.^aOHNM, 
 -; OLIN 
 '-^ LffiRARY 
 
 i^S 
 
 Frederick 
 
 Lexham Hall, 
 
Cornell University Library 
 DA 87.E11 1828 
 
 Naval battles of Great Britain. 
 
 3 1924 027 914 468 
 
The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924027914468 
 
THE 
 
 NAVAL BATTLES 
 
 OF 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN, 
 
 FROM 
 
 THE ACCESSION OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS HOUSE OF HANOVER 
 
 TO THE THRONE 
 
 TO 
 
 THE BATTLE OF NAVARIN, 
 
 REVIEWED BY 
 
 CHARLES J.KINS, 
 
 REAR ADMIRAL, C. B. C.W.N. 
 
 " England is a land which can never be conquered whilst the Kings thereof have tlie 
 dominion of the sea." — SiB. W. Ralegh. 
 
 " The honour and safety of this nation, under the providence of God, chiefly depend 
 upon our strength at sea." 
 
 Address op Parliament to King William III. 
 
 THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PUBLISHED BY BALDWIN AND CRADOCK. 
 
 'tit' 
 
 1828. 
 
DEDICATION. 
 
 May it please Your Royal Highness, 
 
 To the gracious condescension of Your Royal Highness it is 
 principally owing that I now offer to the public a work which, in 
 its present form, I presume to hope, may be found less exposed to 
 the objections of the former edition, and, at the same time, be 
 rendered more worthy of Your Royal Highness's patronage and 
 protection. 
 
 \ 
 In venturing to lay before Your Royal Highness a tactical treatise 
 
 upon the Naval Battles of Great Britain, I am fully aware both of 
 the temerity in undertaking, and of the difficulty in executing 
 the task. 
 
 To Your Royal Highness, bred and educated in the Royal Navy 
 of England, deriving from actual service and experience in its 
 various ranks an intimate knowledge of the profession, and 
 now with unrivalled ability presiding at the helm of its naval 
 power, it is at once a source of pride, yet of apprehension, to 
 appeal : a pride, from knowing that the subject of these pages 
 
 a 2 
 
iv DEDICATION. 
 
 (unless it receive injury in the development), will be perfectly 
 understood by him to whom it has the sanction of being addressed, 
 and dread, lest it should fall far short of his hopes and expectations. 
 
 To the favourable consideration and indulgence of Your Royal 
 Highness, therefore, it is humbly submitted, with a perfect reUance 
 on that Princely candour and liberality which in an eminent degree 
 has distinguished Your Royal Highnesses public life, and measures. 
 
 With the utmost respect, 
 I have the honour to subscribe myself, 
 
 Sir, 
 Your Royal Highness's most obedient. 
 
 And devoted humble servant, 
 
 THE AUTHOR. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 In the " Historical Sketch " of Mr. Clerk's Essay on Naval Tactics is related 
 the following circumstance : — " Dr. Adam Smith, the celebrated author of the 
 ' Wealth of Nations,' after reading his Essay, as it was first printed, said, the 
 only thing which tempts one to entertain a doubt with respect to your system is, 
 that the beneficial effects are so manifest, that one wonders they should not 
 have occurred to professional men.' " 
 
 An anxiety to rescue the profession at the present day from the severity of 
 the imputation, in some measure gave rise to this undertaking; on which 
 account, it is hoped, every liberal allowance will be made. 
 
 Of that " Essay," it is justly observed by Professor Playfair, that " the 
 analysis of those actions forms a most interesting part of Mr. Clerk's book, and 
 furnishes a commentary on the naval history of Britain, such as we seek for 
 in vain in the treatises written expressly on that subject." (See a " Memoir," in 
 the ninth volume of the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh.) 
 Should this opinion be well grounded, it is presumed that it may be applied 
 with an equal degree of truth to the present work. 
 
 In treating of this important subject, it is proposed to give some account 
 of the Naval Battles of the last century, down to the close of the war in the 
 year 1814, divided into two parts or periods : the first commencing with the 
 capture and destruction of the Spanish fleet on the memorable expedition to 
 Sicily, and ending with the battle of Sir Edward Hughes and Mons. SuflPrein, 
 in 1783. 
 
 The Second Part will commence with the celebrated battles of Earl Howe 
 
Missing Page 
 
Missing Page 
 
viii PREFACE. 
 
 with the Revolutionary Fleet of France, in 1794, and close with the attack 
 
 upon Algiers, and the battle of Navarin. 
 
 A late learned naval historian, in the first page of his Preface, insinuates 
 that competency for the task is to be estimated by the length of time the 
 mind has been engaged upon it. If this claim be admissible, the writer has the 
 advantage of him by a period of full seventeen years; for his attention 
 was given to the subject of Naval Tactics from the year 1797, when he 
 commanded a frigate, to the present time, and no single action;* but the 
 battle off Cape St. Vincent, was the first object of his enquiry. 
 
 Extracts from the public dispatches, as they are the bases upon which the 
 descriptive figures are formed, were necessary to his purpose, but every part of 
 them not strictly applicable is carefully excluded. 
 
 The Naval Chronicle, notwithstanding a vast quantity of miscellaneous 
 matter, contains, to a sea oflftcer, much interesting and important information ; 
 and, scattered through its forty octavo volumes, is to be found the detail of 
 Naval Warfare, from 1799 to 1818. 
 
 The present object is to treat of the great battles alone ; accompanied with 
 explanatory figures, notes, observations, and remarks. 
 
 What is sufficient to afford a tactical and general description of them is 
 carefully selected ; what is unnecessary is avoided. 
 
 By this method it is hoped that a considerable store of naval information 
 will be reduced into a small compass ; which, by being entirely separated from 
 all other subjects, may be found useful to professional men ; and, to enliven the 
 otherwise monotonous catalogue of naval transactions, dear to those who cherish 
 in their memory what is so closely interwoven with the true welfare of their 
 country; to keep alive a just sense of the importance of our maritime pre- 
 eminence, such traits of character as relate to the brave men whose deeds are 
 here recorded, have been introduced, to contribute by precept iand example 
 in forming a succession of naval heroes for days to come. 
 
 Unless some such undertaking should, from time to time, appear, our Blakes, 
 
 * See " James's Naval History." 
 
PREFACE. ix 
 
 tjur Drakes, our Rookes, our Russells, our Ansons, our Boscawens, and our 
 Hawkes, would have lived only to render service in their generation : but, so 
 long as the pages of history are open, their great examples will live, and 
 serve to guide others, no less ambitious of honourable distinction, in the paths 
 of fame and glory- 
 In Mr. Clerk's ** Introduction " are many remarks incident to our geo- 
 ^aphical position and national character, which deserve particular attention ; the 
 following is one which leads to a subject of great importance. 
 
 *' From our insular situation, we are led to avail ourselves of a naval force 
 in some such manner as that in which all animals are directed to make use of 
 the weapons or talents with which nature has furnished them, whether for 
 support or defence." 
 
 Our ancestors, by sad experience, were at length taught the necessity of 
 absolute command on the narrow seas. What does the historian say ?* — " The 
 heroic Henry V. was almost as victorious at sea as at land, and in his reign the 
 fleets of England rode triumphant on the narrow seas. His brother, John 
 Duke of Bedford, obtained one naval victory, A.D. 1416, and the Earl of 
 Huntingdon another, A.D. 1417, over the united fleets of France and Genoa, 
 taking or destroying almost all their ships (see Henry's History, vol. x, p. 244), 
 \yhich effectually secured the dominion of the sea." 
 
 " The reign of Richard III. was so short and turbulent, that he had little 
 opportunity of shewing his attention to the dominion of the sea. It is, however, 
 certain that if he had guarded the narrow seas with greater care, he might 
 have prevented the landing of his rival, the Earl of Richmond, and preserved 
 both his life and crown." (Page 246.) 
 
 The dominion of the sea is not less the national interest than it is the 
 national taste, manifested by the annual display of nautical skill in such a 
 fleet of yachts f as no other country in the world can produce : where, from our 
 
 * And what did Buonaparte say ? Let us be masters of the Streights (of Dover) six hours, and 
 we shall be masters of the world. (Lord Collingwood's Corr. p. 90.) 
 
 t The Royal Yacht Club in the year ISM, consisted of about eighty vessels, and employed no 
 less than 500 seamen and seafaring men, who, it may be said, were, and are, in that service 
 
 b 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 muuifieient, and much-loved monarch on the throne, so distinguished for his 
 high patronage of all that can promote the welfare of his kingdom, or the 
 happiness of his people, down to the private gentleman, is shown the genius, and 
 leading propensity, in this the fashionable amusement of the great and wealthy ; 
 and from the numerous regattas of which that beautiful exhibition is the 
 prolific source, enabling all classes of the community to partake of an enjoyment 
 so congenial to their feelings, while it contributes to preserve our maritime 
 character and pre-eminence. 
 
 Many attempts were made during the war, and even since, to persuade a 
 nation surrounded by water, that its best, nay, almost only defence, must be 
 by land; many have laboured to show that, however formidable we were at 
 sea, the coasts of this country were always liable to invasion, and consequently 
 were to be protected only by a land force. In endeavouring (ineffectually) 
 to establish this principle, a very singular mode of reasoning has been resorted 
 to ; namely, that, by the frequent " sudden changes of the wind," the coast 
 could not, at all times, and in all places, be protected by its navy. Any seaman 
 must know that this very circumstance is the strongest argument against 
 the danger ; for in the changes lies our security, as in them we might hope 
 for, at least, an equal chance with the enemy ; now, should the wind be fixed 
 constantly, or for a considerable time to o?ie point (say from the south), and 
 blowing strong, then, indeed, the ships might issue from the ports of France, 
 and those of England be kept at home ; but they would even then contribute 
 to the defence of the ports in which they are placed ; nor cqxM the fleet of an 
 
 becoming pflots for the coast of the British Channel. In this light they can be considered of no 
 small importance, nor are the yachts to be looked upon as mere toys or objects of pleasure, as they 
 are ready upon every occasion to render their assistance to ships or vessels in distress. 
 
 A frigate having a Commander-in-Chief on board from a foreign station, coming through the 
 Needles in thick and blowing weather, got into a difficulty. The Ruby yacht. Sir G. Leeds, Bart., 
 immediately weighed or slipt from Cowes Road and ran to her relief, received on board the 
 Commodore and the dispatches, and landed them at Portsmouth. 
 
 For this service he was gratified by the well-merited and handsome acknowledgments, by letter,, 
 of the first Lord of the Admiralty. 
 
PREFACE. xi 
 
 6nemy, with a force embarked of sufficient magnitude to effect a landing, 
 accomplish it, and gain a footing, but in a sheltered position ; in any other, 
 defeat and destruction must follow their attempt. 
 
 It must first be remembered that a force for the invasion of this country 
 must be a considerable time in collecting; if in one place, it would be 
 remarkable; if in several, it would carry the appearance of stiU greater 
 importance, and cause proportionate vigilance on the part of this country : and 
 to collect an armed force by water, the changes of the wind must contribute. 
 For instance, should the Isle of Wight be the object of attack, with a view 
 to the Roadstead of Spithead and our principal arsenal, an easterly or 
 northerly wind is necessary to carry the ships thither from the Downs; but 
 other winds are requisite for the ships and vessels from the westward. A very 
 strong east wind might, indeed, bring a powerful force over from the ports of 
 Holland ; but it would, at least, be followed by the squadron watching its 
 motions ; nor is there any secure place of anchoring on that coast, at which 
 a formidable army could make good a landing. Boats can cope with boats* 
 where ships cannot act ; and where ships, by a fortunate breeze springing up 
 after a calm, or by a change of wind, can happily be brought to act amidst a 
 flotilla, their entire destruction must be inevitable, and invasion, by such means, 
 could never show its head again. 
 
 To place this in the strongest point of view, shall be stated, in part^ the 
 opinion of a most gallant and highly distinguished seaman, the late Captain 
 Philip Beaver ; to whose merits and abilities it is not in the power of the 
 writer to do justice. 
 
 Bearing the signature of " Nearchus," Captain Beaver f inserted a letter 
 in the " Courier" of the 16th of Februaay, 1804, which (as it well might) 
 tended very considerably to quiet the fears of the timid in this country 
 upon the " threatened invasion." 
 
 * Whether steam-boats, or others, is of no consequence. 
 
 t Captain Beaver was a principal projector of a settlement upon the Island of Bulam (or 
 Bulama) on the coast of Africa; of which he published in 1805, under the title of " African 
 Memoranda," a most interesting narrative. 
 
 b 2 
 
xii PREFACE. 
 
 It is divided into three parts, under the following heads ; namely, of " The 
 Enemy's quitting their Ports," " Their crossing the Sea," and " Their landing 
 on our Shores." 
 
 Under the first head he observes, " The troops intended to be sent against 
 England will, I conceive, issue from all the small ports between Flushing 
 and Cherbourg. If the attempt is to be simultaneous, they must have a 
 wind which will be fair from each of those ports. Suppose S. E., this is an 
 off-shore wind, which will enable our cruizers to keep close off their harbours' 
 mouths, watch all their motions, and transmit early intelligence. If the 
 wind is such as to render the shore a lee one, and oblige our cruizers to keep 
 at a greater distance, the enemy cannot come out: so that it is clear, that if 
 our enemy can quit their ports, our cruizers can keep close in with them; 
 and that if our cruizers cannot keep close to the shore, the enemy cannot 
 come out," &c. 
 
 " On; the enemy's crossing the sea," he goes on to say, " the fleets which 
 it has been supposed might have escaped from the ports of Brest and of the 
 Texel, may arrive at their assumed respective destinations, and may possibly 
 there do much mischief; but, from the vigilance and activity of our numerous 
 cruizers, employed in watching and communicating intelligence of the enemy^ 
 motions, the probahility of their being fallen in with by some of our squadrons 
 before they reach the places of their destination is ^^a% in our favour; and 
 if they once meet, there is an end to that part of the enemy's undertaking." 
 
 Of this justly admired letter, but one extract more shall be given ; it is 
 in the following energetic language : 
 
 " The day on which the attempt shall be made will be glorious to England ; 
 will be dreadful to France. Death itself shall walk upon the face of the 
 waters. What ha« hitherto been done upon the sea shall appear but the 
 amusement of children, when compared to the dreadful carnage of that eventful 
 day ; the floating carcases of slaughtered myriads, thrown back on their own 
 shores, shall be the mute harbingers of their compatriots' fate." 
 
 In Mr. Clerk's " Historical Sketch," are also the following powerful argu- 
 ments against any attempt by large ships : — 
 
PREFACE. xiii 
 
 " That an estimate may be made of the probable success, or of the conse- 
 q^uent hazard and risk to which a numerous armament of great ships, engaged 
 in a hostile enterprize of this kind, may be exposed, the British Channel 
 should be carefully considered* 
 
 " In the first place, as a barrier, or boundary, defending and dividing us 
 from all the rest of the world. 
 
 . " In the next place, as a sea, narrow, winding, and contracted by head- 
 landsj in which the navigation, with all the skill and attention that can be 
 given, is both difficult and dangerous to mariners, even the most familiar 
 with it." 
 
 , " Considering the Channel as a sea, narrow, winding, contracted, and broken 
 by headlands, it is affected by rapid tides, forming innumerable dangerous 
 shelves and banks. By the climate, and by its form, it is subject to 
 tempestuous and sudden changes of wind j so that the boldest and most 
 experienced mariners, from arriving in soundings, in approaching the mouth 
 of the Channel, even with a leading wind, and keeping in the fair way, till 
 they get into port, seldom are at ease. This is meant in case of a single 
 ship; but let anyone so conversant in this navigation, with every advantage 
 of ports in his favour, say what his feelings have been, when on board of 
 a British fleet cruizing in the Channel ; and then we may judge with respect 
 to a numerous fleet of large ships, strangers, with dark nights and blowing 
 weather." 
 
 To resume the thread of prefatory matter, and before entering more fully 
 into the nature of Naval Evolutions, may be introduced the opinion of an 
 honourable gallant Admiral, to whom the writer is indebted for many valuable 
 remarks, and much useful information. 
 
 " An Admiral must, in the formation of his fleets begin with the rudiments-, 
 he should know the relative points of sailing of his fleet before any connected 
 enterprise can be undertaken i and the orders of sailing, well attended to, 
 appear the best sort of drill for this purjjose. The numerous chops and 
 changes to which all naval evolutions are liable, are only to be met with the 
 eye of experience,, seconded by the study of former examples brought to their- 
 
xiT PREFACE. 
 
 view by publications such as yours. It has been attempted by the French 
 to bring all their practice under stated rules : Mons. de Grasse, after th^ 
 action of the 121th of April, justified himself against the charges brought 
 against him by the other flags of his fleet, by pleading his compliance with 
 the Ordonnance du Roy, which specified a particular line of conduct under 
 similar circumstances." 
 
 " The case was this ; * Rodney's fleet, being to leeward of the enemy, was 
 enabled, by a shift of wind during the action, to lead through the enemy's 
 fleet ; the Ordonnance said, that the French fleet was then to tack together ; 
 De Grasse made the signal for that purpose, which was not obeyed by Mons. 
 De Vaudreuil, the second in command and his squadron, under the pretence 
 that no man in his senses would have ordered such a manoeuvre under an 
 enemy's fire. Had it been executed we should not, however, have closed with 
 them so soon. 
 
 « One disadvantage of being compelled to perform certain operations is, that 
 the enemy may anticipate all your motions by becoming possessed of your 
 rules of action ; and so the recipe for a good Admiral is found in the person 
 who combines theory and practice, is blessed with a clear head, and has his 
 heart in the right place." 
 
 The writer considers that he should not do justice to the subject if he 
 omitted to introduce, in this place, the opinions of other distinguished sea 
 officers upon it. 
 
 " No man is more sensible than I am of the advantages to be derived from 
 an intimate knowledge of naval tactics and evolutions. The more we are au 
 fait on these points, and the more we are accustomed to manoeuvre and 
 change our divisions into different forms the better, although perhaps we 
 should practise them less on the day of battle; we want a something to 
 enable us to think with advantage before the time comes, and to act upon 
 it when it arrives ; and nothing is more calculated to give us those essentials 
 than a sensible and clear detail of naval actions and manoeuvres." 
 
 * See Remark at the end of Preface, 
 
PREFACE. XV 
 
 " In whatever arts other nations have excelled, it seems to be universally 
 agreed among maritime powers, that Britain has been most successful in 
 improving the management, and exerting the force employed in ships. This 
 is evinced by the applications which have been made by the different courts 
 of Europe, during a course of many years, to admit foreign sea officers to 
 he instructed in the art of naval defence in British ships of war,* How 
 far wisdom required a compliance with those requests is not doubtful among 
 sea officers, who are also seamen, and well acquainted with the progress of 
 defensive naval knowledge. But, unfortunately, it seems to be impossibly 
 to convince landmen, who are indebted for very extensive blessings to the 
 surrounding sea, that any quality but courage is necessary to those who are 
 to prevent an enemy from setting his foot in this island. Because stupidity 
 and ignorance have, by accidents, returned victorious; because fortune has 
 changed the most gross blunders into success ; and because something must 
 always depend upon sudden or unforeseen alterations in the wind and weather, 
 does it, therefore, follow that where so many complicated objects present 
 themselves for consideration, much must not depend upon skUl, penetration, 
 and experience? But tlie feeble attempts of seamen to elucidate the value 
 of professional attainments are still doomed to be neglected and lost ; because 
 thousands of authors, who have written well upon subjects of which they 
 had a perfect knowledge, have likewise presumed to write, and have obtained 
 credit for their opinions, upon what they could not possibly understand." 
 
 We are told by Mr. Clerk, in his Introduction, that, " in the first of three 
 dreadful wars with the Dutch, we had nine pitched battles ; in the second, 
 five ; and in the third, not less than five also ; making in all nineteen general 
 engagements :" yet he has never once mentioned the mode, then practised, of 
 
 * Should we imprudently continue the practice of admitting foreign officers into our ships, 
 to |;each them the art of offensive and defensive warfare, the publication of a work of this 
 nature, impolitic as it is considered by some, cannot be objectionable. A policy too liberal for 
 our future security seems to have dictated this indulgence; it is much to be wished, that in 
 this, and many other respects, it were followed by one more strictly and exclusively Brilisk. 
 
xvi PREFACE. 
 
 cutting through each other's line, descriptions of which are given in the 
 treatise of Le Pere Paul Hoste. 
 
 One of these battles, Mr. Clerk observes, " vpas renewed for thri^ ^ditional 
 days successively;* another, for two days; and a third, for one day, which 
 may fairly be stated for other six engagements ; making, when taken together, 
 twenty-five days of general actions." And, after speaking of the renowned 
 Blake, he continues, " In all of these enterprises, whether vdth the Spaniards 
 or the Dutch ; whether in making the attack on castles, ships in harbours, 
 or encountering ship with ship in close action, and formed in line of battle, 
 we shall find the British seamen, whether equal or inferior in number, victorious 
 or worsted, invariably fired with such enthusiastic courage, that these battles, 
 though not always decisive, were constantly marked with strong effect; ten, 
 twenty, thirty, or more ships being taken or destroyed; two thousand men 
 killed, and as many taken prisoners." 
 
 In all his reasoning he shows, with truth and success, that our defeats 
 were never owing to a want of spirit, but to a deficiency of tactical knowledge 
 and experience ; such as an inquiry, like his, was calculated to remove. 
 
 To a design so beneficial, an attempt has been made in the present work 
 to contribute. 
 
 Strongly impressed with the magnitude of the subject, the writer submits 
 it to the judgment of the Naval Profession, and to the liberal consideration 
 of the first maritime people in the world. 
 
 He cannot better express his own sentiments than in the language of Mr. 
 Lediard,f who, in the beginning of his Preface, observes, " that our trade 
 
 • " From the great improvements in gunnery, all future naval contests must be speedily 
 decided. The three days' battle off Portland may be settled in as many hours ; and therefore 
 he who best knows how to go at it must win the day — hence the greater value of your work." 
 
 Another professional friend observes, " Taking the general tenor of your book, I think it is the 
 first that has been published for the purpose of exciting a temperate and manly discussion upon the 
 various defects attaching to particular systems, and of the different modes of remedying them. 
 I know of no other at the present day, and I look upon it with hope as the commencement of 
 a series that may perchance follow." 
 
 t See Lediard's Naval History. 
 
PREFACE. xvii 
 
 is the mother and nurse of our seamen — our seamen the life of our fleet — 
 and our fleet the security and protection of our trade — and that both together 
 are the wealth, strength, and glory of Great Britain." A modern intelligent 
 writer has similar " Thoughts " upon the same subject. 
 
 " After an Englishman has passed a year on the burning soil of India 
 and again treads the deck of an Enghsh ship, listens to, and looks upon her 
 brave and active crew, feels her bounding over the ocean, and thinks of home 
 and the wooden walls which defend it, he has a throb of heartfelt delight and 
 innocent pride, which none but a Briton can know. The sea is his element ; * 
 it encircles, it guards his native land ; it bears him forth from pole to pole to 
 do her pleasure, to carry out the fruit of her labour, and bring her back the 
 produce of distant lands ; it bears him to protect her friends, to assail her 
 enemies, or to do her blessed errands of charity and peace ; it brings him 
 home to her with the rich harvests of wealth and glory, or the yet richer of 
 gratitude." (" Thoughts on Board Ship," Sketches of India. 2d. Edit. By an 
 Officer, 1824.) 
 
 They who may expect a regular series of historical events will be disap- 
 pointed; as those treated of are, in themselves, separate and distinct cases, 
 examined upon their own merits, with such lights and illustrations as, during 
 a considerable period, have presented themselves. 
 
 The reasoning of the writer, or of others, will either be blended with 
 the subject itself, or given immediately afterwards. The notes will be 
 placed at the bottom. What is not the writer's will be distinguished by 
 inverted commas. That which is copied or borrowed is acknowledged ; for 
 the rest the writer himself is accountable. 
 
 While some additions have been made in different parts of the work, a 
 new arrangement, and a considerable reduction has taken place in others, 
 which it is hoped will render the whole less objectionable. 
 
 * This character is strongly pourtrayed in the English male children, who are never so happy as 
 when they can make or procure a little cutter or boat, and run to the first stream or pool of water, 
 or even a tub, to sail it in. What are the playthings of children on the continent ? Drums, and 
 muskets, and long swords, in which the parents delight to dress their boys at a very early age. 
 
 C 
 
xviii PREFACE. 
 
 All that is exclusively tactical, or not connected with the battles, ha& in 
 this volume been omitted; at the same time a little improvement will be 
 found in some of the plates, which may offer, in a few instances, different '' 
 modes of proceeding : and an entirely new plate is given of the battle of 
 the Nile ; with the addition of the battle of Navarin. 
 
 BemarJc. " I doubt whether, on the 12th of April, the breaking the 
 line came within Rodney's plan of attack ; or he never would have allowed 
 his van to have run to leeward of the enemy. 
 
 " I strongly suspect it was change of wind, and the Captain of the fleet, 
 that caused the ' Formidable ' * to do it. 
 
 " Was the chance of our English fleet passing through a French line ever 
 contemplated in the Ordonnance du Roy, and did De Grasse ever tack after 
 Rodney passed through his line ? " 
 
 * The Formidable was the ship that bore the flag of Sir G. B. Rodney on the 12th of April, 1782. 
 
GENERAL CONTENTS. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Year. Page 
 
 Debicatiok iii 
 
 List of Subscribers .......;......... v 
 
 Preface vii 
 
 Explanation of Sea Terms xxv 
 
 Some Account of the Battle of Beachey Head, from a Manuscript in the 
 
 possession of, and favoured by Viscount Torrington .... 1690 1 
 
 of a violent Storm, from' ditto • 1703 3 
 
 Attack upon Gibraltar, ditto 1704 5 
 
 Battle of Malaga, ditto 1704 9 
 
 ————— Messina, from Corbett's Narrative, &c., ditto I7I8 12 
 
 Mathews and La Court 1744 16 
 
 Anson and La Jonquiere 174^7 22 
 
 Hawke and L'Etendiere I747 23 
 
 ■ Knowles and E-eggio 1748 32 
 
 Hon. John Byng, with Extracts from RamatueUe 1756 35 
 
 ■ Pococke, three Actions 1758, 1759 39 
 
 Boscawen and De la Clue, with a manuscript Account, and of 
 
 the Use of Cables and Umbrellas, and on driving a-shore . . 1759 45 
 
 Hawke and Conflans 1759 59 
 
 Keppel 1778 66 
 
 Lord Howe and Mons. D'Estaing, off Sandy Hook . I778 72 
 
 Barrington and D'Estaing, with Remarks from RamatueUe . . 1778 91 
 
 Hon. John Bjrron, with Extracts from the Journal of an Officer 
 
 on Ijoard the Flag-ship 1779 95 
 
 ■^—- Hyde Parker and De la Motte, with Remarks from the Journal 
 
 of the Princess Royal, and RamatueUe 1779 98 
 
 ■ Rodney andLangara, with Extracts- from Paul Hoste, &c . . , . I78& 100 
 Hyde Paiker and De Guichen, Manuscript, with Drawing and 
 
 Plan, by an Officer present 1780 109 
 
 c 2 
 
XX GENERAL CONTENTS. 
 
 Year. 
 
 Battle of Rodney, in April, with Remarks from the Journal of the Prin- 
 cess Royal 1780 112 
 
 Rodney, May, I78O 116 
 
 Arbuthnot, with Remarks upon Naval Gunnery by Sir H. 
 
 Douglas, and by Ramatuelle 1781 124 
 
 Sir Samuel Hood, with a manuscript Letter I78I 131 
 
 Parker, Dogger Bank, with Manuscripts, &c. ; some Mis- 
 statements by Ramatuelle of the Attack at Port Praya, and 
 
 Remarks on " rabordage."" 1781 137 
 
 Hon. W. Cornwallis and La Motte Piquet I78O 148 
 
 Mons. Temey 1780 150 
 
 Admiral Graves I78I 152 
 
 Sir Samuel Hood at St. Kitts', with a Mis-statement of Ra- 
 matuelle 1782 156 
 
 Manuscript Journal of the Capture of Nevis 1782 159 
 
 Battle of Lord Rodney, on the 9th and 12th of April ; with further Ex- 
 tracts from Paul Hoste and Ramatuelle 1782 I70 
 
 Sir Edward Hughes February, 1782 180 
 
 , with Remarks by Ramatuelle . . . , April, 1782 185 
 
 July, 1782 187 
 
 September, 1782 191 
 
 1783 195 
 
 Lord Howe with the Combined Fleets, and Remarks by Ra- 
 matuelle 1702 199 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Introduction *203 
 
 Battle of Earl Howe with the Revolutionary Fleet of France 1794 207 
 
 , a French Account 217 
 
 Lord Hotham, off Genoa, with Extracts from Paul Hoste .... I795 221 
 
 ■ , ofFtheHieres i I795 226 
 
 ' Lord Bridport, off L'Orient 1^^5 228 
 
 Retreat of the Hon. W. Cornwallis, with Remarks upon Waring : and 
 
 Manoeuvring a Fleet i 1795 230 
 
 Battle of Earl St. Vincent, with a manuscript Letter, and Remarks by 
 
 Officers present 1797 239 
 
GENERAL CONTENTS. xxi 
 
 Year. Page. 
 
 MS. Letter from Sir W. Parker 242 
 
 Battle of Lord Duncan I797 250 
 
 MS. Letter from Captain W. O'Brien Drury, of H. M. Ship 
 
 Powerful 252 
 
 Battle of the Nile, with two manuscript Letters by Officers present . , . . 1798 257 
 
 — — French Account 265 
 
 Track of the Ethalion, &c. to the Battle off Tory Island 1798 268 
 
 Battle of Sir John Warren, with Remarks upon " James's Naval 
 
 History" 1798 27O 
 
 Sir James Saumarez, with Remarks from Ramatuelle 1801 273 
 
 Captain Ferris'* Account of the Loss of the Hannibal, at Algeziras 274 
 
 Battle of Sir James Saumarez in the Straits of Gibraltar 1801 278 
 
 Extract of a manuscript Letter from Lord Nelson to the Right Hon. 
 
 J. Trevor 1801 283 
 
 Battle of Sir Robert Calder 1805 283 
 
 Trafalgar, with Manuscripts, and Remarks upon " James's 
 
 Naval History " 1805 287 
 
 The Use of Fire-ships 305 
 
 Battle of Sir Richard Strachan 1805 313 
 
 Sir John Duckworth 1806 315 
 
 at the Dardanelles I8O7 318 
 
 Fitting and Orders for the Attack upon Algiers, with Traits of Lord 
 
 Exmouth 1816 322 
 
 Bay and Battle of Navarin, by an Officer in the Battle 1827 333 
 
 Appendix, No. I., an Umbrella 351 
 
 ' No. II., Defensive Armour 353 
 
LIST OF PLATES. 
 
 No. 
 
 ■ I. 
 
 II. 
 
 III. 
 
 IV. 
 
 , V. 
 
 YI. 
 
 VII. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 IX. 
 
 X 
 
 XI 
 
 XI T 
 XIII 
 
 XIV. 
 XV 
 
 XVI. 
 XVII 
 
 XVIII 
 XIX 
 
 XX 
 
 XXI 
 
 XXII 
 
 XXIII 
 
 XXIV 
 
 XXV 
 
 XXVI. 
 
 TO 
 
 XXX 
 
 XXXI 
 
 XXXII 
 
 :} 
 :} 
 !:} 
 :} 
 
 X.J 
 
 Page. 
 
 Battle of Mathews and La Court , 21 
 
 ■ the Hon. John Byng 35 
 
 ■ ' AdmiralPococke 39 
 
 Hawke and Conflans 65 
 
 -^ : Hon. Admiral A. Keppel 'Jl 
 
 <■ — Lord Howe, Sandy Hook 87 
 
 F^ Hon. Admiral S. Barrington, St. Lucie 94 
 
 Hon. Admiral John Byron 97 
 
 ■ r- Admiral Hyde Parker and De Guichen, by an Officer 
 
 , , . : . present Ill 
 
 Sir George Rodney and De Guichen 113 
 
 Rodney (in May) and Arbuthnot with De Guichen II7 
 
 Hon. W". CornWalUs and Mons. Terney 151 
 
 {1 ^-5 
 Tifi 
 
 — — Sir Samuel Hood, at St. Kitt's , < , -„ 
 
 Sir George Rodney, on the 9th and 12th of April, 1782 • • ^lon 
 
 Sir Edward Hughes and Mons. Suffrein .... 184 
 
 — ' — , second Battle .... 186 
 
 ■ , July 15th, 1782 . . 190 
 
 ■ , September 30, 1782, 194 
 
 ^ , with a Shift of Wind, July 25, 1783 , . 194 
 
 Lord Howe with the Combined Fleets, October, 1782 .... 202 
 
 Earl Howe with the Revolutionary Fleet of France ; with. a fp^Q 
 
 Mode of Attack Proposed 1. 214 
 
 Admiral Hotham, off Genoa 222 
 
 : : off the Hieres' 226 
 
xxiv LIST. OF PLATES. 
 
 No. Page. 
 
 xSlV, } ^^*'^^* °f Admiral the Hon. W. CornwaUis 231 
 
 XXXV "1 r239 
 
 ^ • I Battle of Sir John Jervis, off Cape St. Vincent -j oAB 
 
 XXXVTT T €254* 
 
 ^^ ' J. Admiral Duncan, off Camperdown, by an Officer present . . < ggg 
 
 XXXIX.* Nelson, at the Nile, by an Officer present 262 
 
 XL. Track of the EthaUon, &c 269 
 
 XLI. Battle off Tory Island 272 
 
 XLII. according to Sir Edward Thornborough ib. 
 
 ■^ • i Battle of Sir James Saumarez in the Straits of Gibraltar 279 
 
 XLV. Sir Robert Calder 284 
 
 " ' ' I Trafalgar, supposed Attack i nqn 
 
 -' ^ ■ ( real Attack, by an Officer present at the Battle . . < ^o 
 
 L. Sir John Duckworth, at St. Domingo, by an Officer in the 
 
 Battle 316 
 
 LI. ^ — ■■ : at the Dardanelles 322 
 
 LII. Town and Batteries of Algiers 327 
 
 LIII. Bay and Battle of Navarin, by a British Officer distinguished in the 
 
 Battle 349 
 
 LIV, Situations at different Parts of the Engagement ib, 
 
 F'RT? ATA 
 
 Page 282, ISlh line from the bottom, betmeen the words attack 
 end instead, insei:t_, and then to cut ahe cable"). 
 Page 158, line 8 from bottom, ^r presents read present. 
 
 190, for Plate XIV. read XXII. 
 
 191, note, read upon the parallellines C D. 
 
 200 and 202,/or Plate XXIV. read XXV. 
 
 —— 202, line 20, for Steward read Stewart. 
 
 214, note,/or Plate V. read Plate XXX. 
 
 215, head line, for Admiral Hotham read Earl Howe. 
 
 229, head line, fon- Admiral Hotham read Lord Bridport. 
 
 273, line S,for and read et. 
 
 N. B, In plate XLIX., the left hand figure, the ship Temeraire, is marked as Spanish instead 
 of English. 
 
 * This plate has been inadvertently printed without a number. 
 
EXPLANATION OF SEA TERMS 
 
 USED IN THIS WORK. 
 
 To Readers not acquainted with Professional Language, the following Explanations 
 may be necessary. 
 
 To be Athwa/rt hawse, is to lie across the fore-foot or bows of another ship. 
 
 To Answer tlie helm. A ship is said not to answer the helm well, if she be found slow 
 in complying with its movements; this may arise from various causes, and a quality 
 that diifers in different ships ; depending either upon the form or build of the ship, the 
 placing of the masts, the trim or stowage, a defective rudder, the state of the weather, 
 and an unskilful or improper disposition of the sails. 
 
 A-beam.* Abaft the beam, is a situation or position between the direct line a-beain 
 and the quarter. Before the beam, is between the beam and the bow. A vessel bearing 
 directly a-beam, or a-breast of you, when within a moderate distance, is the same thing. 
 
 Abaft, generally signifies the after-part of a ship or boat ; or that nearest the stern. 
 
 To Bear away, is, when upon a wind, to shape a course more to leeward ; to keep 
 away from the wind. In this manner Lord Howe bore up, to bear down upon the enemy 
 on the 1st of June ; Lord Duncan at Camperdown, and Lord Nelson at Trafalgar. 
 
 Bearing up, and Bearing down, although seemingly opposite, frequently mean the 
 same thing, and may consequently confuse those not conversant with sea phrases; for 
 instance, one ship (or fleet) close hauled, right to windward of another, and wishing to 
 speak or bring it to action, must first bear up (sail large or before the wind) and is then 
 bearing down upon the ship or fleet to leeward. 
 
 Bent, and unbent. The sails of a ship are said to be bent when they are attached 
 to the yards ready for use ; and unbent is the reverse. 
 
 To Box off, is when a ship, having got up in the wind, or being taken with the wind 
 a-head, the head-yards are braced round to counteract its effect, and prevent the ship 
 from being turned round against your inclination; if this be done promptly, and the 
 after-sail, i. e. that upon the main and mizen-masts, and helm, are properly attended to, 
 the ship is continued on the same tack ; but making a course so many points to leeward 
 of her former one as the wind may have shifted. 
 
 To Bring-to a vessel, is, by firing a shot over or across her, to cause her to shorten or 
 
 * Any object is said to be on the Beam, when it is situated in a Ime drawn through the main-mast, at 
 right angles with the keel, or other fore and aft line ; or in the direction to which the midship beam of 
 the ship points, on either side. 
 
 d 
 
xxvi EXPLANATION OF SEA TERMS. 
 
 reduce her sail ; and, backing her main or fore-top-sail, to wait for you. You bring or 
 heave-to, your own ship, but can only bring-io another. 
 
 To Broach-to, is when, by the violence of the wind or a heavy sea upon the quarter 
 of the ship, she is forced up to windward of her course or proper direction, in defiance 
 of the helm. 
 
 Cap. The lower cap is a thick block of elm, with a round hole in the fore-part for 
 the top-mast to enter, and a square one abaft to fit the lower mast-head : the round hole 
 is generally leathered within, &c. 
 
 Cat-head, is a strong projection from the forecastle on each bow of every ship 
 (furnished with sheaves or strong pulleys), to which the anchor is lifted, after it has been 
 hove up to the bow even with the surface of the water. The anchor is then catted, and 
 afterwards fished by means of another, a temporary projection from the fore-chains (or 
 channels), called a davit, whence proceeds a large hook and tackle ; the hook being 
 applied to the inner arm of the anchor, it is then Jished and brought into its place. 
 
 The Chains (or channels) of a ship, ar those strong projections from the ship's sides 
 below the quarter-deck and forecastle-ports in large ships, but above the guns in small 
 ones, to which the shrouds and rigging of the lower masts are carried, and secured by 
 means of wooden blocks or dead-eyes, strongly chained and bolted to the ship's sides 
 below it; forming a sufficient angle of support. They are distinguished, by main, 
 fore, and mizen-chains. 
 
 Clue-garnet, main or fore, is a rope running double from nearly the centre of the 
 main or fore-yard, to the clues or corners of the sail to which the tack and sheet are 
 affixed: and is the principal means of cluing up, or taking in the sail. 
 
 " And while the lee clue-garnet's lowered away, 
 
 Taut qfi the sheet they tally and belay." — Shipwreck.* 
 
 Clinch. The outer end of the cable is clinched to the ring of the anchor ; the inner 
 end, of the inner cable, to the main-mast, or main-beam. It is a particular mode of 
 fastening by seizings. (See Darcy Lever.) 
 
 Close-hauled. A ship or fleet is said to be close hauled, when, with the yards braced 
 up, on either tack, it is sailing as near the wind as it is possible to approach it. It is 
 the contrary of saihng free, large, or before the wind. 
 
 Conning a ship, is to direct the principal man at the wheel in steering the ship. This 
 is usually done by a superior seaman termed a quarter-master ; but, in all difficult cases 
 and anxious times, it is performed by the captain or master. 
 
 To Double upon, is by getting both to windward and to leeward of your enemy, to 
 place him between two fires, and to prevent his escape in either direction ; or it is from 
 one position to gain the other. 
 
 To Fill and stand on, is a signal made after lying by, to direct the fleet to fill their 
 main-top-sails and continue the course. 
 
 * For a beautiful introduction of sea language in a poem, see " Falconer's Shipwreck." See also a 
 copious explanation of sea terms in the Appendix to " Cannpbell's Admirals," vol. viir. 
 
EXPLANATION OF SEA TERMS. xxvii 
 
 Forward, means the fore part of the ship or towards the bows ; aft, that towards the 
 stern. 
 
 In the Grain of, is immediately preceding another ship in the same direction. 
 
 To Gripe, is when, by carrying too much sail in the after-part or stern of the ship, she 
 is found to incline too much to windward, and to require a constant application of the 
 weather-helm, or the helm moved to windward, to counteract its effect. It is the reverse 
 of carrying a lee-helm. 
 
 Hauling the wind, or coming to the wind, on the starboard or larboard tack, is, when 
 sailing free, or large, or before the wind, by a movement of the helm -and a correspondent 
 disposition of the yards and sails, to bring the ship's head up to six points from the 
 wind, to starboard or port. 
 
 Hawse, or hawse-holes. Those appertures in the bows of a ship through which the 
 cables communicate with the anchors. 
 
 To Heave-to, is to change from an advancing or progressive motion, to that which is 
 stationary or lying-to. 
 
 Heaving to an anchor, is the process, by means of the capstan, &c., of taking in 
 all the cable until the ship is brought immediately over her anchor, preparatory to 
 its being weighed out of the ground. If proper sail be set on the ship, and the 
 cable then cut, she could not drift, but proceed in the direction required. When the 
 water is deep, it requires a considerable time to heave the anchor to the bows and to stow 
 it ; this must be done before any considerable degree of velocity can be given to the 
 ship's motion. 
 
 Knotting. In Darcy Lever's excellent work, " The Young Sea Officer's Sheet 
 Anchor," are described and illustrated with Plates, fifteen different kinds of knots, of 
 which the shroud knot is one. " This knot is used when a shroud is either shot or 
 carried away. 
 
 The knotting and splicing is spoken of in the detail of the battle of Trafalgar. 
 
 Shrouds are knotted, cables are spliced when cut by shot. 
 
 Lashing, signifies a course steered by a ship in a slanting or oblique direction from the 
 wind ; it is the same as going free, or large. 
 
 To Leeward of an object, is when it is between you and the^ aT 
 
 point of direction of the wind ; for instance. A, the wind ; ^^, 
 B, a bluff, or point of land ; C, a ship sailing close imder the 
 lee of it, and to windward of others at D and E ; which are to 
 leeward of her. 
 
 In this manner, Hawke was to leeward of the Island of ^ uv^ 
 
 Belleisle, but to windward of the fleet of Mons. Conflans. 
 
 '^^ ^^ 
 
 To Lye-to, is so to dispose the sails that the ship becomes nearly stationary. 
 
 Luffing up, or Luffing up under the lee of, is, by a sudden movement of the helm to 
 leeward, to cause the ship's head to approach nearer to the wind or to the object you 
 wish to close with. 
 
 d 2 
 
xxviii EXPLANATION OF SEA TERMS. 
 
 In this manner Lord Howe, after passing through the French line, luffed up close 
 under the lee of the Montaigne to engage her close. The same was done by Lords 
 Nelson and Collingwood at Trafalgar, and by Lord Duncan and Sir Richard Onslow at 
 Camperdown. 
 
 Main-sheet^ is a large rope affixed to the lower corner of the main-sail, by which it is 
 hauled aft, into its place when set. 
 
 Main-tack, is another large rope affixed to the same corner of the sail, but to haul it 
 on board, or down to the chess-tree on the fore-part of the gangway, when set upon a, 
 wind or close-hauled. When the tack fixed to one comer of the sail is hauled on board, 
 the sheet of the othei- corner is hauled aft. In large ships they are both generally 
 double, running through blocks (or pulleys) fixed to the roping of the saU. 
 
 The fwe-sail also is furnised with similar gear. 
 
 To Overhaul, is to examine. If applied to ships in chase, it signifies that one is 
 gaining upon another very fast. 
 
 Preventer. Preventer braces are necessary as well in bad weather as in battle ; and are 
 appUed in both cases to prevent accidents arising &om the original braces, or brace-blocks, 
 &c. giving way ; they are, at the same time, an additional support to the yard. 
 
 To Rake fore and aft, is so to place one ship against another, that by her whole 
 broadside she can sweep the decks of the other without being exposed to more of her 
 guns than she can bring to bear from her bows or stem. It is to lie athwart the hawse, 
 or across the stern of a ship. 
 
 To Round-to, is, when going large or before the wind, to come round towards the 
 wind by the movement of the helm. To Pay round off, is, when near the wind, to fall 
 off from it against the helm, and in spite of every effort to prevent it. 
 
 Slipping the cable. This is done by ships when it is necessary, for a particular 
 object, to get under sail with every possible dispatch. For instance. Admiral Hyde 
 Parker, with the squadron under his command, slipped and put to sea from Gros-Islet 
 Bay, St. Lucia, to protect a convoy from the superior force of the Count de GuicheUy 
 then in sight. It is done by unsplicing the cable within, to the end of which has 
 previously been affixed a buoy and buoy-rope, to show where the ship has left her anchor : 
 sometimes boats are left with the end of the cable in them for the same purpose, when it 
 can be again received into the ship with still greater facility. 
 
 Slings to the yards are chains or ropes for suspending them by the centre. The lower 
 yards are slung upon preparing for sea ; the top-sail-yards only upon going into battle ; as 
 a preventer to their coming down when they are required to keep their place, and when 
 tyes, halliards, kc. are shot away. The lower-yards are slung with a chain only on going 
 into action. 
 
 Splice. Ropes are joined together for different purposes, by uniting their strands in 
 particular forms, which is termed splicing. " A splice is made by opening and separating 
 the strands of a rope, and thrusting them through the others which are not unlaid-" See 
 Darcy Lever's work. 
 
 A Spring ; to Anchor with a Spring, is, before coming to an anchor, to cause the^nd 
 of a smaller cable or hawser, passed out of a stern or quarter-port, and taken outride of 
 
EXPLANATION OF SEA TERMS. xxix 
 
 the ship, forward, to be bent (or fastened) to the ring of the anchor you intend to let go, 
 and left clear and ready for running with it. 
 
 By means of a spring, when anchredin any place head to wind, you can, by heaving 
 it taught (or tight) and paying out cable, bring the ship's broadside to bear upon a battery, 
 or upon an enemy when approaching you on the bow, or a-stern. 
 
 A spring may also be clapt upon the cable of a ship already anchored, and, when hove 
 taught, and the cable payed out as before, answers the same purpose. 
 
 In this manner, the ship, the cable, and the spring, form a triangle, of which the broad- 
 side is the base presented to the object of attack. 
 
 It may sometimes be necessary to clap on two springs upon the same anchor or cable ; 
 by this means the ship is hove whichever way is best, and will present either side you please 
 to the enemy. 
 
 To Spring a mast. A mast or yard is said to be sprung, when a flaw has been 
 discovered in it, or a sudden rend or split, occasioned either by carrying too great a 
 pressure of sail upon it, or by a heavy pitch or jerk of the ship in a head-sea; sometimes, 
 from want of attention in setting up, or tightening the rigging of it. 
 
 To Stand on, signifies a ship continuing in the same direction, when others may be 
 acting differently. 
 
 Starboard, Larboard, and Port. Starboard means to the right-hand, when looking 
 towards the ship's head : larboard the left-hand. To-port means also to the left ; but 
 applied to different things, for instance, put the helm a-port, is to move it to the larboard 
 side ; but it is never said, put the helm a-larboard ; although usual to say, starboard the 
 helm, or put the helm a-starboard : a ship veers, or pays round to starboard, and to-port, 
 but not to larboard. 
 
 Starboard and Larboard Tacks. With the starboard tacks on board, or standing on 
 the starboard tack, a ship is braced close with the wind on her starboard side, six points 
 from the line of her direction. The larboard tack is the contrary ; port in this case is 
 never applied. 
 
 To be in Stays, or to heave in Stays, is to commence the operation of tacking, or 
 gmng-ahout. A ship is said to miss stays when she has attempted to tack, and failed ; 
 either from the state of the weather, or from want of skill and attention on the part of 
 the directing officer. A French line of battle ship is seen in stays, reconnoitring the 
 British squadron, in Plate IX. 
 
 Stoppers, for rigging, are short pieces of rope, knotted at each end, to which lanyards 
 are affixed for the purpose of applying them to a stay or a shroud, when shot away, as a 
 temporary support. 
 
 Stoppers. Dog and deck stoppers are strong pieces of rope ; the former securely fixed 
 to the main-mast, or a beam below ; the latter to the cable-deck ring-bolts, and knotted at 
 the outer end, with a suitable lanyard affixed to it, for passing round the cable, to stop its 
 running out. The dog-stopper is long, and without a knot. Both are applied to the cable 
 in a particular, but m a different manner. 
 
 In the Wake of, is immediately following in the same track, or close behind another 
 ship. 
 
XXX EXPLANATION OF SEA TERMS. 
 
 To Tack, signifies the operation of turning the ship's head round, against and in 
 opposition to the direction of the wind. See Plate IX, a ship tacking. She has hauled 
 round the after-yards ; the head-yards are Oriox.* 
 
 Taught " a corruption of tight." — Darcy Lever. At the end of Darcy Lever's most 
 useful work, is an excellent " Dictionary of Sea Terms," to which the reader is referred 
 for further particulars. 
 
 To Turn, in or out, or up, is said of ships when they are close-hauled and tacking from 
 time to time, to reach a particular object to windward, whether it be an enemy, an 
 anchorage, or otherwise. It is to contend with an adverse wind. 
 
 To Ware (or Veer), is to do the reverse ; or to turn round by going from the wind and 
 hauling to it gradually ; or, as it is termed, coming to the wind upon the other tack. To 
 veer is more properly applied to paying-out or giving out more cable, or hawser ; as, 
 when the anchor is let go, they veer away the cable, &c. 
 
 Windage of shot, is the space left by a shot not exactly fitting the bore of the gun it 
 is intended for, and which alters its direction. 
 
 ^J 
 
 To Windward, is that position which is between the point of 
 directionof the wind and another object; for instance. A, the bAv 
 
 point from whence the wind blows ; B, position of a ship ; C, 
 point of land. The ship B, is to windward of the land C, and ' 
 
 will therefore, should the wind not draw forward upon her, in aU 
 probability weather it. 
 
 To Yaw, is to cause a temporary deviation from the course the ship holds, for a par- 
 ticular purpose, and without making any alteration in the trim, or position of the sails. 
 
 * The ship in Plate IX, having reconnoitred the British squadron, is going about ; she has already 
 hauled main-sail, or braced about the after-yards; when the after-sails become nearly full upon that 
 tack, she will haul-of-all, or haul round the head-yards, and the operation is completed. The head- 
 yards in the Plate are still a-back, or a-box, and continue so until the ship has payed ofif sufficiently 
 to fill the after-sails. 
 
NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 PART I. 
 
NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 The naval battles of Great Britain, from the accession of the illustrious 
 House of Hanover, commence with the name of Byng. 
 
 In the auspicious reign of George the First, Admiral Sir G. Byng, afterwards 
 Viscount Torrington, was charged with an important mission to the court of 
 the two Sicilies, on the part of the " Quadruple Alliance ;" to execute which, 
 a powerful fleet was equipped, and full instructions were given him to guard and 
 defend its interests in the Mediterranean. That the reader may become in some 
 degree acquainted with the character of this great officer, before he assumes the 
 part of an ambassador, or appears as a commander-in-chief and a conqueror, 
 it will be necessary to go back a little into some of the naval battles of the two 
 preceding reigns, in which he acted in a less responsible situation ; but at ail 
 times was distinguished for his patriotism, zeal, perseverance, and intrepidity. 
 From a manuscript now in the possession of the family, kindly affisrded for this 
 work, to which His Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral has been graci- 
 ously pleased to extend his fostering and paternal hand, the following extracts 
 have been made, whereby some traits of the character of Sir G. Byng will be 
 shown, and a judgment be formed of the battles in which it was his lot to bear 
 a part ; taken from journals, and other the purest sources of information kept 
 by him, or found in his possession. If, with the manuscript before him, the 
 writer had indulged himself as freely as he felt inclined, he would have been 
 induced to invade the province of the historian or the biographer ; but adhering 
 to his original design, he has merely selected such parts only as he considers may 
 contribute to a further illustration of the characters of celebrated men, and the 
 achievements of former days. 
 
 The first of this description in which, then Captain, Byng distinguished 
 himself in a ship of the line, was in 
 
 THE BATTLE OF BEACH Y HEAD. 
 
 1690. 
 
 In this, we are told, that, " It was about nine o'clock when the Dutch, 
 who led the van with their starboard tacks on board, began the battle at cannon- 
 
 B 
 
2 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 shot distance at first, but afterwards much nearer ; and half an hour after the 
 blue squadron in the rear ; the red squadron was then at random-shot from 
 the enemy, and at no time came nearer the French than half cannon-shot, 
 which was partly occasioned hy a bow that was in the centre of both fleets, 
 and the whole engaged by backing and filling their topsails. 
 
 " Sir Ralph Delaval, Vice-Admiral of the blue, kept his line at first with 
 Lord Torrington (late Admiral Herbert) ; but when my Lord brought-to at the 
 distance of twice cannon-shot, he however bore right down upon the French^ 
 receiving their shot fore and aft, and did not bring-to till he was within musket 
 shot, and then engaged D'E tree's squadron half an hour after the Dutch had 
 began in the van ; he pressed so much upon them, that, as they edged from him, 
 he came at last almost into their line, and the French set all their sail, and 
 were bearing away when the calm came, and then they towed from him with 
 their boats. Delaval having bore up when Lord Torrington hove-to, caused 
 that great space between the van of the blue squadron and the rear of the red, 
 which there was all the action ; and the reason given for Lord Torrington not 
 gmng nearer than he did, though he had wind enoVtghfor two hours after, was, 
 to avoid being raited fore and aft." 
 
 " As the Dutch did not stretch up to the head of their line before they began 
 to engage, but left nine of the French ships a-head of them ; these nine ships, 
 about one o'clock, had stretched a-head and weathered the van of tM Hutch, 
 by which they were engaged on both sides^ and then it fell so hard upon them 
 that Admiral Vandeput was obliged to put all his division out of the line ; they 
 were very much shattered and disabled, in great confusion, and in danger from 
 their own firing. It then falling calm. Lord Torrington gave orders to anchor, 
 having himself, with several others, towed down between them and the enemy, 
 and then anchored upon the tide of ebb, The French not anchoring, in about 
 an hour after drove out of gun-shot, and so ended the battle, in which one 
 Dutch ship was lost ; for, having no anchors, she drove amongst the French. 
 Captain Byng being second to the admiral of the red, was in the centre, had 
 eight men killed, ten wounded, and eight guns split in the engagement." 
 
 Arthur Herbert, created Earl of Torrington by King William, was the 
 comrflander-in-chief in this battle, was tried by a court martial, and unani- 
 mously acquitted. 
 
 Captain Byng next commanded the Royal Oak, and formed one of the divi- 
 sion of Sir John Ashby at the memorable battle of La Hague ; but, owing 
 entirely to circumstances, this division was not materially engaged. An excellent 
 account is given of this celebrated defeat by Admiral Russell himself, in his 
 
THE BATTLE OF BEACHY HEAD. 3 
 
 " Letter to Lord Nottingham," in " Campbell's Admirals ;" we are there 
 informed that the " Sandwich," one of Sir Cloudesley Shovel's division, drifted 
 through the enemy's fleet, from not having an anchor ready to let go, when 
 the division anchored, and that her Captain (Hastings) was killed. 
 
 From this period. Captain Byng will be brought before the reader as a flag 
 ofiicer ; and, upon the following occasion, although neither arrayed against the 
 enemies of his country, nor appearing in the brilliant career of victory, be no less 
 distinguished in his professional character. The recital will serve to keep alive 
 our interest and our regard for him, until he be again seen employed in the 
 more active and important duties of his station. 
 
 In returning from the Mediterranean, in 1703, on board the Ranelagh, of 
 eighty guns, when, on the morning of the 26th of November, about three 
 leagues from the Lizard, they met with a dreadful gale, such as the oldest 
 seaman amongst them had never before witnessed. It is thus related : — 
 
 " It now began to blow very hard ; and, having made the land plain, he 
 (Admiral Byng), judging it more advisable to shape a course up the channel, 
 than to lay-by, stood away accordingly with the foresail the wind S. W., and 
 the night was very dark. At about twelve o'clock a violent storm came down 
 upon them at S. W. by S. and S. S. W., so violent that nobody could be heard 
 but in the ear; and, though the ship scudded with but part of a foresail, it 
 blew entirely from the yard, and soon after the ship broached-to to the south- 
 ward, and then lay a hull, not being able to ware her, notwithstanding all the 
 endeavours used, unless they had cut the main and mizen-masts by the board, 
 as Baker did in his ship who lay along, and was expected to be lost every 
 minute : but Admiral Byng, who, even in that great extremity, did not care to 
 be deprived of his masts, was not convinced that it was reasonable to cut them 
 away while any hope rettiained of saving the ship, though they had six feet of 
 water in the hold, part of which was occasioned by a gun of the middle tier, 
 which, breaking out of the carriage, went overboard out of the port to leeward : 
 they had very great difficulty in securing the port again. 
 
 " They were not only thus pressed by the storm, almost without hopes of 
 saving themselves, but an accident happened which had soon brought them to 
 their end, but for the extraordinary exertion of one of the ship's company, who put 
 them in a condition to continue pumping and bailing ; for the chain-pump broke, 
 and this man boldly undertook to repair it, by going down to the bottom, and 
 had the good fortune to put it in order, for which great service he was preferred 
 to be a gunner. They continued pumping and bailing for their lives till they 
 were jaded, and, the water still gaining on them, they were ready to give it over. 
 
 B 2 
 
4 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Admiral Byng himself was quite spent with fatigue, and went into his cabin, 
 and, sitting down in one of the lashed chairs, gave all over, and was now, for the 
 first time, sensible that men might be rendered unable to stir, which he had 
 never thought possible before. While he sat in this way, expecting every 
 minute the ship would go down, Davenport, his lieutenant, came to acquaint 
 him that not a man was able to work, and that they had given themselves over ; 
 but that, if he had any brandy to give them, it might spirit them up some little 
 time longer. Admiral Byng ordered him what brandy they could get at ; and 
 Davenport, lashing himself to the mast, doled it out himself to every man, 
 exhorting them to struggle a little longer for their lives : this he did in a 
 strain of oratory peculiar to himself; part of it in a religious way, pointing out 
 to them, in lively colours, how little they were prepared for the next world, and, 
 therefore, how much they ought to endeavour to preserve themselves in this ; 
 for, if the ship sunk, they would certainly he damned ! ! The height of the 
 gale was at about two o'clock in the morning. 
 
 " What with the brandy and his exhortations, the men acquired strength and 
 resolution to renew their labours : they pumped and bailed, so as to keep the 
 water from gaining any further upon them ; by that time it was day, and the 
 extremity of the weather began to abate ; the wind slackened, and the pumps 
 gained upon the ship, but, the tiller being broke in the head of the rudder, they 
 lay till almost noon before they got in another ; then they wore and stood in for 
 the land. They saw no ship but the Torbay, which had her foretop-raast blown 
 by the board, and had no sail upon her, for they were all blown from her yards, 
 though furled. 
 
 " So great a sea was running, that no assistance could be given, and they made 
 the Isle of Wight, still blowing a heavy gale, and anchored in the road of St. 
 Helen's, being glad to get in where they could, for such a storm had never been 
 in the memory of any man living. Spithead, and the shores around, were 
 covered with wrecks." 
 
 " In 1705, Sir G. Byng was very near sharing the unhappy fate of Sir Cloudesley 
 Shovel, by being not more than a ship's length from the rocks upon which his ship 
 struck. ' The topsails of the Royal Anne were set in a minute of time,' when 
 one of the rocks was under her main chains ; thus rescued from destruction by 
 presence of mind, and the skill and activity of the officers and crew." — (Campbell's 
 Admirals, by Mr. Readhead Yorke, vol. vi. p. 122.) 
 
THE ATTACK UPON GIBRALTAR. 
 
 1704. 
 
 After the council of war, held by Sir G. Rooke in the Bay of Tetuan, it 
 was determined to make an attack upon Gibraltar, and resolved that Admiral 
 Byng should proceed with a part of the fleet immediately, and that the rest 
 should follow upon the springing up of an easterly wind : — 
 
 " These dispositions being settled. Sir G. Rooke made the signal for Admiral 
 Byng to proceed with the squadron appointed, and he accordingly made sail for 
 Gibraltar. The next morning, the wind being easterly, the whole fleet stood 
 after him, and that afternoon came to an anchor there : Admiral Byng with his 
 squadron before the town, and Sir G. Rooke with the rest of the fleet anchored 
 from him, along in the bite* of the bay towards the river. When Admiral Byng 
 anchored, the town fired, and the shot went over them, but the main-mast of his 
 ship was wounded, and, having orders not to attack the town before the Prince 
 of Hesse had sent a summons and an answer was returned, he ordered the ships 
 with him to warp a little further out. In about an hour after the fleet came to 
 anchor, the signal was given to land the marines, which was done without any 
 more opposition than by a party of about fifty horse, who went out of the town 
 to the place where they landed at, and made an effort to oppose, but upon the 
 fire of the grenadiers that first landed they returned into the town with the loss 
 of one of their troopers. After this, the marines marched in good order to the 
 mills that are within shot of the north part of the town, and posted themselves 
 there ; then the Prince of Hesse sent a summons to the town to declare for King 
 Charles the Third, But no answer returning that night, nor by break of day. 
 Admiral Byng made the signal to draw into a line before the town, as before 
 directed, which was to be as near one another as possible, and no ship to leave 
 the line, though disabled, before he was acquainted with it. Accordingly, they 
 all proceeded, warping to their stations, it being calm, and the town kept firing 
 upon them now and then. 
 
 " While this was doing, the Governor sent his answer to the Prince of Hesse, 
 that he would defend the town to the last for Ring Philip the Fifth, to whom 
 he had sworn. 
 
 "Sir G. Rooke then sent five ships more to Admiral Byng, who had now 
 twenty-two, and who disposed them in a line as near one another as possible, 
 from the head of the New Mole to the southward, to the Old Mole, and to the 
 
 * Bite, or bight, further advanced into the bay, where it may be said to form a Lite, or the shape 
 of a horse-shoe. 
 
6 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 northward of it. The English to the southward, and the Dutch to the north- 
 ward ; he placed two bombs with the Dutch, and the other just without his own 
 ship. In this form they kept warping in all the next night, sending their boats 
 before them to sound ; and in the morning most of them had placed themselves 
 pretty regular. 
 
 " In the nightj Sir G. Rooke sent Captain Whitaker with boats manned and 
 armed, to burn a French privateer within the Old Mole, which he performed ; 
 at the same time Admiral Byng ordered the bombs to play upon the town. 
 The nature of the place did not admit of all the ships taking up the exact 
 positions assigned them, and Admiral Byng's ship, off the middle of the town, 
 was in less than three fathoms and a half at low water. 
 
 "About five o'clock in the morning, 213d of July, the town began to fire at the 
 ships, and Admiral Byng commenced the attack with a very furious fire, at which 
 all the inhabitants, frightened, ran up the hill out of the town. The smoke in 
 a short time was so great that they could not see any object to fire at, upon which 
 Admiral Byng sent orders along the line to forbear, and fire only now and then ; 
 and at noon he caused them to cease altogether, to see if their fire had produced 
 any effect. 
 
 " Captain Whitaker being at that time on board him, was sent with these 
 orders, and while on board the Lennox, that lay nearest the Mole, he and 
 Captain Jumper observing that several of the cannon of the castle and batteries 
 were dismounted, and the men beat from their guns. Captain Whitaker returned 
 to Admiral Byng with this information, upon which he immediately sent the 
 boats of the line manned and armed, and Captain Whitaker he sent to Sir G. 
 Rooke for more boats, when the signal was made for the boats of the fleet. In 
 the mean time the boats of the line, under Captain Hicks (the senior oflBcer), 
 were ordered to land to the southward of the Mole head ; soon after he was 
 joined by Captain Whitaker and others, with the boats of the fleet, with orders 
 to take possession of, and to reduce the place if possible. 
 
 " As the boats were proceeding to the shore, the inhabitants returned from 
 the hills to the town again, and Admiral Byng perceived a number oi priests, 
 women, and children, who, to avoid danger in the town, had got out of it, and 
 were going towards the Chapel of our Lady of Europa, but who, seeing the 
 boats rowing for the shore, were making all haste into the town again. 
 
 '• Sir Cloudesley Shovel happened to be on board with Admiral Byng at that 
 time, and when the women were perceived in the narrow passage of the rocks, 
 conducting back by the priests, he desired, out of gaiete de coeur, that a cannon 
 shot might be fired that way, to frighten them, when they all ran away to the 
 Convent of our Lady of Europa. 
 
THE ATTACK UPON GIBRALTAR. 7 
 
 " Upon this gun being fired, the ships, taking it for a signal, renewed their 
 attack upon the town, and under the cover of the fire, the sailors landed on the 
 New Mole, and marched up to the castle and fortifications. 
 
 " Davenport, ahroiher of the General's, and one of Admiral Byng's lieutenants, 
 with about thirty men, landed to the left of the covered way, and at the breach 
 that was made, got over to the eastward of the castle, while the main number, 
 finding the gates shut, and the drawbridge up, mounted the wall and palisades, 
 and clambered over every thing they met, thinking of nothing but getting on; the 
 nature of the places they got over were such as surprised the Prince of Hesse 
 and every body who went afterwards to view them ; while some were getting 
 over, and others mounting, the castle blew up, and killed and wounded several : 
 there were about 100 lost on this occasion, 
 
 " It seems uncertain, whether this was by accident or design, yet it so discou- 
 raged the sailors, that they made the best of their way to the boats. In their 
 retreat they were met by Captain Whitaker, who turned them back, landed 
 again, and marched up with little opposition, and took possession of the 
 remaining part of the castle and bastion adjoining, with the redoubt, half-way 
 between the New Mole and the town, and there he planted a union jack, deter- 
 mined to defend his post in the best manner he could. 
 
 " Admiral Byng and Sir G. Rooke, observing what was passing, sent Captain 
 Whitaker all the support in their power, with orders to strengthen himself all 
 he could, in his position, his force then amounting to 1500 men. 
 
 " Admiral Byng now went on board Sir G. Rooke, to consult upon what step 
 to take next ; when it was determined that Admiral Byng should send a drum 
 with a summons to the town, by the south gate, from his camp of sailors, at the 
 same time that the Prince of Hesse should send a summons from his camp of the 
 marines, in the name of the King of Spain. Sir G. Rooke wrote accordingly to 
 the Prince of Hesse to that eflFeot, and gave orders to Admiral Byng as agreed 
 upon, who immediately went on shore to the seamen's camp, and sent in the 
 summons Sir G. Rooke had directed ; he then went and viewed the different 
 posts ; and, as the women of the best fashion, with others, and their children, 
 and some priests were at the Chapel of our liady of Europa, Admiral Byng 
 ordered the out-guards and centihels not to suffer any person to pass that way, 
 lest they might be insulted. 
 
 " In the evening, the governor sent back the drums, with his answer, that they 
 would deliver up the town, and the next morning would send out hostages, and 
 capitulate on the terms that were promised him should be honourable. And 
 the greatest inducement to the citizens to oblige the governor to this was, Ji-om 
 
8 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 the English being between them and their women, for whom, lest any injuries 
 might be offered them, they were in the greatest apprehensions. The next 
 morning Admiral Byng went to the Prince of Hesse, to inform him of their 
 position to the southward, and of the measures that had been taken. 
 
 " At this time the hostages arrived from the governor, in order to capitulate, 
 and desired that their women might be kept from the rudeness of the sailors, 
 and that he would release them ; this seemed to be their great concern ; and 
 chiefly upon their release, offered one of the gates of the town. Admiral Byng 
 assured them that no insult had been offered them, and told them of the care he 
 had taken to protect them, by the guards he had posted ; and this gave those 
 gentlemen great satisfaction. After talking with the Prince of Hesse, Admiral 
 Byng assured them, upon his honour, that he would immediately visit the 
 women, and take them himself to the gates of the town ; and, upon the perform- 
 ance of this, they promised to deliver up the gate to the Prince of Hesse ; and 
 then the articles of capitulation were agreed upon. 
 
 " Upon the signing of these articles, the governor delivered up the north gate, 
 bastions, and fortifications, of that part of the town to the Prince of Hesse, who 
 took possession of it with the marines ; and, at the same time. Admiral Byng, 
 keeping strictly to his word, delivered up the women to the south gate himself, 
 but he did not let them pass him without unveiling." 
 
 The terms of capitulation may be found in the " Memoirs of Sir G. Rooke," 
 Vol. iv. Campbell's Admirals, with a description of the attack, omitting, however, 
 what has here been considered an interesting and an essential part of it. 
 
 " The same evening, the seamen embarked from the camp, leaving only 200 
 men in the castle and 50 men in the redoubt, where they remained until they 
 were relieved by the marines. Thus the fleet unexpectedly took the town of 
 Gibraltar, very much owing to the gallantry of the sailors, with the loss only of 
 61 killed, and 260 wounded. It must also be attributed to the incident of 
 having the women in their possession ; for that furious cannonading, in which 
 it is reckoned they fired 14,000 shot, did so little injury to the town, that orders 
 were going to be sent (if they were not sent) to cease firing, and to draw off the 
 ships ; but when, fortunately, the women were intercepted, and at the mercy of 
 the enemy, it was enough to alarm the Spaniards sufficiently to give an unex- 
 pected turn to this affair, and to be the principal cause of the surrender." 
 
 It may here reasonably be asked, how is it that Gibraltar has not been 
 always garrisoned by marines? the same of .Malta; what eligible depSts of 
 marines for the British fleets. 
 
 An " Historical review of the Royal Marine Corps," from its establishment in 
 
BATTLE OF MALAGA. 9 
 
 1684, down to 1803, appears to have been written by a lieutenant, Alexander 
 Gillespie, twenty-four years an officer in it, dedicated with permission to His 
 Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence. This corps was first termed His Royal 
 Highness the Duke of York and Albany's " Maritime Regiment of Foot,'* 
 and commanded by the Honourable Sir Charles Littleton. It was also called the 
 " Admiral Regiment." — For some account of this work see the 14th Vol. of the 
 Naval Chronicle, page 50 ; the extracts there given are short, but interesting. 
 
 When the Mediterranean is so much the seat of naval war, what advantages 
 might accrue from supplies of royal marines so near as at Gibraltar and Malta?* 
 Voltaire, in some part of his writings, declares that Great Britain upon one 
 occasion went to war for a few acres of snozo in Canada; with this exception, 
 and our wars with America, hostilities may be said generally to commence in 
 the Mediterranean. 
 
 BATTLE or MALAGA. 
 
 1704. 
 
 In the battle of Malaga in the same year, the manuscript informs us, that 
 Sir G. Rooke was obliged to send to Gibraltar for some of the marines that had 
 been left to garrison it, and by means of the fire ships and small vessels 1,000 
 marines were again embarked on board the fleet, to enable him to face the enemy, 
 considerably superior in force, daily threatening an attack. Perceiving that the 
 Count de Thoulouse by his manoeuvres endeavoured to get between the British 
 fleet and the Rock of Gibraltar, Sir G. Rooke, notwithstanding the weakened 
 state of his ships from their want of ammunition, and of his inferiority in every 
 respect, determined to attack him. 
 
 " He immediately bore down in line of battle with aU the sail he could set, 
 the wind blowing then east, with small gales, and while they were drawing 
 near, the French were forming their line with their heads to the southward ; 
 Cape Malaga N. W. by W. eight leagues, all that night light winds and calms, 
 next morning easterly gales, when they again bore down upon the French, who 
 were still in line, with their heads to the southward, and braced-to, when they 
 had formed it to their intention, and lay to receive the English fleet, giving 
 them the opportunity of coming as near them as they pleased. Their line was 
 formed circular ; their centre in a very great bite or half moon, which the 
 
 * Were our colonies ^rrisoned by royal marines, the ships and colonies might recruit each other, 
 and the health of all be much more materially preserved than by the present system. 
 
 C 
 
10 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Admiral supposed they did with an intent to gain the wind of the van or rear of 
 the confederate fleets, with the help of their gallies if it should be little wind. 
 They had fifty ships of the line, in whiph were 23,000 men, besides fire ships 
 and frigates, and twenty-two gallies with 11,900. 
 
 " Some of these small frigates lay to leeward of their line, with the same 
 flags or signals hoisted by their flag ships, which Admiral Byng supposed was 
 with intention to repeat all signals made in action when, from the smoke, they 
 could not be seen from the flag ships: this disposition Admiral Byng thought 
 might be of great use in large fleets where the line is much extended. 
 
 " Their white and blue squadron led the van. In the centre was the Count 
 de Thoulouse, and in the rear was the blue. Each squadron had an admiral, 
 with vice and rear-admirals ; in all nine, besides some chiefs of squadrons. 
 They were strongest in the centre, for which reason their gallies were posted in 
 the van and rear, but a small detachment of them attended Count Thoulouse 
 ready to tow where there should be occasion. 
 
 " The English and Dutch consisted of fifty-three ships, of which Sir G. Rooke 
 ordered two fourth rates, with two frigates and two fire-ships to lay to wind- 
 ward of him, that if the enemy's line should endeavour to pass through the 
 line with their gallies and fire-ships, they might prevent them. 
 
 " Of the confederate fleet. Sir Cloudesley Shovel led the van. In the centre 
 was Sir G. Rooke, and in the rear was the Dutch, commanded by Admiral 
 Callemberg ; but the superiority of the French was so manifest that great dis- 
 inclination was shown both by Sir G. Rooke and the Dutch to bear down upon 
 them too closely. Sir C. Shovel engaged the van within half-gun shot. Admiral 
 Byng sent frequently to the Dutch to desire they would come nearer the enemy 
 to assist him ; but this part of the French line so much surpassed them in the 
 bigness of their ships and number of guns, that none of them were so ready to 
 engage them, though they all did by degrees at last very warmly. When the 
 Count de Thoulouse saw that Sir G. Rooke brought-to so far to windward, he 
 made the signal for the van and rear of his fleet to make sail, then got both his 
 tacks on board, and all the fleet made sail at once as if with design to weather 
 the English ; but it was to move up as near to them as the wind would permit. 
 Upon this Sir G. Rooke made signal to engage, thinking the enemy were going 
 off; and so the battle began, and was continued with great fury on both sides ;" 
 and with various success ; for it seems, though the van and rear of the enemy 
 towards night gave way, the centre, so much stronger than the division of Sir 
 G. Rooke, maintained its position and caused it to suffer severely. So did those 
 of Admiral Byng and Admiral Dilks, who were obliged to haul to windward of 
 
BATTLE OF MALAGA. 11 
 
 the line for want of shot, which had not been equally distributed through the 
 fleet after the expenditure at Gibraltar. 
 
 " In short, the British fleet suflFered very much in this unequal contest. Sir 
 G. Rooke and Sir George Jennings particularly distinguished themselves, with 
 others before-named, and Admiral Callemberg behaved with great bravery, his 
 ship getting very roughly treated. The battle continued until after sun-set, when 
 the French turned from them out of shot, and both sides left off firing, standing 
 on under easy sail aU night." 
 
 It appears the Count de Thoulouse kept his lights abroad, and which Sir 
 G. Rooke did not ; upon which an aukward circumstance was nearly befalling 
 Admiral Byng, who, mistaking the lights of the French admiral for those of 
 his own, put off in his boat to pay him a visit; he went so near the French 
 admiral as to be hailed several times, when, perceiving his mistake, he rowed 
 away from him as fast as he couldj and regained his own, the only flag ship 
 carrying lights. The next morning the French had the wind of the English, 
 and formed their line, but did not appear inclined to approach, but lay-to at the 
 distance of three leagues ; the English fleet also formed in line to leeward, 
 awaiting the attack, should it be the intention of the enemy to make it ; but 
 both fleets seem to have had enough of it ; nor indeed could the English fleet 
 have engaged with any prospect of success. After repairing their damages as 
 well as they could, and making an equal division, too, of the stores and ammunition 
 remaining in the fleet, it was resolved in a council of war to proceed to Gibraltar, 
 and, at all hazards, to make their way through the French fleet, should it oppose 
 itself to their design : however, the French supposed themselves beaten, and had 
 no intention to renew the fight. 
 
 In their progress to Gibraltar it appears that the Albemarle of sixty-four guns, 
 in which ship Admiral Callemberg had fought, but had removed from, after she 
 had been filling of powder, hlew up, and but nine men, who were taken up in the 
 water, were saved. Two days after the fleet anchored in aline in Gibraltar Bay, 
 and received the salutes from the gamson, which fired a salvo of great guns and 
 small arms for the victory. Besides the size of their ships, the French in this 
 battle had a superiority of 600 great guns, with clean ships, lately out of port, 
 and much better supplied with ammunition. 
 
 The manuscript is declared to be written and formed from the most im- 
 partial view of the whole of the proceedings, and from the purest sources 
 of information ; namely, the journals, papers, and other authentic documents 
 of Admiral Byng, who was a party in all he relates. Much is said of the 
 bravery of many of the French officers, particularly of the Bailli de Loraine, one 
 
 c 2 
 
12 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 of the seconds to the Count de Thoulouse, who encouraged his men to do their 
 duty when he had but a few hours to live. Sir George Jennings in the 
 St. George was latterly opposed to him ; had twenty-five guns disabled on the 
 fighting side, and got others over to supply the loss, and though having 
 suffered very severely himself, obliged the other to quit the line, assisted by their 
 gaUies. 
 
 " Admiral Byng had near the same usage with the rest, and Cowe, the captain 
 of his ship, had his head shot off; he suffered the more by the Dutch squadron 
 keeping at the great distance they did until the afternoon : this made Admiral 
 Byng take upon himself to send to them to desire they would bear down, some 
 of them laying to windward of the rear of his division, and some of them 
 got on the other side of his division and fired over at the French, which obliged 
 him to desire they would forbear, some of his ships being struck by the Dutch ; 
 this made one of the captains of his division set down in the report he made of 
 the condition of his ship after the battle — two shot received from the Hutch to 
 one of the French ! — But the Dutch afterwards bore down, and some of them, 
 especially Admiral Callemberg's own ship, took their share of the battle !" 
 
 After a council of war, aU the marines that could possibly be spared from 
 the ships were to be relanded at Gibraltar, sixty great guns, with their carriages, 
 as many gunners, and twelve carpenters, pursuant to the request made by the 
 Prince of Hesse. The two bomb ships with their tenders were also left, with 
 such a proportion of the fleet as were in a condition to remain the winter ; all 
 under the command of Sir J. Leake. In pursuance of these resolutions 2,000 
 marines were sent on shore ; forty-eight cannon, in addition to the hundred that 
 were in the town before, with a quantity of stores and provisions. It was then 
 determined to quit the straights the first fair wind ; the fleet, or most disabled 
 ships, to return to England with Sir G. Rooke, while those to be left were to 
 repair to Lisbon, under Sir J. Leake, to be refitted. 
 
 BATTLE OF MESSINA. 
 
 In the year 1718, England was involved in a rupture with Spain, and for the 
 purpose before-mentioned a fleet of twenty-one ships was equipped with all ex- 
 pedition, under the command of Sir G. Byng, and directed to sail to Naples, 
 then threatened with a Spanish army. He was there informed that the Spaniards, 
 to the amount of 30,000 men, had already landed in Sicily ; upon which he 
 
BATTLE OF MESSINA. 13 
 
 immediately resolved to sail thither, and to pursue the fleet in which they had 
 embarked under Don Antonio De Castaneta. 
 
 Upon rounding Cape Faro, he perceived two small Spanish vessels, and fol- 
 lowing them closely, they led him to their main fleet, which before noon he 
 discovered in line of battle, amounting in all to twenty-seven sail. The Spa- 
 niards attempted to get away, but the British, as this historian (Goldsmith) 
 observes, " had for some time acquired such expertness in naval affairs, that no 
 other nation would attempt to face them but with manifest disadvantage." An 
 ardent pursuit then commenced, their commanders behaving with courage and 
 activity ; notwithstanding which, all excepting six were taken. These six were 
 saved by the conduct of Cammock, their vice-admiral, a native of Ireland. — (See 
 some account of him in Campbell's Admirals," Vol. vi.) Mr. Corbett informs us> 
 that the conduct of the Spanish Government to the English merchants in their 
 ports and harbours was cruel and unwarrantable, and that our merchant ships 
 were compelled to become transports for their troops, or their masters were liable 
 to the severest punishments if they refused. They were made prizes of when 
 met at sea though bound to Italy ; and upon one occasion, " Rear-Admiral 
 Cammock pressed no less than sixty men for his own ship, and one of the 
 masters, endeavouring to keep his men, had both his ears cut off! ! " (Expedi- 
 tion to Sicily, p. 41.) 
 
 Sir G. Byng appears to have accomplished this service with equal resolution 
 and address ; the King wrote him a letter with his own hand, approving of his 
 conduct. He also received distinguished honours from the Emperor and from 
 the King of Sardinia. 
 
 The British Admiral was drawing fast up with the Spanish fleet, having four 
 rear-admirals, when a rear-admiral, with six ships of war, some gallies and 
 store-ships stood in for the Sicilian shore, upon which Captain Walton in the 
 Canterbury, with five more, were dispatched after them, and a running fight 
 succeeded. 
 
 The Santa Rosa and Santa Carlos struck to the Orford and Kent ; the 
 Grafton warmly attacked the Prince of Asturias and left her to be taken by 
 the Bredah and Captain ; for, being one of the best sailing ships, she passed on 
 to others of the enemy. 
 
 The Kent and Superb came up with and attacked the Spanish Admiral, who, 
 after making a resolute defence, surrendered. The gallies, it appears, were made 
 use of in towing the line of battle ships, as the wind was very light the 
 whole time. 
 
 The British Admiral pursued the flying enemy until night. Rear-Admiral 
 
14 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Delaval took the Isabella of sixty guns, the Essex captured the Juno of 
 thirty-six, and the Rupert took the Volante of forty-four guns ; the battle was 
 fought about six leagues from Cape Passaro. 
 
 While Sir George Byng, who, in the Barfleur, had got up with the Spanish 
 Admiral, lay-to repairing damages ; Captain Walton had taken four Spanish 
 ships of war, one of which was of sixty-four guns, bearing the flag of Rear- 
 Admiral Mari, a ship of fifty-four, one of forty, and one of twenty-four guns, 
 with a bomb vessel and a ship laden with arms. He had also burnt four ships 
 of the following descriptions ; namely, one of fifty-four, two of forty, and one 
 of thirty guns, with a fire ship and a bomb vessel. 
 
 It was upon this occasion that a letter was written, so remarkable for its point 
 and brevity, as to become proverbial in the navy, but frequently attributed to a 
 wrong person ; it was Captain Walton who reported his services to the Admiral 
 in the following modest and laconic style : — 
 
 " Sir, 
 
 " We have taken and destroyed all the Spanish ships and vessels which 
 were upon the coast, the number as per margin. 
 
 (Signed) « G. Walton. 
 
 " Canterbury, off Syracuse, Aug. l6, 1718." 
 
 Mr. Corbett in speaking of it says, " The Captain (Walton) was one whose 
 natural talents were fitter for achieving a gallant action than describing one, yet 
 his letter on this occasion carries in it such a strain of military eloquence that it 
 is worth preserving." 
 
 He was knighted for this, and some time after made a flag officer. (Expedi- 
 tion to Sicily, p. 32. Tindal's Continuation of Rapin, Vol. vi. p. 569.) 
 
 In the same works is also given the following — 
 
 " Letter of His Majesty George First, to Sir G. Byng, on his Success 
 
 over the Spanish Fleet. 
 
 " Monsieur Chevalier Byng, 
 
 " Though I have not heard from you directly, I am informed of the victory 
 which the fleet has gained under your command, and I was unwilling to delay 
 the satisfaction that my approbation of your conduct might aflFord you. 
 I thank you for it, and desire you to express my satisfaction to all the brave 
 people who have signalized themselves on this occasion. Secretary Craggs has 
 
ADMIRAL VERNON. 15 
 
 orders to inform you more at large of my intentions, but I am pleased to assure 
 you myself that I am, 
 
 *• Monsieur le Chevalier Byng, 
 
 " Yoiu: good friend, 
 
 (Signed) " George R. 
 
 " Hampton Court, Aug. 23, 1718." 
 
 The Spaniards, in a council of war, before the engagement, determined to 
 meet the British fleet in a regular order of battle, but on its nearer approach 
 soon abandoned their resolution. 
 
 Admiral Castaneta and Rear- Admiral Chacon made a brave defence ; the 
 former was wounded in both his legs. Rear- Admiral Camraock had given it as 
 his advice to remain at anchor in the road of Paradise, ranging their ships in 
 order of battle, in which case the British fleet, from the boldness of the shore 
 and the strength of the currents, would have had more difficulty in attacking 
 them : this advice, it appears, was not regarded. 
 
 By the activity of Sir G. Byng, in transporting German troops into Sicily, 
 the town and citadel of Messina were recovered, and the Spaniards made over- 
 tures for evacuating the island. The recovery of Sicily was followed in 1720 
 by the surrender of Sardinia. In the Spanish complaint upon this occasion, 
 published by authority, it is said that, 
 
 " On the 10th he (Admiral Byng) entered the Faro, with his whole squadron, 
 standing to the southward, our fleet being gone the same course before ; he held 
 on his way till he came into the height of Syracuse ; and on the 11th, coming up 
 with rear-guard of Marquis Mari, he committed downright hostility, and all 
 the actions of open war." (History of Modern Europe, Vol. v. p. 6. Annals 
 of the Reign of George First, Corbett's Narrative of the Expedition to Sicily.) 
 
 ADMIRAL VERNON AT PORTO-BELLO AND AT 
 
 CARTHAGENA. 
 
 In the year 1739, Admiral Vernon, with only six ships, destroyed the fort 
 and harbour of Porto-Bello in South America, and returned with scarcely the 
 loss of a man. 
 
16 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 In 1741 he failed in the attack on Carthagena, with a land force under 
 General Wentworth. 
 
 The next important battle upon record is, that of the brave, unfortunate, but 
 calumniated Mathews, with Monsieur La Court. 
 
 The reader is requested to bear in mind, that the plan of this work being an 
 endeavour to get at the general design, in the modes of attack or defence ; or 
 at the effects produced, or likely to he produced by such design, the cases or 
 situations of particular ships, loss of masts, &c., unless it lead to something of 
 more importance, will not generally he taken notice of. 
 
 The writer thinks it necessary to repeat this preliminary notice, from having 
 found by a late naval historian, the nature and object of the " Naval Battles," 
 was entirely misunderstood. 
 
 BATTLE OF ADMIRAL MATHEWS AND MONSIEUR 
 
 LA COURT. 
 
 In the Gazette dated Whitehall, March 21st, 1743-4, it is stated that ' Late 
 last night a courier arrived here with an account from Admiral Mathews, (dated 
 the 29th of February, O. S. in Mahon harbour) of what passed in the engage- 
 ment near Toulon, between his Majesty's squadron under his command, and the 
 combined fleets of France and Spain ; together with his proceedings subsequent 
 thereto.' 
 
 Plate I, Fig. 1, represents " the Namur, Admiral Mathews, who at one 
 o'clock, three hours after the signal for battle, having broke the line,* bore 
 down, accompanied only by the Norfolk and Marlborough, his second a-head and 
 a-stern, and began the engagement with the Royal Philip and his seconds." 
 
 " The van, under Mr. Rowley, not yet engaged, but watching carefully to 
 prevent the van of the enemy from getting the wind," and Mr. Lestock in the 
 rear, and to windward. 
 
 The second figure is all that appears necessary to show how an attack might 
 have been made, with better prospect of success ; but in this, as in the former 
 case, it is essential that the divisions of the second and third in command do 
 their duty. 
 
 * By this is meant standing out of his own line. 
 
ADMIRAL MATHEWS AND MONSIEUR LA COURT. 17 
 
 Mr. Clerk has displayed the want of conduct and spirit in this action through- 
 out five figures, in which it is apparent that the brave Mathews, and his two 
 seconds, with the Rear Admiral, and " gallant Mr. Hawke," in the Berwick, 
 were almost the only persons who behaved in a becoming manner : but, strange 
 to tell, Mathews was disgraced for breaking his own line, or rather for setting a 
 noble example to his fleet ! ! 
 
 Lestock was tried by a court-martial and acquitted ; Rowley was left in com- 
 mand of the fleet : several of the captains were dismissed the service. 
 
 In " A Narrative of the Proceedings of his Majesty's Fleet in the Mediterra- 
 nean, and the Combined Fleets of France and Spain, from the Year 1741 to 
 March 1744," are the following remarks, " By a Sea Officer :" 
 
 " Our centre attacked their rear, while the van of our fleet was left exposed to 
 nineteen ships, and our rear was a great way off. Undoubtedly this was like 
 aiming at a victory in one place, while there was a certainty of a defeat in an- 
 other. After all, if it was possible for thirteen ships, with a fire ship, to destroy 
 five in four hours, it was practicable for our center to have done it : but it is 
 certain that had the ships been stretched and closed into a line of battle, and 
 had all of them, from the van to the rear, had it in their power to have taken 
 up their adversaries successively, their duty could not have been mistaken ; on 
 the contrary, we seemed to be in a perfect maze, in a conflict between obeying 
 the signal for the line of battle, which was kept abroad (without the signal to 
 give chace, or to come to a closer engagement), and going down nearer the 
 enemy. 
 
 •' Notwithstanding there was little wind when the French doubled upon us, 
 which was lucky considering our confused disposition, yet they preferred saving 
 the Spanish squadron, the rear of their fleet, to the destruction of our van, 
 which they could have easily executed. 
 
 " On our part, as there cannot be reckoned more ships to have been engaged 
 than six sail, if we rank them according to the greatness of their losses, they 
 must be mentioned in the following manner : the Marlborough, Barfleur, Nor- 
 folk, Princess Caroline, Namur, and Berwick. 
 
 " Captain Cornewall had both his thighs shot off", and he had only life to ex- 
 press the agony he was in, by shaking his head at the surgeon below. This 
 gentleman (Captain Cornewall), who was the idol of the navy, and a great 
 ornament to it, expired becoming a man of his spirit.* He had been directed 
 
 * The following short dialogue passed between Admiral Mathews and Captain Cornewall, im- 
 mediately before the action, and sets in a clear light what they thought of the conduct of Lestock : 
 
 D 
 
18 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 by the Admiral, immediately before he bore down, to attack the Real, in which 
 he was determined either to conquer or die ; this was his inflexible resolution, 
 and he strictly adhered to it to his last gasp. Courage was far from being his 
 only endowment ; his genius and knowledge were equal to any task that could 
 be set him in his profession : few persons came up to him, and none surpassed 
 him. 
 
 " Captain Godfrey of the marines was killed. The hammocks, rails, and 
 quick-work having been knocked clear away fore and aft, the quarter deck 
 cleared three times, only one man remaining upon it, the few mariners that 
 were left alive, and not wounded, who, poor fellows, had been some time without 
 any manner of shelter, loading their firelocks upon their bellies and firing, were 
 ordered below to the great guns. The master, Mr. Robert Caton, had both 
 his legs shot off, and lived to get on shore to the hospital. He was a good able 
 master, an excellent stout mariner, and a sober bold officer. 
 
 " According to the Captain of the Poder's account, the first broadside which 
 the Berwick gave him killed twenty-seven men, and dismounted seven of the 
 lower deck guns ; but, on the French fleet doubling upon our van, the Berwick 
 was fain to make sail, leaving on board of the Poder her fourth lieutenant 
 and twenty men, who, in that situation, became prisoners. 
 
 '•' It was observed that the enemy aimed their shot at our masts : no doubt 
 dismasting is a material point ; but what helped to this was, their being to 
 leeward of us, with a considerable swell, which might possibly throw the shot 
 so high, without being always designed. 
 
 " To conclude, the fleet received more damage in the bad weather than from 
 the enemy ; some part of it occasioned from waring twice in two hours, in a 
 very dark, violent, stormy night ; and mistaking the signals made so soon one 
 after another." 
 
 One gallant officer is of opinion in this case, that " the better to prevent the 
 van of the enemy from going to the assistance of his centre and rear, it will 
 be advisable to engage him to leeward, and for the following reasons :" — namely, 
 " in the first place, that the van of the enemy, when engaged to windward, can 
 
 Mathews was walking his stern gallery, when he was saluted by Captain Cornewall thus: 
 Comewall — " Horn do you do, Sir ?" Admiral Mathews — " Do ! I can do nothing ; look at the 
 
 Vice-Admiral !" Comewall — " I have looked at him with concern.'' Mathews " By G d 
 
 every one of these ships will get away from me." Comewall — " / think if you attack these here 
 (meaning the Spaniards directly to leeward), you may stop them." Mathews—" Do you think 
 so; and will you second me?" — The Captain answering in the affirmative, they immmediately bore 
 down into action. 
 
ADMIRAL MATHEWS AND MONSIEUR LA COURT. 19 
 
 ware:, when it is unable to tack ; and secondly, because it has been frequently 
 seen, that the enemy has gone off to leeward, leaving our ships in too disabled 
 a state to follow him ; and thirdly, if you engage to windward, the enemy by 
 waring will be much sooner in action with your ships in the rear than he could 
 be by tacking, because he must then go round the sternmost of his own ships." 
 All this reasoning is perfectly sound, and the writer is gratified in having 
 excited a discussion upon the subject, the principal object he has in view : at the 
 same time he must observe, in defence of his " Mode of Attack Proposed," that 
 the British van is brought close down to windward of that of the enemy to 
 prevent what we are informed afterwards took place, namely, that the van of 
 the enemy " dovMed upon" ours. 
 
 In all the modes of attack proposed, they are by no means to be considered 
 arbitrary : officers are left to examine the positions with care, and to form or 
 select such as may appear the most eligible. 
 
 Another observes, that " No plan of attack in this case can be properly given, 
 unless the position of the whole fleet is shown ;* however, this appears to be the 
 best disposition possible, because fourteen are described as about to overthrow the 
 center and rear, consisting of only eleven, while the van will occupy the atten- 
 tion of that of the enemy, and keep it in check. 
 
 " I do not know that I agree with the officer whose opinion is previously 
 given, in the idea that being to leeward of your enemy is the best way to pre- 
 vent his escape. If the ship about to fly is less disabled than her opponent in 
 masts and rigging, and is to windward, she will get clear off; but if she is 
 forced to attempt her escape to leeward, her adversary can hobble after her before 
 the wind, while preparations are making to set all possible sail. 
 
 "If a ship is very much disabled, she can escape only before the wind, whe- 
 ther she has fought to windward or to leeward of her enemy." 
 
 " I by no means think Clerk's tactics perfect ; there are many errors in them, 
 and I doubt if they instruct how two fleets, wishing to fight each other, should 
 do so in the best possible way ; his plan only goes to show how to bring on a p^le- 
 mde action, which he thought the enemy always wished to avoid, under the idea 
 that to get close was sufficient to give us the victory. If I commanded an 
 English fleet opposed to a French one, I should not have the least objection to 
 
 * Where the whole number of ships cannot be given in the figures, the proportion of difference 
 in force is observed in the respective fleets. In this plate proportinate numbers have been taken 
 from both the fleets, leaving the comparative force nearly the same : besides, as in all large fleets, 
 the wrhole are seldom engaged, it is of less consequence to be particular. 
 
 D 2 
 
20 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 their cutting my line ; I should probably myself break all order of battle, in 
 order to prevent their cutting off any particular ships ; and then behold the old 
 story, I have them in action ship to ship. This is the great secret of our 
 tactics ; that of the French it to prevent it : that they succeeded in doing 
 so for many years is certain, and though Rodney might have found out 
 how to bring them to close battle without Clerk's assistance, yet Clerk was 
 the first to make public the plan, and therefore is entitled to the thanks of 
 the country. 
 
 " I fairly own to you, that I hope close action, ship to ship, will ever be the 
 first object of a British naval Commander in Chief" 
 
 This is bravely said by the gallant son of a noble chief, and let the British 
 navy say Amen ! 
 
 We are told that Mr. Mathews passed the short remainder of his days in 
 peaceable retirement, and died at last considered by most people as entitled to 
 their honourable compassion ; which is the tribute in degree next valuable to 
 regret and public applause. (For a more particular account of this action, see 
 Beaton's " Naval and MiHtary Memoirs," Vol i. p. 187, &c.) 
 
 The fate of Admiral Mathews seems to have been peculiarly hard, and to 
 have made a strong impression upon the mind of the unfortunate Byng ; who, 
 as will be seen, was extremely cautious, in bearing down upon the enemy, not to 
 risk any separation from his rear ; and, that a proper British spirit might again 
 be infused into the naval service, it was found necessary to shoot him, as the 
 witty Voltaire observed, " pour encourager les autres \" 
 
 It evidently appears that mistakes were committed through the defective state 
 of our signals, those in the " fighting " being at variance with others in the 
 *' sailing, instructions," then the only guides to the British fleet. By a misun- 
 derstanding arising from this source, Vice-Admiral Lestock brought-to in the 
 night, when he should have continued his course, or kept in line of battle ; by 
 which, on the morning of the action, he found himself with his division so far 
 removed from the body of the fleet, that the wind being light, he could not 
 reach his station in time to render assistance in the battle. The Poder struck 
 to the Berwick, but was afterwards retaken by the French van, abandoned, and 
 burnt. 
 
 A fire-ship had been sent against the Real by Admiral Matthews, but blew 
 up, and was sunk by Navarro before she could take effect ; he had sent a launch, 
 with intention to tow her to the Marlborough, then an unmanageable wreck upon 
 the water, and unprotected. Fire-ships seem to be doubtful engines of destruc- 
 
PL J TE I . 
 
 /•iy. / 
 
 Wind 
 
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 A- 
 
 ^ M- ^ M- 
 
 
 
 ^ i^ ^ 
 
 4, 
 
 ^ 
 
 h. 
 
 ^^^^^ 
 
 
 ^ S-^^ ^ 
 
 ±. 
 
 F Sj S 
 
 Ji. 
 
 F & ,s- 
 
 X 
 
 Fie/. ?. 
 
 
 i 1 
 
 
 M 
 
 i I i 
 
 ^ 1 I.--. 
 •• ii'"" 
 
 ^ 
 
 i i 
 
 i i i i M 
 
 
MATHEWS AND LA COURT. 21 
 
 tion, and frequently endanger friends as well as foes ; on this account they are 
 perhaps better dispensed with. In latter times, excepting in harbours, and 
 against the materiel of war, they have been laid aside.* 
 
 Admiral Mathews, at eight o'clock in the evening, shifted his flag to the 
 Russell, the Namur having suffered very materially in the battle. 
 
 MATHEWS AND LA COURT. 
 
 Plate I, Fig. 1, represents Clerk's second position, in which a few ships of 
 the centre only are engaged. 
 
 British, 31 ships of the line, and two 50 gun ships, 
 
 French and Spanish, 28 ships, and four frigates. 
 
 Fig. 2, represents the mode of attack proposed. The centre and rear of the 
 British fleet bear down upon the centre and rear of the enemy, and engage them 
 to leeward, while the van bring the van of the enemy to close action to wind- 
 ward ; to prevent its making any movement in support of its centre and rear. 
 
 The unappropriated ships support their friends engaged. 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 " If the enemy make no endeavour to impede your bringing him to close 
 action in your own way, it matters little if you engage to windward or to lee- 
 ward ; much must be left to unavoidable circumstances ; having witnessed the 
 best exertions to pass through the enemy's Hne from to windward defeated, 
 although the ultimate object was attained in bringing on a close action." 
 
 * " Steam fire-ships, or steam-vessels to tow fire-ships, may be in use next war." 
 
22 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 ANSON AND DE LA JONQUIERE. 
 Mays, 1747. 
 
 The pursuit and defeat of M. de la Jonquiere by Admiral Anson, and of 
 M. de L'Etendiere, by Hawke ; as well as that of De la Clue, by Boscawen, 
 although they offer nothing of a tactical nature, should by no means be over- 
 looked. They contributed not a little to the national glory, and tend to per- 
 petuate the names of men illustrious in their time ; and who by their zeal and 
 ability upon these occasions added many ships of war to the British navy. 
 
 Extract taken from the Supplement to the London Gazette. 
 
 " Admiralty OflBce, May 16. 
 
 " Captain Denis, of his Majesty's ship Centurion, arrived this day with an 
 express from Vice-Admiral Anson, giving an account that, on the 3d instant 
 the squadron under his command, consisting of the following ships," [here 
 follows a list of their names, &c.J " being off Cape Finisterre, which bore S. E., 
 distant twenty-four leagues, fell in with a French fleet, consisting of thirty- 
 nine ships ; nine of which shortened sail, and were drawing into a line of battle, 
 when the rest, appearing to be under their convoy, made all sail to the 
 westward." 
 
 It is not necessary closely to follow this long narrative, but to select such parts 
 of it only as wiU afford us the most direct and important information. 
 
 Seeing it was the intention of the enemy to escape, if possible, by cover of 
 the night. Admiral Anson made the signal to chase and engage as the ships 
 came up, without regard to established order. By this method, the Centurion, 
 Namur, Defiance, and Windsor, soon brought the sternmost ships to close 
 action, and having disabled them, left them to the care of others coming up, 
 and went on to those further a-head. 
 
 The Yarmouth, Devonshire, Rear Admiral Warren, and Prince George, 
 having got also into action, the latter being close alongside of the French 
 Invincible, of seventy-four guns ; all the ships in the enemy's rear struck their 
 colours, when the Vice Admiral detached the Monmouth, Yarmouth, and 
 Nottingham, to pursue the convoy ; having before sent the Falcon sloop to keep 
 sight of them, and to make known their position and motions to the Commander 
 in Chief. 
 
HAWKE AND M. DE L'ETENDIERE. 23 
 
 The superiority of force was greatly in favour of the British fleet ; but unless 
 it had been skilfully, promptly, and bravely applied, little success might have 
 been reaped from it. By the decisive measures of the Admiral, so ably seconded 
 by the Rear Admiral and his captains, all the ships of war fell into the hands 
 of the British Admiral. 
 
 The gallant and estimable Captain Grenville, of the Defiance, fell upon this 
 occasion ; and Captain Boscawen was wounded in the shoulder by a musket ball. 
 La Jonquiere was shot under the blade-bone of both his shoulders ; one of his 
 captains was killed, and another lost a leg. 
 
 The following is a statement of the comparative force. British : one of ninety 
 guns, one of seventy-four, one of sixty-six, three of sixty-four, eight of sixty 
 and fifty, and one of forty. French, one of seventy-four guns, one of sixty- 
 six, four of from fifty-six to forty- four, and four of from thirty to twenty. 
 
 Through a private correspondent, we are further informed, that the Bristol, 
 the Hon. Captain Montague, and Pembroke, Captain Fincher, were active com- 
 petitors for fame on this day. 
 
 The Bristol having got up to the Invincible, and brought her to action, 
 the Pembroke attempted to get between them, desiring the captain of the Bris- 
 tol to put his helm a starboard, or he should be on board of him ; to this Captain 
 Montague replied, " Run on board and be d — d, neither you nor any other man 
 shall come between me and my enemy." 
 
 Upon the coming up of the Prince George, the ship of the Vice Admiral, 
 the Bristol, made sail to the Diamant of fifty-six guns, which, after a desperate 
 resistance, and great slaughter, surrendered. — (See the Gentleman's Maga- 
 zine, for May, 1747.) 
 
 HAWKE AND M. DE L'ETENDIERE. 
 
 In the " Memoirs of Lord Hawke," in the " Lives of the Admirals," is an 
 account of an action and capture, by that great officer, of five ships of the line 
 and a fifty gun ship, from the French under De L'Etendiere, off Cape Finis- 
 terre. The exact force of either squadron is not mentioned;* the chase was 
 arduous, and the battle warm ; but the object of the French Admiral, having a 
 large convoy under his care, appeared to be to escape if he could. A few 
 extracts from Admiral Hawke's letter are given, to show the zeal and gallantry 
 
 * The force on both sides may be found in Schomberg's " Naval Chronology," Vol. iv. p. 52. 
 
24 WAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 he ilisplayed in the attack ; and also to prove to us the great importance of pro- 
 tecting the wheel,* as much as possible, and the men who are stationed at it. 
 
 The meeting took place on the 14th Oct. 1747.— (See " Campbell's Admirals," 
 Vol. vi. p. 432.) 
 
 " Finding we lost time in forming our line, while the enemy was standing 
 away from us, at eleven made the signal for the whole squadron to chase. Half 
 an hour after, observing our headmost ships to be a proper distance, I made the 
 signal to engage, which was immediately obeyed. The Lion and Princess 
 Louisa began the engagement, and were followed by the rest of the squadron as 
 they could come up, and went from rear to van. The enemy having the weather- 
 gage of us, and a smart and constant fire being kept up on both sides, the 
 smoke prevented my seeing the number of the enemy, or what happened on 
 either side for some time. In passing on to the first ship we could get near, we 
 received many fires at a distance, till we came close to the Seveme, of fifty guns, 
 whom we soon silenced, and left to be taken up by the frigates a-stern. Then 
 perceiving the Eagle, and Edinburgh, who had lost her fore-top-mast, engaged* 
 we kept our wind as close as possible, in order to assist them. This attempt of 
 ours was frustrated by the Eagle, falling twice on board us, having had her 
 wheel shot to pieces, and all her men at it killed, and all her braces and 
 bowlines gone. This drove us to leeward, and prevented our attacking 
 Le Monarque, of seventy-four, and the Tonnant of eighty guns, within any 
 distance to do execution : however, we attempted both, especially the latter. 
 While we were engaged with her, the breechings of all our lower deck guns 
 broke, and the guns flew fore and aft, which obliged us to shoot a-head, for our 
 upper and quarter-deck guns could not reach her. Captain Harland, in the 
 Tilbury, observing that she fired single guns at us in order to dismast us, stood 
 on the other tack between her and the Devonshire, and gave her a very smart 
 fire. By the time the new breechings were all seized, I was got almost alongside 
 the Trident, of sixty-four guns, whom I engaged as soon as possible, and silenced 
 by as brisk a fire as I could make. 
 
 " Seeing some our ships at that time not so closely engaged as I could have 
 
 * The Hon. Keith Stewart (uncle of the present Earl of Galloway,) when Captain of the old 
 " Cambridge" of eighty guns, without a poop, barricaded the wheel by a light wooden frame work 
 at the sides and back part, to which were lashed the cots and hammocks of the officers ; this 
 afforded considerable shelter in the engagement with the combined fleets in 1782. In the " Cor- 
 respondence" of Lord Collingwood, lately published, is the following remark by that distinguished 
 officer : — " Thornborough is here, with the poopless Royal Sovereign. What ingenious contrivances 
 they have in England to spoil the ships ! but were those great artists to Jighl them, they would be 
 glad of a poop." (Letter to Sir A. Ball, p. 242.) 
 
HAWKE AND DE L'ETENDIERE. 52 
 
 wished, and not being able well to distinguish who they were, I flung out the 
 signal for a close engagement. Soon after I got alongside, within musket 
 shot of the Terrible, of seventy-four guns, and 700 men. Near seven at night 
 she called out for quarter. 
 
 " Thus far I have been particular with regard to the share the Devonshire 
 bore in the action of the day. 
 
 " Having observed that six of the enemy's ships had struck, and it being 
 very dark, and our ships dispersed, I thought it best to bring-to for that 
 night ; and seeing a great firing a long way a-stem of me, I was in hopes 
 to have seen more of the enemy's ships taken in the morning ; but, instead 
 of that, I received the melancholy account of Captain Saumarez being killed, 
 and that the Tonnant had escaped in the night by the assistance of the 
 Intrepide, who, by having the wind of our ships, had received no damage that 
 I could perceive. 
 
 " As the enemy's ships were large, except the Severne, they took a great deal 
 of drubbing, and lost all their masts, except two, who had their fore-masts left ; 
 this has obliged me to lie-by these two days past in order to put them in a con- 
 dition to be brought into port, as well as our own, who have suffered greatly. — 
 Of the ships captured, three were of seventy-four guns, two of sixty-four, and 
 one of fifty ; manned with 3900 men." 
 
 The British fleet, upon this occasion, was considerably superior to that of the 
 enemy, namely, fourteen sail in the line to eight ; but the latter were composed 
 of the heaviest ships ; one of seventy-four guns being the largest in the British 
 squadron ; that of the Admiral mounting but sixty-six, and two were of fifty 
 guns. 
 
 We cannot but admire the spirit with which the Admiral pursued his object, 
 leaving the ships, as he had beaten them, to be taken charge of by others ; in 
 this manner it appears that three fell to the Admiral's share alone. The slaugh- 
 ter was great on the part of the French, showing no deficiency in our naval 
 gunnery, as but two masts were left standing in the French squadron, and two 
 only of their ships of war escaped. 
 
