CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND GIVEN IN 189I BY HENRY WILLIAMS SAGE Cornell University Library B2758 .R52 Metaphysical works / of ... Immanuel Kan 3 1924 029 021 520 The original of tliis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924029021520 r <■ c rz> METAPHYSICAL WORKS , OF THE CELEBRATED IMMANUEL KANT, TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN, W ITH SKETCH OF HIS LIFE AND WRITINGS, BY JOHN RICHARDSON, MANY YEARS A STUDENT OF THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY. CONTAINING 1. LOGIC. ■2. PROLEGOMENA TO FUTURE METAPHYSICS. 3. ENQUIRY INTO THE PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, ASD INTO THE THEODICY, now first pubKshecl. LONDON : MDCCCXXXVI. LOGIC FROM THE GERMAN Of EMMANUEL KANT, M. A. DOCTOR JUD LJTE REGIUS PROFBSSOR OF PPRE PBrLOSOPHT IS THU vturnRsiTr of kow/wgsberg, aso member op the ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIEyCES OF BERLIN ', TO WHICH IS ANNEXED n S^feetcft of Jig ILife antt Silrttingsfj By JOHN RICHARDSON, AUTHOR OF A CRITICAL INQVIRY INTO THE GROUNDS OP PROOF FOR THE EXISTENCE OP GODy AND INTO THE THBODICT, tomon X PRINTED FOR W. SrMPKlN AND R. MARSHALL, STATIONERY COURT, LUDGATE-SrUEET. 1819. PREFACE BY THE TRANSLATOR. It is not augmenting the sciences, but disfiguring them, when their boundaries are allowed to encroach on one another. For which reaaon, and as logic is a science, wherein nothing is fully shewn and strictly proved but the formal rules of all thinking, and as we by consequence abstract in it from all objects of knowledge, as well as from their differ- ence, our author has left us his logic free from every extraneous admixture of either ontological, or anthropological, or psychological, or metaphysi- cal matter. Whoever has but a clear and distinct conception of the proper nature of this science, will soon dis- cover the great difference between Kant's Logic and all former treatises on the same subject, not only by its being purer and more systematical, but, for ail its scientific strictness of method, by its be- ing simpler, and divested of many of the tinsel trappings of mood and of figure. The translator therefore conceives himself warrantable in present- ing it to the English public* * This Treatise on Logic, which is intended for a manual for lectures, is a posthumous work, and it is the editor Gottlob iv PREFACE. He trusts too, that candid and competent judges (unfortunately not a very numerous body in any nation) will not repudiate, on a slight review, a system, which is purged of much useless, though ostentatious, scholastic subtilty, and which is now taught and flourishes in all the protestant univer- sities of Germany. As to his labour (a very secon- dary consideration), by the way, it will, if it or any light that he may have thrown on a science (the critical philosophy), which he has been study- ing for years both in Germany and at home, shall hereafter be found to deserve the approbation of those judges, be amply requited. Benjamin Fesche (doctor and private teacher of philosophy in the university of Koningsberg, fellow of the Learned Society of Francfort on the Oder, disciple, follower, and friend of Kant) whom we have to thank for having thus faithfully pub- lished his illustrious master's manuscript. The doctor Ras promised us his Metaphysic also, which he likewise has in manuscript in Kant's own writing, and which, the moment it comes to hand, the translator intends to turn and to publish ; ■when we shall have something systematical and complete of this incomparably great man's own, and not be any longer troub- led with scraps, mutilated extracts, and imperfect quotations, •which cannot convey his sense or spirit, and only serve to de- ceive the public by giving tliem a false notion of his method of philosophising, by leading those totally ignorant of the princi- pies of his system to prattle superficially of his profound doc- trine, and by making a mere dogmatic jargon of his stiblime science. Preface. v When the arts and the sciences are improved and enlarged, many piore words, than those which sufficed in their infancy, become necessary, Nulli unquam, qui res ignorarent, nomina, quibus eas exprimerent, qucesierunt The author found the technical or rather the scientific words and terms of the German language inadequate to his method of critical philosophising, and was consequently ob- liged to coin new ones. The translator of course is reduced to the same necessity in English; for that language is not less copious than our vernacu- lar tongue ; and circumlocution or a periphrastical style tends greatly to enfeeble philosophical reason- ing. Should any critic, however, or philosopher, whose province it more immediately is, deign to suggest words or terms more expressive of the meaning, than his may be, he, as his sole aim, in clothing his author's thoughts in an English dress, is, to render their sense faithfully without any af- fectation of novelty, and to contribute his mite to propagate and diffuse useful and sublime know- ledge, will, should this work have the fortune to survive the present edition, then adopt those more apposite words and terms with gratitude and plea- sure; for he, though in this instance little more than a mere translator, is far above logomachy, or a dispute about words. True logic (says Watts) does not require a long- detail of hard words to amuse mankind, and to puff vi PREFACE. Up the mind with empty sounds and a pride of false learning ; yet some distinctions and terms of art are necessary to fange every conception in its proper class, and to keep our thoughts from confusion. . Though we may and in fact do syllogize both in conversation and in common writings, it is, like Mr. Jourdain (in Moliere's Bourgeois Gentil- homme), who spoke in prose for more than forty years, without knowing it. An acquaintance with the school form of ratio- cination, however, is indispensable to every man not only of science, hutof a liberal education. The world (continues the doctor) is now grown so wise as not to suffer this valuable science to be engrossed by the schools. In so polite and so knowing an age, every man of reason will covet some acquaintance with logic, since it renders its daily service to wis- dom and to virtue, and is subservient to the affairs of common life, as well as to the sciences. In short, the study of the species of logic con^ tained in this compendium should, in the academi- cal instruction, precede the study of all philosophy, like a quarantine (so to say), which the disciple, who has a mind to go out of the land of prejudice and error into the territory of more enlightened reason and of the sciences, must perform. It is to be hoped, that Kant's accurate and pro- found method of philosophising, a small specimen PREFACE. ' Vll of which is exhibited in this work, will meet with a better reception from our philosophers, than Har- vey's doctrine did, at the beginning, from our phy- sicians. For Hume relates, that , no physician in Europe, who had reached the age of forty, ever, to the end of his life, adopted Harvey's doctrine of the circulation of the blood, and that his practice in London diminished extremely from the reproach incurred by this great and signal discovery. — So slow is the progress of truth in every science, even when not opposed by either factious or supersti- tious prejudices ! — " So slow The growth of what is excellent ; so hard T'attain perfection in this nether world!" CONTENTS. INTRODUCTION. Page i. Conception of Logic . -9 IF. Chief Divisions of Logii;. Propounding Use of this Science. Sketch of a History of it - - 17 111. Conception of Philosophy in General. Philosophy considered according to both the scholastic and . the mundane Conception. Essential Requisites and Ends of Philosophising. Th^ most general and the chief Problems of this Scienee. ,- - 25 IF. Light Sketch of a History of Philosophy - 32 f^. Cognition in general. Intuitive niid Discursive Cogr nition ; Intuition and Conception, and their Dis- tinction in particular. Logical and Eithetical Per- fection of Cognition , - -, 42 VI. Particular logical Perfections of Cognition. A. Logical Perfection of Cognition as to Quantity 52 Vil. B. Do. Bo. Relation 6? nil C, Do. Doi Quality 79 IX. D. Do. Do. Modality 91 X. Probability. Explanation of the Probable. Dis- tinction of Probability fr om Verisimilitude. Ma- thematical and Philosophical Probability. Doubt both subjective and objective. Sceptical, Dogmatical, and Critical Cast of Mind or Method of Philosd' I phising. Hypotheses - - - 115 b CONTENTS. APP£NDIX. Ojthe Distinciien oj theoretical and of practical CoguitioH 12'2 LOGIC. PART THE FIRST. General Doctrine of Elements. Sec. I. Of Conceptions " ^ t^^ //. of Judgments - ' t III of Syllogisms - - - IbO PART THE SECOND. General Doctrine of Method. I. Promoting the logical Perfection of Cognition by the Definition, the Exposition, and the Description of Conceptions. - - - - 197 APPENDIX. //. Promoting the Perfection of- Cognition hy the logical Division of Conceptions. - - 209 A Sketch of the Author's Life and Writings by the Trans- lator. . - - , 216 INTRODUCTION. I. Conception of Tjogic. JJiVERY thing in nature, as well in the inanimate as in the animated world, happens or is done ac- cording to rules, though we do not always knovy them. Water falls according to the laws of gra- vitation, and the motion of walking is performed by animals according to rules. The fish in the water, the bird in the air, moves according to rules. All nature, in general, is nothing but a cohe^rence of phenomena according to rules ; and there is no where any want of rule. When we thinli we fin(I that want, we can only say that, in this case, the rules are unknown to us) The exercise of our powers too takes place ac- cording to certain rules, which we observe without a knowledge of them at first, till we attain it by degrees by essays and a longer use of our powers, nay, make them (the rules) so easy to ourselves at last, that we have great difficulty to think of them in the abstract. Universal grammar, for instance, is the form of a language in general. But we speak without knowing grammar; and he, B 10 INTRODUCTION. who speaks without knowing it, has a grammar and speaks according to rules, of which he is not sensible. The understanding in particular, like all other powers in general, is bound in its operations to rules, which we can investigate. Yes, the under- standing is to be considered as the source and the faculty of conceiving of rules in general. For, as the sensitivity, or the sensitive faculty (sensuali- tas*J, is the faculty of intuitions, the understanding- is that of thinking, that is to say, of reducing the representations of the senses to rules. It is there- fore desirous of looking for ruleSj and satisfied when it has found them. The question then is, as the UHderstariding is the source of rules, on what rules it proceeds itself. For there is not the least doubt, but we can, 'neither think, tior use our understanding otherwise, than according to certain rules. But we can think of these rules again by themselves, that is, we can conceive of them without their application, or in the abstract. What are these rules .^ All the rules, according to which the understand- ing proceeds, are, either necessary, or contingent. The former are those, without which no use of the understanding would be possible; the latter those, without which a certain determinate use of it would * As the word sensuality has degenerated from its original meaning iH pur language, we crave ^eave to substitute the word Sensitivity to express theJntuitive faculty. INTRODUCTION. 1 1 not take place. The contingent rules, which de- pend upon a determinate object of cognition, are as manifold as the objects themselves. For example, there is a use of the understanding in the mathe- matics, in metaphysics, in moral philosophy, &c. The rules of this particular determinate use of the understanding in the aforesaid sciences are contin- gent; because it is contingent, whether we think of tliis or of that object to which these particular rules have reference. But, when we set aside all the cognition, which we must borrow from the objects merely, and reflect entirely upon the use of the understanding in gene- ral, we discover those rules of it, which are absolute- ly necessary in every respect and without regard- ing any particular objects of thinking; because without them we could not think at all. Hence can they be known a priori, that is, independently of all experience ; because they comprise, without dis- tinction of objects, merely the condition of the use of the understanding in general, whether it (the use) be pure or empirical. And hence it follows, th^t the universal and the necessary rules, of thinking in general can regard its form merely, by no means its matter. Consequently the science, which com- prehends these universal and necessary rules, is merely a science of the form of the cognition of our understanding, or of thinking. And we can frame to ourselves an idea of the possibility, of a science of that sort, in the same manner as that of a universal 13 INTRODUCTION. grammar, which contains nothing more than the bare form of language in general, without words that belong to the matter of language. This science of the necessary laws of the under- standing and of reason in general, or of (what a:mounts to the same thing) the mere form of think- ing in general, we name Logic. As a science, which extends to all thinking in general, without regarding objects, as the matter of thinking, Logic is, 1, to be considered as the foundation of all the other sciences, and as the propedeytic (pre-exerci- tation) of all use of the understanding. But it cannot, because of its totally abstracting from all objects, 2, be an organon of the sciences. By an organon we understand the direction how a certain cognition is to be brought about. But, thereto it is required, that we previously know the object of the cognition which is to be produced according to certain rules. An organon o^the sci- ences therefore is not mere logic, because it gives to presuppose the exact knowledge of the sciences, of their objects, and of their sources. The mathematics, for instance, as a science which comprises the ground of the enlarging of our cognition with respect to a certain use of reason, are an excellent organon. Whereas' logic, as it, the universal propedeytic of the use of the Tinderstanding and of region in general, must not be INTRODUCTION. JS made to go into the seiences and to anttcipate their matter, is but a universal art of reason {canoniea Epieuri) to make cognitions in general suitable to the form of the understanding, and consequently in this view only to be denominated an organon, whicb , however serves, not for the enlarging, but merely for the judging and the regulating of our know- ledge. 