
 A DIGEST OF HINDU LAW, 
 
 AS ADMINISTERED IN THE COURTS of the MADRAS PRESIDENCY. 
 
 ARRANGED AND ANNOTATED 
 
 By H. S. CUNNINGHAM, M.A., Advocate-General, Madras. 
 
 DUTCH^ LAW. 
 
 In 1 Vol., 8vo, price \os., cloth, 
 
 THE OPINIONS OF GROTIUS, As contained ill the Hollandsche 
 Consultatien en Advijsen. Collated, translated, and annotated by D. P. de 
 Bruyn, B.A., LL.B., Ebden Essayist of the University of the Cape of Good 
 Hope ; Advocate of the Supreme Court of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, 
 and of the High Court of the South African Republic. With Facsimile Portrait 
 of Mr. Hugo de Gkoot. 
 
 In 2 Vols., Royal 8vo, price 90s. , cloth, 
 
 VAN LEEUWEN'S COMMENTARIES ON THE ROMAN-DUTCH 
 
 LAW. Revised and Edited with Notes in Two Volumes by C. W. Decker, 
 Advocate. Translated from the original Dutch by J. G. Kotze, LL.B., of the 
 Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law, and Chief Justice of the Transvaal. With Fac- 
 simile Portrait in the Edition by Decker of 1780. 
 
 *** Vol. II. can be had separately, price 50/. 
 In 8vo, price i$s. 6J., net. 
 
 VOET'S TITLES ON VINDICATIONES AND INTERDICTA, 
 
 Or the Roman Dutch Law of Actions to Assert Rights of Property, including Injunc- 
 tions and Possessory Actions, translated into English with side-notes ; viz. , Book VI. 
 Titles I. to III., Book VII. Title VI., Book VIII. Title V., Book XX. Title IV., 
 and Book XLIII. Titles I., XVI. to XXXIII., of Voet's Commentary on the 
 Pandects, with a Scientific and General Introduction, Notes Explanatory of the 
 Roman Civil and Roman Dutch, and English Law, Notes of Ceylon Enactments 
 and Practice, and Decisions of the Supreme Court, Ceylon, etc. By John J. 
 Casie Chitty, Barrister-at-Law, Advocate, High Court, Madras, and Supreme 
 Court, Ceylon. 
 
 In 8vo, price 42s., cloth, 
 
 THE JUDICIAL PRACTICE OF THE COLONY OF THE CAPE 
 
 OF GOOD HOPE AND OF SOUTH AFRICA GENERALLY. With suitable 
 
 and copious Practical Forms, subjoined to, and illustrating the Practice of the 
 several Subjects treated of. By C. H. Van Zyl, . Attorney-at-Law, Notary 
 Public, and Conveyancer, etc. etc. 
 
 In Crown 8vo, price 31s. 6d., boards, 
 
 THE INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH JURISPRUDENCE OF 
 
 HUGO GEOTIUS, with Notes by Simon van Groenwegen van der Made, and 
 References to Van der Keesel's Theses and Schorer's Notes. Translated by 
 A. F. S. Maasdorp, B.A., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 
 In i2mo, price 15J. net, boards, 
 
 SELECT THESES ON THE LAWS OF HOLLAND & ZEELAND. 
 
 Being a Commentary of Hugo Grotius' Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence, and 
 intended to supply certain defects therein, and to determine some of the more 
 celebrated Controversies on the Law of Holland. By D. G. van der Kessel, 
 Advocate. Translated by C- A. Lorenz, -Barrister-at-Law, . Second Edition. 
 With a Biographical Notice of the Author by Professor J. De Wal, of Leyden. 
 
STEVENS 6- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 39 
 
 THE 
 
 35ar examination ftnnual 
 
 FOR 18 94. 
 
 (In Continuation of the Bar Examination Journal.) 
 
 Pi-ice 3i. 
 
 EXAMINATION PAPERS, 1893 
 
 for Pass, Honors, and Barstow Scholarship, 
 RESULT OF EXAMINATIONS. 
 NAMES OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES. 
 EXAMINATION REGULATIONS FOR 1894. 
 A GUIDE TO THE BAR. 
 
 LEADING DECISIONS AND STATUTES OF 1894. 
 NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. 
 
 W. D. EDWARDS, LL.B., 
 
 of Lincoln's inn, barkistek-at-law. 
 
 In Svo, price tSs. each, cloth, 
 
 THE BAR EXAMINATION JOURNAL, VOLS. IV., v., 
 
 ¥1., VII., VIII. , IX. & X. Containing the Examination Questions and Answers 
 from Easter Term, 1S78, to Hilary Term, 1892, with List of Successful Candidates 
 at each examination, Notes on the Law of Property, and a Synopsis of Recent Legis- 
 lation of importance to Students, and other information. 
 
 By A. D. TV'SSEN and W. D. EDWARDS, Barristers-at-Law. 
 
 In Svo, price 8s., cloth, 
 
 SHORT PRACTICAL COMPANY FORMS. 
 
 By T. Eustace Smith, of the Inner Temple and Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law, 
 Author of " A Summary of the Law of Companies, " etc., assisted by Roland E. 
 Vaughax William;, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 REVIEW. 
 '■ This collection of Company Forms should certainly prove of service to secretaries, directors, and 
 
 others interested., in the practical working of companies The forms themselves are short and to 
 
 the point." — Law Times. 
 
 Sixth Edition. In 8vo, price gs. cloth, 
 
 A SUMMARY OF JOINT STOCK COMPANIES' LAW. 
 
 Bv T. EUSTACE SMITH, 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW, 
 
 "The author of this handbook tells us that, when 
 an articled student reading foi* the final examina- 
 tion, he felt the want of such a work as that before 
 us, wherein could be found the main principles of 
 law relating ,to joint-stock companies . . . Law 
 students may well read it ; for Mr. Smith, has very 
 wisely been at the pains of giving his authority for 
 all his statements of the law or of practice, as applied 
 to joint-stock company business usually transacted 
 in solicitors' chambers. In fact, Mr. Smith has 
 by his little book offered a fresh inducement to 
 students to make themselves^at all events, tosome 
 extent — acquainted with company law as a separate 
 branch of study." — Law Times. 
 
