3 2_H30 BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME FROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF Henrg W. Sage 189X Pj.sLCjqons , ihImi'L 3777 APR2 21948Ja '2 5243 i DEC 191949 ^' JAAII4 1350 4 fm-t Cornell University Library B2430.B49 S15 Ethical Implications of Bergson's philos olin 3 1924 029 122 095 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924029122095 THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF BERGSON'S PHILOSOPHY BY UNA BERNARD SAIT, Ph.D. ARCHIVKS OF PHILiOSOPHY EDITED BY FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIOGE No. 4, JUI»E, 1914 Colnmbia University Contributions to Philosophy snd PsyeholoAy, Vol. XVIII, Nos. 3—4 NEW YORE THE SCIENCE PRESS 1914 l\.^'^1 c>T S" 7^ /t7 /r TABLE OF CONTENTS Bibliography 5 Preface 9 Introduction i i Chapter I— experience and reality Section 1— immediate Experience 19 Section 2— duration 20 Section 3— motion and Change 24 section 4— intellect and intuition 29 Section 5— science and philosophy 37- section 6— art and Philosophy 47 Section 7— the meaning of reality 56- Section 8— Ethics 67 Chapter ll— the individual and the world Section i— perception 73 Section 2 -memory 79 Section 3-Freedom 93 Section 4— mental effort 101 SECTION 5— Personality 103 SECTION 6— Creative Evolution 110 Section 7— The Principle of life 127 Chapter in— human society and ethics Section 1— Bergson's Conception of society I41 Section 2 -a broader View 148 Section 3— the Good and how it is Known 154 Section 4— voluntary action and Responsibility I63 Section 5— the moral life as a Growth 170 THE WORKS OF HENRI BERGSON. (This bibliography has been certified as complete by Professor Bergson in a letter written April, 1912. There are, however, published in the Seances et travaux de I'academie des sciences morales et politiques many short reports on various books. These have been omitted from this bibliography. Five titles are marked with an asterisk *. These represent the only works by Professor Bergson that have been inaccessible to the writer of this essay. The abbreviations of titles that are used in the text are in- dicated in brackets.) 1. Books (in chronological order) : Quid Aristoteles de loco senserit. (Thesis) Paris: Felix Mean, 1889. Pp. 82. Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience. Paris : Felix Mean, 1889. 7th ed. 1909. Pp. viii, 185. [Donn. immed.] Matiere et memoire : essai sur la relation du corps avec I'esprit. Paris: Felix Mean, 1896. 6th ed. 1910. Pp. iii, 280. [Mat. et mem.] Le rire ; essai sur la signification du comique. Paris : Felix Mean, 1900. 7th ed. 1911. Pp. vii, 205. First published in the Revue de Paris, Feb.-March, 1900, vol. i, pp. 512-545 and 759-791, and vol. ii, pp. 146-179. L'Evolution creatrice. Paris; Felix Alcan, 1907. 7th ed. 1911. Pp. viii, 403. [L'Evol. creat.] 2. Articles and Published Lectures (in chronological order) : *La Specialite. Address at the distribution of prizes at the Lyeee of Angers, Aug., 1882. Angers : Imprimerie Lacheze et Dolbeau, 1882. Pp. 16. De la simulation inconsciente dans I'etat d'hypnotisme. Revue philosophique, Nov., 1886, vol. xxii, pp. 525- 531. *Le bon sens et les etudes classiques. Address at the dis- tribution of prizes at the Concours general des lycees et colleges, 1895. Distribution des prix du Concours general, Paris, Delalain, 1895. Memoire et reconnaisance. Revue philosophique, March and April, 1896, vol. xli, pp. 225-248, 380-399. (Republished in Matiere et memoire.) BIBLIOGRAPHY Perception €t matiere. Revue de metaphysique et de morale. May, 1896, vol. iv, pp. 257-277. (Repub- lished in Matiere et memoire.) Note sur les origines psychologiques de notre croyance a la loi de causalite. Lecture at the philosophical con- gress at Paris, 1900. Published in the Bibliotheque du congres international de philosophie, 1900, pp. 1-15. For a report on the subsequent discussion see Revue de metaphysique et de morale, Sept., 1900, vol viii, pp. 655-660. Le reve. A Lecture at the Institut Psychologique Interna- tional in 1901. Published in the Bulletin de I'institut p. i, May, 1901, vol. i, pp. 103-122; and in Revue scientifique, June, 1901, 4th series, vol. xv, pp. 705- 713. Reported in condensed form in Revue de philosophie, April, 1901, vol. i, pp. 486-489. Le parallelisme psycho-physique et la metaphysique positive. A defence of three propositions at the meeting of the Societe frangaise de philosophie, May, 1901. Published in the Bulletin of the society, June, 1901, vol. i, pp. 33-71. [Paral. psycho-phys.] L'Eflfort intellectuel. Revue philosophique, Jan., 1902, vol. liii, pp. 1-27. [L'EflF. intell.] *La volonte. Address at the distribution of prizes at the Lycee Voltaire, July, 1902. Published in the ac- count of the distribution of prizes, Imprimerie