T^^'^^^' Jr:r*^.K m. u^, QfortigU Itttoerattg aitbrar}| JItljara, Nem ^atk CJi.(jU.yo«*n<\ Cornell University Library JX 234.A41T78 1919 Treaty of peace with Germany.Hearings be 3 1924 007 463 353 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924007463353 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY HEARINGS be:e'orb tbb COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE SIXTY-SIXTH GGNGRESS FIRST SESSION ON THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY, SIGNED AT VERSAILLES ON JUNE 28, 1919, AND SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE ON JULY 1», 1919, BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES Printed for the use of the Gominittee on Foreign Relations WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PEINTINS OFFICE 1919 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE SIXTY-SIXTH CONGEESS FIRST SESSION ON THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY, SIGNED AT VERSAILLES ON JUNE 28, 1919, AND SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE ON JULY 10, 1919, BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1919 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. HENRY CABOT LODGE, Massachusetts, Chairman. POBTEB J. McCUMBEB, North Dakota. GILBERT M. HITCHCOCK, Nebraska. WILLIAM E. BORAH, Idaho. JOHN SHARP WILLIAMS, Mississippi. FRANK B. BRANDEGEE, Connecticut. CLAUDE A. SWANSON, Virginia. ALBERT B. PALL, New Mexico. ATLEE POMERENE, Oluo. PHILANDER C. KNOX, Pennsylvania. MARCUS A. SMITH, Arizona. WARREN G. HARDING, Ohio. KEY PITTMAN, Nevada. HIRAM W. JOHNSON, CaUfomia. JOHN K. SHIELDS, Tennessee. HARRY S. NEW, Indiana. QEORGE H. MOSES, New Hampshire. Chables F. Redmond, Clerk. II TABLE OF CONTENTS. Aland Islands: Page. Statement of Alexander J. Johnson 1041 Albania: Statements of — C. Telford Erickson 971 C. A. CheVrezi 1001 C. A. Dako 1005 Baruch, Bernard M. : Statements of, on economic clauses 5, 38, 53 China: Statements of — Thomas F. F. Millard 430 John C. Ferguson 557, 583 Edward T. Williams •. 617 Lansing-Ishii agreement, with respect to 225 Announcement of Department of State concerning exchange of notes with Japan, in regard to ; 226 Message of the President concerning protest of American delegates to the peace conference in regard to Shantun.? 252 Convention of March 6, 1898, between China and Germany with respect to the lease of Kiaochow to Oermany 585 Agreement of March 21, 1900, between China and Germany with regard to the Jviaochow-Chinan Railway Regulations 587 Con-v'ention of November 28, 1905, between China and Germany regarding the withdrawal of German troops from Kiaochow and Kaomi 590 Agreement of July 24, 1911, between the provincial authorities of Shantung and the Chino-German Mining Co., tor delimiting mining areas in Shan- tung 591 Official statement of the Chinese Government with regard to the Japanese ultimatum of May 7, 1915 601 Opium traffic in Shantung — Statements of — E. T. Williams 647 E. E. Macklin 699 Memoranda on Shantung, filed by — Sidney L. Gylick 755 Toyokichi lyenaga 1084 Frederick McCormick 1C87 Czecho-Slovakia : Statements of — Edward Vaczy 1050 Ven Svarc 1054 CD. Koreff If 66 Davis, Norman H.: Statements of, on financial clauses 75, 97 Egypt: Statement of Joseph W. Folk 651 135546—19 — 1 1 a TABLE OF CONTENTS. Esthonia: Statements by— P»e«- R. T. Caldwell 701 George Gordon Battle 703 G. A. Beall 707 FiuME. (See Italy.) Greece: Staiements of — Williams. Felton 934 Prof. George M. Boiling 93-5 N. J. Cassavetes 941 Hungary: Statem.ent8 of — Eugene Pivany 947 Dr. BelaSekely 961 Henry Baracs 969 Brief of Hungarian American Federation 979 India: Statement of Dudley Field Malone 750 Ireland: Statements of — Daniel F. Cohalan , 757 Frank P. Walsh 794 Michael J. Ryan 854 Edward F. Dunne 860 W. W. McDowell 865 John Archdeacon Murphy 867 Daniel C. O'Flaherty 873 W. Bourke Cockran 879 Memorial of citizens of Irish origin in opposition to the league of nations. . 764 Declaration of Independence of 785 Correspondence between the American commissioners for Irish independ- ence, the American peace commif sion, etc 800 Report of American Commission on Irish Independence relating to condi- tions in Ireland 822 Report of interview in Paris between the President of the United States and the American Commission on Irish Independence 835 Brief protesting against arguments presented to the committee in behalf of Ireland 903 Italy: Statements of — Fiorello H. La Guardia, Member of Congress 1109 Prof. Alexander Oldrini 1112 S. A. Cotillo 1118 Ernest Papich 1140 Marian Curry 1142 Dr. L. Vacarro 1143 W. H. Field 1148 Brief of Italo- American Irredentist Association 1129 Japan : Lansing-Ishii agreement 225 Announcement by United States Department of State regarding exchange of notes with, concerning China (Nov. 2, 1917) 226 Message of the President regarding alleged secret treaty between Ger- manv and 252 Official statement of Chinese Government regarding ultimatum by 601 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 3 Jugo-Slavia: Statements of — Page. Etbin Karistan 1091 R. F. Hlacha 1098 A. H. Skubic 1100 Frank Kerze 1105 Philip Godina 1108 Labor: International conference on — Statement of the Secretary of Labor 32 Lansing-Ishii agreement 225 Lansing, Robert. (See State, Secretary of.) Latvia: Statements by — R. T. Caldwell 701 George Gordon Battle 703 Rev. Carl Podin 709 League op nations: Statement of David Hunter Miller 379 Resolution submitted to American peace commissioners by the Secretary • of State, with respect to 251 American draft of a covenant for 254 First report of the commission on 264 Final report of the commission on 270 Proceedings of the Peace Commission on covenant for 280 Address of the President on, at the Peace Conference 280 Membership of the commission on 309 Lithuania: Statements by — R. T. Caldwell 701 George Gordon Battle 703 John S. Lopatto 714 MoLEH, David Hunter: Statement on the league of nations 379 Negroes, race equality and protection op, etc.: Statements of — William Monroe Trocter 679 Allen W. Whaley 682 Joseph H. Stewart 683 J. ffNeill 684 J. T. Thomas 694 W. H. Jernagan 695 Charles S. WiUiams 696 J. A. Lankford 698 Palmer, Bradley W. : Statement of, on economic clauses 14 Peace Conference: Membership of commissions of the 309 Persia: Statement of Charles Wells Russell 1011 Alleged treaty with Great Britain (Aug. 9, 191 9) 1023 4 TABLE OF GOlifXENTS. President, the: F»ge. Message to the Senate relating to alleged secret treaty between Germany and Japan 252 Message to the Senate relating to the protest of American Peace Commis- sioners in regard to Shantung 252 Letter to the chairman of the committee replying to the committee's request for various information concerning the treaty of peace 253 Address to the Peace Conference, on the league of nations 280 Proceedings of the conference with the committee at the White House 499 Rbsponsibiuty fob the War. (See War.) State, Secretary of: Statement of 139, 215 Resolution on league of nations, submitted to American Peace Commission by 251 Shantung. (See China.) Ukrainia: Statements by — R. T. Caldwell 701 George Gordon Battle 703 Emil Revyuk 712 War: Responsibility for the — Report of the commission on 316 Memorandum by American commissioners on 375 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. THURSDAY, JUIiY 31, 1919. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D. C. The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to the call of the chairman, in room 426, Senate Office BuUding, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge presiding. Present, Senators Lodge (chairman), McCumber, Fall, Knox, Harding, Johnson, Moses, Hitchcock, Williams, Swanson, Pomerene, Smith, and Pittman. STATEMENT OF MR. BERNARD M. BARUCH. The Chairman. Mr. Baruch, what is your title — one of the advisers of the American mission at the peace conference ? Mr. Bakuch. Economic adviser. The Chairman. I want to ask you a question first that does not come directly under your economic clauses, but one about which I thought possibly you might know. Article 237 on page 253, says: The successive installments, including the above sum, paid over bj[ Germany in satisfaction of the above claims will be divided by the Allied and Associated Govern- ments in proportions which have been determined upon hy them in advance on a basis of general equity and the rights of each. Do you know if that determination has been reached, and if it has been omitted in the document ? Mr. Baruch. I understood it had not been reached. Senator McCumber. Then, it should read, "which shall have been determined," rather than "which have been determined," should it not ? The Chairman. The statement in article 237 is incorrect, of course ? Mr. Baruch. Let me see how it rea,ds in the French. The French would mean "following the proportions determined by them ia advance." The Chairman. I did not compare it. Mr. Baruch. It gives an incorrect translation. You see, it says "determin6es par eux k I'avance." The translation is not exactly correct. The Chairman. It says "seronts r^partis par les Gouvemments allies et associ^s suivant les proportions determin^es par eux k I'avance et fond6es sur I'^quite et les droits de chacim." Apparently th(3 French is correct and ours is incorrect. Senator Moses. What is your point with reference to that translation ? 6 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. TheCHAffiMAN. The French says "shall be" and ours is "have been." Senator Moses. The French says "seront repartis "— will be divided. Mr. Baruch. I think you are referring to the one a little further down. Senator Moses. There is only one place. I do not get your point. Mr. Baruch. The point is '^which have been determined." The French means "determined by them in advance." The Chairman. This says "which have been determined." That does not give the sense of the French clause, certainly. Senator Hitchcock. The English text should leave out the words "which have been?" Mr. Baruch. In proportions determined upon by them in advance. Senator Moses. "Which have been" should be omitted, then? The Chairman. I do not think it is clear in either language. Mr. Baruch. It does not seem to me that is a correct translation of the French. I am not a French scholar, but that is the way it seems to me. The Chairman. On second thought, I think it is pretty nearly cor- rect. Senator Moses. It is the past participle. Senator Swanson. It simply means that whatever distribution is made, the Allies shall agree. The Chairman. This speaks of it as having been determined. It says "which shall have been determined." I think the French is pretty nearly the same, on second thought. Senator Knox. Mr. Baruch, you say that this distribution has not been determined upon, so far as you know. Is that correct? Mr. Baruch. Up to the time that I left it had not been, so far as I know. Senator Knox. Had there been any conversations on the subject — any effort to arrive at a basis ? Mr. Baruch. There had been some discussion. Senator Knox. Was there any tentative plan drawn up ? Mr. Baruch. Not that I was aware of. Senator Knox. Do you recall what proportion the United States had in this distribution ? Mr. Baruch. No, sir. Senator Knox. Can you suggest approximately what proportion ? The question of the United States getting an interest in the rep- aration has not been decided. I believe it is a matter that is under discussion. Senator Knox. Between whom were these discussions held, especially with reference to whether the United States should or should not have any proportion of the indemnity ? Mr. Baruch. I think those matters would be a question for deter- mination by the President, rather than anybody else — or for this body. Senator Knox. The President alone, or the President in conjunc- tion with the Congress ? Mr. Baruch. You would be a better judge of that than I, as to what the procedure would be. TKEATY OP PEACE WITH GEEMA^STY. 7 Senator Knox. You said a moment ago, as I understood you, that the question as to whether the United States should participate in this reparation had not been determined ? Mr. Baruch. So far as I imderstand. Senator Knox. Was there any suggestion that the United States should not participate ? Mr. Baruch. That was a part of it — that we should not be paid any reparation. Senator Knox. I understood the President to say in his address to the Senate on July 10 that we were not to have any share in the reparation, and I wondered whether that fact had been determined, or whether he was foreshadowing his own purposes with respect to that? Mr. Baruch. I understand that that has been the President's view. Mr. Knox. That is all, as far as I am concerned. Senator Moses. Have the members of the Keparation Committee been tentatively determined upon by the other powers so far as you know? Mr. Baruch. The membership ? Senator Moses. Yes. Mr. Baruch. No. Senator Moses. Who were the members of this group who held the conversations with reference to reparation ? Mr. Baruch. Did your question refer to the permanent Reparation Commission ? Senator Moses. Yes. Mr. Baruch. I imderstand it has not been appointed for the permanent Reparation committee, but they desired to have an ad iaterim or provisional commission. Senator Moses. The President's letter would indicate that pro- visional selections had been made by all the powers. Mr. Baruch. That I am not aware of; I do not know whether they have been selected, or who they were. In the newspaper reports there were names mentioned, but I do not know how correct they were. Senator McCumber. Was it your understanding of the President's view that we should not have any reparation for the sinking of ships before the war? Mr. Baruch. That matter would not be covered by reparation. That comes under the head of prewar claims and is not a war claim. That is not a matter of reparation. Senator Knox. Pardon just one other question in connection with the suggestion of our nonparticipation in the indemnity. I under- stood you to say that you thought that was a question for the Presi- dent's determination. Mr. Baruch. I would rather put it, "for determination." I do not know exactly who would determine it. Senator Knox. On the question of our renouncement of our share of the indemnity in the Boxer affair, at the time of the Boxer out- break, do you recall how that was determined, whether by the President or by Congress ? Mr. Baruch. No; I do not know. The Chairman. The committee desire to have some explanation of two paragraphs appearing on page 371 [reading]: 8 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANT. (1) As regards Powers adopting Section III and the Annex thereto, tlie said proceeds and cash assets shall be credited to the Power of which the owner is a national, through the Clearing Office established thereunder; any credit balance in favour of Germany- resulting therefrom shall be dealt with as provided in Article 243. (2) As regards Powers not adopting Section III and the Annex thereto, the proceeds of the property, rights and interests, and the cash assets, of the nationals of Allied or Associated Powers'held by Germany shall be paid immediately to the person entitled thereto or to his Government; the proceeds of the property, rights and interests, and the cash assets, of German nationals received by an Allied or Associated Power shall be subject to disposal by such Power in accordance with its laws and regulations and may be applied in payment of the claims and debts defined by this Article or paragraph 4 of the Annex hereto. Any property, rights and interests or proceeds thereof or cash assets not used as above provided "may be retained by the said Allied or Associated Power and if retained the cash value thereof shall be dealt with as provided in Article 24.3. It makes a different disposition. We should like to know about that choice that was there given as to adopting section 3. Senator Swanson. Suppose you put in article 243. Mr. Baeuch. That should be the distribution. The Chairman. That simply arranges as to the distribution, but what the Senator wanted to find out about, and what the committee desired to find out about, was about this choice that was here given. Mr. Baruch. I will be glad to answer that question, but perhaps the rest of the committee would like to know exactly how the eco- nomic commission functioned. If you would, I would like to read a little statement here. I think it might interest the committee to learn somewhat how our committee functioned mechanically and how we arrived at our decisions. It will only take two or three minutes to read it, and then I will answer the question which was asked. I think you can understand my answer better if I read this first. The Chairman. Certainly, read it. Mr. Baeuch. The clauses of the peace treaty dealing with econom- ics, customs, enemy property and industrial property, were drawn up by the economic commission, which was made up of representa- tives of all of the larger powers, representatives of certain of the smaller powers being associated with them from time to time. The work was divided among subcommissions, to consider the various phases of the subject. These subcommissions considered, for example, such matters as customs tariffs and navigation, com- mercial treaties, prewar debts, prewar contracts, the disposal of enemy property, mdustrial property (patents, copyrights, etc.). In order to cover the field, we invited to Paris the following gen- tlemen : Dr. Frank Taussig, chairman of the United States Tariff Commis- sion, to deal with the subjects of customs duties and the Uke sub- jects. These he handled, together with Prof. A. A. Young, who was already attached to the peace commission, and who had been making a special study of these subjects before Dr. Taussig's arrival. There was also associated with the advisory staff Mr. F. K. Niel- sen, who was formerly one of the solicitors of the State Department. Mr. J. E. Brown, who had made a study of patents, and who, together with Mr. Pennie, one of the leading patent lawyers in Amer- ica, looked after industrial property and patents. We also had associated with us Mr. Alex. Legge, formerly vice chairman of the War Industries Board; Mr. L. L. Summers, who had TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 9 been technical advisor of the War Industries Board; and Mr. Charles H. MacDowell, head of the chemical section of the War Industries Board; also Mr. Bradley Pahner, who had been one of the legal advisors of the Alien Property Cu ?todian ; and Mr. Chandler Ander- son, formerly counselor of the Department of State for a short time. We all met as a group from time to time, in order to compare notes, and the entire economic clauses were gone over and subjected to criticism by this group. For the meetings of the international subcommissions each country selected its expert to sit upon the various matters. The chairmen were of different nationalities; thus the chairman of the customs commission was an American, of the commercial treaties commission an Italian, of the property comDiission a' Frenchman, and so on. Covering a period of several weeks these subcommissions sat fre- quently; toward the end they sat almost continuously. American experts upon these subcommissions made frequent reports to the American members of the commission, and ail were thus in close touch with the progress of the work. In accordance with the plan adopted, these subcommissions, when they arrived at a conclusion, presented such reports to the main Economic Commission for approval, amendment or rejection. In this way the points of each particular topic were reviewed again, and as report after report of these subcommissions was adopted by the main commission, the reports were carefully drawn together so as to make a whole. The reports of the mam commission were finally submitted to the Supreme Council for approval, substantially in forna as appears to-day in the treaty text. The work of all the men connected with these prolonged discus- sions was done with the highest order of zeal, intelligence and efl5- ciency, and we can feel that the best interests of the United States were looked after. As an evidence of the way in which the work was prepared for consideration by the American delegation, I will submit to you a copy of draft of economic clauses, privately printed, with comments and explanations of the various American delegates. On one side you will find an explanation of each clause, and on the other the comment of the American delegate. Further I will be glad to submit to you a concise statement of the economic clauses made by the various expert advisers immediately after the treaty was adopted, being explanatory of what they mean and what effect they would have upon American interests. Senator Moses. That summary is already prepared? Mr. Baruch. Yes, sir. Senator Williams. What page ? Mr. Bakuch. I have not the same text that you have, Senator. The Chairman. Paragraphs (1) and (2) giving the choice whether the Powers would accept section 3. Senator Williams. Page 371 of the text. Mr. Baruch. That was in reference to the selection of the clearing- house system, which was put forth primarily by England. The American delegation did not feel that that- was one that we should adopt. 10 TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Hitchcock. Please explain what the clearmg-house sys- tem was. Mr. Baruch. The central part of the clearing-house arrangement is that relating to prewar debts, and the procedure with reference to prewar debts shows the nature of the scheme. Each country begins by guaranteeiag to the other the debts due by its own citizens. Germany, for instance, guarantees that debts due by Germans to Englishmen shall be paid. England, on the other hand, guarantees that debts due by Englishmen to Germans shall be paid. Various incidental provisions are made with regard to the process of ascertaining and checking these debts, but they are not important for the essentials of the scheme. All these debts, when ascertained and checked, are reported to certain clearing offices defined in the treaty. If it should appear that Germany owes to England more than England owes to Germany, as ascertained at the clearing offices, Germany pays the balance m cash to England. If, on the other hand, it appears that England owes a balance to Germany, the balance is not paid by England in cash, but is set aside as a credit to Germany's account in connection with reparations or other obligations which Germany must assume under the treaty. That refers to paragraph 243. Attention should be called to this feature of the general process of settlement. Since Germany has large obligations to meet, more particularly for repa^ rations, anything that is left to her credit is simply turned into what may be called a "pool," namely, the general accumulation of assets and resources which Germany must utilize in. order to meet reparation charges and the like. The clearing-house settlement arrangement is further applied to the liquidation of German property. England, for example, has seized or sequestrated certain property situated in England and belonging to German nationals. This property is held as a security or pledge for repaying damages or sequestration losses incurred by Englishmen who may nave had property situated in Germany. Any balance left in England's hand after these property losses in Germany are met, is again regarded as a balance for the "pool" or reparation assets, is reported to the clearing house, and is available for repara- tion purposes. It IS a natural part of this arrangement that the German Govern- ment itself undertakes to recompense its own nationals (Germans) who may have debts due to them or may be the owners of property taken over by the British Government — I simply use the British as an example. The German nationals are not expected to suffer, but their indemnification is left to their own Government. Senator Williams. All this is credited to Germany as part of her reparation ? Mr. Baruch. Yes, sir. The whole arrangement did not seem to the United States repre- sentatives a desirable one for this country, and from the start they stated that the United States would not enter on it. The treaty Erovides (article 296, clause "e") that no country shall be bound y it imless affirmative notice of its acceptance is given, and our expectation is that no such affirmative notice will be given by the United States. Senator Swanson. That is limited to prewar debts ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 11 Mr. Bakuch. Yes; prewar debts. Senator Swanson. Take the German property that there is in the United States. Under section 3, how would that property be dis- tributed ? Mr. Baeuch. German property that has been seized by the cus- todian ? Senator Swanson. Yes. Mr. Baeuch. That property is left in the hands of Congress, to do with it as it wishes. Senator Swanson. Under this treaty ? Mr. Baeuch. Absolutely. Senator Swanson. Then the treaty does not make any disposition of that property, I imderstand. Mr. Baeuch. No, sir. It leaves it in the hands of Congress to dispose of. But, in addition, under that treaty it has been given additional rights of use. It can be held as a set-off against American property in Germany. It can be used for the payment of prewar claims hke the Lusitania, and other prewar claims. Senator Swanson. Do you know the section of the treaty where that is particularly provided for ? The Chaieman. We will come to that later, when we take up the ahen property provisions. I understand that you take advantage of the privilege granted in paragraph (2) and do not adopt paragraph (3) ? Mr. Baeuch. Yes, sir; that is our recommendation. The Chairman. Well, now, we might as well go to the alien prop- erty division. Senator Swanson. If we do not accept section 3, what is the method of settling claims, with section 3 eliminated? We might as well get that clear. Mr. Baeuch. Congress will have to make disposition and set up machinery, as I understand it, to meet the situation. Senator Swanson. The treaty does not set up any machinery except under section 3. Mr. Baeuch. The machinery that would be set up affecting us would be the mixed tribunal, and that was done in order to enable American citizens, or to protect American citizens — that is not exactly the word, but you will get my meaning — against the neces- sity of going into Germany to get jurisdiction tnere. It provides a mixed tribunal to try the case. Senator Swanson. And aU this treaty does as to section 3 is to create a mixed tribunal to fix the relative indebtedness of German and American citizens. Mr. Baeuch. Our courts are to settle all questions for Americans. Senator Williams. We would have to institute something Hke the Spanish Treaty Claims Commission, or some sort of organization. Mr. Baeuch. I believe that Mr. Palmer, who has given study to that and who is familiar with it, is probably working on that. Senator Hitchcock. The national of every other country must depend upon this international commission in order to secure his claim against Germany. Mr. Baeuch. If his Government elects in the first instance. Senator Hitchcock. Is each Government free to elect ? Mr. Baeuch. Yes; either system. 12 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANY, Senator Knox. Where do you find that, Mr. Baruch, in the treaty; what page and section ? Senator Swanson. It is on page 351, subparagraph "e." Now, I understand that if Germany has any claims against the United States they must sue in our courts ? Mr. Baruch. A German citizen; yes. Senator Swanson. Now, if a citizen of the United States has a claim against a German in Germany, Germany has agreed to create a mixed commission to ascertain that indebtedness. Mr. Baruch. Yes, sir. Senator Williams. Senator Knox, what you are inquiring for is subparagraph "e" on page 351. Mr. Baruch. Does that answer your question. Senator ? Senator Knox. Yes; thank you. Senator Fall. May I ask you a question ? Why do you think that is a better proposition for the people of the United States to go to this mixed arbitration tribunal rather than to a clearing house ? Mr. Baruch. I can answer that question more concisely by just reading three paragraphs here from this print which I had hoped to place in the hands of each member. It is an explanation of each one of the economic clauses, and giving under the head of each one the reasons for the clause as it is. Senator Fall. I will withdraw the question until we have those data. Mr. Baruch. You will find it quite clearly explained there. Senator Pomerene. Those are the explanations made by our rep- resentatives, of the text ? Mr. Baruch. They were explanations made by our representatives, giving our understanding of the clauses. Senator Williams. Made by the subcommittees to the group 1 Mr. Baruch. Yes. Senator Pomerene. In other words, they were reservations to the treaty ? Mr. Baruch. No. Senator Moses. These explanations were made by the groups which you have described as composed of various gentlemen gathered in subsidiary bodies, who were dealing with the economic clauses of the treaty in the first instance ? They represent your own arguments ? Mr. Baruch. Yes, sir. Senator Moses. And after being put in this printed form they were put in the hands of the five commissioners or plenipotentiaries, for their information ? Mr. Baruch. All the economic commissions, of the five countries, came together, and then when we had agreed we reported to the com- mission of four, and they accepted it; and then it was put in the hands of our drafting commission. Does that answer your question ? Senator Moses. Yes; except that it seems as if there was some intermediate step left out as to how our plenipotentiaries got into possession of it. Mr. Baruch. They were advised. Senator Moses. In writing ? Mr. Baruch. The minutes of each meeting were sent to them. Senator Pomerene. Were these explanatory notes incorporated in your minutes which you submitted to the commission ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 13 Mr. Baeuch. So far as I know this is the only commission that made its report in this way. We got this up for our own particular benefit, so that we could digest the subject. You wiU notice that the treaty is a very large volume, and we got this up as a ready ref- erence more for our own selves than for anything else. Senator Williams. It is the explanation of your conduct — explains the residt you arrived at. Suppose you just read that to the com- mittee. Mr. Baeuoh (reading) : Article A and Regulation X provide for a system under which clearing offices are created, one between each allied State and Germany, for the settlement of debts. In order to make the plan workable, it is provided that: (a) Each State shall guarantee the payment of all debts owing by its nationals to nationals of the enemy State, except in cases of the insolvency of the debtor, before the war; (6) The proceeds of the sale of private enenly property in each State shall be used by the said State to pay the debts of its own nationals; (c) Debtors and creditors in States formerly enemy are forbidden to settle their debts with each other or to communicate with each other regarding them. This plan may be desirable for Great Britain, but is extremely undesirable, if not actually impossible, for the United States. It is accordingly recommended that it be not accepted by the United States. 1. Our Government should not accept the biu'den of guaranteeing the private debts owed by its citizens. This would be an obligation of unknown and probably very great proportions. 2. The treaty should not compel the United States to use the private property of Germans in our country for the payment of debts owed by other Germans to our citizens. To do so might amount to confiscation. Senator Fall. If we do not guarantee the debts due to our own nationals as other nations propose to do, and do not use the excess of the proceeds of sales of alien property for the discharge of such debts, we are the only nation that will leave our citizens entirely improtected, except as to their recourse against the nationals of the other country through other tribunals. Mj. Baeuch. Congress has the power to do what it wishes. Senator Fall. You mean to say that although you recommend to the contrary, Congress could go ahead and pass lav/s providing for the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of property in the hands of the Aljen Property Custodian ? Mr. Baeuch. I said that those were the views as expressed by myself. That is still my present view, and I will be glad to state my reasons. Might not Mr. Palmer make a statement in reference to this ? Senator Swanson. Suppose you finish the reading of your own statement. Mr. Baeuch (reading) : Moreover, Congress has expressly reserved to itself the power to decide what shall become of the enemy property in the United States. On the other hand, there seems no objection to the United States retaining the enemy property, for the present, as a hostage or pledge to secure American rights, and then deciding in its own way what is the fair and proper course. To accept the clearing-house system would commit the United States to a course which, it is firmly believed. Congress will not wish to follow. 3. To forbid our citizens from adjusting their debts and accounts with former ene- mies privately would be a wholly unnecessary and unjustifiable interference with private affairs. It would be a most serious obstacle in the resumption of business and commercial relations. Our financial houses and business firms had many complicated accounts, and transactions which were suspended by war. These houses, and espe- cially the bankers, must speedily adjust their financial accounts. Otherwise com- merce can not be properly resumed. The clearing-house plan would compel all such adjustments and all payments to be made through governmental agencies. 14 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. As regards other countries than the United States, the adoption of the clearing-house plan by some of them would be extreraely detrimental to their own interests, and might be ruinous to a nation whose balance of private debts was largely m favor of Germany. i- ^ at The principle is already accepted — ^Article A, clause "«" — that any allied State may exclude itself from the operation of the clearing-house plan. Now, may Mr. Palmer make that statement? The Chairman. Certainly. Senator Fall. Before he makes that statement, let me ask this: How are we going to facilitate the resumption of business between these individuals when we leave it up in the air and wait for Congress ? Mr. Baruch. These individua's can privately proceed, just as they are doing now. Senator Fall. This will, then, facilitate rather than retard the settlement of these private affairs although, as you say, Congress yet has the power to step in and settle it. Senator Fall. Do you desire to make that statement now, Mr. Palmer? STATEMENT OF ME. BRADLEY W. PALMER. Mr. Palmer. The entire subject is very complicated, difficult to . approach and to understand, and in order to answer the questions I thmk it would be desirable to read the explanatory statements made by the American delegates to each of the sections, which are interlocked. I did not intend to make a statement now, because I wished to go into the subject fully and in detail. What I did wish to call the committee's attention to at the outset is that the rights and interests of the American nationals are fully protected; are protected more than any other nation, or at least as much as any other nation. There is no distinction between the two. It is a complicated and difficult situation, and the clearing house system is merely a method of procedure. The British Government and the French Government devised that plan during the progress of the war to meet a situation and condition that did not exist in the United States, arising from this state of facts. The war struck England and France suddenly, in the midst of all their involved transactions with the enemy, and it threw their business affairs into chaos. Never was there such a condition as that before. I do not know the exact details, because they are very confidential, but I understand that it was necessary for the British Government to step in and put its guarantee back of a great many different classes of private obligations, such as acceptances. Otherwise, the great commercial nouses of Great B itain and of London would nave gone down as the result of that. The difference with us was that before we entered the war, war conditions had been going on for two and a half years, and our business men had accommodated themselves to war-like condition !, so that when we entered the war the same condition did not exist and was not threatened, and it was not necessary that our Govornment should interfere in private commercial transactions. The result was that England and France studied what they should do to take caie of their citizens atter the wai was over, and they evolved a clearing system. The object of that system was to enable theii- merchants to adjust their letations piomptly after the war. Some time during 191V, I think, the TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 15 British Government here in Washington explained theii system and theii' theory to us — to the lepresen.atives; to different governmental officials. We gave it 8 cursory examination, oecause vve stiuck right away what we consideied a fundamental oDstacie, the pioposi- tion of the Government guaranteeing the piivate obligations owed by its citizens, and we nevei could get over that. Senator Williams. You also struck the obstacle of forbidding a man's settling his own debts to the Germans 1 Mr. Palmer. That was a minor obstacle, although it was important. We never couldget over that, and we had many discussions or talks about that in Washington prior to the termination of the war. Then, when the peace treaty was proposed, this plan was suggested as a portion of the peace treaty, and the American delegate on the committee happened to be informed of that because of these dis- cussions we had had in Washington, and the American delegate said right away, "Is it essential that the Government should guar- antee the private obhgations?" And that was an essential part of the plan. It could not be worked out without that. Neither could it be worked out without forbidding communications between mer- chants in both countries. Neither could it be worked out without the obligation to take a German's property, or the proceeds of his property, and use it to pay another man's debt in that country. The Ajnerican delegate did not think it was necessary for the United States to get into any such position as that, and therefore, with fuU explanation, and with the full concurrence of the other powers, we devised another system which enabled us to grant our nationals the same protection, and in my judgment a very much better protection, without involving the Government in the inter- ference in private affairs. That is a general statement. Before leaving that subject I would like to make one other statement. Senator Hitchcock. WOl you not state, just here, what is the protection that the American creditor of a German debtor gets? Mr. Palmer. An American creditor Senator Hitchcock. Of a German debtor. Mr. Palmer (continuing). Having a claim against a German? Senator Hitchcock. Yes; a prewar claim ? Mr. Palmer. A right; yes. In the first place, privately he has the right to go to a new tribunal in case of a dispute as to debt. The Government has a right to use any of the property or resources of the enemy property in this country to pay that debt, if the Gov- ernment so chooses. Now, there is the clear distinction. The right is not given to an American citizen to come to this Government and demand that his debt shall be. paid by the Government, either out of its own funds or out of the proceeds of enemy property which the Alien Property Custodian has taken. That is not a right which is given to a private American citizen. The Government has the right to do that if it wishes to do so. In other words, the Govern- ment stands in the position where it can protect its nationals by the use of these funds, or not, as it sees fit. There are many reasons why it is desirable to leave that matter in that position. We do not know what the condition of affairs is in Germany. We do not know what has been done to our property. We do not know whether the Germans wOl restore our property." We do not know whether 16 TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GEBMANY. the German merchants will pay their debts in a fair way or whether obstacles will be put in the way of resuming and obtaining perperty rights and rights of contract by our nationals. If commercial relations are resumed in the ordinary way, and no obstacles are put in the way, perhaps the United States Government will say that that is the best thing to do, to let the commercial relations resume their regular course without interference or guaranty. But all the time under the treaty it has the right and power to protect its nationals as fully as it likes. Senator Hitchcock. Can the American Government use the assets of German nationals in this country for the payment of debts due to Americans, without at the same time guaranteeing the payment of debts of Germans or claims that Germans have against Americans ? Mr. Palmek. Yes; if Congress so desires. Senator Knox. As I understand you, then, the American creditor practically has no rights. Mr. Palmer. The American creditor is restored to the same rights that he had, regardless of the war. Senator Fall. Without the treaty ? Mr. Palmer. Without the treaty. And, in addition to that, his Government has the right to protect him fully, further, by applying the property and credits in this country to the payment of his dam- ages or debts. Senator Knox. You mean the proceeds of ahen property in this country? Mr. Palmer. Yes. Senator Knox. And such alien property as may be disposed of from this time on ? Mr. Palmer. Yes. Senator Knox. But then, pending the action by Congress in appropriating those proceeds, the American creditor has nothing, as I understand you; no provision is made for him under this treaty? Mr. Palmer. Well, Mr. Senator, his rights are not impaired at all. He is restored to his same position that he had, regardless of the war, and the United States Government has not guaranteed to pay his debt, of course. The United States Government has not imposed upon Germany the obhgation to pay his debt. He is restored to his same claim against the sanae creditor in the same way as if there had been no war. He also has the additional protection of being allowed, if he likes, to go to a new arbitral tribunal. Senator Fall. That is only when there is no dispute ? Mr. Palmer. As to the amount, no. Further than that, if the debt is not paid the United States Government has the right to compensate him and pay him out of these proceeds. Senator Swanson. That is what I was going to ask you. This treaty provides that the Government can use the property of any Germans in the hands of the Alien Property Customan to pay such debts? Mr. Palmer. Yes. Senator Swanson. That is in the treaty itself ? Mr. Palmer. Yes. Senator Knox. But in the meantime the American citizen simply has the embarrassinent of having a foreign debt or against whom there is no forum in which he can enforce his claim? He can have the TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 17 amount of his claim determined in this forum but there is no way of enforcing the claim ? Mr. Palmer. Germany agrees to enforce the judgment in the new forum; and he can sue in the German courts, if he likes, or in the American courts. Senator ^nox. How would he satisfy his judgment ? Mr. Palmer. He has the same contractual rights as he always had, according to the nature of his debt and the nature of his claim. Senator Swanson. Nothing ia this treaty prohibits Congress, if it so desires, from assuming liability for these debts? Mr. Baruch. Nothing at all. Senator Swanson. If the United States want to assume the liability for the debts of citizens of the United States, they can do it ? Mr. Palmer. Certainly they can do it. Senator Knox. Have you any idea of the relation between the , amount of the proceeds of the property held by the Alien Property Custodian and the amoimt of the debts held by citizens of the United States against Germans ? Mr. Palmer. No, Mr. Senator; we have not the faintest idea about that. We have a rough idea of the value of the property which has been taken. The State Department, I understand, have asked for the deposit of claims, and they have an enormous amount of claims; but what they are, and of what character they are, and what ought to be done about them, is something that is a very large question that has never been gone into at all. Senator Knox. Would you be willing to risk a guess as to whether there is practically enough German property to pay the American claims from the proceeds of the German property in this coimtry ? Mr. Palmer. Mr. Senator, I would say this, basing my remarks not on hearsay but on what I call intuition. The German Govern- ment has published from time to time the annoimcement that the American properties are intact in Germany. Whether or not that statement is true I do not know. It is not true as to some of the other countries. But if Germany will restore the American property in Germany as required by the treaty, then I should think that there would be a very great balance of property in this country. There must be, because the German claims for debt can not amount to very much, whatever they are. Senator Knox. What disposition would be made of that balance ? Could that be applied, under the terms of the treaty, to the payment of debts of others of our cobelligerents ? Mr. Palmer. No. Senator Knox. That seems to be the scheme between all of the nations that are parties to this treaty, except ours. For instance, if a Turk owed an Englishman money, you could take the property of a Turk in England to pay that debt, if there was a surplus over and above the English debt. Mr. Palmer. Perhaps I have not understood the question. Will you ask it again ? I want to explain what can be done with the proceeds ? Senator Knox. What I want to know is this: If there is a surplus over and above what is necessary in this country to pay American creditors, I want to know what becomes of that surplus? 135546—19 2 18 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANY. Mr. Palmer. I will answer that in this way, that under the clauses of the treaty the disposition of the entire fund is in the hands of the Congress. They can use the fund to pay the claims of American citizens on account of their property in Germany, if they suffer loss or damage. They can use it to pay debts of their citizens unpaid by German nationals. They can use it to pay what we call the Lusi- tania claims — claims on account of damages suffered by nationals of the United States prior to our entry into the war. They can put the balance into the reparation fund. Senator Knox. But suppose we do not have any reparation. Mr. Palmer. That goes into the general reparation. Senator Knox. Then that would be to pay England and France and Italy ? Mr. Palmer. Yes; the general reparation fund, however it is divided. The Chairman. But we have no part in reparation funds, have we ? Mr. Palmer. We are entitled to a share of the reparation, Mr. Chairman, but as to the division of the reparation, that is something that did not come within my province, and I know nothing whatever about that. There is one thing, however, that I do want to call attention to now. The United States has the fullest power and authority to return any of this property that they see fit. That was something that I insisted upon, to have a fair understanding with the other Governments, because we have a lot of classes of property that it is certain we shall want to restore to the owners when Congress has received information on those subjects to give it sufficient knowledge to enable it to deal with the entire subject understandably. It is not necessary for us to turn the balance of the funds or any portion of the funds into the reparation fund. That lies with Congress if they desire to do so. The object of the American delegate, basing himself on the provisions of the act of Congress which we have always interpreted to mean that Congress reserved to itself the disposition of the enemies' property that had been taken, was to preserve that intact; in other words, to leave Congress the full, absolute power to deal with the property as they saw fit ; and that is the effect of the treaty. Senator Williams. Paragraph 4 of the annex t) article 207, with reference to property, rights, and interests, reads as follows: All property, rights, and interests of German nationals within the territory of any allied or associated power and the net proceeds of their sale, liquidation or other dealing therewith may be charged by that allied or associated power in the first place with payment of amounts due in respect of claims by the nationals of that allied or associated power with regard to I heir property, rights, and interests, including com- panies and associations in which they are interested, in German territory, or debts owing to them by German nationals, and with payment of claims growing out of acts committed by the German Government or by any German authorities since July 31, 1914, and before that allied or associated power entered into the war. The amount of such claims may be assessed by an arbitrator appointed by Mr. Gostave Ador, it he is willing, or if no such appointment is made by him, by an arbitrator appointed by the mixed arbitral tribunal provided tor in section 6. Thev may be charged in the sepond place with payment of the amounts due in respect of claims by the nationals of such allied or associated power with regard to their property, rights, and interests in the territory of other enemy powers, in so far as those claims are otherwise unsatisfied. TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 19 The Chairman. That giv.es the widest latitude. Senator Knox. Mr. Palmer, can you tell us whv all the acts of the Alien Property Custodian are validated, thus cutting off access to the courts as to the regularity of the proceedings, or the sufficiency of the amounts realized from the sale of property? Mr. Palmer. Yes, Mr. Senator. This is a treaty between the United States and Germany, and it never seemed to anybody that the action of the United States in fighting the war against Germany should be open to criticism or upsetting by Germany. Senator Knox. Suppose it coidd be demonstrated — I am only us- ing this as an illustration, and I am sure there are no cases that are at all like it, but suppose it could be demonstrated — that property fairly worth $5,000,000 had been disposed of by the Alien Property Custodian in a secret way for $1,000,000. "VVhy should a transaction of that kind be validated? Mr. Palmer. Mr. Senator, I am sure that such a possibility as that does not exist. Senator Knox. 1 agree to that. I simply am using that as an illustration. Mr. Palmer. But if that situation did exist, I would say it was something for our Government to handle, and that it should not be open to the enemy. Senator Knox. In other words, our Government should take the loss ? Mr. Palmer. No; the Alien Property Custodian was an officer of the United States Government engaged in carrying out the provis- ions of the trading with the eme.my act, and for whatever he has done he should be responsible to our Government, but not to Germany. Now, as to the object of piitting those clauses in the treaty, in the first place, those particular clauses were not put there by the American delegates, although if they had not been in there the American dele- gates would have asked to have them put in. There was no possible discussion by anybody as to the propriety of clauses of that character. Senator Pomerene. In other words, the United States as the prin- cipal should settle with its own agents ? Mr. Palmer. Surely. The practical effect of those clauses is this. Whatever the Alien Property Custodian has done in the United- States under the trading with the enemy act is done. He takes Property and he gives receipts, and any claims that may arise from is actions are either relegated to the proceeds or the claims are cut off. Congress has said in the trading with the enemy act that any enemy whose property has been taken, if he has any complaint, shall come to Congress after the war; and Congress by that provision in our judgment has retained the power, the jurisdiction, the discretion to arrange matters with the former enemy. These clauses here amount to nothing, except that they do cut off possible litigation by the enemy respecting, we will say, the constitutionality of the trading with the •enemy act, and things of that kind which might involve us in ex- pensive, useless litigation for years. Aside from that I do not con- sider that the clauses have much effect. Senator Knox. Tell us what the owner of that $5,000,000 property would do under the circumstances indicated in my question. What are his rights ? Mr. Palmer. If he is an enemy, it is pretty hard to think that he has any right, except to apply through diplomatic channels. 20 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Knox. Of course, he has rights. If he is an ahen enemy he has his rights. Private property is to be protected.. That is a rule of international law that there has not been any doubt about for a hundred years. Senator Fall. This whole treaty is providing for the regulation of those very rights. Senator Swanson. I understand your contention is that Congress took charge of this property and Congress will settle the rights. If the property was sacrificed improperly or improvidentiy, then Congress will determine how it shall be settled. Mr. Palmer. I think so. Senator Knox. Then, have you no other answer to the question I propounded except that the alien enemy claimant has no rights under the circumstances indicated in the question I asked a moment ago, which I am sure you have in your mind ? Senator Williams. He has his rights under the treaty, whatever they are. IViij.-. Palmer. The rights of the alien enemy whose property has been taken — is that what you want to know ? Senator Knox. I want to know what rights the man in Germany has who owned $5,000,000 of property in the United States, that was either secretly or fraudulently or otherwise disposed of for $1,000,000. What rights has he, if any ? Mr. Palmer. He has the right to come to Congress for his claim, as the trading with the enemy act provides. Mr. Senator, let me answer your question in this way, in order that you can see how the legal process has shaped itself in our minds. The trading with the enemy act authorized the Alien Property Custodian to take enemy property in this country. Through the original act and the amend- ment thereto the title to the property was vested in the custodian, so that he was given all the rights of the absolute owner, to quote the language of the amendment. Senator Fall. He was a common-law trustee, was he not? Mr. Palmer. Yes, under the original act; but the subsequent amendment went further than that and vested in him the rights of an absolute owner. Fiu-ther than that, he was given the authority to dispose of the property in certain ways. Now, I have always thought, and I think it is perfectly correct, that the title of the alien enemy had passed out of him, had become vested in the United States or in the Alien Property Custodian, an officer of the Government. TTie title has passed from the enemy. Senator Knox. That is undoubtedly true. I am not questioning that at all. Mr. Pai.mek. Now, suppose that the custodian had kept the prop- erty or turned it over to the United States Treasmy as he was en- titled to do under the act. Then, the entire property is gone and the alien enemy would coine to Congress imder the tradin" with the enemy act and make his claim, Cbrigress reserving the right to take it up for consideration. Senator Knox. As to the i^cfgularity of the disposition or the ade- quacy of the compensation ? Mr. Palmer. The truding-with-the-enemy act does not say any- thing at all about that. It simply reserves to Congress the right to receive claims by the enemy after the war. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 21 _ The Chairman. Did not the trading-with-the-enemy act give any right to go into the courts on questions arising out of the dissolution of companies, etc. ? Mr. Palmer. Not to the enemy. The Chairman. It gave no right of any kind ? Mr. Palmer. T think not, except what I have stated. The Chairman. I have sent for the act. I would like to look at it. Mr. Palmer. I have a copy of it here. Senator Hitohcock. Senator Knox makes the point that under international law the alien enemj'- has certain rights. If he has any such right it can only be prosecuted through his own government. Is that the fact under international law ? Mr. Palmer. So I understand. Senator Hitchcock. Now, if his own Government agrees in this treaty not to assert that right, as you have said it does, does not that end the question? If he can prosecute any right at all, it is through his own Government, and his own Government agrees not to prose- cute it. Does not that end the matter as far as we are concerned? Mr. Palmer. I consider that more a matter of words than of sub- stance, because under our law of the United States the United States Government had the war power to take and confiscate the private property of the enemy if it so desired to do. Now, what did Congress do ? They took possession of the enemy property, and they vested the title of it in their officer, the Ahen Property Custodian. That was the act that put the enemy out of the ownership of the property. It did not make any difference what you put in the treaty about that. It does not make that situation any different. The United States had taken the title to the property. Now, the alien enemy could not get that property back without com- ing to Congress, and Congress said in the trading with the enemy act : If any alien enemy makes a claim, he can come to us after the war. I do not understand that the provisions of the treaty have changed that at all. Germany and its nationals, as far as the title to that property is concerned, have given up something that they did not have. The title had already passed to the United States Govern- ment, and they could not get it back without an act of Congress. Mr. Hitchcock. That is not the question Senator Knox is putting to you. He put a hypothetical case, an impossible case, supposing that property worth $5,000,000 had been in some way sacrificed for $1,000,000. Mr. Palmer. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. And he asked you then, whether under inter- national law the owner of that property did not ha^e a claim that might be prosecuted against the United States ? Senator Knox. Oh, no. Senator Hitchcock. What was it ? ' Senator Knox. I asked what his rights were. I did not allege what his rights were. Senator Hitchcock. You asserted by inference that he had a right. Senator Knox. In response to Mr. Palmer's statement that the alien enemy had no rights I replied that under international law private property of the alien was always protected until after the 22 TKBATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. hostilities ceased, and then an accounting was made for it. That is a rule of international law and has been for a hundred years. What I want to get at, if you will permit me, is whether it would not have been entirdy feasible to have inserted in this treaty a provision that the courts of justice of the United States should be open to the ahen enemy after the war is over in order to challenge, not the title that passed to the Alien Property Custodian but the methods by which he disposed of it, if the claimant could make out a case of fraud or such gross negligence as to involve him in a serious loss, instead of passmg him over to the ranks of the Kevolutionary and Mexican War claims, with a technical claim against the United States, which he could only work out through Congress and the Committees on Claims. I asked the question whether it would not have been entirely feasible to open the courts of justice to him. Mr. Palmer. The feasibility of such a ^stem as that, with many other considerations, came up to me, and I decided it, and I am glad to explain the reasons why I decided against a clause of that sort. I should have thought and I do think that a clause of that kind would be contrary to the act of Congress under which we were acting. Senator Knox. We can change an act of Congress by a treaty. Mr. Palmer. We can change an act of Congress by a treaty, surely, but it did not seem to be necessary to do that, because of the United States desires to offer that opportunity to the former enemy, it can do so, and I think it would be very much more appropriate for relief of that character to come from Congress than from the treaty. _ At any rate, that was the view of the representatives of the United States. Senator Swanson. I understand your negotiations have obtained the acquiescence of the German Government in Congress disposing of this alien enemy property as it sees proper ? Mr. Palmer. Yes. Senator Swanson. Is that the result of your negotiations ? Mr. Palmer. The treaty. Senator Swanson. I mean, is that the result of the treaty, that they will acquiesce in the disposition of alien property as Congress may see proper ? Mr. Palmer. Yes. Senator Pomerene. Is not this the situation as to alien claims ? I understand the rule to be with regard to alien property, in interna- tional law, as stated by Senator Knox; but those who were framing this treaty saw fit to insert in the treaty a provision ratifying the acts of the Custodian of Alien Property. Whatever his rights may have been under the general principle of international law, they are more clearly defined by the treaty itself, so that it rests with Congress under this treaty and under the alien property act. Mr. Palmer. That is correct. Senator Pomerene. They can not only reimburse any alien but they can give him a premium if they should desire. Mr. Palmer. They can give him any process by the courts. Senator Pomerene. Or create courts for him? Mr. Palmer. There is one thing that we ought Senator Williams. Before you go further, I want to ask you this, in order to get it clear in my mind: I understand that this in no wise binds our people to what all of the other nationals of the allied and TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 23 associated powers are bound by, to wit, this clearing-house system, but that our nationals are left free with German nationals to make any private settlement that they wish of their mutual claims. Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir. Senator Williams. For example, if a man had been buying cotton from Hamburg, Germany, and had been shipping it, and the ship was on the high seas at the time we declared a state of war existing between us and Germany, if those people did not want to wait for Congress to settle it, if, say, the British Government had taken it and sold it at Liverpool prices and paid the American shipper, these people being old customers, they could settle the whole transaction according to the ethics of it as they saw fit ? Mr. Palmer. Yes; exactly. Senator Williams. Moreover, if they chose, they could have a trial case set to determine the amount, if there was a dispute about that. There is nothing in the treaty to prevent that ? Mr. Palmer. No. Senator Fall. Mr. Palmer, may I ask a question or two ? Is there anything in the treaty which gives any additional rights along the line of guaranties of any right such as Senator Williams has just asked about? They would have these rights without any treaty whatsoever, would they not ? Is there anything in the treaty giving them those rights ? Mr. Palmer. Their rights are unaffected, but they have an addi- tional recourse to a new tribunal instead of going to the German courts, and the United States Government has the additional new power to look out for their interests under the provisions in the treaty. Senator Fall. That new tribunal, however, gives them no new security — in other words, does not enable them to collect the debt. The tribunal fixes the amount in dispute. Mr. Palmer. Security is given to the United States Government. Senator Fall. Where ? Mr. Palmer. In those provisions that were just read under the operation of article 297, clause (h). Senator Hitchcock. There is not any "h." Senator Pomerene. Page 371. Mr. Palmer. Clause (h), page 371, second paragraph, bottom of the page. Senator Fall. Clause (h), to which you have just referred, says: The net proceeds of aales of enemy property, rights, or interests wherever situated carried out either by virtue of war legislation, or by application of this article, and in general all cash assets of enemies, shall be dealt with as follows: (1) As regards powers adopting Section III and the annex thereto — We do not adopt that ? Mr. Palmer. No. Senator Fall (continuing reading) : The said proceeds and cash assets shall be credited to the power — Not adopting Section III. That will be ourselves ? Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir. Senator Fall (continuing reading): Any credit balance in favor of Germany resulting therefrom shall be dealt with a provided in article 243. 24 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. The next paragraph provides : _ The proceeds of the property, rights and interests, and the cash assets, of the na- tionals of allied or associated powers held by Germany shall be paid immediately to the person entitled thereto or to his government; the proceeds of the property, rights and interests, and the cash assets of German nationals received by an allied or associated power shall be subject to disposal by such power in accordance with its laws and regulations. Say, for instance, that we dispose of property here and we have assets of $400,000,000 derived from the sale of property by the Alien Property Custodian, and in Germany assets of $300,000,000. That leaves an excess of $100,000,000. Now, as I understand you, your claim is that under that clause that excess of $100,000,000 may be by Congress applied to the payment of the debts of American na- tionals who can not otherwise collect their debts in Germany. Is that it? Mr. Palmer. Yes. Senator Fall. Then, undoubtedly, the people of the United States are very materially interested in seeing that the alien property brings just as much as it possibly can bring in the market upon its dispo- sition by the Alien Property Custodian. Otherwise, there would be no excess which might be applied as payment of the debts of our nationals. Now, take the Bosch Magneto case, for instance, that you know about, of course, as you are attorney for the Alien Property Custodian. There is a very serious controversy about that case. The entire property was disposed of for something like $4,000,000, and it is claimed by the owner and others that the cash assets would make the value of the property at the time it was disposed of — ^it was disposed of after the armistice, I think — $6,000,000. I wiU call it that in round numbers. It is claimed by some of the accountants that its value might be very much more than that. That matter is now in controversy, through some sort of court proceedings. At any rate it has been before a committee of the Senate upon several dif- ferent occasions and was discussed at great length. Now grant, for the sake of argument, that there was a discrepancy of $2,000,000; that amount might very well have gone to the nationals for the pay- ment of their debts. Mr. Palmer. Surely it is a matter oi interest between the Govern- ment and the Alien Property Custodian. Senator Fall. The Congress of the United States is the only tri- bunal to which they can come. Suppose it is shown clearly to the Congress of the United States that here is an American citizen who has a $2,000,000 claim which he can not collect against Germany and which Germany does not guarantee; if there are funds in the hands of the Alien Property Custodian, Congress can say to the Property Custodian, or to some other official, "Pay this man so as to discharge his claim." If there is no such excess, how is he going about it to get his claim paid ? Would he have to come to Congress for an ap- propriation of $2,000,000 out of the Treasury? You can not set aside a sale that has been made by the Alien Property Custodian. This validates the sale. Mr. Palmer. This validates it. Senator Fall. But suppose it does not. He can not set it aside. Mr. Palmer. In case of a fraud, any fraudulent transaction is void. Senator Fall. What proceedings wbuld you take ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 25 Mr. Palmee. In the case of a question of the character you raise, those are matters between the United States Government and its officers. Senator Fall. I want to see if American citizens can be protected, if I can. Mr. Palmer. Well, I am not prepared to answer that question, because it would depend on the character of the act, in what part of the country, and under what State government it was passed, and a whole lot of things. What I wanted to say was that the treaty has not anythiiig to do with that objection. Senator Fall. I do not think it has, except that it validates the acts of the Alien Property Custodian. Senator Williams. Not as to American nationals. Mr. Palmer. That is just the point. The German national never had any rights, because the trading with the enemy act has taken them away in advance. Senator Williams. Let me ask you this question. If this man was an American citizen, and could show it, and had acted upon a wrong impression that he was an alien enemy, he would have the same rights in the courts of the United States that he always had ? Mr. Palmer. I understand so. Senator Fall. I am not interested in the Bosch Magneto Co. I am interested only in an American citizen collecting his money from a German national. Mr. Palmer. Mr. Senator, I can answer that only in a general way.. It is perfectly true that if the Alien Property Custodian has not collected and realized as much money as he could have from the enemy property in this country, the fund at the disposal of Congress is not as much as it otherwise would be. That is true. If on the other hand there has been nothing that has been wrongly done by the Alien Property Custodian Senator Fall. I did not mean to insinuate that, for a moment. Mr. Palmer. That is a matter between the Government and its own officers. Senator Fall. In so far as I am concerned, I have been on the committee investigating the acts of the Alien Property Custodian for some time, and I am willing to say frankly that I have discovered nothing whatsoever that would reflect in any degree upon the manner in which the present Attorney General of the United States adminis- tered that property. But there may be cases in which his agents or himself have acted in such an inefficient manner in securing the largiest proceeds which they might, that while without any moral turpitude, upon their part whatsoever, nevertheless the funds which may be at the disposal of Congress for the payment of claims to American citizens might not be sufficient. Where would they go ? Senator Smith of Arizona. Would they have to lose their property or come to Congress ? Senator Fall. If by the treaty the German Government had been compelled to guarantee the debts of its citizens, then it would not have been depleted by such claims, we will say, to the extent of $300,000. Senator Hitchcock. Mr. Palmer, the fund which is secured by the sale of alien property under the administration of the Alien Property 26 TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Custodian has certain liens placed upon it by this treaty. Is that true? Mr. Palmer. No; that is not true; there are no liens. Senator Hitchcock. What are the first claims on that fund ? Mr. Palmer. Congress has the fullest right to dispose of it in any way it sees fit. Senator Hitchcock. Are there any claims prior to the payment of claims by American nationals against German debtors ? Mr. Palmer. Not unless Congress desires to so stipulate. Senator Hitchcock. So that this fund is subject m its use to the payment of American claims against German debtors, and not in excess of the fund, but the whole fund? Mr. Palmer. Yes ; if you like. The American with a claim against Germany has got something which he never had before. Senator Williams. Germany undertakes to pay its own nationals ? Mr. Palmer. Yes. Senator Swanson. First, you obtain from Germany an agreement that will return all the property of American nationals ? Mr. Palmer. Yes. Senator Swanson. That is obtained; and secondly, you obtain from Germany an agreement that all the property of the Germans here in this country can be used to discharge any further debts that the German nationals owe the United States ? Mr. Palmer. Yes. Senator Swanson. Third, you have given to Congress the right to dispose of its alien property absolutely without interference by the German Government ? Mr. Palmer. Yes. Senator Swanson. And if Congress desires to create courts to deal with this property, it has the power to do it; and there is nothing in the treaty which precludes Congress from making a free disposition of it? Mr. Palmer. Absolutely. That is one of the reasons why the American delegates would not consent to the enemy debt plan, be- cause the enemy debt plan would have taken away the freedom of disposition which Congress should enjoy. Senator Williams. And which Congress had reserved to itself. Mr. Palmer. Which Congress had reserved. The Chairman. Mr. Palmer, do 1 imderstand you to say this treaty does not validate the acts of the Alien Property Custodian so as to put him entirely beyond the right of the courts so far as enemy aliens are concerned ? Mr. Palmer. Oh, no ; I said that the treaty does validate the act as far as the enemy is concerned. The Chairman. That is, no enemy alien can bring suit in any way. Mr. Palmer. No. The Chairman. Exactly. That is what I supposed. I know nothing about the Bosch magneto case which has been mentioned by the Senator from New Mexico. Suppose there was an American stockholder, would he have any right under this treaty, which be- comes the supreme law of the land, to go to the courts and get proceedings ? Mr. Palmer. The same right as before? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANY. 27 The Chairman. No ; I am not asking whether he has the same right as before. I want to know whether he is cut off from any that he previously had. Mr. Palmer. No. Senator Johnson. In answer to what the chairman said to the Senator from Mississippi, and in answer to what has just now been said to you, may I call Mr. Palmer's attention to paragraph 1 of the Annex, page 375 ? If I may read to you a couple of sentences, I would be glad to be instructed. It reads: In accordance with the provisions of article 297, paragraph (d), the validity of vesting orders and of orders for the winding up of businesses or companies, and of any other orders, directions, decisions, or instructions of any court or any department of the Government of any of the high contracting parties "made or given, or purporting to be made or given, in pursuance of war legislation with regard to enemy property, rights, and interests is confirmed. Now foUow, please [reading] : The interests of all persons shall be regarded as having been effectively dealt with by any order, direction, decision, or instruction dealing with property in which they may be interested, whether or not such interests are specifically mentioned in the Older, direction, decision, or instruction. No question shall be raised as to the regularity of a transfer of any property, rights, or interests dealt with in j^ursuance of any such oi der, direction, decision, or instruction. Everj^ action taken with regard to any property, business, or company, whether as regards its investigation, seques- tration, compulsory administration, use, requisition, supervision, or winding up, the sale or management of property, rights or interests, the collecticn or discharge of debts, the payment of costs, charges, or expenses, or any other matter whatsoever, in pursuance of orders, directicns, decisions, or instructions of any court or of any department of the Government of any of the high contracting parties, made or given, or purporting to be made or given, in pursuance of war legislation with regard to enemy property, rights, or interests, is confirmed: Provided, That the provisions of this paragraph shall not be held to prejudice the titles to property heretofcre acquired in good faith and for value and in accordance with the laws of the country in which the property is situated by nationals of the allied and associated powers. Would you make, with that provision in view, the same answer with regard to the minority American stockholder that you have made to the Senator from Mississippi and the chairman ? Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir; the paragraph begins by reference to article 297, paragraph (d). If you will look at that, you will find that the clause is limited to enemy nationals in Germany. The exact treaty is as follows : (d^ As between the allied and associated powers or their nationals on the one hand and Germany or her nationals on the other hand, all the exceptional war messures, or measures of transfer, or acts done or to be done in execution of such measures as defined in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the annex hereto shall be considered as final and binding upon all persons except as regards the reservations laid down in the present treaty. Now, paragraph (1) of the annex which you read and referred to there is simply an enlargement of that provision, and refers to it. Senator Moses. What other provisions are laid down ? Mr. Palmer. Some other reservations. I do not recall what they are at present. Senator Fall. Reading over that, I became convinced some time ago that you were correct in your construction of this provision. I say without any hesitation that you are correct. Then, if the mmority stockholder was dissatisfied with the amount derived from the sale, what would be his recourse ? ^8 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Palmer. He has the recourse that is given to him under the trading with the enemy act and the general laws of the land. It depends entirely upon the nature of the act, Mr. Senator, and the only reply that I can make to it is that the treaty does not affect his rights, whatever they are. Senator Fall. I think you are correct about that, also. But a minority stockholder in such a company, as was suggested by the question of the chairman — a large stockholder — might, of course, pursue the proceeds, and would only have his proportional amount of the proceeds represented by the average value of his stock, and would not be entitled to upset the sale and have a resale unless donwress gave affirmative relief by subsequent legislation. Mr. Palmer. That depends again. It depends on the nature of the transaction. If there is fraud Senator Fall. I am not speaking of fraud. Mr. Palmer. Or inadequacy of price, that is a question of pro- cedure, a question of corporation law of the State and of various details, and it is impossible to answer intelligently a question of that kind. Senator Fall. You are familiar with the trading-with-the-enemy act? Mr. Palmer. The trading-with-the-enemy act as we have construed it, and we think correctly, provides that no American citizen or any neutral shall be deprived of his rights, and in enforcing the trading- with-the-enemy act, of course, we tried as hard as possible not to transgress anybody's rights; but all the courts are open at every stage of the game, and they had additional rights given them by the act itself. Senator Fall. But having failed to avail himself of the provisions of section 9 of the act by going into court to protect his rights, the American citizen would then merely be left to appeal to Congress for reimbursement of the amount that he had lost, if he established that he had lost anything, or proceed against the proceeds of the sale. Mr. Palmer. He still has a right to make a claim up to nine months after the war is ended. Senator Fall. But not to set aside the sale. Mr. Palmer. His right to set aside the sale had not been changed in any way. Senator Fall. But if the sale is made, you do not think that any individual can set it aside? Mr. Palmer. I know they could if they have the proper cause. Senator Johnson of California. I am unable to see that subdivision (e) has the limited effect that you suggest upon the portion of the Annex that I read to you. You will observe how much extended the portion of the Annex that I read is beyond the matter to which you allude. It says that the interests of all persons should be regarded as having been effectively dealt with, and so on, and no question shall be raised as to the regularity of the transfer of any property, etc. Now, would not that be effective concerning the rights of the minority stockholder such as was suggested by the chairman ? Mr. Palmer. I do not think so at all. We had a discussion on that very question, and all the powers agreed that this treaty did not affect the rights of neutrals or nationals of our country. When it came to that particular clause, in order to make it clear, we inserted TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 29 the sentence which was read, and it is our interpretation and under- standing that those confirmations and ratifications apply to alien enemies. Senator Johnson of California. But you specifically state "the interests of all persons," and then you state again "every action taken" Mr. Palmer. In accordance with the provisions of such and such a clause. Senator Johnson of California. That is yonr first sentence; quite true. Mr. Palmer. But it gives the entire paragraph. Senator Johnson. But your subsequent sentences are wholly general in character. The Chairman. "All persons" means only alien enemies. Senator Johnson. That is exactly the point. The Chairman. Am I not right in that ? Mr. Palmer. German nationals, it means. The Chairman. "All persons" means German nationals; It is rather loosely drawn. Mr. Baruch. It could not mean anything else. Senator Johnson. I would not wish to disagree with you, Mr. Palmer, concerning the construction of language with which you are famihar, but is not that a strained construction, to say the least ? Mr. Palmer. It might be, without the coimection. Senator Williams. "All persons," referring to section 297. Senator Johnson. It does not say so. Senator Williams. That is what it means, explanatory of sec- tion 297. Read the first line. Senator Pomerene. Where is that ? Give me the number and the section. Senator Williams (reading): In accordance with the provisions of article 297. It is on page 375. The Chairman. Are there any futher questions that the com- mittee desires to put to Mr. Palmer? Senator McCumber. I would like to ask one question. If we are to avail ourselves of the rights and the benefits under this system of joining other nations in the collection of debts, vre will have to do it by an act of Congress within 40 days after the treaty has been adopted. Is that your construction ? Senator Williams. That is, adopting the clearing-house system ? Mr. Palmer. If you want to adopt the clearing-house system, it is necessary to give notice within a month, I think. Senator Hitchcock. Thirty days. Mr. Palmer. After the ratification. Senator McCumber. Who is to give notice ? Mr. Palmer. The United States. Senator McCumber. How ? Mr. Palmer. Why, I do not know. I suppose the President, or the executive authority. Senator McCumber. Do you not think that it will require an act of Congress to determuie whether we should come under that system, rather than the mere declaration of the President? 30 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Palmer. I do not think so. Senator McCumber. You would not think it was simply discre- tionary with the President or any other officer as to whether we should adopt that provision ? I just ask. I did not know. but what there might be some other portion of the treaty that bore on it. Mr. Palmer. There is nothing else in the treaty on it, but I should think that inasmuch as the President and the Senate have the power to malce the treaty, they would have the power to do that. Senator Williams. And the American delegation was opposed to the clearing-house system ? Mr. Palmer. Absolutely. The Chairman. The hour of half past twelve having arrived, if I may interrupt Mr. Palmer for that purpose, some of the Senators have to go upon the floor and I think we shall have to take an adjournment. I suppose that there are some further questions that the members of the committee desire to ask Mr. Baruch and Mr. Palmer. Senator Fall. I think so. The Chairman. I understand so, and I shall be glad to know from the committee when they would like to have the witnesses before them again. Senator Johnson. I request an adjournment until 10.30 o'clock to-morrow morning. Senator Hitchcock. I want to suggest that the matter of interro- gating witnesses be on some sort of system, either that the questions be put in writing or asked in order, so that there will be less con- fusion. Senator Moses. May I ask that before the next meeting copies of this document that Mr. Baruch has been referring to be ready and put in the hands of the committee. Senator Pomerene. Could we have those this afternoon ? Mr. Baruch. We have only two copies, but they could be fur- nished the members of the committee this afternoon. The Chairman. If Mr. Baruch will give me a copy I wiU have it printed for the committee. Senator Pittman. Do I understand that this document of Mr. Baruch's is to be printed as a part of his testimony '? The Chairman. There were some other things that he had in typewritten form that wiU go in his remarks. Senator Pittman. I would like to ask Mr. Baruch if he would not like to have this document printed as a part of his testimony. Mr. Baruch. This really was not a completed document. It was a transitory document, just explanatory of the clauses. The Chairman. I did not understand that Mr. Baruch wanted to make the whole dosument a part of his testimony, but it does not make any difference. Senator Pittman. I was asking Mr. Baruch as to his desire. Mr. Baruch. I have no desire in the matter. I think the parts that were read should appear in the testimony. They are simply to be used as a matter of reference for the Senators in order to see what construction had been put on the clauses at that time. The Chairman. We can have the testimony ready and in print to-morrow. (Thereupon, at 12.30 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned until to-morrow, Friday, August 1, 1919, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.) FRIDAY, ATXGTJST 1, 1919. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Eelations, WasMngton, D. 0. The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjourn- ment, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge presiding. Present: Senators Lodge (chairman), McCumber, Fall, Knox, Harding, Johnson, New, Moses, Hitchcock, WUliams, Swanson, Pomerene, Smith, and Pittman. The Chairman. The Secretary of Labor desires to address the committee briefly in regard to a resolution introduced by Senator Kenyon yesterday. If the committee desires, I wUl read the resolu- tion [reading]: [S. J. Res. 80.) JOINT RESOLUTION To authorize the President to convene the first meeting of the international lahor conference in Waslilngton, and to appoint delegates thereto. Whereas in the proposed treaty of peace which was executed by the representatives of the allied and associated powers and Germany at Versailles on the 28th day of June, 1919, and which is now before the Senate of the United States for consideration, provision is made for a general international labor conference for the purpose of promoting improvements in the conditions of labor, and that the first meeting of such conference shall take place in Washington in October, 1919; and Whereas the representatives of the allied and associated powers, signatory to said proposed treaty of peace, have requested the Government of the United States of America to convene and make arrangements for the organization of the first meeting of said conference: It is therefore Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, authorize to convene and to make arrangements for the organization of such first meeting of the said conference and to appoint delegates thereto: Provided, hoivever, That nothing herein shall be held to authorize the President to appoint any delegates to represent the United States of America at the said meeting of such conference or to authorize the United States of America to participate therein unless and until the Senate shall have ratified the provisions of the said proposed treaty of peace with reference to such general international labor conference. Senators will probably remember that we passed as an amend- ment to an appropriation bill a prohibition on the President to call any conventions here without action by Congress. Senator Williams. Hence the necessity of this bUl. The Cha.irman. Hence the necessity of the bUl. We will hear the Secretary of Labor. 32 TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. STATEMENT OF HON. WIIIIAM B. WIISON, SECRETARY OF LABOR. Secretary Wilson. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the comniittee, as stated in the preamble, the proposed treaty of peace which the committee has now under consideration provides for the callirig of an intem.ational labor conference, a. conference that it is proposed shall meet annually. In an annex to article 24, the place of meeting is named as Washington, and the Government of the United States is requested to convene the conference. As has been stated by the chairman, the general deficiency bill of March 4, 1913, carried this provision: Hereafter the Executive shall not extend or accept any invitation to participate in any international congress, conference, or like event, without first having the specific authority of law to do so. Consequently the Executive has no power to comply with the request contained in the treaty now under consideration. I am advised that 22 nations have already signified their intention of being represented at the labor conference, some of them nations on the other side of the globe. The difficulties of transportation and communication at the present time resulting from the war make it important that if an invitation is to go out from this Gov- ernment it should go out at a very early date. The House of Kepresentatives, as I understand, is about to adjourn, with the consent of the Senate, xmtil September 9. Unless action can be secured before the adjournment of the House, it will make a very brief time in which invitations can be extended and action taken by other Governments in selecting their representatives to attend the conference. When I learned that the House was about to adjourn for a month, I took the matter up with Members of the House, among them the minority leader, Mr. Clark of Missouri, with a view to securing action by the House before adjoummant. After consultation with his associates, the majority leader and his associates came to the con- clusion that it was a matter that primarily interested the Senate, because the matter of the treaty of peace was involved in the propo- sition, and that consequently it would be more or less indelicate on the part of the House to take any action on the subject until the Senate had expressed its view upon it. Consequently the House has taken no steps to take any action on the proposition that is now before you. I look upon this particular phase of the proposed treaty as being somewhat different from any other phase of the treaty. There is not only the proposition to convene a labor conference annually, but there is a request that this Government convene the first con- ference. When any of the other nations, parties to the negotiations, ratify the treaty, that carries with it a ratification of the request to the Government of the United States to convene the labor con- ference. If we ratify the treaty itself, then it becomes a treaty obligation on our part to convene the conference. If we fail to ratify the treaty, it still stands as a request from other Governments to our Government to convene this meeting, and in that respect I look upon it as being entirely different from any of the other pro- visions contained within the treaty. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 33 There is an organizing committee at present working upon the data for the subjects to be discussed at the proposed conferences. I am advised that that committee is unable to proceed further with its work, that it is at a standstill and will continue at a standstill until our Government has extended either formally or informally the invitation mentioned in the treaty. Our Government is not in a position to extend, either formally or informally, an invitation except by and with the authority of Congress. That is the situation as it confronts us, and unless speedy action can be secured from the Senate and from the House it will create a condition where the time will be extremely brief, whether we ratify the treaty or not, in which we can issue a call for this convention. I may add that by the very terms of the treaty we would not be entitled to representation in the conference, even though we called it, unless the treaty is ratified; but we are requested to call it whether we are represented in it or not. That is the situation as I under- stand it, and I hope the committee may take prompt action in the matter in order to relieve the situation. The Chairman. I can only say that the committee will take it up just as soon as they finish this hearing. I shall try and get a meeting of the committee this afternoon to deal with it. Secretary Wilson. Thank you. The Chairman. Of course, Mr. Secretary, you realize that it has to be done by unanimous consent of the Senate ? Secretary Wilson. I realize, Mr. Chairman, that unless there is practically unanimous consent both in the Senate and in the House, prompt action can not be had, and I think that prompt action is of the essence of the situation at the present moment. Senator Williams. It can not be considered, Mr. Secretary, except by unanimous consent. Secretary Wilson. That is practically the situation in the House also. STATEMENT OF MR. BRADLEY W. PAIMER— Resumed. The Chairman. Mr. Baruch and Mr. Palmer are both here, and if any members of the committee desire to ask them any further ques- tions, there is now an opportimity to do so. Senator Williams. Mr. Palmer was on the stand j-esterday when we adjourned. The Chairman. Mr. Palmer was on the stand when we adjourned yesterday. Is it desired to ask him any further questions ? Senator Moses. Some of us are under embarassment with reference to questioning this witness further, inasmuch as the print of the explanation which Mr. Baruch presented yesterday morning is not yet ready. The Chairman. Mr. Baruch's pamphlet is not here. The Govern- ment Printing Office was unable to get it to us in time. The testimony taken at the hearing yesterday is printed. Senator Fall. Mr. Chairman, I must admit that we went so far afield yesterday that I did not understand thoroughly the explanation made by Mr. Palmer in answer to the question propounded to him by one of the Senators touching upon the statement that he made that Americans were, as I understood him, betterprotected in the collection 135546—19 3 34 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. of their indebtedness than were the citizens of other nations if they joined this clearing-house agreement. If Mi-. Pahner would be kind enough to proceed as briefly as possible in answer to that question, I should be glad to hear him. I should be glad to know where Ameri- can nation^s have any advantage over the citizens of the other nations, or where they stand upon an equal basis with the citizens of the other nations, in the collection or settlement of their indebt- edness. Mr. Palmer. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, that remark I made was perhaps a little more general than I intended. What I intended to say was that the citizens of the United States would be better pro- tected if the United States did not adopt the clearing system than if they did. I did not intend to differentiate between the citizens of the United States and those of any other nation as the remark would indicate. That was not my view. Senator Fall. That is what I wanted to clear up. Mr. Palmee. I am talking about the operation of the clearing sys- tem. Under the clearing system the friendly power on the one side and Germany on the other each undertakes to collect all the enemy debts within its territory and apply it to the payment of the credit of their own nationals. The result oi that operation in effect is that the creditors of the friendly nation — I use that term instead of repeating "allied or associated nations" — are limited to the proceeds of enemy credits and the proceeds of enemy property in their own coimtry. In case a country does not become a part of the clearing system, the creditors of that country have the right tocoUect their debt from the debtors in Germany, which would otherwise be collected and the proceeds kept by the German Government; and in addition to that their Government has at its disposal the entire fund of enemy property in this country, by which it can, if it so desires, pay the uncollected portion of its citizens' debt. That is a brief statement of the financial difference between those two systems, and that is the foundation of the remark that I made which was quoted by the Senator from New Mexico, Mr. Fall. I find some difficulty in explaining that, because it is complicated, and it is not an easy conception to imderstand or to explain; but I have a very clear understandmg of it, and if I have not made it clear I should like to go further. Senator Hitchcock. Let me ask you this question : If John Smith in the United States has a claim of $5,000 against a German debtor, how would he proceed under article 3 if the United States adopts that, and also how would he proceed and how would he be protected if the other option is elected ? Mr. Palmer. If John Smith, a creditor in the United States, has a claim of $5,000 against a German debtor, if the United States does not adopt section 3, John Smith has the same contractual rights that he always had unimpaired, and pursuant thereto he has a right to demand and collect his claim from the German debtor. He aSo has the right, in case of dispute of his claim Senator Hitchcock. That would be in the German courts ? Mr. Palmer. In the case of the dispute of his claim, instead of going to a German court, he has the right to appeal to the new court with a neutral president; and on top of that, subject to the action of the United States Government, he would have the opportunity to ask the United States to pay his debt out of the funds which the TREATY OF PEACE WITH GBEMANY. 35 United States has in its possession, derived from the enemy property and the proceeds of enemy debts collected in this country. Now if the United States adopts the clearing system, the same creditor hks no longer the right to collect his debt from the debtor in Germany. His only recourse is to the United States, and Che United States would be obliged to pay him from the funds which they had received. Senator Hitchcock. Where could he sue for the collection of his debt? Mr. Palmer. He could not sue. Senator Hitchcock. Where could he present his claim ? Mr. Palmer. To the United States Government. The result is that if the claims in the United States exceeded the amount of prop- erty collected by the Government, the resulting claim would be against the German Government only, which is not a very valuable asset at the present time. So that you will see that the possibility of collection by the Amer- ican creditor is double imder one system as against the other. Senator Fall. Each nation here has exactfy the same alternative that is left to the United States ? Mr. Palmer. Oh, yes. Senator Fall. Now under article 3, if we join the clearing-house system, the German Government guarantees the debts of its nationals? Mr. Palmer. It guarantees the debts of its nationals in this way It gives as a credit to the other country the amount of the debt owed by its nationals to the citizens of that country. That is the book- keeping transaction, which results in a balance one way or the other. Senator Fall. I admit that whenever I run up against a proposi- tion advanced by some auditor or bookkeeper, and it is a bookkeeping proposition, then I am lost; I know nothing about it. But I notice the provision in the treaty itself is that each of the high contracting parties shall be respectively responsible for the payment of such debts of its nationals. Mr. Palmer. Yes. Senator Fall. That may be just a bookkeeping entry, but the question is whether it is worth anything. Mr. Palmer. What I am sure of is that under the operation of the clearing system that becomes a bookkeeping entry. Now the condition which seemed to the American lawyers most serious under this system arises from the operation of that clause, because under it the United States Government would be obliged to guarantee the payment of an enormous amount of obligations, some of which are worthless, many of which can not be collected, and in- cluding, as far as the lawyers could determine, a class of obligations among which were our defaulted railroad bonds wliich became due before the war or during the war. Senator Fall. And State bonds ? Mx. Palmer. No; not State bonds. Senator Fall. Repudiated bonds ? Mr. Palmer. Well, I don't know. I never thought of that. ' Senator Fall. I thought possibly you had thought of it. ' Mr. Palmer. The result would be that the United States would i find itseK guaranteeing and paying to somebody the full par value of ' private and semipublic obligations, the actual value of which was a 36 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. very much less amount. What the effect would be on the German creditor I do not know. If the system operated, the German creditor might get 100 cents on the dollar for a raUroad bond for which our citizens had taken stock. The American lawyers never could figure that out, and we never could get a satisfactory answer from' the other powers as 'to how that would operate, and that was the stumbling block. When we could not cross that block, the ridiculousness of the United States guaranteeing all that vast mass of obligations in this country was an obstacle which no American lawyer could ever get across. Apart from that, however, I have personally taken a great interest in discussing the clearing system and ascertaining as far as I could how the originators of the system expected it to work; because if it was possible to devise a clearing system or rather a system of arrang- ing mutually the debts between this country and Germany without a Government guaranty and without preventing our merchants from communicatiug and arranging their settlements in some way and without some of the other features which would cramp the system, it would be an advantageous thing. In other words, if we could arrange with Germany a system to clear our debts which have been hung up through, we wul say, a group of banks or some private institution, without involving the obHgations or the friction of governmental interests, it would be an admirable thing to do. That is exactly the opportunity that is left to us now, if we desire to do so. Senator Knox. I want to ask you about this option. Do we have to give notice to get into the clearing house, or give notice to stay out? Mr. Palmer. We have to give notice to get in. Senator Knox. Now, do we? I thought that, at first; but look at the text on page 351, at the bottom of the page. I will read enough of it to get the substance of it. It says that "the provisions of tms article and of the annex hereto shall not apply * * * unless * * * notice to that effect is given." Does not "notice to that effect" mean notice that it shall not apply, rather than that it shall apply? Mr. Palmer. I will answer that question in this way. When that clause was originally drawn it was drawn to require notice to stay out, and the United States representative objected to it very strongly, and the word "if" was changed to "unless," in order to give it the effect which I say. In other words, the clause was remodeled for the purpose of providing that in case any country desired to partici- pate in this they must give notice. Otherwise they are left out. Senator Knox. Does this language do so ? Mr. Palmer. I think so. Senator Knox. It says that the provisions of this article and, of the annex thereto shall not apply unless notice to that effect is given. Mr. Palmer. To the effect that they shall apply. Senator Knox. No; it says "notice to that effect." What effect? The effect is that it shall not apply. I assumed that what you saj you were trying to do was what had been done, but this language is really confusing. I, do not know whether the EYench text helps it out any or not. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 37 Mr. Palmer. The language says it shall not apply "unless" — unless what ? Unless notice is given. Senator Knox. Unless notice "to that effect" is given. Mr. Palmer. Unless notice of some kind is given. Senator Knox. Notice that it shall not apply, it seems to me to mean. What I want to find out is whether we have got to give notice to stay in or to give notice to get out. That may be clear to other people, but it is not clear to me. Senator Swanson. Your interpretation is that that means that it shall not apply Senator Knox. My interpretation is that it means that notice shall be given that it shall not apply. Senator Swanson. And you mterpret it that "to that effect," means that it shall not apply ? Senator Knox. That it shall not apply; yes. You and I both thought it was the other way yesterday when we talked about it, that we would have to give notice to get in; that we are automatically out unless we give notice to get in. Senator Fall. Yes ; we are automatically out unless we give notice to get in, and I very much hope that we will not give any such notice, and I would very much like an imperative provision that we shall not give any such notice. Mr. Palmer. This is clear, Senator, I think. It says "unless." Unless what? Unless some notice is given. Therefore, the alter- native is that if no notice is given it does not apply. Senator Knox. It says "notice to that effect." The effect of that paragraph is that imder certain circumstances it shall not apply. Mr. Palmer. Yes. Senator Knox. Therefore, it does apply unless notice is given. Mr. Palmer. No; it does not apply unless notice is given. Senator PIarding. The succeeding paragraph says, on page 353: "The allied and associated powers who have adopted this article and the annex." Does that contemplate notice? Mr. Palmer. If you do not give any notice yourself, it does not apply. It says so. Senator Pomerene. Yes. Senator Pittman. Leaving out intervening words, does it not read this way: "The provisions of this article and of the annex hereto shall not apply unless notice to that effect is given" ? That is the language of this section ? Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir. Senator Knox. Unless notice to the effect that it shall not apply is given. Senator Pittman. The first statement is that it shall not apply imless notice is given to that effect. Mr. Palmer. Senator, I think the words "notice to that effect" should be interpreted for that purpose. Senator Knox. I should be very much disposed to defer it to the interpretation that this committee would put upon it, but to my mind it is very confusing here. Senator McCumber. The matter is also in the French text, and we have here some very good French scholars, and I would like to ask some of them for their interpretation to see how the French agrees. The Chairman. It is very blind. 38 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. Senator Fall. Mr. Chairman, I have nothing further that I wanted to question Mr. Palmer about. I want, personally, to thank him for his expknation of the matter I inquired about. The Chairman. Does any other member of the committee desire to ask Mr. Palmer any questions ? Senator Moses. Mr. Chairman, referring to page 273 of the com- mittee text, which is Annex II, paragraph 15, following article 244, I would like Mr. Pahner to explain the practical working out. Of course, there are many things in connection with the Reparation Commission which possibly these witnesses are not prepared to take up. Mr. Palmer. Is that in the reparation clauses ? Senator Moses. Yes. Mr. Palmer. I had nothing to do with that part of the treaty. Senator Moses. Is Mr. Baruch familiar with that ? Mr. Baruch. Yes. Senator Moses. I will ask Mr. Baruch about that when he comes on, then. The Chairman. If there is nothing further that the members of the committee desire to ask Mr. Palmer, the committee are much obliged to him, and we will now hear Mr. Baruch. STATEMENT OF MR. BERNARD M. BARUCH— Resumed. Senator Moses. Have you the text before you to which I have referred, page 273 of our text? Mr. Baruch. Will you give me the article ? Senator Moses. It is Annex II, paragraph 15, following article 244 of the treaty, on page 273 of the committee print. I would like to know exactly how that would work out, practically, Mr. Baruch. It reads : A certificate stating that it holds for the account of the said power bonds of the issues mentioned above. Just let me go back to the beginning of this. Senator Moses. Look at the bottom of page 268 and the top of page 269. Mr. Baruch. Yes; I have it. This refers to the issue of so many hundreds of millions of marks of gold bonds. Senator Moses. Yes. Mr. Baruch. It says: The commission will issue to each of the interested powers, in such form as the com* mission shall fix: (1) A certificate stating that it holds for the account of the said power bonds of the issues mentioned above, the said certificates, on the demand of the power concerned, being divisible in a number of parts, not exceeding five, * » *. Now, what is the question ? Senator Moses. It also provides that certain warehouse certifi- cates shall be divided in a certain manner. Mr. Baruch. It saj-s, "certificates statiog the goods delivered by Germany on account of her reparation debt." For instance, if a certain power should ask a certain amount of machinery, or Senator Moses. Dyes tuffs ? Mr. Baruch. Or dyestuffs, or raw materials for the building of roadways or of houses, she might be credited and receive a certificate for that. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANY. 39 Senator Moses. And it says: The said certificates shall be registered, and upon notice to the commission may be transferred by indorsement. That makes them securities for the market ? Mr. Baruch. It was not intended that they should be reissued at all, but they were to be held in the commission. Senator Moses. Why, then, should the certificate be divided into five parts ? Mr. Baruch. I presume that what was wanted by the various powers was to have something that they might get credit upon, but still the bonds would never be issued out of the commission s hands. Senator Moses. You mean the bonds would not pass out of the hands of the commission ? Mr. Baruch. Yes. Senator Moses. But the certificates which were the evidence of ownership might pass out ? Mr. Baruch. Yes. Senator Moses. And these five parts into which they had been divided,' upon being indorsed by the government to which they passed, might be sold ? Mr. Baruch. Well, the disposition of those divided parts would be entirely at the wish of the government that owned them. Senator Moses. There are a hundred million marks gold ? Mr. Baruch Twenty billions for cash, forty and forty billion; yes. Senator Moses. In other words, .1520,000,000,000, par value? Mr. Baruch. Yes; about that. Senator Moses. And you have no idea as to the gi-oss amount of the certificates representing merchandise ? Mr. Baruch. Well, you could not arrive at that, Senator, until a demand was made by one of the interested powers, it mightf be Italy, or England, or France, or Belgium, for certain materials, which you wiU find, under an annex here, that they have a certain length of time to ask for. Senator Moses. Yes ; I am familiar with that. Would that amount be likely to equal the amount of the bond issue ? Mr. Baruch. No; I do not think so. Senator Moses. As the effect of the indorsement ? Mr. Baruch. I do not think so, because you could not possibly use that amount of inaterial. Senator Moses. Would the effect of the indorsement and transfer of these certificates be to add directly to the volume of securities in the financial markets of the world ? Mr. Baruch. That is a question I could not answer. Senator Moses. The effect of it would be to place German bonds indorsed by another government upon the market, would it not ? Mr. Baruch. I hardly think so, sir. Senator Moses. That would be the case unless the governments took these certificates and held them. Mr. Baruch. Yes; that is what they are going to do. As I under- stand it, the bonds are not to get out of the hands of the commission. Senator Moses. The bonds do not, that is true: but the certificates evidencing the ownership do. 40 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. Mr. Baruch. I would like to reread this. Mr. Norman Davis attended to the financial part of the reparation, and I had more to do with the industrial part of it. Senator Moses, if there is some other attach^ of the commission who is more familiar with that than you are, I wdl not inquire of you, but will wait for that other person. Whom was it you mentioned? Mr. Baruch. Mi. Norman Davis. Senator MosE.s. I do not want to inquire of you on a matter with which you are not thoroughly famUiar. Mr. Baruch. If I may reread this. Senator, I can answer your question. Senator Moses. No; I just thought it would be more satisfactory if we could talk with the member of the commission who dealt with it. Senator Johnson of California. Nevertheless, Mr. Baruch, in that paragraph (15), let me read the next to the last sentence. It reads: The said certificates shall be registered, and upon notice to the commission may be transferred by indorsement. That contemplates, of course, does it not Mr. Baruch. Yes; that would. Senator Johnson of California (continuing). That the certificates should be marketable and have a regular place upon the market, and be transferred not only from the governments or the commission, but be transferred from private individuals who may acquire them ? Mr. Baruch. I just wanted to see to what issue of bonds this referred. Senator Johnson of California. I think vou will find that on pages 268 and 269. Mr. Baruch. Yes; I am just going over that. There are three issues to be taken up, a first, a second, and a third. I was wondering what this applied to. I know it was contemplated that these cer- tificates should not be sold. Senator Knox. Still this section that Senator Johnson has just read contemplates it. Senator Johnson. Those are certificates relating to demands which may be made by the various powers and not to the bonds. Mr. Baruch. You see this certificate states thjit it is held for such bonds. It is not a certificate for the bonds. It is a certificate to the holder saying that it holds for England a certain amount of bonds. It is not a certificate of the bonds. Senator Moses. These certificates may be registered, and upon indorsement may be transferred. Senator Fall. And sold "when bonds are issued for sale on negotiation." Sir. Baruch. I would not be certain about it — Mr. Davis can tell you — but I think this was put in there for the purpose, perhaps, of transferring from one power to the other, rather than with the idea of their being put on the market. There was no contemplation of the bonds being put on the market, because no one knew the value that the German securities would have; but rather, if England had a debt against France or against Belgium or vice versa, that they might transfer some of these bonds. I think it was more on that account. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 41 Senator Knox. Here is a point that I want to know about. You have read from the treaty the provision that these shall be divided up into five parts. That, of course, means that the share of each nation shall be designated. Is that correct? Mr. Baruoh. Yes, sir. Senator Knox. Very well. Now suppose that we generously forego and agree to the cancellation of such amounts as are awarded to us, does that go to the amelioration of the burden of Germanj^ or the other four powers ? Mr. Baruch. It would be toward the amelioration of the burden of Germany, but the other four powers would get it, I think, for themselves. Senator Pittman. It says, "not to exceed five parts." It means that if the United States does not come in it will be divided into four parts ? Mr. Baruch. He is talking about the certificates being divided into five parts, and not the amount of the issue of bonds. Senator KJsrox. I want to know who gets the benefit of our gener- osity if we forego this indemnity. Does it go to ease the burden of Germany or the other nations ? Mr. Baruch. We think it will go to ease the burden of Germany, because Germany can not pay the entire claim. Senator Swanson. That would depend on what disposition this Government would make of its part. Senator Harding. If they did that it would have to accept the certificate and dispose of it on its own account. Mr. Baruch. The amount is not fixed as a definite amount. The general view is that there will not be enough to go around; that Germany will not be able to pay it. Senator Knox. There would be a disposition on the part of the reparation commission to increase the indemnity in spite of the fact that the United States does not propose to take any share of it. If we are going to be liberal here and forego to Germany the share that we are entitled to, I want to see it worked out so that Germany shall have the benefit of it. Mr. Baruch. That would be a matter which your commission would be able to decide. It would have the power to refund, I think, Senator, for the fact is borne in upon us every day that Germany will be unable to meet the biH that wiU be put against her. Senator Knox. What is the object of putting it against her, then ? Mr. Baruch. That bill is going to be determined by the reparation commission. We were unable to determine the amount that she could pay. So it was left to the reparation commission after investiga- tion to decide; so that it would decide five billions first, and then another amount, of ten billions and so on — a rather indefinite amount. Nothing definite has been decided. Senator Knox. Just one more question. So far as you know, is there any disposition to impose upon Germany, through the instru- mentality of the reparation commission, more than you think she can pay ? Mr. Baruch. Personally, I think so. Senator Knox. You think there is such a disposition? Mr. Baruch. It is a disposition born of the fact that she actually owes it. Germany actually owes more than she can pay. 42 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Knox. It is hardly a good business policy to lay upon your debtor more than he can pay. No good business man does that. Mr. Baeuch. The only remark I make about it is that you are correct, and that was the disposition of the American delegation, from the President down. Back of this is exactly the viewpoint of the intelligent business men, and that is the view that we took. Senator Johnson of California. Just one question. Has a treaty been made that you gentlemen beheve is incapable of being carried out by Germany ? Mr. Baruch. No, sir. Senator Johnson of California. Did you not just say that she would be unable to pay the amount of reparation ? Mr. Baruch. I think that the amount of reparation that is justly due she is imable to pay, but the reparation commission wiU say how much she can pay, and that will be the amomit. For instance, if the reparation commission fixed, say, fifty billions or one hundred biUions, that would be unworkable because she could not pay it. You will find it is drawn up with extreme care. It was done in that way to avoid guesswork. It was almost one of the first com- missions appointed and it was stUl sitting when we left Paris. Great care was taken to draw this so that it would work, and I think that it will work. There is no question in my mind that it will work. Senator Johnson of California. It will work providing that the bDl be scaled down by the reparation commission ? Mr. Baruch. Provided they will scale it down to what Germany can pay. Senator Johnson of California. That is what you mean ? Mr. Baruch. Yes, sir. Senator Johnson of California. So that on the figures as obtainable and presentable now, the bill is one that you say you do not think Germany can pay, but you rely upon the fact the good sense of the reparation commission wOl scale the amount down to a point commensurate with the abUity of Germany. Mr. Baruch. Yes; and within that power it has been left so that it would work. It is workable; there is no question about that. Senator Johnson of California. They have that power and the contrary power as well ? Mr. Baruch. Con trarv power ? What do you mean? Senator Johnson of California. That is, the power to scale down and the discretion to fix as well the amount that might not be scaled down. Mr. Baruch. To fix the amount. But, of covirse, if the amount is fixed, personally I think that will be the most workable treatment, to fix with Germany the amount which they themselves think they could pay. Of course, no one would fix an amount against a debtor that he did not think the debtor could pay. Senator Johnson of California. Was it not that very fact of the fixing of the amount that was denied at the conference? Mr. Baruch. I do not exactly imderstand your question, but I will say this, that the American delegation contended continuously for the fixing of a definite amoimt. Senator Johnson of California. They were unsuccessful in that contention ? TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 43 Mr. Bakuch. Yes; because you can see it would involve the question of repairing farms, and losses to the civilian population, and there would be no possibility of doing that within such a short time after the sound of the cannon had died away, and to get any adequate idea of what the bill should be. It was impossible to get a bill for restoring the districts and the great factories that were ruthlessly destroyed in Serbia, Poland, and these other countries except alter a great length of time, in order to find out what the bill would be. We could not say what the bill was; we could not deter- mine it without an examination; and Germany was not in a condition to find out what she could pay. The only way we could examine the question was to make a guess, or leave it open in the way we did. Senator Johnson of California. You sought in the first instance to have a specific amount fixed. Mr. Bakuch. We sought until the last day. Senator Johnson of California. You deemed that essential in order that there might be stability, and in order that you might have a definite and fixed sum which Germany could look forward to as the debtor nation and the Allies as the creditor nations. Mr. Baeuch. Undoubtedly, it would be better to let Germany know what she had to pay, and to let the rest of the world know what it was to expect. But we soon saw it would be impossible to get up her bill and to get the people to determine now what that fixed sum would be. Senator Johnson of California. Why untU the last day did you continue to ask for a fixed sum ? ■Mr. Baeuch. Well, we discussed the question and tried to con- vince the people who were most interested, and to get them to come around to our viewpoint. Senator Haeding. Germany preferred it too, did she not? Mr. Baeuch. We never had any discussion with her on that. Senator Harding. Did she make such representations in her efforts to modify the treaty ? Mr. Baeuch. They complained about the indefiniteness of the amoimt, but we never had any hearing with them because we had no opportunity to get in touch with them to discuss this question. Senator Haeding. Did I understand you to say that under this provision the American reparation commissioners would have the authority to say whether the United States of America would sur- render any share of the reparation * Mr. Baeuch. I think that has to come back to the United States Government. I will have to go back and read that over. I think the Governments themselves were to say whether they would relin- quish any amount. Senator Johnson of California. I think you are correct in that. I think in some place the treaty provides for that sort of thing. Mr. Baeuch. Had I known that you would discuss this, I would have read it over again to get myself oriented about the reparation clause. Mr. Johnson of California. One other question. The United States expects none of these reparations. That is the theory upon which you are acting, and I presume is the theory that will be finally acted upon if it is the desire of you gentlemen, who are most familiar 44 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. with. it. That being the case, what has the United States repre- sentative on the reparation commission to do ? Mr. Baexjch. Senator Johnson, we are associated with these other Governments in the war. We are imposing certain conditions m)on Germany, and the very thought which gave rise to Senator Knox's impression . is that we are imposing those conditions on Germany, and it is our duty and obligation to see that the spirit of this reparation is carried out. Senator Johnson of California. The theory, then, and the only theory, upon which we take part in this work of the reparation commission is to see that that idea is carried out? Mr. Baruch. No; not entirely; and I think, though I am not entirely clear, that there are some reparational demands that will be put in. I am not clear about that. Senator Johnson of California. You mean by the United States ? Mr. Baruch. Yes; some of them. I am not clear about it. Senator Pomerene. Such as the Lusitanm claims? Mr. Baruch. For the loss of ships. The Lusitama and the Frye cases were prewar claims, which we took occasion to protect in dealing with enemy property. But even if we do not receive any, I think, individually — I am not here to discuss policy, and this is only my view — it seems to me that we had to become a party to these obligations that we are forcing upon Germany and that we have been very insistent upon. Therefore I do not see how we could escape being a party to see that this is carried out; and all the nations of the world, England and the various cotmtries, are looking to the United States to help them in these decisions. Senator Johnson of California. I want to get your viewpoint. Our activities will be wholly altruistic ? Mr. Baruch. I would say no to that, for this reason. The spirit and the wisdom of the carrying out of this reparation commission is a matter of dollars and cents in the United .States of America, because upon the wisdom of those decisions depend the financial and the industrial conditions of the world for years to come, and perhaps for many generations. Senator Johnson of California. Then it is from the world stand- point and for the staoilizing of the world ? Mr. Baruch. And from our own personal interests. Germany was a very large customer of ours. And this reparation commission does not deal alone with Germany, but with all the great central empires, and there are some 130,000,000 to 150,000,000 people involved in this, and it is a matter about which we are moved by great altruistic ideas primarily, but it is also a matter of deep self-interest. Senator Johnson of California. I am inquiring only to get your view. I am not speaking in hostili ty to that view, or in criticism of it. Mr.. Baruch. I quite appreciate that. Senator Johnson of California. Now, we wiU be engaged for some 30 years or more, then, in this particular design that you suggest? Mr. Baruch. Not necessarily. Senator. Senator Johnson of California. Not necessarily ? Mr. Baruch. The probabilities are that it wiU be shorter than that if we are wise. Senator Johnson of California. If we are wise. You mean the Keparation Commission ? TKEAXY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 45 Mr. Baeuch. I mean not the United States alone, but all the people interested. Senator Johnson of California. That is, if the other four powers with whom we will act, and who will have the determination of the matter, are wise ? Mr. Baeuch. I do not think they have any more to say in the determination — I think America witl be the determining factor. Senator Johnson of California. That is, our one vote will be the determining factor ? Mr. Baeuoh. I think the influence of the American representatives win be greater, perhaps, than that of any other individuals. Senator Johnson of California. Do you think that opinion justified by what has transpired at the peace conference ? Mr. Baetjch. Yes, sir. Senator Johnson of California. And it is justified— — Mr. Baeuch. I take it as a matter of fact as I have seen it with my own eyes, and from the facts that greeted me on aU sides in the rela- tion that Americans had with the various powers. Senator Johnson of Cahfornia. And in the terms of the treaty that was made, you think the opinion you just gave is justified ? Mr. Baeuch. Yes, sir. Senator Johnson of Cahfornia. And that the predominant factor in fixing those terms was the United States ? Mr. Baeuch. Which terms ? Senator Johnson of California. Generally speaking, the terms of the treaty of peace. Mr. Baeuch. I think that in most instances we had a very great voice in it. Senator Johnson of California. The "predominant" voice? I think that was your adjective. Mr. Baeuch. I was referring particularly at that time to the reparation commission. Senator Johnson of California. Not to territorial distribution? Mr. Baeuch. I was not familiar with those. Senator Johnson of California. Who drew up the economic provi- sions ? Mr. Baeuch. In here ? Senator Johnson of California. Yes. Mr. Baeuch. They were drawn up by the economic commission, of which myself an^ Mr. Lament were American representatives. I do not know whether you heard yesterday my effort to show you the way it was worked and how these various decisions were arrived at. Senator Johnson of California. Is it not a fact that the whole economic section of the treaty was drawn up by England ? llr. Baeuch. It is not, sir; unless you can caU me an Englishman, sir. Senator Johnson of California. I am not referring to specific provisions, but generally speaking were the economic sections the Jesuit of the work of the United States commissioners or of the United States commission of which you are a member ? Ml-. Baeuch. We had a most active part in it. Senator Johnson of California. I mean in the very phraseology And the very drawing up. 46 TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANY. Mr. BARDCfr. The phraseology was drawn up in the subconamittees, and then that was turned over to the drafting committee, which drafted or redrafted in some way, hut never changed what we thought was the meaning of the clause. Senator Johnson of California. Do you recall whether England presented the economic section of the treaty ? Mr. Bakuch. Every one presented different views. We did that when we had a drafting committee, of which I was the sole American member. Everybody was, of course, asked to give their views. Senator Johnson of California. But you are quite certain that the economic provisions contained in this treaty were not the result of the work of the English conamissioners or representatives? Mr. Baruch. Of course they were not; there were suggestions by them, of course. There were suggestions by everyone. Senator Johnson of California. I did not mean wholly, in detail; but largely? These economic provisions that are a part of this treaty, are they not largely those that were drawn by the English people ? Mr. Baruch. If you mean that they drew up these clauses, no. We all had a hand in it, and the Americans had their say. Senator Johnson of California. Do you recollect having a draft before you that was presented by the English ? Mr. Baruch. Oh, yes; everyone prepared drafts — the Italians, French, and English. Everyone prepared drafts. Senator Johnson of California. Do you recall whether it was the English draft on which you worked and of which this treaty is the result ? Ml'. Baruch. No; I do not recall that. Senator. Senator Johnson of California. Would you say that that was not correct ? Mr. Baruch. It may or may not be correct, but I do not see what bearing it has on the case. Anyone was free to offer any suggestions, and we were glad to have people come forward with constructive suggestions, and we would take them or modify them as we saw fit. Senator Johnson of California. This is a apart from the particular iiiquiry here, but did you participate in the execution of the provi- sion, of the Austrian treaty? Mr. Baruch. Yes, sir; our various associates did. Senator Johnson of CaUfornia. Did you have a great participa- tion in the economic provisions of the Austrian treaty than you did in the treaty witn Germany ? Mr. Baruch, I do not think so; no, sir. We had the same par- ticipation. Senator Pomerene. In order to make the record clear, when you say "you," you mean the delegation here? Senator Johnson of California. I mean Mr. Baruch in conjunction with the American personnel. Mr. Baruch. I presiune you mean the American representatives. Senator Johnson of CaliJornia. Because of some information that has come to me, I ask you the direct question, not for the purpose of questioning what you have said in that regard, but in order that we may be perfectly clear in the matter: Was it or was it not a fact that the whole economic section of the treaty was substantially drawn up by England and presented, and that the English draft was substan- tially or largely accepted ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 47 Mr. Baeuch. That I could not remember. I can only say this Dr. Taussig. Not in the slightest. i(,i Mr. Baruch. Dr. Taussig, who was there with us, says not in the shghtest. I do not know just exactly what the Senator has in his mind, but I would like to say this, that every delegation was asked to present views and suggestions, and if we liked them we took them, but if we did not like them we did not take them. Senator Johnson of California. When you say "we" Mr. Baruch. I mean the American delegation. We took any- body's suggestions, irrespective of whom they came from. We were there for that purpose, and when they brought in these suggestions they were taken before the various subcommittees, and if any sug- gestion was approved, no matter from whom it came, it was written up. Senator Moses. And the decision was by a majority? Mr. Baruch. Our decisions were unanimous. We had to work to a unanimous decision. Senator Hitchcock. How many nations were represented ? Mr. Baruch. Twenty-three. That may give you some idea of the difficulties involved in every one of these questions. Senator Knox. Did you have much trouble with Liberia ? Mr. Baruch. I did not see much of her. Senator Moses. Have you the committee print before you, Mr. Baruch ? Mr. Baruch. Yes. Senator Moses. Will you turn to page 271, to paragraph 13 of the a,nnex ? Mr. Baruch. Yes; as to reparations. Senator Moses. As to voting. I wish to ask you particularly with reference to subdivisions (a) and (/). The commission under this paragraph would have to have a unanimous vote on the cancellation of any portion of the debt or obligations of Germany. Do you think that would be easily arrived at in its decision ? Mr. Baruch. I do not think it v/ould be easy, but it could be done. Senator Moses. Do you think that an interpretation of the treaty by imanimous vote as provided in subdivision (/) would be easy ? Mr. Baruch. That is, of the provisions of this part ? Senator Moses. Yes. Mr. Baruch. I think it can be done; yes. Senator Moses. If that was done the question would never come back to the United States, would it ? Mr. Baruch. That is correct, sir. Senator Fall. Then the commission wouM have the right to cancel, without reference back to the United States, any portion of the German debt, or the American portion of the debt ? Mr. Baruch. There is here another clause regarding cancellation, that I would like to find before I answer that question. Senator Fali,. Now, if the American representative on the com- mission desired to secure or to grant to Germany a postponement, either totally or partially, beyond 1930, of any payment or settlement falling due between May 1, 1921, and the end of 1926, the American commissioner could not secure such action except by unanimous vote? 48 TKEATY or PEACE WITH GBEMANY. Mr. Baeuch. That is right, sir. That is clause (c) that you refer to ? Senator Fall. Yes. And then in clause (d) there is the same case; so that with the American commissioner there, if we do not care for any of this reparation at all, and we sit there simply to carry out, you say, the obligations which we have incurred by going into it at aU, still we would have only one vioce, and it requires a unanimous voice for the commission to grant any of these postponements. Mr. Barucii. They can not do anything without us. Senator Fall. No; and we can not do anything without them. They might not want to postpone. They might want their money, and we not want it. Thej^ can not get it. Mr. Baeuch. I do not think that it is fair to say that we are not getting anything. We are getting 130,000,000 of people on their feet, people who have been accustomed to dea^. with us, and helping to get a reestablishment of the financial system of the world, which is im- portant. Senator Fall. Providing we can force our ideas on the commission. But one of the commissioners can balk us on any step we take. Mr. Barxich. It is always fair to assume that we could get some arrangement. Senator Kxvox. Who are these 130,000,000 people? Mr. Baeuch. There are more than 60,000,000 Germans and some 70,000,000 Austro-Hungarians. Senator Knox. Do you think this treatv puts Germanv on her feet? Mr. Baeuch. I do not thig^ ^,,said so. If I used that language, it did not carry my thought. u.,. Senator Knox. That is what you said. Mr. Baeuch. I think I may have given a wrong impression. What I meant to say. Senator, was that the reestablishment of financial conditions, and therefore of the industrial conditions, wiU help to get them reestabhshed and get on their feet. Senator Knox. My recollection is that your exact answer was that we got a great deal out of this treaty because that put 130,000,000 of people on their feet. Mr. Baeuch. What I meant was that we got a great stake in the reparation commission, even from a selfish view, because we are inter- ested in seeing 130,000,000 people get themselves going again, and we are interested in getting the reestablishment of mdustrial condi- tions of the world. Do I make myself clear ? Senator Knox. Perfectly. Senator Harding. I want to ask if the inference is that our chief function on the reparation commission is one of a friendly and helpful interest to Germany and the Central Powers for our selfish interests rather than anything else ? Mr. Baeuch. No; I would not day so, Senator. I think it is a necessary thing for America first. Senator Haeding. Why do you say that it is to the interest of America when the Central Powers are the most formidable commercial rivals that we have? Mr. Baruoh. Can you imagine the world being prosperous while 130,000,000 milhons of people right in the center of the industrial TKEATY OF PEACK WITH GERMANY. 49 population are not prosperous ? Can you imagine prosperity without the financial prosperity of the Central Powers, with the finances of Italy, France and of Belgium and their industrial life, and to a large extent England's, depending on what they are going to receive from those people ? In that way this reflects upon us. It is a great big partnership. We can not separate ourselves from it. It is of vast consequence to America. The CHAraMAN. Mr. Baruch, I just want to ask a question about your figures. Are you quite correct about the population of Austria ? Mr. Baruoh. I think it is something like 70,000,000. The Chairman. At the beginning of the war it was said to be about 52,000,000—9,000,000 Austrians, 14,000,000 Hungarians and 26,000,000 Slavs. Those were the figures given at that time, with Germany about 70,000,000. That made about 120,000,000 alto- gether. Mr. Baruch. I thought Austria-Hungary was larger; 130,000,000 was the figure I had in mind. It may be 120,000,000. Bulgaria is in there. That is another 15,000,000. Senator Hitchcock. Our interest in the welfare of Europe, Mr. Baruch, you estimate is because our chief exports go to Europe? Europe is our large customer ? Mr. Baruch. She is our large customer. Senator Hitchcock. We have therefore that interest in the restoration of order and of normal conditions in those countries because our export trade depends to a large extent upon it? Mr. Baruch. Quite correct. Senator Harding. Do I understac ou, Senator, that you have got away from your devotion to hui^uuity and are now merely a selfish commercialist ? ' Senator Hitchcock. I mix the two together. Mr. Baruch. I think the Senator will admit that himself. The Chairman. I must be on the floor when the Senate opens, I do not want to interfere with the hearing, and I will ask Senator McCumber now to take the chair. I ask the committee to meet in executive session in the committee room in the Capitol at 3 o'clock so that we may dispose of the resolution of Senator Kenyon. I do not want to stop the hearing now to take that up. Senator Moses. There are others of us who have to be on the floor, Mr. Chairman, and I move that the committee stand in recess until 3 o'clock, then to meet in executive session. Senator McCumber. There have been quite a number of questions asked, but I think we are not quite through with the witnesses. I want to ask a few questions, perhaps three or four, of Mr. Baruch. The Chairman. I see no reason why those Senators who care to stay should not continue the hearing. Senator Knox. I have to be on the floor, and I have a few ques- tions that I want to ask Mr. Baruch. Senator Williams. I move that we take a recess. Senator Pomerene. It is quite apparent that we can not finish to-day with Mr. Baruch and with the other witnesses who are here. A number of Senators want to be on the floor, and I think we ought to adopt the motion made by the Senator from New Hampshire to take a recess at this time. 135546—19 4 50 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMAJirY. The Chairman. I only want it remembered that we are to meet at 3 o'clock this afternoon. These hearings will be continued to-morrow morning at 10.30 o'clock. Now, will the committee give me their attention for one minute? Mr. Taussig is here in regard to the customs provisions of the treaty. 1 am not aware that any Senator has expressed a desire to ask ques- tions on that subject, and it would be convenient to Prof. Taussig to know whether the committee desire to question him about the customs provisions. I have heard nothing said about it. Senator Moses. Upon the examination of these witnesses on this section may depend what we may wish to inquire about further. I think it advisable to request Prof. Taussig to come again. The Chairman. Then the committee stands adjourned to meet at 3 o'clock, in the room of the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Capitol, and to continue the hearing here to-morrow at 10.30. (Thereupon, at 12 o'clock, noon, the committee adjourned until to-morrow, Saturday, August 2, 1919, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.) saturday, augxtst 2, 1919. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, WasJiington, D. C. The committee met at 10 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment, in room 426, Senate Office Building, Senator Hemy Cabot Lodge presiding. Present: Senators Lodge (chairman), McCumber, Brandegee, Knox, Johnson of California, New, Moses, Swanson, Pomerene, Smith of Arizona, and Pittman. The Chairman. Prof. Taussig is anxious to go away, and Senator McCumber desires to ask him some questions. We will allow Prof. Taussig to take the stand first this morning. STATEMENT OF ME. F. W. TAUSSIG. Senator McCumber. Prof. Taussig, there was, in some of the questions asked yesterday, an assumption that the financial clauses were the work rather of British delegates. I want to ask you whether or not, under the terms of the treaty, there are not considerable portions of the treaty that relate to matters that are of pecuHar interest and particular interest to Great Britain and France only, in which the United States has very slight, if any, direct interests, and to ask you also to what extent the American delegates took part in the matter of formulating the financial provisions, and to what extent the British delegates took part, and so lorth. Mr. Taussig. You have in mind. Senator, the economic clauses as well as the financial clauses ? Senator McCumber. The economic clauses equally with the finan- cial clauses. I should include them. Mr. Taussig. Of course, there were some of the economic questions with which the British and French were peculiarly concerned. The arrangement in regard to prewar duties, for example, was one which the British and the French put together and which the United States from the start said that they would not enter into. Naturally the drafting of the details of that was something in which the American delegates took no part, since we would not enter into it anyhow. Those clauses in their details occupy a considerable number of page* in the treaty. When it comes to the clauses in which the United States entered, all nations took their part, and we took our hand in the drafting, as other nations did, and I do not think it can be said that there was a predominance of any country. 51 52 TREATY or PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator McCumbee. There were certain interests, especially pre- war interests, that were applicable only to Great Britain and France, were there not ? Mr. Taussig. The clearing-house system was peculiarly applica- ble to Great Britain and France, and, as was explained by ^ir. Palmer yesterday, from the first we did not expect to enter that. Senator McCumber. Can you say that the financial or economic provisions were peculiarly the presentation of any one nation Mr. Taussig. It can not be so said. Senator McCumber (continuing) . Outside of those in which Great Britain and France alone were interested ? Mr. Taussig. It can not be so said. Drafts were received from all the countries — ^from the United States, from Great Britain, from Italy, from Belgium, from the Slavs — and they were all considered in formulating the clauses as finally presented to the supreme council. Senator McCximber. And you did not follow one recommendation, or the recommendation of one nation or its delegates, any more than that of others ? Mr. Taussig. No, sir. Senator McCinMSER. Those are all the questions that I wanted to ask. Senator Pomerene. Prof. Taussig, you have spoken of the clearing house as applying to Great Britain, France, and Belgium, etc., and I have m mind what Mr. Palmer said bearing upon that subject, which in substance was that that was a matter m which the United States had no particular interest. Do you desire in any way to qualify the statement of Mr. Palmer or to add anything to it? Mr. Taussig. No, sir; not in the least. I only wanted to poiat out that when it came to the drafting of the clauses of the treaty we allowed — I will not say we allowed — we naturally accepted a situation in which Great Britain and France, who wished to put that arrangement into effect, undertook the drafting of the clauses; and it could be said in regard to those that the drafting was British and French. Senator Pomerene. Then, if I understand you correctly, any statement to the effect that the British representatives dominated the framing of these economic and financial provisions is purely voluntary and without any foundation in fact ? Mr. Taussig. I saw no indications of that — of any dominance of any one country. Senator Pomerene. Yes. Mr. Taussig. I think it may be said that the United States in some respects exercised a greater influence than other countries, in that on occasions we were asked to act as arbitrators when there were disputed questions. Senator Pomerene. Do you care to suggest what those subjects were? Mr. Taussig. Yes. For example, there was a question as to certain remissions of duties by Germany, or retentions by Germany; that Germany should not change her duties on certain producte. You will find that in the treaty in regard to Italian products. Other countries wished the same advantages from Germany — France, Belgium, Japan, Jugo-Slavia — and it was difficult to settle it; and finally it was left to the American representative, and the subcom- TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 53 mittee said, " Whatever the American representative decides we will accept"; and the matter was settled in that way. The Chairman. If there are no further questions to ask Prof. Taussig, we are very much obliged to him. Senator Pomeeene. Mr. Chairman, I understood that Prof. Taussig was to be called upon to explain the customs features. The Chairman. No ; he was kept here because Senator McCumber wanted to ask him some questions. I do not know of any questions on customs that are to be asked him. Senator Pomerene. I do not know of any, but while the professor is here I should like to ask him if there is any explanation of thesff customs provisions which he would like to make to the committee. Mr. Taussig. There is one point to which I think attention may be drawn. Under the customs provisions Germany gives to the AUies most-favored-nation treatment for a period, and the AUies do not give Germany most-favored-nation treatment, and the unilateral character of the arrangement has sometimes been criticized. That> provision was made in order to make the competition between the devastated regions, France and Belgium, for example, on even terms with Germany during the five-year period. The French and Belgians feared that during this period, whUe their industries were devastated and broken down so that they could not compete with the Germans, the Germans might make special arrangements with neutral countries or with allied countries such as they have made in the past, by which the Germans would give favors, we will say to Sweden, and Sweden would in return give favors to Germany, and that consequently Germany would be enabled to get in her goods and get her trade estabhshed during the period when the French and the Belgians were incapacitated from carrying on their businesses; and in order to Erevent Germany from making spe6ial arrangements for getting in er trade, this stipulation was put in, that during five years Germany- should foUow the most-favored-nation policy as to the Allies, which would prevent her from making special arrangements for getting her goods into these other countries while France and Belgium were devastated. That is the explanation of this most favored nation arrangement for five years, and for the obligation imposed upon Germany. That is not always understood, why it was that Germany was to give most favored nation treatment to the Allies, and the Allies were not during this five-year period to give it to Germany. The Chairman. If there are no further questions to be asked of Prof. Taussig, we wUl excuse him, and we are much obliged to him. STATEMENT OF MR. BERNARD M. BARTJCH— Resumed. The Chairman. Several members of the committee have expressed a desire to ask Mr. Baruch certain questions. Senator Moses. Mr. Baruch, are you familiar with the operations of the central Rhine commission mentioned in the treaty in article 65 ? Mr. Baruch. No. Senator Moses. Then you can not shed any light upon the question asked yesterday with reference to the appointment of an American, member on that commission ? Mr. Baruch. No. Senator Pomerene. On what page is that ? 54 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Moses. On page 101 and page 103 you will find a reference to the central Rhine commission. Mr. Bakuch. What did you say about appointments ? Senator Moses. The central Ehine commission, as I have always understood, was an international body established by convention prior to the war, and had functions then. Now, according to the dispatches from Paris, which appeared in the morning paper yester- day, that commission is functionmg with an American representative on it. I was wondering whether you knew anything about it. Mr. Baruch. I am not qualified to give any explanation upon that, Senator. Senator McCumber. Mr. Baruch, I should like to ask you a ques- tion or two. It was at least suggested in some of the answers of yesterday that it would be extremely difficult for Germany to respond to the damages assessed by the allied powers against her. Let me ask you first if there is not a provision in the treaty that Germany shall at least be required to pay as heavy a tax as the other nations ? Mr. Bartjch. Yes; that is correct. Senator McCumber. And she probably could pay as heavy a tax as other nations engaged in this war, could she not ? Mr. Baruch. Yes. Senator McCumber. Now I call your attention to the fact that in the year •1919, ending June 30, the per capita tax in Great Britain was $86.13, while the per capita tax in Germany was only S22.88, or only about one-fourth as much as in Great Britain. Senator Pomerene. Will you please give those figures again, Senator ? Senator McCxjmber. In Great Britain the per capita tax for the year ending June 30,. 1919, was S86.13, while that of Germany was I22.88, or about one-fourth the per capita tax of the people of Great Britain; and the per capita tax of the United States was $39.13, or nearly double the per capita tax of Germany. Now with the German industries in such a position that they can be immediately put in operation the moment that she gets over her Bolshevik fever, IS she not in a pretty fair condition to pay such additional tax, equivalent to that of other nations, and thereby take care of this sum of about $24,000,000,000 that is assessed against her? Mr. Baruch. I will answer that question in a moment. First I wish to say that the impression that 824,000,000,000 is the total sum is incorrect, because that is only the first issue of securities. But if you will notice, if goes on to sav "shall forthwith issue any further obligations" so that the $24,000,000,000 is not the limit o"f what Germany may be assessed to pay, but the amount is unlimited. Senator McCumber. That is a sort of indenanity; and then she is to pay reparations in addition. Mr. Baruch. No; the whole matter is all reparation, but the $5,000,- 000,000 bonds and the two succeeding amounts of $10,000,000,000 each are amoimts that will be issued imder certain conditions; but they can issue fiu-ther amounts if it is found that she is able to pay and that the bill calls for the amount. So the $24,000,000,000 is not the limit of what can be called for imder the clauses of the reparation. Then, no doubt your figures as to taxes are correct; but Germany did not pay the costs of the war in the same manner, for instance, as did England and the United States. If my memory serves me correctly, TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMAN'2. 55 Germany paid only about 9 per cent of the cost of the war by taxation. Most of her costs of the war were paid through issues of securities. Senator MoCumbee. She paid only 9 per cent by taxation. Mr. Baeuch. Yes. That accounts for her small amount of taxes. The other nations paid varying percentages. The United States stands, I believe, at the head of the list in the amount of money that we have actually paid, by taxation, to defray the costs of the war. The Chairman. The United States has raised much more by taxa- tion in proportion to the total expenditure, than any other country ? Mr. Babuch. Yes. I would not be certain about the figures, but the amount raised by taxation by the United States is somewhere between 35 and 40 per cent of her total expense. Those figures may be wrong, but we stand at the top of the list on the amount of the cost which we have paid by taxation. Senator McCumber. It is higher than England. England had paid about 28 per cent and we stand a good deal higher than that. Mr. Baruch. I believe that is correct, Senator. Now, as to the ability of Germany to increase those taxes, there is no doubt that she can do so; but I would like to call your attention to this fact, that although her plants in themselves, the physical plants, are intact, and she saw to it through a systematic and wanton destruction of her neighbors that they would be so — she not alone destroyed those plants but took things out of the Belgian and French and Italian plants and increased her own facilities in uiat way — she is not in a position to take advantage of that unless the reparation commission permits her to do so through the purchase of raw material. She has got to have raw material, cotton, copper, wool, jute, and so on, to put into her fac- tories, in order to enable them to have something to manufacture. _ Senator McCumber. But the authority is vested in the commis- sion to do that. Mr. Barxtch. If she had a world market, and was not restricted as to the amount of money she could spend for these things, your state- ment would be absolutely correct. I have answered the question indirectly. She can not go ahead and do what it appears she can do unless the reparation commission permits her to do so. Senator McCumber. And if the reparation commission act with judgment, they will permit her to do so ? Mr. Baruch. As an act of good judgment, they wiU. Senator McCumber. And we must assume that they will do that. Now I again call your attention to the fact that in the matter of determinmg whether Germany can pay a greater assessment of taxes, the debt of Germany is to her own nationals for the most part, and under the treaty this debt must be subrogated to the interest of the assessment made by the Allies against Germany. Mr. Baruch. Quite correct. Senator McCumber. So at present she wiU not have to look after that debt unless it be for the purpose of strengthening her own credit in order to raise money; and secondly, that while the United Kingdom &t the date I have mentioned, June 30, 1919, had an estimated nat- ional wealth of about $85,000,000,000, Germany had $78,000,000,000, ■or nearly as much, while her taxation was only about one-fourth as much. Therefore, with a wealth nearly equal to that of Great Britain, including Ireland — the United Eangdom — do you not think that without destroying her industries she could reach an amount of 56 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANY. taxation equivalent to what is imposed upon the British subjects and thereby meet these obhgations, with the proper assistance given by the reparation commission? Mr. Baruoh. 1 do not think she can, for this reason, Senator, that England has a free supply of raw materials. Germany has lost a large percentage of her coal. She has certain obligations under the treaty for the delivery of coal. If I mistake not she has lost something like 70 per cent of her iron ore. Senator McCumber. Can that be remedied to any extent by the reparation commission ? Mr. Baruoh. No, sir; because she has got to go out into the open market and buy in competition. The deUvery of her coal can be ameHorated to the extent that it must not interfere with the economic and industrial life of Germany. Senator McCumber. Yes; but let me ask you right there, is not the coal condition in Great Britain practically as bad as it is in Ger- many to-day or nearly so ? Are not conditions extremely bad ? Mr. Baruch. I should say they are very grave. Senator McCumber. I wish you would explain to the committee what you mean by "very grave." Mr. Baruoh. WeU, I would not want to qualify as an expert upon this subject, but the production of coal in England has been very seriously hampered from various causes with which you gentlemen are famihar, and that has resulted in very high prices for coal. The production has decreased and the costs have gone up, and it is of very serious moment to England, because coal, of course, is one of the bases of manufacturing, and the cheap production of coal is one of the great causes of England's supremacy both in her manufac-. turing and in her bunkering of ships all over the world ; and of course it is a matter of very serious moment to England that she should be able to continue to have a large and constant and cheap source of supply of coal; and from the present appearances it looks as though this was very seriously menaced. Senator Johnson of California. That arises out of internal differ- ences, does it not? Mr. Baruoh. Yes. I did not want to convey any other impres- sion. Senator Johnson of California. It is not because she has not suffi- cient supply or because that supply can not be mined, but it is be- cause of differences that exist. Mr. Baruch. Yes ; internal social and labor conditions. Senator Johnson of California. Exactly. Mr. Baruch. There has been considerable talk regarding the lessening of her coal mines, but that may be only gossip and rumor, because those things always appear. Senator Johnson of California. As I gather, the supply exists and is easy to be had, but the internal differences which exist have re- sulted in recent rnyestigations, and these differences, and the ques- tion of the nationalization of coal mines which is now being discussed, are the reasons for the existing situation, are they not ? Mr. Baruch. Precisely. Senator McCumber. But nevertheless the condition is there ? Mr. Baruch. Oh, yes. Senator McCumber. And it is a serious condition. Mr. Baruch. A very serious one. TEBATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANY. 57 Senator McCxjmber. As a matter of fact, do you not think that the United States will be equally interested in bringing about a condition in which all the industries of Europe can be again put into operation, for om- own financial gain ? Mr. Baruoh. Unquestionably so. Senator McCxjmber. For instance, Great Britain up to the time of the war bought from the United States about one-haK of all of our exports. She was our greatest customer. Our trade with Great Britain was more than double oiu* trade with Germany prior to the war, on an average. Senator Johnson of California. Did the Senator mention textiles ? Senator McCxjmber. No; I say our commercial trade with Great Britain was about double our trade with Germany, and the balance of trade in our favor, of coxxrse, was about double. Take the year ending June 30, 1914. We sold to Great Britain nearly $600,000,000 worth of goods and bought back from Great Britain less than $300,- 000,000, giving us over $300,500,000 in our favor. Mr. Baruch. That was in 1914? Senator McCxjmber. In 1914; while to Germany we sold $344,- 000,000 and purchased $189,000,000, leaving but $154,000,000 in oui' favor. Now, inasmuch as Great Britain as well as Germany is a heavy pm-chaser of our goods — and Italy likewise — should not our pohcy be to assist all those nations to be put on their feet as soon as possible ? Mr. Baruch. Unquestionably. Senator McCxjmber. And that assistance should not be given any more to one nation of the Old World than another ? Mr. Baruch. I think they all ought to be assisted, but I think good judgment should be used in the way they should be assisted, and to whom assistance should be given. Senator McCxjmber. But our allies at least have an equal claim with our enemies upon our generosity? Mr. Baruch. Oh, unquestionably. Senator Johnson of California. Does that apply to China? Senator McCxjmber. I think so. Mr. Baruch. I think so. Senator Swanson. To get my own mind clear. There is nothing in this treaty that prohibits the nationals of Germany individually from buying all the raw material that they see proper, in order to develop their own factories, is there ? Mr. Baruch. Yes; there is. Senator Swanson. Do you mean that an individual factory in Germany can not make purchases of raw materials except through the. reparation commission? Mr. Baruch. No, sir; they can not. Senator Swanson. Where is that clause ? Mr. Baruch. Article 235. Mr. Norman Davis is more familiar with that than I am, but article 235 provides that — Out of this Bum the expenses of the armies of occupation subsequent to the armistice of November 11, 1918, shall first be met, and such supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by the governments of the principal allied and associated powers to_ be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations for reparation may also with the approval of the said governments, be paid for out of the above sum. ' Senator Swanson. That refers to the first $5,000,000,000 ? Mr. Baruch. Yes. 58 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANT. Senator Swanson. That is applicable to the reparation fund, is it not? Mr. Baruch. Yes; but out of that the amount of cash that Ger- many could pay in the first few years is limited, and in order to give her an opportunity to buy raw materials they said she shall have so much out of this as is necessary to buy them. Now, a man can not go and buy copper or jute or some other raw material and send credit out of the country unless the reparation commission let him do so, because it might affect the payment of this first $5,000,000,000 in cash. Senator Swanson. Do you mean that individuals can not do it ? Mr. Baruch. They can not if it conflicts with the first cash pay- ment. Senator Swanson. I do not catch that. I had an idea that there was a reparation commission provided, but that a concern in Ger- many could buy raw material if it had the money or credit individu- ally, and then, in addition to that, that the reparation commission could make loans to enable them to get raw material if they could not get it on their own individual credit. Mr. Baruch. No, sir; no plans for the reparation commission to make loans. Senator Swanson. I wanted to get my mind clear on that. Mr. Baruch. It says here — And Buch supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by the govemmenta of the principal allied and associated powers to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations for reparation may also, with the approval of the said govern- ments, be paid for out of the above sum. That is the reason why it is necessary for us to have a man to represent us on that commission. Senator Swanson. It says — Out of this sum the expenses of the armies of occupation subsequent to the armistice of November 11, 1918, shall first be met. That is the reparation sum ? Mr. Baruch. Yes. Senator Swanson. Further it says : And such supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by the Grovemments of the principal allied and associated powers to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations for reparation may also,with the approval of the said Governments; be paid for out of the above sum. Mr. Baruch. If she can put up more than $5,000,000,000 then there wUl be cash available to indivicluals. Senator Swanson. What I want to get clear in my mind is this : Here is a manufacturing concern in Germany that has money or credit, and it wants copper or it wants cotton. It can buy it mdi- vidually without asking any credit from the reparation commission, without borrowing any of this money. Can that concern come here and buy cotton or buy copper, or must it get it through the reparation commission ? Mr. Baruch. Not through it, but the reparation commission must be satisfied that it is going to get this sum of money. Germany has no right to go outside and get these materials for cash unless the reparation commission are satisfied that Germany is going to pay them this first cash sum of $5,000,000,000. If they are satisfied tWt Germany can pay that first cash sum, that will permit them to let TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 59 these men go out and buy their cotton or copper — so much as is necessary ; but it has got to be done under the reparation commission . Senator Swanson. Do you think that is provided for under section 235? Mr. Baeuch. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. And it is wholly discretionary whether it be allowed, or in what proportion it shall be allowedf. That is discretionary with the reparation commission. Mr. Baeuch. Yes; otherwise, you see, the individuals might, through some excuse or other, send out every dollar of gold and credit and securities that there was in Germany. Senator Swanson. After they put the taxes as high as they were in Great Britain, and after the taxes have been paid, then if a concern has something left after paying its taxes it can not, as I understand from you, use any surplus after paying its taxes to purchase any raw materials anywhere in the world without the consent of the reparation commission. Mr. Baruch. That is partly correct, and I will tell you why. If a man had the right to use his money and send it out of the country, they might leave absolutely nothing but a shell in Germany. The German Government themselves are going to set up machinery to see that all the money that can be taxed does not escape. Otherwise, if there was no overseer of this thing, every dollar of gold, every bit of securi- ties, everything that would have any cash value, could be shipped out of Germany and there would not be anything left there to be taxed or for the Allies to get their reparation from. Senator Swanson. If they bought property, if the money was exchanged for goods that were brought into Germany, the property could be taxed by the Government when it came back, could it not ? Mr. Baruch. Yes; that is right. The way this will work out will be that the very trade you speak of will go on continuously, and it will have to be done under the general eye of this machinery of the repara- tion commission, and that is one of the reasons why it is necessary for us to be represented on that commission, and why some provisional arrangement should be set up so that Germany can start now. Senator Swanson. I had obtained the idea that the nationals of Germany after they paid their taxes could use any balance they had for the purchase oi raw material, and in addition to that, out of the sum given to the reparation commission, they could also get credit to help them get raw material. That is the idea I got from reading this. But you say that is mistaken, and that they can not buy any raw material except through the reparation commission. Mr. Baruch. Except with the assent of the reparation commis- sion. But the reparation commission will not stop the buying of raw materials. The Germans and the Allies will discuss this matter and it will probably workout in thisway. They willsay, " You can proceed to use all you want for raw materials," when they see that the property so purchased will come back into Germany and be just as taxable and be more valuable than the credit they send out. It will work out just the way you say it will practically. But the reparation com- mission is set up over the whole machinery to see that cash payments are made. Senator Johnson of California. Unless you have already done so, will you explain article 236, which says : ^ Germany further^ agrees to the direct application of here conomic resources to and VI, relating, respectively, to 60 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. merchant shipping, to physical restoration, to coal and derivatives of coal, and to dyestuffs and other chemical products. Just what is meant by that section, and just what is its effect? Mr. Barxjch. Germany agrees to the direct application of her economic resources, that is production and manufacturing, to repara- tion as specified in Article III. Now if you will turn to Article III and the following Articles IV, V, and VI, you will find that those refer to certain manufactured goods and raw materials, to replace- ments of machinery in factories, and to certain coal which it was in- sisted Germany should give to those countries whose coal mines had been ruthlessly and deliberately destroyed, and to certain contractual relations which existed before the war and which were insisted upon for a certain term of years, so that Germany could not stop the coal that she had previously sold; and to the sale of certain dye- stuffs and chemical products that the Allies wanted to have an opportunity to use in the manufacture of their textiles. And there were some particular medicines that the Allies were very insistent upon, as being very necessary for the human race to get. Senator Knox. Were those hydrocarbon products ? Mr. Baruch. I do not know whether they call them by that name, but there was one particular medicine. Senator Johnson of California. Derivatives of coal, dyestuffs, and other chemical products. Does that mean that Germany's economic resources and industrial resources shall be applied as the reparation commission may in the future direct ? Mr. Baruch. No; it applies to the production of those things. They can go ahead and produce them, but the Allies are entitled to certain options and purchases. You will find that, outside of coal, the other provisions are of short duration, and the provision as to coal lasts only ten years. Senator Johnson of California. The direction or application of them is within the discretion of the reparation commission ? Mr. Baruch. Yes; they have certam options, and the reason the powers were given to the reparation commission was because it was the purpose not to interfere with industrial and economic condi- tions Senator Johnson of California. One reading of the treaty, or such reading as we are able to give it in the limited time at our disposal, will enable none except the most brilliant intellect — which I dx) not possess — to grasp all of the features of the treaty; but as I read it, I see substantially a supergovernment imposed upon the economic resources and industries of Germany in order to determine that she shall comply with what the Allies have required. Mr. Baruch. That is quite correct; not only to see that she can comply, but that she does comply. To see that she can comply is a very important part of it. Senator Johnson of California. The question whether she can comply is within the jurisdiction of this supergovernment. They determine that as well as determining the fact that she must comply. Mr. Baruch. After giving Germany a hearing and taking all the evidence. There could not be anybody else who could decide it. Senator New. ■ They determine that she can and then determine that she must. That is the point you make ? Mr. Baruch. Yes. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEKMANY. 61 Senator Johnson of California. You will observe that article 237 contemplates that — The successive installmentSj including the above sum, paid over by Germany in satisfaction of the above claims, will be divided by the allied and associated Gov- ernments in proportions which have been determined upon by them in advance on a basis of general equity and of the rights of each. As I infer from what you said in your previous testimony, those proportions have not yet been determined upon. Mr. Baruch. That is my understanding. That is correct. Senator Johnson of California. And that determination will be made ultimately by the allied and associated Governments ; and then the division will be made in the proportions that they determine? Mr. Baeuch. Yes, sir. Senator Johnson of California. There is one of the things that some of us were talking of yesterday that I want to explain to you, so that you may make it clear to us. The allied and associated Governments determine, now, that a certain sum shall be paid to Germany. I am speaking roughly, now, without reference to technical provisions of the treaty. Mr. Baruch. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. We say, in our altruistic position, that the division of this sum which is to come to the United States we do not desire; but all of the Governments have determined that a certain sum shall come, which sum includes that to which we might be entitled, but which ultimately, for ourselves, we remit. May not the reparation commission levy that siun, notwithstanding our re- mission, upon Germany and that part of the sum which would have come to us be divided, then, among others ? Mr. Baruch. I should think that would be a part of the deter- mination at the time they fixed the sum. That could be determined at the time they fixed the sum. Senator Johnson of California. And then eUminate entirely the right of the United States to any part of the sum ? Mr. Baruch. That might be a part of the negotiation. It would be impossible for me to say what would be done, but that might be a part of the negotiation. They might say, "Well, we will remit this," or, "We will make the sum less by that which is being elimi- nated." You see, it might be a part of the negotiation. Senator. Senator Johnson of California. But, the sum having been deter- mined as one which Germany is able to pay, is it not likely, then, that the full sum will be levied ? Mr. Baruch. Yes, that is so ; but as a part of the reasons for mak- ing a certain fixed sum that is reasonable, we might say that we wUl not take a share of what is a reasonable sum. I do not say we would. Senator Moses. Would article 234 have any bearing on that? Mr. Baruch. That might be so. You mean the last sentence ? Senator Moses. Yes. Mr. Baruch. This commission has the right to fix a certain sum. The commission has plenary powers, if that is the right adjective. They can fix X billions dollars. They have that right. Senator Knox. Will you pardon me a moment, for a question ? Senator Moses. Yes. Senator Knox. Suppose you determined, after consideration, that the maximum sum that Germany should pay would be $25,000,000,000 and suppose you determined that the share of the United States was 02 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. $5,000,000,000, and suppose you were informed the United States did not propose to demand her $5,000,000,000 of the fixed sum that Germany was to pay, would you fix the sum that Germany was to pay to the other powers at $20,000,000,000, or would you still fix it at $25,000,000,000 because she was able to pay $25,000,000,000? Mr. Baruch. Just ofEhand, I would suppose that that would be a matter for the determination of our Government. Senator Knox. But how ? It is a matter for the determination of the commission. Mr. Barxjch. But I presume he would be instructed by our Govern- ment, and would follow out the wishes of our Government with respect to that. Senator Knox. But our Government could not control the decision of the commission. If it was known that our Government was not going to make any exaction on them. Senator Johnson's point was, would Germany get any credit for that. In other words, would she be assessed $5,000,000,000 less than the extreme amount she could pay, or would she still be assessed all she could pay, for the benefit of those Governments who were willing to take it ? Senator Pomerene. Would she get the benefit of any concession we make? Senator Knox. That is it. Mr. Baeuoh. I understand the question. I was wondering how that would work out under this reparation commission. I should think that the American member, before he made that decision, would find out the wishes of his Government. Senator Knox. Does not the decision have to be unanimous ? Mr. Baruch. Yes; but if any reasonable man was on that commis- sion he would find out what the wishes of his Government would be, before deciding. Senator McCumber. Is there any way of finding out the wishes of the Government in regard to the cancellation, except by an act of Congress ? Does not the Government act through Congress ? ifi. Baruch. Yes; it can not be canceled except by the authority of the Government. Senator McCumber. Then, if it can be canceled only by the authority of the Government, the Government must act through its Congress, canceling the debt. Mr. Baruch. Yes; I suppose that would be so. Senator McCumber. Then, if the Government cancels the debt by an act of Congress, under section 234 is there not complete authority in the commission to remit that portion coming to the United States, and to collect only, in the instance of the case cited by the Senator from Pennsylvania, four-fifths of it ? Mr. Baruch. They would collect only the balance then. Senator Swanson. Senator Knox, do you not think that section 237, if you read it carefully, makes it plain? It seems to me that the division of the reparation is fixed by the commission. It says: "will be divided by the allied and associated Governments in pro- portions which have been determined upon by them in advance." The CHAmMAN. Not "shall be," but "have been." Senator Swanson. It says "have been"; but the French says the other. The Chairman. Yes. Senator Knox. In the sense of "have been," yes. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 63 Senator Swanson. Whether it says "shall be" or "have been" by the respective Governments, is there not an agreement how it shall be divided? After the amount is fixed we enter into a treaty as to the division of it by the respective Governments. Senator Knox. If the American commissioner is a high-class and just man, as I assiune he wiU be, he ought to see that when the maximum amount that Germany can pay is fixed, it is fixed upon the theory that our Government is going to collect its share, so that we may do the generous thing by Germany if we decide to do it. Senator Swanson. It seems to me that section 2.37 says that after they have fixed the installments, the allied and associated Governments are to reach an agreement as to the division of it. Senator Knox. What I am afraid of is that, the general impres- sion having gotten out that we do not intend to demand our share, that we intend to remit it, the amount that Germany is to pay will be fixed with that in view, and that the other powers will get the benefit of our remission, instead of Germany getting it. Senator Swanson. But it seems to me that under section 237 our Government is to agree as to our part of it, and that it will have to come back The Chaieman. Is Mr. Dulles to have the opportunity to cancel the money debt due to the United States ? Mr. Babuch. I do not think so. Senator. I did not know that that was determined upon. Senator Moses. You will find a further provision saying that that can not be done except by the express authority of the Government. The Chaibman. Then we come back to Senator McCumber's question; that it requires an act of Congress. Senator Swanson. Yes. Senator Knox. The Boxer fund was disposed of by an act of Congress. The Chairman. Certainly; I introduced the act myself. Mr. Babuch. It can not be canceled except by authority of an act of Congress. Senator Knox. The question asked by the chairman about Mr. Dulles reminds me that you said yesterday that this reparation com- mission was the first commission appointed, and that it was still in operation when you left Paris. Who are the members of that com- mission ? Mr. Babuch. Mr. Davis, Mr. McCormick, and Mr. Baruch. Senator Knox. The reparation commission ? Mr. Babuch. What I understand you mean by the reparation com- mission is the representatives of America on the reparation com- mission, the commission that discussed aU these questions; or do you mean the reparation commission as set up in the treaty ? Senator Knox. Yes. Mr. Babuch. There is none now, but there is a reparation com- mission I speak of that was created under the treaty but not yet set up and they are trying to establish an ad interim or provi- sional body to discuss with the Germans certain matters which have to be discussed with them in order to permit the Germans to reestab- lish themselves in trade. Senator Knox. On page 42 of the print of your testimony of yesterday, here, you said it was almost the first of the commissions appointed and was still sitting when you left Paris. 64 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANT, Mr. Baeuch. I was talking of the reparation commission of the American peace commission. I read that over, myself, and I knew what I meant, but I did not know but that I had left it a little hazy in your mind. Senator Knox. I am glad to have you correct it, so that there will be no misunderstanding about it. Mr. Baeuch. Yes. What we caUed the reparation conmiission in Paris was this commission that was dealing with reparation questions; just like we called the commission that was dealing with economic questions, in that way, the economic commission. Senator Knox. You mean the commission on helping to formulate the reparation clauses? Mr. Bakuch. Yes; and part of the reparation clauses is the creation of an international reparation commission. Senator Moses. You served on both the economic commission and the reparation commission ? Mr. Baeuch. Yes. We divided up our work. For instance, Mr. McCormick had charge of what we call the categories, determining the categories under which reparation could be claimed — ^under which damages could be claimed. Mr. Davis had to do with the financial clauses and I had to do with the securities. We had to subdivide our work, but we met as a general commission. Senator Knox. Mr. Lamont was iu that? Mr. Baeuch. Mr. Lamont came as one of the assistants of the Treasury, and he stayed with the division on reparation, and he had a great deal to do with the formulation of it. So that, as I said, they are more familiar with these financial clauses than I am, and I think if you want any further light than I am able to give you, you might call Mr. Davis or Mr. Lamonfe. Senator Knox. There is one matter I am quite anxious to get some information about, but perhaps it does not come within the sphere of vour activities over there. t notice in the treaty that Memel, Schleswig, and Danzig are ceded to the aUied and associated powers. That includes us. There is an absolute cession of the sovereignty of that portion of the German territory. Then there is a distinct provision in article 254 that the cessionary powers agree to pay a portion of the German debts. Does that fix an absolute liability upon us to pay a portion of the German Government's debts? Mr. Baeuch. May I see that ? What article is that. Senator ? Senator Moses. It is article 254. Senator Knox. It is on page 308. Mr. Baeuch. Those are financial questions, are they not? That means the powers to which the German territory is ceded. If it was ceded to Poland, for instance Senator Knox. But in this case that I mention, Memel, Danzig, and Schleswig are ceded to the allied and associated powers. That includes ourselves. The Chairman. The principal allied and associated powers. Senator KJsrox. Yes; the principal allied and associated powers. Mr. Baeuch. As I understand that language, " the powers to which German territory is ceded," that means that if Danzig was set up as a separate city, or the territory was ceded to Poland, that that city or independent city or independent country would be the one that was responsible for it. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 65 Senator Knox. Yes; but article 254 makes the cessionary powers responsible for it. That includes the United States. Mr. Baeuch. That was not contemplated in that. Senator Knox. I have gone through this treaty with great care to discover whether there is anything in the treaty which allows us to pass that liability over to whomsoever we may ultimately cede the territory. I should assume that that would be the plan that would be adopted, but I do not see anything in the treaty that would justify it. Here is the absolute provision that " the powers to which German territory is ceded shall, subject to the qualifications made in article 255, undertake to pay," and that is a qualification only in respect to what Alsace-Lorraine and Poland shall undertake to pay. The Chairman. Does not that apply to the overseas territories ? Senator Knox. No; I do not think the overseas territories are charged with any portion of the German debt. The Chairman. No; I think not. It gives Alsace-Lorraine an absolute exception. Senator Knox. Yes; Alsace-Lorraine is excepted. Owing to the peculiar conditions under which that territory was acquired, Alsace- Lorraine is relieved of any portion of the German debt. But Memel, Schleswig, and Danzig are expressly made subject — the cession is ■expressly made subject — to the payment of their share of the German debt. The Chairman. Yes. Senator Knox. And that payment is to be made by the cessionaries, and we are one of the cessionaries. Now, I want to know whether there is anything in this treaty or any power in any commission in this treaty to justify us in passing, or allow us to pass, that proportion of uue debt on to the country or the city that ultimately gets the sovereignty of this territory. I can not find anything of that kind here. Mr. Baruch. I am quite swce there is nothing in this treaty that contemplates the United States assuming any obligation of that sort. Senator Knox. Of course, if you are going to dispose of the plkin provisions of the treaty, and brush them aside — ■ — Mr. Baruch. I would suggest that you ask one of the men about that who is more familiar than I am with it. Senator Knox. Yes; that is the reason I asked you. Mr. Baruch. Or that you ask the State Department. But I am ■quite certain that nothing of that kind is or was contemplated. Senator Knox. It is not only contemplated, but it is provided for. Mr. Baruch. Well, it was not provided. They were pretty clever men who drew this up. I was not amongst them, so that I can say that. Senator Knox. There is great difference of opinion about some portions of it. Senator McCumber. The construction, it seems to me, Senator, might be based upon this fact. You are speaking of the word ^' ceded." The construction might be based upon whether or not it is ceded in fact and becomes a part of the territory. None of these territories are now owned by the United States or will be owned by the United States, under the treaty as I would construe it. 135546—19 5 66 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANY. Senator Knox. If you go back to page 147, article 99, and' just take> the case of Meme] as an iflustration. The title to Memel is renounced!, in favoi of the principal allied and associated powers. Mr. Bartjch. What page is that on ? Senator Moses. H" is on page 147. The Chairman. All the rights and powers are renounced' in favor- of the principal allied and associated powers. Senator Eirox. The same language is used in regard to Danzig andl Schleswig. Senator McCxjmbeb. And yet, taking the treaty as a whole, we- could hardly claim that we have title to those countries. The Chairman. If we have not title, nobody has. Senator McCumber. No. Senator Knox. 1 could not imagine a more complete cession of' sovereignty than that. Mr. Baruch (reading) : Germany undertakes to accept the settlement made by the principal allied and' associated powers in regard to these territories. Senatoi Knox. What relevancy would that have ? Mr. Bartjch. If, by chance, there was any obhgation, Germany- accepts the settlement. If it should go to Memel, that is a free-. city, and it would be ceded to Memel. Senator Knox. But Germany is out of it. The instant she signs, this treaty and ratifies it she is out of it, because it contains the cession to the amed and associated powers, and Germany has nothing more- to do with Danzig and Schleswig. Mr. Bartjch. I do not know, but it would seem to me that Ger-- many would have to accept the settlement the aUied and associated; powers decided upon in regard to Memel. Senator Knox. The allied and associated powers decided upoa complete cession. That is the settlement in regard to those three- territories. In the cases of those three territories the decision was, an -absolute cession to the aUied and associated powers, without qualifications. Mr. Bartjch. And Germany agrees to accept the settlement. Senator Knox. No; but we agree to pay a part of Germany's, debts. Mr. Baruch. We agree to that for the power to which it is finally ceded. I do not think there could possibly be any construction — of course I would not want to contend with a man hke yourself, who is- more familiar with it, but to me, as a layman, it does not appear that there could possibly be any justice in your contention. I do not, know that I am expert enough to argue on that subject. Senator Knox. Take the case you put. Germany agrees to accept, any settlement made by the principal allied and associated powers m regard to Memel, Danzig, and Schleswig. What is the settlement provided by the treaty ? It is the complete cession to the allied and associated powers, subject and according to article 254, which pro- vides for the payment of a portion of the German debts. Mr. Bartjch. Yes; but the allied and associated powers settle it. upon Memel, and therefore the obligation goes to Memel, which geta. the ceded territory, to pay. Senator Knox. That is what it ought to say, but tihat is, what it, does not say. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 67 Mr. Baeuch. That is what it would appear to me to say; but I would prefer that you ask men more familiar with it than I am. Senator Knox. Who would be likely to throw the greatest light on that subject? Mr. Baruch. It would be Mr. Davis or Mr. Lamont; or I will furnish to you the name of the man who wrote these particular clauses. Senator Beandegee. I would like to ask Mr. Baruch a question. Before doing so I would like to ask Senator McCumber whether this little tabulation which he has here has been inserted in the record ? Senator McCumbee. No. Senator Beandegee. It is very short, and I will ask the stenog- rapher to put this in the record. This paper brought before the com- mittee by Senator McCumber appears to have been prepared by the legislative reference service of the Library of Congress, and is entitled "Relative rates of taxation for certain countries." (Senator Brandegee here read the table referred to, which ia printed in the record, as follows:) Relative raws of taxation for certain countries. Country. Estimated pre- war national wealtli.' Taxation for 1918. Per cent ol prewar national wealth. Per capita tax. United Kingdom Geimany United States $85 000,000,000 78,000,000,000 220,000,000,000 2 S3 816,000,000 3 1,750,000,000 < 4, 370, 000, 000 4.6 2.2 1.9 $86. 13 22.88- 39.13 ' Ayers. Leonard P. The War with Geimany, 1919, p. 148. 2 To Mar. 31, 1919. (Fiscal year ending Mar. 31, 1919. Thii^ gives rate November, 1918.) Commerce Ee- potts, Apr, 30, 1919, p. 610. ' Current Opinion, January, 1919, p. 63, quoting London Economist. (Estimate ) ' Business L igcst and Investment Weekly, Feb. 18, 1919, p. 239. For United States estimated collections of 1918. revenue laws are given. Senator Beandegee. Now, Mr. Baruch, I understood you to say that Germany had paid only 9 per cent of her war debt — only raised 9 per cent of her war debt — by taxation. Mr. Baetjch. Those are the figures that have been prevalent. Senator McCumbee. Does that mean war debt or war expenses ? Mr. Baetjch. Those are expenses of the war. Senator Beandegee. That is what I mean. Mr. Baeuch. Yes. Senator Beandegee. That means, then, that 91 per cent of the war expense of Gemiany has been financed by the issuance of Gov- ernment securities ? Mr. Baeuch. These figures are the ones that I believe are correct, but we have had no way of checking it up from Germany. Senator Beandegee. I am not, of course, asking you to be exactly accurate, but substantially. Mr. Baeuch. Yes. Senator Beandegee. Now, if the estimated national wealth of Germany was $78,000,000,000, and that of Great Britain wa& $85,000,000,000, and the tax imposed upon Germany was 2.2 per cent and upon Great Britain 4.5 per cent, I wanted to ask you, first,. did Germany pay the interest on this 91 per cent of securities issued for the expenses of the war. 68 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Baruch. There was no default on her bonds, so that she must have paid it. Senator Brandegee. So that 2.2 per cent in tax on the national wealth of Germany in 1918 paid the interest on the entire expenses of the war to Germany ? Mr. Baruch. ThatVould not necessarily follow, Senator, because she might not have raised enough money in that way for that purpose. She might have raised it out of the sale of bonds. The Chairman. She might have borrowed the money to pay it. Senator Brandegee. What I am trying to find out is whether Germany, out of the avails of the imposition of a 2.2 per cent tax rate, was able to pay the interest on her debt incurred in behalf of the expenses of the war or not. Mr. Baruch. We can figure that out from what figures you have here. Senator Brandegee. No; I mean as a fact. Mr. Baruch. What « Senator Brandegee. I mean as a matter of fact, do you know whether in that way they paid the interest on all the obligations they incurred for the expenses of the war? Mr. Baruch. I imagine they must have, because there was no default inpayment of interest on theirbonds. Theymusthavepaidit. Senator Brandegee. All right. Then, by the imposition of one- half of the taxation rate upon the Germans vAich is paid now by the citizens and the United Kingdom, they are able to pay all the interest on their obligations incurred on account of the war. Now, if that is so and their per capita tax is only one-fourth of that of Great Britain, and their estimated national wealth is S78, 000, 000, 000 while that of Great Britain is only §85,000,000,000, why is it that they can not pay more in the way of reparation ? Mr. Baruch. More than what ? Senator Brandegee. More than the treaty provides. Mr. Baruch. The treaty does not provide anj- definite amount, Senator. Senator Brandegee. I thought it did. Mr. Baruch. No, sir. The treaty does not provide for any amount, because the reparation commission wants to have an oppor- tunity to study this before deciding upon it. Probably the questions that arose in your minds are the ones that arose in the minds of the ones who made this. Senator Brandegee. Why is it, if the facts and figures that I have just read are correct, that the Germans are in such a bad way as conipared with the inhabitants of the United Kingdom ? Mr. Baruch. I think I can explain that to you. Senator. Senator Brandegee. I wish you would. Mr. Baruch. Practically every bit of private property owned by the German nationals that is in allied or associated countries has been seized and is going to be used for a specific purpose. Germany is ^oing to lose that. She loses a million and a half of spindles in Alsace- Lorraine, 70 per cent of her iron, 30 per cent of her coal, all of her great contracts for bauxite in France, and for phosphate in Algeria and the Pacific Islands ; and all the raw materials and similar contracts have been lost. I do not think the world realizes what a severe and harsh though eminently just treaty has been put upon Germany. They do TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 69 not realize the conditions that Germany has been put in. So it was impossible to determine, on prewar conditions, what Germany could pay, because we did not know what the conditions, will be after the war and the peace treaty. Does that answer your question ? Senator Bkandegee. Yes. I did not know to what extent Ger- many was crippled. I heard what you said, and it bears on the question. Mr. Baruch. She loses valuable zinc concentrates in Australia, which gave her practicdly domination of the zinc trade of the world. I could put in a long list wiiich would show you generally how much crippled Germany has been made by this treaty in the very clauses that are spread out before you, and it was that that I had in mind. Perhaps it may have been unduly impressed upon me. I had that in mind when I made the statement that she Would be unable to pay the sums of money that would probably be assessed against her under these categories. Senator McOumber. As bearing upon that same subject, I think another little table which I have prepared ought to go into the record at this time, showing each of these three countries and the per capita debt on June 30, 1918, which I obtained from the Statistical Abstract for 1918. The United States, exclusive of the Philippines, has a public debt of $17,005,431,000. The debt per capita was .S159.45. The United Kingdom, exclusive of colonies, had a public debt of $36,391,132,000, with a per capita debt of $789.58. Germany, exclusive of colonies, had a debt of $34,807,337,000, with a per capita debt of $514.81. Thus it will be seen that our per capita debt was practically one- fifth of that of Great Britain, and that Great Britain's was 50 per cent greater than that of Germany, and that while Germany paid most of tlie expenses of the war through borrowings rather than heavy taxes upon her people, yet at the same time she has but $34,807,337,000 of indebtedness against her. Senator Pomerene. Do those figures include not only the national debt, but State and municipal debts as well ? Senator McCumber. No ; I do not so understand. The Chairman. These are national debts. Senator Pomerene. What was the date of the figures that you just gave ? Senator McCumber. June 30, 1918. That was just a little before the close of the war. Senator Pomerene. I had in mind 1914. Senator McCumber. I thought it was proper to put that in as bearing upon the burden of Germany. Mr. Baruch. I do not know whether I made it clear, and I would like to have the opportunity of making a statement in reference to the terms of this treaty. Senator Johnson of California. I am very anxious to hear you. You were indulging in general terms, and I thought you might elabo- rate. I thought it would be interesting. Mr. Baruch. The terms are harsh and severe, but I think are very just, and I would go on record as saying that this commission is workable. It is a workable arrangement. 