3- As a science of the necessary laws of think- ing, without which laws no use of the understandtag or of reason has place, and which are by, conse- quence the sole conditions, on which the understand^ ing can agree with itself or be consistent, — the ne- cessary laws and conditions of its right use — logic, however, is a canon. And it, as a canon of the un- derstanding and of reason, must of course not bor row principles, either from any science, or from any experience whatever ; it must comprehend no- thing but laws a priori, which are necessary and ap- pertain to the understanding in general. Some logicians presuppose psychological prinpir pies in logic. But to introduce such principles as those into it, is just as absurd as to take moral phi"- losophy from life. Were we to take principles from psychology, that is, from the observations on our understanding, we should but see how thinking ^oes on, and how it ij under the various subjective impediments and conditions; this would conse- quently lead to the knowledge of merely contin- gent laws. In logic, however, the inquiry is after. 14 INTRODUCTION. not contingent, but necessary rules ; not how we think, but how we are to think. Hence must the rules of logic be taken, not from the contingent, but from the necessary use of the understanding, which is found in us without all psychology. In logic we want to know, not how the understanding is and thinks, and how it has hitherto proceeded in thinking, but how it shall proceed in thinking. It is to teach us the right use of the understanding, that is, its use agreeing with itself. From the foregoing explication of logic we may. derive the other essential properties of this science, that it is, 4, a science of reason as to the matter, not as to the mere form ; because its rules are not taken from experience^ and because it has reason also for its object. Logic, therefore, is a self-cog- nition of the understanding and of reason, not how- ever as to their faculties with regard to objects, but entirely as to the form. In logic, we would not ask, vyhat does the understanding know, and how much can it know ; or how far does its cognition go ? For that were self-cognition with regard to its material use, and consequently belongs to meta- physic. In logic there is but the question, how does the understanding know itself? As a rational science, as to both the matter and the form, logic finally is, b., a doctrine, or demonstrated theory. For, as it is occupied, not about the common and, as such, mere- INTfeOftUCTIOtl, 15 ly empiri(ial use of the understanding and of rea- son, but entirely about the universal and the neces- sary laws of thinking in general, it depends upon principles, a priori, from which all its rules can be derived and proved to be that, to which all cog- nition of reason must be conformable. By logic's being, as a science a priori or as a doctrine, to be held a canon of the use of the understanding, it is essentially distinguished from esthetic which, as mere criticism of taste, has not a canon (a law), but only a norma (a pattern, or rule merely for judging), which consists in universal agreement. Esthetic contains the rules of the' agreement of cognition with the laws of the sensi- tive faculty ; logic, on the other hand, the rules of the agreement of cognition with the laws of the understanding and of reason. That has but empi- rical principles and of course can never be a sci- ence or a doctrine, provided that we understand by a doctrine a dogmatical instruction on principles a priori, in which every thiwg is known by the un- derstanding without any' other information received from experience, and which gives us rules^ whose observance yields the desired peffection. Many, particularly orators and poets, have at- tempted to reason on taste; but never been able to give a decisive judgment on it. Baumgarten, the philosopher, has formed a plan of an esthetic as a science. But Home has distinguished the esthetic fighter by the appellation of Criticism, as that does 16 INTJIODUCTION- »ot give any rules a priori, which determine the judgment sufficiently;, like logic, but takes its rules ^posteriori, and renders the empirical laws, ac- cording to which we know the more imperfect and Jtb€ more perfect (beautiful), more general by com- parison only. Log^c, th«n, is more than mere criticism; it is a canon, which afterwards serves for a criticism, that is, for the principle of the judgment of all use of the undexstanding in general, though but of its right- ness with respect to the mere form, as it (logic) is sa little an organon as universal grammar. Universal logic, as the propedeytic of all use of the .understanding in general, is distinguished, in a«other point of view, from transcendental logic, ia which the object itself is represented as an objecj «f the bare understanding, whereas universal logic extends to all objects inge,neral. If we collect all the essential marks which pertain 1© the full determination of the conception of logic, we must give the folloi^ing conception of it : Logic, as to the mere form, but not as to the mat- ter, is a science of reason ; a science a priori of the necessary laws of thinking, with regard, not to par- ticular objects, but to all objects in general ; by consequ-ence a science of the right use of the under- standing and of reason in general, not subjective- ly, that is, not on empirical (psychological) princi- ples, how the understanding thinks, but objective- ly, that is, on principles a prion, ,how it must think. IWTBODUCTION. 17 IL Principal divisions of Logic. —Propound^ ing. — Use of this Science.— Sketch of a History of it. Logic is divided^ 1^ into the analytic and the dialectic. The analytic^ by dissecting, discovers all the. opera- tions of reason, which we perform in thinking in general. It is, therefore, an analytic of the form of the understanding and of reason, and justly named the logip of truth; because it contains the necessary rules of all (formal) truth, without which our cognition is, without regard to the ob- jects untrue in itself. It consequently is nothing more than a canon of dijudication (of the formal Tightness of our cognition). Should this merely theoretical and universal doc- trine be used as a practical art, that is, as an orga- non, it would become a dialectic, a logic of appear- ance (ars sophistica, disputatoriaj, which arises from a mere abuse of the analytic, when, accord- ing to the bare logipal form, the appearance of a true cognition whose marks must however be taken from the agreement with the objects, consequently from the matter, is fabricated. In former times the dialectic was studied with great diligence.. By this art false principles were 18 IMTRODUCTION. ' propounded under the appearance of truth, and it was endeavoured, conformably to them, to main- tain things in appearance. Among the Greeks the dialecticians were the counsellors and the orators, who could lead the people as they pleased; be- cause the people can be deceived by appearances. Dialectic, then, was at that time the art of appear- ance. In logic, it was for a timie propounded under the name of the art of disputation, and so long was all logic and all philosophy the culture of certain praters, to fabricate every appearance. But no- thing ^an be more unworthy of a philosopher, than the culture of an art of that sort. In this significa- tion, therefore, it must be totally exploded^ and, in- etead of it, a criticism of this false appearance in- troduced into logic. We shall consequently have two parts of logic: the analytic, which propounds the formal criteria of truth ; and the dialectic, which comprises the marks and the rules, by which we cari know, that soniething does not agree with them. In this sense the dia- lectic would be of great use as a cathartic of the understanding. Logic is usually divided still, 3, into natural or popular, and artificial or scien- tific (logica scholdstica). ' ' Bulthis division is imjiroper. Pbr natural logic, CUT that of common sense, is not logic, but an anthro- pological science, which, ks it handles the rules of the natural tfse of the understanding and of rea|on, INTRODUCTION. 19 that are known but in the concrete^ of course with- out consciousness of them in the abstract^, has only empirical principles. Nothing but artificial op scientific logic, then^ as a science of the necessary and of the universal rules of thinking, which, inde- pendently of the natural use of the understanding and of reason, must, though they can be found at first by the observation of that natural use only.be known in the abstract a priori, deserves the name of logic. 3. Yet another division of logic is, that into theo- retical and practical. But this division too is wrong. Universal logic, which, as a mere canon, abstracts from all objects, cannot have a practical part. This; as practical logic gives to presuppose the knowledge of a certain sort of objects, to which it is applied.were a contradiction in adjecto. Hence may we deno- minate every science practical logic ; for in every science we must have a form of thinking. Univer- sal logic considered as practical, can therefore be nothing more than a technic of learning in general, ,an organon of the scholastic method. In consequence of this division logic has a dogma- tical and a technical part. The former may be term- ed the doctrine of elements, the latter that of me- thod. The practical or technical part of logic is a logical art that treats of the arrangement and of the logicE^l terms of art and distinctions, in order there- by to facilitate the operations of the understanding. In neither of the parts^ however, whether the technical, or the dogmatical;, must the least attention 20 INTRODUCTION. be paid, either to the object, or to the subject of thinking. In the latter reference logic nnay be divided, 4, into pure and applied or mixed. In pure logic we separate the understanding from the other powers of the mind and consider what it does by itself Applied logic considers the understanding as mixed with the other powers of the mind, which influence its operations and give it a false direction, so that it does not proceed according to the laws, which it knows to be the right ones. In strict propriety, mixed or applied logic must not be termed logic. It is a psychology, in which we consider how our thinking usually goes on, not how it must go on. At last, indeed, it says what must be done, in order, under the various subjective impediments and limitations, to make a right use of the understanding ; besides, we may learn from it what promotes the right use of the understanding, its helps or the correctors of logical faults and errors. But it is not propedeytic. For psychology, from which every thing in applied logic must be taken, is a part of the philosophical sciences, to which logic must be the propedeytic. It is said, that thetechnic, or the method of con- structing a science, must be propounded in the ap- plied logic. But that is in vain, nay, even perni- cious. In that case we begin to build before we have materials and give the form, but the matter is wanting. The technic must be propounded in every science. INTRODUCTION. 21 Finally with respect to, 5, the division of logic into that of the common and that of the speculative understanding, vtr6 have to observe, that this science can by no means be thus divided. It cannot be a science of the speculative under- standing. For, as a logic of the speculative cogni- tion or of the speculative use of reason, it were an organon of other sciences, and not a mere propedey- tic, or pre-exercitation, which must extend to all possible use of the understanding and of reason. Just as little can logic be a production of common sense. This sense is the faculty of knowing the rules of cognition in the concrete. But logic must be a science of the rules of thinking in the abstract. The universal human understanding may how- ever be assumed as the object of logic; and in it we then abstract from the particular rules of specula- tive reason, and it is consequently distingaished from the logic of the speculative understanding. As to the propounding of logic, it may be, either scholastic, or popular. It, when it is suitable to the desire for knowledge^ to the capacities and to the culture of those, who have a mind to treat the knowledge of the logical rules as a science, is scholastic. But it, wheii it descends to the capacities and the wants of those, who have a mind, not to study logic as a science, but to use it in order to enlighten their understandings, is popular. In the scholastic 22 INTRODUCTION. propounding the rules must be exhibited in their universality, or in the abstract ; in the popular, on the other hand, in the particular, or in the concrete. The scholastic propounding is the basis of the popular; for nobody can propound any thing in a popular way, but he who can do it more profound- ly also. To conclude, we. here distinguish propounding from method. Ey method we understand the way in which a certain object, to whose cognition it is to be applied, is to be completely known. It must be taken from the nature of the science itself, and of course, as an order of thinking thereby determined and ;n€<;essary, cannot be altered. Propounding signifies nothing but the way of communicating or delivering one's thoughts to others,' in order to ren- der ia, doc trine intelbgible. :F:rom what we have said of the nature and of the end of logic, the value of this science and the use of its study may be estimated according to a right and a dbterminate scale. Logic is not a universal art of invention or of dis- covery ; not an organon of truth ; nor is it algebra, by whose assistance hi4den truths may be disco- vered. Yet it (logic) is useful and indispensable as a cri- ticism on cognition ; or for judging, as well of com- mon, as of speculative reason, in order not to instruct it, but to render it correct, and to make it consistent, or agree with itself. For the logical INTRODUCTION, 23 principle of truth is, 'the agreement of the under- standing with its own universal laws. Finally, with regard to the history of logic, we shall only mention what follows : The logic of the present day derives its origin from Aristotle's Analytic. That philosopher may be considered as the father of logic. He propounds it as an organon, and divides it into analytic and dialectic. His method is very scholastic and ex- tends to the unfolding of the most general concep- tions which form the basis of logic ; of which un- folding, however, there is no use ; because almost every thing in this case runs into mere subtilties, ex- cept that the denomination of various operations of the understanding is taken from it. Besides, logic, since the times of the Stagyrite, has not gained much in point of matter; nor can it do so from its very nature. But it may gain with re- spect to accuracy, determinateness, and distinctness. There are but few sciences, which can attain a per- manent state, so as not to be altered any more. To those both logic and metaphysic pertain, Aristotle has omitted nothing of consequence belonging to the understanding; we are but more accurate, metho- dical or orderly in the science of logic. It was believed, that Lambert's Organon would augment logic much. But it contains nothing ex- cept more subtile divisions which, like all right sub- tilties, sharpen the intellect, but are of no material use. a INTRODUCTION. Among the modern philosophers there are two, Leibnitz and Wolf, who have introduced univer- sal logic. Malebranche and Locke, ag they handle the matter ef cognition and the origin of conceptions, do not treat of any logic in the proper sense. Wolfs universal logic is the best we have. Some have conjoined it with Aristotle's logic, for instance Reusch. . Baumgarten, a man, who has great merit in this respect, has concentrated Wolf's logic, and Mayer made comments on Baumgarten. Crusius too is numbered among the modern logi- cians ; but he did not reflect sufficiently on the na- ture of this science. For his logic contains metar physical principles, and consequently passes the bounds of logic ; besides, he establishes a criterion of truth, which can be none, and therefore gives in this respect free scope to all extravagancies. In the present times there is not one celebrated logician, and we have no occasion for any new disi- , coveries for logic ; because it comprises the form o( thinking only. introduction; 25 III. Conception of Phihsopliy in general. Phi- losophy considered according to both the scholastic and the mundane Concept tion. Essential Requisites and Ends of Philosophising. The mo^t general dUd the chief Problems of this Science. It is sometimes difficult to explain what is un- derstood by a science. But the science gains in point of precision by the establishing of its detej:;- minate conceptionj and many faults, which slip, in when the science cannot be distinguished from the sciences allied. to it, are avoided Previously to our a.ttempt to give a definition of philosophy, however, we must investigate the cha- racter of the various cognitions themselves^ and, as -the philosophical ones belong to the cognitions of reason, explain, in particular, what is to be under- stood by the latter. The cognitions of reason are opposed to the his- torical cognitions. Those are cognitions from prin- ciples; these, cognitions from data. But a cognition may arise from reason and yet be historical ; when^ for example, a man of letters learns th,e produc- tions of the reason of others, his cognition of thera is jnerely historical. Cognitions may be distinguished, D 26 INTRODUCTION. 