 It was for this service the gallant Hawke was created a Knight of the Bath, 
 and that the word " drubhing" * was, as the writer of Campbell's Admirals in- 
 forms us, " promoted" into the English language. (See note, page 435, in the 
 Memoirs of Lord Hawke.) 
 
 The Admiral's letter is also distinguished from almost every other upon similar 
 
 * The word drubbing is used by the author of Httdibras. 
 
 E 
 
26 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Qccasions, by boldly accusing one of his Captains (Fox) of neglect of duty, and 
 requesting that his conduct may undergo inquiry by Court Martial. 
 . This appears to be a manly mode of proceeding, worthy of imitation, by which 
 the guilty are most likely to meet their desert, and none are left to suffer by 
 calumny, or slander. 
 
 It was the fate of this officer to fall under suspicion through the defect of 
 signals ; and although he had fought and captured a, ship of equal force, and 
 brought another to, action, he was sentenced to be dismissed his ship, so tenar 
 cious. were theylin those da,ys of any thing like equivocal conduct in battle. He 
 died a superannuated Admiral. (See Schomberg's Chronology, vol. i. p. 244.) 
 At this period, it appears, councils of war were held in the navy, but since hap- 
 pily discontiuued. 
 
 In this battle the British navy lost one of its brightest ornaments in the death 
 of Captain Philip de Saumarez, of the Nottingham. Owing to the failure of 
 sovae others, which is shown in the inquiry that followed, more than a single 
 share of the %hting fell to his lot ; unsupported, he was considerably separated 
 •from the rest of the fleet, and the ships with which he was engaged escaped. 
 An interesting memoir of this officer is to be found in the 31st volume of the 
 Naval Chronicle, and a description of the monument and inscription in West- 
 minster Abbey, in volumes 3d and 30th. 
 
 The following are extracts from private sources (English and French), of the 
 jengagement which has just been related ; and though it appears that the French- 
 man speaks of the distance kept by the British ships as the cause of rendering 
 the use of small arms iu some cases unnecessary, it should not be forgotten that 
 the French squadron being to windward had it in its power to come as close as it 
 thought proper, while the British fleet was obliged to make ^se of every exer- 
 tion to bring them to action, upon any terms. 
 
 " His Majesty's ship Yarmouth, Portsmouth Harbour. 
 " Though the YarHiouth, without dispute, had as great a share as any ship 
 of the fleet, if not a greater, in the engagement with the French, October 14, 
 yet in all the accounts I have seen she is not so much as mentioned, as if no 
 such ship had been there. It is something surprising that Admiral Hawke should 
 see and mention in his long account the behaviour of the Lion, Louisa, Eagle, 
 and Tilbury, and yet could discover nothing of the extraordinary courage arid 
 conductof Captain Saunders- in the Yarmouth, who lay two hours and a half 
 close engaged with the Neptune, a seventy gun ship, with 700 men, and never 
 quitted her till she struck, althQUgh the Monarchy a seventy-,four gun ship, who 
 
HAWKE AND DE L'ETENPIERE. 27 
 
 gti'uckto lis likewise^ lay upon oiir bdw for some tiriie, with ailother of the ene- 
 my's ships upbn bur stern. When the Neptune struck, after killing them 100 
 men, and wounding 140, she was so close to us that our men jumped into her ; 
 and I'lotwithstaiiding so long warm work, and his ship much disabled in masts 
 and riggingj with twenty-two nien killed aiid seventy wounded, his courage did 
 not cool here; he could not with patience see the French Admiral and the In- 
 trepide, a seventy-four gun ship, getting away, and none of our ships after them ; 
 nor could he think of preferring his own security to the glory and interest of his 
 country, hut ardently wished to go after them, and proposed it to Gapt. Saumarez,) 
 in the Nottingham, and Captain Rodney in the Eagle,- who were within hail of. 
 us; but Captain Satiraarez unfortunately being killed by the first fire of the 
 enemy, the Nottingham hauled her wind, and did no more service; and the 
 Eagle ckrde not nigh enough to do aiiy ; so that the Yarmouth had to deal with 
 both of the enemy's ships for some time, till at length they got out of reach of 
 our guns. I think so much bravery and noble spirit ought not to lie in oblivion. 
 I shall only observe from the two late battles which we have had with the French, 
 that, fighting them close, we shall constantly get the better of them, which is 
 confirmed in the behaviour of the Neptune's men, who all quitted the upper 
 deck and ran below when the Yarmouth came near her ; and that at a distance, 
 hy the superior skill of their gunnery, and the length of their guns, they will 
 always getffotn us. " Yours, &c." 
 
 French Account of L'Etendiere's Action, hy Authority. 
 
 "We sailed together from the Isle of Aix on Tuesday, October 17, (6th) 
 with ah E.N.E. wind, which ceasing, we were obliged to anchor in the Road of 
 Rochelle, from whence: we sailed next morning with 252 merchant ships. As 
 all the motions of a large fleet are slow, we did not get' out till five in the even- 
 ing. • M. de L'Etendiere directed his course off Rochebonues to get into the 
 latitude of Belleisle. The wind favouring, we were on the 21st W. of that isle 
 24 leagues. That day we saw two ships, one large, which after reconnoitring 
 us at two leagues distance, sailed to the south. On the 23th, (14th) we saw iu 
 the horizon 20 sail making swiftly after us, and took them for some of bur own 
 fleet ; it happening daily, that in spite of all our vigilance, niany ships of our 
 convoy in this night lose company to sail more at liberty. We examined these 
 ships, but they being just iu our track, and presenting only their heads, we 
 could form no judgment of their force. We were not sure they were enemies 
 till one of them came alongside of us and fired a gun, under English colours. 
 
 E 2 
 
28 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 That instant M. de L'Etendiere ordered the signal for the trade to make the 
 best of their way, and that for the order of battle to the King's ships, who 
 formed between the merchantmen and the enemy. 
 
 " It was of great consequence that this line should form suddenly ; but the 
 preservation of the merchant ships being the principal object, it was necessary 
 to leave intervals, so that before 252 vessels could pass through, a considerable 
 time elapsed, during which the enemy made their dispositions. 
 
 " All the fleet being passed, and sailing N.N.W., we tacked and stood with 
 our heads to the S. W., the wind S. E. ; we were not well in order when the 
 rear-guard was attacked a little before noon. M. de L'Etendiere made the sig- 
 nal for closing the line, and the combat in a short space of time became general. 
 The enemy's main view seemed to be to disable us, in which they perfectly suc- 
 ceeded, discharging with every ball a prodigious quantity of case shot. We 
 could not answer them in this manner, ill custom having established it as a rule, 
 to allow only four charges of that sort for every gun, which were soon consumed. 
 The cannonade lasted three hours before any thing remarkable happened ; but 
 then we saw the Fougueux without her fore-top-mast : this ship and the Neptune 
 having been attacked by five, the Seveme by two, of which the English Admi- 
 ral was one; the Monarque by two, the Tonnant by three: those of the van- 
 guard having yet only four upon three. M. de L'Etendiere had made the signal 
 for the said vanguard to slacken sail. We beat down the fore-top-mast of the 
 ship that attacked us first (the Edinburgh), and the fore-top-sail of one of those 
 (the Eagle) on the starboard side was fallen upon the foremast. 'Tis true, by 
 this time we were very ill treated ; our foremast was down (this is wrong*), and 
 by its fall prevented some of our guns from firing, which we remedied as soon as 
 possible, by cutting away all that incumbered it. We had already 250 shot in 
 our main-sail and mizen : all our masts and yards were shot through in several 
 places, and we could no longer work the ship. 
 
 " At four o'clock we saw the Neptune, as smooth as an open boat, not a mast 
 standing, obliged to strike ; and soon after, the Monarque also without main or 
 mizen. The Fougueux and the Severne surrendered also at the same time ; the 
 little squadron that fired alternately upon us in the Tonnant, none of which 
 staid aside of us above fifteen minutes at a time, was augmented to five. The 
 Commandant at last honoured us with his company, but his visit was short ;, he 
 received two of our broadsides, and then went to the succour of seven of his own 
 ships which were engaged with our three of the vanguard. M. de Vaudreuil 
 
 * This remark is inserted by an English officer who was present. 
 
HAWKE AND DE L'ETENDIERE. 29 
 
 then tacked about in the Intrepide towards us, and passed through the midst of 
 all these ships, firing on both sides. The Trident and Terrible attempted to 
 follow his example, by tacking also; but they were so disabled, that it was 
 impossible for them to execute their design. We saw at sun-set the Trident, 
 having been engaged for some time against five, make up to the Commandant, 
 and after giving him a broadside, surrender. 
 
 " Then six of the enemy fell upon the Terrible, who at half after* continued 
 to make a brisk fire ; night prevented our seeing what followed, but her silence 
 afterwards makes us also judge that she was overpowered. 
 
 " As the English have suffered very much, as well as the captured ships, it 
 will require some days to put them in a sailing condition ; so that the fleet will 
 have three or four days to get away, with a fair wind ; and if, as we hope, they 
 have the good luck to escape, we shall be partly comforted for the loss of our 
 ships of war, which devoted themselves to the sacrifice for the support of 
 commerce. A little more equality had put us out of danger of insult, &c. &c. 
 
 " To return to what concerns ourselves in the Tonnant : the moment the 
 Intrepide joined us, she got under our stern, and we continued fighting together 
 for half an hour with the five ships that environed us, and which fell back behind 
 our rear ship that sailed after us. We were then left quiet till near eight, when 
 three fresh ships (Eagle, Yarmouth, Nottingham), being those said to have 
 joined the enemy that evening, came and fired upon us : their firing ceased in less 
 than an hour, and they retired also. A little before, M. L'Etendiere, who had 
 seen six ships subdued, his own extremely impaired, and expecting every 
 moment that his main-mast would fall, being held up only with wounded tackle, 
 sailed to the westward, and at midnight tacked to the N. W. and at four in the 
 afternoon to the north ; not so much with a view of escaping by these different 
 routes, which we thought scarce possible, but in order to disperse the enemy, for 
 the fleet to get to a distance. We made the dispositions in the mean while to 
 give them a good reception in the morning, and to make them pay dearly for the 
 taking our two last ships.. 
 
 " Our astonishment was great, when at day-break we saw only three ships at 
 a vast distance. 
 
 " This battle was fought eighty-eight L. N. of Cape Finisterre. We fired in 
 the Tonnant, 1,842 cannon shot, and 10,000 ball cartridge ; the distance at which 
 many of the ships chose to engage us, in order to avoid being hurt, did not 
 always permit us to use our small arms. We stood 4,000 of the enemy's cannon 
 
 * Query, after sun-set? 
 
30 NAVAL battles: 
 
 shot, but theseawhicli was rdugh caused a gteait part to riiiss'; notwithstanding 
 ive received 800 in our masts and rigging ; 134' shot of lower tier guns were told 
 in our sides, oif which only one came through. 
 
 . " It was owing to our hating a ship extremely well timbered and put together, 
 that our loss was so small, for so long and so sharp an engagement. 
 
 " It consisted of only 100 men killed and wounded. The casks of provision; 
 on the seeoiid deck saved abundance of people.* 
 
 " Sixteen different ships^^engaged us alternately ', the Commandant, from whom 
 we expected the worst treatment, staid by us the least of any one. (Mem. he 
 carried away his breechings.) Five or six English Captains distinguished them- 
 SelveSj chiefly he who' commanded the headmost ship of the vanguard (Scot of 
 the Lidn, or Watson of the Louisa), Our officers and men in all our ships fought 
 with a couragfe and valour worthy of more happy success," &c. 
 
 iSxtract of a Letter jfrom the Princess Louisa, at sea, October l6th, 1747. '^ 
 
 " Our Admiral and most of our laigest ships being greatly to leeward, and 
 a-sternof us, except the Defiance, Monmouth, Lion, and Tilbury ; he first made 
 a signal to form a line a-head, but in less than a quarter of an hour, being near 
 eleven o'clock, altered it to chase and engage ; though I am pretty certain, 
 we, with some of the ships above' mentioned, could have weathered the' enemy. 
 During this interval, the Lion, bearing more away than we, began the fight, 
 though the French fired first : — ^thils was a quarter before twelve. 
 
 " It was our turn next, and we fairly ran the gauntlet: for coming up witlr 
 the enemy's sternmost ship of seventy-four guns, within pistol shot, gave her^ 
 and received, three broadsides ; then stood on for the enemy's headmost shipsj 
 engaging as we past them. As we got a-head the wind shifted three or four 
 points, which obliged us to tack and make more sail by haiding our main tack on 
 board; at the same time the' French headmost ships clung to the wind, which 
 was a circumstance in our favour, for they had it in their power to come down 
 upon us, being. then partly alone;, however, in order to double their van, our 
 fire ceased above an hour ; in which time we shot so far a-head, ihat we tacked 
 and gained the wind of the enemy, 
 
 " We then went down and engaged the Terrible very close, till our Admiral 
 in the Devonshire came up, at which time we were situated on her weather-bow, 
 very near.: but as om- Admiral was very dose to her on herleeiquarter, we were 
 
 * Encumbering the decks with provisions is a ptactiee Ettle known in the British navy. 
 
HAWKB AND DE L'ETENDIERE. 31 
 
 afraid to make use of that advantage. Half an hour after he engaged her, she 
 struck to him, and so did some others before, as he passed by them ; and indeed it 
 was high time, for it was now near six o'clock, and so dark we could not do much 
 more, No ships behaved better than the enemy's, or sold their liberties dearer. 
 The Admiral, after the Terrible struck, brought to. At about eight o'clock we 
 h,e^r4 and saw the flashes of guns on our lee-quarter, which appeared the next 
 morning to be the Yarm<?uth, Eagle, and Nottingham, engaging the Tonnant 
 and Intrepide, which by the favour of the night, and the shattered condition our 
 ships were in. Captain Saumarez in the Nottingham being killed, got off. The 
 frigate, after giving us a broadside at the beginning, followed the convoy. No 
 mortal could be wore cool apd intrepid than our Captain duriag the whole of the 
 day : I must do him the justice, though I am a late acquaintance, &c. We 
 have twelve killed and sixty-two wounded. At day-break, the sight was pleasing 
 though horrid ; for nevqr were ships in such a condition, S^c. One of the French 
 
 said to have lost 200 men, and I believe it is the Severne : the smallest ship, 
 which we have in tow lost upwards of sixty killed and seventy wounded. The 
 Louisa had all her standing masts shot, and almost all the yards and booms in 
 the ship wounded. We are likewise wounded in many places ; — sixty shot 
 through the forcrtop-sail alone. I believe every ship in our fleet is damaged 
 much the same, except one ship, very well known, commanded by Sir Thomas 
 Whalebones ; who lost one poor boy and had one port wounded. Three of the 
 French ships would have struck an hour sooner than they did, had they not 
 waited for our Adniiral, to pay him the compliment. Though our number of 
 ships and guns were superior to the enemj, their greater weight of metal and 
 number of men made very little difference }?fstvfe,en us. 
 
 " All their ship^, I am informed,, carried forty-two-pounders, except the 
 Severne. — Qur four best ships ^ carried .thirty-two, and all the rest only 
 twentyrfour." 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 " Hawke's letter leads to a remark t have often made ; that Naval Commanders 
 in Chief, iu their official accounts,- dwell too much on the proceedings of their 
 own flag-ships, and forget that* it is the manoeuvre of the- fleettthey- should 
 describe: Hawke had' more excuse, however, than others for partioulMixiHg the 
 services of his own shi]^; — 'What Became of the oonvoy-of the- enemy f surely it 
 did not escape ?" 
 
32 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 KNOWLES AND REGGIO. 
 
 In the year 1748, Rear Admiral Knowles fell in with and engaged a Spanish 
 squadron under Admiral Reggio, of equal force (seven ships); and was reprimanded 
 by the sentence of a court martial, for not carrying his squadron into action 
 in a proper manner ; as it appeared upon the trial, that he could have attacked 
 it with six instead of four of his ships ; and for not shifting his flag when the 
 Cornwall was disabled. 
 
 The battle was ably supported on both sides, and the Conquestador fell into 
 the hands of the British Admiral ; the Africa, another Spaniard, was destroyed, 
 to prevent her sharing the same fate. 
 
 The sentence of the court martial is remarkable, but not the slightest 
 imputation was thrown upon the Admiral's courage. (See Beatson's " Naval 
 and Military Memoirs," vol. i. p. 383, 385.) 
 
 The writer has since been favoured with the following private account of this 
 action ; and with a Spanish account, which is at the close of it. 
 
 Extract of a Letter from H, M. S, Lenox, Captain Holmes, arrived at 
 
 Spithead, November Q,Srd, 1748. 
 
 " We sailed from Jamaica, August 25th, with convoy for England, and were 
 obliged to run through the Florida Gulph. The 29th of September, in the 
 morning, we spied seven sail of large ships bearing down upon us ; which proving 
 to be Spanish men of war, our Captain made the signal for the convoy to provide 
 for their safety ; we then stood towards the enemy until it was almost dark, when 
 it was prudent to provide for our own safety, having near 200,000/. on board. 
 We had hopes of meeting with Admiral Knowles, who was off Tortuda Bank, 
 with six ships, to intercept the Spanish Plate fleet from Vera Cruz. We joined 
 him the next morning, and informed him of what had happened. We made 
 sail to meet them, and October 1 st came up with the Dons. The Tilbury led the 
 van, the Strafford next, and the Lenox in the third place : Admiral Knowles in 
 the Cornwall, perceiving by the enemy's line that the Spanish Vice Admiral must 
 fall to our share, bid us fall astern of him, that the two Commanders might engage 
 each other ; we did accordingly, and so became the fourth ship, the Warwick 
 next, and the Canterbury last. The enemy having at this time their frigates oujfc 
 of the line, the Oxford, our smallest ship, was also ordered out. At a little past 
 twelve, the Spaniards began to fire, but at too great a distance to do execution ; 
 
KNOWLES AND REGGIO. 33 
 
 soon after, the Admiral made the signal for the Tilbury to bear down nearer the 
 enemy ; but that not being complied with, he fired a shot or two at her. However, 
 he himself in the Cornwall edged down close upon the Spanish Vice Admiral ; 
 we did the same, being very near him ; when all hands played away, except the 
 Warwick and Canterbury, who were so far astern that they could not come up ; 
 nor did they fire a shot for upwards of two hours. You will perceive we were 
 four upon six, and, what added to our disadvantage, about an hour after the action 
 began, the Cornwall had her main-top-mast shot away, and other damage, which 
 occasioned her to haul out of the line, and she never came into it again. We 
 then shot up into her place abreast of the Spanish Admiral, where we had warm 
 work, three of the enemy's ships playing on us for an hour ; when the Warwick 
 and Canterbury came up very seasonably to our assistance. At this juncture, one 
 of the Spaniards was fairly beaten out of the line, as well as the Cornwall out of 
 ours. Admiral Knowles having refitted, bore down upon the Spanish disabled 
 ship, and took her with no resistance. The action was now closer and hotter 
 than ever, and the Spaniards being sick of it, edged away for the Havannah, it 
 being but a little way from them ; and we bore up after, yard-arm and yard-arm. 
 The enemy bearing more away, threw us partly astern of them, when we raked 
 the Spanish Vice Admiral, giving him several broadsides. About nine o'clock, 
 not being able to distinguish one ship from another, we left off. The Spanish 
 Admiral, having lost his main and fore-mast, ran ashore ; the rest, though greatly 
 disabled, got into port ; off which we remained with the Conquestador our prize, 
 until the ships were rigged, and then we stood towards the Spanish Vice 
 Admiral's ship, on shore. On our approach, he set fire to her, and in an hour she 
 blew up. English tars had never more reason to blame fortune, than now ; for if 
 she had favoured us with only two hours' day-light more, we should have taken or 
 destroyed the whole Spanish squadron, and finer ships were never built." 
 
 The following Extract is from an Account of this Affair given in the Hague 
 Gazette, April 16, 1749, detailing the Movements of the Spanish Admiral. 
 
 " The 12th at day-break he descried the enemy, consisting of seven ships of 
 war, and astern of them two large ships taking care of the convoy. He 
 immediately formed his line of battle, and waited for Admiral Knowles, who, 
 notwithstanding he had the wind, did not appear in haste to make use of that 
 advantage ; however, at length he did, and the action began at two o'clock in the 
 afternoon, with a brisk fire on both sides. Admiral Knowles having singled out 
 
 F 
 
34 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Admiral Reggio, and having got within pistol shot, he discharged all his artil- 
 lery and musquetry at him, with eight cohorns ; but he was so warmly received 
 by the Spanish Admiral, that in something more than half an hour he was 
 obliged to fall astern of his own squadron, with the loss of his main-top-mast, 
 and the yard shot in two. So fine a beginning seemed to promise Admiral 
 Reggio a complete victory ; and he probably would have made it so, notwith- 
 standing the enemy's superiority in ships and guns, had not the Conquestador 
 had her main-top-sail-tyes shot, by which, after the example of Admiral Knowles, 
 she dropped astern of the Spanish squadron, but not in safety ; for Admiral 
 Knowles, when he had got the assistance of another ship, came to attack her. 
 The action was long and bloody ; and the second Captain, who defended her 
 well, did not surrender till the granade-shells had set her on fire three times : 
 the other ships continued the action until eight in the evening, when they were 
 separated by the darkness of the night. After this obstinate engagement, the 
 ship of Admiral Reggio remained master of the field of battle, having no ship to 
 engage, with the loss of all his masts, and with his sprit-sail anchored in the 
 Gulph of Viviras,* where he was surprised by the English squadron, and set 
 fire to his own ship. The conduct of Admiral Reggio cannot be too much 
 applauded," &c. &c. 
 
 In the sentence of the court martial upon Admiral Knowles for his conduct 
 on this occasion, it is declared that the Court " were unanimously of opinion " 
 that he ought to have shifted his flag when the Cornwall was disabled ; but that 
 it arose from mistake, and not from any want of zeal or personal courage. The 
 Court also unanimously condemn him for not bringing his ships into action, in 
 closer order, for which he is unanimously adjudged to fall under part the 14th 
 Article of War, implying Negligence ; and therefore reprimand him. In every 
 part of this sentence it is seen that the opinion of every individual member of 
 the Court is disclosed, which, however authorised by custom in some cases, is a 
 violation of their oatb. The Court consisted of eight members : William 
 Rowley, John Forbes, and Edward Hawke, were of the number. 
 
 Several other trials followed in consequence of this, but of no particular 
 importance. Some duels were fought on this subject, and one Captain (Innes) 
 was killed. Knowles and Holmes fought ; and four other challenges were sent 
 to the Admiral, when the King interfered. 
 
 * The name of the place is indistinctly given. 
 
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 ^ -^t 
 
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 F^n. 
 
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 2) 
 
 >^^ 
 
 'V'. 
 
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 A^S^\ F >^ ^ ^^Ss ^^^Sss 
 
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 Fii/. 3. 
 
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ADMIRAL BYNG'S ACTION. 35 
 
 ADMIRAL BYNG'S* ACTION. 
 1756. 
 
 The next in order appears the engagement of Admiral Byng ; a few extracts 
 from his letter are here given : 
 
 " I called in the cruizers, and when they had joined me I tacked towards the 
 enemy, and formed the line a-head. I found the French were preparing theirs 
 to leeward, having unsuccessfully endeavoured to weather me. They were twelve 
 large ships of the line and five frigates. 
 
 " As soon as I judged the rear of our fleet to be the length of their van, we 
 tacked together, and immediately made the signals for the ships that led to 
 lead large ; and for the Deptford to quit the line, that ours might become equal 
 with theirs. At two I made, the signal to engage, as I found it was the surest 
 method of ordering every ship to close down on the one that fell to their lot ? 
 and here I must express my great satisfaction at the very gallant manner in which 
 the Rear Admiral (West) set the example in the van, by instantly bearing down 
 on the ships he was to engage with his second, and who occasioned one of the 
 French ships to begin the engagement, which they did by raking ours as they 
 went down. 
 
 " I bore down on the ship that lay opposite to me, and began to engage him 
 after having received their fire for some time in going down." 
 
 " The Intrepid unfortunately in the very beginning had his fore-top-mast 
 shot away, and as that hung on his fore-sail, and backed it, he had no command 
 of his ship ; his fore-tack and all his braces being cut at the same time ; so that 
 he drove on the next ship to him, and obliged that, and the ships a-head of me, 
 to throw all back." 
 
 " This obliged me to do so for some minutes, though not before we had drove 
 our adversary out of the line ; who put before the wind, and had several shot 
 fired at him from his own Admiral," &c. &c. 
 
 " I found the enemy edged away constantly ; and as they went three feet to 
 our one, they would never permit our closing with them, but took the advantage 
 of destroying our rigging," &c. &c. 
 
 Plate II, Figure 1, describes the position of the two fleets about one p. m. ; 
 Fig. 2, the van bearing down to engage ; and Fig. 3, a mode of attack 
 proposed ; which appears all that it is necessary to say upon this subject. Mr. 
 Clerk has displayed the misconduct and misfortune of this day through five figures. 
 
 * The Honourable John Byng, fourth son of Sir George Byng, Viscount Torrington. 
 
 F 2 
 
36 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 It would seem advisable, that in the movements of fleets upon all important 
 occasions, a flag-officer should lead ; not only from what might naturally be 
 expected by the authority of his example, but probably as being best informed of 
 the intentions of the Commander in Chief Were this practice more generally 
 adopted, failures might be less likely to arise. Where the chiefs themselves 
 have led, success has invariably followed. — (See Fig. 3, Plate II.) 
 
 In the trial of this unfortunate Admiral, it is stated in the evidence of the 
 Captain of his ship (Gardiner), that in conducting the British fleet into battle, 
 his mind was continually occupied with the fate of Admiral Mathews, who was 
 condemned for departing from the strict line of battle, to set a noble example to 
 his fleet, by bringing the Spanish Admiral to close action. 
 
 Admiral Byng observes, " You see. Captain Gardiner, that the signal for the 
 line is out ; and that I am a-head of the ships Louisa and of Captain Durell, of 
 the Trident. You would not have me, as Admiral of the fleet, run down as if I 
 was going to engage a single ship ? It was Mr. Mathews's misfortune to be pre- 
 judiced by not carrying down his force together, which I shall endeavour to 
 avoid."— (See "Byng's Trial," p. 307.) 
 
 In the translation of a " Treatise upon the Naval Tactics of M. D. Morogues," 
 published in 1767, edited by an experienced Naval Officer (whose name does not 
 appear), with a " Supplement," addressed to his son, is the following remark, upon 
 placing flag-officers in the line of battle. 
 
 " But to elucidate this subject stiU further. Admit a fleet of ships commanded 
 by three flags ; I ask, if the leading ship have the post of honour, according to 
 some, why do not the two junior flags lead upon each tack as a guide for the 
 commanding officers to follow ? to which the answer is obvious, the like was never 
 known." 
 
 This valuable little work is dedicated to Sir Edward Hawke, then presiding 
 over the maritime affairs of this country ; it is written by an officer who had 
 served under Sir George Rook and Sir John Norris, and had been in many of 
 the engagements of that period. 
 
 Mr. J. Bennet observes in No. 3 of " Papers on Naval Architecture," that 
 " neither in the action of Byng, Byron, Arbuthnot, or of Graves, has Admiral 
 Ekins recommended the windward fleet to fill up the intervals left by the 
 alternate ships of the leeward fleet, when they quitted their first position, to form 
 another line of battle to leeward, although he recommended it in the supposed 
 case before discussed." 
 
ADMIRAL BYNG. 37 
 
 To this it is replied, that had any of those examples or instances been at all 
 similar, he should most certainly have recommended the same mode of pro- 
 ceeding. In all cases the movements of one fleet, with a view to attack, must 
 assuredly be regulated by the position or movements of its opponent. In the 
 battles named. Admiral Ekins considers that he has made the best choice ; for 
 how can openings in the line be occupied, where none are made ? In this case, 
 " the enemy edged away continually," and, " went three feet to our one." 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 " I should be inclined to propose that an attack under the circumstances 
 described should be made by the fleet to leeward coming up in two divisions ; 
 cutting the enemy's line in two places, and overpowering the rear and centre : 
 thereby securing a victory by bringing all your force on a part only of the enemy's 
 wherever it can be done." 
 
 Plate II, Fig. 1, represents Clerk's first position, (Plate VI,) the French 
 forming their line to leeward, " having unsuccessfully endeavoured to weather 
 me." 
 
 Fig. 2. Admiral Byng's attack ; Clerk's second position. " At two I made 
 the signal to engage, and the van under Rear Admiral West, in a very gallant 
 manner, instantly bearing down on the ships he waste engage." 
 
 Fig. 3. Mode of attack proposed. The leading ship, as she crosses the van of 
 the enemy, followed by the others in succession, bearing up, and breaking 
 through between the ships of the enemy's line, engaging them to leeward on the 
 same tack. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 " This is obviously the best method of securing a close action, but F and S 
 wishing to avoid it, would bear up together, and form a new line to leeward." 
 It is therefore further proposed, that C and D should be flag-ships, and each to 
 lead a division of the fleet B to the attack, as denoted by the dotted lines. C, the 
 Commander in Chief, followed by those a-stern of him, should keep away, and 
 pass through the enemy's line wherever they find a convenient opening ; the van 
 acting as before described. 
 
38 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Or suppose the line D C should form two lines of approach, as at G H, and in 
 this manner pass through some parts of the enemy's line. 
 
 The French are extremely averse to present their bows to the broadside, or 
 " porter de pointe sur I'ennemi," but for a fleet of equal or of inferior force 
 prefer the leeward position in "ligne sur la perpendicidaire du vent" like the 
 lines G C and H I. 
 
 To form the lines proposed, the leading ship D, instead of proceeding so far 
 to windward, should, on arriving upon the line perpendicular to the wind G C, 
 shorten sail, and keep away sufficiently to admit of his second a-stern, forming on 
 his weather quarter, still edging to leeward, to allow of the rest of the fleet 
 coming up, and forming in the same manner, bearing with reference to each 
 other (the wind at North) due East and West, ready to act en echiquier on 
 the offensive. In this manner a very powerful attack may be made ; the lines 
 in succession completing the disorder occasioned by the irruption of the first 
 into the enemy's fleet. 
 
 Audihert Ramatuelle considers it indispensible that the fleet to leeward, 
 not being of superior force, and making the attack, should do it on the opposite 
 tack to that of the enemy. (See p. 432, Cours elementaire.) 
 
 Of an attack of this kind from the leeward, the weather fleet cannot do better 
 than immediately ware round together, and form a line parallel with the enemy 
 on the same tack. 
 
 Ramatuelle gives a very correct description of this battle, and the manner 
 in which Monsieur Gallissoniere profited by the misconduct of Admiral 
 Byng. But to stay to capture a few ships, or even to pick up any that may 
 have fallen within their power, when they have ulterior objects of greater import- 
 ance in view, is not the principle upon which they act. 
 
 For proofs of this, we are informed by this author, that rather than lose 
 time in this manner, he made sail to Minorca to cover the siege of Fort 
 St. Philip ; and relates an anecdote highly to the honour of the French 
 military character. He says in a note, (p. 363,) the soldiers were given to 
 wine, nor could the most rigorous measures prevent frequent intoxication. 
 At length, when St. Philip was about to be stormed, the Mareschal Richlieu, 
 gave orders that every soldier convicted of drunkenness, should he deprived of 
 the honour of mounting to the assault. — Not a drunken man was seen ! ! 
 The system which they have hitherto pursued is explained in the same 
 note, and will receive more weight by being described in his own language. 
 
 " La marine fran9oise a toujours prefere la gloire d'assurer on de conserver 
 une conquete, a celle plus brilliante peut-etre, mais moins reelle en efiet, de 
 
Pi^i.TEiir 
 
 Fl<j. 1. 
 
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ADMIRAL BYNG. S9 
 
 prendre quelques vaisseaux ; et en cela elle s'est plus rapprochee du veritable 
 but que Ton doit supposer a la guerre. 
 
 " Que seroit-ce en eflFet pour les Anglois que la perte de quelques batimens ? 
 Le point capital est de les attaquer dans leur possessions, principe, immediat 
 de leur richesse commerciales et de leur puissance maritime. La guerre de 
 1778 fournit des examples, qui prouvent le devouement des generaux 
 fran9aise aux veritables interests de la patrie. La conservation de I'ile de 
 la Grenade, la reiduction d'York-town, on I'armee Anglaise se rendit pri- 
 soniere, la conquete de I'ile St. Christophe et ses dependences, ont ete le 
 resultat de grand combats, ou Ton a laisse I'ennemi faire tranquillement sa 
 retraite, pour ne pas s'exposer a lui laisser la faculte de jetter des secours 
 dans les points attaques." 
 
 ADMIRAL POCOCK'S FIRST BATTLE. 
 
 1758. 
 
 Extract of Letters upon this sub/ect, but apparently not from the Admiral. 
 
 *' The enemy began to fire upon the English as they were going down, but 
 the Admiral did not make the signal to engage, till he was within half musket 
 shot of the Zodiaque ; which was about three o'clock, A few minutes after, 
 perceiving the ships were not all got close enough to the enemy, he made the 
 signal for a closer engagement, which was immediately complied with by the 
 ships in the van. At half-past four, observing the rear of the French line had 
 drawn up pretty close to the Zodiaque, the Admiral made the signal to the 
 Cumberland, Newcastle, and Weymouth, to make sail up, and engage close. 
 Soon after, Monsieur d'Ache broke the line and put before the wind : his second 
 a-stern, who kept on the Yarmouth's quarter most part of the action, then came 
 up alongside, gave his fire, and bore away. The other two ships in the rear 
 came up in like manner, and then bore away; and a few minutes after, observing 
 the enemy's van to bear away also, the Admiral hauled down the signal for the 
 line, and made the signal for a general chase," &c. 
 
 And thus the action ceased. 
 
 Mr. Clerk has employed five figures to describe a battle much better forgotten, 
 and which is here noted in one ; Figure 2, Plate 3, being a form of attack 
 proposed. 
 
40 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 This engagement was certainly very ill conducted, and one in which the 
 gallant Admiral was not supported by his rear. Admiral Pocock and the van set 
 a noble example to the rest ; and in so small a squadron, it was a peculiar hard- 
 ship to find three captains to fail in their duty ; these, it appears, were disgraced ; 
 but this by no means repaired the injury to the national character ; nor could it 
 make amends for the opportunity that, by their cowardice or disobedience, had 
 been lost, of crushing the power of the enemy in India.* — (See Beatson's " Naval 
 and Military Memoirs," vol. ii. pp. 192, 193, for a more detailed account of this 
 battle.) 
 
 SIR GEORGE POCOCK'S SECOND BATTLE. 
 
 Of Sir George Pocock's second action with M. d'Ache, which took place on 
 the 3d of August, in the same year, the writer will relate what he has been 
 able to collect from a French account, given in the " Gentleman's Magazine " 
 for March, 1 759 ; of which the following are extracts ; and then quote from 
 " Beatson's Naval and Military Memoirs," vol. ii. pp. 205, 206, 294, 295. 
 
 Paris, March 9. 
 
 " The Marquis de Montmorency Laval, Colonel of foot, arrived from the 
 East Indies with the following particulars of the success of the King's forces 
 against the English in that part of the world." Then are related the operations 
 of M. de Lally and Count d'Estaing at Pondicherry and Gondeleur. 
 
 " The Diligente frigate is since arrived express, and hath brought a journal 
 of Count d'Ache's squadron, of which the following is an extract." It then 
 states the force, and details its proceedings in conjunction with M. de Lally ; but 
 which it is unnecessary to insert. All that is said of the first engagement is, that 
 " it commenced at two o'clock in the afternoon, and continued till night, with 
 great vivacity on both sides," From this time the journal proceeds until the 
 
 * Of Sir George Pocock, the following trait is related by one who was an eye-witness. In the 
 heat of the battle, a shot that took off the head of one of the seamen on the quarter-deck had 
 thrown all the contents of the skull directly into the Admiral's face ; he, with the greatest com- 
 posure, called, " Boy, go and get me some vinegar and water to wash my face :" this was a 
 youngster, stationed upon the quarter-deck as a little aid-de-camp. 
 
ADMIRAL POCOCK. 41 
 
 third of August, " on which last day, at one in the afternoon, a fresh engage- 
 ment began, which continued with the utmost fury for above two hours. 
 
 " The Enghsh squadron suffered greatly in this second action, and Count 
 d'Ache would have had the whole advantage, had it not been for the accident 
 that happened on board his ship and the Comte de Provence, by the combustibles 
 (or fire arrows) which the English, contrary to all the rules and customs of war, 
 threw on board. The Comte de Provence was the first that suffered ; all her 
 sails on the mizen-mast took fire, and the flames spread to the quarter-deck ; so 
 that the whole ship would have been consumed, had not the Captain of the Due 
 de Bourgogne shot in between the Comte de Provence and the English vessel, 
 which continued firing broadsides after expending all her combustibles. It was 
 with the utmost difficulty the Captain of the Comte de Provence extinguished the 
 fire on board his ship. 
 
 " The same thing happened to the Zodiaque, with this difference, that the 
 fire having gained the powder-room, she was on the point of blowing up, but 
 was saved by the diligence of the officers. 
 
 " After these accidents the squadron was obliged to retreat, the Zodiaque 
 forming the van. 
 
 " Annexed to this account is a state of the loss which the French fleet 
 suffered. The number of the killed amounts to 251, and that of the wounded 
 to 602 ; of which, it appears that the Zodiaque, the Admiral's ship, had 70 
 killed, and 190 wounded, including the Admiral." 
 
 The conflict this time was short, but severe ; and the force, according to 
 Schomberg's " Naval Chronology," vol. i. p. 322, nearly equal. Admiral 
 Pocock pursued the enemy until he found that, by the superior sailing of the 
 French ships, who cut away their boats (towing a-stern) to facilitate their escape, 
 it became useless to continue it ; and he came to an anchor off Carical. 
 
 Upon this occasion Admiral Pocock, Commodore Stevens, and Captain Martin, 
 were wounded ; as were also M. d'Ache and his Captain . 
 
 In all the battles of Sir George Pocock appears the respected name of 
 Kempenfelt, Captain to the ship of Admiral Stevens ; who closed his useful and 
 honourable career by the unfortunate sinking of the Royal George at Spithead 
 in 1782, where his flag was flying. 
 
 The nation is indebted to the late Admiral Kempenfelt, from whose genius 
 and labour the art of manoeuvring a great fleet was put in practice, and brought 
 to a degree of perfection never known before. Signals were also methodised, and 
 were at once rendered distinct, comprehensive, and intelligent. 
 
 G 
 
42 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Of the Second Action the following is related by JBeatson. 
 
 " At noon, the sea breeze sprung up, which gave the British the weather- 
 gage. Both fleets formed their lines anew to the wind, and at twenty minutes 
 past twelve. Admiral Pocock made the signal to bear down on the enemy and 
 engage. The Elizabeth and Comte de Provence began the engagement ; but 
 soon after, the mizen of the latter happening to take fire, she was obliged to 
 quit the line, and her people were constrained to cut away the mast in order to 
 save the ship. The Due de Bourgogne then attacked the Elizabeth, but was so 
 overpowered by her fire, that Count d'Ache himself, at that time warmly 
 engaged with the Yarmouth, endeavoured all he could to push up to her assist- 
 ance : but his intention was thwarted by the steering wheel of the Zodiaque 
 being shattered by a shot from his antagonist ; to repair which she passed under 
 the lee of the Due d'Orleans ; and no sooner had she returned into the line, 
 than one of her lower deck guns in the gun-room burst, and beat through the 
 deck above. This misfortune was soon followed by another of a much more 
 serious nature, and dreadfully alarming. The bulk-head of the powder-room 
 was set on fire ; and whilst they were busy in extinguishing it, the newly 
 repaired wheel gave way, whereby the ship fell on board the Due d'Orleans, her 
 second a-head. Both, while trying to extricate themselves, were exposed to a 
 most severe cannonade from the Yarmouth and Tyger ; to which the enemy, for 
 a considerable time, were unable to make any return. The Conde and Moras 
 were by this time beat out of the line, and at eight minutes after two, the 
 Zodiaque having got disentangled, M. d'Ache bore away, and in fifteen minutes 
 afterwards the rest of his ships followed his example ; on which Admiral Pocock 
 made the signal for a closer engagement. This signal was obeyed with alacrity 
 by all the ships, and the enemy were severely raked by means of this well-timed 
 manoeuvre ; but, as they crowded all the sail they could set, the Admiral soon 
 after hauled down the signal for the line, and made the signal for a general 
 chace. On this, the enemy cut away all their boats, that their ships might 
 have no impediment to retard their sailing, and stood to the N. N. W." 
 
ADMIRAL POCOCK. 43 
 
 THIRD BATTLE OF POCOCK AND D'ACHE, 
 
 September, 1759- 
 
 This third battle of Pocock with Monsieur d'Ache, was fought on the 10th of 
 September, 1759. In the first volume of Schomberg's Naval Chronology, some 
 account is given of it ; and in the fourth volume is stated the force on both sides : 
 by which it appears the advantage was considerably on the part of the French, 
 they having eleven to nine sail of the line, with a superiority of 200 guns : 
 however, the British Admiral having the weather- gage, bore down with great 
 resolution ; and at eleven the van under Admiral Stevens hrought the enemy to 
 action, which soon after became general, and continued with great bravery on both 
 sides until four o'clock, when the French gave way. Monsieur d'Ache being 
 wounded and his Captain killed, his ship wore out of the line, which the rest mis- 
 taking for an intention to retreat, made all sail away, and were pursued by the 
 British fleet until dark. This last proves to have been the most severe of all 
 these actions, as a much more serious list of killed and wounded follows the 
 account. 
 
 The Captain of the Newcastle and other officers were killed, and Captains 
 Brereton and Somerset were wounded. 
 
 The loss of the enemy amounted to 1500 killed and wounded; amongst the 
 former were the Captains of the Zodiaque and Centaur, and Monsieur d'Ache 
 was severely wounded. 
 
 " Tlie Newcastle was much damaged in her masts, yards, and rigging. The 
 Cumberland and Salisbury, in the rear, were not in a condition to make sail. 
 The Yarmouth had her fore-top-sail yard shot away in the slings ; and the 
 Grafton and Elizabeth were greatly disabled in their masts, yards, and rigging. 
 The Sunderland and Weymouth, in short, were the only ships capable of 
 pursuing the enemy, so that only seven of our ships received the whole fire of 
 the enemy's fleet, till towards the conclusion, and even then only eight." 
 
 At day-break on the 11th, the Admiral stood under an easy sail to the S. W., 
 the Sunderland having the Newcastle in tow ; the Weymouth the Tyger ; and 
 the Elizabeth the Cumberland. 
 
 Of the Third Battle, the following is stated by Beatson. 
 
 " At six in the morning, on the lOtli, the enemy's squadron bore S. E. by S. 
 distant eight or nine miles, and was formed in a line of battle a-bead on the 
 
 G 2 
 
44 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 starboard tack. Admiral Pocock continued bearing down on them in a line of 
 battle a-breast, with the wind about N. W. by W. At ten the enemy wore, and 
 formed a line of battle a-head on the larboard tack ; and at eleven our squadron 
 did the same. Rear Admiral Stevens, in the Grafton, being then opposite 
 to the Zodiaque, began the action on our side, when, perceiving Admiral Pocock 
 in the Yarmouth was coming close to that ship, after giving her a few 
 broadsides he left her ; then, pushing on, he attacked the Vengeur, which having 
 drove out of the line, he went to the assistance of the Tyger and Newcastle, two 
 ships a-head of him, that had suffered very much from the superiority of the 
 ships of the enemy which they had engaged. One of these, the St. Louis, did 
 not long withstand the fire of the Grafton, but retired out of the line. The Rear 
 Admiral then attacked the Minotaur and the Due d'Orleans, and continued to 
 engage both these ships till the battle ended. Admiral Pocock bestowed his first 
 fire on the Comte de Provence ; and then shot a-head, and engaged M. d'Ache 
 in the Zodiaque. The action now became general with seven of the headmost 
 British ships ; but the Sunderland, sailing very iU, kept back the Weymouth. 
 
 " At four o'clock, the only French ships which kept the line, and continued 
 the engagement, were the Minotaur and Due d'Orleans against the Grafton ; the 
 Zodiaque against the Yarmouth ; the lUustre against the Cumberland ; and the 
 Fortunee and Centaur against the Salisbury and Sunderland. Soon after the 
 Fortunee and Centaur quitted the line. The French Admiral being at this time 
 rendered insensible by a very bad wound he had received in his thigh from a 
 grape shot, and the Captain of the Zodiaque being killed an hour before, the 
 officer next in command ordered the ship to be wore, in order to join those who 
 had gone off;* when the other French ships soon followed their Admiral ; which 
 having joined, their whole squadron bore away and stood to the S. S. E. with 
 all the sail they could crowd. The four ships that composed our van had 
 sustained so hot a fire, during two hours, from six of the enemy's largest ships, 
 that they were in no condition to pursue. The Tyger had her mizen-mast and 
 main-top-mast shot away, besides being in other respects greatly disabled." 
 
 * It would seem by the result of this battle, that to kill or disable a Commander-in-chief and his 
 Captain was a sure road to success. 
 
BOSCAWEN AND DE LA CLUE. 45 
 
 POCOCK'S BATTLE WITH D'ACHE IN THE EAST INDIES, 
 
 April 29, 1758. 
 
 Plate 3, Fig. 1, represents Clerk's fifth position. Ships making an attack 
 from the windward should do it under all sail, to prevent a disappointment by 
 such a manoeuvre as this, as they are then in the best condition to follow. 
 
 Fig. 2. Mode proposed. The whole of the British fleet on the starboard line 
 of bearing should have borne down upon the centre and rear of the French 
 squadron, placing two ships upon that of the French Admiral ; this would have 
 left one to act as occasion required : or raking the enemy as at C, while the van 
 of the enemy would be left unoccupied. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 " No plan or mode is given here to the enemy for repelling such an attack." 
 To bear up and form a closer line to leeward appears the most eligible mode 
 of defence ; or that the van of the squadron, F, should tack and double upon the 
 van of B. 
 
 Plate 3, Fig. 2. " The mode of attack proposed is good, if the enemy will 
 allow it; but what would the three headmost ships be about? If the enemy 
 allow me to come down in that way, I should prefer attacking the three stern- 
 most ships with my whole force, cutting through the line and beating them 
 if possible before they could get any assistance from the van : as a small squadron 
 is more easily manoeuvred than a larger one ; and as the line is shorter and the 
 van ships sooner brought to assist the rear, and vice versa, so it is more difficult 
 to cut off a part of it, though an attack on a certain number of ships only will 
 be more likely to bring on a general action." 
 
 BOSCAWEN AND DE LA CLUE. 
 
 Extract of the Admiral's Letter, dated Namur, off Cape St. Vincent, 
 
 August 20, 1759. 
 
 " I acquainted you in my last of my return to Gibraltar to refit. As soon as 
 the ships were near ready, I ordered the Lyme and Gibraltar frigates, the first 
 
id NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 to cruize off Malaga, and the last from Estepona to Ceuta point, to look out and 
 give me timely notice of the enemy's approach. 
 
 " On the 17th, at eight in the evening, the Gibraltar made the signal for their 
 appearance, fourteen sail, on the Barbary shore, to the Eastward of Ceuta. 
 
 " I got under sail as fast as possible, and was out of the Bay before ten, with 
 fourteen sail of the line, the Shannon, and Etna fire-ship. At day-light I saw the 
 Gibraltar, and soon after seven sail of large ships, who, on our not answering 
 their signals, made all sail from us. We had a fresh gale and came up with 
 them fast. About half-past two, some of the headmost ships began to engage ; 
 but I could not get up to the Ocean* till near four. In about half an hour the 
 Namiu-'s mizen-mast, and both top-sail yards, were shot away : the enemy then 
 made all the sail they could. / shifted mijflag to the Newark, and soon after 
 the Centaur of seventy-four guns struck. I pursued all night, and in the morn- 
 ing of the 19th saw only four sail of the line standing in for the land. We 
 were not above three miles from them, and not more than five leagues from the 
 shore ; but with very little wind. 
 
 " About nine the Ocean ran amongst the breakers, and the three others an- 
 chored. I sent the Intrepid and America to destroy the Ocean ; Captain Pratten, 
 having anchored, could not get in ; but Captain Kirk performed that service 
 alone. On his first fire the Ocean struck. Monsieur de la Clue, having 
 one leg broke and the other wounded, had been landed; but they found 
 the Captain, &c. 
 
 " Captain Kirk, finding it impossible to bring her off, set her on fire ; and 
 Captain Bentley, of the Warspight, brought away the Temeraire, of seventy- 
 four guns : at the same time Vice Admiral Broderick, with his division, burnt 
 the Redoubtable, and brought off the Modeste, of sixty-four guns, very little 
 damaged," &c. 
 
 In this affair it is seen that two of the enemy's ships were burnt and three 
 were taken ; nor can we sufficiently admire the conduct of Admiral Boscawen ; 
 who, when his ship was disabled, shifted his flag to the Newark ; by which he 
 continued to direct by his skill, and to animate by his example, the spirited 
 exertions of those under his command. A practice so meritorious, and so con- 
 ducive to the public good, cannot, under similar circumstances, be too strongly 
 recommended. The spirit of de la Clue is also highly conspicuous ; for, despe- 
 rately wounded as he was, he preferred running his ships upon the rocks, rather 
 than surrender them entire to the British fleet ; and throughout the whole of 
 
 * Ocean, ship of the French Admiral. 
 
BOSCAWEN AND DE LA CLUE. 47 
 
 this arduous and unequal contest, conducted himself with a perseverance and 
 hravery that never were surpassed. 
 
 De la Clu^ did not long survive his disaster, and the fate of the Toulon fleet. 
 It had been long and unremittingly watched by Boscawen in the Bay of Hieres ; 
 and some of his ships having suffered materially by an attack made upon the 
 outer ships of the enemy, obliged him to return to Gibraltar. This gave an 
 opportunity to the French Admiral to slip out. 
 
 (See Harvey's Naval History, and the Gentleman's Magazine for August 
 1759.) 
 
 Here shall be introduced some examples from our battles with the Dutch in 
 former times, of the custom of flag-officers, when the ship in which their flag 
 was flying was disabled, removing to a second, and even to a third and fourth 
 ship. 
 
 It is unnecessary to dwell upon the merit of these noble proofs of heroism ; 
 the reader will find them more particularly detailed in Ledyard's Naval History, 
 and Campbell's Admirals. 
 
 We have but one instance, since the time of Boscawefi, of a commanding 
 officer shifting his flag to continue the engagement ; that of Commodore Nelson, 
 on the 14 th of February ; but several for the accomplishment of a particular 
 purpose : Nelson from the St. George to the Elephant, at Copenhagen ; 
 Duckworth, at Minorca ; Mitchel, at the Helder ; Lord H. Seymour, at the 
 capture of Surinam ; and Lord Collingwood after the battle of Trafalgar. It 
 was also necessary in our late war with America ; where the Admirals frequently 
 shifted their flags, the better to conduct the joint operations of the land and sea 
 forces. Commodore Nelson, after the battle of the 14th February, 1797, shifted 
 his pendant to the Irresistible, Captain George Martin. See Part II. 
 
 " Three engagements between the English under Prince Rupert, and the 
 Dutch under De Ruyter. 
 
 " The Golden Lion, in which Van Tromp was, had above a hundred men 
 killed and wounded, and was very much shattered ; and in this condition she 
 was very near being burnt by a fireship set upon her by Sir William Reeves. 
 Van Tromp was then obliged to hoist his flag on board the Prince on Horse- 
 back ; aud her main-mast being shot by the board, he removed to the Amsterdam, 
 and afterwards to the Comet." (Ledyard, page 601.) 
 
 In this battle Sir Edward Spragge greatly distinguished himself by the des- 
 truction and slaughter of the enemy. 
 
 On another occasion, Spragge and Cornelius Van Tromp were opposed to each 
 other with the greatest fury, and were both obliged to leave their ships and go 
 
48 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 to others ; Sir Edward Spragge, again being compelled to quit his ship (the St. 
 George) by the fall of her main-mast, put himself into his barge to go to 
 another, intending to continue the fight in the third ship ; when a cannon ball 
 sunk the boat, and the gallant Admiral was drowned. 
 
 (Ledyard, book iii, page 603. See also Campbell's life of this extraordinary 
 man, volume iii.) 
 
 In a fight between the Duke of York and De Ruyter, the Duke was obliged 
 to leave his ship (the standard being shot down with the main-top mast of the 
 St. Michael) and go on board the Loyal London. In this engagement the Earl 
 of Sandwich was very hard pressed in the Royal James, and had given signal 
 proofs of courage ; and after sustaining with the most intrepid valour an unequal 
 combat for five hours, was again beset by numbers; and a fire-ship of, the 
 enemy grappling with the Royal James, set her in a flame ; and thus perished 
 the gallant but unfortunate Earl. 
 (Ledyard, book iii, page 598.) 
 
 There is also another instance in the person of Vice Admiral Sir Ralph 
 Delaval ; who, in Russel's celebrated defeat of the French fleet, commanded by 
 Monsieur Tourville, in order to follow some of the enemy's ships close in shore, 
 shifted his flag from the Royal Sovereign to the St. Albans, of fifty guns ; and, 
 assisted by some others with armed boats and fire-ships, destroyed several of them. 
 The following extract is taken from Sir R. Delaval's letter to the Earl of Not- 
 tingham, May 22, 1692 : 
 
 " And that no time might be lost, I went immediately on board the St. 
 Albans ; where, for the encouragement of the seamen, I hoisted my flag ; and 
 having ordered the Ruby, with two fire ships, to attend me, I stood in with them, 
 leaving the great ships without, as drawing too much water," &c. 
 
 Finding he could do nothing with the third and fourth rates, he went 
 " himself with all the barges and tenders, and three fire-ships, to attempt the 
 burning them," &c. 
 
 The Royal Sun, Tourville's ship, the Conquerant, and the Admirable, were 
 destroyed by this party, conducted by the Vice Admiral ; whilst Russell was 
 himself occupied in following up his blow on another division of the enemy's fleet, 
 and in sight of the French and Irish camp formed on the heights, destined 
 for the invasion of England. 
 
 " Thus at La Hogue and Cherbourg were burnt two ships of 104 guns each ; 
 one of ninety ; two of eighty ; four of seventy-six ; four of sixty ; and two of 
 fifty-six guns, making a total of fifteen large ships." 
 (See Ledyard, pages 663, 664.) 
 
BOSCAWEN AND DE LA CLUE. 49 
 
 Extract of a Narrative of the Defeat of de la Clue, by a Midshipman then 
 belonging to his Majesty's Ship Guernsey, of fifty Guns, one of Admiral 
 Soscawen^s Fleet, hindly contributed by his Son, a Captain in his Majesty's 
 Navy. 
 
 ■ The writer is persuaded that the interest it will excite in the seaman's mind 
 i^enders no apology for its insertion necessary. 
 
 " On the evening of the 16th of August, the Gibraltar, of twenty-four guns, 
 Captain M'Cleverty, stationed in the Gut, made the signal for seeing the enemy's 
 fleet to tlie eastward. A signal was immediately made on board the Admiral for 
 our fleet to unmoor. 
 
 " It is somewhat remarkable, that Admiral Boscawen and some of the principal 
 officers of his fleet were that day dining with the Governor of St. Roque, a Spanish 
 garrison town a few miles from Gibraltar. Seeing the signal above-mentioned, 
 they left the town in a hurry, and immediately repaired to the shore ; where 
 it has been said they found their barges hauled up upon the beach ; done either 
 by, or at the instigation of the Spaniards, to delay as much as possible the 
 Admiral's return on board ; the enemy's fleet being at that veryinstant making the 
 best of their way through the Gut : whether premeditated or not is uncertain ; 
 but the circumstance was singular. 
 
 " A signal for the fleet to cut or slip was immediately made on the Admiral's 
 return ; and great was the hurry and confusion which ensued : some ships having 
 their sails unljerit, and their yards newly tarred ; others, I think, with their yards 
 and top-masts struck, overhauling their rigging ; and almost all having seamen 
 and officers on shore, either on pleasure or on the several duties of the fleet, little 
 expecting at that moment the approach of an enemy. These, unwilling to be 
 left behind, embarked in any boat they met with, and got on board the first ship 
 they could. 
 
 " Notwithstanding the unprepared situation of the fleet, so great were the 
 exertions of the officers and seamen on this animating occasion, that the whole was 
 got out of the bay with wonderful expedition ; and during the night continued in 
 chase with every thing ready for immediate action. 
 
 " On the morning of the 17th, some ships were seen a-head. The wind was 
 strong at east ; the weather fine, the water smooth ; and we soon perceived that 
 we gained exceedingly fast upon the enemy, which were now plainly discovered to 
 be seven large ships of the line, and one of them carrying a French Admiral's flag_ 
 
 " About ten o'clock, a. m. the Admiral threw out the signal for battle ; the 
 
 H 
 
30 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 ships to engage as they came up, without regard to the line of battle. The 
 enemy's ships were formed in a line a-head, and crowding away from us under a 
 press of sail. 
 
 « Soon after three, the Culloden, of 74 guns. Captain Callis, brought one of 
 the sternmost of the enemy to action, and was supported by the rest as they 
 came up. Admiral Boscawen, in the Namur, never stopped until he came 
 alongside of the French Admiral, Monsieur de la Clue, and the combat was 
 dreadful. For a time the good fortune of the latter protected him, and 
 prolonged his fate ; for the Namur having had her mi%en-mast and main-top-sail 
 yard shot away, unavoidably dropped a-stern. 
 
 " Admiral Boscawen, thus mortified and disappointed, immediately shifted his 
 flag to the Neivarle of 80 guns, and continued the chase with unremitting 
 vigour. About four, the Guernsey began to engage, and directed her fire to the 
 nearest of the enemy's line ; but, at that instant, our Admiral making our signal 
 to proceed, we stood on for the headmost of their line, and engaged such of 
 the ships as came within our reach. We were very roughly handled ; for, being 
 the smallest ship in our fleet, the enemy took us for afire-ship, and treated us 
 accordingly. The sternmost ship of the enemy (the Centaur) then struck her 
 colours to the Edgar, of 60 guns. Captain Drake. As night approached, the 
 enemy's ships seemed insensibly to steal away, and by degrees got out of the 
 reach of our guns ; and the wind, as is usual in sea-fights, was greatly abated : 
 but the chase was continued aill the succeeding night ; and it is extraordinary that 
 the Guernsey, though in general a heavy sailer, yet on this occasion was the 
 headmost ship of the British fleet, and displayed the lights in her stern, to 
 notify that the enemy was stiU in sight. 
 
 " We had now time to examine into the state of our ship ; and found that 
 her hull, masts, rigging, and sails, had suffered considerably, but particularly 
 the latter. One large shot, from a lower decker, had gone through the centre of 
 our main-mast, and we were apprehensive that it would go over the side, the 
 wound being about midway between the deck and the top. 
 
 " In the night I went down into the cockpit, where the wounded are always 
 carried ; and was there witness to a scene shocking to humanity. I ascended 
 precipitately, and endeavoured to banish from my mind the melancholy impres- 
 sion of the sight ; but this was extremely difficult. I must not forget to relate a 
 fact which bears the character of being very singular. 
 
 " A heavy shot, from an enemy's lower-deck gun, penetrated the side of our 
 ship just between wind and water, abaft the main chains ; forced its way through 
 the purser's store-room into the cockpit ; and, having there taken off the leg of 
 
BOSCAWEN AND DE LA CLUE. 51 
 
 our surgeon, Mr. Beckley ; another from Mr. Evans, surgeon's mate ; another 
 from John Bull, a marine, who was assisting them ; and lastly the leg of a chair ; 
 made its way through theuockpit deck, and lodged itself in the hrandy-room. 
 I saw Mr. Beckley long after on the Royal Exchange in London, with his wooden 
 leg ; and he told me he had then the shot in his possession. Another shot was 
 taken out of the ship'^ side, that weighed 74 pounds. We had none in the fleet 
 that weighed more than 32 pounds. 
 
 " The 18th, at day-light, the enemy was discovered a few miles a-head of the 
 British fleet; but some of them had separated, or had fallen a-stern. The 
 French ships stood in immediately from the coast of Portugal, at the distance of 
 six or eight leagues. At nine o'clock the largest of the enemy's ships ran on 
 shore with all her sail set ; when every mast went by the board, and fell over the 
 bows : this was the Ocean, of 80 guns, the ship of M. de la Clue. The 
 Redoubtable followed soon after, and met a precisely similar fate. 
 
 " Two others came to anchor imder the protection of some Portugese forts, 
 near the bay of Lagos, a few miles distant from three which had run on shore. 
 
 " The British fleet was brought to, and dispositions made by the Admiral 
 for attacking the ships which had anchored, and for detroying the two on shore. 
 The Guernsey's signal, amongst others, was made ; and Captain Kearney went 
 on board the flag-ship in the only boat that could swim, to receive the Admiral's 
 commands ; and soon returned, signifying that his instructions were, to proceed 
 with the Guernsey, and at the hazard of our ship and lives, to destroy the French 
 ship (Redoubtable) without any regard to the laws of neutrality. 
 
 " We immediately made sail in company with the Prince, Vice Admiral 
 Broderick, and the St. Albans, of 60 guns. Captain Vernon. The Prince came to 
 anchor near the French ship, and with a few broadsides drove her crew on shore ; 
 when the boats, manned and armed, proceeded to board and to burn her. I 
 went again as a volunteer with Lieutenant Carteret : we boarded the Redoubt- 
 able, and speedily set this fine ship in flames, in the doing of which, Mr. 
 Carteret, who was an excellent officer, was principally instrumental. 
 
 " In the mean time some other ships were employed in bringing, or attempt- 
 ing to bring off the remaining ships of the enemy. The Ocean was set on fire 
 by the America, Captain Kirk ; the Temeraire was brought off by the War- 
 spight. Captain Bentley ; and the Modeste struck to the Jersey, Captain Barker ; 
 the Portuguese firing occasionally at our ships in defence of the French squa- 
 dron, which had sought protection under their guns, by the laws of neutrality. 
 That they fired shot from their guns was not ascertained ; as no damage was re- 
 ceived by the British squadron from that quarter. 
 
 H 2 
 
52 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " Between eight and nine at night, the wind being moderate, the sea smooth, 
 we beheld with admiration one of the finest sights in the world — the Redoubtable 
 at that instant blew up. We were at the distance of a few miles, but the 
 report was tremendous ; the sight, however, was but for a moment, and all was 
 dark and still ! " &c. 
 
 " Admiral Boscawen, having thus successfully accomplished the object of his 
 cruize, and there being now no longer any occasion for so large a fleet in the 
 Mediterranean, sailed on the 26th with six sail of the line, two fire-ships, and 
 the prizes, for England ; where, greatly to the misfortune of his country, that 
 great and gallant officer died. 
 
 " The squadron was then reduced to seven sail of the line and some frigates 
 under Vice Admiral Broderick ; and made sail to the eastward, to block up five 
 sail of the line and three frigates of the squadron of Monsieur de la Clue, that 
 had taken shelter in the port of Cadiz : but the Guernsey was ordered to 
 Gibraltar with the prisoners, and to repair and refit ; our main-mast in particular 
 being in momentary danger of falling over the side ; yet a Midshipman was 
 constantly stationed at the mast-head :* and one day, the wind blowing fresh with 
 a head sea, and my turn to be posted there, I was extremely glad when the 
 officer of the watch ordered me to come down from so dangerous a situation ; and 
 none was afterwards sent up during our way to Gibraltar ; where we arrived soon 
 after, and landed our wounded and prisoners. 
 
 " In November, the squadron under Vice Admiral Broderick, which had been 
 cruizing in the bay of Cadiz to watch the motions of the remaining part of de la 
 Clue's squadron, which had sheltered there, received considerable damage ; and 
 was in imminent danger of being driven on shore by a heavy gale of wind. 
 The Prince, Newark, and CuUoden, were totally disabled and laid up in 
 the Carraccas, to be refitted at the convenience of the Spaniards. By 
 this unexpected event the French squadron became superior to the British ; 
 and the Guernsey received orders to proceed immediately to Cadiz to join 
 the Admiral. 
 
 " In pursuance of these directions, having previously taken on board a large 
 anchor for the Prince, we sailed from Gibraltar ; and the next day were attacked 
 by a severe gale of wind from the westward. 
 
 " The suddenness of the attack prevented all possibility of getting a good 
 offing ; and we found ourselves in a few hours dangerously encumbered with a lee 
 shore, and at no great distance : we crowded a press of sail, but all to no purpose ; 
 
 * " A good practice, which should be respected and observed." 
 
BOSCAWEN AND DE LA CLUE. 53 
 
 the ship drawing rapidly to land. We soon discovered, to our great mortification, 
 that it could not be weathered on either tack. 
 
 " Meanwhile, the gale, as well as our danger, was momentarily increasing ; 
 our fate appeared inevitable. To anchor in a gale of wind, in an open sea, upon 
 a lee shore, appeared chimerical in the extreme ; and nothing but the total 
 absence of hope could have warranted the measure : this was, however, our last 
 resource, and one of our anchors was let go ; the effect appeared no more than if 
 a pebble had been thrown into the sea. Another anchor was dropped ; and after 
 the cables of both had run out to their utmost extent, to our infinite joy they 
 happily brought us up. The sheet-anchor, now the only one remaining, was 
 instantly prepared, to use as occasion might require. 
 
 " The yards and top-masts were struck, and preparations made for cutting 
 away the masts if our anchors should not hold. A dangerous shoal on which the 
 sea most furiously broke, appeared at a small distance a-stern, ready to swallow 
 us up in a moment, should our anchors prove unequal to their task : and this 
 shoal, being a considerable distance from the land, precluded all possibility of being 
 saved, even supposing a few might escape with life, and get through the surf that 
 broke with such violence upon it." {Note. — " If you had gone inside of it, you 
 Inight have anchored in safety.") 
 
 " In this terrible and very critical situation we rode for the space of two days ; 
 braving the violence of the winds ; and exposed without any shelter to the fury of 
 the Atlantic Ocean ; at the end of which time, the wind not only abating, but 
 coming a few points more in our favour, we hove up with extreme difficulty our 
 anchors (one of which we found had lost a fluke), got under sail, and in a day or 
 two afterwards, to our great joy, came to an anchor in the Bay of Cadiz. 
 
 " The scene of our danget and deliverance was between Cape Trafalgar, which 
 is the N. W. boundary of the Straits, and the Bay of Cadiz ; nearly a-breast of 
 a little town or village marked upon our charts Conil. 
 
 " On our arrival at Cadiz, we found Admiral Broderick, with his flag on board 
 the Conqueror, of seventy guns, Captain Lloyd, with only two other ships of the 
 line and four frigates. The Guernsey arrived in a lucky hour ; for the French 
 squadron consisted of five ships of sixty-four and sixty guns, and three frigates. 
 The ships were intermingled with each other at anchor; and, from the mutual 
 good ofiices and civilities which passed between the officers, it did not appear that 
 they belonged to nations at war. A single mile from the port would doubtless 
 have presented a different scene ; the two nations, with the fury of lions, endea- 
 vouring to destroy each other ; and happy the party which could send the other to 
 the bottom. 
 
54 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " The regulations of this neutral port, respecting the sailing of the two 
 squadrons, were in substance as follows : — 
 • " First. — Each squadron had in turn its day to sail. 
 
 " Second. — The squadron which should sail first was not to be pursued by the 
 other within the space of twenty-four hours. 
 
 " When the French made preparations to sail, which they frequently made 
 parade of we always assisted them with hawsers, &c. ; made similar, but I believe 
 more serious preparations ourselves ; it being generally understood by our ships, 
 that whenever the enemy went out of port, we should immediately pursue them, 
 without paying any more deference here to the laws of neutrality, than we had 
 done to the Portuguese ports. The French were twice actually under way ; but, 
 on Admiral Broderick's dispositions for doing the same being observed, they 
 immediately came to an anchor, again. But they were never complaisant enough 
 to repay us with the same attention. 
 
 " It plainly appearing, at length, that the French Commodore, notwithstanding 
 his superiority, would never leave the port whilst we continued in it ; the British 
 Admiral signified to his captains his determination to sail and wait for the enemy 
 without. 
 
 *' Our ships were extremely well manned ; officers and seamen from the three 
 disabled ships were distributed amongst them, and the Guernsey received on board 
 a midshipman (Mr. Nimme) and forty seamen from the Newark ; so that we had 
 many more than our complement. 
 
 " British seamen never want spirit; but on this occasion they seemed particu- 
 larly animated, and wished to be " alongside Monsieurs ; " never in the least 
 doubting but they would speedily give a good account of them. 
 
 *' French officers are, I believe, frequently good ; but their seamen are indif- 
 ferent. They were rudely treated, we were informed, by the Spanish populace in 
 the streets of Cadiz : and the news, which first then arrived, of the defeat of their 
 grand fleet under Mons. de Conflans, did not a little contribute to depress their 
 spirits. 
 
 " We sailed from Cadiz Bay, 26th December ; and, when arrived at a proper 
 distance from the shore, waited with anxious expectation the approach of the 
 enemy's squadron. Our people were employed in the exercise of the great guns ; 
 the marines in the use of their small arms ; and in short every disposition was 
 made that was necessary, in order to ensure success in the approaching battle. 
 
 " The spirit and ability of our officers and seamen were considered as more than 
 adequate to the evident superiority of the enemy ; and we flattered ourselves that 
 a consciousness of that superiority would induce the French Chef d'Escadre to 
 
BOSCAWEN AND DE LA CLUE. 55 
 
 hazard a trial : but Providence ordered it should be otherwise. Scarcely had the 
 British squadron arrived upon its station oflF the port of Cadiz, when a heavy 
 gale of wind from the westward commenced. The Admiral, remembering his 
 recent escape from the dangers of a lee shore (as well as our own, which I have 
 ^Iready described) was anxious to get from the land as fast as possible, and have 
 tlie straights of Gibraltar op^M, With this view we carried a press of sail, and 
 happily eflFected that purpose. The Guernsey, however, had nearly been sacrificed 
 in the attempt : she was always considered as extremely crank ; and a sudden 
 squall having laid her down almost on her beam-ends, we were under the greatest 
 apprehensions that she would overset. The lee side of the quarter deck was two 
 or three planks under water ; an arm-chest went to leeward ; a hawser washed 
 from the forecastle ; and the mizen-top-mast stay-sail blown out of the netting. 
 In this very critical situation, the fore-sheet very providentially gave way ; the 
 fore and other sails blew to pieces, and the ship immediately righted. The 
 Admiral and the rest of the squadron soon after came safely to an anchor in Gib- 
 raltar Bay. We had not long continued there, when on the 3d of January, 1760, 
 the Admiral received advice that the French squadron had sailed from the port 
 of Cadiz ; and shortly after, signals were made at the Spanish watch-towers 
 along the shore, that a fleet was then approaching the straits. 
 
 " Admiral Broderick, on the receipt of this interesting information, imme- 
 diately made a signal for his ships to unmoor ; which was obeyed with wonderful 
 expedition ; and every one sanguinely anticipated in his own mind a complete and 
 glorious victory. The conflict, it was considered, might be sharp ; the squadrons 
 being so nearly equal ; but the event was never so much as doubted, I am per- 
 suaded, by any one in the fleet. 
 
 " Our ships were hove shorty and every thing prepared for immediate pursuit ; 
 the people in the highest spirits, impatiently waiting for the expected signal to 
 weigh or slip. The enemy's ships were that instant passing through the Gut, in 
 a manner within reach of our guns; but the Admiral did not think proper to 
 weigh or go in pursuit of the enemy ! ! I We were astonished at this conduct; 
 for which no probable reason could be assigned. It seemed to be considered in 
 the same light at home ; for he was immediately afterwards recalled, and never 
 employed again." — See the account of this battle given by Monsieur de la Clue, 
 in a letter to the French Ambassador at Lisbon, Annual Register, 1759. 
 
 Of the benefit of anchors, or even of cables without anchots, to ships at sea in 
 heavy gales, the following is a proof. 
 
 When the present Admiral Sir Israel Pellew was Captain of the Cleopatra, of 
 thirty-two guns, upon the coast of America, (in 1797 or 8,) in the month of 
 
56 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 September he was overtaken by a violent hurricane about 500 miles from the 
 island of Bermuda ; and the main-mast, which was before defective, being carried 
 over the side about ten feet above the quarter-deck with the increasing violence of 
 the gale, soon after was followed by the fore-mast, mizen-mast, and bowsprit ; 
 leaving the ship entirely at the mercy of the waves. In this situation, when, 
 from the heavy and deep rolling of the ship, no person could keep his feet, it was 
 proposed to the Captain to ease the ship by throwing the guns overboard ; but 
 this he resolutely forbade; and resolved to have recourse to an expedient, which 
 to him was known only by tradition or report, and to that time had been little or 
 never practised ; as it is hoped the necessity for it had been rare. The Captain 
 immediately ordered the cable of the best bower to be cut at the clinch, and 
 payed out until a sufficient scope had been given, to cause the ship to ride easy 
 to the sea : with seventy fathoms, this was effected, and the ship rose over it in 
 such a manner, that her forecastle remained perfectly dry; the people could stand 
 to their duty, and they soon got rid of the wreck of masts and rigging. In this 
 nianner she continued for three days, and had drifted about forty miles : the gale 
 had then abated; and they proceeded to raise jury-masts by means of the top- 
 jnasts, and top-gallant-masts, &c. ; and having completed her equipment, hove 
 in the cable and made sail for Halifax. 
 
 Few seamen have formed a right estimation of the value of anchors and 
 tables in situations like this. It requires a well authenticated fact to fix the 
 circumstances strongly on the mind ; and the writer received this account from 
 the gallant Admiral himself. Examples of this nature are very rare, and little 
 Icnown ; but, when given from the purest sources of information, may become 
 useful. 
 
 When in a similar situation as that related above, the Centaur of seventy- 
 four guns was suffering after the dreadful hurricane in 1782, Captain Inglefield 
 informs us that, " The ship lying in the trough of the sea, laboured prodi^ 
 giously. I got over one of the small anchors, with a boom, and several gun 
 carriages, veered out from the head door by a large hawser, to keep the ship's 
 bow to the sea ; but this, with a top-gallant-sail upon the stump of the mizen 
 niast, had not the desired effect." (Captain Inglefield's Narrative of the Loss of 
 the Centaur. Page 11.) 
 
 Steering ships by the ends of cables payed out a-stern, with tackles to them 
 when without a rudder, is too well known to require a description. Ships have 
 also been steered by boats towing a-stern. His Majesty's ship Crown of sixty- 
 four guns, having lost her rudder by striking on the Kentish Knoch^ was in this 
 
BOSCAWEN AND DE LA CLUE. 57 
 
 manner conducted in safety through the Gull Stream by five pilot-boats that 
 came to her assistance. Umbrellas have been used with good effect. 
 
 A gallant young officer, who assisted at the capture of the President frigate, 
 relates the following circumstances. 
 
 " Two days after she fell into our hands, in a very heavy gale, in the Gulph 
 Stream, she lost her three masts ; and, having several shot-holes between wind 
 and water not plugged up, was near foundering ; the crew exhausted at the pumps, 
 and the water gaining on them ; the bowsprit remaining, keeping the ship off in 
 the trough of the sea. In this perilous situation. Captain Morgan veered out an 
 umbrella with two hawsers an-end on it, from the hawse-hole (or bridle port), 
 which immediately had the effect of causing the ship to bow the sea, and en- 
 abled the crew, by great exertion of bailing and pumping, to keep her free. 
 When the umbrella had been out eight or ten hours, the hawser parted ; but the 
 gale had then moderated, and the sea had abated; the ship rigged jury-masts, 
 and was safely conducted to Bermuda." 
 
 The American ships are furnished with two of these umbrellas, for the purpose 
 of warping. In this way, or by kedge anchors, the Constitution is said to have 
 escaped from Sir P. Broke, in July, 1812. 
 
 Umbrellas, the contrivance of a friend of the writer, were tried upon a barge 
 on the river Thames, thirty years ago, and warped her a-head at the rate of three 
 miles an hour ; they were made of stout canvass, strongly secured by iron braces, 
 buoyed up by a wooden ball, fired from a mortar. (See Appendix.) 
 
 Umbrellas were used in the year 1759. Two of them were constructed in 
 this year on board a man of war commanded by Captain Moore ; and, in order 
 to animate the crew in the labour of working them, were called, the one " St. 
 Andrew^' and the other " St. Patrick," and were respectively worked by 
 Irish and Scotchmen. His Majesty's ship Levant, off the Western Islands, 
 commanded by the Honourable George Murray, in pursuit of an American 
 schooner, and having no means of getting a-head, it being calm, attempted to 
 effect her purpose by sending out tubs with hawsers attached to them. The 
 boatswain of the Levant, however, having sailed with Captain Moore, and 
 witnessed the effect of the umbrellas, mentioned it, and two of them were 
 caused to be constructed accordingly. Admirals Sir Henry Baynton and Sir 
 Charles Penrose were midshipmen in the Levant at this time ; to the former 
 of these officers the writer is indebted for this anecdote. 
 
 While Sir Henry commanded the Leviathan, seventy-four, in the Mediter- 
 ranean, he had two umbrellas made of large dimensions, and took them with 
 
 I 
 
58 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 him to the Milford. They were eventually left at the Dock-yard, Ply-. 
 mouth. 
 
 The late Captain Sir George Collier related to the writer the following cir- 
 cumstance ; although not treating of the effect of umbrellas, yet connected with 
 the subject. 
 
 In the course of the last long war, when a strong squadron was constantly 
 employed upon the coast of Holland, a ship of sixty-four guns, riding at anchor 
 off one of the enemy's ports, in a very heavy gale parted her cables. En- 
 deavouring to bring the ship up with the sheet anchor, they found, when it was 
 too late, that they had neglected to clinch the inner end of the sheet cable, and 
 were unable to stopper it, or to prevent its running out of the hawse. The ship, 
 left to her fate, drifted on shore. 
 
 In this extremity it occurred to the captain, with a view to ground the ship 
 upon the sand-banks as far off shore as possible, to deepen the ship as much as 
 he could in the water, in hopes still of saving her. He therefore used every 
 exertion in his power to fill the ship with water as fast as he could, so that by 
 means of the cock, and of every bucket that could be had, he succeeded so far 
 as to bring the ship down in the water at least a foot. This of course occasioned 
 her to take the ground sooner than she otherwise would have done, and furnished 
 them with an easy means of lightening her by all that she had been deepened ; 
 and upon the return of fine weather a rising tide enabled them to get her afloat, 
 again. Sir G. Collier had forgotten the names both of the captain and of his 
 ship. 
 
 The inner ends of inner cables have been spliced together, that ships may upon 
 necessity veer all upon one anchor : care must be taken to rouse up cable in time. 
 
 A seventy-four gun ship commanded by the writer, once, in working into the 
 Downs through the " Gull Stream," with the tide of ebb, and the wind at 
 S.S.W. or S.W., late in the evening of a winter's day, tailed (when in stays) 
 upon the " Brake" sand. The pilots, by whose inadvertency, in standing on 
 to six when they should have approached no nearer to the shoal than seven 
 fathoms, recommended to the captain to let go an anchor, to prevent, as the 
 flood-tide should make, the ship being driven further upon the bank. A bower 
 anchor was therefore let go, to preserve her if possible in her then situation : 
 this, however, was not to be done ; as the ship was lightened, and the tide rose, 
 she became uneasy and unmanageable : in defiance of the fore-sail and close- ■■ 
 reefed fore-topsail kept flat a-back to prevent it, the ship was turned round by 
 the course and violence of the tide, which appeared to be running in circles. . 
 In turning from her anchor, and beating heavily upon the sand, she unavoidably 
 
HAWKE AND CONFLANS. 59 
 
 beat at last upon her anchor, the stock of which fortunately gave way to the 
 superior strength and firmness of the ship's bottom. By starting water, and 
 throwing overboard, as far from the ship as possible, a great quantity of shot, by 
 the time of high water she seemed sufficiently light to be forced from her 
 ■perilous situation. As the tide still rose, the falls of the ship upon the ground 
 became more alarming, and the masts were violently agitated, yet nothing gave 
 way. This was the critical moment to seize ; and watching the opportunity 
 when the wind was abaft the beam, the main-top-sail was in an instant let fall 
 and sheeted home, the cable cut, and with many tremendous jumps the ship was 
 again forced into deep water. Being at no great distance from the floating light 
 of the " Sunt Head" little space or time was left for deliberation ; the sails 
 were scarcely filled upon the ship before it became necessary to take them in 
 again, and she was brought up with the other bower anchor in safety, and 
 came-to in the Downs on the following morning. 
 
 The ship was docked at Plymouth, her copper removed, and the bottom ex- 
 amined, and no injury was at first discovered. The ship never made any water 
 until she was again re-stored and re-victualled, guns on board, and sails bent and 
 .ready for sea. It was, notwithstanding, found necessary to clear the ship and 
 dock her again, when it appeared she had started a hutt * in the garboard streak. 
 
 HAWKE AND CONFLANS. 
 
 We are now to consider the memorable encounter, amidst the rocks and shoals 
 of a coast then very imperfectly known, between the above Admirals, on Novem- 
 ber the 210th, 1759. British, twenty-three sail of the line \ French, twenty-one. 
 
 The following being an enterprise of a most daring and peculiar character, it 
 has been thought necessary to insert almost the whole of Sir Edward Hawke's 
 letter upon that occasion ; nor will naval men, to whom it must be interesting, 
 consider it too long. From it the figures of description have been formed. 
 
 The enemy was first discovered between the island of Belleisle and the Main ; 
 
 * A huil is \h& junction of the two ends of timbers or planks ; or the point of union between 
 them, in ship-building. 
 
 The garboard stralce is that line of planking in the ship's bottom that is nearest the keelson and 
 keel. 
 
 I 2 
 
60 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 and under the most unfavourable circumstances of weather ; but nothing checked 
 the undaunted resolution of the British Admiral. Not inclined to risk an 
 engagement with the British fleet in the open sea, Mons. de Conflans employed A 
 more artful method of proceeding, by endeavouring to entangle it with the dangers 
 of the French coast ; with which he knew the English must be but imperfectly 
 acquainted : in this, however, partly by his own want of decision, but principally 
 by the skill and determined conduct of the British fleet, he was entirely baffled ; 
 and, " fluctuating between a resolution to fight and an inclination to fly, he 
 allowed the British ships to come up with him ; and then crowded his sail whea 
 it was too late to escape."* 
 
 The van of the British soon came up with the rear of the enemy ; and a 
 desperate conflict ensued; the French Rear Admiral behaving with great 
 Resolution. Sir Edward Hawke reserved his fire, and directed his ship to be 
 carried alongside of the French Admiral : the master observing that it could not 
 be done without immment risk of running on a shoal ; the brave Admiral replied, 
 " You have done your duty in pointing out the danger : you are now to obey my 
 commands and lay me alongside the Soleil Royal." 
 
 In the mean time, two French ships of the line were sunk, by taking seas into 
 their lower-deck ports ; and two others struck their colours. Darkness came on, 
 and the rest fled to their own ports ; thus recscued from the destruction otherwise 
 awaiting them by the British fleet, which anchored to the westward of the island 
 of Dumet. In a situation of great danger and distress, it contrived to ride it out 
 the whole night. 
 
 The morning shewed them the ship of the French Admiral on shore, and set 
 on fire by her own men. Two English ships were lost upon a bank called Le 
 Four ; but most of their men and part of their stores were saved. (See plate VI.) 
 
 Extract of a Letter from Sir Edward HawJte to Mr. Cleveland, dated 
 " Koyal George, off Penvis Point, November 2itk, 1759." 
 
 " In my letter of the 17th, by express, I desired that you would acquaint their 
 Lordships with my having received intelligence of eighteen sail of the line and 
 three frigates, of the Brest squadron, being discovered about twenty-four leagues 
 to the N. W. of Belleisle, steering to the eastward : all the prisoners, however 
 agree that on the day we chased them, their squadron consisted, according to the 
 accompanying list, of four ships of eighty, six of seventy-four, three of seventy, 
 
 * See " Campbell's Lives of the Admirals." 
 
HAWKE AND CONFLANS. 61 
 
 eight of sixty-four, one frigate of thirty-six, one of thirty-four, and one of sixteen 
 guns ; with a small vessel to look out. They sailed from Brest the fourteenth 
 instant ; the same day I sailed from Torbay. Concluding that their first ren- 
 dezvous would be Quiberon, the instant I received the intelligence, I directed 
 my course thither with a press of sail. At first the wind blowing hard, at S. by 
 E. and S. drove us considerably to the westward. But on the eighteenth and 
 nineteenth, though variable, it proved more favourable. In the mean time, 
 having been joined by the Maidstone and Coventry frigates, I directed their 
 Commanders to keep a-head of the squadron, one on the starboard, and the other 
 on the larboard bow. At half-past eight o'clock in the morning of the twentieth, 
 Belleisle, by our reckoning, bearing E. by N. -J- N. the Maidstone made the 
 signal for seeing a fleet. I immediately spread abroad the signal for a line 
 a-breast, in order to draw all the ships of the squadron up with me. I had be- 
 fore sent the Magnanime a-head, to make the land. At ^ past nine, she made 
 the signal for an enemy. Observing, on my discovering them, that they made 
 off, I threw out the signal for seven ships nearest them to chase, and draw into 
 a line of battle a-head of me, and endeavoured to stop them till the rest of the 
 squadron should come up ; who were also to form as they chased, that no time 
 might be lost in the pursuit. That morning they were in chase of the Rochester, 
 Chatham, Portland, Falkland, Minerva, Vengeance, and Venus ; all which 
 joined me about eleven o'clock ; and in the evening the Sapphire from Quiberon 
 bay. All the day we had very fresh gales at N. W. and W. N. W. with heavy 
 squalls. M. Conflaus kept going off under such sail as all his squadron could 
 carry, and at the same time keep together ; while we crowded after him with 
 every sail our ships could bear. At half-past two, P. M., the fire beginning 
 a-head, I made the signal for engaging. We were then to the southward of 
 Belleisle ; and the French Admiral, headmost, soon after led round the Cardinals; 
 while his rear was in action. About four o'clock the Formidable struck, and a 
 little after, the Thesee and Superbe were sunk.* 
 
 * The late Admiral Philip Pattan, in his admirable " Strictures on Naval Discipline and the 
 Conduct of a Ship of War," p. 151, has the following observation. " In the action with Mons. 
 Conflans in 1759^ the Thesee and Superbe, of 7* guns each, were sunk, entirely by a want of 
 dexterity in hauling in the guns, and letting down the ports of the lower deck ; by which, not only the 
 ships, but about 1500 men, perished in a few minutes. I was myself an eye-witness of this disaster, 
 which has, in'many accounts of the action, been erroneously attributed to the fire of the British 
 fleet, but was evidently the effect of a squall of wind ; which, but for the dexterity and alertness 
 of our seamen, must also have been fatal to some of Admiral Hawke's ships. In this instance, the 
 consequence of a deficiency of seamanship was the complete destruction of two capital ships." This 
 little treatise by that able man, cannot be too much read by sea officers. 
 
62 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " About five the Heros struck, and came to anchor ; but, it blowing hard, 
 no boat could be sent on board her. Night was now come ; and, being on a part 
 of the coast among islands and shoals, of which we were totally ignorant; without 
 a pilot, as was the greatest part of the squadron ; and blowing hard on a lee 
 shore ; I made the signal to anchor ; and came to, in fifteen fathoms water ; the 
 island of Dumet bearing E. by N. between two and three miles ; the Cardinals 
 W. half S. and the steeple of Crozie S. E. as we found next morning. 
 
 " In the night we heard many guns of distress fired ; but, it blowing hard, 
 want of knowledge of the coast, and whether they were fired by a friend or an 
 enemy, prevented all means of relief. 
 
 " By day-break of the 21st, we discovered one of our ships dismasted ashore on 
 the Four ; the French Heros also ; and the Soleil Royal, which under cover of 
 the night had anchored among us, cut and ran ashore to the westward of Crozie. 
 On the latter's moving, I made the Essex's signal to slip and pursue her ; but 
 sbe unfortunately got upon the Four, and both she and the Resolution are 
 irrecoverably lost, notwithstanding we sent them all the assistance that the 
 weather would permit. About eighty-four of the Resolution's company, in spite of 
 the strongest remonstrances of their Captain, made rafts, and, with several French 
 prisoners belonging to the Forrmdable, put off, and I am afraid drove out to sea.* 
 All the Essex's are saved (with as many of the stores as possible) except one 
 lieutenant and a boat's crew, who were drove on the French shore, and have not 
 since been heard of. The remains of both ships are set on fire. We found the 
 Dorsetshire, Revenge, and Defiance, in the night of the 20th, put out to sea ; 
 as I hope the Swiftsure did; for she is still missing. The Dorsetshire and 
 Defiance returned next day, and the latter saw the Revenge without. Thus, 
 what loss we have sustained, has been owing to the weather, not the enemy ; 
 seven or eight of whose line of battle ships got to sea, I believe, the night of 
 the action. 
 
 " As soon as it was broad day-light in the morning of the 21st, I discovered 
 seven or eight of the enemy's line of battle ships at anchor, between Point Penvis 
 and the river Villaine ; on which I made the signal to weigh, in order to work 
 up and attack them ; but it blowed so hard from the N. W. that, instead of 
 daring to cast the squadron loose, I was obliged to strike top-gallant-masts. 
 Most of those ships appeared to be a-ground at low water ; but on the flood, by 
 lightening them, and the advantage of the wind under the land, all, except two, 
 got that night into the river Villaine. 
 
 * They got safe to tie French shore, and are abeady exchanged. 
 
HAWKE AND CONFLANS. 63 
 
 " The weather being moderate on the 22d, I sent the Portland, Chatham, 
 and Vengeance, to destroy the Soleil Royal and Heros. The French, on the 
 approach of our ships, set the first on fire ; and soon after the latter met the 
 same fate from our people. In the mean time, I got under way, and worked up 
 within Penvis Point, as well for the sake of its being a safer road, as to destroy, 
 if possible, the two ships of the enemy, which still lay without the Villaine. But 
 before the ships I sent a-head for that purpose could get near them, being quite 
 light, and with the tide of flood, they got in. 
 
 " All the 23d we were employed in reconnoitring the entrance of that river ; 
 which is very narrow, and only twelve feet water on the bar, at low water. We 
 discovered at least seven, if not eight, line of battle ships about half a mile 
 wiihin, quite light, and two large frigates moored across to defend the mouth of 
 the river ; only the frigates appeared to have guns in. By evening I had twelve 
 long boats fitted as fire-ships ready to attempt burning them, under cover of the 
 Sapphire and Coventry; but the weather being bad, and the wind contrary, 
 obliged me to defer it, till at least the latter should be favourable ; if they can 
 by any means be destroyed, it shall be done. 
 
 " In attacking a flying enemy, it was impossible, in the space of a short win- 
 ter's day, that all our ships should be able to get into action, or all those of the 
 enemy brought to it. The commanders and companies of such as did come up 
 with the rear of the French, on the 20th, behaved with the greatest intrepidity, 
 and gave the strongest proofs of a true British spirit. In the same manner, I am 
 satisfied, would those have acquitted themselves, whose bad-going ships, or the 
 distance they were at in the morning, prevented them from getting up. Our loss 
 by the enemy is not considerable ; for, in the ships which are now with me, I find 
 only one lieutenant and thirty-nine seamen and marines killed, and about 202 
 wounded. When I consider the season of the year, the hard gales on the day of 
 action, a flying enemy, the shortness of the day, and the coast we are on, I can 
 boldly afiirm, that all that could possibly be done has been done. As to the 
 loss we have sustained, let it be placed to the account of the necessity I was 
 under of running all risks to break this strong force of the enemy. Had we 
 had but two hours more day-light, the whole had been totally destroyed, or taken; 
 for we were almost up with their van when night overtook us." 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 " Hawke's pursuit and defeat of Conflaus appears to me one of the best 
 managed of our Naval Exploits."^ 
 
64 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 The Plate will sufficiently display the hazardous nature of this attack ; for 
 whether we consider the ardour and the mode adopted in the pursuit, or the 
 steady intrepidity and perseverance which marks its whole progress ; we are at a 
 loss to decide on which to bestow our greatest admiration. It remains, like other 
 glorious deeds of more recent date, a proud memorial of British enterprise, and 
 an object upon which sea officers may always dwell and reflect with peculiar 
 benefit and gratification. 
 
 It should not be overlooked, that the gallant Admiral directed the chasing 
 ships to form into line as they proceeded towards the enemy, but without in any 
 manner impeding their progress ; by this means, no time was lost ; and the ships 
 which were at first nearest to the French fleet, by putting themselves into line 
 as they advanced, were at once enabled to attack an equal number, whenever they 
 could reach them ; perhaps commencing the attack by inverting the line ; as 
 shown in the Figure. 
 
 From the season of the year, and the state of the weather, it was of infinite 
 importance to do promptly that which, otherwise, could not have been done 
 at all. The British Admiral did it, and did it efifectually ; for that 
 squadron could never appear again at sea. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 " It seems a curious fact, which indeed may be reduced to an effect of climate, 
 that all the long drawling actions are confined to the East and West Indies ; the 
 prompt, vigorous, decisive blows, to more northern regions ;* I think it was 
 Hawke who said, that only two signals were necessary when an enemy was 
 in sight ; namely, ' general chase and close action.' And when a Chief, con- 
 fident in himself, and inspired with the love of fame and his country's weal, 
 boldly outstrips the line of cautious prudence ; kind Providence (as if pleased 
 by being trusted) graciously interferes, and crowns the measure with success." 
 
 " Of Hawke's battle vdth Conflans, I'm pleased to see you dwell with warm 
 praise. I always reflect on this important victory con amore. It was the first, 
 and truly may I add, the last general action I was present at. Although sixty- 
 one years ago, I have as perfect a fecoUection of the glorious scene as if it had 
 
 * The author of this remark will forgive the making of at least one exception to it, when he is 
 reminded of an action (in the West Indies) in which he himself bore a conspicuous part. 
 
riATB IV 
 
HAWKE AND CONFLANS. 65 
 
 passed recently before my sight." — (See Monsieur de Conflans' account. Annual 
 Register, 1759.) 
 
 When Sir Edward Hawke was a Captain, advancing to the top of the list, at 
 a time when a promotion of Flag Officers was in agitation ; the expediency of 
 passing over several, or, as it was familiarly termed, of " Yellowing " them, was 
 talked over very freely at the Admiralty, and in the hearing of Admiral or 
 Captain Boscawen. 
 
 Upon its being proposed to yellow Captain Hawke, Boscawen immediately 
 interposed, and declared that if they yellowed him, they would lose one of the 
 bravest men and finest fellows in the service. 
 
 Plate IV; Fig. 1, exhibits the situation of the fleets at half-past two p. m. 
 when the Admiral (see his Letter, page 61, line 26) made the signal for 
 engaging. 
 
 Fig. 2, exhibits their situation at day-light, on the morning of the 21st, where 
 
 B, shows the British squadron at anchor. 
 
 G, the four British ships that kept the sea OU: the night of the 20th. 
 
 C, the ships on liC Four. 
 
 D, the Soleil Royal, lost near Croize. 
 F, the French ships at anchor. 
 
 In 1762, a successful expedition was undertaken against Martinico, under 
 General Monckton, and Rear Admiral Rodney, followed by the capture of 
 St. Lucia, the Grenades, and St. Vincent. 
 
 In this year also the celebrated attack upon the Havannah was at length 
 crowned with complete success. In this dreadful siege, three line of battle 
 ships were anchored against the strong fortress of the Moro, commanding the 
 entrance ; after seven hours of incessant firing, and extreme suffering, it was 
 necessary to withdraw them, with heavy loss. (See Annual Register for 1762.) 
 
 In 1763, the memorable capture of Manilla, and the Phillippine Islands, by 
 General Draper," and " Admiral Cornish." 
 
 K 
 
66 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 There is also a private expedition against Buenos Ayres, commanded by Com- 
 modore Macnamara, in the ship Clive, which ship took fire, and was destroyed 
 with the great loss of lives, under peculiar circumstances of horror and distress. 
 (See Annual Register for 1763.) 
 
 ADMIRAL THE HON. AUGUSTUS KEPPEL, AND THE 
 FRENCH FLEET UNDER D^ORVILLIERS. 
 
 Extract of Admiral KeppePs Letter, dated Victory, at sea, July 30, 1778. 
 
 " My letters by the Peggy and Union cutters acquainted you, for their 
 Lordships' information, that I was in pursuit of a numerous fleet of French ships 
 of war. 
 
 " From that time till the 2l7th, the winds constantly in the S. W. and N. W. 
 quarters, sometimes blowing strong, and the French fleet always to windward 
 going off", I made use of every method to close in with them that was possible ; 
 keeping the King's ships at the same time collected, as much as the nature of 
 a pursuit would admit of, and the disinclination that appeared in the enemy to 
 come to close action. The morning of the 27th the wind admitted of the van of 
 the King's fleet under my command leading up with, and closing with their 
 centre and rear. 
 
 " The French began firing upon the headmost of Vice-Admiral Sir Robert 
 Harland's division as they led up ; which cannonade the Vice-Admiral and the 
 rest of the ships returned as they could close up. The chase had occasioned their 
 being extended ; nevertheless they were all soon in battle. 
 
 " The fleets being upon different tacks, passed each other very close : the 
 object of the French seemed to be the disabling the King's ships in their masts 
 and sails, in which they so far succeeded as to prevent many ships of my fleet 
 being able to follow me when I wore to stand after the French fleet ; this 
 obliged me to wear again, to join those ships, and thereby allowed of the French 
 forming their fleet again, and ranging it in a line to leeward." 
 
 OBSERVATION. 
 
 Although it appears that the wind had been variable, and the weathe* 
 
ADMIRAL KEPPEL. 67 
 
 unsettled during the pursuit of the French fleet, yet no mention is made in the 
 Admiral's letter of a change of wind, upon the approximation of the two 
 fleets. 
 
 Mr. Clerk, in his account of this battle, states, that " the wind veering a 
 little about to the south at this critical moment, favoured the fleet of the French 
 by enabling them to lie better up, while of course the British fell off;" 
 
 Plate V, Fig. 1, describes the position of the fleets when passing on 
 opposite tacks, and when the change of wind takes place ; showing the effects of 
 it in the different directions of the heads of the leading ships in both lines. 
 
 Fig. 2 is intended to show in what manner the action might have been 
 renewed by the British fleet. 
 
 Extract from the " Remembrancer" vol. 6. 
 
 " The circumstances of the engagement are very easy to be understood. 
 
 " The French were standing off against the wind ; Admiral Keppel was fol- 
 lowing them : and while the French were standing one way, and he another, he 
 managed by means of good seamanship, and a little shifting of the wind, to 
 bring up a great part of the ships of his line so near to the centre and rear of 
 theirs, that they were enabled to carry on a smart engagement as they passed. 
 
 Mr. Keppel's bringing up his ships in this manner, without regard to 
 regularity, against a fleet of superior force, drawn up in perfect line, and to 
 windward of him, is considered as a most daring manoeuvre, and such as could 
 proceed only from a determination to bring the enemy to action on any terms, 
 and a thorough consciousness of naval superiority. When the two lines had 
 completely passed, Mr. Keppel gave the signal to ware. 
 
 " His own ship, and a few others of his division, were the first that got round, 
 and were very near the French ; but before the others could form the line (the 
 time necessary for which may partly be conceived, by considering that Mr. 
 Keppel's line was at one time ten miles in extent) the day was beginning to 
 close," &c. 
 
 In the same book are to be found different accounts of the proceedings of the 
 French fleet upon the same occasion, translated from the " Journal of the King's 
 fleet," published in the Gazette of France, and from an officer in the French 
 fleet. A few extracts are selected. 
 
 " No sooner was the line formed, than Admiral d'Orvilliers plainly perceived 
 the intention of the English Admiral was to fall upon the rear of the French 
 
 K 2 
 
68 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 fleet, and to extend his line alongside of it : to prevent which, he caused the 
 whole fleet to tack together, and that the former order of the line should be 
 reversed ; the blue squadron to compose the van, the white the centre, and the 
 blue and white the rear-guard. By this bold manoeuvre, which was extremely 
 well executed, he was enabled to counteract the designs of the English Admiral, 
 to assist the blue squadron, and take of the enemy the same advantage they 
 intended taking of the French fleet ; which was now drawn up in the best order 
 on that line. When the van of the English fleet came up, they found it upon 
 the other tack in order of battle," &c. " The fire was very hot on both 
 sides for about three hours, during which it was evident that the fire from the 
 French ships was quicker than of the English. The position of the English to 
 leeward, gave them the advantage of using their lower-deck guns, which 
 Admiral d'Orvilliers was anxious to deprive them of; he therefore made a signal 
 for the blue squadron to veer by a successive movement, and for the rest to follow 
 and range in order of battle upon the starboard tack. That movement was 
 afterwards well executed, but nevertheless was too much delayed to follow close, 
 and extend the line from rear to van of the English fleet as the Admiral 
 intended." These accounts are too diffuse and contradictory to aflFord 
 any further information ; but with respect to the firing, it is but justice to 
 make a short extract from the letter of an English officer in the same 
 engagement. 
 
 " Sir Hugh Palliser was persuaded, that if the wind and the situation of the 
 ships would have admitted of his being alongside of the Bretagne for ten 
 minutes, she must have struck; as her decks were cleared of men, and she 
 returned only about twenty-five guns, very slowly, in return for near three 
 broadsides which he fired at her," &c. 
 
 In the " Universal Magazine" for August, 1778, it is positively asserted, by 
 a writer of " cool thoughts " on that engagement, that Admiral Keppel had 
 received orders not to take a single ship from the enemy — that it was resolved, 
 " rather to suffer the British navy to perish in the sea, than to let the laurel of 
 victolry crown the brow of a Whig Admiral,* warm with zealous feelings, ripe 
 
 * An order of this nature may have been given to Admiral Keppel when he sailed on his first 
 cruize : and from the conduct of the Licome, French frigate, to the America, and that of the 
 Arethusa to the BeUe-Poule, each country laid the aggression at the door of the other. Admirar 
 Keppel returned on the 26th of June, and sailed again probably with fresh instructions, on the 9th 
 of July. — (See State Papers, and the letters of Admiral Keppel, upon this subject dated at sea, June 
 18th and 20th, in the " Maritime Campaign of 1778," by J. M., Lieutenant in the fleet.) 
 
ADMIRAL KEPPEL. 69 
 
 to execute a glorious revenge :" but that these instructions were not opened until 
 he was actually in chase of the French fleet. " That the Admiral had orders 
 not to make a single capture, I positively aver." — (See, as above, p. 96, from the 
 " Gazetteer," " Cool Thoughts on the late Naval Engagements," signed with 
 the initials D. G.) 
 
 These are mysteries into which the writer does not intend to enter — certain it 
 is, that little impression was made upon the French fleet. The apple of discord 
 was thrown into the British navy ; distrust followed all the measures of the 
 government ; while at the same time the character of one brave ofiicer was 
 blasted for ever, and the other certainly acquired no additional merit in the 
 estimation of his countrymen. 
 
 The French fleet, it is shown, passed round the rear of the British fleet, and 
 formed in line of battle to leeward, on the starboard tack. 
 
 At this period both our code of signals and our naval discipline were very 
 defective ; and the delay consequent upon the mode of commuincating orders, 
 that of messages by boats or ships, and the unaccountable conduct of Sir H. 
 Palliser and his division, appear to be the only reasons why the British Admiral 
 did not fall upon the enemy to leeward of him. 
 
 Of a cannonade when passing on opposite tacks, it may be observed, that we 
 are too apt to consider it of more importance than it deserves ; for when ships are 
 passing each other at the rate of five miles an hour, or even at a less rate, little 
 real effect can be expected from it. Mr. Clerk has very clearly shown, that to 
 go much less than five miles per hour, under such circumstances, would not be 
 prudent, and at that rate of going, ships are firing at an object passing them 
 at the rate of ten ; and, with all the imposing appearance of fighting, much 
 ammunition must be wasted : the remarks of Mr, Clerk upon this subject strongly 
 merit the attention of sea officers. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 " In the account of this action, it is asserted that Keppel had orders not to 
 take a single ship : this is at least very improbable, or at all events it is clear that 
 he did not intend to have obeyed them. The very circumstance of his being a 
 WTiig would have urged him for his country's sake to have gained a victory, 
 which would have insured his popularity, and the disclosure of the order in ques- 
 tion must have ruined the Tory party ; besides, had such an order existed, he 
 would have produced it at his trial. 
 
70 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " The proposed plan to tack the British fleet together would certainly have 
 been the best ; but it appears they were not in a condition to eflFect it, as many 
 were prevented following the Admiral when he wore to stand after the enemy. 
 
 " Admiral Keppel lost his chance of a victory by not passing through the 
 enemy's line with his van before the shift of wind ; which, as it took place 
 afterwards, prevented any support being given from the van to the enemy's 
 rear. 
 
 " Admiral Keppel lost another opportunity of defeating the French fleet, by 
 not attacking it in the night. ' By night or by day,'* in fine weather or foul, no 
 opportunity should be lost, of bringing the adverse fleet to a close decisive action. 
 Such are the chances of shifts of wind, &c. in nautical proceedings, that delay 
 is more than dangerous ; it is almost certain ruin in the presence of an enemy's 
 fleet. See the truth of this in the case of single ships. 
 
 " The Renown, Captain Dawson, by not engaging the Languedoc in the 
 night, lost an opportunity of destroying the ship of the French Commander-in- 
 Chief; Captain Dawson resolved to lie by her till the morning, when six French 
 ships hove in sight. Commodore Hotham, in the Preston of fifty guns, fell in 
 with the Tonnant of eighty guns, with only her main-mast standing; he engaged 
 her with great advantage till night obliged him to draw offj with the same 
 intention as that of Captain Dawson ; but met with the same disappointment 
 and from the same source — ^the sudden appearance of more of the enemy's 
 fleet." 
 
 Mr. Clerk, in his Recapitulation of his Remarks on this battle, comes to the 
 following just conclusions : 
 
 " Suppose, for example, that two, three, or more ships, are passing each 
 other on opposite tacks at the rate of five miles per hour ; then will the velocity 
 of the transit be equal to ten ; or, which is the same thing, let us suppose, for 
 the sake of demonstration, the one fleet at rest, and the other in motion, at the 
 rate of ten miles per hour ; then each ship of the squadron in motion v^dll pass 
 through 880 feet in one minute of time. 
 
 " According to which, then, each ship of the squadron A, will pass each ship 
 of the enemy F, with the interval between ships included, in one minute ; that 
 is, she will make a transit of 880 feet, or 300 yards (the general allowance of 
 
 * " If I fall in with the French fleet in the night I shall engage them immediately ; they do 
 badly in the day, but much worse by night." — Lord Nelson. 
 
 This was said by the great Chief during his memorable pursuit of a superior force to the West 
 Indies in 1805. , . ,, / / ^ 
 
FT. ATE r 
 
 » 
 
 Fu/.l. 
 
 F 
 
 . '1?, -^ ^ ^ s^ \ii±. '*-' - 
 
 '^^^^^^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^i^ 
 
 _D -\ 
 
 ^ 
 
 Fij^. 2. 
 
 / 
 
 ^ 
 ^ ^ 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^ ^ # ^ ^;* * * i^ ^ ^ . 
 
 1^ 
 
 # 
 
 # 
 
ADMIRAL KEPPEL. 71 
 
 space for ships drawn up in line of battle), in one minute. — (See his Plate IV, 
 Fig. 13. 
 
 " Therefore, if the two fleets did pass one another on the 27th of July, J 778, 
 at the rate of five miles per hour, and if it were possible that the loading of a 
 ship's gun could be repeated once every minute of time, still each British ship 
 could be exposed to the fire of each French ship during the space of one quarter 
 of a minute only ; that is, while the two ships were in direct opposition ; and as 
 there were twenty-six ships of the enemy, each ship, on the whole, could be 
 exposed to a cannonade of six minutes only. And if the fleets had passed each 
 other at the rate of two miles and a half per hour (a motion absolutely necessary 
 to make a ship answer the rudder well) each ship would then be exposed to a fire 
 of 13 minutes' duration. 
 
 " By such investigation only can it be explained, how two adverse fleets, 
 amounting to thirty ships of the line each, carrying above 36,000 men, after 
 having been brought in opposition of battle, and mutually sustaining a furious 
 cannonade from above 4,000 guns, besides musquetry ; how I say, they have 
 been brought to, to be separated again, without effect ; without the smallest ap- 
 parent decision, &c. 
 
 " From all which it must be concluded, that the most artful management of 
 sails, the closest approximation, or the most spirited cannonade, will avail 
 nothing under such circumstances ; and that it is in vain to hope that ever any 
 thing material can be effected against an enemy's fleet keeping to windward, 
 passing on contrary tacks, and desirous to go off", unless his line of battle can be 
 cut in twain, or some such other step can be devised, as has already been 
 described." 
 