70 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. Senator Johnson of California. Do you express that with some doubt ? Mr. Baruch. No, sir. Senator Johnson of California. There is much of it left to the future, however, is there not ? Mr. Baruch. I have no fear of the future. Senator Johnson of Cahfornia. Not of the future of our Nation. Mr. Baruch. No; because I could name hundreds of men in America — thousands of them — that would carry out that. The Chairman. Carry out what ? Mr. Baruch. That would make this a workable treaty, that could sit on this commission and make it work. I am talking about the reparation commission. The Chairman. You would have no difficulty in filling the places. You need not assure us of that. Mr. Baruch. I thought the Senator was disposed to doubt as to the reparation commission working. Senator Johnson of California. Not a bit. I have some serious doubts about our work in connection with it, but I was not express- ing any doubt at all; but I was in hopes you would elaborate the theme which you were discussing with Senator Brandegee. You said the treaty is very severe and harsh, but just. Now, I would like you in general terms to go on and elaborate what you were speaking about. Let us take the coal situation, for instance. How much coal did you take from Germany ? Mr. Baruch. We took enough to make up all the losses that she caused the Belgian and French mines. Senator Johnson of California. But how much in proportion ? Mr. Baruch. Let us say there are 26,000,000 tons. It is about 30 per cent, but that would include the SUesian fields, of which she will get her proportionate share that she has been accustomed to have. Senator Johnson of California. And your answer is, I take it, that you take enough to make up for her wanton destruction ? Mr. Baruch. Provided it does not interfere with her economic life. Senator Johnson of California. That is all you take — enough to make up for her wanton destruction. Mr. Baruch. And to make it sure that Germany will continue to sell the coal that had formerly been under contract, for instance, to France for a number of years. Senator Johnson of California. Has that anything to do with the ■question of destruction? Mr. Baruch. I think so, sir. Senator Johnson of California. Is it likewise in respect to the coal that is directed to be delivered to Italy? Mr. Baruch. Yes ; a protection to- Italy for coal that she has to have. Senator Johnson of California. The point of it is that you said very well and eloquently that you took from Germany enough coal to make up for her wanton destruction. Does Italian coal come within that ? Mr. Baruch. I think I added — if I did not, I should like to — and to prevent the disturbance of the whole coal situation in Europe which resulted from that, and so as to give to France and to Belgium and these other countries the same amount of coal that thev had TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 71 gotten in peace conditions, so as not to put Germany in the position of taking this coal away and delivering it to anyone that she cared to. She might ruin Belgian, Italian, and French industries in that way. Senator Johnson of California. Unless you compelled her to give 'them a certain amount of coal. Mr. Baruch. Under this she is not to be compelled to deliver coal if it is to interfere with her economic and industrial life. Senator Johnson of California. That which is taken from her, does ihat interfere with her industrial life ? Mr. Baeuch. If it does, they will not take any. Senator Johnson of California. Does it ? Pardon me. Are there ~any specific amounts to be delivered, any minimums? Mr. Baruoh. Let me turn to the clause and read it to you. It is on page 291. Senator Johnson of California. You are familiar with the coal situation, are you ? Mr. Baruch. I am familiar with this part of the treaty. Senator Johnson of California. It is page 295, Annex V. Mr. Baruch. The last clause in Annex V is the one that we want to look at, the very last clause. Senator McCumber. It is on page 295. Mr. Baruch. The last clause of the annex, paragraph 10, reads: If the commission shall determine that the full exercise of the foregoing options "would interfere unduly with the industrial requirements of Germany, the commission is authorized to postpone or to cancel deliveries, and in so doing to settle all questions of priority; but the coal to replace coal from destroyed mines shall receive priority over other deliveries. I wrote that clause myself. Senator. Senator Johnson of Claifornia. That is, the last sentence you just read? Mr. Baruch. Yes, sir. Senator Johnson of California. So that it is left with the commis- sion to determine whether the options interfere and whether they shall be fulfilled. Mr. Baruch. Yes, sir. The intent of this was that Germany should pay what she ought to pay and could pay, and to give her an oppor- tunity to pay it, without any undue interference in the working out ■of payments. Senator Johnson of California. Wherein is the severity and harsh- ness of that ? Mr. Baruch. Well, that is not so, taken by itseh. I refer not to one particular thing, but to the general thing. If you take into con- sideration that she is obliged to pay aU that she can pay, and in addi- tion that she has lost her colonies and her territories contiguous to her, that the property of her citizens has been taken from her, that these contracts that she had have been broken, that these vast inter- laced commercial relations aU over the world of a financial and com- mercial nature which she had established for many years have been destroyed and taken away and abrogated, and all raw materials and ■supplies have been cut off, and that me great commercial houses that gathered together the raw materials and sent them into Germany and brought them back in manufactured articles are taken away from her, I think my adjectives are quite correct. Also her merchant marine Jias been taken. 72 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Johnson of California. I am not questioning your adjec- tives at all; I am simply endeavoring to have you elaborate the sub- ject. That is the reason I asked you about the coal, because I thought that that was one part of the general statement that you made as to the severity and harshness of the terms. I thought you minimized the coal question, so I was asking you the question, where- in was the severity and the harshness. Mr. Baruch. 1 am very glad to elaborate as fully as I can. I do not question the justice of it. Senator McCxjmbee. Are there any further questions? Senator Moses. Will you turn to page 273 of the commiitee print, paragraph 15, the last two lines in paragraph 15. That is a little vague in my mind. Senator I*OMEKEXE. What lino? Senator Moses. The last two lines in paragraph 15 on page 273: [reading] : When bonds are issued for sale or negotiation, and when goods are delivered by th commission, certificates to an equivalent value must be withdrawn. The last two lines apparently contemplate an ultimate sale of the- bonds to individuals. Mx. Baruch. You mean those two sentences [reading] : The said certificate shall be registered, and upon notice to the commission, may be- transferred by indorsement. Senator Moses. And then [reading]: When bonds are issued for sale or negotiation ilr. Baruch. Of course — explaining the last sentence first — the certificates which have been issued against bonds which have been sold will naturally be destroyed. Senator Moses. You mean warehouse certificates ? Mr. Baruch. That would apply to both. Senator. If they were withdrawn, the certificates issued against them would be destroyed. Senator Moses. Y^ould you control the sale of goods against which warehouse certificates are issued ? Mr. Baruch. I presume so, vSenator. I would like to read that again before replying. Senator Moses. I said yesterday that possibly Mr. Davis knowa about this better than you. If so, I will not pursue this inquiry. I thought that, in anticipation of his coming, your view would oe of value. Mr. Baruch. I could answer the first part of your question, but if you are going to have him down here to deal with the financial clauses, it might be just as well to wait for him. Senator Moses. What I was trying to get at is who would control the sale of these goods which are delivered and against which certifi- cates are issued, and who will determine the time when bonds shall be issued for sale or negotiation, certificates having been previously issued against both. Mr. Baruch. The reparation commission determines all of these things, and they can make their rules and regulations. It is a very broad power. I do not know that that particular phase has been determined. They have the right to determine. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 73 Senator Moses. That is to say, up to 1951, the commission can prevent the passing of bonds into the hands of the purchaser if it so chooses. Mr. Baruch. Up to 1951, I presume so, but I would like to read over this clause before I answer that question definitely. I think that would lie with the reparation commission. Now, do you desire Mr. Davis to come down here ? Senator McCumber. I think some of the Senators desire him. Senator Moses. I think somebody who is familiar with the financial clauses should come. Senator McCumber. And do you desire to have Mr. Lamont? Senator Moses. Except for the personal pleasure of meeting my old classmate, I do not particularly care for Mr. Lamont or for Mr. Davis, but I would like to have some one here who is familiar with the financial clauses, especially with reference to the powers of the reparation commission. Mr. Baruch. You do not think that is suflSciently stated. Senator Moses. I think that there is some disparity of interpre- tation, certainly in the minds of some members of the committee, as to just what the powers of the commission may be. There is no question in the minds of any of the committee, I think, as to the wide extent of the powers of the reparation commission. Mr. Baruch. I trust not. Senator Knox. I move that we adjourn until Monday at 10.30. Senator McCtjmbee. Are there any further questions that you desire to ask, Mr. Baruch? Mr. Baruch. May I ask whether you will want me any further ? Senator McCumber. I will ask the other members to say whether there is any desire to hold Mr. Baruch. Senator Moses. I think it will be desirable not to dismiss any witness, but I would not want to keep Mr. Baruch in the city. He may be recalled. Mr. Baruch. It will give me great pleasure to come back. Senator McCumber. Certainly, you can go to New York. We have not yet adjourned. I would like to see first as to the time. I desire to say that the chairman, just before leaving, said that he would like to rush this matter along as rapidly as possible, indicating that he would like to have a session this afternoon if it could be had. Senator Swanson. What witnesses have you for this afternoon ? Senator Moses. We have finished with Prof. Taussig. Senator Swanson. I do not thmk we could do any work. (Thereupon, at 12.05 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned until Monday, August 5, 1919, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.) MONDAY, AUGUST 4, 1919. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Wasldnglon, I). 0. The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjourn- ment, in room 426, Senate Office BuUding, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge presiding. Present, Senators Lodge (chairman), McCumher, Brandegee, Knox, Johnson of California, New. Moses, Williams, Swanson, and Pomerene. The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Mr. Davis, ■will you be kind enough to give your full name to the stenographer. STATEMIINT OF MR. NORMAN H. DAVIS. Mr. Davis. My full name is Norman H. Davis. The Chairman. And what is your business in this country? Mr. Davis. I was finance commissioner to Europe. The Chairman. Yes; finance commissioner to Europe. "Mr. Davis. And was financial adviser to the Peace Commission. The Chairman. And what is your' business here? Mr. Davis. I have no business here now. I have given up every- thing, for the last two years, since we were in the war. I am a banker by profession, ])ut I retired from all my banking connections. The Chairman. "What banks were you connected with ? Mr. Davis. I was president of the Trust Co. of Cuba, in Havana, Cuba, and I have been a stockholder in several other banks in this country — i^nterested in that way. The Chairman. The members of the committee desire to ask j^ou some questions in regard to the work in Paris. I was not here when you were called. I had to be on the floor of the Senate. Some of the Senators who were here desire to ask you questions. Senator Moses, wUl you proceed ? Senator Moses. The financial commission to Paris comprised how many members ? Mr. Davis. There were two members from each Government — fromi each of the big powers. Senator Moses. Who was your colleague? Mr. Davis. Thomas Lamont. Senator Moses. He especially represented theTreasury Department? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Moses. You also represented the Treasury Department? Mr. Davis. Yes; as Finance Commission to Europe, I repre- sented the Treasurj^ Department, and Lamont represented them also in connection with the peace, but I had the other Treasury work besides. 75 76 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Moses. Were there two financial delegates there from each, of the allied and associated powers ? IVIr. Davis. Yes. Senator Mosss. And you all got together^ ilr. Davis. Yes. Senator Mo.«es. To the number of fiftj^-odd ? Mr. Davis. Oh, no; just Senator Moses. Of the principal allied and associated powers? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Moses. Namely, 10? Mr. Davis. Yes; hut the others had representatives. But they met only occasionally, because the work was divided among sub- committees and, as a rule, the principal allied and associate 1 powers acted practically as the executive committee, and then would call in the other delegates and go over matters after they had been settled or agreed upon among themselves. Senator Moses. Was any record kept of the meetings oi the com- mission ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Moses. Of each session ? Mr. Davis. Yes. .Senator Moses. Were they reported stenographically ? Mr. Davis. Yes; well, not always stenographically, because we kept the minutes in French and English, and they would have to be revised because there were a lot of discussions sometimes that were not necessary to put in the minutes; but the substance of the agree- ments arrived at was put down in the minutes and agreed upon. • Senator Moses. Those were made up in substance and were initialed at the close of each session? Mr. Davis. No; they were not initialed at the close of each session. They were written up and presented to the members, and at the next meeting they were approved or disapproved — approved with what- ever alterations were necessary. Senator Moses. Did those minutes go to our plenipotentiaries for their guidance ? Mr. D.wis. Oh, yes. wSenator Moses. Were copies kept by each of our financial commis- sioners ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Moses. You have your copies ? Mr. Davis. I have not got them yet. They were in w-th all my files, which are being sent over, but they have not arriv'ed yet. I kept the con^plete mmutes. Senator Moses. Then they will be available for the use of this committee ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Moses. I assume that the peace financial commissioners for the countries other than the principal allied and associated powers sat with the 10 when the matters connected with their o-«ti coim tries were under consideration ? Mr. Davis. Yes; after we had come to some tentative decision on something that did concern them we called them in. Senator Moses. After having decided you called them in and com- municated to them your decision ? TBBATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 77 Mr. Davis. No; we did not do that. It would have been impos- sible to carry on the work if you had had all the delegates sitting there all the time. Senator Moses. Yes; I understand that. Mr. Davis. Oh, no; that was not the spirit of it, at all. Senator Moses. Did these 1 frame the articles in the treaty con- tained in Part VIIT, which you will find on page 249 of the print you have before you of the treaty ? Mr. Davis. No; that is reparation. Senator Moses. Who framed those sections ? Mr. Davis. The reparation sections were framed by the reparation commission. Senator Moses. Who were they ? Mr. Davis. Mr. Baruch, Mr. McCormick, and myself. Senator Moses. You were a member of the reparation commission, and of what other ? Mr. Davis. Of the financial commission. Senator Moses. Then you are familiar with these articles in Part VIII? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Moses. Did the Belgian finance commissioners sit with you in reaching the determination contained in article 232 ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Moses. Just why was it left to the reparation commission to determine the amount of money that Belgium had borrowed from the allied and associated Governments which Germany should repay ? Mr. Davis. I do not recall specifically why the reparation commis- sion was to do that. They had to name some one to do it, because so far as the advances made by the Government of the United States were concerned, we have obligations of the Belgian Government. There is no discretion about that. But as to the advances made by England and France to Belgium, they were on open account, and there were questions about which there may be considerable discus- sion, and they had to designate some one who would finally arrive at those figures in case there was any discussion over it. Senator Moses. What was the reason why the bonds to be issued by the German Government in payment of that item of reparation were to be handed to the reparation commission rather than to the Belgian Government ? That provision is on the top of page 251 : Such bonds shall be handed over to the reparation commission, which has authority to take and acknowledge receipt thereof on behalf of Belgium. Mr. Davis. Well, that was because everything is to be handed to the reparation commission — everything that Germany pays. Senator Moses. I understand that. Mr. Davis. And this was just following the general rule. Senator Moses. And just what will the reparation commission do with those bonds ? Mr. Davis. If England, France, and the United States agree to accept these German bonds in payment of the Belgian indebtedness to them prior to the armistice, they wiU be turned over to them proportionately. That is one other reason why they were to be delivered to the reparation commission. 78 TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Moses. Was not that proposal advanced, that we should take the German bonds in settlement of the obligations of our loans- to the Allies ? Was not that a definite proposal ? Mr. Davis. From the Alhes ? Senator Moses. Was it not definitely proposed that the Allies should accept, in lieu of the obhgations which we now have from certain of the allied Governments in Europe — that in lieu of those- obhgations we should accept German bonds ? Mr. Davis. No; that was only specifically made in the case of Belgium. Senator Moses. And was that proposal declined ? Mr. Davis. Do you mean in the case of Belgium ? Senator Moses. Yes. Mr. Davis. No; it was not declined. We simply told them that we had no authority to act on that. Senator Moses. And it was left open ? Mr. Davis. It was left open for Congress to decide. Senator Moses. For legislation ? Mr. Davis. Yes; in fact, the President said that he would pro- {)ose to Congress that we accept German obhgations in respect of the- oans to Belgium up until the armistice — that he could simply recom- mend that to Congress. Senator Knox. How much had we loaned to Belgium up to that time? Mr. Davis. We had loaned them, as I recall, between §300,000,000 and $400,000,000. It was about $300,000,000. I can get that exactly. Senator Knox. I do not care for that. Senator Moses. The reparation commission wiU fix the total sum of reparation due from Germany ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator MosES. They will do that sometime prior to May, 1921? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Moses. And notify the German Government? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Pomeeene. May I interrupt the examination for a moment ? Senator Moses. Certainly. Senator Pomeeene. As I understand you, the offer on our part was an agreement to make that recommendation to the Congress ? Mr. Davis. That is all. Senator Pomeeene. But it was left to the Congress to determine whether or not that shall be done ? Mr. Davis. Absolutely. We told them specifically that neither the President nor any of us had any authority whatever to agree otherwise. Senator Moses. Was it well understood in Paris that the United States would keep no portion of this reparation payment ? Mr. Davis. No. Senator Moses. What was the understanding ? Mr. Davis. I do not know what the general opinion of different people was, but the United States Government representatives did not say they would not keep any of the reparation, and we did not say they would. That was another matter that we f< we had no right to determine. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 79 Senator Moses. I understood your colleague, Mr. Baruch, to have said that it was understood that the United States was to have no share in it. Mr. Davis. By whom did he say it was understood? Where is Mr. Baruch's testimony ? I should like to see that. Senator Moses. I think he said that in response to one of Senator Enox's questions. Senator Knox. He practically said that. I called his attention to the fact that the President had said so in his speech of July 10. Mr. Davis. Did the President say that ? Senator Knox. Yes. Senator Moses. You will find that at the bottom of page 6, an interrogatory by Senator KJaox, beginning about the middle of the page ; and further down, at about the middle of page 7, you will find a very clear intimation at least from Mr. Baruch that the United States was to have no share in the reparation. Senator Knox. The whole tenor of the- testiomny indicated that that was his opinion. Mr. Davis. All I can say is, there was no official declaration of that kind. Senator Knox. Mr. Baruch said that, too. Mr. Davis. Of course, I will say this, that we were in a different position from any of the other Governments negotiating the peace. Our material interests — that is, our direct material interests — were so infinitesimal that we were not there trading for something. We were endeavoring all the time to look at this from the standpoint of the welfare of the whole world, and indirectly the welfare of the United States, and there were no specific material interests that we were endeavoring to obtain. Senator Johnson of California. You were the only ones who had that viewpoint, however, were you not ? Mr. Davis. Well Senator McCumbbr. Did the President indicate to your commis- sion, or the subcommittee of which you were a member, that it was his intention to recommend that Congress remit anything to Germany? Mr. Davis. No. Senator McCumbee. Of the debt due us ? Mr. Davis.' No. Senator McCumber. Was there any intimation of that in any way, so far as you know ? Mr. Davis. No. I have heard some discussions there. Some people expressed the opinion that it would probably be good pohcy for the United States not to file claims for reparation; but it was just a general discussion at various times. ' Senator McCumber. Do you mean reparation or indemnity ? Mr. Davis. Indemnity. Senator McCumber. Rather than reparation ? Mr. Davis. As a matter of fact we did not often use the word "inderonity." It was usually "reparation." The Chairman. "Indemnity" was usually applied to prewar losses, was it not ? Mr. Davis. Yes. That did not come under this. The Chairman. I understand that. 80 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Davis. I guess that probably would be a fair distinction to make. Senator Moses. Then it is your understanding that we were to have some share in the reparation ? Mr. Davis. It was my understanding that we would have a per- fect right to file claims under the various categories, just as a,ny other country does, and that it is for our Government to decide whether or not it desires to do so, and that that has not been decided. Senator Moses. But it is very clear that the other four Govern- ments will take reparation in full ? Mr. Davis. Oh, yes. Senator Moses. Mr. Baruch intimated in picturesque language the other day that "X" billions of dollars reparation would be de- manded from Germany ; and the question arose in the minds of some Senators, if the United States waived its right of reparation, whether the amount to be exacted from Germany would be X minus Y, Y representing the amount which the United States would be en- titled to receive. Have you any information about that ''. Mr. Davis. That would just depend entirely on how you worked it out at the time. It could be settled on that basis, or it could be settled on another basis. Senator Moses. The theory of the reparation is that they would fix the total amount which Germany can pay. Mr. Davis. No; the reparation commission first is to determine by 1921 from its various reports and investigations how much Germany owes under the various categories of damage. That might, for instance, be $40,000,000,000, and that is what Germany is obligated to pay. Then the reparation commission, however, can afterward, by unanimous vote, reduce that amount in accordance with what they think Germany can pay. In other words, the amount of Germany's bill may be considered as in excess of Germany's capacity to pay, and as the reparation commission did not decide just what Germany's bill should be, it was necessary to set up this commission and give it more latitude, in order to regulate Germany's actual liability with her capacity. Senator Johnson of California. The theory being that the repara- tion commission wUl take all the traffic will bear ? Mr. Davis. Yes; that is it. Senator Moses. On page 61 of Mr. Baruch's testimony you will see Mr. Baruch says : This commission has the right to fix a certain sum. The commission has plenary powers, if that is the right adjective. They can fix "X " billion dollars. They have that right. The Chairman. On what page is that ? Senator Moses. Page 61, part 3, about the middle of the page. Mr. Davis. I do not see any difference between us. That is just a different way of expressing it. Senator Moses. That is not the point I was getting at. X being the total sum which Germany is to be called upon to pay, and i representing the sum which the United States might claim, if we waive our rights to the payment of Y, will the total indemnity to be paid by Germany be X minus Y, or will X, undiminished by Y, be •divided among the others ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 81 Mr. Davis. I should say that will he regulated by the conditions under which the United States agrees to remit its claims ; that is', the United States could fix the conditions. Sena;tor Moses. Just as we did with the Boxer indemnity ? Mr. Davis. Absolutely. Senator Moses. If you will now turn to page 273 of the printed text of the treaty Senator McCumbee. May I ask a question upon this same subject ? Senator Moses. Certainly. Senator McCumbbr. Then, of course, Mr. Davis, your understand- ing is that if the United States remits whatever is due from Germany to the United States, Germany will not be compelled to pay that sum to the other allies ? Mr. Davis. The United States, in my judgment, in remitting, could dictate the conditions on which it will remit. Senator McCumbee. Certainly. Senator Moses. Would the other four powers be necessarily obliged to accept our conditions ? Mr. Davis. I should think so; because otherwise, if we want to remit it to Germany, we -can collect it and then give it back to Germany. Senator Moses. That would be a rather cumbersome process, however. Mr. Davis. Yes. That is the reason I think there would be no trouble about having an agreement about it. Senator Moses. On page 273 of the printed text of the treaty, article 15, wiU you please explain how that will work out ? Mr. Davis. That is the certificate of ownership. There was quite a lot of discussion in the committee. The American delegation felt that while our material interest in what is collected from Germany is insignificant, our interest in the financial situation of the world is very great, and we felt that it would be very inadvisable to have the obligations of a big country floated throughout the world unless they were good and could be met, and that it would cause a critical financial situation if they were floated before they could be met, and so we put in the reparation chapter the condition that the bonds which Germany delivers are to be delivered to the reparation commis- sion and are only to be distributed by the reparation commission upon, a unanimous vote ; and I assume that Senator Moses. May I interrupt you there to ask you in what por- tion of the treaty that occurs — ^where it provides that they may be distributed by unanimous consent ? Mr. Davis. 1 will find it for you. Senator Johnson of California. It may be the provision at the bottom of page 271. Mr. Davis. It is on page 271. It says: On the following questions unanimity is necessary. Senator Moses. Under section (b) ? Mr. Davis. Yes (reading): Questions of determining the amount and conditions of bonds or other obligation^ to be issued by the German Government and of fixing the time and manner for selling, negotiating, or distributing such bonds. 135546—19 6 82 TREATY or PEACE WITH GERMANY. Those questions require a unanimous vote. Senator Moses. Then the commission, having determined that the bonds shall be distributed, shall issue those certificates ? Mr. Davis. Not at all. Senator Moses. What will they do ? Mr. Davis. They may issue these participating certificates before they decide upon the distribution. If they are going to distribute the bonds, there is no necessity for issuing these participation receipts. Senator Moses. Then they wiJl issue these certificates as against the bonds which the Commission have in their possession ? Mr. Davis. Not as against the bonds, no, but simply as evidences of ownership in bonds which are held by the reparation commission, the final disposition of which has not been determined by the repara- tion commission. Senator Moses. Do you mean that the distribution might be dif- ferent from the participation in ownership ? Mr. Davis. They might decide never to distribute those bonds at all, and they will not decide to distribute them untU they are unani- mously of the opinion that Germany can pay the interest and sinking fund on those bonds. Senator Moses. Then why issue the certificates of participating ownership ? Mr. Davis. Because these are held practically in trust, and the powers interested are entitled to have some evidence that they have an interest in them. Some of the Governments were objecting to the reparation commission withholding those bonds; and they said, ' ' We will need credit, and if we have something to show for them we might be able to exchange among the various Governments, to offset these against some other claim; or we might be able to use those with banks for temporary advances." Senator Moses. That is under the provision that the certificates may be registered and transferred by indorsement? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Moses. In other words, while the Reparation Commission will hold the bonds, nevertheless in fact the bonds will go on the market. Mr. Davis. Not at all, because we assume that, for instance, they would be in very large blocks. Suppose Germany delivers S 15, 000,- 000,000 of bonds. Senator Moses. She will deliver $24,000,000,000, I believe. Mr. Davis. Well, not yet. We do not know whether she will or not. Senator Moses. She may. Mr. Davis. Yes; and she may deUver more than that. I do not believe she will, myself. But all that Germany delivers now will be, approximately, $15,000,000,000 in bonds. Now let us take the case of France. Suppose the participation of France will be approxi- mately 50 per cent. That would be 17,500,000,000. Then France, if she wanted to, could have five certificates of $1,500,000,000 each; and if there is anybody who is sucker enough to buy that certificate outright — one of them — I do not think it is up to the Reparation Commission to look after him. We wanted to avoid their getting these out into the hands of the public, and that is what we have done in this case. f; TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 8-3 Senator Moses. I do not see how you have accomplished that, because while there may not be a sucker who would give 11,500,000,- 000 for one of those certificates, there might be some speculator who would be willing to give $900,000,000 and take those bonds at 60 and then issue subdivisions of the participation. Mr. Davis. Well, but do you think a responsible government would sell its bonds to a speculator on those conditions ? Senator Moses. I have been repeatedly told that the reason why we should go into this reparation commission and why we should do all these things was because we have got to furnish money to keep these people going, and we have got to stabilize all their finances, and industry, and agriculture, and everything else ; and I do not see how it is going to be done, when we get all through with it, unless we are oing to furnish some money; and I do not think we are going to urnish money unless we get Some kind of collateral, and it might be done by a group of bankers, or it might be done by legislation whereby we would take those participating certificates. Mr. Davis. I do not think they can use those German bonds now as collateral very efl'ectively, because they are in such large units that it is impossible. Senator Moses. That would not prevent an underwriting syndicate issuing certificates in smaller sums. Mr. Davis. That is true, but they would be issuing something which is undeterminate, and issuing against something that may never be delivered. Senator Moses. In the first place, here is an obligation of the German Government, namely, these certificates. In the first place, the German Government issues its bonds which go into the hands of the reparation commission. They are the underlying security as an obligation of the German Government, whatever that underlying security may be good for. Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Moses. Then the reparation commission issues its certifi- cates to the effect that it holds these bonds for the benefit, let us say, of the French Government. The French Government takes those certificates in five portions, which it is to indorse. Mr. Davis. No. Senator Moses. Not more than five portions. Mr. Davis. Not more than five portions and the reparation com- mission will determine that. It says the reparation commission may. It does not say it will. Senator Moses. In article 15, on page 273, it says: The commission will issue to each of the interested powers, in such form as the commission shall fix Mr. Davis. Yes; "in such form as the commission shall fix." Senator Moses. Yes; but that means the wording of it, does it not — the form ? Mr. Davis. Well, yes; but our records will show very distinctly that these certificates are not to be used in any way to go into the hands of the public. Senator Moses. They go into the hands of the Governments. Mr. Davis. Well, but the reparation commission, in fixing the form, if there is any fear of that — I do not think there is at all — can put in there that debentures can not be issued against it. 84 TREATY or PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Moses. The language of the treaty, on page 273, does not indicate it. It says that they shall issue — a certificate stating that it holds for the account of the said power bond? of the issues mentioned above, the said certificate, on the demand of the power concerned, being divisible in a number of parts not exceeding five. Now, it savs they will issue, it says what they shall consist of, and that on the demand of the power it is divisible. Mr. Davis. Into five. Senator Moses. They get their certificate of one-fifth and hold it as a sovereign power. They indorse it, that it is the obligation of another Government, do they not? In other words, it is the note of the German Government indorsed by the French Government ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Moses. And the underwriting syndicate takes it at a de- preciation from par. There is nothing preventing the underwriting syndicate from issuing debentures and putting them on the market. Mr. Davis. What would you do? I do not think there is any danger of it at aU myself, but how would you avoid it ? Senator Moses. I do not know that it can be avoided, but what I am trying to get at is that it is inconceivable to my mind that a bankrupt country or a country hard pressed for funds is going to liold their certificates of ownership in these bonds and not raise money on them when money is the thing they need; and what I wanted to find out is just what took place in the commission in its discussion with reference to these points, as to whether it was intended that the bonds should be held in the treasuries of the Allied Govern- ments or whether they were going to seep out to the public. Mr. Davis. It was distinctly understood that they should not seep out to the public. That was our principal contention. They first contended that the bonds should be cfelivered to the Governments themselves. The Governments said, "When these bonds are dehv- ered to the reparation commission, we want our share of the bonds"; but our contention was that this was a matter that concerned the whole world, and that one power that got those bonds might be hard pressed and might want to dispose of them, and they might cause a great deal of trouble; and then we, as I say, agreed that those bonds should be held and distributed only when the reparation com- mission unanimously decided that it was advisable to do so, and that it was safe to do so, and then they said, "Well, but we might be able sometime to borrow some money. We realize that we should not go to the public, but we would like to have something so that we can fp to our own banks and get something against these. We would ike to have that right." We explained to them that under the con- ditions it would not be a very attractive security and that was the reason it was limited to such large units and with the distinct under- standing that it was not to get out to the public, because that is the reason we objected to the distribution of the bonds. I am sure our records will be very clear on that, Senator. Senator Moses. There are some Governments who possibly could not maintain those things. Now, the Serbian Government, for instance, will have a far smaller gross amoiint of these bonds than any other. It is absolutely inconceivable to my mind, from observa- tion of the Serbian Government at close range and at long distance, that they are going to hold those bonds and that they are not going TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 85 to get money on them, and the chances are that they will have to sell them to an underwriting syndicate that will take them at a great depreciation. The Chairman. Do they not issue certificates also for goods, things exported, which should be credited to Germany? Mr. Davis. That is a clause that was put in here because it was contemplated that the reparation commission might take over cer- tain properties or certain materials, in which case the Government said that they would like to have a certificate showing that the reparation commission had it, and that their indivisible interest was so much The Chairman. It is credited to the commission? Mr. Davis. And all the proceeds actually credited. The Chairman. The proceeds are credited ? Mr. Davis. Yes. The Chairman. There is no restriction on those certificates, is there ? Those can be sold ? Mr. DAvrs. No; there is no restriction on those; but I do not be- lieve myself that there will be any of them sold, or very few. The Chairman. I thought the prodiict of certain of those sales was looked on as one of the things that were to be credited to Germany's reparation fund ? Mr. Davis. This will be credited to the reparation fund. The Chairman. You do not think anytning will be derived from those ? Mr. Davis. Not very much. The Chairman. Those certificates can be put on the market. Mr. Davis. No; not uiider the same conditions The Chairman. You mean to say that the treaty requires the commission to hold them? Mr. Davis. That is true. They probably could be put on the market. It is a different kind of certificate. They are not bonds, and I see no objection to their being sold. Senator Brandegee. What wUl be the total amount of those certificates ? Mr. Davis. I say I do not believe they wOl amount to much. Mr. Brandagee. What do you mean by "much?" Mr. Davis. It would not surprise me if they did hot amoimt to anything at all. I do not see how they could possiblj'^ amount to over a billion doUars. Senator Brandegee. You think they are not going to turn over goods ? Mr. Davis. No; I do not. Senator Brandegee. You spoke of your records showing clearly the intention of the parties in relation to the disposition of those bonds. Where are your records? Mr. Davis. They are with the peace commission at Paris. Senator Brandegee. In Europe? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Brandegee. Why are they not brought to this country now that the treaty is being considered here ? Mr. Davis. They probably are. My records are coming over. I have had them shipped. They just have not arrived yet. 86 TEEATY or PEACE WITH GEBMAIfY. Senator Brandegee. Did each committee keep a separate record? Mr. Davis. Each advisory committee kept copies of its records. Senator Brandegee. What does the record consist of? Mr. Davis. Just regular agreed minutes. Senator Brandegee. Is it a stenographic record of the conversa- tions that took place? Mr. Davis. No; not necessarily. Sometimes there are conversa- tions, hut as a rule the minutes simply represent the conclusions that were finaUj^ arrived at, and if there is a difference of opinion, why, then, it represents those differences of opinion. Senator Brandegee. V,'Jio had the decision as to what should go into the record ? Mr. Davis. The various members. You see the}" had official secretaries of the A'arious conunittees and commissions. Senator Brandegee. I am speaking about your committee. Mr. Davis. Well, after we agreed upon something, then the minutes "were sent to us, after that meeting, and we went over it, and if it was not in accordance with our views, each delegation had a right to make a protest and clear that up. Senator Brandegee. Who said what the minutes should consist of ? Did the secretary make the minutes according as he thought they ought to be ? Mr. Davis. He made the minutes as he thought they ought to be, and afterwards they were approved by the commission. Senator Brandegee. Submitted to the members of the commission? Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. Senator Brandegee. It is simply a skeleton of results ? Mr. Davis. That is aU. Senator Brandegee. It does not contain any of the arguments or reasons ? Mr. Davis. Sometimes it did; if they were considered of importance they were put in. Senator Brandegee. Was this considered of importance — the ques- tion of the disposition of these bonds ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Brandegee. Wni the record in that instance show what the argument was, or what the conversation was, between the dif- ferent members ? Mr. Davis. I do not know. It will not show all of the conversa- tion, but it will show the policies and views. Senator Brndegee. Will it show the reasons why you arrived at a certain decision ? Mr. Davis. I think so; yes, sir. Senator Brandegee. Tne reason I ask that is because not only in your cases, but in the case of other witnesses, when we ask what a certain article or phrase in the treaty means they say, "Why, it is my understanding that it means thus and so." But the treaty wiU have to be interpreted, if there is a dispute 5 or 10 years hence, by somebody. I saw the other day in one of the public prints an article stating that there was to be a commission created to mterpret the treaty where its terms are in dispute. Have you seen any- thing like that ? Mr. Davis. I have noticed something about it. Senator Brandegee. Do you know anything about the facts? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 87 Mr. Davis. No. Senator Brandegee. If there is no such commission appointed, how are disputes between the different signatories to the treaty to be settled? Mr. Davis. In the reparation chapter of the treaty it is provided that the reparation commission shall settle disputes if there are any. Senator Brandegee. That is, decide their own case ? Mr. Davis. Yes; that is, they are to agree upon an interpretation. Senator Williams. Decide upon the meaning of what they them- selves have said ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Brandegee. In other instances, who is to settle disputes that may arise as to the terms of the treaty ? Mr. Davis. I do not remember any specific instances other than the one I have referred to. I imagine they wiU be settled just like most disputes are settled. Senator Brandegee. By war? Mr. Davis. No; I hope not. That is what we are trying to prevent. Senator Brandegee. How are most disputes settled ? Mr. Davis. Most disputes, I have found, with what experience I have had since we got into the war, are settled by the people getting around the table, talking it over and coming to a comtaon agreement. Senator Brandegee. Suppose they can not come to a common agreement, how is the dispute to be settled ? Mr. Davis. That I could not teU, ahd I do not suppose anybody else could. Senator Brandegee. How many members of the league are there goiug to be, provided we go in ? Mr. Davis. I do not remember the exact number. Senator Brandegee. Some 42, are there not ? Mr. Davis. Something like that. I did not have very much to do with the league of nations part of the treaty, so I do not pose as an expert. Senator McCumber. There are 32 provided in the original and 13 more have been invited ? Mr. Davis. Something like that. Senator Williams. It is provided in the treaty itself that the league of nations shall settle questions of interpretation of treaties between parties. Mr. Davis. I beheve it is. Senator. Senator Brandegee. The league itself is to be the final arbiter, then ? Does that require a unanimous judgment ? Mr. Davis. It requires a unanimous judgment on most questions. Now, of that I am not sure. The covenant certainly ought to teU. Senator Williams. In some cases the treaty says that a majority shall sufiice. Mr. Davis. Yes; some a majority and some a unanimous vote. Senator McCumber. You say that the league must settle it. The league is simply the name that is given to this organization of govern- ments. It is reaUy settled by the council ? Mr. Davis. That is right. Senator McCumber. And the coimcil consists of nine members ? Mr. Davis. Yes. 88 TKEATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. Senator McCxjmbee. And on all votes, with the exception of matters in dispute, it must be unanimous, and in matters of dispute it win be unanimous with the exception of the disputants ? Mr. Davis. Yes. It is quite remarkable the way you can get a unanimous agreement with a lot of governments sitting around the table. Senator Knox. Big governments have a lot of influence over little ones. Mr. Davis. Yes; and little ones have a lot of influence over big- ones. Senator Brandegee. How long did it take you to come to a unan- imous agreement about this treaty? Mr. Davis. About six months — five or six months. Senator Brandegee. Surprising how easy it was to do it, was it not? Mr. Davis. No; it was not easy, because there were so many questions to come to a unanimous agreement about. But it did not take so long to come to an agreement on a specific question, but there were so many questions to take up that it took a long time. The Chairman. Mr. Davis, you said, what is clear in the treaty, that the reparation commission would decide these questions arising under clauses in the treaty. But the reparation commission to be appointed under the treaty was not identical with yoiu- body that prepared those clauses ? Mr. Davis. No; not at all. No; the reparation commission to be appointed under the treaty is composed of one representative from each of the five powers, and then one from Belgium and one from Serbia. Senator Moses. On page 267 of the print which you have, Mr. Davis, paragraph (b), does that empower the reparation commission to supersede the German Reichstag in writing taxation measures for Germany ? Mr. Davis. No, as a matter of fact, in the exchange of notes with Germany, after the first conditions of peace were presented, we specifically informed Germany that it was not intended that the powers of the reparation commission should extend to interfering m the internal afi^airs of Germany, and my own opinion is that this clause was unnecessary but some of the Governments were very anxious to have it put m. Senator Moses. What Governments ? Mr. Davis. England and France especially wanted it, and Italy. The three of thein wanted it. Senator Moses. The exchange of notes constituted an effective reservation in the treaty ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Well, it was more a question of the spirit than anything else, but a protocol was finally draJfted, which is very short — I have forgotten how many articles — which defines that, and there were probably four or five questions that arose, and one of them was the specific question, as I recall it, that the reparation commission was not to exercise administrative influence or power over Germany, or interfere with her internal affairs. Senator Brandegee. What could be the object of this language? Mr. Davis. I think it is poHtical. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 89 Senator Brandegee. No; wait a minute. Take this same para- graph (&) on page 267. [Reading:] The commission shall examine the German system of taxation, first, to the end that the sums for reparation which Germany is required to pay shall become a charge upon all her revenues prior to that for the service or discharge of any domestic loa,n, and secondly, so as to satisfy itself that, in general, the German scheme of taxation is fully as heavy proportionately as that of any of the powers represented on the commission. Now supposing they find that the German scheme of taxation is not proportionately as heavy as that of the other powers repre- sented on the commission. Are they to do nothing about it ? Mr. Davis. Well, my judgment is that they can do absolutely nothing about it until Germany has failed to comply with her obliga- tions up to that moment, and unless the reparation commission is convinced that an increase in Germany's tax would increase her capacity to comply with her obligations, and it is not until Senator Brandegee. Suppose they are convinced of those things. Then what? Mr. Davis. They have a right to tell Germany that she should increase her tax. She has to comply with the reparation obligation. Senator Brandegee. Then why did you not answer Senator Moses in the affirmative instead of the negative ? Mr. Davis. I will tell you why. To begin with, if Germany was unable to comply witli her reparation obligations, and was taxed maybe 50 per cent of those of England: you might, for instance, increase them equal to England's, and by so doing you would really decrease her capacity to pay instead of increasing it. Senator Brandegee. That was not Senator Moses's question. He asked you, if I understood him correctly, whether under this para- graph (&) it would overreach the right of the German Reichstag to fix their rate of taxation, and you, said it would not. Now, if they can order them to raise their rate of taxation and also increase their capacity to pay, then it seems to me you ought to say that it does overreach. Mr. Davis. I can not say so, because I do not believe it does. I probably have not expressed myself clearly. Senator Brandegee. Well, if it does not, I do not see the use of putting it in. Mr. Davis. As I said, I think it really is an article that is unneces- sary, but some of the Governments wanted this in very badly, and we agreed to it. Senator McCinnBEE. Suppose that Germany should levy a tax, one-half of the tax that is imposed upon the subjects of Great Britain, and that 50 per cent of said tax would not be sufficient to meet her obligations. Then the commission would have a right to insist that she meet her obligations, if she had to raise her tax equivalent to that of Great Britain. Mr. Davis. Yes, provided that the raising of the tax would enable her to do so. Senator Williams. Would bring a greater net revenue? Mi. Davis. Yes. Senator Williams. Let me ask you a question there. Under the Articles of Confederacy, before we went into this Federal Union, the Congress of the Confederacy had no right to levy taxes on a State, 90 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. but they did have a right to call upon the States to increase their levies and come up to their quotas as they had undertaken to pay them. Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. Senator Williams. And they had the power to coerce the State to do it. That was under the Articles of Confederacy, which was a sort of American league of nations. Senator Knox. It turned out to be a failure. Senator Williams. It turned out to be a failure in every respect except the first original object, which was to keep peace among the colonies. It did turn out to be a failure as a government, and we had to organize instead of a league of States a State league, or a Federal Government, the old German difference btween a staats- bund Mr. Davis. Germany's reparation is really to be payable in foreign currency, and a decrease in her tax may increase her capacity to obtain foreign currency. Senator Moses. But that is to be paid at a stabilized rate of exchange. Mr. Davis. How can you convert local currency into foreign cur- rency ? There is only one way on earth, and that is by exports. Senator Moses. But you can stablize the rate of exchange. You know how many marks she has. Mr. Davis. How will you do that ? Senator Moses. It is in the treaty. Mr. Davis. They have established a gold parity, but they can not possibly maintain that gold parity unless they can get foreign cur- rencies with which to do so. It is perfectly conceiveable that Ger- many might have a big surplus income which is payable in German marks, and the Germany currency might show such a depreciation in respect to foreign currencies that she could not use that surplus at all. If that condition existed, what would be the use of increasing her taxes further 1 Senator Moses. Is it the opinion of the reparation commission that Germany could meet the conditions of the treaty ? Mr. Davis. I think they can meet it the way it is, because it is elastic. It is to be regulated in accordance witli her capacity. I do not think Germany could meet the maximum that is laid down here. American delegates were in favor of fixing a definite amount now, but there are many reasons that make that practically impossible at this moment. Senator Moses. Such as what? Mr. Davis. For instance, the reparation commission was. sub- divided into three other committees or commissions and one of these commissions was to endeavor to arrive at an agreement as to what Germany could reasonably be expected to pay — her capacity to pay. There was quite a considerable difference of opinion as to what Ger- many could pay within a period of 30 years, or one generation, but it soon became apparent that Germany's bill would be greater than her capacity to pay, I mean on a reasonable estimate at this time. But as she did owe so much more, the governments who are greatly concerned said, "It is probable that she can not pay everything that she owes, but we want to get all we can out of her, and we want at least to make her pay all she can, and we would like to have that open. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 91 We do not propose to collect — we can not collect — more than Ger- many can pay." That is the reason this elasticity is given to the reparation chapter and to the powers of the reparation commission. Senator Johnson of California. To take the utmost she can pay dm-ing the next generation ? Mr. Davis. That is it. My own judgment is that within six months they will come to a definite aJgreement as to what Germany shall pay. Senator Williams. That they will be able to state a definite amount ? Mr. Davis. Absolutely. I think they are going to find that those governments do need something as a basis of credit. Under the present arrangement the German bonds that would be delivered under this treaty would not be sufficiently attractive because of this indefinite, ness. At present, the more Germany works and the more she saves, the more she has got to pay, but even then she might not be able to pay the full amount, and I do not believe that investors would be interested in German obligations, and the banks would not buy them, until they know definitely what is going to be the final policy of the reparation commission and the various governments in relation thereto, and just what Germany is going to be called upon to pay; and then, after that amount is fixed and agreed upon, if they think that Germany can pay, why then those would be attractive securities and would serve as a basis of credit to rehabilitate Europe. Senator Brandegee. You say that that will be within six months ? Mr. Davis. Yes; that was in the interchange of notes. For political and other reasons it was impossible to agree to a definite, fixed amount now. Senator Brandegee. I quite understand that. Mr. Davis. We had to leave it indefinite; but in the notes ex- changed with Germany we finally stated, "Now, we will be glad to give you facility to study the damage you have done and make propositions within four months either to repair a part of this damage, or to pay for the damage, and to issue obligations for the balance, and in order to come to a definite agreement we will endeavor to arrive at an agreement, fixing a definite amount, two months thereafter." Senator Knox. Between whom were those notes exchanged ? Mr. Davis. Between the allied and associated peace conference and the German plenipotentiaries. Senator Knox. Where are those notes ? Mr. Davis. They were published. Senator. Senator Knox. Are they here in our State Department? Mr. Davis. Oh, yes; I think so. Substantially what they agreed, Senator, is in the protocol to the treaty. Senator Johnson of California. That was submitted by the President ? Mr. Davis.-' Yes; but there is quite a lot of correspondence. Senator Johnson of California. I mean the substance of it. Mr. Davis. The substance is in the protocol. Senator Johnson of California. There is extensive correspondence ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. That which was furnished to the Senate by the President constitutes the substance, you say ? 92 TREATY or PEACE WITH GERMAK^Y. Mr. Davis. Yes. I am satisfied tliat all of the governments con- cerned, especially those most greatly concerned, will soon realize that it is very important to fix a definite amount and settle this definitely, so that Germany and the world knows what is to he done. Senator Moses. Particularly in Mr. Baruch's testimony, he says that Ge-many can not pay. He says on page 41 : Because Germany can not pay the entire claim. Further down on the same page he says [reading] : The general view is that there will not be enough to go around ; that Germany will not be able to pay it. And then again he says : Germany will be unable to meet the bill that will be put against her. And he says further: Germany actually owes more than she can pay. Mr. Davis. I agree with what Mr. Baruch says, hut there are other people that hold different views, Senator. I quite agree with his views, hut there are people who hold other views. There were some representatives who thought thatGermanycouldpay.'?100,000,000,000, which is more than Germany's national wealth. There was quite a difference of opinion, hut I think that as a rule decidedly a very large majority of economists and financiers agreed substantially that Ger- many can not pay what her hill will amount to. Senator Moses. And Mr. Baruch said that up to the very last day the American commissioners sought to have a definite amount fixed. Mr. Davis. We did. Senator Moses. But he gave no explanation as to why the Ameri- can commissioners yielded that point. What was the real reason? Mr. Davis. Because it was not our party as much as it was that of the other Governments'. Senator Moses. Upon the theory that we are not to participate in the reparation ? Mr. Davis. I mean our participation is so infinitesimal, that it is not a vital question. Senator Moses. Then, why take one-fifth of the responsibility? Mr. Davis. The results of it concerns the United States very much because the financial stability of the world concerns the United States even from a selfish standpoint,. Senator Moses. We are one of the four permanent voting mem- bers of the reparation commission ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Moses. Just why was that unique piece of mechanism set up in that way ? Mr. Davis. Well, England, France, Italy, and Belgium have more material interest in what Germany pays than any other Government, very much more. They were the only ones that had very much to collect from Germany. Senator Moses. Serbia? Mr. Davis. Serbia's bill is really more against Bulgaria. Senator Williams. And Austria. Mr. Davis. And Hungary and Austria. Those were the principal coimtries concerned. That is the reason. -.Ai TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 93 Senator Moses. Then, why was not Belgium made a member ? Mr. Davis. Belgium is made a member. Senator Moses. As far as her interest is concerned. Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Moses. We are made a permanent voting member ? Mr. Davis. Germany was made jointly and severally liable for the damage done by her associates and allies, and Germany theoretically is liable for all the damage that Biilgaria and Austria-Himgary did to Serbia and Roumania, but it is hoped that they will collect most of their share from Bulgaria and Hungary. Senator Williams. Whatever they do collect will go as a credit ? Mr. Davis. Absolutely. Senator Moses. You seem to be missing the point. We would have an infinitesimal share in the reparation, but we are one of the four permanent votmg members. Belgiimi has a larger share in the reparation, but is a member only as her interests are concerned. Why the distinction ? Mr. Davis. Well, Belgium is of course a small power and does not have the world interests that a larger power has, but it was felt that Belgium's rights must be protected, and therefore that she should participate in voting on matters that concerned Belgium. But the larger powers are really more concerned with conditions throughout the world than a small power, because they can suffer more and they have more interests. Senator Moses. The assumption being that every vote taken by the reparation commission is one that will interest us ? Mr. Davis. Yes; the other powers were very anxious to have the United States come into the reparation commission. Senator Moses. I have no doubt of that. Mr. Davis. Because they thought that our material and moral influence would be valuable. Senator Pomeeene. May I suggest this, too, that while we may not have a very large part of the funds that are paid in reparation, we have a very positive intisrest in the financial condition of those nations which will receive this money, because they owe us about $10,000,000,000? Mr. Davis. I see every reason why we should go on the commis- sion myself, and I see no reason, practically, why we should not, because, as I say, while the other countries, England, France, Italy, and Belgium, expect to collect very much more from Germany and have a much larger claim than the United States — om* claim is very small, even if we put it in — yet it would seem that we are vitally interested in the financial conditions of the world and of these coun- tries. We are the creditors of the world. Senator Brandegee. Do you know what portion of the records of the peace commission has arrived in this country ? lb. Davis. No; I do not. Senator Beandegee. It has been a month since the President arrived here, and I wondered whether they were going to keep the records over there or send them here. Mr. Davis. I have not heard as to that. Senator Williams. He ought to have brought them in his valise. Senator Beandegee. No; but in a month I thought they might have been brought over. 94 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. Senator Williams. TTiere are many of them coming every day. Senator Brandegee. Tha,t is what I am trying to find out. I did not know whether they were coming or not. Senator Moses. In naming fifteen bilhons as the amoimt of bonds to be issued, you had reference to the provisions at the bottom of page 267 and on page 269 of the committee print, did you not, para- graphs 1 and 2 ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Moses. Fifteen bilhons surely will be issued ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Moses. And possibly ten billions more '( Mr. Davis. Well, possibly. I hope that the financial condition of Germany will be so good that those can be delivered; but it entirely depends on that, because those .110,000,000,000 under (3) are not to be deUvered until the reparation commission are unanimously of the opinion that Germany can meet the interest and sinking fund on these obhgations. Senator Pomerene. May I ask a question there? Senator Moses. Oh, j^es. Senator Pomerene. In view of certain suggestions which have been made, perhaps outside of the committee, I will ask you this question: You have called attention to the manner in which these bonds are to be trusteed, the manner in which the certificates are to be issued to the several parties. Is there anything in this treaty which makes the commissioners or the State or the Government which they represent individually or collectively liable for the redemp- tion of either these bonds or the certificate ? Mr. Davis. No; there is not. The Chairman. Does any other member of the committee desire to ask any questions? Senator Swaxsox. Mr. Davis, let me ask you a question on some- thing that we were discussing with itr. Baruch. After this treaty is ratified, how will the trade relations between Germany and the United States and other allied countries be resumed? To what extent will the reparation commission have control of that? Mr. Davis. Theoretically they can come and trade. Anyone who has got the money to buy somethuig — any German who has the money to buy something — can come and o;et it. From a practical standpoint it will probably be rather difficult, for the first two years, without the permission of the reparation commission. If you can conceive of this reparation chapter as something that we were dis- cussing pro and con for several montlis. j^ou will understand that people's views changed, more and more as they got into the facts. It was first thought that Germany could pay s.5, 000,000,000 within the first two years, I personally, always contended that it would be impossible, or that if she did, she would not be able to pay anything else, because it would leave her so weak: it would just take all her capital they had; and that instead of Germany paying 85, 000, 000, 000 the first two years, 1 thought those Govern- ments would have to help Germany"; either land her money, or let her keep some capital which she had; and that unless Germany could get food and raw materials, they would not be able to do anything. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 95 So that, in substance, my interpretation of that first payment of $5,000,000,000 is that Germany shall pay to the reparation commis- sion $5,000,000,000, less what she may require in food and raw ma- terials during those first two years, which may perhaps mean that Germany can pay only $2,000,000,000; because, in addition to that, she has to pay the armies of occupation; and the United States will have a rather large bill there. Senator Swanson. Let me ask you this question, for the under- standing of the treaty. If a German facjiory or manufacturing establishment had the money, and desired to purchase raw material in this country, lumber or cotton, or elsewhere rubber, could she do it without the consent of the reparation commission? Mr. Davis. My judgment is, yes. Senator Swanson. Mr. Baruch had an idea that she could not. Mr. Davis. Here is the point. Germany can not export securities or gold during the first two years without the consent of the reparation commission. For instance, during the armistice period Germany could not export gold without the consent of the supreme economic council, which was the body that controlled such matters. Senator Swanson. Nothing would prevent a foreign concern from extending credit to a German manufacturing establishment for raw materials ? Mr. Davis. No. It might be possible, however, that anyone ex- tending credit, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, would like to have the approval of the reparation commission. Senator Knox. Are not the French selling to the Germans now? Mr. Davis. Yes; and I think that if any American wants to sell anything to a German, he will sell it to him and ship it to him. Senator Williams. You do not mean if it involves the export of gold or securities from Germany ? Mr. Davis. No. If it does, it can not be done. Senator Williams. But if it involved some credit that a German bank could arrange with a bank in New Orleans which did not involve the export of gold or securities from Germany, then no consent of anybody would be necessary? Mr. Davis. My opinion is that it would not require the consent of anybody. Senator Knox. That is, to-day, if the United States Steel Corpora- tion wanted to sell to a German raUroad 20,000 tons of steel raUs, they could do it and give them credit for it ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Williams. Or if a New Orleans bank wanted to extend a credit to a Hamburg bank and the Hamburg bank wanted to buy cotton, that could be done ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Williams. It is only where gold or securities come into consideration that that becomes operative ? Mr. Davis. That is perfectly true. It is I think, however, that a banking institution or an exporting house would like to know just what the reparation commission's policy is going to be before extend- ing any very large line of credit. They might want to know that. Senator Williams. Undoubtedly, because any very large line of credit would have to be based, ultimately, upon gold or securities. 96 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Swanson. But there is nothing in the treaty to prohibit anything except the export of gold and securities ? Mr. Davis. No. Senator Knox. That might involve the pohcy of whether the reparation commission were going to permit the export of gold or securities in connection with that transaction. Senator Williai^s. In a transaction such as I have indicated in cotton, or in a steel products transaction such as Senator Knox indi- cated, a good deal of thjs payment would be made through clearing- house balances, woidd it not — clearances of one sort or another — without resulting in the shipment of gold or securities ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Williams. Germany wiU be wanting to buy steel from us, and we will be wanting to buy a good deal from Germany, too, pretty soon. Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Knox. Is there any limitation upon the importation of gold into Germany 1 Mr. Davis. No, sir. Senator Knox. So that if we wanted to buy now, and pay in gold, we could do it ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Williams. Yes; and that very gold might later be treated, as a part of a balance of trade settled by the reparation commission, as being in an exceptional attitude ( Mr. Davis. Germany will want to withdraw the gold if she can. The Chaieman. Are there any further questions to be asked Mr. Davis. If not, Mr. Davis, we will excuse you. Senator Knox. Senator Johnson indicated that he would like to have Mr. Davis return to-morrow. He was compelled to leave, and he wanted to ask him some questions. The Chairman. Very well; then Mr. Davis will come back to- morrow. The committee has said hitherto that they would like to hear the Secretary of State, and I think we can finish with ilr. Davis to-morrow and I could ask Mr. Lansing to come. Senator Moses. To come on the following day, 'do you mean, Mr. Chairman ? The Chairman. No ; to come to-morrow. I do not know how long Senator Johnson desires to examine Mr. Davis. I will take the ■pleasure of the committee on that. Shall 1 ask the Secretary of State to appear the day after to-morrow ? Senator Swanson. I think it would be better. We sit only an hour and a half each morning. The Chairman. Very well; then I will ask the Secretary to come on Wednesday. There is no other witness to be heard this morning, that I am aware of. The committee will stand adjourned until to-morrow morning at half past 10, and I will ask you to be here then, Mr. Davis, if you can. Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. (Thereupon, at 11.55 o'clock a. m. the committee adjourned until to-morrow, Tuesday, August 5, 1919, at 10.30 o'clock a. m. tuesday, august 5, 1919. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D. C. The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjourn- inent,m room 426, Senate Office Building, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, presiding. Present, Senators Lodge (chairman), McCumber, Brandegee, Fall, Knox, Harding, Johnson of California, Moses, Hitchcock, Williams, Swanson, Smith, and Pittman. STATEMENT OF MR, NORMAN H. DAVIS— Continued. The Chairman. We will continue with Mr. Davis. Senator Johnson of California. Mr. Davis, you were a member of two commissions, as I understood you, Finance and Reparation? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Did each commission have separate experts ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Sometimes they duplicated. Sometimes some of the same people were on both commissions, but they were separate bodies. Senator Johnson of California. Did any of those experts resign at any time ? Mr. Davis. One of the British representatives resigned along at the last, who represented the British treasury. He resigned because of ill health. Senator Johnson of California. Did the American experts resign ? Mr. Davis. Not on any of the committees that I was on. Senator Johnson of California. Do you recall that any resigned at all? Mr. Davis. I recall that Mr. Bullitt, who was attached in some way to the peace delegation, resigned. Senator Johnson of California. Did any of the experts resign that you recall ? Mr. Davis. No. The Chairman. Was Mr. Bullitt the one who went to Russia? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator McCumber. Wbo went with Mr. Bullitt to Russia ? There was some one else went with him. The Chairman. Lincoln Steflens. Mr. Davis. I am not positive, but I think it was Lincoln Steflens. Senator Johnson of California. They went there representing the United States ? 135546—19 7 97 98 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. Mr. Davis. Senator, I never did quite understand just in what capacity they went there, but apparently for the United States. Senator Johnson of California. When you reached Paris and were engaged in that work, Mr. Bullitt was a regular official attached to the American Commission in some capacity, was he not ? Mr. Davis. Mr. Bullitt was, I understand, in some way connected with the State Department and was with the State Department staff there, and I did not come in contact with him at all, so I do not know just what he did. Senator Johnson of California. Did you have any fundamental theory or any basis upon which you began your work in relation to reparations ? Mr. Davis. Yes; you mean as to arriving at Germany's capacity to pay ? Senator Johnson of California. Well, in arriving at the modus operandi ultimately of the collection of the debt, and the like ? Mr. Davis. Yes; we started out with a practical definition as to what Germany was liable for, which was defined in the interchange of notes between the President and the German Government and between the President and the alUed powers. Senator Johnson of California. Those notes to which you refer were written when — after the armistice or before the armistice? Mr. Davis. Leading up to the signing of the armistice. Senator Johnson of California. And the armistice gave you the foundation, then, upon which to work ? Mr. Davqs. We felt that an agreement was made. Senator Johnson of Cahfornia. And that that agreement had been that Germany should pay all of the damage that had been caused by her? Mr. Davis. All of the damage to civiUans and their property. Senator Johnson of California. That alone ^ Mr. Davis. I forget the exact wording. It was first defined in certain of the fourteen points, in the interchange of notes by the President with the Germans and the Allies, the Allies desired to clear this matter up definitely, and they rephed that they would Uke to understand just what this damage referred to; that is, if it were all damage caused on the ocean, from the air, and on the land, and the President replied yes, and then that was presented to the Germans, and they said, "On those conditions we are prepared to sign the armistice. " Senator Johnson of California. Were these notes published at the time? Mr. Davis. Oh, yes. Senator Johnson of California. And these were notes that were subsequent to the fourteen points and prior to the armistice ? Mr. Davis. Absolutely. Senator Johnson of California. Were they the notes upon which the armistice was based ? Mr. Davis. That was our understanding. Senator Johnson of California. You started, then, so far as the American Commission was concerned, with a basis for computation and a basis for reparation provisions ? Mr. Davis. Absolutely. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GBEMANY. • 99 Senator Johnson of California. And that basis was what, if you will please repeat it ? Mr. Davis. That Germany should repair the damage caused to the civilians and their property wherever found. Senator Johnson of Cfalifornia. Was that basis adhered to through- out. Mr. Davis. We understand that it was. Senator Johnson of California. And so far as the provisions of the treaty are concerned, is that basis adhered to ? Mr. Davis. I think so. Senator. There were naturally some differ- ences of opinion as to what would be included in that, but I think it was. Senator Johnson of California. Now, that basis, you took it from the very beginning, without a real computation, would equal an amount greater than Germany could pay ? Mr. Davis. Well, we had experts working for several months com- puting damages under the various categories which came within that so-called agreement leading up to the armistice, and all of the Gov- ernments were filing statements of their specific damages, and our ex- perts and their experts were going over these, comparing them with their own information, and we got at a comparatively reasonable estimate as to what the damage under the various categories would amount to. Senator Johnson of California. These experts began that work after you had gone to Paris ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Now that estimate that you thus reached was conceived to be a reasonable estimate of the amount that ought to be paid upon the basis you have suggested ? Mr. Davis. We felt that that was a reasonable estimate of what Germany was liable for. Then the other question arose as to whether or not Germany could pay that amount. Senator Johnson of California. And the conclusion reached on the latter subject was that she could not pay that amount ? Mr. Davis. That was our conclusion. Senator. Some people still hold that she can. Senator Johnson of California. It is a part of the treaty, is it not ? You have inserted it as a provision that it is recognized that Germany is unable to pay the full debt that is due from her ? Mr. Davis. No, I do not so understand that. My interpretation of the first article in the reparation chapter is that Germany is mor- ally responsible for having caused all of the damage, aU the war costs and everything else, but realizing her inability to make good, to restore all of that damage, the allied and associated governments had confined themselves to requiring Germany to pay to the utmost of her capacity the damages imder the specific categories attached. Senator Knox. Can you teU how much the war cost the world * Mr. Davis. Oh, that is very difficult. Of course. Senator, that depends very much on how you figure that. If you mean the eco- nomic loss, it is one thing. If you mean actual expenditures Senator Knox. I mean actual expenditures. Mr. Davis. The actual expenditures were probably between 1200,000,000,000 and $250,000,000,000. Senator Harding. Does that include property destroyed by the war? 100 . TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Davis. No, I am just referring to expenditures by the various Governments concerned. Senator Hitchcock. Do you include what the German Govern- ment would have to expend now in reimbursing ? Mr. Davis. No, I mean the expenditures for conducting the war. Senator McCumber. Is that on the part of the AUies alone, or on both sides ? • Mr. Davis. That would include everything, the Germans and everybody. Senator Swanson. I have seen a statement made by some statis- ticians that the bonded indebtedness would amount to about $190,000,000,000 when the armies were disbanded, and that the residue, between that and 1250,000,000,000 would be represented by the taxes that were collected in that time. Mr. Davis. I think $190,000,000,000 is rather excessive, Senator. Aslrecall, England's bonded indebtedness will be about 10,000,000,000 pounds, or we will say, $50,000,000,000, and the United States $30,000,000,000. That would be $80,000,000,000. Ours probably will not go quite so high, say, $25,000,000,000. That will make $75,000,000,000 for England and the United States; France, $25,- 000,000,000, would be $100,000,000,000, and Germany about $35,- 000,000,000, or a total of $135,000,000,000. Italy increased her bonded indebtedness to about $12,500,000,000 during the war, and Austria increased hers about $12,500,000,000. Senator Williams. Does that computation take in Turkey and Bulgaria ? Mr. Davis. No, but they were very small. I should say both those Governments combined would not increase the figure over $5,000,- 000,000. Certainly $150,000,000,000 of bonded indebtedness would about cover it. Senator Swanson. I think that estimate was for the time when the armies were disbanding and peace declared. Mr. Davis. I am calculating up to the present. Senator Johnson of California. With the estimates made by your experts of the total damage, what was the reason why you did not in the treaty fix the total amount to be paid by Germany? Prob- ably you stated that yesterday, but possibily I have forgotten it. Mr. Davis. I should say principally, Senator, because, according to the judgment of most of us at any rate, Germany could not pay anything like the full amount of the damage for which she was liable; and because the amount which she could pay was smaller than the full bill, we were principally anxious to have Germany sign a note for the full amount, and then determine later on what reductions should be made on that. Senator Johnson of California. And so you consider the treaty to be the signing of a note for the full amount, with the power in the Reparations Commission to make deductions subsec[uently, which shall be determined. Now your Reparation Commission consists in reality of the Big Five ? Mr. Davis. Not the Big Five. It is really the Big Four and Belgium. Senator Johnson of California. The Big Pour and Belgium. I think we have one-fifth of the voting power. Mr. Davis. Yes. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 101 Senator Johnson of California, And in some instances, where Belgium is not concerned, as I recall the treaty, probably one-fourth of the voting power. Mr. Davis. No ; where Belgium is not concerned some one else fits in Belgium's place. Senator Johnson of California. So that in any event we will never have more than one-fifth of the voting power. Mr. Davis. No; but we provided that that one-fifth would be a very powerful vote, because in most important matters a unanimous vote is required. Senator Johnson of California. Yesterday you said what I think is quite the fact in all of our experience, that when men sit by them- selves around a table it is not difficult to reach a unanimous con- clusion. That is correct, isn't it? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. And that is your experience in practice ? Mr. Davis. It takes time. It can not always be done. Sometimes there inay be such conflicting conditions that it may take some time; and you may have to go at it gradually to accomplish it. Senator Johnson of California. But ultimately Mr. Davis. Ultimately, I think it can be done. Senator Johnson of California. So that now we have Germany signing a note admittedly for more than she can pay. We can start with that premise, can we not ? Mr. Davis. Well, it is no more than some of the interested parties think she can pay? Senator Johnson of California. I am, of course, taking the view that you gentlemen took. Mr. Davis. The American view is that, absolutely. Senator Johnson of California. I take our American view in preference to any other. Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. And you gentlemen have reached the conclusion that it was a note for a greater sum than Germany was able to pay? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. You look forward, however, finally to the reparation commission, composed, as you have indicated, scaling that down so that she can pay. The scaling down would depend upon obtaining the unanimous consent of the reparation com- mission hereafter, would it not ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. And without that unanimous con- sent the world is confronted to-day with a bill that has been placed against Germany greater than it is possible for her to pay, and under the terms of this treaty she may be required in various fashions, as they are indicated, to attempt to pay that bill. Mr. Davis. I think not. In the first place, Germany delivers bonds for only $15,000,000,000, except the small extra amount that she wUl deliver for Belgium, which probably would run it up to 116,000,000,000, and Germany can not be called upon to deliver any more bonds without the unanimous consent of the reparation com- mission. In other words, we insisted that Germany must not be 102 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. put in the position of having obligations, bonds outstanding, which might be in excess of what she comd reasonably be expectea to pay, and we avoid that dangfer in that way. " Senator Johnson of California. With the debt hanging over her? Mr. Davis. Yes; it is a book account, that is true; there is that book account. Senator Johnson of California. Is there any mode by which that book account may be collected or enforced '( Mr. Davis. No. Senator Johnson of California. To what extent, then, may the reparation commission enforce its collection hereafter 'i Mr. Davis. My interpretation is that the reparation commission can not enforce the collection of anything beyond the bonds which they have in their possession or that have been delivered to them. Senator Johnson of California. Is that your reading of the treaty ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. And is that your reading concerning ■the taxation clause, the industrial clauses, and the like? Mi-. Davis; Yes; it is. Senator Johnson of California. And in respect to shipping and the various things that Germany is to deliver, is that your reading of the treaty ? Mr. Davis. That will all be credited. Senator Johnson of California. I understand that, that that will all be credited, but the point is, has not the reparation commission the power — ^whether it will exercise it or not is a different proposi- tion — to endeavor to collect this bill that Germany now owes ? Mr. Davis. I do not understand that they can do anything toward collecting anything except the bonds that they have, that have been ■delivered to them. Senator Johnson of California. Do you interpret the treaty to mean that the reparation commission can do anything concerning the compelling the performance of the terms of the treaty by Ger- many except the collection of the bonds ? Mr. Davis. From a practical standpoint and from a reading of the treaty I do not see how they can do anything else. Senator Johnson of California. I am very glad to have your con- struction of it because, as I understand the terms, I had quite a dif- ferent view. Senator Harding. Right there, then, what is the object in giving to the reparation commission the power to see that the German rate of taxation is made equivalent to that of any other power engaged in the war ? Mr. Davis. Senator, as I stated yesterday, I do not think that was a necessary clause to put in the treaty. Some of the other powers wanted it in the treaty, partly for political reasons, and we could see no objection to it, and we agreed to its going in; but, as I explained yesterday, the German rate of taxation may or may not have any relation to Germany's capacity to pay in foreign currency, because her taxes will be collected in German currency. Senator Harding. If you have covered that already, I am sorry to have taken the time to-day. TREATY or PEACE WITH GERMANY. 103 Senator McCumber. Is not the effect of that agreement simply this: That the reparation commission will not release any part of the sum. which Germany agrees to pay if the taxation in Germany is not as heavy as it is in the other countries ? In other words, if her taxa- tion is less than that of the countries to which she owes the debt, those countries will insist that she shall pay, if it requires a taxation equal to their own, and that they will not release any part of it until her taxation comes up to the taxation of the other countries. Mr. Davis. That is, provided they are of the opinion that an in- crease in her taxes will increase her power to compl}' with her obli- gations. Senator McCumber. Yes ; I understand, but that is the purpose of it ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator McCumber. And if they find that she can not even pay the taxation equivalent to what is paid in France or in Great Britain, they may still relieve her from a portion of the debt, provided the efiFect of increasing her taxation would be to destroy her ability to pay. Mr. Davis. Absolutely. In other words, if they expect to collect from Germany they have got to treat that situation in an intelligent manner, or they will destroy Germany's capacity to pay. Senator Johnson of California. Exactly, and you look to see the reparation commission treat it in an intelligent manner, so that they will take up to Germany's capacity and no more ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. But there is the power to do more, is there not ? Mr. Davis. Yes; they have the power. That is, they have the power to take measures or fail to take measures which would not be intelligent and constructive. Senator Johnson of California. Exactly; so that with your biU that Germany has signed in blank, your reparation commission have the discretion to do as they see fit. We assume that the reparation commission will act intelligently, of course, and not press the debtor to the wall, but the reparation commission has the power to do otherwise. Mr. Davis. I do not see how the reparation chapter of the treaty can be construed beyond the fact that the reparation commission can only enforce compliance on the part of Germany in respect to the bonds which have been delivered to the reparation commission. Senator Johnson of California. How do you look for the enforce- ment of the sums that will be fixed otherwise — for reparation in those sums ? Mr. Davis. That is left rather vague, and I do not see how it can be enforced. Senator Johnson of California. Do you mean that if the repara- tion commission, outside of these bonds, determine that Germany shall pay a certain sum, there is no means of enforcement of it ? Mr. Davis. No; but I say the reparation commission must first determine that Germany shall deliver additional bonds, and that that requires a unanimous vote. Senator Johnson of California. All right, but under thebiU which has been admitted by Germany and is now indefinite in amount, if they require that a certain sum shall be delivered in bonds, Germany must deliver them. 104 TREATY OF PEACE. WITH GEKMANY. Mr. Davis. Oh, decidedly. Senator Johnson of California, Certainly, and the reparation commission has the power to determine the amount of those bonds up to the amount of the bill. Mr. Davis. Absolutely. Senator Johnson of California. And require Germany to pay .them « Mr. Davis. Yes, indeed. Senator Johnson of California. Now the reparation commission, if .you will recall, has no power of cancellation. Mr. Davis. Except by unanimous vote. Senator Johnson of California. They have even got to go back to their Governments, have they not ? Do you not recall that provision ? Mr. Davis. It does say that the Governments, acting through the reparation commission, as I recall the wording Senator Johnson of California. I am not attempting to state with any degree of accuracy my recollection of the treaty, but as I recall it, before cancellation or modification in reality, the reparation com- mission must have the consent of the Governments concerned. Senator Fall. I have the provision here. Senator Johnson of California. Will you read it ? . Senator Fall. This is the way it reads: Annex 2 to article 244, paragraph 13, suhsertitn (a): Questi(ns involving the sovereignty of any of the allied and associated p.j-iveiH. or the cancellation of the whole or any part of the debt or obligaticr s of Geirr.any, shall be by unanimous vote. In case of any difference of opinion rmcng ihe delegates, which can not be solved bv reference to their GoAemments, upon the question whether a given case is one which requires a unanimous vote for its decision cr not, such difference shall be referred to the immediate arbitration of some impartial person to be agreed upon by their Governments, whose award the allied and associated Governments agree to accept. Senator Johnson of California. That is the provision. Senator McCumber. I think the provision that the Senator from California [Mr. Johnson] refers to is article 2.34, found on page 251. Senator Johnson of California. I recalled the provision, but it was not of suflBicient importance to bother with it. Senator McCumber. Giving the right to cancel or not to cancel any part, except with specific authority of the Governments represented on the commission. Senator Johnson of California. I thank the Senator. That was what I referred to — Except with the specific authority of the several Governments represented upon the commission. Mr. Davis. The last sentence in article 238 also bears on the same question: If, however, within the period mentioned, Germany fails to discharge her obligations, any balance remaining unpaid may, within the discretion of the commission, be post- poned for settlement in subsequent years, or may be handled otherwise in such manner as the allied and associated Governments, actin" in accordance with the procedure laid down in this part of the present treaty, shalldetermine. Senator Johnson of California. I am trying, you know, to form a picture if I can Mr. Davis. Yes, I know. I am interested, because we went through all of that. TREATY OE PEACE WITH GERMANY. 105 Senator Johnson of California. I think I understand now much more clearly than I did before, that we have a bill against Germany that from the the standpoint of the American delegation is greater than Germany can pay; that it is now within the jurisdiction of the reparation commission, that that reparation commission has the power to do as it sees fit, but we will rely on its intelligence and its wise discretion to see that it will take from Germany only such sums as Germany is able to pay. Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. Not simply our judgment, but it is stated in article 232, if Germany is incapable of paying the whole amount. Senator Johnson of California. But in speaking to Mr. Davis con- cerning that particular provision he said that did not really have reference to the total bill that we are now speaking of. Senator. Mr. Davis. Article 231 refers more to the moral responsibility. Senator Johnson of California. That was the distinction he was drawing, I think, probably before the Senator from Nebraska came in; but I quite agree with you. As I said to Mr. Davis in the begin- ning of the examination to-day, I thought that provision of the treaty showed that the treaty itself recognized the very fact of which we are speaking. Senator Hitchcock. I think it does. Mr. Davis. It does. Senator Johnson of California. Yes. Mr. Davis. But it is not only a question of Germany's capacity to pay. It is also a question of how much the principal interested allied powers can afford to have Germany pay. Assuming that Ger- many could pay the total amount of her damage that will be assessed in the various categories, let us assume that that would be 140^- 000,000,000. Germany certainly could only pay that by developing a higher state of efficiency than they have ever had anywhere in the world before, and by restricting her imports to absolute essentials, which would exclude importations from France, especially, and would exclude many importations from England; and she would have to increase her exports very much to France and England and would have to find markets in other parts of the world; and in my judg- ment, if Germany could pay $40,000,000,000, by the time she has paid 110,000,000,000 or $15,000,000,000 of it those Governments will be wanting her to quit. Senator Hitchcock. Is there some restriction placed on Germany in this treaty as to her legislating against imports ? Mr. Davis, For the first five years there is a clause against the restriction of imports from Alsace-Lorraine and from those segre- gated portions of Germany ; and then for a certain period she shall not pass discriminatory legislation against imports from the allied powers. Senator McCumber. In other words, that she shall give each power the rights of the other powers ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator McCumber. The most favored-nation treatment? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. But if Germany is to make a very serious and radical effort to pay her debts rapidly she must in some way restr ic her imports ? 106 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Davis. Absolutely. She must go on a war basis and stay- there. Senator Hitchcock. And that will hurt her neighboring countries? Mr. Davis. Decidedly. It is bound to, because the consumption power of the world is not going to increase so rapidly that Germany could do this without taking trade away from the other countries. Even before the war, in the height of her prosperity, Germany's actual commercial trade balance, that is her exports, amounted to $300,000,000 less than her imports. She covered that deficit by profits and other incomes, from her insurance companies and her mercantile marine, and from her investments abroad, and from re- mittances of Germans living abroad, which were estimated to run up to about $800,000,000 a year, which left Germany with a surplus of about $500,000,000 a year, most of which they invested in foreign countries. Senator Johnson of California. I think, perhaps, you misstated that. You mean that her imports were greater than her exports? Mr. Davis. That is right. I thought I said that. I said that her exports were $300,000,000 less than her imports. Senator Johnson of California. Unless the reparation commission should agree on the amount due, it is a workable treaty ? Mr. Davis. You can not answer that yes or no, Senator. That goes back to the same point. Once that it was impossible to agree upon a fixed and a reasonable amount which Germany shall be com- pelled to pay, it became necessary to give more elasticity, more power, to the reparation commission to regulate the amount that would be collected in accordnace with Germany's capacity to pay and in accordance with what they could afford to have Germany pay. JBut in order to avoid any abuse, or forcing a large country of that kind to practically repudiate or forego the payment of obligations outstanding, we hmited the amount which Germany should be actually called upon to take care of at present to 15,000,000,000 in bonds which are to be delivered, and that she shall never be called upon to deliver any more bonds until the reparation commission are unanimously of the opinion that she can take care of them. Now, I can not conceive of an American representative on that reparation commission agreeing to have Germany deliver more l)onds unless she is in a position to take care of them, because that is a matter that would concern the United States very much. Senator Johnson of California. Is that not a matter that would ■concern Great Britain and France also ? Mr. Davis. I think so; very decidedly. Senator McCumber. Therefore, would not the same rules and reasons govern them that would govern the American delegates? Mr. Davis. Absolutely. Suppose they threw this large country Into international bankruptcy. The financial situation that would result would cost the world more, really, than what they expect to collect from Germany, and it would cost them more than anyone else. Senator Johnson of California. Was there a specific sum fixed, I mean not definitely, but agreed upon as the amount that Germany •ought to pay? Mr. Davis. No; we could not agree upon that. Senator. Senator Johnson of California. In round numbers, what did your •experts agree upon ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 107 Mr. Davis. Do you think it is advisable to state that? We have got to have negotiations afterwards with the Germans. I have no objection to it, but I am thinking about the advisability of stating it publicly, because they are to Senator Moses. Is that contained in the memoranda to which you referred yesterday ? Mr. Davis. I am not positive. Senator Johnson of California. I do not want to ask anything that ought not to be asked in that regard. Senator Moses. Is there any way we could get that — in executive •session ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Moses. I do not want to ask for it publicly, if you think it ought not to be so stated. Mr. Davis. I would be glad to go into details with you. Senator Moses. Will you state that in executive session before the committee ? Mr. Davis. Yes; I will be glad to. Senator Johnson of California. You drew a distinction between the fixed amount and a reasonable amount, did you not ? Mr. Davis. What I meant by that was that the amount should be a reasonable amount, that is an amount which Germany could be reasonably expected to pay. No one can tell, of course, just what they could pay within one generation. Senator Johnson of California. What do you estimate the wealth ■of Germany to be? I understood you yesterday to say about 100 billions. Mr. Davis. No; before the war I estimated Germany's national wealth at $75,000,000,000. Senator Johnson of California. When you say $75,000,000,000, what do you put in that ? Do you mean within the confines of the European Empire ? Mr. Davis. Yes; that means her colonies, too. Senator Johnson of California. Her colonies, too ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Her wealth now you estimate to be what ? Mr. Davis. That depends upon whether you estimate it upon the inflated currency or on the gold basis. Values have increased so that probably Germany's national wealth, according to the present prices, might probably be, I should say would be, $100,000,000,000, less the value of such deductions as may be made, and her colonies less the value of such deductions as Alsace-Lorraine and her colonies. Her colonies were not worth much. Senator Johnson of California. The reason of my question was to begin after your deductions. The Saar Valley you estimated at vhat? Mr. Davis. We estimated it at about $200,000,009. Senator Johnson of California. And Alsace-Lorraine ? Mr. Davis. It is rather difficult. We did not get a specific esti- mate of Alsace-Lorraine, but the principal values, of course, are the ■ores there. Senator Johnson of California. Yes. Mr. Davis. But it was estimated at between 5 and 10 billions. 108 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Johnson of California. The amount that was taken from her in territory or in value would be about what ? Mr. Davis. My guess would be $15,000,000,000. Senator Johnson of California. What would be the effect upon her of what has been taken from her, on her industries 'i Mr. Davis. It will hamper her industries to a certain extent. Senator Johnson of California. To a large or a small extent, or are vou unable to estimate ? Mr. Davis. I am unable to estimate that; but she will still have access to the ores from Alsace-Lorraine, because France is dependent on Germany for certain ores, and they will have to have an inter- change of ores. They will not be deprived of that. Senator Knox. If she gives 15 billions in bonds and 15 billions of territory, then she is giving 30 billions as the result of the war, is she not? Mr. Davis. Practically; yes, sir. Senator Knox. She is getting no credit for the value of her colonies or for Alsace-Lorraine — those are taken from her — ^plus this 15 billions of bonds ? Mr. Davis. Practically so. There are some credits. Senator Hitchcock. How do you estimate her colonies as being of so little value ? Mr. Davis. I say I judged — my estimate was made — that the territory taken from her would be about $15,000,000,000. Senator Hitchcock. Were not her. colonies worth anything? Mr. Davis. As I say, they were not worth very much. Senator Johnson of California. When you speak of the Saar Val- ley, do you mean all the uses of the Saar Valley for 15 years? Was that it ? Mr. Davis. That is what it was estimated at. Senator Johnson of California. Not the actual capital value ? Mr. Davis. The actual mines and the properties that were taken over. Senator Johnson of California. They came to what ? Mr. Davis. $200,000,000 at an estimate. That has not been fixed yet. The reparation commission is to fix that finally, but that is the estimate that was fixed at the time, approximately $200,000,000. Senator Harding. The use of that valley enters into the reparation payment ? Mr. Davis. That is credited to Germany's biU. Senator Hitchcock. Did you make any estimate of what the Ger- man Government would save on account of the reduction of the army and navy expenditures as compared with prior to the war ? Mr. Davis. Yes; from $400,000,000 to $500,000,000 a year. Senator Hitchcock. Are you estimating her prewar expenditures in that ? Mr. Davis. Her prewar expense was about $400,000,000 a vear; and of course, theoretically, tnose materials and the labor would be devoted to industries, which would also increase her industrial output. Senator Johnson of California. Did the American delegation take any particular position concerning the Saar Valley ? TREATY 0¥ PEACE WITH GERMANY. 109 Mr. Davis. I was not on that commission, Senator, but the American delegation felt that it should be returned to Germany within, say, 15 years, or that the people would have a right to return to Germany. Senator Johnson of California. Do I understand from that, that the provision for a plebiscite met the views of the American dele- tion in this treaty ? Mr. Davis. That is my impression; but, as I say, I was not on that commission. Senator Johnson of California. So it would be futile to ask you concerning the details of that ? Mr. Davis. Yes; it would. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know why it was that the reparation of Russia was reserved by the treaty ? Mr. Davis. There were several reasons. Russia had made a tremendous contribution toward winning this war before she went out of it, and it was felt that she had lost a great deal in the way of property and many lives, and it was felt that the door should not be closed entirely to Rusisa, once that her people have organized a government which can speak for them. Senator Johnson of California. If finally a government shall be organized that will be recognized by the Allies, was it designed, as expressed by the commission, that Russia should be given repara- tion, too? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. That reparation would be very considerable, would it not? Mr. Davis. Yes; it would. Senator Johnson of California. So that that is another indeter- minate sum that the reparation commission must consider ? Mr. Davis. Yes; but that would merely change the percentage of the division. It would not mean that any additional amounts would be collected from Germany, because Germany, irrespective of what the reparation commission may want to do, can not pay more. It is impossible to collect from Germany more than she can pay. Senator Harding. How could you do that, when the treaty pro- vides that the reparation fund shall be divided into five parts? Mr. Davis. I do not think it says five parts. Senator Hitchcock. Each nation shall have certificates which can be divided into five parts. Mr. Davis. It is divided among the allied and associated powers in proportion to the ratio that shall be determined. Senator Moses. Russia is not one of them, according to the treaty, Mr. Davis. Mr. Davis. But the general opinion was that the principal allied and associated powers would allow Russia to participate m this of their own free wUl and accord. They feel that they have no right to exclude Russia ; and France, especially, has many investments in Russia, and I believe that they would not object to Russia partici- pating, although it would reduce France's percentage of participation. The Chairman. Does not Russia get considerable reparation by having repudiated all her bonds ? Mr. Davis. They do not seem to have made very much by that yet, Senator. 110 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. The Chairman. They have saved the interest. Mr. Davis. It may be accumulating. I doubt if any Russian Government will ever be recognized by the principal powers of th& world unless it assumes those obligations which have apparently been repudiated. Senator KJNOX. Internal as well as external, you mean? Mr. Davis. They would not be so much concerned with the in- ternal. I do not know, Senator, about that. Senator Knox. Have they repudiated their internal obligations? Mr. Davis. I am not positive. Senator Hitchcock. No; I think not. Russia has not repudiated her internal obligations. Senator Knox. It depends altogether on what you call "Russia.' This Bolshevik government has. Senator Hitchcock. I think they made some exception when they made their proclamation, in favor of their internal obligations, cer- tainly during certain periods. The Chairman. They have repudiated the exterior debts, have they not? Mr. Davis. They have — especially Trotski — signified their williag- ness to recognize their obligations. Senator 'Williams. But they do not pay. Mr. Davis. No; they do not pay. Senator Williams. They did that when they wanted to negotiate. Senator Hitchcock. Have you any idea why it was provided that each of these certificates should be divided into five parts? Why was the number five selected ? Mr. Davis. We rather favored, at first, having only one certificate issued to each Government, really a trust certificate showirg its ownership in an undivided amount of bonds ; but some of the coun- tries, especially France, rather wanted those in smaller denominations, thinking that they might be able to use them, either to offset some other debt or to pledge them at their bank for additional credits, and so we finally agreed that they should have as many as five certificates, but that those should be in such large units that it would avoid any danger of having them get into the hands of the public; because there are two ways of looking at that. In the first place, as- sume that certificates were endorsed by a responsible government like France or England, who would have the largest units, and then assuming that they might be sold to a syndicate as Senator Moses thought might happen, then if that syndicate should issue debenture, against that certificate, there would not be the danger attached to it, because there would be an additional security back of it, by the endorsement of the French Government, and it would not increase the amount of securities floating in the world, or that would otherwise have been issued, because they would be used to take up some other obligations, or to take the place of obligations which would otherwise have been issued to meet their requirements; and assuming that one of the Governments might be a bankrupt Government, and that it should sell its certificates to speculators, it is rather difficult to con- ceive it as a fact that investors would purchase debentures issued against an ownership certificate representing bonds which the rep- aration commission had felt were not safe enough to distribute. I can not imagine any intelligent investor purchasing a debenture of that kind. TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Ill Senator Hitchcock. Do I understand you to say that the amount of these bonds represented by these certificates in the aggregate is $15,000,000,000? Mr. Davis. Yes; that is the amount of the original Senator Hitchcock. Deposit? Mr. Davis. Deposit, except the additional amount which will be issued to Belgium, which would possibly not exceed $900,000,000 or a billiop. Senator Johnson of California. Is it not a fact that Europeans have been fed up upon the idea of a tremendous bill, and that is the reason that the thing is there left indefinite ? Mr. Davis. Their people have expected a great deal. Senator Johnson of California. That is the reason you speak of the reason for certain indefinite provisions of the treaty being political ? Mr. Davis. Well, I hardly know how to answer that, Senator. Senator Johnson of California. You used that term several times, yesterday. Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. What did you mean when you used that term "political"? Mr. Davis. I mean that the people in Europe are still shell shocked. Senator Johnson of California. I think you can include us, too. Mr. Davis. And they have been carrying tremendous burdens, and they have expected to get a certain relief from those burdens, and they were in different ways led to believe that Germany would assume a great portion of those; and they were even led to believe that they would collect from Germany even more than the amount of Germany's bill which will be defined under the categories ; and it will take some time, probably, for them to realize how much Germany can pay and how much they really can afford to have Germany pay. Senator Johnson of California. And for that reason, for the reason that you state, the matter was left in indefinite shape ? Mr. Davis. That was probably one of the reasons why we could not come to a satisfactory agreement for fixing a definite amount. Senator Harding. Now, getting back for a moment to the question which I asked you in rather unhappy language: Kef erring to article 237, ia which it is provided that these payments by Germany shall be divided by the allied and associated powers into portions which have been determined upon by them in advance, has there been any determined amount for Russia ? Mr. Davis. No; there has not been for anybody yet. Senator Harding. What does it mean, then, when it says "have been determined upon" ? Mr." Davis. That seems to be a rather unfortunate wording. Senator Beandegee. It means "which shall have been determined upon," does it not? Mr. Davis. Yes; that is what it does mean, as I recall now. Senator Williams. It speaks of the date of the ratification of the treaty. Senator Harding. That is not clear to me. It says, "which have been determined upon." Senator Moses. "Seront repartis" is the French future. H2 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Davis. It means "which shall have been determined upon," but this practically means not to divide it until you do determine what the division shall be and that has not been determined and will have to be determined yet. The Chairman. As a matter of fact, it has not been, determined. Senator Moses. We seem to get that from every witness. Senator Johnson of California. How long do you think it will take to determine what each country claims '( Mr. Davis. The first claims, tentative claims, of the various Gov- ernments I believe have all been filed now, but they are subject to revision. It was estimated that it would probably take two years to agree upon the final amount of the claims of the respective Gov- ernments. Senator Johnson of California. The determination to be made, of course Mr. Davis. By the Reparation Commission. Senator Johnson of California. Yes; and there is no appeal from their decision ? Mr. Davis. No. Senator Johnson of California. They determine just exactly what •hall be levied upon Germany in the future, and then levy it ? Mr. Davis. Well, within those specified categories. Senator Johnson of California. Yes; of course. Mr. Davis. And Germany has an opportunity to be heard on that. Senator Johnson of California. Yes. Senator Pittman. You stated, in answer to Senator Johnson, that one of the reasons was a so-called pohtical reason. What were the other arguments raised by the other powers against fixing a definite amount ? Mr. Davis. Some of them argued that no one could tell now what Germany would be able to pay m 30 years. Senator Pittman. Is that true? Mr. Davis. Oh, yes; that is true. No one can tell exactly what they can pay. It depends on so very many things. It depends upon their labor conditions, upon their markets, upon their industrial efficiency, and upon the financial situation throughout the world, and many other factors. .Senator Pittman. If you had fixed an amount it would have had to be an arbitrary amount ? Mr. Davis. It would have had to be. Senator Pittman. And well within the powers of Germany to pay? Mr. Davis. Within the reasonably estimated powers. Senator Pittman. It would probably have been much less than she could pay ? Mr. Davis. Yes; there was some danger of that. Senator Moses. Who estimated the American claims that were filed? Mr. Davis. Mr. Vance McCormick represented us on the subcom- mittee of the reparation commission which had charge of ascertaining the claims of the various Governments under the various categories. Senator Jonhson of California. Does the treaty leave Germany in a position to indulge in any commerce — I do not mean internal ? Mr. Davis. Oh, yes; I think so. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 113 Senator Johnson of California. Is there any sufficient number of ships by which she could ? Mr. Davis. Germany will not have many ships. She will be prac- tically in the same position that the United States was in before the war; she will have to hire her ships, unless the allied and associated powers decide that it is advisable to let her retain enough of her ships to meet her own requirements until she can build others to replace them. Senator Johnson of California. Has not the reparation commission control over her commerce ? Mr. Davis. For the first three years they have control over her shipbuilding output, up to a certain amount. Senator Johnson of California. They have substantial control over her industrial life and her commerce, too, have they not? Mr. Davis. They will have considerable control for the first two years. After that I think that we will have no control whatever to speak of, provided Germany is in good faith endeavoring to comply with her obligations, except that others will have a call on a certain amount of Germany's coal. Senator Johnson of California. France alone ? Mr. Davis. Well, that principally goes to France. Senator Johnson of California. Does it not go to Belgium largely also ? Mr. Davis. A very small quantity of it. Mostly it goes to France, I think. I was not on the economic commission, but that is substan- tially correct. Senator Johnson of California. I do not want to trouble you about those things that you are not thorougrily familiar with. Senator Moses. Annex III, page 277, reads as follows: The German Government, on behalf of themselves and so as to bind all other persons interested, cede to the allied and associated Governments the property in all the German merchant ships which are of 1,600 tons gross and upward. Mr. Davis. I say they do. But it is possible that the allied and associated powers will determine that it is advisable to let Germany retain, under some kind of conditions, say one-third of her mercan- tile marine to meet her requirements. Senator Moses. Do you regard that question as likely to arise? Mr. Davis: I say that while under this Annex III, paragraph 1, the allied and associated powers take over all the German ships with the exception of those under 1,600 tons, after that Germany will «ither have to go into court and charter ships, as the United States did before the war, or the allied and associated powers may decide that it is good business, as I think it will be myself, to let Germany retain, say, one-third of those ships or those contracts to meet their requirements. Senator Moses. That involves a modification of the treaty, does it not ? Mr. Davis. Not necessarily; it does not involve a modification of the treaty. Senator Johnson of California. In respect to shipping, does it not ? Mr. Davis. No, sir; the allied and associated powers can take those ships over and then recharter them to Germany on such a basis that Germany could run them with her own crews and pay in her own currency. 135546—19 8 114 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEKMAUT. Senator Johnson of California. I do not mean that; but I thought you said the reparation coirunission could permit her to have a certain number of ships. Mr. Davis. If I did, that was a mistake. Senator Johnson of California. I probably misunderstood you. Senator Hitchcock. Iklr. Davis, what factors were taken into account in estimating Germanj's ability to pny ? Can you give them briefly ? Mr. Davis. The first definite thing we had to go on is what Ger- many could have paid before the war when she had all of her capital intact. Assuming that she maintained the same efficiency and the same industrial output as before the war, Germany could pay at least 1500,000,000 a year; and by cutting off her navy and army I figure that she could have increased that probably by $400,000,000 or $500,000,000 a year, assuming that she could have found a market for her excess output. But Germany has been deprived, or has spent a great deal of her foreign investments — disposed of them — and she will not have that income of $500,000,000 a year from her mercantile marine and her investments abroad. That will be con- siderabh^ reduced. Senator Hitchcock. Did you, for instance, take into account the ability of her national government to levy taxes ? Is there a limit to that, which was ascertained in any way ? Mr. Davis. No; because that really has very little relation to her capacity to pay in foreign currency. Senator Hitchcock. Was any attempt made as to the amount of taxation the national government would be compelled to levy ? Mr. Davis. Germany paid her war expenses practically from the flotation of loans, instead of from taxation. They increased their taxes practically nothing during the war. Senator Hitchcock. And issued additional currency ? Mr. Davis. Issued additional currency and bonds; and in order now to cover the interest and sinking fund on those bonds and to meet their increased expenditure, Germany will undoubtedly be com- pelled to increase her taxation very greatly, and probably it will reach 75 per cent of what the taxes are in France to-day, at least that much, and probably 100 per cent of the taxes in France, and I think it will probably be more, assuming that she does not levy a capital tax, which she is proposing to do. Senator Hitchcock. I have seen the statement that Germany's national taxation would have to be approximately six times as much as it was prior to the war. Mr. Davis. Yes, I think it will ; but it was only about 9 per cent- it was very small in proportion to her requirements during the war. Senator Hitchcock. Is it expected that Germany will make an effort to keep up the interest on her domestic bonds ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. It is expected that she will do that ? Mr. Davis. There is one school in Germany which seems to favor levying a capital tax of .30 per cent right away. Senator Hitchcock. All payable in one year ''. Mr. Davis. Yes, payable in rather short installments. Senator Knox. That would be payable in their securities. Mr. Davis. Yes, that just simply reduces their internal obligation. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 115 Senator Knox. By a repudiation of a third of the debt? Mr. Davis. That is just a nice way of repudiating it. Senator Hitchcock. Then what would she do with regard to lier expanded currency ? Mr. Davis. That is one of her great problems. There are two ways in which she might do that, of course. Germany could levy a special tax payable in currency and then just as soon as she collects that tax cancel that currency. That is probably the only practical way in which she can decrease that tremendous inflation. Senator Hitchcock. I saw a statement that whereas she had some- thing more than $600,000,000 in her Reichsbank, more than half of it had disappeared since the armistice. Mr. Davis. Yes, that was to pay for food. We got a good deal of that. Senator Hitchcock. Is she going to be able to keep any gold at all ? Mr. Davis. I think she wiU be able to keep the balance of her gold. Senator Harding. I note that the treaty takes all of the German merchant marine above 1 ,600 gross tons, and one-half of the shipping of between 1,000 and 1,600 tons, and one-quarter of the vessels of less capacity, and then demands of Germany the building of 1,000,000 tons of shipping in the next five years. Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Harding. That, of course, runs into the hundreds of millions of dollars. Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Harding. Does that become a credit on the $15,000,000,000 about which you have been talking ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Swanson. I understood you to say that the taxes in Germany were estimated to be about six times what they were before the war — that that would be necessary. Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Swanson. You said the taxes were 9 per cent before the war. Do you mean upon aggregate earnings Mr. Davis. I meant 9 per cent of their governmental require- ments — their expenditures during the war. Senator -Swanson. Do you mean that her taxes amounted to about 90 per cent of her aggregate increase in wealth ? Mr. Davis. No; I understand that 9 per cent of her war cost was paid by taxation. Senator Swanson. That was during the war ? Mr. Davis. Yes; and that she paid 91 per cent of the cost of the war from additional currency and loans. Senator Swanson. What was her rate of taxation on her earning capacity before the war ? Mr. Davis. I can't tell you that. Senator. I have forgotten. I have that somewhere. Senator Williams. Of course Germany could get gold by making part or all of her taxes payable in gold, just as the United States for years after the Civil War made her customs dues aU payable in gold. Mr. Davis. She might collect her customs dues in gold. Senator Williams. Yes. 116 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Davis. Theoretically, yes; but I think Germany has scraped Tip every piece of gold she can jfind in that part of the world, and I AVis. It is hard to tell now what Hungary wanib. Senator Fall. You know that Germany is not, do you not ? Mr. Davis. No; I do not. I think Germany is m favor of the league of nations, and that they are very anxious for it. Senator Fall. And that they are in favor of this treaty as it is drawn ? Mr. Davis. Well, now, I would not say. Senator Williams. No. Senator Fall. Do you know whether Turkey is in favor of the league of nations and the treaty? Mr. Davis. Of course, in writing the treaty it was not the purpose to try to write something that would entirely suit the enemy. Senator Fall. 1 understand that. That is exactly my idea. But you have made the assertion here that from your knowledge, spend- mg your time in Europe and meeting these people in France — and that you are not confined to France but that you have been in Great Britain and other foreign countries — the great mass of the peopli the majority of the people, of Europe, are in favor of this treaty. Mr. Davis. Yes; that is true. Senator Fall. I am just asking you the usual questions which would be asked, to see whether your information is correct, so that we can make irp our minds. Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Fall. Do you know whether the people of Little Russia and the Ukraine are in favor of the league of nations and of the treaty ? . Mr. Davis. As I have just said, it is rather difficuH to get accurate information as to Russia. Senator Fall. Do you know whether the Italian socialists are in favor of it ? Mr. Davis. The Socialist Party in Italy probably is not, but I think the majority of the people are. Senator Fall. Do you Imow whether the Norwegian Government — the people of Norway — are in favor of it ? Mr. Davis. I have talked to several representative Norwegians — 10 or 15 of them from Norway — and they told me that they were; that the people were. Senator Fall. Could you give me the names of any of those people? I would like to have the opportunity to get any of them that are on this side. Mr. Davis. I do not recoHect the names of any of them now. One of them was the head of the State Bank and another was one of the principal shipping men. Senator Fall. How about the people of Sweden ? Mr. Davis. The people of Sweden feel the same way there, I am told. The head of their State Bank there told me so. You see, the neutrals all sent delegations and committees to Paris to take up questions with us. Senator Fall. They have not expressed their desire yet to join the league? Mr. Davis. The Government, officially, has not. Senator Fall. They have been invited. Have they indicated their intention of joining? Mr. Davis. I do not know. 136 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Fall. Neither Norway nor Sweden ? Mr. Davis. That I can not say. Senator Fall. The Socialist f arty is very strong in those two countries ? • Mr. Davis. They are not a majority. Senator Fall. They are not ? Mr. Davis. I understand they are not. Senator Fall. Do you know what the Norwegian Parliament is ? Mr. Davis. No; I do not. Senator Fall. Do you know who controls it ? Mr. Davis. No; I do not. Senator Fall. Do you know whether Denmark is in favor of this treaty or not ? Senator Williams. In favor of what, the league or the treaty ? Senator Fall. Both. Mr. Davis. No; I do not. I talked several times with the head of the State Bank of Denmark, who told me that Denmark was very much in favor of the league of nations, and that while they thought the treaty was rather hard ,on Germany, they thought that, all in all, it was satisfactory. Senator Fall. As a matter of fact, Denmark repudiated that por- tion of the treaty in relation to the territory which was to be turned over by Germany to Denmark, did she not ? Mr. Davis. It was because they did not get it just the way they wanted it. Senator Fall. Yes; because they got more than they wanted? . Mr. Davis. I say because they did not get it just as they wanted it, and they did not want to have any trouble with Germany. Senator Knox. I notice these people you speak of all seem to be at the heads of banks. Mr. Davis. Yes; they were from neutral countries. Senator Ejstox. Kuhn, Loeb & Co., and J. P. Morgan & Go. are in favor of it too, are they not ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. You speak about the State banks of Denmark ■ and Norway ? Mr. Davis. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. That is a bank that corresponds to our Fed- . eral reserve ? Mr. Davis. Yes. ' Senator Hitchcock. A Government institution ? Mr. Davis. A Government institution: Senator Fall. How about the people and the Government of Hol- land as to this league and treaty — are they in favor of it? Mr. Davis. I do not know. ■ Senator Fall. They have been invited to join, have they not? Mr. Davis. Yes; I believe they have. Senator Fall. Have they indicated any intention to do so ? Mr. Davis. I do not know. Senator Hitchcock. They are supposed to have a vote on it in Switzerland, are they not ? Mr, Davis. I think so, but I am not positive. Mr. Chairman, I did not say that I knew the opinion of Europe. I said that I had had considerable opportunity of gauging the opinion of Europe, and TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 137 that I had come to a definite opinion as to what it was. I did not say Senator Beandegee. You said your information was obtained, among other ways, from reports coming from Mr. Hoover's agents ? Mr. Davis. Among others. Senator Brandegee. And those whose opinions you have given were bankers whom you have met around and who have told you they were in favor of it. How could they have known what the opinion of all their nations was ? Mr. Davis. Bankers usualty endeavor to gauge the opinion of people in their countries. Senator Brandegee. You are a banker. Would you be able to state authoritatively that a majority of the people of America are in favor of it ? Mr. Davis. I would not hesitate to say that in my opinion the majority of all the people of the United States were in favor of it, but I have not been in America now for some time. Senator Brandegee. The President does not hesitate to say so, either, but a good many of us doubt it. Mr. Davis. Yes; it is difficult to get people to agree. Senator Brandegee. My opinion is that the poeple ought to have a right to express their opinion and not have it reported by a lot of bankers. Senator Williams. I would like to see a referendum. I would like to see that taken. Senator Hitchcock. A number of these banking institutions that you refer to are Government banks ? Mr. Davis. They are Government banks. Senator Hitchcock. Similar to our Federal reserve banks, or pos- sibly to our Treasury ? Mr. Davis. Yes; absolutely. But I was not confined to bankers. I saw more of those. Senator Hitchcock. You mentioned those particularly because you are a financial expert and you were coming m contact with the rep- resentatives of financial institutions ? Mr. Davis. Yes. The Chairman. If there is no further business, the committee will stand adjourned until to-morrow at half past 10, when the Secretary of State will be here. (Thereupon, at 12.30 o'clock p. m. the committee adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, August 6, 1919, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.) WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1919. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D. C. The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjourn- ment, in room 426, Senate Office Building, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge' presiding. ^ i^ v/ Present: Senators Lodge (chairman), Mcpumber, Borah, Brandegee, 'Fall, Knox, Harding, Johnson, New, Moses, Hitchcock, Williams, Swanson, Pomerene, Smith, and Pittman. STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT LANSING, SECRETARY OF STATE. * The Chairman. Mr. Lansing, I desire to ask you a few questions about a matter which has not been discussed by the committee yet. That is in relation to the expenses of the league, the provision for the payment of the expenses. Article 6 says: The expenses of the secretariat shall be borne by the members of the league in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union. That is a clause simply arranging for the apportionment ? Mr. Lansing. Yes. The Chairman. I suppose those expenses will include salaries of officers and staff, and equipment, and rental and maintenance of offices of the organization, and, generally, the expenses to carry on the activities involved in the work of the permanent committees on armament and mandates under articles 9 and 22, and in formulating the plans of the international tribunal. I am just taking this from ;the treaty. I should say there would be large expenses. Article "24 says: There shall be placed under the direction of the league all international bureaus already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaus and all commissions for the regulation of matters of inter- national interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the 3eague. , I need not go into details. That involves a great many more Heavy expenses. Article 399 says: , All the other expense^ of the international labor office and of the meetings of the conference or governing body shall be paid to the director by the secretary general of the league of nations out of the general funds of the league. ■The director — That is, the director of labor — shall be responsible to the secretary general of the league for the proper expenditure of all moneys paid to him in pursuance of this article. 139 140 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Now, I have been unable to find any provision for what is styled here the general funds of the league, and 1 should hke to know if you can tell us how those funds are to be provided and how those expenses are to be met ? We are told how they shall be apportioned but not how they shall be met. Mr. Lansing. I assume — and it must be an assumption, since there is nothing definite about it in the treaty — that there will be a budget prepared and the apportionment made accordingly, and it will all enter into one general fund which will be distributed under the direction of the council. The Chairman. The labor provision seems to assume the existence of a general fund in the possession of the league. Secretary Lansing. I suppose it means the general fund of the league, which would be the fund raised by that apportionment, based upon a budget. The Chairman. Who establishes the amount of that fund ? Secretary Lansing. I should assume that it would have to be established by the council in the first instance and probably a sub- mission to the assembly afterwards. The Chairman. Our share then is assessed upon us by the league? Secretary Lansing. Assessed upon us, of course, subject to the proper appropriations, as is always so in the event of an international fund. The Chairman. Well, of course, theCongress has to appropriate the money, but is anything left to the Congress as to the amount ? Secretary Lansing. I should assume so. They might refuse to pass the amount. The Chairman. They might refuse to agree then to the assessments made by the league organization ? Secretary Lansing. So far as it concerns the United States, I pre- sume they have got entire control over the appropriations of the Government. The Chairman. There seems to be no special provision in the treaty for this matter of finance. There must be a large sum raised. That is obvious. Secretary Lansing. Yes. The Chairman. The point I was anxious to get at was whether we were bound to take that budget as it stood, or whether Congress still had the power to say what appropriations should be made. Secretarjr Lansing. I think it is no more so than in the case of the Pan American Union and other international bodies which are sup- ported by contributions from the various member Governments. Senator Hitchcock. As it is now, every year your department makes a recommendation to Congress of items to be appropriated for the various international commissions that are in existence, and then it is for Congress to decide whether it will appropriate the money asked for. Secretary Lansing. Yes; my recollection is that we have 19 such international commissions. Senator Hitchcock. And you assume that this will probably be provided for in the same way. That is, the council of the league would request each nation to furnish so much on a certain basis of proportion, and then you would recommend it to Congress, and it will be for Congress to say whether the appropriation should be made or not. TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 141 Secretary Lansing. Exactly. The Chaikman. Well, there is no obligation then under the league on any power to appropriate this money ? Secretary Lansing. No more than any international agreement imposes a certain moral obligation. The Chairman. Yes; I know the distinction that is attempted to be drawn, but I regard a moral obligation as just as binding as a legal obligation. Senator Swanson. This action of the council and assembly would have to be unanimous, would it not ? Secretary Lansing. I have no recollection that there is any excep- tion made in that particular case. Senator Swanson. And there being no exception made, the budget would have to have the approval of the representative of the United States? The Chairman. I had only one or two other questions. What I wanted to get at really was that this assessment is made by the council of the league ? Secretary Lansing. You can term it an assessment. I thought it was an apportionment. I thought that was the term used. The Chairman. That is the apportionment of the total, the pro- portion that we should pay. That is according to the International Univwsal Postal Union apportionment; but who fixes the total amount that is to be taken from the different countries ? Secretary Lansing. I assume that as it is left indefinite, it falls on the assembly, ultimately. The Chairman. It falls on the assembly to decide how much each country should pay ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; how much they ought to pay; and for that purpose the general fund of the league of nations was established. The Chairman. And those general funds are under the control of the secretariat ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator McCumber. Why did you say the secretariat rather than the council ? Under what provision of the league of nations is there anything about this particular matter being a matter for the assembly rather than for the councU ? Secretary Lansing. My recollection is that the items with which the council have particularly to do are set forth, while those ia connection with the assembly are not set forth. Senator McCumber. And you assume, therefore, that those which are not set forth as those which the coimcil has special jurisdiction of, must necessarily fall under the jurisdiction of the assembly ? Secretary Lansing. Yes ; but of course the introduction would be by the councU. It would be passed by the council and then by the assembly. The Chairman. I have a series of questions I want to ask the Secretary, but I am perfectly willing to wait. I have one or two more questions that I would like to ask him. Senator McCumber. That is all I want to ask. The Chairman. As to these bureaus which all pass under the control of the league, they include the 19 bureaus and commission you were speaking of, do they not ? 142 TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. Secretary Lansing. Not all, no ; because many of those are merely bilateral in character. I assume that it does not refer to those, but to general international bureaus. The Chairman. Can you refer me to the provision in the treaty that makes a distinction of that kind ? Secretary Lansing. No, sir. The Chairman. The article says: There shall be placed under the direction of the league all international bureaus already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaus and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international. interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the league. That would include the Pan American, would it not ? Secretary Lansing. I should doubt it. That is not a general international treaty. That is a special treaty covering the Western' Hemisphere. The Chairman. Well, but this says "all." Secretary Lansing. No; it says "all general." The Chairman. " All general ? " Secretary Lansing. Yes. The Chairman. That is special, is it ? Secretary Lansing. I should say it was special international. The Chairman. What is the basis of the distinction ? Secretary Lansing. Because it is limited in the character of the membership. The Chairman. Then "general" means only those that cover the whole world ? Secretary Lansing. Substantially that. The Chairman. Well, then, there are none. Secretary Lansing. Oh, many. The Chairman. That cover all the world, to which all the powera of the world are parties ? Secretary Lansing. Not necessarily all the powers of the world, but all that desire to enter. The Chairman. Then, as I understand it, a general treaty is one that includes — that is open to — all the powers of the world? Secretarj^ Lansing. Yes. The Chairman. How about The Hague convention '. Secretary Lansing. I assume that that would be a general con- vention. The Chairman. Tiiose are general ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. The Chairman. But the Pan American is not general because it is confined to a hemisphere'^ Se?retary Lansing. Exactly; any more than the joint higli <-om- mission between this country and Canada. i The Chairman. Tlie language of the treaty is e.xtremelv broad; It does not draw that distinction, I think. Secretary Lansing. Well The Chairman. Except that it says "general," and that dis- tinction, I confess, I was not familiar with. I thought that a general agreement was one that applied to all the world, of which the whole world took notice. Senator Hitchcock. The chairman will notice, too, that the parties, to the treaties must first consent, in order to have it come under the control of the league. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEKMAIT'S. 143- The Chairman. I have not got it before me. Senator Hitchcock. That is the language. Secretary Lansing. It is limited. It is not general. Senator Knox. I assume that consent provision would refer to those treaties already made and not to the future. Secretary Lansing. That would be to a limited extent, except those that came in. The Chairman. The league would take them all, everywhere? Secretary Lansing. It would be a mere transference from one bill to another. The Chairman. Yes. Now, on another matter: The President stated at the meeting at the White House of the Foreign Affairs Com- mittee of the House of Representatives and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate last March, that four plans were presented at the peace conference for a league: The Italian plan, an American plan, a French plan, and a Britisn plan, and that the American plan was not the one used for the purpose of building the league, and triere have been several requests and there has been a good deal of desire to see that American plan. Do you know whether that plan is in existence ? Secretary Lansing. I do not, sir. The Chairman. There is no copy in the department? Secretary Lansing. There are no copies, to my knowledge, in the department. The Chairman. Do you know who drafted the plan? Secretary Lansing. I do not. I should say, the President. The Chairman. Then that draft of that plan is practically unob- tainable. Secretary Lansing. That I do not know, sir. The Chairman. That is all. Oh. yes; may I ask if you ever saw it yourself ? - Seeretary Lansing. Yes. The Chairman. Was it presented by our delegates ? Secretary Lansing. No, sir. It may have been presented to the commission on the league of nations. It was not presented to the conference. The Chairman. Did you ever prepare a draft yourself? Secretary Lansing. No. The Chairman. That is all I have to ask now. Senator Borah. Mr. Secretary, you say you saw this plan. Could you tell us the difference between the plan which the Americans presented and the one which was finally adopted ? Secretary Lansing. No; I do not think i could, because they were- along the same general line. Senator Borah. Do you remember any distinguishing features between them ? Secretary Lansing. No; 1 can not recall now. It was very early in the proceedings, and the American plan was not pressed. Senator Borah. No print of it that you know of was ever made '. Secretary Lansing. I do not think it was ever printed. Sena,tor Borah. Mr. Secretary, I wanted to ask you in regard to another feature of this matter we have been talking about, the American plan, if no one else wanted to ask any c|uestioiis about that. 144 TBEATT OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Brandegee. Eight in that line, before we leave it, Senator Borah, if it will not interrupt you. I will not interrupt if you prefer to go ahead with what you had in mind. Senator Borah. No ; go ahead. Senator Brandegee (continuing). But inasmuch as we were talk- ing about that plan, I understood the President to say last March at the meeting to which Senator Lodge has referred that these four plans were discussed before the conference. Secretary Lansing. Not before the conference. Semator Brandegee. And that he said that the American plan was put aside or laid aside — and the British plan was adopted — or the Gen. Smuts's plan — with some modifications. I had assumed that he meant that, there being four plans, they had been before the conference. Secretary Lansing. No ; they never were read before the confer- ence. Senator Brandegee. They were not read before the conference? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Brandegee. Now, what plans were considered by our commission ? Secretary Lansing. That I do not know. I was not a member. Senator Brandegee. You say you did not draft a plan ? Did you not suggest a plan, or lay something before our commission, whether you drafted it not, in the way of a plan ? Secretary Lansing. Not of a general plan; no. Senator Brandegee. What did you lay before the commission in the way of suggestions ? Secretary Lansing. I laid before it a general resolution. Senator Brandegee. What was the nature of that? Secretary Lansing. It covered the general principles on which the league was to be organized. It was very brief. Senator Brandegee. Have you that document in existence now ? Secretary Lansing. I presume I have. Senator Brandegee. Could it be produced here ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Brandegee. I should like to have it. What was done with that by our commission ? Secretary Lansing. That I do not know, sir. Senator Brandegee. It was not favorably considered, was it ? Of course it was not adopted. Secretary Lansing. No ; there was no action taken. Senator Brandegee. Do you know who drew the plan that Mr. Wilson calls the American plan ? Secretary Lansing. No; I do not. Senator Brandegee. I understood you to say that you assumed that he drafted it himself. Secretary Lansing. I did assume so. Senator Brandegee. Did you never hear that it was drafted by two New York lawyers for him, and taken over there by him ? Secretary Lansing. No ; I think that is not true. Senator Brandegee. And that that plan was destroyed, it was so absurd ? Secretary Lansing. No ; I never heard any such thing. TREATY or PEACE WITH GEEMANY, 145 Senator Beandegee. And that the other plan was got up, after- wards — the one that Mr.' Wilson calls the American plan — bv other people? Secretary Lansing. I saw the American plan about two days after we landed. Senator Brandegee. Did you study it thoroughly or just glance over it ? Secretary Lansing. The President read it. Senator Brandegee. How did it impress you? I mean, do you think the present plan is a better plan than the one that the President calls the American plan ? Secretary Lansing. I do not quite catch that. Senator Brandegee. I do not want you to damn the American plan with faint praise, but I want to know what is your opinion as to the respective merits of .the two. Secretary Lansing. I think it is a decided improvement. Senator Brandegee. This is a better one ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Brandegee. But you do not know who drew the American plan ? Secretary Lansing. I do not. Senator Brandegee. I have here the New York Sun of yesterday, August 6, 1919, and in the first column on the editorial page there is an editorial entitled "The Facts — President Wilson, give us the facts." I do not ask that the whole editorial be printed in the record, but there is one particular paragraph that interested me. I do not see the little extract that I expected to find. I find that I have here Wednesday's Times instead of yesterday's, which is what I sent for. Anyway, the gist of that was that it was a dispatch from Paris, quoted from the New York Times, stating substantially that Clemenceau had laid before the committees on treaties of the French Senate and the French Chamber of Deputies a cable from President Wilson requesting him not to make public any of the notes: or documents in relation to this treaty. Do you know whether or not such a cable was sent by President Wilson ? Secretary Lansing. No; that was not it, at all. Senator Brandegee. What was not it ? Secretary Lansing. I say, that is not a true statement of the facts, at all. Senator Brandegee. Will you be kind enough to state what the fact was, if you can recognize the situation from what I have stated ? Secretary Lansing. The Senate Chamber in Paris asked Mr. Clemenceau to lay before it the minutes of the proceedings of the commission on the league of nations, and Mr. Clemenceau said that as that was a matter which pertained to other Governments as well as France, he must make inquiry as to whether it was advisable, and he did. He incjuired, I think of me in the first instance, and I said that niy iinpression was, in view of the great freedom of debate in the commission, that it would be unwise to lay the minutes before the Senate, as it might cause irritation, but that I would communicate "with the President in regard to it, which I did, and the President agreed as to that answer. Senator Brandegee. Who sent the cable to Clemenceau, you or the President? 135546—19 10 146 TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Secretary Lansing. I think it was cabled to the peace commission. Senator Brandegee. I mean, by whom was it sent? Secretary Lansing. By the President. Senator Brandegee. When do you expect that all the records per- taining to the peace conference will have arrived in this country ? Secretary Lansing. Oh, I do not know. It will be some time yet. They have to be kept there on account of the other treaties that are being discussed at the present time. Senator Pomerene. With other powers, you mean? Secretary Lansing. With other powers. Senator Brandegee. Then it is uncertain whether we can have access to docximents that we would like to see, or not, is it not ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Of course, it they related to certain matters, we would have to get the permission of the other govern- ments to submit them. Senator Brandegee. The witness who was here yesterday, Mr. Davis, stated that his records — ^he was on the financial commission, I thmk Secretary Lansing. Yes. ; Senator Brandegee. He stated that his records were arriving every day, and he was going to produce some here. Can he not do that without getting permission from the other governments ? Secretary Lansing. I have no doubt, so far as reports are con- cerned ? Senator Pomerene. Let me suggest that as I understand Mr. Davis, not yesterday, but in what he said the day before, told us that he kept, as the other members of the reparation commission kept, copies, and it was these copies to which he referred. That was my understanding about it. Senator Brandegee. I know; but if he covdd not produce the originals, of course he could not produce copies, either, without the consent of the other members of the commission, if that is a rule of the commission. It is the information he is to give us, no matter whether it is the first, second, or third copy. If it was impossible for him to produce the originals, he could not produce copies. That is all that I had. Senator Harding. I want to ask the Secretary, in view of the character of the league covenant, and aU that it seeks to do in open relationship, can you teU me what character of discussion was going on there that makes it inadvisable to let the various nations under- stand ? Secretary Lansing. No, I can not tell you, because as I say I was not a member of that commission, and I have never looked at their minutes, and in fact, know nothing about their records. I made that as a general remark applying to everything. Senator Borah. Where is Col. House now ? Secretary Lansing. I suppose he is in England. Senator Borah. Does he expect to return to this country soon ? Secretary Lansing. Not to my knowledge. I have had no com- munication with htm. Senator Borah. Mr. Secretary, if this subject has been ended, I desire to ask in regard to another feature of the proceedings at Ver- sailles, and to go back a little. If I remember correctly, what was TEEATY OP PEACK WITH GERMANY. 147 known as the Lansing-Ishii agreement was made about November 2, 1917? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Borah. At the time that that agreement was entered into, what knowledge, if any, did the State Department have with reference to the secret agreements between Great Britain and Japan, France and Japan, Russia and Japan, and Italy and Japan ? Secretary Lansing. I should have to look the matter up before I could give you a definite answer in regard to that. Senator Borah. Then you likely would be able to state, after investigating the matter, just what information was in the State Department at that time ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Borah. I presume that you had full information with . reference to what was known as .the 21 demands at that time, had you not ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Borah. If it is permissible to so state, did the discussion turn upon those 21 demands? Did it enter into the discussion at all with reference to your agreement which you entered into ? Secretary Lansing. Never. Senator Borah. In view of those 21 demands, what construction did you place upon the question of Japan's special interest in China ? Secretary Lansing. Only the special interest that comes from being contiguous to another country whose peace and prosperity were involved. Senator Borah. No different special interest from that which we have in Canada ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Borah. Or which we have in Mexico? Secretary Lansing. Exactly. Senator Borah. It was at no time understood by the State Depart- ment that the Lansing-Ishii agreement was in any sense an indorse- ment of the program which Japan had apparently initiated at that time under her 21 demands ? Secretary Lansing. Absolutely not. We were opposed to the 21 demands. Senator Borah. And I presume you could also state that it was m no sense an indorsement of anything which has since developed under the secret agreements ? Secretary Lansing. Oh, no ; nothing. Senator Borah. If you had known of those secret agreements, would you likely have entered into that agreement with Japan ? Secretary Lansing. I think so. Senator Pomerene. Senator, in order to make the record entirely clear, you mean the secret agreements between Japan, Great Britain, France and Italy ? Senator Borah. Yes; I mentioned that just a moment ago. Senator Pomerene. I had overlooked that. Senator Harding. The Senator also mentioned Russia. Senator Borah. Whatever may be the construction of the Lansing- Ishii agreement in Japan or China, it should not from the standpoint of the State Department be construed in America as indorsing any- thing in the nature of the program which Japan has under the secret agreement ? 148 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. Secretary Lansing. You are quite correct about that. I think I can say, although I would like to refresh my memory, and would be subject to correction later, that one of the very reasons why that Lansing-Ishii agreement was entered into was on account of the 21 demands and the attitude that Japan was taking toward China, in order to secure from Japan a redeclaration of the open-door policy, which she did in that agreement. Senator Borah. It would seem then that if the secret agreements had been known to the State Department at that time, the State Department would likely have written that Lansing-Ishii agreement in different terms, would it not ? Secretary Lansing. Well, I do not know. No; I do not see why we should. . Senator Boeah. It is a fact that at that time Japan had a secret agreement with those other countries, by which it was understood and agreed that certain territorial interests and certain rights in China should be given her at the close of the war. Now are you not familiar with the fact that as soon as the Lansing-Ishii agreement was made, it was construed in Japan and China, both by the press and semiofhciaUy, to be a tacit indorsement of Japan's program in China ? Secretary Lansing. In regard to those secret agreements, do you refer to them ? Senator Boeah. Yes; and the 21 demands. Secretary Lansing. I know it was in Japan. I never knew that it was in China. Senator Boeah. Did not China issue a statement or a protest, or something in the nature of a protest against the Lansing-Ishii agree- ment, and was not that brought to the attention of the State Depart- ment here in Washington ? Secretary Lansing. I will have to refresh my memory on that. Senator Boeah. I think you will find, Mr. Secretary, that that is true. Now are you able to state when the secret agreements to which I have referred were first brought to the knowledge of the President, or those two, the secret agreements with Great Britain and Italy? Secretary Lansing. No; that is a thing I would have to refresh my memory about. Senator Boeah. Are you able to state whether or not it was before you went to Versailles? Secretary Lansing. Oh, yes. Senator Boeah. It was before? Secretary Lansing. That is, so far as Great Britain is concerned I do not think I knew of any secret agreements with France or Italy. Senator Boeah. May I suggest, then, Mr. Secretary, that you ascer- tain for the committee as soon as you can conveniently, just when you learned of these secret agreements ? If it has not already occurred to you, I think you wiU recall, probably, that these secret agreements were published first by the Russian Government, so far as the world was concerned. I do not know how long before that the Department of State had knowledge of them; but so far as the world had any knowledge of them, as I recall, the first knowledge came from Mr. Trotski. Mr. Secretary, with reference to the settlement of what is known as the Shantung affair, did you take part in the discussion by which that affair was finally adjusted? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 149 ; Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Borah. Did you file any statement in regard to it ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Borah. Did any one of the American commission file any statement ? Secretary Lansing. Gen. Bliss wrote a letter, but it was prior to any settlement. Senator Borah. Is that letter available ? Secretary Lansing. That I do not know. It was written to the President. Senator Borah. Who signed the letter ? Secretary Lansing. Gen. Bliss. Senator Borah. Did the letter purport to be written on the part of anyone other than himself ? •Secretary Lansing. Yes; on the part of Mr. White and myself. Senator Borah. Can you recall in a general way the contents of the letter? Secretary Lansing. I should not want to, as it was a letter between Gen. Bliss and the President. Senator Borah. Is there any copy of it in the State Department ? ' ' Secretary Lansing. There may be. I am not sure. Senator Borah. Is it available for the committee? Secretary Lansing. No; not from me. It is a private commimica- tion from Gen. Bliss to the President. Senator Borah. Was it in the nature of a protest against what is known as the settlement of the Shantung affair? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Borah. What was the nature of it, then ? Secretary Lansing. The President had conferred with the com- missioners in my office in connection with the Japanese situation, and after we had expressed our general views in regard to the matter the President wanted to know if we would communicate them in writing. Gen. Bliss prepared a letter and showed it to Mr. White and myself, and we said that we concurred in it, and there was no reason why we should write separate letters, as we had nothing to add to it. That was some days before the Shantung settlement. It was a matter of advice, as to our advice to the President. Senator Borah. Did the advice correspond with what was after- wards accomplished ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Borah. Why is not that letter available ? Secretary Lansing. You must ask the President that. He has the letter. Senator Borah. Oh, he has it, has he ? Secretary Lansing. It was sent to him. I assume that he has it. Senator Borah. Did you see a memorandum which was filed by the experts who were advising the commission with reference to far- eastern aft'airs, concerning the attempt of the Japanese delegates to control the Chinese settlement and to intimidate the Chinese repre- sentatives with reference to Shantung ? Secretary Lansing. Well, I would not say that I saw such a memo- randum exactly as you describe it, because we had numerous memo- randa on the subject. 150 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GBEMANY. Ssnator Borah. Was there a memorandum whicli partook in its general nature of a description or an account of the action of the Japanese delegates toward the Chinese delegates with reference to Sliantung ? Sacretary Lansing. I have no recollection of such a memorandum. Ssnator Borah. You recollect nothing of that nature? Sscretary Lansing. No; I do not. Senator Harding. Senator, may I ask a question right there? Sanator Borah. Yes. Ssnator Harding. Do you recall, Mr. Secretary, how long a time iiit r/ened between the reaching of the Shantung decision and the making public of that decision ? Secretary Lansing. No ; I am afraid I do not, Mr. Senator. Senator Harding. Was there an unusual lapse of time between the Shantung agreement and the bulletin to the public of the agree- ment ? Secretary Lansing. No, because my recollection is — and, of course, this is purely recollection — that the decision was reached about May 1 ; that having been reached by the council of the heads of States, it was sent to the drafting committee to be incorporated in the treaty, and that on the 7th of May the treaty was delivered to the Germans. Senator Williams. So that it was about a week? Secretary I^ansing. About a week from the time the council de- cided it, I should say. Of course, it is pretty hard to carry ■dates of that sort in your mind with accuracy. Senator Harding. There was a longer lapse of time between reaching the Shantung decision and making it public than related to most other agreements, was there not ? Secretary Lansing. Oh, no, a shorter time. Senator Harding. You are quite certain about that ? Secretary Lansing. Qui'e certain about it. Senator Borah. Mr. Secre'^ary, one question which I omitted to ask you in regard to the Lansing-Ishii agreement. I wish you would state somewhat at length or fully the construction which the State Department placed and now places upon the Lansing-Ishii agreement with reference to the phrase "special interest in China." Secretary Lansing. I would prefer to be allowed to make a full statement in regard to that later. Senator Borah. Very well. That is satisfactory. At the time that China broke off her diplomatic relations with Germany were any assurances given to China, either directly or indirectly through the American mmister at Pekin, with reference to the United States taking an interest in Chinese affairs at Versailles and seeing that her rights were protected ? Secretary Lansing. I can not recall, sir. Senator Borah. The record of that would be in the State Depart- ment if any such instructions were sent ? Secretary Lansing. Oh, yes. Senator Borah. I wish you would make a note of that, and also make a note of the fact as to whether or not that assurance was re- stated at the time that China actually declared war against Germany. Those are all the questions I desire to ask until we get these other facts. TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. 151 The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, a question in connection with Japan. Has there ever been any note or intimation — I will not undertake to describe the form — ^has there been any note or intimation of any sort from Japan that she would regard any attempt on the part of the United States or its nationals to lend money to China as interfering with Japan there, tending to create disturbance, and that it might be brought up under article 15 of the league ? Secretary Lansing. I never heard of such a thing. The Chairman. No such suggestion was ever made ? Secretary Lansing. Never to my knowledge. The Chairman. I think it would be as well, as it was up here and Senator Brandegee did not have the paper which he now has, to quote the dispatch which was taken from the New York Times, which says: Paris, August 1. — Among the documents received by the conference commission is a not* from Premier Clemenceau, transmitting a dispatcn from President Wilson asking Clemenceau to postpone the publication of the notes of the peace-conference deliberations. Senator Knox. It is true, it it not, Mr. Secretary, that under the demands that were made upon China by Japan in 1915, called com- monly the 21 demands, one of the demands was that if China needed money for the building of railroads and the development of her resources, she must first apply to Japan ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Knox. Might not that raise a question that would go to the league of nations ? Secretary Lansing. You know she modified those 21 demands? Senator Knox. Did she modify that particular one ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; that is my recollection. I should like to make full report on the 21 demands. Senator Knox. There was only one other question 1 wanted to ask you about the Lansing-Ishii agreement. I have not looked at it lately, but as I recollect it the claim of Japan in that agreement, which you acknowledge, is for a special interest throughout China entirely. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Knox. Covering the whole of China. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Knox. Had not her previous claims of special interest been limited to Manchuria ? Secretary Lansing. This made no distinction, except that it was stated that it was on account of the contiguity of territory, and that would naturally apply t6 Manchuria. Senator Knox. My recollection is that as far back as 1912 Japan -formulated and presented a claim of special interest, practically in the language of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, except that she limited herigipecial interest to Manchuria. She did not present it as to other portions of continental China. Have you any recollection about that? Secretary Lansing. No; I have not. Senator' 'New. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask a question or two, following up Senator Borah's line of inquiry. 'The Chairman. Senator New, Mr. Secretary. 152 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator New. Mr. Secretary, do you know when Cliina learned of the secret agreements between Great Britain, Russia, France, Italy, and Japan ? Secretary Lansing. No, sir. Senator New. Or any of them ? Secretary Lansing. I never heard. Senator New. Did China at any time make any appeal to the United States with reference to the protection of her territorial interests at the time of the peace conference, asking for the good offices of the United States ? Secretary Lansing. I do not think there was anything formal. Of course China's delegates saw the delegates of the United States and discussed the matter with them. Senator New. There was a discussion ? Secretary Lansing. Oh, yes. Senator New. And it was in the nature of an informal appeal, was it ? Secretary Lansing. I do not want to call it an appeal. It was a discussion of the question, just in the same way that the Japanese delegates discussed the cj;uestion. Senator New. How did the United States meet that appeal? Secretary Lansing. The United States could act only as a body, or in the person of the President. I do not know how the President met it. All I know is the informal nature of the conferences between delegates of the American commission and of the Chinese commission whidi took place. Senator New. Did the United States seek to influence China to enter the war on the side of the AUies ? Secretary Lansing. I would hke to make a report on that too. I can not recall just exactly what the course was, and I am afraid that I might make a statement that would not be in exact accordance with the facts. Senator New. I wish you would, Mr. Secretary. Senator Harding. We did ask all neutral nations to break relations with Germany, did we not ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Harding. When we broke relations with her 1 Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator New. You do not know, then, whether the President or the American envoys at any time sought to obtain from Japan a guarantee to restore to China the Province of Shantung ? Secretary Lansing. I know there was such an effort made. Senator New. There was such an effort made ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator New. Are you at liberty to state the character and condi- tions of it ? Secretary LansiNg. No; I am not, because it was made entirely by the President. Senator New. But it was made ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. ' Senator Williams. I did not quite imderstand what the effort was to which Senator New referred. Senator New. An effort to obtain from Japan a guaranty tb re- turn to China the Shantung Province and territory that was held by Germany prior to the war. TEEATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. 153 Senator Williams. An effort by the United States, do you mean? Senator New. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. And the answer was that the President had made such an effort. Secretary Lansing. Yes. I do not wish to convey by that word "effort" the idea that there was a failure to do so. Senator New. I understand; but it is understood that you will endeavor to enlarge upon that a little ? Secretary Lansing. No; I can not do that. That is a matter with which the President alone had to do. Senator Harding. Do you mean to say, Mr. Secretary, that the effort was not a failure ? Secretary Lansing. I said I could not pass upon that on account of its being a matter entirely with the President, but I did not wish to convey the impression that might be gathered from the word " effort." Senator New. You do know that, as a matter of fact, up to this- time no such guaranty has been given ? That is correct, is it not ? Secretary Lansing. Well, there is a statement in the morning papers, that is all. Senator New. That informal statement of Uchida ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Moses. There were two statements in the morning paper as I read them, one from the leader of the opposition ia the Japanese Diet, which was exactly opposite to the Uchida statement. Secretary Lansing. One is the statement of the Japanese Govern- ment and the other is not. Senator Moses. Unless the opposition becomes the majority. Secretary Lansing. Ultimately, not now. Senator New. Now, Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a question along a somewhat different line. It is now an admitted fact that there were secret engagements between some of our allies of which the United States was ignorant. Do you know — are there to your knowledge — any other secret agreements between Great Britain, France, and Japan regarding Asia ? Secretary Lansing. Regarding Asia I Senator New. Are there any agreements between them the details of which are not known to the United States ? Secretary Lansing. I do not think so. I do not know. i. Senator New. Have you reason to believe that there are no such agreements ? Secretary Lansing. I have reason to believe that there are none. Senator New. Would you mind stating what those reasons are? Have you any assurance that there are no such agreements ? Secretary Lansing. I have no assurance except the fact that in connection with the matter of financing China we are working in" entire harmony with Great Britain and France. Senator New. Then if it should develop hereafter that there are such agreements you would consider that you had been misled. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Williams. Do you mean by that secret agreements made before we entered into the war or afterwards ? 154 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator New. Either before or afterwards, if there are any agree- ments between the other nations, our aUies, of which we have been kept in ignorance. Senator Williams. That is the reason I asked the question, because you used the word allies. Senator New. Allied or associated powers. In the event that such private agreements do exist, the United States not being a party to them, would they not in effect bind the contracting Governments to stand together in their interpretation of them ? Secretary Lansing. Well, that is a rather hypothetical question. That goes into the conscience of nations, and it is rather philosophical. Senator New. Now, Mr. Secretary, in the event that their interpre- tations of those agreements are contrary to the interests of the Umted States, what recourse would this Government have ? Secretary Lansing. I should have to know something about the nature of the agreement before I could determine what recourse we could have. Senator New. With reference to the open-door policy in Asia, and the Asiatic trade, Asiatic conditions generally. Secretary Lansing. Well, I have been assured that the British Government is strongly in favor of the continuance of the policy of the open door and opposed to spheres of influence, and that is by Mr. Balfour. Senator Borah. How do you reconcile that with the action of the British Government entering into secret agreements which would give Japanese spheres of influence in affairs in China ? Secretary Lansing. Not more than Germany did. Senator Borah. But we are not following German precedents. vSecretary Lansing. It was prior to our being. in the war. Senator Borah. These same agreements were entered into with Japan for the very purpose of giving her spheres of influence in China, and Great Britain not only entered into that secret agreement but she has exerted her influence to maintain and support it. Secretary Lansing. Great Gritain has a habit of keeping her treaty obligations. Senator Borah. Yes; so 1 have heard. Secretary IjANSING. They were under peculiar conditions at the beginniag of the war, in endeavoring to get Japan into the war in oraer that Japan might control the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and prevent German raiders. Senator Knox. Was not Japan bound to come in under the Japanese-British alliance '>. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Knox. W^as any special effort required to get her to keep ■ her agreement % Secretary Lansing. That I could not say. Senator Knox. There ought not to have been, ought there ? Secretary Lansing. I do not think so. Senator McCumber. I would like to ask the Secretary a question if he is through on that subject. If I understood you correctly you preferred to make a full statement as to the Lansing-Ishii under- standing. Secretary Lansing. Yes, sir. TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 156 Senator McCumber. Are you prepared to do that now as to what it meant and the extent of it ? ■ • Secretary Lansing. I should like to make that at a future time. Senator McCumber. That is the only question I want to ask now before we leave. I want to ask some questions about the labor pro- vision, but as that is in the latter portion of the treaty, we may cover that later. Senator Borah. I want to ask a question in connection with this same subject matter, with reference to the phrase ''regional under- standing," in article 21. Would that phrase cover the secret agree- ment or these special agreements between Japan and Great Britain ? Are not those regional understandings ? Secretary Lansing. Well, I confess I do not know. Senator Hitchcock. Do you consider those secret treaties in effect now? Secretary Lansing. I suppose they are. Senator Hitchcock. Would they be in the event of the adoption of the league of nations ? * Secretary Lansing. No; I think that would dispose of them. Senator Hitchcock. They would be abrogated by that ? . Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. Abrogated then upon the ratification of this treaty by Japan 1 Secretary Lansing. Yes. ' Senator McCumber: Provided they are in conflict with it. Senator Hitchcock. They are specifically denounced. Senator McCumber. To the extent that they are in conflict with it. Senator New. Are you through, Senator Hitchcock ? Senator Hitchcock. Yes. Senator New. Mr. Secretary, on that same line, just one question. As article 21 of the league covenant reads, the implication is that there are so-called regional understandings other than the Monroe doctrine. That is the implication. Can you tell us what some of these regional understandings are ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; Morocco, Egypt, certain portions of East Africa. Senator Knox. Liberia ? Secretary Lansing. Liberia is another. Senator New. Would it not be well in order to arrive at a complete understanding and to avoid future disagreements, to set forth all the regional understandings that are to be hereafter observed ? . Secretary Lansing. You mean in the league ? Senator New. Yes. The Monroe doctrine is specifically named as a regional understanding. Secretary Lansing. It might have been well. That is a matter of opinion, that is all. Senator New. Well, are we to understand, Mr. Secretary, that in joining the league with that article phrased, as it is that we accept that definition of the Monroe doctrine ? Secretary Lansing. What definition do you mean? Senator 'New. As a regional understanding, that we accept that definition of it, that it is a regional understanding. Secretary IjAnsing. Yes, I should think so. Yes*, it is a regional understanding. It is a phrase that I was not famihar with until it ' appeared in the covenant. 156 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator New. Who originated that phrase? Secretary Lansing. I have not the shghtest idea. Senator New. I think we are all alike on that. None of us ever heard of it. Senator Borah. The puhlic press attributed it to Col. House. Senator McCumber. J t is an understanding that covers a certain region ? Secretary Lansing. That is it. Senator McCdmber. There is no objection to calling the Monroe doctrine a regional understanding if it covers the Western Hemisphere. The Chairman. With whom, is the understanding? Senator McCumber. I would like to have an answer to my question. Secretary Lansing. Will you please repeat it ? Senator McCumber. I stated that if the Monroe doctrine is a doc- trine covering certain regions of the earth, that is the Western Hemi- sphere, what objection is there to calling it a regional doctrine? The Chairman^ A regional understanding. Senator McCumber. Well, a regional understanding. The Chairman. With whom is the understanding ? Secretary Lansing. It does go perhaps to make an understanding. Senator McCumber. If the rest of the world agrees to it there is an understanding. The Chairman. They have not, yet. Senator McCumber. This treaty is supposed that they do acquiesce in it. The Chairman. Then, it is to be a regional understanding. It wiU not be until the treaty is agreed to. Senator Williams. Call it by that name in order to keep it from being the Monroe doctrine. Secretary Lansing. I do not believe I can debate that. Senator McCumber. My question is, What is the objection to using the term region ? Secretary Lansing. I am not objecting. Senator New. I do not know that it is so much an objection as it is to ask for information. Senator McCumber. We do not have to draw very heavily on our understanding to know what regional means. Senator Pomerene. Nor what the Monroe doctrine means. Senator Borah. But it would require a good deal of fancy to make the Monroe doctrine to conform with that, i The Chairman. In speaking about England's dealings with Japan, you said that England had a habit of carrying out her treaties. Was it carrying out her treaty when she said to her ambassador at Tokyo, I think it was — the letter has been published— when he gave out the statement to Great Britain about Japan's demand for the control of the German rights in Canton, that of course it was understood that England would have all the islands south of the Equator? Was tha,t carrying out and fulfilhng England's treaty obhgations ? Secretary Lansing. With whom, Germany ? The Chairman. No ; was it a treaty obligation before ? Secretary Lansing. I do not think so ; no ; only she captured the islands ; that is all. The Chairman. Has England cantured those islands ? TREATY Off PEACE WITH GERMANY.' 157 ■ Secretary Lansing. She captured the islands south of the Equator. The Chairman. She captured Samoa. Secretary Lansing. She took some of the others too. The Chairman. Did Japan have some ? Secretary Lansing. That is purely a matter of recollection ; but I think subsequently they were turned over to Japan to hold in order to release the British Navy to go to the seat of war. The Chairman. I thought those islands were taken by the Aus- trahan ships. Secretary Lansing. Australian. I include those in the British. Senator Borah. Mr. Secretary, were you chairman of the com- mission to try the Kaiser ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; not to try the Kaiser. -Senator Borah. To prepare for his trial? Secretary Lansing. The commission known as the commission on responsibilities. Senator Borah. What did that have to do with the trial of the Kaiser ? Secretary Lansing. It had to do in this, that there was a ques- tion of responsibility as to the authors of the war and responsibility for violations of the laws and customs of war. The commission investigated the matter and reached the unanimous decision that, while it was most reprehensible and there was unquestionable guilt of individuals as to having caused the war, there was no legal process by which they could be tried for such an offense. Senator Borah. Then the trial of the Kaiser is not to take place ? Secretary Lansing. I do not say that. Senator Borah. Do you know of any legal process by which he could be tried ? Secretary Lansing. No; no legal process; no. Senator Borah. We are not going to take part in any process that is not legal ? Secretary Lansing. It is practically an investigation as to his guilt and determination as to what penalty, if any, should be imposed upon him, purely on the grounds of policy. Senator Knox. Could they not punish him without trying him, just as they did Napoleon ? Secretary Lansing. Exactly. This is a matter of international policy as to what should be done. Senator Knox. Is it not a breach of all precedent and an unheard of thing to try a ruler for a political offense of that character. Secretary Lansing. There is only one case that I know of, and that is the case of Mary Queen of Scots. She was tried by a foreign authority. She was executed by a foreign authority, and as a matter of policy her son ruled over her executioners and hung the judges that were alive at the time. Senator Knox. It was not very popular even at that time, or since? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Pomerene. Capt. Henry Wirz was court-martialed and executed by the United States because of conduct in excess of what was recognized by the rules of warfare. Under that same principle the Kaiser could be tried. Secretary Lansing. It is a different thing. 158 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Williams. On what principle of law was Napoleon Bonaparte tried ? Secretary Lansing. None. It was a matter of policy. Senator Williams. Just as it is here. They sent Napoleon to Elba, and afterwards to St. Helena, but there was no law by which he could be tried ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Knox. That is what they ought to do now as to making up this neutral court. The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, may I ask you a question? Secretary Lansing. May I just complete the answer? The Chairman. Certainly. Secretary Lansing. Senator Williams, I am perfectly willing to submit the report to this committee. I am perfectly wflling to sub- mit the report of the commission on responsiljilities, and the reservk- tions that were made by the American delegates. The Chairman. Merely a historical point. Napoleon Bonaparte was a prisoner of war, was he not ? Senator Harding. The Secretary interests me. You say, "the reservations that were made by the American delegates." The Chairman. Can I not ask this question? Senator Harding. Certainly; I thought you had. The Chairman. I had not gotten the answer. I asked you simply if it is not true that Napoleon Bonaparte went on board the BeUero- phon and surrendered himself as a prisoner to the British ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. The Chairman. And he remained a prisoner of war? Secretary Lansing. Yes. The Chairman. The Kaiser has never done that, has he ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Williams. But Great Britain did not sentence and did not punish him; the Vienna Congress did that. Senator McCumber. Mr: Secretary, there is a provision in the treaty itself whereby any officer guilty of any conduct against the niles of war may be extradited and may be tried by a court-martial, is there not ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator McCumber. The Kaiser was an officer, was he not, in the German Army ? Secretary Lansing. Well- Senator McCtTMBER. He was an officer in the German Army; and if he was an officer, wherein is he not responsible, while the officers under him, who received their commands through him, are respon- sible? I mean, under the provisions of the treaty which Germany makes herself ? Secretary Lansing. That was the report of the Commission, with which the United States disagreed; and I am perfectly willing, as I say, to submit the report of that Commission and the memorandum of the United States setting forth its reservations. 5^^ The Chairman. Our delegates disagreed to it, did they not ? Secretary Lansing. We disagreed to that feature. Senator McCumber. But the Commission found that they had the authority under that part of the treaty ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GBBMANY. 159 Secretary Lansing. In regard to violations of the laws and cus- toms of war. The fact is, under that provision it seemed to me there was grave doubt as to whether they could establish the guilt of the Kaiser; and to let him get off scot free would have been a great calamity to the world. Senator McCumber. Well, of course if they could not establish his guilt under that proAdsion, he would be acquitted ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Moses. Mr. Lansing, you have spoken of a conference held in your ofhce of the five American plenipotentiaries with reference to the Shantung matter. Were such conferences of the plenipoten- tiaries frequent ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Moses. Were minutes made ? Secretary Lansing. No; none at all. Senator Moses. No proces verbaux ? Secretary Lansing. No ; they were entirely informal. Senator Moses. How many treaties were signed at Versailles on the 28th of June ? Secretary Lansing. Three, I think. Senator Moses. The treaty with Germany, the treaty of alliance, and the treaty with Poland ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Moses. And there are still three more to be signed ? Secretary Lansing. Three more — four, probably, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Senator Moses. Will there be separate treaties of peace with Austria and with Hungary ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; they are separate and distinct States at the present time. Senator Moses. Just what was the line of reasoning which led to the conclusion that the United States should become signatory to the treaties with Turkey and Bulgaria, against whom we had not de- clared war ? Secretary Lansing. I do not know that I can state it. I put the question up to the President and asked him his views, and that was his answer — that he desired us to take part in the negotiations, and if we did take part we would have to sign the treaty. Senator Moses. Would you think the Senate would be justified in disregarding those treaties, if they are laid before us, on the ground that we had not declared war against those countries ? Secretary Lansing. You can always make a treaty with a nation, whether you are at peace or have been at war. "^ssS Senator Moses. Yes, certain kinds of treaties; but can you make treaties which are the settlement of acts of war to which we were not a party? Secretary Lansing. I do not know that there is any limitation. I do not know that there is any case that covers it. Of course there were many that took part in the negotiations and adhered to the treaty that were not parties to the war. Senator Moses. Yes, but they were not signatories. Secretary Lansing. I think they were. Senator Moses. In other words, the treaty describes two groups,Jas the principal allied and associated powers, and then the allied and 160 TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. associated powers. That would assume, would it not, that they were The Chairman. I thought the signers had all been belligerents. It is so stated in the treaty. Secretary Lansing. Yes ; 1 think that is correct. Senator Moses. I think you will find that they were all belligerents. Secretary Lansing. Yes; I think they were. Senator Moses. Mr. Lansing, you said there were two replies made to the French prime minister with reference to his request about submitting the minutes to the French committee. Secretary Lansing. Just a moment; I wiU finish up this other matter first. The President of the Eepublic of Ecuador was one of the signatories. Senator Moses. Ecuador was never a belligerent ? Secretary Lansing. Never a belligerent; also the President of the Republic of Peru. Senator Borah. He is belUgerent all the time. [Laughter.] Secretary Lansing. WeU, tnis is a different president. Senator McCumber. Had they severed diplomatic relations? Secretary Lansing. The President of the Republic of Uruguay- Sena;tor McCumber. Had those parties severed diplomatic rela- tions with Germany ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator McCumber. But they had not become actual belligerents ? Secretary Lansing. No; in the same way that we had with Turkey. Senator Moses. But Costa Rica, which had declared war, was not permitted to sign? Secretary Lansing. She had no member in that conference. Senator Moses. Could you enUghten the committee as to why she was not permitted to sit ? Secretary Lansing. I think that no government was permitted to sit as to which there had not been general recognition by all the nations. Senator Moses. AU the nations at the table ? Secretary IjAnsing. Yes. Mexico did not sit. Senator Moses. With reference to the reply sent to the French prime minister when he asked about submitting the minutes of cer- tain commissions to the French committee, you replied that you thought it was inadvisable to submit them on account of the irrita- tion that might be produced. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator IVlosEs. And the language of the press dispatch which the chairman caused to be read into 9ie record was that the President had replied that he wished the submission of those minutes post- poned. Are we to assume that this committee may not have uiose minutes complete before we take action on the treaty ? Secretary Lansing. You mean the minutes of the commission on the league of nations ? Senator Moses. All the commissions. I understood from Mr. Davis and Mr. Baruch, in their testimony, that there were numerous procfe verbaux made up of the meetings of all the commissions and «ven of the subcommittees. Secretarv Lansing. Yes. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 161 Senator Moses. Some of which, at least, are of prime imi)ortaiice, as it seems to me, as we study the treaty; and I was wondering from the tenor of your replies this morning whether we were estopped from having those. Secretary Lansing. Well, I should doubt very much the propriety of it, unless the other governments gave their consent. Senator Moses. But this is the day of "open covenants, openly arrived at," Mr. Lansing. . Senator Harding. That is like the passing of "dollar diplomacy." Senator Pomeeene. Bear in mind the irritation it would be to cer- tain Senators if they did not get it. Secretary Lansing. Then it" is a question of irritation between Senators or Governments, is it ? Senator Pomeeene. Both are to be considered. Senator Moses. Mr. Lansing, there once was a maxim of the American diplomatic service that there we're no secrets between a diplomatic representative and his Government; and I am assuming that in the present instance the Foreign Kelations Committee of the Senate and the Senate itself are a portion of the Government in its treaty-making functions, and that the old maxim of their being no secrets between a diplomatic representative and his Government should be maintained with us. Secretary Lansing. Yes ; but you notice it is limited to govern- ments and their diplomatic agents. Senator Moses. Well, the plenipotentiaries at Paris were diplo- matic agents of the Government? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Moses. And I assume that the Senate, in its treaty-making function, is at the present minute the Government. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Moses. So I hope the old maxim that used to apply when I knew more about the service than I do to-day still applies. Secretary Lansing. Yes. The Chairman. Are there any further questions ? Senator Johnson of California. Mr. Secretary, I presume after the selection of the members of the peace conference there were many consultations and conferences among you; were there not? Secretary Lansing. Where do you mean ? Senator Johnson of California. At any place prior to the actual work at Paris. Secretary Lansing. Oh, yes. Senator Johnson of California. And was there any agreement among you as to the policy which should be pursued by the United States commissioners at Paris ? I am not asking you as to what that policy was, but whether or not there was an agreement as to the policy to be pursued. Secretary Lansing. What do you mean by "policy" ? Senator Johnson of California. Was any basis or any foundation upon which subsequently the work should be done at Paris agreed upon? Secretary Lansing. No ; the organization at Paris for working was very largely, as was to be expected, in the hands of the French Government. 135546—19 11 162 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Johnson of California. Was there any definite policy, then, in the aspect to which I have just alluded, agreed upon by the American commissioners prior to the actual beginnmg of the sessions at Paris ? Secretary Lansing. Only as to our own work. Senator Johnson of California. That is what I mean. Secretary Lansing. Oh, yes. Senator Johnson of California. But as to your own attitude, there was an agreement as to policy, was there not ? Secretary L.-iNSiNG. Generally; yes. Senator Johnson of California. Did you hare a foundation or a basis U})on which it was agreed you would act in the proceedings at Paris « Secretary Lansing. I must confess that I do not quite understand your question. Senator Johnson of California. Did you have 14 points that you were going to take as the basis for your activities in the peace con- ference at Paris ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Had it been agreed among the American delegates that those 1 4 points should be the mode and the measure of the peace ? Secretary Lansing. I do not think it was discussed. Senator Johnson of California. It was not discussed at all ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. Was there any agreement as to any particular policy that should be pursued, or did you wait until you reached Paris and then expect to be guided by the circumstances and the exigencies as they arose ? Secretary Lansing. We followed the armistice in that particular. Senator Johnson of California. And was there anything in dis- cussion concerning the 14 points that originally had been laid down as to insistence on those points by the American delegates prior to your activities beginning at Paris ? Secretary Lansing. I do not recall any such; possibly. Senator Johnson of California. Was there any agreement or any understanding among the peace delegates prior to sitting at Paris as to the draft of a league of nations ? Secretary Lansing. Prior to the meeting of the conference ? Senator Johnson of California. Yes, sir. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Was the draft agreed upon by the American delegates prior to the meeting of the conference at Paris? Secretary Lansing. No; not absolutely, because what we had was the American plan. Senator Johnson of California. That is what I mean. Had you agreed upon an American plan ? Secretary Lansing. Not definitely, I do not think. Senator Johnson of California. Tentatively 1 Secretary Lansing. Well, possibly. It was largely, of course, in the hands of the President, under whose instructions we were and who gave oral instructions to his representatives. Senator Johnson of California. But I assume, of course, that you saw that plan ? TEEATY OF PEACE AVITH GERMANY, 16S ,,, Secretary Lansing. I did. Senator Johnson of California. You read it ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Generally speaking, you recall what was in it; do you not ? I am not examining you now as to what was in it, but do 3^ou not generally recall what was in it ? Secretary Lansing. Well, I have rather a hazy idea, because it was not followed up. Senator Johnson of California. What do you mean by "It was not followed up" ? ■ Secretary Lansing. Because it at once went into open consulta- tion, and there was a redraft made. I think the President has sent all those to the Senate; has he not ? Senator Johnson of California. If he has, T did not know it. The Chairman. They have not been received. Secretary Lansing. Have not they ? Senator Johnson of California. We did ask for them, but I did not know that they had been received. The Chairman. We asked for them three weeks ago, but they have not been received. Senator Johnson of California. I might cease this particular sort of inquiry if you can state whether you know whether or not they will be submitted to the Senate. Secretary Lansing. They will be; those that were taken up and given consideration by the commission. Senator Johnson of California. By the American commission ? Secretary Lansing. No ; by the commission on the league of nations. Senator Johnson of California. You said, in answer to a question that was asked you, that you yourself had submitted the general outline of what should be considered by a league of nations. Was that correct ? Secretary Lansing. What I submitted was a proposed resolution, for the conference. Senator Johnson of California. Well, of course you preserved a copy of that resolution, did you not ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. And that resolution now is in the archives of the State Department ? Secretary Lansing. I doubt that, but then I probably have a copy of it. • Senator Johnson of California. You have a copy of it; so that if it should be determined that it ought to be produced by you, it could be produced ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Can you recall now what was in that particular document ? Secretary Lansing. Only in a general way. I would not want ta attempt to recite it. Senator Johnson of California. Can you recall now what was the basis of any draft that was agreed upon by the American commission- ers prior to the meeting in Paris ? .