1^ according to their objective origin, that is, the only source, from which a cognitioa is possible. In this respect all cognitions are, either rational, or empirical ; % according to their subjective origin, that is, the way, in which a cognition can be acquired by men. Considered under the latter point of view, the cognitions are, either rational, or historical, in whatever way they in themselves may have taken their origin. A cognition therefore may be a cog- nition of reason objectively, when it is but histori- cal subjectively. It is pernicious to know some rational cognitions merely historically^ but indifferent to know others so. The mariner, for instance, knows the rules of navigation historically from his tables; and that is enough for him. But, when the lawyer knows la.w historically only, he is rendered very unfit indeed for a good judge, and utterly so for a legislator. From the adduced distinction between the objec- tively and the subjectively rational cognitions, it is obvious, that one may learn philosophy in a cer- tain respect without being able to philosophise. By consequence he, who would become a philosopher, must exercise himself in making a free and not merely an imitative and, so to say, a mechanical use of his reason. We have explained the cognitions of reason as cognitions from principles ; and hence it follows, that they must be a priori. But there are two spe- INTRODUCTION. 27 cies of cognitions, the mathematics and philosophy, which are both a priori, and yet very considerably distinct. It is usually maintained, that the mathematics and philosophy, as the former treats of quantity, the latter of quality, are distinct from one another as to the object. That is however false. The dis- tinction of these sciences cannot depend upon the object; for philosophy extends to every thing, con- sequently to quanta too, and the mathematics do so likewise, as far as every thing has a quantum. Nothing but the distinct sort of the cognition of reason or of the use of reason in the mathema!- tics and in philosophy makes the specific distinction b(e't\*een these sciences. Philosophy is, The cog- nition of reason from mere conceptions; the iila- thematics, on the other hand, are. The cognitidk of reason from the construction of conceptions. We construct conceptions when we exhibit them . by intuition a priori, without experience, or when we exhibit by intuition the object, which corres* ponds to our conception of it. The mathematician never can use his reason according to mere concep- tions ; the philosopher never his by the construc- tion of conceptions. In the mathematics reason is used in the concrete ; the intuition however is ndt empirical, bflt we in this case make for ourselves something a priori the object of intuition. We perceive, that the mathematics have this ad- vantage of philosophy, that their cognitions are 2-8 INTRODUCTION. inlijjtive; while those of it are but discursive. knA the reason of our reflecting- more on quantities in the mathematics is, that quantities may be con- structed by intuition a priori ; whereas qualities cannot be exhibited by intuition. Philosophy ig the system of philosophical cog- nitions,, or of the cognitions of reason from concep- tipiis. That is the scholastic conception of this sci- ence. According to the mundane conception, Phi^ losopliy is the science of the ultimate ends of hu- man reason. This sublime conception, gives a dig- nity, that is, an absolute value, to philosophy. And it is really it only that is of intrinsic value, and gives a value to all other cognitions. It is usually inquired. What is the use of philo- sophising and its scope — philosophy even consi- dered ,as a science according to the school con- ception .'' In this scholastic sense of the word ^ philosor phy extends to address only ; but it, relatively to the mundane conception, extends to utility. • In the former respect philosophy is therefore a doctrine of address i in the latter, a doctrine of wisdom ; the legislatrix of reason, and the philosopher, in this view, not the artificer, but the legislatoir of reason. The artificer of reason or, as Socrates names him, the philodox, endeavours merely after specu- lative knowledge, without regarding how mucbthe knowledge coptributes to the final end of human rea- INTRODUCTION. 29 soh ; he gives rules for the use of reason for all sorts of ends. The practical philosopher or the sage, the teacher of wisdom both hy doctrine and by example, is the philosopher in the proper sense. For philosophy is the idea of a perfect Avisdom that shews us the final ends of human reason. To philosophy in the scholastic sense two things are requisite : The one, a sufficient stock of the cognitions of reason ; the other, a systematic coherence of these cognitions, or their conjunction in the idea of a whole. Philosophy, riot only allows a strictly systematic coherence, but is even the only science, which in the proper sense has a coherence of that sort, and gives all other sciences systematic unity. But, with regard to philosophy according to the mundane sense (in sensu cosmicoj, it may be termed, A science of the hig'hest maxim of the use of our reason, provided that we understand' by a maxim, the internal principle of choice between Various ends, i i For philosophy, in this signification, is the sci- ence of the reference of all cognition and of all use of reason to the sdope of humsin reason, to which, as the highest, all other ends are subordinated, and in which they must conjoin to a unity. The field of philosophy, in this cosmopolitical sense, may be reduced to the following questions : 80 INTRODUCTION, 1. What can we Jknow ? 2. What ought we to do ? Si What may we hope for ? 4. What is man ? Tfbe first question is answered by metaphysic, the ssecotid by philosophy, the third by religion, and the fourth by anthropology. But they at bottom fiaig^t all be considered as pertaining to anthropo- logy ; because the three first questions refer to the !ast one. The philosopher must therefore be able to deter- Wiifte^ 1, the sources of human knowledge, 2^ :^he sphere of the possible and the advanta- gel^ti^ use of all knowledge, and finally, 3, the boundaries of reason. The l^st i« the most necessary, as well as the fldftst difficult, but a^out which the philodox gives hitn^elif no trouble. , , T-Q.'* philospber two things are chiefly requisite : J, culture of his taints, and of address, in order to Hse them for all sorts of ends ; 3, habit in the use of all means to whatever ends he^leases. Both must be united ; for without know- ledge one will never become a philosopher; but knowledge alone, unless a proper conjunction of all cognitions and abilities in a unity and an in- sight into their agreement with the highest ends of human reason be superadded, will aever constitute the philosopher. INTRODUCTKWi 2t In general whoever cannotiphilosophisfij cannot name himself a. philosopher^ But phibao|thising! c«mnol,be learned^ but by exercise, and by the^iUger of- one's own, reason. And how should philosophy be susceptible;of berr ing learned ? -Every philosophical thinkc'r buiJds, so to say, his own work, upon the ruins of another; but a work, stable in all its parts, has never y^t^be^BP^ e?«cuted. Philosophy, therefoee, as it isno*; yet giyen, cannot be learned. But-suppose there were one extant, nobody, who should: learn it, could ev.^n; then say, that he is a philosopher ; for his knQwIed@^ of it never could be but subjectively historical. . ' , In the m^theniatics. it is otherwise. This science m^y,in some degree be learned;; for the proofe, in it- are so evident, that eVeryibody iHiwy be convinced of them ; and it may, on account of its evidence, t%! as- it were, laid up as a certain and a staWe'dpctrine, Whoever would learn to philosophise mustj; on thift contrary, consi^^valtthe systems of phiio$Qfirhry)aSi histories of the usftof reason only, and as ohj4Qiiiif}Ss the exercise of his philosophic talent. jj ^d The true philosopher, therefore, must, as a thinker for himself, make a free use of' his reason, n we shall compare them together with regard to the four chief points of quantity, of quality, of relation, and of modality, upon which the stress lies in the judgment on the perfection of cognition. A cognition is perfect, 1, as to quantity, when it (a cognition) is universal ; 2, as to quality, when it is distinct; 3, as to relation, when it is true; and 4 and lastly, as to modality, when it is certain. Considered in those points of view, a cognition I is logically perfect, as to quantity, when it (a cognix ition) has objective universality (universality of the ' conception or of the rule) ; as to quality, when \t h^^ INtROfiuCTlOT*. 51 objective distinctness (distinctness in the concep- tion) ;. as to relation, whep it has objective truth; and finally as to modality, when, it has objective certainty. To those logical perfections the following estheti- cal perfections correspond relatively to those four main points; 1, the esthetiCai universality. This consists in the applicableness of a cognition to a multitude of objects, which setve for examples, to which its aip- plication can be made, and by which it may also be used for the purpose of popularity ; ,2, the esthetical distinctness. This is the distinct- ness by intuition, whereby an abstractly formed conception is exhibited in the concrete by examples, or illustrated ; • i 3, the esthetical truth. A merely subjective irtith, which consists but in the agreement of the cognition with the subject and with the laws of the appearance of sense^ and by consequence is nothing more than a universal appearance; 4, the esthetical certainty. This depends upon' what is necessary in consequence of the testimony of the senses, that is, what is confirmed by both sen- sation and experience. In the perfections just mentioned two parts, niul- tifariOusness and unity, vvhqse harmonious conjunc- tion. constiti^tes perfection in general, aJways occur. With the understanding the unity lies in the con- oeption, with the senses in the intuition. 52 INTRO pUCTION. ; .., Mere multifariousness without unity cannot satis-i fy us. And hence is truth the chief of all perfe<;-! tiops; because it is, by the reference of our cogni- tion to the object, the ground of unity. And even in the esthetical perfection truth always remains the conditio sine qua non, the chief negativei condition, without which nothing can please taste universally. Hpnce needs nobody hope to ipaHe progress in the belles lettres, if he has not founded bis cognition in logical perfection. And, as well the character^ as the art of a geniug, betrays itself in the greatest possible union of the logical with the esthetical perfection in general with respect to such knowledge, as is intended at once to edify and to entertain. VI. Particular logical Perfections of Cogni- tion. A.. Logical Perfection of Cognition as to Quantity. Greatness. Extensive, and intensive Greatness. Copiousness and Profoundfiess or Importance and Ferti-^ lity of Cognition. iDetermination (f the Horixon of our Cognition. The greatness (or quantum) of cognition may ba taken in a two-fold sense, as, either extensive, or intensive. The former refers to the sphere of cog- nition and consequently consists in its abundance INTBOpUCTIOJI. 5S antf variety (or multifariousness) ; the latter, to ita contents;, which regard the great value ( Vielgultig^ ffeitj or the logical importance and fertility of a cognition, provided that it is considered as the ground of many and of great consequences (non Viulta sed muUy^mJ, . ji ;■ In the enlargjpg of oqr cognitions ox in advan- cing them to perfection^ as to their ejxt«nsive quan- tum, it is good to calculate hovy far a cognitioti agrees with our ends andpur capacities, k, This, re- flection concerns the determination of the horizon of our cognitions, by which horizon is to be under- stood. The ad^quatpness of the quantum of all the cognitions to the capacities and the ends of the subject. The horizon may be determi)()ed, 1, logically, according to the; faculty or the piowers ^ of cognition, with respect to, the interest of the un- derstanding. We have here ;to judge how far we can go in our cognitions, how far we shall go in them, and how far certain cognitions serve with a logical view for, means to these or to those princi- pal cognitions, as our ends ; 2, esthetically, according to taste with regard to the interest of feeling./i'tWho determines his hori- zon esthetically, endeavours to accommodate the science to the taste of the public, that is to say, to render it popular, or in general to acquire such cognitions only, as may be universally communicated. 54 INTRODUCTION. and as please the class of the illiterate and in Which they are interested ; i and 3, practically, according to the utility with regard to the interest of the will. The practical horizon, if it is determined according to the influ* ence, which a cognition has on out morality, is pragmatical and of the greatest moment.