 Mr. Clerk has left nothing further to be said upon this subject. We shall 
 therefore proceed with pleasure to give some account of the conduct of Lord 
 Howe in America ; and afterwards of that of the Honourable Samuel Barrington 
 with the Count d'Estaing in the West Indies. 
 
 Plate V, Fig. 1. The fleets on opposite tacks, exchanging fire on passing, 
 when a change of wind takes place. 
 
 A, the direction of the wind, when the centres of the opposing fleets meet and 
 exchange fire. 
 
 D, the change of wind ; by which the van of the British fleet falls off; while 
 
72 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 that of the enemy, wishing to avoid an action, lies higher up. The change of 
 wind drawing forward on the British fleet, and aft upon the French fleet, afifects 
 them differently (on opposite tacks), as described in the figure. 
 
 Fig. 2. Proposed mode of attack by the British fleet tacking together. By 
 this method it is apparent, that every ship of the British fleet would most likely 
 succeed in getting closely engaged with those of the enemy, either to windward 
 or to leeward. 
 
 A, the direction of the wind as before, which brought the French fleet down 
 upon that of England. 
 
 D, the direction of the wind after the change, which enables the fleet B, after 
 tacking together, to lie up for the enemy, as in the figure ; and, should the 
 enemy, taking advantage of the change, haul their wind together, as at E, G ; 
 still, by carrying a press of sail, the fleet B may bring him to action upon equal 
 terms. 
 
 Should the disabled state of the leeward fleet render this difficult, the wind- 
 ward fleet will have time to form a new line of battle ; or if of equal or superior 
 force, it might draw out into two lines. The ship of the Commander-in-chief 
 hauling up to lead the weather division. The body of the leeward fleet would 
 then advance between them. The weather fleet forming upon the dotted lines, 
 as in the Plate (5). 
 
 LORD HOWE AND D'ESTAING, 
 
 OFF SANDY HOOK. 
 
 As the conduct of Lord Howe on the coast of America is little known, and 
 therefore cannot be properly estimated, some account of the operations of the 
 squadron under his command, as given by an officer serving in the fleet, cannot 
 be unacceptable. It is contained in a small, scarce pamphlet, published soon 
 after the events took place ; and is accompanied by a plan of the situation of the 
 fleet at Sandy Hook. 
 
 All matter not relative to the positions, or hostile intentions of the two fleets, 
 has been carefully avoided, for the pamphlet contains much on the neglect shown 
 them by the naval authorities at home. 
 
HOWE AND D'ESTAING. 73 
 
 It 
 
 A candid and impartial Narrative of the Transactions of the Fleet, 
 under the Command of Lord Howe (in 1778^, from the Arrival of the 
 Toulon Squadron on the Coast of America to the Time of his Lordship's 
 Departure for England. With Observations, hy an Officer then serving 
 in the Fleet. 
 
 " ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 " The design of the following narrative is to do justice to a great and good 
 man, by the best mode of justification that can be offered in his favour ; a plain 
 statement of facts, an impartial account of his actions, submitted to public 
 view. 
 
 " The writer acknowledges, that he has not the honour of being in Lord 
 Howe's secrets, or of being even distantly connected with him : yet the facts he 
 relates will bear the strictest scrutiny, in point of truth ; and his observations 
 on those facts shall be such as he formed on the spot ; such as arose from his own 
 feelings at the time, or were suggested to him by officers of the first character, 
 both in the navy and army. If he assign the reasons and motives of any of his 
 Lordship's operations, or advert to the instructions and intelligence communicated 
 to him from home, he does it from subsequent information, and chiefly from his 
 Lordship's public letters." 
 
 " He thinks the public have a right to be informed of the important services 
 Lord Howe has rendered to his country. 
 
 " The narrative is confined to that period in which the writer had the honour 
 to serve under his Lordship." 
 
 " A CANDID AND IMPARTIAL NARRATIVE. 
 
 " In consequence of the advices from England, with which the Porcupine 
 arrived in the Delaware, in the beginning of May, Lord Howe began imme- 
 diately to collect his scattered force. To the surprise of those who were ignorant 
 of his motives, he called in his cruizers from the Chesapeak, and the other 
 parts of the coast : and ordered the large ships firom Rhode Island and 
 New York to assemble at the mouth of the Delaware. The transports and 
 victuallers were cleared from the wharves of Philadelphia with as much ex- 
 pedition as the moving of the army would admit; and on the 18th of June, 
 Sir H. Clinton having completed the evacuation of Philadelphia, and entered 
 
 L 
 
74 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 tlie Jerseys on his route to New York, the whole fleet assembled below 
 Reedy Island. 
 
 " On leaving the Delaware, which calms and contrary winds rendered 
 impracticable till the 28th of June, Lord Howe divided the fleet into different 
 squadrons ; each squadron under the immediate inspection of particular Captains : 
 and ordering Captain Hammond to remain about the Capes, vfith. some light 
 cruizers proceeded in the Eagle to New York, attended by the Trident, carrying 
 the Commissioners, and the Maidstone frigate. 
 
 " The fleet was particularly fortunate in its passage. The Eagle anchored at the 
 Hook, the day (June 29th) after she had cleared Cape Henlopen ; and we all joined 
 her the following evening. By equal good fortune. Sir H. Clinton gained the 
 heights of Neversink the succeeding morning, after a long and fatiguing march. 
 Washington had for several days hung on his rear, and harassed him by small 
 parties ; till, by endeavouring, on the 28th, to cut . off the baggage of the 
 English army, he brought on a sharp action at Freehold ; wherein our rear- 
 guard repulsed two large detachments under La Fayette and Lee, and beat them 
 back to the main body of the rebel army ; pursuing them for four miles with 
 much slaughter. The chief loss sustained by the British was the death of Col. 
 ]\Ionkton, one of the bravest officers in the army, and of the best beloved. 
 
 " June 29th, the morning of the day on which Lord Howe arrived at the 
 Hook, he was met at sea by the Grantham packet, express from England. 
 
 " She brought advice that the Toulon squadron had sailed for America on the 
 13th of April; and informed his Lordship, that she had been chased by them, 
 in a southern latitude, at no great distance from the coast. Her dispatches, 
 bearing date the 2d of May, mentioned a strong reinforcement to be sent imme- 
 diately, under Vice Admiral Byron, for Hallifax. 
 
 " The utmost expedition was now requisite to take off the troops ; that, with 
 the transports and victuallers, they might be placed in safety, and the fleet got 
 in readiness for sea, to act as circumstances should require ; and vdth a view to 
 the destination of the squadron under Admiral Byron. The' enemy did not dare 
 to pass the heights of Middleton : the sick and wounded were therefore em- 
 barked without molestation, and the artillery and baggage taken off", while a 
 bridge of boats was throwing over the channel that separates Sandy Hook from 
 the main. 
 
 " This work was entrusted to Captain Duncan, and executed with the usual 
 zeal and promptitude of that vigilant and industrious officer. On the 5th of 
 July, the whole army passed into the island, and from thence were carried in flat 
 boats on board the fleet, without the loss of man. a Lord Howe attended in 
 
HOWE AND D'ESTAING. 75 
 
 person, as usual ; and by his presetice animated the zeal, and quickened the in- 
 dustry, of officers and men. 
 
 *' This important service was scarcely performed, and Commodore Hotham, 
 with the men of war that lay off the town of New York, arrived at the Hook 
 (July 7th), when a lieutenant from Captain Gardiner, whom the Vice Admiral 
 had dispatched to the southward on the 1st of July, returned in a letter of 
 marque, acquainting his Lordship, that the Toulon squadron was seen by the 
 Maidstone, on the coast of Virginia, the 5th of the month ; that, by their 
 course, they seemed at first to be bound for the Chesapeak; but that on 
 attending their motions to the morning of the 8th, Captain Gardner had left 
 them at anchor in the Delaware. This account was confirmed the same evening, 
 by the arrival of the Roebuck, and some of our small cruizers ; and while the 
 Vice Admiral was employed, in consequence, in collecting his small force, and 
 preparing for every emergency, the Captain of the Zebra arrived (July 11th) on 
 board the Eagle; bringing intelligence, that a fleet of 12 sail of two decked ships, 
 and three frigates, appeared the evening before, under French colours, holding 
 their course for New York. At 12 o'clock the same day, a signal was made 
 from one of our frigates without the bar, that they had hove in sight ; and in the 
 afternoon they were observed to come to anchor off Shrewsbury Inlet, about four 
 miles from Sandy Hook. 
 
 " It is not in the power of words to do justice to the spirit that blazed forth 
 throughout the navy and army on this occasion. Six sail of sixty-four gun ships, 
 three of fifty, two of forty, with some frigates and sloops, for the most part 
 wretchedly manned, were all the force Lord Howe had to oppose to twelve sail 
 of two-deck ships, and three frigates. Of these, one carried ninety guns, one 
 eighty, six were of seventy-four guns, three of sixty- four, one of fifty ; the least 
 of the frigates mounted thirty-six. Their complement in men was above eleven 
 thdusand. Yet the spirit of Britons, roused by the superior genius of one man, 
 and influenced to second his exertions to a height of emulation scarcely paralleled 
 in history, set them at defiance. 
 
 " A thousand volunteers from the transports presented themselves to man the 
 fleet. Scarce could the agents detain sufficient hands for the watch of their 
 respective ships. Many, whose names were omitted in the lists given in to the 
 . Adjutant of the fleet,* were found concealed in the boats, which carried their 
 more fortunate companions on board the several men of war. The army, 
 idolatrous of the Admirats character, were equally forward and impatient to 
 
 * Probably the Admiral's Captain, as there is no such officer in a British fleet. 
 
 L 2 
 
76 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 signcdhe their %eal, in a line of service, new, and, independent of the spirit 
 that animated them, unpleasant and disgusting to men unaccustomed to a sea 
 life. The grenadiers and light infantry, scarcely recruited from the fatigues of 
 a toilsome and dangerous march ; many of the officers with their wounds still 
 green ; were obliged to cast lots, to determine the companies which, with the 
 General's approbation, were accepted to serve as marines. The masters and 
 mates of the merchantmen and traders in the harbour, solicited employment with 
 equal earnestness and spirit. 
 
 " Several of them took their stations at the guns with the common saUors : 
 others obtained permission to put out to sea in their small swift-sailing shallops, 
 to alarm such ships as might be bound for the port, and to look out for Byron's 
 fleet, if fortunately it should reach the coast. One, in particular, his name was 
 Duncan, with a spirit of disinterested bravery, and in language worthy of an old 
 Roman, wrote for leave to convert his ship, the whole hopes of his fortune, into 
 a fire- vessel, to be conducted by himself; rejecting every mention of reward ! 
 
 " What then must have been the feelings of that man, who shared the glory 
 with his country ; and who, notwithstanding the unaffected modesty of his 
 character, must have been conscious that all this zeal and emulation, in both 
 corps, was as much personal to himself, as he boasted it to be national ! 
 
 " Encouraged by such earnests of determined bravery in the men, and assured 
 of the merit and skill of his seconds and officers, he lost not a moment in forming 
 his disposition. The Eagle and Trident, the Isis, Roebuck, Phoenix, and Pearl, 
 which had moved up to Staten Island to take in water, with the Ardent, from 
 which Gambier had been ordered to shift his flag ; fell down from the watering 
 place on the first intimation of the approach of the French. A contrary wind 
 preventing them from joining the detachment of the squadron that had been left 
 at the Hook, with all the expedition the danger seemed to require, the Vice- 
 Admiral quitted the Eagle, and throwing himself into his barge, hastened to 
 the ships below. But d'Estaing, instead of crossing the bar immediately, in the 
 hope of surprising our fleet, which it was natural to suppose he came prepared to 
 attempt, anchored, as is before mentioned, at the distance of four miles from 
 the Hook. 
 
 " Here he remained for several days, employed at times in sounding the bar, and 
 wearing every appearance of a determination to enter and attack the port. Lord 
 Howe improved this interval, by placing his ships in the strongest position the 
 channel within the Hook would admit. He sounded its several depths in person ; 
 he ascertained the dififerent settings of the currents ; and, from the observations 
 thus made, formed different plans with a view to the points of wind with which 
 
HOWE AND D'ESTAING. 77 
 
 d'Estaing might resolve to cross the bar. These plans, with the grounds on 
 which they rested, he daily communicated to the Commodores and Captains ; 
 soliciting their opinions, and desirous of profiting by their objections. His line 
 he lengthened by the addition of the Leviathan store-ship, manned by volunteers 
 for the occasion, and supplied with cannon from the train. A battery of two 
 howitzers, and one of three eighteen-pounders, was erected on the point, round 
 which the enemy must have passed to enter the channel ; while four regiments, 
 under the command of Colonel O'Hara, were ordered by General Clinton to the 
 Hook, lest the enemy should attempt to possess it, and annoy us from so 
 dangerous a quarter. 
 
 " In the mean time, we had the daily mortification to see several of our traders 
 fall into the enemy's hands. The Stanley, armed brig, commanded by a gallant 
 young man, son to Sir Charles Whitworth, with five prizes, anchored in the 
 midst of their fleet during the night, thinking them to be British ; and was 
 boarded before he could discover the mistake. Several tenders, however, and 
 advice-boats, escaped over the flats, and prevented the Hope, with a convoy from 
 HaUifax, from adding to our losses and indignation. 
 
 " From the time the French squadron first anchored off Shrewsbury, boats 
 and small vessels were seen constantly passing to and from the shore, for 
 supplies of water and provisions. On the 211st of July this intercourse was 
 observed to cease ; and it was, in consequence, supposed that some movement was 
 in agitation. The succeeding day proved our conjectures to be well founded. 
 The wind blew fresh at north-east ; and by eight o'clock, d'Estaing, with all his 
 squadron, appeared under way. He kept working to windward, as if to gain a 
 proper position for crossing the bar by the time the tide should serve. The wind 
 could not be more favourable for such a design ; it blew from the exact point by 
 which he could attack us to the greatest advantage. The spring tides were at 
 the highest, and that afternoon thirty feet on the bar. We consequently 
 expected the hottest day that had ever been fought between the two nations. 
 On our side all was at stake. Had the men of war been defeated, the fleet of 
 transports and victuallers must have heen destroyed, and the army, of course, 
 have fallen with us ; yet, under Heaven, we had not the least doubt of success. 
 D'Estaing, however, had not spirit equal to the risk ; at three o'clock, we saw 
 him bear off to the southward, and in a few hours he was out of sight. 
 
 " The French fleet had a tedious passage. After arriving on the coast, 
 twenty-four hours were thrown away in chasing the Mermaid ; and they after- 
 wards remained forty-eight hours at anchor in the Delaware. Lord Howe (for 
 this depended on his own vigilance and activity) had the earliest intelligence of 
 
78 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 their approach ; and was iustantly informed of all theiir movements. He had 
 time to place the fleet of transports in safety ; to see the army equally secure ; 
 to concentrate his forces, and form such dispositions, as, in the eiid, effectually 
 disappointed the sanguine hopes of the rebels, and their faithless allies ; and 
 defeated the chief object of this boasted and admirably concerted expedition. 
 We experienced, no doubt, the worst of insults and mortifications. A British 
 fleet blocked up by a squadron of Frenchmen ! and in our own harbour ! Vessels 
 bearing English colourSj daily captured in our sight ! To have gone out to their 
 assistance, even had it been practicable, would have been the extreme of 
 madness ; since to have been able to defend ourselves where we lay, would, in 
 the opinion of the most gallant officers in the fleet, have been the utmost that 
 human valour could accomplish. 
 
 *' The French squadron continuing to stand to sea, on the afternoon of the 22d 
 of July, instructions were sent to the advice-boats that were stationed on the flats 
 without the bar to follow and observe their motions. From the unanimous 
 report of the people of the country, who escaped to us from the Jersey shore, as 
 well as from d'Estaing's movements previous to that afternoon, it was gathered 
 that the enemy's design was to force the port of New York. It was not 
 unreasonable therefore to suppose, that their bearing away to the southward was 
 owing to the appearance of an easterly gale, which, as it should blow directly on 
 the coast, must have rendered their former situation extremely dangerous ; and 
 that their return might speedily be expected. Advice, however, was received, that 
 they were seen on the morning of the 23d, about thirty leagues from the land, 
 in the latitude of the Delaware, steering by the wind, which was then at East, 
 on the larboard tack. The Delaware frigate was ordered on the look-out ; and 
 we at the same time received an unexpected accession of force, by the arrival of 
 the Renown from the West Indies (July 26th). Even a single fifty gun ship 
 was then of such infinite consequence to us, that it was matter of exultation in 
 the fleet, to learn that she had passed unnoticed through the rear of the French, 
 in the dusk of the preceding evening. 
 
 " The same day, the Dispatch returned from Hallifax. As the Admiralty 
 had given Lord Howe to understand, that Byron's squadron was destined for 
 that port (why they should have been destined for that port, was not within 
 the powers of common sense to guess),* his Lordship had ordered this sloop 
 thither on the first certain knowledge he had that the French fleet were advanced 
 to the Delaware. Her dispatches brought no mention of Byron ; but they made 
 
 * A mistake ; — see Note at the end 
 
HOWE AND D'ESTAING. 79 
 
 some amends, by informing the Admiral, that the Raisonable and Centurion 
 were on their way to New York ; and in two or three days they both joined us 
 in safety. The Raisonable so narrowly escaped the French fleet, that she saw 
 them the evening of the 27th, steering for Rhode Island. Had those ships 
 appeared a few days sooner, either they must have been prevented from forming 
 a junction with our squadron, and forced again to sea ; or we should have had the 
 mortification to see them increase the triumph of our enemy. 
 
 " The same would also have been the fate of the Cornwall, a seventy-four gun 
 ship of Byron's squadron, that crossed the bar on the 30th. 
 
 " The fortunate junction of so many detached ships, and their arriving at so 
 happy a moment, counterbalanced, in some degree, this alarming intelligence. 
 It was now known for certain, that the French fleet had sailed for Rhode Island ; 
 and whatever little prospect of success our force, even after the late addition, 
 could open to us, yet the post was of such importance, and the fate of so large a 
 portion of the British army as formed the garrison of such infinite consequence 
 to the general cause, that it was imagined the Admiral would not lose a moment 
 in making some attempt for their relief The accounts received by his Lordship, 
 subsequent to the report of the Raisonable, as appears from the public letters, 
 favoured such an attempt. These accounts intimated, that on the morning of 
 the 29 th, the French fleet had appeared off Newport Harbour ; that two of their 
 frigates had entered the Seconnet passage the same day ; that the next morning 
 two line of battle ships had run up the Naraganset passage, and anchored off the 
 North end of Conanicut ; and that the remainder of the squadron were at 
 anchor without Bren ton's Ledge, about five miles from the town. In this 
 divided situation, some opportunity might offfer, of which advantage could be 
 taken, for the relief of the garrison ; and the preparations for sea were hastened 
 with this view. The 23d regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Balfour, came down volunteers to serve on board the fleet ; relieving the grena- 
 diers and light infantry, whom Sir H. Clinton had withdrawn to be re-embodied. 
 Two additional fire-ships, constructed by the Vice Admiral's orders, joined him 
 at the same time, and all things were in readiness for sea by the 1st of August. 
 
 " But the signal to weigh had scarce been made, when the wind veered round 
 to the southward, and not returning fair so as to correspond with the time of high 
 water on the bar, till the morning of the 6th, we could not make Rhode Island 
 before the evening of the 9th ; when we anchored between point Judith and the 
 light-house. From the report of the frigates sent on a-head, the French fleet 
 were at anchor within the harbour. By this means, the communication with 
 Brenton's Neck was open, and the Vice Admiral had an opportunity of receiving 
 
so NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 immediate intelligence, both from Sir R. Pigot and Captain Brisbane. They 
 informed him that d'Estaing, after having remained at anchor off Brenton's 
 Ledge from the 29th of July, had, the afternoon before we arrived, entered the 
 harbour under an easy sail ; cannonading the town and batteries as he passed, 
 and receiving their fire, without any material effect on either side ; and anchored 
 above the town, between Goat Island and Conanicut : that the two line of 
 battle ships still kept their stations in the Naraganset, and the frigates in the 
 Seconnet : that the Wednesday before we appeared, it had been found necessary 
 to destroy the Orpheus, Lark, Juno, and Cerberus frigates ; that several 
 merchantmen had been sunk in the channel, to prevent the enemy from 
 approaching near enough to attack the batteries to advantage ; and that, on 
 d'Estaing's entering the harbour, the Flora and Falcon had also been sunk ; 
 that the men belonging to the several ships were all on shore, and encamped by 
 themselves, to be disposed of at the General's pleasure. 
 
 " From Sir R. Pigot he learned that the rebel army, with which the Toulon 
 squadron was to co-operate, was assembled on the Connecticut shore, all round 
 the island. Small parties of them had taken possession of Conanicut, from 
 whence he had previously withdrawn his troops, as he had also from all the 
 out-posts on the northern extremity of Rhode Island. Craft of all kinds were ready 
 to transport the enemy to whatever part they should mark out for the descent. 
 Sir Robert had caused several additional works to be thrown up on the heights 
 adjacent to Newport ; to which he meant to confine his defence ; and was himself 
 posted, with his chief strength, on Tommeney HiU, a very high eminence, that 
 commands the principal approaches to the town. 
 
 " Various were the conjectures throughout the fleet, with regard to the 
 probable resolutions which the Vice Admiral might form in consequence of 
 those advices. The French, with aU their former superiority of force, now enjoyed 
 a position infinitely stronger than that on which we depended at Sandy Hook. 
 The rebels were possessed of the left-hand shore, the whole length of the harbour 
 They consequently could not only annoy us on our entrance and approach from 
 the craggy heights of Conanicut, close to which we must have passed, but in 
 the course of an attack against d'Estaing, as he then lay, bring whatever number 
 of guns they chose to bear upon us from the northern extremity of that island. 
 The most skilful ofiicers were therefore of opinion that the Vice Admiral could 
 not risk an attack; and it appears by his Lordship's public letter, that this 
 was also his own opinion : under such circumstances, he judged it was 
 impracticable to afford the General any essential relief. 
 
 " The next morning totally altered the scene. The wind had changed to the 
 
HOWE AND D'ESTAING. 81 
 
 north-east, and blew directly out of the harbour. About eight o'clock, a heavy 
 cannonade was heard towards the town ; and, in a short time, the French squadron 
 appeared standing out to sea with all their sail abroad. Ten sail formed a line 
 of battle a-head, advancing through the middle channel, and were joined without 
 the light-house by the two ships from the Naraganset. Lord Howe immediately 
 made the signal to get under way ; and the British fleet stood to sea. By this 
 movement it was evident his Lordship had two objects in view ; to get time and 
 space to form his disposition to his wishes ; and, either to profit by the sea-breeze, 
 should it set in, as from every appearance it was conjectured it would ; or by 
 manoeuvring to gain the weather-gage from the enemy. This was an object of 
 the greatest importance. Should his Lordship await the French Admiral, and 
 attack him from the leeward, the fire-ships, in which were placed the greatest hopes 
 of success against a force so superior, not only could not have been brought into 
 action, but would have also obliged the large frigates, which had them in charge, to 
 remain inactive. The whole of that day was therefore employed in endeavouring 
 by several masterly manoeuvres to throw the enemy to leeward. But they appeared 
 to be equally attentive to the same object ; and discovered as great solicitude to 
 preserve their advantage, as the English Admiral to wrest it from them. 
 
 " Night came on. The Apollo was ordered to stand between the two fleets, 
 within view of our lights, and by private signals to intimate the enemy's situation, 
 as long as she could keep them in sight. By these means, we found ourselves at 
 the dawn of the next day in the same relative position ; though at somewhat a 
 greater distance than the preceding evening. The wind still hung to the 
 eastward, blowing fresh. The weather was extremely thick and hazy; no prospect 
 of a change appeared. The Vice Admiral therefore ordered the frigates which 
 had the charge of the fire-ships to be informed, that should the enemy continue 
 to preserve the weather-gage, he should await their approach, with the squadron 
 formed in a line of battle a-head, from the wind to the starboard. At the same 
 time, the fleet beheld him, with infinite satisfaction, take a decisive step that 
 strongly marks his character ; and shows him to be above the little fears and 
 apprehensions of those who, to avoid the whispers of the ignorant, act against 
 their own judgment. It has ever been acknowledged, that any station in the 
 line is the most improper a Commander-in-Chief can choose in the time of action. 
 As soon as the ship, in which he is embarked, engages, his abilities can be of no 
 more consequence or service than those of any other Captain in his fleet. But 
 to break through established customs, and be the first to try the experiment, 
 where malice might throw a sneer at his personal bravery, required a man who 
 possessed other qualities of inind than are merely requisite to form the seaman. 
 
 M 
 
82 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Lord Howe was convinced of the utility of the measure ; and this alone deter- 
 mined him to pursue it. In his situation, indeed, the expediency was particularly 
 obvious. Engaged with such unequal force, the chief hope of success was placed 
 in the skill and abilities of the Commander-in-Chief; in his taking advantage of 
 every fortunate occurrence, and drawing every scruple of his little force into its 
 proper point. He therefore shifted his flag on board the Apollo frigate ; leaving 
 the Eagle in the centre ; and moved to a convenient distance, to take a view of 
 the whole line. As he gained by this a nearer observation of the French fleet, 
 his Lordship, perceiving, as we supposed, that d'Estaing had placed his largest 
 ships in his van, thought proper to strengthen the rear of the British to receive 
 their attack ; and made a signal for the Cornwall to move from the centre and 
 change stations with the Centurion. About four o'clock, the French Admiral 
 altered his bearing, and now formed his line to engage to leeward. Lord Howe 
 crossed through the interstices of our line with the frigates and fire-vessels, and, 
 in a few minutes after, made a signal for the ships to shorten sail, and close to 
 the centre. In this movement he was obeyed to the admiration of the oldest 
 officer ; as indeed he had been in the several manoeuvres he had put in practice, 
 either to gain the wind, or preparatory to the intended attack. We now expected 
 every instant to hear our rear engaged with the French van ; but in a short time 
 they again altered their course, and, bearing away to the southward, were soon, 
 from the state of the weather, entirely out of sight. 
 
 " The wind at this time blew so fresh, that our ships were under close-reefed 
 top-sails ; and the sea ran so high, that Lord Howe would not venture on board 
 his own ship. He therefore made the signal from the Apollo, that he meant to 
 lie to, for the night, on the starboard tack, to prevent separation. Yet so dark 
 and hazy was the weather, and to such violence did the gale increase, that in the 
 morning the Blue Division was totally divided from the fleet. The centre and 
 van, with most of the frigates and fire-ships, still kept together. At noon, the 
 squadron was alarmed by a signal of distress from the Apollo, and, in a few 
 minutes after, her main-top-mast was seen to go overboard. The ship in which 
 the writer of this narrative served, kept sight of the flag until eleven o'clock that 
 night; from which time, till the 17th, in the evening, the greater part of the 
 fleet were ignorant of his Lordship's situation, and under the greatest anxiety 
 for his fate. It afterwards was known to us, that, the Apollo having lost her 
 fore-mast also on the night of the 12th, he had been tost about till the next day; 
 when, as the gale moderated, he was taken up by Captain Hammond, and carried 
 on board the Phoenix, then in company with the Centurion, Ardent, Richmond, . 
 Vigilant, and Roebuck. On the 1 5th, he discovered the French fleet, partly at 
 
HOWE AND D'ESTAING. 83 
 
 anchor, about twenty-five leagues to the eastward of Cape May ; and after having 
 viewed their position, and left the Centurion to direct the dispersed ships of his 
 own squadron, or such of Vice Admiral Byron's as might arrive, to follow him, 
 he directed his course for the rendezvous at the Hook. Here he found the rest 
 of the fleet, which had also been much dispersed. 
 
 " The Roebuck appeared without her mizen-top-mast. The Raisonable 
 brought in her bowsprit ; the Cornwall her main-mast sprung. The fire-ships 
 were so much damaged by the wet, as to be, for some time, totally unfit for 
 service. Besides those damages caused by the storm, the Isis returned much 
 shattered and disabled, from a gallant action she had sustained for an hour and 
 a half with a French seventy-four. The French fleet were much more severely 
 handled. On the evening of the 13th, towards dusk. Captain Dawson, in the 
 Renown, of fifty guns, fell in with the Languedoc, carrying Monsieur d'Estaing, 
 totally dismasted. He ran down close under her lee, and being there hailed, and 
 ordered to show his colours, gave her all his upper-deck guns. He then stood off 
 to windward, and opening his lower ports, wore round under her stern, and at 
 half a cable's length poured in three broadsides. Among other damages, he shot 
 away her rudder. It then was so dark, and blew so fresh, that Dawson resolved 
 to lie-to for the night, in the resolution of renewing his attack the next morning. 
 But at the first dawn, six French ships hove in sight ; three of which gave him 
 chase, and three remained with the wreck. 
 
 " The same evening, and about the same hour. Commodore Hotham, in the 
 Preston, of fifty guns, also crossed the Tonnant, their eighty gun ship, with only 
 the main-mast standing. He engaged her, with the greatest advantage, till 
 night forced him to draw off, in the same design that Dawson had formed, and 
 with the same certainty of success. But he was disappointed by a similar 
 unfortunate intervention of part of the French squadron. 
 
 " A third action, as brilliant as any on record in the history of the English 
 navy, was fought the same day between the Isis, of fifty guns, commanded by 
 Captain John Raynor, and the Caesar, of seventy-four, with a flag at her mizen- 
 mast, in complete order. Raynor, returning to the rendezvous, first discovered 
 her force about three in the afternoon, and endeavoured to escape her ; but she 
 proved the fastest sailer. In a short time they were close on board each other, 
 and engaged for an hour and a half within pistol shot. The skill and address of 
 the British Captain ; his intrepidity and resolution during so unequal a contest ; 
 seconded by the ardour and bravery of his men and officers, who all placed the 
 utmost confidence in his abilities ; at length forced the Frechman to put before 
 the wind, and fly with all her sails. The Isis was incapable of pursuing him ; 
 
 M 2 
 
84 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 having suflfered greatly in her masts and rigging, at which the enemy pointed 
 all his guns. Raynor directed his to better purpose. Bougainville lost his arai, the 
 first lieutenant his leg ; and they acknowledged seventy men killed and wounded.* 
 
 " The modesty and reserve that strike us in Raynor's public account of this 
 glorious action add new lustre to his gallantry ; recommend him the more 
 forcibly to the public ; and are characteristic of the true hero. The Duke of 
 Ancaster, though arrived from England only the day before we sailed, obtained 
 leave to serve on board the Isis, and was greatly distinguished during the action. 
 
 " On the fleet being re-assembled, the attention of the Vice Admiral was 
 instantly directed to the speedy repair of the disabled ships. The Isis, with the 
 Apollo and fire-ships, was sent up to New York; and such stores ordered 
 down as were requisite for the supply of the ships that could be repaired at the 
 Hook. The Experiment was dispatched (August 18) to explore the state of 
 affairs at Newport, and the condition of the garrison ; and the Ariel and 
 Galatea sent to cruize, the one to the southward, and the other to the northward. 
 The same day, the IMonmouth, one of Byron's ill-fated squadron, with her 
 main-mast sprung, and her men wasted with disease, joined the fleet. The 
 essential repairs requisite for so many ships unavoidably employed several days ; 
 during which the Vice Admiral received information that the Frencli squadron 
 had returned to Rhode Island. The Experiment (93d) had been chased into 
 the Sound by three of their large ships, and had returned to New York through 
 Hellgate ; the first two-decker that had ever attempted that dangerous passage. 
 The Venus and Galatea confirmed the accounts. The latter had seen eleven sail 
 of the line, including the two dismasted ships, at anchor off the harbour of 
 Newport, on the evening of the 20th, and left them in the same situation the 
 following day. 
 
 " The morning after Lord Howe had received this iutelHgence, and while he 
 was waiting for the tide, to begin crossing the Bar, the disabled ships, except 
 the Isis and the Apollo, being then nearly completed ; Lieutenant Stanhope 
 arrived fi-om Rhode Island, from whence he made his escape in a whale-boat, 
 the Friday before, at the utmost risk of his life.f His information was, that 
 he had left the French fleet at anchor off" the harbour's mouth ; that, as the wind 
 had since then continued at east, it was not probable they could be got in ; that 
 the rebels, in number more than 20,000, were advanced within 1,500 yards of 
 
 * " In the Isis, fourteen were wounded, and one man of the 23d killed in the tops." 
 
 t " He had passed unperceived through the body of the French fleet, and coasting along the 
 
 outward shore of Long Island met with so heavy a sea, as exposed his boat to be swamped at each 
 
 instant." 
 
HOWE AND D'ESTAING. 85 
 
 our works ; that Sir R. Pigot was under no apprehensions from any of their 
 attempts in front ; but that, should the French fleet come in, he ordered him to say, 
 it would make an alarming change. Troops might be landed at Brenton's Neck, 
 according to the original plan agreed upon between the rebels and the French, 
 and advance upon his rear ; and in that case he could not answer for the 
 consequences. 
 
 " On this information Lord Howe immediately crossed the bar ; aiid, being 
 joined in the night by the Experiment and fire-ships from New York, and a 
 number of volunteers for the Monmouth, sailed the next morning for Newport. 
 A reinforcement from Clinton's army was at the same time to be sent through 
 the Sound for the relief of the garrison. Lord Howe was to favour their approach 
 by drawing off the French fleet, and endeavouring to bring them to action : but 
 being met at sea by the Galatea, with dispatches from General Pigot; by which 
 it appeared that d'Estaing had, on the night between the Friday and Saturday, 
 sailed from his anchorage off Point Judith, and steered in a course for Boston ; 
 he detached the Nautilus, Sphynx, and Vigilant, to Rhode Island, and stood 
 on with his squadron in quest of the enemy. As it was not probable that they 
 would attempt to navigate their large ships, in their disabled state, through the 
 South Channel within George's Bank ; the Vice Admiral was in hopes, that by 
 following that course, he might intercept them in their approach to Boston Bay. 
 These hopes were confirmed by the Captain of the privateer brig Resistance, taken 
 by our fleet on the 28th. He had been sent from Boston the preceding Monday, 
 to look out for the French squadron, and pilot them into Boston. But as he had 
 sailed down the channel, and seen nothing of them, he supposed they had steered 
 round the Bank. 
 
 " The morning of the 30th brought us into Boston Bay. The fleet continued 
 under sail, while the Roebuck and Experiment were sent forward to look into 
 the harbour, and by private signals to intimate to the Admiral, whether the 
 French squadron were arrived or not ; or, if arrived, where anchored. Between 
 four and five we had the mortification to learn, by a signal from the Experiment, 
 that they were lying in Nantasket Road. 
 
 " The next day the Vice Admiral, meaning to take advantage of a leading 
 wind to view their position, was prevented by the St. Alban's running on shore 
 near the point of Cape Cod. He effected his purpose, however, on the 1st of 
 September ; when finding them so strongly posted under cover of the strong 
 works constructed on the islands which command the Nantasket Road and 
 Channel, that no attempt could be made upon them with the least prospect of 
 success ; he lost not a moment in returning to the assistance of Newport. But 
 
86 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 he had already effectually relieved that important garrison ; Sullivan, on the 
 retreat of his allies, and the account of the British fleet having sailed in pursuit 
 of them, thought proper to retire from before the place, charging his ill success 
 to the failure of promise on the part of d'Estaing. 
 
 " Thus, by a happy mixture of prudent and bold measures ; by a series of 
 manoeuvres, which the naval tactic was scarcely thought capable of exhibiting ; 
 by an indefatigable zeal, and an ardent attention to take advantage of every 
 occurrence; by the unconquerable and persevering spirit with which his example 
 inspired every officer and seaman under his command ; Lord Howe having, with 
 forces so unequal, defeated all the great designs of the enemy, protected the 
 army and the fleet of transports at New York, raised the siege at Rhode Island, 
 and driven the French squadron into the port of Boston ; whence their shattered 
 condition would not suffer them to venture for a length of time ; returned to 
 New York, and to the infinite regret both of navy and army, resigned the com- 
 mand into the hands of Rear Admiral Gambler." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 Nothing certainly can surpass the conduct of Lord Howe throughout the 
 whole of this anxious and difficult service ; and the disposition of his little force 
 at anchor at Sandy Hook is of the most seamanlike and masterly description. 
 By the Plate it will be seen, that the stern anchors enabled the ships to bring 
 their broadsides to bear upon the direct line of approach in the narrowest part 
 of it : when, by veering again, they resumed their situations, and continued to 
 command the long line of course which the enemy must pursue as he advanced ; 
 while the smaller vessels were so placed as to harass and distress him from 
 inaccessible positions. 
 
 Of the step afterwards taken by the brave Chief,* much difference of opinion 
 has existed in the navy ; namely, of the propriety or expediency of removing 
 from the line of battle, the better to direct the movements of his fleet. The 
 writer considers that the intention of Lord Howe, when he shifted his flag to 
 the Apollo, was simply to enable him to get a nearer view of the enemy's 
 fleet ; by which he became better acquainted with its force and disposition ; and 
 from which he could better form a judgment in the management of his own, 
 since it appears that he soon after made two of his ships exchange places 
 
 * The Apollo parted company in bad weather, and might have fallen into the hands of the enemy. 
 
Missing Page 
 
HOWE AND D'ESTAING. 87 
 
 in the line of battle. There is no reason to suppose that he intended to 
 continue in the Apollo, if d'Estaing had thought fit to bring him to action ; 
 which was so much in his power, and so anxiously expected by the British 
 squadron. 
 
 The writer ventures to offer it as his opinion, that, for a purpose like the 
 preceding, such a measure was highly judicious, and might have been beneficial ; 
 but he considers that, where it is expedient, in the presence of an enemy, to 
 withdraw from the line for a particular object, it should be done in a line-of- 
 battle ship, capable of taking her share in the battle wherever it may be found 
 necessary. 
 
 As in different parts of these pages it is recommended that flag officers should 
 take the lead upon all important services, an opposite doctrine will not be 
 advanced upon the present occasion ; but the taking of a ship of the line for 
 obtaining a nearer view of the enemy, and a more distinct sight of his own 
 line, is, under certain circumstances, worthy of imitation. It must, however 
 by no means be with an intention to keep out of the action : such a conduct 
 would never be relished in the British navy : yet a Commander-in-chief, going 
 as described, and rendering his personal assistance where most required, would 
 tend greatly to animate the combatants, and contribute much to the success and 
 glory of the day. 
 
 For noble proofs of the efficacy of this system, let us take the examples of 
 Howe, Duncan, Cornwallis, Nelson, CoUingwood, Strachan, Duckworth, Ex- 
 mouth, and lastly Codrington. Admiral Cornwallis's reasons for leading were 
 given when he chased the French fleet into Brest. 
 
 Lord Howe, in a code of signals which are considered his, and were issued to 
 the navy at a subsequent period, had a signal to direct, " that the fleet was to 
 continue in the same form or order it then was, although the Commander-in-chief 
 should act otherwise ; and that the motions of the flag ship were no longer 
 binding on the fleet." This of course continued in force until it was annulled, 
 when he would probably resume his station. 
 
 Plate VI. — " The anchors laid out on the larboard side of the ships in the line 
 were designed as springs to heave their broadsides up, to oppose any force that 
 might attempt to come up the channel. 
 
 " The Vigilant, Phoenix, and Preston, were advanced, to command the bar, to 
 
88 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 annoy the French fleet in passing it, and to endeavour to throw them into 
 confusion ; after which they were to drop into the rear of the fleet. 
 
 " The four gallies were ranged across the narrow part of the channel, abreast 
 the Hook ; from which situation, in case of an attack, they could row in upon 
 the shoal, and cannonade at such distance as should be most convenient for the 
 purpose of annoying the enemy ; their situation on the shoal would efifectually 
 prevent their being cut off. 
 
 " The St. Alban's and frigates were designed for a moving and occasional force, 
 and lay within the line. 
 
 " The figures mark the depth at low water." 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 " Lord Howe, in the presence of d'Estaing, shifted his flag into a frigate ; 
 whether he would have kept it there, had the action taken place, is uncertain, I 
 agree that an Admiral should do so for particular purposes ; but I am of opinion 
 that it should be done generally in a ship that can take her share in the battle ; 
 keeping himself at liberty to withdraw from the line to observe the motions of 
 his fleet and give the necessary directions ; yet in going into battle the chief 
 should lead. 
 
 " By the Plate I think it appears that d'Estaing might have destroyed the 
 Vigilant, Phoenix, and Preston, without risking a general action, if he did not 
 like it." 
 
 Some particulars of the proceedings of the British fleet under Vice 
 Admiral Byron, tahen from the journal of an officer on board the flag ship, 
 the Princess Royal, of ninety guns. Captain Blair. 
 
 " In the storm on the 3d of July, the cause of the dispersion of the fleet, it 
 is remarkable that the Admiral's barge was washed overboard from the booms, or 
 at least had disappeared during the night ; no one being able to give any 
 account of her. The Russel having damaged her rudder, and being very sickly, 
 went back to England. The Albion, losing all her masts, bore away for Lisbon, 
 where she refitted, and rejoined in America. The Invincible, after losing her 
 foremast and bowsprit in a second gale on the banks of Newfoundland, put into 
 St. John's, and thence went to England ; the remainder got into New York at 
 different times, and were all in a very sickly state. 
 
HOWE AND D'ESTAING. 89 
 
 " Towards the end of October, the Admiral sailed to cruize off Boston with 
 thirteen sail of the line, and a fifty gun ship. The Diamond was sent to 
 reconnoitre the enemy in Nantucket roads. On approaching Boston, a violent 
 storm arose, by which the Somerset was driven on shore and lost on Cape Cod ; 
 the crew made prisoners. The Bedford was dismasted and obliged to be taken 
 in tow by the Cornwall to New York. The Culloden, which ship had a Imack at 
 parting company, was heard of no more till her arrival in England. The day 
 after the storm the Diamond re-joined, and reported d'Estaing's fleet ready for 
 sea, and by a brig captured on the following day, it was learnt that d'Estaing 
 had sailed. 
 
 " Ships were soon after seen, and chase given, when at the same moment 
 Came on a most tremendous snow-storm, which put an end to it : the ships proved 
 to be part of d'Estaing's fleet, then off for the West Indies. Admiral Byron on 
 this proceeded to Rhode Island to refit. Here he was detained by storms and 
 foul winds for three weeks, when at length, on the 14th December, he put to 
 sea with ten sail for the West Indies, leaving the Bedford to be re-masted. 
 Before many days another storm arose, which dismasted the Fame, and separated 
 that ship and the Diamond from the fleet. Several sprung their masts. On the 
 9th of January, 1779, the fleet made Barbadoes, when, on gaining intelligence, 
 the Admiral thought it necessary to proceed without anchoring to St. Lucia, 
 lately captured from the French, and which d'Estaing had fruitlessly attempted 
 to re-take. Anchored the next day in the Grand Cul de Sac, where Vice 
 Admiral Barrington was then lying in the same line of battle which had recently 
 proved so formidable to the enemy. 
 
 " A squadron of five men of war, with 5^000 troops, had sailed from New 
 York for the West Indies the same day that d'Estaing left Boston, and a curious 
 circumstance occurred to prove how close these two fleets had approached each 
 other on the passage. A Newfoundland dog was taken up swimming by the 
 Languedoc, the French Admiral's ship, which had belonged to one of the British 
 men of war, from which it had fallen, and was afterwards seen by an officer of 
 the Princess Royal when sent on board the ship of the French Admiral with a 
 flag of truce at Martinico ; and by his collar discovered to have been the pro- 
 perty of an officer in the convoy. 
 
 "On the 10th of March, a squadron under Commodore Rowley having arrived 
 from England, the French put to sea from Fort Royal, and Admiral Byron 
 immediately weighed to meet them, but was again unfortunate in not bringing 
 them to action ; owing chiefly to making a wrong signal, and which occasioned 
 a great deal of sensation in the fleet. 
 
 N 
 
90 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " When about half way across the channel, between St. Lucia and Martinico, 
 the Admiral directed the signal to be made for the line a-head, which was a union 
 flag at the mizen-peak ; his Captain ordered a Dutch flag to be hoisted, without 
 telUng the officer what it was intended to convey, who, had he done so, would 
 have corrected the error. The Dutch flag was hoisted, and of course no line 
 was formed, while the Admiral shortened sail for the ships to take their stations, 
 and at length ordered some shot to be fired at ships that appeared to be the most 
 disobedient ; when happening to looh up, he discovered the mistake, but too 
 late to remedy it, as by this time the enemy had nearly got bach to Fort 
 Royal ! Much complaint was made of the Captain, but to no purpose ; he 
 retained his situation in the ship. 
 
 " On the 25th of May, having received intelligence that a fleet of seven sail 
 of the line were expected at Martinico, Admiral Byron cruized to windward, in 
 hopes of intercepting it, but was disappointed, as he quitted the station to 
 proceed to St. Kitts to take the Trade (the largest fleet that was ever collected) 
 to the northward ; immediately upon Admiral Byron leaving his cruizing 
 ground, the French fleet got safe into Fort Royal. At St. Kitts occurred a 
 disaster which threatened much injury to both ships of war and merchantmen. 
 The Supply, store ship, which lay within the whole, caught fire forward, and the 
 flames quickly ran up the fore-mast, which became a column of fire : the boats 
 of the men of war boarded her in a few minutes ; her main -top-sail was set, her 
 cable cut, and she was steered through the fleet, crowded as it lay, a burning 
 mass, and ran upon the mud to leeward, where towards evening she blew up. 
 The officers, amongst whom was the late Admiral Kelly, who were employed in 
 this service, gained great credit. It was they who loosed the sails, and took the 
 helm on this critical occasion. 
 
 " The fleet left St Kitts on the 15th of June, and seeing the convoy safe 
 through the passage of the Dog and Prickly-pear, left it under the care of the 
 St. Albans and Isis, and returned to St. Lucia." 
 
BARRINGTON AND D'ESTAING. 91 
 
 BARRINGTON AND D'ESTAING, 
 At the Grand Cul de Sac, St. Lucia, December, 1778. 
 
 Commodore Hotham, with five men of war, a bomb vessel, some frigates, 
 and a large convoy, left Sandy Hook the same day the Count d'Estaing sailed 
 from Boston with a large force by sea and land, to make a conquest of the British 
 West India Islands. They were in the near neighbourhood of each other, and 
 steering the same course for many days ; but entirely ignorant of each other's 
 situation : when a violent storm dispersed the French fleet, and gave the advan- 
 tage to the British squadron ; which by great care and exertion had kept together, 
 and suffered little from the gale. 
 
 They anived on the 10th of December at Barbadoes, where they joined 
 Admiral Barrington ; who without permitting the troops under Major General 
 Grant to land, immediately determined upon the reduction of St. Lucia. 
 
 This force, joined by others under Brigadier Generals Meadows and Prescot, 
 was landed at the Grand Cul de Sac on the 13th in the evening ; and pushed 
 forward to the heights ; while General Prescot took a position that commanded 
 the environs of the Bay. In the morning General Meadows advanced, and 
 possessed himself of the important post of the Vigie, which commanded the 
 north side of the Carenage. 
 
 " Celerity in execution, and prudence in securing and immediately turning to 
 account every advantage obtained in war, was never more necessary, nor ever 
 more eminently displayed, than upon this occasion. It affords an useful lesson, 
 in a striking instance, that nothing should ever be committed to chance in 
 warfare, which any industry could secure from so doubtful a decision." — (See the 
 " Annual Register," for 1779.) 
 
 It is necessary to proceed to the operations of the fleet. Admiral Bkrrington, 
 upon the success of the troops, had intended to have removed the transports into 
 the Carenage Bay, as a place of much greater security than the Cul de Sac ; but 
 was prevented by the sudden appearance of the French fleet ; and was occupied 
 the whole night of the 14th in warping the transports into the bottom of the 
 bay, remote from danger ; while the ships of war were employed in arranging 
 themselves in a line of battle at the entrance of it, the better to resist the 
 attack of so formidable an enemy. 
 
 His squadron consisted of the following ships ; the Prince of Wales, of seventy- 
 four guns, bearing the flag of Rear Admiral Barrington ; the Boyne, of 
 
 N 2 
 
92 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 seventy ; the Preston, Commodore Hotham ; St. Albans, and Nonsuch, of 
 sixty-four ; the Centurion and Isis, of fifty guns each, and three frigates. 
 
 Such was the force that, by skill, activity, and resolution, prepared to await 
 the encounter of the Count d'Estaing. The line, formed as in the plan, was 
 defended in its most vulnerable point (to leeward) by the ship of the intrepid 
 Chief, and flanked at each end by a powerful battery. 
 
 The Isis, supported by the frigates, guarded the in-shore approach to windward. 
 Such was the masterly disposition of this little band, when the French fleet 
 commenced its attack. 
 
 The French Admiral, after being painfully convinced that the island was no 
 longer theirs ; having suffered materially from the fire of one of the batteries on 
 his approach ; bore down with ten sail of the line upon the British squadron ; and 
 a warm conflict ensued, supported on the side of the British fleet by the two 
 batteries on shore. 
 
 Coolness, firmness, and resolution, were never more conspicuous in repulsing 
 the enemy ; but d'Estaing, forming a new disposition, renewed the attack at 
 four in the afternoon with twelve sail of the line, and directed his principal efforts 
 from the British Admiral in the rear to the centre. 
 
 This was continued with sensible effect on both sides for a considerable time. 
 The cannonading from the enemy was heavy and concentrated ; but nothing 
 could shake the firmness and determination of the British force. After a long 
 and warm contest, the French fleet fell into disorder and retired ; without 
 having made any effectual impression upon the British line. — (See the plan, 
 Plate VIL) 
 
 In this manner ended an engagement which, for conduct and intrepidity, 
 never was surpassed ; and which added another ray of glory the British arms. 
 
 (The plan is formed from a drawing taken by an officer present.) 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 " While the British deserve every credit for their skill and gallantry, I 
 cannot but think the failure of the attack was owing more to the lack of both 
 on the part of the enemy." 
 
 In the second volume of the " Field of Mars," has been found the letter 
 of the gallant Barrington upon the subject of the attack of d'Estaing at 
 St. Lucia. 
 
 To confirm the statement already made, and to stamp it with official 
 
BARRINGTON AND D'ESTAING. 93 
 
 authenticity, such extracts shall be given as appear necessary ; without entering 
 
 into the co-operative part taken by the British troops; which, for boldness, 
 
 decision, and celerity, never was excelled. To say more would be to pass the 
 
 limits of the present design. 
 
 " H. M. Ship Prince of Wales, Grand Guide Sac, 
 " St. Lucia, Dec. 23, 1778, at night. 
 
 " You will now please to acquaint my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 
 that the Commodore (Hotham) arrived at Barbadoes on the 10th instant, with 
 his Majesty's ships Nonsuch, St. Albans, Preston, Centurion, Isis, and Carcase, 
 bomb, and fifty-nine transports, having on board 5,000 troops under Major 
 General Grant. 
 
 " To save time, and prevent the confusion naturally arising from a change of 
 signals among the transports, I adopted those of the Commodore ; and directing 
 him to lead with the landing division, put to sea the 12th in the morning, in 
 order to carry into execution their Lordships' secret instructions ; and about three 
 o'clock on the day following, anchored there * with the whole squadron, except 
 the Ariadne, Ceres, Snake, Barbadoes, and Pelican ; which I had stationed 
 along the coast to intercept any vessels attempting to escape from the land, &c. 
 
 " More than half the troops were landed the same day, and the remainder 
 the next morning, the 14th ; when they immediately got possession of the 
 Carenage ; and it was my intention to have removed the transports thither as 
 soon as possible, had it not been prevented by the appearance of the fleet of the 
 Count d'Estaing, of which I received notice by signal from the Ariadne. 
 
 " It therefore became necessary to secure the transports as well as we could in 
 the bay ; and the whole night was accordingly employed in warping them within 
 the ships of war, and disposing of the latter in a line across the entrance ; the 
 Isis to windward, rather inclining into the bay ; and the Prince of Wales, being 
 the most powerful ship, the outermost and to leeward ; and the Venus, Aurora, 
 and Ariadne, flanking the space between the Isis and the shore, to prevent the 
 enemy's forcing a passage that way. 
 
 " Almost all the transports had fortunately got within the line before half-past 
 eleven in the morning of the 15th ; when the Count d'Estaing thought proper 
 to bear down a,nd attack us with ten sail of the line ; and at four in the afternoon 
 he made a second attack with twelve sail of the line, &c. 
 
 " The next day, the 16th, the Count shewed a disposition to attack us a 
 third time : but on the appearance of a frigate standing for his fleet, with signals 
 
 * The Admiral must mean the Cul de Sac, whence his letter is dated. 
 
94 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 flying, he plied to windward ; and in the evening anchored in Gros Islet Bay, 
 about two leagues from us : where he still continues with ten frigates and twelve 
 sail of the line, &c. 
 
 " This being the situation of the squadron, and the army being in the 
 possession of all the strong holds in the neighbourhood of the bay ; such a spirit 
 of cheerfulness, imanimity, and resolution, actuates the whole of our little force 
 both by land and sea, notwithstanding the amazing fatigue they have 
 undergone, that we are under no apprehensions from any attempts the enemy 
 may meditate," &c. 
 
 Plate VII. — A, the British squadron at anchor at the entrance of the Grand 
 Cul de Sac. 
 
 B, the transports. 
 
 C, the frigates. 
 
 D, Admiral Barrington. 
 
 E, Commodore Hotham. 
 
 F, the French fleet and transports. 
 
 G, a French frigate reconnoitring. 
 
 In the " Cours JElementaire" it is observed of this mode of defence, that 
 however easy it was to have attacked the fleet in Basseterre Road, St. Christo- 
 pher's, it was by no means so at this place, in consequence of the position and 
 local circumstances ; for, although Admiral Barrington opposed but seven to 
 eleven ships of the line, he describes the situation as " un enfoncement,'" where 
 one is very frequently becalmed, and where the British line was supported at 
 both extremities by batteries on shore. He however declares that the destruction 
 of this force would have decided the fate of the British colonies in the Antilles, 
 and that this motive determined the French Admiral to attack it ; at the same 
 time he says it should have been " une attaque decisive," either by anchoring 
 upon the buoys of the British fleet, or by boarding ; in which mode of warfare, 
 by his account, the French are so superior to us. With such superiority, 
 why did they not attempt it ? the sea breeze brought in our fleet, so it might 
 another ! — See " Cours Elementaire," page 477. 
 
J 'LATE VH 
 
 i i I 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 % r 
 
 k 
 
ADMIRAL BYRON'S ACTION. 95 
 
 ADMIRAL BYRON'S ACTION. 
 
 July 6th, 1779. 
 
 Extracts of Admiral Byron's Letter. 
 
 (Date not found.) 
 
 " It being my intention to be off St. George's Bay, soon after day-break, I 
 drew the ships of war from among the transports ; leaving the Suffolk, Vigilant, 
 and Monmouth, under Rear Admiral Rowley, for their protection. 
 
 " Soon after day-light on Tuesday the 6th, the French squadron was seen off 
 St. George's, getting under way, seemingly in great confusion, and with little 
 or no wind. The signal was immediately made for a general chace, and for the 
 ships to engage and form as they could get up. In consequence of which, Vice 
 Admiral Barrington, in the Prince of Wales, with Captain Sawyer, in the Boyne, 
 and Captain Gardner, in the Sultan, being the headmost and carrying a press of 
 sail, were soon fired upon at a great distance ; which they did not return till they 
 got considerably nearer. But the enemy getting the breeze, drew out their line 
 by bearing away and forming to leeward on the starboard tack ; when it was 
 plainly discovered they had thirty-four sail of ships of war. 
 
 " The general chase was continued, and the signal made for close engagement ; 
 but the enemy industriously avoided it, by always bearing away when our ships 
 got near them," &c. " and being to leeward they did great damage to the masts 
 and rigging, when our shot could not reach them. The ships that suffered most 
 were those the action began with ; the ships of Captains CoUingwood, Edwards, 
 and Cornwallis : the spirited example of Admiral Barrington exposed them to a 
 severe fire in making the attack. The Monmouth likewise suffered exceedingly, 
 by Captain Fanshawe's having bore down, in a very gallant manner, to stop the 
 van of the enemy's squadron, and bring it to action. The Suffolk also, having 
 suffered considerably by the attack of Rear Admiral Rowley on the van, I took 
 in the signal for chase, but continued that for close action ; formed the best line 
 which circumstances would admit of ; and kept the wind, to prevent the enemy 
 from doubling upon us, and cutting off the transports," &c. 
 
 This is all that is necessary of Admiral Byron's letter; but from the 
 journal on board the Princess Royal, we collect that " the enemy on their 
 approach drew out of the cluster they were in, and advanced, forming a 
 a close line a-head on the starboard tack ; but it was certainly not very easy to 
 count them, as they were nearly end on ; and particularly after the van ships 
 
96 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 began to engage. The Prince of Wales, Sultan, and Boyne, were the first in action, 
 and after passing the enemy's line, wore after them, thus meeting the rest of their 
 own advancing fleet. The Cornwall, Grafton, Lion, and Fame, from being the 
 leewardmost ships, were the next and closest engaged. In this manner the two 
 fleets passed each other ; the British force much spread, and at very different 
 distances from the enemy. The Monmouth, Captain Fanshawe, received an 
 order (that was never given) to leave his convoy and bear down ; upon which he 
 attacked the enemy in the most gallant manner, and the health of the Captain 
 of the little black ship (the Monmouth) was drank by the officers of the Lan- 
 guedoc afterwards. 
 
 " As the French sailed much better than the English ships, they might 
 certainly have gained the wind if they had tried for it ; but that was not their 
 object. On tacking they looked up for the Lion, with some prospect of cutting 
 off the Cornwall and Grafton, so disabled as to be far astern and to leeward : 
 the Lion, knowing her critical situation, bore up before the wind for Jamaica. 
 Admiral Byron openly declared that if d'Estaing detached any ships after the 
 Lion, or had he cut off the other two, he would have borne down to renew the 
 action. 
 
 " On waring the fleet, to place it on the same tack with the enemy, the 
 Princess Royal passed very near the Lion, and the Admiral ordered her to be 
 hailed, as her sails were a perfect cullender, to know if she was in want of any 
 thing. Captain Cornwallis himself took the speaking-trumpet, and in his cool 
 way answered, ' We are all pretty well, but you had better not come too near 
 usj for we don't steer very well.' At that moment his main and raizen-top-masts 
 went over the side, and the Princess Royal stood on." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 With such an inferiority of force (21 to 26 or 27 ships of the line), it was 
 certainly indiscreet in the British Admiral to attempt to bring on a general action 
 by endeavouring to stop the van of the enemy. He probably would have made 
 more impression by acting as described in Fig. 2, Fig. 1 showing the manner 
 in which the British fleet bore down in chace to attack the van of the French 
 fleet. 
 
 By the method proposed, an advantage might have been gained upon the 
 enemy's rear ; while, by the judicious and steady position of the British van and 
 centre, he would have been prevented in making an attempt upon the convoy. 
 This battle is described by Mr. Clerk in five figures. 
 
Z^T.A TE VTZr 
 
 CouvoT of Transports. 
 
 Fi(;.l. 
 
 ^ 
 
 1 1 ^3 — -^ 
 
 
 -iJ^^ "T ;^ ^-ji 
 
 -Tij;, 
 
 .ti^ s^ ^ ^^' 
 
 iij 
 
 4+ iL^' 
 
 ^ -tli. ^ ^ .^ 
 
 
 ^ ^ " "" ^ . - '"^ ^ ^ ^ 
 
 Convoy of TraTisports. 
 
 T'Vy. ,". 
 
 :b 
 
 i 
 
 i f i * 
 
 ■^^^ ^""a^A^ * f / / 
 
 A / 
 
 ^ ^ Njl^ ^ik s^ ^ ^ -iii. ^ ^tL / / ^ 
 
 ^ ^ ^ -^ -A' / ^ U /^ / W ^i 
 
 ^ .tit 
 
ADMIRAL BYRON. 97 
 
 REMARKS. (By different officers.) 
 
 " The observation is very just, and with British intrepidity it might have 
 ended gloriously." 
 
 " I agree with the proposed mode of attack, on account of the object of 
 securing the transports ; otherwise the whole of the British fleet should in my 
 opinion have attacked the centre and rear of the enemy. A certain number of 
 ships should always be cut oflP, to insure a victory where fleets are equal ; but if 
 the attacking one is inferior, this object should never be lost sight of; and if 
 circumstances did not allow of more than three or four of the rear being over- 
 powered, still I should be content with that number. The van should never be 
 attempted unless with a very superior force." 
 
 Plate VIII, Fig. 1, exhibits the van, under Admirals Barrington and Rowley, 
 under a press of sail, bearing down upon the enemy. 
 
 C, Convoy of Transports. 
 
 Fig. 2, exhibits the mode of attack proposed : the van and centre of the 
 British fleet keep their wind ; while the rear, and perhaps part of the centre, 
 carry a press of sail and bring the rear of the enemy to close action before it can 
 have time to form. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 " The double object, of securing an important fleet of transports, and of 
 engaging an enemy's force of considerable superiority, requires a series of skilful 
 manoeuvring, the nature of which must be left to the exigency of the case." 
 
 In the " Cours Elementaire," it is observed of this battle, that had the van 
 of M. d'Estaign carried sufficient sail, it would in all probability, by tacking in 
 succession, have got between the British fleet and the convoy, and have cut off 
 the disabled ships. {Cours Elementaire, page 384.) 
 
 The Plates in that work, giving the positions of the two fleets, bear no re- 
 semblance to the British Admiral's account, although both are agreed in the 
 dangerous situation of Admiral Byron's disabled ships. 
 
 o 
 
98 NAVAL BATTLES, 
 
 HYDE PARKER AND DE LA MOTTE, 
 
 December 18, 1779, off Martinico. 
 
 The vigilance and activity of Rear Admiral Hyde Parker (who afterwards 
 beat the Dutch on the Dogger Bank) about this time, should not be forgotten. 
 
 The Admiral was lying with a squadron often or eleven sail of the line in Gros 
 Islet Bay, St. Lucia ; M^hen, at eight a. m. the signal was made, by a ship looking 
 out, of a fleet to windward. The squadron instantly slipped, leaving boats with 
 the ends of their cables, and stood over to Fort Royal. 
 
 The chase was an enemy's convoy ; which, on the appearance of the British 
 fleet, was thrown into great disorder. About four in the afternoon, nine or ten 
 sail were run on shore on the coast of Martinico, and set on fire ; and the Boreas 
 had brought a French frigate to action in Fort Royal Bay, when M. de la Motte 
 slipped his cables, and with two other seventy-four's, came to her relief. 
 
 The French Admiral, by this bold and judicious manoeuvre, saved part of his 
 convoy, but not without risk of endangering himself: as the Conqueror, with 
 several other ships, brought them to action on opposite tacks, as they were 
 working back to their anchorage. Eight valuable ships were taken. 
 
 In this affair the brave Captain Griffith, of the Conqueror, lost his life. 
 Night put an end to all further attempts ; and the British Admiral returned 
 with his prizes to St. Lucia, each ship receiving again the end of her own cable. 
 
 By the French account of this affair, to be found in the " Political Magazine " 
 for 1780, it is stated that La Motte Piquet slipt from Port Royal with the 
 Annibal, Vengeur, and Reflechi, and with these he fought seven sail of the 
 English fleet ! 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 " I don't see any thing particulary worthy of notice in this affair ; that a fleet 
 should slip to destroy a convoy, and then take in the ends of their cables again, 
 having allowed three seventy-four's to save part of it. I don't mean even to hint, 
 that Sir Hyde Parker could have done more, but only that he could not have done 
 less ; the French Admiral seems to deserve most credit." 
 
 OBSERVATION. 
 
 Every credit is due to the French Admiral ; but the gallant commentator, 
 perhaps not having local knowledge of the positions of the two fleets, does not 
 seem to be aware that the most prompt execution and great exertion were 
 
HYDE PARKER AND DE LA MOTTE. 99 
 
 necessary, to enable the British fleet to reach the convoy, right to windward of 
 them, in time to do any thing. 
 
 Upon opening the N. E. end of St. Lucie, ships have in general to encounter 
 a fiery sea breeze, and a strong lee current ; while ships from the windward haul 
 close in to the island of Martinique. 
 
 Audibert Ramatuelle gives great and just credit to Monsieur La Motte Piquet 
 for his spirit and activity upon this occasion. It appears that his ships were 
 undergoing a complete refit when the convoy made itself known round Cape 
 Solomon, with the British fleet in chase from St. Lucie. They rigged, bent 
 sails, took on board their powder, and slipped their cables to protect their convoy. 
 The three French ships, he says, after having saved the greater part, returned 
 to Fort Royal, amidst the acclamations of the colony ; and that on the following 
 morning Admiral Parker sent over a flag of truce to compliment the French 
 Admiral upon his conduct. {Cours EUmentaire, p. 461.) 
 
 From the journal before mentioned we learn that the fleet heretofore under 
 Vice Admiral Byron was now commanded by Admiral Hyde Parker, and who 
 was " always on the alert." In the chase which ensued, and the skill and 
 exertion used by La Motte Piquet to protect his convoy and his squadron, his 
 account is very similar to that of Monsieur Ramatuelle : he observes, that " It 
 was an interesting spectacle to the rest of the fleet to see those ships, followed 
 by the Conqueror, making short tacks with a fresh breeze within the bay, in 
 order to regain their anchorage under cover of the forts, which opened a heavy 
 fire on the British ships as they advanced. Night, however, put an end to the 
 pursuit, I'Annibal having had a very narrow escape. Captain Grifliths, of the 
 Conqueror, with the trumpet at his mouth, putting the ship in stays, received 
 a cannon shot between the shoulders, and never spoke more. This was the only 
 loss sustained, but one much to be deplored ; for both as a man and as an officer. 
 Captain Griffiths was universally esteemed." 
 
 " As the fleet was returning to Gros Islet, during the night, the General 
 commanding the heights sent to inform the Admiral that three large ships had 
 been seen at sunset some leagues to leeward, standing for Martinico. Admiral 
 Rowley, without anchoring, was immediately dispatched in search of them, 
 with four sail of the line, and when day dawned found himself within a short 
 distance of them, who lay becalmed, while he carried the breeze up with him. 
 He captured the whole, and proved to be three French frigates of from twenty- 
 four to twenty-eight guns, who had been in the battle off Grenada. Fortune 
 seemed at length inclined to smile on the fleet under its new flag, and console us 
 for all its former disasters." 
 
 o 2 
 
100 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 In February, 1780, De Guichen arrived with a considerable fleet at Martinico, 
 and much at the same time Admiral Rodney arrived at Barbadoes with four 
 copper-bottomed ships of the line. Upon this information Admiral Parker 
 removed from Choque Bay to Gros Islet, and anchored the ships in a " crescent- 
 shaped line" with springs on" their cables. 
 
 RODNEY AND LANGARA. 
 
 We come now to a relation of Sir G. Rodney's defeat of the Spanish Admiral 
 Langara; of which there is also an account in the "Political Magazine" for 
 1780, with a translation of the Spanish account. 
 
 Extracts from Sir G. B. Rodney's Letters from Gibraltar Bay, dated 
 H. M. ship Sandwich, January ^*lth, 1780. 
 
 " Having received repeated intelligence of a Spanish squadron, said to consist 
 of fourteen sail of the line, cruizing off Cape St. Vincent, I gave notice to all 
 the captains, upon my approaching the said Cape, to prepare for battle ; and 
 having passed it on the 16th in the morning, with the whole convoy, at one p. m., 
 the Cape then bearing north four leagues, the Bedford made the signal for seeing 
 a fleet in the S. E. quarter. 
 
 " I immediately rnade the signal for the line of battle a-breast, and bore down 
 upon them ; but before that could be well effected, I perceived the enemy were 
 endeavouring to form a line of battle a-head upon the starboard tack ; and as the 
 day was far advanced, and unwilling to delay the action, at two p. m. I hauled 
 down the signal for the line a-breast, and made the signal for a general chase ; to 
 engage as the ships came up by rotation ; and to take the lee-gage in order to 
 prevent the enemy's retreat into their own ports. 
 
 *' At four p. m., perceiving the headmost ships very near the enemy, I made 
 the general signal to engage, and close. In a few minutes, the headmost ships 
 began the action ; which was returned with great briskness by the enemy. At 
 forty minutes past four, one of the enemy's line of battle ships blew up with a 
 dreadful explosion ; every person perished. At six p. m. one of the Spanish 
 ships struck. The action and pursuit continued with a constant fire till twO 
 o'clock in the morning ; at which time the Monarca, the headmost ship of all the 
 
RODNEY AND LANGARA. 101 
 
 enemy's ships, having struck to the Sandwich, after receiving one broadside ; and 
 all firing having ceased ; I made the signal, and brought to. 
 
 " The weather during the night was very tempestuous, and with a great sea ; 
 which rendered it difficult to take possession of, and shift the prisoners of those 
 ships that had surrendered. 
 
 " It continued very bad weather the next day ; when the Royal George, Prince 
 George, Sandwich, and several other ships, were in great danger, and under the 
 necessity of making sail to avoid the shoals of St. Lucar ; nor did they get into 
 deep water till the next morning ; when, having joined the convoy, and made 
 Cape Spartel, I dispatched two frigates to Tangier to acquaint H. M. Consul of 
 our success ; that Great Britain was again Mistress of the Straits ; and desiring 
 him to hasten a supply of fresh provisions for the garrison. At sun-set we entered 
 the Gut. 
 
 " I may venture to affirm, though the enemy made a gallant defence, that had 
 the weather proved but even moderate, or had the action happened in the day? 
 not one of their squadron had escaped." 
 
 Here follows a list of the two fleets, from which the relative force can be 
 collected. It appears the Spanish fleet consisted of eleven sail of ships of 
 seventy and eighty guns, and two frigates. The force of the British fleet was 
 greatly superior ; being composed of eighteen ships of the line, besides frigates ; 
 number not mentioned. Of the Spaniards, five were taken and brought into 
 Gibraltar ; two were taken and afterwards lost upon the rocks ; and one was 
 blown up in action. From the prompt and spirited manner in which the attack 
 was made, little doubt can be entertained, that, under the circumstances supposed 
 by the gallant Admiral, the result would have been such as to justify his con- 
 clusion. 
 
 From Sir G. Rodney to the Earl of Sandwich. 
 
 " Gibraltar, 7th February, 1780, 
 
 " I have the sincere satisfaction to assure your Lordship, that the five Spanish 
 men of war are as fine ships as ever swam ; they are now completely refitted, 
 manned, and put into the line of battle ; and, I will answer for them, will do their 
 duty as English men of war, should the enemy give them an opportunity." 
 
 The British fleet suffered comparatively very little by this daring pursuit ; the 
 whole loss amounting to but four top-masts, one top-gallant-mast, and other 
 trifling damages ; thirty-two men were killed, and 102 wounded in the fleet ; 
 many of the ships not having received any loss or damage whatever. 
 
102 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 It seems the enemy was directly to leeward of the British fleet ; the day was 
 far advanced (in the month of January), and a dangerous coast to run upon, 
 having a port to receive the Spanish ships ; and blowing very strong with a 
 rough sea. 
 
 Under these circumstances we cannot too much admire the spirit and 
 professional skill shown by the British Admiral and his fleet. The superiority 
 of his force was little, compared to the otherwise discouraging position in which 
 he found himself; sufficient to have appalled many a manly heart less courageous 
 than his : but he, like Sir Edward Hawke, never considered the " perils of a 
 lee-shore" until he had effected all he could, in the capture and destruction of 
 the enemy. 
 
 We are likewise to observe, that finding the enemy were first disposed to form 
 in line of battle, it was the intention of Sir G. Rodney to have passed through 
 it, and engage them to leeward, the better to prevent their escape. 
 
 The result shows what may be expected from a happy union of skill, judgment, 
 and intrepidity, upon similar occasions : this is remarkable, from being the first 
 instance in latter times of a decided intention to break through the enemy's line 
 and engage him to leeward. 
 
 Mr. Clerk, in his " Essay," appears to have taken to himself the entire credit 
 of recommending this practice to our British Admirals ; nay, from the tenour of 
 his work, we are led to consider that to break through the line of the enemy, or, 
 as he terms it, to cut it in twain, is purely a discovery of his own. 
 
 That Lord Rodney and other Admirals may have profited by reading his book, 
 no one can doubt ; and Mr. Clerk is justly entitled to the merit of having recalled 
 the attention of the British navy to a subject of so much importance ; but the 
 practice seems by no means a new one ; nor to have been a discovery of Mr. 
 Clerk's ; as it was frequently put in practice in our former wars with the Dutch ; 
 proved in " L'Art des Armees Navales, ou Traite des Evolutions Navales, &c. 
 par le Pere Paul Hoste, Professeur des Mathematiques dans le Seminaire Royal 
 de Toulon;" published at Lyons in 1727; and since in part translated by 
 Christopher O'Bryen, Esq. a Lieutenant in the Royal Navy, in 1762. 
 
 Professor Playfair observes of this work, " It is an elementary and distinct 
 exposition of the ordinary manoeuvres at sea, and has no pretensions to any thing 
 more. It was, however, highly regarded at the time." 
 
 See the " Memoir" in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, 
 volume ix. (read in 1818), 
 
RODNEY AND LANGARA. 103 
 
 We are, however, informed in the title page, that it is a " Traite des 
 Evolutions Navales, qui contient des Regies utiles aux OflSciers Generaux et 
 Particuliers d'une Armee Navale ; avec des Exemples tire% de ce qui s'est passe 
 de plus considerable sur la Mer depuis Cinquante Ans." 
 
 Now as the book was published in 1737, he was treating of events that had 
 taken place, some of them at least, in his own life-time ; and in which perhaps he 
 had been present ; for in his Preface he tells us — " J'ai pris occasion de faire le 
 recit des principaux combats qui se sont donnez sur la mer, depuis qu'on a mis de 
 gros vaisseaux dans les armees navales a la place de galeres, qui on faisoient 
 autrefois toute la force :" and he concludes in the following words : — 
 
 " An reste, on ne trouvera pas etrange, qu'un homme de ma profession ait 
 travaille sur ces matieres ; si on S9ait que depuis dou%e ans j'ai eu I'honneur 
 d'etre aupres de Marechal d'Estrees, de Mons. le Due de Mortemart, et de 
 Mons. le Marechal de Tourville, dans toutes les expeditions quHls ont Jiaites, 
 quand ils commandoient nos armees navales ; et que Mons. le Marechal de 
 Tourville a bien voulu me communiquer ses lumieres, en m'ordonnant de 
 composer sur une matiere que je pense n'avoir pas encore ete traitee." 
 
 To the writer it appears to be a work which embraces in the most comprehensive 
 manner every part of the subject ; and to be the root from which all other 
 treatises upon naval tactics have grown. The fifth part treats expressly " Des 
 mouvemens de I'armee navale sans toucher aux ordres ;" among others, 
 " Disputer le vent a I'ennemi." " Eviter le combat." " Forcer les ennemis au 
 combat." " Doubler les ennemis." " S'empScher d'etre double." " Recevoir 
 les ennemis." " Traverser I'armee enuemie," &c. 
 
 The following is taken from the original ;* (see also extracts from " Ledyard's 
 Naval History," and " Whitlock's Journal," which are given at the conclusion 
 of this account.) 
 
 " On trouve dans les relations des combats donnez dans la manche entre les 
 Anglois and les HoUandois, que leur armees se traversoient souvent ; c'est a 
 dire que I'armee C, H, D, qui etoit sous le vent, aiant un pen couru de I'avant 
 reviroit par la contre-marche, et coupoit I'armee A, B, au point E, et aiant 
 revire une seconde fois au point C, gagnoit le vent a I'ennemi ; mais celui-ci 
 reviroit a son tour, et coupoit Tarmee qui lui avoit gagne le vent. De cette 
 maniere les deux armees se traversoient plusieurs fois ; ce qui leur donnoit 
 lieu de se couper, de se prendre, de se faire perir mutuellement plusieurs 
 
 vaisseaux." 
 
 * See part v. page 388, of L'Art des Armees Navales, &c. 
 
104 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 '• REMARQUE. 
 
 " Cette maneuvre est egalement hardie et delicate, et il faut etre consomme 
 dans le metier, pour y reussir aussi heureusement que fit le Comte d'Estrees, 
 ViceAmiral, dans le combat du Texel I'an 1673: car il traversa I'Escadre de 
 Zelande, lui gagna le vent, la dissipa, et mit les ennemis en un si grand desordre, 
 qu'il fit declarer la victoire, qui etoit encore en balance." 
 
 He further says, that " Admiral de Ruyter put this sort of traverses in prac- 
 tice to the greatest advantage when he beat the English fleet, under General 
 Monk, in the year 1666, three days successively, on the north coast of England." 
 (Page 43 of Christopher O'Brien's " Naval Evolution.") 
 
 This appears to be the first year after the form of a line, in battle, had been 
 adopted ; and attributed to the Duke of York, afterwards James II. 
 
 In speaking of the advantages and disadvantages of the weather-gage, Paul 
 Hoste observes in his " Premiere Partie," page 53 : — 
 
 " Si quelques vaisseaux de I'armee qui est sous le vent, sont desemparez ou a 
 la tete, ou a la queu, ou meme au malieu ; I'armee qui est au vent, leur envoie 
 plus aisement des Brulots, fait plus aisement des detachmens pour fondre sur les 
 fuyards. Ainsi quand plusieurs vaisseux de I'armee A, B, qui est sous le vent 
 seront desemparez ; I'armee C, D, detachera des vaisseaux et des brulots, pour 
 fondre sur eux, et tsLchera de couper la tSte, ou la queue de I'armee ennemie ; et 
 le vent lui donnera un si grand avantage pour cela, qu'il sera mal-aise a I'armee 
 A, B, de s'en defendre." And Plate XVI describes a windward fleet passing 
 through that of an enemy to leeward, and two ships burning together to leeward 
 of them ; with a disabled ship close to them. 
 
 This can be understood to be nothing else but a fire-ship sent through the 
 enemy's line, followed and supported by a detachment of ships ; and setting fire 
 to one of the disabled ships of the leeward fleet. 
 
 Fire-ships, had there been any, might have been applied with the same success 
 at the battle of Trafalgar, and by either party ; the disabled of the British fleet, 
 after drifting to leeward of the enemy's line, being equally exposed to them. Of 
 these an opinion will be given, after describing the battle of Trafalgar. Among 
 the " ordinary manoeuvres" given and taught by Paul Hoste, is the frequent 
 and honible application ol fire-ships i and this " Treatise" — of " no preten- 
 sions to any thing more" — comprises every thing to be known upon sailing, 
 forming in difi"erent lines and orders, fighting and manoeuvring a fleet ; and the 
 subject is treated in a seaman-like manner. 
 
 No explanatory figures appear necessary to accompany this account. 
 
RODNEY AND LANGARA. 105 
 
 The diligence, so kindly exerted by a naval friend, to forward the present 
 undertaking, has furnished the writer with the following striking passages from 
 Ledyard and Whitlock. 
 
 BREAKING THE LINE. 
 (In the reign of Charles II. in the year 1652.) 
 
 Extract. — " In the mean time, Sir George Ayscough cruizing off Plymouth, 
 with about forty sail, was met the l6th of August by the Dutch Admiral De 
 Ruyter, with a fleet of men of war convoying a fleet of merchant ships. Both 
 Admirals immediately prepared to engage ; and the engagement proved very smart 
 from four in the afternoon until night parted them. Sir George behaved him- 
 self very bravely ; and, with nine of his headmost ships, charged through the 
 Dutch fleet, and got the weather-gage. Having this advantage, he renewed 
 the attack, and continued it warmly for some hours ; but some of the rest of the 
 ships not seconding him as>they ought to have done, and the night coming on, 
 he thought fit to retire to Plymouth. The Dutch, having likewise enough of it, 
 made the best of their way up the Channel, having had two captains killed, two 
 ships sunk, and a considerable number of men killed. 
 
 " The English lost only one fire-ship. 
 
 " The Dutch confessed that their own fleet was so disabled, that De Ruyter was 
 obliged to send home fifteen, including his own ship." Ledyard's Naval History, 
 book iii. page 542i 
 
 " In all these engagements with the Dutch, fire-ships were very useful on both 
 sides ; in that of the 3d of June, 1665, four Dutch ships having fallen on 
 board one another, were destroyed by a single fire-ship." See Ledyard, book iii. 
 
 p. 577. 
 
 Whitlock's Journal says, " Sir George and four others charged through the 
 whole body of the enemy's fleet, and was much damaged ; but Sir George 
 tacked about and weathered them, and charged them all again, and so continued 
 engaged until night." 
 
 DOUBLING ATTEMPTED. 
 (In the reign of William III. in the year 1692.) 
 
 " The sun having dispersed the fog, Tourville's fleet were seen by Admiral 
 Russell, forming their line on the same tack with the British. Admiral 
 Russell bore away so far to leeward, that every one in the fleet might fetch 
 
 P 
 
106 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 into the wake or grain of his own ship, then bringing to, and lying by with 
 his fore-top-sail to the mast. The British line stretched from S.S.W. to 
 N.N.E. The Dutch in the van, the Admiral in the centre, and the Blue in 
 the rear. By nine, the enemy's van had almost stretched as far southward as 
 ours ; their Admiral and Rear Admiral (who were in the rear) closing the line, 
 and their Vice Admiral of the same division standing towards the rear of our 
 fleet. Between ten and eleven, they bore down and made the signal for battle. 
 The French were inferior in number ; and (as the attack appears to have been 
 directed on the rear) Admiral Allemande, the Dutch Commander of the van, 
 was sent to, to tack and get westward of the French, as soon as any of his 
 ships could weather them ; and the rear was directed to close the line. The 
 French would have been thus completely doubled on ; but the fleets had not long 
 been engaged before it became quite calm ; so that the manoeuvre was not 
 completed. 
 
 " In the close of the day a fog came on, and the fleets were thrown confusedly 
 together." Ledyard's Naval History, book iv. page 659, &c. 
 
 DOUBLING. 
 
 (Sir George Rooke's action off Malaga, 1704.) 
 
 " The Marquis de Villette observing that the Admiral, as he bore down, was 
 at some distance from the centre, and thinking that he might get a-head of 
 that squadron with his foremost ships, made a signal to the headmost ships 
 of the French line to crowd all the sail they could. Admiral Shovel, still 
 I)earing down upon the enemy with the van, insensibly found himself in their 
 line a-head of them ; which the French judging to be a favourable opportunity, 
 resolved to make their advantage of it, by keeping their wind, and crowding all 
 the sail they were able, in order to cut off the van of the Confederates from 
 the rest of their fleet ; hoping, with reason, that if it grew calm, which usually 
 happens in a sea-fight, their gallies might tow them off, so as that they might 
 make a double, and, weathering Sir Cloudesley Shovel, fire upon him on both 
 sides. But Admiral Shovel having discovered the enemy's intention, immediately 
 clapped upon a wind; and Sir George Rooke, foreseeing what would be the 
 consequence if his van was intercepted, bore dowii upon the enemy with the 
 rest of the Confederate fleet, and put out the signal for the fight ; which was 
 immediately begun by Admiral Shovel." Ledyard's Naval History, book v. 
 page 794j note. 
 
 " The English Blue squadron charging through the enemy, De Ruyrle's 
 
RODNEY AND LANGARA. 107 
 
 division suffered much ; and himself was in the greatest danger of being taken 
 or sunk by Lawson, till relieved by Tromp." Ledyard, book iii. page 552. 
 In this bloody fight. Dean was killed ; and, Monk covering his body with a cloak, 
 the battle continued with great fury. 
 
 " In a subsequent action, in which Monk had issued orders to give no quarter, 
 thirty Dutch men of war were sunk, Evertzen made prisoner, and Van Tromp was 
 killed." Ledyard, book iii. page 555. 
 
 " Sea-fight between the English under the Duke of York, and the Dutch 
 
 under Opdam. 
 
 " This memorable battle began on the 3d of June, 1665, at three in the 
 morning. To give a particular account of it would be too long to find a place 
 here. Though the English had, in the beginning, the weather-gage, and the 
 two fleets had several times charged through each other with great fury and 
 intrepidity ; there was no visible advantage till about one o'clock at noon ; when 
 the Earl of Sandwich, with his Blue squadron, happening to Jail into the centre 
 of the enemy's fleet, separated it into two parts, and thereby made a great step 
 towards the victory." Ledyard, book iii. page 577. 
 
 In this action several of the Dutch ships were destroyed by the English fire- 
 ships, and the Dutch Admiral's ship blew up. The Duke, in the Royal Charles, 
 was in the greatest danger. 
 
 Again, in action with the Dutch under Cornelius Van Tromp, Evertzen, and 
 others ; the English commanded by the Duke of Albermarle and Prince Rupert ; 
 the following is related : — 
 
 " In the evening of the third day, the Duke discovered Prince Rupert's 
 squadron hastening to his assistance. Being joined, the two Admirals resolved 
 to attack the enemy again immediately ; and setting their course towards them, 
 with drums beating and trumpets sounding, charged through and through the 
 Dutch squadrons." Ledyard, page 583. 
 
 In the life of James II, written by himself, and found in Macpherson's 
 " Original Papers," it appears that in this year's war the English and Dutch 
 fleets were first drawn up into line or order of battle. Note. — " If there was no 
 line before, how could it be broken ?" 
 
 r 2 
 
108 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 REMARKS 
 ON kodney's defeat op langaba. 
 
 " Allowing all possible credit to Rodney in the defeat of Langara, I shall only 
 observe, upon the 'Observations' of the writer, of its being the j'?/**^ instance in 
 modern times of ' a decided intention to break the enemy's line and engage him 
 to leeward,' that I fancy this action took place after the explanation of Clerk's 
 system to Lord Rodney ; who, on being asked his opinion, replied, ' you shall 
 see what I think of it the first time I meet an enemy's fleet.' 
 
 " Clerk certainly takes to himself the entire merit of recommending the 
 breaking of the line to our Admirals, and also claims the discovery of the 
 manoeuvre, to which I am convinced he is justly entitled. 
 
 " P. Hoste, in the extracts given, informs us that the English and Dutch made 
 frequent traverses through the lines ; but fleets were then in no order of battle, 
 but crowds of ships charging and re-charging through each other ; this I maintain 
 is not the manoeuvre treated of by Clerk ; even P. L. Hoste speaks of it as 
 • egalement bardie et delicate ;' and he must have known, what I believe to be 
 correct, that in the Dutch wars alluded to a regular line of battle was not known. 
 The fleets were formed into a number of divisions, drawn together, rather than 
 formed in line ; and in all their charges and re-charges, do not appear to have had 
 any ultimate plan in view; any object of cutting off and overpowering particular 
 parts of the enemy's fleet ; nor indeed any object but that of showing individual 
 valour. 
 
 " Clerk recommends the breaking through a regularly formed line, to throw 
 into confusion what was in order before, and to cut off and overpower a certain 
 part of your enemy's force before the other can come to its assistance : he 
 continually urges the adoption of this system, and says it is the only way to bring 
 on a decided action with an enemy wishing to avoid one. 
 
 " Sir G. Ayscough's action is open to the same argument. 
 
 " Russell's action shows a disposition to double on the enemy, but does not 
 discover any knowledge of putting it in practice after the manner of Clerk. 
 
 " Sir G. Rook's action off Malaga does not prove that the French knew of the 
 attack by breaking the line. They took a favourable opportunity, by our van 
 having separated itself from the rest, to try to cut it off; but, had Shovel passed 
 through their line, they would not have had that opportunity." 
 
 Between conflicting opinions, it is for the reader to decide. 
 
HYDE PARKER AND DE GUICHEN. 109 
 
 HYDE PARKER AND DE GUICHEN. 
 
 Some proceedings of the English Fleet, under Rear Admiral Hyde ParJcer, 
 March, 1780, hy an Officer present. 
 
 " We had in the mean time proceeded from Antigua to Barbadoes, and seen 
 the Jamaica convoy as far on their way as Antigua. General Vaughan had 
 arrived from England with four new regiments, and an expedition was planned 
 against St. Vincent's or Grenada. For this purpose the troops were ordered up 
 from Antigua and St. Kitt's, 6xcept a small body left for the defence of those 
 islands. The fleet had been at St. Lucia, and, with Commodore CoUingwood's 
 squadron, proceeded to windward of Martinico ; as well to meet our troops from 
 the leeward, as to intercept any fleets from France. The 211st of March we fell 
 in with the convoy with the army ; and having intelligence by the Alert brig, 
 who had fallen in with a French convoy under four sail of the line, steering to 
 the West Indies, Commodore CoUingwood was left with an equal number to 
 intercept them, and we bore away with the transports for St. Lucia. Every 
 thing was nearly ready for sailing on the meditated expedition, and the fleet had 
 dropped down to Choque Bay (between Gros Islet and the Carenage) when a 
 number of large ships were seen from Morne Fortunee in the afternoon, going 
 into Fort Royal, Martinico. A frigate was immediately sent to reconnoitre 
 them, and returned with an account to the Admiral of their being a convoy 
 under many line-of-battle ships. It was now without doubt that the ships in 
 question were the squadron expected from Europe under the Comte de Guichen, 
 consisting of sixteen sail of the line ; of which the Admiral had received very 
 particular information. 
 
 " I should have observed that, on our arrival at St. Lucia, a frigate met us 
 with dispatches from Sir George Rodney, who was arrived at Barbadoes, with 
 four sail of coppered line-of-battle ships, which he had sent to cruise to wind- 
 ward of Martinico, on receiving the same information which the Alert had 
 brought to Admiral Parker. 
 
 " Choque Bay being an improper place to sustain an attack in, the fleet 
 weighed the next morning and anchored in line in Gros Islet Bay. The troops, 
 which had been drawn from St. Kitt's and Antigua, were also embarked in the 
 frigates and sloops of war, and sailed for those islands by night. Commodore 
 CoUingwood joined us as we were anchoring ; and informed the Admiral that he 
 
110 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 had fallen in with the enemy's newly arrived convoy under sixteen sail of the 
 line, and had been chased by several of them, till they were recalled by signal, 
 when they might have brought him to action ; that he had also fallen in with the 
 four sail detached as before mentioned by Sir George Rodney ; who, on the 
 information he gave them, returned to Barbadoes. 
 
 " March 23. — The day after our anchoring at Gros Islet, the enemy's fleet 
 came out, and stood over to St. Lucia. In the afternoon the body of their fleet 
 came within two gun shots of us, and then tacking, made sail to windward. 
 We counted twenty-six sail of the line, and ten large frigates ; and they all 
 seemed full of troops ; from which it was supposed they meditated an attack on 
 the island. Every precaution was forthwith taken in case of such an attempt 
 being made. A small schooner arrived on the 23d from Barbadoes, who brought 
 the Admiral information, that the troops lately arrived were to sail the following 
 day from thence for St. Lucia under one frigate's protection only. As the French 
 were completely masters of the whole Channel by being to windward a league or 
 two, the capture of this convoy appeared inevitable. 
 
 " The next morning the signal was made from Pidgeon Island, that they were 
 in sight. Most fortunately the enemy's fleet, whether from their shortening sail, 
 or a lee current stronger than ordinary, had fallen by day-light in the morning 
 about three leagues to leeward ; but two of their line were well advanced, getting 
 to windward of Gros Islet Bay, and in full chase of the convoy as soon as they 
 discovered them. In this very critical situation Admiral Parker called the flag 
 officers together, and represented to them the state of the two fleets and 
 convoy ; at the same time asking their opinion, whether he ought to put to sea 
 at all risks, for the preservation of the latter, so important to the safety of the 
 West India Islands. The Admiral was said to have waited but for one assent, 
 and instantly made the signal to slip and form line, without regard to station, 
 as they got out. Animated by one spirit, this signal had been so well antici- 
 pated, that in ten minutes from its being made, every ship was under sail, and 
 quickly formed in close Une as they rounded Pidgeon Island. The moment our 
 headmost ship made its appearance, the two advanced French ships, who were 
 well to windward, and so near to the convoy that they were on the point of 
 running the transports on shore, immediately bore up with a press of sail, and 
 never hauled up until they had reached their fleet, which also bore up to jpin 
 their leewardmost ship, when they formed the line. 
 
 " By this manoeuvre the convoy were enabled to proceed in safety to the 
 Carenage ; and the English fleet, at one o'clock p. m., tacked, and stood back 
 to Gros Islet Bay ; where, at five o'clock, they came to, each ship taking up its 
 
Missing Page 
 
PARKER AND GUICHEN. Ill 
 
 own anchorage, the cables having been left with buoys to them ; the enemy's fleet 
 at this time being able to fetch into the bay, and not four miles ftom us. 
 
 " This affair was highly creditable to the Admiral and the whole fleet ; being 
 executed with inexpressible alertness and good order, and manifesting the most 
 perfect discipline and finest spirit. Nothing could exceed the beauty and preci- 
 sion of the line of battle ; nor was our gallant Chief in any hurry to return ; for 
 we continued standing over to Martinico, long after the security of the convoy had 
 been effected, and in the face of so superior a force. 
 
 " Immediately on our return the Admiral issued public thanks to the officers 
 and men of the fleet. A small vessel was sent in the night to apprise Sir G. 
 Rodney how we were situated, and the fleet was kept in constant readiness to 
 push out the moment his ships appeared to windward. 
 
 " On the 28th the enemy's fleet, then far to windward, suddenly bore up for 
 Fort Royal ; at the same moment the signal was made from Pidgeon Island for 
 five sail of English line-of-battle ships coming down ; and to them, that they 
 might approach with safety. In the afternoon Sir George Rodney anchored in 
 the bay, and took the command of the fleet. 
 
 " Had the French chosen it, they might have easily prevented this junction, 
 which could not have been made without a battle, in wjdeh they would have had 
 so many circumstances in their favour." 
 
 Plate IX. — A, Gros Islet Bay, in the island of St. Lucia. 
 
 B, Pidgeon Island. 
 
 C, the English fleet under Rear Admiral Parker, consisting of seventeen sail of 
 the line, lying at anchor in line of battle ; the Yarmouth, of sixty-four guns, 
 the sternmost of the rear division, being close to the Islet Foureur. 
 
 D, an English convoy of thirty sail of transports, with troops, under the 
 Pegasus frigate, coming from Barbadoes, and on the point of running on shore. 
 
 E, two French ships of the line, who had got to windward of their fleet, 
 during the night of the 24tb, and had discovered, and were in chase to intercept, 
 the convoy. 
 
 F, the French fleet of twenty-seven sail of the line under the Comte Guichen ; 
 with their heads in this direction, under a press of sail, but about three leagues 
 to leeward, at eight o'clock in the morning. Their present position anticipates 
 their advance in the course of the afternoon. 
 
112 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 G, it being resolved by the Rear Admiral to save the convoy at all hazards, 
 the signal was made to cut or slip at half-past nine o'clock ; and in ten minutes 
 the whole were under weigh (excepting the Yarmouth, who was not in condition, 
 and remained at anchor) and formed a line a-head as they came out, on the 
 lineG. 
 
 H, the two French ships in chase, who would have reached the convoy on 
 the next tack ; the moment they saw our first ship coming round the point of 
 Pidgeon Island, bore up under aU sail to join their own fleet, which likewise bore 
 up to join their leewardmost ship. 
 
 I, the course of the convoy te the Carenage ; the English fleet stood on till 
 half-past one o'clock, when they tacked, and at five p. m. were all anchored in 
 their former line ; the French fleet then distant about a couple of gun shots. 
 
 SIR G. RODNEY WITH THE FRENCH FLEET, UNDER 
 MONSIEUR DE GUICHEN. 
 
 April 17, 1780. 
 
 Extracts of a Letter from Sir George Rodney, April 26tk, 1780, of Fort 
 
 Royal, Martinico. 
 
 " On the I6th we got sight of the enemy about eight leagues to leeward of 
 the Pearl Rock : a general chase followed, and at five in the morning we plainly 
 discovered that they consisted of twenty-three sail of the line, a fifty gun ship 
 and three frigates. When night came on, I formed into line of battle a-head 
 and directed the Venus and Greyhound to watch the enerdy's motions, which was 
 admirably attended to by that veteran officer. Captain Fergusson, &c. 
 
 " At day-light of the 17th, the enemy were forming the line a-head. I made 
 signal for the line at two cables' distance. At forty-five minutes after six, I gave 
 notice by public signal that my intention was to attack the enemy's rear with 
 my whole force ; at seven a. m. I made signal for the line at one cable's distance 
 only. At thirty minutes after eight, a. m. I made signal for the line a-breast, 
 each ship bearing from the other N. by W. and S. by E., and bore down upon 
 the enemy. The enemy discovered my intention, wore, and formed line on the 
 
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SIR GEORGE RODNEY. 113 
 
 other tack. I immediately hauled the wind, and formed line a-head at two 
 cables, on the larboard tack, &c. 
 
 " At 11, a. m., I made signal to prepare for battle, to convince the whole 
 fleet I was determined to bring the enemy to an engagement. At fifty minutes 
 past 11,1 made signal for every ship to bear down and steer for her opposite in 
 the enemy's line, agreeably to the twenty-first article of the additional fighting 
 instructions. At fifty-five minutes past eleven, the signal for battle, and that it 
 was my intention to engage close, and of course the Admiral's ship to be the 
 example. At one p. m. the Sandwich in the centre began to engage. Per- 
 ceiving several of our ships engaging at a distance, I repeated the signal for 
 close action. 
 
 " In the centre the battle continued till fifteen minutes after four ; when the 
 Couronne, Triumphant, and Fondant, bore away, &c. 
 
 " The Sandwich had, before being attacked by them, beat three ships out of 
 their line of battle, had entirely broke it, and was to leeward of the wake of the 
 French Admiral," &c. 
 
 Thus ended Sir George Rodney's first encounter with the enemy in the 
 West Indies, and certainly much to the discredit of the British fleet. (See 
 Annual Register for 1780.) 
 
 Plate X, Fig. 1, shows the attack by the British Admiral ; in which it 
 clearly appears he was by no means properly supported. If he had been so, a 
 very difi"erent result might have been expected. This was the case in the battle 
 of Matthews, and the same mode of attack is recommended in both. 
 
 The British force consisted of twenty ships of the line, one fifty, and four 
 frigates ; that of the French, twenty-three ships and eight frigates. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 The remarks of Mr. Clerk upon this affair are perfectly just ; and had Sir 
 George Rodney been able to carry his first intention (of attacking the rear) into 
 execution, success might probably have crowned his endeavours. 
 
 We should never for a moment suffer ourselves to believe that the enemy, 
 because some of his ships, or even the whole line, bear away to form again to 
 leeward, is therefore beaten. This has been frequently practised by the French, 
 with a view to profit by a second similar attack of the windward fleet : from which 
 they have never failed to reap considerable advantage. 
 
 This should teach us, that nothing but closing with the enemy to leeward, in 
 whatever part of the line you can penetrate it, is the way to conquer him. In 
 
 Q 
 
114 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 this rencontre there was great misconduct in many of the Captains, while Rodney 
 set a noble example in the Sandwich. By his eagerness for close action, he had 
 got to leeward of the French Admiral's wake. 
 
 Rodney, after the battle, shifted his flag to the Montague. 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 " The ill success of that day is to be ascribed to the injudicious extension of 
 our van, unchecked by the officer commanding in that post." 
 
 Audibert Ramatuelle, in his account of this affair, gives the superiority of force 
 to Lord Rodney, and highly compliments Monsieur De Guichen for his conduct. 
 
 There is, as usual, much incorrectness in the statements, which finish by saying 
 that an English ship of seventy-four guns sunk afterwards at St. Lucie. 
 (P. 442.) 
 
 The same author observes, that a fleet to leeward of superior force to his 
 opponent, might leave an open space in the centre of his line, where it is supposed 
 the enemy has placed his heaviest ships, and as a snare, or inducement to the 
 windward fleet to bear down, to penetrate, and cut off some ships. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 In this affair it is related of a woman on board the Sandwich, that she worked 
 at a twenty-four pounder all the action ; and, what was still more to her praise, 
 that she set up all night afterwards with the wounded. 
 
 The Sandwich had seventy shot in her hull, seventeen of them between wind 
 and water : the crew were kept at the pumps for twenty-four hours. 
 
 " On the 17th, when the day broke, the French were about four miles on the 
 lee-bow of the Princess Royal (commanding the van division of the British fleet). 
 Sir G. Rodney then informed his fleet, by signal, that he intended to attack the 
 enemy's rear, and soon after made the signal to bear away in line a-breast on a 
 particular bearing, steering for their rear. Mons. De Guichen immediately 
 wore to the northward, and the British fleet hauled up to the southward ; both 
 at this time not more than three miles asunder. When the van of the British 
 fleet as then formed came opposite to the rear of the enemy, Sir G. Rodney 
 
Sm GEORGE RODNEY. 115 
 
 made the signal to ware together, and form on the same tack with the enemy, in 
 line to the north. At twelve o'clock the signal was made to bear down, every 
 ship to engage her opponent. 
 
 " As the French were carrying a press of sail, preserving their line, going a 
 little from the wind, it took some time to approach near enough for action ; nor 
 was it until one o'clock that the battle commenced, in the van, and quickly ran 
 through the whole fleet. 
 
 " Rear Admiral Parker, who commanded the van, not finding himself a-breast 
 of the flag ship of the enemy's van, was nearly so of her second a-stern, a sixty- 
 four , but he was most anxious to reach the former, an eighty gun ship ; which 
 ship, averse to accept the challenge, did not exchange her place with the sixty- 
 four ; the sixty-four thereupon fell to the lot of the Princess Royal, and in a short 
 time was so roughly treated, that a frigate very gallantly came up and towed her 
 to leeward. 
 
 " After about two hours' action the whole of the enemy's van broke and pressed 
 to leeward — Admiral Parker followed, but as the repeating frigates had the 
 signal flying for the line of battle, he thought it his duty to haul his wind, 
 to sixpport the centre, coming up and warmly engaged. Upon this the centre 
 and rear of the enemy broke and bore away. The Commander-in-Chief's ship, 
 the Sandwich, was much disabled, not having been properly supported by her 
 seconds, although there never was a more gallant officer than Captain Edwards, 
 of the Cornwall, who was one of them : he lost twenty-one killed and forty-nine 
 wounded, which proved he had not been idle, though perhaps he might have 
 lost sight of his Admiral. Captain Young, of the Sandwich, had great credit 
 with the fleet, as no ship was ever better fought. 
 
 " Sir G. Rodney, in his public letter, speaks of the van and rear of his fleet 
 as being at too great a distance from the centre ; affording a reason for not pur- 
 suing the enemy that night, and casting a reflection on the van for having ex- 
 tended itself so far. But it should be asked, what was the meaning of* the 
 signal ' for every ship to steer down for and engage her opponent,' unless it was 
 for the van ship to engage the van ship of the enemy, and so of the rest ? both 
 fleets being a-breast of each other, and nearly ship for ship when that signal 
 .was made. 
 
 " That such was Sir George's intention plainly appeared from his continuing 
 to carry sail after the van of the enemy, for a whole hour, each British ship 
 endeavouring to bring to action her corresponding one of the enemy ; nor did he 
 countermand that signal, or show his disapprobation of the manner it had been 
 acted on by the van division. He did not get into action until after the van 
 
 Q 2 
 
116 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 were engaged, when the Sandwich got alongside of the Couronne, which was the 
 centre ship. 
 
 " Under the impression of that signal, the van felt bound to keep up, if pos- 
 sible, with the van of the enemy ; a portion of their fleet, equal, if not superior 
 to itself. It is, therefore, difficult to understand what Sir George had to com- 
 plain of, or how the extension of his van, having that of the enemy along with 
 it, could have prevented the pursuit of the rest." 
 
 SIR GEORGE RODNEY WITH THE FRENCH FLEET. 
 
 May 15 and 19, 1780. 
 
 Extract of a Letter from Sir George Rodney, May 31, 1780. Barhadoes. 
 
 " Having landed the wounded and sick men, watered and refitted the fleet, 
 on the 6th of May, upon receiving intelligence of the enemy's approach to 
 windward of Martinico, I put to sea with nineteen sail of the line, two fifty gun 
 ships, and several frigates. 
 
 " From the 6th to the 10th of May, the fleet continued turning to windward 
 between Martinico and St. Lucia, when we got sight of the French fleet, about 
 three leagues to windward of us ; Point Salines then bearing N. N. E. five 
 leagues. Captain Afileck in the Triumph joining me the same day. 
 
 " The enemy's fleet consisted of twenty-three sail of the line, seven frigates, &c. 
 Nothing could induce them to risk a general action, though it was in their 
 power daily. 
 
 "* As they were sensible of their advantage in sailing, it emboldened them to 
 approach nearer to his Majesty's ships than they would otherwise have done; and 
 for several days, about two in the afternoon, they bore down in a line a-breast, 
 and brought to the wind a little beyond random-shot distance." 
 
 After changes of wind and difierent operations of the hostile fleets, the Ad- 
 miral proceeds thus : 
 
 " However, it did not enable them to weather his Majesty's fleet so much, but 
 the van, led by that good and gallant ofiicer. Captain Bowyer, about seven in 
 the evening, reached their centre ; and was followed by Rear Admiral Rowley's 
 
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SIR GEORGE RODNEY. 117 
 
 squadron, who then led the van, the centre and rear of his Majesty's fleet 
 following in order." 
 
 (Here see Fig. 2, Plate X.) 
 
 '• As the enemy were under a press of sail, none but the van of his Majesty's 
 fleet could come in for any part of the action, without wasting powder and shot ; 
 the enemy wantonly expended a great deal of theirs at such a distance as to have 
 no effect," &c. 
 
 " The enemy kept an awful distance till the 19th instant, when I was in 
 hopes that I should have weathered them, but had the mortification to be 
 disappointed ; however, their rear could not escape being closely attacked by the 
 ships of the van, then led by Commodore Hotham," &c. 
 
 Plate X, Fig. 2, exhibits Clerk's fourth position (Plate XI) with a shift of 
 wind. Here it is evident, that the British fleet, by tacking in succession when 
 the wind shifted, might have brought the enemy to close action to the leeward ; 
 leaving the van unoccupied. 
 
 A, the original direction of the wind. 
 
 D, the wind when it had shifted. 
 
 The following extracts from the journal so frequently quoted, distinctly show 
 the aversion of the French to close fighting. 
 
 " May 10th, 1780. The British fleet formed line and chased to windward; 
 the next day, about two o'clock, Mons. de Guichen suddenly bore down in line 
 a-breast, as if with a determination to attack ; but on coming within random 
 shot, hauled up, and made all sail he could to windward. He was encouraged 
 to take this liberty by finding that he sailed so much better as a fleet than the 
 British. This was regularly repeated every day at the same hour. 
 
 " On the fifteenth, in the afternoon, when the French van ship was nearly 
 a-breast of the British centre, and rather nearer than usual, the wind shifted so 
 much as to afibrd a prospect of forcing the enemy to battle ; and the signal was 
 instantly made for the commander of the rear division, who led on the larboard 
 tack, to tack and gain the wind. The French immediately wore, and crowded 
 sail away, endeavouring to regain the advantage. " 
 
118 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " At six, p. xn. they tacked and stood across the British van, when the wind 
 shifted six points in their favour, which obliged Rear Admiral Rowley and his 
 division to pass to leeward of their line, exposed to a severe fire. The enemy 
 keeping his wind, the centre and rear were not engaged. From this day they 
 kept at a greater distance ; but on the 19th an opportunity again offered, and the 
 British again tacked, with the hope of being able to weather them ; when finding 
 their rear must be brought to action, the rest of the fleet, after crossing the 
 British van, and getting sufficiently far to windward, edged away, keeping up a 
 heavy cannonade as they passed parallel to the British line, though hardly within 
 gun-shot. 
 
 " Rear Admiral Rowley's division again led upon this as on the former occasion, 
 and sustained about the same loss ; but the French rear ships must have suffered 
 severely, being exposed to a raking fire after passing the Sritish van, as they 
 were obliged to hug their wind as close as possible in order to fetch into the wake 
 of their leading ships, who were in no hurry to bear away. 
 
 " After this Mons. de Guichen stood away under a press of sail, and approached 
 the British fleet no more. It was afterwards understood that the French fleet, 
 unable to keep the sea any longer, and not daring to run the risk of forcing a 
 passage through the British fleet, received orders the same night to make the 
 best of their way to Fort Royal, each ship as she could, which they effected, 
 while Sir G. Rodney stood away for Barbadoes. Had he continued off Fort 
 Royal, this could not have happened. The French had been at sea from the 15th 
 of April ; had sustained three actions ; nor had they landed their wounded : 
 the British had been nine days in port, had landed their wounded, and had 
 been refreshed and refitted. No doubt Sir George had good reasons for his 
 conduct. 
 
 " While at Barbadoes information was received of the sailing and near 
 approach of a Spanish squadron and large convoy, from Cadiz to the West 
 Indies. Sir George was in hopes of intercepting it, but was too late ; the whole 
 got safe into Fort Royal, where the combined fleet amounted to thirty-six sail of 
 the line. Sir George proceeded to St. Lucia, where he thought it provident to 
 anchor in line of battle. One of the coppered line-of-battle ships looked into 
 Fort Royal every morning without being molested. The whole combined force 
 soon after sailed for Cape Francois. 
 