^Secretary Lansing. Well, let me explain. We reached Paris on December 13. The conference did not meet until the 12th of Janu- ary- We had practically a month of conference. 164 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Johnson of California. And during that month you were conferring, not only upon the specific points of the treaty of peace, but conferring, as well, upon the specific points of the league of nations, were you not ? Secretary Lansing. Yes ; we were advising the President, who was the authority. Senator Johnson of California. Exactly. But the President sat with you as one of the plenipotentiaries there, and all of you sat together — the President and all of those whom he had appointed 1 Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. And discussed both the league of nations and the treaty of peace ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Now, if I were to read to you what purports to be article 10 of the American draft, would you recognize it, do you think % Secretary Lansing. I possibly might. I could not tell. Senator Johnson of California. Permit me to read, then, what has been published as article 10 in its original form Senator Williams. What original form do you mean, now — ^the draft of Mr. Lansing ? Senator Johnson of California. No ; the original American draft. Mr. Lansing says — ^perhaps you did not hear him Senator Williams. Yes. He said it had been redrafted later. Senator Johnson of California. He says that he presented a reso- lution himself. Senator Williams. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. But that there was a draft — if I am in error, he will correct me — an American draft. Senator Williams. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. I am reading what purports to be article 10 of that American draft now. Secretary Lansing. I suggested this resolution to the President — that is all — as a method of procedure. Senator Johnson of California. Yes, sir. Senator Hitchcock. Will you let me interrupt a moment, Senator? I want to make this clear. Mr. Lansing, you were not a member of the commission of 14 nations that considered the league of nations? Secretary Lansing. Not at all. Senator Hitchcock. That work was done by the President and Col. House? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator HrrcHCocK. So that aside from your first discussion with the President, you were not familiar during those long struggles and discussions with the details? Secretary Lansing. Not at all. Senator Johnson of California. Oh, but I understood you to say that there was a consultation and conference prior to the meeting of the Paris conference — the official conference. Secretary Lansing. Yes; undoubtedly. Senator Johnson of California. And during that month the league of nations was discussed repeatedly; was it not? Secretary Lansing. Yes; and it was discussed with the delegates of other countries, too. TREATY OP PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 165 Senator Johnson of California. Exactly; and discussed in detail ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; but the American commissioners did not hold these discussions as a commission. They were discussed by the President and Col. House, who were going to take part in the commission's work. Senator Johnson of California. And you were a part of the dis- cussions, were you not, prior to the conference ? Secretary Lansing. Not with foreign representatives. Senator Johnson of California. No, no; but with the President and Col. House and with the other members of our peace conference ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Certainly. Senator Swanson. Before you leave that, Mr. Secretary, you say you presented a resolution. By whom was that resolution to be passed — by the conference ? Secretary Lansing. It was to be passed by the conference. Senator Swanson. That was a resolution that the President should offer in the conference ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Williams. You suggested it to the President as what you thought would be probably the American suggestion to the con- ference ? Is that about the idea ? Secretary Lansing. Well, it was really preliminary to the drafting of a covenant. Senator Williams. Yes; I understand. It contained your ideas of what ought to be in "the covenant — your ideas ? Secretary Lansing. In general terms; yes. Senator Harding. With Senator Johnson's permission I want to ask you a question, Mr. Secretary. You said there were conferences and exchanges of opinion on the part of the American commissioners as to the course to pursue. Would you mind saying whether it was decided that the league of nations should be negotiated as the founda- tion upon which to build the peace treaty ? Secretary Lansing. I do not know that that was discussed. I have no recollection of any such thing. Senator Harding. There never was any understanding that the league of nations should be assented to first ? Secretary Lansing. Not to my recollection was any such thing proposed. Senator Harding. That is all. Senator Johnson of California. I now read to you what purports to be article 10 in its original form in the American draft of the league of nations, which was published by Mr. Hamilton Holt, vice president of the League to Enforce Peace and editor of the Inde- pendent. I read from the copy in the New Republic, on page 5^. of its last issue: The contracting powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political independence and territorial integrity against external aggression; but it is understood between them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by reason of changes in racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political relationships pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may, in the judgment of three-fourths of the delegates, be demanded by the welfare and manifest interests of the people concerned, may be effected if agreeable to those people and to the States from which the territory is separated or 166 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. to which it is added, and that territorial changes may in equity involve material com- pensation. The contracting powers accept without reservation the principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to every question whatever of political jurisdiction or boundary. Do you recognize that? Secretary Lansin.g. I can not tell you; no. I would not like to commit myself because I am not sure at all. Senator Johnson of California. Are you familiar with Article X of the present covenant ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know whose particular article that was, or who originated it ? Secretary Lansing. I do not, sir. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know whether it was an article that originated with the American commissioners ? Secretary Lansing. That I do not know. Senator Johnson of California. Are you familiar with the fact that the plan that was finally accepted was the plan of Gen. Smuts ? ■ Secretary Lansing. I think it was, with certain modifications. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know what those modifi- cations were 1 Secretary Lansing. I could not tell, except by comparing Gen. Smuts' plan. Senator Johnson of California. Have you in your mind now any modifications which you may suggest that were made ? Secretary Lansing. No ; I have not. Senator Johnson of California. None at all. Did you have part subsequently, as one of the commissioners, in the adoption finally of the league of nations ? Secretary Lansing. No ; except in so far as we received the various drafts for consideration and comment. Senator Johnson of California. Who received the various drafts? Secretary Lansing. The American commissioners. Senator Johnson of California. Do you mean those of other nations ? Secretary Lansing. I said "the American commissioners." Senator Johnson of California. Yes, I know; but what I meant was, did you receive the drafts of the other nations, or just Secretary Lansing. Oh, no ; the drafts of the commission. Senator Johnson of California. Of what commission ? Secretary Lansing. The commission on the league of nations. Senator Johnson of California. Were those received before the meeting of the Paris conference, during the month that you were in Paris before the meeting ? Secretary Lansing. The commission was not appointed until the 12th of January. Senator Johnson of California. That is, it was not appointed by the peace conference ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. But you had been meeting for a month prior to that in Paris with the American commissioners ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Now, just again, if you please. Pardon me for the insistence, because I think we may be at cross- TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY, 167 purposes in the matter. What drafts do you refer to now that were submitted to the American commissioners ? Secretary Lansing-. I can not tell you exactly. Of course, we had an American draft, and then subsequently there was a preliminary draft that was the basis, I think, of the discussions in the commission on the league of nations, Plow that was drafted I do not know; and then the commission on the league of nations made corrections and redrafted it, and that went on several times, I think. Senator Johnson of California. In your original suggestions as to what should be included in the league of nations did you have any- thing in respect to any matter such as Article 10 ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. What was your conclusion in that regard ? Secretary Lansing. Well, you see at that time the President had indicated very clearly his views as to what should be contained as to the matter of guaranties, and so I naturally included that in the resolution that I proposed, basing it very largely on the form that the Panama Treaty took. Senator Johnson of California. Your resolution, then, was sub- sequent to the agreement on the form — the agreement that had been reached by the commission ? Secretary Lansing. Oh, yes. It was after the commission on the league of nations had met. Senator Johnson of California. So your resolution was designed merely to carry out what had been agreed upon ? Secretary Lansing. Not entirely that; no. Senator Johnson of California. Well, what else ? Secretary Lansing. It was merely a declaration of principle by which the conference would practically indicate its will for the purpose of guiding the commission on the league of nations in its deliberations, which were not completed at that time. It was toward the end of January that I made the suggestion. Senator Johnson of California. It was not with the design of indicating what the league of nations should contain, because that was in what had been sizbmitted to you. Is that correct ? Secretary Lansing. Yes ; I think that is correct. Senator Johnson of California. Now, you undertook your duties in connection with the general treaty. Was not the President engaged in those duties as weU ? Secretary Lansing. I do not understand you. Senator Johnson of California. You said awhUe ago that the com- niittee on the league of nations from America consisted of Col. House and the President. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. You, I assume, were engaged with your work upon the treaty during that period — -the treaty of peace, generally, rather than the league of nations. Is that correct ? Secretary Lansing. Yes ; and with thfe commission on responsibili- ties, which sat for two months. h Senator Johnson of California. Did the President sit with, you in those matters at all ? Secretary Lansing. In the commission on the league of nations ? Senator Johnson of California. No. 168 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Secretary Lansing. I mean, the commission on responsibilities ? Senator Johnson of California. Yes. Secretary Lansing. No; he had nothing to do with it. Senator Johnson of California. When you began your duties, then, with the general peace commission in the manner which you have indicated, did you commence with a definite plan as to how to arrive at peace or as to what the treaty should contain ? Secretary Lansing. Well, yes ; I had a general idea as to what I thought the treaty should contain. Senator Johnson of California. Had there been, in what had transpired prior to that time, any definite basis for the idea that then you had ? Were you relying upon the 14 points, or upon the armistice agreement, or upon any particular written matter that had been sub- mitted to the world prior to that time ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. Were you working to any specific, definite end in the peace treaty that had been declared prior to that time? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. That specific, definite end related to specific, definite terms ? Secretary Lansing. In certain cases. • Senator Johnson of California. And they had been embraced in what had been declared to the world before that time? Secretary Lansing. Well, I do not know that they were declared in definite terms in the matter of detail. General principles were declared. They were common-sense principles which anybody would follow. Senator Johnson of California. And it was merely a matter of com- mon sense and general principles upon which you acted ? Secretary Lansing. And an avoidance of policy and expediency. Senator Johnson of California. I beg pardon; I did not catch that. Secretary Lansing. And an avoidance of the motives of policy and expediency instead of principle. Senator Johnson of California. So that your treaty was founded upon general common sense and the avoidance of policy and ex- pediency ? Secretary Lansing. Embodied in the 14 points, of course. Senator Johnson of California. Well, that is what I am getting at; and I am trying to ascertain whether you were starting with the 14 points as a basis. Secretary Lansing. I consider those as common sense. Senator Johnson of California. Were you starting with the 14 points as the basis of your peace ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Did you carry it out ? Secretary Lansing. I think so. Senator Johnson of California. And does the peace treaty ? Secretary Lansing. As far as possible. Of course you understand, Mr. Senator, if you have been in any negotiations of this kind — I can appeal to Senator Knox, who knows that it is absolutely impossible to get 23 nations to carry out the exact wishes of one. Senator Johnson of California. I am not questioning that. Secretary Lansing. Well, it sounds so. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMAITY. 169 Senator Johnson of California. I am seeking information upon the subject. Did you, in your opinion, carry out in the peace treaty the 14 points, substantially ? Secretary Lansing. I think we did, substantially. ■- Senator Johnson of California. When you say "substantially," you mean substantially you carried out each particular point embraced within the 14 points? Secretary Lansing. Well, the treaty was not arranged along the line of the 14 points. Senator Johnson of California. I realize that, but I am getting your view concerning it now. Secretary Lansing. I think it was. Senator Johnson of California. So that you carried out substan- tially each of the 14 points ? I Secretary Lansing. I think substantially they were carried out. Senator Johnson of California. Were there any resignations of ex- perts during any of the period over there ? Secretary Lansing. There were. Senator Johnson of California. Who resigned ? Secretary Lansing. I can not recall. I think two men resigned. Senator Johnson of California. Can you state who they were ? Secretary Lansing. No ; I can not. I do not know. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know the reasons for their resignations ? Secretary Lansing. No ; I can not recall that. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know whether or not any of the experts at any time made protests concerning any of the actions or any of the agreements that were made 1 Secretary Lansing. Oh, frequently, as a matter of difference of opinion. Senator Johnson of California. Oh, I assume that. Secretary Lansing. And then lack of knowledge as to the diffi- culties in certain cases. Senator Johnson of California. You say "lack of knowledge of the difficulties. " Anything beyond that ? Secretary Lansing. I do not think of anything. Senator Johnson of California. On the Shantung question, to be perfectly blunt in the matter, was the resignation based on the plain moral issue ? Secretary Lansing.. Who resigned? Senator Johnson of California. I do not know; I am asking you if anybody did. Secretary Lansing. I do not know that any one resigned on that. I never heard of it. Senator Johnson of California. Were there any protests concerning it by any of your experts ? Secretary Lansing. None. Senator Johnson of California. None at all? Secretary Lansing. Do you mean a written protest ? Senator Johnson of California. No; verbal or written. Secretary Lansing. Why, certainly. Senator Johnson of California. Did not some of them protest upon plaia moral grounds against the Shantung decision? 170 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Secretary Lansing. Certainly. Senator Johnson of California. Many of them; did they not? Secretary Lansing. There were not very many — two. Senator Johnson of California. "Well, practically all there were pro- tested; did they not? Secretary Lansing. Two. Senator Johnson of California. Who were they ? Secretary Lansing. Prof. E. T. Williams and Capt. Hornbeck. Senator Johnson of California. Did not Prof. Williams, in the plainest language, protest against the Shantung decision on moral grounds, because he said the moral question had not been met ? Secretary Lansing. I do not recall it in that form at all. Senator Johnson of California. You recall his protest against it ? Secretary Lansing. Certainly. Senator Johnson of California. Did the captain protest as well ? , Secretary Lansing. I do not think he did. i know his views, though. His views were adverse. Senator Johnson of California. His views were adverse ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Did Williams resign ? Secretary Lansing. He resigned, but he resigned before any decision had been reached, or anything like it. Senator Johnson of California. Did he resign on account of the Shantung matter ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. Did the captain continue or did he resign ? Secretary Lansing. I left him in Paris. Senator Jo ;iN£0^^ of California. He is still in Paris. Did you have anything to do with the selection of Mr. Bullit to go to Russia? Secretary Lansing. Only formally, that is all. Senator Johnson of California. Was he selected to go to Russia? Sscretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Officially? Secretary Lansing. Officially. Senator Jo inson of California. Who selected him ? Secretary Lansing. I can not tell you that, except — ^well, he was appointed by the commission. Senator Johnson of California. Was it not on the President's suggestion ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. Was anj^body selected to go to Russia with Mr. Bullit ? Secretary Lansing. That I can not toll you. He may have been asked to take one or two men with him, because we were afraid to have anybody go in there that would not be to an extent immune from attack by the Bolsheviks. That is the only way we could get information. Senator Johnson of California. Did Bullit submit a written report subsequently ? Secretary Lansing. He did. Senator Johnson of California. Is that in the State Department archives ? Secretary Lansing. I do not think it is. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 171 Senator Johnson of California. Where it is, if you please ? Secretary Lansing. I think it is in Paris. Senator Johnson of California. Is there any copy of it extant here ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. Who has charge of the report over there, Mr. Secretary, please ? ' Secretary Lansing. Over Senator Johnson of California. In Paris ? Secretary Lansing. Mr. Polk would have, probably. It might be in the Russian branch of the service. Senator Johnson of California. Did BuUit resign afterwards ? Secretary Lansing. He did. He resigned on account of our atti- tude toward the Senator Williams. How is that? Secretary Lansing. BuUit resigned on accoimt of our failure to . take up certain — he resigned, really, without specifyuig the grounds)-^ because he did not like the treaty at aU. Senator Johnson of California. During your negotiations at Paris as one of the peace commissioners, what mode was adopted for the preservation of what you were doing ? Secretary Lansing. We had a secretariat. Senator Johnson of California. And were the proceedings steno- graphicaUy reported ? Secretary Lansing. Of the commission, or what ? Senator Johnson of California. Of the actual peace commission. Secretary Lansing. The American commission ? Senator Johnson of California. No; I was speaking of the general commission. Secretary Lansing. Of the conference ? Oh, yes. Senator Johnson of California. There was a stenographer ? Secretary Lansing. Oh, yes. Senator Johnson of California. And the proceedings, all the pro- ceedings, were stenographically reported ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Were copies of those proceedings supplied then to the different commissioners? Secretary Lansing. I think only proces verbaux. Senator Johnson of California. At the end of each day's session? Secretary Lansing. Well, the conference did not sit continuously, you know. Senator Johnson of California. I mean, at the ead of each session rather than each day. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. So that in your possession, I assume you have those proces verbaux ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Covering the entire period ? Secretary Lansing. I think so. Senator Johnson of California. Who has the transcribed steno- graphic notes of the proceedings? Secretary Lansing. It is difficult to say. You see, I think there were two stenographic reports, and yet I am not entirely sure about that— one French, and the other English — and in certain cases, in dealing with the Austrians, it was translated into Italian also; so 172 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. there were three reports, and where those stenographic reports are I do not know. What we got was the printed proces verbaux after the conference. Senator Johnson of California. At the conclusion of each session I presume in some fashion they were marked so as to indicate their official character ? Secretary Lansing. Oh, yes. They were in print. They were in printed form. Senator Johnson of California. They were in printed form. Are those in your pssession now ? Secretary Lansing. I do not know, but I could find out easily. Senator Johnson of California. I was asked to ask you how many sessions of the conference were held ? Secretary Lansing. That I can not tell. Senator Johnson of California. There is, however, in existence, of course, an absolute and an accurate record of everything that was done by the peace conference ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Is there as well in existence an accurate record of all that was done concerning the league of nations ? Secretary Lansing. That I do not know. I have never seen that. Senator Johnson of California. What was it that you wired to or that you assisted in preparing a wire for — I do not just grasp which it was — to Clemenceau concerning the proceedings upon the league of nations ? ^ Secretary Lansing. It was the procfe verbal. Senator Johnson of California. The proems verbal ? Secretary Lansing. Of the commission. Senator Johnson of California. Did you deem that the procfe verbal — which, I take it, is a recapitulation or a r6sum6 of the pro- ceedings of the particular session, I am correct in that, am I not? » Secretary Lansing. Yes. "^ Senator Johnson of California. Officially gotten up by your representatives ? Secretary Lansing. By the secretary of the commission on the league of nations. Senator Johnson of California. Exactly. It was in relation to the process verbal that Clemenceau was wired that it should not be given to the French Senate ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Aiid do you take the same attitude regarding this committee and this Senate regarding the proces verbal of the league of nations ? Secretary Lansing. I should; yes. Senator Johnson of California. On the theory that it would be irritating ? Secretary Lansing. It might be. Senator Johnson of California. Do you mean to other nations? Secretary Lansing. To other nations; not to this Nation ataU. Senator Johnson of California. And because it might be irritating, therefore, j^our position is that this Senate and our people ought not to be permitted to have the detail of the proceedings ? Secretary Lansing. Of the arguments — that is what it is. It is debate. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 173 Senator Johnson of California. Is the proces verbal the arguments ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. A mere r6sum6, though ? Secretary Lansing. The debate. Senator Johnson of California. But it i§ a brief account; it is not an extended account of the debates, is it ? Secretary Lansing. Oh, sometimes quite extensive; much more full than our minutes are in such cases. Senator Johnson of California. Would you object to this com- mittee having them in executive session ? Secretary Lansing. Personally, I have no objection at all. I do not know anything about them. I have never seen them. Senator Johnson of California. If you do not know anything about them, and have never seen them, why should you wire Clemenceau ? Secretary Lansing. On the general principle. Senator Johnson of California. Just what general principle. Secretary Lansing. On the general principle that I would not sub- mit the proces verbaux of a commission without the consent of all the other governments that were parties. Senator Johnson of California. Without knowing anything about them, without knowing whether they would be irritating, on the general principle that they might be irritating Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California (continuing). You would not permit them to be seen ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; because if you open the door once I know it will make trouble. Senator Johnson of California. Would that be your attitude now, without any knowledge of the situation at all, on the theory that it might be irritating ; that in executive session you would not desire Secretary Lansing. That would be, until I was shown it was the other way. Senator Johnson of California. Where are those proces verbaux at the present time ? Secretary Lansing., I have not the slightest idea. I have never seen them. Senator Johnson of California. Have you any continuous r6sum6 or recapitulation other than that in the proceedings upon the league of nations ? Secretary Lansing. Just a moment. What was that question ? Senator Johnson of California. Other than the proces verbal, have you any account, any resume, any recapitulation, other than the proceedings of the conference on the league of nations ? Secretary Lansing. No ; I have not even that. Senator Johnson of California. Have you any other r6sum6 or any other recapitulation than the proces verbal of the proceedings of the peace conference ? Secretary Lansing. No; I do not think there were any others. I do not know about the minutes, the stenographic minutes. I can not tell you whether I have those or not. Senator Johnson of California. I asked you the question because I did not know but what, for your own personal use or for the use of the American commission, there might have been, other than that, a separate and distinct account. 174 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Secretary Lansing. I have no doubt there was, but I have never used it. Senator Johnson of Cahfornia. You have never used it ? Secretary Lansing. No ; I have never used it. Senator Johnson of Cahfornia. You were asked by Senator Hitch- cock about the secret treaties, and I wanted to make it plain in that regard. Is it not a fact that since the completion of this treaty Britain has announced that she recognizes the treaties she has made in the past, and will stand by those treaties ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. That is quite true, is it not ? Secretary Lansing. I think it is true. Senator Johnson of California. Is it not a fact that that announce- ment of hers applies to the league of nations, and did it not specifi- cally apply, in the announcement, to the league of nations as well as g,enerally ? ; Secretary Lansing. I do not understand your question. Senator Johnson of California. I mean this, that the treaties that are in existence now by which Britain considers herself bound, whether there be a league of nations or no league of nations — ^Britain considers herself bound by those treaties. That is true, is it not ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of Cahfornia. I am glad I asked you, because I think there was some misapprehension in regard to that — it night have been wholly mine — that these treaties would have been abro- gated by the league of nations. Senator Hitchcock. Let me insert in the record what I was referring to. It is article 20. [Reading:] The members of the league severally agree that this covenant is accepted as abro- gating all obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof. In case any member of the league shall, before becoming a member of the league, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this covenant, it shall be the duty of such member to take immediate steps to procure its release from' such obligations. Senator Brandbgee. There could not be any inconsistency, because in terms they say, in article 21, "treaties of arbitration or regional understandings." Senator Johnson of California. I did not want to ar^e the ques- tion with you at all, but that very point, as I recall the British announcement, was taken up, and Great Britain contended that there was nothing inconsistent in her duties — just as all treaties are assmned by those who make them to be treaties of peace, treaties to prevent war, not offensive treaties at all in their character. Whether they are offensive or defensive in character, the nations making them assume that they are wholly defensive, and Britain, as she says, has observed these treaties and will observe them in the future, notwith- standing any league of nations. Senator Williams. In other words, she says that she has not any treaties which are inconsistent. . Senator Johnson of California. Exactly. Senator Williams. And if that was so, we have no quarrel with her. Senator Johnson of California. Yes, exactly. TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY, 175 . Senator Hitchcock. That is a matter that would come on China's Presentation, and will come before the league of nations on what hina has said she will bring before the league of nations at the proper time. The Chairman. I think that had better be stated correctly. China said that she would be wUling to sign if she could bring it before the league of nations and was not precluded from doing so. Senator Hitchcock. China will present The Chairman. I am talking about what China did; and she was not allowed Jbo sign, even with that reservation. Senator Hitchcock. The representatives of China have said that they proposed to bring it before the league of nati6ns, and that they have a case in court. Senator Borah. It will not stay in court very long. [Laughter.] Senator Hitchcock. I wanted to ask a question in connection with the question Senator Johnson asked. Senator Johnson of California. I have a long list here, and we might as weU adjourn here for luncheon. Senator Hitchcock. He alluded to this expert here, who is said to have resigned on account of the Shantung agreement. Secretary Lansing. What expert was that ? Senator Hitchcock. Did he resign ? Secretary Lansing. No, he did not — not on that account. Senator Hitchcock. What expert was referred to there ? Secretary Lansing. Bullit, I think. Senator Hitchcock. Senator Johnson was insisting upon having it read that way, "because he considered the Shantung convention immoral" Senator Johnson of California. No, I have no such intention, and had no such intention. I had no design of that kind. Senator Hitchcock. I wiU alter it, then. Senator Johnson of California. I think you ought to. Senator Hitchcock. I wiU say, when the Senator from California was questioning the witness. Senator Johnson of California. That is the better way to put it. Senator Hitchcock. He stated that one of the experts had re- signed because he considered the Shantung convention immoral. I want to ask if that expert was engaged as an expert on morals. Senator Williams. No; there is only one, that is here. Senator Borah. There is only one expert there on morals. Senator Hitchcock. That expert was not there on morals ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Borah. I just want to ask the Secretary one question. If we desired to have the discussions which went on somewhere in Paris with reference to article 21, the views expressed at the time when they were arriving at the understanding as to what regional understand- ings mean, etc., what would we call for? Secretary Lansing. I do not know. I do not think they had stenographic reports. Senator Borah. Then there must have been some person whom we could call before this body who would know about it ? Secretary Lansing. Col. House. Senator Borah. How soon do you expect Col. House in this country ? 176 TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. Secretary Lansing. I have not any idea. _ . Senator Borah. Is there any way by which we could communicate with him and find out? Secretary Lansing. I suppose so. Senator Williams. Wire him. Secretary Lansing. Wire him. Senator Borah. Where could we wire him ? Secretary Lansing. You could reach htm through the American embassy in London. Senator Knox. In London. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that the Senator from California has indicated that he has quite a, number of questiohs to ask, and that we can not complete the exami- nation in one session, I move that we adjourn until 2 o'clock. Senator Swanson. Or half past 2. Senator Borah. Before we do that let me ask the Secretary this: Could you secure this other information by 2 o'clock, Mr. Secretary? Secretary Lansing. I doubt it. Senator Borah. Very well. The Chairman. The Secretary can return to-morrow. Senator Knox. Some one has suggested that half past 2 would be a more convenient hour than 2. Senator Swanson. Yes; I think so. Senator Knox. I will modify my motion, then. The Chairman. The motion is that the committee adjourn until half past 2 o'clock. Without objection, that will be done. (Thereupon, at 12.30 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned until 2.30 o'clock p. m.) afternoon session. The committee met at 2.30 p. m., pursuant to the taking of the recess. STATEMENT OF HON. EOBEET lANSING, SECRETARY OF STATE — Continued. The Chairman. The Senator from North Dakota (Mr. McCumber) is obliged to leave early this afternoon, and would like to ask the Secretary some questions before he goes. Senator McCximbee. Mr. Secretary, can you give us the history, the genesis, of this chapter upon the labor provisions ? Secretary Lansing. No, sir; I can not. Senator McCumber. You have read it over carefully, I presume? Secretary Lansing. I have read it; yes. Senator McCumber. And are acquainted with all of its provisions ? Secretary Lansing. I was at one time. I can not say that I am at the present moment. Senator McCumber. Do you know who drafted the provisions ? Secretary Lansing. I do not. Senator McCumber. Nor how they were drafted ? Secretary Lansing. No; I do not. Senator McCumber. Or how accepted ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMASTY. 177 Secretary Lansing. No. My recollection is that there were two American representatives on the commission, Mr. Gompers and I think Mr, Shotwell. Senator McCumber. Mr. Secretary, in order that you may better imderstand the import of my questions, and answer accordingly, I wish to say that while I can see the propriety of one nation talking to another nation through a council in which each is represented, and submitting its differences where the council represents not a bankers' association, or a mercantile association, or any other individual association, I can scarcely see the propriety of a great nation being called to the bar of condemnation by any particular class or any association. I wish first to call your attention to article 411, on J)age 505, of fhe general treaty, the last paragraph before 412, which ast paragraph reads as follows : When any matter arising out of articles 410 or 411 is being considered by the govern- ing body, the Government in question shall, if not already represented thereon, be entitled to send a representative to take part in the proceedings of the governing body while the matter is under consideration. Adequate notice of the date on which the matter will be considered shall be given to the Government in question. The matter referred to is the matter of a complaint by one nation agaiast another that it has failed to keep its compact with reference to labor. Under that provision we speak of this governing body here as something superior to the government itself, and say that the government may, with the good grace of the governing body, be entitled to a representative to be heard before this World Labor Union. Do you consider that as a proper position for a great nation to occupy before any class of society or any private organization ? Secretary Lansing. It never was called to my attention before, and I would not want to pass judgment on it without considering just the meaning of it. I could not give snap judgment on it. Senator McCumber. Let me carry you a step further then. On page 507, the first paragraph, which relates to article 412, provides that each of the members agrees to nominate within six months of the date on which the present treaty comes into force, three persons of industrial experience and so forth. They are to represent the several Governments. On page 507 it says: The qualifications of the persons so nominated shall be subject to scrutiny by the governing body, which may by two-thirds of the votes cast by the representatives present refuse to accept the nomination of any person whose qualifications do not in its opinion comply with the requirements of the present article. Under that provision if this Government sends a representative selected by this Government, this World Labor Union can say to the United States, "We refuse to recognize the delegate whom you have sent to us, because we doubt whether his views comport with ours upon certain things in the treaty." Is not that the true meaning •ofit« • Secretary Lansing. So far as the commission of inquiry is con- cerned, I should say yes. Senator McCumber. And this commission can veto the action of the Government in sending the delegate whom it sends, if it sees fit ? The Chairman. Does that apply to Government delegates, or only the other two? Secretary Lansing. It relates entirely to a commission of inquiry, and all that is agreed is that each of the members agrees to nominate 135546—19 12 178 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. within six months of the date on which the present treaty comes into force, three persons of industrial experience, of whom one shall be a representative of employers, one a representative worker and one a person of independent standing, who shall together form a panel from which the members of the commission of inquiry shall be drawn. Senator McCumber. Yes. Do you not think in a, case of that kind that the Government should have a right to determine whom it should send, and that that representative should not be subject to repudiation by this general governing body? Is not that putting the Government in a rather abject position? Secretary Lansing. Well, I am not at all sure. I do not know. As I say, I am not familiar with this question. I would have to think this over before answering your question. Senator McCumbee. Then let us take article 414 again. Secretary Lansing. Does this still relate to the labor orgaiiization ? Senator McCumbee. Yes ; on the same page, 507 : When the commisBion of inquiry has fully considered the complaint, it shall prepare a report embodying its findings on all questions of fact relevant to determinmg the Bsue between the parties and containing such recommendations as it may think proper as to the steps which should be taken to meet the complaint and the time within which they should be taken. It shall also indicate in this report the measures, if any, of an economic character against a defaulting Government which it considers to be appropriate, and which it considers other Governments would be justified in adopting. Do you understand that to mean that this governing body, after listening to the report of the commission, may determine that a boycott should be levied against the United States if it failed to put its laborers, for instance, upon the same basis as the laborers of Germany or Great Britain or Norway or Sweden or any other country ? Secretary Lansing. Of course, it does not say any such things All it says is that they are to report. Senator McCumbee. No ; but it says further ttiat they may report the measures, if any, of an economic character against a defaulting Government which it considers to be appropriate, and which it con- siders other Governments would be justified in adopting. Of course, they only report. Secretary Lansing. That is all. Senator McCumbee. But do you think it an appropriate thing for a great Government to put itself in a position in which it should sub- ject itself in honor or in any other way to be hauled up before a com- mission of this kind to ansrwe^ as to what it should do with refelrence to it's own labor ? Secretary Lansing. I do not think there is anything out of the way about that at all. Senator McCumber. You would see nothing out of the way? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Harding. The Senator from North Dakota will observe that if the Government does not see fit to accept the recommendation, then it is determined by the league of nations. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Borah. That is the principle on which the league of nations is built, all the way through. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 179 Senator McCumbee. Now, please turn to article 419, on page 509: ~ "In the event of any member failing to carry out within the time specified the recommendations, if any, contained in the report of the commission of inquiry, or in the decision of the permanent court of international justice, as the case may be, any other member may take against that member the measures of an economic character indicated in the report of the commission or in the decision of the court as appropriate to the case." I suppose for the same reason you would see no objection to that provision ? Secretary Lansing. No ; I think the objection would be that it restricts the member to taldng only such measures. Senator McCum»er. Your idea is then Secretary Lansing. They could take those measures in any event. Senator McCumbee. Your idea is then, that if this governing body of the labor organization should make these recommendations, etc., that the Govermnent should occupy exactly the same position that it would occupy if the recommendations came from the council which speaks for the independent nation and does not speak simply for members of professions, or commerce, or anything inferior to the nation itself. Secretary Lansing. I have yet to see anything in here that is compulsory upon a member. Senator McCumbee. There is nothing that compels the Govern- ment unless there is more or less of a moral obligation. Do you think there is no moral obligation when you have signed the treaty to com- Ely with these requirements and to respond to an accusation that you ave broken your pledge with these unions, etc. ? Secretary Lansing. It does not seem to me that the gathering of the public opinion of the world and determining what that is in con- nection with any labor question is a matter that imposes a moral obligation. , Senator McCumbee. Do you not think there is something more than gathering the opinion of the world when an article like 41& declares that in the event of any member failing to carry out within the time specified the recommendations, if any,, contained in the report of the commission of inquiry, or in the decision of the perma- nent court of international justice, as the case may be, any other member may take against that member the measures of an economic character indicated in the report of the commission or in the decision of the court as approrpriate to the case ? There is a little more there, is there not, than gathering the opinion of other nations on these economic problems ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; possibly. Senator McCumbee. Now, connecting this up with the balance of the treaty and the league of nations, suppose, for instance, that Great Britain or France should come to the conclusion, or rather the delegates from those two countries who are represented in this gov- erning body should come to the conclusion, that the United States has not fulfilled its obligations relative to any treaty or agreement it had made with reference to labor with any one of these nations, that Great Britain or France should levy a boycott against the United States ? 180 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY, Secretary Lansing. That they should, or that they could ? Senator McCxjmber. They could do it under that provision, could they not ? Secretary Lansing. Could — ^not should. Senator McCumbee. Would that be a cause for war ? Secretary Lansing. That always depends on the government that feels itself aggrieved, as to whether it is a cause of war. That is a very wide expression. Senator McCxjmber. If the United States as one of the members of league of nations desired to fulfill its obligations which it thought it was in duty bound to fulfill, and Great Britain or France should lay a boycott against the United States because the United States declined to put its labor on an equal footing with that of Great Britain or France, would you consider that we would have cause of complaint against Great Britain, and that it was one of the things that was liable to disturb the peace of the world ? Secretary Lansing. Why, if it operated in the way you suppose, in a hypothetical way, it might disturb the peace of the world, I should think; yes. Senator McCxjmber. Then, where would it go for final decision ? Secretary Lansing. I do not know. Senator McCumber. Would it go to the council, or would it go to this governing body? Which would have jurisdiction -of the subject ? Secretary Lansing. I do not know. You will have to give me time to study it. You are asking some very complex questions. Senator McCxjmber. I admit it. That is all. Senator Fall. May I ask a question on that line which possibly will resolve to some extent the complexity ? Is it not a fact that if we agree to this treaty, and such a government should use any economic means, by embargo or otherwise against us, that we by the agreement to the treaty would be prevented from using any reprisals at all against that government, and that having agreed to the treaty, if we did use such reprisals or any other means to offset the action of the government using the economic measures against us, we ourselves Would be guilty of an act of war under the terms generally of the treaty ? Secretary Lansing. What articles do you refer to ? Senator Fall. All of them. Secretary Lansing. Oh, well; I can not tell. Eighty thousand - words, you know, are too many. Senator Fall. I supposed you were familiar with the provisions. Do you mean to say, Mr. Secretary, that you do not understand that by article 419, if we disobey the orders of this governing body, the one government being authorized by ourselves to use these means against us, that we are precluded from using any means in self defense against that government ? Secretary Lansing. No; I do not say that. Senator Fall. You do not consider it in that way ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Fall. That is all. Senator Johnson of California. You, Mr. Secretary, were a sig- natory not only to the general peace treaty but to the treaty of al- liance with France, were you not ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 181 Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. When was the first suggestion made of the treaty of alliance with France ? Secretary Lansing. Some time in April. Senator Johnson of California. When was it agreed to? I do not mean when was it consummated by the signatures, but was it agreed to in April ? Secretary Lansing. I think it must have been, but I do not know. Senator Johnson of California. Were you a party to the original conversations concerning it ? , Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. You were not brought in until subsequently ? Secretary Lansing. No; I was not brought in before it was pro- posed. Senator Johnson of California. In April were you a partj^ to the conversations ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Then, you know whether or not it was agreed to in April ? Secretary Lansing. No ; you misunderstood me, Senator. Senator Johnson of California. Pardon me ? Secretary Lansing. The President conferred with me about it in. April before he submitted it to Mr. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd- George. Senator Johnson of California. Whose suggestion was it ? Secretary Lansing. The President's. I do not know whether it was his original suggestion, but that was the first I heard of it, was from the President. Senator Johnson of California. The first you heard of it was th& President's suggestion to you ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. And you think that the understand- ing was accomphshed and consTmimated in April ? Secretary Lansing. I am quite sure that it was. Senator Johnson of Cahfornia. In sitting in the peace conference you sat there upon the treaty. There was a subcommittee, as I think you have stated, consisting of Col. House and the President, so far as we are concerned, deaUng with the league of nations ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; they made the report. Senator Johnson of California. It was discussed there, was it not ? Secretary Lansing. In a measure. Senator Johnson of California. Were you a party to the discussion ? Secretary Lansing. No; I took no part in it. Senator Johnson of California. You took no part in it at all ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. Does the French alUance contra- ^ vene article 20 of the league of nations covenant, in your opinion ? Secretary Lansing. No; it is supplementary to it. Senator Johnson of California. Additional to it ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Could any offensive and defensive alliance under article 20 of the league of nations be made, in your opinion ? 182 TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. Secretary Lansing. I will have to look at that. Senator New. Page 35. Secretary Lansing. No ; I do not think it affects it._ ^ Senator Johnson of California. That is, any offensivre and defen- sive alliance might be made that would be within the purview of the league of nations. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. This morning in answering me you said that one of the ideas — I do not quote you verbatim, and correct me please, if I misquote you, as I have no such intention, of course — one of the ideas that you had in offering this treatv was that expe- diency should not rule principle. That is substantially your language, I think. Secretary Lansing. Yes. ■ Senator Johnson of California. Did that prevail in the Shantung decision % Secretary Lansing. Not entirely; no. Senator Johnson of California. In your opinion it did not? Secretary Lansing. In my opinion it did not. / Senator Johnson of California. And in the opinion of the other American representatives whom you named, Gen. Bliss, yourself,and Mr. White, that was the opinion was it not % Secretary Lansing. I think so. Senator Johnson of California. Was the Shantung decision made /in order to have the Japanese signatures to the league of nations ? Secretary Lansing. That I can not say. Senator Johnson of California. In your opinion was it ? Secretary Lansing. I would not want to say that, because I really have not the facts on which to form an opinion along that line. Senator Johnson of California. Would the Japanese signatures to the league of nations have been obtained if you had not made the Shantung agreement ? Secretary Lansing. I think so. Senator Johnson of California. You do % Secretary Lansing. I think so. Senator Johnson of California. So that even though Shantung had ; not been delivered to Japan, the league of nations would not have ^' been injured % Secretary Lansing. I do not think so. Senator Johnson of California. And you would have had the same signatories that you have now ? Secretary Lansing. Yesj one more, China. Senator Johnson of California. One more, China. So that the result of the Shantung decision was simply to lose China's signature "^ rather than to gain Japan's % Secretary Lansing. That is my personal view, but I may be wrong about it. Senator Johnson of California. Why did you yield on a question on which you thought you ought not to yield and that you thought ^^was a principle ? Secretary Lansing. Because naturally we were subject to the direction of the President of the United States. Senator Johnson of California. And it was solely because you felt that you were subject to the decision of the Pl-esident of the United States that you yielded ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY, 183 Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. The decision is his ? Secretary Lansing. Necessarily. Senator Johnson of California. Will you state the reason that he gave for making the decision ? Secretary Lansing. I do not recall that he stated any. Senator Johnson of California. Did you on any occasion hear reasons given by the President for making the Shantung decision in contravention of the views expressed by the rest of you 1 Secretary Lansing. I do not recall any. Senator Johnson of California. Was Col. House in like mind with you in respect to the Shantung matter ? Secretary Lansing. T never discussed it with Col. Hoase. Senator Johnson of California. Did any of the American repre- sentatives discuss it with Col. House, so far as you recall ? Secretary Lansing. So far as I recall, no. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know at all his opinion upon the subject? Secretary Lansing. No, I do not. I never discussed it with him. Senator Johnson of California. Why ? Secretary Lansing. Well, it never came up in our conversation. The matter was ended. Senator Johnson of California. It was a matter, at the time you .addressed your note to the President, that you felt was of great importance, did you not ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. And it was a matter upon which you three gentlemen felt so keenly that you addressed your note to the President? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. On what theory did you not con- sult the other member of the delegation ? Secretary Lansing. He was not present at our meeting when we discussed it. Senator Hitchcock. Senator, has not the witness already stated that the reason why he wrote that note was because the President requested him to put in writing something that he had said in con- versation? It was the request of the President that led to that note. Secretary Lansing. That is it. I stated that. Senator Johnson of California. Then you had expressed verbally, the three of you, your opinion to the President, when you wrote the opinion ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; and Col. House was there. Senator Johnson of California. Did Col. House express any opinion ? Secretary Lansing. No; I think not. I do not recall. Senator Johnson of California. But the opinions that you ex- pressed were substantially what you put into that note ? ,. Secretary Lansing. Yes; substantially. ■ Senator Johnson of California. This morning you said that this treaty had substantially carried out the 14 points. I begin with point No. 1. [Reading:] Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. 184 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. That was impossible of fulfillment at the Paris conference, was it not? Secretary Lansing. Of course, no negotiation can go on between nations that is done in public at public hearings. That is quite out of the question. That is the meaning. Senator Johnson of California. You did not carry that out at the Paris peace conference ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; its meaning. Senator Johnson of California. It was carried out at the Paris peace conference ? Secretary Lansing. I should consider it was. Senator Johnson of California. The second one [reading] : Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international ' action for the enforcement of international covenants. Was that carried out ? Secretary Lansing. There was nothing done with it. Senator Johnson of California. Nothing at all ? Why ? Secretary Lansing. It never was raised. Senator Johnson of California. Is it not a fact that England would not permit it to be done ? Secretary Lansing. It never was raised. Senator Johnson of California. Did she not, before you met, say she would not permit the question of the freedom of the seas to be discussed ? Senator Beandegee. Said she would not allow it to be considered. Secretary Lansing. That was not made except by men on the sttunp. Senator Johnson of California. In England ? Secretary Lansing. In England. Senator Johnson of California. Not oflicially ? Secretary Lansing. Not officially. Senator Borah. It was made by the premier. Secretary Lansing. He made it on the stump. It was before the election. [Laughter.] Senator Johnson of California. AU right. Why was it not con- sidered then at the Paris peace conference ? Secretary Lansing. I do not know, sir. Senator Borah. That was one election pledge that was carried out. [Laughter.] Senator Johnson of California. Three. [Reading:] The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an ecjuality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and asso- ciating themselves for its maintenance. Was that carried out ? Secretary Lansing. I think so. Senator Johnson of Cahfornia. Wherein ? Secretary Lansing. Where has it not been ? That is the point. Senator Johnson of California. Do you say that that has been in every respect ? Secretary Lansing. So far as I can recall. Senator Johnson of California. Four. [Reading:] Adequate guaranties given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 18j5 Secretary Lansing. That has been, so far as possible. Senator Johnson of California. Where is that done ? Secretary Lansing. In the league of nations provision for dis- armament. Senator Johnson of California. But there is not any provision except what is optional with any particular nation in relation to disarmament. Secretary Lansing. It is not entirely optional. Senator Johnson of California. Is it not ? Secretary Lansing. Let us look at it. Senator Johnson of California. Can you state from memory what is provided in the league of nations on disarmament ? Secretary Lansing. From memory? I prefer to look. Senator Johnson of California. Are you under the impression, Mr. Secretarv, that the league of nations does disarm all nations ? ^' Secretary Lansing. It has that intention. Senator Johnson of California. It has that intention, but it does not do the act, does it 1 Secretary Lansing. Not directly. Senator Johnson of California. Are you not familiar with the fact that it leaves it optional with every nation whether or not there shall be ultimate disarmament ? Secretary Lansing. No ; I am not, sir. Senator Johnson of California. If you want to examine those provisions, Mr. Secretarv Senator Harding. Page 23, Mr. Secretar-" . Senator Borah. Article 8. Secretary Lansing (reading) : The members of the league recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common, action of international obligations. The council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments. Senator Johnson of California. In your opinion, that causes the various Governments to disarm, does it ? Secretary Lansing. It is only the moral obligation that has been urged here frequently. Senator Johnson of California. It is optional with each Govern- ment whether it does disarm, is it not ? Secretary Lansing. Always so. That is true in practically the entire covenant. Senator Johnson of California. You do not accomplish disarma- ment by the league of nations ? Secretary Lansing. Oh, probably not in exact terms. Senator Knox. Do you mean to say that there is complete liberty of action in respect to all features of the covenent ? Secretary Lansing. No; I say practically this, that every nation ultimately has the veto. Senator Knox. Then, it has that liberty of action ? Secretary Lansing. It has. There is no more modification of our sovereignty than there was in the case of the Panama treaty. 186 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator JInox. What was guaranteed there ? Secretary Lansing. The sovereignty of Panama. Senator Johnson of Cahfornia. Five. [Reading:] A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined. Was that carried out in the peace treaty ? Secretary Lansing. It has not been, entirely, yet. Senator Johnson of Cahfornia. You hope that it will be, eventu- ally? Secretary Lansing. I do. Senator Johnson of California. Carried out voluntarily by what machinery of the peace treaty ? Secretary Lansing. Possibly under a system of mandates. Senator Johnson of California. Under a system of mandates ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. By the way, are there any manda- tories undertaken by the United States ? Secretary Lansing. I think not. Senator Johnson of California. Any suggestion for mandatories ? Secretary Lansing. Many. Senator Johnson of California. Any now that are in contemplation that the United States should undertake ? Secretary Lansing. Not to my knowledge. Senator Johnson of California. Any that the United States has tentatively agreed to ? '--Secretary Lansing. None. Senator Johnson of California. But at any rate at the peace con- ference this fifth point was carried out only in prospective Secretary Lansing. It could not be. Senator Johnson of California. By virtue of what might be done ultimately under mandatories ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Six. [Reading:] The evacuation of all Russian territory — I will not read the sixth clause unless you wish it read. There was nothing done respecting Russia at the peace conference definitively? Secretary Lansing. No; there could not be. Senator Johnson of California. Seventh, which relates to Belgium, and I assume is entirely carried out by the peace treaty. The eighth relates to the French territory. [Reading:] All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Nine. [Reading:] A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality. Was that done ? Secretary Lansing. It has not been settled yet. Senator Johnson of California. It is still in process of settlement f Secretary Lansing. Yes. It does not come under the German treaty. TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. 187 Senator Johnson of California. Ten. [Reading:] The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see saieguarded and assitred, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development. Has that been done ? Secretary Lansing. I think so. Senator Johnson of California. In all eleven. [Reading:] Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories re- stored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guaranties of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into. Was that done ? Secretary Lansing. Not yet. The treaties have not been made covering that. Senator Johnson of California. Twelve relates to the Turkish Empire, the Ottoman Empires, which I presume are in process of adjustment, and have not been made as yet by the German treaty? Secretary Lansing. Not yet. Senator Johnson of California. Thirteen. [Reading:] An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories . inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and terri- torial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant. Has that been accomplished ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. XIV relates to the association in a league of nations. So that you feel that your answer this morning, , that substantially all of the 14 points haye been carried out, is correct, do you ? Secretary Lansing. I do, sir. Senator Johnson of California. The Shantung decision, was that- within any of the 14 points ? Secretary Lansing. Well, I do not recall what one. Senator Johnson of California. It was rather contrary to som^ was it not ? Secretary Lansing. I do not know which one you refer to. Which point do you refer to ? Senator Johnson of California. Well, there is one concerning racial characteristics, and the like, that I thought it might be contrary to, ' Secretary Lansing. I thought that was especially in relation to Aus,tria-Hungary. Senator Johnson of California. And one in relation to Italy, too. There was another point about self-determination; that might cover that. Secretary Lansing. In the 14 points? Senator Johnson of California. It was in a subsequent address containing four additional points, if you recall, called general state- ment. It hardly would come under the consummation of self- determination, would it ? Secretary Lansing. No; I should think not. 188 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. The Chairman. If the Senator from California will allow me to interrupt. We have four points laid down at Mount Vernon the 4th of July, 1918, and the second one is: The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a dif- ferent settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery. That seems to me, perhaps, to cover the Shantung case. -Senator Johnson oi California. Yes; I presume that I am not mcorrect in saying that that violates the Shantung decision, violates the provision that has been read, does it not ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. When the American delegates went to Paris, did they have any particular or specific ideas in reference to reparations ? Senator Borah. Senator Johnson, before you take that up, wiU you permit me to ask a question ? Senator Johnson of California. Surely. Senator Borah. Mr. Secretary, after the decision in the Shantung affair, after this adjustment finally found itself in the treaty, I have been informed that either the President or some representative of the President notified the Chinese delegates as to the settlement that had to be made. Do you know who it was that notified them, whether it was the President or some other person ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Borah. Or whether some other individual. Secretary Lansing. I can not tell you that. Senator Borah. Do you know anything about the communication which was carried to them, the message which was taken to them, and the explanation which was given to them ? Secretary Lansing. Well, I knew something about it, but I can not recall what. Senator Borah. Before you return to the stand, if you have any information in the State Department or any memorandum of your own by which you could give me the information as to who carried that message, whether it was the President or some one for him, I would be glad to have it. Secretary Lansing. I can assure you now that I have no such memorandum. Senator Johnson of California. Do you recall that a message was taken to them? Secretary Lansing. There was some communication taken to them. In what form it was given I am not at all sure. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know whether or not the Chinese were denied the right of attaching their signature to the treaty, with a protest ? Secretary Lansing. That I do not know. I heard so. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know whether or not they were denied the right of signature to the treaty with a reservation ? Secretary Lansing. That would be the same thing. Senator Johnson of California. By whose authority was that done? Secretary Lansing. It would naturally be done by the heads of the States. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 189 Senator Johnson of California. Only by the heads of States ? Secretary Lansing. Of the council. Senator Johnson of California. Not by the general peace confer- ence ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Knox. Was anybody allowed to sign with protest ? Secretary Lansing. No ; there was no one. Senator Knox. Did not Smuts make a protest ? Secretary Lansing. Yes ; but he signed the treaty without it. Senator 'Knox. Without the protest? Secretary Lansing. Yes, sir. Senator Pomerene. That is, without incorporating it as a part of his signature ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Knox. But he did it at the time of affixiag his signature, did he not ? Secretarj^ Lansing. It was issued later. Senator Johnson of California. Could you tell me whether or not in the American draft of the league of nations a central international <- police power was proposed ? Secretary Lansing. That I do not know. In the American draft ? Senator Johnson of California. Yes. Secretary Lansing. I do not know, but my recollection is there was not, but I would not want to commit myself on the subject. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know whether there was an international police power under an international management and control, under which each nation should contribute its propor- tionate share of naval armament, etc., whether that was a part of the American proposal ? Secretary Lansing. I do not, but my impression would be that there was not. Senator Johnson of California. Do you recall any discussion upon that particular subject? "^ Secretary Lansing. No; I do not. Senator Johnson of California. Can you recall whether or not England objected to any such provision and said that she would noti^ permit it ? Secretary Lansing. No; I do not know. I never had any discus- sion with the British on the subject. ■ Senator Johnson of California. Did you discuss personally with any of the foreign commissioners the various provisions of the league of nations ? Secretary Lansing. I did not but once, that was very early in the proceedings, and it was very general. Senator Johnson of California. And subsequently to that time you did not at all? Secretary Lansing. Not at all, not after the commission was organized. Senator Johnson of California. There was a very dramatic dis- Satch that came over to this country at the time of the Shantung ecisioa which stated, as I recall it, substantially that the question arose and then the Japanese commissioners said that the matter had been determined, and upon the President's inquiry as to how it had been determined, it developed then for the first time that the secret 190 TKEATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. treaties existed between Japan and the British, Japan and France, and Japan and Italy, concerning the disposition of Shantung. Is that an accurate statement? Secretary Lansing. I do not know. I never heard of it except in the newspapers. Senator Johnson of California. You probably saw that item that was cabled across as one of the dramatic incidents of the peace conference ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Mr. Johnson of California. When that occurred you were not present ? Secretary Lansing. I was not present and knew nothing of it. Senator Johnson of California. Were not the secret treaties a matter of discussion constantly at the peace conference. Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. Were you familiar with the treaties that had been made after the commencement of the war concerning the disposition of territory by the different belligerents? Secretary Lansing. I was more familiar with the London agtee- ment, that affected the Italian boundaries, than any other. Senator Johnson of California. Were you familiar with any other agreements between- Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. Did you know that any such existed ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. Did you not read of them at the- time of the Eussian revolution ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; I knew about the British and the Japan- ese treaty. ' Senator Johnson of California. Yes ; but did you not read of other treaties as well ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. Did you not ever know of such treaties ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know now of any such treaties as to territorial disposition except those that you have mentioned ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know whether or not any treaties were made with reference to Syria, Mesopotamia, and the like ? Secretary Lansing. No; I have read of it since. Senator Johnson of California. Since you came home ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California, Before you came home you never heard of it at all ? Secretary Lansing. I may have heard of it at Paris, but whether there was discussion of it, I have no recollection. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know whether or not the territorial disposition made under the treaties and those that are being made, are being made in accordance with the secret treaties ? Secretary Lansing. You mean in Turkey ? Senator Johnson of California. Those in regard to Mesopotamia, Syria, and Turkey; yes. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 191 Secretary Lansing. I do not know. Senator Johnson of California. You do not know whether there were any treaties made during the war or not ? Secretary Lansing. No; because I never paid any attention to that. Senator Johnson of California. But you did in the Shantung decision ? Secretary Lansing. I mean outside of that. Senator Johnson of California. Outside of that ? I think I can refresh your recollection, perhaps. Do you not recall the publica- tion, even in this country, of the treaties for the disposition of tevvi-'-^ tory that were made among the belligerents during the war ? Secretary Lansing. Well, I wish to be a little more definite. To what belligerents do you refer ? What territory 1 Senator Johnson of California. France, England, and Italy. Secretary Lansing. I do not know. I knew about the London agreement. Senator Johnson of California. You knew about the pact of London 1 Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know what that disposed Secretary Lansing. That disposed of the territories along the Adriatic in northern Italy. Senator Johnson of California. Did it dispose of any territories in Turkey, Sjrria, or Mesopotamia ? Secretary Lansing. I think not. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know whether or not any of the treaties did dispose of any of the territories in those countries ? Secretary Lansing. I have heard that there were certain treaties, but I have never seen them and do not know. Senator Johnson of California. You said that you had heard of those only since you have returned. Secretary Lansing. I only say that I may have heard of them in Paris, but I paid no attention to the matter of considering the Otto- man questions. Senator Johnson of California. Well was the pact of London recog- nized at the peace conference ? Secretary Lansing. No, you can not say that it was. Senator Johnson of California. You mean by that that it was not whoQy recognized ? Secretary Lansing. No, it was not wholly recognized. Senator Johnson of CaUfornia. Was it not generally recognized? Secretary Lansing. It was recognized in the north, but not on th^^ Adriatic. Senator Johnson of California. That is because that particular <^ matter is not yet settled ? Secretary Lansing. It is not yet settled. Senator Johnson of California. But so far as there has been a con- ,- summation, the pact of London was recognized ? '^ Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know whether upon any previously executed treaty the territorial dispositions are now being made in the peace conference ? 192 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Williams. Mr. Lansing, this treaty between Great Britain and Japan and the treaty between France and Japan, and Italy and Japan, these treaties were all entered into before or after Japan had conquered the part of Shantung which she did conquer from Germany ? Secretary Lansing. Mr. Senator, I never have seen the text of any one of those treaties, and I am not at all sure when they were entered into. Senator Williams. As a matter of fact Japan did reconquer from Germany the part of Shantung which Germany had held ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Williams. Now you do not know whether her agreement with Great Britain and France antedated that conquest or postdated it. Secretary Lansing. I can not tell you. Senator Borah. I was going to give him the dates. They were made in March and February, 1917. Senator Williams. Which ones ? Senator Borah. The secret treaties. Secretary Lansing. They were made in 1916, not 1917. Senator Borah. I think you are mistaken. Senator Williams. If they were made in 1917, they were made after Japan had conquered the country. SecretaryL/ANSiNG. Yes. Senator Williams. Senator Johnson was questioning you about Mesopotamia. The Mesopotamian question as well as the Syrian and Armenian questions will have to be settled in the treaty with Turkey? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Williams. But that treaty has not been negotiated? Secretary Lansing. Not at all. Senator Williams. And whatever treaty is effected by the allied and associated powers, or rather the allied powers, that treaty of peace with Turkey will settle those questions! Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Williams. Is there any reason why the United States should be a party to a treaty of peace with Turkey ? We never had any war with Turkey, did we ? Secretary Lansing. I answered that earlier. Senator Williams. Did you? Very well, I beg your pardon. Secretary Lansing. The thought of the President had been that we should be a signatory to the treaty in that we took part in the negotiations with them. Senator Williams. Yes; I understand that. There was no reason why we should establish peace with Turkey, not having had war with her ? Secretary Lansing. Oh, no; absolutely not. Senator Wili>iams. And therefore we are not necessarily parties to that treaty. Now, I want to ask you another question. This treaty between Italy on the one hand and Great Britain and France upon the other as to the Dalmatian coast, that part of Italy Irre- denta, as it was claimed, in which they agreed that it should go to Italy at the end of the war — did that treatv include the town of Fiume ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 193 Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Williams. Italy, then, in contending for the town of Mume, is contending not only for all the so-called secret treaty arrangements made with her, but is contending for more ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Of course I confess I do not quite understand the line of these questions, because I do not see what they have to do with the treaty of peace with Germany. Senator Williams. The line of the questions is to attack the treaty And the league of nations. Secretary Lansing. I know, but I am simply trying ,to answer what will he useful in connection mth the German treaty. Senator Borah. Mr. Secretary, I think you will find that those special agreements, secret agreements, were made on the following dates: The British agreement February 16, 1917; the French agree- ment March .3, 1917; the Russian agreement February 20, 1917; the Italian agreement March 7, 1917. Senator Williams. And all of that was after Japan had conquered the German possessions in Shantung. Senator Boeah. And just before Ishii came over here to get his agreement with this country. Secretary Lansing. No; Ishii Senator Borah. No; it was in November, 1917. SecretaryLANSiNG. 1917. Senator Williams. That what took place — oh, that Ishii made his agreement ? Senator Borah. Yes. Senator Williams. I was not talking about the Ishii agreement. Senator Johnson of California. Does the fact that is apparently established now, that these secret treaties were made before your agreement with Ishii, bring to your mind any of the particular conditions ? Secretary Lansing. No ; I would have to refresh my memory on that. Senator Johnson of California. You do not recall that you had in mind these treaties at ail ? Secretary Lansing. I did not know about these treaties at that time. Senator Johnson of California. You did not know about these treaties at the time of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, as it is called ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. You said you did not understand the exact line of the questions that I was aslang. I do not wish to be repetitive or insistent, but I ask you again, do you not remember the publication even in this coimtry of the treaties for the disposition of territory, after the war and in the peace, of the various belligerents ? Secretary Lansing. No, sir ; I confess I do not. When were they published ? I Senator Johnson of California. They were published— I got my^ copies in the New York Evening Post. Secretary Lansing. At what time 1 pi Senator Johnson of California. Oh, it was a long time ago; I can not tell you how long ago; long before the armistice, you knoWj'V durmg the war. Secretary Lansing. Well, possibly that is so. 135546—19 13 194 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Johnson of California. During the war they were first pubHshed ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; I do not remember at all. Sentor Pomeeene. May I ask, for my own information, are you referring now to the publication of these treaties as made by the Russian Government 1 Senator Johnson of California. Yes; I think Kerensky published them first, and then they appeared in the New York Evening Post. Senator Pomeeene. I remember seeing them there. Senator Johnson of California. I can not ask you anything about that because you say you do not know anything about those secret trjeaties, but if it was demonstrated as a fact that the territorial afdministrations were made and were being made in Paris according 5 /to those seciret treaties — ^but I will no ask you anything about those secret treaties because you are not familiar with them. I make that explanation because you said you did not understand the trend of the questions I asked. Secretary Lansing. You mean in connection with the German treaty ? Senator Johnson of California. Not only in connection with the German treaty, but in connection with the treaties that are being made now. However, I pass that because of your unfamiliarity with the various treaties. y^ Now, did the American commissioner have any particular theory concerning reparations under the German treaty ? Secretary Lansing. That question also I would like to know what you mean by. We had the general theory in regard to reparations that Germany could never pay for the damage that she had caused, and that she should pay just so far as she was able. That was the whole policy of our commission. Senator Johnson of California. To determine how much she could pay, and assess it against her ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Did you do it ? Secretary Lansing. So far as possible. Senator Johnson of California. How did you do it ? Secretary Lansing. How do you mean ? Senator Johnson of California. How did you assess what she should pay? Secretary Lansing. We have not assessed what she should pay. Senator Johnson of California. That is what I asked you. Secretary Lansing. It could not be done. Senator Johnson of California. It could not be done ? Secretary Lansing. It could not be done. Senator Johnson of California. It has not been done. Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. Is it a possibility that it shall be done? / Secretary Lansing. Yes. ij Senator Johnson of California. Through the reparation commis- sion? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. When that has determined the amount to be assessed ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 195' Senator Johnson of California. Which is left indefinite at the present time ? Secretary Lansing. Yes, because they can not tell. They dis- cussed that. Senator Johnson of California. And it is left to the Reparation Commission to assess such sum as they may deem appropriate ? Secretary Lansing. No; it is based on the ability of Germany to pay, and the relative Senator Williams. Claims ? Secretary Lansing. On the relative division that, should be made according to the character of damages done. Senator Johnson of California. The division is a secondary problem that I am coming to in just a minute. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. But it is left to the Reparation Commission to fix the amount j,^ Secretary Lansing. Yes. '^ Senator Johnson of California. Solely with regard to the ability of Germany to pay ? Secretary Lansing. Exactly. Senator Johnson of California. Now, do you know how the Repa- ration Commission arrive at their decision? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know whether they have to arrive at that unanimously ? Secretary Lansing. I do not know. Senator Johnson of California. You do not know ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. You are a part of the treaty making, and of this particular treaty? Secretary Lansing. Exactly,; but I could not pick up all these various matters and details. It is physically impossible. Senator Williams. He could not carry it all in his head if he wer& Solomon. Senator Johnson of California. I am not asserting that he is Solomon, or that he can carry it in his head. Secretary Lansing. It is very much easier to ask questions that you have prepared in advance than it is to answer questions prepared m advance and asked you when you do not know what is going to be asked you. I asked at the committee to know what I was to be questioned about. They said they did not know, so that I had to come up here without any preparation. Senator Johnson of California. If I had known that you had made a request of that kind I would have been very glad to have put them in writing and furnished you a copy. Secretary Lansing. I would have been glad to have it. Senator Johnson of California. If you would prefer, I will let this- thing pass for the moment. Secretary Lansing. No; I am perfectly willing, if it is satisfactory to you ? Senator Johnson of California. It is perfectly satisfactory to me, but I do not want to be at all disagreeable to you in the examination. Secretary Lansing. I appreciate your courtesy. /; 196 TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GEBMANY. Senator Johnson of California. Now, if you tell me you are not faniiliar with the reparation part of this treaty I will not trouble you on it; I will not bother you about it. Secretary Lansing. No; I am not. In many ways it was a very complicated affair, and it was worked over for months, and worked out by men who were more or less experts in the matters of finance and economics. It is largely an industrial and financial question, and I am in no way an expert myself on it. I would not know whether it was worked out properly or not. Senator Johnson of California. I intended to ask you a series of questions as to its workability and whether or not it could be carried but, but I will refrain from doing so, under your statement, on account of your lack of knowledge on it. Secretary Lansing. Yes. It is a matter of expert knowledge. Senator Johnson of California. You do know, as a matter of policy, whether the United States intends to take any part of the reparation? Secretary Lansing. I do not know whether that has been deter- mined. I never have heard it discussed. Senator Johnson of California. You say you have never heard it discussed ? Secretary Lansing. We have never discussed that, to my knowl- edge. Senator Johnson of California. I understood from some witness's testimony here that it had been determined, and tentatively deter- mined by the President, that we would have no part in the reparation. Secretary Lansing. You see, naturally, the experts in a matter of this sort would go directly to the heads of the States, because that is where the determination lay, in the determination of items of that sort in the treaty. Senator Fall. I might suggest to the gentleman from California, and to the Secretary also, that the President of the United States sent a written request to this committee the other day that they might advise him and help him in the appointment of a commissioner on this reparation board. Senator Swanson. I understood Senator Johnson's question to be whether we will have any part of the reparation, and not whether we will take part in its admimstratiori. Senator Johnson of California. Yes; that is correct. If there has been a misunderstanding, I will ask the question again, whether or not it was tentatively or otherwise understood or agreed that we were to have no part in the reparation; not in the reparation com- mission, but in the reparation ultimately paid. Secretary Lansing. I do not think there has been any definite agreement as to that. Personally, I am in favor of not taking any. Tnat is my personal view. Senator Williams. What is that? Secretary Lansing. Personally, I am opposed to taking any repara- tion. Senator Hitchcock. You mean so far as the Government is concerned. Secretary Lansing. Oh, yes. Senator Hitchcock. You do not mean so far as private individuals are concerned? Secretary Lansing. No; they must all be paid. TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. 197 Senator Hitchcock. There are $100,000,000 of shipping losses during the war, and they have got to be paid. Secretary LANsnsfG. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. And they are reparations. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Do you happen to know whether that is the President's personal opinion? Secretary Lansing. I understand that it is so. Senator Johnson of California. I understood that from his speech of July 4, that that was his position. Senator Williams. I want to ask you a question on another phase of the matter. Discussion came up the other da}^ as to how far the league of nations would affect the question of boundaries, and the assertion was made by the witness then before us to the effect that certain boundaries that were not laid out on strategical lines, but were laid out on other lines, of nationality or race, could not be supported except with the league of nations; which led to some acrimonious debate around the table. Have you ever read that page or two of the treaty containing the boundaries between Poland ana Germany ? Secretary Lansing. I have, at one time. Senator Williams. Now, I want to ask you this question. Could that boundary be maintained by Poland for six months, or for any great length of time, without a league of nations and its moral force behind Poland ? Secretary Lansing. Not unless Germany was disarmed and Poland was armed. Senator Williams. And kept disarmed? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Williams. If you follow out the line, that boundary is not at all strategical, is it ? Secretary Lansing. No ; it is not. Senator Williams. There are no natural objects that make it strong? It is just the line that they tried to get the majority of Poles on one side of, and the majority of Germans on the other? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Williams. And now and then they could not succeed, because the line could not be made too zigzaggy ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Williams. Are there not other boundaries of which the same thing could be said, of big nations ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; it is quite true in several instances that the boundaries are not strategic in any way. And I think this should be said, that in certain cases the ethnological line has given place to the economic line. My own theory is that the economic Ime is frequently more important than the ethnographic line. Senator Williams. It might be, in a particular place. Secretary Lansing. Yes. ' Senator 'Williams. Is not this true, that they tried to be guided by racial and national lines so far as they could, but now and then they would strike a place where the economic question made it absolutely necessary to overlook the other, in a small territory ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. 198 TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator vVilliams. For instance — the country around Fiume, the population is largely Italian, and the thing which led them to dis- regard the racial question there was the economic question of trans- portation and trade? Secretary Lansing. Yes, sir. Senator Johnson of California. I beg you to follow me in asking you this question: On the 28th of June, 1919, there was read into the record a cable- gram from the President, addressed to his fellow-countrymen, aimouncing the- signing of the peace treaty, and speaking of the league of nations he said: It associates the free governments of the world in a permanent league in which they are pledged to use their united power to maintain peace by maintaining right and justice. Further that the member governments "undertake to be responsible to the opinion of mankind in the execution of their task by accepting the direction of the league of nations." In the President's address to the Senate, on July 10, again speaking of the league of nations, he said: It provided a means of common counsel which all were pledged to accept; a common authority whose decisions would be recognized as decisions which all must respect. On the 9th of May, 1919, Secretary Tiunulty gave out the following message from President Wilson, referring to the Franco-American treaty: I have promised to propose to the Senate a supplement in which we shall agree, subject to the approval of the council of the league of nations, to come immediately to the assistance of France in case of unprovoked attack by Germany, thus merely hastening the action to which we should be bound by the covenant of the league of nations. In his message to the Senate, dated July 29, 1919, transmitting the Franco- American treaty, the President says: The covenant of the league of nations provides for military action for the protection of its members only upon advice of the council of the league. Advice given, it is to be presumed, only upon deliberation and acted upon by each of the governments of the member states only after its own judgment justifies such action. The question I desire to ask you is this : Which one of these state- ments is correct? Are we bound by the common authority of the league, as stated in the President's address of July 10? Would we be bound by the covenant of the league to go to the relief of France, as stated in the Tumulty message of May 9, or would we be free to accept the advice of the league only if our own judgment justified such action, as stated in the President's message of July 29 ? Can you follow me ? Secretary Lansing. I can, and I do. Senator Johnson of California. Can you answer me ? Secretary Lansing. No ; I am not going to answer — I am not going to interpret the President's language for nim. Senator Johnson of California. AH right, sir. Senator Knox. No ; but it seems to me that calls for an interpre- tation of the treaty. Secretary Lansing. I know, that is quite true ; if not from anything that the President has said. If you ask me for an interpretation of it, that is a different thing. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 199 Senator Knox. Speaking from the language of the treaty itself, is it a matter in which we have perfect freedom of action under article 10? Secretary Lansing. I think so. Senator Knox. You think so. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Knox. You think that we may do just as we please with- out violating our honor or agreement on any recommendation made in the council of the league of nations ? Secretary Lansing. I think so. Senator Knox. That is mighty important. Secretary Lansing. I think we have got, certainly, that legal right. Senator Knox. I asked you about the moral right. Secretary Lansing. No, you did not mention that. Senator Knox. Yes, I said without violating our honor; with honor. Secretary Lansing. With honor ? Senator Knox. Yes. Secretary Lansing. I presume in honor we would have to foUow out the general purposes of that article. Senator Knox. In other words if the council of the league of nations directed us to resort to arms against China in order to pre- vent her from regaining her rights in Shantung, we would be bound to do it ? Secretary Lansing. If Congress approved. Senator Knox. No, I am not talking about Congress, I am talking about the obligations we have assumed under the treaty. Secretary Lansing. I do not think that is an absolute obligation. Senator Knox. It is one thing or the other, Mr. Secretary. We either have liberty of action, or we are bound by our agreement, and there has been a great deal of difference of opinion in the discussion in the Senate on that subject, and apparently among the Democratic Members of the Senate some are convinced that we are absolutely boimd by the decision of the council. Others say, just as this last expression of the President indicates, that it is up to us to decide, after the recommendations have been_iBade. Secretary Lansing. Is it not very much like the Panama Treaty ? Senator Knox. I do not think there is a particle of analogy between the Panama treaty and that, because in Panama we were defending our own property. We have a zone in Panama, and we have built the greatest engineering enterprise in the world, and the peace of the environment is essential to the operation of that property. _ We are merely defending our own down there. I do not see any analogy between this and the Panama treaty. Secretary Lansing. It is more essential, then, that there should be peace in Panama than that there should be peace in all the world ? Senator Knox. No; not at all. That is a non sequitur. It is in my mind that wherever we have tremendous property interests at stake we should see that there is peace in that neighborhood. Secretary Lansing. And therefore the change of sovereignty would affect our rights there ? Senator Knox. Would affect our rights. Secretary Lansing. How could that be, under that law ? 200 I'EEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Knox. The change of sovereignty would affect our rights in this sense, that as long as our zone and our great property is sur- rounded by a friendly nation we are at peace. That is a matter of great concern to us; but the difference between that and guaranteeing- the territorial integrity and the political independence of a remote nation is just as great as the difference between night and day, to my mind. Secretary Lansing. It is a difference in degree rather than any- thing else. '.' Senator Knox. It is the degree, I think, that determines the ques- tion. Secretary Lansing. But it binds future Congresses, does it not— that treaty ? Senator Knox. Only in the sense that future Congresses might feel that the s*me reasons that justified the making of the treaty would justify the carrying of it out as long as we have the canal. Senator Williams. Which cost us the most money from an Ameri- can standpoint, the Panama Canal or the European war ? Secretary Lansing. It is hardly necessary to answer that question. Senator Williams. It seems that we had a pretty important interest in that war when we were dragged into it against our own will. Senator Knox. We did not go into it in pursuance of any agree- ment whatever. Senator Williams. No; but if we had gone into it in the pursuance of any agreement we would not have been any more in it than we were without any agreement. Senator Knox. But I do think in aU seriousness that it is impor- tant to understand the provisions of the treaty. In one breath the President says we are bound. In the next breath he says we may act according to our own discretion upon the recommendation. Now^ we ought reaUy to know what the thing means, and I am only trying to get your opinion, because I value your opinion. Secretary Lansing. Thank you. I confess that all it provides in article 10 is that the council shall advise upon the means. Senator Johnson of California. That is the last sentence of article 10. That is as to a threat or a danger. First we guarantee. Then after that sentence guaranteeing comes another sentence Or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression If you will follow me, am I accurate in that statement ? Secretary Lansing. You are the council shall advise upon the means by which tliis obl^ation shall be fulfilled. That is the obligation with respect to preserving territorial integ- rity and the political independence. Senator Johnson of California. You do not divide it, then, as Senator Lodge does, into two distinct segments or sections ? Secretary Lansing. No; indeed I do not. There is no comma after the word "aggression." Senator Williams. Mr Secretary, Italy had an alliance with Ger- many and Austria under which Italy was obliged to go the assistance of her allies imder certain circumstances, in a war of defense. Ger- many declared that she was in a war of defsnse. Austria declared that she was in a war of defense, and Italy put her own interpretation TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 201 upon the sort of war it was, and declared that she was neutral. Is not that analogous ? There may be a moral obligation, but after all each nation is left to determine whether the particular circumstances that bind it are confronting it ? Secretary Lansing! I think you are right, Mr. Senator. Senator Knox. I ,think, Mr. Secretary, that there is no one phase of the covenant #f the league of nations that the public are so much interestec^ ij^arin Article X, and I think any elucidation that you can mafee ofTTwould be a real service, to tell us your opinion as to whether we have bound ourselves so that in honor we must accept the advice of tHe council and go to the relief of nations that are threat- ened by outside aggression or whether we can take the matter under consideration and do as we please. Secretary Lansing. As I understand the last clause of article ten, the council shall meet to consider the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled, and then it is up to the various nations to take such action as they may deem proper after the result of that consultation is reported. Senator Knox. But that advice is only as to the means. We have already entered into a covenant that we will do the thing. Secretary Lansing. Yes; that is quite true. Senator tisrox. If you have covenanted to do a thing and then leave it to someoody to determine the means, it seems to me you are under an obligation to adopt the means suggested by the coimcU or committee, or whatever the authority is that suggests the means. The strength of the covenant, it seems to me, is in the first sentence there. Secretary Lansing. It is, and the word "aggression" is very important. The word "aggression" naturally convej^s the idea of a wrongful act. Now, somebody has to determine whether or not it is a wrongful act. As I read it, the mere invasion of territory is not necessarily an aggressive act. You may invade territory to protect your own nationals fi'om danger. 1 do not assume for one moment Senator Knox. Would it not be aggression just the same, only it would be justifiable aggression ? It is still aggression. Secretary Lansing. Possibly that is in a broader sense,, but I assume that this is used in the narrower sense of an evil invasion. For example, I can conceive where it is necessary to land troops in time of revolution or anarchy to protect your own. citizens and their property. Senator Knox. I would not regard that as an aggression at aU. Secretary Lansing. That is not aggression. Senator Knox. I would not regard that as aggression. Secretary Lansing. And there might be similar cases, where you could cover considerable area of territory. Senator Knox. But take a case where it was a distinct aggression. We bind ourselves to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of all members of the league against external aggression. Now, suppose there is what, to your mind, would be a well defined case of aggression. There is no ooubt about what we have agreed to do first. Secretary Lansing. No. 202 TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. Senator Knox. "Very well then. If we have agreed to do it, have we not agreed to adopt the means of the council that we have set up to determine what means shall be adopted ? Secretary Lansing. No; I do not think that follows at all. Senator Williams. We might not agree with them. , Secretary Lansing. We might not agree with them, if Our repre- sentative in the councU might disagree with the otkers. "^ Senator Fall. About what^— about whether it ^^j^^'^efc act of aggression, or about how we should repel it, or what 3Qr OD|^ations are? , Secretary Lansing. Or whether this Nation should take part in any military operations at all. Senator Fall. Is it not clear to your mind that the council itself decides whether an act is one of aggression or not, and not the nation itself behind it ? Secretary Lansing. I think the Nation has a right to determine. Senator Fall. To decide whether it is an act of aggression ? Then what has the coimcil to do ? Secretary Lansing. It has to advise and consider means as to fulfillment of the obligation. Senator Fall. It has to submit to every nation obligated by the treaty, and allow each nation to say whether a particular act under consideration is an act of aggression or not. Then suppose they report back to the council that they have discovered that it was an act of aggression. Then the council says, "You should repel it in such and such a way. " Then that is reported back to the individual members of the league, and then they take up the question as to how they will repel it, or whether they will repel it at all. Is that what article 10 means ? Secretary Lansing. I do not think the machinery is as complicated as that. Senator Fall. I have understood you to say that the question as to whether it was an act of aggression was to be decided, not by the council but by the State. Secretary Lansing. Ultimately. I think they have a right to review that question. Senator Fall. Then there is an appeal from the council to the State, first as to whether it is an act of aggression, and second the State has power to determine as to whether it wiU adopt the recom- mendation of the council. That is your judgment, is it? Secretary Lansing. I think so. It is just as if we, in the event of a manifest wrong against some nation Senator Fall. We have that privilege without going into this league at all. Secretary Lansing. But we will not do it. Senator Fall. We have done it in the history of this country. We have just done it, and we are now trying to wind up a war in which we did it. We had another war in 1898 in which we exercised that judgment. We engaged in that war. We have done it wherever humanity has called upon us to do it, every time in our entire history. I should like to see anyone cite an instance where we have not. Secretary Lansing. Other nations have not. Senator Fall. But we have. I am speaking of the United States of America. Now you say that is all the power we would have — all the obligation we would incur under article 10. TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 203 ,|*Secretary Lansing. As I have stated. ^Senator Johnson of California. Were you ever present at any dis- cussion of article 10 at Paris ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. Did you ever hear the American commissioners discuss article 10, as to what would occur under it? Secretary Lansing. No; they never discussed it with me. r Senator Johnson of California. Never discussed it at all ? Did you evendiscuss it with anybody, Mr. Secretary? . Secretary Lansing. I have, a great many times. Senator Johnson of California. But the viewpoint of the men who adopted it at Paris and the viewpoint of those of our own commission who adopted it you do not know? Secretary Lansing. I do not know their views of it. Senatpr Johnson of California. Never having discussed it with aay of them ? ri^Secretary Lansing. Oh, well, I have discussed it informally with them, of course. Senator Johnson of California. You do not recall the discussions ? 1^^ Secretary Lansing. I do not recall them. Senator Fall. Mr. Secretary, so that we may clear up the record as we go along, that is so far as my own head is concerned, I wish to ask you anomer question or two. The Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Williams) asked you a question about to this effect, as to whether the line of demarcation agreed upon in this treaty between Poland and Germany could be maintained six months if it were not for the constitution of the league of nations, and I understood you to answer that it could not. Was that the effect of his question and your answer ? Secretary Lansing. I limited it. Senator Fall. That it would be impossible unless it was for the league of nations — that it would be impossible to maintain that line. Secretary Lansing. I went further than that. Senator Fall. That is exactly what I want to know. Now, let us see how far. Secretary Lansing. I stated that very clearly. ; Senator Fall. That is what I am trymg to get. Secretary Lansing. That if Germany was disarmed and Poland was armed, of course Poland could hold it. That is a manifest fact. Senator Fall. But you think it is necessary to form a league of nations for the purpose of maintaining that line ? Secretary Lansing. I did not say so. . Senator Fall. Well, do you think so ? Secretary Lansing. If you keep Poland fully armed and Germany disarmed, you do not need the league of nations. Senator Fall. Suppose they are both armed ? Secretary Lansing. If they are both armed, then you need the le^e of nations. f Senator Fall. Then you need the league of nations ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. i , Senator Fall. The league of nations, as it happens, has nothmg to io with it in the treaty. ,, Secretary Lansing. I think article 10 has. 204 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Fall. Page 129 of the tre&tj, paragraph 2 of the annex, provides for an international commission which shall govern the disposition of that line. It provides that the United States of Americal France, the British Empire, and Italy shaU appoint an international commission. Paragraph 3 provides that — ' The commission shall onjoy all th Secretary Lansing. I do not. Senator Fall. You do not know that both of those delegations held that they could not accede to some of the propositions advanced by Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and others, because of the Constitution of the United States and the form of our Government, being constituted of various sovereign States ? Secretary Lansing. I do not. Senator Fall. You heard nothing of that discussion at all? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Fall. Did you hear anything of any discussion there or any promise or pledge on the part of the labor leaders, or the rep- resentatives of the United States Government, on that commission, that they would go as far as they could and then they would here- after seek to have the Constitution of the United States amended so that without the interposition of a court they could make the mandate of the league council absolutely binding upon the United States ? Secretary Lansing. I never heard of any such thing. Senator Fall. You do not know that that proposition was ad- vanced by Great Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, and other delegates 1 Secretary Lansing. I certainly do not. Senator Fall. And that it was turned down by the Americans, simply on the Constitution of the United States ? Secretary Lansing. I do not. Senator Fall. Now, Mr. Secretary, to clear up another matter, I was out of the room this morning when you were asked a question by one of the Senators with reference to the reason why Costa Rica was not allowed to sign the peace treaty. Of course I have not read the record, and I regret that I was not present; but I have under- stood from the other members of the committee that the reason in general offered by you was that the Government of Costa Rica now existing has not been recognized by the powers. Secretary Lansing. No; I said it had not been recognized by all the powers. Senator Fall. And that is the reason why it was not even invited to become a party to the treaty? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. There was no invitation at all extended to her? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Fall. And Costa Rica is left at war with Germany ? Secretary Lansing. Mexico was treated in the same way. Senator Fall. Mexico never was at war with Germany. That is the distinction. Costa Rica, however, did declare war against Germany, did it not ? Secretary Lansing. Yes ; that is, the unrecognized Government of Costa Rica did. Senator Fall. The unrecognized Government. Do you recall that on December 20, 1918, Hon. Thomas R. Marshall, Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate, sent a telegram to the President of the Senate of the Republic of Costa Rica acknowledging TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 207 the receipts of their notice that they had gone to war, which telegram was to the following effect : By resolution the Senate of the United States has instructed me to acknowledge Tfith deep appreciation your recent message of congratulation and compliment. you and your country upon your splendid stand for liberty. Secretary Lansing. I recall that. Senator Fall. You recall that ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. Do you know whether the French Government also congratulated Costa Rica, through its present Government ? Secretary Lansing. Costa Rica was recognized by France. Senator Fall. It was recognized by France ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. And it has a minister at Paris ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. A recognized minister ? Secretary Lansing. On, yes. Senator Fall. Then, it is only necessary for me to make a record to show the recognition and the congratulations extended by the President of the Congress of France on December 18, 1918, to Costa Rica, upon her entrance into the war. Do you know what action Great Britain took with reference to Costa Rica ? Was her Government acknowledged by Great Britain ? Secretary Lansing. I can not tell you, but my impression is it was. I am not sure. Senator Fall. Then, this transcript which I have is probably cor- rect. It is dated Paris, France, May 29, 1918, and signed "Derby." Derby was the representative of Great Britain, was he not 1 Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. It is addressed to Senor Manuel de Peralta, Costa Rican Minister, Paris, France: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note in which you announce that the President of Costa "Rica has declared war against the German Government. I have lost no time in transmitting your communication to my Government. This is followed by a note of June 1, 1918, to the following effect:" As I had the honor to inform- you in my note of May 29, 1 promptly brought to the attention of my Government the declaration of war against Germany made by the Republic of Costa Rica, which you have been good enough to communicate to me. I have just received orders from my Government to transmit to you the following message in reply to your communication: "HiB Majesty's Government desires to assure the Government of the Costa Rican Republic that it has received with the greatest pleasure the good news of the adherence of Costa Rica to the cause of liberty and of humanity." Signed by Derby. It is not necessary for me to go further, I presume, than to call your attention to the note of Mr. Pichon. Mr. Pichon, I believe, is the minister of foreign affairs of France, is he not ? Secretary Lansing. Foreign affairs; yes. Senator Fall. I call attention to his note of May 31, 1918, to the ininister of Costa Rica, acknowledging the receipt of the communica- tion of Costa Rica to France, and thanking Costa Rica for her action in joining the Allies in the war against Germany. 208 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. It is not necessary to go further than to call your attention, I presume, to a telegram from Gen. Foch, commander in chief of the allied armies, I believe, to Gen. Tinoco. Many thanks for your congratulationa. Please convey to the Costa Rican Army, in the names of the armies fighting, full of confidence for the most just of causes. My sincere thanks for i ts good wishes. Then there is a communication from the Imperial Japanese em- bassy, Paris, France, May 31, 1918, signed by K. Matusi. Do you know who Mr. Matusi is 1 Secretary Lansing. Matsui, is it not ? Senator Fall. It is signed here "Matusi." Possibly it should be "Matsui." Do you know Mr. Matsui? Secretary Lansing. I do. Senator Fall. You are acquainted with him. I did not have ref- erence to chop-suey, which is more familiar to some of the Senators, possibly, than Matsui is to me. In this communication he says: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of the 25th instant, in which vou are good enough to inform me that the President of the Republic of Costa Rica has declared the existence of a state of war with the German Empire. Do you consider that a recognition of the Costa Rican Government ? Secretary Lansing. Not that act necessarily, but I think probably it was recognized. Senator Fall. It was recognized. Then there is a communication from the United States embassy, a letter from Mr. W. G. Sharpe. I think I have made no mistake in the spelling of that name. He is our ambassador, is he not ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. His communication is addressed to Senor Manuel de Peralta, in which he acknowledges receipt of the notice of the declaration of war, and states : This news has given me great pleasure, and I hear with lively satisfaction the noble decision of yoin- valorous Republic, which, with no incentive" but its fraternal disinterestedness, has of her own free will taken its place by the side of the poweiH of the entente, ready to aid with all its forces the cause of right against oppression. ' Your declaration will evoke the hearty sympathy of all our sister Republics. You had knowledge of that note of Ambassador Sharpe, did you not? Secretary Lansing. I never did. Senator Fall. He is imder you, is he not? Secretary Lansing. He is. It was not done by authority of the Department of State. Senator Fall. Neither was that of the Senate of the United States in sending its congratulatory message. Secretary Lansing. It did not have to be. Senator Fall. Here is a communication from the Italian ambassa- dor, under date of June 3, saying: You were good enough to inform me that the President of the Republic of Costa Rica, by decree of the 23d of May, has declared the existence of a state of war witl the German Empire, and that his Government desires to cooperate with the Govern- ment of His Majesty and its allies in the triumph of right and of civilization. While noting with the liveliest satisfaction the decision of your Government, whick has thus established a new bond of friendship between our respective countries, associated as they are now in the same noble cause, 1 hasten to assure you that 1 immediately brought the contents of your communication to the attention of Hif Majesty's Government. TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. 209 I find also a communication from the then president of Brazil, Mr. Gomez. I find a note from the Serbian Legation to the minister, thanking him for the entrance of Costa Rica into the war. I find a cablegram under date of June 19, 1917, from Brazil to Costa Rica, notifying them that Brazil was entering the war, and calling upon all the republics on this continent to join them; and I find here an answer from Costa Rica complyiag with the request of Brazil, expressing their gratification at the action of Brazil, and their intention to follow Brazil in the matter. Did you have any knowledge of those matters ? Secretary Lansing. I think I did. Senator Fall. Then who was it that had not recognized Costa Rica, or caused her to be left out ? Secretary Lansing. The United States of America. Senator Fall. Yes; thank you, sir. Secretary Lansing. You could have asked me that to begin with, and I would have answered it frankly. Senator Fall. I may be unfortunate in my method of interrogation. Senator Williams. Has an ambassador, or a legation, or a general in the field any right to recognize any government ? Secretary Lansing. Oh, no. Senator Fall. The Senator evidently did not hear the answer of the Secretaiy. Senator Williams. The Senator evidently did hear it. Senator Fall. I did. Senator Williams. Well, I did, too. Senator Fall. I did not think the Senator would interject a remark of that kind if he had heard the answer. Senator Williams. I am sure the Senator heard it, and the Senator interjected the remark for the express purpose of showing the wide ■ ■extent and the small depth of all this stuff. Senator Fall. I would not engage in a controversy with the Senator from Mississippi, nor with the honorable Secretary of State; but if it became a matter of importance I would ask the Secretary of State, and I think I know what his answer would be, if there are not more ways than one of recognizing a government. Senator Williams. Oh, yes; but Senator Fall. You agree, do you ? Senator Williams. But those telegrams are not one of the ways. Senator Fall. That depends altogether Senator Borah. This controversy is very unfortunate. Senator Williams. The whole thing is of no importance. Senator Fall. You mentioned Mexico, Mr. Secretary. Was the United States equally responsible for the noninvitation or the fact that no invitation was extended to Mexico to join the league 1 Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Fall. It was not. Then who was responsible ? Secretary Lansing. I do not know. Senator Fall. Did the United States suggest extending to Mexico an invitation ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Fall. It did not. Did any other nation suggest it ? Secretary Lansing. I do not know. Senator Fall. You do not know whether France suggested it? Secretary Lansing. I do not. 135546—19- 210 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GBRMAITY, Senator Fall. Did you meet Mr. De la Bara in Paris ? Secretary Lansing. I did. Senator Fall. May I ask — I am not going to ask you what it was — but did you have any conference with him with reference to Mexican affairs? Secretary Lansing. Not a word. Senator Fall. He was the former ambassador to this country? Secretary Lansing. I knew him very well. Senator Fall. And he was the president ad interim between Huerta and Madero ? Secretary Lansing. We justhad personal conversations ; thatwas all. Senator Fall. I was not going to ask you, of course, about that. It would not be official, I presume. Now, Mr. Secretary, was there any discussion in reference to Mexican matters or any phase of the Mexican matters at Paris in which you engaged ? Secretary Lansing. None at all. Senator Fall. There was no discussion ? Secretary Lansing. None. Senator Fall. May I ask you whether, when you came in as counsellor for the State Department, you found upon your files, or whether after you came in there were placed upon your files, any notices of any kind or requests from this Government to any other Government that the United States of America be allowed to handle Mexican affairs? Secretary Lansing. No; I have not seen any such thing. I do not recall any such thing. But what has that got to do with the German treaty? Senator Fall. I understood that you were considering the peace of the world, and that you were engaging in the formation of a league for the conservation and preservation of the peace of the world. Secretary Lansing. That is quite true, but I am considering the treaty. I am not considering Mexican affairs. If you wish to ask me about Mexican affairs, I shall be very glad to come before the committee at any time and discuss them ; but I should like to be prepared beforehand, because I do not know where an investigation of this kind is going, and I do not propose to answer offhand. Senator Fall. I am not going to ask you to answer anything that I think would embarrass you at all, sir. I so stated with reference to the conversations between Mr. De la Bara and yourself. They were not of an official nature, as I understand you ? Secretary Lansing. Not at all. Senator Fall. So I simply asked you whether you had met him there and talked to him. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. I asked you nothing as to the purport of your con- versations. Something of that kind I might know myseli through some other source, but I am not going to interrogate you about it at all. I simply ask you now as leading up to what I consider to be a very important matter, and which it seems to me must necessarily have been considered in some way around the peace table with reference to Mexican matters. Secretary Lansing. I might say that, so far as I know, Mexico was never mentioned. Senator Fall. It was not ? Secretary Lansing. No. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 211 Senator Fall. No phase of Mexican matters was mentioned ? Secretary Lansing. Never discussed. Senator Fall. The question of the French banking interests in Mexico was never mentioned ? Secretary Lansing. Never to my knowledge. Senator Fall. I am not asking you as to the contents of any notes. Do you know, however, whether the United States Government has made representations to any other Government, prior to the peace conference or during the peace conference, with reference to the lia- bihty or nonliabiUty of the United States and such other Governments for debts or damages due to the nationals of such Governments in Mexico ? Secretary Lansing. I never heard of such a thing. Senator Fall. And nobody suggested that Mexico should be even invited into the league ? Secretary Lansing. Not to my knowledge. Senator Fall. Who suggested that Sweden should be invited into the league, Mr. Secretary? Secretary Lansing. I do not know; but, of course, you will bear in mind that the list was made up by France originally. Senator Fall. The list of those who were to be invited to the conference was made up by France ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. I am glad to know that. I did not know that. Secretary Lansing. They had control of the organization, it being in Paris. Senator Fall. Then such nations as France left off of her list were not invited to become parties to the league of nations ? Secretary Lansing. I do not think there were any added. I do not recall. Senator Moses. Senator, I understood the Secretary to mean that France made up the list of nations to be invited to the peace conference. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Moses. Not the league of nations. Senator Fall. No ; I am speaking now — there is a list here Secretary Lansing. Oh, the league of nations ? Senator Fall. Yes, sir. Secretary Lansing. I do not know how that was reached. I assume that was done, probably, by the commission on the league of nations. Senator Fall. There are so many States here who signed. Aside . from the principal allied and associated powers, various other States- signed this treaty, the States invited to accede to the covenant — the Argentine Republic, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Netherlands,. Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,, and Venezuela. You do not know why Mexico was not invited ? Secretary Lansing. No; I do not know. I assume it was made up by the commission on the league of nations, but I am not sure about that. Senator Fall. And you are sure that Costa Rica was not repre- sented at the peace table or invited to sign because of the United States ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. Because of her objections ? 212 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEKMANY. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. Thank you, sir. Senator Beandegee. Mr. Secretary, referring to this list of matters that Senator Fall suggested to you, and then asked you whether they were the subjects of consideration over there by the peace com- mission, and you say as to the most of them they were not, so far as you know, or according to your knowledge — it is quite possible, I suppose, that some of them may have been discussed without your knowledge; is it not? Secretary Lansing. I doubt if the Mexican question would be. Senator Brandegee. What do you say as to the other questions? Secretary Lansing. What other questions ? Senator Brandegee. Many of them that you do not know about that have been asked you this afternoon. It is not possible that the commissioners themselves, the heads of the States, had conversations among themselves that you did not know about ? Secretary Lansing. Oh, possibly; but I am quite convinced that Mexico was not discussed. That is the only thing that I am re- ferring to. Senator Brandegee. Now I want to ask you just this one question. Article 10 of the covenant of the league reads as follows: The members of the league undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. I understand your view of the effect of that article is that although we, if we entered the league, would undertake to respect and pre- serve as against external aggression the territorial mtegrity and existing political independence of all members of the league, when the council advise upon the means by which this obligation should be fulfilled it is then optional with every member of the league to do as they please about the matter? Secretary Lansing. Furthermore than they think it is their duty. Senator Brandegee. Now, if that is so, as it seems to me, in view of the fact that the friends of this league are claiming to erect some- thing that is going to at least diminish the poesibilities of war, at any rate, under this article 10, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of all members against external aggression, if each member of the league is to be allowed to carry out its guaranty in its own way, what sort of a spectacle will the world be treated to if all the mem- bers of the league think that different methods ought to be adopted to carry out the guaranty ? Secretary Lansing. Well, but of course Senator Brandegee. I had supposed this was an idea of unifying the members, so that their combined strength could be brought against the offending power. Secretary Lansing. I think you are quite right about that. I think your views are correct about that, and that by a council of the nations when there has been external aggression to be resisted, or the rights of the nation invaded restored, they should counsel together as to the means which should be taken. It is assumed that the decision of the council will be a reasonable decision. In any event, it will be of value in showing how the aggression may be resisted. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 213 Senator Brandegee. My point is this; Suppose there is a threat of aggression, and the council meets in conclave, and resolves unani- mously, our delegates concurring with the others, that a force of a million men should be raised and sent against the offending power, and that the proportion of the United States of that force is hereby apportioned as 200,000 men. In your view of this, we are not in honor bound to agree to conform to the judgment of the council; but if we think at that time that our contribution and our honor will be sufl&ciently vindicated by having Congress pass an economic law cutting off trade with the enemy, that we have sufficiently fulfilled our pledge to guarantee the territorial integrity of our friend and fellow-member of the league, that is perfectly permissible, and can be done without any reflection upon our honor ? Secretary Lansing. I think the chances are that we would have to refer it back to the other nations and say that we viewed this as an unfortunate way of handling the situation. Senator Brandegee. Yes. Suppose we have a pacifist wave in this country at that time, and we have had enough fighting, and we say we will resort to economic pressure ; we will forbid our citizens to trade with them, etc. Now, then, your theory is that we so report to the coimcil, who are begging us to send 200,000 men ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Brandegee. And then if the council adhered to their former well-considered recommendation, and said, "You are a shirker: we want your men and your guns, and we do not care any- thing about your statute of Congress." Then what would we do ? Secretary Lansing. Then I suppose it would be up to Congress to determine whether we should raise the men. Senator Brandegee. In other words, we would be an international slacker if we did not obey the recommendation of the council of the league, in my opinion. Now, in your opinion we would not be ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Brandegee. If your opinion is correct, I desire to state that in my opinion this whole fabric is a league of sand, a rope of sand, without any power whatever except moral suasion. Senator Borah. Not even that. Senator Brandegee. Which is not very effective against the bayonets of ravaging Prussians, in my opinion. The Chairman. 7&e there any further questions ? Senator Williams. Is not that about the measure of power under which we waged the war of the Kevolution and won our independence ? Was there any way of making a colony furnish its quota ? , Secretary Lansing., Nq. ,,, , i.^^-;l, •,!!; si j:' ..i'M',:; Senator Brandegee. France had to come to pur rescue, ; .,;;,, ,,, i (iSepator Borah. We got out of that fearful dilemma just as q^iclly as, we poT^ld. , ,• ; . • .c i',. ,■ •■ . '.(li ■ ,-; : Sena,tor Williams. Yes; af ter we once f orine4 a goyernmeflt. ,,Bilt .1^ iSepator does not w;ant, to ,f oifm a governmen,t. , - / , . , , j(,,The Chairma,n. Xhp .Secretary has beeni on the stand now; for some hours, and I do not Imow whether the Senators desire to ask him any Jjapre; , questions or, npt,;' but,! the Secretary, said there, were certain statements he would like to have time to prepare. , , : , , Secretary Lansing. Yes. The Chairman. When would it be convenient to you to make those statements ? 214 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEKMANT. Secretarj^ Lansing. Just as soon as possible, Mr. Senator. Can I do it by writing ? Would you prefer it in writing ? The Chairman. As you please. If you will come before the com- mittee, you can present it m any form you please. Secretary Lansing. Do you not think it would be advisable for me to put it into writing, and then, if you want to ask any questions, I will be very glad to come ? The Chairman. I think the committee would like to hear it, and then we can ask the questions, if you wiU come and read it — any statement you want to make. Secretary Lansing. Very well. The Chairman. Would Friday be too soon ? Secretary Lansing. I think I can do it Friday. I will try to. The Chairman. Very well, then. Senator Moses. Would Saturday be a more convenient time for yon, Mr. Secretary? Senator Williams. What is to-day ? Secretary Lansing. To-day is Wednesday. That only gives me to-morrow. I do not know. I will have to look over and see what the questions are. Senator Williams. We had better make it Monday. The Chairman. Suppose we make it Saturday; would that do? Secretary Lansing. I think you had better give me until Monday, if you can do it. Senator Moses. I move that the committee adjourn until Monday at half past 10. The Chairman. The committee have some other matters they ought to attend to. Senator Brandegee. Suppose we adjourn subject to the call of the chairman. Senator Fall. The chairman is aware of the fact that some mem- bers of the committee requested a little information about another matter from the Secretary. Would it be possible for you to let us have that information to-morrow ? Secretary Lansing. Oh, yes ; I think I can get that for you at once. I do not know what time it is now. The Chairman. That relates to another treaty. Senator Fall. It relates to the Colombian treaty, so that that might be considered. The Chairman. Very well. Then the committee will meet on Monday at 10.30 to hear the Secretary. In the meantime, what is the pleasure of the committee? Senator Moses. In the meantime, the committee may be called together by the Chair. The Chairman. There are some other things we ought to attend to. I hope the Secretary wUl be able to let me kno\y to-morroW about that treaty with France to modify the treaty of 1822. Secretary Lansing. I will. I will have that for you to,-morrow. The Chairman. Then the Chair will call the committee together for those other matters. - (Thereupon, at 4.30 o'clock p. m. the committee adjourned sub- ject to the call of the chairman.) MONDAY, ATJGTJST 11, 1919. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Kelations, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10.30 o'clock a. m., in room 426 Senate Office Building, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge presiding. Present, Senators Lodge (chairman), McCumber, Borah, Bran- degee, Fall, Harding, Johnson of California, New, Moses, Hitckcock, Williams, Swanson, Pomerene, and Shields. The Chairman. The committee will come to order. The Sec- retary of State is here, and ready to go on with his statement which he promised us to-day. STATEMENT OF HON. KOBEKT LANSING, SECRETARY OF STATE — Resumed. Secretary Lansing. Mr. Chairman, I was asked twice during the hearing on last Wednesday, in relation to my knowledge as to the secret treaties or secret agreements which existed between Japan and Great Britain, France, and Italy, and, I believe, Russia. In order to refresh the memory of members of the committee, I would like to read from page 148 just a brief portion of the hearing. [Reading.] Senator Bokah. Are you able to state whether or not it was before you went to Versailles? Secretary Lansing. Oh, yea. Senator Borah. It was before? Secretary Lansing. That is, so far as Great Britain is concerned I do not thtuk I knew of any secret agreements with France or Italy. Senator Borah. May I suggest, then, Mr. Secretary, that you ascertain for the coramittee as soon as you can conveniently, just when you learned of these secret agreements? It it has not already occurred to you, I think you will recall, probably, that these secret agreements were published first by the Russian Government, so far M the world was concerned. I do not know how long before that the Department of State had knowledge of them; but so far as the world had any knowledge of them, as I recall, the first knowledge came from Mr. Trotsky. Later on in the hearing, this matter came up again. I read from page 193 as follows: Senator Johnson of California. Does the fact that is apparently established now, that these secret treaties were made before your agreement with Ishii, bring to your mind any of the particular conditions? Secretary Lansing. No; I would have to refresh my memory on that. Senator Johnson of California. You do not recall that you had in mind these treaties at all? Secfeiary Lansing. I did not know about these treaties at that time. 215 216 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Johnson of California. You did not know about these treaties at the time of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, as it is called? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Johnson of California. You said you did not understand the exact line of the questions that I was asldng. J do not wish to be repetitive or insistent, but I ask you again, do you not remember the publication even in this country of the treaties for the disposition of territory, after the war and in peace, of the various belligerents? Secretary Lansing. No, sir; I confess I do not. When were they published? Senator Johnson of California. They were published— I got my copies in the New York Evening Post. Secretary Lansing. At what time? Senator Johnson of California. Oh, it was a long time ago; I can not tell you hoV long ago; long before the armistice, you know, during the war. Secretary Lansing. Well, possibly that is so. Senator Johnson of California. Buring the war they were first published? Secretary Lansing. Yes; I do not remember at all. Senator Pomeeene. May I ask, for my own information, are you referring now to the publication of these treaties as made by the Russian Government? Senator Johnson of California. Yes; I think Kerensky publish«d them first, and then they appeared in the New York Evening Post. Gentlemen, in connection with those inquiries and the apparent imphcation that I must have had knowledge, or should have had knowledge, of those agreements prior to the Lansing-Ishii agree- ment, I can now state that my first knowkedge of the actual agree- ments came the first part of February of 1919. Under date of February 26, 1919, they were transmitted to the Department of State by the American Peace Commission, and the department has no record or any knowledge of the treaties prior to that time. On April 22, 1919, alleged copies of the agreements between Japan and Great Britain and Japan and France were published by the. New York Times under a Paris date line. I have inquired of the Russian division, and I have also inquired of Mr. D. C. Poole, consular officer of the Department of State, who has just returned from Russia, and who was m Moscow up to the end of the time that it was safe for Americans to remain there, and then was attached to the embassy of the United States in Russia, and the latter part of the time acted as charge for this Government there, and the Russian division and Mr. Poole both assure me that these treaties never were published in any form in Russia. In regard to the statement that I knew of the British agreement before we went to Paris, let me say Senator Johnson of California. Just what British agreement do you refer to, if you please ? Secretary Lansing. Between Japan and Great Britain. Senator Johnson of California. And in your statement of the other treaties that you have just referred to you referred to those with Japan ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Yes. Secretary Lansing. And I refer to the text of the British agree- ment Senator Johnson of California. With Japan? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Yes. Secretary Lansing. As to my knowledge at the time of the Lansing Ishii Agreement, which was negotiated m September and October, 1917, 1 did know that Great Britain and France had at least an imder- TBBATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 217 standing as to the disposition of the German Islands in the Pacific. Sir Cecil Spring-Eice, then the British Ambassador, had informed me, in October, 1916, six months before we entered the war, that Japan was to take the islands north of the equator, and Great Britain those that were south of it. Furthermore, at my first interview in connection with our negotia- tions, Viscount Ishii, on September 6, 1917, told me that in 1915, on his way home to Japan, he stopped in London, that he saw Sir Edward Grey there, and stated to him that Japan intended to return Kiaochow to China, but that the islands would have to be retained, because no government in Japan could stand if there was an agree- ment to return them to Germany. Senator McCumber. Do you mean to Germany, or to China? Secretary Lansing. They did not belong to China. I am speaking of the Islands in the Pacific. ' Senator Pomerene. From whom did you ascertain that? Secretary Lansing. Viscount Ishii. Senator Pomerene. At what time ? Secretary Lansing. On September 6, 1917. He said it was then practically arranged that the Equator should be the line of division between the acquired territories of Japan and Great Britain, so far as the conquered islands were concerned. Senator Hitchcock. That was an agreement reached between those two countries before we entered the war. Secretary Lansing. Oh,, yes; in 1915. I would pause here to inquire if there are any questions in regard to what I have stated ? Senator Borah. I wanted to ask some questions. I will either ask them now, or when you get through with your full statement, which- ever you prefer ? Secretary Lansing. If your questions refer particularly to this matter, I would like to hear them now. Senator Borah. Very well. Senator Brandegee. I beg the Senator's pardon. May I ask a question here ? Senator Borah. Go ahead. Senator Brandegee. Does this include your statement with refer- ence to the Japanese secret treaties? Have you finished that part of it, or is there more on that subject? Secretary Lansing. No more on that question. Senator Brandegee. Then I think it is all right for Senator Borah to go ahead. Senator Borah. Mr. Secretary, as I understand you, the first knowledge you had of any of these agreements other than the British agreement was on what date ? Secretary Lansing. In the early part of February, 1919. Senator Borah. Ajid you received that information through what channels? Secretary Lansing. I can not tell you, except that the commission received it in Paris ? , |§ena,tor Borah. The first knowledge you had of the British agree- ment was frora Ishii himself ? Secretary Lansing. From Sir Cecil Spring-Eice. 218 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMAWY. Senator Borah. At what -time was that ? Secretary Lansing. October, 1916. That covered merely the Pacific islands. Senator Borah. The agreement that I was talking about had not been made at that time. Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Borah. The secret treaty with reference to Shantung and the German possessions in China had not been made in October, 1916« Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Borah. When did you first learn of that agreement? Secretary Lansing. I first learned of that in the early part of February, 1919. Senator Borah. Will you state again briefly what it was that Viscount Ishii stated to you as to the understanding which he had with Great Britain, and when it was ? Secretary Lansing. The statement was made on September 6, 1917, and he told me that in 1915 — that was after Kiaochow and the German islands had been taken — he was in London, and that he stated to Sir Edward Grey that Japan intended to return Kiaochow to China, but that the islands would have to be retained, as no Japanese Government could stand without obtaining them; that it was practically agreed that the line of division between the territory acquired by conquest in the Pacific Ocean should be the Equator, so far as Great Britain and Japan were concerned. Senator Borah. Will you give me the date of that ? Secretary Lansing. September 6, 1917. Senator Borah. Is that the only statement that Viscount Ishii made which would indicate to you any understanding between Japan and Great Britain with reference to the German possessions in China ? Secretary Lansing. That did not indicate any. Senator Borah. Did he make any other statement indicating to you at all that Japan had any agreement with Great Britain in regard to the German possessions ? Secretary Lansing. None at all, sir. After that statement, that it was the intention of Japan to return Kiaochow to China, the subject was never again mentioned during the conversation. Senator Borah. You do know now, Mr. Secretary, that at the time Viscount Ishii made that statement to you, he had a secret agreement, or Japan had a secret agreement, with Great Britain and these other powers ? Secretary Lansing. I do. Senator Borah. And that he either affirmatively or by his silence concealed it from the Secretary of State of this country ? Secretary Lansing. That is the truth. I do not know whether it was an intentional concealment or not. He did not teU me about it. Senator Borah. I want to say, Mr. Secretary, in answer to an intimation in your opening statement that we were indicating that you must have had laiowledge of these thin^, that that was hot my desire at all. My desire was to show what Viscount Ishii was doing.' TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 219 I desire to read a statement which appeared in the Parliamentary Debates in the House of Commons on March 4, 1918. [Reading:] Mr. King asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether there have been commu- nicated to President Wilson copies of all treaties, whether secret or public, and memo- randa of all other agreements or undertakings to which this country has become a party since 4th August, 1914; and if not, whether copies of all such documents will be handed to the American ambassador in London. Mr. Balfour. The honorable member may rest assured that President Wilson is kept fully informed by the Allies. You would understand from that that these secret agreements had been made known to the President ? Secretary Lansing. I should dislike very much to interpret the language of Mr. BaKour. Senator Borah. It does not need much interpretation, does it? Senator Hitchcock. What was the date of that ? Senator Borah. March 4, 1918. When did this Government make known to China the existence of these secret agreements ? Secretary Lansing. I do not know as the Government ever made them known to China, because China had delegates at Paris, and I assume that she was more or less cognizant of "the agreements at the same time that we were. Senator Borah. Notwithstanding the statement of Ishii and the statement of Mr. Balfour, it is a matter of fact that the Secretary of State of the United States had no knowledge of these treaties until after the signing of the armistice, is it not? Secretary Lansing. That is true. Senator Borah. That is all. Senator Brandegee. You said the other day, Mr. Secretary, if I recall correctly, that you would have made the so-called Lansing-Ishii agreement just the same if you had known that these secret treaties were in existence ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Brandegee. Involving the turning over of Shantung, or the rights in Shantung, to Japan? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Brandegee. Has the so-called Lansing-Ishii agreement any binding force on this country ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Brandegee. It is simply a declaration of your policy, or the policy of this Government, as long as the President and the State Department want to continue that policy, I suppose ? Secretary Lansing. Exactly, in the same way that the Eoot- Takahira agreement is. Senator BRAiirDEGEE. Will you be kind enough to state again the date of the tansing-Ishii agreement? - V (i^ecretai^y Lansing. November 7, 1917. Senator Brandegee. That is all I care to ask upon that. I have some other questions relating to other things. ' ,,S,enp,]toF MpsES. Mr. Secretary, the monarchy in Russia was ovcr- tjjirp-wn in March, 1917 ? j,j Secretary LANSING. Yes. ' Senator Moses. And the Kerensky government was replaced by Lenin-Trotsla government in the autumn of that year? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. November 7. 220 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Moses. Was our embassy at Petrograd in touch constantly for information during that period? Secretary Lansing. During the Kerensky regime, yes. Senator Moses. And through the early days of the Lenin-Trotski regime ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Moses. At Petrograd ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Moses. As I recall, one of the first steps taken by the Lenin-Trotsld regime was the publication of certain secret archives of the Russian Goverimient? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Moses. Including what purported to be the texts of many secret treaties. Did the embassy report upon those to this Govern- ment? Secretary Lansing. All of them. Senator Moses. And those reports did not include any of these secret treaties which we have been discussing. Secretary Lansing., None of them. Senator Moses. Is it possible that those secret treaties were not published in Petrograd, although published elsewhere ? Secretary Lansing. I do not understand your question. Senator Williams. What was the question ? Senator Moses. I asked him if it was possible that those secret treaties, though published elsewhere, were not made public in Petro- grad, inasmuch as it was not long after the first week in November, when Lenine and Trotzky came into power in Petrograd, that the publication of those documents began, and they were published in this country not greatly subsequent to that time ? Senator Williams. What was the obiect of that question, Senator? Senator Moses. L was trying to find out whether the embassy in Petrograd had overlooked anything in making this report to the State Department. Secretary Lansing. I can assure you that I have investigated very thoroughly as to that, and they were not published in Bussia. Senator McCumbek. Do you intend to go into an explanation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement and its reasons, and so forth, and to put the agreement in the record ? Secretary Lansing. I will. Senator Hitchcock. Mr. Secretary, before you proceed I wish to ask you this. Some secret treaties were published in Russia at a certain period, were they not ? Secretary Lansing. There were some, but none of these. Senator Hitchcock. None relating to the Japanese matters? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Beandegee. Was that done before the Russian revoliition? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Brandegee. When the Czar was on the throne ? Secretary Lansing. Do you mean the agreements that were made? Senator Hitchcock. I was referring to the fact that the Lenin- Trotsky government had published, shortly after they came into power, I think in the fall of 1917, certain secret treaties. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. But they related to European or Asian affairs? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 221 ■ Secretary Lansing. Yes; they did not relate to this matter at all. Senator Moses. Were those published in other European capitals, do you know, if not in Petrograd ? Secretary Lansing. I think none were published in other European capitals, unless they also appeared in Kussian publications. Senator Johnson of California. Are you going on with that subject of those treaties now, or are you going on to other subjects? Secretary Lansing. I was going on with the Lansing-Ishii agreement. Senator Johnson of California. I do not want to take you out of the thought on which you are now engaged, but do you intend to take up again the secret treaties that were published by the Russians ? Secretary Lansing. No, sir; I do not. Senator Johnson of California. When you answered Senator Hitchcock you referred to the Japanese treaties alone, did you not? Secretary Lansing. I referred to them as to being published in Russia. Senator Johnson of California. That they were not published ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. But there were many secret treaties published by the Russians ? Secretary Lansing. I would not wish to say many, and I would not want to say what they pertained to without examining our records. Senator Johnson of California. You know as a matter of fact that they pertained to territorial dispositions, do you not? Secretary Lansing. I do not recall, sir; and I would prefer to look that up if you desire. Senator Johnson of California. You have read here a portion of the testimony given by you the other day, part of which contained an interrogation by myself, and that interrogation related in part at least to the treaties other than the treaty with Japan concerning the disposition of Shantung and the islands of the Pacific. Secretary Lansing. I did not so understand it. Senator Johnson of California. You may be correct in that re- spect — ^you were answering only in respect to treaties with Japan. Secretary Lansing. That is all. Senator Johnson of California. Let me ask you one more question while we are on the subject. You recall that Mr. Balfour was here and addressed the Senate at one time ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. And that Viviani was here and addressed the Senate ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Did either of those gentlemen while here communicate to you any secret treaties that had been executed for the disposition of territory after the war ? Secretary Lansing. Neither of them. Senator Johnson of California. Did either of them on any occa- sion, either when here or at any other time, commimicate to the State Department of the United States any information concerning the treaties that disposed of territory in which the Allies were con- cerned, the disposition of which was to be made by the peace con- ference ? Secretary Lansing. None. 222 TREATY OF PHAGE WITH GERMANY. Senator Johnson of California. As I miderstood you, you have no recollection of the particular treaties that were published in Russia and published subsequently in this country ? Secretary Lansing. No; I have none. Senator Johnson of California. I understood you to say with some positiveness that you knew that the Japanese treaties — the treaties with Japan — ^had not been published ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Necessarily, to have that informs^ tion you would have to have some knowledge of what publications were made, would you not? Secretary Lansing. I need not necessarily have the information, but somebody familiar with the record would have to have the information. Senator Johnson of California. You had somebody who was famihar with the record look it up ? Secretary Lansing. Certainly. Senator Hitchcock. You spoke of the British ambassador having advised you in the fall of 1916 as to the agreement between Great Britain and Japan as to the islands in the Pacific Ocean ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. The dividing line being the Equator? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Secretary Hitchcock. At that time the so-called secret treaties with Japan had not been made ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Hitchcock. They were not made until the following spring ? Secretary Lansing. The exchange of notes Senator Hitchcock. That was in the following spring. They were not made at the time you talked with the British ambassador? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator McCumbee. But the Chinese-Japanese agreement with reference to Shantung was executed in 1915, was it not ? Secretary Lansing. In May, 1915. Senator PoMERENE. Mr. Secretary, up to the time of the exchange of the letters which embraced the Lansing-Ishii agreement, did the Republic of China have any information concerning that agreement ? Secretary Lansing. Do you mean the Lansing-Ishii agreement? Senator Pomerene. Yes. Secretary Lansing. Not until it was negotiated and the notes were exchanged. Senator Pomerene. As this related to Chinese territory, what reason was there, if any, for not conferring with the Chinese repre- sentatives with respect to it ? Secretary Lansing. It was a mere matter of declaration of a mutual policy between Japan and the United States in regard to their attitude toward China. It did not directly affect any rights of China, except that the two Governments agreed they would keep their hands oft. Senator Brandegee. You said the other day, did you not, Mr. Secretary, that your principal object in making this so-called agree- ment was to get a renewed declaration from Japan in favor of the open door in China ? TREATY OF PEACE W:TH GERMANY. 223 Secretary Lansing. Yes; I did. Senator Pomerene. When, if at all, did you first learn that the Chinese Government took any exception to the Lansing-Ishii agree- ment? Secretary Lansing. We had no definite information that China took exception to the Lansing-Ishii agreement. They did make a declaration, which I was going to state later in discussing that agree- ment. Senator Pomerene. If you are going into that later, I will not pursue it now. Senator New. I wish to ask you, Mr. Secretary, if you knew that the General Board of the Navy had at any time considered the pro- posed disposition of the Pacific islands, and had made any recom- mendation concerning the attitude of the United States toward that disposition of them ? Secretary Lansing. I can not say that I have direct knowledge of that, but it seems to me that there was some consideration, very naturally, as to the disposition of those islands, more particularly on account of the trans-Pacific cables. Senator New. Do you know or do you not know that there was a formal recommendation made by the General Board of the Navy with reference to that subject? Secretary Lansing. I do not, sir. Senator New. Then, not knowing that, you can not say that any action was ever taken concerning it ? Secretary Lansing. It would depend very largely on when such a recommendation was made, as to its effect on the negotiations in Paris. Senator New. That is all. Senator Beandegee. Mr. Secretary, I suppose you mean that no official protest was made by China against the Lansing-Ishii agree- ment; but my recollection is that the newspaper dispatches at the time stated that Chinese sentiment was very much opposed to it. Do you not remember that ? Secretary Lansing. There was something of that sort; yes, in regard to the Lansing-Ishii agreement. I suggested to Viscount Ishii that it would be well for the two Governments to reaffirm the open-door policy, on the ground that reports were being spread as to the purpose of Japan to take advantage of the situation created by the war to extend her influence over China — political influence. Ishii replied to me that he would like to consider that matter, but that, of course, he felt that Japan had a special interest in China, and that that should be mentioned in any agreement that we had; and I replied to him that we, of course, recognized that Japan, on account of her geographical position, had a peculiar interest in China, but that it was not political in nature, and that the danger of a statement of special interest was that it might be so construed, and therefore I objected to making such a statement. At another interview we discussed the phrase "special interests," which the Japanese Government had been very insistent upon, and which, with the explanation I have made, I was not very strongly opposed to, thinking that the reafl&rmation of the open-door policy was the most essential thing that we could have at this time; and we discussed the phrase which appeared in the draft note, "special 224 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. interest," and I told him then that if it meant "paramount interest," I could not discuss it further; hut if he meant special interest based upon geographical position, I would consider the insertion of it in the note. Then it was, during that same interview, that we men- tioned "paramount interest" and he made a reference to the Monroe doctrine, and rather a suggestion that there should be a Monroe ■doctrine for the Far East. And I told him that there seemed to be a misconception as to the underlying principle of the Monroe doctrine; that it was not an assertion of primacy or paramount interest by the United States in its relation to other American Republics; that its purpose was to prevent foreign powers from interfering with the separate rights of any nation m this hemisphere, and that the whole aim was to preserve to each Republic the power of self-development. I said lurther that so far as aiding in this development the United States claimed no special privileges over other countries. Senator Beandegee. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. Were these oral declarations that were made 1 Secretary Lansing. Oral entirely. Senator Brandegee. No stenographer was present ? Secretary Lansing. No stenographer was present. Senator Brandegee. This is from memory? Secretary Lansing. Not at all. It is made from memoranda which I dictated to a stenographer immediately upon the departure •of Count Ishii. Senator Williams. That is the usual way of keeping these records. Secretary Lansing. It is the only possible way. Senator Brandegee. Yes. Secretary Lansing. I told Viscount Ishii that I felt that the same principle should be applied to China, and that no special privileges, and certainly no paramount interest, in that country should be •claimed by any foreign power. While the phrasing of the notes to be exchanged was further considered, the meaning of "special interest" was not again discussed. Senator Brandegee. Will you pardon an interruption there ? Secretary Lansing. Yes, sir. Senator Brandegee. What did Count Ishii say ? Did he appar- ently coincide with your view or did he maintain silence ? Secretary Lansing. He maintained silence. Senator Borah. Have you anything more, Mr. Secretary ? Secretary Lansing. Not so far as "special interest" is concerned. Senator Borah. Have you finished about the Lansing-Ishii agree- ment? Secretary Lansing. Not entirely. Senator Williams. I suggest that he finish. wSenator Brandegee. I would like to ask one question there. Have you a copy of the Lansing-Ishii agreement in the room here ? Secretary Lansing. I have one here somewhere. It is a Senate document. Senator Brandegee. Please give the number of it. Secretary Lansing. No; I beg your pardon, it is not a Senate ■document. It is one of the treaty series. Senator Brandegee. For the use of the State Department? TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. 225 Secretary Lansing. For the use of the State Department. Treaty Series No. 630. Senator Pomerene. There is no objection to incorporating that in your testimony, is there ? Secretary Lansing. Not at all, sir. Senator Pomerene. I ask that that may be done. The Chairman. That will be done. (The agreement referred to is here printed in full as follows :) AGREEMENT EFFECTED BY EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN — ^MUTUAL INTEREST RELATING TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA — SIGNED NOVEMBER 2, 1917. (The Secretary of State to the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan on special mission.) Department of State, Washington, November 2, 1917. Excellbnct: I have the honor to communicate herein my imderstanding of the agreement reached by us in oiu: recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China. In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and inten- tions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable. The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial pro- pinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently the Govern- ment of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous. The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers. The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China, and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open door" or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China. Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China, or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China. I shall be glad to have Your Excellency confirm this understanding of the agree- ment reached by us. Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration. Robert Lansing. His Excellency Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan, on Special Mission. (The Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan, on Special Mission, to the Secretary of State.) The Special Mission of Japan, Washington, November 2, 1917. Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of to-day, communi- cating to me your understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent con- versations touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China. I am happy to be able to confirm to you, under authorization of my Government, the understanding in question set forth in the following terms: In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public announcemfent once more of the desires and inten- tions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable. 135546—19 15 226 TBBATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMAOSTY. The Governments of Japan and the United States recognize that territorial pro- pinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Govern- ment of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests m China, par- ticularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous. The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests, they have no desire to discrimmate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers. The Governments of Japan and the United States deny that they have any purpose to Infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open door," or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China. Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China. I take this opportunity to convey to you, sir, the assurances of my highest con- sideration. K. IsHn, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan on Special Mission. Hon. Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, Secretary Lansing. On the 2d of November, 1917, as will appear by the document, the notes were exchanged between this Govern- ment and Japan, and I issued on the 6th, the time the notes were made public, a statement in regard to them. There are portions of that statement that I would like to incorporate. Senator Beandegee. Why not put the whole statement in; I mean, furnish it to the stenographer ? Let us have the whole state- ment. Secretary Lansing. I have not the whole statement. Senator McCumbek. If it is not too long, may it not be read now ? Secretary Lansing. This is real short, and I think it will save time to read this. Senator Brandegee. I do not mean to read it all now, but later to furnish the whole statement so that it can be incorporated. Senator Hitchcock. I think we ought to have read what he has now. Senator Brandegee. Certainly. Secretary Lansing (reading) : There had unquestionably been growing up between the peoples of the two coun- tries a feeling of suspicion as to the motives inducing the activities of the other in the Far East, a feeling which, if unchecked, proniised to develop a serious situation. Rumors and reports of improper intentions were increasing and were more and more believed. Legitimate commercial and industrial enterprises without ulterior motive were presumed to have political significance, with the result that opposition to those enterprises was aroused in the other country. By frankly denouncing the evil influences which have been at work, by openly proclaiming that the policy of Japan is not one of aggression, and by declaring that there is no intention to take advantage commercially or industrially of the special relation to China created by geographical position, the representatives of Japan have cleared the diplomatic atmosphere of the suspicions which had been so carefully spread by our enemies and by misguided or overzealous people in both countries. The statements in the notes require no explanation. They not only contain a reaffirmation of the "open door" policy, but introduce a principle of noninterference with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, which, generally applied, is essential to perpetual international peace, as clearly declared by PresiQent Wilson, and which is the very foundation also of Pan Americanism as interpreted by this Government. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 227 That is all I desire to read. Senator McCximber. That is a statement that you issued for pub- lication at the time, in connection with the agreement ? Secretary Lansing. Yes, sir; for publication. Senator Fall. Would it interrupt to ask a question ? Secretary Lansing. Not at all. Senator Fall. You made a statement as to the interpretation of Pan Americanism. Do you understand that the Monroe doctrine and the Pan-American doctrine as declared by President Wilson are the same ? Secretary Lansing. No, sir. Senator Fall. I did not understand that. Secretary Lansing. They come to the same result but they are entirely on a different basis. The Monroe doctrine is purely a national doctrine. Pan Americanism is an international policy. Senator Hitchcock. Did Viscount Ishii make any public statement following the agreement ? Secretary Lansing. He did, very much of a similar order. Senator Hitchcock. That was published in this country, or only in Japan ? Secretary Lansing. I think it was telegraphed back here. I can not recall exactly. He did make a statement on leaving this coun- try. I think his Government also made a statement in Japan. Senator Brandegee. Is it your understanding, Mr. Secretary, that the original use of the Monroe doctrine was based upon the theory that it was necessary for our defense ? SecretaryLANSiNG. Entu'ely so. Senator Williams. Defense of our institutions, too? Senator Brandegee. Yes; of our country and our institutions. Secretary Lansing. It was apparently a national poUcy. Senator Brandegee. And a warning. Senator Williams. A declaration by the United States, with a threat by the United States that she would maintain it by force, if necessary. Senator Borah. Are you through with that incident, Mr. Secretary ? Secretary Lansing. I am, sir. Senator Borah. Mr. Secretary, in order that we may have a chronological statement Senator New. You say it was announced as a national policy ? Secretary Lansing. The Monroe doctrine ? Senator New. Yes. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator New. Not as a regional understanding ? Secretary Lansing. It had that effect, very decidedly. Senator New. But it was a national policy. Secretary Lansing. A national policy. Senator New. Aimounced by this country for itself and by itself? Secretary Lansing. Yes; it was a selfish doctrine. Pan Ameri- canism is an unselfish doctrine. Senator Williams. Just following up what he said, I understood him to ask you if it was a regional understanding. It does pertain to the Western Hemisphere ? Secretary Lansing. Entirely. 228 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Williams. There was more or less of an express or implicit understanding among the peoples of the earth that they respected it, was there not ? Secretary Lansing. Yes, sir. Senator Williams. And they accepted it practically, whether they did or not. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Williams. And it was an miderstanding, and it was regional. Senator Fall. I do not like to interrupt the proceedings to call attention to specific matters and declarations of other countries or language of other countries with reference to the Monroe doctrine, but I do not want by my silence to seem to agree with the statement made by the Senator from Mississippi and with the answers of the Secretary. It has been challenged. Senator Williams. I never said it had not. I was getting the Secretary's opinion and expressing my own. I did not mean to intrench in the slightest degree upon your right to have a different opinion. Senator Fall. Exactly. The Senator could not do that. How- ever, the word "understanding" implies something more than a unilateral declaration, does it not 1 Secretary Lansing. Necessarily. Senator Williams. Let me ask the Secretary this question-: Was there not an understanding between us and Great Britain not to go any further, even before President Monroe announced the doctrine? Secretary Lansing. That is apparently the evidence of history, that Canning had a great deal to do with the announcement of the Monroe Doctrine. Senator Fall. And the United States distinctly declined to make the declaration jointly with Great Britain, which is clearly shown by the correspondence between the various parties, including Jeffer- son, Madison, Adams, and Monroe. The Chairman. We went so much further than Canning expected, that he rejected it. Senator Williams. To go a step further, the United States de- clined to make a joint announcement with Great Britain as was suggested by Canning, but the United States made an announce- ment upon her own hook, and there had been a previous under- standing that Canning wanted the annoimcement made. Now, that is all I am contending for. So that there was an understanding which was to be constituted a part of President Monroe's proclama- tion. It did constitute a part of it; there is no doubt about that. Senator Fall. The Senator is another man skilled in the English language, and he can express in his words what he understands, I presume, or what he wants people to understand that he under- stands, as to an understanding oetween Canning and the United States which was never arrived at. Senator Brandegee. I wish to state, in relation to what the Senator from Mississippi has said, that Canning made the sugges- tion that we fell into. Senator Fall. Canning made the suggestion, which we repudiated. Senator Williams. But imder our principle of not being involved in entangling alliances, we did not want to be involved. And, by the way, Mr. Jefferson was in favor of its being a joint announcement. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 229 Senator Fall. Mr. Chairman, I can not allow such historical distortions, made, of course tinintentionally, to go into the record. Senator Williams. We will let it speak for itseK. The gentlemen will find it in Mr. Jefferson's answer. Senator Fall. I challenge that statement. The Chairman. I will say to the committee that I think the discussion of the Monroe Doctrine is hardly necessary at this point of the hearing of the Secretary. Senator Williams. I have thought so all along. The Chairman. Why did you indulge in it, then ? Senator Borah. Mr. Secretary, I do not desire to ask anything about the Monroe Doctrine. We all imderstood what it was, up to six months ago. Secretary Lansing. I congratulate the Senator, because there seems to be a wide difference of opinion as to what it means. He may be the only man that knows. Senator Borah. There has been no misunderstanding until lately. Mr. Secretary, in order to get a connected statement as to the situation, at the time that Ishii appeared here for the purpose of consummating this agreement, the 21 demands were made, in the early part of the year 1915 ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Borah. The Ih-st four groups of those demands had been acceded to by China in her agreement with Japan in what is known as the Japanese-Chinese agreement? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Borah. Then at the time that Ishii appeared here, the agreement, which followed the demands, had been made known to the world ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Borah. Now, who suggested the proposition of inserting in the agreement which you made with Ishii this proposition of special interest ? Secretary Lansing. It was made by Count Ishii. Senator Borah. You suggested to him that if that meant political control or paramount control, you did not care to discuss it? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Borah. What did he say in reply to that, which would indicate that he waived that construction upon your part? Secretary Lansing. He continued the discussion. Senator Borah. And continued it along what line? Secretary Lansing. Well, only along the line that he inserted it in his counterdraft of a note and urged that it be included. But he understood exactly what I interpreted the words "special interest" to mean. Senator Borah. And you understood what he interpreted them to mean ? Secretary Lansing. No; I did not. Senator Borah. He had said that his idea was that Japan had special interests in China which ought to be recognized, and by those special interests he meant paramount control ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; and I told him I would not consider it. 230 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Borah. Did he say, "Very well, I adopt that construction of it," or anything of that kind ? Secretary Lansing. No, hut he continued to introduce the words "special interest" ; but he knew that if he did not take my meaning I could not continue the discussion. Senator Borah. Is it not a fact that before and after he appeared, his country, officially or semiofficially, placed the construction upon it which Ishii placed upon it ? Secretary Lansing. Before ? Senator Borah. Yes. Secretary Lansing. Not to my knowledge, further than his statement. Senator Borah. I have a dispatch here from the Russian ambas- sador to his home Government, made October 22, 1917, in which he said that Japanese Senator Pomerene. From what are you reading ? Senator Borah. From a copy of this dispatch published in "Democracy and the Eastern Question." Secretary Lansing. By whom ? Senator Borah. By Mr. Millard. Is there any question about the authenticity of the dispatch ? Secretary Lansing. No question, because I do not know anything about it, except his publication of it. Senator Borah. Do you have any doubt about this pubhcation being correct, as to this dispatch? Secretary Lansing. I have no information on the subject at all, one way or the other. Senator Borah. Then you do not desire to have it inferred from your answer that it is false 1 Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Williams. Or true?. Secretary Lansing. No, neither one. Senator Borah. We will read it and see whether time proves it to be true. [Reading:] The Japanese are manifesting more and more clearly a tendency to interpret the special position of Japan in China, inter alia, in the sense that other powers must not undertake in China any political steps without preN-iously exchanging views with Japan on the subject — a condition that would to some extent establish a Japanese control over the foreign affairs of China. On the other hand, the Japanese Govern- ment does not attach great importance to its recognition of the principle of the open door and the integrity of China, regarding it as merely a repetition of the assurances repeatedly given by it earlier to other powers and implying no new restrictions for the Japanese policy in China. It is therefore quite possible that in some future time there may arise in this connection misunderstandings between the United States and Japan. The minister for foreign affairs again confirmed to-day in conversation with me that in the negotiations by Viscount Ishii the question at issue is not some special concession to Japan in these or other parts of China, but Japan's special position in China as a whole. That information, I take it, was unknown to you at the time you had your discussion with Ishii. Secretary Lansing. That dispatch ? Senator Borah. Yes. Secretary Lansing. Entirely so. I would call your attention to the fact that the Root-Takahira agreement included an arrangement be- tween Japan and the United States that they would take no steps without consulting each other, and it would have the same effect as this statement made by the Russian Ambassador. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 231 Senator Borah. And in another dispatch from the Russian Am- bassador under date of November 1, 1917, there is another paragraph which I quote. [Eeading:] To my question whether he did not fear — This was the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Japan that he was talking to — that in the future niisunderstandings might arise from the different interpretations by Japan and the United States of the meaning of the terms "special position" and "special interests" of Japan in China, Viscount Motono replied by saying that (a gap in the original) . Nevertheless I gain the impression from the words of the minister that he is conscious of the possibility of misunderstandings also in the future, but is of the opinion that in such a case Japan would have better means at her disposal for carrying into effect her interpretation than the United States. Now, it is a fact that you stated the other day, is it not, Mr. Secre- tary, that after this Lansing-Ishii agreement was made, Japan placed the construction upon it which Ishii desired to have you place upon it in the first instance ? ■ Secretary Lansing. I have no recollection that there is any state- ment made by the Japanese Government as to the fact which you set forth. Senator Bokah. Have you information that it was made by the press of Japan ? Secretary Lansing. Oh, yes. Senator Borah. And by publications which are under the control of the Government ? Secretary Lansing. That I do not know. Senator Borah. Now, these notes between yourself and Count Ishii were published first in Japan, were they not ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Borah. Was that in accordance with the understanding ? Secretary Lansing. I believe not. I believe they were pub- lished — I believe they came to the knowledge of China before they were made public. Senator Borah. Japan presented the information of these notes to China? Secretary Lansing. That is my recollection. Senator Borah. Yes; and the first knowledge that the American ambassador had of the contents of the notes or that they existed came to him from the Japanese Government ? Secretary Lansing. That I can not tell you. Very likely that is so, however. Senator Borah. They were published there. There was an agree- ment as to the date upon which they should be published and made known to the world ? Secretary Lansing. The 6th of November; four days after they were signed. Senator Borah. And they were published in China and Japan prior to that time ? Secratary Lansing. I wUl not say that they were published. Senator Borah. They were made known to China prior to that ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Borah. And the information came back here prior to the time it should ha"e been pubhshed ? 232 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Secretary Lansing. I think not. I do not think you coiild have had it by cable. Senator Borah. The information came to this comitry not through the Secretary of State, but through cable from China and Japan. Secretary Lansing. I can not tell that. I do not recall any such thing. Senator Borah. The Chinese Legation issued a statement ia the nature of a protest, November 12, 1917. Secretary Lansing. Not a protest. Senator Borah. What do you regard it ? Secretary Lansing. A declaration, as she called it. Senator Borah. I said, "in the nature of a protest." I should say, "a declaration." Senator Hitchcock. That was after the publication? Senator Borah. Yes. Of course they could not issue it before, because they did not know. Senator Hitchcock. You intimated that the Chinese Government did have advance iaformation, and I thought possibly you might be under the impression that they issued this proclamation before. Senator Borah. If I led to that inference I should be corrected. It is declared [reading] : The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have recently, in order to silence mischievous reports, effected an exchange of notes at Washington concerning their desires and intentions with regard to China. Copies of the said notes have been communicated to the Chinese Government by the Japanese Minister at Peking; and the Chinese Government, in order to avoid misunderstanding, hastens to make the folio-wing declaration so as to make known the views of the Government. The principle adopted by the Chinese Government towards the friendly nations haa always been one of justice and equality; and consequently the rights enjoyed by the friendly nations derived from the treaties have been conastently respected, and so, even with the special relations between countries created by the fact of terrilnrial contiguity, it is only in so far as they have already been provided for in her exjating treaties. Hereafter the Chinese Government will still adhere to the principle hitherto adopted, and hereby it is again declared that the Chinese Government will not allow herself to be bound by any agreement entered into by other nations. That last sentence undoubtedly had reference to the Ishii agree- ment? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Borah. And they undoubtedly interpreted it as giving more than a geographical interest in China. Secretary Lansing. That is an assumption that I do not think fol- lows from the language. Senator Borah. What is your construction of it ? Secretary Lansing. Simply that that was a very natural thing for a Government to issue a declaration of that sort because it was deal- ing more or less with her interests. I wish, since you have inserted the text of that declaration into the hearing, that you would also insert the title. Senator Borah (reading) : Declaration of the Chinese Government concerning the notes exchanged between the Governments of the United States and Japan, dated November 2, 1917. Senator Pomerene. May I suggest there that it would seem to be a natural thing for the Chinese Government to issue such a declara- tion in view of the fact that the newspapers of Japan had apparently placed a different construction upon the agreement from that which was entertained by the United States. TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 233 Senator Boeah. I do not know whether they had prior to the 12th of November or not, because that was only five days after the pub- hcation in Japan. Senator Pomerene. I had in mind the fact that you had stated that there were such publications. Senator Borah. No doub^ there were such views in the Japanese press. I would like the Secretary to make clear to my untrained mind the difference between a declaration and a protest in the diplomatic world. Secretary Lansing. There is a very decided difference. A protest calls for an answer, and a declaration does not. Senator Hitchcock. The declaration was in entire accord with the American interpretation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement ? Secretary Lansing. Entirely, sir. Senator Williams. The Monroe doctrine did not call for any answer. Secretary Lansing. That declaration was delivered to the State Department here by the Chinese ambassador, and it was also de- livered at the Japanese Government. Senator Brandbgee. May I ask you, Mr. Secretary, at the time you and Count Ishii were having your conversations in relation to this subject, and as to what "special interests" meant, did he say anything which would allow you to understand what he meant by the term "special interests"? Secretary Lansing. Nothing further than I have stated. Senator Brandegee. Did he at any time intimate that it meant paramountcy or interest different from that of any other nation, other than from Japan's propinquity to Chiina? Secretary Lansing. My only recollection as to that is that he wished to have inserted the words "special interests and influence," and I objected seriously to the insertion of the words "and influence," and they were stricken out. Senator Brandegee. He gave no intimation of what he under- stood by those terms? He did not attempt to define either "influ- ence" or "special interests," did he? Secretary Lansing. Nothing fiurther than that, except that the insertion of the words "and influence" indicated that he understood fully my interpretation of "special interests." Senator Brandegee. "Special interests" could not mean any- thing else, in your opinion, could it, except Secretary Lansing. Political. Senator Brandegee (continuing) . Except political ? Secretary Lansing. That is true. Senator Boeah. That is all I want to ask. Senator Johnson of California. Mr. Secretary, may I direct your attention again to what are termed the secret treaties published by Trotski after November, 1917, when the Kerensky government fell? Up to the time of those publications and the transmission, as you have suggested, by the representative of the United States to our Government, did our Government have any knowledge whatsoever of those secret treaties ? Secretary Lansing. I think not, sir. 234 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Johnson of California. Are you familiar with their terms now? Secretary Lansing. No ; I could not, without refreshing my mem- ory as to the terms of any treaties that were entered into Senator Johnson of California. But the first intimation that the United States had of those secret treaties was in the publication by Trotsky ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Was there any position taken by our commissioners at Paris concerning secret treaties ? Secretary Lansing. Only in the spitit of the treaty, finally. Senator Johnson of California. In the discussion and the conversa- tions, the debates, or the arguments, was there a definite position at any time taken by the American commissioners concerning secret treaties ? Secretary Lansing. Well, I should not wish to answer that, be- cause — of course you understand the organization of the peace con- ference for work, do you not? Senator Johnson of California. Partially so. I would not say whoUy so. Secretary Lansing. I might explaia that. Senator Johnson of California. If you please. Secretary Lansing. In the first instance, it was discovered that to deal with so many delegates and delegations as there were at Paris was not a practicable way of doiag business. There were some 80 delegates. It was therefore determined that there should be instituted a coimcil of ten composed of the 5 heads of the principal powers, and the 5 foreign ministers of the several powers. They dealt with the questions and planned in a general way the work of the conference. Certain commissions were appointed by the confer- ence at the suggestion of the Council of Ten, and on the other hand, other commissions were appointed directly by the Coimcil of Ten when it became necessary to deal with specific subjects. Later, it was deemed advisable that there should be a division of the Council of Ten ia order that the work might progress more rapidly, a division into a council of heads of States which was com- posed of President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Clemenceau, and Mr. Orlando, and then there was a council of foreign ministers established which was composed of the foreign ministers of the heads of the principal Governments, at which presided Mr. Pichon, French minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Balfour, Baron Sonnino, and myself, ministers of foreign affairs, and Baron Makino, of Japan, who was a former minister of foreign affairs of Japan. Senator Moses. There were, then five in the Coimcil of Foreign Ministers and only four in the Coimcil of the Heads of the States? Secretary Lansing. Yes; they were frequently designated as the Council of Four and the Council of Five. The Council of Four practically had entire control of all the activi- ties of the various councils, commissions, and committees that were appointed. The CouncU of Five took up the questions which were referred to it by the Council of Four. They frequently had hearings, and they frequently even appointed special committees to consider subjecte and report directly to them; but in the majority of cases they passed TEBATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMABTY, 235 on questions that were submitted to them and made recommenda- tions to the Council of Four, who adopted, rejected, or amended their recommendations. That was the system of operation, and that prevailed to the last. Senator Johnson of California. Did the Council of Five have referred to it at any time questions of territorial disposition ? Secretary Lansing. Many. Senator Johnson of California. As a metnber of the council, and as one of the representatives of the United States, did you have any policy concerning secret treaties ? Secretary Lansing. I do not recall that the question of secret treaties came up before the Council of Five at all. Senator Johnson of California. So far as you are aware, did the United States commissioners have any policy respecting secret treaties ? Secretary Lansing. I think that as I merely stated the policy myself. I was approached by one of the Italian representatives as to the treaty of London. That was before we had had any meetings of the conference, at all, and he wanted to know what the attitude of the United States would be toward the treaty of London, and I said that so far as the United States was concerned it would support the treaty of London if it was just, and if it was unjust it would resist it or any portion of it. Senator Johnson of California. Pardon me for repeating the ques- tion: Specifically, then, there was no policy outlined for the American Commissioners concerning secret treaties, at all ? Secretary Lansing. We did not consider ourselves bound by secret treaties. Senator Johnson of California. That is exactly what I mean That was a definite policy ? Secretary Lansing. A definite policy. Senator Johnson of California. And that was the policy .of the United States Commissioner in the negotiations at Paris ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Yes. Senator Williams. But I understand you further to have left the inference, at any rate, that where the provisions of a treaty were just and reasonable, the United States would respect them ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Oh, yes. Senator Johnson of California. That was, Senator, as I gathered it, irrespective of any treaty; they would determine the matter upon its justice. Is not that correct ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Williams. I did not quite mean that. Senator, where it had not been determined by the treaty; but if the determination by the treaty was reasonable and just, the United States would respect it ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Let me see if I get that correctly. Was it not the justice of the particular territorial disposition that controlled, with you, rather than any secret treaty ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Yes; I think I understand you. 236 TKBATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Of course you will bear in mind, in that connection, that it is not always possible, in a diplomatic negotiation such as this, to carry out entirely your own ideas of what justice is. Senator Johnson of California. I recognize that. Secretary Lansing. And we had to make peace. Senator Johnson of California. Yes. Now, are you f amUiar with any engagements, if there are any, that the United States undertakes in the Austrian treaty ? Senator Williams. What is that question ? Senator Johnson of California. I asked him if there were any en- gagements with which he was familiar that the United States under- takes in the Austrian treaty ? Secretarjr Lansing. I should want to refresh my memory on that. I do not think I have got the'full text of the Austrian treaty. Senator Johnson of California. You could not speak with accu- racy of that, at present ? Secertary Lansing. I could not speak at all. Senator Williams. With authority ? Senator Johnson of California. No ; accurately, he said. Do you know whether or not in the Turkish and in the Bulgarian treaties that are contemplated there are any engagements that the L^nited States is to undertake ? Secretary Lansing. We have had no text on those at all. Senator Johnson of California. So that the full engagements in which the United States may be involved can not be determined until we get the full text of all the treaties. Secretary Lansing. That is quite true, of course. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know whether there is any tripartite agreement with respect to the Orient or the Far East between France, England, and Japan ? Secretary Lansing. I have never seen any. I have heard of such an agreement, but I do not know of its contents, only in that gen- eral way. Senator Johnson of California. You say you have heard of it in a general way. Have you heard of it officially ? Secretary Lansing. No, sir. Senator Johnson of California. Have you heard of it in such fashion that in your opinion you could say that such an agreement exists 1 Secretary Lansing. I should not wish to say so, but I believe so. Senator Hitchcock. Are you speaking of the Near East now? Senator Johnson of California. I am speaking of the Far East and the Orient. Senator Hitchcock. Are you speaking of Asia Minor? Senator Johnson of California. Yes; of Asia Minor, China, and the territory thereabouts. Secretary Lansing. Possibly it would help me to answer and it would be of more value to you if I should find out just what this has to do with the German treaty. Senator Johnson of California. It has this to do with it: The German treaty has within it a league of nations. The German treaty has within it a disposition of a part of China. If there is a secret tripartite agreement in existence to-day dealing with other parts of Chma and other parts of the Far East, of course, we ought to know TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 237 it when we are dealiiig with this particular treaty. That is the theory, exactly, upon which I asked you. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. In your opinion, then, does such an agreement, such a tripartite agreement — mutual understanding- exist? Secretary Lansing. That I am not prepared to say, without ' Senator Johnson of California. May I rest it upon the proposition that you believe there is such a one ? Secretary Lansing. I believe there is such an agreement. Just what it contains I do not know. Senator Williams. To what effect do you believe it extends? What is the ^bstance of the understanding that you believe exists ? Secretary Lansing. I believe there was some agreement early in the war as to, possibly, the spheres of influence in Turkish territory. Senator Williams. In Turkish territory? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Williams. Senator, are you inquiring about Turkey, or the Far East? Senator Johnson of California. I was inquiring about Asia Minor and China as well. Secretary Lansing. I do not know anything about any other agreements with regard to China. I do not believe there are any. Senator Swanson. You believe that this agreement is limited to what is generally known as Asia Minor and that section ? Secretary Lansing. To the Ottoman Empire, I would say. Senator Williams. I understand, as a matter of newspaper notoriety, at any rate, whether it is true or not — nobody knows how much is true — that there was some sort of agreement between Great Britain and France and Italy and Greece with regard to Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and possibly Armenia. Is that the matter you are referring to ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; that is the matter I am referring to. Senator Johnson of California. We wiU clear that ujp. Do you refer to an agreement between France, England, and Japan? Secretary Lansing. Another one ? Senator Johnson of California. Yes. Secretary Lansing. I never heard of it. Senator Pomerene. Do I understand, then, that when you said that you believed there was such a tripartite agreement awhile ago, you meant between some other parties and France, Great Britain, and Japan? Secretary Lansing. No; I did not refer to France, Great Britain, and Japan, at all. I referred to France, Great Britain, and Italy in regard to the Ottoman Empire; nothing else. Senator Johnson of California. Yes; I am glad of the correction, hecause I thought your answer was open to the suggestion made by Senator Pomerene, and I wanted to get it exactly. The question did involve only those three powers; but you have made that matter plain, now, so far as that is concerned. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Do you recall, first, the submission of the German treaty; then subsequently, the matter coming up upon modification or revision? 238 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMAlirY. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. You recall such a thing trans piring ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Can you state whether or not it is a fact that Mr. Lloyd-George and Mr. Clemenceau left to the President the determination of whether there should be modification or revision ' Secretary Lansing. No, sir; I do not know. Senator Johnson of California. That is all, so far as I am concerned Senator Moses. Mr. Secretary, what was the reason that Japar had no place on the first council of five ? Secretary Lansing. There was no head of the state. Senator Moses. She had a chief plenipotentiary. Secretary Lansing. I know, but that is a different thing. That is the head delegation. There now are sitting in Paris, instead of the Council of the Heads of States and the Council of Foreign Ministers, a CouncU of the Heads of Delegations, which are dealing with the Austrian, Bulgarian, and Turkish questions. Senator Moses. Roumanian, too ? Secretary Lansing. Roumanian, yes. Senator Moses. At any time during the consideration of the treaty was the question of racial minorities brought forward ? Secretary Lansing. I could not answer that with actual knowledge, because whatever was brought forward in that connection was brought forward before the commission on the league of nations, and I was not a member of that commission. Senator Moses. Do you think it was brought forward before that commission ? Secretary Lansing. I beheve it was. Senator Moses. And what determination was made of it ? Secretary Lansing. That I could not answer. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know how our representa- tives on that commission voted on that question ? Secretary Lansing. I would not answer, sir. I can not. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know anything about the blockade, Mr. Secretary ? Secretary Lansing. The blockade ? Senator Johnson of California. Yes. Secretary Lansing. What feature of it ? Senator Johnson of California. Is there a blockade being main- tained in respect to Russia at the present time ? Secretary Lansing. No, sir. Senator Johnson of California. Is it off, so far as the United States is concerned ? Secretary Lansing. So far as the United States is concerned. Senator Johnson of California. Were we a party to it for a time ? Secretary Lansing. Only so far as it affected certain ports that were occupied by Germans. Senator Johnson of CaUfomia. Are our people at liberty to trade with Russia now — I mean European Russia ? Secretary Lansing. To an extent. I do not know how far. That is a matter which the War Trade Board is at present considering. I believe that it would be a rather dangerous thing to do. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know whether we have merchants in Stockholm waiting to go in and trade ? TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 239 Secretary Lansing. That I do not know. I believe we have, because we have many in neutral countries simply waiting for the treaty of peace to be ratified, when tbey will go in and stand an equal chance with the British and the French, who are also waiting. Senator Williams. With regard to our blockade of certain ports of Russia, do you know whether that affected only those ports of Russia where the commerce of Russia would become indirectly, at any rate, commerce with Germany ? Secretary Lansing. That is practically the only place that we car- ried on a blockade. Senator Williams. That is what I imderstand. Secretary Lansing. The attitude of this Government has been that a blockade was an act of war, and that we could not institute a blockade until Congress had declared war on Russia. That has been our attitude, and within a week I have sent such instructions to Paris. Senator Williams. That is, a blockade against all Russia? SecretaryLiANSiNG. Yes. Senator Williams. A blockade against points in Germany or under German influence ? Secretary Lansing. That is a different thing. Senator Johnson of California. How long have we been a part of the blockade of Russia ? Secretary Lansing. We have not been a part of the blockade, yet. Senator Johnson of California. At any time ? Secretary Lansing. Not that I know of. Senator Johnson of California. Are not the French and the English trading in Germany now ? Secretary Lansing. Trading in Germany ? Senator Johnson of California. Yes. Senator Williams. Across the border ? Secretary Lansing. I do not know to what extent. Senator Johnson of California. Are not trade relations resumed between the French and the English and the Germans ? Secretary Lansing. Not entirely. Senator Johnson of California. Not entirely; that is quite true; but are they not resumed so that they are resumed in great part ? Secretary Lansing. Without the sanction of the Governments, I believe. Senator Williams. We are also trading with Germany, are we not ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Williams. To a certain extent; sending cotton through certain Dutch ports; that goes on through to Germany? Secretary Lansing. We can not resume trade relations until we have consuls in the various ports, and we can not have consuls in the various ports until this treaty is ratified. The Chairman. We abrogated — or terminated, I should say — the Russian treaty, as you will know, some years ago. ■ Secretary Lansing. Yes. The Chairman. Have we ever made another consular treaty with Germany ? Secretary Lansing. Not yet. We have not had the opportunity. The Chairman. How did we carry on trade with Germany ? 240 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Secretary Lansing. By mutual agreements with our consular officers. The Chairman. It is perfectly possible to do that. Secretary Lansing. With any country. The Chairman. Trade can be carried on without a consular treaty. Secretary Lansing. I did not say a consular treaty; I said without consular officers. You can not carry on much trade without consular officers. Senator Harding. What would happen to our trade if England, France, and Japan were to ratify this treaty and we should not ? Secretary Lansing. We could not have consular officers. We could not go on with the trade. Senator Harding. The treaty becomes effective on such ratifica- tion? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator McCumber. And the treaty gives us every right that France, England, or Japan would have in commercial relations the moment it is signed, even by them, even though we do not sign 1 Secretary Lansing. No; it does not go into effect except by the signature of those who have ratified the treaty. The Chairman. I do not think that is the wording of the treaty. Secretary Lansing. What ? The Chairman. Is that the wording? Senator McCutmber. Does not the treaty itself provide that when it is ratified so that it becomes an effective treaty even as between those nations, that aU nations shall have the right of the most- favored nation ? Secretary Lansing. No, sir; because there is no most-favored- nation clause that we can invoke. Senator McCumber. No ; but if the treaty does provide that every one of the allied and associated nations shall have the rights of the most-favored nation, then when this is signed by Great Britain and France and England and Germany, that gives us the right, does it not? Secretary Lansing. The right to what ? Senator McCumber. The right of the most-favored nation to trade in Germany's territory? Of coiu-se I admit that you would have to have consular agents to get along very weU. Secretary Lansing. Yes; of course. Senator McCumber. But I am speaking of the bare legal right. Secretary Lansing. I do not think so. Senator McCumber. I will simply say that the treaty so provides. Secretary Lansing. I do not tmnk that the ratification by any other power can create peace between this country and Germany. Senator McCumber. But it declares what the commercial relations shall be between this country and Germany and all the aUied powers, including the United States. I can not turn to it immediately, but I call your attention to it. Secretary Lansing. But unless we accept that, it does not affect us. The Chairman. We are trading with Germany now, as a matter of fact. Secretary Lansing. To a very small degree, sir. The Chairman. StUl, we are trading with Germany now, as a mat- ter of fact. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 241 Secretary Lansing. Because it is an emergency. The Chairman. I am not going into explanations, but I am sim- ply stating that as a matter of fact we are trading with Germany now. Secretary Lansing. Yes, but it is not the legalized trade of a time of peace, when we say we are trading with her. The Chairman. If you will pardon me, I did not say what kind of trading it was or how much it was. I said that we were trading with Germany now, as a matter of fact. Secretary Lansing. I quite agree with you, sir, but I do not want to let it rest there. I want to show that the trade we are carrying on with Germany amounts to nothing to-day. The Chairman. You can make any explanation you desire, of course. Secretary Lansing. And it will amount to nothing until we have a restoration of peace; and the only way we can have a restoration of peace is by the ratification of this treaty. Senator Williams. Or the making of a new one. The Chairman. How about France ? I saw it stated that the Chamber of Deputies would not take up the discussion of the peace treaty until the 26th of August. Secretary Lansing. I heard that was so, sir. That is all I know about it. I have seen that in the paper. Senator Fall. Mr. Secretrary, I was not here during the first part of your discussion of this consular matter. In the event that we ratified this treaty, would consular arrangements be restored between the United States and Germany at once ? Secretary Lansing. Yes, sir. Senator Fall. There is no provision in the treaty for that. Secretary Lansing. That does not make any difference. We could have just a formal agreement. We can send consular officers any- where, provided we can find a government from which the proper documents can issue. Senator Fall. We could do that without the treaty of peace. Secretary Lansing. No; not without the treaty of peace, because we can not trade with enemies. Senator Fall. The reason for my remark is because I have here before me what purport to be the counterproposals of Germany, with the Brockdorff-Kantzau covering letter, and the answer to the same with the Clemenceau letter, and the specific discussion of yourself and the other peace commissioners; and I find under the discussion of part 10, Economic Causes, a final answer, followed by the other matters, to Germany, containing this statement: Consular relations are not reciprocally established, owing to the war activity of German consuls. , That is, not estabHshed and not provided for in the Peace Treaty, and this is our oflBicial answer: Private property of Germans abroad may justly be used to meet reparation charges, as Germany's resources are wholly inadequate and because in the war the allied powers themselves have had to take over foreign investments of their nationals to meet foreign obligations, giving their own domestic obligations in return. The significant part of it is that in passing upon this treaty I noted, as aU the other members did immediately, that there was no provision for reciprocal trade relations except as carried on by certain com- 135546—19 r-16 242 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMAirT. missions, the Reparation Commission having general governmental powers, for instance; but here is the distinct statement as to why the consular agreements, which we either place in a peace treaty or follow by a separate consiilar agreement, are not reciprocally established. In answer to the demand of Germany that these very things be done, the specific reason is set forth here, if this is a correct statement of the position of the Allies, and the reason stated why we do not provide for consulat relations. I wiU read it agaia: Consular relations are not reciprocally established, owing to the war activity of German consuls. Senator Williams. "Reciprocally." Senator Fall. That was the governing influence with the peace commissioners, was it ? Secretary Lansing. Undoubtedly. Senator Fall. Then, in the event that we sign this treaty, the war activities of the German consuls would no longer prevent om- en taring into consular relations with Germany? Secretary Lansing. Why, we have got to negotiate a consular treaty with Germany, of course. Senator Fall. Is it not a fact, or an I misinformed, that through your office the statement was made that, ia the absence of consular agents or consuls of the United States ia Germany, consuls of other ooimtries in Germany would be asked temporarily to take care of the American business, in order that trade might go along? Secretary Lansing. They have to a certain extent been asked to do so. Senator Johnson of California. Do you mean the consuls of neutral countries ? Secretary Lansing. Of neutral coim tries ; yes. Senator Johnson of California. Has that request been made of them? Secretary Lansing. I do liot recall that it has. Senator Fall. As I recall, the statement purporting to emanate from your office — possibly it may have been from the Department of Commerce — was that that request had been made, and pending a final arrangement, or the signing of the treaty, and consular arrange- ments being restored, that consuls of other countries who were there would be asked to take care of American trade, and that American trade with Germany was being carried on through such channels. I assume that it meant through the consuls of such countries as Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and Holland — neutral countries. The Chairman. Are there any further questions that any Senator desires to ask? Senator Swanson. On page 53% of the treaty is a provision which says that the treaty only becomes operative with those who ratify it. I will read the provision : A first procfes verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up as soon as the treaty has been ratified by Germany on the one hand, and by three of the principal allied and associated powers on the other hand. Prom the date of this first procfes verbal the treaty will come into force between the high contracting parties who have ratified it. The Chairman. Read the whole of it. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEKMAWY. 243 Senator Swanson. The rest of it reads : For the determination of all periods of time provided for in the present treaty this date will be the date of the coming into force of the treaty. Of course that limits it to those who ratify it. Senator McCumbee. Let us put into the record this statement in addition, that if the treaty itself provides, and there is an agreement between Germany and Great Britain and France, that Germany shall give to the United States the same rights that she gives to France and Great Britain, then vre have the right to take advantage of the treaty which Germany has made with Great Britain and France, that she will give to American citizens the same rights that she gives to the British and French citizens, and that is what I contend this treaty does provide. Senator Swanson. But that treaty does not become operative until we agree to it. Senator McCumber. We can take advantage of it or not, as we choose, but we have that right in the treaty itself. Senator Williams. By that the Senator may mean one of two things. If he means that while we are technically at war with Ger- many we can claim the rights of the most favored nation, that she has given to those who are technically at peace with her, I think he must be mistaken. But immediately after the ratification by us, of course we come into our rights under the treaty. The CiiAiEMAN. Are there any more questions to be asked of the Secretary ? Senator Fall. I should like to ask this question, Mr. Secretary: Has the ban been removed from the importation of German potash ? I have a newspaper clipping • here which says that the War Trade Board, in response to the farmers' demand for potash for fertilizer, have removed the ban, and that German potash can now be imported into the United States. Secretary Lansing. That is correct. Senator Fall. We are technically at war with Germany, and still under the powers vested in the War Trade Board by the laws of the United States the War Trade Board can relieve that condition to the extent of allowing the importation of potash simply by a declara- tion of the War Trade Board ? Secretary Lansing. Certainly. Senator Fall. Could the War Trade Board by a similar declaration, or by a similar proclamation, relieve the ban against the trading with Germans in every other way ? Secretary Lansing. Those are impoi-ts into this country and not exports to Germany. Senator Fall. Could they do that? Could they allow German imports to come in ? Secretary Lansing. Possibly we could continue in a state of war with Germany, and the War Trade Board, which is created as an instrument of war, could modify certain prohibitions that were issued. Senator Williams. Either in part or in toto ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; I think so. Senator Harding. If Germany wanted American raw materials, would there be anything to prevent her getting them if we were agreeable ? 244 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Secretary Lansing. And continue at war ? Senator Haeding. Whatever you choose to call it. Secretary Lansing. I should doubt the feasibility of such a plan as that. Senator McCumber. Not discussing the question of feasibility, can it be done under the treaty 1 Secretary Lansing. Not under the treaty, no. Senator McCxjmber. The question is not whether it is feasible, but could American citizens, with the consent of Germany herself, sell goods into Germany? Germany makes no objection, and we make no objection. What is to prevent our sending the goods into Germany, simply in spite of the fact that there is technically a state of war? Secretary Lansing. A great deal. We have none of the machiaery of commerce. Senator McCxjmber. We have ships and we have goods. They are the principal machinery. Secretary Lansing. That is not the only machinery that is neces- sary. Senator McCumber. It is difficult, we will say, without consular agents, but I am speaking now of the bare legal right. Secretary Lansing. Yes, but we would have no claim against a government with which we are at war, if she should violate her agree- ment. Senator McCumber. That would be a different proposition entirely. Senator Fall. Mr. Secretary, if the other Senators are through, I should like to go back to the subject that we were discussing. That is the question of trading between Geiman nationals and American nationals and the German Government and the American Govern- ment, in view of your statement with reference to imports. That is certainly a matter of our municipal regulation. Secretary Lansing. It is. Senator Fall. In other words, unless we had the trading- with- the- enemy act, which is municipal legislation adopted by the Congress of the United States, there would not have been any penalty at all attaching to trading between the citizens of this country and the citi- zens of Germany, although enemies, except the liability to seizure of the goods. There would not have been any penalty for such trading, except the liability of seizure, if it had not been for the trading-witn- the-enemy act. Secretary Lansing. We have got to have a law fixing the penalty, of course. Senator Fall. Then, subject simply to seizure by the respective governments, either as contraband of war or because of the inter- national rule against trading with the enemy, or because of our municipal law, the interchange of products between the two countries is prohibited; but under the international rule the only penalty would be the seizure of the goods and the loss of them, if intended for enemy consumption. Of course, a country has the right always, without municipal legislation, to prevent its citizens sending goods out of the country or trading with the enemy so as to assist the enemy in carry- ing on the war while we are at war with her. That would be the right of a government in self-protection; but there is no penalty except the seizure of the goods. We passed the trading-with-the-enemy act for TREATY OP PEACE WITH GEBMANY. 245 the very purpose of providing a penalty, so that we could immediately seize the goods through our civil authorities as well as we ordinarily could seize them through our military authorities, in order to stop it. Now, there is power vested in the War Trade Board, so you say, to suspend that law in so far as imports from Germany are concerned. They have done that in the matter of potash. Oi course, if they could do it in the matter of potash they could do it with reference to chemicals or any other product of Germany. There is no distinct provision in the law, as I recall it, which gives to the War Trade Board any such authority. My recollection of the trading-with-the-enemy act is that trading, either buying or selling, is prohibited under a penalty, and that the President of the United States may issue licenses allowuig citizens of the United States, or presumably alien citizens, possibly enemies, to continue to trade under his license, under proper circumstances, in his dis- cretion. That is the only provision that I find in the trading with the enemy act by which there can be any suspension of the penalty whatsoever; that is, at least in so far as our citizens are concerned. We can not penalize the Germans, because we can not catch them. But as soon as those goods come into the hands of citizens of the United States, unless they have a license from the President of the United States, would they not be liable under the trading-with-the- enemy act ? Secretary Lansing. I assume they would. Senator Fall. Then along with this declaration or proclamation authorizing the importation of potash there would be necessarily a license from the President to the party receiving the goods and dis- tributing them, to relieve him from the penalties of the trading with the enemy act. Secretary Lansing. I presume that would be so, but I am not an expert on the provisions of that act, or on the operations of the War Trade Board, although it has recently been placed under the Depart- ment of State. Senator Fall. You readily understand the point I am getting at. Then this whole matter is a matter of municipal legislation under the act of Congress governing the trading. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. If the Congress of the United States to-day repealed the provisions contained in the trading-with-the-enemy act, then there would no longer be any penalties, and the trading would be free, would it not ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Williams. Except still the penalty of seizure? Secretary Lansing. The penalty of the. seizure of the goods com- ing from G-ermany. Senator Fall. Then Congress could not repeal that at all. Secretary Lansing. I think that is a war power. Senator Fall. My impression was that the war power belonged to Congress. Secretary Lansing. The war power, so far as the Military and Naval Establishments are concerned, rests very largely, I believe, with the President of the United States, as Commander in Chief. 246 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Fall. Naturally the direction of the naval and military- forces in time of war, of course, rests in the hands of the President. No one undertakes to assert the contrary; but the whole line of my questioning, .with which I thought you were in agreement, was that this trading-with-the-enemy act could be suspended so that people could come in here with carloads or shiploacfe of potash and trade freely with the people of the United States, and that that was all ia pursuance of this proclamation by the War Trade Board. Secretary Lansing. I think it takes a proclamation of the Presi- dent to do that. Senator Fall. I thought you said that it was suspended, and that potash was being brought in. Senator Williams. Licensed. Secretary Lansing. Licensed by the President. Senator Fall. Not in so far as Germans . are concerned. The President can not license Germans. He could license them to trade with us, of course, during the war, here in this country; but so far as the importation of potash into this country is concerned, the War Trade Board has issued a proclamation, and potash is being brought into this country at the demand of the farmers. Now, under the ruling of the War Trade Board, this is what is happening. I am not trying to put anybody in a hole or to take any advantage. I am trying to ascertain exactly where we stand; and I myself nave sug- gested that in the face of the trading-with-the-enemy act passed by Congress, an American citizen accepting that potash here and imder- taking to distribute it might become liable to the penalties provided in the act itseK, unless he operated under a license from the President of the United States. I think that is a fair statement of it, as I understand the law. Senator Williams. I think so, too, except this, of course, which I wish to add, that the President made the War Trade Board his instrumentality for the purpose of granting these licenses. Senator Fall. I am not trying to criticize. I am trying to get at the facts. Senator Williams. That is all I am trying to do, and all anyone is trying to do, I think. Senator Fall. The Senator from Mississippi is entitled to amend the question, or to get such definition of the answer as he desires, if he can. Now, Mr. Secretary, to get back for a moment, you say you under- stand we are trading with Germany, and we are using the instru- mentalities of the consular agents and consuls of other countries there for that purpose. Secretary Lansing. I did not say that, sir. Senator Fall. I misunderstood you. I asked you if it was not a fact, and I understood you to say that you understood it was. Secretary Lansing. I did not say that I knew that to be a fact. I said I thought so. Senator Fall. Are we trading with Germany at all ? Secretary Lansing. I do not know anythmg about the actual trading that is going on with Germany. Senator Fall. If it is necessary that bills of lading should be visaed by consuls or consular agents, in order that intercourse be carried on between two countries, through their regular diplomatic TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 247 agents or through consular agents or consuls of some other country acting for us, you would know it, would you not ? That is in your department ? ■ Secretary Lansing. Yes, I assume so; unless something has been done while I was on the way over or while I was in Paris. If some- thing had been done while I was. away I might not know it, but I have no recollection of its having been brought to my attention since I returned. Senator Fall. Then you do not know, as a matter of fact, whether we are trading with the enemy or not ? Secretary Lansing. As a matter of fact I do not know. I assume that we are. Senator Fall. If we are, we must necessarily be using some other instrumentality for the carrying on of such trade, must we not? Secretary Lansing. If we go to German ports, yes; but if we go to neutral ports instead of German ports, we do not need to. Senator Fall. Assuming that we are trading directly with Ger- man ports, then we must use some instrumentality, like the consuls or consular agents of neutrals ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. Prior to the war we had a consular agreement with Germany. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. We first had constdar agreements with Prussia and the Hanseatic towns, and Bavaria, and various other independ- ent States. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. And then we had a consular agreement with the German Empire 1 Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. And that was suspended during the war ? Secretary Lansing. It was abrogated before the war. Senator Fall. I mean it was in effect up to the time that we dismissed von Bernstorff and broke off diplomatic relations. Secretary Lansing. It had been abrogated prior to that. Senator Fall. It had ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; following the Seaman's act. We abro- gated about 23 consular treaties at that time. Senator Fall. You have reference to the La Follette Act? Secretary Lansing. To the La FoUette Act. Senator Fall. We abrogated that how ? Secretary Lansing. We gave notice to the Governments. Accord- mg to the terms of the consular treaties, and treaties which con- tamed consular provisions, we gave notice to the various Govern- ments that we abrogated that portion, or the whole treaty. Senator Fall. Did we withdraw our consuls and consular agents from Germany ? . . , , Secretary Lansing. We did not. It was permissive that they would continue, so as not to interrupt the trade. Senator Fall. What functions did they perform ? Secretary Lansing. The same functions that they had performed previously, but under the general provision as to consular officers. 248 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANY. Senator Pall. That general provision was never abrogated by the United States Government, except as it was suspended by the declaration of war by the Congress of the United States. Secretary Lansing. Yes ; I think that is true. I think your state- ment of that is correct. Senator Fall. We continued doing business with Germany right along ? Secretary Lansing. We did. Senator Fall. Except in so far as the particular provisions with reference to desertions of saUors in ports, and so forth, were concerned. Secretary Lansing. Of course there were not very many American ships entering German ports. Senator Fall. No, but the provisions of this seaman's act to which you have reference were with regard to seamen who should desert or leave ships in port? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. And subsequent to the passage of the La FoHette Act, which abrogated these treaties, we notified these coimtries that these particular provisions ia these consular treaties were abrogated. Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. As to the other provisions, they remaraed in full force and effect until we declared war. Secretary Lansing. They did remain in effect with certain coun- tries. Senator Fall. With Germany ? Secretary Lansing. That I can not tell you without examining the act. I presume the whole treaty fell in that particular case, because we had a special consular treaty. Senator Fall. Then if the whole treaty fell, and we continued to do business with Germany, aU that is necessary is that there be by the President, whom I assume to be the proper authority, or by some other proper authority, a declaration that peace exists between Ger- many and the United States, and those consular agreements or arrangements would be restored. Secretary Lansing. So far as they are concerned it would be — when peace is restored, those provisions would be restored. Senator Williams. Senator, if you will pardon me, I should like to ask a question right there, more as a matter of- curiosity, because it relates to this. Senator Fall. Certainly. Senator Williams. How far did our cutting off diplomatic rela- tions with Germany affect our consular service, before the declara- tion of war ? Secretary Lansing. We withdrew our consular officers at the Bame time. Senator Williams. At once ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. I noticed in yesterday's dispatches among other things a statement that Rumania would decline to be boimd or to abide by or to enter into treaties such as are provided in this treaty that is pending before us, for the protection of racial and religious minorities. Ilave you had any information upon that subject? Secretary Lansing. None at aU. Senator Fall. Has your attention been called to the Associated Press dispatches ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANY. 249 Secretary Lansing. No, sir. Senator Harding. Mr. Secretary, Eumania wanted to make some reservations in the treaty, did she not? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Harding. Do you know what they were ? Secretary Lansing. They related to minority representation. Senator Fall. Mr. Secretary, in so far as enemy countries are con- cerned we have only negotiated a treaty with Germany. That is, in so far as any conclusion of negotiations is concerned. Is that correct ? Secretary Lansing. That is correct. Senator Fall. With what other countries are there now pending peace-treaty negotiations ? Secretary Lansing. Peace treaties with Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey are being considered. The negotiations with Austria are practically finished. Senator Fall. They are in process of negotiation and more or less completed ? Secretary Lansing. Yes; and I assume — ^though it would be an assumption on my part — that a Hungarian treaty is also being prepared. Senator Fall. I was going to ask about that. Hungary when we entered the war having been an integral portion of the Austrian Empire and having since been separated, and we recognizing and demanding the separation Secretary Lansing. It was a federated monarchial State com- posed of two distinct sovereignties united under one ruler. Senator Fall. I said "the Austrian Empire," not Austria; that it was an integral portion of the Austrian Empire, which was composed of Austria and Hungary. , Secretary Lansing. "Austro-Hungarian" is the title. Senator Fall. Then I hope the record may be corrected so that where I said the "Austrian Empire" it will appear that it should have been the "Austro-Hungarian Empire," of which Hungary was an integral portion. The Chairman. It is understood that that correction will be made. Senator Fall. Mr. Secretary, there is a provision here for a future treaty with Czechoslovakia with the principal allied and associated powers — that is, the five great powers — is there not ? ' Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. Although it is placed in the German treaty here, it is a treaty to be made with Czechoslovakia. They are to enter into a treaty with the principal aUied and associated powers, by which they are to agree to guarantee racial and religious protection within their boundaries whenever they have any boundaries. That is cor- rect, is it not ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. Sometime within two years ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. Senator Fall. There is a similar provision with reference to a treaty with Poland ? Secretary Lansing. We have that. Senator Fall. We have that and it is before this body now. The Chairman. It has never been sent in. I have had printed in the record an English copy of it. 250 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Fall. I was assuming that it had been brought in before us as officially as any of the others. The Chairman. It was laid before the House of Commons and the Chamber of Deputies, but it has never been laid before us officially. Senator Fall. Very well. You say you have not had your atten- tion called to it; but suppose it is true, as announced, that Roumania has dechned to enter into any proposed treaty to guarantee racial or religious minorities. Would that have any effect upon the treaty for the same purpose mentioned in the treaty that is pending before us ? Secretary Lansing. I do not think so. Senator Fall. You think not ? Secretary Lansing. I think not. Senator Fall. Suppose that Roumania declined to enter the league of nations. Would that have any effect upon the league at all ? Secretary Lansing. She has already signed this treaty. Senator Fall. She has already broken it, has she not ? Secretary Lansing. No. Senator Fall. If she signed it, and she is continuing at war, continuing to fight the commands of the high commissioners who are there now, and if she has invaded Hungary and has committed acts of war on various portions of the earth's surface, do you say there is no violation of any treaty agreements ? Secretary Lansing. No; because it has not been ratified. Senator Fall. Is it not a fact that as between governments them- selves a treaty becomes operative when it is signed or negotiated? Secretary Lansing. No, sir. Senator Fall. It is not ? Secretary Lansing. No, sir. Senator Fall. Has not our Supreme Court so held ? Secretary Lansing. No, sir. Senator Fall. Do you remember the Swiss case, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States several years ago, in wmch a treaty between Switzerland and the United States was negotiated and signed, but not ratified for something like 10 years? A ques- tion came up involving private property rights, and the Supreme Court of the United States held that as between Governments the treaty was in force from the date of the negotiations, but that as to citizens it was not in effect and would not take effect until it was ratified. Secretary Lansing. I have no such recollection. Senator Fall. Well, sir, I will take pleasure in furnishing you with that decision, as well as with some other opinions upon the same subject. Secretary Lansing. Thank you very much. The Chairman. Are there any further questions to be asked of the Secretary ? Senator Moses. Has the State Department received any recent information from the legation at Brussels with reference to the pro- ceedings in the Belgian Parliament in connection with the treaty ? Secretary Lansing. I have heard nothing except what I have seen in the papers. We have had no reports on it at aU. Senator Moses. The legation has not reported? Secretary Lansing. No. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 251 The Chairman. Are there any further questions to be asked of the Secretary? Some members of the committee would like to ask some questions of Mr. David Hunter Miller, who is in the State Department, and we should be glad to have him here to-morrow at half past 10. Secretary Lansing. Very well, sir. There is one other thing I want to make entirely clear, that I fulfill my promises. I was asked to produce the resolution that I suggested to be introduced in regard to the league of nations. It is very brief, and with your permission I wiU read it. The Chairman. Certainly, we should be very glad to have you read it into the record. Secretary Lansing. It was under date of January 22, 1919, and is as foUows: PROPOSED RESOLUTION TO BE LAID BEFORE THE OONFEBBNCB ON THE PRELIMINARIES OP PEACE. Resolved, That the conference make the following declarations: That the preservations of international peace is the standing policy of civilization and to that end a league of nations should be organized to prevent international wars; That it is a fundamental principle of peace that all nations are equally entitled to the undisturbed possession of their respective territories, to the full exercise of their respective sovereignties, and to the use of the high seas as the common property of all peoples; and That it is the duty of all nations to engage by mutual covenant — (1) To safeguard from invasion the sovereign rights of one another; (2) To submit to arbitration all justiciable disputes which fail of settlement by diplomatic arrangement; (3) To submit to investigation by the league of nations all nonjusticiable disputes which fail of settlement by diplomatic arrangement; (4) To abide by an award of an arbitral tribunal and to respect a report of the league of nations after investigation. That the nations should agree upon — (1) A plan for general reduction of armaments on land and sea; (2) A plan for the restriction of enforced military service and the governmental regulation and control of the manufacture and sale of munitions of war; (3) Full publicity of all treaties and international agreements; (4) The equal application to all other nations of commercial and trade regulations and restrictions imposed by any nation; (5) The proper regulation and control of new states pending complete independence and sovereignty. January 22, 1919. Senator Williams. That was your suggestion to the American delegates, to be suggested by them to the conference ? Secretary Lansing. Yes. The Chairman. I will say that I have here, just received from the President, a printed copy of the American draft, and also a printed copy of the first covenant reported, which has, of course, been widely pnnted in this country. Senator Williams. Suppose you print it in this hearing. Senator Lodge. I am going to have it printed separately as a document. Senator Williams. I suggest that you also put it into this record. Senator Lodge. I can see no objection to that. Senator Moses. Mr. Secretary, with reference to that resolution which you read, everything which you have to say further about it is contained on page 144 of your testimony, in which you say that it was laid before the commission. Senator Brandegee asked you what 252 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEKMABTY. was done with that by our commission, to which you replied that you did not know. Senator Brandegee said, "It was not favorably considered, was it ? Of course it was not adopted." And you replied, "No; there was no action taken." The Chairman. Are there any further questions? Secretary Lansing. I was also asked to submit the report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, which contained the reservations The Chairman. Those are the sections relating to the Kaiser? Secretary Lansing. Yes; the trial of the Kaiser. I do not know whether you want that inserted in the record. Senator Moses. I think it should be. The Chairman. It may be inserted as a part of the Secretary's testimony. Senator McCumber. Your view on that subject is in the document ? Secretary Lansing. Is in the signed memorandum that is annexed to the report. (The document referred to is printed following to-day's hearing.) Senator Fall. Is there a statement in this memorandum as to whether the trial of the Kaiser will be judicial in its nature or not ? Secretary Lansing. You will have to determine that from the terms of the treaty. I do not undertsand that it is of a judicial nature at all, but it is rather a tribunal that is established as a political instru- ment. Senator Fall. Mr. Clemenceau so stated in his answer to Brock- dorff-Rantzau, did he not ? Secretary Lansing. I do not recall. Senator Fall. Mr. Clemenceau stated in his answer to Brock- dorff-Rantzau that the trial would not be judicial in its nature, while it would follow judicial forms. Senator Williams. Yes; as I understand it, it is a political case, but that in investigating it they will pursue judicial methods. Secretary Lansing. That is correct. The Chairman. Is there anything else you care to have printed? We will be very glad to put it in the record if there is anything. Secretary Lansing. I think there is nothing to add. The Chairman. I understand Mr. MiUer had something to do with the drafting of the league of nations provision, and we wiU be very glad to have him here to-morrow morning at 10.30. If there are no further questions, we will excuse the Secretary of State. (Whereupon, at 12.35 p. m., the committee adjourned until Tuesday, August 12, 1919, at 10.30 a. m.) (The documents referred to in the hearing, to be printed in con- nection with it, are as follows:) To THE Senate: I have received the resolutions of the Senate dated July 15 and July 17 asking: First. For a copy of any treaty purporting to have been projected between Grermany and Japan, such as was referred to in the press dispatch inclosed, together with any information in regard to it which may be in possession of the State Department, or any information concerning any negotiations between Japan and Germany during the progress of the war. In reply to this resolution I have the honor to report that I know of no such negotiations. I had heard the rumors that are referred to, but was never able to satisfy myself that there was anj^ substantial foundation for them. Second. Requesting a copy of any letter or written protest by the members of the American Peace Commission, or any officials attached thereto, against the disposition TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 253 or adjustment which was made in reference to Shantung, and particularly a copv of a letter written by Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, member of the peace commission, on I^enalf of himself, Hon Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, and Hon. Henry White, members of the peace commission, protesting against the provisions of the treaty with refer- ence to Shantung. In reply to this request let me say that Gen. Bliss did write me a letter in which he took very strong grounds against the proposed Shantung settle- ment, and that his objections were concurred in by the Secretary of State and Mr. Henry White. But the letter can not properly be described as a protest against the final Shantung decision, because it was written before that decision ha,d been arrived at and in response to my request that my colleagues on the commission apprise me of their judgment in the matter. The final decision was very materially qualified by the policy which Japan undertook to pursue with regard to the return of the Shantung Pemnsula in full sovereignty to China. I would have no hesitation in sending the Senate a copy of Gen. Bliss's letter were it not for the fact that it contains references to other Governments which it was per- fectly proper for Gen. Bliss to make in a confidential communication to me, but which, I am sure. Gen. Bliss would not wish to have repeated outside our personal and intimate exchange of views. I have received no written protest from any officials connected with or attached to the American Peace Commission with regard to this matter. I am also asked to send you any memorandum or other information with reference to an attempt of Japan or her peace delegates to intimidate the Chinese peace dele- gates. I am happy to say that I have no such memorandum or information. WooDKow Wilson. The WnrrE House, August 8, 1919. The White House, Washington, 8 August, 1919. Mt Dear Mr. Chairman: I have at last been able to go personally over the great mass of papers which remained in my hands at the close of my stay in Paris, and am disappointed to find that it is in no respect a complete file, the complete files remaining with the American commission. You ask for all drafts or forms presented to or considered by the peace commissioners relating to the league of nations, and particularly the draft or form prepared or pre- sented by the commissioners of the United States. There are no formal drafts in my possession, except that presented by the American commissioners, and this I take pleasure in enclosing, along with the formal report of the commission on the league of nations. You also ask for all proceedings, arguments, and debates, including a transcript of the stenographic reports of the peace commission relating to or concerning a league of nations or the league of nations finally adopted, and all data bearing upon or used in connection with the treaty of peace with Germany now pending. No stenographic reports were taken of the debates on the league of nations, and such memoranda as were taken it was agreed should be confidential. The reason for regarding as con- fidential intimate exchanges of opinion with regard to many delicate matters will, of course, occur to you, and I beg to say that I am following the example of the repre- sentatives of the other Governments in making this explanation. The various data bearing upon or used in connection with the treaty of peace with Germany are so miscellaneous and enormous in mass that it would be impossible for me so supply them without bringing from Paris the whole file of papers of the commission itself, and would include many memoranda which, it was agreed on grounds of public policy, it would be unwise to make use of outside the conference. Very sincerely, yours, WooDKOW Wilson. Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Senate. AMERICAN DRAFT OF COVENANT OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS. COVENANT. Preamble. In order to secure international peace and security by the accept- ance of obligations not to resort to the use of armed force, by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obhga- tions in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, and in order to promote international cooperation, the Powers signatory to this Covenant adopt this constitution of the League of Nations. Article I. The action of the Contracting Powers under the terms of this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of a Body of Delegates which shall consist of the diplomatic representatives of the Contracting Powers accredited to X. and the Minister of For- eign Affairs of X. The meetings of the Body of Delegates shaU be held at the seat of government of X. and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of X. shall be the presiding officer. Whenever the Delegates deem it necessary or advisable, they may meet temporarily at the seat of government of Y. or of Z., in which case the diplomatic representative to X. of the country in which the meeting is held shall be the presiding officer pro tempore. It shall be the privilege of any of the Contracting Powers to assist its representative in the Body of Delegates by any method of con- ference, counsel, or advice that may seem best to it, and also to be represented at any time by a special representative. Article II. The Body of Delegates shall regulate their own procedure and shall have power to appoint such committees as they may deem neces- sary to inquire into and report upon any matters that lie within the field of their action. It shall be the right of the Body of Delegates, upon the initiative of any member, to discuss, either publicly or privately as it may deem best, any matter lying within the field of action oi the League of Nations as defined in this Covenant, or any matter likely to affect the peace of the world; but all actions of the Body of Delegates taken in the exercise of the functions and powers granted to them under this Covenant shall be formulated and agreed upon by an 254 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 255 Executive Council, which shall act either by reference or upon its own initiative and which shall consist of the representatives of the Great Powers, together with representatives drawn in annual rota- tion from two panels, one of which shall be made up of the repre- sentatives of the States ranking next after the Great Powers and the others of the representatives of the minor States (a classification which the Body of Delegates shall itself establish and may from time to time alter), such a number being drawn from these panels as v/ill be but one less than the representatives of the Great Powers; and three or more negative votes in the Council shall operate as a veto upon any action or resolution proposed. All resolutions passed or actions taken by the Body of Delegates or by the Executive Council, except those adopted in execution of any specific powers herein granted, shall have the effect of recommenda- tions to the several governments of the League. The Executive Council shall appoint a permanent Secretariat and staff and may appoint joint committees, chosen from the Body of Delegates or consisting of other specially qualified persons, for the study and systematic consideration of the international questions with which tne Council may have to deal, or of questions likely to lead to iuternational complications or disputes. The Executive Council shall also take the necessary steps to establish and maintain proper haison both with the foreign offices of the Contracting Powers and with any governments or agencies which may be acting as manda- taries of the League in any part of the world. Article III. The Contracting Powers undertake to respect and to protect as against external aggression the political independence and territorial integrity of all States members of the League. Article IV. The Contracting Powers recognize the principle that the main- tenance of peace will require the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations; and the Executive Council shall formulate plans for effecting such reduction. It shall also require into the feasibility of abolishing compulsory military service and the substitution therefor of forces enrolled upon a volun- tary basis and into the military and naval equipment which it is reasonable to maintain. The Executive Coimcil shall also determine for the consideration and action of the several governments what military equipment and armament is fair and reasonable in proportion to the scale of forces laid down in the programme of disarmament; and these limits, when adopted, shall not be exceeded without the permission of the Body of Delegates. The Contracting Powers further agree that munitions and imple- ments of war shall not be manufactured by private enterprise and that there shall be full and frank publicity as to all national armaments and military or naval programmes. 256 treaty of peace with germany. Aeticle v. The Contracting Powers agree that should disputes or difficulties arise between or among them which cannot be satisfactoriljr settled or adjusted by the ordinary processes of diplomacy, they will in no case resort to armed force without previously submitting the ques- tions and matters involved either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Executive Council and untU there has been an award bv the arbitrators or a recommendation by the Executive Council; and that they will not even then resort to armed force as against a member of the League of Nations who complies with the award of the arbitrators or the recommendation ot the Executive Council. The Contracting Powers agree that whenever any dispute or difhculty shall arise between or among them with regard to any ques- tion of the law of nations, with regard to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any fact which would, if established, constitute a breach of international obligation, or as to any alleged damage and the nature and measure of the reparation to be made therefor, if such dispute or difficulty cannot be satisfactorily settled by the ordinary processes of negotiation, to submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration and to carry out in full good faith any award or decision that may be rendered. In case of arbitration, the matter or matters at issue shall be referred to arbitrators, one of whom shall be selected by each of the parties to the dispute from outside their own nationals, when there -are but two such parties, and a third by the two thus selected. When there there are more than two parties to the dispute, one arbitrator shall be named by each of the several parties and the arbitrators thus named shall add to their number others of their own choice, the num- ber thus added to be limited to the number which w ill suffice to give a deciding vote to the arbitrators thus added in case of a division among the arbitrators chosen by the contending parties. In case the arbitrators chosen by the contending parties cannot agree upon an additional aibitrator or arbitrators, the additional arbitrator or arbitrators shall be chosen by the Executive Council. On the appeal of a party to the dispute the decision of said arbi- trators may be set aside hj a vote of three-fourths of the Delegates, in case the decision of the arbitrators was unanimous, oi by a vote of two-thirds of the Delegates in case the decision of the arbitrators was not unanimous, but unless thus set aside shall be finally binding and conclusive. When any decision of arbitrators shall have been thus set aside, the dispute shall again be submitted to arbitrators chosen as heretofore provided, none of whom shall, however, have previously acted as arbitrators in the dispute in question, and the decision oi the arbi- trators rendered in this second arbitration shall be finally bindii^ and conclusive without right of appeal. If for any reason it should prove impracticable to refer any matter in dispute to arbitration, the parties to the dispute shall apply to the Executive Coimcil to take the matter imder consideration for such mediatory action or recommendation as it may deem wise in the cu"- cumstances. The Coimcil shall inmiediately accept the reference and give notice to the parties, and shall make the necessaxy arrangements for a fuU hearing, mvestigation and consideration. The Coimcil shall TEBATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. 257 ascertain and as soon as possible make public all the facts involved in the dispute and shall make such recommendation as it may deem wise and practicable based on the merits of the controversy and calculated to secure a just and lasting settlement. Other members of the League shall place at the disposal of the Executive Council any and all infor- mation that may be in their possession which in any way bears upon the facts or merits of the controversy; and the Executive Coimcil shall do everything in its power by way of mediation or conciliation to bring about a peaceful settlement. The recommendation of the Executive Council shall be addressed to the disputants. Should the Executive Council fail to arrive at any conclusion, it shall be the privilege of the members of the Executive Council to publish their several conclusions or recommendations ; and such publications shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any of the disputants. _ The Executive Council may in any case refer the consideration of a dispute to the Body of Delegates. The consideration of the dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute. In any case referred to the Body of Delegates all the provisions of this Article relating to the action and powers of the Executive Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Body of Delegates. Article VI. Should any Contracting Power be found by the League to have broken or disregarded its covenants under Article V, it shall thereby ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all the members of the League, which shall immediately subject it to a com- plete economic and financial boycott, including the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention, so far as possible, of all financial, commercial, or per- sonal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not. It shall be the duty of the' Executive Council in such a case to recommend what effective military or naval force the members of the League shall severally contribute, and to advise, if it should thiiik best, that the smaller members of the League be excused from making any contribution to the armed forces to be used against the covenant- breaking State. The covenant-breaking State shall, after the restoration of peace, be subject to the regulations with regard to a peace establishment pro- vided for new States imder the terms supplementary Article IV. Article VII. If any Contracting Power shall be found by the League to have declared war or to have begun hostilities or to have taken any hostile step short of war, against another Contracting Power before sub- mitting the dispute involved to arbitrators or consideration by the Executive Council as herein provided, or to have declared war or to have begun hostilities or to have taken any hostile step short of war, in regard to any dispute which has been decided adversely to it by arbitrators the Contracting Powers hereby engage not only to cease 135546—19 17 258 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. all commerce and intercourse with that Power but also to unite in blockading and closing the frontiers of that Power to commerce or intercourse with any part of the world and to use any force which may be agreed upon to accomplish that object. Article VIII. Any war or threat or war, whether immediately affecting any of the Contracting Powers or not, is hereby declared a matter oi concern of the League and to all the Contracting Powers, and the Contract- ing Powers hereby reserve the right to take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly right of each of the Contracting Powers to draw the attention of the Body of Delegates or of the Executive Coimcil to any circumstances anywhere which threaten to disturb international peace or the good under- standing between nations upon which peace depends. The Body of Delegates and the Executive Council shall meet in the interest of peace whenever war is rumored or threatened, and also whenever the representative of any Power shall inform the Body of Delegates that a meeting and conference in the interest of peace is advisable. The Body of Delegates may also meet at such other times and upon such other occasions as they shall from time to time deem best and determine. Article IX. In the event of a dispute arising between one of the Contracting Powers and a Power not a party to this Covenant, the Contracting Power shall bring the matter to the attention of the Executive Council. The Executive Council shall in such a case, in the name of the League, invite the Power not a party to this Covenant to become ad hoc a party, and if that Power consents it is hereby agreed that the provisions hereinbefore contained and applicable to the sub- mission of disputes to arbitration or to consideration shall be in all respects apphcable to the dispute both in favor of and against such Power as if it were a party to this Covenant. In case the Power not a party to this Covenant shall not accept the invitation of the Executive Council to become ad hoc a party, it shall be the duty of the Executive Council immediately to institute an inquiry into the circumstances and merits of the dispute involved and to recommend such joint action by the Contracting Powers as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances disclosed. Article X. If hostilities should be begun or any hostUe action taken against the Contracting Power by the Power not a party to this Covenant before a decision of the dispute by arbitrators or before investiga- tion, report and recommendation by the Executive Council in regard to the dispute, or contrary to such recommendation, the Contracting Powers engage thereupon to cease all commerce and communication with that Power and also to unite in blockading and closing the fron- tiers of that Power to all commerce or intercourse with any part of TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 259 the world, and to employ jointly any force which may be agreed upon to accomplish that object. The Contracting Powers also undprtake to unite in coming to the assistance of the Contracting Power against which hostile action has been taken, and to combine their armed forces in its behalf. Article XI. In case of a dispute between states not parties to this Covenant, any Contracting Power may bring the matter to the attention of the body of Delegates or the Executive Council, who shall thereupon tender the good offices of the League with a view to the peaceable settlement of the dispute. If one of the states, a party to the dispute, shall offer and agree to submit its interests and cause of action wholly to the control and decision of the League, that state shall ad Jioc be deemed a Contract- ing Power. If no one of the states, parties to the dispute, shall so offer and agree, the Body of Delegates shall through the Executive Council or of its own motion take such action and make such recom- mendation to the governments as will prevent hostilities and result in the settlement of the dispute. Article XII. Any Power not a party to this Covenant, whose government is based upon the principle of popular self-government, may apply to the Body of Delegates for leave to become a party. If the Body of Delegates shall regard the granting thereof as likely to promote the peace, order, and security of the World, they shall act favorably on the application, and their favorable action shall operate to con- stitute the Power so applying in all respects a full signatory party to this Covenant. This action shall require the affirmative vote of two- thirds of the Body of Delegates. Article XIII. The Contracting Powers severally agree that the present Covenant is accepted as abrogating all treaty obligations inter se which are inconsistent with the terms hereof, and solemnly engage that they will not enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms hereof. In case any of the Powers signatory hereto or subsequently ad- mitted to the League shall, before becoming a party to this Covenant, have undertaken any treaty obligations which are inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations. SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS. To the colonies formerly part of the German Empire, and to those territories formerly belonging to Turkey which include Armenia, Kurdestan, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia, which are inhabited by peoples not able to stand by themselves under the 260 TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the per- formance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandataries on behalf of the League. The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the terri- tory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances. II. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as inde- pendent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the ren- dering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatary must be responsible for the administration of the territory subject to conditions which will guarantee the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traflB.c and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defense of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League. There are territories, such as South-west Africa and certain of the Islands in the South Pacific, which, owing to the sparseness of their popidation, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the mandatory state, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatary state as if integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population. III. In every case of mandate, the mandatary state shall render to the League an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge. The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the mandatory State or agency shall in each case be explicitly defined by the Executive Council in a special Act or Charter which shall reserve to the League complete power of supervision, and which shaU also reserve to the people of any such territory or governmental unit the right to appeal to the League for the redress or correction of any breach of the mandate by the mandatory State or agency of for the substitution of some other State or agency, as mandatory. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 261 The object of all such tutelary oversight and administration on the part of the League of Nations shall be to buUd up in as short a time as possible out of the people or territory under its guardianship a political unit which can take charge of its own affairs, determine its own con- aections, and choose its own policies. The League may at any time release such people or territory from tutelage and consent to its being set up as an mdependent unit. It shall also be the right and privilege of any people or territory to petition the League to take such action, and upon such petition being made it shall be the duty of the League to take the petition under full and friendly consideration with a view of determining the best interests of the people or territory in question in view of all circumstances of their situation and development. IV. No new State shall be recognized by the League or admitted into its membership except on condition that its military and naval forces and armament shall conform to standards prescribed by the League in respect of it from time to time. V. The Contracting Powers will work to establish and maintain fair hours and humane conditions of labor for all those within their several jurisdictions and they will exert their influence in favor of the adoption and maintenance of a similar policy and like safeguards wherever their industrial and commercial relations extend. Also they will appoint Commissions to study conditions of industry and labor in their international aspects and to make recommendations thereon, including the extension and improvement of existing con- ventions. VI. The League shall require all new States to bind themselves as a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autono- mous States and the Executive Comicil shall exact of all States seeking admission to the League, the promise to accord to all racial or national minorities within their several jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and security, both in law and in fact, that is accorded the racial or national majority of their people. VII. Recognizing religious persecution and intolerance as fertile sources of war, the Contracting Powers agree, and the League shall exact from all new States and all States seeking admission to it the promise that they will make no law prohibiting or interfering with the free exercise of religion, and that they will in no way discriminate, either in law or in fact, against those who practice any particular creed, religion, or belief whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals. 262 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. VIII. When the rights of beUigerents on the high seas outside territorial waters shall have been defined by international convention, it is hereby agreed and declared as a fundamental Covenant that no Power or combination of Powers shall have a right to overstep in any particular the clear meaning of the definitions thus established; but that it shall be the right of the League from time to time and on special occasions to close the seas in whole or in part against a per- ticular Power or Powers for the purpose of enforcing the international Covenants here entered into. IX. It is hereby covenanted and agreed by the Contracting Powers that no treaty entered into by them shall be regarded as vaHd, bind- ing, or operative until it shall have been published and made known to all the other States members of the League. X. It is further covenanted and agreed by the Contracting Powers that in their fiscal and economic regulations and policy no discrimination shall be made between one nation and another among those with which they have commercial and financial dealings. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Preliminary Peace Conference. 1. Teems of Eeference. The Preliminary Peace Conference at the plenary session of the 25th January, 1919 (Protocol No. 2) decided to nominate a Conunis- sion to work out in detail the Constitution and functions of a League of Nations. The terms of reference of this Commission were as follows: "The Conference, having considered the proposals for the crea- tion of a League of Nations, resolved that — "1. It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement, which the Associated Nations are now met to establish, that a League of Nations be created to promote international co-operation, to ensure the fulfilment of accepted international obligations and to provide safeguards against war. "2. This League should be treated as an integral part of the general Treaty of Peace, and should be open to every civilised nation which can be relied on to promote its objects. "3. The members of the League should periodically meet in inter- national conference, and should have a permanent organization and secretariat to carry on the business of the League in the intervals between the conferences. "The Conference therefore appoints a Committee representative of the Associated Governments to work out the details of the con- , stitution and functions of the League." This Commission was to be composed of fifteen members, i. e. two members representing each of the Great Powers ( United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy and Japan), and five members to represent all the Powers with special interests. At a meeting of these latter Powers on the 27th January, 1919, Belgium, Brazil, China, Portugal and Serbia were chosen to designate one representa- tive each. (See Annex 6 of Protocol No. 2.) 2. Constitution of the Commission. The Commission was therefore originally composed as follows: For the United States of America: The President of the United States of America. Honorable Edward M. House. For the British Empire: The Rt. Hon. the Lord Robert Cecil, K.C., M.P. Lieutenant-General the Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts, K.C., Minister of Defence of the Union of South Africa. 263 264 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANY. For France: Mr. Leon Bourgeois, former President of the Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Lamaude, Dean of the Faculty of Law of Paris. For Italy: Mr. Orlando, President of the Council. Mr. Scialoja, Senator of the Kingdom. For Japan : Baron Makino, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Member of the Diplomatic Council. Viscount Chinda, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Pleni- potentiary of H.I.M. the Emperor of Japan at London. For Belgium: Mr. Hymans, Minister for Foreign Anairs and Minister of State. For Brazil : Mr. Epitacio Pessoa, Senator, former Minister of Justice. For China: Mr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China at Washington. For Portugal: Mr. Jayme Batalha-Reis, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Portugal at Petrograd. For Serbia: Mr. Vesnitch, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipo- tentiary of H.M. the King of Serbia at Paris. A request of four other Powers — Greece, Poland, Roumania and the Czecho-Slovak Republic — to be represented on the Conunission was referred by the Conference to the Commission for consideration. Upon the recommendation of the Commission the four following members took their seats on February 6th: For Greece: Mr. Eleftherios Veniselos, President of the Council of Ministers. For Poland: Mr. Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National Commit- tee. For Roumania: Mr. Diamandy, Roumanian Minister Plenipotentiary. For the Czecho-Slovak Repubhc: Mr. Charles Kramar, President of the Council of Ministers. 3. FmsT Report of the Commission. Between the date of its appointment and the 14th February, the Commission met ten times. As a result of these meetings the fol- lowing draft Covenant of the League of Nations waj adopted, and read as a preliminary report by the Chairman at a plenary session, of the Conference on the latter date. (Protocol No. 3) : Preamble. In order to promote international co-operation and to secure international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescrip- tion of open, just and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establish- ment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, the Powers signatory to this Covenant adopt this constitution of the League of Nations. TEBATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 265 Article I. The action of tlie Higli_ Contracting Parties under the terms of this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of meetings of a Body of Delegates repre- sentingthe High Contracting Parties, of meetings at more frequent intervals of an Executive Council, and of a permanent international Secretariat to be established at the Seat of the League. Article II. Meetings of the Body of Delegates shall be held at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require for the purpose of dealing with matters within the sphere of action of the League. Meetings of the Body of Delegates shall be held at the Seat of the League or at such other place as may be found convenient and shall consist of representatives of the High Contracting Parties. Each of the High Con- tracting Parties shall have one vote but may have not more than three representatives. Article III. The Executive Council shall consist of representatives of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, together with representatives of four other States, members of the League. The selection of these four States shall be made by the Body of Delegates on such principles and in such manner as they think fit. Pending the appointment of these representatives of the other States, representatives of shall be members of the Executive Council. Meetings of the Council shall be held from time to time as occasion may require and_ at least once a year at whatever place may be decided on, or failing any such decision, at the Seat of the League, and any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world may be dealt with at such meetings. Invitations shall be sent to any Power to attend a meeting of the Council at which matters directly affecting its interests are to be discussed and no decision taken at any meeting will be binding on such Power unless so invited. Article IV. All matters of procedure at meetings of the Body of Delegates or the Executive Council including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters shall be regulated by the Body of Delegates or the Executive Council and may be decided by a majority of the States represented at the meeting. The first meeting of the Body of Delegates and of the Executive Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America. Article V. The permanent Secretariat of the League shall be established at which shall constitute the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise such secretaries and staff as may be required, under the general direction and control of a Secretary-General of the League, who shall be chosen by the Executive Council; the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary-General subject to confirmation by the Executive Council. The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Body of Del^ates or of the Executive Council. The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the States members of the League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union. Article VI. Representatives of the High Contracting Parties and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immu- nities, and the buildings occupied by the League or its officials or by representatives attending its meetings shall enjoy the benefits of extraterritoriality. Article VII. , Admission to the League of States not signatories to the Covenant and not named in the Protocol hereto as States to be invited to adhere to the Covenant requires the assent of not less than two-thirds of the States represented in the Body of Delegates 266 TBEATY OF PEACE WtTH GERMAN Y, and shall be limited to fully self-governing countries including Dominions and Colonies. No State shall be admitted to the League unless it is able to give effective guar- antees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and unless it shall conform to such principles as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its naval and military forces and armaments. Article VIII. The High Contracting Parties recognize the principle that the maintenance ot peace will require the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obliga- tions, havin» special regard to the geographical situation and circumstances of each State; and the Executive Council shall formulate plans for effecting such reduction. The Kxecutive Council shall also determine for the consideration and action of the several governments what military equipment and armament is fair and reasonable in proportion to the scale of forces laid down in the programme of disarmament; and these limits, when adopted, shall not be exceeded without the permission of the JKxecutive Council. The High Contracting Parties agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war lends itself to grave objections, and direct the Executive Council to advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those countries which are not able to manufacture for themseU'es the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety. The High Contracting Parties undertake in no way to conceal from each other the condition of such of their industries as are capable of being adapted to war-like pur- poses or the scale of their armaments, and agree that there shall be full and frank interchange of information as to their military and naval programmes. Article IX. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the League on the execu- tion of the provisions of Article VIII and on military and naval questions generally. Article X. The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all States members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Executive Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. Article XI. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the High Con- tracting Parties or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the League, and the High Contracting Parties reserve the right to take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly right < each of the High Contracting Parties to draw the attention of the Body of Delegates >. i of the Executive Council to any circumstances affecting international intercourse which threaten to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends. Article XII. The High Contracting Parties agree that should disputes arise between them which cannot be adjusted by the ordinary processes of diplomacy, they will in no case resort to war without previously submitting the questions and matters involved either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Executive Council and until three months after the award by the arbitrators or a recommendation by the Executive Council; and that they will not even then resort to war as against a member of the League which com- plies with the award of the arbitrators or the recommendation of the Executive Council. In any case under this Article, the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the recommendation of the Executive Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 267 Article XIII. The High Contracting Parties agree that whenever any dispute or difficulty shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject matter to arbitration. For this purpose the Court of arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the court agreed on by the parties or stipulated in any Con vention existing between them. The High Contracting Parties agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered. In the event of any failure to carry out the award, the Executive Council shall propose what steps can best be taken to give effect thereto. Article XIV. The Executive Council shall formulate plans for the estabjishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice and this Court shall, when established, be competent to hear and determine any matter which the parties recognize as suitable for sub- mission to it for arbitration under the foregoing Article. Article XV. If there should arise between States members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration as above, the High Contracting Parties agree that they will refer the matter to the Executive Council; either party to the dispute may give notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof. For this purpose the parties agree to communicate to the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Executive Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof. Where the efforts of the Council lead to the settlement of the dispute, a statement shall be published indicating the nature of the dispute and the terms of settlement, together with such explanation as may be appropriate. If the dispute has not been settled, a report by the Council shall be published, setting forth with all necessary facts and explanations the recommendation which the Council think just and proper for the settlement of the dispute. If the report is unanimously agreed to by the members of the Council other than the parties to the dispute, the High Contracting Parties agree that they will not go to war with any party which complies with the recommendation and that, if any party shall refuse so to comply, the Council shall propose the measures necessary to give effect to the recommendation. If no such unanimous report can be made, it shall be the duty of the majority and the priv- ilege of the minority to issue statements indicating what they believe to be the facts and containing the recommendations which they consider to be just and proper. The Executive Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Body of Delegates. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request must be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute. In any case referred to the Body of Delegates all the provisions of this Article and of Article XII relating to the action and powers of the Executive Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Body of Delegates. Article XVI. Should any of the High Contracting Parties break or disregard its covenants under Article XII, it shall thereby ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all the other members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not. , It shall be the duty of the Executive Council in such case to recommend what effective military or naval force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenantsof the League. The High Contracting Parties agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one oftheir number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the High Contracting Parties who are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League. 268 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMAHY. Article XVII. In the event of disputes between one State member of the League and another State which is not a member of the League, or between States not members of the League, the High Contracting Parties agree that the State or States not members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes; of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Executive Council may deem just, and upon acceptance of any such invitation, the above provisions shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by th'e Lea^e. Upon such invitation being given, the Executive Council shall immediately insti- tute an inquiry into the circumstances and merits of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances. In the event of a Power so invited refusing to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and taking any action against a State member of the League which in the case of a State member of the League would constitute a breach of Article XII, the provisions of Article XVI shall be applicable as against the State taking such action. If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Executive Council may take such action and make such recommendations as will prevent hostihties and will result in the settlement of the dispute. Article XVIII. The High Contracting Parties agree that the League shall be entrusted with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traflic is necessary in the common interest. Article XIX. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well- being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandataries on behalf of the League. The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provision- ally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatorjr power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the manda- tary must be responsible lor the administration of the territory subject to conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to the mainte- nance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic ana the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifica- tions or military and naval bases and of mditary training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defense of territory, and will also secure equaj opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League. There are territories, such as Southwest Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centers of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the mandatory state, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory state as integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards above- mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population. In every case of mandate, the mandatory state shall render to the League an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge. TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 269 The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the mandatory State shall if not previously agreed upon by the High Contracting Parties in each case be explicitly defined by the Executive Council m a special Act or Charter. The High Contracting Parties further agree to establish at the seat of the League a Mandatory Commission to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatory Powers, and to assist the League in ensuring the observance of the terms of all Mandates. Article XX. The High Contracting Parties will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend; and to that end agree to establish as part of the organization of the League a permanent Bureau of Labor. Article XXI. The High Contracting Parties agree that provision shall be made through the instru mentality of the League to secure and maintain freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all States members of the League, having in mind, among other things, special arrangements with regard to the necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918. Article XXII. The High Contracting Parties agree to place under the control of the League all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent.. Furthermore, they agree that all such international bureaux to be constituted in future shall be placed under t'j e control of the League. Article XXIII. The High Contracting Parties agree that every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any State member of the League, shall be forthwith registered with the Secretary-General and as soon as possible published by him, and that no such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered. Article XXIV. It shall be the right of the Body of Delegates from time to time to advise the recon- sideration by States members of the League, of treaties which have become inapplic- able, and of international conditions, of which the continuance may endanger the peace of the world. Article XXV. The High Contracting Parties severally agree that the present Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly engage that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements incon- sistent with the terms thereof. In case any of the Powers signatory hereto or subsequently admitted to the League shall, before becoming a party to this Covenant, have undertaken any obligations which are inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations. Article XXVI. Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the States whose representatives compose the Executive Council and by three-fourths of the States whose representatives compose the Body of Delegates. 4. Subsequent Meetings of the Commission. The draft Covenant of the 14th February was made public in order that discussion of its terms might be provoked. A great deal of constructive criticism followed upon its publication. Further sug- gestions resulted from hearings of representatives of thirteen neutral 270 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. states before a Committee of the Commission on the 20 and 21st March. These various recommendations were taken under advisement by the Commission which held meetings on the 22nd, 24th and 26th. March and on the 10th and 11th April. At the meeting of the 10th April a delegation representing the International CouncU of Women and the Suffragist Conference of the Allied countries and the United States were received by the Commission. 5. Final Report of the Commission. At the meetings of the 10th and 11th April the Commission agreed definitely on the following text of the Covenant to be presented to the Conference : COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. In order to promote international co-ojperation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescnption of open, just and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among govern- ments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, the High Contracting Parties agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations. Article I. The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within t ,vo months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members oi the League. Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex, may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military and naval forces and armaments. Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal. Article II. The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instru- mentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat. Article III. The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the League. The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon. The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one vote, and may have not more than three Representatives. Article IV. The Council shall consist of Representatives of the United States of America, of the British Empire, of France, of Italy, and of ,Tapan, together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by the Assem- bly, Representatives of shall be members of the Council. TREATY OF PEVCE "WITH GERMANY. 271 With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name addi- tional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be members of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council. The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon. The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the con- sideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League. At meetings of the Council each Member of the League represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one Representative. Article V. Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting. All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting. The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America. Aeticle VI. The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary General and such secretaries and staff as may be required. The first Secretary General shall be the person named in the Annex; thereafter the Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly. The secretaries and the staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary General with the approval of the Council. The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly and of the Coimcil. The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the Members of the League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union. Article VII. The Seat of the League is established at Geneva. The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be established elsewhere. All positions .under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women. Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities. The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable. Article VIII. The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances^ of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments. Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years. After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fiied shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council. The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall 272 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety. The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military and naval programmes and the ■condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes. Article IX. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execu- tion of the provisions of Articles I and VIII and on military and naval questions generally. Article X. The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation ■shall be fulfilled. Article XI. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Oouncil. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends. Article XII. The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any ■dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council. In any case under this Aiticle the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute. Article XIII. The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject matter to arbitration. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for anjr such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable -for submission to arbitration. For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the court agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them. The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto. Article XIV. The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international char- acter which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly. TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 273 ahticle xy. If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration as above, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dis- pute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investi- gation and consideration thereof. For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof. The Council shall endeavor to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate. If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto. Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a state- ment of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same. If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report. If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such actions as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice. If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council to arise put of a matter which by international law is solelv within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement. The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council. In any case referred to the Assembly all the provisions of this Article and of Article XII relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly if concurred m by the Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute. Aeticle XVI. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII or X!V, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Govern- ments concerned what effective military or naval force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League. The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League. Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon. 135546—19 ^18 274 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY, Article XVII. In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League,_ the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles XII to XVI inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council. Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances. If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article XVI shall be applicable as against the State taking such action. If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute. Article XVIII. Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League, shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered. Article XIX. The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world. Article XX. The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abro- gating all obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engage- ments inconsistent with the terms thereof. In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations. Article XXI. Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace. Article XXII. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themsehes under the strenuous conditions of the modern world., there should be applied the principle that the well- being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for-the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their re- sources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should he exer- cised by them as Mandataries on behalf of the League. The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provi- TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 275 sionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatary until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatary. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Manda- tary must be responsible for the administrationof the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to the mainte- nance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League. There are territories, such as South-west Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparsenees of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centers of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatary, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatary as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population. In every case of mandate, the Mandatary shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge. The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Manda- tary shall if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League be explicitly defined in each case by the Council. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandataries and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates. Article XXIII. Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League (a) will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organizations; (b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control; (e) will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agree- ments with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs; (d) will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest; (e) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall be borne in mind; (f) will endeavor to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease. Article XXIV. There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent.^ All such international bureaux and all commissions for the regulation of matters of inter- national interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League. In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions but which are not placed under the control of international bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which mav be necessary or desirable. The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League. Article XXV. The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organizations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world. 276 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY, Article XXVI. Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Assembly. No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which signifies its dis- sent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League. ANNEX TO THE COVENANT. 1. Original Members of the League of Nations. SIGNATORIES OF THE TREATY OF PEACE. United States of America. Cuba. Liberia. Belgium. Czecho-Slo vakia . Nicaragua. Bolivia. Ecuador. Panama. Brazil. France. Peru. British Empire. Greece. Poland. Canada. Guatemala. Portugal. Australia. Haiti. Eoumania. South Africa. Hedjaz. Serbia. New Zealand. Honduras. Siam. India. Italy. Uruguay. China. Japan. STATES INVITED TO ACCEDE TO THE COVENANT. Argentine Republic. Norway. Sweden. Chili. Paraguay. Switzerland, Colombia. Persia. Venezuela. Denmark. Salvador. Netherlands. Spain. 2. First Secretary General of the League of Nations. 6. Recommendation of the Commission. At the last meeting of the Commission, the following resolution was adopted : Resolved, that in the opinion of the Commission, the President of the Commission should be requested by the Conference to invite seven Powers, including two neu- trals, to name representatives on a Committee A. to prepare plans for the organization of the League, B. to prepare plans for the establishment of the Seat of the League, C. toJ>repare plans and the Agenda for the first meeting of the Assembly. This Committee shall report both to the Council and to the Assembly. PRELIMINAKY PEACE CONFERENCE. PROTOCOL No. .2. Session op January 25, 1919. AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE. [Preliminary peace conference, protocol No. 2, plenary session of January 25, 1919.] The Session is opened at 15 o'clock (3 p.m.) under the presidency of Mr. Clemenceau, President. Present: For the United States of America. The President of the United States. Honorable Robert Lansing. Honorable Henry White. Honorable Edward M. House. General Tasker H. Bliss. For the British Empire. great britain. The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George. The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour. The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes. The Hon. C. J. Doherty, Minister of Justice of Canada. The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Ward, Bart., K. C. M. G., Minister of Finance and Posts of New Zealand. The Rt. Hon. The Lord Robert CecH, K. C, M. P., Technical Delegate for the League of Nations. Dominions and India. CANADA The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden, G. C. M. G., K. C, Prime Minister. The Rt. Hon. Sir George Eulas Foster. AUSTRALIA The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes. The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Cook. SOUTH AFRICA General The Rt. Hon. Louis Botha. Lieut.-General The Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts. 277 278 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. NEW ZEALAND The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey, Prime Minister. INDIA The Et. Hon. E. S. Montagu, M. P., Secretary of State for India. Major-General His Highness The Maharaja of Bikanir. For France Mr. Clemenceau. Mr. Pichon. Mr. L. L. Klotz. Mr. Andrfi Tardieu. Mr. Jules Cambon. Mr. Leon Bourgeois, Former President of the Council of Ministers, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Technical Delegate for the League of Nations. Marshal Foch. For Italy. Mr. V. E. Orlando, President of the Council of Ministers. The Baron S. Sonnino. The Marquis Salvago Raggi. Mr. Antonio Salandra, Deputy, former President of the Coimcil of Ministers! Mr. Salvatore Barzilai, C. B., Deputy, former Minister. Mr. Scialoja, Senator of the Kingdom, Technical Delegate for the League of Nations. For Japan. The Baron Makino, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Member of the Diplomatic Advisory Council. The Viscount Chinda. Mr. K. Matsui. Mr. H. Ijuin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty The Emperor of Japan at Rome. For Belgium. Mr. Hymans. Mr. Van den Heuvel. Mr. Vandervelde, Minister of Justice, Minister of State. For Bolivia. Ml'. Ismael Montes. For Brazil Mr. Olyntho de Magalhaes. Mr. Pandia Calogeras. treaty of peace with germany. 279 For China Mr. Lou Tseng Tsiang. Mr. Chengting Thomas Wang. For Cuba Mr. Rafael Martinez Ortiz. For Ecuador Mr. Dorn y de Alsua. For Greece Mr. Eleftherios Veniselos, President of the Council of Ministers. Mr. Nicolas Pohtis. For Peru For the Hedjaz His Highness The Emir Feisal. Mr. Rustem Haidar. Mr. Francisco Garcia Calderon. For Poland Mr. Roman Dmowski. For Portugal The Count Penha Garcia, Former President of the Chamber of Deputies, Former Minister of Finance. Mr. Jayme Batalha Reis, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Portugal at Petrograd. For Roumania Mj. Jean J. C. Bratiano. Mr. Nicolas Misu. For Serbia Mr. Pashitch. Mj. Trumbitch. Mr. Vesnitch. For Siam The Prince Charoon. Phya Bibadh Kosha. For the Czecho-slovak Republic Mr. Charles Kramar, President of the Coimcil of Ministers. Mr. Edouard Benes. 280 tkeaty of peace with germany. For Uruguay Mr. Juan Carlos Blanco. The President informs the Conference that, at the request of the Delegation of the United States, the approval of the Protocol of the first Session is postponed to the next Session, as that Delegation has not yet received the English text of Protocol No. 1 which it reserves the right to present to the Conference. The order of the day calls for the appointment of five Commis- sions charged Avith the duty of examining the following questions: — 1. League of Nations. 2. Responsibility of the authors of the War and enforcement of penalties. 3. Reparation for damage. 4. International Legislation on Labor. 5. International Control of Ports, Waterways and Railways. The first Commission to be nominated concerns the League of Nations, upon which subject the Bureau presents a draft res- olution (Anex I.) which has been distributed in Enghsh and French to all the members of the Conference. The discussion is opened on the question of the League of Nations. The President of the United States delivers the following speech: "I consider it a distinguished privilege to open the discussion in this Conference on the League of Nations. We have assembled for two purposes — to make the present settlements which have been rendered necessary by this War, and also to secure the Peace of the world not only by the present settlements but by the arrange- ments we shall make in this Conference for its maintenance. The League of Nations seems to me to be necessary for both of these purposes. There are many complicated questions connected with the present settlements which, perhaps, cannot be successfully worked out to an ultimate issue by the decisions we shall arrive at here. I can easily conceive that many of these settlements will need subsequent re-consideration; that many of the decisions we shall make will need subsequent alteration in some degree, for if I may judge by my own study of some of these questions they are not susceptible of confident judgments at present. "It is, therefore, necessary that we should set up some machinery by which the work of this Conference should be rendered complete. We have assembled here for the purpose of doing very much more than making the present settlement. We are assembled under very peculiar conditions of world opinion. I may say without straining the point that we are not representatives of Governments, but representatives of peoples. It will not suffice to satisfy Governmental circles anywhere. It is necessary that we should satisfy the opinion of mankind. The burdens of this War have fallen in an unusual degree upon the whole population of the countries involved. I do not need to draw for you the picture of how the burden has been thrown back from the front upon the older men, upon the women, upon the children, upon the homes of the civilized world, and how the r^al strain of the War has come where the eye of Government TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. 281 could not reach, but where the heart of humanity beats. We are bidden hj these people to make a peace which will make them secure. We are bidden by these people to see to it that this strain does not come upon them again, and I venture to say that it has been possible for them to bear this strain because they hope that those who repre- sented them could get together after this war, and make such another sacrifice necessary. "It is a solemn obligation on our part, therefore, to make per- manent arrangements that justice shall be rendered and peace maiQtained. This is the central object of our meeting. Settlements may be temporary, but the actions of the nations in the interests of peace and justice must be permanent. We can set up permanent processes. We may not be able to set up permanent decisions, and therefore, it seems to me that we must take, so far as we can, a picture of the world into our minds. Is it not a startling circum- stance for one thing that the great discoveries of science, that the quiet study of men in laboratories, that the thoughtful develop- ments which have taken place in quiet lecture-rooms, have now been turned to the destruction of civilization? The powers of destruc- tion have not so much multiplied as gained facility. The enemy whom we have just overcome had at its seats of learning some of the principal centres of scientific study and discovery, and used them in order to make destruction sudden and complete; and only the watchful, continuous co-operation of men can see to it that science, as well as armed men, is kept within the harness of civili- zation. "In a sense, the United States is less interested in this subject than the other nations here assembled. With her great territory and her extensive sea borders, it is less likely that the United States should suffer from the attack of enemies than that many of the other nations here should suffer; and the ardor of the United States, — - for it is a very deep and genuine ardor — for the Society of Nations is not an ardor springing out of fear and apprehension, but an ardor springing out of the ideals which have come to consciousness in the War. In coming into this war the United States never thought for a moment that she was intervening in the politics of Europe, or the politics of Asia, or the politics of any part of the world. Her thought was that all the world had now oecome conscious that ■ there was a single cause which turned upon the issues of this war. That was the cause of justice and liberty for men of every kind and place. Therefore, the United States would feel that her part in this war had been played in vain if there ensued upon it merely a body of European settlements. She would feel that she could not take part in guaranteeing those European settlements unless that guarantee involved the continuous superintendence of the peace of the world by the Associated Nations of the World. "Therefore, it seems to me that we must concert our best judg- ment in order to make this League of Nations a vital thing — ^not merely a formal thing, not an occasional thing, not a thing some- times called into life to meet an exigency, but always functioning in watchful attendance upon the interests of the Nations, and that its continuity should be a vital continuity; that it should have functions that are continuing functions and that do not permit an intermission of its watchfulness and of its labor; that it should 282 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. be the eye of the Nation to keep watch upon the common interest, an eye that does not slumber, an eye that is everywhere watchful and attentive. "And if we do not make it vital, what shall we do? We shall disappoint the expectations of the peoples. This is what their thought centres upon. I have had the very delightful experience of visiting several nations since I came to this side of the water, and every time the voice of the body of the people reached me through any representative, at the front of its plea stood the hope for the League of Nations. Gentlemen, select classes of mankind are no longer the governors of mankind. The fortunes of mankind are now in the hands of the plain peoples of the whole world. Satisfy them, and you have justified their confidence not only, but estab- lished peace. Fail to satisfy them, and no arrangement that you can make would either set up or steady the peace of the world. "You can imagine, Gentlemen, I dare say, the sentiments and the purpose with which representatives of the United States sup- port this great project for a League of Nations. We regard it as the keystone of the whole program which expressed our purpose and our ideal in this war and which the Associated Nations nave accepted as the basis of the settlement. If we return to the United States without having made every effort in our power to realise this program, we should return to meet the merited scorn of our fellow-citizens. For they are a body that constitutes a great democracy. They expect their leaders to speak their thoughts and no private purpose of their own. They expect their represen- tatives to be their servants. We have no choice but to obey their mandate. But it is with the greatest enthusiasm and pleasure that we accept that mandate; and because this is the keystone of the whole fabric, we have pledged our every purpose to it, as we have to every item of the fabric. We would not dare abate a single part of the program which constitutes our instructions. We womd not dare compromise upon any matter as the champion of this thing — this. peace of the world, this attitude of justice, this principle that we are masters of no people but are here to see that every people in the world shall choose its own master and govern its own desti- nies, not as we wish but as it wishes. We are here to see, in short that the very foundations of this war are swept away. Those foimda- tions were the private choice of small coteries of civU rulers and military staffs. Those foundations were the aggression of great Powers upon small. Those foimdations were the holding together of Empires of unwilling subjects by the duress of arms. Those foundations were the power of small bodies of men to work their will upon mankind ana use them as pawns in a game. And nothing less than the emancipation of the world from these things wiU ac- complish peace. You can see that the Representatives of the United States are, therefore, never put to the embarrassment of choosing a way of expediency, because they have laid down for them their unalterable lines of principle. And, thank God, those lines have been accepted as the lines of settlement by all the high-minded men who have had to do with the beginnings of this great business. "I hope, Mr. Chairman, that when it is known, as I feel con- fident that it will be known, that we have adopted the principle of the League of Nations and mean to work out that principle in TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 283 effective action, we shall by that single thing have lifted a great part of the load of anxiety from the hearts of men everywhere. We stand in a peculiar case. As I go about the streets here I see everywhere the American uniform. Those men came into the War after we had uttered our purposes. They came as crusaders, not merely to win the war, but to win a cause; and I am responsible to them, for it fell to me to formulate the purposes for which I asked them to fight, and I, like them, must be a crusader for these things, whatever it costs and whatever it may be necessary to do, in honor, to accomplish the objects for which they fought. I have been glad to find from day to day that there is no question of our standing alone in this matter, for there are champions of this cause upon ■every hand. I am merely avowing this in order that you may mderstand why, perhaps, it fell to us, who are disengaged from the poUtics of this great Continent and of the Orient, to suggest that this was the keystone of the arch and why it occurs to the generous mind of our President to call upon me to open this debate. It is not because we alone represent this idea, but because it is our privilege to associate ourselves with you in representing it. "I have only tried in what I have said to give you the fountains ■of the enthusiasm which is within us for this thing, for those foun- tains spring, it seems to me, from all the ancient wrongs and sym- pathies of mankind, and the very pulse of the world seems to beat. " Mr. Lloyd George (Great Britain) delivers the following speech: "I arise to second this resolution. After the noble speech of the President of the United States I feel that no observations are needed in order to commend this resolution to the Conference, and I should not have intervened at all had it not been that I wished to state how emphatically the people of the British Empire are behind this proposal. And if the National leaders have not been able. during the last five years to devote as much time as they would like to its advocacy, it is because their time and their energies have been absorbed in the exigencies of a terrible struggle. "Had I the slightest doubt in my own ftiind as to the wisdom of this scheme it would have vanished before the irresistible appeal made to me by the spectacle I witnessed last Sunday. I visited a jegion which but a few years ago was one of the fairest in an ■exceptionally fan land. I found it a ruia and a desolation. I ■drove for hours through a country which did not appear like the habitation of living men and women and children, but like the excavation of a buried province — shattered, torn, rent. I went to •one city where I witnessed a scene of devastation that no indemnity can ever repair — one of the beautiful things of the world, disfigured and defaced beyond repair. And one of the cruellest features, to my mind, was what I could see had happened, — that Frenchmen, who love their land almost beyond any nation, in order to establish the justice of their cause, had to assist a cruel enemy in demohshing their own homes, and I felt: these are the results — only part of the results. Had I been there months ago I would have witnessed something that I dare not describe. But I saw acres of graves of the fallen. And these were the results of the only method, the only organized method, — the only organized method that civilized nations have ever attempted or established to settle disputes amongst each 284 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. other. And my feeling was : surely it is time, surely it is time that a saner plan for settling disputes between peoples should be estab- lished than this organized sa\^agery. "I do not know whether this will succeed. But if we attempt it the attempt will be a success, and for that reason I second the proposal." Mr. Orlando (Italy), having asked leave to speak, delivered the speech of which the following is a translation : "Allow me to express my warmest adhesion to the great prin- ciple which we are called upon to proclaim to-day. I think that we are thus accomplishing the first and the most solemn of the pledges which we gave to our people when we asked them to make immense efforts in this immense war; pledges of which the coimter- part was death, nameless sacrifices and boimdless grief. We are, therefore ftdfilling our duty in honoring this sacred pledge. That is much, but it is not all. We must bring to the task a spontaneous spirit and, if I may be allowed the mystic expression, purity of intention. It is not in any spirit of petty national vanity that I allow myseK to recall the great juridical traditions of my peo- ple and its aptitude for law. I only do so the better to prove to you that the mind of the Italian people is well fitted to accept this principle spontaneously and whoUy. Now, law is not only the defense of order, founded on justice, against all violence, it is also the necessary outward form, guaranteed by the State, of that essential principle which forms the very foundation of the existence of human society, that is to say, the principle of social co-operation. I think then that the formma proposed to us offers not only guarantees against war, but also that co-operation among nations which is the true essence of right. "Mr. President, Gentlemen, today is a great moment, a great historical date, because it is only from today that the law of peoples begins and is born, and the fact that this birth has taken place in the generous and glorious land of France, which has proclamied and won acceptance fo^; the rights of man by its genius and its blood appears to me to be a happy omen. Quod bonum felix faustumque sit." Mr. Leon Bourgeois (France) speaks in French in these terms : . "I am deeply grateful to the President of the French Council of Ministers for having done me the distinguished honor of entrusting to me the task of speaking in the name of France. Recollections of the Conference of the Hague have probably led him to this choice; the honor therefore belongs to the very numerous colleagues present here with whom I collaborated in 1899 and 1907. "President Wilson has just eloquently and finally said that we do not, that you, Gentlemen, do not represent Governments alone, but peoples. What do the peoples wish today and what therefore, do the Governments wish who are really free, really representative, really democratic, that is to say, those whose wishes are necessar- ily in agreement with those of their peoples ? They wish that what we have seen during these four horrible years shall never be repeated in this world. Their wishes are the wishes of all the victims of this war, of all those who have breathed their last for liberty and for right. Those men fought not only to defend their coimtry, but came together from all parts of the world for this crusade of TEE AT Y OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 285 which President Wilson so rightly spoke, and they knew that they died not only for France but for universal freedom and univerasl peace. For uniyersal reace: the Premier of England has just de- scribed with striking eloquence the picture of ruin and desolation •vvhich he has seen. That ruin, that desolation we ourselves have witnessed and you have seen them very far from the spot where hostilities began. For in fact, henceforth, no local conflict can be confined to some one part of the world: whatever may be the State where the difficulty arose, believe me, it is the whole world that is in danger. There is such an interdependence in all the relations between nations in the economic, financial, moral and intellectual spheres that, I repeat, every wound inflicted at some point threatens to poison the whole organs. "There is another reason why it is impossible that Humanity should again witness such spectacles. President Wilson has just alluded to the alarming progress of science, turned from its proper object, which is continually to give to mankind greater well-being, a surer moral, more hope for the future, and which was used for the most terrible and miserable of purposes, the purpose of destruc- tion. Now science daily makes fresh progress and fresh conquest; daily it perfects its means of action and in the light of what we have seen during these last five years in the way of terrible and destructive improvements in machinery and gunnery, think of the fresh destruction with which we might be threatened in a few years. "We have then the duty of facing a problem of conscience which thrills us all, that is what we are to do to reconcile the special interests of our peoples, which we cannot forget, with those of our common country, all Humanity. "We must take counsel with ourselves and ponder that saying which I deem as a sublime truth, that among all the vital interests which we can consider, there is one which is above, and includes . all others, one without the defence and protection of which all the others are in danger — the interest of the common country. "Speaking of tragedy of conscience, I remember the scruples which, at the Conference of the Hague, held back the Representa- tives of even the freest peoples, the peoples most imbued with the sense of democracy and most resolved to prepare the way of peace. They said to themselves: 'We must nevertheless reserve questions of our honor and our vital interests.' Perhaps it was this which delayed the creation of that bond which will unite us from to-day. We know now that there is one vital interest which we have before all to consider and defend. That is the interest of universal peace founded on Right, without which none of the most vital interests of our several countries, great or small, would be free from menace and destruction. "How can we succeed in making a reality of that which but a few years ago was still thought to be a dream? How is it that this dream now appears as an imminent fact in the mind of the statesmen present here, realists whose right and duty it is not to let themselves be carried away by ideals of generosity, however attractive they may be? Why is it that to-day these statesmen are sitting round this table inspired with a common thought ? For doubtless you wUl presently adopt unanimously the proposals which will be made to you. How is it that these statesmen, these realists, 286 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. can come to consider as a tangible thing realisable in a short time, that which formerly appeared a dream? Looking back at the his- tory of the last thirty years, particularly to that Conference at the Hague, for reverting to which I beg your pardon, we see that if it did not produce all the resvdts expected from it, it nevertheless pro- duced a certain number. Members of the different Governments wUl remember that the institutions set up by the Hague Conference thrice proved defective and that in differences — I wiU not use a stronger term — ^which might have disturbed the relation between the different States, the judgments of the Hague succeeded in smoothing away difficulties and re-establishing harmony. I may even recall that between France and Germany there was a conflict — the Affair of Casablanca — which might have been very serious and not for those two countries alone, for, — as I was saying, local conflicts sometimes become general, — ^where recourse to arbitration completely safeguarded the honor of France and made it possible for Germany not to draw the sword. "Why is it that this could not last, or rather, why is it that the institutions of the Hague failed to prevent the terrible conflicts from which we are just emerging? There are two reasons and within the next few days you will sweep away one of them. The Conferences at the Hague were attended by the Representatives of many States, but even those who were inspired by real good will were forced to recognize that on the map of the world the frontiers of different countries were not what they should have been. While we were deliberating there, we Frenchmen could not forget that there was a part of France which was not free and you. Represent- atives of the Kingdom of Italy, could not forget that there were stiU Italian Provinces outside Italian law. How could you expect an international organization, however perfect, to prove really effective if, when it began to work, it met this terrible question of irredentism as our Italian friends call it, national claims, as we say, just as one's foot meets an obstacle on the road ? "You will bring about the situation in which the facts conform to the principles of Right. You wUl draw frontiers which corre- spond to the wishes of the peoples themselves, and you will give to each country the limits which Right itself would give it. You will also impose obligations which it was beyond our power to impose, for, as you will remember, — it was historically a very significant fact — how the different states grouped themselves, and we have now seen those who voted against us then join against us on the" field of battle. The foes of Right were already leagued together against us. "You who have fought for Right are about to set up an organi- zation, to impose penalties and to insure their enforcement. Having established compulsory arbitration, having fixed — ^methodically, progressively and surely — the penalties to be imposed for disobe- dience to the common will of civilized nations you will be able to make your work solid and lasting and enter with confidence and tranquility the Temple of Peace. "This is not the moment to discuss ways and means, but I hasten to say, in the name of the Government of the French Republic, that to do all that can be done to lead the free peoples as far as possible on the road to agreement must be our aim and wish. In addition TEBATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. ,287 to juridicial methods designed to establish the reign of Right and to ensure the freedom of all, we shall certainly adopt — and here I turn toward the Italian Prime Minister who just said; 'It is co-opera- tion in the work of peace' — all the measures required for co-opera- tion between States in relation to those numberless interests the interdependence of which I mentioned just now. This interde- pendence becomes daily closer. It wiU not only be a question of checking nacent conflicts but of preventing their birth. "I thmk that, even without any further statement, I have thus correctly interpreted the general feeling. It is enough for me to have shown with what deep enthusiasm France joins those who but lately proposed the creation of the League of Nations. President WUson said that this question was at the very heart of mankind. That is true. He said we must constantly have an eye open on humanity, a watchful eye that never shuts. Well, I wiU end by recalhng another memory of the Hague. It has been said that we heard there the first heart-beats of Humanity. Now it lives indeed. Thanks to you. May it live for ever V Mr. Hughes (Australia) having asked whether it will be possible to discuss the scheme when it is complete, the President replied that the members of the Conference would be quite at liberty to do so. The President calls successively on the Delegates of various Powers who, speaking in French, supports the draft resolution in these terms: Mr. Lou (China) : In the name of the Chinese Government I have the honor to support whole-heartedly the proposed resolution. China, always faithful to her obligations and deeply interested in the maintenance of the Peace of the World, associates herself entirely with the lofty ideal embodied in the resolution, which is that of creating an international cooperation which would insure the accomplishment of obligations contracted and will give safe- guards against war. I am glad to give an assurance to this Con- ference that the Chinese Republic will always have the keenest desire to consult with the otner States in the establishment of a League which will give all nations, both small and great, an effective guarantee of their territorial integrity, of their political sovereignty, and of their economic independence founded upon an impartial justice. Mr. Dmowski (Poland): I rise not only to support the draft resolution but to express deep gratitude for this noble initiative. I do so not only as representing a part of mankind which has suffered no less than those who have suffered most and which cherishes the hope that such sufferings will never be repeated and that what this war has not destroyed will be preserved for the peaceful generations of the future. I do so also as representing a country placed in that part of the world where sources of danger to future peace are greater than elsewhere, where today after the conclusion of the armistice, war contmues, as representing the country which at this moment is exposed on three sides to danger and is forced to make war on three fronts. If we have an institution like that which is proposed to-day, such as would give international guarantees of peace, we shoiild not be in this dangerous situation. 288, TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. I express my gratitude in the name of a coimtry which, perhaps more than all others, needs international guarantees of peace and which will greet a League of Nations with the greatest enthusiasm. Mr. Hymans (Belgium): Gentlemen, I have not asked leave to speak in order to discuss the ideas expressed in the draft resolu- tion, which the Belgian Delegation of course accepts whole-heartedly, and which have been so nobly set forth in this Assembly. I have asked to speak only on a practical question which is, I think, of general interest. The Conference to-day is organizing its methods of work and pro- cedure. I should like to ask for an explanation of the last sentence of the draft resolution relative to the representation of the Powers on the Commission appointed to examine the draft constitution of the League of Nations. The draft says that the Conference appoints a Commission representing the Associated Governments to work out the constitution in detail and to settle the functions of the League. The President replies to Mr. Hymans that the explanation which he is about to furnish will doubtless give him satisfaction. As nobody asks leave to speak on the subject of a resolution of the League of Nations, which has been submitted to the Conference by the Bureau, that resolution is unanimously adopted. The President then replies to the question raised by the Hon. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, on the method of appoint- ment of the Commission charged with the duty of working out the draft constitution of the League of Nations : The Great Powers, in accordance with the motion, have desig- nated two delegates each to serve on the Commission. It has been decided that five delegates to be chosen in common by the other Powers should represent those Powers on the Commission. That is to say that you are asked to meet here, say, on January 27th, if that day suits you, at 2 or 3 o'clock, to come to an agreement among yourselves and appoint the 5 delegates of the other powers. I ought to tell you that we shall ask you to agree to the same course as regards the appointment of other commissions. You will therefore have several elections to hold at the samie time. On this question of the appointment of the commission, the dele- gates of a certain number of Powers ask leave to speak and explain in turn the views of their respective coim tries : (All speak in French except Sir Robert Borden (Canada) and M. Phym Bibaoh Kosha (Siam). Mr. Hymans (Belgium) : The reply which the Hon. President has been so good as to make to me raises the question of the constitution of all the conditions which will be appointed to-day. That will allow me, I think, to define my views on the whole question, which I will do very quickly. Excepting the case of the Commission appointed to examine the question of reparation for the damage of the war, the general system, according to the President, is to give two delegates to each of the great Powers, which allows them 10 delegates, and five delegates in all to a group or collection formed of 19 Powers who have been classed among the Powers ingeniously termed "Powers with special interests." TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. 289 I do not wish to speak in the name of the Delegates of other coun- tries, but I will speak only in that of my own and in that of the Belgian Delegation. As an exceptional measure we, like Serbia, Greece, Poland and Koumania, have been given 2 delegates — 2 to each of these Powers that on the Commission appointed to examine the question of repa- ration for the damage of the war. Apart from this Commission, the 19 Powers "With special interests" have to appoint in common by a system hitherto unexplained, which they will have to discover, 5 delegates. It is not stated whether this will be done by propor- tional representation or otherwise. We Belgians wiU beg leave to present to the Conference the follow- ing request: First, as regards the Commission to examine the constitution of the League of Nations and next, the Commission appointed to ex- amine international legislation on labor. We should wish the Con- ference to be so good as to grant to Belgium 2 delegates on each of these 2 Commissions. As regards the Commission for the establishment of the League of Nations, we think that we have a right to this on account of our international, political and even geographic position, which has ex- posed us, and may again expose us in the future to serious danger. As regards the question of international labor legislation there is nothing that could interest us more. Belgium, small in extent, counts among the great commercial producing and industrial powers of the world — she counted among them and I hope she wOI again count among them in a short time, after her reconstruction. I wiU not tire the Conference by quoting figures, but we are in that respect among the 5 or 6 foremost Powers; we have a large industrial population. In certain departments we are among the very first. I will mention only the coal and zinc industries and the production and casting of iron. I will not labor the points. I think it would be just to give to Belgium a double representa- tion on the 2 Commissions I have mentioned, that is, two delegates. There remain. 3 Commissions: One dealing with the control of ports and ways of communication, another which will deal with crimes committed during the war and with the penalty to be in- flicted for those crimes and the third dealing with reparation. But in this last named Commission we think we are fairly well repre- sented. There remain therefore only two : that on ports waterways and railways and that on crimes committed during the war and the penalties which those crimes deserve. I ask that it should at once be recognized that Belgium, shall have a delegate on each of these two Commissions and in doing so I do not think that I am asking more than is reasonable. Belgium pos- sesses one of the three most important ports on the European Con- tinent. She has a network of railways which is the densest m Europe. Owing to the needs of her production and trades she is directly inter- ested in the whole system of international communications. It is certainly not exaggerated to ask that for the examination of so grave a problem Belgium should have a Delegate, and I ask the Confer- ence to decide m this sense. As regards the question of crimes committed duriag the war and the penalties to be exacted for them, who could deny that we 135546—19 ^19 290 TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. have an absolute right to be represented on the Commission, when our country was the first to be invaded, the first to be submerged by invasion, when her neutrality was violated in spite of the treaty signed by the enemy, and when some of the most abominable crimes with which the enemy can be reproached were committed on our soil as also on Serbian soil ? I think then there is nothing exces- sive in our demand. I speak only for ourselves. I do not wish to prejudice the rights and interests of any other country. I do not think I shall arouse their susceptibilities when I state this claim in the name of 'th& Belgian Delegation alone. To sum up, I ask that, as in the case of the Commission on damage caused during the war, Belgium, should have two delegates on the Commission for the establishment of the League of Nations, two delegates on the Commission on international labor legislation, one delegate on the Commission relative to the control of ports, and one delegate on the Commission for the examination of crimes committed by the enemy and of the penalties to be exacted for them. I appeal to the sense of justice of the Great Powers and to that of the President of the Conference. Mr. Calogeras (Brazil) : It is with some surprise that I constantly hear it said: "This has been decided, that has been decided." Who has taken a decision? We are a sovereign assembly, a sovereign court. It seems to me that the proper body to take a decision is the Conference itself. Now, it appears from what has been said that functions have been allotted and that representation on the Commissions is con- templated without certain very important interests having been able to obtain a hearing. It is umiecessary to say that I cordially adhere to the principle of a League of Nations. I have the honor to represent a country which in its constitution absolutely forbids^, in express terms, the waging of a war of conquest. This is an idea of long standing with us, firmly rooted in our traditions. I am therefore heartily in favor of the idea of a League of Nations. But if, on the other hand, I consider the proposed organization of the conditions and the manner in which the interests of my country may be represented thereon, I must point out that we have laws, I may even say texts, of a constitutional character, which do not permit us to give to anybody powers to represent us. I therefore appeal to the sense of justice of the President and of the members of the Bureau of this Conference. I ask them that, at least on the Commission which will deal with the League of Nations as well as those on which are to examine international control of railways and ports and reparation for damage, Brazil should enjoy the representation to which she considers herself entitled. Sir Robert Borden (Canada): I have a great deal of sympathy with the point of view of the smaller nations, because possibly the constitution of the League affects them even more closely that it affects the status of the Great Powers of the world. On the other hand, I reaUze that there must be a reasonable limitation of the membership of the committee; otherwise, it would be very difficult to carry on the work in an effective way. And I remember, also, that TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 291 after this Committee has made its report, its conclusions must be submitted to this Conference, and must be approved by it before they can go into effect, but I do feel that the matter has been placed before this Conference in perhaps not the most appropriate way. We are told that certain decisions have been reached. The result of that is that everyone of us asks: "By whom have those decisions been reached, and by what authority?" I should have thought it more appropriate to submit a recom- mendation to this Conference, and to have the Conference itself settle the number to be appointed and who they are to be. If that course had been taken, it seems probable that most of the difficulty which had arisen would not have presented itself. And I should like. to suggest, with all due respect, that perhaps that would be a more appropriate method of dealing with such matters in the future. Certain regulations have been formulated and passed by which, as I understand, two Conferences were established — one a Confer- ence of the 5 Great Powers, and another which may be called the full or plenary Conference. I do not understand that, up to the present time, there has been any Conference of the five great Powers in accordance with the regulations thus adopted. It may be that there has and I have no doubt that there is, and with the best inten- tion; but nevertheless, as we are acting under regulations adopted by the representatives of the 5 Great Powers, it seems highly desirable that we should abide by them. Therefore, I again suggest, with all respect, that the proceedings in the future should be guided by those regulations. M. Trumbitch (Serbia) : I have the honor to declare, in the name of the Delegation of the Eangdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, that we support the entirely just proposal of my honorable friend Mr. Hymans. At the same time, I have the honor to ask that the same representation may be given to the delegation to whif'.h I belong as to the Belgian delegation. It is not necessary for me long to retain the attention of thit high assembly to justify the desire which I have expressed, for the reasons just now put forward by M. Hymans are almost the same as those which justify our proposal. M. Veniselos (Greece) : As regards the League of Nations. I associate myself with the request put forward by the Belgian Delegation, without, however, asking that Greece should receive the same treatment. I recognize that all small countries are deeply interested in the study of this question, but I must admit also that the situation of Belgium is entu-ely a special one by reason of her proximity to the German Empire, which started this War, and for the other reasons given by Mr. Hymans. I therefore do not ask that my country should be specially repre- sented on this Commission, and confine myself to declaring that I hold myself at the disposal of the Commission when it is appointed in order to make known my ideas on the subject. As regards reparation for damage, I must thank the represent- atives of the Great Powers for the representation which they have granted to my country. As regards the responsibility of the authors of the war, I ask that Greece may also be given a representative, in view of the fact 292 TEEATY OP PEACE "WITH GEKMANY. that we have to deplore the loss of between three and four hundred thousand people oi Greek race in the Ottoman Empire. It would, therefore, appear to be just that we should be represented in order that we may be able to submit to the Commission and then to the Conference our special point of view on this question. I do not ask that my country should be specially represented on the Commission relating to international legislation on labor, for other nations are perhaps more interested than oiu^elves in this question. It would be well, finally, that we should be granted a representa- tive on the Commission for the international control of ports, not only on account of the maritime importance of my country, and of the special interest which it has in this question, but. also because of the fact that even in the present territory of Greece there are certain places which might come within the purview of this part of the program of the Conference. It would, therefore, be just that Greece should in this respect be authorized to make known her wishes. I think it right to remind the assembly in conclusion that in the report that I have the honor to submit to the Conference concerning the territorial claims of my country, I declared myself ready to agree that countries bordering on the sea should give all possible facilities to countries placed behind them which have not such easy access to the sea. Count Penha Garcia (Portugal) : You will allow me to make some observations on a question which interests small and great Powers alike. First, I draw your attention to an essential fact which is moreover the corollary of all the noble speeches which this assembly has just heard. It is certain that the League of Nations, a question of such great importance raised by the Great Pow-ers and interesting the weaker countries in so high a degree, must inspire confidence as regards the future, particularly among the latter. It is likewise certaia that respects for our rights, the decisions which we shall be called upon to take and the cordiality of our relations within this Assembly will constitute a kind of foretaste of that League of Nations which we have just been invited to join. I feel certam that this consideration will guide the proposals of the Great Powers and that our decisions will be inspired by the lofty view and the spirit of high jtistice which should preside over the League of Nations. We must not, however, exaggerate the importance of the ques- tion of representation on the Commissions, for that, after all, only concerns a method of work, and those who propose this method meant well in doing so, because it offers indisputable advantages. It is true that large Commissions are more difficult to direct .and that their work is sometimes rather slow, but we must not forget that the work of these Commissions must be of such impor- tance to each of the countries interested that perhaps in reality it is worth running the risk which we are now seekiag to avoid. Perhaps it would be better so to arrange that in each Commission all interests should be represented and made known so that we may attain, doubtless more slowly, a surer result, which will enable us to come with more precise ideas and less unprepared to the plenary sessions. TREATY 01" PEACE WITH GERMANY. 293 I will especially draw the attention of the President, whose qualities )f heart and whose fairness constitute for us a two-fold guarantee, ;o this point, of the importance of which for my country he has jertainly not lost sight. As regards the Commission on Keparation, the non-representation )f Portugal is certainly due to an oversight, since other countries laving special interests in this respect are all represented thereon, J, fact which, I may say, affords me great satisfaction. I pay homage to the sufferings and endurance of so many countries which have been the victims of an aggression, the brutality of which has excited universal indignation. I beg leave, however, to point out that the position of Portugal is absolutely the same, that we have shed our blood in France for the cause of Right and Justice, that our territories in Africa have been invaded, that we are half, I might indeed say completely, ruined by our efforts in the war. We do not regret this. But why, then, should we not be heard, why should we not also be represented on the Commission appointed to consider the question of Reparation. Once again I must observe this seems to me to be an oversight. As regards the other Commissions, those relating to the control of ports, to the League of Nations, to Labor questions and to pen- alties for responsibility for the war, are also of unquestionable interest to Portugal, but, generally speaking, I request the Bureau to be so good as to accede to the legitimate desire of all countries represented at the Conference to be able to make their voices heard whenever they have a special interest to defend, and to be represented on the Commissions. I ask that all these countries may be placed on the same footing as the others where their rights are affected. Mr. Benes (Czecho-Slovak Republic) : Without entering into detail in regard to the question of the nomination of representatives on the Commissions, I beg leave to submit the following considerations to the Conference : The Czecho-Slovak delegation ask to be represented on the Com- missions appointed to examine the questions of Reparation and of the Responsibility of the Central Empires. We base this proposal on the following grounds : The Czecho-Slovak Republic is especially interested in all questions concerning the financial and economic liquidation of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire ; for its territory formed the most industrial region of that monarchy. It would therefore be impossible to settle these questions without allowing us to bring forward such information on the subject as we possess. Our delegation also has a special interest in the question of Inter- Qational railways and waterways. Our country has in fact no access to the sea, and it is extremely important for our future inter- national position to know how these great channels of communi- cation will be controlled, and especially to take part in the discussion relating to the control of international railways, waterways and ports. Therefore we ask to be represented on the Commission instructed to examine these questions. The questions of the League of Nations being also of the highest . interest to countries surrounded, like ours, by Powers who have 294 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEKMANY. always been hostile to them, we ask that we may be granted a rep- resentative on the Commission concerned. To sum up, we beg the Conference to grant us a representative on each one of the three Commissions called upon to discuss ques- tions of special interest to our Eepublic. Mr. Bratiano (Roumania): The Belgian Representative, although professing only to speak on behalf of the special interests of Belgium, has raised a question of principle which Roumania has far too much at heart to allow her to refrain from expressing agreement with his point of view. I wish for the moment to confine myself to drawing attention to the importance of these principles to States like Roumania without entering into the details of each of the questions which, I hope, will be treated fully in a subsequent discussion. I will, however, point out, in passing, with regard to one of these questions (that of inter- national ways of communications), that Roumania is at the mouth of the Danube, a great river which affects the communication of a great part of Europe, and that she has therefore very special interests in it. I do not, however, wish to lose sight of the fact that at this moment the League of Nations is in question, and that it would be poor evidence of the interest felt by Roumania in the formation of this League if I did not contribute to the explanations made by those representatives of other countries who have already spoken. It is certain that, in the representation of such a league, the relative strength of each state has been kept in view, and it would be just to consider at the same time the interests which lead each state to favor the formation of this league, when it might perhaps be found that small states have more interest in it than great ones. In settling the representation of the League both of these points of view must be kept in mind. It is to express the interest which Roumania feels in the prin- ciples of this League that she asks to be represented on this com- mission. Phya Bibadh Kosha (Siam): May I be permitted, in the name of the Siamese Delegation, to ask whether representation may be aflforded to those countries who have the misfortune to be without it, and, as a delegate of one of those nations, to ask whether we have the right and opportunity to attend the proceedings of each commission dealing with matters directly of mterest to the country which they represent, such as a League of Nations and the International Control of ports, railways and waterways ? Mr. Lou (China) : I also desire to appeal to the spirit of equity of the members of the Conference, so that technical delegated may largely participate in the different work on the Commissions. The desire has already been expressed, as to representation by delegates, that the prkiciple of equality among States be the basis of the League of Nations. I also express the desire to see the delega- tion of Chiaa represented in the Commissions on Labor Legislation and on the Means of Communication. In fact, China, during the war has sent to France nearly 150,000 Chiiiese laborers, of whom nearly 120,000 were in the British camps. All these laborers have indirectly contributed to the happy issue of the present war. TSEATT OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 295 On the other hand, China has a very large coast line, and her rail- ways, which connect her with the three big neighboring Powers will aave considerable development after the war. It is for these reasons that I ask for the representation of the [Chinese delegation on the two Commissions I have indicated. I may perhaps make a suggestion. I have heard my honorable 3oUeague, who represents Brazil, saying: "The Conference decided this, the Conference decided that." I personally have had the ex- perience of two Peace Conferences, as Mr. Leon Bourgois kindly remarked a moment ago: I think that the present Conference will make its work much more interesting if it will concentrate the efforts of the two former ones, which have established a panel of delegates from which each delegation mterested in any one particular ques- tion could select one or two members for the workmg of the Com- mission. That is a suggestion I beg to propose to this Conference. Mr. Dmowski (Poland) : In view of the extent of the territory of Poland, the size of the population, and the economic development of the country, and in view also of her political interests and her very important geographical position, I am of opinion that she should have the right to send a delegate to all such Commissions as she may think fit. I rise to associate myself with those members present who have opposed the method v^herehj it is proposed to choose these five delegates for Powers with special interests. The large number of voices which have been raised shows that the task of assembling the delegates of the Secondary Powers Avould be very difficult, that the discussion between them would, firstly, involve much loss of time and, secondly, would not tend towards harmony among them. I beg leave to propose that each delegation should draw up a written statement of its case in making a demand for the number of representatives whom it wishes to send to each Com- mission. I would likewise propose that there should be a Commission above all the others to decide finally on the composition of each of them. We would accept its decisions in advance, being convinced that it would seriously consider the interests of all the Powers whatevere they may be. The President, speaking in French, replies to the observations and suggestions of the delegates, in a speech of which the followiag is a translation : "As nobody else wishes to speak, I shall speak in my turn in order to try to justify the Bureau. It requires this, for if it had ever flattered itself that it could satisfy everybody, it would by now be thoroughly disilusioned. "Sir Robert Borden has reproached us, though in a very friendly way, for having come to a decision. Well, we have decided, as tegards the Commissions, in the same way as we decided to summon the present Conference. With your permission I wUl remind you that it was we who decided that there should be a Conference at Paris, and that the representatives of the countries interested should be summoned to attend it. I make no mystery of it — there is a Con- ference of the Great Powers going on in the next room. Sir Robert Borden has the less reason to be unaware of it since he yesterday 296 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. did US the single honor of making a statement before us on questions concerning the British Colonies. "The Five Great Powers whose action has to be justified before you today are in a position to justify it. The British Prime Minister just now reminded me that, on the day when the war ceased, the Allies had 12,000,000 men fighting on various fronts. This entitles them to consideration. "We have had dead, we have wounded in millions, and if we had not kept before us the great question of the League of Nations we might perhaps have been selfish enough to consult only each other. It was our right. "We did not wish to do this, and we summoned all the nations interested. We summoned them, not to impose our will upon them, not to make them do what they do not wish, but to ask them for their help. That is why we invited them to come here. But we stiU have to see how this help can best be used. "A few days ago Mr. Lloyd George was cruel enough to remind me that I was no longer very young. I entered Parliament for the first time in 1871. I have seen many Committees and Commissions and attended many meetings, and I have noticed — as most of you f)erhaps have also noticed — that the larger the Committees are the ess chance they have of doing any work. "Now, Gentlemen, let me tell you that behind us is something very great, very august and at times very imperious, somethiag which is called public opinion. It will not ask us whether such and such a State was represented on such and such a Commission. That interests nobody. It Avill ask us for results, ask us what we have done for the League of Nations so eloquently championed today by President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Bourgeois and Mr. Orlando. "What crime have we committed? We have decided that, for our part, we would appoint two delegates each on the Commission on the League of Nations. I would beg Mr. Hymans and aU those who followed him to let me keep to the point. As soon as I indul- gently allowed him to wander from it, as soon as the door was opened, everybody rushed in and discussed everything except the subject under discussion. It is my duty to guide the Conference in its work in order to obtain a residt. "We have therefore decided to appoint two delegates each, and then^may I be pardoned for it — we have decided to ask you to- appoint five delegates iu conmaon. If you do not think this enough, 1 will not take the responsi- bility of choosing from among you all, since each asks for more representation, but I wiU make a proposal: Choose all of us, so that everybody will at least have his rights. "What is the complaint? Has any right been denied to any Power? You all know how Committees work and you have the right to go before any Committee you like. Mr. Bourgeois, who is here, is not a plenipotentiary. He spoke with the authority to which he is entitled, and you were glad to hear him. I have heard Mr. Veniselos and many of you say: 'Our voice will not be heard.' How can you level such a reproacn at us ? Your voice will be all the better heard, because we are now arranging a means by which we can listen to each other. You can be heard on all the Commis- jy \ Cor TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 297 sions and Committees, and, after all, are you not sure that your voice will reach the Conference since you yourselves will be present and able to speak there ? "ThinK, Gentlemen, of the consequences of the proposals now made to us. As Mr. Dmowski said just now, requests wiU be made in writing and we shall collect these papers and then spend an hour or two in our Committee trying to find the best way out of these difficulties. But that is of no use either, for what we want is tangible results. The armistice still keeps many miUions of men at the front. It is not questions of procedure, but essential ones, that have to be decided. I ask all of you to consider the con- sequences of the proposals which come to us from all parts of this Assembly. If today we leave aside the essential question to indulge bx debates in procedure, I think I am safe in saying that at the end of a week or even of. a fortnight nothing wul have been settled and the essential question wiU not even have been examined. "Now, the public is waiting. This state of things appears to me impossible. I join Mr. Dmowski in asking anybody having observations to make to send them to the Bureau. But I do not ask for a special Committee to decide the matter. "Why should I not say what I think? I do not see that the Committee has the right to impose its wUl upon these five Powers. At least I say what I think. I want to get on, and I should very much like you to make up your minds today. "Let me make a suggestion which might suit everybody for the time. You might vote on all the proposals which we put before you today, reserving the right, which all Assemblies have, to iasert amendments. But, Gentlemen, do not let us go home today without having voted decisively, so that President Wilson, Mr. Bourgeois, Lord Robert Cecil and all of them may be able to get to work this evening and the Commissions to start from tomorrow. My aim and that of my colleagues of the other Powei's is to organize Commissions as soon as possible, so as to give them \^ork. All those of you wish to appear before them will do so. Anybody who wants changes will ask for them. As proposed by Mr. Dmowski, they will be examined and reported on. In this way we shall at least have the advantage of beginning woik at once. "We propose to you to appoint a certain number of Commissions. There will be two — one economic and the other financial — to be appoiated at the next Session, after which all the Commissions will be working, the order of the day can be satisfactorily dealt with, and effective discussion begun. "I beg yom- pardon, Gentlemen, for having spoken at such length, but all that I have said appeared to me necessary. Think of the immense work awaiting us. Just think of it! As Presiden t Wilson just now said, in an admirable sentence which sums up the whole question: 'We, like our Armies,. wish to win not only the war, but a cause.' We have the burden and responsibility of this cause in our hands. Of course, questions of procedm-e have their importance, too. They will be settled in due course. If the number of Commissions proves insufficient it can be increased — ^we leave you quite free in, that respect — but remember. Gentlemen, the larger the Commissions, the less gets done. 298 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMAITY. "Gentlemen, since I began to take part in these discussions I have sacrificed a certain number of personal opinions. I have done this cheerfully, feeling that I was doing something good and useful for the Common Cause. That was what I said to myself just now on hearing the noble words of President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George. "Let all of us, Gentlemen, be animated by the same spirit. The Bureau never wished to hurt anybody at all. On the contrary, it would like to unite you all in one group. Let us, then, start work at once and in the meantime claims will be presented and your Bureau able to start work." Mr. Hymans (Belgium) declares that he will say no more for fear of justifying the reproaches of the President of the Conference, and confines liimself to the following observation : "I simply propose that the Conference should vote on the resolutions which have been submitted to it. The Bureau has heard the observations which have been made in this Assembly. As I said just now, I have confidence in its justice, and I ask it to pay attention to those observations, to revise the composition of the Commissions and decide thereon." Mr. Klotz (France) lays on the table of the Conference, for reference to the Commission which has just been appointed, a draft proposal for a financial Section of the League of Nations. The President submits to the Conference resolutions relative to the appointment of the four other Commissions for which pro- vision is made in the order of the day, and for which the Powers with special interests have to name their delegates. He recalls the fact that the second Commission has to examine the responsibility of the authors of the war and the enforcement of penalties (Annex 2) and that the small Powers have to choose five representatives on this Commission. In reply to an observation made by Mr. Calogeras (Brazil) on the subject of the number of representatives alloted to his country, the President points out that Brazil has no reason to com- plain of the number of Delegates allowed to her, and that it does not foUow that because a country is not represented on a Commis- sion, it has not the same rights as those who are. On the third Commission, which will consider the question of reparation for damages (Annex 3), Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania and Serbia are asked to appoint two representatives each. With regard to the text of the resolution relative to this Commission, Jlr. Klotz (France) observes that there appears to be an important omission in it. It says that this Commission will have to examine various questions; (1) the amount of reparation which the enemy Powers ought to pay: (2) their capacity for payment; (3) by what method, in what form, and within what time this payment must be made. To this last paragraph it will be well to add: "And the guarantees necessary to msm-e its payment." The amendment proposed by Mr. Klotz is referred to the Bure^iu for examination. TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. 299 On the fourth (International Legislation on Labor — Annex 4) and fifth (International Control of Ports, Waterways and E ail- ways — Annex 5) Commissions, the Powers with special interests will for the time appoint five Delegates. The President proposes that these appointments should be made on January 27. Mr. Hymans (Belgium) having asked that the Secretariat should examine the question and arrive at a decision regarding the number of representatives to be appointed, the President replies that the question is one for the Bureau, and not for the Secretariat. He adds : I ask that the Bureau should retain its liberty of action. If you do not wish to name your Delegates now, but would rather wait, so be it, but, let me tell you, at this moment we are occupied with serious questions. The Polish question is among the foremost. On Monday we have to hear Delegates. If you ask for the post- ponement of the election, it will be postponed, but I must tell you that the Delegates of the Great Powers, for their part, will not con- sider themselves to have been postponed and nobody will gain anything. As for us, we think that our work is urgent, and we ask the help of the whole Conference to assist us to get through it. Mr. Hymans (Belgium) expresses agreement, and asks for the judgment of the Bureau, whose decision will be awaited. Mr. Bratiano (Roumania) recognizes that everybody is willing to meet on the 27th of January for the purpose of naming Delegates, who will be able to begin work at once now that it is possible to examine questions of principle. The President puts to the vote the proposal of the Bureau: — That the Delegates of the Powers with special interest should meet on the 27th of January at 15 o'clock (3 p. m.) to elect representatives. This proposal is adopted. (See Annex 6 for the minutes of the Session of January 27, and Annex 7 for the list of the members of the five Commissions.) The President asks those members of the Conference who have declarations to make regarding the Delegates to be so good as to present them to the Bureau. The Session is adjourned at 18.10 o'clock (6.10 p. m.). P. Dutasta, G. Clemenceau, Secretary General. President J. C. Grew, M: P. A. Hankey, Paul Gauthier, Aldrovandi, Sadao Saburi, Secretaries 300 treaty of peace with germany. Annex 1. DRAFT RESOLUTIONS RELATIVE TO THE LEAGUE OF' NATIONS. The Conference, having considered the proposals for the creation of a League of Nations, resolves that: (1) It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement, which the Associated Nations are now met to establish, that a League of Nations be created to promote international cooperation, to insure the fulfillment of accepted international obligations and to provide safeguards against war. (2) This League should be treated as an integral part of the general Treaty of Peace, and should be open to every civilized nation which can be relied on to promote its objects. (3) The members of the League should periodically meet in interna- tional conference, and should have a permanent organization and secretariat to carry on the business of the League in the intervals between the conferences. The Conference therefore appoints a Committee representative of the Associated Governments to work out the details of the Constitu- tion and functions of the League. January 25, 1919. Annex 2. draft resolution relative to the responsibility of the au- thors of the war and the enforcement of penalties. That a Commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers, be appointed to inquire into and report upon the following : (1) The responsibility of the authors of the war. (2) The facts as to breaches of the customs of law committed by the forces of the German Empire and their Allies on land, on sea and in the air during the present war. (3) The degree of responsibility for these offences attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staffs and other individuals, however highly placed. (4) The Constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate to ■ the trial of these offences. (5) Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above which may arise in the course of the inquiry and which the Commission finds it useful and relevant to take mto consideration. January 25, 1919. Annex 3. draft resolution relative to reparation for damage. That a Commission be appointed with not more than three repre- sentatives apiece from each of the five Great Powers and not more than two representatives apiece from Belgium, Greece, Poland, Eoumania and Serbia, to examine and report: (1) On the amount which the enemy countries ought to pay by way of reparation. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 301 (2) On what they are capable of paying; and (3) By what method, in what form and within what time payment bould be made. January 25, 1919. Annex 4. draft resolution on international legislation on labor. That a Commission, composed of two representatives apiece rom the five Great Powers and five representatives to be elected )y the other Powers represented at the Peace Conference, be ap- )ointed to inquire into the conditions of employment from the inter- lational aspect and to consider the international means necessary ;o secure common action on matters affecting conditions of em- jloyment, and to recommend the form of a permanent agency to ;ontinue such inquiry and consideration in co-operation with, and inder the direction of the League of Nations. January 25, 1919. Annex 5. draft resolution relative to international control of. International control of ports, waterways and railways. That a Commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers and five representatives to be elected by the Dther Powers, be appointed to inquire into and report on : International control of ports, waterwavs and railwavs. January 25, 1919. Annex 6. minutes of the meeting held by the representatives of powers with special interests, january 27, 1919. The Session is opened at 15 o'clock (3 p. m.) under the Presidency of Mr. Jules Cambon, French Delegate, President. Present: — For Belgium: Mr. Hymans, Mr. Van den Heuvel, Mr. Vandervelde. For Bolivia: Mr. Ismael Montes. For Brazil: Mr. Olyntho de Magalhaes, Mr. Pandia Calogeras. * For China: Mr. Lou Tseng Tsiang, ' Mr. Suntchou Wei, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni- potentiary of China at Brussels. For Cuba: Mr. Rafael Martinez Ortiz. For Ecuador: Mr; Dorn y de Alsua. 302 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMAITY. For Greece: Mr. Nicolas Politis, Mr. Athos Romanes, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister "Plenipo- tentiary of H. M. The King of the Hellenes at Paris, Technical Delegate. For Haiti: Mr. Tertnllien Guilbaud, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Haiti at Paris. For Tlie Hedjaz: Mr. Rustem Haidar. For Peru: Mr. Francisco Garcia Calderon. For Poland: Mr. Roman Dmowski. For Portugal: Dr. Egas Moniz, The Count Penha Garcia. For Roumania: Mr. Jean J. C. Bratiano, Mr. Nicolas Misu. For Serbia: Mr. Pashitch, Mr. Trumbitch, Mr. Vesnitch. For Siam: The Prince Charoon, Phya Bibadh Kosha. For the Czecho-Slovalc Republic: Mr. Charles Eo-amar, Mr. Edouard Benes. For Uruguay: Mr. Juan Carlos Blanco. TTie President sets forth in the followiag terms the object of the meeting: — The President of the Conference has done me the honor of appoint- ing me to preside over the meeting of the Delegates of the Powers with special interests which have to settle the names of their repre" sentatives on the different Commissions, the list of which has already been drawn up. Other Commissions wiU be appointed later on. Today you are summoned to express your views in regard to the composition of four Commissions. I believe that all the members present speak or understand French: I therefore suggest that you should decide that no translation shall be made of the words pronoimced here. (The meeting, after consultation, assents to this proposal.) So far as concerns the appointment of Delegates on the Commis- sions, the simplest plan appears to me to be to suspend the session in order that you may be able to come to an agreement among your- selves. We wiU open an examination of the lists when the session is- resumed. Mr. Kramar (Czecho-Slovak Republic) asks leave to speak in order to propose a compromise; — I perfectly understand the idea which guided Mr. Clemenceau at the last session, when he said that it would be useless to have Com- TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 303 missions composed of too great a number of members. All those who, like him, have had experience of parliamentary affairs ;rre convinced of this. I hold the view, in accordance with this opinion, that the Com- missions should be composed, in fact, of fifteen members. I ask, however, that an exception should be made in the case of one of them which seems to me to be of special importance. I mean the Commission on the League of Nations. I am well aware that nothing will be definitely decided in commission, but we all of us realize that, when a step has been accepted by a Commission, it is difficult for a contrary decision to be taken in plenary session. Now, no injury could be caused to the idea of the League of Nations if the small Powers were represented on the Commission. For this reason, and since Mr. Clemenceau has publicly declared that number was not a sacred thing before which one has to bow, it has occurred to me that we might modify the number of Delegates on this important Commission. It would be possible to decide that it should be composed of twenty-five members: fifteen to represent the Great Powers and ten for the Powers with special interests. In this way it would be impossible for any kind of bitterness to remain in the minds of the Delegates of the last-named Powers. The other Commissions would remain ^vdth their composition of fifteen members, ten for the Great Powers and five for the Powers with special interests. Such is the arrangement which I desire to propose. The President states that he takes note of the extremely interest- ing observations offered by Mr. Kramar, and adds : You certainly remember that at the last plenary session, the President of the Conference was at pains to observe that all Dele- gates who might desire to make their voices heard in the Commis- sions could do so as they wished. At the present moment, I do not think that we — ^for we repre- sent here only a fraction of the Conference — can modify on our own authority that which has been decided by the Conference at its last session. The proposal which Mr. Kramar has just made can be referred to the next plenary session. To-day we could not deliberate in regard to it without exceeding the mandate which we have to fulfifl. The only thing which we have to do is to keep within the rules laid down for us by the Conference and to proceed to vote. It would, in my opinion, be best to suspend the session in order that you may agree among yourselves on the choice which you wish to make. Mr. Calogeras (Brazil), after seeking leave to speak, expresses himself as foUows : I desire, in the first place, to congratulate this limited assembly on having at its head as President so illustrious a statesman as Mr. Jules Cambon. May I now be permitted to define certain questions ? Unless I am mistaken, it was stated at the last plenary session of the Conference, as Mr. Kramar reminded us, that the composition of the Commissions, in respect of numbers, was a settled matter. 304 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. It was likewise stated that all claims — ^Justified ones, naturally — relating to an increase in the number of members of these Com- missions, should be reserved for a later session. I think I remember that certain claims have already been heard; it win at least be necessary for them to be examined. It is clear that we cannot at this moment do more than what has been decided. It should, however, be well understood and per- fectly clear that this is only a temporary solution until such time as a decision shall have been taken with regard to the question of increasing the number of members of the Commissions. I apologize for speaking at some length and I wiU attempt to summarize my observations. I possess a certain experience of international conferences, having sat on several occasions as the representative of Brazil in Pan- American conferences. Now, my experience does not altogether accord with what has been said here. One is aware that in great parliamentary debates, the majority, by its vote, compels the minority and, moreover, that commissions are not always models of efficiency: this we all know; I am myself a parliamentarian. However, in an Assembly like this one, which is an International Conference, where neither majority nor minority exists, votes must be obtained by unanimity, because, as a final enforcement, you have the signature of the agreements whereby conventional laws are fixed. There clearly exists certain difficulties in connection with pub- licity, the very great publicity which is, moreover, necessary to our discussions. In plenary session, a question of human pride comes into play. A nation which has expressed itself in a certain sense cannot easily gainsay itself or reach a compromise; whereas, in Commissions where there is a far greater degree of intimacy, where discussions take place with greater heat but also with greater freedom, agreements are far easier and far simpler than when they are de- pendent on a vote to be obtained in the plenary Conference. It is, moreover, manifest that one cannot require that, among so many representatives of different States, among so many man- datories bearers of diverse diplomatic instructions, one should obtain forthwith the agreement which is the indispensable prehmi- nary of the needed solutions. By the very fact that publicity is much greater in plenary session, you will understand that any divergences of opinion, even those which may merely be ones of detail and devoid of really great importance, directly they appear soon acquire a much greater importance and produce an impression which might be xmfayorable and, if I may say so, disastrous to the solutions which we wish to reach in harmony and by the free con- sent of the will of all concerned. These are the reasons for which it seemed, and still seems to me to-day — I speak from my small experience as a member of several international conferences — that there will be every advantage, from the point of view of the rapidity of our labors and having regard to the necessary agreement which must receive the sanction of the plenary Conference, in fixing the nmnber of members, not of all but of certain of the Conunissions, at a higher figure than the one hitherto adopted. I have myself made a claim. Other Delegates have spoken more or less in the same sense; it is clear that there is something to be done in this direction. TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 305 We have come here with a great ideal which all the world sup- ports; we desire to institute the League of Nations, that is to say, a system of equality as between all nations. The principle of the League has already been completely established. Each nation must be given a vote; "one nation, one vote." That is the spirit in which I beg leave to bring to your attention the arguments which appear to militate in favor of an increase in the number of members of Commissions, for the phrase "League of Nations" must not merely appear in our speeches; its spirit must reign in our hearts. The President points out, with the agreement of Mr. Calogeras, that the observations which have just been made cannot modify the proposals already placed before the Assembly; that, moreover, they cannot be taken into account at a meeting which has for its sole object the designation of the representatives of Powers with special interests. The observations of the Delegate for Brazil will, however, be recorded in the Minutes of the session, and the President will com- municate them to the Bureau of the Conference. Furthermore, the Delegates of Powers which desire to see an increase in the number of their representatives on the Commission of the League of Nations may naturally go and offer their observa- tions before that Commission. That Commission, which will be undoubtedly animated by a most liberal spirit, may, if it considers the number of representatives to be insufficient, request the plenary Conference to increase the number originally settled. Mr. V'esrMcli (Serbia), offers an observation of a technical descrip- tion by proposing that the vote to be given should be in the name of States, but not in the name of persons. This proposal is adopted. The session is suspended at 15.25 o'clock (3.25 p. m.) in order to allow the Delegates to exchange views before examining the. list of the representatives to be designated. The session is resumed at 16.05 o'clock (4.05 p. m.). On the resumption of the session Mr. Hymans (Belgium) de- scribes as follows the result of the exchange of views among the Delegates: — We have sought to reach an agreement, by means of private conversations, in regard to the position of the four following Com- missions: Commission on the League of Nations; Commission on Ports; Commission on International Legislation on Labor; Commis- sion to inquire into the Responsibility for Crimes committed during the war. As a result of the conversations which have taken place, there are two Commissions in regard to the composition of which there appears to be agreement, and we can thenceforward eliminate the two following questions from our deliberations : the Commission on the Responsibility for Crimes committed during the war, and the Commission on International Legislation on Labor. If there were no opposition, we could consider that the Dele- gates have been named for the Commission to inquire into the responsibility for crimes committed during the war, and to examine the penalties attached to those crimes, that Conimission being composed of the representatives of Belgium, Serbia, Roumania, Poland and Greece. 306 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. As regards the composition of the Commission to study Inter- national Legislation on Labor, we propose to put down the names of the following Powers: Belgium, Serbia, Cuba for the South American group, Poland and the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Serbian Delegates, however, have been good enough to state that they agreed to yield their place to Belgium, which, in view of the position which she holds in the industrial and commercial world, may be considered from that point of view as a Great Power. Belgium would therefore have two seats. The question is a more delicate one as regards the composition of the Commission to inquire into the constitution of the Le^tgue of Nations, and the composition of the Commission on the Control of Ports, Waterways and Railways. In the conversations which have just taken place, there seemed to be an agreement as regards Belgium and Serbia, each having a representative on both Commissions; there are, however, besides those two, Powers which likewise demand to be represented on both Commissions and the number of the Powers which wish to sit on them exceeds the number of available seats. Brazd, China, Roumania, Poland, the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Greece, and Por- tugal ask to be represented on the League of Nations Commission. With regards to the Ports Commission, in addition to Belgium and Serbia, Uruguay representing the South American group, Po- land, China, Greece, Roumania, and Portugal ask to be represented on this Commission. In our opinion it would be best, with a view to the composition of these two Commissions, to take a vote; it is our intention to request you, Mr. President, when the vote has taken place and after the nomination of the iive Delegates to whom we have been told we are entitled, to make yourself the interpreter of the desire of today's meeting by begging the Bureau of the •Conference to be so good as to increase eventually the number of seats on these two Commissions; we would indicate the Powers for which these seats are requested. The Greek Delegates state that they agree with Mr. Hymans in regard to the composition of the first two Commissions for which, in default of opposition, the vote should be regarded as settled; furthermore, like Serbia, they renounce their representation on the International Labor Legislation Commission in favor of Beligum. The President gives his consent to this mode of procedure and concludes, to sum up, that five Delegates mil be appointed and that four will be designated in order that they may oe proposed to the Bureau of the Conference so as to complete the Delegation. The discussion is resumed on the method of voting. The President states that, with regard to the Labor Legislation Commission and that on the Responsibility for Crimes, there is no need to vote, as the Delegates have agreed among themselves. The representation of Powers with special mterests on the international Labor Legislation Commission will therefore be com- posed as follows: Belgium, with two seats; Cuba, Poland, and the Czecho-Slovak Republic, with one seat each. As regards the Commission to inquire into the ResponsibiUtv for Crimes committed during the War, Belgium, Greece, Poland, TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 307 Roumania, and Serbia will each have one representative on that Commission. As regards the two other Commissions — those on the League of Nations and on Ports — the President proposes to proceed by separate vote for each Commission. This havmg been accepted, he states that it is understood that the Delegates to be considered as elected wiU be the five who have received the greatest number of votes. The four names following them will be laid before the Con- ference, by way of suggestion, with a view to complete the Commis- sions. An exchange of view takes place in order to fix the method of voting. It is decided in the first place that the voting at the first round is to be determined by absolute majority; at the second, by relative majority; further, that each Delegation shall only hand in one voting card. The list of candidates for the League of Nations Commission is communicated to the meeting. These candidates are, in alpha- betical order in French: Belgium, Brazil, China, Ecuador, Greece, Haiti, Poland, Portugal, Koumania, and Serbia and the Czecho- slovak Republic. The votes are collected, sorted and counted. The President announces the result: There are seventeen voters; the five nations which have received an absolute majority and the greatest number of votes are: Belgium, China, Brazil, Serbia, and Portugal. Thereafter come Roumania, Poland, Greece, the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Haiti and Ecuador. In accordance with the decision of the Assembly, the President will communicate to the Bureau of the Conference the names of the four nations which, after the five nations appointed, have ob- tained the greatest number of votes, namely: Roumania, Poland, Greece, and the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The President thereupon proposes to designate the members of the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission. Mr. Benes (Czecho-Slovak Republic) offers the following ob- servation : When we examined the question of the number of Delegates to be admitted into the Commission for Railways, Waterways, and the Internationalization of Ports, I explained to my colleagues on the Commission certain reasons for which we, the Czecho-Slovaks were anxious to be represented among the five Powers to be desig- nated. Those reasons are as follows: We are in the middle of Central Europe, a country surrounded on all sides by enemy powers, notably Germany and the Magyars, and we have no access to the sea. For us the question of the internationalization of railways is a vital one; on the other hand, our State is a riverain state of the Danube and we are specially interested in the question of the Adriatic; moreover, having no great ports, we shall therefore be interested in expressing our views on the subject of the special systems of control of the Baltic and the Adriatic ports. These are the reasons which we have advanced in order that we may be included in the number of the five Powers which are to be represented on the Commission: I therefore propose the candidature of the Czecho-Slovaks to be among the Five Powers which you are about to designate. 308 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Hymans (Belgium) announces, but not in order of priority, the names of the Powers which ask to be represented on the Com- mission: They are Belgium, Serbia, Uruguay, Poland, China, Rou- mania, Greece, the Czecho-Slovak Republic and Portugal. The votes are collected, sorted and counted. The President announces the result: — The five Powers which have secured an absolute majority are: Belgium, China, Greece, Uruguay and Serbia. After them, the following have secured the greatest number of votes: Roumania, Portugal, Poland and the Czecho-Slovak Re- public. Therefore, the suggestion to be made to the Bureau is concerned with the supplementary admission of the four last-named Powers. Mr. Calogeras (Brazil) makes the following statement in regard to the result of the voting: It appears to me that a great moral lesson is derived from the votes which this Assembly has just cast: on all the Commissions it is to Belgium that the greatest number, indeed almost the una- nimity of votes, has been given. That is not astonishing. We have barely emerged from a struggle which will undoubtedly effect a complete transformation of modern society: now, if it has been possible to secure this victory, if we are assembled round this Conference table, it is certainly because there has been an expira- tory victim, a country, small in extent, but great of heart, which has offered itself up as a holocaust, and to which we may well apply the phrase which Joan of Arc used of her banner: "It has been dragged in the dust; it now floats in the breeze." Mr. Hymans (Belgium) thanks him in the following terms: — From the depths of my heart I thank the representative of noble Brazil for the words with which he has just greeted my country. We have, I think, done our duty; victory has crowned the common efforts of the Allies and all of us here will have only one purpose, together with the great Allies at whose side we were sitting yesterday; that is, to establish a just peace, and to organize an international order founded on the rights and equality of nations. The President adds these words: In the name of all the nations represented at this table I associate myself with the words just pronounced by the represen- tatives of Brazil; at the same time, however, I desire to associate with these eulogies Serbia, Roumania, and aU the nations which have suffered, like ourselves and like Belgium, for the cause of Civilization and Right. • It is understood, of course, that the Delegates of coimtries which have been indicated will be at the same time the Delegates of all the nations, and that they may be requested to present the desiderata of nations which have not been themselves designated. In conclusion, the President begs the Delegations to communi- cate as soon as possible to the General Secretariat the names oi the representatives of nations designated by the vote which has just been taken, as the Commission ought to be constituted as rapidly as possible. I he members of the Secretariat take note of these names. (See Annex VII.). The session rises at 16.50 o'clock (4.50 p. m.). teeaty op peace with gebmany. 309 Annex 7 list of members of commissions 1 Commission on the League of Nations. United States of America: President Wilson, Honorable Edward M. House. British Empire: The Rt. Hon. The Lord Eobert Cecil, Lieutenant-General The Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts. France: Mr. L6on Bourgeois, Mr. Larnaude, Dean of the Faculty of Law of Paris. Italy: Mr. Orlando, Mr. Scialoja. Japan: The Baron Makino, The Viscount Chinda. Belgium: Mr. Hymans. Brazil: Mr. Epitacio Pessoa, Senator, former Minister of Justice. China: Mr. Wellington Koo, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plen- ipotentiary of China at Washington. Portugal: Mr. Jayme Batalha Reis. Serbia: Mr. Vesnitch. 2 Commission on the Responsiiility of the Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties. United States of America: Honorable Robert Lansing. Mr. James Brown Scott. British Empire: The Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart, K. C, M. P., Attorney General, with the right of substituting. The Rt. Hon. Sir Ernest Pollock, K. B. E., K. C, M. P. Solicitor- The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey. France: Mr. Andr6 Tardieu, Mr. Larnaude. Italy: Mr. Scialoja, Mr. Raimondo, Deputy. 310 TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Jafan: Mr. Adatci, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Brussels. Mr. H. Nagaoka. Belgium: Mr. Rolin-Jacquemyns, Secretary-General of the Belgian Delegation. Greece: Mr. Politis. Poland: Mr. Constantin Skirmunt, Member of the Polish National Com- mittee, Representative of the Committee at Rome. Roumania: Mr. S. Rosental, Jurist. Seriia: Mr. Slobodan Yovanovitch, Rector of the University of Bel- grade, with the right of substituting. Mr. M. K. Koumanoudi, Professor of the University of Belgrade, or Mr. M. M. Novacovitch, Professor of the University of Belgrade. Commission on Reparation of Damage. United States of America: Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, President of the War Industries Board. Mr. Norman H. Davis, Commission of Finance. Mr. Vance McCormick, President of the War Trade Board. Great Britain: The Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes, The Rt. Hon. The Lord Sumner of Ibstone, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, The Rt. Hon. The Lord Cunlifle, former Governor of the Bank of England. France: Mr. L. L. Klotz, Mr. Loucheur, Minister of Industrial Reconstruction, Mr. Albert Lebrun, Minister of the Liberated Territories. Italy: Mr. Salandra, Mr. D'Amelio, Councillor to the Court of Cassation, Mr. E. Chiesa, Deputy. Japan: Mr. Kengo-Mori, Financial Agent to the Embassy at London, Mr. H. Nagaoka, Mr. Tatumi, Administrator of the Yokohama Specie Bank. Belgium: Mr. Van den Heuvel, Mr. Despret, Advocate at the Court of Cassation, Administrator of the Bank of Brussels. Greece: Mr. Romanes, Mr. Michalakopoulos, Minister of State. TEEATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. 311 Poland: Mr. Sigismond Chamiec, Director of the National Loan Bank, • Mr. Casimir Olszewski, Director of the Department of War Damage at the Ministry of Finance. Boumania: Mr. Georges Danielpol, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipo- tentiary of His Majesty the King of Roumania at Washington, former Director of the National Bank of Roumania. Mr. P. Zahariade, Engineer, Inspector-General, former Director of the Railways. Serbia: Mr. C. Stoyanovitch, Deputy, Ml'. Milosh Savtchitch, former Minister, with the Right to be Replaced by : M. Dragoutine Provitch, Lawyer, Dr. Vel Baikitch, Bank Director. Commission on International Legislation on Labor. United States of America: Honorable Edward N. Hurley, President of the Shipping Board, Mr. Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor. Or eat Britain: The Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes, Sir Malcolm Delevingne, K. C. B., Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department. France: Mr. CoUiard, Minister of Labor and Social Insurance, Mr. Loucheru. Italy: Baron Mayor des Planches, Honorary Ambassador, Commissioner- General of Emigration, Mr. Cambirni, Deputy. Japan,; Mr. Otchiai, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at The Hague; Mr' Oka, former Director of Commercial and Industrial Affairs at the Ministry of Commerce. Belgium: Mr. Vandervelde, Mr. Mahaim, Professor of the University of Li^ge, Secretary of the Belgian Section of the International Associaticn for the Legal Protection of Workers. Cuba: Mr. Antonio Sanchez Bustamante. Poland: Mr. Jean Zoltowski, Member of the Polish National Committee (temporary Delegate). Ozeeho-Slovalc Republic: Mr. Benes. 