 " These pages give, in the words of the Preface, 
 ' as briefly and concisely as possible a general 
 view both of the principles and practice of the law 
 affecting companies. ' The work is excellently 
 printed, and authorities are cited ; but in no case 
 is the very language of the statutes copied. The 
 plan is good, and shows both grasp and neatness, 
 and, both amongst students andlaymen, Mr. Smith's 
 book ought to meet a ready sale." — Law Journal. 
 
 "The book isphe from which we'have derived 
 a large amount of valuable information, and we can 
 heartily and conscientiously recommend it to our 
 readers." — Oxford and Cambridge Undergra- 
 duates' Journal. 
 
40 STEVENS 6- HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 In 8vo, Sixth Edition, price ox, cloth, 
 
 THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACTS ; 
 
 1870, 1874, 1882 and 1884, 
 
 With Copious and Explanatory Notes, and an Appendix of the Acts 
 relating to married women. 
 
 By Archibald Brown, M.A., Edinburgh and Oxon., and the Middle Temple, 
 Barrister-at-Law. Being the Sixth Edition of The Married Women's Property 
 Acts. By the late J. R. Griffiths, B.A. Oxon., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister- 
 at-Law. 
 
 "Upon the whole, we are of opinion that this is the best work upon the subject which has been issued 
 since the passing of the recent Act. Its position as a well-established manual of acknowledged worth gives 
 it at starting a considerable advantage over new books ; and this advantage has been well maintained by 
 the intelligent treatment of the Editor." — Solicitors' Journal. 
 
 "The notes are full, but anything rather than tedious reading, and the law contained in them is good, 
 and verified by reported cases. ... A distinct feature of the work is its copious index, practically a 
 summary of the marginal headings of the various paragraphs in the body of the text. This book is worthy 
 of nil success." — Law Magazine. 
 
 In 8vo, price 12s. , cloth, 
 
 THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 SECOND EDITION. 
 
 By Robert Campbell, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law, and Advocate 
 of the Scotch Bar. 
 
 " No less an authority than the late Mr. Justice j new edition brought down to date. It is indeed an 
 Willes, in his judgment in Oppenheim v. White i able and scholarly treatise on a somewhat difficult 
 Lion Hotel Co,, characterised Mr. Campbell's . branch of law, in the treatment of which the 
 ' Law of Negligence ' as a ' very good book ; ' and author's knowledge of Roman and Scotch Juris- 
 since very good books are by no means plentiful, prudence has stood him in good stead. We con- 
 when compared with the numbers of indifferent ' fidently recommend it alike to the student and the 
 ones which annually issue from the press, we think ! practitioner." — Law Magazine. 
 the profession will be thankful to the author of this I 
 
 In 8vo, price lew. 6d, net. 
 
 THE LAW AND PRIVILEGES RELATING TO 
 
 THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND SOLICITOR-GENERAL 
 
 OF ENGLAND, with a History from the Earliest Periods, and a Series of 
 King's Attorneys and Attorneys and Solicitors-General from the reign of 
 Henry IH. to the 6oth of Victoria. By J. \Y. Norton-Kyshe, of Lincoln's. 
 Inn, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 BIBLIOTHECA LEGUM. 
 
 In l2mo (nearly 400 pages), price 2s., cloth, 
 
 A CATALOGUE OF LAW BOOKS. Including a.l the Reports 
 in the various Courts of England, Scotland, and Ireland ; with a Supplement to 
 December, 1884. By Henry G. Stevens and Robert W. Haynes, Law 
 Publishers. 
 
 In small 4to, price 2s., cloth, beautifully printed, with a large margin, for the 
 special use of Librarians, 
 
 A CATALOGUE OF THE REPORTS IN THE 
 
 VARIOUS COURTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT 
 BRITAIN AND IRELAND, arranged both in alpha- 
 
 BETICAL &> CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER. By Stevens & Haynes, 
 
 Law Publishers. 
 
STEV£NS &> HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 41 
 
 Second Edition, much enlarged, in 8vo, price 20j., cloth, 
 
 CHAPTERS ON THE 
 
 LAW RELATING TO THE COLONIES. 
 
 To which are appended Topical Indexes of Cases decided in the Privy Council 
 on Appeal from the Colonies, Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, and of 
 Cases relating to the Colonies decided in the English Courts otherwise than on 
 Appeal from the Colonies. 
 
 By CHARLES JAMES TARRING, M.A., 
 
 ASSISTANT JUDGE OF H.B.M. SUPREME CONSULAR COURT, CONSTANTINOPLE, AND H.M.'s CONSUL; 
 AUTHOR OF "BRITISH CONSULAR JURISDICTION IN THE EAST," "A TURKISH GRAMMAR," ETC. 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Table of Cases Cited. 
 Table of Statutes Cited. 
 
 Introductory. — Definition of a Colony. 
 Chapter I. — The laws to which the Colonies are 
 subject. 
 Section i. — In newly-discovered countries. 
 Section 2.— In conquered or ceded countries. 
 Section 3. — Generally. 
 Chapter II. — The Executive. 
 Section 1. — The Governor. 
 
 A. — Nature of his office, power, and 
 
 duties. 
 B. — Liability to answer for his acts. 
 I. -Civilly. 
 
 1. a. — In the courts of his Govern- 
 ment. 
 b. — In the English courts. 
 2. — For what causes of action. 
 II.— Criminally. 
 Section 2. — The Executive Council. 
 Chapter III. — The Legislative Power. 
 Section 1. — Classification of colonies. 
 Section 2. — Colonies with responsible govern- 
 ment. 
 Section 3. — Privileges and powers of colonial 
 Legislative Assemblies. 
 
 Chapter IV. — The Judiciary and the Bar. 
 Chapter V. — Appeals from the Colonies. 
 Chapter VI. — Imperial Statutes relating tu the 
 Colonies. 
 Section 1. — Imperial Statutes relating to the 
 
 Colonies in general. 
 Section 2.— Subjects of Imperial Legislation 
 relating to the Colonies in 
 general. 
 Section 3. — Imperial Statutes relating to par- 
 ticular Colonies. 
 