 " The Princess Royal immediately afterwards sailed for Jamaica with the flag 
 of Admiral Rowley, and thence a private ship for England, with a convoy, the 
 20th August, 1781. She reached Spithead after a passage of thirteen weeks. 
 
SIR GEORGE RODNEY. 119 
 
 with but one day's provisions on board at half allowance, and was making five 
 feet water per hour. During this long passage the weather was so fine that the 
 smallest boat might have lived the whole way." 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 " The plan proposed in this mode of attack is very desirable, and would pro- 
 bably have been followed if the lateness of the hour (seven, p. m.) had not 
 prevented the use of signals. Or, had the van to the centre, or flag-ship, tacked 
 together, they might soon have brought to close action the van of the enemy F, 
 and engaged him ship to ship ; the rear C, of the fleet B, standing on to engage 
 the rear of the fleet F." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 In describing this battle, it is not necessary to follow the Admiral, in all his 
 previous endeavours to weather upon the enemy, and bring him to close action ; 
 but to examine it when the fleets had arrived at the fourth position. (Fig. 2, 
 Plate X.) By their appearance in this figure, it would seem, that had the 
 British fleet then tacked in succession from the van, it would have been closely 
 engaged with the enemy from centre to rear, leaving the van unoccupied. 
 
 It is true, that by attacking them in this manner, ships, while in stays, would 
 be exposed to a heavy raking fire from the enemy's line; but in situations of this 
 nature, where an opportunity offers of seizing an advantage, too nice a calcula- 
 tion should not be made as to present consequences ; intent only upon defeating 
 the enemy by every possible means. 
 
 On the 19th, it appears, that although the British Admiral was disappointed 
 in his hopes of gaining the wind, he might have passed through the enemy's 
 line, at the fourth or fifth ship from the van. See Fig. 1, Plate XI. 
 
 Should the leading ship of the fleet B, succeed in laying the enemy " athwart 
 hawser the second should in like manner proceed to another ; thus, in different 
 places, the centre and rear of the enemy's line will be attacked to great 
 advantage. 
 
 By breaking the line, he would have thrown one ship upon another, and the 
 rear into confusion ; by which, no doubt, great advantage might have arisen. 
 Where a superior can be brought to act with effect upon an inferior force, there 
 can be little doubt of success. 
 
 " Nothing can be more clear and plain than this, and a glorious opportunity, 
 was lost, by not passing through the French line." 
 
120 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 The following remarks, by a former able commentator, are entitled to the closest 
 attention : 
 
 " When chasing from the leeward, if he had advanced his fast sailing ships, 
 I should think he would have stopped, or at all events would have much impeded, 
 the enemy's progress. Under most circumstances, I think a fleet has less chance of 
 escaping when to windward (at a moderate distance) of the chasing fleet, than if 
 it were to leeward ; because a certain number of the chasing must certainly sail 
 better than the worst of the flying ships, and wiU be able to harass and 
 annoy them. A disabled ship is not so easily carried oif on a wind, as off the 
 wind ; therefore, if one of the attacked fleet is disabled, she must be supported 
 (which would probably bring on a general action), or she must fall into the hands 
 of the chasing fleet ; while if one of the detached ships of the latter be 
 disabled, she will in like manner be better able to rejoin, and receive assistance 
 from her friends to leeward. 
 
 " AU fleets in order of sailing, or of battle, should have a squadron of reserve 
 composed of the best sailing ships, for the purpose of strengthening any parti- 
 cular part of the line, or bringing a flying enemy to action ; for general purposes 
 of chasing, or for covering a retreat. But should a fleet to leeward be losing 
 time by unnecessary manoeuvres, it never can get up with an enemy to windward." 
 
 OBSERVATION. 
 
 Admitting that Lord Rodney considered the system of Mr. Clerk entirely 
 new, it only proves that he had not looked farther back for examples, not being 
 a man of particular research. The same may be said of Lord Howe and Lord 
 Nelson : but had they only cast their eye over the Preface of Paul Hoste's work, 
 they would have read, " Sans I'art des Evolutions un General ne peut disposer 
 que tres imparfaitement de son armee, soit pour s'opposer a propos aux ennemis, 
 soit pour les enfoncer, les couper, les doubler, les eviter, les forcer au combat, 
 et les poursuive ;" and probably they would have been encouraged to go on ; 
 but in those days the French language was seldom studied by sea officers, and 
 French works were held in little esteem. 
 
 Admiral Kempenfelt, who was a man of acknowledged talents and acquire- 
 ments, is thought to have practised the " order of retreat " to protect his convoy 
 from a superior force. This order of retreat is fully described and explained in 
 the " Traite des Evolutions Navales," by Paul Hoste. From this circumstance 
 
ADMIRAL RODNEY. 121 
 
 it may be presumed that he had consulted, and profited by that useful treatise ; 
 and to him it is more than probable the system of Mr. Clerk would not have 
 appeared new. The talents and services of Admiral Kempenfelt were lost to 
 his profession and to his country somewhat before the publication of the " Essay 
 on Naval Tactics," by Clerk, of Eldin. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 " Have you ever said any thing respecting the propriety of an officer running 
 his ship on board of one of the enemy, in order to detain her by disabling her; 
 and by that means to bring on a general action ? To do it in a masterly manner, 
 would be, if possible, by carrying away the enemy's bowsprit without disabling 
 your own ships. 
 
 " It struck me, on reading an account of one of Rodney's partial actions to 
 windward of St. Lucie ; when the van of his fleet fetched up with the rear of 
 the enemy, I think the seventh or eighth ship ; and bore up along the line of the 
 enemy, exchanging fires as they passed under their lee upon opposite tacks. 
 
 " I should in this case conceive that the leading ship should have actually run 
 on hoard of the ship she fetched, or of her second a-stern ; this, by throwing 
 those a-stern of her into confusion, might have been attended with good effect ; 
 the ship abandoned, or a general action brought on. 
 
 '* A signal to such an effect would be of service ; namely, for a particular ship 
 to run on board of the enemy and endeavour to detain her by disabling her." 
 The object of the gallant officer is answered in the following 
 
 MODES OF ATTACK FROM THE WINDWARD, &c. 
 By Admiral the Hon. Sir A. J. Cochrane, Bart. G. C. B. 
 
 " When an attack is intended to be made upon the enemy's rear, so as to 
 endeavour to cut off a certain number of ships from that part of their fleet, the 
 same will be made known by signal No. 27 ; and the numeral signal which 
 accompanies it will point out the headmost of the enemy's ships that is to be 
 attacked, counting always from the van, as stated in Page 160, Art. 31 (Instruc- 
 tions). The signal will afterwards be made for the division intended to make the 
 attack, or the same will be signified by the ships' pendants, and the pendants of 
 the ship in that division which is to begin the attack, with the No. of the ship 
 to be first attacked in the enemy's line. Should it be intended that the leading 
 
 R 
 
122 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 ship in the division is to attack the rear ship of the enemy, she must bear up, so 
 as to get upon the weather quarter of that ship ; the ships following her in the 
 line will pass in succession on her weather quarter, giving their fire to the ship 
 she is engaged with ; and so on in succession, until they have closed with the 
 headmost ship intended to be attacked. 
 
 " The ships in reserve, who have no opponents, will break through the enemy's 
 line a-head of this ship, so as to cut off the ships engaged from the rest of the 
 enemy's fleet. 
 
 " When it is intended that the rear ship of the division shall attack the rear 
 ship of the enemy's line, that ship's pendants will be shown ; the rest of the 
 ships in the division will invert their order, shortening sail until they can in 
 succession follow the rear ship, giving their fire to the enemy's ships in like 
 manner as above stated ; and the reserve ships will cut through the enemy's line 
 as already mentioned. 
 
 " When this mode of attack is intended to be put in force, the other divisions 
 of the fleet, whether in order of sailing or battle, will keep to windward just out 
 of gun-shot, so as to be ready to support the rear, and prevent the van and centre 
 of the enemy from doubling upon them. This manoeuvre, if properly executed, 
 may force the enemy either to abandon the ships in his rear, or submit to be 
 brought to action on equal terms, which is difficult to be obtained when the 
 attack is made from to windward. When the fleet is to leeward, and the 
 Commanding Ofiicer intends to cut through the enemy's line, the number of the 
 ship in their line, where the attempt is to be made, will be shown as already 
 stated. 
 
 " If the ships after passing the enemy's line are to tack, and double upon the 
 enemy's ships a-head, the same will be made known by a blue pendant over the 
 signal twenty-seven ; if not, they are to bear up and run to the enemy's line to 
 windward, engaging the ship they first meet with ; each succeeding ship giving 
 her fire, and passing on to the next in the rear. The ships destined to attack the 
 enemy's rear will be pointed out by the number of the last ship in the line that 
 is to make this movement, or the pendants of that ship will be shown ; but, 
 should no signal be made, it is to be understood that the number of ships to bear 
 up is equal in number to the enemy's ships that have been cut off; the succeeding 
 ships will attack and pursue the van of the enemy, or form, should it be necessary 
 to prevent the enemy's van from passing round the rear of the fleet to relieve or 
 join their cut-off ships. 
 
 " If it is intended that the ships following those destined to engage the 
 enemy's rear to windward shall bear up and prevent that part of their rear 
 
ADMIRAL RODNEY. 123 
 
 which has been cut off from escaping to leeward, the same will be made 
 known by a red pendant being hoisted over the signal twenty-one, and the 
 number of ships so ordered will be shown by numeral signals or pen- 
 dants. If from the centre division, a white pendant will be hoisted over 
 the signal. 
 
 " If the rear ships are to perform this service by bearing up, the same will 
 be made known by a red pendant under the numeral signal, or pendants ; 
 counting always from the van will show the headmost ship to proceed on this 
 service. The ships not directed by those signals are to form in close order, to 
 cover the ships engaged from the rest of the enemy's fleet. 
 
 " When the enemy's ships are to be engaged by both van and centre, the rear 
 will keep their wind, to cover the ships engaged from the enemy to windward, 
 as circumstances may require. 
 
 " When the signal shall be made to cut through the enemy's van from to 
 leeward, the same will be made known by signal twenty-seven, &c. In this case, 
 if the headmost ships are to tack and double upon the enemy's van, engaging 
 their ships in succession as they get up, the blue pendant will be shown as already 
 stated, and the numeral signal pointing out the last ship from the van which is 
 to tack, which in general will be equal in number to the enemy's ships cut through; 
 the rest of the ships will be prepared to act as the occasion may require, either by 
 bearing up and attacking the enemy's centre and rear, or tacking or waring to 
 cut off the van of the enemy from passing round the rear of the fleet to re-join 
 their centre. And on this service, it is probable, should the enemy's ships bear 
 up, that some of the rear ships will be employed — the signal No. 21 will be made, 
 accompanied with the number of pendants of the headmost ship — upon which 
 she, with the ships in her rear, will proceed to the attack of the enemy, 
 
 " When an attack is likely to be made by an enemy's squadron, by forcing the 
 fleet from to leeward, signal 109 will be made with a blue pendant where best 
 seen ; upon which each ship will luff up upon the weather quarter of her second 
 a-head, so as to leave no opening for the leading ship of the enemy to pass through : 
 this movement will expose them to the collected fire of all that part of the fleet 
 they intended to force." 
 
 In the same bpok is also a signal (No. 785) under the head " Enemy," to " lay 
 on board," with the adjoining iV, JS. " This signal is not meant that your people 
 should board the enemy, unless you should find advantage in it ; but that you 
 ghould run your ship on hoard the enemy, to disable him from getting away." 
 
 R 2 
 
124 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 ADMIRAL ARBUTHNOT'S ACTION. 
 
 March l6th, 1781. 
 
 Extract of a Letter from the Admiral, March 20th, 1781. Linnehaven Say. 
 
 " 1 immediately concluded it must be the enemy I was in search of, and 
 accordingly prepared the squadron for battle, by forming the line a-head, a cable's 
 length asunder, on a wind which was then fresh ; and proceeded, towards them 
 with a press of sail ; wind at West : the French bearing from us N. N. E. 
 the weather very hazy," &c. 
 
 " Soon, after eight, a. m, the wind veered to N. by W. which gave the enemy 
 the weather-gage. About this time several of the enemy's ships were discovered 
 to windward, manoeuvring to form their line," &c. 
 
 " The British line was by this time completely formed, and close hauled on 
 the larboard tack," &c. 
 
 " At twelve o'clock, there being a prospect of the van of my line reaching the 
 enemy, tacked by signal, in succession ; the van ship continuing to lead on the 
 other tack," &c. 
 
 " At one o'clock, the French squadron having completed their line, consisting 
 of eight two deckers, bore E. by S., the British line steering E. S. E., wind 
 at N. E." &c. 
 
 " At half an hour after one o'clock, the enemy, being very apprehensive of the 
 danger and inconvenience of engaging to windward ; from the high sea that was 
 running, and squally weather, wore, and formed their line to leeward of the 
 British line," &c. 
 
 " At two o'clock, the van of my squadron wore in the line," &c. 
 
 " The ships in the van and centre were all engaged by half past two ; and by 
 three the French line was broke. They began to wear and form again with 
 their heads to the South East. At twenty minutes after three I wore and 
 stood after them. I was sorry to observe the Robust, Prudent, and Europe, the 
 headmost ships, and having received the whole of the enemy's fire at their 
 rigging as they bore down, so entirely disabled," &c. 
 
 Passing over the different evolutions of the two fleets upon the first discovery 
 of each other, we shall proceed to Mr. Clerk's second position of them. 
 
ADMIRAL ARBUTHNOT. 125 
 
 Plate XI, Fig. 2. It is proposed here, that the British fleet should have 
 carried a press of sail along the dotted Hue, to have intercepted the enemy ; 
 who evidently seems to prefer the leeward position ; by which, he is afterwards 
 enabled greatly to annoy the British fleet in its attack. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 " There can be no reasonable doubt, but that essential advantages would have 
 attended the adoption of the measures proposed by this plan." 
 
 It is further proposed, that the British fleet should, when it approaches the 
 enemy, invert the line ; No. 1 stopping at No. 1 of the enemy ; No. 2 passing 
 dose to leeward, and fixing upon No. 2 of the enemy's line ; and so of the rest. 
 By this mode, some of them must have been taken or destroyed. 
 
 " I certainly think he should have attacked the French fleet while running 
 down, as in the proposed plan ; but as he did not, he should have cut off their 
 rear and centre after they were formed inline to leeward, instead of trying to stop 
 their van." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 This engagement is one of the many proofs of the advantages of a leeward, 
 to the weather-gage ; and here it is seen that the French relinquished the one 
 for the other ; by which they very considerably disabled the British fleet. 
 
 It is somewhat strange, that the British Admiral, aware too of its " dangers 
 and inconvenience from the high sea that was running," should have been so 
 anxious " to gain the wind of the enemy," when he appears to have had so good 
 an opportunity of attacking him to great advantage, and of frustrating his inten- 
 tions. See Plate XT, Fig. II. 
 
 It is unnecessary to carry the inquiry further : suffice it to observe, that if it 
 was an advantage to the enemy to attain the leeward situation, it was no less so 
 to the British Admiral to have Ttept it, when he had it; and by standing 
 immediately across him, with a press of sail, and attacking him when bearing up 
 to change his position, he most probably would have entirely defeated him. 
 
 The following remarks are taken from a " Short Account of the Naval Actions 
 of the last War, by an officer," London, 1788. 
 
 It will appear, they are strongly in favour of tactical acquirements in the 
 forming of a perfect sea officer ; and are therefore justly entitled to attention in a 
 work like this. Extracts from this little book are therefore given in different places. 
 
126 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " We have failed more than once by confiding merely in our bravery, and 
 permitting our ships to attack at random. This happened on the 27th of July, 
 and in the battle ofFthe Grenades in the West Indies ; and I may add, Admiral 
 Arbuthnot's battle off the Capes of Virginia. If the latter was not at random, I 
 am sure it will be admitted that, if there had been as much skill in the manage- 
 ment of the whole fleet, as there was bravery shown in those ships that engaged, 
 the French squadron would have been captured." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 In describing this engagement, Mr. Clerk has been guilty of a great mistake i 
 
 for when he tells us the French fleet had quitted its windward position and 
 
 formed to leeward, he at the same time says, the British fleet is " in chase, 
 
 keeping their wind." (Clerk's Part I, Page 76, Third Edit., Plate VIII, 
 
 Fig. 2.) 
 
 In the " Political Magazine and Parliamentary Journal," for May 1781, are 
 several letters upon this subject ; aU tending to show how little the result of it 
 satisfied the public expectation. A few extracts shall be given, by which it 
 will no doubt appear that, as more »?«^^# have been done, it is fair to offer such 
 suggestions on the mode of attack, as may seem better calculated for defeating 
 the enemy ; at the same time affording sufiicient authority for the criticism already 
 attempted. 
 
 " The French fleet sailed from Rhode Island, having on board 2000 land 
 forces: fortunately our fleet fell in with them on the l6th instant, off the 
 Delaware ; an action ensued, which lasted an hour and ten minutes, though 
 nothing decisive followed ; as the French fleet ran away, leaving some of our 
 ships much disabled," &c. " Every body allows more might have been done. 
 As for the two Admirals, they had little share of the action; and the ships a-stem 
 never came in, owing to the blunder of ordering the signal for the line at 
 two cables length asunder, and keeping it up the whole time ; whereas, had he 
 hauled it down, our ships would have each taken one of the enemy's, and 
 have stuck by her; when, no doubt, almost the whole of the French fleet would 
 have been taken, sunk, or destroyed; as they were in the greatest confusion 
 when they saw our fleet," &c. 
 
 In another letter, from an officer present, it is said, 
 
 " In my line of service I have learnt, having now seen three general actions ; 
 that of July 1788, under Mr. Keppel ; that with Mons. D'Estaingin July 1779, 
 
ADMIRAL ARBUTHNOT. 127 
 
 under Mr. Byron; and the one I am now speaking of: and the result of my 
 observations, is, that two fleets of equal force can never he all brought into 
 action, unless the two commanding (Officers are equally disposed to it,'' &c. 
 
 " We have to do with an enemy, who, by keeping on the defensive, obliges us 
 to bear down and attack in a mode that must always expose our ships to be 
 crippled in their rigging : our late experience is a melancholy proof of it," &c. 
 
 In another, from an officer also present in the fleet, it is asserted ; that 
 
 " The whole cause of our failure was the Admiral not hauling down the signal 
 for the line, and making the signal for a close action," &c. This officer ends by 
 saying, " I am tired of telling our misfortunes ; I wish I could obliterate such a 
 day out of my memory." 
 
 In some " Remarks " on our " Engagements at Sea," and the diflerent modes 
 of fighting of the French and English, it is well observed in the same work, 
 " that every captain of a gun in the French service is equal in ordnance 
 abilities to the most experienced gunners in our navy." On this account they 
 have always preferred the lee to the weather-gage ; and by this superiority of 
 gunnery, and the preference they have shown to that position, we have so 
 frequently and materially suffered, when they have received little comparative 
 injury ; leaving us at their option and often not in a condition to foUow them. 
 " The letters of Admiral Barrington, Byron, Rodney, and Arbuthnot," (says the 
 writer) " prove this," &g. 
 
 He goes on to observe, " many of our brave commanders will say, that by 
 taking the weather-gage, they have the option of bearing down on the enemy 
 when they please ; or, should he be too strong for them, by hauling their wind, 
 they may more easily escape ; and that by firing at the hull they destroy many 
 of the enemy, and drive the remainder from their quarters. 
 
 " A ship whose rigging is much damaged cannot with safety look to windward, 
 and is little adapted to pursuit : and of what service is it to us to destroy half 
 the enemy's men, when the remainder can leave us at pleasure ? 
 
 " Would it not therefore be better to imitate in part the French method ? 
 Our upper guns might be directed against the rigging ; the heavy metal of the 
 lower decks against the hull; and the quarter-deck and forecastle guns for 
 clearing all above their decks either abaft or forward. In our three-deckers both 
 the lower and middle deck guns might be directed against the hull," &c. 
 
 " In this mode of fighting the lee-gage is certainly preferable ; as in that 
 situation the guns to be directed against the rigging can be elevated with greater 
 facility, and more certain aim : besides, the officers on board the windward ships 
 
128 NAVAL BATTLES, 
 
 are more exposed to the small arms of those to leeward ; and when within pistol 
 shot, the whole can be directed at the hull. The battle would then be brought 
 to a crisis, from which the enemy could with difficulty escape." 
 
 These observations are entitled to serious consideration ; particularly the 
 manifest advantage arising from allotting the guns of every particidar deck to 
 its appropriate object ; by which, undoubtedly, greater effect is to be produced. 
 This is by no means new in practice ; many officers having brought even to stiU 
 greater precision the rules and practice of gunnery in His Majesty's ships.* 
 
 A ~ gallant baronet, greatly distinguished in the late American war, amongst 
 many other meritorious officers, by diligent application to the subject, and 
 constant exercise, brought the system of naval gunnery to a state of perfection 
 never before known ; for which the service at large is greatly indebted to him : 
 he could point his guns with such precision, as to concentrate the fire of the 
 whole broadside to any given object ; and, from a description of the system, it 
 appears to merit a more general introduction. 
 
 The naval service acknowledges with gratitude what it owes to Sir Charles 
 Douglas for the application of the lock to the great gun ; and the present 
 Admiral Sir Charles M. Pole, when he commanded the Success, in the first 
 American war, was so delighted with the improvement, that, fearing the failure 
 of one, he even caused two to be placed (one on each side of the touch-hole), 
 which were both pulled together by one lanyard. He also caused sights, made 
 of copper, to be fixed upon the second reinforce-ring of every gun, with a 
 graduated point rising in the centre of it, to guide the elevation. In this 
 manner he fought and captured in the night the Santa Catalina ; and by means 
 of these sights the seamen could at any time shoot away the flag placed upon a 
 cask. 
 
 Abundant proofs were also given of the efficiency of naval gunnery on the Jst 
 of June. When the Brun'swick was engaging the Vengem-, with her starboard 
 guns, I'Achille came to her assistance, by bringing the Brunswick to close action 
 on the larboard side : in the course of a very few broadsides, all the masts of the 
 French ship were seen tumbling over the side. The fate of the Vengeur is well 
 known, and is related in another part of this work. 
 
 Since the foregoing was written, there has appeared an able little " Treatise 
 upon Naval Gunnery," by Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart., well meriting the 
 
 * See Sir William Congreve's Description of Sights for the Use of the Navy, with an Account 
 of them after continued Trials, by the Hon. Captain Henry Duncan, R.N. C.B, (Second edition 
 1819.) 
 
 See also Captain Pechel's Tract. 
 
ADMIRAL ARBUTHNOT. 129 
 
 attention of Naval officers ; and although much of it applies to the higher 
 departments in the state, yet the observations it contains upon pointing and 
 firing, whether upon the lee-lurch or weather-roll, with other considerations 
 attached to the service of naval ordnance, are highly useful; and so is the 
 reasoning, and his plate, upon the " tactics of single actions" Much informa- 
 tion is also conveyed upon the " windage" of shot, the quality of gunpowder, 
 and the preference to be given to a long gun ; with a display of scientific know- 
 ledge, showing the author to be perfect master of the subject. 
 
 Having acknowledged this, it is hoped that the writer will be forgiven for an 
 observation he is about to make upon another part of it ; the tendency of which, 
 since it could not have been intentional, was most likely overlooked by the gallant 
 officer in its progress. 
 
 , Of the " Established Form of Exercise for the Great Guns of the Year 1817,"* 
 the writer knows nothing ; but this he knows, that the practice of quartering 
 by watches and divisions, with appellations expressive of their duties (by which 
 terras the men answered at muster), has existed in the service ever since (and 
 probably before) the peace preceding the revolutionary war. 
 
 To readers not better acquainted with the state and discipline of the navy 
 generally, it may appear from Sir Howard Douglas's work that the " Shannon " 
 was the only ship in it wherein the crew were quartered in that way: this 
 is to pay a compliment to Sir P. Brooke at the expense of others, not very 
 acceptable to a liberal mind, and therefore not gratifying to him. To lessen the 
 merit of the skilful and gallant Baronet's achievement is impossible ; and he 
 may have carried his arrangements and experiments further than most men ; 
 yet the system of quartering the crew, as described by Sir Howard Douglas, 
 was well known and practised long before. As to the " French manual^' it 
 is entitled to little consideration, since it consists of more that will perplex than 
 direct. 
 
 It is too minute in the detail. This should be taught, and taught in turns, 
 to all the crew at the gun, by the officers at the different quarters, that their 
 men may become all equally expert. Losses from casualties will then not be so 
 severely felt. The numbering has been a more recent practice in our navy, and 
 in leaving that off we have only returned to the old custom. 
 
 The French manual teaches to stop the vent by the thumb ; a man thus 
 occupied is useless in other respects ; vents, two at each gun, made of the 
 carpenter's " back leather," and affixed by lanyards to the breech of the piece, 
 
 * See the " Treatise on Naval Gunnery," Part III, pages 143, &c. 
 
 S 
 
130 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 have been found to answer better than any thing. When one of these is 
 applied, the captain of the gun can assist at the train (or port) tackle fall, 
 should not the gun have recoiled sufficiently for reloading ; which, if a lee-gun, 
 may probably be the case. The general system for supply of powder is nearl}^^ 
 the same in both services. On this part of the subject the writer will venture 
 a remark. 
 
 Upon an attentive inquiry into the history of most general actions at sea, it 
 will be found that explosions from cartridges have taken place to a fatal extent, 
 in one or the other, if not in both the fleets engaged ; and have become known, 
 notwithstanding every attempt to conceal them. 
 
 Upon this subject Ramatuelle is particularly eloquent, and gives a chapter 
 upon the method of loading the guns when fighting with the lee-gage, and 
 recommends the use of a canvas bag (made after a very particular manner, 
 which he takes two or three pages to describe), instead of the wooden boxes, and 
 this bag is to be kept wet. 
 
 If men are cautious to shut the box close upon the delivery of the cartridge, 
 no fire can enter, Ramatuelle declares he has known explosions to take place 
 from sparks left in the boxes ; and more frequently when firing the weather guns, 
 the wadding flying back into the ship. This is well known, and always to be 
 guarded against ; the great danger arises from having too large a quantity of 
 powder collected in one place, and from carelessness and inattention. 
 
 To avoid the necessity of keeping too much powder upon deck, an ingenious 
 ofiicer recommends that a second load be kept within the mus,sle of every gun, 
 affixed to the lanyard of the tompion, so as to be drawn out with it; then cut 
 loose and put into the cartridge or salt-hox, kept for that purpose. 
 
 To prevent as much as possible the calamitous effects arising from such a 
 cause (an accumulation of powder in one place), the following method was adopted 
 in one of the seventy-four's employed against the walls of Algiers. Her 
 two principal gun-decks, (of fifteen each) were divided into three equal divisions, 
 each division having three " powder-men " attached to it. These men were not 
 to consider themselves as belonging to one gun only, but were to carry their 
 cartridge, first to the foremost gun of their division ; and if it was not wanted 
 there, to proceed in succesion to the rest ; upon the cartridge being demanded, 
 he returned by the opposite side of the deck with the empty box ; and, on going 
 to the supplying hatchway, exchanged it for a full one. In this manner the 
 powder-men were making a perpetual circuit throughout their division ; every 
 gun had a cartridge when it wanted one, and no more. 
 
ADMIRAL ARBUTHNOT. 131 
 
 The fire thus kept up was uniform and general, and more animated at the 
 close than at the commencement ; the only orders given from the quarter-deck 
 were, to take deliberate aim, and not to fire too fast. 
 
 In some ships it has been the custom to station a man or boy, with a " salt- 
 box " belonging to his gun, on the side of the deck not engaged ; a powder-man 
 of that gun keeps the salt-box in supply, making a merit of collecting all he 
 possibly can for his gun ; when, if the powder-man of the next has not been so 
 active, or, from the struggle of so many applicants at the hatchway, that gun 
 should he without ; the provident boy, tenacious of his charge, will not give a 
 cartridge for any gun but his own. The consequence may be an explosion ; at 
 all events, neither the rapidity nor the regularity of fire is preserved. Boys 
 may, with more benefit and propriety, be quartered to pass along the boxes 
 below. 
 
 Of instrumental sights, the writer has seen frequent trial, and strongly 
 recommends their use ; particularly at small and distant objects : gun-boats in 
 a calm, for instance ; and, for close action, they must prove very efficacious. The 
 trial made of different ones, on board the Liffey, by the Honourable Captain 
 Duncan, has entirely established their character for the utmost precision in 
 striking the object, and a perfect aptness to the naval service. Great merit is 
 due to Sir William Congreve for the invention, and his introduction of them 
 into the British navy. 
 
 Yet, if we look to the effect of the fire from some of the ships in our most 
 important actions, we shall find that for close fighting om- naval gunners have 
 little to learn. The ships of the late Sir Samuel Hood, and of the present Sir 
 Thomas Foley, at the battle of the Nile, completely dismasted their opponents in 
 15 minutes ; while that of Sir James Saumarez dismastetl and sunk a frigate in 
 about a couple of broadsides, as it was in passing her to take up her anchorage 
 in the attack. The Zealous dismasted the Guerrier in five minutes. 
 
 When practising with instrumental sights at a target for some time on board 
 the Tonnant, at sea, in 1818, and without having once struck it, an old seaman 
 requested he might be permitted to fire at it without the sights : at the third 
 trial he shot away the flag-staff! 
 
 The following observations are strongly in point ; and, as they proceed from 
 an officer of acknowledged ability and enterprise, who greatly distinguished 
 himself in the late wars, the writer is happy to avail himself of them. Opinions 
 of a professional nature from such sources must at all times be highly valuable. 
 
 " Sufficient attention to the manner in which ships were manned was never 
 
 s 2 
 
132 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 paid by any Admiral ; and very few of them ever took the trouble of mustering 
 the crews of the ships under their orders. A ship should be frequently reviewed 
 by an Admiral or Commanding Officer:* she should be worked while he is on 
 board in all ways, and by every Lieutenant in her ; and, above all, her gtms 
 should be exercised under his inspection. If you have a spare corner in your 
 book, impress on us the necessity of attending to the real exercise of guns, and 
 of the manoeuvre of the ship in action : at the same time contradict the false 
 notion, that because a ship is well painted, smart looking, and particularly clean, 
 she cannot fight : never was an idea so absurd. If a ship removes any of her 
 rigging, annoys her men, by polishing holts, &c., does not exercise her guns 
 for fear of spoiling the paint, does not keep the essentials necessary Jbr action 
 upon her decks because it would lumber them ; and sacrifice every thing needful 
 to external show ; then, that ship is in bad order, and will disgrace herself in 
 fight ; and such ships, to a seaman's eye at least, generally seem in the worst 
 condition. Our navy was certainly bad at the breaking out of the (last) 
 American war ; we had had no enemy to fight with for some time," &c. 
 
 In another letter he observes,- — " To show how much may be made of any set 
 of men ; a crew consisting of 145, made up principally of foreigners ; seven 
 pressed men, three of whom were Americans, being the only good men 
 in the ship; were in six months rendered every thing that could be 
 wished for in a gallant ship's company. The same men who, six weeks 
 after the ship was commissioned, declined to volunteer the cutting out 
 of a gun-boat, in six months behaved in the most gallant manner ; and those 
 who had before refused to come forward, were seen to insist upon returning, 
 under a heavy fire, to a vessel they had left burning, because they had forgotten 
 to haul down the French flag; and they did go back, and hoisted a blue jacket 
 over the enemy's colours ! 
 
 " Upon leaving England we had only two men in the ship who had 
 ever steered with a wheel ; and I am satisfied that a brig well manned 
 would have taken us. In the Archipelago we fell in with an American 
 ship (before the war with that Power) one night ; and in going alongside of 
 her a gun went off by accident : the broadside followed : we were so close, I 
 concluded we must have cut her to pieces: what was my surprise when I found 
 not a rope-yarn had been touched ! We had been manned at this time about a 
 
 * Admirals were in the habit of mustering the ships of their division in our large fleet?. 
 Upon the Expedition to Algiers Lord Exmouth mustered in a particular manner every one of his 
 squadron soon' after leaving Plymouth. 
 
ADMIRAL HOOD. 133 
 
 month, and this affair was the first thing that opened my eyes to the necessity 
 of paying the greatest attention to the guns ; and I hope I have never lost sight 
 of it since." 
 
 Such had been the education and experience of this strange mixture of people, 
 that by the constant exertions and example of their Captain and Officers, at the 
 end of fourteen months, upon the appointment of another Captain, he declared 
 " he had never seen anything like them at the guns." 
 
 SIR SAMUEL (AFTERWARDS LORD) HOOD'S ENGAGEMENT 
 WITH THE FRENCH FLEET, 
 
 OFF FORT ROYAL, MARTINICO, APRIL 29, 1781. 
 
 Extracts of a Letter from Sir Samuel Hood, May Mh, 1781. 
 
 " A little before nine, the Amazon joined me, the enemy then in sight coming 
 down between Point Salines and the Diamond Rock. I made the signal for a 
 close line, and to prepare for action," &c. 
 
 " At thirty-five minutes past ten, tacked the squadron together ; the van of 
 the enemy being almost a -breast of our centre: at eleven they began to fire, which 
 I took no notice of. At this time the ships in Fort Royal Bay slipped their 
 cables, and got under sail. I tacked the squadron together, and repeated the 
 signal for a close order of battle. At twenty-five minutes past eleven, finding 
 the enemy's shot to go over us, made the signal for engaging ; and, in passing, 
 our van and the enemy's rear exchanged some broadsides. At forty minutes after 
 eleven the enemy tacked. At fifty minutes past eleven, finding it impossible to 
 get up to the enemy's fleet, I invited it to come to me, by bringing the squadron 
 to, under the top- sails. 
 
 " At half past twelve the French Admiral began to fire at the Barfleur, which 
 was immediately returned ; and the action became general, but at too great a 
 distance ; and, I believe, never was more powder and shot thrown away in one 
 day before ; but it was with Monsieur de Grasse the option of distance lay ; it 
 was not possible for me to go nearer," &c. 
 
134 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " At forty-five minutes past four sent Captain Finch to the Shrewsbury, to 
 order Captain Robertson to keep as near the wind, and carry all the sail he could 
 to preserve the line of battle, and to return back along the line, to acquaint every 
 captain of the saine," &c. 
 
 " Rear Admiral Drake sent to inform me that the Russell was in great 
 distress, having received several shot between wind and water; that the water was 
 over the platform of the magazine, and gaining upon the pumps; and that three 
 of their guns were dismounted. Ordered the Russell to come within hail, &c. 
 The enemy's fleet consisted of twenty-four sail of the line, at this time about four 
 miles to windward," &c. 
 
 " The Russell, Captain Sutherland, parted company, for St. Eustatius, or 
 any other port he could make ; and to acquaint Sir George Rodney of all that 
 had passed. 
 
 " On Monday, April 30th, at day-light, found the van and centre of the 
 squadron separated at some distance from the Barfleur and rear, owing to 
 fluttering winds and calms in the night ; and, finding the enemy's advanced 
 ships steering for our van, made all possible sail towards them, and made signal 
 for a close line of battle. At seven, the squadron under my command being well 
 formed, the enemy's advanced ships hauled off"," &c. 
 
 " At twenty-five minutes past twelve, the wind blowing steady at S. E. made 
 the signal for a general chase to windward, with a design to weather the enemy ; 
 in which, had the breeze continued, I should certainly have succeeded ; but the 
 wind dying away at four, I found it impracticable," &c. 
 
 " Having been informed that the Intrepid made so much water, they could 
 scarce keep her free ; and that the Centaur was in the same state, and that her 
 lower masts were very badly wounded ; I judged it improper to dare the enemy 
 to battle any longer," &c. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 The gallant Admiral's letter is more in the nature of a log of his proceedings 
 for several days ; but is unnecessary to be further detailed in this place. These 
 extracts, it is hoped, are sufficient to prove to the naval reader the skill and great 
 anxiety shown by the British Admiral to bring the enemy to close action ; and, 
 from the excessive caution and disinclination manifested by the French Com- 
 mander, the perfect impossibility of effecting it ; the enemy having throughout, 
 by the weather-gage, the option of fighting, and the choice of distance. The 
 more important object with him appears to have been the secure arrival of his 
 
ADMIRAL HOOD. 135 
 
 convoy ; for which he manoeuvred with equal dexterity and success. Sir Samuel 
 Hood did all that it was in the power of man to do ; but the winds and currents 
 were against his utmost eflForts; and the object and obvious intention of De 
 Grasse was merely to amuse him until he had eflPected his purpose. 
 
 In this affair, the defective state of our signals, from the frequent necessity of 
 sending orders by ships, is very apparent. But our improvement in the use of 
 signals has advanced much more rapidly than our knowledge of tactics, or the 
 art of managing and manoeuvring squadrons or fleets ; having constantly in 
 Tiew the power of attacking an enemy to the greatest advantage, with the least 
 risk of loss or injury to our own ships. This familiarity with naval evolutions 
 should not be confined to the flag-officers. It is absolutely essential to the safety 
 of all, and to success in battle, that every captain should possess a competent 
 knowledge of this subject, by which he may properly direct and instruct those 
 under his command. 
 
 An attempt to describe this encounter by a figure would be to point out the 
 unfortunate and helpless situation of the British fleet, without any means of 
 displaying in an adequate manner the efforts and extreme anxiety of the British 
 Admiral to grapple with the enemy ; and therefore, as it could not render him 
 justice, would only be productive of disappointment. 
 
 Extract of a Letter from Captain Sutherland, of the Russell, to a naval friend 
 
 in England, Sept. 12th, 1781. 
 
 " Inclosed is the narrative I promised you ; to men unacquainted with our 
 service, it may appear simple and inadequate ; but to you, vs^ho are able to judge 
 of our situation and views, it will not seem strange that I have not been more 
 diffuse. 
 
 " Sea-fights are infinitely grand and interesting, but they can afford no great 
 field for description, there is such a sameness in the events. At the moment no 
 officer ought to be sufficiently at leisure to exercise his imagination ; after it is 
 over, it would be ridiculous affectation. I am interrupted. Remember that I 
 am not ambitious of being tlwught an author. Yours, &c., 
 
 " A. Sutherland. 
 
 " Fort Royal Bay, Martinique, April 28th. 
 
 " Having early in the morning left the fleet with an intention of going into 
 St. Lucia for the recovery of our people, who were becoming very sickly, at nine 
 
136 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 we discovered a frigate coming from the windward, making the signal for an 
 enemy's fleet, which we repeated to the Admiral. At eleven rejoined him, and 
 had his directions to take our station in the line, then forming to the southward. 
 
 " At four the Amazon made the signal that the fleet seen was of superior force. 
 We soon after could perceive them from oui* mast-heads, lying-to off Point 
 Salines. 
 
 " At six our fleet tacked to the north, and kept moving across the bay for 
 the right, in line-of-battle, without seeing any more of the enemy. 
 
 " At seven, a. m., on the 29th, still in line, standing to the southward, per- 
 ceived a French frigate open with the Diamond Rock, when Admiral Sir 
 Samuel Hood made signal for the van to make more sail. 
 
 " At nine we discovered the fleet, changing from line a-breast to line-of-battle 
 a-head, and in that order they stood towards us ; and the wind having favoured 
 them, they were enabled to weather us : about ten their van was nearly a-breast 
 of ours, and within random shot, when they began to fire on our rear, which was 
 returned by some of our ships. At ten our fleet tacked together per signal, and 
 received some shots while in stays. 
 
 " When about, their van was nearly a-breast of our centre. In this position 
 we continued about a quarter of an hour, exchanging random shot ; when our 
 van being well in with the shore to the northward of the bay, we tacked again 
 to the southward, at which time we perceived the four ships that had been lying 
 in Fort Royal Bay, under sail, standing out ; and as their own fleet was then 
 waring to the southward, took their stations in the rear. 
 
 " When the French, wore, the two fleets were in lines nearly parallel, about 
 a mile asunder ; theirs, as more numerous, extending more to the southward than 
 ours, which enabled them the better to cover their convoy, at that time passing 
 into port, between them and the land. 
 
 " This appears to have been their principal object ; and in order to prevent 
 the possibility of interruption, they bore down at this time something nearer, 
 and I believe the action became pretty general, at least it was so in the van, and 
 continued for about three quarters of an hour. The French then hauled their 
 wind, increasing their distance, and the firing ceased for the present. 
 
 " At half past one, the leading ship's signal (the Shrewsbury) was made to 
 make more sail, and shortly after for a closer line, which until then had been 
 at two cables asunder. Upon opening the land, the leading ships having a 
 fresher breeze, increased their distance a little, and four of them were attacked 
 by eight of the enemy very smartly. Until half past three these ships were 
 warmly engaged, the enemy directing their fire principally at the rigging : the 
 
THE DOGGER BANK. 137 
 
 iriasts were more particularly their aim, most were wounded, though none 
 rendered unserviceable. 
 
 " Besides our killed and wounded, we found we had received nine shot between 
 wind and water ; four of them very dangerous, the ship making so much water, 
 that with pumping and bailing we could scarcely prevent its gaining on us. In 
 this condition we quitted the line per signal, and as soon as it was dark, the 
 fleet," &c. 
 
 " When it is considered that the French had twenty-five sail of the line to 
 our eighteen, and that the whole of the first day they had it at their option to 
 have made the battle as general and close as they pleased ; I flatter myself we 
 shall not be found to have conducted ourselves unworthily ; though no doubt the 
 French will gasconade enough on the occasion ; but with so very decided a 
 superiority, I do not see that they have much to hoast of." 
 
 ADMIRAL PARKER'S BATTLE ON THE DOGGER BANK, 
 
 August 5th, 1781. 
 
 Extract of Admiral Parleers Letter. 
 
 " Yesterday morning we fell in with the Dutch squadron, with a large 
 convoy, on the Dogger Bank. I was happy to find I had the wind of them, as 
 the great numbers of their large frigates might otherwise have endangered my 
 convoy. Having separated the men of war from the merchant ships, and .made 
 a signal for the latter to keep their wind, I bore away with a general signal 
 to chase. 
 
 " The enemy formed their line, consisting of eight two-decked ships, on the 
 larhoard tack. Ours, including the Dolphin of forty-four guns, consisted of 
 seven. Not a gun was fired on either side until within the distance of half- 
 musket shot. The Fortitude being then a-breast of the Dutch Admiral, the 
 action began, and continued with an unceasing fire for three hours and forty 
 minutes: by this time our ships were unmanageable. I made an effort to form 
 the line to renew the action, and found it impracticable. 
 
 T 
 
138 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " The Bienfaisant had lost her main-top-mast, and the Buffalo her fore yard; 
 the rest of the ships were not less shattered hi their masts, rigging, and sails ; 
 the enemy appeared to be in as bad a condition. Both squadrons lay-to a con- 
 siderable time near each other, when the Dutch, with their convoy, bore away 
 for the Texel. We were not in a condition to follow them." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 This action is introduced by Mr. Clerk (page 136, 3d edition), as another 
 proof of the disastrous effects of an attack from a windward position ; although it 
 appears, the Dutch Admiral did not think proper to take all the advantage of his 
 own leeward position that was in his power. It displays at the same time the 
 gallantry of the British Admiral, who, with a very inferior force, did not hesitate 
 to bear down upon him and bring him to close action (very properly) to windward : 
 for had he gone to leeward, he would thereby have exposed his convoy. 
 
 The battle ended in favour of the British ; as a Dutch ship of the line (the 
 HoUandia) foundered before they reached the Texel ; her pendant having been 
 brought to the Admiral by Captain Patton, of the Belle Poule. 
 
 The Hollandia having sunk in shallow water, her mast heads were left 
 considerably above its surface ; and a neutral vessel falling in with them, took 
 away her pendant, still flying, and, justly considering it the property of the 
 British Admiral, presented it to the Captain of the frigate. 
 
 Postscript of Admiral H. Parker's Letter. 
 
 " The frigate this morning discovered one of the Dutch men of war sunk in 
 twenty-two fathoms of water ; her top-gallant-masts were above the surface, and 
 her pendant still flying, which Captain Patton struck, and brought to me on 
 board. I believe she was the second ship in the line, of seventy-four guns."* 
 
 Of Admiral Parker it is related, that upon being informed of the force of the 
 Dutch squadron in the morning, he replied (pulling up his breeches), "It 
 matters little what their force is ; we must fight them if they are double the 
 number." 
 
 * By Admiral Zoutman's report it appears to have been the HoUande, Captain Dedel, of sixty-, 
 four guns. See the " Remembrancer" for 1781; also, excellent accounts," English and Dutch, 
 of this engagement, in the "Political Magazine and Parliamentary Journal," for September, 1781. 
 
THE DOGGER BANK. 139 
 
 Engagement between the English and Dutch Squadrons on the Dogger 
 
 Bank, August 5th, 1781. 
 
 The following " Notes " were taken during the action, by a Lieutenant of a 
 frigate ; he is now a distinguished Vice Admiral. 
 
 " I send the minutes of the Dogger Bank, which you must make allowance 
 for, as written by a young Lieutenant ; but I believe them to be quite correct, 
 as I remember they were kept with great care during the action. 
 
 " Before I speak of the battle, I think it proper to give some particulars of 
 the state of our squadron ; which was chiefly composed of ships totally unfit for 
 the line of battle, and had been but a short time together, and during that time 
 but little attention was paid to make them expert in the forming of lines ; the 
 signal for that purpose having been made but two or three times. The Berwick 
 was a fine ship, well appointed ; and, in addition to her proper metal, had several 
 carronades, two of which were sixty-eight-pounders. The Dolphin (who was 
 next her in action) was a good forty-four, but a kind of ship very unfit for 
 lines of battle ; for, having only twenty or twenty-two eighteen-pounders on her 
 lower deck, what impression could she make on a seventy-four gun ship ? besides, 
 the small size of her masts rendered them very easy to be shot away : yet this 
 little ship, with the assistance of some carronades, on her quarter-deck, did 
 wonders. The Buffalo was formerly the Captain, of seventy guns ; but in the 
 beginning of the war, not being thought fit for service as a ship of force, she was 
 fitted up as a mast ship, and her name changed ; but either from a change of 
 opinion, or from a great want of ships, she was again fitted out for war, with 
 sixty guns ; but I believe with only eighteen-pounders below. She had only a 
 fifty gun ship's masts and yards. The Fortitude was well manned ; and, as the 
 weather was remarkably fine, no inconvenience was found from her being rather 
 a small ship for a seventy-four. The Princess Amelia, an old eighty gun ship 
 with reduced metal, and I also believe masts. The Preston was a good fifty 
 gun ship. The Bienfaisant had either her guns on the lower or main deck 
 reduced, or both. The Artois was then the finest frigate known ; twenty-eight 
 eighteen-pounders on her main deck ; and, in addition to her proper complement 
 of guns, had several heavy carronades on her quarter-deck, and two sixty-eight - 
 pounders on her forecastle : her masts and yards were the size of a fifty gun 
 ship, and she had nearly 300 men on board. The Latona, a fine thirty-eight 
 gun frigate with eighteen-pounders. The Cleopatra, a fine thirty-two gun 
 
 T 2 
 
140 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 frigate. The Belle Poule, a fine ship of thirty-six guns. The Tartar went 
 away with the convoy. 
 
 " As we knew the Dutch convoy was at sea, we expected to meet them ; 
 accordingly, on the 5th of August, about four o'clock in the morning, we saw the 
 enemy about six leagues directly to leeward, the weather finely calculated for the 
 business before us, there being a fine commanding breeze and smooth water ; arid 
 the clear weather, by giving us a distinct view of the enemy's fleet, put it in our 
 power to make all the proper dispositions to annoy them effectually. At thirty- 
 five minutes past four the signal was made for a general chase to the S. E. and of 
 course the attention of the officers and men was taken from the necessary prepa- 
 rations to engage, to the making sail. The signal for chasing may be thought 
 to give an idea of superiority ; but it could not persuade any person, that an enemy 
 which was seen coolly preparing to receive us, was running away. It was here no 
 doubt very improper, as it lumbered the ships with the great quantity of gear 
 necessary for the setting of studding-sails, royals, &c., some of which would be 
 wanting for preventer braces. The sails also should liave been placed so as to be 
 in no danger of falling in the way of the guns, or of taking fire. The presence 
 of the officers and men was requisite to see their quarters in every respect clear and 
 provided. I am of opinion that at this time the signal should have been made 
 for the line of battle a-breast, or on the point of the compass parallel to the general 
 range of the enemy's fleet ; and the Admiral should have carried such sail as would 
 just have obliged the worst sailing ship to have set all her plain sails. And even 
 if the Admiral's hurry for fighting was very great, this manceuvre would not haVe 
 kept him many minutes out of action. At five, the Dutch hoisted their colours, 
 and the men of war drew out from among the merchant ships. At half past 
 five, the Admiral made the Tartar's signal to stay by the convoy ; and the 
 Latona, who had charge of the convoy, made a signal to the mercTiant ships to 
 make the best of their way into port. Upon this, the Tartar, the brig, and the 
 convoy, hauled their wind to the westward, and were soon out of sight and danger, 
 even had our fleet been worsted. The Admiral then is rid of all fear on theit 
 account, and before him sees a glorious harvest of honour and wealth ; and on 
 his skill depends the success of the reapers. At eleven minutes past six the 
 signal was made for a line of battle a-breast, two cables' length distance. The 
 headmost ships were by this means enabled to take in their flying-sails ; but 
 the heavy sailers were still obliged to crowd, as it was some time before the 
 Admiral took in his fore-sail and top-gallant-sails ; and, if I recollect right, 
 when the signal for battle was made, the Princess Amelia had a fore-top-mast 
 studding-sail boom unsecured. At twelve minutes past six the signal was made 
 
THE DOGGER BANK. 141 
 
 for the Dolphin and Preston to change stations; a signal of bad tendency, for it 
 placed the Dolphin in the hottest part of the enemy's line ; but, however, it 
 appears that quite the contrary was intended, and this signal was made owing to 
 a mistake of the Admiral's, in looking at an old line of battle instead of the 
 
 present one. Why the D 1 did he not look at the ships themselves f At 
 
 forty-six minutes past six the signal was made for the line to close to one cable's 
 length. At seven the Bienfaisant's signal was made to make more sail (this was 
 the oldest Captain going into action). At thirty-five minutes past seven the 
 Berwick's, Buffalo's, and Dolphin's signals were made, that they were out of 
 their stations ; but I believe that they were all three erring on the right side, and 
 were a little too far a-head. At fifty-six minutes past seven the signal for battle 
 was made. Let me now turn to the Dutch, and see the situation they were in 
 when we made our approach. Their line of battle, consisting of seven sail, were 
 drawn up in a regular line of battle a-head, on the larboard tack, at a little more 
 than a cable's length distance from each other. They kept about a point from 
 the wind, and seemed to have their sail well proportioned to each other's going. 
 In general, they had top-sails, mizen and fore-sails and fore-top-mast stay-sails ; 
 some had their jibs hoisted. They appeared to be in great order ; and their 
 hammocks, quarter-cloths, &c., were spread in as nice order, as if for show in 
 harbour. Their marines also were well drawn up, and stood with their muskets 
 shouldered, with all the regularity and exactness of a review. Their politeness 
 ought to be remembered by every man in our line ; for, as if certain of what 
 happened, we came down almost end on upon their broadsides ; yet did not the 
 Dutch Admiral fire a gun, or make the signal to engage, till the red flag was at 
 the Fortitude's mast-head, and her shot were finding their way into his ship. 
 This was a manoeuvre which Admiral Zutman should not be warmly thanked for 
 by their High Mightinesses ; as he had it in his power to have done infinite 
 mischief to our fleet, coming down in that un-officer-like manner. Having 
 suffered Admiral Parker to place himself as he pleased, he calmly waited till 
 the signal was hoisting on board the Fortitude ; and at the same instant we saw 
 the signal going up on board Admiral Zutman's ship. At this time the Dutch 
 frigates and convoy were close under the lee of their line, and some large ships 
 were observed working to windward amongst the convoy, which we thought to 
 be Indiaraen ; and probably fired some shot at our ships through the intervals of 
 their line. Our frigates kept about a mile to windward of our line ; all the 
 advantages given us by the Dutch Admiral one should conceive were eagerly 
 seized ; but as ill luck would have it^ that was far from the case ! 
 
142 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 C H L A I K B 
 
 o- o- o- o- o- o- o- 
 
 o- o- o~ o- o- o- o- 
 
 G D P E 
 
 " For our Admiral, A, without considering that the Dutch Admiral, D, was 
 not in the centre of his line, bore down alongside of him ; from which reason, 
 as may be seen by the rough sketch above, the Bienfaisant, C, had not at first a 
 ship opposed to her ; the Dutch rear, G, being opposite to the Preston, H. The 
 consequences of this mistake were, that the Buffalo, I, and Dolphin, K, which 
 were our weakest ships, had for some time three ships opposed to them ; and 
 unfortunately the van of the Dutch was the strongest part of their line, while 
 our van was the weakest of ours. At eight the signal for the line was hauled 
 down, and the signal for closer action was made. At six minutes past eight the 
 signal was made for the Buffalo to make more sail ; but this she was disabled 
 from doing, not having a brace remaining ; and she could not get her jib and 
 main-top-mast stay-sail set. At about a quarter before ten the Berwick, B, 
 having forced the Dutch van ship, E, to edge off, she soon found herself (by 
 following her up a little) so far to leeward, that she received several shot into her 
 larboard side, from the Dutch ship, F, commanded by Commodore Kingsbergen. 
 
 " This was a sad blow upon us, as the Berwick was our best ship, and now obliged, 
 to make sail a-head to regain her station again by tacking ; and it was eleven 
 o'clock before she got again within shot. Here was surely some error on board 
 the Berwick ; * as she only set her fore-sail and jib. If she had not set her main- 
 sail, she ought surely to have set top-gallant-sails ; and this was the more neces~ 
 sary, as her mizen-top-raast was shot away. As soon as she could fetch to wind- 
 ward of the Dutch line, she ranged along the line on the starboard tack, till 
 a-breast of Admiral Parker. She then tacked, and was standing into her station ; 
 but did not get there before the end of the action : but although the Berwick 
 was so long kept out of action, yet did she fully get her share of the danger of 
 the day ; for no ship was so warmly engaged for some time after the beginning 
 of the action ; and her list of killed and wounded was as great as that of the 
 Fortitude, or nearly so. Before the Berwick had returned again to action, the 
 
 * If the Berwick did not set her main-sail and top-gallant-sails, it must have been from inability, 
 as all her lower masts were badly wounded. Never was greater exertion used, nor anxiety shown, 
 to enable a ship to recover her station in the battle. 
 
 The writer (who was on board the Berwick) distinctly recollects, that when the ship succeeded in 
 getting upon the starboard tack, standing for the van ship of the enemy's line, the Captain directed 
 the Master (John Forbes) in case he could not weather, to run on board of her ; and that she bore 
 up a little, to let us pass, when the broadside was given, mentioned in the narrative. 
 
THE DOGGER BANK. 143 
 
 Dolphin had also been obliged to stand a-head, and make a tack, having got to 
 leeward of some of the Dutch line. And all this was owing to the Admiral's 
 error in going to engage Admiral Zutman, instead of the ship a-head of him ; 
 or, if he thought proper to engage the Dutch Admiral, he should have changed 
 stations with the Princess Amelia, L, and then the ships of each squadron would 
 have been arranged ship against ship from the beginning. At eleven the Admiral 
 passed to leeward of the Buffalo, the ships a-stem of the Admiral following 
 him up (the signal for a line a-head having been again hoisted at forty-three 
 minutes past ten) and engaging the Dutch line as they passed. At this time 
 the Dutch fire was very slack, except from the Admiral and Commodore Kings- 
 bergen's ships. The latter in particular kept up a glorious fire to the last 
 moment, and a very severe cannonading took place between the Fortitude and 
 her, as the latter passed her. And she continued to engage with the same 
 vigour, as the ships a-stern of the Admiral passed her in succession. At thirty- 
 five minutes passed eleven the action ceased, and at forty minutes past twelve 
 the signal was made to wear ; and ten minutes after to form a line a-head. This 
 being the last signal that was made of consequence, I now take a view of our 
 situation. About the middle of the action, the Dutch convoy bore away for the 
 Texel ; an acknowledgement on their sides, that they no longer hoped for 
 victory, or that they would be able to continue their voyage. That they kept 
 their convoy by them at all, was, I think, most likely owing to their having 
 been misinformed of our force ; the Berwick having, by great good fortune, 
 joined us on the coast of Norway a few days before. Not but I conceive the 
 Dutch were superior to us in force, even with this great addition to our strength. 
 Several of their ships had very heavy metal on board ; shot being found on 
 board some of our ships of forty pounds weight ; and, so far from having a ship 
 in their line so small as the Dolphin, I am almost sure they had none of inferior 
 size to the Preston. Being to leeward, they brought all their frigates into 
 action ; and even a cutter came up and fired a broadside or two at the Fortitude. 
 When the signal was made to wear at forty minutes past twelve, the damage 
 our fleet had received was not such as to prevent their going again into action, 
 especially against an enemy much more disabled than ourselves ; our damage, 
 besides the killed and wounded, (who could have been replaced from the frigates) 
 being only of a main-top-mast on board the Bienfaisant, which went after the 
 action ; a mizen-top-mast on board the Berwick ; a fore-top-gallant-mast on 
 board the Princess Amelia ; and the Buffalo had a fore-yard lowered down : the 
 mere reeving of new ropes would not have prevented her from setting sail 
 enough to have gone into action. Now let us see the state of the Dutch fleet 
 
144 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 at the same time. One of their line of battle ships was lying several miles to- 
 windward of the body of their ships, totally disabled ; and two frigates, which 
 were working up to her assistance, bore away as soon as we wore. Their 
 squadron in general seemed perfectly unmanageable, and either did not, or else 
 they in vain endeavoured to fall at all into a line ; although it was in our power 
 to have renewed the action instantly, and I am sure every soul in both squadi-ons 
 expected it. When the signal for our line was made, their disabled ship was 
 still unable to move, and, to my knowledge, our Admiral was then intending, 
 and eager to renew the engagement ; which must inevitably have been crowned 
 with complete success : but neither now, nor the next day, when one of their 
 large ships was found sunk, nor afterwards, when we knew they had all lost one 
 or more of their top-masts, did we follow them — a mystery this indeed. * * * * 
 Thus was lost a glorious opportunity of destroying the flower of the Dutch navy ; 
 and the action, as no attempt was made to reap any advantage from it, was but 
 a sacrifice of a great number of brave men's lives." 
 
 The author of the above narrative proceeds thus : " I do not much admire 
 some of the Lieutenant's observations as to the manner of hastening into action^ 
 but you see it was a motley squadron. 
 
 " Old Parker was full of life and spirits. Sir James Saumarez * was the officer 
 on deck actively employed refitting the rigging, &c. The Captain had the gout, 
 and Waghorn, the first Lieutenant, was wounded. 
 
 " I kept a sharp look-out on the Berwick : the whole party of Dutch marines 
 seemed to be knocked down by your poop-carronades ; your pilot, Hutchinson, 
 was an old shipmate of mine ; and when Keith Stewart told him to assist in 
 conning the ship close to the enemy, he asked, ♦ If by close, he meant about a 
 ship's hreadth* This brave man was killed early in the action. 
 
 " We ought to have taken every ship of war, and many of the convoy." 
 
 By the foregoing minutes it is seen, that the British Admiral inadvertently 
 rendered his van too weak for that of the enemy ; and through the same mistake 
 one of his ships was for a time useless, by being extended beyond the rear. This 
 teaches us the necessity of care in forming lines of battle, that force may be as 
 equally applied to force as circumstances will admit. 
 
 The Dutch Admiral is more to be admired for his cool intrepidity than for his 
 
 • See an interesting " Memoir '' of this distinguished officer and amiable man, with some account 
 of his gallant ancestors, in " Public Characters" for 1805, also in the more recent work of Mr. 
 Ralfe, the " fioyal Naval Biography." 
 
THE DOGGER BANK. 145 
 
 prudence, in forbearing to avail himself of the advantage of attacking the 
 approaching fleet : at the same time a proof is given of the evil effects arising 
 from the siUy custom of drawing up the marines in battle array upon the poop. 
 Were they riflemen, and distributed where they could do most execution at the 
 least risk, they would certainly contribute more effectually to success. 
 
 The conduct of Commodore Johnstone, and the discomfiture of his squadron, 
 in Port Praya Bay, St. Jago, in 1781, as they contribute nothing to tactical 
 iiiformation, are omitted. 
 
 A full account of this unfortunate affair by his own, and by different hands, 
 may be seen in vol. xii. of the " Remembrancer." 
 
 Much may be gleaned from the work of Audibert Ramatuelle ; but great 
 allowances are necessary from the glaring partiality of his statements. British 
 seamen will not be found to yield their assent to at least one erroneous assertion 
 with which he has attempted to impose upon the credulity of his countrymen. 
 Such an unblushing disregard to truth cannot be overlooked. In striving to 
 prove the superiority of the French " a Vahordage" he has the following 
 passage : — 
 
 " J'ai choisi quelques-uns des examples les plus recens, qui prouvent notre 
 superiorite a, I'abordage, et qui attestent jusqu'a quel point nos enemies naturels 
 EEDOUDENT ce genre d'attaque ! ! " 
 
 Of the four proofs, one is of the Scipion falling on board of the London 
 in the first American war, and unaccountably suffered to escape ; the next by 
 L'Artisien driving on board the Isis in Port Praya Bay ; the third, the capture of 
 the Sprightly (Lougre Anglaise, de quatorze canons) ; and the last, the Ambuscade 
 by the Bayonaise, overpowered by numerous troops ! ! (Cours Elementaire, 
 p. 349.) To reflect the greater credit on " Le Bailly de Souffrien," he has 
 described the British squadron as anchored with springs in a line of defence, 
 or " embossee" It is perfectly well known that it was neglecting to do this 
 which led to the Commodore's misfortunes. 
 
 As a considerable set-off against the foregoing unfounded attack upon the 
 character of British seamen, the French reader (for it must be sufficiently known 
 to others) is invited to look into the account of the third expedition to 
 Louisbourg, under Admiral Boscawen, Generals Amherst and Wolfe, 1 758. In 
 the twenty-fifth volume of the " Naval Chronicle " (p. 178) is, in the " Memoirs" 
 of the services of the late Admiral Sir J. Laforey, a circumstantial detail of the 
 operations there by land and sea ; by which it will be seen that a resolution to 
 capture or destroy the two remaining ships, and arrangements necessary for that 
 
 V 
 
146 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 purpose were made by the Admiral upon the destruction by fire of the other 
 three.* 
 
 Commanders Laforey and Balfour, with 600 subordinate oificers and men,. 
 were selected for this service, who, with their usual unanimity and undaunted 
 bravery, boarded from boats, with sword in hand, the hows, gangways, and 
 quarters of the Prudente, of seventy-four, and the Bienfaisant, of sixty-four 
 guns, making the forts and harbour re-echo with their cheers. From the 
 difficulties of situation the Prudente grounded, and could not be brought awiay, 
 but the Bienfaisant (called afterwards by the British sailors the JBonny 
 Pheasant) was borne off in proud triumph, in spite of every eflFort of the enemy. 
 She was long a favourite ship of her class in the British navy. 
 
 For examples "plus recens'' "To whatever extent boarding and cutting 
 out the enemy's vessels from under the forts, &c., may have been carried. Captain 
 Nicholas Tomlinson believes he had the honour to set the example in the late 
 war (in Europe at least), by cutting out a lugger in a single boat in open day- 
 light, while lying within pistol shot of a battery, with the adjoining sand-hills 
 covered with soldiers." (Naval Chronicle, vol. xxv. p. 93.) 
 
 The Naval Chronicle, and " James's Naval History," abound in proofs of 
 daring enterprises of this, and of a still more extraordinary character ; officers 
 and men upon such occasions trying to outdo all former examples, however 
 brilliant. 
 
 The most early of these feats of bravery which present themselves to the 
 memory of the writer, are the boarding of the Bien-venue frigate, by Lieutenant 
 Bowen, in the guard-boat of the Boyne, in Fort Royal, Bay of Martinique ; the 
 desperate recovery of the Hermione by the boats of the Surprise, under the pre- 
 sent Sir Edward Hamilton ; and the no less determined attack upon and capture 
 of the ChevrettBi 
 
 In the naval history of the war from 1793, by Mr. James, is a circumstantial 
 account of no less than one hundred and sixty-six proofs of the falsehood of the 
 Frenchman's assertion ; all distinguished by the greatest bravery and entire 
 devotion; plans deliberately formed, and carried into execution with the utmost 
 'heroism. Many of the instances related by Mr. James are not merely attacks by 
 
 * The late Vice Admiral Sir R. Onslow, who so nobly forced the Dutch line in the battle of 
 . Camperdown, distinguished himself upon this occasion. 
 
 Owing to the rather singular part of the ship by which it was his lot to scramble on board the 
 ' enemy, some rather unpleasant consequences attached themselves to his person j this caused an 
 epithet of an unsavory nature to be familiarly applied to him ; which, as it originally stuck, adhered 
 to him for the rest of his life ! 
 
THE DOGGER BANK. 147 
 
 boats on armed vessels afloat, but where it has not unfrequently happened that 
 formidable forts or batteries were to be carried to secure their success, and under 
 circumstances of peculiar difficulty and danger. Within the same period in 
 which these memorable details are given, tending to show how truly the sons of 
 Britain " redouient ce genre d'attaque," are to be found not more than half-a- 
 dozen instances of attempts to board, or of absolute success in boarding, by the 
 enemy, and one of them, that of the Ambuscade by the Bayonaise mentioned 
 by Ramatuelle; in others their attacks have been powerfully resisted and 
 overcome, the boarders having become the boarded and subdued.* 
 
 It is not for a work of this nature to enter into a description of exploits already 
 told with so much spirit by the naval historian, for in every one of his six octavo 
 volumes will be found most interesting details upon this subject; where the well- 
 known names of Pellew, Sydney Smith, Richard Bowen, T. M. Hardy, 
 P. Campbell, Cochrane, Coghlan, P. Carteret Sylvester, P. D. Broke, and a 
 multitude of others may be found ; and many who no longer live to enjoy the 
 honourable fame attendant upon their deeds in arms, who fought, hand to hand, 
 and glorioiisly fell, in that very mode of warfare they have been basely accused 
 of holding in dread. 
 
 To readers who are not satisfied of the falsehoood of this pretended claim to 
 superiority, let them call to their recollection the attack upon Teneriffe, where 
 the names of Nelson, Trowbridge, Hood, Thompson, Bowen, Fremantle, and 
 Miller appear, all well known to and dreaded by the enemy ; what was this but 
 a deliberate and most desperate " ahordage ;" and marked too with circumstances 
 of the deepest interest, to admire and to deplore ! 
 
 Many other instances may be advanced, differing only in the degree of 
 importance attached to them ; while the same spirit and intrepidity distinguished 
 their progress and success ; such are the capture of Cura^oa by Sir Charles 
 Brisbane, and of Banda, by Sir Christopher Cole. Nay, what was the landing 
 in Egypt, but a descent, en masse, in defiance of a large French army drawn up 
 with fifteen pieces of cannon to oppose it ? The British army and navy steadily 
 advanced in their boats eight miles, determined to rescue the country from their 
 grasp ; and made good their purpose, driving the enemy before them. Numbers 
 were killed and drowned before a shot could be returned, and some, in jumping 
 from the boats, leaped as it were upon their bayonets.f What was this but a 
 
 * The writer having seeir a hoarding jacket, which from its lightness, convenience, and apparent 
 efficiency, seems very capable of adoption for services of this description, has given the inventor's 
 Bccount of it, in Appendix No. 2. 
 
 f See Walsh's " Campaign in Egypt." 
 
 U2 
 
148 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 most splendid display of that system of attack so frequently manifested by 
 British troops and seamen, and which this boasting Frenchman would deny them 
 even the courage to attempt !* 
 
 Ramatuelle makes this charge even subsequent to this great event ; for his 
 work is dated in 1802, and dedicated to the man who had deserted his army of 
 Egypt for laurels more easily to be gained ; for nothing less than absolute power 
 and universal dominion could glut his ambition. 
 
 THE HON. WILLIAM CORNWALLIS. 
 
 When the Honourable William Cornwallis commanded the Lion of sixty-four 
 guns ; having the Bristol of fifty, and the Janus of forty-four guns, under 
 his orders, upon meeting with the squadron, under the celebrated La Motte 
 Piquet, consisting of the Hannibal, Diadem, and another ship of seventy- 
 
 * " The practice of detaching boats on a distant service, out of the protection of the ship (Lord 
 CoUingwood observes), are enterprises highly injurious to the public service, because they disable 
 the ship from performing her real duty," &c. &c. 
 
 " The Hydra performed lately a very gallant thing against a great force. Three privateers, 
 well armed, and a battery of four twenty-four-pounders, were taken, with the loss of one man ; 
 but the ship and boats acted in concert, and in every part the skill and conduct of Captain Mundy 
 was as conspicuous as the gallantry of his officers and men." (Lord Collingwood's Letter to 
 Admiral Thornborough, p. 276.) 
 
 " All our frigate Captains are great generals, and some in the brigs are good brigadiers. They 
 have taken seven forts, garrisons, or castles, within the last two months ; and scaling towers at 
 midnight, and storming redoubts at mid-day, are becoming familiar occurrences. The enemy 
 cannot stand a galling fire from the launch's carronade, or a sharp fire of grape and musketry from 
 the jolly-boat. It is really astonishing." (Lord CoUingwood, p. 467.) 
 
 " The Spartan, Amphion, and others, have taken and blown up three fortified places. Stewart, 
 in the Seahorse, and the Halcyon brig, took two small islands, in which were fortified forts and 
 towns ; Alceste and Cyane three towers by escalade at midnight ; and the Scout, not to be behind 
 hand, divided his force, and making a brisk attack with his boats in front, stormed a French work 
 in the rear, and brought down seven vessels out of the port." (Correspondence, p. 468.) 
 
 The names of the Captains of the ships mentioned are, Sir Jahleel Brenton, Sir Wm. Hoste, 
 Sir Murray Maxwell, Sir Thomas Staines, Captain H. W. Pearse, and Captain Raitt, 
 
 "The morning of the 3 st of November (1809) we burnt the convoy, which had escaped into 
 Rosas Bay. The attack was highly spirited ; there were five armed ships and vessels amongst 
 them, moored under the protection of the castle and strong batteries. They were boarded by the 
 boats, carried in a short time sword in hand, and all on fire. We lost sixteen men, and had between 
 fifty and sixty wounded. The loss of the enemy was great,", fijc. (Correspondence, p. 488.) 
 
THE HON. W. CORNWALLIS. 149 
 
 four guns,* the Reflechi of sixty-four, and the Amphion of fifty; and one of 
 Commodore Comwallis's ships being in danger to leeward, he bore down to her 
 support ; and, uniting his force, resisted the attack of the heavy ships of the 
 enemy : the Ruby of sixty-four guns, and the Pomona and Niger frigates after- 
 wards appearing in sight (that is, on the following morning) the enemy made off. 
 
 When officers have thus considered it their duty to risk all for the protection 
 of one, how can it be presumed that any will ever think of leaving three of their 
 ships to the mercy of the enemy, without risking something ; particularly when 
 they may be, at last, compelled to fight, with their force thus diminished, or so 
 far separated, as to be beyond the reach of mutual assistance ? 
 
 Upon the manner of rendering support to the rear, when exposed to the attack 
 of a superior force from the windward, reference may again be made to Sir Edward 
 Hughes. In retiring before the enemy, he skilfully collected his little force, so 
 as efifectually to prevent his rear from being cut off; even the stemmost ship, that 
 was so considerably separated from the rest. With intelligent British seamen, 
 alive to their own reputation, and to the honour and interest of their country, 
 there can be no question as to the conduct to be pursued. Under this persuasion 
 it is confidently left to their decision. 
 
 In this affair. Sir Manley Dixon was first Lieutenant of the Bristol, com- 
 manded by the Honourable (now Sir) Thomas Pakenham, 
 
 The Janus, with her Captain (Glover) lying dead in the cabin, was, on the 
 second morning of this contest, considerably to leeward; and sustained the heavy 
 fire of the French ships in a most gallant manner, supported by the Lion and 
 Bristol. The Bristol- had fired away all her powder, and was supplied with 
 more from the Lion ; and, when every moment it was expected that the Janus 
 must fall, or sink under the overpowering fire of the enemy, a grape-shot from 
 that ship struck M. La Motte Piquet on the breast ; when his ship made all sail 
 away, followed by the rest of the French squadron. Th6 late Admiral G. H. 
 Stephens was first Lieutenant of the Janus, and fought the ship. 
 
 During the time Lieutenant Dixon remained on board the Lion to receive 
 the supply of powder, he was charged with the thanks of Captain Cornwallis 
 to Captain Pakenham, for the gallant and able support he had given hitti against 
 
 * " The Amphion was seen to enter Cape Francois with the convoy which La Motte Piquet had 
 in charge, and did not rejoin the French Admiral." 
 
 In Sir Peter Parker's account of this affaii (to be found in the Political Magazine for 1780), it is 
 <stated, that Captaini Cornwallis, upon being reinforced on the morning of the 22d, chased the 
 French Admiral for five hours. 
 
150 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 such a superior force; at the same time, a hasty " Memorandum" was issued 
 to the squadron, expressive of his approbation of their conduct, and of his firm 
 persuasion that none of his Majesty's ships, under his orders, would " be given 
 away !" 
 
 A trait of professional skill and undaunted resolution was shown by the pre- 
 sent Rear Admiral Tollemache, when he commanded a seventy-four gun ship, 
 watching the motions of the enemy's fleet at Toulon in the last war. 
 
 The French fleet had that day ventured out of port to exercise ; and, favoured 
 by the wind, the van had so considerably advanced upon the in-shore squadron 
 of British ships, as to bring into danger of being cut-oiF a frigate and a sloop 
 of war. This was immediately seen by Admiral Tollemache (then Captain 
 Halliday), who instantly ran his ship between the line-of-battle ships of the 
 enemy and his two little friends, and rescued them from destruction: his conduct 
 excited the admiration of the whole British fleet, in sight, but at too great a 
 distance to support him. 
 
 A similar act and in the same place occurred a second time, when the present 
 Sir "Waller Otway interposed in the Ajax, seventy-four, and rescued the Sheer- 
 water from destruction; (See the very interesting memoir of that able and enter- 
 prising oflBcer in " Ralfe's Royal Naval Biography.") 
 
 HONOURABLE W. CORNWALLIS WITH A SMALL SQUADRON. 
 
 Extracts from the letter of Captain Cornwallis, taken from the 10th volume 
 of the " Remembrancer." 
 
 It appears to have been written to Sir Peter Parker, then Commander-in- 
 Chief at Jamaica : and the force to which he was opposed, a squadron under the 
 orders of Mons. Terney, 
 
 " H. M. ship Lion, oflFCape Francois, July 14th, 1780. 
 
 "Sir, 
 
 " On the 9th of June, the convoy having past through the Gulph 
 of Florida, and got as far to the northward as twenty-nine degrees thirty minutes. 
 Captain Inglis made the signal to separate. We parted company accordingly, 
 and proceeded on, pursuant to your orders, with the Lion, Sultan, Hector, 
 
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THE HON. W. CORNWALLIS. 151 
 
 Bristol, Ruby, and Niger. On the 20th, at one p. m., the wind S.S.E,, stand*, 
 ing to the eastward, the Niger, a-head, made the signal for a general chace. 
 We soon perceived they were a convoy standing across us to the N. N. W. ; but 
 upon seeing us, they hauled up towards us ; some large ships stretching a-head 
 of the rest, particularly two that were much advanced ; who, as soon as the 
 Hector and Niger came near them, wore, and edged down to join the others. 
 About half-past foul*, being pretty near, and perceiving seven two-decked ships 
 (Plate Xn, Fig. 1) drawing into a line ; besides some others that were with the 
 convoy, and some frigates ; I made the signal for the line on the starboard tack; 
 the enemy being upon the larboard tack (Fig. 1) ; their convoy being about two 
 or three miles upon their starboard quarter ; and some two-decked ships and 
 frigates carrying a press of sail to join the other seven. 
 
 " The Ruby was so far to leeward, that the enemy would have weathered her. 
 She was therefore obliged to tack, (Fig. 2.) I then made the signal to ware, 
 and form the line upon the larboard tack ; the same the enemy were upon ; and 
 edged down to support the Ruby, and prevent their weathermost ships getting 
 between her and us. The enemy kept edging off, and forming their line ; but 
 did not fire, although within gun-shot," (See Plates XII, and XIII.) 
 
 " About half-past five, perceiving we had pushed the French ships sufficiently 
 to leeward, to enable the Ruby, who was upon our lee bow, to join us, I made 
 her signal to tack. The enemy then hoisted their colours, and began to fire : 
 their leading ship had a broad pendant ; and their third ship, which commanded, 
 and was a-breast of the Lion, a flag at the mizen-top-mast head ; all the others 
 .common white pendants," (Plate XIII, Fig, 3.) 
 
 " As soon as the Ruby had fetched into the rear of our line and tacked, the 
 enemy tacked, headmost first, and the rest in succession, keeping their line; and 
 those leading upon the starboard, that led before upon the larboard tack ; they 
 fired as they jpassed our ships, but at a great distance. When they got the 
 length of our rear, about seven in the evening, they bore up, and joined their 
 convoy." 
 
 (In Plate XIII, Fig. 4, — A, is the Ruby; B, the British squadron; F, seven 
 French line-of-battle ships, hauled out from the rest ; G, the convoy, attended 
 by two or three ships of the line, and some frigates.) 
 
 " This fleet I believe consisted of fourteen men of war, ten or eleVen of which 
 were two-decked ships, and three or four frigates ; the rest were merchant ships 
 or transports, a cutter, &c. ; the whole from forty-four to forty-seven sail," &c. 
 
 " A random shot killed the coxswain, and wounded a marine on board the 
 
152 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Lion ; one man was wounded on board the Bristol : the Ruby, by passing 
 between the two lines, was more exposed to the enemy's fire than the other 
 ships, and had one killed and three wounded, and her jib-boom shot away. 
 
 " The whole is a matter of small importance ; but I thought it my duty to 
 inform you of every particular, for fear of misrepresentations, as the enemy are 
 sometimes not very correct in their accounts," &c. 
 
 " I am to lament my ill fortune, that, after having been entrusted by you 
 with the command of five such ships, and a frigate, I should again * meet the 
 enemy so strong, as to prevent our being able to attempt any thing against 
 them." 
 
 ADMIRAL GRAVES'S BATTLE OFF THE CHESAPEAK, 
 
 September 5th, 1781. 
 
 Extract of a Letter from Admired Graves, 
 
 " The moment the wind served to carry the ships over the bar, which was 
 buoyed for the purpose, the squadron came out. Sir Samuel Hood getting under 
 way at the same time, the fleet proceeded together to the southward. 
 
 " The wind being rather favourable, we approached the Chesapeak the morn- 
 ing of the 5th of September ; when the advanced ship made the signal of a fleet. 
 We soon discovered a number of great ships at anchor, extended across the 
 entrance of the Chesapeak, from Cape Henry to the middle ground. As we 
 approached, the whole got under sail and stretched out to sea, vdth the wind at 
 N.N.E. 
 
 " As we drew nearer I formed the line, first a-head, and then in such a 
 manner as to bring his Majesty's fleet nearly parallel to the line of approach of 
 the enemy ; and when I found that our van was advanced as far as the shoal of 
 the middle ground would admit of, I wore the fleet, and brought it upon the 
 same tack with the enemy. 
 
 * This refers to his meeting with a superior force under La Motte Piquet on a former cruize. 
 
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ADMIRAL GRAVES. 153 
 
 " So soon as I judged that our van would be able to operate, I made the signal 
 to bear away and approach, and soon after to engage the enemy close. 
 
 " Somewhat after four, the action began amongst the headmost ships, pretty 
 close, and soon became general as far as the second ship from the centre towards 
 the rear. The van of the enemy bore away, to enable the centre to support 
 them, or they would have been cut up. 
 
 " The centre of the enemy continued to hear up as it advanced,* and at that 
 moment seemed to have little more in view than to shelter their own van, as it 
 went away before the wind," &c. 
 
 Here at sun-set the engagement ended. His Majesty's fleet consisted of nine- 
 teen sail of the line ; that of the French twenty-four. Many of the British fleet 
 suffered very severely upon this occasion ; justifying all that has been said upon 
 such a mode of attack from the windward position. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 If the British Admiral could not have attacked the French fleet before it 
 could be formed into line, he would have had a much greater prospect of success 
 had he done so when in position Fig. 2, and with his van and centre made an 
 attack on their rear. 
 
 By this mode, a superior would have been brought to act against an inferior 
 force ; calling as many ships to his assistance as he thought necessary; while the 
 van of the enemy would have been left unoccupied. 
 
 By the plan adopted, the fleet was certain to suffer very materially, without 
 any probable chance of a compensation ; while, at the same time, the British 
 Admiral might have flattered himself that he had broken the enemy's line, and 
 compelled him to fly before the wind ! Mr. Clerk has described this action in 
 four Figures. 
 
 Plate XIV, Fig. 1, A, the French fleet at anchor. 
 F, the French fleet drawn out into line. 
 B, the British fleet bearing down. 
 Figs. 1 and 2, show the modes proposed ; Fig. 2, the van and part of the 
 centre bear down to attack the centre and rear of the enemy. The rest stand 
 
 * The centre of the enemy is described as having " bore up as it advanced ■" meaning, that the 
 centre having advanced to the support of its van, engaged with the van of the British fleet, then 
 kept away from the wind, increasing its distance from the British fleet ; having given its fire in 
 passing, and not vnshing to expose itself to closer action. (See Clerk's Plate IX, Fig. 4.) 
 
 X 
 
154 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 on under a press of sail to support the attack, and to keep the van of the enemy 
 in check. 
 
 It clearly appears that had a proper attention been paid to signals, and that 
 -the east and west line had been occupied by the fleet (Fig. 1), the battle must 
 have been more general. 
 
 To make sail after, and follow in the wake of your leader, was then eon. 
 sidered to be forming the line of battle ! Where you chase in line, with the 
 enemy a-head of you, it may carry you up with him ; but that is not to form 
 the litie of battle against a fleet drawn up in line to leeward; as in Fig. 1, 
 Plate XIV. 
 
 It was the prevailing custom in those days, to consider that any considerable 
 fleet of an enemy could only be approached in a regular line of battle equally 
 extended with that of their opponent : had a less formal and deliberate mode of 
 proceeding been adopted upon this occasion, a much better effect might probably 
 have been produced. Unfortunately, the fate of Mathews and of Byng was 
 still fresh in the recollection of our naval Commanders ; and as in those cases, 
 disgrace or punishment alike awaited both the daring and the cautious, the 
 conducting of a fleet in the presence of an enemy became a duty at once perilous 
 and perplexing. 
 
 By a log of the proceedings of the fleet, taken on board the London (the flag- 
 ship of Admiral Graves), it appears that the French were discovered at half- 
 past nine a. ra. in the S. W.— ^wind at N. N. E. ; and at ten, Cape Henry was 
 seen at the distance of six leagues. At eleven, the enemy's large ships hove 
 in sight at an anchor ; when the signal was made for the line of battle a-head, 
 at two cables' length asunder. 
 
 It is here with deference submitted, that the signal at this time should have 
 been for a general chase; then to clear for action, and to engage the enemy on 
 arriving up with him. By these measures, the headmost of the British fleet 
 would most likely have brought to close action the most advanced of the enemy, 
 and have thrown the rest, not yet under way, into disorder. The British ships, 
 as they drew near to the leading ships of the enemy, should ware and close with 
 them (either to windward or to leeward) on the same tack ; and the remainder 
 following in close succession, a desperate attack might have been made upon 
 their van, at that time beyond, the reach of assistance from their rear, unable to 
 
ADMIRAL GRAVES. 155 
 
 cle ar the anchorage, and hot in a situation to form in line for a regular defence 
 (See Plate XV.) The success of such an attack depends entirely upon the 
 promptitude and vigour of the execution.* 
 
 FROM THE LONDON'S LOG. 
 
 At one, signal for an east and west line, at one cable. 
 
 At two, the van distant three miles. The enemy twenty-four sail. 
 
 At fifteen min. past two, the fleet veered together, and brought to, to let 
 the centre of the enemy come a-breast of the British centre. 
 
 At forty-six min. past three, signal for a line a-head, at one cable, and for 
 the fleet to bear down, and engage their opponents. 
 
 At forty-nine min. past three, repeated the signal to engage. 
 
 At eleven min. past four, hauled down the signal for the line a-head, that it 
 might not interfere with the signal to engage close. 
 
 At twenty-two min. past four, hoisted again the signal for line a-head, the 
 ships not being sufficiently extended. 
 
 At twenty min. past five, repeated signal for close action. 
 
 At half-past five. Rear Admiral Sir Samuel Hood bore down towards the 
 enemy. 
 
 At half-past six, the firing ceased on both sides. 
 
 In a note it is said, the rear bore down at half-past five, but not near enough 
 to engage before dusk. In the van and centre 336 men were killed and 
 wounded, and sixteen guns dismounted ; in the rear none, and no damage 
 received. 
 
 Soon after two p. m., when the van of the French bore south of the London, 
 three miles, the British fleet wore together, and placed themselves on the same 
 tack with the enemy : but it was not until a quarter past four p. m. that 
 the engagement commenced in the van and centre, and half-past five when 
 the rear division (Sir Samuel Hood's) bore down into action ; and it appears that 
 much difficulty was experienced by the Admiral in getting some of his ships to 
 keep their stations, and great dilatoriness on the part of the rear division in 
 
 * The mode suggested in a note upon Rodney's rencontre with the French fleet, to windward of 
 Martinique, might also he applied to an attack of this nature : — namely, by laying the enemy on 
 board, to disable him^ 
 
 X 2 
 
156 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 obeying his signals and closing with the enemy. At half-past six the firing 
 ceased on both sides ; the rear division having been very little, if at all, engaged; 
 not one of the ships under Sir Samuel Hood having suiFered by the loss of a 
 single man in killed or wounded. 
 
 In the " Political Magazine" for 1782, it is said of this affair, that the 
 " SoMverain" the flag-ship of de Grasse, was entangled with the shore in four 
 fathoms water in getting under way at ten in the morning. 
 
 " If Admiral Graves, upon first seeing the enemy, had pushed into the bay, as 
 the wind was perfectly fair for him, he would have found the French fleet in the 
 utmost confusion," &c. 
 
 " He also might have taken up the anchorage there at the mouth of York 
 River in a strong position. He would also have found some ships of war of the 
 enemy there, and been at hand to support Lord Cornwallis. 
 
 " Even after the action he might have attempted to gain the Chesapeak ; but 
 this, after five days, de Grasse prevented by going back there himself, 
 
 " De Grasse, with his fleet, had to turn out of the bay, and were in great 
 irregularity, struggling with the shore and shoals of Lynhaven Bay." 
 
 In the " Political Magazine" for 1782, is much naval information, with 
 anecdotes, &c. 
 
 Plate XV. shows the British fleet B, supposed under a press of sail, bearing 
 down to attack the van of the enemy. 
 
 SIR SAMUEL (LORD) HOOD, AT ST. CHRISTOPHER'S, 
 
 February, 1782. 
 
 Extract of Sir Samuel Hoods Letter. 
 
 " At day-light of the 25th, we plainly discovered thirty-three sail of the 
 enemy's ships ; twenty-nine of which, of two decks, formed in a line a-head. I 
 made every appearance of an attack, which threw Count de Grasse a little from 
 
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SIR SAMUEL (LORD) HOOD. 157 
 
 the shore ; and as I thought I had a fair prospect of gaining the anchorage he 
 left, and well knowing it was the only chance I had of saving the island, 
 if it was to be saved, I pushed for it, and succeeded, by having my rear and part 
 of my centre engaged. 
 
 " The enemy gave a preference to Commodore Affleck ; but he kept up so 
 noble a fire, and was so supported by his seconds. Captain Cornwallis and 
 Lord Robert Manners, that the loss and damages sustained in those ships were 
 but trifling, and they very much preserved the other ships in the rear," &c. 
 
 " Would the event of a battle have determined the fate of the Island, I would 
 without hesitation have attacked the enemy," &c. 
 
 " I anchored His Majesty's squadron in a close line a-head. Next morning, 
 about eight o'clock, I was attacked from van to rear with the whole force of the 
 enemy (twenty-nine sail) for nearly two hours, without having the least visible 
 impression made upon ray line. The French ships then wore and stood off 
 again ; and in the afternoon began a second attack upon my centre and rear, 
 with no better success than before ; since which the Count de Grasse has kept a 
 safe distance." 
 
 See the Plates XVI. and XVII. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 This was, no doubt, a most skilful and gallant attempt to recover the Island 
 of St. Christopher's; but had the Count de Grasse possessed the talents and 
 enterprise of his opponent, he would have made him pay dearly, for having, with 
 a force so inferior, taken up the anchorage so lately occupied by the French fleet; 
 and which, "feeling the situation disadvantageous," they had quitted. 
 
 The French Admiral, to have struck a decisive blow, should have made his 
 attack upon the van (being the windward end of the line), by anchoring against 
 it in double force, and on the outside of his enemy : having succeeded in the 
 van, he would then have turned his attention to the centre and rear ; and left, as 
 his superiority allowed, a sufficient number of ships under way, to watch their 
 motions and prevent their escape. 
 
 To anchor on the outside of the British line was expedient (rather than to 
 double upon it, as in the battle of the Nile), the better to prevent any escape to 
 sea ; the land side being at that time equally hostile to the British fleet. 
 
 If, with the island in possession of the French, the Count de Grasse, so superior 
 in force (twenty-nine to twenty-two sail of the line), considered his position in 
 Basseterre Road " untenable," what might it have been deemed to a hostile fleet 
 
158 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 of so unequal a number ? This enteifpiise displayed in an eminent degree the 
 skill and intrepidity of the British Admiral ; whose conduct far surpassed that 
 of any of his predecessors, and formed a brilliant contrast to the ostentatious 
 manoeuvring of the Count de Grasse. 
 
 In " A Short Account of the Naval Actions of last War, by an Officer," 
 published in 1788, are the following remarks. 
 
 " The placing of our fleet at anchor was most judicious ; the ships occupying 
 the whole space from the salt-pans, at the bead of the Ba,y, to the outer part 
 of Basseterre Road ; the van ship being anchored so near the shore, that it 
 would be impossible for the enemy to weather her ; and so nearly upon the edge 
 of the bank, that the enemy's fleet could not anchor without it ; and beyond 
 the range of a shell from the batteries at Basseterre, at this time in the enemy's 
 possession. 
 
 " This brilliant manoeuvre was at once so mortifying and distressing to the 
 enemy, that Monsieur de Grasse seemed determined the following morning to try- 
 the weight of his fleet against the advantage of position, and came on accordingly, 
 his van ship leading with the greatest gallantry." 
 
 If such were the case, as to the nature of the ground occupied by the British 
 fleet, it was not in the power of the French fleet to have attacked it by anchoring ; 
 and the skill and ability of the British Admiral are strikingly displayed. 
 
 Plate XVI. shows Sir Samuel Hood's action at St. Christopher's, February 
 1782. British, twenty-two sail of the line and five frigates. French, thirty- 
 three. 
 
 A, the British fleet standing for the anchorage. 
 
 B, the van of the British fleet having come to anchor with springs, prepared 
 to act on the defensive. 
 
 C, the rear of the British fleet under Commodore Affleck, with part of the 
 centre, sustaining, while coming to an anchor, an attack from the enemy. 
 
 Plate XVII., the ships having anchored with springs, presents their starboard 
 broadsides to the French fleet. 
 
 F, the first attack from van to rear. 
 
 F, G, the second attack, upon the centre and rear. 
 
 C, the Alfred, Canada, and Resolution; having before anchored too far to 
 leeward, and near the edge of the bank, outside of which there is no anchorage. 
 By the judicious position of these ships the British line was flanked, and the 
 rear greatly protected. 
 
J'/.-iTE xvn. 
 
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CAPTURE AND RECOVERY OF NEVIS. 159 
 
 Ramatuelle says of this affair, that the British fleet being but very feebly 
 defended^ hy batteries on shore, at the extremities of its line, might have been 
 attacked with ease by ships in perpetual succession, on the rear ; and recommends 
 a line of approach, by which they would avoid exposure to the fire of the line 
 in general, and direct their whole force successively upon the three or four 
 sternmost ships. The island being in possession of the enemy, the British fleet 
 could receive no support or defence whatever from the land side. (See Cours 
 J^lementaire, p. 475.) 
 
 The account of these memorable transactions may here be closed by an 
 Extract from a 
 
 JOURNAL OF THE CAPTURE AND RECOVERY OF NEVIS. 
 
 The surrender took place on the 20th of January, 1782. It was taken 
 possession of by the Viscount d'Escars, Captain of the Glorieux. 
 
 Note. — The " Narrows," so frequently mentioned In this narrative, is the long, rocky, and 
 intricate channel which separates N«vis from St. Christopher's. 
 
 Jfinuary 23d, 1782. — Sir Samuel Hood at anchor under Antigua ; look-out 
 vessels continually sent out by the French Admiral to reconnoitre to windward, 
 and returning with different signals. The Iris in particular goes out of our 
 road every morning, stretches far to windward, and returns every evening about 
 sunset. Towards evening the English fleet was plainly seen getting under way. 
 The Iris, in returning this evening (rather in a hurry I presume), ran plump on 
 shore on the reef above our fort. After sticking about an hour, she fired signals 
 of distress; which were answered by the Glorieux, who sent boats to her assist- 
 ance ; and, by throwing her guns overboard, she got off about day-light, and 
 made the best of her way to St. Kitt's, 
 
 January 24^^.«-^Just before day-light the Glorieux slipt her cable and stood 
 for St. Kitt's, leaving the English flag flying at one fort, and taking every 
 Frenchman off the island. The dawn discovered the English fleet nearly in to 
 windward of the island ; about thirty sail, large and small. About seven o'clock 
 a. m. two English frgates were so far aJiead of the fleet as to be a-breast of our 
 
160 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 fort. A large French cutter standing from the southward, stood close to them, 
 taking them for French ; but a broadside from one of them soon undeceived her, 
 and she immediately struck ; which we considered as a favourable omen of what 
 might follow. This happened in the face of the French fleet in Basseterre ; and 
 four heavy frigates were immediately dispatched, on whose approach our scouts 
 retired towards our fleet with their prize. When this happened I had got up to 
 a fine look-out, which commanded aU Basseterre Bay to leeward, and a great 
 range to windward : and here was soon collected a large company both of men 
 and women. 
 
 About one p. m* the van of Hood's fleet hove in sight, advancing very slowly, 
 and sometimes lying-to. The French having yet formed no regular line, we 
 conclude they mean to come out ; they have always lain in great confusion in 
 Basseterre road, three or four deep. About three p. m. the French began to 
 move, and were all under way before sun-set, standing towards Hood with an 
 easy sail. Towards evening Hood tacked and stood up to the southward, 
 seemingly retiring, and the French following boldly : a mortifying sight this to us 
 all, and the occasion of many uneasy conjectures during an anxious night. 
 
 January 25th, Friday. — Both fleets to leeward of the island, but the English 
 much better in with the land, about three leagues off. The frigates of the two 
 fleets pretty near each other, at least some of them. The English seemingly 
 endeavouring to get stiU more to windward, and the French appearing to work 
 with uncertainty and irregularity. About ten a. m., on a signal from the 
 Admiral, five or six sail of the English van made sail a-head in a regular line ; but 
 another signal called them back again, the French working up to get nearer. 
 About one p. m. the English Admiral again made his signal for a line a-head, 
 which was formed with the greatest expedition and regularity. As they got to their 
 stations they made sail a-head towards St. Kitts, keeping as close to Nevis' 
 shore as the water would permit ; the frigates within them. Our whole line was 
 formed in less than an hour, each ship in her exact distance. The French imme- 
 diately formed their line also a-head, but in a very irregular manner ; and hore 
 down* diagonally towards our centre, with a view probably to cut off our rear. 
 About half-past two the Ville de Paris, being the seventh ship from the French 
 van, fired about three single shots, probably to try the range of his guns ; which 
 were taken no notice of At about three o'clock the French Admiral began in 
 earnest, seeming to direct his fire at the sixth ship from our rear. He was imme- 
 
 * This must be intended for " hauled up," the French fleet being to leeward. As the observer 
 was not a seaman, he might not know the distinction. 
 
CAPTURE AND RECOVERY OF NEVIS. 161 
 
 diately followed by about thirteen or fourteen of his ships nearest to him a-head 
 and a-stern. This being returned by the six or seven of our rear, a most 
 dreadful cannonade ensued, which spread by degrees to about the twelfth ship 
 from our rear. But the heaviest of the French fire fell on our three last ships ; 
 for whose fate we trembled, as they had the fire of twelve or fourteen of the 
 enemy on them at once : yet they never moved an inch out of the line, but kept 
 their stations and distances as steadily as if they had been at anchor ; at the same 
 time we could distinctly perceive they shot a-head of the enemy. Some of our 
 centre seemed at this time to edge down a little to take off part of the French 
 fire, while our van made more sail to reach St. Kitt's, which our whole fleet happily 
 effected before sun-set. The heat of this action lasted about an hour and a half ; 
 after which the fire subsided by degrees. During this action there were about 
 seven sail of the French line which kept a-stern of the rest the whole time ; they 
 were probably some of their worst ships, and ordered to keep that station till 
 wanted. The steadiness of our whole line was truly admirable ; not one of our 
 ships seemed to deviate a single foot from her station. One small armed ship of 
 ours was frequently between the two fleets on all tacks, and seemed to court 
 unnecessary danger. She was once a-ground, and had frequently the fire of 
 three or four of the line on her, and their shot we could see fall round her like 
 showers of hail; yet she had not a sail or yard hurt. During the engage- 
 ment the Solebay frigate ran on shore. Several French ships kept firing on her 
 in this distress, and the Captain returned it ; but, finding she must inevitably 
 fall into the enemy's hands. Captain Everett set fire to her and quitted her. 
 She burnt for an hour or more, and blew up about eight o'clock with a most 
 tremendous report; having 160 barrels of powder on board. The reverberation 
 from the mountain was like distant thunder. This awful explosion seemed 
 a characteristic conclusion to this memorable day. The action happened so near 
 our shore, that the shot from the French fleet (which was the outer line) came in 
 some places above half a mile on shore ; but fortunately did no damage. I have 
 two in my possession which weigh forty pounds each. The whole was minutely 
 seen from all the lee-side of the island ; and had it been a representation calcu- 
 lated for the entertainment of the company where I was, it would have begun on 
 the very spot it did. After the crew quitted the Solebay, they came to town ; 
 and, their road lying through this fort, they lowered our flag, and hoisted it again, 
 to retake the island as they called it. Hearing the captain and crew were in town, 
 I went thither. When it was proposed by some unthinking people that he might 
 with his crew easily take possession of the island, he or one of his officers (the 
 latter I think) said " it was of more consequence to His Majesty's service to join 
 
 Y 
 
162 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 the English fleet with his men, than to take such a paltry island." He took 
 possession therefore of two vessels in the road, and carried with him as many of 
 his people as he could collect ; but before he went oflF it seems he was pre- 
 vailed on to leave a letter for the President, demanding a surrender of the 
 island to His Britannic Majesty; which was to be delivered by his lieutenant 
 next morning. 
 
 The small ship which behaved so gallantly, or rather rashly, was (it seems) the 
 Amazon privateer, of London, Captain Hughes, who came down with the English 
 fleet. 
 
 January ^Qth, Saturday. — We observed the French fleet (which had lain-to 
 near the land during the night, making many signals with rockets and false fires), 
 forming in a regular line a-head, and standing with a leading breeze towards the 
 English, who were at anchor in a line, or rather crescent, under Green Point at 
 St. Kitt's ; extending to sea so as to cut off the communication with Basseterre 
 road; their frigates lying nearer in. As the French bore down, the wind 
 headed them a little, so as to prevent their reaching our van. The leading ship 
 of the French stood on with amazing steadiness and resolution, and advanced 
 considerably farther than the rest. She kept on advancing tiU the fire of our 
 line opened upon her, which seemed visibly to stagger her : the fire of the whole 
 line opening in a manner at once, was truly awful : it resembled loud rolling 
 thunder, and was incessant for nearly two hours. The whole French line 
 followed their leader, but none came so near to the English line : the difference 
 among them was very distinguishable in this respect ; some luffing up and 
 endeavouring to get as close as possible, while others apparently edged out of the 
 heat of our fire. The Ville de Paris on this occasion set a fair example to the 
 rest of the fleet. The action lasted near two hours, during most part of which 
 the cannonade was dreadful. The heat of it feU again on the fifth or sixth ships 
 composing our rear. As the French got out of action, they wore and stood again 
 to the southward, and afterwards tacked and formed the line a-head and stood 
 again towards our line. During this interval Sir Samuel Hood had strengthened 
 the rear of his line considerably, by moving some of his heaviest ships, and 
 placing them in the intervals of the others ; so that the line was in a manner 
 double in the rear, where he had reason to expect the weight of the enemy's 
 attack, as they could not weather his van. 
 
 About two p. m. the French made a second attempt, when six or seven of the 
 French van attacked our rear ; two of them seemed to us to luff up very gallantly, 
 almost so as to double round it ; but the fire from our rear was now so terrible. 
 
CAPTURE AND RECOVERY OF NEVIS. 163 
 
 and particularly the Barfleur s, that they soon bore away and stood up to the 
 southward ; when they lay-to for the night. 
 
 This third action seemed but a feeble attempt of the French, who were much 
 further to leeward, and did not appear very anxious to get nearer ; probably 
 some of them were a good deal hurt in the two former. 
 
 Lieutenant Hare, of the Solebay, went down to the English fleet this 
 morning, with as many of the remainder of his crew as he could find ; the 
 President having refused any voluntary surrender of the island to Captain 
 Everett's letter ; and informing Mr. Hare that he was to act as he thought 
 proper, but that our oath of neutrality put it out of our power to take any 
 active part in such a business, however desirous we must of course be to return 
 under the British government. 
 
 January %^th, Sunday. — The French fleet at day-light two or three leagues 
 to leeward of this island. As the day advanced they made sail, in a line a-head 
 towards the English line ; but when the leading ship was nearly within shot, 
 they all on signal lay-to, and so continued to do the whole day, with boats 
 passing between them. We could perceive that several of them had suffered 
 much in their hulls. The Ville de Paris in particular had many plugs and 
 patches near or below her coppering There were men on stages over her bows, 
 and others in boats alongside at work the whole day: other ships had also 
 stages over, and many holes patched. In the afternoon two of their frigates 
 came pretty near our line and lay-to ; but two or three of ours being dispatched 
 through the line to speak with them, they brushed off with much haste. The 
 whole French fleet swagged away so far to leeward to-day, that we imagined 
 they were going to anchor at St. Eustatia. A large ship of the line joined 
 them from the southward in the afternoon, full of signals ; which appeared to 
 be a fresh ship. Some bombs were this day thrown from the French batteries 
 against Brimstone Hill, and some guns fired from the Hill. From Tysons we 
 could distinguish the large encampment of the French, and see every mortar 
 fired.. 
 
 This day was very squally ; the French fleet in much disorder ; and had the 
 English thought proper to attack them, many of th^ir ships would have found 
 it difficult to keep the line. 
 
 It was learnt from pretty good authority that a Council of War was this 
 day held by Count de Graase, in order to consult on again attacking Hood ; 
 when he proposed to bring his fleet to an anchor alongside the English, and 
 make one desperate effort ; but he had only ten captains who approved his 
 
 Y 2,. 
 
164 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 scheme. This accounts in some manner for the apparent confiision in their fleet 
 this day. 
 
 January 28th, Monday. — The French fleet at day-light about four leagues 
 to leewai'd, lying-to ; during the forenoon sometimes working up to windward ; 
 at other times lying-to. About noon the body of the fleet, something near 
 thirty-one sail, in sight ; one of their frigates much to windward of the rest. 
 Under easy sail the whole day, and falling again to leeward towards the evening. 
 
 This day 700 regulars, being all the effectives General Prescott brought down 
 with him, were landed under cover of the frigates at Frigate and Potatoe 
 Bays. The French had a body of men posted on the hills above them, 400 
 or 500. 
 
 About one p. m., the General detached 400 to dislodge them ; who performed 
 this service with gallantry, though their march was all up hill, and through thick 
 shrubs and prickly pears. This action was very smart while it lasted ; but the 
 French gave way and retired in great disorder to Basseterre. We lost about 
 seventeen killed, forty- seven wounded, and seven missing. Among the killed, 
 two Captains (Ross and Elliott) ; and Captain Smith desperately wounded, with 
 four or five others. General Prescott made an attempt to march towards 
 Basseterre ; but a large detachment from the French camp being on their way 
 towards him (about 3000, headed by the Marquis de Bouilli and Count Dillon), 
 he retreated and retired across Frigate Bay .to St. Timothy's Hill. The French 
 detachment arrived at Frigate Bay towards evening, and made Dupuis Estate 
 their head-quarters. 
 
 The loss of the French not exactly known; but it is supposed that they had 
 between 200 and 300 killed and wounded. 
 
 January 29th, Tuesday. — ^At day-light, thirty-four sail, including frigates, 
 about two leagues and a half from our island, standing towards St. Kitt's (they 
 must have worked toward windward all night). About seven a. m. they tacked 
 and stood to the southward under their topsails ; manoeuvring the whole day to 
 keep their ground. Towards evening four large sail were seen towards the 
 south. They have probably been joined in the night by some fresh ships, as the 
 four seem standing towards Martinico, and are likely to be disabled ships going 
 to refit. 
 
 The French troops, though so numerous, did not think proper to attack ours 
 on the hill, who were glad to retire quietly down the other side, and re-embarked 
 in the evening from Friers Bay. 
 
 January 30th, Wednesday. — The French fleet in the morning (thirty-three 
 sail), tolerably well in with the land, and standing towards our line pretty 
 
CAPTURE AND RECOVERY OF NEVIS. 165 
 
 regularly. About teu a. m. they all hoisted their colours, when we expected 
 another attack. The headmost ships stood on, and the two or three leaders 
 being within shot of the rear of our line, the Barfleur and some of the rest fired 
 a few shot at them ; which the French did not return, but wore and stood up 
 to the southward again, as was their constant practice. We could perceive the 
 English shot fall considerably over them. 
 
 January 31*/, Thursday. — The French fleet manoeuvring as usual, but it 
 having blown hard all last night, they were further to leeward than usual. Only 
 twenty-eight sail in sight, including frigates. 
 
 The French had generally two sail of the line watering at Old Road all the 
 while Sir Samuel Hood staid at St. Kitt's ; and it was to protect these that they 
 kept hovering so near him. They frequently also detached ships and frigates to 
 windward ; probably for repairs, or supplies ; or to look out ; and were joined by 
 others in their room, which occasioned an almost daily difference of their number 
 in sight. 
 
 Sir Samuel Hood used to send his boats up in the night for water to Nevis 
 unperceived I suppose by the French, who might easily have prevented it. Thus 
 the French were supplied with water at an English Island, and the English at 
 a French island, in spite of, and in fact in view of, each other. Sir Samuel Hood 
 had also an armed schooner generally lying in the narrows, sounding, and looking 
 out to windward occasionally. 
 
 February hit, Friday. — The French fleet well in with the land this morning : 
 twenty-seven sail employed as yesterday. 
 
 About an hour before sun-set we were much surprised to see two English 
 frigates standing up from Sir Samuel Hood's line. They passed by our road 
 and kept close to the land, under a press of sail, standing to windward in sight 
 of the whole French fleet. About eleven p. m., several guns were heard to the 
 southward and windward of the island ; which we fear was owing to some pursuit 
 of those ships by the French. This day an armed ship came through the 
 narrows with signals, and safely joined Sir Samuel Hood. 
 
 The two frigates which went to windward were the Fortunee and Convert, 
 with the English troops for Antigua. They were chased the whole night and 
 part of the next day, by two frigates and two of the line : they exchanged some 
 broadsides with the headmost frigate ; and the Convert would have been taken 
 by an eighty-four, which was close up with her, had not the Fortunee lain-to, 
 and received the ship's fire while the Convert got away. The people of Antigua 
 say that both frigates must inevitably have been taken by the French eighty- 
 four, if he had had good pilots on board ; as they escaped by keeping so near 
 
166 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 the reefs, that the Frenchman was afraid to follow, though there was no real 
 danger. 
 
 General Prescott was not in these ships, but went through the narrows in an 
 armed brig, and was chased into Montserrat, and did not arrive at Antigua till 
 some days after. 
 
 The ship which went through the narrows was the Tisiphone fire-ship, express 
 from Admiral Kempenfelt, with an account of the dispersion of Vaudreuil's 
 fleet. 
 