312 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY, Commission on the International Control of Ports, Waterways, and Railways. United States of America: Honorable Henry White, Honorable David Hunter Miller. Great Britain: The Hon. A. L. Sifton, Sir Hubert Llewellyn-Smith, K. C. B., Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade. France: , Mr. Claveille, Minister of Public Works and Transport, Mr. Andr6 Weiss, Professor at the Faculty of Law of Paris, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Italy: Mr. Crespi, Minister of Food, Mr. de Martino, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan: Mr. K. Matsui, Colonel Sato. Belgium: Mr. Paul Segers, Minister of State. China: Mr. Chenting Thomas Wang. Greece: Mr. Coromilas, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes at Rome. Serhia: Mr. Trumbitch. UrugvMy: Mr. Juan Carlos Blanco. COMMISSION ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR AND ON ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTIES THE Preliminary Peace Conference at the plenary Session on the 25th January, 1919 (Minute No. 2), decided to create, for the purpose of enquiring into the responsibilities relating to the war, a Commission composed of fifteen members, two to be named by each of the Great Powers (United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy and Japan) and five elected from among the Powers with special interests. The Commission was charged to enquire into and report upon the foUowLag points: — 1. The responsibility of the authors of the war. 2. The facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war com- mitted by the forces of the German Empire and their Allies, on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war. 3. The degree of responsibility for these offences attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staffs, and other individuals, however highly placed. 4. The constitution and procedure of a tribimal appropriate for the trial of these offences. 5. Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above which may arise in the course of the enquiry, and which the Commission finds it useful and relevant to take into con- sideration. At a meeting of the Powers with special interests held on the 27th January, 1919, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania and Serbia . were chpsen as the Powers who should name representatives. (Miaute No. 2. Annex VI.) After the several States had nominated their respective repre- sentatives, the Commission was constituted as follows : — • United States of America: Hon. Eobert Lansing. Major James Brown Scott. British Empire: The Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart, K. C, M. P. or Sir Ernest PoUock, K. B. E., K. C, M. P. The Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey. France: Mr. Andr6 Tardieu. (Alternate: Captain R. Masson.) Mr. F. Lamaude. 313 514 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEKMANY. Italy: Mr. Scialoja. (Alternates: Mr. Ricci Busatti, Mr. G. Tosti.) Mr. Eaimondo. Later, Mr. Brambilla (3rd February); Mjr. M. d'Ameloi (16th February). Ja'pan: Mr. Adatci. Mr. Nagaoka. Later, Mr. S. Tachi (15th February). Belgium: Mr. Rolin-Jaequemyns. Greece: Mr. N. Politis. Poland: Mr. C. Skirmunt. Later, Mr. N. Lubienski (14th February). Roumania: Mr. S. Rosental. Serhia: Professor Slobodan Yovanovitch. (Alternates: Mr. Koumanoudi, Mr. Novacovitch.) Mr. Lansing was selected as Chairman of the Commission, and as Vice-Chairman, Sir Gordon Hewart or Sir Ernest Pollock and Mr. Scialoja. Mr. A. de LapradeUe (France) was named General Secretary and the Secretaries of the Commission were: — Mr. A. Kirk, United States of America; Lieutenent-Colonel 0. M. Biggar, British Empire; Mr. G. H. Tosti, Italy; Mr. Kuriyama, Japan; Lieutenant Baron J. Guillaume, Belgium; Mr. Spyridion Marchetti, Greece; Mr. Casimir Rybinstd, Poland. Mr. G. H. Carmerlynck, Professeur agrege of the University of France, acted as interpreter to the Commission. The Commission decided to appoint three Sub-Commissions., Sub-Commission I, on Criminal Acts, was instructed to discover and collect the evidence necessary to establish the facts relating to culpable conduct which (a) brought about the world war and accom- panied its inception, and (b) took place in the course of hostilities. This Sub-Commission selected Mr. W. F. Massey as its Chairman. Sub-Conamission II, on the Responsibility for the War, was instructed to consider whether, on the facts established by the Sub-Commission on Criminal Acts in relation to the conduct which brought about the world war and accompanied its inception, prosecutions could be instituted, and, if it decided that prosecu- tions could be undertaken, to prepare a report indicatmg the individual or individuals who were, m its opinion, guilty, and the Court before which prosecutions should proceed. This Sub-Commission selected alternatively Sir Gordon Hewart or Sir Ernest Pollock as Chairman. Sub-Commission III, on the Responsibility for the Violation of the Laws and Customs of War, was instructed to consider whether, on the facts established by the Sub-Commission on Criminal Acts in relation to conduct which took place in the course of hostilities, prosecutions could be instituted, and if it decided that prosecutions could be undertaken, to prepare a report indicating the individual or individuals who were, in its opinion, guilty, and the Court before which prosecutions should proceed. TEEATY OF PBAOE WITH GERMANY. 315 This Sub-Commission selected Mr. Lansing as its Chairman. When the reports of the Sub-Commissions had been considered, a committee composed of Mx. Eohn-Jaequemyns, Sir Ernest Pollock and Mr. M. d'Amelio was appointed to draft the report of the Commission. This Committee was assisted by Mr. A. de Lapradelle And Lieutenant-Colonel O. M. Biggar. The Commission has the honour to submit its report to the Preliminary Peace Conference. The report was adopted unani- mously subject to certain reservations by the United States of America and certain other reservations by Japan. The United States Delega- tion has set forth its reservations and the reasons therefor in a memorandum attached hereto (Annex II) and the same course has been taken by the Japanese Delegation (Annex III). REPORT PRESENTED TO THE PRELIMINARY PEACE CON- FERENCE BY THE COMMISSION ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR AND ON ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTIES CHAPTER I RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR On the question of the responsibihty of the authors of the war, the Commission, after having examined a number of official docu- ments relating to the origin of the world war, and to the violations of neutrality and of frontiers which accompanied its inception, has determined that the responsibility for it lies wholly upon the Powers which declared war in pursuance of a policy of aggression, the concealment of which gives to the origin of this war the character of a dark conspiracy against the peace of Europe. This responsibility rests first on Germany and Austria, secondly on Turkey and Bulgaria. The responsibility is made all the graver by reason of the violation by Germany and Austria of the neutrahtv of Belgium and Luxemburg, which they themselves had guaranteed. It is increased, with regard to both France and Serbia, by the violation of their frontiers before the declaration of war. I. — Peemeditation of the War. A. — Germany and Austria Many months before the crisis of 1914 the German Emperor had ceased to pose as the champion of peace. Naturally belieAong in the overwhelming superiority of his army, he openly showed his enmity towards France. General von Moltke said to the Kiug of the Belgians: 'This time the matter must be settled.' In vain the King protested. The Emperor and his Chief of Staff remained no less fixed in their attitude.' On the 28th June, 1914, occurred the assassination at Sarajevo of the heir-apparent of Austria. 'It is the act of a little group of madmen,' said Francis Joseph.^ The act, committed as it was by a subject of Austria-Himgary on Austro-Hungarian territory, could in no wise compromise Serbia, which very correctly expressed its condolences ^ and stopped public rejoicings in Belgrade. If the Government of Vienna thought that there was any Serbian com- plicity, Serbia was ready * to seek out the guilty parties. But this attitude failed to satisfy Austria and still less Germany, who, after their first astonishment had passed, saw in this royal and national misfortune a pretext to initiate war. 1 Yellow Book, M. Cambon to M. Piohon, 22nd November, 1913. 2 Message to his people. 8 Serbian Blue Book, page 30. * Yellow Book, No. 15, M. Cambon to M. Bienvcnu Martin, 21st July, 1914. 316 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 317 At Potsdam a 'decisive consultation' took place on the 5th July, 1914.' Vienna and Berlin decided upon this plan: 'Vienna will send to Belgrade a very emphatic ultimatum with a very short limit of time.' ^ The Bavarian Minister, von Lerchenfeld, said in a confidential despatch dated the 18th July, 1914, the facts stated in which have never been officially denied: 'It is clear that Serbia cannot accept the demands, which are inconsistent with the dignity of an inde- pendent State.' ^ Count Lerchenfeld reveals in this report that, at the time it was made, the ultimatum to Serbia had been jointly decided upon by the Governments of Berlin and Vienna; that they were waiting to send it until President Poincare and M. Viviani should have left for St. Petersburg; and that no illusions were cherished, either at Berlin or Vienna, as to the consequences which this threatening measure would involve. It was perfectly well Imown that war would be the result. The Bavarian Minister explains, moreover, that the only fear of the Berlin Government was that Austria-Hungary might hesitate and draw back at the last minute, and that on the other hand Serbia, on the advice of France and Great Britain, might yield to the pres- sure put upon her. Now, 'the Berlin Government considers that war is necessary.' Therefore, it gave full powers to Count Berch- told, who instructed the Ballplatz on the 18th July, 1914, to nego- tiate with Bulgaria to induce her to enter into an alliance and to participate in the war. In order to mask this understanding, it was arranged that the Emperor should go for a cruise in the North Sea, and that the Prussian Minister of War should go for a holiday, so that the Imperial Government might pretend that events had taken it completely by surprise. Austria suddenly sent Serbia an ultimatum that she had carefully prepared in such a way as to make it impossible to accept. Nobody could be deceived ; ' the whole world understands that this ulti- matum means war.' '■ According to M. Sazonof, 'Austria-Hungary wanted to devour Serbia.' * M. Sazonof asked Vienna for an extension of the short time limit of forty-eight hours given by Austria to Serbia for the most serious decision in its history.^ Vienna refused the demand. On the 24th and 25th July England and France multiplied their efforts to persuade Serbia to satisfy the Austro-Hungarian demands. Russia threw in her weight on the side of conciliation.^ Contrary to the expectation of Austria-Hungary and Germany, Serbia yielded. She agreed to all the requirements of the ultimatum, subject to the single reservation that, in the judicial enquiry which she would commence for the purpose of seeking out the guilty par- ties, the participation of Austrian officials would be kept within the limits assigned by international law. ' If the Austro-Hungarian Oovernment is not satisfied with this,' Serbia declared she was ready 'to submit to the decision of the Hague Tribunal.' ' 1 Lichnowsky Memoir. 2 Dr. Muehlon's Memoir. ' Report o( the 18tli July, 1914. < .\ustro-Hunsarian Bed Book, No. 16. 'Blue Book, 5Jo. 26. 6 Yellow Book, No. 36; Blue Book, Nos. 12, 46, 65, 65, 94, 118. ' Yellow BAok, No. 46. 318 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. A quarter of an hour before the expiration of the time Umit, at 5.45 on the 25th, M. Pachich, the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, delivered this reply to Baron Geisl, the Austro-Hungarian Minister. On M. Pachich' return to his own office he found awaiting him a letter from Baron Geisl saying that he was not satisfied with the reply. At 6.30 the latter had left Belgrade, and even before he had arrived at Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Government had handed his passports to M. Yovanovitch, the Serbian Minister, and had prepared thirty-three mobilisation proclamations, which were published on the following morning in the 'Budapesti Kozloni,' the official gazette of the Hungarian Government. On the 27th Sir Maurice de Bunsen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey: 'This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war \vith Serbia.' ' At midday on the 28th Austria declared war on Serbia. On the 29th the Austrian Army commenced the bombardment of Belgrade, and made its dispositions to cross the frontier. The reiterated suggestions of the Entente Powers with a view to finding a peaceful solution of the dispute only produced evasive replies on the part of Berlin or promises of intervention with the Government of Vienna without any effectual steps being taken. On the 24th of July Russia and England asked that the Powers shoiild be granted a reasonable delay in which to work in concert for the mamtenance of peace. Germany did not join in this request.^ On the 25th July Sir Edward Grey proposed mediation by fotu- Powers (England, France, Italy and Germany) . France ^ and Italy * immediately gave their concurrence. Germany ^ refused, alleging that it was not a question of mediation but of arbitration, as the Conference of the four Powers was called to make proposals, not to decide. On the 26th July Rtissia proposed to negotiate directly with Austria. Austria refused. ° On the 27th July England proposed a European Conference. Germany refused.' On the 29th Jiily Sir Edward Grey asked the TVUhelmstrasse to be good enough to 'suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent a war between Austria and Russia.' * She was asked herself to say what she desired." Her reply was evasive.'" On the same day, the 29th July, the Czar Nicholas II despatched to the Emperor William II a telegram suggesting that the Austro- Serbian problem should be submitted to the Hague Tribunal. This suggestion received no reply. This important telegram does not appear in the German White Book. It was made public by the Petrograd 'Official Gazette' (January 1915). The Bavarian Legation, in a report dated the 31st July, declared its conviction that the efforts of Sir Edward Grey to preserve peace would not hinder the march of events." 1 Blue Book, No. il. 2 Russian Orange Book, No. 4, Yellow Book, No. 43. 3 Yellow Book, No. 70. ' Yellow Book, No. 72, Blue Book, No. 49. 5 Blue Book, No. 43. 6 Yellow Book, No. 54. ' Yellow Book, No?. C8 and 73. 8 Yellow Book, No. 07. Blue Book, No. 8-1. » Blue Book, No. Ul. i« Yellow Book, 97, 98 and 109. " Second Report of Count Lerchenfeld, Bavarian Plenipotentiary at Borlm, published on the instruc- tions of Kurt Eisner. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 319 As early as the 21st July German mobilisation had commenced by the recall of a certain number of classes of the reserve/ then of German officers in Switzerland/ and finally of the Metz garrison on the 25th July.^ On the 26th July the German fleet was called back from Norway.* The Entente did not relax its conciliatory efforts, but the German Government systematically brought all its attempts to nought. When Austria consented for the first time on the 31st July to discuss the contents of the Serbian Note wdth the Russian Government and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador received orders to ' converse ' with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs/ Germany made any negotiation impossible by sending her ultimatum to Russia. Prince Lichnowsky wrote that 'a hint from Berlin would have been enough to decide Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success and to declare that he was satisfied with the Serbian reply, but this hint was not given. On the contrary they went forward towards war.' ° On the 1st August the German Emperor addressed a telegram tc the King of England ^ containing the following sentence: 'The troops on my frontier are, at this moment, being kept back by telegraphic and telephonic orders from crossing the French frontier.' Now, war was not declared till t\\'o days after that date, and as the German mobilisation orders wei'e issued on that same day, the 1st August, it follows that, as a matter of fact, the German army had been mobilised and concentrated in pursuance of previous orders. The attitude of the Entente nevertheless remained still to the very end so conciliatory that, at the very time at which the Geiman fleet was bombarding Libau, Nicholas II gave his word of honour to • William II that Russia would not undertake any aggressive action during the pourparlers,* and that when the German troops commenced their march across the French frontier M. Viviani telegraphed to all the French Ambassadors 'we must not stop working for accommo- dation.' On the 3rd August von Schoen went to the Quai d'Orsay with the declaration of war against France. Lacldng a real cause of complaint, Germany alleged iu her declaration of war, that bombs had been dropped by French aeroplanes in various districts in Germany. This statement was entirely false. Moreover, it was either latter admitted to be so ' or no particulars were evej furnished by the German Government. Moreover, in order to be manifestly above reproach, France was careful to withdraw her troops 10 kilom. from the German frontier. Notwithstanding this precaution, numerous officially established violations of French territory preceded the declaration of war." ' Yellow Book, No. 15. ' Yellow Book, No. 60. ' Yellow Book, No. 106. ' Yellow Book, No. 58. ' Blue Book, No. 133, Red Book, No. 55. ■ Lichnowsky Memoir, p. 1. ; White Book, Anlage 32; Yellow Book, Annex H bis, No. 2. ' Telegram from Nicholas n to William II. Yellow Book No. 6, Annex V. "Statement of the Municipality of Nuremburg, dated the 3rd April, 1916. , '" Patrols of various strengths crossed the French frontier at fifteen pomts, one on the 30th July at Xures, eight on the 2nd August, and the others on the 3rd August, before war was declared. The French troops lost one killed and several wounded. The enemy left on French territory four killed, one of whom was an officer, and seven prisoners. At Suarce, on the 2nd August, the enemy carried ofl rune inhabitants, twenty - Ave horses, and thirteen carriages. Four incursions by German dirigibles took place between th- 26th July and the 1st August. Finally, German aeroplanes flew over Lun^ville on the 3rd August, belore the declaration of war, and dropped six bombs. (Yellow Book, Nos. 106, 136, 139 &c.) 320 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. The provocation was so flagrant that Italy, herself a member of the Triple Alliance, did not hesitate to declare that in view of the aggressive character of the war the casus foederis ceased to apply.^ B. — Turkey and Bulgaria The conflict was, however, destined to become more widespread, and Germany and Austria were joined by allies. Since the Balkan war the Young Turk Government had been draw- ing nearer and nearer Germany, whilst Germany on her part had constantly been extending her activities at Constantinople. A few months before war broke out, Turkey handed over the com- mand of her military and naval forces to the German General Liman von Sanders and the German Admiral Souchon. In August, 1914, the former, acting under orders from the General Headquarters at Berlin, caused the Turkish Army to begin mobilizing.^ Finally, on the 4th August, the understanding between Turkey and Germany was definitely formulated in an alliance.' The con- sequence was that when the 'Goeben' and the 'Breslau' took refuge in the Bosphorus, Turkey closed the Dardanelles against the Entente squadrons and war followed. On the 14th October, 1915, Bulgaria declared war on Serbia, which country had been at war with Austria since the 28th July, 1914, and had been attacked on ail fronts by a large Austro-German army since the 6th October, 1915. Serbia had, however, committed no act of provocation against Bulgaria. Serbia never formulated any claim against Bulgaria during the negotiations which took place between the Entente Powers and Biilgaria prior to the latter's entry into the war. On the contrary, she was offering herself ready to make certain territorial concessions to Bulgaria in order to second the efforts of the Entente Powers to induce Bulgaria to join them. According to Count Lerchenf eld's reports, however, Bulgaria had begun negotiations with the Central Powers as early as the 18th July, 1914, with a view to entering the war on their side. In April, 1915, the Btdgars made an armed attack against Serbia near Valandovo and Struvmitza, where a real battle was fought on Serbian territory. Being defeated, the Bulgars retired, ascribing this act ^of aggression to some comitadjis. An International Commission (composed of representatives of the Entente) discovered, however, that there had been Bulgarian regidar officers and soldiers among the dead and the prisoners.* On the 6th September, 1915, Bulgaria and Austria-Himgary con- cluded a treaty which recited that they had agreed to undertake common military action against Serbia and by which Austria- Hungary guaranteed to Bulgaria certain accretions of territory at Serbia's expense, and also agreed, jointly with Germany, to make to the Bulgarian Government a war loan of 200,000,000 fr., to be increased if the war lasted more than four months.^ Even after this, M. Malinoff, one of the former Prime Ministers of Bulgaria, ' Yellow Book, No. 124. ' H. Morganthau. 'Secrets otthe Bosphorus,' London, 1918, pp. 39, 40. » German White Book, 1913, 1917, Nos. 19 and 20. * Memorandum 1 of tli« aeruian iJeiejjatiou, Chapter II, para, c, ' Treaty bet ..-ecn Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, dated the 24th August, 1915 (lumished by the Serbian : Ration). TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 321 took part in negotiations with the Entente, and, while these negotia- tions were continuing, Bulgaria, on the 23rd September, mobilised, ostensibly to defend her neutrality. No sooner had the army been mobilised and concentrated and Bulgarian forces massed on the whole length of the Serbian frontier, than the Bulgarian Government openly and categorically repudiated M. Maliaoff, stating that he was in no way qualified to commit Bulgaria, and that he deserved ' to be subjected to the utmost rigour of ms country's laws for his conduct on that occasion.' Some days later, Austro-German troops crossed the Danube and began to invade Serbia. As soon as the Serbian troops began to retire, the Bulgars, on the pretext that the former had violated their frontier, launched the attack which eventually led to the complete subjugation of Serbia. Two documents in the possession of the Serbian Government prove that this incident on the frontier was 'arranged' and represented as a. Serbian provocation. On the 10th October, 1915, the Secretary- General to the Foreign Office at Sofia, at the request of the Bidgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent the following communication to Count Tamovski, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Sofia: — 'In order to divest the attack on Serbia of the appearance of a preconceived plot, we shall, this evening or to-morrow morning, provoke a frontier incident in some uninhabited region.' ' Also, on the 12th October, 1915, Count Tarnovski sent the following telegram to Vienna: — 'The Generalissimo informs me that the desired incident on the Serbian frontier was arranged yesterday.' ' Bulgaria, in fact, first attacked on the 12th October, 1915, two days before the declaration of war on Serbia, which took place on the 14th October, 1915. That this was the case does not prevent Bulgaria from asserting that the Serbs first crossed her frontier. The above sequence of events proves that Bulgaria had premed- itated war against Serbia, and perfidiously brought it about. By means of German agents Enver Pasha and Talaat Pasha had, since the spring of 1914, been aware of the Austro-German plan, i. e., an attack by Austria against Serbia, the intervention by Germany against France, the passage through Belgium, the occupation of Paris in a fortnight, the closing of the Straits by Turkey, and the readiness of Bulgaria to take action. The Sultan acknowledged this plot to one of his intimates. It was indeed nothing but a plot engineered by heads of four States against the independence of Serbia and the peace of Europe.^ coNciusioirs 1. The war was premeditated by the Central Powers together with their Allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoid- able. 2. Germany, in agreement with Austria-Hungary, deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war. ' Memorandum I of the Serbian Delegation Cliapter 11, para. c. 2 Memorandum of tlie Serbian Delegation, I. Chapter II, para. c. » Basri, 'L'Orient dfibalkanis^,' Chapter 11 (Paris, 1919). 135546—19 21 322 , TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMAITY. II. — Violation of the Neutrality op Belgium and Luxemburg A. — Belgium Germany is burdened by a specially heavy responsibility in respect of the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxem- burg. Article 1 of the Treaty of London of the 19th April, 1839, after declaring that Belgium should form a 'perpetuaJly neutral State,' had placed this neutrality under the protection of Austria, France, Great Britain, Russia and Prussia. On the 9th August, 1870, Prussia had declared 'her fixed determination to respect Belgian neutrality.' On the 22nd July, 1870, Bismarck wrote to the Belgian Minister at Paris, 'This declaration is rendered super- fluous by existing treaties.' It may be of interest to recall that the attributes of neutrality ■were specifically defined by the fifth Hague Convention, of the 18th October, 1907. That Convention was declaratory of the law of nations, and contained these provisions — 'The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable' (Article 1). 'Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys, whether of munitions of war or of supplies, across the territory of a neutral Power' (Article 2). 'The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts against its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostUe act' (Article 10). There can be no doubt of the binding force of the treaties which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. There is equally no doubt of Belgium's sincerity or of the sincerity of France in their recogni- tion and respect of this neutrality. On the 29th Jiily, 1914, the day following the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, Belgium put her army on its reinforced peace strength, and so advised the Powers by which her neutrality was guaranteed and also Holland and Luxemburg.' On the 31st July the French Minister at Brussels visited the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to notify him of the state of war proclaimed in Germany and he spontaneously made the foUowing statement: 'I seize this opportunity to declare that no incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostUe act. Instructions in this sense will be given to the French authorities.' ^ On the 1st August, the Belgian Army was mobilised.' On the 31st July, the British Government had asked the French and German Governments separately if they were each of them ready to respect the neutrality of Belgium, provided that no other Power violated it.' In notifying the Belgian Government on the same day of the action taken by the British Government, the British Minister added : ' In view of existing treaties, I am instructed to inform the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other Powers will respect and maintain it.' * The immediate and quite definite reply of the Belgian Minister of Foreign 1 Grey Book I, No. 8. » Grey Book I, No. 10. a Grey Book I , No. ". • Grey Book I, No. 11. TREATY or PEACE "WITH GERMANY. 323 Afiairs was that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing Belgian independence could rest assured that she would neglect no effort to maintain her neutrality.^ On the same day, Paris and Berlin were officially asked the question to which reference was made in the British communication. At Paris the reply was categorical: 'The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself imder the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her own security, to act otherwise.' ^ On the same day as this reply was made at Paris, the French- Minister at Brussels made the following communication to M. Davig- non, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs: — 'I am authorised to declare that, in the event of an international war, the French Government, in accordance with the declarations they have always- made, wiU respect the neutrality of Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French Government, to secure their own defence, might find it necessary to modify their attitude.' ^ It was decided that this communication should forthwith be made to the Belgian press. Meanwhile the attitude of the German Government remained enigmatic. At Brussels the German Minister, Herr von Below, made efforts in his discussions to maintain confidence *; but at BerUn, in reply to the question which had been ofEciaUy asked by the British Government, the Secretary of State informed the British Ambassador that 'he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer.' ' On the 2nd August, in the course of the day, Herr von Below insisted to the Bdgian Minister, M. Davignon, upon the feelings of security which Belgium had the right to entertain towards her eastern neighbour," and on the same day, at 7 o'clock in the evening; he sent him a "very confidential" note, which was nothing more than an ultimatum claiming free passage for German troops through Belgian territory.' - • It was impossible to be under any delusion as to the purely imagi- nary character of the reason alleged by the German Government in support of its demand. It pretended that it had reliable infor- mation leaving "no doubt as to the intention of France to move through Belgian territory" against Germany, and consequently had notified its decision to direct its forces to enter Belgium.' The facts themselves supply the answer to the German allegation that France intended to violate Belgian neutrality. According to the French plan of mobilisation, the French forces were being con- centrated at that very moment on the German frontier, and it was necessary, by reason of the situation created by the German violation of Belgian territory, to modify the arrangements for their transport. In the meantime, at 7 o'clock in the morning of the 3rd August, at the expiration of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum, Belgium ' Grey Book I, No. 11. ' Blue Book, No. 122. .2 Blue Book, No. 125. ' Grey Book I, No. 19. ' Grey Book I, No. 15. ' Grey Book I, No. 20. * Grey Book I, No. 19. ' Grey Book I, No. 20. 324 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. had sent her reply to the German Minister. Affected neither by Germany's promises nor her threats, the Belgian Government "boldly declared that an attack upon Belgian independence would ■constitute a flagrant violation of international law. "No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law. The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would •sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe." In conclusion, the Belgian Government declared that they were "firmly resolved to repel by all the nieans in their power •every attack upon their rights." ' Even on the 3rd August, Belgium refused to appeal to the guar- antee of the Powers until there was an actual violation of terri- tory.^ It was only on the 4th August, after German troops had entered Belgian territory, that the Belgian Government sent his passports to Herr von Below,^ and it then appealed to Great Britain, France and Russia to cooperate as guaranteeing Powers in the ■defence of her territory.* At this point it may be recalled that the pretext invoked by Ger- many in justification of the violation of Belgian neutrality, and the invasion of Belgian territory, seemed to the German Government itself of so little weight, that in Sir Edward Goschen's conversations with the German Chancellor, von Bethmann HoUweg, and with von Jagow, the Secretary of State, it was not a question of aggressive French intentions, but a 'matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality,' and of 'a scrap of paper.' ^ Fm-ther, in his speech on the 4th August, the German Chancellor made his well-known avowal: 'Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory. Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. . . . We have been obliged to refuse to pay attention to the justifiable protests of Belgium and Luxemberg. The wrong — I speak openly — the wrong we are thereby committing we wiU try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained. He who is menaced, as we are, and is fighting for his all can only consider how he is to hack his way through.' To this avowal of the German Chancellor there is added the overwhelming testimony of Count von Lerchenfeld, who stated in a report of the •4th August, 1914, that the German General Staff considered it 'neces- sary to cross Belgium: France can only be successfully attacked from that side. At the risk of bringing about the intervention of England, Germany cannot respect Belgian neutrality.' •" As for the Austrian Government, it waited until the 28th August to declare war against Belgium,' but as early as the middle of the month 'the motor batteries sent by Austria have proved their excel- lence in the battles around NamuTj" as appears from a proclamation of the German general who at the tune was m command of the fortress of Li6ge, which German troops had seized. Consequently, the par- ' Grey Book I, Nn. 22. 2 Grey Book I, No. 24. » Grey Book I, No. 30. . < Grey Book I, No. 43. ' Blue Book, No. 100. « Stenographische Beriohte flber die Verhandlungon des Beichstags, Dienstag, 4 August, 1914. See also E. Miililer, ' Des Weltkriegen und das VOlkerrecht,? Berlin, G. Eeimer, 1915, pp. 24 et tea. 'Grey Book I, No. 77. sGreyBookll, No. 104. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 325' ticipation of Austria-Hungary in the violation of Belgian neutrality- is aggravated by the fact that she took part in that violation without any previous declaration of war. B. — Luxemhurg The neutrality of Luxemburg was guaranteed by Article 2 of the Treaty of London, 11th May, 1867, Prussia and Austria-Hungary being two of the guarantor Powers. On the 2nd August, 1914, German tropps penetrated the territory of the Grand Duchy. Mr. Eyschen, Minister of State of Luxemburg, immediately made an energetic protest.^ The German Government alleged 'that military measures had become inevitable, because trustworthy news had been received that French forces were marching on Luxemburg.' This allegation was at once refuted by Mr. Eyschen.^ CONCLUSION The neutrality of Belgium, guaranteed by the Treaties of the 19th April, 1839, and that of Luxemburg, guaranteed by the Treaty of the- 11th May, 1867, were deliberately violated by Germany and Austria- Hungary. CHAPTER II. VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR On the second point submitted by the Conference, the facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their allies on land, on sea, and in the air, during the present war, the Commission has considered a large number of documents. The Report of the British Commission drawn up by_Lord Bryce, the labours of the French Commission presided over by M. Payelle, the numerous publications of the Belgian Gov- ernment, the Memorandum submitted by the Belgian Delegation, the Memorandum of the Greek Delegation, the documents lodged by the Italian Government, the formal denunciation by the Greels at the Conference of the crimes committed against Greek popula- tions by the Bulgars, Turks and Greeks, the Memorandum of the- Serbian Delegation, the Report of the Inter-Allied Commission on the violations of the Hague Conventions and of international law in general, committed between 1915 and 1918 by the Bulgars in occupied Serbia, the summary of the Polish Delegation, together with the Roumanian and Armenian Memoranda, supply abundant evidence of outrages of every description committed on land, at sea, and in the air, against the laws and customs of war and of the- laws of humanity. In spite of the explicit regulations, of established customs, and of. the clear dictates of humanity, Germany and her allies have piled outrage upon outrage. Additions are daily and continually being 1 Yellow Book, No. 131. 'Telegram to the German Ministry ot Foreign AfEairs, the 2nd August, 1914. 326 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. made. By way of illustration a certain number of examples have been collected in Annex I. It is impossible to imagine a list of cases so diverse and so painful. Violations of the rights of combatants, of the rights of civilians, and of the rights of both, are multiplied iu this list of the most cruel practices which primitive barbarism, aided by all the resources of modern science, could devise for the execu- tion of a system of terrorism carefully planned and carried out to the end. Not even prisoners, or wounded, or women, or children have been respected by belligerents who deliberately sought to strike terror into every heart for the purpose of repressing all resistance. Murders and massacres, tortures, shields formed of living human beings, collective penalties, the arrest and execution of hostages, the requisi- tioning of services for military purposes, the arbitrary destruction of public and private property, the aerial bombardment of open towns without there being any regular siege, the destruction of merchant ships without previous visit and without any precautions for the safety of passengers and crew, the massacre of prisoners, attacks on hospital snips, the poisoning of springs and of wells, outrages and profanations without regard for religion or the honour of individuals, the issue of counterfeit money reported by the Polish Government, the methodical and deliberate destruction of industries with no other object than to promote German economic supremacy after the war, constitute the most striking list of crimes that has ever been drawn up to the eternal shame of those who committed them. The facts are established. They are numerous and so vouched for that they admit of no doubt and cry for justice. The Commission, impressed by their number and gravity, thinks there are good grounds for the constitution of a special Commission, to collect and classify all out- standing information for the purpose of preparing a complete list of the charges under the following heads: — The following is the list arrived at : — (1.) Murders and massacres; systematic terrorism. (2.) Putting hostages to death. (3.) Torture of civilians. (4.) Deliberate starvation of civilians. (5.) Rape. (6.) Abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution. (7.) Deportation of civilians. (8.) Internment of civilians under inhuman conditions. (9.) Forced labour of civilians in connection with the military operations of the enemy. (10.) Usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation. (11.) Compulsory enlistment of soldiers among the inhabitants of occupied territory. (12.) Attempts to denationalise the inhabitants of occupied territory. (13.) Pillage. (14.) Confiscation of property. (15.) Exaction of illegitimate or of exorbitant contributions and requisitions. (16.) Debasement of the currency, and issue of spurious currency. TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. 327 (17.) Imposition of collective penalties. (18.) Wanton devastation and destruction of property. (19.) Deliberate bombardment of undefended places. (20.) Wanton destruction of religious, charitable, educational, and historic buildings and monuments. (21.) Destruction of merchant ships and passenger vessels without warning and without provision for the safety of passengers or crew. (22.) Destruction of fishing boats and of relief ships. (23.) Deliberate bombardment of hospitals. (24.) Attack on and destruction of hospital ships. (25.) Breach of other rules relating to the Red Cross. (26.) Use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases. (27.) Use of explosive or expanding bullets, and other inhuman appliances. (28.) Directions to give no quarter. (29.) Ill-treatment of wounded and prisoners of war. (30.) Employment of prisoners of war on unauthorised works. (31.) Misuse of flags of truce. (32.) Poisoniag of wells. The Commission deshes to draw attention to the fact that the oflEences enumerated and the particulars given in Annex I are not regarded as complete and exhaustive; to these such additions can from time to time be made as may seem necessary. CONCLUSIONS 1. The war was carried on by the Central Empires together with their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, by barbarous or illegitimate meth- ods in violation of the established laws and customs of war and the elementary laws of humanity. 2. A Commission should be created for the purpose of collecting and classifying systematically all the information already had or to be obtained, in order to prepare as complete a list of facts as possible concerning the violation of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and its Allies, on land, on sea and in the air, in the course of the present war. CHAPTER III PEESONAL RESPONSIBILITY The third point submitted by the Conference is thus stated: — The degree of responsibility for these offences attaching to par- ticular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staffs and other individuals, however highly placed. For the purpose of dealing with this point, it is not necessary to wait for proof attaching guilt to particular individuals. It is quite clear from the information now before the Commission that there are grave charges which must be brought and investigated by a Court against a number of persons. 328 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. In these circumstances, the Commission desire to state expressly that in the hierarchy of persons in authority, there is no reason why rank, however exalted, should in any circumstances protect the holder of it from responsibility when that responsibility has been estab- lished before a properly constituted tribunal. This extends even to the case of Heads of States. An argument has been raised to the contrary based upon the alleged immunity, and in particular the alleged inviolability, of a Sovereign of a State. But this privilege, where it is recognised, is one of practical expedience in municipal law, and is not fundamental. However, even if, in some countries, a Sovereign is exempt from being prosecuted in a national court of his own country the position from an international point of view is quite different. We have later on in our Report proposed the establishment of a High Tribunal composed of judges drawn from many nations, and included the possibility of the trial before that Tribunal of a former Head of a State with the consent of that State itself secured by articles in the Treaty of Peace. If the immunity of a Sovereign is claimed to extend beyond the limits above stated, it would involve laying down the principle, that the greatest outrages against the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity, if proved against him, could in no circumstances be punished. Such a conclusion would shock the conscience of civilized mankind. In view of the grave charges which may be preferred against — to take one case — the ex-Kaiser — the vindication of the principles of the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity which have been violated would be incomplete if he were not brought to trial and if other offenders less highly placed were punished. Moreover, the trial of the offenders might be seriously prejudiced if they at- tempted and were able to plead the superior orders of a Sovereign against whom no steps had been or were being taken. There is little doubt that the ex-Kaiser and others in high authority were cognisant of and could at least have mitigated the barbarities committed during the course of the war. A word from them would have brought about a different method in the action of their sub- ordinates on land, at sea and in the air. We desire to say that civil and military authorities cannot be relieved from responsibility by the mere fact that a higher authority might have been convicted of the same offence. It will be for the Court to decide whether a plea of superior orders is sufficient to acquit the person charged from responsibility. CONCLTJSION All persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without distinction of rank, including Chiefs of States, who have been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution. TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 329 CHAPTER IV CONSTITUTION AND PROCEDURE OF AN APPROPRIATE TRIBUNAL The fourth point submitted to the Commission is stated as fol- lows: — The Constitution and Procedure of a Tribunal appro- riatefor the Trial of these Offences (crimes relating to the war). On this question the Commission is of opinion that, having regard to the multiplicity of crimes committed by those Powers which a short time before had on two occasions at the Hague protested their reverence for right and their respect for the principles of humanity/ the public conscience insists upon a sanction which will put clearly in the light that it is not permitted cynically to profess a disdain for the most sacred laws and the most formal undertakings. Two classes of culpable acts present themselves: — (a.) Acts which provoked the world war and accompanied its inception. (6.) Violations of the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity. (a.) Acts wHch ProvoJced the War and Accompanied its 'Inception In this class the Commission has considered acts not strictly war crimes, but acts which provoked the war or accompanied its incep- tion, such, to take outstanding examples, as the invasion of Luxem- burg and Belgium. The premeditation of a war of aggression, dissimulated under a, peaceful pretence, then suddenly declared under false, pretexts, is conduct which the public conscience reproves and which history will condemn, but by reason of the purely optional character of the Institutions at The Hague for the maintenance of peace (Inter- national Commission of Enquiry, Mediation and Arbitration) a war of aggression may not be considered as an act directly contrary to positive law, or one which can be successfully brought before a tribunal such as the Commission is authorised to consider under its Terms of Reference. Further, any enquiry into the authorship of the war must, to be exhaustive, extend over events that have happened during many years in different European countries, and must raise many difficult and complex problems which might be more fitly investigated by historians and statesmen than by a tribunal appropriate to the trial of offenders against the laws and customs of war. The need of prompt action is from this point of view important. Any tribunal appropriate to deal with the other offences to which reference is made might hardly be a good court to discuss and deal decisively with such a subject as the authorship of the war. The proceedings and discussions, charges and counter-charges, if adequately and , dispassionately examined, might consume much time, and the result might conceivably confuse the simpler issues into which the tribimal will be charged to enquire. While this prolonged investiga- l See the declaration of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, who, speaking at the H&^ie Conference of 1907 with regard to submarine mines, used the following expressions:— ' Military operations are not governed solely by stipulations of international law. There are other factors. Corscience, good sense, and the sense 01 duty imposed by the principles of humanity will be the surest guides for the cond uct of sailors, and will constitute the most eSective guarantee against abuses. The officers of the German >Tavy, 1 loudly pro- claim it, will always fulfil in the strictest fashion the duties which emanate from the unwritten law of Humanity and civilisation.' 330 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. tion was proceeding some witnesses might disappear, the recollection of others would become fainter and less trustworthy, offenders might escape, and the moral effect of tardily imposed punishment would be much less salutary than if punishment were inflicted while the memory of the wrongs done was still fresh and the demand for punishment was insistent. We therefore do not advise that the acts which provoked the war should be charged against their authors and made the subject of proceedings before a tribunal. There can be no doubt that the invasion of Luxemburg by the Germans was a violation of the Treaty of London of 1867, and also that the invasion of Belgium was a violation of the Treaties of 1839. These Treaties secured neutrality for Luxemburg and Belgium, and in that term were included freedom, independence and security for the population living in those countries. They were contracts made between the High Contracting Parties to them, and involved an obligation which is recognised in international law. The Treaty of 1839 with regard to Belgimn and that of 1867 with regard to Luxemburg were deliberatedly violated, not by some out- side Power, but by one of the very Powers which had undertaken not merely to respect their neutrality, but to compel its observance by any other Power which might attack it. The neglect of its duty by the guarantor adds to the gravity of the failure to fulfil the under- taking given. It was the transformation of a security into a peril, of a defence into an attack, of a protection into an assault. It constitutes, moreover, the absolute denial of the independence of States too weak to interpose a serious resistance, an assault upon the life of a nation which resists, an assault against its very existence while, before the resistance was made, the aggressor, in the guise of tempter, offered material compensations in return for the sacrifice of honour. The violation of international law was thus an aggrava- tion of the attack upon the independence of States which is the funda- mental principle of international right. And thus a high-handed outrage was conrmiitted upon international engagements, deliberately, and for a purpose which cannot justify the conduct of those who were responsible. The Commission is nevertheless of opinion that no criminal charge can be made against the responsible authorities or individuals (and notably the ex-Kaiser) on the special head of these breaches of neutrality, but the gravity of these gross outrages upon the law of nations and international good faith is such that the Commission thinks they should be the subject of a formal condemnation by the Conference. CONCLUSIONS 1. The acts which brought about the war should not be charged against their authors or made the subject of proceedings before a tribunal. 2. On the special head of the breaches of the neutrality of Luxem- burg and Belgium, the gravity of these outrages upon the principles of the law of nations and upon international good faith is such that they should be made the subject of a formal condemnation by the Conference. TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. 331 3. On tte whole case, including both the acts which brought about the war and those which accompanied its inception, particularly the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, it would be right for the Peace Conference, in a matter so unprecedented, to adopt special measures, and even to create a special organ in order to deal as they deserve with the authors of such acts. 4. It is desirable that for the future penal sanctions should be provided for such grave outrages against the elementary principles of international law. (b.) Violations of the Laws and Customs of War and of the Laws of Humanity Every belligerent has, according to international law, the power and authority to try the individuals alleged to be guilty of the crimes of which an enumeration has been given in Chapter II. on Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, if such persons have been taken prisoners or have otherwise fallen into its power. Each belligerent has, or has power to set up, pursuant to its own legis- lation, an appropriate tribunal, military or civil, for the trial of such cases. These courts would be able to try the incriminated persons according to their own procedure, and much complication and consequent delay would be avoided which would arise if aU such cases were to be brought before a single tribunal. There remain, however, a number of charges: — (a.) Against persons belonging to enemy countries who have com- mitted outrages against a number of civilians and soldiers of several Allied nations, such as outrages committed in prison camps where prisoners of war of several nations were con- gregated or the crime of forced labour in mines where pris- oners of more than one nationality were forced to work; (6.) Against persons of authority, belonging to enemy countries, whose orders were executed not only in one area or on one battle front, but whose orders affected the conduct of opera- tions against several of the Allied armies; (c.) Against aU authorities, civil or military, taelonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, with- out distinction of rank, including the heads of States, who ordered, or, with knowledge thereof and with power to inter- vene, abstained from preventing or taking measures to pre- vent, putting an end to or repressing, violations of the laws or customs of war (it being understood that no such abstention should constitute a defence for the actual perpetrators); {d.) Against such other persons belonging to enemy countries as, having regard to the character of the offence or the law of any belligerent country, it may be considered advisable not to proceed before a court other than the High Tribunal hereafter referred to. For the trial of outrages falling under these four categories the Commission is of opinion that a High Tribunal is essential and should be established according to the following plan:— (1.) It shall be composed of three persons appointed by each of the following Governments: — The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, and one person appointed by each of the following Governments: Belgium, 332 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Greece, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, and Czecno- Slovakia. The members shall be selected by each country from among the members of their national courts or tribunals, civil or miUtary, and now in existence or erected as indicated above: (2.) The tribunal shaU have power to appoint experts to assist it in the trial of any particular case or class of cases. (3.) The law to be applied by the tribunal shall be 'the principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages estab- lished among civilised peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.' (4.) When the accused is found by the tribunal to be guilty, the tribunal shall have the power to sentence him to such punishment or punishments as may be imposed for such an oflFence or offences by any court in any country represented on the tribunal or in the country of the convicted person. (5.) The tribunal shall determine its own procedure. It shall have power to sit in divisions of not less than five members and to request any national court to. assume jurisdiction for the purpose of enquiry or for trial and judgment. (6.) The duty of selecting the cases for trial JDefore the tribunal and of directing and conducting prosecutions before it shall be imposed upon a Prosecuting Commission of five members, of whom one shall be appointed by the Governments of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, and for the assistance of which any other Government may delegate a representative. (7.) Applications by any Allied or Associated Government for the trial before the tribunal of any offender who has not been delivered up or who is at the disoosition of some other AUied or Associated Government shall be addressed to the Prosecuting Commission, and a national court shall not proceed with the trial of any person who is selected for trial before the tribunal, but shall permit such person to be dealt with as directed by the Prosecuting Commission. (8.) No person shall be liable to be tried by a national coiut for an offence in respect of which charges have been preferred before the tribunal, but no trial or sentence by a court of an enemy country shall bar trial and sentence by the tribunal or by a national court belonging to one of the Allied or Associated States. CONCLUSIONS The Commission has conseqnently the honour to recommend : — 1. That a High Tribunal be constituted as above set out. 2. That it shall be provided by the Treaty of Peace : — (a.) That the enemy Governments shall, notwithstandingj|that Peace may have been declared, recognise the jurisdiction of the National Tribunals and the High Tribunal, that all enemy persons alleged to have been guilty of offences against the laws and cus'toms of war and the laws of humanity shall be excluded from any amnesty to which the belligerents may agree, and that the Governments of such persons shall undertake to surrender them to be tried. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 333 (&.) That the enemy Governments shall undertake to deliver up and give in such manner as may be determined thereby : — (i.) The names of all persons in command or charge of or in any way exercising authority in or over all civilian internment camps, prisoner-of-war camps, branch camps, working camps and 'commandoes' and other places where prisoners were confined in any of their dominions or in territory at any time occupied by them, with respect to which such information is required, and all orders and instructions or copies of orders or instructions and reports in their possession or under their control relating to the administration and discipline of all such places in respect of which the supply of such documents as aforesaid shall be demanded; (ii.) All orders, instructions, copies of orders and instructions. General Staff plans of campaign, proceedings in Naval or Military Courts and Courts of Enquiry, reports and other documents in their possession or under their con- trol which relate to acts or operations, whether in their dominions or in territory at any time occupied by them, which shall be alleged to have been done or carried out in breach of the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity ; (iii.) Such information as will indicate the persons who committed or were responsible for such acts or opera- tions ; (iv.) All logs, charts, reports and other documents relating to operations by submarines ; (v.) All orders issued to submarines, with details or scope of operations by these vessels ; (vi.) Such reports and other documents as may be demanded relating to operations alleged to have been conducted by enemy ships and their crews during the war contrary to the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity, 3. That each Allied and Associated Government adopt such legis- lation as may be necessary to support the jurisdiction of the International Court, and to assure the carrying out of its sentences. 4. That the five States represented on the Prosecuting Commis- sion shall jointly approach Neutral Governments with a view to obtaining the surrender for trial of persons within their territories who are charged by such States with violations of the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity. 334 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. CHAPTER V. COGNATE MATTERS Finally, the Commission was asked to consider any other matter cognate or ancillary to the above which may arise in the course o the enquiry, and which the Commission finds it useful and relevan to take into consideration. Under this head the Commission has considered it advisable ti draft a set of provisions for insertion in the Preliminaries of Peace for the assuring in practical form, in accordance with the recom mendations at the end of the last chapter, the constitution, th recognition, and the mode of operation of the High Tribunal, ani of the national tribunals which will be called to try infractions o the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity. The text of these provisions is set out in Annex IV. March 29, 1919. United States of America: — Subject to the reservations set forth in the annexed Memo- randum. (Annex II.) ROBERT LANSING. JAMES BROWN SCOTT. British Empire: — ERNEST M. POLLOCK. W. F. MASSEY. France : — A. TARDIEU. F. LARNAUDE. Italy : — Japan: — V. SCIALOJA. M. D'AMELIO. Subject to the reservations set forth in the annexed Memo- randum. (Annex III.) M. ADATCI. S. TACHI. Belgium :— ROLIN-JAEQUEMYNS. Greece: — N. POLITIS. Poland: — L. LUBIENSKI. Roumania: — S. ROSENTAL. Serbia: — SLOBODAN YOVANOVITCH. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 335 COMMISSION ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR AND ON ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTIES Annex I to the Report of the Commission (Report pp. 17, 18.) Summary of Examples of Offences committed by the Authorities or Forces of the Central Empires and their Allies against the Laws and Customs of War and the laws of Humanity. [Note. — ^As has already been stated in the Report, this tabular analysis does not by any means purport to be exhaustive or com- ;lete. The object is simply to give a number of typical examples, 'he crimes imputable to the Central Empires and their allies run into thousands. The list under each of the heads given below could be very greatly extended.] Contents Page. 1. Murders and massacres; systematic terrorism 29 2. Putting hostages to deatli 31 3. Torture of civilians 32 4. Deliberate starvation of civili;ms 33 5. Rape 34 fi. Abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution 34 7. Deportation of civilians 35 8. Internment of civilians mider inhuman conditions 36 9. "Forced labour of civilians in connection with the military operations of the enemy, and otherwise. 37 10. Usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation 38 11. Compulsory enlistment of soldiers among the inhabitants of occupied territory 39 12. Attempts to denationaUso the inhabitants of occupied territory 39 13. Pillage 40 14. Confiscation of property 41 15. Exaction of illegitimate or of exorbitact contributions and requisitions 42 16. Debasement of the currency, and issue of spurious currency 43 17. Imposition of collective penalties 44 18. Wanton devastation and destruction of property 44 19. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places 46 20. Wanton destruction of rehgious, clraritable, educational, and historic buildings and monuments. 48 21. Destruction of merchant slilps and passenger vessels without warning and without provision for the safety of passengers and crew 48 22. Destruction of fishing boats and of rehef ships 50 23. Deliberate bombardment of hospitals 61 2i. Attack on and destruction of hospital ships 51 25. Breach of other rules relating to the Red Cross 52 26. Use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases 53 27. Use of explosive and expanding bullets, and other inhuman appUances '. 53 28. Directions to give no quarter 54 29. Ill-treatment of prisoners of war 55 30. Employment of prisoners of war on unauthorised works 57 31. Misuse of flags of truce 51 32. Poisomng of wells 67 336 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 00 o 21 «5 6 o Cod >^ .C2 ^w Ci? Si f=^c^ ^^ e:^ _ o ^ o V- o c;z; cK <='^ "£ >i H ■»J 03 S o..S, S2 g M'3 ^ o 3 g,23SSSi S-.gm^|-3 3 ""2a.2 .£[» sgiS'oSg oa 3 bx)^^ oSjj « * 3 d 2 ^^3 :,- S D.S f' "1 s s ° ° t;^ s e l-"3 P C3 = 5a+3 O O 03 3 « o e f-" m m Ml > M ■^ n, "^ S £ +J O) w >• 'S OS a ■= S •3 § ■§ a O H S w C3 3 ^ 1^ B .£ m w M M - (-. kH Lri CD Xi /5 a a a a fl d 03 03 t4 M 1 s sa SS Sirt •a d^ Sw Cw § til -. cq^'-' CQ ^ •- a 02 n Kg .aW 5&q S i O S?2 S tS- Kg 1*^ = §.2° s»S ft* •- Mj3«-i 03J3.3.S TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 339 a s g 3 t © m t^ o ■ea a.S -w ** ■«»>Sa — o; P tern any mps rla, C SSSJi g w > > ti p. ^ Aft PHftp4ft •«9 = 3.2 §■1 > (d W"!^ til's ffl d oj *^ •a I o ..a|s^;5« ■^a: s'^ § 3 =. s a " S.<2 BBS'S t^fe g 5 S^"^9^T''a''^.:=:cSa3 Ck^ C ^ g ft Sa|^§Sn§»£^dgMg£g'|5 §gfc;-S-=''Sd'^o?'ag5§S'=--a S Big ^SgtH P^)^? iJO < > 5 f» o o M < <^ H CQ H H o o o 3 go 2s|| a 1> M « i"ls ft© £ &■ 2.6; gS as m^ ^ o So 0-" * ft 39 u IP CQ- 'A as ■ao 2 o Eog|.g 43 ass's £ 3 e o B M rt n d 3 .cr ■oa ■3m • i2a s ■■■3o-a z <■! 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Aided ;hat invaded the territories S so §1 .2 ° If n § i B s 1 s o Ph B 09 IP i a §1 ii II ll a s a's is 3 ^ 81 2? fl i^ P S n ^S 111! Ill II &OJ-. CO (U-- .^J O if^l ll^ill ■e^§3p|55gs§ 1 £"" 3 "" p- Q &■ Sh p &< 344 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. (A O g S o « W EH O IZ O u> — « H l-H P o o- - Eh Eh M ?; o o p< i 3 S 6 3 a o O +3 O < z a a IB S-9 ■o.g m ^ £ w ai^""m ■egg g^-^ •o b^w a*^ e:s-g.a|s pci Pm ta « O o o o c=. o M 1 '?, ■aSs ^§^ o'S'3 io^ ■9-1 >: .2n CD n"--:; P so m I I sa •'^ W ft ,**- o ft o3 ftfl ,9 y &< n fl ^ ja m g J^ H B.§ H S •3 "!»■§ 3 9 ^si si rt H <, .d A4 I a a .9 1 1-; iS P e. rt 346 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. oT ^ "^ Of ■tj a a o .2 8 a £ O 1 a V ■a oo O.N &d « W tH o d ■tJ p < 1 3 pa Ph 2 ^ 3 CQ 00 o CI rt P 1 o s ^ 1 ■p G t:! CD a •-( 1 - c A^ O -o o S) .g. O rt 1— H <1> s •°x II fu 1 c w « o -«! CO 2; o g S E-i 2; o o Eh 2; S « o >< w o « o H < as S'5) to a ■s ■-. d d d =■2; 2; 2; 6 o o 2; 3 SS Sj lid a 3 a: B ^ TREATY or PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 347 Cilia m Ira o-p w 2 to in a to 3 S 2 Ja ft K "K d "5 2^ Kg Qb So ^1 o O C3 OlOl 3 . go S B ^ b n > a ^ ■w'3 ■" -o o o . Efl . . ■ o_ • [ft : TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 349 a Q o O O & Su,- 1... o ■§ f Cm . K'^.ZS. 9 r; port o liry, N OS. 135 OS. 254 F-4 1 Sal p . -d . • rifN 6 (i fis S a 8JS §S .a li « rf-a^ P 13 Tjg -5 O.CO p< g-o, » W tf f aa^ ■^ ■3g'§ S a 'S «> ,>T » SB'S -IS •a S °8, -s »& III 1 Ij 8.h'fi n. ^s ft+j'S s: Oi^^ 5|g i %-4 There is documen equipments br cubes, &c.). T tills manner 14 if ii 05 j^W a* g.2 <1S J -a •a f o °a S 5* - ■03 E .0 57 as « ® 3 « P. <5 .2 =3 2 h a fc^ III ^1 sa s o 53 » "p. goo, ■^ rfl P a cog ■So Is 6h 350 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. lb j3 •3 O K T. u o rt rt o s •U f^ am c, o j^fi p; K a it St; o 2gd B •5.! ^-3 CO diqsJI^ am^s aqx diusjre omug 73 O 9 «.2 ^ P5 O H 3 ^, S>^ S^ C3 P. ¥ T^ia'o M« P ft i3 a s-s TS d«W W M qT ^ 05 p gas — to C2 CO Ah its 1 T^'B fl O 01 'O B«5 a p a +j Wirt c C:a r* 4j pq fl oi St:;"! o aj-■._ ^ T) %%m ;- 06060606 , CO CO ci CO O t— . . • . ftM ft ft ft ft rt ft- - - - CO s o « ""*"*' i ~T •g c g 5 fl Oj ^ a C3 1 OS Id 4J 03 (-1 © s J2 i2 •§« 03 S) ss g il u '■M rz i s S tt ft( g £ l^-g 1 II ill M tfl t? 1 £ %. « ' xm en S » .J 1 1 monuments destroyed., inscriptions, portraits of ardens, fomitains, tomb ies of Serbian soldiers de t 1 E a> ~ C+J WJt-i 2 'c8 (/ •GduS ^ hi 'c ®ia^ 1 C c c 1 1 <• ■£ £ 1 O -^ m M « o o ft M 25 Pi . ^1 gS op mz MS > M O z CQ <1 Ph P Z H o P5 O g; o M H o & H H *? 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M "^ - S *-' QitJ £* f*» <» _ O P a S-Qjs (1) 3cQ^ Sop ,£^ woj hc^ g OS OT 5i> 5 R^.tS ST 2S ^ M = :-, S5 9!n w ? 2 « 2 45 ■* CC S S g ^ M.ga- ^ n t- h ||*-§ I J2 3-W o ^ ^-o rt be ^ SS^£ ° 3 %^ f-" " 3Sj-S 1 t, |.S ° « 2 "■" • ■£ . gTi' s*jS 2|S §>&•§; |a| I sf^-S ■^s go jSs p m S 03*0 ea > O TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 355 g°'3 = oJ3 "J 3«5-£ Sod =9 2 -«isa § § .isss = oS^-SsS a □■a'-'io OS'S n Sgwa'°£Sa O Sffi-^-H CJ ^ ^a- fig "2-3 f-ST! to SSm ,3 a * fl'C o'^ ■"S P'O mx! mS Eh S « rt S tj s s O « f ■*^ ^ a P. g 5flS tii ob5= 'S'o M s. S o g £• o w w c^^S 0^"S MS •S £ 6 c P " (-C c; S 5 o ■6 ^ &•£ a-* 0-. & O; a. ■ .a =3 M « a fart p5 t:; tt §5 .2 f3 a:i -oi CO +J ^ 'Bta g'a^as -3 (S a - •ss CJ o •^ PI ^ o ri j5 =>» a = = = S' p. an 356 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. .A V- O ss °?; l^lzi fe t>l Kg' - - J3M an o o o E;^ C! o D 3 3 S'i o o 111 (fl 03 ft ■^1 SI .a o -^ w So tnfc.Sli( .iti O ,;j —i •9H g« T3 a, .1. o« d.sg Eta ^-^.s/^ffl OJ 0) "l^ S-»-»+> I § IS .gs WW ■gM ,.-■3 •3-S 8| ■S-9 •■a I (uS 03 CO as «2 St CO oa ■■§•§ TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 357 a F! N o o U o ln§ 1 .1 Of Bel p. 131. of Bel p. 65. fee J Jll g » 3 » O g 03 fl CJ ii. •s s - ^"S- 11 o ^ 8^ P*^ P ^,fl a' 2H SkJ - rt 3= §2 fl as d o of "'3 — ^ Ora Q> t_ 03 ^ a d m aZ td Pl o o « 3 3 O a C3 3 '■6 o ■s a a OS a 13 H a 08 °2 I— I "O 00 (C -, O tD coco COcCO TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 359 o d a P4 o 1 i s .23 o M u Ph 1 § ® M &,« s ». c & ^' °^ '<»' P5 § o t, O ■owS 111 a :^ a V 9 . u o J3 4-3 s cS g g (m ;. 3 § is S S Pi FKA ent of Frer disarmed, -«J •-=} ■ij" t-, o p. ID X m 'S :; a a> rt O P< o o ■^ ■l 3 < g 03 HH ui »o Oi Oi lO O CD o §1 1 § fl V S i 08 d « ■2-S^ "o 03 !- ■S'gja (Did fj M 2 O CQ (D g li 1 3 d ©'3 is ga CD O 1 s •s c3 ■S2 03 fl S>> ® the white flj id and heav lian alpine d (s'os is is ft^ra £ 03 +i 03 5 o w ^ — < (h d-w «! Eh S la 32 £S ? a 360 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Annex II. Memorandum of Reservations presented hy the Representatives of the United States to the Report of the Commission on Responsihilties, April 4, 1919. The American members of the Commission on Responsibilities, in presenting their reservations to the report of the Comnaission, declare that they are as earnestly desirous as the other members of the Commission that those persons responsible for causing the Great War and those responsible for violations of the laws and customs of war should be punished for their crimes, moral and legal. The differences which have arisen between them and their colleagues lie in the means of accomplishing this common desire. The American members there- fore submit to the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace a memo- randum of the reasons for their dissent from the report of the Com- mission and from certain provisions for insertion in Treaties with enemy countries, as stated in Annex IV, and suggestions as to the course of action which they consider should be adopted in dealing with the subjects upon which the Commission on Responsibilities was directed to report. Preliminary to a consideration of the points at issue and the irre- concilable differences which have developed and which make this dis- senting report necessary, we desire to express our high appreciation of the conciliatory and considerate spirit manifested by our colleagues throughout the many and protracted sessions of the Commision. From the first of these, held on February 3, 1919, there was an earnest purpose shown to compose the differences which existed, to find a formula acceptable to all, and to render, if possible^ a unanimous report. That this purpose failed was not because of want of effort on the part of any member of the Commission. It failed because, after all the proposed means of adjustment had been tested with frank and open mmds, no practicable way could be found to harmonise the differences without an abandonraent of principles which were funda- mental. This the representatives of the United States could not do and they could not expect it of others. In the early meetmgs of the Commission and the three Sub- Commissions appointed to consider various phases of the subject submitted to the Commission, the American members declared that there were two classes of responsibilities, those of a legal nature and those of a moral nature, that legal offences were jus- ticiable and liable to trial and punishment by appropriate tribunals, but that moral offences, however iniquitous and infamous and however terrible in their results, were beyond the reach of judicial procedure, and subject only to moral sanctions. While this principle seems to have been adopted by the Com- mission in the report so far as the responsibility for the authorship of the war is concerned, the Commission appeared unwilling to apply it in the case of indirect responsibility for violations of the laws and customs of war committed after the outbreak of the war and during its course. It is respectfully submitted that this inconsistency was due in large measure to a determination to punish certain persons, high in authority, particularly the heads of enemy States, even though heads of States were hot hitherto legally responsible for the atrocious acts committed by subordinate TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GEEMANY. 361 authorities. To such an inconsistency the American members of the Commission were unwilling to assent, and frorn the time it developed that this was the unchangeable determination of certain members of the Commission they doubted the possibility of a unanimous report. Nevertheless, they continued their efforts on behalf of the adoption of a consistent basis of principle, appreciating the desirability of unanimity if it could be attained. That their efforts were futile they deeply regret. With the manifest purpose of trying and punishing those persons to whom reference has been made, it was proposed to create a high tribunal with an international character, and to bring before it those who had been marked as responsible, not only for directly ordering illegal acts of war, but for having abstained from preventing such illegal acts. Appreciating the importance of a judicial proceeding of this nature, as well as its novelty, the American Representatives laid before the Commission a memorandum upon the constitution and procedure of a tribunal of an international character which, in their opinion, should be formed by the imion of existing national military tribimals or commissions of admitted competence in the premises. . And in view of the fact that 'customs' as well as 'laws' were to be considered, they filed another memorandum, attached hereto, as to the principles which should, in their opinion, guide the Commission in considering and reporting on this subject. The practice proposed in the memorandum as to the military com- missions was in part accepted, but the purpose of constituting a high tribunal for the trial of persons exercising sovereign rights was f)ersisted in, and the abstention from preventing violations of the aws and customs of war and of humanity was insisted upon. It was frankly stated that the purpose was to bring before this tribimal the ex-Kaiser of Germany, and that the jiu-isdiction of the tribunals must be broad enough to include him even if he had not directly ordered the violations. To the unprecedented proposal of creating an international criminal tribunal and to the doctrine of negative criminality the American members refused to give their assent. On January 25, 1919, the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace in plenary session recommended the appointment of a Com- mission to examine and to report to the Conference upon the follow- ing five points : — 1. The responsibility of the authors of the war. 2. "The facts as to the violations of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and its allies, on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war. 3. The degree of responsibility for these crimes attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including mem- bers of the General Staffs, and other individuals, however highly placed. 4. The constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offences. 5. Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above points which may arise in the course of the enquiry, and which the Commission finds it useful and relevant to take into consideration. 362 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMA2iIT. Tlie conclusions reached by the Commission as to the responsi- biUty of the authors of the war, with which the Eepresentatives of the United States agree, are thus stated : — The war was premeditated by the Central Powers, together with their AUies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable. Germany, in agreement with Austria-Hungary, deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war. The American Representatives are happy to declare that they not only concur in these conclusions, but also in the process of reasoning by which they are reached and justified. However, in addition to the evidence adduced by the Commission, based for the most part upon official memoranda issued by the various Governments in justification of their respective attitudes towards the Serbian ques- tion and the war which resulted because of the deliberate determina- tion of Austria-Hungary and Germany to crush that gallant little country >vhich blocked the way to the Dardanelles and to the realisa- tion of their larger ambitions, the American Kepresentatives call attention to four documents, three of which have been made known by His Excellency Milenko .R. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister at Paris. Of the three, the first is reproduced for the first time, and two of the others were only published during the sessions of the Commission. The first of these documents is a report of Von Wiesner, the Austro- Hungarian agent sent to Serajevo to investigate the assassination at that place on June 28, 1914, of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian Throne, and the Duchess of Hohen- berg, his morganatic wife. The material portion of this report, in the form of a telegram, is as follows : — " Herr von Wiesner, to the Foreign Ministry, Vienna. "Serajevo, July 13, 1914, 1-10 p. m. "Cognizance on the part of the Serbian Government, participation in the murderous assault, or in its preparation, and supplying the weapons, proved by nothing, nor even to be suspected. On the con- trary there are indications which cause this to be rejected." ' The second is likewise a telegram, dated Berlin, July 25, 1914, from Count Szoegeny, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna, and reads as follows: — "Here it is generally taken for granted that in case of a possible refusal on the part of Serbia, our immediate declaration of war will be coincident with military operations. "Delay in beginning military operations is here considered as a great danger because of the intervention of other Powers. *■ Herr V. IViesnfr an Ministtriuvi dis Aeussernin H'ien. Sfirajtvo, IS. .JuliUiH, 1.10 p. m. MinWssenschaft serbisclur RcKkning, Leitung an Attentat Oder desscn Vorbereilung und Ueistellung der Waffcn, durch nichls erwlosen Oder auch nur zu vermuten. Es bestelun vielmehr Anhaltspunkte, dies als ausgeschlossen anzusehcn. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 363 "We are urgently advised to proceed at once and to confront the world with a, fait accompli." ' The third, likewise a telegram in cipher, marked "strictly confi- dential," and dated Berlin, July 27, 1914, two days after the Serbian reply to the Austro-Htmgarian ultimatum and the day before the Austro-Hujigarian declaration of war upon that devoted kingdom, was from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin to the Min- ister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna. The material portion of this document is as follows: — "The Secretary of State informed me very definitely and in the strictest confidence that in the near future possible proposals for mediation on the part of England would be brought to Your Excel- lency's knowledge by the German Government. "The German Government gives its most binding assurance that it does not in any way associate itself with the proposals; on the con- trary, it is absolutely opposed to their consideration and only trans- mits them in compliance with the English request." ' Of the English propositions, to which reference is made in the above telegram, the following may be quoted, which, xmder date July 30, 1914, Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin: — "If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrange- ment to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and om^elves, jointly or separately." ' While comment upon these telegrams would only tend to weaken their force and effect, it may nevertheless be observed that the last of them was dated two days before the declaration of war by Ger- many against Russia, which might have been prevented, had not Germany, flushed w^ith the hope of certain victory and of the fruits of conquest, determined to force the war. The report of the Commission treats separately the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and of Luxemburg, and reaches the conclusion, in which the American Representatives concur, that the neutrality of both of these countries was deliberately violated. The American Representatives believe, however, that it is not enough to state or to hmd with the Commission that "the war was pre- meditated by the Central Powers," that "Germany, in agreement i GrofSzoegeny an Minister des Aeussern in Wien. (285.) ■ Berlin, 15. Jvli 19H. Hier wird all^emem vorausscesetzt, dass auf eventuelle abweisende Antwort Serliens sofort unserc Kriegserklanmg verbunden mit kriegischen Operationen erfolgen werde. Man sieht hier m ieder Verjogerung des Beginnes der triegerischen Operationen grosse Cetahr tetrefls Einmischung anderer Machte. Man rat uns dringendst soiort vorzugehen und Welt vor ein/s!( accompli zu stellen. s GrafSzoegeny an Ministerium des Aemsern in Wien. (307, Strang vertraulich.) Berlin, i7. J iH 19H. Staatsse'sretar erklarte mir in streng rertraulicher Form sehr entscUeden, dass m der nSchsten Zeit erentuelle VermittlungsTorschlage Englands durch die deutsche Regierung zur KenntDis Euer Exc gebracht wiirden. ^ . .. Die deutsche Regierung versichere auf das Bundigste, dass sie stch m kemer Weise wit den VorsclMgen ideitifieire, sogar entsohieden gegen derer Beriicksichtigung sei, und dieselben nur, um der englischen Bitte Reohnung zu tragen, weitergebe. ,„„„,,>,.„„, • British Parliamentary Papers, "Miscellaneous, No. 10 (1915)," "Collected Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War," p. 78. 364 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. with Austria-Hungary, deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war," and to declare that the neutrality of Belgium, fuaranteed by the Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839, and that of /uxemburg, guaranteed by the Treaty of the Uth of May, 1867, were deliberately violated by Germany and Austria-Hungary. They are of the opinion that these acts should be condenmed in no uncertain terms and that their perpetrators should be held up to the execration of mankind. II The second question submitted by the Conference to the Com- mission requires an investigation of and a report upon 'the facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their AUies, on land, on sea, and in the air, during the present war.' It has been deemed advisable to quote again the exact language of the submission in that it is at once the authority for and the limitation of the investigation and report to be made by the Commission. Facts were to be gathered, but these facts were to be not of a general but of a very specific kind, and were to relate to the violations or 'breaches of the laws and customs of war.' The duty of the Commission was, therefore, to determine whether the facts found were violations of the laws and customs of war. It was not asked whether these facts were violations of the laws or of the principles of humanity. Nevertheless, the report of the Commission does not, as in the opinion of the American Representatives it should, confine itself to the ascertain- ment of the facts and to their violation of the laws and customs of war, but, going beyond the terms of the mandate, declares that the facts found and acts committed were in violation of the laws and of the elementary principles of hvunanity. The laws and customs of war are a standard certain, to be found m books of authority and in the practice of nations. The laws and principles of humanity vary with the individual, which, if for no other reason, should exclude them from consideration in a court of justice, especially one charged with the administration of criminal law. The American Representatives, therefore, objected to the references to the laiws and principles of humanity, to be fornid in the report, in what they believed was meant to be a judicial proceeding, as, in their opinion, the facts found were to be violations or breaches of the laws and customs of war, and the persons singled out for trial and punish- ment for acts committed during the war were only to be those persons guilty of acts which should have been committed in violation of the laws and customs of war. With this reservation as to the invocation of the principles of humanity, the American Representa- tives are in substantial accord with the conclusions reached by the. Commission on this head that : 1. The war was carried on by the Central Empires, together with their Allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, by barbarous or illegiti- mate methods in violation of the established laws and customs of war and the elementary principles of humanity. XKEATY OP PEACE WITH GEBMANY. 365 2. A Commission shotdd be created for the j)urpose of collecting and classifying systematically all the information already had or to be obtained, in order to prepare as complete a list of facts as possible concerning the violations oi the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and its allies, on land, on sea, and in the air, in the course of the present war. However, in view of the recommendation that a Commission be appointed to collect ftirther information, the American Repre- sentatives believe that they should content themselves with a mere expression of concurrence as to the statements contained in the report upon which these conclusions are based. Ill The third question submitted to the Commission on Responsibili- ties requires an exprsesion of opinion concerning "the degree of responsibility for these offences attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staffs, and other mdividuals, however highly placed." The conclusion which the Com- mission reached, and which is stated in the report, is to the effect that "all persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their posi- tion may have been, without distinction of rank, including Chiefs of States, who have been guilty of offences against the laws and cus- toms of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecu- tion." The American Representatives are unable to agree with this conclusion, in so far as it subjects to criminal, and, therefore, to legal prosecution, persons accused of offences against "the laws of human- ity," and in so far as it subjects Chiefs of States to a degree of re- sponsibility hitherto unknown to municipal or international law, for which no precedents are to be found in the modern practice of nations. Omitting for the present the question of criminal liability for offences against the laws of humanity, which will be considered in connection with the law to be administered in the national tribunals and the Hight Court, -whose constitution is recommended by the Commission, and likewise reserving for discussion in connection with the High Court the question of the liability of a chief of State to crim- inal prosecution, a reference may properly be made in this place to the masterly and hitherto unanswered opinion of Chief Justice Mar- shall, in the case of the Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon and Others {7 Cranch, 116), decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1812, in which the reasons are given for the exemption of the sovereign and of the sovereign agent of a State from judicial process. This does not mean that the head of the State, whether he be called emperor, king, or chief executive, is not responsible for breaches of the law, but that he is responsible not to the judicial but to the political authority of his country. His act may and does bind his country and render it responsible for the acts which he has committed in its name and its behalf, or under cover of its authority; but he is, and it is submitted that he should be, only responsible to his coun- try, as otherwise to hold would be to subject to foreign countries, a Cmef executive, thus withdrawing him from the laws of his country, «ven its organic law, to which he owes obedience, and subordinating 366 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. him to foreign jurisdictions to which neither he nor his country owes allegiance or obedience, thus denying the very conception of sov- ereignty. But the law to which the head of the State is responsible is the law of his country, not the law of a foreign country or group of countries; the tribunal to which he is responsible is the tribunal of his country, not of a foreign country or group of countries, and the punishment to be inflicted is the punishment prescribed by the law in force at the time of the commission of the act, not a punish- ment created after the commission of the act. These observations the American Representatives believe to be applicable to a head of a State actually in office and engaged in the performance of his duties. They do not apply to a head of a State who has abdicated or has been repudiated by his people. Proceedings against him might be wise or unwise, but in any event thej would be against an individual out of office and not against an individual in office and thus in effect against the State. The American Representatives also believe that the above observations apply to liability of the head of a State for violations of positive law in the strict and legal sense of the term. They are not intended to apply to what may be called political offences and to political sanctions. These are matters for statesmen, not for judges, and it is for them to determine whether or not the violators of the Treaties guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and of Luxemburg should be subjected to a political sanction. However, as questions of this kind seem to be beyond the man- date of the Conference, the American Representatives consider it unnecessary to enter upon their discussion. IV The fourth question calls for an investigation of and a report upon "the constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offences." Apparently the Conference had in mind the violations of the laws and customs of war, inasmuch as the Commission is required by the third submission to report upon "the degree of responsibility for these offenses attaching to par- ticular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staffs and other individuals, however highly placed." The fourth point relates to the constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the investigation of these crimes, and to the trial and punishment of the persons accused of their commission, should they be found guilty. The Commission seems to have been of the opinion that the tribunal referred to in the fourth point was to deal with the crimes specffied in the second and third submissions, not with the responsibility of the authors of the war, as appears from the following statement taken from the report : — On the whole case, including both the acts which brought about the war and those which accompanied its inception, particu- larly the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg and of Bel- gium, the Commission is of the opinion that it would be right for the Peace Conference, in a matter so unprecedented, to adopt special measures, and even to create a special organ in order to deal as they deserve with the authors of such acts. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY, 367 This section of the report, however, deals not only with the laws and customs of war — improperly adding "and of the laws of hu- manity" — but also with the "acts which provoked the war and accompanied its inception," which either in whole or in part would appear to fall more appropriately under the first submission relating to the "responsibility of the authors of the war." Of the acts which provoked the war and accompanied its incep- tion, the Commission, with special reference to the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg and of Belgium, says: "We therefore do not advise that the acts which provoked the war should be charged against their authors and made the subject of proceedings before a tribimal." And a little later in the same section the report con- tinues: "The Conamission is nevertheless of opinion that no criminal charge can be made against the responsible authorities or individuals, and notably the ex-Kaiser, on the special head of these breaches of neutrality, but the gravity of these gross outrages upon the law of nations and international good faith is such that the Commission thinks they should be the subject of a formal coTulemnation iy the Conference." The American Representatives are in thorough accord with these views, which are thus formally stated in the first two of the foiu- conclusions under this heading: — The acts which brought about the war should not be charged against their authors or made the subject of proceedings before a tribunal. On the special head of the breaches of the neutrality of Ltixemburg and Belgium, the gravity of these outrages upon the principles of the law of nations and upon international good faith is such that they should be made the subject of a formal condemnation by the Conference. If tne report had stopped here, the American Eepresentatives would be able to concur in the conclusions under this heading and the reasoning by which they were justified, for hitherto the authors of war, however unjust it may he in the form of morals, have not been brought before a court of justice upon a criminal charge for trial and punishment. The report specifically states: (1) That "a war of aggression may not be considered as an act directly contrary to positive law, or one which can be successfully brought before a tribunal such as the Commission is authorised to consider under its Terms of Reference"; the Commission refuses to advise (2) "that the acts which provoked the war should be charged against their authors and made the subject of proceedings before a tribunal"; it further holds (3) that "no criminal charge can be made against the responsible authorities or individuals, and notably the ex-Kaiser, on the special head of these breaches of neutrahty." The American Representatives, accepting each of these statements as soimd and unanswerable, are nevertheless unable to agree with the third of the conclusions based upon them: — On the whole case, including both the acts which brought about the war. and those which accompanied its inception, particu- larly the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxem- burg, it would be right for the Peace Conference, in a matter so unprecedented, to adopt special measures, and even to create a special organ in order to deal as they deserve with the authors of such acts. 368 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. The American Eepresentatives believe that this conclusion- is inconsistent both with the reasoning of the section and with the first and second conclusions, and that "in a matter so unprece- dented," to quote the exact language of the third conclusion, they are relieved from comment and criticism. However, they observe that, if the acts in question are criminal in the sense that they are punishable under law, they do not understand why the report should not advise that these acts be punished in accordance witli the terms of the law. If, on the other hand, there is no law making them crimes or affixing a penalty for their commission, they are moral, not legal, crimes, and the American Representatives fail to see the advisability or indeed the appropriateness of creating a special organ to deal with the authors of such acts. In any event, the organ in question should not be a judicial tribunal. In order to meet the evident desire of the Commission that a special organ be created, without however doing violence to their own scruples in the premises, the American Representatives pro- posed — The Commission on Responsibilities recommends that : — 1. A Commission of Inquiry be established to consider generally the relative culpability of the authors of the war and also the question of their culpability as to the violations of the laws and customs of war committed during its course. 2. The Commission of Inquiry consist of two members of the five following Powers: United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan; and one member from each of the five following Powers: Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Roumaina, and Serbia. 3. The enemy be required to place their archives at the disposal of the Commission which shall forthwith enter upon its duties and report jointly and separately to their respective Governments on the 11th November, 1919, or as soon there- after as practicable. The Commission, however, failed to adopt this proposal. The fourth and final conclusion under this heading declares it to be "desirable that for the future penal sanctions should be provided for such grave outrages against the elementary principles of inter- national law." With this conclusion the American Representatives find themselves to be in substantial accord. They believe that any nation going to war assumes a grave responsibility, and that a nation enagaging in a war of aggression commits a crime. They hold that the neutrality of nations should be observed, especially when it is guaranteed by a treaty to which the nations violating it are parties, and that the plighted word and the good faith of nations should be faithfully observed in this as in all other respects. At the same time, given the difficulty of determining whether an act is in reality one of aggression or of defence, and given also the difficulty of framing penal sanctions, where the consequences are so great or may be so great as to be incalculable, they hesitate as to the feasilibitv of this conclusion, from which, however, they are unwilling formally to dissent. With the portion of the report devoted to the "constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offences," the American Representatives are unable to agree, and their views TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 369 differ so fundamentally and so radically from those of the Com- mission that they found themselves obliged to oppose the views of their colleagues in the Commission and to dissent from the state- ment of those views as recorded in the report. The American Representatives, however, agree with the introductory paragraph of this section, in which it is stated that "every belligerent has, according to international law, the power and authority to try the individuals alleged to be guilty of the crimes" constituting violations of the laws and customs of war, "if such persons have been taken prisoners or have otherwise fallen into its power." The American Representatives are likewise in thorough accord with the further provisions that "each belligerent has, or has power to set up, pur- suant to its own legislation, an appropriate tribunal, military or civil, for the trial of such cases." The American Representatives concur in the view that "these courts would be able to try the incriminated persons according to their own procedure," and also in the conclusion that "much complication and consequent delay would be avoided which would arise if all such cases were to be brought before a single tribunal," supposing that the single tribunal could and should be created. In fact, these statements are not only in accord with but are based upon the memorandum submitted by the American Representatives, advocating the utilisation of the military commissions or tribunals either existing or which could be created in each of the belligerent countries, with jurisdiction to pass upon offences against the laws and customs of war committed by tEe respective enemies. This memorandum already referred to in an earlier paragraph is as follows : — 1. That the military authorities, being charged with the interpreta- tion of the laws and customs of war, possess jurisdiction to determine and punish violations thereof; 2. That the military jurisdiction for the trial of persons accused of violations of the laws and customs of war and for the punish- ment of persons found guilty of such offences is exercised by military tribunals; 3. That the jurisdiction of a military tribunal over a person accused of the violation of a law or custom of war is acquired when the ofl'ence was committed on the territory of the nation creating the military tribunal or when the person or property injured by the offence is of the same nationaUty as the mil- itary tribunal; 4. That the law and procedure to be appUed and followed in deter- mining and punishing violations of the laws and customs of war are the law and the procedure for determining and pun- ishing such violations established by the military law of the country against which the offence is committed ; and 5. That in case of acts violating the laws and customs of war involving more than one country, the military tribunals of the countries affected may be united, thus forming an inter- national tribunal for the trial and punishment of persons charged with the commission of such offences. In a matter of such importance affecting not one but many coun- tries and calculated to influence their future conduct, the American Representatives believed that the nations should use the machinery 135546—19 24 370 TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. at hand, which had been tried and found competent, with a law and a procedure framed and therefore known in advance, rather than to create an international tribunal with a criminal jurisdiction for which there is no precedent, precept, practice, or procedure. They further believed that, if an act violating the laws and customs of war com- mitted by the enemy affected more than one country, a tribunal could be formed of the countries affected by uniting the national commis- sions or courts thereof, in which event the tribunal would be formed by the mere assemblage of the members, bringing with them the law to be applied, namely, the laws and customs of war, and the procedure, namely, the procedure of the national commissions or courts. The American Representatives had especially in mind the case of Henry Wirz, commandant of the Confederate prison at Andersonville, Georgia, during the war between the States, who after that war was tried by a miUtary commission, sitting in the city of Washington, for crimes contrary to the laws and customs of war, convicted thereof, sentenced to be executed, and actually executed on the 11th Novem- ber, 1865. While the American Representatives would have preferred a national military commission or court in each country, for which the Wirz case furnished ample precedent, they were willing to con- cede that it might be advisable to have a commission of representa- tives of the competent national tribimals to pass upon charges, as stated in the report : — (a) Against persons belonging to enemy comitries who have com- mitted outrages against a number of civilians and soldiers of several Allied nations, such as outrages committed in prison camps where prisoners of war of several nations were congregated or the crime of forced labour in mines where prisoners of more than one nationality were forced to' work. (b) Against persons of authority, belonging to enemy countries, whose orders were executed not only in one area or on one battle front, but whose orders affected the conduct towards several of the Allied armies. The American Representatives are, however, unable to agree that a mixed commission thus composed should, in the language of the report, entertain charges: — (c) Against all authorities, civil or military, belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, with- out distinction of rank, including the Heads of States, who ordered, or, with knowledge thereof and with power to inter- vene, abstained from preventing or taking measures to pre- vent, putting an end to or repressing, violations of the laws or customs of war, it being understood that no such absten- tion shall constitute a defence for the actual perpetrators. In an earlier stage of the general report, indeed, until its final revision, such persons were declared liable because they 'abstained from preventing, putting an end to, or repressing, violations of the laws or customs of war.* To this' criterion of liability the American Representatives were unalterably opposed. It is one thing to punish a person who committed, or, possessing the authority, ordered others to commit an act constituting a crime; it is quite another thing to punish a person who failed to prevent, to put an end to, or to repress violations of the laws or customs of war. In TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. 371 one case the individual acts or orders others to act, and in so doing commits a positive offence. In the other he is to be punished for the acts of others without proof being given that he loiew of the commission of the acts in question or that, knowing them, he could have prevented their commission. To establish responsibility in such cases it is elementary that the individual sought to be punished should have knowledge of the commission of the acts of a criminal nature and that he should have possessed the power as well as the authority to prevent, to put an end to, or repress them. Neither knowledge of commission 'nor ability to prevent is alone sufficient. The duty or obligation to act is essential. They must exist in conjunction, and a standard of liability which does not include them all is to be rejected. The difficulty in the matter of abstention was felt by the Commission, as to make abstention punishable might tend to exonerate the person actually committing the act. Therefore the standard of liability to which the American Representatives objected was modified in the last sessions of the Commission, and the much less objectionable text, as stated above, was adopted and substituted for the earlier and wholly in admis- sible one. There remain, however, two reasons, which, if others were lacking, would prevent the American Representatives from consenting to the tribunal recommended by the Commission. The first of these is the uncertainty of the law to be administered, in that liability is made to depend not only upon violations of the laws and customs of war, but also upon violations 'of the laws of humanity.' The second of these reasons is that Heads of States are included within the civil and militarj^ authorities of the enemy countries to be tried and punished for violations of the laws and customs of war and of the laws of humanity. The American Representatives believe that the Commission has exceeded its mandate in extending liability to violations of the laws of humanity, inasmuch as the facts to be examined are solely violations of the laws and customs of war. They also believe that the Commission erred in seeking to subject Heads of States to trial and punishment by a tribtmal to whose jurisdiction they were not subject when the alleged offence were committed. As pointed out by the American Representatives on more than one occasion, war was and is by its very nature inhuman, but acts consistent with the laws and customs of war, although these acts are inhuman, are nevertheless not the object of punishment by a court of justice. A judicial tribunal only deals with existing law and only administers existing law, leaving to another forum infrac- tions of the moral law and actions contrary to the laws and principles of humanity. A further objection lies in the fact that the laws and principles of humanity are not certain, varying with time, place, and circumstance, and according, it may be, to the conscience of the individual judge. There is no fixed and universal standard of humanity. The law of humanity, or the principle of humanity, is much like equity, whereof John Selden, as wise and cautious as he was learned, aptly said: '* Equity is a roguish thing. For Law we have a measure, know what to trust to; Equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. 'Tis 372 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. all one as if they should make the standard for the measure we call a "foot" a Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure would this be: One Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot. 'Tis the same thing in the Chancellor's con- science." While recognising that offences against the laws and customs of war might be tried before and the perpetrators punished by national tribunals, the Commission was of the opinion that the graver charges and those involving more than one country should be tried before an international body, to be called the High Tribunal, which "shall be composed of three persons appointed by each of the following Governments: — The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, and one person appointed by each of the following Governments: Belgium, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Rou- mania, Serbia, and Czecho-SIovakia " ; the members of this tribunal to be selected by each country ' ' from among the members of their national courts or tribunals, civil or military, and now in existence or erected as indicated above." The law to be applied is declared by the Commission to be "the principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience." The punishment to be inflicted is that which may be imposed "for such an offence or offences by any court in any country represented on the tribunal or in the country of the convicted person." The cases selected for trial are to be determined and the prosecutions directed by "a prosecuting commission" composed of a representative of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, to be assisted by a representative of one of the other Govern- ments, presumably a party to the creation of the court or repre- sented in it. The American Representatives felt very strongly that too great attention could not be devoted to the creation of an international criminal court for the trial of individuals, for which a precedent is lacking, and which appears to be unkno^\^^ in the practice of nations. They were of the opinion that an act could not be a crime in the legal sense of the word, unless it were made so by law, and that the commission of an act declared to be a ciime by law could not be punished unless the law prescribed the penalty to be inflicted. They were perhaps, more conscious than then- colleagues of the difficulties involved, inasmuch as this question was one that had arisen in the American Union composed of States, and where it had been held in the leading case of United States v. Hudson (7 Cranch 32), decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1812, that "the legis- lative authority of the Union must fii-st make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the court shall have jurisdiction of the offence." What is true of the American States must be true of this looser union which we call the Society of Nations. The American Representatives know of no international statute or con- vention making a violation of the laws and customs of war — not to speak of the laws or principles of humanity — an international crime, affixing a punishment to it, and declaring the court which has jui'is- diction over the offence. They felt, however, that the difficulty, however great, was not insurmountable, inasmuch as the various States have declared certain acts violatmg the laws and ciistoms of TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 373 war to be crimes, affixing punishments to their commission, and providing military courts or commissions within the respective States possessing jurisdiction over such offence. They were advised that each of the Allied and Associated States could create such a tribunal, if it had not already done so. Here then was at hand a series of existing tribunal or tribunals that could lawfully be called into exist- ence in each of the Allied or Associated countries by the exercise of their sovereign powers, appropriate for the trial and punishment within their respective jurisdictions of persons of enemy nationality, who during the war committed acts contrary to the laws and customs of war, in so far as such acts affected the persons or property of their subjects or citizens, whether such acts were committed within portions of their territory occupied by the enemy or by the enemy within its own jurisdiction. The American Representatives therefore proposed that acts affect- ing the persons or property of one of the Allied or Associated Govern- ments should be tried by a military tribunal of that country; that acts involving more than one country, such as treatment by Germany of prisoners contrary to the usages and customs of war, could be tried by a tribunal either made up of the competent tribunals of the countries affected or of a commission thereof possessing their authority. In this way existing national tribunals or national com- missions which could legally be called into being would be utilised, and not only the law and the penalty would be already declared, but the procedure would be settled. It seemed elementary to the American Representatives that a country could not take part in the trial and punishment of a viola- tion of the laws and customs of war committed by Germany and her Allies before the particular country in question had become a party to the war against Germany and her Allies; that consequently the United States could not institute a military tribunal within its own jurisdiction to pass upon violations of the laws and customs of war, unless such violations were committed upon American persons or American property, and that the United States could not properly take part in the trial and punishment of persons accused of violations of the laws and customs of war committed by the military or civil authorities of Bulgaria or Turkey. Under these conditions and with these limitations the American Representatives considered that the United States might be a party to a High Tribunal, which they would have preferred to call, because of its composition, the Mixed or United Trbunal or Commission. They were averse to the creation of a new tribunal, of a new law, of a new penalty, which would be ex 'post facto m nature, and thus contrary to an express clause of the Constitution of the United States and in conflict with the law and practice of civilised commun^ities. They believed, however, that the United States could co-operate to this extent by the utilisation of existing tribunals, existing laws, and existing penalties. However, the possibility of co-operatmg was frustrated by the insistence on the part of the majority that criminal liabihty should, in excess of the mandate of the Conference, attach to the laws and principles of humanity, in addition to the laws and customs of war, and that the jurisdiction of the High Court should be specifically extended to " the heads of States." 374 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. In regard to the latter point, it will be observed that the American Eepresentatives did not deny the responsibility of the heads of States for acts which they may have committed in violation of law, including, in so far as their country is concerned, the laws and customs of war, but they held that heads of States are, as agents of the people, in whom the sovereignty of any State resides, responsible to the people for the illegal acts which they may have committed, and that they are not and that they should not be made responsible to any other sovereignty. The American Eepresentatives assumed, in debating this ques- tion, that from a legal point of view the people of every independent country are possessed of sovereignty, and that that sovereignty is not held in that sense by rulers; that the sovereignty which is thus possessed can summon before it any person, no matter how high his estate, and call upon him to render an account of his official stewardship; that the essence of sovereignty consists in the fact that it is not responsible to any foreign sovereignty; that in the exercise of sovereign powers which have been conferred upon him by the people, a monarch or head of State acts as their agent; that he is only responsible to them; and that he is respon- sible to no other people or group of people in the world. The American Representatives admitted that from the moral point of view the head of a State, be he termed emperor, king, or chief executive, is responsible to mankind, but that from the legal point of view they expressed themselves as unable to see how any member of the Commission could claim that the head of a State exercising sovereign rights is responsible to any but those who have confided those rights to him by consent expressed or implied. The majority of the Commission, however, was not influenced by the legal argument. They appeared to be fixed in their deter- mination to try and punish by judicial process the "ex-Kaiser" of Germany. That there might be no dotibt about their meaning, they insisted that the jurisdiction of the High Tribunal whose constitution they recommended should include the heads of States, and they therefore inserted a provision to this effect in express words in the clause dealing with the jurisdiction of the tribunal. In view of their objections to the imcertain law to be applied, varying according to the conception of the members of the High Court as to the laws and principles of humanity, and in view also of their objections to the extent of the proposed jurisdiction of that tribunal, the American Representatives were constrained to decline to be a party to its creation. Necessarily they declined the proffer on behalf of the Commission that the United States should take part in the proceedings before that tribunal, or to have the United States represented in the prosecuting commission charged with the "duty of selecting the cases for trial before the tribunal and of directing and conducting prosecutions before it." They therefore refrained irom taking further part either in the discussion of the constitution or of the procedure of the tribunal. It was an ungracious task for the American Representatives to oppose the views of their colleagues in the matter of the trial and punishment of heads of States, when they believed as sincerely and as profoundly as any other member that the particular heads of TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 375 States in question were morally guilty, even if they were not punish- able before an international tribunal, such as the one proposed, for the acts which they themselves had committed or with whose com- mission by others they could be justly taxed. It was a matter of great regret to the American Representatives that they found them- selves subjected to criticism, owing to their objection to declaring the laws and principles of humanity as a standard whereby the acts of their enemies should be measured and punished by a judicial tribunal. Their abhorrence for the acts of the heads of States of enemy countries is no less genuine and deep than that of their col- leagues, and their conception of the laws and principles of humanity is, they believe, not less enlightened than that of their colleagues. They considered that they were dealing solely with violations of the laws and customs of war, and that they were engaged under the mandate of the Conference in creating a tribunal in which violations of the laws and customs of war should be tried and punished. They therefore confined themselves to law in its legal sense, believing that in so doing they accorded with the mandate of submission, and that to have permitted sentiment or popular indignation to affect their judgment would have been violative of their duty as members of the Commission on Responsibilities. They submit their views, rejected by the Commission, to the Con- ference, in full confidence that it is only through the administration of law, enacted and known before it is violated, that justice may ultimately prevail internationally, as it actually does between indi- viduals in all civilised nations. Memorandum on the Principles wTiich should Determine Inhuman and Improper Acts 0/ War To determine the principles which should be the standard of justice in measuring the charge of inhuman or atrocious conduct during the prosecution of a war, the following propositions should be considered: — 1. Slaying and maiming of men in accordance with generally accepted rmes of war are from their nature cruel and contrary to the modem conception of humanity. 2. The methods of destruction of life and property in conformity with the accepted rules of war are admitted by civilised nations to he justifiable and no charge of cruelty, inhumanity, or impropriety hes against a party employing such methods. 3. The principle underlying the accepted rules of war is the nec- CBssity of exercising physical force to protect national safety or to maintain national rights. 4. Reprehensible cruelty is a matter of degree which cannot be justly determined by a fixed line of distinction, but one which fluctuates in accordance with the facts in each case, but the mani- fest departure from accepted rules and customs of war imposes upon the one so departing the burden of justifying his conduct, as he is primM facie guilty of a criminal act. 5. The test of guilt in the perpetration of an act, which would be inhuman or otherwise reprehensible under normal conditions, is the necessity of that act to the protection of national safety or national rights measured chiefly by actual military advantage. 376 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 6. The assertion by the perpetrator of an act that it is necessary for military reasons does not exonerate him from guilt if the facts and circumstances present reasonably strong grounds for establishing the needlessness of the act or for believing that the assertion is not made in good faith. 7. While an act may be essentially reprehensible and the per- petrator entirely unwarranted in assuming it to be necessary from a military point of view, he must not be condemned as wilfully violating the laws and customs of war or the principles of h\unanity unless it can be shown that the act was wanton and without reasonable excuse. 8. A wanton act which causes needless suffering (and this includes such causes of suffering as destruction of property, deprivation of necessaries of life, enforced labour, &c.) is cruel and criminal. The fuU measure of guilt attaches to a party who without adequate reason perpetrates a needless act of cruelty. Such an act is a crime against civilisation, which is without palliation. 9. It would appear, therefore, in determining the criminality of an act, that there should be considered the wantonness or malice of the perpetrator, the needlessness of the act from a military point of view, the perpetration of a justifiable act in a needlessly harsh or cruel manner, and the improper motive which inspired it. KoBEET Lansing. James Beown Scott. Annex III Reservations hy the Japanese Delegation The Japanese Delegates on the Commission on Responsibilities are convinced that many crimes have been committed by the enemy in the course of the present war in violation of the fundamental prin- ciples of international law, and recognise that the principal respon- sibility rests upon individual enemies in high places. They are consequently of opinion that, in order to re-establish for the future the force of the principles thus infringed, it is important to discover practical means for the punishment of the persons responsible for such violations. A question may be raised whether it can be admitted as a principle of the law of nations that a High Tribunal constituted by belligerents can, after a war is over, try an individual belonging to the opposite side, who may be presumed to be guilty of a crime against the laws and customs of war. It may further be asked whether international law recognises a penal law as applicable to those who are guilty. In any event, it seems to us important to consider the consequences which would be created in the history of international law ijy the Erosecution for breaches of the laws and customs of war of enemy eads of States before a tribunal constituted by the opposite party. Our scruples become still greater when it is a question of indicting before a tribunal thus constituted highly-placed enemies on the sole ground that they abstained from preventing, putting an end to, or repressing acts in violation of the laws and customs of war, as is provided in clause (c) of section (Jb) of Chapter IV. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEKMANY. 377 It is to be observed that to satisfy public opinion of the justice of the decision of the appropriate tribunal, it would be better to rely upon a strict interpretation of the principles of penal liability, and consequently not to make cases of abstention the basis of such responsibility. In these circumstances the Japanese Delegates thought it possible to adhere, in the course of the discussions m the Commission, to a text which would eliminate from clause (c) of section (h) of Chapter IV both the words 'including the heads of States,' and the provision covering cases of abstention, but they feel some hesitation in sup- porting the amended form which admits a criminal liability where the accused, with knowledge and with power to intervene, abstained from preventing or taking measures to prevent, putting an end to, or repressing acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. The Japanese Delegates desire to make clear that, subject to the above reservations, they are disposed to consider with the greatest care every suggestion calculated to bring about unanimity in the Conmiission. April 4, 1919. M. Adatci. S. Tachi. An^ex IV. Provisions for Insertion in Treaties with Enemy Governments Article I. The Enemy Government admits that even after the conclusion of peace, every Allied and Associated State may exercise, in respect of any enemy or former enemy, the right which it would have had during the war to try and punish any enemy who fell within its power and who had been guilty of a violation of the principles of the law of nations as these result from the usages established among civilised peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience. Article II. The Enemy Government recognises the right of the Allied and Associated States, after the conclusion of peace, to constitute a High Tribunal composed of members named by the AUied and Associated States in such numbers and in such proportions as they may think proper, and admits the jurisdiction of such tribunal to try and punish enemies or former enemies guilty during the war of violations of the principles of the law of nations as these result from the usages established among civilised peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience. It agrees that no trial or sentence by any of its own courts shall bar trial and sentence by the High Tribunal or by a national court belonging to one of the Allied or Associated States. 378 TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Article III. The Enemy Government recognises the right of the High Tribunal to impose upon any person found guilty the punishment or punish- ments which may be imposed for such an offense or offences by any court in any country represented on the High Tribunal or in the country of the convicted person. The Enemy Government will not object to such punishment or punishments being carried out. Article IV The Enemy Government agrees, on the demand of any of the Allied or Associated States, to take all possible measures for the purpose of the delivery to the designated authority, for trial by the High Tribunal or, at its instance, by a national court of one of such Allied or Associated States, of any person alleged to be guilty of an offence against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity who may be in its territory or otherwise under its direc- tion or control. No such person shall in any event be included in any amnesty or pardon. Article V The Enemy Government agrees, on the demand of any of the Allied or Associated States, to furnish to it the name of any person at any time in its service who may be described by reference to his duties or station during the war or by reference to any other description which may make his identification possible and further agrees to furnish such other information as may appear likely to be useful for the purpose of designating the persons who may be tried before the High Tribunal or before one of the national courts of an Allied or Associated State for a crime against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity. Article IV The Enemy Government agrees to furnish, upon the demand of any Allied or Associated State, all General Staff plans of campaign, orders, instructions, reports, logs, charts, correspondence, proceed- ings of courts, tribunals or investigating bodies, or sucn other documents or classes of documents as any Allied or Associated State may request as being likely to be useful for the purpose of identifying or as evidence for or against any person, and upon demand as aforesaid to furnish copies of any such documents. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. TUESDAY, AtTGUST 12, 1919. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Eelations, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10.30 o'clock a. m., in room 426, Senate Office Building, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge presiding. Present: Senators Lodge (chairman), McCumber, Brandegee, Fall, Harding, New, Moses, Hitchcock, Williams, Swanson, Pomerene, and Pittman. STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID HUNTER MILLER. The Chairman. The committee will come to order and I will ask Mr. MUler to take the stand. Mr. Miller, will you give your full name, please, to the stenographer ? Mr. Miller. David Hunter Miller. The Chairman. You are now in the State Department ? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir; special assistant in the Department of State. The Chairman. You are a lawyer ? Mr. Miller. Yes. The Chairman. Will you give the name of your firm in New York? Mr. Miller. Miller & Auchincloss. The Chairman. You were in Paris, were you not ? Mr. Miller. I was. The Chairman. And in what position there ? Mr. Miller. I went to Paris in November, attached to the mission of Col. House, which was then in Paris. When the American com- mission to negotiate peace arrived in Paris, I was attached to the American commission as one of the two techincal advisers, or legal advisers, of the commission. The Chairman. As one of the legal advisers of the commission ? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. It was after the armistice that you arrived in Paris ? Mr. Miller. I arrived in Paris on the 19th of November. I left before the armistice, and arrived there after the armistice. Senator Beandegee. What year? Mr. Miller. 1918. The Chairman. As one of the legal advisers of our commissioners, ■did you have any part in drafting the American plan for the league ? Mr. Miller. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, by "American plan" do jou mean the plan which is printed in the Congressional Eecord ? 379 380 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. The Chairman. The plan which was submitted by the President yesterday as the American plan, which is printed in the Congressional Ilecord, of which I handed you a copy. Mr. Miller. I think not, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. You were not consulted about the drafting of the covenant of the league at all ? Mr. Miller. Well, I was consulted about the drafting of the covenant, but your former question related to the American plan. The Chairman. Yes. Mr. Miller. I had submitted memoranda before I saw that plan, but I was not The Chairman. You mean you had submitted memoranda to the American commissioners 1 Mr. Miller. My recollection is that I submitted one memorandum to Col. House before the commission arrived in Paris, and that, together with Dr. James Brown Scott, I submitted another memo- randum to the commission after they arrived in Paris. The Chairman. Those memoranda related to the covenant of the league ? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir; they related to a league of nations. The Chairman. They were suggestions for a league covenant? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. The Chairman. Did you see the resolution which Mr. Lansing drafted, which he put in here yesterday, the purpose being to lay down the principles upon which the covenant of the league should be drafted? Mr. Miller. I am not certain as to whether I did or not, sir. The Chairman. Do you know what became of that resolution of Mr. Lansing's, or what action was taken upon it? Mr. Miller. I do not. The Chairman. When the commission arrived you submitted the memoranda in relation to the league? Mr. Miller. Only one memorandum. I think, after the com- mission arrived. The Chairman. Was there a draft then made of the covenant of the league by the commission ? Mr. Milleh. Not that I know of, sir. The Chairman. This plan that the President sent in yesterday — where did that come from ? Mr. Miller. I suppose it came from the President. I saw it in printed form, as I recollect, in Paris. The Chairman. You saw it then for the first time ? Mr. Miller. After it was printed. The Chairman. After it was printed — and did you have any dis- cussion in regard to it? Mr. Miller. I discussed it with Col. House. The Chairman. Was that plan that you then saw the same as the one in the printed form ? I do not expect you to cover every detail, of course, but generally, was it the same ? Mr. Miller. I have looked at it very hastily. It appears to me to be the same. The Chairman. After that was submitted to you in printed form, I mean after it was shown to you in printed form by the President, there- were no changes made in it? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 381 Mr. Miller. I do not quite understand. The Chairman. I understood you to saj that you first saw this plan in printed form, laid before the commission by the President. Mr. Miller. Yes. The Chairman. And I wanted to find out whether it was sub- stantially the same. You think it was the same ? Mr. Miller. I think the plan that I saw was the same as this plan which is printed in the record, although I have not read this with enough care to be positive as to that point. The Chairman. No changes were made by the commission in the plan submitted by the President ? Mr. Miller. Not that I know of. There was a subsequent draft submitted to the commission on the league of nations. The Chairman. But this draft that we have here was not the draft submitted ? Senator Brandegee. Submitted to whom? The Chairman. To the commission on the league of nations appointed by the peace conference. Mr. Miller. I did not say that, or at least I did not intend to say that. The Chairman. What became of this plan? Mr. Miller. I think it was submitted to the other members of the commission. The Chairman. Of the American commission? Mr. Miller. Of the commission on the league of nations. The Chairman. The commission on the league of nations appointed by the peace conference ? Mr. Miller. I believe so. I did not personally have anything to do with that. The Chairman. I had understood that you had some part in drafting the league of nations as it finally appeared. Mr. Miller. I did. The Chairman. That is, as reported by the commission ? Mr. Miller. Yes. The Chairman. Did you appear before that commission? Mr. MiLLEK. I was present at its meetings — that is, at the meetingL of the commission on the league of nations of the peace conference. The Chairman. That was composed of ho"v many persons ? Mr. Miller. At the beginning it was composed of, I think, 15 persons, but after Uvo or three meetings four other powers were represented, so that it became composed of 19 persons. The Chairman. And that was the commission which drafted the covenant of the league as it now appears ? Mr. Miller. .It was. The Chairman. Were the American plan and the Italian plan and the British plan and the French plan all submitted to that commis- sion? Mr. Miller. I believe they were. The Chairman. What became of the other plans ? Do you know? The President stated to us at the White House in March that the British plan was submitted as the foundation. That is, were the other plans withdrawn, or were they simply laid aside ? Mr. Miller. No; they were not laid aside. They vrere there. 382 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMA3STy. The Chairman. They took the British plan as the foundation for the work of the league commission, did they ? Mr. Miller. No. The plan that was taken as the basis of dis- cussion The Chairman. Yes; that is what I mean — — Mr. Miller. Was not the British plan. The Chairman. Wliose plan was it? Mr. Miller. I think it was a combination of various features of various plans. Senator Pittman. Mr. Chairman, I was present at the meeting at the White House to which you refer, and I want to go on record as saying that my memory does not serve me to the extent of remem- bering that the President stated that the British plan was taken as the foundation for the formation of the league. I understood the President to say at that time that it appeared that it was possibly more nearly like the British plan than others, but I certainly did not understand him to say that the British plan was taken as the plan. The Chairman. I understood him to say that there were these four Elans; that they were in agreement on the fundamental principles, ut that the British plan was the basis of the covenant subsequently developed. That is what I understood him to say. Mr. Miller. I did not understand it that way. Senator Brandegee. I want to add my recollection of that meet- ing, because I am very positive about it. I made a statement about it at the time, the next day after the President talked with us; and my recollection of what he said is clear and positive, to the effect that he said that the plan proposed by Gen. Smuts was the plan that had been mostly before the commission, and that while that had not been adopted just as presented, it furnished a basis for the plan that was finally adopted. Senator Williams. A skeleton structure. Senator Brandegee. Yes; words to that effect. He certainly mentioned the fact that the plan proposed by Gen. Smuts was the plan that the commission used in building up what turned out to be their report in favor of a covenant for a league of nations, and that the American plan and the other plans had been laid aside or put aisde. He did not say whether there had been any formal vote ; taken upon that or not. He said that the Italian plan had not been ' a complete plan, but was more of a skeleton of principles than it ■ was a detailed plan. Mr. Miller. It was more a statement in the nature of a statement ; of principles. j Senator McCumber. I wanted to ask the witness whether it was ( his understanding that the plan that was proposed by Gen. Smuts ; was the plan that was followed to a greater extent than any other ? i Mr. Miller. The plan that was proposed by Gen. Smuts was ) printed. It was available to anyone, printed, I think, in the paper, ! as well as in a pamphlet. The plan that was taken as a basis of i discussion by the commission was a plan which was modeled, to some j extent, on the other plans, but was not the Gen. Smuts plan itself. I Senator McCumber. When you speak of the British plan, do you J mean to be understood as speaking of the Gen. Smuts plan ? i Mr. Miller. Yes, generally; although I think there was another j British pamphlet which embodied it. i| J TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 383 Senator MoCumber. But generally, when you speak of the British plan, you refer to the plan submitted by Gen. Smuts, do you ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator McCumber. I ask that in order that I may understand your testimony. Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Brandegee. Mr. Chairman, I did not mean to interrupt your examination. I simply want to ask the witness one question, and then I will hand him back to you. The Chairman. Certainly. Senator Brandegee. Mr. Miller, you speak of being present at the proceedings of the commission, which was a committee, I suppose, of the delegates who were represented at the peace conference. It was called a commission, but was really a committee of that body was it not, composed of 15 persons? Mr. Miller. We would probably call it a committee, but they call it a commission over there. Senator Brandegee. I get the idea. Mr. Miller. Of 19 members. Senator Brandegee. It was another name for what we would call a committee here ? Mr. Miller. They call it a commission when it is rather large. Senator Brandegee. Very good. You said you were present there while they considered the formulation of the plan which they finally proposed? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Brandegee. What I wanted to know was, did you regularly attend their meetings? Were you present at all of them or the greater part of them, or only once or twice ? Mr. SliLLER. I was present at all of them. I was not a member of the commission. Senator Brandegee. I understand that. You were there as an adviser ? Mr. Miller. As legal adviser of the President; yes, sir. Senator Fall. Mr. Chairman, if the Chair wiU pardon me just a moment, as we appear to be making records here The Chairman. Certainly. Senator Fall. My reason for declining to attend this conference at the White House which the other Members have testified that they attended is brought out by the records which have been made here this morning. I felt that we would differ in our recollection of what occurred, that there would be various opinions of what occurred, and that that difference would possibly be embarrassing both to the Senate committee and to the President of the United States, and that was one of the reasons why I declined to attend that conference at the White House. The Chairman. Is it not true, Mr. Miller, that comparison shows that a good deal of the covenant, as now presented, was exactly like what was printed in this Smuts plan ? Mr. Miller. I think some of it is, but I would not say that a good deal of it is exactly like it. Senator Hitchcock. Is the present league a sort of composite of various plans that were submitted ? Mr. Miller. Yes, Senator; and it is the composite of previous ideas also, such as the so-called Bryan peace treaties. 384 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. The Chairman. You mean those arbitration treaties of Mr. Bryan ? Mr. Miller. I mean the 30 treaties which were negotiated by the United States Government, of which 20 were ratified by the Senate. The Chairman. Those were very brief treaties and dealt with only one thing. Mr. Miller. True, Mr. Chairman, but the principle of those trea- ties is very similar to one of the principles of the covenant. The Chairman. One of the principles of the covenant? Surely those Bryan treaties do not cover all the things in the covenant? Mr. Miller. Oh, no; I did not intend so to state, of course. Senator Hitchcock. You are referring to the provisions of the covenant which prohibit war within three months after the period of arbitration or investigation by the council ? Mr. Miller. I refer to that, Senator. The so-called treaties for the advancement of peace do not provide for compulsory arbitration. Neither does the covenant. They do provide for an international inquiry into any cause of difference whatsoever, in the most sweeping language, without any exception. There is a similar provision in the covenant. They contain a covenant not to go to war pending that inquiry. There is a similar provision in the covenant. The treaties for the advance of peace provide that the international commission shall have one year in which to conduct its inquiry. The covenant makes that period six months. The international commissions provided by the treaties for the advancement of peace are composed of five members, of which only one could be an American. That is very similar to the provision for inquiry by the council, on which the United States is represented by one memoer. Some of the treaties for the advancement of peace provide for a further period of six months after the report of the commission in which the parties agree not to go to war, and the treaties for the advancement of peace provide that the report of the international commission may be made by a majority. The covenant provides that only in the case of a report which is unanimous, except for the parties, is there an agreement not to go to war. The treaties for the advancement of peace reserve liberty of action after the report, subject to six montns' exception in some cases, which I have mentioned, and the covenant is similar except in the one case of the report which is unanimous, aside from the parties, in which there is a covenant not to go to war against a state which accepts the ananimous recommendation. The Chairman. Were not the Byron treaties substantially arbitra- tion treaties? Mr. Miller. I do not think so, at all. The Chairman. Do you think they established a league of nations ? Mr. Miller. I do not. Senator Brandegee. Mr. Miller, what did you say your law firm's name was ? Mr. Miller. Miller & Auchincloss. Senator Brandegee. Is that all of it ? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. Senator Brandegee. What Auchincloss is that? What is his first name? Mr. Miller. Gordon. TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 385 Senator Brandegee. Does he hold any position abroad now? Mr. Miller. I believe not. He was in the State Department and resigned on the 1st of July. Senator Brandegee. He has been abroad, has he not? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. Senator Brandegee. What was he doing there? Mr. Miller. He was private secretary to Col. House. Senator Brandegee. Is he related to Col. House? Mr. Miller. He is his son-in-law. Senator Brandegee. And 3'^our partner? Mr. Mn^LER. I so stated. Senator Brandegee. "What has been your experience as an inter- national lawyer ? Mr. Miller. 1 have been connected with the State Department since the United States ■went into the war, or shortly afterwards. Senator Brandegee. In what capacity? Mr. Miller. As special assistant of the Department of State. Senator Brandegee. Before you went into the State Department what had been your experience as an international lawyer ? Mr. Miller. I had a general practice in New York. To some ex- tent it was European. Senator Brandegee. Well, I mean advising commissions of dif- ferent countries ? Mr. Miller. No, sir. Senator Brandegee. Your firm had a general law practice in New York? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Brandegee. Had you personally had any special exper- ience as an international lawyer representing Governments before commissions, making treaties, or anything of that kind ? Mr. Miller. Not prior to my entrance into the State Department. Senator Brandegee. What is the name of your position that you occupied when you sat with the commission on the covenant of the league ? What did you call yourself, or what were you called ? Mr. Miller. I was technical adviser of the American commission to negotiate peace. Senator Brandegee. Do you know who recommended you for that post ? Mr. Miller. I do not. I was appointed by Secretary Lansing. I had been appointed by him about a year previously on a committee consisting of Mr. Lester H. Woolsey, the Solicitor of the Department of State, Dr. James Brown Scott, and myself, to prepare data of a legal nature in anticipation of peace negotiations. That committee worked in Washington — I do not remember exactly the time, but for about a year previous to the arrival of the American commission in Paris. Senator Brandegee. You are not related to Col. House, are you ? Mr. Miller. No, sir. Senator Brandegee. Do you laiow who prepared the American plan that the President is said to have taken to Europe with him, the draft for a plan for a league of nations ? Mr. Miller. No, sir. I do not know that he did take such a plan. Senator Brandegee. Do you know whether there had been pre- pared for the President by any New York lawyers a plan for a league of nations which the President had seen ? 135546—19 25 386 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GBRMAJSTY. Mr. Miller. I have no knowledge of that. Senator Bbandegee. I have been told by New York lawyers that they had seen such a plan and that they knew who drew it. Ilow many plans, or suggestions, or resolutions, or prospectuses for plans were presented by any American interests or any Americans for consideration by the commission of the plenary conference which was considering the covenant of the league of nations ? Mr. Miller. Could I have that repeated ? Senator Brandegee. How many drafts for a league of nations were presented by anybody to the commission which was considering the draft for a covenant for a league of nations in behalf of America ? You have spoken of several yourself. Mr. Miller. I have spoken of two. Senator Brandegee. Yes. Mr. Miller. I do not knov/ of any others. Senator Bbandegee. You knov that Secretary Lansing presented a resolution, do you not? Mr. Miller. 1 do not know to whom he presented it. Senator Brandegee. He stated that he presented it to the Ameri- can commission; not to the committee or commission that was considering the draft in behalf of the peace conference, but to the American commission. Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. Senator Brandegee. Do you know anything about that ? Mr. Miller. Senator, you spoke a moment ago about the commis- sion of the plenary conference. You are now speaking of the Amer- ican commission. Senator Brandegee. I am speaking of both. I want to know, if your recollection serves you about it, how many plans or suggestions were presented either to the American commission, our five commis- sioners, of which the President was the head, and Col. House was next in rank, and Secretary Lansing was a member — how many American drafts or plans or suggestions were presented to the official commis- sion that was considering the formation of a covenant for a league of nations as an agency of the peace conference ? Mr. Miller. So far as tne American commission to negotiate peace was concerned and the plans submitted to it, I have mentioned all that I know about it, Senator, except that I suppose that a great many plans were presented by writers on the subject and sent to the commission. The volume of such matter was very large. Senator Brandegee. Was article 10, as it is now embodied in the proposed covenant for the league of nations in the treaty of Ver- sailles, in any of these so-called American plans of propositions ? Mr. Miller. As it now stands ? Senator Brandegee. Yes. Mr. Miller. I think not. Senator Brandegee. Was the subject of our guaranteeing the territorial integrity or political independence of members of the league phrased in that way in any of the American propositions ? The Chairman. I will at this point read into the record Article III of the plan sent to the Senate by the President — the American plan. [Reading:] The contracting powers undertake to respect and to protect as against external aggression the political independence and territoiial integrity of all States members of the league. THE AT Y 01-' I'EAGK WITH GERMANY. 387 That is the whole of the article. It is in the American plan which the President sends us. Senator Brandegee. You are famihar with that, are you not, Mr. Miller, that Senator Lodge has just read ? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. Senator Brandegee. In your opinion, as a technical expert for the commission, are not those two provisions substantially the same ? Mr. Miller. This provision? Senator Brandegee. The one that Senator Lodge just read and the one that is in the treaty, article 10. Mr. Miller. I think there is considerable difference between article 10 and Article III, which the chairman has just read from the Congressional Eecord of yesterday. Senator Brandegee. Well, I would be glad to have your idea of the difference. The Chairman. Let me read article 10 so that they may be side by side [reading] : The members of the league undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league. That is the first sentence of article 10. I will repeat Article III [reading] : The contracting powers undertake to respect and to protect as against external aggression the political independence and territorial integrity of all States members of the league. Senator Brandegee. Now, you may answer, Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller. Well, the first sentence of article 10 differs from article 3 in containing the word "existing," and otherwise in phraseology. Senator Brandegee. Will you pardon me there a minute. You interpret the words "existing political independence" to mean existing political independence that may exist at the time the treaty is ratified, if it is ratified. The treaty speaks from the date of its ratification, does it not ? Mr. Miller. The treaty goes into force when ratified by certain powers as therein provided. Senator Brandegee. Yes. Mr. Miller. As to "existing political independence" I think it would relate back to the date of signature. Senator Brandegee. I do not get you. Mr. Miller. As to "existing," I think it would relate back to the date of signature. Senator Swanson. I understand the treaty when ratified goes back to the date of signature. Senator Brandegee. I want to get the witness's idea. He is the iaternational lawyer of the commission. Suppose the treaty is signed at different dates by the different signatories. Then what does "existing" mean? Senator Hitchcock. They were all signed the same date. Senator Brandegee. Please let me examine him. You will have plenty of time. Senator Hitchcock. I thought possibly you used language you did not intend. You said "ratify." OSS TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Brandegee. No; I did not. He said the word "exist- ing" relates back to the date of signature. Now, I asked him if the signatures Senator Hitchcock. You are supposing an impossibihty. Senator Brandegee. What do you mean by signatures? Signa- tures by whom ? Mr. Miller. By the contracting parties. The Chairman. On the 28th of June. Senator Brandegee. You think that the word "existing" relates back to that time? Mr. Miller. I dt). The Chairman. The 28th of June? Mr. MiLLEft. Yes, sir. Senator Brandegee. Of course, China has not signed the treaty yet, and we have not signed. Mr. Miller. The United States has signed it. Senator Brandegee. Yes. Now, I do not know whether bounda- ries have been changed or will have been changed between the date of the signature of me treaty and the date of the proclamation that it has been duly ratified by the different nations; but, however that may be, it refers to the boundaries as defined by the treaty, of course. Those are the boundaries to be maintained and preserved, are they not? Mr. Miller. Not necessarily. Senator Brandegee. Well, can these boundaries be changed now, after the treaty has been ratified by Great Britain, in your opinion, by the peace commission? Mr. Miller. Certainly. There are a great many boundaries that are not described. Senator Brandegee. No; I am talking about the boundaries that are described. Mr. Miller. Your question is, Can a boundary be changed after the treaty goes into force ? Senator Brandegee. I asked you first if the boundaries to be preserved by the signatories of the treaty are the boundaries as described in the treaty. I assumed of course that they were. What do you say to that. Are they or are they not ? Mr. Miller. It is the territorial integrity of the members of the league — the boundaries of many members of the league are not described in the treaty at all. Senator Brandegee. I ask you if the territorial mtegrity which. we are asked to guarantee and preserve is the territory as defined by boundaries fixed in the treaty where boundaries are fixed in the treaty ? Mr. Miller. Yes, at present. Senator Brandegee. You do not think that the peace conference, or what is left of it now, can make any change in the boundaries that are defined in the treaty, do you ? Mr. Miller. Not without the consent of all the parties to the treaty. Senator Brandegee. There would have to be a new treaty, would there not? Mr. Miller. A new agreement, certainly. Senator Brandegee. I am moved to ask that because Mr. Davis, the financial expert, the other day, if I understood his testimony TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. 389 correctly, seemed to be under the impression that one of the fruits in the covenant of the league was that if any mistake had been made about fixing a boundary in the treaty it could be corrected by the league or the council of the league. You do not think that coiud be done, do you ? Mr. MiLLEE. Well, there are certain of the boundaries in the treaty which are not definitely fixed, which are fixed subject to plebiscite. The Chairman. Which are those, Mr. Miller ? Senator Beandegee. Which boundaries are not definitely fixed that we are to guarantee ? Mr. MiLLEE. There is a plebiscite in upper Silesia, in Schleswig, in the Saar Basin The Chaieman. Is the plebiscite to alter the boundaries? It does not seem to read that way. Mr. MiLLEE. I did not catch you. The Chairman. The plebiscite is to determine to what country it is to belong. Does the plebiscite alter boundaries? Plebiscites alter possession but not boimdaries. Mr. MiLLEE. The boundaries are to be fixed in some cases by the plebiscite. The Chaieman. Are they ? Senator Beandegee. Then we do not guarantee those, do we, under the language of our obligation to guarantee existing boundaries ? Mr. Miller. lilay I complete my answer? Senator Brandegee. Yes, sir. Mr. Miller. And in the district adjacent to Belgium. Senator Brandegee. So that you consider that if we ratify the treaty we are gauranteeing to preserve boundaries that may be placed in the future, and of which we have no present knowledge, in some instances? Mr. Miller. I did not state that as the legal effect Senator Brandegee. State it in your own way, and take all the time you want to, what your conception is about that. Mr. Miller. In the first place, I pointed out that the word ' ' exist- ing" does not qualify "territorial integrity," but qualifies "political independence." Senator Brandegee. I agree with you. Mr. Miller. "Territorial integrity and existing political inde- pendence." Senator Beandegee. What territorial integrity? The territorial integrity as of what date? Mi. Miller. The territorial integrity as it exists; primarily, as it exists at present. Senator Brandegee. And secondarily? Mr. Miller. As it may be determined pursuant to the provisions of the treaty, according to these plebiscites which I have mentioned. The Chairman. You refer to Belgium. The second part of the treaty begins by defining the boundaries of Germany. I do not sup- pose you mean that the boundaries of Germany with Holland and France are to be changed, do you? There is nothing about those there. I merely asked that preliminarily. The boundary between France and Belgium and the boundary between Belgium and Hol- land — are those open to change? 390 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Miller. There is no provision for changing the boundary be- tween France and Belgium and the boundary between Holland and Belgium. The Chairman. I did not say that. Are they open to change by those treaties ? Mr. Miller. The treaty makes no reference to them, Senator. They are open to change by agreement. The Chairman. Between France and Belgium, undoubtedly. Mr. Miller. Yes. The Chairman. But that is not what we are discussing. The only boundary of Belgium that is open for settlement is the boundary with Germany. Is that not true? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. The Chairman. Now, that first one reads: The boundaries of Germany will be determined as follows: 1. With Belgium: From the point common to the three frontiers of Belgium, Hol- land, and Germany and in a southerly direction; the northeastern boundarj'^ of the former territory of neutral Moresnet, then the eastern boundary of the Kreis of Eupen, then the frontier between Belgium and the Kreis of Montjoie, then the northeastern and the eastern boundary of the Kreis of Malmedy to its junction with the frontier of Luxemburg. Do you concede that boundary to be open to further change ? Mr. Miller. In answer to that, Mr. Chairman, I will read article 34 of the treaty [reading]: Germany renounces in favor of Belgium all rights and title over the territory com- prising the V hole of the Kreise of Eupen and of Malmedy. During the six months after the coming into force of this treaty, registers will be opened by the Belgian authority at Eupen and Malmedy in which the inhabitants of the above territory will be entitled to record in writing a desire to see the whole or part of it remain under German sovereignty. The results of this public expression of opinion will be communicated by the Belgian Government to the league of nations, and Belgium undertakes to accept the decision of the league. The Chairman. Yes; that is the question of settling possession. But are the boundaries to be changed ? Mr. Miller. The boundary would be changed if a part of Eupen and of Mahnedy went back to Germany. The Chairman. Would the boundary be changed ? The possession would be changed, unquestionably. Mr. Miller. The sovereignty would be changed. The Chairman. Yes. I mean, are they altering these boundaries as laid down in the treaty as the boundaries of Germany and Belgiimi ? It may go to Germany or Belgium under article 34, with which I am familiar, but the change provides for no change in the boundary line. Mr. Miller. But the boundary line will depend on whether it goes to one or the other. The Chairman. There seems to be nothing depending on it but possession. Senator McCumber. Wliat you mean is that at present under the treaty that territory is subject to Belgmm. Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator McCumber. But subject to change as to its plebiscite? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator McCumber. And therefore if a portion of it goes back to Germany after a vote, it would change the boundary of Belgium. The Chairman. It carries the boundary with it. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GBEMANY. 391 Senator McCumber. It carries the boundary with it? Mr. Miller. Yes. The Chairman. I only wanted to get what it meant. Senator Brandegee. To guarantee the territorial integrity of aU members of the league would cover the preservation to the powers to whom they have been awarded under this treaty, of all the colonies taken from Germany, would it not ? Mr. Miller. I think that would depend on the exact disposition of the colonies — the final disposition of the colonies — which is not provided in detail in the treaty. Senator Brandegee. Well, I know, but that is one of the reasons why it is important to know when the treaty speaks from — from what •date. In other words, does it mean to guarantee boundaries or the territorial integrity of members of the league as that integrity existed at the time of the signing of the treaty or at the time of the procla- mation of its ratification, or does it mean to guarantee, as you sug- gest, the territorial integrity of the members of the league as it may be added to, depending upon the result of future considerations and the award of other territory yet to come to the various members of the league ? Mr. Miller. I think the whole treaty must be read together. The provisions which provide for the plebiscites are a part of the treaty, just as much as the provisions of article 10. Senator Brandegee. Very well, then. What I am trying to get at is whether the thing we are asked to preserve is an existing thmg or is a thing that is liable to be different from what it is now, and are we guaranteemg a known thing or something that is liable to change in the future ? I simply want your opinion about it, of course. I do not expect your decision will settle it Mr. Miller. Naturally. Senator Brandegee. But I want to get your view of it. You were present at the consideration of the treaty. Mr. Miller. I think that the territorial integrity of Poland would mean the territorial integrity of Poland as it resulted from this treaty — from aU its provisions. Senator Brandegee. AU right. Mr. Miller. Including the provision as to upper Silesia and the plebiscite there. Senator Brandegee. How many powers took part in the so-called peace conference in Paris ? By that I mean how many of them sent {)eace commissions or delegates ? Do you not remember without ooking it up in the book ? Mr. Miller. The number is quite large. Senator Brandegee. How large ? Mr. Miller. It is 27, not counting the British dominions in India, and aside from Germany. Senator Brandegee. Counting the Germans and the British dominions in India, how many ? Mr. Miller. Counting those would make 33. Senator Brandegee. Thirty-three powers. Did they aU have the same number of commissioners ? Mr. Miller. No, sir. Senator Brandegee. Who fixed the number of commissioners who were to attend the peace conference ? 392 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GEPaMANY. Mr. Miller. It was fixed before the invitations were sent out by the French Government to attend the conference. Senator Brandegee. You mean it was fixed by the French Gov- ernment, or that the invitations were sent out by the French Govern- ment? Mr. Miller. The invitations, according to my recollection, were sent out by the French Government, and the number was fixed by consultation before that. Senator Brandegee. Consultation by whom ? Mr. Miller. I do not know. Senator Brandegee. I do not want to ask you anything that you do not know. Of course, if you do not know Mr. Miller. I know that the United States was consulted. I do not know how many powers Avere consulted. Senator. Senator Brandegee. You do not know who did the determining of how many commissioners each country should have, do you ? Mr. Miller. Except that it was done by consultation. I do not know who participated. Senator Brandegee. Of course, somebody must have consulted and determined, but I did not know but you, being the expert legal adviser of the commission, might have known. Of course, if you do not know, just sa}' so and I will pass on to something else. Mr. Miller. I know that it was discussed. I do not know who made the final decision. Senator Brandegee. If you know that it was discussed, by whom was it discussed ? Never mind. We have not very much time this morning. Mr. Miller. My recollection is Senator Swanson. I insist that the witness be allowed to answer. Senator Brandegee. I am perfectly willing he should, but it is rather immaterial, and the witness seems to hesitate. Senator V^illiams. Let him answer. Mr. Miller. The French Government sent a note on the subject tu various powers; I do not loiow what to powers, but i do know that the United States was included. Senator Williams. Mr. Chairman, the United States was con- sulted upon how the commissioners Senator Brandegee. I prefer that the witness should do the testifying, because the Senator will have a chance later. Senator Williams. I was going to ask a question, with the per- mission of the chairman, and I addressed the chairman for that purpose. Senator Brandegee. I yield to the Senator from Mississippi. Senator Williai.is. I did not know we were going through all that. Mr. Chairman, with the permission of the Senator from Connecticut, I would like to ask a question. Is the permission granted ? Senator Brandegee. Why, certainly. Senator Williams. You do know, do you not, that the United States was consulted as to how many commissioners she desired to name to the conference ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Williams. Do you or not presume, from that, that other nations were likewise consulted ? Mr. Miller. Certainly; they must have been. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 393 Senator Williams. It is a very harmless question that I wished to ask. Senator Brandegee. I think so. Now, Mr. Miller, as a matter of fact, did these different participants all have the same number of commissioners ? Mr. Miller. No, sir; they did not. Senator Williams. Different numbers ? Mr. Miller. Different numbers. Senator Brandegee. What was the total number of commis- sioners in the plenar}^ conference, if that is the proper expression ? Mr. Miller. I would have to look that up. Senator Brakdegee. All right. Mr. Miller. Because, as you suggested, some powers had a greater number than others. Senator Brande(;ee. All right. How many meetings did the plenary conference have, before these commissions were appointed to take up various phases of the treaty ? Mr. Miller. Well, as to that, Senator, the commissions, as I remember it, were not appointed at the same time. There were a good many commissions appointed, and I do not think they were all appointed at the same plenary session. Senator Braxdegee. Very well; I will change the form of the question. How many meetings did the plenary conference hold before the final meeting of the plenarj^ conference which approved the treaty ? Mr. Miller. Three or four, I think. I do not remember exactly. Senator Brandegee. Are you aware to what extent the various commissions who had under consideration the different parts of the treaty consulted with one another and kept. posted on the work of one another ? Mr. Miller. I do not think there was any communication be- tween the commissions as such. The different members of each delegation who were on the various commissions doubtless con- sulted, but as between one commission and another I do not think there was consultation except between the economic commission and the financial commission. Senator Brandegee. After each commission finished its work and was ready to report, to whom did they send the completed report of their proposals ? Mr. Miller. They sent it to the plenary conference through the secretariat. Senator Biiandegee. They sent it to the secretariat. Then who took the various reports and put them together, so as to make the completed treaty? Mr. Miller. The drafting committee. Senator Brandegee. And were these reports of commissions ap- proved by any meeting of the plenary council before the final meet- ing of the plenary council approved of the entire treaty ? Mr. Miller. Some of them were. I am not sure that all of them were. Senator Brandegee. Do you remember which ones were approved by the plenary conference before the entire treaty was approved ? Mr. Miller. The report of the commission on the league of nations, was approved. 394 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Brandegee. Excuse me right there. At the meeting of the plenary conference that approved the report on the league of nations, were the reports of any other commissions approved ? Mr. Miller. I think it was at the same meeting that the report of the commission on the labor clauses was approved. Senator Brandegee. Are you sure about that ? Mr. Miller. I would have to look that up, Senator. Senator Brandegee. My impression had been, from what little information we got in this country about it, that the meeting of the plenary conference which approved the report of the commission on the covenant of the league of nations did that and nothing else, and that'it was a hastily called meeting, called by the President to get the covenant approved so that he could come back here in March and submit it tentatively or informally to us. Mr. Miller. I think he did, without referring to the final report •of the commission. When the report w.as made in February, I think there was nothing else approved at that meeting. Senator Brandegee. That was my impression. Mr. Miller. Yes, I think that is correct. I thought you were referring to the later meeting, Senator. Senator Brandegee. Did you attend in any way, or were you present, either as an auditor or in any other capacity, at the meeting of the plenary conference which approved the draft for the covenant of the league of nations ? Mr. Miller. The one in February? Senator Brandegee. If that was in February, and I think it was. Mr. Miller. There was a first report and a second report. Senator Brandegee. The report where the plenary conference approved the draft for the covenant of the league of nations just before the President sailed for this country and got here with it. Mr. Miller. Yes, I was present. Senator Brandegee. You were present. Was that meeting of the plenary conference open to the public? Mr. Miller. I think it was. Senator. Senator Brandegee. Do you not remember whether people were in the gallery; or was there a gallery? Were there outsiders there other than the delegates or commissioners ? Mr. Miller. Yes; the public was there. Senator Brandegee. Was there quite a large audience or a small one? It seems to me, this, being an epoch-making event, ought to have occasioned a ripple, and there ought to have been a few spec- tators to see it adopted. But never mind Mr. Miller. There were quite a large number, considering — as many as could get into the room. Senator Brandegee. How many spectators were there — 10 or 100 ? Mr. Miller. Oh, well, more than a hundred. Senator, but I am not an expert at guessing crowds. Senator Swanson. How many could the room hold ? Mr. Miller. I think the room could hold some hundreds. Senator Swanson. And you say the room was filled? Mr. Miller. It seemed crowded to me. Senator Brandegee. Now I am getting something. I am much obliged to you. Senator Swanson. You insisted upon it. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 395 Senator Brandegee. I did not insist upon it, but you did. There -were hundreds of people there, were there ? Mr. Miller. I should think so. • Senator Brandegee. How long was the plenary conference in session considering the covenant of the league of nations ? Mr. Miller. My recollection is it was all the afternoon. Senator Brandegee. The whole afternoon. The President made the report, did he not ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Brandegee. And made a speech about it, did he not? Mr. Miller. He did. Senator Brandegee. Who else made speeches? Mr. Miller. I do not remember, at this distance of time. Senator Brandegee. Was there any debate on the various provi- sions of the covenant of the league of nations in the plenary council ? Mr. Miller. Yes; there were various speeches made. Senator Brandegee. I know there were speeches made. The President made one. Was there any debate upon the various articles, the 26 articles, which constitute the covenant of the league of nations ? Mr. Miller. I think that the speeches were all prepared speeches. Senator Brandegee. Yes? Mr. Miller. They seemed so. Senator Brandegee. Canned oratory? Mr. Miller. I do not know whether you would call it debate or not. Senator Brandegee. What I want to know is, did anybody ask anybody else what certain articles meant ? Was there any difference of opinion expressed as to the meaning of any of the articles or what they might mean ? Mr. Miller. I do not think so. Not that I remember. Senator Brandegee. There was not a word said, was there, except that the President, and the head of the Japanese delegation, and other heads of delegations made remarks about it. That was all, was it not, and then they unanimously agreed to the whole thing, did they not? Mr. Miller. I do not recall that the head of the Japanese delega- tion made any remarks at that meeting. Possibly he did. Senator Brandegee. I read something that purported to be, not ■a protest on his behalf, but a regret that some racial equality clause had not been included in it, or something of the kind, but I may be mistaken about that. I do not consider the garbled newspaper ac- counts that we were allowed to receive through the censor at that time as being authority for any opinion; but that is all we have. I get a fair idea of how the thing was done, and that is all I care to ask. Senator Harding. Mr. Chairman, I wish to ask a question. The Chairman. The Senator from Ohio. Senator Harding. Do you understand that the league of nations has authority to change the territorial possessions of any nation a member of the league ? Mr. Miller. It has authority to some extent to decide on these plebiscites, as granted in the treaty. Senator Harding. Suppose the readjustment of the Balkan and other Near East problems should not prove to be aU that those who 396 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. favor them hope, would the league of nations for the promotion and preservation of peace have authority to make readjustments of territorial lines ? • Mr. Miller. Not unless it was so agreed. Senator Harding. What do you mean when you say "so agreed" ? Do vou mean the unanimous consent of everybody? Mr. Miller. Well, it might be agreed in the treaty with Austria, for example, or with Hungary o)- with Bulgaria, that a line should , be subsequently fixed by the league of nations. ^ Senator Harding. Do you mean a reservation, for instance, like that contained in the treaty relating to the Saar Basin, wherein the i government of the basin is intrusted to the league of nations, and wherein Germany renounces her sovereignty to the league of nations ? Mr. Miller. I was not referring to that. Senator. I was referring to the provisions which provide for the fixing of the line and for a plebescite in such territory as Upper Silesia, or in Schleswig. Senator Harding. Maybe I can make it a httle more specific. I do not know that the question is wise. I am trying to clear up certain things in my own mind. Suppose the disposition of Thrace should, two years from now, prove a menace to the peace of the world in the estimate of the members of the council or the assembly. Has the league authority to undertake the readjustment of that assignment of territory ? Mr. Miller. To change it '? Senator Harding. Yes. Mr. Miller. No. Senator Harding. Not without a specific provision in the treaty with Austria. Mr. Miller. There might be a specific provision in a subsequent treaty; in that case, with Bulgaria. Senator Harding. Then in accepting the league covenant in the peace treaty that we have before us we really undertake to guarantee territorial integrity that we know not of at this time. Mr. Miller. The boundaries are not fixed. That is true, Senator. Senator Harding. That is precisely what I am getting at. The Chairman. I am obliged to go to the Senate, but there is no need of adjourning this hearing, because I am going to move that the Senate take a recess from 12 to 2 o'clock to enable those who desire to see the parade of the Marines to do so, so the Senate will not really meet for action until 2 o'clock. (Senator McCumber took the chair.) Senator Moses. The Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Brandegee) has some other questions to propound, but he has left the room temporarily. Senator Williams. Mr. Miller, does not this league of nations article itself provide that where any nation shall report to the league that a given question has become a menace to the peace of the world, the league may take up that question and consider it and make recommendations concerning it ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Williams. Then, in so far as that goes, Senator Harding's question would have been answered in the affirmative, that the league could deal with the subject matter of Thrace if later on, upon com- plaint of Greece or Bulgaria, the league concluded that it was a menace to the peace of the world to allow it to remain in statu quo. TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 397 Mr. Miller.' Yes. Senator Williams. Now let me ask you another question. Does it not provide that the league shall have power to consider complaints that existing treaties have become inapplicable and that if allowed to exist they may become a menace to the peace of the world. Mr. Miller. Yes. Article 19 provides: The assembly may from time to time adrae the reconsideration by members of the lea^e of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of inter- national conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world. Senator Harding. Now, following up Senator Williams's question: Suppose in the judgment of the council that the possession of the Danish West Indies, which we purchased within the last few months, should be a menace to the peace of the world from any cause what- soever. Would the league have a right to step in and make that readjustment? Mr. Miller. No, sir; in my opinion not. Senator Harding. They would be inhibited by the exercise of the Monroe doctrine only. Mr. Miller. It would be inhibited by that, in my opinion — by the Monroe doctrine provision. Senator Harding. This is the point I am trying to get at, and I consider it of some importance. If when once territorial lines are established by this peace treaty the league has authority to step in to make a readjustment and pass territory from one nation to another in the interest of the peace of the world, what is to prevent the league doing the same thing with a piece of American territory? What except our size would pre\'ent that ? Mr. Miller. Well, Senator, my answer to that is that I do not think the league has the power to make the change. Senator Harding. You said to Senator Williams that if they found an adjustment of territory was menacing the peace of the world, they had the authority to take it up and change it. Mr. Miller. To advise. I read the article. Senator Williams. I said to recommend — to investigate and recommend. Senator Harding. Well, then, let us follow that. Let us ask ourselves the practical question — I should like the judgment of the witness on tins: What does the league amount to if its recom- mendations are nothing rpore than an adnionition ? Senator Williams. If its recommendation is unanimously adopted and there is no minority report upon it, then none of the members of the league can go to war. That is one thing! The next thing, of course, is that where the recommendation of the councU is unani- mously given, we being represented upon it as well as the other great powers, it will have a moral weight in the world that will be irre- sistible. Senator Harding. All right. Now, let us follow that. Suppose we were involved, and the league unanimously made a recommenda- tion, and we declined to accept the recommendation of the league. What happens then ? Senator Williams. If that were the case, of course our commission would have had to vote against what we have done. If there was no minority report, then if we went to war, the council would consider what measures were necessary and would make a recommendation; 398 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. but in addition to that, the free passage of troops would be allowed' through the territories of all members of the league against the re- calcitrant country — in that case our own country — and in addition, to that the league might recommend anything that it chose to recom- mend that might be accepted by the other members of the league. Senator Fall. Mr. Chairman, I submit that this is all entirely irregular, with due deference to the Senator from Mississippi. Of course, he is expressing his opinion, and we would have different opinions, and this committee is engaged in a general conversation. Senator Harding. Does the Senator mind if I ask a question? Senator Fall. I have no objection in' the world. Senator Williams. I agree thoroughly, but the Senator from Ohio- asked a question and I was answering it. Senator Fall. I thought the Senator from Ohio said he would like to have the opinion of tiie witness upon it. Senator Williams. I beg the pardon of the Senator from New Mexico. The Senator from Ohio turned to me, and we were just talking amongst ourselves. Senator McCumber. I think the question was rather general, and it might be answered by anyone. We will get back to the witness now. Senator Harding. I will address my question to the witness. This- is what I want to get at. Take a hypothetical case, where a question of American territory is involved, and the league of nations recom- mends contrary to our wishes. Suppose then that we do not even go to war. We are subject to what might be termed ostracism by the international powers, are we not? Are we subjected to that, for one thing? Are we made an international outlaw if we refuse to accept the recommendations? Mr. Miller. Not if we do not go to war. Senator Harding. Are we not subject, under the terms of the con- tract, to trade boycotts ? Senator Hitchcock. Certainly not, unless we go to war. Mr. Miller. It is one of the sections of article 16, which provides that — Should any member of the league resort to war in disregard of its covenants, under articles 12, 13, or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the league. Senator Harding. Suppose we do not go to war. What happens ? Suppose we just refuse to accept the recommendations of the league and ignore its authority ? Mr. Mn.LER. What happens as a practical matter? Senator Harding. What happens to us as a practical thing ? Mr. Miller. Nothing, under the covenants, if we do not resort to war. Senator Harding. But the league would have authority to institute a boycott, economic pressure, embargoes Senator Hitchcock. Certainly not. Senator Harding. I am asking the witness. Mr. Miller. Not in my opinion. I think it is prefaced by those words I just read, which limit it to a case where a member of the league resorts to war in disregard of its covenent under articles]12, 13, or 15. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 399 Senator Harding. Then, if that be true, what remedy has the league to make its recommendations effective ? Mr. Miller. Pubhc opinion, publicity, the moral force of its recommendations. Senator Moses. We might be expelled. Mr. Miller. For a violation of any covenant we might be expelled. Senator McCiirdBER. But mere negative action would not be a violation of the covenant ? Mr. Miller. Not a violation of the covenant in this particular case that is supposed. Senator McCumber. In other words, if the United States did not accept the suggestions of the council, it would not make a cause for expulsion. Mr. Miller. Not in my opinion. Senator Harding. Then let us put it in another way. Suppose' the league makes an alteration of territorial lines, are we bound under article 10 to recognize the territorial integrity of the new allotment? Mr. Miller. Senator, I do not think the league has any power to ma'ke a new line, as you put it, except in a case where it is given specific power under this treaty or under a subsequent treaty. Senator Harding. I understood you to say, at the suggestion of the Senator from Mississippi, that if a situation was menacing the peace of the world it did have that power. Mr. Miller. I said to advise. I read article 19, in which that would be included. The word "advise" is used. Senator Harding. Then let us go back to a specific case. I am sorry to take the time of the committee, but it is important to me. Senator Fall. I think it is very interesting. Senator Harding. If I understand the covenant, if that question arises and we are disputants, we have nothing to say. We are ruled out because we are disputants. Mr. Miller. We sit in the council. Senator Harding. I know; but we do not vote on it, because we are disputants. Mr. Miller. I would not say that. There is no provision that we do not vote. Senator Fall. There are several provisions here that wherever a member is a party to a dispute it has no vote. Mr. Miller. I differ. Senator Senator Swanson. Explain your understanding of it. Mr. Miller. My understanding is that the provision does not say that the parties to the dispute shall not vote, but it sim.ply provides that the votes of the parties to the dispute shall not be counted. Senator Harding. It is the same practical situation. Senator Fall. It is the same thing. I do not see why you want us to vote if the vote is not counted. That is the southern style. Senator Harding. The point I am trying to get at is this: I am very sincere about it. I want to know if the league becomes an inter- national power that can change territorial lines in the interest . of world peace and then command the adherents of the league to respect those lines. Mr. Miller. My opinion is no. •Senator Harding. Except as it is provided for Mr. Miller. Except as it is specifically provided for in this treaty or in other treaties 400 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Harding. That is all I have to ask. Senator Moses. Mr. Miller, you said that the draft of the cove- nant of the league of nations which was finally adopted as a basis upon which the commission worked to get its final results was a com- posite of many suggestions. Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Moses. Parts being taken from the four drafts submitted by Great Britain, the United States, France, and Italy. Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Moses. Who made that composite? Mr. Miller. I have to ask a rather technical question before I can answer your question. Do you mean who physically got it up, prepared the language of it? Senator Moses. Yes. Mr. Miller. Mr. Hurst and myself. Senator Moses. In the form in which you submitted it, was it submitted by our representatives on the commission, namely, the President and Col. House? You submitted it to them and they submitted it to the commission ? ' Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Moses. Have you a copy of that draft as you handed it to the President and Col. House ? Mr. Miller. I suppose the department has a copy. Senator Moses. Under the limitations set upon our procuring the information, as stated in the President's letter of yesterday, do you think we could get it ? Mr. Miller. I have no authority to answer that question. Senator Moses. May I ask the witness to endeavor through the department to get that for the committee? Senator McCumber. Will the witness do so ? Senator Hitchcock. I did not hear the question. What was it that was desired ? Senator Moses. The witness testified in the first instance that the draft upon which the finally completed covenant of the league of nations was based was a composite draft containing suggestions drawn from the four drafts submitted by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, and he testified that that composite draft was made by Mr. Hurst and himself. I am asking if we can get possession of that draft ? Senator Swanson. The right way would be to ask the department. Mr. Miller. I will ask the department, if that is the request. I can not do any more than that. Senator McCumber. Of course, that is all that you could do. Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator McCumber. You have not a copy in your possession? Mr. Miller. No, sir; I have not. Senator Hitchcock. Senator Moses, wiU you put into the record a statement of the reason why such a request is made ? Senator Moses. Yes; because I would like to know in what particulars the completed draft departed from the draft of Mr. Miller and Mr. Hurst. Senator Hitchcock. Why? Senator Moses. I have a great thirst for information on the subject. Senator Hitchcock. Why ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 401 Senator Moses. I would like to enlighten myself. I shall have to vote on it presently. Senator Hitchcock. I supposed you had made up your mind a long; Avhile ago. Senator Fall. I suppose the Senator from Nebraska is doing as we all very often do, and that is judging others by himself. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the witness a tew questions ? Senator McCumbee. Certainly. Senator Fall. Mr. Miller, you have referred once or t-w-ice to article 19, apparently with the idea that that is the only article that would be aippealed to in the event that there was a question as to readjustment of territorial lines. Suppose that there were a question between the United States and Mexico, on the lines suggested by the Senator from Ohio, touching, we will say, an irrigation project on the Colorado .River, a portion of Avhich was in the United States and a portion of which was in Mexico, that the matter was brought before the league by Mexico after we had become a member of the league, or by some friend of Mexico, while Mexico is outside the league. Suppose the league in its judgment were to come to the conclusion that here was a question that might affect the peace of the world. Article 17, in the event that Mexico was out of the league, would then be invoked, would it not 1 Mr. Miller. It might be. Senator Fall. In a dispute between a member of the league and a State which is not a member of the league, it is provided that the nonmembers shall be invited to accept the obligation of membership for the purpose of the dispute. Mexico would then be invited by the council to become a member of the league for the purposes of that dispute, would it not ? Mr. Miller. Upon such conditions as the council may deem just. Senator Fall. Well, of course I am not attempting to quibble about it. Mr. Miller. No ; I was not either. Senator Fall. I do not care to read into the record the entire article, but I call your attention to it. The invitation would be extended to Mexico to become a member of the league for the pur- poses of the dispute. Then articles 12 to 16 of the covenant would immediately automatically become operative in the event that Mexico accepted the invitation, would they not? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Fall. Suppose then that under the second paragraph of article 17 — Upon such invitation being given the council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem beat and most effectual in the circumstances — if the recommendation of the council were to the effect that the Mexican line should be so extended as to take in that portion of the country in dispute which is now claimed by the United States, what wotild t)e the effect of such recommendations ? Mr. Miller. It would depend on whether the United States accepted it or not. Senator Fall. Suppose that Mexico accepted it, and acted upon it, and the United States did not accept. What would be the status ? What would be the result ? 135546—19 26 402 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. Mr Miller. The result would be that not havuag: been accepted by the United States, it would not have gone into effect. Senator Fall. Suppose Mexico had accepted and put into effect the recommendations of the council. Suppose that she had put her flag over the country and put her civil officers there, if not her mili- tary force, to administer it, and the United States did not accept. Mr. Miller. It would be an invasion of the United States. Senator Fall. It would ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Fall. By Mexico ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Fall. Contrary to the orders of the league, when Mexico herself accepted the recommendations of the league ? Mr. Miller. It would still be an invasion of the United States. Senator Fall. One which we would be authorized to resist with armed force, without violation of our covenant ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Fall. Then what does it mean by saying, in the paragraph which I was reading here, "And recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances"? If your construction is true, they could not then recommend anything which might prove effectual. Mr. Miller. The second paragraph of article 17 is the provision for inquiry, upon the invitation being given.- Senator Fall. Yes. Mr. Miller. Your question supposes that the invitation is ac- cepted by Mexico Senator Fall. Accepted by Mexico, and Mexico comes in. I will state the proposition a little more fully. Suppose that in the event of such dispute Mexico was invited to become a member of the league for the purposes of the dispute only, and she accepts. Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Fall. Immediately and automaticallj'^ the provisions of articles 12 to 16 apply. The council makes its recommendations, with such suggestions as it thinks necessary to make such recommen- dations effectual. Mexico accepts, and acts upon the recommenda- tions, and takes the effectual means suggested by the council. The United States refuses to accept it. You say that Mexico in taking possession of the territory would be making an invasion of the United States which we would be justified, without violating our pledges, to resist with all the force necessary. Is that your opinion ? Mr. Miller. Senator, the recommendation of the council would be, as 1 understand your question, a recommendation regarding a disputed boundary ? Senator Fall. Yes. Mr. Miller. The United States being in possession of the territory ? Senator Fall. Yes. Mr. Miller. The recommendation, assuming, as I understand you, that it was in favor of Mexico, would not in my opinion authorize Mexico to take possession forcibly of the territory. Senator Fall. If she did not do it, then both the United States and Mexico, to use a legal phase, would be in contempt of the council, because neither one would have accepted it. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 403 Mr. Miller. Mexico would have accepted, according to your hypothesis. Senator Fall. Oh, no. According to my hypothesis, but you say she would have no right to accept. I am saying that she does accept the recommendation. The recommendation is that the disputed territory is given to Mexico, and the effectual means which is sug- gested by the council for putting that recommendation into effect is that Mexico's jurisdiction should be extended over the disputed territory. Mexico accepts the recommendation and adopts the means suggested by the council, and puts her flag over it and takes possession. Mr. Miller. The difference, Senator, is this: That the recommen- dation which the council would make in the case of a boundary dispute would be to suggest where the boundary should be located Senator Fall. That is exactly the point I am making. Mr. Miller. But you go further Senator Fall. Well, I will take a case that possibly you know about, having been connected with the department, to put the shoe on the other foot. The Chemizal zone in Texas is claimed by Mexico and by the United States. At the same time the American flag is put over it, the American customs are put over it, and one end of the international bridge between Texas and Mexico is located upon the Chemizal zone, which has always been claimed by Mexico, or is now claimed by her, at least. An arbitration treaty was agreed upon between the United States and Mexico. Arbitration has been had upon that question. The arbitration resulted in a decision against the United States, and the United States refused to accept the result of the arbitration. Now, suppose that exactly the same thing were brought up to-day, without reference to the prior arbi- tration, and Mexico, through some friend — because any nation has a right to bring to the attention of the council under the terms of this treaty any matter which may threaten the peace of the world — Mexico, through some friend, brought the matter to the attention of the council. France was one of the arbitrators that decided against us in that case. Suppose the attention of the council was brought to the Chemizal zone, and Mexico under article 17 was invited to become one of the members of the league for the purposes of the Chemizal dispute; and suppose that one party refused to arbitrate. Auto- matically the case would go to the council for disposition. Suppose the council decided in favor of the claims of Mexico and recom- mended that the American flag be pulled down and that the Mexican flag be raised over the Chemizal zone and that Mexico took possession through her civil authorities and established her customs upon this zone; and suppose that Mexico acted upon that recommendation, and the United States refused, as she has refused, to abide by the arbitration and to abide by the action of the council. What would be the result ? Mr. Miller. Senator, your question assumes that the council might recommend that Mexico should go to war. Senator Fall; No; I am not assuming anything of the kind. I very carefully refrained from the use, except incidentally, of an ar ed force. Mr. Miller. You said as I understood, an armed force. 404 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Fall. Then I will repeat it and cut out any armed force, and put the supposition that Mexico, without the use of a man in uniform or a man with a rifle or a pistol or a hoe, should proceed to follow the advice of the commission and to use the effectual means which the council recommends to restore to herself the disputed country. She comes over across the country, across what we now regard as the international line, and raises her flag and establishes her customs. What is the result ? Mr. Miller. I repeat. Senator, that in ro.y opinion that is not a settlement of the dispute. Neither party has agreed to accept that. Senator Fall. But Mexico has accepted it. Senator Hitchcock. Let the witness answer the question and not be interrupted all the time. Senator Fall. I am pursuing this line of inquiry. Senator Hitchcock. You objected yourself to somebody butting in. Senator Fall. I was objecting to an ordinary conversation, just as I am objecting now. Senator Hitchcock. The witness should not be interrupted in the midst of his answer. Senator Fall. I do not accept your suggestion Senator Hitchcock. I am making the objection, whether you accept it or not. Senator Fall. Very well, then; I will pursue my line of inquiry without your assistance. Mr. Miller. I do not remember what the question was. The Chairman. Let the stenographer read the question. The stenographer read as follows : Senator Fall. Then I will repeat it and cut out any anned force, and put the sup- position that Mexico, without the use of a man in uniform, or a man with a rifle or a pistol, or a hoe should proceed to follow the advice of the commission and to use the elTectiial means which the council recommends to restore to herself the disputed country. She comes over across the countiy, across what we now regard as the inter- national line, and raises her flag and establishes her customs. 