X0X Presii>bnt White Library Cornell UNiVBRSiTY llS5!ii,.!;.'""E«SITy 1 3 1924 071 S 037 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924071955037 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO A STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL STUDY OF THE EMPEROR'S CAMPAIGN WITH THE ARMEE DU NORD IN 1815 " AclwiUy Activiti, Vitesse: Je me recommende a vous." NapoUon. " On ne marumivre pas qu'autour dun point fixe." NapoUon. ' ' La fortune est femme ; si vous la manquez aujourd'hui, ne vous attendee pas a la retrouver demain." — NapoUon. "La critique est aisie, mais I'art de la guerre est difficile." NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO THE EMPEROR'S CAMPAIGN WITH THE ARMEE DU NOBB, 1815 A STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL STUDY BY CAPTAIN A. F. BECKE LATE R.F.A. Author of An Appreciation of the Situation from, the French Point of View, June 1, 1815 ; Napoleon's Plan of Campaign (translation) ; The Strategical Advanced Guard ; J7te Application of the Strategical Advanced Guard to the Waterloo Campaign, 1815 ; The Battle of Flewus, 1 July, 1690 ; The British Artillery at Waterloo, 18 Jv/ne, 1815; The Waterloo Campaign, 1815 ("Encyl. Brit.," SIth Edition) ; Introduction to the History of Tactics, 1740-1905 ; The Battle of SanoM, 30 Oct., 1813, etc. WITH ELEVEN MAPS Vol. II LONDON KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & Co., Ltd. BEOADWAY HOUSE, 68-74 CAKTEB LANE, E.C. 1914 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I PAGE June 18. — The Battle ov Waterloo ..... 3 CHAPTER II Napoleon's Plans for June 18 . . . . . . 4 CHAPTER III The Pbussian Plans for June 18 , . . . .21 Note G. — Bluchbr and Gnbisbnau ..... 27 CHAPTER IV The Anslo-Dutch Plans for June 18 . . . .29 Wellington's Detachment at Hal and Tubize on June 18 38 CHAPTER V The Division op the Battle of Waterloo into Phases . 47 CHAPTER VI The Battle of Waterloo. 1st Phase, 11.30 a.m. — The Attack ON Hougoumont, and the Appearance of the Prussians 60 CHAPTER VII The Battle of Waterloo. 2nd Phase, 1.30 p.m. — D'Erlon's Attack on Wellington's Left Centre . . .61 CHAPTER VIII The Battle of Waterloo. 3rd Phase, 3.30 p.m. — Attack of Wellington's Centre and Right Centre, culminating in the great French Cavalry Charges. Opening of Bluchbr's Attack against Napoleon's Right . . 75 Note H. — The Legend of the Hollov^ Way ... 98 CHAPTER IX The Battle of Waterloo. 4th Phase, 6 p.m. — The Capture of La Hayb Sainte ....... 101 CHAPTER X The Battle of Waterloo. 5th Phase, 7 p.m. — The Crisis, culminating in the Attack and Failure of the Imperial Guard, and the Defeat of the Arm^ib du Nord . 113 v vi TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER XI PAGE The PtnisuiT, after 9.15 p.m. ...... 138 CHAPTER XII Some Comments on Waterloo ; — (a) The Hour at which the Battle Commenced (6) The Attack of the Middle Guard (c) Should Napoleon have broken off the Fight when V. BtJLOw's Approach was signalled ? and if so, WHAT Course could he have adopted so as to give himself a Chance of Ultimate Success ? . . 145 CHAPTER XIII Grotjchy's Pursuit of the Prussians on June 18 . .153 CHAPTER XIV The Action of Wavbe, June 18 . . . . .175 CHAPTER XV June 19. The Conclusion of the Action at Wavre. Grouchy Learns the Result of the Battle of Waterloo, and Opens an immediate Retreat ..... 187 CHAPTER XVI Marshal Gbouchy's Retreat to France, via Namub . . 193 CHAPTER XVII The Advance of the Allies on Paris .... 200 CHAPTER XVIII The Conclusion of the Hundred Days .... 209 Note I. — The Fighting Qualities of the British and K.G.L. Troops in 1815 217 Note J. — The Duke of Wellington's Estimate of Napoleon 226 Note K. — Napoleon in 1815 ...... 229 APPENDIX I COMPOSITION AND ORGANISATION OF THE OPPOSING FORCES L'Abm^e du Nobd ........ 245 The General Staff of the Armee du Nord in Belgium in 1815 251 The Prussian Army ........ 256 The Anglo-Dutch Army ....... 258 TABLE OF CONTENTS vii APPENDIX II. DOCUMENTS Some Despatches, Obders, Bulletins, and Letters PAGE 1. Soult's Proclamation on Buonaparte's Return prom Elba, March 8 263 2. Napoleon to Davout, May 30 . . . . . 264 3. Napoleon to Davout, June 3 .... . 264 4. Napoleon to Soult, June 7 .... . 264 5. Napoleon to Davout, June 11 . . . . . 265 6. Napoleon's Order of the Day, June 13 . . . 265 7. Napoleon's Proclamation to the ARMi:E du Nord, June 14 ........ . 267 8. Napoleon's March Orders for the AemSe du Nord, June 14 268 9. Lefebvrb-Desnoettes' Report to Ney, June 15 . 273 10. Ney's Report to Soult, June 15 ... . 274 11. Wellington to General Sir H. Clinton, 1 p.m., June 15, 1815 .275 12. Orders foe the Movement of the Anqlo-Dutch Army, June 15 275 13. Orders for the Movement of the Anglo-Dutch Army, After Orders, June 15 . . . . . . 278 14. Disposition of the Anglo-Dutch Army at 7 a.m., June 16 279 15. Napoleon to Ney, June 16 ..... 280 16. Soult to Vandammb, June 16 .... . 282 17. Napoleon to Grouchy, June 16 .... 283 18. Ney to Soult, June 16 284 19. Wellington to Bluchbr, June 16 ... . 285 20. Soult to Ney, 10 a.m., June 16 .... 285 21. Soult to Ney, 2 p.m., June 16 286 22. Soult to Ney, 3.15 p.m., June 16 . . . .286 23. Ney to Soult, 10 p.m., June 16 .... 287 24. Soult to Ney, 7-8 a.m., June 17 . . . .288 25. Soult to Ney, noon, June 17 .... . 289 26. Wellington to Hill, June 17 . . . . . 290 27. Wellington's Orders, June 17 . . . . . 291 28. Grouchy to Napoleon, 10 p.m., June 17 . . . 292 29. Soult to Grouchy, 10 a.m., June 18 . . . . 293 30. Grouchy to Napoleon, 3 a.m., June 18 . . . 293 31. Soult to Grouchy, 1 p.m., June 18 . . . . 294 32. Grouchy to Napoleon, 11 a.m., June 18 . . . 295 33. Napoleon's Orders to Ney, June 18 . . . . 296 34. Napoleon's Attack Orders, 11 a.m., June 18 . . 297 35. Napoleon to King Joseph, June 19 . . . . 298 36. Napoleon's Farewell Address to his Army, June 25 . 298 viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Letters re Napoleon's Execution PAGE 37. I Gneisenatj to Muffling, June 27 ... . 299 38. J Gneisenau to Muffling, June 27 ... . 299 39. j Gneisenau to Muffling, June 29 ... . 300 40. i Gneisenau to Muffling, June 29 ... . 300 41. Marshal Ney's account of the Campaign, June 26 .301 42. Marshal Grouchy's Beport to the Emperor, June 20 306 43. Army Bulletin, June 16 . . . . . . 308 44. Army Bulletin, June 20. (Napoleon's account of the campaign) ........ 310 45. Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar to his Father (Letter) June 19 316 46. Private John Lewis, 95th Rifles (Letter), July 8 .319 LIST OF MAPS AND SKETCHES IN VOL. II No. 5. The Battle of Waterloo. June 18, 1815 To face page 1 5a. The Battle of Waterloo, showing Prussian Attack 6. The Action of Wavre. 4 p.m., June 18, 1815 6a. The Action of Wavre. 4 a.m., June 19, 1815' Sketches (with reference to the Battle of Waterloo) 1. Plan of Hougoumont 2. Plan of La Haye Sainte 3. Plan showing formation of Altbn's, 3rd (British) Division, ON June 18 Sketches 1, 2, and 3, and Maps 5a, 6, and 6a at end of Vol. II. 90000 M^ Si Jean Mi S^ Jean Farm S S g = 1; Wavre ffosd ia fiaye Sainte § ■ O 0-0 I La Be//e A//iance ,Oecoster!s Farm O r 3i« CD -T* g- I J ffossomme (a O. O o Mai son du /foi Le Ca/7/ou (/mpi Hi qcf) +^ H X m DO _ > « H H q r m e 3- C- c -n Z f1 ^ 00 > 01 H m o o _l en LU 1- lO < 00 5 z U- 3 O 4-( CO Ixl r _l E — of O — « < ^ GQ LU X 1- ? 00 E o L&s Champs de Bataille. Hiatoriques de la Belgique, II, 1815, L. Navez. CHAPTER V THE DIVISION OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO INTO PHASES The ground is cleared, and the great battle itself must be considered. To understand it more easily, it is convenient to divide it into five phases, as follows : — ' First Phase — 11.30 a.m. Commencement of the battle with the attack on Hougoumont, the Allied right, made by Reille's Corps. This was a side issue ; the first appearance of the Prussians in force synchronised with the closing of this phase. Second Phase — 1.30 p.m. The attack on the Allied left centre by D'Erlon's Corps. Third Phase — about 4 p.m. The great cavalry attacks on Wellington's position between the two farms of Hougou- mont and La Haye Sainte ; Billow's first attack, against the French right, was launched at the commencement of this phase. Fourth Phase — 6 p.m. The capture of the tactical key of Wellington's position — ^the farm of La Haye Sainte — by the wrecks of D'Erlon's Corps. The Prussian Corps of Pirch I and Zieten now commenced to debouch on to the battle-field. Fifth Phase — 7.30 p.m. Napoleon's general assault on Wellington's position, culminating in an attack by the Imperial Guard. The final crisis was reached by 7.45 p.m., and the repulse of the Guard and defeat of the French Army was decided by 8 p.m. At 9.15 p.m. Blticher and Wellington met, and the great battle was at an end. Immediately the Armee du Nord gave way the Allies pushed forward at all points, and an immediate and relent- less pursuit was opened by the Prussians, who drove the beaten wrecks before them, Hke chaff before the wind ; and ' I have followed in outline General Kennedy's masterly sub- division of this great battle into phases. 47 48 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO although it would be wrong, to call the pursuit a phase of the battle, yet it placed the crown on the Victors' triumph so indubitably, that it must receive mention here in the suggested arrangement and division of the great battle. This closing scene took place after 9.15 p.m. The rout of the Armee du Nord was most pronounced, and the Prussian pursuit, led by Gneisenau, which reaped the fruits of the great victory, finally drove the rudderless horde of fugitives over the Sambre. The five phases were quite distinct and well-defined ; for they were separated by intervals, in which merely a hot cannonade was sustained, but unsupported by any other action of the troops. Naturally there was no interval whatever between the rout and the pursuit ; for, when Napoleon's main battle gave way, the pursuit was at once opened and the Allies surging forward at last completed their triumph. The only dividing line between these two acts was the failure of the Guard, and Zieten's irruption through the north-east angle of the French front. These facts proclaimed that the battle was over, and it only remained to gamer in the spoils of the great victory. It will be remarked that the first four phases only dis- close what were, at most, partial attacks ; and, further, they were attacks in which the three arms — Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry — did not co-operate thoroughly with, and mutually aid, each other, as Napoleon had taught con- sistently that they should do. An experienced eye-witness (Sir A. Frazer, e.h.a.), said, " Had Napoleon supported his first cavalry attacks on both flanks by masses of infantry, he had gained the day.''^ All the available evidence, and what is now known of the course of the great battle, confirms and strengthens Sir Augustus' opinion. Thus the conduct of this, his last battle, appears somewhat unworthy of Napoleon, and the great and well-deserved reputation that he had acquired of hand- ling masses of men in a general action. Note.— It is interesting to note that the name, Waterloo, was not marked on some of the maps used by Wellington's officers. Sir A. Frazer, commanding Royal Horse Artillery, 1 Letters, p. 552. June 20. THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 49 writing from Brussels at 6 a.m., on June 16 (p. 536) stated : ..." I have just learned that the Duke moves in half an hour. Wood (Colonel Sir George Wood, commanding Royal Artillery) thinks to Waterloo, which we cannot find on the map ; this is the old story over again. I have sent Bell (Lieut. W. Bell, Staff Officer, R.A.) to Delancey's office, where we shall learn the real name, etc. . . ." It is also said that Tilly was not shown on the Prussian maps, and that Gneisenau added Wavre to his orders on June 17, in order to make clear the line of the Prussian withdrawal. In more recent times there are many officers who have had a similar experience to that of Sir Augustus Frazer. Maps of various theatres of operations are not always complete, even to-day. II. — E CHAPTER VI THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO^ (iSee Maps 5 and 5a) (a) First Phase— from 11.30 a.m. The Attack on Hoiigou- mont, and the Appearance of the Prussians. Eleven o'clock had sounded some time before from the Plancenoit clock-tower, when Napoleon took up his position near Rossomme ; and the action opened about 11.30 a.m., with the launching of an attack against Hougoumont. As the French advanced, skirmishers were thrown forward and covered the French left wing, the batteries also moved rapidly to take up suitable positions so as to cover the attack by their fire. The weather grew brighter, and the imposing array of Napoleon's Army distinctly impressed the spectators who were situated in Wellington's position. 1 This account is principally based on : — M. Houssaye's Waterloo, 1815 (pp. 335-445) ; Colonel Grouard's Critique de 1815 (pp. 143-177) ; Hippolyte de Mauduit, Derniers Jours de la Grande Armie (II, pp. 235-465) ; General Kennedy's Battle of Waterloo (pp. 97-150) ; Colonel Chesney's Waterloo Lectures (pp. 172-226) ; LeUers of Sir A. Frazer (pp. 543-561) ; Journal of Captain Mercer (I, pp. 291-337) ; Colonel Tomkinson's Diary of a Cavalry Officer (pp. 288-317) ; General von Muffling's Passages from My Life (pp. 241-252) ; L. Navez's Champs de Bataille (pp. 162-242 and 453-462) ; Sibome's Waterloo ; Waterloo Letters ; Beamish's History of the K.Q.L. (II, pp. 343-385) ; Jones' Battle of Waterloo. And also on Napoleon's account (Appendix II, No. 44) ; together with Blilcher's account, and also that submitted by the Duke of Wellington, given in the Wellington Despatches (ed. 1838, XII, pp. 478-487). The positions of the Troops (on the two maps of the battle) are based on Commentaires de NapoUon I'r (Carte 31) ; and also on Kausler (Map 121) and Siborne (Maps 6 and 7). The outline of the ground shown in the section is based on the Belgian Survey, scale ^ ^I d^ . The groundwork of Map 5 is based also on the -^xm Belgian Survey of the Field of Waterloo ; and the trees are put in from Craan's Survey (1816). SO BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 1st PHASE 51 Such masses, and such uniformity and regularity of move- ment, had not been seen in the Peninsula, for there the broken and difficult country had rarely allowed the French to form up in a uniform order of battle. The sight, on this morning in mid-June, 1815, was an unaccustomed one, and indescribably grand. (Batty, p. 88.) To cover this movement, one of the Divisional Batteries of the II Corps (Reille) opened fire at about 11.30 a.m., on Wellington's position ; and some British batteries, in action to the east of the Nivelles road, at once responded.* A brisk duel broke out between the British guns and some French batteries who endeavoured to silence them. But the British gunners realised which target was of the greatest tactical importance at the moment, and kept up a steady fire on Prince Jerome's infantry. The guns were well handled, fought, and served ; and the officers personally laid the pieces with unerring aim. One French column, indeed, was broken up by howitzer shells. (Batty, p. 89.) Prince J6r6me's Division advanced against Hougou- mont ; and after some fighting the copse and field were carried by the assailants, but the defenders held tenaciously to the buildings and the gardens, and attack after attack was beaten off with loss. Despite the serious fighting that occurred in this part of the field it can only be called a side- issue. The underlying idea being, obviously, to distract Wellington's attention from the vital spot — his centre ; and to induce the Duke to weaken his centre by detaching troops to support and rally his right. The Emperor's orders certainly point to the fact that he did not anticipate, or desire, a result to be achieved on this flank ; but, on the contrary, he desired that the forces engaged should neutra- lise a considerable portion of Wellington's force ; in other words, he aimed at putting out his capital to good interest. * There were apparently two claimants for the honour of firing the first shot from Wellington's position — Major Bull's Troop of Horse Artillery (now " I," R.H.A.), and Captain Sandham's Field Brigade (now 7th Battery, R.F.A.) ; at any rate the first round (it was a spherical case) from our guns was effective, for it occasioned three easualties in the /«'' Liger of Prince J6r6me's Division. It would appear that in all probability the honour must be accorded to Bull's Troop. In the Reminiscences of the Duke of Wellington by the Earl of EUesmere, on p. 105, it is stated : " The present Lord Bokeby was close to the gun, one of Captain Bull's howitzers, from which the first shot of the battle was fired." 52 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Unfortunately for the French, the very opposite result oc- curred, and Prince Jerome engaged in a murderous struggle which went entirely in favour of the Anglo-Dutch Army ; for the garrison of Hougoumont had fortified the post, and made a skilful use of cover in its defence. Hence, the com- paratively small body of defenders successfully kept em- ployed around the Chateau a very superior number of assailants, and the latter were continually reinforced by fresh troops, who were drawn into the vortex of strife that soon raged around the blazing buildings ; for it was not long before one of the Brigades of Foy's Division was attracted to the spot, and swallowed up in the profitless fray. So as to clear the wood around the Chateau, and destroy the latter, howitzers should have been brought into action against the post from the outset.* But as matters turned out the attacks were conducted most unskilfully, albeit most courageously, and very heavy losses were experi- enced ; but as the Duke never had occasion to reinforce his right seriously, no compensating advantages occurred, and the French troops on the left were thus squandered without affecting the issue. On the French side Reille's Batteries had opened fire to cover the advance of the assaulting troops ; and, on the Emperor's order, Kellermann's two Horse Artillery Batteries were pushed up into the line of guns which were in action to the south of Hougoumont. The cannonade soon grew in intensity, and more guns also opened fire from Wellington's position. Nor was Fire's Horse Battery idle ; it came into action on a small rise of ground near the Nivelles road, and opened a galling enfilade fire against the batteries that were in action immediately to the north- ward, and who were already engaged in repelling the French Infantry attacks, and thus afforded a fine target. (Sibome, pp. 235-239.) But it was not until 2.45 p.m. (during the second phase) that the Chateau burst out in flames, and formed, as Colonel Sir A. Frazer said, " a striking feature in this murderous scene." However, the garrison undauntedly held on to the blazing 1 This happened later, on Napoleon's own order, and good results were obtained from their practice ; but by then the mischief was done. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 1st PHASE 53 buildings, and were never dislodged. The intensity of the musketry fire around Hougoumont may be gauged from the fact that " the trees in advance of the Chateau were cut to pieces by musketry, "i The smoke from the burning buildings gradually drifted back into the Allied position, for the light variable wind set from the French position towards the Anglo-Dutch, and the smoke, as it was wafted back, proved a great em- barrassment, for it prevented any clear or extended view of what was going on.^ Further, the smoke from the guns and musketry naturally added to the dense pall that soon settled over Wellington's position. About noon, Captain Mercer, waiting in reserve with his Horse Artillery troop near the farm of Mt. S. Jean, received an order through the Adjutant of the Horse Artillery (Lieut. Bell) to move his troop to the right of Wellington's second line. Captain Mercer accordingly brought his guns into action facing towards Nivelles, to the east of the Nivelles road, and about 1000 yards to the north of the farmhouse of Hougoumont. The guns were unlimbered immediately in front of our 14th Regiment, whose men were lying down in square. Thus posted the troop were annoyed by some French 4-pounders (in action 1300 yards off and to the west of Hougoumont), as well as by howitzer shells fitted with long fuses, whilst the French round shot sailing over the main position often ended among our troops in the second line. However, the Duke's orders were direct and clear, Captain Mercer's troop was to observe Fire's Cavalry, and the troop was not to fire unless the French horsemen attempted to close. But Captain Mercer became impatient, and he opened a slow fire on the French 4-pounders, expect- ing to gain an easy mastery over them by sheer weight of metal. To his surprise, the very first round drew the fire of six heavier and larger calibre pieces, which had been carefully concealed to the east of the 4-pounders. Captain Mercer recog- nised his blunder and promptly ceased firing, the French heavy guns acted in the same way, whilst the 4-pounders kept up their annoying cannonade. This flagrant dis- 1 Tomkinson, p. 318. The oak tree that was out through by bullets in the Bloody Angle at Spottsylvania in 1864, will be recalled instinctively. ^ ReminiBcencee, pp. 172-173; also Batty, p. 100. 54 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO obedience of orders had not passed unnoticed, for the Duke himself had seen a projectile from one of our guns strike a French 4-pounder, and he sent in haste to have the com- mander (Captain Sandham) of a neighbouring Field Brigade placed under arrest. Fortunately Captain Sandham was able to offer a satisfactory explanation, and the real offender was never identified until Captain Mercer's Journal was published in 1870. Fortune, however, was kind to Captain Mercer, on June 18, for she gave him a chance during the stress of the battle to retrieve his earlier fault ; meanwhile Captain Mercer's troop remained in a position of observation in front of the 14th Regiment, until finally Colonel Sir A. Frazer,R.H.A., came to lead them to a position in the first line.^ During this fighting the preparations were proceeded with for launching D'Erlon's advance against Wellington's left centre. To prepare the way for this attack, the Emperor brought into action a great battery of 84 guns, and massed them along the spur that ran eastwards athwart the Charle- roi road, and about 250 yards from La Haye Sainte. The battery was composed of the twenty 12-pounders of the II and VI Corps, forty 8-pounders of the I Corps, and twenty-four 12-pounders from the Guard — the Emperor's " beautiful daughters." To prepare the selected section of the position for attack this great battery opened fire about midday against Wellington's line, and soon a furious cannonade was raging.^ It was the sound of these guns that attracted the attention of Grouchy and his officers at Walhain, and convinced them that a serious action was raging in front of the Forest of Soignes, and not merely a rear-guard affair ; the fire opened by the few stray batteries that were engaged in pounding Hougoumont could not have had the same effect. ' Mercer's Journal, I, pp. 297-303. 2 There is no doubt that this battery opened about noon, and not aa late as 1 p.m. The Emperor always believed in a thorough artillery preparation, and half an hour would have been quite inadequate for this. Further, Kennedy (p. 102) stated : " This attack (on Hougoumont) was unaccompanied with any other, except that of a general cannonade on the centre of the Anglo- Allied line " ; and he was speaking of the commencement of the action. Also the redoubled roar of a cannonade, which came to Grouchy's ears about noon on this eventful day, must not be forgotten ; of course this was the great battery opening fire. (II, 159.) Gourgaud (p. 96) also stated: " It was noon when eighty guns opened fire." This must have been the big battery settling down to its task. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 1st PHASE 55 It was now that Grouchy's second letter, written from Gembloux, at 3 a.m.,» reached the Emperor. The Marshal reported that he considered the Prussians were moving on Brussels ; and being necessarily ignorant (when he wrote the letter) of Wellington's stand at Mt. S. Jean, the conclusion was warrantable enough. But Napoleon had Wellington in front of him, and to the south of the Forest of Soignes, and Mt. S. Jean would surely have appeared a more likely objective for Bliicher than Brussels, if the latter was ready once more to take a hand in the game, and prepared to abandon his line with Li^ge. Napoleon evinced no hurry to answer Grouchy's despatch. It was not until about 1 p.m. that Soult commenced a letter,^ which informed Grouchy that his advance on Corbais and Wavre was conformable to His Majesty's arrangements. No precise instructions were given to Grouchy to seize any especial points, such as the Dyle passages at Mousty and Ottignies. Doubt- less the Emperor realised that this letter could not reach Grouchy before 4 or 5 p.m., and thus could not influence his operations on June 18. Further, Grouchy was a Marshal, and on his own initiative would have taken such an obvious course already. However, the letter was not despatched immediately ; and the Emperor shortly had to add a post- script containing somewhat disquieting information. The fire of the big French battery had been replied to by the AUied guns, which were in action in front of their left wing, and a deafening cannonade broke out and raged for some time. Although Wellington's Infantry in this quarter was somewhat sheltered by the crest of the ridge, yet, necessarily they were posted sufficiently near to their own artillery to render the position of the Anglo-Dutch Infantry a very dangerous one. For projectiles that missed the guns only too frequently tore through the infantry columns in rear. But, to have drawn back the infantry, to a really safe position, would have been merely to expose the guns to the risk of immediate capture, by the French Cavalry, who were close at hand. (Batty, p. 92.) It was now that the discipline and the dogged nature of Wellington's best troops stood them in such good stead, for the fire was " so terrible, as to strike with awe the oldest veteran in the field."' ' Appendix H, No. 30. ^ Ibid., No. 31. ^ Letters of a Britiah Officer. 56 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO It was at 1 p.m. when Ney was ready to attack, and the Marshal Prince of La Moskowa merely awaited the Emperor's order to lead D'Erlon's Corps against Wellington's left centre, and storm the advanced posts of La Haye Sainte and the sand-pit. The position, too, had been as well prepared as it was possible to do it by the hour's bombard- ment to which it had been subjected by the great French battery. Wellington's deft arrangements of course had neutralised the effect to a certain extent ; but further cannonading was hardly necessary, and the greatest result would be more quickly achieved by an attack in force on Wellington's left centre. But before Napoleon launched this attack, and the battle-field had become enshrouded in the smoke-pall from the musketry, the Emperor cast his eye over the field ; and lastly looking north-eastward he saw what ap- peared to be a dense black cloud emerging from the woods of Chapelle S. Lambert. Opinions on the Imperial Staff varied as to its composition ; ^ but soon it was evident that it was composed of troops, although it was by no means certain of what strength or nationality they were. A reconnaissance was despatched ; and soon afterwards all doubts as to the Prussian intentions were set at rest. For a prisoner (a Prussian orderly officer, the bearer of a despatch) who was brought in, made clear that the troops were Btilow's advanced guard, and that the IV Prussian Corps was hasten- ing to Wellington's assistance." Napoleon realised that • Despite the fact that the Staff levelled their glasses at the appari- tion, many contended that it was only trees ! Others were even absurdly exact. ^ The Prussian advanced troops had been seen much earlier by some of the troops on Wellington's left. For Lieut. Ingilby, b.h.a. (of Sir Bobert Gardiner's Troop) stated that at the opening of the battle he could distinguish through his glasses a stationary patrol of Prussians, perched on an eminence to his left and some distance away {Waterloo Letters, No. 82). Sir R. Gardiner's Troop was attached to Sir H. Vivian's (6th) Cavalry Brigade (10th and 18th Hussars, and 1st Hussars, K.G.L.), and was therefore on the extreme left of Welling- ton's Une, when the battle opened. Also Colonel Taylor, 10th Hussars {Waterloo Letters, No. 75), who was in command of his squadron on picket early on June 18, above Papelotte, received a Prussian patrol under an officer ; the latter requested Colonel Taylor to inform the Duke of Wellington that General Billow's Corps was advancing to his assistance, and was only about three-quarters of a league away. Lieut. Lindsey, 10th Hiissars, was sent therefore to head-quarters with this intelUgenee, and the Prussian patrol retxirned. This all occurred some little time before the action opened. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 1st PHASE 57 the matter had become comphcated ; it was no longer a simple affair with Wellington, but he would have to reckon with Btilow's Corps of 30,000 fresh troops (which had not been engaged at Ligny) closing round his right flank. Further, as the prisoner had owned that all Bliicher's Army had spent the previous night at Wavre, it was quite possible that Bliicher would intervene in the battle in full strength. But still Napoleon was undismayed. He would involve Btilow in Wellington's rout, the greater the army presented to him, the greater glory he could gain from the victory. He never appears to have contemplated breaking off such an unequal combat. But Soult's letter to Grouchy not having been despatched a postscript was added, ^ which warned the Marshal that Biilow had been sighted and that he was threatening the Emperor's right ; and at last Marshal Grouchy was ordered definitely to draw near to Napoleon and to crush the Prussians who would be caught in the very act of concentrating with Wellinf^on. At last Napoleon saw the truth, and issued precise and correct orders to meet the critical danger, but it was twelve hours too late. By the time Grouchy could render effectual aid the Grand Army would have fought its last battle, for unless the Marshal had already acted with great initiative, and was crossing the Dyle at Mousty to join the Emperor, it would be impossible for him to receive the order at Wavre and then march to La Belle Alliance, so as to reach the latter place before 9 or 10 p.m. at earliest. By then the day would be decided. The past twelve to eighteen hours had been demanding that Grouchy should co-operate on the left bank of the Dyle ; but, now that the manoeuvre was ordained, the time necessary to execute it had passed by. It was 1.30 p.m. Despite the apparition of the Prussians, Napoleon gave the order to Marshal Ney to commence the attack forthwith ; for the Emperor meant to ruin the Anglo-Dutch Army before the Prussians arrived in force. Nevertheless he considered that Btilow could not be neglected ; and he ordered Demon's and Subervie's Light Cavalry Divisions to move to the right, co^'er the exposed flank and watch the Prussians ; and shortly after he directed Lobau to take his two divisions of the VI Corps — Jannin's and Simmer's — and support the Light Cavalry. 1 Appendix II, No. 31. 58 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO The directions given to Lobau appear to have been that the General was to take up a good intermediate position where his 10,000 men could stop the advance of Billow's '30,000, if such action became needful (much as Davout's 10,000 had held up 40,000 Russians at Austerlitz in 1805), and from which Lobau could assail Biilow vigorously as soon as Grouchy's guns were heard thundering in rear of the Prussian Corps, announcing the fact that the troops which the Marshal had detached had come up behind their foe, and had caught Biilow " en flagrant delit de concen- tration." Nevertheless the detachment of Lobau is not easy to explain ; for as yet the Prussian danger was by no means immediate ; and it could have been guarded against best by a Napoleonic stroke, — by smashing in, or rolling up, Wellington's line with the least delay ; in such an eventu- ality the circumspection of the Prussian Generals would have forbidden them to strike, for then they would have risked being involved in Wellington's certain destruction. But, to drive in Wellington's centre, every available man was required. Consequently to detach Lobau, at this moment, was to weaken unduly the French reserves, and to spoil the symmetry of Napoleon's magnificently simple battle formation. As the circumstances had changed so much, it might have been wiser not to let Lobau move in rear of D'Erlon's left, but rather to advance in echelon behind the right of the I Corps. Thus placed the VI Corps could strike at Wellington's left, if the Prussians remained mere onlookers ; or, if they became an active danger, Lobau would be well placed to wheel up rapidly and cover D'Erlon's right with the VI Corps. But, if the Prussians were content to remain passive spectators, then reserve might have been piled on reserve to compel the decision— Lobau supporting D'Erlon, and being in turn backed up by the Young Guard, as well as by Domon's and Subervie's Cavalry, Lefebvre-Desnoettes' Light Horse of the Guard, and by the steel-clad mass of Milhaud's Cuiras- siers. Launched with impetuous fury against the Anglo- Dutch left, carried forward with the unsurpassed Man of French troops in attack, these repeated sledge-hammer blows might have overwhelmed Wellington's Army. At any rate this was no time for half-measures ; the time had come BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 1st PHASE 59 when, if he wished to compel victory, Napoleon must risk all to gain all ; and he must hammer all along Wellington's line with tremendous energy, envelop the Anglo-Dutch left, and grudge every man not employed in this main action. But, as matters turned out, Lobau merely drew out at right angles to the French front, between Plancenoit and the Paris Wood, and here for over three hours he was im- mobilised and wasted — ^for the Prussians did not come on seriously until 4 p.m., and probably were not really dangerous until 5 p.m. ; and it was not Lobau's presence that delayed their advance, but their natural hesitation to commence an action fraught with such dangerous possibilities for them- selves. At first sight it appears that Napoleon had observed and obeyed his own maxim, which ran, " The Art of War consists, although your army is actually numerically less than the enemy's, yet in having disposable, at the place where you attack him, a real numerical superiority, and the same appUes where the enemy attacks you." This is the maxim which underlies the meaning of " economy of force." Of course, it means economy on the whole transaction ; in other words, it entails cutting down all secondary detach- ments to the irreducible minimum, so as to appear in crushing superiority at the decisive point and at the correct time. Judged by this standard, those who run and read, may run off with the idea that the detachment of Lobau with 10,000 men was justifiable enough to hold Billow's 30,000 in check, whilst Napoleon drove Wellington from his position. But the attendant circumstances must be given full weight. There was no immediate danger, and it was now essential to crush Wellington at once ; if this was done it would settle all the difficulties automatically and immedi- ately. Napoleon would need every disposable man, horse, and gun to crush Wellington and his stubborn and in- domitable troops ; and the essential was to achieve this task before the Prussians could nerve themselves to take the plunge and engage. Judged by this, the really Napoleonic standard, the detachment of 10,000 to hold 30,000 in play, was unjustifiable at this critical juncture. It proved con- clusively that Napoleon was no longer the Napoleon of Austerlitz ; the sun still shone, but his power was waning visibly — he was about to sink. As a matter of fact, for the moment, one of Jacquinot's Cavalry Regiments would have 60 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO been sufficient to keep touch with the Prussians, and such an arrangement would have left 10,000 more men, horse and foot, at Napoleon's disposal to effect the essential — Wellington's overthrow in the short time-limit that was vouchsafed to him. But Napoleon was undismayed and still confident, and turning to Soult he remarked : " This morning we had ninety chances in our favour ; even now we have sixty chances in our favour, and but forty against us." His excess of confidence, in what were his waning powers, made him unduly optimistic. Thus ended the first phase of the great battle. So far, the fighting had gone a little in favour of Wellington, also the arrival of the Prussians in the vicinity of the field to a certain extent had changed the balance of the strategical situation, but nothing was as yet comprised so far as Napoleon was concerned. CHAPTER VII THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO {b) Second Phase— from 1.30 -p.m., D'Erlon's Attack on Wellin^orCs Left Centre. After about IJ hours cannonading the great French battery suspended its fire momentarily to allow D'Erlon's Corps to advance. When the two armies originally formed up, some 1300 yards had separated the two combatants, and D'Erlon's Corps had to traverse about this distance. How- ever, the unevenness of the ground, which dipped towards the centre, gave some partial cover to the French troops as they pressed forward. This advantage was neutralised to a certain extent by the formation that D'Erlon's Corps adopted. The formation used by the I Corps for the advance was undeniably clumsy ; for of the four divisions, which formed the corps, no less than three — ^those of Donzelot, Quiot (AUix), and Marcognet — advanced with their batta- lions deployed in line, and formed one behind the other ; thus each division, about 5000 strong, moved forward with a front no greater than that of one deployed battalion. Apparently, on his own initiative, Durutte, the remaining divisional commander, adopted a less clumsy formation, for he formed his two Brigades in a similar fashion, and thus at once halved the depth of the mass, and doubled the frontage and fire-power. His formation was by no means perfect, but at any rate it was deployable under fire ; and it was somewhat significant that Durutte gained the greatest success of the venture, he did seize Papelotte. It is essential to pause and consider how this forma- tion came to be used by D'Erlon in his attack, for it cannot be denied that Napoleon, Ney, and D'Erlon were all very experienced officers, and little likely to make a gross mistake in an elementary matter of this kind. Further, it is im- possible to fix any blame on Napoleon for the formation 61 62 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO which his troops used at Waterloo. He was the Com- mander-in-Chief, and the exact formation used by his troops in battle was not, at the moment, his affair. Had it been so, he could not be ranked higher than a mere sergent de bataille. For a Commander-in-Chief gives orders to his subordinates as to what they are to do ; he does not inform them how they are to do it. The conception is his business, mere details of execution are their affair. As a matter of fact, Colonel Grouard considers that it was probably the word " Division " that was the primary cause of all the trouble and confusion. This word, in the French military phraseology of the period, had a double connotation. The formation probably ordered in this case was Colonne de hataillon par divisions — which meant that all the battalions would go forward side by side, at deploying interval, and each on a double company [Division) front ; a formation that had everything to recommend it. It was easily con- trollable, could work across any ground, or through the debris of a fight ; could be deployed into line under fire ; moreover it presented a small target, and could change to square readily, if charged suddenly by cavalry.^ But owing probably to some mistake, which crept in during the trans- mission of the order, it reached the Divisional Commander thus transposed — Colonne de Division par hataillon — this was the formation which was actually used ; and which can 1 It must not be assumed that the French wished to attack in columns. That was not their idea. The column formation in the Napoleonic wars was used simply for manoeuvre, and for advancing to the attack. The French columns were always intended to be deployed when they reached decisive range, so as to develop their fire-power. For, as Napoleon knew, battles are won by fire ; and not being deficient in sense he had no idea of neutralising the fire of seven-eighths of his infantry at the crisis of a battle, because such procedure would have ensured the loss of the battle. On the other hand, he was not concerned with keeping his men out of hospital. He was there to gain a decision and his methods were eloquent of his desires. Consequently D'Erlon's Corps were intended to advance in column until they closed with Wellington's Army and required to develop their own fire-power ; then at the psychological moment they would deploy, engage in a murderous fire-fight with Wellington's men, and give Napoleon the chance to strike the great blow once Wellington was immobilised. Missing, however, the moment when they could have deployed, the columns were caught at a hideous disadvantage by the deployed hne which stood waiting to receive them; and then, owing to their unwieldy size, deployment under fire became virtually impossible. (I have gone into this question of " Column and Line, 179.3-1815 " more fully in Appendix I, " An Introduction to the History of Tactics, 1740-1905 "). BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 2nd PHASE 63 only be described as a mass which it was impossible to deploy under a close fire. But why this formation was adopted without comment arose from another fact — heavy columns had previously been used for advance at Friedland, and at Wagram (to mention but two classic instances), and their use had passed unnoticed and unchecked by Napoleon, and thus the practice had crept in. It would be too much to say that this formation, used by D'Erlon's Corps at Waterloo, was account- able for the disaster that occurred, or that had the other formation been used then Napoleon must have triumphed. But the formation was responsible for the loss that Was experienced by the corps in men, and more important still in moral. These losses also were accentuated no doubt by the tardy support that was accorded to D'Erlon by the French Cavalry. Given that Domon and Subervie (with Lobau) were employed in watching the Prussians, yet Milhaud was still available ; and had he been directed (as Kellermann was at Marengo) to second and support the infantry attack, with every means in his power, then the British Cavalry charge would not have fallen on D'Erlon's surprised and fully engaged infantry, but would have been met by the Cuirassiers with a furious counter-charge ; and, whatever the outcome, the French Cavalry would have shielded their infantry from the full force of a storm which, as it was, caught them unprepared. Nevertheless, be that as it may, D'Erlon's Corps did advance using a formation that is only comparable to a Greek phalanx — which indeed it equalled in clumsiness, and probably surpassed in depth. ^ But, what was more important, the Anglo-Dutch line of battle was but ill-prepared by Napoleon's guns, thanks to Wellington's skill in using so deftly the brow of the ridge to shield his troops. Consequently, the endurance of the Anglo-Dutch had not been overcome, their tenacity was still unshaken. Hence, the fully developed fire-power of infantry at close range was required to overwhelm Wellington's * A Greek phalanx was 16 ranks deep, without interval. But the arm of the Greeks was a 22-ft. spear ; and as they were armed with pikes, the formation one would expect them to adopt was a deep formation ; for it is the armament in use which dictates the actual formation to be adopted, so that the especial quahties of the armament may be brought out and utilised to the utmost. (See " Infantry Fire Formations," by Colonel Hime, B.A., in Stray Military Papers.) 64 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO line, and prepare it for the swift, decisive stroke ; thus the columns would have to deploy, for they could not expect to force their way through the hostile battle-line, and to come out beyond, in hand, and ready to meet any eventu- ality. It was no question of keeping them in hand to meet Wellington's Reserves, for his main battle-line was still intact, and that was the objective. But to deploy within decisive range would be an almost impossible manoeuvre to accomplish, under the deadly, galling fire of the two-deep British line, as yet unshaken. To return to what occurred. As D'Erlon's Corps advanced they were met by a heavy fire, but they gallantly pushed on up the slope. As in all the attacks, so in this one " we worked their columns in advancing with every gun we could bring against them." In accordance with the Duke's orders fire was invariably reserved for the attacking cavalry or infantry, and the enemy's guns were neglected ; because good troops, as he knew, could not be shot away, and the decisive stroke to drive him from his position must be delivered by infantry or cavalry. Hence the objective, correctly selected for our guns, was that target which was of the greatest tactical importance at the time. An eye-witness said, " the manner their columns were cut up in making the attack was extra- ordinary, and the excellence of practice in artillery was never exceeded."! Confronting the extremities of the I Corps were two advanced posts which had to be captured before the Duke's line could be overcome ; they were Papelotte, and the key of the Anglo-Dutch position — the farm of La Haye Sainte. To the two flank divisions of the I Corps were entrusted therefore the task of reducing these places. Consequently Durutte headed for Papelotte, which he seized, whilst one Brigade of Donzelot's Division diverged to storm La Haye Sainte, and the remainder of the I Corps pushed on straight against Wellington's left centre. On the left of Donzelot's Brigade (whose objective was La Haye Sainte) moved Travers' Brigade of Cuirassiers (Corps of Kellermann), whose duty it was to cover D'Erlon's left, which otherwise would have been quite open to attack. • Both the quotations are taken from Colonel Tomkinson, p. 303. Artillery officers will realise and appreciate the value of the praise bestowed by this veteran cavalry officer and shrewd observer. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 2nd PHASE 65 This cavalry pounced on a German battalion (of Ompteda's Brigade) which was advancing towards La Haye Sainte to support Major Baring's post, and the Cuirassiers cut the battalion to pieces. But the incident led to no other result, because the assaulting infantry brigade had been met by a hot musketry fire, and failed ; for Donzelot's Infantry were unaccompanied by guns and they were not supported by artillery, whose function it should have been to blow a breach in the massive walls of the farm, pound the place to pieces, or set it on fire. Thus Donzelot's Division failed to storm La Haye Sainte, much as Prince Jerome had failed to carry the buildings at Hougoumont. It is true that the orchard and garden were taken by Donzelot's men ; but nothing further could be achieved after the garrison had retired into the build- ings. Whilst D'Erion was attacking Wellington's left centre, the Anglo-Dutch troops, in the main position to the west of the Charleroi road, were not engaged, except by a cannonade ; and to shelter themselves from its effects the troops were free to lie down on the reverse slope of the position. Meanwhile the remainder of D'Erlon's Corps (Donze- lot's remaining Brigade and AUix's and Marcognet's Divisions) had come under a hot fire as they climbed the low ridge. They struck first into the exposed Dutch-Belgian Brigade of Bijlandt, which had been subjected for some one and a half hours to the pitiless fire of the great French battery, and was already shaken, and in no state to stand a determined attack made by such very superior numbers. Further, Bijlandt's Brigade had suffered severely at Quatre Bras, and conse- quently was much reduced in strength. However, it stood firm until D'Erlon's Corps were close upon it, then it gave way. It turned about, and, bolting in disorder, dashed through Sir Thomas Picton's 5th (British) Division and pro- ceeded to place itself on the reverse slope of the position, where apparently it remained in permanent reserve for the rest of the day. But it must not be supposed that the Dutch-Belgian troops failed merely through a lack of courage. A study of history shows that these people can be most persevering and heroic in the support of any cause which appeals to II.— F 66 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO them. Hence the reason for their failure here, on June 18, must be sought elsewhere ; and in this campaign the reason is to be found in political causes ; they lacked confidence, and were fighting for a cause that they did not support cordially, and for which they were openly unwilling to oppose French troops. Hence on the whole they behaved rather feebly. But that von Bijlandt's Brigade had withstood one and a half hours' furious cannonading, at such short range, was to its great credit ; and proved the stubborn temper of these troops and their firm spirit. The lesson which this incident taught is obvious. The slight resistance offered by Bijlandt's Brigade to the ad- vancing French Infantry, who had not yet even deployed to develop their fire-power, showed how effectually Napoleon's preliminary bombardment always crushed the spirit of further resistance out of continental troops, before he sent in his infantry to win ; and consequently it had happened in many battles, as it had up to this moment at Waterloo, that the large columns (used for advance and manoeuvre) were not even called on to deploy, for the shattered enemy broke at their near approach. At such times a resolute advance, in a compact formation, with the men kept well in hand, would suffice, so long as the foe had fully exposed his troops to the French Artillery preparation — as in fact Bijlandt had done on June 18. Of course against defended villages the effect was often less ; also against British troops, posted as Wellington could post them, the effect of the bombard- ment was not unduly severe ; at any rate it was not nearly sufficient to damage their moral seriously, destroy their fighting spirit, or break down their stubbornness and powers of resistance. About this time the garrison of the sand-pit (95th Rifles), whose accurate fire had caused severe loss to the French and checked the advance of the skirmishers, found that their advanced post threatened to become untenable, on account of both its flanks being turned, therefore the three companies of the 95th fell back and joined the remainder of their battalion behind the Wavre road. It was immediately after these incidents that the French pressing on met Picton's Division (the dauntless Brigades of Kempt and Pack). Picton's Division was apparently only about 3600 muskets strong on June 18, owing to BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 2nd PHASE 67 the losses it had encountered at Quatre Bras, but its steadiness was unimpaired.' On its left were two Han- overian Brigades, mustering another 5000 muskets. Mere numbers favoured the French ; but the defenders could bring all their muskets into play, whereas the French failed to deploy at tliis crisis, although they naturally made an attempt to do so, and therefore they could not assert their great numerical superiority. Picton's troops were lining a hedge, and the fire they poured in, coupled with co-operating gun fire, caused the French to hesitate whilst they were still one hundred yards away. The gallant Picton gave a loud order to charge, then promptly dashed for- ward, and met his death (being shot through the head)^ ; but the engagement became general, and a tremendous musketry fight ensued.^ Donzelot's Brigade opposed Kempt, and Pack confronted Marcognet ; whilst Quiot (AUix) at- tempted to pass through the gap that existed between Pack and Kempt. Meanwhile the attempt which had been made to storm La Haye Sainte was partially successful. Major Baring's slender force had been compelled to relinquish the orchard, and to fall back upon the buildings. However, they were reinforced by the 1st Liineburg Battalion, and they succeeded in pressing back the French troops. But then a strong force of Cuirassiers threatened the orchard (for the surrounding hedge was no obstacle to determined horse- men) ; Major Baring once more determined to retire to 1 Sir T. Picton marched out of Brussels 5170 strong on June 16. The division lost 1569 men at Quatre Bras, and 1055 at Waterloo ; in other words, more than half its strength. (Gomm, p. 375.) ' General Picton had neglected to report a bad contusion that he had received at Quatre Bras, so anxious was he to be present at the Battle of Waterloo. The loss of this distinguished and heroic officer was a heavy one, both for the army, and for England. There is a tradition that Napoleon asked on the morning of June 18, " Oil est la division de Picton ? " Such remembrance from Napoleon was praise indeed. (Sibome, pp. 253-254). Sir T. Picton met his death close to one of the 9-pounder guDs of Captain Rogers' Field Brigade (now 54 Coy., R.G.A.), the brigade being in action close to the east of the cross-roads, and north of the Wavre cross-road. ' " Sir Denis Pack . . . galloped up to the 92nd, and . . . said, ' Ninety-second, you must charge ! All the troops in your front have given way.' The regiment [reduced to 220 men] answered the call with cheers. . . . Wlien the Scots Greys charged past the flanks of the 92nd, both regiments cheered, and joined in the heart- touching cry of ' Scotland for ever ! ' " — Letters from a British Officer, pp. 253- 254. (Letter dated June 24.) 68 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO the barn, particularly as the French Infantry had gained the garden. Unfortunately the Liineburg Battalion mis- appreciated the situation and attempted to retire to the main position ; and a part of the battalion succeeded in doing so. However, a portion of Major Baring's own battalion still maintained a grip on the farmhouse. Luckily, at this moment, the English Cavalry charged, the Cuiras- siers were beaten back, and the victorious horsemen fell on the French Infantry and nearly cut them to pieces. Im- mediately after the failure of the French attack Major Baring asked for a further reinforcement ; two companies of the 1st Light Battalion were sent up to him, and he proceeded to redistribute his garrison for the defence of the garden and the buildings — very wisely he made no further attempt to hold the orchard, for the force was too slender to hold so large a perimeter adequately, and it was far better to concentrate the force and their efforts, so as to maintain possession of the detached post. Meanwhile D'Erlon's main attack had fared no better. Although Donzelot's Brigade was worsted and forced back, yet there is no doubt that the situation was critical so far as Wellington was concerned. The Allied Infantry were fully engaged, their attention in each case was riveted on their immediate foes, and clouds of smoke covered the combatants and limited a distant view. The chance had come for cavalry to intervene effectually on either side ; and fortunately for Wellington it was Lord Anglesea who decided that he would engage his horsemen and clinch the matter. The British Cavalry General promptly ordered Somerset's and Ponsonby's Cavalry Brigades to charge the enemy, and placed himself at the head of Somerset's horse- men. The latter, moving to the west of the Charleroi road, crossed the Ohain road (the celebrated hollow way) and hurled themselves against Travers' Cuirassier Brigade — to facilitate the passage of their horsemen, the Allied Infantry, to the west of the Charleroi road, formed into squares and columns. Travers' Brigade was encountered on the ridge, and being completely overridden was forced back with considerable loss. This (as General Kennedy remarked) was probably the fairest cavalry fight that took place on June 18. In it two bodies of heavy cavalry met each other in perfect order. The ground was slightly in our favour, BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 2nd PHASE 69 but to reach the foe we had had to cross the Wavre road, by no means a considerable obstacle, but sufficient to loosen the formation of any but first-class troops. Meanwhile, Ponsonby's three gallant dragoon regiments, the Union Brigade (Royals, Greys, and Inniskillings), had achieved a startling and brUliant success. They swooped down on D'Erlon's Infantry, and surprised them whilst they were still fully engaged in their duel with Picton's Division. The Royals and Inniskillings overthrew Allix's Division, and the Scots Greys rode down Marcognet. In this charge of the Greys the 92nd Highlanders also participated. Major R. Winchester (then a Lieutenant in the 92nd Highlanders) wrote : " The Scots Greys came up at this moment, and doubling round our flanks and through our centre where openings were made for them, both regiments charged together calling out ' Scotland for ever,' and the Scots Greys actually walked over this column, and in less than three minutes it was totally destroyed . . ." (Waterloo Letters, No. 168.) The discomfited French Infantry, over whom this furious storm burst, were chased down the slope, losing heavily as they went in killed, wounded, prisoners, and prestige ; and finally they were swept back to their first position. In the victors' hands they left 3,000 prisoners, and also two of their prized eagles.^ But the time had come to draw rein. Unfortunately the very reverse happened, the charge was allowed to overreach itself, and the Union Brigade got out of hand, and swept on regardless of consequences, and — regardless of Napoleon. The horsemen, maddened by success, rode into the great French battery and began cutting down the gunners and stabbing the horses. It was this suicidal tendency, to be carried away by a first success, that undoubtedly caused the Duke of Wellington to lay down, as a general principle, that a general placed in a prearranged position could act within it according to his judgment ; but he might never pursue an enemy beyond the obstacle which bounded his position in front ; such obstacle had to be regarded as the limit, or boundary, of his inde- pendent sphere of action. (Miiffling, p. 245.) Judged by the handling of our cavalry at Waterloo it will be concluded that ' Captain A. K. Clark, Royal Dragoons, captured the eagle of the 105th Regiment of the Line (Division AUix) ; and Sergeant Ewart, Royal Scots Greys, captured the eagle of the 45th Regiment of the Line (Division Marcognet). 70 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO the Duke's rule was as sound as it was justifiable. The ruin of Ponsonby's Union Brigade, at this critical time, was a very serious misfortune indeed ; and it might have had very grave issues, but for Bliicher's intervention. On seeing these reckless British horsemen career amid his guns, Napoleon took prompt action ; and it was as effective as it was timely. For the mistake met with swift and heavy punishment, and Napoleon effectively retaliated by hurling on the British horsemen fresh cavalry from right and left — Jacquinot's Lancers and Farine's Cuiras- sier Brigade — and they made the reckless horsemen pay dearly for their first success. Back they were driven with fearful loss, leaving over one-third of their number behind, dead and disabled ; and their gallant leader, Major-General Sir W. Ponsonby, was killed. Colonel Tomkinson stated (p. 308) that the Household Brigade (Somerset) also followed up " their success in the same imprudent manner as the other Heavy Brigade had done after their charge. They suffered very much, but not, I think, to the same extent as the others." The Regiment (16th Light Dragoons) in which this officer commanded a troop, formed part of Vandeleur's Cavalry Brigade on Wellington's left ; and they witnessed the return of our discomfited cavalry after their repulse by the fresh French squadrons. The author described the scene thus (p. 301) : " On our moving out in front of the left of the position (they) were seen riding back to our line in parties of twenty and thirty, followed by the enemy, whose horses were not blown, and suffering greatly from theirs being scarcely able to move. On moving to support them we had to cross a deep lane, which broke us, and occasioned some confusion ; however, we got forward as quickly as possible, charged, and repulsed a body of lancers in pursuit of a party of the Scot- tish Greys. "1 Colonel Tomkinson estimated the effective * The lane crossed by the 16th must not be confused with that section of the hollow road crossed by the French Cavalry in their charges. For the Charleroi main road divided the two places in ques- tion. These lanes were of very varying depth, for the 12th Light Dragoons, on the left of the 16th, were not so much delayed with the lane. (This statement is based on the authority of the same writer.) In this manoeuvre, the Colonel of the 16th was severely woxmded by a musket ball fired probably by our own infantry, who had not per- ceived the advance of their own cavalry amid the smoke and excite- ment of the battle (the ball entered the Colonel's back and came out in front). BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 2nd PHASE 71 strength of the 2nd Cavahy Brigade (Ponsonby's) after this episode at " not above a squadron." Had they been content with their first great success, the loss would have been but trifling, and in such a case they would have been available to strike a great blow later in the day. But, despite these great losses, a tangible and visible effect had been obtained. For the result of these first two phases was that Reille's Corps was exhausting itself in a struggle around Hougou- mont, which promised to effect nothing of importance ; D'Erlon's Corps had failed signally to achieve its object, and had lost a quarter of its total strength, and much moral. But the second French attack had been directed against a far more vital point in the Anglo-Dutch line than Hougou- mont — the objective of the first assault. On the stability of Wellington's left virtually depended his connection with the Prussian Army ; and the Duke recognised that on this flank General von Muffling could be most effectively employed. The Prussian Attache, if placed on this flank, could direct the Prussian troops to their stations on the battle-field as they came up ; for Bliicher's Army were unacquainted with the topography of the field. Also it was essential that the Anglo-Dutch left, and the supporting Prussian troops, should act in complete accord, union, and cohesion. To ensure this end would require the immediate presence of a superior officer, well known to both armies, and one who was capable of taking upon himself considerable responsibility. The Duke's selection of General von Miiffling, to carry out these most important duties, was extremely wise ; and with these ends in view he (the Duke) referred the Generals of the Anglo-Dutch left to General von Muffling. The Prussian General took over his new duty almost at the same moment that General Picton was killed ; and from his new station he despatched officers con- tinuously to Marshal Blucher, so as to keep the latter duly informed of the state of affairs. It is necessary to explain why Picton 's Division did not immediately pursue the great advantage which they had gained over D'Erlon's badly mauled corps, and springing on the beaten troops with the bayonet complete the success they had gained. To have acted in such a manner, at this moment, would have been most unsound. Napoleon had 72 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO still ample reserves in hand, and dearly would he have made the 5th Division pay for such temerity ; and, by following up the success which the French troops must then have gained, the Emperor would naturally have forced the breach which he would have found in the left centre of Wellington's battle-line and the grim struggle would have been over. The Duke had foreseen the temptation to dash forward, which would assail any commander in the hour of a temporary triumph, and before the action opened the Generalissimo had issued stringent orders that no troops were to leave the positions assigned to them in order to follow up any temporary advantage. It was only by issuing such an order that the Duke could ensure that he should retain under his own hand the free disposal of all his troops. This would be impossible if subordinate generals were permitted to engage on their own initiative in independent, but subsidiary, enterprises. In consequence of this wise arrangement the 1st Corps were allowed to fall back unimpeded by any pursuit from the 5th Division ; and the latter at once resumed their original positions directly D'Erlon's Corps had been beaten off.i Also three companies of the 95th pushed out at once to the knoll in front, and reoccupied their old post at the sand-pit. Of course, Wellington's object was to retain his position until Blilcher could co-operate. He had expected Prussian intervention by noon ; but when D'Erlon's attack had been foiled, at 2.30 p.m.,^ there was no sign to show that the Prussians had engaged. The Duke had cause to be anxious, for the resisting power of his army had already been highly tried, and he must have dreaded having to withstand another attack unaided. It was soon after 3 p.m., when at last there came a lull in the battle ; and each side seized the opportunity to prepare for fresh efforts.^ 1 " When we [92nd Highlanders] retired behind the hedge on the ridge, it was exactly a quarter past three o'clock." (Letters from a British Officer, p. 255. Letter of June 24.) ^ It was at this time that the French howitzers set Hougoumont on fire, vide II, pp. 52-53. ^ " For nearly 20 minutes after the return of the troops to the ridge . . . there was almost a total suspension of hostilities." {Letters, as above, p. 256.) BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 2nd PHASE 73 On Wellington's side the following rearrangements were promptly made, Lambert's Brigade, which had been in reserve, now moved up into line with Picton's Division ; thus the 10th Brigade was able to fill the gap that the retreat of Bijlandt's Brigade had caused ; and Major-General Sir J. Kempt replaced the fallen Picton as Divisional Com- mander. Just previously La Haye Sainte had been re- inforced by two fresh companies, bringing the garrison up to a total of six companies. Also Prince Bernard's troops had retaken the farm of Papelotte from Durutte ; thus nothing permanent had been obtained, or achieved, by D'Erlon's attack; but it must have been evident to the veriest tyro that Wellington was occupying the Mt. S. Jean position in force. No rear-guard could have beaten off such an assault, or even have attempted to with- stand it ; for a rear-guard under the threat of such an attack would have behaved much as Ney behaved at Redinha (1811). However, despite the rearrangements, Wellington's situa- tion was fast approaching the critical stage, and practically everything depended on prompt Prussian succour being forthcoming. General Muffling realised this clearly, and the Prussian General urged Bliicher to strike in ; however, it was not until the next phase had commenced — about 4 p.m. — that the welcome roar of Blucher's opening cannonade was heard, showing that the two jaws of the vice were at last articulated and about to perform their deadly work. It was just before the end of this second phase, that Napoleon received another letter from Grouchy, written from Walhain at about 11 a.m.^ — Walhain being situated on the direct road from Gembloux to Wavre. This letter cleared away all doubts as to the Marshal's position ; he was clearly heading for Wavre, and at noon was still some seven or eight miles short of his objective. Hence, if he persisted in this course, no help need be expected at Mt. S. Jean from his direct intervention on June 18. But doubtless before this Napoleon had given up all hope of seeing Grouchy arrive — if he had ever really held it. Therefore, had the Emperor only possessed the bump of prudence on this day, he must have decided to draw off his army after the failure that had 1 Appendix II, No. 32. 74 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO attended D'Erlon's Corps, and allowed the Armee du Nord to await a more favourable opportunity of dealing with the Allies, after having effected a concentration with Grouchy and the right wing. But the reverse was the case ; and con- sidering that he must ensure Wellington's destruction, before Bliicher could engage, the Emperor resolved to make a fresh attack on the Anglo-Dutch line, and thus he opened the third phase of the battle. ^ CHAPTER VIII THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO (c) Third Phase— from 3.30 p.m. — Attack of Wellington's Centre and Right Cent)-e Culminating in the Gi-eat French Cavalry Charges — Opening of Bluchefs Aitcwk against Napoleon's Right. At about 3.30 p.m., and directly D'Erlon's troops had partly rallied, Napoleon ordered Marshal Ney to storm the farm of La Haye Sainte. The dauntless Ney led D'Erlon's least-injured regiments forward in two columns of attack, but the assault failed ; and the tactical key of the Anglo-Dutch position still remained in Wellington's posses- sion. However, a certain backward tendency was visible on the plateau. Some of the battalions drew back to screen themselves from the tempest of iron that drove up into their faces from the mouths of the French cannon ; indeed, the fire delivered from the French guns at this time was of so vigorous and sustained a nature as to baffle description. Under the extreme pressure of the cannonade stragglers were dribbling away from the front, and parties bearing and escorting wounded men were also to be seen leaving the front line. The roar of the cannonade became deafening, and appeared interminable. Gun after gun was fired in quick succession. Bright flashes, followed by clouds of smoke, leaped to the front of each piece as it was discharged, and gradually enveloped the centre in a dense pall of smoke, whilst the uninterrupted roar of the firing pealed up and down the line.^ This furious cannonade dwarfed all Napoleon's previous preparatory bombardments in his other battles ; and despite the fact that whilst the storm was at its height the Anglo-Dutch Infantry lay down, yet they 1 Siborne, p. 282. 75 76 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO suffered severe loss from the heavy fire that swept over and through their ranks, and deluged them with a real " hail of death." There is no doubt that Ney was in possession of the broad outlines of the Emperor's plan of attack, to the extent that the Marshal knew that his Master intended to support the infantry attacks with the splendid veteran cavalry which he had massed on the field. Imagining that the movements on the plateau heralded the commencement of a general retreat of Wellington's Army, the Marshal decided to compel an immediate decision with the Cuirassiers. Doubtless his lack of daring at Quatre Bras on June 16 (not of course in personal valour, but in the handling of his troops), and on June 17, had rankled in Ney's mind, and had made the Marshal determined not to be backward at Mt. S. Jean in delivering the stroke at Wellington. This frame of mind may have gone far to explain Ney's desire to launch the cavalry against Wellington's position before receiving Napoleon's direct orders to do so. No one should be able to accuse the lion-like Marshal of timidity at Mt. S. Jean. Ney ordered Delort's Division of Milhaud's Cuirassiers Corps to attack, but the latter General at first refused ; finally he consented, when he learned that Ney had the Emperor's authority to make the attempt. The Marshal then led forward the whole of Milhaud's Cuirassiers to carry out his reckless enterprise. Apparently Lefebvre- Desnoettes, who was stationed behind Milhaud, received no orders directly from Ney on the subject ; but, seeing Milhaud's Cuirassiers move off, he determined on his own initiative to conform to the movement and to support Milhaud. Possibly, Ney, riding at the head of Milhaud's Cuirassiers, could not see the strength of the body that followed him ; and it is also possible, indeed probable, that the convexity of the ground prevented Napoleon from noticing what was" going on, until the attack was fairly launched. Further, even if Ney did notice Lefebvre- Desnoettes following Milhaud, yet he might have con- cluded, quite naturally, that the Emperor himself had ordered the Light Horse of his Guard to back the Marshal's blow ; and thus the Marshal would have been confirmed in his terribly rash resolve. But, be all that as it may, it is certain that before 4 p.m., Ney led out the splendid cavalry BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 3rd PHASE 77 of Milhaud and Lefebvre-Desnoettes to attack Wellington's line, between the two farms of Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte. The glittering mass that Ney was about to launch against Wellington's centre numbered about 5000 veteran horsemen, organised in some forty-three squadrons. Probably it was the finest body of horse the battle-field had seen since the time of Seydlitz. This superb body of cavalry crossed to the left (west) of the Charleroi high-road, and then formed up to the left of this main road, still apparently unseen by Napoleon. The cavalry having been formed originally on the right of the Charleroi road had to incline considerably to its left, so as to form up in order to make this attack. An eye-witness stated that the magnificent and highly disciplined cavalry carried out this manoeuvre in beautiful order. However, the opinion was prevalent among the senior officers of Welling- ton's centre that the attack was premature, and, that so far as any military operation could be calculated on, the defenders were perfectly prepared and secure against its effects.^ Further, the frontage available for the charge was limited greatly by the two Allied advanced posts — Hougou- mont and La Haye Sainte — which had to be kept at a respectful distance, so as to avoid the galling enfilade fire their garrisons could pour into the horsemen as they passed. But Ney had misappreciated the situation. Wellington was not even contemplating retreat ; and the part of his position selected by the Marshal for his onslaught was in reality the strongest part, and had so far been the least shaken. However, it was nearing 4 p.m. when Ney placed himself at the head of the horsemen, and led them forward to the attack. The Marshal bore somewhat to his left, leaving La Haye Sainte well to his right. Thus the attacking horsemen were about to avoid the deeper section of the Hollow Road, and to cross it where it presented no serious obstacle whatever to cavalry. As the French horse advanced the Allied Infantry formed squares to receive them, and soon twenty squares covered the plateau like a chess- board. Also the Duke had given a clear and definite order to the gunners not to stand to their pieces in the event of the cavalry closing ; but that after firing their last rounds they were to seek a temporary refuge in the nearest squares, 1 Kennedy, pp. 114r-116. 78 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO only to emerge directly the cavalry drew off ; meanwhile the abandoned guns would remain at the edge of the plateau in front of the squares. The wisdom of this order is at least questionable. Guns with their flanks even partially protected, as the flanks of these batteries were by the squares, could always be trusted to keep their front clear, so long as they did not run out of ammunition, and artillery (even in those days) were almost invulnerable to a frontal attack. Also at the last moment the sudden with- drawal of the gunners might prove very upsetting in moral to any but the most determined infantry. Further, unless the gunners were of the highest class, they would prefer to remain in the squares once they had gained the refuge. This did not happen, however, in any case, and probably this fact, more than anything else, proved the disciplined courage and quality of the personnel of our artillery at Waterloo.' However, owing to the fact that the infantry had drawn back already, to their second position, and the guns had still been left in action at the edge of the plateau, there was a distinct gap between the batteries and the squares, though possibly not more than 100 yards or so. To-day such a distance is trivial ; but in 1815 the weapon of the infantry was " Brown Bess," and even a short distance made a great and very appreciable difference in the percentage of hits obtained, and thus directly diminished the defensive power of our small arm.^ It is true that cavalry, outflanking the guns and then wheeling inwards to cut down the gunners, must have passed very close to the squares, and presented a target into which a deadly and telling fire could be, and ' " The horses of the artillery, attached to that division [2nd], were taken from the guns, and sent to the rear of the infantry, and, when the enemy came close, the artillerymen took shelter within our squares of infantry. This was a most admirable plan ... it enabled the gunners to remain at their posts, pouring destruction on their enemies, till they were within a few paces of them." Letters from a British Officer, pp. 257-258. Letter dated June 24. ^ I am indebted entirely to Lieut.-Colonel Hime, b.a., for bringing the exposed nature of the flanks of our batteries to my notice ; and also for reminding me of the rapid loss of accuracy in small-arms which occurred as the range increased. In his " Infantry Fire- Formations " (p. 29, Table B), he gives a table to show the state of musketry in Germany in 1833. Against a target 6 J feet square the percentage of hits at a range of 72 yards was 98.8, whereas at 108 yds. it had decreased to 69.8, and at 180 yds. it was only 44 per cent. Hence even a very short withdrawal of the infantry made all the difference to their defensive power. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 3rd PHASE 79 would have been, poured ; but gaps did undeniably exist, and they were probably the reason for the order in question. The simple solution was to have drawn back the guns themselves and wedged them between the squares ; but this was not feasible under the existing circumstances. Most of the guns had apparently stuck fast in the mud, and hence they could not have been run back by hand ; to bring up the limbers for the purpose was merely to ensure the destruction of the teams. '^ Lastly, owing to the contour of the ground such a procedure would probably have restricted the field of fire unduly. That the guns could and did keep their fronts clear, if only charged frontally, was proved on more than one occasion, by batteries withholding fire till the horsemen were within 20 yards, and then pouring in a " hail of death " that nothing could withstand. In this operation the coolness, steadiness, and stoical courage of the British Artillery stood them in good stead. But the order to retreat into the squares was probably given by the Duke because he was not so intimately acquainted with the power of artillery as his opponent was, and therefore he trusted his artillery less, and relied more on his infantry. In every case, except one, the Duke's order was obeyed literally.