 February 2d, Saturday. — The French fleet well in with the land ; twenty- 
 seven sail. About noon a very fast-sailing armed brig left the Admiral, and 
 stood close into the opening of the narrows. She then tacked and stood along 
 our road with a boat out ; and, being close in, she sent her boat and cut out 
 a schooner belonging to Mr. Ross, and carried her off to the French Admiral. 
 Two English frigates from Sir Samuel Hood's line made sail after her, but 
 too late. 
 
 It appears since, that Count de Grasse ordered this, as Mr. Ross's schooner 
 was one of the vessels in which Captain Everett joined the English fleet the day 
 after the engagement. 
 
 February 3d, Sunday. — The French fleet standing off and on, as yesterday ; 
 but the number increased to thirty-three sail, including frigates. In the afternoon 
 they were joined by about twelve sail of small craft from windward, probably 
 with supplies. 
 
 February iith, 5th, 6th. — The French fleet constantly working and tacking as 
 usual, sometimes near in, and sometimes farther off, as the wind favoured them, 
 or not. 
 
 February 7th, Thursday. — The French fleet working as usual, but as near 
 our shore as the water would permit. A schooner being dispatched this morning- 
 from the English fleet to go through the narrows, the French sent two fast- 
 sailing brigs quite into the passage after her, and took her : their whole fleet 
 standing near our line to cover in case of need. The schooner might easily 
 have put back, or run on shore. 
 
 It seems to have been a Spanish prize, which had fallen into Sir Samuel 
 Hood's hands as he lay at anchor ; mistaking his fleet for the French. 
 
 February Sth, Friday, and Saturday, 9th. — The French fleet working 
 as usual. 
 
 February 10th, Sunday. — The French fleet as near shore as possible ; about 
 ten a. m. a seventy-four lay-to close off our fort. In the forenoon they were 
 joined from leeward by two sail of the line, clean ships, with many signals flying. 
 
 They proved to be the Triomphant, of eighty-four, and the Brave, of seventy- 
 
CAPTURE AND RECOVERY OF NEVIS. 167 
 
 four ; the only ships which kept their course after Kempenfelt's affair. Mons. 
 Vaudreuil was on board the Triomphant. 
 
 February l\th, Monday. — The French fleet well to the southward, with a 
 detachment of five or six still more to windward, nearly as far as Redondo. 
 
 February 12th, Tuesday. -^They kept lower down, but several still to wind- 
 ward, seemingly on the look out. 
 
 ^February 13th, Wednesday. — The French fleet were joined by another ship 
 of the line, and about ten store-ships from windward. About nine this morning 
 we first discovered a white flag on Brimstone Hill, by some thought to have a 
 red cross on it. Under this state of suspense and agitation we continued the 
 whole day and night. This was truly a period of the utmost anxiety. In the 
 evening two boats from Hood's fleet came up for water, which knew nothing of 
 the surrender ; this gave us hopes, though we knew that the flag on the hill 
 could not be seen from Hood's line. 
 
 February lith, Thursday. — At day-light perceived plainly the French fleet 
 were standing for our road with a view to anchor. By noon the whole were 
 anchored, though some of them came-to almost as far up as Long Point, in 
 very foul ground. They consisted of one three-decker, thirty two-deckers, six 
 or eight frigates ; in all about fifty sail ; though two of their ships seemed only 
 armed en flute. We sent off a deputation to wait on Count de Grasse, who 
 returned with a demand for 50 cattle and 300 sheep, and as much poultry, 
 greens, &c. as possible, to be ready by to-morrow morning. 
 
 We now first learned for certain that Brimstone Hill capitulated on Tuesday 
 night, after a breach being made in the walls, and two additional batteries being 
 ready to open against it. The Council dispatched orders for the stock to be 
 brought in to-morrow. 
 
 February 15th, Friday. -^Cowai de Grasse invited the President and Council 
 to dine on board the Ville de Paris. The Ville de Paris had been very roughly 
 handled in the different rencontres ; her stern and galleries much shattered, and 
 many shot-holes about her quarters. It seems, in the first affair off Nevis, she 
 had ninety men blown up on her middle-deck by loose cartridges taking fire ; 
 many of whom died, and, among ©thears, the Danish officer who translated our 
 capitulation. 
 
 Count de Grasse, &e. were on shore again this day. M. de Vaudreuil never 
 landed. 
 
 This morning we peiGeived that Sir Samuel Hood had quitted his station in 
 the night, and his whole fleet was out of sight. 
 
 February iQiJi, Saturday. ~^This morning the whole French fleet got under 
 weigh and went to St. Kitt's. 
 
168 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 February 17th, Sunday. — The whole French fleet at anchor in Basseterre 
 road. 
 
 February 18th, Monday. — Two gentlemen went this afternoon down to St. 
 Kitt's, in a boat belonging to the Auguste, at the desire of the Council, to 
 compliment the Marquis de Bouilli on his departure. 
 
 They got alongside the Auguste about half-past seven, and were invited by 
 M. de Bougainville to go on board and sup, which they declined : he then 
 ordered a small boat to carry them on shore. They landed about eight o'clock; 
 when they first heard that the island of Nevis was included with St. Kitt's in 
 their capitulation, and were much surprised at it : finding the Marquis de Bouilli 
 was preparing to quit the island, determined to see him directly : found him 
 surrounded by French oflScers on the point of embarking. They first made the 
 compliments of our island to him, and then brought on the subject of our being 
 included in the St. Kitt's capitulation. 
 
 He seemed to attend to them with impatience ; told them it was all settled ; 
 that it was no time for alterations ; that he was sure we should be contented ; 
 that he would do all in his power to make us so ; that the second capitulation 
 was in some respects more favourable than our own ; made many professions of 
 his desire to make us all happy, &c. They endeavoured to argue with him, but 
 found it in vain : and he, beginning to be displeased with their importunity, 
 left them, and soon after embarked in a frigate for Martinico. 
 
 February Wth, Wednesday. — This day Count de Grasse left St. Kitt's with 
 the whole fleet, and took Monserrat in his way up. It surrendered on 
 capitulation to a detachment of the fleet under M. Barras and the army under 
 Count Flechin. 
 
 February 34#A.— The Deputies returned to Nevis. 
 
 February 2Sth.~Thk day is the date of our Memorial to Count Dillon. 
 
 March 5th. — Count Dillon came up and produced his own commission as 
 Governor of St. Kitt's and Nevis ; also the commission of Marquis de Fresne as 
 joint Governor (« adjoint au gouvernement ") ; the commissions were read ; Mr. 
 Dillon was then addressed, and afterwards took his seat. He had not been 
 seated many minutes before a fellow in a white jacket enters the room with a 
 bundle tied up in a handkerchief, and placing himself in one corner, untied the 
 handkerchief, and took out a case resembling a barber's apparatus ; which the 
 President perceiving, mistook the man for the Count's valet ; and, being a great 
 friend to decorum, began to apprehend our new Governor was going to dress 
 himself in the Council Chamber : to stop, therefore, so indecent a proceeding, 
 he addressed Count Dillon in these words, looking, at the same time, at his 
 
CAPTURE AND RECOVERY OF NEVIS. 169 
 
 attendant in the corner. " If your Excellency means to shave, you had better 
 stay till you get to my house" (where he was to dine): Count Dillon stared; 
 " Shave ! Shave, sir ! what do you mean ? that gentleman is my secretary ! " 
 It was difficult to stifle our laughter at this ridiculous mistake; as M. le 
 Secretaire looked much more like a brother of the razor, than of the quill. He 
 was afterwards found to be a corporal in the brigade, and generally attended the 
 Count's person with a sheet or two of paper, and three or four pens in a tin case. 
 After Council Count Dillon went out, accompanied by his aides-de-camp and 
 three other officers of the brigade, to dine with the President ; M. le Secretaire 
 following on foot, which the Count said he was used to. 
 
 March %th. — Count Dillon again met the Council, when he presented Mr. *** 
 with a special commission as president and commander of the island ; which, 
 with the advice of Council and Assembly, he accepted. This commission he 
 accompanied with a curious set of instructions for his conduct. 
 
 He dined with the Council and Assembly, and all was harmony and 
 
 conviviality. 
 
 * # * # 
 
 He then signed a pass for a vessel going to windward, " By virtue of the 16th 
 article of the Capitulation of Nevis^'' &c. He went to St. Kitt's in the 
 afternoon, and left us flushed with the hopes that we should now carry our 
 point. 
 
 April 12th. — Count Dillon left St. Kitt's, and the government devolved on 
 the Chevalier de Fresne. 
 
 April 13th. — It being reported that the Marquis de Bouilli was at St. Kitt's, 
 the two Deputies were desired to go down and know the fate of our Memorial. 
 
 April 14>th. — They found the Marquis de Bouilli was not at St. Kitt's, but 
 concluded by waiting on M. de Fresne at Sandy Point ; who paid great attention 
 to what they had to offer, and promised to forward some additional papers they 
 left with him to the French Governor-general. They there heard of an engage- 
 ment between the two fleets (the affair of the 9th) which the French called a 
 victory, and had actually fired a general feu de joie on the strength of their 
 intelligence. 
 
 They then returned to dinner, and on their way perceived two men of war 
 of the line, the largest seemingly of eighty guns, dreadfully mauled, and in a 
 shattered condition, standing along under the lee of St. Kitt's, pretty near in. 
 The ships made many signals, which were answered from Brimstone Hill ; but 
 they hoisted no colours. It was, however, clear, from their build as well as 
 their signals, that they were French ; though when the Deputies got -to 
 
 z 
 
170 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Basseterre, the French and Irish officers were determined to call them English, 
 and that they were runaways from our beaten fleet. Next day appeared off 
 Basseterre a large frigate under English colours, which worked for some hours as 
 if she wanted to communicate with the shore ; but bore away in the afternoon. 
 
 The two French ships were the Auguste, and the Brave, which got into 
 Curassoa. 
 
 The Auguste was Bougainville's ship. 
 
 April 16th. — The Deputies returned to Nevis. Just before getting on board 
 the packet, one of them was taken aside by a particular friend, who told him in 
 the utmost confidence, that he had spoken to a white man who had been the day 
 before on board the Enghsh frigate in the offing ; which was the Endymion, 
 Captain Smith ; where he learnt there had been two actions, the last, on the 
 12th, decisive — that we had taken the VUle de Paris, and three other ships of 
 the line, and burnt another — that Count de Grasse was then prisoner on board 
 the Formidable — and that he had brought two letters on shore for gentlemen of 
 the island. 
 
 LORD RODNEY. 
 
 On the 9th and 12th of April, 1782. 
 
 Extracts of Letters from Lord Rodney, dated Formidable, at Sea, 
 
 April lith, 1782. 
 
 " On the 5th of April I received intelligence that the enemy were embarking 
 their troops on board the ships of war ; and concluded they intended to sail in a 
 few days. Captain Byron, of the Andromache, an active and diligent officer, 
 watched their motions with such attention, that on the 8th instant at day-light 
 he made the signal of the enemy's coming out, and standing to the N. W. I 
 instantly made the signal to weigh ; and having looked into the bays of Fort 
 Royal and St. Pierre, I made the signal for a general chase ; and, before day- 
 light, came up with the enemy under Dominique, where both fleets were becalmed. 
 
LORD RODNEY. 171 
 
 and continued so for some time. The enemy first got the wind, and stood 
 towards Guadaloupe. 
 
 " My van division, under that gallant officer Sir Samuel Hood, received it 
 next, and stood after them. At nine the enemy began to cannonade my 
 van, which was returned with the greatest briskness. The baffling winds 
 did not permit part of the centre division to get into action with the enemy's 
 rear till half-past eleven ; and then only the ship next to me in the line of 
 battle," &c. 
 
 " The enemy's cannonade ceased upon my rear's approach, but not before they 
 had done considerable damage to the ships in the van, and disabled the Royal 
 Oak and the Montague," &c. 
 
 " The night of the 9th instant the fleet lay-to, to repair their damages. The 
 10th, they continued to turn to windward under an easy sail, the enemy's fleet 
 continuing to do the same; and always had it in their power to come to 
 action, which they cautiously avoided, and rendered it impossible for me to 
 force them in the situation they were in, between the Saints and the Island 
 of Dominique. 
 
 " On the 11th, the enemy having gained considerably to windward, and the 
 wind blowing a fresh steady gale, I made the signal for a general chase to 
 windward; which continued the whole day; and towards sun- set, one of the 
 enemy's ships damaged in the late action falling to leeward, the Count de Grasse 
 bore down with his whole fleet to her protection, which brought him so near, 
 that I flattered myself he would give me an opportunity of engaging him next 
 day. With that view I threw out the signal for the form of sailing, and stood 
 with the whole fleet to the southward, till two in the morning ; then tacked, 
 and had the happiness, at day-light, to find my most sanguine desire was 
 near being accomplished, by my having it in my power to force the enemy to 
 battle," &c. 
 
 Note, from Lord Rodney's Narrative, contained in aprivate Letter. (See Clerk.) 
 
 " The 10th and 11th of April were employed in endeavouring to bring the 
 enemy to battle ; and on the 11th, late in the afternoon, the enemy bore down to 
 protect two of their own ships, who were in danger of being cut off"." This 
 brought them to the position the Admiral wished : he " instantly issued orders 
 to sail during the night in the order of sailing ; to put all lights out ; to stand 
 to the southward till two in the morning, and then the whole fleet to tack without 
 
 z 2 
 
172 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 signal. This deceived the enemy, who had no conception that the British fleet 
 should be so near them at day-light : we instantly formed the line of battle 
 upon the starboard tack ; the enemy formed theirs upon the larboard tack, and 
 had made the signal to ware ; but the nearness of the British squadron prevented 
 its being put in execution ; and the British fleet taking the lee-gage, the 
 Admiral made the signal to engage and close." 
 
 " This important victory was obtained the 12th instant, after a battle which 
 lasted with unremitting fury from seven in the morning till half-past six in the 
 evening, when the setting sun put an end to the contest," &c. 
 
 " The enemy's whole army, consisting of 5500 men, were on board their ships 
 of war : the destruction among them must have been prodigious ; as, for the 
 greatest part of the action, every gun told, and the Formidable fired near eighty 
 broadsides," &c. 
 
 " The Monarch fired away all her powder, and was supplied from the frigates 
 during the action." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 Plate XVIII, Fig. 1, describes the situation of the two fleets on the 9th ; 
 wherein it would seem some advantage might have been taken by the rear of the 
 British fleet, had it hauled closer to the wind. (See Fig. 1.) 
 
 Upon this supposition they would probably have driven the ships, F, upon 
 their own line to leeward ; then engaged ; and must have occasioned much 
 confusion ; this alone is to gain an advantage. 
 
 In Lord Rodney's narrative is related an admirable manoeuvre, by which 
 the gallant Admiral surprised the enemy on the morning of the 12th, and 
 gained the victory. On this day, nothing could be better conducted, whether 
 by accident or design, than the cutting the line in twain,* by the centre of the 
 
 * By the story of Lord Rodney and the cherry-stones related by Mr. Cumberland, it would 
 appear that he considered the project of breaking the line to originate in his Lordship, for he 
 observeSj " the thought seemed first to occur to him of breaking the French line by passing tlirough 
 it in the heat of the action.'' Lord Rodney, in describing his intention, makes no mention whatever 
 of Mr. Clerk's Essay, nor did it appear to the company that the idea was taken from any other 
 person, or any previous consideration on the subject. The conversation took place after dinner at 
 Stoneland, the seat of Lord George Germain. 
 
 In attributing originality to Lord Rodney, Mr. Cumberland fell into a scrape with the Edinburgh 
 
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LORD RODNEY. 173 
 
 British fleet, as shown in Plate XVIII, Fig. 2 ; but let it be observed, that the 
 enemy, by proceeding as recommended in the figure, had it in his power to 
 retaliate with great effect ; fortunately for the British Admiral, this was not 
 attempted. 
 
 A copy of the log of H. M. ship Anson, on the 12th of April, is inserted 
 below. A veteran officer, distinguished in this and in several other engagements, 
 declared to the writer, that upon this occasion it was as easy to have taken 
 fifteen as five sail of the line. 
 
 Extract of the Log of His Majesty's ship Anson, Captain Blair, 
 
 Jprill2th, 1782. 
 
 Fresh breezes and clear weather. P. M., April 11th, all the fleet still in chase 
 of the French fleet. At five p. m. all the French fleet that were to windward of 
 the islands called the Saints, bore down to succour two of their bad sailing 
 line of battle ships, that the weathermost of our ships was gaining on very fast ; 
 and in all probability would have soon brought them to action : we then bore up 
 for our fleet, as per signal from the Admiral. All the French fleet bore up in a 
 body after us ; at seven p. m. we made sail, and stood to the S. E. The enemy 
 having hauled their wind to the S. E. at eight p. m., moderate and cloudy 
 weather ; saw the lights of the enemy's fleet bearing E. by N. At midnight 
 the Admiral made the signal to tack ; do. tacked to the northward. At five a. m. 
 squally with rain, saw the French fleet, consisting of thirty-eight sail, bearing N. E. 
 two or three leagues ; at half-past five the Admiral made the signal for two 
 ships to chase two French ships in the N. W. quarter. At three-quarters 
 past five the Admiral made the signal to call in all cruizers ; at fifty minutes 
 past five the signal to form the line a-head at two cables' length asunder ; at 
 
 Reviewers, who informed him that it was to the Essay of Mr. Clerk he was indebted. This is 
 related in the Supplement. 
 
 See the interesting " Memoirs of Richard Cumberland," vol. i. p. 407. 
 
 In the 25th volume of the " Naval Chronicle," p. 406, a writer, styling himself a physician, 
 and under the signature of " Scrutator," declares that he had " often been assured by that brave 
 officer himself, that it first occurred to him a considerable time before in France, during a conver- 
 sation at the table of a Marechal de Biron." This is part of a letter copied by this person out of 
 the 5th vol. of the " Athenseum," denying Mr. Clerk's claim to any originality whatever ; or that 
 Rodney had been in the least degree actuated by Mr. Clerk's presumed recommendations. 
 
 It is supposed to be from the pen of a " Doctor G. B****, M. D." For further particulars 
 readers are referred to the 5th vol. of the Athenaeum, or the 25th of the Naval Chronicle. 
 
174 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 six, the French fleet being formed in the same line, standing to the southwards 
 we beat to quarters, and got all clear for action. The Admiral then made 
 the signal for the van (Drake's) division to lead on, and engage the enemy 
 as they closed with them. At half-past seven the enemy began to fire on oux 
 van ships ; which was returned. At forty minutes past seven we began to fire at 
 the enemy ; the first ship that we engaged was the twenty-fourth ship from the 
 enemy's rear : we kept our wind, and passed close alongside to leeward of their 
 line. At eight we received the whole broadside from the Ville de Paris : at halfr 
 past eight Captain Blair was killed : at nine, having passed all the French line, 
 we ceased firing. Our centre and rear still engaging the enemy, the Admiral 
 made the signal for a closer action. We began to repair our rigging (it being 
 much cut), so as to enable us to keep our station in the line. Admiral Rodney 
 in the Formidable, followed by the Duke,* broke the French line, which oc- 
 casioned great confusion amongst them: three or four of their ships got foul 
 of each other, one of which ships sunk,\ supposed to be the Diademe, of 
 seventy-four guns. At half-past nine the Admiral made the signal to tack ; do. 
 hauled down ; and the signal was made to ware. We wore ship, but were so 
 much disabled, that we could not keep up with Admiral Drake ; our damages 
 received were, the main-top-sail-yard, cross-jack-yard, fore and main-top-gallant- 
 masts shot away ; the fore, main, and mizen yards much wounded ; the fore and 
 main-masts and bowsprit slightly wounded ; all our stays and rigging shot away ; 
 two shot betwixt wind and water ; and our sails shot all to ribbons. Captain and 
 one man killed, and thirteen wounded. At noon, when the smoke cleared away, 
 we saw the Glorieux dismasted, with her colours flying on the stump of her main- 
 mast. She was taken in tow by one of their frigates, who was soon obliged 
 to cast her off; she then struck to the Royal Oak, whose signal was made to take 
 her in tow, which she did. The rear and part of the centre still in action with 
 the enemy. Twelve sail of their line bore up and made all the sail they could, 
 in great confusion ; one of which was steering with sweeps : we were employed in 
 getting down our main-top-sail- yard and cross-jack-yard, and fitted the mizen-t(^- 
 gallant-sail for a mizen-top-sail ; knotting and splicing our rigging ; still following 
 Admiral Drake with all the sail we could make. At half-past twelve the 
 Admiral made the signal for the van to close with the centre. At one p. m. the 
 signal for close action was repeated ; at twenty-five minutes past one our fleet 
 closed with the enemy, every ship engaging as they could come up with them ; 
 they still canying all the sail they could. At fifty minutes past one the signal 
 
 * This is a mistake. Lord Rodney was followed by the Namur. 
 t The report of one sunk was unfounded. 
 
LORD RODNEY. 175 
 
 for a closer action was again repeated ; several of our weathermost ships renewed 
 the action with the enemy's rear. At five minutes past four the Admiral made 
 the signal to ware ; do. wore ship, and bore up for the enemy. At twenty-five 
 minutes past four the Hector struck to the Canada ; but was taken possession of 
 by the Alcide ; whose signal was made to take her in tow, which she did. At 
 thirty-five minutes past four the Admiral made the signal for the fleet to close. 
 At five minutes past five the Ville de Paris was hard pressed by several of our 
 headmost ships, which caused her to keep up a heavy fire on both sides together. 
 At half-past five the Ardent struck to the Belliqueux. At half-past six the Ville 
 de Paris struck her flag ; (on board of which ship was the Count de Grasse, 
 Commander-in-chief of the enemy's fleet,) and the Caesar struck to the Centaur ; 
 at which time the action ceased. At eight the Caesar blew up. At five a. m. 
 we hauled our wind to the S. E., having lost sight of the enemy's fleet ; and only 
 the Bedford, Marlborough, Torbay, Russell, and Fame in company. At six 
 a. m. saw our fleet from the mast-head, bearing E. N. E., but no sight of the 
 French fleet." 
 
 From this plain narrative, taken by the master of the Anson, and copied by 
 one of the young midshipmen,* it is seen that breaJcing the enemy's line 
 occasioned confusion ; and confusion led to defeat. 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 It is curious to observe, that notwithstanding this brilliant manoeuvre, so well 
 performed, the French rear escaped to leeward ; while their van, separating 
 in two parts, made off in different directions. It was surely for the British van 
 to have closely pursued the separated rear ; this could not have interfered with 
 the capture of De Grasse. When he surrendered he had three British Admirals 
 very near him. 
 
 It is related of Lord Rodney, and by one who was a party upon the occasion, 
 that in the middle of the battle, being very thirsty, he directed one of his little 
 attendants to mix him some lemonade ; the boy observing a lime and a knife, 
 black from former use, upon a table in the after-cabin, immediately proceeded to 
 comply, and having made it, but being without a spoon, stirred it with the knife. 
 " Child," said Lord Rodney, " that may do very well for a midshipman's berth ; 
 but not for an admiral; drink it yourself, and go and call my steward 
 to me." 
 
 * Now a captain in the service, and who kindly favoured the writer with permission to insert it. 
 
176 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Of the character and talents of Sir Charles Douglas, then Captain of the fleet, 
 the service at large cannot be ignorant ; yet it may not generally be known, that 
 to him, by passing through the enemy's line, are we indebted for the fortunate 
 result of that day. Lord Rodney had at first opposed it, by directing the helm 
 to be put to starboard, when Sir C. Douglas had ordered it to be put " Or-port ;" 
 and the master, seeing the inconvenience likely to arise from this difference of 
 opinion, caused the helm to be kept a-mid-sMps ; and soon after. Sir C. Douglas 
 urging it a second time, the Chief said, " Then do it as you please." The fault 
 was in not doing more afterwards. 
 
 Sir Charles Douglas was the first man who proposed and fitted locJes to the 
 cannon of His Majesty's ships. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 The advocates for the originality of Mr. Clerk, having triumphantly exhibited 
 the battle of the 12th of April, as the glorious result, arising from a knowledge 
 of the great secret ; let us see if in any of the battles of preceding times 
 nothing can be found to compare with it ; for this purpose may be given the 
 " Combat du Tesel, 1665," as related by Paul Hoste, page 42. Speaking of 
 the order of battle> he begins by telling us, " Cet ordre fut exactement garde 
 pour la premiere fois, dans le fameux combat du Texel, ou le Due d'York, a 
 present Roy d'Angleterre, defit les HoUandois, le 13 Juin, 1665, et c'est a sa 
 Majeste Britannique que nous en devons toute la perfection. L'armee d'Angle- 
 terre etoit de cent vaisseaux de guerre ; l'armee de - HoUande en avoit plus, 
 quoiqu'elle n'efit pas tant de vaisseaux a trois pons. Les deux armees se trou- 
 verent en presence au point du jour, et le vent etant au Sud-Ouest, elles se 
 rangerent sur deux lignes paralleles au Sud-Sud-Est ; et elles occupoient chacune 
 pres de cinq lieues en longeur ; celle des Anglois avoit le vent. Le Due d'York, 
 qui commandoit l'armee d'Angleterre, s'etoit mis au corps de bataille, et il avoit 
 donne son avant-garde au Prince Robert (Rupert), et au Comte de Sandwich son 
 arriere-garde. Le Sieur Opdam, Amiral de Hollande, s'etoit aussi mis au 
 milieu de son armee par le travers du Due d'York, et il avoit oppose le Vice 
 Amiral Tromp au Prince Robert." After a cannonading from three o'clock in 
 the morning to eleven, and the capture of one ship by the Dutch, " A onze 
 heures le Due d'York. fit arriver (to bear down) toute sa ligne sur I'ennemie 
 arrivant lui-meme sur Opdam. Cette action renouvella I'ardeur des combattans. 
 Le bruit efFroiable des canons, les debris des vaisseaux, la chute des mats, une 
 fumee epaisse, et . melee de I'eclat du feu que les vaisseaux vomissoient en 
 
LORD RODNEY. 177 
 
 sautant ; tout cela donnoit a ce combat toute I'horreur qu'on peut imaginer," &c. 
 " Sur les deux heures apres-midi le Due d' York fit le signal pour arrwer tout-a- 
 fait sur I'ennemi ; et les HoUandois commencerent a ne pas tant pincer le vent. 
 Opdam seul, et TOrauge, vaisseaux a trois ponts, ne changerent point leur route ; 
 mais un moment apres, Opdam aiant re9u de fort pres toute lia bordee du Due 
 d'York, son vaisseau sauta en I'air; les HoUandois, qui avoient deja perdu 
 plusieurs navires, voiant sauter leur Ainiral, firent vent arriere pour se retirer 
 au Texel. Le Due d'York les poursuivit avee une ardeixr incroiable jusques a 
 I'entree de leur port : il leur prit ou brula vingt-deux vaisseaux de guerre, dont 
 vingt etoient de cinquante a quatre-vingt pieees de canon ; et il remporta sur 
 eux la plus glorieuse vietoire, et la plus complete, qu'on eut encore gagne sur la 
 mer. Elle ne coiita qu'un vaisseau au Anglois, avee la perte de trois a quatre 
 cents hommes." 
 
 To those not acquainted with French sea-phrases,* it is expedient to state, 
 that the term arrwer signifies, " to bear away, to bear up," or " bear down ;" and 
 that pincer le vent means, " to hug," or " to keep close to the wind." Arriver 
 iout-a-fait may therefore be understood to mean to bear right down upou the 
 enemy ; when the Dutch, no longer liking such close quarters, bore away right 
 before the wind for the Texel. In this manner they avoided, not only having 
 their line cut in twain, but being cut to pieces ; it appeared to be sauve qui peut, 
 and fortunate were those who escaped. 
 
 Compared with this, the battle of the 12th of April was but children's play ; 
 and nothing in later times can be thought to resemble it in its effects, but the 
 battles of Camperdown, of the Nile, of St. Domingo, and of Trafalgar. 
 
 Let it be remembered that the man who has given us this description, lived in, 
 or soon after, the time in which the events he relates took place ; and, having 
 himself been twelve years at sea, in all the expeditions under some of the most 
 celebrated French Admirals, may be considered to have known something of the 
 subject of which he treats. 
 
 It has been observed by an oflicer, one of the supporters of Mr. Clerk, that 
 Paul Hoste treats only of drawing up two hostile fleets in parallel lines, upon a 
 wind, or nearly so, and not of a regular plan of breaking a line of battle to 
 leeward ; or of any form of attack upon a particular part. On this latter subject 
 Paul Hoste shall speak for himself. See his fifth part, page 382. 
 
 * See a " Vocabulary of Sea Terms, &c. French and English, and English and French, by a 
 Captain in the British Navy, 1799. London." Also, at the end of the work of Paul Hoste, 
 " Explication des Tennes de Marine dont on se sert dans cet ouvrage." 
 
 2 A 
 
178 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " Tout le monde n'a pas desaprouve la maniere dont I'Amiral Herber 
 rangea son armee, quand il arriva sur les Francois dans le combat de Bevisier 
 I'an 1690. II avoit quelques vaisseaux raoins que nous : et il etoit resolu de faire 
 ses plus grands efforts centre nStre arriere-garde. C'est purquoi il ordonna a 
 la premiere division HoUandoise de tomber sur nStre seconde division ; ensuite il 
 ouvrit son armee au milieu, laissant un grand vuide par le travers de nStre 
 corps de bataille : Apres quoi aiant extremement serre ses Anglois, il les opposa 
 a notre arriere-garde, et il se tint avec sa division un pen au large, afin 
 d'empScher que les Fran9ois ne profitassent du vuide qu'il laissoit dans son armee, 
 pour doubler les HoUandois. Get ordre rendit en efFet n8tre premiere division 
 presque inutile, parcequ'il lui fallut faire une fort longue bordee, pour revirer sur 
 la tete des ennemis ; et le vent aiant calme, elle eut peine de se trouver assez a 
 tems pour partager la gloire de Taction. D'autre part, les Anglois, qui etoient 
 extremement serrez, eurent d'abord quelque avantage sur n8tre queue, qu'un 
 accident fit plier ; mais les vaisseaux suivans, animez par I'exemple du Comte 
 d'Estrees, Vice Arairal de France, qui commandoit I'arriere-garde, soutinrent 
 avec tant de valeur le grand nombre d' Anglois qui tomboient sur eux, que 
 ceux-ci, ne pouvant plus souffirir le feu des Francois, pincerent le vent, et se firent 
 remorquer par leur chaloupes, pour se tirer au large des victorieux." 
 
 The same officer also says, that had Paul Hoste ever thought of breaking the 
 enemy's line from the windward, he never would recommend an opening to be 
 left in any part of it, as in his Plate CXXIV : and quotes the following from 
 page 387. 
 
 " Si I'armee moins nombreuse est sousle-venf, on pourra laisser plus de vuide 
 au milieu, et moins de I'avant :" but what is the rest of the sentence ? " mais il 
 faudra avoir un petit detachement de vaisseaux de guerre et de hrulots, afin 
 d'empecher que les ennemis ne prqfitent des vuides de t armee pour la diviser" 
 A clear proof that such a manoeuvre was to be guarded against; and the 
 Plate represents two vessels placed immediately opposite the openings in the 
 lee line. 
 
 A gallant officer, now an Admiral, who was present on the 12th of April, has 
 assured the writer, and shown him, clearly described in an old engraving of that 
 battle, that the " Duke," Lord Rodney's second a-head, had it in her power to 
 have passed through the French line ; but that Captain (afterwards Lord) 
 Gardner, not knowing it to be the intention of Lord Rodney so to do, and 
 considering it his duty to follow the van, put his helm up, that he might preserve 
 his station in the wake of his leader. The plate in question shows the Duke 
 coming close round to leeward of the French ship ; when, by the change of the 
 
LORD RODNEY. 179 
 
 wind, and the space left in the enemy's line, he might with more ease, by keeping 
 his wind, have been the first, but without signal or previous design, to cut 
 through the French line. In bearing up to follow the British van, so close was 
 he to a French ship a-breast of him, that he nearly ran on board of her in the 
 operation. The opening then becoming wide, Lord Rodney in the Formidable, 
 followed by the Namur, kept his wind and separated the French line of battle. 
 Another distinguished officer, who commanded a ship of the line in this battle, 
 has assured the writer that no previous intention of cutting the enemy's line was 
 made known by Lord Rodney to his fleet, nor appeared on the day of battle. 
 
 The Namur was afterwards directed to take the Duke's place, a-head of the 
 Formidable ; and upon the capture of De Grasse, took the Ville de Paris 
 in tow. 
 
 Besides the engraving before mentioned, the writer has seen drawings by 
 Pocock, in the possession of an officer who was on board the Namur, illustrative 
 of what he advances. 
 
 Of this battle it is observed by " Ramatuelle," that Lord Rodney attached 
 considerable importance to the mode of attack — that of engaging upon opposite 
 tacks ; to this, to the favourable change of the wind, and to his superiority of 
 force, he ascribes his success ; which indeed he declares would have been fol- 
 lowed by consequences the most disastrous, had he been skilful enough to 
 have made the most of his victory ; instead of which he says he shut himself 
 up at Jamaica with all his fleet, permitting the French Admiral (Vaudreuil) to 
 send two considerable convoys from St. Domingo, which arrived safe in France, 
 under the protection of two ships of war, no longer able to keep the sea. 
 
 The object of the French Admiral was to unite with the Spaniards at St. 
 Domingo, for the attack of Jamaica ; for this purpose they had embarked troops 
 to the amount 5,500 men : the loss of a few ships they considered nothing when 
 compared with an important enterprise in view ; and not without reason claim 
 merit to themselves for accomplishing objects of a secondary nature, after a de- 
 feat which, had it been properly followed up, would have annihilated their force 
 in those seas. (Cours Elementaire, P. 37].) 
 
 Plate XVIII, Fig. 1. It appears by the direction of the wind in this figure, 
 and the position of the two fleets, that it was in the power of the rear, D, by 
 hauling closer to the wind, to have weathered upon the enemy, and thus to have 
 attacked to greater advantage. 
 
 2 A 2 
 
180 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Fig. 2. Here it was evidently in the power of the enemy to have made a 
 violent attack upon the rear of the British fleet, by waring round the sternmost 
 ship in succession, and bringing it to close action ; No. 2 passing No. 1, and so 
 on in the manner denoted by their numbers ; by which movement it would have 
 rejoined the other part of the fleet to leeward, or by bearing immediately down, 
 and breaking through the line in every accessible part. 
 
 Plate XIX. Fig. 1, where is exhibited the situation of the two fleets after 
 Lord Rodney had passed through the enemy's line. 
 
 The dotted lines denote the course of pursuit recommended to the British 
 fleet ; the division D bearing up, the sternmost ship first, and the rest in 
 succession, following in each other's wake, to renew the action with the van, G. 
 The division E doing the same, beginning with the fifth ship ; by which G 
 would be between two fires, and consequently overpowered. 
 
 Fig. 2 is intended to show the probable effect of the above movement. 
 
 The van of the enemy, G, would be surrounded, and entirely separated from 
 the rest of his fleet. 
 
 SIR EDWARD HUGHES'S BATTLE IN THE EAST INDIES. 
 
 February 17, 1782. 
 
 Extract of a Letter from Sir Edward Hughes. 
 
 " Superbe, at sea, April 4, 1782. 
 " On the 8th of February I anchored in Madras Road ; in the afternoon of 
 the 9th, Captain Alms, of the Monmouth, with the Hero, Isis, and the armed 
 transport Manilla, joined me. On the 15th the enemy's squadron, consisting of 
 twelve sail of the line, six frigates, with transports and captured vessels, came in 
 sight to the northward, standing for Madras Road ; and about noon anchored 
 about four miles without the road. In the mean time, I placed his Majesty's 
 ships in the most advantageous manner to defend themselves ; and the other 
 
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SIR EDWARD HUGHES. 181 
 
 ships in the road with springs on their cables, that they might bring their 
 broadsides to bear more efFectually on the enemy, should they attempt an 
 attack. 
 
 " At four in the afternoon the enemy weighed and stood to the southward ; 
 when I immediately made the signal to weigh, and stood after them, with the 
 squadron as per margin,* the worst manned of them having part of 300 officers 
 and men of the 98th regiment distributed amongst them. 
 
 " At day-light on the morning of the 17th, the body of the enemy's squadron 
 bore N. by E. of ours, distant about three leagues ; the weather very hazy, with 
 light winds and frequent squalls, of short duration, from the N. N. E. the enemy 
 crowding all the sail they could towards our squadron, 
 
 " At six in the morning I made the signal to form the line of battle a- head : 
 at twenty-five minutes past eight, our line being formed with great difficulty, 
 from the want of wind, and frequent intervals of calms ; I made the signal 
 for the leading ship to make the same sail as the Admiral, and made sail : 
 formed in line a-head, intending to weather the enemy, that I might engage 
 them closely. 
 
 " At ten, the enemy having the advantage of the squalls from the N. N. E., 
 which always reached them first, and in consequence continued longest with 
 them, neared us very fast ; and I made the signal for our line to alter course two 
 points to leeward ; the enemy then steering down on the rear of our line, in an 
 irregular or double line a-breast. 
 
 " At half-past noon I made the signal to form the line of battle a-breast in 
 order to draw the rear of our line closer to the centre, and 'prevent the enemy 
 from hreaking in on it, and attaching it when separated. 
 
 " At three in the afternoon, the enemy still pushing on our rear in a double 
 line a-breast, / again altered my course in the line, in order to draw our rear 
 ships still closer to the centre; and at forty minutes after three, finding it 
 impossible to avoid the enemy's attack, under all the disadvantages of little or no 
 wind to work our ships, and of being to leeward of them, I made the signal to 
 form at once into the line of battle a-head. 
 
 " At four, the Exeter (the sternmost ship when formed on the larboard tack) 
 not being quite closed with her second a-head, three of the enemy bore right 
 down upon her ; while four of their second line, headed by the ship bearing M. 
 Suffrein's flag, hauled towards our centre. 
 
 * Superbe, Exeter, Monarch, Hero, Worcester, Burford, Monmouth, Eagle, Isis, Sea-horse, and 
 Combustion. 
 
182 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " At five minutes past four the enemy began to fire upon the Exeter, which 
 was returned by her and her second a-head. At ten minutes past four I made 
 the signal for battle, and the action became general from the rear to the centre; 
 The French Admiral never advanced beyond the centre of the British squadron, 
 with little or no wind, and heavy rain during the engagement. 
 
 " Under these circumstances, the enemy brought eight of their best ships to 
 attack five of ours. As the van of our line could not be brought into action 
 without tacking on the enemy ; and although the signal for that purpose was at 
 the mast-head ready for showing ; there was neither wind sufficient to enable' 
 them to tack, nor for the five hard-pressed ships of om- centre and rear, so much 
 disabled, to foUow them. 
 
 " At six in the afternoon a squall of wind from the S. E. took our ships, 
 and paid them round, head on the enemy to the N. E. ; when the engagement 
 was renewed by our five ships, with great spirit, from the starboard guns ; and 
 at twenty-five minutes past six, just before dark, the enemy's ships engaged 
 with ours having visibly suffered severely, the whole of them hauled their wind, 
 and stood to the northward. 
 
 " At this time the Superbe had lost her mainyard, had five feet water in the 
 hold, and several large shot-holes under water, and neither brace nor bow-line 
 left entire ; and the Exeter, reduced almost to a wreck, had made the signal of 
 distress," &c. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 Mr. Clerk, in his " Attack upon the three Sternmost Ships," has invariably 
 made the fleet attacked, to abandon them. Now it has been proved by himself, 
 in the account he has given of the foregoing battle, that such a measure not only 
 was unnecessary, but would have been extremely disgraceful. 
 
 Sir Edward Hughes managed his little force with great skill and bravery, 
 and was so well seconded in his object by all the Captains of his squadron, that 
 wind alone was wanting, to give him an opportunity of displaying his courage 
 and ability with better effect. 
 
 Could the van have tacked, it should have been by the sternmost ship first ; 
 and in failure of getting round by any other means, they should have towed 
 round. A boat or two, with men in them, should be in the water from every 
 ship, before going into action ; particularly in light winds ; and in going to 
 make an attack at an anchor, every boat in the fleet should be previously hoisted 
 out; and if circumstances should render it necessary, prepared with arms. 
 
SIR EDWARD HUGHES. 183 
 
 hawsers, or small anchors, or such aids as would naturally occur to the mind of a 
 zealous and experienced officer. 
 
 In " A Complete History of Europe," for the year 1704, is a letter from Sir 
 Cloudesley Shovel upon the action off Malaga; conducted in chief by Sir G. 
 Rooke, assisted by a Dutch squadron, against a powerful fleet of France, con- 
 sisting of forty-nine sail of the line ; the British and Dutch of fifty-three ; but 
 the gallant Admiral says, " Their ships did far exceed in bigness ; I judge they 
 had seventeen three-deck ships, and we but seven." 
 
 " The ships that suffered most in my division were the Lenox, Warspight, 
 Tilbury, and Swiftsure ; the rest escaped pretty well, and I the best of all ; 
 though I never took greater pains in all my life to have been soundly beaten ; 
 for I set all my sails, and rowed with three boats a-head to get alongside with 
 the Admiral of the White and Blue ; but he, outsailing me, shunned fighting, 
 and lay alongside of the little ships. 
 
 " Notwithstanding, the engagement was very sharp, and I think the like 
 between two fleets never has been in any time." 
 
 Ships of fifty guns were in the line in those days. The French had twenty- 
 four gallies. 
 
 It has been suggested by a gallant young ofiicer, that in cases of close action, 
 a boat provided with proper materials and a few resolute fellows, might, by means 
 of wedges, jam up the rudder of the ship you engage, and render it useless. 
 
 It is possible, that in the thickness of the smoke and the ardour of the fight, 
 such an attempt might not be discovered until the mischief was done ; but 
 musquetry from the stern-ports would probably take off some of the persons 
 employed. 
 
 Iron wedges, ragged (or jagged), should be used, and stout carpenters sent 
 with an officer for this service ; such an attempt could only be made in moderate 
 weather and smooth water, when, by the state of the atmosphere, and smoke, 
 concealment might favour the design. 
 
 Perhaps two guns allotted to that object alone, well worked and served, might 
 answer the purpose better ; and where the rudder is much exposed, it might in 
 little time be rendered unserviceable. 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 " This battle affords a remarkable instance of a well-combined attack of a 
 superior squadron, under unfavourable circumstances, upon the rear of an in- 
 ferior, and failing, from the resolute manner in which a part only of the 
 British force defended itself, against the united efforts of the enemy. 
 
184 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " Sir Edward Hughes might have counteracted the attack, by waring his 
 squadron when it was about to commence. If there was wind enough to bring 
 the enemy's ships into their stations, there was sufficient to enable the British to 
 ware, though not to tack, and thus to have met the attack.— The vicinity of 
 the land, in all probability, prevented the British Admiral from performing 
 this manoeuvre." 
 
 In waring together, the van would have soon been in a situation to give sup- 
 port to the rear. 
 
 Plate XX. Fig. 1, exhibits Sir Edward Hughes's battle, Feb. 17, 1782. 
 
 F, the French fleet in pursuit. 
 
 B, the British fleet retiring ; the dotted lines showing the method adopted 
 by the British Admiral to collect his force, and to succour his rear, the object 
 of attack. 
 
 D, the Exeter. On board this ship. Commodore (afterwards Sir Richard) 
 King carried his broad pendant, and Captain Reynolds was killed : the ship being 
 greatly pressed by a superior force and reduced to great distress, the master came 
 to the Commodore to ask him, " what was to he done f" upon which he coolly 
 replied, " There is nothing to be done hut to fight her till she sinks /" 
 
 Fig. 2 shows the attack commencing upon the rear of the British fleet, and 
 the French Admiral having advanced to the centre of it, the engagement took 
 place from centre to rear. From the lightness of the wind, the British Admiral 
 had not been able entirely to accomplish his purpose before the enemy came up 
 with him. He therefore formed the best line of battle that circumstances 
 admitted of; his rear and van being still somewhat separated from the centre. 
 The signal was not shown for the van to tack, as it could not be obeyed for want 
 of wind ; the van should have towed round, and thus must have approximated 
 the enemy. The enemy should have passed through a-head of the British Admiral 
 if possible, and thus have separated his van and centre ; the fifth ship from the 
 rear cutting oflF the two sternraost British ships. 
 
ri^ I ri-: xx. 
 
 
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SIR EDWARD HUGHES. 185 
 
 SIR EDWARD HUGHES'S SECOND BATTLE IN THE 
 
 EAST INDIES. 
 
 April 12th, 1782. 
 
 ' Extract of a Letter from Sir Edward Hughes, Trincomalee Bay, 
 
 May 10th, 1782. 
 
 " On the 8th, about noon, I came in sight of the enemy's squadron, consisting 
 of eighteen sail, in the N. E. quarter ; and continued niy course for this place 
 on the 9th, 10th, and 11th; the enemy still in sight. On the 11th, having 
 made the coast of Ceylon, about fifteen leagues to windward of Trincomalee, I 
 bore away for that place. On the 12th, at day-light, the position of the enemy's 
 Squadron being altered by my bearing away, so as to give them the wind of ours, 
 I discovered them crowding all the sail they could set after us ; and their copper- 
 bottomed ships coming fast up with the ships in our rear ; I therefore determined 
 to engage them. 
 
 " At nine in the forenoon I made the signal for the line of battle a-head on 
 the starboard tack, at two cables' length distance ; the enemy then bearing N. by E. 
 distant six miles, and the" wind at N. by E. They continued manoeuvring their 
 ships, and changing their positions in the line, till a quarter past noon ; when 
 they bore away to engage us. Five ships of their van stretched along to engage 
 the van of the British squadron, and the other seven steered directly on our 
 centre ships, the Superbe, the Monmouth, and the Monarca. 
 
 "At half-past one the engagement began in the van, and I made the signal 
 for battle. The French Admiral and his second bore down within pistol-shot of 
 the Superbe ; the Hero then stood on to attack the Monmouth, at that time 
 engaged with another ship ; making room for the ships in his rear to come up to 
 the attack of our centre, where the engagement was hottest. 
 
 " At three the Monmouth had her mizen-mast shot away, and soon after her 
 nuiin-mast ; and bore away out of the line to leeward. At forty minutes past 
 three, the wind continuing far northerly, and careful not to entangle bur ships 
 with the shore, I made the signal to ware and form the line of battle on the 
 larboard tack, still engaging the enemy. 
 
 " At forty minutes past five, being in fifteen fathoms water, and apprehensive 
 that the Monmouth, in her disabled state, might drift too near the shore, I made the 
 
 2 B 
 
186 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 signal to prepare to anchor. At forty minutes past six the enemy drew oflp in 
 great disorder to the eastward, and the engagement ceased ; and soon after I 
 anchored with the squadron, the Superbe close to the Monmouth, to repair our 
 damages, which were very great ; and all the ships had suffered considerably in 
 their masts, sails, and rigging," &c. 
 
 " The enemy anchored about five miles without us." 
 
 " In these situations both squadrons continued at anchor till the 19th in the 
 morning, when the enemy's got under sail with the land wind, and stood out to 
 sea close hauled ; and at noon tacked with the sea breeze and stood in, as with an 
 intent to attack us ; but after coming within two miles, and finding us prepared 
 to receive them, they tacked again and stood away to the eastward ; nor have I 
 been able to learn certainly where they are gone." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 Equal bravery and good conduct were displayed by all upon this, as on the 
 former occasion ; nor should the merit of skill and resolution be denied to the 
 French Admiral j yet, let it be remembered, he had the superiority of force ; 
 nor does it appear that he derived any material advantage from it. The British 
 Admiral's firmness and good management saved the Monmouth, whose Captain 
 fought her until she was a wreck. 
 
 Plate XXI, Figs. 1, 2, and 3, wiU make it clear to the naval reader. 
 
 " Ramatuelle," in a note page 481, gives the character of the Bailly de 
 Souffrien in the highest strain of eulogy ; he observes that he united in himself 
 every thing that constitutes a superior man. 
 
 Plate XXI, Fig. 1, shows Sir Edward Hughes's action off" Ceylon, April 12th, 
 1782. 
 
 The French squadron bearing down to attack the British, formed in line at 
 two cables' distance, on the starboard tack. 
 
 Fig. 2. The enemy having brought the van and centre of the British fleet to 
 action : C, the Monmouth, having lost her main and mizen-masts, falling out 
 of the line. With such openings in the British line, the enemy should have 
 passed through it. 
 
 Fig. 3. The British fleet wore and formed in line on the larboard tack, (still 
 in action) to avoid the shore. 
 
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SIR EDWARD HUGHES. 187 
 
 SIR EDWARD HUGHES'S THIRD BATTLE WITH 
 M. SOUFFRIEN. 
 
 Extracts of Letters from Vice Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, K, B. 8ejC. to 
 Mr. Stephens, brought home hy the Honourable Captain Carpenter. 
 
 " Superb, ofiF Negapatnam, July 15, 1782. 
 
 " I continued with the squadron at anchor in Negapatnam road till the 5th 
 of this month ; when, at one p. m. the French squadron, consisting of eighteen 
 sail, twelve of which, of the line, came in sight. At three p. m. I weighed 
 with his Majesty's squadron, and stood to the southward all that evening and 
 night, in order to gain the wind of the enemy. 
 
 " On the 6th, at day-light, the enemy's squadron at anchor, bearing N. N. E., 
 distant about seven or eight miles, wind at S. W. At fifty minutes past five 
 a. m. I made the signal for the line of battle a-breast, and bore away towards 
 the enemy. 
 
 " At six, observing the enemy getting under sail, and standing to the 
 eastward, hauled down the signal for the line of battle a-breast, and made the 
 signal for the line a-head at two cables' length distance. At ten minutes past 
 seven, our line being well formed, made the signal to bear down on the enemy ; 
 each ship in our line against the ship opposed to her in the enemy's line. At 
 forty minutes past ten, the enemy's line began to fire on ours. At forty-five 
 minutes past ten, I made the signal for battle ; and, at the same time, the signal 
 for a close engagement. 
 
 " From ten minutes after eleven, till thirty-five past noon, the engagement 
 was general from van to rear in both lines, and mostly very close ; the enemy's 
 ships appeared to have suffered severely both in hulls and masts. The van ship 
 had bore away out of the line ; and the Brilliant, the French Admiral's second 
 a-head, had lost her main-mast. 
 
 ■ ^ At this time the sea-breeze set in at S. S. E. very fresh, and several of the 
 ships in our van and centre were taken a-back, and paid round with their heads 
 to the westward ; while others of our ships, those in the rear in particular, which 
 had suffered much less in their rigging, paid off, and continued on their former 
 tack. Some of the enemy's ships were also paid round by the sea breeze, with 
 their heads to the westward: the Admiral's second a-head in particular, which 
 I supposed to be the Ajax, but it proved afterwards to be the Severe, fell 
 
 2b 2 
 
188 NAVAL BATTLES. : 
 
 alongside the Sultan, and struck to her ; but, whilst the Sultan was waring to 
 join me, made what sail he could, fired on and raked the Sultan,, without 
 showing any colours, and then got in amongst his own ships. At fifty minutes 
 past noon, finding the Worcester, Eagle, and Burford still continuing on their 
 former tack, and nearing the body of the enemy's squadron very fast, I made 
 the signal to ware, and hauled down the signal for the line, purposing to make 
 the signal for a general chase ; but the Captain of the Monarca having hailed, 
 and informed me that all his standing rigging was shot away, and the ship 
 otherwise so much disabled as to be ungovernable ; and the Hero, on the contrary 
 tack, hauling in with the land with the signal of distress out ; and the enemy's 
 ships having wore: and come- to on the larboard tack ; those least disabled forming 
 to the windward to cover their disabled ships, and endeavouring to cut off the 
 Eagle ; I made the signal, at twenty minutes past one, to ware, and stood to the 
 westward ; the engagement stiU continuing partially, wherever our ships were 
 near the enemy's, aiid the Eagle hard pressed by two of the enemy's ships. 
 At half-past one, I made the signal for the line of battle a-head on the larboard 
 tack, and made the Exeter's signal to come within hail, and directed her to 
 take her station a-stem of the Sultan. At two p. m. the enemy's squadron were 
 standing in shore, and collecting their ships; which I was also endeavouring to 
 do, as our squadron was very much dispersed, and continued on different tacks ; 
 the ships being greatly disablied, and in general ungovernable. 
 
 " At half-past four I hauled down the signal for the line of battle a-headj 
 and made the signal, to prepare to anchor ; and at half-past five I" anchored 
 with the Superb, in six fathoms of water, between Negapatnam and Nagore ; 
 the other ships of the squadron anchoring as they came in with the land,; and 
 the Worcester next day. 
 
 " On the 7th, in the morning, the damages sustained by the several ships' of 
 the squadron appeared to me so great, that I gave up all thoughts of pursuing 
 the enemy ; and at nine a. m. the French squadron got under sail, and returned 
 to Cuddalore Road, their disabled ships a-head, and those less so covering their 
 retreat in the rear. 
 
 " I am extremely happy to inform their Lordships, that, in this engagement, 
 his Majesty's squadron Under my command gained a decided superiority over 
 that of the enemy; and, had not the wind shifted, and thrown his Majesty's 
 squadron out of action, at the very time when some of the enemy's ships had 
 broken their line, and were running away, and others of them greatly disabled-, 
 I have good reason to believe it would have ended in the capture of several of 
 the line df battle ships." , 
 
SIR EDWARD HUGHES. 189 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 From the circumstances attending all the battles of Sir Edward Hughes, it is 
 recommended, as indispensably necessary^ never to come to action with the fleets 
 of our enemy without a positive determination to take or destroy as many as 
 possible. 
 
 Commanding officers would find a convenience in forming or selecting such 
 plans of attack or defence as, from position, &c. they may most likely be called 
 upon to execute, distributing them, numbered, to their fleets, having a signal 
 attached to each. Upon meeting with an enemy, it will probably be under some 
 case of resemblance to one of the plans, with a mode of attack adapted to it ; 
 one signal would then express the Admiral's intention ; and those at a loss have 
 only to bear in mind the memorable remedy of Nelson. 
 
 The British Admiral, it appears, having, by diligence and exertion during the 
 night, obtained the object of his wishes, found himself in the morning to wind- 
 ward of the enemy about seven or eight miles, and stood towards him in line 
 a-breast ; but soon after, observing the enemy's fleet getting under way, and 
 drawing out to the eastward,* he changed to the order of battle ; and when 
 formed, bore gallantly down, in a lasking direction, to bring him to action, ship 
 with ship. 
 
 For two hours and three quarters the engagement was general ; and, as the 
 Admiral tells us, " mostly very close," and, of course, the ships on both sides 
 must have suffered considerably ; the van ship of the enemy had (as customary) 
 bore away out of the line, and the French Admiral's second a-head had lost his 
 main-mast, when an important change of wind took place, which payed the 
 ships' heads round in dififerent directions. 
 
 Here the truth of Mr. Clerk's observations upon this mode of attack is very 
 apparent ; for the rear ships of the British squadron had " suffered much less 
 in their rigging," than the van and centre, and were, consequently, better able 
 to second the gallant Admiral's intentions ; but the latter were so seriously 
 disabled, as to oblige him to relinquish his design ; and at about half-past one, 
 he wore from the enemy, and, excepting a little partial cannonading, the battle 
 ceased. 
 
 If it be admitted that the sudden shift of wind to S. S. E. threw the British 
 
 * In the Annual Register, It is printed rvestrvard, which must evidently be a mistake, clearly 
 demonstrated by looking at a chart of the coast, and by what follows in the Admiral's letter. 
 
190 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 squadron out of action, it can only be meant for a short time ; as, had it been 
 in a condition to follow the enemy, the wind was then full as favourable for it 
 as before ; and unless circumstances, such as those mentioned, the ungovernable 
 state of many of the ships of both fleets, &e. prevented a renewal of the action, 
 they were not, by the shift of wind to S. S. E. (as may be seen by the plate), 
 necessarily compelled to separate. 
 
 It would seem, indeed, that both squadrons had had enough of it, and were 
 glad to avail themselves of a change of wind to withdraw ; but whether the 
 wind was from S. S. E, or the opposite quarter, it most certainly adihitted of 
 the closest mode of fighting ; and nothing but the damages sustained in the 
 contest prevented a complete victory, or the defeat of M. SuflTrien. 
 
 Plate XIV, Fig. 1, shows the enemy's fleet in the N. N. E. weighing and 
 standing to the eastward ; the British squadron, from line a-breast, dravdng into 
 line a-head. 
 
 Fig. 2. The position of the hostile fleets upon the sudden change of the 
 wind from S. W. to S. S.E. when several of the ships in both fleets are thrown 
 upon diflFerent tacks. 
 
 G G, the French fleet when it had wore and hove-to on the larboard tack. 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 " Here is an instance where the enemy's masts and rigging suffered much 
 more than ours ; the French Admiral's ship lost his main and mizen-mast ; our 
 Commander-in-chief had not, therefore, the old excuse of being unable to 
 follow; but unfortunately the French upon that occasion fired low, and the 
 British fleet suffered severely from shot in their hulls." 
 
J'LATII^XII . 
 
SIR EDWARD HUGHES. 191 
 
 FOURTH BATTLE OF SIR EDWARD HUGHES. 
 
 Extract of a Letter from Vice Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, K. S. &^c. 
 
 " Superb, in Madras Road, September 30tb, 1782. 
 " In my letter of the 12th of last month, I mentioned my intention to 
 proceed to sea, when the squadron was refitted, for the purpose of covering the 
 arrival of the expected reinforcements under the command of Sir Richard 
 Bickerton, and to oppose the enemy's squadron ; and accordingly, on the 20th, 
 the squadron having completed its provisions, and being in a tolerable condition 
 for service, I left the road with the squadron under my command, and used all 
 diligence possible to get to the southward, to Trincomale ; being apprehensive 
 the enemy would endeavour to make themselves masters of that harbour in the 
 absence of the squadron. But, the wind blowing strong from the southward, 
 I did not arrive with the squadron off Trincomale till the night of the 
 second of this month; and, in the morning following, I discovered French colours 
 on the forts, and their squadron reinforced by the lUustre of seventy-four guns, the 
 St. Michael of sixty-four, and the Elizabeth, formerly a company's ship, of fifty 
 guns, with several transports, in all thirty sail, at anchor in the several bays 
 there. On the appearance of his Majesty's squadron on the morning of the 3d, 
 the French squadron, consisting of fourteen line-of-battle ships, the Elizabeth, 
 three frigates, and a fire-ship, got under sail, and about six a. m. stood out of 
 Back Bay to the S. eastward, the wind blowing strong at S. W. off the shore) 
 which placed them to windward of his Majesty's squadron. At ten minutes past 
 six a. m. I made the signal for the line of battle a-head at two cables' length dis- 
 tance ; shortened sail, and edged away from the wind, that the ships to form the 
 van of our line might the more speedily get into their stations. At twenty 
 minutes past eight, the enemy's squadron began to edge down to our line, then 
 formed in good order. From that time till half-past eleven a. m. I steered under 
 top-sails in the line E. S. E. * with the wind blowing strong at S. W. in order to 
 draw the enemy's squadron as far as possible from the port of Trincomale ; they 
 
 * It thus appears tbat the British line, formed in good order, was steering_/b«r points from the 
 mind : had the British fleet hauled up, upon the line C. D. in the plate, it must have met, or 
 broken the line of the enemy in its advance (Fig. I, Plate XXIII.); at all events it would have 
 mixed sooner with him. 
 
19^ NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 sometimes edging down, sometimes briuging-to, and in no regular order, as if 
 undetermined what to do. 
 
 " At noon, the enemy's squadron appeared to have an intention to engage. 
 At half-past two p. m. the French line began to fire on ours, and I made the 
 signal for battle : at five minutes after, the engagement was general, from our 
 van to our rear : the two additional ships of the enemy's line falling furiously on 
 our rearmost ship, the Worcester, were bravely resisted by that ship, and the 
 Monmouth, her second a-head, which backed all her sails to assist her. About 
 the same time, the van of the enemy's line, to which five of their ships had 
 crowded, bore down to the Exeter and Isis, the two headmost ships of our line ; 
 and, by an exerted fire on them, forced the Exeter, much disabled, out of the 
 line ; then tacked, keeping their wind, and firing on the Isis, and other ships of 
 our van, as they passed. In the mean time, the centres of the two lines were 
 warmly engaged, ship to ship. At twenty-eight minutes past three, the mizen- 
 mast of the French Admiral's second a-stern was shot or cut away ; and, at the 
 Same time, his second a-head lost her fore and mizen-top-masts. 
 
 " At thirty-five minutes past five, the wind shifting suddenly from S. W. to 
 E. S. E. I made the signal for the squadron to ware, which was instantly obeyed 
 in good order, the ships of the enemy's squadron either waring or staying at 
 the same time ; and the engagement was renewed, on the other tack, close and 
 vigorously on our part. At twenty minutes past six, the French Admiral's 
 inain-mast was shot away by the board, and soon after his mizen-mast ; and 
 about the same time, the Worcester, one of our line-of-battle ships, lost her 
 main-top-mast. At about seven p. m. the body of the French squadron hauled 
 their wind to the southward ; the ships in our rear continuing a severe fire on 
 them till twenty minutes past seven, when the engagement ceased ; and the 
 ships of our squadron had apparently suffered so much as to be in no condition 
 to pursue them. At about eight p. m. made the night signal for the line of 
 battle a head on the larboard tack ; but the night being dark, and several of the 
 ships not to be seen, at twelve p. m. I made the signal for the squadron to 
 bring-to, and lie by on the larboard tack. At day-light no part of the enemy's 
 squadron was in sight ; and the Eagle, Monmouth, Burford, Superb, and 
 several other ships, making much water from shot-holes so very low down in 
 the bottom as not to be come at to be effectually stopped ; and the whole having 
 suffered severely in their masts and rigging ; under these circumstances, and 
 Trincomale being in the enemy's possession, and the other parts of the west coast 
 of Ceylon unsafe to anchor on at this late season of the year, when the N. E. 
 winds often blow strong there, I was under the necessity of steering with the 
 
SIR EDWARD HUGHES. 193 
 
 squadron for this coast to get anchoring ground, in order to stop the shot-holes 
 under water ; and, from the disab led state of the ships, I fell in with the land a 
 very few leagues only to windward of this port, on the 8th inst. and anchored 
 in this road on the 9th, and am now closely employed in repairing the 
 damages the several ships have received." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 It appears the British Admiral could not arrive in time to save the harbour of 
 Trincomale ; and, upon making Ceylon, he found himself to leeward of the 
 French fleet, and very judiciously stood away to the E. S, E. in order to draw 
 the enemy as much as possible from his own port ; yet not declining the attack 
 of his old competitor. Keeping a steady course under top-sails only, he 
 received the enemy as he bore down upon them, with the same determined 
 resolution he had always manifested ; and, at about half-past two, the action 
 became general. The superiority of the enemy enabled him to direct his 
 principal attention to the van and rear ; five ships of the van bearing furiously 
 upon the two leading ships of the British line, while two more made a desperate 
 attack upon the Worcester, supported very properly and gallantly by the 
 Monmouth. 
 
 The two centres having quite sufficient to occupy their attention, the British 
 van and rear were exposed to a severe and very unequal contest; the force 
 opposed to them being not unskilfully applied on the part of the French ; yet it 
 is somewhat surprising that the five van ships of the enemy did not succeed in 
 entirely separating, and afterwards capturing the two hard-pressed ships, Exeter 
 and Isis. 
 
 In this manner it seems the fleets were situated, when, about half-past five, 
 the wind shifted from S. W. to E. S. E. ; that is, right-a-head, and consequently 
 must have taken them a-back. The British Admiral lost no time in attempting 
 to reap every advantage that was offered him by this change, and the action was 
 renewed on the other tack, close and vigorously ; the squadron waring in good 
 order, in obedience to the signal ; the ships of the enemy doing the same. At 
 half-past seven, both fleets having suffered very severely, they separated by tacit 
 consent, and the battle ceased. The French Admiral, having lost his inain and 
 mizen-masts, was certainly in no condition to continue the fight ; while it must 
 be allowed that his capture might seem an object of no great difficulty. Two 
 other ships of the enemy also suffered the loss of masts ; the Admiral's second 
 a-stern, her mizen-mast ; and his second a-head, her fore and mizen-top-masts ; 
 
 2 c 
 
194 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 and it does not appear that any of the British squadron, excepting the Worcester, 
 had lost any thing, and she lost her main-top-mast. 
 
 But " the Eagle, Monmouth, Burford, Superb, and several other ships, were 
 making so much water from shot-holes low down, and were otherwise so severely 
 handled, that the Admiral retired in the best way he could, to the nearest safe 
 anchorage, to repair his shattered fleet." In this manner concluded the naval 
 warfare of 17821 in the east ; and, from the evident advantages gained over the 
 enemy, it is much to be regretted it was not in the power of the British squadron 
 to have captured his dismantled ships, concealed and protected from further 
 molestation by the darkness of the night ; for every thing seems to have been 
 attempted by the skill and bravery of the British fleet, which, it must also be 
 remembered, was much inferior in force. 
 
 Plate XXIII, Fig. 1, is described by the following extract from Sir Edward's 
 letter : — 
 
 " On the morning of the 3d, the French squadron, consisting of fourteen line- 
 of-battle ships, the Elizabeth, three frigates, and a fire-ship ; and at six a. m. 
 stood out of Back Bay to the south-eastward, wind blowing strong at S. W_ 
 which placed them to windward of his Majesty's squadron." 
 
 The British line, until half-past eleven, steering under top-sails, E. S. E. to 
 draw the enemy from Trincomale. 
 
 In Fig. 2. " The engagement general from van to rear, the two additional 
 ships of the enemy's line falling furiously on our rearmost ship, the Worcester." 
 
 Plate XXIV, Fig. 3. " The van of the enemy's line, to which five shijps had 
 crowded, bore down to the Exeter and Isis, the two headmost ships of our line 
 and forced the Exeter, much disabled, out of the line ; then tacked, keeping 
 their wind, and firing on the Isis, and other ships of our van." 
 
 Fig. 4. " The wind shifting suddenly from S. W. to E. S. E. I made the 
 signal for the squadron to ware, which was instantly obeyed in good order ; the 
 ships of the enemy staying or waring at the same time ; and the engagement 
 was renewed, on the other tack, close and vigorously on our part." 
 
FLATE^Zm. 
 
PT./tTEisxjy: 
 
SIR EDWARD HUGHES. 195 
 
 SIR EDWARD HUGHES'S FIFTH BATTLE WITH 
 M. SUFFRIEN. 
 
 Extract of a Letter from Vice Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. &p. 
 
 in the East Indies. 
 
 " Superb, in Madras Road, July 25, 1783. 
 
 " From the day of the squadron's arrival in this road, all possible diligence 
 has been used to complete the ships' water ; in doing which, great delay, and 
 frequent disappointments, arose from the want of a sufficient number of shore 
 boats, and the high surf on the beach. However, I put to sea on the 2d of May, 
 with his Majesty's ships, to seek the enemy's squadron. 
 
 " On the 15th of May, when off Cuddalore, I spoke two Portuguese ships 
 from Trincomalee, who informed me Mons. Souffrien, with his whole force, 
 was there fitting for sea, with aU possible expedition, to come to the relief of 
 Cuddalore. From that time, I continued working to windward with the 
 squadron along shore, lest the enemy's squadron should pass in shore of me, 
 and fall on the store-ships, and their covering party, then at anchor near to 
 Cuddalore. 
 
 " On the 25th of May, I came off Trincomale, and reconnoitred the position 
 of the enemy's squadron, which I did not think by any means eligible to attack 
 at anchor under cover of their gun and mortar batteries ; and therefore stood to 
 the southward, to intercept any reinforcement or supplies that might be coming 
 to them ; at the same time watching their motions by the frigates of the 
 squadron, and keeping within a proper distance of the place, lest they should 
 put to sea in the night, and fall down on the covering ships and store-ships off 
 Cuddalore. 
 
 " On the 1st of June, two English seamen in a boat escaped from the French 
 squadron, and brought certain intelligence, that the Fendant of 74 guns, with 
 two frigates, and two storeships, had slipped out of Trincomale bay ; the store- 
 ships I concluded carried stores for the French garrison of Cuddalore, and the 
 Fendant and two frigates destined to cover and protect them ; and being appre- 
 hensive they might attack our covering ships and store-ships off Cuddalore, I bore 
 away on the 2d of June for the coast, and on the 3d, had sight of the Fendant 
 and two frigates, whom I chased till night, when I lost sight of them. 
 
 2 c 2 
 
196 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " I continued cruizing, with the squadron, to the southward of Cuddalore till 
 the 9th of June, when I anchored in Porto Novo Road, about seven leagues to 
 the southward of that place, partly to cover our own ships in Cuddalore Road, 
 and engage the enemy's squadron before they could anchor there ; and partly to 
 endeavour to get a supply of water, of which many ships began to be in want. 
 But, after exerting ourselves to the utmost, no water could be obtained, either at 
 Porto Novo, or Tranquebar ; at the first place the enemy's troops were in 
 possession of both banks of the river ; at the other, the wells were dried up. 
 
 " On the 13th of June, the enemy's squadron, under the command of Mons. 
 SufFrien, came in sight to the southward, consisting of fifteen ships of the line, 
 three frigates, and a fire-ship ; and the same day, I weighed with his Majesty's 
 squadron, and dropped down to about five miles distance off Cuddalore and there 
 anchored ; the French squadron anchored off the Coleroon river, about seven or 
 eight leagues to the southward of ours. 
 
 " On the 17th, the French squadron being under sail, and bearing down, I 
 made the signal, and weighed with his Majesty's squadron, and formed the line 
 of battle a-head to receive the enemy. In the evening, they hauled the wind, and 
 stood to the southward, and I followed them with his Majesty's squadron. From 
 this time to the 20th, I was continually employed in endeavouring to get the 
 wind of the enemy ; which, however, I was never able to effect, from the extraor- 
 dinary variableness of the winds, that often brought part of the two squadrons 
 within a random shot of each other. On the 20th the enemy, still having the 
 wind, showed a disposition to engage, when I immediately formed the line of 
 battle a-head, and brought-to to receive them. At four minutes past four p. m. 
 the van ship of the eiiemy having first tried her distance by a single shot, when 
 scarce within point-blank-shot distance, the enemy's squadron began their fire on 
 his Majesty's ; which, at twenty minutes after, was returned, and a heavy 
 cannonade ensued on both sjdes ; the enemy still keeping up their distance. The 
 cannonade continued till seven p. m. when the enemy hauled off. At day-light 
 I made the signal, and wore with the squadron, and brought-to to repair the 
 damages, with the ships' heads towards the land : several of the ships much 
 disabled in their hulls, masts, and rigging, the Gibraltar and Isis in particular ; 
 the enemy's squadron not in sight. 
 
 " In the morning of the 22d, I saw the French squadron at anchor in 
 Pondicherry Road, bearing S. S. W. directly to windward of his Majesty's 
 squadron, and some of them getting under weigh ; and I made what sail I could 
 towards them, and anchored the same night off the ruins of Alemparvo, the more 
 effectually to stop shot-holes, and repair the damages sustained. I beg you will 
 
SIR EDWARD HUGHES. 197 
 
 be pleased to iaform their Lordships that, so early as the 8th of June, the scurvy 
 began to make a rapid progress among the crews of all the ships of the squadron; 
 but particularly on board the ships last arrived from England, under the orders of 
 Commodore Sir Richard Bickerton, Bart. 
 
 " The number of sick on board the line-of-battle ships amounted on that day 
 to 1,121 men ; 605 of whom, being in the last stage of the scurvy, I was under 
 the necessity of sending, on the day following, to the naval hospital of this place 
 in his Majesty's ships Bristol and San Carlos. 
 
 « From that time to the 23d, the disease increased the numbers of the sick 
 daily, so as most of the ships of the line had from seventy to ninety men, and 
 the ships last from England double that number, very many in the last stage of 
 the disease, and unable to come to quarters, dying daUy. Under these circum- 
 stances, and the water of most of the ships being expended, except a few casks in 
 their ground tiers, and none to be obtained to the southward, I determined to 
 return to this road, there to land the sick and wounded, and complete the water 
 of the squadron for further service. On the 23d of June, I weighed with the 
 squadron, and arrived in this road on the afternoon of the 25th." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 The zeal and perseverance of Sir Edward Hughes were never more conspicuous 
 than in this last endeavour to recover Trincomale, and bring the French fleet to 
 close action ; but the winds, and the inclination of Mons. SufFrien, upon this 
 occasion, seem to have been against him; for, having the weather-gage, he 
 cautiously avoided too near an approach, lest he should thereby afford the British 
 Admiral an opportunity of closing with, or weathering upon him, which would 
 have given him the option of distance. 
 
 This battle furnishes us with another proof of the dislike the French have 
 always shown to the windward position ; and, by their extreme caution in coming 
 down, it is evident they consider that a fleet posted to leeward has the advantage. 
 
 It appears that Sir Edward Hughes made every effort to avail himself of the 
 variableness of the wind to effect his purpose ; but, in all its variations, it never 
 did more than bring " part of the two squadrons within random shot of each 
 other :" yet, on the 20th, " the enemy, still having the wind, showed a dis- 
 position to engage ; when he formed the line, and brought-to to receive them." 
 A cannonade, scarcely within point-blank-range, was commenced by the enemy 
 soon after four, which continued until seven p. m. when he hauled off, and the 
 battle ceased. The British fleet had before suffered very materially by the 
 
198 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 scm-vy ; and on this day, although not distinguished by any event of a decisive 
 nature, it shed its blood profusely; as, by the returns, ninety-nine were 
 killed, and 431 wounded, many of whom were officers. The battles of Sir 
 Edward Hughes were all of them bloody, though never characterized either by 
 a loss of ship, or a capture. He had to contend with the best sea officer that 
 France had ever known ; and, excepting in this last action, was always inferior in 
 force. On this occasion, it is probable that the difference of three ships in the 
 line contributed to increase the disinclination of the French Admiral to a nearer 
 connexion with them. The numbers being, on the part of the British, eighteen 
 ships in the line, eight frigates, and a fire-ship ; when that of Mons. Suflxien 
 was but fifteen sail in the line of battle, and three frigates. 
 
 A distinction is made between ships in and of the line ; for, in those days, 
 ships of fifty guns, on both sides, were placed in the line of battle ; but they 
 were never considered line of battle ships. A seventy-four gun ship is now the 
 smallest in the line of battle. 
 
 The late Admiral Sir Andrew Mitchell went out in the Rippon to the East 
 Indies with Sir Edward Vernon ; and was made a Lieutenant by him, and at once 
 a Post Captain into the Coventry, of twenty-eight guns. In the Coventry he 
 fought a severe battle with the Bellona, of forty guns, and suffered so much as to 
 be unable to follow her, and she escaped to the French fleet. (See " Memoirs " of 
 this officer in " Public Characters " for 1806.) He then arrived at the command 
 of the Sultan in the last engagement ; and ultimately succeeded to the rank of 
 Commodore in those seas, and realized a considerable fortune. 
 
 The battles of Sir Edward Hughes were peculiarly marked by the loss of 
 officers. Many brave captains fell in the faithful discharge of their duty ; and 
 of those who remained, the names of King, Alms, Raynier, and Gell, should 
 never be forgotten. 
 
 The late Sir Thomas Troubridge entered the navy, and went to India with 
 Sir Edward Hughes ; by whom he was taken great notice of, and brought 
 forward ; the merit and talents of the youngster showed the discernment of the 
 patron, as the naval service, perhaps, never produced a more extraordinary 
 character. For resources in time of need and distress he was scarcely equalled, 
 never surpassed. 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 . " If this Admiral, with eighteen ships, chased, in line of battle, fifteen sail 
 of French ships, I do not think he could expect to get up with them ; and when 
 they edged away to engage him, he should have kept working up under a press 
 of sail, and should not have brought-to." 
 
LORD HOWE. 199 
 
 LORD HOWE'S AFFAIR WITH THE COMBINED FLEETS 
 AFTER THE RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR. 
 
 October 20th, 1782. 
 
 LoKD Howe, after having with equal judgment and address thrown succoui's 
 into the garrison of Gibraltar, was followed out of the Streights by the combined 
 fleets of France and Spain, amounting to forty-five or forty-six ships of the line ; 
 the British force consisting of but thirty-four. 
 
 Extract of a letter from Lord Howe to Mr. Stephens, dated on hoard 
 H. M. Ship Victory, October 21st, 1782. Cape Spartel E. N. E. 
 forty leagues. 
 
 " The wind changing next morning (the 20th) to the northward, the combined 
 fleets (forty-five or forty-six ships of the line) still retained the advantage of 
 the wind. 
 
 " The British fleet being formed to leeward to receive them, they were left 
 uninterruptedly to take the distance at which they should think fit to engage. 
 
 " They began their cannonade at sun-set on the van and rear ; seeming to 
 point their chief attack on the latter ; and continued their fire along their whole 
 line at a considerable distance, and with little eflPect until ten at night. It was 
 returned occasionally from different ships of the fleet, as their nearer approach at 
 times afforded a more favourable opportunity for making any impression upon 
 them. 
 
 " The enemy hauling their wind, and the British fleet keeping on all 
 night with the full sail directed before the commencement of their fire, the 
 fleets are now much separated." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 The British fleet was formed in a most exact line of battle on the starboard 
 tack, wind from the northward, in very close order (the weather being extremely 
 favourable,) and the enemy was on the weather-beam. 
 
 This encounter (for it can scarcely be called an action) affords an additional 
 proof of the truth of Mr. Clerk's observation ; namely, the evident dislike the 
 
200 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 French have always shown to the weather-gage ; and of the disadvantages to 
 which a fleet is exposed in the situation before us (Plate XXII, Fig. 1), 
 in bearing down upon an enemy's fleet drawn up in close line of battle to 
 leeward. 
 
 The van and centre of the enemy were formed of French ships ; the rear of 
 Spaniards, under Don Cordova. The firing commenced by the van of the enemy, 
 and ships in succession, edging down upon the van of the British fleet. 
 
 In this manner, but at an increased distance, the action was continued to the 
 centre ; Lord Howe declaring that " not a gun should be fired from the Victory 
 until he could see the buttons upon the Frenchmen's jackets ;" and but one gun 
 was fired from that ship, by accident, from the lower deck ; the centre never 
 approaching to the fighting distance of the British Admiral. 
 
 Don Cordova bore down about nine, p. m., followed by some others in 
 succession, to cut asunder the British rear at the sixth or seventh ship; in this, 
 however, by a steady and well-directed fire, he was completely foiled ; and 
 suddenly luffing up to the wind, caused considerable confusion in the ships a-stern 
 of him : the attempt was then entirely abandoned. 
 
 Had it been day-light, the British fleet, by tacking in succession from the 
 centre, might probably have gained an advantage over the Spaniards by separating 
 them from the van. See the figure ; the British rear, by making sail, would 
 thus have eluded the attack. 
 
 Another mode also presents itself in this case; and recommended in thfe 
 " Cours Elementaire," when the windward fleet shall have left any open spaces 
 in their line, opposite to the heavy ships of the enemy. 
 
 The centre ware in quick succession from the ship of the Commander-in- 
 Chief, and, followed by the van, haul the wind on the other tack in line, 
 through the opening in that of the enemy. 
 
 The rear do the same, beginning with the rear ship, as shown by the dotted 
 lines in the Figure 1, Plate XXIV ; in this manner the leeward fleet would 
 elude the attack, leave the van of the enemy to themselves, and have the power 
 to make a formidable impression upon the rear. 
 
 Figure 2 describes the fleet B, on the line of battle perpendicular to, or at 
 right angles with the wind ; and having tacked together, form what the French 
 call techiquier sur la perpendiculmre du vent, C D, E G, and are in pursuit of 
 the enemy to windward. 
 
 The ships are close hauled preserving their line, and forming Vechiquier. 
 
 The relation of this action is of no further importance, than as it affords an 
 additional illustration of Mr. Clerk's argument ; the powerful eflFects of a fire 
 
LORD HOWE. 201 
 
 from the leeward, on ships coming down to the attack ; attested by one who was 
 then on the quarter-deck of one of the rear ships. 
 
 Of their objection to the weather-gage, we can want no better proof than the 
 case before us ; where our enemy, with a fleet so greatly superior, profited no- 
 thing by its position, evidently considering it to be disadvantageous. 
 
 Audibert Ramatuelle observes (Page 240), upon the " Usage de la ligne de 
 battaille au plus pres du vent :" 
 
 " line armee determinee a combattre doit se former en battaille au plus pres 
 du vent dans deux circonstances ; 1° lorsqu'etant sous le vent elle veut 
 forcer I'ennerai au combat ; 2° lorsqu'etant au vent elle veut I'eviter, ou 
 au moins differer le plus possible I'instant de I'engagement. Dans le premier 
 cas, il est d'une necessite rigoureuse qu'elle se forme strictement au plus pres, 
 puisque, sans cela, I'ennemi lui echapperoit indubitablement en tenant rigoureuse- 
 ment le vent. 
 
 " Dans le second cas, il y a meme necessite de tenir strictement le vent, car, 
 sans cela, I'ennemi se forraant strictement au plus pres, on acceleroit I'instant de 
 I'engagement." (Cours Elementaire, p. 240.) 
 
 " La ligne de battaille sur la perpendiculaire du vent est la formation la 
 plus avantageuse pour une armee sous le vent, plus foible ou egale en force, 
 qui voit I'armee du vent decide a I'attaquer. Cette formation reunit la plus 
 grande partie des avantages de la ligne de battaille au plus pres du vent." 
 
 Again, Ramatuelle observes, that, " une armee doit naviguer sur I'ordre que 
 reunit le mieux ses batimens sans les trop exposer aux abofdages ; sur I'ordre 
 qui coute le moins de temps a former et a conserver ; enfin sur celui qui 
 facilite la formation de tons les autres. 
 
 " Jusqu'a present nos arraees ont navigue sur trois colonnes. On trouve, 
 dans la formation de cet ordre, le grand avantage d'etre moins expose aux 
 abordages." (Cours Elementaires, p. 128.) 
 
 This Frenchman begins by " Des ordres primitifs," of which he mentions 
 eight : these again are divided and subdivided into forty-six different forms and 
 modes of arranging fleets under the various circumstances of the wind, and the 
 intentions of the Commander-in-chief. The magnitude of number is truly 
 appalling, and at once would induce a British seaman to shut the book ; nor is 
 it necessary to spin the subject to such an extent. His first order of sailing is 
 " sur trois pelotons, ou sur trois colonnes." Then comes eighteen different 
 ways of forming a line of battle ; with twelve modes of arranging fleets ou 
 echiquier, or the bow and quarter line. There is a ligne deforce, and a ligne 
 
 2 D 
 
202 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 de contre force, a prompte ligne de hattaille, ligne de force, de contre fotrce, 
 echiquier, &c. &c. 
 
 This author also recommends the order of sailing on the line perpendicular to 
 that of the wind, for the convenience it offers to a fleet of assuming the line of 
 battle, wind a-beara. 
 
 Suppose any given number of ships upon the east and west line, close hauled, 
 with the wind at north ; it will be seen that, by bearing up two points, the 
 whole will be in line of battle, wind a- beam, on either tack. (See Plate XXIV.) 
 Suppose also a fleet formed upon the same line, to be sailing one or more 
 points free, taking care to preserve the same relative bearing (line perpendicular 
 to the wind), they have but to haul up together the number of points between 
 their course and the perpendicular line to effect the same purpose. On this 
 account, and in the presence of an enemy of superior force, this order is not 
 without its advantages. A fleet to leeward so formed, making sail upon a wind 
 (on either tack), may attack with success the rear of an enemy's fleet, formed in 
 closed hauled line to windward. (See Plate. Admiral Byng.) 
 
 Fig. 2 shows the situation of the fleets on the following morning. 
 
 Carronades with shot of sixty-eight pounds' weight, it is thought, were first 
 used on board H. M. ships in this action. The Cambridge, of eighty guns, 
 commanded by the Hon. Keith Steward, had one mounted in each entering port, 
 and fired carcase shots from the side engaged. Locks were also more generally 
 used at this time ; musket locks, upon wooden stocks shaped for the gun, and 
 secured by lashings. The advantages of these over the common match became 
 so apparent, that in due time they gave place to locks of a better sort, made and 
 supplied for general use. 
 
 This action, and the partial cannonade of the 28th and 29th of May, 1794, 
 are the only instances wherein the enemy have had the advantage of the wind ; 
 unless it is in that of Sir Robert Calder ; where, however, it appears the British 
 fleet might have passed through that of the enemy, had it not been for the thick 
 fog which prevailed in almost every direction. 
 
 Plate XXIV, Fig. 1, is Lord Howe's engagement with the combined fleets of 
 France and Spain, after the relief of Gibraltar, October, 1782. 
 
 " They began their cannonade at sun-set on the van and rear, seeming to 
 point their chief attack on the latter." 
 
 The combined fleets (forty-five or forty-six sail of the line) to windward, 
 
''i.,rri:jjcv^. 
 
 Fu, I. 
 
 
 >i4 <4 ^ 
 
 i 
 
 C D 
 
 I 
 I ;. 
 
LORD HOWE. 203 
 
 edging down to engage the British van ; and the rear under Don Cordova 
 bearing down, about nine p. m., to break through the rear of the British 
 fleet; but from the steady fire kept up upon them, they were stopped and 
 thrown into confusion at the distance of point-blank range, and obhged to 
 relinquish it. 
 
 The British fleet (thirty-four ships of the line) was formed in the most exact 
 line, and in very close order. 
 
 Fig. 2. " The enemy hauling their wind, and the British fleet keeping on 
 all night, with the full sail directed before the commencement of their fire ; the 
 fleets are now much separated." 
 
 Lord Howe and Lord Hood were as much indebted to their skill in the 
 management of fleets for the glory they acquired, as to their intrepidity. 
 With this knowledge, they often braved and foiled a superior force; profiting 
 with dexterity by every occasion that offered to distress the enemy. 
 
 Lord Howe, Lord Gardner, and Lord St. Vincent, were of the few British 
 Admirals who in former days took any particular pleasure in exercising a fleet in 
 different evolutions ; but in this, from want of practice, they were little understood, 
 and indifferently seconded. 
 
 The necessity of a general understanding of the movements of ships in concert 
 must therefore be apparent to all, and may form a proper subject for future 
 consideration. 
 
 2 D 2 
 
NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 PART II. 
 
" Esteeming the naval superiority of this country as the principle 
 on which its power, interest, safety, and general prosperity, in the 
 highest degree, depend." — (Sixth Report of the Finance Committee 
 of the House of Commons.) — From the " Globe" of Monday, 
 March 16, 1818. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 THE SECOND PART. 
 
 If there be truth in that opinion of a committee of our Legislators which 
 introduces this portion of the present work — if, as that extract declares, not 
 only the " power " but also the " safety " of this country depend on its " naval 
 superiority," then it will be readily granted that the subject before us is of the 
 most positive vital importance. 
 
 Under the impression that our very existence as a powerful and independent 
 state rests solelij on our naval superiority, and even at the risk of incurring 
 the unmerited imputation of aiming to magnify the necessity of preserving our 
 maritime weight in the scale of nations, the writer considers that no efforts 
 should be spared, no opportunity neglected, by the government or by the people, 
 of cherishing and supporting its naval force ; whether by stimulating the zeal 
 of its officers, encouraging and rewarding the services of its warriors, or 
 by improving the powers and the qualities of our ships. 
 
 The overthrow of the monarchy of France involved in its fall (more or less) 
 the remaining established governments of Europe, and by its convulsive effects 
 created a system of inveterate hostility, only finally extinguished on the 
 glorious and memorable field of Waterloo ! 
 
 All who are acquainted with the history of events so indelibly marked, so deeply 
 engraven, yet here so summarily noticed, cannot overlook the connexion between 
 them and the foregoing observations, or fail to perceive that the dominion of 
 the seas led directly to the imposing character assumed by Great Britain in the 
 vast continental struggle which followed. 
 
 2 D 4 
 
204* INTRODUCTION. 
 
 But should this view of it by some be considered erroneous, let it be supposed, 
 for the sake of illustration, that, owing to neglect or imbecility on the one part> 
 or a want of capacity and inclination on the other, our fleets, instead of being 
 successful, had been defeated in our principal combats upon the ocean. It is 
 jjossible that we might have lost the battle with revolutionary France, and even 
 that of the Nile, or of Trafalgar, although commanded by a Howe or a 
 Nelson : it would therefore become us to reflect upon the probable conse- 
 quences of a reverse of fortune so serious ; of the condition to which this 
 country would be reduced, and the altered position she must be compelled to 
 take, by such a calamity. 
 
 Without great superiority at sea, it is entirely vain to suppose that we can be 
 either safe at home, or secure abroad. 
 
 What, let us ask, (under the avenging hand of the Almighty) annihilated 
 the views, and preserved us from the bigot gripe of Spain, in her gigantic 
 Armada ? How did we become possessed of what is now our justly boasted 
 Gibraltar ? By what means did we put a stop to the aggressions of Spain in 
 the reign of George the First ? And how did we render abortive the attempts 
 of France upon Ireland in the reign of George the Third ? Unless we had 
 first destroyed the French fleet, * there could have been no landing of troops 
 in Egypt! What saved the remains of our retreating army at Corunna? 
 How are we to form expeditions, whether to Sicily,f to Walcheren, the Baltic, 
 the East or West Indies, or to America ? What is to protect our trade, and 
 be the bulwark of our shores ? How are we to chastise an Algerine, or to 
 punish a Turk? 
 
 When Great Britain can no longer maintain the character of the most 
 powerful maritime state on earth, she will then form an object of contention 
 for the most aspiring ; and, at length fall a prey to the strongest : she will, as 
 
 * " Sicily, I hope, is well secured against any sudden attack. There is great reason for 
 believing that the fleet which was beaten oft" Trafalgar was destined for that island. A con- 
 siderable field equipage was embarked ; 4,000 troops were in the ships ; a like number was 
 expected to embark at Carthagena, and 12,000 were on the march to Toulon for the same purpose, 
 but were remanded on the action taking place." (Lord CoUingwood's Correspondence, page 157-) 
 
 I See Corbett's " Expedition to Sicily" in 1718. 
 
INTRODUCTION. *205 
 
 heretofore, be exposed to insult and depredation, or become the property of 
 another people. 
 
 The victories detailed in the foregoing, as in the following pages, were not so 
 much the result of physical as of moral power.* Bravery, enterprise, experience, 
 and discipline, are the sources whence the navy derives its most essential 
 support ; compensating for the physical deficiencies under which it so frequently 
 laboured, and which they so happily contributed to veil. 
 
 The commencement of the year 1827 brought with it a memorable and 
 fortunate change in the administration of our naval affairs : when such is the 
 zeal, interest, and ability so strongly manifested by the illustrious head of this 
 important arm of the national body, the country may look with pride and 
 exultation at the firm and dignified stand she will ever make to assert or to 
 defend her rights, to protect her crown, her liberty, and her religion. 
 
 February, 1828. 
 
 * See " Hume's History of England," octavo edition, vol. v. page SZi,. 
 
EARL HOWE. 307 
 
 EARL HOWE'S ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE FRENCH 
 REVOLUTIONARY FLEET. 
 
 May 28th, 29th, and June 1, 1794. 
 
 Extracts from tlie Letters of Lord Howe, dated (^st) Queen Charlotte at 
 Sea, June 2d, 1794. Ushant E. -l N. 140 Leagues. 
 
 " On the morning of the 28th, the enemy were discovered far to windward, 
 and partial actions were engaged with them that evening and the next day. 
 
 " The weather-gage having been obtained in the progress of the last-mentioned 
 day, and the fleet being in a situation for bringing the enemy to close action the 
 1st instant, the ships bore up together for that purpose between seven and eight 
 o'clock in the morning. 
 
 " The French, their force consisting of twenty-six ships of the line, opposed 
 to his Majesty's fleet of twenty-five (the Audacious having parted company with a 
 captured ship of the line on the night of the 28th), waited for the action, and 
 sustained the attack with their customary resolution. 
 
 " In less than an hour after the close action commenced in the centre, the 
 French Admiral, engaged by the Queen Charlotte, crowded ofi^, and was followed 
 by most of the ships of his van in a condition to carry sail after him, leaving 
 with us about ten or twelve of the crippled ships, exclusive of one sunk in the 
 action. The Queen Charlotte had then lost her fore and main-top-masts. See 
 Plate XXX.* 
 
 " The greater number of the other ships of the British fleet were, at this 
 time, so much disabled, or widely separated, and under such circumstances, 
 with respect to those ships of the enemy, in a state for action, and with which 
 the firing was still continued, that two or three even of their dismasted ships 
 attempting to get away under a spritsail singly, or smaller sail raised on the 
 top stump of the foremast, could not be detained ; seven remained in our 
 possession." 
 
 " The material injury to his Majesty's ships, I understand, is confined princi- 
 pally to their masts and yards," &c. 
 
 * Lord Howe kept an advanced squadron to windward, as chasing ships ; it was by means of 
 this squadron that the rear of the enemy was first brought to action, and that the three-decker 
 mentioned was separated, or cut off, by the Audacious, of seventy-four guns. 
 
208 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Extracts from another Letter, dated June 9,\st {referring to the Figures). 
 
 Plate XXVI, Fig. 1, " Eiii-ly in the morning of the 28th, the enemy were 
 discovered by the advanced frigates far distant on the weather bow ; the wind 
 then fresh from the S. by W. with a very rough sea." 
 
 Fig. 2. " They came down for some time in a loose order, hauling their 
 wind; when they came nearer, and, after some hours, formed the order of 
 battle on the starboard tack — the British fleet continuing as before in the order 
 of sailing." — " This facilitated the nearer approach of his Majesty's fleet to 
 them, and for the detached part of it, under Rear Admiral Pasley, to be placed 
 more advantageously for making an impression on their rear." 
 
 Plate XXVIT, Fig. 3. " The Rear Admiral, upon the close of the day, led 
 his division with peculiar firmness, and attacked a three-decked ship, the stern- 
 most in the enemy's line. He was followed by the Leviathan, Lord H. 
 Seymour ; and by Captain Parker of the Audacious. The three-decked ship 
 struck, and separated with the Audacious." (C. in the Fig.) 
 
 Fig. 4. " The two opponent fleets continued on the starboard tack in a 
 parallel direction, the enemy still to windward the remainder of the night. 
 The British fleet appearing in the morning of the 29th,* when in order of 
 battle, to be far enough advanced for the ships in the van to make some further 
 impression on the enemy's rear, was tacked in succession with that intent." 
 
 Plate XXVIII, Fig. 5. " The enemy hereupon wore from van to rear, and 
 continued edging down in line a-head to engage the van of the British fleet. 
 When arrived at such a distance as to be just able to reach our most advanced 
 ships, their headmost ships, as they came successively into the wake of their 
 respective seconds a-head, opened with that distant fire upon the headmost ships 
 of the British van. The signal for passing through their line, made when the 
 fleet tacked before, was then renewed." 
 
 Fig. 6. " As the smoke at intervals dispersed, it was observed that the 
 Caesar, the leading ship of the British van, after being about on the starboard 
 tack, and come a-breast of the Queen Charlotte, had not Icept to the wind, — and 
 that the appointed movement would, consequently, be liable to fail of the 
 proposed effect. 
 
 " The Queen Charlotte was, therefore, immediately tacked ; and, followed 
 
 • In the morning (between three and four o'clock), the signal was made to form the line as most 
 convenient. The C«sar led, then Queen, Russell, Royal George, Invincible, Orion, &c. 
 
Plate xrvz 
 
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EARL HOWE. 209 
 
 by the Bellerophon, her second a-stern, and soon after by the Leviathan, 
 passed through in action between the fifth and sixth ships in the rear of the 
 enemy's line : she was put about again on the larboard tack forthwith after the 
 enemy, in preparation for renewing the action with the advantage of that 
 weathermost situation."* 
 
 Fig. 7. " The rest of the British fleet being, at this time, passing to leeward, 
 and without the sternmost ships, mostly of the French line; the enemy wore 
 again to the eastward in succession for succouring the disabled ships of their 
 rear ; which intention, by reason of the then disunited state of the fleet, and 
 having no more than the two crippled ships, the Bellerophon and Leviathan, at 
 that time near me, I was unable to obstruct." 
 
 Plate XXIX, Fig. 8. " The enemy, having succeeded in that operation, wore 
 round again after some distant cannonading with the nearest British ships, 
 and stood away in order of battle on the larboard tack, followed by the British 
 fleet in the same order (but with the weather-gage retained), as soon as the 
 ships, coming forward to close with the Queen Charlotte, were suitably arranged. 
 
 " The fleets remained separated some few miles, in view, at times, on the 
 intermission of a thick fog, which lasted most part of the two next days," &c. 
 
 It will here be useful, the better to describe the situation of the two fleets 
 on the 28th and 29th of May, to give extracts from the letters of Captain W. 
 Parker of the Audacious. 
 
 'f Every thing was done by his Majesty's fleet, per signals from the Earl 
 Howe (preserving them in order), to get up with the enemy, who appeared to be 
 formed in order of battle. But, as I apprehend, his Lordship considered their 
 conduct began rather to indicate an intention of avoiding a general action ; at 
 fifty-five minutes after one o'clock, he directed a general chase. It was just 
 becoming dark when his Majesty's ship, under my command, arrived up with the 
 rear ship of the enemy's line." 
 
 " The rear of the French line had been engaged at a distance by Re^r 
 Admiral Pasley's division, and some other ships that did not fetch so far to 
 windward, a considerable time before I arrived up with them ; and this very 
 ship was engaged by one of his Majesty's ships at some distance to leeward at 
 the time I did." 
 
 " The night being very dark, I could form but little judgment of the situation 
 of our fleet with respect to the French, in point of distance, other than, not 
 
 * However " unintelligible " this figure may have been to a late naval historian, it cannot be 
 altered. The work is addressed to practical sea officers. 
 
 2 E 
 
210 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 hearing any firing after our own ceased, I concluded they were scarcely far 
 enough to windward. 
 
 " Soon after day-light next morning, we discovered nine sail of the enemy's 
 ships about three miles to the windward." 
 
 The rest of Captain Parker's letter is a description of his own action with the 
 steiTimost ship, and consequent separation from the fleet, — ^^unnecessary here ; at 
 the same time, it is impossible to withhold the tribute of admiration and 
 applause to which his conduct, upon that occasion, so justly entitled him, 
 together with his gallant officers and ship's company. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 Nothing could be more favourable for an attack, had the day-light continued, 
 than the position of the two fleets in Figure 3 ; for, while the rear (or weather) 
 division was closely engaged with the rear of the enemy, the centre and leeward 
 divisions of the British fleet, by carrying a press of sail, and keeping their wind, 
 must, in a short time, have reached, and the centre have brought to action, the 
 centre of the enemy. 
 
 A long line of battle cannot be preserved if it be kept close to the wind, — 
 and seven points from it is usually considered necessary for that purpose ; while 
 smaller divisions of ships, and in general chase, can be kept closer. Under these 
 circumstances, the centre would have closed Vvith the centre of the enemy ; and 
 the leeward division standing on would, on one tack or the other, be able to bring 
 to action the van of the enemy ; acting then as occasion might offer ; fighting 
 him either to windward or to leeward ; the whole of their line being then engaged 
 by the British fleet. 
 
 It does not appear that any better movement could have been made by the 
 British fleet, than that adopted by the Admiral (in Figure 4), for making 
 " further impression upon the enemy s rear." This was, however, frustrated by 
 an important movement on their part, which led to the failure of th6 British 
 Admiral's design. 
 
 Fig. 5, This movement of the French Admiral was certainly well adapted 
 to prevent the meditated attack upon his rear ; exposed to be separated by 
 the advance of the British van ; and, by veering (or waring) and edging 
 down in line a-head, to engage the leading ships of the British fleet, 
 offered battle upon equal terms ; the latter continuing its course in line to 
 receive him. 
 
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EARL HOWE. 211 
 
 Fig. 6. We now come to the only unpleasant part of, the detail ; to show, 
 in the conduct of one man, that the greatest designs of a Commander-in-chief 
 may be rendered ineffectual by negligence, stupidity, or cowardice ; and to point 
 out how much it is the duty of captains, and juniors in command, to become 
 masters of their chief's intentions, by clearly understanding his signals, and 
 devoting themselves to a rigid execution of them ; for on this, not only their 
 own character may depend, but the glory and success of a great national 
 enterprize. 
 
 Had the Caesar, and the rest of the British van, followed the direction of the 
 Commander-in-chief, the struggle might, on that day, have been decided ; but 
 " the appointed movement failed of the proposed effect." 
 
 Fig. 6. Under the pressure of vexation and disappointment, the gallant 
 Admiral did the only thing that was left him, to show his intention to the rest 
 of the British fleet ; and to accomplish, though but in part, the object of his 
 wishes — to penetrate the line of the enemy, by which to separate and overpower 
 part of his force. 
 
 The Caesar having, by inability or mistake, not " kept to the wind"* when 
 *' about on the starboard tack, and having come a-breast of the Queen Charlotte, 
 the Queen Charlotte was immediately tacked ; and, having passed through the 
 line was put about again on the larboard tack forthwith," &c. supported only by 
 the Bellerophon and Leviathan. 
 
 ' The enemy veering again to protect his rear, while the British fleet was 
 hastening to windward to enable the Admiral to re-form his line and renew 
 the attack. 
 
 Figs. 7 and 8, show the altered position of the hostile fleets ; and it appears 
 that nothing more could be done by the British Admiral, from the then 
 '' disunited state of the fleet ; having no more than the two crippled ships, the 
 Bellerophon and the Leviathan, at that time near him." 
 
 Fig. 9. Here, " as soon as the ships coming forward to close with the Queen 
 Charlotte were suitably arranged," the two fleets are again drawing out into 
 order of battle, the British Admiral having gained the weather-gage. 
 
 " The enemy stood away in order of battle on the larboard tack, followed by 
 
 * It has been said, and by an officer then on the quarter-deck of the Queen Charlotte, that the 
 Caesar passed to windward of that ship : this is, however, unlikely, as it is stated by Lord Howe 
 that she had " not kept to the wind." The writer has also been assured by the signal lieutenant, 
 and from the authority of the master of the fleets that it was not so. By a plan of the movements 
 of both fleets by an officer present, since obtained, the Csesar is nearly as placed in the figure. 
 
 2 E 2 
 
2ia NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 the British fleet in the same order, but with the weather-gage retained. The 
 fleets remained, separated some few miles, in view, at times, on the intermission 
 of a thick fog, which lasted most part of the two next days." 
 
 Fig. 10. June 1 : as both fleets on the 29th May (Fig. 9) are left on the 
 larboard tack, the British fleet having the weather-gage, and Lord Howe 
 making no mention of a change, either of the wind, or the position of the 
 hostile fleets on the 1st June, we suppose them arranged in parallel lines ; the 
 French being drawn up in line of battle to leeward ; " and the British fleet 
 being in a situation for bringing the enemy to close action the 1st instant, the 
 ships bore up together for that purpose, between seven and eight o'clock in the 
 morning." 
 
 The position of the British fleet, if divided into two parts, offered a fine 
 opportunity for a vigorous attack upon the van and rear, leaving the centre 
 untouched : the van and rear might thus have been overpowered by numbers, 
 and the whole thrown into confusion. AH the ships, from the Commander-in- 
 chief to the rear, if not then within long range of shot, should shape a course 
 as if to attack the centre ; and upon getting within shot range, alter course 
 together, and dart upon the rear. This would at least place the centre in what 
 Rainatuelle calls " un emharras." If the fleet be formed in two lines a-breast, 
 as supposed in Fig. 10, an attack upon the rear would be irresistible. 
 
 In both these cases, the lines should be in rather open order, and the change 
 of course be made by all, with the utmost regularity and precision, according to 
 signal. 
 
 By the preparatory movements and exertion of the British Admii-al, seconded 
 by the zeal and gallantry of his fleet, we now behold the great event drawing 
 to a crisis ; and the anxious wishes of the leader on the point of receiving their 
 fullest completion. The power of choosing his fighting distance, so ardently 
 desired, is at length attained ; and " the enemy's force, consisting of twenty-six 
 ships of the line, waited for the action, and sustained the attack with their 
 accustomed resolution." 
 
 The figure describes the British fleet having " bore up together, to break 
 through the line, and bring the enemy to close action." The British fleet one 
 less in number. 
 
 All that professional skill, perseverance, and judgment could effect, was now 
 accomplished. What was still necessary to its final, glorious issue depended 
 much on the conduct of the subordinate characters. Had all striven to imitate 
 the many bright examples, conspicuous on that day, a greater triumph would have 
 crowned its success ; and although the enemy was most unequivocally beaten, and 
 
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EARL HOWE. 213 
 
 entirely routed ; yet " seven ships (only) remained in our possession, exclusive 
 of one sunk ; while many got away under little or no sail, and could not be 
 detained." 
 
 In this, as in the victory of the 12th of April, we may lament that the blow 
 was not followed up ; as in that case, a much greater number of ships might 
 have been added to the train of the valiant chief. 
 
 The mode of attack is what Mr. Clerk terms the " perpendicular," or 
 " attack at right angles," and is exposed to the objections he has urged against 
 it : they appear to be corroborated in this instance ; as the material injury to his 
 Majesty's ships " was confined principally to their masts and yards." 
 
 The British Admiral, on the morning of the 1st of June, finding his fleet to 
 occupy a line parallel to that of the enemy, determined on a vigorous attack 
 upon his whole line, rather than lose a moment by making a diff^erent 
 arrangement ; though it will be admitted, that an attack upon a particular part 
 of it, by a superior force, might have been attended with greater success : upon 
 this occasion, allowance should be made for the anxious impatience of the 
 British chief, somewhat mortified and disappointed by the preceding events : 
 he inay, therefore, well be forgiven for having rushed forward mth impetuosity to 
 the combat, relying on the Zealand bravery of those under his command.* 
 
 An extract from the log of a ship, particularly distinguished, cannot fail to be 
 interesting to naval men ; the more so, as it never yet has appeared in print. 
 
 Log of His Majesty's Ship Queen, ^^th and SOth May, 1794. 
 
 " At fifty-three minutes past noon (which, by log, at that time, ended the 29 th 
 WL^L began the SOth day of the month) ,f wore ship per signal, and renewed the 
 action ; passing along the enemy's line within ours ; made four different attempts 
 to break the enemy's line, but could not effect it ; their rear being so compact 
 rendered it impossible, particularly from the shattered state of our ship, which 
 barely steered. At half past two discontinued firing ; having passed the enemy's 
 rear ship ; most of our fleet in action. Wore ship and laid our head towards the 
 enemy. Employed repairing damages. Masts all wounded. Got the fore- 
 top-gallant-mast down : cleared the wreck of the fore-yard. Sent the main- 
 
 • The writer has been informed, that the British fleet was (to use a military term) dressed, two 
 or three times, when bearing down to the enemy ; and that the latter, upon its near approach, 
 instantly made sail, " large," to elude as much as possible the severity of the onset. In a letter 
 from Lord Collingwood to Mr. Blackett, he says, " Drew up and dressed our ranks." 
 
 t A ship's log now commences from midnight. 
 
214 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 top-gallant-mast up for a mizen-top-mast ; main-top-sail-yard for a fore-yard, and 
 bent a complete new set of square sails. At 4** 10' made the Venus's signal to 
 stay by us ; 6^ 10' enemy's fleet wore and stood for us with an intent to cut us offj 
 but some of our ships bore down and prevented it, when they hauled off, and wore 
 in a good line. At eight p. m. body of the fleet west, inclinable to fog ; fresh 
 breezes and cloudy ; lost sight of the fleet ; when it became clearer, saw, at day, 
 light, the body of the French fleet N. W. three or four leagues ; 8^ 45' made 
 the signal of being ready to renew the action. Fleet forming in order of 
 sailing." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS— 1st of June, 1794. 
 
 Plate XXX exhibits the situation of the two fleets about one o'clock p. m^ 
 when the enemy was completely beaten, dnd several of the British fleet so much 
 disabled, that it was not without apprehensions some might have been over- 
 powered by the enemy ; the Queen and some others being out of the reach of 
 immediate protection. 
 
 If in this plate be shown the result of a combined vigorous assault, the object 
 of the tactician is answered. The writer declared in his former Preface, that it 
 was not his purpose to enter into a detail of the cases of particular ships. The 
 plan is by an ofiicer in the battle, and was presented by the Captain of one of the 
 most distinguished ships. The casualties of war are for the naval historian. 
 
 Here it is seen, that ten or twelve ships are making their escape in the best 
 manner they can, when the second in command makes the signal for a general 
 chase.* 
 
 Lord Howe, in countermanding this signal, probably judged of the state of his 
 fleet by the condition of the Queen Charlotte, Queen, Defence, and some others, 
 more severely handled than the rest ; for it is well known, there were still a 
 sufficient number left to have stopped the fugitives ; but the responsibility was 
 entirely his own, and it appeared to him, " the greater number of the British 
 fleet were at this time so disabled or widely separated, that they could not be 
 datached after them." 
 
 With another extract from the log of that distinguished ship which bore the 
 
 * That Admiral Graves made this signal has been forgotten by some, and disbelieved by others. 
 The writer's authority for stating it is that of the master of the Bellerophon, (Urquhart) who has 
 made a note of it in one corner of his plan of the battle, from which Plate V. is taken. 
 