'VMiat is the result? Mr. Miller. In my opinion, Senator, the distinction is this: The question being a boundary dispute, the recommendation of the council is, as it is specifically stated in the covenant, a recommenda- tion. It is not a decision of Ihe boundary dispute, and the United States in the case supposed is not obliged to agree and does not agree to accept that as a decision of the dispute. All the United States agrees is by negative covenant that it will not resort to war in disregard of the covenants in the three articles named, the reference in this case being to article 15, which says that the members of the league agree that they will not go to war with any party to a dispute that complies with the recommendations of the report. That is the sole covenant. The dispute as to the boundary question is not settled, as it would be by final judgment in the matter. Senator Fall. Very well, let us go back to the conditions as we left them. Mexico is over here with her flag raised and her custom- houses on the chemizal zone. What is the result? Mr. Miller. I can not imagine Mexico being there, Senator. Senator Fall. Well, possibly your imagination is not as vivid as mine. I can imagine her being there, because she is constantly trying to come now, invading the chemizal zone. Now, in the event that your imagination could wing its far light to that result, if the TEBATY OF PEACE WITH GBEMANY. 405 United States resorted to force to eject Mexico she would violate article 16 of the league covenant, and all the power of each of the members, and all of them collectively and severally, and all the power of the nations not members of the league, under articles 16 and 17, should be, and they obligate themselves to exert it economi- cally, financially and with armed force, against the United States, do they not ? Mr. Miller. If the United States resorts to war, the provisions of article 16 apply to the United States the same as they do to any other member of the league. Senator Fall. Very well. Then, if the United States did not resort to war, we would simply have a condition existing where the United States possibly would still continue to maintain her custom- houses, wave her flag in the breeze along by the side of the Mexican customhouse, and the Mexican flag floating. Would that be the condition ? Mr. Miller. I should not think so. Senator Fall. That is all on that line. I have one or two other questions. Senator Swanson. Let me ask Mr. Miller a question. Senator Fall. On this line ? Senator Swanson. Yes. Senator Fall. Certainly. Senator Swanson. As I understand, in a boundary dispute like this, you stated that your judgment is that the United States, where the recommendation, as contained in the covenant is unanimous, would agree not to resort to war ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Swanson. Then, if the United States did not accept that provision, Mexico would not be restrained from going to war ? Under the covenant, slie could declare war against us. Mr. Miller. There would be no covenant on the part of Mexico not to go to war. Senator Swanson. So she could declare war against us. If she did so, then there is nothing in the league covenant that prevents us from defending against a war declared on us first ? Mr. MiLtER. I do not think there is. Senator Swanson. If Mexico should be the aggressor in a war against us, there is nothing that prevents us from defending our- selves. Our covenant, as I understood you to say, is that we agree not to go to war, where there is this unanimity ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Swanson. If Mexico should declare war on us, do you know anything that prevents us from being on the defensive? Is there any such provision in the league covenant ? Mr. Miller. No, sir; it would create a state of war which we could not avoid. Senator Fall. We can each read again article 16 and the other articles, and we would possibly come to the same result of a disagree- ment, which is the result ordinarily between an old line Baptist and a Methodist. Now, Mr. Miller, you have said that this covenant was largely based upon what is known as the Bryan peace treaties, as I understood it. li* — 406 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Miller. I said that some of the features of the covenant were very suiailar to those of the Bryan peace treaties. Senator Fall. One of the features which you referred to was that we had only one representative in the international commission pro- vided by the Bryan peace treaties, as we would have only one repre- sentative upon the council. Mr. Miller. I said there was only one American on the interna- tional commission. Senator Fall. I am glad you now use the word "American." You said "one representative," because I put that down myself. I am glad you qualify it by saying "one American." Mr. Miller. I wish to say that I used the word "American" before, and the stenographic record will show it. Senator Fall. I want to do you justice. I regret that my hearing was at fault. Now, in the Bryan peace treaties you speak of the pro- vision for this international commission. That was a commission between two nations a,lone, was it not; that is, the two nations which were parties to this particular treaty? Mr. Miller. Yes. I used the words "international commission," because those are the words used in the Bryan treaties. Senator Fall. Yes; it is also the expression used in this peace treaty, is it not; but in this peace treaty it means in many instances the representatives of all the various nations, while in the Bryan peace treaties it means the representatives of the two nations. Mr. Miller. The word "council" is used in the covenant — not members of the international commission. Senator Fall. Well, members of the council then, or the repre- sentatives of the nations. You are familiar with this treaty. There are plebiscite commissions and governing commissions established through the league of nations. Mr. Miller. I thought you were referring to the covenant. Senator Fall. We have both, and the covenaiit appears to be, so far, until we can possibly separate it, a part of the peace treaty. Now, all the Bryan peace treaties are similar, and article 2 of the treaty that I now have — which happens to be the treaty with Nica- ragua, but there are similar covenants in each of them, and I have tbem here before me — provides that the commission shall be composed of five members to be appointed as follows: One member shall be chosen from each country by the Government thereof. That is the American citizen that you had reference to. One member shall be chosen by each Govei'nmont from some third country. That is the representative of this country on that commission, is it not? Mr. Miller. One of the two chosen by this country, yes. Senator Fall. Supposed to be a representative of this country, because Nicaragua has nothing whatsoever to do with the choice of that man chosen by this country. Mr. Miller. That is correct. Senator Fall. Then this country has two representatives chosen by itself. Nicaragua has two, chosen by itself, and the fifth member is chosen by the two countries jointly, is he not ? Mr. Miller. I think in most of the treaties it is provided that he shall be chosen by the four first named. Senator Fall. I can read this treaty to you. Mr. Miller. They differ a little bit in that. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 407 Senator Fall. I am very familiar with them. I will say to you Tery frankly that I am not yet at all sorry that I opposed each of those treaties. Mr. Miller. I think the general provision, Senator, is that the two Oovernments shall chose the fifth member, and if they do not agree, that the four members already selected shall choose the fifth. Senator Fall. Yes ; you are correct about that. That is the pro- vision in each of them. That is not with reference to the four com- missioners chosen, but the common provision is that the two countries shall choose the fifth member. In one or two of the treaties there is a provision that that fifth member, in the event of failure to choose, may be chosen by the four commissioners already selected. Now, that is purely an agreement by treaty between two countries, with which no other countries of the world have anything to do and in which they have no interest, is it not ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Fall. Now, you have stated, as I understand you — I may be mistaken and if I am I want you to correct me — that the provision that the decision of those commissioners should not be binding was similar to the provision that the procedure of the arbitration tribunal under articles 12 and 15 is not binding. That was another basis upon which you founded this treaty. Do you still understand that that is the fact, that there is any similarity between those provisions in the Bryan peace treaties, such as you seem to think there was, and the provisions contained in articles 12 and 15 of the present treaty ? Mr. Miller. Not as to article 12, I did not say so. Article 12 is that provision of the covenant that relates to arbitration. Senator Fall. Yes. Then what other ground of similarity do you find between the Bryan peace treaties and this treaty now before us ? Mr. Miller. The similarity that the recommendation of the coun- cil is not a binding decision of the dispute, that the liberty of action is reserved in the treaties for the advancement of peace. Senator Fall. Of course that is your judgment. I have mine. Now, to refer back to one of the matters which you discussed a while ago, that is, as to the boimdaries present and future which we agree by article 10 to respect, and the territorial integrity of which we agree to protect — on the 28th of June Germany signed this treaty, did she not ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Fall. And in that agreement she agreed to the Saar Basin proposition, did she not ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Fall. She agreed to the division between Poland and Prussia, and to the constitution of Danzig as a free city, subject in so far as her external relations were concerned to be controlled by Poland ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Fall. Now, suppose that before the ratification of this treaty and the deposition of the ratification, when it comes into effect, Germany refuses to yield as to Danzig or as to the Saar Basm, refuses to abide by her agreement in this treaty, what is the status of Germanv with reference to the other nations who signed it with 408 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. her on the 28th of June? Suppose she just simply says, "I will nob abide by it." Mr. Miller. She continues the war. Senator J^all. She does continue the war ? Then in order to make peace the negotiation of another treaty would be necessary? Mr. Miller. Probably. I do not think it would certainly be so. Senator Fall. Then, is it your opinion or not that on the signing of this treaty on the 2Sth of June a status was fixed as between the signatories to the treaty ? Mr. Miller. There was a change in the status; yes. Senator Fall. Peace is the ordinary status, is it not? Mr. Miller. Yes; between nations. Senator Fall. Then, is it your opinion that on the 28th day of June the status of war was affected bj^ the signature to this treaty by Germany with the other nations ? Mr. Miller. No, sir; the status of war still continues. Senator Fall. Still continues until when ? Mr. Miller. Until the treaty goes into force. Senator Fall. The status of war still continues ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Fall. The President is in error, then, when he says that both the status of peace and the status of war continue. Mr. Miller. I was speaking Senator Fall. We are neither at peace nor at war ? Mr. Miller. I was speaking from the legal point of view. Senator Fall. That was what I was trying to get at, because I understood you were there as an international lawyer. Mr. Miller. The practical situation is of course very different from that of actual war. Senator Fall. Yes; we have stopped fighting. Mr. Miller. The fighting stopped at the date of the armistice. Senator Fall. When the fighting stops, then the status of peace exiists ? Mr. Miller. Is that a cpestion. Senator Fall ? Senator Fall. Yes. Mr. Miller. Then my answer is no. Senator Fall. I am glad to have your idea upon that subject. Then there can be no peace between nations except by the execution and ratification of a signed peace ? You answer that "no," I presume, as an international lawyer. Mr. Miller. That is the customary method of concluding war and making peace. Senator Fall. You know that Sweden and Poland had peace for a great many years after 1720 without ever declaring; it ? Mr. Miller. I have so understood. Senator Fall. Do you know that Mexico and France had a peace after 1867 without ever declaring it? Mr. Miller. I have understood that. There are instances where peace has resulted without the procedure which I mentioned as the usual procedure. Senator Fall. Peace is established as recognized by all inter- national law writers, in three different ways, is it not ? Mr. Miller. As recognized by law wi'iters Senator Fall. Yes; every one that I have ever read. TREATY OF PEACE AVITH GERMANY. 409' Mr. Miller. I do not understand the question. Senator Fall. Where war has been the status between two coun- tries, peace may be estabUshed in at least three different and distinct ways, may it not ? Mr. Miller. Yes; I think it may. Senator Fall. A treaty of peace simply establishes the terms upon which the nations will remain at peace and conduct their busi- ness together, does it not? Mr. Miller. Well, a treaty of peace may establish a great many different things. To say that it simply establishes Senator Fall. I am speaking of the effect upon the status of the nations. A treaty of peace is not necessary to peace, is it ? Mr. Miller. Not in all cases. Senator Fall. How is that ? Mr. Miller. It has not been in all cases. Senator Fall. But a treaty of peace is adopted to provide distinct rules and regulations, and to avoid future disputes between the two nations, to provide rules by which the citizens of the countries may enter into commercial relations and continue to do business, and by which the countries themselves, as distinguished from the populations of the countries, may conduct their intercourse. That is the purpose of the treaty of peace, is it not? Mr. Miller. Yes, and to create definitely a status of peace instead of a status of war, and to provide for the usual relations that exist in time of peace. Senator Fall. Suppose that you have no treaty of peace at all between Germany and the United States of America. Suppose that this treaty is not ratified by the Senate of the United States at all. Do you mean to say that the status of war would continue to exist between he German Empire and the United States of America ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Fall. Mr. Chairman, I ask to put in the record right at. this point various advertisements of sailings of ships between this country and German ports. Senator McCumber. They will be made a part of the record. (The advertisements referred to are as follows;) [From the New York Journal of Commerce.] Hamburg — Now loading Pier 7, N. R, — S. S. Juliana (steel, 100 Al IJoyds) — Shipping I5oard Rates — Pacat Steamship Corporation, 42 Broadway, New "York- Broad 7551-2-3-4-5-6. Hamburg — Japanese steel steamer— 100 Al Lloyds — Gozan Mam — Now receiving — Sailing on or about July 16 — Full brokerage paid — For rates and particulars apply Triangle Steamship Co" (Inc.), 44 Whitehall Street, New York; Bowling Green 6511-6512-6513-6514. Prompt sailings to Hamburg and Rotterdam — 100 Al steel steamers — Skogstad — Julianna — Dalgada — Obah — Prompt loading from our own per 7, North River — For rates and fiirther particulars apply to Pacat Steamship Corooration, 42 Broadwav. N. Y.— Telephone Broad 7551-2-3-4-5-6— Chicago, 327 So."l.aSalle St., Harrifiin 283— Philadelphia, Land Title Bldg., Spruce 5515— Pittsburgh, Chamljer of Commerce- Bldg., Grant 2371— San Francisco, 210 Drumm St.; Sutter 4472— Mobile, City Bank Bldg., Mobile 326. 410 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. For the development of American trade in Germany— Our Mr. Charles Schroeder is now in personal charge of our branch office in Hamburg — We are in a position to offer to manufacturers, exporters, importers, and others interested in furthering trade with the above and adjacent countries, the facilities of a complete organization for the sale and distribution of all products — We invite proposals, samples, catalogues, and correspondence from responsible parties — Maritime Navigation Co. (Inc.), 17 Battery- Place, New York; telephone, Whitehall 1648-55. Hamburg — Japanese steel steamer — 100 A-1 I.loyds — Itsukushima Mara^ — Now receiving — Sailing on or about July 11 — Full brokerage paid — For rates and particu- lars apply Triangle Steamship Co. (Inc.), 44 Whitehall Street, New York; Bowling Green 6511-6512-6513-6514. Hamburg— .\merican steamer — A-1 Lloyds — Thala--Now receiving — Sailing on or about July 18 — For rates and particulars applv Brooks Steamship Corporation, 25 Broad St., New York; Broad 5S35. Senator Beandegee. Will the Senator from New Mexico permit me to ask a question at this point? Senator Fall. Certainly. Then I will have another question or two later. Senator Brandegee. Eight on that particular point, before you pass to the other methods of making peace. As between Germany and the United States of America, Germany never declared war on America, did she ? Mr. Miller. No; the United States declared that a state of war existed. Senator Brandegee. Now the President appeared before Congress and announced that the war was over. The German Army has been defeated and demobilized. The American Army is being demobilized. The German Navy has been surrendered. Germany has signed the peace treaty, which Great Britain has signed. The President has affixed his signature to that same peace treaty. The fighting is over. The blockade against Germany has been raised. We get no indemnity and no reparation from Germany under the terms of the treaty itself, and we are demanding none. We get no part of the captured Ger- man territories. In view of those facts, is there no way in which the United States of America and Germany can be in a status of peace, except by having a written treaty of peace executed hj the two nations 1 Mr. Miller. Do you mean that no way could be devised ? Senator Brandegee. I mean, is there no way possible for us to be at peace without executing a written treaty of peace ? Mr. Miller. I do not think there is any practical way of doing it. Senator Brandegee. Suppose Congress should repeal the joint resolution which it passed declaring a state of war to exist. What do you think the international situation would be between the United States and Germany? Mr. Miller. I should like to consider that. Senator, before an- swering it. It has never happened in the history of the country, and I should like to think it over. Senator Brandegee. Suppose Congress should pass a joint x-eso- lution, as it did when it declared a status of war, but declaring that the status of war previously declared by Congress no longer existed. What do you think would be the international relations between the United States and Germany? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 411 Mr. Miller. I should like also to make a considered answer to that question. Senator Brandegee. Suppose that were supplemented biy^ a joint resolution of Congress authorizing and directmg the President to reestablish the Consular Service and to proclaim that a status of peace •exists between the two countries ? Mr. Miller. You are assuming that the joint resolution was passed by Congress and signed by the President, or passed over his veto ? Senator Brandegee. No; I am not assuming that, any more than I assume that it was necessary for the declaration of war to have been signed by the President. The Constitution provides that Congress shall declare war. Mr. Miller. Well, I am aware of that. I was asking what your assumption was in this case 1 Senator Brandegee. I will assume both cases. I will assume, first, that the joint resolution declaring a status of peace was signed by the President. Then what is your answer. And if it was not signed by the President, what is your answer ? Please answer both. Mr. Miller. I should like to think of that a little, Senator. Senator Brandegee. Very well. I understood you, when you were answering a question of mine sometime ago, to say that you and a gentleman named Hurst had prepared, or had to do -with the preparation of the plans for the covenant of the league which was submitted to the commission. Am I correct about that ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Brandegee. What is the full name of this Mr. Hurst ? • Mr. Miller. C. J. B. Hurst. Senator Brandegee. What does the "C" stand for? Mr. Miller. I only know his initials. Senator Brandegee. How long were you associated with him? Mr. Miller. He was there in Paris all the time that I was there — most of the time. Senator Brandegee. How long were you in conference with him in the preparation of this plan ? Mr. Miller. Several days, I think, Senator. I don't remember. Senator Brandegee. And you do not know his first name ? Mr. Miller. It escapes me at the moment Senator. Senator Brandegee. You have known it ? Mr. Miller. I have known it; but it escapes me at the moment. Senator Brandegee. What was his business ? Mr. Miller. He is legal adviser to the British foreign office. Senator Brandegee. Is he an attorney at law in Great Britain? Mr. Miller. I assume that he is. Senator Moses. He has no connection with Mr. Francis Hurst, former editor of the Economist ? Mr. Miller. I know nothing as to that. Senator Brandegee. He is an Englishmen, is he not, a subject of Great Britain ? Mr. Miller. Well, I assume so. Senator Brandegee. Do you know whether he is a writer in public journals ? Mr. Miller. I think he has written ; yes. Senator Brandegee. Do you know in what journals he has written ? 412 TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Miller. I do not recall. Senator Beandegee. Did you ever bear of a British publication called Common Sense ? Mr. Miller. I think T have seen copies of it. Senator Brand egee. You are quite sure there is such a publi- cation ? Mr. Miller. I am not sure. Senator Brandegee. You think you have seen copies ? Mr. Miller. I think so. Senator Brandegee. Did you ever hear that Mr. Hurst contributed to that publication ? Mr. Miller. I do not recall. Senator Brandegee. Is that a pacificist journal ? Mr. Miller. I do not recall, Senator. Senator Brandegee. Was Mr. Hurst an advocate of peace without victory ? Mr. Miller. Not that I know of. Senator Brandegee. Is he not well known in England as a pacificist ? Mr. Miller. I do not know. Senator Brandegee. Did he not protest against the war in his articles which were published, and did he not say that peace ought to be established at once without victory ? Mr. Miller. Not to my knowledge. Senator Brandegee. Did you ever discuss with him any of these questions about the conduct of the war? Mr. Miller. No, sir. Senator Brandegee. Did you not know that he was a critic of the British conduct of the war, right straight through the war ? Mr. Miller. I did not know as to that. Senator Brandegee. Did you ever hear that he was suspected of being a pro-German ? Mr. Miller. No, sir. Senator Brandegee. That is all. Senator Moses. Mr. Miller, when was your law firm organized in its present form ? Mr. Miller. In 1915. Senator Moses. Are there other partners besides Mr. Auchincloss? Mr. Miller. No, sir. The firm has only had a nominal existence since the war commenced. Senator Moses. Since he entered the war? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Moses. Was Mr. Francis Lord Warren a partner of yours? Mr. Miller. No, sir. Senator Moses. Was he associated with the firm ? Mr. Miller. Yes; he was associated with me and also with the firm. Senator Moses. Was he associated with you in Paris? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. Senator Moses. In what capacity ? Mr. Miller. He was an assistant. Senator Moses. He performed the duties of translator to the American commission, did he ? Mr. Miller. No, sir. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 413 Senator Moses. Had you a partner named Blatchford ? Mr. Miller. No, sir. Senator Moses. Was he associated with the firm ? Mr. Miller. He was a clerk of the firm. Senator Moses. Was he in Paris also ^ Mr. Miller. Not that I ever knew of. Senator Moses. Is he now attached to the firm? Mr. Miller. No, sir. Senator Moses. Do you know what he is doing? Mr. Miller. I do not know. Senator Moses. Is he a member of the legal staff of any of the •departments here so far as you know ? Mr. Miller. Not so far as I know. Senator Fall. Mr. Miller, there is one matter that I think was left in a little confusion in the answers that you gave first. The different delegations to the peace conference voted as a unit when it came to a vote did they not? It made no difference how many delegates this country had or any other country had, the vote was by countries ? Mr. Miller. It was the vote of Great Britain or France, or what- ever it might be. Senator E'all. They voted by countries. They had no advantage by having a superior number of delegates ? Mr. Miller. No, sir; unless it might be some advantage of con- venience in dividing the work. Senator Fall. I mean no advantage in deciding questions ? Mr. Miller. No, sir; not that I could see. Senator Fall. You were asked about that and about the number ■of delegates, and stated that some others later joined the delegation, and some were not present at the time, and I simply wanted to clear the record in that regard, so that it would appear plainly that it made no difference whether they were there or not there, that each country had one vote ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Fall. Irrespective of the number of delegates ? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. Senator Brandegee. Have you finished, Senator Fall ? Senator Fall. Yes, Senator. Senator Brandegee. I just wanted to ask one question for my information. If you will turn to page 31 of the committee print of the treaty, at the top of the page, you wiU see the latter part of article 15 of the covenant for the league of nations. I will read it. It reads as follows : The council may in any case under this article refer the dispute to the assembly . The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within 14 days after the submission of the dispute to the ■council. In any case referred to the assembly, all the provisions of this article and of article 12 relating to the action and powers of the council shall apply to the action and powers of the assembly, provided that a report be made by the assembly, if concurred in by the representatives of those members of the league represented on the council and of a majority of the other members of the league, exclusive in each case of the repre- sentative of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the •council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the representatives of one •or more of the parties to the dispute. 414 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. Now, suppose the United States and Great Britain had a dispute. Great Britain has six votes in the assembly, has she not ? Mr. MiLLEE. Well, there is a vote for each of the four dominions, and one for India. Senator Beandegee. How many does that make for Great Britain, the British Empire altogether ? You know what the British Empire is, do you not? Mr. Millee. I do, but Senator Beandegee. How many votes does the British Empire have in the assembly altogether ? Ml'. Millee. The British Empire has one vote, Canada has one vote, Australia has one vote, New Zealand has one vote Senator BeXndegee. Wait a minute. Senator Hitchcock. I insist that the witness be allowed to finish his answer. Senator Beandegee. I do not are. Senator Hitchcock. The committee has a right to have the ques- tion ansv/ered. Senator Swanson. It is the committee, not a matter of the Senator personally. Senator McCumbee. I think the witness should answer the ques- tion. Senator Swanson. This is not done entu'ely for any one Senator. It is for the entu'e committee. Senator Beandegee. I have the right to call the attention of the witness to what I think was a misstatement. I am going to give the witness a chance to answer the question. Mr. Millee. I should like to complete the answer. Senator Beandegee. I should like to suggest to you the difference between the British Empire and the United Eangdom. Senator McCumber. The witness was enumerating the votes that the British Empire had in the assembly. Senator Beandegee. Please enumerate the votes that the British Empire has in the assembly. Mr. Millee. The British Empire has one vote, Canada has one vote, Australia has one vote. New Zealand has one vote, South Africa has one vote, and India has one vote. Senator Beandegee. Is not Canada a part of the British Empire ? Mr. Millee. Yes. Senator Beandegee. Then, why do you say the British Empire has one vote and Canada has one vote? Mr. Millee. Because that is what the covenant says. Senator Beandegee. Does it not say that Great Britain has one vote, and its self-governing colonies, Canada, New Zealiand, and India each have one vote ? Mr. Millee. It does not. Senator Beandegee. The British Empire altogether has six votes, has it not, in the assembly ? Mr. Millee. I can only a,nswer it except in the way I have an- swered it. Senator Beandegee. What is the total of the votes that the British Empire has, as you have answered it ? Mi. Millee. The total as I have answered it is that the British Empire has one vote, Canada has one vote, Australia one vote, India one vote. South Africa one vote, and New Zealand one vote. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 415 Senator Brandegee. That makes six votes under the control of the British Empire, does it not ? Mr. Miller. Not in my opinion. Senator Brandegee. Now, the corenant provides, does it not, that a party to the dispute can not sit in judgment, can not partici- pate in the judgment by the assembly ? Mr. Miller. To be precise, it excludes that vote in certain conse- quences. Senator Brandegee. Does it not exclude the vote of the parties to the dispute, from participation in the proceedings, in the settle- ment of the dispute '>: Mr. Miller. No; they participate in the proceedings. Senator. There is no provision that they shall not participate in the proceedings. Senator Brandegee. What does it mean then, when it says in the part I have read — Provided, That a report made by the assembly, is concurred in by the representatives of those members of the league represented in the council and of a majority of the other members of the league, exclusive in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute? Mr. Miller. That is exclusive in relation to the concurrence. Senator Brandegee. They can not participate in making the report, can they? Mr. Miller. I do not see why they can not. Senator Brandegee. I do not see how they can, if this English language means what I think it does : Provided, That a report made by the assembly, if concurred in by the representa- tives of those members of the league represented on the council and of a majority of the other members of the league, exclusive in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute. Does not that exclude them from participation in the report ? Mr. Miller. No, sir; because that is not what it says. It says a report made by the assembly, if concurred in by the representatives of those members of the league represented on the council, and a majority of the other members of the league, exclusive in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute. That is in regard to concurrence by the representatives of those members represented on the council, and in regard to the concur- rence of a majority of the other members of the league. "Exclu- sive" relates to that. The effect of the vote is the effect of their concurrence or nonconcurrence, as described here. Senator Brandegee. And do you understand by that where two nations are members of this league, and at the request of one of them a dispute has been referred to the assembly, that the parties to the dispute can participate in the decision of their own case ? Mr. Miller. They take part, yes; but under this provision their concurrence or their nonconcurrence does not affect certain results of the decision. Senator Brandegee. Do you mean that they can vote on the adoption of the report ? Mr. Miller. In my opinion, yes. Senator Brandegee. Well, I just wanted to get your opinion. Senator Harding. May I ask a question right there ? Senator Brandegee. Certainly. 416 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Harding. Suppose a case affecting Australia should go from the council to the assembly for settlement, and under this pro- vision a majority vote of the assembly carried the decision, if it is concurred in by the members of the councU apart from those con- cerned in this dispute, would the other representatives of the British Empire be restrained from voting in the assembly if it was a matter in which Australia was concerned ? Mr. Miller. May I ask a question, Senator ? Senator Harding. Certainly. I want to make it clear. Mr. Miller. The dispute is between Australia and some other Senator Harding. Some other country than Great Britain. We will say it is between Australia and the United States, for example ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Harding. And we wiU say that the matter in dispute is ■agreed on in the council except by Australia. Australia has no place in the council. Mr. Miller. If it was referred to the council. Senator, there is a provision in Article IV — Any member of the league not represented on the council shall be invited to send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the council during the consideration ■of matters specially affecting the interests of that member of the league. Senator Harding. Let us disregard that. Let us assume that the •dispute between the United States and Australia goes from the council to the assembly. The point I am trying to clear up is, will Great Britain and Canada and India and her other possessions, other than Australia have a right to vote in the assembly in that decision ? Mr. Miller. I think, Senator, there is some doubt as to that. I ■can only give you my own opinion, which is that they would. Senator Harding. That they would ? Senator Brandegee. I was going to ask him that very question. Senator Swanson. Let him finish. Mr. Miller. I had not quite finished my answer. Senator. I paused, but I had not quite finished. Senator Brandegee. I beg your pardon. Mr. Miller. Although I wish to point out that you used the words "Great Britain" I think that name does not appear in the treaty. Senator Harding. You know what 1 mean. I mean the associated governments of the British Empire. Mr. Miller. But I pointed out, Senator, that the British Em- pire Senator Harding. The British Dominions. Choose any term you like. You know precisely what I mean. Mr. Miller. Yes, Senator, there was no misapprehension, but I wanted to allude to the point, because the words "British Empire" as used here, include various parts of the British Empire that are not •dominions, that are outside of dominions. That is the British Em- pire here. Senator Harding. I am not trying to be querulous or smart about it. I am trying to get at this fact: In a dispute between one of Britain's dominions which participated with her in the defense of the realm, arising between that dominion and the United States, it goes apparently to the assembly for a vote. Will India and England and Canada and the other British possessions, other than the one party .to the dispute, have votes in the assembly in determining the question? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 417 Mr. Miller. I am inclined to think they would, Senator, because this covenant has gone very far in the direction of making Australia a separate entity internationally. I do not say that it has reached that point, but I do say that it has gone very far in that direction in my opinion. Senator Fall. She is a separate party to the treaty herseK ? Mr. Miller. The treaty is made Senator Fall. I was referring to pages 5 and 7, which I have before me. She signed by her representatives. Mr. Miller. Yes, under their theory, as I understand it, the treaty is made by the Eang for the British Empire and for Canada and for Australia and so on. Senator Fall. Whatever the theory may be, it says: His Majesty, the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the seas, Emporor of India, by: The Right Honorable David Lloyd George, M. P., first lord of his treasury and prime minister; The Right Honorable Andrew Bonar Law, M. P., his lord privy seal; The Right Honorable Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G., his secretary of state for the colonies; The Right Honorable Arthur James Balfour, O. M., M. P., his secretary of state for foreign affairs; The Right Honorable George NicoU Barnes, M. P., minister without portfolio; And — For the Dominion of Canada, by: The Honorable Charles Joseph Doherty, minister of justice; The Honorable Arthur Lewis Sifton, minister of customs; For the Commonwealth of Australia, by: The Right Honorable William Morris Hughes, attorney general and prime minister; The Right Honorable Sir Joseph Cooke, G. C. M. G., minister for the navy; For the Union of South Africa, by: General the Right Honorable Louis Botha, minister of native affairs and prime minister; Lieutenant General the Right Honorable Jan Christian Smuts, K. C, minister of defense; For the Dominion of New Zealand, by: The Right Honorable William Ferguson Massey, minister of labor and prime minis- ter; For India, by: The Right Honorable Edwin Samuel Montagu, M. P., his secretary of state for India; Major General His Highness Maharaja Sir Ganga Singh Bahadur, Maharaja of Bikaner, G. C. S. I., G. C. I. E., G. C. V. 0., K. C. B., A. D. C. Mr. Miller. It was to that that I alluded. Senator Brandegee. Now, I want to resume my examination. I was just about, in the next question, to ask you the very question that Senator Harding asked. I notice on page 43 of this treaty in the annex it describes the original mfembers of the league of nations signatories of the treaty of peace. They are so headed, and when it comes to the British Empire these words are used: "British Em- pire," "Canada," "Australia," "New Zealand," "South Africa," "India." There are six of them. There are six votes, as I understand it, in the assembly, to which upon the request of either party, within 14 days after a dispute comes to the council, the dispute must be re- moved. Now, I ask you this: Suppose a dispute develops between what I suppose as correctly described as the United Kingdom of England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, which I suppose is called Great Britain; supposing a dispute arises between that portion of 135546—19 27 418 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. the British Empire and the United States of America, and upon the request of the United States of America the dispute is removed from the council to the assembly, where there are these six British votes; what we call the United Kingdom, and these self-governing colonies, Australia, Canada, South Africa, India, and New Zealand, which are parts of the British Empire. Would they be allowed to have five Azotes in that dispute while the United States is excluded from any vote? Mr. Miller. I think I have answered that. Senator. Senator Brandegee. I should like to have you answer it now ? Mr. Miller. I think I have answered that if the dispute were such that it in no way involved any of the dominions or India, which is proposed by your hypothesis Senator Brandegee. My hypothesis is that they are part of the British Empire, and are allowed to sit in a dispute between a part of the British Empire and the United States, while the United States is clearly excluded from participation. I wanted to know if that was your understanding, or whether you consider the question to be in doubt? Mr. Miller. I think it is in a great deal of doubt. Senator, because it is very difhcidt to imagine a dispute in which the British dominions and India would not be interested in the result. Senator Brandegee. It seems to me so. That is, it is difficult to imagine a case where they would not be interested, but it does not seem to me there is any doubt about it; but if it is, in doubt, in your opinion as an international lawyer and as the expert adviser of the commission that drafted the league of nations covenant, do you not think now is the time to clear up that doubt, before we take the chances of submitting a vital dispute affecting the United States to a tribunal from which we are excluded and in which Great Britain, or the British Empire, may have five votes to our none ? Is not now the time to clear that up ? Mr. Miller. Why, Senator, .my doubt was as to the possibility of the hypothesis. Senator Brandegee. What is there about the hypothesis that is doubtful ? Mr. Miller. That there might be a dispute affecting the British Empire in which Canada and the other dominions and India were not interested. The question which the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Harding) asked me was concerning a dispute with Australia, which is a possibility, I admit. Senator Brandegee. I know his question involves the question whether Great Britain — or England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, as I understood you — would be allowed to vote on the Australian dispute ? My question is whether in a dispute between Great Britain, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales on the one hand, and the United States of America on the other, all the other members of the British Empire which are allowed delegates in the assembly are to be allowed to vote in a case in which the British Empire is interested, while we are to be excluded from voting on the report on that dispute. You under- stand the question, do you not ? Mr. Miller. Yes, I understand the question, Senator. The doubt I expressed was not as to the answer to the question, but as to the possibility of the case arising. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 419 Senator Beandegee. Do you mean that you deny the possibility of the United States ever having a difference of opinion with Great Britain which would come under the jurisdiction of the council of the league of nations ? Mr. Miller. Oh, no; that is possible; but Senator Brandegee. Assuming that that possibility has arisen, and I "repeat the question which I just asked you, and to which I did not quite understand your answer. You, however, seem to doubt something Mr. Miller. I will make it perfectly clear. Senator Brandegee. I wish you would. Mr. Miller. Suppose a dispute between the British Empire and the United States: As I understand it, in that dispute neither Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, or India has any interest. Senator Brandegee. They are parts of the British Empire, are they not ? Mr. Miller. If they have an interest, then they would be parties to the dispute. That is what I am in doubt about. Senator Harding. Who determines that ? Senator Brandegee. Do you claim there can be any dispute between the British Empire and the United States of America in which the units that compose the British Empire are not interested ? Mr. Miller. That was the point I was raising, Senator; because then, if Senator Brandegee. Suppose^ Senator Swanson. Let him finish his answer. Senator Brandegee. Very well; let him answer. I am glad to have him. Mr. Miller. In that case they would be interested and would come within the provisions of parties to the dispute, and would be excluded. Senator Brandegee. In which case ? Mr. Miller. In that case. Senator Brandegee. In which case? Mr. Miller. In the case of a dispute in which, as you say, they would be interested, they would come within the expression "parties to the dispute." Senator Brandegee. Can you imagine a case in which a dispute arose between the United States and that portion of the British Empire composed of England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, which would not interest all the members of the British Empire as an Empire ? Mr. Miller. That is what I can not imagine. Senator, and that is why I say they would be parties to the dispute and would be excluded as against the United States. Senator Brandegee. Then, is it your understanding that no dis- pute could arise between the United States on the one hand and England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales on the other hand in which all members of the British Empire would not be interested ? Mr. Miller. I can not think of any such dispute. Senator Brandegee. Then you think they all would be excluded, instead of having the right to participate, do you not? Mr. Miller. In the case you suppose. 420 TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. Senator Brandegee. Then what did you mean by saying in your previous answers that you had some doubt about it '^ Mr. Miller. That was not the same question. That was if there was a possibihty of dispute between Australia and the United States. Senator Brandegee. Have you any doubt that there might be a dispute between AustraUa and the United States ? Mr. Miller. Oh, no; there might be. Senator Brandegee. Very well. In that case would the other self-governing colonies of the British Empire be excluded from par- ticipation in the assembly ? Mr. Miller. It is very difficult to imagine a case where the others would not be interested, but I think perhaps it is possible to imagine such a case, where the interests of Canada would be adverse to Australia. Senator Swanson. I think the question was Senator Brandegee. I do not care to be interrupted Senator Swanson. The question was Senator Brandegee. I am conducting this examination, and you have no right to interrupt it without I yield to you. Senator Swanson. If the Senator insists, I will not press my ques- tion for the present. Senator Brandegee. I do not yield. As I understand you, Mr. Miller, there might arise a case where one English colony was inter- ested in a dispute, and it would be doubtful whether another English colony would be interested or not. Mr. Miller. I think it is verv difficult to visualize a case where it would be doubtful, but it is perhaps possible. Senator. Senator Brandegee. I can not conceive that there would be any doubt that one part of the British Empire would be interested in anything that affected the whole British Empire, just as any State of the American Union would be interested in everything that pertains to the United States of America. But if there was a doubt or could be a doubt in any case, in your opinion who would decide the ques- tion of whether they were interested or not? Mr. Miller. Let me explain, Senator. Senator Brandegee. Certainly, that is what I am asking you about. Mr. Miller. When I answered the Senator from Ohio he raised the question of Australia. I was thinking of it as perhaps a possi- bility — a technical possibility. I can not think of a concrete case which would arise, but perhaps some such case could arise. None have been suggested that I Imow of, and it seems to me that the presumption would certainly be that a dispute involving one part of the British Empire would involve all of it. Senator Brandegee. Do you think you have answered the ques- tion 1 You know I asked you who would decide the question in case there was a doubt. Do you think you have answered that question? Mr. Miller. I do not think I have fuUy- answered it. Senator Brandegee. No; I did not think you had. Do you care to answer it ? Mr. Miller. Oh, yes. I think the presumption would be, certainly, that every part of the British Empire was interested. Senator Brandegee. If there was a doubt, and it was only de- pending upon a presumption, who would decide the doubt ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 421 Mr. Miller. It would seem to me that it would require the unan- imous vote of the assembly to permit any part of the British Empire to participate in that case. Senator Beandegbe. In that case the very people who might be interested — the question is, being interested, are they to be allowed to vote in their own case ? Mr. Miller. Their vote, in my judgment, would not have any effect on the matter, because every other power would have to agree unanimously that they be admitted. Senator Brandegee. But would they be allowed to vote or not? Mr. Miller. I answer that by saying that they would, in my opinion, be allowed to vote — to record what they thought — but that it would not affect the result. Senator Brandegee. Do you mean to say that a party whose right to participate in the proceedings is challenged because he may be interested would be allowed to vote as to his own qualifications, as to whether he was interested and should be excluded or not. Mr. Miller. I think he would have a right to record his view that he was not interested. Senator Brandegee. I did not ask you about recording his view, or making an oral statement. I asked you, would he have a right to vote on the question and have his vote counted as determining his own credentials ? Mr. Miller. I said his vote would not count in my opinion. Senator Brandegee. Then, what would be the use of letting him vote at all if you would not count his vote ? Mr. Miller. That applies to a great many votes. Senator. Senator Brandegee. Some in the South; yes. I did not suppose the league was going to do business on those principles. Mr. Miller. It applies to any minority vote, where a majority controls. Senator Brandegee. Well, I give it up. Senator Harding. I think it will help us to get an understanding if you will return for the moment to the language in article 15, if the witness will say to us whether a prejudicial or fraternal interest makes one of the British subsidiary powers a party to the dispute. It says in the language used here — Exclusive in each case of representatives of the parties to the dispute. Is there any construction whereby in a strictly technical way a British dominion would become a party to a dispute raised by another dominion ? Let us go back, for example, to our Australian question. Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Harding. If we had a dispute with Australia, do you con- strue it that Canada could in any way be counted as a party to the dispute ? Mr. Miller. Well, Senator, it might be possible to think of a case where Canada would have no interest, but it seems to me Senator Harding. But now, mark you, the language does not say "having an interest." Mr. Miller. No. Senator Harding. It says "a party to the dispute." Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Harding. And that is precisely what I am anxious to see cleared up. I can not myself conceive, these nations being members 422 TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. of the league, how any of them save the one directly interested can be in any way a party to the dispute, though I can very well conceive of every one of them being interested. Senator McCumbee. Let me ask right there : If we have any trouble with Canada, where do we go to settle that trouble ? We go to Great Britain — that is, the British Empire, as represented by Great Britain — do we not ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator McCumber. We want to settle it diplomatically. Canada has no diplomatic agent here. We have to deal with Great Britain, do we not ? Mr. Miller. The theory and the practice are very different in that regard. Theoretically we deal with London, but it is not so prac- tically. Senator McCumber. But she, of course, refers the matter to her dominion, and will generally go in accordance with the wishes of that dominion; but in all cases in matters of dispute between the United States and the Dominion we must deal with the British Government, must we not ? Mr. Miller. Senator, I want to repeat, because I do not think it is technical at all — I think it is very practical — that the negotiations in that event have been carried on directly with Canada. That is a practical matter. Senator Hitchcock. Canada has no diplomatic relations with any country ? Mr. Miller. No. Senator Hitchcock. If a dispute arises, it is a dispute between the British Empire, representing Canada, and the other Government. Mr. Miller. That is true, Senator. Senator Hitchcock. So that any dispute that could arise between the United States and the Dominion of Canada involves the whole British Empire. Mr. Miller. It seems so to me. Senator; but I mean to say that as a practical matter somebody is usually appointed who is satisfac- tory Senator Hitchcock. That is not the question. But it disqualifies the whole British Empire from participating in the decision. Mr. Miller. In my opinion, I can not conceive of a case where it would not be interested. Senator McCumber. That is what we wanted to understand. Senator Hitchcock. If a dispute arises between the British Em- pire and the United States, does not that disqualify all of the parts of the British Empire from participating ? Mr. Miller. It would seem to me that it would be impossible to suppose that they were not parties to the dispute. Senator PIitchcock. Yes; certainly. Mr. Miller. In that case. Senator McCumber. Are there any other questions ? Senator Fall. Yes. I should like to see if we can get at the truth of this business. Under the status as it exists to-day between the United States of America and Great Britain, it is true that a diplo- matic question affecting Canada would be taken up by Great Britain; but what will be the status after the adoption of this treaty ? TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 423 Senator Hitchcock. The same thing Senator Fall. You are answering for the witness, and you and I disagree absolutely. Senator Hitchcock. I thought you were asking me. Senator Fall. I say, granting that disputes between the United States and Canada to-day are taken up to Great Britain, which is the truth, what will be the status if this treaty is ratified ? I will go on and explain a little further. You said, Mr. Miller, that you could not imagine a case in which Great Britain might be interested and her colonies not be interested. Great Britain has a coastwise traduig act applicable to the Kingdom of Great Britain, but not applicable to Cfanada or Australia, just as we have a coastwise trading act. Mr. Miller. We have. I am not sure about the British act. Senator Fall. You are not familiar with the general navigation act of Great Britain ? Mr. Miller. I am not clear that it is just like ours. Senator Fall. You know that under the British North American Act of Union, of 1867, the different Provinces of Canada have juris- diction over lands and mines and real estate and timber, etc., within their own confines, and that under that act of 1867 and subsequent acts amendatory to it the general Dominion Government of Canada exercises appellate jurisdiction over those matters, and in some cases original jurisdiction, and has absolute control, aside from any control whatever of Great Britain over such objects, do you not ? Mr. Miller. Yes; I know generally the effect of that act. Senator Fall. Then there could be a case arising between one of those Provinces, which has entire self-government and control of this property, and the United States, which in so far as the subject- matter was concerned would not interest the other Provinces, except as they might say they would generally be interested in the welfare of one another. Mr. Miller. A dispute between one Province of Canada Senator Fall. One of the dominions of the British Empire and the United States, in which the other dominions of the British Em- pire would not be interested, just as you have suggested that there might arise such a case in Australia. Now, if Australia has final jurisdiction over her land matters, or, for instance, over certain har- bors in Australia, and she owns her own railroads, with which Great Britain has absolutely nothing to do, and New Zealand owns her own railroads, a question might arise between New Zealand and the United States or some other country, in which Canada was not inter- ested at all. Ordinarily such a dispute with a foreign country would go to Great Britain, and through chplomatic arrangements she might bring pressure to bear on New Zealand or Australia, exactly as the dispute between Japan and the United States over the exclusion act in California, so far as the public schools are concerned, or over the land act of California, might indh'ectly involve the United States. The United States might bring pressur > t bear upon the State of California. Might not that condition arise with reference to such a dispute as we have been discussing ? Mr. Miller. It is very difficult. Senator, for me to see how it would not involve the rest of the British Empire Senator Fall. The difference is simply this, that this is the United States of America, and that you gentlemen over there around the 424 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. peace table gave six votes to Great Britain — that is, to the United Kingdom one vote, to Canada one vote, to Austraha one vote, to South Africa one vote, to India one vote, to New Zealand one vote, or six votes altogether, and you did not give a vote to the State of California, or to the State of New York, or to any one of the 48 States of our Union. There is the difference. Mr. Miller. May I have it appear in the record, Mr. Chairman, that my answer to the pi-evious question was not completed ? Senator McCumber. The witness can now complete his answer. Senator Fall. I beg the pardon of the witness. I thought he had completed his answer. Senator McCumber. It is not necessary to ask the pardon of any- one. The witness has signified that he has not completed his answer, and he is now allowed to complete it. Senator Fall. I will be very glad to hear it. Mr. Miller. I do not remember just the words of the question, or how far I had got in my answer, but I had not completed it. Senator McCumbek. Let the stenographer read the question and the answer as far it had gone. (The stenographer read as follows:) Senator Fall. One of the dominions of the British Empire and the United States in which the other dominions of the British Empire would not be interested, just as you have suggested that there might arise such a case in Australia. Now if Aus- tralia has final jurisdiction over her land matters, or for instance, over certain har- bors in Australia, and she owns her own railroads, with which Great Britain has absolutely nothing to do, and New Zealand owns her own railroads, a question might arise between New Zealand and the United States or some other country, in which Canada was not interested at all. Ordinarily such a dispute with a foreigp country would go to Great Britain, and through diplomatic arrangements she might bring pressure to bear on New Zealand or Australia, exactly as the dispute between Japan and the United States over the exclusion act in California, so far as the public schools are concerned, or over the land act of California, might indirectly involve the United States. The United States might bring pressure to bear upon the State of California,. Might not that condition arise with reference to such a dispute as we have been discussing? Mr. Miller. It is very difficult, Senator, for me to see how it would no.t involve the rest of the British Empire Senator McCumber. Now you may complete your answer. Mr. Miller. It is very difficult for me to see how it would not involve the rest of the British Empire, because a dispute regarding any such matters would arise under treaties which had been made with the British Empire. Senator Fall. That is the answer, is it ? Mr. Miller. That is all. Senator Brandegee. Let me ask this one question: Under the language of the clause of the covenant of the league of nations which we have been discussing — Exclusive in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute — If we had a dispute with Australia, would you consider that all the other countries which constitute the British Empire were parties to that dispute? Mr. Miller. It would seem to me. Senator, that in any case that I can think of they would be. I do not say that it is not possible to imagine a theoretical case, some dispute that might arise in the future, particularly if the relations of the British Empire change interse. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GBEMANY. 426 Senator Bbandegee. What I am surprised at is that your answer now seems to be diametrically opposed to what it was when I asked you these questions in the earlier part of your examination; because you were saying then, as I understood it, that a dispute with one of the self-governing colonies of the British Empire would not exclude the other members of the British Empire from participating in the report on that dispute. Mr. Miller. If I recollect, I said that a case could be imagined. I said I did not imagine any. I said that in reply to the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Harding]. Senator Brandegee. I will put the question in this way, then: If we have a dispute with England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales, for instance, do you think that any of the British self-governing colonies can participate in the report on that dispute? Mr. Miller. No; I do not think so. Senator Brandegee. You think they would all be excluded ? Mr. Miller. I think they will all be excliided in that case by this language; but we must remember, without regard to the technical question of voting, that they would have no effect on the result. Senator Brandegee. They could not participate in the report, could they? Mr. Miller. They might concur in the report in favor of the United States if they chose. Senator Brandegee. What does it mean then by saying — Exclusive in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute. Mr. Miller. It means this, that their concurrence or noncon- currence is immaterial. It might well be that Canada or Australia would concur with the view of the United States against the British Empire in a dispute between the British Empire and the United States. Senator Brandegee. How can that be so when the very language of the act is — Provided, That a report made by the assembly if concurred in by the representa- tives of those members of the league represented on the council and a majority of the other members of the league, exclusi^'e in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute. Does not that exclude them even from the privilege of concurring in the report, which you say they have the right to do ? Mr. Miller. No, Senator; this is what I think it means. Let me take an arbitration case to illustrate exactly what I mean; and in order to simplify it, may I take the council instead of the assembly ? The council is composed at present of nine members. Now I will assume that the dispute is between two States represented on the council. The provisions of article 15 are that if the report is con- curred in by the other seven members, it has a certain effect, but it does not say that one of the other two may not concur in it if he chooses; but his concurrence in it or his dissent from it would not affect the result that the report concurred in by the seven members would have. The distinction, I admit, has no practical result; but you asked me as to the precise language and I think that is the effect of it. Senator Brandegee. I was asking, of course, not as to the council but as to the assembly, and that is what I have directed my entire 426 TKEATY or PEACE WITH GERMANY. examination to, because it is in the assembly that the self-governing colonies of the British Empire have votes, and not in the council. Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Brandegee. Therefore what you say about the council is not responsive at all to my question. Mr. Miller. Well, Senator, it is intended to be responsive. I took it for the sake of simplicity of numbers. I did not intend to evade the question. Senator Brandegee. I know you did not. I did not know that you saw the point of my question. Of course, the question does not arise in the council as to whether the self-governing colonies of Great Britain can vote, but that question continually arises in the assembly where each self-governing colony has a vote, and there are six votes of the British Empire in the assembly; and the whole object of my inquiry for the last hour has been to ascertain whether, the United States being excluded certainly from conciu-ring in the report of the assembly because it is a party to the dispute — the question is whether all the British self-governing colonies are excluded also in case of a row between the United States and Great Britain itself. The council has nothing to do with it. I am talking about the assembly. Mr. Miller. But the provisions are the same. Senator Brandegee. The provisions are not the same, because Great Britam has only one vote in the council and we have one vote. In the assembly Great Britain has six votes and we have one, and if we are a party to a dispute with Great Britain our one vote is excluded, and we can not concur in it because we are a party in interest; and I understood you first to say that the self-governing colonies, if they themselves were not original parties to the dispute, could sit there and vote, although Great Britain was concerned. Mr. Miller. Oh, no; I never said that. You are mistaken. I did not say that. Senator Brandegee. I will have to leave that to the record, and I can not quote the whole record. But that was clearly what I understood you to say. Mr. Miller. No, Senator, I did not say so, and I am sure the record will show it. Senator Brandegee. I will leave it to the record. Mr. Miller. In what I said in answer to your last question I took the council simply for the sake of simplicity of numbers. My opinion is the same as to the assembly. I think in a dispute between the British Empire and the United States the votes of the dominions and of India would not count in the force that the report would have under the last paragraph of article 15; but I do thiiik there is nothing in article 15 which would prevent one of the dominions or all of them from concurring in that report in favor of the United States and against the British Empire; but their concurrence would not affect or change the force of the report. Senator Brandegee. If they have the right to concur, they cer- tainly have the right to nonconcur, have they not ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Brandegee. That means to vote against it, does it not? Mr. Miller. And that would not have any effect upon the force of the report. Senator Brandegee. Not if they were outvoted, of course. TBBATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 427 Mr. Miller. No, but their votes are not counted, according to the ast paragraph of article 15, in my opinion. Senator Brandegee. Not only not counted, but the language is that they are excluded from concurrence, in my opinion; but I will leave it right there. Mr. Miller. I do not think there is any practical difference between what you have expressed and what I have expressed. Senator Brandegee. Well, I do. Senator McCumber. Are there any other questions ? Senator Swanson. Let us see what is the practical effect of this. Let us see if I have got it clear in my mind about going to the assem- bly. The United States has a dispute. The United States has agreed that it will not go to war in a dispute provided it has been referred to the assembly, and provided that the members of the councU represented in the assembly, and the majority of the members of the assembly a^gree on a report — excluding the members interested. Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator Swanson. Now, when it comes up it is left to the United States to determine, when that report is made, whether a majority, either in the councU or the assembly, is composed of people not interested, is it not? That is what is required to make it binding on us under our obligation not to resort to war. That is the only obligation we assume. The obligation not to go to war is in a case where a majority of the assembly not interested, not counting the votes of those interested, have made a report, or there is unanimity of the council, not counting those interested. She is left to judge when that report is made and the vote is recorded, as to whether that situation is complied with or not, is she not? Mr. Miller. Yes. I do not see. Senator, how there could be any difference. It would have to be all the members of the council, or it would have to be a majority of the assembly, excluding those interested. Senator Swanson. When you get to the assembly the United States may say that the six members representing Great Britain are inter- ested, and that consequently they have not got a majority of the assembly, and not having a majority, our obligation not to resort to war has not been imposed. Who determines as to whether a majority of the assembly is composed of people not interested ? Mr. Miller. The United States would count and see. Senator Swanson. My contention is that the United States would count the number of votes in the assembly, and then if there was a majority, excluding those who are interested — and she would have to determine that for herself whether they were or not — then her obli- gation under that would accrue, would it not ? Mr. Miller. Her obligation would accrue. Senator Swanson. I mean the obligation has not accrued until she is satisfied that a majority in the assembly of those not interested have voted against her, or if there is a unanimous report by the members of the council ? Mr. Miller. All of them unanimously except the parties to the dispute. . . . 1 . ,- Senator Swanson. When that report is made, it is not binding unless that is the condition ? Mr. Miller. It has no effect. 428 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. Senator Swanson. Who determines whether that condition has been compUed with or not ? Mr. MiLLEE. It says specifically that in that case the members of the league reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they may consider necessary. Senator Swanson. But suppose you have 160 men in the league and 83 of them vote one way, and in that 83 there are the six repre- sentatives of Great Britain in the assembly. If we take those six away, it does not leave a majority. The United States says, "If you take six from this report, it is not a majority of the assembly, and consequently I am not bound." Who determines that question? Mr. MiLLEE. The United States would say it is not bound. It is not bound, in my opinion, according to the language of the treaty. Senator Swanson. Consequently it would be left to the United States to determine whether the six members representing the British Empire were sufficiently interested that their concurrence in the report would not count. What is your judgment on that? Mr. Miller. I do not think it would be doubted at all that they were not to be counted by the United States or anybody else. Senator Moses. In other words, we take on an obligation in the covenant which leaves us to do as we please ? Mr. MiLLEE. No, Senator, I do not think you can say that, but it is true in any international agreement of any kind, of any treaty, that in the last analysis the power that signs the treaty says that it will do this, that, or the other thing. It is very difficult to draw the line between what the party to a treaty is bound to do, and the particular decisions that may come up at particular times, as to just how it shall do it. That is very difficult. Senator Moses. Do you find in your answer any justffication for Germany in her tearing up the treaty with reference to the neutrality of Belgium ? Mr. MiLLEE. Oh, no; because that was a case where there could be no doubt whatever, and furthermore Germany admitted it. Ger- many said, "We have violated this treaty." Senator Moses. Then, you think the stipulations of this covenant are not sufficiently clear, so as to obviate au these doubts in the inter- pretation of questions arising under the covenant ? Mr. MiLLEE. I think they are sufficiently clear. I do not think there will be differences of opinion of any serious character regarding the interpretation of the covenant. Senator Moses. There seem to have been quite a number around this table. Mr. MiLLEE. I think that is quite a different thing, Senator. Senator McCumbee. I want to ask you just one or two questions bearing on this same subject, and call your attention to Article V of the treaty, which says: Except where otherwise expressly provided for in this covenant or by the terms of the present treaty, decisions at any meeting of the assembly or of the council shall require the agreement of all the members of the league represented at the meeting. That, of course, means a unanimous vote ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator McCumbee. The exception is found immediately in the following paragraph: All matters of procedure at meetings of the assembly or of the council, including the appointment of committees to investigate particalar matters, shall be regulated TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 429 by the assembly or by the council, and may be decided by a majority of the members of the league represented at the meeting. Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator McCumber. In other words, practically all matters except those of procedure must be by a unanimous vote. Now, turning again to page 31, which relates to the transferring of a matter from the council to the assembly — all matters must first go to the council; that is, all matters of dispute — and then the council may- in any case, under this article, refer the dispute to the assembly. That means, of course, that there is a discretion there in the council to refer the matter. Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator McCumber. Otherwise there will be no necessity for that provision at all. Now, inasmuch as that is not a mere matter of pro- cedure but a matter affecting the vital interests of the parties — that is, as to where it shall be sent for determination — that would require a unanimous vote in the council, would it not ? Mr. Miller. Yes. Senator McCumber. Very well, then, if it required a unanimous vote, and the United States had any doubt or fear about being out- voted in the assembly, she would not be required to send it to the assembly, would she ? Mr. Miller. No ; she would vote against it. Senator McCumber. She would vote against it, and if she voted against it, it could not go to the assembly ? Mr. Miller. No; not under that provision. Senator McCumber. That is aU I desire to ask. (Thereupon, at 1.35 p. m. the committee adjourned until Wednes- day, August 13, 1919, at 10.30 a. m.) (Subsequently, at his request, the following letter from Mr. Miller was ordered printed in the record :) Department of State, Washington, August 15, 1919. Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. , Dear Sir: In reading over the print of my testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations of August 12, I have observed certain errors, mostly typographical, which I have indicated in the inclosed print, and I request that the record be corrected accordingly. Referring to pages 411 and 412 of the record, there was obviously some confusion as to the identity of Mr. Cecil J. B. Hurst. In justice to Mr. Hurst, I venture to suggest that the record be changed by striking out everything after the question on page 411, "What is the full name of this Mr. Hurst?" down to and including the words, "Senator Brandegee. That is all," on page 412, and that the following be inserted : "Cecil ,T. B. Hurst. Mr. Hurst has been connected with the British foreign office since 1902. He was technical delegate and legal adviser to the British Government at the Second Hague Conference in 1907, and appeared before the British- American •Claims Commission, at its sessions in the United States. " The questions which were asked obviously related to Mr. Francis W. Birst, but even ■a careful reading of the record does not make this clear. ■ Faithfully, yours, ^ Durand Hunter Miller. MONDAY, AUGUST, 18 1919. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, WasJiington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to the call of the chairman, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 426, Senate OfSce Building, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge presiding. Present: Senators Lodge (chairman), McCumber, Borah, Brande- gee, Knox, Johnson of California, Moses, Hitchcock, Swanson, and Pomerene. STATi;]yiEirT of me. thomas f. f. millard. The Chairman. Please give your full name. Mr. Millard. Thomas F. F. Millard. The Chairman. You have been a newspaper correspondent, have you not ? Mr. Millard. Yes; that is my occupation. The Chairman. Have you been in China in that capacity % Mr. Millard. Yes; I have been more or less connected with the Far East for 20 years. The Chairman. In what capacity? Mr. Millard. As a writer, a journalist, a publisher of newspapers, editor of newspapers. The Chairman. I am going to ask Senator Johnson, as he has given particular attention to this matter, to conduct your examina- tion. Senator Swanson. If the Senator will allow me, before he begins, 1 would like to ask Mr. Millard this question: Did you ever hold any official position, or were you ever advisor to the Chinese Government? Mr. Millard. I can state the circumstances to you, and you can judge for yourself. Last February I was in New York. I left China in December and came to New York, and in January and February I wrote the manuscript for a book; and while I was doing that I received a telegram transmitted through the Chinese Legation in Washington, from the Chinese delegation at Paris, asking me if I would come to Paris to advise them in an unofficial capacity. When I had delivered my manuscript, I went on to Paris, and from the time I left New York until I got back they paid my expenses. I received no compensation. Senator Swanson. No compensation? Mr. Millard. No. If that constitutes an official connection, why, that is what it amounted to. I might say in that connection, that it has been the desire of the Chinese delegation at Paris to employ two eminent Americans of reputation as international lawyers, as their official advisors over there; but by reason of advice given to them by our Government, they did not do that. Thw had an English and a French advisor. Senator Brandegee. Wiiat part of our Government gave them that advice ? Mr. Millard. I think the advice was first tentatively rendered through our legation at Pekin and afterwards confirmed at Paris in the early weeks of the assemblage of the conference. Senator Brandegee. Confirmed by whom at Paris % 430 TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. 431 Mr. Millard. I think, perhaps, by Mr. Lansing, or perhaps com- municated through the Far Eastern experts — the advisors of our cominission. Senator Brandegee. Do you loiow what was the ground of that advice that they should not employ American counsel ? Mr. Millard. The explanation given to me by the Chinese was that our Government felt that China's position over there was some- what that of the ward of the United States. I am not saying that they used that term, I am using that term as descriptive of the situa- tion. There had been preliminary consultations with the Chinese delegation at Peking before they left for Paris, in which they had submitted to our legation at Peking a list of the matters which they wished to bring up at Paris. On the suggestion of our Government, communicated through the minister at Peking, certain matters were ehminated. That is, China was advised that our Government con- .sidered that it would be inexpedient and would embarrass matters or complicate matters to raise those questions at Paris, and that led to the elimination of those questions. China did not raise those ques- tions. Then the matter of employing some expert American advisors was brought up at that time, but I think was deferred for later considera- tion. After the peace conference had met at Paris, as I understand it, the matter was brought up again. I, meanwhile, and others, had advised them in a perfectly informal way, myself acting merely as a sort of general friend of China and a man who was known to be a friend of China and familiar with the political questions out there, that they employ a couple of American advisors. I had suggested Mr. John Bassett Moore and Dr. W. W. Willoughbe, who at one time had been employed out there, but neither of those gentlemen went, and I did not know until after I arrived at Paris why they had not gone. Then I was told by the Chinese over there that it had been intimated to them that our Government would prefer that no Americans be officially connected with the Chinese delegation. Senator Brandegee. Was it stated at any time that the embar- rassments to which you refer if they did employ American advisors would be because the plans of our Government or the intention of our Government or of our peace commissioners to protect China would be interfered with if they had American counsel connected with them ? Mr. Millard. I could not say that. I could only conjecture about it. That was the explanation given me when I got over there. I asked Mr. Wong, and I asked Dr. Ku, because I had had some correspondence here in America with Dr. Willoughbee, in America, as to whether he was going over there or not. I said "Why didn't you get any of these gentlemen? Their counsel would have been valuable in these circumstances." And then they told me they had not done so because it had been intimated to them that our Government would prefer that they did not. I do not know what the motives of our Government were. Senator Brandegee. These Chinese gentlemen to whom you refer as having told you these things, were they officially connected with the Chinese delegation ? 432 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. ■ Mr. Millard. They were official envoys of the Chinese Govern- ment at Paris. Senator Brandegee. And your services, as I understand you, were without compensation. Simply your expenses were paid? Mr. Millard. My expenses were paid. Senator Brandegee. Did you regard it simply as a friendly act ? Mr. Millard. It was a friendly act on my part, without any com- pensation. I probably would have gone to Paris any way. Senator McCumber. What were your services to be ? What were they ? Mr. Millard. Just you might say as a sort of friendly counsellor. Senator McCumber. A counsellor representing the Chinese Gov- ernment ? Mr. Millard. No; I did not represent the Chinese Government. My position was entirely unofficial. Senator McCumber. I know, but if you were counsel you must have been counsel for somebody or something, and what I am trying to get at is for whom you were acting. Mr. Millard. I have explained the exact circumstances. Senator Brandegee. You did not say you were counsel. You said you were advisor. Who received the requests of the Chinese over here in Washington? Who made the requests from China— what man ? Mr. Millard. It was Dr. Wellington Ku who sent the telegram. He was one of the plenipotentiaries, the former Chinese minister here in Washington. Senator McCumber. You were to advise on what ? Mr. Millard. Whatever they would ask me to advise them about. Senator McCumber. That is very broad. I assumed that it was technical advice. Mr. Millard. On several occasions — I watched the course of events, and whenever anything came up that I thought worthy of attracting their notice, I would call attention to it or write a memo- randum about it or something like that, and on two or three occasions they asked me what I thought about this or that question that came up, and I would write a little memorandum about it. Senator McCumber. But you were not acting officially in any way ? Mr. Millard. Oh, no, sir; in no sense. It was entirely unofficial. Senator Brandegee. Are you interested in any publications pub- lished in the Far East now, or anywhere else, with reference to Far Eastern questions ? Mr. Millard. Yes; I am interested in a publication in China. Senator Brandegee. What is the name of it ? Mr. Millard. Millard's Review. Senator Brandegee. Do you own that ? Mr. Millard. No, it is owned by a corporation. Senator Brandegee. Are you the editor ? Mr. Millard. Oh, no ; I have been away for the last year or so most of the time, and Prof. J. B. Powell is the editor. Senator Brandegee. Were you ever the editor of it? Mr. Millard. Yes; I founded that paper. Senator McCumber. Did you live in Japan at any time during the last 20 years ? TEEATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. 433 Mr. Millard. No, sir. I have spent different times over there, sometimes for two or three months at a time. I have been there very frequently but never resided there. Senator Swanson. Most of the 20 years you have resided in China ? Mr. MiLLAED. I went to China to reside in 1911. Before that I had been there frequently, sojourning there. Senator Swanson. Since 1911 you have lived there? Mr. MiLLAED. Yes; I founded a daily newspaper in China in 1911, called the China Press, and edited it for the first five years of its existence at Shanghai. Senator Brandegee. Do you speak Chinese at all ? Mr. MiLLAED. Very little. Senator Hitchcock. Were you in China at the times the Germans acquired their leasehold and other interests in the Shantung Penin- sula? Mr. MiLLAED. No; I was first in China in 1897, and that was done the previous year. Senator Hitchcock. Is Millard's Eeview a self-sustaining pub- lication ? Mr. Millard. It is just about breaking even now. Senator Hitchcock. From what does it derive its revenue ? Mr. Millard. Ordinary sources — subscriptions and advertising. Senator HiTcifcocK. Nothing else ? Mr. Millard. Nothing else. Senator Hitchcock, it has no subsidy? Mr. Millard. None whatever. Senator Hitchcock. No revenue except from advertising and subscriptions ? Mr. Millard. Nothing whatever. Senator Johnson of California. Its attitude has been very different from that of any American papers that are engaged in Japanese propaganda, has it not ? Mr. Millard. I do not know as to that. Senator Johnson of California. Your residence in China, Mr. Millard, has been for about 20 years, most of that time at Shanghai ? Mr. MiLLAED. As far as I have had any residence there it has been entirely in Shanghai. Of course I have always traveled more or less. I have made different trips to Peking, but my habitat has been Shanghai. Senator Johnson of California. In addition to your journalistic activities have you written any published books on the Far East ? Mr. MiLLAED. Yes; I have published several books on the Far East. Senator Johnson of California. What are their titles ? lir. Millard. My first book was published in 1906. It was called The New Far East. In 1907 I published a book called America and the Far Eastern Question. Then I published a small book in 1911. Then I published a book in 1916 called Our Eastern Question. Senator Knox. What was the title of the 1911 book? Mr. Millard. That was called The Revolution in China. It was published out there, right in Shanghai, and then it just dropped out of publication and I incorporated some of the contents of that book in a later book. Our Eastern Question, in a more permanent form. 135546—19 28 434 TKBATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANY. That was published three years ago. Then I published a book the last of May called Democracy and the Eastern Question. Senator Johnson of California. During the time you have been in China you have made an intimate study, have you not, of the Far Eastern question? Mr. Millard. Yes; I think I may say that I have. Senator Johnson of California. Not only in its relation to China, but in its relation to the other powers, including Japan ? Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. You are familiar, are you not, with the situation that exists there at present regarding China and Japan ? Mr. Millard. Yes; I think I am. Senator Johnson of California. Just amplify what you were asked by my colleague a moment ago. What was the date you went to Paris in the capacity you have indicated ? Mr. Millard. I left New York toward the end of March and arrived there at the end of March. Senator Johnson of California. March, 1919 1 Mr. Millard. March, 1919. Senator Johnson of California. And you remained there how long ? Mr. Millard. I remained there until toward the end of May. Senator Johnson of California. During the period that you were there was the Shantung question under discussion ? Mr. Millard. Yes; it was decided during the period that I was there. Senator Johnson of California. It was decided during the period that you were there ? Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. I presume you followed the pro- ceedings of the peace conference respecting the Shantung decision? Mr. Millard. Yes, as well as I could. Senator Johnson of California. Please go ahead in your own fashion and describe the problem as it affects Japan and China or the Far East, as to the interest of America in the situation there, and then leading up to the decision that was made in the Shantung- Kaiochow question, and the effect of that so far as the United States is concerned and so far as China is concerned. Go ahead in your own way, if you please. Mr. Millard. Well, gentlemen, it might help a little in this con- nection if I would somewhat briefly give the background of this Shantung question. I might say that the Shantimg question is the crux of the far- eastern question. It was one of the contributory causes of the great war in Europe, and it was a contributory cause to the creation of one of the two fundamental foreign policies of the United States, the two that I have in mind being the Monroe doctrine and the Hay doctrine. Senator Hitchcock. What other doctrine beside the Monroe doctrine ? Mr. Millard. The Hay doctrine. We are all the time learning about these matters, and there is a great deal about it in a book called The Eclipse of Russia, published by the great authority on Eussia, the Englishman, Dr. E. J. Dillon. This book was not per- mitted for publication during the war, but it was published three or TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEKMANY. 435 four months ago. I obtained a copy in Paris and read it on my way back home. He was a sort of confidential adviser of Count Vitte for many years, and in that book he discloses how Germany came to acquire Snantimg. That is, at a certain very historic conference held between the Kaiser and the Czar, the Kaiser obtained the con- sent of the Czar that Germany should acquire a foothold in Kaiochow Bay. Count Vitte says that it was without the knowledge of his own Russian foreign office that this was done. Some of these facts have only recently been disclosed. Then, with that as a background, Germany seized a pretext — some violence done to a German missionary in Shantung — to demand of China the cession that was acquired there. These facts, revealed in Dr. Dillon's book, coming from Count Vitte himseK, show, however, that even the point that they were going to seize had been determined before the so-caUed outrage which was m.ade the excuse of it. That secret agreement had been made between the Czar of Eussia and the Emperor of Germany, to the effect that Russia would interpose no objection to Germany seizing the port of Kaiochow. Senator Hitchcock. Give the date of the agreement betv/een the Czar and the Kaiser. Mr. Millard. You will find that in this book, the whole thing. Senator Hitchcock. What was the date of the agreement? Mr. Millard. It was, I should say, about 1897, or some such time as that. Senator Swanson. Was any documentary evidence produced, or was it simply on the evidence of this writer? Was there anj^ docu- mentary evidence ? Mr. Millard. Of course, you know what Count Vitte's position was. Senator Swanson. I mean, were there any letters or memoranda ? Mr. Millard. He gives it in considerable detail in this book. I had intended to bring the book with me, but I found I had loaned it to Judge Campbell, and he had not returned it. You will find it in the Congressional Library. Senator SwAnson. Was there any documentary evidence — were there any memoranda made at the time ? Mr. IVfiLLARD. Yes; he gives certain memoranda, and he gives the details as related to him by Count Vitte in full in this book. Senator Hitchcock. The date was 1897? Mr. Millard. As I recall, 1896 or 1897; thereabouts. Senator Knox. Do you know as a matter of fact that as early as 1896 there had been a public statement in the Reichstag that that was going to be the policy of Germany ? Mr. Millard. If I did know it, I have forgotten it. Senator Knox. Prof. Hornbeck's authority for that is Contempo- rary Politics in the Far East ? Mr. Millard. Of course the matter had been discussed; there had been a good deal said about it by the German press, and they had been beating about the bush for several years; but the specific thing you refer to I did not have in mind. Senator Knox. Prof. Hornbeck refers to that. Mr. Millard. Yes; he no doubt looked it up. Senator Borah. At any rate. Senator Swanson, Dr. Dillon said that. I do not think the Senator will have any doubt about it when he reads it. 436 TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Millard. Of course he is recognized as outside of Eussia, the greatest authority on Russia, Dr. E. J. Dillon; and he was employed in the most confidential capacity by the Russian Government for years. Well, then, Germany raised the pretext and secured the leasehold of Kiaochow, China, not being able at that time to get any support to resist the pressure that was brought upon her. So she signed the ease. I Senator Hitchcock. Do you know what effort was made by her to get support in any direction ? Mr. Millard. I have been told that she went to the legations at Peking, that she went to the British and American legations, and flustered around, to see if she could, but she found that she could not, and Germany was backed up by Russia, and China gave in. Senator Hjtchcock. Did she apply to the United States ? Mr. Millard. I do not know if she actually applied. Probably some one went up and sounded out the American legation and found out that we considered it not a matter that vitally concerned us. At that time we had not even enunciated the Hay doctrine. The Hay doctrine was the result of these things that occurred, as I am going to point out. Now, that was the manner in which Germany obtained that leasehold. I noticed in a communication some two weeks ago that Mr.Taft, in commenting on the Shantimg matter, referred to the murder of the German minister at Peking, and said that the Shantung leasehold was the result of that. He just got the events in inverse order. It was the Shantung "grab," if I may term it that, that led to the murder of the German minister at Peking some two years later, and brought on the world and all of us the turbulence known as the Boxer Rebellion, that upheaval in China against the foreign interests in China. Thatwas caused by a cumulation of circumstances, and was brought to a head by the Shantung matter, because Shantimg has sacred associations for China. In the Chinese mind it is the birth- place and the burial place of Confucius; and various other matters give it a sentimental place in the thoughts and in the minds of the Chinese. Moreover, it was recognized that when you pressed into Shantung you pressed right into the heart of China, politically, strategically, and every other way. Senator Hitchcock. Before you go any further, can you put into the record the date of the enunciation of the Hay doctrine of the "open door" ? Senator Brandegee. He has indicated that. Senator Swanson. That is in his recent book. Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. Mr. Hay was Secretary of State at the time this so-called German "grab" occurred? Senator Johnson of Cahfornia. No. The Chairman. No; he came in shortly afterwards. Mr. Olney was Secretary of State and Mr. Hay must have succeeded very soon after. Senator Hitchcock. Y\?'ill you put that date in the record ? Mr. Millard. Yes; I have all those documents here in this book. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 437 The Chairman. Mr. Hay became Secretary of State in September, 1898, as I remember. He came home from London Senator Knox. Yes; he succeeded Mr. Day. The Chairman. Yes; in the summer or autumn of 1898. Senator Hitchcock. Did not the Germans acquire Shantung in 1899 ? Mr. Millard. No, sir; in 1898. I have the whole document here printed in this book. I will look it up. Senator Hitchcock. The lease is dated 1899. Mj-. Millard. Here it is; " Convention between the German Empire and China, Kiachow," page 434; here it is. The date is the 6th of March, 1898. Senator Hitchcock. What was that ? Mr. Millard. The Kiachow convention — the German lease. It is dated March 6, 1898. Senator Swanson. Mr. Da}^ was Secretary at that time. The Chairman. Yes; he was Secretary of State. Senator Knox. That demand was made upon China in 1897. That was when the ministers were killed. Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. Then at the time that was signed, Mr. Day was Secretary of State and Mr. McKinley was President ? Mr. Millard. I would not know without looking it up. Senator Knox. Mr. McKinley had been President two days. Senator Swanson. No; a year and two days. Senator Knox. Yes; a year and two days. Mr. Millard. The reason I have brought these details out was that I wanted to demonstrate its connection with other events that occurred later. Germany being able at that time to grab the stra- tegical position there in Kiaochow had demonstrated to the minds of our diplomats in Europe the existence of some kind of secret compact or collusion with Russia. I have never seen these facts fully brought out until they were brought out in this book of Dr. Dillon's, but any trained diplomat would at once have seen, in the circumstances there, that there was some connection. That set other forces in motion that unquestionably brought about the first Anglo-Japanese alliance. That made the Japanese-Russian War possible. There was set in motion the whole train of circum- stances of which we are to-day beginning to see the consequences. Now, this was so important — that is, this seizure by the Germans— . strategically and in regard to the whole situation of China and the balance of power in the Far East, that Mr. Hay took cognizance of it, and as you will recall, the so-called Hay doctrine resulted from an exchange of notes which Mr. Hay took up with the German Govern- ment through von Bulow, the German minister of foreign affairs, and it was entu-ely about the Shantung question; the Shantung question, that is, was the nail upon which the Hay doctrine was hung. It was Germany's acquisition of Shantung which caused the Hay doctrme to be formulated. That is, Mr. Hay, when he came m and surveyed the situation, said, "If this thing goes on, China is broken up; the partition of China will soon be an accomplished thmg;" and he took cognizance of that situation, and the way it would affect the United States and the way it would affect various other matters, m his judgment; and so he opened up a correspondence with the German 438 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEKMANY. Government — ^with the minister of Foreign Affairs, Count von Btilow — which resulted in what is called the Hay doctrine. Of course the Hay-von Billow notes are published. I have them here. Senator Swanson. Will you put those notes in the record? Senator Brandegee. You do not mean to put them in now, but put them in afterwards ? Mr. Millard. On page 448 of this book, "Mr. Hay, American Secretary of State, to Mr. White, American Ambassador of Germany." That is, it was communicated in that way. The Chairman. That was Andrew D. White ? Mr. Millard. I suppose so. Yes, Andrew D. White, Mr. Hay's note is "Washington, September 6, 1899," and Count von Billow's is February 19, 1900. Senator Brandegee. On what page of that book does that occur? Where is it printed ? ' Mr. Millard. In this book? Senator Brandegee. Yes. Mr. Millard. It is in the appendices, pages 448 to 450. Of course it is in Rockhill's Treaties, and m all the textbooks. Senator Borah. Those things are in that book, and are much more accessible than they would be in this interminable record. Of course it is in that book Contemporary Politics in the Far East, also. Senator Brandegee. Will you let me ask you one thing, not con- nected with this particular thing. When did you first hear of this particular treaty between Great Britaia and Japan providing that Great Britain will have Shantung? In 1917, was it not? Mr. Millard. 1917? I first heard of it at Paris. Senator Brandegee. When ? Mr. Millard. About the 1st or 2d of Apri' — last April. Senator Brandegee. 1918? Mr. Millard. 1919. Senator Brandegee. That is all. Mr. Millard. I will come to that a little later. Senator Swanson. Now, will you tell us, from yom- interpretation of the Hay doctrme, the open-door policy, from those two com- munications, how far it goes, and how it affects trade and commerce of this country ? Mr. Millard. The Hay doctrine was designed, as it appears on its face, to extract from the German Government a statement, which it did extract, that in acquiring the leasehold of Kiaochow and the subsequent railway agreement signed a year or so after the lease, Germany disclaimed by those acquisitions any preferential position in China, any impairment of Chinese sovereignty, any intention or fmrpose to use her position at Kiaochow to discriminate against the ree commerce in China of other nations, or the rights of other nations under the clause of the so-called most-favored nations clause of the treaty — that is our position; we have a very favorable treaty with China. The notes, as I say, speak for themselves. Now, then when Mr. Hay got the German Government on record then he approached the opposite Governments, the British, the French, and the Japanese, and the other Governments. Senator Swanson. Before you proceed, was that a protest against the sovereignty that Germany acquired ? Did the note contain any protest agamst sovereignty? TEEATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. 439 Mr. Millard. You can read the note. Senator Swanson. I just wanted that clear. It simply asks for equal trade relations and things of that sort. Mr. Millard. It started out with the usual diplomatic language, that it should be cleared up and would be to the advantage of every- body if they would state their positions. Senator Swanson. I had an idea that the determination was that no rights acquired by Germany should interfere in any manner with the righte and the position of the United States. Mr. Millard. No; with the integrity of aU nations, and also that China's rights were to be unimpaired. Senator Swanson. I did not notice that particularly. Senator Knox. Territorial integrity is specifically mentioned. Mr. Millard. Territorial integrity is mentioned.. Senator Knox. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a suggestion, that Senator Johnson has asked the witness to narrate in his own way this story and the witness is accustomed to giving a consecutive narration of events. I would like to hear that and then have questions asked afterwards. I think we could get a much better idea if we would let Mr. Millard go on and answer Senator Johnson's question in his own way, and then put such questions as we wish. The Chairman. You mean that no Senator is to ask any question imtil he has concluded his statement ? Senator Knox. Oh, I do not mean no question. Senator Swanson. If other Senators askcfuestions, I want the same right. I want to have his interpretation of what the Hay doctrine did. Senator McCumber. We have been deviating from that rule a great deal since we began the examination of witnesses. Senator Knox. But none have been so accustomed to express themselves consecutively as Mr. Mniard. Senator Swanson. I am perfectly wUling that he proceed without interruption. Senator Knox. I think it wiU contribute to the information of aU of us. The Chairman. I think it is a better way to let him make his state- ment. Senator Swanson. So long as all the Senators do not interrupt. The Chairman. Of course that is understood. Senator MoCumber. As his next statement is on a different subject, if I understood Mr. Millard correctly, Germany renounced any claim over Shantung. Mr. Millard. I would say that it amounted to that, a disclaimer of any purpose to infringe upon the integrity of China or interfere with the general open door or various things of that kind. Senator McCumber. She claimed no sovereign rights over the territory. Mr. Millard. She disclaimed. That was the purpose of the Hay note, and it accomplished that. Senator Brandegee. Japan disclaims any sovereignty over Shan- tung and agrees to give it back. Mr. Millard. It is difficult to know. Senator Borah. Can not we have an understanding that the wit- ness may make a statement, and then ask questions if we want to ? 440 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. Senator Swanson. It is perfectly agreeable to me. Senator Brandegee. Senator Johnson has the witness. Senator Johnson of California. I asked a general question, and we have not advanced very far on it. I ask that no particular rule be ■pursued except that which the committee deem appropriate, but I would be glad if the witness could proceed with his statement under such rule as may be prescribed by the committee. Mr. Millard. I merely brought that in because I think it is im- portant to understand in relation to this Shantung situation to-day the different steps by which this Shantung situation has arisen. Senator Johnson of California. Now, if you will proceed histori- cally and come down to the Shantung decision, describe what it was, its effect upon China, upon Japan, and upon our country. Mr. Millard. I think it is pertinent in this connection to point out that after the promulgation of what was termed the Hay doctrine, after Mr. Hay- had gotten this communication from the German Gov- ernment, and then had subsequently got the assent of the other Gov- ernments to the thing in principle, the whole thing constituted a gen- eral international understanding known as the Hay doctrine. Various Governments, however, continued among themselves to make what we now have a new phrase for, "regional imderstandings" regarding China. There exists at the present time in the neighbor- hood of 20 known regional understandings affecting China, and others are suspected to exist. For instance, among the regional understandings, soon after Germany's acquisition of Shantimg there was a regional understanding between the British and German Gov- ernments whereby Great Britain in effect recognized Germany's superior position or sphere in Shantung. That agreement held pre- sumably up until the abrogation by declaration of war in 1914 of all agreements between the British and German Governments. And then various other trades were made in the Far East, regional under- standings or collateral trades on the side among the various nations to reduce the balance, due to Germany's acquisition of that position there. One of the very pertinent things in that connection was the Anglo- Japanese alliance. There is very good authority for the statement that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was first proposed by Germany in the form of a tri-partite alliance — Germany, Japan, and Great Britain. Germany approached the Japanese Government first, and the Japanese Government evidently took the thing under favorable consideration, and approached the British Government. The British Government at that time seemed to have been animated by a different hypothesis, and they did not want any alignment in the Far East between Germany and Japan ; so finally they succeeded in sidetrack- ing that, and the alliance was made between Japan and Great Britain solely, and excluding Germany. I mention that for the bearing that Germany was gradually being pushed into a position off by herself, and in my mind those were among the con tributirig causes that finally led to this clash in 1914. One thing led to another. You built up and kept building up combinations, a waU, and Germany was trying to breaK out in different directions. I have brought in that question of regional understandings and their existence because you will see the pertinency of that later. TEEATY OF PEACE "WITH GEEMANY. 441 We come along now up to the time of the beginning of the great war. There were different demonstrations in the interim there of the apphcation of these various regional understandings, operating, you may say, inside of the Hay doctrine, and antagonistic to it. Mr. Knox's efforts to neutralize the railways of Manchuria constituted one strong demonstration of the fact that there were combinations inside of combinations there, regional understandings of powers among them- selves, which, when it came to a showdown, superseded their acqui- escence to the Hay doctrine. When the Great War broke out suddenly, Japan almost immediately took the occasion to send an ujtimatum to Germany, practically de- manding that she get out of Shantung, to which Germany never re- plied, and that resulted in a declaration of war and the Japanese expe- dition which captured the port of Tsingtau. China made efforts to preserve her neutrality. She made efforts in which the American legation at Peking took some part, but the time was very short. The proposal that Tsingtau be neutralized, that it be turned over to China, and various ways to keep China from being involved in the thing were proposed. Japan did not want any of those things. She moved quickly, and proceeded to go over there and land her troops. In her occupation of the Province she immediately, from the begin- ning, went further than Germany had ever done. She did not con- fine her military operations to the leased German territory at all. She overran the whole Province almost immediately; seized the whole railway up to the capital of the Province over its entire length, established her troops and police clear outside the railway, and va- rious other parts; and in that way she made a rapid military pene- tration of this entire Province, which condition exists to the present day. China's various efforts to prevent that were unavailing; and the next move in that game — the other powers were preoccupied with the desperate struggle in Europe, and unable to interpose any effective action in the Far East — so Japan came along in 1915 with her 21 de- mands, which she sought first to impose upon China by secrecy. When that was impossible, the Chinese realized the character of the demands, and they happened to have quite a strong man as President of China at that time, Yuen Che Kai, a strong, able man. He communicated it to other governments. The thing was brought out into the light, and raised such an outcry that although Japan persisted in pressing the demands, and China was finally compelled to yield, they were in somewhat modified form over the form in which they had been originally presented. That was in 1915. However, the United States Government took an official exception to that 1915 treaty, which is all in the record. Senator Pomekene. You say the United States Government took an exception ? Mr. Millard. Took an exception; yes, sir. The United States Government took an official exception, which is published, and which is included in that book; and the Chinese Government took exception also by stating that it signed under compulsion. From the standpoint of the United States, the next important official maneuver, if you may call it that, was the Lansmg-Ishu agreement. Oh, no ; let me go back a little. 442 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GBEMANY. After our Government severed diplomatic relations with Germany, which I believe was earlj in February, 1917, we approached the Chinese Government officially. I was in Peking at the time. The United States Government officially, through the American minister at Peking, approached the Chinese Government with an invitation and advice that we join with her in severing diplomatic relations with Germany. That was very strongly urged upon the Chinese Govern- ment, and for several days there was a very strong diplomatic fight raised in Peking, the German and Austrian legations, of course, op- posing it, and the Japanese legation opposing it very strongly, but in a secret way. The British, French, and Russian legations were sym- pathetic to the proposal, and such influence as they had was exerted in favor of China accepting the American invitation. China did. Well, at that time China was favorably inclined to this proposal. I -might say that on two previous occasions China had offered to join the Allies. Both times she had been prevented by the objections of Japan. Japan would not let her come in. Her influence with the other allied powers was so strong that China was not allowed to join the Allies. The result was that when we came along and urged China to join with us — we had not at that time declared war on Germany, but we urged her to take the preliminary step and join us in severing diplo- matic relations with Germany, which every one felt would be a pre- lude to war — China was dubious, having been repulsed twice in efforts to join the alhes by the Japanese objections; and having knowledge that at that moment the Japanese legation and all the Japanese influences at Peking were fighting bitterly the proposal that China act upon the advice of the United States, the Chmese Govern- ment wanted certain assurances. That is, they wanted to know where they would get off. They said: "Suppose we do follow your advice and come in: Now, we want certain assurances. We would Mke to have definite assurances of the Allies that our territorial integrity will be protected in the peace settlement." An effort was made by the Chinese Government at that time to get such assurances from the French and British Governments. The French and British legations at Peking, while they urged China to follow the advice of the United States, communicated with their Governments, and they could not give any definite assurances; but they told the Chinese Government— tnat is, the British minister and the French minister to Peking told the Chinese Gorernment — "You come on in; you follow along with the United States, and come on in, and we are quite sure you will be taken care of." The thing hung fire for two or three days just on that point, China quite willing to come in, but saying: "No; tell us just exactly, will you, if we come in, will you guarantee our territorial integrity?" They finally, when they got that kind of a negative reply from the British and French Governments, went after Dr. Eeinsch, and said, " Well, at least the American Government can say that you will sup- port us in protecting our territorial integrity." Now, I have this account from Dr. Kernsch, the American minister at Peking — Dr. Paul Eeinsch. It happened that just at that moment there was a break in the Pacific cable, and for several days Dr. Eeinsch was out of cable com- TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 443 munication with the State De|)artment. It was very urgent, and the thing had to be concluded quickly, or everyone there thought that it should be concluded quickly, because they felt that if they did not get the Chinese to act promptly the various Japanese intrigues would get to work, and they would succeed possibly in preventing China irom taking any action. They were holding almost hourly sessions there for two or three days. Two or three times a day Dr. Reinsch was in consultation with the Chinese Premier, Tuen Chi Jui, and Li-Un-Hung, the President at that time — Gen. Li-Un-Hung. They wanted definite assurances. Dr. Eeinsch said: "The cable is inter- rupted, and I can not communicate with my government at this momerit, but I feel justified in telling you verbally my opinion that in the event that you follow the advice of the United States now and sever displomatic relations with Germany, and in the event that that leads us into war with Germany, you can count upon the dip- lomatic support of the United States in seeing that China's rights are protected in the peace settlement." The result of these negotiations was that China did take that action, and, as the document shows, upon the advice of the United States, severed diplomatic relations with Germany. That eventually brought China into the war as an €nemy of Germany. The next important event in this connection was the signing of the so-called Lansing-Ishii agreement, which occurred here in Wash- ington, signed on the 2d of November, 1917. Meanwhile, both the United States and China had declared war on Germany. The Lansiag-Ishii agreement followed the general lines of pre- vious statements of the United States regarding China — the so- caUed Ha^y doctrine formula, which had been repeated now in eight or nine international agreements of one kind or another, which had been repeated in the Eoot-Takahira agreement signed in 1907; that is, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of China, and the "open door"; but it was significant in that it contained in its preliminary paragraphs a recognition of Japan's special position relating to China. That agreement was made, the negotiations were conducted, with- out China being informed, without consulting China in any way. ■China first learned of it when it was published. I might say in that connection that it was given premature publication at Peking by Japan. As the document itself shows, it was signed on the 2d of November, 1917. By a sort of general agreement, the two Gov- ernments were to give it simultaneous publication on November 7 at a stated hour — to give it simultaneous publication in Tokio and in Washington. However, as we know now, I think it was two days, even, before the thing was signed — it was either October 31 or October SO^that the contents of the agreement were communicated to the Russian Government by Japan through the Russian ambas- sador at Tokio. As I say, it was to have been given simultaneous publication on the 7th of November. On the 4th of November — and meanwhile our Government had not even informed our embassy at Tokyo or our legation at Peking of this matter at all — on the 4th of November the Japanese minister at Peking officially informed the Wei Chow Pou— that is, the Chinese Foreign Office— of the signing of the Lansmg-Ishu ■agreement, and provided them with a text in Japanese and Chinese^. In those texts in Japanese and Chinese, the phrase "special position" 444 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. was translated in a way to amount to a recognition of Japan's para- mountcy in China. The Chinese Government was naturally dum- founded at this thing, and immediately went to the American lega- tion. Now, if you know anything of the diplomatic atmosphere of Peking imder those circumstances, the Avay that would look to the Chinese was this: Japan comes and tells them of this thing under the cir- cumstances, which gives it the circumstantial appearance that "Now, we are paramount here, and we inform you about this, and if you do not believe us go up and ask the American legation." They went over to the American legation and inquired, and the American legation had never heard of it, of course. It immediately cabled for information. Meanwhile, through Japanese sources at Peking, and Chinese sources, too — they were bound to blab a thing Hke that; it completely flustered them — the Chinese Government and the Chinese Foreign Office and the newspaper men there in Peking got hold of it, and the result was a little telegram carried by the Associated Press and Renter's New Service aU over the world, to the effect that this had been signed, and the news was given out at Peking. I was in New York when I read that short telegram in the papers, and then our Government, of course, cabled the text immediately to the minister at Peking, to the legation at Peking, and we then com- municated it to the Chinese Government; but our translation of the term "special position" differed very materially, when translated into Chinese, from the way that Japan had translated it in the original text communicated by Japan. That led to some little diplomatic controversy there at Peking, but we stuck to our text, and Japan sticks to hers, and so that matter stands to this day, so farasT know; the Chinese having two texts of this thing in their Foreign Office, one the first one communicated by Japan in Japanese and Chinese, in which the term "special position" is translated into the equivalant of paramountcy, and our text, which translates into the interpreta- tion which Mr. Lansing exhibited to you in his examination the other day, which, so far as I know, has been the first official delineation of the American position on the subject. Meanwhile it has stood in China's eyes in that obscure position, with all of the circumstantial indications favoring the Japanese interpretation. Moreover, Japan went ahead and acted on her interpretation. From that time she assumed a position of paramountcy in relation to China. She went ahead and began the establishment of civil gov- ernment over Shantung Province. She extended her civil govern- ment regime in Manchuria. She began actually to acquire the pos- sessions and the position of a sovereign in those parts oi China where she had obtained a foothold by the methods I have indicated. She went on, and she obtained, through that influence, a great influence at Peking. The Chinese Government, you might say, threw up their hands and said: "Well, America will not support us; they have recognized Japan's paramountcy; we have got to do the best we can." Japan bribed several high Chinese officials up there, and began to press for other secret agreements and things. However, the Chinese Government resisted. They did obtain a so-called supplementary agreement to the 1915 agreement, signed, I believe, in September, 1918; but they could not get that signed at Peking. They seemed to have reached the Chinese minister over in Tokio by the money TBBATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 445 process — I am only repeating the open accusations made in the press of China — and got him to sign a memorandum, the so-called secret 1918 agreement, which is further confirmatory of Japan's position in^Shantung, and which amounted to the fact that they would have certain additional raUway concessions there over and above what Germany had had, and that, providing the peace con- ference would give Japan Germany's position in Shantung, China would consent. That thing was signed at Tokio by the Chinese minister, and if that holds China, that is aU there is. It was never confirmed by the Chinese parliament; it was never confirmed by a meeting of the Chinese cabmet or anything. Now, that is what that so-called 1918 agreement rests upon. Senator Pomerene. Will it interrupt you to ask you just this question, to clear that up : Does the Chinese law require ratification by the Chinese Parliament ? Mr. Millard. Yes; the only constitution that is in existence. Senator Pomerene. Excuse me for interrupting you. Mr. Millard. You see, China has been in a more or less turbulent state ever since the revolution. They have a so-called constitution and under their forms it would have required at least ratification by the cabinet and also ratification by the Parliament. It was never ratified. In fact, the text of it was never even disclosed to anybody imtil the Paris peace conference. That brings us along up to, say, the armistice. I was in Peking at the time, and China made preparations Senator Hitchcock. Before you leave that, will you please make it clear whether there was any disagreement between the Ishii note in Japanese and the American note in English ? Mr. Millard. As I say, it was a question of translation. Of course, we can all read the American note in English, but we can not read it in Japanese or Chinese. Now, the Japanese Government, of course, immediately telegraphed this out to Tokio and then tele- graphed it over to Pekin, and they had translations made. They had a translation made into Chinese and another translation made into Japanese, those, of course, being the languages of the two Governments. Senator Hitchcock. Is there any question whether the Japanese note is correctly translated into Chinese ? Mr. Millard. That, of course, as I say, led to a dispute, because our sinologues say that our translation is the better translation. Senator Hitchcock. Is the translation of the Japanese note into Chinese ? Mr. Millard. Our translation of the Lansmg-Ishii agreement into Chinese is accepted by everybody except Japan. She made her own translation. . . Senator Borah. As I understand, in translatmg it into Chinese and Japanese they used a certain word Mr. Millard. They used a certain character. Senator Borah. They used a character or word. Mr. Millard. They used a different .character than we used in our translation. . , . ,, ,, Senator Borah. Which indicated "special interest or para- mount," according to which character was used. 446 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANY. Mr. Millard. Something which they translate paramount. Senator Borah. Ours indicates nothing but "special interest." Mr. Millard. Ours indicates the interpretation which Mr. Lansing fave you gentlemen the other day. There is just that difference, ut as you say, it is a very important difference. Senator Pomerene. In view of these questions may I ask this further question: Are you able to state whether the word which was used by the Japanese was correctly translated into our word " paramountcy ? " Mr. Millard. There would be no way of making an exact trans- lation, but the sense of it would be that according to the sinologues. Our legation has Chinese experts, as every legation has, and these sinologues got together and translated this thing, and the general unanimity of opinion outside of the Japanese legation is that oui translation is correct and theirs is a translation fixed up to suit what they want to put in there. Senator Pomerene. That is all. The Chairman. You may continue, Mr. Millard. Mr. Millard. Now the next step would come after the armistice,, when China began to make her preparations. The Japanese had been making a fight up there for some time by which they were attempting to secure representation in China. They even produced at Peking — they never had the nerve to produce it at Paris — an agreement which this same Chinese minister, Mr. Lou, had signed, whereby Japan was to represent China at the peace conference. However, when they tried to put that over, China absolutely re- sisted that, and of couise the British, American, and all other lega- tions said, "Do not recognize anything like that. You send your own delegation." They did that. They nominated their representatives. They sent their minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang. Then the Chinese delegates had been working with various experts on the subject of their case, how they would present it at the peace conference, and the matters they would want to bring up at the peace conference. I understand you have summoned ^. Ferguson to appear. He was among the foreign advisers thej'' had employed.. When I was in Peking, last October, I went up there, and I had- two interviews with the Chinese minister of foreign affairs, merely in my capacity as a journalist, in which we discussed these various mat- ters, and what China ought to do, and what China purposed to bring up, and things like that. Just about that time the Chinese foreign office went up to our legation and said, "Now, we have followed along with you people. We came into the war under your wing, and we are going to continue in that way. We are going to Paris in that way. We are not going there under the vv'ing of Japan, like she is trying to fix it up, and here is what we propose to ask. What do you think about it ? " And they laid down a list of the matters which China wanted to bring up at the peace conference. I will say that I have this information in a way so that I do not doubt its substantial accuracy, and I presume that that list perhaps was cabled by Dr. Eice, the American minister, to the State Department, and eventually the Chinese were advised by our Government that it would be better if they would not raise certain questions. I might mention what those questions are. One of them was the question of extraterritoriality in China, Another was the question TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY, 447 of figure financial cooperation in China, and these various conces- sions and one thing and another. China wanted to obtain from the Powers over there a general declaration written somehow into the treaty, which would form the groundwork for a real reconstructive policy in China, which would rid her of the burden of all these secret and published regional understandings, and all these various conces- sions interfering with Chinese territorial integrity and economy, which in one way and another have been forced on her by that method. As I understand it our Government advised China somewhat to this effect, that it would tend to befog the issue. Our Government, I understand, was in perfect sympathy with what China wanted to do by these things, but she said, "Now, the Paris conference wiU be concerned with the making of peace with Germany, and perhaps it will be advisable if China will not raise any questions at Paris except those which are directly concerned with her relations with Germany." Of course the Shantung question was directly concerned, and a few matters associated with the Shantung question, but our Government said, "Do not raise all these other questions, because they will open up the whole subject so that perhaps it will impair your chances of getting the Shantung question raised in the right way." And I will say that, in my opinion, that advice was exactly sound, and that if my advice had been asked at that moment I would have advised China in the same way. In fact I did so at Paris. I do not think it is fortunate the way the thing turned out, but I mean looking at it from the way the situation appeared then, i would have given the same advice that our Government is presumed to have given on that occasion. China took with her to Paris her chief British adviser. Dr. George E. Morrison, for twenty-odd years the famous foreign correspondent of the London Times, and for the last seven years employed as foreign adviser on foreign affairs to the Chinese Government. They took Dr. Leconte, a Frenchman, who for a long time has been employed over there as counsel. The Japanese tried to force them to take Dr. Riga, the Japanese legal adviser, whom in one way and another they had forced upon the Chinese Government, but" they would not take him, because they knew 'that if Dr. Riga had gone along the Chinese delegation would have been privv to everything the Chinese delegation did. They refused to take Dr. Riga, but they took Dr. Morrison and Dr. Leconte, and they desired to take one or two Americans, but I have explained about that. That brings us on to Paris. China went over there and confined the presentation of her case to the Shantung issue, which, of course, was entirely a question with Germany, complicated by Japan's inter- position. At a plenary session — I was under the impression that it was early in February, but I see Mr. Lansing the other day fixed it, i believe, at January 29, which probably is the correct date — at-a plenary session of the council of ten in Paris, before it narrowed down to a council of four— my knowledge of this, as you gentlemen nnderstand, is- second hand. I was not present. The account which I am going to give now was, however, given to me circumstantially by two plenipotentiaries who sat at the table, and their accounts substantially coincided. They did not differ m any material degree in their recollection of what transpired. The 448 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. matter under discussion at the moment was the disposition of the German colonies. As you may recall, at that time they had advanced the theory that the German colonies were to be detached from Ger- many, but that their disposition would be turned over to a league of nations if such a thing was organized, to be disposed of by them, and they brought forward this idea of mandatories. They were discussing the disposition of the German colonies, and President Wilson, as I understand it, proposed that they could just brush this question of the German colonies off to one side by agreeing at that session that they should be detached from Germany, and their disposition in- vested in the league of nations or some other international trusteeship, to be parceled out afterwards under the mandatory theory in some form, and by that method they would simply get that question dis- posed of and out of the way, and they could go on to other business. There was a general agreement and it looked like it would be passed unanimously, but the Japanese plenipotentiary. Baron Makino, who was sitting in the council, interposed an objection. They asked him what was the objection. He said Japan could not consent to that. When asked for his reasons, he said that Japan could not consent because she already had private engagements with her allies regarding the Shantung question. President Wilson then asked, or some one asked, what was the nature of those private agreements. Baron Makino said they were confidential, and he did not feel at liberty to communicate them without conferring with the other Allied governments and with his own government. President Wilson then asked that it be made the sense of the coimcil that the Japanese Government be requested to produce the text of those agreements and to lay them upon the table for the information of the council. That action was taken as the sense of the conucil, and the result was that at the next meeting the text of those agreements was produced. They are knoMTi as the Shantung secret agreements, and were produced confidentially. I can say from my own knowledge, coming direct from the Chinese delegation at Paris, that that was the first knowledge which the ' Chinese Government had of their existence, although myself and many of us had suspected the possible existence of those agreements, from various circumstantial indications, for at least a couple of years. In fact I had for some time felt morally certain of them. You could not explain in any other way certam things that had happened. Therefore those agreements revealed that at different dates, from I believe the 16th of February on to the 7th of March and on certain intervening dates, Japan had obtained Senator Hitchcock. In what year? Mr. Millard. In 1917 — that Japan had obtained from the British, the French, the Russian, and the Italian Governments written en- gagements — in the case of the British, French, and Russian Govern- ments, and oral statements from the Italian Government — by which those nations assented and would support Japan at the Peace Confer- ence in having yielded to her Germany's rights and leaseholds in Shantung Province. There was one other interesting thing brought out in the French note replying to the Japanese note on that question. France made certain conditions, one of which was that Japan would withdraw her TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 449 objections to China entering that war on the allied side. You will find that in the text of the French note, thereby getting it down in black and white, what everybody had known for various reasons to be the fact, that Japan had been keeping China out of the allied gjroup ever since the war started. If you wiU note the dates of the signing of those agreements you will see that they coincide with our severance of diplomatic relations with Germany and with the efforts which I have just narrated by which we were inducing China to come into the war, which was in February and March, 1917. I guess it was early in March. China, I think, actually took that step on the 9th of March, 1917. However, as we all had been morally certain, but as Mr. Lansing disclosed positively the other day, our Government did not know of the existence of those agreements until we learned of it at Paris, in the manner which I have described, at the same time that China did. China was urging them to give her assurances in the same way she was urging us to give assurances, but the British, Russian, and French Governments would not give any assurances that the territorial rights of China would be protected, because they had already signed them away to Japan, or were on the verge of doing so; but if China had known it at that time and we had known it at that time, it was rea- sonable to assume it would have had some influence upon the action of China and upon the action of the United States. If we had been appraised of i t at that time we would have said to the nations flatly, "You musy agree to this." We were in a position at that moment to have demanded any conditions from any of those governments, any- thing in reason that we had said we wanted, and we could have pro- tected China positively by saying, "Here, these things must be un- written, these things must be wiped out. It will be understood that we will all be there to act on a footing ot justice to China when the time comes." Mr. Lansing also disclosed the other day that at the time of the Lansing-Ishii agreement we also were not informed of it, and after we had declared war on Germany and were in the war, and Mr. Balfour and M. Viviani came over here, they did not tell us, but we were allowed to go ahead and get China into the war under those circum- stances, without that information. After that disclosure at Paris — the date of which Mr. Lansing fees at January 29 — I thought it was early in February — then it was evident m respect to China's case at the peace conference that she had to submit her case to a court of five, because Japan was added to the council of four on the Far Eastern question, and that of those five, four members of the court had signed a secret agreement in advance to decide against her.- Under those circumstances it became a question as to whether or not our Government would or could exert its influence upon the British, French, Japanese, and Italian Governments. Russia was also a signatory to one of those secret Shantung agreements, but she was not represented in the oonfererice. The revolution had eliminated Russia. Under those circumstances, as I say, it became a question as to whether or not our Government could prevail upon them to scrap those secret Shantung agreements and to make what we considered to be a proper solution of the Shantung matter, in justice to ourselves and to 135546—19 29 450 TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. China there. That was the situation I found when I got to Paris, I went over to see Dr. Kou immediately, and one of the first things he said to me was, "Do you know of the secret Shantung agree- ments?" I said, "I know nothing about them except that I saw a short telegram in one of the jSTew York papers from Paris indicating that something of the facts had been disclosed." I said, "Is it a fact?" He said, "Yes, we have the texts, but of course the texts are coiifidential at present." He gave me a synopsis of their con- tents, and I as rapidly as I could posted myself up on the situation of what had transpired before I had arrived at Paris, and from that ■ time on I could follow the developments with more or less intelligence. I was constantly in touch with the experts attached to our com- mission, the experts on the far eastern question. I had been per- sonally acquainted with all of them for many years. I saw them aU almost daily. Senator Johnson of California. State their names, will you ? Mr. Millard. The official ones were Dr. E. T. Wilhams and Prof. Hornbeck, who ranked over there as a captain ; and at different times certain naval and military officers were brought into the thing on those angles. I will say in that connection that on several occasions, when I would prepare little memoranda for the advice and information of the Chinese on certain developments from Japan, I would always, take a copy over and give it to our own experts on the commission for their information. The whole thing, as far as China was con- cerned at Paris, was conducted with the greatest intimacy with the: American delegation. Every move that China made was immedi- ately communicated to the American commission. Every move that any foreign advisor of China made, she imme- diately communicated to the American experts. Of course none of us could tell whether they went on higher up or whether they did not. We turned them in for the information oi Prof. Williams and Prof. Hornbeck. I had various conversations with Dr , Morrison, whom I had known for twenty years, and who probably of all foreigners, knows more about the politics and conditions of the Far East than any man, because he is a methodical man and has kept his notes for years, and he indexes them and files them. He is simply a walking encyclopedia of the politics of China of the last 30 years. Senator Johnson of California. Where is he now? Mr. Millard. He is in England now, I believe. At that time h& was sick, and his wife had to come over and take him to England.. He became ill so he took very little part in matters after I arrived there on account of his illness. But I went up and had several talks with Dr. Morrison about the situation, because he particularly was- in touch with the British end of it, being a British subject, and I found that he was very doubtful as to what England was, and he felt very gloomy about the situation. He told me that he was afraid that the sense of the French and British Governments was to make the Shantung agreement stick. I found that our own experts wefe very much mystified by the official attitude regarding China of the British and French Governments, particularly of the British. They would, go over and talk to the men who held corresponding positions to- them, and the Far East experts of the British (Jommission, and they could not fathom — they would know how these men stood — but TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 451 back of that there was the superior policy of the Government. One thing accumulated after another, and they felt that the British and French were against them, which turned out afterwards to be the.- case. The situation drifted along in that position and became side-- tracked. China meanwhile discovered the psychology of the situa-- tion and acting upon the advice of a number of those whose opinions were asked, she interposed a proposal to compromise the matter; which opened a way out. Senator Pomerene. China did ? r Mr. Millard. China did. It had developed by that time pretty concisely the attitude of the different nations. The attitude of' Great Britain and France was that they would have to stand by, these secret agreements unless the United States somehow or other persuaded Japan to recede. Japan was saying "We insist upon Germany ceding her possession there to us, because we have prom- ised "to restore it to China, and we want to do that in our own way, and any other solution would indicate to the people that they do not take our word for it, and would dishonor us, and so forth, and so on." China proposed a compromise by way of getting around the difficulty. That proposal was made on April 23, in writing to the council of four, and it was in four points. I quote now the sense of it from memory. The first part was that China would consent to have the treaty, of peace cede the German rights in Shantung direct to Japan, pro- vided the other members of the council of four would be, you might say, cotrustees for the eventual turning over of it to China, or a league of nations or whatever body should be organized to carry out these processes. Japan had made a great deal over there of the enormous expense she had been to in capturing Shantung and driving Germany out of the Far East. China's second proposal to compromise was that she would reimburse Japan for those expenses. Japan had gotten in the 1918 agreementr— I have described how she obtained it — a special concession that she was to reserve to herseK Tsing Tau, which included railway timnels, docks, water front, and the whole port machinery. China proposed that during such period when other foreign residential conditions exist m China, Tsing Tau be made an international port. And the fourth one was merely that Japan would also m the treaty record a definite promise to restore and evacuate Shantung and restore Tsmg Tau within a certam specific time. As I say, that pro- posal was communicated in writing on April 23 by the Chmese dele- gation to the council of four. Before the decision was made it was known that it was coming up for decision very shortly. Meanwhile all along China had been pressing for a consideration of this thmg. She had presented her case in print and m various ways had been pressing to get the thing out of the way. Japan had been retardm^ It. That compromise was taken under advisement as I understand it by the council of four but Japan objected and succeeded m defeat- 1 do not know what her objection was based on, but it is interesting now to recall that she did reject that proposal, in view of the state, ments that they are makmg now that she is proposing to interna- 452 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. tionalize Tsing Tau, which means that she is proposing to hold- the kernel of the nut and turn over the shell, and various other claims which she is making now. It is interesting to put into the record the fact that she was instru- mental in rejecting the proposed compromise of the Chinese Govern- ment, which would seem to an impartial mind to have met the situa- tion fully, provided Japan has any real intention of getting out of Shantung. After this decision was announced the Chinese were naturally very much disappointed. The President's reasons were given to them, that he was forced to make this decision because of the uncompro- mising attitude taken by Japan, which amounted virtually to a threat to bolt the conference and to refuse to join the league of nations. The President was afraid of the general effect upon the world of that thing happening. Of course, I may say here that the President seems to have oeen about the only one of the powers that seemed to think that Japan's threat was more than a pure bluff. But at any rate he did not think so. He apprehended that that might take place, and he acted accordingly, and he told the Chinese — or rather he did not tell them personally, but sent them, word — that he felt that from the oral Sromise that had been obtained before the Council of Four from apan, taken in conjunction with the relief which China might obtain from the league of nations, China could eventually get justice by that method. To that the Chinese delegation responded in substance as follows: In the first place the league of nations had no existence, and in the second place, that if it was organized, its power and authority were problematical. In the third place, that it was not logical to assume that a league of nations, adopted by the same vote and in conjtmction with the treaty of peace, would design to reverse the provisions of that treaty. In the fourth place, that the real ruling power, the supreme council, of the league, would be constituted oy the same nations as made the Shantung decision in the council of four. Senator Bokah. You saiy this was the Chinese reply? Mr. Millard. Yes. And in the fifth place, that as near as China could make out, it was only the weak nations that were asked to depend for justice upon the league, for the strong powers were taking every other outside precaution to protect their interests. However the decision had been made, and China's pleas from that on were in the nature of doing what she could to amend or better herself in that position. She made various requests for interviews with the President and others. I remained in Paris several weeks longer and China had not seen the President up to that time, but China's representatives were subsequently received by him, and they were received by Mr. Balfour and the French representative, and they gave the information that they found they had been bound by the secret agreements and that Japan had made oral promises whicL. they felt Japan intended to carry out. And then this happened after I left Paris; but I have the informa- tion from a man who was attached to the Chinese delegation or who left Paris after I did. I advised in a memorandum which I wrote, a copy of which I have here somewhere on the situation — I advised the Chinese to take a certain course. One of the things that I suggested — and I showed this to Prof. Williams and Prof. Horbeck, also, and they TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 453 concurred— I said, "Get the best legal counsel you can; get the best American international lawyer, and the best French international lawyer, and the best British international lawyer you can find, and get their advice on this point : If you under these circumstances sign this treaty without reservation, to what extent wUl they qualify any appeal which you may make for revision of this law to an inter- national court, or a court of international arbitration, or to a league of nations. Get their advice on that point, and also even if you make no reservations." I do not know whether they took that counsel or not. Then I said: "When the things come up, ask to be permitted to make reservations, stating your position, so that you may file your exception for an appeal later, on which to base your appeal. If these legal counselors advise you and you draft these exceptions, and the exceptions are put into the record, and you are not inhibited from taking your appeal later, then sign. If you can not sign under those circumstances, then do not sign." I do not know to what extent my advice had to do with the course that the Chinese delegation pursued. Later they requested formally that they be allowed to make certain reservations to the treaty. I was stni in Paris on the day that the treaty came up for adoption by the conference, when it was read and adopted, and China had signified her intention of taking an exception. She was advised not to do it. Great pressure was being brought on them to yield, and when later it came to the signing of the treaty and they asked to put in these reservations, that was refused. I am informed also that at the very last moment after that was refused they then tried to obtain some kind of a statement from the council of four to the effect that the league of nations later would take up the Chinese case. They .failed also to obtain any assurance in that particular. Under these circumstances, as you know, the Chinese refused to sign the treaty. Of course the refusal to sign the treaty, as the Chinese knew very well, placed them in an unfortunate and isolated position. My opinion is that if some malicious marplot has set out to devise a way to place China in the most imfortunate circumstances in connection ,with this whole thing they could not have devised anything that would accomplish it more completely than this course of events. China is now in the position of having lost out entirely on the - Shantung thing. By reason of the advice of the United States she did not even present these various other matters for the consideration of the conference, thereby providing a way for some mutual inter- national action, by reason of her refusal to sign the peace under those circxunstances, because, as one of the Chinese put it, they can hang a man, but they can not make him sign his own death warrant, they are left so completely isolated. They are outside of the allied group. They are nowhere. That is their situation. - I might now just conclude what I have to say — that is, before you interrogate me — ^by saying that immediately after we learned of this decision of April 30 I was talking with Prof. E. T. Williams, our chief oriental expert, whose experience in China extends back over 35 years, inost of the time as an official of the Government. He has been acting minister on several occasions, and before he resigned for some two or three years he was head of the far eastern division of the State ■ Department. Those of you who are acquainted with Prof. Williams will know that he is a reticent, quiet man and one from whom it is 454 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. difficult to get any positive expression of opinion on any subject, especially about diplomatic matters. When he heard of this he simpler said, "That means war," and every American expert who was in Paris at the time felt exactly the same way. As we balance things, we feel that such things mean war, and we felt that this was left in a position where it is going straight on into a deadlock, and impasse, which will not be broKen m any way except by a fight. That is what we all fear. I heard — ^I do not know whether it is true or not — that the so-called Gen. Bliss letter contained a statement somewhat to that effect. It is still held in camera. Probably the Government is not yet ready to publish that letter at this time, but, as we all know and as has been disclosed to you, our experts and Mr. Wilson's own col- leagues all dissented from the Shantung decision. That about con- cludes what I have had in mind to say. Senator Johnson of California. A question or two that I shovdd like to ask if you will permit m.e, Senator. I want to go back to the incident of the 21 demands. Do you recall when the 21 demands were first made by Japan, that Japan maintained secrecy concerning the rest of the world knowing of those demands ? Mr. Millard. I recall it ver;^ distinctly. Senator Johnson of California. And then do you remember that when finally the world learned something of those 21 demands that Japan published an erroneous statement or misstatement of them to the world ? Mr. Millard. I remember that perfectly. Senator Johnson of California. Do you recall that after these de- mands were made upon China, and the world became cognizant that something of that sort had been done, Japan specifically denied that she had made any such demands ? Mr. Millard. I remember, yes, sir, that she did deny it until she knew that the text of the whole 21 demands was in the possession of every government, and then she could not deny, although she denied it after that. You gentlemen might be interested in this. If you did not know the late Bishop Bashf ord of China you know who he was. I have this from Bishop Bashford himself. The Americans in China, especially the missionaries, well everybody out there was so wrought up over these 21 demands that Bishop Bashford made a trip back to the United States. He had been on a trip in the Yangtsev alley, and he came down to Shanghai. The newspapers there published the 21 demands. Senator Pomerene. That is the call of the Senate. What is the purpose of the committee, to continue this hearing now? The Chairman. I should like to conclude Mr. Millard's testimony to-day. Senator Pomerene. I am obliged to go to the Senate. I am sorry that I can not be here. The Chairman. We can take a recess until the afternoon if you prefer. Senator Swanson. Do you expect to be in Washington several days? Mr. Millard. I expect to be here a couple of days anyway. Senator Swanson. Can we not wait until Wednesday ? The Chairman. We have Dr. Ferguson on Wednesday. TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. , 455 Mr. Millard. I was going to relate a conversation which Bishop Bashford had with Mr. Bryan on the matter. Mr. Bryan was then Secretary of State. This will show to what lengths Japan carried Iter deception in the matter. Senator Johnson of Cahfornia. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the witness may finish that particular matter, and inasmuch as Dr. Ferguson will be here on Wednesday and the witness will be here, we can conclude with him Wednesday and conclude with Dr. Ferguson Wednesday. Senator Swanson. Why not this afternoon ? Senator Johnson of California. I have no objection so far as I am concerned except that we want to be in the Senate, that is all. Senator Swanson. I notice that there are very few in the Senate from day to day. We adjourn on account of the Senate and then we see a large collection of empty chairs there. Senator Johnson of California. Well, go ahead as far as I am con- cerned. I do not care. The Chairman. I should like to go on and finish with Mr. Millard to-day. Senator McCumber. Let us go on until 1 o'clock now. Senator Johnson of California. Go ahead and finish. Mr. Millard. Bishop Bashford wrote a very strong letter to the President, of which he gave me a copy, and I incorporated parts of it in the book on the Far Eastern question without stating that it came from him. The Bishop came on to Washington. The Chairman. Is he of the Methodist Church? Mr. Millard. Yes. He died a few years ago. He was in frail health. Every one in China looked up to Bishop Bashford. Among the churchmen in these foreign parts there are some eminent church- men who are looked upon as politicians. His interests took a wide range for a cleric, and he had an interest in political matters. Bishop Bashford came to Washington, coming here for the purpose of atteilipting to present the facts about this thing to the American {government. There had been so much — to use a word that is current now — camouflage, and so much downright lying, that it was very doubtful to the people out in China that the Government knew the facts, although we knew that a full copy of the 21 demands had been procured by our legation at Peking and had been telegraphed and sent in writing to the State Department. Bishop Bashford arrived here, and he had made an appointment to see Secretary Bryan, who was Secretary of State at that time, and about half an hour — he was stopping at the New Willard Hotel as he told me afterwards — -about half an hour before he was to go over to see Secretary Bryan, Dr. Sidney Gulick, a former missionery in Japan, who had been prominent for many years, somewhat of a pro-Japan propagandist, called upon Bishop Bashford at the New Willard Hotel and said, "Now, Bishop Bashford, we are old friends and respect each other," and he added, "I do not like to see you making a terrible mistake." He said, "I saw a statement that you gave in San Francisco in which you say so and so, and I tell you privately that you are all wrong about this. You have come here and you are gomg to see the President, and you are going to see Mr. Bryan, and you do not want to go up there and make statements that are not correct, and I think I can enlighten you." Well, Bishop 456 TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GEKMA3JY. BasMord said, "Go ahead and enlighten me. What is it that I am misinformed on?" He said, "You are all wrong about those 21 demands." He replied, "In what way am I wrong about those 21 demands?" "Well," Dr. Gulick said, "Japan never did such and such thing and so and so," giving a remarkable account of the thing. Bishop BasMord said, "What is the source of your information?" He replied, "The foreign minister at Tokyo, and I went over the whole thing with the Japanese Minister in Washington. I can assure you by the highest authority that you are entirely wrong." Bishop Bashford said, "Well, Dr. Gulick, I have an appointment just, about now with the State Department. You come over with me and see Mr. Bryan." And Dr. Gulick said, "Very well," and they went over and saw Mr. Bryan. Bishop Bashford asked Mr. Bryan before Dr. Gulick, "What in- formation have you about these 21 demands?" And Mr. Bryan brought out a copy of the 21 demands and showed them to Dr. Gulick, and in a way that could not dispute the authenticity of it, and then Bishop Bashford said — before they had gone over Bishop Bashford said, "You come with me and we will talk to Mr. Bryan, and then I will go with you to talk to the Japanese ambassador." Bishop Bashford then said, "Dr. Gidick, are you satisfied?" Dr. Gulick, who was flabbergasted, said, "Yes." They finished their talk with Secretary Bryan and then they went out of the State Department, and then Bishop Bashford said, " We will now go to see the Japanese ambassador, and see what he says." Dr. Gulick re- plied, "I wiU have to ask to be excused. It would be too embarrass- ing." Senator Johnson of California. Do you remember in the 21 de- mands there was a demand by Japan for virtual sovereignty? Mr. Millard. It would amount practically to that. Nations in those things deal euphemistically. Senator Johnson of California. I am not indicating that that was the phraseology. | Mr. Millard. The so-called group 5 made Japan practically sovereign of China. By the way, Mr. Bryan told Bishop Bashford and Dr. Gulic that our Government had protested. Senator Johnson of California. It was ehminated by the protest of our Government? Mr. Millard. The British protested against it, too. Senator Johnson of California. It is ultimately ehminated. Mr. Millard. Great Britain at that time was not in a position to make serious demands upon Japan. Probably they would not have paid much attention to Great Britain, but the combination of cir- cumstances was that they thought they had better cut out group 5. Senator Johnson of California. I want to call your attention to another secret treaty made by Japan in addition to those in relation to Shantung, the treaty maae in 1916 between Russia and Japan. Do you recall that secret treaty ? Mr. Millard. Yes, sir. Senator Johnson of California. Do you remember the particular provisions ? I read article 2 for instance. [Reading.] In the event, in consequence of measures taken by mutual consent of Russia and Japan, on the basis of the preceding article, a declaration of war is made by any third power, contemplated by article 1 of this agreement, by just one of the contracting TEEATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. 457 parties, the other party, at the first demand of each ally, must come to its aid. Each of the high contracting parties herewith covenants in the event such a condition arises, not to conclude peace with a common enemy, without preliminary consent therefor from its ally. Article 3 provides [reading]: The conditions under which each of the high contracting parties will lend armed assistance to the other side, by virtue of the preceding article, as well as the means by which such assistance shall be accomplished, must be determined by the corre- sponding authorities of one and the other contracting parties. Senator McCumber. Do I understand that that was an agreement that was made between Japan and Russia ? Senator Johnson of Caliiornia. Yes, sir. Mr. Millard. It was a secret alliance during the war between Japan and the Russian Government. The documents were published after the revolution. Senator Johnson of California. In response to Senator McCumber, yes; it was an agreement between Japan and Russia, signed by Sazonoff on the one hand and Motono on the other. Senator McCumber. On what date ? Senator Johnson of California. 1916. [Reading:] In witness whereof the persons invested with full power of both parties have signed and affixed their seals to the present agreement at Petrograd on the 20th of June — July 3 Mr. Millard. That is the 20th of June our cal'?ndar, and July 3 the Russian calendar. • Senator Johnson of Caliiornia. As an expert upon the eastern question, against whom would you say this alliance was directed ? Mr. Millard. An analysis of all che conditions and circumstances would demonstrate unmistakably that the third power mentioned in there would be the United States. Senator Johnson of California. Can you sate, Mr. Millard, who it was that reported the result of the Shantung decision at Paris to the Chinese there ? Mr. Millard. I believe it was communicated to them — well of course they learned it first by Dr. Way being right there in the press room when Mr. Ray Stannard Baker came in with the official announcement. As a matter of fact everybody had known it the previous day, and then that night Ray Baker went over to the hotel Lutitia, which was the headquarters ot the Chinese delegation, and fave them a copy of the memorandum which they had received several ours before, and also personally tendered the President's explanation of the thing, and then the next morning both Prof. Williams and Prof. Hornbeck went there and communicated substantially the same thing. Senator Johnson of California. Did you know Mr. Ray Stannard Baker ? Mr. Millard. Yes, sir. I know him. Senator Johnson of California. What position, if you know, did he occupy at Paris ? ' Mr. Millard. He occupied a position there of official intermediary, I should call it, between the American press correspondents and the President, or the American mission — ^but really the President. ■Every day Mr. Palmer would go up and see the President, and then he would come back to the press room with whatever was to be communicated to the press and give it out, either mimeographed or orally . 458 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Johnson of California. Let me ask you in regard to the Shantung Province, if you can answer me. The Province is about how large, if you know? Mr. Millard. I do not know, but — — ■ Senator Johnson of California. If you are not familiar with the statistics, never mind. Mr. MiLLAKD. No; I know exactly its relation to China, but I would not know how to compare it with anything; and I do not know the number of square miles it contains. You can look in the China Year Book and see that. It is a large Province, comparable to one of our States. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know about what its population is ? Mr. Millard. I should say 35,000,000 to 40,000,000. Senator Johnson of California. What is the effect upon the control of the Province — of economic control, there ? Mr. Millard. The Japanese occupancy of the Province, as it has existed since they went in there and occupied it and as they occupy it up to the present time, and as it would be continued under this treaty, amounts to practical economic and political control of the Province. To give you a specific case Senator Johnson of California. Let me ask you: Under the provi- sions of the treaty Santung Province is practically given — substan- tially given — unto Japan, is it not ? Mr. Millard. That is really what it amounts to. That was the opinion of every expert we had at Paris. Senator Hitchcock. Before you leave that, may I ask a question ? Senator Johnson of California. Yes; I am practically through. Senator Hitchcock. Is there anything that gives to Japan, under this treaty, more than Germany actually had ? Mr. Millard. No; the treaty merely cedes to Japan what Germany was supposed to have. Senator Hitchcock. So that if Japan does exercise anything more than that, it is usurpation ? Mr. Millard. Yes. Now, here is the actual situation, Senator. Japan, by the terms of this treaty, establishes herself in the position that Germany was in, there. Meanwhile, Japan had gone ahead and gone far beyond anything Germany had ever dreamed of doing, jou see, and by these 1918 and 1915 agreements she had nailed China down on these things. China, of course, repudiated them; but she said they put a bayonet to her throat and she was helpless. She asked to be relieved from them, but that plea of China was turned down. Did you not notice Uchida's statement the other day, and did you not notice that the President came right back at him and contradicted him, and said, "You did not bring this up at Paris at all" ? Now, they are going to get China off in a corner by herself, there, and just stick the bayonet at her throat again, and make her confirm all these things. Iti that Uchida statement, issued about 10 days ago, I believe — the 6th, was it not, of August— which is supposed to clear this thing up, but which is far more cryptic than any utterance she has ever given out before, that I know of, she says — it ainounts to this — "We are going to give back when we get good and ready." He mentions no date or anything like that, but says, "We are going to TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 459 ^ive it back under the 1915 agreement." Then, the President, on the same day, came right back at him and said, "At Paris you did not say anything about the 1915 agreement or the 1918 agreement, and nothing that was said there could be construed as placing the prom- ises you made upon those agreements." Senator Hitchcock. I wanted to get your construction of that. You agree, then, that if Japan exceeds in any particular the claims that Germany has, or had, in regard to Shantung, it is usurpation ? Mr. Millard. Absolutely. Senator Johnson of California. And not due to this treaty ? M". Millard. Yes. Senator Knox. I would like to know Senator Johnson of California. Will you not let him answer the -question ? Senator Knox. Certainly; I will wait until you finishi Senator Johnson of California. I did not hear the answer to the last question. Senator Swanson. He said yes. Mr. Millard. Yes; I said yes, and I will go further and say they iave already usurped it. They are in possession. Senator Knox. What I wanted to know is, by reason of Japan's propinquity to China, does not the same concession mean much more to Japan than to a European power ? Mr. Millard. Absolutely. That is as China pointed out at the time she was trying to protect her neutrality and prevent Japan from lOverrunning the province — that the possession of Germany was one thing from the strategic point of view, but the possession of Japan is absolutely another thing. Senator Swanson. Another thing to the same point: When this ultimatum was issued by Japan, in that ultimatum was a promise, a promise to the world that at some time in the future Mr. Millard. They would return it to China. Senator Swanson. That they would turn the whole thing over to China? Senator Swanson. When that promise was made did China take any steps to secure Mr. Millard. At that time there were negotiations by which China wanted to neutralize herself. Senator Swanson. She acquiesced in Japan taking this control ? Mr. Millard. No; she never acquiesced. Senator Swanson. What did she do at the time when that ulti- matum was issued ? Mr. Millard. She protested. Senator Swanson. Formally, at that time ? Mx. Millard. Yes; she protested formally. Everybody saw, the minute that it came up, that the establishment of a German base at Kiaochow complicated matters so that China could not afterwards — one of the proposals was that China would join the AlHes. Another proposal was that China would main absolute neutrality, and that she would take Kiaochow and intern the Germai. ships, and that Tvould settle it. , _ , Senator Johnson of California. Is it not true that m Korea, and ■coming down through Mongolia and north and south Korea, Japan has made incursions in China that have been accompanied with the 460 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. most solemn protest that it was not intended to injure or impair the- integrity or destroy the sovereignty of China ? Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. And that every time Japan winds^ up with the absolute sovereignty ? Mr. Millard. She winds up, as when she went to war with Eussia, when she affirmed the independence of Korea in the treaty of peace, and a few years afterwards annexed it to the Japanese Empire, as she has Shantung, and by precisely the same process. Senator Swanson. I understand you to say that Great Britain and France and Italy definitely stated that they would adhere to those secret treaties, and could not adhere to a treaty in which those- secret treaties were not taken care of? Mr. Millard. That was the attitude. Of course at the time this- decision was made Italy had bolted, you see, and she was indiflerent, and she did not care. Senator Swanson. But if Great Britain, France, and Italy ad- hered to their secret agreements, it was impossible for Great Britain to sign any agreement as to the Shantung matter ? Mr. Millard. If they adhered to the secret agreements, then it waa all fixed before the conference met. Senator Swanson. And if that had been done a treaty of peace in which Great Britain, France, and Italy participated would not have been signed ? Mr. Millard. If they had carried out those agreements. Senator Swanson. If they had carried out their secret agreements ; and they insisted that they would ? Mr. Millard. They insisted that they would, Of course nobody believed that they would. That was just a matter of opinion. Senator Swanson. Then we would have been relegated to a sepa- rate treaty with Germany, if the Shantung matter had not been included ? Mr. Millard. It might have had that possibility, and might not. Senator Swanson. If Shantung had been left out of the treaty entirely, what position would have been occupied, so far as China is concerned, now? Would not China have been confronted by an agreement of France, Great Britain, and Italy to stand by Japan in her attempts on China, regarding the Shantung Province ? Mr. Millard. No; that agreement only contemplated up to the time of the peace conference, and that wiped that out. Seaator Swanson. Now, has not the Chinese position been im- proved with this declaration on the part of the authorities in Japan and also the verbal promise given the President and the other mem- bers of the council that this will be restored ? Has not the position of China been improved by those conditions, not including the treaty but outside of the treaty; has it not been made better than it would have been than if Shantung had been left entirely out of the treaty, ■with these secret agreements ? Mr. Millard. No; I do not think so. Senator Swanson. What would have been the effect if the Shan- tung matter had been left out, and Japan had been left to deal with, these other things ? Mr. Millard. China, from the strategical standpoint, as Mr. Knox just brought out — and so would the British and the Americans and TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 461 ■everybody else — would a great deal rather have the German status than the Japanese status. Senator Swanson. They would rather have left it with Germany ? Mr. MiLLAED. Yes. Yes, China wanted to get it back, and if she had to have some foreign nation there, she would rather have had ■Germany there, as before the war, than to have had it as it is now. Senator Swanson. What chance would China have had with these secret agreements between France, Great Britain, and Italy, and Japan ? Mr. MiLLAKD. That was a war agreement, and it would be elimi- nated with whatever action was taken by the peace conference. In fact, the Chinese plan was to get rid not only of those things but all of that, and she wanted to bring those things forward at Paris. Senator Swanson. But you stated that Great Britain, France, and Italy frankly stated that they would have to keep these secret agreements if Great Britain insisted upon it. Is that true ? Mr. Millard. Yes. The Chairman. Did I understand you to say that France and Great Britain stated that they would refuse to sign the league and the treaty unless Shantung was recognized ? Mr. Millard. No; I said nothing of the kind. You said that hypothetically. Senator Swanson. I understood you to say that they said that they could not have any settlement of the Shantung matter that violated the agreements ; that that was the position of France, Great Britain, and Italy. Mr. Millard. Here is the attitude that they took, apparently. They took the position, "We did not want to sign these things, but we have signed them, and the only way of getting out of them is that you" — meaning the United States — "will have to open the way out." Senator Swanson. That is, they would have to get the consent of Japan ? Mr. Millard. They would have to try to do so. We did not do that in the Fiume matter. We could have' said, "We will not sign any such thing," but this is what they did Senator Swanson. If Shantung had been left out entirely in the treaty with Germany, what position would China have been left in then ? Mr. Millard. It would have reverted to the prewar status. Senator Swanson. But how would she have gotten rid of the agree- ments with France, Great Britain, and Italy to stand by China ? Mr. Millard. In your statement to me you assume two contra- dictory things. If you had omitted the Shantung matter from the treaty, they would have discovered that in some way or other the Shantung matter would have been disposed of. Senator Swanson. Suppose that the President had refused to •consent to anything about Shantung ? Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator Swanson. And that it should have nothing to do with the treaty with Germany ? M:- Millard. Yes. Senator Swanson. And all the allies had consented to that with regard to Shantung? Mr. Millard. Yes. 462 TREATY or PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Swanson. What would have been the position of China; better than it is to-day ? Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator Swanson. How? Mr. Millard. It would have reverted to the prewar status. Senator Swanson. And those secret agreements? Mr. Millard. Those secret agreements were simply to the effect that when it came to the decision of a peace conference to settle this question up, Japan was going to make certain claims; that these., powers would vote with her on those claims. That is all the secret agreements amounted to. Senator Swanson. And suppose the Shantung matter was then taken up separately by France, Great Britain, Italy, and Germany,. France, Great Britain, and Italy would still have been precluded from doing anything contrary to the wishes of Japan under that agreement ? Mr. Millard. Not necessarily. That would have created a situa- tion not contemplated in the agreements when they were signed, and it might have been dealt with differently. Senator wSwanson. It seems to me with this understanding made by the council that Japan will support it, that the position of China has been improved. Mr. Millard. Not at all, because so far as we know in regard to the promise Japan has made, she has not stated a date; and now, by the very statement of Uchida she is equivocating already. It says that you are to predicate something on thb 1915 agreement, but that touches a lot of things besides Shantung. Senator Swanson. Would not China have been infinitely better off than she is now, would not she have had a better standing to-day; would not the United States now be in a better position to befriend her, if she has a positive agreement from Japan that she will keep this agreement? The Chairman. There is no such agreement. Senator Swanson. Yes; I think there is. The Chairman. It is a verbal agreement. Japan has violated every verbal algreement she has made. Let me ask you, is it not the worst thing that could possibly happen to China to have Shantung go into Japanese hands? Mr. Millard. That is the way I view it, and every person in China that I know of, the British and everybody else. Senator Swanson. It is all in her fiands ? Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator Swanson. Just as much as the treaty could put it in her hands ? Mr. Millard. The treaty does not put it there. Senator Swanson. The treaty does not put it there? Mr. Millard. The treaty confirms her. I will tell you how the treaty helps her to hold the thing down. Senator Swanson. Yes. Mr. Millard. The treaty merely consists of the clauses by which, without any mention of China whatever, Germany cedes certain ihings to Japan. Those things happen to be territorially in China. In the covenant of the league of nations there is an Article XXI. That article is to the effect that the Monroe doctrine and other regional understandings that are in existence, presumably at the TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GEBMANY. 463 time this covenant goes into effect, are made valid. Now, that confirms the Monroe doctrine, and it confirms about 20 known agreements, and Heaven knows how many secret agreements and understandings about China. Senator Swanson. Are those regional understandings different from or like our Monroe doctrine ? Mr. Millard. They are as different as night is from day. Senator Swanson. They do not protect those that are unlike the Monroe doctrine. The treaty says '.'regional understandings, like the Monroe doctrine." Senator Knox. No; the regional understanding is like the Monroe doctrine. Senator Swanson. Well, that is a difference of opinion. Senator Johnson of California. We will now let him go ahead and finish his answer about the regional understandings ? Senator Swanson. Yes. Mr. Millard. Since I have returned to this country I have taken the trouble to get the opinions of two or three international lawyers of ability on that question, "Now, here, whom are you going to appeal that case to ? You are going to appeal it to this very bunch that have got these regional understandings betwen themselves. You see, that is where the Chinese Government is going, and they are going to take a diplomatic attitude, just like they took at Paris, favorable to a certain construction; and when is our Government ever going to be, I would like to know, in a better position to make these various nations conform to our ideas of what is right than we were at Paris ?" Senator Swanson. Except that we have, if the statement is true, an agreement from the Japanese Government — ^verbal — but a written agreement is simply evidence of an understanding, and it is simply evidence and it does not give any more sanctity, it is of no more force than a verbal one, and it is of value only as insuring that there shall be no dispute about it — an understanding that this territorj will be returned to China. Senator Johnson of California. So far as Japan is concerned ? Mr. Millard. Yes; of course reserving the special concession and these special privileges. Senator Swanson. Now Ml'. Millard. Will you let me finish one of the observations, if you do not object ? Senator Johnson of California. Yes. Mr. Millard. To my mind and to the mind of every expert who really understands the conditions as they are translated into action in China, and all the various things that affect it, Japan is now in a much stronger position, looking at those things that are going to arise. You have seen one thing: Mr. Uchida's understanding does not conform to the President's, because when Mr. Uchida made that statement the President came right back at him and said that he did not say anything about that in Paris. Mr. Johnson's understanding as to the Japanese agreement is not what the Japanese understand by it. Senator Swanson. If this regional agreement had not been ratified by Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States in the council when they had their conference that she would surrender what she has to China, that supersedes the secret treaties, does it not ? It is 464 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. subsequent to the secret treaties, and you understand that having made this agreement with the United States and these other coun- tries, she will return Shantung to China, and with that understanding, which is subsequent to the secret treaties, my impression was that the situation of China was benefited rather than hurt by the situation. Mr. Millard. Yes, that was the tenor of the President's expla- nation. Senator Swanson. Now, the only thing is whether Japan will com- ply with that Mr. Millard. Every expert disagreed with him, however. Senator Swanson. Now, let us go back to your ideas about these regional understandings. Let me read what is in article 21 [reading] : Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace. Now, my idea is that the one thing protected is regional under- standings like the Monroe doctrine. Now, if these regional under- standings are contrary to the Mom-oe doctrine, which to my mind is plain, they are not protected by this. Mr. Millard. If when this thing came up you Senators or the President were going to interpret it, it would probably be along the line of what you have expressed. Senator Swanson. Just take that language. Mr. Millard. But you are not going to interpret it. That is going to be the point; and the chances are that Mr. Wilson is not going to interpret it, because the test of this thing is going to come after he leaves office. Senator Swanson. The President has given his statement about it. Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator Swanson. They have made a public declaration which any honorable nation ought to comply with. Mr. Millard. There is no question about that. Senator Swanson. They have made a promise and bound them- selves ta it. Mr. Millard. Yes; the question is whether under the circum- stances you can trust it or not. The Chairman. Where is the record of that statement ? Mr. Millard. I wiU say that the Chinese made a request in writing, and they referred that statement up, and my latest information was they could not obtain it. They would be entitled to it. The Chairman. It has never been made in writing. Senator McCumber. Has Japan made an agreement with China that has been put in writing? Mr. Millard. Yes; that is, in half a dozen different statements, if you want to say that, something like what Mr. Uchida said the other day is an agreement. Senator McCumber. But when was the agreement made with China ? Mr. Millard. They put that in the agreement, I think, on half a dozen different things. Senator McCumber. That is in writing ? Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator McCumber. Japan agreed in writing there that she will return Shantung to China. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 465 Mr. MiLLAED. She has agreed; all right. Senator McCumber. We will agree, then, if you wish, that she will break her word; but my question is whether Japan has made a solemn covenant in writing that she wiU return Shantung to China ? Mr. Millard. If you wul read that agreement, wherever she has stated anything in writing, you will find that is in very vague and qualified fashion. It would lead the average person to say that she has agreed to do this; but when you come to analyze it and see how this is qualified by other clauses of other things, then you wiU get a different impression, and nobody but an expert understands that. He digs into it. Senator McCumber. Do not take the witness away from me. It is my purpose to ask some other questions along this line. The Chairman. Did not Japan make explicit statements that she would respect the independence of Korea, and then change the dynasty ? Mr. Millard. She did. Senator Knox. She did that in a treatj^ ? Mr. Millard. Yes, in the Portsmouth treaty of peace. Senator McCumber. All right; she makes an agreement that she wiU sign this agreement, another agreement, not that she has made with Korea, but with the whole world; and one of the things she agrees to is that in order to permit international cooperation and the largest international vision and security, she is to do it by the main- tenance of justice and scrupulous respect for aU treaty obligations ? Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator McCumber. Now, Japan signs that? Mr. Millard. Yes ; she signed it, aU right. Senator McCumber. When she signs that with Great Britain and France and the United States and Italy, do you mean to say that we are not in a better position to compel her to abide by what she agrees to abide by? Mr. Millard. Not at all, because that is worth nothing, and when the thing comes to a test, some combinations, or plans, will develop that will change everything. Senator McCumbeR. We will differ as to our decision on that. Do you suppose they will allow her to make an agreement with China and then break it? Mr. Millard. Yes. The GHAiRiiAN. China is helpless in this. Mr. Millard. I wish you Senators would go into this thing some- what on the lines I have laid down to you, and see if you can not find out whether or not a thing in Paris is supposed to have happened, that happened while the French and British Governments were making up their minds how they were going to line up on this ques- tion, did happen. They had signed similar agreements with Italy about Fiume, and others that they have tried to wriggle out of and others that they have not tried to wriggle out of but that they will undoubtedly try to get out of before the world is 48 months older, and when they were lining up their position there at Paris on this Shantung thing, it is believed, and there is considerable circumstan- tial evidence of it, that before they decided they would come into the couneil of four they said, "If we do this, what situation does that lead to ?" and then had gone on and made an agreement among themselves 135546—19 30 466 TKBATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. covering the situation to which that would lead, involving the- creation of a new tripartite agreement covering Asia, which is equiva- lent of the recognition of the paramountcy of Japan over a consider- able part of China; and here they remain. But these are what we are going to be confronted with, that far, and you gentlemen can bring that out if you will ask the President and the Secretary of State about it, as you did Mr. Lansing the other day, and Mr. Lansing- said he believed that there was such an agreement; that he does not. know what its terms are or what it embraces. Senator Johnson of California. I think, if you will permit the correction, that the newspaper accounts got that somewhat involved. I think Mr. Lansing said he did not know of any such agreement. Senator Swanson. I think he stated that he did not believe there were any such agreements. Senator Johnson of California. Yes; I think Senator Swanson is correct, that he said he did not believe there were any such agree- ments — did not know of any such. Mr. Millard. Before you Senators decide upon the final form those things shall take, I would not leave that to chance. All you have to do is to ask of the British and French Governments what agree- ments they have on that, if they have any, or if not; and if they have, to let our Government see the test of them. That is something that can be absolutely disclosed, and it goes right to the heart of this whole thing; because by that information and by that information alone have you got a line on after Mr. Wilson is out of office, after all of you may be dead, or one thing and another; he may be dead and the man that made this promise at Paris may be dead, and when this question comes up, as it is coming, and I will state my position here without any qualification with that situation in the Far East; as it is. left now if we do not have war with Japan we are going to arrive in the next 10 years at a place where the ice is going to be so blamed thin that we do not know whether we will get over it or not Senator Swanson. What do you think will bring that war on ? Mr. Millard. Any pretext; any one of a hundred things would bring it on. You have got that issue there, and it is only a question of opinion. It is just like the experts of Europe saw this thing cooking for years, and they skated time afte^" time over ice so thin that it cracked and they did not know whether they would get over or not, and finally, one day the ice did not hold. Senator Swanson. I have read your books with a great deal of interest, and they are very illuminating. I would like to ask you this question : If Japan does make a verbal agreement with those five great nations, whether that supersedes these agreements, whether verbal or written ? Mr. Millard. Of course in this memorandum to the Chinese Government I analyzed this matter of the Japanese. We went over there and talked it over with them, and they were simply heart- broken; and I said, "We are all feeling badly to-night, and we had better think it over to-morrow morning, and I will write you out. what I think of this thing;" and the next morning I did, and I analyzed it, and I have got that memorandum somewhere; and I said, "Now, you have got to take into consideration certain things."' They were bitter at the President. I said, "Here we all think that the President made a wrong decision here.' I said, "There is na TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 467 reason to think that he did not mean well in his heart by China in doing this, but he will be President of the United States for the next 20 months, and we do not want to do anything to alienate the Presi- dent's sympathy, and if I was you people, I would be very circum- spect in everything I said, and I would try to let the President see that you disagree with what he did, but you do not impugn his motives;" and then I pointed out that the only thing in this that China could take an appeal out of m this was that these secret agree- ments are wiped out under the Shantung agreement of 1907. Senator Swanson. Yes. Mr. Millard. It is wiped out because they were just like a promis- sory note. You have paid it up. These Governments all agreed that they would support Japan in this agreement. Senator Swanson. Japan agreed that she would return this to China. Mr. Millard. These agreements were wiped out so far as these Governments were concerned. That left the French and the British and the other Governments to line un with them to keep all their promises in the future. Senator Swanson. You think so if Japan made that promise ? Mr. Millard. But now you could find out before they had done that if they had not agreed with Japan something else. That is what you want to find out, and the Senate has the means of finding that out. I have not. Senator Swanson. Do you not think that the United States, if she wanted to help China about Shantung, would have a greater right to do so with this understanding and promise made to President Wilson in the council that she would return Shantung, a promise made to him ? Mr. Millard. To the extent that this is all cumulative, yes. Every time that you get them to say over again that they are going to do this, it is cumulative in the sense that is is going to build up an opinion, a moral sentiment. Senator Swanson. You have a right to force anybody to comply with an agreement. The Chairman. No date is mentioned for the accomplishment of this. Mr. Millard. No. She may hold it for 50 years. You see. Sen- ator, she is in the same thing in Manchuria, kept crowding in. Whereas this may seem clear to you, you can not satisfy the Chinese. It is a thing that is present to them. I would like to say this, that this thing is a living situation to all the people out there in respect to Shantung. We should remember that three-fifths of the people of the world are out there, when it comes to man power, and there is a very serious and grave danger that if something is not done to remedy this thing or to give a hope for a remedy, not which you will under- stand, but which the Chinese will understand as offering a hope. It might be all right to you, with your le-al mind, observing the thing ia detachments, but it has got to be fixed so that they will get some hope out of it. You are going to have a wave of antiforeignism over Chma, with missionaries murdered up in the country. Senator Swanson. All of us would have loved to see included in the treaty an absolute promise to China. The difficulties are such as you have narrated. We feel that with this agreement made on 468 TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Japan's part to the five great powers China is in a better condition than she was when she went to the peace conference. Mr. Millard. They do not think so, and the lawyers whom I have advised them to consult do not think so, because, they say, ' ' You have given Japan various points upon which she can successfully quibble and evade and she did not have those points before. You have this signed up in the treaty with all the nations. It was more or less nebulous before." It is my own opinion, but I did not trust my own opinion. I state the opinion of international lawyers whose opinions reach higher than mine. Senator Johnson of California. Let me call your attention to the fact that five great powers have nailed the thing down in the treaty. They never have mentioned in the treaty any promise, verbal or otherwise, and there exists to-day no written agreement for Japan to turn back Shantung. Mr. Millard. Not so far as I know. Senator McCtjmber. Not even with China? Senator Johnson of California. No written agreement. Mr. Millard. China has requested to get the minutes of this thing, to see what Japan did. Senator Swanson. I think you wiU find that as an agreement. Mr. Millard. You think China is included ? Senator Swanson. It is included in the ultimatum to turn it back to China. There is a public declaration to that effect. Senator Johnson of California. If anybody had considered the promise of any value it would have been put in the treaty. Mr. Millard. The whole psychology of the Asiatic world is turning against us on this thing, and it leaves a very grave circumstance. There is this thing that the Senate can do. The iSenate can disclose the facts and the Senate can disclose the action, and without touching the treaty or the government to which this issue is bound, which we say is as distinct as anything can be, it can be seen whether she makes food these oral promises. And that is coming as certain as we sit ere. The Senate can so shape events and it can do that without touching the government or treaty, that we vsdll be practically through with them, and we wUl have lined up with us the majority of the so-called principal powers. Whereas, in my opinion, if we do not take those precautions, we will find them lined against us, and in that event we will have the same result as at Paris, because we will be in no better position to exert pressure than now. The Chairman. It is now 5 minutes of 1, and as there are other questions that Senator McCumber desires to ask, we will take a recess until 3 o'clock. (Thereupon the committee, at 12.55 o'clock p. m., took a recess until 3 o'clock p. m.) AFTER recess. The committee met at 3 o'clock p. m. pursuant to the taking of recess. Present: Senators Lodge (chairman), McCumber, Borah, Brande- gee, Johnson, Moses, Hitchcock, Swanson, and Pomerene. Senator McCumber. The committee will please come to order. The chairman. Senator Lodge, is busy at present in the committee and has asked me to preside until he returns. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY.. 469 Senator Johnson of California. Will you note Mr. Reporter that the presiding officei", Senator McCumber, Senator Moses, and myself are those who are present. Senator McCumber. Will you take the stand again, Mr. Millard ? STATEMENT OF ME. THOMAS F. F. MILLARD— Resumed. Senator McCumber. Had you finished. Senator Johnson ? Senator Johnson of California. Yes. Senator McCumber. I would like to ask you then, Mr. Millard, a few questions for the purpose of placing upon the record the events in the regular order which led to this inclusion of the treaty which also held Kiaochow for Japan. There was a lease entered into between China and Germany March 26, 1898, respecting Shantung Peninsula, was there not ? Mr. Millard. I believe that is the correct date. Senator McCumber. In that treaty Article I provides : His Majesty, the Emperor of China, guided by the intention to strengthen the friendly relations between China and Germany, and at the same time to increase the military readiness of the Chinese Empire, engages, while reserving to himself all rights of sovereignty in a zone of 50 kilometers, etc. And then provides what rights are granted to Germany. In that, Germany clearly recognizes the sovereignty of China, does she not ? Mr. Millard. I think so. Senator McCumber. But at the same time she exercises and en- forces upon China the right whereby Germany may exercise rights that are inconsistent with complete sovereignty, such as sending her soldiers across the territory without interference and in other respects to control that territory ? Mr. Millard. Yes; various matters of that nature arose subse- quently where there was a question as to the propriety of Germany's action. Senator McCumber. At this time, then. Secretary Hay took the matter up with Germany, did he not ? Mr. Millard. Yes, sir. Senator McCumber. And the result was an understanding that the open-door poHcy would be maintained in that part of China and also that Germany did not claim any sovereign rights over the territory? , ■ , Mr. Millard. Yes; that was disclosed by what is known as the Hay-Von Buelow notes. . , j. r^, ■ Senator McCumber. Then so far as the right of China to exercise sovereignty over her own territory has not been denied either by Germany or any other country ? ,. , .. ..i ■ Mr. Millard. You mean denied in the form of a treaty or anything of that kind ? Senator McCumber. Yes. Mr. Millard. Not to my knowledge. . , ,, Senator McCumber. The only treaty there was recognized the sovereignty of China over this territory? ,„ v^r .Mr. Millard. Yes, sir; that is recognized in about 10 different Senator McCumber. Then we have had several other agreements with Japan and others about the open-door pobcy ? 470 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Millard. I think Japan is on record in about nine written agreements and treaties. Senator McCumber. Two of which ar-^ the Root-Takahira agree- ment Mr. Millard. And the Lansing-Ishii agreement, and then also her acquiescence in the principles of the Hay-von Buelow, or the Hay doctrine. Senator McCumber. Now, on May 25, 1915, Japan and China entered into a treaty relating to Shantung, did they not ? Mr. Millard. That treaty included provisions relating to Shan- tung. It did not relate to Shantung exclusively. Senator McCumber. It also related to Manchuria ? Mr. Millard. Yes, sir. Senator McCumber. To refer now simply to the part relating to Shantung, Article I of this agreement provides [reading] : The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung. That, of course, was a clear grant on the part of China that Japan might retain all rights that Germany had acquired under the treaty which China made with Germany. Mr. Millard. Undoubtedly. Of course you are acquainted with the fact that China signed that ultimatum ? Senator McCumber. Oh, yes ; just as practically she signed aU the other treaties whereby any of these nations obtained rights in Chinese territory. She signed them all because she had to. Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator McCumber. Yes ; exactly ; just as Japan at one time made an agreement to open up her ports to American trade when we sent Perry over there, some fifty-odd years ago. Mr. Millard. There is a great deal of difference in the circum- stances. China objected to some things very strongly. Senator McCumber. But aU of these concessions have been ob- tained from China because she was too weak to resist ? Mr. Millard. A majority have; yes, sir. Senator McCumber. Now, at the same time that this treaty was under consideration, and on May 15, 1915, there were certain notes exchanged between Japan and China; that is, between the ministers of the two countries. Mr. Millard. A large number of notes. Senator McCumber. I call attention to one of them, and this was a note from the Japanese minister to the Chinese minister, dated May 25, 1915. In this the Japanese minister says: In the name of my Government I have the honor to make the following declaration to the Chinese Government: "When, at the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China under the following conditions." There was a clear and unequivocal statement on the part of Japan at that time that the leased territory would be restored to China under the conditions that are mentioned 1 Mr. Millard. Yes, sir. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 471 Senator McCumbee. And the conditions, I will set them out here •as w ell [reading] : 1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a commercial port. 2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a •place designated by the Japanese Government. 