 Topical Index of Cases decided in the Privy 
 Council on appeal from the Colonies, the 
 Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man. 
 
 Index of some Topics of English Law dealt with 
 in the Cases. 
 
 Topical Index of .Cases relating to the Colonies 
 decided in the English Courts otherwise than on 
 appeal from the Colonies. 
 
 Index of Names of Cases. 
 
 Appendix I. 
 — 11. 
 
 General Index. 
 
 In 8vo, price iot., cloth, 
 
 THE TAXATION OF COSTS IN THE CROWN OFFICE. 
 
 COMPRISING A COLLECTION OF 
 
 BILLS OF COSTS IN THE VARIOUS MATTERS TAXABLE IN THAT OFFICE; 
 
 INCLUDING 
 
 COSTS UPON THE PROSECUTION OF FRAUDULENT BANKRUPTS, 
 AND ON APPEALS FROM INFERIOR COURTS ; 
 
 TOGETHER WITH 
 
 A TABLE OF COURT FEES, 
 
 AND A SCALE OF COSTS USUALLY ALLOWED TO SOLICITORS, ON THE TAXATION 
 
 OF COSTS ON THE CROWN SIDE OF THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
 
 OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. 
 
 By FREDK. H. SHORT, 
 
 CHIEF CLERK IN THE CROWN OFFICE. 
 
 " This is decidedly a useful work on the subject of those costs which are liable to be taxed before the 
 Queen's Coroner and Attorney (for which latter name that of ' Solicitor' might now well be substituted), or 
 before the master of the Crown Office ; in fact, such a book is almost indispensable when preparing costs 
 for taxation in the Crown Office, or when taxing an opponent's costs. Country solicitors will find the scale 
 relating to bankruptcy prosecutions of especial use, as such costs are taxed in the Crown Office. The ' general 
 observations' constitute a useful feature in this manual." — Law Times. 
 
 11 The recent revision of the old scale of costs in the Crown Office renders the appearance of this work 
 particularly opportune, and it cannot fail to be welcomed, by practitioners. Mr. Short gives, in the first 
 place, a scale of costs usually allowed to solicitors on the taxation of costs in the Crown Office, and then 
 bills of costs in various matters. These are well arranged and clearly printed."— Solicitors' Journal. 
 
42 STEVENS '& HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 Just Published, in 8vo, price •js. 6d., cloth, 
 
 BRITISH CONSULAR JURISDICTION IN THE EAST, 
 
 WITH TOPICAL INDICES OF CASES ON APPEAL FROM, AND 
 RELATING TO, CONSULAR COURTS. AND CONSULS; 
 
 Also a Collection of Statutes concerning Consuls. 
 
 By C. J. TARRING, M.A., 
 
 ASSISTANT-JUDGS OF H.B.M. SUPREME CONSULAR COURT FOR THE LEVANT. 
 
 In one volume, 8vo, price Ss. 6d., cloth, 
 A COMPLETE TREATISE UPON THE 
 
 NEW LAW OF PATENTS, DESIGNS, & TRADE MARKS, 
 
 CONSISTING OF THE PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 
 
 1883, WITH THE RULES AND FORMS, FULLY ANNOTATED 
 
 WITH CASES, &c. 
 
 And a Statement of the Principles of the Law upon those subjects, with a Time Table 
 
 and Copious Index. 
 
 By EDWARD MORTON DANIEL, 
 
 of Lincoln's inn, barrister-at-law, associate of the institute of patent agents. 
 In 8vo, price 8j., cloth, 
 
 The TRADE MARKS REGISTRATION ACT, 1875, 
 
 And the Rules thereunder ; THE MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT, 1862, with an 
 Introduction containing a SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS, 
 together with practical Notes and Instructions, and a copious Index. By 
 Edward Morton Daniel, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 Second Edition, in one volume, 8vo, price 16s. , cloth, 
 A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE 
 
 STATUTE LAW OF THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS. 
 
 With an Appendix of Statutes, Copious References to English, Irish, and American Cases, 
 and to the French Code, and a Copious Index. 
 
 By HENRY THOMAS BANNING, M.A., 
 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 "The work is decidedly valuable." — Law Times. 
 
 " Mr. Banning has adhered to the plan of printing the Acts in an appendix, and making his book a 
 running treatise on the case-law thereon. The cases have evidently been investigated with care and 
 digested with clearness and intellectuality." — Laiv Journal. 
 
 In 8vo, price is., sewed, 
 AN ESSAY ON THE 
 
 ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. 
 
 Embracing more particularly an Enunciation and Analysis of the Piinciples of Law as 
 applicable to Criminals of the Highest Degree of Guilt. 
 
 By WALTER ARTHUR COPINGER, 
 
 OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, ESQ., BARRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 Sixth Edition, in 8vo, price 31J. 6d. t cloth, 
 
 THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, No. IX., of 1872. 
 
 TOGETHER 
 
 WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND EXPLANATORY NOTES, TABLE OF 
 
 CONTENTS, APPENDIX, AND INDEX. 
 
 By H. S. CUNNINGHAM and H. H. SHEPHERD, 
 
 BARRISTERS- AT- LAW. 
 
STEVEXS &• HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 A?, 
 
 Second Edition, in 8vo, price 15.C, cloth, 
 
 LEADING CASES and OPINIONS on INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 COLLECTED AND DIGESTED FROM 
 
 ENGLISH AND FOREIGN REPORTS, OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, 
 PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, and other Sources, 
 
 With NOTES and EXCURSUS, Containing the Views of the Text- Writers on 
 the Topics referred to, together with Supplementary Cases, Treaties, and Statutes ; 
 and Embodying an Account of some of the more important International Trans- 
 actions and Controversies. 
 
 By PITT COBBETT, M.A., D.C.L., 
 
 OF GRAY'S INN, BARRISTER-AT-LAW, PROFESSOR OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, N.S.W. 
 
 "The book is well arranged, the materials well 
 selected, and the comments to the point. Much 
 will be found in small space in this book."— Laiv 
 Journal. 
 
 "The notes are concisely written and trust- 
 worthy The reader will learn from them a 
 
 great deal on the subject, and the book as a 
 whole seems a convenient introduction to fuller and 
 more systematic works." — Oxford Magazine. 
 