^ But the only conclusion is that the Duke must have trusted the personnel of the artillery very highly indeed to have dared even to issue such an order. ^ To return to Ney's advance, which was sweeping up ^ This can be deduced from Sir A. Frazer's letter No. 25, p. 559 ; he said, " in a deep stiff soil the fatigue of the horse artillery men was great, and their best exertions were unable to move the guns again to the crest without horses " (the guns had recoiled down the reverse slope and thus limited their field of fire). Hence the guns could not have been withdrawn any distance by hand, and Sir A. Frazer stated explicitly " to employ horses was to ensure the loss of the animals." ^ Those interested in the subject of how the artillery behaved at Waterloo should read Appendix A in Major Duncan's History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery ; and particularly Appendix D in Colonel Hime's History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, 1815-1853. The latter author has put the whole case with convincing, logical clear- ness, and with his usual impartiality and conciseness. ' That the gunners did take refuge in the squares is proved by countless writers, but probably no one has put it more clearly than the Earl of EUesmere, Personal Reminiscences of the Duke of Wellington, p. 207, " the artillerymen having retired into the squares of the infantry, and the horses and limbers of the guns being retired to the rear." 80 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO the front slope. As they closed the squadrons were re- ceived by a perfect hurricane of fire, and although the guns were captured, yet it was not until their fire had literally blown many of the leading squadrons to pieces. Further, as the cavalry closed with Wellington's main position, the garrison of La Haye Sainte had poured in a heavy and effective enfilading fire, which brought down many men and horses ; but the intrepid horsemen dis- regarded this fire entirely, and continued their advance against Wellington's centre ; then the French Cavalry, still undaunted, closed with the squares. " And hurrying as to havoc near. The cohorts' eagles flew. In one dark torrent, broad and strong. The advancing onset roU'd along, Forth harbinger'd by fierce acclaim. That, from the shroud of smoke and flame, Peal'd wildly the Imperial name." ' But the fire of the artillery had disordered their for- mation ; the sodden ground and deep corn-fields were ill- adapted to rapidity of movement, ^ also the restricted space on which the cavalry advanced hampered them, and hence the most rapid pace used by the French horsemen appears to have been a trot, or at most a slow canter. There was no attempt made to emulate Kellermann's brilliant effort at Quatre Bras, and break up the squares by the sheer, irresist- ible impulse of a resolute charge, delivered at full speed, which would overwhelm the living citadels in a blaze of rapid steel that nothing human could withstand. Thus two of the lessons that Frederick the Great taught, with reference to the handling of cavalry in action, were overlooked. The great King always insisted on the charge in line, and the charge was always to be delivered at a gallop. The narrowness of the available front, and the deep, holding nature of the ground, prevented the French Cavalry from attaining the King's ideal, but their charge was robbed thereby of much of its sting. As the French horsemen closed with the squares, fire was reserved until they had arrived within about thirty yards, and then at last a volley pealed along the front. This caused the horsemen to swerve 1 Scott, The Field 0/ Waterloo. ^ Even a month after the battle the holes made by the horses' hoofs measured in many places from 12 to 18 inches in depth. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 3rd PHASE 81 to right and left of the squares ; and then began the great struggle of endurance. Around each living fortress the horsemen surged and crowded ; it is true they did not gallop on top of the infantry, but they used every other means to enter the squares. The French Cavalry showed great gallantry, devotion, and persevering obstinacy in their efforts to win an entrance. But all their attempts failed ; their numbers dwindled fast ; and the splendid body of cavalry became what is only comparable to a wreck, and a wreck which lay surrounded by the impenetrable and immovable masses of infantry, within whose rock-like formation the horsemen had become almost hopelessly wedged and entangled. ^ There were intervals in this prolonged melee when the horsemen clearing the front of a square gave the French Artillery a target, and their round shot made sad havoc of the infantry who were caught in a most advantageous formation ; and probably, during this phase, the bulk of the losses that our army suffered were occa- sioned by the French guns, rather than by the long swords and pistols of the horsemen. For Wellington's line was subjected to a tempest of iron, during any interludes in the fighting ; owing to the compact formations in which his troops had to remain during this phase, whole files were often torn away by the round shot. But, despite the strain, the infantry stood firm, and closing in automatically, stopped up the gaps occasioned by the round shot, where they had penetrated. Yet, the squares were dwindling, and it was essential to release them from the close pressure of their foe, and gain them a breathing space. Finally, therefore. Lord Uxbridge, who had kept his hand on the pulse of the combat, deemed that the time for counter-attack had come ; the Cuirassiers were obviously exhausted, and even the in- domitable infantry showed signs of disorder. Lord Uxbridge was not slow to act, and he flung against the Cuirassiers his fresh squadrons, nearly 5000 cavalry in all ; and, in face of this attack, the French horse gave way and abandoned the plateau. As they retired the gunners ran out from the squares, and manning the pieces pursued the retiring horsemen with deadly fire. For strange to say, the guns and their stores all remained intact, although they had been captured by the French. No attempt had been > Kennedy's Waterloo, p. 117. 82 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO made to bring them off with spare teams ; the guns had not been spiked ; the sponge-staves had , not been broken, or carried off. In the heat and stress of the combat these things had been overlooked, even by veterans whose experience of war had been most varied and extensive. The superb feat of arms performed by the French horsemen was consequently of no permanent value in silencing Wellington's guns. Colonel Sir A. Frazer, commanding Royal Horse Artillery, wrote of these charges on the night of the battle : " The French Cavalry made some of the boldest charges I ever saw ; they sounded the whole extent of our line which was thrown into squares. Never did cavalry behave so nobly, or was received by infantry so firmly. Our guns were taken, and retaken, repeatedly. "^ But the dauntless French Cavalry rallied and reformed, then they advanced once more against Wellington's position, and the same scenes were re-enacted, until finally the horsemen, becoming utterly confused in the fierce, long drawn-out struggle, were charged by the Allied Cavalry, and being overborne were again forced down the forward slope of Wellington's position. But at last the situation was on the mend, so far as Wellington was concerned, for it was during this phase that Bliicher unmasked, and Biilow commenced his attack against the French right. The welcome sound of the Prussian guns must indeed have filled Wellington's sorely tried troops with renewed hope. Their Allies had arrived, and were about to strike a blow in their assistance. Meanwhile Napoleon had removed his head-quarters nearer to the battle-field, and he placed himself close to the farm of La Belle Alliance. From here he watched Ney's gallant, but (as he recognised, and remarked) premature effort, and also the advance of the Prussians against his right. From now onwards he had a double role to play. Frontally he assailed Wellington ; on his right he had a defensive battle to conduct against Bliicher. But some malignant fate must have possessed and obscured the Emperor's keen perception of events. How otherwise did he come to overlook that the moment had arrived when a decision, if it was to be obtained, must be 1 Sir A. Frazer, Letters, p. 547 (written at 11 p.m., on June 18, 1815). BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 3rd PHASE 83 forced on immediately. For the only logical results that could accrue from a mere continuance of the action in the ordinary way, were that Bliicher would have time to mass all his forces, and engage them in the action, and that Welhngton would be able to restore order among his troops and call up his Reserves. Therefore any delay must be all in the Allied favour ; and as the Emperor had decided that he was going to continue the battle with Wellington, despite Billow's appearance, there was not a moment to lose ; for at the Prussian head-quarters action had obviously taken the place of vacillation. Although Ney's attack had been premature, and the Marshal had been mistaken when he considered that the Anglo-Dutch defence was wavering, yet the time had come when Wellington's Army must be closed with, assailed hand-to-hand all along the line, and forced to seek safety in retreat, or possibly in flight. Further, as some of the cavalry were already heavily engaged, it became im- perative to support this attack with the remainder of the French Horse, and back the stroke with the Artillery and Infantry of the Guard ; and thus, without granting Welling- ton a moment's respite, break down the indomitable defence of the Duke's tenacious infantry, by the sheer fury and weight of repeated sledge-hammer blows delivered by Napoleon's choicest troops. It was 4.30 p.m., and Billow's attack was not yet serious, ^ it was indeed only in its initial stages ; thus there was at least an hour available in which to force a decision on the slopes of Mt. S. Jean. Granting that the Emperor must have kept Friant's Division of the Old Guard in hand as a last reserve, yet Morand's (Middle) and Duhesme's 1 Of course, the hoTir is in dispute. Kennedy stated, " Bliicher debouched from the wood of Paris at 4.30 p.m." (p. 136) ; and again, " About 4.30 a part of Biilow's Corps debouched from the wood of Paris " (p. 120). Tomkinson (p. 307) said, " About 4 p.m., we saw a column advance out of a wood beyond Frischermont " (i.e. the Paris Wood). This col-umn he then proceeded to identify as a Prussian one ; and he fixed the time by a movement made by his own Brigade after he had seen the column debouch, a movement that he considered took place by 5 p.m. This eye-witness is especially reliable iu this connection; for at the moment he was not actively engaged, and therefore had the necessary freedom and leisure to make exact mental notes of so momentous an occurrence, which struck him as being so different to what had always happened in the Peninsula, where everything, and the fate of the day, had invariably centred on WeUington and the British Army. 84 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO (Young) Divisions of the Guard were available to support the decision-compelling stroke that the cavalry would have been directed to deliver ; and, further, every single man of Reille's and D'Erlon's Corps, who was not already engaged and could be rallied, would have been ordered to co-operate in the assault. In this manner the Napoleon of Marengo would have seized his last chance of compelling victory by the sheer audacity of his plan, and by the resolution he would have exhibited in the execution of that plan. At this moment a victory over Wellington was by no means impossible ; but it was almost the last chance that Fortune deigned to vouchsafe to Napoleon on June 18, and he neglected it. For before launching his Guard against Wellington, it appears that he decided to beat back Biilow. But was not this false reasoning ? Whereas the battle was already raging with Wellington, it had hardly commenced with Biilow. If the Emperor was determined to refrain from launching his Guard, then surely he should have re- frained also from engaging Kellermann, or allowing Ney to engage the remainder of the cavalry in an unsupported attack, which was unlikely to lead to any great result. At this supreme moment, when about to stake his all, he should have been true to himself and thrown for complete success ; then probably he would have seen the battle turn decisively in his favour. But he behaved very differently, and for once in his life adopted an ever-ruinous course — a half-measure. Once more the Emperor's glance swept right over his battle-field, and then after a short period of thought, he said : " This (Ney's Cavalry attack) has taken place an hour too soon, but we must stand by what is already done." Consequently he despatched General Flahaut, one of his aides-de-camp, to Kellermann, with an order to that General to charge with his four brigades of Cuirassiers and Carabiniers. The time was approaching 5.30 p.m., when this fresh onslaught was delivered against Wellington's centre. Kellermann's Cavalry were followed by Guyot's squadrons, the Heavy Horse of the Guard (Grenadiers and Dragoons) — 37 squadrons in all. But this reckless manoeuvre was not supported by infantry — the Guard Infantry were still kept under Napoleon's hand. Nor was it closely sup- ported by Horse Artillery. Had guns been galloped up in BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 3rd PHASE 85 the wake of the cavalry, and commenced a case-shot attack of the squares, directly our gunners left their guns (as it was now certain they would do), then nothing could have saved the centre of Wellington's line from being torn to pieces and breached. At this crisis it required merely the presence of a Senarmont in the Armie du Nord, and the bold independent manoeuvre would have been attempted ; the result gained would have been comparable to the great result which the artillery General achieved in the triumph of Friedland — a result which astonished even Napoleon himself. It was at such a critical time as this, that guns could be employed with the greatest boldness, to achieve an end obtainable by no other means within the short available time-limit. Well might Napoleon have said, " Ah ! if I had Senarmont here."^ For the second time Milhaud had just been repulsed from the plateau — and driven down the exterior slope of Welling- ton's position by the Allied Cavalry, when this fresh reinforce- ment of veteran horsemen advanced. The 43 mangled isquadrons thereupon rallied and fell in as a support to this new attack ; filling the whole space between Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte, numbering 9000 sabres, organised in 80 squadrons, the French horsemen fell again upon the crippled squares. What followed can only be described as an hour of pandemonium and confused, chaotic meUe ; the horsemen rode about all over the plateau, they even worked through to the very rear of the Anglo-Dutch position, and they charged repeatedly every one of the blocks of infantry, that so stoically and heroically faced them, and which refused to be broken, or to consider themselves vanquished. The stress was nevertheless extreme ; and, in the prolonged struggle that ensued, Wellington appears to have used up nearly all his horsemen — except the Brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur, which were posted on his extreme left — and gradually also he used up his reserves of infantry, ^ The Emperor actually made use of this phrase at Wagram (1809). General de Senarmont lost his life in the siege of Cadiz, during October, 1810. General Drouot, General de Senarmont's brilliant successor, had his hands too full with the Guard to allow him to handle his guns here at Waterloo as he had done at Hanau in 1813 ; and General Desvaux, commanding the Guard Artillery, was killed near Napoleon early in the action ; his death at such a time was most unfortunate for the French Army. Also the wet and heavy groimd was partly respon- sible for the lack of mobility shown by the French Artillery on June 18. 86 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO except apparently Bijlandt's and also one other Dutch- Belgian Brigade, which at this crisis could hardly have been engaged in the front line. (See also vol. II, p. 106.) It was later in the battle that Vandeleur's Dragoon Brigade was drawn up in rear of this same body of infantry. The horsemen closed their intervals to impede any con- templated withdrawal, and partly by threats, and partly by exhortation, the vacillating troops were induced to maintain their ground. But all the time the squares were shrinking, almost visibly. Again the fearful casualties, which they suffered, appear to have been occasioned chiefly by the French guns, and also partly by the French skirmishers, who crept up close to them, galled them with fire and would not be driven off. To have deployed into line to sweep away the skirmishers would have meant certain and speedy annihilation by the Cuirassiers. This was proved when later on in the action (see vol. II, pp. 107-108) the Prince of Orange insisted on a battalion deploying ; the Cuiras- siers promptly pounced on it and cut it to pieces ; this incident showed what must have happened had the cavalry only been supported closely by the French infantry, and particularly by their horse artillery. The guns, too, would have run no risk ; for, by the Duke's orders, our gunners were sheltering in the squares ; and to have unlimbered at the crest of the plateau was quite feasible ; then the deadly volleys of grape-shot, poured into the squares at point-blank range, would have blown them away. Guns would have achieved here in a quarter of an hour, what corps of cavalry failed to achieve in two hours. That the round shot had done such damage is proof of what case-shot must have accomplished. Round shot may be deadly ; but case-shot was annihilating at point-blank range, against close formations. Thus the Allied squares would have been overwhelmed with decisive fire, to which their formation would have prevented them from replying effectually ; and had they deployed to develop their fire- power, then they would have been at the mercy of the long swords of the Cuirassiers. In either case the decision would have been reached within the hour. Here, as at Quatre Bras, the close co-operation of the French artillery and infantry was required, for the cavalry by itself was incapable BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 3rd PHASE 87 of achieving a definite and permanent success over its dogged opponents. The close and timely support of French infantry and French guns would have given the victory to their heroic horsemen, have captured the allied batteries, and have ensured the annihilation of the allied infantry ; the deadly case-shot attack of the guns, opened at the decisive point, and at the critical moment of this phase, must have decided the result in the centre. Further, had this attack gone right over Wellington's Army, then nothing could have saved Bliicher from extermination as well ; for he was committed fully to his hazardous flank march, and part of his force was already engaged. During the hottest time of this episode the Duke of Wellington placed himself inside the square of the 73rd Regiment (in Sir C. Halkett's Brigade of the 3rd Division). As in the previous cavalry attack the guns had been abandoned when the horsemen closed, and our gunners awaited the termination of the onslaught to issue forth and resume the working of their pieces. Once again, the French did nothing with the captured guns. This is the more surprising, as they had the experience of the previous charge to guide them ; and Kellermann was in this affair, and he could be trusted to keep his head, and to act in the most correct manner — even at a crisis. It is right, however, to note that one troop of Royal Horse Artillery, Captain Mercer's, ^ did not obey the Duke's order ; but the officers and men remained with their guns through- out. ^ Captain Mercer had previously been in action near the Nivelles road, when, after the first cavalry charge. Colonel Sir Augustus Frazer, commanding the Royal Horse Artillery, rode up to him, and ordered the troop to Umber up ; Colonel Sir A. Frazer then led it, at a gallop, to its new position, in front of the centre of the Allied line, and placed it between two squares of Brunswickers, who were at the moment suffering heavy casualties. Before leaving the troop. Sir A. Frazer warned Captain Mercer that he would probably be charged by French cavalry immediately he gained his position ; and repeated to him the following order, " The Duke's orders, however, are positive, that, in the event of their persevering and charging home, you 1 Now G Battery, R.H.A. ' Captain Mercer's Journal, I, pp. 309 et eeq. 88 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO do not expose your men, but retire with them into the adjacent squares of Infantry " ; with an injunction to Captain Mercer to husband his ammunition, and to remem- ber the Duke's orders, Sir Augustus left Captain Mercer, having first pointed out the position to be occupied by the troop. Captain Mercer took careful stock of the Bruns- wickers, to whom he was ordered to entrust the safety of the personnel of his unit. The outlook was not promising, for the protecting infantry seemed to be almost bereft of their senses, they stood like wooden figures ; and at any moment it appeared likely that these mere boys would break up in panic, throw down their arms, and seek safety in common flight. On the other hand, their officers and sergeants were behaving nobly ; for despite the carnage they were keeping the squares intact by their personal efforts. Captain Mercer at once decided that the rank and file of the two squares in question, were too unreliable to justify him in seeking refuge in their midst, when the cavalry closed — to have acted in this way would have been madness ; for the very moment the gunners ran from their guns would have given the signal for the instant dissolution of the squares, and then all would have been at the mercy of the French horsemen. Worse still, the centre would have been pierced, and who could say how far an incipient panic might spread along the line. Panics are as unaccountable as they are catching, even among the best troops ; and, once they break out are apt to spread like wildfire.^ Rather than run such a risk, it would be far better for all to fall at their posts. Captain Mercer's soldierly decision undoubtedly saved this section of the line from annihilation ; though it is going too far to say that he saved the battle. He determined, rightly, to say nothing of the Duke's order to his men, and to let his troop take its chance, fighting the guns. This wise resolve he maintained all through the remainder of that long June afternoon ; and the effect of the troop's fine discipline ' In proof of this assertion we would merely recall the panic that suddenly seized the white-coats in the battle of Marengo (1800), when Napoleon turned round, and having prepared his attack with Marmont's 18 guns, he launched Desaix's Infantry Division and Kellermann's 400 horsemen against the pursuing Austrian Army. In a brief half- hour the fortunes of that day were completely turned, and the First Consul and the Armie de Riserve secured a glorious triumph, that ranks second only to Austerlitz. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 3rd PHASE 89 and devotion was excellent on the Brunswick Infantry ; for gradually they became well-closed, steady, and compact bodies of infantry, thus showing the value of a good example in action. But scarcely had Captain Mercer's first gun come up between the squares than the enemy's leading squadrons could be observed, coming on at a sharp trot and not more than one hundred yards off. Captain Mercer ordered line to be formed for action, and for the troop to- use case-shot. Each gun as it came up unlimbered, and opened fire im- mediately. A terrible slaughter of the enemy resulted, and the ground in front of the troop was soon covered with men and horses. Still the dauntless cavalry came on, though very slowly ; but at the last moment they flinched ; and falling into disorder, bolted down the hill, a mere mob, but a mob into which the six pieces kept up a steady fire of case- shot. The carnage was frightful. Thereafter Captain Mercer's Troop received other charges, but in each case they were ready for their foes, and received them with a volley from double-shotted guns — the guns being loaded with a round shot first, with a case over it. Also fire was always withheld until the enemy was within fifty yards or so, and the effect was terrible ; for, literally, nearly the whole of the leading rank would be blown away, and the round shot would tear through the whole depth of the column, spreading death and confusion throughout the whole formation ; and the rolling fire delivered, with ever- increasing spirit by the two Brunswicker squares, admirably seconded the efforts of the gallant troop of British Horse Artillery, which had afforded to them so fine an example of disciplined courage at a most critical time. The task of the French horsemen gradually became hope- less and impossible ; and in front of the gun-muzzles rapidly arose a rampart " that the boldest dared not scale," a rampart composed of corpses and mangled horses ! Captain Mercer's Troop was really admirably placed, for it was literally wedged between the two squares, which (so long as the infantry stood their ground) protected its flanks perfectly, and the guns could keep their own front clear ; so the reason for seeking a refuge among the infantry, in Captain Mercer's case, was far less cogent than it was for the men of the more-exposed batteries. The troop was also somewhat protected from the heavy fire which the French 90 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Artillery kept up on it, during the intervals between the charges, by being in action behind a low natural epaulement — a bank about two feet high being between them and their foes. But the gunners were much annoyed by a cloud of sharpshooters, who creeping up to within forty yards delivered a galling fire, which was particularly exasperating, as the skirmishers, in their loose formation, presented a target that, considering the general situation, it was a waste of gun ammunition to fire at. Too much praise can hardly be given to Captain Mercer for the responsibility he accepted so fearlessly in this matter. He certainly saved this portion of our line from being pierced ; and no one can say what serious result might not have followed the penetra- tion of our right centre. At any rate, in all probability all the unreliable units would have broken up and streamed away ; and then the whole battle line might have gone to pieces. From this risk the Anglo-Dutch Army was saved by Captain Mercer's prompt and soldierly action. Meanwhile the great cavalry attack had run its course ; the French horsemen had suffered very heavy losses, most of the Generals were wounded, and the cavalry were utterly disorganised. But, nevertheless, the cavalry were inde- fatigable, no sooner were they swept off the plateau than they proceeded to rally and reform again at the foot of the slope, where they were sheltered and covered in a great measure from the fire of the British guns ; for the latter had recoiled after firing, and thus by running back had lost some of the advantages derived from their original commanding position ; and the deep, greasy, poached ground rendered it impossible for the detachments to run them back up to the crest, without the aid of horses, whom it was unsafe to employ. However, for the fourth time Ney essayed to carry the plateau. He placed himself at the head of the Brigade of Mounted Carabiniers, whom Keller- mann had had the foresight to leave behind as a reserve, and whom he had strictly enjoined not to stir without a direct order from himself. But Ney launched this, the last cavalry reserve of the army, against the resolute infantry whose diminished squares covered the plateau ; however, the attack resulted in nothing whatever being achieved. The Carabiniers were powerless to overthrow the Allied squares ; and the infantry held firm. Finally, despairing BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 3rd PHASE 91 of success, the valiajit horsemen drew off and descended into the valley. They were indeed decimated as a result of their efforts, worn out, and practically incapable of a fresh attempt. For two long hours the dauntless infantry had stood between Ney and Victory ; and the last charges had only been despairing efforts to force the Allied position ; charges that must be classed as " death-rides " — sublime in the devotion shown by the intrepid band of heroes, who dared advance again and again up the fatal, greasy, blood-be- sprinkled slope ; but useless, inasmuch as these last attempts were made with exhausted men and half-dead horses ; and they were always opposed by that same infantry, who had rightly acquired the conviction that they were absolutely invincible, owing to the firm conduct which they had dis- played during the last two long hours. Could the same confidence repose in the breasts of the highly tried and repeatedly baffled horsemen ? Hence these last gallant efforts were foredoomed to failure. The living fortresses beat back all assaults ; and these last charges burst on, and were dispersed by the squares, in much the same way as the groynes of a sea-wall dissolve, into spume and spray, the fierce onrushing waves that surround and batter, but do not really shake the granite blocks. Hence the last scenes in this wild act were played out to a glorious, if resultless end. Even so, it was this phase which naturally enough always remained most vividly and most clearly before the mental vision of the survivors on both sides. Indeed, it would ill-become an Englishman to say whether the heroic French Cavalry, or the dauntless and dogged British and King's German Legion Infantry, are entitled to the most honour, for their splendid behaviour during these two tremendous hours. The result, so far as the French horsemen were concerned, cannot be summed up better than by quoting a great French writer of another age : " ils sont vaincus avec honneur."^ But at last Marshal Ney had remembered a part of Reille's Corps (Bachelu's Division, and one Brigade of Foy's Division, 6000 bayonets in all) who were still available to support and assist the horsemen. Previously these troops 1 Voltaire. The words were applied to our men at Foutenoy (1745). 92 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO had been overlooked by the Marshal, just when they naight have achieved something ; but now Ney noticed them, and decided to hurl them against Wellington's line. The attack was quite unsupported ; the troops were cut to pieces, and were forced back, without shaking Wellington's hold on his position. They had faced, and been destroyed by, a real " hail of death." It is time to turn to the eastern section of the field and see what Billow had achieved. Between 5.30 p.m. and 6 p.m., Billow's attack became really pronounced, and began at last to assume a very menacing aspect. Billow's two leading Brigades (the 15th and 16th) having debouched from the Paris Wood, about 4.80 p.m., proceeded to drive aside the squadrons of Domon whom they encountered. Lobau, with Domon covering his front, had previously taken up a position on some heights close to the Chateau of Frischermont. Although his force numbered some 10,000, all told, yet the General was very weak in the mainstay of battle — infantry — possessing not more than some 7000 muskets. Hence he could hardly expect to sustain successfully, nor for any lengthy period, an attack delivered by Billow's 30,000 men. Neverthe- less the intrepid French General showed the same fierce, unconquerable spirit here, that he had previously exhibited among those blazing ruins on the Danube's bank in the lost battle of Essling; when he, and Andre Mass6na, covered the retreat of the baffled Grand Army. Consequently he presented a bold front to the Prussians, and fought a bitter and truculent fight. However, despite his courage and the admirable obstinacy of his men,^ they were over- powered finally by sheer weight of numbers, and slowly, but inexorably, Lobau was forced back. But the French General had not shown much skill in his selection of a position where " with 10,000 he could hold off 30,000 Prussians." Yet, even if he had not dared to dispute the actual passages over the swollen Lasne, at any rate he would have been well-advised to occupy the Paris Wood in force. The attributes belonging to a wood, used for defen- sive purposes, are the concealment and cover that it gives 1 It is worthy of note that in Lobau'3 force was the famous 5th Regiment of the French Line, who, at Gap, in front of Grenoble, were the first to acclaim the Emperor on his return from Elba. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 3rd PHASE 93 to a defender — not negligible qualities even in those black- powder days. Again, Biilow must have deployed his whole force to master the wood, and the close nature of wood- fighting would have so disordered the Prussians that they must have rallied and reformed before advancing any further against the French right, and thus valuable time would have been gained. Or they must have continued their advance with a confused hotchpot of infantry that would have been absolutely impotent. A wood may be easy to get into, it is proverbially difficult to get out of. But, as matters turned out, the wood was surrendered to Biilow without a blow, and proved of great value as a screen to the Prussian movements, and served as a reservoir wherein they could collect their troops as they required, before issuing forth against the French right. Lobau made a serious tactical mistake when he neglected to garrison and hold the Paris Wood. Although Lobau successfully resisted the attack of Billow's two leading Brigades, which had swept Domon aside, yet within the hour, by 5.30 p.m.. Billow's entire corps had reached the front and had come into action ; the support thus accorded by the fresh Brigades, and the corps cavalry, was too much for Lobau. Gradually he was pressed back on to the heights in front of Plancenoit. Thence he was pushed relentlessly into the village ; and, being ousted finally from the place, the Prussians captured it and at once garrisoned it. Then the Prussian round-shot ranged through on to the Charleroi main road, and ploughed up the highway behind Napoleon. With the Prussians in possession of Plancenoit, Napoleon saw his line of retreat threatened, and that the danger had become both imminent and ex- treme. At once he issued orders to Duhesme, to lead his division of the (Young) Guard to reinforce Lobau, and ordered him to recapture Plancenoit at all hazards. This task Duhesme duly effected, he dislodged the Prussians, and completely cleared the village. Thus Napoleon had freed his right flank, and temporarily restored the wavering balance of the battle on this side of the field. It was 6 p.m., so far Billow's action had by no means turned the fate of the battle ; indeed, had no other Prussian troops arrived, on June 18, then, in all probability. Napoleon would have beaten both Wellington and Biilow handsomely. 94 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO But although Billow had been noticed from our position issuing from the Paris Wood about 4 p.m., his nationality at iirst had been uncertain, to the eager eyes that scanned the arrival of these fresh troops. Therefore, their relief and delight can be imagined when the newcomers' guns were seen to come into action against the French right. The long- expected Prussians had arrived ; and a great access of moral must have filled the troops on Wellington's left, who had leisure to realise the full significance of this welcome rein- forcement. " Such a reinforcement during an action was an occurrence so different from former days in the Peninsula, where everything centred in the British Army, that it appeared decisive of the fate of the day."' Beyond giving a great increase of moral to Wellington's sorely tried troops, also, as matters turned out, Billow's attack had compelled Napoleon to divert against the Prussian IV Corps no less than 14,000 men from his general reserve, who otherwise would have been available to drive home the attack against Wellington. Naturally the Duke, when he offered battle, had expected far more help and co-operation than this. But now, when affairs were very critical — Wellington's line was shaken, and Biilow's attack beaten oft —other and most welcome reinforcements approached the field. The Corps of Pirch I— moving to rally and support Billow — drew near to Napoleon's right flank, and Zieten's Corps was also approaching Wellington's left, and would soon be available to strengthen that important part of his line. To anticipate, this latter reinforcement was of great importance, for Zieten's close approach about 6.30 p.m. allowed Generals Vandeleur and Vivian (acting on General V. Miifiling's suggestion) to move their 2600 fresh horsemen, and Sir Robert Gardiner's Horse Artillery Troop, from the extreme left of Wellington's position and to form them up behind the centre ; and thus strengthen Wellington's confidence and the moral of his troops. From Miiffling's station at Papelotte, the General saw both the French 1 Tomkinaon, p. 307. In Letters from a British Officer, pp. 259-260, it is stated that, " about 3 o'clock there were none of them [Prussians] in view. . . . But about 4.30 two Prussian officers passed in front of our line, at full speed, eagerly enquiring for the Duke of Wellington . . . [on their return they were] cheered all the way by the British line." (Letter of June 24.) BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 3rd PHASE 95 Reserve at La Belle Alliance, and the arrival of Zieten's Advanced Guard on the nearest height. Realising (about 6.30 p.m.) that the French Reserve was just about to be launched against Wellington's centre, and right centre. General v. Muffling rightly considered that the final crisis had arrived, and also that immediate support for the Anglo-Dutch left was fortunately at hand. General von Muffling promptly recognised that the two fresh cavalry Brigades (Vivian and Vandeleur) no longer could serve any useful purpose on Wellington's left ; and thereupon he urged Generals Vandeleur and Vivian to hasten with their six cavalry regiments (5 British and 1 K.G.L.) and the troop of horse artillery,^ to the assistance of the sorely tried centre. The Brigades accordingly moved off, and formed up in rear of the centre, where they arrived in time to be really useful. Had Wellington not received this timely, moral, and material reinforcement, it is quite possible that, under the extreme pressure exerted by the assault of the Guard, his centre might have given way.^ Had this disaster occiurred, then Zieten would not have moved to Wellington's support, but the Prussian General would have taken up a position with the I Corps, so as to rally the compromised corps of Biilow and Pirch I ; and then the result of the battle must have been very different. To return to the conclusion of the third phase. It was towards the end of this third phase that one of Thielemann's Aides-de-Camp rode up to the Prussian Head- quarter Staff, and reported that Thielemann was hard- pressed at Wavre, being engaged by superior forces, and the Prussian General was uncertain as to the result of the action. It was Gneisenau who sent the terse answer, which ran as follows : " Let Thielemann defend himself as best he can ; it matters little if he is crushed at Wavre, so long as we gain the victory here." At last Gneisenau appreciated the truth ; for the answer was absolutely sound and correct. Economy of force meant economy on the whole transaction, • Sir Robert Gardiner's Troop, now E Battery, R.H.A. " Colonel Tomkinson (p. 308) wrote, " In passing along the line it appeared to have been much out up, and the troops, which in part held the position, were but few, and had suffered greatly. From inarching under shelter of the hill we could not distinctly see ; yet I conceived from aU I could learn that many points in the position were but feebly guarded." 96 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO and the fate of a detachment was of no real importance, provided the decision was obtained as originally planned. Or as Napoleon has expressed it, so truly and so powerfully : " Qu'importe Vhumanite, ilfaut suivre un plan." Gneisenau's answer summed up in a nutshell the relative importance of Thielemann's affair at Wavre and the decisive battle with Napoleon at La Belle Alliance. Had Grouchy possessed the same sense and clear perception of the relative importance of current events, then at starting, on June 18, he would have placed himself between Blticher and Napoleon ; and at the first sounds of the opening cannonade, on June 18, he would have despatched the greater part of his detachment to the roar of the guns, so as to ensure holding up the maximum number of Prussians on this eventful day, or giving his Master as much assistance as possible in the thick of the fight. Had only Davout, or Soult, been in Grouchy's place, surely their procedure would have been far more correct, and the support they would have rendered far more effective. During this phase repeated, but fruitless, efforts were made to storm La Haye Sainte ; gradually the garrison's stock of ammunition ran low, and despite repeated requests no further supply was forthcoming. Towards the end of the phase welcome reinforcements, consisting of the skirmishers of the 5th Line Battalion, K.G.L., were thrown into the advanced post ; and later on 200 Naus- sauers were sent up to the farm. Soon afterwards the French tried the expedient of setting the place on fire ; this created great consternation among the defenders, for although ample water was available in the courtyard, yet the means of drawing and carrying it were wanting, as all the utensils had been broken. Major Baring noticing, however, that the Naussauers all carried large field-cooking- kettles, seized one, and filling it with water advanced to put out the fire ; others followed his example, and soon all the kettles were requisitioned and the fire was got under ; the men suffered considerable loss, however, whilst engaged in subduing it. Finally, after about an hour and a half's fighting, the French attack was once more beaten off. But, by now. Major Baring fully realised the importance of holding La Haye Sainte to the last, and there is no doubt that he rose to the height of the occasion, and willingly BATTLE OF WATERLOO, Srd PHASE 97 accepted the responsibility that had been thrust upon him. Thus ended the third phase, and the one that probably appeals the most to the imagination. So far no tangible result had been achieved by Napoleon, despite the desperate nature of the fight, and the French Cavalry was absolutely ruined. Moreover, the growing seriousness of the strategical aspect must have been apparent to him, for on the eastern horizon lowered the ever-increas- ing dark masses of Prussian troops. But, now, when the outlook was distinctly unpromising, Napoleon at last gained a decided advantage from Wellington. n.— H 98 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Note H. — The Legend of the Hollow Way. Whereas Austerlitz has one myth attached to it, that tended to dim the splendours of its " Sun," Waterloo has attracted at least two ; and there is this in common between the three myths, that in each case the author is known, and such an uncommon fact tends to make them almost unique. One of the Waterloo myths is defamatory. This has fortunately been dealt with, dissipated, and dispersed for ever, by the united energies of Major Duncan, r.a., and Lieut.-Colonel Hime, r.a. — working quite separately. The other myth is of a different class altogether ; for although it is a piece of sheer imagination, like the others, yet it is a shadowy, extravagant figment, or imagined illusion, that should never have received credence for a moment, had all students of the Campaign only been endowed with that trained critical faculty that may fitly be termed " historic doubt." But, on the contrary, this visionary chimera has been subscribed to and repeated by many authors, and also artists, who surely should have known better. Of course " the legend of the hollow way " (or Ohain road) is the one referred to ; and the grossly exaggerated disaster to the French Cavalry which is represented to have occurred in the passage of that much-magnified obstacle. The hollow way was no ravine, as it is too often stated to have been ; rather it was a somewhat ordinary country lane, which was slightly sunk below the level of the ground. At its deepest part, along Wellington's battle-line, it was merely an easy in-and-out jump, complicated by neither hedge nor ditch, either on the taking off, or on the landing side. Such an obstacle, crossed under fire, might have overturned a few French Cuirassiers as they essayed to scramble across it, it might even have loosened, or disordered the forma- tion of the advancing squadrons ; but it could never have led to a disaster of any importance or magnitude. For it must not be forgotten that a brigade of our own heavy cavalry (Somerset's) charged across it, and with no evil effects, at the time when they repulsed Travers' Brigade of Cuirassiers who were covering D'Erlon's left in his great BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 3rd PHASE 99 attack ; further, this was practically the only occasion in which the opposing heavy cavalries met one another on fairly equal terms on June 18, and our horsemen triumphed, despite the dangers of the sunken road. Again, General Kennedy, General Alten's Staff Officer, whose Division was posted just above La Haye Sainte, and therefore behind the road in question, stated : " the ground between them and us (3rd Division) presented no natural obstacles what- ever " ; 1 also an officer on General Sir Thomas Picton's Staff, Sir W. Gomm (footnote, p. 352), said : " As for Victor Hugo's monstrous chemin creux d'Ohain, and its train of catastrophes, there was no creux in the whole extent of it, save the sand-pit." Conclusive evidence, when we recollect the sources from which these remarks come ; and they prove definitely what a small and insignificant obstacle " the hollow way " actually was. Again, if this impassable obstacle existed, it is very strange that Napoleon did not learn of its existence from his guide de Coster, and from his map. Further, Ney must have possessed a map ; and the Marshal, not to mention the chief Generals of Cavalry who led the first charge — Milhaud, Wathier de S. Alphonse, and Dubois — were criminally negligent if they launched their horsemen to the attack where it was impossible to close mth the enemy. Yet no criticisms have been levelled at them for this reason, in itself a very significant fact. Further, as these officers actually led the cavalry, they must have been precipitated to the bottom of the abyss, first of all, and then crushed under the horsemen who followed them, who must have fallen on top of them. But strangely enough only Dubois, out of the four, was even wounded ; and Dubois' wound was a sabre cut.^ These war-worn and experienced Generals naturally did not make such an elementary mistake, and a handsome apology is due to them for even associating their great names with the argument. It was necessary to do so to kill an idiotic legend. But legends, and foolish ones, die ' Kennedy, p. 100. Also see Kennedy, p. 59, where he said that charges of cavalry could have been delivered " at all points at full gallop, for the ascent was gentle, and the position of easy access." ^ These last arguments are based on those used by M. Louis Navez in Champ de Bataille de Waterloo (pp. 35-37) wherein this graphic writer seeks to dissipate and kill the grotesque legend. 100 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO hard ; for the generality of mankind are as credulous as they are uncritical. To conclude the matter, neither Milhaud in his report (to Soult), nor his Divisional General, Delort, nor General Kennedy (then Captain Shaw), Staff Officer to General Alten, made any mention at all of this catastrophe, which must be consigned to its fitting resting-place — the limbo of exploded fictions ; for facts are stubborn things, that in the end must wear down and cause the death of even the oldest legend ; and this one is surely " the largest . . . piece of blague manufactured for some centuries by any man or nation."^ Also it will be clear why this dramatic, but fabulous and fantastical, incident has not even been alluded to in the body of this work. • Carlyle, French Revolution, III, book V, chap. VI. CHAPTER IX THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO Fourth Phase— from 6 p.m. The Capture of La Haye Sainte.^ At this stage the Emperor passed along his whole line of battle. As was usual with him, at critical times, he ex- posed his o%vn person freely and fearlessly in order to give encouragement to his men. The fire was as hot as ever, and several of the Generals who accompanied him were struck. As a result of his personal reconnaissance, the Emperor determined on another effort. Consequently Marshal Ney was ordered by the Emperor to take La Haye Sainte cost what it might. But although the attack on this advanced post might prove successful, yet it was unlikely that any definite result would be achieved, unless an order was given to the Artillery Reserve and to the Infantry of the Guard to follow up and drive home the success, in crushing strength, directly the tactical key of Wellington's line was in Napoleon's possession. Further, the cavalry were incapable of fresh efforts ; and, even if Wellington was overthrown, only infantry were avail- able to reap with a sickle the red harvest of victory that would remain beaten down and within their grasp, hence nothing definite was likely to accrue, particularly when the proximity of Bliicher's masses is recalled. Also, at the close of the third phase, the three Brigades of ReiUe's Corps had been brought to a standstill in their ad- vance against Wellington's right centre, and they had been forced back after losing about 25 per cent, of their strength ; and now, on their right, the assault of La Haye Sainte was resumed by the mere wrecks of D'Erlon's Corps, led by ' M. Houasaye, Waterloo, 1815 (p. 390, footnote 2) has proved that La Haye Sainte fell between 6 and 6.30 p.m. ; and in support he calls as witnesses Baring, Kennedy, Cotton, Planzeaux, and Heymfes, as well as Sibome and Chesney. Colonel Grouard and General PoUio are also in accord ; and therefore we need not bother to go into a matter in which all the best authorities are in agreement. 101 102 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Marshal Ney in person ; whilst Durutte advanced and re- captured Papelotte. Just before this final assault of their stronghold the little garrison of La Haye Sainte (which even with rein- forcements only totalled 9 companies altogether) took stock of their remaining ammunition ; and it was found that, on the average, the men had only 3 or 4 rounds each in their pouches.^ At first there seems to have been some talk of withdrawing from the farm to the main position, as further resistance appeared to be quite hopeless. But, at the near approach of the French assaulting columns, the soldier-spirit triumphed, and the men unanimously informed their gallant commander. Major Baring of the K.G.L., that, " No man will desert you — we will fight and die with you." It should be noticed especially that there was here no word of sacrifice, a word that should be unknown to soldiers ; and it is only when such a doctrine exists that men can be trusted to perform deeds that equal those of former times ; and this is only assured by training men how to die victori- ous, and not merely how to avoid dying. This dearth of ammunition, at this important post, requires perhaps a word of explanation. It arose, appar- ently, not so much from the interception of communication between La Haye Sainte and Wellington's position, for the distance was short, it had frequently been open and available during the battle, and the farm had been rein- forced at least on three occasions. But rather the shortage was due to the difficulty of obtaining rifle-ammunition, despite the fact that La Haye Sainte was situated immedi- ately in front of the Brigade to which the defenders of the post belonged ; and in this Brigade, two, out of the four battalions, appear to have been armed with rifles. But the probable cause why Major Baring's ammunition supply was not replenished was, that there existed only one cart with reserve rifle ammunition for the two Light Battalions of the King's German Legion, and it would appear that this cart was involved in the premature, but precipitate, retreat of a great part of the baggage and was thrown into a ditch and overturned ;' and thus it was not possible to replenish • The original garrison appear to have brought into action only 60 rounds apiece for their rifles. 2 Beamish, History of the K.Q.L., p. 363. (Vol. II.) BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 4th PHASE 103 the amount with which each man was supplied when the action opened — 60 rounds, an inadequate amount, con- sidering the nature of the fighting, and the importance of the post. Had the importance of the latter only been recognised, it appears likely that a supply of ammunition might have been stored inside one of the massive buildings ; thus ensuring the garrison against any difficulties that might arise in its replenishment. But, be that as it may, with the buildings almost in ruins and the garrison running short of ammunition, this last French attack, pressed as vigorously as ever, could not be denied, and the assailants broke in. Even then the garrison fought stubbornly ; and a bitter fight raged inside the place, quarter being neither asked nor given ; until finally Major Baring and all that remained of the brave garrison of this important post had to retire from the house into the garden. But Major Baring soon reaUsed that the garden was untenable, with the French in possession of the house, and consequently he caused the men to retire singly to the main position. This withdrawal was not interfered with by the French. Major Baring then sent back to their own regiments those men who had been sent to him, and attached himself, together with the weak remnant of his own battalion, to the two companies of the 1st Light Battalion, K.G.L., who were occupying the hollow road behind the farm. Although Major Baring's men could not fixe a shot they helped to swell the numbers.^ The strong advanced post of La Haye Sainte fell, because its importance had not been sufficiently recognised in the first place. The garrison originally told off was inadequate, and so were the defensive arrangements. The place was declared to be sufficiently strong for all that was required of it. Consequently, despite the heroic efforts made by its devoted garrison, it did fall into Napoleon's power ; and the success- ful resistance of the Anglo-Dutch Army was undoubtedly endangered thereby. The capture, too, was most important ; ' To show the stubborn defence that Major Baring's force made at La Haye Sainte, it need only be stated that out of nearly 400 men, with which he had commenced the battle, only 42 remained efiective at the close. Further comment is needless. For a more detailed account the reader is referred to Major-General Baron von Baring's account, given in Beamish's History of the K.G.L., II, pp. 453-462. 104 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO for it gave the French an undeniable advantage. An eye- witness said, " The possession of La Haye Sainte, and of the knoll above it on each side of the great road, enabled the enemy to keep up a destructive fire of musketry upon the troops posted for the defence of this important part of the line." (Gomm, p. 360.) Marshal Ney made immediate use of his success ; he brought a battery into action on a hillock near La Haye Sainte, and he pushed a regiment into the sand-pit ; which the 95th Rifles again had been forced to evacuate. The advanced French guns were within 300 yards of Wellington's position, and the regiment in the sand-pit within 80 yards. Once more the action broke out furiously along the Allied front, and D'Erlon's shattered divisions pushed on up to the Ohain road. In many places the Anglo-Dutch troops yielded ground, but their assailants were too exhausted to press home the advantage which they had gained. Ney asked to be supported, but Napoleon could not, or dared not, comply ; for Billow's whole corps had taken the offensive again, had driven the Young Guard out of Plance- noit, and threatened once more the right flank of the Armee du Nord, whilst its line of retreat, the Charleroi road, was torn up by the Prussian round-shot. But the crisis that had been reached in Wellington's position shall be dealt with first. Marshal Ney had noticed the wavering, the backward tendency here and there, shown among Wellington's troops as a result of the close, continual pressure that was being exerted ; and realising that he had no fresh force with which to drive home the success, that he thought was at hand, the Marshal promptly applied to Napoleon, through Colonel Heymes, and asked to be reinforced by a few infantry. The Marshal realised that such reinforcement would inspire his exhausted troops to fresh efforts, stimulate them with fresh vigour, and allow them to renew the battle with Wellington's troops, who must be very nearly at the end of their physical resources. But Napoleon, with Bliicher's round-shot tearing up the ground near his position and ranging across the Charleroi road, and with his cavalry destroyed, did not consider the moment propitious to reinforce the Marshal, whom he must have considered also to some extent responsible for the present crisis ; and turning on BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 4th PHASE 105 Heym^s, he answered the appeal roughly : " Troops, where do you expect me to get them ? Do you expect me to make them ? "^ But Marshal Ney was right ; for matters had become exceedingly critical with Wellington since La Haye Sainte had fallen. " Nevertheless, despite the tremendous strain, the Duke, as usual, was calm, undaunted, resourceful, and fearless to the end. He appeared quite confident that he could control and guide the storm that raged around him, and he issued an identical order to all the officers, who came up from every direction, asking what should be done, and generally describing the situation as desperate, that there was no other order to issue but to stand fast to the last man. Nobly was the great Englishman carrying out his part of the pact with Bliicher. It was his steadfastness and Blticher's loyalty that triumphed in the end, and struck down Napoleon on this field of " La Belle Alliance,'''' and thus consummated the glory of Trafalgar by striking the sword forever from the Emperor's grasp. If Napoleon meant to use his Guard to force Wellington's position, surely the very last moment had arrived when ^ Des troupes I Oil voulez-vous que fen prenne ? Voulez-vou^ que fen fasse ? ' M. Houssaye, onp. 392 of Waterloo{59th edition), stated that Welling- ton was heard to murmur, ' ' Night or the Prussians must come. ' ' Putting on one side the fact that the words were most unlikely to have dropped from the Duke's lips, for this was not the way he spoke usually ; in any case before accepting such an unlikely statement we must have the most cogent proof that they were said, and by the Duke, at this critical time. Certainly he would never have allowed his feelings to master him to such an extent at this crisis that anything he said to this eSect could have been overheard by his Allies, who were anything but enthusiastic in the cause in which they were fighting ; and who would have interpreted such open misgivings in only one way. We think, therefore, that M. Houssaye was mistaken in his opinion that the Duke uttered this singularly unskilful and pregnant sentence at this crisis ; and further that his frame of mind was much more clearly shown in the prompt answer he was about to give to General Kennedy (II, p. 109) which was recorded by that officer, and is undoubtedly authentic. They were words worthy of the Iron Duke. The other phrase can apparently be traced to Lieut. Woodberry, of the 18th Hussars, who stated in his Journal (published in Paris, 1896) that the Duke made the remark to an A.D.C. belonging to the Staff of the 5th Division at about 7 p.m. As Lieut. Woodberry did not actually hear the words used, his evidence cannot be accepted as conclusive in this matter ; for all the known facts tend to show that WeUingtou could never have used such a phrase. 106 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO such an attack could possibly succeed. It is true the Prussian strength was developing visibly, but the key of Wellington's position had been wrested from the Anglo- Dutch Army, and their troops were showing all the out- ward signs of having nearly reached their limits of endur- ance ; as a fact they had far exceeded the limits that Napoleon had expected from them. Therefore, if the stroke was to be given, this was the last chance ; and had the Guard been launched en masse, directly La Haye Sainte fell, and been directed at Wellington's centre, it appears likely that under this supreme effort Wellington's crippled line must have yielded before the impact of those veteran troops. In support of this statement it is essential to consider the situation of that centre at this critical time. Colonel Tomkinson may safely be called as the first witness in this case ; for at this time his regiment, in common with Vandeleur's Cavalry Brigade, was formed up on the reverse slope of the position, he was thus well placed to make a calm survey of the scene. He stated, ^" There was a regiment of the Pays Bas in square. They were not engaged, nor suffering much from fire, I may say not in the least cut up whilst I saw them. They were immediately in our front, and fancying the affair rather serious, and that if the enemy advanced any further (as their fears apprehended) they would have to oppose them, they began firing their muskets in the air, and their rear moved a little, intending, under the confusion of their fire and smoke, to move off. Major Childers, 11th Light Dragoons, and I rode up to them, encouraged them, stopped those who had moved the farthest (10 yards perhaps) out of their ranks, and whilst they were hesitating whether to retreat or to continue with their columns, the Duke rode up and encouraged them. He said to us, ' That is right, that is right. Keep them up.' Childers then brought up his squadron, and by placing it in their rear they continued steady. The Duke rode away again immediately. Had this one battalion run away at this moment, the consequence might have been fatal." The above account shows clearly enough the effect which the prolonged strain had had on some of the troops ; for they were undoubtedly on the brink of disintegration. It also 1 p. 309. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 4th PHASE 107 shows the grip that Wellington kept on his battle at this juncture, and his coolness when confronted with an incident which, had it developed any further, might have proved the signal for a general rearward movement that would have cost him the battle. In considering the state of affairs in Wellington's centre at this time, the best course wiU be to follow briefly the account which General Kennedy has ^v^itten.l For General Kennedy was not only a soldier of great and recognised ability, and absolutely impartial, but he was also General Alten's senior Staff Officer, and therefore at this crisis of the battle he had an unique opportunity of seeing how it fared with Welling- ton's centre at this dangerous hour. La Haye Sainte was completely in French hands, and also the ground on both sides of the Charleroi road in its immediate vicinity. Ompteda's Brigade was nearly annihilated, and Kielmansegge's Brigade was so thinned, that the two together could scarcely hold this position. Hence that part of the battle-line, between Sir C. Halkett's left and Sir J. Kempt's right, was virtually bare and un- protected ; this was the centre of the Duke's line, and therefore, above all, the one point which Napoleon desired to gain. It was now that the Duke's finest tactical qualities must be displayed if the battle was to be saved ; and the Iron Duke rose triumphantly to the full height of the critical situation. The danger was imminent ; and the result of the day's fighting was wavering in the balance, as Victory inclined first to one side and then to the other. Generally Napoleon could be trusted to press home immediately and in irresistible strength any advantage that he might gain. But, on June 18, he allowed this un- deniable chance to slip by unnoticed, and thus he un- doubtedly showed marks of decadence, in that he did not exert the same energy, activity, and personal superintendence of his battle, that he was accustomed to do. Directly La Haye Sainte fell a strong body of Cuirassiers took position in the valley between Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte, where they were sheltered from the fire of the Alhed guns, and yet were well-placed to take advantage 1 Kennedy, pp. 126-129. In the Battle of Waterloo General Shaw- Kennedy (then Captain Shaw, 43rd Regiment) was an A.Q.M.G. on the Staff of the 3rd Division (Baron Alton). 108 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO of any disorder which might break out among Wellington's sorely tried soldiers. For Marshal Ney made the most of his important capture, he launched numerous attacks against Wellington's centre ; and the King's German Legion, and Hanoverian Battalions of Alten's (3rd) Division were very highly tried. The 5th Line Battalion, K.G.L., were standing in square behind the Wavre road, when a French Infantry column debouched from La Haye Sainte and advanced towards them. General Alten at once sent orders to Colonel Ompteda to deploy and attack the advancing infantry. Colonel Ompteda demurred, as such a manoeuvre must place the battalion at the mercy of the Cuirassiers, who were lying in wait on the other side of the road. At this moment the Prince of Orange rode up and ordered Colonel Ompteda to deploy ; the same representation was made to the Prince, who impatiently reiterated his order. Colonel Ompteda, therefore, at once mounted and issued the order to deploy. The battalion rushing against the French Infantry column overbore it, but immediately afterwards the French horse- men pounced on their defenceless foes, and, taking them in front and flank, rode over the battalion and inflicted tremendous slaughter. Colonel Ompteda was killed, and less than 20 survived this fatal charge. '^ This incident affords sufficient proof of the result that would have been obtainable from the co-operation of the French Infantry with their Cavalry. If earlier in the day the two arms had worked better together, then far greater results must have been achieved ; and such temporary success as was obtained by the horsemen would have been converted into a permanent and lasting result by the following masses of infantry, who could have fastened with an iron grip on the ground won by their cavalry. It was at this moment that General Kennedy (then Captain Shaw) found that he was probably the senior Staff Officer present with Alten's (3rd) Division — all the other senior officers of the 3rd Division had been either killed, or so badly wounded that they had perforce to leave the field, but fortunately Captain Shaw recognised at once the serious state of affairs, and took prompt and correct action, for he galloped direct to the Duke himself, to report personally to 1 Beamish's K.O.L., II, pp. 369-371. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 4th PHASE 109 the Commander-in-Chief the peril in which his centre stood. The Duke at that moment was standing on the right of the Nivelles road behind the British Guards. Captain Shaw informed the Generalissimo that his line was open for the whole space between Sir C. Halkett's and Sir J. Kempt's Brigades. Captain Shaw, by his ready acceptance of initiative, did all in his power to minimise the risk. Fear- lessly he told the whole truth to the Duke, and left in the capable hands of the British Field-Marshal the decision as to what steps should be taken. At such moments flatterers are a commander's worst enemies ; for he can only base his plans on facts ; and so as to act correctly and be saved from dangerous error, he must know all the facts and nothing must be glozed over. Thus the Duke was enabled to ap- preciate the situation, and to make correct counter-dis- positions. This he did ; he received the very startling information with great coolness, and immediately replied with much precision and energy, proving that he retained the most complete self-possession. His mind was calm and inflexible ; at the crisis of his battle, he disdained to take counsel of his fears, but by his answer he showed that he had resolved to defend every inch of the position which he would hold to the very last extremity, and he proved that if he had been careless, or indifferent, at the com- mencement of the battle, yet when the crisis was reached, his whole demeanour had changed, and he had risen far superior to all that could be imagined. For, as an observant officer, who had often seen him in action, wrote, "... Generally quiet, and even apparently indifferent, the moment of danger arouses him, and shows the great man." ^ Wellington was true to himself at the crisis of the battle of La Belle AlHance ; and his prompt answer rang out clear and definite : — " I shall order the Brunswick troops to the spot, and other troops besides ; go you, and get all the German troops of the division to the spot that you can, and all the guns that you can find." Carried out as expeditiously as possible, it was these dis- positions that closed the dangerous gap with the best avail- able means. Doubtless the peril had arisen directly from > Letters of Colonel Sir Augustus Frazer, K.B., R.H.A. The quota- tion is from Letter 137 (p. 465), and dated April 12, 1814. 110 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO the original failure to appreciate the real importance of La Haye Sainte, a misappreciation which resulted in its capture; but that error was most ably amended and nobly atoned for. Well might the Duke say, " Twice have I saved this day by perseverance." For the day assuredly would have been lost without the Duke's own personal exertions, and his continual presence wherever, and whenever, more than usual efforts were required. Therefore confidence in their Commander still filled all minds, and animated all ranks. But gaps began to show in several places in Wellington's hard-pressed line. The 30th and 2 /73rd had formed a square together nearly all day ; however, about 6.30 p.m., Major Dawson Kelly, of the 73rd (although acting as A.Q.M.G. in 1815), was sent by the Duke to find out the cause of some con- fusion that was noticed in the 5th Brigade (Sir C. Halkett's). Major Kelly learned that all the officers of the 73rd had been killed, or wounded, and there was no officer to com- mand the regiment. Consequently Major Kelly very properly remained with the 73rd, and assumed temporary command of his battalion. A crisis was thus averted, and the battalion stood firm to meet the last attack. (This battalion lost 21 officers out of 2^ in this short campaign, Waterloo Letters, Nos. 145, 146.) Major Kelly (according to Sergeant Morris, p. 227) ordered that the colours of the 2 /73rd, which were riddled with holes, should be removed from their staff, rolled round the body of a trusty sergeant, and taken to Brussels, as there was no longer an officer to carry them. Another instructive incident was as follows : — Just to the right of Captain Bolton's Field Brigade the Duke noticed six foreign guns, which had been abandoned by their gunners. Wellington therefore ordered Sir G. Wood (commanding R.A.) to have them withdrawn to the rear. This duty was entrusted to Lieutenant Anderson, who carried it out successfully, and withdrew the cannon (except one, a very exposed gun, that could not be moved), with a working party taken from Captain Bolton's Field Brigade. To re-establish his mauled and shattered line, the Duke brought forward both D'Aubreme's and Ditmer's BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 4th PHASE 111 Brigades to take the position of the Brunswick troops. The Brunswickers had meanwhile been pushed forward into the front line between Sir C. Halkett and Kruse. In this manner the Duke attempted to restore his line before the final attack surged up against it.^ Meanwhile it is time to see what progress the Prussian attack had made. On the French right, Biilow had retaken Plancenoit. Therefore, before reinforcing Ney, Napoleon decided that he must retake the village of Plancenoit, and free his threatened right. For this task, the Emperor selected two battalions of his Old Guard (l/2nd Grenadiers and l/2nd Chasseurs), 2 led by Generals Morand and Pelet, and ordered them to storm and recapture the place. The Emperor himself gave personal instructions to the l/2nd Grenadiers, under Lieut .-Colonel Baron Golzio, that the Grenadiers were not to fire a shot, but to do the work with the bayonet. The two battalions of picked troops closed on Plancenoit, on two points, thej^ advanced with drums beating, colours spread, and bayonets fixed. In accordance with the Em- peror's orders — they disdained to fire, and ^\ith the naked steel forced their way into the place, overthrew ruthlessty and relentlessly all resistance, drove out the Prussians, and in twenty minutes they had swept the tillage streets and chxu-chyard clear, and hurled back their foe 600 yards beyond the place. Many acts of great personal gallantry occurred in this Homeric strife ; not the least picturesque being the action of the Drum-Major of the Grenadiers. He had pre^-iously been Drum-Major of the 10th Parisian Legion, and armed only with his Drum-Major's staff, he beat down all who confronted him. The 14 Prussian battalions in Plance- ' Sibome, p. 330, and footnote. Captain Sibome considered that the abandoned guns belonged to the Brunswiekers, who had abandoned them after ha\-ing suSered severely in their exposed position. Lieut. Anderson stated that the foreign guns were Belgian cannon. But Captain Sibome disproved this, for he stated that no Belgian batterj' stood on the ground in question. It may be mentioned that Bolton's battery stood in action at 7 p.m., on the ridge, in front of the Wa\Te cross-road, and almost half-way between La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont, mth the right gun some 550 yards from the north-eastern point of the Hougou- mont enclosures. ^ Ps Mauduit, II, pp. 396-404. 112 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO noit were utterly unable to withstand the human avalanche of 1100 Grenadiers and Chasseurs who descended on the village and its defenders, and swept away all resistance in much the same way as its prototype — an Alpine avalanche —overwhelms all obstacles which it finds in its path ; and in this case also the similarity in behaviour was very close, for the onrushing tide of destruction was only brought up when it had reached the bottom of the precipice. In the track of the fierce, devastating hurricane which burst over Plancenoit, were left more than 3000 Prussians — the price our Allies paid for the honour of crossing bayonets with the Old Guard. The Guard, elated by success, pressed on victoriously up the further slope. They reached the muzzles of the Prussian guns, and even succeeded in capturing some ; but Biilow turned round, and realising that he was not confronted by a grand attack of the whole of the Old Guard, he concentrated every man he could lay hands on, and hurled them against the veterans. Slowly the latter gave ground, withdrawing in good order to Plancenoit, where they arranged themselves for the stubborn defence of the village. They had achieved all that was required of them. With one tremendous, smashing stroke they had cleared the Emperor's right, taken the pressure off Generals Lobau and Duhesme, and given these Chiefs time to rally their men for further efforts. For at the end of this terrific twenty minutes the Young Guard had been rallied, and Lobau and the VI Corps were able to show front once more. By this sledge-hammer blow, from a part of his Old Guard, the Emperor had arrested the advance of the Prussians, and he was free to act decisively against Wellington. But he had depleted still further the reserve with which he wished to ensure Wellington's final defeat ; and for his last throw he had in hand only some 5000 bayonets of the Old and Middle Guard. The final crisis indeed was approaching fast. For this fourth attack had not been unsuccessful like all the previous ones ; La Haye Sainte had been gained at last, and the French were now well-placed to drive home their main attack against the Allied centre, whilst backing the supreme onslaught by a general attack all along the line. CHAPTER X THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO Fifth Phase— from 7 p.m. The Crisis, culminating in the Attack and Failure of the Imperial Guard, and the Defeat of the Armee du Nord. The Emperor having been relieved of all immediate anxiety regarding his right flank, was able once more to return to the welcome task of destroying the Anglo-Dutch Army. But the latter had profited fully from the respite accorded to them after the faU of La Haye Sainte, whilst Napoleon was employed in clearing Biilow out of Plancenoit for the second time ; and, by calling in his reserves, from right and left, the Duke had reinforced and strengthened his depleted and torn centre, and also he had cleared the Ohain road of the infantry of D'Erlon's Corps. The Duke could see that the supreme moment of the battle was fast approaching, and that Napoleon was about to launch his Guard ; but he awaited the coming onslaught unfhnchingly. Actually important reinforcements were close at hand, for the head of Zieten's marching column had attained Smohain, and was about to debouch on to the battle-field. Thus the support, so long and so anxiously awaited, was in touch at last. Napoleon also realised that the Prussian I Corps was approaching ; but instead of keeping in hand the 10 batta- lions of Grenadiers and Chasseurs of the Old and Middle Guard, 5000 strong, to protect the retreat, the Emperor believed that WeUington's troops were exhausted, and that the Anglo-Dutch Army had no longer any reserves available with which to stem his onset, accordingly the Emperor de- termined to have one last bid for victory. Consequently Napoleon despatched General de la Bedoyere and other Staff Officers down the ranks of the Armee du Nord, to spread the news to all that Marshal Grouchy was arriving, that II.— I 113 114 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO he was coming up on the French right, and was about to engage the AlHed left. The news spread all along the line like wildfire, the effect it produced was extraordinary, everywhere moral was re-established, and the sorely tried French Army braced itself gladly for the supreme effort. '^ This last phase almost baffles description. Once more pandemonium reigned ; and it is exceedingly difficult to disentangle what happened, for so little stands out really clear-cut against the background of confusion and chaos, storm and stress. However, it was nearing 7.30 p.m. when the distant rumble of Grouchy's cannonade became more distinct and persistent ; and this seemed to prove that, at the eleventh hour, the Marshal was at last to strike a telling blow for France ; and that whatever happened he would grip and neutralise Bliicher and the Prussian Army, and so leave Wellington unaided to bear the brunt of Napoleon's decisive stroke. The Emperor made a final, keen scrutiny of Wellington's position. The smoke-wreaths and puffs indicated the situation with sufficient clearness. On the right. Napoleon saw Durutte in possession of Papelotte, and gradually working his way forward up the slope ; and if the division were only strong enough to press further forward then it would outflank the Anglo-Dutch left, and be in a position to swing down the reverse slope of the Mt. S. Jean plateau ; whilst in the centre the remainder of D'Erlon's gallant corps crowned the ridge, beyond La Haye Sainte, which was theirs at last. But it must have been obvious to the Emperor's trained judgment that, even fighting as it did with all the courage of despair, the worn- out but intrepid infantry of the First Corps was powerless at this, the critical, moment, to force Wellington's attenuated but still tenacious battle-line. It was at this time that Marshal Ney remarked to Count D'Erlon, " We must die here, because if we are spared by the English grape- shot we shall both be hanged." ^ But it was not to be ; Ney's fate was not to find a soldier's death on the field of honour, even though it was the field of dark despair. But in his brief survey of the historic scene Napoleon 1 Marshal Ney's Report, given in Appendix II, No. 41. ^ De Mauduit, II, p. 412, stated that Count D'Erlon personally informed him of this incident. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 5th PHASE 115 must have noticed that, in the valley away to his left front, the remnants of his shattered cavalry as well as a part of Reille's Corps were rallying ; and far away to the left the strife around the blazing ruins of Hougoumont still raged as furiously as ever. Wellington's grip on his position was plainly relaxing, whereas the Emperor still held under his hand, his Guard — the Invincibles — whose steadiness, courage, and devotion in the past had always proved suf- ficient to wrest victory from a doubtful battle. The moment had come, so thought the Emperor, when victory would be the prize of him who attacked audaciously and furiously. " Uaudace, et encore de Vaudace, et toujour s de Vaudace " had always been his motto, as it was Danton's ; and rarely, in consequence, had Napoleon failed at such a crisis. Had he only decided to act with vigour directly La Haye Sainte fell, the attack might have succeeded ; but now it was too late, for the crisis in reality was over-passed, so far as Wellington was concerned. Zieten's Corps had attained Ohain at 6 p.m., and it was close up to Wellington's left flank when Napoleon decided to make his last effort. In fact Napoleon's attack was precipitated, for Zieten, at last, after some vacillation, had borne down to the support of Wellington's left. General Zieten's Advanced Guard, which General MtifHing had already seen in such close proximity to himself only a short while before, had turned round suddenly and disappeared. General Muffling promptly galloped after the corps, and luckily encountered Zieten himself. Apparently Bliicher had ordered Zieten to close up to him, and Zieten had acted correctly enough when, in attempting to carry out this order, he moved through Papelotte. But the General commanding the I Prussian Corps made a mistake when he sent on a young and in- experienced officer to reconnoitre, for the latter soon in- formed his General that the Anglo-Dutch left was in full retreat. Zieten thereupon changed his mind and intention. But the young officer's report was false ; he had come to an erroneous conclusion, through mistaking for fugitives the wounded, who were being taken in large numbers to the dressing stations in rear. General Muffling reassured Zieten, and explained both the urgency of the case, and the need for prompt action. This was most necessary. 116 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO for Zieten at the moment was quite undecided, whether he should engage to support the Duke's left, or manceuvre to rally Biilow. But General Miiffling was not to be denied, and he clinched the matter by saying, " The battle is lost if the First Corps does not go to the Duke's rescue." After a further show of hesitation, Zieten turned about and allowed General Miiffling to direct his further advance. But, if it had been persisted in, there can be little doubt that General Zieten's retrograde movement (which was commenced as a direct result of the false report) might have occasioned the loss of the battle. The day was drawing on apace, and the light was beginning to fail. Had General Zieten continued his withdrawal, or even indulged in vacillation much longer, then the I Corps would never have struck in at all on June 18. As matters turned out, thanks to General Mtiffling's prompt action, the loss of time was not material. Under such circumstances General Zieten deserved censure for not selecting with especial care the officer who had to undertake such a critical reconnaissance, and for not verifying his report in every possible way in the time available. This incident cannot be passed over without a tribute of praise to the tactful, capable, loyal soldier who served Wellington and Bliicher so well in this short campaign, and particularly on this critical 18th of June ; the effectiveness of the Prussian co-operation at Waterloo was due in no slight degree to his efforts and arrangements. It is time to consider Napoleon's action at this crisis. The Emperor leaving behind 5 battalions of his Guard (2 already at Plancenoit ; and 3 more who were to be held in reserve until the last — two of them to remain near La Belle Alliance, and one near Le Caillou), gave 5 battalions to Marshal Ney,^^ and he also ordered the two corps of Reille and D'Erlon to support the attack ; whilst the Emperor himself proceeded to La Haye Sainte, where he would be able to place himself at the head of his last troops and compel a victory. ' These appear to have been one battalion each of the 3rd Grenadiers, 4th Grenadiers, and 4th Chasseurs, together with 2 battahons of the 3rd Chasseurs. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 5th PHASE 117 It is true that this body of picked and veteran troops, now sent in to win back for their Master the fleeting fortunes of the day, were not formidable on account of their mere numbers. But in war moral is to physical as three is to one ; and so the Guard were always formidable, because of their trained valour, alike unquestionable and unquestioned ; and also because of their prestige and splendid reputation. But Wellington had warning of this attack, for Sir A. Frazer, commanding R.H.A., distinctly stated that a Cuirassier (Carabinier ?) officer apprised him of it, and pointed to the side on which he said the attack would be made in a quarter of an hour. Sir A. Frazer, who was involved with artillery details at the moment, sent the Cuirassier (Carabinier ?) with General Adam to the Duke, who thus received this very important piece of information in time to make the necessary dispositions. Too much importance can easily be attached to the warning, that the attack of the Guard was impending, which the deserter officer brought over to the Anglo-Dutch position. It is going much too far to say that this piece of treasonable information saved the Anglo-Dutch Army. Wellington hardly could be surprised by such an assault, and he had in hand sufficient troops to meet the onslaught, and retain his hold of his position until the Prussians threw all their weight into the strife and settled matters ; for Zieten was well in sight, and both Biilow and Pirch I were heavily engaged. The importance of the incident, and also of de Bourmont's desertion on June 15th, lay in the fact that they showed the trend of popular feeling. If all ranks of the Armee du Nord were not loyal to Napoleon, so much the less was the nation. Yet if the Emperor was to have a chance against the Allies, both the army and the nation must rally unreservedly to his cause ; and dastardly conduct, of which instances have been quoted, was a weakness in Napoleon's defensive armour, that might become serious or critical in the event of a reverse or disaster overtaking the Armie du Nord in Belgium. But, despite the warning, Sir A. Frazer stated that, " this last struggle was nearly fatal to us."i This attack of the Guard has been called not inaptly " the 1 Sir A. Frazer's Letters, p. 552. The Carabiniers also wore cuirasses. 118 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO last madness of despair " ; for, by the time it was launched, Zieten had arrived and was able to take an effective hand in the game ; also Wellington had closed up his ranks and drawn in Vivian and Vandeleur's Cavalry Brigades from his extreme left, and placed them behind his centre. Practically the 5 battalions of the Guard, under Marshal Ney, advanced alone, in three echelons, against the Anglo- Dutch Army. They moved forward with shouldered arms, and their dressing was as correct as if they were taking part in a ceremonial parade at Paris. Their devotion and discipline were superb and unsurpassed in the annals of warfare ; possibly they were equalled by the stately advance of the scarlet-clad battalions at Fontenoy, but even battle- fields very rarely show such sublime pictures as these, of soldiers ready and willing to die victorious for their country, and under such disheartening and impossible conditions. For their Master had hardly given his " In- vincibles " a chance to succeed. On June 18, Napoleon, the embodiment of daring resolve and resolution, had allowed himself to be gripped by hesitation, that arch-foe to all success. Hence he would not stake his all ; neither, when he did make his final bid for victory, did he limit him- self to one single united throw ; for the Guard made practically three attacks on two different parts of Welling- ton's line. The stroke Napoleon delivered came too late, was not sped true, nor was it backed by sufficient force. The attack of the first echelon must be examined. Of course the Guard advanced to the attack in columns so as to enable them to cross with ease and rapidity the death- strewn battle-field, climb the face of Wellington's position, and then be in hand to meet any eventuality, either to be readily deployable if they required to develop their fire- power, or to form square if charged suddenly by cavalry. The battalions were formed close to one another, and in the interval between the various Echelons two guns advanced, loaded with grape-shot, to second the onslaught of the Guard Infantry. 1 The attack of the first ichelon was delivered almost midway between La Haye Sainte and Hougou- mont. Marshal Ney with Generals Friant, Roguet, and Michel, and all the other general officers, rode at the head ' See also footnote to page 121 of this volume. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 5th PHASE 119 of the attacking columns ; Ney was riding his fifth horse, but almost immediately it fell beneath him — shot. The Marshal Prince de la Moskowa in this campaign had more than justified his nom de guerre ot " le plus brave des braves," undismayed he arose, and continued the advance on foot. At 600 yards from Wellington's position, as it passed to the front, the first echelon of the Guard defiled past the Emperor, who had taken up his position in the middle of the road between two batteries which were covering the attack with their fire. The sun was sinking, the darkened smoke-laden air made it very difficult to distinguish clearly what was going on. The conditions were somewhat similar, therefore, to the last scene at Ligny ; but the denouement was to be very different. Passing their Emperor with their usual tremendous salute, the veterans hurried on, and threw themselves against Wellington's line. The Allied batteries were disposed on a curve along the ridge that ran above La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont, and as they drew near more than thirty guns received the first Schelon of the Guard with a double volley of grape- shot, that beat in the faces of the advancing columns and also took them in flank. ^ Each volley tore a hole in the ranks of the assailants, but the veterans did not flinch or falter, steadily they pressed on, then closed their shot-scarred ranks, and, as they advanced to close with their foes, their war-cry could be heard pealing high above the din of the battle. This first echelon headed by the 1 /3rd Grenadiers overcame some Brunswickers and then seized the tem- porarily abandoned guns of Lloyds' (R.A.) and Cleeves' (K.G.L.) Batteries. Then, inclining slightly, they bore down on Sir Colin Halkett's Brigade, and pressed back the 30th and 73rd Regiments who formed one square together, and were slightly in advance of the 83rd and 69th. However, ' At 7 p.m. our Troops and Field Brigades stood along the crest from east to west, as follows : — • Whinyates' (Rocket) Troop, east of the cross-roads, and north of the Wavre road. All the others (except Mercer's) were in front, south of the Wavre road, and all were to the west of the cross-roads : — Ross' Troop, Sinclair's Field Brigade, Cleeves' Field Brigade (K.G.L.), Lloyd's Field Brigade, Sandham's Field Brigade, Bolton's Field Brigade, Rogers' Field Brigade, Bean's Troop, Mercer's Troop (behind the road), Webber-Smith's Troop, Norman Ramsay's Troop (above north-east comer of Hougoimiont enclosure), and Bull's Troop (Howitzers). {British Artillery at Waterloo, R.A.I. Journal, vol. XXXIV, No. 7.) 120 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO our Dutch Allies brought valuable assistance to our troops at this moment, for the Dutch-Belgian General, Chasse,^ hastened to bring up Major van der Smissen's Dutch- Belgian Horse Battery on the right of the two British regiments who had receded, and the grape-shot volleys from the guns smote the Guard in flank with deadly effect. Then General Chasse brought up a further reinforcement (Ditmer's Dutch-Belgian Brigade, 3000 strong), placed them on the left of the two regiments, and threw them with the bayonet against the shattered French column ; they broke it, crushed the dibris, and then hurled it to the bottom of the slope. In this way the 1 /3rd Grenadiers was overthrown ; and largely by the exertions of our Allies, the Dutch- Belgian troops. Meanwhile the single battalion of the 4th Grenadiers 2 had engaged the right of Sir Colin Halkett's Brigade. Two of Duchand's guns (belonging to the Guard Horse Artillery Reserve) augmented the musketry of the 4th Grenadiers ; and, under this extreme pressure, the shat- tered remnants of the 33rd and 69th Regiments wavered. However, Sir Colin Halkett rose nobly to the occasion, and seizing the flag of the 33rd he stood firm waving it above his head ; by his fine example he steadied his men who reformed, and once more showed a firm front. Their deter- mination " to kill the longest " was rewarded, for they beat off the 4th Grenadiers. Thus the attack of the first echelon ended in failure. The remainder of the Middle Guard was formed in two echelons of which one was composed of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the Srd Chasseurs, whilst the other was formed of a battahon of the 4th Chasseurs. These veterans were formed in two columns, with but a slight interval between them, they advanced with perfect steadiness, and they were undeterred by the appalling sight of the ground around Hougoumont and on the slopes, covered with the remains of the shattered ' Earlier in the action, dtiring the third phase, Wellington at last had become convinced that no serious attack would be delivered on his right, beyond the Nivelles road. Therefore he had called in General Chass6 and his division from Braine I'Alleud. The Division moving through Merbe Braine proceeded to form up in rear of Welling- ton's right centre. This was indeed a reinforcement — as welcome as it was judicious. 2 TWs reduced owing to the losses it had euSered at Ligny on June 16th. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 5th PHASE 121 cavalry. 1 Undismayed they pressed on ; and they had worked almost to the crest of the slope before they en- countered any of Wellington's Infantry. The Guard had been pounded with round-shot by Major Norman Ramsay's Troop 2 (commanded at this moment by Lieutenant P. Sandilands), since they formed near La Belle Alliance, and the fire was kept up until the veterans almost attained the very crest of the position itself ;^ yet generally there is httle doubt that the fire of the guns had slackened considerably, on account of the scarcity of ammunition which prevailed on both sides ; and hence the oris de guerre, uttered by the veterans as they closed, rang out clearly 1 Gourgaud stated (p. 107) that the Emperor had formed the Guard " in the mixed order," to which he had always been faithful ; he placed one battalion in line and two in close column on its flanks, a forma- tion which possessed every advantage ; for it permitted a large propor- tion of muskets to be brought to bear when required, and the battalions in column on the flanks were well placed to withstand a sudden deluge of cavalry, or they could be deployed rapidly if more muskets were required to gain the decision. Thus, in " the mixed order " of Guibert, Buonaparte had formed the demi-brigades at the passage of the TagUamento, eighteen long years before ; and at the crisis of his hfe he remained true to the formation he had used so often. Therefore it appears quite probable that the attack against Sir C. Halkett — i.e. Wellington's centre — was made by battalions of the Guaxd formed in the " mixed order." But the attack which was met emd repulsed by the Royal Artillery, the British Guards, and the 52nd Light Infantry, was made in a very different formation. This advance was made in column, and some have even asserted that the battahons were in hollow square. The latter formation is a most unlikely one to have been used ; and it is far more probable that the formation was an existing one of the period, viz. colonne contre la cavalerie, or some slight variant of it. This formation consisted in a succession of battalions, formed in double-company columns at half-company distance, and having a one- and-a-half company distance left between the battalions themselves. The formation had much to recommend it on June 18, particularly as Wellington was known to have some cavalry in hand, and the attacking troops would require to be able to form defensively before any sudden cavalry storm burst over them. The formation of the Guard shown in Captam Sibome's model of the battle, depicting the veterans in the very act of advancing against our line, just to the east of Hougoumont, merely shows a simple variant of colonne contre la cavalerie. (For greater details and description of this formation see Revue d'Histoire, No. 124, pp. 123-125.) If this is correct, two diHerent formations were used by the Guard in its two great attacks. But, in estch case, the underlying idea of the particular formation was to keep the men well in hand until the critical moment, and to enable the connmnnder of the assaulting troops to meet almost any eventuality in the least possible time. ' Now H Battery, R.H.A. ' It is possible of course that this troop devoted some of its atten- tion to the 3rd and 4th Grenadiers, who engaged Sir C. Halkett's Brigade, as weU as to the 3rd and 4th Chasseurs. 122 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO above the noise of the battle, and above the dropping shots. But just before the 3rd Chasseurs had attained the Ohain road they were confronted by the loom of a long, thin, red line, which stood barring a further advance northwards, and met them steadfastly face to face. It was the British Guard. On Wellington's personal command, " Up Guard, ready ! " they had sprung up from their lair in the standing corn, and, bringing their muskets to the present, they fired a smashing volley at 20 yards' range into their assailants. A storm of grape-shot was poured into the veterans from the guns on the heights above them. The head of the 3rd Chasseurs went down in one weltering mass and their further advance was thereafter obstructed by dead bodies. Captain Bolton's Field Brigade, ^ in particular, appears to have poured in a very heavy fire of grape-shot at ranges of 200 yards and under. An attempt was made to deploy the 3rd Chasseurs ; but, at such a moment, it was ineffectual, and merely served to increase the disorder and confusion which was spreading through their ranks, and the latter soon com- menced to wave at each discharge " like standing corn blown by the wind." The historic scene witnessed at Fontenoy (70 years before), when the English column penetrated into the French posi- tion and then could gain no further ground, was repeated here at Waterloo ; with this difference, that it was now the French who, having forced a way almost into the heart of Wellington's position, had come to a standstill, and lacked the power to drive home the blow. The advance was delayed, and the order crushed out of the Guard, by the destructive fire of the British Artillery, who, at this, the crisis of the battle, were giving to their infantry a really close and effectual support ; and also the battalions of the Imperial Guard were beaten and could make no further headway, when they collided with and were opposed so resolutely by the steady battalions of the British Guards, who had been thrown across their front. Thus, at this moment, it was the real comradeship in action which existed between the British Artillery and the British Infantry, that proved too much even for the veterans of Napoleon's Imperial Guard. ' Now 42nd Battery, R.F.A. Captain Bolton was killed by a cannon-shot just before this attack ; Captain Napier then succeeded to the command. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 5th PHASE 123 But for ten long minutes more, the stubborn veterans showed admirable obstinacy and refused to acknowledge their defeat ; however, the outward signs of their demoralisa- tion did not escape the Duke of Wellington's keen eye, and then he ordered his troops to charge. In a moment, the British Guards dashed forward with the bayonet, leaped on their foe, swept back the miserable fragments of this heroic band of men, and flung them do^vn the slope as far as the enclosures around Hougoumont. In doing so friend and foe became intermingled so inextricably that the field guns of Bolton's Brigade had to cease firing. ^ But another foe was seen looming through the smoke — it was the remaining battalion of the Middle Guard, who were advancing to extricate their comrades. The British Guards at once halted, and then hastened to regain their original positions, being followed closely by the French, who steadily faced the volleys of grape-shot with which they were greeted. But reinforcements for the British were at hand ; for General Adam's Brigade came hurrying up on the left flank of the Imperial Guard. Meanwhile, relieved of their other assailants, the British Guards and Sir Colin Halkett's Brigade stood astride the path of the attackers ; whilst Colonel WUliam Halkett's 3rd Hano^'erian Brigade emerged from Hougoumont and commenced to fire into the rear of the Imperial Guard. The end of this great bid for victory was in sight, but even so it came ■with a catastrophic suddenness that befitted the close of our greatest land-battle. It was at this moment that, on his own initiative. Colonel Colborne wheeled up the 52nd Light Infantry (of Adam's Brigade), and the regiment pouring a smashing volley into the left flank of the Guard, literally tore it out. Adam's Brigade promptly advanced with the bayonet, and short, sharp, and decisive as it had been, the death-v\Testle was over. The ' This Field Brigade had only 5 guns in action at this time, for the sixth, the howitzer, having been loaded by mistake with canister, had been placed imder the charge of a N.C.O. when the battery took up its final position, and the N.C.O. had orders to unload the piece and then rejoin. He failed, however, to bring the weapon into line again before the battle was over. Captain Napier, who was in temporary command of this Brigade, when the action was virtually over, was unfortunate enough to be severely wounded in several places, by a shrapnel shell (or spherical case), which burst in one of his guns as it was fired at the enemy, who were then giving way. (See Waterloo Letters, Nos. 96 and 97.) 124 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Guard were unable to withstand this furious but steady onslaught, and dissolving in hopeless disarray, they were pushed to the bottom of the fatal slope. The battle had come to a sudden end. For both sides were so exhausted, and strained to the highest pitch of tension, that at this crisis the first retrograde movement made by any body of troops, however small, was wellnigh certain to settle the fate of that army to which it belonged. It was 8 p.m. when this attack had spent itself ; and there rang out the dread cry which no field had heard before — " La Garde recule.'" All along the battle-line it pealed, paralysing the French and preventing all further efforts ; but on the other hand galvanising and stimulating the Allies into immediate and decisive action. This was the moment for them to strike a " knock-down " blow with their clenched fist ; and the Duke of Wellington rose to the full height of the occasion, for he determined to finish off the last of the Grand Armies, and deal it a death-wound then and there. Riding to the crest of his position, he took off his hat and waved it in the air. The signal was understood at once, and obeyed as promptly ; it was the order for a general advance, and 40,000 men came pouring down the slopes in the twilight, whilst the drums beat and the trumpets sounded the charge. But the position that the Anglo-Dutch Army had held so tenaciously was marked, as far as the eye could reach, by the red line of the uniforms of the killed and wounded. At the same moment Wellington's last cavalry reserve, the two fresh cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur, were loosed on the wavering foe, who now gave up all in a moment, abandoning at once La Haye Sainte, the en- closures around Hougoumont, and aU the ground they were in possession of ; simultaneously a panic broke out and spread like wildfire, transforming the French left and centre into a rudderless horde, who streamed away from the fatal field TOthout any unity or cohesion, and with no other thought than the single one of saving their own lives. The finest description of this dramatic scene came from the pen of a combatant ; he wrote : "I have seen nothing like that moment, the sky literally darkened with smoke, the sun just going down, and which till then had not for some hours broken through the gloom of a duU day, the indescribable shouts of thousands, where it was im- BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 5th PHASE 125 possible to distinguish between friend and foe. Every man's arm seemed to be raised against that of every other. Suddenlj-, after the mingled mass had ebbed and flowed, the enemy began to yield, and cheerings and English huzzas announced that the day must be ours."i To show how rapidly the end had come another eye- witness may be quoted : " On our Brigade (Vandeleur) getting to the point where we overlooked them (the French), they were seen rimning away on every side in the greatest haste and confusion. Not knowing when we moved to the front which had succeeded, it was a sight I shall never forget." 2 The close of the great battle had come with a meteoric suddenness that equalled Marengo, and was only surpassed by AusterUtz. At the same moment as the Guard failed, another great success was obtained by the Prussians against the French right ; for Zieten's Corps had come up, and had engaged on Wellington's left, thus binding the Duke's battle to that of the Prussian Corps of Biilow and Pirch I. Consequently Zieten confronted the right angle, which had been formed at the north-east comer of the French front when Lobau had taken up his position to bar the Prussian advance. Zieten's troops were comparatively fresh, and, so late in the day, the French in this part of the field could not with- stand the onslaught of numerically superior Prussian masses ; under the pressure that was exerted they gave way at the apex of the angle, and their front at this spot was driven inwards, leading open a road which led straight to the very heart of the Armie du Nord. Of a truth, tried beyond all powers of endurance. Napoleon's battle- line had suddenly fallen to pieces ; through this fresh gap poured in the Prussian horse, and they succeeded in reaching La Belle Alliance at the same time as the British horsemen, who had crashed across the dibris of the fight to the east of Hougoumont. The one great risk, against which Napoleon had had to guard in this campaign, was the unlikely one of being caught and jammed between the two closing jaws of the Allied ^^ice as they came together on a field of battle. But the unUkely had happened ; for the jaws had fastened firmly with their * Sir A. Frazer's Letters, p. 553. (Written at 9 a.m., on June 20.) ' Tomkinson, p. 311. 126 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO iron grip into what had been the Armee du Nord, and rapidly they proceeded to tear it to pieces. There was practically no further resistance. Lobau and the troops under his com- mand alone held firm, and covered the retreat, or rather flight, of the Grand Army along the Charleroi road. A fUght that was quickened by the ever-increasing roar of Bliicher's cannon, as the Prussian Corps drew in nearer and nearer to Plancenoit, whilst their round-shot ploughed up the Charleroi road, which their infantry threatened to irrupt across, and directly this occurred the retreat of the whole French Army would be cut off. Too much honour cannot be given to Lobau for the firm front he showed at this crisis. It was his admirable obstinacy that gave to Napoleon a last chance to rally and reform the army he had used so hardly ; and, when that failed, Lobau's obstinate and heroic defence gave to the Emperor and the dibris of the Arviee du Nord an avenue of escape from the accursed field ; for hope had died out in every breast but Napoleon's. Here, as at Essling on the Danube's bank, Lobau once more held on to the blazing ruins of an almost worthless village, so as to save the main army from annihilation. It was owing chiefly to his self-sacrificing devotion, and to the fortitude and discipline shown by his gallant troops, that a staggering disaster was avoided when the two jaws of the Allied vice fixed firmly in their prey. • Just as the Guard failed, far away to the north-east angle of the French front, amid the failing light and the ever-increasing smoke, Durutte could be discerned fighting on grimly, with his troops formed in the " mixed order " which Napoleon himself had introduced ' many years before ; and had remained faithful to to the end. It was fitting that ' It was in this fighting on the French right around Plancenoit that General Duhesme was killed. Napoleon has written his General's epitaph : ' ' He was an intrepid soldier, and a consummate general ; both staunch and true, alike in good as in evil fortune." (Commen- taires, V, p. 187). This was praise indeed. ^ Napoleon first introduced it at the crossing of the Tagliamento, in 1797. He thought so much of his innovation that he promptly wrote to the Directors about it ; thus for the first time mentioning to them the actual tactical disposition which he used. { Vide Gorrespond- ance de Napoleon I"; No. 1589.) Whatever formation the Guard actually used in their advance, there is no doubt that Durutte did use this particular formation at the end of the battle. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 5th PHASE 127 an example of this formation should be found on the Emperor's last battle-field. However, in the murky gloom that enshrouded the battle-field, two other scenes remained to be played out before the curtain fell finally on the death-throes of the last, but by no means the least gallant of the Grand Armies of the First Empire. Just as his whole battle-line went to pieces, Napoleon had in hand near La Haye Sainte the 2nd battalions of the 1st Chasseurs, and of the 2nd Grenadiers and 2nd Chasseurs, under Generals Cambronne, Roguet, and Christiani. The Emperor was busy forming up these troops, whom he intended to lead personally on to the plateau ; and with them he meant to give the coup de grace to Wellington. But suddenly he saw that such an attempt was hope- less ; however, as usual, he retained his calm and self- possession, and he realised that the best use which he could make of the veterans was with them to form a human dike, so as to withstand the onrush of his foe ; and, behind this cover, rally the Armee du Nord, and march off. Napoleon therefore formed the three battalions into three squares, with their right resting on the Charleroi road, and about a hundred yards distant from La Haye Sainte. The squares withstood Vivian's charges ; thereupon (unchecked by the four head-quarters' squadrons which the Emperor launched against them) the Hussars turned on the flying masses and cut down all they could reach. Meanwhile WeUington's Infantry had closed with the three squares, and accompanying the advance there were two British Horse Artillery Troops (Captain and Brevet-Major Whin- yates', and Lieut.-Colonel Sir R. Gardiner's), and also a British Field Brigade (Captain and Brevet-Major Rogers'). The guns opened on the squares with grape, at a range of about 60 yards ; and the infantry swarmed round the Guard, who were in a very unfavourable position to reply to the fire that was poured into them. Their position was indeed untenable, and the Emperor ordered them to withdraw, whilst, with a few mounted Chasseurs, he galloped off to La Belle Alliance to endeavour to select a position in which the Armee du Nord might be rallied and reformed. Napoleon now issued his last orders, and among them was an order sent to General Pire to move at once 128 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO with his Light Cavalry to the entrance of the village of Genappe, and there he was to stem the tide of flight and rally and reform all the fugitives. Meanwhile the three devoted battalions of the Guard steadily withdrew, surrounded by enemies. But their retreat, although slow and made with ever-diminishing numbers, was carried out with precision and order. It was amidst this tumult that, on being asked if he would sur- render, General Cambronne made that answer which a few days later was improved into the immortal phrase that be- fitted the occasion so well : "ia Garde meurt, elle ne se rend pas." ' But at last, on reaching La Belle Alliance, the dwindling squares were submerged by the crowd of assailants, and they literally dissolved ; the survivors then mingled with the flying remnants of the Armee du Nord. It was during this part of the fifth phase that a strange disaster overtook Captain Mercer's gallant troop of Horse Artillery. The incident is worth recalling, for it shows the confusion into which even the victors had fallen in the hour of their triumph, and the rudderless disorder that always exists at the end of a hard-fought fight ; as well as the intermixture and intermingling that must occur inevitably when Allies effect their concentration on the battle-field itself. For just when the day had been won, a battery, which must have dropped from the clouds, opened a very heavy enfilade fire on the left of Captain Mercer's Troop, at a range of about 400 yards. The new battery was certainly a Prussian one. The British Troop was raked from end to end, and every shot took effect. Slowly and laboriously the tired gunners trained the two left flank guns on to their new foe, so as to check his fire. However, it was not long before a Black Brunswicker Officer galloped up in a great state of excitement, and asserted that the Troop was firing on its own good friends — the Prussians ! As Captain Mercer explained, reasonably enough, in a melee one can only tell the tree by the fruit, and this fruit was deadly, for the fire of the enfilading battery threatened to annihilate the Troop ; and if the offenders were Prussians, then they ^ It is inconceivable that General Cambronne could have given utterance to such a magnificent sentence at a time like this. His answer was probably far ourter, and possibly far coarser. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 5th PHASE 129 were behaving very uncivilly. Captain Mercer eventually ceased fire against the Prussian Battery, but as a result the Prussian shot came in thicker than ever, and even the Black Brunswicker Officer had a narrow escape. Soon afterwards the latter left ; and gradually Captain Mercer's Troop was reduced to a %vreck. In fact, it was only saved from uttet extinction by the advent of a Belgian Horse Artillery Battery, which came up close on Captain Mercer's left, and thus were in a position to enfilade either the Troop, or the Prussian Battery. Having been induced to turn their gims on the latter, the Prussians were soon driven off, and what remained of Captain Mercer's Troop was saved. It was shortly after this that the order to advance and co-operate in the ptursuit reached Captain Mercer. This order it was impossible for him to comply with, for the Troop was a jumbled mass of guns whose trails had become interlocked, the personnel had suffered very severely, and of the horses no less than 140 out of 200 had fallen. Hence the Troop had perforce to pass the night in its position.^ Meanwhile Marshal Ney had made his final bid to escape the hangman's rope, or the firing platoon, and to die a soldier's death on his last field. He stood close to the road, whilst the mass of fugitives swirled past in utter confusion ; finally, he caught sight of Brue's Brigade (belonging to Durutte's Division of D'Erlon's Corps), which was the only organisation of troops of the line that still maintained any show of formation, although at this time the Brigade numbered not more than 2 battaUons. The Marshal stopped them, and, placing himself at their head, he flung them once more upon the foe, electrifying them by crying out, " Come, and see a Marshal of France die ! " Naturally enough, the attack achieved nothing, the Brigade was quickly broken and scattered. But Ney still clung to his last field. He proceeded therefore to enter one of the squares of the Guard to save himseK from being captured by the victors. Finally, when the square dis- solved, he left the field on foot, and, supported by a corporal of the Guard, proceeded in this fashion until he had passed through Genappe ; but the pursuit every moment was 1 Captain Mercer's Journal, pp. 325-331. It is partly because Captain Mercer had to spend that night ajid the next morning on the field of battle, that his Joumtd is so valuable, II.— K 130 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO waxing fiercer and fiercer ; at last Major Schmidt, of the Lancers, recognised the Marshal and gave him his horse. "^ Surely Fate was more than unkind when she preserved " le brave des braves " from the death he wooed so persistently on this his last field, merely to allow him to escape, and then to find a felon's doom awaiting him in Paris before the year was out. At the same time as Marshal Ney sought a temporary asylum in the nearest square of the Old Guard, after Brue's Brigade had been dashed to pieces, the commanding officer of one of the battalions of the 95th Regiment of the Line (belonging to Brue's Brigade) seized the eagle of his regiment from the officer who carried it (who had just been seriously injured), and ran towards the same square as the Marshal had entered. Entrance at first was refused. But the sight of the eagle was a sufficient passport, and a way was made for the officer to bring his precious charge to safety, and preserve the honour of the 95th Regiment of the Line.^ Meanwhile a most gallant fight had raged around the devoted square of the 2 /3rd Grenadiers (commanded by Lieut. -Colonel Belcourt). Placed by Napoleon himself towards the left flank and near Hougoumont, the square found itself much in the position of an isolated redoubt when the Armee du Nord gave way. However, it retained its position, and was subjected to a heavy gun-fire which tore bloody breaches in its flanks. Thinking that the fort could be stormed, the Allied Cavalry dashed against it ; but they left 200 of their number to act as a glacis to the impenetrable work. Another fierce charge was delivered, and again with the same lack of success. Once more the square was subjected to another deluge of horse ; and a slight momentary success was achieved, for 15 or 20 horsemen did penetrate the square — to be bayoneted instantly in the interior of the square itself. But no longer could the Grenadiers remain where they were, or they must have been cut off irretrievably from the retreating French Army. Reduced from 500 to 300, the square moved off to Rossomme. On the way it allowed itself to become an asylum for many of the wounded, who begged to be escorted 1 See Marshal Ney's report, Appendix II, No. 41. 2 De Mauduit, II, pp. 440-441. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 5th PHASE 131 from the field. This proved its undoing ; for no longer could it form a large and roomy square three deep ; and perforce it had to form up in a triangle, whose faces were two deep only, with the apex directed at Rossomme. The chance for the Allies to break up the Grenadiers had come, and they prepared to deliver a fourth and final assault on the living fortress that had defied them so long. Close to La Belle Alliance the end came ; a last furious charge finally broke in, and after a desperate fight between bayonet, lance, and sabre, the square outnumbered and crushed — disappeared. The 2 /3rd Grenadiers had done their duty nobly, and even if they had lost all, yet they had saved their honour. ^ The last scene of the battle has been reached, and it was memorable enough ; it redounded chiefly to the glory of the French Army, and it was fought out near de Coster's house. Here, waiting in squares, stood the two battalions of the 1st Grenadiers of the Guard, under General Petit— probably the finest troops in Europe. ^ In the centre of the 1st Battalion was the Emperor himself. It was with these living ramparts that Napoleon designed to cover the dis- organised flight of the Grand Army, and save them from the horrors of a close pursuit. A 12-pounder battery of the Guard Artillery was brought into action on the prolongation of the squares ; but it possessed only one round per gun. As the pursuing cavalry closed, a last volley of grape-shot pealed from the mouths of the guns ; and then the gunners standing calmly beside their empty pieces were sabred where they stood. But the squares standing firm with- stood all charges. The attacks had no more effect on them than have handfuls of sand when they are blown against the granite pyramids of Egypt. The two squares of picked troops defied all efforts to break them, and they stood alone — two battalions confronting two armies ! 1 De Maudmt, II, pp. 444-450. ' On one side of the flag of the eagle of this regiment of Grenadiers was the inscription, " Garde Impiriale. L'Empereur Napolion au I'r Rigiment des Grenadiers d. Pied " ; whilst on the other was the following list of battle-honours which this regiment had gained : " Marengo, Austerlitz, Eylau, Eckmiihl, Wagram, Moskowa, Berlin, Ulm, Jina, Friedland, Essling, Smolensk, Vienne, Madrid, Moskow." (Hiatoire populaire de la Garde Impiriale, by S. Hilaire, footnote to p. 390.) CoTild any regiment claim a more glorious record for so brief a period ? 132 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO For even Lobau's defences were down, and the Prussians had driven the defenders out from the ruins of the blazing village of Plancenoit, and pursuers and pursued debouched pell-mell on to the Charleroi highway. In self- defence the Grenadiers had to clear their faces with fire, lest foes should enter the two citadels along with the friends who sought refuge therein. General Petit's Grenadiers stood firm despite the awful ruin around ; but at length the Emperor ordered them to fall back, and slowly these war-worn veterans yielded ground. In perfect order they drew off, halting continually to rectify their line and arrest the pursuit by effective enfilading fire. Thus the Old Guard showed that it was worthy of itself — and of France. As the poet said truly enough : — " In ' pride of place ' here last the eagle flew, Then tore' with bloody talon the rent plain, Pierced by the shafts of banded nations through." ' Meanwhile the Emperor, accompanied by a small staff and a tiny escort, had pushed on to his overnight head- quarters at Le Caillou, where he found the guard that had been left there — the 1/lst Chasseurs — and, with this batta- lion, the Emperor slowly took the road to Charleroi. It was after 9 p.m. when Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington and Field-Marshal Prince Bliicher met near the farm of "La Belle Alliance,"* and greeted each other as victors, for indeed the day was theirs.' ^ Byron, Ghilde Harold's Pilgrimage. The lines are a fitting descrip- tion of G6rome's magnificent work, L'aigle expirant. ' The origin of the name for this farm is obscm'e ; there are three versions of which one may be true, or all may be false ; but it is certain that the house was so called before the victorious Generals met there, and made it immortal. The long arm of coincidence is again in evidence, for the name of the place is so A propoa of the historic meeting, and of the great Alhed victory, that it cannot escape a passing reference. (For the three legends about the farm see M. Navez, Champ de Waterloo, 1815, pp. 104-105.) ' " Bliicher and I met near La Belle Alliance." Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 245. In Letters from a British Officer, pp. 264^265, it is stated, "... a little in front [of La Belle Alliance] we came in contact with the Prussians, who halted on our approach and played our national air of " God Save the King." In the vicinity of La Belle Alliance the two great Commanders met." Also see Blticher's report, dated June 20 (given by de Baa and de BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 5th PHASE 133 At this time the Prussians were stamping out the last elements of resistance in Plancenoit, and General Petit's Grenadiers were still standing firm at de Coster's house. It was already nearly dark, but the field of battle was lit feebly with a red and sinister glow, emanating from the blazing ruins of Hougoumont and Plancenoit. An immediate pursuit was agreed on by the two chiefs ; and the fiery Prussian Marshal undertook to conduct the pursuit of the vanquished foe, which Wellington's troops, in the opinion of the British Marshal, were incapable of carrjang out. Bliicher's offer being accepted, he directed the Corps Commanders to carry out the pursuit so long as they possessed a man and a horse able to stand ; and (General Gneisenau, BlUcher's Chief of the Staff, imdertook to lead the pursuit in person. The great battle had ended ; but before considering the pursuit it is essential to enumerate the strength developed by the Prussians during the battle, and also the casualties suffered by the combatants on this day. Sibome (Appendix XXXIII, p. 561), gives the varying strengths of the Prussians throughout the day as follows : — At 4.30 p.m. 16,000 (including 2700 sabres) and 64 guns ; At 6.30 p.m. 30,000 (including 2700 sabres) and 64 guns ; and At 7.30 p.m. 52,000 (including 8800 sabres) and 104 guns. The Prussians actually engaged in the fighting appear to have been : — von Billow's, the IV Corps ; 5th Brigade (Tippelskirch) of Pirch I's, II Corps ; 1st Brigade (v. Steinmetz) of Zieten's, I Corps ; and Roder's Cavalry of Zieten's I Corps. Wommeraom, pp. 485-493) ; the Marshal desired to name the battle after the farm, and thereby to commemorate the historic alliance. But, despite all this evidence, the actual spot where the two Field- Marshals met is in dispute ; another generally accepted place is on the Charleroi-Brussels highway between the Caillou Farm and the Maison du Roi ; and the Duke only stated that the meeting took place " near La Belle Alliance." However, the point is not of very great im- portance. 134 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO The losses were apportioned as follows : — Killed, wounded, and missing Anglo-Hanoverian (K.G.L.) . . 10,600 Dutch-Belgian . . . 8,200 Nassauers and Brunswickers . . 1,300 Total loss suffered by Wellington's force 15,100 ^ The Prussian casualties numbered — 7000. The casualty list showed that, to obtain Napoleon's con- quest, our gallant Allies bled, as well as we did ; and the part they played must not be minimised or forgotten ; nor must we arrogate to ourselves more than a share of the great victory. On June 18 the total casualties of the Allies were over 22,000 men. Well might Wellington say at the close of this day, " I have never fought such a battle, and I trust I shall never fight such another." The nature of the firing can be estimated from the fact that many of our guns became unserviceable, owing to the incessant fire which they kept up on June 18. All told the Royal Artillery fired no less than 9476 rounds on this eventful day ; ^ and Captain Sandham's Field Brigade is credited with having expended 1100 rounds ; whilst Captain (and Brevet-Major) Whinyates' Troop, R.H.A., • The exact British and K.G.L. losses (killed and wounded) were as follows : — British. June 16. 157 officers and 2292 men ; June 17. 3 officers and 64 men ; June 18. 380 officers and 6002 men ; Total 540 officers and 8358 men. K.G.L. June 16, 17, and 18, 129 officers, 1343 men, and 374 horses ; as well as 215 men and 40 horses missing. The authorities for the above are the pricis of the returns of our casualties given in Battle Honours of the British Army (pp. 194-195) ; and the table. No. XX, given in the History of the K.G.L., II, opposite to p. 452. The same return gives the total strength of the K.G.L. at Waterloo as 512 officers, 6492 other ranks, and 2858 horses. Conse- quently the casualty list of the K.G.L. amounted very nearly to 25 per cent, of their efiective strength, ample proof of their fighting quality. In the campaign of June 16, 17, and 18 the Army of the Nether- lands lost about 4150 all ranks, and some 1600 horses. (Wellington Despatches, X, supplementary, p. 657. Table appended to the Prince of Orange's report.) ^ Sir A. Frazer, in his Remarks on the Organisation of the Corps of Artillery (1818) BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 5th PHASE 135 fired 309 shots, 236 spherical case (or shrapnel), 15 case, and 52 rockets. 1 The losses on the French side can be given only approxi- mately. The minimum numbers appear to have been some- what as follows : — 25,000 killed and wounded ; 8,000 captured ; 8,000 deserted or straggling ; Total — 41,000 men. The Annie du Nord also lost in the action two eagles ; and they abandoned on the battle-field over 120 guns and more than 210 artillery vehicles. « The concentrated nature of the battle, and the fierce fighting, were borne silent wtness to by the fact that the 45,000 men, who were killed and wounded at Waterloo, lay on an area of, roughly, 3 square miles. According to an eye- witness, who saw the field on the morning of June 19 (Colonel Tomkinson, p. 317), " the face of the hiU near La Haye Sainte, and from thence to Hougoumont, has more the appearance of a breach carried by assault than an extended field of battle." For there, closely packed together, lay " rider and horse in one red burial blent." In another place " the 27th Regiment (Inniskillings) were lying literally dead in square " ; ^ and the position, which om- infantry had held so stubbornly and so gallantly throughout the long trying hours of that memorable Sunday afternoon in mid- June, was marked clearly enough by the red line of their dead and wounded.* ^ Dead they lay shoulder to shoulder. ' The Prussian guns fired about 4800 rounds on June 18 (authy.. Use of Rifled Field Artillery, translated by Lieut. C. M. Smith, e.a., and published by the R.A. Institution in 1874). - Sir A. Frazer, Letters, pp. 550-551. But altogether over 220 French guns were accounted for ultimately. An assistant surgeon of the 6th Dragoons, who saw 82 of the captured guns parked together, noticed that all of them had been cast in the Republican moulds ; for they bore such revolutionary emblems as the cap of Liberty, and also they had inscribed on them not only such words aa " Liberti," " Agalitd," etc., but each piece had some name, such as Jupiter, Vulcan, Brutus, etc. = Kincard's Adventures, p. 170. * Muffling. ' At Gravelotte-S. Privat (18th August, 1870), in which the same number of combatants, 192,000, were engaged, as at Waterloo, the 32,000 casualties were strewn over 20 square miles. This gave a very diSerent density to Waterloo, and showed the extension of modem battle-fields in a very marked fashion. 136 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Well might the Duke write after this action to Marshal Beresford : " Never did I see such a pounding match. Both were what the boxers call gluttons. Napoleon did not manoeuvre at all. He just moved forward in the ' old style ' in columns, and was driven off in the ' old style.' The only difference was that he mixed cavalry with his infantry, and supported both with an enormous quantity of artillery. I had the infantry (Anglo-Dutch) for some time in squares, and we had the French Cavalry walking about as if they had been our own. I never saw the British Infantry behave so well." The day after the battle the Duke owned to Creevey that, " it had been a damned nice thing — the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life." Again, in a letter ascribed to the Duke of Wellington, the writer mentioned " the desperate affair " he had had with the Emperor ; and continued, " That battle of Waterloo was the worst I have ever seen. In all my life I have not ex- perienced such anxiety, for I must confess I have never before been so close to defeat. "^ Also on the battle-field, when near Rossomme, the Duke remarked among other things to General de Constant, " By God, I saved the battle four times myself." (It was to this same officer that the Duke stated that he had to call the battle, Waterloo, and not La Belle Alliance.) From the foregoing can be appreciated the full nature of the severe strain that had been placed on Wellington and on his staunch troops. Moreover, that a large proportion of the British Infantry were young soldiers only made their performance the finer. It is true they only mancEUvred indifferently — but the essential was to fight, and none can gainsay that they fought splendidly. Further, the Duke's wise choice of a position only taxed their fighting qualities ; for the defensive position they occupied required no manoeuvring to take up ; and also it shielded the young troops to a certain degree from the terrific case-shot attack. Thanks to Welling- 1 The letter was quoted in the Pall Mall Gazette of March 8, 1911, and is supposed to have been written by the Duke to his brother. The opinion expressed in it is absolutely in accord with the opinions uttered by the Duke at the time. Certainly he had never undergone such mental and physical strain before, nor gone so near to defeat. But then he had never before met Napoleon. From these letters may be deduced how opportune was Bliicher's assistance in the great battle. BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 5th PHASE 137 ton's skill, the admirable tenacity and firm resolution dis- played by his troops, and their fine fighting qualities, the British Field-Marshal held his position until Bliicher's loyalty and energy enabled the Allies at last to co-operate in grim earnest, and deal the Grand Army its death-blow, which made it reel, and then seek safety in flight. In conclusion of the whole matter the Duke's attitude on this great day may be summed up by a paraphrase of Caesar's message ; for throughout this Homeric struggle Speravi, oravi, vici was the great Englishman's motto. ^ ' I have borrowed this idea from the similar motto ascribed to Osman Pacha, after the 3rd Battle of Plevna, by Wilham V. Herbert, in his Defence of Plevna, p. 273. CHAPTER XI THE PURSUIT — AFTER 9.15 P.M. The pursuit need only be considered in the briefest detail ; firstly, because one longs to draw the curtain over the last agonies of gallant men ; and secondly, except for a general lesson, there is not much to glean from a detailed account of the operation, and certainly nothing so far as Napoleon's plan of campaign for the invasion of Belgium was concerned. Undoubtedly the Emperor was embarrassed tremendously by the darkness of the night. For it prevented his soldiers from recognising him, and thus he could not make his presence felt by them, as it was his invariable custom to do in all times of real stress. Further, the darkness increased the growing confusion, and, under the circum- stances, made it almost impossible to restore order in what had been the Armee du Nord.^ When Napoleon reached Genappe he realised quickly that it was impossible to organise any immediate resistance, so as to stem the on- rushing Prussians and gain a breathing space. The main street of the little country town was so choked that it took the Emperor himself upward of an hour to traverse it. He had reached his campaign carriage (which he had fortunately recovered from among a mass of abandoned vehicles), but the horses had not been hooked in, when he heard the shouts of Roder's pursuing horsemen, and hastily getting out of the vehicle he leaped on to his horse and rode off ; immediately afterwards the Prussians seized the carriage and looted it. (In the lining of a spare uniform 1 Gourgaud, p. 111. It is evident that the moon, which had risen before sunset, was temporarily obscured by clouds. Later there was "fine moonlight." (Colonel Taylor, 10th Hussars, Waterloo Letters, No. 75.) I am indebted to the Astronomer Royal for the following piece of information : " On the day of the battle of Waterloo the moon was three days before full, and therefore had risen well before sunset." 138 THE PURSUIT 139 were sewn up diamonds which were worth a milhon francs.) Therefore the Emperor had perforce to continue his retreat on horseback to Charleroi. He was accompanied by Marshal Soult, the Grand Marshal Bertrand, and General Drouot, of the Guard Artillery, and his escort was a detach- ment of the Red Lancers of the Guard. The party pushing on reached Quatre Bras about 1 a.m. Here the Emperor hoped to find the Girard Division (Reille Corps), which had been left at Sombreffe on June 17 ; for the division could have taken up a rallying position, and have checked the pursuit. However, Colonel Matis (who had taken General Girard's place) had withdrawn the division to Charleroi, via Fleurus. The Emperor therefore directed Marshal Soult to send Marshal Grouchy a despatch, apprising the latter Marshal of the desperate turn which affairs had taken ; for it was fully recognised that the right wing of the Armee du Nord was in a perilous position. Whilst the Emperor was still halted at Quatre Bras, the Prussians seized the houses at the cross- roads, and opened a dropping fire. Napoleon at once despatched a Staff Officer (Major Baudus) to Fleurus ; this officer was to warn Girard's Division of their danger, if they were still in position at Sombreffe ; and, in such an eventuality, Major Baudus was ordered to conduct the division across the Sambre. The Emperor and his party remounted and rode for Charleroi, past Gosselies. At Charleroi, which they reached about 5 a.m., the same disorder and congestion of the roads was in evidence, as had been the case at Genappe. The Emperor halted here for only an hour, and then set out for Philippeville, which place he reached at 9 a.m. on June 19.^ Meanwhile, to the utmost of their power, Bliicher's troops were proceeding to carry out two of their Marshal's sayings. One ran : " For pursuit brigades are not necessary, batta- lions will suffice " ; and the other was equally to the point, under such circumstances, for it was the order that he had issued after his victory on the Katzbach (August 26, 1813), ' Had the Emperor ordered Charleroi to be fortified when he entered Belgium in 1815, then possibly the place could have been held for sufficient time to delay the Allied advance, so as to allow the Armie du Nord to be raUied on June 19. Even hastily constructed works, held by Girard's Division, might have proved of considerable use at this critical time. 140 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO in which battle he had heavily defeated Marshal Macdonald ; the order had run as follows : " It is not enough to be victorious, we must know also how to turn the victory to account. If we do not press the enemy at close quarters he will rally, and we shall have to attain by a fresh battle, what we can gain in this if we act with energy." Bliicher and Gneisenau proceeded to carry out quite literally the teaching contained in the two quotations. They realised clearly enough that never are laurels reaped easier than in a pursuit, when an enemy has given up all resistance to save what may still be saved. Also they realised that by cavalry alone could the red harvest of victory be cut with a scythe ; and therefore very wisely they allowed Roder's squadrons to head the pursuit. The Prussians also were extremely well placed to open an immediate pursuit, for part of their army had advanced straight against the French right, near Plancenoit. Further, despite the failing light, the victory was so evident and so complete that there could be no doubt by which road the main body of the Armie du Nord had flown, thus no time was lost in initiating a powerful pursuit, and also the narrow, choked way through the village of Genappe, immediately in rear of the French centre and situated on the main line of retreat, delayed the flying rabble and gave the Prussians time to come up, to re- establish certain contact, and then to improve the victory in every way. Nor was the arrival of night used by the victors as an excuse for abandoning the tactical pursuit, before it had achieved any great result ; on the contrary, the Prussians acted as if they realised fully that darkness is a bold victor's most potent ally, and, with their small numbers concealed by the shroud of night, the pursuit was pushed harder than ever. It is possible that, at this supreme hour, the Prussian Generals recalled their great King's advice -.^ " But what signifies the art of conquest, if we know not how to reap the advantages of victory ? . . . Not to pursue a defeated enemy, is to render our good fortune useless, and our success of little consequence. . . . The worst consequence of a defeat is not the loss of those that are slain, but the dis- couragement of the survivors." In the hour of their triumph the Prussian Generals were true to Frederick's teaching. 1 Military Instructions by Frederick the Great. (Eng. trans., 1762, pp. UO and 143.) THE PURSUIT 141 Both Field-Marshal Bliicher and General Gneisenau, have gained immortal renown by their conduct in the hour of victory — for these two Prussian Generals rose superior to the occasion, and immediately stirred themselves and their troops to fresh efforts, and they overcame, not only the feeling of completeness that was theirs, but they sur- mounted also the resistance of all ranks, who were little inclined to undertake new exertions. The two Generals eschewed the delights of resting and " digesting their joy over a victory," and they spent no time in halting to sing Te Deums in honour of their exploit ; but, as the tired troops moved oft in pursuit of the French, the Soldiers' hymn rose Heavenward, " Now thank we all our God," the finest Te Deum that could be sung under the circumstances ; and rightly sung by troops who were engaged in reaping the fruits of the action. Gneisenau pushed on undauntedly, but he met with no organised resistance. The Armee du Nord was a beaten host ; and, once Genappe was passed, the 40,000 flying Frenchmen were kept on the run by a force which con- sisted of not more than 4000 Prussians. Yet the strange fact must not be overlooked, that not an eagle was lost during the retreat. A small band of determined men marched grouped around the sacred eagles of each regiment, and brought them safely away. Naturally this makes the pursuit even more difficult to understand. But the facts cannot be gainsaid, the bulk of the French Army had degenerated into a defenceless rabble ; and during the night it was driven out of seven successive bivouacs that it attempted to form, and next morning the wreckage of the Armee du Nord drifted across the Sambre in rudderless hordes of fugitives. Once more was shown the truth of Marshal Saxe's aphorism, " Pursuit should be incessant — any manceuvre will suffice for it, and the worst is a prudent one."^ Gnei- senau acted up to this advice in every way, and thus the crown was placed on the victor's strategy. But by the time that General Gneisenau and the pursuing Prussians had • " II faut . . . poursuivre sans cesse. Toutea les manoeuvres sont bonnes aJors, il n'y a que les sages qui ne valent rien." Les Reveries sur I'art de la guerre, de Maurice, Comte de Saxe (p. 216, edition 1756). 142 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO pressed beyond Frasnes, their numbers had dwindled so much that the Prussian Chief of Staff found that he had with him only a few squadrons, together with a detachment of the 15th Infantry Regiment of the Line (Corps of Biilow); and mounted on one of the horses, that had been taken from Napoleon's carriages, was the drummer of this regiment who continued to beat the charge. Having proceeded so far. General Gneisenau considered that he was not justified in continuing what had been a regular man-hunt by moonlight, because of the very small numbers of the pursuing troops who were available, and the great fatigue experienced by both men and horses. Therefore the Chief of the Prussian Staff called a halt when he was abreast of a little inn, which lay on the Charleroi road, betwixt the Roman road and Frasnes ;^ its signboard was decorated with the strange inscription A I'Empereur — a coincidence indeed, but one in which some may see the hand of Fate. Once more Belgium had witnessed a complete French rout ; and this one almost eclipsed that which had followed Marlborough's historic victory at Ramillies (1706), when the French in hopeless disorder were rolled back, and kept remorselessly on the move, until they had retired as far as Ghent. It was in this way that Marlborough, the greatest of all English Generals (only excepting Oliver Cromwell), dis- pelled the taunt which had been levelled at him, that he was incapable of reaping the fruits of his victories. So, on this occasion, Blticher pressed the beaten host relentlessly once the great blow had been struck, and, on the very morrow of the decisive victory. La Belle France herself was exposed again to the iron heel of the hated invader. Indeed, it may be doubted if, even after his greatest victories, the Emperor had caused the beaten army of his opponents to break up into such a flying rabble as the last of the Grand Armies now exhibited. Suddenly there had snapped asunder every band and tie, which before had knit the Armee du Nord together ; and, as if by magic, the army had dissolved into a mere horde of evasive fugitives. No organisation existed, every corps (except Grouchy 's detach- ment) had disbanded ; and all instinctively obeyed one single stage direction — Exeunt Omnes. THE PURSUIT 143 But surely this ruin was due directly to the madness of his obstinacy, and to the stubborn pride which possessed the Emperor on this fatal, and to France ever-accursed, day ; an obstinacy and pride which had bidden Napoleon at all hazards to continue a strife from which no satis- factory result could be obtained, and from which disaster would ensue almost as certainly ; also the same reasons forbade him to draw off temporarily, so that presently he might be given an opportunity of engaging his much- despised opponents with at least a real chance of success, and thus be able, after recoiling, to spring the further. On June 18 his overweening confidence, coupled with his waning powers, induced him to make a fatal miscalcula- tion ; and whilst, as usual, he showed no hesitation in asking the utmost from his devoted soldiers, yet he himself failed utterly to give them that assistance which they re- quired in the thick of their desperate fight, and which his former glorious campaigns had taught them to expect from the masterful mind and the clear, calculating brain which alone, at the zenith of his powers, would have post- poned their overthrow by ensuring their success. Although maintaining the bitter strife with all the stubbornness and ruthlessness for which the victor of Areola, of Marengo, and of Eylau is famed so justly, yet at critical moments he dared no longer compel Fortune to crown his eagles and bind victory to his standards, by staking all, so that he might gain all. Thus from his weakening grasp, the Allies struck the sword for ever ; that selfsame sword to which he was ever ready to appeal, and rarely so in vain. The weapon, too, was much the same ; of as fine an edge, but more brittle perhaps than of yore. It was the master-hand that retained no longer all its old powers of cunning and dexterity of fence ; no longer could the master deal those swift strokes and deadly thrusts which none might parry. The rudderless ruin of his host had resulted directly from the fact, that the Emperor had pushed the resisting powers of the gallant Armee du Nord up to, and even beyond, their breaking strain. As the battle ran its course, the chances of Napoleon achieving a success waned visibly hour by hour ; but at the last, in a frenzied moment of despair, the Emperor made a final, but half-hearted, bid for a victory that was then practically beyond his strength ; and swift on the heels 144 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO of his failure, that surely he might have foreseen, the Allies sprang forward to raven on their wellnigh defenceless foe, and to plough red furrows through the crippled and impotent mass that so short a time before had been — ^the proud Armee du Nord. CHAPTER Xn SOME COMMENTS ON WATERLOO Before proceeding to narrate Marshal Grouchy's opera- tions, it will be well to consider two or three important points in connection with Waterloo ; and herein it is impossible to do better than to follow the admirable criticisms which have been put forward by Colonel Grouard.^ (a) The Hour at which the Battle Commenced. There are some authors who consider that Napoleon should have commenced the battle at 6 a.m. on June 18. This statement is made without a full consideration of the overnight disposition of the Armie du Nord. It was not possible for Napoleon to have attacked Wellington either at 6 a.m., or even at 7 a.m., because, early on June 18th, the depth covered by the overnight bivouacs of the French Army precluded any idea of Napoleon opening a general action in serious earnest before 9 a.m. on June 18. This unfortunate dispersion, on June 17, resulted from the straggling which Napoleon's rapid pursuit of the Anglo- Dutch Army had induced, the confusion into which the columns had been thrown, and the fatigue of the troops, consequent on a too brief period of rest during a night of heavy rain. However, the problem being merely to ensure Wellington's defeat, before Bliicher engaged in force, it was only necessary that the action should have been as fully de- veloped at 10 a.m. as in reality it was at 1 p.m. If at 10 a.m. Napoleon had combined a frontal attack against Wellington's centre and left centre, with an envelopment of the Anglo- Dutch left, and also had employed all his available troops to compel a decision, merely retaining in hand the Young Guard (Duhesme) and the Light Cavalry of the Guard 1 Critique de 1815, pp. 143-177, and 201-226. II.— L 145 146 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO (Lefebvre-Desnoettes) — -whom he might have pushed out towards Frischermont, so as to strengthen and cover his exposed right flank — then there can be no reasonable doubt that the Anglo-Dutch Army would have been overpowered and hurled back on Brussels by 2 p.m. at latest. Thus the delay in opening the action saved Wellington's Army. Despite the cannon thunder that had been growling, and later even roaring, away to the westward since before mid- day, Biilow only debouched from the Paris Wood after 4 p.m., and did not therefore become dangerous until about 5 p.m. — in other words, more than four hours after the action had entered on a serious phase. There is no reason to suppose that Biilow would have marched any quicker, even if the guns had been heard thundering away two hours earlier ; nor could he have intervened so effectually, for naturally at the opening stage of the action he would have been even further from the battle-field. Therefore he could hardly have engaged his corps seriously before 3 p.m., but by then Wellington, exposed to the full vigour of Napoleon's merciless sledge-hammer blows, would have already suffered a serious defeat. Analogously there is no reason to suppose for a moment that Pirch I, or Zieten, could have engaged any earlier than Biilow. For the former followed Biilow, and on the same road, consequently he could not have out- distanced the IV Corps. As for Zieten, he did not reach Ohain until 7 hours after the cannonade had reached its maximum intensity ; and it is not clear that he would have marched any quicker, even supposing he had started 2 hours earlier. Hence he would have attained Ohain at 5 p.m. at earliest ; and, judging from his circumspection, when he found Wellington in full retreat he would have allowed himself to give way to motives of prudence, and not compromised his command ; and he would have been satisfied, under the circumstances, in taking up a position to rally Biilow, as in fact he attempted to do and would have done, but for General Miiffling's prompt inter- ference. Thus it is clear that Napoleon had a distinct chance of winning a decisive victory at Mt. S. Jean on June 18, and that he could have done so even without Grouchy's direct intervention ; but he could effect this only by advancing the time of attack by at least 2 hours — and this fault, of COMMENTS ON WATERLOO 147 over-delay, must rest on the Emperor's shoulders, and on his alone. Of course General Drouot's* advice, that the opening of the action should be delayed, so as to allow the ground to dry, and to permit the easy manoeuvring of guns, possibly induced the Emperor to put back the commence- ment of the engagement. But nevertheless the responsi- bility for the momentous decision was Napoleon's alone. For the Emperor alone could know the whole strategic outlook at the moment ; and thus he alone could decide whether events did, or did not, permit of this delay ; and naturally it was the Emperor's duty to weigh carefully, and then to accept, or to reject, General Drouot's advice and suggestion. But in reality the conclusion can hardly be escaped that the same reason accounted both for the delay in attacking Wellington and the neglect, at daybreak on June 18, to order up Marshal Grouchy to Plancenoit — and that reason was, that Napoleon absolutely failed to solve and probe to the bottom the Prussian plans ; even when he realised that a large fraction of Bliicher's Army was actually at Wavre. It was this misappreciation of the strategic situation that cost him the battle — and his throne. Thinking, in his over-confidence, that the Prussians could not take a serious hand in the game for several days, Napoleon considered that he could take his time in destroy- ing Wellington ; and consequently he need not hurry on matters on the slopes of Mt. S. Jean. For the very self- same reason, he judged it was unnecessary to secure Marshal Grouchy's certain and direct aid in the battle that was impending against the Anglo-Dutch Army. (b) The Attack of the Middle Guard. It has been stated previously that Napoleon's determina- tion to launch his Middle Guard up the slopes of Wellington's position led directly (once the attack had failed) to the utter ruin and overthrow of the Armee du Nord. It appears certain that, after the destruction of his cavalry. Napoleon had no chance of achieving a real success on June 18. Hence immediately after these magnificent episodes he might 1 Antoine Drouot (1774-1847) was one of Napoleon's most loyal adherents. He was also one of the finest artillery Generals that the Grand Army ever possessed. 148 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO have considered how he should draw off ; at any rate, launched as it was, nothing can be urged in defence of his last attack with his Guard ; more particularly because, at the very moment when he launched his Middle Guard, he knew full well that Zieten had reached Smohain. It has been urged that, at this supreme moment, retreat was no longer possible or practicable ; and hence that the only hope of safety lay in adopting this last desperate expedient. But this was not really the case. At 7 p.m., the two intrepid battalions of the Old Guard had cleared Plancenoit for the second time, yet practically every assault on Wellington's position had failed (except the last attack on La Haye Sainte), nevertheless neither D'Erlon's nor Reille's Corps were hopelessly disorganised ; and without reckoning those battalions who were engaged at Plancenoit, Napoleon still had a reserve left of 12 battalions of the Old and Middle Guard. Had he formed up these veterans checkerwise, in two lines, with the battalions placed so as to have masked each other's withdrawal, by placing the squares in the second line so as to cover the intervals in the first line, then, even at the eleventh hour, these incomparable troops could have acted as a mighty rampart, behind which it would have been perfectly feasible to rally the rest of the Armie du Nord and draw it off. As a matter of fact, after the battle had been hopelessly lost, no impression whatever was made on General Petit's Grenadiers of the Old Guard, by the hosts of pursuers, who were flushed with an unpre- cedented success. If two battalions could withstand two armies, what might not have been expected from 12 batta- lions of these heroes, joined, somewhat later, by the troops engaged at Plancenoit, and supported by all the rest of the army who were still in fighting trim ? Further, the Reserve Artillery of the Guard, unlimbered in the intervals between these living bastions, would have pounded an enemy who sought to approach too close ; and, as necessity arose, the guns could have retired by alternate groups, covering one another's withdrawal by fire. Thus even as late as 7 p.m. it was not too late for Napoleon to open a retreat, and carry it out in good order. By nightfall the French Army would have crossed the Dyle and have reformed behind it ; and, on June 19, it would have been able to show COMMENTS ON WATERLOO 149 front once more to Wellington and Blueher mth over 50,000 men. But as matters turned out no resistance whatever to the AUied advance was encountered on the Dyle ; for the Armee du Nord had been tried far above its breaking strain, and in the hour of its defeat it had dissolved into its con- stituent parts. The point that has just been considered leads up naturally to an even more important one, and this is : — (c) Should Napoleon have broken off the fight when Billow's approach was signalled? and if so, what course could he have adopted so as to give himself a chance of ultimate success ? Inasmuch as Napoleon must have recognised at 1.80 p.m. that Marshal Grouchy's arrival at La Belle Alliance was, at any rate, problematical, was he wise to risk a pitched battle with such odds against him ? By only one method could he effect a timely concentration with the French right wing ; and that was by calUng in Marshal Grouchy's detachment, and, at the same time, moving in the Marshal's direction. To carry out this manoeuvre it was necessary for Napoleon to retreat from in front of Wellington. Of coiu-se it is true that although, by this means. Napoleon could effect his concentration -with Grouchy, yet this move would not prevent Wellington and Bliicher from joining hands ; and then the Emperor could only oppose about 110,000 troops to their 160,000. But surely it would have been better to postpone a general action, than to continue it with the almost certain result that it must prove disastrous. Fiui:her, although Napoleon would slip away from Wellington, yet he might hope to score some success against the Prussians on June 18, as he marched to effect his concentration with Grouchy. Again, it may be accepted as a general principle, that whenever a commander finds himself in a critical position, the best coxu-se usually to pursue is to slip out of the toils. By acting in this way he will upset the enemy's plans, which have been laid with forethought and care to meet the especial case ; and it is most difficult at a moment's notice for the foe to modify his arrangements so that he can meet an unexpected development in the campaign. In the 150 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO case under consideration, the Prussian plans (already in course of execution) were clearly based on the hypothesis of a battle being waged at Mt. S. Jean, between Napoleon and Wellington on June 18 ; or, if Napoleon remained quiescent in his position until June 19, then a joint attack was to be delivered on the French position at La Belle Alliance on the latter date. But, by declining wager of battle and slipping away on June 18, Napoleon must have disarranged the Allied plans ; and he might have made it difficult for them to avoid taking some serious risk, or even making a bad mistake. Also the Anglo-Dutch Army were standing on the defen- sive, and they had taken up their position so as to await the French onslaught ; therefore they could not have passed over rapidly to an offensive attitude ; such a manoeuvre is one of the most delicate of all warlike operations, also in this especial case it would have taken considerable time to carry out ; and Wellington's Army, in particular, was singularly ill-adapted to carry out this difficult and delicate manoeuvre with nicety and speed. The manoeuvring power of the Anglo-Dutch Army, and particularly their manoeuv- ring power in attack, was not to be compared with the splendid defensive qualities which this army possessed. Therefore, in all probability. Marshal Ney, in command of Napoleon's first line — the I and II Corps — and supported by Kellermann's Cuirassiers, would have sufficed to hold back the Anglo-Dutch Army, and delay, control, and regulate their advance in pursuit of the retiring French Army ; this the Marshal would have effected by fighting a series of combats en retraite (yielding fights). The Marshal Prince of the Moskowa would have been able to dispose of some 45,000 men to hold back the Duke of Wellington's 67,000 ; and this bore a greater proportion to Wellington's strength, than the force which the Marshal had in hand at Quatre Bras on the evening of June 16. Further, Marshal Ney was a master in the art of rear-guard fighting, and of the tactics which it was necessary to display to compel an enemy to consume an hour of time in advancing over every mile of ground ; he would have shone in this manoeuvre. Marshal Ney would have had to keep the essential in the problem before him ; he would have had to avoid rushing at the foe, or opening a precipitate retreat, or being drawn COMMENTS ON WATERLOO 151 into a general action. But he would have sought to gain his end by the employment of the most skilful rear-guard tactics. Meanwhile Napoleon would have moved off the remainder of the Armie du Nord, via Plancenoit and Maransart, and at Mousty, on the Dyle, he would have met Marshal Grouchy's detachment, whom he would have summoned thither. Thus by 6 p.m., on June 18, the French concentration on the Dyle would have been effected ; and then Napoleon could have disposed of at least 60,000 men, and thus he would have been in a position to have attacked any Prussian troops, whom he might have located between the Rivers Lasne and Dyle. If the Emperor advanced on Wavre, he could have been opposed only by Pirch I and Thielemann, with about 40,000 men. But these two Prussian Corps he would have annihilated ; and the case would not have been altered, had Billow attempted to support the two corps in question. Meanwhile Marshal Ney would have continued his retro- grade movement towards Genappe. Doubtless at so early an hour as 1.30 p.m., on June 18, Napoleon could not be expected to know all the Prussian movements accurately ; but it was logical to think that Biilow would not have marched to support the Anglo-Dutch Army alone ; at least one other corps would have been pushed up to strengthen Wellington's left. Merely by upsetting this combination, the chance for delivering a telling blow might arise. At the worst, during the evening, the French Army could retire across the Dyle at Mousty and Ottignies, and then effect their concentration with Marshal Ney on June 19 ; so that, on that date, the whole army would be reunited once more — having carried out a retrograde movement. But the suggested movement gave to Napoleon the oppor- tunity of dealing powerful blows, such as no ordinary retreat could have afforded. To have manoeuvred, in this way, would not have been a proof that Napoleon was lacking in intrepidity. Grant- ing that the first duty of a general who gives battle is the glory and honour of his country's arms, and that the preservation of his men can only rank second ; yet this was an extraordinary situation, and an extraordinary manoeuvre was required to save the situation, and to save — France. Further, by manoeuvring in this way, no chance of disaster 152 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO was involved ; and very dexterously Napoleon would have avoided the mortal wound which the two Allies must deal him, directly they effected their battle-field concen- tration. Further, Napoleon knew full well the dangerous position in which he stood. Had he not said to Ney, on June 17, " You have ruined France " ? Consequently it was im- perative to take especial care that the two Allies did not concentrate in the actual course of a battle. Ney's mistake on June 17 was certainly a vital one, for it prevented Napoleon from gaining a decisive success in Belgium, and it ruined the campaign strategically. How- ever, it cannot be said to have been the direct and proximate cause of the disaster that did overtake the French Army on the next day at Mt. S. Jean ; for that was brought about primarily by the Emperor ; he it was who opened the battle late ; and, when it became imperative to break off the action, he continued it until his troops were worn out, and at the end of their physical and moral resources. For the idea of avoiding the tactical encounter for which he had prepared, and for which he longed, was not considered for one moment by Napoleon. His masterful mind, that would brook no restraint, induced him to make a serious, indeed fatal, mis- calculation on June 18 ; a miscalculation that proved to be the direct cause of the defeat of his army, and of the disaster which overwhelmed it, and swept Napoleon from his throne on this fatal field of La Belle Alliance. CHAPTER XIII GROUCHY'S pursuit of the PRUSSIANS ON JUNE 18 ^ {Vide Map 2) It is now necessary to proceed to the right bank of the Dyle in order to bestow some attention on Marshal Grouchy, and see how he spent this eventful day ; and learn why, on June 18, he did not render his Master any direct aid during the thick of the fight at Mt. S. Jean. The information that had come to hand during the night of June 17-18 must have showed unmistakably to Grouchy that at least three, out of the four, Prussian Corps were heading for Wavre on June 17. However, the Marshal failed to appreciate the real meaning of this manoeuvre. He considered Wavre's importance began and ended with its being a convenient halting-place for Bliicher's Army, and he conceived that the Prussians were heading for Brussels. Until too late, he did not establish any con- nection between the battle that was impending with the Anglo-Dutch Army to the south of the Forest of Soignes, and Bliicher's presence at Wavre ; consequently the Marshal did not realise how well Bliicher was placed to support Wellington on June 18, if only the Prussians succeeded in carrying out unimpeded the short flank march which they must make in order to reach Mt. S. Jean. But this was the heart of the whole problem. At any rate, so far as Marshal Grouchy was concerned, the essential, in the situation before him, was the prevention of any junction of Bliicher's and Wellington's forces, with a view to their combined action against Napoleon. All else was neces- sarily less essential. It was Marshal Grouchy's duty, there- fore, to manoeuvre so that he could prevent such a disastrous concentration. But to be in a position to prevent such a junction, it was essential for the Marshal to gain the Dyle's 1 The facts are baaed chiefly on Houssaye, Waterloo, 1815, pp. 291- 305. 