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ADMIRAL HOTHAM. 215 
 
 flag of Rear Admiral Gardner, the account of this important victory may be 
 closed. 
 
 "June 1st, 1794. — Wind southerly; at half-past eight bore down on the 
 enemy, each ship for her opponent ; three-quarters past eight the two vans began 
 to engage. At nine received the fire of several ships in the rear, going down to 
 engage our opponent ; which she easily declined by making sail from us ; our 
 ship being then very much disabled in her masts, sails, and rigging. At a 
 quarter past nine brought the next ship to close action, passed through their line, 
 and engaged within a cable's length to leeward ; sometimes the ships barely clear 
 of each other. Soon found we had the superiority at close fighting ; the fire of 
 our opponent being nearly silenced by half-past ten. She suffered us to rake her 
 twice, and soon after her three masts went by the board, as did our main-mast 
 nearly at the same time. At eleven the French ship called for quarter ; 
 boats not in a condition to take possession; people employed clearing the 
 wreck, and getting up a jury main-mast ; the van and part of the centre still in 
 action. 
 
 " Counted twelve ships dismasted a-stern of our van, the generality of them 
 having struck to our ships," 
 
 June 2ld, p. m. — " Employed refitting and repairing our damages. Three- 
 quarters past one wore ship. In standing between the French and English lines' 
 the ship being unmanageable, eleven of the enemy's line of battle, with several 
 frigates, fired upon us on passing; which we returned. At two discontinued firing, 
 the enemy having passed us. Proceeded again to repair our losses. Rigged a 
 fore-top-mast for a main-mast, and other spars and sails, in proportion to what 
 the masts would bear. At two the Pegasus took us in tow. At six wore ship ; 
 observed one of the prizes, a two-decker, sink. At half-past six the Pegasus cast 
 us off. At twelve Admiral's lights E. by S. one mile. At five a. m. thirty- 
 one sail of masted ships and a cutter in sight, with eight sail of dismasted 
 ships." 
 
 In this severe conflict of two days, it appears that the Queen lost her captain, 
 master, and thirty- six seamen and marines killed, and thirty-two officers, seamen, 
 and marines wounded. The loss of Captain Hutt was ably supplied by the First 
 Lieutenant (the late Vice Admiral Bedford), who was immediately appointed 
 Captain of the ship. 
 
 In the " Naval Chronicle," is to be found the log of Sir J, Duckworth, 
 then Captain of the Orion, one of the van ships on the 29th of May : by this it 
 appears, that although the leading ship (the Caesar,) did not make any attempt 
 
216 NAVAL BATTEir& 
 
 to break the enemy's line, in conformity witb the" agnali- the Orion and many- 
 others did ; and were only prevented by their own disabled state, and the 
 compactness of the French line of battle.* 
 
 A brave and distinguished officer, who commanded a frigate in this action, has , 
 observed, that if ships going down into battle " large " or before the wind, would 
 previously brace their yards in the direction they wish them, when hauled up to 
 attack the enemy, they would probably preserve their masts and yards longer, 
 than in general they do ; the act of bracing them up, and hauling to the wind, 
 exposing them at once both to the effects of the wind and of the shot at the 
 same time; the men also must be more exposed to the fire of the enemy. 
 The same officer informed the writer that the Bellerophon, on the 28th of May, 
 having received so much injury in her main-cap, as to prevent her continuing the 
 action with the rear of the French line, necessarily fell a-stern, and was occupied 
 in securing the heel of the main-top-mast to the head of the main-mast. The 
 example was followed even by the frigates ; and the heels of the top-masts, by 
 means of filling-pieces and stout lashings and frappings, passed and hove 
 taught, from the heel of one to the head of the other, rendered the top-mast 
 as firm in its place, and as independent of the cap, as the nature of the case 
 would admit. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Lord Howe caused to be abandoned and destroyed all the captures that were 
 made by the ships under his orders from the time he left Spithead, to his battle 
 of the 1st of June; that the effective strength of his fleet might in no way be 
 diminished. 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 " I have always been of opinion that this action should have been more 
 decided. When the Queen Charlotte tacked, how came she separated from all the 
 ships a-stern of her wake, except two ? Surely, if they had all tacked successively 
 in her wake, and again in the same position when on the larboard tack, at least 
 two of the enemy's rear ships must have been taken. And had the van of our 
 fleet tacked (or wore, if unable to tack) when the mistake was discovered, they 
 
 * A seaman of the Brunswick, in a letter to his wife at Newton Abbot, makes the following, 
 remark : — 
 
 " This dreadful battle happened on a Sunday ; and if the French have rejected that day out of 
 
 their calendar, God Almighty has shown them that he has not left it out of his" 
 
EARL HOWE. 217 
 
 wovdd have kept a position close a-breast of the enemy's rear, and prevented the 
 manoeuvre of the French van waring to support it. 
 
 " On the 1st of June, had Lord Howe attacked the centre and rear of the 
 French line with his whole force, he would have gained a complete and easy 
 victory ; not to follow up his success, I hold to have been a great error." 
 
 A French Account of the Proceedings of their Fleet. 
 
 Jean bon Saint Andre, a Deputy from the then ruling power of France, has 
 given a journal of the proceedings of their fleet, from its sailing to its defeat on 
 the 1st of June; but from this little information is to be collected. Much 
 anxiety is expressed throughout, and great hopes of success are entertained from 
 the apparent zeal and spirit of the officers and seamen ; at the same time the 
 Deputy complains much of the want of attention and experience in many of the 
 captains in performing the different evolutions, previous to their meeting with 
 the British fleet : nor does it appear that the " Citizen Captains " (of the frigates 
 particularly) considered strict obedience to orders or signals as a necessary part 
 of their duty ; for, when sent in chase, they returned at discretion. Le Jacobin, 
 from missing stays twice, threw the rear of the centre column into disorder ; 
 and the Brutus frigate, having lost a main-top-mast at seven p. m. had only 
 removed the stump of it by ten o'clock on the following morning ; and at eight 
 of the morning of the day after, she had got up the main-top-sail-yard ! * and 
 the Deputy very properly considers, that, as the same ship had lost a top-mast 
 upon a former cruize, it should have proved a " lesson " to the captain ; not 
 understanding how such an accident ought to be suffered to take place a second 
 time ! His letters to his " Citizen Colleagues " of the Committee of Public 
 Safety are not interesting. He says, " some 6fficers are deficient in instruction, 
 but none wanting good will," and that a fleet like theirs requires fifteen or twenty 
 frigates to attend it. 
 
 He goes on to say, that " signals were not sufficient to prevail on the captains 
 keeping in close order," and a frigate is sent to perform this service ; which is 
 termed rallying the fleet : in another part it is said Le Scipion's fore-yard had 
 been carried away three days ; her main-top-sail-yard yesterday ; and this after- 
 noon she made the signal for springing her fore-top-mast 1 
 
 He magnifies the force of the British fleet. On the 29th of May they discover 
 the separation of the Revolutionaire ; and that Le Terrible had by a violent 
 pitch, in a head sea, carried away her fore-top-mast. 
 
 * See notes at the end. 
 2 F 
 
218 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 In speaking of the conduct of the ships, he observes, " they all manifested a 
 courage, from which, had it been joined by practical knowledge, the day would 
 have been glorious to them ; but, slowness of manoeuvres, continual mistakes, 
 small means when large ones should have been conceived and daringly executed, 
 was what snatched from us the brilliant success we had a right to expect." He 
 complains greatly of the conduct and disobedience of the frigates, particularly of 
 La Seine and Le Brutus. 
 
 The disasters of the 1st of June he attributes much to the unskilfulness of 
 manoeuvre in some of their ships, particularly of Le Jacobin, the second a-stern 
 of the Montaigne ; which, by first running up too near the Admiral, and then 
 backing to regain her place, left an opening in the line for the British Admiral. 
 Thence they date their defeat. These indeed are " lessons" from which it is 
 hoped British seamen will never fail to profit : this last was taught by the 
 example of one of the greatest masters this nation has ever known ; — ^long may 
 his name be cherished and revered by an admiring and grateful country ! 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 Amongst an abundance of proofs that might be advanced, of the superior 
 skill and activity displayed on board British ships of war in cases similar to 
 that of the Brutus mentioned in the foregoing journal, may be given the 
 following; as it contrasts in a striking manner with the extremely dilatory 
 conduct of the French ship, and under circumstances of great resemblance. 
 
 When the St. Albans, of sixty-four guns was a look-out ship from the chan- 
 nel fleet in the year 1797 or 1798, it was discovered one evening, just before 
 sun-set, that both her fore and main top-masts were sprung. Every necessary 
 arrangement being immediately made for shifting them, they set to work as soon 
 as they were no longer perceptible by the fleet ; and preserving her station to 
 the look-out, she shifted both top-masts before day-light, and appeared to the 
 fleet as if nothing whatever had taken place. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 " I once in 1808 kept company with a French fleet twenty-one days. A 
 corvette lost her fore-top-mast, was taken in tow by a line-of-battle ship, and 
 never attempted to get up another until she got into Corfu, five days after; 
 though fine weather. 
 
 " A British frigate in the Mediterranean shifted a main-top-mast in four 
 
EARL HOWE. 219 
 
 hours, when under storm stay-sails in a gale of wind on an enemy's coast, and 
 blockading an enemy's force ! " 
 
 It has been said that, " in 45 minutes, the Bittern sloop of war shifted her 
 main-top-mast without previous preparation !" 
 
 OBSERVATIONS CONTINUED. 
 
 To point out the precise spot or situation of any particular ship, at different 
 periods of an action like that which has just been related, would be a very 
 difficult, if not an impossible task. To give a general idea of the whole, at the 
 most eventful crisis of the day, is therefore all that can be attempted ; and 
 in the last Plate, many ships, from the very nature of the scene, which is 
 perpetually shifting, may not be accurately placed. This, it is hoped, will 
 be pardoned by those who from actual knowledge are better acquainted with the 
 subject. What is presented is from the best information that the writer could 
 obtain ; the same must be said of individual cases, or of particular incidents 
 which occurred in the battle. If more are not related, it is only because more 
 have not reached the knowledge of the writer ; who would be still most happy to 
 record every particular that would render justice to the brave, and illustrate their 
 professional character. 
 
 The following is from an intelligent and distinguished officer, then belonging 
 to the Ramillies : — 
 
 " In the battle of the 1st of June, a circumstance occurred, not generally 
 known. — In -the dreadful contest between the Brunswick (commanded by 
 Captain John Harvey) and Le Vengeur, one of the bower-anchors of the 
 former ship was shot away ; and the cable, not being stoppered within board, 
 ran out its whole length. This naturally brought the ship round-to, and 
 prevented her from veering or waring ; at the same time, throwing her close 
 on board of the Vengeur : each ship preparing to board. In this situation, they 
 were seen by the Ramillies, Captain Henry Harvey, brother of the Brunswick's 
 gallant chief, who fell upon that day. He immediately stood to her relief, and 
 placing himself in the most judicious and effectual position, and firing several 
 tremendous broadsides into the stern and quarters of the Vengeur, sent her 
 shortly after to the bottom." 
 
 The value of sprit-sails, and sprit-sail-top-sails, was seen in this action ; the 
 Ramillies wore by means of these two sails only, having nothing else in a 
 condition to set upon the ship. 
 
 To show, in a striking manner, what it is in the power of particular 
 
 2 F 2 
 
220 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 circumstances, apparently trifling, to effect in the most critical situations, may 
 be related a remarkable occurrence which took place in the battle of the 1st of 
 June on board the Marlborough. When that ship was entirely dismasted, and - 
 otherwise disabled by the extreme severity of the conflict ; the Captain (the Hon. 
 G. Berkley) severely wounded ; the ship so roughly treated that the officers were 
 considering of the necessity of surrendering ; — a cock, having escaped from his 
 coop, suddenly perched himself upon the stump of the main-mast, clapped his 
 wings, and crowed with extreme vociferation. In an instant three hearty 
 exhilarating cheers rang throughout the ship's company. 
 
 All classes immediately renewed their efforts to defend the ship ; victory at 
 the same time appearing to be inclined towards the British fleet, and succour 
 being rendered to the Marlborough,* she was happily rescued from her perilous 
 situation. 
 
 On that important day, when Great Britain, single-handed upon the ocean, 
 first opposed herself to the infuriated spirit of revolutionary France ; Lord 
 Howe, deeply impressed with the magnitude of the charge entrusted to him, 
 zealous for his country's honour, and perhaps inwardly exulting in the prospect 
 before him, could not conceal from the master (the skilful Palinurus of the fleet) 
 his great anxiety to penetrate the enemy's line in the very spot and manner 
 previously determined on. Fearing that the ship of the French Commander-in- 
 chief and his second a-stern would not give him room to enter, he called the 
 attention of the master, Mr. (now Commissioner) Bowen, to that object. The 
 undaunted seaman replied, " conning " the ship from the poop-ladder into 
 battle, " Never fear, my Lord, we'U make room enough for ourselves presently !" 
 
 It is unnecessary to point out how effectually the Admiral was assisted in his 
 great duties by this brave man ; while the conduct of the Captain, the late much 
 lamented Sir Andrew Douglas, throughout the whole of this eventful crisis, was 
 greatly conspicuous, by an entire devotion to his country's service. 
 
 His Majesty's ship the Brunswick was distinguished by a large figure-head 
 of the Duke of that august house ; proudly riding the waves, with his hand 
 upon his sword, and a laced hat upon his head. This figure was in the heat of 
 the battle (1st of June) deprived of his hat by a cannon-ball. The crew of the 
 Brunswick, not feeling satisfied that their great leader should continue uncovered 
 in the face of his enemies, sent a deputation, in form, to the quarter-deck, to 
 request that their Captain (John Harvey) would be pleased to order his servant 
 
 * At this moment the Aquilon, Captain (the Hon. Sir Robert) Stopford, came to her assistance, 
 and towed her out of the battle. 
 
EARL HOWE. 221 
 
 to give them his laced cocked hat to supply the loss. The Captain of course 
 immediately complied; and the hat, nailed upon the head of the figure, 
 remained there the rest of the action !* 
 
 Of Admiral, the first Lord Gardner (who so greatly distinguished himself in 
 this battle) it may be truly said, that he was one of the most zealous and 
 independent oflScers that ever the country produced. His thoughts were at all 
 times entirely and solely bent upon rendering service to his country, unmixed 
 with the smallest particle of self-interest. Of this feeling he was so extremely 
 tenacious, that he would not suffer even his secretary to be in any manner 
 connected with prizes and prize concerns. He was also a severe and strict 
 economist of the public stores. 
 
 During the time he commanded the Channel fleet, and was blockading that 
 of the enemy in Brest, it was his invariable rule, when standing in for the land, 
 to lead the line himself; then, to tack the fleet together, and lie off under easy 
 sail. By this means he became the sternmost, and the nearest ship to hold com- 
 munication with the in-shore squadron ; and upon tacking again, together, the 
 fleet were in line of battle, with their heads for the shore. Such a practice 
 merits imitation ; as the Commander-in-chief not only placed himself in the 
 most convenient position for receiving intelligence, but at the same time kept the 
 fleet in the best posture for battle. 
 
 When tacked together with their heads off for the night, they formed the line 
 of hearing of the tack just left ; and upon again tacking together, the line of 
 battle. Ships in the former situation (in what is called the bow-and-quarter-liue) 
 should be particularly attentive to preserve the bearing. 
 
 ADMIRAL HOTHAM'S BATTLE WITH THE FRENCH 
 FLEET OFF GENOA. 
 
 " His Majesty's ship Britannia, at sea, March l6th, 1795. 
 " I SHALL not enter into a detail of our proceedings until the two squadrons 
 got sight of each other, and the prospect opened of forcing the enemy to action ; 
 
 * In this battle Admiral Pasley suffered the amputation of a leg : in reply to an observation 
 respecting it, he said, " never mind the leg j take care of my flag !" 
 
222 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 every movement which was made being directed to that object, and that 
 alone. 
 
 " Yet the two squadrons did not get sight of each other until the 12th ; when 
 that of the enemy was discovered to windward. 
 
 " The signal was made for a general chase ; the weather being squally, and 
 blowing very fresh, we discovered one of their line-of-battle ships to be without 
 her top-masts, which aflforded to Captain Freemantle, in the Inconstant frigate, 
 an opportunity to distinguish himself. He was most ably seconded by Captain 
 Nelson of the Agamemnon ; but they were at this time so far detached from our 
 own fleet, that they were obliged to quit her, as other ships of the enemy were 
 coming up, by one of which she was soon after taken in tow. 
 
 " Finding that our heavy ships did not gain on the enemy during the chase, 
 I made the signal for the squadron to form upon the larboard line of hearing* 
 in which order we continued for the night. At day-Hght next morning (the 14th) 
 we observed the enemy's disabled ship, with the one that had her in tow, to be 
 so far to leeward, and separated from their own squadron, as to afford a probable 
 chance of our cutting them off. The opportunity was not lost ; which reduced 
 the enemy to the alternative of abandoning those ships, or coming to battle. 
 
 " Although the latter did not appear to be their choice, they yet came down (on 
 the contrary tack to which we were) with the view of supporting them ; but the 
 Captain and Bedford were so far advanced, and so closely supported by the other 
 ships of our van, as to cut them off effectually from any assistance that could be 
 given them. 
 
 " The conflict ended in the enemy's abandoning them, and firing upon our 
 line as they passed with a light air of wind. 
 
 " Our van ships suffered so much by this attack, particularly the Illustrious 
 and Courageux (having each lost their main and mizen-masts) that it became 
 impossible for any thing further to be done." 
 
 Plate XXXI. Fig. 1, shows the position of the two fleets when the French 
 were " first discovered, to windward ;" but the tack on which they were standing, 
 or the course steered, is not mentioned : they are placed on the starboard tack ; 
 the British fleet on the same tack to leeward.f 
 
 Fig. 2. After the signal for a general chase, when the Agamemnon and 
 Inconstant attacked the disabled ship, and were obliged to quit her. 
 
 * On the lines of bearing, see what Paul Hoste says further on. 
 
 t British, fourteen sail of the line and three or four frigates ; — French, fifteen ssiil of the line 
 and four frigates. 
 
PLAT B XXXI 
 
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ADMIRAL HOTHAM. 223 
 
 Fig. 3. Not gaining on the enemy, the signal was made to form upon the 
 " larboard line of bearing ;"* both fleets still supposed upon the starboard 
 tack ; the Admiral not having denoted his tack, nor that he had put about. 
 The British fleet in this Fig. therefore is placed upon the larboard XmQ of bearing, 
 but continuing on the starboard tack. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 It appears, however, not very likely that this should actually have been 
 the position of the British fleet ; but for the sake of inquiry, it may remain 
 so, in order to show the nature of a line of bearing such as that before us ; 
 which by being tacJeed together at once becomes a line of battle on the larboard 
 tack. 
 
 From a consideration of the circumstances related in the Admiral's letter, it 
 seems probable that the enemy was first encountered upon the larboard tack ; and 
 that the British fleet was formed upon the larboard line of bearing when chasing 
 upon the larboard tack; and upon the chase being discontinued, the fleet 
 resumed its position, upon the larboard line of bearing ; in other words, the line 
 of battle on the larboard tack, as in Plate XXXII, Fig. 4, when the leading 
 ships, supported by the van, succeeded in cutting ofi' the two disabled ships of the 
 enemy. 
 
 " The French bearing down on the opposite tack with a view to protect them, 
 the conflict ended by the enemy's abandoning them and firing upon our line as 
 they passed." 
 
 Here it is to be regretted that the British Admiral should have been satisfied 
 vdth the capture of two only of the enemy's ships ; for although two of his own 
 were much disabled, and rendered incapable of keeping then* stations, yet the 
 same comparative force still remained ; and the British Admiral, by tacking in 
 succession, when in position represented by Figure 4, might have passed through 
 the enemy's line, and brought him to close action, in whatever manner he thought 
 proper ; leaving the frigates, and such others as might be deemed necessary, to 
 take care of the prizes and disabled ships. 
 
 Paul Hoste speaks thus upon the lines of bearing in presence of an enemy : 
 
 " Quand on prevoit la ligne du plus-prSs sur laquelle on sera oblige de se 
 battre, on n'attend pas d'etre en presence des ennemis pour s'y ranger : mais 
 apres avoir mis I'armee sur cette ligne, on fait la route qui convient ; ainsi 
 
 • See note further on. 
 
224 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 quand le poste des ennemis, ou le lieu du combat, ou quelques autres circonstances, 
 auront fait juger au General de I'annee, A, B, qu'il faudra se battre sur la ligne 
 du plus-pres stribord, il rangera son armee sur cette ligne, et ensuite il fera la 
 route qui conviendra, courant vent-arriere, et largue de m^me bord, comme A, 
 B, I, L, ou vent-arriere, et largue de I'autre bord, comme G, H, C, D, ou au 
 plus-pres bas.bord, comme E, F." P. Hoste, p. QQ, pi. 21. 
 
 REMARQUE. 
 
 " On ne doit gueres ranger I'armee en cet ordre que quand on est a la vAe, et 
 fort pres de I'ennemi : car cet ordre est defectueux pour plusieurs raisons : 
 1. L'armee en cet ordre est trop etendue ; ce qui rend la communication des 
 commandemens fort mal-aisee ; outre que l'armee pent aisement se diviser par 
 la diversite des vents, des courants, des parages, &c. sur tout quand on est peu 
 eloigne des terres. 
 
 " 2. L'armee ne courant pas sur la ligne sur quoi elle est rangee, se maintien- 
 dra difficilement en ligne, et se trouvera bient&t en desordre. Aussi voions-nous 
 dans la pratique, qu'on ne se sert gueres de cet ordre, lors ra^me qu'on n'est pas 
 fort eloigne de I'ennemi." 
 
 The following opinions of Paul Hoste may serve as some reply to those who 
 consider that he has not advanced any thing in support of an attack upott a 
 particular part of an enemy's line of battle. The work itself gives many 
 instances of the contrary : — 
 
 UPON DOUBLING, PAUL HOSTE. 
 
 " L'armee qui est plus nomhreuse tachera d'elonger les ennemis, de teUe 
 maniere qu'elle laisse une queue de Parriere, qui se repliera ensuite sur 
 Tennemi pour le doubler, et le mettre entre deuxjeux." 
 
 " REMARQUE I. 
 
 " Si l'armee qui est plus nombreuse est au-vent, elle pourra plus aisement 
 replier sa queue sur celle de I'ennemi, et le mettre entre deux feux : mais si 
 l'armee qui est plus nombreuse est sous le vent, elle ne doit pas moins laisser 
 une queue de I'arriere, parceque le vent peut changer durant le combat; 
 
ADMIRAL HOTHAM. 225 
 
 d'ailleurs, I'armee qui est sous le vent, peut larguer insensiblement en com- 
 battant, pour donner lieu a sa queue de se replier sur Tenneini en pin9ant le 
 vent." 
 
 " REMARQUE II. 
 
 " Je s^ai que plusieurs habiles gens sont persuadez qu'il faut doubter les 
 ennemis par la t^te : parceque si la tete des ennemis est une fois en desordre, elle 
 tombe sur le reste de I'armee ; et elle y met infailliblement la confusion : car si 
 la Mte A, de I'armee A, S, se trouve demdtee, elle tomhe sur les vaisseaux qui 
 viennent apres, ceux-ci sur les suivans, et hientot tout les vaisseaux ne pouvant 
 plus avan^er, se milent, se douhlent, s'dbordent. La chose paroitra vraisem- 
 blable, si on ne fait pas reflexion, que les vaisseaux dans I'armee A, B, sont 
 rangez sur une ligne, avec des distances qui donnent lieu au vaisseau A de 
 passer au-vent du vaisseau E, qui pour lui faciliter la chose, peut un peu 
 arriver, sans craindre nuUe confusion. La t^te A, se tireroit encore plus 
 aisement d'intrigues, si I'armee A, B, etoit sous le vent ; d'ou je conclus que ce 
 n'est pas un grand avantage pour I'armee C, D, d'avoir double I'armee A, B, 
 par la tSte; parceque les vaisseaux de I'armee A, B, qui sont desemparez, 
 peuvent se retirer, sans que les vaisseaux G, F, puissent les poursuivre, a moins 
 qu'ils ne veiiillent essuier tout le feu de Tarmee ennemie, et se mettre en un 
 danger evident de perir. Au contraire, si les vaisseaux L, M, de I'armee C, D, 
 ont double la queue B, et que le vaisseau B vienne a ^tre desempare, il ne peut 
 pas s'empecher d'etre la proye des vaisseaux L, M, qui fondront sur lui, ou qui 
 le feront tomber sur la queue D." Paul Hoste, p. 376, plate 121. 
 
 The naval square described in all the more modern works on naval tactics is 
 taken from this of Paul Hoste. See his Plate 130, page 409. 
 
 2 G 
 
226 NAVAL BATTLES, 
 
 ADMIRAL HOTHAM'S BATTLE WITH THE FRENCH FLEET 
 
 OFF THE HIERES ISLANDS. 
 
 1795. 
 
 Extract. Britannia, at Sea, Juli^ 19, 1795. 
 
 " Yesterday, at day-ireak, we discovered them to leeward of us, cm the 
 larboard tack, consisting of twenty-three sail, seventeen of which proved to be 
 of the line. The wind at this time blew very hajrd from the W. N. W. 
 attended with a heavy swell; and six of our ships had to bend main- top-sails 
 in the room of those split in the night." 
 
 Plate XXXII, Fig. 1. "I caused the fleet, however, to be formed with all 
 possible expedition on the larboard line of bearing, carrying all sail possible 
 to preserve that order, and to keep the wind of the enemy, in hopes of cuttiag 
 them off from the land ; from which we were only five leagues distant. 
 
 " At eight 0^ clock, finding they had no other view but to get from us, I made 
 the signal for a general chase, and for the ships to tate suitable stations for their 
 mutual support; and to engage the enemy as arriving up with them in succession 
 (see Fig. 2, PI. XXXII); but the bailing winds and vexatious calms, which 
 render every naval operation in this country doubtful, soon afterwards took place, 
 and allowed a few only of our ships to get up with the enemy's rear about noon ; 
 which they attacked so warmly, that, in the course of an hour after, we had the 
 satisfaction to find one of the sternmost ships, viz. the Alcide of seventy-four 
 guns, had struck. The rest of their fleet, favoured by a shift of wind to the 
 eastward (that placed them now to windward of us), had got so far into Frejus 
 bay, whilst the major part of ours was becalmed in the ofiing, that it became 
 impossible for any thing further to be done." (See Fig. 3.) 
 
 The British fleet consisted of twenty-three ships of the line, and were to 
 windward; that of the enemy of but seventeen. It cannot therefore appear 
 surprising that seventeen should have had but one object in view, namely, to 
 escape if they could. 
 
 Plate XXXII,* Fig. 1, shows the supposed position of the two fleets in the 
 
 * It appears, from an officer who was in the British fleet, that it was formed in two lines on the 
 starboard tack, as in the figure c. c. 
 
PLATJSTUir 
 
 
 
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ADMIRAL HOTHAM. 227 
 
 morning when first discovered ; the British fleet forming the " larboard line of 
 hearing." As the Admiral has not said that he was steering a particular course, 
 we are left to conclude they must have been nearly upon a wind, or in a line of 
 battle on the larboard tack. 
 
 Fig. 2, represents the British fleet bearing down in general chase, preserving 
 their order ; namely, the larboard line of bearing, or that point of the compass 
 which is six points from the wind on the larboard tack. 
 
 As this is frequently confounded with, and misunderstood for, the relative, or 
 reciprocal bearing, and will continue to mislead if not more closely examined, it 
 is necessary here to enter more fully into an explanation of it, since it is a point 
 or part of our tactics highly important to be clearly understood. 
 
 The relative bearing of ships is the reciprocal bearing they have to each other 
 in their different orders and evolutions ; but very distinct froni the " lines of 
 hearing" starboard and larboard, as described and intended by the general 
 instructions, contained in the signal book now issued. 
 
 For instance, with the wind at north (as the " line of bearing" must always 
 have relation to the wind), the larboard line of bearing will be E. N. E. or six 
 points from the wind on the larboard tack : the starboard line of bearing 
 W. N. W. or six points from the wind on the starboard tack. 
 
 The wind upon this occasion being W. N. W. the larboard line of bearing 
 was, consequently, north and south, or six points from the wind ; when ships 
 were formed in line of battle upon that tack. Arranged upon that line, or 
 preserving that order, a fleet may be sailing any course, large, or before the 
 wind, that the Admiral may think proper ; the intention and utility of such 
 order or disposition being the ease with which, from that order, it can become a 
 line of battle ; which is performed by hauling the wind together upon the 
 larboard tack. 
 
 With the wind at W.N. W. the "starboard line of bearing" is S. W. 
 and N. E. or six points from the wind on the starboard tack ; and had the 
 Admiral fallen in with the enemy upon that tack, he might have chased him 
 upon the starboard line of bearing (or S. W. and N. E. line), with a view to the 
 facility of forming a line of battle, by bringing his fleet together to the wind on 
 the starboard tack, whenever he had approached the enemy's line sufficiently 
 near to have brought him to action. But to close the account of this engage- 
 ment, Plate XXXII, Fig. 3, describes the van of the British fleet having brought 
 the rear of the enemy to action : when one ship of the line was captured, and 
 the wind shifting, nothing more could be effected. 
 
 2 G 2 
 
228 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 In considering the proceedings of the British fleet on the morning of the 
 18th July, it cannot escape the attention of a careful observer, that much time 
 appears to have elapsed from day-break in the morning, when the enemy was 
 first seen to leeward, to the period of the general chase : since we are at the 
 same time told, it was evidently their intention to get away ; and that the land, 
 from which it was the wish of the British Admiral to cut them off, was distant 
 only five leagues. 
 
 Six ships having to shift their main-top-sails, ought not to have prevented the 
 British fleet from immediately bearing down to the attack ; as the most effectual 
 mode of cutting them off from the land ; the prospect of which never occurred 
 again. These are lessons which should never be forgotten by a sea officer, and 
 such opportunities once lost may never return. 
 
 We see that, " by the baffling winds and vexatious calms " which followed, 
 few only of the van could get up with the enemy about noon ; and but one ship 
 was captured. The wind then shifted, giving the enemy the weather-gage ; and 
 all was over. 
 
 LORD BRIDPORT'S CAPTURE OF THREE SHIPS 
 OFF L'ORIENT. 
 
 1795. 
 
 This capture was effected by a chase of great zeal and perseverance on the 
 part of the British fleet ; which was considerably superior to that of the enemy. 
 It does not appear that any thing more could have been done ; and it was by 
 great exertion that any part of the British fleet succeeded in cutting off the three 
 line of battle ships of the enemy close to the port of L'Orient, to which place 
 the rest of them made their escape. 
 
 In all long pursuits, like this, with light and variable wind, ships are much 
 separated ; many, by superiority of sailing, are far advanced before their com- 
 
ADMIRAL HOTHAM. 229 
 
 panions. These had the advantage, and to them belonged the danger and 
 honour of the day, as all that could be done was effected before the body of the 
 fleet could reach the scene of action. 
 
 It has since been considered, that justice will not be rendered to the parties 
 who had the good fortune to distinguish themselves upon this occasion, if the 
 (Conduct of the fleet be not more fully entered into ; and this cannot be done so 
 well as by giving extracts of Lord Bridport's letter ; with some information 
 relative to the situation of the two fleets at the close of the battle, from an officer 
 who was present. 
 
 " Royal George, at sea, June 24tli, 1795. 
 
 " His Majesty's squadron under my command attacked the enemy's fleet, 
 consisting of twelve ships of the line, attended with eleven frigates, and some 
 smaller cruizers, on the 23d instant, close in with the port of L'Orient. 
 
 " The ships which struck are Le Formidable, L' Alexandre, and Le Tigre ; 
 which were with difficulty retained. If the enemy had not been sheltered by 
 the land, I have every reason to believe that a much greater number would 
 have been taken or destroyed." 
 
 " Early in the morning of the 23d instant, the headmost ships, the Irresistible, 
 Orion, Queen Charlotte, Russell, Colossus, and Sans-Pareil, were pretty well up 
 with the enemy ; and a little before six o'clock the action began, and continued 
 till near nine. When the ships struck, the British squadron was near to some 
 batteries, and in the face of a strong naval port; which will manifest to 
 the public, the zeal, intrepidity, and skill, shown by all employed upon this 
 service." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 The wind, although not mentioned by the Admiral, was from the southward, 
 and the chase was from the dawn of day of the 22d, and continued with very 
 little of it, until the following morning. 
 
 The French squadron, upon approaching the S. E. end of Groix, found they 
 could not weather it, and were obliged in consequence to keep away under easy 
 sail, to round the N. W. point of it, before they could haul in for L'Orient. 
 
 The British fleet, not aware of the dUemma into which they had fallen, after 
 the capture of the three ships, unfortunately retired with their prizes ; whereas,, 
 had a few ships of the line, well in with Groix, and not able to fetch the 
 weathermost ships of the enemy, posted themselves for mutual support, off, 
 and close in with the N. W. point, many more of the enemy's fleet must have 
 been intercepted and brought to action, and most likely would have shared the 
 
230 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 fate of their companions. At this time there was no signal by which the wishes 
 of the Commander-in-chief to this effect could be signified ; and the opportunity 
 was lost before it was possible to convey instructions by other means. 
 
 A better acquaintance with this coast at a subsequent period enabled a dis- 
 tinguished officer, in a ship of seventy-four guns, by running in between the Isle 
 of Groix (or Groa) and L'Orient, and anchoring his ship, to destroy a squadron of 
 two frigates and a corvette, returning with the plunder of a long cruize. If the 
 detail of single exploits came within the scope of the present work, this would 
 make a conspicuous figure. It was effected in the face of several strong batteries, 
 under imminent risk of either running upon the rocks, or suffering the enemy to 
 escape. 
 
 The gallant and much-esteemed Admiral, under whose orders this service was 
 performed, observed, that " it was the only thing ever done at sea, which, was 
 it to do again, could not be done better." 
 
 It happened in the month of May, 1812. 
 
 THE RETREAT OF ADMIRAL THE HON. W. CORNWALLIS. 
 
 June, 1795. 
 
 Although this cannot strictly be considered in the light of a general action, 
 yet it is an event of so peculiar a nature, a display of conduct so highly 
 honourable to the British naval character, that it would be an unpardonable 
 injustice to the memory of the great Admiral to whom the glory is due, and to 
 the merit of his brave associates, if some account of it was not attempted. A 
 description of this celebrated retreat, therefore, the pride and boast of the 
 British navy, claims place, as a sacred duty, at the hands, however humble, of 
 a professional man. 
 
 We must begin by extracts from the Admiral's account of it. 
 
 " On the l6th in the morning, I sent the Phaeton a-head, to look for any of 
 the enemy's ships upon the coast ; and stood after her with the rest of the ships 
 (Royal Sovereign, Mars, Triumph, Brunswick, Bellerophon, and Pallas). At 
 
Plate. 
 
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ADMIRAL CORNWALLIS. 231 
 
 ten she made the signal for a fleet a-head. I made the signal to haul the wind 
 upon the starboard tack ; thirty sail were then counted upon a wind directly to 
 leeward of us. 
 
 " Upon asking their force. Captain Stopford answered, thirteen ships of the line, 
 fourteen frigates, two brigs, and a cutter ; in all thirty sail ; near half of them 
 tacked in shore ; in the afternoon the wind fell and came to the northward off 
 the land, and of course brought those ships of the enemy which had tacked to 
 windward, and the other ships laid up for us. They were seen in the morning 
 before dayJight upon both quarters of the squadron. 
 
 " At nine in the morning, one of the front line-of-battle ships began to fire 
 upon the Mars. Their frigates were ranged up a-breast of us to windward, 
 except one, which kept to leeward and ran up upon the larboard quarter of the 
 Mars ; then yawed and fired ; which was frequently repeated. This was the 
 only frigate that attempted any thing. 
 
 " The line-of-battle ships came up in succession ; and a teazing fire, with 
 intervals, was kept up during the whole day. In the evening they made a show 
 of a more serious attack on the Mars, and obliged me to bear up for her 
 support. This was their last effort, if any thing they did can deserve that 
 appellation. 
 
 " Several shot were fired for two hours after ; but they appeared to be 
 drawing off ; and before sun-set their whole fleet had tacked, and were standing 
 from us. The Mars and Triumph, being the sternmost ships, were of course 
 more exposed to the enemy's fire," &c. 
 
 DESCRIPTION.' 
 
 Plate XXXIII, Fig. 1, shows the relative position of the British squadron 
 (consisti'Hg of five sail of the line and two frigates) and the French fleet when 
 first seen and reported by Captain Stopford ; thirteen sail of the line, fourteen 
 frigates, two brigs, and a cutter ; and when the British Admiral " hauled upon 
 the starboard tack, with all our sail, keeping the ships collected." They are 
 therefore placed in line of battle on the starboard tack. 
 
 Fig. 2, represents their situation when nearly half of the French fleet had 
 tacked in shore, with a view of taking advantage of the land wind : which they 
 probably expected during the night; by which they laight reach the British 
 squadron. 
 
 Plat© XXXI V, Fig. 1, describes a more advanced state of the attack. 
 
 Fig. 2. — In the evening, when they made a show of a more serious attack 
 upon the Mars, the Admiral wore round, as in this figure, to her protection. 
 
232 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 T^hus ended this memorable defence, which can never be sufficiently admired 
 or extolled : it will ever hold up to British seamen a brilliant example of what 
 can be eflfected by skill, unanimity, and courage. In the language of the 
 dauntless Chief, " Could common prudence have allowed me to let loose their 
 valour, I hardly know what might not have been accomplished by such men." 
 
 French officers, present in this action, have declared, that the determined 
 resolution shown by this little band of heroes, the management of their ships, 
 and their steady and destructive fire, perfectly appalled them ; and they left them, 
 satisfied with having done all that was in their power. The modest Admiral 
 says nothing of his own fire, but the enemy have done justice to its powerful 
 effect upon them, 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 " I never have been able to view this retreat in so high a light as it has 
 been so often placed. Admiral Cornwallis deserves every credit for doing all he 
 could, and no brave man would have done less. Had the French attacked this 
 squadron seriously, it would have sold itself dearly ; but it must have been over- 
 powered. As in Barrington's affair at St. Lucie, I take more credit from the 
 French, than I am disposed to give to the English." 
 
 In a contest like this, it cannot be doubted that if our ships' sterns were 
 formed into circular hatteries they would prove of the greatest advantage ; 
 giving to the British ships the power of defending themselves with ease and 
 security, and much more effectually than with the square stems. 
 
 OF ADMIRAL CORNWALLIS. 
 
 When Admiral Cornwallis commanded the Channel fleet, and was occupied 
 in watching the motions of the enemy on the coast of France, it once happened 
 that he was so sanguine in his hopes of an opportunity to bring him to close 
 action, that, compelled to anchor for the night in sight of the enemy's fleet, 
 outside of the harbour of Brest, he during the night dispatched a cutter round 
 the fleet, with the following memorandum. 
 
 " The Commander-in-chief intends to attack the enemy to-morrow morning • 
 when every ship is to take, sink, burn, and destroy as many of their fleet as 
 possible ; he will himself lead in the Ville de Paris." 
 
 The fleet was all under weigh at dawn of day standing for the French fleet ; 
 which had also lost no time in weighing their anchors to escape into Brest. 
 Every exertion was made on the part of the British fleet to come up with them, 
 
ADMIRAL CORNWALLIS, 233 
 
 after sustaining a heavy cannonade from the batteries around the entrance of 
 Brest harbour. Upon this occasion the gallant Admiral led the body of the 
 fleet, stating as his reason, that no person could so well judge as himself, of 
 the proper time and expediency of tacking, to relinquish the attempt. He was 
 struck on the breast by a part of a shell fired from one of the batteries. 
 
 To adhere strictly to truth, and give what is due to Sir Richard Strachan, it 
 must be stated, that the Caesar, being a look-out ship in the direction of the 
 enemy, was, in reality, the headmost ship upon this occasion ; nor would he 
 yield his advantage to the Commander-in-chief, who, nevertheless, was foremost 
 of the main body ; observing that a junior officer might be exposed to blame 
 without deserving it, by tacking, when the Commander-in-chief, at a greater 
 distance, could not judge of his situation. 
 
 The plan of flag-officers taking the lead, upon all important occasions, has 
 before been recommended. " Billy Blue," as Admiral Cornwallis was nick- 
 named by the seamen, was a man of very reserved habits and manners ; of few 
 signals, and fewer words; but no one could have done the business more 
 effectually than he would. 
 
 The Caesar, upon being broken up very lately in the dock-yard at Plymouth, 
 was found to be more full of shot than any ship that had before been examined 
 in that yard. In obedience to the signal to " harass the enemy's rear," the 
 Caesar, Sir Richard Strachan ; the Montague, Captain R. W. Otway ; and the 
 Indefatigable, Captain Rodd, had an opportunity to distinguish themselves. 
 
 The unusual manner of waring the fleet practised by this officer should not 
 be overlooked ; for, although it may not have been adopted by others, experience 
 and consideration may, at a future time, render it less objectionable than by 
 many it is thought at present. The following description of it, therefore, is 
 given by the same officer to whom the writer was first indebted for his able 
 assistance and valuable remarks : — 
 
 " I happened to be but a very short time in company with the Channel fleet 
 during the practice of Admiral Cornwallis's novel manoeuvre of waring. The 
 manner of execution was this : — On the signal being made for waring (and he 
 established a particular one for this operation) his second a-stern shortened all 
 sail, and manoeuvred so as to admit the Admiral to pass a-head of him ; all sail 
 was then made by the secoud a-stern, until he had wore and gained his station 
 a-stern of the Admiral. The same operation was continued in succession through 
 the line ; and, I think, the advantage of it consisted in the fleet preserving its 
 ground to windward better than by the former mode of waring and passing to 
 leeward of the whole line. 
 
 2 H 
 
234 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 <c 
 
 I never witnessed this evolution at night, but was told that it was 
 occasionally practised ; and, in clear and moderate weather, it might be done 
 with safety. 
 
 " For myself, I should always prefer waring sternmost and leewardmost 
 first, keeping the line of bearing on one taek, and the line a-head on the other. 
 It aflfbrds more practice, and renders the order of sailing (otherwise dull and 
 monotonous) a perpetual school of observation and nautical practice. 
 
 Upon this subject another experienced flag officer observes : " For my part, 
 I cannot but think that all general evolutions by a fleet should be performed 
 together, whether in moderate or in blowing weather. This would insensibly 
 lead to the exercise of all other manoeuvres ; for officers, being accustomed to 
 keep their stations in the bow-and-quarter line, would very soon comprehend, 
 without much trouble, the other movements. This, I understand, was Lord 
 St. Vincent's mode of conducting his fleet. I think, also, that the Commander- 
 in-chief's position should be to windward, a-breast of the Admiral's ship of the 
 van division. Here he would be visible to the whole fleet, a circumstance that 
 rarely occurs, in the mode at present adopted, when the fleet is numerous, and 
 in three divisions. Moreover I am of opinion that the movements would be 
 simplified, if the van was always the weather division instead of the centre ; 
 which, with Lord Howe, was always stationed the most to windward." 
 
 Of Admiral Cornwallis's singular manoeuvre, one more opinion will be given. 
 It was kindly transmitted in compliance with a request, and from the hand of 
 an able and experienced seaman. 
 
 QUESTION. 
 
 " When a fleet is formed in the order of sailing in three divisions upon a 
 wind, and the weather will not admit of tacking, what is your opinion upon 
 ships waring in succession, the headmost first, and coming to the wind upon the 
 other tack a-head of their seconds a-stern ?" 
 
 ANSWER. 
 
 " In considering this question, so materially varying from the usual mode, it 
 becomes necessary well to examine the several circumstances that may arise in 
 practice to defeat the accomplishment of it ; together with a consideration of the 
 titility, and the degree of risk attending the performance of it; but more 
 especially as it may afifect the efficient state of a fleet for service. 
 
ADMIRAL CORNWALLIS. 235 
 
 " Experience has fully proved, that when the weather is boisterous, or there 
 is too much wind and sea for a fleet to tack, the ships will occupy more time 
 and space in waring, than when the sea is smooth, or the wind sufficiently 
 moderate to manage the sails with facility ; likewise, that ships varying in their 
 construction are extremely different in their movements. These and such like 
 uncertainties would render it indispensably necessary to form a fleet in a very 
 extended order of sailing, previous to the execution of this evolution; for which 
 I do not consider it an exaggeration to state, that the distance of each ship 
 from her second a-stern should not be less than three times what the established 
 regulation at two cables prescribes. But it is evident that such an extension of 
 the ships would militate against the first principle upon which an order of sailing 
 was established ; namely, for the forming in line-of-battle, either by day or night, 
 in the shortest possible time, with the least degree of risk, combined with such 
 a safe disposition of the ships as should best favour this object. It would, not 
 be consistent with the naval service to contemplate the ships of a fleet otherwise 
 than as one combined body, arranged in such an efficient state of constant prepa- 
 ration, as should best enable them to meet all the exigencies that might arise. 
 
 " In the event of a fleet being formed in such a sufficient open order of sailing 
 as would favour the evolution in question ; and should an enemy's fleet be 
 discovered at a short distance, either at day-break, or during the night ; and 
 a consequent necessity arise for immediately forming in line-of-battle ; — it is 
 obvious, from the increased distance between all the ships, that the stemmost 
 ship of the weather, or van division of the fleet, would, at that moment, be 
 separated from the headmost ship of the centre division, at three times the 
 distance that would be required in the same state of weather, when in the usual 
 prescribed order of saUing. Consequently there would be a loss of time, in 
 forming in line-of-battle, equal to the increased distance the stemmost ship 
 would have to run, in order to take her station a-head of the leading ship of the 
 centre division. 
 
 " The leeward, or rear division of the fleet, would experience an equal delay 
 in forming in line-of-battie. The commander of this division would, probably, 
 deem it expedient to allow the same time for the ships of the rear division to 
 close, as the ships of the centre would require, before he made the signal to ware 
 tc^ether in furtherance of the object in contemplation; as, by a contrary 
 proceeding, in the open order in which the fleet would be sailing, the headmost 
 ships of the rear division, after waring, would meet the centre ships of the centre 
 division ; and be obliged either to shorten sail before approaching too near, or 
 else to bear up and pass to leeward and a-stern of the remaining ships ; whilst 
 
 2 H 2 
 
236 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 many of the rear column, then in a line of bearing, would be unable to close 
 with their leader until again formed in a line a-head, a-stern of the centre 
 division ; and thus occasion a still further loss of time. Should the columns 
 be previously separated to a distance proportionate to the extension of the ships 
 in each column in order to guard against their meeting on opposite tacks ; then 
 the loss of time in completing a line-of-battle would be considerably augmented, 
 as a separation of two cables' length to leeward would require a distance of some- 
 thing more than five cables to be run, in order to recover the original position to 
 windward. 
 
 " The great diiFerence that is observable in the rate of ships sailing, in 
 proportion as the sea may be more or less on their broadsides or bows, presents 
 an additional obstacle to the safe execution of this evolution. It is likely often 
 to occur, that the ships of each division, after running the distance to leeward 
 that is unavoidable in waring, and then coming to the wind, and howing* the sea 
 with little way through the water ; whilst their seconds a-stern were more rapidly 
 advancing, would find it very hazardous to pass a-head of their seconds a-stern. 
 But, should the direction of the sea be reversed, and the rate of sailing increased 
 in the same proportion, when on the opposite tack, whilst the rear ships were slowly 
 advancing ; then it might be practicable to ware and pass with safety a-head of 
 their seconds a-stern : but the certain consequence would be, with such extended 
 columns, that the headmost ships of the centre and rear divisions would meet on 
 opposite tacks the centre ships of the columns next to windward of each other ; 
 and thus occasion an ultimate increased separation of the columns, proportionate 
 to their length ; as the leading ships would necessarily have to bear up, and pass 
 to leeward and a-stern of the rear ships. Should the ships of the columns, as 
 they successively ware, close again with their corresponding ships in the columns 
 next to leeward, by running parallel with them to windward of their respective 
 columns ; and preserving, at the same time, their relative bearings ; it is evident 
 that each time the fleet was directed to ware, there would be a loss of distance 
 to leeward, equal to three times what would be lost, were the fleet, from a compact 
 order of sailing, to ware the headmost first, and to pass to leeward and a-stern of 
 their respective columns ; admitting that the distance I have suggested, as being 
 necessary between each ship should not be greater than the several detailed 
 circumstances that may occur in practice would render prudent to allow. Those 
 
 * Bowing the sea is when a turbulent sea presents itself more a-head, or on the bows of a ship 
 and obstructs her course : it also occasions a very heavy pitching or plunging motion, frequently 
 springing a mast or yard. 
 
ADMIRAL CORNWALLIS. 237 
 
 officers who have witnessed the performance of this evolution, as being frequently 
 practised, well know that, at day-break, the rear-ships of the columns have been 
 hull down* a-stern from their leaders : so great has been the apprehension of 
 danger from not allowing space sufficient between the ships. 
 "It may, on a cursory consideration of this question, be imagined that, when 
 the leading ships of each division, and others in succession, have wore, and come 
 to the wind, on the opposite tack, a-head of their seconds a-stern, the fleet by 
 this evolution will have gained an advantage by preserving its position to 
 windward. 
 
 " Although I think enough has been already advanced, to refute such a 
 misconception; yet I wiU consider this view of the subject separately; and, 
 more generally, as it appears to furnish some pretext for its adoption. I have 
 to observe, that what the leading ships of each column would gain to windward, 
 by thus waring a-head of their seconds a-stern, the rear ships, and particularly 
 the lee columns, would lose in a greater proportion, by necessarily keeping so 
 far a-stern and to leeward. As a fleet, for all efficient purposes, must be 
 considered to act and move as a whole ; consequently, as the leading ships of 
 each division, after waring, would be obliged to shorten all possible sail, and to 
 continue in that state for a much longer period than would otherwise be necessary 
 to enable the ships to close, before an effectual line-of-battle could be formed ; 
 it follows, that as time, and distance to be run, are as one to the other, the ships 
 composing a fleet thus separated, would not, considered as a body, gain any 
 advantage to windward; but, on the contrary, the loss of time from the 
 increased distances would be very considerable : nor would it in any way affect 
 this question, whether the columns were previously formed in open order, com- 
 mensurate to the length of the columns, or not : for such a separation would be 
 produced, whenever the fleet was directed to ware in the manner under 
 consideration ; and the loss of time, as I have before shown, would be propor- 
 tionate to the distance to be recovered, 
 
 " It may not be out of place here to remark, as connected with the foregoing 
 observations, that the prescribed distances of the columns, in the established 
 order of sailing, has always a reference to an assumed number of ships in each 
 column ; and a consequent arrangement is made, sufficient for general purposes, 
 to giiard the leading ships from to leeward, against the risk of meeting the rear 
 ships to windward, when tacking in succession ; preserving, at the same time. 
 
 * " Hull down" is when the hull of a ship, from her distance, is not to be seen from the deck 
 of another— her masts and sails only appearing above the horizon. 
 
238 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 the ships of the fleet in as compact a state as possible for immediate service. 
 Thus when a fleet is formed in order of sailing in two columns, or grand divisions, 
 it is assumed, that the length of each is greater than when formed in three 
 columns ; and, in consequence, their distance is fixed at one mUe and a half. 
 When the fleet is formed in three columns, it is presumed there are a greater 
 number of ships ; but, being thus divided, the columns are less in length than 
 in the former instance, and the distances between each are reduced to one mile. 
 When the number of ships is still augmented, the fleet is divided into three 
 squadrons of two columns each ; the distances between the squadrons being fixed 
 at one mile ; assuming that the length of each, when the fleet is so divided, 
 would be comparatively short. But if, from this disposition in six columns, 
 the Commander-in-Chief should deem it advisable to form the fleet in three 
 columns ; which would have the effect of doubling the length of each ; no change 
 would be requisite in the general arrangement of distances, as by the established 
 regulations, the weather columns of each squadron would be already at the 
 prescribed distance from each other, of one mile and a half. The same degree 
 of general precaution is observed, to guard the leading ships as far as seems 
 necessary, from meeting those to windward, when tacking in succession ; as when 
 the fleet is composed of fewer ships divided in two grand divisions ; thus 
 manifesting throughout an attention to the security of the whole, whilst the 
 most compact order of sailing is preserved. 
 
 " With respect to the general safety of the ships, I think great danger would 
 attend the practice of this mode of waring, particularly during the night, 
 from the uncertainty of the precise distances of the seconds a- stern, as well as of 
 the rate of approximation of ships when crossing on opposite tacks. The ex- 
 perience of almost every officer will furnish him with proof sufficient to verify 
 this latter observation ; and bring to his recollection instances of ships, by day- 
 light, which, when attempting to cross, have both been obliged to heave in stays, 
 to prevent the otherwise unavoidable result of running on board of each other. 
 
 " Should the general arrangements now in force for the safe conduct of the 
 
 fleet he departed from ; as they necessarily/ must be, to enable the ships to ware 
 
 a-head of their seconds a-stern ; and this mode of waring be adopted; I am of 
 
 opinion that the general security and order of thefl^et, as well as its efficiency, 
 
 tcould be materially impaired, without obtaining any one desirable object.''' 
 
PXATEJ 
 
 
 IW.L 
 
 jh ^ Wind W.M S . 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
 
 i- T -t -' , Fiq.4i. 
 
 '^^A^± . \^ 
 
 
 % ^ ^ . ., 
 
SIR JOHN JERVIS. 239 
 
 THE ENGAGEMENT OF SIR JOHN JERVIS 
 
 (AFTERWARDS EARL ST. VINCENT) 
 
 WITH THE SPANISH FLEET OFF CAPE ST. VINCENT, 
 
 February 14, 1797. 
 
 We come now to the bold attack of the British fleet, under Sir John Jervis, 
 on a very superior force of Spaniards ; and the capture of four ships of the 
 line. 
 
 Extract from the Public Dispatch. 
 
 " I anxiously awaited the dawn of day ; when, being on the starboard tack, 
 Cape St. Vincent bearing E. N. E. eight leagues, I had the satisfaction of seeing 
 a number of ships extended from S. W. to S., the wind then W. by S, ; at 
 forty-nine minutes past ten, the weather being extremely hazy. La Bonne 
 Citoyenne made the signal that the ships seen were of the line, twenty-five in 
 number. 
 
 " His Majesty's squadron under my command, consisting of fifteen ships of 
 the line, named in the margin, happily formed in the most compact order of 
 sailing in two lines. By carrying a press of sail, I was fortunate in getting in 
 with? the enemy's fleet, at half-past eleven, before it had time to collect, and form 
 a regular order of battle. Such a moment was not to be lost ; and confident in 
 the skill, valour, and discipline of the oflicers and men I had the happiness to 
 coihmand ; — and judging that the honour of his Majesty's arms, and the 
 circumstances of the war in these seas, required a considerable degree of enterprise, 
 I felt myself justified in departing from the regular system ; and passing through 
 their fleet, in a line formed with the utmost celerity, tacked, and thereby 
 separated one-third from the main body ; after a partial cannonade, which 
 prevented their rej unction till the evening; — and by the very great exertions 
 of the ships which had the good fortune to arrive up with the enemy on the lar- 
 board tack, the ships named in the margin were captured, and the action ceased 
 about five in the evening." 
 
 DESCRIPTION DEDUCIBLE FROM THE ADMIRAL'S LETTER. 
 
 Plate XXXV, Fig. 1, represents the relative position of the hostile fleets; 
 when first discovered to each other in the morning, extended from S. W. to S. 
 
240 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Both fleets were, at first, on the same tack. The Spaniards afterwards tacked, 
 and continued on the larboard tack. 
 
 Fig. 2. By the prompt, skilful, and spirited decision of the British Admiral, 
 the fleets are supposed to be now in the situation described by Figure 2 ; where 
 the British squadron, in " a hne formed with the utmost celerity," had passed 
 through and separated one-third of the enemy's fleet from the main body. The 
 Admiral's letter says nothing of the Spanish fleet tacking. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 The judgment which directed this movement, and the alacrity and precision 
 with which it was carried into effect, cannot be sufiiciently admired, and were 
 productive of the advantage and success it deserved. Yet as, from this position, 
 a different mode of attack presents itself to a seaman's eye, he may be permitted 
 to indulge himself by submitting it to the consideration of others. Let it be 
 observed that the Figures from 1 to 4 consider the Spaniards to have remained 
 on the starboard tack, and that the larger proportion was to leeward : this was 
 not the case. 
 
 The Admiral tells us, he " then tacked, whereby he separated," &c. : while 
 the van was, by signal, tacking in succession, the action had become very close 
 and severe in the rear ; the enemy to windward having borne up, with a view to 
 pass round the rear of the British fleet, to join their main body to leeward. 
 
 Commodore Nelson, in the Captain, one of the rear ships, seeing the intention, 
 immediately bore up out of the line to prevent it ; in this he was followed 
 by two or three others ; and the contest in this part of the line became very 
 severe — the Captain having two of the enemy's ships alongside of her at the 
 same time ; but they effectually frustrated the enemy's design, and ultimately 
 captured four of them. 
 
 In this situation, then, it is presumed, was the rear of the British squadron, 
 when, " by the great exertions of the ships which had the good fortune to arrive 
 up with the enemy on the larboard tack," the victory was secured. 
 
 Plate XXXV, Fig. ,S, shows the supposed situation of the fleets, when, 
 according to signal, the van of the British fleet had tacked in succession. About 
 this time the events before mentioned were taking place in the rear ; and it will 
 be seen by the distance of the van, that considerable time must elapse, and 
 " great exertions " were necessary to enable them to render any support to the 
 ships engaged \ but their arrival put a decisive period to the battle. 
 
SIR JOHN JERVIS. 241 
 
 Fig. 4. Instead of the British squadron tacking in succession, it is here 
 proposed that they should tack together. 
 
 By this movement, it is conceived that the Spanish division to windward 
 might have been attacked to greater advantage : the action, by being more 
 general, would have been less severe upon the few, and the success still greater 
 than it proved : it is difficult to see how, under such circumstances, any of the 
 separated ships could have escaped ; while the British squadron, should it be 
 necessary, by tacking again together, would be in a line of hattlef ready to act 
 on the defensive against the designs of the main body of the fleet. 
 
 Remark. — " Another mode equally eligible is waring the fleet, sternmost ships 
 first, and the rest in succession." 
 
 What may occasionally be presented, differing from established practice, and 
 from modes adopted by brave and experienced officers, is submitted as questions 
 for their consideration, and an appeal to their judgment, rather than, by any 
 means, to imply censure. 
 
 " I agree with the proposed suggestion of tacking together ; and, had not 
 Lord St. Vincent commanded the fleet, I should consider that an oversight had 
 been committed, in taking the van so far beyond the enemy that it did not tack 
 until his rear was a-breast of that of the Spaniards. 
 
 " Forming the line appears to have been unnecessary : had the weather 
 division of our fleet kept its wind, it would have closed with, and intermingled 
 with, the enemy's weather ships ; while the lee division, closing up to leeward, 
 would have doubled on them, and at the same time prevented a junction. 
 Plate XXXVI, Fig. 1. 
 
 " I am ready to allow it was more prudent to attack as Lord St. Vincent did ; 
 but, having done so, he should have tacked sooner and together, or sternmost 
 first." 
 
 In this plan of attack, the lee division of the British fleet is exposed to the 
 attack of a much superior force, by the tacking together of the enemy's line to 
 leeward of it. It is daring in the extreme — and, should the lee division of 
 the eiiemy be otherwise than in a close line of battle, much advantage might be 
 reaped from it. 
 
 Notes on the tattle of the 14^A of February, 1797, collected from Officers 
 who were then on hoard the ship of the Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 When the Spanish fleet was first seen, it was standing on the starboard tack, 
 scattered and divided. As the British fleet advanced, the Spaniards tacked, and 
 
 2 I 
 
242 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 part was to windward, and part to leeward of the British fleet ; the weaiher-T^art 
 being the most numerous. In an irregular line it was steering aWay from the 
 wind to go round the rear of the British fleet, to join the other division of their 
 own. 
 
 The leeward part of the Spanish fleet was keeping its wind on the larboard 
 tack, trying to Weather the British van ; but in the attempt received the heavy 
 fire of the leading ships, and more particularly of the Victory, the ship of the 
 British Admiral; who only just weathered the ship of the Spanish Admiral, 
 which hove in stays under the Victory's fire, and suffered very severely. 
 
 The British van then tacked ; and, followed by the Victory, carried all the 
 sail they could to assist the rear of the British line, warmly engaged with the 
 windward division of the Spaniards. Plate XXXVI, Fig. 2, is intended to re- 
 present the battle about this period, and before the " Captain," the ship of 
 Commodore Nelson, had wore to stop their leading ships. 
 
 Upon his ship being disabled. Commodore Nelson went on board the Minerva, 
 Captain G. Cockburn, whom he directed to take him to the first ship he could 
 reach that was closely engaged with the enemy; but the signal being then 
 made to discontinue the action, he went on board the Victory ; where he was 
 received with open arms by the great Chief, and greeted with the warmest 
 cordiality. 
 
 The Commodore afterwards hoisted his broad pendant on board the Irresistible, 
 Captain George Martin. 
 
 The fleets separated, by the British fleet continuing on the starboard tack, 
 and the Spaniards on the larboard tack, leaving four large ships in our 
 possession, 
 
 " His Majesty's ship Prince George, Lagos Bay, Feb. 18th, 1797. 
 
 " Extract of a Letter from Sir W. Parker. 
 
 " About a quarter before eleven the signal for the line-of-battle without regard 
 to the order presctibed ; the enemy now being open to our view, in a disordered 
 line upon the larboard tack : the King's fleet upon the starboard tack. At forty- 
 two minutes past eleven the signal to cut through the enemy's line, I being the 
 only flag oflicer in the van, this was effected by the CuUoden, Blenheim, myself 
 in the Prince George, Orion, and Colossus. The CuUoden passed through, 
 leaving some ships of the enemy between the Prince George and herself; the 
 other four of us were close after each other, which occasioned the enemy's ships 
 left in the rear, though the two headmost were three-deckers, to tack, and make 
 a great deal of sail. At forty-eight minutes past eleven the signal to engage, 
 
SIR JOHN JERVIS. 243 
 
 which continued during our passing through a number of the enemy's ships, upon 
 the contrary tack in no regular order, close on board of some, and others more 
 distant, and until eighteen minutes past twelve, when we tacked per signal, in 
 which time the Colossus lost her fore and fore-topsail yards. 
 
 "At twenty minutes past one o'clock, the signal to cut back through the enemy's 
 line and engage them to leeward. When we tacked, the two three-deckers 
 tacked after us, and which the rest of the enemy's rear were about to do, but the 
 Commander-in-Chief, with the centime and rear followed close, and covered us 
 from their attack, and obliged them to re-tack, engaging that part of the enemy's 
 fleet, and effectually dividing it. 
 
 " Commodore Nelson, in the Captain, being in the rear of our line upon the 
 starboard tack, tacked, and joined the ships with me in the van. We got up 
 with the enemy's van, now considerably the larger number, and in great disorder, 
 at a quarter-past one o'clock, upon the larboard tack, and began to engage, close 
 on board of them. 
 
 " At forty-three minutes past one the signal by my order for the ships a-head 
 to fill and stand on, which I found necessary to repeat at three o'clock. The 
 Commander-in-Chief arriving up in the rear of the Orion, my second a-stern 
 repeated it also. This part of the action was supported until this time by the 
 CuUoden, Captain, Blenheim, Prince George, and Orion : during which time the 
 enemy never formed ; therefore, though we had the fire of two or three of them 
 together, yet, from their disordered state, our fire had a great effect upon them, 
 for it could not be lost, even if it had not the full effect upon the ships we were 
 more particularly opposed to. They were so huddled together, I've no doubt but 
 that they did each other a great deal of injury ; by this time five of them became 
 very much disabled, and the Excellent, at twenty-three minutes past three, closed 
 with one to windward and she struck her colours, and one of the three-deckers we 
 had engaged and left in our rear much disabled, struck, I believe to the Victory. 
 
 " Soon after, from the disabled state of the " Captain," (fore-top mast gone) she 
 fell on board one of the ships she had been opposed to, but whether from exact 
 intention of Commodore Nelson I am to learn, however he boarded her and made 
 her strike, and a three-decker bearing a Rear Admiral's flag, struck to the fire of 
 the Prince George, and from her disabled state fell on board the same ship Com- 
 modore Nelson was on board of, upon the quarter, on the other side. By this 
 time the Namure passed between the Prince George, Culloden, and the Saint 
 Trinidad of 130 guns, Don Cordova, Commander-in-Chief; the ship was appa- 
 rently in a sinking state, but receiving timely support, was saved the necessity 
 of surrendering, though it was asserted that she did strike her colours. At sun- 
 
 a I 2 
 
244 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 set the signal to ware and come to the wind on the other tack ; to form in close 
 order of battle and cover the prizes. 
 
 " I feel it incumbent on me to say, that the Captain, CuUoden, and Blenheim, 
 but more particularly the two former, bore more of the brunt of the action than the 
 Prince George and Orion, from their being more in the van. The Commander- 
 in-Chief certainly displayed great naval abilities in conducting the attack, and in 
 the maYiagement throughout, and I do not believe the King has a more competent 
 officer. 
 
 " I fully believe that more acts of gallantry were shown than could possibly have 
 come within my observation," &c. &c. 
 
 By the unwearied diligence of a naval friend, the writer is enabled to lay before 
 the reader some further accounts of this celebrated battle. They are extracts 
 from "A Journal of the Proceedings of H. M. Fleet on the 14th of February, 
 1797j by an officer on board one of the ships that bore a distinguished share in 
 the action :" with apian, a copy of which is given in Plate XXXVI, Fig. 3. 
 
 " After passing over the mention of several signals by different ships, denoting 
 the appearance of a strange fleet, we shall proceed at once to those made when it 
 was at length clearly discovered through the fog, and at fifty-five minutes past ten, 
 by the Bonne Citoyenne, declared by signal to be twenty-five sail of the line. The 
 enemy a-head endeavouring to form on the larboard tack. Observed one of their 
 line-of-battle ships with her fore-top-mast gone. At eleven the Admiral made 
 the signal to form the line of battle a-head and a-stern of the Admiral as most 
 convenient, steering S. S. W. At sixteen minutes past eleven the signal to alter 
 course one point to port in succession. At twenty-five minutes past eleven, that 
 the Victory would take her station a^stern of the Colossus. At twenty-seven 
 minutes past eleven, to alter course one point to starboard in succession. 
 Observed a Vice Admiral in a three-decked ship, four two-deckers and some 
 frigates of the enemy separate from the body of the fleet, and bear up with the 
 wind on the starboard quarter, steering about S. E. 
 
 " At twenty-nine minutes past eleven the signal was made, that the Admiral 
 intends to pass through between the ships of their line for engaging them to 
 leeward, when having the weather-gage of the enemy ; or, being to leeward, to 
 pass between them, for obtaining the weather-gage. The enemy's five ships in 
 the S. E. hauled their wind, and endeavoured to form on the starboard tack. 
 
 " At thirty-four minutes past eleven the signal to come to the wind on the 
 starboard tack in succession, our rear and centre forming as they arrived up. 
 « The CuUoden took her station a-head in the line of battle ; the Blenheim 
 
SIR JOHN JERVIS. 2i5 
 
 second ; the Prince George on her lee-bow, the Orion on her lee-quarter. At 
 thirty-five minutes past eleven the signal was made to engage. The Culloden 
 began a warm and well-directed fire, which was immediately returned by the 
 enemy's van and centre ; and the action soon became general, as the fleets passed 
 on opposite tacks. At twelve, having passed the rear of the enemy, the 
 Culloden tacked by signal. Observed five sail of the line and some frigates of 
 the enemy to leeward to tack to the northward. At six minutes past twelve the 
 Blenheim tacked, and closed with the Culloden : the Prince George and Orion 
 also tacked and formed in her rear. At 12^ 19' the Colossus carried away her 
 fore and fore-top-sail-yard, in stays, but wore immediately, and came to the wind 
 on the larboard tack : the enemy's fleet bearing N. by E., distant about two or 
 three miles, going large, with the wind abaft their beam. 
 
 " At 12^ 22' the Admiral made the signal that he intended to pass between 
 the enemy, for obtaining the weather-gage. At 12^ 30' the Spanish Admiral 
 with five sail in the S. E. opened their fire on the Victory and centre of our fleet 
 in passing them. At 33 minutes past twelve, the Spanish Admiral all a-back, 
 and the Victory in stays. The five Spanish ships wore and stood to the south- 
 ward. At 12^ 35' observed H. M. ship Captain steer and make sail to the 
 northward, on the larboard tack. At 12'' 42' the Captain took her station in 
 the van, a-head of the Culloden, and both engaged the centre of the enemy, 
 seemingly in great confusion. At one, signal for ships to take suitable stations 
 for mutual support, and engage as arriving up with the enemy. At 1*^ 13' the 
 signal for the Minerva to take the Colossus in tow. At 1*^ 25' the signal to 
 come to the wind in succession on the larboard tack. The Culloden and Captain 
 with their mizen-top- sails a-back, their sails and rigging much cut. At two, one 
 of the enemy's ships had her main-top-mast shot away. At 2** 30' the Blenheim 
 warmly engaged, having a four-decked ship on her larboard beam, two two-deckers 
 nearly a-stern of her, and another to windward, keeping up a constant fire. The 
 smoke clearing away a little, saw an enemy with his mizen-mast gone. At 
 S** 37' the Captain lost her fore-top-mast. Observed the Excellent to pass the 
 Captain, and take a station to support her. At 3*" 40' the Captain, the ship 
 she was engaging, and the ship with her mizen-mast gone, were on board of 
 each other, 
 
 " At four the smoke had cleared away a-stern : — observed a three and a two- 
 decked ship had struck, besides the two on board of the Captain. 
 
 " The signal for the fleet to bring- to. At 4*^ 11' the enemy's four-decker lost 
 her main-top-mast :: — the headmost of our ships in close action. Observed the 
 
246 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 five sail before to leeward standing in to the fleet under a press of sail to 
 v\dudward, and firing upon our ships in passing. At 4*" 27' the signal to come 
 to the wind on the starboard tack. At 4'' 49' wore. At 4*^ 50' the firing ceased 
 on both sides." 
 
 Plate XXXVI, Fig. 3, describes the position of the two fleets with reference 
 to this journal, and is noted as follows : — 
 
 A, Five sail of the Spanish line and some frigates. 
 
 B, British fleet in close line on the starboard tack. 
 
 C, The body of the Spanish fleet in an irregular line to windward, engaging 
 as they pass. 
 
 D, The Santissima Triuidada, with some others, bearing down to leeward. 
 
 E, Several Spanish ships that had kept their wind. 
 
 F, The Captain, of seventy-four guns, on board of the San Nicolas and San 
 Josef at the same time. 
 
 G, San Nicolas, taken. 
 
 H, San Josef, 112 guns, taken. 
 
 I, Salvador del Mundo, taken. 
 
 K, San Isidro, taken. 
 
 L, Santissima Trinidada, struck, but got away. 
 
 M, Irresistible engaging the Salvador. 
 
 N, The Diadem of sixty-four guns, engaged until other ships came up. 
 
 The ships as numbered and named in the plan, and given in the figure, are as 
 follow : — 
 
 1, CuUoden. 9, Goliah. 
 
 2, Blenheim. 10, Captain. 
 
 3, Prince George. 11, Excellent. 
 
 4, Orion. 12, Namur. 
 
 5, Barfleur. 13, Britannia. 
 
 6, Colossus. 14, Diadem. 
 
 7, Victory. 15, Irresistible. 
 
 8, Egmont 
 
 The dotted lines show the movements of some of the ships during the action. 
 
PZATHSKXXm. 
 
 * > ^ ^ ^ 
 
 ■*«■ ^ ^ . 
 
 B ^ ^ ^ ^ .;, , ^ 
 
 ^ ^^ ^ ^ a/..-' 
 
 ^ -^ -^ J^ , 
 
 
 
 
 Fm.3. 
 
 
 Si i-^,,^ 
 
 >f^ 
 
 ^5 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 K L 
 
SIR JOHN JERVIS. 2i7 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 Here, in the conduct of the heroic Nelson, followed by several others, is seen 
 a bold departure from established order and strict discipline : which, had it not 
 met with the success that attended it, might probably have drawn upon the 
 leader a heavy responsibility ; but in this case it was wisely overlooked by the 
 Commander-in-Chief; who was said to have made a noble reply, when urged by 
 an officer near him to visit such a breach of order by a public investigation. 
 The writer not having been able to trace this circumstance to an authentic source, 
 as such was not heard to pass by other officers close to the side, and much in 
 the confidence of the Chief on the day of battle, he does not give it ; the reply 
 was worthy of the Noble Earl, but it is hoped no feeling of hostility to the 
 Commodore could have given rise to it. 
 
 When we compare the position of the fleets as shown in Fig. 3, (Plate XXXVI.) 
 with the signals of the Commander-in-Chief, we are led to imagine that the rear 
 of the enemy to windward was the object it was his intention to attack, by keeping 
 the wind, and causing the van to tack in succession ; having before effectually 
 prevented any junction of the ships at A. In this, he might very probably have 
 succeeded to his wishes, by cutting off many of the sternmost ships from the body 
 of their fleet. The new and important events that were taking place in the 
 rear of his own line, however, obliged him to change his intention, and hasten to 
 support the gallant band that with so much address had arrested the course of 
 the wary Spaniards, in their attempts to join others to leeward. By this 
 judicious measure he supported and covered the attack, and secured the captures 
 made. It may yet appear, that by waring the whole line in quick succession, 
 beginning with the sternmost ship, still more might have been accomplished. 
 
 Same particulars relative to the proceedings of H. M. ship Captain, 
 hearing the hroad pendant of Commodore Nelson. 
 
 " At one p. m. the Captain having passed the sternmost of the enemy's ships 
 which formed their van and part of their centre, consisting of seventeen sail of 
 the line ; they on the larboard and we on the starboard tack ; the Admiral made 
 the signal to tack in succession ; but Commodore Nelson perceiving the Spanish 
 ships all to bear up before the wind, or nearly so, evidently with an intention of 
 forming their line, going large, and joining their separated division, at that time 
 engaged with some of our centre ; ordered the ship to be wore, and passing 
 
248 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 between the Diadem and Excellent, at a quarter past one, was engaged with the 
 headmost and leewardmost of the Spanish ships; namely — the Santissiraa 
 Trinidada, of 130 guns, San Josef, of 112 do., Salvador del Mundo, of 112, 
 San Nicolas, of 80, another first-rate, and a 74, names not known. We were 
 immediately joined, and most ably supported by the CuUoden, Captain Trow- 
 bridge. The Spanish fleet trying to avoid such close fighting, hauled to the 
 wind on the larboard tack. For near an hour did the Culloden and Captain 
 support this apparently unequal contest ; when the Blenheim, passing between 
 us and the enemy, gave us a respite and sickened the Dons. 
 
 " At this time the Salvador and San Isidro dropped a-stern, and were engaged 
 in a masterly style by the Excellent, Captain CoUingwood, who compelled the 
 San Isidro to hoist English colours ; and it is thought the Salvador then struck : 
 but Captain CoUingwood, disdaining the parade of taking possession, gallantly 
 pushed on under all sail, to save his old friend and messmate, who was, to 
 appearance, in a critical state ; the Blenheim being a-head, and the Culloden 
 crippled and a-stern. The Excellent ranged up within ten feet of the San 
 Nicolas, giving her a tremendous fire. The San Nicolas luffing up, the San 
 Josef fell on board her, and the Excellent passing on for the Santissima Trini- 
 dada, the Captain resumed her station a-breast of the San Nicolas and San Josef 
 and close alongside. At this time the Captain having lost her fore-top-mast, not 
 a sail, rope, or shroud left ; her wheel shot away, and incapable of further 
 service in the line or chase ; the Commodore directed Captain Miller to put 
 the helm a-starboard, and calling for the boarders, ordered them to board." 
 
 By another officer in the fleet it is stated that, " the Spaniards were not in 
 line, but in a confused cluster of at least a mile long. The wind was very light 
 and partial (I should not think the fleet were at any time going above four miles 
 an hour, though under all sail). The ' Journal ' makes the Victory tack before 
 the Captain wore, which certainly was not the case. My own idea is, that the 
 Captain wore immediately after the CuUoden tacked, and that the Excellent 
 tacked out of the line to support the Captain just before the Victory tacked 
 (the Culloden and Blenheim having already passed the Excellent). The 
 Culloden was the first ship that came to the Captain's assistance, then the 
 Excellent and Blenheim but which first I do not remember. 
 
 " Had our fleet tacked -together when the Culloden did, our sternmost ships 
 would have fetched them, and in their state of confusion more would certainly 
 have been done. Indeed, as it was, it is difficult to give a good reason why the 
 Santissima Trinidada was allowed to escape. 
 
 *' The Spanish fleet were in fact in a state of actual flight. It must, however, 
 
SIR JOHN JERVIS. 249 
 
 be remembered, that we had three ships, the Captain, CuUoden, and Colossus, 
 disabled, and that to the remaining twelve the Spaniards could oppose 
 twenty-three. 
 
 " It is easy to find out what might have been done after a battle is over, and 
 here our forming a line of battle at all seems to have been a misfortune ; for it 
 prevented our fetching into the body of the Spanish fleet, which our weather 
 line in the order of sailing could have done, had they not run down to the lee 
 line to form the line of battle. 
 
 " The Journal allows the Captain but seven minutes from the time of her 
 waring to her being in ' close action,' The thing is impossible. I suspect 
 the time of the various occurrences to be incorrect throughout the Journal, and 
 was probably stated from memory of the events, and not from observation at the 
 moment." 
 
 A Spanish account of the battle of the lith of February, 1797. 
 
 " On the 13th of February at night, the corvette that preceded the squadron 
 made signal that several English ships were in sight, which were taken for a 
 convoy, of which some had been captured the evening before. After much 
 deliberation, orders were given to keep as near the land as possible. In the 
 morning of the 14th, at half-past seven, the belief still prevailed that the ships 
 were but a convoy : a thick fog prevented any accurate knowledge. At ten the 
 frigate Santa Catalina, being a-head, made signal for ships of the line in the 
 N. E. The signal was repeated by the Preciosa. Every one was then convinced 
 it was the English fleet. The Spaniards, relying too much on their superiority, 
 began a general chase, as if the English had evinced a disposition to retreat. 
 Upon the fog clearing away, they saw the British fleet in two lines making all 
 the sail they could to cut off the squadron. 
 
 " Eleven o'clock came ; it was no longer possible to form the line. After 
 many efforts and much disorder, a square was formed. In the mean time the 
 English came within reach. After the first broadsides, the advanced guard 
 broke through, and cut out of the line several ships, amongst which were the 
 San Isidro and San Nicolas. Upon this, the Admiral's ship, seconded by seven 
 or eight others, commanded by French emigrants, advanced in a line to take the 
 enemy on the starboard side, and to give time to the ships to form the line of 
 battle. 
 
 " Admiral Cordova was himself o» board a frigate, and left the command to 
 Captain Essano. 
 
 2 K 
 
350 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " The former movement disengaged several ships, and it was hoped both sides 
 might be put on a par, but these hopes and efforts were vain. 
 
 " More than twelve ships having hung out signals of distress, for want 
 of goodwill, could not even form a van-guard. It was now six p. va., when 
 a land-breeze favoured the English, who by skilful manoeuvre surrounded four 
 of our ships, and carried them off. The remainder of our squadron dared not 
 follow them." 
 
 ADMIRAL DUNCAN OFF CAMPERDOWN. 
 
 1797. 
 
 " Venerable, off the coast of Holland, 12th October, three p. m. 
 Camperdown, E. by S. eight miles, wind N. by E.* 
 
 " Sir, 
 
 " I have the pleasure to acquaint you, for the information of the 
 Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that, at nine o'clock this morning, I 
 got sight of the Dutch fleet ; at half-past twelve, I passed through their line, 
 and the action commenced, which has been very severe. The Admiral's ship is 
 dismasted and has struck, as have several others, and one is oil fire." 
 
 " Venerable, October 13, 1797. 
 " At nine o'clock in the morning of the 11th, I got sight of Captain 
 TroUope's squadron, with signals flying for an enemy to leeward ; I immediately 
 bore up and made signal for a general chase, and soon got sight of them, 
 forming in a line on the larboard tack to receive us ; the wind at N. W. As we 
 approached, I made the signal to shorten sail, to connect the squadron : soon after 
 I saw the land between Camperdown and Egmont, about nine miles to leeward 
 of the enemy, and finding there was no time to be lost in making the attack, 
 I made the signal to bear up, break the enemy's line, and engage them to 
 leeward, each ship her opponent ; by which I got between them and the land, 
 
 * This precisipn of time, place^ the wind, &c. is important and well-judged. The letter itself 
 Taings to our recollection the style of Captain Walton off Syracuse, and is by no means inferior 
 to it. 
 
ADMIRAL DUNCAN. 251 
 
 whither they" were fast approaching. My signals were obeyed with great 
 promptitude ; and Vice Admiral Onslow, in the Monarch, bore down on the 
 enemy's rear in the most gallant manner, — his division following his example ; 
 and the action commenced about forty minutes past twelve o'clock. 
 
 " The Venerable soon got through the enemy's line, and I began a close 
 action, with my division on their van, which lasted near two hours and a half; 
 when I observed all the masts of the Dutch Admiral's ship to go by the board. 
 She was, however, defended for some time in a most gallant manner ; but, 
 being overpressed by numbers, her colours were struck, and Admiral de Winter 
 was soon brought on board the Venerable. 
 
 " On looking round me, I observed the ship bearing the Vice Admiral's flag 
 was also dismasted, and had surrendered to Vice Admiral Onslow ; and that 
 many others had struck. 
 
 " Finding we were in nine fathoms water, and not further than four miles 
 from the land, my attention was so much taken up in getting the heads of the 
 disabled ships off shore, that I was not able to distinguish the number of ships 
 captured ; and the wind haying been constantly on the land since, we have 
 unavoidably been much dispersed, so that I have not been able to gain an exact 
 account of them ; but we have taken possession of eight or nine, — more of them 
 had struck," &c. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 The gallant Admiral having informed us both of his own force and of that of 
 the enemy, we are under some degree of surprise* to find that, in the list of 
 killed and wounded, ah account of ten ships only is given ; one of them the 
 Isis of fifty guns. 
 
 Admiral de Winter, in his account of the battle, considers the British 
 fleet to have consisted of sixteen sail of the line, including the fifty-gun ship ; 
 but he has mis-stated the tack on which he stood when attacked by the British 
 Admiral. 
 
 Admiral Duncan's squadron consisted of sixteen ships of two decks ; as the 
 Russell, commanded by Captain TroUope, who first gave notice of the enemy, 
 with others under his orders, joined in the chase, and was present in the 
 battle. 
 
 • In Schomberg's Naval Chronology, the force stated is sixteen British of two decks^ and two 
 frigates, and a sloop of war ; Dutch, fifteen of two decks, four frigates, and six sloops of war ; 
 superior in number of guns by about 150. (See his App. vol. iv.) 
 
 2 K 2 
 
252 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Extract of a Letter from Captain W. O'Brien Drury, of H. M. Ship 
 Powerful, seventyfour guns. 
 
 " October l6th, 1797- 
 
 " Our late action off the Texel was so curious a scramble, that it would be im- 
 possible to mention all the circumstances without creating as much confusion in 
 your mind as there was in our fleet. What has immediately fallen under my 
 knowledge I will recount. * * * 
 
 " At nine we discovered the Dutch fleet formed in a line a-head on the lar- 
 board tack, lying-too — we kept steering down upon them with a press of sail ; 
 the signal for a general chase having been made. Admiral Duncan made the 
 signal to shorten sail, and for the line to be formed N. W. and S. E. It 
 was not clearly imderstood, and the fleet continued in great disorder, still closing 
 the enemy ; it was then blowing strong, and he made the signal to bring to, and 
 take two reefs in the topsails ; that being done, he made the signal to attack 
 your opponent in the line on coming up, and immediately after Vice Admiral 
 Onslow's signal was made to attack the rear of the enemy, and No. 34 soon after, 
 to cut their line. * » * 
 
 " Upon the lee quarters of the line of battle ships were placed their frigates 
 and brigs, to fire I imagine red shot shells, and grenades ; I judge so from being 
 set on fire hy a shot on the starboard gangway hy the frigate which supported 
 my opponent in the line, and from combustibles bursting between decks, which 
 have done infinite mischief and set me on fire in the fore-cockpit ; which by 
 God's providence was extinguished, or in five minutes we must have been 
 blown up ! 
 
 " No sooner did Admiral Duncan make signal 34, but the Vice Admiral 
 Onslow, in the Monarch, with the most decided gallantry, marked to the fleet 
 their duty, by steering directly down on the Dutch Vice Admiral. 1 was so for- 
 tunate as to be the gallant Admiral's second a-stern, therefore closed the Mo- 
 narch a-breast, and we cut the enemy's line at the same moment, and at the 
 same time luff'ed within pistol shot — the Monarch of the Dutch Vice Admiral, 
 the Powerful of his second a-stern, and not ten yards from my jib-boom to the 
 Monarch's stern. In twenty minutes my opponent struck her colours, and in 
 ten or twelve more the Dutch Vice Admiral also struck. At this time very few 
 of our ships had got into action, and what is extraordinary to say, the Monarch 
 and Powerful were I think twenty minutes engaged to leeward of the enemy's 
 line before a single gun was fired from any ship in the British line. The brig 
 which fired into the Monarch was sunk, and my frigate made off. 
 
ADMIRAL DUNCAN. 253 
 
 " Admiral Duncan was now in close action in the van, and the ships in the 
 rear were pretty well defeated. — I was soon able to make sail, and joined action in 
 the van, but not in a condition to place myself properly, my fore and fore-top- 
 sail-yard being shot away ; I pushed forward to support Admiral Duncan, who 
 appeared to be surrounded by Dutchmen. The Triumph I first met, appearing 
 much beaten, and next the Venerable, followed by the Ardent. * * * 
 
 " At the time Admiral Duncan was coming out of a very heavy fire to leeward 
 of the enemy's ships, three of our men of war were firing at the Dutch ships 
 from to windward, at so ridiculous a distance that even my little son desired to 
 make the signal for closer action, which he did, and it was kept flying until I 
 joined our gallant Admiral. I wore upon his quarter ; and the unfortunate 
 Dutch Admiral which I had passed on different tacks, half an hour before, and 
 who had shot away my fore-yard, was now astern, standing towards his van, 
 which were flying, but fighting : he was to pass the Venerable and me ; being 
 much beaten at this time, he was very soon dismasted, and being surrounded by 
 our ships he struck. * * * 
 
 " Had Admiral Duncan's instructions, and No. 34, been carried into effect, 
 I do not believe a single ship would have escaped ; for however well this fleet 
 was manned and obstinately defended, they were by no means upon a footing 
 with us ; for I give you my word, that after the first quarter of an hour the 
 sixty-four or sixty-eight which we took, and a large Razee frigate, were 
 comparatively silenced ; and 1 am sure from the time Vice Admiral Onslow 
 commenced the action until our two ships were taken could not have been forty 
 minutes. 
 
 " Admiral De Winter informed me that this fleet was the completest that ever 
 sailed from Holland, and that expectation was on the tip-toe, from the full 
 persuasion that we must have been defeated. I am satisfied they built their 
 hopes of success on the certainty of setting us on fire. The French forced them 
 to sea, and all the mobility of Holland insisted upon their making another 
 ' Dogger BanJe ' of it. * * * 
 
 " I am sure you will be pleased to hear that my son behaved like a hero. I had 
 my pocket shot off, and received a very severe bruize on the fleshy part of my 
 thigh from the wind of a shot ; as it twisted me round, and confused me a good 
 deal, the people thought I was wounded, and told William so ; he came to 
 see, and when I recovered, he told me he was afraid if he said any thing of 
 his father being wounded, that the people might be alarmed ! " 
 
 Plate XXXVn, Fig. 1, shows the state of the British fleet when the signal 
 
254 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 was given for a general chase ; and then to bear up, break through the enemy's 
 line, and engage them to leeward. 
 
 Too much credit cannot be given to the British Admiral for his promptitude 
 and decision upon seeing the Dutch fleet, as he took immediately the most 
 effectual mode of capturing or destroying it. To the plan of attack, and the 
 example set by the Commander-in-Chief and the Vice Admiral, the highest 
 commendation is due ; and " eight or nine were taken, more had struck," but 
 unfortunately succeeded in making their escape. 
 
 Fig. 2, shows the position intended by the British Admiral to have been taken 
 by his fleet, which is supposed to have passed through the enemy's line, to engage 
 them to leeward, and cut them off from the land, distance to leeward five 
 miles. 
 
 " The squadron suffered much (the Admiral observes) in their masts, yards, 
 and rigging ; and many of them have lost a number of men, however, in no pro- 
 portion to that of the enemy. The carnage on board the two ships that bore the 
 Admiral's flags has been beyond all description." 
 
 However much this mode of attack exposes a fleet to severe cannonade, by 
 which it may sufffer considerably before it can grapple with the enemy, — ^yet this 
 action is another decisive proof of the final advantage of it, when, by getting close 
 to leeward, the contest can be decided only by the party which displays most 
 resolution and perseverance, which can best maintain his position, and whose fire 
 is seen to produce the most destructive effects. This should teach us to be 
 particularly attentive at all times to acquire a perfect knowledge and management 
 of the great guns, to husband our resources, and to be prompt and skilful in the 
 application of them : to dispose of the marines in such manner as, with the least 
 exposure of themselves, to produce the greatest effect upon the decks of the enemy: 
 and while braces, bowlines, sails, sweeps,* and rudder, are left you, to endeavour 
 to preserve an advantageous position. 
 
 The British Admiral soon perceived that if he waited to form his line (the 
 enemy drawing fast in with the land) " there would be no action." He, there- 
 fore, made the signal to make all sail, break the line, and engage the enemy to 
 leeward, and for " close action ;" which, " last signal flew until it was shot 
 away." This signal could not be mistaken ; and, coupled with the gallant chief's 
 
 * Sweeps are immense oars worked by several men. In large ships they may be applied out of 
 the stern ports and used as a rudder in a calm, or when the ship is entirely disabled. The BeUeisle 
 (Captain Hargood), totally dismasted in the battle of Trafalgar, is said to have benefited very much 
 by a timely use of them. Small vessels are pulled a-head by them. 
 
PLATF.XXX.VJ1. 
 
 % . I 
 
 I 
 
 
 M,J. 
 
 ii^^iii:,ii.ii.i^^' 
 
 fl,l^,d.lM^'^W^^ ^ 
 
 The Laud 
 
 V 
 
 ,J-Ytf. ?. 
 
 
 B 
 
 Tlie Land 
 
ADMIRAL DUNCAN. 255 
 
 example, superseded all former ones ; and every ship had then nothing to call her 
 attention from using every exertion to close speedily with the enemy. 
 
 If further proof of the superior efficacy of such a mode of attack be wanting, 
 it is to be found, not only in the manly declaration of the gallant Dutchman, but 
 also in the honourable testimony of the great Nelson, who, although not 
 acquainted with Lord Duncan, after the battle of the Nile, wrote to him to tell 
 him how " he had profitted by his example ! " De Winter said, "Your not 
 waiting to form a line ruined me ; if I had got nearer to the shore, and you had 
 attacked, I should have probably drawn both fleets on it, and it would have 
 been a victory to me, being on my own coast." 
 
 The British squadron was formed of very indifferent and inadequate ships, 
 many of them having been intended for Indiamen ; it was otherwise ill 
 conditioned and deficient : but a trait of professional character in a seaman 
 must not be overlooked. When the main-top-gallant-mast of the Venerable 
 was shot away, a man of the name of Crawford nailed the flag to the top-mast 
 head. 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 " Had his fleet been composed of the same materials as Lord St. Vincent's, 
 every Dutch ship would have been taken. Had all the ships followed the 
 example of their Chief, such must have been the result. 
 
 " When the action ceased, the British ships were in nine fathoms water, five 
 miles from a lee shore, with every appearance of the gale which followed. Few 
 people are aware of the merits of the Chief on that day ; and it should be 
 recollected he had been only two days in port, after a blockade of nineteen weeks, 
 when the Dutch fleet put to sea.* 
 
 " It was the opinion of Lord Duncan that, upon such occasions, the Commander- 
 in-Chief should hoist his flag on board of a frigate ; and he said, should he ever 
 fight another battle, he would certainly do so. I often heard him declare, that 
 had his flag been flying on board of a frigate in this action, not one of the Dutch 
 fleet would have escaped. However, the man who first does this should have 
 his character well established for personal courage." 
 
 The author of these remarks has kindly favoured the writer with a plan of the 
 situation of the two fleets, five minutes before the action commenced. The 
 original is taken from the best authority. 
 
 * " For a piece of artless and 'affecting oratory," see the speech which he made to the crew of 
 hia own ship on the 3d of June, 1797, when left alone off the Texel, by the mutinous conduct of the 
 rest of his squadron. (Public Characters for 1798.) 
 
256 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Plate XXXVIII represents the British fleet bearing down towards the Dutch 
 line of battle, formed on the larboard tack, five minutes before the action com- 
 menced. Nine ships of the line, two frigates, and three Admirals, were taken, 
 though one of the latter escaped. 
 
 The seventh ship in the Dutch line, bearing the flag of the Rear-Admiral 
 Story, closed up to the ship of his Commander-in-Chief, and obliged the 
 Venerable to go a-stern of her ; — she, notwithstanding, struck to the British 
 Admiral, and afterwards made off. Those distinguished by dots under them 
 were taken. Thus it appears that eleven ships of war were captured by ten 
 ships of the British squadron, as not more than that number were seriously 
 engaged. What is remarkable in this action is, that more was accomplished, in 
 proportion to the means, than in any naval engagement of modern times, — a 
 circumstance in the highest degree honourable to the character and conduct of 
 the great departed Chief, and to those who so bravely supported him. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Of Sir Henry Trollope it is related from authority not to be questioned 
 that, on the morning when he discovered the Dutch fleet, he assembled all the 
 officers of his ship, and pointed out to them in a becoming and impressive 
 manner, as necessary to his, and to their own honour, that the enemy should 
 by no means be lost sight of; he declared, that unless from excessive thick 
 weather, this should take place, he would bring the officer of the watch to a 
 Court Martial; and directed that notice, every ten minutes, should be taken, 
 and marked, of the enemy's position. 
 
 The officers required no threat of that kind to stimulate them to a strict 
 discharge of their duty. 
 
 Sir H. Trollope, when a lieutenant, commanding the Kite cutter, and coming 
 into Plymouth after a long cruize, was informed that two ships deeply laden 
 with ship timber had been seen a few days before, bound for Brest ; and from 
 the prevailing light and contrary winds since, it was conjectured that they 
 could not have made much progress. Lieutenant Trollope immediately altered 
 his course, and by an animated address incited his crew to a diligent exertion 
 of their duties ; to which a fidler, and constant good cheer upon deck, very 
 mainly contributed. 
 
 The prospect of making so rich a capture, kept alive by the zeal, perseverance, 
 and liberality of the commander, lightened their labour at the sweeps, occa- 
 sionally suspended by light breezes, which, in a few days, carried them to the 
 
Pl-lT£JiXX.VJiL. 
 
 '^\ 
 
 C£ff}rperdown- 
 
 
 ; 1 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 4. 
 
BATTLE OF THE NILE. 257 
 
 desired spot, and just in time to prevent the two ships from getting safe into 
 Brest. They returned, as may be supposed, in the greatest exultation to 
 Plymouth with their prizes; for which the Lieutenant's share amounted to 
 30,000/. 
 
 Captain Inglis of the Belliqueux of sixty-four guns, owing either to a long 
 ahsence from active service, or an inaptitude to the subject, sometimes apparent in 
 Sea oflScers, had neglected to make himself a competent master of the signal book : 
 and, on the morning of the day of battle, when it became necessary to act 
 with promptitude in obedience to the signals, found himself more puzzled 
 than enlightened by it ; and throwing it with contempt upon the deck, 
 exclaimed in broad Scotch, " D — n me, up wie the hellem an' gang into the 
 middle o't." 
 
 In this manner he bravely anticipated the remedy in such cases provided 
 by the gallant Nelson, who, in his celebrated " Memorandum," observes, " tliat 
 when a captain should be at a loss, he cannot do very wrong if he lay his ship 
 alongside of the enemy." In strict conformity with this doctrine, the Belliqueux 
 got very roughly treated by the van of the enemy. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE NILE. 
 
 FROM SIR HORATIO KELSON TO EARL ST. VINCENT. 
 
 " Vanguard, off the mouth of the Nile, August 3d, 1798. 
 
 " My Lord, 
 
 " Almighty God has blessed his Majesty's arms in the late 
 battle by a great victory over the fleet of the enemy ; whom I attacked at 
 sunset on the 1st of August off the mouth of the Nile. 
 
 « The enemy were moored in a strong line of battle for defending the 
 entrance of the Bay (of shoals) flanked by numerous gun-boats, four frigates, 
 and a battery of guns and mortars on an island in their van. 
 " The ships of the enemy, all but their two rear ships, are nearly dismasted, 
 
 2 L 
 
258 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 and those two, with two frigates, I am sorry to say, made their escape ; nor was 
 it in my power to prevent it." 
 
 " Captain Berry will present you with the flag oif the second in command, 
 that of the Commander-in-chief being burnt in L'Orient." 
 
 British force, fourteen sail of the line (with the Leander of fifty guns), and 
 La Mutine brig. The French, thirteen sail of the line, and four frigates. 
 Of this fleet, nine ships of the line were captured ; two line of battle ships and 
 two frigates burnt and sunk ; two ships of the line and two frigates escaped. 
 
 We must here observe that the service of one ship of the line (the CuUoden) 
 was entirely lost to the British Admiral, by her unfortunately getting a-ground 
 when advancing to the attack ; and that he had no frigates. 
 
 The gallant chief has not detailed his plan of attack ; it has, however, been 
 accurately described by many com.petent eye-witnesses : the following are 
 extracts : — 
 
 " He (Sir H. Nelson) instantly directed his course towards them, and found 
 them at anchor in a line extending from N. W. to S. E. They were at single 
 anchor with springs on their cables, and riding head to wind, which was from 
 the N. W. To approach them it was necessary to sail round an island, and a 
 reef projecting from it to the distance of several miles, from the point in which 
 the small fort of Aboukir stands. The wind was perfectly fair, but unfortunately, 
 in rounding the reef, the CuUoden ran a-ground, and could not be got at all 
 into action. 
 
 " After this accident. Nelson found himself with ten ships only (three having 
 fallen very much a-stem) to fight thirteen of the enemy ; and several of these 
 of superior force to any of his. 
 
 " The island also, fortified with mortars and some heavy guns, was to be 
 passed ; yet he determined on an immediate attack, and made the signal to 
 attack the van and centre of the enemy. It was near six in the evening 
 when he closed with them. About half the ships got between the enemy and 
 the shore, either by cutting through their line, or by sailing round the head of 
 it ; and the rest attacked on the outside. All dropped their anchors close in 
 front of their opponents : by this disposition, some of the French line were 
 doubled on, and all that were engaged on the land side were taken unprepared.' 
 The Zealous fired three broadsides before a gun was returned from that side. 
 
 " The enemy began firing as soon as Our ships came within shot. The Zealous 
 dismasted the Guerrier (French van ship) with three broadsides, and completely 
 beat her in five minutes. 
 
 •' Their six headmost ships were taken possession of the first night, and 
 
BATTLE OF THE NILE. 259 
 
 L'Orient blew up. Next morning, at day-light, the action recommenced, and 
 the other ships were taken or destroyed ; nor did the battle end till the forenoon 
 of the third day, when the enemy's rear was compelled either to suiTender or 
 run : all the captured ships were dismasted. The Timoleon shared the fate of 
 L'Orient," &c. 
 
 The writer of the above remarks, " that if the French Admiral could not 
 have made such a disposition of his fleet at anchor as to command the Bay of 
 Aboukir, he should have got it under sail, so that every ship might have had a 
 chance of coming into action : as it was, his line was formed in the direction 
 of the wind, exposed to be attacked to windward, leaving out all the leeward 
 ships ; and consequently was beaten in succession ; and, on this matter, the 
 decisive nature of the victory turned." 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 " The ships that had fallen a-stern, as they dropped in, took their stations 
 a- stern of the other ships ; but the last did not arrive till two or three hours 
 after the commencement of the action." 
 
 REMARKS ON THE BATTLE OF THE NILE. 
 With a Plate, by a gallant and intelligent officer, then on board the " Goliah." 
 
 " When the French fleet were discovered in Aboukir Bay, the body of the 
 English fleet were pretty much together, but not in any order of sailing, for 
 none was usually maintained. The CuUoden was nearly hull down a-stern, and 
 the Alexander and Swiftsure still more distant on the lee-beam, looking into 
 Alexandria. 
 
 " The wind on the larboard quarter. The signal was made to 'form the line 
 as most convenient^ when the Zealous and Goliah immediately made for the 
 post of honour ; but the Goliah having gained her own length, took the lead, 
 and the line was soon formed, with every sail set. When well in with Aboukir 
 Island, the Mutine obtained some men out of a coasting or fishing vessel, and 
 sent them to the flag-ship as pilots ; the boat missed the Vanguard, who imme- 
 diately rounded to, as did the whole line, except the Goliah and Zealous, till 
 the boat got on board. As soon as the water deepened over the shoal, which 
 extends from the island, it became necessary to haul nearly on a wind, on the 
 starboard tack, to fetch the headmost ship in the French line. There was then 
 
 2 L 2 
 
2€0 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 a space of at least two miles between the Zealous and the ship a-stern of her ; 
 every sail was however kept set, till within a cable's length of the Guerrier's 
 bow, and that position was attained by the two leading ships without receiving 
 any injury, though coming in nearly on the beam of the French van. The 
 second or third ship of their line did indeed fire one broadside, but it was just 
 too late, as the Goliah was nearly past her line of fire, as was the Zealous 
 before she could fire a second. The batteries were too far off to do much 
 execution to an object moving so fast (six or seven miles an hour). AU sail was 
 now taken in, except the mizen-top-sail, which was thrown a-back, and, when 
 thus very slowly passing the bow of the Guerrier, within a ship's length, the 
 action was commenced on our side by a most dreadfully destructive raking fire. 
 The anchor was at the same time dropped from the bow, the cable being in at the 
 stern port ; but having no after bitts, when the ship swung stern to the wind, 
 and the sails began to fly loose from the running rigging being cut, it became 
 difficult to stopper the cable. It kept surging for some minutes, and at last 
 carried all away, and ran out to the clinch, placing the Goliah on the quarter 
 of the second, and bow of the third ship of the French line, so as to engage 
 both. The Zealous exactly followed the Goliath's example ; but the enemy 
 being occupied, she furled her sails, and anchoring a little more to windward, 
 veered into the place just left by the Goliath. From this moment the Guerrier 
 never fired a shot except from her stern guns, so completely had she been 
 destroyed [in little more than five minutes) by her two opponents. As the 
 Goliah passed her quarter, the Guerrier's foremast fell by the deck, and five 
 minutes afterwards her main and mizen-masts also fell, as well as the main-mast 
 of the Conqurant. This was just as the Orion was passing inside of the Goliah, 
 and the Audacious was coming to an anchor on the inner bow of the Conqurant. 
 Such rapid execution must be partly attributed to the smoothness of the water, 
 and partly to the unprepared state of the French ships on their larboard sides^ 
 The Guerrier's lower-deck guns on that side were not run out, and the other 
 ports were full of bags and lumber ! ! As the Theseus passed the Goliah (soon 
 after), she gave her three such cheers, as have been seldom heard. They were 
 returned by the Goliah's crew, and an attempt was made to do the same by the 
 French ships engaged, but it was so truly ridiculous, that it caused peals of 
 laughter on board the English ships, loud enough to be heard by both parties. 
 Such enthusiastic cheers were certainly very disheartening to the French, and 
 they readily acknowledged it after the battle, 
 
 " The Vanguard was the first ship that anchored on the outside of the line, 
 on the quarter of the Spartiate and bow of the Aquilon. The other ships followed 
 
BATTLE OF THE NILE. 261 
 
 as described by the Rev. C. Willyams, and as represented in a plan I send with 
 this, which I think will be found pretty correct. The sun was just touching 
 the horizon as our fire commenced, and it must have been getting dark when 
 the Culloden ran on shore. It was quite so when the Alexander and Swifsure 
 came in, and when the Leander returned from the Culloden. 
 
 " I must here say, that it has always appeared most extraordinary to me, that 
 it should have been so long and generally believed that the Culloden ran on 
 shore leading the fleet in. That honour was due to a most gallant ofiicer and 
 most estimable man, the present Sir Thomas Foley, to whom also was due the 
 whole credit of passing inside the headmost ship of the enemtfs line, a 
 manoeuvre they were perfectly unprepared for. The noble example which he 
 set, and Captain Hood so readily followed, of running on under all sail when 
 the rest of the English line brought-to for the Mutine's boat, proved also of the 
 greatest consequence ; for the senior officer of the French van was rowing up 
 to his own ship from U Orient in a longhoat, and they waited foyr his orders 
 to commence firing. He hailed his ship as soon as he was near enough, and 
 they fired a broadside, but it was just too late for their guns to bear. Had ten 
 minutes been lost (in bringing- to with the rest of the line for the Mutine's 
 boat), this qfficer would have been on hoard in time to have caused a destruc- 
 tive fire on the leading ships, and very likely to disable them sufficiently to 
 prevent their getting into their proper positions, when the day must have been 
 much less glorious and complete ; such is often the value of time in closing with 
 an enemy, a single minute ought certainly never to be lost. 
 
 " On the following morning, could the Audacious have gone to the assistance of 
 the Zealous, the two ships which escaped would most likely have fallen into our 
 hands ; but as neither the Theseus nor Goliah had a boat that could be made to 
 swim, the Audacious had taken possession of the second and third ship in the 
 French line, and Captain Gould did not think he had men enough left to justify 
 him in making the attempt. The rest of the ships were too much disabled to 
 make sail ; but the Theseus, Leander, and Goliah cut their cables, and drifted 
 down before the wind to the enemy's ships that were disabled and had not 
 surrendered ; the Alexander was also there, and the French ships being disabled, 
 and on shore, could make but little resistance. 
 
 " I conceive it to be a mistake to say the Serieuse was sunk by a single 
 broadside from the Orion ; she was too far off for such an accident, and was 
 partially engaged by the Goliah from the very beginning of the action, and I 
 believe by the Theseus also. She cut her cable, and her rudder being wedged 
 by a shot when the helm was hard a-port, she ran on shore, and heeling to 
 
262 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 starboard (on which side she was much battered), she filled. Her principal 
 damage was most likely received from the Orion. Of course the English ships 
 suffered a little from each other's fire, but the difficulty of stoppering the cables 
 was the great evil, so much so, that it would have been perhaps better to have 
 anchored by the bow. The Alexander's was a most masterly manoeuvre to be 
 executed in so dark a night." 
 
 Plate XXXIX shows the position of the British squadron, at different periods of 
 the combat ; and whether in considering the mode of attack, or the manner in 
 which it was carried into execution, the mind is entirely engrossed between 
 gratitude, astonishment, and admiration. 
 
 The want of frigates or small vessels was greatly felt ; they would have been 
 useful in many ways, but particularly in buoying off the shoals, the better to 
 guide the squadron to the attack ; by which the services of the Culloden might 
 have been preserved. 
 
 The following extract of a letter contains some further details of the 
 battle : — 
 
 Extract of a Letter of the late Sir Samuel Hood to Lord 3ridport. 
 