 Second Edition, in royal 8vo. noo pages, price 45.?., cloth, 
 
 STORY'S COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY 
 JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 \ Second English Edition, from the Thvelfth American Edition. 
 By W. E. GRIGSBY, LL.D. (Lond.), D.C.L. (Oxon.), 
 
 AND OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW, 
 
 " It is high testimony to the reputation of Story, 
 and to the editorship of Dr. Grigsby, that another 
 edition should have been called for. . . . The work 
 
 has been rendered more perfect by- additional 
 indices." — Lazv Times. 
 
 Second Edition, in Svo, price 8j., cloth, 
 
 THE PARTITION ACTS, 1868 & 1876. 
 
 A Manual of the Law of Partition and of Sale, in Lieu of Partition. With the Decided 
 Cases, and an Appendix containing Judgments and Orders. By W. Gregory 
 Walker, B.A., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. 
 "This is a very good manual — practical, clearly 
 written, and complete. The subject lends itself 
 well to the mode of treatment adopted by Mr. 
 Walker, and in his notes to the various sections he 
 
 has carefully brought together the cases, and dis- 
 cussed the difficulties arising upon the language of 
 the different provisions." — Solicitors' Journal. 
 
 Second Edition, in 8vo, price 22s. , cloth, 
 A TREATISE ON THE 
 
 LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO INFANTS. 
 
 By ARCHIBALD H. SIMPSON, M.A., 
 
 of Lincoln's inn, barrister-at-law, and fellow of Christ's college, Cambridge. 
 SECOND EDITION. By E. J. Elgood, B.C.L., M.A., of Lincoln's Inn, 
 
 Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 "Mr. Simpson's book comprises the whole of the 
 law relating to infants, both as regards their per- 
 sons and their property, and we have not observed 
 any very important omissions. The author has 
 evidently expended much trouble and care upon 
 his work, and has brought together, in a concise 
 and convenient form, the law upon the subject down 
 to the present time." — Solicitors' Journal. 
 
 "Its law is unimpeachable. We have detected 
 no errors, and whilst the work might have been 
 done more scientifically, it is, beyond all question, 
 a compendium of sound legal principles." — Law 
 Times. 
 
 * • Mr. Simpson has arranged the whole of-the Law 
 relating to Infants with much fulness of detail, and 
 
 yet in comparatively little space. The result is 
 due mainly to the businesslike condensation of his 
 style. Fulness, however, has by no means been 
 sacrificed to brevity, and, so far as we have been 
 able to test it, the work omits no point of any im- 
 portance, from the earliest cases to the last. In 
 the essential qualities of clearness, completeness, 
 and orderly arrangement it leaves nothing to be 
 desired. 
 
 " Lawyers in doubt on any point of law or prac- 
 tice will find the information they require, if it can 
 be found at all, in Mr. Simpson's book, and a 
 writer of whom this can be said may congratulate 
 himself on having achieved a considerable success." 
 — Law Magazine y February, 1876. 
 
44 
 
 STEVENS & HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 In one volume, royal 8vo, 1877, price 3&r., cloth, 
 
 THE DOCTRINES & PRINCIPLES OF 
 THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS. 
 
 By WILLIAM JOYCE, 
 
 OF LINCOLN S INN, 
 
 BARRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 "Mr. Joyce, whose learned and exhaustive work on 'The Law and Practice of Injunctions has 
 gained such a deservedly high reputation in the Profession, now brings out a valuable companion volume 
 on the ' Doctrines and Principles' of this important branch of the Law. In the present work the Law is 
 enunciated in its abstract rather than its concrete form, as few cases as possible being cited ; while at the 
 same time no statement of a principle is made unsupported by a decision, and for the most part the very 
 language of the Courts has been adhered to. Written as it is by so acknowledged a master of his subject, 
 and with the conscientious carefulness that might be expected from him, this work cannot fail to prove of 
 the greatest assistance alike to the Student — who wants to grasp principles freed from their superincum- 
 bent details — and to the practitioner, who wants to refresh his memory on points of doctrine amidst the 
 oppressive details of professional work." — Law Magazine and Review. 
 
 BY TBS SAME AUTHOR. 
 In two volumes, royal 8vo, 1872, price 70J., cloth, 
 
 THE LAW & PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS. 
 
 EMBRACING 
 
 ALL THE SUBJECTS IN WHICH COURTS OF EQUITY 
 AND COMMON LAW HAVE JURISDICTION. 
 
 By WILLIAM JOYCE, 
 
 OF LINCOLN'S INN, BARRISTEH-AT-LAW. 
 
 BE VIEWS. 
 
 " A work which aims at being so absolutely 
 complete, as that of Mr. Joyce upon a subject 
 which is of almost perpetual recurrence in the 
 Courts, cannot fail to be a welcome offering to the 
 profession, and doubtless, it will be well received 
 and largely used, for it is as absolutely complete as 
 
 it aims at being This work is, therefore, 
 
 eminently a work for the practitioner, being full of 
 practical utility in every page, and every sentence, 
 of it We have to congratulate the pro- 
 fession on this new acquisition to a digest of the 
 law, and the author on his production of a work of 
 permanent utility and fame." — Law Magazine 
 and Review. 
 
 " Mr. Joyce has produced, not a treatise, but a 
 complete and compendious exposition of the Law 
 and Practice of Injunctions both in equity and 
 common law. 
 
 " Part III. is devoted to the practice of the 
 Courts. Contains an amount of valuable and 
 technical matter nowhere else collected. 
 
 " From these remarks it will be sufficiently per- 
 ceived what elaborate and painstaking industry, as 
 well as legal knowledge and ability has been 
 necessary in the compilation of Mr. Joyce's work. 
 No labour has been spared to save the practitioner 
 labour, and no research has been omitted which 
 could tend towards the elucidation and exemplifi- 
 cation of the general principles of the Law and 
 Practice of Injunctions." — Law Journal. 
 
 " He does not attempt to go an inch beyond that 
 for which he has express written authority ; he al- 
 lows the cases to speak, and does not speak for them. 
 