153 154 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO left bank at Mousty and at the earliest possible moment, so as to ensure his uninterrupted communication with Napoleon ; and also to be placed so that the detachment could take in flank any move which the Prussians might make on June 18, to cross the belt of country that separated the Dyle from the Lasne. The Marshal would achieve nothing of importance by a simple pursuit, or following the Prussians along the right bank of the Dyle ; for at present he was situated outside the Prussians, and hence any advance via Walhain, and subsequent attack on Wavre from the south-east, must result in driving the Allies together — the one thing which Napoleon had been manoeuvring to prevent from the outset of the cam- paign — also, as Wavre was on the left bank of the Dyle, the Prussians (if attacked from the south-east) would be able to use an economical detachment, posted behind the natural ditch formed by the little river, and, if well and resolutely handled, this force might take the French right wing many hours of desperate fighting to overpower, before the river passages passed definitely into the Marshal's possession. But by an immediate advance along the left bank of the Dyle, the bridges must be obtained with ease and certainty, and moreover with no delay. Even sup- posing that the Marshal was correct in his surmise, that Bliicher would retreat on Brussels on June 18, yet the city was easily reached from Wavre ; and once he had attained the latter place the Marshal could follow the Prussians. But if the unexpected happened, and if Marshal Bliicher carried out the only really dangerous move at this un- doubted crisis of the campaign, and actually headed west- ward so as to support Wellington, then the apparition of 33,000 men on the Prussian flank must impede and delay, if it did not actually paralyse, the manoeuvre. Late on June 17, with all his great and varied war experience to assist him. Marshal Grouchy should have realised that a critical phase had been reached, because of the undoubted direction of the Prussian retreat, and as a result of Wellington's safe with- drawal of his army from Quatre Bras.^ Even if the Allied ' That Wellington had decamped, and thus avoided a general action, miist have been fairly evident to Grouchy ; there had been no roar of guns to proclaim that a great battle had been joined ; consequently Wellington must have avoided it by withdrawing in time. GROUCHY'S PURSUIT, JUNE 18 155 concentration had been effected on the battle-field on June 18, before the right vsdng had come up, yet being on the left bank of the Dyle already, the Marshal could move without let or hindrance to the Emperor's succour ; and either range his detachment in battle array alongside his Master, or manoeuvre in such a way as the Emperor and circumstances might dictate at the time, so as to ensure giving effectual aid in the thick of the fight to the Armee du Nord. With all these possibilities before him, the luckless Marshal modified in no particular his orders of June 17. Certainly he determined to make for AVavre, but he did not counter-order Pajol's wide sweep via Grand Leez, which he allowed the General to persevere with. At 3 a.m. Marshal Grouchy duly wrote to the Emperor, from Gembloux, stating that all the information which he had obtained showed that Bliicher was moving on Brussels, via Wavre, so as to concentrate with Wellington. Hence the Marshal was moving immediately to Wavi-e with the right wing.^ The route chosen, along the Dyle's right bank, and adhered to so servilely by the Marshal on June 18, was a flagrant, strategical blunder, and this should have been quite clear to him from the information he possessed, and the implied duty given in the " Bertrand order " of covering the Emperor's exposed right. Some slight strategical insight of course was necessary, to solve the very simple problem which confronted Marshal Grouchy ; and that the Marshal did not rise to the height of the occasion may in part be put down to Napoleon, because the Emperor had failed to see that his own orders were drafted with sufficient clearness for Grouchy to comprehend his task, and also on Napo- leon alone lay the responsibility for the selection of this sub- ordinate, for an important duty which he was so ill-fitted to carry out. But, on June 18, for allowing his troops to waste so many precious hoiu"s of daylight in bivouac, at such a critical time, and under such grave and pressing circumstances, when every minute was golden, that was an irrevocable mistake for which the Marshal alone must take all the blame. By 4 a.m. on a morning in mid-June it is quite light enough to march ; yet the unfortunate and unskilful Marshal had » Appendix 11, No. 30. 156 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO ordained that Vandamme should be on the march at 6 a.m., whereas G6rard would not start until 8 a.m. But even so, punctuality was not obtained in keeping these late starting hours. General Exelmans' Dragoons, who had passed the night of June 17-18 at Sauveni^re, were detailed to head the column ; and this body of horse only paraded at 6 a.m. ! although at this hour it should have been in position to cover the march of the French right wing, and take over the full responsibility for the tactical protection of Grouchy's marching column, from the hour at which the march was ordered to commence. Consequently, as a result of this delay, Vandamme and the III Corps only cleared Gembloux between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m., and Gerard's IV Corps, which had bivouacked on the further side of the Orneau stream, started at the same hour. Also all these troops were to use the same road, when time was all- important ; and apparently for no more cogent reason than to preserve the numerical seniority and correct precedence of the corps on the road ! Had the right wing even now advanced in two columns : one moving via Sauveni^re and Walhain, and the other via Ernage and Nil Pierreux, then both columns could have concentrated at the same time at Corbaix. To have persisted in continuing the march from Gembloux in such a long, unwieldy, cumbrous column, was a piece of really bad staff work ; and it was an elementary mistake, which all the Marshal's previous practical experi- ence in handling masses of men should have prevented him from perpetrating. Marshal Grouchy waited at Gembloux for some time after the troops were under way, then he rode along the marching column, overtaking the van when it had attained Walhain. On reaching this village the Marshal pulled up and let the troops file on, whilst he dismounted to write to the Emperor, and report some intelligence which he had just gleaned ; ' the information was utterly false, but unfortunately for Grouchy it had succeeded in deceiving him completely. This report, which he had obtained, tended to show that the Prussians had passed Wavre, and were now seven to eight miles away to the north-east of that town. In his innermost mind Marshal Grouchy must have had some misgivings about the feeble fashion in which he was attempt- 1 Appendix II, No. 32. GROUCHY'S PURSUIT, JUNE 18 157 ing to carry out his most important task. He must have longed to hear that Bliicher was drawing off towards Louvain, and allowing the supply question to dictate his strategy to the Prussian Marshal. Only if Bliicher manoeuvred in this way could Marshal Grouchy ensure covering the Emperor's exposed right, as Ney had previously covered and secured the left of the Armee du Nord ; and lo ! when at a late hour he had decided to move in one column, and on the Dyle's right bank, he heard that Bliicher had committed the very blunder which cancelled automatically all the French Marshal's previous faults. The Marshal was only too eager to believe such comfortable news ; apparently he did not possess the bump of " dovie historique," and at once he beUeved news which he desired so ardently to hear. He forgot that the more improb- able the information, the more cogent must be the proof as to its correctness. On the contrary. Marshal Grouchy con- gratulated himself on his work ; here he was on the Prussian tracks, and actually better situated than ever, for he was between Bliicher and Wellington, and the former was putting himself deUberately out of the game. But surely as Bliicher had adopted the sound course, and retired on Wavre, Marshal Grouchy might have given him credit for continuing to do the correct thing, and not at once have assumed that he had merely to deal with an idiotic opponent. Did Bliicher's conduct in 1813 and 1814 awake no thoughts in the Marshal's mind, that the procedure which he was so ready to attribute to the Prussian Generahssimo was indeed most unUkely ? Or was Marshal Grouchy so obsessed with a preconceived notion of how Bliicher must behave, that he had become mentally incapable of considering any other course, except the one that filled his mind ? As a wise old Greek wrote in ages long since passed by : " In making preparations against an enemy it must always be assumed that the enemy has taken the best coimsel ; and it would be madness to build hopes on the mistakes that the enemy may possibly make."^ In war it is always wise to assume that the enemy has adopted the correct course of action, and then to make and to carry out prompt and suitable counter-dispositions, so as to frustrate the enemy. Thus alone can success be achieved. • Thucydides. 158 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Be all that as it may, undoubtedly Grouchy was fully satisfied at the turn which affairs were supposed to have taken, and he informed the Emperor that he would have concentrated the right wing at Wavre by nightfall — a total march of only twelve miles — and he concluded by asking for orders for June 19. When his epistle was completed he despatched it to the Emperor, by one of the latter's ex- pages — Major la Fresnaye ; the despatch duly reached the Emperor about 4 p.m. After the despatch of his report, Grouchy considered that all his cares and worries were behind him ; and in front of him was the livelong summer day, in which he had merely to complete his short march, and then, according to the orders he should receive, he would in due course come to some decision about the morrow's operations. But as no immediate decision or action was required, the Marshal sat down serenely to his breakfast, which he partook of in the house of Notary Hollaert at Walhain.^ Grouchy had reached the historic strawberries when an interruption oc- curred (but even so, M. Houssaye, page 300, was quite correct when he said that " eating strawberries on the morning of a battle is not in itself a hanging matter "). General G6rard entered the room, ha^'ing ridden on ahead of the IV Corps. Very shortly afterwards there was another and more serious interruption, and it tended to bring back the Marshal to the business in hand ; it was Colonel Simon Lori^re (General Gerard's Assistant Chief of the Staff) who came in to report that he, and some officers who were in Notary Hollaert's garden, had heard the opening roarof a cannonade. It was nearing noon. Marshal Grouchy at once rose, and accompanied General Gerard and the Colonel into the garden. The guns were distinctly audible, and the impetuous Gerard advocated marching to the sound of the cannon. However, Marshal Grouchy demurred, and urged that in all probability it was nothing more serious than a rear-guard affair. But all opinion as to the serious 1 M. Houssaye has proved conclusively (footnotes on pp. 296, 297, Waterloo, 1815) that Grouchy halted at Walhain, and not at Sart-a-Walhain, as the Marshal said in his letter to Napoleon, and that he wrote his report and partook of breakfast in Notary Hollaert's house in that village. The mistake about the name of the village was probably due to the sheet of Ferrari's map which Grouchy vised, for on this the name Sart-a-Walhain was very prominent ; it probably caught Grouchy's eye, and misled him. GROUCHY'S PURSUIT, JUNE 18 159 nature of the engagement was quickly dispelled, for the increasing roar of the cannonade dissolved any doubt about the matter. Suddenly the gun-thunder grew louder, and the reports of the discharges increased in rapidity. Then away to the north-westward, on the far-distant horizon, vast smoke-clouds gathered and grew. It was evident that a general action was in progress ; and the location of the fighting was soon discovered. A peasant was brought forward, and he informed the Marshal that the battle was taking place at Mt. S. Jean — a four or five hours' march away ; or eight or nine miles' distance, according to the estimate of Notary HoUaert. General Gerard again, and some of the other officers as well, reiterated the opinion that the right wing must march at once to the sound of the guns. Marshal Grouchy, a typically weak character, was annoyed at his officers offering a Marshal of France gratuitous advice, and in so public a manner. ^ Being only too conscious of his inferiority as the commander of an important detachment, probably he possessed in the highest degree a very under- standable and natural distaste to have counsel thrust upon him so openly. Further, to accept such advice was to run the gravest risk of all — acceptance of responsibility — an attitude which Napoleon had certainly done his best to discourage, for Napoleon was always a believer in im- plicit obedience. Doubtless Grouchy preferred to adhere sla\ishly to the letter of Napoleon's instructions, which he considered would cover him whatever happened, rather than to hearken to Gerard's hazardous ad^^ce, which apparently ran coimter to the Emperor's commands. Consequently, as an independent commander faced with an awkward dilemma, is it to be wondered at that Grouchy failed his Master, and that he did not rise above mediocrity ? But, on the other hand. Grouchy was a Marshal of France, and not merely a subaltern. With his vast and varied 1 Frederick the Great laid down that a general may deign to take advice even from a subaltern. The Great King ha-s-ing summed up dead against aU councils of war, and having gi%-en it as his opinion that a general entrusted with an independent command ought to act on his own judgment, continued, "Nevertheless I am of opinion, that he ought not entirely to reject the adi-ice even of a subaltern, provided, after mature deUberation, it seems reasonable. In that case he ought to forget the rank of him who started the hint, and act as if it had been his own." Frederick the Great, Military Instructions (Eng. trans., 1762, pp. 158-159). 160 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO experience of warfare to call upon, it must appear that a few minutes' study of the map, and an appreciation of the circumstances as he knew them, must have caused the Marshal to realise the possibilities which were open to Blticher, and have enabled Grouchy to come to a reasonably correct solution, in what cannot be considered either a very difficult, or involved problem. Even so. Napoleon's personal responsibility was no slight one. He had always discouraged initiative in the subordinates who were under his control. So far back as 1799, when Commander-in-Chief of the French Army in Egypt, he is to be found writing on June 15,^ and testifying his displeasure very openly, because the commandant at Katieh had shown an excess of zeal by taking upon himself some slight responsibility. The rebuke was sharp and un- compromising, and not without its lesson as to Buonaparte's methods : " In any unforeseen and similar eventuality that may arise, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief directs that all commandants will note that they are to take no independent action, but await the issue of orders from head-quarters." If it is argued that there was at the time in question no crisis, nor could one arise, which could call for immediate action without guidance from above, then it is only necessary to state that Berthier was equally and similarly restricted by the letter sent him on February the 14th, 1806, when Prussia was preparing for war and the Emperor was in Paris. The Major-General (Chief of the Staff) was at the time with the Grand Army in Southern Germany, and he was emphatically enjoined to " keep strictly to the orders I give you, and execute punctu- ally your instructions. ... I alone know what I have to do."* The Emperor was thus quite consistent in large things as in small ; he demanded preciseness and punctu- ality in the execution of the orders which he issued ; but he neither expected, nor encouraged, initiative. Napoleon's invariable custom was to foresee and to give detailed orders for everything. The inconveniences and dangers of such a system were not apparent in small theatres of war, when the ' Correapondance, 4176. ' In 1807, Berthier wrote to Soult, " I am nothing in the Army. ... I sign his [the Emperor's] orders for him, but personally I have no position." In the same year, Berthier, writing to Ney, stated, " None fathom his [the Emperor's] designs." GROUCHY'S PURSUIT, JUNE 18 161 forces to be controlled were not too large, the commanders of independent detachments were men of great ability and strong character, and the Emperor's physical activity was still unimpaired. But from 1812 onwards, such a procedure became risky ; and in 1815, not having been trained to think and act for themselves, the Emperor's Marshals, who commanded detachments, proved to be very unwilling to accept any responsibility when the outlook was far from ideal and they were at a distance from the Imperial head- quarters. This state of affairs may help to explain Marshal Grouchy 's frame of mind on June 18, how he fell an easy prey to his opponents, and why he adhered so literally to his orders ; for it would have required a far stronger character, than Marshal Grouchy possessed, to have set at naught Napoleon's previous teaching, even in the crisis that had arisen. Naturally, nothing could exonerate the Marshal for failing to realise the essential ; but his Master must share with him some of the responsibility for the failure which ensued. That Grouchy, a Marshal of France and not a subaltern, failed to grasp the essentials in the situation, emphasises another point — his previous training had been defective ; and this proves how very necessary it is that all superior leaders, who are destined for independent command in war, shall have received a thorough preliminary training in the art. However, this is just what Napoleon in his busy, crowded life had never found time to do. Due weight must also be given to what General Langlois has urged, ^ that no soldier is called to high command (in a well-conducted army) who has not proved his worth in a subordinate position. This was undoubtedly the case in all Napoleon's Grand Armies. His Marshals were valiant and successful soldiers, with great practical experience, and endowed with much trained common-sense. It was not altogether their fault, that when in independent high com- mands they achieved only too often a mediocre result ; but it was traceable partly to their natural jealousy, and partly to all those who formed the military atmosphere in which they were raised ; and towering above all others stood out their • Put forth most clearly in the introduction to his Enseignements de deux gtierres recentes, which has been translated by our General Staff, and published under the title : Lessons from two Recent Wars (1877 and 1899). II. — M 162 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Emperor ; his dominating personality moulded the training of his Marshals, and discouraging initiative, as he had done, he had not taught them to stand alone and act with vigour, determination, and skill, when they were at a distance from him, and thus were without direct guidance from above. Of course it is useless to criticise Napoleon because he acted in this way, for when he was in his prime he achieved the most glorious successes that are recorded as yet in the Temple of Fame. But it must be recognised that this system is not one to be copied blindly by any army, for its chief requirement is that there shall be a Napoleon to work it. That some of his generals and marshals (Massena, Davout, Lannes, and others) did rise superior to their sur- roundings, was to their immortal credit ; but this fact will not shift the responsibility from Napoleon himself for the mediocre results and sometimes dangerous short- comings of the less-gifted Marshals, when operating away from the direct influence and supervision of the Commander- in-Chief. It was the atmosphere of repression of all initia- tive, which Marshal Grouchy had breathed throughout his career, that stifled his weak character, checked all desire for independent and intelligent action, and caused the Marshal to look for inspiration from above, act feebly, manoeuvre falsely, and strike irresolutely. Napoleon had done more than require passive obedience to his orders only when he was present in person ; and although in 1796 General Buonaparte had written that a government should place every confidence in their General, and limit themselves to defining the end to be achieved, whilst leaving to the General the widest latitude as to the plan and means which were adopted ; yet this cannot be accepted as Napoleon's usual method of dealing with his subordinates. The advice was absolutely sound to give to a Government which was fortunate enough to have a Napoleon to deal with ; and after Napoleon came to supreme power he employed the same wise method, when he knew that he could trust the subordinate with whom he happened to be dealing ; for the Emperor knew his men, and was quite prepared to allow a very free hand to some of his Marshals, so long as they kept to the spirit of their instructions. But in ordinary cases Napoleon did not adopt this procedure ; and officers, who GROUCHY'S PURSUIT, JUNE 18 163 were not strong and reliant in character, had always counted on receiving from the Emperor very clear and precise orders for the handling of their detachments, and they had rarely looked in vain. Consequently, when these officers found themselves confronted by a situation, to which the orders in their possession did not apply and their Master was far distant, then either they did nothing, merely waiting for further orders, or they adhered blindly to the letter of the orders which they possessed already — as Marshal Grouchy did on June 18, even when the at- tendant circumstances clearly proclaimed that instant action was required of the Marshal, and as clearly showed what particular action was demanded from le Marechal, Commandant I'aile droite de VArmee du Nord. For, granting that Napoleon had trained these men in their youth, yet he had so impressed his will on their minds that, in moments of crisis, they looked to him always for orders and obeyed blindly such orders as he issued. His responsi- bility was no slight one ; and in fairness to Grouchy and Ney it must not be overlooked. As might have been expected. Marshal Grouchy summed up against General Gerard's rather tactless and very outspoken proposal ; and the Marshal proceeded to inform the knot of officers, now gathered around him, that the Emperor had apprised him of the action that was impending with Wellington ; and Grouchy laid stress on the fact that, if Napoleon had desired his help, he would not have detached him just as the Armee du Nord was moving against the Anglo-Dutch Army. He mentioned also that the cross-country roads, that traversed the watershed between the Dyle and Lasne, were in so miry and boggy a condition, as a result of the tropical rain of the previous day, that they would prevent the arrival of the right wing on Napoleon's battle-field before nightfall ; and consequently, even if it started immediately, it would not be able to render any useful aid in the battle that was now in progress. The Chief Engineer of the IV Corps, General Valaze, indeed offered with his three companies of Sappers to settle aU difficulties arising from the bad roads. But this promise cannot be taken too literally or seriously, for a rapid march could not be undertaken if the road had to be put in good order with pick and shovel as the troops advanced. On the 164 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO other hand there was no reason to suppose that such a task was necessary ; the river bridges were standing, and, for the rest, the Prussians proved conclusively enough that the cross-roads were traversable by all three arms and at a sufficiently rapid rate. Thus the discussion went on, when General Gerard, who was working himself up, made a bad mistake ; " Marshal," he ejaculated, "it is your duty to march to the cannon." This settled matters. Grouchy was really offended that his duty should have been pointed out to him by a subordinate and in such uncompromising tones, particularly in the presence of several other subordinates ; therefore he replied sternly : " My duty is to execute the Emperor's orders, which direct me to follow the Prussians, it would be infringing his commands to pursue the course of action which you recommend." Immediately after this a diversion was caused by the arrival of an aide-de-camp, who had been sent by General Exelmans to report that his Dragoons were in touch with a strong Prussian rear-guard, that was in position covering Wavre. The Cavalry General also added that everything pointed to the fact that the Prussian Army had passed through the town of Wavre, so as to approach nearer to its Allies ; and consequently the General was contemplating crossing with his horsemen to the Dyle's left bank at Ottignies. This was light on the situation indeed, and at a very opportune moment too ; for it was additional, timely, and strong evidence in support of General Gerard's plan. The essential was no longer obscure, it was to cover Napoleon's right from an attack by the Prussian Army in force ; and now no mere geographical point could hold the field as an objective for the French right wing. But still obsessed with his fixed, preconceived, and stereotyped idea as to the course taken by Blticher, Marshal Grouchy simply saw in the manoeuvre an ample confirmation of his previous deductions ! He looked on the Prussian rear-guard as a mere cloak to such Prussian action. Therefore he called for his horse, so as to proceed to the front and give his orders personally to General Exelmans. But, before he left, Gerard made one final attempt to sway and influence his decision. He asked for leave to take his own (the IV) Corps, as well as General Vallin's Hussars to screen and cover his march, and to move GROUCHY'S PURSUIT, JUNE 18 165 forthwith with these troops as rapidly as possible to Mt. S. Jean ; General Gerard pledged his word that he would arrive, and that he would arrive in time to be useful. But Grouchy would not split his force at this juncture — in his opinion, to have acted in such a fashion was to court disaster if the enemy got touch with either part. Even granting that the general principle " keep the force together on the march and in action," is a reasoned rule of the military art, yet in war there is not a single maxim which may not be broken on certain occasions ; provided that the General who behaves in such a fashion does so with his eyes wide open, and is fully aUve to the risks he runs by departing from established principle. In this case it is at least doubtful if the Marshal was wise in his decision. His duty was not to fight a pitched battle on June 18, but to the best of his ability to assist Napoleon in the struggle at Mt. S. Jean. That was the essential, and with it was coupled the duty of neutralising and keeping off Bliicher for at least the next twenty-four hours. Conse- quently to have detached Gerard, via Ottignies and Maran- sart, would have ensured that a considerable reinforcement reached the Armee du Nord at a critical and opportune time ; and, if energetically pushed, the advance of the remainder on Wavre might have held up a considerable portion of Bliicher's force on the River Dyle. Now that the situation was clearing up, to have detached General Gerard and the IV Corps was to have acted ui strict accord with the underlying idea of Napoleon's plan for manoeuvring in Belgium with the Armee du Nord — disposed in two wings, or covering forces, and a reserve. For, at critical moments, the Emperor had designed to add his reserve to one wing, and thus win a decisive victory ; and to ensure this end he purposed to sweU his reserve stiU further by depleting the containing wing, and augmenting his reserve by the troops thus obtained. Marshal Grouchy should have realised that the time had come when he should deplete his command — the French right wing — of the largest possible fraction, and send it westward at once to join the Emperor, so as to ensure that a decisive result was obtained on Jxme 18. With the remainder of the right wing the Marshal would have manoeuvred, as skilfully as he was able, so as to locate and hold up the largest possible 166 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO proportion of Bliicher's troops ; and thus ensure that, at the crisis of the campaign, the Prussian Marshal was engaged in the profitless task of staking gold against copper. Marshal Grouchy must have realised Marshal Ney's lamentable failure on June 16, when the left wing of the Armee du Nord utterly failed to co-operate in the Battle of Ligny, and to convert that action into a decisive French victory. Also Marshal Grouchy must have known that actions fought by detachments were never decisive ; and that the great pitched battle was always regarded as the essential in the Napoleonic strategy, the sword of Alexander, on which Napoleon always and rightly relied to shear through the Gordian knot of all his diffi- culties, and to resolve them automatically. Again, Marshal Grouchy must have realised that this was the fourth day of the Campaign, and not the second. No longer could the great battle be postponed with safety, or the Emperor's chance of beating the Allies in detail would pass away. Consequently, whatever happened, it was the Marshal's duty to ensure that he did not fail to co-operate with a part of his detachment in the big battle that had just opened with the Anglo-Dutch ; and then with the remainder to have manoeuvred skilfully, boldly, and rapidly, so as to have imposed on Blticher on this eventful day, and neutralised as large a part as possible of the Prussian Army, whilst the Emperor gained the decision at Mt. S. Jean. Further, if Gerard could have intervened at Plancenoit by 7 p.m., then in all probability victory would have declared for Napoleon. For the certainty of the proximity of this powerful support must have determined the Emperor to advance the death-blow — the attack of his Guard — by at least one hour ; and thus he would have delivered it directly La Haye Sainte fell into his hands. Also, under such conditions, he would have used all his " bearskins " for the decisive stroke ; and this must have ensured Wellington's overthrow before Zieten and the I Prussian Corps had engaged. Undoubtedly Colonel Grouard is correct when he states' that the wisest course of action for Marshal Grouchy • Critique de 1815, pp. 181-184 ; and also Riponse d, M. Houssaye, pp. 38-43. GROUCHY'S PURSUIT, JUNE 18 167 to have pursued at this moment was very different to the plan which he adopted ; briefly the suggested course was as follows : The Marshal should have pushed on immediately one of the Dragoon Divisions of General Exelmans' Cavalry Corps and also the leading Infantry Division of Vandamme's (III) Corps, and have given these troops orders to occupy the woody defile of La Huzelle, thus simulating an attack on Wavre, and thereby deceiving the Prussians. Also this detachment would have served admirably to act as a stationary flank guard, to cover the right or exposed flank of the other columns, which would have been wheeled to the westward, heading for the Dyle passages that lay abreast of Walhain. The bulk of Vandamme's Corps, and the remaining Dragoon Division of General Exelmans' Cavalry Corps might have passed the Dyle at Ottignies (the lower passage) ; whilst Gerard's Corps, which was in rear, would have used the upper passage at Mousty. At the same time General Pajol would have been ordered to come in from Tourinnes with his horsemen and follow in the wake of General Vandamme. General Teste's Division of the VI Corps would have followed General Pajol. Had these arrangements been put into effect, then Gerard, moving from Walhain about noon, would have attained Mousty by 4 p.m., preceded by his cavalry who would have seized the crossing by 2 p.m. Protected in his further advance by Vandamme, General Gerard and the IV Corps would have reached Plancenoit by 7 p.m., and they would have been in time to render inestimable service to Napoleon in the thick of the fight. Such dispositions appear eminently reasonable and worthy of consideration. Alone they appear to ensure the essential — the rendering of speedy and timely support to the Armee du Nord ; and at the same time they would not have neglected, but indeed they would have taken ample notice of, the Prussian movements ; and they would have provided adequate security for the flank march, which, it must be conceded, would have been terribly risky had no precau- tions been employed, such as the occupation in force of the La Huzelle defile. Hence the conclusion cannot be resisted that Gerard's suggestion was sound. Given the known situation of the opposing armies at the time when the distant cannon- 168 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO thunder was first heard, then, although it is certain that if no speed greater than one mile an hour^ could have been attained, in that case General Gerard's suggestion might not lead to any useful result. Even so, it must be conceded that no other course could have attained any important, let alone decisive, result ; and consequently in following Gerard's plan lay the only chance of doing any useful work on June 18, and not wasting the right wing. The Marshal was quite wrong not to stifle his pride, and to persist in resisting his subordinate's suggestions. But again Napoleon's responsibility was no slight one ; for at daybreak, on June 18, the Emperor failed to call the Marshal in to him, when he saw that the battle was im- pending with Wellington. In this case, had Grouchy headed for the Dyle at 7 a.m., he would have reached Plancenoit by 2 p.m. and not at 7 p.m., and then the result could not have been in doubt. For, before 5 p.m.. Napoleon, with the whole of the Armee du Nord massed under his hand, would have hurled back northward and westward the shattered Anglo-Dutch array. Therefore inasmuch as the Emperor (with all the informa- tion that he had at his disposal) failed to call in Grouchy to his aid at earliest daybreak on June 18, then he (Napoleon) must be regarded as primarily and chiefly, although not altogether or entirely, responsible for the non-intervention of his lieutenant on this decisive day of the campaign. Of course it was immeasurably unfortunate for the Emperor that his right wing was not handled with sufficient rapidity, intelligence, or resolution, by Marshal Grouchy on June 18 ; and that on June 18, as well as on the previous day, the Marshal's operations were characterised by a want of real determination. Marshal Grouchy failed to make sufficient use of the 5000 horsemen which had been allotted to his detachment ; and, as a Cavalry General, he might have been expected to handle his own arm with skill and daring ; ' I do not subscribe to this view which is advocated by Charras, and also by the brilliant Belgian writer, M. Louis Navez. The rate which these two authors consider practicable was two kilometres an hour. But what actually happened on this day seems to negative this idea. Further, to reach their Emperor's battle-field his soldiers were capable of superhuman exertions, and a study of his campaigns will confirm this point. One need only cite his marvellous perform- ance in driving the Grand Army to the Danube in 1805. It is just this characteristic that both these writers overlook. GROUCHY'S PURSUIT, JUNE 18 169 his failure in this respect was both unaccountable and in- excusable. Further, the Marshal knew that full and accurate information was urgently required concerning the Prussian movements ; the force given to him for the purpose was adequate, but the use he made of it was feeble. It was Grouchy's duty to confirm, or to correct the impression imder which the Emperor laboured, about the line by which Bliicher had withdrawn. Granting that at noon, on June 18, there was no possibility of mistake with reference to the instructions which he had received, yet the peculiar circum- stances of the moment — the reports to hand and the in- creasing cannon-thunder — made it every moment more palpable that the instructions had been issued under a false hypothesis. Marshal Grouchy knew that the bulk of the Prussians were at Wavre, and his ears told him that WelUngton had accepted a battle to the southward of Soignes Forest. All that the Marshal had to do was to examine most carefully the possibility of Bliicher manoeuvring so as to co-operate with Wellington's Army. The chances were strongly in favour of this assumption ; otherwise why had Bliicher abandoned his line with Liege, and what else could have induced Wellington to accept battle single-handed with Napoleon — a course he had declined to consider on June 17 ? Hence to advance direct on Wavre, along the Dyle's right bank, was to act contrary to the spirit of his instructions. Grouchy's failure to appreciate the fairly simple situation with which he was confronted, showed that he did not possess the qualifications which it is essential that an independent commander must enjoy. Had the result of the campaign of 1814 adversely affected Marshal Grouchy and robbed him of some of his previous dash, resolution, and confidence ? It is time to consider the execution of the actual manoeuvres which the luckless and incompetent Marshal carried out. It will be remembered that General Gerard had made his final appeal to the Marshal just when the latter was about to mount his horse. The Marshal showed no hesitation in negativing Gerard's proposal ; immedi- ately afterwards he mounted and then galloped off to join General Exelmans. At 10 a.m. General Exelmans had been in position near 170 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO La Baraque, and reports, that had reached him from his patrols, showed that a large Prussian force of all arms was on the heights above Wavre. The General considered that his dragoons were insufficient to engage the enemy's masses in such a difficult and wooded country. But apparently he did recognise that Marshal Bliicher was manoeuvring to join the Duke of Wellington, and hence he came to the logical conclusion that a further direct advance on Wavre was useless ; therefore, the General proceeded to spread out his cavalry, so as to secure the nearest Dyle passage at Ottignies, and at the same time to cover adequately the front and right of the present advance. His procedure was eminently sound and correct. Meanwhile General Vandamme's III Corps had halted at Nil S. Vincent, in strict accordance with Marshal Grouchy's march orders issued on the evening of June 17. It would have been far wiser for the Marshal to have ordered the III Corps to follow Exelmans' Cavalry. But, under the circum- stances, Vandamme halted pending the receipt of further instructions. In this way some more of the really golden moments were wasted ; for it was not until 1 p.m. that Marshal Grouchy reached Nil S. Vincent. Then the Marshal ordered Vandamme to resume his advance, and despatched the same orders to Exelmans. However, it was not until shortly before 2 p.m. that Exelmans' advance established close contact with the foe ; and then his two advanced squadrons were attacked by part of a Prussian detachment (1 cavalry regiment, 2 infantry battalions, and 2 guns), under Colonel Ledebur, which had been posted at Mt. S. Guibert. Ledebur appears to have been profoundly ignorant of Grouchy's advance, and also of the fact that he was actually in the very midst of enemies ; for Vincent's Brigade (Strolz's Division, Corps of Exelmans) was in position just to the eastward of Ottignies. About 1 p.m., the advance of the French, on Nil S. Vincent, awakened Ledebur to the gravity of the situation ; then he realised speedily that his line of retreat on Wavre was endangered. Hence he used his cavalry to hold back the French advance, whilst he occupied La Huzelle woods with his infantry. The Prussian Hussars forced the leading French squadrons back, but Exelmans came up with the main body of his dragoons, and the Prussian GROUCHY'S PURSUIT, JUNE 18 171 Hussars thereupon retired through their infantry, who had reached and occupied the woody defile. General Exelmans found that he was powerless to dislodge the Prussians single- handed ; consequently Vandamme's leading troops were sent to the front and they attacked promptly. Supports of two further battalions were forwarded to Ledebur from the Dyle's right bank, and an obstinate defence was made. Meanwhile, unknown to Exelmans, Marshal Grouchy had called in Vincent's Brigade from Ottignies. Thus this Cavalry Corps was intact once more. Consequently Marshal Grouchy decided to clear the defile by a bold outflanking movement ; and he ordered General Exelmans to take his 3000 dragoons (the whole Cavalry Corps) and turn the Prussian position, moving via Dion-le-Mont. The concep- tion was eminently correct and sound, but nevertheless nothing resulted. For the Prussians actually evacuated the defile before Exelmans had carried through the manoeuvre and cut their line of withdrawal ; and Ledebur's troops had drawn back to Wavre before the French Cavalry could strike in. The small Prussian detachment had been well handled, and it had gained valuable time. It had caused Marshal Grouchy to deploy superior numbers, it had delayed his advance, and it had secured its own retreat without being cut oft. Vandamme and the III Corps advanced as Ledebur drew off, and followed the Prussians through the defile. Marshal Grouchy then ordered General Vandamme to pursue the Prussians as far as Wavre, and take up a position there pending further orders. However, General Vandamme proceeded to pay very little attention to the Marshal's commands. But the Marshal himself was uneasy as to the line of action which he had adopted. Apparently the cannon, which was thundering away to the left with ever-increasing vio- lence, * aroused in him many doubts and uncertainties. Ac- cordingly he galloped off to Limelette, in order to come to some definite opinion about the cause of the cannonade ; he was soon convinced that a general action was really in pro- gress on the southern border of the Forest of Soignes. He 1 The time of the great French Cavahy charges — 4 p.m. — was fast approaching, and the French preparatory bombardment -was now as intense as it was continuous. 172 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO returned to the Wavre road, and just before 4 p.m. (when Marshal Ney was leading the French Cavalry to assault Wellington's position), Marshal Grouchy received Soult's letter,^ despatched at 10 a.m. from the Imperial head- quarters at Le Caillou. The bearer had been far too long on his journey, and even if he had taken the longer route, i.e. via Sombreffe, yet he had taken nearly 6 hours to cover what was at most 25 miles, a tediously slow rate for the bearer of an important despatch. But the delay was not vital ; for this was the despatch which enjoined on the Marshal the necessity of marching on Wavre, consequently its perusal tended to confirm him in the decision which he had taken ; and it contained nothing definite enough to induce him to alter that decision. In all probability he congratulated himself inwardly on resisting General Gerard's importunity. Even although the despatch did not order Grouchy to cross the Dyle, as he closed on Wavre, yet certainly it did imply that he should behave in this fashion. But the despatch was badly worded ; it was far from clear, and worse still it was perplexing. Soult's staff work, at this critical juncture, was of a piece with his other per- formances in this brief campaign, it was unsatisfactory ; the order was casual and ambiguous, and Grouchy misread it. When writing to a commander of Grouchy's personality and lack of real strategic insight, it was very necessary to state what was required in very precise terms ; in this case the Marshal should have received a definite order to cross the Dyle before he closed on Wavre ; and to send at least one officer's patrol to Waterloo, so as to learn the latest news of the situation. Further, this order should have been sent off at 4 a.m. on June 18, and not at 10 a.m. Even so Soult must not be accused hastily of initiating the issue of slipshod orders. For with all his experience Marshal Berthier had perpetrated some very careless and haphazard productions, both in 1809 and in 1813, to name only two campaigns. Also, of course, there is no true analogy between Marshal Grouchy's failure to march to the sound of the guns on June 18, 1815, and Desaix's handling of Boudet's Division on June 14, 1800, when the General reached the battle-field 1 Appendix II, No. 29. GROUCHY'S PURSUIT, JUNE 18 173 of Marengo in the very nick of time. It has been proved conclusively! that Desaix did not anticipate his order of recall in any way ; that he did not march for the battlefield until an orderly officer overtook him, bearing a peremptory order of recall, and after its receipt he hastened to obey the order with all the energy of which he was capable ; conse- quently he arrived with his troops in time to turn the tide of war, and convert a French defeat into a dazzling triumph for the First Consul. However, it is impossible to draw any conclusion from Desaix's behaviour in 1800, with reference to the way that Marshal Grouchy should have behaved in 1815. The situa- tion in 1800 was much more obscure ; also, in 1815, all the French leaders had had far more actual war experience — for much water had flowed under the bridges in those eventful fifteen years — and thus, in the last of Napoleon's campaigns, it was surely not too much to expect from a Marshal of France, granted that he had only just been elevated to that dignity, that he should recognise the essential in the com- paratively simple situation that confronted him. What had happened at Marengo, and also Bernadotte's culpable behaviour on more than one occasion, should have burned the lesson into the minds of all thoughtful men, when in doubt, it was essential to march to the sound of the guns. The Marshal now received a report from General Pajol, which made clear that no traces of the enemy had been discovered during his advance via Grand Leez to Tourinnes. Consequently Grouchy sent an order to Pajol to move to the left flank, and force the Dyle passage at Limale with his horsemen, and that Teste's Infantry Division would support the manceuvre. This arrangement was clumsy in the extreme ; it led to a grave waste of time, when even minutes were pregnant with momentous results ; for, at the moment. General Pajol was at Tourinnes, and therefore the General was 9 miles distant from Limale ; whilst, within 3 miles of the bridge in question, there were ValUn's Hussars, also Hulot's Division (of Gerard's Corps) had reached La Baraque, and consequently it was far closer to the point selected than Teste's Infantry. But the Marshal did not stop to consider such matters. 1 Campagne de VArmee de Riserve en 1800, by Commandant de Cugnao. 174 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Having issued the order he headed for Wavre at a gallop. There he found that the Action of Wavre had already been opened by General Vandamme, in flagrant defiance of the orders which the Marshal had issued to his subordinate — the commander of the III Corps. CHAPTER XIV THE ACTION OF WAVRE, JUNE 18 ^ {See Map 6) Vandamme had been as impetuous as ever, and before the Marshal came up the General was fully committed to the assault. General Vandamme had paid a total disregard to the orders which he had received, to the need for any pre- Uminary reconnaissance, or to the necessity for an adequate preparatory bombardment ; ^ and, determined to seize the bull by the horns, he hurled General Habert's Division against the foe, who were in position behind the Dyle, and covering the river passages at Limale, Bierges, Wavre (two), and Basse Wavre. The bridges in Wavre were of stone ; the remainder, and also the one at Limelette, were of wood. The River Dyle was a fairly formidable obstacle, for it was unfordable below Limelette, and its breadth, opposite to Bierges, was about 30 feet. A French Staff Officer, who reconnoitred it on June 18, likened it not inaptly to " a muddy canal," on account of its low and parallel banks. Further, the low-lying ground of the Dyle valley was intersected by deep ditches, and after the heavy and continuous rain they had filled with storm-water and they had become very awkward obstacles to the free movement of all arms, whilst the ground itself was both soft and treacherous ; also the low hills on the right bank had a distinct command over the ground on the left bank of the Dyle valley.' The line of the little river was held by Thielemann's (III) 1 The account is based on Marshal Grouchy's Keport (Appendix II, No. 42) ; Hovissaye, Waterloo, 1815, pp. 455-^83 ; Kausler's Atlas, pp. 543-548 ; L. Navez's Champs de bataille de la Belgique, pp. 243-301 ; Col. Grouard's Critique d-e 1815, pp. 181-199. The position of the troops is based on Kausler (Map 91), and on Siborne (Map 10). ' Three French Batteries appear to have opened fire almost simul- taneously with General Habert's attack. ^ L, Navez, Champs de bataille de la Belgique, pp. 266-268. ITS 176 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Prussian Corps, whose effective strength was between 15,000- 16,000 men, with 36 guns. The General had disposed his force as follows : 1 Brigade (Stulpnagel's) and 1 Troop of Horse Artillery were formed on the high ground behind the bridge at Bierges, with one company placed in position so as to cover the bridge. Another Brigade (Kampfen's) was formed up on the heights behind Wavre to the left of Stulpnagel's. A third Brigade (Luck's) was halted astride the Brussels road and in rear of Wavre. The cavalry (Hobe) were held in reserve, and were formed in column on the southern side of the Brussels road, abreast of La Bavette. The Prussian guns were in action on the heights behind and above Wavre. After passing his Brigade over the Dyle, at Basse-Wavre, and leaving a detachment to hold the place, General Borcke had dropped three battalions in Wavre, and also two squadrons, and then he had followed General Pirch's (II) Corps westward. ^ A detachment from Zieten's I Corps (3 battalions and 3 squadrons), under von Stengel, had been left in position at Limale, so as to deny the bridge at that place to the French. With this exception, all Zieten's, I, Corps was on the move westward ; and even Thielemann himself at first had mistaken Exelmans' Dragoons for a mere screen, and, impressed by the heavy cannonade that was then raging, the General was about to put the III Corps in motion towards the west, so as to follow Zieten, and he intended to leave a small rear-guard of 2 battalions to hold Wavre and cover the movement ; it was just when he had reached this conclusion that Vandamme's Corps debouched in strength. Thielemann promptly counter marched those of his troops who had started, and they took up the positions that had been vacated only shortly before, and which have been indicated above ; but the officer placed in command in Wavre itself (Zeppelin) had not completed his arrangements before the French attack was launched. ^ ^ The left bank of the Dyle from Basse-Wavre to Bierges was lined with Prussian skirmishers. ^ Thielemann's line (from Limale to Basse-Wavre) measured about three miles ; thus the Prussian General could not deploy more than about 5000 men to the mile, against very superior hostile forces. The most he could achieve, therefore, was to engage in a yielding fight, and chiefly by means of rear-guard tactics, attempt to gain the time necessary for Bliicher to reach Wellington and deal the decisive stroke, and ensure as well that Grouchy was neutralised on June 18. ACTION AT WAVRE, JUNE 18 177 It was about 4 p.m. when the action commenced. A heavy plunging fire was opened on the town by the French batteries, which were in action on the high ground and some 600 yards away from the river. The preparation, however, was a perfunctory one, and the French Infantry were sent forward far too soon. Habert's rush at Wavre met with a first success, for the French drove the Prussians from the houses of the suburb situated on the right bank. But nevertheless the onslaught came to a standstill in front of the Dyle. The bridges had been barricaded hastily but effectually, and they were also swept by the fire of guns which were in action in the steep streets that overlooked them, their case shot thus raked the bridges from end to end ; and at least 1000 Prussian skirmishers were con- cealed in the houses on the left bank. The affair was short and deadly ; in a few minutes Habert's unfortunate and mishandled di\'ision lost 600 men, including its General, and the French troops failed to carry the bridge. Retirement was also impracticable, for the streets by which they had advanced were swept by a murderous fire. As Grouchy tersely remarked : " They were wedged in a veritable cul-de-sac." The position of this division was as unenviable as it was unsatisfactory and im^availing. However, fresh troops were coming up, and Gerard's leading division was within about one mile of Bierges. Marshal Grouchy himself reached the front, and surveyed the scene. He soon came to a decision that he would assist Vandamme's effort by two other attacks — one to be de- livered above, and one below Wavre. Habert's Di\'ision was reinforced, whilst Lefol (of Vandamme's Corps) was ordered to take one of his battalions and storm the bridge at Bierges ; meanwhUe Exelmans and his Dragoons were detailed to threaten Basse-Wavre. But hardly had the Marshal made these arrangements, when Soult's despatch, timed 1.30 p.m., came to hand ; and this letter ' informed Grouchy that the battle was in full smng in front of Water- loo — as the cannon-thunder was testifying insistently — and to it was added that pregnant postscript, which in- formed Grouchy that Billow's Corps had been sighted away to the Emperor's right front ; in it the Marshal was ordered peremptorily to turn westward at once, and ^ Appendix II, No. 31. II.— N 178 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO crush this Prussian Corps, before it should complete its concentration with the Anglo-Dutch Army. Certainly this 1.30 p.m. despatch was both imperative and precise ; and there is no doubt that Grouchy under- stood it fully.' But the Marshal was impotent, for it was already 5 p.m., and he had no troops on the Dyle's left bank ; nor had his troops wrested even one of the river passages from the Prussians. Even so, at this obviously critical time, Grouchy's efforts to carry out his master's order were both misdirected and unsound. To force the river at once a heavy blow with the clenched fist was requisite. The Prussians in and about Wavre, might have been neutralised by Habert and the three batteries, which were already in action and were playing busily on the town ; Lefol's Division might have been left to support this manoeuvre, and to mask the bridge at Bierges. Basse- Wavre could have been neglected with safety ; and Van- damme's other division (Berthezene) together with Exel- mans' Cavalry Corps should have been directed to storm the bridge at Limale at any cost. This bridge was the one which it was essential for Grouchy to possess, so as to allow the right wing to march at once to Waterloo, without delay or excessive counter-marching. Also, directly it was captured, the Marshal would be enabled to threaten the flank of some of the Prussian marching columns as they moved from the Dyle to the Lasne. Further, two divisions of Vandamme's Corps were excellently placed to cover the passage at Limale, whilst the remainder of the right wing passed over the Dyle. But at this crisis Grouchy behaved very differently, he adopted ruinous half-measures ; he struck with his open hand, in preference to using his clenched fist, and not only did he hurt his hand, but the result was indifferent. The Marshal was still determined to carry Wavre ; and for this purpose he decided to allow half his force to continue the attack on that place. Meanwhile he wished the other half to move on S. Lambert, and therefore to cross the Dyle at 1 It will be remembered that when Major Baudus reached Marshal Ney at Quatre Bras on June 16, and the full significance of the Em- peror's plan dawned on the Prince of La Moskowa, he was powerless to comply. The definite orders, worded with sufficient precision, had arrived too late. The coincidence is too striking to pass by without remark. ACTION AT WAVRE, JUNE 18 179 Limale. Hence, in pursuance of this ill-digested plan, Grouchy left Exelmans and Vandamme confronting Basse- Wavre and Wavre respectively, and despatched an order to the far-distant Pajol to hasten his advance on Limale. The Marshal himself then rode over to La Baraque, so as to issue an order to Gerard, commanding the General to take the IV Corps and storm the Limale bridge. What happened is somewhat obscure, for Gerard actually headed for Wavre, with Vichery's and Pecheux's Divisions which he had in hand, instead of advancing direct to Limale as the Marshal had intended him to do.' Hulot's Division (late de Bourmont's) of the IV Corps, had been in position on the heights above Wavre since 5 p.m. Of course, as matters were, this mistake of Gerard's could have no significance. But it is both interesting and instructive, because it affords a criterion whereby the Marshal's skill in handling his troops can be judged. It was not on June 18 that Grouchy was to retrieve his reputation. Meanwhile the fight raged fiercely along the Dyle's banks, and Lefol's battalion failed to carry the bridge at Bierges. This failure stimulated the Marshal to fresh exertions, for he was determined to win this point, although the bridge was only suitable for the passage of infantry. There- fore he ordered Gerard to renew the attack with one of Hulot's battalions. As promptly, and quite properly, Gerard pointed out, that it would be a better arrangement to support Lefol ^^-ith troops who were drawn from the same Corps (the III) as the assailants. Grouchy rejected this advice ; and Gerard thereupon ordered Hulot to comply. Hulot led the attack in person. Broad, deep ditches (over four feet deep) running perpendicular to the line of advance, had to be crossed ; they proved to be very formidable obstacles indeed, and they did much to retard the attack, and break up its cohesion. An attempt made to cross them in the face of a very hot fire proved a failure, and the battalion fell back. Marshal Grouchy, as well as General Gerard who was leading up a supporting battalion, appeared 1 M. Houssaye suggests, very reasonably, that the head of the column may have gone in the wrong direction, possibly being without a reKable guide ; and, finding it was off the desired line of advance, it then headed for Wavre as being the most Ukely place to reach without any undue loss of time. (Waterloo, 1815, p. 467.) 180 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO at this juncture. Thereupon Gerard placed himself at the head of the next attack, but he was severely wounded by a musket ball, which struck him in the chest, and he fell.' Marshal Grouchy promptly ordered General Baron Baltus, commanding the Artillery of the IV Corps, to take General Gerard's place, and lead the assault. This General Baltus declined to do. (However unusual the request, yet the refusal to obey Was unsoldierly.) Whatever his faults. Marshal Grouchy did not lack personal courage of a high order. Without a moment's hesitation, he sprang from his charger and headed the assault himself.^ But the attack achieved no more than the preceding assaults had done, and it failed also. Therefore Grouchy left Hulot's Division in front of Bierges, and rode off to join Gerard's two other divisions, whom he proceeded to lead towards Limale. Although it is easy to admire Marshal Grouchy's courage, yet it is impossible to accord the same admiration to his handling of his battle. By his adoption of the role of a regimental officer, the Marshal had degenerated into a pure sergent de bataille ; a role which has been harshly and deservedly criticised by that great French Marshal, Maurice de Saxe, who beat the English in a stand-up fight at Fon- tenoy in 1745. What he has said is so pertinent, and so generally overlooked, that it is reproduced here ; it was as follows : " The orders issued by the General of an army must be short and simple, as, for instance, 'The first line shall attack, and the second line shall support.' The Generals under his command would be men of very shallow parts indeed if they did not know how to execute these orders, and in consequence of them carry out the proper manoeuvre with their respective divisions. Thus the ' Curiously enough General Gerard was taken back on a stretcher to the house of Notary Hollaert at Walhain, where Marshal Grouchy had breakfasted in the morning ; and in the garden of this house the celebrated discussion had taken place. This fact enables us to place with precision the spot where the earlier incidents happened ; and also the village from which the Marshal wrote to the Emperor. It was not from Sart-&- Walhain, as Grouchy described it, but from the village of Walhain, situated under a mile from the hamlet in question. (See Houssaye, Waterloo, 1815, pp. 296, 297, and 457 notes.) ^ In his long career Grouchy was wounded 23 times, proof sufficient that he was an intrepid soldier. But on June 17 and 18, 1815, the Marshal was required to show that he possessed exceptional military talents and personal character, as well as gallantry. ACTION AT WAVRE, JUNE 18 181 Commander-in-Chief of an army will have no occasion to embarrass or perplex himself. Consequently he will see things better, preserve a clearer judgment, and be more in a condition to profit by circumstances. It is not for him to be everywhere and play the part of a sergent de bataille. He must be free to deal those strokes which decide engage- ments, and win victories. For it is he, and he alone, who must see the opportunity and be able to profit from it immediately." 1 Certainly, on June 18, Marshal Grouchy handled his troops like le hon General Ordinaire ; and when perplexed, or doubtful, as to what he should do, he did what was second- nature to him. But luifortunately he had always been a subordinate, and therefore his efforts were the mechanical and methodical ones of a subordinate. The art of leader- ship, as Marshal Saxe said, is sublime, but Grouchy never approached this height. Of course there are times in action when a leader correctly exposes himself in the midst of his troops, so as to electrify them, at a crisis, into per- forming the impossible, and thus causes them to be irre- sistible. But generally, at other times, a commander should not go forward into the firing line ; for if he does, he loses sight and grip of the action as a whole, and receives a totally false impression of the state of affairs where he ^ Reveries sur I'art de la Guerre (1756) abridged from pp. 210-215. It is also given in the English translation of this great book, entitled The Art of War, pp. 159-163, edition of 1757 ; and on pp. 92-95 of the 1811 edition. Marshal Marmont in his Esprit des Institutions militaires (1846) con- firmed Marshal Saxe's opinion. Marshal Marmont considered that a general commanding 30,000 men should direct the movements of the troops and reserves, but that he should keep outside the range of musketry. However, if the general commanded 100,000 men, then he decided on the plan, issued the orders for the battle, and awaited the result in a convenient position. During the action he would be ready to issue orders and make counter-dispositions so as to meet all unforeseen emergencies and great accidents. He must have made a careful personal reconnaissEince before the battle, but then, after having issued the orders which detailed what his subordinates were to do, the General- issimo would have allowed each subordinate to play the part entrusted to him without any unnecessary interference from above ; thereafter he would influence the battle only by his skilful use of his general reserve. But his presence at the moment when the great stroke was launched would give an impulse and produce a moral efiect that would double its value. There is no doubt, despite the fact that Marshal Grouchy's force did not number nearly 100,000 men, yet as the commander of a most important strategical detachment it was essential that he should not degenerate into a sergent de bataille. 182 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO happens to be. Nor does his forward presence at such a time have any compensating advantage ; usually its effect is felt only by the very nearest troops, and meanwhile the commander is inaccessible to reports, and incapable of exercising that cool, reasoned judgment which alone can command success and ensure victory. All through an action a real general does his utmost to control his opponent and his opponent's ideas, and to bend him and them to his own will. To behave, therefore, as Marshal Grouchy behaved, was merely a waste of energy. Meanwhile skirmishing continued at Basse-Wavre, and a desperate fight was in progress at Wavre itself. Vandamme with his 31 battalions appears to have delivered no less than thirteen assaults on the town ; nevertheless, despite his fiery obstinacy, he failed to wrest the place from its de- fenders who fought as fiercely and stubbornly as the French ; for the Prussians knew that they were gaining time for Bliicher's co-operation with Wellington, and the delivery of a decisive blow by the Allies. On more than one oc- casion Vandamme's men stormed the bridges, and pene- trated even into the houses in their vicinity. But, when they were driven from the bottom floors, the Prussians retreated to the upper storeys, and fought on with rare determination. Thus the French could neither penetrate further into the town, nor make good their foothold on the left bank of the Dyle. Further, the prolonged struggle gave ample time for the Prussian reserves to arrive, and in the end drive back the assailants over the bridges — baffled and decimated. That not more than four Prussian battalions succeeded in holding up the whole of Vandamme's Corps for seven hours, on June 18, redounded greatly to the credit of the gallant defenders of Wavre ; and so, for the remainder of the day, the fight raged at Wavre, and even at 11 p.m. it was raging still. But in the meantime the Dyle had been forced elsewhere. When the Marshal, leading up Gerard's two divisions, reached Limale he found the bridge at that place was free ; for the bridge had fallen to Pajol's horsemen. The latter General had remembered the daring expedient which had been attempted at Montereau in 1814 ; and he resolved to attempt it once more at Limale. Consequently he hurled General Vallin's Hussars (part of Gerard's Corps Cavalry) ACTION AT WAVRE, JUNE 18 183 at the bridge, which was held by a Prussian battaUon, and was only wide enough to allow four horses abreast to cross it. The audacious manceuvre succeeded. The Prussians were ridden into, broken through, and cut to pieces ; and Teste's Infantry Division, which had also reached the front, followed to the Dyle's left bank in the wake of the dashing Hussars, who had opened the passage so gallantly ; and thus the infantry made permanent the temporary success which had been achieved by Vallin's horsemen. But had the Limale bridge been barricaded, like the Charleroi bridge was on June 15, or the Wavre bridges actually were on this day, then this bold manoeuvre could never have been attempted. The oversight was most unskilful, and the Prussians deservedly lost the river- crossing. The Dyle at this point was about 25 feet broad and un- fordable ; the bridge was only about 30 feet long in conse- quence, and therefore could have been raked with a deadly musketry fire. It would appear, when this gallant feat of arms was performed, that the light, as Clausewitz said, was failing ; this may help to explain how the manoeuvre suc- ceeded ; but it does not explain why an extemporised barricade had not been placed on the bridge. Pajol's Cavalry Corps also crossed over to the left bank. But von Stengel, in command at Limale, realised very fully the importance of time, and he fought truculently to retain Limale itself, and to stem a further French advance ; however, the Prussians were pressed back by superior numbers, although, when von Stengel was forced to relinquish Limale, he rallied his men and took up another position on the high ground that commanded the village on the northern side. Despite the failing light Teste attacked him resolutely, and it was at this moment that Grouchy came up, at the head of Gerard's two divisions. This reinforcement arrived at the right moment, for Thielemann, to support von Stengel, had hastened up both Stulpnagel's Division and Kobe's Cavalry. In the growing darkness the Prussian reinforcements encountered a ravine, and their advance was brought to a standstill by a heavy fire poured in by the French Infantry ; finally a wide outflanking movement, made by the French horse, directly menaced the Prussian right, and the latter 184 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO thereupon retired into the cover of the large woods behind them. Thus, until 11 p.m., on this side too the fight raged on for the possession of the plateau, which in the end was captured and held by the French. Then at last the road to Mt. St. Jean lay open, and Grouchy could move to his master's assistance when he pleased. But the Emperor's cannonade had died away, and a deathlike silence reigned to the westward. The fate of the day had been decided ; but as yet none could say what this ominous silence presaged. ^ The critical hours of Waterloo had passed whilst Thiele- mann and Grouchy fought so stubbornly for the mastery of the Dyle passages. Thielemann's arrangements and dispositions to hold the river line had been excellent, and the desperate fight he made to hold back Grouchy, at the head of his very superior numbers, reflected the greatest credit on the Prussian General. Indeed, when the French debouched finally on to the left bank, it was far too late to affect the main issue — for by 8 p.m. the great struggle at Mt. S. Jean was over. This proved that had Grouchy been able to march westwards at once, directly he received Soult's 1.30 p.m. despatch, the Marshal even then would have effected nothing of impor- tance ; for Billow at that time was attacking Plancenoit, and it would have been far too late to detain Pirch I, or Zieten. Grouchy would have reached the fatal field, only to find his master defeated, and the Armie du Nord spread-eagled in panic flight over southern Brabant. Thus he must have shared in the disaster that had overtaken them, and by no means could he have changed or altered the fortunes of the day. The time to move to the Emperor's assistance had long passed by. But the precise order, when it was received, did galvanise Marshal Grouchy into action, and changed the spirit of his manoeuvres ; for the Emperor's despatch showed clearly that a crisis had been reached, and the arrival of this crisis awoke Grouchy's cavalry spirit, which had lain dormant, and the Marshal immediately was up and doing. Thus the necessity for immediate action nerved Grouchy to strike hard at last, albeit he struck unskilfully, yet he struck ; and it is therefore fair to ask what might not have happened had as definite orders been issued at ' Marshal Grouchy's Keport, Appendix II, No. 42. ACTION AT WAVRE, JUNE 18 185 daybreak on June 18, and been received by Marshal Grouchy before leaving Gembloux ? Even allowing that the Emperor was responsible for the ruin that involved the Armie du Nord; and that Grouchy was covered, partly, by the system of command that Napoleon had devised and practised ; yet the Marshal was culpable, for he cannot be acquitted of a real want of energy and insight. Had Davout only been in Grouchy's place his procedure and behaviour would have been far different and more correct ; the Prussians indeed would " have seen fine things." But it was not to be. As it was dark the opposing forces bivouacked in front of one another to pass the short summer night of June 18-19. The French left bivouacked in squares on the plateau which they had won, whilst the Prussians occupied the woods immediately in front (north) of them ; the opposing outposts being in such close proximity to one another that they bickered all night. Kobe's Cavalry had retired behind the wood to pass the night, the Prussian Infantry being left in the front line. French and Prussian patrols were in constant contact, and generally also in con- fhct with one another all through the night ; and the natural result was that little rest was obtained by the troops who were disturbed constantly by outbursts of musketry. About 11.30 p.m., after the fighting had ceased. Grouchy sent Vandamme orders to bring the III Corps over the Dyle at Limale. The Marshal's idea was to finish oft the action early on June 19, by rolling up the river Une from the south, now that he had gained the Prussian bank, and then to move at once on Brussels, so as to reinforce the Armee du Nord there ; for rumour — that lying jade — had it, that Napoleon had beaten Wellington. But had the Marshal forgotten Bliicher ? and, if he had not, where did he expect the Prussian Marshal was ? had he been content to act the part of spectator whilst Wellington was destroyed ? and then had he been satisfied with applaud- ing the victors on their feat ? much as a losing side in a game, or pastime, applauds the side that wins. Such procedure is not war ; nor was such conduct understandable when applied to the loyal and fierce old Field-Marshal, to whom the leading of Prussia's hosts had been confided in 1815. 