 " After completing our water at Syracuse in SicUy, we sailed from thence on 
 the 24th of July, and arrived a second time o£P Alexandria on the 31st, where 
 we found many more ships than were there before ; amongst which were six 
 with pendants, and appearing large, so that we were convinced the French fleet 
 had been there. I immediately kept well to the eastward of the Admiral, to 
 try if I could discover the enemy at Bequier. About one o'clock, the man at 
 the mast-head called down, and said he saw a ship, and in a few minutes after 
 announced a fleet at anchor. I sent a glass up, and eighteen large ships were 
 clearly ascertained, thirteen or fourteen of which appeared to be of the line ; 
 which I made known by signal to the Admiral ; who instantly pressed sail up, 
 and made the signal to prepare for battle. The wind being to the N. N. W. 
 and sometimes more northerly, we were obliged to haul to the wind. The 
 Alexander and Swiftsure called in, which were to leeward ; and the Culloden 
 ordered to cast off the prize she had in tow, as she was somewhat a-stem. As 
 we advanced towards the enemy, we plainly made out thirteen sail of the line, 
 four frigates, with several small armed vessels, all at anchor in the road of 
 Bequier or Aboukir, very close in, and in order of battle. The Admiral then 
 made the signal to anchor, and for battle, and to attack the vail and.centre of 
 
Missing Page 
 
Missing Page 
 
BATTLE OF THE NILE. 263 
 
 the enemy; and soon after for the line a-head as most convenient. As we got 
 pretty near a-breast of the shoal at the entrance, being within hail of the 
 Admiral, he asked me if I thought we were far enough to the eastward to 
 bear up clear of the shoal ; I told him I was in eleven fathoms ; that 
 I had no chart of the bay ; but if he would allow me, I would bear up and 
 sound with the lead, to which I would be very attentive, and carry him 
 as close as I could with safety ; he said he would be obliged to me. I imme- 
 diately bore away and rounded the shoal, the Goliah keeping upon my lee 
 bow, until I found we were advancing too far from the Admiral ; and then 
 shortened sail; and soon found the Admiral was waiting to speak to a boat. 
 Soon after he made the signal to proceed on, the Goliah leading; and as we 
 approached the enemy, shortened sail gradually; the Admiral allowing the 
 Orion, &c. to pass a-head of the Vanguard. The van ship of the enemy being 
 in five fathoms, I expected the Goliah and Zealous to stick fast on the shoal 
 every moment, and did not imagine we should attempt to pass within her, as the 
 van with, the mortars, &c. from the island fired regularly at us. Captain Foley 
 intended anchoring a-breast of the van ship ; but his sheet anchor, the cable 
 being out" of the stern port, not dropping the moment he wished it, he brought 
 up a-breast of the second ship, having given the van one his fire. I saw 
 immediately he had failed of his intention. Cut away the Zealous's sheet-anchor, 
 and came-to, in the exact situation Captain Foley meant to have taken. 
 
 "The enemy's van „ship having her bow towards the Zealous (which had received 
 very little dailiage, notwithstanding we received the fire of the whole van, island, 
 &c. as we came in), I directed a heavy discharge into her bow within musket 
 shot a little after six ; her fore-mast went by the board in a few minutes, just as 
 the sun was closing with the horizon ; upon which the squadron gave three cheers, 
 it happening before the next ship a-stern of me had fired a shot, and only the 
 Goliah and Zealous had then eiigaged ; and in ten minutes more, her main and 
 mizen-niasts went (at this moment went also the main-mast of the second ship, 
 dosely engaged. by thte Goliah and Audacious) ; but I could not get her to strike 
 for three hours after^ although I hailed her several times, and seeing she was 
 totally cut up, and qnly firing a stem-ohase at intervals at the Goliah and 
 Audacious. At Jast, being tirM of killing men in that way, I sent a lieutenant 
 on board, who was allowed, as I had instructed him, to hoist a light and haul it 
 down as a sign of her submission. From the time her foremast went, the men 
 had been driven from her upper decks by our canister shot and musketry ; and 
 I assure your Lordship, that from her how to the gangway, the ports on her 
 main'deck were entirely in one ; and the gunwale in that part totally cut away i 
 
264 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 which caused two of her main-deck beams to fall upon her guns ; and she is so 
 terribly mauled that we cannot move her without great detention and expense ; 
 so that I imagine the Admiral will destroy her. In doing this execution, I am 
 happy to say the Zealous had only seven men wounded, and not one killed. 
 With respect to how the other ships anchored, I refer your Lordship to the 
 enclosed sketch of the bay." (No sketch was found with this extract.) 
 
 " The Bellerophon, unfortunately, alongside L'Orient, was in two hours totally 
 dismasted ; and, in consequence, cut her cable, and went off before the ship took 
 fire : but she was most gallantly replaced by the Alexander and Swiftsure, our 
 worthy friends. She soon after took fire and blew up. The Alexander and 
 Swiftsure having been sent to look into Alexandria, was the cause of their being" 
 so late in the action. Poor Trowbridge, in trying to make the shortest way to 
 the enemy, being too far a-stern, struck on a reef: his ship has since got off, with 
 the loss of her rudder and some damage in her bottom ; so that he had no share 
 in the glorious victory. I believe, had not the CuUoden struck, the Alexander 
 and Swiftsure in the dark would probably have got into her situation, so that 
 the accident may be fortunate, as she was a buoy to them. 
 
 " On the blowing-up of L'Orient a part of the wreck fell on board of, and set 
 fire to the jib and fore-top-mast-stay-sail of the Alexander ; but the great exertion 
 of her officers and people soon got it under, with the loss of some men. Captain 
 Westcott was killed by a musquet ball, early in the action ; but his loss was not 
 felt, as the First Lieutenant, Cuthbert, fought the Majestic most gallantly 
 during the remainder of the action. The Bellerophon and that ship have 
 suffered much. In the morning, the Theseus, Goliah, Audacious, and Zealous^ 
 were ordered into the rear, having sustained but little damage ; but as I was 
 going down, the Admiral made my signal to chase the Diane frigate, which was 
 under sail, and attempting to escape. She, however, returned, and closed with the 
 ships of the enemy that had not submitted ; and I was called in, and ordered to 
 go to the assistance of the Bellerophon, who lay at anchor on the other side of 
 the bay ; but in going to her I perceived the Guillaume Tell of eighty guns, and 
 Genereux of seventy-four, the Diane and Justice of forty, pressing to make their 
 escape ; being the only ships not disabled ; and immediately directed the Zealous 
 to be kept close upon a wind, in the hope I should be able to bring them to action 
 and disable them, so as to allow assistance to come to me ; or so far to cripple 
 them as to prevent their working out of the bay. I weathered them within 
 musquet shot, and obliged them to keep away to avoid being raked ; and although 
 I did them a good deal of damage, they were so well prepared as to cut away 
 every brace and bowling, with top-mast and standing rigging. I meant to have 
 
BATTLE OF THE NILE. 265 
 
 boarded the rear frigate, but could not get the ship round for a short space of 
 time ; and whilst I was trying to do it, I was called in by signal, seeing I should 
 get disabled, without having it in my power to stop so superior a force. The 
 Admiral was very handsome in his acknowledgments for my zealous attempt, as 
 well as for my general conduct ; I told him I only did my duty, and although 
 the ship was very much cut in her sails and rigging, having forty cannon shot 
 through her main-sail, I had but one man killed, and none materially wounded. 
 The Audacious was sent to the Bellerophon in my room, and I am now got quite 
 to rights. Ben Hallowell has written to your Lordship ; so has our brave 
 Admiral, who, I am sorry to say, is again wounded, but is doing well ; the 
 wound is in his head, not dangerous but very troublesome : some of our ships 
 have suffered much. Your Lordship, as well as the whole world, will believe 
 and think this the most glorious victory that ever was gained, and it will 
 certainly prove the ruin of the Frenck army. 
 
 " A courier has been taken, charged with dispatches from Buonaparte and the 
 other generals for France ; and herewith your Lordship will receive some 
 intercepted letters that are full of the distresses of the French army in their 
 march to Cairo ; and I am very confident, when Buonaparte hears of our victory, 
 he will conclude all is lost. 
 
 " Lieutenant Duval, fourth of the Zealous, is gone to India by way of 
 Alexandretta. I pointed him out to Sir Horatio as a proper person. Our 
 frigates have not yet joined us. I fear your Lordship will think me troublesome 
 in writing so long a letter, but flatter myself the greatness of our success will 
 plead my excuse. 
 
 " Amongst the French letters we have got hold of, is one from young 
 Beauharnois, Buonaparte's son-in-law, who is with him, to his mother ; in 
 which he says, ' Buonaparte is very much distressed, owing to some disputes 
 with Tallien and others, and particularly with Berthier, which he did not 
 expect.' These are favourable events, and will make our victory the more 
 important. 
 
 " We have taken the island that covered the van of the enemy, and brought 
 off two brass thirteen-inch mortars, two brass twelve-pounders, and two iron 
 twelve-pounders, — the latter are destroyed." 
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE NILE. (French Account.) 
 
 Having given an account of this memorable event from details furnished by 
 British officers engaged, it cannot be uninteresting to observe in what manner 
 
 2 M 
 
266 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 the same subject has been related and considered by our enemy. The following 
 are extracts from an account written in French, on board the Alexander, on her 
 passage to Naples, by the Adjutant General to Aidmiral Blanquet. 
 
 The whole is not necessary, as it describes too many individual cases occurring 
 amongst the French ships : such parts therefore are selected as seem best suited 
 to the purposes of the present undertaking ; and first by showing the object ajid 
 finesse of the French Admiral. : ' ' 
 
 " The Alert then began to put the Admiral's orders into execution, namely, 
 to stand towards the enemy until nearly within gun-shot, then to manoeuvre and 
 endeavour to draw them towards the outer shoal lying off the island ; but the 
 English Admiral no doubt had experienced pilots on board, as he did notrpay 
 any attention to the brig's track, but allowed her to go away,, hauling well round 
 all the danger, 
 
 " At five o'clock the enemy came to the wind in succession ; the manoeuvre 
 convinced us that they intended attacking us that evenings The Admiral got 
 the top-gallant-yards across, but soon after made the signal that he intended 
 engaging the enemy at anchor: convinced no doubt, that he had not seamen 
 enough to engage under sail." ■ - 
 
 " After this signal each ship ought to have sent a stream cable to the ship 
 a-stern of her, and to have made a hawser fast to the cable, about twenty fathoms 
 in the water, and passed to the bow on the opposite side to that expected to be 
 engaged, as a spring. This was not generally executed ; orders were then ^iyen 
 to let go another bower anchor, and the broadsides of the ships were brought to 
 bear upon the enemy ; having the ships' heads S. E. from the island Bequir, 
 forming a line of about 1300 fathoms N. W. and S. E. each with an andior 
 outS.S.E." "■ • ' ,.- . • • . "-• 
 
 "All the van were attacked on -both "sidies by the enemy, who ranged close 
 along our line ; they had each an anchor out a-stern, which facilitated their 
 motions, and enabled -them to place themselves in a most advantageous 
 position." &c. 
 
 " At nine o'clock the ships in the van d^ackened their fire, and soon after it 
 totally ceased; and with infinite sorrow we supposed they had surrendered. 
 They were dismasted soon after the action began, and so damaged, it is to be 
 presumed they could not hold out against an enemy so superior by an 
 advantageous position», in placing several ships against one." 
 
 " At ten o'clock the main and mizen-masts (of the ship* on board which the 
 officer is who gives this account) fell, and all the guns on the main-dedc were 
 dismounted : at half-past ten the Tonnant cut her cables to avoid the fire from 
 
 • The ship of Admiral Blanquec. 
 
BATTLE OF THE NILE. 267 
 
 L'Orient. The English ship that was on L'Orient's larboard quarter, as soon as 
 she had done firing at her, brought her broadside to bear upon the Tonuant's bow, 
 and kept up a very heavy raking fire. The Hereux and Mercure conceived 
 that they ought likewise to cut their cables ; this manoeuvre created so much 
 confusion amongst the rear ships, that they fired into each other and did 
 considerable damage ; the Tonnant anchored a-head of the Guillaurae Tell ; 
 Genereux, Timoleon, got on shore." 
 
 " The Adjutant General Montard, although badly wounded, swam to the ship 
 nearest L'Orient, which proved to be English. Commodore Casablanca and his 
 son, only ten years of age, who during the action gave proofs of bravery and 
 intelligence far above his age, were not so fortunate ; they were in the water 
 upon the wreck of L'Orient's masts, not being able to swim, seeking each other 
 until three quarters past ten, when the ship blew up, and put an end to their 
 hopes and fears. The explosion was dreadful, and spread, the fire to a 
 considerable distance. The Franklin's decks were covered with red-hot seam,* 
 pieces of timber, and rope ; on fire the fourth time, but luckily got it under. 
 Immediately after the tremendous explosion, the action ceased every where, and 
 was succeeded by a most profound silence ; the sky was darkened by thick clouds 
 of black smoke, which seemed to threaten the destruction of both fleets. 
 
 " It was a quarter df an hour before the ships' crews recovered from the stupor 
 they were thrown into : towards eleven o'clock, the Franklin, anxious to preserve 
 the trust confided to her, recommenced the action with a few of the lower-deck 
 guns ; all the rest were dismounted : two-thirds of the ship's company were 
 killed, and those who remained most fatigued. She was surrounded by the 
 enemy's ships, who mowed down the men at every broadside. At half-past 
 eleven, having only three lower-deck guns that could defend the honour of the 
 flag, it became necessary to put an end to so disproportionate a struggle ; and 
 Citizen Martinel, Capitaine de Fregate, ordered the colours to be struck." 
 
 After detailing at considerable length the various disastrous events of the 
 battle, dwelling with great feeling on the calamitous condition to which they 
 were reduced by the judicious mode of attack chosen by the British Admiral ; 
 and the brave but unfortunate end of both of the French Admirals ; the writer 
 of the narrative draws it to a conclusion in the following manner : — 
 
 " Thus ends the journal of the 1st, 2d, and 3d of August ; which wiU ever be 
 remembered with the deepest sorrow by all those Frenchmen who possess good 
 hearts, and by all those true Republicans who have survived this melancholy 
 disaster." 
 
 * This must mean the composition of pitch and oakum with which the decks are caulked. 
 
 2 M 2 
 
a68 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 WATCHING AND FOLLOWING A SQUADRON OF THE ENEMY 
 
 BY CAPT. COUNTESS, OF THE ETHALION, WITH 
 
 THE ANSON AND SYLPH. 
 
 From the 17th of Sept. to the 1 1th of Oct. 1798. 
 
 Before entering upon Admiral Sir John Warren's account of his proceedings 
 on the coast of Ireland, it is due to the character of the late Admiral Countess 
 to show in what manner the French squadron had been watched, and fairly 
 conducted into the hands of the British Admiral, by himself and the officers 
 under his orders. 
 
 Captain Countess, of the Ethalion, with the Anson and Sylph, had, " with 
 great attention, continued to observe the French squadron since their sailing on 
 the 17th ultimo;" and, on the morning of the 11th, had joined the Admiral. 
 
 The merit of such a service as that of the British Captain's in keeping sight 
 of a superior force,* for so long a period at that season of the year, could not 
 be sufficiently dwelt upon in a single dispatch; and to render justice where it is 
 so evidently due is the object of introducing, in this place, the track of the 
 Ethalion and ships in concert. By their skill, vigilance, and perseverance, every 
 movement of the enemy was known ; timely information of their approach was 
 also given to Sir John Warren ; and the enemy entirely defeated in his attempts 
 upon Ireland. 
 
 The track of the Ethalion, from which the Plate is taken, was drawn and 
 given by Captain Countess to Admiral Vashon ; who, with a just sense of the 
 importance of such service, and of the great abilities, but modest merits of the 
 man, kindly contributed it for the present undertaking; anxious that so 
 memorable a trait in the professional life of his old messmate should meet the 
 commendation it deserves. The track is therefore given with the writer's 
 thankful acknowledgments to Admiral Vashon. 
 
 * The force is shown ia Capt. Countess's journal, and their object was Ireland. 
 
Missing Page 
 
Missing Page 
 
CAPTAIN COUNTESS. 269 
 
 References, accompanying the Track, hy Captain Countess. See Plate XL. 
 
 " Off the Passage du Raz, at day-light, in the morning of 
 the 17th September, 1798. 
 
 " His Majesty's ships Boadicea, Ethalion, and Sylph brig, being in company, 
 fell in with a French squadron, consisting of one line of battle ship, eight 
 frigates, and a schooner; where Captain Keats, in the Boadicea, left the 
 Ethalion and Sylph to watch their motions, and went himself to make known 
 their having sailed, to the Admiral, Lord Bridport. 
 
 " The 18th, at night, we were joined by the Amelia, the Honourable Captain 
 Herbert, who passed through the enemy's squadron without being noticed. In 
 the morning some of their frigates chased us, but we out-sailed them. 
 
 " The S3d, in the evening, sent off the Sylph, Captain White, with despatches 
 for Ireland. 
 
 " The 25th, in the forenoon, saw a strange fleet to leeward of the enemy ; 
 observed several of them to be large ships, and that they formed in line of 
 battle (they proved to be an English convoy, several of them East India ships) ; 
 the Anson was ordered to go round the rear of the enemy to let them know our 
 situation and the enemy's. At this time the French squadron seemed much 
 confused, and the Hoche fell a-stern to protect their rear ; and we were in hopes 
 the fleet fallen in with was of force sufficient to enable us to attack the enemy to 
 advantage : but, the weather being thick, we supposed they could not make out 
 our signals ; and, by the time the Anson had got round the enemy's rear, they 
 had got a long way to leeward ; so the Anson was recalled. It was the opinion 
 that our signals and manoeuvres prevented the enemy from attending to the 
 convoy, and, of course, saved them. 
 
 " The 26th, in the morning, the enemy chased us, but left off chase at noon, 
 when we shortened sail, and followed them again. 
 
 " The 29th, at day-light, the enemy's whole squadron chased us ; three of 
 them sailed very fast, and came up with us considerably ; afterwards we held 
 our own, and at nine they left off chase ; one of them having carried away her 
 inain-top-mast, another a top-sail-yard, and a third a top-gallant-mast. The 
 Anson, during the chase, sprung her main-top-mast. 
 
 " The 4th October, a little after noon, a heavy gale came on, with thick 
 weather, which occasioned our losing sight of the enemy, and gave them an 
 Opportunity of getting from us. 
 
 " The 8th, in foggy bad weather, the Amelia parted company. 
 
270 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " The 11th, at day-light in the morning, saw the coast of Ireland ; and, in 
 the forenoon, the Ethalion and Anson joined the squadron under Sir John B. 
 Warren, and found the Amelia in company with them. Soon after noon, the 
 enemy's squadron was discovered to windward coming down ; but, on seeing us, 
 they hauled their wind,- and we chased them : during the night, the Ethalion 
 kept close to them, to prevent their attempting to escape, 
 
 " The 12th, the enemy was attacked and defeated, the Hoche and two 
 frigates taken, and the rest attempted to escape; after noon, the Ethalion 
 chased, engaged, and took the Belloiia. The Melampus (Captain G. Moore) 
 afterwards took the Resolue ; the Anson (Captain P. C. Durham) the Loire ; 
 and the Fishguard (Captain T. B. Martin) took the Immortalite o£F Brest ; so 
 that only two frigates and a schooner escapedj viz. the Romaine, Semillante, and 
 Biche. The frigates had each 300 soldiers on board, besides the crew." 
 
 SIR JOHN WARREN'S BATTLE WITH A FRENCH SQUADRON 
 ON THE COAST OF IRELAND. 
 
 October, 1798. 
 
 TO VICE ADMIEAL KINGSMILL, AT CORK. 
 
 " Canada, Lough S willy, Ireland, l6tli October, 1798. 
 " SlE, 
 
 " In pursuance of the orders and instructions I received by the 
 Kangaroo, I proceeded with the ships named in the margin (Canada, Robust, 
 Foudroyant, Magnanime) off Achille head ; on the 10th I was joined by the 
 Malampus and Doris ; the latter of whom I directed to look out for the enemy 
 off Tory Island and the Rosses. In the evening the Amelia appeared in the 
 offing. She had parted company with the Ethalion, Anson, and Sylph, who, 
 v^ith great attention, had continued to observe the French squadron since their 
 sailing on the 17th ultimo. In the morning of the 11th, however, these two 
 ships also fell in with us: and, at noon, the enemy were discovered in the 
 N. W. quarter, consisting of one ship of eighty guns, eight frigates, a schooner, 
 
SIR JOHN WARREN. 271 
 
 and a brig. I immediately made the signal for a general chase, and to form 
 in succession as each arrived up with the enemy, whom, from their great 
 distance to windward, and a hollow sea, it was impossible to come up with 
 before the twelfth. 
 
 " The chase was continued, in very bad and boisterous weather, all day of the 
 11th, and the following night ; when, at half- past five a, m. they were seen at 
 a little distance to windward, the line of battle ship having lost her main-top- 
 mast. 
 
 " The enemy bore down, and formed their line in close order upon the 
 starboard tack ; and, from the length of the chase, and the ships being spread, 
 it was impossible to close with them before seven a. m. when I made the Robust's 
 signal to lead, which was obeyed with much alacrity, and thp rest of the ships 
 to form in succession in the rear of the van. The action commenced at twenty 
 minutes past seven, the Rosses bearing S. S. W. five leagues ; and, at eleven, 
 the Hoche, after a gallant defence, struck ; and the frigates made sail from 
 us : the signal to pursue the enemy was immediately made, and, in five hours 
 afterwards, three of the fhg^tsis hauled down their colours also ; but they, as well 
 as the Hoche, were obstinately defended, all of them being heavy frigates, 
 entirely new, full of troops and stores, and every necessary for the establishment 
 of their plans in Ireland. 
 
 " I am happy to say, that the efforts and conduct." 
 
 " I left Captain Thornborough' with the Magnanime, Ethalion, and Amelia, 
 with the prizesy and trust they will soon make their appearance." 
 
 " P. S. The ships with us in the action were the Canada, Robust, Foudroyant, 
 Magnanime, Ethalion, Melampus, and Amelia. The Anson joined us late, 
 having lost her mizen-mast in the chase the day before." 
 
 Thus, by the vigilance, > perseverance, and spirit of this little detached 
 squadron, a line of battle ship and three large frigates were taken from the 
 enemy; and -his views upon Ireland entirely frustrated. This was effected with 
 little comparative loss, under very unpromising circumstances from the state of 
 the weather. 
 
 EXTRACT. 
 
 " Canada, Plymouth Dock, November 18th,, 1798. 
 " I have been waititig with great anxiety the arrival of -the Robust and Le 
 Hoche at this port, to enabk irte to make a fetum of the killed and wouuded on 
 the 12th of October last ; but those ships maybe still further detained by repairs 
 at Lough Swilly. 
 
272 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " As the whole squadron was separated in chase of the flying enemy, and 
 have successively arrived at this port, it was impracticable to communicate the 
 particulars sooner, or to state the very gallant conduct of Captains Thornborough 
 and De Courcy in the Robust and Magnanime ; who, from their position in the 
 van, were enabled to close with the enemy early in the action ; and were 
 zealously and bravely seconded by every other ship of the squadron, as well as 
 by the intrepidity displayed by the Anson in the evening, in obeying my signal 
 to harass the enemy, and in beating off their frigates. 
 
 " For further particulars, I refer their Lordships to the letters they may have 
 received from Captains Countess and Moore, of the Ethalion and Melampus." 
 
 Plate XLI. Figs. 1, 2, 3, describe the relative position of the hostile 
 squadrons, according to Sir J. Warren's account, when first discovered to each 
 other in the morning of the 12th, and at the commencement of the action ; the 
 French squadron having borne down, and formed a close line of battle on the 
 starboard tack. 
 
 The French fleet consisted of one ship of eighty guns, and eight frigates, a 
 brig and schooner ; the British, of three ships of the line and four frigates : the 
 Anson joined late in the action. 
 
 Fig. 3. The British squadron having formed the line " in succession in the 
 rear of the van ;" the Robust leading, followed by the Magnanime ; who, " from 
 their position, were enabled to close with the enemy early in the action." 
 
 From theinformation to be collected from the Admiral's letter, we are told, 
 that the enemy bore down and formed a line on the starboard tack, &c. ; 
 but this is certainly incorrect. By a sketch from the hand of one of the best 
 witnesses now living, Admiral Sir Edward Thornborough, (Nov. 1827) Plate 
 XLI I has been formed ; by which it appears that, although the enemy's 
 squadron was considerably to windward of the Jlag-sMp, it was very little so 
 of the Robust, Magnanime, and Amelia, who, on the morning of the 12th of 
 October, discovered the enemy, as given in the figure, nearly right a-head, on 
 the larboard tack. The Robust and frigates brought the Hoche and others to 
 action on the larboard side, and to windward of them ; and the action was 
 nearly over before the Canada and Foudroyant, from being so far to leeward, 
 could render any assistance. 
 
 When the Hoche struck, the French frigates endeavoured to escape by the 
 opening made between the Canada and ships in shore of her; and, by the 
 vigilant pursuit of the squadron, three of them, as we are informed in Sir J. 
 Warren's letter, were taken. 
 
PZATE jij: 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 \1f' 
 
 ^ ^ ^ ^ 
 
 ^>i^^^^ 
 
 -^ ^ -^ A ,^ : 
 
 A^a^-^S- -=^-M««^.»z<r b 
 
 B 
 
 i 
 
 
 ^ 
 
Plate tt.tt 
 
SIR JAMES SAUMAREZ. 273 
 
 Excepting a few guns at the enemy's frigates, the Robust &reA hex starboard 
 guns only at the Hoche, which ship, without her main-top-mast, seems to have 
 defended herself very well ; that is, from twenty minutes after seven until eleven 
 o'clock. 
 
 The late naval historian, who places so much reliance upon log-book 
 authority, is at last driven to confess that " the entries in the different logs " 
 respecting this battle " are confused, and in some instances contradictory.'' 
 A French author (" Victoires and Conqu^ttes'") is here considered "respectable," 
 in another place he is accused of " ignorance,'' and of making " sneering 
 remarks" and at last is declared guilty of making ^^*e statements. — (James, 
 Vol. ii, p. 193, 439.) It is presumed the authority here shown can never be 
 shaken. 
 
 SIR JAMES SAUMAREZ AT ALGEZIRAS. 
 
 1801. 
 
 Extracts of Letters from Sir James Saumare% dated Ceesar, Gibraltar Bay, 
 
 July Qth. 
 
 " On opening Cabrita point, I found the ships lay at a considerable distance 
 from the enemy's batteries ; and, having a leading wind up to them, afforded 
 every reasonable hope of success in the attack, 
 
 " I had previously directed Captain Hood, in the Venerable, from his 
 experience and knowledge of the anchorage, to lead the squadron ; which he 
 executed with his accustomed gallantry ; and, although it was not intended he 
 should anchor, he found himself under the necessity so to do, from the -wind's 
 failing ; owing to which circumstance, I have to regret the want of success in 
 this well-intended enterprise. Captain Stirling anchored opposite to the inner 
 ship of the enemy, and brought the Pompee to action in the most gallant 
 manner ; which was also followed by the Captains of the ships in the squadron. 
 Captains Darby and Ferris,* owing to light winds, were prevented, for a 
 
 * See Remark, page 277. 
 2 N 
 
274 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 considerable time, from coming into action. At length, the Hannibal getting a 
 breeze. Captain Ferris had the most favourable prospect of being alongside one 
 of the enemy's ships, when the Hannibal imfortunately grounded ; and I am 
 extremely concerned to acquaint their Lordships that, after having made every 
 possible effort, with this ship and the Audacious, to cover her from the enemy, 
 I was under the necessity to make sail, being at the time only three cables' 
 length from one of the enemy's batteries," &c. 
 
 Letter of Captain Ferris to Sir James Saumare% upon the Loss of his Ship, 
 
 the Hannibal. 
 
 " Sir, " Algeziras, July 7th. 
 
 " I have little more to tell you of the fate of his Majesty's ship 
 Hannibal than yourself must have observed ; only that, from the number of 
 batteries and ships, gun-boats, &c. we had to encounter, our guns soon got 
 knocked up ; and I found it was impossible to do any thing, either for the 
 preservation of the ship, or for the good of the service. Our boats, sails, rigging, 
 and springs, being all shot away, and having so many killed and wounded, which 
 will appear by the annexed list, I thought it prudent to strike, and thereby 
 preserve the lives of the brave men that remained." 
 
 British force, six ships of the line, and one sloop of war ; enemy, three ships 
 of the line, protected by numerous batteries and gun-boats. 
 
 For a more particular account of this gallant but unfortunate attack shall be 
 subjoined the clear, manly, and ofRcer-like detail given by Captain Ferris at his 
 Court Martial. It will be found to contain an excellent description of this 
 severe and obstinate contest, which untoward circumstances alone, and the strong 
 position of the enemy, rendered unsuccessful. 
 
 The Narrative of Captain Ferris. 
 
 " Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court, 
 
 " In giving a detail of the circumstances which led to the loss of His 
 Majesty's late ship, the Hannibal, then under my command, I am sorry that, 
 owing to my clerk being killed, whose remarks were lost, I cannot be so 
 particTllar as to the exact times of signals being made, as I otherwise should 
 have been ; but I shall state them to you to the best of my recollection. 
 
 " On the morning of the 6th July last, at about six o'clock, his Majesty's 
 
SIR JAMES SAUMAREZ. 275 
 
 ships. Venerable, Pompee, Audacious, Caesar, Spencer, and Hannibal, under the 
 command of Rear Admiral Sir J. Saumarez, being off Cabrita point, and 
 standing in for Algeziras bay, upon the larboard tack, with the wind westerly; 
 the Admiral made the signal to the Venerable, to know if she could fetch the 
 enemy's ships then in sight in that bay ; which being answered in the affirmative^ 
 the Admiral made the signal for close action. 
 
 " At about eight o'clock the Venerable began the action, at a considerable 
 distance to leeward, as she could not fetch further into the bay ; and soon after, 
 the Pompee anchored nearer in shore, and the Audacious a-stern of her. The 
 Admiral, in the Caesar, next anchored a-head of the Audacious, and made the 
 signal for the ships to anchor in the best possible manner for their mutual 
 support. We then anchored a-head of the Caesar, within hail of her, and, by a 
 spring, got our broadside to bear on one of the enemy's line of battle ships at 
 about ten minutes before nine o'clock, where we kept up a good fire for about an 
 hour. 
 
 " At this time, about ten o'clock, not having understood some verbal 
 directions attempted to be given from the Caesar, I received an order from the 
 Admiral by an officer to go and rake the French Admiral. I instantly turned 
 the hands up to make sail, cut the cable, and cast the ship by the spring, and 
 made sail to the northward ; stood into a quarter less six, and then tacked for 
 the French Admiral, for the purpose I had been ordered to effect. As I 
 approached him, I began to take in sail in such manner as would have enabled 
 me to have hauled in shore athwart his hawse ; which I preferred to going to 
 leeward under his stern, as that might have subjected me, from the variable 
 flaws of the wind, to have drifted further to leeward, and, consequently, 
 without fulfilling, in a manner the most effectual and decisive, the object of 
 my orders. But just as I got the fore-cluegarnets manned, in order to take in 
 the fore-sail, with an intent to put the helm a-lee, and to brace the head- 
 yards a-box, the ship took the ground within hail of the French Admiral's ship, 
 which accident alone could have prevented me from putting my orders into 
 execution, 
 
 " In this situation, I opened my fire on the French Admiral, with as many 
 of my fore-most guns as could be brought to bear on him ; the rest being 
 directed, with much effect, on the town, batteries, and gun-boats, with which I 
 was surrounded ; but, the ship appearing to swing a little, I let go the bower- 
 anchor, and cut the cable ; the stream -cable being clenched to the ring of the 
 anchor, and in at the gun-room port, on which I intended to heave a strain to 
 endeavour to force the ship round, so as to bring her broadside to bear on the 
 
 21 N 2 
 
276 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 French Admiral (having, at this time, no hope of getting the ship entirely afloat, 
 the master finding less water round the ship than where she lay) ; but the 
 spring being shot away before it was well taut, the ship remained immoveable. 
 I had, by this time, after much endeavour, all my signal halliards being shot 
 away, effected making the signal for striking and sticking fast on a shoal. 
 
 " I observed some time afterwards all our ships driving out of the bay ; 
 the Admiral having previously made my signal of recal, and sent a boat from 
 the Caesar, and another from the Venerable, to my assistance ; but, finding they 
 could afibrd me none, I sent the Venerable's boat back, and the crew of the 
 Caesar's in one of my own cutters ; their pinnace having been sunk by a shot 
 alongside. 
 
 " About twelve o'clock our ships were all out of gun-shot of the enemy ;* 
 and we had the fire of the whole French squadron, batteries, and gun-boats, to 
 contend viith alone ; against which we continued to keep up as brisk fire as 
 could be expected even of men in the most sanguine expectation of victory, 
 until near two o'clock. 
 
 " I had been before this time receiving repeated reports from several of my 
 officers, of the numbers killed and wounded, and of many of the guns being 
 rendered unserviceable; and seeing many of my brave crew every moment 
 falling at their quarters, and the ship in all respects but little better than a 
 wreck, I thought proper to call my ofiicers together, and asked their opinion 
 whether more could be done for the preservation of the ship ; they replied, they 
 thought it was impossible to do more, and that to strike the colours was the only 
 means of preserving the lives of those that remained. 
 
 " On these considerations, and from a conviction of having experienced every 
 possible assistance that the persevering endeavours of zealous and brave officers 
 and men could afford me ; whose exertions, and those of Lieutenant Hill in 
 particular (my First Lieutenant), I shall ever remember with the greatest 
 gratitude ; and seeing that our hitherto effective fire on the enemy's ships and 
 batteries was now so slackened as to be nearly useless, I ordered the firing 
 to cease, and the people to shelter themselves as much as possible ; and in a 
 little time afterwards I submitted to tlie painful necessity of ordering his 
 Majesty's colours to be hauled down." 
 
 * Here this gallant officer was led into a mistake, as the Hannibal was reduced to the necessity 
 of surrendering before Sir James Saumarez had quitted his position : but he commences by stating 
 that his clerk was killed, and the minutes of the battle were lost. 
 
SIR JAMES SAUMAREZ. 277 
 
 OBSERVATION. 
 
 Such was the honourable fate of this obstinate and brilliant contest. The 
 attack reflects honour and credit upon all ; and on no one more than the skilful, 
 cool, and determined captain, ofiicers, and crew of the Hannibal. To be at last 
 compelled to surrender to a host of foes, and under such an accumulation of 
 disasters, was perhaps more desirable than some victories would have been ; and 
 rendered them objects rather of envy and emulation, than of commiseration and 
 regret. 
 
 To show the impression the conduct of this ship had made upon the members 
 of the Court Martial, the following is extracted from the sentence ; — 
 
 " The Court, on hearing the narrative of Captain Ferris, &c., was of opinion, 
 that the loss of his Majesty's ship Hannibal was caused by her grounding on a 
 shoal in the bay of Algeziras a-head of the French Admiral ; when Captain 
 Ferris, her commander, agreeably to the orders he had received, was making the 
 gallant and well-judged attempt to place her so as to rake the enemy ; and after 
 a considerable part of his ship's company had been killed or wounded, being 
 obliged to strike his Majesty's colours : and that the conduct of Captain Ferris, 
 in going into action, was that of an excellent and expert seaman ; and that his 
 conduct, after she was engaged, was that of a brave, cool, and determined officer ; 
 and that Captain Ferris, his officers, and ship's company, throughout the action, 
 more particularly in continuing it for a considerable time after she was on shore, 
 and the rest of the British squadron had been obliged to quit her, did the utmost 
 for the preservation of his Majesty'^s ship, and the honour of the British flag ; 
 and doth adjudge them to be honourably acquitted." 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 " A difference in the Admiral's statement and Captain Ferris's occasions some 
 little obscurity ; for by the latter it appears he was at an anchor, within hail of 
 the Caesar (the flag-ship), engaged for an hour ; and ordered from that position 
 to take another, in order to rake the French Admiral, The ships, not fetching 
 in, should never have anchored." 
 
 Ramatuelle, in his chapter " De li'embossage," or the anchoring with springs 
 for the defence of a port or road, alludes to this attack, to show how much its 
 success depends upon the wind. He observes that an inferior force so placed, 
 threatened with an attack, should take down all vanes, colours, or flags that 
 
278 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 could in any way show the force or direction of the wind to a fleet in the offing, 
 who may be affected by a very different one. 
 
 The wind in this instance first failed the British squadron, then shifted to the 
 N. E. and E. N. E. which he observes threw the English upon a lee shore. 
 
 His account seems no otherwise incorrect than in stating that two of the 
 British squadron ran aground ; but that one of them was got off again. The 
 change of wind, he says, obliged the French ships to cut their cables and run on 
 shore. (Page 468.) 
 
 In such cases he recommends having some fire ships ready, outside and to 
 windward, and provided with a few good swimmers or divers, to grapple with 
 the enemy under cover of the smoke, when they shall have approached within 
 half gun-shot ! 
 
 SIR JAMES SAUMAREZ, 
 
 IN THE STRAITS OF GIBRALTAR. 
 
 We are now to relate another proof of extreme vigilance and activity displayed 
 by Sir James Saumarez in equipping his disabled squadron, and pursuing in the 
 shortest space of time a very superior force of the enemy ; of his gallantly 
 attacking it, and of the success which so honourably crowned his exertions. 
 
 The following are extracts from his letter, and that of Captain Keats of the 
 Superb : — 
 
 " Ctesar, JulylStli. 
 
 " The three line of battle ships disabled in the battle of the 6th instant off 
 Algeziras were on the 8th reinforced by a squadron of five Spanish line of 
 battle ships, under the command of Don Juan Joaquin de Moreno ; and a 
 French ship of seventy-four guns, wearing a broad pendant ; besides three 
 frigates and an incredible number of gun-boats and other vessels ; and got under 
 sail yesterday morning." 
 
 " Confiding in the zeal and intrepidity of the officer.s and men I had the 
 honour to command, I determined, if possible, to obstruct them in their passage 
 to Cadiz. Late in the evening I observed the enemy's ships to have cleared 
 
lU^ATXXIJIL. 
 
 THE COAST OF SPAIN I^T THE STREIGHTS OE GlBIt^iLTAR 
 
 Iig.J._ 
 
 -A 
 
 
 KSzS. 
 
 
 Superb Gf.<<v 
 
 LAND 
 
 Fig. 
 
 it 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 €sss<u' 
 
 M, 
 
 J, 
 
 i^<fe^. 
 
 -=^ 
 
jn^TESLIV. 
 
 L A -T D 
 
 Fig.3. 
 
 SpanL'h BDcdocis onFirc 
 
 
 >j3i ^ ^ 
 
SIR JAMES SAUMAREZ. 279 
 
 Cabrita point, and at eight I bore iip with the squadron to stand after them. 
 His Majesty's ship Superb being stationed a-head of the Caesar, I diriEcted 
 Captain Keats to make sail and attack the sternmost of the enemy's rear, using 
 his endeavours to keep in-shore of them." See Plate XLIII, Fig. 1. French 
 and Spanish, nine sail of the line ; British, five sail of the line and one frigate. 
 
 Fig. 2. " At eleven the Superb opened her fire close to the enemy's ships ; 
 and on the Caesar's coming up, and preparing to engage a three-decker that had 
 hauled her wind, she was perceived to have taken fire, and the flames having 
 communicated to a ship to leeward of her, both were soon in a blaze, and pre- 
 sented a most awful sight. No possibility existing of offering the least assistance 
 in so distressing a situation, the Caesar passed to close with the ship engaged by 
 the Superb ; but by the cool and determined fire kept upon her, the enemy's 
 ship was completely silenced, and soon after hauled down her colours. The 
 Venerable and Spiencer having at this time come up, I bore up after the enemy, 
 who were.carrying a press of sail, standing out of the Straits ; and lost sight of 
 them during the night." 
 
 Plate XLIV, Fig. 4. " It blew excessively hard till day-light ; and in the 
 morning the only ships in company were the Venerable and Thames, a-head of 
 the Caesar ; and one of the French ships at some distance from them, standing 
 towards the shoals of Conil ; besides the Spencer a-stern coming up. 
 
 "All the ships immediately made sail with a fresh breeze; but as we 
 approached, the wind suddenly failing, the Venerable was alone able to bring 
 her to action, which Captain Hood did in the most gallant manner, and had 
 nearly silenced the French ship, when his main-mast (which had been before 
 wounded) was unfortunately shot away ; and it coming nearly calm, the enemy's 
 ship was enabled to get off without any possibility of following her." 
 
 V This action was so near the shore, that the Venerable struck on a shoal, 
 but was soon after got off arid taken in tow by the Thames ; but with the loss 
 of all her masts. The enemy's ships are now in sight to the westward, standing 
 in for Cadiz. The Superb and Audacious, with the captured ship, are also in 
 sight." 
 
 Of this force, two ships of 112 guns took fire and blew up ; and one of seventy- 
 four, guns was taken. 
 
 British force, five ships of the line, one frigate, and a sloop of war. 
 
 To do justice to those who had the good fortune to bear a more conspicuous 
 part than others upon this occasion, we shall select parts of the following letter 
 of Captain Keats, from which to draw no unimportant conclusion. 
 
280 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " Superb, off Cape Trafalgar, July ISth. 
 
 " I have the honour to inform you, that in consequence of your direction to 
 make sail up to, and engage the sternmost of the enemy's ships, at half-past 
 eleven I found myself a-breast of a Spanish three-decked ship (the Real Carlos), 
 which having hrought-in-one * with two other ships nearly line a-breast, I 
 opened my fire upon her at a distance, not more than three cables. This 
 evidently produced a good effect, as well in this ship, as the others a-breast of 
 her ; which soon began firing on each other, and at times on the Superb. (See 
 Fig. 2.) In about a quarter of an hour I perceived her to be on fire, and I 
 proceeded on to the ship next at hand, which proved to be the San Antonio of 
 74 guns and 750 men, under French colours, and wearing a broad pendant ; 
 which, after some action (the chief being wounded), struck her colours. 
 
 " I learnt that in the confusion of the action, the Hermenegildo (a first-rate) 
 mistaking the Real Carlos for an enemy, ran on board her, and shared her 
 melancholy fate. Services of this nature cannot well be expected to be performed 
 without some loss," &c, 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 From the result of this action is clearly shown the impropriety of retreating in 
 a line a-breast; or as Mr. Richard H. Gower, in his treatise, calls it, the order 
 of retreat, having the line of hearing across the wind. 
 
 Nothing could have been more disadvantageous on the one hand, and (as it 
 proved) of advantage to the pursuing squadron, than this mode of retreat ; for 
 to a skilful and enterprizing enemy, it afforded every prospect of success ; which 
 from the form of approach recommended by the British Admiral, and the cool 
 and determined manner in which it was executed by Sir Richard Keats, was so 
 happily effected. 
 
 The French and Spanish Commanders well knew the vigilance and activity 
 of their enemy, and fully expected to be closely pursued. Their force consisted 
 of nine sail of the line, with numerous small vessels ; the British force, five sail 
 of the line and a frigate, The following were Admiral Moreno's orders to his 
 fleet upon this occasion. (See " Naval Chronicle," vol. vi. for a full account.) 
 
 " Order of sailing to be observed by the ships in my charge, on their passage 
 through the Straits of Gibraltar : — 
 
 * This signifies, to bring in a direct line together; exposed to suffer by the same broadside. 
 
SIR JAMES SAUMAREZ. 281 
 
 " The three French ships under the command of Rear Admiral Linois will 
 form the van-guard, with the line a-breast. The six ships under my charge 
 will follow a-stern of these, likewise formed in line a-breast ; endeavouring as 
 much as possible to keep opposite to the intervals of the French ships, so 
 as not to impede their fire, according to the following disposition. (See 
 Fig. 1, Plate XLIII.) 
 
 '* In case the enemy should attempt to follow and attack the combined 
 squadron in the rear, besides the continual fire which we ought to make from 
 the stern chases, chiefly with a view to destroy the enemy's rigging, the 
 squadron will form the line a-head, either with their heads to the Spanish coast, 
 or to that of Africa, as will be determined by a signal from the Admiral ; and in 
 order that this may be the more simple, in that case, he will only show the signal 
 for the course, at the entire lowering of which the movements must uniformly be 
 made. As the operation, from their local situation, cannot naturally be of long 
 duration, consequently, either by hailing (if near enough) or by a signal to 
 ' pursue the course,' the squadron wUl proceed to form again the line a-breast as 
 formerly. 
 
 " It is of the utmost importance that the fire from none of the ships should 
 interfere, or be embarrassed with that of the others in this squadron, nor to leave 
 the three French ships in the rear." Here are some further observations, not 
 necessary ; and the line of battle in the natural order ; this is followed by 
 
 " A very essential Caution. 
 
 " A red pendant under any other signal, signifies that the signal above is 
 directed only to the French ships under the command of Mons. de Linois. 
 
 " On board the Real Carlos, in the Bay 
 of Algeziras, July 11th, 1801. 
 
 (Signed) " Juan Joaquin de Moreno." 
 
 Neither the disposition of his force, nor the precautionary orders with regard 
 to the fire of his ships, were sufficient to protect the Spanish Admiral from the 
 skill and intrepidity of British seamen. 
 
 His very mode of retreat was his ruin, and cannot be compared with that of 
 Admiral Cornwallis ; who, by a very different mode, defeated the attempt of an 
 overwhelming superiority. Here, nine sail of the line (two of them first-rates, 
 which took fire and blew up ; and a seventy-four is taken) are attacked by three 
 only of five ships of two decks, and are beaten and dispersed. In the former 
 
 2 o 
 
282 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 case, five ships of the line, having but one three-deched skip, completely set at 
 defiance a force of thirteen ships of two decks and fourteen ftigates.-*Let the 
 reader consider this, and form his own conclusions. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 " With regard to this retreat, when nine ships make up their minds to run 
 from five, it is of little consequence in what order they take their flight ; and 
 the confusion of the combined squadron, on being attacked by the Superb, shows 
 they never would have preserved any regular order. Now the circular stern has 
 been introduced, I think the line a-breast may be used with effect." 
 
 " The disastrous consequence of a retreat in line a-breast, in this instance, 
 I do not consider a fair trial ; the line was never preserved ; the enemy ran in 
 disorder, and panic was the order of the day. If every ship had behaved like 
 the French Formidable the next morning the British squadron could have done 
 nothing. The fault was not in the line a-breast, but a want of skill and 
 courage." 
 
 The bombardment of Copenhagen by Lord Nelson, in 1801, although a naval 
 achievement of the most brilHant description, does not come within the limits of 
 the present inquiry, as not strictly connected with tactics. Lord Nelson remarked 
 at a subsequent period, that he had there committed one great error, namely, 
 by not having directed the ships to heave dose to their anchors in going to the 
 attack, instead of weighing them ; as in the time taken to cat, fish, and stow 
 their anchors, the navigation being so intricate and shallow, two of the ships 
 grounded. (See the Biographical Memoir of Sir Waller Otway, by Mr. 
 I. Ralfe.) 
 
 In this celebrated attack Captain Otway was a volunteer, and performed 
 enterprising and distinguished service, to which it is shown he was particularly 
 recommended and adapted. 
 
 Of the Peace of Amiens, concluded in that year. Lord Nelson's opinion is 
 given in a MS. letter to the Right Hon. John Trevor, in which also he has drawn 
 in few words the character of the then principal actor in the great continental 
 drama. The letter was written soon after the destruction of the flotilla at 
 Boulogne, and when he was suffering for the loss of his " dear gallant Parker ;" 
 yet continuing to interest himself in the future prospects of others, who v?ere 
 
SIR ROBERT CALDER. 283 
 
 known to him ; particulMrly in one recommended by Mr. Trevor. The following 
 is an extract, and dated from the 
 
 " Amazon, October I6th, 1801. 
 
 " I am one that rejoices at the peace, and rejoice from my heart that we are 
 not to keep Malta and liie Cape of Good Hope, an enormous expense and no 
 use to us ; <iiis I will defend by proofs against all the dislikers of the terms in 
 another pkce. If Europe had been true to itself our peace and their peace 
 would have been very different; they never read the Jhhle of the old man 
 and the sticks, I feel for the poor King of Sardinia ; I ■ hate the French 
 as much as ever ; and it is not because Buonaparte is a clever great scoundrel 
 that I can ever like him ; Corsican cunning grafted upon French insolence 
 and infamy ; this is the god that Murcyae has made and they fall, down and 
 worship it. But we have made peace with this animal — this nondescript—and 
 I hope we and all Europe will keq) it ; but •die moment he outst^s his 
 boundaries and again shows his cloven foot, then I hope Europe will join heart 
 aavd hand and heat this animal Jrom the throne" &c. 
 
 (Signed) Nelson anb Bronte. 
 
 In this letter it would seem that he had a strong suspicion this " nondescript " 
 would outstep his boundary, and again show his cloven foot. The sequel 
 proves Lord Nelson to have been no false prophet, and how with " heart and 
 hand " he bravely contributed to " beat the animal from the throne." 
 
 Sm ROBERT CALDER'S BATTLE. 
 1805. 
 
 EXTRACT. 
 
 " Prince of Walra, July tSd. 
 
 " Yesteuday, at noon, I was favoured- with a view of the combined 
 squadrons of France and Spain, consisting of twenty sail of the line ; also three 
 large ships armed en flute of about fifty guns each, With five frigatesf, and three 
 
 2 2 
 
284 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 brigs ; the force under my direction at this time consisting of fifteen sail of the 
 line, two frigates, a cutter, and lugger. I immediately stood towards the enemy, 
 making the needful signals for battle in the closest order ; and, on closing with 
 them, I made the signal for attacking their centre. 
 
 " When I had reached their rear, I tacked the squadron in succession ; . this: 
 brought us close up under their lee ; and, when our headmost ships reached 
 their centre, the enemy were tacking in succession. This obliged me to make 
 again the same manoeuvre, by which I brought on an action, which lasted 
 upward of four hours, when I found it necessary to T)ring-to the squadron, to 
 cover the two captured ships named in the margin. 
 
 " I have to observe, the enemy had every advantage of wind and weather 
 during the whole day ; the weather had been foggy at times a great part of 
 the morning ; and, very soon after we had brought them ,to action the fog was 
 so very thick, at intervals, that we could, with great difficulty, see the ship 
 a-head or a-stern of us. This rendered it impossible to take the advantages of 
 the enemy, by signals, I wished to have done. Had the weather been more 
 favourable, I am led to believe the victory would have been more complete," &c. 
 
 " If I may judge from the slaughter on board the captured ships, the enemy 
 must have suffered greatly. They are now in sight to windward, and when I 
 have secured, &c. I shall endeavour to avail myself," &c. 
 
 Plate XLV shows the positions of the two fleets, from the best information 
 that can be collected. 
 
 Fig. 1. Wind about N. W. by N. forty leagues N. W. from Cape Finisterre. 
 The British and combined fleets meeting, on opposite tacks, July 22!d, 1805, 
 " I made the signal for attacking their centre ; when I reached their rear 
 I tacked the squadron in succession :" " this brought us close up under 
 their lee." 
 
 Fig. 3. " When our headmost ships reached their centre, the enemy were 
 tacking in succession : " " this obliged me again to make the same manoeuvre." 
 
 The van having reached the centre of the enemy, and preparing to make the 
 same manoeuvre. 
 
 Fig. 3. The van of both fleets having tacked in succession, according to the 
 British Admiral's statement. 
 
 By his manoeuvre, the Admiral informs us, that he " brought on an action 
 which lasted upwards of four hours, when he found it necessary to bring-to the 
 squadron^ to cover the two captured ships." 
 
 By this position of the two fleets, it is difficult to understand how the British 
 
pjlate:szv. 
 
 X. 
 
 i. 
 
 1. 
 
 J> 
 
 ^^^^^""^^ 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 ■^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^^t| 
 
 ^^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 Fig. 7. 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 Fig. 3. 
 
 
 J> 
 
 1. 
 
 
 ^ 
 
/ \ ', V.\ \ 
 
SIR ROBERT CALDER. 285 
 
 fleet could avoid passing through the centre of the enemy, and thereby rendering 
 the battle infinitely more decisive. After this manoeuvre the writer is unable 
 further to trace the track of the British Admiral. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 It is singular that, in the foregoing letter, we are neither informed of the 
 direction of the wind, the quarter in which the enemy is first seen, nor the tack 
 or course upon which either fleet is standing. These are only to be discovered 
 from its general contents, and from sources distinct from the Admiral's 
 dispatches. 
 
 From the trial of the British Admiral by a Court Martial, as it relates 
 exclusively to the transactions of the squadron from the 23d, in the morning, 
 nothing is to be learned of the encounter of the 22d, excepting that the enemy 
 was left upon the weather quarter of the British fleet at a very considerable 
 distance. Upon this, his subsequent conduct, a Court Martial has pronounced 
 judgment. 
 
 There is one part of the Admiral's letter that cannot escape observation; it 
 is this — that, notwithstanduig the thickness of the fog at intervals, when he 
 could with difficulty see the ships a-head and a-stern of him, it was also, at times, 
 so clear, that he could discover the movements of the van ships of the enemy, by 
 which he himself was guided. When they tacked in succession, he performed 
 the same manoeuvre, which brought on an action of four hours, which he appears 
 to have quitted without a sufficient reason ; for merely to cover the two captured 
 ships will not be admitted to be so. By Figure 3, it would seem that it was 
 in the power of the British Admiral, when he last tacked, to have passed 
 through the enemy's line, and to have separated and captured many more. 
 
 FURTHER OBSERVATIONS UPON SIR ROBERT CALDER'S BATTLE. 
 
 As accuracy, so far as it can be attained, is essential to the credit of a record 
 of this nature, no apology will be necessary for offering a few more observations 
 upon the battle of Sir Robert Calder. 
 
 From an intelligent officer. Captain of one of the ships in that fleet, and 
 another, a Lieutenant ~ of one in the rear, whose account and description 
 entirely correspond, the writer has been informed that mistakes have arisen in 
 the statement given in the Admiral's letter. 
 
 The French Commander-in-chief (with the wonted address and politeness of 
 
286 NAVAL BATTLES, 
 
 his eoumtrjr), yielding the post of honour to his faithful aUiei^, had placed the 
 Spaniards in the van to lead them into hattle ; but, the British fleet approaehing 
 his rear, lest they should be deprived of this opportuaity of distinguishing 
 themselves, he caused the van to ware (as along the dotted line in Figures 1 
 and 3), and thus to bring to action the van of the British fleet, upon the opposite 
 tack, keeping to windward ; while the French division continued standing away 
 upon the larboard tack. The rear of the British fleet, at this time, had not got 
 upon the larboard tack, but were still standing as in Figure 1, when: the 
 stemmost ships' came in contact with the van of the enemy (the Spaniards) 
 which had then nearly run the gauntlope of the British line. It was two of 
 these that fell a prey to the British fleet : the rest were suffered to proceed, and 
 the battle ended. Our sternmost ships were never engaged, but on the starboard 
 side, with the enemy to windward ; and must, therefore, have engaged on the 
 starboard tack. 
 
 By a log of one of the ships, it appears that the enemy's fleet were seen at 
 11^ 15' a. m. bearing S. S. W. wind N. N. W. j and, at three p. m. they- bore 
 N. W. by W. ; an evident proof of the advantage given them by the British 
 Admiral, when, as the enemy were first seen on the lee-bow, he had it clearly 
 in his power to have passed through their line in whatever part he thought 
 proper ; but he stood away, large, to be joined by the Dragon on the look-out 
 in that quarter ; and thus the opportunity was lost. He could then only tack, 
 and, by carrying sail, range up under the enemy's lee, from the rear to the centre, 
 as in Figure % 
 
 The two Spanish ships struck about sunset; and, at day-light on the 
 foUbwing morning, the van of the British fleet was nearer to the enemy than to 
 its own. The cause of this great separation between them does not appear to be 
 accounted for. 
 
 All the information the writer can collect is, indeed, scanty and imperfect ; 
 but the accuracy of this may bc; entirely r^d oir, so fer as relates to what could 
 be seen from, or take place in, the rear of the British fleet. It led, however, 
 to one, the greatest in our naval amtals of modern times, now about to 
 be described. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 " Some men have thought that domg^ a little is doing enough ; Lord NelSon, 
 like Cassar, considered nothing done while any thing remained limtone" 
 
 " This engagement is so ill-described (from want of proper information) that 
 
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. 287 
 
 it seems but fair to leave it out : it ceirtainly appears by Figure 3 that Sir Robert 
 might have taken (by cutting off) the enemy's rear." 
 
 The writer must observe in reply, that where he has applied for information, 
 namely, to Captains who were present in the battle, no very clear or satisfactory 
 account was given him ; some of them knew little beyond the conduct of their 
 own ships ; and ail agree in its having been a very ill-conducted attack, and 
 quitted when the British fleet was only beginning to reap the advantage of it. 
 The writer regrets that his numerous and earnest endeavours to acquire more 
 satisfactory details of this battle have not met with better success. 
 
 BATTLE OF TRATALGAR. 
 
 Extract from Lord Collingwood's Letter to the Admiralty. 
 
 " Euryalus, oflf Cape Trafalgar, October 22d, 1805. 
 
 " On Monday, the 21st instant, at day-light, when Cape Trafalgar bore 
 E. by S. about seven leagues, the enemy was discovered six or seven miles to the 
 eastward, the wind about west, and very light; the Commander-in-chief 
 immediately made the signal for the fleet to bear up in two columns, as they are 
 formed in order of sailing ; a mode of attack his Lordship had previously 
 directed, to avoid the inconvenience and delay in forming a line of battle in the 
 usual manner. 
 
 " The enemy's line consisted of thirty-three ships (of which eighteen were 
 French and fifteen Spanish), commanded in chief by Admiral Villeneuve ; the 
 Spaniards, under Gravina, wore with their heads to the northward, and formed 
 their line of battle with great closeness and correctness ; but as the mode of 
 attack was unusual, so the structure of their line was new ; it formed a crescent 
 convexing to leeward, so that, in leading down to their centre, I had both their 
 van and rear a-baft the beam. Before the fire opened, every alternate ship was 
 about a cable's length to windward of her second a-head and a-stern, forming a 
 kind of double line ; and appeared when on their beam, to leave a very little 
 interval between them, and this without crowding their ships. 
 
288 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 " The Commander-in-chief, in the Victory, led the weather column ; and 
 the Royal Sovereign, which hore my flag, the lee.* 
 
 " The action began at twelve o'clock by the leading ships of the columns 
 breaking through the enemy's line ; the Commander-in-chief about the tenth ship 
 from the van ; the second in command about the twelfth from the rear, leaving 
 the van of the enemy unoccupied ; the succeeding ships breaking through in all 
 parts a-stern of their leaders, and engaging the enemy at the muzzles of their 
 guns. The conflict was severe ; the enemy's ships were fought with a gallantry 
 highly honourable to their ofiicers ; but the attack on them was irresistible ; and 
 it pleased the Almighty Disposer of all events to grant his Majesty's arms a 
 complete and glorious victory. 
 
 " About three p. m., many of the enemy's ships having struck their colours, 
 their line gave way ; Admiral Gravina, with ten sail, joining their frigates to 
 leeward, stood towards Cadiz. 
 
 " The five headmost ships in their van tacked, and, standing to the southward, 
 to windward of the British line, were engaged, and the sternmost of them 
 taken. The others went off, leaving to his Majesty's squadron nineteen ships 
 of the line (of which two are first rates), with three flag ofiicers," &c. 
 
 In another letter he observes, " The ruin of the fleet is as complete as could 
 be expected under the circumstances of fighting them close to their own shore- 
 Had the battle been in the ocean, still fewer would have escaped." 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 By a representation of the plan of attack, given in the 14th volume of the 
 Naval Chronicle, and said to be copied from a drawing in the possession of the 
 
 * In an attack of this sort, a formidable battery in the bows of our ships would be desirable if it 
 could be had; and, if not, that the bow should, if possible, be made shot-proqf, yet not heavy. In 
 the power, or means, of assailing an enemy from the bow, our ships in general are very deficient. 
 The Endymion frigate, by a singular felicity, could at a long range make a cross fire with her two 
 foremost guns on the main-deck. In her engagement with the President, for nearly three hours, 
 she kept up a fire from one of these guns, and a traversing brass eighteen-pounder belonging to 
 the Captain (Henry Hope) from the forecastle ; the only guns that, during that time, could be 
 brought to bear ; and, for the last half hour, having, vdth excellent management and attention, 
 attained and preserved the " point of impunity," did some execution. Such was the look-out kept 
 by the Endymion, and so closely in concert were all her movements with those of the enemy, that 
 the American Captain declared both ships appeared to be steered hy the same wheel ! There can be 
 no stronger proof of the discipline and conduct of the ship, nor could he have paid the Captain a 
 higher compliment. 
 
FZ^TZXLVI. 
 
 lin/' of ^ adva/icai Squadron Ships iiot pr-csmt in t^jicti^n 
 o. x- o .. O - -o. t: o .o . 
 
 ir^'athfi- DiviswJi jmdrr lordXtlson 
 
 Fuf.I. 
 
 Le&Ihi'LiioTi loiderZojd thlbjujwood 
 
 iXi %% % l % \ ll\ 
 
 
 i^. 
 
 
 Jit 
 
 D 
 
 i' 
 
 
 /^z"<7. ?. 
 
 i i 
 
 I 1^ 
 
 
 M 
 
 
 ^: ,^' /k^ ' 
 
 — ^ - 
 
 / it- iii^ 
 
 ili^ 
 
 x 
 
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. 289 
 
 Lords Gommissioners of the Admiralty, it is shown that the British fleet bore 
 down (as the letter expresses it) in two columns (lines A, B, C, D, Fig. 2, 
 Plate XL VI), led by the flag-officers respectively. The advanced squadron (had 
 there been one) was intended to have cut through more towards the van, but, at 
 all events, to secure the capture or destruction of the Commander-in-chief; on 
 whom, and the rear, their principal efforts were to be directed ; and, supposing 
 the enemy's force to have consisted of forty-six sail of the line, " twenty of 
 them were to be left untouched ;" that is, until those that were the first object 
 had been properly accounted for. 
 
 While such must be considered as the actual mode of attack adopted, it is 
 well known to all the Captains of that fleet, that an attack from the windward 
 was, by previous concert, to have been of a different and still more formidable 
 nature ; for, as the order of sailing was the order of battle, and the enemy seen 
 to leeward, the Commander-in-chief, in that case, would " bring the British fleet 
 nearly within gun-shot of the enemy's centre, and the signal, most probably, then 
 be made for the lee-division to bear up together, to set all sails, even steering 
 sails," &c. 
 
 The secret memorandum at the end of these remarks, will best explain 
 his Lordship's intention ; but as an attempt to reconcile the approach in 
 column with the plan before directed, we shall suppose the advance of the fleet 
 as here given.* The lee division, bearing up together, followed soon after by 
 the centre ; the fleet originally formed in the order of sailing upon a wind on 
 the larboard tack ; the enemy formed in close line convexing to leeward, heads 
 to the northward. 
 
 ■ The preconcerted plan of attack differed essentially from the real one, inas- 
 much as that presumes the two lines to have borne up together. In the actual 
 case, they afterwards fell into line a-head, the ships in the wake of each other, 
 in obedience to the signal made in conformity with a change of intention on the 
 part of Lord Nelson. This, it would seem, can only be accounted for by his great 
 impatience to be the leader of his column, and the first in battle ; for certain it is 
 that such change was made in the form of attack, the writer having been 
 assured of it from the best authority. Now, supposing a line, like that of Lord 
 CoUingwood's, of fifteen ships, all in their stations when the signal to bear up 
 together should be made ; and supposing the signal to be obeyed vdth equal 
 alacrity by all ; yet the different rates of sailing in them will soon be conspicuous ; 
 and the advantages of some over others neither to be reckoned upon nor 
 
 * British fleet twenty-seven sail of the line ; French and Spanish thirty-three. 
 
 2 P 
 
290 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 accounted for ; yet it will be readily admitted that, from the design, no mode of 
 attack could have been formed better calculated for effecting the piurpose of the 
 determined Chief; the capture or destruction of the centre and rear of the 
 enemy. See the " Memorandum^ 
 
 The great man, whose last brilliant achievement it is here feebly attempted to 
 describe, had well calculated upon the probable result of this masterly manoeuvre : 
 justly confiding in the intrepidity of those under his command. The twelve rear 
 ships of the enemy he had already assigned to the fifteen under Lord CoUingwood ; 
 while, with his remaining twelve, he undertook the " management" of the rest ; 
 taking care that " the movements of the second in command should be as little 
 interrupted as possible." Twenty-one ships therefore were to be managed by 
 this matchless hero and his twelve sail of ships ! 
 
 The dying Chiefs wishes were accomplished before he resigned his breath ; 
 the fruit of his arrangements and example. He had " bargained for twenty," * 
 nineteen was the number taken or destroyed. 
 
 Sanguine in his expectations " as to the result," his great mind had nevertheless 
 considered the subject well in all its bearings ; for, towards the close of this 
 celebrated memorandum, he says, " something must be left to chance ; nothing 
 is sure in a sea fight above all others ; shot will carry away the masts and yards 
 of friends as well as foes ; but I look with confidence to a victory before the van 
 of the enemy could succour their rear," &c. 
 
 Yet it may be permitted us to inquire, how far it might have been in the 
 power of the enemy's van (ten or eleven sail) left unoccupied, to have succoured 
 his rear ; or in what manner to have stayed the dreadful havoc committed upon 
 the rest of the fleet. For this purpose are offered for consideration, the 
 movements described by Plate XLYII, Fig. 3 ; where the enemy's van has 
 borne up to form a line of battle (on either tack) to leeward of the contending 
 ships. 
 
 All sea ofiicers will admit, that the crippled ships of both fleets must necessarily 
 fall to leeward. This formidable line of fresh ships will therefore be ready to 
 assist their friends, or to attack their disabled enemy; who, already having 
 suffered severely in the contest, may be little able to contend with others, and 
 most probably will fall an easy prey to them ; while they present a safe shelter 
 and protection to the shattered remains of their own fleet. 
 
 In the same Memorandum it is said, " If the van of the enemy tacks, the 
 captured ships must run to leeward of the British fleet ; if the enemy veers, (or 
 
 » See «' Dr. Beatt/s Narrative and Death of Nelson." 
 
PZATZSSnra. 
 
 I / / 
 
 V 
 
 ' ' 
 
 
 Fig. 3. 
 
 ^ 
 
 X ^ ii-'' Mr-// 
 
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 ^--^:-'-'^:^SS^";itt:^^--^- 
 
 .. Ji;--~„. jii^-..ji^-, Ji^ Jij,,, j^ j^, _^-„ii>-,j|t---ili< 
 
 ^ 1 Enemj'sTan 
 
 THE CO^S-J' or SPAIN AliOJ'T THE JLiBBOLTi OE CADIZ 
 
 Fi^.4 
 
 
 
 ^t jt 
 
 
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. 291 
 
 wares), the British must place themselves between the enemy and the captured 
 ships ; and should the enemy close, I have no fear as to the result," 
 
 In a conflict like this both fleets must suffer most severely ; and the British 
 fleet, having already fought its way through a double line of the enemy, cannot 
 be equally capable of penetrating a third ; and from their battered and 
 dismantled condition must inevitably fall to leeward. 
 
 The Victory had suffered considerably before she could return a single shot. 
 She had lost fifty men killed and wounded; her mizen-top-mast and all her 
 studding-sails and their booms on both sides were shot away ; the enemy's fire 
 being chiefly directed at the masts and rigging ; so certain is the eflFect of a 
 cannonade from a line to leeward, and fully justifying Mr. Clerk's conclusions. 
 The Victory was then laid on board of the Redoubtable ; which ship had 
 afterwards on her other side the Temeraire, with the Fougeux also alongside 
 of her ; " so that the extraordinary and unprecedented circumstance occurred 
 here, of four ships of the line being on board of each other in the heat of 
 battle."* 
 
 Since such was the case with two, it was probably so With many of the ships ; 
 this will further appear by an extract from the log of the Bellerophon, with 
 which this account shall be closed ; all tending to favour the proposed movement 
 of. the enemy's van ; who, in protecting their disabled companions, might still 
 have disputed the fortune of the day. 
 
 From Lord Collingwood we learn, that five of the headmost ships tacked, were 
 engaged by some of our ships, and the sternmost of them taken ; the others 
 went off; but, as it proved, only to fall into the hands of Sir Richard Strachan. 
 This was at least a most ignoble proceeding; offering nothing to the pro-^ 
 tection or defence of their comrades, and productive neither of honour nor of 
 advantage. 
 
 In a letter dated October 24th, we are told, " On the 22d, in the morning, a 
 strong southerly wind blew, with squally weather ; which, however, did not 
 prevent the officers and seamen of such ships as were manageable, to be actively 
 employed in getting hold of many of the prizes (thirteen or fourteen) and towing 
 them off to the westward, torendezvous round the Royal Sovereign, in tow by 
 the Neptune. But on the 23d the gale increased, and the sea ran so high that 
 many of them broke the tow-rope, and some of them taking advantage of the 
 dark and boisterous night, got before the wind, and have perhaps drifted upon 
 the shore and sunk. 
 
 * See " Dr. Beatty's Narrative of the Battle and Death of Lord Nelson." 
 
 2p2 
 
292 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 « On the afternoon of that day the remnant of the combined fleet, ten sail of 
 ships, who had not been much engaged, stood up to leeward of my shattered 
 and straggled charge, as if meaning to attack them ; which obliged me to 
 collect a force out of the least injured ships, and form to leeward for their 
 defence. All this retarded the progress of the hulks ; and the bad weather 
 continuing, determined me to destroy all the leeward-most that could be cleared 
 of the men," &c. See further details in Lord CoUingwood's letter of the 24th 
 of October. 
 
 In another letter from the same officer it is said that " a dreadful gale had 
 dispersed the ships, and drove the captured hulls in all directions ; I have since 
 been employed in collecting and destroying them. 
 
 " In the gale the Royal Sovereign and the Mars lost their fore-masts, and are 
 now rigging a-new, where the body of the squadron is at anchor to the N. W. of 
 San Lucar. 
 
 " The Royal Sovereign having lost her masts, except the tottering foremast 
 (which fell afterwards), I called the Euryalus to me, and shifted my flag to her, 
 the more easily to communicate my orders, and to collect the ships ; towing the 
 Royal Sovereign out to seaward. 
 
 " The whole fleet was now in a most perilous situation ; many dismasted, 
 all shattered, in thirteen fathoms water, off' the shoals of Trafalgar : and when 
 I made the signal to prepare to anchor, few had an anchor to let go, their cables 
 being shot ; but the same good Providence which aided us throughout, preserved 
 us in the night by the wind shifting a few points, and drifting the ships off" the 
 land, excepting four of the captured, dismasted ships, now at anchor off Trafalgar ; 
 and I hope they will ride in safety until the gales are over." 
 
 By all this it must be evident what might have been effected by a squadron 
 of reserve posted as in Fig. 3, early in the battle, formed of those not made the 
 immediate object of attack. 
 
 Having thus considered the mode of defence adopted by the enemy, in a 
 double line (as we are informed by Lord CoUingwood) convexing to leeward, 
 as in Fig. 3, it may be useful to examine it in another manner, by supposing 
 that he had so arranged his fleet as to have formed it into a half-moon convexing 
 to windward. See Fig. 4. 
 
 Of these two modes, the latter appears the best, particularly while the attack, 
 as in this case, is made upon the centre and rear. 
 
 Here the weathermost ships are in a situation to assail the approaching fleet 
 before it is near enough to penetrate the line ; and, should they have circular 
 
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. 293 
 
 sterns, by a flanking fire would considerably annoy any ships passing the line of 
 their direction towards the rear. 
 
 Should the principal attack take place upon the van, the centre must advance, 
 cut through the approaching column, separate, and inclose it. Unless they 
 advance, they would be exposed to a severe raking fire ; while the present con- 
 struction of the bows of our ships admits of but a feeble fire in return. 
 
 A line thus formed might in an easy and simple manner become a line of 
 battle in the regular way, by the van ships, and the rest in succession making 
 sail ; the centre edging gradually to leeward to receive the support of the 
 whole line. 
 
 The Figure may represent the fleet upon either tack. 
 
 By a late naval historian, the author of the " Naval Battles" has been ac- 
 cused of having " entirely misunderstood the principle upon which the battle 
 of Trafalgar was fought." (See " James," vol. iv, p. 144.) 
 
 In reply, the author must observe, that persons of experience in nautical 
 affairs, with the facts before them, wiU clearly see by Lord Nelson's first plan of 
 attack that he could not have intended to expose his ships, more particularly in 
 light winds, to be singly beaten in succession. That this was the case, Mr. 
 James himself affords ample proof. For example, — " It was not until full fifteen 
 minutes after the " Tonnant " had cut through the line, that her second a-astern 
 (the Bellerophon), owing to her distance from the former, and the lightness of 
 the wind, was enabled to do the same." (Page 73.) 
 
 Again, " The Royal Sovereign was in hot action, after having cut through 
 the enemy's line, for upwards of a quarter of an hour before any ship did, or 
 could come to her assistance" (Page 136.) 
 
 " The Victory and Temeraire were also closely engaged for even a longer 
 period, before the three or four ships a-stern of them could get to their sup- 
 port. The nature of the attack, combined with the lightness of the bree%e, 
 was such, indeed, that the whole business was done by twelve or fourteen ships, of 
 the twenty-seven (page 136), and that, without the slightest disparagement to the 
 conduct of the remainder !" So entirely was it occasioned by the mode of attack ; 
 and for what ? Why, to oppose a smaller "front to the enemy." If, indeed, 
 British ships are built only to be fired at, such a mode of reasoning might be 
 tenable ; but from a man who has so strenuously laboured to show throughout his 
 whole work the effects of a superior and well-directed " broadside weight of 
 metal," it is somewhat extraordinary. 
 
 We are not now to learn what can be done in fifteen minutes, when exposed 
 
294 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 only to an equal force ; but here we see that the " Bellerophon" at about fifty 
 minutes past noon, ran foul of the " Aigle," and fired from both sides. In a 
 short time three other of the enemy's ships opened a cannonade upon her." 
 (Page 73.) 
 
 " For upwards of fifteen minutes the Royal Sovereign was the only ship in 
 close action." (Vol. iv. p. 51.) 
 
 ^ The Royal Sovereign we left just as, after fifteen minutes of close action 
 with three or four ships, the BeEeisle had cometer relief." (Page 63.) 
 
 FURTHER PARTICULARS OF THE TRAFALGAR FIGHT, 
 
 As every authentic memorial of this great national event must be generally 
 interesting, but more especially so to naval men, no apology is necessary for 
 inserting in this place the following particulars. 
 
 The intelligent officer to whom the writer is iud'ebted for this important 
 manuscript, was an eye-witness of what he has so ably related ; and upon which 
 he has reasoned with so much judgment. Of six plans of the battle, delineated 
 by the same band ; to the accuracy of which, many who were engaged have borne 
 testimony, the present writer has selected three, still further to illustrate this 
 great victory; and' he will accompany them by such extracts from the remarks; 
 as are calciilated to explain them ; and, also such as may show, in the narrator's 
 own language, the opinion he had formed of the mode of attack, and the conduct 
 of the enemy. 
 
 The sketch of the coast of Spain is taken from the first plan j tiie position 
 of the fleets from the fourth, fifth, and sixth. 
 
 " The combined fleet, after veering from the starboard to the larboard tack? 
 gradually fell into the form of an irregular crescent ; in which they remained to 
 the moment of attack. Many have considered that the French Admiral intended 
 this formation of the line of battle ; but from the information I obtained after the 
 action, connected with some documents found on board the BucentBur, I believe it 
 was the intention to have formed a line a-head, consisting of twenty-one sail ; 
 the supposed force of the British, fleet ; and a squadron of observation composed 
 of twelve sail of the line, under Admiral Gravina, intended to act according to 
 circumstances after the British fleet were engaged. By waa:ing together, the 
 enemy's line became inverted, and the light squadron which had been advanced 
 in the van on the starboard tack, was left in the rear after waring-, ^nd the 
 ships were subsequently mingled with the rear of the main body; The wind 
 being light, with a heavy swell, and the fleet lying with their main-top-sails to 
 
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. 295 
 
 the mast, it was impossible for the ships to preserve their exact stations in the 
 line ; consequently scarce any ship was immediately a-head or a-stern of her second. 
 The fleet had then the appearance, generally, of having formed in two lines, 
 thus ( o ® o '^ o ® )' so that the ship to leeward seemed to be opposite the 
 space left between two in the weather-line. 
 
 " In the rear, the line was in some places trebled ; and this particularly 
 happened where the Colossus was ; who, after passing the stern of the French 
 Swiftsure, and lufiing up under the lee of the Bahama, supposing herself to 
 leeward of the enemy's line, unexpectedly ran alongside of the French Achille, 
 under cover of the smoke. The Colossus was then placed between the Achille 
 and the Bahama, being on board of the latter ; and was also exposed to theiire 
 of the Swiftsure's after^guns. All these positions I believe to have been merely 
 accidental ; and to accident alone I attribute the concave circle of the fleet, or 
 crescent line of battle. The wind shifted to the westward, as the morning 
 advanced ; and of course the enemy's ships came up with the wind, forming a 
 bow and quarter-line. The ships were therefore obliged to edge away, to keep 
 in the wake of their leaders ; and this manoeuvre, from the lightness of the 
 wind, the unmanageable state of the ships in a heavy swell, and, we may add, 
 the inexperience of the enemy, not being performed with facility and celerity, 
 undesignedly threw the combined fleets into a position, perhaps the best that 
 could have been planned, had it been supported by the skilful manoeuvring 
 of individual ships, and with efficient practice in gunnery. 
 
 " Of the advantages and disadvantages of the mode of attack adopted by the 
 British fleet, it may be considered presumptuous to speak, as the event was' so 
 completely successful; but as the necessity of any particular experiment 
 frequently depends upon contingent circumstances, not originally calculated upott, 
 there can be no impropriety in questioning, whether the same plan be likely to 
 succeed under all circumstances, and on all occasions. 
 
 " The original plan of attack, directed by the comprehensive mind of our 
 great Commander, was suggested on a supposition that the enemy's fleet consisted 
 of forty-six sail of the line, and the British forty ; and the attack, as designed 
 from to windward, was to be made under the following circumstances : — 
 
 " Under a supposition that the hostile fleet would be in a line a-head of forty- 
 six sail, the British fleet was to be brought within gun-shot of the enemy's 
 centre, in twa divisions of sixteen sail each, and a division of observation consisting 
 of the remaining eight. 
 
 " The lee division was by signal to make a rapid attack under all possible sail 
 on the twelve rear ships of the enemy. The ships were to break through the 
 
296 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 enemy's line ; and such ships as were thrown out of their stations were to 
 assist their friends that were hard pressed. The remainder of the enemy's fleet, 
 of thirty-four sail, were to be left to the management of the Commander-in- 
 Chief." 
 
 This able officer then proceeds to describe by a figure, the plan of attack as 
 origincdhf intended ; beariiig a very close resemblance to that already given in 
 Fig. 1 ; but making the enemy's fleet, as arranged in a regular line a-head, 
 to extend the distance of five miles ; and the van, consisting of sixteen ships, 
 left unoccupied ; the whole comprising a fleet of forty-six sail of the line. He 
 then observes, — 
 
 " If the regulated plan of attack had been adhered to, the English fleet should 
 have borne up together, and have sailed in a line a-breast in their respective 
 divisions, until they arrived up with the enemy. Thus the plan which 
 consideration had matured, would have been executed ; than which perhaps 
 nothing could be better ; the victory would have been more speedily decided, and 
 the brunt of the action would have been more equally felt," &c. 
 
 "With the exception of the Britannia, Dreadnought, and Prince, the body of 
 the fleet sailed very equally ; and I have no doubt could have been brought into 
 action simultaneously with their leaders. This being granted, there was no time 
 gained by attacking in a line a-head : the only reason, I could suppose, that 
 occasioned the change. 
 
 " The advantages of an attack made in two great divisions, with a squadron of 
 observation, seem to combine every necessary precaution under all circumstances. 
 
 " The power of bringing an overwhelming force against a particular point of 
 an enemy's fleet, so as to ensure the certain capture of the ships attacked, and 
 the power of condensing such a force afterwards, as not only to protect the 
 attacking ships from any offensive attempt that may be made by the unoccupied 
 vessels of the hostile fleet, but also to secure the prizes already made, will most 
 probably lead to a victory ; and, if followed up according to circumstances, may 
 ultimately tend to the annihilation of the whole, or the greater part of the 
 mutilated fleet. 
 
 " Each ship may use her superiority of sailing, without bemg so far removeid 
 from the inferior sailing ships as to lose their support. 
 
 " The swifter ships, passing rapidly through the enemy's fire, are less liable to 
 be disabled ; and, after closing with their opponents, divert their attention from 
 the inferior sailers, who are advancing to complete what their leaders had begun. 
 The weather division, from being more distant, remain spectators of the first 
 attack for some little time, according to the rate of sailing ; and may direct 
 
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. 297 
 
 their attack, as they observe the failure or success of the first onset, either to 
 support the lee division, if required, or to extend the success they may appear to 
 have gained. 
 
 " If the enemy bear up to elude the attack, the attacking fleet is well collected 
 for the commencement of a chase, and for mutual support in pursuit. 
 
 " The mode of attack, adopted with such success in the Trafalgar action, 
 appears to me to have succeeded from the enthusiasm inspired throughout the 
 British fleet, from their being commanded by their beloved Nelson ; from the 
 gallant conduct of the leaders of the two divisions ; from the individual exertions 
 of each ship after the attack commenced, and the superior practice of the guns 
 in the English fleet. 
 
 " It was successful also from the consternation spread through the combined 
 fleet on finding the British so much stronger than was expected ; from the 
 astonishing and rapid destruction which followed the attack of the leaders, 
 witnessed by the whole of the hostile fleets ; inspiring the one and dispiriting 
 the other ; and from the loss of the Admiral's ship early in the action. 
 
 " The disadvantages of this mode of attack appear to consist in bringing 
 
 fgrward the attacking force in a manner so leisurely and alternately, that an 
 
 enemy of equal spirit, and equal ability in seamanship and gunnery, would have 
 
 annihilated the ships one after another in detail, carried slowly on as they were 
 
 by a heavy swell and light airs. 
 
 " At the distance of one mile, five ships, at half a cable's length apart, might 
 direct their broadsides efiectively against the head of the division for seven minutes, 
 supposing the rate of sailing to have been four miles an hour ; and, within the 
 distance of half a mile, three ships would do the same for seven minutes more. 
 Before the attacking ship could fire a gun in her defence. 
 
 " It is to be observed that, although the hull of the headmost ship does 
 certainly, in a great measure, cover the hulls of those a- stern, yet great injury 
 is done to the masts and yards of the whole, by the fire directed against the 
 leader ; and that, if these ships are foiled in their attempt to cut through the 
 enemy's line, or to run on board of them, they are placed, for the most part, 
 hors de combat for the rest of the action. 
 
 " Or should it Jail calm, or the wind materially decrease about the moment 
 of attack, the van ships must be sacrificed before the rear could possibly come 
 to their assistance ! ! 
 
 " In proceeding to the attack of the 21st of October the weather was exactly 
 such as might have caused this dilemma, as the sternmost ships of the British 
 were six or seven miles distant. By the mode of attacking in detail, and the 
 
 2 Q 
 
298 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 manner in which the combined fleet was drawn up to receive it, instead of 
 doubling on the enemy, the British were, on that day, themselves doubled and 
 trebled on ; and the advantage of applying an overwhelming force collectively, 
 it would seem, was totally lost ! ! 
 
 " The Victory, Temeraire, Sovereign, Belleisle, Mars, Colossus, and Belleror 
 phon, were placed in such situations in the onset that nothing but the most 
 heroic gallantry and practical skill at their guns could have extricated them. If 
 the enemy's vessels had closed up as they ought to have done, from van to rear, 
 and had possessed a nearer equality in active courage, it is my opinion that 
 even British skill and British gallantry could not have availed. The position 
 of the combined fleet, at one time, was precisely that in which the British were 
 desirous of being placed ; namely, to have^or^ of an opposing fleet doubled on, 
 and separated from the main body ! ! 
 
 " The French Admiral, with his fleet, showed the greatest passive gallantry ; 
 and certainly the French Intrepide, with some others, evinced active courage 
 equal to the British ; but there was no nautical management, no skilful 
 manoeuvring. 
 
 " It may appear presumptuous thus to have questioned the propriety of the 
 Trafalgar attack ; but it is only just to point out the advantages and 
 disadvantages of every means that may be used for the attainment of great 
 results, that the probabilities and existing circumstances may be well weighed 
 before such means are applied. A plan, to be entirely correct, must be suited to 
 all cases. If its infallibility is not thus established, there can be no impropriety 
 in pointing out the errors and dangers to which it is exposed, for the benefit of 
 others. 
 
 " Our heroic and lamented Chief knew his means, and the power he had to 
 deal with ; he also knew the means he adopted were sufficient for the occasion ; 
 and that sufiiced. 
 
 " The Trafalgar attack might be followed under different circumstances, and 
 have a different result ; it is right, therefore, to discuss its merits and demerits. 
 It cannot take one atom from the fame of the departed hero, whose life was one 
 continued scene of original ability, and of superior action. 
 
 " During the battle, the Neptune and Conqueror's crews were cheering each 
 other, from the fore-castle of the one, and the poop of the other ; and the 
 Leviathan was advanced on the Conqueror's starboard bow. 
 
 " The Victory attempted to break the line a-stern of the Bucentaur, but the 
 Redoubtable closed up, and fell on board of her on her starboard side. The two 
 ships went off before the wind together ; and, in coming-to on the contrary tack. 
 
Missing Page 
 
Missing Page 
 
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. 299 
 
 the Temeraire, being too near to keep clear, fell on board the Redoubtable, on 
 the contrary side to the Victory. The Fougeux, endeavouring to avoid these 
 three ships, became entangled with the Temeraire on her starboard side ; and, 
 for some time, these four ships lay in a tier, alongside of each other, continuing 
 the action on the opposite tack to the fleet, until the French ships surrendered, 
 
 " The Victory then separated, and dropped a little a-stern, when the 
 Conqueror hauled up under the lee of the Bucentaur. 
 
 " Through the opening thus made by the two leading ships, the Neptune 
 followed, passing the Bucentaur, and going on to the Trinidada. The Conqueror 
 came next, and hauled up directly alongside of the French Admiral, to the 
 capture of whom Lord Nelson's instructions were particularly directed. 
 
 " In a short time her main and mizen-masts fell ; and, as the ship fell round 
 off, her fcnre-top-sail-yard was shot away, and soon after her fore-mast came 
 down, which prevented her from falling on board the Conqueror ; and some time 
 after, an officer appeared from the lee quarter gallery, waving his hat in token 
 of surrender.* 
 
 " The Captain of marines, of the Conqueror, was sent on board the Bucentaur, 
 and took out the French Admiral Villeneuve, and endeavoured to return to his 
 ship ; but, the Conqueror passing on, and the shot falling fast about the boat, 
 he thought proper to carry his prisoner to the nearest ship, the Mars. 
 
 " No. 4 (Plate XL VIII of the present work) represents another stage of the 
 battle ; the van of the enemy in the act of waring to assist their Admiral, but 
 moving very cautiously ; the English ships lying up to protect the Victory and the 
 captured ships. The Bucentaur had just surrendered, and the Conqueror passed on 
 to take a station on the quarter of the Trinidada, while the Neptune continued 
 the action with her on the bow. In a short time this tremendous fabric gave a 
 deep roll, with the swell, to leeward, then back to windward ; and, on her return, 
 every mast went by the board, leaving her an unmanageable hulk on the water. 
 Her immense topsails had every reef out ; her royals were sheeted home, but 
 lowered ; and the falling of this majestic mass of spars, sails, and rigging, 
 plunging into the water at the muzzles of our guns, was one of the most 
 magnificent sights I ever beheld. Immediately after this, a Spaniard showed 
 an English Union on the lee gangway, in token of submission. The Conqueror 
 passed on in further pursuit, in admiration of the Neptune's crew, who were 
 
 * " I have been thus particular, as the capture of the French Admiral has been unblushingly 
 attributed to others, without any mention being made of the ship that actually was the principal 
 in engaging her; wishing to do justice to a gallant oiEcer, who, on that day, considered his task 
 not complete until every ship was either captured or beyond the distance of pursuit." 
 
 2 Q 2 
 
300 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 shifting her tattered top-sails for new ones with as much coolness as if she had 
 been in a friendly port. 
 
 " Admiral Dumanoir, with four sail of French and one Spaniard, endeavoured 
 to escape to the westward ; and the rest bore up for Cadiz. Some straggling 
 ships went off from the main body, and others, with Admiral Gravina, from the 
 rear. 
 
 " The French Intrepide from the rear, in standing towards the van to join 
 Dumanoir, was intercepted and engaged, first by the Conqueror, and then by the 
 Africa, who came in between the Conqueror and Intrepide, forcing the former to 
 leeward, and was followed by the Orion ; when, after a most gallant resistance, 
 the capture was completed. 
 
 " After the capture and surrender of the Intrepide the action ceased in the 
 van, and the whole was closed about six o'clock, at sun-set, by the blowing up 
 of the French Achille. 
 
 " Nothing remains to relate but the unhappy fate of the captured ships, 
 and the days of suffering experienced after the action in contending against the 
 severity of the weather. So strongly impressed was Lord Nelson with the 
 necessity of anchoring, that the signal was made to prepare for it before the 
 action commenced ; and the last words of the dying chief, before he bid farewell, 
 were, ' Anchor, Hardy, anchor.'* It is impossible to conceive why it was not 
 done. 
 
 * It certainly appears very unaccountable ; for, unless all the anchors of a ship be shot away, 
 she most likely has it in her power, at least after a little preparation ; for should the cables, in 
 different places, be shot through, or much damaged, they can be speedUy spliced, and are then 
 full as good as before : if shot near the ring, the cable is then clenched anew, and the anchor 
 ready. 
 
 For the very interesting and instructive correspondence of Lord Collingwood, naval men are greatly 
 indebted to his son-in-law, Mr. Newnham Collingwood. Where the editor himself is professional, 
 it is necessary to say a word. Upon the question of anchoring the ships after the battle, it is 
 observed in a note (page 124) that, " to anchor a disabled ship would be, it her anchor parted, to 
 insure her destruction." In reply, be it said, that it is only such ships as are disabled, or unable " to 
 crawl off shore," that are under the necessity of anchoring, provided they have anchors to let "o. 
 Unfit as ships were to work off a lee shore, . with some of them a prize in tow, to anchor was 
 perhaps their best, if not their only security. Where the water shoalens a-stem, the anchor is 
 drawn up hill; if the cable part, and the ship be driven from her anchor, she will then but meet the 
 fate that probably otherwise awaited her, from her inability to do better. Lord Nelson made the 
 signal early, " to prepare to anchor at the close of day," foreseeing what would and did take place. 
 Powerful steam vessels at such a time would have been infinitely useful. 
 
 In the letter of Captain Bayntun, quoted by the editor, let it be observed, that notwithstanding 
 some losses and disadvantages mentioned by that gallant and skilful oflScer, yet he says, " 1 have 
 preferred this to keeping the ship under weigh in our crippled state." 
 
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. 301 
 
 " The great difficulty, the first night, was in getting the hulks clear of their 
 shattered rigging, and taking them in tow. Under circumstances like these, 
 occasioned by the want of boats, and the disabled state of the ships, it was 
 almost impossible to accomplish it under sail. At an anchor it might have been 
 done with ease. 
 
 " The Conqueror was twenty hours endeavouring to take the Bucentaur in 
 tow, and did not succeed at last, with eight hours of moderate weather. 
 
 " Most undoubtedly the fleet should have anchored ; and, by so doing, every 
 ship might have been saved, excepting such as could not swim. 
 
 " Captain George Hope, in the Defence, on his own responsibility, anchored 
 with his prize, the San Ildefonso, on the night of the action, rode out the 
 gales, and afterwards arrived safe at Gibraltar. The Defence had all her masts 
 standing, and the Spaniard her fore-mast, fore-top-mast, and main-mast." 
 
 Of the five ships that attempted to make off to windward, one (the Neptune) 
 of eighty guns, was with great promptitude and address cut ofi' by the Spartiate, 
 Sir F. Laforey, and Minotaur, Captain Mansfield ; who cut away their studding- 
 sails and hauled their wind to attack them. The remaining four fell into the 
 hands of Sir Richard Strachan. 
 
 . As every corroborative testimony respecting this great event must be deeply 
 interesting ; more particularly those which confirm and illustrate the character of 
 him who this day sealed his devoted and brilliant services with his blood ; the 
 following remarks, coming from an officer greatly distinguished in the battle, need 
 no apology. They constitute part of a letter written on seeing the manuscript 
 remarks upon " Clerk's Essay." 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 " In one principal thing I must beg leave to differ from jNIr. Clerk, who lays 
 great stress on the preference to the leeward position ; whereas I am fully 
 persuaded that of the weather-gage has advantages that must preponderate ; 
 
 A " fresh ship," with " her masts and rigging complete," such as are rarely to be found after a 
 conflict like this, has certainly no business to anchor on a lee shore. 
 
 It is not quite correct to say that an anchor parts. The ship parts from her anchor by the parting 
 or giving way of the cable. The anchor may break or drag, aud the ship drive. 
 
 For a mode of attack, both from the windward and leeward, see Lord Collingwood's Order of 
 March 23d, 1808, page 313, Correspondence. It seems formed after the original design of Lord 
 Nelson at Trafalgar ; namely, by simultaneous attacks by columns or divisions upon parts of the 
 enemy's line, whether to windward or to leeward. 
 
302 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 the principal reasons I have to offer in support of my opinion are these : — By 
 being to windward you can always choose your distance of engaging ; and there 
 is nothing equal to close work ; and if your enemy chooses his distance, I have 
 always found him fond of long bowls, thereby crippling you, and then making 
 off himself, with his usual gasconade. But by bearing plump down, and passing 
 through his line, and raking him as you do so ; then pelting him close on his lee 
 side, you strike a panic into him that he cannot easily recover. Another material 
 point not unworthy of notice is, I have always observed on boarding a captured 
 ship, that their decks are never so clear as with us ; consequently much confusion 
 must ensue ; as by this manoeuvre they are in some degree taken by surprise ; 
 and the result of confusion always proves fatal, particularly in great matters. I 
 am borne out in this opinion by the events which were experienced in both Lord 
 Nelson's actions ; of the Nile and Cape Trafalgar. Had Lord Rodney pursued 
 the same system, it is probable his victory would have been more splendid. I am 
 willing to allow that many circumstances may occur, when it might not be 
 altogether feasible to commence a battle in this way ; but as there are numerous 
 circumstances, such as light or variable winds, lee shores, shoal water, &c., a 
 Commander-in-Chief often has a choice of difficulties ; and fortunate it will be 
 for his country, if he be so happy as to possess presence of mind to use and find 
 resources as emergencies present themselves ; for I know of no subject which 
 embraces a greater variety in all its bearings than that of sea-fights ; and it may 
 be a useful reflection to bear in mind, that all the achievements of the renowned 
 Nelson were owing to the felicity he displayed in the manner of his attacks, 
 which were always of a novel and unexpected kind ; to which may be attributed 
 the splendour of his victories. If anything else be necessary to add lustre to his 
 memory, or mark his zeal, it is that, with his dying breath, he recommended his 
 successor to anchor the fleet ; indicating a presentiment of the violent gale which 
 succeeded. Had the advice been followed, it is most likely that most, if not 
 all the prizes would have been saved." 
 
 SUBJECT RESUMED. 
 
 During the heat of the battle of Trafalgar, when, from the extreme ardour 
 and obstinacy mutually displayed, and the close intermixture of ships in almost 
 impenetrable masses, in various parts of the line, many of the British fleet, 
 in the rear of the advancing columns, could not at first find an opportunity to 
 distinguish themselves; a situation afterwards presenting itself to the keen 
 
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. 303 
 
 impatient eye of the Captain (Bayntun) of the Leviathan, he availed himself of 
 it in the most masterly manner. 
 
 A Spanish seventy-four gun ship (the St. Augustine), one of the van ships of 
 the enemy, having in vain attempted her escape to windward, was observed to be 
 bearing away out of the combat, to leeward ; not having sustained any material 
 injury. 
 
 By this time the Leviathan had penetrated the two lines, and passing the 
 Conqueror, then engaged with the Intrepide, went on between that ship and 
 the stern of the Spaniard. Two well directed broadsides from the Leviathan 
 brought instantly down alongside the main and mizen-masts of the St. 
 Augustine ; the Leviathan then luffing up, laid her on board, carried her, and 
 in less than twenty minutes had her in quiet possession, towing her out of the 
 action ! * The Africa, of sixty-four guns, had also ferreted her way in, amidst 
 the largest ships of the enemy ; but unhappily exposing herself to the full effect 
 of the broadside of the Intrepide, was silenced for a time, having suffered very 
 severely. 
 
 His Majesty's ship " Prince " appearing in the annexed plate to be far 
 removed from the scene of action, it seems necessary in some manner to account 
 for it : and the following statement is by an officer, then a lieutenant of that 
 ship, and since, for gallant services, promoted. 
 
 " The Prince, being employed in supplying the Britannia with water and 
 provisions at the time the signal was made for the enemy's fleet, was thrown into 
 a situation that would have been unfavourable even to a better sailing ship ; and 
 in this position she continued on the morning of the 21st of October, when she 
 had split her fore-top-sail ; and this was scarcely replaced, when at day-light the 
 enemy was seen to leeward, and the signal Was made to bear up in two divisions. 
 In proceeding to her station, she passed under the stern of the Defiance (Sir 
 P. C. Durham), who had just laid alongside and boarded the French L'Aigle, in 
 
 * The Leviathan, with her prize in tow, afterwards exchanged shots with the Intrepide, then 
 closely engaged with the Orion and AfMca, Captains Codrington and Henry Digby. 
 
 On board the Conqueror a circumstance occurred which reflected high honour on the character 
 and feeling of Lieutenant P. Toole, of the royal marines ; whose conduct attracted the admiration 
 of those about him : — 
 
 On the stump of the main-mast of one of the enemy's ships, which she had engaged and dismasted, 
 a man was seen most fearlessly occupied in placing the tri^coloured flag ; Lieutenant Toole had 
 three times raised the musket to his shoulder and levelled it, to bring him down ; but a compas- 
 sionate and generous feeling forbade him to execute his threat, and the gallant fellow was suffered 
 to live to share the fate of his, soon aftfer, captured companions. 
 
304 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 a manner which immediately drew forth the exulting cheers of the Prince's ship's 
 company ; and as the fire of the Defiance was sufficient, and the ship so placed 
 as to render any assistance more officious than necessary, the Prince proceeded to 
 a two-decker that had lost her mizen-mast ; and, ranging up close to her, received 
 her broadside. The Prince then directed her fire with such effect, as in five 
 minutes to bring her two remaining masts over the side. The ship was on fire 
 in several places, and the crew jumping overboard in all directions ; these it was 
 considered an imperative duty to use every means to rescue from a watery grave. 
 Having picked up a hundred and forty-six, amongst which were two women, she 
 received orders to take the Santissima Trinidada in tow. In three days of most 
 boisterous weather, she broke adrift several times, and notwithstanding every 
 effisrt to save her, to prevent getting on shore, and in eight fathoms water, she 
 was destroyed ; leaving six-and-twenty of the worst of the wounded to perish 
 in her." 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 To relate- all the instances of indifference to death, which occur both in 
 seamen and soldiers, when fighting the battles of their country, would, of itself, 
 form an interesting volume ; and when such traits of character in a British 
 seaman, genuine and well authenticated, appear, it is a violence to one's feelings 
 to pass them over, and would be an injustice to the merits and memory of a class 
 of men, to whom no others under heaven bear an exact resemblance. 
 
 A seaman of the Conqueror, upon losing a leg, and going below to have it 
 amputated, observed to the purser, " Ah ! Mr. Beattie, I shall live now half as 
 cheap again as I did before, as one pair of stockings will now serve me twice ^s 
 long." 
 
 Another seaman was seen to amuse himself with picking up the grape and 
 canister shot, falling thick on board, as the ship was going down into battle, 
 and " pitching marbles with them ;" this man was afterwards attacked by one 
 of eighteen English deserters on the lower-deck of the Bucentaur, who lost his 
 head in an instant : most of these deserters were killed. 
 
 In the accounts of our engagements with the Dutch in the wars of former 
 times particularly related in the " Treatise " of Paul Hoste, the application and 
 destructive effects of j/^z-e-^A^p* frequently occur; and they appear to have been 
 
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. 305 
 
 a means of offensive warfare much resorted to and depended on. This gave rise 
 to the following opinion upon their merits, by the same able hand which has 
 described the battle of Trafalgar. 
 
 OF FIRE-SHIPS. 
 
 " With respect to fire-ships, the impression on my mind is certainly not in 
 their favour : I think in some instances they may be essentially serviceable ; in 
 many totally ineffective. I am inclined to believe their best effect is almost 
 incompatible with civilized warfare, when the object can be attained without 
 such a sacrifice of life. When this can be done by firing a few broadsides more, 
 or calling another ship to your assistance, as for instance in the case of the Real, 
 in Mathews's action, I should prefer this mode of fighting rather than the 
 burning and blowing up all hands with a fire-ship. 
 
 " In a particular instance, where the fight was nearly balanced, a fire-ship 
 might be lawfully and eligibly used ; but even then, what an expense, to destroy 
 one ship ! not only the immediate loss, but the wear and tear of this ship, of 
 little service otherwise, for so many previous years. Then the uncertainty of the 
 ship being burnt effectually ; and the nerve and judgment required for the service. 
 In the Rochefort business, where there was every thing to favour the effect of 
 the fire-vessels, I believe the French government would have gladly burnt, of 
 themselves, the ships that were actually destroyed, if we had given them the 
 price, to us, of their destruction. 
 
 " The intrepidity and self-possession required under various circumstances 
 are shown in the statement of Captain Cookesley, who was first lieutenant of the 
 Gibraltar, and commanded one of the fire-vessels upon that occasion : * That his 
 vessel was the only one that grappled with the enemy, and was fired before the 
 commander left her.' He was a likely man to have sought in this manner, either 
 a commission or &fir coffin. 
 
 " I could cite many instances of failure, and few of success ; but there are 
 some where they may be fairly and successfully applied. 
 
 " When the combined fleets were in Cadiz, previous to the Trafalgar action, 
 and the harbour was filled up with shipping to the very jaws of the port, I 
 thought a fire-ship might be effectively applied ; and there could be little doubt 
 that, if the commander possessed sufficient resolution to have entangled his ship 
 before he left her, and had left his escape to the chapter of accidents, much 
 mischief might have ensued ; and I reckoned on the destruction of two, at least. 
 Through the captain of the Conqueror was sent a list of fourteen men, with my 
 
 SI R 
 
306 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 name at their head, to Lord Nelson, as volunteers to take in a fire-ship ; but his 
 Lordship declined the offer, 
 
 " The Greeks have used them with great success against the Turks ; but I do 
 not think they would have succeeded to the same extent with English, French, 
 or American ships of war. Upon the whole, I consider that on some occasions 
 they may be useful ; generally not so, and more especially in battle between 
 fleets in the open sea." 
 
 Of the arrangement of a fleet as in Fig. 4, Plate XL VI I, or the double line 
 convexing to windward, the same writer makes the following remarks : — 
 
 " Your new order I think may do well for a temporary purpose, when a fleet 
 is under the necessity of retreating in the form of the crescent, and wishes to 
 heave-to, or come to the wind for a short time, to protect a retreating convoy, or 
 otherwise. But I should not make choice of it to receive an attacking enemy, 
 with whom I intended to come to a decisive action. I consider the great principle 
 of attack is, to bring a superior force to act instantaneously on an inferior, and to 
 capture or disable many before the enemy's remaining ships can be brought to 
 their rescue. In the lines you have formed, the enemy would most likely attack 
 the weathermost ships in the centre. If these should bear up immediately, and 
 run down in a line with the horns of the crescent, to profit by their assistance, 
 they resign the form they had taken, and might as well have been formed in line 
 a-head in two columns in the first instance. If they do not bear up, and suffer 
 the attacking ships to cut through and engage them at pleasure, they will be 
 prevented from bearing up afterwards, and the horns of the crescent will find it 
 more difficult to come to their relief. 
 
 " From this view of it, I prefer the concave order of defence to the convex, 
 inasmuch as it is easier to bear up and run to leeward in action, than to hug the 
 wind and tack." 
 
 Let it be observed in reply, that should part of the attacking fleet penetrate 
 the centre of the crescent so formed ; the rear, by advancing, would completely 
 inclose it. It would neither be obliged to hug the wind very close, nor to tack ; 
 the enemy would be drifting down upon it. The van, if not engaged, might 
 tack, and cover their centre. 
 
 He further observes — " I should be inclined to form a defensive fleet in two 
 or three lines, according to the orders of sailing ; the Admiral in the centre of 
 the lee column, if in two lines ; and in the centre of the second, or middle, if in 
 three. The ships at a cable and a half or two cables a-part, to allow of the lee 
 ships firing through the openings, and the weather ships bearing up and running 
 through if hard pressed from the windward." 
 
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. 307 
 
 Probably the figure below may afford some idea of this officer's plan of defence 
 " Drawing the columns as close as they can be brought, to allow of manoeuvring." 
 
 ooooooo© 
 oooooooo 
 ooooooo© 
 
 It certainly appears not only a very formidable, but a very simple one. A 
 fleet so anchored, head and stern, or with springs, would be impenetrable. Under 
 sail, two lines might be better than three, from the danger of the ships firing 
 into each other. 
 
 We shall now introduce an extract from the log of the Bellerophon : and 
 bring the whole to a conclusion, with a copy of the no less celebrated than 
 instructive, " Memorandum ;" followed by a tribute to the departed hero, from 
 the eloquent pen of an accomplished woman, in a letter to the late Marquis 
 of Londonderry ; for which " extract," as it has been already circulated, no 
 apology is required : to this are added some traits of character little known. 
 
 Extract from the Log of His Majesty's ship Bellerophon, Oct. 21st, 1805. 
 
 " At day-light saw the enemy's fleet E. N. E. ; answered the signal 72, to 
 form the order of sailing ; and 76, to bear up and sail large, with compass- 
 signal East. Cleared for action ; answered 63, with " preparative," after 
 close of day. At eleven answered 88, " general," from the Royal Sovereign 
 to make more sail ; set steering-sails. At noon Cape Trafalgar E. S. E. nine 
 leagues. 
 
 " P. M. October 22d (noon of the 21st). — Light breezes with swell from the 
 westward ; 10' past noon the Royal Sovereign opened her fire on the enemy's 
 centre;* IS' past, answered 16, general to engage closer ; 20' past, the Royal 
 Sovereign broke through the enemy's line a-stern of a Spanish three-deckers and 
 
 * " The nearest of the English ships was now distant ahoul a mUe from the Royal Sovereign." 
 " In ahout a quarter of an hour, and before any other English ship had been enabled to take a 
 part in the action." (Lord Collingwood, pages 110, 111.) 
 
 " There is great diversity of opinion as to the exact period during which the Koyal Sovereign was 
 engaged aUme. Admiral Collingwood considered it to be twenty minutes, while others believe that 
 it considerably exceeded that time. In the mean while, the English ships were pressing forward with 
 their utmojst speed in support of their leader, hut doubtful at times of his fate." (Lord Colling- 
 wood, page 113.) 
 
 2 H 2 
 
308 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 engaged to leeward ; being followed by the Mars, Belleisle, and Tonnant, who 
 engaged their respective opponents. 
 
 " At 12'' 20' opened our fire on the enemy. At 30' past, engaged on both 
 sides in passing through the enemy's line a-stern of a Spanish two-decker. At 
 35' past, while hauling to the wind, fell on board the French 74, L'Aigle, with 
 our starboard-bow on her larboard-quarter; our fore-yard locking with her main : 
 kept up a brisk fire both on her and on the Spanish ship on the larboard-bow ; 
 at the same time receiving the fire of two ships, one a-astern, and the other on 
 the larboard-quarter. At one o'clock the main and mizen-top-masts fell over the 
 side. At I'' 5' the master fell, and at I'' ll' Captain Cooke fell. Ship still foul 
 of L'Aigle, and keeping up a brisk fire on the main and lower-decks. Quarter- 
 deck, poop, and forecastle nearly cleared by musketry from troops on board 
 L'Aigle. At l** 20' the jib-boon was shot away. At I'' 40' L'Aigle dropt to 
 leeward under a raking fire from us as she fell off : our ship at this time un- 
 manageable from ropes being shot away. At l** 45' L'Aigle was engaged by 
 Defiance, and at 2'' 5' she struck. 
 
 " On the smoke clearing away, observed several of the enemy's ships had 
 struck. 
 
 " Sent an officer and took possession of the Spanish ship Monarcha. At 
 S^ 6', the ship being ungovernable, and in danger of falling on board the 
 Temeraire and prizes, made the signal to Sirius for boats to tow. At 4'' 5^ 
 answered 101, general, to come to the wind on the larboard tack in succession. 
 At 4'* 10' opened our fire on five ships making off to the southward ; the 
 stemmost of which was cut off by the Minotaur, At 5** 7' the firing ceased ; 
 twelve of the enemy's line, four frigates and two brigs, being to leeward, 
 and four to windward. At 5^ 20' answered signal 99, to come to the wind on 
 the starboard tack together. At 5^ 30' took possession of the Spanish seventy- 
 four, Bahama. 
 
 " At sun-set one French seventy-four blew up and one sunk. At 7'' 30' the 
 Euryalus showed Admiral's lights. A. M. at day-light hazy weather with rain : 
 some of our ships to be seen. Enemy's ships not to be seen." 
 
 By the Royal Sovereign's first broadside into the stem of the Santa Anna 
 (a three-decker) as acknowledged by the Spanish captain to Captain Rotheram 
 of the Royal Sovereign, four hundred men were killed and wounded, and sixteen 
 guns were disabled. So much for British discipline and gunnery. The guns 
 were only double-round shotted. It was a favourite doctrine of Lord Collingwood, 
 to pour in the three first broadsides as quickly as possible ; for by such a shock, a 
 panic is created which often terminates in a surrender. 
 