 "The work is something more than a treatise on 
 the Law of Injunctions. It gives us the general 
 law on almost every subject to which the process of 
 injunction is applicable. Not only English, but 
 American decisions are cited, the aggregate number 
 being 3,500, and the statutes cited 160, whilst the 
 index is, we think, the most elaborate we have ever 
 seen — occupying nearly 200 pages. The work is 
 probably entirely exhaustive."- — Law Times. 
 
 "This work, considered either as to its matter or manner of execution, is no ordinary work. It is a 
 complete and exhaustive treatise both as to the law and the practice of granting injunctions. It must 
 supersede all other works on the subject. The terse statement of the practice will be found of incalculable 
 value. We know of no book as suitable to supply a knowledge of the law of injunctions to our common 
 law friends as Mr. Joyce's exhaustive work. It is alike indispensable to members of the Common Law 
 and Equity Bars. Mr. Joyce's great work would be a casket without a key unless accompanied by a good 
 index. His index is very full and well arranged. We feel that this work is destined to take its place 
 as a standard text-book, and the text-book on the particular subject of which it treats. The author 
 deserves great credit for the very great labour bestowed upon it. The publishers, as usual, have 
 acquitted themselves in a manner deserving of the high reputation they bear."— Canada Law Journal. 
 
STEVENS & HA YATES, BELT, YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 45 
 
 Third Edition, in 8vo, price 20s., cloth, 
 A TREATISE UFON 
 
 THE LAW OF EXTRADITION, 
 
 WITH THE CONVENTIONS UPON THE SUBJECT EXISTING BETWEEN 
 ENGLAND AND FOREIGN NATIONS, 
 
 AND THE CASES DECIDED THEREON. 
 
 By Sir EDWARD CLARKE, 
 
 of Lincoln's 
 
 " Mr. Clarke's accurate and sensible book is the 
 best authority to which the English reader can 
 turn upon the subject of Extradition," — Saturday 
 Review. 
 
 "The opinion we expressed of the merits of this 
 work when it first appeared has been fully justified 
 by the reputation it has gained. It is seldom we 
 come across a book possessing so much interest to 
 the general reader and at the same time furnishing so 
 useful a guide to the lawyer." — Solicitors' Journal, 
 
 "The appearance of a second edition of this 
 treatise does not surprise us. It is a useful book, 
 well arranged and well written. A student who 
 
 INN, S.-G., Q.C., M.P. 
 
 wants to learn the principles and practice of the 
 law of extradition will be greatly helped by Mr. 
 Clarke. Lawyers v/ho have extradition business 
 will find this volume an excellent book of reference. 
 Magistrates who have to administer the extradition 
 law will be greatly assisted by a careful perusal of 
 'Clarke upon Extradition.' This may be called a 
 warm commendation, but those who have read the 
 book will not say it is unmerited." — Law Journal. 
 The Times of September 7, 1874, in a long 
 article upon "Extradition Treaties," makes con- 
 siderable use of this work and writes of it as " Mr. 
 Clarke's use/it I Work on Extradition." 
 
 In 8vo, price 2s. 6d., cloth, 
 
 TABLES OF STAMP DUTIES 
 
 FROM 1815 to 1878. 
 By WALTER ARTHUR COPINGER, 
 
 OP THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, ESQUIRE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW : AUTHOR OF THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN 
 WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART," " INDEX TO PRECEDENTS IN CONVEYANCING," " TITLE DEEDS," &C. 
 
 " We think this little book ought to find its way 
 into a good many chambers and offices." — Soli- 
 
 citors' Journal. 
 
 J( This book, or at least one containing the same 
 amount of valuable and well-arranged information, 
 should find a place in every Solicitor's office. It is 
 of especial value when examining the abstract of a 
 
 large number of old title-deeds." — Law Times. 
 
 His TaMcs 0/ Stamp Duties, from 1815 to i8y8, 
 have already been tested in Chambers, and being 
 now published, will materially lighten the labours 
 of the profession in a tedious department, yet one re- 
 quiring great care." — Law Magazine and Review. 
 
 In one volume, 8vo, price 14J., cloth, 
 
 TITLE DEEDS: 
 
 THEIR CUSTODY, INSPECTION, AND PRODUCTION, AT LAW, IN 
 EQUITY, AND IN MATTERS OF CONVEYANCING, 
 
 Including Covenants for the Production of Deeds and Attested Copies ; with an Appendix 
 of Precedents, the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, &c. &c. &Ci By Walter 
 Arthur Copinger, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law ; Author of " The 
 Law of Copyright " and " Index to Precedents in Conveyancing." 
 
 here. Mr. Copinger has supplied a much-felt want, 
 by the compilation of this volume. We have not 
 space to go into the details of the book ; it appears 
 well arranged, clearly written, and fully elaborated. 
 With these few remarks we recommend his volume 
 to our readers." — Law Journal. 
 
 "The literary execution of the work is good 
 enough to invite quotation, but the volume is not 
 large, and we content ourselves with recommendihg 
 it to the profession." — Law Times. 
 
 " A really good treatise on this subject must be 
 essential to the lawyer : and this is what we have 
 
 Third Edition, in 8vo, Considerably enlarged, price 36s., cloth, 
 
 THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 
 
 In Works of Literature and Art; including that of the Drama, Music, Engraving, 
 Sculpture, Painting, Photography, and Ornamental and Useful Designs ; together 
 with International and Foreign, Copyright, with the Statutes relating thereto, and 
 References to the English and American Decisions. By Walter Arthur 
 Copinger, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 
 "Mr Copinger's book is very comprehensive, merits which will, doubtless, lead to the placing of 
 dealine with 1 every branch of his subject, and even this edition on the shelves of the members of the 
 eKtendlne to copyright in foreign countries. So far profession whose business is concerned with copy- 
 as we have examined, we have found all the recent right ; and deservedly, for the book is one of con- 
 authorities noted up with scrupulous care, and siderable vaius."— Solicitors' Journal. 
 there is an unusually good index. These are 
 
46 STEVENS &> HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 Third Edition, in One large Volume, 8vo, price 32J., cloth, 
 
 A MAGISTERIAL AND POLICE GUIDE: 
 
 BEING THE LAW 
 
 RELATING TO THE 
 
 PROCEDURE, JURISDICTION, and DUTIES OF MAGISTRATES 
 AND POLICE AUTHORITIES, 
 
 IN THE METROPOLIS AND IN THE COUNTRY! 
 