186 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO On the other hand, Thielemann actually knew before this time what was the true state of affairs, for a credible report had reached him that the Allies had won a great victory, and that the French Army was in full retreat. The commander of the III Prussian Corps was reassured ; nothing beyond a mere temporary reverse could be his fate, and his detach- ment indeed had justified its existence and his handling ; for, at the critical moment, with less than 16,000 Prussians, he had kept at bay and neutralised the French right wing of 38,000 men, commanded too by a Marshal of France. The Prussian General could feel a justifiable pride in his day's work. CHAPTER XV JUNE 19. — THE CONCLUSION OF THE ACTION AT WAVRE. GROUCHY LEARNS THE RESULT OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO, AND OPENS AN IMMEDIATE RETREAT. (See Map 6a) ^ General Thielemann used the hours of darkness to con- centrate almost his whole force in the vicinity of the plateau that Grouchy had wrested from him on the previous after- noon, and the Prussian General intended to assume the offensive at daybreak on June 19. Thus the Prussians were occupying the following positions when the action was resumed : — Eight companies occupied the edge of the woods ; Three battahons were posted at the eastern salient of the big wood ; Seven battalions and two squadrons were between the latter force and Bierges ; Four battalions were behind Wavre ; Two battalions were in position behind the bridge at Bierges ; Kobe's Cavalry were to the north of the wood ; whilst Wa\Te, Basse- Wavre, and Bierges were occupied in force by Prussian troops. Meanwhile Marshal Grouchy had not been idle. He had massed four Divisions during the night on the Limale plateau. He placed three — Pecheux and Vichery (of Gerard's Corps), and Teste (of Lobau's Corps) in the first line ; holding in Reserve the fourth, Hulot (of Gerard's Corps), which had been moved up from Bierges. Pajol's squadrons covered the left flank. Just as day dawned, about 3 a.m., Hobe's Cavalry ' The authorities for the action, and the placing of troops, are as before quoted, p. 175, and also Sibome (Map 11). 187 188 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO advanced, and with their two horse batteries opened a heavy- fire on the French bivouacs. Grouchy took prompt action ; he unhmbered his guns to return and curb the Prussian fire, and the French advanced at once in three columns. To Teste's Division, on the right, Bierges was assigned as an objective ; Vichery, in the centre, was to attack the Prussian centre ; whilst Pecheux, on the left, advanced against the Prussian right. A swarm of skirmishers, and a battery in action at the head of each division, covered and prepared these attacks. To Pajol's Cavalry, on the extreme left, was assigned the twofold duty of covering the French flank, and at the same time manoeuvring against the Prussian right. Thielemann's troops fought stubbornly enough, but they had to give way before the superior numbers that Grouchy brought into action ; until finally the Prussians fell back, and took up the following position further to the rear : — - Four battalions held the small wood to the north-west of Bierges. The remainder of Stulpnagel's Brigade was further to the rear, on the open ground to the right flank of the wood. Three battalions of Luck's Brigade, and 15 guns, took post behind the large wood, from which the Prussians had been driven. Lottum's Cavalry Brigade were away to the north-west ; whilst Marwitz's Cavalry Brigade were on the left of Lottum ; the duty assigned to these two bodies of horse was to cover the right flank of the III Prussian Corps, as far as the Lasne. Scarcely had General Thielemann occupied this new position, which had been taken up by pivoting on the left, and wheeling back the rest of the line parallel to the Wavre- Brussels road, when the definite news of Waterloo arrived. It was now between 8 and 9 a.m. The despatch had been sent through by Pirch I ; and Thielemann learned definitely of the French retreat, and also that the II (Prussian) Corps was being pushed on so as to cut off Marshal Grouchy's force when it withdrew. The great news raised the spirits of the soldiers, and inspired them with new ardour. The fighting broke out afresh and more fiercely than ever, and the French were dislodged momentarily from the large wood ; but the Prussians were unable to maintain their success, and finally were driven out. However, Thiele- ACTION AT WAVRE, JUNE 19 189 mann was behaving quite correctly. He was retaining Marshal Grouchy at Wavre, and thus, so far as lay in his power, ensuring that Pirch I should have sufficient time to place the II Prussian Corps astride the Marshal's line of withdrawal, so that, later in the day, the latter would have the option of choosing whether he should capitulate, or die sword in hand. The French pushed home their success, and Teste carried Bierges ; Berthezene's Division (III Corps) also co-operated in this attack from the right bank. Thielemann's left was turned, and Pajol was threatening the Prussian right with his horsemen ; thus, about 10 a.m., the Prussian Commander found it necessary to order a general retreat along the Louvain road. Wavre itself had not been attacked on June 19 ; but it had to be abandoned by Colonel Zeppelin and his troops, who had defended the place with such indomitable tenacity on the previous day. Vandamme had obeyed Marshal Grouchy's order, of the evening before, and he had de- spatched to him Hulot's Division, replacing the latter at Bierges with Berth^zene. The Prussian Infantry drew off in several columns, heading for Louvain ; but Vandamme, as impetuous as ever, pushed through Wavre, as soon as Zeppelin had cleared the place, and, finding the Wavre battalions in position near La Bavette, the French General attacked them promptly and fiercely, and dislodged them. Mean- while the Prussian Cavalry and 4 batteries formed up parallel to, and to the westward of, the Wavre-Brussels road, and took over the duties of rear-guard. The French horse deployed opposite to the Prussian horsemen, and a village on the left of the French Cavalry was occupied by French Infantry. The Prussian horse fell back, and took up another position to the north of La Bavette and on the opposite side of the Brussels road. The French Cavalry followed their foes, whilst the French Infantry reached the heights of La Bavette. The action was at an end ; it was about 10.30 a.m. The losses had been heavy on both sides, for each side had lost about 2400 men, and Thielemann had abandoned 5 guns. The number of casualties worked out at about 15 190 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO per cent, of the effective strength of Thielemann's Corps, and this bore ample testimony to the stubborn Prussian spirit of resistance, and to the share in the result of the 18th that was due to the III Prussian Corps. It will be remembered that, on June 18, General Borcke, and the 9th Prussian Brigade, had marched in the direction of Mt. S. Jean. This brigade reached S. Lambert during the night. On the morning of June 19, General Borcke learned, by chance, that a French force had crossed the Dyle near Limale. Thereupon he retraced his steps and took up a position in the eastern edge of the S. Lambert woods. Despite the long range, his guns opened on the French Cavalry, as they swept past the big wood, hoping no doubt that the cannonade might retard their pursuit of the III Corps. But the French horsemen were not to be denied in the hour of victory, and General Pajol left only 3 cavalry regiments to observe the Prussian detachment, the remainder of the force carrying through their manoeuvre. Once more the fact was exemplified in this short cam- paign that the greater included the less ; for the tactical reverse sustained by the Allies at Wavre, in pursuance of absolutely sound, nay, brilliant strategy, was absorbed automatically in the great triumph they had achieved at Waterloo on the previous day. Again it was the victor and the victorious force in the side-issue, who were placed in a perilous position. For indeed, on June 19, Grouchy 's position was most unenviable, although for a few moments he was sublimely unconscious of danger. As a matter of fact Thiele- mann had been handled so roughly that the infantry of the III Corps could effect nothing further on June 19, although the Prussian Cavalry were in a better state. However, it was elsewhere that critical danger threatened. The presence of the Prussian detachment (v. Borcke), to- wards S. Lambert, should have caused Marshal Grouchy to suspect that all was not well at Mt. S. Jean. Further, as it happened, the Prussian pursuit on the previous night had attained within measurable distance of the Sambre crossings at Charleroi, and on June 19 Marshal Bliicher was sure to reach the line of the river at this point ; also, Pirch I was already on the march to cut off Grouchy's retreat. Marshal Grouchy's position was indeed precarious. However, unconscious of all this, and master of his battle- ACTION AT WAVRE, JUNE 19 191 field. Grouchy prepared at 10.30 a.m. to take the Brussels road. But, just as he had come to this decision, an officer of the Imperial Staff rode up. The new-comer (Captain Dumonceau) was the very pictured embodiment of despair and disaster ; and it was some time before he could tell a coherent story. By piecing together such details as were understandable, from the midst of his broken and confused ramblings, Grouchy learned at last the purport of the dire news which the Staff Officer sought to deliver. Then there burst upon the Marshal the full significance of the disaster which had befallen the Armee du Nord at Waterloo, and the ruin that had overtaken the Emperor. Much in the same way that the receipt of Napoleon's precise and imperative despatch, on the previous evening, had changed the Marshal's demeanour, and although the zeal which he displayed was misdirected, yet energy had replaced sloth and vacillation from that hour ; so the awful news he had received, improved stiU further the Marshal's manoeuvres, and, in the closing hours of this great campaign, he shone forth like a single star in a cloudy sky.^ The very thing which had clogged the Marshal's initiative on June 18, had disappeared. With the destruction of Napoleon's Army was dissipated the military atmosphere which had enveloped Grouchy for so many years. No longer was Napoleon available to lean on at moments of crisis, and the Marshal realised in a flash that he must think and act for himself. It was useless to await any inspiration from above, the inspiration for the action to be taken must come from within. Consequently Marshal Grouchy called on his own great and varied practical experience of war, and, appreciating the critical nature of the situation, he prepared to take appropriate, prompt, and vigorous measures, for he realised that true prudence lay in energetic resolution, and in that alone. Grouchy recognised that this was no time for grief, or vain regrets. If he wished to save the right wing of the Armee du Nord he must act at once, and act with vigour. The Marshal perceived the serious danger in which he stood, and that Blticher would spare no effort to cut off his line of retreat to France, and thus ensure a catastrophe overtaking the French force. This, however, the Marshal was determined 1 For Marshal Grouohy'e retreat, see Maps 2 and 1. 192 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO to prevent. But, before he acted, he could not resist one last reparation to his pride and dignity. Consequently he drew his Generals around him for a conference, and thus addressed them : — " My honour makes it a matter of duty to explain myself, with regard to the dispositions that I took yester- day. The instructions, which I received from the Emperor, left me free to manoeuvre in no other direction than Wavre. Therefore I was obliged to refuse the advice which General Gerard thought he had a right to offer me. I freely admit General Gerard's talents and brilliant valour, but doubtless you were as surprised as I was, that a General Officer, ignorant of the Emperor's commands, and all the information which influenced the Marshal of France under whose orders he was placed, should have presumed to dictate to the latter his line of action. The advanced hour of the day, the distance from the point where the cannonading was heard, the condition of the roads, made it impossible to arrive in time to take part in the action that was taking place. At any rate, whatever the subsequent events may have been, the Emperor's orders, the import of which I have disclosed to you, did not permit of my acting otherwise than I have done."i Thus Marshal Grouchy attempted to justify his refusal to listen to General Gerard, when the guns were heard thundering away on the previous day. Even admitting that the Emperor did direct the Marshal to move on Wavre, yet his earliest order, in which Wavre was mentioned, was the despatch written at 10 a.m. on June 18, and it did not come into Grouchy's hands until the luckless Marshal had attained Wavre with the head of his column ! Again, Grouchy had not been ordered to keep to the right bank of the Dyle. Therein lay the fatal mistake which was committed after Gerard's intervention. But it is not necessary to labour this point ; it is quite evident that Grouchy was attempting to excuse his line of action, and naturally enough he did not succeed in putting forward one real, serious, logical reason for his utter failure to help his Emperor and the Armee du Nord in their hour of need at Mt. S. Jean. 1 Given by M. Houssaye, Waterloo, 1815, pp. 474-475. Among other authorities whom M. Houssaye cites, as vouching for this remark- able address, is General Baron Hulot, who was present at the con- ference. CHAPTER XVI MARSHAL GROUCHY's RETREAT TO FRANCE, Via NAMUR {See Maps 1 and 2) Marshal Grouchy had informed his Generals previously of the ruin which had overtaken their comrades ; and after finishing his apologetic address the Marshal proceeded to explain his plan of retreat. He realised that Namur was the one free bridge over the Sambre which he had a chance of reaching. Grouchy determined to open a prompt retreat on this place, thus gain the Meuse Valley, and win a way back to France ; for the country needed every armed man that she could raise. However, it was essential to secure Namur and its bridges without further delay, and hold them for the passage of the French right wing.^ With this object in view, the Marshal despatched- General Exelmans with several regiments of Dragoons to seize Namur and its bridges. Pushing through at speed, Exel- mans reached the place at 4 p.m. on June 19. What a different pace to that which he used in his original advance ! This use of cavalry was admirable, for it was extremely sound ; Grouchy correctly looked on his Cavalry as an instrument, placed in his hands to assist him to gain his object. For some reason his powers had been in abeyance, until late on Jime 18, when the Marshal first of all received precise orders ; now that disaster threatened him the real cavalry-spirit triumphed, difficulties and dangers ' It must not be overlooked that Gourgaud stated (p. 112) that the Emperor (before moving on to Charleroi) sent several officers to Marshal Grouchy, and these orderly officers were ordered to acquaint the commander of the right wing with the disastrous result of the Battle of La BeUe Alliance, and order the Marshal to recross the Sambre at Namur, and then move via Charlemont and Laon to rejoin the Armee du Nord. Even if the Emperor did direct the Marshal's attention to Namur, yet this fact does not detract a whit from the ener- getic resolution and wise forethought that Grouchy exhibited when conducting his precarious retreat. II.— o 193 194 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO merely existed to be overcome, and inaction was once more the only dishonourable course to pursue. Also the Marshal very wisely decided to move his force in two columns. Vandamme and the III Corps were ordered to recross the Dyle at Wavre, and then to march to Gembloux, via Tourinnes. The 20th Regiment of Dragoons (Corps of Exelmans) were placed temporarily under Vandamme's orders. (This regiment was to act as Corps Cavalry and to replace Vandamme's Cavalry Division — Domon — which had accompanied the Emperor.) Gerard's Corps and Vallin's Hussars were next moved southward, they recrossed the Dyle at Limale, and then moved direct to Gembloux ; later they were followed by Teste and Pajol — who had taken over the duty of rear- guard, and were to march via Sauvcniere. Even before Marshal Grouchy had opened his retreat on Namur, Pirch I and his Corps (II) had attained Mellery ; and thus were within striking distance of the Marshal's line of withdrawal. However, at Mellery Pirch I came to a stand- still ; his men were weary, and his transport was in a bad state. Had the Prussian General only risen to the occa- sion and pressed on, he must have intercepted the French right wing and either have captured it or destroyed it, acting in conjunction with Thielemann, whose assistance he could have obtained had he requested the latter to follow closely on Grouchy's heels. It was later in the day that Thielemann learned of Grouchy's retreat, but even then he did not feel justified in pressing the Marshal on June 19, for the III Prussian Corps was much weakened by the losses it had suffered in its recent action ; and, as Thiele- mann did not establish contact with Pirch I, the chance of capturing Grouchy gradually disappeared, and, once he had opened his retrograde movement, the Marshal actually slipped through on June 19 without becoming engaged. Conse- quently during the night of June 19-20 the French right wing concentrated around Gembloux, and the most anxious time was over. The only possible conclusion is that the Prussian arrange- ments, to intercept the Marshal, were defective. Surely a better arrangement would have been to have turned the leading corps, v. Billow's, off the Charleroi road at Quatre Bras, as early as possible on June 19. Acting in this way. GROUCHY'S RETREAT 195 von Biilow might have attained Sombreffe at 7 a.m. ; on the rV Prussian Corps reaching that place it would have been a wise precaution to throw forward 2000 horsemen — allowing each cavalry soldier to take up an infantry man behind him on the saddle, or, if sufficient captured wagons were available, to allow the foot soldiers to use them, and let this mobile force move on rapidly to Namur, and seize the river passages at that place. Von Biilow would have moved the rest of the IV Corps to Gembloux, and prepared to bar Grouchy's further progress southward.^ Meanwhile Thiele- mann would have been ordered to co-operate, by clinging to the Marshal's skirts as he drew off. Then Grouchy would have been faced with three alternatives : to fight his force out, until it was annihilated ; to dissolve, and order a general sauve qui peut ; or to surrender unconditionally. All three courses were unpleasant, and the two latter were unsoldierly as well ; in any case from that time the French right wing must have ceased to exist as a serious factor in the game. But the two Prussian Corps Commanders, who were actually engaged in the operations against Grouchy, showed very little dash, vigour, or real initiative in this pursuit. In explanation of their conduct, it is only necessary to recall the fact that the Prussian Corps Commanders (except von Biilow) had all been chosen because they were junior in rank to Gneisenau, and therefore their certain sub- ordination to the Chief of the Prussian Staff could be relied on, should Bliicher be removed through any casualty. Further, both Pirch I and Thielemann appear to have been quite unpractised in the separate and responsible com- mands which they were selected to perform. Hence the reason for the selection of the victor of Dennewitz (1813), the more experienced von Biilow, for the task in question ; and his selection would have facilitated Thiele- mann's co-operation, for the latter was very junior as compared to von Biilow. In matters like this, the wise 1 Accompanied by horse artillery, mounted riflemen to-day would be exactly the arm to carry out this manoeuvre ; and modem weapons and smokeless powder are all in favour of the delaying action of re- taining forces. By intercepting a retiring force, it may be held at bay for a suiScient time to allow the slower moving infantry to cloee and complete its capture. The action of the 5th Company of the 24th Japanese Regiment at Ha-ma-tang, at the close of the action on the River Yalu, May 1, 1904, will illustrate this point sufficiently. 196 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO choice of the subordinate to be entrusted with the task, was all-important. Nevertheless these facts do not detract in the slightest degree from Grouchy's fine per- formance, but they do serve to explain how it was possible for the French Marshal to escape from an apparently hope- less situation. June 20. Even on the night of June 19-20, when Grouchy's force was concentrated at Gembloux, Vandamme caused it to run a needless risk. The General apparently went off to pass the night at a distance from his corps (in Namur ?), and hence he missed the orders that Marshal Grouchy issued for the operations which were to take place on June 20 ;^ consequently the III Corps failed to remain in position astride the Gembloux road until noon, and thus, as the Marshal had intended, cover the withdrawal of the rest of the force into Namur. Instead of retaining position, the Corps, on the initiative of the Divisional Commanders, commenced to move at 7 a.m. towards Namur, whereas Gerard's (IV) Corps only started at 9 a.m. Con- sequently, owing to the movement of the III Corps, the flank of the IV Corps was uncovered ; and, whilst still at some distance from Namur, the IV Corps were attacked by the Prussian horse (under Hobe), accompanied by a horse- battery, whom Thielemann had pushed ahead at 5 a.m. This assault also synchronised with an advance of Pirch's (II) Prussian Corps down the Nivelles-Namur main road. But Marshal Grouchy's instincts as a leader of horse stood him in good stead at this critical juncture, and his demeanour was cool and confident. Placing himself at the head of Vallin's Hussars, he fell on those of Kobe's horsemen who were threatening the Namur road, and drove them back ; this ensured an open line of retreat for the IV Corps. Having secured the essential. Grouchy moved promptly to Van- damme's help, for the III Corps also had been attacked. In the meantime, once the road lay open, the IV Corps, the ' General Vandamme was guilty of an analogous fault on the night of June 14-15, and owing to the march orders for June 15 not reaching him, largely due to his own fault, the march of the Armie du Nord was delayed when advancing against the Allies. GROUCHY'S RETREAT 197 Artillery Park, and the Ambulances, passed on to Namur, covered by one of the divisions, which acted as a rear-guard, disputed every yard of ground with the Prussians, and thus kept their advance at bay for the requisite time. The Prussian advanced troops were not strong enough to grasp and hold the two French Corps, and the latter were able to slip away into Namur. Meanwhile the attack on Vandamme had met with some success, and consequently Grouchy's intervention was most opportune. Vallin's Hussars and Briqueville's Dragoons (of Exelmans' Cavalry Corps) threw themselves on Kobe's Cavalry, and readjusted matters by driving off the Prussian horse, who thereupon reeled back on Pirch's (II) Prussian Corps to rally. Grouchy ordered Vandamme to take up a position covering Namur, and hold the Prussians in check. Meanwhile all the remainder of the French right wing entered Namur and proceeded to pass through the town, where they were warmly received. Vandamme, in his turn, then drew off and followed in the wake of the FV Corps, leaving the Teste Division to hold the city until nightfall, and cover the withdrawal of the rest of the force up the Meuse valley. For the actual defence of the time-worn and broken- down fortifications of Namur, General Teste could muster only some 2000 men and 8 field guns. But the General boldly scattered these troops along the old ramparts, which were in such a cnmabling state that they were far from proof against a determined assault ; and General Teste also posted detachments to hold the three eastern gates of the town. Hardly had he effected his dispositions when Pirch I dashed his corps at the town, being afraid that Grouchy's force was escaping. The Prussians were met by a salvo of grape-shot and by a heavy musketry fire, which forbade a closer advance. Smitten at short range by such a withering fire, the assailants wheeled sharp round on the glacis and drew back, leaving the slope encumbered with their dead and wounded. But Pirch I was not to be denied, and without delay he ordered a second assault. Again this proved a costly failure ; but Teste's ammunition was running low, therefore the French had to reserve their fire untn the Prussians could not be missed ; once more the assailants suffered very heavily, and the assaults having 198 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO cost Pirch I upwards of 1500 men the Prussian General despaired of success and broke off the fight. It was about 8 p.m. General Teste considered that he had performed the duty which Marshal Grouchy had allotted to him ; also the light was failing, and the available ammunition was hardly sufficient to warrant him in risking another attack, therefore he commenced to draw off. But Teste's withdrawal was noticed by the Prussians ; they dashed forward at once, and, bursting into the town, pressed on so as to seize the Sambre bridge. However, General Teste had provided for this danger, for he had placed a party of engineers in some loopholed houses in order to cover the river-passage. The hot fire delivered by these troops checked the Prussian onrush, the rear-guard drew off through the " Gate of France," which had been prepared previously for demolition by fire. When all were clear, the sappers set light to the bundles, the roaring flames spread from the gate to the houses in the vicinity, and by closing the debouchure against the Prussians prevented any further pursuit. In the mean- time, as a result of General Teste's spirited resistance, Marshal Grouchy's main body had reached Dinant, and the crisis was over. On the next day, June 21, the whole of the French right wing crossed the frontier, and under the shelter of the bastions of Givet the Marshal concentrated all the men, horses, and guns that had been committed to his charge. It was entirely due to Marshal Grouchy's foresight, resolution, and rapidity of movement, that the ring wing of the Armee du Nord escaped to France intact, after the disaster which had overtaken the Emperor and the French Army on June 18 ; and Marshal Grouchy's force had been withdrawn most skil- fully from what was a very dangerous situation. The Marshal had risen to the height of the occasion ; he rose superior to all difficulties which he encountered ; he proved in this crisis that he was indeed the commander, and that he would have the operations carried out as he had ordered ; thus, at last, when it was too late, he put on record a per- formance, which at any other time must have added to his reputation and gained him great honour. When, on June 19, the outlook appeared most desperate, Grouchy did not abandon himself to despair, but he behaved GROUCHY'S RETREAT 199 in a most soldierly way ; without any delay he commenced an operation which promised only the slightest chance of success, but which at the time was the only one possible ; what he did was absolutely necessary, if he was to have a chance of sa'vdng his force from capture or annihilation, and therefore it cannot be condemned as unduly hazardous, or reckless. At such a crisis true prudence lay in energetic resolution, and above all in audacity. The onlj^ utterly wrong covuses for Marshal Grouchy to have taken at such a moment, were to have done nothing, or to have taken counsel instead of taking action, and to have wasted the precious hours while he sought for the best solution of the difficult problem. As it was the Marshal acted quite correctly ; he realised that in war the best is always the enemy of the good, and, by his prompt decision and resolute action, he showed that he knew it was necessary to do something at once, and to do it with real energy and resolution. Hence he was successful. But the decisive battle had settled all, and Grouchy's operations could not set aside the result which had been gained on the red slopes of Mt. S. Jean, or wring better terms for France from the all-conquering hosts of the Seventh Coalition. Hence, although full of instruction, the Marshal's operations, from June 19-21, have not received the attention and the praise that is their due ;^ they are overshadowed naturally by the %'ictory gained at La Belle Alliance. ' For Marshal Grouchy's retreat after Namur see Map 1. Marshal Grouchy's own report of his operations is given in Appendix II, No. 42. CHAPTER XVII THE ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES ON PAEIS {See Map 1) Once Grouchy had escaped through Namur, Thielemann and Pirch I gave up their chase of the French right wing. Pirch I moved from Namur to Thuin (June 21), and the II Corps was employed in the reduction of the French frontier fortresses. On the other hand, Thielemann with the III Corps moved through Charleroi (June 21), and Beaumont (June 22), and, following Blucher to Paris, the III Corps reached S. Germain on July 1. But it is time to return to the Emperor, who was left at Philippeville at 9 a.m. on June 19 ; here Napoleon had halted to write the bulletin of Ligny and Waterloo for the Moni- teur, 1 and he also wrote to Joseph. ^ His letter is worth close study, it showed that Napoleon was true to his proudest tradi- tions, even in the dark hour of disaster, for he had cast aside all fear of what ultimate defeat might mean, and he proved that he was as indomitable as of yore, when he determined to follow the great example set by Rome after the Battle of Cannae, rather than that exhibited by Carthage after the Battle of Zama. In every line this letter revealed the inflexible personality of its author. Even after such an over- whelming defeat his mind was undimmed, it remained keen and tranquil, and thus, with the enemy at his gates, he was able to think clearly how the foe could be met, where the necessary troops must come from, how they should be raised, and his artillery horsed. Further, he evolved a workable plan for holding back the rising tide of invasion that was threatening to submerge all northern France, and he arranged to gain time for the necessary defensive measures to be taken ; he appreciated the Austrian advance and its danger at its correct worth ; and above all he ended on a high note, > Appendix II, No. 44. « Ibid., II, No. 35. 200 ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES 201 that the common duty of all Frenchmen was to rally aroimd the Emperor, and thus serve France in her darkest hour, and at all hazards to show real courage and iron resolution. The Emperor determined that Grouchy should retire forthwith to Laon, where Soult would collect the debris of the Armee du Nord ; that Rapp's Corps, together with the French troops around Belfort and in La Vendee, should make forced marches to Paris, whilst the resistance offered by the frontier fortresses would gain the time necessary for this concentration. Thus, even in this tre- mendous hour, did L'Empereur des Batailles prove that his proud spirit was unbeaten and unafraid, that he never contemplated abandoning the struggle, but he desired to repeat the real defensive strategy of 1814 ; and, by pro- longing the war, he considered that he might wear out the Allies, or be able to make favourable opportunities for dealing with them in detail, and then, promptly, make the most of those opportunities. Once more at this crisis Napoleon's character exhibited the inexhaustible reserve fund of fortitude and valour which the Emperor possessed, and, at such a perilous time, his exhortation, " surtout du Courage et de la Fermete," did infinite honour to him. But the Emperor realised fully that events demanded his immediate presence in Paris. There alone could he keep Fouche and the traitors in check, and give France the time to organise her last means of resistance. He realised, too, that Marshal Soult could superintend the purely mechanical duty of rallying the Armee du Nord ; and, at this crisis, both strategy and policy emphasised that Paris was the one place where Napoleon's personality and knowledge could be employed to the best advantage for the general weal of France. The Emperor remembered what had befallen him in 1814, and no doubt he wished to profit from his previous bitter experience. In the previous year he had played the game of desperate defence right out to the inevit- able end ; and, despite the shipwreck of his Empire, when all went to ruin and foimdered around him, he had been worthy of himself and of his proudest traditions. He never deserted the Ship of State ; but. Great Captain as he was, he remained on her to the last, until, indeed, she went down imder his feet. 202 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO In those historic days his indomitable fortitude in the face of ruin had inspired others ; then, as in the days of his great triumphs, his will had dominated all others ; and, even when driven to bay and cornered as he was, it is at least questionable whether he ever appeared more admirable than when first he succumbed to Europe in arms. So in 1815 he did not acknowledge defeat as yet ; other armies could be raised, other material could be provided. To do so would require heroic efforts, and he alone could achieve the impossible. The Emperor did not despair, and his gallant soul disdained to be filled with the dread of ultimate defeat ; rather Napoleon was inspired by the hope of final victory in this great campaign. At any rate he had to hasten to Paris to restore confidence, and to ensure that not a moment of time was wasted ; but he was destined to be cruelly de- ceived. However, ignorant of the blow which Fate had in store for him, the Emperor left his Major-General at Philippe- ville to superintend the reorganisation of the debris of the army. The mustering points of what had been the Armee du Nord were to be as follows : — The I, II, and VI Corps were to collect at Laon ; The cavalry were to gather at Marie, S. Quentin, Rethel, Vervins, and Rheims ; whilst the artillery would reform at La Fere (insensibly connected with the name of Napoleon) ; and the Imperial Guard would mass at Soissons. Of all the Corps Commanders, Reille alone arrived and reported himself whilst Napoleon was at Philippeville, and the General was ordered to organise all the troops who reached that fortress. At this moment all the organised means of resistance, immediately at Napoleon's disposal, were some 10,000 men at Philippeville and Avesnes. The Armee du Nord had disappeared ; it was still scattered in roving bands over the countryside. To anticipate a little. General Foy, who had been wounded in the battle, arrived at Marchienne at 4 a.m. on June 19, but he only reached Avesnes on June 20 ; here he found both General Reille and Prince Jerome. General Foy managed to collect 1800 men of his division, and the General then started them from Avesnes for Laon — the selected rallying point for the II Corps. But unfortunately General Foy's wound prevented him from accompanying the wreck of his division. The spirit of loyalty and of devotion that filled ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES 203 the wounded General at this crisis, proved clearly enough that the fighting power of the French Army was far from being extinguished ; if time were only given to Napoleon, he would recover. But the Allies also reahsed that time was the essence of the whole matter, and they determined to press their beaten foe immediately and relentlessly. Meanwhile Napoleon set off for Paris, travelling via IMarienburg, Rocroi, Mezieres, and Laon ; this roundabout route was taken so as to ensure that his journey should not be interfered with ; finally the Emperor reached his capital on June 21 completely worn out in mind and body. He had been absent just ten days. Probably the most famous ten days in the whole history of the World. It was soon made clear to him that he had to face hostility that was far nearer home than the enemy in the field, for the Chambers were openly opposed to him ; to prevent their dissolution by the Emperor, they declared themselves in permanent session, a decision which Fouche had probably inspired ; and on June 22, Napoleon learned that he had been granted a choice between deposition and resignation. He gave up the unequal struggle and yielded to the pressure ; on the same day he signed his abdication,^ resigning in favour of his son (the King of Rome), who was to reign under the title of Napoleon II. ^ Napoleon's reign was at an end, and therefore Byron was justified when he wrote the lines : — " 'Tis done — but yesterday a King ! And armed with Kings to strive — And now thou art a nameless thing." ^ Yet assuredly it is true no longer. Napoleon has come into his own again ; for over one hundred years he has reigned, enshrined in the minds of the thoughtful soldiers ^ Napoleon's farewell address to his soldiers (June 25) is given in Appendix 11, No. 36. ' Both Camot and Sieyes appear to have been of opinion that Napoleon ought to have been given a free hand at this crisis. It was no time to babble of liberty ; and plotting and conspiracy mxist weaken France's resisting power. But Sifeyes and Camot were in the minority ; and although the people wanted Napoleon, for they believed only in him, yet he declined to take part in a civil war, and he would not stoop to head a faction. The end had come at last. ^ Byron's Ode to Napoleon. 204 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO of all nations, growing in power with every day that passed. No small heritage. Three days later (June 25) Napoleon betook himself to Malmaison. But, surely, he had overlooked a very necessary precau- tion. Inasmuch as Marshal Davout had been left in Paris, the Emperor might have entrusted wide discretionary powers to this capable and loyal Marshal, in order to have enabled him to take the necessary timely steps to avert a crisis. Could not a sealed despatch have been entrusted to his keeping, only to be opened in the event of a French disaster ? For Napoleon had realised the enormous odds that were against the Armee du Nord before he launched it into Belgium ; and it would have been prudent to make arrangements so as to meet adverse fortune. The despatch might have con- tained a signed declaration immediately dissolving the Chambers, and declaring Napoleon once more absolute ; and Fouche's death-warrant should have been enclosed. Thus nothing would have been left to chance ; and the Emperor would have been given one last opportunity to retrieve his falling fortunes, by collecting another army, and with it defeating in detail the over-confident Allies as they closed in on Paris from the north. If this could have been effected in time then he might have been able to turn eastward and show front to the invaders, who were surging up against and threatening to pour across France's long eastern frontier. Of course, time was the essence of the problem. Whilst the Chambers, assisted by Fouche, turned against Napo- leon, the foe was closing in, and the Anglo-Dutch Army and Bliicher's Prussians pushed forward at all speed, heading for Paris. Bliicher's Army advanced past Charleroi (19th), Avesnes (22nd), Guise (24th), S. Quentin (25th), Compiegne (27th), S. Denis (29th), S. Germain (July 1st), and eventually reached Versailles (July 3rd). In his advance Bliicher established contact with part of the French force under Marshal Grouchy, but nothing of note was achieved, although more than one affair occurred. Less full of ardour and less impetuous than Bliicher, Wellington advanced more slowly. British troops, who fight with such heroic stubbornness in battle, are not pre-eminent in pursuit. Thus ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES 205 it had been in the Peninsula, and so it was in 1815. Conse- quently the Duke's Army spent the 19th at Nivelles, re- cuperating and refitting after the great battle. The Duke then followed the Prussian Marshal to Paris, moving via Maubeuge (20th), Cateau Cambresis (22nd), Cambray (25th), Peronne (26th), ^ Louvres (30th), and attained S. Denis on July 1st — all through the advance the Anglo-Dutch Army had marched to the west of the Prussian Army. It will be noticed that Wellington was somewhat in rear of the Prussian Marshal throughout ; but, under the quite ex- ceptional circumstances, it may be conceded that he was within good supporting distance. In the meantime Marshal Soult had employed himself energetically in rallying the wrecks of the Armee du Nord at Laon, and on June 25 he marched to Soissons with such troops as he had under his hand, so as to effect a junction with Marshal Grouchy's Force, which was coming up from Givet (21st), and mo^dng via Rethel (24th), and the valley of the Aisne to Soissons, which place Grouchy attained on June 26.2 At Laon the Provisional Government's instructions were received ; by them Marshal Grouchy was ordered to take command of the whole army, and Marshal Soult, realising that he was superseded in the command, quitted the army in disgust and repaired to Paris. Grouchy then led his troops, possibly numbering some 60,000, to Paris via Villers Coterets (27th), Nanteuil (28th), and he marched into the capital on June 29, via Meaux and Lagny. On this same day (29th) the heads of Bliicher's advancing columns were sighted on the heights to the northward of the city, and although Wellington's Army was not visible, yet the risk which the two Allies ran was slight, for the remaining armies of the Seventh Coalition were fast coming up, and a set-back at this period could mean no more than a slight ' " P6ronne is situated in a marshy plain on the banks of the Somme, and is a place of considerable strength. Had it been furnished with the necessary means of defence, the Allied Army would have had some difficulty in taking the place ; but . . . there were [on June 26] only a few gims mounted on the ramparts, and a very small garrison to defend them." Letters of a British Officer, pp. 284-285. Letter dated July 20. ' Marshal Grouchy's troops used two roads from Bethel ; Vandamme's III Corps moved to Soissons via Rheims (25th), and rejoined the main body at Soissons. 206 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO delay ; a reverse might retard, but it could not avert final disaster from overwhelming France. Early on June 29 Bliicher detached a flying column to seize the Seine passage at Chatou, and ordered it to capture Napoleon dead or alive. However, Davout promptly parried one of the dangers, for he caused the Seine bridges, which were nearest to Malmaison, either to be barricaded or destroyed ; the other danger was averted by Fouche, for, on the previous night, he had sent Napoleon directions to set out at once for Rochefort. But Fouche's advice found Napoleon undismayed, and he sent back General Becker to lay before the Provisional Government a scheme, drafted by the ex-Emperor, for massing the available French forces ; then Napoleon, acting as General Buonaparte, would place himself at their head, and proceed to surprise and beat Bliicher and Wellington in detail ; for, as Napoleon pointed out, the Allies were two days' march apart. Once Welling- ton and Bliicher were overthrown then Napoleon would continue his journey to Rochefort. The Commission negatived the proposal, and there is much to say for their decision. Even if a temporary success was achieved, might not the bloodshed under the circum- stances have been useless ? The other armies of the Seventh Coalition were closing in, and would have readjusted affairs owing to their overwhelming numerical superiority. Also, before reaching Paris, the Allies closed up, and it is a matter of speculation whether even Napoleon could have managed to fight them separately. Under the circumstances, the risks that Wellington and Bliicher ran were probably justifiable, considering that the Allies were carrying out the strategical pursuit of a shattered army, that they disposed of about 120,000 men flushed with success, and the French could only put into the field some 80,000 men. Already Schweidnitz, Schwarzenberg, and Bianchi were submerging France with an ever-increasing flood of invasion, and fastening securely over the whole country. Schweidnitz attained Laon and Rheims on July 7 ; Schwar- zenberg's Austrians entered Melun (July 13), and Tonnerre and Montbard on July 21 ; Bianchi, having crossed the Simplon Pass, had reached Geneva and Magon by July 11, and was spreading northwards to Besangon. A column ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES 207 commanded by Frimont crossed the Simplon on July 1, another imder Bubna crossed the Mt. Cenis ; both headed for Lyon, and the city was reached by the end of Jxily. Also at the end of July, Barclay de Tolly and his Russians reached the line of the Rhine. It was during these operations that Marshal Bugeaud, the Duke of Isly (then Colonel Bugeaud, commanding the 14th Regiment of the Line), fought his historic action at Conflans and I'Hopital on the Ai-ly River. This brilliant action was fought on June 28 — the very day on which the news of the disaster at Waterloo came to hand. Colonel Bugeaud fought the action for France, as he had heard that Napoleon was no longer the Sovereign. On this day General Trenck advanced with some 10,000 Austrians over the Little S. Bernard and attacked Colonel Bugeaud, who could dispose only of some 1800 men. The affair went all in favour of the French, and they beat off the Austrian attacks, killing or wounding 1500, and making 500 prisoners — a most remark- able and glorious feat of arms. {Historiques des Corps de Troupes de I'Armee FrariQaise, pp. 30, 31 ; and Marshal Bugeaud's Memoirs — ^English translation — Vol. I, pp. 94- 101.) Despite the wide area covered by the advancing armies of the Seventh Coalition, the risk they ran was infinitesimal ; for hope had died out in the hardiest French breast. With Napoleon as a Dictator and every Frenchman rallying to his eagles, there might have been a chance to turn the tide of war. As it was France was faced with another hostile entry into her capital, and the retiurn of the Bourbons to power. There were some sharp engagements between Marshal Suchet and the Austrian columns who headed for Lyon ; but, before any decisive result was achieved, the cessa- tion of hostilities in the north settled the result in the secondary theatres. Napoleon's scheme was but another proof of his indomitable temper, fearless acceptance of responsibility, and unquenchable pride. On hearing of the Commission's refusal to entertain his request Napoleon was much vexed. However, as nothing further could be done, and not wishing to be captured by Bliicher's Prussians, the fallen Emperor set out at 6 p.m., on June 29, for Rochefort, accompanied by the Grand-Marshal Bertrand, and Generals Savary, 208 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Gourgaud, and Becker. Thus Blticher's horsemen found their bird had flown when they reached Malmaison a few hours later ; and fortunately the Marshal was disappointed of his prey.^ ^ For Bliicher's determination aa to the fate which should be meted out to Napoleon, see the letters given in Appendix II, Nos. 37, 38, 39, and 40. CHAPTER XVIII THE CONCLUSION OF THE HUNDRED DAYS Paris, menaced by Blticher and Wellington, had to choose between standing the rigours of a siege, for which the capital was but ill-prepared, or of capitulating immediately to the Allies. On July 3, it was decided to make terms ; this result was explainable, partly because the capital was more or less untenable, and also because the army within its walls was too disorganised to make any further, let alone a sus- tained resistance, hence the wise decision was come to that no useful end could be attained by prolonging the agony. Marshal Davout was won over at last to the side of peace, and the capitulation was arranged. Once more the Marshal Prince of Eckmiihl showed that he was honest and loyal to his Master and to France, and he was also a soldier to the backbone ; for he had declared that he was ready and prepared to engage the oncoming Anglo-Dutch and Prussian masses, and moreover he anticipated a success. The intrepid Marshal pledged himself to conquer, if only he were not killed within the first two hours. Such determination was worthy of the victor of Auerstadt and the defender of Hamburg. But resistance was becoming daily more useless ; a French victory could not have been decisive nor have turned the tide of war ; for at this stage of the game of what avail would it have been to have beaten back Wellington and Bliicher ? In a few more days 200,000 fresh foes would have appeared to rescue and rally the Prussians and the Anglo-Dutch ; and pursuit of the beaten Allies would have been impossible under the circum- stances, hence they could have evaded making the full payment for a defeat. Further, with no Napoleon to lead the French Army, a battle would have decided nothing. But, even in a hopeless cause, the desire to fight reflected the greatest credit on Davout's unflinching and indomitable II.— p 209 210 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO soldier-spirit, and although it was a generous and unselfish resolution, yet it might have had the direst results. Conse- quently the plan was negatived in a council of war, to which it had been referred ; and, the Marshal having been won over to consent to a capitulation, the capital of France fell. The Convention was signed on July 3 ; and the French Army agreed to evacuate Paris and to take up a position behind the River Loire. On July 4 the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Bliicher having approved the Convention, Marshal Davout thereupon led the French Army out of Paris towards the Loire, and the Allies promptly took possession of the suburbs. On July 7 a further humiliation befell the Parisians, for the Allies made their triumphal entry into the French capital, and, on the following day (8th), Louis XVIII returned to the Tuileries, for the Allies had decided to restore the Bourbon dynasty. But as this history commenced with Napoleon, so it shall conclude by recounting his fate ; it is right to do so, for his was indeed the central figure of the drama, around him it all revolved, for him men fought, and for him they laid down their lives. The end was near at hand ; for Napoleon, on reaching Rochefort, determined to escape to the New World, and settle down in the United States. Therefore, on July 8, he embarked on the French frigate La Saale, and, accompanied by another frigate, La Meduse, the two ships proceeded to the roads of Aix, to await there a favourable wind so as to set sail for America.^ On July 10 a favourable wind sprang up, but proof was experienced of the tightness of the cordon which the British ships had drawn round the French coast, for a British Fleet of eleven ships hove in sight and their vigilance could not be eluded. After waiting three days, the ex-Emperor opened up communication with Captain Mait- land, commanding H.M.S. Bellerophon of the blockading squadron, and Napoleon was informed that he would not be permitted to escape to America. By July 13, Napoleon realised that it was hopeless to think of flight by sea, and it did not become his dignity to ' The plan apparently was that, in event of attack, the M^use should sacrifice herself in the interests of the Saak — which latter ship bore Napoleon and his fortunes. CONCLUSION OF HUNDRED DAYS 211 be captured in disguise whilst attempting an impossible task ; thus, on July 13, Napoleon arranged to surrender to Captain Maitland, of the Bellerophon, and on July 14 the ex-Emperor sent a personal letter to the Prince Regent of Great Britain informing him of his intention, and claiming protection and hospitality from " the most powerful, the most unwavering, and the most generous of his enemies."^ On the very next day (15th) Napoleon went on board the Bellerophon and formally surrendered, or rather entrusted his person, to the British nation. Of the way in which the British nation performed its trust it is unnecessary to say much, for it has nothing whatever to do with the strategical or tactical lessons of this campaign. The decision about the place of Napoleon's exile was doubtless arrived at after serious consideration by the responsible statesmen, and probably their choice was correct. But his treatment in that captivity reflected no credit on our nation, and it is a transaction that we are glad to be spared the necessity for examining and criticising. Indeed, the whole unhappy episode is well-described in Burke's words : " Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom ; and a Great Empire and little minds go ill together." ^ However, on making his formal surrender. Napoleon was first of all brought to this country, for the ship-of-war at once sailed with him for England ;^ the Hundred Days were 1 In Facsimiles of the Signatures of the Emperor Napoleon I (London, 1875), p. 10, a copy is given of the signature appended to this letter ; interesting beoaxise it is far more easily legible than most of the later ones given in that collection. This letter was dated July 13 ; it was forwarded with General Gourgaud, who was charged to present it personally ; the General was sent on in H.M.S. Slaney, but he was not allowed to land in England, and thus the original of this letter was forwarded only on July 27 by Admiral Lord Keith, commanding at Plymouth. " Speech on concihation with America. ' At the time of the actual surrender, the Bellerophon lay in the Basque Roads to the west of the Isle d'Aix, midway between La Rochelle and the Isle d'Oleron. The ex-Emperor came on board in the BellerophorC s barge (from the French brig of war, V Epervier) at about 6 a.m. on Saturday, July 15. Napoleon was dressed in the familiar green uniform of the Chasseurs of his Guard. His suite numbered 50. Under the orders of Sir H. Hotham, commanding the squadron blockading the western coast. Captain Maitland with the Bellerophon, accompanied by the Myrmidon, sailed for Torbay during the afternoon of July 16. The ships sighted England on Sunday, July 23, and anchored in Torbay on the next day. On August 7, Napoleon, and his reduced suite of 26, were trans- ferred in Start Bay to H.M.S. Northumberland (Rear-Admiral Sir 212 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO at an end, and had become a matter of history ; and he, the central figure, of this great drama, ..." Who owned the name which vibrated Through silence, — trusting to his noblest foes, When earth was aU too grey for chivalry. Died of their mercies 'mid the desert sea." ^ Far happier would have been Napoleon's lot had he, like the great Swedish king, died sword in hand, with a command on his Ups, and victory in his imagination. That Napoleon was not permitted to have his wish, and settle in England, was perhaps one of the finest tributes we could pay to his greatness and to his personality. The place selected for his incarceration showed the real impor- tance which England, and Europe, attached to his being rendered incapable of stirring up further trouble. But that Napoleon bitterly resented this high-handed treatment of his person, any one could readily understand who has studied him and knew his personality, ^ and the bitterness was increased by knowing that escape from his island gaol would be wellnigh impracticable ; that never more would he be a world power, making and unmaking states, altering the map of Europe, and shaking the tottering thrones of effete sovereigns with the steady onward tramp of his legions. Yet it had to be, though his work had only begim, both politically and strategically. Had Napoleon been left on his throne, it is quite possible that he would be acclaimed as a benefactor of mankind. As it was he was never given the chance of George Cockbum) for the passage to S. Helena, and she sailed that day. The Hne was crossed on Saturday, September 23, and S. Helena being sighted on October 14, the Northumberland anchored ofi James- town about noon on Sunday, October 15. Napoleon landed on the Prison-Island about 7.30 p.m. on October 17. (Captain Maitland's Narrative, and Itineraire General, by Schuermans.) ^ Mrs. E. B. Browning, in Crowned and Buried. ' His protest is given in the Correspondance, No. 22,067. However, his protest against the refusal to recognise his right to the title of Emperor, whilst in exile, is worth recording here ; it ran : " They may call me what they like ; they cannot prevent me from being myself." Also, on July 31, the date on which the official decision to send the ex-Emperor to S. Helena, as well as the decision that in future he should be styled " General," were conamunicated to him, he pro- tested privately to Captain Maitland against the latter insult, " They can have no right to call me General ! They might as well call me Archbishop, for I was head of the Church as well as of the Army." Further, as the ex-Emperor pointed out, we had acknowledged him officially as First Consul. (Captain IMaitland's Narrative.) CONCLUSION OF HUNDRED DAYS 213 reaping the harvest which he had sown so Hberally in Europe. Just as ploughing and sowing must precede a harvest in the fields, so they must also in the world of policy and strategy. It was the mighty plough of the Grand Army, directed by the Emperor's master-hand, which had seared obsolete Europe with long red furrows, and prepared it for the sowing. Only a part of the latter task was accomplished when Napoleon fell. But the harvest that was garnered from his efforts, showed what he would have accomplished, had he been allowed to complete his work ; the greatest man of modern times was prevented from accomplishing his mission. It is in this light that Napo- leon should be regarded. It should not be considered, as is too often the case, that he was the victim of greed and ambition. To look at him in this way is to show a lack of knowledge of human nature ; for ambition is the fault of youth, and by 1815 Napoleon had outgrown the feeling. It is necessary therefore to make an attempt to appreciate Napoleon and his work, and not give utterance to puerile criticism, or to mere futile detraction. For, in both these latter cases, the defamers employ themselves in the profit- less task of champing their teeth upon a granite block. "^ Assuredly Napoleon had not been a mere titanic imbecile ; nor can his treatment of Europe be compared to the devastation which is caused by a mighty hurricane ; nor was he merely a mighty but maleficent scourge, who destroyed all that stood in his reckless, ruthless path and spread ruin broadcast over a continent. ^ ' That Napoleon's character was a noble one is proved by his treatment of his friends, and those who had befriended him at any period of his hfe. He never showed to better advantage than in the forbearaxice and kindness which he exhibited, under most discouraging and irritating surroundings, to those who shared his weary exile — in some cases unworthy recipients of favours. ^ General Foy, who knew him well, said, " Napoleon was not wicked by nature ; he always showed himself full of leniency for his people ; even his enemies he could not hate long or vehemently " ; and Napoleon himself once remarked with true insight, " Great men are never cruel without necessity." Meissonier's (1815 ?-1891) impression of Napoleon is also very valuable, for the great artist had made a close study of the Emperor's character, and he never believed that Napoleon was vainglorious ; as he remarked so truly, things look difierently to those on top of Mt. Blanc and to those below ; probably his accusers would have been giddier at such a height than he wtis. When dealing with such a man, it is necessary not to confound greatness with vanity. " Every- thing in the genius, must be measured by genius." 214 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO How different the reality, for Napoleon prepared Europe for the rich harvest that was to come ; he had acted there- fore like a ploughshare, he had broken the ground every- where and made it ready to receive the seeds of liberty and modern policy. Many European powers date their charters from the days of the Great Emperor ; and not only France, but all Europe, still bears, and will bear, the impress of his work. But to soldiers he is something far more ; we revere Napoleon Buonaparte for being both the founder and the master of the art of strategy. It was Napoleon who freed the military art from the cult of the bloodless decision, and for ever banished the profitless pursuit of some mere geographical point ; he achieved these great ends by teaching us, by precept and by practice, that the enemy's main army is the one and only objective in war ; that the decisive pitched battle must be forced on at the eariiest opportunity ; and that battle must be more than a mere defeat for the enemy, it must be delivered so that defeat shall spell disaster for him. These, among other things, we soldiers owe to Napoleon. Further, Napoleon's teaching has left us a sure touch- stone, by its application to warfare, at any time, we shall be enabled infallibly to detect the true gold, and sift it from, and purge it of the dross. Thus we are enabled to draw the true lessons from any war, and are prevented from being led astray by fallacious reasoning. Soldiers, too, realise and appreciate, as no one else can do, that Napoleon was as daring as he was astute, clear- headed, and discerning. Once Napoleon had made the dispositions, which he considered suitable, and provided for contingent mishaps, that might possibly occur during the execution of his manoeuvres, then he would step boldly forward through the darkness of uncertainty, possessed by that true confidence, which sprang from the feeling that the arrangements made would meet all expectations ; and filled with that true courage to which nothing seemed impossible. Napoleon was as brilliant in combination, as he was vigorous, decided, and forceful in action. The great Emperor's genius was well described in some lines that deserve to be recalled. They run as follows : — CONCLUSION OF HUNDRED DAYS 215 "... With a glance, Fierce as the eagle's, when his piercing eye Gleams through the darkening air, he looked beyond Them all. . . ." i But the eagle, caged at last, must be left to pass the remainder of his brief span of life on that sea-girt isle, set in the heart of a great ocean, and watched over by his most implacable enemy— England, the proud mistress of the seas ; ^ until, some six years later, the day came when he died in the very arms of victory, ^ and, in the midst of a great storm, his proud and wearied warrior-spirit was un- chained, as the evening gun of S. Helena boomed suUenly over the grey wastes of the Atlantic, and, taking its flight,* his spirit sped into the Great Unknown ; whilst the minute guns of Heaven itself were thundering out the last salute to him, who is indeed "the God of Modern War."' For some years all that was mortal of the Greatest of the Great Captains lay at rest, in that ' ' lone grave, The proudest sea-mark that o'ertops the wave ; " ° 1 Lines published by Robert Montgomery. * On July 16, 1815, Napoleon stated to Captain Maitland that, " If it had not been for you English, I should have been Emperor of the East ; but wherever there is water to float a ship we are sure to find you in our way." ' Napoleon's last words appear to have been, " France — armie — tSte d'armie — Josephine " ; whilst Marchand stated that the Emperor called for " Desaix " (killed 1800) ; " Lannes " (killed 1809) ; and " Duroc " (killed 1813) ; he stated also that, " I heard liiTri order up the artillery, and then he cried, ' Deploy the eagles ! Forward ! ' " * Napoleon died at about 6 p.m., on May 5, 1821. According to the post-mortem examination, held on May 6, at which 8 medical men and 9 others were present, the principal cause of death was found to be cancer of the stomach. Napoleon's father. Carlo Buonaparte (or Charles de Buonaparte) had died at the age of 38 (in 1785) apparently from the same disease. However, his mother (nie Laetitia Ramohno) Uved to 86 ; and it was probably from her that Napoleon inherited his great physical powers of endurance. Dr. Chaplin (Illness and Death of Napoleon Buonaparte) considers that the cancer, from which Napoleon died, developed in the last twelve months of his hfe from a chronic ulcer of the stomach. s Clausewitz. * Byron. Napoleon was buried on May 8, 1821, at a spot which he had chosen, in case the authorities forbade the return of his body to France. The valley, in which Napoleon was laid to rest, was then called the Punch Bowl, and now apparently goes by the name of the Geranium Valley. The remains, however, were disinterred on October 15, 1840, and they were at last returned to France, to the accompaniment of every honour which rightfully belonged to the great Emperor of the French, and 216 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO whilst down the ages shall ring for evermore, the name of him who has gained Fame's Eternal Splendour — -Napoleon ! made his last passage one great triumph, befitting Earth's Greatest War-Captain, whilst over all there hung the speU of his deathless past. In some measure England had vindicated herself by her tardy restora- tion of all that was mortal of her great prisoner. On December 6, 1840, the Emperor's body was finally interred beneath the great dome of the Invalides, and there Napoleon was left to rest for ever, according to the desire expressed in his will, " On the banks of the Seine, and amidst the French people whom I have loved so well." Napoleon was once more supreme ; and since that time he has been " the ornament of history, and the star of civilised nations." BRITISH AND K.G.L. TROOPS, 1815 217 In conclusion there are three points which are worthy of special attention in this campaign of 1815. Note I. — The Fighting Qualities of the British and King's German Legion Troops in 1815. Naturally an English writer on this eventful campaign is chary of saying much in praise of our countrymen, for it will be urged that he is not impartial ; and the same remark applies to those gallant troops who were in our pay — ^the King's German Legion. On the other hand it would be impossible to close, what professes to be a critical study of 1815, without some mention of what proved to be one of the main factors which broke down Napoleon's plan, and finally shattered his power. Although Napoleon's Army was far from being a perfect instrument of war and the staff was admittedly imperfect, yet Napoleon was in command, and his opening manoeuvres showed that he was a real artist in warfare, and the strategic con- centration that he achieved was superb, for he managed to push, into the space between the two Allies, the Armee du Nord, organised in its correct formation of two wings and a reserve ; then nothing mattered, except that one of those AUies should offer an immediate battle — which Blticher did. Once started, the whole machinery on Napoleon's side would work itself, all small errors cancelling one another. But Napoleon had neglected to take sufficient account of three very important factors — Blticher's steadfast loyalty, Wellington's unshaken firmness, and the stubborn British Troops. (In this expression the K.G.L. are assumed to be included — it is impossible to differentiate between them and our soldiers.) This oversight ruined the Emperor. But for these three factors, on the side of the Allies, Napoleon was bound to have won ; and one would have been useless without the other. ^ Errors, of course, arose in the execution of Napoleon's plan of campaign — for errors and mistakes are inevitable in war, ' A warm tribute has already been paid to the work done by all our Allies, and to the Iron Duke's invincible fortitude, in 1815. All bore a share ; but the main factors on the Allied side were nevertheless the three just mentioned, and. so far. suiScient notice has not yet been taien of the third. 218 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO where a leader has to plan in the dim twilight of uncertainty and is always enshrouded by the fog of war, whilst he is never surrounded by the broad daylight of actual certainty. It is this fact which led Turenne to remark, " The general who has never made a mistake has not waged war for long." Naturally it is not suggested that mistakes should be made deliberately (unless they are designed to trap a foe), for such an idea is mere folly ; but it must be realised clearly that success inclines to that general who makes the fewest mis- takes. No one knew better than the Emperor that a certain percentage of error in war was (and is) unavoidable ; and that it was (and is) useless to reckon on a quite unattainable precision when handling such an army as the Armee du Nord — even gallant and devoted as it was — or, for that matter, when handling any other army. Always excepting Ney's vital mistake with the left wing on June 17, and Grouchy's mishandling of the right wing up to noon on June 18, all the other mistakes in the campaign were merely unfortunate accidents, and nothing more ; except Napoleon's under-estimation of Bliicher's loyalty, his miscalculation of Wellington's iron resolution and the steadfast, fighting qualities of Wellington's best troops. The first two causes of the French defeat have been dealt with at some length. The three last-named were also vital mistakes ; but, for the reasons already given, it is only necessary now to discuss the third. The dangers that the advance in two wings and a reserve ran, were twofold ; namely, defeat in detail, or a failure to overcome the immediate foe, within the time which was actually available for the decisive stroke. With refer- ence to the first, the risk was only serious when the army advancing in two wings and a reserve was opposed by such veterans as are too rarely seen on the battle-field. Men who, like Frederick the Great's soldiers, our men at Fontenoy, and Wolfe's Army at Quebec, were so well in hand, that they could reserve their fire until within decisive range, and then pour in one tremendous deadly volley that would shatter to pieces their opponents. To achieve such a result, troops require the precision that discipline and fire-discipline alone can give ; and it can only be acquired after long, stern, continuous practice. The Armee du Nord ran no risk of failure from this cause in 1815. Bliicher's Prussians could not be compared to the veterans of the BRITISH AND K.G.L. TROOPS, 1815 219 Great King, as Ligny proved conclusively ; and Wellington's miscellaneous Army was not sufficiently war-worn and homogeneous to repeat the triumph of Salamanca, where " 40,000 men were beaten in 40 minutes." Therefore from this risk Napoleon had naturally nothing to fear in 1815, as he knew full well ; and the campaign proved the truth of this deduction. It was only some lightning overthrow, like Quebec, Rossbach, or Salamanca, which could have upset his calculations, by annihilating one of the covering masses before the Reserve could be swung in by the Emperor to obtain the decision ; and neither of his opponents, in 1815, were capable of dealing the French Army such a rapid death-thrust. But the other factor — the grim determination, the power of endurance, the firm, unyielding discipline of the British, and the undaunted courage of their Chief — might have given Napoleon pause for thought. As naturally it is un- becoming to sing the praises of our own men, eye-witnesses of their performances in the Wars of the First Empire shall be called ; and first of all a Prussian officer, who knew them well — General von Muffling — shall state his opinion of them. The opinion of this clear-headed, capable, loj^al, and inteUigent officer must carry great weight ; and it carries even greater weight than that of almost any other witness, for it could not be to his advantage to give undue credit to the British troops at the expense of their Ally — his own nation. The General wrote as follows : — " For a battle there is not perhaps in Europe an army equal to the British ; that is to say none whose discipline and whole military tendency is so purely and exclusively calculated for giving battle. The British soldier is \-igorous, weU-fed, by nature both brave and intrepid, trained to the most rigorous discipUne, and admirably well-armed. The infantry resist the attacks of cavalry with great confidence, and when taken in flank, or rear, British troops are less disconcerted than any other European Army. These circumstances in their favour will explain how this army, since the Duke of Wellington commanded it, has never yet been defeated in the open field." The eye-witness account of one of our most gallant foes, Marshal Bugeaud,^ shows clearly the great effect produced 1 L'Armde FrancaUe en 1867 (8th edition), pp. 239-243. 220 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO on their enemies' minds by the disciplined silence that enshrouded our gallant troops whilst awaiting attack, and also the impression made on their assailants by the un- equalled unconcern and phlegm exhibited by the British Infantry in battle ; as well as the imposing spectacle of that long red wall which lay athwart a French attack, and thus barred a further advance. Naturally their opponents were upset by the outward impassiveness of the British, and the lack of notice which they took of their foes, as the latter drew near with noisy shouts. All realised that the fire, so long withheld, would be murderous when delivered ; and that the storm, so long preparing, would be overwhelm- ing when it did burst. The moral effect of studied calm, over wild disorder, sank deep into the souls of the assailants. Nor were they wrong — for as General Trochu stated in the same work (p. 242) the fire delivered by the English was con- sidered, by Marshal Bugeaud, to be more effective than any which the French troops at that era were called on to face ; and the General recalled the deadly skill our archers had with the long-bow ; General Trochu ascribed this fire-power to a characteristic that distinguishes our race : mental calmness, and complete self-possession in all times of strife. Further, Marshal Bugeaud has left it on record that "the British Infantry are the best in the world " ; however, he was careful to add this significant statement, " But for- tunately there are not many of them." General Foy, who had fought against us so often, in the Peninsula and in Belgium, added his tribute of praise. He considered that for holding a defensive position there were no more redoubtable foes than the English. He eulogised their firmness under fire, as well as their fine fire-action, and stated that, in his opinion, their officers were the bravest and most patriotic in Europe. ^ Praise from our loyal ally, and from our gallant enemies, is praise indeed, and praise that we need not be ashamed of repeating. In another place General Foy, himself a very able artillery officer, mentioned our artillerymen in these words : " The English artillerymen are especially noticeable for the fine spirit which animates them. In action their energy is suitable, their observation of events is perfect, and the courage they exhibit is stoical." That General Foy was a 1 Vie Militaire du Oiniral Foy (as before), p. 277. BRITISH AND K.G.L. TROOPS, 1815 221 most able artillery officer, who had been in many actions against our nation, made his unsolicited testimony most valuable. Further, the officers, who were in the ex-Emperor's suite on board H.M.S. Bellerophon, gave their opinion of our infantry to Captain Maitland in the following words : " There is no such infantry in the world ; there is no making any impression on them ; you may as well attempt to charge through a wall ; and their fire is tremendous." (Captain Maitland's Narrative, p. 221.) But sufficient testimony has been called to show the qualities inherent in the British troops in 1815. Naturally particular stress and attention have been bestowed on the infantry ; for on this arm must fall the brunt of the fighting in any severe and long drawn-out fight ; in 1815 infantry was (and is) the " Queen of the battle-field." It was un- doubtedly the firm, unyielding discipline possessed by our men, which enabled them, in times of stress, to stand up to heavy punishment in accordance with the accepted tradition, and without breaking their ranks or seeking safety in retreat. This, even Bliicher's gallant soldiers had failed to do at Ligny, and thus, on June 16, the time-limit, upon which Napoleon based his calculation, had not been upset. However, on June 18, the undaunted front shown by Wellington's troops, and the skill with which the Duke chose and occupied the position in which he was prepared to give battle, enabled him to defy Napoleon long enough to allow Bliicher to arrive and deal a fatal stroke. One of these factors would have been useless without the other ; it was the unlikely combination of the two which Napoleon had overlooked, or rather neglected, and which proved his ruin. Also the British Infantry could be trusted to stand steady, and await assault behind the brow of a ridge, by no means the safest place owing to the trajectory ; but this was a position where it would be impossible to place any but the staunchest troops. Yet Wellington's occupation of his position at Waterloo was most important ; for the brow of the ridge screened his defensive moves, and at the crisis mitigated the effect of Napoleon's pitiless case-shot attack. It was his knowledge that his troops were trustworthy and staunch, and that they would scorn to fly, which enabled the Duke t-o arrange them as he did ; and thus it took far 222 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO longer to kill them all than Napoleon had estimated, and time was gained for Bliicher to intervene in force. The very converse, in every respect, had occurred at Ligny. But the weakest feature in Wellington's Army — their lack of real manoeuvring power — must not be glozed over.^ Luckily their Chief realised this weakness, and did all that he could so as to minimise this disadvantage. He accepted battle in such a position, and fought it in such a way, that his troops were hardly called on to manoeuvre ; and thus he proved the truth of the aphorism : " The art of war consists in the practical adaptation of the means at hand to the attainment of the object in view."^ It has already been made clear {ante, vol. II, p. 134) that there is no wish to claim, or even to suggest, that our soldiers did more than their share in achieving the great result ; for the casualty lists of June 15 and June 16 and 18, and Thielemann's losses at Wavre on June 18 and 19, proved that all our Allies suffered heavily in the cause which they had espoused ; and it was essential that all should co-operate if Napoleon was to be defeated. Thus the fighting worth of our own troops has only been glanced at, with the idea of drawing some lessons from their behaviour so as to assist us in the present day ; but this has been done with no idea of belittling our Allies, for without them it was impossible for Wellington and his troops to have won. It is evident that a close and detailed study of this cam- paign of Waterloo must be profitable to Englishmen ; for herein can be seen the sort of warfare in which our troops excel. Our strong points can be noted, with a view to their development ; our weaknesses can be. observed, with a view to their eradication. Probably it is wiser and better to foster and strengthen those traits that are inherent to 1 General von Muffling writing on June 24, from Le C&teau, said : " For coolness, bravery, and interior discipline there is nothing like them [the EngUsh] in all Europe, but, on the other hand, they have little manoeuvring power, and are extremely slow. The Duke of Wellington himself said to me, when I urged him at Quatre Bras to press the attack more quickly, that that would not do — that one must give the English time, and not attack until they are fully formed. ' Ah,' I sighed, ' would that the situation were reversed ; would that the English were in position, and the Prussians ready for the ofienaive ... we should then be invincible.' " As Fate willed, it did happen at Waterloo two days later, exactly as General von Muffling had desired. 