 I 
 
 .^& 
 
 ^' 
 
 
 f 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 '^ 
 
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 ^ 
 
 1^ 
 
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. 309 
 
 Lord Nelson^s last Instructions to his Fleet off Trafalgar. 
 
 " MEMORANDUM. 
 
 " Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty sail of the line into 
 line of battle, in variable winds, thick weather, and other circumstances which 
 must occur; without such a loss of time, that the opportunity would probably be 
 lost, of bringing the enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business 
 decisive ; 
 
 " I have therefore made up my mind to keep the fleet in that position of 
 sailing (with the exception of the first and second in command), that the order 
 of sailing is to be the order of battle ; placing the fleet in two lines of sixteen 
 ships each, with an advanced squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked 
 ships ; which will always make, if wanted, a line of twenty-four sail, on whichever 
 line the Commander-in-Chief may direct. 
 
 " The second in command will, after my intentions are made known to him, 
 have the entire direction of his line ; to make the attack upon the enemy, and 
 to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed. 
 
 " If the enemy's fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and that 
 the two lines and the advanced squadron can fetch them, they will probably be 
 so extended that their van could not succour their rear. 
 
 " I should therefore probably make the second in command's signal, to lead 
 through about their twelfth ship from the rear ; or wherever he could fetch, if 
 not able to get so far advanced to windward. My line would lead through about 
 their centre ; and the advanced squadron to cut through two, three, or four ships 
 a-head of their centre, so far as to ensure getting at their Commander-in-Chief, 
 whom every effort must be made to capture. 
 
 " The whole impression of the British fleet must be to overpower from two to 
 three ships a-head of their Commander-in-Chief, supposed to be in the centre, to 
 the rear of their fleet. I will suppose twenty sail of the enemy's line to be 
 untouched ; it must be some time before they could perform a manoeuvre to bring 
 their force compact, to attack any part of the British fleet engaged, or to succour 
 their own ships ; which indeed would be impossible, without mixing with the 
 ships engaged. 
 
 " The enemy's fleet is supposed to consist of forty-six sail of the line. British 
 fleet of forty : if either is less, only a proportionate number of the enemy's ships 
 are to be cut off". British to be one-fourth superior to the enemy cut off". 
 
 " Something must be left to chance ; nothing is sure in a sea-fight above all 
 
SIO NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 others ; shot will carry away the masts and yards of friends as well as foes ; but 
 I look with confidence to a victory before the van of the enemy could succour 
 their rear ; and then the British fleet would most of them be ready to receive 
 their twenty sail of the line, or to pursue them, should they endeavour to 
 make off. 
 
 " If the van of the enemy tacks, the captured ships must run to leeward of 
 the British fleet ; if the enemy veers, the British must place themselves between 
 the enemy and the captured ships ; and should the enemy close, I have no fears 
 as to the result. 
 
 " The second in command will, in all possible things, direct the movements 
 of his line, by keeping them as compact as the nature of the circumstances will 
 admit. Captains are to look to their particular line as their rallying point ; 
 hut in case signals can neither be seen nor perfectly understood, no Captain 
 can do very wrong, if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy ! ! 
 
 " Of the intended attack from to windward, the enemy in the line of battle 
 ready to receive the attack." 
 
 
 Advance Squadron. 
 
 oooooooc 
 
 Van. 
 
 oooooooooooooooo 
 
 Rear. 
 
 ClOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
 
 !> British Fleet. 
 
 Enemy. 
 
 OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOQO 
 
 " The divisions of the British fleet will be brought nearly within gun-shot of 
 the enemy's centre. The signal will most probably then be made for the lee 
 line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even steering sails. 
 
 « Vide Instructions for Signal, Yellow with a Blue Fly, page 17, Eighth 
 Flag, Signal Book, with reference to Appendix. 
 
 *Mn order to get as quickly as possible to the enemy's line, and to cut 
 through, beginning from the twelfth ship from the enemy's rear, some ships may 
 not get through their exact place ; but they will always be at hand to assist their 
 friends; and, if any are thrown round the rear of the enemy, they will effectually 
 complete the business of twelve sail of the enemy. 
 
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. 311 
 
 " Should the enemy veer together, or bear up, and sail large ; still the twelve 
 ships composing, in the first position, the enemy's rear, are to be the object of 
 attack of the lee line, unless otherwise directed by the Commander.in-Chief, 
 which is scarcely to be expected ; as the entire management of the lee line, after 
 the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief are signified, is intended to be left to 
 the judgment of the Admiral commanding that line. 
 
 " The remainder of the enemy's fleet, thirty-four sail, are to be left to the 
 management of the Commander-in-Chief; who will endeavour to take care 
 that the movements of the second in command are as little interrupted as 
 possible." 
 
 Ejctract of a Letter from Lady Londonderry to her Son-in-law, 
 
 Lord Castlereagh. 
 
 " Mount Stewart, November 13th, 1805. 
 
 " I thank you a thousand times for your interesting letter : never was there 
 indeed an event so mournfully and so triumphantly important to England as 
 the battle of Trafalgar. The sentiment of lamenting the individual more than 
 rejoieing in the victory, shows the humanity and affection of the people of 
 England : but their good sense upon reflection will dwell only on the conquest, 
 because no death, at a future moment, could have been more glorious. The 
 public would never have sent him on another expedition ; his health was not 
 equal to another effort, and so might have yielded to the natural but less 
 imposing effects of more worldly honours : whereas he now begins his immortal 
 career, having nothing left to achieve upon earth, and bequeathing to the 
 English fleet a legacy which they alone are able to improve. Had I been his 
 wife, or his mother, I would rather have wept him dead, than seen him languish 
 on a less splendid day. In such a death there is no sting, and in such a grave 
 everlasting victory." 
 
 " Of Clerk's Treatise on Navall Tactics Lord Nelson was very fond, and 
 frequently, at his leisure, would desire his Chaplain, Mr. Scott, to read a little 
 to him, about the wild geese ; to flocks of which, the figures of ships are thought 
 to have a resemblance." 
 
 The following trait of Lord Nelson sets in an amiable light the liberality 
 and nobleness of his character : — 
 
 When the French Admiral I)ecrees, in the Guillaume Tell, captured by 
 Captain (now Admiral Sir Mauley) Dixon, Sir Henry Blackwood, and Sir E. 
 
312 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Berry, was carried into Malta ; some circumstances occurred between him and 
 the then commanding officer at that port, which rendered his situation extremely 
 irksome and uncomfortable. 
 
 Lord Nelson, with Sir William and Lady Hamilton on board, arriving not 
 long after, and being informed of what had happened, justly appreciating the 
 gallant defence of the French Admiral, his talents, and his gentlemanly 
 deportment, was determined to do all he could to remove the unfavourable 
 impression, and endeavour to heal the breach that had been made between the 
 parties in question. For this purpose, he desired Sir Manley Dixon, whose 
 prisoner he was, to inform him, that Lord Nelson requested the honour of his 
 company at dinner ; that he was to appear in his side-arras, and was to be 
 received with all the honours due to his rank. Admiral Decrees, in expressing 
 his sense of the great kindness shown him by the British Admiral, replied that, 
 however grateful he felt for the honour intended him by permission to appear in 
 his side-arms, as he had delivered up his sword upon surrendering himself a 
 prisoner of war in battle, he could never resume it, until it was regularly 
 restored to him by his country. Full dressed in every other respect, he paid his 
 respects to the British chief, who received him with every mark of distinguished 
 honour and respect : at the dinner table he seated him between himself and 
 Lady Hamilton, who strove with the hero of the Nile, by the kindest marks of 
 civility and attention, to restore him to himself. In this manner he continued to 
 treat his brave but unfortunate enemy during his stay ; and, it is hoped, 
 succeeded in giving him a more improved opinion of the character and disposition 
 of British naval officers. Decrees * rose afterwards to places of high honour 
 and trust in the French government. 
 
 One of the many proofs given by Lord Nelson in his professional life, of 
 his extremely sanguine and zealous anxiety to meet the enemy upon all 
 occasions, and of his considerate and kind conduct towards all around him, is 
 thus related : — 
 
 In his memorable chase of the French fleet to the West Indies (the same he 
 afterwards defeated and destroyed at Trafalgar) he was misled in his pursuit, by 
 intelligence, apparently good, from General Brereton, at St. Lucia, that it had 
 proceeded to Trinidad ; upon which he immediately left Barbadoes in search 
 of them ; and while there, he was, of course, waited upon by the Admiral and 
 
 * Decrees appears to have been Minister of the Marine when Napoleon was First Consul, by 
 a letter to Audibert Ramatuelle, authorizing and approving of his " Cours Elementaire." This is 
 probably the last scientific French work upon naval tactics, and may therefore most likely be taken 
 as their future guide. 
 
SIR RICHARD STRACHAN'S BATTLE. 313 
 
 all the Captains of the ships of the station then present. The Captain of the 
 flag- ship, being somewhat indisposed, sent an officer to Lord Nelson with an 
 apology, stating the reason for his absence ; upon which he replied, " tell the 
 Captain of the Northumberland, I am sorry not to have seen him ;" but, in a 
 cheerful good-humoured manner, added, " tell him that nobody must be sick 
 until after Friday ! " On that day he calculated to have had his meeting with 
 the French fleet, and, notwithstanding his great inferiority, would most certainly 
 have attacked it. 
 
 SIR RICHARD STRACHAN'S BATTLE WITH, AND CAPTURE 
 OF, FOUR SHIPS OF THE LINE. 
 
 As a becoming sequel and appendage to the great victory just detailed, may 
 be related the vigilant pursuit and attack by Sir Richard Strachan of the four 
 sail of line of battle ships that had escaped the fate of their companions at 
 Trafalgar. 
 
 The gallant Admiral, with four sail of the line, and some frigates, brought 
 them to close action, dismasting two of them entirely; and, to the others, 
 lea;ving nothing but the. foremast : with three ships only (the other not having 
 come up he attacked the centre and rear. 
 
 The van of the enemy then tacked ; when the British Admiral was joined by 
 the Namur, and the action became close and general, and continued to be warmly 
 contested until half-past three, when the enemy's ships, entirely unmanageable, 
 surrendered. 
 
 They first attempted to fly in line a-breast ; but, upon being attacked by 
 the frigates in advance, they took in their small sails, and formed the line 
 a-head upon the starboard tack, when the British squadron bore down to engage 
 them. 
 
 The spirit and skill displayed by Sir Richard Strachan upon this occasion 
 are eminently conspicuous, and aiFord an additional proof, to the numerous 
 examples he had before given, of his unwearied zeal and unabating thirst for 
 professional glory. 
 
 2 s 
 
314 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 Sufficient justice will not be rendered to the gallant Admiral, unless some 
 account of this exploit be given in the animated strain of his own letter, with 
 the " apology for the hasty manner in which it is written." 
 
 " Csesar, November 4th, 1805. 
 
 " Being off Ferrol, working to the westward, with the wind westerly, on the 
 evening of the 2d we observed a frigate to the N. W. making signals. Made 
 all sail to join her before night ; and, followed by the ships in the margin,* 
 came up with her at eleven at night ; at the same moment, seeing six large 
 ships near us. Captain Baker informed me he had been chased by the Rochefort 
 squadron, then close to leeward of us. We were delighted ! 
 
 " I desired him to tell the Captains of the ships of the line a-stern to follow 
 me, as I meant to engage them directly, and immediately bore away in the 
 Caesar, for the purpose." 
 
 " The moon enabled us to see the enemy bear away in line a-breast, closely 
 formed ; but we lost sight of them when it set." 
 
 " At nine in the morning, we discovered the enemy, of four sail of the line, 
 in the N. E. under all sail; we had also every thing set, and came up with them 
 very fast.^' 
 
 " At day-light on the following morning, we were near them, and the Santa 
 Margarita had begun in a very gallant manner to fire upon the rear, and was 
 soon joined by the Phoenix. 
 
 " A little before noon, the French, finding an action unavoidable, began to 
 take in their small sails, and form in a line, bearing on the starboard tack ; 
 we did the same, and I communicated my intentions, by hailing, that I should 
 attack the centre and rear ; and, at noon, began the battle. In a short time* 
 the van ship of the enemy tacked, which made the action close and general ; and 
 the Namur joined soon after we tacked, which we did as soon as we could get 
 the ships round ; and, at half-past three, the action ceased." 
 
 (See the Gazette account in the 14th volume of the Naval Chronicle.) 
 
 When the numbers engaged are so few, it is unnecessary to form a figure. 
 
 * Ctesar, Hero, Courageux, and Namur. Bellona, Molns, Santa Margarita, far to leeward in 
 the S. E. The Revolutionaire also joined when the Namur did. 
 
SIR JOHN DUeKWORTH. 315 
 
 SIR JOHN DUCKWORTH'S BATTLE OFF ST. DOMINGO. 
 
 1806. 
 
 Extracts from Sir John Duckworth's Letter, dated Superb, off the Town of 
 St. Domingo, February 'Ith, 1806. 
 
 " I LOST not a moment in getting through the Mona Passage ; and, on the 5th, 
 was joined by the Magicienne, with a further corroboration from various vessels 
 spoken, of an enemy's force of ten sail of the line, with as many frigates and 
 corvettes, being in these seas. I therefore continued under easy sail for the night, 
 on my approach off the town of St. Domingo ; having given orders to Captain 
 Dunn, of the Acasta, to make saU with the Magicienne, Captain M'Kensie, 
 two hours before day-light, to reconnoitre ; when, at six o'clock, the Acasta, to 
 our great joy, made the signal for two of the enemy's frigates ; and before seven, 
 for nine sail at anchor ; at half-past, that they were getting under way. The 
 squadron under my command, then in close order, with all sail set, and the 
 Superb bearing my flag, was leading and approaching fast, so as to discover 
 before eight o'clock that the enemy were in a compact line, under all sail, going 
 before the wind for Cape Nisao, to windward of Ocoa bay ; but consisting only 
 of five sail of the line, two frigates, and a corvette; endeavouring, as I con- 
 cluded, to form a junction with their remaining force ; and which, by shaping a 
 course accordingly, was rendered completely abortive, by making an action 
 certain a little after nine o'clock. 
 
 *' I therefore telegraphed the squadron to prepare to attack the Admiral and 
 his seconds ; and, at three quarters past nine, for the ships to take stations for 
 their mutual support, and engage the enemy as they got up ; and a few minutes 
 after, to engage as close as possible ; when a little after ten, the Superb closed 
 upon the bow of the Alexandre, the leading ship, and commenced the action ; 
 but, after three broadsides, she sheered off. The signal was now made fen." 
 closer action, and we were enabled to attack the Admiral in the Imperial 
 (formerly the Vengeur), the fire of which had been very severe on the 
 Northumberland, under the Honourable Rear Admiral Cochrane. 
 
 " By this time the movement of the Alexandre had thrown her among the 
 lee division, which Rear Admiral Louis happily availed himself of; and the 
 
 2 s 2 
 
316 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 action became general, and continued till half-past eleven ; when the French 
 Admiral, completely beaten, hauled at once for the land, and at twenty 
 minutes before noon, ran on shore ; her only remaining mast, the fore-mast, 
 then falling ; and the Superb, being only in seventeen fathoms water, hauled 
 oflF to avoid the same evil. 
 
 " Not long after, the Diomede of eighty-four guns, having struck her colours,* 
 pushed on shore near his Admiral, when all his masts went overboard. 
 
 " About fifty minutes after eleven the firing ceased ; and upon the smoke 
 clearing away, I found the Brave, the Alexander, and the Jupiter, in our 
 possession, and five sail of the line were taken or destroyed in less than two 
 hours," &c. 
 
 British Line. (See Plate L.) 
 
 Weather Division. Lee Division. 
 
 Superb, Northumberland, Canopus, Donegal, 
 
 Spencer, Agamemnon. Atlas. 
 
 Frigates. Sloops. 
 
 Acasta, Magicienne. Kingsfisher, Epervier. 
 
 French Line. 
 
 One ship of eighty-four guns, and one of 120, driven on shore and wrecked ; 
 one ship of eighty-four, and two of seventy-four guns, taken. Two frigates and 
 a corvette escaped. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 In this prompt and spirited attack it may perhaps be observed, that as the 
 British Admiral had something the advantage of force, an account should have 
 been given of the enemy's frigates and corvette ; when it appears, there was 
 little or nothing to engage the attention of ours until the action ceased. 
 
 To such an inquiry it must be replied, that the British Admiral, from the 
 corroborated information he had received by the Magicienne, from vessels spoken 
 learned that the enemy's force in those seas consisted of ten sail of the line and 
 as many frigates ; and that the remainder were probably lying in Ocoa Bay ; to 
 which place, that part of the fleet he so judiciously and gallantly intercepted, 
 
 * This was afterwards found to be a mistake ; it was the '< Brave " that had made every token 
 of surrender. 
 
J'LATEl.. 
 
 TO-WTS OF STDOMIXGO 
 
 
 .^ajrijenuioTv 
 
 AIMS' 
 
SIR JOHN DUCKWORTH. 317 
 
 were making all the haste they could ; for this reason, he acted prudently in 
 keeping his little force collected. Under such circumstances, it would have been 
 by no means justifiable to have detached any part of it in pursuit of the enemy's 
 frigates ; who might probably have led them into a snare. 
 
 The following, from an intelligent officer who partook of the dangers of 
 the day, will throw additional light upon this subject ; and prove to be a full 
 answer to every inquiry : — 
 
 " In the Admiral's letter, it will be seen that he alludes to the information 
 which induced him to go down to St. Domingo ; and that information was, that 
 ten French ships of the line and as many frigates (not forming two separate 
 squadrons, but one collected fleet) had been met with in the Mona Passage. He 
 received this intelligence at St. Kitt's, whither it was conveyed to him by Captain 
 Nathaniel Cochrane, then Commander of the Kingsfisher. In consequence of 
 which, he went as fast as he could to St. Domingo ; and, in passing through 
 the Mona Passage, fell in with the Magicienne, one of the Jamaica frigates, which 
 had been cruizing in that passage; and the Captain of the Magicienne 
 corroborated it, by saying that he had received the same accounts from * various 
 vessels which he had spoken.' " 
 
 In this short but decisive conflict the main-mast of the Northumberland, 
 bearing the flag of Sir Alexander Cochrane, when engaged with the three-decker, 
 was shot away, and fell on board the ship ; forward on the starboard side ; it 
 stove the boats that were filled with water (ready in case of fire), and at once 
 disabled the starboard main-deck guns. 
 
 At the same time a splinter came with such force upon the head of this brave 
 officer, as to bring him on his knees.* 
 
 The three-decked ship (LTmperiale), destroyed upon this occasion, was the 
 largest out of France ; she had seventeen ports on the broadside of her lower- 
 deck, sixteen upon the middle, and fifteen upon the main-deck, independent 
 of the bridle-ports ; her tonnage 3300 ! 
 
 REMARK. 
 
 " The filling of the boats with water seems to be attended with more 
 inconvenience that benefit ; as even the effect of shot upon them might disable 
 the guns below. Fire-buckets, engines, and the cistern-pump, are the best 
 resources in case of fire." 
 
 * Sir Alexander Cochrane had before distinguished himself upon many occasions ; particularly 
 when commanding the landing of the troops in Egypt, with the ever-lamented Abercromby. 
 
318 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 PASSING AND REPASSING THE DARDANELLES 
 BY SIR JOHN DUCKWORTH,* 
 
 February the 19th to March the 3d, 1807. 
 
 The country had now become so accustomed to success in arms, obtained 
 by the skill, enterprize, and valour of its navy, that public espectation was 
 wrought up to an unreasonable height. 
 
 The British navy was at this time, from its numbers and state of discipline, so 
 generally effective, that we are not surprised it should have been called upon to 
 make still greater efforts. It seemed to be the universal opinion that nothing 
 was unattainable by a British Squadron ; that, to accomplish an object, it was 
 but to issue a positive order to achieve it. The cruel and unmerited obloquy 
 that for a time hung over the transaction to which the following observations 
 relate, is a proof of the intoxicated state of the public mind at that period ; and 
 of the extravagant hopes formed by Government, from feelings of triumph and 
 exultation, which the exploits of the British navy had created. 
 
 If we consider the magnitude of the object contemplated in this expedition, 
 with the means given to effect it, we must confess that they appear entirely 
 inadequate to the purpose ; and consequently that the advantages then 
 anticipa,ted from it were presumptuous and unreasonable. 
 
 Seven ships of the line, two frigates, and two bomb vessels, without any 
 assistance or co-operation of a land force, were, through an intricate and well- 
 guarded navigation, to proceed directly to the capital of a great empire ; and in 
 the face of a whole people, to demand of them their fleet ; consisting of twelve 
 
 * British Force — Seven ships of the line (the Ajax having heen burnt by accident at Tenedos), 
 two of which were of three decks, and one of sixty-four guns; two frigates and two bomb- vessel? ; 
 no troops. 
 
 Turkish Force. — Twelve sail of the line, two of which were of three decks ; nine frigates, 
 besides gun-boats, Ssc, and filled with troops : — two hundred thousand also said to have been in 
 Constantinople. 
 
SIR JOHN DUCKWORTH. 319 
 
 ships of the line, nine frigates, and an innumerable quantity of gun-boats, 
 lire-vessels, &c. of every description ; and defended by two hundred thousand 
 troops; and as the Admiral informs us, at this time the whole line of the coast 
 presented a chain of batteries ; their fleet with their sails bent apparently in 
 readiness, filled with troops," &c. 
 
 The Admiral continues to say ; * " With the batteries alone we might have 
 coped, or with the ships, could we have got them out of their strong-hold ; but 
 after combating the opposition which the resources of the empire had been many 
 weeks employed in preparing, we should have been in no state to have defended 
 ourselves against them, as described, and then to repass the Dardanelles. 
 
 " I know it was my duty, in obedience to your Lordships^ orders^ to attempt 
 every thing (governed by the opinion of the Ambassador) that appeared within 
 the compass of possibility ; but when the unavoidable sacrifice of the squadron 
 committed to my charge (which must have arisen, had I waited for a wind to 
 have enabled me to cannonade the town, unattended by the remotest chance of 
 any advantage) must have been the consequence of it, it at once became my 
 positive duty to relinquish it," &c. 
 
 " The Turks had been occupied unceasingly in adding to the number of their 
 forts ; the fire of the two, inner castles had, on our going up, been severe ; but I 
 am sorry to say, the effect they have had on our ships returning, has proved them 
 to be doubly formidable. In short, had they been allowed another week to 
 complete their defences throughout the channel, it would have been a very 
 doubtful point whether a return lay open to us at all." 
 
 What may have been the nature or extent of the encouragement (if any) held 
 out to Great Britain in this enterprize, or of any favourable issue from the joint 
 influence of threats and negociation, we are not informed ; but, from the moment 
 the British squadron made its appearance in the Turkish seas, it seems to have 
 met with the most determined resistance ; and the Turks proved themselves, in 
 all respects, fuUy capable to set at defiance the efforts even of a much larger 
 force. We cannot therefore refuse our assent to the propriety of the Admiral's 
 determination : but not without regret, that the British flag should have been 
 vauntingly displayed before the Turkish capital, and by them dared to carry 
 into execution the instructions of the British cabinet. 
 
 To afford some information respecting the impediments which the squadron 
 
 * Letter to X>ox&. CoUingwood. 
 
320 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 had to encounter in passing and repassing the Hellespont, some passages of a 
 former letter of Sir J. Duckworth are selected : — 
 
 " Information had been given me by his Majesty's minister and Sir T. Louis, 
 that the Turkish squadron, consisting of a sixty-four gun ship, four frigates, and 
 several corvettes, had been for some time at anchor within the inner castle ; and 
 conceiving it possible they might have remained there, I had given orders to 
 Rear Admiral Sir Sydney Smith to bring up, with the Thunderer, Standard, and 
 Active, to destroy them, should our passage be opposed," &c. 
 
 " At half past nine o'clock the Canopus, which had been appointed to lead, 
 entered the narrow passage of Sestos and Abydos, and sustained a very heavy 
 cannonade from both castles within point blank shot of each. 
 
 " They opened their fire upon our ships as they continued to pass in succession, 
 although I was happy in observing that the very spirited return it met with had 
 considerably diminished its force, and that the eflFect on the sternmost ships was 
 not so severe. 
 
 " To the N. E. of the castles, and between them and point Pasquins, in which 
 a formidable battery had been newly erected, the small squadron I have alluded 
 to were at anchor. 
 
 " The van division gave them their broadsides as they passed, and Sir Sydney 
 Smith, with his division, closed into the midst ; and the effect of the fire was 
 such that in half an hour the Turks had all cut their cables to run on shore. 
 The object of the Rear Admiral was then to destroy them ; which was most 
 rapidly effected," &c. 
 
 " I cannot help expressing my satisfaction that we have suffered so slightly; 
 as, had any of their stone shot, some of which exceed eight hundred weight, 
 made such a breach between wind and water as they have done in our sides the 
 ship must have sunk ; or had they struck a lower-mast in the centre, it must 
 have been cut in two," &c. 
 
 " By the zeal and distinguished ability of Sir Sidney Smith, and under his 
 immediate directions, the sixty-four-gun ship was destroyed by the Hon. Captain 
 Legge of the Repulse ; while the Captains Dacres, Talbot, Harvey, and 
 Mowbray, with the boats of the different ships, executed the remainder of this 
 dangerous service in the most effectual manner. 
 
 " The battery on the point, of more than thirty guns ; which, had it been 
 completely finished, was in a position to have annoyed the squadron most 
 severely, was taken possession of by the royal marines and boats' crews of the 
 rear division ; the Turks having retired at their approach ; and the guns were 
 
SIR JOHN DUCKWORTH. 321 
 
 immediately spiked. This service was performed by Captain Nichols of the 
 Standard's marines; and Captain Mowbray of the Active, with Lieutenants 
 Carrol and Arabin, and Lieutenant Lawrie of the marines, were to complete the 
 destruction of the redoubt and guns ; and the Active was to continue iu the 
 passage of the Dardanelles until further orders." 
 
 The ships and vessels taken and destroyed on this occasion were, burnt, one 
 sixty-four-gun ship, four frigates, three corvettes, one brig, and two guh-boats. 
 Taken, one corvette and one gun-boat. 
 
 On the 28th of February the Admiral writes, " It was perceived at nine 
 o'clock yesterday morning that the Turks had landed on the island of Prota, 
 near which the squadron was anchored, and were erecting a battery," &c. 
 
 Boats were sent, manned and armed, which drove the Turks from the island, 
 and captured the guns : a larger force again returned to the island, which it was 
 found necessary to attempt to dislodge ; and parties of seamen and marines from 
 the Royal George, Windsor Castle, Canopus, and Standard, were immediately 
 sent. These were drawn into an ambush, and suffered severely. The Turks had 
 retired to an old convent, and from loop-holes defended themselves with musketry. 
 
 The boats returned from this service after dark, having lost many valuable 
 officers and men, and without effecting their object : the remaining Turks eluded 
 the vigilance of the guard-boats, and escaped in the night. 
 
 The entire loss in this enterprizing but unfortunate affair was forty-two killed, 
 and two hundred and thirty-five wounded, and four missing. The main-mast of 
 the Windsor Castle being more than three-quarters cut through by a granite 
 shot of eight hundred-weight, they found great difficulty in saving it. The shot 
 was six feet eight inches in circumference. 
 
 This subject has been so fairly and impartially considered in the 17th volume 
 of the " Naval Chronicle," that little more is necessary than to observe that, 
 upon every other enterprise of a similar, or nearly similar nature, a much larger 
 force, and a considerable body of troops, with artillery and every requisite 
 accompaniment, have been afforded. Of this description were the attack upon 
 Walcheren, and the expedition to Copenhagen under Admiral Gambler and 
 Lord Cathcart. For in the former undertaking, although it was one of unusual 
 extent and magnitude, and nevertheless failed of entire success, yet the ships 
 at Antwerp were the chief and ultimate object, and the force employed most ample. 
 
 The expedition to Copenhagen in 1807 is similar to that before us. Our 
 operations commenced in negociation, but ended in war ; and the object was 
 solely the surrender of the Danish fleet. The means in this instance being 
 adequate to the purpose, were completely successful. The British flag here was 
 
 2 T 
 
322 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 triumphant, and the requisitions of the British government, supported as they 
 ever should be, were carried into complete effect. 
 
 The avowed intention of this visit to Constantinople was not simply to" 
 demand a surrender of the Turkish fleet, but to bully the Ottoman court 
 into a compliance with our political views, rather than listen to those of the 
 French government, at that time ably promoted by Sebastiani. 
 
 It will be evident, however, that unless we could possess ourselves of the one, 
 we were by no means likely to succeed in the other. The subject here is consi- 
 dered merely as a naval enterprise. 
 
 A further example of the propriety of adapting the means to the end will be- 
 found in the liberal manner in which the executive authority furnished the 
 supplies upon a subsequent occasion ; without which, the object must have failed, 
 the national flag have been defeated, and the country humbled and disgraced iit' 
 the eyes of all the Christian states in every quarter of the globe. 
 
 Explanation of Plate LI. 
 
 A, The British squadron. — J, Canopus; 2, Repulse; 3, Royal George; 
 
 4, Windsor Castle ; 5, Pompee ; 6, Thunderer ; 7, Standard. 
 
 B, The Turkish squadron taken or destroyed. 
 
 C, Frigates and bombs. 
 
 Note.— The arrows in this plate represent the set of the current, and the little 
 fl^ags denote the direction of the wind^ 
 
 FITTING FOR THE EXPEDITION, AND FORMS OF 
 ATTACK UPON ALGIERS. 
 
 August, 1816. 
 
 As this more recent exploit of the British navy is not very unlike that which 
 precedes it, some account of it cannot be uninteresting to the naval reader : much 
 misinformation also has, in many instances, been shown, even by professional 
 men, upon this subject.^ 
 
 To make known, therefore,, the nature and extent of the supplies, of the 
 force, and of the arrangements necessary to its success, seems to be neither 
 irrelevant, nor inexpedient. 
 
PLJ.TELI. 
 
ALGIERS. 
 
 323 
 
 ■ As the chastisement of the Day of Algiers, and the capture or destruction of 
 his navy, defended as it was, must be considered a service of a peculiar 
 character, such a force was to be selected as was best calculated to effect it ; and, 
 for this purpose, the following ships were appointed, and directed to undergo 
 preparation accordingly : — 
 
 ■ The force consisted of five ships of the line (two of them of three decks), five 
 frigates of the largest and second class, five sloops of war, and four bomb-vessels; 
 in all nineteen vessels of war. 
 
 The ships were, in the first place, supplied with ordnance stores of every 
 ' description, as for foreign service ; nor were the supplies even limited to that ; 
 but the Captains, upon proper application, were given powder, ball, &c. to any 
 extent, consistent with their means of stowing it away. 
 
 The storehouses of Woolwich were opened, to furnish the squadron with eviery 
 species of combustible (with the Congreve rockets) that was judged efficacious ; 
 and fire-boxes, and other materials of a similar description, were served to the 
 ships in great abundance. 
 
 Anchors of a particular class were also given in addition to the regular 
 number, with a sufficiency of cables and hawsers for every emergency ; each ship 
 of the line having also an iron cable. 
 
 The two-decked ships were to have " first rates' launches, and all the boats 
 Were to be double- banked and large ; one flat boat to each ship as a rocket-boat — 
 frigates as well as line-of-battle ships. 
 
 " Frigates to take a spare stream anchor and cable. 
 
 " Shrapnell shot are ordered, such a proportion as the captain of each ship 
 may judge necessary, say one hundred each ship.* 
 
 " Long sights for the guns cut out of deal board, and grooved, as in the 
 annexed figures, to be fitted on board."f 
 
 "pilDi "W" _JE V 
 I 
 
 * These are quotations from the orders issued. 
 
 t Similar sights were used by the Amazon, Captain Riou, at the attack of Copenhagen in 1801. 
 
 2 T 2 
 
324 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 All these orders were punctually obeyed ; and the sights, so formed and fixed, 
 were particularly useful; every gun employed was considerably within point 
 blank range, leaving nothing for the captain of the gun, but to direct his eye 
 alpng the groove (parallel with the bore of the gun) to the object ; and the 
 greatest precision was attained. 
 
 Launches were to be fitted for the reception of " eight-inch land-service brass 
 mortars, or the like number of eight-inch howitzers." Also, one hundred 
 laboratory torches for the purpose of conflagration, and twelve copper explosion 
 coffers, with locks ; and the requisite apparatus for exploding, at different times, 
 were also ordered ; and the Rocket equipment to be increased to two thousand 
 five hundred rockets. 
 
 The above accompaniments were embarked in a transport at Woolwich. The 
 beds for the mortars having also been put on board the transport, it was not 
 necessary that the launches should then undergo any particular preparation. 
 The only things which remain to be noticed are the qfter-hitts fitted on board all 
 the line-of-battle ships, and which were fixed by the dock-yard within the given 
 time ; and a sailing lighter was to attend the squadron with an additioual supply 
 of anchors and hawsers, to assist the ships in any emergency. The squadron, by 
 the foresight and experience of its Chief, thus amply provided in every respect, 
 left Plymouth for the destined service. 
 
 On the passage to Gibraltar, the ships' companies were mustergd by th.e 
 Commander-in-Chief, and the crews daily exercised at the guns, every other 
 day firing powder, so that in the short space of ten days they became tolerably 
 expert. 
 
 At Gibraltar every ship of the line was directed to fit-out and man a gun-boat; 
 this, furnished with a sixty^eight pound carronade, was to attend the expedition ; 
 and a dock-yard sloop was, at the same ^ime, conveited into a fire-ship, or ex- 
 plosion vessel ; the ships having also made good their expence of powder, and 
 taken in what was further necessary, in four or five days, proceeded to the ulti- 
 mate object in view. The sqiiadron was clear for action in every respect, having 
 landed all bulk-heads and other lumber at Gibraltar. Frigates' cables were also 
 carried out of the stern-ports to anchors in the main-chains ; and these, brought 
 to the after-bitts, secured to the orlop-beams, were to bring the ships up by the 
 stern. 
 
 At Gibraltar five or six Dutch frigates, under Admiral Van Capellen, re- 
 quested to join the British squadron in this service, and probably had stations 
 appointed them by the Britisb Admiral ; but, as no alteration was made in the 
 
ALGIERS. 325 
 
 orders and instructions already given to the ships on the passage from England, 
 they had such duties assigned them, as were least likely to interfere with the 
 arrangements already determined on.* 
 
 To show that the subject had undergone a careful investigation in the mind 
 of the gallant Admiral, and that he had attentively examined it in all its bear- 
 ings, copies of his memorandums will be given, relative to his plans of attack 
 under different circumstances ; by which it will be seen, that experience had 
 clearly pointed out all possible difficulties, whilst his judgment, professional 
 skill, and intrepidity, were sufficient to surmount them. 
 
 Contrary opinions were, at first, entertained as to the character of the arma- 
 ment in contemplation ; some having considered it a joint expedition with a 
 military force. If one hundred and twenty sappers and miners, under a brevet- 
 major, can entitle it to that name, it was so ; but one company, consisting of 
 about that number, and some artillery-men, were the whole of the military force 
 embarked ; who, had it been found necessary to land, were to be placed under 
 the command of two senior majors of the royal marines, on board the Superb 
 and Impregnable ; and the whole subject to the direction of a post captain, 
 should it be the pleasure of the Commander-in-Chief to appoint one. But no 
 landing was attempted, the attack having entirely succeeded without it ; and, 
 had any landing been necessary, the force would have proved inadequate to the 
 undertaking ; consisting of but eleven hundred men, and these taken from the 
 strength of the ships. 
 
 To place this beyond dispute, it is perfectly well known, that the British 
 Admiral requested that two regiments might be embarked at Gibraltar ; they 
 were,f however, refused, as being unnecessary to the service contemplated, which 
 was considered entirely of a naval description. It certainly differed in some 
 particulars from any attempt of the kind that had preceded it ; as the sinking 
 or loss of the ships (not improbable), unlike civilized warfare, would have been 
 followed by instant butchery, or ignominious slavery ; to say nothing of the blow 
 to our naval pride, and national glory. 
 
 This memorable battle, it may be said, bore the character of a crusade in be- 
 half of Europe, rather than on the part of Great Britain alone ; on which ac- 
 
 * If any additional orders were issued in consequence of the junction of the Dytch frigates, 
 they were communicated only to those ships to which they were addressed, and not to the fleet. 
 The Dutch attiacked the batteries on the left, or S. E, side, while the British ships attacked the 
 Mole, Light-house, and Town-batteries. 
 
 t The request was made to government before the squadron sailed. 
 
326 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 count, in bestowing the rewards which followed, it should have been compared 
 with nothing that had gone before it.* 
 
 To justify this opinion of it, let it be remembered that, of the 1,200 Christians 
 rescued from slavery upon this occasion, not one of them was a British subject. 
 A boat's crew belonging to the Prometheus, employed to smuggle off the British 
 Consul and his family, a few days before the bombardment, being detected by 
 the Dey, were, of course, stopped until the issue of Lord Exraouth's visit 
 should be known. 
 
 GENERAL MEMORANDUM. 
 
 " Queen Charlotte, at Sea, 6th August, 1816. 
 
 " It is the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to take his. station for the 
 attack of Algiers, if the wind admits, as soon as the ships arrive in that bay, 
 and the Dey's answer to his demand is returned, or the time for its reception 
 elapsed. 
 
 " If an attack is not immediately practicable, the ships will, after they anchor, 
 send their spare top-masts, yards, and jib-booms to the bombs and transports, as 
 underneath : viz. 
 
 Queen Charlotte to Belzebub. 
 
 Impregnable .... Hecla. 
 
 Superb Infernal. 
 
 Albion . . Fury. 
 
 Minden Trafalgar. 
 
 Ships will be prepared to anchor by the head or stern, as the prevailing wind 
 may render necessary, and follow the example of the flag-ship as nearly as 
 possible, if no positive inconvenience arise therefrom. 
 
 " All boats will be hoisted out, the launches prepared for the howitzers, and 
 the flat-boats for carronades and rockets ; and the jolly-boats must attend the 
 latter with ammunition. 
 
 * In the promotions which followed, the battle of Trafalgar was said to be the example taken, 
 and one Midshipman only was to be recommended by the Captains. A great many, however, not 
 even in the battle, were advanced from other interest, in every gradation of rank. Of nine Com- 
 •narerferj in battle, three o«i!^ were promoted ! ! and not one of them received the honour of the 
 Bath, although it was conferred on a Major in the army upon the same occasion ! The three 
 Captains, Brace, Chetham, and Palmer, were, for former services, Companions of the Bath. They 
 are Companions of the Bath still (June, 1828). 
 
^1 
 
ALGIERS. 327 
 
 " The launches must, in the first instance, be prepared with hawsers in them 
 ready to carry out anchors, and not prepare for other service until the ships are all 
 placed. 
 
 " The Commander-in-Chief leaves to the judgment of the respective captains 
 the use of the iron cables ; he means himself to bring up with rope cables, and, 
 when brought up, to lash the chains on the cable, to ride by, paying out so much 
 cable as will put them under water for safety from grape-shot. 
 
 " If the wind should oblige the squadron to anchor previous to any attack^ 
 the launches and flat-boats will be prepared for night service, and care is to be 
 taken to afford the crews as much rest as possible ; and, as the land winds 
 generally prevail very early in the morning, the ships will carefully watch the 
 Admiral's motions at night, and be ready to weigh at dawn of day, 
 
 " Twelve-pound carronades having been supplied for the barges and yawlsj 
 these boats are to be kept ready prepared to move in aid of, or to protect, the 
 launches on the least alarm ; and will proceed to one of the two brigs, which 
 will, by signal pointed out, have charge of the night, without delay, unless 
 called for by any heavy fire attacking the boats already throwing shells and 
 rockets. 
 
 •' EXMOUTH. 
 
 " To Rear Admiral Milne, and the respective 
 Captains of the Squadron." 
 
 FORM OF ATTACK.* 
 
 " Queen Charlotte, at sea, 6th August, 1816. 
 
 " The space for the attack on the S. E. part of the mole of Algiers being very 
 limited, it will require the greatest attention to place the ships well in their 
 respective stations ; and it is very desirable to avoid opening any fire from them^ 
 if it be possible, before they are placed. But, as it cannot be presumed the enemy 
 will remain inactive, it becomes necessary to prepare for that event by 
 endeavouring to divert their fire from the ships of the line, by opening fire from 
 the frigates, which may under sail pass the batteries in advance, or possibly in the 
 intervals of the line, as circumstances point out. 
 
 " The flag-ship will lead, and bring up as near to the mole head as 
 practicable ; the Superb and Impregnable, following, will anchor as close as they 
 can to her ; the latter ship placing herself to the southward of the large arch near 
 the centre of the works, and the Superb between us ; and when placed, it will be 
 
 * See the plan of Alters (Plate LIZ), where the batteries are numbered according to the references. 
 Th« bombardment not having been described) the ships are omitted. 
 
328 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 of the greatest advantage if they could be made fast to each other, and hove 
 together to concentrate their fire. 
 
 " The rear ship, the Albion, will see if, by any failure, she can supply 
 the place of either ship thrown out. But, if the Impregnable succeeds in 
 getting place, it appears to me the Albion may be well situateid close on her 
 bow, presenting her broadside against the only flanking battery, marked H, 
 of three guns ; by which she may cover the Impregnable, and enfilade the 
 north part of the works, by throwing part of her fire upon the upper tier of 
 the light-house battery. 
 
 " The Leander will keep nearly abreast of the Superb, and, seeing the flag- 
 ship placed, will anchor as near to her as possible, veering towards the towri until 
 she opens the mole, when she will either fire on the round tower, or the gun- 
 boats, and batteries on the town walls ; she must run a-warp to the flag-ship, and 
 heave as close to her as possible, to connect the fire of both, and to aflFord room for 
 the Severn to get within her, or between her and the flag-ship. 
 
 " The Glasgow will anchor, and present her broadside to the fish-iftarket 
 battery. No. 9 and 10, and any others she may be able to fire upon. 
 
 " The Granicus should occupy any space in the line open between the ships 
 at anchor : or, if either of the frigates in the mouth of the mole should meet 
 with accident, she will endeavour to take her place. 
 
 " The Hebrus will attack battery. No 7 and 8. 
 
 " Minden will attack the large battery. No. 4, taking care not to pass to the 
 southward of the N. E. angle. She vnll also be able to fire on No. 5 and 6. 
 This attack need not be closely pressed, being a cover only for the ships attacking 
 the mole from a flank fire. Captain Paterson will be extremely watchful of our 
 operations, and be ready to slip, and join, in the event of any accident to the 
 ships attacking; and he will use the schooner to the best advantage for 
 communication. 
 
 " Heron, Mutine, Cordelia, and Britomart, will consider it their first duty to 
 attend and aid the ships they are named to assist, in evay possible way; 
 and they are to remember that even their brigs are to be sacrificed, to save the 
 ships they are ordered to attend. Should that service become uncalled for by 
 their being well placed, the Captains will take any position where their fire can 
 do good. 
 
 " Prometheus will tow down the explosion ship, as instructed, and receive her 
 commander and crew. 
 
 " The bombs will put themselves under the orders of Captain Kempthorne, 
 and, as soon as anchored, prepare to open fire. 
 
ALGIERS. 329 
 
 " They will be placed by the master of the fleet to the northward of the large 
 arch ; and take care during the attack not to throw their shells over our own 
 ships. The light-house battery is a great object ; and, keeping that in a line 
 with the town gate, will give two objects for throwing the shells at. 
 
 " N. B. Ships leading into" anchorage are to have the preparative flag flying 
 at the mizen-top-gallant-mast-head, which is to be hauled down immediately 
 they let go the anchor, 
 
 " EXMOUTH. 
 " To Rear Admiral Milne, and the' respective 
 Captains of the Squadron.'' 
 
 « BY ADMIRAL LORD EXMOUTH, &c. 
 
 " The marines to be put into two battalions, to be commanded by the two 
 senior officers whenever landed." 
 
 First Battalion. 
 
 Queen Charlotte 170 
 
 Superb 125 
 
 Leander 84 
 
 Severn 64 
 
 Granicus 48 
 
 491 
 
 Second Battalion. 
 
 Impregnable 150 
 
 Minden 125 
 
 Albion 125 
 
 Glasgow 64 
 
 Hebrus 48 
 
 512 
 
 " Each three-decker will form her party into four divisions, having an officer 
 at the head of each. The two-deckers will form into three divisions, and the 
 frigates into two divisions in the same manner ; and, whenever one division is 
 ordered to land from each ship, the appointed officer will take his command. 
 
 " If the first and second divisions are ordered to land, the Captains will, in 
 that case, land with them, taking the second subalterns, and leave the seniors 
 on board. 
 
 " Major Vallack to land in command of the first and second divisions, and 
 Major Collins to remain on board to command the remaining party whenever 
 they may be ordered to land. 
 
 " Lieutenant Hunt, of the Queen Charlotte, will act as Adjutant, and four 
 steady men from each division are to be selected to carry rockets and storming 
 poles. - 
 
 " The Commander-in-Chief sees, in the intended attack, a possibility of 
 
 2 u 
 
330 
 
 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 pushing on the mole the first, and perhaps the second, divisions of marines 
 from each ship (under cover of their own ships) in order to support the sappers 
 and miners who will land with them. 
 
 " The flat-boats and launches therefore are to be used as gun and rocket-boats 
 under the shelter of, and close to the ship to which they belong, ready to take 
 advantage of any sudden confusion of the enemy, by embarking a division in 
 each of these two boats. They will assemble alongside the flagship, there to 
 receive orders when the signal 3, A, C, is made. 
 
 " The men to land without any incumbrance, with sixty rounds of ammunition, 
 and canteens, if they have any ; and a proportion of small rockets will be 
 distributed among them for throwing into the casemates. 
 
 " Given on board the Queen Charlotte, at sea, 6th August, 1816. 
 
 " To the respective Captains. 
 " By command of the Admiral, 
 
 " EXMOUTH. 
 
 " Jos. Grimes, Secretary. 
 
 " Arrangement for the Boats of the Squadron. 
 
 Larboard Division, to consist of Yawls. 
 First Part. 
 
 Starboard Division, to consist of Launches 
 and Barges. 
 
 First Part. 
 
 Iiaunches. Barges. 
 
 Queen Charlotte 1 3 
 
 Superb 1 1 
 
 Minden 1 2 
 
 Severn 1 1 
 
 Granicus 1 1 
 
 Second Part. 
 
 Impregnable 
 
 Albion 
 
 Leander . . . 
 Glasgow . . . 
 Hebrus . . . 
 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 
 8 
 
 2 
 3 
 1 
 2 
 1 
 
 9 
 
 " The Starboard Division, to be un- 
 der the directions of a Lieutenant, to be 
 appointed from the Queen Charlotte. 
 
 Yaw>. 
 
 Queen Charlotte 2 
 
 Superb 
 
 Minden 
 
 Severn 
 
 2 
 1 
 1 
 
 Granicus 
 
 Second Part. 
 
 Impregnable 2 
 
 Albion 2 
 
 Leander 2 
 
 Glasgow 1 
 
 Hebrus . . 2 
 
 9 
 
 " The Larboard Division to be un- 
 der the direction of a Lieutenant, to 
 be appointed from the Impregnable. 
 
ALGIERS. 331 
 
 " The whole to act under a Commander, who will be named by the Commander- 
 in-Chief. 
 
 " A separate boat, with a Surgeon's Assistant, to attend each division. The 
 ships to provide for this service will be pointed out by signal. 
 
 " And the Midshipmen of all boats are to copy the boats' signals. 
 
 " To the respective Captains. «« ExMOUTtt."^ 
 
 OF LORD EXMOUTH. 
 
 Of this distinguished son of Neptune and of Mars (as each might claim him 
 for his own), it was the invariable rule, and positive injunction, never to fire a 
 shot until after he had hailed the enemy, to make sure of being sufficiently close : 
 this was manifested in a style and manner, upon this last great occasion, which 
 never can be forgotten. Hailing, indeed, was unnecessary, for the British Chief 
 had already delivered his ultimatum to the Dey ; but, two shot having been fired 
 from the batteries, the Admiral twice waved his hat to the immense crowds which 
 lined the shore and the ramparts, to apprize them of their danger ; after which 
 he gave orders to fire. Thus commenced a cannonade that continued without 
 any intermission for six hours ; and, with intervals of rest, to a much longer 
 period ; and ending in the entire accomplishment of the object. 
 
 Another trait of this great professional character cannot be unacceptable : — 
 Upon returning from his command in India in the Culloden of seveny-four guns, 
 with a convoy of Indiamen of about twenty sail, they were caught by one of the 
 most tremendous hurricanes that was ever known in that or any other country. 
 Four of the Indiamen foundered in the gale, and the Culloden herself was in 
 imminent danger. 
 
 Upon a proposal of the officers to give ease and relief to the ship, by a disposal 
 of the guns into the sea, the Admiral gave his decided negative ; observing that 
 " A man of war without guns was nothing ; it were much better to sink than to 
 be disgraced." And many of the guns of both decks were thereupon securely 
 housed in midships. 
 
 At this time it should be told that a French squadron was cruizing off the 
 Island of St. Helena to intercept the India fleet. 
 
 The Culloden survived the storm with no other material injury than the loss 
 of the head of her mizen-mast. 
 
 Of Lord Exraouth's services to the King of France, when, with a land force 
 of about 5,000 men under Sir H. Lowe, they preserved the city of Marseilles in 
 
 g u 2 
 
332 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 its subjection to the Royal authority, the following circumstances bear ample 
 testimony : — 
 
 Supported by the spirit of loyalty around them, they marched, and challenged 
 to the field the superior force of Marshal Brune, then occupying Toulon, which 
 produced a capitulation. This was followed by the sudden death of the 
 Marshal. 
 
 On the occupation of it by the British forces, by land and sea, the King of 
 France had occasion to address a letter to Lord Exmouth ; to which the following 
 postscript was written in his Majesty*s own hand : — (in English.) 
 
 " I cannot, my Lord, neglect the present opportunity of offering you my 
 grateful acknowledgments for the noble efforts by which you have so powerfully 
 assisted my loyal subjects in their successful endeavours to place again Provence 
 and Toulon under my obedience. 
 
 (Signed) " Louis." 
 
 The King of France also addressed a congratulatory letter to Lord Exmouth 
 after the battle of Algiers ; to which the following postscript was written in His 
 Majesty's own hand : — 
 
 " I cannot omit to mention how much I was gratified by the sight of the 
 present my good city of Marseilles has offered you. This is no longer, however, 
 an adequate acknowledgment to you ; and the Christian world is now under 
 an equal obligation of devising a monument of its gratitude towards the man 
 (and very truly a man) by whom it has been rescued from the horrible fear of 
 slavery. <■<■ Louis." 
 
 To commemorate the battle of Algiers, it has been said that medals for distri- 
 bution were actually ordered to be struck ; but by some influence at the Admiralty, 
 at that period, in some respects hostile to the general interests of the naval 
 service, they were stopped ! 
 
BATTLE OF NAVARIN. 333 
 
 THE BATTLE OF NAVARIN. 
 
 This extraordinary conflict presents us with a memorable proof of what skill, 
 discipline, courage, and unanimity can eflFect, against brave, but unskilful and 
 undisciplined numbers. It is a battle distinct in character from any which 
 have preceded it, and a display of general and individual intrepidity that may 
 have been equalled, but never surpassed. It is also to be distinguished in other 
 remarkable particulars ; first, from its being a contest with a people with whom 
 we have been accustomed to live in habits of commercial amity and intercourse ; 
 yet the most hostile to our holy religion. Secondly, from motives of disinterested 
 humanity, having in view the object of reducing to reason, and of effecting a 
 reconciliation, between two deep-rooted, ferocious, and implacable enemies ; in- 
 terrupting the peaceable occupations of the rest of the world. To accomplish 
 this important, difficult, but beneficent purpose. Great Britain was so fortunate as 
 to be assisted by the squadrons of two great mediatorial powers, who, with their 
 chiefs, were eminently conspicuous in a generous emulation of their leader's 
 example ; and who by their unremitted and cordial co-operation nobly contributed 
 to bring it to a glorious, and, it is to be hoped, successful issue. Let it then no 
 more be said that any thing like natural enmity * can exist in the bosoms of the 
 nations of Europe ; let those only have enemies, who are the enemies of man- 
 kind. 
 
 Extracts from Orders and Instructions. 
 
 "Asia, off Navarin, Oct. 19, 1827, 
 *' It appears that the Egyptian ships in which the French officers are 
 embarked are those most to the S. E. : it is therefore my v?ish that his Excel- 
 lency Rear Admiral the Chevalier de Rigny should place his squadron a-breast 
 of them. As the next appears to be a ship of the line with a flag at the main, 
 I propose to place the Asia a-breast of her, with the Grenoa and Albion next to 
 the Asia ; and I wish that his Excellency Rear Admiral Count Heyden will 
 have the goodness to place his squadron next in succession to the British ships of 
 
 * Ramatuelle speaks of the English as " iips ennemis naturels." (Cours Elementaire, p. 34^ 
 
33 i NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 the line ; the Russian frigates in this case can occupy the Turkish ships next m 
 succession to the Russian ships of the line, the English frigates forming along- 
 side such Turkish vessels as may be on the western side of the harbour a-breast 
 of the British ships of the line, and the French frigates forming in the same 
 manner, so as to occupy the Turkish frigates, and a-breast of the French ships 
 of the line. 
 
 " If time permit before any hostility is committed by the Turkish fleet, the 
 ships are to moor with a spring on the ring of each anchor. No gun is to be 
 fired from the combined fleet without a signal for that purpose. If shot be fired 
 from any of the Turkish ships, the ships so firing are to be destroyed imme 
 diately. 
 
 " The corvettes and brigs are under the direction of Captain Fellowes, of the 
 Dartmouth, to remove the fire-vessels into such a position as will prevent them 
 doing any injury to the combined fleet. In case of a battle ensuing, let the 
 memorable words of Lord Nelson be borne in mind, that ' no captain can do 
 very wrong who places his ship alongside that of an enemy.' " 
 
 Extracts from the Dispatches of Vice Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, 
 K. C. B,, to J. W. Croker, Esq. Admiralty. 
 
 " H. M. Ship Asia, in the Port of Navarin, 
 « Sir, Oct. 2^1827. 
 
 " I have the honour of informing his Royal Highness the Lord 
 High Admiral, that my colleagues. Count Heyden and the Chevalier de Rigny, 
 having agreed with me that we should come into this port, in order to induce 
 Ibrahim Pacha to discontinue the brutal war of extermination which he has been 
 carrying on since his return here from his failure in the Gulf of Patras, the 
 combined squadrons passed the batteries in order to take up their anchorage at 
 about two o'clock yesterday afternoon. 
 
 " The Turkish ships were moored in the form of a crescent, with springs on 
 their cables, the larger ones presenting their broadsides towards the centre, the 
 smaller ones in succession within them, filling up the intervals. 
 
 " The combined fleet was formed in the order of sailing, in two columns, the 
 British and French forming the weather or starboard line, and the Russian the 
 lee line. 
 
 " The Asia led in, followed by the Genoa and Albion, and anchored close 
 alongside a ship of the line, bearing the flag of the Capitana Bey, another ship 
 of the line, and a large double-decked frigate, each thus having their proper 
 
BATTLE OF NAVARIN. 335 
 
 opponent in front line of the Turkish fleet. The four ships to windward, part 
 of the Egyptian squadron, were allotted to the squadron of Rear Admiral de 
 Rigny ; and those to leeward, in the bight of the crescent, were to mark the 
 stations of the Russian squadron, the ships of their line closing with those of 
 the English line, and being followed up by their own frigates. 
 
 " The French frigate the Armide was directed to place herself alongside the 
 outermost frigate, on the left hand entering the harbour ; and the Cambrian, 
 Glasgow, and Talbot next to her, and abreast of the Asia, Genoa, Albion ; the 
 Dartmouth and the Musquito, the Rose, the Brisk, and the Philomel, were to 
 look after the six fire-vessels at the entrance of the harbour. 
 
 " I gave orders that no gun should be fired unless guns were first fired by the 
 Turks, and those orders were strictly observed. 
 
 " The three English ships were accordingly permitted to pass the batteries, and 
 to moor, as they did, with great rapidity, without any act of open hostility, 
 although there was evident peparation for it in all the Turkish ships ; but upon 
 the Dartmouth sending a boat to one of the fire-vessels, Lieutenant G. W. H. 
 Fitzroy and several of her crew were shot with musketry. This produced a 
 defensive fire of musketry from the Dartmouth and La Syrene, bearing the flag 
 of Rear Admiral De Rigny ; that was succeeded by a cannon shot at the Rear 
 Admiral from one of the Egyptian ships, which, of course, brought on a return, 
 and thus very shortly afterwards the battle became general. 
 
 " The Asia, although placed alongside of the ship of the Capitana Bey, was 
 even nearer to that of Moharem Bey, the Commander of the Egyptian ships ; 
 and since his ships did not fire at the Asia, although the action was begun to 
 windward, neither did the Asia fire at her, and therefore no hostility took place 
 betwixt our two ships for some time after the Asia had returned the fire of the 
 Capitana Bey." 
 
 Mr. Peter Mitchell the Pilot, having been sent to interpret to Moharem Bey, 
 the mediatory intentions of the allied squadrons, was killed alongside of the 
 Turkish ship. This act of deliberate cruelty was soon after followed by the firing 
 of the Turk into the Asia ; and, as the gallant Admiral proceeds to say, " was 
 consequently effectually destroyed by the Asia's fire ;" sharing the same fate as his 
 brother Admiral on. the starboard side, and falling to leeward a mere wreck. 
 
 " These ships being out of the way, the Asia became exposed to a raking fire 
 from vessels in the second and third line, which carried away her mizen-mast by 
 the board, disabled some of her guns, and killed and wounded several of her crew. 
 This narration of the proceedings of the Asia would probably be applicable to 
 most of the other ships of the fleet. The manner in which the Genoa and Albion 
 
336 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 took their stations was beautiful, and the conduct of my brother Admirals, Count 
 Heyden and the Chevalier de Rigny throughout was admirable and highly ex-^ 
 emplary. 
 
 " Captain Fellowes (now Sir Thomas Fellowes, C. B., &c.) executed the part 
 allotted to him perfectly; and, with the able assistance of his little but brave 
 detachment, saved the Syrene from being burnt by the fire vessels. And the 
 Cambrian, Glasgow, and Talbot, following the fine example of Capitaine Hugon, 
 of the Armide, who was opposed to the leading frigate of that line, effectually 
 destroyed their opponents, and also silenced the batteries. 
 
 " This bloody and destructive battle was continued with unabated fury for 
 four hours, and the scene of wreck and devastation which presented itself at its 
 termination was such as has been seldom before witnessed. As each ship of our 
 opponents became effectually disabled, such of her crew as could escape endea- 
 voured to set her on fire ; and it is wonderfid how we avoided the effects of their 
 successive and awful explosions." 
 
 In the first public report, or dispatch of a Commander-in-Chief, of events so 
 entirely new, it cannot be supposed, particularly when written, as in this ease, 
 so immediately, and in the very midst of the havoc and destruction it describes; 
 that every prominent feature or circumstance attending this great achievement 
 could have been related ; as, indeed, they may not then have become known to 
 him. By means, therefore, of some authentic narrative of those particular parts, 
 which may on that account have been overlooked by the gallant chief, such col- 
 lateral testimony of the progress of this extraordinary battle, as the writer has 
 been able to collect, will furnish matter of additional interest and gratification, 
 by presenting the reader with instances of individual heroism and noble conduct, 
 with which he may not otherwise be made acquainted. 
 
 It appears from unquestionable authority, that the combined squadrons com- 
 pletely seized the bull by the horns, by anchoring as they did in the center of 
 the two lines ; but no choice was left them. They found the Turks in a state of 
 preparation, anchored with springs on their cables ; but the battle was com- 
 menced by them accidentally and unintentionally,* as they intended to h&ve 
 
 * The Vice-Admiral Tahir Pacha, who went on board the ship of the British Commander-in- 
 Chief on the morning after the battle, acknowledged that their intention had been to permit them 
 quietly to anchor, and to treat them with great civility, watching their opportunity." A gale of 
 wind, or midnight darkness was to be the time chosen. In the mean while, hy mistake, they made 
 the signal for battle ! — Many of the ships and vessels which escaped the conflagration and summary 
 destruction of the first splendid day, were set on fire by the Turks themselves afterwards, at the 
 
BATTLE OF NAVARIN. 337 
 
 taken the treacherous, but, in their opinion, the most certain method of destroy- 
 ing the ^combined squadrons, by first treating them with curtesy, until a 
 favourable opportunity should offer for putting their diabolical project in execu- 
 tion, favoured by a strong breeze, or a dark night, of sending their .fire-ships 
 amongst them. Had they commenced with their batteries as soon as their guns 
 could act, it would have been next to impossible for the ships to have got in, 
 for they must have suffered severely by a heavy raking fire long before they 
 could have brought a gun to bear upon them in return, for as the wind was light 
 they advanced but slowly. 
 
 , When the Asia and Genoa had anchored in the stations appointed them, the 
 Albion, Capt. I. A. Ommanny, was proceeding to that which she was directed 
 to occupy, and was passing the Genoa, when the flag-lieutenant was sent on 
 board of her, to order that ship to take a different position, which made it 
 necessary that she should immediately haul close to the wind on the larboard 
 tack, and the Turkish ships were so closely placed that it was with difiiculty she 
 could find room to pass between them ; however, in this way, she bad nearly 
 reached her berth, when the wind died away, the ship became unmanageable, a 
 very heavy firing had commenced upon her, (the Russians at that time not being 
 able to get up), so that she was compelled at once to anchor, and in bringing her 
 up, she swang on board a Turkish frigate,* whose sprit-sail-yard was over her 
 hammocks, between the main and mizen rigging. While in the act of swinging, 
 ^e contrived to get about half a dozen guns, treble shotted, to bear, and which 
 nearly cut her in two ; she was then instantly boarded, and upon the Albion's 
 getting possession of the forecastle, the barbarians set fire to their ship in the 
 cabin. The sails of the Albion were still loose, and in the utmost danger of 
 being caught by the flames, but by the extraordinary exertions of her men, the 
 cables of the frigate were cut, and after burning for thirty -five minutes along- 
 side, she dropt clear. In five minutes afterwards, at the distance of a cable's 
 length, she blew up. 
 
 The Albion had thus a very narrow escape, the concussion breaking two panes 
 df her light-room window, and so immediate was the explosion, that many of the 
 boarders were obliged to take to the water and swim back to their ship. The 
 Russians not having yet been able to reach their stations, the fire was conse- 
 <juently more severe upon the Albion from that part of the line to which they 
 
 head of the bay, far removed from the scene of their disgrace, and of the signal punishment which 
 was so justly their due. It is supposed they were destroyed as having been rendered unfit for any 
 further service. 
 
 * A double-decked frigate of the largest class. 
 
 2 X 
 
338 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 were to be opposed. In this perilous situation she was observed by the Breslaw, 
 a French ship of the line, who immediately altered his- course and most 
 gallantly came to her assistance, and anchored a few minutes before the 
 Russians. 
 
 An officer of the Asia writes — " During the conflict many of the enemy's 
 ships took fire, and blew up with tremendous explosions. Upwards oififty ships 
 fell victims to the devastating fury of the flames, before the engagement had 
 entirely ceased. Lieutenant Sturgeon, of the Royal Marines of the Cambrian, 
 fell by a cannon shot from one of the batteries. Lieutenant Maine Lyons has 
 lost a leg. The Asia and Genoa have lost their mizen masts, and the masts 
 and yards of the Albion have also sustained considerable injury. During the 
 battle we were frequently in the most imminent danger of coming in contact with 
 the hurnitig ships of the enemy, which were drifting about, and awfully explod- 
 ing in all directions." — (Hampshire Telegraph.) 
 
 A German paper contains the following paragraph : — " The Turkish batteries 
 on the island of Sphacteria were silenced and taken by the Russians. It is said 
 that the Turkish Admiral's secretary, who was taken prisoner, has declared that 
 the Admiral wished for, and sought an engagement, having received orders from 
 Constantinople, by the aid of Ms fire-ships to destroy the Christian ships on 
 the first opportunity." 
 
 The spirit of enterprize, of address, and of intrepidity in the British seaman 
 is well known ; that of the French and Russian may be equal to it ; but the 
 situation of the allied fleets, as described by the officer of the Asia, is truly ap- 
 palling. Many a manly heart can brave any thing but a conflagration like this. 
 In such a tremendous scene nothing but the hand of a merciful Providence could 
 have rescued the Christian Allies from the fate of the infidel. 
 
 Extract of the Log of H. M. Ship Talbot, Oct. Wth 1827. 
 
 " At 2^ 10' p. m. saw a blank gun fired * from the Tower ; 2^ 25' Asia 
 anchored ; 2'' 45' came-to on the west side of the harbour, and furled sails ; 
 observed firing between the Dartmouth and a fire-brig ; 2^ 50' commenced action 
 with two large frigates and a corvette. At 3^ L'Armide, French frigate, 
 anchored on the starboard quarter, and took off the fire of one frigate ; fired at 
 a fire-brig with the larboard guns ; S^ 45' action became general ; saw the frigate 
 strike to L'Armide ; 4*' 5' frigate struck to us ; 4^ 50' ceased firing, to allow the 
 
 * This must have been the signal for battle, made by mistake. 
 
BATTLE OF NAVARIN. 339 
 
 Rose to pass inside to attack the corvette ; fired at the corvette as the guns 
 would bear clear of the Rose and L'Armide : 5^ 45' ceased firing, with the loss 
 of five killed and eighteen wounded ; spars, hull, and rigging much struck. 
 Sent a boat to the Admiral. Enemy's line driven in, and nearly all his large 
 ships driven on shore and blown up. Heard the explosions of several of the 
 enemy's ships. Employed refitting the ship." 
 
 By an authenticated statement of a Greek boatswain, who vpas pressed to serve 
 on board a Turkish frigate from Constantinople, and one of those engaged by 
 the Talbot, it is shown and declared that the " corvette (H. M. ship Talbot) 
 anchored alongside of us, and did not begin to fire until the other ships fired. 
 The shot from the corvette came in upon us like rain ; our men, after fighting 
 about twenty minutes, all run on the lower deck. I myself hoisted the English 
 colours to stop their (the corvette's) firing." 
 
 The frigate had on her upper-deck twenty-six brass guns, eighteen-pounders ; 
 main-deck thirty-two ditto, thirty-six-pounders, long guns. Of these guns two 
 were pointed out of the stern -ports, both on the main and upper-decks. This 
 Greek called her a sixty-four, although she carried but fifty-eight guns, saying 
 they had removed the guns from her gangways, on account of the ship being 
 weak. 
 
 The cool and deliberate conduct of Captain Hugon, of L'Armide, in advancing 
 to the support of the Talbot, contending with a force of such magnitude, was 
 brilliant, skilful, and highly complimentary to the gallantry displayed by that 
 little ship. Under an easy, yet commanding sail, L'Armide, slowly proceeding 
 in her course, contrived to worm herself through the Turkish inside line of ships, 
 but always cautiously avoiding to obstruct the Talbot's fire. In this manner, 
 closely engaged, she arrived at the position described in the log, and afforded 
 the most seasonable and effectual support. This manoeuvre of the French 
 Captain is as much to be admired for the design as, in its execution, for the 
 gallantry and truly delicate feeling towards the British frigate, and will ever 
 reraaiii a striking example of professional ability. When the Turkish frigate 
 surrendered, he claimed a share only in the honour of the capture, by hoisting 
 the British ensign with his own. 
 
 After a dreadful conflict of five hours, an awfid stillness ensued; in this 
 interval a report had gained ground that the Arabs, having secured some of the 
 Turkish boats, were determined to attempt a boarding. In consequence of this, 
 the crews of the ships, particularly the smaller ones, were on the alert all night, 
 
 2X2 
 
340 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 and, " armed to the teethl^ were ready to receive them, while other ships took 
 the precaution of sending boats to row guard. 
 
 The frigate so beaten by the Talbot had 150 men killed and wounded on hei 
 decks, and shot pointed for sinking her rebounded, ripping up large pieces of 
 her decks ; she went down in about twenty-four hours after the commencement 
 of the action. 
 
 The Talbot was for the first ten minutes in a very warm berth, having the fire of 
 three frigates and a corvette upon her. The Armide then came and took off one 
 of the frigates, and a Russian line of battle ship another, leaving the third to 
 be disposed of by herself This was gallantly effected, but with considerable 
 loss. 
 
 When she had pretty well finished her business, she sent a boat across the 
 harbour to inquire after the Admiral. In this boat were two fine young men. 
 Aides-de-camp to the Captain, and " Old Mills, the signal man :" the shot 
 were then falling like rain upon the water, and taking a momentary shelter 
 under the stern of a six-gun French schooner, gave an opportunity for the 
 exchange of many compliments and civilities between these parties, now so cor- 
 dially united in one common cause. Old Mills was very desirous of making a fine 
 complimentary speech to the Commander of the schooner, but which consisted of 
 little more than " Bono Francis,^' often repeated, and as often acknowledged by the 
 bows and smiles of the gallant Frenchman ; they then proceeded on their mission, 
 and in the course of an hour returned to their ship with the gratifying intelligence 
 of the Admiral's safety, who, nevertheless, had much cause of uneasiness in the 
 sufferings of a son severely wounded, who only regretted that he was unable to 
 ascend the deck to enjoy the sight of the general conflagration of the Turkish fleet. 
 
 Good discipline and expert gunnery were never more conspicuous, nor brought 
 to a more severe test than upon this occasion ; nor was the effect of the latter 
 more strongly displayed than upon the hulls of the Turkish ships and the lives 
 ef their men. 
 
 By means of the quadrants affixed to the gun«, the Talbot fired them with 
 unerring precision, and such was the effect that, with only part of her broad- 
 side, the remainder being engaged, with other vessels, the slaughter on board the 
 Turkish frigates opposed to her was beyond all precedent, not one shot from her 
 guns having missed the hull ! The Asia's fire, and the Albion's, were of a 
 similar description, making the most sensible and rapid destruction of every ship 
 within their range, the two colossal ships of the Mussulman Admirals having 
 been very quickly disposed of. 
 
 The Cambrian, Captain G. W. Hamilton, having been detached upon 
 
BATTLE OF NAVARIN. 341 
 
 other service, did not get into the bay until twenty or thirty minutes after 
 the battle had commenced ; the wind was light, and every stitch of canvas was 
 spread on both sides. In this manner, the lower studding sails being first taken 
 in, to be clear of the fire from her own guns, all the rest of her sail was in an 
 instant reduced by the men quartered upon the upper decks, and the ship brought 
 to an anchor, while, at the same time, she was engaging on both sides with her 
 main-deck guns ! Nothing can more strongly denote the high state of discipline 
 and interior arrangement to which this ship's company must have arrived, by 
 performing with skill and address, in the very focus of a tremendous cannonade, 
 so complicated a manoeuvre. Where examples like these were so eminently 
 displayed, what enemy could withstand it ? 
 
 Extract from the Log of H. M. Cutter the Hind. 
 
 ** At a** SO', observed a boat frofti the Dartmotith board a Turkish brig which, 
 blew up. ^ 30', passed within hail of the Asia. Came-to with the best bower 
 under the stern of a Turkish frigate with a spring, and brought the starboard 
 guns to bear on her, within forty yards, double shotting the guns. S^ 30', suf- 
 fering greatly from the fire of a corvette raking us a-head, a brig on the 
 larboard bow, and a two-decked frigate on the larboard beam. Found the B. B. 
 chain shot away, and S. B. anchor shot in two pieces ; let go the shank of it, 
 with spring fast to it. Veered to thirty fathom of chain and endeavoured to 
 spring the larboard broadside to bear on the frigate, but found the anchor 
 coming home.* Let go the spring, and swung broadside and broadside with the 
 corvette and brig. Kept up a heavy fire from both sides. 4^ 15', observed the 
 brig to be on fire, and having two larboard guns dismounted, manned the 
 starboard guns with all hands and continued firing at the corvette. 4^ 30', 
 suflPering much from the fire of the enemy ; the small bower chain was shot away 
 from the windlass, and the cutter was drifting abowt, not being able to get a. 
 gun to bear on enemy's ships. At 5^, ordered all hands below from fire of 
 enemy hulling us in all parts. 5\ 15' drifted alongside a Turkish frigate with 
 the main boom in at one of her main-deek ports. Got aU hands under arms, 
 effectually repulsed the enemy with great loss in his repeated attempts to board. 
 Observed enemy crowding into a launch a-stem of the frigate^ Loaded the 
 
 • An anchor is said to be coming heme when it no longer preserves its first position in the 
 ground, and either from the depth of water, the badness of the holding, or nature of the ground, 
 it is dragged through, and the vessel drivesr 
 
342 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 starboard guns with grape, cannister, and round shot to the muzzle. A light 
 breeze taking us on the larboard bow, swung round and got two guns to bear on 
 enemy's boat, which was immediately sunk, and many of the Turks destroyed. 
 5^ 4<5', drifted clear of the frigate and hoisted a red ensign, the others being shot 
 away. 5^ 55', foimd the cutter hanging by the starboard spring. Veered and 
 brought up by it to prevent drifting alongside two Turkish frigates on fire. At 
 6^ 15' they blew up. &^ 30', cut the spring and swept (i. e. rowed with the 
 sweeps) a-stern of the Asia, and got a hawser from her, both anchors being lost. 
 Sent the surgeon and wounded men on board ; found the casualties to be four 
 killed and ten wounded ; three guns dismounted, twenty-three shot in the hull ; 
 masts, bowsprit, &c. &c. &c. all shot away, except the spring stay and the;shrouds ; 
 booms and boats quite destroyed. Midnight calm and cloudy, pumps con- 
 stantly at work, but keeping her free," 
 
 The Hind is a cutter of 165 tons, of ten guns, and thirty men. Lieutenant 
 Robb took the command about two months before the action, and had exercised 
 the- men at the guns twice a day, and made every disposition and arrangement 
 with small arms for the most effective warfare. 
 
 The Capitana Bey, of 84 guns, the Asia's first opponent, had 650 men lying 
 dead upon her decks when boarded by an English boat the day after the battle. 
 The Tiurks are stated to have lost about 6,000 men.* 
 
 Extract of a Letter from the Dartmouth. 
 
 " This circumstance brought on a general action : we were then engaged with 
 a double-decked frigate and the forts ; not more than half of our ships were at 
 this time at anchor. The fire-brig having no ballast, lightened as she burnt, 
 and we could not sink her, although we kept a brisk fire on her ; her cables 
 burnt, and she was dropping down fast upon us, we were obliged to sUp our 
 cable, and set the fore-sail to shoot a-head, or she would have fallen on board of 
 us. She was so close that we boomed her off with spars ready for the purpose ; 
 the heat of the flames was very great, being to windward of us ; our boats 
 towed her out of the way, till after some time she sunk. We then poured a 
 heavy raking fire into the double-decked frigate ; the corvette annoyed lis a good 
 
 * For a beautiful illustration and description of this dreadful but splendid triumph over the 
 bigotted enemies of Christendom, the reader is recommended to a magnificent series of engravings 
 from drawings by G. P. Reinagle, who was present during the conflict on board the Musc[uito, 
 Captain G. B. Martin, and whose talents as an artist are beyond the reach of eulogy from the writer. 
 
BATTLE OF NAVARIN. 343 
 
 deal, as they struck their colours and hoisted them again. The French Admiral 
 coming in at this time protected us a good deal, and soon silenced the frigate's 
 guns : we then directed our larboard broadside to the corvettes, and sanJe them 
 aU : with our starboard guns we engaged the forts and some small vessels in 
 shore, and about five o'clock, it being dusk, we ceased firing. The Turks fired 
 high. It was pleasant to hear the cheers of our men when a Turkish ship blew 
 up or was sunk. 
 
 " Thousands of Turks perished ; an immense number attempted to swim on 
 shore from the ships. In the heat of the action a French seaman swam on 
 board from his frigate for a hawser ; he was a very fine fellow. Some of our 
 ships being boarded by the Turks, the Greek prisoners who boarded with them, 
 the instant they gained the English decks, turned upon the Turks : a Greek who 
 swam on board of us in the battle, supplied the place of a man who was shot at 
 
 one of our guns." 
 
 ***** 
 
 " The Asia and the rest of our ships have suffered much : the Asia was 
 engaged with two ships of the line, one double-decked frigate, and a corvette, 
 at the same time : she sunk the frigate and all her crew, and hilled 1050 men 
 in ike line of hattle ships. Our loss upon the whole was severe. The French 
 and Russians also fought remarkably well. Many of the Turkish ships blew up 
 in the night ; it was a most magnificent sight. We lay at our guns every night, 
 in case of surprise. The next two days a number of ships blew up and sunh. 
 We expected some hunting after the pirates, but it has proved to be a large 
 shooting party, and the game has been very plentiful." 
 
 More strongly to confirm what the writer advances upon the events of this 
 battle, short extracts from the logs of some of the ships engaged will here be 
 presented, as interesting to the naval reader, as it must be gratifying to the 
 feelings of the brave men to whom such a tribute is so eminently due. 
 
 In a plan of a battle like this (and indeed of any battle), " there must be," 
 as the gallant contributor admits, " many inaccuracies as to the position of the 
 Turkish, or other ships, particularly as they so soon began to change their places 
 by cutting and otherwise." Again he observes (and to which the writer mostly 
 entirely assents,) " no one person could give a decidedly correct plan of the 
 battle ; and if two or three were to attempt it, they would most probably diflfer 
 as to the position of each and every ship. I have no doubt many will find their 
 ships not exactly placed." 
 
344 NAVAL BATTLES, 
 
 Extract from (lie Log of H. M. Ship Asia. 
 
 " At S*" 15/ having completely silenced the Capitana Bey, got the starboard 
 broadside to bear on Moharem Bey's double-tier frigate, and some other vessels 
 that were raking us. At 4" 40' the mizen-mast went. At 5*" 20', having 
 silenced every vessel our guns could reach, ceased firing. Sent a hawser to the 
 Genoa, ready to haul clear of a frigate burning close to tis. At 5^ 50' she blew 
 up. At night guard boats rowing round the fleet ; people at quarters. Turkish 
 ships blowing up occasionally." * 
 
 Extract from the Log ofH. M. Ship Rose. 
 
 " At 3*^ 20' the action became general : sent boats to tovi fire-vessels clear of 
 our ships and of a French line of battle ship. At. 4'' 20' slipt the small bower, 
 and ran to close with a corvette firing on the Talbot. 4^ 40' anchored with 
 b. bower in nineteen fathom, and opened fire on the corvette. 4'' 50' driving, 
 veered cable and brought up alongside a Turkish frigate with English colours 
 flying ; veered past her and engaged the corvette. Five corvettes parted or 
 slipped. About this time several Turks blew up, and others were inflames.''' 
 
 Extract from the Log of H. M. Ship Dartmouth. 
 
 " At l** 40' came-to with the b. bower in fifteen fathoms, between the S. E. 
 and headmost ship of the Turkish line, a razee of sixty-two guns, and the fire- 
 vessel. Veered cable and hove on the spring to bring the broadside to bear upon 
 her, being across her hawse. At 1 '^ 45' the Asia anchored a-breast of a line of 
 battle ship, furled sails. Observed Genoa, Albion, and Talbot anchor. Rose 
 and Philomel, Musquito and Brisk, watching fire-vessels anchored across the 
 entrance of the harbour. At 1^ 55' sent the pinnace to endeavour to persuade 
 the nearest fire-brig to shift her berth. She fired on the boat, and immediately 
 set the vessel on fire. Sent boats to tow the vessel clear, and fired musketry to 
 cover them. French Admiral anchored within hail," &c, 
 
 " At 2^ the action became general. Commenced firing the larboard guns 
 upon the bow of the razee, and upon some Turkish corvettes in shore, and 
 starboard quarter-deck guns upon the fire^vessel to endeavour to sink her. At 
 2*^ 30' slipped the cable and spring, and hoisted the head-sails, to clear the fire- 
 brig close to us. Sent the boats a second time to tow her clear : the small sails 
 on fire in the main-top, and also the mizen-top-gallant-sail. Cut away the 
 
 * The Plate describes the Asia, moored with springs to her anchors. 
 
BATTLE OF NAVARIN. 345 
 
 head-sails, they being on fire. At 2*' 40' the fire-vessel sunk. Sent boats to 
 tow off one that -wasjbul of a French line of battle ship. Let go the s. bower, 
 and veered to forty fathoms of cable. Opened the larboard guns upon a brig 
 and a schooner in shore, and sunk them. Hove on the spring, and re-commenced 
 firing upon the corvettes and others in shore. A Turkish ra%ee slipped her 
 caMe*, w«* ow^?*e, and her crew were quitting her. At S^ ran a warp to the 
 French Admiral, to assist him clear of the ranee on fire ; at 3"^ 40' she blew up. 
 Four corvettes cut or slipped, and ran on shore. Cambrian and Glasgow 
 engaging the batteries on the western side of the harbour. At 5^ 50' firing- 
 ceased. Observed the Asia, Genoa, and French Admiral had lost their mizen- 
 masts." 
 
 Extract from the Log of H. M. Sloop Philomel. 
 
 " At ^ 5' sunk fire-ship alongside of us, which exploded as she was going 
 down. 2^ 10' disabled a twelve-gun brig, which cut her cables and caught fire : 
 continued to engage two corvettes and a large Turkish frigate. Russian 
 frigates came to our assistance. Observed a fire-ship under the bows of a French 
 line of battle ship ; sent the cutter to tow her clear, which service she executed 
 and returned. At 4'' slipped and made sail nearer to the town to engage the 
 fort ; came-to in thirteen fathoms. Several of the enemy sunk or blown up." 
 
 Extract from the Log of H. M. Sloop Brisk. 
 
 " At 2'' 10' anchored close to a Turkish fire-ship. ^ 20' commenced firing at 
 the fire-ship, and S'tarboard broadside at corvette and frigate in shore ; sent boats 
 to take possession of fire-ship. Opened larboard broadside on a large Turkish 
 frigate. 4** 40' the same was silenced by a French line of battle ship." 
 
 Extract from the Log of H. M. Ship Glasgow. 
 
 " At S^ 45' came-to in thirty-two fathoms, half a cable from the Cambrian, 
 with our starboard broadside on four corvettes and a frigate, about two cables' 
 length from the island of Sphagia.. Engaged on both sides with batteries, 
 corvettes, and frigate. At 4!^ four fire-brigs exploded, two corvettes struck, 
 others ran on shore." 
 
 From a French account we learn, that " at noon on the 20th the wind being 
 favourable, the signal was made to prepare for action ; every one took his 
 
 2 Y 
 
346 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 station, the Euglish Admiral's ship, the Asia, leading." The British line of 
 battle ships were followed, first by the French Admiral de Rigny and his squa- 
 dron, and then by the Russian Admiral Count Heyden, with the ships of the 
 line and others under his command. 
 
 " The Turks had formed a crescent on the contour of the bay in a triple line, 
 making a total of three ships of the line, a razee, sixteen frigates, twenty-seven 
 large corvettes, and as many brigs. 
 
 " Six fire-ships were placed at the extremities of the crescent, to be able to 
 fall upon the combined squadrons if an engagement should take place, and to 
 the windward of which they were naturally placed. 
 
 " The principal force was assembled towards the right on entering, and com- 
 posed of four large frigates, two ships of the line, a large frigate, a ship of the 
 line, three frigates of various sizes finishing the line, and strengthened in the 
 second line by corvettes and brigs^ 
 
 " At two o'clock the Asia entered the port, and had passed the batteries ; at 
 half-past two it anchored alongside the Turkish Admiral, and was followed by 
 the other English ships. 
 
 " The Syrene followed, and at twenty-five minutes past two. Captain Robert 
 anchored it within pistol shot of the first frigate of the Turkish line ; at this mo- 
 ment a boat from the Dartmouth was fired at from one of the fire-ships, which 
 killed the officer commanding it. 
 
 " The Syrene was then so near the fire-ship, that it could have sunk it, could 
 it have been done without endangering the English boat. The Dartmouth then 
 opened a fire of musketry at the fire-ship, at the same time the Syrene was yard- 
 arm and yard-arm with the Egyptian double-decked frigate the Esnina. At 
 the same instant two cannon shot were fired from one of the vessels a-stern of the 
 Syrene, on board of which a man was killed ; the other appeared to be directed 
 at the Dartmouth. The battle now began, and soon became general. 
 
 " The Russian ships had to sustain the fire of the forts, which only began to 
 fire upon the fifth, which was the Trident. At five o'clock in the afternoon, 
 the first line of Turks was destroyed ; the cut-down frigates and ships of the 
 line sunlf or burned, tlie remainder ran upon the coast, and were set fire to by 
 the enemy themselves. 
 
 " In this unforeseen engagement, there were of course some vessels which, by 
 their position, have suffered more than the others ; what is certain is, that in 
 each squadron all have rivalled each other in doing their duty. 
 
 " His Majesty's frigate the Armide, which, at the beginning of the action, 
 was placed with the English frigate, the Talbot, at the left extremity of the 
 horse-shoe, was exposed with his brave comrade to the fire of five Turkish fri- 
 
BATTLE OF NAVARIN. 34T 
 
 gateSi till the arrival of the Russian frigates. Captain Hugon has received 
 unanimous felicitations for the boldness of his manoeuvre, and the gallantry 
 with which he fought the vessels opposed to him. 
 
 " The Scipion, Captain Millius, whose bowsprit was entangled with a fire-ship 
 that was in flames, had toi extinguish the fire on board four times without ceasing 
 to fight, firing at the same time to right and left, on the enemy's line and on 
 the forts.* 
 
 "In consequence of the position taken by the Trident, Captain Maurice, 
 Admiral de Rigny received the most powerful assistance from that ship. 
 
 " Captain La Bretonniere, of the Breslaw, fought first under sail, and then 
 at anchor, going wherever his presence might be usefiil. The Russian Admiral 
 has returned especial thanks to Admiral de Rigny for the support he received 
 from the Breslaw, at the moment when the Azof sufifered severely from the cross 
 fire of the enemy. 
 
 " The Alcyone and the Daphne, schooners, bravely participated in the attack 
 upon the fire-ships made by the English brigs and corvettes, 
 
 " In a word, whatever opposed the allied squadrons was speedily overcome, not- 
 withstanding the desperate bravery shown by the Turks. 
 
 " Admiral de Rigny has felt himself bound to return particular thanks to 
 Capt. Fellowesi of his Britannic Majesty's frigate the Dartmouth, which was 
 appointed to watch the fire-ships, for the timely succour which he aflForded him, 
 when one of the fire-ships in flames was on the point of felling on board the Syrene. 
 
 " Our squadron had forty-three killed, and one hundred and seventeen 
 wounded. Captain La Bretonniere was slightly wounded. The squadron has 
 suffered great damage, the Syrene in particular has sustained great injury, its 
 main and mizen masts are shot away, the two lower yards and the main-topsail- 
 yard are shot away, and it has six shots between wind and water. 
 
 " Chevalier deR%ny speaks in high terras of the cordiality and efficacious co- 
 operation of the Admirals his colleagues. 
 
 " Our crews have justified the confidence of the King; in each vessel the cry 
 of ' Vive le JRoi * spontaneously accompanied the first broadside. 
 
 " The sqnadron had before it for some hours a dreadful scene. Conceive 150 
 ships of war, of all rates, firing in a narrow basin, in a triple line, the burning 
 of some, and the explosions which ensued. 
 
 " When the first frigate, yard-arm and yard-arm, with our vessels took fire 
 and blew up, the Syrene was so near a-stern, that its mizen-mast fell on that 
 
 * This ship was in the most imminent danger of falling a prey to the devouring element, when, 
 with intrepidity and address, she was timely rescued by cutting away the burning limbs. 
 
 2 Y 2 
 
348 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 frigate, which was soon followed by the main-mast." (From the Gaiette de 
 France, Nov. 10th.) 
 
 In another French account it is observed, " Admiral de Rigny, whose firm 
 spirit and wisdom will have so powerfully concurred to the safety of Greece, by 
 the services which he has rendered for several years in these latitudes to the cause 
 of humanity, has acquired in this glorious affair new titles to public esteem and 
 recognizance." 
 
 " The conflict was long and serious. It covered the Christian fleet with 
 glory. The Turko-Egyptian fleet is annihilated. An admirable concord reigned 
 among the Allies. Each of the Admirals in his dispatches does homage to the 
 other two. We learn with regret that a son of Sir Edward Codringtonj a brave 
 officer, has been wounded ; one Captain is killed." The British Captain who 
 fell upon this occasion was Captain Walter Bathurst, of the Genoa, a distin- 
 guished veteran in his country's naval service. 
 
 In the letter of Admiral de Rigny to Sir E. Codrington he states, trom a 
 detailed report of Captain Hugon, of the Armide, " that the excellent 
 manoeuvre of Captain Davies, when the Rose came up and resolutely cast her 
 anchor within pistol shot of two Turkish corvettes, relieved the Armide in a few 
 minutes from her unfavourable position ; and it is my duty, and at the same time 
 a great pleasure to me, to assure your Excellency that on this occasion Captain 
 Davies did every thing that could be expected of a brave and experienced officer." 
 He goes on to say, " Allow me to take this opportunity of returning my thanks, 
 to Captain Fellowes for the assistance which the Syrene received from the 
 boats of the Dartmouth, when, with much skill and bravery, they attacked and 
 turned off" the fire-ships ready to come down upon us." 
 
 In his reply to the letter of Sir E. Codrington, expressive of his approbation 
 of the good management of the French squadron. Admiral de Rigny modestly 
 observes, " In the action of the 20th, you set us the example ; we could not do 
 better than follow it." 
 
 When thus we see great rival powers striving, not only in deeds of arms, but 
 with liberality of mind and gentlemanly deportment, to rival each other in acts 
 of courtesy and kind feeHng, we may still cherish the belief that the " days of 
 chivalry " are not yet past. May succeeding generations bear in perpetual 
 remembrance the noble example of the Heroes of Navarin. 
 
 " Circumstances constitute the essence of every case" — (Debate on the 
 blockade of Oporto by Don Miguel, 1828.) 
 
3^ 
 
 cttl> 
 
 I 
 
■pjJTr.TTV 
 
 nM'BinTNiir& 
 
 ^A 
 
 %1 
 
 ^^ 
 
 ^ "''-^ 
 
 % 
 
 / 
 
 Before MlDMARMM firei 
 
 Z> Cajritan ^ 
 
 Bey 
 
 fry^- 
 
 * > 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 Hma 
 
 When. MOMAMXM Tjegan. ami 
 Ca-pitaiL 33 ey "was silenirei 
 
 
 "Wken ferst Tine -was cleaied. away anjl 
 IIlc xest were sank, or cict their cables. 
 
 i ^ 
 
 • /"- 1 
 
 ^ ^ 5< 
 
 '^,,^' 
 
 ^^ 
 
 
 X^' 
 
 -v h 
 
 li =-:■.-: 
 
BATTLE OF NAVARIN. 
 
 349 
 
 Two Plates, No. LIII. LIV. are given to represent the scene of action : the 
 first exhibiting the position of the ships in the general engagement; the 
 latter showing some detatched parts of it. 
 
 Although the united squadrons are represented as in their proper places, yet 
 the action had commenced, and continued twenty to thirty minutes before the 
 sternmost of the French or headmost of the Russian squadrons had anchored, 
 and nearly two hours before the Cambrian, Glasgow, and Constantine were able, 
 from the lightness of the wind, to take up their positions. 
 
 UNITED SQUADRONS. 
 
 'Ships. 
 
 1. Asia (V. Admiral) 
 
 2. Genoa 
 
 3. Albion , 
 
 4. Dartmouth 
 
 5. Cambrian ,...,. . 
 
 6. Glasgow 
 
 7. Talbot 
 
 8. Rose 
 
 9. Mosquito 
 
 10. Brisk 
 
 11. Philomel 
 
 Hind, Cutter 
 
 12. Sirene (R. Admiral) 
 
 13. Trident 
 
 Carried forward. . 
 
 Guns. Mea. 
 
 Ships. 
 
 Brought forward . 
 
 14. Scipion 
 
 15. BreslaW 
 
 16. Armida. 
 
 Alcyon 
 
 Daphne 
 
 17. Azoff (R. Admiral) 
 
 18. Gangoute 
 
 19. Ezekiel 
 
 20. Alex. Newski . . 
 
 21. Provonoy 
 
 22. Elena 
 
 23. Castor 
 
 24. Constantine . . . . , 
 
 Total. . 
 
 Guns, Men. Killed. Wounded 
 
 84 
 76 
 74 
 42 
 48 
 50 
 2« 
 18 
 10 
 10 
 10 
 6 
 60 
 74 
 
 14 
 
 26 
 
 10 
 
 6 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 3 
 2 
 1 
 1 
 5 
 22 
 
 48 
 
 35 
 
 66 
 
 8 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 18 
 
 15 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 9 
 
 42 
 
 7 
 
 96 
 
 255 
 
 80 
 
 84 
 42 
 10 
 6 
 74 
 84 
 74 
 74 
 42 
 38 
 32 
 46 
 
 96 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 14 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 24 
 
 14 
 
 13 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 255 
 
 36 
 
 14 
 
 35 
 
 9 
 
 5 
 
 67 
 
 37 
 
 18 
 
 7 
 
 2 
 
 5 
 
 172 
 
 481 
 
 TURKO-EGYPTIAN SQUADRONS. 
 
 Ships. 
 
 No. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Men. 
 
 Of fbp 1 ,ine. Turks 
 
 3 
 
 5 
 15 
 26 
 11 
 
 5 
 
 64 to 60 
 
 50 to 48 
 
 26 to 20 
 
 19 
 
 850 
 
 550 to 500 
 450 • 
 . 200 
 150 to 130 
 40 
 
 DniiMp-ilpckers. Eavntians 
 
 Friffates. all Turks 
 
 Corvettes, IS Turks, 2 Egyptians 
 
 -a 
 
 RriCTs 4. Turks. 7 Esrvrtians 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 65 
 
 2,082 
 
 18,700 
 
350 NAVAL BATTLES. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 In taking leave of the subject it is expedient to call the attention of the young 
 officer to what may be considered the leading and most important points in the 
 present inquiry ; and these will naturally fall under four separate heads ; namely, 
 first, of the best modes of attack at sea ; secondly, of the attack at anchor ; 
 thirdly, of the modes of defence at sea; and lastly, of the best defence to be 
 made at an anchor. 
 
 By a reference to the Plates before us, in which it is attempted to display the 
 plan of attack in all our principal- battles, with the reasoning and judgment 
 given upon them ; it may probably appear that, for attack at, sea, the examples of 
 Hawke, Rodney, on the 121th of April, Howe, Nelson's intended -plan of attack 
 at Trafalgar, with those of Duncan at Camperdown, and Duckworth at Saint 
 Domingo, may be selected as the best models for imitation. And of plans for 
 defence at sea we have but two; they are that of Van Tromp off Pordaud,* 
 and a masterly one by Sir Edward Hughes, in his first engagement wiiii 
 Mons. Suffrein. 
 
 For resolution, steady bravery, and perseverance,- we may indeed include the 
 celebrated retreat of Admiral Comwallis ; although it does not appear that he 
 had formed any regular disposion of his little force; Even without this, he 
 proved himself invincible. 
 
 For the attack at anchor, we have the never-to-be-forgotten battles of the Nile 
 and of Navarin ! for the attack of Batteries, although not described in this 
 work, there are the bombardments of Copenhagen and of Algiers. 
 
 For the defence at anchor, there is the skilful and seaman-like example of 
 Lord Howe at Sandy Hook; the determined position taken by Admiral 
 Barrington at the Cul de Sac, St. Lucie; and that of Lord Hood at St. 
 Christopher's. 
 
 Of the methods proposed, either for attack, retaliation, or deffertce, it is for 
 skill, judgment, experience, and bravery to decide. 
 
 The writer has now the grateful office of making his cordial acknowledgments 
 • More particularly described in Part 3, Plate VII, of the former edition, and not shown in this. 
 
CONCLUSION. 351 
 
 to all those friends, professional and others, who not only have contributed very 
 essentially to the work, but, by their criticisms and corrections, as well as by their 
 encouragement, have most kindly assisted him in its completion. 
 
 To those (of whose judgment he entertains the highest respect) who consider 
 that a work of this nature is more calculated to benefit other maritime states 
 than our own, it is answered, that a Treatise upon Naval Battles can be looked 
 upon only in the same light with those of a military character ; disclosures or 
 discoveries, favourable or otherwise, may be available to all who will be at the 
 trouble to examine them; but it has not appeared by experience that the 
 " Essay " of Mr. Clerk has yet taught our enemies the secret, to a knowledge 
 of which the successes of the British navy have hitherto been attributed ; and it 
 is hoped that the period is still far distant ibr apprehending any such danger. 
 
 Military achievements have found able commentators from the days of Julius 
 Caesar to the present ; from these, it will not be denied, much advant^e has been 
 reaped in conducting the British arms continually to victory: and from these 
 there can be no doubt the greatest benefits must arise in future wars. The 
 cruel lesson taught to the British army by the sufferings of the unfortunate and 
 gallant Moore is known to have had (as well it might) a most salutary influence 
 upon the execution of the arduous duties of every succeeding campaign ; and 
 iJtimately at Waterloo under the first Captain of the age, crowned their services 
 with imperishable fame, and Europe with long-desired repose. 
 
 If then it be admitted that works of such a tendency are beneficial in one case, 
 they may be equally so in another. Upon this, much as the subject is capable of 
 enlargement, the writer rests his defence. With deference and respect, therefore, 
 he offers to the naval profession, and to his country, the result of his inquiries ; 
 with a confident hope that, under the guiding and protecting hand of the 
 Almighty, the brave sons of Britain will ever be found to do their duty. 
 
 1828. 
 
REMARK. 
 
 " I have attentively read over the First and Second Parts- of this work, but I 
 do not think the character of the British navy has been rescued from the imputa- 
 tion of ignorance cast upon it by Doctor Adam Smith at the time such remark 
 was made ; although, the conduct of our Admirals, since Clerk published his 
 ' Essay,' has generally indicated a wish to practise the system therein given. 
 
 " By a work of this nature the Profession is invited to give to Naval Tactics 
 the attention they deserve ; and the description of the different battles gives 
 opportunity to officers to study them, to observe the errors committed, and to 
 profit by the knowledge of them in similar situations, in which they may probably 
 afterwards be placed^' 
 
351 
 
 APPENDIX. No. I. 
 
 DESCRIPTION OF CAPT. DE STARCK'S INVENTION FOR 
 MOVING A SHIP IN A CALM. 
 
 The. method made use of by Captain Manby for conveying a rope from the 
 shore to a stranded vessel in distress, namely, by means of a mortar, powder, and 
 shot, is similar to that which, in the year 1785 (being then on the coast of Guinea), 
 suggested itself to my mind, for a purpose certainly far less meritorious, though 
 not less important than that of Captain Manby's ; his immediate and very humane 
 object being to save the lives of shipwrecked mariners, while mine was only to 
 advance my ship progressively in a dead calm, either in the prosecution of her 
 voyage, or to the attack of an enemy similarly becalmed. To efFect this, I 
 constructed a parachute, the stem and spreaders of which were of iron, and the 
 spread of oiled canvass ; and connecting this, from the head-ring thereof, by a 
 six-foot iron chain, to a bolt-ring affixed to a cylindrical wooden-shot, I fired my 
 raortar at 33" elevation, charged only with as much powder (for my projectile 
 force) as should thraw the above described apparatus about 300 yards a-head 
 of the vessel, when so soon as the wooden-shot fell into the water (carrying along 
 with it a small rope) the buoyancy of the wood prevented the sinking of the iron 
 work, and upon hauling in the said rope, attached to the lower end of the 
 parachute, the latter became immediately out-spread and in contact with a. 
 column of water, and consequently caused the vessel to move a-head by the 
 continued effort of running in the rope, which, in this instance, is, in fact, the 
 tow-line ; and as my design was to work with a double apparatus, and a mortar 
 on each bow, firing them alternately, I think even a large ship might be moved 
 through the water at the rate of perhaps one mile and a half, or two miles an 
 hour. 
 
 The proportions of the mortar, parachute, shot, &c. were as follows : — The 
 parachute was, in length, three feet six inches, and only three feet in spread, 
 weighing, together with the connecting six-foot iron chain, about twelve pounds ; 
 the wooden cylindrical shot weighed twenty-eight pounds, and measured fourteen 
 inches in length ; the calibre of the mortar nine inches. In fact, the mortar 
 which I employed was hired of the engineer of Vauxhall Gardens, who used it 
 
 2 z 
 
352 APPENDIX. No. I. 
 
 for throwing up his balloon fire- works, and was so portable that it could be eanied 
 on a man's shoulders, being made only in the form of a large cylindrical tube 
 of sheet-copper, well woolded with rope, and inserted at the breech in a block 
 of oak. 
 
 A represents the starboard mortar ; B the starboard parachute suspended from 
 the shot in the loaded mortar ready for discharging ; C the parachute in use j 
 D represents the wooden-shot acting as a buoy ; G the chain connecting the 
 shot to the parachute ; E represents the larboard mortar recently fired ; F the 
 quoil of small rope by which the vessel is worked a-head. 
 
 With the above described contrivance, I humbly presume that I proved the 
 practicability of my invention ; having, in the year 1789, upon the broad part 
 of the Thames above Battersea bridge, made repeated experiments with a large 
 luggage-boat, though of no more than five tons burthen, which, of course, was 
 rapidly worked with great facility. Among the friends who honoured me with 
 their presence on the occasion, was a naval officer now of high rank and 
 distinction, who expressed himself of opinion that the plan might be useful. 
 
 M. A. DE Staeck, 
 
35S 
 APPENDIX. No. 11. 
 
 ON THE PARTIAL RE-ADOPTION, BY THE NAVY, OF 
 DEFENSIVE ARMOUR.* 
 
 By E. T. C, Lieutenant R. N. 
 
 In contemplating the nature of the art of war, two opposite principles obviously 
 present themselves to notice, under which, indeed, the whole system may be con- 
 sidered as comprehended, i. e. offence and defence. It is the importance which 
 each of these principles respectively assumes that constitutes the main difference 
 between the modes of ancient and modern warfare. 
 
 The ponderous and solid shield, helmet, and cuirass of the Roman legionaries, 
 especially during the civil wars, were admirably adapted to resist the heavy 
 pilum, and short strong-bladed sword. In the middle ages, and to a late period, 
 the scale seems to have inclined even in favour of the defensive, at least the 
 dose and complete covering of almost impenetrable armour then used would 
 justify the supposition ; still, however, as from the earliest recorded times, the 
 art of war continued to exhibit these two principles. It was reserved for that 
 tremendous engine, gunpowder, effectually to destroy the balance -, opposed to 
 the musket, as well as the cannon, the shield and cuirass became an unavailing 
 incumbrance. Formidable as these powerful instruments must be deemed, yet 
 experience has fully proved that they cannot entirely usurp the province of the 
 sword and lance. When man is personally opposed to man, gunpowder is far 
 from being a substitute for the blade ; for not only do the sword and pike 
 continue to maintain their wonted rank among offensive implements, but the 
 musket itself is admitted to be incomplete till furnished with that most effective 
 weapon, the bayonet> 
 
 To the great esteem, then, in which the blade i« still imiversally held, and as 
 if in some measure to restore the defensive principle, which had so deeply declined, 
 must be ascribed the resumption of the ancient and valuable cuirass. The 
 utility of re-adopting this excellent piece of armour has been allowed by the 
 greatest Captains of the age — has been acknowledged by the example of the conti- 
 nental powers, and has, at length, been admitted by ourselves. The advantages 
 of body -armour thus generally proclaimed by its re-adoption, the object of this 
 essay is to direct the attention to the benefits which might be derived thence to 
 the British sailor as well as to the soldier,to the boarder as well as to the dragoon. 
 
 * Referred to in page 147, n. upon the subject of I'ahordage. 
 2z2 
 
354 APPENDIX. No. II. 
 
 As before observed, the cuirass offers no protection against the cannon or 
 musket shot ; but it must be granted that there can be few, very few situations in 
 which the dragoon is not exposed to both ; whereas, when the sailor is summoned 
 to act as a boarder, fire-arms are, for the most part, laid aside. The cannon 
 then becomes an useless engine to both parties, and the musket nearly so. In 
 the close combat that ensues, with the sword, the bayonet, the tomahawk, and 
 pike, we see again the ancient offensive warfare restored, but unaccompanied by 
 its naturally opponent principle. 
 
 It has been asserted, and probably with truth, that no people have yet been 
 discovered uninfluenced by a belief in a Supreme Being. The history of the 
 world might with equal propriety be challenged to produce an instance of a 
 people acquainted with offensive, but ignorant of defensive arms. Yet such is 
 the surprising fact that, naked as his single weapon (of which, at best, he 
 possesses but an indifferent knowledge), the boarder rushes on a host of opposing 
 pikes, bayonets, and swords, his body and head exposed to every random blow 
 and thrust, while, at the same time he is fully unprepared to resist a chip from a 
 shattered block, or a fragment of falling cordage. 
 
 That the most brilliant achievements have been performed by a defenceless 
 man is a fact indisputable; but will any one gifted with common sense and 
 humanity affirm that, because a man be brave, it is an advantage for him to be 
 exposed to death from an unparried blow or thrust ? With equal reason it might 
 be asserted that courage and nakedness were synonimous. Of such a one I 
 would ask, whether our brave ancestors, who won the fields of Cressy, Poictiers, 
 and Agincourt, considered armour an index of fear ? It is to be hoped, for the 
 sake of our modern cuirassier, that they had no such notion. On the contrary, 
 the circumstance which most forcibly exposes the decay of that fearless and 
 manly spirit which had subdued the ancient world, is the petition preferred to 
 the Roman emperor (Gratian) to relieve his dastardly and effeminate soldiers 
 from the no-longer tolerable burthen of their armour ! 
 
 In considering the kind of defence to be adopted by the boarder, the cuirass 
 must be deemed too unwieldy for one who needs so much freedom both of body 
 and limbs; besides, the cuirass, in form and quantity of metal, is chiefly 
 adapted to resist the rested lance. Again, inconvenience would arise from its 
 consisting of two plates, which cannot be put on and off without assistance. 
 The hauberk is preferable on account of its flexibility ; but the mailed sleeves, 
 with which it is furnished, are unnecessary, and a stout under-garment is 
 required to render the upper one a sufficient protection. This piece of armour, 
 therefore, is likewise objectionable. 
 
APPENDIX. No. II. 355 
 
 The defence recommended should be considerably lighter than the cuirass, and 
 more convenient than either the hauberk or habergeon. It should consist, 
 simply, of a vest,* with a kind of epaulette reaching to the elbow, covered with 
 thin plates of steel, laid on like the scales of a fish, and its principal fastening, 
 a broad belt attached to the back and buckled in front, to sustain at the same 
 time a cutlass ; so that nearly as little time would be required to put on both 
 mail and sword as is now taken to buckle on the sword alone ; this, with a light 
 head piece (or morion) would not inconvenience even a slight man at his gun, 
 nor prevent his running aloft and pulling with ease and comfort. A single trial 
 would certainly afford a sufficient test of this assertion. The sword exercise 
 lately adopted in the British navy, with a view, doubtless, of furnishing a 
 defence to the hitherto unprotected persons of the boarders, unquestionably 
 affords a most unequivocal support to the principle herein advocated. But who 
 can fail to perceive the consequent diminution of the offensive character of the 
 sword, from its use as a defensive instrument ? A very slight acquaintance with 
 the art of fencing will suffice to point out the immense advantage of being 
 enabled to act offensively, even at the very instant of receiving a thrust! Thus 
 armed, the boarder would be completely protected from pike, bayonet, and sword. 
 An unskilful swordsman would thus become a formidable opponent even to a 
 skilful fencer, and a strong and dexterous one invincible but by odds. 
 
 The writer is aware of the prejudice to which innovation must be exposed ; 
 but in this instance there is nothing novel save the proposed application and 
 extension of a benefit already, in part, acknowledged. 
 
 Should a plan so likely to prove advantageous to the nation in general, and 
 to our seamen in particular, be deemed worthy an experiment, the expense, it 
 may be presumed, will not be a bar to the accomplishment of so excellent a 
 purpose as the preservation of the lives of our brave countrymen under circum- 
 stances of imminent and unnecessary exposure. 
 
 1824. 
 
 * Each plate in steel (according to the pattern exhibited by the writer), weighs only 3 dwts. 
 6 grs. so that exclusive of the cloth on which they would be sewed, a vest, containing 500 plates, 
 and large enough to protect a well-sized man from the throat to the hips would only weigh six 
 pounds ten ounces ! consequently not half the weight of a musket and bayonet ! 
 
 When, therefore, this trifling burden of light plates, dispersed, too, over the whole body, and 
 combined with a flexibility that accommodates itself to every movement, be considered, it may well 
 be presumed that no rational ground can be raised on which to found the important objection of 
 incumbrance. 
 
 THE END. 
 
C. Baldwin, Printer, 
 
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