 With an Introduction showing the General Procedure before Magistrates 
 both in Indictable and Summary Matters. 
 
 By HENRY C. GREENWOOD, 
 
 STIPENDIARY MAGISTRATE FOR THE DISTRICT OF THE STAFFORDSHIRE POTTERIES \ AND 
 
 TEMPLE CHEVALIER MARTIN, 
 
 CHIEF CLERK TO THE MAGISTRATES AT LAMBETH POLICE COURT, LONDON ; 
 AUTHOR OF "THE LAW OF MAINTENANCE AND DESERTION," " THE NEW FORMULIST," ETC. 
 
 Third Edition. Including the Session 52 & 53 Vict., and the Cases Decided in the 
 Superior Courts to the End of the Year 1889, revised and enlarged. 
 
 By TEMPLE CHEVALIER MARTIN. 
 
 "A second edition has appeared of Messrs. Greenwood and Martin's valuable and 
 comprehensive magisterial and police Guide, a book which Justices of the peace should take 
 care to include in their Libraries. "Saturday Review. 
 
 " Hence it is that we rarely light upon a work which commands our confidence, not merely 
 by its research, but also by its grasp of the subject of which it treats. The volume before us 
 is one of the happy few of this latter class, and it is on this account that the public favour will 
 certainly wait upon it. We are moreover convinced that no effort has been spared by its 
 authors to render it a thoroughly efficient and trustworthy guide." — Law Journal. 
 
 "Magistrates will find a valuable handbook in Messrs. Greenwood and Martin's 
 ' Magisterial and Police Guide,' of which a fresh Edition has just been published." — The 
 Times. 
 
 " A very valuable introduction, treating of proceedings before Magistrates, and largely of the 
 Summary Jurisdiction Act, is in itself a treatise which will repay perusal. We expressed our 
 high opinion of the Guide when it first appeared, and the favourable impression then produced 
 is increased by our examination of this Second Edition." — Law Times. 
 
 " For the form of the work we have nothing but commendation. We may say we have 
 here our ideal law book. It maybe said to omit nothing which it ought to contain." — 
 Law Times. 
 
 " This handsome volume aims at presenting a comprehensive magisterial handbook 
 for the whole of England. The mode of arrangement seems to us excellent, and is well 
 carried out." — Solicitors' Journal. 
 
 " The Magisterial and Police Guide, by Mr. Henry Greenwood and Mr. Temple 
 Martin, is a model work in its conciseness, and, so far as we have been able to test it, 
 in completeness and accuracy. It ought to be in the hands of all wlw, as magistrates or 
 otherwise, have authority in matters of police." — Daily News. 
 
 " This work is eminently practical, and supplies a real want. It plainly and concisely 
 states the law on all points upon which Magistrates are called upon to adjudicate, syste- 
 matically arranged, so as to be easy of reference. It ought to find a place on every Justice's 
 table, and we cannot but think that its usefulness will speedily ensure for it as large a sale 
 as its merits deserve." — Midland Counties Herald. 
 
 " The exceedingly arduous task of collecting together all the enactments on the subject 
 has been ably and efficiently performed, and the arrangement is so methodical and precise 
 that one is able to lay a finger on a Section of an Act almost in a moment. It is wonderful 
 what a mass of information is comprised in so comparatively small a space. We have much 
 pleasure in recommending the volume not only to our professional, but also to our 
 general readers ; nothing can be more useful to the public than an acquaintance with the 
 outlines of magisterial jurisdiction and procedure." — Sheffield Post. 
 
STEVENS &* ffAYNES, BEtL 'YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 47 
 
 In one thick volume, 8vo, price 32*., cloth, 
 
 THE LAW OF RAILWAY COMPANIES. 
 
 Comprising the Companies Clauses, the Lands Clauses, the Railways Clauses Consoli- 
 dation Acts, the Railway Companies Act, 1867, and the Regulation of Railways 
 Act, 1868 ; with Notes of Cases on all the Sections, brought down to the end of the 
 year 1868 ; together with an Appendix giving all the other material Acts relating 
 to Railways, and the Standing Orders of the Houses of Lords and Commons ; 
 and a copious Index. By Henry Godefroi, of Lincoln's Inn, and John 
 Shortt, of the Middle Temple, Barristers-at-Law. 
 
 In a handy volume, crown 8vo, 1870, price iar. 6d., cloth, 
 
 THE LAW OF SALVAGE, 
 
 As administered in the High Court of Admiralty and the County Courts ; with the 
 Principal Authorities, English and American, brought down to the present time ; 
 and an Appendix, containing Statutes, Forms, Table of Fees, etc. By Edwyn 
 Jones, of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 In crown 8vo, price 4s., cloth, 
 A HANDBOOK OF THE 
 
 LAW OF PARLIAMENTARY REGISTRATION. 
 
 WITH AN APPENDIX OF STATUTES AND FULL INDEX. 
 By J. R. SEAGER, Registration Agent. 
 
 In 8vo, price 5-r., cloth, 
 
 THE LAW OF PROMOTERS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES. 
 
 By NEWMAN WATTS, 
 
 of Lincoln's inn, barrister-at-law. 
 
 " Some recent cases in our law courts, which at 
 the time attracted much public notice, have demon- 
 strated the want of some clear and concise exposi- 
 tion of the powers and liabilities of promoters, and 
 this task has been ably performed by Mr. Newman 
 Watts." — Investor's Gttardian. 
 
 " Mr. Watts has brought together all the lead- 
 ing decisions relating to promoters and directors, 
 and has arranged the information in a very satisfac- 
 tory manner, so as to readily show the rights of 
 different parties and the steps which can be legally 
 taken by promoters to further interests of new com- 
 panies." — Daily Chronicle. 
 