2 Von Moltke. BRITISH AND K.G.L. TROOPS, 1815 223 our natures and suited to our armies, rather than to borrow others from foreigners, which are sure to be less suited to our characteristics ; and to curb the mania for imitation which occasionally seizes our nation, and causes those who run and read, to run riot after strange ideas and ideals which are quite foreign to our nation. The Battle of Waterloo proved clearly enough that mere defence, even coupled with indomitable tenacity and intre- pidity, could achieve nothing per se. In the end every- thing depended on the Allies themselves assuming the offen- sive, and, to gain the victory, the defenders had in their turn to become assailant at the correct moment ; they had to change from the role of anvil to that of hammer, and strike the foe to the ground. This most difficult task, of turning from a defensive to an offensive attitude, was rendered com- paratively easy for Wellington at Waterloo, by the co-opera- tion of Bliicher and his Prussian Army. Thus in reality the Prussians were Wellington's General Reserve. Further, as the Allied concentration off a double line of operations was made on the battle-field itself, the blow struck was bound to be deadly. Whilst on June 18 the Duke and his stubborn army immobilised, wore out, and wore down the Armee du Nord, and prepared the French Army for the decisive stroke, Marshal Bliicher hastened up, and at the crisis drove home the death-thrust against the open flank of the already shattered French Army. Thus the Battle of Waterloo affords a fine example of co-operation and combination of effort, that will stand for all ages as a model of the highest type of defensive battle. There are those who hold, and rightly, that the same stiff- ness of character that kept our troops firm through those long, hot, trying, critical hours, on the reverse slopes of Mt. S. Jean, are still alive to-day, for human nature alters very slowly, almost imperceptibly ; and what men have done, that men can do. But it must be realised that victory is only gained by sacrifice : Decisions demand blood. It must never be forgotten that our gallant troops stood for hours, on June 18, faced with two dread alternatives : death in front of them, and unutterable shame behind. To their honour they never flinched from the ordeal. Neither the surging flood of invincible French horse, nor the cease- less hail of death which swept over them from the French 224 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO guns, nor the point-blank discharges of the Guard, could break, or force back, the steadfast British and King's German Legion Infantry, who, apparently, had taken root on the historic slope. Their last majestic advance, in the dim twilight, is not the least of the lessons they teach ; for, despite the losses they had suffered, they were ready to advance, and in their turn play hammer instead of anvil, so that a decisive result must ensue ; thus they did their duty, on June 18. They proved that the Duke was right, when he observed that they would never deign to fly, it must take hours to kill them all — and this would allow old Bliicher time to intervene. Once more our infantry proved that victory always inclines to the most obstinate troops. Consequently Fame's Eternal Splendour will gild the bayonets of those indomitable and intrepid troops, who held the ridge of Mt. S. Jean on June 18, 1815 ; and their proudest boast must have been the simple words, " We were at Waterloo ! " Their conduct and behaviour should teach us, it is only by each and every Englishman fearlessly doing his duty to his country both to-day and every day, that, on the day of her trial, England can hope to win a way through darkness and blood, and finally emerge triumphant so as to demand the victor's crown from the God of Battles. BRITISH AND K.G.L. TROOPS, 1815 225 Note. — It may be of interest to record that our infantry- soldiers carried a weight of about 4 stone each at this period. The musket was nearly one stone ;i and besides there were 60 rounds of ammunition carried in the pouches. (Sergt. Morris, p. 248, gives the number as 120), three days' biscuit in the haversack, and accoutrements, knapsack, canteen, camp-kettle, blankets, great-coat, and clothing. (Sergt. Morris, p. 248.) But, as the Duke owned, marching was not our men's forte. {Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, pp. 24-25). In modern times the Russians in Manchuria (1904) appear to have carried 70 lbs. of dead weight, about 10 lbs. more than our men carried under the Duke ; but the Russians on going into action used to carry between 200- 800 rounds of ammunition. (Of course their musket had a much smaller bore than old " Brown Bess.")^ ' The Treatise on Military Small Arms (1888) gives, on p. 100, the following details of the flint-lock musket with which our troops were armed at the beginning of the nineteenth century — generally known by the name of " Brown Bess." M'^eight of musket with bayonet, 11 lbs. i ozs. ; caUbre of musket, •7.53 inch ; of buUets, -68 inch. The bullets weighed \i\ to the lb. The powder charge was 6 drs., F.G. Three flints were allowed for every 60 rounds. The weight of the bayonet was 1 lb. 2 oz., and its length was 17 inches. The rifle of the period had a caUbre of -61 inch ; that of its bullets was -60 inch, weighing 20 to the lb. The weight of the complete rifle was 10 lbs. 5 ozs. The powder-charge was 4 drs., F.G. (I have supplemented the information given in the Official Treatise from Captain Spearman's The British &unner, 2nd edition, 1828, pp. 6, 52, and 124. Captain Spearman pointed out that the charge had not been altered since 1775 ; and that the powder had nearly doubled in power since that date. Therefore he recommended a decrease of the charge by 25 per cent.) ^ To-day our infantry soldiers (privates) carry over 60 lbs. weight — including 150 rounds of anamunition {vide F. S. Manual, Infantry Battalion, 1913). Should it be necessary to carry 250 rounds S.A.A. per man, then the pack could be discarded as a temporary measure, and the flghting equipment would total 55 lbs. II.— Q 226 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Note J. — The Duke of Wellington's Estimate of Napoleon. The following is a verbatim copy of a memorandum drawn up by the Duke of WelHngton to explain what he meant, when he said that Napoleon's presence on a battle- field was equivalent to 40,000 men in the scale. The memo was dated September 18, 1836,^ and ran as follows : — " It is very true that I have often said that I considered Napoleon's presence in the field to be equal to 40,000 men in the balance. " This is a very loose way of talking, but the idea is a very different one from that of his presence at a battle being equal to a reinforcement of 40,000 men. I'll explain my meaning. " I. Napoleon was a Grand Homme de Guerre, possibly the greatest that ever appeared at the head of a French Army. " II. He was the Sovereign of the country as well as the Military Chief of the Army. That country was constituted on a military basis. All its Institutions were framed for the purpose of forming and maintaining its armies with a view to conquest. All the offices and rewards of the State were reserved, in the first instance, exclusively for the army. An officer, even a private soldier, of the army, might look to the sovereignty of a kingdom as the reward of his services. It is obvious that the presence of the Sovereign with an army so constituted must greatly excite their exertions. " III. It was quite certain that all the resources of the French State, civil, political, financial, as well as military, were turned towards the seat of the operations which Napoleon himself should direct. " IV. Every Sovereign in command of an army enjoys advantages against him who exercises only a delegated power, and who acts under orders and responsibilities. But Napoleon enjoyed more advantages of this description than any other Sovereign that ever appeared. His presence, as stated by me more than once, was likely to give not only ^ The memo is given in exienso in Conversations with the Duke o/ vn, pp. 81-83. THE DUKE'S ESTIMATE OF NAPOLEON 227 to the French Army all the advantages above detailed, but to put an end to all the jealousies of the French Marshals and their counter-action of each other, whether founded or bad principles and passions, or their fair difference of opinion. The French Army thus had a unity of action. " These four considerations induced me to say generally that his presence ought to be considered as 40,000 men in the scale. But the idea is obviously very loose, as must be seen by a moment's reflection. " If the two armies opposed to each other were 40,000 men on each side, his presence could not be equal to a reinforcement of 40,000 men on the side of the French Army, nor even if they were 60,000 men on each side, or possibly even 80,000 men on each side. "It is clear, however, that wherever he went he carried with him an ob^'ious advantage. I don't think that I ought to be quoted as calling that advantage as equal to a rein- forcement of 40,000 men under all possible circumstances. " Wellington." Note (by the Author). — There is no doubt that, even from the very outset. Napoleon possessed the gift of natural authority, and this ensured for him at all times the ready obedience of his subordinates, and he wielded the power entrusted to him with ease. In his first campaign as a Generalissimo, in North Italy (1796), Napoleon Buonaparte possessed neither a brilliant past, nor experience of high command, and yet with most inferior means, an ill-equipped, badly found, and badly compacted army, he gained the most brilliant and glorious successes. The result was an undoubted tribute to his energy and to his genius. But after he gained supreme power Napoleon's means were vast, his resources almost limitless. His relation then with his subordinates was perfect, he had absolute freedom and hberty to conceive, to plan, and to operate ; he owed responsibiKty, and had to justify his undertakings, to no one ; he could order the most hazardous operations, with the absolute certainty that he would be obeyed promptly and cheerfully. Therefore the Duke of Wellington has by no means overstated the mark when he placed Napoleon's presence on a field of battle as equivalent to 40,000 men. But there is one more point, whereas the failures of a General 228 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO are nearly always reparable in a great country, yet the failure in the field of an absolute Sovereign, who is also his own Generalissimo, may prove a national disaster, from which there is and can be no recovery ; for the Sovereign may have staked his country's whole resources on the great throw ; he alone has the power to do this, for he alone is subject to no control. This risk is sufficient to daunt all but the boldest spirits. NAPOLEON IN 1815 229 Note K. — Napoleon in 1815. Writers have held every sort and shade of opinion about Napoleon's state of health and capabilities in 1815 ; and the subject is so important that it must be given serious consideration. There are writers who consider that, in 1815, Napoleon was utterly broken down, both physically and mentally ; and not a few who state that he was so lethargic, that he might have been suffering from some disease akin to " sleeping sickness." But these writers have greatly exaggerated their side of the case, being over-anxious to explain away what they have not understood. On the other hand, it is equally impossible to subscribe to M. Houssaye's opinion, when he ■wrote as follows : — ^ " (Between early morning, 3 a.m., on June 15, and about 2 a.m. on June 19), for that is practically four days, or 96 hours, this man whom writers are so eager to represent as broken down, depressed by disease, lacking in energy, unable to overcome sleep, and incapable of keeping in the saddle, scarcely took 20 hours' rest ; and, granting that he was on foot for three-quarters of the time that the two great battles lasted, yet he remained in the saddle for 37 hours. ^ " In 1815 Napoleon was in sufficiently good health to enable him to bear the great fatigues of war, and his brain had lost none of its power. But with him his moral power no longer upheld his genius. . . . He no longer believed in success, his boldness gave way with his confidence. . . . He dared not seize and force circxmistances. . . . With his faith in his destiny he had always been a daring and audacious gambler. Now that Fortune showed herself contrary he became a timid player. He hesitated to risk the game, he no longer followed his inspiration, temporised, weighed the chances, saw the pros and cons, and would risk nothing save on a certainty." 1 M. Houssaye, Waterloo, 1815, pp. 499, 500. ' Fine as this physical performance was, yet, of course, it cannot compare to Napoleon's great eiiort against Alvinzy, in November, 1796, which culminated in the hard-fought battle of Areola. During this trying period it is supposed that General Buonaparte did not take oS his clothes for a week, and during three of the days he scarcely closed his eyes. But in 1796 he was nineteen years younger. 230 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO But we cannot agree with M. Houssaye, who, although he has written a very brilUant and detailed aceount of 1815, is in reality far more brilliant as a writer and historian, than he is judicious as a critic on the Art of War. M. Thiers has left on record, " Whatever may have been Napoleon's state of health in 1815, it did not in any way affect his activity." Colonel Chesney ^ has stated, " Certain French writers are disposed to impute a large share of their country's disaster to some supposed falling off of the physical energy and mental powers of the Emperor. The simple reply to this is, that his warlike capacity had never been more splendidly displayed than during that part of the struggle with the Allies in the spring of 1814, and known as the Week of Victories. The General of Areola and Rivoli was not more full of resource, nor more sudden and deadly in his strokes, than he of Montmirail and Champaubert." But it did not seem to have struck Colonel Chesney that, in 1814, Napoleon staked all that he held dear ; and this tremendous incentive nerved him like a stimulant, whilst there remained even a slight hope of success ; and its action on that noble and indomitable mind, in " the Week of Victories," resulted in his equalling the glorious achievements of the General in 1796 ; for, in 1814, whilst the tremendous incentive lasted. Napoleon became once more the personal embodiment of energy, audacity, and resolution. Again, as he had been in 1796, he was quick and sure to see the opportunities offered by his foes, and quicker and surer still to strike home. Once more, as at the beginning of his career, he dominated all. But like all great and prolonged mental strains, there was the after-effect to reckon with, and that was depressing. Colonel Chesney has allowed nothing for this ; and he has shown clearly and repeatedly, brilliant writer though he was, that he has allowed his personal animosity against Napoleon to becloud his critical judgment. His book deserves the very greatest credit for bringing forward so clearly the important part played by Field-Marshal Blticher and his gallant Prussian Army in the campaign of 1815, and his work is a fine piece of well-reasoned advocacy ; but with reference to Napoleon's powers in 1815 it is not history. Rather we prefer to range ourselves with Colonel Grouard, ' Waterloo Lectures, p. 72. NAPOLEON IN 1815 231 and to jBlnd the truth midway between the two schools of thought. A study of 1813 and 1814 shows that Napoleon in those campaigns made the fatal mistake of underrating his adversaries. He conceived that they would shake in terror at the very sound of his name, and tremble when opposed personally to him. Of course, on the morrow of the great Victories of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, such a state of affairs very likely did exist, and possibly even after Wagram. But in 1813 there was no longer the same reason to hold such feelings about the Emperor. He had laid the founda- tions of his own ruin, in the disastrous and never-ending war in the Spanish Peninsula, which, like an incurable ulcer, was perpetually breaking out afresh, and ever con- tinued to eat away his means of resistance ; his down- fall had been brought appreciably nearer by the even more disastrous Russian Campaign of 1812 ; and now his adversaries were determined to complete his overthrow and final ruin. Further, in 1813, 1814, and especially in 1815, they had one great and undeniable advantage in the gigantic task to which they had set their hands, for at last Napoleon had taught them something of the art of war ; and they were enabled to profit from the knowledge they had acquired slowly and painfully, from the admirable lessons in the art and conduct of warfare which had been given to them by Napoleon himself, in the days of his un- bounded powers. Thus, in 1815, Napoleon no longer possessed quite the same prestige; having been conquered by Europe in arms, he had shown that he was con- querable — under certain conditions. Also the Allies were more formidable foes in 1815, than they had been of yore. But the physical and mental state of the Emperor in 1815, is of such first-class importance to a clear appreciation of the Waterloo Campaign, that it vnll repay a brief study. For if only the correct deductions can be made from this complex problem, then much will become clear that is otherwise misunderstood. At the outset it may be conceded readily enough, that the Emperor's conduct of the campaign in 1815 is wellnigh inexplicable, if it is assumed that Napoleon, the very embodiment of Mobility, Energy, and ever-impelling Impatience, still retained all his powers of mind and body. It is only when it is realised that such was not the case, that 232 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO it becomes possible to understand, and to explain satis- factorily, how such a really brilliant conception was utterly marred, and finally ruined in execution. Attention has been drawn to the fact that Napoleon lagged far behind his previous performances in appreciating both the true measure of his offensive means, and in his actual distribution of his soldiers on his theatre of war ; both left much to be desired ; and the latter, in particular, was unworthy of Napoleon, who had always realised and vigorously pursued the essential, whilst neglecting less- essentials. It was in this way that his impaired mental faculties penalised him at the very outset of the campaign, consequently there was scarcely a chance left that he would succeed. Even so, his concentration was so brilliant that he did possess on June 15 a most undeniable chance of victory ; and Fortune threw into the lap of her favourite yet another rose. But gradually this flower was allowed to wither away. By following Napoleon during the execution of the campaign, it is possible to notice certain facts, which, taken by themselves, might mean nothing, but, in the aggregate, they afford convincing testimony that no longer did he retain unimpaired his former mental and bodily powers. Granting that, on June 15, the Emperor was early in the saddle, yet on the far side of Charleroi he succumbed to drowsiness ; from which even the plaudits of his soldiers failed to wake him. Of course this lethargy might have been caused by the heat ; but, the important thing is, was it a solitary case ? If so, it would only show that his powers of endurance were no longer limitless. However, it was not a solitary instance, for on the evening of June 15, Napoleon was thoroughly overcome by fatigue ; and although M. Houssaye has said that he wrote out his orders for June 16 at 4 a.m., he has not explained why those orders were not sent out until 9 a.m. Probably, therefore, Napoleon did not commence to work at them before 6 a.m., at the very earliest. Further, although Napoleon was mounted throughout the Battle of Ligny, on June 16, yet he was stationary in the battle, and hence the strain on his physical powers was far less. But, at nightfall on this day, it is acknowledged that the Emperor was unwell ; and he had to go to bed, refusing to issue orders to Marshal Grouchy, about opening an instant pursuit after the Prussians. Even NAPOLEON IN 1815 233 on June 17, after Grouchy, on his own initiative, had thrown Pajol and Exelmans forward at an early hour to get touch of Blticher's beaten host toward Namur and Liege, and then had reported for fresh instructions, yet the Emperor was sleeping, and it was only at 7.30 a.m. that he awoke. This day was the \'ital one of the whole campaign. On it, either Bliicher's ruin was to be sought, and brought about ; or Wellington must be seized by Ney and held fast at Quatre Bras, preparatory to Napoleon swinging in with the French Reserve and effecting the Duke's destruction. Thus at an early hour the Emperor was required to make certain of Blticher's line of retreat by his own personal and unfailing reconnaissance ; and at daybreak to send to Ney the orders to attack and hold WelHngton at Quatre Bras on June 17. But the lethargy that he exhibited allowed some of these critical hours to pass by unnoticed and unused. Had Ney behaved correctly the lethargy would not have mattered an iota ; but it was Napoleon's business to ensure that Ney did behave correctly, and this he failed to do betimes, and thus he did not repair the errors of the previous day. Had Napoleon been afoot at 4 a.m., on June 17, as was his invariable custom in his earlier and glorious campaigns, and if he had pushed the bulk of his horsemen northward towards Wavre, in the only dangerous direction, then, before they attained Mt. S. Guibert, the French Cavalry must have established contact mth the retiring corps of Zieten and Pirch I. Napoleon would have appreciated the full meaning of such a roundabout retreat, and realised that if the de- cision was to be obtained at all, then it must be demanded at once from Wellington, who was already held fast at Quatre Bras by Ney, and the Anglo-Dutch left flank was open and inciting an assault. Had he moved to the assault of the Anglo-Dutch Army, with those troops who were ready to advance at a moment's notice — Lobau's (VI) Corps, Milhaud's Cuirassiers, and the Guard — and if he had also called up Lefebvre-Desnoettes and Kellermann to co-operate, there can be no doubt that the Anglo-Dutch jaw of the vice would have been smashed to atoms long before the great storm broke, and the remnants would have been in full flight westward before 3 p.m. A junction with Bliicher would have been out of the question. So early as 4 a.m., on June 17, it was impossible for 234 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Grouchy to distinguish the essential in the complicated situa- tion. For the morrow of the double battle of Quatre Bras- Ligny cannot be compared ^vith that of Jena-Auerstadt. After the latter, in which the Prussians had suffered a crush- ing defeat, the subordinates could be trusted to reap the fruits of those glorious victories, without any special in- structions from Napoleon. It was far different after Ligny. It is true the Prussians had been beaten ; but the battle finished in the darkness, touch was lost, and no one knew for certain whither they had gone ; also all were in ignorance about the result of Quatre Bras, where Wellington was known to be concentrated in the field and almost within gun-shot of the Armte du Nord ; and D'Erlon's recall signified, apparently, that Ney was hard pressed. Hence at 4 a.m., on June 17, the situation was beyond the range of the subordinates at Ligny. Ney's duty alone was clear — to entangle Wellington, and await further instructions. For, although Ney was ignorant of the result of the Battle of Ligny, yet he could have deduced that Napoleon had the battle with Bliicher in hand, from the fact that D'Erlon had been allowed to leave the proximity of the Emperor's battle-field without any attempt at recall. If the Marshal was in any doubt, then an olScer's patrol, sent eastwards to Ligny at daybreak, would have found the French in possession of the field, and the Prussians nowhere visible, also sufficient information on this head could have been gathered from Durutte's Division, who witnessed the end of the fight, after D'Erlon had detached the division to fill the existing gap. The patrol would have returned and reported, and Ney must have realised that his duty was to pin Wellington at once ; now the Emperor must swing westwards, to deal with this determined foe who was concentrated only a short march away ; and Napoleon was free to do so, because Bliicher was out of the game for at least another 24 hours. Ney's failure was vital and inexplicable.^ However, the orders necessary for the Armee du Nord at Ligny must have emanated from Napoleon alone. In his 1 D'Erlon (p. 96) distinctly stated that " during the night (16-17) we learned that the Battle of Ligny had forced the Prussian Army to retire." If this is so, and I can find no confirmation, Ney's duty was clear without any further orders. NAPOLEON IN 1815 235 hands was this weapon, and he alone could guide its stroke at this critical juncture. Marshal Grouchy was now com- mander of the right wing, and no longer commander of the cavalry ; therefore, at 4 a.m., the order to reconnoitre north- wards should also have come from the Emperor. By failing to be available at 4 a.m., the Emperor showed that the old, fiery energy was dimmed. No longer, as in 1805, was he pre- pared to improve his victory in every way, no longer was he true to himself, for no longer did he show that in warfare nothing is done so long as anything remains to be done, and no victory can be reckoned complete so long as an enemy is in the field. In 1815 all was changed. Again, by failing to recognise at dawn that reconnaissance to the northward — ^the only direction in which danger threatened — was essential. Napoleon showed that he under-estimated Bliicher's contempt and hatred for himself, and the moral of the gallant Prussian Army. The Emperor easily convinced himself that, after Ligny, Bliicher and his Prussians must seek safety behind the Meuse ; but, even so, he did not ensure Wellington's immediate annihilation ; thus his mental powers were decadent as well. He was no longer Napoleon. Of course when, about 11.30 a.m.. Marshal Grouchy was despatched to find, to follow, and to neutralise Bliicher, then the responsibiUty, for scouting northwards, was shifted on to the Marshal's shoulders. Earlier in this work his failure to do this has been discussed, and therefore need not be considered here. But it appears from what happened, the Emperor never recognised that, in the direction of Mt. S. Guibert, information and intelligence of the Prussians should be sought first of all. This was astonishing indeed, when the great Emperor's previous superb, and almost superhuman, strategical faculty is recalled. But, in 1815, his mental powers were on the wane, his mind had lost its flexibility; for never, even for a moment, did he suspect the full significance of the Allied plan. On this particular morning, June 17, there was certainly no adequate reason to cause Napoleon to change his superb strategical plan ; but at this crisis of the campaign it was essential not to lose even minutes by over- confidence. No one can ever accuse the Emperor of sloth, nor of halting in pitiful indecision. On the contrary, his 236 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO glorious successes had been due entirely to his firm and decided character, and he had succeeded generally because he never hesitated. On the morning of June 17 his im- paired health caused him to lose some valuable hours which he was never able to make up, and which proved vital to the issue, owing to Marshal Ney's failure to hold the Anglo- Dutch Army fast at Quatre Bras, and to Marshal Grouchy's miserable manoeuvres, which, at nightfall on June 17, placed the French right wing outside the Prussian Army ; and also to Marshal Grouchy's feeble and false manoeuvres on June 18. These fatal errors, together with the initial faults of distribution, Napoleon's own decadence, and also owing to Marshal Bliicher's amazing loyalty, and the Duke of Wellington's iron fortitude and singleness of purpose, to- gether with the stubborn tenacity and intrepidity of the British and King's German Legion troops, one and all con- tributed to, and were the undoubted causes for Napoleon's failure in Belgium. Of course it is true that the Emperor in his pursuit of Wellington's rear-guard on June 17, showed a blaze of the old furious energy ; for he rode at the head of the pursuit — though it lasted for some seven miles, and was undertaken in a tropical downpour, from which he emerged as wet as if he had taken a bath. Then immediately after- wards he proceeded to dictate orders and deal with corre- spondence ; and during the same night (17-18) he made a round of his outposts. But it is only when compared with the Napoleon of earlier years, the only standard indeed by which it is possible to judge him, that the Emperor's performance in 1815 is seen to fall so far short of his previous, magnificent physical, and mental, performances ; and there is no doubt that, in 1815, Napoleon's powers of mind and body were seriously impaired — yet that is very far from saying that he was impotent ; but no longer did he attain to the high standard which he had set in former years. Even so, after a good night's rest, such as he had after Ligny, he was still capable of vigorous action — if he desired to take it. But, in 1815, such action would be un- likely to outlast the circumstances which had demanded this outburst of energy ; and no one will maintain that he was still the General of Areola, Rivoli, or Marengo; NAPOLEON IN 1815 237 of Austerlitz or of Jena ; of Friedland, or even of Wagram. Thus the mistake, after Ligny, of letting Bliicher slip away unobserved, and retreat — no one kjiew whither — rested primarily on the Emperor's shoulders. This mistake was attributable to his not being on the field at 4 a.m. on June 17, when every hour was golden. Undoubtedly this failure to be up and doing was caused by his illness, and the lethargy that resulted therefrom ; and his ill-health affected his mental powers appreciably. For no longer did the Great Captain show that vnde grip of the strategical situation; no longer did he display that consummate master-glance, which in a moment brought all actions into their proper relation and perspective ; no longer did he take as many precautions as of yore, so as to leave nothing whatever to chance ; and not only was his calculation defective, but his genius and tactical inspiration were waning, for they failed to warn him when the psychological moment had arrived on June 18, and to enable him to turn that battle into a masterpiece by one smashing stroke ; also, except for a few short hours on June 17, there was no trace in 1815 of that blazing energy, which made his ItaUan campaigns unique, and placed them for ever before the world as a model of how to wage offensive war. This campaign of 1815 is inexplicable on the sup- position that Napoleon's powers were not seriously impaired by the life he had led. After giving due weight to Ney's dire failure on June 17, and to Grouchy's wretched manoeuvres on June 17 and 18, yet it must be acknow- ledged that Napoleon himself was responsible, very largely, for the disaster which overtook the last, and perhaps the most devoted of all the Grand Armies of that heroic age. Napoleon, the greatest indeed of all historic men, al- though he achieved immortality, was, nevertheless — a man. He had ended by considering himself something almost superhuman, and thereby he lost all sense of due propor- tion ; and in 1815, owing to his waning mental powers, his ruin and final overthrow were ensured. In the battle of Waterloo itself, as M. Houssaye has proved. Napoleon was full of energetic action ; for even if he did sleep during the battle, yet he took his rest, and wisely so, during some non-critical period. For during all 238 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO the other and critical phases of the battle he was wakeful, active, and eager. Even although his mind no longer dominated his body as of yore, yet the stimulus of action, and particularly of battle, at once galvanised him into at least a resemblance of his old self. So, in 1815, there came brilliant flashes on occasions, which revealed a trace of the old unsurpassed genius, but they were few and far between and at ever-lengthening intervals. Thus, without holding either extreme view, the sound conclusion is probably that the Emperor's powers were impaired seriously ; but this is far from saying that in 1815 he was palsied, paralysed, or impotent. The battle in- variably acted as a tonic to his mind, and stimulated him afresh while it lasted ; and, at times, his iron will could gain the mastery over his body to such an extent, that he was still capable of great, but alas ! only temporary, energy ; and in the conduct of his battle, on June 18, the confirmation of these views, with regard to the withering of his mental powers, is only too apparent. There is no doubt that, in 1815, Napoleon's powers were declining. For Napoleon's genius at this time resembled at best a dying fire. Occasionally, it is true, there were brilliant flashes of light, as a flame leaped up, but it merely served to accentuate the general murky gloom around. As an example, the magnificent concentration around Beaumont may be cited ; but already the power was decadent. The next effort was the forcing of the Sambre bridge at Charleroi ; on this occasion the news of the delay that had been occasioned to Vandamme's (III) Corps acted as a stimulant, and Napoleon drove the Guard to the front and seized the bridge. But directly the stimulus was re- moved, the exertion took its full toll of his powers, and his lethargy at Charleroi is proof of this contention. The next flash came at Gilly, where with a thunderclap he drove Pirch II's Prussians in headlong flight on Fleurus ; then came the night, and the Emperor was not himself, he was over-late in issuing the orders on June 16 ; then followed the great mental exertion at Ligny, where the Emperor gained the last of all his great triumphs ; neverthe- less Ligny proved to be only a parting gleam of splendour, so far as Napoleon was concerned ; and the exertion — mental and physical — proved too much for him, and on NAPOLEON IN 1815 239 the night of June 16-17 Napoleon was unwell. After this, the embers burned merely red ; and such flashes as shot up, were short, spasmodic, and totally insufficient for the purpose. Till on the fatal field of La Belle Alliance the fire was quenched for ever, and at length the Great Emperor was compelled to drink to the dregs the bitter cup of dis- aster and humiliation. Colonel Grouard, in his fine study of the campaign of 1813, has written : " The chief feature of men like Napoleon, is their insatiable and vaulting ambition, and once they attain to supreme power they commit their country to boundless enterprises, but they do not possess infallibility in the conduct of war — wars brought on by their unre- strained ambition ; and, in such wars, infallibility alone could compensate successfully for their excesses, which in the end must lead to a catastrophe. The campaign of 1813 showed clearly that Napoleon was not infallible, nor can it be urged that his fate was predetermined, it was rather his logical fall after unheard-of fortune. He ascribed it to natural forces, but ever disdained to value them at their true worth, and thus he ended by being crushed by them — and France with him. " But far otherwise was it with those Generals who had led French armies during the Revolutionary Wars, or even with those who commanded the armies of the Coalition in 1813. " Of all the brilliant group, who defended the French frontiers from 1792-1796, but two survived (in 1813) : Massena and Gouvion Saint-Cyr ; the former was worn out and in disgrace, and the latter's merits were not appreciated by Napoleon, who did not like him, for Gouvion had retained the manners of the Republican General." Colonel Grouard continues : " But would to God that we had only possessed leaders of this stamp. It is true that none of them might compare with Napoleon for grandeur of intellect, nor with his unsurpassed military genius ; but their only thought was to serve France, his idea was to make her the instrument of his boundless ambition. Doubt- less they would never have led our conquering hosts through the streets of Berlin, or of Vienna, still less could they have carried the Grand Army through Russia to Moscow ; but on the other hand they would not have brought the invader 240 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO to Paris, to crush France beneath his heel of iron. Further, possessing their full share of talent, although not possessed of genius, their powers were amply sufficient to ensure to France the legitimate grandeur that is her due, and after having wrested the Rhine frontier from our foes, at any rate they would have retained it." Colonel Grouard's study has shown clearly Napoleon's limitations in 1813 — and in 1815 they were accentuated. Most undoubtedly it shows also wherein Napoleon was far greater than all the other leaders of his era. For, put briefly, the great difference between Napoleon and Massena, or St. Cyr, or even the Archduke Charles, was that Napoleon repeatedly could, and did, accomplish great ends with means that would have proved utterly inadequate to any of his contemporaries. Such is genius. It is his genius which has made Napoleon immortal, by placing him in the fore-front of all the Great Captains — for he was indeed the greatest of them all. In all the earlier and glorious campaigns. Napoleon's capacity for hard mental work had only been equalled by his great physical powers. His iron frame never wearied ; and at the close of the longest and most tiring day his mind was always clear, and ready both to grasp and to tear the heart out of the most complex problem. However unex- pected, or however disheartening, were the reports which came to hand, even if they were received in those small hours when a man's mental courage is at its lowest ebb, yet Napoleon was always greatest in hours of critical danger, and his mind was always calm, dispassionate, and perfectly capable of weighing events, seeing things as they were, and appreciating everything at its correct value. Then he would arrive always at a rapid, definite, and perfectly appropriate conclusion ; thereafter he would carry through his plans without loss of time, or hesitation. Further, Napoleon's genius and character were even more admirable than his magnificent physical powers. For it was due to his genius that he could foresee so clearly what the enemy would do ; thereafter it was his imagination that allowed him to create the decisive manoeuvre, which was destined to ruin his foe beyond all hope of recovery ; lastly, it was his resolution which enabled him to carry through his plan, despite all the dangers and accidents that must attend on NAPOLEON IN 1815 241 execution. His masterful will bore down all obstacles as they presented themselves, ensured that his plan was carried through, and in all his heroic directness of purpose he would lead on the Grand Army until a definite and decisive conclusion was secured. Thus invariably did he conquer by sheer will-power ; he succeeded because he willed it. In general, up to 1815, his bodily health had not penalised him.i In order to wage successful, offensive war as Napoleon knew it, good bodily health was more than needful ; it was essential. But on his return from Elba he had grown distinctly stouter. ^ The Emperor had been told by Dr. Corvisart that, if ever he led a sedentary life, his circulation would slacken and might give him consider- able trouble. Had the enforced inaction at Elba had this prejudicial effect on his health ? was it a primary cause of the marked deterioration in his physical powers, so apparent in 1815 ? This question must be left to the experts in these matters to answer. It is certain that, in 1815, Napoleon was treading the downward path. In his career he had torn the very heart from glory ; but in 1815 he was no longer Napoleon, and thus it was that he succumbed to Europe in arms ; for although still far superior to any of his adversaries, yet he was overmatched by great numerical superiority and stead- fast loyalty ; and having missed the chance of dealing a decisive " knock-out " blow to the Allies at the very outset, the end came with catastrophic suddenness ; then the rising tide of Allied Invasion submerged all France, prevented the Emperor from collecting the floating debris, and thus once more forming an army with which he could show front to his foes. Beaten in an heroic struggle, with all ^ Captain Maitland in his Narrative noted particularly (p. 210) that Napoleon was very lethargic when on the Bellerophon, and he had ample means of judging between July 15 and August 7, 1815; but this exhibition of lethargy may have resulted from the tremendous strain which Napoleon had just experienced, the absolute cessation of all necessity to work whilst on board the ship, and the necessarily lazy life usually passed by any passenger on a sea- voyage. On the other hand. Captain Maitland (p. 139) noted that this lethargy had been marked during the last two or three years ; this fact is more important, and, no doubt, it was gleaned from some of the members of the suite. ' On this subject see The Drama of St. Helena (Paul Fr^meaux), Chap. V, and particularly pp. 213-214. II. R 242 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO the odds against them, it can safely be said of Napoleon and the Armie du Nord of 1815 — lis sont vaincus, avec honneur — Defeated, yet they kept their honour clean. Lastly, for the epitaph of the Emperor Napoleon, it is permissible to borrow the words which the poet wrote in memory of the greatest man who has ever ruled over England, and say i — " For he was great, ere fortune made him so, And wars, hke mists that rise against the sun. Made him but greater seem, not greater grow."' • Dryden, Poem on Oliver Cromwell, written in 1658. APPENDICES L'ARMEE DU NORD 245 P Ph O O O CO O Plh PM O H K E-i O o M Eh c . S CO p_i © en j cS o 05 © o o5 05 00 ■S -* CO CO lO ■* CTi ■* w6 a CS -;J 'S'r-^ . -^ Mo rt 00 '^-' 1— t -t- 'is t~ lO CO lO ■* o B c3 J3 M . as (5 c^ p. +i o ■-1 ,c T1 § .a s +3 -< © l> o — - c8 © T) © s « © -a O g -*^ -*^ ^ i-H © _ ■S 3 o D o O c3 SB C3 © ,J3 © CI . IS © ! -P > o i c I c3 fq H c o ^ © O 1^ ® . «S s a m c o u m © © . © n ° 'H c 13 o u cS m © © .0 o s lO to o n o o T3 2 fi a a § . a © a a a O o a o .r-3 m> fqpq FLiO pqp P^l> o a a o p ^ ^ § § o © CO 'Eh 4^ © O 't-l 02 -2 o 5 "^ ® -t-3 S ^ a O a o N a -4^ c3 s ^ 2 2 a -P 1^ o >> 2 CO CQ 3 o 53 1 fQ ft5 •3 "3 © Ts 'cS O '3 -3 © ra '3 s CD ■-2 1 P © a © a © 2 "+:> ^ © a © a © © a © •2 S § ■3 J2 •^ ^ S § © CO a © a © ■5 1 O Cs (D O O 0) O *-p O (D O o O © -p ■* -p a © 4 a © © 2 o 03 4^ a © O 4-i o r— 1 r— 1 i -© .a 4 r— 1 4-i © CO 4i a © ^ -<*< -P i 1 ^ 3 13 (N *— 3 3 tN ^ 3 3 (N 3 h3 IM w o a a o Q cS M © n M a c^-°T^ © C5 '. o § .P1^ -P 0) i-:i o ^-1 a sg cs ra a d a r*1 « S © W -H pq M o o m a a in d j:3 4^ © ^- >n . o f^ a C4H cr! B> •IH B 3 > n rJ crt 5 02 ■a Is © 5 ^ S © rt MH d g 3 § 6 M L'ARMEE DU NORD 249 L'AemAe dtj Noed — continued The Impeeial Guaed. Marshal Mortier, Duke of Treviso.^ Aide-Major-Oeneral de la Garde, Lieut. -General Count Drouot. Old Guabd (on foot). Lieut. -General Count Friant. 1st and 2nd Grenadiers. (1st Grenadiers, General Petit.) (2nd Grenadiers, General Christiani.) 1st and 2nd Cheisseurs. (1st Chasseurs, Major-GeneraJ Cambronne.) (2nd Chasseurs, Major-GeneraJ Pelet.) Middle Gttaed (on foot). Lieut. -General Count Morand. 3rd and 4th Grenadiers (Generals de Morvan and Harlet). 3rd and 4th Chasseurs (Colonel Mallet and General Henrion). Young Guard (on foot). Lieut. -General Count Duhesme. 1st and 3rd Voltigeurs (Colonel Hurel). 1st and 3rd Tirailleurs (Colonels de Malcolm and PaiUies). Light Cavalry. Lieut. -General Lefebvre-Desnoettes (Lancers and Chasseurs). Reserve Cavalry (Heavy). Lieut. -General Count Guyot. (Mounted Grenadiers, Dragoons, and Gendarmes d' elite.) Artillery. Lieut.-General Desvaux de S. Maurice. (3 Horse Artillery, and 13 Field Artillery Batteries.)^ ^ Marshal Mortier was left behind, on June 15, at Beaumont, on the sick list. He was not replaced at the head of the Guard, the orders thereafter apparently passing through the deputy head of the General Staff of the Guard, Lieut.-General Count Antolne Drouot (Com- mentaires, V, 204). The Staff of the Guard consisted of 8 officers (authy., Decree, April 8, 1815). 2 In the Decree of April 8, 1815 (given in Histoire de I'Ex-garde, pp. 128-144, pubhshed 1821), it was stated that the organisation of the Guard for war was to be as follows : — Infantry. Each regiment composed of 2 battahons, each battalion of 4 companies, each company of 200 men. Cavalry. Each regiment composed of 4 squadrons, each squadron of 2 companies, each company of 150 men. Artillery. 8 horse artillery (6-gun) batteries (4 with the cavalry and 4 with the reserve) ; 2 field artillery (8-gun) batteries, attached to the infantry of the Old Guard ; 4 field artillery (6-gun) batteries, attached to the 2 divisions of the Young Guard; 8 12-pdr. (8-gun) batteries (4 being manned by the artillery of the Old Guard) to be attached to the Guard Artillery Reserve. General Govugaud (p. 21) stated that the Artillery was organised as 250 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO The total strength of the Annee du Nord was about 125,000 men (including 20,000 to 22,000 Cavalry), and 370 guns ; or 180 squadrons, 50 batteries, and 176 battalions. follows : Each division had a (field) battery of 8 guns, and with each infantry corps there was a reserve (field) battery of 8 12-pdrs. Each cavalry division also possessed a (horse artillery) battery of 6 guns. Further, the artillery of the Guard numbered 96 guns ; comprising 24 horse, and 72 field artillery guns. For the organisation of the French Army in greater detail see de Mauduit, I, pp. 476-494. The strength of the Guard varied in the different campaigns of the 1st Empire : whereas it was 12,000 in 1805, in 1806 it was 15,000 ; it then remained at about this strength until 1809, when it rose to 24,000; it was 32,000 in 1810; 52,000 in 1811; 56,000 in 1812; 81,000 in 1813 ; and it attained its maximum strength, 102,000, in 1814; dropping to a little over 20,000 in 1815. (Vide L'Histoire de VEx-Qarde, p. 145.) THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ABMEE DU NORD IN BELGIUM IN 1815 1 S.M. rEmpereur Napoleon, commandant en peraonne. Aides de camp de I'Empereur activement employes aupris de Sa Majeste. MM. les g6n6raux : duo de Plaisance, comte Drouot, comte C!orbineau, comte Flahaut, comte Dejean, baron Bernard, comte de la B6doyere. Officier d'ordonnance : le colonel Gourgaud, premier offlcier d'ordonnance. Grand quartier-general. Major-general : le mar^chal due de Dalmatie. Chef d'etat-major-general : le Iieutenant-g6n6ral comte Bailly de Monthion. Charge du service des prisonniers de guerre : le mar^chal de camp baron Dentzel. A djudants-commandants. Baron Michal, baron Stoffel, Babut, d'Hincourt, Petiet. Officiers superieurs et autres attaches d I'etat major-general. Comte Gramont, Roul, | Comte Forbin de Janson, Hugo, > colonels. Zenowicz, Duzaire, I Desaix, 1 Tessier de Marguerittes, / •* Dalbenas, Grondal, Gentet, Bernard, Fourchy, Laplace, Waleski, Arnaud, Girard, Hime, Lefebure, '\ Desmarquets de Cir6, 1 chefs de Favelaa, > bataillon. Deschamps, 1 Rollin, ; aavet Gaubert (du 2e du Dulnas de Samt-L6on, Baudisson, Favier, g6nie), Descrivieux, de Joly, \ Noaillon, Coignet, 1 capi- Guettard, wagmestre, j taines, Ramorino, 1 Garda, sous -lieutenant. 1 Vide de Mauduit, I, pp. 476-493. 251 252 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Grand etat-major. MM. les mar6chaux de camp : Lebel, baron Gressot, baron Couture. Artillerie. Le lieutenant-general Ruty, commandant en chef. Etat-major-gen6ral. ■ Le lieutenant-general Neigre, directeur-g6n6ral. Le colonel Triquenot, sous-directeur-general. Direction I Le chef d'escadron Lechesne, adjoint. g6n6rale { Le chef de bataillon Sesilly, id. des pares. I Le colonel Renaud, directeur. Le chef de bataillon Barr6, sous-directeur. . Le lieutenant Marion, garde g6n6ral. Adjoints d, I'etat-major-g^niral. Les capitaines : Guillon, Lamy, Goussard, Bonnard, adjoints. Le lieutenant Erard, conducteur-general. \ Les capitaines : Maurel, Taupin, Poulin, David, [ adjoints. Delamone, Crozet et Guyot, ) Oenie. Le lieutenant-general baron Rogniat, commandant en chef. Major-gen6ral . . . Service topographigue. Le colonel Bonne, directeur. Gendarmerie. Le Iieutenant-g6n6ral Radet, commandant. Inspecteur en chef aux revues, Lambert. Administration generate. Intendant general, Daure. Le 16 Juin, I'Empereur mit sous le commandenaent du mar^chal Ney, prince de la Moskowa, les l^r et 28 corps, ainsi que la cavalerie de reserve du Heutenant-g6n6ral comte de Vabny; et le 17 sous les ordres du mar^chal comte Grouchy les 3^ et 4e corps d'infanterie, et les l^r et 2^ corps de cavalerie. The Staff of the Impebial Guabd.^ Le heutenant-g6n6ral comte Drouot, aide-major-g6n6ral de la garde. 1 The Staff of the Guard is not detailed by Captain de Mauduit, I, p. 478 ; but the above organisation is given in L'Histoire de I'Ex- Oarde, p. 132, and the authority there quoted (p. 128) is the Decree of 8 April, 1815. STAFF OF ARMEE DU NORD 253 ^tat-major. 1 lieutenant-general (acting as aide-major) ; 1 major de la garde (acting as assistant to the aide-major) ; 1 chef de bataillon, adjoint ; 4 capitaines a/djoints ; 1 secr^taire-archiviste. Inspecteur aux Revues. 1 inspecteur aux revues ; 7 sous-inspecteurs aux revues, ou adjoints. Commissaires des Querres. 1 commissaire des guerres ; 11 sous-commissaires des guerres, ou adjoints. The Stati- of the I Cobps, 10 June, 1815. Le lieutenant-general comte d'Erlon, commandant en chef ; le marechal de camp baron Delcambre, chef de Fetat-major- general ; I'adjudant conainandant Viala, sous-chef de I'etat- major-general ; le marechal de camp baron Desales, commandant I'artillerie ; le colonel Bernard, chef d'6tat-major de Tartillerie ; le marechal de cajnp baron Garbe, commandant le g6nie ; le colonel Baraillon, chef d'etat-major du genie. The Staef of the II Cobps, 10 JuifE, 1815. Le Heutenant-gen^ral comte Reille, commandant en chef ; le heutenant-g6n6ral baron Pamphile-Lacroix, chef de I'^tat- major-general ; I'adjudant- commandant Lecouturier, sous-chef de r^tat-major-general ; le marechal de camp baron PeUetier, commandant I'artillerie ; le chef de bataillon Bobillier, chef d'etat-major de rartillerie ; le marechal de cajnp baron de Richemont, commandant le g^nie ; le colonel DauUe, chef d'etat- major du genie. The Staff of the III Cobps, 10 June, 1815. Le lieutenant-general comte Vandamme, commandant en chef ; le lieutenant-general comte Guilleminot, chef d'etat-major- gen^ral ; I'adjudant-commandant Trezel, sous-chef de I'etat- major-gen6ral ; le marechal de camp Doguereau, commandant rartillerie ; le major Legriel, chef d'6tat-major de I'artillerie ; le marechal de camp Nempde, commandant le genie ; N . . . chef d'etat-major du genie. (Revest, marechal de camp, rem- place le general Guilleminot, mis a la disposition du prince J6r6me.) The Staff of the IV Cobps, 31 May, 1815. Le lieutenant-general comte Gerard, commandant en chef ; le marechal de camp Saint-Remy, chef de I'etat -major-general ; I'adjudant-comraandant Simon Loriere, sous-chef de I'etat-major- general ; le marechal de camp baron Baltus, commandant rartillerie ; le major Raindre, chef d'etat-major de I'artillerie ; le marechal de camp Valaze, commandant le genie ; le colonel Marion, chef d'etat-major du genie. 254 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO The Staff of the VI Cobps, 10 Jttne, 1815. Le lieutenant-general comte de Lobau, commandant en chef ; le mar6chal de camp Durrieu, chef de r6tat-major-g6neral ; I'adjudant-commandant Janin (Etienne), sous-chef de I'^tat- major-g6n6ral ; le Iieutenant-g6n6ral baron Noury, commandant I'artiUerie ; le major Chaudon, chef d'6tat-major de Tartillerie ; le mar^chal de camp Sabatier, commandant le genie ; le colonel Constantin, chef d'etat-major du g6nie. The Staff op the I Cavalry Corps, 9 June, 1815. Le lieutenant-general comte Pajol, commandant en chef ; I'adjudant-commandant Picard, chef de r6tat-major-g6n6ral. The Staff of the II Cavalby Cobps, 9 June, 1815. Le Keutenant-g6n6ral comte Exelmans, commandant en chef ; radjudant-commandant Feroussat, chef de retat-major-g6n6ral. The Staff op the III Cavalby Cobps, 1 June, 1815. Le lieutenant-general com.te de Vahny, commandant en chef ; I'adjudant-commandant Tancarville, chef de r6tat- major - g6n6ral. The Staff op the IV Cavalby Cobps, 9 June, 1815. Le Iieutenant-g6n6ral comte Milhaud, commandant en chef ; radjudant-commandant baron Chaaseriau, chef de I'^tat-major- g6n6ral. The foregoing detailed organisation of the Staff of the last army which Napoleon commanded in the field, has been taken entirely from the work of Captain Hippolyte de Mauduit, of the Imperial Guard, entitled Les Derniers Jours de la Orande Armee, Vol. I, pp. 476-493. My excuse for giving this extract here in extenso, is that the organisation of Napoleon's Staff in 1815 is rarely to be found in any easily accessible work deahng with the campaign, and its historic interest is very considerable. Actually, in the absence of any Commander of an Army Corps, it was the custom for the Chief of Staff of that particular corps to assume the command whilst his superior was away. Thus this particular post carried with it a great responsibility in Napoleon's time. Also, as the Military Correspondent of The Times has ably pointed out in his article on " the General Staff under Napoleon," Napoleon's own personal aides-de-camp were no mere gallopers, nor were they employed as a rule to carry messages, but they were all general officers of proved worth and ability, and they were one and all capable of assuming command at a moment's notice. All branches of the fighting troops were represented in this galaxy of military talent, and they were used very freely by STAFF OF ARMEE DU NORD 255 the Emperor, both in action at critical moments as his repre- sentatives at some important spot in a great battle, where their especial qualities would be of the greatest value to the Grand Army ; and also to undertake arduous missions. It is to their credit that these officers rarely failed their master in a crisis.* It was possibly because he was included among this select band, that General de la Bedoyere took upon himself the task of turning D'Erlon's Corps off the Quatre Bras road on June 16, and of heading it for Ligny. This was undoubtedly an error of judgment on his part, for on this particular occasion he was neither required, nor ordered, to take such a responsi- bility upon himseK ; this fact is proved by Napoleon's reception of the report that a strange corps was bearing down on the French left, for he made no allusion then to the fact that de la BMoyere might have acted on his own initiative in the matter of heading D'Erlon's Corps for Ligny, and thus have caused its prematxire arrival on the field. Each of Napoleon's personal aides-de-camp also possessed two or more aides-de-camp of their own, and thus they provided the Emperor with extra gallopers, when his own orderly officers were all employed. His large staff of trained and very experienced officers enabled the Emperor to keep himself in touch with all current events, and he was not averse to calHng on any general to send a trusted officer to any detachment and report what was occurring there — witness his use of Colonel E. Janin of Lobau's Staff on June 16 ; and it must be remembered that when Janin was sent on towards Quatre Bras his corps was halted, and therefore the choice was a wise one. Also during an action Napoleon's numerous staff officers were frequently moving over all parts of the battle-field, and returning with clear and valuable reports about the situation at any point. Thus despite the smoke-clouds which occasionally made it difficult for the Emperor to keep the whole battle under his own eye from his observatory, yet his trusted emissaries kept him posted in aU the details of the action, for in these matters the Emperor was not wont to leave anything to chance. * In 1805, the opening campaign of the First Empire, the following officers formed the select band of Aides-de-Camp to Napoleon : Junot, Lemarois, Cafiarelli, Lauriston, Savary, Lebnm, Rapp, Bertrand, and Mouton (afterwards better known as Count Lobau). At the moment when the 1805 campaign opened Junot was the French Ambassador at Lisbon ; he was recalled and ordered to rejoin with aU haste, and he caught up the Grand Army near AusterMtz. (La Campagne de 1805, by Alombert and Cohn, I, p. 200.) In April, 1807, in Poland, the Emperor employed 7 general aides- de-camp and 14 orderly officers ; whilst Marshal Berthier had 13 officers serving him as aides-de-camp [Histoire des Campagnes de VEmpereur NapoUon, 1805-1809, p. 285 ; Paris, 1843.) In 1809 the Emperor was accompanied by 9 general aides-de-camp, and also by 10 orderly officers. In addition Marshal Berthier, the Chief of the Staff of the Grand Army, had no less than 24 aides-de-camp. THE PRUSSIAN ARMY Commander-in-Cliief : Field-Marshal Prince Bliicher von Wahl- statt. Quartermaster-General and Chief of the Staff : General Count von Gneisenau. Chief of the General Staff: General von Grolmann.' Lieut. -General von Zieten II. COBPS. BBIQADES.^ I. / Von Steinmetz. Von Pirch II. Von Jagow. Von Henckel. ^ Cavalry : Von Roder. Von Treskow II. Von Liitzow. ^Artillery : Von Lehmann. Corps Artillery : One horse artillery, three 12-pdr., one 6-pdr. field batteries ; one howitzer battery. 31,000 and 80 guns (including 20 howitzers). ' On the Staff of the Prussian Army there was an officer who acted as Commissary of the Low Countries. The Head-quarters Staff under General von Grolmann numbered 6 ofBoers. The remainder of the Staff numbered 49, including the officer commanding the artillery, head-quarters commandant, surveyors, surgeons, auditor, provost marshal, etc. The whole of the Prussian Head-Quarters Staff totalled 58 officers. (For this Staff in greater detail see Campagne de 1815, de Bas and de Wommersom, III, p. 121-12.3.) Each corps had a staff of about 20 officers ; and the brigades each had a staff of about 5 officers. To each infantry brigade there was allotted a 6-pdr. field battery, and to each cavahy brigade, a horse artillery battery ; there were also 6 batteries belonging to the corps artillery. A Prussian battery appears to have consisted of 6 guns and 2 howitzers. " It will be noticed that there was no divisional organisation in the Prussian Army of 1815. However, the brigades were each about the strength of a French division ; but the correct nomenclature has been adhered to in the body of this work, because, in a history of the campaign, there was no adequate reason to change the name which was used in the Prussian Army in 1815. 256 THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 257 Major-General von Pirch I. III. Lieut.-General von Thiele- mann. CORPS. BRIGADES. II' f Von Tippelsldrch, Von Krafft. Von Brause. Von Langen. Cavalry : Von Jurgass. Von Thiimen. Von Sohr. Von Schxilenburg. Artillery : Von Rohl. Corps Artillery : Two horse artillery, three 12-pdr., one 6-pdr. field batteries, and one battery of howitzers. 31,500 and 80 guns {including 20 howitzers). Von Borcke. Von KaiTipfen. Von Luck. Von Stiilpnagel. Cavalry : Von Hobe. Von der Marwitz. Von Lottum. Artillery : Von Mohnhaupt. Corps Artillery : Two horse artillery, four 12-pdr. field batteries, and one battery of howitzers. 24,000 and 48 guns (including 12 howitzers). Von Hacke. Von Ryssel. Von Losthin. Von Hiller. Cavalry : Prince William of Prussia. Von Schwerin. Von Watzdorf. Von Sydow. Artillery : Von Braun. Corps Artillery : One horse battery, three 12-pdr., and one 6-pdr. field batteries, and one howitzer battery. 30,800 and 88 guns (including 22 howitzers). Total strength, about 117,000 men (including 12,000 sabres) with 296 guns (or 136 battalions, 137 squadrons, and 37 batteries). II. — s IV. General Count Biilow von Dennewitz. 258 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Pi < W o H Q I O . a ND CD SCO . ^^ ANGLO-DUTCH ARMY 259 SpmB o .< 2 -p ffl o •• §2 ~ " >> .S3 CD C! Ifl s C •3 a > c P OT3 1 c e e^ . OS ^10 =S S P § •§» § _ C Hh o ffi - r u -hi ^ -^ If .u m CO ■— ^ ^ .9 "" > ^ « PP CO a> . (D 2 5 2 "© <3 '3 CQ pP l-H ^ I— I .2 ~ M ^ ■a if I s s s g cj (3 60 to -.2 2 d ■^ .j; j5 2 00 *i3 .^'"^"' „ (D tlOOD't^ !>^£t^ ^ ^^ '^ M © > .S ^ -a ^ "^ em ^nSsM«'^S°®WMo'^W o vg .2 i^ -^ i « ^ <1 «o ° c^ 0:2 ^ n H P ►^1 ^ A a 2 X, m CO m M -3 J3 CO cS 3 > fe« a ieut.-Gen Picton, (B.). i-:i ^A u n m '3 % > p -+^ .« ■-I CD s. o 5- . SO « c .2 ^2-§ .|P « ?^ S § ■uo'jgninQAi JO eijnQ; gq^ j'sqsj'Bin-piei^ ; SMasBg ANGLO-DUTCH ARMY 261 Anglo-Dutch Abmy — continued. Cavalry : Lieut.-General the Earl of Uxbridge. BBIGADES. / Lord E. Somerset's (B.), (1 and 2 L.G., R.H.G., and 1 K.D.G.). Sir W. Ponsonby (B.), (1, 2, and 6 Dragoons). Sir W. Dornberg (B. and K.G.L.), (1 and 2 Light Dragoons, K.G.L., and 23 Light Dragoons). British and I Sir J. Vandeleur (B.), (11, 12, 16 Light King's German \ Dragoons). Legion Cavalry. Sir C. Grant (B. and K.G.L.), {7 and 15 Hussars; and 2 Hussars, K.G.L.). Sir H. Vivian (B. and K.G.L.), (10 and 18 Hussars ; and 1st Hussars, K.G.L. ). Baron F. von Arentschildt (B. and K.G.L.), \ (13 Light Dragoons ; and 3 Hussars, K.G.L.). British Horse Artillery Troops attached to the Cavalry. Commanding : Lieut.-Colonel Sir A. Fraser, k.b. Major Bull's Troop (Howitzers) . . (I, R.H.A.) Lieut.-Colonel Webber-Smith's Troop . (D, B.H.A.) Lieut.-Colonel Sir B. Gardiner's Troop . (E, B.H.A.) Major E. C. Whinyates' Troop (Bockets) (O, B.H.A.) Major Norman Bamsay's Troop . . (H, R.H.A.) Captain Mercer's Troop . . . (G, B.H.A.) Hanoverian Cavalry Brigade, : Baron von Estorff. Brunswick Cavalry. (Trip. Dutch-Belgian Cavalry Di\'ision. J Baron de Ghigny. Lieut.-General Baion de CoUaert. 1 Baron von Merlen. { Artillery : 1 Horse Battery. Total strength, about 110,000 men' (including 14,000 cavalry), or 130 battalions, 110 squadrons, and 34 batteries, with 222 guns. ^ ' This total includes aU the garrison troops. The available Field Army appears to have been about 93,000 men and 196 guns. ^ The Stafi of the Anglo-Dutch Army was constituted as follows : The Duke of WeUington had 9 aides-de-camp, and the head-quarters staff numbered 60 other ofBcers. The Prince of Orange had 7 A.D.C.'s and 1 Brigade-Major ; the Earl of Uxbridge, 5 A.D.C.'s ; Lord Hill, 5 A.D.C.'s ; General Picton, 4 A.D.C.'s ; the other Divisional Commanders had 1 or 2 A.D.C.'s, and in some cases Brigade-Majors ; Brigadiers had an A.D.C. and a Brigade-Major each. 262 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO The General Officers of the Allied Powers officially present on the Duke of Wellington's staff were :— Russia — General Pozzo de Borgo. Prussia — Major-General Baron v. Miiffling. Austria — General Baron Vincent. Spain — General Miguel Alava. The British officer attached to the Prussian Staff was Brigadier- General Sir H. Hardinge. Another point that requires mention is that the British Artillery, in 1815, was the only one which possessed in its equipment spheri- cal case-shot (or shrapnel as they are now termed). Writing in 1828 Captain Spearman (The British Gunner, 2nd Edition, pp. xi-xii) stated that even at that date " the secret of this destructive missile " was still well preserved, for foreign nations were in " utter ignorance of its principle of construction." The advantage we enjoyed in 1815, in possessing the only serious man-killing projectile capable of being used at longer ranges than 500 yards, was very real, and it must not be under-estimated. Under 500 yards case-shot could be and was largely used by the guns of all nations, and with deadly effect ; hence the name " case-shot attack." But case was almost innocuous beyond 500 yards, and then the advantage of possessing " spherical case-shot " was apparent. T APPENDIX II DOCUMENTS Some Despatches, Oeders, Bulletins, and Lettees No. 1. Soult's Proclamation to the French Army on Buonaparte's return from Elba. War Department. Order of the Day to the Army. Soldiers, That man Buonaparte, who recently in the face of all Europe abdicated an usurped Power of which he had made so fatal a use, has now landed once more on French soil, which he ought never to have seen again. What does he desire ? Civil War. Whom does he seek ? Traitors. Where wiU he find them ? Will it be among those soldiers whom he has deceived and sacrificed so often, by mis- leading their valour ? WiU it be in the bosom of those families, whom his very name alone is still sufficient to inspire with terror ? Buonaparte despises us enough to beUeve that we are capable of abandoning a legitimate and beloved sovereign [Louis XVIII], to share the fortunes of a man who is no more than an adventurer. So he thinks, madman that he is ! and his last act of insanity reveals his character completely. Soldiers, the French Army is the bravest in Europe, it will also prove itself the most faithful. Let us rally round the Lilies of France, at the voice of the Father of his people, the worthy heir of the virtues of the Great Henry. He has pointed out to you the duties which you have to fulfil. He has placed at your head that Prince, the model of French Chevaliers, whose happy return to our country has driven the usurper from it, and he sets out now to destroy his only and his last hope. The Minister of War, Duke of Dalmatia. Paris, March 8, 1816. Note. — This Proclamation was promulgated in the Moniteur of March 9, 1815. 263 264 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO No. 2. To Marshal Davout, Prince of Eckmuhl.' Minister of War, Paris. Paris, 30 May, 1815. My Cousin, Several Cuirassier Regiments have mounted men at their depots ; the delay in sending these men to rejoin their regiments has arisen owing to a shortage of Cuirasses ; inform those respon- sible that the reason is inadequate, that you will arrange for forwarding the Cuirasses in question to the service squadrons ; that the raen who are disposable ought not to lose a moment before rejoining their service squadrons, since a man can fight without a cuirass. I beheve that the 11th Regiment is in this state. There are also corps who delay sending on men because they lack sabres ; therefore write in a similar way to these units, that this reason should not prevent them sending forward the men ; and that you will consign the sabres to the service squadrons. Generally it is essential that you should issue a circular memo- randum to this effect. The enemy may attack us at any moment ; and it is necessary that the greatest possible numbers should be in the ranks of the army. Napoleon. No. 3. To Marshal Davout, Prince of Eckmiihl ' Minister of War, Paris. Paris, 3 June, 1815. My Cousin, Issue an order that all Cuirassier Regiments send on all men who are available to join the army in the field, even if the men do not possess Cuirasses. Cuirasses are not indispensable in warfare, and when the men reach the army they will receive their Cuirasses from Paris. Napoleon. No. 4. To Marshal Soult, the Duke of Dalmatia.^ Major-General, Paris. Paris, 7 June, 1815. Issue the most precise orders that, along all the northern frontier and that of the Rhine and of the Moselle, all communica- tions will be broken off, and that no carriages or stage-coaches are to be permitted to cross the frontier. ' Correspondance, No. 21,991. ^ Correspondance, No. 21,999. ' Correspondance, No. 22,027. DOCUMENTS 265 Direct that the most stringent care is exercised so that no letter is despatched across the frontier, if it can possibly be stopped. See the Minister of Police and the Finance Minister, and get them to write to their agents so that aU communications may be interrupted absolutely. Napoleon. No. 5. To Marshal Davout, Prince of Eckmiihl.i Minister of War, Paris. Pabis, 11 June, 1815. My Cousin, Call up Marshal Ney ; tell him, if he wishes to be present when the first battle takes place, that he must be at Avesnes on June 14, there he will find my headquarters. Napoleon. No. 6. Order of the Day. ^ Avesnes, 13 June, 1815. Disposition of the army on June 14. The Imperial Headquarters wiU be at Beaumont. The Infantry of the Imperial Guard will be bivouacked a quarter of a league (three-quarters of a mile) in front of Beau- mont, and will form up in three lines as follows : the Young Guard, then the Chassexxrs, and lastly the Grenadiers. The Duke of Treviso [Marshal Mortier] will reconnoitre the site of this bivouac. He will arrange that everjrthing is properly placed — Artillery, Ambulances, Baggage-wagons, etc. The ist Regiment of Grenadiers wiU move to Beaumont. The Cavalry of the Imperial Guard will be posted in rear of Beaumont, but the furthest corps should not be a league from the place. The II Corps [Reille] will take up its position at Leers, that is to say, as near as possible to the frontier without crossing it. The four divisions which compose this Army Corps will be massed, and their bivouacs will be concentrated on two or three leagues, with the headquarters of the corps in the centre ; the Cavalry will be in front reconnoitring all the passage across the frontier, but they will not cross the latter ; also they will prevent the passage of the frontier by any hostile partisans who may ■wish to attempt it. The bivouacs will be placed so that their ^ This letter is given in the Correspondance, No. 22,042 ; and it explains fully the reason for Marshal Ney's late arrival at the front, and bears out the statement made by him in his report (Appendix II, No. 41). ' Correspondance, No. 22,049. 266 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO fires are screened from the enemy's view ; Generals will prevent troops straying away from the camps ; they wiU assure them- selves that all the troops carry fifty cartridges per man, £is well as fom" days' bread supply, and half a pound of meat ; also that the Artillery and the Ambulances are in good order, and that they are placed in their order of battle. Thus the II Corps will be arranged so that it can commence marching on June 15, at 3 a.m., if ordered to do so, so as to move on Charleroi and reach that place before 9 a.m. The 1st Corps [D'Erlon] will take up its position at Solre-siu-- Sambre, and it will bivouac in several hues ; also in a similar way to the II Corps it will take care that its bivouac fires are concealed from the enemy, that no one is allowed to wander away from the camps ; its Generals will satisfy them- selves about the condition and supply of the ammunition and food carried by the troops, and that the Artillery and Ambulances are placed in their order of battle. The I Corps will hold itself ready to move off on June 15, at 3 a.m., so as to follow the advance of the II Corps, in order that, on the day after to-morrow, these two corps may co-operate and assist one another. The III Corps [Vandamme] will take up its position to-morrow one league in front of Beaumont, placing itself as near as possible to the frontier, but without crossing it ; nor will it permit any hostile bodies to cross it. General Vandamme will keep every man at his post, and he will direct that all fires are concealed, so that they may not be noticed by the enemy. He will conform to the directions issued to the II Corps with reference to the Ammunition, Food, Artillery, and Ambulances, so that his corps may be ready to take the road on June 15, at 3 a.m. The VI Corps [Lobau] also will be in front of Beaumont, and it will bivouac in two lines, at a quarter of a league from the III Corps. Count Lobau will select the site for his bivouac, and he will observe the general instructions which are contained in the present order. Marshal Grouchy will move the I, II, III, and IV Cavalry Corps beyond Beaumont, and he will establish their bivouacs between that town and Valcourt ; the Marshal will respect the frontier, and ensure that no one crosses it ; also he will arrange that his bivouac fires are concealed from the enemy, and he will hold himself in readiness to start at 3 a.m. on the day after to-morrow, if ordered to do so, so as to move on Charleroi, and act as Advanced Guard to the army. He will direct the Generals to satisfy themselves that all the horsemen are provided with small-arm ammunition, that their weapons are in good condition, and that they are supplied with the four days' bread and the half-pound of meat as ordered. The boat-bridging equipment will bivouac in rear of the VI Corps and in front of the Imperial Guard. I. The Central Artillery Park will halt in rear of Beaumont. '' The Army of the Moselle [or IV Corps, Gerard] will take post to-morrow in front of Phihppeville. Count Gerard will arrange so DOCUMENTS 267 that he can commence marching on the day after to-morrow, June 15, at 3 a.m., in order to concentrate with the III Corps, and to second its advance on Charleroi, according to the new order which will be issued to him. But General Gerard will take care to protect his right flank and the head of his advance adequately, by reconnoitring along all the roads running to Charleroi and Namur. Should the Army of the MoseUe possess pontoons. General Gerard will cause them to march as near to the head of his columns as possible, so as to be able to make immediate use of them if need arises. All the Army Corps will cause the Sappers and bridging material (which the Generals have collected) to march at the head of the columns. The Sappers of the Imperial Guard, and those belonging to the Marines, and to the Reserve, wiU foUow the VI Corps, and move at the head of the Guard. All the corps will march in perfect order and closed up. In the advance on Charleroi, every advantage will be taken of all avail- able passages, so as to crush any hostile force that may wish to attack the army, or to manoeuvre against it. Only the Imperial Headquarters will be estabHshed in Beau- mont ; nothing else wiU be placed there, and the town will be kept clear of all obstructions. The old regulations as to the headquarters and the baggage wagons in the order of march, PoUce for the carriages and baggage, and about the washerwomen and vivandieres, wiU be strictly adhered to. Consequently General Officers Commanding Army Corps will make the necessary arrangements, and the chief Provost-Marshal of the Army will see that these orders are carried out. The Emperor directs that all the dispositions detailed in the present order are kept secret by the general officers concerned. By the Emperor's Order, Marshal of the Empire, Major-Oeneral, Duke op Dalmatia.' No. 7. Napoleon's Proclamation to the Armee du Nord.' To the Army. AvESNES, 14 June, 1816. Soldiers, This is the anniversary of Marengo and of Friedland, which twice decided the fortunes of Europe. But then, as after Austerhtz, and as after Wagram, we were too generous ; we behoved the protestations and the oaths of the Kings whom we had left on their thrones. Now, however, they have formed a 1 Correspondance, No. 22,049. " Correspondance, No. 22,052. 268 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO League to overthrow the most sacred rights of France. They have decided on the most unjust aggressions. Let us therefore march to meet them, for are not we and they still the same men ? Soldiers ! at Jena, the Prussians, so arrogant to-day, were three to one against you ; at Montmirail you were one to six. As for the English, let those who have been their prisoners tell the tale of the miseries and tortures they suffered whilst cooped up on their prison-hulks ! Saxons, Belgians, Hanoverians, the forces of the Rhine Con- federacy, groan at being compelled to assist the cause of the Kings, who are the enemies of Justice and of the rights of the people. They know full well that this Coalition will be insatiable. After having swallowed 12,000,000 Poles, 12,000,000 ItaUans, 1,000,000 Saxons, 6,000,000 Belgians, it must needs annex the second-rate States of Germany. Madmen ! a moment of good fortune has blinded their eyes. The oppression and humiliation of France are beyond their powers, if they cross her frontiers it will be but to find their graves. Soldiers ! We shall be called on to make forced marches, to fight battles, and to face dangers ; but, with perseverance, Victory will be ours ; the rights, the honour, the happiness of our country will be regained. For every Frenchman who has a heart, the time has come to conquer or to die ! Napoleon. ' No. 8. March Orders [for the Annie du Nord].^ Beaumont, 14 June, 1815. To-morrow, the 15th, at 2.30 a.m.. General Vandamme's Light Cavalry Division will advance along the Charleroi road. Patrols will be sent out in every direction to reconnoitre the country, and to capture the enemy's advanced posts ; each patrol will consist of not less than fifty men. Before marching off General Vandamme will make sure that the cavalry are provided with small-arm ammunition. At the same time Lieut. -General Pajol will parade the 1st Cavaby Corps, and will foUow the advance of General Demon's Division ; the latter is placed under General Pajol's orders. The divisions of the 1st Cavalry Corps will furnish no detachments, the 3rd Division will furnish such as are necessary. General Demon's Horse Battery will follow, marching immediately behind the leading battalion of the III Infantry Corps, and consequently will come under General Vandamme's orders. Lieut.-General Vandamme will have Reveille sounded at 2.30 a.m. ; and at 3 a.m. his corps will move off in the direction of Charleroi. All his baggage and impedimenta will be parked in rear, and will not take the road until the whole of the ' Correspondance, No. 22,052. - Correspondance, No. 22,053. DOCUMENTS 269 VI Corps and the Lnperial Guard have defiled. The baggage, etc., will come under the orders of the Director-General of Trans- port, together with that of the VT Corps, of the Imperial Guard, and of the Headquaxter Staff, and the before-mentioned officer will issue their march orders to the baggage of these units. Each division of the III Corps will march complete, namely, accompanied by its battery and ambulance wagons ; but every other vehicle seeking to accompany the column of troops will be burned. Count Lobau will cause Reveille to be sounded at 3.30 a.m., he will follow at 4 a.m. with the VI Corps, in rear of General Vandamme's Corps, and act as a support to the latter. His order of march will be identical with that already laid down for the III Corps, and the same orders will hold good for his troops, artillery, hospital equipment, and baggage. The baggage of the \T Corps will be collected with that of the III, under the orders of the Director-General of Transport, as already detailed. The Young Guard will have Reveille sounded at 4.30 a.m., and it will march off at 5 a.m., along the Charleroi road, in rear of the VI Corps. The Chasseurs of the Guard will blow their Reveille at 4 a.m., and will follow in rear of the Young Guard at 5.30 a.m. The (dismounted) Grenadiers of the Guard will sound their Reveille at 5.30 a.m., and will follow in rear of the Chasseurs at 6 a.m. The Imperial Guaxd will observe the same march orders with reference to their artillery, ambulances, and baggage, that have already been laid down for the III Infantry Corps. The baggage of the Guard will join that of the III and VI Corps, and come under the orders of the Director-General of Transport, who will arrange to issue its march orders to it. Marshal Grouchy will cause the Cavalry Corps, which bivouacs nearest to the main road, to be ready at 5.30 a.m., and he will order it to follow the advance on Charleroi ; his other two corps win follow in succession at one hour's interval between each. Marshal Grouchy will be careful to arrange that his corps use lateral roads for their advance, marching on each side of the main road used by the Infantry, in order to avoid crowd- ing ; and also that his Cavalry may preserve a better formation. He will order the whole of his baggage to remain behind in bivouac, parked ajid collected, until orders arrive for its disposal from the Director-General of Transport. Count Reille will have Reveille sounded at 2.30 a.m., and will move off the 11 Corps at 3 a.m. He will march to the bridge at Marchienne, and will arrange to reach that place before 9 a.m. He will cause all the bridges over the Sambre to be guarded, and wiU allow no one to cross them, the piquets which he leaves in charge will be relieved in due course by the I Corps ; but Count Reille will do his utmost to forestall the enemy at the bridges, in order to prevent their demohtion, and especially to seize that 270 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO of Marchienne, which will enable him to cross to the other bank, and which he will arrange to have repaired immediately, if he finds that it has been damaged. At Thuin, and at Marchienne, as well as at the villages en route. Count Reille will interrogate the inhabitants, so as to get the latest news of the enemy's situation. He will cause the letters in the post-offices to be seized, and will open them, forward- ing any information thus gained to the Emperor. Count D'Erlon will march off the I Corps at 3.30 a.m., and will advance on Charleroi, following the march of the II Corps, the left of which he will gain as soon as possible, so as to be able to support it in case of need. He will keep one Cavalry Brigade in rear to screen himself and to keep up con- nection, by small posts, with Maubeuge. He will also push patrols beyond this town in the direction of Mons and Binche ; they are to advance right up to the frontier so as to get news of the enemy, and they are to report immediately anything is ascertained ; these patrols will be careful not to compromise themselves, and they are not to cross over the frontier. Count D'Erlon will arrange to occupy Thuin with a division, and if the enemy has destroyed the bridge there, it is to be repaired at once, and a bridge-head will be traced and constructed on the left bank. The Division occupying Thuin will be responsible also for the bridge at the Abbey at Aulne ; and Count D'Erlon will construct on the left bank another bridge-head at this place. The II Corps will conform to the same march orders as those already detailed for the III Corps, with reference to their artillery, ambulances, and baggage. The I Corps will do likewise. The impedimenta of these two corps will collect on the left of the I Corps, and wiU come under the orders of the Senior Transport Officer. H The IV Corps (Army of the Moselle) has received orders to-day to take up a position in front of Phihppeville. If this movement is completed, and the divisions of this corps are now concen- trated, Lieut.