* -The horizon then concerns the judginfint and the determination of what man can know, of what heimay know, and of what he ought to know. ' As to the theoretically or logically determined horizon in particular'— and it only can be the mat* ter in hand in this place— we may consider it in, either' the objective, or the subjective," point' of view. With regard to the objects the horizon is, either historical, or rational. The former is much wider than the latter, nay, it is immensely great ; for oiif historical knowledge has no bounds. Whereas the rational horizon may be fixed ; it for example may be determined to that sort of objects, to Which the mathematical cognition cannot be extended. And with respect to the philosophical cognition of rea- son, how far reason can go in it a priori, without any experience. j * Knowledge, provided that it serves for accomplishing our 1 design, is (according to Kant) Pragmatical— belbngs to wel- fare. T. INTRODUCTION. 65 Relatively to the subject the horizon is,, eithei? the universal and absolute, or a particular ^nd con- ditional (a private) one. By the absolute and universal horizon is to he understood the congruence of the boundaries of the human cognitions to those of all human perfec- tion in general. And therefore the question. What can man, as man in general, know ? now occurs. The determination of the private horizon de- pends upon various empirical conditions and special considerations, for instance, of age, of sex, of rank, of the business or the profession, and many the like. Every particular class of men has, with re- gard to its special powers of knowledge, ends and stations peculiar to it ; every head in proportion to, the individuality of its powers and of its station, its own horizon. Finally, we may conceive of a horizon of sane reason and of one of science, which latter requires principles, in order to determine according to them what we can know (scientifical- ly) and what we cannot. What we cannot know is above our horizon ; what we need not know or have no occasion toj know, without our horizon. The latter however can hold but relatively, with regard to this or to that particular private end, to the attaining of which certain cognitions might, not' only contribute no- thing, but even be an impediment. For n^ cogni- tion, though we may not always be able to see its utility. Is absolutely useless in every respect. It is 66 INTRODUCTION. therefore both an unwise and an unjust reproach, with which great men, who cultivate the sciences with laborious industry, are charged by shallow pates, when they ask, What is the use of doing so? This question must by no means be put by those who h^ve a mind to occupy themselves about the sciences. A sfeience, suppose it could throw a light on any one possible matter, were then useful enough. Every logically perfect cognition is al- ways of some possible use which, though hitherto unknown to us, will perhaps be found out by pos- terity. Had nothing been ever considered in the culture of the sciences, but their material gain, their Utility, we should have, neither arithmetic, nor geometry. Besides, our understanding is so order- ed, that it finds satisfaction in the mere insight, and yet more than in the advantage that arises from it. This observation was made so early as by Plato. A man feels his own excellence on the occasion; he sees the meaning of having understanding. Men, who do not see that, must envy the brutes. The internal value, vyhich cognitions are of by logical perfection, is not to be compared with their external value -that in the application. As that, which lies without our horizon, if we need not know it according to our views, as not being necessary to us, is to be understood in a relative sense only, by no means in the absolute onej^that, which lies below our horizon, if we not re- pugnant to itself. Xhig sign of the internal logical truth however .is only negative; for a cognition, ■which is repugnant to itself, is false, but, when it ^snotfio, not always (true ; and. Secondly, that it be logically founded, that is, that it have, a, groupds aud, b, not false conse- quences. This second criterion of the external logical truth, relative tq the logical coherence of a cognition with grounds and consequences, or of the rationalness of cognition, is positive. And the following rules hold here : 1, FFom the truth of the consequence the truth of the cognition as a ground may be inferred, but only negatively ,: when one false consequence flow* from a cognition, the cognition itself is false, FoP» were the ground tru^, the consequence would be so likewise ; because the consequence is determined by the ground. ; But we cannot infer conversely : when not a false consequence flows from a cognition, it is true ; for we can draw true inferences from a false ground. 2, When all ilie consequences of cogoiiion are true, the cognition also is true. For, were but nSTRODUCnOIf.: 7X •ome^hingifa^se in the cognition, ft !fajI«d!con«eqt(i9nce too. would have place, sol ' ,i, o't vi . y c l; i ..ifcf Prom the consequence we may then infer si ground, but without being able to , determine it. We can only infer a determinate; groun4) sthjat it is the true one, from the complex of all tbiec^n*^- quences. -^ip ■'jiIuk ■ ■(,, '-^q • !; .h\ is The forrafer mode of inference^ according to ivhich the consequence can be but a negatively 4n4 an indiriectly sufiicient criterioil of the truth Of a cognition, is termed in logic the apagogicaJ (jff^f^ toUensJ. ■■''> ijiny/)-- lo- ■.■j«. .-. ■ ■■'.'',■; •■■ . > Tbis'procediiTe, of which great use ia m«de ta geometry, has the advem,tage, that HveJneed; derive but one false consequence from a cognijiion tjo pj: ove its falsenies&. For example;' in iorder to; levince, that the earth is not flat, we. need, without adducing po- sitive abd direct reasons, but infer and- CMDnclude «pagogicaUy; or indirectly, thus: Wer^stbe earth flat, the polestar would be ; equally;' high every- whiere; b«it this* is not the cafte; therefore the earth is'not flitJ; -.-o - a.l ;i--,i > ^ji , o '»i3jj «; '■ In the other, the positive and direct mode of in- ference (modus ponens), there occurs the diffii- culty, that the totality of the canaequeftceis cannot be known apodictically, and that We therefore are not led by this mode of illation but to a probaMe and a hypotbetically true cognitiiin (ahypothesisjaeeording to the presupposition, ■ that, when many ; conse- quences are true, all the othiirs may be «o likewise. *72l IKTRODUCTION. We may then lay down here three principles, as universal merely formal, or logical, criteria of truth; they are, 1, the principle of contradiction and of identity, by^hich the internal possibility of a cognition- fs determined for problematical judgments' ; 2, the principle of sufficient reason, upon which the (logical; reality of a cognition depends ; that it is founded, as matter for assertive judgments ; 3, the principle of the exclusive third (principium eieclusi medii inter duo contradictoria), in which the (logical) necessity of a cognition is founded '; that we must necessarily judge so and not other- wise, that is, that the opposite is felsB-^fOF apo- dictical judgments. The contrary of truth is falsehood which, if it is held truth, is named error. An erroneous judg- ment (for error as well as truth is only iri/the judgr ment) is therefore such a one, as takes the appear- ance of truth for truth itself. How truth is possible, is, as the understanding acts hereon its essential laws, easily known. But how error in.lhe formal sense of the word, that is to say, how the form of thinking contrary to the understanding is possible, is difficult to be comprehended, as it is in general not to be compre- hennfi^d how any one power should deviate from i,ts own essential laws; We can therefore seek thfe ground of errors just as little in the understanding itself and its essential laws, as in the limits of the INTRODUCTION. 73 understandings in which the 'cause of ignorance, but by no means that of error, lies. Had we no other cognitive power, than the understanding, avb should never err. But there lies in us yet another indispensable source of cognition, the sensitivity; which supplies us with matter for thinking and acts according to other laws, than the understanding does. But from the sensitivity considered in and by itself, error cannot arise neither; because the senses never judge. The ground of the origin of all error must con- sequently be looked for no where but in the insen- sible influence of the sensitivity on the intellect or, more accurately speaking, on judgment. This in- fluence makes us in judging hold merely subjective grounds objective ones, and by consequence take the mere appearance of truth for truth itself. For therein consists the very essence of appearance which is on that account to be considered as a ground for holding a false cognition true. What makes error possible is therefore the ap- pearance, according to which the merely subjective in the judgment is exchanged for the objective. Tn a certain sense the understanding too, provi- ded that it, for want of the requisite attention to that in^uence of the sensitivity, is led by the appearance arising from it to hold merely subjective determina- tives of judgment objective ones, or to admit that, whieh is not true but according to laws of, the sen- K 74 INTRODUCTION. sitivity, to be true according to its own laws, maybe made the author of errors. Only the fault of ig-norauce then lies in the limits of the understanding ; the fault of error we have to attribute to ourselves. Nature has denied us much knowledge, she leaves us in the inevitable ignorance of so much ; yet sbe does not occasion error.- To it our own propensity to judge and to decide even when we are not able to do so, because of the limi- tation of our faculties, leads us. All error however, into which the human under- standing can fall, is but partial, and in every erro- neous judgment there must always be something true. For a total error were an oppugnancy against the laws of the understanding and of reason. With regard to what is true and erroneous in our cognition, we distinguish an exact from a crude cognition. A cognition, when it is adequate to its object, or when with respect to its object not the smallest er- ror has place, is exact; it, when errors may be in it with an impediment to the design, is crude. This distinction regards the larger or the stricter determinateness of our cognition. At first it is sometimes necessary to determine a cognition in a larger sphere, particularly in historical things. Bi^t in cognitions of reason every thing must be exactly (stride) determined. In the large determination it is said, a cognition is determhied prater, propter. INTRODUCTION. 75 It always depends upon the purpose of a cognition whether it shall be crudely or exactly determined. The large determination still leaves a latitude for error, but which may have its determinate bounds. Error has place especially when a wide determina- tion is taken for a strict one, for instance, in mat- ters of morality, in which every thing must be strict- ly determined. Who do not do so are named, by the English, latitudinarians. From the exactness, as £in objective perfection ; of cognition — as the cognition in this case is fully congruent to the object — the subtilty asa subjective perfection of it may still be distinguished. A cognition of a thing, when one discovers in it "what usually escapes the attention of others, is sub- tile. It consequently requires a higher degree of attention and a greater exertion of the intellectual power. Many blame all subtilty; because they cannot attain it. But it in itself does honor to the under- standing, and is, provided that it is applied to an object worthy of observation, even meritorious and necessary. But it, when the same end might be at- tained with less attention and effort of the under- standing, than is used, is a pseless expense, and we fall into subtilties, which are difficult, but of no utility (nugce difficiles). As the crude is opposed to the exact, the gross is to the subtile. From the nature of error, in whose conception. 76 INTRODUCTION. as we have already reraark'ed, besides falsity, the appearance of truth is contained as an essential mark, the following rule, which is important to the truth of our cognition, unfolds itself: In order to avoid errors (and no error is at least absolutely inevitable, though it may be so relatively to the cases, in which it is, even at the risk of err- ing, unavoidable for us to judge) Ave must endeavour to discover and to explain the source of them — ^Ap- pearance or semblance. But that few philosophers have done. They have only endeavoured to de- termine the errors themselves, without shewing the appearance, whence they arise. The discovering i and the solving of the appearance, however, is of I much greater service to truth, than the direct shew- ing of errors themselves, by which their source can- liotbe stopped up, nor can the same appearance, because it is not known, be prevented from leading again to errors in other cases. For, if we are even; convinced of having erred, there still remains tons, if the appearance itself, which forms the basis of ouri error, is not removed, scruples, little as we can ad- duce to their justification. Besides, by explaining the appearance we do the erring person a sort of equity. For, nobody will allow, that he has erred without some one appear- ance of truth, which perhaps migbt have deceived one more acute ; because the stress of the affair rests upon subjective grounds. An error, when the appearance is obvious to com- Kfr INTRODUCTION. 7? mon sense; is termed an insipidity or absurdity The reproach of absurdity is always a personal one, which we 'must avoid, particularly in the cor- recting of errors. For to him^ who maintains an absurdity, the ap- pearance, which forms the basis of this evident falsity, is not obvious. This appearance must fir^t be made obvious to him. If he still continues to maintain it, he is insipid indeed ; but then nothing more can be done with bim. He has thereby ren- dered himself both incapable and unworthy of all farther instruction and refutation. For we cannot, properly speaking, prove to a person that he is ab- surd ; in this case all reasoning were in vain. Wheh we "prove the absurdity we speak no longer to the erring person, but to the rational man. Then, "fe&wever, the discovery of the ahsurdity ( deductio dd absiirdiifn) is not necessary. An insipid error may likewise be named such a one as nothing? not so much as even appearance, serves it for an excuse ; as a gross error is that, which evinces ignorarice in common cognition or a want of common attention. Error in principles is greater tban that in their application. ^ An external mark or an external test of truth is the comparison of our own judgments with those of others ; because that which is subjective is not in- herent in the same way in all others, by consequence the appearance may be thereby explained. Hence 78 INTRODUCTION. is the incompatibility of the judgments of others with ours to be considered as an external mark of error, and as a hint to investigate our proceeding in judging, but not immediately to reject it on that account. For we may perhaps be right in the thing and wrong in the manner only, that is, the pro- pounding. Common-sense is in itself too a touchstone, to discover the faults of the artificial use of the under- standing, that is to say, to put one's self right in thinking or in the speculative use of reason by com- mon-sense, when the common understanding is used as a test for the purpose of judging of the rightne^s of the speculative. Universal rules and conditions of avoiding error in general are, 1, To think for one's self, 2, To conceive one's self in the place of another, and 3, Always to think consistently with one's self. The maxim of thinking for one's self may be distinguish- ed by the denomination of the enlightened way of thinking; that of putting one's self, in thinking, in the place of another, the enlarged ; and that of ..always thinking consistently with one's self, the consequential or solid. INTRODUCTION. 