 Second Edition, in One Vol., 8vo, price I2j., cloth, 
 
 A COMPENDIUM OF ROMAN LAW, 
 
 Founded on the Institutes of Justinian ; together with Examination Questions 
 Set in the University and Bar Examinations (with Solutions), and Definitions of 
 Leading Terms in the Words of the Principal Authorities. Second Edition. By 
 Gordon Campbell, of the Inner Temple, M.A., late Scholar of Exeter College, 
 Oxford ; M.A., LL.D., Trinity C°H e g e > Cambridge ; Author of "An Analysis of 
 Austin's Jurisprudence, or the Philosophy of Positive Law. " 
 
 In 8vo, price 7-r. 6d., cloth, 
 
 TITLES TO MINES IN THE UNITED STATES, 
 
 WITH THE 
 
 STATUTES AND REFERENCES TO THE DECISIONS 
 OF THE COURTS RELATING THERETO. 
 
 By W. A. HARRIS, B.A. Oxon., 
 
 of Lincoln's inn. barrister-at-law; and op the American bar. 
 
INDEX 
 
 To the Names of Authors and Editors of Works enumerated in this Catalogue. 
 
 Aldred (P. F.), page 21. 
 
 Argles (N.), 32. Ashworth (P. A.), 21 
 
 Attenborough (C. L.), 27. 
 
 Baldwin (E. T.), 15. 
 
 Banning (H. T.), 42 
 
 Beal (E.), 32. Bellewe (R.), 34 
 
 Bellot & WlLLIS, 11. 
 
 Seven (T.), 8. 
 
 Blyth (E. E.), 22. 
 
 Brice (Seward), 16, 33. 
 
 Brooke (Sir R.), 35. 
 
 Brooks (W. J.), 13. 
 
 Brown (Archibald), 20, 22, 26, 33, 40. 
 
 Browne (J. H. Balfour), 19. 
 
 Buchanan (J.), 38. 
 
 Buckley (H. B.), 17. 
 
 Bucknill (T. T.), 34, 35. 
 
 Campbell (Gordon), 47. 
 
 Campbell (Robert), 9, 40. 
 
 Cecil (Lord R.), 11. 
 
 Chaster (A. W. ), 32. Chitty (J.J. C. ), 38, 
 
 Clarke (Edward), 45. 
 
 Clauson (A. C), 17. 
 
 Cobbett (Pitt), 43. 
 
 Coghlan (W. M.), 28. 
 
 Cooke (Sir G.), 35. 
 
 Cooke (Hugh), 10. 
 
 copinger (w. a.), 42, 45. 
 
 Corner (R. J.), 10. 
 
 COTTERELL (J. N.), 28. 
 
 Craif.s(W. F.), 6, 9. 
 
 Cunningham (H. S.), 38, 42. 
 
 Cunningham (John), 7. 
 
 Cunningham (T.), 34. 
 
 Daniel (E. M.), 42. 
 
 Darling (C J.), 18. 
 
 Deane (H. C), 23. 
 
 DeBruyn (D. P.), 38. De Wal(J.), 38. 
 
 Dibdin (L. T.), io; 
 
 Duncan (J. A.), 33. 
 
 Edwards (W. D.), 16, 39. 
 
 Elgood (E. J.), 6, 18, 43.- 
 
 Elliott (G.), 14. 
 
 Errington (F. H. L.), 10. 
 
 Evans (M. O.), 20. 
 
 Eversley (W. P.), 9. 
 Finlason (W. F.), 32. 
 
 Foa(E.J, 11. 
 
 Foote (J. Alderson), 36. 
 
 Forbes (U. A.), 18. 
 
 Forsyth (W.), 14. Frost (R.), 12. 
 
 Gibbs (F. W.), 10. 
 
 Godefroi (H.), 47. 
 
 Greenwood (H. C.), 46. 
 
 Griffiths (J. R. ), 40. 
 
 Grigsby (W. E.), 43. 
 
 Grotius (Hugo), 38. 
 
 Hall(R. G.), 30. 
 
 Hanson (A.), 10. 
 
 Hardcastle (H.), 9. 
 
 Harris (Seymour F.), 26, 27; 
 
 Harris (W. A.), 47. 
 
 Harrison (J. C), 23. 
 
 Harwood (R. G.), 10. 
 
 Hazlitt (W.), 29. 
 
 Higgins (C), 30. 
 
 Houston (J.), 32. 
 
 Hudson (A. A.), 12. Hurst (J.), 11 
 
 Indermaur (John), 24, 25, 28. 
 
 Inderwick, 11. 
 
 Jones (E.), 47. Joyce (W. ), 44. 
 
 Kay (Joseph), 17. 
 
 Kelke(W. H.), 6. 
 
 Kelyno (Sir J.), 35. 
 
 Kelynge (W.), 35. 
 
 Kotze(J. G.), 38. 
 
 Lloyd (Eyre), 13. 
 
 Lorenz (C. A.), 38. 
 
 Loveland (R. L.), 30, 34, 35. 
 
 Maasdorp (A. F. S.), 38. 
 
 Macaskie (S. C), 7. 
 
 Mansfield (Hon. J. W.), 17. 
 
 March (John), 35.' 
 
 Marcy (G. N.), 26. 
 
 Martin (Temple C), 7, 46. 
 
 Mattinson (M. W. ), 7. 
 
 May (H. W.), 29. 
 
 Mayne (John D.), 31, 38. 
 
 Mellor (F. H.), 10. 
 
 Menzies (W.), 38. Moore (S. A.), 30. 
 
 Norton-Kyshe, 40. 
 
 O'Malley (E. L.), 33. 
 
 Pavitt (A.), 32. Peile (C. J.), 7. 
 
 Pemberton (L. L.), 18, 32, 
 
 Phipson (S. L.), 20. 
 
 Porter (J. B.), 6. 
 
 Reilly (F. S.), 29. Renton (AW.), 10. 
 
 Ringwood (R.), 13, 15, 29. 
 
 Salkowski (C), 14. 
 
 Salmond (J. W.), 13. 
 
 Savigny (F. C. Von), 20. 
 
 Scott (C. E.), 32. 
 
 Seager (J. R.), 47. 
 
 Short (F. H.), 10, 41. 
 
 Shortt (John), 47. 
 
 Shower (Sir B.), 34. 
 
 Simpson (A. H.), 43. 
 