-General Gerard will march them off to-morrow at 3 a.m., and will advance on Charleroi. ^ He will be careful to keep in line with the III Corps, with which corps he will arrange to keep in touch, so as to arrive in front of Charleroi at ^ A further despatch was sent to General Gerard at 3.15 p.m. on June 15, by Marshal Soult, commanding the General to support the right and to miove across the Sambre at Chatelet (some 4 miles below Charleroi). Had General Gerard only been punctual, he would have been magnificently placed to turn the Prussian position at Gilly, and time would have been saved. In this case the Emperor would not have had to postpone the opening of the battle of Ligny, on June 16, so as to allow the IV Corps to come up, and the battle would then have been over at an earlier hour, with the result that the initial direction of the Prussian retreat must have been observed ; then the consequences, following on the Prussian defeat, would have been far more serious for Marshal Bliioher's beaten army. DOCUMENTS 271 the same time that General Vandamme's Corps reaches that point ; but General Gerard will reconnoitre to his right, and observe especially all the roads leading to Namur. He will march closed up and in order of battle, and will leave all his baggage and impedimenta at Philippeville, so that his corps may be able to manoeuvre better, as it will be free of all its encumbrances. General Gerard will order the 14th Cavalry Division (due to reach Philippeville to-day) to follow the IV Corps to Charleroi ; on arrival at the latter place this Cavalry Division will join the 4th Cavalry Corps. Lieut.-Generals ReUle, Vandanune, Gerard, and Pajol, wiU connect with one another frequently by patrols, and will time their advance so as to arrive before Charleroi together, and concentrated. As far as possible they wiU attach to their respective Advanced Guards those officers who speak Flemish, so that they may interrogate the inhabitants and thus gain information ; but these officers will be careful to give out that they merely command patrols, without alluding to the Grand Army in their rear. Lieut.-Generals Reille, Vandamme, and G&ard will arrange that all the Engineers belonging to their corps march in rear of the leading Light Lifantry Regiment, and the Engineers will be accompanied by all the necessary materiel for the repair of bridges ; the Lieut.-Generals will order their Engineer officers to repair aU bad places, to open up lateral conununications, and to bridge those streams that would wet the Infantry when fording them. The Marines, the Sappers of the Guard, and the Sappers of the Reserve, will follow the leading regiment of the III Corps. Lieut.- Generals Rogniat and Haxo will march at their head, they will be accompanied by only 2 or 3 vehicles, and the remainder of the Engineer Park will raarch on the left of the III Corps. If the enemy is encoimtered these troops will not be engaged, but Generals Rogniat and Haxo will use them for bridging rivers, constructing bridge-heads, opening up communications, etc. The Cavalry of the Guard will foUow the advance on Charleroi, marching ofi at 8 a.m. The Emperor will accompany the Advanced Guard on the Charleroi road. The Lieut.-Generals wiU take care to keep His Majesty informed of their various movements, and to transmit all information which they happen to collect. They are warned that His Majesty intends to have passed the Sambre before noon, and to cross the whole army over to the left bank of that river. The bridging train will be divided into two sections, the first section being subdivided into three parts, each consisting of 5 pontoons and 5 Advanced Guard boats, so as to throw 3 bridges over the Sambre. There wiU be a company of pontoon personnel accompanying each of these subdivisions. The first section will follow in rear of the Engineer Park, and after the III Corps. The second section will remain with the ArtUlery Reserve Park, in 272 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO the baggage column, it will have with it the fourth company of the bridging train [personnel]. The Emperor's baggage, and that of the Headquarter Staff, will be collected and marched off at 10 a.m. ; as soon as they have defiled, the Director-General of Transport will put in motion that of the Imperial Guard, followed in succession by that of the III and VI Corps ; at the same time he will send orders to the baggage columns of the Cavalry Reserve to proceed in the direction already taken by the Cavalry. The ambulances of the army will follow the Headquarters, and will march ahead of the baggage ; but, in no case, will the baggage, or the Artillery Reserve Park, or the second section of the bridging train equipment, approach within 3 leagues [about 8 miles] of the army, without express orders from the Major- Oeneral [Chief of the Headquarters Staff], and they will only cross the Sambre when specially ordered to do so. The Director-General of Transport will subdivide the baggage into divisions, each to be placed under an officer, so that any- thing required by Headquarters, or for the use of officers, can be detached. The Commissariat-General will have collected in this column all the administrative baggage and transport vehicles, and their precise places in the column will be assigned. Carriages which are delayed will go to the left, and will only be able to leave their allotted place under orders from the Director-General of Transport. The Emperor commands that all transport vehicles found in Infantry, Cavalry, or Artillery columns are to be burned, as well as the vehicles in the baggage column which leave their allotted place and thus change the order of march, unless they have previously obtained special permission to do so from the Director-General of Transport. For this purpose a detachment of 50 Military Police will be placed under the orders of the Director-General of Transport ; and the latter officer is held personally responsible, as well as the officers of the Military Police and also the Military Police them- selves, for the due execution of these arrangements on which the success of the campaign may depend. By Order of the Emperor, Marshal of the Empire and Major-Gineral, Duke of Dalmatia.^ ' Correspondance, No. 22,053. DOCUMENTS 273 No. 9. Report rendered in the evening of June 15 by Lieut.-General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, commanding the Light Cavalry of the Imperial Guard, to Marshal Ney, Prince of the Moskowa, com- manding the Left Wing of the Armee du Nord.^ To the Marshal Prince of the Moskowa. Fkasnes, 9 p.m., 15 June, 1815. My Lokd (Monseignetjr), When we reached Frasnes, in accordance with your orders, we foimd it occupied by a regiment of Nassau Infantry (some 1500 men), and 8 guns. As they observed that we were manoeuvring to turn them, they retired from the village where we had practically enveloped them with our squadrons. General Colbert [commanding the Lancers of the Guard] even reached within musket shot of Quatre Bras on the high road, but as the ground was difficult, and the enemy fell back for support to the Bossu Wood and kept up a vigorous fire from their 8 guns, it was impossible for us to carry it. The troops which were found at Frasnes had not advanced this morning and were not engaged at GosseHes. They are under the orders of Lord WeUington, and appear to be retiring towards Nivelles. They set light to a beacon at Quatre Bras, and fired their guns a great deal. None of the troops who fought this morning at GosseHes have passed this way, they marched towards Flexirus. The peasants can give no information about a large assembly of troops in this neighbourhood, only that there is a Park of Artil- lery at Tubize, composed of 100 ammunition wagons and 12 grins ; they say that the Belgian Army is in the neighboiirhood of Mons, and that the head-quarters of the Prince of Orange are at Braine-le-Comte. We took about 15 prisoners, and we have had 10 men kiUed and wounded. To-morrow at daybreak, if it is possible, I shall send a recon- noitring party to Quatre Bras so as to occupy that place, for I think that the Nassau troops have left it. A battalion of Infantry has just arrived [from Bachelu's Division], and I have placed it in front of the village. My ArtiUery not having rejoined me, I have sent orders for it to bivouac with Bachelu's Division, it wiU rejoin me to-morrow morning. I have not written to the Emperor, as I have nothing more important to report to him than what I am telling your Excellency. I have the honour, etc., Lefebvee-Desnobttes. * Given by de Bas and de Wommerson, III, pp. 253, 254 ; by Col. James, " 1815," pp. 74, 75 ; and also partly in General PoUio, p. 143. H. — T 274 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO I am sending you a non-commissioned ofiScer to receive the orders of your Excellency. I have the honour to observe to your Excellency that the enemy has shovm no Cavalry in front of us ; but the Artillery is Light Artillery. 1 Note. — General Lefebvre-Desnoettes disposed of less than 2000 horsemen, unsupported by Infantry or Artillery. Opposing his advance was Prince Bernard with over 4000 Infantry and 8 guns. Hence the French Cavalry General did well to press the Nassauers back to Quatre Bras. Obviously he was powerless at that late hour to wrest Quatre Bras from the Nassau Contingent that held it. Nor was such a result by any means desirable {ante, I, 130, 131). In as much as General Lefebvre-Desnoettes reported to Marshal Ney in such detail, it may safely be assumed as Colonel James in fact does) that the Marshal was not present at the extreme front during the brush with the Nassauers. The report is particularly interesting, because it is submitted by an Advanced Cavalry General who had just established contact with a considerable body of the enemy. No. 10. Report submitted by Marshal Ney, commanding the Left Wing of the Armee du Nord, to the Major-Oeneral of the Armee du Nord [Marshal Soult, the Duke of Dalmatia].^ To His Excellency the Major-Oeneral. GOSSELIES, 11 p.m., 15 June, 1815. Marshal, I have the honour to report to Your Excellency that, in accordance with the Orders of the Emperor, I advanced with the Cavalry of General Pir6 and the Infantry of General Bachelu to Gosselies this afternoon, to dislodge the enemy from this point. The enemy made only a slight resistance. After an exchange of 25 to 30 cannon-shots he fell back through Heppignies to Fleurus. We have made 500 to 600 Prussian prisoners from the corps of General Zieten. This is the situation of the troops : General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, with the Lancers and the Chasseurs of the Guard, at Frasnes. General Bachelu with the 5th Division at Mellet. General Foy with the 9th Division at Gosselies. ' Prince Bernard of Saxe- Weimar stated that the guns at Frasnea were Dutch horse artillery guns (see his Report, No. 45). 2 Given by de Bas and de Wommerson, III, pp. 252-253 ; by Colonel James, " 1815," pp. 76, 77 ; and partly given by General Pollio, p. 144.^ DOCUMENTS 275 The Light Cavalry of General Pire at Heppignies. I do not know where Greneral ReiUe is. Gteneral D'Erlon has sent to inform me that he is at Jumet with the greater portion of his Army Corps. I have just sent him the instructions prescribed in Your Excellency's letter of to-day's date. I annex to my letter a report received from General Lefebvre-Desnoettes. Accept, Marshal, the assurance of my great regard. Ney. No. 11. To Lieut.-General Sir Henry Clinton, g.c.b.* Bbuxelles, 15 June, 1815, 1 p.m. My deae Clinton, Some of the general officers would wish very much to have the divisions numbered over again, and have their old numbers, which appears to be a very natural wish ; and I should be very much obUged to you if you would let me know as soon as you can if you participate in it. They would stand thus : — Present Nuinbers. New Numbers. General Officers. 1 1 General Cooke. 2 6 Sir H. Clinton. 3 5 Sir C. Alten. 4 2 Sir C. Colville. 5 3 Sir T. Picton. 6 4 Sir L. Cole. Beheve me, etc. (Signed) Wellington. Lieut.-General Sir H. Clinton, g.c.b. No. 12. From the Duke of WelKngton's Despatches. 1838 Edition; Xn, 472-3. 1852 Edition; VUl, 142-3. Memorandum for the D.Q.M.G. Instructions for Colonel Sir W. De Lancey, the D.Q.M.G., to Movements of the Army. be sent forthwith to Lieut.- General Lord Hill, the Prince Bruxelles, June 15, 1815. of Orange and the Earl of Uxbridge. Brussels, June 15, 1815, 5 p.m. * Given in the Wellington Despatches, XII, pp. 469, 470 (edition, 1838). This letter is also given in VIII, p. 140 (of the 1852 edition) ; the body of the letter is the same in both books, but in the 1852 re- print the opening words, " My dear Clinton," and the signature are not given. 276 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO 1838 Edition. General Dornberg's Brigade of Cavalry and the Cumberland Hussars to march this night upon Vilvorde, and to bivouac on the high road, near to that town. The Earl of Uxbridge will be pleased to collect the Cavalry this night at Ninhove, leaving the 2nd Hussars looking out between the Scheldt and the Lys. The 1st Division of Infantry to collect this night at Ath and adjacent, and to be in readi- ness to move at a moment's notice. The 3rd Division to collect this night at Braine-le-Comte, and to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice. The 4th Division to be collected this night at Grammont, with the exception of the troops beyond the Scheldt, which are to be moved to Aude- narde. The 5th Division, the 81st Regi- ment, and the Hanoverian Brigade of the 6th Division, to be in readiness to march from BruxeUes at a moment's notice. The Duke of Brunswick's Corps to collect this night on the high road between BruxeUes and Vilvorde. The Nassau troops to collect at daylight to-morrow morning on the Louvain road, and to be in readiness to move at a moment's notice. The Hanoverian Brigade of th» 5th Division to collect this night at Hal, and to be in 1852 Edition. 1. General Dornberg's Brigade and the Cumberland Hussars to march this night upon Vyvorde. 2. Lord Uxbridge to collect his Cavalry this night upon Nin- hove, leaving the 2nd Hussars looking out between the Scheldt and the Lys. 3. The 1st Division to remain as they are at Enghien, and all in readiness to march at a moment's notice. 4. The 2nd Division to collect this night at Ath and adja- cent, and to be in readiness to march at a moment's notice. 5. The 3rd Division at Braine- le-Comte, the same. 6. The 4th Division to be col- lected at Grammont, with the exception of the troops be- yond the Scheldt, which are to be brought to Audenarde. 7. The 5th and 6th Divisions in readiness at a moment's notice. 8. The Brigade at Ghent to march to Brussels in the evening. 9. The Duke of Brunswick to collect to-night on the high road from BruxeUes to Vil- vorde, the Nassau troops on the Louvain road, and both ready to march in the morn- ing. DOCUMENTS 277 1838 Edition. readiness at daylight to-mor- row moming to move towards BruxeUes, and to halt on the high road between Alost and Assche for further orders. The Prince of Orange is re- quested to collect at NiveUes the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the Army of the Low Coun- tries ; and, should that point have been attacked this day, to move the 3rd Division of British Infantry upon NiveUes as soon as collected. This movement is not to take place until it is quite certain that the enemy's attack is upon the right of the Prussian Army, and the left of the British Army. Lord HiU will be so good as to order Prince Frederick of Orange to occupy Audenarde with 500 men, and to collect the 1st Division of the Army of the Low Countries, and the Lidian Brigade at Sotteghem, so as to be ready to march in the morning at dayhght. The Reserve Artillery to be in readiness to move at day- hght. Wet.t.tngton. 1852 Edition. 10. The Prince of Orange, who is now at Alava's, to be directed to collect at NiveUes the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the Low Countries ; and in case that point should have been attacked this day, to move the 3rd Division and 1st Division upon NiveUes as soon as coUected. This movement not to take place until it is quite certain that the enemy's attack is upon the Prussian right or our left. 11. Lord HiU to be directed to order Prince Frederick of Orange to occupy Audenarde with 500 men, and to coUect the 1st Division of the Army of the Low Countries and the Indian Brigade at Sotteghem, so as to be ready to march in the morning at dayhght. The Reserve ArtiUery, etc., to be in readiness to move at daylight. Note. — The discrepancies between the two documents are explainable in several ways, some are obvious errors made in copying, also the original was lost, with apparently aU Sir W. de Lancey's papers, thus there were avaUable from which to reconstruct this memorandum only copies of the original, and of the orders actually issued. No copies of this Memorandum are given in Vol. X of the Supplementary Despatches, nor in Vol. XIV, Appendix volume to the Supplementary Despatches. Major-General C. W. Robinson, c.b., has dealt with this subject most fuUy in his article on " Waterloo and the de Lancey Memorandimi" (published in the R.U.S.I. Journal, 1910), conse- quently the documents are only reproduced here because the books in which they are to be found are aU out of print, and are not always to be found aU together when required. It is obvious that aU four copies of the various editions must be consulted together, as one edition is complementary to the other. 278 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO No. 13. 1838 Edition ; XII, 474. Movements of the Army. After Orders, 10 p.m. Bruxelles, June 15, 1815. The 3rd Division of Infantry to continue its movement from Braine - le - Comte upon Nivelles. The 1st Division to move from Enghien upon Braine-le- Comte. The 2nd and 4th Divisions of Infantry to move from Ath and Grammont, also from Audenarde, and to continue their movements upon Enghien. The Cavaby to continue its movement from Ninhove upon Enghien. The above movements to take place with as little delay as possible. Wellington 1852 Edition ; VIII, 142. Additional Instructions. Issued June 15, 1815, 10 p.m. The Troops in Bruxelles (5th and 6tli Divisions, Duke of Brunswick's and Nassau Troops) to march when as- sembled from Bruxelles by the road of Namur to the point where the road to NiveUes separates ; to be followed by General Dorn- berg's Brigade and the Cumberland Hussars. The 3rd Division to move from Braine-le-Comte upon Nivelles. The 1st Division from Enghien upon Braine-le-Comte. The 2nd and 4th Divisions upon Enghien from Ath and Gram- mont, also from Audenarde, and to continue their move- ment upon Enghien. The Cavalry upon Enghien from Ninhove. Note. — The original instructions were lost with Colonel Sir W. de Lancey's papers. The above were compiled from the orders issued to various officers. The above instructions are not given either in the Supple- mentary Despatches, or in their Appendix volume. DOCUMENTS 279 No. 14. Disposition of the Army at 7 a.m., June 16, 1815. Memorandum by Sir W. De Lancey, d.q.m.g. 1st Division. 2nd 3rd Braine-le-Comte. Nivelles. Marching to Nivelles and Quatre Bras. Marching to Nivelles. Marching to Quatre Bras. 4th Audenarde. Marching to Braine-Ie Comte. 5th 6th Beyond Waterloo. Assche. Marching to Genappe. Marching to Genappe Hal. Beyond Waterloo. 5th Hanoverian Brigade. 4th Hanoverian Brigade. 2nd Division fArmy of thel 3rd Division \Low Countries/ 1st Division and J r, , . , Indian Brigade.) " Sotteghem. Maj.-Gen. Dornberg's Beyond Waterloo. Brigade and Cum- berland Hussars. Remainder of the Braine-Ie-Comte. Cavalry. Duke of Brunswick's Beyond Waterloo. Corps. Nassau Corps. Beyond Waterloo. and Quatre 'Bras. Maxching to Genappe and Quatre Bras. Marching to Genappe and Quatre Bras. At Nivelles and Quatre Bras. Marching to Enghien. Marching to Genappe and Quatre Bras. Marching to Nivelles and Quatre Bras. Marching to Genappe. Marching to Genappe. The above dispositions written out for the information of the Commander of the Forces by Sir W. de Lancey. The centre column of nanaes indicates the places at which the troops had arrived, or were moving on. The column on the right of the paper indicates the places the troops were ordered to proceed to at 7 o'clock a.m., June 16, previous to any attack on the British. (Signed) De Lacy Evans, Note. — The above is given in the 1852 edition of the WeUington Despatches, Vol. Vm, p. 143. Major-General C. W. Robinson, O.B., has pointed out in his article on " Waterloo and the de Lancey Memorandum," that the author of this memo, died from the wounds which he received at Waterloo, the original does not appear to be in existence, and what is available ia only a copy of a copy. The original was 280 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO necessarily put together in a hurry ; it is timed " 7 a.m., June 16," and the Reserve had long since started from Brussels. If the words " Disposition of the Army at 7 a.m., on June 16," are merely held to mean the disposal of the Army, in other words what arrangements had been made for, and directions given to, the various divisions at 7 a.m., then the memorandum is under- standable, and it suffices to show how the various divisions had been directed, quite irrespective of where they actually were at 7 a.m. This explanation. General Robinson shows, is the only reasonable and sane meaning to attach to this otherwise per- plexing document. In considering the document. Sir W. de Lancey's great ability and long experience as a Staff Officer under the Duke must be recollected, and also the fact that the Duke of Wellington had personally selected Colonel de Lancey as his Chief of the Staff. Therefore the latter officer was unlikely to compile a careless, or inaccurate, document. Thus the document must be regarded merely as a precis, which is intended to give the disposal of the Anglo-Dutch Army at 7 a.m., on June 16, and not as giving the actual positions of the Army at that hour. This relieves the document of the charge of being a " most misleading statement " ; and naturally it had nothing whatever to do with Bliicher's determination to stand and receive battle at Ligny. (A similar copy appears in the Supplementary Despatches, 1863 edition, Vol. X, p. 496. It does not appear at all in the 1838 edition, or in the Appendix volume to the Supplementary Volumes.) No. 15. To Marshal Ney, Prince of the Moskowa, Commanding the Left Wing of the Armee du Nord.^ Chaelesoi, 16 June, 1815. My Cousnsr, My Aide-de-Camp, General de Flahault, is directed to de- liver this letter to you. The Major-Oeneral [Soult] should have given you orders, but you will receive mine first because my officers travel faster than his. You will receive the operation orders for the day, but I wish to write to you in detail because it is of the highest importance. I am sending Marshal Grouchy with the 3rd and 4th Infantry Corps to Sombrefie. I am taking my Guard to Fleurus, and I shall be there myself before midday. I shall attack the enemy if I find him there, and I shall clear the roads as far as Gembloux. At that place, according to the circumstances, I shall come to a decision — perhaps at 3 p.m., and perhaps this evening. My intention is that, immediately after I have made up my ^ Correspondance, No. 22,058. DOCUMENTS 281 mind, you will be ready to rtlarch on Brussels. I shall support you with my Guard, who will be at Fleurus, or at Sombrefie, and I shall wish to reach Brussels to-morrow morning. You will set off with your troops this evening, if I make up my mind early enough for you to be informed of my intention by day, and then this evening you will cover three or four leagues [8 to 10 miles] and reach Brussels by 7 a.m. to-morrow morning. Therefore you will dispose your troops as foUows : — 1st Division 2 leagues [5 miles] in front of Quatre Bras, if it is not inconvenient ; 6 Infantry Divisions around Quatre Bras, and a Division at Marbais, in order that I can move it myself to Sombrefie, should I need its assistance, besides it wiU not delay your march. The corps of the Count of Valmy, who has 3000 Cuirassiers, picked troops, will be placed where the Roman road cuts and crosses the Brussels road, in order that I can call him in to me if necessary. As soon as my course of action has been taken you will order him to move and rejoin you. I should desire to have with me the Division of the Guard [Cavaby] commanded by General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, and I send you two divisions of the Count of Vaimy's Corps to replace it. But in my actual scheme I prefer placing the Count of Valmy so that I can recall him if I wish to, and I do not wish to cause General Lefebvre- Desnoettes to make unnecessary marches, since it is probable that I shall decide to march on Brussels this evening with the Guard. However, you will cover the Lefebvre Division by the Cavalry Divisions belonging to D'Erlon's and Reille's Corps, in order to spare the Guard ; and if any fighting occurs with the English it is preferable that this should faU on the Cavalry of the Line rather than on the Guard. I have adopted for this campaign the following general principle, to divide my army into two wings and a reserve. Your wing will be composed of four divisions of the 1 Corps, four divisions of the II Corps, two divisions of Light Cavalry, and two divisions of the corps of the Count of Vahny. This ought not to faU short of 45,000 to 50,000 men. Marshal Grouchy wiU have almost the same force, and will command the right wing. The Guard will form the Reserve, and I shall bring it into action on either wing just as the actual circumstances may dictate. The Major-Oeneral issues the most precise orders, so that when you are detached you should not find any difficulty in obey- ing such orders as you receive ; general officers commanding corps will take orders directly from me when I am present in person. Also according to circumstances I shall draw troops from one wing to strengthen my Reserve. You understand how much importance is attached to the taking of Brussels. From its capture certain things would happen, because such a quick and sudden movement would cut the English Army from Mons, Ostende, etc. I desire that your dispositions 282 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO may be well conceived, so that at the first order your eight divisions will take the road at once and march rapidly and unhindered to B™ssels. Napoleon. Note. — This was the most important letter written by the Emperor during the campaign. In it the whole strategic concep- tion of the manoeuvre in " two wings and a Reserve " is outlined with marvellous, almost miraculous, lucidity. From it Ney should have detected at once the compensating nature of the conception. Further, the Emperor especially pointed out that he would only issue orders personally, or directly, to officers commanding corps when he was present himself. This must be recollected when the celebrated " pencil note " is being considered. In fui'ther proof of this a letter of the same date addressed to Vandamme is attached hereto. No. 16. A similar letter was written to General Gerard and taken by Crova, vide Batty, pp. 151, 152, • No. 16. To Lieut.-General Count Vandamme.' (Carried by M. Guyardin.) Chableboi, 16 June, 1815. General, The Emperor orders you to march on Sombreffe with the III Corps ; the IV Corps and the Cavalry Reserve are also proceeding to the same place. His Majesty commands that you place yourself under Marshal Grouchy, who has been appointed to the command of a wing of the army ; hence you will inform him of the movement you are making, and you will send to him immediately an officer to obtain any orders which he may have for you, but you will not delay the commencement of your march on this account. Count Grouchy ought now to be found near Fleurus. You will only receive direct orders from the Emperor when His Majesty is present in person ; but you will continue to render your reports and states as he has prescribed. Major-Oeneral [Chief of the Staff] of the Army. (Signed) The Duke of Dalmatia. ' The above letter is given, in French, by Captain Batty, Appendix XI, pp. 152, 153. DOCUMENTS 283 No. 17. To Marshal Count Grouchy,' Commanding the Right Wing of the Armee du Nord. Chaelekoi, June 16, 1815. My Cousin, My Aide-de-Camp, La Bedoyere, is directed to dehver this letter to you. The Major-General should have informed you of my intentions ; but as his officers are badly mounted my Aide-de-Camp wiU perhaps rea^h you first. My intention is that, as the commander of the right wing, you wiU take co mm and of the III Corps, commanded by General Vandamme, of the IV Corps, commanded by General Gerard, and of the Cavalry Corps commanded by Generals Pajol, MUhaud, and Exelmans, this force should not fall far short of 50,000 men. Proceed with this (the right wing) to Sombrefie. Consequently march oS in succession the corps of Generals Pajol, Mfihaud, Exel m ans, and Vandamme, and, without halting, move to Som- brefie. The IV Corps, which is at Chatelet, has been ordered to march straight to Sombrefie, without moving through Fleurus. This is important, because I am moving my head-quarters to Fleurus, and it is essential to avoid blocking the roads in that place. Send an officer at once to General Gerard to inform him of your move, so that he may commence his march. My intention is that all the generals shall receive their orders directly from you ; they will not take my orders unless I happen to be present in person. I shall be at Fleurus between 10 and 11 a.m. ; I shall move to Sombrefie, leaving my Guard, both horse and foot, at Fleurus ; I shall advance the Guard to Sombrefie only in case of necessity. If the enemy are at Sombrefie I desire to attack them ; I wish to attack them even if they are at G«m- bloux, and also to occupy this position ; my intention being, after gaining possession of these two positions, to set out by night and to co-operate with Marshal Ney and my left wing in a stroke against the English. Thus do not waste a moment, because the more rapidly I manoeuvre the more favourable it wiU be for the rest of my operations. I presume that you are at Fleurus. Keep in constant cormnunication with General G6rard, so that he can support you in an attack on Sombrefie, if that is necessary. Girard's Division (II Corps] has moved to Fleurus ; do not use it at all unless it is absolutely necessary, because it will have to march all night. Also leave my Young Guard and all its artillery at Fleurus. The Count of Valmy [Kellermann] is advancing on the Brussels road with his two Divisions of Cuirassiers, he is attached to Marshal Ney, so as to assist this evening's operations on the left wing. As I have remarked, I shall be at Fleurus between 10 and 1 1 a.m. '■ Correspmidance, No. 22,059. 284 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Submit reports to me, giving me all the information that you collect. Take care that the Fleurus road is kept free. All the news that I possess is to the effect that the Prussians cannot oppose us with more than 40,000 men. Napoleon. Note. — The importance of this letter Hes in the fact that it is the corollary to the letter written to Marshal Ney (No. 15), and that it shows with great clearness the Emperor's plan early on this day. The letter to Marshal Grouchy from Marshal Soult, carried by Major Hirne of Soult's staff, is given by Captain Batty, Appen- dix IX, pp. 150-151 ; it is obviously the one alluded to by the Emperor, but it is not reproduced here because it contains no further instructions for the Marshal commanding the Right Wing. No. 18. To His Excellency the Duke of Dalmatia.' Fbasnes, 11 a.m., 16 June, 1815. Gbnebal, I have this moment received your instructions for the I and II Infantry Corps, and for the following Cavalry Divisions — Pir6, Light Cavalry of the Guard, and the 2 divisions of the 3rd Corps (Vabny). The Emperor's instructions have already reached me. Here are the dispositions that I have ordered : — The II Corps [Reille] will place a division in rear of Genappe, another at Bauterlet, and the two others at Quatre Bras. A division of Light Cavalry will cover the march of the II Corps. The I Corps [D'Erlon] will place a division at Marbais, and the two others at Frasnes,'' and the Light Cavalry Division [of the I Corps] will be placed at Marbais. The Count of Valmy's [Kellermann's] two Cavalry Divisions will be placed one at Frasnes and the other at Liberchies. The two divisions of Light Cavalry of the Guard' will remain at Frasnes, where I shall establish my head-quarters. All information to hand tends to show that there are 3000 hostile Infantry at Quatre Bras and very few Cavalry. I think that the Emperor's arrangements for the advance on Brussels will be carried out without great difi&culty. The Marshal Prince of the Moskowa, Ney. Note. — About 11 a.m. Napoleon's instructions (No. 15, here- with) and Soult's despatch were both in Marshal Ney's hands. ' General Pollio, pp. 186, 187. ^ The Marshal appears to have overlooked D'Erlon's foxirth division. ' The Marshal was mistaken, there was only one division. DOCUMENTS 285 No. 19. Wellington to Bliicher.i On the heights behind Frasnes, 10.30 a.m., 16 June, 1815. My deae Prince, My army is disposed as follows : — The Prince of Orange's Corps has a division here at Quatre Bras, the remainder are at Nivelles. The Reserve is now marching from Waterloo to Genappe, where it wiU arrive at midday. At the same hour the Enghsh Cavalry will have attained Nivelles. Lord Hill's Corps is at Braine-le-Comte. I do not see many of the enemy in front of us, and I await the receipt of news from Your Highness, and the arrival of my troops, to decide on my operations for this day. Nothing has been seen in the direction of Binche, nor on our right. Your very Obedient Servant, Wellington. No. 20. To the Marshal Prince of the Moskowa.'i Charleroi, 16 June, 1815. Marshal, A Lancer ofScer has just told the Emperor that the enemy is showing masses of troops at Quatre Bras. Concentrate the corps of Counts Reille and D'Erlon and that of the Cotmt of Valmy, who at this moment is marching to join you ; with these troops you will attack and overthrow any hostile forces who may present themselves. Bliicher was yesterday at Namur, and it is unlikely that he has moved troops towards Quatre Bras ; thus you will only be confronted by those who come from Brussels. Marshal Grouchy is now carrying out the advance on Sombreffe that I have already acquainted you with, and the Emperor is just starting for Fleurus, consequently to that place you will address all further reports that you desire to submit to His Majesty. Marshal of the Empire, Major-Oeneral, [About 10 a.m.] Duke op Dalmatia. ' This letter is given in facsimile by Major-General C. W. Robinson, C.B., in Wellington's Campaigns, pp. 562-563. It was written in French. The handwriting has given rise to several difierences of opinion ; but I believe that the sense is as it is given above. ' This despatch is given by Captain Batty, Appendix XII A, p. 153. 286 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO No. 21. To the Marshal Prince of the Moskowa.' Before Fleueus, 2 p.m., 16 June, 1815. Marshal, The Emperor desires me to inform you that the enemy has collected a body of troops [un corps de troupes] between Sombreffe and Brye, and at 2.30 p.m.. Marshal Grouchy with the III and IV Corps will attack the enemy's position. His Majesty's desire is that you will attack whatever force of the enemy is directly opposed to you, and after having driven it aside you will turn in our direction, so as to bring about the envelopment of that body of the enemy's troops whom I have just mentioned to you. If the latter is overthrown first, then His Majesty will manoeuvre in your direction, so as to assist your operations in a similar way. Inform the Emperor forthwith of your dispositions, and of all that goes on in your front. Marshal of the Empire, Major-General, Duke of Dalmatia. At the back of this order was written : — To the Marshal Prince of the Moskowa, at Gosselies, on the Brussels road. And in pencil — Wagnee, Bois de Lambuc. (These names obviously detailed the road which the orderly officer was to follow.) On a duplicate of this order is to be found : — To the Marshal Prince of the Moskowa, at Gossehes, on the Brussels road. Wagn6e, Ransart. No. 22. To the Marshal Prince of the Moskowa. ^ In front of Fletirus, 3.15 p.m., 16 Jmm€, 1815. Marshal, I wrote to you an hour ago to inform you that, at 2.30 p.m., the Emperor would attack the position taken up by the enemy between the villages of S. Amand and Brye. At this moment the action is in full swing. ' This despatch is given by Captain Batty, Appendix XII B, p. 154. * This despatch is given by Captain Batty, Appendix XIII, pp. 154r-155. DOCUMENTS 287 His Majesty desires me to tell you that you are to mancBuvre immediately in such a manner as to envelop the enemy's right and fall upon his rear ; the army in our front is lost if you act with energy. The fate of France is in your hands. Thus do not hesitate even for a moment to carry out the manoeuvre ordered by the Emperor, and direct your advance on the heights of Brye and S. Amand so as to co-operate in a victory that may well turn out to be decisive. The enemy has been caught in the very act of carrying out his concentration with the English. Marshal of the Empire, Major-General, Duke of Dalmatia. No. 23. To His Excellency the Duke of Dalmatia.^ Fkasnes, 16 June, 1815, 10 p.m. Mabshal, I have attacked the Enghsh position at Quatre Bras with the greatest vigour ; but an error of Count D'Erlon's deprived me of a fine victory, for at the very moment when the 5th and 9th Divisions of General ReiUe's Corps had overthrown everything in front of them, the I Corps marched off to S. Amand to support His Majesty's left ; but the really fatal thing was that this Corps, having then counter-marched to rejoin my wing, gave no useful assistance on either field. Prince Jerome's Division fought with great valour ; His Royal Highness has been sHghtly wounded. Actually there have been engaged here [on our side] only 3 Infantry Divisions, a Brigade of Cuirassiers, and General Fire's Cavalry. The Count of Vakny deUvered a fine charge. All have done their duty, except the I Corps. The enemy has lost heavily ; we have captured some guns and a flag. We have only lost about 2000 kiUed and 4000 wounded. I have called for reports from Generals Reille and D'Erlon, and will forward them to Your Excellency. Accept, Marshal, the assurance of my deep respect, The Marshal Prince of the Moskowa, Ney. Note. — This letter was found apparently by General PoUio, and the General reproduces it in facsimile, giving a photograph of the original which was sent to him by the present Prince de la Moskowa, the great-grandson of Marshal Ney and the owner of the original. The order is both important and interesting. It is • Given, ia facsimile, by General Pollio, pp. 248-249. 288 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO a letter in Ney's characteristic handwriting ; but so far, until General Pollio found it, it had escaped the notice of previous historians. It proves, on that very night, Ney did submit a short report of his action to the Major-General, giving a general account of his engagement with the Duke of Welhngton. But it is clear that the Marshal has glozed over the upshot of that encounter, for the reference to his captures seems to imply that he has won after a bitter fight, and that it was D'Erlon's absence that prevented him from destrojring his foe. On the other hand, the report made no mention of the recall order that Ney undoubtedly sent to the Commander of the I Corps. The casualties are instructive, for the proportion of killed to wounded (1 to 2) is very high, and it testifies eloquently enough to the fierce nature of the struggle. No. 24. To the Marshal Prince of the Moskowa.' Fleueus, Between 7-8 a.m., 17 June, 1815. Marshal, General Flahault, who has just reached here [from you], reports that you are still in doubt about the precise result of yesterday's operations on this wing. I thought that I had already acquainted you of the victory which the Emperor gained. The Prussian Army has been routed, and General Pajol is now pur- suing it along the roads leading to Namur and Liege. We have captured some thousands of prisoners and 30 guns. Our troops behaved splendidly, an attack made by six battalions of the Guard, some head-quarter squadrons {des escadrons de service'], and General Delort's Cavalry Division, pierced the enemy's line, the greatest disorder then broke out in their ranks, and we captured the Prussian position. The Emperor is proceeding to the Bry Windmill, past which runs the Namur and Quatre Bras high road ; and, as it is possible that the English Army will engage your command, then, in such circumstances, the Emperor would march by the Quatre Breis road against the enemy in front of you, whilst you attacked them in front with your divisions, which ought now to be concentrated ; and in such an eventuality the hostile army would be annihilated immediately. You must report to His Majesty the precise dispositions of your divisions, and all that goes on in your front. Yesterday the Emperor remarked with regret that you had not massed yoiir divisions ; they acted spasmodically, and consequently you suSered disproportionate loss. ^ This despatch is given by Siborne, in his Waterloo Campaign, pp. 357-358. DOCUMENTS 289 Not an Englishman would have escaped if the corps of Counts ReiUe and D'Erlon had been kept together. If Count D'Erlon had carried out the movement on S. Amand, prescribed by the Emperor, then the Prussian Army would have been totally destroyed, and we might have captured 30,000 prisoners. All the time the corps of Generals G6rard and Vandamme, and the Imperial Guard, have been massed for the stroke, one risks a reverse if dehberately one engages piecemeal in action. The Emperor hopes and desires that your seven Infantry Divisions and the Cavalry are concentrated, and that they occupy no more than a league of ground, so as to have the whole force in hand, and ready for immediate action in case of need. His Majesty's intention is that you will take up a position at Quatre Bras, as you were ordered to do ; but if it is impossible to act in this manner send a detailed report immediately and the Emperor will move thither along the road already mentioned ; if, on the other hand, you are only confronted by a rear-guard, drive it off, and occupy the position. To-day is required for completing this operation, replenishing ammunition, gathering stragglers and detachments. Give the necessary orders to carry out your part ; see that all the wounded are attended to, and then sent to the rear ; com- plaints are rife that the Medical Service has not done its work well. The well-known partisan leader, Liitzow, who has been taken prisoner, stated that the Prussian Army was lost, and that for the second time Blvicher had jeopardised the Prussian Monarchy. Marshal of the Empire, Major-Qeneral, Duke op Dalmatia. No. 25. To the Marshal Prince of the Moskowa.^ In front of Liqny, Noon, 17 June, 1815. Mabshal, The Emperor has just placed in position before Marbais a corps of Infantry and the Imperial Guard. His Majesty desires me to tell you his intention is that you shall attack the enemy at Quatre Bras, and drive them from their position ; the corps at Marbais will support your opera- tions. His Majesty is going to Marbais, and waits impatiently for your report. Marshal of the Empire, Major-General, Duke of Dalmatia. n. — TJ Given by Sibome in his Waterloo, p. 358. 290 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO No. 26. Instructions for the Movement of the Army on June 17.' From the Duke of Wellington to Lord Hill. To General Lord Hill, g.o.b. June 17, 1815. The 2nd Division of British Infantry to march from Nivelles to Waterloo at 10 o'clock [a.m.]. The brigades of the 4th Division, now at Nivelles, to march from that place on Waterloo at 10 o'clock. Those brigades of the 4th Division at Braine-le-Comte, and on the road from Braine-le- Comte to Nivelles, to collect and halt at Braine-le-Comte this day. ' The above is given in the 1838 edition of the Dispatches, XII, p. 475. Instructions issued by the Duke of Wellington on June 16 (for June 17) are given in Vol. VIII of the Dispatches (pp. 143, 144 of the 1852 edition). They ordered the 2nd Division to move to Quatro Bras from Nivelles at daybreak on June 17, whilst the 4th Division was ordered to start for Nivelles at the same time. The Reserve Artillery was also to move to Quatre Bras at the same hour. Major-General Lambert's Brigade was to start from Assohe at the same time, and march to Genappe, along the Namur road. (These orders were all dated " June 16," and appear to have bete written from Genappe. ) The full orders for June 17 (edition 1852, p. 144) ran as follows : — Instructions for the movement of the army, June 17, 1815. Quatre Bras, 9 a.m. The 1st Division to keep picquets only in the wood on the right of the high road, and to be collected on the road to Nivelles, in rear of the wood. The 2nd Division to march from Nivelles to Waterloo at 10 o'clock. The 3rd Division to collect upon the left of the position, holding by its picquets to the ground it now occupies. The 4th Brigade, 4th Division, now at Nivelles, to march from Nivelles upon Waterloo at 10 o'clock. The Brigades of the 4th Division on the road from Braine-le- Comte, or at Braine-le-Comte, to coUeot and halt this day at Braine- le-Comte. All the baggage on the road from Braine-le-Comte to Nivelles to be sent back to Braine-le-Comte, and to be sent from thence to Hal and Brussels. The 5th Division to collect upon the right of the position in three lines, and the 95th Regiment to hold the gardens. The 6th Division to be collected in columns of battalions, showing their heads only on the heights on the left of the position of Quatre Bras. The Brunswick Corps to be collected in the wood on the Nivelles road, holding the skirts with their picquets only. The Nassau troops to be collected in the rear of the wood on the Nivelles road, holding the skirts with their picquets only. The 2nd Division of the troops of the Netherlands to march from DOCUMENTS 291 All the baggage on the road from Braine-le-Comte to Nivelles to retiirn immediately to Braine-le-Comte, and to proceed immedi- ately from thence to Hal and Brussels. The spare musket ammunition to be immediately parked behind Genappe. The corps under the command of Prince Frederick of Orange win move from Enghien this evening and take up a position in front of Hal, occupying Braine-Ie-Chateau with two battalions. Colonel Estorff will fall back with his brigade on Hal, and place himself under the orders of Prince Frederick. Wellington. No. 27. ■ The Duke of Welhngton's Orders. Instructions to Major-General the Hon. Sir C. Colville, g.c.b.' June 17, 1815. The Army retired this day from its position at Quatre Bras to its present position in front of Waterloo. The brigades of the 4th Division at Braine-le-Comte are to retire at daylight to-morrow morning upon Hal. Major-General ColviUe must be guided by the intelligence he their present ground on Waterloo at 10 o'clock [then marching]. The march to be in columns of half-companies at quarter distance. The 3rd Division of the troops of the Netherlands to march from Nivelles at 10 o'clock. The spare Musket Ammunition to be transported behind Genappe, as weU as the Keserve Artillery. The wagons of the Reserve Artillery to be parked in the Foret de Soignes. The British Cavalry to be formed at 1 o'clock in three lines in rear of the position at Quatre Bras, to cover the movement of the infantry to the rear, and the retreat of the rear-guard. Note. — ^The foregoing orders issued at about 9 o'clock on the morning of the 17th June, on the ground of the action at Quatre Bras, in consequence of the Prussian Army being found to have retired from the position of Ligny. Copied from the Duke's writing. Saw the Duke write them while seated on the ground. They are my own original copies, taken at the moment. De Lacy Evans. The above note is given in italics, in the 1852 edition of the Dis- patches, VIII, p. 144. At the same place is also the following : — Memorandum. June 17, 1815. The Corps under Prince Frederick of Orange wiU move from Enghien this evening, and take up a position in front of Hal, occupying the ChS.teau with two battahons. Colonel Estorff will fall back with his brigade on Hal, and place himself under the orders of Prince Frederick of Orange. * This order is given in the 1838 edition (XII, p. 476), and in the 1852 edition (VIII, p. 144) ; the two copies are identical. 292 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO receives of the enemy's movements in his maxch to Hal, whether he moves by the direct route or by Enghien. Prince Frederick of Orange is to occupy with his corps the position between Hal and Enghien, and is to defend it as long as possible. The army will probably continue in its position in front of Waterloo to-morrow. Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens will inform Major-General Sir C. Colville of the position and situation of the armies. Note. — The orders issued by Napoleon to Marshal Grouchy on June 17, 1815, are given in Vol. I, pp. 318-319, and need not be repeated here. No. 28. Grouchy to Napoleon.' Gemblotjx, 10 p.m., 17 June, 1815. SiBE, I have the honour to report that I have occupied Gembloux, with my Cavalry at Sauveniere. The enemy, to the number of 35,000 men, continue their retreat ; we have captured here 400 cattle and food magazines, as well as heavy baggage. From all reports to hand, the enemy appear to have divided at Sauveniere into two columns, one marching on Wavre via Sart-^- Walhain, whilst the other is heading for Perwez. Perhaps it may be inferred that one portion is going to join Wellington, whilst the centre, \mder Bliioher, retires on Liege ; another column, accompanied by guns, has already retreated to Namiir. This evening General Exelmans is pushing six squadrons of Cavalry towards Sart-a-Walhain, and three to Perwez. When their reports are to hand, then if I find that the mass of the Prussians is retiring on Wavre I shall follow them, so as to prevent them gaining Brussels and to separate them from Welhngton. If on the other hand all my information proves that the prin- cipal Prussian force has marched on Perwez, then I shall follow them in that direction. Generals Thielemann and Borstell belonged to the Prussian Army that Your Majesty defeated yesterday ; they were stiU here at 10 a.m. this morning. They stated that the Prussian casualties reached 20,000 men. On leaving this place they enqmred how far it was to Wavre, to Perwez, and to Hannut respectively. Bliicher was shghtly wounded in the arm, but this did not prevent him from retaining the Chief Command after his wound had been dressed. He has not moved through Gembloux. I am respectfully. Sire, Your Majesty's faithful subject, Maeshal Cotnsra Gbouohy. 1 O'Connor Morris, Campaign of 1815, pp. 386-387 ; and also Prince E. de la Tour d'Auvergne, Waterloo, pp. 230-231. DOCUMENTS 293 No. 29. Soult to Grouchy. 1 Before the Farm of Le Caillou, 10 a.m., June 18, 1815. Mabshai, The Emperor has received your last report dated from Grembloux. You mention to His Majesty only two Prussian columns which have passed Sauveniere and Sart-a-Walhain, nevertheless our reports state that a third column, a fairly strong one, has passed Gery and Gentinnes, and that it was heading for Wavre. The Emperor instructs me to tell you that at this moment His Majesty is going to attack the English Army, which has taken up a position at Waterloo, near the Forest of Soignes ; con- sequently His Majesty desires that you will head for Wavre in order to draw near to us, and to place yourself in touch with our operations and to keep up your communication with us, pushing before you those portions of the Prussian Array which have taken this direction, and which have halted at Wavre ; this place you ought to reach as soon as possible. You will follow the enemy's columns which are on your right by some hght troops, so as to observe their movements and pick up some stragglers. Inform me immediately as to your dis- positions and your march, also any news that you may have collected about the enemy, and do not neglect to keep up yoM communications with us. The Emperor desires to hear from you very often. rr^j,, d^jkb of Dat.matta. No. 30. Grouchy to Napoleon.' Gembloux, 3 a.m., 18 June, 1815. SlEE, AH my reports, and also the intelligence to hand, con- firm me in the opinion that the enemy is falling back on Brussels in order to concentrate there, and to dehver battle after having eSected his junction with WeUington. Namur has been vacated by the enemy, General Pajol has written to me to this efiect. 1 Captain Batty, Appendix XV, p. 160, identified the bearer of this despatch as Adjutant-Commajidant (Colonel) Zenowich. The despatch is given by Captain Batty, pp. 160-161. ' O'Connor Morris, The Campaign of 1815, pp. 389-390; and Prince E. de la Tour d'Auvergne, Waterloo, pp. 318-319. As M. Houssaye pointed out, in all probability this letter was timed 6 a.m., and not 3 a.m. Soult in his answer said, " You wrote this morning to me at 6 o'clock." Also when Soult wrote to Grouchy, at 10 a.m., the Major-General never alluded to this letter. 294 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO The I and II Corps of Bliioher's Army would appear to be heading as follows, the I towards Corbais, the II towards Chaumont. They left Toizrinnes yesterday evening at 8.30 p.m., and executed a night march ; luckily the weather has been so bad that they would not have been able to make good progress on the road. I start this very instant for Sart-&-WaIhain ; whence I shall advance on Corbais and Wavre. I shall have the honour to write to you further from one or other of these villages. I am, etc., Maeshal Count Geouchy. No. 31. Soult to Grouchy. 1 From the battle-field of Waterloo. 1 p.m., 18 June, 1815. Maeshai, You wrote to the Emperor at 2 a.m. [6 a.m.]'' this morning that you would march on Sart-a-Walhain ; your further plan was to proceed to Corbais, or to Wavre. This movement is conformable to His Majesty's arrangements, which have been communicated to you. Nevertheless His Majesty directs me to tell you that you ought always to manoeuvre in our direction. It is for you to ascertain our exact whereabouts, to regulate your movements accordingly, and to keep up your communication with us, so as to be prepared at any moment to fall upon and to crush any of the enemy's troops which may endeavour to annoy our right flank. At this moment the battle is raging \engagee] in front of Waterloo, the enemy's centre is at Mt. S. Jean, man- oeuvre therefore to join our right. The Maeshal Duke of Daxmaiha. P.S. — A letter which has just been intercepted states that General Biilow is about to attack our right flank. We believe that we notice this corps now on the heights of S. Lambert. So do not lose a moment in drawing near to us, and effecting a junction with us, in order to crush Biilow whom you will catch in the very act of concentrating [with Wellington]. ^ This most important despatch is given by Captain Batty, pp. 161-162 ; but somewhat unaccountably he gave gagnie instead of " engagie." However, this matter is set at rest definitely by the admirable facsimile given by M. Houssaye, in Waterloo, 18l5, in the 59th French edition, 1907. 2 It has been explained in the note to No. 30 that in Soult's original despatch (facsimile mentioned above) the time is given as " 6 a.m." DOCUMENTS 295 No, 32. Grouchy to Napoleon.* SABT-LES-WAIfllAXN, » 11 a.m., 18 June, 1815. SiBE, I do not waste a moment in submitting to you the in- formation that I have collected here. I look on its truth and authenticity as assured, and, in order that Your Majesty may receive it vsithout any delay, I send it by Major de la Fresnaye, your former page ; he is well horsed and a good rider. The I, II, and III Prussian Corps, under Bliicher, are marching towards Brussels. Two of these corps marched through Sart-les-WaJhain, or passed just to the right of the place ; they marched in three columns roughly keeping abreast of each other. They took six hours to pass through the village. That corps which passed within sight of Sart-les-Walhain was of an estimated strength of 30,000 men at least, and was accompanied by 50 or 60 guns. One corps, coming from Liege, effected its concentration with those that had fought at Fleurus (herewith a requisition in proof of this statement). Some Prussians in my front are directing their advance towards the plain of the Chyse, which is near the [Namur to] Louvain road, and some 2J leagues [6 to 7 miles] from this town. It would seem as though they intended to concentrate there so as to give battle to their pursuers, or finally to join hands with Wellington ; such was the report spread by their officers, who, in their usual boasting spirit, pretend they only left the field of battle on June 16 in order to ensure their junction with the English Army at Brussels. This evening I shall have massed my troops at Wavre, and thus shaJl find myself between the Prussian Army and Welling- ton, who, I presume, is retreating before Your Majesty. I need further instructions as to what Your Majesty desires me to do next. The country between Wavre and the plain of the Chyse is rough and broken and in some parts marshy. By the VUvorde road I shall reswh Brussels before the troops who have halted at La Chyse. • O'Connor Morris, Campaign of 1815, pp. 391-392. ' This letter was actually written at WaUiain, and at the house of Notary HoUaert, vide Vol. 11, pp. 158 and 180. As M. Houssaye stated, this mistake is easily understandable ; for " Sart-a-Walhain " was very clearly marked on the map which Marshal Grouchy used — Ferrari's map — and it might easily have been misread for Walhain, which latter name was obscured by the shading. A very fine reproduction of this map is given in Les Champs de la Bdgique, U, 1815. The map is worthy of study, for it was the one that Napoleon generally used in this campaign. In aU probability the map was used also by the Duke of Wellington, by Marshal Blucher, and by General Gneisenau. 296 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Deign, Sire, to send me your orders so that I can receive them before commencing to-morrow's operations. The greater part of the information contained in this letter has been obtained from the owner of the house where I have halted to write to Your Majesty ; this officer previously saw service in the French Army ; he has been decorated, and appears to be entirely devoted to our cause. I attach the information herewith. I am, etc., ! Marshal Count Geouchy.' Note. — The mystery about this retired and decorated officer has never been solved satisfactorily, for he has never been identified. It is quite true that Notary Hollaert had served, but he had not been decorated. At any rate the information collected by the Marshal about the direction of the Prussian retreat — towards the Chyse — was valueless, because it was false. But it fitted in with his preconceived ideas, and so it proved to be readily acceptable. It must be remembered that when Marshal Grouchy wrote this letter he had not received any answer to the despatch which he had written from Gembloux at 10 p.m., the evening before. This accounts for his repeating the information that he was marching on Wavre. (M. Houssaye has dealt at length with " this decorated and retired officer," but he has failed to penetrate the identity of Marshal Grouohy's informant). No, 33. To the Marshal Prince of the Moskowa.^ The Emperor commands that the army will be formed up ready to attack the enemy at 9 a.m. General Officers Commanding Army Corps will concentrate their troops, they will arrange that the arms are put in serviceable condition, they will permit the soldiers to prepare their soup, also they will cause the men to complete their meal so that by 9 a.m. to the minute the whole force will be ready and formed up in battle array, and in the positions indicated in the Emperor's overnight order. The Lieutenant-Generals commanding both Infantry and Cavahy Corps will despatch officers at once to report to the Chief of ^ The last two sentences have been omitted by O'Connor Morris, but they are to be found in Ropes' Campaign of Waterloo, Appendix C, XXX. The letter is also given by Prince E. de la Tour d'Auvergne in his Waterloo, pp. 324-325. " O'Connor Morris, Campaign of 1815, p. 387. DOCUMENTS 297 the General Staff [Major-General] the positions now occupied by their corps, and these officers will also act as bearers of further orders. Given at the Imperial Head-quarters on June 18, 1815. Marshal of the Empire, Major-Oeneral, The Duke of Dalmatia. Copied — Lieut.-General Count Drouot, Imperial Guard. No. 34. Napoleon's attack Orders. ^ To each Corps Commander. 11 a.m., 18 June, 1815. Directly the army has formed up, and soon after 1 p.m., the Emperor will give the order to Marshal Ney and the attack will be dehvered on Mt. S. Jean village in order to seize the cross- roads at that place. To this end the 12-pdr. batteries of the II and VI Corps will mass with that of the I Corps. These 24 guns will bombard the troops holding Mont S. Jean, and Count D'Erlon will commence the attack by first launching the left division, and, when necessaj^y, supporting it by the other divisions of the I Corps. The II Corps also will advance keeping abreast of the I Corps. The corapany of Engineers belonging to the I Corps will hold themselves in readiness to barricade and fortify Mt. S. Jean directly it is taken. (In pencil in Marshal Ney's writing, and added by Marshal Ney :— " Count D'Erlon wiU note that the attack wiO be delivered first by the left instead of commencing from the right. Inform General Reille of this change.") (On the back : — " Order dictated by the Emperor on the field of battle of Mt. S. Jean, on June 18, at 11 a.m., and written by the Marshal Duke of Dalmatia, Major-Oeneral.") The Maeshal Prince of the Moskowa. ^ Correspondance, No. 22,060 for the body of the order ; but the additions made by Marshal Ney are giv«i by O'Connor Morris, p. 388 298 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO No. 35. To King Joeseph.' Phllippeville, 19 June, 1815. . . . All is by no means lost. I suppose that I shall have 150,000 men available when my forces are once more united. The well-affected among the federated troops and the National Guards will give me another 100,000 men, and I shall obtain 50,000 more from the depot battalions. Thus I shall have 300,000 soldiers to oppose to the enemy. I shall horse my artillery with carriage horses [chevaux de luxe] ; I shall raise 100,000 conscripts ; I shall arm the latter with muskets taken from the Royalists and the disaffected of the National Guard ; I shall call up the whole male population of Dauphiny, Lyonnais, Burgundy, Lorraine, Champagne ; I shall crush the enemy ; but it is essential that I am helped and assisted and not bewildered. I am now setting out for Laon ; doubtless I shall find there some of my army. I have no news of Grouchy ; if he is not yet taken, as I fear may be the case, then in three days I shall possess 50,000 men. With this force I shall confront and occupy the enemy's attention, and thus obtain the time necessary for Paris and France to do their duty. The Austrians advance but slowly ; the Prussians fear the country people and dare not push on rapidly, there is still time therefore to repair all. Write to me of the effect which this horrible muddle [echauffouree] has produced in the Chamber. I believe that the Deputies will recognise that their duty at this crowning moment is to rally around me so as to save France. Therefore prepare them to second my efforts suitably ; above all let them show courage and resolution. No, 36, Napoleon's farewell address to his Army.' To the Army. Soldiers, While obeying the necessity which removes me from the French Army, I carry with me the happy assurance that, by the eminent services which the country expects from it, it will justify the praises which our enemies themselves have not been able to withhold from it. Soldiers ! I shall follow your steps, though absent. I know ' Lettres Inedites de Napoleon /«'' (Leon Lecestre), No. 1225. " The publication of this proclamation was forbidden by the Provisional Government. The text of it is to be found in the Corre- epondance. No. 22,065. DOCUMENTS 299 all the corps, and not one of them will obtain a single advantage over the enemy but that I shall give it credit for the courage which it shall have displayed. Both you and I have been calumniated. Men, incapable of appreciating your achievements, have seen in the marks of attachment which you have given to me, a zeal of which I was the sole object. Let your future successes convince them that, in obesdng me, it was the country above all things which you served ; and that if I had any share in your affection I owe it to my aident love for France — Our Common Mother. Soldiers ! some eSorts more and the Coalition will be dis- solved. Napoleon will recognise you by the blows which you are about to strike. Save the honour and independence of France ! Be, unto the last, the same men that I have known you to be these twenty years, and you wiU be invincible. Napoleon. Malmaison, 25 June, 1815. Lettees re the Execution of Napoleon Buonapabtb BY THE PbTJSSLANS.' No. 37. To Major-General Baron von Miiffling, Grand Cross, etc. etc. The French General de Tromehn is at Noyons with the inten- tion of proceeding to the head-quarters of the Duke of Wellington to treat for the dehvery of Buonaparte. Buonaparte has been declared under outlawry by the Allied Powers. The Dxike of WeUington may possibly (from Parlia- mentary considerations) hesitate to fulfil the declaration of the Powers. Therefore Your Excellency will direct the negotiations to the effect that Buonaparte may be surrendered to ics, with a view to his execution. This is what Eternal Justice demands, and what the declarer tion of March 13 decides ; thus the blood of our soldiers, killed and mutilated on the 16th and 18th, will be avenged. VoN Gneisenau. CoMPiiiGNE, June 27, 1815, No. 38. To Major-General Baron von MiifBing, Grand Cross, etc. etc. Your Excellency wiU give notice to the Diake of Wellington that we have sent an officer to the five deputies from Paris, in order to accompany them to the head-quarters of the Sovereigns. 1 Nos. 37, 38, 39, 40 are taken from Miiffling's Passages from my Life, pp. 273-275. 300 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO A halt and armistice is denied them, but it has been declared that after the conquest of Paris, we, Prussians, would agree to a truce under the following conditions : — I. The delivery of Buonaparte, alive or dead. II. The cession of the fortresses of the Sambre, Meuse, Moselle, and Saar — including Longwy. in. The occupation of the provinces of the Marne — including Chateau Thierry and 6pernay. IV. The cession of the Castle of Vincennes. V. The restoration of the treasures of art to the nations from which they were taken. VI. Indemnification for the costs of the War. Your Excellency will inform the Duke on these points, in order that no scruple may arise respecting them on his part, which however I do not expect. Perfect liberty is left to the Duke to stipulate for himself to act as he pleases, according to the views of his Cabinet. Count N. von Gnbisbnau. GuiOBY, 27 June, 1815. P.S.- — The Deputies have had no written answer. The Prince von Schonburg is charged with their escort, the Count von Nostitz with the negotiations, and Count Flemming with the redaction. The capture of Peronne is very important. No. 39. To Major-General Baron von Miiffiing, Grand Cross, etc. etc. I am directed by the Field-Marshal to request your Excellency to communicate to the Duke of Wellington, that it had been his intention to execute Buonaparte on the spot where the Duke D'Enghien was shot ; however, out of deference to the Duke's wishes, he will abstain from this measure, but the Duke must take on himself the responsibility of its non-enforce- ment. It appears to me that the English will feel embarrassed by the dehvery of Buonaparte to them ; therefore Your Excellency will only direct the negotiations so that he may be delivered up *'° "^- N. VON Gneisenau. Senlis, June 29, 1815. No. 40. To Major-General Baron von MiiHling, Grand Cross, etc. etc. When the Duke of Wellington declares himself against the execution of Buonaparte, he thinks and acts in the matter as a Briton. Great Britain is under weightier obhgation to no mortal man than to this very villain ; for by the occurrences whereof he DOCUMENTS 301 is the author, her greatness, prosperity, and wealth, have at- tained their present elevation. The English are the Masters of the Seas, and have no longer to ieax any rivalry either in this Dominion or the Commerce of the world. It is quite otherwise with us Prussians. We have been im- poverished by him. Our nobility will never be able to right itseK again. Ought we not, then, to consider ourselves the tools of that Providence which has given us such a victory for the ends of eternal Justice ? Does not the death of the Duke D'Enghien call for such a vengeance ? Shall we not draw upon ourselves the reproaches of the people of Prussia, Riissia, Spain, and Portugal, if we leave imperformed the duty that devolves upon us ? But be it so ! If others will assume a theatrical magnanimity, I shall not set myself against it. We act thus from esteem for the Duke and weakness. Count von Gneisenau. Senxis, 29 June, 1815. No. 41. Marshal Ney's account.* The Prince of the Moskowa [MeirshaJ Ney] to His Excellency the Duke of Otranto [Joseph Fouche]. Pabis, 26 June, 1815. M. LE Due, For some days the most false and defamatory reports have been spreading over the public mind, upon my conduct during this short and unfortunate campaign. The journals have re- ported these odious calumnies, and appear to attach credit to them. After having fought for twenty-five years for my country, after having shed my blood for its glory and independence, an attempt is made to accuse me of treason, an attempt is made to mark me out to the people, and to the army itself, as the author of the disaster that has just been experienced. Forced to break silence, whilst it is always painful to speak of oneself and above all to answer calumnies, I address myseK to you. Sir, as the President of the Provisional Government, for the purpose of laying before you a faithful statement of the events I have witnessed. On the 11th of Jime [1815], I received an order from the Minister of War to repair to the Imperial Presence. I had no command, and no information about the composition and strength of the army. Neither the Emperor nor his Minister had given me any previous * Original Journals of the Eighteen Campaigns of Napoleon Buona- parte, II, pp. 437-441. 302 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO hint, from which I could anticipate that I should be employed in the present campaign, I was consequently taken by surprise, without horses, without accoutrements, and without money, I was obliged to borrow the money for the necessary expenses of my journey. Having arrived at Laon on June 12, I reached Avesnes on June 13, and Beaumont on June 14 ; in this last city I pur- chased two horses from the Duke of Treviso [Marshal Mortier, who commanded the Imperial Guard], with which I repaired on June 15 to Charleroi, accompanied by my senior aide-de-camp, the only officer who attended me. I arrived at the moment when the enemy, attacked by our troops, was retiring upon Fleurus and Gosselies. The Emperor immediately ordered me to put myself at the head of the I and II Infantry Corps, commanded by Lieut.- Generals D'Erlon and Reille, of the division of Light Cavalry of Lieut.-General Pire, of the division of Light Cavalry of the Guard, under the command of Lieut.-Generals Lefebvre-Desnoettes and Colbert, and of two divisions of cavalry of the Count of Valmy [Kellermann], forming in all 8 divisions of Infantry and 4 of Cavaby.' With these troops, a part of which only I had as yet under my immediate command, I pursued the enemy and forced them to evacuate Gosselies,^ Frasnes, Mellet, Heppignies. There they took up a position for the night, with the exception of the I Corps which was still at Marchiennes, and which did not join me until the following day. On June 16 I received orders to attack the English at Quatre Bras. We advanced towards the enemy with an enthusiasm that baffles description. Nothing resisted oiu^ impetuosity. The battle becaotne general, and victory was no longer doubtful, when at the moment that I intended to order up the I Infantry Corps, which had been left by me in reserve at Frasnes, I learned that the Emperor had disposed of it without warning me of the circumstance, as well as the division of Girard of the II Corps, on purpose to direct them upon S. Amand and to strengthen his left wing which was vigorously engaged with the Prussians. The shock which this intelligence gave me, confounded me. Having no longer under me more than 3 divisions, instead of the 8 upon which I had calculated, I was obUged to renounce my hopes of victory ; and in spite of all my exertions, in spite of the intrepidity and devotion of my troops, my utmost efforts after that could only maintain me in my position until the close of the day. About 9 p.m. the I Corps was sent me by the Emperor, to whom it had 1 Marshal Ney appears to have omitted Jacquinot's Cavalry Division of D'Erlon's Corps. Further, Kellermann's Cuirassier Corps did not come under Marshal Ney's orders until June 16, when they were sent to replace the Light Horse of the Guard, Oorrespomiance, 22,058, given in this Appendix, No. 15. ^ This, in conjunction with Marshal Ney's statement about the time when he reached Charleroi, proves that he did not report to Napoleon later than 3.15 p.m., for the action at Gosselies was fought at 4 p.m. DOCUMENTS 308 been of no service.' Thus, I may say, 25,000 or 30,000 men were paralysed, and were paraded uselessly during the whole of the battle, from the left to the right and then from the right to the left, without firing a shot. It is impossible for me. Sir, not to draw your attention for a moment to these details, in order to bring before your notice all the consequences of this false movement, and, in general, of the bad arrangements during the whole of the day. By what fatality, for example, did the Emperor, instead of leading all his forces against Lord Welhngton who would have been attacked unawares and could not have resisted, consider this attack as secondary ? After the passage of the Sambre, how did the Emperor con- ceive it possible to fight two battles on the same day ? It was to oppose forces which were twice as numerous as ours, and to do what miUtary men who were witnesses of it can scarcely yet comprehend. Instead of this, had he left a corps of observation to watch the Prussians and marched with his most powerful masses to support me, the EngUsh Army would undoubtedly have been destroyed between Quatre Bras and Genappe ; and this position which separated the two Allied Armies, being once in our power, would have opened for the Emperor an opportunity of advancing to the right of the Prussians and of crushing them in their turn. The general opinion in France and especially in the army, was, that the Emperor would concentrate all his efforts to annihilate first of all the EngUsh Army ; and circumstances were favourable for the accomplishment of such a project— but Fate ordered otherwise. On Jime 17, the army marched in the direction of Mt. S. Jean. On June 18, the battle began at 1 p.m. ; and since the bulletin which details it makes no mention of me, therefore it is not necessary to mention that I was engaged in it. Lieut.-General Drouet [Count D'Erlon] has already spoken of that battle in the House of Peers. His narration is accurate, with the exception of some important facts which he has passed over in silence, or ' The reader will notice at once that Marshal Ney's statement cannot be accepted as it stands. D'Erlon was hardly left in reserve at Frasnes. Again the Emperor's order for D'Erlon to co-operate at Ligny was addressed to Ney and it duly reached the Marshal. It was the mistaken zeal shown by the bearer of the message that re- sulted in the I Corps wheeling ofi too early to the eastwards. Again, the Emperor never sent D'Erlon back to Quatre Bras, for the I Corps was recalled imperiously by Marshal Ney himself ! In his report Ney showed clearly that he had misjudged his task, which was not to win a victory, but to hold Wellington in check on June 16 and detail a sufficient force to ensure Blucher's annihilation. There is no hint of this in the Marshal's report. The Marshal continued in the same strain, showing that he inisappreciated both Napoleon's Plan of Campaign and also the strategical situation ; and then he glozed over the whole of June 17 with a mere reference. Yet on this day Ney ruined France ! 304 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO of which he was ignorant, and which it is now my duty to declare. About 7 p.m., after the most frightful carnage which I have ever witnessed, General De La Bedoyere came to me with a message from the Emperor that Marshal Grouchy had arrived on our right, and attacked the left of the united EngUsh and Prussian Armies. Riding along the lines the General Officer spread this intelligence among the soldiers, whose courage and devotion remained unshaken, and they gave new proofs of them at that moment in spite of the fatigue which they experienced. Imme- diately after, what was my astonishment, I should rather say indignation, when I learned that so far from Marshal Grouchy having arrived to support us, as the whole army had been assured, in reaUty between 40,000 and 50,000 Prussians attacked our extreme right and forced it to retire. Whether the Emperor was deceived with regard to the time when the Marshal could support him, or whether the march of the Marshal was retarded by the action of the enemy longer than was calculated upon, the fact is, that at the moment when his arrival was announced to us, he was only at Wavre upon the Dyle, which to us was the same as if he had been 800 leagues from the field of battle. A short time afterwards I saw four regiments of the Middle Guard arriving, they were led up by the Emperor. With these troops he wished to renew the attack and to penetrate the enemy's centre. He ordered me to lead them on ; generals, officers, and soldiers, all displayed the greatest intrepidity ; but this body of troops was too weak to resist, for a long time, the forces opposed to it by the enemy, and it was soon necessary to renounce the hope which this attack had inspired for a few moments. General Friant had been struck by a ball at my side, and I, miyseK, had my horse lulled and fell under it. I hope the brave men who have survived this terrible battle wiU do me the justice to say that they saw me on foot, sword in hand, during the whole of the evening, and that I only quitted the scene of carnage among the last and at the moment when retreat could no longer be prevented. At the same time the Prussians con- tinued their offensive movements, and our right retired decidedly, the Enghsh advancing in their turn. There remained to us still four squares of the Old Guard to protect the retreat. These brave Grenadiers, the elite of the whole army, forced to retire in suc- cession, yielded ground foot by foot, till, overwhelmed by numbers, they were almost entirely annihilated. From that moment a retrograde movement was declared and the army formed nothing but a confused mass. However, there was not a total rout, nor the cry of sauve-qui- peut. Such statements made in the bulletins are calumnious. As for myself, constantly with the rear-guard which I followed on foot, having had all my horses [5] killed under me, being worn out with fatigue, covered with contusions, and having no longer the strength to march, I owed my life to a corporal, who DOCUMENTS 305 supported me on the road and did not abandon me during the retreat. At 11 p.m., I found Lieut.