79 VIII. C. Logical Perfection of Cognition as to Quality. Clearness. Conception of a Mark in general. Various sorts of Marks. Determination of the logical Essence of a Thing. Its Distinction from the real Essence. Distinctness^ a higher Degree of Clearness. Estheti- cal and Logical Distinctness. Discre- pance between analytic and synthetic Distinctness: The human cognition is on the side of the un- derstanding discursive ; that is^ it is acquired by means of representations, which make a ground of cognition of that which is common to several things, consequently by means of marks, as such. We know things then by marks only. A mark is in a thing that, which makes up a part of its cognition ; or (what amounts to the same) a partial representation, provided that it is consider- ed as a gcound of cognition of the whole represep- tion. By consequence all our conceptions are marks and all thinking is nothing but a represent- ing by means of marks. Every mark may be considered in two points of vi^w: / 80 INTRODUCTION. First, as a representation in itself; and Secondly, as belonging, as a partial conception, to the whole representation of a thing, and thereby as a ground of cognition of this thing itself. All marks, considered as grounds of cognition, are of a twofold use ; either of an internal, or of an external. The internal use consists in derivation, in order to cognise the thing itself by marks, as its grounds of cognition. The external consists in cotnparison, provided that we can compare a thing vvitji other things by means of marks according to the rules of identity and of distinction.* Among the marks there are many specifical dis- tinctions,' in which the following classification of those are founded : 1, Analytic or synthetic marks. Those are par- tial conceptions of the actual conception (which we form to ourselves in this conception), these, par- tial ones of the mei:ely possible whole conception (which must consequently be first formed by a syn- thesis of several parts). The former are all con- ceptions of reason, the latter may be those of ex- perience. 2, Co-ordinate or subordinate. This division of marks regards their connexion beside or under one another. The marks, if each of thein is represented as an * Not diversity, but distinction or difference is tlje contran- of identity or sameness; diversity is Ibat of similitude or lilse- nes9. Many of our atdhors confound these contraries. T. INTRODUCTIOU. 8l ittimediale mark of the thing-, are co-ordinate ; and, if one mark is represented only by means of ano- ther i!i the thing, subordinate. The conjunc- tion of the Co-ordinate marks so as to amount to the whole of the conception is named an aggregate ; the conjunction of the subordinate ones, a series. That, the aggregation of the co-ordinate marks, makes up the totality of the conception, but which, with regard to synthetic empirical conceptions, never can be completed. ^ The series of subordinate marks falls, a parte ante, or on the side of the grounds, upon insoivable conceptions, which cannot on acc(junt of their sim- plicity be farther dissected ; it, a parte post orwith respect to the consequences, on the other hand, is infinite , because wfr have a highest genus, but ijot a lowest species. With the synthesis of every new conception in the aggregation of co-ordinate marks the extensive or diffused distinctness increases in the same manner as with the farther analysis of the conceptions in the series of subordinate marks the intensive or deep distinctness does. This sort of distinctness, as it necessarily serves for the profundity or solidity of cognition, is chiefly the business of philosophy and, particularly in metaphysical perquisitions, car- ried to the highest pitch. 3, Affirmative or negative marks. By those we know what the thing is, by these what it is not. The negative marks serve to keep us from errors. Ofi INTRODUCTION. Hence are they when it is impossible to errunncces- sary, and necessary and of impoitance in thos® cases only^ when they keep us from an important error, into which we may easily fall. For instance, with regard to the conception of a being like God, the negative marks are very necessary and of mo« jnent, }n By affirmative marks we have then a mind to un- derstand something ; by negative ones (to which all marks whatsoever may be turned) only not to mis- understand or only not to err in it, even should we learn to know nothing of it. 4, Important and fertile or empty and unim- portant marks. A mark is important and fertile when it is a ground of cognition of great and of numerous con- sequences, partly with regard to its internal use (the use in the derivation) provided that it is sufficient, jn order to know by it a great deal of the thing itself; partly with regard to its external use (the use in the comparison) provided that it serves to know, as well the similitude of a thing to many other things, as its diversity from many others. Besides, we must here distinguish the logical im- portance and fertility from the practical — utility. 5, Sufficient and necessary or insufficient and contingent marks. A mark, provided that it suffices always to dis- tinguish the thing from all other things, is suffi- cient 3 otherwise it is insufficient, as, for example, introduction; 33 the mark of barking of the dog. But the sufficiency of marks, as well as their importance, is to be de- termined in a relative sense only, with reference to the ends, which are intended by a cognition. Necessary marks fiually are those, which must always be to be met with in the thing represented. Such marks are termed essential too, and stand op- posed to the unnessential and contingent, which may be separated from the conception of the thing. But between the necessary marks there is yet a distinction. Some of them belong to the thing as grounds of other marks of the very same thing ; others again as consequences only of other marks. The former are primitive and constitutive marks ( essentialia in sensu strictissimoj ; the latter are denominated attributes ( consectaria, rationata), and pertain likewise to the essence of the thing, but only with a proviso, that they must first be de- rived from those its essential parts ; as, for instance, the three angles in the conception of a triangle from the three sides. The unessential marks also are of a twofold sort ; they regard either internal detferminations of a thing (modi), or its external relations. For ex- ample, the mark of learning denotes an internal determination of man ; being a master or a servant, only an external relation of him. The complex of all the essential parts of a thing, or the sufficiency of its marks as to cb-ordiaatlon or subordination, is the ssence (complexus notarum §4f INTRODUCTION. prirmtivarum, interne conceptui data sufficien- Hum ; s. complexus notarum, conceptum aliquem primitive constituentium) . But in this definition we must by wo means think here of the reaji^essence or the essence of nature of things^ which we never can know. For, as logic abs*raots from all the matter of cognition, by conse- quence from the thing itself, in this science nothing "but the logical essence of things can possibly be on the carpet. And this we can easily know For hereto belongs nothing farther than the linowledge of all the predicates, with regard to which an ob- ject IS determined by its conception ; whereas to the real essence of the thing {esse rei, the knowledge of those predicates, upon which, all tliat belongs as a determinative to its essence depends, is required. If we chtise, for instance, to determine the logical essence of a body, we have no occasion to seek for the data to this in nature ; we need but turn our re- flection to the marks which, as essential parts (con-' stitutiva, rationesj, originally constitute its funda- mental conception. For the logical essence is no- thing but The first fundamental conception of all the necessary marks of a thing {esse conceptus). The first step of the perfection of our cognition, as to quality, is then the clearness of the cog.iition. The distinctness is a second step, or a higher degree of clearness. This consists in the clearness of the marks. In the first place, we must in general distinguish here the logiical dIstinctDess from the estbetical. INTRODUCTION. 85 The former depends upon the objective, the latter upon the subjective, clearness of the marks. That is a clearness by conceptions, this a clearness by in- tuition, i he latter species of distinctness consists then in a mere vivacity and intelligibleness, that is to say, in a mere clearness by examples in the con- crete (for many things that are not distinct may be intelligible, and conversely, many things that are difficult to be understood, because they refer back to remote marks, whose connexion with intuition is not possible but by a long series, may be distinct). The objective distinctness often occasions sub- jective obscurity, and conversely. Hence is the logical distinctness seldom possible but to the dis- advantage of the esthetical, and, vice versa, the esthetical distinctness by examples and likenesses, which are not quite adequate, but taken according to a certain analogy only, is often hurtful to the logical. And besides, examples in general are not marks, and belong, not as parts to the conception, but as intuitions for the use of the conception only. A distinctness by exatnples (the mere intel- ligibleness) is therefore of quite another sort, than the distinctness by conceptions as marks. Perspi- cuity consists in the conjunction of both, the esthsT tic or popular, with the scholastic or logical, dis- tinctness. For, by a perspicacious head we under- stand the talent of a luminous exhibition of abstract and of profound cognitions, suitable to the capa- city of coramon-gense. 86 INTRODUCTION. In the second place, as to the logical distinctness in partiQular, it, if all the marks, which collectively taken make up the whole conception, have reached clearness, may be named a complete one. A con- ception, on the other hand, may be completely dis- tinct, with regard to the totality either of its co- ordinate, or of its subordinate marks. The exten- - sively cpmplete or sufficient distinctness of a con- ception, which is also termed the amplitude, con- sists in the total clearness of the co-ordinate marks. The total clearness of the subordinate marks con- stitutes the intensively complete distinctness — the profundity or solidity. The former species of the logical distinctness may be denominated the external, the latter the in- ternal completeness of the clearness of the marks. This can be obtained from the pure conceptions of reason only, and from arbitrarious conceptions, but not from empirical ones. The extensive greatness or quantum of distinct- ness, provided that it is not abundant, is named precision. The amplitude and the precision toge- ther make up the adequateness fcognitionem, quae rem adcequatj; and in the intensively adequate cognition in the profundity conjoined with the extensively adequate one in the amplitude and the precision, the consummate perfection of a cognition {consummata cognitionis perfectio) (as to quality) consists. Since it is the business of logic (as we have al- INTRODUCTION. 87 ready remarked) to render clear conceptions distinct, the question now iSj In what manner it does so. The logicians of the Wolfian school place all the rendering of cognitions distinct in their mere dis- section. But all distinctness does not depend upon the analysis of a given conception. It thereby arises with regard to those marks only, which are thought of in the conception, but by no means with regard to the marks, which are first added to the conception as parts of the whole possible concep- tion. That sort of distinctness, which arises, not by the analysis^ but by the synthesis of the marks, is syn- thetic distinctness. And there is consequently an essential distinction between the two propositions : To form a distinct conception and. To render a con- ception distinct. For, when we form a distinct conception, we begin with the parts and proceed from them to the whole. In this case no marks yet exist ; we obtain them first by means of the synthesis. From this synthe- tic procedure then the synthetic distinctness arises, which, as to the matter, enlarges the conception by that, which is superadded to itasa mark in the (pure or empirical) intuition. Both the mathematician and the natural philosopher use this synthetic pro- cedure in rendering the conceptions distinct. For all distinctness of the properly mathematical, as well as of all other empirical, cognition, depends upon 88 INTRODrCTION. an enfargement of it of this sort by a synthesis of the marks. But, when we render a conception distinct, our cognition by no means increases, as to the matter, by this mere dissection. The matter remains the same -, only the form is altered by our doing nothing but distinguishing better, or learning, to know with a clearer consciousness that, which lies in the given conception. As by the mere colouring of a map nothing more is added to the map itself; so by the mefe clearing-up of a given conception by means -of the analysis of its marks, the conception itself is not increased in the least. The making of objects distinct belongs to the synthesis, the making of conceptions distinct, to the analysis. In the latter the whole precedes the parts, in the former the parts precede the whole. The philosopher renders none but given conceptions dis- tinct. Sometimes one proceeds synthetically, even when the conception, which he has a mind to ren- der distinct in this manner, is already given. This has often place in empirical propositions, provided that we are not satisfied with the marks already con- tained in a given conception. The analytic procedure, in order to beget dis- tinctness, about which procedure only logic can be occupied, is the first and the chief requisite in ren- dering our cognitions distinct. For the more dis- tinct our cognition of a thing is, the stronger and INTRODUCTIOlf; ^ 89* the more