 Slater (J.), 7. 
 
 Smith (Eustace), 23, 39. 
 
 Smith (F. ].), 6. 
 
 Smith (Lumley), 31. 
 
 Snell (E. H. T.), 22. 
 
 Story, 43. 
 
 Tarring (C. J.), 26, 41, 42, 
 
 Taswell-Langmead, 21. 
 
 Thomas (Ernest C), 28. 
 
 Tyssen (A. D. ), 39. 
 
 Van der Keesel (D. G.), 38. 
 
 Van Leeuwen, 38. Van Zyl, %8 
 
 Waite (W. T.)-, 22. 
 
 Walker (W. G.), 6, 18, 43. 
 
 Watts (C. N.), 47. 
 
 Wertheimer (J.), 32. 
 
 Whiteford (F. M.), 33. 
 
 Whitfield (E. E.), 14. 
 
 Williams (S. E.), 7. 
 
 Willis (W.), 14. 
 
 Worth ington (S. W.); 29. 
 
 BRADBURY AGNEW, & CO LD., PRINTERS, LONDON AND TONUStDGE. 
 
[A Catalogue of New Law Works may be ott a ,„ B u 6 ,au<> u/juh afipiwattvu «« o. <* n,] 
 
 8JEVENS AND HAYNES' LAW PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 Fov/rth Edition, in One- Volume, 8vo, price 30s. cloth, 
 HANSON'S DEATH DUTIES : Being the Fourth Edition of 
 THE PROBATE, LEGACY, AND SUCCESSION DUTIES ACTS; Comprising 
 36 Geo. 3, c. 62 ; 45 Geo. 3, o. 28 ; 65 Geo. 3, o. 184 ; 16 & 17 Vict. o. 61 ; the 
 Customs and Inland Revenue Acts, 43 Vict. c. 14 ; 44 Vict. c. 12 ; and the New 
 Estate Duty Finance Acts, 57 & 58 Vict. c. 30, and 59 & 60 Vict. c. 28 ; with an 
 Introduction and copious Notes, incorporating the Cases to 1896 ; together with an 
 Appendix of Statutes, and a full Index. By Lewis T. Dibdin, M.A., D.C.L., and 
 F. H.'L. Errington, M.A., of Lincoln's Inn, Barristers-at-Law. 
 Third Edition, in Svo. Just ready. 
 OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF TOETS. By Kichard Ring- 
 wood, M.A., of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 Second Edition, in Svo, price 28s. cloth, 
 
 HAEDCASTLE'S TEEATISE ON THE CONSTEUCTION 
 
 AND EFFECT OF STATUTE LAW. With Appendices. Second Edition. By W. F, 
 Craies, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 Second Edition, in 8vo, price 16s. cloth, 
 
 A CONCISE TEEATISE ON THE STATUTE LAW 
 
 OF THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS. With an Appendix of Statutes, References 
 to English, Irish, and American Cases, and to the French Code. By H. T. 
 Banning, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 Third Edition, in Svo, price 20s. cloth, 
 
 A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF PEOPEETY IN 
 
 LAND. For the use of Students and the Profession. Third Edition, with Addenda, 
 giving the Land Transfer Act, 1897, with references to the Text. By William 
 Douglas Edwards, LL.B., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. 
 Second Edition, in royal Svo, in the press, 
 
 A TEEATISE ON THE LAW AND PEACTICE EE- 
 
 LATING TO LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS. With an Appendix of 
 Statutes, International Convention, Rules, Forms and Precedents, Orders, &c. By 
 Robert Frost, B.Sc (Lond.), Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 Second Edition, in Svo, price 26s. cloth, 
 
 A CONCISE TEEATISE ON PEIVATE INTEENA- 
 
 TIONAL JURISPRUDENCE. Based on the decisions in the English Courts. By 
 John AldersQn Foote, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Chancellor's Legal 
 Medallist and Senior Whewell Scholar of International Law, Cambridge University, 
 1878, etc. 
 
 In Svo, price 30s. cloth, 
 
 THE PEACTICE ON THE CEOWN SIDE OF THE 
 
 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice (founded on 
 Corner's Crown Office Practice), including Appeals from Inferior Courts. With Appen- 
 dices of Rules and Forms. By F. Hugh Shobt, Chiei Clerk of the Crown Office, and 
 Francis H. Mellob, M.*A., Barrister-at-Law. 
 
 Sixth Edition, Svo, price 10s. 6d. cloth, 
 
 EINGWOOD'S PEINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF BANK- 
 
 RUPTCY ; Embodying the Bankruptcy Acts, 1883 and 1890 ; part of the Debtors Act, 
 1869 ; the Bankruptcy Appeals (County Courts) Act, 1884. With an Appendix contain- 
 ing Schedules to the Bankruptcy Act, 1883; the Bankruptcy Rules, 1886 and 1890, &c, 
 &c. Sixth Edition. By S. Ringwood, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 
 Third Edition, in Svo, price 32s. cloth, 
 
 A MAGISTEEIAL AND POLICE GUIDE : Being the statute 
 
 Law relating to the Procedure, Jurisdiction, and Duties of Magistrates and -Police 
 Authorities in the Metropolis and in the Country. With an Introduction, snowing the 
 General Procedure before Magistrates both in Indictable and Summary Matters. By 
 Henry C. Greenwood, Stipendiary Magistrate, and Temple Chevallier Martin, 
 Chief Clerk to the Magistrates at Lambeth Police Court, London. Third Edition, in- 
 cluding the Session 52 & 53 Vict., and the Cases decided in the Superior Courts to 
 the End of the Year 1889, by Temple Chevallier Martin. 
 
 [ See Catalogue at end of this Volume. ] 
 
11 ■'':■■ : -\ ; \ ■' ■".■'■■■■■■■:■■ 
 
 
 ■ . ■'■ ■.-■-..■. : 
 ■ / ' ■ ■ : 
 
 
 
 . r. . 
 
 ■ 
 
 iw-j% ■'.^.■■/-■■,^ 
 
 
 • . - * 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ :■■■:---■ 'f:?V;V' . :"' "" -i,;-£S : >i^:U:<sw- ; v!