3. If the foreign po-wers desire it, an international concession may be established. 4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and properties of Germany ■and the conditions and procedure relating thereto, the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement before the resto- ration. Now, you being particularly acquainted with these conditions, can you explain what is meant by the second proposition : A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a place •designated by the Japanese Government. Mr. Millard. That has since that time been disclosed with abso- lute definiteness. Subsequently to the singing of that the Japanese 'Government has made surveys, all of which have been charted out with maps specifically designating the area which is dominated there :as a special concession. Senator McCumber. What were the rights to be given in that ■concession to Japan ? Mr. Millard. The exclusive jurisdiction over that territory. Senator McCumber. You mean exclusive sovereignty over it, or •control over it, or what ? Mr. Millard. It would amount to absolute sovereignty. Now .then you can split a hair there if you are disposed to, and say that it is a qualified sovereignty. But it is an absolute and complete sovereignty, a police control of that district just as much so as Japan would have at Yokohama and Tokyo. Senator McCumber. Will you give us the facts as to what the agreement was and the control to be exercised, and how exercised and for what purpose ? Mr. Millard. The control in general terms is designated in that -.statement. The way it works out in actual practice is that a certain area of ground specifically designated, like a deed to a plot of land, and within that the Japanese would establish their courts, and would have entire police control and have entire municipal control -of the place. Senator McCumber. Where did you obtain that information? Where did you get that agreement as included in the concession, because there is nothing here to show what the word "concession" means ? Mr. Millard. There is nothing there, but that is exactly the way she conducts her concessions everywhere else, and there is no reason to presume that there will be any departure in this case. Senator McCumber. Then you do not know exactly what Japan will claim under this agreement to grant her a concession ? Mr. Millard. No; no one could foresee in advance how the thing may be subsequently qualified or modified or anything like that. ■' JSTobody could foresee that. So far as anybody could judge at the ■present time, that would give her the :ull right and authority, all that is needed to go ahead, just the same kind of jurisdiction that she tas in other places in Chinese territory. , Senator McCumber. Then followed considerable discussion between •Chma and Japan, and finally Japan sent an ultimatum to China ? 472 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMAN Y. Mr. Millard. Yes, sir. Senator MoCumber. The third proposition in this ultimatum Mr. Millard. That is, of course, she sent the ultimatum before China ever signed. China signed as the result of the ultimatum. Senator McCumber. Yes; while they were discussing it. The third proposition reads : If the Chinese Government accept all the articles as demanded in the ultimatum the offer of the Japanese Government to restore Kiaochow to China, made on the 26th of April, will still hold good. That was one of the agreements that Japan made to China, that if China would agree to the ultimatum which she had given that very- day, the agreement of Japan to restore Kiaochow back to China would still hold good 1 Mr. Millard. Yes, sir. Senator MoCumber. Then China replied on the same day, did she not? Mr. Millard. I have not read that for some time. I would not say offhand. Senator MoCumber. I think it was on the same day. Senator Borah. She did reply the same day. Senator MoCumber. The month is given here, but the year of the Chinese Republic, and I do not know whether that corresponds with our month or not. The Chinese reply was this [reading] : The Chinese Government with a view to preserving the peace of the Far East, hereby accepts, with the exception of those five articles of Group V, postponed for later negotiation, all the articles of Groups I, II, III, and IV, etc. Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator MoCumber. And III is the one relating to Kiaochow Bay. Well, those agreements are in writing and are a part of the notes relating to the transfer of aU the rights that Japan may have to China in Shantung ? Mr. Millard. Yes, sir. Senator McCumber. Then under those notes certainly Japan is in honor bound to retm-n it, is she not ? Mr. Millard. She is in honor bound, also legally bound, I would say, as far as treaties legally bind any one. Senator MoCumber. Although it is not mentioned in the treaty itself or the treaty taken in connection with those notes, that Japan is boimd to return Shantung to China ? Mr. Millard. You will notice that in anything she has given no time has been given. Senator McCumber. That has been repeated several times, and I fully recognize it, and I will come to that after a while. Well, Germany also disclaimed any right of sovereignty when she took the territory from China, although she exercised riglitB of sovereignty ? Mr. Millard. To a limited extent, she did, but usually those little matters of friction when they came up were straightened out fairly well to the satisfaction of China. After Germany had once accom- pli;:hed her strategical purpose there, which was to effect lodgment and leave herself free to create a naval base at that place, her policy was to try to placate China in every possible way, and after a matter of 1 5 or 20 years to a certain extent they had handled the situation so diplomatically with respect to the Chinese, that Chinese resent- ment had very largely died down. TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY, 47 S Senator McCumber. But let us follow this up now. Before Great Britain, France, and Italy entered into an agreement with Japan that if Japan would continue in the war she might hold the rights of Germany, there had already been this agreement between China and Japan that Japan might hold this territory ? Mr. Millard. Yes, sir; that had preceded. Senator McCuMBER. Then we have these two facts: First, that Japan had taken the territory by conquest from Germany and seized whatever rights Germany had in it, and in addition to that China had agreed that Japan might hold all the rights that Germany had had: Mr. Millard. Yes. She had agreed under duress. Senator McCtjmber. Yes ; then came Great Britain, France, and Italy, and by their secret agreement they had assured Japan that she might hold what she had taken from Germany. That is correct ? Mr. Millard. It amounted to this, that they would vote that way on this question at the conference. Senator MoCumber. And that made it rather difhcult for those nations to refuse to recognize the right of Japan to hold this Shan- tung at the peace conference. It rendered it almost impossible for them to do that without going back on their national words ? Mr. Millard. In a sense that will be; but you will recall. Senator, on several occasions the Prime Ministers of those Governments made express statements which would indicate to the world an intention to regard various secret agreements of that kind as water imder the bridge, so to speak. That was at the time that we came into the war,, and they were cajoling us about these questions. The average person not cognizant with all the questions, with all the ins and outs of this thing, would have believed that these Governments had said that subsequent events had perhaps abrogated the moral obligation involved in those agreements, just as, for instance, China took the position at Paris that when she came in and declared war with Ger- many and denoimced all her treaties and agreements with Germany, thereby the German rights in Shantung became automatically non- existent, and the only way they could be given to Japan by treaty would be to reinvest them somehow in Germany. Senator McCumber. But she had first given Japan, before she entered into this war, all the rights Germany had? Mr. Millard. She was still a neutral, you see. Senator McCumber. But the point I wanted to make, Mr. Millard, was this, that it was rather difficult for Great Britain, France, and Italy, to force Japan to relinquish her claim upon Shantung after the promise had been given her that they would support her. Mr. Millard. You might say it was difficult to do just that on several occasions in regard to other matters. Senator McCumber. Did they leave it to President Wilson to attempt to accomplish that ? Mr. Millard. They did in the Fiume incident, yes. Senator McCumber. And President Wilson was unable to accom- plish it ? Mr. Millard. There was almost an exact analogy as to the prm- ciple and circumstances involved. You will note some discussions in the papers at the present moment in regard to an agreement with France in regard to extreme western Russia. When Russia was an 474 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. important element in the war, Great Britain, France, and Eussia entered into an agreement which covered that region of Russia. Later when Russia became weak, France and England made a sub- sequent agreement. And now apparently the British Government at raris took the position that by reason of the circumstances that caused the collapse of Russia, everything broke down, and she is out of the agreement. Senator McCumber. You have indicated, if I got the construction of your testimony correctly, that Great Britain and France would like to see Chma regain complete conotrol over this territory? Mr. Millard. I think in the abstract that would be their prefer- ence ; yes, sir. Senator McCumber. And they are prevented from insisting upon that by reason of their agreement ? Mr. Millard. I do not believe that that states the real reason quite accurately, sir. That is the ostensible reason. Senator McCumber. Do you think they could compel Japan to do so ? Mr. Millard. Yes; and I tell you what I think the real reason is. I have discussed these questions at different times with men in various governments, unofficially, and they spoke freely, and I have had some of them say to me at various times while this was going on, "Here is a certain condition existing in Asia, and as far as I can make out the American Government has no definite policy. We can not depend on it for anything out there to stabilize the condition in Russia. Under the circumstances, we are compelled to play with Japan." Senator Brandegeb. You mean the Enghsh said this ? Mr. Millard. Yes; both French and English. Senator Pomeeene. Did these people have authority to commit Great Britain in such a statement ? Mr. Millard. Just as I say, it was just as you and I would sit down and talk. Senator Pomeeene. Corner grocery talk ? Mr. Millard. Not at all, just plain common sense. I would say, "What do you fellows mean? We can not figure on what you are driving at. As far as British interests in China are concerned, British opinion on this is absolutely unanimous as American opinion is. They are so bitter against the Japanese. The British in the Far East are so bitter about it that the average Englishman can not talk about it without getting red in the face, and the British Gov- ernment, say, "We know perfectly well just like when they secretly got out of Korea, they made a sacrifice of British interests there but they traded it off for something else. In Manchuria they did the same thing, and when they traded Shantung in 1917 they did the same thing. " You talk to these fellows and ask them, "Why do you do this?" They reply, "We admit we do not like to do it, but we havo to do it because of the shiftless policy of the American Government which will not come down in black and white. We have to trade the best we can. " That is the line of talk they give. Senator Beandegee. You say certain Englishmen and Frenchmen when they were talking with you informally. Were they men who are officials of these countries ? Mr. Millaed. They were officials of these countries. They were far eastern experts. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 475 Senator Brandegee. I mean it was not comer grocery talk. Mr. Millard. No. Senator McCumber. But if Japan insists before the conference -that her treaty with Great Britain, France, and Japan must be kept, were those countries in any position to go back on their treaties ? Mr. Millard. They might if those treaties were made before America and China came into the war. That act altered many things. Senator McCumber. But that treaty was madf for the purpose of keeping Japan in the war and Japan stayed in the war and Japan took possession of that section, she took it from Germany. Could they then say to Japan, "Now we promised you this, but because the United States got into the war it made a change of conditions and now we will go back on the promise." Mr. Millard. They said substantially that, not to Japan but to other nations under different circumstances. Senator McCumber. Under different circumstances, I admit. Senator Hitchcock. Before we leave that, this morning you stated in reference to the secret treaties, that these secret treaties were recognized and that Great Britain and France and Japan liquidated them and they were closed and satisfied. Mr. Millard. That is the way it turned out; yes, sir. Senator Hitchcock. So that they were recognized' and of course the nations must have insisted on their recognition or tbey would not have recognized them. Mr. Millard. Japan insisted, and Great Britain stood by her. That is the way it worked out. Senator McCumber. Then Japan takes these German concessions with the added obligation that Germany was not required to fulfill under 99 years, but with the added obligation that she will return Shantung to China. Mr. Millard. Yes, sir; she stated that in various ways. Senator McCumbee. So China has better terms with Japan than she had with Germany with the exception as you say that Japan does not fix a definite time ? Mr. Millard. No, and with the exception also that Japan by this supplementary 1918 agreement which they bribed the Chinese Am- bassador at Tokio to sign, and which she now is trying to work in various ways, to have it established as a valid instrument, which the President refused to do in his rejoinder the other day, gets an influ- ence that Germany never had at all, and which she is attempting to get in the terms she made at Paris. Senator McCumber. But she does not get those under the treaty. It is purely an assumption of right without any written authority to back it. Mr. Millard. Those matters are not mentioned in the treaty un- less they would come in under the general terms of economic rights. Senator McCumber. She has no right to do it under the treaty. Mr. Millard. I would not say that she had not. She might con- strue that she had an interest in it. Senator Brandegee. The obligation to return sovereignty is not in the treaty, is it ? Mr. Millard. No, sir; it is not mentioned in the treaty. Senator McCumber. But it is by a written agreement affixed to ■the treaty ? 476 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Millard. No, sir. Senator McCumber. The written agreement between the ministers was made at the same time or just prior to the adoption of the treaty. Mr. Millard. I am speaking now of the peace treaty at Paris. Senator Brandegee. Yes ; that is what I was speaking about. Senator McCumber. Then the present treaty or the treaty between Japan and China requires Japan to return Shantung to China? Mr. Millard. It does, sir. Senator McCumber. Of course, if she does carry that out in good faith it means a reasonable length of time ? Mr. Millard. I would assume so. Senator McCumber. It does not mean that she has a right to quibble ? Mr. Millard. Not to hold it 1.5 or 20 years. Senator McCumber. Nor a hundred years or a thousand years ? Mr. Millard. No, sir. Senator McCumber. That is an obligation upon Japan ? Senator Borah. May I say a word there ? A Japanese gentleman lecturing at Georgetown University some time ago gave an idea when that time would ripen. He said it was likely to be when Eng- land got out of China or when the United States gave up the Philip- pines. Senator McCumber. He might have said that, but I am not talking about what some one Japanese or any one says when he gets up and talks. Senator Borah. He was a commissioner to this country, I wanted to give you an idea of the Japanese idea of time. Senator McCumber. Not the Japanese idea of time, but a certain Japanese idea. The treaty requires Japan — the present treaty I am speaking of — to faithfully carry out the terms oi any treaty she has made with a foreign government that is not inconsistent with this treaty. Mr. Millard. Which treaty are you referring to now. Senator ? Senator McCumber. I am referrmg to the peace treaty before us. Mr. Millard. The peace treaty does not i-equire them to do any- thing. Senator McCumber. I beg your pardon; it does. Mr. Millard. In respect to Shantung. Senator McCumber. The point is this, that Japan promises China that she will return Shantung to China. Mr. Millard. She did that in the 1915 agreement and she has repeated that in various ways. There is no question about that. Senator McCumber. It has been repeated in this treaty, if Japan signs it. It reads: In order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security — It is to be done by certain means — by the maintenance of justice and the scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples. She certainly does agree to that when she signs this treaty. Mr. Millard. Yes, sir; I have read a great many treaties, and 1 have discovered that preambles sometimes state a purpose opposite to that in the treaty. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 477 Senator MoCumber. You have found that some have been broken, but some have been kept ? Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator McCumber. Do you not assume that honorable Govern- ments will keep their treaties, and that this Government will main- tiain its obligations ? Mr. Millard. Unfortunately my 25 years in the field of world politics will not allow me to be that optimistic about it. Senator McCumber. Japan signs another agreement; that is, she agrees to reach these things in the "prescription of open, just, and honorable relations between nations." Would it be an honorable relation between China and Japan if Japan would say, "We will turn this over in 99 years'?" Mr. Millard. I would not consider it honorable. Senator McCumber. Do you think that Great Britain or the United States or any civilized country would think that that was an honorable response to her treaty obligations ? Mr. Millard. I do not think they would; no, sir. Senator McCumber. Now, take it on the other hand. Suppose Japan is out of this entirely, and does not sign it. She then is not bound by this treaty, but she is bound by what- she may consider as an honorable obligation between herself and China. Do you think she would ever let go of Shantimg under those conditions ? Mr. Millard. I do not think so, and I do not think she has any intention any time under the present circumstances of letting go of Shantung except as circumstances may compel her to do so. Senator McCumber. But you are quite certain she would not if there was no influence of any other nation to bear upon her to compel her to do so ? Mr. Millard. I am quite certain of it, and I am quite certain that the whole diplomacy may neutralize the forces that would compel her. Senator McCumber. And if she does not sign this treaty, there is no obligation on the part of other countries to compel her to let go in China? Mr. Millard. Yes; she is still signed up in the Koot-Takahira agreement. Senator McCumber. That is to maintain the open door ? Mr. Millard. Yes; and the integrity of China, specifically men- tioned in all of them. Senator McCumber. Suppose she does not sign this and says "I will hold on to Shantung and turn it over when we get good and ready." What are we going to do about it ? Mr. Millard. I do not know. I am not the Government of the United States. Senator McCumber. You know something about the Government of the United States, and under our policy we would hardly reach over to China and defend China against Japan? Mr. Millard. I think under certain circumstances we might well have to. Senator McCumber. Do you think we ought to extend our Monroe doctrine to China ? , . , . , n • Mr. Millard. We do not need to. We have the identical doctrine in the Hay doctrine. 478 TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator McCumber. You think we have a Monroe doctrine in- China ? Mr. MiLLAED. Exactly. Senator McCtjmber. Then our Monroe doctrine, according to your view, is not a doctrine that refers only to the Western Hemisphere, but a doctrine that has been extended by the United States until it- covers the Eastern Hemisphere ? Mr. Millard. As it is in effect therb it is called the Hay doctrine,, not the Monroe doctrine. Senator McCumber. Only a difference in name ? Mr. Millard. Yes, sir. Senator McCumber. And therefore it would be perfectly proper for us to interfere in China's affairs even though not proper to inter- fere in European affairs ? . Mr. Millard. I would never put it that way. Senator McCumber. Put it in the way you would like to have it in the record. Mr. Millard. Here is the exact situation that may arise. In the history of our relations with China, just as with Japan, we have dealt with each nation separately as an independent nation. We have based all our diplomatic relations, with them and all our treaties with them, on the fact that each nation was an independent nation acting for itself and was in a position to maintain that position. Now, for instance, treaties with China established the position of Americans and the relations that exist between us and China. Those are treaties made between us and" China. When they were made we did not call in Japan, Great Britain, or anyone. We made them direct with China, Senator McCumber. Whereby we agreed to protect China's terri- tory ? Mr. Millard. I am talking about our rights — how they came into this thing. Senator McCumber. All right. Mr. Millard. Now then, among those treaties, for instance, w& have certain very favorable clauses. We have the right to trade anywhere in China on the same terms and conditions that other nations have. With respect to any other matters we have all those rights under the treaties with China. Now, let us say that outside of that a third power comes in and denies us those rights, takes action which is tantamount to a special and practical denial of those rights.. We naturally as between our treaties go to China for satisfaction. We have no other nation to go to. We do not recognize any other nation in relation to the matter, but we take the matter up diplo- matically with China and say, "Why is it that Smith & Co. can not go over here and make a contract with this municipality for an electric-lighting plant?" She comes along and says, "We have nc objection, but Japan says we can not." We turn around and say to Japan, "What are you butting in here for ?" We are not fighting for China's rights there, but our own. Senator McCumber. But the only thing that we have agreed with China is that on the theory of the open-door pohcy we shall have the- same commercial rights of the most favored nation. Mr. Millard. Yes ; we have such a treaty. Senator McCumber. Suppose that Japan does not interfere with, that in any way, and she says she will not interfere with it, and TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 479 suppose that she does not interfere with it, but at the same time she deprives China of her sovereignty over a portion of Chinese territory. Will we have to go to war to help China out « Mr. Millard. I think that would largely depend on the mentality and the character of the man who happened to be president of the United States. Senator MoCumber. Do you think the American people would want to go to war to see that Japan did not get control over any portion of China and to protect our commercial mterests in China ? Mr. Millard. At this moment if you were to put it to the Ame ican. people they would say no, just as six years ago they would have said no to sending millions of troops to Europe and spending billions of dollars there. Senator McCtjmber. They would have continued to say that if they had not stepped on our toes. Mr. Millard. That is what will happen in this case, and that is what I can not make clear. Senator McCumber. I am assuming that it has not happened. Mr. Millard. If it does not happen — our whole character' as a Nation of course is that we are not seeking trouble and will not go to war. Senator McCumber. We have not interfered in Korea. Mr. Millard. No. Senator McCumber. Nor in Manchuria. Mr. Millard. Have not as yet. Senator McCumber. What reason would you give that we will not interfere in Shantung? Mr. Millard. There are a great many people that will fight a different stages of provocation. Take the provocation that Germany gave us leading up to our declaration of war. Many people thought thiat the first provocation was sufficient for us to go to war, but a majority of people thought it was not. And then others thought that when the second provocation came along that that was sufficient provocation, and so on. The thing becomes cumulative. Now in regard to this far eastern question, the way it shapes itself in my mind after 20 years of study of it is that the thing that we have declared over and over again is that the territorial integrity and the political autonomy of China is ultimately in the last analysis sacred to our opinions and out institutions. That comes up in the question that is returnable to the American people or to the man who at the time happens to be President; it may be 10 or 20 years from now. Then, I say, if that question comes to them in that form, they will say, "We will fight;" and I do not care whether it is in China or at the North Pole, if we recognize that as so, we will fight. That is what I say. Senator McCumber. In other words, you consider that we will extend our Monroe doctrine to China and will fight to maintain the Monroe doctrine on the assumption that it is necessary in our national life? Mr. Millard. That it is necessary for our national security and our institutions, and for those institutions throughout the world; yes, that is my belief. Senator Brandegee. Mr. Chairman, I am compelled to leave the room in a little while. Will you allow me to ask one question before I go? 480 TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator McCumbee. Certainly. Senator Brandegee. The Senator from North Dakota asked whether, if our commercial rights in China were jeopardized, we would be justified in fighting. Senator McCumber. If they were not; Senator Brandegee. Or if they were not, if we would be justified. I call your attention, in the hearings before this committee, to the following matter in the letter of Secretary Lansing to Viscount Ishii — and this matter is duplicated in the letter of Viscount Ishii to Secretary Lansing : Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China. They declare — Japan declares — that it is opposed to the acqui- sition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or the territorial integrity of China. Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator Brandegee. If such an agreement was made by any nation, what do you think about the possibility of our being justified in ^intervening, or doing something to stop the violation of the terri- torial integrity of China ? Mr.*^MiLLARD. In speaking of possibilities of armed conflict between nations, it is very difficult to deal with them as abstractions. That is not the way wars come up, as a matter of fact. Now, 'of course, to read these various declarations of governments you would think they were all in harmony and that they all agree ; consequently, that there is no danger, where all agree. That is not the way the thing works. These governments sign up these things, some of them like a lot of sharpers would, with the full intention of gaining a certain point and then working it around into something else. If they would stick to their statements, this eastern question would have been solved 20 years ago, which amounts to the extension of the Monroe doctrine to Asia. They have all agreed to that. The devil of it is that they do not stick to them, and that leads to trouble; and that goes on. You gentlemen sit here and carry your minds back 20 years, and you see this Japanese situation creep up on us inch by inch, and inch by inch; and it is creeping on further, just like the German situation crept up on Europe, and you are going to have to meet this thing. You are not going to be able to meet that with words, but when you meet that issue it will come to you in such a form that the American people would fight for it, it does not make any difference if it was at the North Pole. Senator McCximber. You think, then, that the American people would make war if their treaty obligations — that is, the treaty rights — are maintained for commercial rights of China, and if Japan claims that she does not deprive China of her territorial integrity, although she has certain concessions, she would still go to war to compel these concessions being carried out ? Mr. Millard. If you would just state that in an auditorium before any number of Americans, in the abstract, they would have to agree with you. Senator MoCxtmber. Yes; I am asking you this question Mr. Millard. No; but it will not come up that way, Senator. Senator McCltmber. I was asking you what you would do. TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. 481 Mr. Millard. Stating it in that form, I mean to me, you are statin^' a set of facts under which I would not go to war, myself; I mean, 3 the thing was genuine. If there was a genuine respect for these things I would not go to war, myself. The point is, that that is not the way we have got the thing to deal with. Here is the way this thing will come up on us, and we.wUl get sucked in just like we were into this thing in Europe: If we are not very careful, and that is one reason I am so anxious to see the Senator make some kind of a disclaimer that will straighten us out in the eyes of the Chinese Eeople, that we do not approve of this Shantimg question. This as caused a lot of revulsion of these Chinese, and there are 400,000,000 of them. There are 900,000,000 of these Asiatics, and I am more or less familiar v.ith the psycology of Asiatics, having lived among them for years, and I say if we ever get into a nght about China you are not going to have anything to say about it at all because when it comes to a certain point where you feel yourself sucked in, the way we were into the German things in Europe, we wUl not be able to help ourselves. This is the way the people out there think about it. It will start, perhaps, in the form of a fight between Chinese and Japanese. The Japanese have got that country plastered with what they call their agents for wawakure. A Japanese will go up into a little remote town up in the middle of China and open a little barber shop or store, and go ahead and stay there and peddle and trade. Some day, working around among the Chinese, this fellow's shop will be burned down. That will create an incident. A mob will form and something of that sort will happen. Japan goes in there and interferes, and this thing spreads and they have a condition of tur- moil; they get to fighting among themselves. What happens? The Chinese have learned a good deal in the last few years about war psycology and the minute that thing starts the Chinese will begin to kill Ajnerican missionaries around all over China, if for no other purpose than to force us into this war, and we will then be in the Sosition of either having to sit back and throw up our hands and epend on some friend of ours to protect us, or of having to take some action to protect ourselves, and one thing will lead to another, just like in this thing in Europe, and we will be sucked into it. It is apt to come up in the following manner when it comes up. Something like this will happen. Senator McCumber. This is what I wanted to know. I think I understand you pretty well. So far as Chinese matters are con- cerned you ^o not believe that this country should occupy a situa- tion of isolation to the extent that she would not take any part in Chinese difficulties and the settling of Chinese questions in pre- venting war in China, if possible ? Mr. Millard. We have to, Senator. Senator McCumber. We have to ? Mi. Millard. Yes; we can not help ourselves. It is not a ques- tion of wanting to keep out of it. We can not help ourselves. That is the way I think about it. Senator McCumber. And you beheve, from what you know of the situation there, that we ought not to take a situation in which we say we will be drawn into your squabbles and questions ? Mr Millard. Here is the way it looks to me. I have been watching these Orientals for years. I know their psychology. I 1 s.f;f;4fi — ^1 9 HI 482 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. have got Asiatics that work for me as writeis, graduates of Oxford and Cambridge and of American universities, etc. In the Japanese and China, however, you have just got another Germany. Piece by Eiece, it fits with the same purposes. With China you have got a ig, lumbering democracy. The Chinese are distinctly democratic, to the very essence and to the very core. Looking to the futm-e, this thing shapes itself something like this: Are we going to have another autocratic power, another Germany, undei the hegemony of these Japanese; are we going to have these 900,000,000 Asiatics trained and armed and directed against us; to develop this thing there and create this very thing that Germany was going to create in Europe; and are we just letting this creep on and creep on, and we are just letting them build this up and get another little place here; to raise a dust here when what they want is something over there; and so build this thing up. That is what they are doing on as. I have watched that for 20 years. Senator McCxjmbee. And you would stop it W'th war, would you not? Mr. Mtllaed. If it gets to the place where we can not stop it in any other way, then we must fight. Senator McCumber. That is the way you think we should have stopped the encroachment of Germany ? Mr. Millard. We did not stop it. They want everything we can think of. Senator McCumbee. But you think we should have stopped the encroachments of Germany by war ? Mr. Millard. Yes; we can not get back to where we were on that thing; but we have the same thing developing out there now, and I say that we should try to head it off if we can and not let it go on to a point where we can not control it, and we will simply be sucked into a great conflict out there, in spite of us. Senator McCxlviber. If you could do it by alliances with the great white nations, you would do it ? Mr. Millard. I think this thing can be fixed without danger and without a scrap of alteration in the treaty. Senator McCumbee. Entangling alliances would not affect you, would they ? Senator Swanson. What is your suggestion about it ? Mr. MiLLAED. The President has brought over here, tacked on as a sort of a supplement to the treaty, a covenant, a proposed alliance — it amounts to that whether yov call it so or not — between Great Britain and France and the United States, and the purpose of it stripped right down to the bone is to sustain a certain balance of power in Europe during an indeterminate period. Now, I am not saying that anything the Senate can do or does not do wiU of necessity prevent the thing that I fear happening in the Far East. I do say this, that the Senate may take action m respect to this thing, the tendencies of which would be to retard such an unfortunate consum- mation out there; or if we ultimately do have to get into a fight on this thing, we will have the general psychology of the situation and the general alignment with us instead of against us. With that, all you would have to do would be to write a clause into this alliance. I do not know what you intend to do with that alliance, whether you are going to throw it out altogether or not, but the whole thing, TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 48 S the treaty and the covenant and everything else, is very wobbly, unless you put that spike in it, I can see that. There is another thing. Japan does not want to put anything in writing, but they come over here and they do not trust Mr. Wilson's memory whether we are coming to the support of France. They want us down in black and white. When you get this thing up close you see that they have certain concessions in regard to the Hay doctrine which they have all in writing adhered to ; that if it is threat- ened, or anything like that, they wOf stand with us. Senator Borah. That is, that France will. Mr. Millard. France and Great Britain. Senator Borah. Yes. Mr. Millard. Then you will align the whole psychology of thi& thing. You leave it in the shape, then, in which these Japs will carry it on, building up combinations, and you create a different set of combinations, also and they will say, "Well, yes, I guess maybe we can not get away with this," and you alter their psychology, and their governments will alter their policy. That is the way thia world policy goes. It is done just like your Senate politics is done., They do not run this thing on a lofty and theoretical basis. Senator McCumber. Mj. Millard, we have got somewhat far afield, from the purpose of my inquiries. Senator Borah. Mr. McCumber does not want you to talk about Senate politics. Senator McCumber. Let us get back to the agreement, and see what effect of the alliance will have. Mr. Millard. I beg your pardon for digressing. Senator McCumber. I believe that on certain things we have ia black and white from Japan that she will return Shantung to China.. Mr. Millard. But not when. Senator McCumber. But not when; and also we have notice that she wiU live up to her treaty obligations. Mr. Millard. That is the assumption of every contract. Senator McCumber. She makes that with all of these nations,, not only with China but she makes that last agreement with every one of these nations. Now, if she refuses to carry out her agreement with China, she has broken her obhgation there? Mr. Millard. I would say so, most emphatically. Senator McCumber. Then she has also broken her treaty with these other nations ? Mr. Millard. Yes, sir; she would have done so. Senator McCumber. She would have broken her treaty with these other nations; just what would happen? Mr. Millard. I could not tell. I would have to know exactly the circumstances as to how the thiag came up. Senator McCumber. Then the matter would be brought before the council, would it not ? Mr. Millard. Yes, presumably. Senator McCumber. Then the councU would at least attempt to get a settlement, would they ? Mr. Millard. Presumably. Senator McCumber. And they would attempt to get a settlement along the line of keeping her treaty obhgations ? 484 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMAHY. Mr. Millard. Exactly; I mean- Senator McCuMBER. Do you not think, if we have the United States and Great Britain and France and Italy all pressing Japan to keep her obligations, that she makes in this treaty, and to prevent war with China, it would be a wholesome influence ? Mr. Millard. Yes; if you had that combination you could make Japan keep her promises. Senator McCumber. Yes; but you have the combination of this treaty, in general terms. I am very much afraid that in behind that you have a combination that wiU work exactly to the contrary. Senator McCumber. That may be a conclusion and others may agree to it, but I am assuming that she is going to carry out this con- tract honestly; that these nations are entering into it with an honest purpose, and that if China comes to this alliance, to this council, and says, "Japan in said treaty with me agreed to return Shantung, and I now demand that she will return it, and if she does not return it I will make war," then there is a threat of war, and then it goes before the council and then the council will say to Japan, "There is your written agreement. Are you going to break both your agreement with China and your agreement with us to keep your agreement with China ?" Would not Japan then be made an outlaw nation under the very terms of that agreement, if she did not comply ? Mr. Millard. Yes; theoretically she would; but she could say, "You fellows can all go to hell; I will fight," and you will probably find then that all these nations that are aligned with us would fall off and decide that it was none of their business. Senator McCumber. In other words, you assume that the league of nations would fail and that all of them would fail to perform their duties under the league of nations ? Mr. Millard. Under those circumstances, that they aU had a lot of regional understandings that would control, it at least certainly would fail. Senator McCumber. But any regional understanding to control is vacated by the very terms of this agreement. Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. We have heard about how they hiave been vacated heretofore. Mr. Millard. That would be an abstract assumption about it. I would state that if you state it that way, that would be correct ; but you will see there always comes up the possibility that other people will construe this thing differently. Senator McCumber. I am only considering whether China would be in a better position if she had the United States and Great Britain and France and Italy and Japan signing up an agreement that Japan will keep her agreement — whether she would be in a better position to secure her rights than she would be in if we would turn her over to the tender mercies of Japan without any agreement. Mr. Millard. You would not turn her over to the tender mercies of Japan. She already had all these assurances of Japan about get- ting out of Shantung, and one thing and another, before the Paris conference met. Senator McCumber. But you are assuming that Japan will not keep her word. TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. dSS Mr. MiLLAKD. Japan might just as well not have gone into the conference, and this issue will move along in a practical way very much as if there had been no such thing as the peace conference. Senator McCumbee. But Japan can not turn that over to China to-day because Japan only gets this Shantung right under this treaty, and the treaty has not been signed. After the treaty has been signed and Japan secures the right and the cession from Germany, then she will be in position to turn Shantung back, and then if she refuses she has broken her treaty. Mr. Millard. As a matter of fact Japan could, if she wished to, to-morrow — or she could have done it ever since they have occupied Tsingtau — get up and get out and say to China, "Here it is." Senator McCumber. But she could not transfer the German rights, until she got them. Senator Borah. They are all forfeited. Mr. Millard. In regard to those German rights, our position im this war was like that of a neutral until the war began. Senator McCumber. But Germany did get a right in Shantung. Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator McCumber. And that right will exist until Germany has- been deprived of that right, and Germany must be deprived of that right by some kind of written agreement. Mr. Millard. Germany, for the purposes of an abstract argument, was deprived of that right absolutely on the day that Japan declared war on her. Senator McCumber. She was also deprived of it when she signed the treaty depriving her of it. Mr. Millard. She was deprived of it on the day that Japan de- clared war on Germany and declared all Germany's rights forfeited. Senator Pomerene. Was it not forfeited when Germany declared war, and that she should acquire property by the declarance Mr. Millard. I am not enough of a lawyer to decide that, but there are two kinds of rights in Shantung that Germany had. One was a territorial right, but more important, so far as commerce goes, were the economic rights. When you come down to the economic rights, there in Shantimg it is as if, while we were still a neutral, some third Sower should come over here, and there was some corporation in' few Jersey which was a German concern in which Germans owned half or more of the stock, and one of the belligerents had grabbed that, and proceeded to put their troops in there. That is what the Japanese did in Shantung Province, all over that Province. Here was a coal mine, we will say, 200 miles away from Tsing-tau, in which the Germans, being technical men, and supplying the ma- chinery, were operating the coal mine in partnership with the Chinese, and they just walked in there and took possession of it; and now they expect to retain control of all of it. Senator McCumber. I shall have to leave in just a moment, and I want to ask you a question on another subject before I go. I ask this simply for information. What did China do in the matter of this war ? She declared war on Germany ? Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator McCumber. But what did she do under it ? She furnished no soldiers, did she ? Mr. Millard. No, sir; she wanted to. 486 TEE AT Y or PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator McCumber. She furnished laborers for France, did she not ? Mr. Millard. (She furnished some 200,000 to 250,000 laborers. Senator McCiyMBEE. Did they go simply under the instructions of the Chinese Government to go there? Mr. Millard. No. Senator McCutvibee. Or did France simply allow them to go in for the wages they could receive for foreign labor there ? Mr. Millard. No; it was a question of wages. The people re- ceived wages. But you could not go in and take 250,000 of that population. Most of these fellows came from Shantung, by the way. China agreed to it. Senator McCumbee. Was it done under a military order of China ? • Mr. Millaed. It was done by the consent of the Chinese Govern- ment. Senator McCumbee. In other words, she consented that her citi- zens might go to France ? Mr. Millaed. Yes; and as you may know, on two or three occa- sions these Chinese laborers actually fought, at the time the Germans "were running over things; they picked up what arms they could get and fought, and thousands of them died, were killed and wounded, although they were not trained soldiers, at all. Here was the proposition. France needed man-power. The French even sent a military mission to Peking and made a plan Tvhereby China would contribute so many troops. At different times they tried to get Japan to send troops, but they could not get her to do it. She always asked such compensation, in various ways, that they could not do it. They wanted to get Chinese, and the Chinese were very willing to go. They could not finance themselves. We had to finance Italy and all. If we had sent the money, a couple •of million dollars, the Chinese would have sent three of four hundred thousand troops. Senator McCumbee. Did China send any troops or assist finan- cially in any way, or with supplies ? Mr. Millaed. They bought about $2,000,000 worth of Liberty bonds. I never heard of anybody in Japan buying any. Senator Moses. These Chinese laborers that went to France released a lot of men for active fighting? Mr. Millaed. Yes, they did. Senator Hitchcock. You know that Japan has invested in a lot of Liberty bonds, do you not ? Mr. Millaed. No, I do not know. This thing in China was a popular subscription. Senator Hitchcock. Japan has purchased a lot of war securities. Senator Beandegee. You mean the Japanese Government ? Senator Hitchcock. Yes; the Government. Mr. Millard. In China they got up a Liberty loan drive in Shanghai, ■and the Chinese came up and subscribed liberally. The Chinaman never before in the world could have been gotten to put his money in any foreign investment. Senator Hitchcock. Were you in the Fai East at the time the trouble occurred over Korea ? Mr. Millard. I do not loiow what trouble you refer to now, Senator. Senator Hitchcock. The first aggression of Japan in Korea ? TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANY. 487 Mr. Millard. Of course the first aggression of Japan in Korea occurred away back in 1894, in the Japan and China War. I was not in the Far East at that time. I was m the Far East as a newspaper correspondent during the whole of the Japanese-Chinese War and then I have been in Korea three or four times since that time. Senator Hitchcock. Was that the time they were making their grab in Korea ? Mr. Millard. They had seized Korea at that time. They seized it on the theory of protecting Korean independence, and the rest was simply the different phases of their absorption until they got possession of the entire country. Senator Hitchcock. Do you remember the appeal that the Korean Emperor made to the United States ? Mr. Millard. Not in a very definite way. I recollect it. Senator Hitchcock. Do you remember the effort to seek asylum in the legation of the Unitea States ? Mr. Millard. Yes; I remember that. Senator Hitchcock. Do you recall the terms of the treaty we made with Korea in 1892 by which we agreed to exert out good offices for the benefit of the Korean Government in the event that it was im- posed upon in any way ? Mr. Millard. Yes, I do. I have had a lot of Koreans throw that up to me. Senator Hitchcock. Did the United States ever do anything toward carrying out that agreement? Mr. Millard. I think, quite on the contrary, that they rather lent themselves to the other hypothesis. Senator Hitchcock. That is, helped the Japanese ? Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. I wUl just insert in the record at this point that part of article 1 of our treaty with Korea which reads as follows : If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the act, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feeling. You think that the United States, when appealed to by the Korean Emperor, did not do anything to carry out that promise ? Mr. Millard. I do not think that it did anything at all. In fact, I am quite sure they did not. Senator Hitchcock. Were you famihar, at all, with the action of our minister who at that time was located in Seoul, representing the United States, when he was appealed to by the Korean Emperor to make good on this promise ? Mr. Millard. I was not there then. I read and heard something of what occurred. , Senator Hitchcock. Did you ever hear of this telegram which was sent by our minister, Mr. Harris M. Allen, to Mr. John Hay, then Secretary of State, reading as follows: •' Seoul, Korea, Februwy U, 1904. Hon. John Hay, Secretary of State, Washington. Sir- I have the honor to confirm my telegram of to-day as follows: Had an audi- •ence with the head of Government of Korea last night. He informed me Japanese minister opposed to making alliance whereby m return for the protection of Korea Japan will have control. The document promised me has not arnved. Head of •Government of Korea is very anxious to secure the assistance of the United States. I have pacified him without any promises, and refused any asylum. " I have the honor, to be, sir, your obediant servant, Harris M. Albbn. 488 TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Millard. Yes; I have seen a copy of that telegram before. Senator Hitchcock. Yes. Mr. Millard. In fact, I was shown all of that matter by Mr. Allen himself within a few months, as I recall it. Senator Hitchcock. Then, were you familiar with the story of how the Japanese representative in Seoul was attempting to force the Korean Emperor to sign this decree giving full power to the Japanese ? Mr. Millard. In two of my books I devoted quite a number of chapters to information about those events. Senator Hitchcock. And how the Korean minister sought to escape from him and appealed to the American minister to let him enter the American legation. Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. And how the American minister sent repre-. sentatives to the fence and prohibited the Korean minister from even being able to escape from the Japanese by entering the American legation. Mr. Millard. Yes, I recollect those things. Senator Hitchcock. Who was Secretary of State at that time? Mr. Millard. I would have to think. Senator Hitchcock. Mr. John Hay ? Mr. Millard. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. Who was President of the United States at that time ? Mr. Millard. I would have to think about that. I guess it must, have been Mr. Roosevelt. Senator Brandegee. In what year ? Senator Hitchcock. In 1904. Senator. Moses. May I interrogate the Senator from Nebraska about the purpose of his inquiry ? That has been done here before. Senator Hitchcock. Part of the purpose of the inquiry is to show that even when bound by a treaty the United States has refused to come to the assistance of an Oriental power against Japan. Senator Moses. The purpose being to show that the United States did not live up to its treaty obligations? Senator Hitchcock. Yes. Senator Moses. And from that you argue that therefore Japan will live up to its treaty obligations ? Senator Hitchcock. No; but to argue that all these tears that are being shed over the woes of China are crocodile tears, because they are being shed by men associated with the same people who laud John Hay as a great American statesman who always protected the rights of those with whom he had contracted. Senator Johnson of California. I do not know anything about those who laud John Hay, but — - — ■ Senator Hitchcock. He was lauded on the floor the other day. Senator Johnson of California. But I do know there are no croco- dile tears being shed over the Shantung matter. What I say in regard to it is that it presents a moral question, that it is up to us to- determine for ourselves, not up to John Hay or any Secretary of State. Senator Moses. Nor any other dead man. Senator Johnson of California. It is up to us to determine what we will do on a moral question; and when we come to a moral question TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY.' 489 like Shantung I know that I shall not shelter myself behind any wrong that may have been done in the past, nor any action, whatever it it may have been, of any official of the United States in the past. I will meet that moral question and decide it as I think a moral ques- tion ought to be decided. Now, I do not know whether the United States Senate ever had anything to do with the Korean question or not, but the United States Senate to-day has to do with the Shan- tung decision; and so when you endeavor to escape responsibility for a decision in the Shantung question because some official in the past may have done wrong in respect to some other question, you are seeking hypocritically simply to escape a bounden duty that rests upon the human beings before whom that moral question comes to-day. Now, Mr. Millard, I want to ask you a question or two, in response to Senator McCumber. Are you familiar with these provisions in relation to Shantung in the treaty ? Mr. MiLLAED. I read them several times; yes. Senator Johnson of California. Before this peace conference in Paris all the nations of the earth were assembled, deciding territorial Juestions. Before them came Japan and China, the United States, taly, Great Britain, France, and others. Definitively, *at that time, with all the evidence before them, they decided the Shantung ques- tion by sections 156 and 157, did they not? Mr. Millard. Yes; they did. Senator Johnson of California. Now, would it not seem to follow, then, that that definitive determination by aU the nations of the earth, with all of the previous acts and treaties before them, decided everything concerning Shantung finaUy at that time ? Mr. Millard. I would say that a certain presumption to that effect would lie; and furthermore I would like to say this, perhaps you noticed it: In finally leaving Paris the Japanese peace delega- tion, through its mouthpiece, Baron Makino, gave out a sort of state- ment in which he said officially that Japan regarded the way the Shantung question was settled before the peace conference as a gen- eral indorsement of Japan's policy in the Orient. Senator Johnson of California. Of necessity, that is so, is it not, because they had before them the Chinese statement and the Chinese treaty ? Mr. Millard. He gave that out as an official statement. That was his validictory you might say upon leaving Paris. Senator Johnson of California. So that the Shantung decision rests upon a definitive agreement, and the indefinite verbal promise of Japan that at some indefinite period in the future something wiU be returned. Mr. Millard. All the gentlemen who have rank as international lawyers, to whom I have submitted the question, say that that is the status. Senator Johnson of California. That is all. Senator Beandegbe. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask some questions. The Chairman. The Senator from Connecticut. Senator Brandegee. I understood you to say this morning that when Japan entered upon the possession of Shantung she practically overran the whole Province. Mr. Millard. She did, sir; yes. 490 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Brandegee. Including the railroad, up to the capital of the Province. Mr. Millard. Yes. A city called Tsinan, or, as the Chinese write it, Tsi-nan-pou, but pou means capital or great city. Senator Brandegee. I understood you also to say that they assumed control of the civil government. Mr. Millard. That was later. First, on the theory of military necessity, they went clear outside of the comparatively small terri- tory which had been leased to Germany, and sent their troops all over the Province and occupied the principal places, and everywhere they did that they would string a field military telegraph, and would establish telegraph and post offices, and all those things are still there to-day. Senator Brandegee. Do you consider that a violation of the terri- torial integrity of China ? Mr. Millard. I would say absolutely that it is a violation of terri- tory and an invasion, where that set of circumstances would arise. Senator Brandegee. Do you consider it an invasion of the sov- ereignty of China for Japan to come in there and assume control of the civil government of the Province ? Mr. Millard. Yes. In regard to the civil government, that status that I am describing established Japan throughout the Province. They would send their troops into a certain district where there had been some little coal mine that the Chinese had hired some German engineer or somebody to get the coal out of, and under the presmnp- tion that there was a German equity in it somewhere they would go off the railroad over to this district and grab that property. Then they would send a few hundred troops in there and string a miUtary wire, a military telephone system for communication, and the next thing you would find a Japanese post office, and the next thing there would be a Japanese drug shop with which they distributed their opium and other things throughout the country, and you would find a Japanese house of prostitution and all those other things, a httle Japanese settlement would grow up there. After that thing had gone on for a couple of years, and they had the whole Province pretty well placed, then they foresaw a time when the war would end and when the excuse of military necessity would not hold good. So then they invented a kind of substitute and began a substituting process by which there would be gradually substituted a civil administration in the Province instead of the military occupation, with its presumed military necessity. There was no more military necessity for it than there would have been for the Japanese occupation of California, but that was the excuse, and of course with the termination of the war that would end even as an excuse, so they set out to create a so-called civil a-dministration. They began it tentatively like they always do, by establishing It in three different localities. There had been a military commandant at each of those places. So they substituted a civil administrator there, and creating a little court along with him. Now, that was a direct infringement, not only upon the Chinese sovereignty, but upon the treaty rights of all other nations, because they extorted the extra- territoriality from China imder certain circumstances, under which China does certain things and the foreigners will do certain things, and the foreigners will reside in certain localities. If they go out of those localities, at least under certain conditions, by reason of those TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 491 things they retain their extraterritorial jurisdiction. That is, if a foreigner commits an offense, he can be haled before his own consul, or something like that. So, when the Japanese would go out into these places and establish a civil administration, that merely meant that if a Japanese committed any offense he could not be haled before a Chinese court but he would be brought before a Japanese coiu-t, which would simply release the man. They worked that all over the province. Senator Swanson. In your last book. Democracy and the East, I received the impression that you stated in that book that the Japanese had the right of extraterritorial jurisdiction for the entire Chinese Empire. Is that true? Mr. Millard. No; their status under the treaty is exactly the same as ours. St^nator Swanson. But the impression I derived in reading that book was that by some process the Chinese had given or the Japanese had taken the right of extraterritorial jurisdiction on all diflFerences with the Chinese Empire. Is that true ? Mr. Millard. Not quite. I must have stated it quite obscurely if you got that impression. They ha\a done it wherever they have obtained a foothold. They have done it in Manchuria and Shantung. They have done it in different parts of China. They claimed that Fu-kien Province is within their sphere on account of its proximity to Formosa, and that is just a criterion of their methods for the rest of the country, which amounts to taking political possession of it by those methods. Senator Swanson. As I understand them, they have no greater rights by treaty than the other nations have as to extraterritorial jurisdiction. Mr. Millard. None whatever. Their rights by treaty are the same as ours. We would have just the same rights at any time in this war, while China was neutral, or since, to have sent a bunch of American marines over into Shantung Province and grabbed coal mines and strung telegraph wires there, or anything else, just as Japan has done. Senator Swanson. I got that impression from your book, and I looked to see if there were any treaties in the appendix, but I did not fbd any. So you say it is simply limited to where they have mil- itary occupation, like Shantung and Formosa. Mr. Millard. Yes; and they saw that the end of the war would end that, and they have created a substitute for it in the form of civil administration. Senator Brandegee. At what points has Japan established herself in China ? Mr. Millard. Over three Manchurian Provinces and what is called Outer Mongolia. The distinction between Outer and Inner Mon- golia was never heard of until Russia and Japan split it up that way by a secret treaty and invented those distinctions to define what was Japan's part and what was Russia's part, and then through this process down there in Fukien Province. That is down there by Amoy. , , r- 1.1 The revolution in China began m 1911, and the first outbreak occurred away up there on the Yangtse River, at Wu-chang, opposite Hankow, and there was a good deal of disorder. The government troops were on the north bank of the river and the rebels were on the south bank, and shells and bullets fell around the settlement. 492 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. before the government went up there to protect foreign concessions. Japan took advantage of that period of disorder to send a lot of troops up there, and then she just deliberately went over there and took a piece of ground right outside of the foreign settlement of Hankow, and built big permanent barracks there, and has kept a garrison there ever since, and China can not get them out. Senator Beandbgee. In what province is that? Mr. Millard. That must be m the Province of Hupeh. It is right up there at Hankow. Hankow bears about the same relation to China that Chicago does to the United States. It is the great interior city of China, with 3,000,000 people there. Senator Brandegee. What other Provinces does Japan occupy? Mr. Millard. Every time I go to China I find she has done a lot more things. In the last two years she has gone out, and by this process of penetration she will go off into some little Province up there and bribe some local official, or in some way get some kind of a concession out of him — mayb^ to mine some minerals in the district, or something of that kind — ana in that way establish some sort of a presumption of Japanese vested interest in something or other. Senator Brandegee. Does she send her troops in there? Mr. Millard. Then the first thing you know there will be half a dozen Japanese soldiers who will drift in from nowhere. You will hardly know how they came there. You will wake up some morning and fmd them there, supposedly there to protect this vested interest, and that is the way it is done. Then some fine day some of the other foreign consular agents wake up and find the soldiers there, and they say, "What are these Japanese soldiers doing here?" And the Chi- nese say, "We don't know how they got here. We woke up one morning and found them there." Then they go and make represen- tations to the Japanese consul, and they say, "VvThat are those fel- lows there for? They have no right there." Then they will make some excuse and say, "Oh, they are here temporarily," and they dawdle along, and the next time, where there were 6 there will be 50 more, and then a little later they will have barracks built, and there will be 200.' You would have to check up those things every three months in order to catch up with them. Senator Brandegee. To revert to an inquiry that Senator Mc- Cumber made of you a little while ago, as to the effectiveness of the league of nations if the covenant should be ratified, as to being an ef- fective guaranty that Japan would perform its treaties or the stipu- lations made in a note to abandon the sovereignty of Shantung, or to get out within a certain time. You started to say something, but was cut off and did not finish it. You expressed some doubt as to whether the league would come up to the test of protecting China, and you said that in other cases it had not been done, and that that fact could be developed by the Senate if it wanted to. Do you recall having made such a statement, and if you made it, what did you mean ? Mr. Millard. My 20 years' experience as a reporter of interna- tional events and politics may have made me a little cyniQal. I do not think I am cynical, but I do think I regard international politics from a common sense practical view. I see how the machinery works. I know how the thing runs. And here you have got this situation: As Senator Johnson said, you have had all the nations of the world assembled in a great conclave at Paris, where they were TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 493 fixing up everything on the basis of justice, and were supposed to give everything due consideration, and that was the result in regard to Shantung. Now let us suppose this thing goes on for two or three years and China comes alon^ some day and says, "I can not stand this any more," and some disorder starts in China and there is a flare-up, and it takes the form of an antiforeign demonstration, and they kill some missionaries, and our Government says, "Something has got to be done," and China says, "We can not let Japan go in here by herself; she will just overrun the country." And if we have any kind of international action, then we have got to go in and participate, and then China comes along and says, "I demand that the league of nations make Japan fulfill her promises and get out." She might come and make that appeal to the league of nations. Then suppose it should develop that it would get around to the point where there would have to be a matter of force. How are you going to make her get out ? She could tell the league of nations to go to the devil unless you could line up certain forces that she could see could be applied to her, and the only way you could make her see that would be by making a certain alignment, and united action among enough of the principal powers to overawe her, or else fight her. You would have to have a sufficient alignment of power to overawe her. Under those circumstances our Government might take the attitude, "Japan, this is all wrong. You must straighten this thing out before the league of nations." Then we go around among the British and French Governments, among the principal powers as the Senator who interrogated me a little while ago was speaking about; and we ask these principal powers to tell Japan that she has got to behave herself; and suppose under those circumstances the British Government should shrug its shoulders and say, "We are very sorry, but here is another secret agreement," and should pull it out on you, and France should pull out another secret agreement on you, and so forth and so on, in which secret agreements they have practically agteed in advance that Japan can get away with all this. That is just what happened to us at Paris; that is, they pulled these things on us there. That is the way the game is played. It is a practical proposition, and I say that there is circumstantial evidence that that arrangement was agreed to prac- tically at Paris, except that my information was that the French had not conamitted themselves to it, because they wanted to wait to find out what conditions we might attach to this so-called alliance, to the support they want us to give them; but Pichon distinctly was in favor of it, and it is believed that the British have already really reached an agreement with Japan, one of those collateral or regional agreements on the side. Now, suppose you sign up this league of nations, or this alliance, and within say six months, or whatever time would elapse, they got the league of nations together and started to organize it; then it would seem to me that under article 21, or another article which says that treaties shall all be made public, they say. "Everybody who has got any treaties bring them out on the table and let us look them over." Then it would seem that legally all those that are brought out under those circumstances will be valid treaties. Then when they brmg out those agreements, we are signed up, we are nailed down, and we 494 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. have not any way of going back on this thing. I say, get back of it now and find out if it is true. The only hold we had over any of these nations was that they were asking us to do something. Now, what they are asking us to do is to enter into a tripartite alliance to protect the balance of power in Europe. There is a good deal to be said in favor of that in sustaining the equilibrium of the world. Senator Brandegee. You refer to the Franco-American treaty and the British-French treaty. , Mr. Millard. Yes. But I say, let us say to them, "Now let us make this 50-50. We went into this war blind. You did not tell us of these things, and we gave you our best. We gave you our generous help without asking any questions, and we believed that everybody would act right at the end. Now, before we go into any of these things we would like to ask you a few questions. Have you got any secret agreements that are going to infringe upon our policy in differ- ent parts of the world ?" Let us say to them, "If you have got any- thing of that sort, put them right on the table now. Don't wait until later. Then we will see what kind of a treaty we have got." That was one line of thought that I was proposing. Senator. If they do that, they can find out these things. If you ask the President or Mr. Lansing whether they know of any such thing, they say, "No, we don't know." Let us make it a categorical interrogation, of the French and British Governments, and see what they say. Senator Brandegee. You are aware, I assume, of the construction which I understand the President and certain Senators place upon article 10 of the covenant of the league, are you not? Mr. Millard. I have read a good many different statements about it. Senator Brandegee. If I unc'^^rstand their position correctly, they claim that when the council hears a dispute and makes recommenda- tions, or makes recommendations as to how the treaty stipulations shall be carried out by the members of the league, their recommen- dations are merely advisory and not compulsory on the members of the league. You are familiar with that, are you ? Mr. Millard. I would not consider that my opinion about that would be worth anything. Senator Brandegee. I am not going to ask your opinion about that, but have you heard that interpretation of article 10, of the effect of such a recommendation of the council, that it would be purely advisory and not mandatory on the members of the league ? Mr. Millard. I have. Senator Brandegee. What effect do you think the guaranty under article 10, that we are, if we are asked to undertake to protect and preserve the territorial integrity of all the -members of the league would have if Japan should understand that the recommendations of the council under that were only advisory ? Mr. Millard. I would think that anything that leaves a loop- hole by which Japan can squirm around and evade the promises that she has made about that, she will utilize in that way. So I think prudence would dictate that you leave as few loopholes as possible. Senator Brandegee. If there are loopholes there, they are there, and we are told that we can not stop them or amend them, or dot an "i" or cross a "t." Mr. Millard. I do not know what the powers and prerogatives of the Senate are in respect to these things. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 495 Senator Beandegee. Well, I do; but you do not think, do you, that if the recommendation of this coimcil that Senator McCumber was asking you about is only advisory on the members, if as you have said you do not think this recommendation would be an effect- ive guaranty to China that Japan would perform her promise to get out of Shantung, do you think that recommendation would terrify Japan to any appreciable extent? Mr. Millard. From my knowledge of the circumstances I do not think it would terrify her at all. Nothing will terrify Japan in re- spect to this subject unless she sees that if she does not do certain things she is coming in collision with superior forces. Senator Brandegee. Moral forces ? Mr. Millard. No, material forces. She does not care the snap of her fingers about any moral force, any more than Germany did. Senator Pomerene. May I ask a question ? The Chairman. Certainly. Senator Pomerene. This morning you said there were some 20 regional understandings affecting China. Mr. Millard. I said I thought there were about that many known, yes. Senator Pomerene. What do you mean by understandings? Do you mean secret treaties? Mr. Millard. No, sir; most of them are in writing and have been published. Senator Pomerene. Between what countries ? Mr. Millard. I can give you a list of them if you want them, that is a partial list. I will not say it is complete. I was looking it up the other day and I have it here. The first are the various notes and so forth constituting what they call the "Hay doctrine." Then there is the Anglo-Japanese alliance, first signed on January 30, 1902; revised and amended August 12, 1905, and revised and renewed July, 1911. Third, there is the Franco-Japanese arrangement, signed July 10, 1907. Fourth is the Eusso-Japan treaty of peace of September 5, 1905. Fifth, there is the convention between Japan and Russia of July 30, 1907. Sixth, there is the Russo-British convention of August 31, 1907. Seventh, there are the secret Russo-Japanese alliance and agree- ments signed on July 7, 1907; June 21, 1910; July 4, 1910; June 25, 1912; July 8, 1912; June 20, 1916. The existence of these agree- ments was revealed by the publication of documents after the revo- lution in Russia, but the texts of all of them have not vet been pub- lished. The text of the secret alliance of 1916, made during the Great War, has been published. Eighth, there is the Russo-British agreement of April 28, 1899. Ninth is the agreement between Great Britain and France of Janu- ary 51, 1896. . , o , Tenth, there are the British-American agreements of September 2, 1898, and October 16, 1900. Eleventh is the British-Chinese agreement relatmg to Thibet. Twelfth is the Root-Takahira agreement between Japan and the United States of November 30, 1908. Thirteenth is the Lansmg-Ishii agreement between Japan and the United States of November 2, 1917. 496 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANY. Fourteenth is the secret agreement between Russia, Great Britain and France in 1915, relating to Western Asia. Fifteenth is the secret agreement between Great Britain and France, known as the Sykes-Picot Treaty, made in 1916, relating to Western Asia. Sixteenth are the alleged secret agreements made by Japan with various Russian factions in vSiberia in 1918 and 1919. Seventeenth is the alleged secret regional understanding relating to Asia made by Japan, France, and Great Britain in 1919. I have 17 of them enumerated here, but I do not have with me a copy- of Mr. Rockhill's treaties. Senator Pomerene. Those are either secret treaties or an exchange of notes, are they ? Mr. Millard. Most of them are in the form of the exchange of notes. Senator Pomerene. So in that respect they are not akin to the Monroe doctrine. Mr. Millard. I do not know to what extent you would draw an analogy there. I would not think they were akin to the Monroe doctrine. Senator Pomerene. Now another matter. As I recall, Count Ishii gave out a statement which was printed in the American papers here, to the effect that Japan had invited China to join her forces in fighting the German troops in the Far East in the Shantung Peninsula or Province. Mr. Millard. Viscount Ishii. Do I understand you to say he stated that Japan had invited China to do so ? Senator Pomerene. Yes. Mr. Millard. I think quite the contrary. As I say, she pre- vented China from doing so. Senator Pomerene. In the first place, I mean. Mr. Millard. In the first place. Senator Pomerene. Before or about the time she began active military operations. Mr. Millard. Absolutely the contrary of that is the fact. China proposed to enter into the operations at Kaichow, and Japan pre- vented her. Senator Pomerene. So you take issue with Viscount Ishii in that ? Mr. Millard. If he made that statement. I do not laiow that he did. Senator Pomerene. That i& as I understand it. Mr. Millard. I never heard it before. Senator Pomerene. Suffice it to say that China took no part in seeking to drive the Germans out of Shantung. Mr. Millard. She asked to be permitted to participate in the operations, but was notpermitted. Senator Pomerene. Was that during the period that Japan was doing the actual fighting ? Mr. Millard. It was before she even started to fight. Senator Pomerene. If I understood you correctly this morning, you stated that later on Japan tried to dissuade China from severing diplomatic relations with Grermany. Mr. Millard. Yes; I did state that. Senator Pomerene. With what Chinese officials were those efforts made ? TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GBKMANY. 497 Mr. Millard. With various people in the Wai-chow Pou and espe- cially with the Premier of China. Senator Pomerene. What was Japan's reason for doing that, if you know? Mr. Millard. Of course I can only say that by deduction. Her reason was that Japan had twice before rejected absolute proposals for China to join the war, proposals made directly on one occasion to the ambassadors at Tokyo, saying that she did. not want China to join, because under those circumstances China would be in the allied group and would have a protected position at the end of the war. Senator Pomerene. That position would be antagonistic to the position taken both by Great Britain and France, would it not? Senator Pomerene. With respect to China severing her diplomatic relations. Mr. Millard. Yes; the attitude of the British and French legations. I suppose you are referring now to China — when China did sever relations. Senator Pomerene. Yes. Mr. Millard. The attitude of the French and British legations at that time was distinctly sympathetic to having China follow the advice of the United States. Senator Pomerene. So that Japan at that time was, in your judg- ment, acting in direct antagonism to what were the interests of Great Britain and France and Italy, with which nations she had these secret treaties ? Mr. Millard. You see the signing of these treaties was very nearly contemporaneous with these events which we are speaking of. These negotiations in regard to the secret treaties were being conducted at a different place. Senator Pomerene. These secret treaties were made some time in 1915, were they not? Mr. Millard. In 1917, right at the very time, almost day for day, week for week, almost at that moment. Japan did not want China to do anything untU she got these secret treaties signed up. That was one immediate motive. Meanwhile you have got to take various other things into consideration. That was the most precarious moment of the war for the Allies. Senator Pomerene. And still, at that very precarious moment, you feel satisfied that Japan was trying to prevent China from sever- mg relations with Germany. Mr. Millard. Exactly. She used that very circumstance, I would say flatly, to blackmail her allies into signing these secret agreements. Senator Pomerene. Suppose this treaty fails of confirmation, what will be the relationship existing between China and Japan with respect to Shantung? Mr. Millard. It will be just what it has been at any time for the last five years. Senator Pomerene. That is all. If there are no further questions, Mr. Millard will be excused, and the secretary will arrange for his fees and expenses. The committee will stand adjourned until to-morrow at 10 a. m., at the White House. (Thereupon, at 4 o'clock and 50 minutes p. m., the committee ad- journed until Tuesday, August 19, 1919, at 10 o'clock a. m., at the White House.) 135546—19 32 TUESDAY, AUGUST 19, 1919. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D. C. CONFERENCE AT THE WHITE HOUSE. The committee met at the White House at 10 o'clock a. m., pursuant to the invitation of the President, and proceeded to the East Room, where the conference was held. Present: Hon. Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, and the following members of the committee : Senators Lodge (chair- man), McCumber, Borah, Brand egee, Fall, Knox, Harding, Johnson of California, New, Moses, Hitchcock, Williams, Swanson, Pomerene, Smith, and Pittman. STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT. The President. Mr. Chairman, I have taken the liberty of writing out a little statement in the hope that it might facilitate discussion by speaking directly on some points that I know have been points of controversy and upon which I thought an expression of opinion would not be unwelcome. I am absolutely glad that the committee should have responded in this way to my intimation that I would like to be of service to it. I welcome the opportunity for a frank and full interchange of views. I hope, too, that this conference will serve to expedite your con- sideration of the treaty of peace. I beg that you will pardon and indulge me if I again urge that practically the whole task of bringing the country back to normal conditions of life and industry waits upon the decision of the Senate with regard to the terms of the peace. I venture thus again to urge my advice that the action of the Senate with regard to the treaty be taken at the earliest practicable moment because the problems with which we are face to face in the readjustment of our national life are of the most pressing and critical character, will require for their proper solution the most intimate and disinterested cooperation of all parties and all interests, and can not be postponed without manifest peril to our people and to all the national advantages we hold most dear. May I mention a few of the matters which can not be handled with intelligence until the country knows the character of the peace it is to have? I do so only by a very few samples. The copper mines of Montana, Arizona, and Alaska, for example, are being kept open and in operation only at a great cost and loss, in part upon borrowed money; the zinc mines of Missouri, Tennessee, and Wisconsin are being operated at a,bout one-half their capacity; the lead of Idaho, Illinois, and Missouri reaches only a portion of its 499 500 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. former market; there is an immediate need for cotton belting, and also for lubricating oil, which can not be met — all because the channels of trade are barred by war when there is no war. The same is true of raw cotton, of which the Central Empires alone formerly purchased nearly 4,000,000 bales. And these are only examples. There is hardly a single raw material, a single important foodstuff, a single class of manufactured goods which is not in the same case. Our full, normal profitable production waits on peace. Our military plans of course wait upon it. We can not intelligently or wisely decide how large a naval or military force we shall maintain or what our policy with regard to military training is to be until we have peace not only, but also until we know how peace is to be sustained, whether by the arms of single nations or by the concert of all the great peoples. And there is more than that difficulty involved. The vast surplus properties of the Army include not food and clothing merely, whose sale will affect normal production, but great manufacturing establishments also which should be restored to their former uses, great stores of machine tools, and all sorts of merchandise which must lie idle until peace and miUtary policy are definitively determined. By the same token there can be no properly studied national budget until then. The nations that ratify the treaty, such as Great Britain, Belgium, and France, will be in a position to lay their plans for controlling the markets of central Europe without competition from us if we do not presently act. We have no consular agents, no trade representatives there to look after our interests. There are large areas of Europe whose future will lie uncertain and questionable until their people know the final settlements of peace and the forces which are to administer and sustain it. Without determinate markets our production can not proceed with intelligence or confidence. There can be no stabilization of wages because there can be no settled conditions of employment. There can be no easy or normal industrial credits because there can be no confident or permanent revival of business. But I will not weary you with obvious examples. I will only venture to repeat that every element of normal life amongst us depends upon and awaits the ratification of the treaty of peace; and also that we can not afford to lose a single summer's day by not doing all that we can to mitigate the winter's suffering, which, unless we find means to prevent it, may prove disastrous to a large portion of the world, and may, at its worst, bring upon Europe conditions even more terrible than those wrought by the war itself. Nothing, I am led to believe, stands in the way of the ratification of the treaty except certain doubts with regard to the meaning and implica- tion of certain articles of the covenant of the league of nations ; and I must frankly say that I am unable to understand why such doubts should be entertained. You will recall that when I had the pleasure of a conference with your committee and with the Committee of the House of Eepresentatives on Foreign Affairs at the White House in March last the questions now most frequently asked about the league of nations were aU canvassed with a view to their immediate clari- fication. The covenant of the league was then in its first draft and subject to revision. It was pointed out that no express recognition was given to the Monroe dootrme; that it was not expressly pro- TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 501 vided that the league should have no authority to act or to express a judgment on matters of domestic policy; that the right to with- draw from the league was not expressly recognized; and that the constitutional right of the Congress to determine all questions of peace and war was not sufficiently safeguarded. On my return to Paris aU these matters were taken up again by the commission on the league of nations and every suggestion of the United States was accepted. The views of the United States with regard to the questions I have mentioned had, in fact, already been accepted by the commission and there was supposed to be nothing inconsistent with them in the draft of the covenant first adopted — the draft which was the subject of our discussion in March — but no objection was made to saying explicitly in the text what aU had supposed to be implicit in it- There was absolutely no doubt as to the meaning of any one of the resulting provisions of the covenant in the minds of those who par- ticipated m drafting them, and I respectfully submit that there is nothuig vague or doubtful in their wording. The Monroe doctrine is expressly mentioned as an understanding whichisinnoway tobe impaired or interfered with by anything con- tained in the covenant and the expression ' ' regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine" was used, not because anyone of the conferees thought there was any comparable agreement anywhere else in. existence or in contemplation, but only because it was thought best to avoid the appearance of dealing in such a document witk the policy of a single nation. Absolutely nothing is concealed in the phrase. With regard to domestic questions Article XVI of the covenant, expressly provides that, if in case of any dispute arising between members of the league the matter involved is claimed by one of the parties "and is found by the council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement." The United States was by no means the onlj_ Government interested in the explicit adoption of tliis provision, and there is no doubt in the mind of any authoritative student of inter- national law that such matters as immigration, tariffs, and naturaliza- tion are incontestably domestic questions with which no international body could deal without express authority to do so. No enumeration of domestic questions was undertaken because to undertake it, even by sample, would have involved the danger of seeming to exclude those not mentioned. The right of any sovereign State to withdraw had been taken for granted, but no objection was made to making it explicit. Indeed, so soon as the views expressed at the White House conference were laid before the commission it was at once conceded that it was best not to leave the answer to so important a question to inference. No proposal was made to set up any tribunal to pass judgment upon the question whether a withdrawing nation had in fact fulfilled "all its international obligations and all its obligations under the covenant." It was recognized that that question must be left to be resolved by the conscience of the nation proposing to withdraw; and I must say that it did not seem to me worth while to propose that the article be made more explicit, because I knew that the United States would 502 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMAITY. never itself propose to withdraw from the league if its conscience was not entirely clear as to the fulfillment of all its international obligations. It has never failed to fulfill them and never will. Article 10 is in no respect of doubtful meaning when read in the light of the covenant as a whole. The council of the league can only "advise upon" the means by which the obligations of that great article are to be given effect to. Unless the United States is a pa,rty to the policy or action in question, her own affirmative vote in the council is necessary before any advice can be given, for a unanimous vote of the council is required. If she is a party, the trouble is hers anyhow. And the unanimous vote of the council is only advice in any case. Each Government is free to reject it if it pleases. Nothing could have been made more clear to the conference than the right of our Congress under our Constitution to exercise its independent judgment in all matters of peace and war. No attempt was made to question or limit that right. The United States will, indeed, under- take under article 10 to "respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league," and that engagement constitutes a very grave and solemn moral obligation. But it is a moral, not a legal, obligation, and leaves our Congress absolutely free to put its own interpretation upon it in all cases that call for action. It is binding in conscience only, not in law. Article 10 seems to me to consitute the very backbone of the whole covenant. Without it the league would be hardly more than an influential debating society. It has several times been suggested, in public debate and in private conference, that interpretations of the sense in which the United States accepts the engagements of the covenant should be embodied in the instrument of ratification. There can be no reasonable objec- tion to such interpretations accompanying the act of ratification pro- vided they do not form a part of the formal ratification itself. Most of the interpretations which have been suggested to me embody what seems to me the plain meaning of the instrument itself. But if such interpretations should constitute a part of the formal resolution of ratification, long delays would be the inevitable consequence, inas- much as all the many governments concerned would have to accept, in effect, the language of the Senate as the lang'iage of the treaty before ratification would be complete. The assent of the German Assemblv at Weimar would have to be obtained, among the rest, and I must frankly say that I could only with the greatest reluctance approach that assembly for permission to read the treaty as we understand it and as those who framed it quite certainly understood it. If the United States were to qualify the document in any way, moreover, I am confident from what I know of the many conferences and debates which accompanied the formulation of the treaty that our example would immediately be followed in many quarters, in some instances with very serious reservations, and that the meaning and operative force of the treaty would presently be clouded from one end of its clauses to the other. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman, if I have been entirely unreserved and Elain spoken in speaking of the great matters we all have so much at eart. If excuse is needed, I trust that the critical situation of afEairs may serve as my justification. The issues that manifestly TREATY OF PEACK WITH GEEMANY. 503 hang upon the conclusions of the Senate with regard to peace and upon the time of its action are so grave and so clearly insusceptible of being thrust on one side or postponed that I have felt it necessary in the public interest to make this urgent plea, and to make it as simply and as unreservedly as possible. I thought that the simplest way, Mr. Chairman, to cover the points that I knew to be points of interest. The Chairman. Mr. President, so far as I am personally con- cerned—and I think I represent perhaps the majority of the com- mittee in that respect — we have no thought of entering upon argu- ment as to interpretations or points of that character; but the committee is very desirous of getting information on certain points which seem not clear and on which they thought information would be of value to them in the consideration of the treaty which they, I think I may say for myself and others, desire to hasten in every possible way. Your reference to the necessity of action leads me to ask one question. If we have to restore peace to the world it is necessary, I assume, that there should be treaties with Austria, Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. Those treaties are all more or less connected with the treaty with Germany. The question I should like to ask is, what the prospect is of our receiving those treaties for action. The President. I think it is very good, sir, and, so far as I can judge from the contents of the dispatches from my colleagues on the other side of the water, the chief delay is due to the uncertainty as to what is going to happen to this treaty. This treaty is the model for the others. I saw enough of the others before I left Paris to know that they are being framed upon the same set of principles and that the treaty with Germany is the model. I think that is the chief element of delay, sir. The Chairman. They are not regarded as essential to the con- sideration of this treaty ? The President. They are not regarded as such; no, sir; they follow this treaty. The Chairman. I do not know about the other treaties, but the treaty with Poland, for example, has been completed ? The President. Yes, and signed; but it is dependent on this treaty. My thought was to submit it upon the action on this treaty. The Chairman. I should Uke, if I may, to ask a question in regard to the plans submitted to the commission on the league of nations, if that is the right phrase. The President. Yes, sir. The Chairman. You were kind enough to send us the draft of the American plan. When we were here in February, if I understood you rightly — I may be incorrect but I understood you to say that there were other drafts or plans submitted by Great Britain, by France, and by Italy. Would it be possible for us to see those other tentative plans ? The President. I would have sent them to the committee with pleasure. Senator, if I had found that I had them. I took it for granted that I had them, but the papers that remain in my hands temain there in a haphazard way. 1 can teU you the character of the other drafts. The British draft was the only one, as I remember, that was in the form of a definite constitution of a league. The 504 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. French and Italian drafts were in the form of a series of propositions laying down general rules and assuming that the commission, or whatever body made the final formulation, would build upon those principles if they were adopted. They were principles quite con- sistent with the final action. I remember saying to the committee when I was here in March — I have forgotten the expression I used — something to the effect that the British draft had constituted the basis. I thought after- wards that that was misleading, and I am very glad to teU the com- mittee just what I meant. Some months before the conference assembled, a plan for the league of nations had been drawn up by a British committee, at the head of which was Mr. Phillimore — I believe the Mr. Phillimore who was known as an authority on international law. A copy of that docu- ment was sent to me, and I built upon that a redraft. I will not now say whether I thought it was better or not an improvement; but I built on that a draft which was quite different, masmuch as it put defijiiteness where there had been what seemed indefiniteness in the Phillimore suggestion. Then, between that time and the time of the formation of the commission on the league of nations, I had the advantage of seeing a paper by Gen. Smuts, of South Africa, who seemed to me to have done some very clear thinking, particularly with regard to what was to be done with the pieces of the dismembered empires. After I got to Paris, therefore, I rewrote the document to which I have alluded, and you may have noticed that it consists of a series of articles and then supplementary agreements. It was in the supplementary agreements that I embodied the additional ideas that haa come to me not only from Gen. Smuts's paper but from other discussions. That is the full story of how the plan which I sent to the committee was built up. The Chairman. Of course, it is obvious that the Gen. Smuts plan has been used. That appears on the face of the document. The President. Yes. The Chairman. Then there was a previous draft in addition to the one you have sent to us ? You spoke of a redraft. The original draft was not submitted to the committee? The President. No; that was privately, my own. The Chairman. Was it before our commission ? The President. No; it was not before our commission. The Chairman. The one that was sent to us was a redraft of that ? The President. Yes. I was reading some of the discussion before the committee, and some one, I think Senator Borah, if I remember correctly, quoted an early version of article 10. Senator JBorah. That was Senator Johnson. Senator Johnson of California. I took it from the Independent. The President. I do not know how that was obtained, but that was part of the draft which preceded the draft which I sent to you. Senator Johnson of California. It was first published by Mr. Ham- ilton Holt in the Independent; it was again subsequently published in the New Republic, and from one of those publications I read it when examining, I think, the Secretary of State. The President. I read it with the greatest interest, because I had ' forgotten it, to tell the truth, but I recogniied it as soon as Lread it. Senator Johnson of California. It was the original plan ? \ TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 505 The President. It was the original form of article 10; yes. ITie Chairman. I was about to ask in regard to article 10, as the essence of it appears in article 2 of the draft which you sent, whether that was in the British plan — the Smuts plan— or the other plans ? Of course if there are no drafts of these other plans, we can not get them. The President. I am very sorry, Senator. I thought I had them, but I have not. The Chairman. Mr. Lansing, the Secretary of State, testified before us the other day that he had prepared a set of resolutions covering the points in the league, which was submitted to the American commission. You saw that draft ? The President. Yes. The Chairman. No specific action was taken upon it ? The President. Not in a formal way. The Chairman. Mr. President, I have no prepared set of questions, but there are one or two that I wish to ask, and will go to an entirely different subject in my next question. I desire to ask purely for information. Is it intended that the United States shall receive any part of the reparation fund which is in the hands of the reparation commission ? The President. I left that question open. Senator, because I did not feel that I had any final right to decide it. Upon the basis that was set up in the reparation clauses the portion that the United ■ States would receive would be very small at best, and my own judg- ment was frequently expressed, not as a decision but as a judgment, that we should claim nothing under those general clauses. I did that because I coveted the moral advantage that that would give us in the counsels of the world. Senator McCumber. Did that mean we would claim nothing for the sinking of the Lusitania ? The President. Oh, no. That did not cover questions of that sort at all. The Chairman. I understood that prewar claims were not covered by that reparation clause. The President. That is correct. The Chairman. I asked that question because I desired to know whether under the reparation commission there was anything ex- pected to come to us. The President. As I say, that remains to be decided. The Chairman. By the commission ? The President. By the commission. The Chairman. Going now onto another question, as I understand the treaty the overseas possessions of Germany are all made over to the five principal allied and associated pDwers, who apparently, as far as the treaty goes, have power to make disposition of them, I suppose by way of mandate or otherwise. Among those overseas possessions are the Ladrone Islands, except Guam, the Carolines, and, I think, the Marshall Islands. Has there been any recommen- dation made by our naval authorities in regard to the importance of our having one island there, not for territorial purposes, but for naval purposes ? The President. There was a paper on that subject, Senator, which has been published. I only partially remember it. It was a 506 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. paper laying out the general necessities of our naval policy in the Pacific, and the necessity of having some base for communication upon those islands was mentioned, just in what form I do not remem- ber. But let me say this, there is a little island which I must admit I had not heard of before. Senator Williams. The island of Yap ? The President: Yap. It is one of the bases and centers of cable and radio communication on the Pacific, and I made the point that the disposition, or rather the control, of that island should be re- served for the general conference which is to be held in regard to the ownership and operation of the cables. That subject is mentioned and disposed of in this treaty and that general cable conference is to be held. The Chairman. I had understood, or I had heard the report, that our General Board of the Navy Department and our Chief of Opera- tions, had recommended that we should have a footing there, primarily in order to secure cable communications. The President. I think you are right, sir. The Chairman. That we were likely to be cut off from cable com- munication—that is, that the cables were likely to pass entirely into other hands^unless we had some station there, and it seemed to me a matter of such importance that I asked the question. I wish to ask this further question: There was a secret treaty between England and Japan in regard to Shantung; and in the corre- spondence with the British ambassador at Tokyo, when announcing the acquiescence of Great Britain in Japan's having the German rights in Shantung, the British ambassador added: It is, of course, understood that we are to have the islands south of the Equator and Japan to have the islands north of the Equator. If it should seem necessary for the safety of communication for this country that we should have a cable station there, would that secret treaty interfere with it ? The President. I think not, sir, in view of the stipulation that I made with regard to the question of construction by this cable con- vention. That note of the British ambassador was a part of the diplomatic correspondence covering that subject. The Chairman. That was what I understood. Senator Moses. Was the stipulation that that should be reserved for the consideration of. the cable conference a formally signed protocol ? The President. No; it was not a formally signed protocol, but we had a prolonged and interesting discussion on the subject, and nobody has any doubt as to what was agreed upon. The Chairman. I asked .the. question because it seemed to me a matter of great importance. The President. Yes; it is. The Chairman. As a matter of self-protection, it seemed on the face of it that the treaty would give the five principal allied and asso- ciated powers the authority to make such disposition as they saw fit of those islands, but I did not know whether the secret treaty would thwart that purpose. I have no further questions to ask, Mr. President. Senator Borah. Mr. President, if no one else desires to ask a question, I want, so far as I am individually concerned, to get a little TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 507 clearer information with reference to the withdrawal clause in the league covenant. Who passes upon the question of the fulfillment of our international obligations, upon the question whether a nation has fulfilled its international obligations? The President. Nobody. Senator Borah. Does the council have anything to say about it ? The President. Nothing whatever. Senator Borah. Then if a coimtry should give notice of withdrawal, it would be the sole judge of whether or not it had fulfilled its inter- national obligations — its covenants — to the league? The President. That is as I understand it. The only restraining influence would be the public opinion of the world. Senator Borah. Precisely; but if the United States should con- ceive that it had fulfilled its obhgations, that question could not be referred to the council in any way, or the council could not be called into action. The President. No. Senator Borah. Then, as I understand, when the notice is given, the right to withdraw is unconditional? The President. Well, when the notice is given it is conditional on the faith of the conscience of the withdrawing nation at the close of the two-year period. Senator Borah. Precisely; but it is unconditional so far as the legal right or the moral right is concerned. The President. That is my interpretation. Senator Borah. There is no moral obligation on the part of the United States to observe any suggestion made by the council? The President. Oh, no. Senator Borah. With reference to withdrawing? The President. There might be a moral obligation if that sugges- tion had weight, Senator, but there is no other obligation. Senator Borah. Any moral obligation which the United States would feel, would be one arising from its own sense of obligation ? The President. Oh, certainly. Senator Borah. And not by reason of any suggestion by the council? The President. Certainly. Senator Borah. Then the idea which has prevailed in some quar- ters that the council would pass upon such obligation is an erroneous one, from your standpoint ? The President. Yes ; entirely. Senator Borah. And as I understand, of course, you are expressing the view which was entertained by the commission which drew the league ? The President. I am confident that that was the view. That view was not formulated, you understand, but I am confident that that was the view. Senator McCuMBER. May I ask a question right here? Would there be any objection, then,- to a reservation declaring that to be the understanding of the force of this section ? The President. Senator, as I indicated at the opening of our con- ference, this is my judgment about that: Only we can interpret a moral obligation. The legal obligation can be enforced by such ma- chinery as there is to enforce it. We are therefore at liberty to in- 508 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. terpret the sense in which we undertake a moral obligation. What I feel very earnestly is that it would be a mistake to embody that interpretation in the resolution of ratification, because then it would be necessary for other governments to act upon it. Senator McCumber. If they all recognized at the time that this was the understanding and the construction that should be given to that portion of the treaty, would it be necessary for them to act on it again ? The President. I think it would. Senator. Senator McCumber. Could they not accept it merely by acquies- cence ? The President. My experience as a lawyer was not very long; but that experience would teach me that the language of a contract is always part of the debatable matter, and I can testify that in our discussions in the commission on the league of nations we did not discuss ideas half as much as we discussed phraseologies. Senator McCumber. But suppose, Mr. President, we should make a declaration of that kind, which would be in entire accord with your view of the understanding of all of the nations, and without further comment or action the nations should proceed to appoint their com- missions, and to act under this treaty, would not that be a clear acquiescence in our construction? The President. Oh, it might be. Senator, but we would not know for a good many months whether they were going to act in that sense or not. There would have to be either explicit acqui- escence, or the elapsing of a long enough time for us to know whether they were implicitly acquiescing or not. Senator McCumber. 1 should suppose that when the treaty was signed, under present world conditions, all nations would proceed to act immediately under it. The President. In some matters; yes. Senator Harding. Mr. President, assuming that your construc- tion of the withdrawal clause is the understanding of the formulating commission, why is the language making the proviso for the fulfill- ment of covenants put into the article ? The President. Merely as an argument to the conscience of the nations. In other words, it is a notice served on them that their colleagues will expect that at the time they withdraw they will have mlfilled their obligations. Senator Harding. The language hardly seems to make that implication, because it expressly says, "Provided it has fulfilled its obligations." The President. Yes. Senator Harding. If it were a matter for the nation itself to judge, that is rather a far-fetched provision, is it not? The President. Well, you are illustrating my recent remark, Senator, that the phraseology is your difficulty, not the idea. The idea is undoubtedly what I have expressed. Senator Pittman. Mr. President, Senator McCumber has drawn out that it is your impression that the allied and associated powers have the same opinion of the construction of these so-caUed indefinite articles that you have. Is that construction also known and held by Germany ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY, 509 The President. I have no means of knowing. Senator Pittman. Germany, then, has not expressed herself to the commission with regard to these mooted questions ? The President. No; we have no expression from Germany about the league, except the expression of her very strong desire to be ad- mitted to it. Senator Pittman. And is it your opinion that if the language of the treaty were changed in the resolution of ratification, the consent ■of Germany to the change would also be essential. The President. Oh, undoubtedly. The Chairman. Mr. President, in that connection — I did not mean to ask another question — I take it there is no question whatever, under international law and practice, that an amendment to the text of a treaty must be submitted to every signatory, and must receive either their assent or their dissent. I had supposed it had been the general diplomatic practice with regard to reservations — which apply only to the reserving power, and not to all the signatories, of course — ■ that with regard to reservations it had been the general practice that silence was regarded as acceptance and acquiesence; that there was that distinction between a textual amendment, which changed the treaty for every signatory, and a reservation, which changed it onlv for the reserving power. In that I may be mistaken, however. The President. There is some difference of opinion among the authorities, I am informed. I have not had time to look them up myself about that; but it is clear to me that in a treaty which involves so many signatories, a series of reservations— which would ensue, undoubtedly — would very much obscure our confident opinion as to how the treaty was going to work. Senator Williams. Mr. President, suppose for example that we adopted a reservation, as the Senator from Massachusetts calls it, and' that Germany did nothing about it at all, and afterwards con- tended that so far as that was concerned it was new matter, to which she was never a party: Could her position be justifiably disputed? The President. No. Senator Borah. Mr. President, with reference to article 10 — you will observe that I am more interested in the league than any other feature of this discussion — in listening to the reading of your state- ment I got the impression that your view was that, the first obligation of article 10, to wit — The members of the league undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league — was simply a moral obligation. The President. Yes, sir; inasmuch as there is no sanction in the treaty. Senator Borah. But that would be a legal obligation so far as the United States was concerned if it should enter into it; would it not ? The President. I would not interpret it in that way. Senator, because there is involved the element of judgment as to whether the territorial integrity or existing political independence is invaded or impaired. In otlier words, it is an attitude of comradeship and protection among the members of the league, which in its very nature is moral and not legal. 510 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Borah. If, however, the actual fact of invasion were beyond dispute, then t'he legal obligation, it seems to me, would immediately arise. I am simply throwing this out in order to get a full expression of views. The legal obligation would immediately arise if the fact of actual invasion were undisputed ? The President. The legal obligation to apply the automatic punishments of the covenant, undoubtedly; but not the legal obliga- tion to go to arms and actually to make war. Not the legal obliga- tion. There might be a very strong moral obligation. Senator MoCumber. Just so that I may understand definitely what your view is on that subject, Mr. President, do I understand you to mean that while we have two different remedies, and possibly others, we would be the sole judge of the remedy we would apply, but the obligation would still rest upon us to apply some remedy to bring about the result ? The President. Yes. I can not quite accept the full wording that you used, sir. We would have complete freedom of choice as to the application of force. Senator McCumber. Would we not have the same freedom of choice as to whether we would apply a commercial boycott? Are they not both under the same language, so that we would be bound by them in the same way ? The President. Only in regard to certain articles. The breach of certain articles of the covenant does bring on what I have desig- nated as an automatic boycott, and in that we would have no choice. Senator Knox. Mr. President, allow me to ask this question: Suppose that it is perfectly obvious and accepted that there is an external aggression against some power, and suppose it is perfectly obvious and accepted that it can not be repelled except by force of arms, would we be under any legal obligation to participate? The President. No, sir; but we would be imder an absolutely compelling moral obligation. Senator Knox. But no legal obligation ? The President. Not as I contemplate it. Senator Williams. Mr. President, each nation, if I understand it, is, of course, left to judge the applicability of the principles stated to the facts in the case, whether there is or is not external aggression ? The President. Yes. Senator Williams. And if any country should conclude that there was not external aggression, but that France or some other country had started the trouble indirectly, we would have the same right, if I understand it, that Italy had to declare that her alliance with Germany and Austria was purely defensive, and that she did not see anything defensive in it; so when you come to judgment of the facts, outside of the international law involved, each nation must determine, if I understand, whether or not there has been external aggression ? The President. I think you are right, sir. Senator [addressing Senator Kjiox], you were about to ask something? Senator Knox. I only wanted to tell you that I asked that ques- tion because I was a little confused by the language of your message transmitting the proposed Franco-American treaty to the Senate, m which you said, in substance, and, I think, practically in these terms, that this is only binding us to do immediately what we other- wise would have been bound to do under the league of nations ? TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. 511 The President. Yes. Senator Knox. Perhaps I am mistaken with respect to its having been in that message. I am sure I am mistaken; it was not in that message; it was in the message that Mr. Tumulty gave out The Chairman. May 10. Senator Knox. Yes. The President. Yes. Senator Knox. That it was merely binding us to do immediately, without waiting for any other power, that which we would otherwise have been bound to do under the terms of the league of nations. The President. I did not use the word "bound," but "morally bound." Let me say that you are repeating what I said to the other representatives. I said, "Of course, it is understood we would have to be convinced that it was an unprovoked movement of aggression," and they at once acquiesced in that. Senator McCumber. Mr. President, there are a number of Senators who sincerely believe that under the construction of article 10, taken in connection with other clauses and other articles in the treaty, the council can suggest what we should do, and of course, while they admit the council can only advise and suggest, that it is nevertheless our moral duty to immediately obey the council, wiuh- out exercising our own judgment as to whether we shall go to war or otherwise. Now, the public, the American people, a great pro- portion of them, have that same conviction, which is contrary to your view. Do you not think, therefore, that it would be well to have a reservation inserted in our resolution that shall so construe that section as to make it clear, not only to the American people but to the world, that Congress may use its own judgment as to what it will do, and that its failure to follow the judgment of the council will not be considered a breach of the agreement 1 The President. We differ, Senator, only as to the form of action. I think it would be a very serious practical mistake to put it in the resolution of ratification; but I do hope that we are at liberty, con- temporaneously with our acceptance of the treaty, to interpret our moral obligation under that article. Senator Pittman. Mr. President, I understand that, under the former method, in your opinion, it would have to go back to Germany and the other countries; while under the latter method it would not be required to go back for ratification. The President. Yes, sir; that is my judgment. Senator Knox. Mr. President, is it not true that such matters are ordinarily covered by a mere exchange of notes between powers, stating that they understand in this or that sense, or do not so understand ? The President. Yes, sir; ordinarily. Senator Knox. That would be a matter that would require very little time to consummate it, if these constructions have already been placed upon it in their conversations with you. The President. But an exchange of notes is ciuite a different matter from having it embodied in the resolution of ratification. Senator Knox. It we embody in our resolution of ratification a statement that we understand section 10 or section 16 or section something else in a particular sense, and this Government, through its foreign department, transmits the proposed form of ratification 512 TREATY OF PEACE WITH Gi ivMANY. to the chancellors of the other nations that are concerned in this treaty, and if those interpretations are the same as you have agreed upon with them in your conversations, I do not see how we would need anything more than a mere reply to that effect. The President. It would need conJirmation. Senator Knox. Yes; it would need confirmation in that sense. The President. My judgment is that the embodying of that in the terms of the resolution of ratification would be acquiescence not only in the interpretation but in the very phraseology of the interpreta- tion, because it would form a part of the contract. Senator Knox. It might with us, because we have so much ma- chinery for dealing with treaties, but in other countries where it is much more simple I should think it would not be. The President. It is simple legally. Senator; but, for example, this treaty has been submitted to legislatures to which the Govern- ment was not, by law, obliged to submit it, and it is ever3rwhere being treated as a legislative matter — I mean, so far as the ratifica- tion is concerned. Senator Knox. You mean in countries where, under their consti- tutions, there are provisions that treaties ordinarily are not sub- mitted to the legislative branch of the government, this treaty is being so submitted ? The President. So I understand. Senator Knox. Where there are two branches of the legislative department, an upper and a lower branch, do you know whether it is being submitted to both ? The President. I think not, sir. I am not certain about that; but my memory is it is not. Senator Fall. Mr. President, the idea has struck me and I have entertained the view, since reading the treaty and the league, that Germany having signed the treaty but not being yet a member of the league, any reservations which we might make here would be met by Germany's either joining the league or refusing to join the league. It would not be submitted to her at all now, oecause she is not a member of the league ? You catch the point ? The President. Yes. I differ with you there, Senator. One of the reasons for putting the league in the treaty was that Germany was not going to be admitted to the league immediately, and we felt that it was very necessary that we should get her acknowledgment — acceptance — of the league as an international authority, partly because we were excluding her, so that she would thereafter have no ground for questioning such authority as the league might exercise under its covenant, Senator Fall. Precisely. The President. Therefore, I think it would be necessary for her to acquiesce in a league the powers of which were differently construed. Senator Fall. Precisely; but her acquiescence would be by her accepting the invitation, when extended, either to join the league or not to join the league. In other words, upon ratification by three of the powers a status of peace is established, and as to those three , powers and Germany all the rules and regulations contained in the treaty of peace become operative. As to the other nations which have not ratified, the status of peace exists; that is, war has termi- nated. Now, that being the case, and Germany being out of the TEBATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY, 513 league — not having been invited to join the league — if in ratifying the treaty we ratify it with certain explanations or reservations, even in the ratifying resolution, when the time comes and Germany is invited to become a member of the league, or when she applies, under the admission clause of the league, for membership therein, if she enters she of course accepts our reservations. If she makes a qualified application, then it is for the league itself to consider whether she will be admitted ? The President. I do not follow your reasoning in the matter. Senator, because this is not merely a question of either membership or nonmembership. The covenant is a part of the treaty, it is a part of the treaty which she has signed, and we are not at liberty to change any part of that treaty without the acquiescence of the other con- tracting party. Senator Fall. Well, Mr. President, of course it is not my purpose to enter into an argument, but we are here for information. There are provisions for the amendment of the articles. Germany is out of the league. Any amendment proposed by the other members of the league prior to her coming into the league would not be submitted to her, would it, she not being a member ? The President. I will admit that that point had not occurred to me. No, she would not. Senator Fall. Then so far as we are concerned we could make a recommendation in the nature of an amendment. Senator Pittman. She has already agreed by this treaty that she has signed that the members may amend it. The President. Yes. Senator Fall. Precisely, and we could come in with an amend- ment. Senator Hitchcock. Did I understand your first reply to Senator Fall to be that Germany under this treaty already had a relationship to the league by reason of its international character, and its partici- ation in a number of questions that Germany was interested in ? The President. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. So that it has a relationship to the league of nations even before the time that it may apply for membership. The President. Yes. Senator McCumber. Mr. President, you answered one question that I think possibly may need a little elucidation. If I remember rightly, in reference to reparation your statement was that the com- mission would have to decide whether the United States should claim her proportion of the reparation. The President. That the commission would have to do it ? No ; we decide whether we claim it or not. Senator McCumber. That is what I want to make clear. I think the question was asked if the commission was to decide that, and I thought your answer said yes. That is the reason I asked the question. The President. The claim would have to come from us, of course. Senator McCumber. It would have to be through an act of Con- gress, would it not ? The President. I would have to be instructed about that, Senator. I do not know. 13554&— 19 33 514 TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. Senator McCumbee. Whatever right the United States would receive under the treaty for reparation or indemnity i& one that runs to the United States, and therefore to divest ourselves of that right would require an act of Congress. The Peesident. To divest ourselves of it ? I suppose so. Senator Knox. In the question of the Japanese indemnity, that was done by a joint resolution. Senator McCumbee. I thought the President said it would have to be decided by the constituted authority. Senator Knox. I did not imderstand that he said that. Senator Swanson. I understand that the reparation is to be decided upon a representation made by the associated powers. It would seem that the President under that agreement with France, Great Britain, and other nations would have to submit it to the Senate for ratification, and the agreement would have to be reported. Senator McCumbee. In each case it would have the force of law. Senator Swanson. If the Senate wanted to ratify it, it would take an act of Congress. Senator Williams. This question of reparation does not in any way affect our rights to prewar dndemnities. The President. That is expressly stated. Senator Williams. That is expressly stated. Now, then, one other question. Germany has signed this treaty with the covenant of the league in it, and she is subject to be dealt with as a nonmember under the treaty, and has very much fewer privileges than a member? The President. Yes. Senator New. Mr. President, may I ask a question there? What effort was made by the delegates there to prevent the proceedings of the reparations committee being required to be secret ? The President. I beg your pardon, Senator. Senator New. What effort, if any, was made by the American delegates to prevent the proceedings of the reparation commission from being required to be secret, and did the American delegates protest that America be omitted from this commission on account of that thing ? The President. Nothiag was said about it, that I remember. Senator Borah. Mr. President, coming back for a moment to the subject from which we were diverted a moment ago, and coupling with article 10 article 11, in order that we may have the construction of the committee which framed the league as to both of those articles, as I understand it from your statement, the committee's view was that the obligations under articles 10 and 11, whatever they are, are moral obligations. The President. Remind me of the eleventh. I do not remember that by number. Senator Boeah (reading) : Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the league or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole league, and the league shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. What I am particularly anxious to know is whether or not the con- struction which was placed upon these two articles by the committee which framed the league was that it was a binding obligation from a legal standpoint, or merely a moral obligation. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 515 The President. Senator, I tried to answer with regard to article 10. Senator Borah. Yes ; exactly. The President. I would apply it equally with regard to article 1 1 , though I ought to hasten to say that we did not formulate these interpretations. I can only speak from my confident impression from the debates that accompanied the formulation of the covenant. Senator Borah. Yes; I understand; and your construction of article 11 is the same as that of article 10? The President. Yes. Senator Borah. As to the question of legal obligation. That is all I desire to ask at present. Senator Harding. Right there, Mr. President, if there is nothing more than a moral obligation on the part of any member of the league, what avail articles 10 and 11 ? The President. Why, Senator, it is surprising that that question should be asked. If we undertake an obligation we are bound in the most solemn way to carry it out. Senator Harding. If you believe there is nothing more to this than a moral obligation, any nation will assume a moral obligation on its own account. Is it a moral obligation ? The point I am trying to get at is, Suppose something arises affecting the peace of the world, and the council takes steps as provided here to conserve or preserve, and announces its decision, and every nation in the league takes advantage of the construction that you place upon these articles and says, "Well, this is only a moral obligation, and we assume that the nation involved does not deserve our participation or protection," and the whole thing amounts to nothing but an expression of the league council. The President. There is a national good conscience in such a matter. I should think that was one of the most serious things that could possibly happen. When I speak of a legal obhgation, I mean one that specifically binds you to do a particular thing under certain sanctions. That is a legal obhgation. Now a moral obli- gation is of course superior to a legal obligaton, and, if I may say so, has a greater binding force; omy there always remains in the moral obligation the right to exercise one's judgment as to whether it is indeed incumbent upon one in those circumstances to do that thing. In every moral obligation there is an element of judgment. In a legal obligation there is no element of judgment. Senator Johnson of California. But, Mr. President, when a moral obligation is undoubted it will impel action more readily than a legal obligation. The President. If it is undoubted, yes; but that involves the cir- cumstances of the particular case, Senator. Senator Johnson of California. Yes; necessarily. Senator Harding. In answering Senator Knox a moment ago you spoke of a compelling moral obligation. Would you think that any less binding than a specific legal obligation ? The President. Not less binding, but operative in a different way because of the element of judgment. Senator Harding. But not less likely to involve us in armed participation ? The President. In trifling matters, very much less likely. 516 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Harding. To clear my slow mind, let me take a specific case. Suppose the allotted territorjr which comes under the control of Italy should in some way be assailed from the Balkan States and the council of the league should immediately look upon that as a threat of war involving other nations and should say that the nations of the league should immediately contribute an armed force to stop that war or to bring the attacking nation to terms, would we be a perfidious people, if I may use that term, or would we violate our obligations, if we failed to participate in the defense of Italy ? The President. We would be our own judges as to whether we were obliged in those circumstances to act in that way or not. Senator Hitchcock. In such a case the council would only act unanimously, and our representative on the council of course would have to concur in any advice given. The President. Cfertainly; we would always in such case advise ourselves. Senator Williams. But if in such case, Mr. President, we concluded that the case provided for and prescribed had arisen and that the extraneous attack existed and that it fell within the terms of the treaty, then we would be untrue if we did not keep our word ? The President. Certainly. Senator Borah. In other words, then, that transfers the power to decide whether we should act from the Congress of the United States to one individual who sits on the council. Senator Williams. No, it does not; it merely provides that when the council acts in accordance with the prescribed terms and we see that it has acted, then Congress will, as a matter of faith keeping, act itself; and, if Congress does not. Congress will do a dishonorable thing. Senator Borah. Precisely so; so that the matter gets back to the point where one individual has bound Congress. Senator Hitchcock. I hope my question to the President will not be interpreted in that way. My question to the President was whether the matter would even come before this country as the advice of the council until the American representative had con- curred with the other eight members of the council. After he had concurred it would then be up to Congress to decide. The President. You are quite right. Senator. And let me sug- gest that I find nothing was more clearly in the consciousness of the men who were discussmg these very important matters than that most of the nations concerned had popular Mvermnents. They were all the time aware of the fact that it would depend upon the approving or disapproving state of opinion of their countries how their representatives in the council would vote in matters of this sort; and it is inconceivable to me that, unless the opinion of the United States, the moral and practical judgment of the people of the United States, approved, the representative of the United States on the council should vote any such advice as would lead us into war. Senator Borah. Mr. President, does the special alliance treaty with France which has been submitted to us rest upon any other basis as to legal and moral obligation than that of article 10 and article 11 which you have just described ? The President. No, sir. Senator Borah. That is also, as you understand it, simply our moral obligations which we enter into with France ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 517 The President. Yes. Senator Williams. All international obligations are moral ones. Senator Pittman. There is one thing I do not understand about Senator Borah's question. He has stated that he gathers from what you said that it all rests with our representative on the council. Even if our representative on the council advises as a member of the council, and the council is unanimous, is it not then still up to Congress either to accept or reject that advice? The President. Oh, yes; but I understood the Senator to mean that it would be dependent on our representative. Senator Johnson of California. May I take the example that was just suggested concering the Balkan States and a possible attack upon the new territories of Italy. Assuming that that is a case of external aggression by the Balkan States concerning the new territory that Italy has acquired by the peace treaty, upon us rests a compelling moral obligation to d.o our part in preventing that, does there not? The President. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. And that compelling moral obliga- tion would require us to use such means as would seem appropriate, either economic or force ? Is not that correct ? The President. Deemed appropriate by whom ? That is really the point. Senator Johnson of California. Of course, deemed appropriate for the purpose of preventing and frustrating the aggression. The President. Deemed by us appropriate ? Senator Johnson of California. I assume of necessity it would have to be deemed by us to bind us as a compelling moral obligation to prevent the aggression in the case named. The President. Yes. Senator McCumber. Mr. President, I think, due to my own fault, I do not fully comprehend your distinction between a moral and a legal obligation in a treaty. If we enter into a treaty with France to defend her against aggression from Germany for any length of time, that is a legal obligation, is it not ? The President. Legal in the sense that a treaty is of binding force; yes. Senator McCumber. Yes; that is what I meant. It is as legal as any treaty could be made legal, and there is also a moral obligation to keep that treaty, is there not? The President. Yes, sir. I happened to hear Senator Knox say what I am glad to adopt. It is a legal obligation with a moral sanction. Senator Borah. That is true generally, is it not ? The President. Yes, Senator; but I have already defined in what special sense I use the word "legal." Senator McCumber. To my mind those two articles are legal obli- gations to be carried out by the moral conscience of the Aiaerican people if the conditions justify it. The President. You see we are speaking of two different fields, and therefore the language does not fit. In international law the word "legal " does not mean the same as in national law, and the word hardly applies. Senator Borah. I wish to ask some questions in regard to the secret treaties. I do not feel as free about those matters as 1 do about the 518 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. league, because there are certain things that I recognize may not be entirely open for public consideration; but, nevertheless, in so far as we can, I should like to know when the first knowledge came to this Government with reference to the secret treaties between Japan, Great Britain, Italy, and France concerning the German possessions in Shantung ? The President. I thought that Secretary Lansing had looked that up and told you. I can only reply from my own knowledge, and my own knowledge came after I reached Paris. Senator Borah. We did get a reply from Mr. Lansing to the same effect so far as he was concerned . When did the secret treaties between Great Britain, France, and the other nations of Europe with reference to certain adjustments in Europe first come to your knowledge ? Was that after you had reached Paris also ? The President. Yes ; the whole series of understandings were dis- closed to me for the first time then. Senator Borah. Then we had no knowledge of these secret treaties, so far as our Government was concerned, until you reached Paris ? The President. Not unless there was information at the State Department of which I knew nothing. Senator Borah. Do you know when the secret treaties between Japan, Great Britain, and other countries were first made known to Chma ? The President. No, sir; I do not. I remember a meeting of what was popularly called the council of ten, after our reaching Paris, in which it was first suggested that all these understandings should be laid upon the table of the conference. That was some time after we reached there, and I do not know whether that was China's first knowledge of these matters or not. Senator Borah. Would it be proper for me to ask if Great Britain and France insisted upon maintaining these secret treaties at the peace conference as they were made ? The President. I think it is proper for me to answer that question, sir. I will put it in this way: They felt that they could not recede from them, that is to say, that they were bound by them, but when they involved general interests such as they realized were involved, they were quite willing, and indeed I think desirous, that they should be reconsidered with the consent of the other parties. I mean with the consent, so far as they were concerned, of the other parties. Senator Moses. Were all those treaties then produced, Mr. Presi- dent ? The President. Oh, yes. Senator Moses. Did that include the secret arrangement with ref- erence to Avlona ? The President. I do not recall that agreement. Senator. You mean with regard to Italy having Avlona ? Senator Moses. Yes. The President. If it did, I did not see it. I heard of it, but I can not say confidently that the terms were laid before us. Senator Moses. I recall in some statements jou.made in connection with Fiume that you referred to Italy receiving Avlona under some agreement previously arrived at, and in that statement you held that to be part compensation at least for any loss she might sustain in not having Fiume. TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 519 The Presidemt. T was referring to what I understood to be the agreement. I am simply now answering your question that I did not see that agreement in written terms. Senator Moses. Then, they were not produced in textual form ? The President. I do not know; they may have been and I may not have picked them up in the great mass of papers before me. Senator Moses. The purpose of my inquiry was to ascertain whether there was laid before the council of ten any textual agree- ments which transferred parts of the territory of one independent nation to another. The President. Only those that have been spoken of. Senator Moses. That is to say, Shantung and Avlona ? The President. I say only those that we have had under general discussion. I can not enumerate them, but there are none that have not been produced so far as I know. That answers the question. vSenator McCtjmber. The secret treaties to which you refer are those treaties which were made from time to time as the exigencies of the war required during the period of the war ? The President. Yes'. Senator McCumber. And not treaties that were made prior to the war? The President. Yes. Senator Williams. Mr. President, T wish to ask you a question in order to see if the facts are, clear in my own mind. As I understand the situation — and I should like to have you correct me if I am wrong — France and Great Britain both have stated that they were bound by certain treaties with Japan and they were perfectly willing, with Japan's consent, to reconsider those treaties, but that they were themselves bound if the other party to the treaty did not consent to reconsider. Is that about it ? The President. Yes. Senator Williams. That is what I thought. Bound in honor is the only way a nation is bound in international affairs. Senator Swanson. Can you tell us, or would it be proper to do so, of yotir understanding with Japan as to the return of Shantung ? That is a question which has been very much discussed. The President. I have published the wording of the under- standing. Senator. I can not be confident that I quote it literally, but I know that I quote it in substance. It was that Japan should return to China in tuU sovereignty the old Province of Shantimg so far as Germany had had any claims upon it, preserving to herself the right to establish a residential district at Tsingtao, which is the town of Kiaochow Bay; that with regard to the railways and mines she should retain only the rights of an economic concession there, with the right, however, to maintain a special body of police on the railway, the personnel of which should be Chinese under Japanese instructors nominated by the managers of the company and appointed by the Chinese Government. I think that is the whole of it. Senator PoMerene. That is, that the instructors should be con- firmed by the Chinese Government ? The President. No; not exactly that. The language, as I re- member it, was that they should be nominated by the managers of the railway company, and appointed by the Chinese Government. Senator Borah. Was that understanding oral ? 520 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Williams. This rather curious question presents itself to my mind : As I understand, Japan has retained sovereignty for the 99 years of the lease only at Kiaochow, and 5 kilometers, or some such distance, back from the bay. The President. She has not retained sovereignty over anything. Senator Williams. She has not ? The President. I mean, she has promised not to. Senator Williams. During the period of the lease? The President. No ; she has promised not to retain sovereignty at all. Senator Borah asked whether this understanding was oral or otherwise. I do not like to describe the operation exactly if it is not perfectly discreet, but as a matter of fact this was technically oral, but literally written and formulated, and the formulation agreed upon. Senator Johnson of California. When, Mr. President, is the return to be made? The President. That was left undecided. Senator, but we were assured at the time that it would be as soon as possible. Senator Johnson of California. Did not the Japanese decline to fix any date ? The President. They did at that time, yes ; but I think it is fair to them to say not in the spirit of those who wished it be within their choice, but simply that they could not at that time say when it would be. Senator Johnson of California. The economic privileges that they would retain would give them a fair mastery over the Province, would they not, or at least the Chinese think so? Let me put it in that fashion, please. The President. I believe they do. Senator. I do not feel qualified to judge. I should say that that was an exaggerated view. Senator Johnson of California. But the Chinese feel that way about it, and have so expressed themselves ? The President. They have so expressed themselves. Senator Knox. Mr. President, the economic privileges that they originally acquired in Korea, and subsequently in inner and outer Mongolia, and in northern and southern Manchuria, have almost developed into a complete sovereignty over those countries, have they not ? The President. Yes, Senator; in the absence of a league of nations they have. Senator Knox. You think the league of nations would haA^e pre- vented that, do you ? The President. I am confident it would. Senator New. Mr. President, does ilot this indefinite promise of Japan's suggest the somewhat analogous case of England's occupa- tion of Malta ? She has occupied Malta for something like a centurj', I believe, under a very similar promise. The President. Well, Senator, I hope you will pardon me if I do not answer that question. Senator Fall. Mr. President, speaking of the duty of defense in reference to sovereignty, and of aggression with reference to sover- eignty, in construing these different articles of the league, I have been curious to know who will defend the mandate territories or colonics if there should be external aggression. The President. Primarily, the mandatory power. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 521 Senator Fall. The mandatory power would have that character of sovereignty over the possession which would compel it as a duty to defend the m_andate province ? The Pkesident. Yes. Senator Fall. Then a qualified sovereignty would in that instance, at any rate, compel the mandatory of the league first to defend the colony ? The President. I should put it this way. Senator : We had in mind throughout the wliole discussion of the mandate idea the analogy of trustees. The States taking those under mandates would be in the nature of trustees, and of course it is part of the trustee's duty to preserve intact the trust estate. Senator Fall. But out of the funds of the trust estate ? The President. Oh, yes. Senator Faln page 225 of these hearings, part 7. Secretary Lansing put that in. This reads as follows: The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial pro- pinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently the Govern- ment of the United States recognizes that .Japan has special interests in (Ihina, par- ticularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous. The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and the 'Government of the United States has every confidence in the rejDeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests, they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers. The Government, of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the indepepdence or territorial integrity of China, and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called ''open door" or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China. _ Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or 598 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GBEMANY. territorial integrity of China, or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China. And Japan wrote an identical note agreeing to that. Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir. Might I say to the Senator in reference to that, that the Chinese Government was much embarassed by the conflict of the interpretations which were given to it by the two lega- tions, the American legation and the Japanese legation, the Ameri- can legation emphasizing that the purport of the Lansing-Ishii agreement was to confirm the principle of the "open door" and equal opportunity, and the Japanese Government emphasizing the fact that the purport of the agreement was to recognize Japan's special interests, m China. For that reason the Chinese Goverrmient issued the statement which it did. Senator Johnson of California. At the time the Lansing-Ishii agreement was made, China and the United States were on the most friendly terms, were they not? Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir. Senator Johnson of California. And at that time we had already stated to the world our principles in the new world era of self-deter- mination of the rights of weak nations, their protection, and that they should not be permitted to be traded upon by the strong. Do you recall those circumstances, which in substance I have stated, but not verbatim? Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir; those were given out through the Amer- ican legation in Peking and published widely through the Chinese press. Senator Johnson of California. Now during the time of the nego- tiations between Secretary of State Lansing and Ishii, was Chma invited to participate? Mr. Ferguson. Not to my knowledge, sir. Senator Johnson of California. In determining the interests of Japan of one sort or another, as the case may be, and of China, was Chma consulted at all by the United States, its friend ? Mr. Ferguson. At the time of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, you mean? Senator Johnson of California. Yes, sii\ Mr. Ferguson. No, sir. Senator Johnson of California. And did China know anything about the disposition of China, so far as she was disposed of in the Lansing-Ishii agreement, until after it had been consummated, simed, and executed? Mr. Ferguson. Absolutely not. Senator Johnson of California. You recall, of course, the 21 de- mands that were made by Japan upon China ? Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir. Senator Johnson of California. Do you remember that at the time of the first suggestion of those demands, Japan enjoined upon China silence, and asked or demanded that China should not make known the demands ? Mr. Ferguson. That was an explicit demand by the Japanese minister who presented them to the President of China. Senator Johnson of California. Do you recall subsequently, when they had been published or had become known to other powers, a TBBATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 599 specific public denial made by Japan that any such demands had been made ? Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir. Senator Johnson of California. Was there such denial ? Mr. Ferguson. There was. Senator Johnson of California. Do you recall that subsequently to that time, when the matter had become sufficiently public so that the other nations were inquiring, Japan stated to the other nations the demands that had been made ? Mr. Ferguson. It gave a version. Senator Johnson of California. That is what I mean.' Mr. Ferguson. Those were communicated to several powers. Senator Johnson of California. Will you state whether or not that version was an accurate one or an entirely distorted version of the 21 points or demands ? Mr. Ferguson. There were three versions of the 21 demands. There was the original version as handed to the President of China, January 18, 1915, by the Japanese minister; there is an incorrect version as communicated by the Japanese Government to the other powers in response to their inquiries; and there is the third version, which is Japan's revised demands as presented to China, April 26, 1915. Senator Johnson of California. This last revised version omitted some of the original demands, did it not? Mr. Ferguson. It omitted Group 5, but provided that several of the items under group 5 should be arranged by the exchange of notes between China and Japan. The most notable omission in the third version of these demands was in reference to nothing being given to any third power. I should say the most notable omission or change in the second and third versions from the first version was the omission of what was recognized everywhere to be a very objectionable phrase, and that is reference to any third power. Senator Johnson of California. Let me chronologically state the situation, and then will you please say whether or not I state it accu- rately. Japan presented, in January, 21 demands to China. Mr. Ferguson. Under five groups. Senator Johnson of California. Under five groups. At the time of the presentation of those demands Japan commanded China to keep still about it and not to communicate them to the world. There- after they were either communicated by China or learned by other powers, who requested of Japan a statement concerning the demand, whereupon Japan, to the powers thus asking, comraunicated a state- ment of the demands at variance with the fact and not the demands that she had presented to China. Thereafter protests were made and group 5 of the demands was withdrawn by Japan. Thereafter an ultimatum was issued by Japan to China concerning the other demands, backed up by preparation of its military and its naval forces, and then Chma yielded to the demands, with the elimination of group 6, because of the military and naval preparations which were about to carry into effect Japan's intentions. Have I stated it correctly ? Mr. Ferguson. I should say yes, sir, with the exception of this fact, that from the presentation of the demands— the first instance until the final agreement which led up to the ultimatum — to the final 600 TREATY or PEACE WITH GERMANY. conference, rather — the demands as discussed between China and Japan were the original 21 demands as presented in January 1915. That was considered always as the basis of the discussion, and the question was, on the side of China, to whittle those down so as to give away as little as possible, and that resulted in the third version which I quoted, the version of April 26, which was Japan's final statement of as far as she would go in yielding what she had originally demanded. Senator Johnson of California. Prior to that time had not the United States protested to Japan concerning certain of the demands ? Mr. Ferguson. I understand so, though that of course is not naturally under my personal knowledge, sir, except as I know what has been published in the matter. I have no means from my official position of knowing what took place between the United States Government and Japan. Senator Johnson of California. But during this period the United States was in that continued intimate friendliness with China that has existed for a long period of time ? Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir; and through the American legation at Peking was constantly and consistently urging China not to yield to these demands. I think it is no breach of confidence if I state that. I would ask that this be not inserted if in the opinion of the chairman it is a breach of confidence. But that -is within my knowledge, that throughout all that period the United States minister in Pekmg was continually urging the Chinese Government not to accede to these demands. Senator Brandegee. Who was the American minister at that time? Mr. Ferguson. The same who is representing the Government now. Dr. Reinsch. Senator Knox. Was he acting under instructions from this Gov- renment or on his own account ? Mr. Ferguson. I have no means of knowing that. That was a matter between him and the Government. Senator Knox. He personally is a warm friend to China ? Mr. Ferguson. He is a very warm friend and consults unofficially and officially constantly with the foreign office, the president, and the premier. Senator Johnson of California. At that time, the relationship between China and the United States being as you indicate, they sat down with Ishii, and in a measure, at least, disposed of China's fate, without ever consulting China or aavising her of the fact that we were about to do it, or in any way letting her know that her particular fate was being dealt with at all ? Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir. Senator Johnson of California. That is aU. Mr. Ferguson. Let me state in that connection I have a great personal fear that the arrangement under the covenant of the league of nations concerning regional understandings would include the Lansing-Ishii agreement, and would be an indirect way of confirming by the Senate that agreement as well as the Root-Takahira agreement, and what other agreements I do not know, but I suppose that the Lansing-Ishii agreement would come under the head of regional understandings. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 601 Senator Brandegee. You spoke yesterday, I think of China having signed the treaty under protest ? Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir. Senator Brandegee. What was the character of her protest and when was it made ? Mr. Ferguson. The protest was made at the conference when the ultimatum was given, and after the whole thing was practically decided on the part of Japan, and no further yielding after April 26. There was parleying for several days, and naval preparations and military preparations by Japan, ending with the presentation of the ultimatum of May 7. During all that time there were parleyings, but there was no change in what was decided upon at that time, and during the progress of the negotiations previous to April 26, on two distinct occasions the Japanese threatened that if their requests were not agreed to, the promise to restore Kiaochow would be withdrawn. Senptor Brandegee. That was a threat to break the treaty, was it not ? Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir. Senator Brandegee. Of course none of these protests on the part of China which you sa\ were made at the conference prior to the actual signature of the treaty were in writing, were they ? Mr. P^'erguson. No, sir; but thev were all later put in writing and there was issued an "Official statement by the Chinese Government respecting the Chino-Japanese negotiations now brought to a con- clusion by China's compliance with the terms of Japan's ultimatum delivered'on May 7, 1915." That was communicated diily to all the various legations in Peking. Senator Brandegee. In what publication does that appear? Have you it in the pamphlet before yo\i ? Mr. Ferguson. I have it. Senator Brandegee. What is the title ? Mr. Ferguson. It is appendices. Senator Brandegee. It is appendices of what ? Mr. Ferguson. Appendices of Mr. Millard's book on the far eastern question. I have also an official copy in my notes. Senator Brandegee. I wish you would put that written protest or statment that China issued in relation to this treaty into the record, if you please. How long is it — not the whole appendix, but the protest ? Mr. Ferguson. The whole statement covers 15 pages. Senator Brandegee. That is China's statement of the whole case ? Mr. Ferguson. That is China's statement of the whole case. Senator Brandegee. I would like to have that put into the record, if there is no objection. (The statement referred to is here printed in full as follows:) Official Statement by the Chinese Government Respecting the Sino-Jap- ANESB Negotiations Now Brought to a Conclusion by China's Compliance with the Terms of Japan's Ultimatum Delivered on May 7, 1915. At 3 o'clock on the afternoon of May 7, 1915, his excellency the Japanese minister in Peking delivered to the Chinese Government in person, an ultimatum from the Imperial Japanese Government, with an accompanying note of seven articles. The concluding sentences of the ultimatum read thus: 602 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. "The Imperial Government hereby again offer their advice and hope that the Chinese Government, upon this advice, will give a satisfactory reply by 6 o'clock p.m. on the 9th day of May. It is hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received before or at the specified time the Imperial Government -will take such steps as they may deem necessary." The Chinese Government, haying received and accepted the ultimatum, feel con- strained to make a frank and plain statement of the facts connected with the negotia- tions which were abruptly terminated by this drastic action on the part of Japan. The Chinese Government have constantly aimed, as they still aim, at consolidating the friendship existing between China and Japan, and, in this period of travail in other parts of the world, have been particularly solicitous of preserving peace in the Far East. Unexpectedly on January 18, 1915, his excellency the Japanese minister in Peking, in pursuance of instructions from his Govei-nment, adopted the unusual procedure of presenting to his excellency the President of the Republic of China a list (hereto appended) of 21 momentous demands, arranged in five groups. The first four groups were each introduced by a preamble, but there was no preamble or ex- planation to the fifth group. In respect of the character of the demands in this group, however, no difference was indicated in the document between them and those embodied in the preceding groups. Although there was no cause for such a d-marche, the Chinese Government, in deference to the wishes of the Imperial Japanese Government, at once agreed to open negotiations on those articles which it was possible for China to consider, notwith- standing that it was palpable that the whole of the demands were intended to extend the rights and interests of Japan without securing a quid pro quo of any kind for China. China approached the pending conferences in a spirit of utmost friendHness and with a determination to deal with all questions frankly and sincerely. Before negoti- ations were actually commenced, the Japanese minister raised many questions with regard to the number of delegates proposed to represent China, the number of confer- ences to be held in each week, and the method of discussion. The Chinese Govern- ment, though their views differed from those of the Japanese minister, yielded in all these respects to his contentions in the hope of avoiding any delay in the negotiationB. The objections of the Japanese minister to the customary recording and signing of the minutes of each conference, which the Chinese Government suggested as a neces- sary and advisable precaution, as well as one calculated to facilitate future reference, were also accepted. Nor did the Chinese Government retaliate in any way when in the course of the negotiations the Japanese Minister twice suspended the conferences, obviously with the object of compelling compliance with his views on certain points at the time under discussion. Even when delay was threatened owing to the un- fortunate injury sustained by the Japanese Minister as a result of a fall from his horse, the Chinese delegates, in order to avert interruption, proposed that the conferences should be continued at the Japanese Legation, which proposal was accepted. Later when, on March 22, the Japanese Government dispatched large bodies of troops to South Manchuria and Shantung for the ostensible purpose of relieving the garrison — whose term of service had not then expired — the Japanese Minister stated at the conference, in reply to a direct question as to when the retiring troops would be with- drawn, that this would not be done until negotiations could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Although this minatory step caused much excitement, indignation, and alarm on the part of the Chinese people, and made it diflScult for the Chinese Govern- ment to contmue the conferences, they successfully exerted efforts to avert a rupture and thus enabled the negotiations smoothly to proceed. All liiis demonstrates that the Chinese Government were dominated by a sincere desire to expedite the progress of the conferences; and that the Japanese Government recognized this important fact was made clear on March 11 when the Japanese Minister conveyed to ttie Chinese Government an expression of his Government's appreciation of China's frankness and sincerity in the conduct of the negotiations. One of the supplementary proposals was in these terms: From February 2, when the negotiations were commenced, to April 17, 24 confer- ences were held in all. Throughout this whole period the Chinese Grovemment steadfastly strove to arrive at an amicable settlement and made every concession possible. Of the 21 demands originally submitted by Japan, China agreed to 15, some in prin- ciple and some textually, 6 being initialed by both parties. IN THE MATTER Or THE DEMANDS TO WHICH CHINA AGREED. At the first conference, held on February 2, China agreed in principle to the first article of the .Shantung group of demands which provides that China should give her assent to the transfer ofGermany's rights in Shantung to Japan. The Chinese Govern- ment maintained at first that the subject of this demand related to the post bellum TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 603 settlement, and therefore should be left over for discussion by all the parties inter- Btited at the peace conference. Failing to persuade the Japanese minister to accept this view, the Chinese Government agreed to this demand in principle, and made certain supplementary proposals. "The Japanese Government declares that when the Chinese Government give their assent to the disposition of interests above referred to, Japan will restore the leased territory of Kiaochow to China, and further recognizes the right of the Chinese Govern- ment to participate in the negotiations referred to above between Japan and Ger- many. " The provision for a declaration to restore Kiaochow, was clearly not a demand on Japan but only a reiteration of Japan's voluntary statement in her ultimatum to Germany on August 15, 1914 (a copy of which was officially transmitted to the Chinese Government for perusal on August 15), and repeated in public statements by the Japanese premier. Appreciating the earnest desire of Japan to maintain the peace of the Far East and to cement her friendship with China, as evidenced by this friendly offer, the Chinese Government left the entire question of the conditions of restoration to be determined by Japan, and refrained from making any reference thereto in the supplementary proposal. The suggestion relating to participation in the conference between Japan and Germany was made in view of the fact that Shantung, the object of future negotiation between Japan and Germany, is a Chinese Province, and therefore China is the power most concerned in the future of that territory. Another supplementary proposal suggesting the assumption by Japan of responsi- bility for indemnification of the losses arising out of the military operations by Japan in and about the leased territory of Kiaochow was necessitated by the fact that China was neutral vis-i-vis the war between Japan and Germany. Had China not inserted such a provision, her position in relation to this conflict might have been liable to misconstruction — the localities in which the operations took place being a portion of China's territory — and might also have exposed herself to a claim for indemnification of losses for which she was in no way responsible. In a further supplementary proposal the Chinese Government suggested that, prior to tjie restoration of the IGaochow territory to China, the maritime customs, the telegraphs, and post offices should continue to be administered as heretofore; that the military railway, the telegraph lines, etc., which were installed by Japan to facilitate her military operations, should be removed forthwith; that the Japanese troops now stationed outside of the leased territory should be first withdrawn, and those within the tenitory should be recalled at the time when Kiaochow is returned to China. Shantung being a Chinese Province, it was natural for China to be anxious concerning the restoration nf the status quo ante bellum. Although the Chinese Government were confident that the Japanese Government would effect such resto- ration in pursuance of their official declaration, it was necessary for China, being neutral throughout the war, to place these matters on record. At the third conference, held on February 22, China agreed to the second demand in the Shantung Group not to cede or lea-'e to any power any territory or island on the sea border of Shantung. At the fifth conference, held on Fobruarj 29, China agreed to give Japan the pref- erence, provided Germany abandoned the privilege to supply the capital for the con- struction of a railway froni Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, in the event of China deciding to build that railway with foreign capital. At the sixth conference, held on March 3, China, in the interests of foreign trade, agreed to open certain important cities in Shantung as trade marts under regulations approved by the Japanese Government, although this was a demand on the part of Japan for privileges additional to any that hitherto had been enjoyed by Germany and was not an outcome of the hostilities between Japan and Germany, nor, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, was its acceptance essential to the preservation of peace in the Far East. At the eighth conference, held on March 9, China agreed (1) to the extension of the term of the lease of Dairen and (2"l Port Arthur, and (3) of the South Manchuria and (4) Antung-Mukden Railways, all to 99 years. Owing to the bitter experiences which China sustained in the past in connection with the leased portions of her territory, it has become her settled policy not to grant further leases nor to extend the term of those now in existance. Therefore, it was a significant indication of China's desire to meet Japan's wishes when she agreed to this exceptional departure from her settled policy. , At the same conference the Chinese Government also agi-eed to refrain from raising objections to the principle of cooperation in the Hanyehping Co., if the latter should arrive at an agreement in this respect with the Japanese capitalists concerned. With reference to this question it was pointed out to the Japanese Minister that, in the 604 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. provisional constitution of the Republic of China, Chinese subjects are guaranteed the right of protection of their property and freedom to engage in any lawful occupation. The Government was precluded, therefore, from interfering with the private business of the people, and could not find any other solution than the one thus agreed to. As regards the single article of the fourth group, and the preamble thereto, the Chinese Government held that they were inconsistent with Chinese sovereignty. However, China, at this conference, expressed her readiness to meet the wishes of Japan so tar as it was possible without infringing her sovereignty, and agreed to make a voluntary pronouncement that she would not alienate any portion of her coast line. In connection with the South Manchuria Railway it is worthy of note that the pro- vision regarding the repurchase period in the agreement (36 years from 1902) was not mentioned in Japan's original proposal. Subsequently the Japanese Government, on the ground that the meaning of this provision was not clear, requested China to agree to its cancellation. To this request the Chinese Government acceded, though well aware that the proposed change could only benefit Japan. China thus relin- quished the right to repurchase the railway at the expiration of another 23 years. In connection with the Antung-Mukden Railway, the article, which was originally initialed at the conference, provided for the reversion of the railway to China at the end of 99 years without payment, but, at the subsequent meeting, the Japanese Minister requested that the reference to the reversion without payment de deleted from the initialed article. In acceding to the Japanese minister's request, China again showed her sincere desire to expedite matters and to meet Japan's wishes even at the sacrifice of a point in her favor, to which Japan had already aereed. At the eleventh conference, held on March 16, China agreed to give Japan preference in regard to loans for railway construction in South Manchuria. At the thirteenth conference, held on March 23, China agreed (1) to the amendment of the Kirin-Changchun Railway loan agreement; (2) to give preference to Japan if the revenue of South Manchuria were offered as security for loans; (3) to give preference to Japanese in the event of the employment of advisers for South Manchuria; (4) to grant to Japanese the right of mining in nine specified areas in South Manchuria. In its original form the demand with reference to mining in South Manchuria tended to create a monopoly for Japanese subjects, and, therefore, was entirely incon- sistent with the principle of equal opportunity. The Chinese Government explained that they could not, in view of the treaty rights of other powers, agree to this monopoly, but they readily gave their acceptance when Japan consented to the modification of the demand so as to mitigate its monopolistic character. In connection with the Kirin-Changchun Railway, the amendment agreed to involves a fundamental revision of the original agreement on the basis of the existing railway loan contracts concluded by China with other foreign capitalists, as well as an engagement on the part of the Chinese GoVernment to extend to tiiis railway any better terms which may be hereafter accorded to other railway concessionaries in China. The capital of this railway was originally 50 per cent Chinese and 50 per cent Japanese. The effect of this undertaking is to transfer the capital originally held by the Chinese, as well as the full control and administration of the railway, to the Japanese. At the twenty-first conference, held on April 10, China agreed, in regard to the demands concerning Fukien province, to give Japan an assurance in accordance with Japan's wishes at a future time. As regards demands 2 and 3 in the Manchuria Group, relating to the ownership of land for trade, manufacture, and agricultural enterprises, as well as for this right of settlementin the interior of South Manchuria, the Chinese Government, after discussion at several conferences, agreed to them in principle, but desired to introdtice certain amendments concerning the control and protection of the Japanese subjects who might avail themselves of these rights. The course of the negotiations in connection with these amendments will be referred to subsequently. IN THE MATTER OF THOSE DEMANDS TO WHICH CHINA COULD NOT AGREE. Of the 21 original demands there were 6. as previously mentioned, to which China CDuld not agree on the ground that they were not proper subjects for international negotiation, conflicting as they did with the sovereign rights of China, the treaty rights of other powers, and the principle of equal opportunitv. Thus, for example, the second article of the Hanyehping question in the original third group in particular seriously affected the principle of equal commercial oppor- tunity. The proposal that there should be joint administration by China and Japan of the police in China was clearly an interference with the Republic's domestic affairs, aiid consequently an infringement of her sovereignty. For that reason the Chinese Go^•em- ment could not take the demand into consideration. But when it was explained by TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 605 the Japanese minister that this referred only to South Manchuria, and he suggested that his Government would be satisfied if China agreed to engage Japanese as police advisers for that territory, the Chinese Government accepted the suggestion. The two articles relating to the acquisition of land for schools, hospitals, and temples, as well as to the right of missionary propaganda, would, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, ha\e presented ffruxe obstacles to the consolidation of the friendly feeling subsisting between the two people. The religions of the two countries are identical and, therefore, the need for a missionary propaganda to be carried on in China by Japanese does not exist. The natural rivalry between Chinese and Japanese followers of the same faith would tend to create incessant disputes and friction. Whereas western missionaries live apart from the Chinese communities among which they labor. Japanese monks would live with the Chinese; and the similarity of their physical characteristics, their religious garb, and their ha'bits of life would render it impossible to distinguish them for purposes of affording the protection which the Japanese Government would require should be extended to them under the system of extra-territoriality now obtaining in China. Moreover a general apprehension exists among the Chinese people that these peculiar conditions favoring conspiracies for political purposes might be taken advantage of by some unscrupulous Chinese. The demand for rai4way concessions in the Yangtze Valley conflicted with the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway agreement of March 6, 1908, the Nanking- Changsha Railway agreement of MarchSl, 1914, and the engagement of August 24, 1914, fiving preference to British firms for the projected line from Nanchang to Chaochowfu. 'or this reason the Chinese Government found themselves unable to consider the demand, though the Japanese minister, while informed of China's engagements with Great Britain, repeatedly pressed for its acceptance. In respect to the demand for the appointment of influential Japanese to be advisers and instructors in political, financial, and military affairs, the policy of the Chinese Government in regard to the appointment of advisers haa been similar to that which has presumably guided the Japanese Gtovemment in like selection of the best quali- fied men irrespective of their nationality. As an indication of their desire to avail themselves of the services of eminent Japanese, one of the earliest appointments , made to an advisership was that of Dr. Ariga, while later on Dr. Hirai ana Mr. Naka- yami were appointed to the ministry of communications. It was considered that the demand that Japanese should be appointed in the three most important administrative departments, as well as the demand for the joint con- trol of Criina's police, and the demand for an engagement to purchase a fixed amount of arms and ammunition from Japan or to establish joint arsenals in China, so clearly involved the sovereignty of the Republic that the Chinese Government were unable even to consider them. For these reasons the Chinese Government, at the very outset of the negotiations, declared that they were unable to negotiate on the demands; but, in deference to the wishes of the Japanese Minister, the Chinese delegates consented to give the reasons for declining to enter into a discussion of them. IN THE MATTER OF THE QUESTIONS OF DISPUTE INVOLVED IN SOME OF THE FOEEGOING DEMANDS. The demand by Japan for the right of her subjects in South Manchuria to lease or own land, and to reside and travel, and to engage in business or manufacture of any kind whatever, was deemed by the Chinese Government to obtain for Japanese sub- jects in this region a privileged status beyond the terms of the treaties existing between the two nations, and to give them a freedom of action which would be a restriction of China's sovereignty and a serious infringement of her ad ministrative rights. Should Japanese subjects be granted the right of owning land, it would mean that all the landed property in the region might fall into their hands, thereby endangering China's territorial integrity. Moreover, residence in the interior was incompatible with the existence of extra-territoriality, the relinquishment of which is necessary to the actual enjoyment of the privilege of inland residence, as evidenced in the practice of other nations. Japan's unconditional demand for the privilege of inland residence accompanied with a desire to extend extra-territoriality into the interior of China and to enable Japanese subjects to monopolize all the interests in South Manchuria, was also pal- pably irreconcilable with the principle of equal opportunity. For this reason the Chinese Government were, in the first instance, unable to accept this demand as a basis of negotiation. Their profound regard for the friendly relations of the two countries, however, persuaded them to exert their utmost efforts, in spite of all the inherent difficulties, to seek a solution of a question which was praatically imposMble 606 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. to solve. Knowing that the proposal made by Japan was incompatible with treaties, they nevertheless sought to meet her wishes within the limits of treaties. Accord- ingly they_ submitted a counter-proposal to open more places in South Manchuria to international trade and to establish Sino-Japanese joint reclamation companies. This suggestion was made in the belief that the places to which Japanese subjects would desire to resort for purposes of trade, could not be other than important locali- ties; if all these localities were opened to commerce, then they could reside, trade, and lease land there for joint reclamation. Thus Japanese subjects might enjoy the essence of the privilege of inland residence and would still be able to reconcile their position with China's treaties and the principle of equal opportunity. After the Japanese Government declined to accept this suggestion, China with- drew it and replaced it with an amendment to the original articles. It was proposed in this amendment to grant to Japanese subjects the extra-treaty privilege of inland residence with the provisos that Japanese subjects in places outside of trade marts should observe Chinese police regulations and pay taxes in the same manner as Chinese; and that civil and criminal cases involving such Japaiiese subjects should be adjudicated by Chinese authorities, the Japanese consul attending merely to watch the proceedings. This suggestion was not an innovation; it was based upon the modus operandi now in force as regards the Korean settlers in inland districts in Chientao. But the Japanese Government again declined to accept it. The Chinese Government thereupon made a third proposal along the line of what constitutes the present practice in Turkey, making a distinction, however, in favor of Japanese subjects, in the exercise of jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. This was once more objected to by the Japanese Government. Then the Chinese Government proposed to concede still another step — the fourth endeavor to meet Japan's wishes. They proposed to agree to the full text of articles 2 and 3 relative to the question of inland residence, except that "the right of owning land" was changed into "the right of leasing land" and to the phrase "cultivating land" was added this clause: "the regulations for which shall be determined sepa- rately"; and, further, to add a supplementary article which embodied a modus operandi which the Chinese Government had constrained themselves to make, out of a desire to come to a settlement over this question. The view advanced in this sup- plementary article was based upon the Japanese minister's declaration made on March 6, 1915, that a separate article embodying some compromise might be added to the original articles 2 and 3 for the purpose of avoiding any conflict with China's sovereignty or the system established by treaties. These suggestions made by the Chinese Government were not accepted by Japan. As regards eastern inner Mongolia, not only have no treaties been entered into with Japan concerning this region, but also the people are so unaccustomed to foreign trade that the Chinese Government invariably feel much anxiety about the safety of foreign- ers who elfect to travel there. The Chinese Government, therefore, considered that it would not be in the interest of foreigners to open the whole territory to them for residence and commerce, and on these grounds baaed their or^nal refusal to place eastern inner Mongolia on the same tooting as South Manchuria. Still, their desire to meet the wishes of the Japanese Government eventually prompted them to offer to open a number of places in the region to foreign trade. IN THE MATTER OF JAPAN'S REVISED DEMANDS. "The foregoing is an outline of the negotiations up to April 17. It was hoped by the Chinese Government that the Japanese Government, in view of the great concesssions made by China at the conferences held up to this time, would see a way of effecting an amicable settlement by modifying their position on certain points. In regard to these it had, by this time, become manifest that China would encounter almost insuperable difficulties in making further concessions. The Japanese Government, however, suspended the negotiations until April 26 when they surprised the Chinese Government by presenting a new list of 24 demands (which is hereto appended), and requested the Chinese Government to accord their acceptance without delay, adding that this was their final proposal. At the same time the Japanese minister stated that the Japanese Government would restore the leased territory of Kiaochow to China at an opportune time in the future and under proper conditions if the Chinese Government would agree to the new list of 24 demands without modification. In this new list, although the term "special position" in the preamble of the Man- churian group was changed to "economic relations," and although the character of the articles in the original fifth group was altered from demands to a recital of alleged statements by the Chinese foreign, minister, four new demands were introduced con- TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 607 cerning eastern inner Mongolia. In deference to the wishes of the Japanese Govern- ment, the Chinese Government gave the revised list the most careful consideration; and being sincerely desirous of an early settlement offered new concessions in their reph presented to the Japanese minister on May 1. (Annexed.) In this reply the Chinese Government reinserted the proposal in reference to the retrocession of Kiaochow, which they advanced at the first conference on February 2, and which was postponed at the request of the Japanese minister. This, therefore, was in no sense a new proposal. The Chinese Government also proposed to agree to three of the four articles relating to eastern inner Mongolia. There was.some difficulty in determining a definition of the boundaries of eastern inner Mongolia — this being a new expression in Chinese geographical terminology — but the Chinese Goverimient, acting upon a statement made at a previous conference by the Japanese minister that the Japanese Government meant the region under Chinese administrative jurisdiction, and taking note, in the list presented by the Japanese minister, of the names of places in eastern inner Mongolia to be opened to trade, inferred that the so-called eastern inner Mongolia is that part of inner Mongolia which is under the jurisdiction of South Manchuria and the Jehol Intendency, and refrained from placing any limitations upon the definition of this term. The Chinese Government also withdrew their supplementary proposal reserving the right of making regulations for agricultural enterprises to be undertaken by Japanese settlers in South Manchuria. In respect of the trial of cases involving land disputes between Japanese only, or between Japanese and Chinese, the Chinese Government accorded to the Japanese consul the right of deputing an officer to watch the proceedings. The Chinese Government also agreed to accept the suggestion of the Japanese Government to modify the term " police law and ordinances " into " police rules and regulations," thereby limiting the extent of control which the Chinese would have over Japanese subjects. As regards the Hanyehping demand, the Chinese Government accepted the draft made by the Japaaese Government, embodying an engagement by the Chinese Government not to convert the company into a State-owned concern, nor to con- fiscate it, nor to force it to borrow foreign capital other than Japanese. In respect of the Fukien question the Chinese Government also agreed to give an assurance in the amplified form suggested by the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government had not given their consent to any foreign nations, to construct a dockyard, or a coaling station, or a naval base, or any other military establishment aloiig the coast of Fukien Province; nor did they contemplate borrowing fore^n capital for the foregoing purposes. Having made these concessions which practically brought the views of China into Une with those of Japan, and having explained in a note accompanyii^ the reply the difficulty for China to make further concessionB, the Chinese Government hoped that the Jaj)anese Government would accept their reply of May 1, and thus bring the negotiauons to an amicable conclusion. The Japanese Government, however, expressed themselves as being dissatisfied with China's reply, and withdrew the conditional offer to restore Kiaochow to China made on April 26. It was further intimated that it the Chinese Government did not give their full compliance with the list of 24 demands, Japan would have recourse to drastic measures. Upon receiving this intimation the Chinese Government, inspired by the con- ciliatory spirit which had been predominant from the very beginning of the nego- tiations and desirous of avoiding any possible rupture in the relations of the two countries, made a supreme effort to meet the situation, and represented to the Japanese Government that they would reconsider their position and make another attempt to find a solution that would be more satisfactory to Japan, in respect to those articles which China had declared could not be taken up for consideration, but to which Japan attached great importance. Even in the eveming of May 6, after the Japanese minister had notified the Chinese Government that the ultimatum had arrived in Peking, the Chinese Government in the interests of peace still exerted efforts to save the situation by offering to meet Japan's wishes. These overtures were again rejected and thus exhausted the means at the disposal of the Chinese Government to prevent an impasse. It is plain that the Chinese Government proceeded to the fullest extent of possible concesaon in view of the strong national sentiment manifested by the people through- out the whole period of negotiations. All that the Chinese Government strove to maintain was China's plenary sovereignty, the treaty rights of foreign powers in China, and the principle of equal opportunity. 608 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. To the profound regret of the Chinese Government, however, the tremendous sacrifices which they had shown themselves ready to make, proved unavailing, and an ultimatum (the text of which is appended) was duly delivered to them by the Japanese minister at 3 o'clock on the afternoon of May 7. • As to the allegations made in the ultimatum against China, the Chinese Govern- ment ^ope that the foregoing outline of the history of the negotiations constitutes a clear, dispassionate, and complete reply. In considering the nature of the course they should take with reference to the ultimatum the Chinese Government was influenced by a desire to preserve the Chinese people, as well as the large number of foreign- residents in China, from unnecessary suffering, and also to prevent the interests of friendly powers from being imperiled. For these reasons the Chinese Government were constrained to comply in full with the terms of the ultimatum (the reply being hereto appended), but in complying the Chinese disclaim any desire to associate themselves with any revision, which may thus be effected, of the various conventions and agreements concluded between other powers in respect of the maintenance of China's territorial independence and integrity, the preservation of the status quo, and the principle of equal. opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China. Senator Brandegee. What was the date of that statement ? Mr. Ferguson. It was issued — I can not say, sir, because printing is so slow in Peking. It was somewhere toward the latter part of May. Senator Brandegee. On what date was the treaty signed ? Mr. Ferguson. May 25. It was somewhere about that same time. Senator Brandegee. It must have been issued within a week after the signature of the treaty. Mr. Ferguson. I should say somewhere along there. It may have been in the first weeks of June. I do not remember exactly. Senator McCumber. It was given publicity throughout China ? Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir. Senator Johnson of California. Did you hear Senator McCormick's speech yesterday ? Mr. Ferguson. I did, sir. Senator Johnson of California. In the course of it he quoted from an eminent Japanese statesman's construction of, or the future con- struction that Japan would put upon, the Lansing-Ishii agreement. Did you follow that particular part ? Mr. Ferguson. Part of it. 1 could not hear from where I was sit- ing in the gallery . Senator Johnson of California. The only reason of my inquiry was that if you were familiar with it I was going to ask you about it, but if you did not hear it I will not refer to it further. Mr. Ferguson. If you could state Senator Johnson of California. I do not want to state it. I might not state it with entire accuracy. The substance of it as I gathered was that some eminent Japanese statesman — here is the record, if I am going to question you about it, it will be far better, I think, to get it accurately. If somebody will proceed with other questions, I will ask that later. Senator Knox. I was goin^ to make a suggestion that we might take the time to send out and got some of our Democratic brethern to come in and help expedite this treaty. Senator Sw.^-NSON. I would like to ha\e you give your interpreta- tion of the Lansing-Ishii text, as to its scope and its effect. Mr. Ferguson. May I do so first without its going into the record, Senator? I would like to ask as to the expediency of putting it into the record. I should hate to put it in the record. TREATY OF PEACE WITH qwRM-ATT V. 609 Senator Swanson. The reason I desire that is that in the question of Senator Johnson he used the words that the agreement disposed of the "fate" of China, and I would like to have also in the record your interpretation as to the effect of that agreement, the English text, which was the official text. Mr. Ferguson. Personally, 1 regarded the Lansing-Ishii agree- ment as a most unfortunate document, and out of kaeping with our traditional policy. Senator Swanson. How about the Root-Takahira agreement? Mr. Ferguson. That was perfectly right and perfectly in agree- ment with all our previous treatment of China. Senator Swanson, Was China consulted about that agreement ? Mr. Ferguson. No, sir. Senator Swanson. That agreement was made without any con- sultation with China ? Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir; so far as I know. Senator Brandegee. Have you finished, Senator ? Senator Swanson. No. You said it was out of accord. What special rights does that agreement give to Japan ? The Chairman. You mean the Root-Takahira agreement ? Senator Swanson. The Lansing-Ishii agreement. Mr. Ferguson. Well, the primal difficulty in that is that it deals with China without consulting her, whereas the Root-Takahira agree- ment was following up by Mr. Hay's original plan of getting eyerybody to agree to recognize the territorial integrity and the "open door," the equal opportunity of all nations, and whether China was con- sulted about it, or was not consulted about it, made very Uttle difiFerence. But here it was a question of the attitude of the powers that were in treaty with China toward her. The Lansing-Ishii agreement brings in something which directly affects China, by saying that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries. That is a statement which I think is very broad. Senator Swanson. Does that give Japan any greater interest in China than China would have in Japan ? Their relations are similar to each other, as a general statement of the general proposition. Mr. Ferguson. It states they are on the basis of territorial pro- pinquity, and consequently that "the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China." Senator Swanson. Well, now, the declaration of that general priuciple Mr. Ferguson. It is very different from what we have ever stated, and is directly — ^how it can be possible to maintain on the one hand the " open door," equal opportunity, and on the other hand say that a certain nation on account of territorial propinquity has special interests, is more than I can understand, sir. Senator Swanson. Does that general declaration give Japan any greater interest in China than China would have in Japan on account of being so geographically situated toward each other — the general declaration of principle ? i i. • Mr. Ferguson. No, sir; provided they were on an equal basis, which they have not been for several years. 135546—19 39 610 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. Senator Swanson. The general principle does not create any more interest in one than in the other. Mr. Ferguson. As a statement between Great Britain and France, for instance, it would be a perfectly harmless statement. As a state- ment between a strong nation and an adjoining weak nation, it can have only one significance as far as my judgment would go, and that is a threatening influence. Senator McCumbeb. How would it be between the United States and Mexico ? Mr. Ferguson. I should say it would have a very threateniag in- fluence there. Senator McCumber. That we have a special interest by reason of our Mr. Ferguson. Of our territorial propinquity. Senator McCumber. That we have a special interest in Mexico, would you thiak that would be a harmful declaration or one that would be anything but in accord with the facts ? Mr. Ferguson. Well Senator Swanson. Do we claim special interest in Mexico on accoimt of its geographical position to us ? Mr. Ferguson. I do not know what is claimed by the United States Government in that respect. Senator Swanson. You know, do you not, that it has been one of OUT principles under the Monroe doctrine — nearness to us ? Now, let me ask you, further, do you not think the Lansing-Ishii agreement gives to China territorial rights in that regard ? Mr. Ferguson. No more than she had. Senator Swanson. But it is a reiteration of that, made by the United States. Mr. Ferguson. They made that reiteration, but in the same note the other, "special interest" comes in the first time. Senator Swanson. That is the only addition that was made in this, above what was included in other notes ? Mr. Ferguson. Yes. Senator Swanson. In that Japan also reiterates her adherence to the open door policy ? Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir. Senator Swanson. As I understand, in the Root-Takahira agree- ment we agree that if there is any change in the affairs in China, the United States and Japan shall consult before taking any action ? Mr. Ferguson. Yes. Senator Swanson. Did that include also that they should consult China at the same time, or was the consultation limited to those two nations ? Mr. Ferguson. It was limited to those two nations. Senator Swanson. That is, there was an agreement that they should consult each other, without any agreement that China should also be consulted ? Mr. Ferguson. Yes; but that was to protect her interests. Senator Swanson. Not to consult China was to protect her interests ? Mr. Ferguson. No; but the purpose of that note was the protec- tion of China's interests. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 611 Senator Swanson. Do you not think that, if Senator Johnson was right about that, China should have been included as a third party to the consultation ? Mr. Ferguson. It would have been a very courteous thing on the part of both Governments; but as both Governments were simply promulgating a benevolent policy toward China, which did not affect Chuia's iaterests except favorably, such lack of consultation did not at the time give any offense to China. I may point out. Senator, in reference to this Root-Takahira agreement that you are questioning me upon, that it is very clear to my mind that the presentation of the 21 demands upon China by Japan, without any consultation with the United States, was in direct violation of the Root-Takahira agreement. That I feel per- fectly free to say. Senator Swanson. Those 21 demands were in violation of the Mr. Ferguson. They directly affected the interests of China. Japan promised, under the Root-Takahira agreement, to consult with the United States before taking action. I should say that that was in direct contravention. Senator Brandegee. The Root-Takahira agreement, if I imder- stand your position, was an agreement to treat all nations equally with reference to China, and to give them all the same privileges — to keep the door open — ^was it not? Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir. Senator Brandegee. Was there anything in the Root-Takahira agreement that intimated that Japan had any special interests in China ? Mr. Ferguson. Not a suggestion of it. Senator Brandegee. And is it your opinion that because this agreement, made subsequently to the Mr. Ferguson (continuing). The Root-Takahira agreement being on our initiative and the Lansing-Ishii agreement being on the Japanese initiative. Senator Brandegee. The Lansing-Ishii agreement having been preceded, according to the testimony of the Secretary of State which is in the record here, by a demand on the part of Viscount Ishii that we should not only recognize their special interest, but their Mr. Ferguson. Influence. Senator Brandegee (continuing). Influence, taking all these things into consideration, and that we recognized Japan's special interest, does it not, in. yoiu- opinion, precipitate a question as to what that special interest is above and apart from aU other nations ? Mr. Ferguson. Certainly, sir. Senator Brandegee. And it must be construed to mean some- thing different from the interests of other nations in China, must it not ? Mx. Ferguson. Certainly, and it must be construed in reference to the question which Japan has considered of paramount interest to herself; that is, the Shantimg question. Senator Brandegee. And also, whether it shall be construed so or not, at least it must be considered as to the effect which the Japanese put upon it and the way m which they mterpret it, must it not ? 612 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir. Senator Brandegee. That is all. Senator McCumber. Now, I would like to ask you, Doctor, just what rights are given to Japan, in the Lansing-Ishii agreement, that are withheld in the Root-Takahira agreement ? Senator Brandegee. That is the question. Nobody knows. Senator McCumber. I know, but he must have an idea. Mr. Ferguson. I can answer that question, I think. Senator McCumber, by stating that the Root-Takahira agreement provides for the open door and equal opportunity for all nations. The Lansing- Ishii agreement states as follows: The United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous. Senator Brandegee. What part would that be, Doctor ? Senator McCumber. But what is there there about the open-door policy ? Mr. Ferguson. It goes on and states "the open door." Senator McCumber. It goes on and reiterates what is in the Root- Takahira agreement. Mr. Ferguson. But you asked what, in addition to that, there was, and I was just quoting. Senator McCumber. I know the words. I know that the wording declares "interests" and "special interests;" but what I am trying to get at is what you conceive that "interests" to be, different from what is in the Root-Takahira agreement? Mr. Ferguson. The Root-Takahira agreement recognized no special interests of any nation. Senator McCumber. It recognizes the equal right of every nation ? Mr. Ferguson. Of all nations. Senator McCxjmber. Does this recognize that Japan has any right that is not accorded, in trade or in any other waj^, to all the nations ? Mr. Ferguson. To my mind it does, sir. It distinctly recognizes Japan's special interests in Manchuria, which are contiguous, and Korea; and it probably recognizes Japan's interest in the coast op- posite Formosa, which is the coast of the Province of Fulden. Senator McCumber. This country has often declared its special interest, for instance, by reason of our contiguous territory. That declaration that we have a special interest in Mexico by reason of our geographical situation does not carry with it, does it, any right, commercially or in any other respect, with Mexico that is not ac- corded to all other nations of the world 1 Mr. Ferguson. No; but we have not American soldiers in Mexico guarding American concessions railways. We have no military rights in protecting mines in Mexico. The situatioa is not on all fours, sir, in my opinion. Senator Knox. We have no extraterritoriality there. Mr. Ferguson. No extraterritorial privileges and no establish- ment of special courts. Senator McCumber. Have we soldiers in any other one of the South American Republics ? Mi. Ferguson. That is not a matter that is within my knowledge. Senator McCumber. Have we had any kind of a protectorate over Haiti, where we have our American soldiers ? Mr. Ferguson. I think the Senator can answer his own question, can he not ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 613 Senator McCumbek. Yes; I asked it only to connect the matter up with the theory that the fact that we claim a special interest does not carry with it a commercial or other interest antagonistic to other countries; and that we ought to construe the Japanese special inter- est exactly in the same way as we would construe a declaration of special interest to the United States. That was all. Senator Swanson. Doctor, have you any special knowledge that these negotiations were begun at the instance of Japan ? Mr. Ferguson. You mean the 21-demand negotiations? Senator Swanson. No. I mean the negotiations in connection with the Lansing-Ishii agreement. Mr. Ferguson. Oh. Senator Swanson. Mr. Lansing, on page 223 of part 7 of these hearings, when he was testifying before the committee, said this: I suggested to Viscount Ishii that it would be well for the two Governments to reaffirm the open-door policy, on the ground that reports were being spread as to the purpose of J? pan to take advantage of the situation created by the war to extend her influence over China — political influence. Ishii replied to me that he would like to consider that matter, but that, of course, he felt that Japan had a special interest in China, and that that should be mentioned in any agreement that we had ; and I replied to him that we, of course, recognized that .Japan, on account of her geographical posi- tion, had a peculiar interest in China, but that it was not political in nature, and that the danger of a statement of special interest was that it might be so construed, and therefore I objected to making such a statement. Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir. Senator Swanson. Now, it would seem from that that Secretary Lansing- Mr. Ferguson. Did not agree to the agreement which- Senator Swanson. That Secretary Lansing suggested these negotia- tions in order to protect the sovereignty of China and the open-door policy that he thought was being threatened by the conduct of Japan in China, and he thought this would be a protection to China, con- sidering the troubled conditions existing in the world at that time. Mr. Ferguson. That would not be my interpretation of Secretary Lansing's remarks. My interpretation of the Secretary's remarli is that when Viscount Ishii came to America on his special mission and had a consultation with the Secretary, he considered, in view of what Japan had been doing in Shantung, the large number of peti- tions wmch had been sent to this country by the people of Shantung, that it would be well for Japan to reaffirm her policy of nonaggression in China; and that Viscount Ishii countered him by saying that they would be quite willing to do that, but would like also to add a new statement, that on account of geographical position Japan has special interests there; to which Secretary Lansing objected. But in the final agreement, to which whether or not the Secretary was a party I do not know, that was included; and I judge from this statement that the Secretary made that it was included contrary to his advice in the matter. Senator Swanson. What I wanted to know is, if you know, if Ishii came here personally with the purpose of opening negotiations, or whether, when he came here, these negotiations were initiated by our Government? Mr. Ferguson. He came to make negotiation. Senator Swanson. You are satisfied of that ? Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir; I think that is without doubt. 614 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Moses. On page 193 of this record you will find that Secretary Lansing apparently acquiesces in that view. I read as follows from page 193 of our record: Senator Borah. And just before Ishii came over here to get his agreement with this country. Secretary Lansing. No; Ishii — ■ — Senator Borah. No; it was in November, 1917. Secretaty Lansing. 1917. Senator Williams. That what took place — oh, that Ishii made his agreement? Evidently Secretary Lansing acquiesced in that assumption. Senator Johnson of California. The matter to which I was en- deavoring to direct your attention in Senator McCormick's address in the Senate was this. [.Reading:] The Russian minister at Tokio sent his Government a confidential report on the Japanese view of the agreement. That was also published by the Russian revolu- tionaries, and in part is as follows: "To my question whether he (the .lapanese minister of foreign affairs) did not fear that in the future misunderstandings might arise from the different interpretations by Japan and the United States of the meaning of the terms, 'special position' and ' special interests ' of Japan in China, Viscount Motono replied by saying that — (a gap in the original). Nevertheless, I gain the impression from the words of the minister that he is conscious of the possibility of misunderstandings also in the future, but is of the opinion that in such a case Japan would have better means at her disposal for carrying into effect her interpretation than the United States." Do you know anything of the remarks of Motono concerning the interpretation that might in future be put upon the Lansing-Ishii agreement ? Mr. Ferguson. I have seen that same statement quoted in the press of Japan, and I have a copy of it, also. Senator Johnson of California. Can you enlighten us as to what is the "better means" referred to in that statement? Mr. Ferguson. Japan is nearer China. It is much easier for her to move troops, to move ships, than it is for the L^nited States, m China. I do not know of any other. Senator Johnson of California. That is all, sir. The Chairman. Does anyone else desire to ask any questions 1 Senator Moses. What means was China permitted to employ in presenting her case at Paris ? Mr. Ferguson. She had free opportunity, so far as I understand. I speak there only from reports given me by returned Chinese dele- gates. So far as I Imow, she had every opportunitj' of presenting her case. Senator Moses. Was she limited in any way in her choice of counsel, by suggestion or otherwise ? Mr. Ferguson. Not officially; no official suggestion, so far as I know. Senator Moses. Do you know of any unofficial suggestion ? Mr. Ferguson. Yes; I think there were unofficial suggestions. Senator Moses. Of what character ? Mr. Ferguson. That it would be inadvisable to have foreign advisers there with her, in view of the complicated situation. Senator Moses. Do you know of any other delegation that was limited in respect to its advisers in presenting its case before the peace conference ? Mr. Ferguson. No, sir. Senator Moses. What argument was employed in making this unofficial suggestion ? TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. 615 Mr. Ferguson. That it would be better for China's case. Senator Moses. That was a simple assertion ? Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir. Senator Moses. When the final decision was reached in the Shantung matter, how was it communicated to the Japanese and Chinese delegations ? Mr. Ferguson. I can only quote hearsay in that matter. It came to them, I might state, through the publicity department of the American delegation, as I understood it. Senator Moses. In writing ? Mr. Ferguson. No, verb^ly. Senator Moses. Who was the messenger ? Mr. Ferguson. I have only had that on hearsay. I should hate to read into the record the name without being able to state it on my own personal knowledge. I only know it from hearsay. Senator Moses. Hearsay from whom? Mr. Ferguson. From the returned delegate from the Chinese Government. Senator Moses. Would you mind giving his version of it as he communicated it to you ? Mr. Ferguson. The facts were communicated to him by Mr. Ray Stannard Baker. Senator Moses. Did the communication contain anything except a statement of what had been decided upon ? Mr. Ferguson. No, that is all; what had been decided upon. Senator Moses. No further communication was ever had with Mr. Baker ? Mr. Ferguson. No, sir. I may also state that I have been informed from that same source that it was the imderstanding of the Chinese delegation that articles 156, 157, and 158 were drafted by the Japanese member of the drafting committee of the Paris treaty. The Chairman. Are there any further questions to be asked of Dr. Ferguson? If not, that is all. Dr. Ferguson, and we are very much obliged to you. Mr. Ferguson. Thank you. I have handed to the official reporter these conventions that you asked me to insert in the record. The Chairman. Yes, very weU. (Thereupon, at 11.40 o'clock a. m., the committee adjourned until to-morrow, Friday, August 22, 1919, at 10 o'clock a. m,) FE.IDAY, ATJGTJST 22, 1919. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Eelations, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 426 Senate Office Building, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge presiding. Present: Senators Lodge (chairman), McCumber, Borah, Brande- gee. Kjiox, Harding, Johnson of California, Moses, Hitchcock, Williams, and Swanson. STATEMEITT OF PEOF. EDWARD THOMAS WILLIAMS. The Chairman. Prof. Williams, will you be kind enough to give your full name ? Prof. Williams. Edward Thomas Williams. The Chairman. Of Berkeley, Calif. ? Prof. Williams. Of Berkeley, Calif. ; yes, sir. The Chairman. You are now a professor in the university, are you not ? Prof. Williams. Yes; I am professor of oriental languages and literature in the University of California. The Chairman. You have been in China ? Prof. Williams. I lived in China for nearly 26 years, or about 26 years. The Chairman. You were at Paris as one of the eastern experts, were you not ? Prof. Williams. Yes; my commission read as technical adviser of the American commission to negotiate peace. The Chairman. You were one of the American experts ? Prof. Williams. Yes, sir; technical adviser on far eastern affairs. The Chairman. Prof. Williams, I am going to ask Senator Johnson if he will go on with the examination, because he knows exactly what we desire to get. Senator Johnson of California. Will you state about the time of your residence in China ? You say you were there for about 26 years. That was during what period, Doctor ? Prof. Williams. I went out in 1887, and in 1909 I returned to the Department of State for 18 months, and then went back in 1911 and was there until February, 1914, when I returned to the Department of State again, and was in the Department of State until last Septem- ber. Senator Johnson of California. Were you, in your residence in China, acting in any official capacity? Prof. Williams. I was. Senator Johnson of California. What was your position ? 617 618 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. Prof. Williams. Not all the time, but from 1896 until 1898 I was in the American Consular Service at Shanghai, and from 1898 until 1901 I was in the Chinese Government service as translator. From 1901 until 1908 I was Chinese secretary of the American Legation at Peking. From 1908 to 1909 I was consul general at Tientsin, and then came home in 1 909 and was Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State. In 1911 I went back to Peking as secretary of legation, and was charg6 d'affaires while Mr. Calhoun was at home; I was charge d'af- faires when the revolution broke out, and was again charg6 d'affaires when he resigned and came home. I remained in charge during the recognition of the Republic and the coming out of Dr. Reinsch. In 1914 I returned to the State Department as Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs; and remained there until last September. Senator Johnson of California And during that period as chief of that division in the Department of State/ was your residence in Washington ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Last September you undertook your work at the University of California ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Were you called from your work there for any specific purpose "i Prof. Williams. Yes; on the 3d of December I received a tele- gram signed by Secretary Lansing, asking me to go to Paris, and he was good enough to say that I was needed at the peace conference. I left as soon as I could — ^left on the 7th of December and arrived at- Paris on the 31st of December. Senator Johnson of California. You remained in Paris how long? Prof. Williams. I remained until the 17th of May. Senator Johnson of CaUfornia. During that time were you per- forming the duties of the particular post of adviser ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Adviser upon Prof. Williams. Upon far eastern affairs. Senator Johnson of California. And while you were in Paris were you familiar with the proceedings had in reference to the Chinese- Japanese matters in controversy 1 Prof. Williams. Yes; to a certain degree. Of course I was not present at the meetings of the council. Senator Johnson of California. Have you been the author of any books on far eastern affairs ? Prof. Williams. Only pamphlets. Senator Johnson of California. Pamphlets ? Prof. Williams. No books. Senator Johnson of California. Senator Moses asks whether the proceedings of the council were communicated to you in your capacity as adviser ? Prof. Williams. Some of them were; yes. At times when ques- tions relating to the Far East came before the council I was sum- moned to the council meetings. I attended six meetings of the coun- cils ; five meetings of the council of ten and one meeting of the council of five. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 619 Senator Johnson of California. Was that during the period that they were considering the Shantung matter ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Moses. What was the procedure in those meetings that you attended, Doctor? Prof. Williams. Mr. Clemenceau, the French Premier, presided, and two delegates from each of the five powers. They gathered around the room and questions that were raised were put by Mr. Clemenceau, and then there was a sort of informal discussion by anybody that cared to speak. Senator Moses. Was any vote taken at any of the meetings which you attended ? Prof. Williams. I do not remember any vote to have been taken. Senator Johnson of California. Were you called upon at any time to render any advice concerning the Shantung decision ? Prof. Williams. Not before the council, but by our own commis- sioners I was asked several times for memoranda on various phases of it. Senator Johnson of California. Did you furnish any memoranda ? Prof. Williams. I did; yes, sir. Senator Johnson of California. Have you any copies of the mem- oranda thus furnished ? Prof. Williams. No; I have not. They were left in the files, in Paris. Senator Johnson of California. Do you remember substantially what you then advised ? Prof. Williams. YeS. Senator Johnson of California. Go ahead arid in your oivn way state your advice on the Shantung decision, will you ? Senator Brandegee. And let him state what he put in these memoranda. Senator Johnson of California. Yes ; I was going to have him char- acterize in his own fashion the Shantung decision and tell about it. Then I was going to ask him concerning this advice and to whom given. Prof. Williams. My own opinion is that the decision was an un- fortunate one; that the leased territory of Kiaochow and the rail- ways and mines in Shantung, which had been in the possession of Germany ought to have gone automatically to China at the conclu- sion of the peace; that they were taken from China by force, by an act of piracy; that the fact that some other power had driven out the Germans from Shantung did not seem to constitute a title to this property, and that they would naturally revert to the soverign of the territory. You remember that the conference was organized on the 18th of January, 1919, and on the 27th this question came up before the conference, when the disposition of the German colonies was brought up. On that day Baron Makino presented the claim on behalf of Japan to have these rights formerly belonging to Germany in the Provmce of Shantung transferred directly and unconditionally to Japan. He made his statement, and immediately one of the Chinese delegates arose and asked if China could be heard. M. Clemenceau said that the question that morning was not so much about Shantung as about the German colonies, and that China would be heard later. 620 TREATY OP PBAOE WITH QBBMANT. So they first discussed the question of the disposition of the islands in the Pacific north of the Equator, and then passed to the German colonies in Africa. The next day China was called upon for her statement. Dr. Ku, the Chinese minister to the United States, spoke on behalf of the Chinese delegation, made a very clear and forcible statement in behalf of China's claim to have these rights handed directly to China, and then Baron Makino arose and said that this matter really had been already arranged for between China and Japan by the con- vention of 1915, in which China had agreed that she would abide by any arrangement made between Germany and herself with regard to the disposition of these rights in Shantung Province. He also re- ferred to the fact that there had been some agreements between China and Japan with regard to the railways m Shantung. President Wilson arose and asked if he meant that these agreements were to be put on the table, and he said yes; and then he corrected himself and said of course he would have first to consult his Government, but he thought there would be no objection to their being put on the table. The agreements to which he referred were those of last September with regard to the joint operation of the Shantung Railway by China and Japan and the tiu-ning over to Japan of the option which Ger- many had for building certain extensions of railways in the Province of Shantung. .Senator Hitchcock. What was that date? Prof. Williams. That was last September; I think September 24, 1918. Then the question rested for a good many weeks. On the 9th of April, or the 8th of April, I think it was, I received a telegram from the Shantung legislative assembly, the legislative assembly of the Province of Shantung, asking the delegation of the United States to use its good offices to have these rights which had been taken by Germany in Shantung transferred directly to China rather than to Japan. This telegram was signed not only by the officers of the Shantung legislative assembly, but by other prominent men, repre- sentatives of the educational association of China and the provincial chamber of commerce of Shantung. On receiving this telegram I wrote another memorandum. I for- got to say that in January I had prepared a memorandum on the whole question, which was sent to the commission, and this was sup- plemented later by another memorandum on the question of the rail- ways in Shantung. I do not remember the exact date of that; but on the 9th of April I prepared a memorandum calling attention to the fact that in our treaty with China of 1858 we were pledged to China to use our good offices in case any country acted unjustly toward China — that we would use our good offices to try to make an amicable adjustment. I called attention to this, and suggested that we ought to draw up a clause for the treaty which would provide for the transfer of these rights directly to China. This was sent to the commission, and the next day I received instructions to draw up such a clause and to con- sult with Dr. James Brown Scott of the American delegation, who was our international law expert. I did this, and saw Dr. Scott, I think it was the next day. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY* 621 Dr. Scott suggested as an alternative that instead of transferring the rights directly to China they might be transferred to the five powers, in trust for China. That that might be a compromise that ■would be satisfactory to Japan. ^This was discussed, but I do not know how much, Tjy the council. At any rate I heard nothing definite ilntU the 22d of April, in the evening, when I received a telephone message that the President would like to see me. I went up, and President Wilson was in conference with some one. I was waiting only a few moments, however. He came in and said that he wanted me to consult with the other far eastern experts of the British and French delegations as to which of two alternatives would be the least injurious to China, whether it would be less injurious to China to transfer to Japan ail the rights and privileges formerly enjoyed by Germany in the Province of Shantung, or to insist upon the execution of the convention of May 25, 1915. While in conversation with President Wilson he said to me that unfortunately the British and French were bound by certain engage- ments which they had entered into with Japan to support Japan's claim for the transfer of these rights to herself directly, and that Lloyd George said he was bound only to support the transfer of the rights enjoyed by Germany but no others — not the transfer of anything else; and he said that the war seemed to have been fought to establish the sanctity of treaties, and that while some treaties were unconscionable, at the same time it looked as though they would have to be observed. Senator Knox. Lloyd-George said this ? Prof. Williams. No; President Wilson said that to me. I said, "Well, Mr. President, do you think that a treaty which has been extorted from China by force and by threats of military opera- tion ought to have any binding force?" He said, "Well, perhaps the Japanese would not admit that it was obtained in that way." I suggested that the published documents seemed to indicate that it had been in that way, and he said, "Of course if the documents show it, then the Japanese would not deny it;" but he asked me, however, to go and consult these experts about the question which he had raised. I asked if I might suggest an alternative solution, and he said "certainly," and I suggested that we might adopt a blanket article in the treaty covering all German properties in China, saying that ■Germany renounced all rights and title to those government prop- erties in China and that they reverted automatically to China, but since the port of Tsingtao and the railways and mines in the Province of Shantung had been taken from Germany by Japan with the aid of Great Britain, and were now in the possession of Japan, that in so far as these government properties in Shantung were concerned they would be transferred to China by Japan within one year after the signing of the peace treaty. He said that he had not considered it from that angle, and would like me to write it out, which I promised to do. This was the 22d; the next day was the 23d. The next day there appeared in the papers the appeal which President Wilson made to :the Italian people with regard to Fiume and the Dalmatian coast, 622 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. which raised considerable stir in Paris; and on the 24th the far eastern expert for Great Britain and the far eastern expert for France and myself met and signed a statement which was sent to the council of three, President Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau, with a signed statement in which we said that in our opinion it would be less injurious to China to transfer all the rights formerly enjoyed by Germany in the Province of Shantung than it would be to insist upon the observance of the convention of 1915, and I told these two gentlemen representing the British and French delegates that I was going to send an independent statement trying to point out that neither alternative ought to be adopted; that we ought neither to insist upon the enforcement of the treaty of 1915 nor the transfer of these rights ; that I would make an argument against it. At first Mr. Macleay, of the British delegation, said that he would not be able to do anything in that line, but afterwards he changed his mind and he also sent a statement — I never saw it, and I do not know just what he said, but I believe it was along those lines — that we were not shut up to these alternatives. I sent a statement to President Wilson, in which I begged to call attention to this fact. I can not recall the argument wmch I made at the time, so that I can not say definitely what I said except that I must have pointed out that the convention of 1915 was extorted by force; that Japan had already two divisions of troops in China and had just transferred two more, and gave the Chinese Government 51 hours in which to reply to the ultimatum, failing which she would take such measuies as to her seemed desirable in the premises, and that therefore a convention of that sort did not seem to me to have any binding force. 1" mast have pointed that out, because afterwards — if you will allow me, 1 will quote a statement here. Just to return a moment to the interview with President Wilson of the day before, I asked President Wilson if the settlement proposed transferring these lights directly to Japan or insisting upon the execution of the convention of 1915, was not contrary to the fourteen points laid down as a basis of peace. He said unfortunately he did not think there was anything in the fomteen points that exactly covered the case. But on looking over the addresses of President Wilson and the statement made by Secretary Lansing to the German Government with regard to the bases of peace, I found this [reading]: The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government and by a large majority of the German Reichstag of the terms laid down by the President of the United States of America in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of Jan- uary, 1918, and in his subsequent addresses, justifies the President in making a frank and direct statement of his decision with regard to the communications of the German Government of the 8th and 12th of October, 1918. Now as to the subsequent addresses, although there is nothing directly bearing upon the question of the 14 points mentioned in the address of January 18, one of the subsequent addresses was that on the 4th of July at Washington's Tomb at Mount Vernon in which he said: No halfway decision is conceivable. These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must be conceded them before there can be peace. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 623 Then he mentions, one, "the destruction of any arbitrary power anywhere," and so on, and two is the one to which I want to call attention. [Reading :] The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned ,and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people ■which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery. I think it was in this memorandum to the President that I men- tioned this point. I can not say positively that it was in that or some other connection that I called attention to this statement and said that my imderstanding was that all the powers who entered into the agreement for the negotiation of peace after the armistice of November 11 practically accepted the bases of peace as laid down by the American Government and that this was one of the bases of Eeace, and that no exception, no reservation, had been made to this y any of the powers, by Great Britain, France, or Japan, although Great Britain did make reservations with regard to some other things, and that therefore it seemed to me that any prior arrangement such as these secret treaties between Great Britain and Japan and between France and Japan ought not to be held any longer in force because they were really abrogated by the acceptance of these bases of peace. Senator Johnson of California. Did you state that to the President or state it in the argument that you presented to him upon the subject ? Prof. Williams. That is my recollection; but, as I say, I am not absolutely positive whether it was in a memorandum to the President or in an argument to the commission, but I stated it in one of the memoranda. Senator Johnson of California. In either one or the other ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Was there any response given you in that regard ? Prof. Williams. I received only a note from the President's secre- tary thanking me for the memorandum. Senator Johnson of California. Proceed, then, Doctor. After you had reached a certain date Prof. Williams. On the 24th of April and on the 30th of April I was iiiormed that the question had been decided; it had been deter- mined to transfer all the property formerly belonging to Germany and all the rights and privileges belonging to Germany in the Province of Shantung unconditionally to Japan. Senator Johnson of California. Did you have any further connec- tion with the matter ? Prof. Williams. No; nothing further. Well, perhaps I may say that I did have a conference — no; it was before this statement that I had a conference. Senator Johnson of California. Was there any other expert upon oriental or far eastern affairs at Paris with you ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Who was that ? Prof. Williams. Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck. Senator Johnson of California. Did his views coincide with yours ? Prof. Williams. Entirely. 624 TBEATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Johnson of California. Did you and he tmite in any other protest than that stated in your memorandum? Prof. Williams. I think we did. We sent at different times a great many memoranda on various phases of the question between China and Japan, in which we united. I can not definitely say when they were and what they were. Senator Johnson of California. You mean united in opposition to the position taken ? Prof. Williams. No. We did not make any report after the decision was rendered. We made no protest after the decision was rendered. Senator Johnson of California. Up to the time of the rendition of the decision, you had protested against such a determination ? Prof. Williams. Yes; we had objected very strongly to the sug- gested transfer of these properties. Senator Johnson of California. Can you explain any more fully the reasons of your position and of your protest of the particular decision regarding Shantung? In yom- opinion has it violated the 14 points of the basis of peace? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. What effect in your opinion does the decision have upon China or our relations with China ? Prof. Williams. Well, I felt that it would raise a storm of protest in China and it was tending to strife rather than peace, because I knew or felt sure that the Chinese would not submit to it without considerable protest, and that there was danger of violence. Also I felt that it was injurious to our interests, though I think that is a matter of secondary consideration. Senator Williams. Injurious to what? Prof. Williams. To our own interest in China, because it would raise a feeling that China had come into the war on the invitation of the United States and rather looked to the United States to help bring about a just settlement of these troubles, and that now in turn- ing over the whole situation to Japan, we were really iajuring our own standing in the Far East. Senator Johnson of California. When did you cease your connec- tion with the peace conference in Paris, doctor? Prof. Williams. The 17th of May. Senator Johnson of California. Was that due to any particular reason ? Prof. Williams. No; I had already engaged my passage some six weeks before, and before this question was decided, because my leave of absence was about to expire. I would have come home in any case. Senator Johnson of California. Are you familiar with the pro- visions inserted in the treaty concerning the disposition of Sh^tung? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Will you state whether or not in your opinion those provisions give more to Japan than either the con- vention of 1915 or the succession to the German lease? Prof. Williams. Well, I think they do. I am not quite certain whether the clause of the treaty makes any reference to the leasing of the railway. Does it ? Senator Johnson of California. I think not. I will show that to * you, however. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 625 Senator Hitohoook. May I ask a question there ? Senator Johnson of California. Surely. Senator Hitchcock. In the treaty Japan gets nothiag except what Germany gives, does it? No other power transfers anything to Japan ? Prof. Williams. No. Senator Hitchcock. So it is only what Germany had that Japan gets? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. I notice that specifically you did not mention sovereignty. You mention only rights and interests ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Sections 156 and 157 are the sections of the treaty relating to the matter, I think. Prof. Williams. Well, whether she got any more than Germany fossessed depends somewhat on the status of the railway in Shantung, t has been held by some of the Japanese experts that the railway in Shantung was German Government property and by other Japanese experts that the railway in Shantung was not government property but belonged to a Sino-German corporation; so that this transfer of the railway to Japan would seem to be a transfer to government ownership of a railway which really was constructed by a Sino- German corporation, and in my opinion it was a private corporation. It did not belong to the government. Senator McCxjmbee. Germany could not renounce to Japan any- thing that Germany did not own, could she ? Prof. Williams. Quite so. Senator McCumbee. Therefore all that Japan could obtain from Germany by this renunciation would be the Gferman rights ? Prof. "Williams. Quite so. Senator McCumbek. And nothing further ? Prof. Williams. Yes. But I might point out that Japan, in order to safeguard herself on this point, last September entered into a secret convention with the Chinese Government in which China agreed that the operation of the railway in Shantimg should be made a joint Chinese-Japanese concern. Senator McCumbee. What we were considering is what this treaty does. Prof. Williams. Quite so. Senator Hitchcock. Was this arrangement between Japan and China in September, 1918, also made under duress? Prof. Williams. Not exactly, and yet it was. I will tell you the circumstances. After Japan took Tsingtao, in fact, before she took Tsingtao, she took the railway not only in the leased territory but the whole length of the railway clear up to the capital of the Province of Shantung. That railway had never been policed by the Germans. No German troops had ever been there. It was under the protection of the Chinese and had been policed by them. But the Japanese took the railway for 254 mUes outside the leased territory, and after they had taken the railway they began to establish civil governments along at the stations. The Chinese, particularly the people of Shantung, protested strongly against the usurpation of sovereign rights in Shantung, and the protest was so strong that the Chinese Government, last Septem- 626 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMASTY. ■ ber, in order to get rid of the troops and the civil governments, entered into this agreement that they would make the railway a Sino-Japanese concern, and that Japan was immediately to with- draw all her troops except a small guard at Tsinan, which is the capi- tal of the Province, and was to abolish the civil government along the line. The Chairman. Has she done that ? Prof. Williams. I do not know whether she has or not. Senator HiTcficocK. Has China ever denounced these treaties of 1915 and the agreement of 1918? Prof. Williams. Well, when she signed them it was under not exactly formal protest, but she made objection at the time. Senator Hitchcock. You spoke of the German acquisition of the 99-year lease and other rights in Shantung Province as an act of piracy. Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. Was it any different from other acquisitions by Great Britain and France in China ? Prof. Williams. Yes; I think it was. It is true that Great Britain acquired territory, the Island of Hongkong, and Kowloon opposite, but it was the result of war, for which China of course was blamed, and in this particular case the Germans had had two mis- sionaries murdered in 1897 in a smaU vOlage in southwest Shantung, not because they were missionaries, not because they were Germans, but because these robbers robbed the whole vUlage, robbed the Chin- ese as well as the foreigners, and these tw.o unfortunate Germans were killed. Immediately the Germans landed marines and threw out the Chinese Government and took possession of the ports and held them until they obtained satisfaction for the murder, and com- pensation to the families of the murdered men, and the erection of two chapels in Shantung, and then they demanded the lease for 99 years of the port. Senator Hitchcock. That was in 1898 that that was consimi- mated ? Prof. Williams. Yes; March, 1898. Senator Hitchcock. Was that acquiesced in by the nations of the world ? Prof. Williams. I do not know whether they made any formal protest, but it was that which led to the action of Secretary Hay asking for the guaranty of the open door. I beg your pardon, may I say one thing further, that when Ger- many seized this, it seemed to be acquiesced in by certain other powers because immediately Russia demanded the lease of Dalny and Port Arthur, and Great Britain demanded the extension of Kowloon, and the French demanded the lease of Kuangchouwan. Senator Hitchcock. Did the others protest these concessions ? Prof. Williams. China did. Senator Hitchcock. But you regard this acquisition as more extreme, and as you term it, an act of piracy and an imposition on the Chinese Government ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. Now you say that in 1858 we made a treaty with China in which we agreed to use our good offices in case of a power attempting to impose upon China. Can you state what we did about it ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 627 Prof. Williams. We did not do anything so far as I know. Senator Hitchcock. We acquiesced in it ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. This note that you spoke of from Mr. Hay contained many compUmentary and congratulatory phrases to Von Bulow, the German minister, for the manner in which Germany was undertaking to administer the Province, did it not ? Prof. Williams. T do not know that it referred to the administrar tion of the Province. I can not recall just what it did say. Senator Hitchcock. That was in 1899, as I recall it, when he com- mended the German Government in Prof. Williams. In protecting their own citizens. Senator Hitchcock. No ; the method and means Germany adopted with respect to the treatment of other nations, administering cus- toms Prof. Williams. And making it an open door. Senator Hitchcock. So that it really was an acquiescence in what Germany had done, and what you describe as an act of piracy. Senator McCumber. Has that treaty of 1858 ever been put into any kind of practical application ? Prof. Williams. Not to my knowledge. Senator McCumber. Has China ever made any request to us to exercise our good offices to protect her against the acquisition of these concessions by other governments ? Prof. Williams. I do not recall any. Senator McCumber. When Germany took possession of Kia;ochow and obtained her rights in the Shantung Peninsula, did China ever request this Government to intervene in any way? Prof. Williams. Not that I kaow of. Senator McCumber. And this Government never has intervened in any of those matters or extended to China her good offices to protect her against that. Prof. Williams. I do not recall any such action. Senator Knox. Doctor, do you not recall that while you were in the State Department there were certain concessions that Japan demanded of China of a monopolistic character, and China appealed to us and we did intervene and secured modifications of them ? Senator McCumber. Did they do that. Senator, under the pro- visions of the treaty of 1858, or did they even refer to that treaty? Senator Knox. 1 do not recall whether they referred to the treaty, but China asked of us our good offices to relieve her of the burden of these monopolistic concessions, and we did intervene and did secure a very decided modification. Senator McCumber. She did not base her request, however, on the treaty of 1858. Senator Knox. I do not recall that. I do not see any other ground on which she could ask for Jt. Senator McCumber. I wanted to know if tha,t treaty had fallen by the wayside or whether it was considered a live treaty. Prof. Williams. After the occupation of Kiaochow by Germany and the signing of the convention by which she obtained not only the lease of that territory but certain economic rights in the Province of Shantung, we made a reservation, if I remember rightly, of our own rights in the case. 628 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Knox. And we put an interpretation upon the lease that released it from a monopolistic character, in which Japan acquiesced. Is not that correct? Prof. Williams. I think so. I do not remember the details. Senator McCumber. But we did nothing in regard to the very- much greater and more serious menace to China in the matter of the seizure by Germany of Kiaochow. Prof. Williams. Apparently not. Senator McCumber. May I ask one other question right here ? If I understood you correctly, in your conversation with the President, the President made some reference at least to Japan turning the Kiaochow territory over to China within one year after the signing of the treaty. Would you kindly repeat what you said ? Prof. Williams. That was my own suggestion, as a compromise, that, if Japan wanted these rights transferred directly to her and China wanted them transferred directly to herself, possibly we might introduce into the treaty a simple blanket clause that all government propertv formerly belonging to Germany in the Republic of China should he renounced by Germany and should revert automatically to China; but with this qualification, that since the properties in Shantung had been taken by Japan and were now in the possession of Japan, they should be transferred to China by Japan within a year after the signature of this treaty. Senator McCumber. What did the President say to that ? Prof. Williams. He said that he had not thought of it particularly from that angle and asked me to write it out, and I embodied that in the memorandum which I sent to him the next day. Senator McCumber. Did you ever have any further talk with the President with reference to that ? Prof. Williams. No. Senator McCumber. Do you know of any conversations between the President and the Japanese representatives in reference to the return of the German rights to China ? Prof. Williams. I do not, I know that there were such conver- sations, but I was not present, and I do not know what was said. Senator Brandegee. May I ask the professor a question? I was called from the room on business, and you may have answered this. If you have, just to say so and I will withdraw it. As I recall it, the President in his interview with the members of the Foreign Relations Committee the other day stated that he had implicit confidence in the agreement or promise that Japan had given to return these rights or concessions, whatever the}' may be, which she gets under the treaty, to China. Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Brandegee. Have you stated in your testimony exactly what that agreement made by Japan consisted of ? Prof. Williams. No; I have not. Senator Brandegee. Would you be kind enough to tell us whether it was a verbal statement between the other representatives, and which ones, and whether it appears at length in the proc^s-verbal; whether it is accessible to anybody so that they can see in what terms it was couched ? Prof. Williams. Well, you mean of a promise that Japan made in Paris ? Senator Brandegee. Yes, sir. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 629 Prof. Williams. I do not know. I do not know whether she has made anything more than a statement that her agreement of 1915 would be carried out, and that to state it in the treaty would be a reflection upon her bona fides. Therefore, it is not stated in the treaty. Senator Beandegee. So far as you know, was there any assurance given by any representative of Japan in Paris, either to the con- ference or any member of the American Commission, in addition to what was contained in the treaty promise ? Prof. Williams. I only remember one case. I suppose that some- thing of the sort may have been said in the council meeting. That I do not know. But I do remember an interview between Viscount Chinda and Secretary Lansing, in which Viscount Chinda said that the convention of 1915 must be carried out exactly, and of coiirse that convention of 1915 has annexed to it, you remember, an exchange of notes in which Japan agrees upon four conditions to transfer the leased territory to China, Senator Brandegee. I have seen in the newspapers, I think, state- ments to the effect that representations had very recently been made by Japan or some of its spokesmen to the effect that while they would get out, they would name no time when they would get out, and that, and the conditions of their getting out, and the terms of their getting out, were to be decided by agreement to be made at some time in the future between Japan and China. Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Brandegee. Was that correct? Prof. Williams. I do not know. I saw the report, myself. But the four conditions of transfer, you will remember, were these. The lease only covered the waters of the bay up to high-water mark and two little points at the mouth of the bay. That was all that was contained m the lease. The first condition was that the waters of the bay should be thrown open to international trade — the whole area of the leased territory. The second condition was that Japan should have, somewhere within the leased territory, a concession for a settlement under her exclusive jurisdiction. The third condition was that if the other powers wanted an inter- national settlement, they should have it elsewhere on the bay. The fourth condition was that the disposition of the government properties in Tsingtao should be settled by agreement between Japan and China; and of course the fourth condition has already been settled by the treaty, which transfers all these properties directly to Japan. Senator Brandegee. What is the extent of Kiaochow Bay? If I get your idea, there are two points on opposite sides of the curve, and then there is a zone of the waters of the bay up to high-water mark How much area, in square miles, would be contained within those limits, in the bay ? Prof. Williams. I do not recall the number of square miles. Senator Brandegee. I do not want you to be exactly accurate, of course, but give us some idea. Prof. Williams. The bay is horseshoe-shaped, and it is about 15 miles from the mouth of the bay to high-water mark on the opposite side of the bay. Senator Brandegee. What is the width of the bay ? 630 TEE AT Y OF PEACE WITH GEKMANY. Prof. Williams. About the same. I do not remember exactly. The point on the other side of the bay is very small. The water is very shallow there. There is a bathing beach there. The point on the right is a little larger, and there has been, from ancient- times, a little village there called Tsingtao, which means green island, and that has now grown into a beautiful city. The Germans have built a beautiful city there; they have built docks and wharves and dredged. Senator Brandegee. Let me ask you this, and it is all that I care to ask: If it be true that Japan has agreed to get out only in accord- ance with such conditions as she may agree upon with China, does it not leave it practically within the sole power of Japan to get out or to stay on ? That is, can she not refuse to agree with China and con- tinue to stay on the ground that China is unreasonable about the conditions, and that the treaty provides that she need not get out until they have agreed on conditions ? Prof. Williams. Well, they have practically agreed, you see, in this convention of 1915; but China's position was that that treaty was no longer binding, not only because it was forced upon her, but because, after entering into this convention, China herself declared war upon Germany and abrogated all her treaties with Germany, including this lease of Eaaochow. Therefore, there was not any- thing to be discussed between Japan and Germany. Senator Brandegee. Have you any idea, from your knowledge and experience of the situation there, why it is that Japan declines to name a definite day — even a remote day — when she will get out ? Prof. Williams. I should say probably it was because of the atti- tude of China in refusing to sign the treaty. Senator Knox. May I ask you a question here ? Having reference to the topography of the bay and the surrounding country and the Eeninsula, generally, what relation do these German rights that have een transferred to Japan have, economically and politically, to the entire peninsula and to China, generally? Prof! Williams. The lease — or the convention, rather — of March, 1898, not only transferred, or gave Germany a lease of, the bay and territory, but also the right to construct railway's in the Province of Shantung, and to operate certain mines there; and also an option on all public works that might require foreign capital or skilled labor. These now have passed to Japan, so that she not only has Tsingtao, but she has the right to operate these mines; and she also has the option on aU public works in the Province of Shantung. Senator Knox. What relation does that give her to the economic conditions in Shantung ? Prof. Williams. It practically controls the economic conditions of Shantung. Senator Knox. And what relation does it have to the great outlet to the northwest ? Prof. Williams. It is very important, because Kiaochow Bay is the best bay on the Chinese coast north of the Yangtse River, and bv the railway which is already completed to Tsinan it connects with the main line to Peking and by tne extension of that railroad will connect with the other railway from Hangkow to Peking, and by another extension which has been agreed to it will connect with the proposed grand-trunk line the building of which was granted as a TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GEKMANT. 631 concession to Belgium and which is to extend from the seacoast far up into northwestern China towards Turkestan, so that they can practically make it an outlet for all the trade of northern China, and not only the trade, but it also taps the coal fields not only of Shantung but of Shansi, one of the largest fields in the world. Senator Williams. This railway you are referring to from Tsing- tao, or whatever it is, was that a State railway or was it built and owned by a German corporation ? Prof. Williams. As I stated awhile ago, that is a matter of dispute. My own opinion is that it belonged to a private corporation, but it is stated that it was a State-owned railway. Senator Williams. I notice that the language in the treaty is "all German rights in the Tsingtau-Tsinanfu Railway." That would include not only German State rights but German corporation rights, whichever they happened to be, would it, or would it not ? Prof. Williams. 1 should not think so. I should not think that the German Government could transfer private rights. Senator Williams. According to your interpretation that would refer only to German State rights ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Williams. If that is the case, and that is all that Germany had, that was all she could give, was it not ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Williams. I notice down below, when we come to sub- marine cables, it uses the language "German State submarine cables," instead of saying "German rights in submarine cables." Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Williams. Do you know how that distinction happened to be made in the language of the treaty ? Prof. Williams. I do not. Senator Williams. I notice stUl further down, in article 157, the language, "the movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the territory of Eaaochow.' Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Williams. I notice about this entire matter here in articles 156 and 157, that the first clause in article 156 has the language "Germany renounces." The second clause transferred certain German rights in a railway. The next clause transferred certain German States cables. The next clause transferred certain "movable and immovable property owned by the German State." Prof. Williams. What about it« Senator Williams. Now, if your interpretation is correct, the second clause under article 156 means German State rights and not German corporation rights of various sorts; and then, of course, if there were no German State rights in the railway none would pass by this clause. But suppose it meant, contrary to your interpreta- tion, German corporation rights established under the German power and transferred over to Japan when she took possession and therefore become subject to her jurisdiction, just as alien property here taken over by us becomes subject to us — although subject, of course, to final treaty disposition. Now, coming down to where it is all taken together, could it be possible that this would mean any- thing except such rights as Germany already had, and could it be 632 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. affected by any change in the status quo by any action of the Japanese subsequent to taking them? Because I understood you to say that Japan has made certain assertions of right which Germany had not made, and they were afraid that those Japanese assertions of right would come in under this treaty. Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Williams. I understand how those Japanese assertions of right might come in under the treaty of 1915, if that was a proper interpretation, but I do not see how they would come in under any possiole interpretation of this treaty, if this treaty stood alone. Prof. Williams. I think you are right. Senator Williams. And as an agreement between us and Germany it does stand alone. Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Knox. When I yielded to Senator WUliams I had not finished my questions as to the topographical conditions, and I should like to recur to them. You spoke of the relative value of the harbor at Kiaochow. Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Knox. Is it correct that there is a permanent depth of water there that wiU allow the largest ships to come right to the docks ? Prof. Williams. Yes; but that, I think, is due to the dredging done by the Germans since they took possession. Senator Knox. It is a permanent improvement, however? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Knox. As compared with the remaining littoral of the bay, how is it as to water there ? Prof. Williams. It is the only place where there is a good depth of water. Wlien you go farther up the bay the water is very shallow and before any other settlement could be made there would have to be some further dredging. Senator Knox. And as compared, say, with the harbor at Shanghai, what is the relative value of the harbor of Kiaochow? Prof. Williams. It is very much more valuable than the harbor at Shanghai, because the large ocean-going steamers do not as a rule go up to' Shanghai unless they are first lightered. Shanghai is 14 miles up from the mouth of the river, and most of the large steamers anchor in the mouth of the river. So here at Kiaochow you have a very much more advantageous port, because the largest ocean-going steamer can go alongside the wharf. Senatoi Knox. So that in effect the possession and control of the harbor at Kiaochow is the mouth, or the inlet, of the great trans- portation lines that lead not only up through the peninsula itself but on to Peking and then on to the northwest. Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Knox. That is all I wanted to ask. Senator Harding. Before you get away from the inquiry made by Senator Williams, is it your understanding that the language em- ployed in the relinquishment and transfer ot rights was suggested by the Japanese commissioners. Prof. Williams. I do not know. Senator McCumber. I should like to ask Prof. Williams a question about the treaty, if the Senator from Ohio has concluded. TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. 638 Senator Harding. I am through. Senator McCumbee. The Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Brande- gee) in his question suggested, at least as I understood him, that there was a provision in the treaty between Japan and China whereby Japan agrees to restore Kiaochow Bay on certain conditions, and those conditions were to be agreed upon between China and Japan. Are there any conditions that are to be agreed upon by China and Japan as a condition precedent to the transfer of Kiaochow Bay, either in the treaty or in the note ? Prof. Williams. There is none in the convention of 1915 or the note. The conditions are expressly stated. They are not reserved to be made thereafter. Senator McCximber. I wish to call attention to that. That is, the very first proposition is this: When after termination of the present war the leased territory on Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the free disposition of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China under the following conditions Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator McCumber. The first condition is simply this : 1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a commercial port. Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator McCumber. The only condition there is that when it is returned it is to be opened as a commercial port ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator McCuiwber. And that means for the commerce of all nations ? Prof. Williams. Yes ; that is all. Senator McCximber. There is no string whatever tied to that? Prof. Williams. No. Senator McCumber. Let us come back, then, to the first propo- sition : _ When after termination of the present war the leased territory on Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China. "After termination of the present war" would naturally be con- strued to mean immediately after, would it not ? Prof. Williams. I shovdd think it would require the ratification of the treaty before it could be terminated. Senator McCumber. That would be the termination of the war by the ratification of the treaty. Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator McCumber. Then your construction of the treaty would be that it would be the duty of Japan to proceed immediately — that is, within a reasonable time — to retransfer the rights she obtained from Germany in Kiaochow Bay to China ? Prof. Williams. Only the lease. Senator McCumber. Yes; the rights that she obtained; and the ri^ts were those of a lessee only. Prof. Williams. That, of course, does not carry with it the rail- way and mining rights. Senator McCumber. No; those are dealt with under other sub- divisions. 634 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY, Prof. Williams. And I want to say right here that I have not the slightest doubt that Japan will, when the war is ended, carry out her promise; but that the promise is wholly unsatisfactory, because while she is to transfer to China the lease, which has yet 78 years to run, she obtains a perpetual concession on the port, so that there is nothing of any consequence handed back. Senator MoCumber. What is thafe concession, that she obtains at the port? I am asking you for information on this, because the second proposition to me is very much clouded. Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator McCumber (reading) : Second, a concession under the exclusive jurisdication of Japan, to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government. That signifies nothing to me, because I do not know what is meant by it, and I would like to have your view of it. Prof. Williams. In the Far East, especially in China, the word ^'concession" has a very definite meaning. For instance, there is in Shanghai a French concession where there is a French settlement. There is no limit to the lease. It is indeterminate. There is also an international settlement there which includes the former British concession, and territory which was offered to the United States for an American concession. Then at Canton there are two concessions, a British and a French concession. At Tientsin there are several concessions; there are, altogether, nine, I believe. Senator McCumber. They are concessions covering what territory? Prof. Williams. Covering territory for the residence and trade of the citizens, I suppose, of the power concerned. Senator McCumber. In each instance they would cover how many acres or square miles, or whatever territorial unit you desire to use ? Prof. Williams. In Shanghai — ^perhaps that is not a good illus- tration, but I can use it — the French concession at Shanghai is about four miles long by perhaps on an average a mUe wide; about 4 square miles. Senator McCumber. It can be used for what purpose? Prof. Williams. For the residence of French and other foreign nationalities, and for their trade. There is a French municipality there. Senator McCumber. Then your view is that the concession men- tioned in subdivision No. 2 of the note, is a concession similar to that granted to the other powers? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator McCumber. That is, a place for the residence of Japanese for the purpose of trade ? Prof. Williams. Yes; quite so. Senator Borah. Senator, may I ask a question right there? Senator McCumber. Certainly. Senator Borah. You speak of this concession as a place of residence and trade and so forth. To what extent does that exclude the Chinese from control over that particular territory ? Have they any say with regard to the policing of it, or the administration of the laws of the country over it, and so forth ? Prof. W^iLLiAMS. We have three varieties of concessions in China. There are those like Shanghai, which are policed entirely by the TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 635 foreign municipality, having foreign policemen. There are others which are open to China herself, which are policed by China. In this case this is to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan, and pre- sumably the policing would be by the Japanese. Senator Borah. Then to all intents and purposes — that is, as a practical proposition — the Chinese would be excluded entirely from that territory ? Prof. Williams. No. Originally that was the meaning of these concessions. When they first opened up five ports for foreign resi- dents they did not allow the Chinese to reside in the concessions; but during the Taiping rebellion there was such disorder in those settle- ments that the Chinese were allowed to crowd into those concessions for protection, and since that they have lived in the foreign conces- sions, under foreign control, and they can go in there. Senator Bokah. In some of these concessions under the jurisdiction of foreign Governments, have you not heard of places where there are signs in the parks, "Chinese and dogs not admitted here" ? Prof. Williams. Yes; that used to be a sign in the park at Shanghai. Senator McCumbee. The concession will be the same, you under- stand, as is granted to these other great nations ? Prof. Williams. Yes, except that it specifies particularly that it is under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan. Senator McCuMBER. Yes, I understand; and the same as Great Britain and France have exclusive jurisdiction over certain territory within the confines of their concessions. Prof. Williams. In these concessions, as a rule, the foreign resi- dents have a vote if they pay a certain amount of tax, whether they are citizens of the nationality owning the concession or not. They have votes in the election of the council. Senator Williams. Senator, are you through?- Senator McCumber. Yes. Senator Williams. Going back to the question I was interrogating you upon when I quit, was this Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway built with money out of the German treasury, or was it buUt with German capitalists' money? Prof. Williams. It is supposed to have been built with money subscribed by German capitalists and Chinese capitalists. Senator Williams. It was, then, built by the joint capital of both countries ? Prof. Williams. Yes; but there is very little Chinese capital in it. Senator Willlams. That is what I thought. Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Williams. So that this railway owes its existence to the men whoput up the money and paid for it ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Williams. That being the case, independent of the ques- tion as to who should guarantee them their property rights, or who cshould secure them finally, somebody ought to do so, do you not think so ? , ■ q Prof. Williams. Do you mean to guarantee their interest ? Senator Williams. Yes; their capital property rights to the rail- ways built with their own money. , . , Prof. Williams. No doubt that will be adjusted m the end, and ^hey wiU recover. 636 TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMAliTT. Senator Williams. I just wanted to get into the record the idea that under any aspect of it, either yours or mine or that of anybody else, ought these people who put up the money to build the railroad to be robbed of their money ? Prof. Williams. Certainly not. Senator McCumber. Then, Dr. Williams, it is your belief that Japan will carry out the provisions in the treaty and notes with China ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator McCumber. In other words, that Japan will retransfer the whole of Kiaochow Bay to China, to be opened as a commercial port ? You think that will be done ? Prof. Williams. Yes; reserving, of course, her own settlements — her own concessions. Senator McCumber. Yes; but I am speaking of that part of it. Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator McCumber. The only thing, then, that will be left which you think is not just to China is that Japan will ask for this concession, and insist upon this concession of a few square miles for a place of residence for her citizens, the same as has been granted to the other great nations of Europe ? Prof. Williams. Quite so. Senator Borah. Who says it will be a few square rnUes ? How do you know it will be a few square miles ? Prof. Williams. Well, the whole leased territory is not very large, and this concession is to be at some point within the leased territory, so that it can not be very large. Senator Borah. It may be all there is of it, may it not ? Prof. Williams. It will undoubtedly be all the port of Kiaochow, because as you" see the Treaty transfers all the public property there to Japan, and most of it is public property. Senator McCumber. Will it be any greater than that which other countries hold there? Prof. Williams. Hold at other ports ? Senator McCumber. Yes. Prof. Williams. No. Senator Johnson of California. Other countries do not hold any concession at Kiaochow, do they 1 Prof. Williams. Not at Kiaochow, but in other parts of China. Senator McCumber. But they hold them at other ports. Senator Johnson of California. You said, "there." Senator McCumber. When I said "there" I meant in China. Senator Moses. There is no question in the Chinese mind as to the point to be selected by the Japanese, is there? Prof. Williams. No doubt at all. Senator Moses. Have not the Japanese already begim buying up additional property near the town of Tsingtao ? Prof. Williams. Yes; they have expropriated a large piece of property back of the town clear across tne peninsula, iuthough the peasants were unwilling to sell, they compelled them to dispose of the property to them. , Senator Williams. How far does that run back ? Prof. Williams. I do not know. Not very far. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GBKMANY. 637 Senator Moses. And it is at that point, is it not, that all the wharves and public property and the cable landing are 1 Prof. Williams. They are in Tsingtao, yes; and the railway termi- nal is there also. Senator Moses. All that property is transferred by the terms of the treaty from Germany to Japan without charges, is it not ? Prof. Williams. Yes, without charges. Senator Moses. Including certain specified cables ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Moses. And in that respect that property is segregated under the terms of the treaty from all other German property, is it not? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Moses. All other German property by the terms of the treaty is put into a pool for the benefit oi the allied powers. Prof. Williams. That is so. Senator Moses. While these specified properties are taken out and delivered directly to Japan without charges of any character 1 Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Moses. There was a cable commission in the organization of the peace conference, was there not ? Prof. Williams. Yes; there was. Senator Moses. Did that cable commission recommend the segre- gation of these particular cable properties? Prof. Williams. Not that I know of. I understood that all cables were to go into a pool. Senator Moses. Do you know the reason why these cables were excepted ? Prof. Williams. None except that Japan wanted them. Senator Moses. Was Japan insistent upon that point? Prof. Williams. That I do not know. Senator Moses. You spoke. Doctor, of a meeting of the conference held on January 28. Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Moses. At which you stated also that the general subject of consideration ^\•as the disposition of the German colonies. Prof. Williams. That was on the 27th. Senator Moses. Specifying particularly the islands north of the Equator and the German possessions ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Moses. Was it then made known that prior arrangements had been entered into for the disposition of those properties ? Prof. Williams. I should have said the islands of the Pacific, not simply those north of the Equator. Senator Moses. Was it stated at that meeting of the conference that prior arrangements had been definitely made ? Prof. Williams. No; I do not think it was stated in the conference. I do not recollect hearing it there, but I had heard of it before that. Senator Moses. That was the fact, however. Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Moses. There was also a provision with respect to direct negotiations between Germany and Japan in the disposition of the Kiaochow property, was there not ? Prof. Williams. Yes. 638 TREATY OF PEACE "WITH GERMANY. Senator Moses. Were any such direct negotiations ever had, to your knowledge ? Prof. Williams. Not. to my knowledge. Senator Moses. Were any negotiations ever had except such as were had by the council of four ? Prof. Williams. I do not understand the question. Senator Moses. In other words, the council of four having reached a determination of what should be done with those properties, notified Germany of their decision, did they not ? Prof. Williams. I do not think so, except that Germany was notified when she received the treaty. Senator Moses. I mean when she received the treaty. Prof. Williams. Yes; that is correct. wSenator Moses. Did you ever see the letter lodged with the Presi- dent by certain members of the American peace commission with reference to the Shantung matter ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Moses. Are you familiar with its contents? Prof. Williams. I could not quote it. I only know in a general way that it was advising against the transfer of these German rights directly to Japan. Senator Moses. Did they suggest an alternative ? Prof. Williams. I do not remember that they did. Senator Moses. Was the protest emphatic ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Moses. Upon what ground ? Prof. Williams. I should hardly call it a protest. It was an argument against the proposed disposition of those properties. I can not recall the argument now. Senator Moses. Was it an argument of some length ? Prof. Williams. Yes; it was I should think about three pages of t3rpewriting. Senator Moses. Was the communication wholly argumentative in its tone ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Moses. The President told us the other day that it was not an argument, that it was an assertion. Prof. Williams. Well, that might be a difference of opinion. It seemed to me to be an argument. Senator Johnson of California. Substantially what was it, Doctor? Prof. Williams. I can not recall it, Senator. Senator Johnson of California. Who were the signatories to it? Prof. Williams. Gen. Bliss. Senator Johnson of California. Did you participate in the prepa- ration of that particular document, argument, protest, or whatever you term it? Prof. Williams. Well, Senator, Gen. Bliss asked me to come to his office one evening and he read me an outline of it and asked me what I thought of it, and I told him I thought it was very good, and he asked me if I had anything further to suggest, and I told him I would think it over; and in the morning I did suggest one item only. Senator Johnson of California. What was that ? Prof. Williams. That was that we ought to explain to the council what was meant by the restitution of the leased territory of Kiaochow. ' TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 639 What I meant was to call attention to the four conditions under which the restitution was to be made. Senator Johnson of California. You mean you thought it ought to explain to the council that the restitution of Kiaochow did not mean the restitution of Shantung ? Prof. Williams. Not only that, but that it did not mean the entire restitution of the port to China, because Japan would retain practical control of the port by having its concession there. Senator Johnson of California. Would she control the economic rights which she had in Shantung ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Therefore if she carried out her promise in full, and yet retained what you suggest she would retain, would she retain substantial control of Shantung Province ? Prof. Williams. Economic control, yes. Senator Johnson of California. Economic control would be sub- stantial control, would it not ? Prof. Williams. Well, of course the Chinese will be there in nominal political control. Senator Johnson of California. In nominal political control ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Do I understand from your answer to Senator Moses that these particular portions of the treaty regarding German property are drafted in a fashion different from the other provisions of the treaty regarding the disposition of German property ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. That the property here disposed of, instead of being put in a pool for the Allied and Associated Govern- ments, as in the disposition of other German properties, is given directly to Japan ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Is that correct ? Prof. Williams. Yes; that is correct. Senator Moses. May I ask one question right there ? Senator Johnson of California. Certainly. Senator Moses. These provisions of the treaty relating to Shan- tung were drafted by the Japanese drafting committee, were they not ? Prof. Williams. I do not know. Senator Johnson of California. Certainly our experts did not draft them, did they ? Prof. Williams. They did not. -Senator Johnson of California. Were they asked to draft them at any time ? Prof. Williams. Not this particular clause, but we did draft other clauses relating to German rights in China. Senator Johnson of California. In your opinion, whatever shall transpire in future respecting this matter, in relation to the carrying out of the promises that have been given to China, Japan will have virtual economic control of Shantung in any event, will she not ? Prof. Williams. I think so. Senator Hitchcock. Doctor, will you let me refer to two or three clauses in the treaty by which Japan cedes to China certain rights which she had theretofore enjoyed in China? I believe they begin at article 128. 640 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Prof. Williams. You mean certain rights which Germany en- joyed ? Senator Hitchcock. Certain rights which Germany cedes to China. Can you give an outhne of what those are ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Moses. May I ask relative to the value of those conces- sions as convpared with the concession made in Shantung ? Senator Hitchcock. Let the doctor state it in his own way. I am trying to get at how China benefits by that. Prof. Williams. Article 128 of the treaty reads as follows: Germany renounces in favor of China all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final protocol signed at Peking on September 7, 1901, and from all annexes, notes, and documents supplementary thereto. That refers to the German share of the Boxer indemnity and the right to maintain legation guards in Peking and along the railway between Peking and the sea; and a share of certain territories in the city of Peking which were set aside for legation purposes. Senator McCumber. That is one thing that China gets that Japan does not secure ? Prof. Williams. Oh, Japan does not get that, of course. Senator Knox. Japan still has her own share in the Boxer indemnity ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Moses. And she still has her own compound in Peking? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Hitchcock. Go on. Prof. Williams. The last sentence in article 128 reads: She likewise renounces in favor of China any claim to indemnities accruing there- under subsequent to March 14, 1917. That is, there will be no pa3niient to Germany of any balance of the Boxer indemnity after March 4, 1917. Senator Hitchcock. Can you state in a general way the benefits which China derives out of it ? Prof. Williams. Yes. I do not remember how much has been paid, but Germany's claim was about 90,000,000 taels, if I remember rightly, and on that there has been paid, of course, the interest and- amortization for some 12 or 13 years. I presume there must be 50,000,000 or 60,000,000 taels still outstanding. I do not know. Senator Johnson of California. How much is a tael ? Senator Williams. There is that much due still from China ? Prof. Williams. I think so. I am only guessing, because I can not make 'the calculation in my own mind. Senator Johnson of California. Do you know the value of the tael ? Prof. Williams. The tael at present is worth a little more than the gold dollar. Before the war it was worth about 70 cents gold. Senator Knox. What taels are those — haikwan taels ? Prof. Williams. Protocol taels, not ha^ikwan taels. Before the war the value of the tael was from 60 cents to 70 cents somewhere. Senator Hitchcock. Proceed with the next article. Prof. Williams. Article 129 reads: Prom the coming into force of the present treaty the high contracting parties shall apply, in so far as concerns them respectively: (1) The arrangement of August 29, 1902, regarding the new Chinese customs tariH. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 641 In 1902 there was a revision of the customs tariff, which was to bring it up to an effective 5 per cent ad valorem on the imports and exports. Senator Hitchcock. Can you assess what that amounts to or give any impression of the benefit derived ? Prof. Williams. I do not understand why that was put in. Senator Hitchcock. You will see immediately following it that Germany loses whatever advantage or privilege she had there, while the other nations retain it. Prof. Williams. It says: (2) Tie arrangement of. September 27, 1905, regarding Whang-Poo, and the pro- visional supplementary arrangement of April 4, 1912. Senator Hitchcock. Those were customs concessions to the nations of the world ? Prof. Williams. I have not finished the sentence: China, however, will no longer be bound to grant to Germany the advantages or privileges which she allowed to Germany under these arrangements. That is, Germany wiU not have the benefit of the most favored nation clause when it comes to paying duty on German goods going into China. China can make her own tariff arrangements. Germany can not have any share in the improvements of the Whangpoo River. Senator Hitchcock. Then, article 130. Prof. Williams. Article 130 reads: Subject to "the provisions of section 8 of this part, Germany cedes to China all the buildings, wharves, and pontoons, barracks, forts, arms and munitions of war, vessels of all kinds, wireless telegraphy installations, and other public property belonging to the German Governnaent, which are situated or may be in the German concessions at Tientsin and Hankow or elsewhere in Chinese territory. I do not think that the wharves and barracks belonging to Ger- many amount to a great deal, except that there are barracks in Peking for the accommodation of, say, 500 men, and possibly a similar barracks at Hankow. Senator Moses. The Peking barracks are for the legation guard? Prof. Williams. Yes; the Peking barracks are for the legation guard, but Germany is not to have a legation guard there any longer, and the other public property belonging to the German Government at Tientsin and Hankow — I do not know how much that is, but I do not think it is very much. Senator Hitchcock. Then article 131 speaks for itself? Prof. Williams. Yes; under article 131 Germany undertakes to restore to China within 12 months from the coming into force of the treaty all the astronomical instruments which her troops carried away from China in 1 900-1 90A. Senator Hitchcock. And in article 132 Germany agrees to the abrogation of the leases from the Chinese Government under which the German concessions at Hankow and Tientsin are now held ? Prof. Williams. Yes. There are. two German concessions in China, one at Tientsin, which is along the water front about a mile, I should think, in length, along the river and perhaps three-quarters of a mile in depth; i could not say exactly. At Hankow there is also a rather large concession. These are returned to China. Senator Hitchcock. Is there any considerable value to these concessions ? 135546—19 41 642 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Prof. Williams. Yes, they are valuable. Of course the property in them is mostly private property, but it will no longer be controlled by a German municipality. They will be under the Chinese municipal control and policing. Senator Hitchcock. China recovers her whole sovereign rights in these concessions ? Prof. Williams. Yes. The Chairman. This abrogation of Germany's right to the most favored nation treatment in the tariff would only benefit Germany's rivals in trade ? Prof. Williams. Yes; quite so. The Chairman. In the Chinese trade ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Brandegee. Professor, may I ask you a question ? Prof. Williams. Certainly. Senator Brandegee. You were advisor to the American commis- sion? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Brandegee. Did I understand you to say that you attended the meetings of the plenary council ? ■ Prof. Williams. No. Senator Brandegee. When you attended meetings of the Ameri- can commission you heard all that was said, did you not ? Prof. Williams. I did not attend any of the meetings of the American commission. I only attended five meetings of the council of ten and one meeting of the council of five. Senator Brandegee. On those occasions were you where you could hear all that went on ? Prof. Williams. Oh, yes, I could hear everything that went on. Senator Brandegee. If you had been a member of the American Commission, would you have voted to transfer Shantung to Japan? Prof. Williams. No. Senator Brandegee. What do you think would have been the result if we had refused to vote in favor of transferring Shantung to , Japan ? Prof. Williams. Well, of course it is very difficult to say what would have happened. The Japanese delegation in Paris probably would not have signed the treaty, and Great Britain and France felt that they were bound to support Japan's claim. It would haye been an impass6. What would have happened I can not say. Senator Brandegee. But what I want to get light upon is this: Although you think the result might have been an impass6, still you would not have voted to give Shantung to Japan ? Prof. Williams. No. Senator Brandegee. Do you think more damage would be done by giving Shantung to Japan than would have resulted if Japan had declined to sign the treaty ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator MoCumber. What do I understand you to mean by "returning Shantung to Japan?" Prof. Williams. I should not have said Shantung. I should have said the leased territory of Kiaochow. Senator McCumber. The Senator spoke of returning Shantung. Of course, aU there is in Shantung is simply the right to the railway, is it not ? TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 643 Prof. Williams. The rights to the railways, mines, and the option on all public works requiring foreign capital and skill. Senator Beandegee. I simply wanted to say. Professor, for your information and for the information of Senator McCumber as well, that when I spoke of transferring Shantung, I merely used a brief expression to indicate what was transferred. Prof. Williams. That is the way I took it. Senator Williams. Brief and comprehensive. Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator McCumber. In article 132 it says: China, restored to the full exercise of her sovereign rights in the above areas, declares her intention of opening them to international residence and trade. So that under article 132 Chiaa also grants to aU of the countries the right to obtain concessions at that point, does she not ? Prof. Williams. No. Senator McCumber. That is, places for international trade. Is not that included in the concession ? Prof. Williams. It means that those places will not be closed, as most Chinese cities and ports are, but that although they are taken over by China they remain open for foreign residence and trade. Senator McCumber. That foreigners may live there ? Prof. Williams. That foreigners may live there. Senator McCumber. And own property there ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator McCumber. The same as Japan might have a concession and ownproperty — — Prof. Williams. No; it is quite different. Senator McCumber. In Kiaochow Bay ? Prof. Williams. No; it is different from that. These concessions which have heretofore been administered by Germany in Hankow and Tientsin will now be administered by a Chinese municipality, but, unlike other Chinese cities, they wUl be open for the residence of Americans or Europeans. Senator McCumber. But it will be opened for trade ? Prof. Williams. Yes; opened for trade. Senator McCumber. It will have the same commercial rights here as Japan would obtain in Kiaochow Bay ? Prof. Williams. The same right to trade, but not the same control of the district. Senator Harding. Doctor, are you in any way familiar with the reaction in China as the result of this transfer of German rights to Japan ? Prof. Williams. I remember reading the telegrams, of course, that came immediately after the treaty was read before the plenary council on the 6th of May. Of course I was not present; but I was told by the Chinese that they made certain reservations protesting against the proposed transfer of these German rights at Kiaochow to Japan; but when the conference met the next day with the Germans to have the treaty signed the Chinese refused to sign. Immediately in Peking there was a great uproar, and a mob composed of several thousand students tried to march into the legation quarter to appeal to the American mmister and the British minister, but they were not allowed to enter the quarter, and they went to the home of Tsao Ju-lin who was the minister of communications, and burned his 644 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. house and beat him up, and also met the Chmese minister to Japan, who had signed the conventions of last September, and injured him very seriously. Then, shortly after that, there began throughout China an economic war, a boycott of Japanese trade. Senator Harding. I want to ask particularly about that. What do you know about the character and the extent of the Chinese economic boycott ? Prof. Williams. It is a very serious one if it lasts. We had some experience in 1904 when they boycotted us over the exclusion treaty, do you remember ? Senator Harding. Inasmuch as the impelling purpose of this treaty is the promotion of permanent peace of the world, do you regard the situation in China as a menace to that peace ? Prof. Williams. Yes; I think it is a .menace to peace. I think that so long as the question remains as it is there will be occasion for strife between the Japanese and the Chinese, and outbreaks like that which occurred a few days ago in Chang Chun in Manchuria, where a number of Chinese and Japanese were killed. Senator Harding. What likelihood is there in such development of our involvement ? Prof. Williams. There is no occasion for our being involved unless there should be an attack upon the territorial integrity of either power by some outside power. I suppose we would be involved in that case, under the league of nations, provided there is such a league of nations established, but I do not think that we would be involved otherwise. Senator Moses. Suppose there should be a general antiforeign movement in China and some of our nationals should be killed or their property destroyed ? Prof. Williams. Such antiforeign movements are very unhkely. The treatment of Europeans and Americans in China in the last 10 years has been above reproach, and they have been very careful not to attack foreigners. Senator Harding. Going back for a moment to the economic boycott, is it likely to extend to those who are parties to this treaty because they ignore Chinese rights ? Prof. Williams. There has been talk of that, but my experience with the boycott in China is that after a certain number of months the people get tired of it and the thing peters out. Senator Harding. You think, then, that that is only a temporary expression of Chinese resentment ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Of course, it may be more serious than I think, because China, of course, has undergone a great change in the last lew years. Since the republic has oeen estabhshed there is much more interest being taken in public affairs by the people gen- erally than before, and it may result in something much more serious than I think. Senator McCumber. One question, on another subject, I want to ;et the sentiment of the Chinese people with reference to our exclusion aw. Is there a feeling of resentment or enmity on account of that ? Prof. Williams. Almost none at aU. There has been, in the past, in the Province of Kwangtung, from which most of the Chinese laborers have come to the United States, but elsewhere there is no interest in it. Is TREATY or PEACE WITH GERMANY. 645 Senator McCumber. At the time of the passage of the act, there was considerable opposition to it ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator McCumber. And ill-feehng ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator McCtrMBEB. But you think that has gradually worn away ? Prof. Williams. Yes. I think that the people generally in China are very friendly in their feeling toward the United States, because they are trying to establish a republic and they feel that we are a sort of model for them. Senator Williams. Prof. Williams, can you make any offhand approximate estimate of the value of the general concessions at Kiaochow and Shantung which were demanded of China, under this treaty ? Prof. Williams. You mean the value of the real estate there ? Senator Williams. The value of the property of every description. Prof. Williams. No ; I could not give that. Senator Williams. The value mainly consists of a return of political Jurisdiction . Prof. Williams. That is right. Senator Williams. Do you know what the value is of the German ships which were seized in Chiaese waters? Prof. Williams. No; they seized six or eight German and several Austrian vessels, but I do not remember what the values are. Senator Williams. You do not know that? Prof. Williams. No. Senator Williams. You think that the balance due on the Boxer fund, due to Germany, which is released to China, comes to about $60,000,000 1 Prof. Williams. That is simply a guess. Senator Williams. I understand that is only an approximate esti- mate, as weU as you can make it offhand. Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Williams. I notice the phrase here, "international resi- dence." I suppose that means a place of residence of nationals of all the various parties to the treaty. It uses the phrase, "inter- national residence." Prof. Williams. That means that any foreigners who come to China may reside there. Senator Williams. Yes. It is a rather peculiar phrase — ^"inter- national residence." I suppose of course that is what it means. Senator Moses. Do you regard, Dx. Williams, that these provisions in article 128, were inserted as a quid pro quo for the cession of the Shantung Province to Japan ? Prof. Williams. No. • j. , Senator Moses. They were merely settlements growing out of the war, were they not ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Moses. There was no other country to which these pro- posed concessions could be returned except China, was there ? Prof. Williams. No; and in the early draft of the clause we included all German property in China. Senator Moses. Including Kiaochow? Prof. Williams. Yes. 646 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Moses. When you say "we," whom do you mean? Prof. Williams. The American experts. Senator Moses. And at the instance of Japan, Kiaochow was segregated from the others ? Prof. Williams. Yes. The Chaikman. Are there any further questions ? Senator Johnson of CaUfornia. Before you conclude let me ask what were your particular duties as expert at Paris ? Prof. Williams. My duties were of two sorts. As an expert on far eastern affairs, I prepared memoranda for the American commis- sion on any question that they might refer to us or on questions that came up in the correspondence with the commission. And secondly, I was there largely as a chief of the far eastern section of the Secretary of State, because a great deal of correspondence that came to the Department of State here with regard to the Far East was referred to Secretary Lansing in Paris, and all that correspondence had to pass through my hands, and I would bring the matter to his attention and draft replies and consult with him about the disposition of these questions. They were entirely independent of the commission. Senator Johnson of California. You were to advise as to what disposition should be made of various matters in the Far East ? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. And the most important matter that came to you was the Shantung matter ? Prof. Williams. Quite so. Senator Johnson of California. And on that your advice was not taken ? Prof. Williams. Quite so. Senator Johnson of California. Was there any other matter of any consequence there upon which your advice was asked ? Prof. Williams. Oh, yes; with regard to the settlement of the opium question and with regard to the disposition of German prop- erties elsewhere, outside of Shantung. Senator Johnson of California. Do you mean the islands of the Pacific ? Prof. Williams. The islands of the Pacific also. Senator Johnson of California. They were divided in accordance with a secret treaty, were they not? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. So far as your duties were con- cerned, they were superseded by the treaties that had been made prior to the peace conference? Prof. Williams. Not entirely, but practically so. Senator Williams. With regard to the islands? Senator Johnson of California. Not only the islands but Shantung. Senator Williams. Kiaochow. Prof. Williams. But it is Shantung, Senator. Senator Williams. It is a comprehensive term. Senator Johnson of California. The treaty says "Shantung," too. So far as the settlement of the Far East was concerned, on which you were the adviser and expert, the settlements were made subr stantiaUy in accordance with secret treaties that had been made during the progress of the war, and before our entrance into the war. Prof. Williams. Yes; quite so. The islands south of the Equator were not ceded to Japan, but she has been made mandatory. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEBMANY. 647 Senator Johnson of California. Which gives her control over the islands. ? Prof. Williams. Quite so. Senator Moses. You say she has been made mandatory? Prof. Williams. Yes. Senator Moses. I have been informed somewhere that no manda- tories have yet been issued. Prof. Williams. I am subject to correction, but I read a state- ment in the Paris papers in April that Japan was made mandatory temporarily. Senator Johnson of California. The statement has been made that Britain has those north of the Equator and Japan those south of the Equator. The Chairman. That is stated in the dispatch of the British ambassador at Tokyo. Senator Williams. The Senator is technically wrong. Since then it has been turned over to Australia and New Zealand. Prof. Williams. You are right. Senator Beandegee. May I ask you a question ? Have you any knowledge to what extent the opium traflftc has increased, if it ha* increased at all, since Japan has had the Shantung concession ? Prof. Williams. According to the statement of the Chinese who were at the peace conference, it increased tremendously during the three or four years of Japanese occupation of Tsingtao. I have a statement made by Liang Chi Chao, if you would care to hear it. Senator Beandegee. I would like to have it put into the record. Is he a competent authority? Prof. Williams. He is the greatest living Chinese scholar, and he was one of the men, in 1898, who was condemned to death but escaped to Japan, where he has many friends. The Chairman. You can put that in the record. (The statement referred to is here printed in full, as follows :) Coutraband opium and morphia became common articles; it has been estimated that no less than 12 tons of morphia and 65 tons of opium were smuggled into Shantung in 1918 alone. The Chairman. If there are no further questions, you can be ex- cused, Prof. Williams. Mr. Millard desires that a three-page memorandum that he has submitted modifying his testimony may be printed as part of his testimony. If there is no objection, that will be done. (Mr. Millard's memorandum is here printed in full, as follows:) Memorandum by Thomas F. Millard, Submitted August 20, 1919. "regional understandings" and the shantung decision. Definition of regional understandings.— Article 21 of the proposed covenant of the league of nations validates "regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine " which are in existence at the time the league is organized, and other such understandings made later that are approved by the league. Another article of the covenant provides that all members of the league must inform all the other members of any and all treaties, agreements, pacts, alliances, and regional understandings (or the article is presumed to have that meaning) that exist among members of the league, or between members of the league and nations not members of the league. '648 TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. A reading of the various articles of the covenant bearing on this phase of international relations under the league indicates that members of the league will have until a time after the formal organization of the league to make and to declare whatever regional understandings they have, and that such regional understandings thus formally de- clared to the league within that time shall be recognized as valid. A point has been advanced that only regional understandings which properly are "like the Monroe doctrine" will be made valid by article 21 of the covenant. Conditions affecting interpretation of article 21. — Only the Monroe doctrine is mentioned by name in article 21 as being a valid regional understanding under the terms of the covenant. But the language of the article expressly indicates that it is the purpose of the article to validate regional understandings other than the Monroe ■doctrine. ' It may be that subsequent to the organization of a league a question may be raised upon the presentation of some regional understanding, as to whether it is "like the Monroe doctrine. " If a difference of view develops on that point, it would be a question to be decided by the governing body of the league. The decision of the question in each particular case would depend on the alignment of votes in the gov- erning body of the league. For the purpose of the argument, let us assume, for instance, that after the American Government signs the treaty of peace and the covenant and an Anglo-French- American alliance in the present form of those treaties, the league is formally notified of a regional understanding covering Asia entered into mutually by the British, French, and Japanese Governments. Let us further assume that that regional understanding would be regarded by the American Government as not "like the Monroe doctrine," but, on the contrary, as being subversive of the principles of the Monroe doctrine, and as destructive of that -counterpart of the Monroe doctrine in Asia, the Hay doctrine. In that case, the American Government probably would enter objection to such an arrangement as being not in conformity with article 21. In such a case, it is probable that the British and French and Japanese Governments would take an opposite view of the meaning of article 21, whereupon the issue would depend on a vote of the governing body of the league. The constitution of the governing body of the league is such that it would be almost ■certain that the American Govermnent would be outvoted on such an issue. If it was held (and accepted) that the four powers directly involved in the dispute should be excluded from voting on the decision of it, and they were excluded, and the decision was left to the remaining members of the governing body, it also is practically -certain that the American Government would be outvoted, for these reasons: (a) There are known to exist more than twenty regional understandings about Asia, involving all the great powers except the United States. Also, it is suspected that several other regional understandings exist whose texts never have been disclosed. (6) Outside of Asia, there are many known and probably also many secret regional understandings in existence, involving all of the great powers except the United States, and also involving a majority of the lesser nations that are expected to be members of the league. . (c) That condition establishes a situation whereby almost all the members of the league except the United States have regional understandings which they may desire to make valid under the league. In that situation it is highly probable, and it certainly is possible, that the members having regional understandings which they want to sustain will combine to define article 21 as meaning to include regional understandings of whatever character that were made before the formal organization •of the league. The application to China and the Bay doctrine. — Even since the Paris conference met, there have been several distinct intimations of the purpose of' some of the prin- cipal powers to advance certain re^onal understandings about China as the basis for international action regarding China. In connection with the newly formed international (four-power) financial ^oup to operate in China, it already is reported that the Japanese Government will insist that Manchuria and Shantung will be excepted from the operations of the group, Japan reserving those regions for her exclusive economic exploitation. If the Japanese Government has developed, or subsequently does develop this atti- tude, it can be taken for certain that the British, French, and other Governments which have regional understandings about China based on the "sphere of influence" thesis will insist in maintaining their exclusive rights under those regional understandings. That would array three of the four members of the new financial group in opposition to the American member of the group, and, since the United States has no "sphere" TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 649 or any regional understanding regarding China or Asia, giving it any special privileges in any region, such a situation will be tantamount to excluding America, and will •defeat the announced purposes and objects of the banking group. Such a situation will effectively prevent any effort to relieve China of the " sphere " •condition, and will fasten it upon her more strongly than before. Note. — The statements of the President at his conference with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 19 positively demonstrated how the existence of secret regional understandings can compel, or induce, the American Government to yield on important questions. It, therefore, is possible that the American Government may find, after it has ratified the treaty, the covenant, and the proposed alliance, that new secret regional under- standings may thereafter be consummated which can be made valid under the league. P. S. — By this means, Jajjan may secure the "better means" to enforce her under- standing of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, and of her promises to return Shantung. The Chairman. The committee will stand adjourned until to- morrow at 11 o'clock, when it will meet in the committee room in the Capitol in executive session. (Thereupon, at 12.05 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned until to-morrow, Saturday, August 23, 1919, at 11 o'clock a. m.) MONDAY, ATTGtrSTI35, 1919. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 426, Senate Office Buildiag, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge presiding. Present: Senators Lodge (chairman), Borah, Brandegee, Knox, HardiQg, Johnson of California, New, Moses, Swanson, Pomerene, and Smith. STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH W. FOLK. The Chairman. Gov. Folk is here by appointment to bring to the attention of the committee the provisions in regard to Egypt. Mr. Folk. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I appear before you as the counsel for the commission appointed by the legislative assembly of Egypt to attend the peace conference at Paris. A majority of the legislative assembly of Egypt is elected by the people of Egypt The commission was appointed by that assembly and is composed by Messrs. Zaghlul, Armand, and Alfifi. Mr. Zaghlul is the vice president of the legislative assembly, the highest elective office in Egypt. He was formerly minister of justice, and before that was minister of education for Egypt. He is easily the first citizen of Egypt, so recognized, so honored .and respected both by Egyptians and by all other nationalities in Egypt. The other members of the commission are men of learning and culture. That commission is in Paris to-day in virtual imprison- ment. Through the influence of Great Britain they are not per- mitted to come to the United States. They were not permitted to send their representative to the United States. Great Britain does not seem to be anxious that the people of the United States should know the story of Egypt. The Chairman. Governor, perhaps you are about to do it, but please tell us the origin of this legislative assembly. Mr. Folk. Yes. This legislative assembly was established upon the recommendation of Lord Kitchener in 1913. It is composed of 89 members, three-fourths elected by district electors, chosen by popular vote in proportion to the population. Twenty-two members are appointed. There are four copts, three Bedouins, two merchants, one pedagogue, and one municipal representative. It is a repre- sentative body, -and actnally represents the people of Egypt. This commission, through the legislative assembly, speaks for the people of Egypt; and in speaking for this commission I may fairly say that I appear before you in behaK of the people of Egypt. 651 652 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Moses. Is the legislative assembly an actively functioning body in connection with the government of Egypt ? Mr. Folk. Yes; it is a part of the regular government of Egypt at this time. The people of Egypt want a league of nations to protect their independence, not to destroy their independence. They ask that you do not deny them that self-determination which is guaranteed to the peoples of all nations in the covenant. They ask that in the name of self-determination you do not sanction the making of Egypt to be a pendant to Britain's red girdle of the globe. Great Britain has a Government that is just when it has no selfish reason to be otherwise. In the case of Egypt it has a selfish reason to be otherwise, and it has been and is otherwise. Egypt, as history tells us, was a part of the Turkish dominions until 1831. In that year war broke out between Egypt and Turkey. The Egyptian armies were victorious and Constantinople would have fallen, but the powers interfered for the purpose of maintaining the balance of power, and the Egyptian armies were denied the full fruits of their victories. The Chairman. That was the movement under Mehemet Ah ? Mr. Folk. Yes. Later, in the treaty of London, Egypt was given autonomy, practical independence, subject to a nominal Turkish sov- ereignty and subject to the payment of an annual tribute to Turkey of about $3,500,000. I will sketch the subsequent occurrences hastily, and later on I will take them up more in detail. In 1892 Great Britain occupied Egypt for the ostensible purpose of suppressing rebels and of collecting debts due to Europeans, arising out of the Suez Canal. She pledged to Egypt and the world that this occupation would be only temporary, but she continued to stay. Great Britain first entered Egypt upon the pretext of pro- tecting the khedive against rebels among his people. She continued to stay upon the pretext of protecting the people against the tyranny of the khedive. So at the beginning of this war England was occu- pying Egypt in that way. On December 18, 1914, Great Britain seized Egypt, took over the government of Egypt through the appointment of a stdtan of Egypt by Great Britain, and now, contrary to the principles in the covenant of the proposed league of nations, Great Britain asks that Egypt be turned over to Great Britain without the consent of the Egyptians, as a subject and conquered nation. The status of Egypt arose out of the war just ending, and in that respect — a very material respect — it differs from the status of many other subject countries. The status of Egypt can not be an internal question to Great Britain unless this treaty itself makes it so. Now, Section VI, Article 147, provides: Germany declares that she recognizes the Protectorate proclaimed over Egypt by Great Britain on December 18, 1914, and that she renounces the regime of the Capitu- ations in Egypt. This renunciation shall take effect as from August 4, 1914. You of com-se are familiar with the capitiilation. I shall not dis- cuss it here. It merely provides regulations whereby foreigners in Egypt who commit crime or offend in any way are tried by their consular com-ts. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 653 The Chairman. I do not want to interrupt your argument. Of course the committee laiows all about the capitulations, but assume for the moment that we do not, and explain the provisions briefly, will you please ? Senator Johnson of California. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Folk. Sidney Low, in his booli "Egypt in Transition," on page 251, very clearly describes that in this way: Most people know roughly what the capitulations are, but it is only the resident in Egypt who is fully aware of the manner in which their — mostly baneful — influence is exercised. The capitulations are the treaties and conventions which give Euro- peans in the East the right of exemption from the local tribunals. * * * If a foreigner commits a crime he can not be arrested by the Egyptian police, nor may he be brought up before an Egyptian judge and tried by the Egyptian law. The police or the aggrieved party can only bring him before his own consular court. And before he can be punished it must be proved that he has committed an offense not only against the law of Egypt, but against the law of his own State, or, at any rate, against such local law as the consular authorities agTee to recognize. Now, I understand that Great Britain proposes to abolish the capitulation, but she proposes to abohsh it by abolishing the inde- pendence of Egypt entirely. It will be noted that this article in question merely purports to declare the position of Germany. The United States and the other parties to the treaty are not mentioned. But what wotdd be the effect of an unqualified ratification of this article ? Would it not have the effect of making the question of the status of Egypt an internal question to Great Britain and therefore, beyond the juris- diction of the council of the league of nations ? But is the holding and governing of Egypt without the consent of the Egyptians a protectorate in a legal sense ? I say it is not. This occupation of Egypt up to 1882 was often spoken of by British diplomats as a veiled protectorate. This thing that England has now done to Egypt may be well characterized as a masked annexation. A protectorate is a relation assumed toward a weak nation by a strong nation, whereby the weak nation is protected from hostile invasion or dictation. The situation in Egypt is that Great Britain has taken over the government in part. The flag of Great Britain is supreme in Egypt. Great Britain has appointed a sultan in Egypt to rule over Egypt. He represents, not the sovereignty of Egypt but the sovereignty of England. The Egyptians to-day are governed without their consent by Great Britain. Great Britain has assumed sovereignty over Egypt. This protectorate is the same character of protectorate that a highwayman would proclaim over your pocket- book when he should hold a pistol at your head and demand that you deliver over your valuables. Senator Brandegee. Will you allow me to ask you a question there, Governor ? Mr. Folk. Yes. Senator Brandegee. If a nation is under a protectorate, can it make a treaty with a foreign power ? Mr. Folk. Usually it can, but Egypt is not allowed to make any treaties with foreign powers. Great Britain has expressly required that all treaties and all deahngs with foreign powers shaU be through Great Britain. Senator Moses. Governor, may I interrupt you ? Mr. Folk. Yes. 654 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Moses. Are you intending at any time in the course of your argument to show the development of the power of the British ? Mr. Folk. Yes. Senator Moses. Especially under the Cromer regime ? Mr. Folk. Yes. Senator Brandegee. Do you desire to proceed without inter- ruption at first ? Mr. Folk. It is entirely agreeable to me to answer questions as I go along, or if you prefer, when I finish 1 will be glad to take up any discussion that you desire, but it does not discommode me at all to be asked questions. A bank robber in a sense proclaims a protectorate over the funds of a bank. If that protectorate, so-called, be sanctioned, the act of the robber is sanctioned even though it be called by the soft name of protectorate rather than by the name of robbery. So if the so-called protectorate of Great Britain over Egypt be recognized and sanc- tioned, the act is sanctioned even though as a matter of fact it is not a protectorate, but a masked annexation. The occupation of Egypt by British troops, as I have said, was until December 18, 1914, claimed by the British Government to be merely temporary. After the beginning of the World War, Great Britain seized Egypt and the proclamation seizing Egypt was pub- lished in the London Times of December 19, 1914, page 8, column 3. It reads : In view of the action nf his Highness, Abbas Hehni Pasha, lately Khedive of Egypt, who has adhered to the King's enemies. His Majestjr's Government has seen fit to depose him from the Khedivate, and that high dignity has been offered, with the title of Sultan of Egypt, to his Highness Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha, eldest living prince of the family of Mehemet Ali, and has been accepted by him. The King has been pleased to approve the appointment of Prince Hussein to an honorary Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath on the occasion of his accession -to the Sultanate. This seizure of Egypt by Great Britain is shown on the face of the proclamation to be a war measure. But how can a continuation of Britain's assumed sovereignty over Egypt be justified now that the war is over and the league of nations is to be established upon the principle of the right of self-determination in all nations ? Senator Johnson of California. What league of nations is that that you speak of ? Mr. Folk. I am speaking of the covenant of the league of nations which is supposed to be based upon that ideal. Senator Johnson of California. I think it is conceded now that it is not based upon any such ideal as that. Mr. Folk. Of course, there are two viewpoints. I am assuming that it is. That is the theory on which the league of nations pro- poses the right of self-determination of all people, and that govern- ment everywhere must be based upon the consent of the governed. The Manchester Guardian, in the issue of December 14, 1914, com- menting on the seizure of Egypt, said that the action taken by Great Britain with respect to Egypt was tantamount to annexation, and did not differ in any essential point from the assumption of complete sovereignty. The facts show this statement to be true. The London Times, in the issue of December 19, 1914, has large headline, saying "Egypt Under the British Flag — Abbas Hilmi TREATY OF PEACE WITH GBBMANY. 655 deposed — Appointment of a Sultan." But the Times in an editorial in the same issue, with characteristic British diplomacy, naively said: All that is desired now is to defend Egypt against attack, and to keep the internal administration running smoothly. Other questions can wait until peace is restored as Lord Cromer implies in the letter which we publish to-day. It is purely a practical administrative step, dictated by the appearance of Turkey as a belligerent. The truth is that under the guise of a protectorate Great Britain seized Egypt and swept away every vestige of Egyptian freedom or independence. But the people of Egypt did not realize at that time the full meaning of this action on the part of Great Britain. They were told that this was a step towards their independence. They were practically promised independence. His Majesty King George in a letter to the Sultan, whom he had appointed to rule over Egypt, which letter was widely published throughout Egypt and was pub- lished in the London Times of date December 21, 1914, which I have here, said: I feel convinced that you will be able, with the cooperation of your ministers and the protectorate of Great Britain, to overcome all influences which are seeking to destroy the independence of Egypt. Of course the Bitish idea, the idea of the British Government, of independence evidently is to be independent of all other governments except the British Government, but the Egyptian people accepted that word as we have always accepted it. The word "independence" was a word to conjure with with the Egyptians. To them the word was as sacred and is as sacred as it was to our forefathers who fought and struggled for independence from the very power that is now seeking to destroy the independence of Egypt. Senator Knox. Governor, what is the population of Egypt ? Mr. Folk. 13,000,000. Senator Knox. How many are Egyptians ? Mr. Folk. About 10,000,000. Senator Johnson of California. What races are the others ? Mr. Folk. The races are English, American, Syrian, etc. Senator Johnson of California. A great many British? Mr. Folk. A great many British. Of course the seizure of Egypt being announced to be temporarily, as a war measure, it was assumed by the Egyptians to be such. The Egyptian troops fought on the side of the Allies to make, as they believed, the world safe for democ- rat, and for the right of national self-determination in all people. The Chairman. They were loyal to Great Britain and the Allies? Mr. Folk. They were loyal. More than a million strong they fought on the eastern front, and Gen. AUenby, not long ago, in a speech to the Y. M. C. A. at some point in Egypt said that the Egyptian troops were responsible for the allied successes in Palestine and Assyria. When it came to making the terms of peace and the formation of a league of nations, the Egyptian people naturally ■ concluded, since under the league of nations they would be protected and preserved from external aggression, that the protectorate of Great Britain, the alleged purpose of which was to preserve them from external aggression, would be removed. But they were doomed to disappointment. England not only refused to give up Egypt, but England asked the United States and the other nations to indorse and sanction and to glorify the wrongs that she has done and is doing to Egvot. 656 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. If there should be a league of nations, to give the nations some remedy, other than war, to settle their disputes and to preserve the right of self-determination in small nations, and to prevent one nation from bleeding another, by what process of reasoning can it be assumed that in the very treaty creating a league of nations for the purposes indicated, there should be a clause recognizing the British holding of them, which is utterly inconsistent with the principles of the league of nations, and is based upon the doctrine of military might not upon the principles of justice and right. Egypt is a country of immense wealth. She contains more than 350,000 square miles and a population of something like 13,000,000. She has millions of acres of agricultural lands. The valley of the Nile is greater in value per acre and ia producing power than the richest farming lands in Illinois or Missouri or Iowa. By the seizure, then. Great Britain has added to her enormous acquisitions an area of 350,000 square miles and 13,000,000 souls. From her geographical position, Egj^t has attracted the attention of the colonizing powers more perhaps than any other country in the world. Lying beneath South Africa and the Mediterranean, as between also the eastern and western worlds, Egypt is not only the key to England's position in her vast project of colonization, bufrshe is moreover an important factor internationally in the affairs of practically every European, Asiatic, and indeed American country. The eyes of the covetous rulers of earth have always been upon Egypt, and for illustration we need go no further back in history than Csesar and then come up to Napoleon and then to Great Britain. In 1798 the French under Napoleon iavaded Egypt. In 1801 the French were expelled from Egypt by the Egyptian troops, aided by the Turks, and aided also at that time by Great Britain. In 1807 Great Britain herself invaded Egypt and attempted to conquer the country, but the British troops were ejected by the Egyptian army. Egypt continued to be a nominal Turkish province until 1831, when in the war between Turkey and Egypt, Egypt being victorious, there was a settlement brought about by the powers in order to preserve in the balance of power whereby Egypt was given its autonomy and practical independence, subject to the nominal sovereignty of Turkey, and subject to the payment of the tribute that I have mentioned. The title of the ruler of Egypt meant sovereign or king, without qualification. The government of Egypt could maintain an army^ contract loans and make new political conventions with foreign powers. Things continued to run smoothly until the time of the Khedive Ismail in 1863 to 1879. He was an extravagant promoter by nature and was surrounded by European usurers who were ready to lend him money at ruinous interest, in seven years Ismail raised the debt in Egypt from something like 3,000,000 pounds to 94,000,000 odd pounds. This debt was largely contracted through the construction of the Suez Canal. This canal was begun under French auspices, but Great Britain later secured control of it. The French had perusaded Ismail to grant a concession for the building of the Suez Canal. This canal was not to cost Egypt one cent, and Egypt was to get 15 per cent of the revenues. But the French interests could not fmance the undertaking and finally they went to Ismail and persuaded him to put TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 65T up about $5,000,000 to finance it and then persuaded Ismail to sub- scribe for $85,000,000 of the stock. Now Ismail had no money, so he gave his due bills, and these due bills were discounted in London at about 50 cents on the dollar, and these due bills constituted the beginnings of the troubles that Egypt has had. Later the stock of Ismail for which the due bills were given was bought by Great Britain for $20,000,000 through Disraeli, and through the purchase of this stock for $20,000,000 Great Britain secured a voting control of the Suez Canal Corporation, and that is how she secured control of the Suez Canal; and as I wiU show a little later, the fact of the Suez Canal being there, and the fact of Egypt being the entrance and the highway to India, is the reason why Great Britain refused to get out of Egypt and why Great Britain intends to stay in Egypt under any- and all circumstances. The debt owing to Europeans growing out of the construction of the Suez Canal offered an opportunity or excuse for the interference by England and other nations in the affairs of Egypt, whereby ther& was a supervision of the revenues by the agents of Great Britain for the ostensible purpose of collecting the debts contracted by Ismail. Great Britain attempted not only financial control but Sohtical control as well. Origiaally there was what was known as Ual control, control by France and Great Britain, but France- afterwards withdrew. In September, 1881, a revolution broke out in Cairo which had for its chief object the emancipation of Egypt from European influences. In May, 1882, a British fleet appeared before Alexandria. In June, 1882, serious disturbances took place in Alexandria and a number of Europeans were killed. On July 11 and 12, 1882, Alexandria was bombarded by the- British fleet and British soldiers began to occupy Egypt. Great Britain solemnly pledged the world that this occupation would only be temporary. Some of these pledges are illustrated by these docu- ments. Lord Granville, who was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on November 4, 1881 (to be found in Egypt No. 1 (1882), pp. 2 and 3), said: The policy of His Majesty's Government toward Egypt has no other aim than the prosperity of the country, and its full enjoyment of that liberty which it has obtained under successive firmans of the Sultan. * * * It can not be too clearly understood that England desires no partisan ministry in Egypt. In the opinions of His Majesty's Government a partisan ministry founded on the support of a foreign power, or upon the personal influence of a foreign diplomatic agent, is neither calcu- lated to be of service to the country it administers, nor to that in whose interest it is supposed to be maintained. In a protocol signed by the Ambassador to Turkey for Great Britain, Lord Dufferin, together with the representatives of five other great powers, on June 25, 1882 (to be foimd in Egypt No. 17 (1882), p. 33), it was provided: The Government represented by the undersigned engage themselves, in any arrange- ment which may be made in consequence of their concerted action for the regulation of the affairs of Egypt, not to seek any territorial advantage. 135546—19 42 658 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Sir Charles Dilke, who was under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons, on July 25, 1882, said: It is the desire of His Majesty's Government, after relieving Egypt from military tyranny, to leave the people to manage their own affairs. * * * We believe that it is better for the interests of their country, as well as for the interests of Egypt, that Egypt should be governed by liberal institutions rather than by a despotic rule. Mr. Gladstone, when he was Prime Minister, said in the House of Commons on August 10, 1882 (reading) : I can go so far as to answer the honorable gentleman when he asks me whether we contemplate an indefinite occupation of Egypt. Undoubtedly, of all things in the world, that is a thing which we are not going to do. It would be absolutely at variance with all the principles and views of Her Majesty's Government, and the pledges they have given to Europe and with the views, I may say, of Europe itself. And again, Lord Dufferin, in a dispatch dated December 19, 1882, to be found ia Egypt No. 2 (1883), page 30, stated: In talking to the various persons who have made inquiries as to my views on the Egyptian question I have stated that we have not the least intention of preserving the authority which has thus reverted to us. And Lord Granville, on December 29, 1882, found in Egypt No. 2 {1882), page 23, said — and this was an official dispatch: You should intimate to the Egyptian Government that it is the desire of Her Majesty's ■Government to withdraw the troops from Egypt as soon as circumstances permit; that such withdrawal will probably be effected from time to time as the security of the country will allow it, and that Her Majesty's Government hojje that the time will be very short during which the full number of the present force will be maintained. And Lord Dufferin's dispatch of February 6, 1883, Egypt No. 6 (1883), pages 41 to 43, said: The territory of the Khedive has been recognized as lying outside the sphere of European warfare and international jealousies. The Valley of the Nile could not be administered from London. An attempt upon our part to engage in such an undertaking would at once render us objects of hatred and suspicion to its inhabitants. Cairo would become a focus of foreign intrigue and conspiracy against us, and we should soon find ourselves forced either to abandon our pretensions under discreditable conditions or embark upon the experiment of a complete acquisition of the country. And Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons on August 6, 1883, being Prime Minister at that time, said: The other powers of Europe * * * are well aware of the general intentions entertained by the British Government, intentions which may be subject, of course, to due consideration of that state of ciicumstances, but conceived and held to be in the nature not only of information, but a pledge or engagement. And on the 9th of August Mr. Gladstone said: The uncertainty there may be in some portion of the public mind has reference to those desires which tend toward the permanent occupation of Egypt and its incorpora- tion in this Empire. This is a consummation to which we are resolutely opposed, and which we will have nothing to do with bringing about. We are against this ■doctrine of annexation; we are against everything that resembles or approaches it; .and we are against all language that tends to bring about its expectation. We are against it on the) ground of the interests of England; we are against it on the ground oi our duty to Egypt, we are against it on the ground of the specific and solemn manner and under the most critical circumstances, pledges which have earned for us the confidence of Europe at large during the course of difficult and delicate operations, and which, if one pledge can be more solemn and sacred than another, special sacredness in this case binds us to observe. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 659 And Lord Granville's dispatch on June 16, 1884 (to be found in Egypt No. 23 (1884), p. 13), stated: Her Majesty's Government * * * are willing that the withdrawal of the troops shall take place at the beginning of the year 1888, provided that the powers are then of opinion that such withdrawal can take place, without risk to peace and order. Lord Derby in the House of Lords, February 26, 1885, said: From the first we have steadily kept in ^dew the fact that our occupation was tempo- porarily and provisional only * * *. We do not propose to keep Egypt perma- nently * * *. On that point we are pledged to this country and to Europe; and if a contrary policy is adopted it will not be by us. Lord Salisbury, in the House of Lords, June 10, 1887, said: It was not open to us to assume the protectorate of Egypt, because Her Majesty's Government have again and again pledged themselves that they would not do so * * *. My noble friend has dwelt upon that pledge, and he does us no more than justice when he expresses his opinion that it is a pledge which has been constantly present to our minds. And Lord Salisbury, in the House of Lords, August 12, 1889, said: When my noble friend * * * asks us to convert ourselves from guardians into proprietors * * * and to declare our stay in Egjrpt permanent * * * i must say I think my noble friend pays an insufficient regard to the sanctity of the obliga- tions which the Government of the Queen have undertaken and by which they are bound to abide. In such a matter we have not to consider what is the most convenient or what is the more profitable course; we have to consider the course to which we are bound by our own obligations and by European law. Mr. Gladstone agaia on May 1, 1893, said, in his fourth ministry: I can not do otherwise than express my general concurrence * * * that the occupation of Egypt is in the nature of a burden and difficulty, and that the per- manent occupation of that country would not be agreeable to our traditional policy, and that it would not be consistent with our good faith toward the suzerain power, while it would be contrary to the laws of Europe. * * * I certainly shall not set up the doctrine that we have discovered a duty which enables us to set aside the pledges into which we have so freely entered. * * * The thing we can not do with honor is either to deny that we are under engagements which preclude the idea of an indefinite occupation, or so to construe that indefinite occupation as to hamper the engagements that we are under by collateral considerations. The text of the Anglo-French agreement of April 8, 1904, pro- vides [reading]: The Government of His Majesty declares that it has no intention of altering the political status of Egypt. The French Government was objecting to the occupation of Egypt by Gieat Britain, and finally France and Great Britain made a secret treaty whereby Great Britain was to be permitted to do certain things" in Egypt without interference by France, and France was to be permitted to do certain things in Morocco without inter- ference by Great Britain. Senator Johnson of CaUfoinia. About what was the date of that — the year ? Mr. Folk. 1904. I have the clause right here in Lord Cromer's report of March 3, 1907, Egypt No. 1 (1907), page 2: There are insuperable objections to the assuniption of a British protectorate over Egypt. It would involve a change in the political status of the country. Now, in Article \ of the Anglo-French agreement of the 8th of April, 1904, the British Gov- ernment have explicitly declared that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt. 660 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. In an interview with Dr. Nimr, editor of the Mokattam, October 24, 1908, acknowledged as official by Sir E. Gray in the House of Com- mons, Sir Eldon Gorst was asked : It has been said that Great Britain proposes shortly to proclaim the protectorate or the annexation of Egypt to the British Empire. Will Sir Gordon Gorst permit me to ask him whether this rumor is well founded or not? Sir Eldon Gorst, who was diplomatic agent of Great Britain in Egypt, answered: The rumor has no foundation and you may contradict it categorically. Great Britain has engaged herself by official agreements with Turkey and the European powers to respect the suzerainty of the Sultan in Egypt. She will keep her engage- ments, which, moreover, she reiterated in 1904 at the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-French agreement. England stipulated in that agreement that she has no intention to change the political situation in Egypt. Neither the people nor the Gov- ernment wish to rid themselves of these engagements. And so it is clear that up to the beginning of the war the status of Egypt was not an internal question, but the war gave an excuse for Great Britain to break her plighted word. Senator Johnson of California. Could I ask you a question there without interrupting you ? You refer quite often, Governor, to internal questions. Do you mean by that that now with the recogni- tion of that protec orate established and with the league of nations, it would be no longer an internal question ? Mr. Folk. No, sir. I say, the way this annex reads, with the recognition of the territorial protectorate, which is not a protectorate, but a masked annexation, Egypt would be made an internal question and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the coimcil of the league of nations. Senator Johnson of California. Your position is that by the recogni- tion of this masked annexation we are parties to a wrong? Mr. Folk. We are parties to a wrong. Senator Johnson of California. And then in the league of nations we rivet that wrong for all time ? Mr. Folk. Particularly, what Egjrpt desires is independence. Possibly the United States can not recognize, her independence, but she would be glad if the United States could do so. But she asks this, that there be a clause in section 6 making it clear that the status of Egypt shall be within the jurisdiction of the league of nations council in order that at least Egypt may go there and liave her right to self-determination adjudicated. Senator Johnson of California. You construe the league of nations to mean that with the recognition of the situation now existing in Egypt, it would be the duty of the United States hereafter, in case Egyptians rebelled under the league of nations, to refrain from aid, if they saw fit to aid ? Mr. Folk. To refrain from aiding the Egjrptians ? Senator Johnson of California. Yes. Mr. Folk. My point is this, that as the annex now reads, Egypt would be precluded from appeahng to the council of the league of nations. We want Egypt to have the right to go before that council and to have her case adjudicated. Now with the recognition of this condition unqualifiedly, undoubtedly if Egypt should go before the council as she intends to go, if a council is formed, she would be met TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 661 by the plea from Great Britain, "Why, Egypt is an internal question." The United States has recognized the protectorate over them and in doing that has recognized the present status, and it is not a matter over which the council of the league of nations has any jurisdiction. Senator Johnson of California. The fact of the matter is, we did recognize the protectorate, not in the treaty but by an independent recognition some time later, did we not ? Mr. Folk. I understand about a month ago there was a recognition by the State Department. Senator Johnson of California. Some of it was before that, while the President was at Paris, and the Secretary of State was at Paris. Mr. Folk. I think there was a recognition then. Senator Johnson of California. It was then that the recognition occm-red, was it not ? Mr. Folk. And this was written into the annex of the treaty. Senator Swanson. Would it interrupt you to ask you a question ? Mr. Folk. Not at all. Senator Swanson. I would like to get it clear in my mind. I have read some articles on this. Before the war, Egypt had as her sovereign, Turkey. Mr. Folk. Nominally. Senator Swanson. Nominally, and the ruler was called a khedive ? Mr. Folk. He was khedive then. Senator Swanson. He was simply the governor of the Province ? Mr. Folk. Egypt was practically independent, subject only to this nominal sovereignty of Turkeyl Senator Swanson. I have read an article somewhere, and I want to see if I get it clear in my mind; that before the war the governor of Egypt, flae khedive, was simply the governor of a province. Mr. Folk. No. The Chairman. That is historically wrong. Mr. Folk. He is absolute sovereign, subject only to this nominal sovereignty of Turkey. Senator Swanson. As I understand, the flag in Egypt was really the Turkish flag, was it not ? Mr. Folk. Yes. Senator Swanson. Did not the money carry the stamp of the Sultan of Turkey? Mr. Folk. Yes. Senator Swanson. I have seen it stated that since then they changed the name of the ruler from Khedive to Sultan, and that the word "Sultan" is a radical term, indicating complete sovereignty, while the Khedive was more or less of a subordinate. Mr. Folk. No; "Khedive" means sovereign or king, and the word "Sultan" was used by Great Britain in appointing Trince Hussein in order to distinguish his office from that of the Khedive from which the other man was ousted. Senator Swanson. I noticed an article written from a British standpoint which indicated that the word "Sultan" meant complete sovereignty over Egypt by the Stiltan, free from anybody else. Mr. Folk. Yes; it does. Senator Moses. That is to say, free of annual tribute. Senator Swanson. And that the money there is now Egyptian instead of Turkish ? Mr. Folk. Yes. 662 TREATY or' PEACE WITH GERMANY. Senator Swanson; And that the flag of Egypt floats over every- thing except the British consulate and the places where the British are? Mr. Folk. The Egyptian flag floats over everything except the British flag, which is supreme. Senator Swanson. I have seen it stated that the British flag floats only over the British Embassy and where the troops are. Is that true? Mr. Folk. No; I do not understand it that way. The British flag is supreme in Egypt. They have an Egyptian flag, like the flag of Virginia, or the flag of any State. Senator Swanson. Three crescents and three stars ? Mr. Folk. That is the flag of Egypt; like the flag of Virginia. Senator Swanson. Do you know why the three crescents and the three stars were adopted ? Mr. Folk. That was adopted as the form of the flag. Senator Swanson. This article stated that that flag floated supreme, except that the British had their flag over their canton- ments or posts where the troops were, and over their embassy; but that outside of that the Egyptian flag was supreme, and that the money now had the stamp of the sultan, and that that evidenced sovereignty, and it gave them more sovereignty than they had under Turkey. Is that true ? Mr. Folk. Great Britain has assumed sovereignty over Egypt, and is practically annexing it to thQ British Empire. Senator Swanson. Have you put into the record the proclamation in which she establishes the protectorate, sajdng she will defend and protect Egypt ? Mr. Folk. I will come to that in a moment. Senator Swanson. As I understand, there were two proclamations, one proclamation dethroning the khedlve Mr. Folk. Yes; I have read that. Senator Swanson. And the next one establishing the protectorate. Mr. Folk. Yes; I have that here and wUl read it in a moment. In order to have it clear as to just what Great Britain had Senator Moses. The khedivate was a hereditary oflBce in the Egyptian royal family ? Mr. Folk. Yes ; it was hereditary. Senator Swanson. They have dethroned one ruler and put in another, and call him the sultan ? Mr. Folk. Yes. Senator Swanson. Does the term "sultan" indicate more sov- ereignty than "khedive" ? Mr. Folk. Not at all. Senator Swanson. This article stated that it did. Mr. Folk. "Khedive" stands for sultan or king, and the term "sultan" stands for practically the same thing. Now, in order to have it clear as to just what Great Britain did, I will state that in an offlcial report of date' November 1, 1914, it was stated: His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey has forwarded a circular to the great powers directing their attention to the fact that the presence of the English troops in Egypt does not permit him to exercise his suzerain rights. Acting upon this basis, the Khedive of Egypt, Abbas II, has also invited the English Government to with- draw her troops from his country. TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 663 Again, on November 2, 1914, the report st?ited: The Turkish ambassador at London, Tewfik Pascha, has presented to the foreign office aii ultimatum from the Khedive of Egypt demanding the immediate evacua- tion of Egypt by the English troops. And so on December 18, 1914, England proclaimed the removal by her of the lawful Khedive of Egypt and the appointment by England of Price Hussein, uncle of the Khedive, as Sultan of the Throne. England's Sultan of Egypt is maintained on the throne of Egypt to-day, against the will of the Egyptian people, by the power of England's military forces. In the London Times of December 19, 1914, appears the proclama- tion, proclaiming the protectorate. It is rather long, and I will not read it. The Chairman Insert it in the record. Mr. Folk Yes; I will ask to insert it in the record. The proclamation referred to is as follows: In view of the action of his Highness Abbas Hihni Pasha, lately Khedive of Egypt,. who has adhered to the King's enemies. His Majesty's Government have seen fit tO' depose him from the khediviate, and that high dignity has been offered, with the title of Sultan of Egypt, to his Highness Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha, eldest living^ price of the family of Mohomet Ali, and has been accepted by him. The King has been pleased to approve the appointment of Prince Hussein, to be an honorary Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath on the occasion of his acces- sion to the sultenate. The King has been pleased to give directions for the following appointment to the order of St. Michael and St. George. His Excellency Hussein Rushdi Pasha, president of the council of ministers of His Highness the Sultan of Egypt, to be an honorary knight, Grand Cross of the Order. The following notice is issued by the foreign office: "His Majesty's Government having been informed that the Government of the French Republic have recognized the British protectorate over Egypt, His Britannic Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs hereby gives notice that His Majesty's Government adhere to the Franco-Moorish treaty of March 30, 1912. "The foreign office communicates the following letter addressed to Prince Hussein' by the acting high commissioner in Egypt: "Cairo, December 19, 1914. "YouK Highness: I am instructed by His Britannic Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs to bring to the notice of your Highness the circumstances preceding the outbreak of war between His Britannic Majesty and the Sultan of Turkey and the changes which that war entails in the status of Egypt. "In the Ottoman cabinet there were two parties: On one side was a moderate party, mindful of the sympathy extended by Great Britain to every effort toward reform in Turkey, who recognized that in the war in which His Majesty was already engaged no 'Turkish interests were concerned and welcomed the assurances of His Majesty and his allies that neither in Egypt nor elsewhere would the war be used as a pretext for any action injurious to Ottoman interests. On the other side, a band of miscrupulo.us military adventures looked to find in_ a war of aggression waged in concert with His Majesty's enemies means of retrieving the disasters — military, financial, and economic — into which they had already plunged their country. Hop- ing to the last that wiser counsels must prevail, His Majesty and his allies, in spite of repeated violations of their rights, abstained from retaliatory action until com- pelled thereto by the crossing of the Egyptian frontier by armed bands and by the- unprovoked attacks on Russian open ports by Turkish naval forces under German officers. "His Majesty's Government are in possession of ample evidence that ever since the outbreak of war with Germany His Highness Abbas Hihni Pasha, late Khedive of Egypt, has definitely thrown in his lot with His Majesty's enemies. "Prom the facts above set out it results that the rights over the Egyptian executive of the Sultan or of the late Khedive are forfeited to His Majesty. "His Majesty's Government have already, through the general officer commanding- His Majesty's forces in Egypt, accepted exclusive responsibility for the defense of Egypt during the present war. It remains to lay do-wn the form of the future govern- 664 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. ment of the country freed, as I have stated, from all rights of suzerainty or other :rights heretofore claimed by the Ottoman Government. "Of the rights thus accruing to His Majesty, no less than of those exercised in Egypt during the last 30 years of reform, His Majesty's Government regard themselves as trustees for the inhabitants of Egypt. And His Majesty's Government have de- cided that Great Britain can best fulfill the responsibilities she has incurred toward Egypt by the formal declaration of a British protectorate and by the government of the country under such protectorate by a prince of the khedival family. "In these circumstances I am instructed by His Majesty's Government to inform Your Highness that by reason of your age and experience you have been chosen as the Prince of the family of Mehemet Ali most worthy to occupy the Khedivial position, with the title and style of the Sultan of Egypt; and in inviting Your Highness to accept the responsibilities of your high office, I am to give you the formal assurance that Great Britain accepts the fullest responsibility for the defense of the territories under Your Highness against all aggression whencesoever coming. And His Majesty's Government authorizes me to declare that, after the establishment of the British protectorate now announce, all Egyptian subjects, wherever they may be, wUl be ■entitled to receive the protection of His Majesty's Government. "With Ottoman suzerainty there will disappear the restrictions heretofore placed by Ottoman firmans upon the numbers and organization of Your Highness 'a Army and upon the grant of Your Highness of honorific distinctions. "As regards foreign relations, His Majesty's Government deem it most consistent with the new responsibilities assumed by Great Britain that the relations between Your Highness 's Government and the representatives of foreign powers should be lenceforth conducted through His Majesty's representative in Cairo. "His Majesty's Government have repeatedly placed on record that the system of treaties known as the Capitulations, by which Your Highness's Government is bound, are no longer in harmony with the development of the country, but I am expressly lauthorized to state that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government the revision of these treaties may most conveniently be postponed until the end of the present war. ' ' In the field of internal administration I am to remind Your Highness that, in consonance with the traditions of British policy, it has been the aim of His Majesty's Government, while working through and in the closest association with the con- stituted Egyptian authorities, to secure individual liberty, to promote the spread of education, to further the development of the natural resources of the country, and in such measure as the degree of enlightenment of public opinion may permit, to asso- -ciate the governed in the task of government. Not only is it the intention of His Majesty's Government to remain faithful to such policy, but they are convinced that the clearer definition of Great Britain's position in the country will accelerate progress towards self-government. ' ' The religious convictions of Egyptian subjects will be scrupulously respected, as ^re those of His Majesty's own subjects, whatever their creed; nor need I affirm to Y'our Highness that in declaring Egypt free from any duty of abedience to those who "have usurped political power at Constantinople His Majesty's Government are ani- mated by no hostility toward the khalif ate. "The past history of Egypt shows, indeed, that the loyalty of Egyptian Mahomedans toward the khalifate is independent of any political bonds between Egypt and Constantinople. ' ' The strengthening and progress of Mahomedan institutions in Egypt is naturally a matter in which His Majesty's Government take the deepest interest and in which Your Highness will be specially concerned, and, in carrying out such reforms as may be considered necessary, your Highness may count upon the sympathetic support of His Majesty's Government. "I am to add that His Majesty's Government rely with confidence upon the loyalty, good sense, and self-restraint of Egyptian subjects to facilitate the task of the general officer commanding His Majesty's forces, who is intrusted with the maintenance of internal order, and with the prevention of the rendering of aid to the enemy. "I have, etc., "(Sd.) Milne Cheetham." TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 665 The New Era. . end op an anomalous situation. [By our special correspondent.) Cairo, December 18. The Ottoman suzerainty over Egypt has at last given place to a British protectorate. The proclamation announcing Great Britain's decision and explaining the cause is just published, and the thunder of 101 guns has laid the ghost of Turkish rule. Only the madness of Egypt's ex-suzeraia has compelled Great Britain once for all to confirm and regularize her position in the Valley of the Nile. Until the Anglo- French agreement of 1904 our very occupation was not officially recognized by Europe. That agreement, though it involved the recognition by France, and subsequently by other powers, of our predominant interests in Egypt, was yet a self-denying ordinafice in that we boimd oiuselves therein not to make any change in the status of the country. Neither the Turkish adventure in 1906 nor the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, whose foreign minister, the late Count Aehrenthal, undoubtedly believed we should follow his lead and annex Egypt, nor the proclamation of a French protectorate over Morocco in 1911, induced us to alter the status of Turkey's vassal. It was not till the maintenance of the status quo had been rendered impossible by Turkey's gratuitous attack on Great Britain and her allies that the British Govern- ment took the one step, short of annexation, thnt she could take with justice to herself and the Egyptians. Such a situation, with England in beneficent occupation of a Turkish vassal State and at war with the nominal suzerain, who had never recognized our occupation, and had never conferred the slightest benefit upon Egypt, was alike intolerable and absurd. A solution which might have placed the Egyptians in closer relations with the British Empire might have been adopted. But nothing has impressed more the intellectual elements among the Arab peoples, whom the Pan Islamists of the Levan- tine elements of Constantinople and Jewish Salonika were striving to combine against us, than our unremitting efforts to prepare the Egyptians for self-government and our abstinence from all action calculated to repress the development of local institutions. Again, we are at war on behalf of small nationalities. None can deny the growth of Egyptian racial feeling, and this racial feeling — ^particularism, call it what you will — ments respect all the more so when it is remembered that the Egyptian people, with insignificant exceptions, have shown good sense and good feeling in the present crisis. More drastic action, while simplifying the problem of how to deal with the foreign jurisdictions in Egypt, would have hurt the feelings of many Egyptian Anglophiles and might have put a weapon into the hands of our enemies. None can doubt that under the British protectorate, proclaimed on a day which Moslems regard as auspicious, Egypt will prosper and advance even more rapidly than it has yet done, and will be all the'happier for the disappearance of Ottoman suzerainty. Once a cruel reality, that suzerainty had long become a shadow, but it was a shadow that still troubled some men's dreams in Egypt. Senator Swanson. What is the date of that ? Mr. Folk. December 14, 1914. We are told that the league of nations will apply the same prin- ciples between nations that have long been applied between indi- ■viduals by mmiicipal law. If an individual were to appoint himself trustee of your property and take your property by virtue of his appointment, that would, under municipal law, land him behind the bars. England appointed herself trustee, and under that self- appointment took over Egypt. Now, as a war measure, that was accepted and not objected to, and the Egyptian troops fought on the side of the Allies ; but the war is now over. Shall Egypt be handed over to Great Britain as spoils of war contrary to the declarations in the covenant of the league of nations and of the principles for which America fought? When Great Britain's pledges of altruism are set down side by side with the treatment of Egypt by Great Britain the result must be awesome to the democratic mmd. Of all the countries at war the aims and motives of Great Britain and America were stated to the world with the greatest clarity and in the most impressive 666 TREATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. way. On November 10, -lOH, Mr. Lloyd George in a speech called the world to witness the utter unselfishness of Great Britain in the war. "As the Lord liveth, " he declared, "England does not seek a yard of territory. ' We are in this war," he said, "from motives of purest chivalry, to defend the weak." On February 27, 1915, Premier Lloyd George asserted with dra- matic fervor that the suggestion that England desired ' ' territorial or other aggrandizement" was an infamous lie of the enemy. Senator Johnson of California. What was the date of that ? Mr. Folk. February 27, 1915. Senator Johnson of California. Where do you find those speeches f Mr. Folk. In any daily newspaper, in the Associated Press reports. Aside from "making the world safe for democracy," the reasons- given for America's entrance into the war were, "For the right of all who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government," and "for the rights and liberties of small nations." President Wilson, in his great address at Mount Vernon, the home- of Washington, on July 4, 19 K, said — -you are familiar with it, but I will read it again lest we forget— and the ideals expressed in this^ speech and in the 14 points, I believe, had more to do with winning the war than a thousand cannon or a million men. President Wilson in his Mount Vernon address said: There can be but one issue. The settlement must be final. There can be no- compromise. No halfway decision would be tolerable. No halfway decision is conceivable. These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are- fighting, and which must be conceded them before there can be peace. * * * The settlement of every question, whether of territory, or sovereignty, or economic arrangement, or of political relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own influence or mastery. * * * What we seek is the reign of law based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind. Shall Egypt, without the consent of the Egyptians, be turned over to England' for the sake of England's influence or mastery? Let us be true to the ideals expressed in President Wilson's Mount Vernon address. In the 14 points advanced by President Wilson we find the following pertinent and applicable provisions : Point 14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants^ for the purj)0Be of affording mutual guaranties of political independence and terri- torial integrity to great and small States alike. This principle allied to Egypt would lead to a conclusion directly opposite from the indorsement of the British seizure of Egypt and destruction of Egypt's independence. Applying the principle of the seventh point to Egypt and only substituting the word "Egypt" for "Belgium," the seventh point would read : Egypt, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the govern- ment of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired. How can it be justly said that Egypt is outside the realm of the principles of the 14 points, and that England may deny the right of" TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 667 self-determination to Egypt? If Great Britain's holding of Egypt by military force should be indorsed and ratified by the very instru- ment which condemns that character of international aggression, would not the "whole structure and validity of international law" be forever impaired ? Would not the covenant as to the rights of all nations to self-determination and to freedom from aggressions by other nations be made a hollow mockery? Shall the principles of democracy, so beautifully set forth in the league of nations cove- nant, be repudiated in Section VI of the annex to the treaty ? Senator Knox. Governor, do you claim that this treaty in any other way, except inferentially making it an internal question, ratifies it ? Mr. Folk. No, sir; I do not find anything else in the treaty, and I charge that Great Britain intends to keep Egypt, that Great Britain will not give up Egj^jt. If Great Britain will announce that she intends to give up Egypt, that she wUl turn Egypt over to the league of nations or to a mandatory, that wUl be a different proposition, but there has been no such announcement, and from the circumstances which I will detail in a moment it is not likely that there will be any such announcement. Senator Johnson of California. The only part of the treaty with which you deal is that portion of article 147 whereby Germany de- clares that she recognizes the protectorate proclaimed over Egypt by Great Britain ? Mr. Folk. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. On December 18, 1914? Mr. Folk. Yes. Senator Johnson of California. Independently of the treaty the United States some few months ago recognized this protectorate as well. Now perhaps you are going to reach that point, but I wish to ask you, what can be done so far as this treaty is concerned, to accomplish the object which you suggest ? Mr. Folk. By inserting the words ' ' the status of Egypt shall be within the jurisdiction of the council of the league of nations." That one sentence inserted in section 6 would relieve any question. Senator Johnson of California. But do you consider the treaty as dealing with the status of Egypt ? Does it not simply require the recognition by Germany of the British protectorate ? Mr. Folk. It merely provides that Germany recognizes this pro- tectorate; but when that is indorsed without qualification, we like- wise recognize and indorse it. It is not a protectorate. If it were a j)rotectorate actually, that would be one thing, but it is a masked annexation. We would recognize the condition. We would deliver over Egypt to British bondage forever if there were no qualifications there. Senator Johnson of California. We have done that already by our recognition, have we not ? Mr. Folk. What I want you to do is to put in the treaty a clause providing that the league of nations shall have jurisdiction. If we nave done it, then let it be undone, as this clause would undo it. Senator Knox. Do you recognize this proposition, that we might be estopped from den3ang that status ? By our treaty with Germany we seek recognition of the status of a protectorate over Egypt. That 668 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. is the thing that we made Germany do. Would we not be equitably- estopped from denying that status ourselves ? Mr. Folk. I think unquestionably we would. We could not deny that status. In other words, God seems to be in the covenant, but the devil in the annex to this treaty. Permanent peace can not be founded on injustice. If Great Britain seeks the turning over of Egypt to her as a condition defining the covenant, then we may well question her sincerity in signing the covenant. If Great Britain really intends to turn Egypt back to the Egyptians, or over to the council of the league of nations, Great Britain should not object to a clause specifically giving jurisdiction over Egypt to the council of the league of nations. If Great Britain does not intend to turn Egypt oyer to the Egyptians or to the council of the legaue of nations, then Great Britain has no right to object to such a clause. If Great Britain was not sincere in proclaiming the beautiful principles of democracy in the covenant, then the sooner we find that out the better, and it were better to find it out before the knot is tied and it is too late. Senator Harding. Governor, you overlook the point that the council of the league of nations is made up by the very powers that have made this treaty. Mr. Folk. Yes, I know that very well; but when you put in this clause Senator Harding. Would not the cure be to leave Egypt to her own fortunes, without putting her under the control of the league ? Mr. Folk. That would be the maximum. That is the desire, the hope, the prayer of the Egyptians, to be independent. They would like to be recognized as independent, but they ask at least that they be not precluded from going before the league of nations. Senator Knox. What is going to become of your theories if there is to be no league of nations ? Mr. Folk. If there is no league of nations then, of course, that is a different proposition. I do not think we could assume to act with reference to Egypt except through a possible treaty. Senator Knox. But there is opposition to the league of nations. Mr. Folk. Yes. Senator Knox. Suppose the league of nations is stricken out, how are we going to help you then in this treaty ? Mr. Folk. You could if you should recognize the independence of Egypt, but that would possibly be going beyond what you might desire to do. Senator Knox. The executive branch of our Government has recognized the protectorate ? Mr. Folk. Yes. Senator Knox. And it has exclusive jurisdiction of such matters. Mr. Folk. Undoubtedly, except when it comes up in a treaty, as it does here. But I am speaking only upon the assumption that there is to be a league of nations established and that this treaty will be_ adopted with the covenant of the league of nations. TTien upon that assumption we ask for the insertion of this clause so as to give Egypt the right to go before the council of the league of nations. If Great Britain merely intends to keep Egypt until the creation of the league of nations, so that Egypt shall be saved from outside aggres- sion, that is one thing; but if that were the intention of Great Britain, TEEATY OP PEACE WITH GERMANY. 669 why should she ask that the seizure and holding of Egypt by her be recognized and approved by the other nations ? Is it not apparent that the purpose of Great Britain is to keep Egypt permanently as a part of her dominions, and to do this if possible with the approval of the civilized nations of the world ? Mr. Frederic Courtland Penfield was consul general of the United States to Egypt, and wrote a book entitled "Present-Day Egypt." In that book, on page 315, he gives some reasons why Great Britain would probably not want to give up Egypt. He says: Great Britain has ■well-nigli made an English lake of the Mediterranean; the outlet of this lake, the Suez Canal, is the key to the whole scheme of British rule in India and the East. To control the canal, by force of arms if necessary, is the predominant reason why England remains in Egypt. It serves her purpose perfectly to have 5,000 redcoats within a few hours' journey of the great international waterway and a guard- ship at each terminus of it. Without the absolute control of this connecting link between Occident and Orient, 36,000,000 people in Great Britain could not expect long to hold in subjection 400,000,000 in India and to govern a quarter of the globe. And again, on page 316, he says: An incidental reason why Great Britain retains her hold upon Egypt is that the cotton crop of the Nile Valley reduces more and more each year the dependence of British spindlers upon the cotton fields of the United States. Clearly, if the principles of the covenant of the league of nations are to be made impartially effective, the status of Egypt should be declared to be a matter of adjustment by the league of nations, when the league of nations shall have been formed and in active operation. What title has Great Britain to Egj^t? Ordinarily a country acquires title to territory by discovery, by purchase, or by conquest. England did not discover Egypt, did not purchase Egypt, and it has made no lawful conquest of Egypt. Entering Egypt for the purpose of collecting debts and promising the world to withdraw after tem- porary occupation; seizing Egypt as a war measure by reason of the appearance of Turkey as a combatant; that is the title of Great Britain to Egypt. Now the war is over, and the league of nations is presumed, supposed, or assumed to be established, and government is to be based upon the consent of the governed, and this being so, shall the title of seizing nations to their plimder be recognized? If so, the war will have failed of its chief purposes and victory will have been robbed of her most precious jewel. The league of nations, we are told, would apply the same principles between nations that have long been applied between individuals by municipal law. If an individual were to forcibly intrude into the home of another for the ostensible purpose of collecting a debt and then should assume proprietorship and direction over the entire household upon the theory that it is best for the owners of the house, and then should ask that his title to dominion and control of the house be recognized, he would, under municipal law, land in jail as a trespasser. If, under the league of nations, the same principles are to be applied between nations. Great Britain would have to get out of the land of Egypt, where she is a trespasser by force and without title. Great Britain holds Egypt not by right of any title, but by might of military force. The Government of, Japan has announced that Japan wiU not hold Shantimg in violation of the rights of the people there; that 670 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. she will give Shantung back to China. She may not be sincere ia that announcement. That is not a question to discuss here. But there has been no announcement that Great Britain will be even that unselfish as to Egypt. Indeed, Great Britain's occupation of Egypt under pretense of collecting debts or protecting the Egyptian Government from "rebels," and her continued occupation in viola- tion of her promises to withdraw and the later seizure and present holding of Egypt in violation of the rights of the people of Egypt, do not lend encouragement to the hope that Great Britain will act unselfishly toward Egypt. There is no defense, in any of the books, as to Great Britain's holding of Egypt. It is a stain upon the history of England and is so recognized. They only say in defense, "Well, Great Britain has given good government down in Egypt." We might have good government in this country under a king, but that would be no reason why we would be satisfied with a king. We want more than good government — we want self-government. And so do the Egyptians. No amount of good government can com- pensate for the loss of self-government. England's seizure and continued holding of Egypt, not by right but by might, is out of keeping with the world's new temper. Onlj'- by the exercise of the gospel of force can the holding of Egypt be maintained. The cruel disappointment of the Egyptians who fought so bravely with the Allies to overthrow autocracy and to sus- tain democracy throughout the world, only to be denied the things for which they and America fought, and to be placed under the steel of the military autocracy of England, means bitterness that iU ac- cords with that spirit of the league of nations hich speaks for right and justice to all people, and that no people shall be governed with- out their consent. The inevitable outcome is recorded in the daily press. Most of the news from Egypt is suppressed by Great Britain. We hear very little. Once in a while something leaks through. For instance, there was an Associated Press dispatch of July 25 last, and I quote from the headlines of the St. Louis Republic of July 25, 1919: Eight hundred Egyptians die, 1,600 wounded, when British put down revolution. Is there any wonder ? Would not Americans fight under the same circumstances? Would not Englishmen do the same? Shall the same instrument guaranteeing the right of self-determination to the people of all nations approve the denial of self-determination to Egvpt? Is the world to continue to be ruled by might, or are we really in the dawn of a new day when right and justice shall reign throughout the earth ? The Egyptians fought on the side of the Allies, believing that they were fighting for the right of self-determination and for the principle that no people should be governed without their consent. When the armistice was signed the Egyptians rejoiced, even more than we re- joiced, for they were glad that the military autocracy had been over- thrown, that the world had been made, as they believed, safe for democracy. They were glad further because they thought it meant the independence of Egypt. They did not doubt that they would have the right of self-determination, and that the time of their being governed without their consent was about to end. The legislative assembly of Egypt then appointed this commission to go to Paris to TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 671 the peace conference, thinking that there would be a league of nations, and that ^gypt would be a part of it. There was joy throughout the land of Egypt. A song of gladness was heard up and down the Nile. 'This commission went on its way to Paris, but when it reached Malta the members of the commission were astounded when they were arrested by order of the British Government and interned in jail. Senator Johnson of California. Where? Mr. Folk. At Malta. The British Government did not intend that Egypt should be heard before the league of nations, or before the peace conference. Not only that, but the British Government did not intend that the cause of Egypt should be heard in the United States, for upon order of the British Government this commission is interned in Paris to-day, and passports have been denied not only to members of the commission to come to the United States, but to any representative of the commission to come. If you are to consider this treaty long enough, I wish you would send for Mr. Zaghlul, the first man of Egypt, and let him tell you the story. Great Britain ■can not claim that he is a mere agitator and not reliable, for in every book upon Egypt written by Englishmen there are comments upon Mr. Zaghlul, and compliments upon his record. For instance, from the book by Mr. J. Alexander, page 54, called "The Truth About Egypt," I read from page 54, as follows: The appointment, In October, of Said Bey Zaghloul as minister of public instruc- tion was one of the most opportune events of the year, and one of the very few which Teceived the approbation of all parties. The appointment of Mr. Dvmlop as adviser to the ministry some months earlier had raised the fury of the Anglophobe papers; but the selection of Said Bey Zaghloul — a man of Egyptian origin and tried abili- ties — emphasi^zed the readiness of the British agency to support the genuinely pro- ■gressive element among the Moslem natives of the country. It refuted the arguments so often repeated by Mustapha Pasha Kamel that no Egyptain of independent judg- jnent and progressive views ever received the due recognition under the "iron rule of the occupation"; and it called forth the unanimous hopes of the native papers that it signified the beginning of a much-needed reform, and was in answer to their criti- cisms of Lord Cromer's past policy. It was he who instituted the reforms for the education of women in Egypt. He is the head of this commission. He is detained in Paris by order of the British Government. The British Government does not intend that you shall hear him. You may get him if you can. I do not know whether you can or not. But if you would like to hear a story, the story of Egypt's wrong, you can have no better witness than Mr. Zaghloul. In behalf of the commission and as counsel for the commission we ask that Section VI, articles 147 to 154, of the annex to the Versailles treaty clearly state that the status of Egj^pt shall be within the jur- isdiction of the coimcil of the league of nations. Whether Egypt shall be turned over to Great Britain as spoils of war can not be an internal question unless it be made so by the treaty itself fixing the status of Egypt as internal to Great Britain. America has always been the refuge of the oppressed of every land, •and freedom of discussion of complaints of aggression has been a matter of course. The condemnation of Egypt without a hearing, to British bondage and subjection would mean continued mowing ■down by British guns of these hberty-seeking people who fought with America to make the world safe from military autocracy. If, on the other hand, the Egyptians are assured of a hearing of their case by the council of the league of nations, or some interna- 672 TEBATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. tional tribunal, there would, no doubt, be peace and quiet in Egypt, in the knowledge that an international forum wiU be open to them to determine their status and for the adjustment of their grievances. Thus the league of nations wUl have justified one of the sublime purposes of its conception in affording a remedy to oppressed nations and enabling them to obtain an adjudication of their right to national self-determination by appealing to justice rather than to force. There can be no permanent peace based upon a foundation of injustice. Peace can only come to the world permanently through the application of the principles of self-government and of democracy to the peoples of all the world. Not only in the covenant should they be expressed, but they should not be repudiated in the annex to the covenant. When peace between the nations shall be based upon justice, then and not till then may we confidently look forward to the coming of the day foretold by the prophets of old, when there shall be peace on earth and good will in the hearts of the children of men. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. I would be glad to answer any questions. Senator Swanson. Egypt, as I understand, has a legislative body. Do you know to what extent it functions ; what authority and power it has « Mr. Folk. Yes, sir. Senator Swanson. What authority has that legislative body? Mr. Folk. Until 1913 the authority was very limited. Lord, Kitchener in 1913 recommended the present legislative assembly of Egypt. A majority of that body is elected by the people of Egypt. They now have authority to make laws. Senator Swanson. I understand that three-fourths are felected and one-fourth appointed. How is the one-fourth appointed? Mr. Folk. One-fourth is appointed by the Khedive. I read a while ago how it was selected. The Chairman. Gov. Folk put that in the record. Senator Swanson. I was not in at the time. Mr. Folk. Eighty-nme members — three-fourths — are chosen by district electors chosen by popular vote in proportion to population. Twenty-three are appointed. There are four Copts, three Beduoins, two merchants, one pedagogue, and one municipal representative. Senator Swanson. I wiU read that. Did you put in the record what authority they have ? Mr. Folk. Yes. They have a legislative authority at this time. Senator Harding. Governor, I want to ask you, was any voice for Egypt deard at the conference ? Mr. Folk. Absolutely no voice for Egypt was allowed to be heard before the peace conference, and this is Ihe first time Egypt has been heard in connection with the discussion of the league of nations and the peace treaty. Senator Harding. Do you know if the American commissioners and the special agents of humanity knew anything about Egypt's cry for assistance ? Mr. Folk. I have not heard whether they knew or not. The Chairman. They recognized the protectorate. Senator Johnson of California. Were the members of the commis- sion in Paris during the deliberations of the peace conference, at any time? TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY, 673 Mr. Folk. They were interned at Malta, and when the people of Egypt heard that Zagdul was interned — he is the idol of the people of Egypt — ^revolution broke out. Senator Swanson. The real status of Egypt would have to be fixed in the treaty with Tiu-key ? Mr. Folk. Yes ; I understand that the treaty with Turkey attempts to turn over the title of the Sultan of Turkey to Great Britain, not to Egypt. There would be injustice pUed upon injustice; and of course you want to see the treaty with Turkey before you can act intelligently in regard to Egypt. You are quite correct, Senator. Let me answer Senator Johnson's question. Senator Knox. Is there not every presumption that they wUl require the same recognition of the protectorate in the treaty with Turkey that they have in the treaty with Germany ? Ml*. Folk. Absolutely. I understand that is in the Turkish treaty. Now, they were interned at Malta, and when the people of Egypt heard that Zaghlul was interned, revolution broke out. It was reported that 800 Egyptians were kUled, but I am told by people of Egypt that 30,000 were killed; that they used machine guns from airplanes and mowed the people down. Finally, after Zaghlul and his associates had been kept in Malta for a month. Gen. Allenby advised the British Government that the commission ought to be allowed to proceed to Paris. The commission thereupon was released and went to Paris ; and they found to their horror when they reached Paris that two days before this clause had been written into the treaty. They asked for a hearing and it was denied. Then they asked to see President WUson, but he could not see them. They went to the American consul and asked for passports to the United States in order that their story should be told in the land of the free. The American consulate said of course that they could have pass- ports, but three days later the American consul and the British consul called upon the commission and advised them that neither they nor any representative would be given passports to come to the Umted States. And they are kept there to-day, unable to get passports to any other country. That simply shows some injustice that Great Britain desires to cover up. Right does not fear the truth and hght. Injustice always seeks the darkness. Are there any further questions ? Senator Swanson. As I understand, what you ask is to give juris- diction of the league to the Egyptians. Mr. Folk. We ask that in the event • Senator Swanson. Do the Egyptians favor the league of nations to cover their case ? Mr. Folk. They would favor it, undoubtedly, if they could get before the league .of nations. Let me say this, that they are entitled to independence; as much entitled to independence as we were in 1776. But if it is insisted that they must be under a mandatory, under Section XXII of the covenant, then the United States should be that mandatory and not Great Britain. Great Britain can never rule Egypt except by the utter extinction of every Egyptian. That is what they say. Senator Swanson. As I understand it, the Egyptians look with confidence in presenting their case to the league of nations, and would like to have the league of nations adopt it. 674 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. Mr. Folk. If they are not prevented from going before it. Senator Swanson. If they were permitted to appear before the league of nations, they would be pleased. Mr. Folk. It offers them a remedy and a forum in which to plead their case. The Chairman. Do you think the council of the league of nations as proposed would be likely to change their status ? Mr. Folk. Of course, they would like to reduce the vote of Great Britain in the council. The Chairman. She has only one vote in the council, but have they looked over the other countries and considered whether they would be apt to change their status? Mr. Folk. Of course, you can not tell about a court beforehand. I notice here, in ans'iver to Senator Fall's question 13, something that I did not understand, where the President says: There has been a provisional agreement as to the disposition of these overseas pos- sessions whose confirmation and execution is dependent on the approval of the league of nations, and the United States is a party to that provisional agreement. Whether that includes Egypt or not I do not know. I presume you have that agreement. The Chairman. What agreement ? Mr. Folk. That he refers to in question No. 13. Senator Swanson. Read it again. Senator Johnson of California. Of course we have not the agree- ments. Senator Harding. On what ground do you assume that we have. Mr. Folk. I have heard that you have been asking for them, and the Bible says, "Ask and you shall receive," and I assume that you have received. Senator Knox. Are you reading the question or the answer ? Mr. Folk. I am only reading the answer because the paper I have only gives the answer. Senator Knox. That is what I wanted to know. Mr. Folk. These are the President's words [reading]: There has been a provisional agreement as to the disposition of these overseas possessions whose confirmation and execution is dependent on the approval of the league of nations, and the United States is a party to that provisional agreement." The Chairman. I think he says elsewhere that it is not in his possession and that he could not send it to us. Mr. Folk. Of course if that included Egypt, it would be hke the judges of a court getting together and decreeing how they would decide a case beforehand. The Chairman. On that matter of the power of the league of nations, the United States, which has the power of recognition, has recognized the protectorate. It is estopped. Mr. Folk. The Senate is not estopped. The Chairman. I grant you the Senate is not estopped. Mr. Folk. But unless you put that clause in, then The Chairman. I know that point has been made before, but I am getting back of that; but in the council of the league of nations, to which you ask us to give you access, the United States would be estopped under that recognition. Mr. Folk. It would be estopped unless you write into the treaty this clause. TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 675 The Chairman. No; I am assuming that we do write it in, that the status is to be determined by the council of the league of nations. When they get in theie they will find themselves in the presence of men representing the United States who are estopped by the Presi- dent's recognition. Mr. Folk. I do not think so, if you wiU write it in the treaty that way. The Chairman. All you write in the treaty is to give them the right to go to the council. Mr. Folk. And give the council jurisdiction. Great Britain would then be estopped from treating Egypt as an internal question. The treaty expressly includes that idea. The Chairman. The President could tmn around and say with great force, "The authority of the United States, which has the power to recognize — that is, the executive authority — has recognized this protectorate." Mr. Folk. Absolutely. And the answer would be, "Temporarily." And the treaty has expressly given jurisdiction to the council over Egypt, and the treaty is the document that covers the council and not an executive temporary recognition. The Chairman. I should be sorry to have to take that chance if I was an Egyptian. Senator Swanson. And Egypt agrees with confidence to the covenant of the league of nations ? Mr. Folk. If you do not have a league of nations, Egypt would be hopeless. Sh^would be in the grasp of Great Britain to be ground under her heel forever. Her only hope is through some sort of a league. You gentlemen here would have no concern about Egypt if you were about to make a treaty. Senator Johnson of California. Is it not a fact that your only hope in the league of nations is in the amendment ? Mr. Folk. In the amendment. Senator Johnson of California. And you have no hope in the league of nations unless we amend this treaty ? Mr. Folk. Absolutely. Unamended, Egypt would be worse than hopeless because she would have no remedy. She would have not only Great Britain to contend with, but other countries, including the United States. But with this amendment adopted she would have some remedy. The Chairman. Merely as a matter of speculation, if Egypt comes into that forum, the council of the league. Great Britain would not vote to change her status ? Mr. Folk. No, sir. ' The Chairman. Do you think Japan would ? Mr. Folk. Well, I would not hke to go over the different members of the court and try to determine in advance how they might vote. Of course the league is founded on justice. You could not tell ia advance how each member is going to vote, and if this league is not founded on justice, then it will be the greatest curse to mankind. Senator Moses. You have already pointed out that Great Britain, and France already had an agreement with respect to Egypt. Would not that prevent France from voting with the Egyptians ? Mr. Folk. If that is true, then indeed they are hopeless. But if the league of nations is to be formed on the basis of justice, that is a 676 TREATY OP PEACE WITH GEEMANY. different proposition. Now we do not know what is in this agreement spoken of here, and we do not know what might be in secret agree- ments. I have an article here in the Century Magazine, where the writer says there are six agreements between Great Britain, France, and Italy respecting these eastern countries. Senator Johnson of California. Who is the author ? Mr. Folk. This is written by Herbert Adams Gibbons. He discusses article 23 of the covenant. The Chairman. Mr. Gibbons has sent to the committee and asked to lay a mass of papers before them in regard to Egypt, which I think you have covered. Senator Moses. You feel certain about this provisional agreement? Mr. Folk. What provisional agreement? Senator Moses. That you have been telling us about, for the disposition of overseas possessions. Mr. Folk. I do not know anything about it. I have never seen it, but I merely called your attention to the clause in the answer of the President to Senator Fall's question 13. I asked if you had not seen this provisional agreement, and whether it included Egypt or not. The chairman says he has not seen it. He does not know that he will see it. Senator Harding. The President says there is such an agreement? Mr. Folk. To use his exact language again [reading] : There has been a provisional agreement as to the disposition of these overseas pos- sessions whose confirmation and execution is dependent on the approval of the league of nations, and the United States is a party to that provisional agreenient. Senator Moses. What date is that ? Mr. Folk. August 21. Senator Moses. What is the date of the President's statement, in the paper of August 21 ? Mr. Folk. His statement is dated August 21, and is published in the afternoon papers of August 21. Senator Moses. I call your attention in that connection. Gov. Folk, to the stenographic report of the meeting held at the Wliite House, Tuesday, August 19. Toward the conclusion of it 1 spoke to the President about our taking only an undivided one-fifth part of the German overseas possessions, and asked him if there had been any plan made for the disposition of those overseas possessions, and he said, "I have not thought about that at all." I then asked him: You have no plans to suggest or recommendation to make to Congress? And he answered: Not yet, sir; I am Tvaiting until the treaty is disposed of. And yet the next day or two days after, he makes the statement which you read, that the United States is a party to a provisional agreement for the disposition of the overseas possessions. Mr. ]?OLK. Of course I am not here to discuss the answers of the President except in so far as he has mentioned a provisional agree- ment, and to ask if that provisional agreement covers the case of Egypt, and if it does, whether we would not be in this position, as Senator Lodge has intimated, the members of the Supreme Court might go outside and agree on how they will decide a case, subject merely to entering it up when they get on the bench, and then ask TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 677 for an argument. The litigant would have very little show. But I assume that the character of the contracts the President is speaking of is of a different nature. I assume that. I can not believe that he would have made a contract giving away these countries con.- trary to principles in the covenant. The Chairman. Governor, do you regard the council of the league of nations as a judicial body? Mr. Folk. If it is not judicial, then God help them. Senator Moses. Mr. Chairman, my only purpose in calling atten- tion to this is to show the tremendous contradictions which are involved in all our attempts to get any information as to what has been done, and what stipulations we are bound by in all these numerous treaties and secret treaties and other documents which have been made. Mr. Folk. Of course you have to see the treaty made with Turkey to see what has been done with Turkish territory. That is, I under- stand, to be turned over to Great Britain. Of course you want to see these agreements before you can decide. The Chairman. Yes; they are closely bound together. (Thereupon, at 12.05 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned to meet to-morrow, Tuesday, August 26, at 10.30 o'clock a. m., in executive session.) (The following letters from Mr. Folk were subsequently ordered printed in the record:) August 30, 1919. Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate. (In the case of Egypt.) Dear Mr. Chairman: The status of Egypt which has arisen out of the war just closing becomes properly a subject to be considered in any general treaty that may be made. Supplementing what 1 said to your honorable committee the other day and epitomizing the relief then asked for in behalf of the Egj^ptian commission, in the alternative, the first relief being the most desirable, the second the next, and the third next, that relief expressed in the alternative form is as follows: 1. Amend by inserting a new clause after section 6, article 147, to be known as article 147-A, to read as follows: "The independence of Egypt is hereby recognized, and the British Government will withdraw the British troops from Egypt within one year from the effective date of tliis treaty." Or— 2. Amend by inserting a new clause after section 6, article 147, to be known as article 147-A. to read as follows; "The protectorate proclaimed by Great Britain over Egypt is hereby declared to be temporary, and this protectorate shall in no wise interfere with the independence of Egypt, which is hereby declared to be free to enter into diplomatic relations with other nations." Or- 3. Amend by inserting a new clause after section 6, article 147, to be known as article 147-A to read as follov.s: " The status of Egypt is hereby declared to be a matter within the jurisdiction of the council of the league of nations, and shall not be considered an internal question of Great Britain." In behalf of the Egyptian commission appointed by the Legislative .\ssembly of Egypt, consideration of your committee is asked for the relief above prayed for in the hope that Egypt may be accorded that self-determination for which the Egyptian troops fought and which has so far been denied. Respectfully, .Jos. W. Folk, Cnunselfor the Commission Appointed by the Legislative Assembly of Egypt. 678 TREATY OF PEACK WITH GERMANY. AaausT 31, 1919. Hon. Henry Cabot Iiodge. Chairmnn Foreirjn Relations Commitlee, United States Senate, Washinglun, ]). C. In the case of Kgypt. Dp.Au Mr. Chairman: In behalf of the commiBsion appointed hv the Lej