-General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, and one of his officers, Major Schmidt, had the generosity to give me his last remaining horse. In this manner I arrived at Marchienne- au-pont at 4 a.m., alone, without any officers of my staff, ignorant of what had become of the Emperor, who, before the end of the battle, had entirely disappeared, and I was allowed to believe either that he might have been killed or taken prisoner. General Pamphile Lacroix, Chief of the Staff of the 11 Corps, whom I found in this town, having told me that the Emperor was at Charleroi, I was led to suppose that His Majesty was going to place himself at the head of Marshal Grouchy's Corps, so as to cover the Sambre and to give the troops the means of rallying in the vicinity of Avesnes, with this idea, I went to Beaumont ; but parties of pursuing cavalry having already cut the roads to Maubeuge and PhiUppeville, I realised the total impossibility of collecting a single soldier to oppose the progress of the victori- ous enemy. Therefore I continued my march upon Avesnes, where I could obtain no intelligence of what had become of the Emperor. In this state of affairs, having no knowledge of Hi a Majesty, nor of the Major-General [Marshal Soult], confusion increased every moment, and, with the exception of some fragments of the Guard and of the hne, every one was following his own inoUnation ; therefore I determined to move immediately to Paris, by S. Quentin, so as to disclose, as quickly as possible, the true state of affairs to the Minister of War [Marshal Davout], that he might send to the army some fresh troops and take the measures which circumstances rendered necessary. On my arrival at Le Bourget, 3 leagues from Paris, I learned that the Emperor had passed there at 9 a.m. M. le Due, this is an account of this calamitous campaign. Now, I ask the survivors of this fine and nmnerous army, how I can be accused of the disasters of which it has been the victim, and of which ovu mihtary annals furnish no example. It is said I have betrayed my country — whereas, to serve it, I have shown a zeal which I have carried perhaps to an extravagant height ; but this calumny is supported by no fact, by no cir- cumstance. How can they be stopped, these odious reports which spread with frightful rapidity ? If in the researches, which I could make on this subject, I did not fear almost as much to discover the truth as to be ignorant of it, I would say that all the facts tend to show that I have been unworthily deceived, and that an attempt has been made to screen with the pretence of treason the faults and extravagancies of this campaign — faults which have not yet been avowed in the bulletins which have appeared, and against which, in vain, I raised that voice of truth which even yet I will uplift in the House of Peers. I expect from the candour of Your Excellency and from n. — I 806 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO your indulgence to me, that you will cause this letter to be inserted in the journals and give to it the greatest possible publicity. I renew to Your Excellency, etc., Marshal Prince of the Moskowa, Ney, No. 42.1 Report addressed to the Emperor by Marshal Grouchy. DiNANT, June 20, 1815. It was not until after 7 p.m. on June 18, that I received the Duke of Dalmatia's [Soult's] letter, which directed me to march on S. Lambert, and to attack General Biilow. I fell in with the enemy about La Baraque, as I was marching on Wavre. They were driven into Wavre immediately, and General Vandamme's Corps attacked that town and became warmly engaged. The portion of Wavre on the right of the Dyle was carried, but much difficulty was experienced in debouching on to the other side. General G6rard was wounded by a ball in the breast whilst endeavoioring to carry the Mill of Bierges in order to pass the river, but the attack failed. Lieut.-General [Alix had been killed in the attack on the town. In this state of things, being impatient to co-operate with Your Majesty's Army on that important day, I detached towards Limale, Pajol's Cavalry, Teste's [Infantry] division, and two of General Gerard's Divisions, to force the passage of the Dyle, and march against Biilow. In the meantime, the Corps of Vandamme continued to attack Wavre and the Mill [of Bierges], whence the enemy showed an inclination to debouch, but I did not consider they would succeed, because our position and the courage of the soldiers convinced me they would fail. My manoeuvre against Limale took time to carry out because of the distance to be covered ; however, I arrived at Limale, passed the river, and the heights were carried by the division of Vichery and the cavalry. Night did not permit us to advance further ; and no longer could I hear the sound of Your Majesty's battle. I halted, in this situation, until daylight. Wavre and Bierges were occupied by the Prussians, who at 3 a.m., on June 19, attacked in their turn wishing to take advantage of the difficult position in which I was, and expecting to drive me into the defile, take the artillery which had debouched, and make me repass the Dyle. Their efforts were fruitless. The intrepidity of 1 Battle 0/ Waterloo (Booth, 1852 ; XI edition), pp. 389-390, and also de Bas and de Wommersom, pp. 575-577. DOCUMENTS 307 our troops was proof against all attacks and sufficed to drive back the Prussians, then the Teste Division captured the village of Bierges. The brave General Penne was killed there. General Vandamme then passed one of his divisions by Bierges and carried with ease the heights of Wavre, along the whole of my Une the success was complete. I was in front of Rozieres, preparing to march on Brussels, when I received the sad intelli- gence of the loss of the battle of Waterloo. The officer who brought it informed me that Your Majesty was retreating to the Sambre, without being able to indicate any particular point on which I should direct my march. Still in contact with the enemy all along the front, I ceased to pursue and began my retrogade movement. The retreating enemy did not think of following me. I headed at once for Temploux and Gembloux, pushed my hght cavalry to Mari, and sent on my Dragoons to Namur. Learning that the enemy had already passed the Sambre and was on my flank, and not being sufficiently strong to make a diversion in favour of Your Majesty, without compromising the detach- ment which I commanded, I marched on Namur, the IV Corps along the Namur-Charleroi road, and the III Corps by the direct road from Temploux. At this moment the rear parties of the two columns were attacked. The right made a retrogade movement sooner than was expected, which endangered for a moment the retreat of the left ; but good dispositions soon repaired everything, and two pieces which had been taken were recovered by the brave 20th Dragoons, under the orders of Colonel BriqueviUe, who besides took a howitzer from the enemy. The weak squares of the Regiment, charged by a mass of hostile cavalry, waited tUl the horsemen came within point- blank range and then inflicted a heavy loss on their assailants, proving what good dispositions together with steadiness and well-aimed fire can effect. The hostile cavalry was then charged by the 1st Hussars, under Major-General [Marec}ial de Camp] Clari, and our horsemen took niunerous prisoners. We entered Namur without loss. The long defile which extends from this place to Dinant, in which only a single colimin can march, and the embarrassment arising from the numerous vehicles carrying the wounded, rendered it necessary to hold the town for a considerable time, but I was unable to blow up the bridge. I entrusted the defence of Namur to General Vandamme, who, with his usual intrepidity, maintained himself there until 8 p.m., so that nothing was left behind and I occupied Dinant. The enemy has lost some thousands of men in the attack on Namur, where the contest was very obstinate ; the troops have performed their duty in a manner worthy of praise. Mabshat. Couno? De Gbouchy. 308 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO No. 43. Army Bulletin.' Chableeoi, 15 June, 1815, Evening. On the 14th the army was disposed as follows :— The Imperial Head-quarters at Beaumont. The I Corps, commanded by General D'Erlon, was at Solre- sur-Sambre. The II Corps, commanded by General Reille, was at Ham-sur- Heere. The III Corps, commanded by General Vandamme, was on the right [east] of Beaumont. The IV Corps, commanded by General Gerard, was arriving at Philippeville. On the 15th, at 3 a.m.. General Reille attacked the enemy and advanced towards Marchienne-au-Pont. He had several engage- ments, in which his Cavalry charged a Prussian battalion and made 300 prisoners. At 1 a.m. the Emperor was at Jamioulx-sur-Heere. General Domon's Division of Light Cavalry cut to pieces two Prussian battalions and captured 400 prisoners. General Pajol entered Charleroi at noon. The Sappers and the Marines of the Guard were marching with the Advanced Guard to repair the bridges ; they penetrated first of all into the town acting as sharpshooters. General Clary, with the 1st Hussars, advanced towards Gosselies along the Brussels road, and General Pajol headed for GiUy along the Namur road. At 3 p.m. General Vandamme and his corps debouched upon GiUy. Marshal Grouchy came up with General Exelmans' Cavalry. The enemy held the left of the Fleurus position. At 5 p.m. the Emperor ordered the attack. The position was turned and carried. The 4 head-quarter squadrons [eacadrons de service] of the Guard, commanded by General Letort, one of the Emperor's Aides-de-Camp, broke three squares ; the 26th, 27th, and 28th Prussian Regiments were routed. Our squadrons cut down 400 to 500 men and made 1500 prisoners. Meanwhile General Reille had crossed the Sambre at Mar- chienne-au-Pont to advance upon Gosselies, and, with Prince J6r6me's and General Bachelu's Divisions, he attacked the enemy, captured 250 prisoners and pursued the foe along the Brussels road. Thus we became masters of the whole of the Fleurus position. 1 Correspondance, 22,056. Published in the Moniteur, June 18, 1815. DOCUMENTS 309 At 8 p.m. the Emperor retvu-ned to his head-quarters at Charleroi. This day had cost the enemy 5 guns and 2000 men, of whom 1000 are prisoners.* Our loss is 10 men killed and 80 wounded, ajid they iDelong principally to the head-quarter squadrons who de- livered the charges, and to the 3 squadrons of the 20th Dragoons,'' who also charged a square with the greatest intrepidity. Our loss, through trifling in numbers, is felt distinctly by the Emperor because of the severe wound received by General Letort,' his Aide-de-camp, whilst charging at the head of the head-quarter squadrons. He is an officer with a most distinguished record. He was wounded by a ball in the stomach, and the surgeon is apprehensive that the wound will prove mortal. We have found some magazines at Charleroi. The joy of the Belgians is indescribable. There are villages where the people danced at the very sight of their deliverers ; and everywhere is evinced an enthusiasm {elan) which comes from the heart. In the Major-General's despatch will be inserted the names of officers and men who have distinguished themselves. The Emperor has given the command of the left [wing] to the Prince of the Moskowa [Ney], who had his head-quarters this evening at Quatre-Chemins^ on the Brussels road. The Duke of Treviso, to whom the Emperor had entriisted the command of the Young Guard, has remained at Beaumont, being confined to his bed by sciatica. The IV Corps, commanded by General Geraxd, reached Chatelet this evening. General Gerard reports that Lieut.- General Bourmont, Colonel Clouet, and Major Villoutreys have gone over to the enemy. A Heutenant of the 11th Chasseurs [Subervie's Division] also has deserted to the enemy. The Major-General has ordered that the legal penalty shall be pronounced immediately against these deserters. The good spirit and the ardour of the army baffle description. It regards as auspicious the timely unmasking of these few traitors. ' There is a discrepancy here, for it is stated higher up that 1500 had been captured at Gilly. The Emperor's estimate of his own loss is worthy of the writer of the Eyiau bulletin. ' Of the 2nd Cavalry Corps, this regiment also received special mention in Marshal Groucliy's report {ante. No. 4-2). ' Actually General Letort was killed. * Quatre Bras. This is a misstatement. 310 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO No. 44. Bulletin of the Army.^ Laon, June 20, 1815. (Published in the Moniteur, June 21, 1815.) Battle of Ligny, under Fleurus. On the morning of June 16 the army occupied the following positions : — The left wing, commanded by the Marshal Duke of Elchingen [Ney], consisting of the I and II Infantry Corps and the 2nd Cavahy Corps, occupied the Frasnes position. The right wing, commanded by Marshal Grouchy, composed of the III and IV Infantry Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Corps, occupied the heights in rear of Fleurus. The Emperor's head-quarters were at Charleroi, and here also were the Imperial Guard and the VI Infantry Corps. The left wing had orders to march upon Quatre Bras, and the right wing upon Sombreffe. The Emperor advanced to Fleurus with his Reserve. Whilst on the march, the columns of Marshal Grouchy, after having passed Fleurus, perceived the enemy's army com- manded by Field-Marshal Bliicher, the hostile army occupied the heights of the Mill of Bussy, its left resting on the village of Sombreffe, with its horsemen pushed out far along the Namur road ; Bliicher's right was at S. Amand, and this large village was held in great strength ; in front of it was a ravine which made it a good position. Tlie Emperor reconnoitred the enemy's army and position, and resolved to attack immediately. Therefore it became necessary to change front by swinging up the right and pivoting upon Fleurus. General Vandamme marched upon S. Amand, General Gerard advanced against Ligny, and Marshal Grouchy headed for Sombreffe. The 7th Division of the II Infantry Corps, commanded by General Girard marched, as a reserve, behind General Van- damme's Corps. The Guard formed up abreast of Fleurus, as well as General Milhaud's Cuirassiers. At 3 p.m. these positions had been taken up. General Lefol's Division, of General Vandamme's Corps, opened the action by storming S. Amand with the bayonet and driving out the enemy. It maintained itself during the whole continuance of the action in the cemetery and belfry of S. Amand. This large village was the scene of much fighting diu-ing the afternoon and evening ; the whole corps of General Vandamme became engaged there, and also considerable numbers of the enemy were involved in its defence. ' Correepondance, 22,061. DOCIBIENTS 311 General Girao-d, who was acting as Reserve to General Van- damme's Corps, turned the right flank of the village, and fought there with his usual valour. The respective forces were each supported by some 60 guns. On the right General Gerard attacked the village of Ligny with the IV Corps, and the place was taken and retaken several times. On the extreme right Marshal Grouchy and General Pajol were engaged at the village of Sombrefie. The enemy showed between 80,000 to 90,000 men and a great number of guns. At 7 p.m. we had wrested from the enemy aU the villages which were situated on the left bank of the ravine, which covered his position ; but his masses still held the heights of the Mill of Bussy. The Emperor moved with his Guard to the village of Ligny ; General Gerard directed General Pecheux to advance with what still remained of the [IV Corps] Reserve, for almost aU the troops had been engaged in the village fighting. Eight battaJions of the Guard debouched with fixed bayonets, and behind them came 4 head-quarter squadrons. General Delort's Cuirassiers, those of General MiUiaud, and the moionted Grenadiers of the Guard. The Old Guard, with bayonet-s fixed, charged the enemy's columns who were on the heights of Bussy, and in an instant strewed the battle-field with dead bodies. A head-quarter squadron [escadron de service] attacked and broke a square, and the Cuirassiers drove the enemy before them in all directions. At 9.30 p.m., we had taken 40 pieces of cannon, several carriages, colours, and prisoners, and the enemy sought safety in a precipitate retreat. At 10 p.m., the action was over, and we foimd our- selves masters of the whole battle-field. Genereil Liitzow, a partisan leader, was taken prisoner. The prisoners also assure us that Field-Marshal Bliicher was wounded. The flower of the Prussian Army was destroyed in this battle. Its loss could not have been less than 15,000 men, whilst ours was 3000 killed and wounded. On the left, Marshal Ney had marched on Quatre Bras with a Division which cut to pieces an English Division that was stationed there •,^ but being attacked by the Prince of Orange with 25,000 men, partly English and partly Hanoverians in the pay of England, the Marshal retired upon his position at Frasnes. There much fighting took place, the enemy obstinately endea- voured to force the position, but in vain. The Duke of Elchingen waited for the I Corps, which only arrived at nightfall, hence he confined hims elf to maintaining his position. In a square attacked by the 8th Regiment of Cuirassiers [Guiton's Brigade, KeUermann's Cavalry Corps], the colours of the 69th English Infantry Regiment fell into our hands. The Duke of Brimswick has been killed, the Prince of Orange has been wounded. We are assured that many persons of distinction and generals of note on the enemy's side were kUled or wounded. The EngKsh loss is esti- mated at from 4000 to 5000 men ; our loss, on this side, is very 1 It was really Perponcher's 2nd Dutch-Belgian Division. 312 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO considerable, it amounts to 4200 killed and wounded. This action ended with nightfall. Lord Wellington then evacuated Quatre Bras and proceeded to Genappe. On the morning of June 17 the Emperor repaired to Quatre Bras whence he marched to attack the English Army, and then he drove back the latter to the entrance of the Forest of Soignes with the left wing and the Reserve. The right wing [Marshal Grouchy] meanwhile advanced by Sombreffe in pursuit of Field-Marshal Bliicher, who was moving towards Wavre, where he wished apparently to take up a position. At 10 p.m., the English Army occupied Mt. S. Jean with its centre, and was in position before the Forest of Soignes ; it would have required three hours to attack it, therefore the battle had to be postponed until the morrow. The head-quarters of the Emperor were estabhshed at the Farm of Le Caillou, near Plancenoit. The rain fell in torrents. Thus, on June 16, the left wing, the right wing, and the Reserve were all equally engaged within a space of about 2 leagues. The Battle of Mont S. Jean. At 9 a.m., the rain having somewhat abated, the I Corps moved off and formed up with its left on the Brussels road, opposite the village of Mt. S. Jean, which appeared to be the centre of the enemy's position. The II Corps leaned its right upon the Brussels road and its left upon a small wood within cannon-shot of the English Army. The Cuirassiers [Milhaud and KeUermann] were in reserve behind, with the Guard also in Reserve upon the heights. The VI Corps, with General Domon's Cavalry, under the orders of Count Lobau, were destined to proceed in rear of our right so as to oppose a Prussian Corps which appeared to have escaped Marshal Grouchy and to have the intention of assailing our right flank, an intention which we learned through our reports and by a Prussian General's letter enclosing an order, which was captiu-ed by om^ light troops. The troops were full of ardour. We estimated the strength of the English Army at 80,000 men. We supposed that the Prussian Corps which would come into line towards nightfall might number 15,000 men. The enemy's forces were then up- wards of 90,000 men, ours were less numerous. At noon, all the preparations being terminated, Prince Jerome, commanding a division of the II Corps, intended to form the extreme left, advanced against the wood which the enemy partly held. The cannonade opened ; the enemy supported the troops, which had been sent to hold the wood, by the fire of 30 guns. On oxu' side also we brought Artillery into action. At 1 p.m. Prince J6r6me was the master of the whole wood, and the whole English Army withdrew as behind a screen. Count D'Erlon then attacked the village of Mt. S. Jean and supported his attack by the fire of 80 guns. A very severe bombardment now DOCUMENTS 313 took place, and the English Army must have experienced heavy losses. All the efiorts were directed against the ridge. A brigade of Count D'Erlon's 1st Di^-ision took the village of Mt. S. Jean ; a second brigade was charged by a corps of English Cavalry and suffered severely. At the same moment a division of Enghsh Cavalry charged Count D'Erlon's big battery and put several guns out of action ; but General Milhaud's Cuirassiers charged the English Di\'ision, and its three regiments were broken up and cut to pieces. It was 3 p.m. The Emperor advanced the Guard to form it up in the plain and upon the ground which the I Corps had occupied at the opening of the action, for now this corps was in advance of its former alignment. The Prussian Division, whose move- ment had been foreseen, commenced to engage with Count Lobau's Light Troops, and its fire took effect upon our whole right flank. Therefore it was expedient to await the issue of this attack before undertaking anything elsewhere. Further, all the troops held in reserve were available to support and succour Count Lobau and overwhelm the Prussiem Corps when it ad- vanced. When this was accomplished the Emperor intended leading an attack upon the village of Mt. S. Jean, from which we expected a decisive success ; but by a rash movement, so common in our military annals and which has often been so fatal to us, the Reserve Cavalry crowned the heights of Mt. S. Jean and charged the English Infantry, having noticed a retrograde movement made by the English to shelter themselves from our batteries whose fire had already caused them to suffer serious loss. This manoeuvre made at the correct time and supported by the Reserves must have decided the fate of the day, but made in an isolated fashion and before affairs on the right were satisfactorily settled, it was fatal. Having no means of countermanding it, and the enemy showing masses of Cavalry and Infantry and our two divisions of Cuirassiers being engaged, all our Cavalry riished forward at the sajne moment to support their comrades. Then for three hours numerous charges were delivered, which enabled us to penetrate several squares and take six standards from the English Infantry,^ thus gaining an advantage out of all proportion to the losses which we experienced from their grapeshot and musketry fire. It was impossible to engage our Infantry Reserves until we had repulsed the flank attack of the Prussian Corps. This attack always prolonged its front perpendicularly to our right flank. The Emperor sent thither General Duhesme with the Young Guard, and also several batteries from the Artillery Reserve. The enemy was checked, then he was repulsed, and finally fell back ; he had exhausted himself, and we had nothing now to fear from him. This was the moment that was indicated for an onslaught against the hostile centre. As the Cuirassiers were suffering heavily from the grape-shot, four battalions of the Middle Guard were sent in to protect the ' This is a statement that cannot be regarded seriously. 314 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO horsemen, to hold the position, and if possible to disengage a part of our Cavalry, so that they coiild draw back into the plain. Two other battalions were pushed forward to place themselves en potence^ upon the extreme left of the division which had manoeuvred upon our flanks, in order not to have any caiise for uneasiness on this side ; the remainder were held in reserve, part to occupy the potence behind Mont S. Jean, and part upon the ridge in rear of the field of battle across which ran our line of retreat. In this state of affairs the battle was already won ; we were in possession of all the positions which the enemy held at the opening of the action ; however, our Cavalry having been pre- maturely engaged and badly handled, we could no longer hope for decisive success. But Marshal Grouchy, having learned of the movement of the Prussian Corps, was advancing against the rear of that corps, which ensured for us a signal success on the morrow. After eight hours of firing and Infantry and Cavalry charges, all the army saw with joy that the battle was won and the battle-field was in our hands. At 8.30 p.m., the four battalions of the Middle Guard, who had been advanced to the ridge on the far side of Mt. S. Jean so as to support the Cuirassiers, became greatly annoyed by the grapeshot, and therefore they advanced to storm the batteries with the bayonet. The day was at an end, when a charge delivered against their flank by several EngUsh squadrons threw them into disorder, the fugitives recrossed the ravine ; several regiments near at hand, seeing some troops belonging to the Guard in confusion, beUeved that it was the Old Guard and in consequence were themselves thrown into disorder. Cries of " All is lost ! the Guard is driven back ! " were heard on every side. The soldiers even state that at many points ill-disposed persons raised the cry of " sauve qui peut / " Be this as it may, a complete panic at once broke out and spread over the whole battle-field, and a wild rush was made towards the line of communications ; soldiers, artillerymen, ammunition wagons, all pressed in that direction, the Old Guard, which was in reserve, was involved, and was itself hurried along in that wild rush for safety. In a moment the army became a panic-stricken rabble, the different arms were even intermingled, and it was utterly im- possible to rally a single corps. Noticing this astonishing dis- organisation, the enemy immediately attacked with their Cavalry and increased the disorder, and owing to night coming on, such was the confusion that it was impossible to rally the troops and point out their error to them. Thus a battle was won, a day's fighting completed, false moves rectified, a greater success assured for the morrow, yet all was ^ En potence means forming at right angles to the main line ; i.e. similarly shaped to a gallows, with its main tree and its arm at right angles to the tree. DOCUMENTS 315 thrown away by a moment of mad terror. Even the head- quarter squadrons, who were formed up alongside the Emperor, were overthrown and disorganised by these tumultuous waves, and there was nothing else to be done but to follow in the wake of the torrent. The reserve parks, the baggage, wliich had not recrossed the Sambre, and all that was on the battle-field, remained in the enemy's hands. It was impossible even to await the arrival of the troops on our right, every one knows what the bravest army in the world is hke when it is thrown into confiision and its organisation ceases to exist. The Emperor crossed the Sambre at Charleroi, on June 19, at 5 a.m. PhiHppeviUe and Avesnes have been selected as the rally- ing and concentration points for the army. Prince Jerome, General Morand, and other Generals, have already ralhed a part of the army there. Marshal Grouchy, with the corps on the right, is heading for the lower Sambre. The enemy must have experienced very heavy losses, if we may judge from the number of standards that we have taken from them, and from the retrograde movements which they made ; our losses cannot be ascertained accurately until after the troops have been collected. Before the confusion broke out we had already experienced a very considerable loss, particularly among our Cavalry, who were engaged so unfortunately and yet so valiantly. Despite these losses, these intrepid horsemen continued to hold the position which they had wrested from the Eijglish, and only abandoned it when the tumult and disorder of the battle-field forced them to reUnquish their prize. In the darkness, and amongst the obstacles that blocked the road, the Cavalry could not preserve their organisation. The Artillery as usual has covered itself with glory. The carriages belonging to the head-quarters remained in their customary position, no retrograde movement being judged necessary for them. In the course of the night they fell into the enemy's hands. Such has been the issue of the Battle of Mont S. Jean, glorious for the French Army, and yet so fatal. Note.— All Napoleon's writings may be divided into two broad divisions — those which were written with the dehberate intention of deceiving the recipient and readers, and those which were not written for this purpose. This being so, there can be no difficulty in placing this bulletin in the class to which it belongs. This decision is confirmed by the old famihar saying, " to lie like a bulletin." However, this effort from Napoleon's pen was a fine specinaen of his style of despatch writing for the pubHc eye. Much was suppressed and much was garbled ; and yet, we cannot help admiring the clear and lucid way in which, at such a desperately critical time, he recounted the disastrous campaign. Naturally he was quite correct to explain away the unparalleled disaster that had befallen the gallant Armee du 316 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Nord, for he had not yet given up the game. To have told the bald truth at such a crisis would only have ensured alienating France from his cause, and it must have prevented him from raising any fresh armies wherewith he might hope to retrieve his fallen fortunes. Thus Napoleon cannot be blamed for not giving in these bulletins an historically accurate account of his campaign. Such procedure would have been as inconceivably idiotic as it would have been unskilful. But it is interesting to notice that in the bulletins no importance was attached to the incident of Vandamme's orderly on June 15, nor to the wanderings of D'Erlon on June 16. Neither, it is true, was any mention made of Ney's mistake on June 17, which " ruined France." No. 45. Letter of Prince Bernhard of Saxe- Weimar to his Father.' Bivouac near Waterloo, in the wood between Brussels and Genappe, June 19, 1815. Dear Father, Thank God I am still alive, and have escaped unhurt from two bloody battles. The first was on June 16, the second was yesterday. When you read this, I beg you to take Ferraris' map in your hand. For four weeks I was in cantonments in Genappe, with the regiment of Orange-Nassau of which I am Colonel. On the 15th I was appointed Brigadier of the 2nd Brigade of von Perponcher's Division. My predecessor had had the misfortune to break his leg. Beside my two battalions of Orange-Nassau, now I had under my command three battalions of the Duchy of Nassau. My brigade was then 4000 strong — to-day I have not 1200 left ! On the 15th, the French fell upon the Prussian Army and pressed the latter very much. My brigade continued on the left wing of the Dutch Army, the head- quarters of which [I Corps] were at Braine-le-Comte — my division lay in Nivelles. A battaUon of Nassau were at Frasnes, and also a battery of Dutch Horse Artillery. = When the Prussians re- treated towards Fleurus the post at Frasnes was attacked and driven back. The Infantry threw itself into a wood on the right, and the Artillery retired fighting to Quatre Bras. The group of houses at the Brussels-Charleroi and Nivelles-Namur cross-roads, are called Quatre Bras. At this important post I had drawn my brigade together, and cannonaded the enemy whom I succeeded in keeping off. I maintained this post through the whole night. Towards morning ' The letter (above) is given in Battle of Waterloo (Booth, 1852; XI edition), pp. 66, 67. The letter is given in fuU in German and in French by de Bae and de Wommersom, III, p. 562, etc., and in French in Wellington's Despatches (1852), VIII, pp. 396, 397. " In General Lefebvre-Desnoettes' report {ante. No. 9) the General stated particularly that the hostile guns were " Light Artillery." DOCUMENTS 317 on the 16th I was reinforced by a battalion of Dutch Jagers and a battalion of Militia. Soon afterward my Divisional General and the Prince of Orange arrived. With the latter I went to the outposts, and by his order I undertook a reconnaissance with a battahon and two cannoru Towards noon the enemy showed strong columns and began to cannonade us. It is said he had three corps of his army engaged against us on this day.^ We had only five battaUons to oppose them ; and I was given three, and ordered to hold the skirts of a wood to the last extremity. The Duke of Wellington, himself, was present at the beginning of the action ; for a long time I held my ground against an enemy of thrice my numbers, and had only two Belgic cannon to co-operate with me [Stevenart's Battery]. The enemy seized the point of a wood which was opposite to me and incommoded my left flank. Without loss of time I collected some Volunteers and two companies of Dutch Militia, and recovered my wood at the point of the bayonet. I was at the head of the storming parties, and had the honour to be one of the fhst in the wood. In cutting away some branches, I wounded myself very sHghtly in the right leg with my sabre but was not for a moment out of action. It is, in fact, not worth while to mention this wound ; I write to you about it, only that you and my good Mother may not be alarmed by exaggerated and foohsh reports. Whilst I defended my wood resolutely, the enemy drove back our left wing as far as Quatre Bras. It was on this occasion that the brave Duke of Brunswick was killed by a ball which entered his breast. Strong colimons of Infantry turned my right flank ; I asked for orders how to act, but received none. When I saw myself surroimded on all sides, and my troops had expended all their ammunition, I retreated in good order through the wood to the neighbourhood of Houtain- le-Val. The Hanoverian Division, Alten, supported me and recovered the wood, but then lost it again ; at last it was re- captured by the English with great loss, and retained through the night. I bivouacked for the night in the wood. The Prussians retreated this day [17 June] to Wavre, and on account of this retreat we were obhged to retire to the position near Mt. S. Jean, between Genappe and Brussels, this was done on the 17th. We were obhged to bivouac for the night upon very muddy ground and in the most dreadful rain. Yesterday about 10 o'clock' the decisive battle began, in which towards evening WeUington defeated Napoleon in person. Sixty cannon are the fruit of this bloody victory. ^ 1 In reality only three divisions of EeUIe's Corps. * This is quite an hour and a half too early ; but probably Prince Bemhard is alluding to brushes with French Cavalry reconnoitring patrols before the main action opened. ' The Prince could not yet have learned the full lists of captured trophies. 318 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO I commanded on the left wing, and was ordered to hold a village and a position. With a great loss of men I succeeded. The victory was still doubtful, when about 4 o'clock [p.m.] the Prussians under Generals Biilow and Zieten arrived upon our left flank and decided the battle. Unhappily the Prussians, who were to support me in my village, mistook my Nassauers, whose uniform is still very French though their hearts are true German, for Frenchmen, and opened a heavy fire upon them. They were driven from their post and I rallied them a quarter of a league from the field of battle. My Divisional General, whose first brigade [Von Bijlandt] was wholly destroyed, is now with me. I must conclude because I have just received orders to proceed to Nivelles in pursuit of the enemy. Farewell, dear Father ; salute my Mother, my Sister-in-law, my Brother, and all my friends ; and be assured that I will do everything to be worthy of you. The Colonel and Brigadier, Bernhard, Prince of Saxe-Weimab. Note. — With reference to the statement made by Prince Bernhard about the encounter between the Prussians and his Nassauers, a protest and correction were published in 1815 ; they are given on pp. 570-572, in La Campagne de 1815, by de Bas and de Wommersom — Brussels, 1908 {Tome III, Annexes and Notes), This protest, signed by three Senior Officers of the Regiment, pointed out that on June 18 the 2/Nassau Infantry Regiment, was with our 2nd Division. At 9 a.m., the 1st Battalion was sent to occupy Hougoumont in conjunction with part of our Guard, and other troops. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions under the direct command of their Brigadier — the Prince of Saxe- Weimar — occu- pied, together with the Orange-Nassau Regiment, the extreme left of the Duke of Wellington's position ; five companies held La Haye, Frischermont was held by the Orange-Nassauers, and the remainder of the 2/Nassau Infantry formed up in column behind La Haye, acting as a support to the front line. Here these troops remained until the dehvery of the great general attack. The garrison of La Haye were attacked at the commencement of the action and were engaged in a more, or less, severe fight all day. When Biilow and Zieten debouched near La Haye, the Prussian skirmishers enveloped and fired indifferently on both the French and Nassauers. The Nassauers, knowing nothing of the arrival of the Prussian reinforcements, answered their fire until they discovered their error. An officer (in command at La Haye) then proceeded at once with a small party into the Prussian lines and convinced them of their mistake. Firing between the Alhes then ceased, and both concentrated their attention and efforts on destroying their common foe. Thus the protest disposes of the rout mentioned by the Prince of Saxe-Weimar. This evidence is very detailed, and it may be accepted. It confirms the mistake of the Prussians in opening fire on friend and foe alike — a mistake to which Captain Mercer DOCUMENTS 319 and his gallant Troop of Horse Artillery were able to bear witness. However, the protest only shakes Prince Bernard on one point, in which it was easy for him to be deceived in the failing light and amid the awful confusion that reigned at the end of this battle. Fortunately the protest leaves unsullied the fame of a gallant regiment, who held their positions manfully all day, and who behaved with soldierly fortitude and forethought under the trying circumstances of being mistaken for foes by their own AUies. The rest of Prince Bernard's document is not assailed, and therefore its value is unimpaired. No. 46. Extract of a letter from John Lewis, Private, 95th Rifles, to his friends at Axminster.^ July 8, 1815. I make no doubt but you have heard of the glorious news, and I suppose you thought I was kiUed or wounded ; but yesterday is the first day we have halted since the beginning of the Battle on the 18th June, and my hands are swelled so with walking day and night, that I scarce can hold my pen. I do not know what the English newspapers say about the Battle ; but, thank God, I am living, and was an eye-witness to the beginning of the Battle — to the ending of it ; but my pen cannot explain to you, nor twenty sheets of paper would not contain, what I could say about it ; for, thank God, I had my strength and health more on the days we was engaged than I had in my Hfe ; so what I am going to tell you is the real truth. But I think my Brother Tom, as he is such a scholar, if he was to look in the newspapers, he might see what Officers was killed and wounded of the 95th Regiment ; we have but 6 Companies in the Country, and after the Battle were only 255 privates ; 2 Colonels, 1 Major, 15 Officers, 11 Sergeants, and 1 Bugler were killed ; my first rank man was wounded by part of a shell through his foot, and he dropt as we was advancing ; I covered the next man I saw, and had not walked twenty steps before a musket shot came sideways and took his nose clean off ; and then I covered another man, which was the third ; just after that, the man that stood next to me on my left hand had his left arm shot off by a nine-pound shot just above his elbow, and he turned round and caught hold of me with his right hand, and the blood run all over my trousers ; we was advancing, and he dropt directly. After this was ordered to extend in front of all our large guns, and small arms was firing at the British lines in our rear, and I declare to God, with our Guns and the French Gims firing over > Battle of Waterloo (Booth, 1852 ; XI edition), pp. 199-202. 320 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO our heads, my pen cannot explain anything like it ; it was not 400 yards from the French hnes to our British lines, and we was about 160 yards in front of ours, so we was about 250 yards from the French, and sometimes not 100 yards ; so I leave you to judge if I had not a narrow escape of my life. As I just said, we now extended in front ; Boney's Imperial Horse Guards, all clothed in armour, raade a charge at us ; we saw them coming, and we all closed in and formed a square just as they came within ten yards of us, and they found they could do no good with us ; they fired with their carbines on us, and came to the right-about directly, and at that moment the man on my right hand was shot through the body, and the blood ran out at his belly and back like a pig stuck in the throat ; he dropt on his side ; I spoke to him ; he just said " Lewis I'm done ! " and died directly. All this time we kept up a constant fire at the Imperial Guards as they retreated, but they often came to the right-about and fired ; and as I was loading my rifle, one of their shots came and struck my rifle, not two inches above my left hand, as I was ramming down the ball with my right hand, and broke the stock and bent the barrel in such a manner that I could not get the ball down ; just at that time we extended again, and my rifle was no use to me. A nine-pound shot came and cut the Sergeant of our Company right in two ; he was not above three file from me, so I threw down my rifle and went and took his rifle, as it was not hurt at the time. We had lost both our Colonels, Major, and two eldest Captains, and only a young Captain to take command of us ; as for Colonel Wade, he went to England about three weeks before the Battle. Seeing we had lost so many men and all our Commanding Officers, my heart began to fail, and Boney's Guards made another charge on us ; but we made them retreat as before, and while we was in square the second time, the Duke of Wellington and his Staff came up to us in all the fire, and saw we had lost all our Commanding Officers ; he himself gave the word of command ; the words he said to our Regiment were this,—" 95th, unfix your swords, left face, and extend yourselves once more, we shall soon have them over the other hill," and then he rode away on our Right ; and how he escaped being shot God only knows, for all that time the shot was flying like hail-stones. This was about 4 o'clock* on the 18th June, when Lord Welling- ton rode away from our Regiment ; and then we advanced like Britons, but we could not go five steps without walking over dead and wounded ; and Boney's horses of the Imperial Guards, * Probably the time was actually 8 p.m. Apparently at this moment the fate of the battle was assured, and the General Advance was about to commence. At 4 p.m. the state of the battle was most critical, for Biilow had not yet engaged and the deluge of French horsemen was surging up against Wellington's line. Even if Private Lewis has committed a mistake in the chronology of the Great Battle yet he has erred in exalted company, and the mistake does not detract from the obvious value of his delightful and natural letter. DOCUMENTS 321 of the men that was killed, was running loose about in all directions. If our Tom had been a httle behind in the rear, ho might have catched horses enough to had a troop or two like Sir John Delapole. Lord Wellington declared to us this morning, that it was the hardest Battle that he had ever seen fought in his life ; but now, thank God, all is over, and we are very comfortable in Paris, and hope we shall remain here and have our Christmas Dinner in Paris, for London cannot compare to it. I hardly know how to spare time to write this, for I want to go out about the City ; it is four o'clock and the letters go off at five ; but I must say a httle more on the other side : — We was all very quiet in quarters tiU the 15th June, when the orders came all at once, at 12 o'clock at night, for every man to be ready in one hour, and march at one o'clock, there we was all in a bustle, and oS we goes, and it was not hght, there was no Moon ;^ the orders was that the French was making different movements on our left, about twenty-two leagues from us ; mind the days of the month. I say this day, the 16th, we marched tUl eleven o'clock that night, which was twenty-two hours march for us the first day, and we walked thirteen leagues in that time, or thirty-nine Enghsh miles ; being dark. General Clinton ordered tis to lie down on the road side for two hours ; so we halted, and every man got half a pint of real Rum to keep up his spirits. We set off again at ten o'clock in the morning on the 17th of June, and marched nine leagues, about four o'clock in the afternoon ; then we were in front of the enemy, but the rain fell so hard that the oldest soldiers there never saw the like in their life. I really thought that Heaven and Earth were coming together. There were a few shots fired on both sides that night, but the guns would not go off.^ We were on one long high hiU, and the French on another, facing us ; there was a large wood behind us [the Forest of Soignes], and Lord WeUiogton told us to get wood, and make us large fires and dry ourselves, and get our guns fit by day, as the Enemy could not hurt us. So we made large fires, and they were about four miles in length ; and when the French saw it, they did the same, and it was one of the most beautiful sights I ever saw ; and the next morning, as soon as it was light,' we went at it ding-dong, and drove all before us, tUl yesterday, the 7th of July, that we entered Paris ; but ever since the 15th of June, till 7th of July, we have only laid down on the ground with our clothes on ; so leave you to judge if I am not fatigued out, ^ This is interesting, for the moon was sis days from the full, and rose early in the evening, probably when the troops started it had sunk. 2 At UddevaUa, in Sweden, 1677, a prolonged rainstorm put a complete stop to all firing, and the battle was fought out with naked steel. (Colonel Hime's Infantry Fire Formations, p. 13.) Needless to say the slaughter was tremendous. This stoppage of firing by rain is a risk that the percussion system has abolished. » The battle opened at 11.35 a.m. II. — Y 322 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Bliicher rode by the side of Lord Wellington yesterday, when we entered Petris. As we weis on the advance after the French Army, every town we came to the people was all fied to Paris, and had taken away what they could ; the British, Prussian, and Russian Army, broke their houses open, and plundered what was most good, and set fire to some. Wine was more plentiful than water, for all their cellars was full of wine, the" same as Tucker's is full of cider, and that was the first place the soldiers broke open. I have often been in cellars, and what wine we could not drink and carry away, broke in the heads of the casks and let it run about. We marched through towns as large as Exeter, and not a person to be seen, but all locked up and window-shutters fastened. Note. — The foregoing letter is extremely interesting as a docu- ment of first-class value, showing the feeUngs of a private in one of the world's greatest land-battles. Also it confirms our knowledge about the late hoiu" on June 15 when the orders to march to the concentration point were received. Captain Mer- cer (in his Journal, I, pp. 230-231) stated that he was awakened early on June 16 to receive his orders, which were to "proceed with the utmost dihgence to Enghien." In each case great energy was shown in taking the road, and most creditable marches were performed by the troops to reach the scene of action. The description of the great Battle is most interesting reading, for it is indeed a hiiman document, the more valuable because it was written purely as a private letter with no idea of publication. THE END iou9/uet/Q qi s/ss^nug uio^j ^ <^ =, =f =i tj ^ «( .a^ i i A i 'A ,,o^«3n«vHO^^=^n.. , .Ae^ 4 (0 INDEX Advanced Guards, action of, defined by Clausewitz, I, 157. Allied plan for invasion of France, I, 46-48. Allies enter Paris, II, 210 ; undeniable advantages of, in 1815, II, 231. Anglo-Dutch Army, dispositions, I, 64—69 ; outpost line, I, 66-67 ; dispositions of those troops not at Quatre Bras, June 16, I, 211, 212; dispositions on June 17 (early), I, 296-298 ; retires from Quatre Bras on June 17, I, 330 ; dispositions on June 17 (even- ing), I, 341-342 ; strength of, at Waterloo, II, 35-36 ; the Duke's opinion of his troops at Waterloo, II, 44, 224 ; loss experienced at Waterloo, II, 134 ; advance after Waterloo, II, 204, 205 ; organisation of, II, Appendix I, 258-262. Armie du Nord, composition, I, 22 ; strong points, I, 34r-35 ; weak points, I, 35-39 ; opening moves, I, 74—75 ; dispositions, June 13, I, 81 ; redistribution of duties in, I, 82-89; dispositions, June 14, 1, 99-100; dispositions, June 15, I, 129, 132, 133; dispositions, June 17 (early), I, 296-298 ; dispositions, June 17 (evening), I, 342 ; strength of, at Waterloo, II, 19 ; Armie du Nord — contd. loss experienced at Waterloo, II, 135 ; strength available on June 19, II, 202 ; organisation of, in detail, II, Appendix I, 245-250 ; staff of, in detail, II, Appendix I, 251-255. Artillery, British, at Quatre Bras, I, 195, n., and 212; change of horse-artillery arma- ment in 1815, II, 36, 37; conduct of, at Waterloo, II, 64, 77-79 ; the Duke's order to, on June 18, II, 77, 78 ; co-operates in assisting in the defeat of the Guard, II, 119, 121, 122-123 ; used when the French broke, II, 127; ammunition expended at Waterloo, II, 134. B Barclay de Tolly, commands Russian Army, I, 23. Baring, Major, K.G.L., in command at La Haye Ste., II, 30, 31 ; his fine defence of La Haye Ste., II, 96, 97, 102, 103. Baudus, Major, bears verbal order to Ney, June 16, I, 206-207, 237-238. B^doySre, General de la, mission in Belgium, I, 30, n. ; bears " pencil note " on June 16, I, 196, 237 ; his misdirected zeal on June 16, I, 196, 292, n. Belgium, military description of, I, 39-42. 323 324 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Bernard, Prince, of Saxe-Weimar, shows fine initiative on June 15, I, 125-126 ; opposes Lefebvre - Desnoettes' advance, I, 127-128. Berthier, Marshal, Prince of Wag- ram, death of, I, 83. Bertrand, General, Grand Marshal, writes the order to Marshal Grouchy, on June 17, I, 318- 319; accompanies Napoleon on night reconnaissance before Water- loo, I, 342 ; accompanies Napoleon to Koche- fort, II, 207. Bliicher, Field-Marshal Prince, first hears of French concentra- tion, I, 77 ; his reception of the traitor, de Bourmont, I, 113 ; orders for June 15, I, 119 ; moves to Sombreffe, June 15, I, 119; orders sent to General Billow, I, 142, 143, 144 ; at Battle of Ligny (q.v.) ; writes to Wellington about co-operation at Mt. S. Jean, I, 345 ; his second letter to Wellington on June 18, II, 23; his character, II, 24, 27, 28 ; at Battle of Waterloo {q.v.); compared with Gneisenau, II, 27-28 ; faulty arrangements to inter- cept Marshal Grouchy, II, 194-195 ; attempt to capture Napoleon, II, 206 ; desires to execute Napoleon, II, 206, 208, and Appendix II, Nos. 37-40. Bourmont, General de, his deser- tion, and reception by Blii- cher, I, 112, 113. British Artillery. See Artillery, British. British Troops, General Reille's opinion of, II, 11; fine fighting qualities in 1815, II, 217-224 ; weight carried by, in 1815, II, 225. " Brown Bess," probable power of, II, 78, n. ; details of, II, 225. Bugeaud, Marshal, opinion of British Troops, II, 219, 220. Bulow, General von, Blucher's orders to, for June 15, I, 142, 143, 144 ; late at Hannut, I, 143 ; his Corps to lead advance to Mt. S. Jean on June 18, I, 346 360 ; II, 22, 23 ; Bliicher's orders to Biilow, for June 18, II, 22, 23 ; his delay in engaging on June 18, II, 25-26 ; attacks Lobau on June 18, II, 92, 93. " Case-shot Attack," the, introduced at Friedland, I, 53— 55; might have been used at Water- loo, II, 84, 85. Champ de. Mai, I, 13. Clausel, General, commands in W. Pyrenees, I, 21. Clausewitz, General von, on action of covering forces, I, 157; praise for Bliicher's plan for June 18, II, 23. Conditions of 1796 and 1815 con- trasted, I, 60, 61. D Danton's aphorism anent auda- city, I, 106 ; II, 115. Davout, Marshal, Prince of Eckmilhl, appointed Minister of War, I, 8, 87-88 ; desires to fight to the end, II, 209, 210. D'Erlon. See Drouet. Domberg, General, reports French concentration on June 14, I, 102 ; refuses to forward Colonel Grant's report, I, 123. Double line of operations, risks attendant on the use of, I, 328-330 ; II, 19, 20. INDEX 325 Dragomirov, General, on necessity for massing troops to strike, I, 258. Drouet, General, Count D'Erlon, commands I Corps, I, 21 ; manoeuvres on June 16, I, 195- 197; returns to Quatre Bras, 1, 210 ; wanderings on June 16, I, 285- 295; an earlier Napoleonic example of missing a force, I, 285 ; suggested placing of D'Erlon's I Corps, on June 16, I, 288- 289; Napoleon might have led D'Erlon's Corps himself, I, 289; D'Erlon's and Ney's responsi- bility in the matter, I, 290 ; D'Erlon's own account of what happened, I, 291-293 ; formation used by his Corps at Waterloo, on June 18, II, 61- 64. Drouot, Antoine, General, Aide- Major-General de la Garde, returns from Elba with Napo- leon, I, 3 ; orders issued to the Guard through him after Mortier leaves, I, 22, n. E Economy of Force, I, 52, 53, 269 ; II, 59, 60, 95, 96. English subsidies to Continental Powers, I, 24. Eacadrons de service, I, 131 ; used at Gilly, I, 151 ; used at Waterloo, II, 127. Exelmans, General, his mishandling of his dragoons on June 17, I, 352, 354 ; his dispositions on June 18, II, 164, 169-170 ; sent on to secure Namur, on June 19, II, 193. Forbin-Janson, Colonel, bears de- spatch to Ney, on June 16, I, 237-238. Fouche, Joseph, Duke of Otranto, appointed Minister of Police, I, 8. Foy, General Count, opinion of Napoleon, II, 213, n. ; opinion of British troops, II, 220, 221. France, state of, on Napoleon's return, I, 2. Frazer, Colonel Sir Augustus, commanding R.H.A. in 1815, on the lack of British cavalry at Quatre Bras, I, 212 ; responsible for change of British horse-artillery armament, in 1815, II, 36-37 ; criticises Napoleon's tactics at Waterloo, II, 48 ; on the French cavalry charges on June 18, II, 82 ; description of closing scene in the Battle of Waterloo, II, 124r-125. Frederick the Great, two essentials in a cavalry charge, II, 80 ; on the necessity for pursuit, II, 140; on taking advice from a subaltern, II, 159. French Army, state of, on Napo- leon's return, I, 10. G Gembloux, reasons for the Em- peror directing Marshal Grouchy to this place on June 17, I, 318-321, 352. Gerard, General Count, commands IV Corps, I, 21 ; late inconcentratingatPhihppe- ville, I, 112; late in reaching the Sambre, I, 113; advises Grouchy to march to the sound of the guns on June 18, II, 158, 159, 164 ; asks permission to take his Corps from Walhain to Waterloo, on June 18, II, 164-165 ; wounded at Wavre, II, 180. Gilly, Affair of, June 15, I, 149, 152. Girard, General Count, his division placed to connect the wings on June 15, I, 127; shows great gallantry at Ligny, I, 240-241. 326 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Gneisenau, General Count von, plans for Wellington's co-opera- tion on June 16, I, 175, 177 ; his decision to retreat to Wavre, on June 17, and the reasons that influenced him, I, 276- 281, 358-359, n. ; neglects to inform Wellington immediately, I, 281-282 ; contrasted with Blucher, II, 27-28 ; his fine answer to Thielemann's appeal for help on June 18, 11, 95 ; his pursuit of the French Army after Waterloo, II, 140-142. Grant, Colonel Colquhoun, mis- sion in France, I, 122-123. Grolmann, General von, supports Bliicher, on June 17, to ensure working with Wellington, I, 358-359, n. ; orders Prassian attack on June 18, II, 25-26. Grouard, Colonel, his opinion of Napoleon, II, 239-240. Grouchy, Marshal Count, commands cavalry reserve, 1, 21; shows energy and zeal on June 12, I, 79 ; given command at Gilly, I, 118; dispositions on night of June 15, I, 132 ; orders received on June 16, I, 160-161 ; his action early on June 17, I, 298-299 ; to command against the Prus- sians on June 17, I, 316, 317 ; orders received on his appoint- ment to the command of the FrenchRightWing,I,317-319; misinterprets the " Bertrand Order," I, 319 ; suppresses " Bertrand Order," I, 319 ; suggested course to follow on June 17, 1, 322-323, 347-351 ; his dilatory march by one road to Gembloux, I, 351-353 ; mishandling of his cavalry on Jime 17, I, 352, 354-355 ; suggested course to follow on evening of June 17, I, 356 ; his misappreciation of the situation on night of June 17-18, II, 153-155; Grouchy, Marshal Count — contd. he writes to the Emperor at 6 a.m. on June 18, II, 155 ; his late start on June 18, II, 155-156 ; he reports to Napoleon from Walhain, at 11 a.m., June 18, II, 156-158 ; whilst at breakfast at Walhain receives report of heavy firing to N.W., II, 158 ; advised to march to the sound of the guns, he refuses, II, 158, 159, 163, 164; declines to divide his detach- ment on Gerard's suggestion, II, 164-166; suggested course for Grouchy to have followed when he heard the guns, II, 166-168 ; Napoleon's responsibility, II, 168; Grouchy's shortcomings, II, 168, 169; encounters the Prussians, II, 170-171 ; receives 10 a.m. despatch from Napoleon, II, 172 ; at Action of Wavre (q.v.) ; degenerates into being a sergent de bataille at Wavre, II, 180- 182; nerved to take action, on Jime 18, by Napoleon's 1.30 p.m. despatch, II, 184-185 ; his position after his victory at Wavre, II, 190 ; learns the result of the Battle of Waterloo, II, 191 ; determines to take instant action, II, 191 ; hisspeechto his Generals,II,192; his real responsibility on June 18, II, 192 ; decides to open his retreat on Namur, his arrangements, II, 193, 194 ; reaches Gembloux with his force on Jvme 19, II, 194 ; concentrates his force at Dinant, on June 20, II, 198 ; reaches Givet with his force on June 21, II, 198 ; criticisms on Grouchy's fine retreat, II, 198-199; retirement of his force to Paris, II, 205. INDEX 327 Hal, Duke of Wellington's de- tachment at, on June 18, II, 38-44. Hardinge, Brigdr. General Sir H., reports the result of Ligny to Wellington, I, 275, 276 ; his description of Blucher's desire to co-operate with Wellington, I, 358-359, n. Haye Sainte, La (see sketch 2, vol. n), also II, 30, 31 ; and see Battle of Waterloo. HoUow Way, the Legend of the, n, 98-100. Hougoumont (see sketch 1, %-ol. n), also n, 30 and n.; and see Battle of Waterloo. Infan try, British, weight carried by, in 1815, 11, 225. Jena and Auerstadt, no analogy with Quatre Bras and Lignv, _ 1,288. Jerome, Prince, warns Xapoleon, on June IS. about an Allied concentration, II, 12. Jo m i n i, General, his conversation with Napoleon in 1806, 1, 105, 106. Kellermann, General, Count of Vahny, his charge at Quatre Bras, I, 201-206 ; at Action of Quatre Bras {q.v.) ; at Battle of \A'aterloo (q.v.). Kennedy, General (then CaptEiin Shaw), forms up HI Division on June 18, n, 34 ; reports serious situation of Allied centre to Duke of Wellington, after fall of La Haye Sainte, II, 108, 109. King's German Legion, at Waterloo {q.v.) ; provides garrison for La Haye Ste., n, 30-31 ; fine fighting quahties in 1815, n, 217-224. Ligny, Battle of, June 16 — Battle-field and Prelimitiary Dis- positions : the Battle-field, I, 221-224, 227 ; the windmills, I, 223-224 ; Marshal Blucher's preliminary dispositions, I, 224^227 ; Napoleon's plan of attack, I, 228-230 ; Napoleon's remark to Gerard, I, 230; disposition of Armee du Nord, I, 230-231 ; numbers engaged on both sides, I, 232 ; Napoleon's orders to Marshal Ney, I, 232-234, 235 ; Napoleon's orders to Lobau, I, 234-235 ; development of Napoleon's plan for June 16,1,236; despatch bearers sent to Ney, I, 237-238. 1st Phase : opening of the Battle, Van- damme's attacks, I, 239, 240 ; Girard attacks the htimlets of S. Amand, I, 240-241 ; Blucher counter-attacks the French left, I, 241-242 ; Gerard's attacks on Ligny, I, 242-244 ; Grouchy's progress, I, 244, 245, 253, 263. 2nd Phase : D'Erlon sighted by Vandamme, I, 246-247 ; Napoleon and D'Erlon's arrival, I, 248-252 ; Durutte's inaction, I, 250-252 ; Blucher's counterstroke, I, 252— 253, 254r-255. 3rd Phase : Napoleon's decisive attack, I, 259-265 ; Blucher heads a desperate charge, is vmhorsed, and rescued by his A.D.C., I, 263-264 ; positions at the close of the fighting, I, 266 ; description of the stricken field, I, 262-263, 266-267, 314 ; comments on the battle, I, 267— 274. 328 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Lobau, General Mouton, Count of, commands VI Corps, I, 21 ; orders to, for Jime 16, I, 163- 164, 234^235 ; ordered to neutralise Billow on June 18, criticisms on, II, 57-60 ; neglects to occupy the Paris Wood, II, 92, 93. Luxembourg, the Marshal Duke of, his victory at Fleurus, 1690, I, 287. M Mass^na, Marshal, Prince of Ess- ling, in command at Mar- seilles, March, 1815, I, 3, 4. Mauduit, Captain Hippolyte de Mauduit, 2/ 1st Grenadiers, gives General Roguet's attack orders for the Guard at Ligny, I, 261 ; describes the close and heavy fighting, characteristic of Ligny and Waterloo, I, 266- 267. Meissonier, his opinion of Napo- leon, II, 213, n. Mercer, Captain C., R.H.A., his Troop on rear-guard duty on June 17, I, 334 ; fires on Napoleon, I, 335-336, 339; his Troop's first position at Waterloo, II, 63 ; disobeys the Duke's order, II, ' 53; his soldierly action during the French Cavalry charges, II, 87-90 ; his Troop destroyed by a Prus- sian Battery after the vic- tory was obtained, II, 128— 129. Mistakes on the French side in 1815, criticised by Napoleon as they occurred, I, 110—112, 311, 312, 332, and 332-333. Moltke, Field Marshal von, opinion on concentration oft a double Mne of operations, I, 329; on necessity for adaptation, II, 222. Moon, age of, on June 18, II, 138, n. Mortier, Marshal, Duke of Treviso, commands Imperial Guard, I, 21 ; left at Beaumont on sick-list, I, 22, n. Mouton, General. See Lobau. Muffling, General von, criticism on Wellington remain- ing at Brussels, I, 137 ; neglects to obtain Bliioher's message from Major Winter- feldt, on June 16, I, 211 ; plans for Bliicher's co-operation on June 18,11, 32, 33; his idea of the best solution from the Allied point of view, II, 33, 222, n. ; posted on Anglo-Dutch left on June 18, II, 71 ; moves Vivian's and Vandeleur's Cavahy Brigades, from Allied left to the centre, II, 94, 95 ; secures co-operation of Zieten's Corps at crisis of Battle of Waterloo, H, 115, 116; opinion of British soldiers, II, 219, and 222, n. Murat, Joachim, Marshal, King of Naples, campaign against the Austrians in Italy, I, 14-20 ; Napoleon's opinion of, I, 15 ; Napoleon's opinion of what Murat might have done at Waterloo, I, 19-20, 85, 86. N Namur, state of, in 1815, II, 197- 198. Napoleon Buonaparte, Emperor of the French, lands from Elba, I, 3 ; marches on Paris, I, 4-5 ; meets 5th Regiment of the Line near Grenoble, I, 5—6 ; reaches Paris and organises his Cabinet, I, 7-8 ; makes overtures to Great Britain and Austria, I, 9-10 ; obtains details about Belgium, I, 11, and 30, n. ; holds the Champ de Mai, I, 13 ; distribution of the French forces, I, 21 ; plan of operations in 1815, I, 26-45 ; INDEX 329 Napoleon Buonaparte — contd. takes out too small an army, I, 36-39 ; his system of advancing in mass, I, 49-59 ; " the case-shot attack," I, 53- 55; secrecy of, I, 73, 74 ; leaves Paris for the front, I, 76 ; reaches Laon, I, 79 ; reaches Avesnes, I, 80 ; issues march orders for June 14, 1,80; misappreciates the Allied Com- manders, I, 98 ; issues final orders to Rapp, Suchet, and Lecourbe, I, 99 ; issues march orders for June 15, I, 108-109 ; plan for June 15, I, 110, 130- 131; leaves a pont d'argent for the Allies, I, 130, 131 ; visits Gilly to assist Grouchy, I, 131-132 ; first plan for June 16, I, 158- 165; orders to Marshal Ney on June 16, I, 161-163, 171, 173-174, 198, 206 ; sends Janin to Quatre Bras, I, 171; moves to Fleurus, I, 171 ; reconnoitres Prussians at Ligny, I, 172-173 ; at Battle of Ligny {q.v. ) ; ' unwell at close of Battle of Ligny, I, 266 ; asleep when Marshal Grouchy comes for orders on June 17, I, 299 ; courses open to Napoleon after Ligny, I, 301-311 ; orders sent to Ney on June 17, I, 300, 311 ; limits to Napoleon's physical powers on June 17, I, 313, 314; visits Ligny Battle-field on June 17, 1, 314 ; decides on his plan for June 17, I, 314^315 ; gives command of French right wing to Marshal Grouchy on June 17, I, 317 ; orders issued to Grouchy, I, 317-319 ; Napoleon Buonaparte — contd. reason for use of the name Gembloux in the orders given to Grouchy on June 17, I, 319-321 ; reaches Marbais on June 17, I, 331; criticises Marshal Ney, I, 332 ; pursues Wellington's rear-guard I, 334-339 ; reconnoitres Wellington's posi- tion at Mt. S. Jean, on June 17, I, 339-340 ; he&i's of Prussian column near Gery, I, 340 ; makes a night reconnaissance of Wellington's position, I, 342 ; strength of his Army in front of Mt. S. Jean, I, 342 ; hears from Marshal Grouchy, I, 343; at Battle of Waterloo, {q.v.) ; accustomed to demand implicit and punctual obedience to his orders, II, 159 ; reaches Philippeville on June 19, II, 139, 200 ; his letter to Joseph, II, 200-201; determines to return to Paris at once, II, 201 ; his arrangements to rally and reorganise the Armie du Nord, II, 202 ; reaches Paris on June 21, II, 203; signs his abdication, June 22, II, 203 ; retires to Malmaison, II, 204 ; moves to Bochefort, II, 204, 210; surrenders to England, II, 211 ; protests against being called General, II, 212, n. ; his work in the world, II, 212- 214; his death at S. Helena, II, 215 ; on need for study, I, 1, 2 ; on essentials for war, I, 10 ; his energy in organisation, I, 1 1 ; his maxim about separation of forces, I, 44, 45 ; II, 20 ; his use of artillery to force on and ensure a decision, I, 63— 55; on the fundamental principle to observe in the art of war, I, 55; 330 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Napoleon Buonaparte — contd. on Activity and Speed, I, 74, 354; on value of time in war, I, 97, 313, 340 ; draws a distinction between " assembled " and " concen- trated," I, 101 ; on real courage, I, 106 ; on the value of artillery, I, 260 ; use of roads when advancing to give battle, I, 334 ; on Fortmie, I, 340 ; on the necessity for following a plan through, despite loss, 11, 96 ; his treatment of subordinates, II, 160-163 ; his use of General Aides-de- Camp, 11, 254, 255 ; his health in 1815, II, 229-242 ; his deterioration from 1813, on- wards, II, 231 ; his lethargy in 1815,11,232-237; his spasmodic energy in 1815, II, 238-239 ; Napoleon's work, II, 212-214 ; Napoleon's genius, II, 240 ; Napoleon's military character, I, 27, 28, 45, 46, 53, 118, 159, 257, 267, 268, 270, 271, 274, 287-288; II, 200, 201, 202, 214, 227-228, 240-242. Ney, Marshal, Prince of the Moskowa, joins Napoleon, I, 7 ; called up for campaign in Belgium, I, 75 ; given command of right wing, I, 117; captures Gosselies, I, 127 ; encounters Prince Bernard, I, 128, 129; dispositions for night of June 15, I, 129 ; visits Napoleon at night on June 15, I, 158 ; orders from Napoleon, for June 16, I, 161-163, 171, 173-174 ; moves to Frasnes, I, 179 ; fights Action of Quatre Bras (q.v.) ; recalls I Corps, I, 198 ; Ney at Bautzen and at Quatre Bras, compared, I, 286-287 ; failure early on June 17, I, 299, 324-326, 330-331 ; Ney, Marshal — contd. criticised by the Emperor, I, 332; Ney at Waterloo (q.v.) ; his speech to D'Erlon at Waterloo, II, 114; his last bid for death at Water- loo, II, 129 ; escapes from the Field on June 18, II, 130. Numbers to the yard, Allies at Quatre Bras, I, 185 ; Prussians at Ligny, I, 226 ; Anglo-Dutch at Waterloo, II, 37-38 ; normal at the period, II, 37. Prussians, at Wavre, June 18, II, 176, n. Pajol, General, his extraordinary manceuvres on June 17, I, 354^355 ; storms Limale Bridge with his cavalry during Action at Wavre, June 18, II, 182-183. Pirch I, General von, concentrates II Corps on June 15, I, 144 ; sent to out off Marshal Grouchy on June 19, 11, 188, 190 ; comes to a halt at Mellery on June 19, II, 194 ; co-operates with Thielemann (on June 20) in pursuit of Marshal Grouchy, II, 196- 198; employed in reduction of French fortresses, II, 200. Pirch II, General von, dispositions at Gilly, I, 149. Plan for campaign in Belgium, I, 162-163 ; factors which marred Napo- leon's plan, II, 217-219, 236. Prussian Army, dispositions, I, 69-71 ; strength at Ligny, June 16, I, 232; disposition after the close of the fighting at Ligny, I, 283 ; disposition on June 17 (early), I, 296 ; dispositions on night of June 17, I, 359-360 ; strength at Waterloo, June 18, II, 133 ; INDEX 331 Prussian Army — contd. time at which its attack com- menced on June 18, II, 83, 94 ; loss experienced at Waterloo, 11, 13i ; amount of ammunition fired by Prussian guns at Water- loo, II, 135, n. ; advance of Prussian Army after Waterloo, II, 204 ; organisation of, II, Appendix I, pp. 256-257. Pursuit, Bliicher's maxims for, II, 139-140; Frederick the Great's maxims for, II, 140 ; Marshal Saxe's advice for, II, 141, n. ; doctrine of pursuit, I, 312 ; II, 235. Quatre Bras, Action of, June 16, I, 178-215 ; Dutch-Belgian forces at, I, 166, u. ; description of position, I, 181- 182; dispositions of Dutch-Belgian troops, I, 182-186 ; Ney's plan of attack, I, 187- 188; reinforcements arrive for the AUies, I, 189, 194, 207 ; Ney's decision on receiving Napoleon's 2 p.m. order, I, 192; Ney recalls I Corps, I, 198 ; Ney orders Kellermann to charge, I, 201, 202 ; KeUermann's charge, I, 202- 206; Wellington takes the offensive, I, 207-209 ; Ney reports the result of the Action, I, 211; comments on the Action, I, 209, 210, 212-214; losses at, I, 210 ; situation at close of the Action, I, 210. R Eapp, General Count, commands V Corps, I, 21. Rebecque, General Constant, shows great initiative on June 15, I, 125, 126. Reille, General Count, commands II Corps, I, 21 ; his opinion of the English Army, on June 18, II, 11, 12. Reserve, use of, in a general action, I, 256-258, 271. Sambre, passage of, forced by Napoleon,I,lll-116, 145-147. Savary, General, Duke of Rovigo, appointed Chief of the Gen- darmerie, I, 8 ; accompanies Napoleon to Rochefort, II, 207. Saxe, Marshal Maurice, Count de, his opinion of a general who becomes a sergent de balaiUe, 11, 180-182. Schwarzenberg, Marshal Prince, coramands Austrian Army, I, 23; Generalissimo of Seventh Coah- tion, I, 46. Senarmont, General de, introduces " case-shot " attack at Friedland, I, 53-55 ; what he might have achieved at Waterloo, II, 85. Seventh Coalition, composition of its armed forces, I, 23; Generalissimo of, I, 46. Siborne, Captain W., 9th Foot, Model of the Field of Water- loo, II, 44-46. Soult, Marshal, Duke of Dahnatia, his attitude on Napoleon's return, I, 4 ; appointed Chief of the Staff, I, 83; neglects to issue orders to Grouchy, I, 79 ; sends only single copy of orders to Vandamme on June 14, I, 110-111; failure early on June 17, 1, 299 ; desires Grouchy's recall on June 18, II, 10, 11 ; left, on June 19, to rally and reorganise the Armie du Nord, II. 202 ; superseded by Marshal Grouchy, he returns to Paris, II, 205. 332 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO Steinmetz, General von, runs grave risks at Gosselies, June 15, I, 148. Strategical plan, for invasion of Belgium, I, 39-45. Strategical situation, March, 1815, I, 9-13 ; June, 1815, I, 20-26 ; morning of June 17, I, 296-298. Suehet,Marshal,Duke of Albufera, commands Army of the Alps, I, 21. Tactical Reverse but Strategical Success, Examples of, Ney at Quatre Bras, I, 209 ; 214, 215; Thielemann at Wavre, II, 190. Teste, General, his division detached from VI Corps and attached to Grouchy 's force on June 17, I, 318 ; his counter-marching on June 17, I, 355 ; at Action of Wavre (q.v.) ; on June 19, commands rear- guard in Grouchy's retreat, II, 194; on ' June 20, holds Namur against Pirch I and Thiele- mann, II, 197-198. Thielemann, General von, zeal shown on June 15, I, 144 ; his Corps seen by Exelmans' Cavalry at Gembloux, on June 17, I, 352 ; his Corps should have led the advance to Waterloo on June 18, I, 360 ; sends to Gneisenau for assist- ance on June 18, II, 95 ; at Action of Wavre (g.v.) ; learns result of Battle of Water- loo, 11, 186, 188 ; co-operates with Pirch I (on June 20) in pursuit of Marshal Grouchy, II, 196- 198; rejoins Prussian Army, II, 200. Thunderstorm on June 16, during Battle of Ligny, I, 256, 259. Thunderstorm on June 1 7, 1, 336— 337. Tolentino, Battle of, I, 17-19. Tomkinson, Captain, 16th Light Dragoons, comments on handling of British Artillerv at Waterloo, II, 64 ; impression made on him by the appearance of the Prussians on June 18, II, 94; description of the state of our centre, on June 18, II, 95, n., 106; description of the sudden end of the Battle of Waterloo, II, 125; description of the stricken field, II, 135. Trochu, General, opinion of British Troops, II, 220. Turenne, Marshal, Vicomte de, two of his maxims, II, 9 ; his aphorism about mistakes in war, 11, 218. Vandamme, General Count, commands III Corps, I, 21 ; warned on June 13 to be ready to advance at 3 a.m. on Jmie 15, I, 80 ; Napoleon's opinion of, I, 88 ; unnecessary delay on June 15, I, 110-111; co-operates poorly with Marshal Grouchy on June 15, I, 119 ; at Battle of Ligny (q.v.) ; at Action of Wavre (g.v.) ; causes Grouchy's force to run an unnecessary risk on June 20, 11, 196. W Waterloo, Battle of, June 18 — Napoleon's Plans : postponement of the opening of the action, II, 4 ; formation of French Army on Junel8, 11, 5; comments on, II, 5, 6 ; Napoleon's plan of attack, II, 6-8, 12 ; Napoleon and his Generals at Le Caillou, on the morning of June 18,11, 9-12; INDEX 333 Napoleon's Plans — contd. reconnaissance of Wellington's position, II, 13-14 ; did Napoleon think he was opposed only bv a rear-guard on June 18?II,"U-18; Napoleon's miscalculations, II, 18, 19; Napoleon reviews his troops, II, 19; strength of the French Army present at La Belle Alliance, on June 18, I, 342 ; II, 19. Prussian Plans : Blucher's plans for June 18, II, 21, 22; V. Billow selected to lead Prus- sian advance, his late start on June 18, II, 22, 23 ; Bliicher writes to Wellington on June 18, II, 23-24 ; Bliicher spurs on the Prussian columns, II. 24-25 ; Grolmann orders the Prussian attack, II, 25-26 ; Bliicher and Gneisenau con- trasted, II, 27-28. Anglo-Dutch Plans : Wellington's position at Mt. S. Jean, II, 29, 30, 44-46 ; the advanced posts, II, 30-31 ; the key to the position, II, 30 ; organisation of Anglo-Dutch line into sections, II, 30 ; description of the Battle-field, II, 29-32 ; state of the ground, II, 31 ; frontage of Wellington's posi- tion at Waterloo, II, 32 ; MilSling's plans for Bliioher's co-operation, II, 32-33 ; formation adopted by Anglo- Dutch Army, II, 34-35 ; strength of Anglo-Dutch Army at Mt. S. Jean, II, 35-36 ; positions of Napoleon and Wellington on June 18, II, 45-46; division of the Battle into phases, II, 47-48. 1st Phase : the Battle opens about 11.30 a.m., II, 50 ; the first shot from oiu: position, II, 50, n. ; the fight for Hougoumont, II, 50-53 ; 1st Phase — contd. the French Battery opens fire on Wellington's centre, II, 54, 55; Napoleon receives Grouchy's second letter on June 18, II, 55; the Prussians first sighted by Napoleon, II, 56 ; Napoleon's order to Grouchy, II, 57 ; Napoleon's arrangements to neutrahse the Prussian ad- vance, his use of Lobau's Corps, II, 57-60. 2nd Phase : the attack of D'Erlon's Corps, II, 61, 64^69 ; formation used by D'Erlon's Corps for its advance, II, 61— 64; attack of La Haye Sainte, II, 64, 65 ; Bijiandt's Brigade driven back, II, 65, 66 ; Picton's Division counter- attacks D'Erlon's Corps, II, 66-68 ; the British Cavalry charges, II, 68-71 ; defence of La Haye Sainte, II, 67, 68 ; Napoleon destroys the Union Brigade, II, 70, 71 ; General v. Muffling posted on the Anglo-Dutch left, II, 71 ; Lambert's Brigade pushed up into the first line, II, 73 ; Napoleon receives Grouchy's thii-d letter, II, 73. 3rd Phase : Ney's second failure to storm La Haye Sainte, II, 75 ; the great cannonade, II, 75, 76 ; Ney leads forward the French Cavalry, II, 76, 77 ; the great French Cavalry charges, II, 76-91 ; the second series of charges, II, 84-87; Ney sends in infantry too late, II, 91, 92 ; Biilow attacks and forces back Lobau, II, 92, 93 ; the third attack against La Haye Ste., the farm catches fire, II, 96, 97. 334 NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO 4cth Phase : Napoleon orders the fourth attack of La Haye Sainte, II, 101 ; lack of ainmvmition in La Haye Ste., II, 102, 103 ; La Haye Sainte stormed by the French, II, 103 ; . Marshal Ney profits from the capture, II, 104 ; Napoleon rejects Ney's demand for reinforcements, II, 104, 105; the crisis in Wellington's Army, II, 106-111; two battalions of the Old Guard retake Plancenoit, II, 111, 112. 5th Phase : Napoleon spreads the news of Marshal Grouchy's approach, II, 113, 114; General v. Miiffling secures the co-operation of Zieten's Corps, II, 115, 116 ; Napoleon sends forward five battalions of the Guard to attack Wellington's position, II, 116; the attack of the Guard, II, 117-124; attack and failure of the first echelon, II, 118-120; attack and failure of the second echelon, II, 120-124 ; Wellington orders a general advance at the moment when the Guard fails, II, 124 ; Zieten breaks in at north-east corner of French front, II, 125; Napoleon attempts to stem the Allied advance, II, 127 ; Lobau's stand at Plancenoit, II, 126; Marshal Ney's last effort, and escape from the field, II, 129, 130; the destruction of the 2 /3rd Grenadiers, II, 130, 131 ; the stand of Petit's Grenadiers, 11, 131, 132; Napoleon leaves the Battle-field, t^fll, 132; Wellington and Blucher meet after the victory, II, 132 ; 5th Phase — contd. losses experienced at Waterloo, II, 134-135 ; descriptions of the stricken field, II, 135. The Pursuit : capture of the Emperor's car- riage, II, 138, 139 ; Napoleon's efforts to stem the pursuit, II, 139 ; the Emperor reaches Philippe- ville, II, 139 ; thePrussian pursuit, II, 138—142; Comments on the Battle of Waterloo. the exhausted state of the French Army at the con- clusion of the fighting, II, 143, 144 ; the horn: at which the battle commenced, II, 145—147 ; the attack of the Middle Guard, II, 147-149 ; should Napoleon have broken off the action when Biilow was sighted ? II, 149-152. Waterloo compared with Fried- land, II, 6, 7. Waterloo compared with Auster- litz, II, 7. Waterloo compared with Boro- dino, II, 19. Wavre, Action at, June 18 and 19 : June 18 : Vandamme opens the action, II, 175; description of the field, II, 175 ; Thielemann's dispositions, II, 175, 176; French attack on Wavre beaten off, II, 177 ; Grouchy receives Napoleon's 1.30 p.m. despatch, II, 177- 178; Grouchy's misdirected efforts, n, 178-179 ; the failures to storm the Bierges bridge, II, 179-180 ; Vandamme's attacks on Wavre, II, 182 ; Pajol storms Limale bridge with cavalry, II, 182-183 ; Grouchy presses back the Prus- sians on the left bank, II, 183- 184 ; the dispositions during the night of June 18/19, 11, 185. INDEX 335 June 19 : positions at daybreak, II, 187 ; the Action reopened, II, 188 : the Prussians steadily pressed baok, II, 188-189; end of the Action, II, 189 ; losses of both sides, II, 189-190 ; Grouchy's perilous position at the close of the fighting, II, 190. WeUington, Field-Marshal the Duke of, reaches Belgium, I, 12, n. ; appreciation of his section of Belgium, I, 68 ; not dependent on Fouch6 for information, I, 90-92 ; first orders for June 15, 1, 121 ; second orders for Jvme 15, 1, 124; halts Reserve at Mt. S. Jean on June 16, I, 168 ; reaches Quatre Bras, I, 168 ; rides to see Bliicher at Ligny, I, 169, 174-177 ; at Action of Quatre Bras (q.v.); not aware of exact result at Ligny on evening of June 16, I, 211 ; his ability to see the Ligny Battle-field, I, 216-220 ; sends a reconnaissance to- wards Ligny, early on June 17, I, 326-327; Wellington — contd. decides to retire from Quatre Bras, I, 327 ; suggests a plan of co-operation with the Prussians, I, 328 ; hears from Bliicher on June 18, I, 345 ; at Battle of Waterloo, (q.v.) ; his detachment at Hal on June 18,11,38-44; opinion of Napoleon, II, 226- 227. Winterfeldt, Major, bearer of a message from Bliicher to Wellington, on June 1 6, after crisis had been reached at Ligny, I, 210, 211, 274, 275. Zieten, General v., commands I Prussian Corps, I, 69, 70 ; only reports French concentra- tion, on June 14, 1, 102 ; disposition of his Corps on the Sambre, June 14, I, 145 ; arrangements when attacked, June 15, 1, 146 ; at Battle of Ligny (q.v.) ; at Battle of Waterloo (q.v.). PLYMOUTH WILLIAM BRENDON AND SON, PRINTERS -:::iIli;j2iiIfHdW