efficacious it can be. Only the analysis must not go so far, as at last to occasion the object itself to vanish. Were we conscious to ourselves of all that which we know, we could not but be astonished at the multitude of our cognitions. As to the objective value of our cognition in general, the following degrees, according to which it (our cognition) can be increased in this respect* may be conceived : Representing something to one's self, is the first degree of cognition or knowledge ; Representing to one's self with consciousness or PERCEIVING (pereiperej something, the second;* ' Kenning (noscerejf something, or represent- ing to one's self something in comparison of other things as to identity, as well as to distinction, the third ; Kenning with consciousness, that is, cognising (cognoscere) something, the fourth. The brute kens objects, but does not cognize them. Understanding (intelligere), that is, cognising by the understanding by means of conceptions, or conceiving of something, is the fifth. This is very * Should not apprehending, or receiving into the empiri- cal cunsciousiiess, have a place here and precede perceiving ? T. -|- Must not we use Kenning here, in order to distinguish be- tween this degree of cognition and the highest degee of holding true, Knowing {scire) \ or what othfif word have we in Eng- lish? T. U 90 INTRODUCTION. distinct from comprehenditig. We can conceive of ■many things, though we cannot comprehend them, for example, a perpetuum mobile, whose impossi- bility is shewn in the mechanics. Cognising something by reason, or perspectins (perspicerej or having an insight into it, is the sixth. We reach this in few things, and our cognitions grow fewer and fewer, the more we advance them towards perfection in point of value. Comprehending something, that is, cognising it by reason a priori, in the degree sufficient to our purpose, is the seventh and the last. For all our comprehending is but relative, that is to say, suffi- cient for a certain purpose ; we comprehend no? thing absolutely. Nothing more than what the mathematician demonstrates can be compreliended ; for instance, that all the lines in the circle are prot portional. And yet he does not comprehend how H happens, that so simple a figure as a circle ha» these properties. Hence is the field of conceiving «r of the understanding. in general much greater, than that of comprehending or of reason. iNTnODUCTlON] 91 IX. Logical Perfbction of Cognition as to Modality, Certainty. Conception of Holding-true in general. Modes of Holding-true : Opining ^ Believing, and Knowing. Conviction and PeT-> suasion. Reserving and Suspending a Judgment. Previous Judgments. Pre^ judices, their Sources and their chief Sorts. Truth is an objective; property of cognition; thejudgmentj by which something is represented as true (the reference to an understanding and therefore to a particular subject), is subjective, a hoMing-true. Holding-true is in general of a twofold nature : a cei'tain and an uncertain. The certain holding- true or certainty, is conjoined with the conscious- ness of necessity ; the uncertain, on the other hand> or uncertainty, with that of contingency, or of the possibility of the contrary. The latter again is, either subjectively as well as objectively insufficient, or objectively insufficient, but subjectively suffi- cient. That is termed opinion ; this must be named belief. There are consequently three sorts or modes of 92 INTRODUCTION. holding-true: opining, believing, and knowing. The first is a problematical, the second an assertive, and the third an apodictical, judging. For, what we merely opine we in judging hold with conscious- jiess but problematical ; what we believe, assertive, not as objectively necessary, however, but as sub- jieCtively so (valid for one's self only); and what we know, apodictically certain, that is, universally and objectively necessary (valid for every body) ; even suppose the object itself, to which this certain hold- ing-true. refers, were a merely empirical truth. For this distinction of the holding-true according to the three modes just mentioned concerns nothing but the judgment with regard to the subjective criteria of the subsumption of a judgment under objective tules,* Li Our holding immortality true, for instance, is merely probleniatical, if we but act as if we were immortal ; but assertive, provided we believe, that we are, (BO ; and it were apodictical if we all knew, that there is a life after the present. Between opining, believing, and knowing, then, there is a material distinction, which we shall here explain more closely and more at large. 1. Opjning, or holding-true on a ground of cognition, neither subjectively, nor objectively suf- ficient, may be considered as a pi'evious judging, I- " Subsumpting is, ranking under a given rule (casUi dalee .legi$). T. ■ ' ■ INTRODUCTrOK. 93 {sub condittone suspensiva ad interim), which can- not well be dispensed with. We must opine before we assume and, maintain, but be aware of holding an opinion more than a mere opinion In all our cognising, we for the most part begin with opining. Sometimes we have an obscure presagement* of truth; a thing seems to us to contain marks of truth; we are sensible Of its truth before we cog- nise it with determinate certainty. . But when has mere opining place?: — Not in any of the sciences that contain cognitions a priori j by consequence jieither in the mathematics, nor in the metaphysips, 1 nor in the ethics, but in empirical cognitions only, in the physics, in psychology, and such like; for it is a palpable absurdity to think of opining a prioti. And in fact nothing would be nifore laughable, than to Opine only in the mathe- matics. In them, as well as in the metaphysics and in moral philosophy, the object is either to know, or not to know. Hence can matters of opinion never be but objects of a cognition of experience, which cognition is possible in itself, but impossible to us only from the empirical limitations and condi- tions of our cognitive faculty and according to the degree of it depending upon them, which we pos- sess. The ether of the modern natural philosof * The literal translation is PresensioD, but the Translator pre- fers sagement as referring more to the understanding, by which onij we can discover truth. T< 94 INTKODOOTION. pheiMy for example, is\ a mere matter of opinion. For! of this, as of every, opinion in general, what- ever it may be, we pe'rspect, that the contrary may perhaps, be proved:; Our. holding-true in this case is theaefore otgectively, as well as subjectively, in- sufficient, though itj considered in itself, may be rendered complete. 3. Bejlievins, or holding-true on a ground which is objectively insufficient, but' subjectively sufficient,, has reference to objects,- with regard to whicii wfi can, not only know nothing, but opine nothing, nay, not so much as pretend^probabilityj but be merely certain, that it is hot c6htradictory to think of such objects in the manner we do. The testis a free holding-true,, which is not necessary^ but with a practical -vi'ew given apn'oTi; conse- quently a holding-true of that which we assume on moral grounds in such a manner, as to be certain, that the contrary never can be proved.* • PelieviDg is not a particular; source of cognition. It is. a sort of 'incomplete holding-true with consciousness, and dis- tinguished, when considered as limited to a particular sort of objects [credibilia or those of belief only), from opining, not by the degree, but by the relation, which it as a cognition bears acting. The merchant, for instance, in order to make a bargain, must not merely opine, that there is something to be gained by it, that is, that his opinion is'&ufficient for the undertaking at a venture. We have- theoretical cognition (of the sensible), in which we can attain certainty, and with regard to all that which we can name human cognition this must^be possible. W« have similar certain cognitions totally i priori in practical laws; INTRODUCTION. 95 Matter? of belief then are, I , not objects of em- pjrical cognition. Hence can tbe historical belief, but these are foumied in a supersensible principle (liberty), as a principle of practical reason, in ourselves. But practical reason i* a causality with regard to an object likewise supersensible, the chief good, which is not possible in the sensible world by our power, yet nature as the object of our theoretical reason must har- monize with it ; for it is necessary, that the consequence or ef- feet of this idea should be met with in the sensible world. We ought therefore to act iu order to realize this end. We find in the sensible world traces of a wisdom of art ; and we believe, that the Cause of ihe world works with moral wisdom too for the chief good. This is a holdiag-true, which is sufficient to acting, that is, a belief. We stand in no need of that for acting, according to moral laws, for they are given by practical reason only; but we stand in need of the assumption of a Su- preme Wisdom for the object of our moral will, to which we, besides the mere tightfuluess of our actions, cannot avoid direct- ing our ends. This is objectively not a necessary reference of our arbitrament, yet the chief good is subjectively necessarily the object of a good (every human) will, and the belief in its attainableness is necessarily presupposed for it. Between the acquisition of a cognition by experience (a pos- teriori} and by reason (ipriori) there is no mean. But be- tween the cognition of an object and the mere presupposition of its possibility, there is a mean, either an empirical ground, or a ground of reason to assume its possibility with reference to a ne- cessary extending of the field of possible objects beyond those, whose cognition is possible to us. This necessity does not obtain but when the object is cognised as practical and practically neces- sary by reason ; for, to assume any thing in behalf of the mere enlargement of theoretical cognition, is always contingent. Thi> practically necessary presupposition of au object is that of the possibility of the chief good as the object of the arbitrament, by consequence that of the conditions of this possibility (God, li- 96 INTRODUCTIOK. commonly so named, not be termed belief, in the proper sense, and as such be opposed to knowing ; berty, and immortality). This is a subjective necessity, to as- sume the reality of the object on account of the necessary deter- mination of the will. This is the casus extraordinarius, without which practical reason canbot maintain itsielf with regard to it^ necessary end, and the favor necessitatis is of use to it here in its own judgment. It can acquire no object logicaSly, but ooly oppose what impedes it in the use of this idea which pertains to it practically. This belief is the necessity of assuming the objective reality of a conception (of the chief good), that is, the possibility of its ob- ject as an object of the arbitrament necessary d priori. When we consider actions only, we have no occasion for this belief. But if we have a mind to reach by actions the possession of the end possible by them, we must assume, thiit this end is quite possi- ble. I can only say, that I find myself necessitated by my end according to laws of liberty to assume a chief good in the world as possible, but I can necessitate nobody else by grounds (belief 13 free). The belief of reason consequently can never extend to theoreti- cal cognition ;' for in it the objectively insufficient holding-true is merely opinion. It is merely a presupposition of reason with a subjective, but absolutely necessary practical, view. The mind- cdntess according to moral laws leads to an object of the arbitra- ment determinable by pure' reason. The assuming of the at- tainableness of this object and consequently of the reality of the cause of its atlainableness is a moral belief, or a holding-true, which is free and necessary with a moral view tfi the completion of its ends. Fides is, properly speaking, faith in pacta, or a subjective confidence in one another, that the one will k«ep his word to the other — faith and belief. The former, wben the pactum is made, the latter, when it is to be concluded. iktroduction'.' 97 because it may itself be a knowing-. Holding-true on testimony is distinguished, neither as to the de- gree, nor as to the species, from holding true by one's own experience. Nor are matters of belief, II, objects of the cog- nition of reason (cognition a priori), either of the- oretical cognition, for example, in the mathematics and the metaphysics, or of the practical,, in moral philosophy. Mathematical truths of reason may be believed on testimonies, because error in this case, partly ig not easily possible, partly can be easily discovered; But they cannot be knqwn in this manner Philoso- phical truths of reason, on the other hand, cannot be so much as believed; they must be only known ; for philosophy does not admit of mere persuasion. And, as to the objects of the practical cognition of reason in moral philosophy in particular, the rights and the duties^ a mere belief can just as little have place. We must be quite certain whether some- thing is right or wrong, consonant to duty or con- trary to it, licit or illicit. In moral things nothing can be done at a venture ; nothing resolved on at the risk of infringing the law. For instance, it is not enough for a judge merely to believe, that one accused of having committed a crime has committed According to analogy practical reason is (so to say) the pro- iiyser,^man, the proiiiissary, the good expected from the act, the premissum. 98 IKTRODUCnOK. it. He must know it (juridically), or he ii not in- fluenced \)y conscience. III. Only the objects, the holding-true of which is necessarily free, that is to say, not determined by grounds of truth, which are objectively independ- ent of the nature and of the interest of the subject, are matters of belief . Hence does belief afford, because of the merely subjective grounds, no conviction, which may be communicated and commands universal assent, like the conviction which proceeds from knowing. I only can be certain of the validity and of the immu- tability of my practical belief in the truth of a pro- position, or the reality of a thing is that which, with regard to me, only supplies the place of a cog- nition, without being itself a cognition. He, who does not assume that, which it is im- possible to know but morally necessary to presup- pose, is morally unbelieving : A want of moral in- terest always forms the basis of this sort of incre- dulity. The greater the moral mindedness of a man is, the firmer and the more lively will his be- lief be in all that, which he finds himself forced from the moral interest to assume or presuppose in a practically necessary view. 3, Kn. WING (scire) is holding-true on aground of cognition, which is both objectively and subjec- tively sufficient, or certainty, accordingly as it is founded, either in experience (one's own, as well as that of others communicated), or in reason, i$ tNTRODUCTION. 99 either empirical, or rational: This distinction con- sequently refers to both the sources, experience and reasdn from whith all our knowledge is drawn. The rational certainty (or rather the certainty o^ reason) is again, either mathematical, or philoso- phical ; that is intuitive, this discursive. The mathematical certainty is named etidence; because an intuitive cognition is clearer, than d discursive one. Though the mathematical and the philosophical cognitions of reason are in themselves equally certain, the species of certainty is distinct in them The empirical certainty is an original one, pro- vided that we are certain of something from our own experience, and a derived one, if we are so by the experience of others; the latter is usually deno- minated the historical certainty. The rational certainty (or rather the certainty of reason) is distinguished from the empirical by the con- sciousness of the necessity that is conjoined with it; it is therefore an apodictical certainty, whereas theem- pirical is *utan assertive one. We are rationally cer- tain of what we would have perspected a priori, of course withoutall experience. Hence may ourcogni- tions regard objects of experience, and yet their cer- tainty be at once empirical and rational, provided that we cognise an empirically certain proposition from principles a priori. Certainty of reason of every thing we cannot have ; but, when it is possible for us to have it, vre must prefer it to the empirical certainty. 100 INTRODUCTION. All certainty is either a mediatei or an imme- diate one, that is to say, it either requires a proof, or is capable and stands in need of none. Though so much in our cognition is certain but mediately, that is, only by a proof, there must be something indemonstrable, or immediately certain, and all our cognition must set out from immediately certain pro- positions. The proofs, upon which all the mediate certainty of a cognition depends, are either direct, or indi- rect, apagogical. When we prove a truth by its grounds, we give a direct proof of it ; and when we from the falsity of the contrary infer the truth of a proposition, an apagogical. But if the latter shall hold good, the propositions must be contradic- torily or diametrically opposed to one another. Fof two propositioiis but contrarily opposed to one ano- ther may be both false. A proof, which is the ground of niathematical certainty, is termed a demon- stration, and that, which is the ground of philoso- phical certainty, an acromatical proof. The essential parts of every proof in general are its matter and its form ; or the argument and the consequence.* By a SCIENCE the complex of cognition, as a sys- tem, is to be understood. It is opposed to the com- mon cognition, that is, the complex of cognition, as a mere aggregate. A system depends upon an idea of the whole, which precedes the parts ; in ' * That argument, which is the principal ground of perspiect- ting the truth of a proposition, is Ditmed, by logicians, the nervus proiandi. T. IKTRODUCTION. lOl the common cognition, on the other hand, or in the piere aggregate of cognitions, the parts precede the whole. There are historical sciences and sciences of reason. In a science we often know the cognitions only, but not the things represented by them ; conse- quently there may be a science of that our cogni- tion of which is not a knowing. The universal result of what has been said of the nafure and of the species of holding-true is, That all our cognition is either logical, or practical. When we know, that we are divested of all sub- jective grounds and yet that the holding-true is suffi- cient, we are CONVINCED logically, or on objective grounds (the object is certain). The complete holding-true on subjective grounds, however, which in a practical view are equal to ob- jective ones, is likewise conviction, only not logi- cal (it is certain), but practical (I am certain).' And this practical conviction or moral belief is often firmer than all knowing. In knowing we listen to contrary grounds, but in believing we do not, because in it objective grounds ai'e not concerned, but the moral interest of the subject is.* * This practical conviction tlien is tlie belief of reason, which only, in the proper sense, must be named a belief and as such opposed to knowing and to all theoretical and logical conviction in general; because it never can be raised to knowing. Whereas the belief commonly termed historical must, as we have already observed, not be distinguished from knowing ; because it, as a species of theoretical or logical holding-true, may itself be a 103 INTROOnCTION. To conviction persuasion, a holding-trne oft insufficient grounds, which -we do not know whe- ther they are merely subjective or objective at the fame time, stands opposed. Persuasion often precedes conviction. We are conscious to ourselves of many cognitions but in such a manner, that we cannot judge whether the reasons of our holding-true are objective, or sub- jective. "VVe therefore must, in order to be able from mere persuasion to reach conviction, first re- flect, that is, see to what cognitive power a cogni- tion belongs, and then investigate, that is, prove whether the reasons are sufficient, or insufficient, with regard to the object. Many rest satisfied with persuasion, some reflect, but few investigate. Whoever knows what pertains to certainty does neither easily confound persuasion and conviction, nor allow himself to be persuaded. There is a de- terminative to approbation, which determinative is composed of both objective apd subjectfve grounds, and this mixed effect the greater number of man- kind do not disentangle. Though every persuasion, as to the form (for- knowing. We can assume an empirical truth on the testimony of others with the same certainty, as if we had attained it by facts of our own experience. In the former sort of empirical knowing, as well as in the latter, there is something fallacious. The historical or mediate empirical knowing depends upon the certitude of the testimonies. To the requisites of an unexsep- tionabU witness sufficient capacity and integrity belong. INTRODUCTION. 103 maliter) h, if an uncertain cognHion seems by it to be certain, false, it, as to the matter (materia' liter), may be true. And thus is it distinguished from opinion, which, if it is held certain, is an un- certain copjnition. The sufficiency of holding-true (in believing) may be put to the test either by betting, or by making oath. To the former comparative, to the latter absolute, sufficiency of objective reasons is necessary, instead of which however, when thej do not exist, an absolutely subjectively sufficient liolding-true is valid or holds good. We often use the phrases. To yield to one's judg- ment ; to reserve, to suspend or to give up one's judgment. Those and similar phrases seem to de- note, that there is something arbitrarious in our judging, by our holding something true, because we have a mind to do so. The question here there- fore is. Whether volition have an influence on our^ judgments ? The will has no influence on holding-true imme- diately ; otherwise it were very absurd. When it it said. We believe willingly what we wish, it signi- fies but our good wishes, for instance, those of the father with regard to his children. Had the will an immediate influence on our conviction of what we wish, we should be constantly forming chimeras of a happy state, and would then hold them always true. But the will cannot contest convincing proofs, which are contrary to our wishes and our ittclina- tions. 104 MJTRODUCTIOiN. But, as far as the will either excites the under- standing to the investigation of a truths or withholds it from it, we must grant it (the will) an influence on the use of the understanding, and by conse- quence mediately on conviction itself as it depends BO much upon the use of the understanding. But as to the suspending or reserving of our judg- n;ent in particular, it consists in the intention not to allow a merely previous judgment to become a determining one. A previous judgment is a judg- ment, by which I represent to myself, that there are ^nore reasons for the truth of a thing, than against it, but that these reasons do not suflSce to a deter- mining or definitive judgment, by which we decide directly for truth. Previous judging then is a judg- ing merely problematical with consciousness. The reservation of a judgment may take place with a twofold design ; either to seek for the rea. sons of the determining judgment; or in order ne- ver to judge. In the former case the suspension of thejudgmentis named a critical one fsuspensioju- dicitindagatoriaj ; in the latter, a sceptical. For the sceptic disclaims all judging; whereas the true philosopher, if he has not sufficient reasons for holding something true, but suspends his judgment. Tosuspend one's judgment according to maxims, an exercised judgment, which is not found but at an advanced age, is required. The reservation of our approbation is in general a very difficult thing, partly because our understanding is so desirous of INTRODOCTIOW. 105 enlarging itself and of enriching itself with know- ledge by judging, partly because we have always a greater propensity to certain things, than to others. But whoever has been often obliged to retract his ap- probation and is thereby grown prudent and circum- spect, does not bestow it so quickly, for fear of being under the necessity of retracting his judgment afterward. This retraction is always a mortifica- tion, and a reason of being diffident of all other knowledge. We have still to notice here that, to let one's judgment remain in duhio, and to let it remain in suspenso, are not identical. In this we always take an interest in the thing ; but in that it is not always suitable to our end and our interest to decide whe- ther the thing is true or not. Previous judgments are very necessary, nay, in- dispensable to the use of the understanding in all meditation and all investigation. For they serve to guide it in them and to furnish it with various means When we meditate on an object we must always judge previously and, as it were, get the scent of the cognition we are to acquire. And if one's ob- jects are inventions and discoveries, he must al- ways make a previous plan for himself; else his thoughts are employed at random. Hence may be conceived by previousjudgments maxims for the in- vestigation of a thing. They might be named an- ticipations too; because one anticipates his judg-" 106 INTRODUCTION. raentof a tbingbefore he knows what must determrne it. Such judgements are therefore of great utility j and even rules how to judge of an object previously mjght be given. Prejudices must be distinguished from previous judgments. Previous judgments^ if adopted as principles, are PREJUDICES. Every prejudice is to be consi- dered as a principle of erroneous judgment^ and not prejudices, but erroneous judgments arise from pre- judices. The false cognitioUj which arises from a prejudice, must therefore be distinguished from its source, the prejudice. The bodement of dreams, for example, is in itself not a prejudice, but an er- ror, which arises from the received general rule : What falls out according to expectation a few times, does so always or is for ever to be held true. And this principle, from which the bodement of dreams flows, is a prejudice. Prejudices are sometimes true previous judg- ments ; only their serving us for principles or for determining judgments, is wrong. The reason of this illusion is to be looked fOr in subjective grounds' being falsely held objective ones, from a want of reflection that must precede all judging. For, though we may assume several cognitions, for instance, the immediately certain propositions, with- out investigating them, that is, without proving the conditions of their truth, we judge of nothing with- out reflecting, that is to say, without comparing a INTRODUCTION. IQ'J' cognition with the cognitive faculty (the sensitivity or the understanding) whence it must needs arise. If we assume judgments without this reflection, ■which is even necessary when no investigation has place^, prejudices^ or priisciples for judging for suj^- jective reasons, falsely held objective ones, arise therefrom. The principal fountains of preji^dices are, imi- tation, custom or assuetude, and inclination. Imitation has a universal influence on our judg- ments; for it is a strong reason to hold true that, which others have given out to be so. Hence the prejudice. What every body does is right. As to the prejudices, which arise from custom, they ca|> be extirpated by length of time only, by the un- derstanding, stopped and detained by little and lit-, tie in judging by contrary reasons, by the under- standing's being thereby brought by degrees to an opposite way of thinking. But if a prejudice of custom originates in imitation too, it is difficult to cure the person who is filled with it. A prejudice from imitation may likewise be named, a proper\- sion to the passive use of reason or to the me- chanism of reason, instead of its (reason's) spon- taneity under laws. Reason is an active principle, which imst take nothing from the authority of others, not even, when its pure use is concerned, from experience. Put the indolence of a great many lu^jies them chuse rather (o trgad in ^he foqtstep^ of others, tlian 108 INTRODUCTION. to take the trouble of exercising their own intellect- ual facalties. Such men never can be but copies of others, and were every body of this sort, the world would remain for ever upon the same spot without making farther progress. It therefore is highly ne- cessary and important not to confine youth, as it is usually done, to mere imitating There are so many things, which contribute to accustom us to the maxim of imitation and thereby to make reason a soil fertile in predudices! To such aids of imitation pertain, 1. FoHMULES, which are rules, whose expres- sion serves for a pattern for imitation. Besides, they are very useful for the purpose of ease in in- tricate propositions, and therefore the most acute endeavour to find out rules of this sort. 2. SAYiNGS, or aphorisms, which express a preg- nant sense with so great precision, that it seems the sense cannot be comprised in fewer words. These say- ings (dicta), which must always be taken from others, to whom a certain infallibility is ascribed, serve, be- cause of this authority, for a rule and a law. The dicta of the bible are denominated xar sgo^ijy sayings. 3. Sentences, or propositions, which, as pro- ductions of a mature judgment, recommend them- selves and often, by the energy of the thoughts they contain, maintain their credit for centuries. 4. Canons, which are universal didascalic pro- positions that serve for a basis to the sciences, and express soniething well digested and sublime. That INTRODUCTIOM. 109 tlviey may please the more^ they may be expressed in a sententious manner, and, 5. Proverbs, or adages, which are popular rules of common-sense, or expressions of its popu- lar judgments. As such merely provincial propo- sitions serve none but the vulgar for sentences and canons, they are not used among those of a more liberal education. From the aforesaid three universal sources of m prejudices, and especially from imitation, many par- ticular prejudices have their issue. We shall here touch on the following only, as the most common ones : I. Prejudices of authority. Under this head may- be ranked, a, the prejudice arising from the authority of a person. When we, in things that depend upon experience and upon testimonies, build our know- ledge upon the authority of other persons, we can- not on that account be accused of any prejudice; for in things of this sort the authority of a person must, as we cannot experience every thing ourselves and embrace it with our own understand- ing, be the foundation of our judgments. But, when we make the authority of others the ground of our holding-true with regard to cognitions of reason, we assume these cognitions on a mere prejudice. For truths of reason hold anonymously ; relatively to them the question is, not Who said it, but What is said (non quis, sed quid)? It is of no conse- liQ INTflODUeXIOHi ^eniBe whether a eognition be qf a noble extract lion or not; but yet the propension to the preju- dice arising from the authority of great men is verj cpmmon, partly because of the limitation of one's own insightj partly from a desire of imitating that, which is described to us as great. Besides, the au- thority of the person serves to flatter oi^r vanity in an indirect manner. As, for instance, the subjects, of a potent despot are proud of being treated all alike by him, for the least may consider himself so fer equal with tKfe greatest, as both of them aie no- thing in comparison of the illimited power of their ruler; the admirers of a great man judge them- selves equal, if the merits, which they may possess among themselves, are to be considered as insignifi- cant in comparison of his pre-em;nence. Hence do the highly finished extolled great men feed the pro- penwty to the prejudice of the authority of a person not a little on more than one ground. b. The prejudice arising from the authority of a multitude. To this prejudice the populace in par- ticular are inclined. For they, not being able to jj,udge of the merits, abilities, and knowledge of a man, rather abide by the judgrtient of a multitude, on the presupposition that. What every body says ^lust be true. Yet this judgment has reference with them to nothing but historical things ; in mat- ters of religion, in which they themselves are iur terested, they rely upon the judgment of the learned. It is remarkable, th^t the ignorant are in genera) iNtrtoBtr^^ioiir: ill pre{)09SMsed in favor of learning, and that the'leata- ed, on the other hand^ are so in favor of common- Sense. When all the endeavours of a man of ktters. after he has piretty well gone through the circle of the sciences, do not afford him the proper satisfaction, he at last grows diffident of learning, particularly with regard to those speculations, in which the conceptions cannot be rendered sensible, and whose foundation is not solid, ds, for example, in the me- taphysics. But, as he thinks the key,to truth in cer- tain objects must hh to be found somewhete, he, after having looked for it so long in vain in the Way of the scientific investigation, seeks it in com- mon-sfense. But this hope is very fallacious ; for when the cultivated faculty of reason can effeetuatte nothing with regard to the cognition t)f certain things, the uncultivated will certainly do it just as little. Every where in the metaphysics the appeal to the decisions of common-sense is quite inadmissible ; because in them no case can be exhibited in the concrete. But in moral philosophy it is not so. In it not only all the rules can be given in the concrete, but practical reason reveals itself in general more clearly and rightly by the organ of the common use of the un- derstanding, than by that of the speculative. Hence does the common understanding often judge righter of matters of morality, than the speculative. lis INTRODUCTION. c. The prejudice of the authority of the age. In this class of prejudices the prejudice of antiquity is one of the principal ones. We no douht have reason to judge favourably of antiquity; but it is only a reason for a moderate reverence, whose bounds we but too often pass, by our making the ancients, so to say, treasurers of cognitions and of the sciences, raising the relative value of their wri- tings to an absolute one, and trusting ourselves blind- ly to their guidance. To esteem the ancients so excessively is, to reduce the understanding to its years of infancy and to neglect the use of one's own talent. And we would lie under a great mistake if we should believe, that all the ancients wrote in so classic a manner, as those, whose writings have reached us, have done. As time sifts every thing, and as nothing but that, which is of an intrinsic value, is preserved, we may presume, not without reason, that we possess no writings of the ancients but the best. There are several reasons for the begetting and the maintaining ofthe prejudice of antiquity. When something exceeds expectation according to a universal rule, one at first wonders at it and then this wondering often passes to admiration. That is the case with regard to the ancients, when we find in them something that, considering the circumstances of the time in which they lived, we did not look for. Another reason lies in this cir- lUTRODUCTHM. " 113 cnrastance, that the knowledge of the ancients and of antiquity shews learning and having read much ; which, common and insignificant as the things that have been drawn from the study of the ancients may be in themselves, always procures respect. A third reason is, the gratitude we owe the ancients for having broken the ice for us to much Jcnowledge. For which it should seem equitable to hold them ia particular veneration, but whose measure we often exceed. A fourth reason finally is to be sought in a certain envy of one's contemporaries. Whoever cannot cope with the moderns^ praises at their ex- pense the ancients to the skies, that the moderns may not be able to raise themselves above him.* The prejudice of novity is the contrary to that. The authority of antiquity and the prejudice in its favor fell now and then ; particularly at the begin- ning of the century before the last, when "the cele- brated Pontenelle declared for the moderns. Witli respect to cognitions susceptible of enlargement, it is very natural for us to put more confidence in the modems, than in the ancients. But this judgment has only a foundation as a mere previous judgment. If we make it a determining one, it becomes a pre-t judice. * This last reason seems quite applicable to our authoF's own er«mies, and envy to' be the only secret spring of their impotent opposition. But, as this venerable old man is now sunk into the grave, " Envy will drop her snakes, and stern* ejed Fury's self will melt." T. P 5 H wcy^oDucTioN. §, Prejudices from self-love, or logical egotism^ aecording to which one holds the agreement of his ©wn judgment with the judgments of others an uiIt Iieoessary criterion of truth. They, as they manit fe§t themselves by a, certain predilection to what is ^ production of one's own understanding, for in^ stance, one's own sysitem, are opposed to the prcr ^ijdices of authority. Whether is it good and adviseahle to let preju-: dices remain, or even to favor them ? It is asto- nisbin^; that in our age such questions, especialljf tbi$ one with regard to favoring prejudices, should ^tillbeput. Favoring one's prejudices,, ipjust ^ much as deceiving one with a good view, Toleav? prejudices untouched, however, may be done ; for who can occupy himself about discovering and aboi}t removing the prejudices of every body? But whether it is nqt adyiseable to labour at their extir-- patipn with all one's might ? —is another question. Old and rooted prejudice* are difficult to be pvei?- come ; because they exculpate themselves and s^re, as it were, their own judge. And letting prejudices remain is endeavoured to be excnsed by saying, that pjfcschief would be occasioned by their extirpation.. But, admitting this mischief; — it fthis extirpatipei) ^ill be productive of great good bef eafi^, tJiTitoiJucftolf. i 15 X. Prohahility. Explication of the Proha- hiliiies. Distinction of Probability from Verisimilitude. Mathematical and Philosophical Probability. Doubt both subjective and objective. Sceptical, Dog^ maticali and Critical Way of Think*- ing" or Method of Philosophising^. My*- pothesiss The doctrine of the knowledge of the prob^bili'^ ties which are to be considered as an approximation to certitude, belongs to the doctrine of the certainty i)f our knowledge. By t-ROBABiLitr, a holdiog-true on insafficiefit grounds, but which have a greater relation to suffi- cient ones, than the grounds of the contrary, istttbfe tmderstood. By this explication we distinguish J»f' the first relation categori- cal judgments are determined, by the second hypo- tltetical^and by the third disjunctive. JUDGMENTS. 147 24. Categorical Judgments. In these the subject and the predicate make up their matter ; the form, by which the relation (of agreement or of disagreement) between the subject and the predicate is determined and expressed, is tejmed the copyla. Scho. Categorical judgments make up the matter of other judgments ; but from this we must not think, as several logicij^ns do, that both hypothetical an.d disjunctive judgments are nothing more than differ- ent dresses of categorical ones, and can therefore be all reduced to them. All the three judgments de- pen^ upon essentially distinct logical functions of the understanding, and consequently must be dis- cussed ^according to their specific distinction. 25. Hypothetical Judgments. The matter of these consists of two judgments, which are connected together as antecedent and consequent. The one of these judgments, which contains the ground, is the antecedent (priusj ; the other, which stands in the relation of consequence to that, the consequent (posterius); and the repre- sentatiion ,of this sort of connexion of both judgr mcnts together forming the unity of consciousness 148 LOGIC. is named the consequence, which makes up the form of hypothetical judgments, Scho. I. What the copula is to categorical judg-- ments, the consequence is to hypothetical ones their form. 3. Some think it easy to transform a hypotheti- cal proposition to a categorical. But it is not prac- ticable; because they are quite distinct by their very nature. In categorical judgments nothing is problematical, but every thing assertive; whereas in hypothetical ones, the consequence only is asser- tive or positive. In the latter we may therefore connect two false judgments together; for in this case the whole affair is the rightness in the con- nexion—the form of the consequence ; upon which the logical truth of these judgments depends. There is an essential distinction between these two propositions : All bodies are divisible, and. If all bodies are composed, they are divisible. In the former the thing is maintained directly; it in the latter is maintained on a problematically expressed condition only. 26. Modes of Conneocion in hypotheticalJudg' ments : Modvs ponens and Modus tollens. The form of connexion in hypothetical judg- ments is twofold : the laying down (modus ponens) and the annulling f modus tollens J. JUDGMENTS. 149 I. When the antecedent or ground is true, the consequent determined by it is likewise true. This is denominated the modus ponens ; S. When the consequent is false, the antece- dent or ground is likewise false ; the modus tollens. 27. Disjunctive Judgments. A judgment, when the parts of the sphere of a given' conception determine one another in tibe whole or ttt a whol^ as complements, is disiunc- tive, S8. Matter and Form of disjunctive Judg- ments. The several given judgments, of which the dis- junctive judgment is composed, constitute its mat- ter, and are named the members of disjunction or opposition. In the disjunction itself, that is, in the. deterrr|ination of the relation of the various judg- ments, as members of the whole sphere of the di- vided cognition excluding one another, the form of these judgments consists, Scho. All disjunctive judgments then represent various judgments as in the commerce of a sphere anddo not produce any judgment but by the limi- tation of the otherswith regard to the vyhole sphere ; they consequently determine the relation of eyery 150 ■ 1,061c. judgment to the whole sphere, and thereby the relation, which these members of disjunction have to one another. Not one member in this judgment -therefore determines another but with a proviso, that all the members are in bommeree as parts of a ■whole sphere of cognition, without which nothing in a certain reference can be thought of. 29. Peculiar Character of disjtmctive Judg- ntents. The peculiar character of all disjunctive judg- ments, whereby their -specific distinction, as to the point of relation, from the others, in particular from the categorical ones, is determined, consists in this, that all the members of disjunction arepro- ■ blematieal judgments, of which nothing else is thought, than tlmt' they, as parts of the sphere of a cognition, each the complement of the other to the whole ( complementum ad totum), taken toge- ther, are equal to that sphere. And hence it fol- lows, that tlie truth must be contained in one of these problematical judgments or (what amounts to the same thing) that one of them must hold asser- tively ; because besides them the sphere of cogni- tion comprehends nothing more on the given con- ditions and the one is opposed to the other ; by con- sequence 'they only, and butone of them, can be true. oil. ; JUDGMENTS. 151 Scho. In a categorical judgment the thing, whose representation is considered as a part of the sphere of another subordinate representation, is consi- dered as contained under this its superior con- ception ; consequently in the subordination of the spheres here the part of the part is com- pared with the whole. But in disjunctive judg- ments we go from the whole to all the parts taken together. What is contained under the sphere of a conception, is likewise contained under any one of the parts of thiis sphere. Accordingly the sphere must be first divided. When we, for instance, form the disjunctive judgment, ' a learned man is either a mere historian^ or a philosopher, or a hia- thematician,' we determine by it, that these con- ceptions, as to the sphere, are parts of the sphere of the learned, but by no means parts of one ano- therj and that they, collectively taken, are com- plete. That in disjunctive judgments, not the sphere of the divided conception, as contained in the sphere of the divisions, but that which is contained under the divided conception, as contained under one of the members of division, is considered, the following- scheme of the comparison between categorical and disjunctive judgments- may render the matter more intuitive : In categorical judgments, x is what is contained under b, and likewise under a ; 1 53 tOGlC. In disjunctive ones x, contained under a, is con tained under either b, or c, and so on ; d X- S:. i^^Ji.