Quelquejeu, 1902. Introduction a la metaphysique. Revue de metaphysique et de morale, Jan., 1903, vol. xi, pp. 1-36. [Introd. met.] Le paralogisme psycho-physiologique. A lecture at the philosophical congress at Geneva, 1904. Published in the Revue de metaphysique et de morale, Nov., 1904, vol. xii, pp. 895-908. For a report of the sub- sequent discussion see id., pp. 1027-1036. L'Idee de neant. Revue philosophique, Nov., 1906, vol. Ixii, pp. 449-466. (Republished as part of chap, iv of L'Evolution creatrice.) Le souvenir du present et la fausse reconnaissance. Revue philosophique, Dec, 1908, vol. Ixvi, pp. 561-593. [Souv. du pres.] Life and Consciousness. The Huxley lecture at the Uni- versity of Birmingham, 1911. Published in The Hibbert Journal, Oct., 1911, vol x, pp. 24-44. La perception du changement ; conferences faites a I'uni- versite d'Oxford les 26 et 27 Mai, 1911. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1911, pp. 2>7. [Percep. du chang.] BIBLIOGBAPBT 7 L'Intuition philosopbique. A lecture at the philosoohical congress at Bologna, 1911. Published in the Revue de metaphysique et de morale Nov., 1911, vol. xix, pp. 809-827. [L'Int. phil.] *Les realites que la science n'atteint pas. Foi et vie, 1911, fasc. 14, p. 421 et seq. Presidential Address. Delivered on May 23, 1913, be- fore the Society for Psychical Research. Published in the Proceedings of the Society, July, 1913, vol. xxvi, pp. 462-479. 3. Miscellaneous (in chronological order) : Extraits de Lucrece, avec un commentaire, des notes et une etude sur la poesie, la philosophic, la physique, le texte et la langue de Lucrece. Paris : Delagrave, 1884, 8th ed., 1912, pp. viii, xlvii, 159. Revue critique; Principes de metaphysique et de psychol- ogic par Paul Janet. Revue philosophique, Nov., 1897, vol. xliv, pp. 525-551. Rapport sur la fondation Carnot. Seances et travaux de I'academie des sciences morales et politiques, 1903, vol. clix, pp. 56-62. Also in Memoires de I'academie des sciences morales et politiques, 1904, vol. xxiv, pp. 351-358. Remarks on the place and character of philosophy in sec- ondary education. Delivered at the meeting of the Societe frangaise de philosophic, Dec., 1902. Pub- lished in the Bulletin of the society, Feb., 1903, vol. iii, pp. 44-46, 51. Rapport sur le concours pour le prix Halphen, 1903. Seances et travaux de I'academie des sciences morales et politiques, 1903, vol. clx, pp. 540-544. Also in Memoires de I'academie des sciences morales et politiques, 1904, vol. xxiv, pp. 693-698. Notice sur la vie et les ceuvres de M. Felix Ravaisson- Mollien. Seances et travaux de I'academie des sci- ences m.orales et politiques, 1904, vol. clxi, pp. 673- 708. Also in Memoires de I'academie des sciences morales et politiques, 1907, vol. xxv, pp. 1-43. Preface to Esquisse d'un systeme de psychologic rationelle, by Emile Lubac. Paris : Felix Alcan, 1903, pp. vii-x. A brief account of his theory of perception given at the meeting of the Societe frangaise de philosophie, Dec, 1904. Published in the Bulletin of the society, 1905, vol. V, pp. 94-99. Letter explaining that his theory of duration was devel- oped independently of James and Ward. Revue philosophique, Aug., 1905, vol. Ix, pp. 229-230. BIBLIOGRAPHY Rapport sur le concours pour le prix Bordin, 1905, ayant pour sujet Maine de Biran. Seances et tra- vaux de I'academie des sciences morales et politiques, 1906, vol. clxv, pp. 152-162. Also in Memoires de I'academie des sciences morales et politiques, 1907, vol. XXV, pp. 809-821. Sur revolution creatrice. Revue du mois, Sept., 1907, vol. iv, pp. 351-354. A propos de revolution de I'intelHgence g^metrique. Re- vue de metaphysique et de morale, Jan., 1908, vol. xvi, pp. 28-33. Remarks as to the influence of his philosophy on the pupils of the lycees. Delivered at the meeting of the Societe frangaise de philosophie in Nov., 1907, and published in the Bulletin of the society, 1908, vol. viii, pp. 21-22. Letter on the same subject as the above. Published in the appendix to L'Evolution de I'enseig^ement philos- ophique, by Binet. L'Annee psychologique, 1908, vol. xiv, pp. 230-231. Rapport sur le concours pour le prix Le Dissez de Pe- nanrun. 1907. Seances ct travaux de I'academie nanrun, 1907. Seances et travaux de I'academie 91-102. Also in Memoires de I'academie des sciences morales et politiques, 1909, vol. xxvi, pp. 778-785. [Diss de Pen.] Notes on the words "immediat" and "inconnaissable." Bulletin de la societe frangaise de philosophie, 1908, vol. viii, pp. 331-333 and p. 341. Preface to a volume of Les grands philosophes, G. Tarde par ses fils. Paris: Louis Michaud, 1909, pp. 5 and 6. Remarks as to the part played by the unconscious in men- tal life. Delivered at the meeting of the Societe frangaise de philosophie, Nov., 1909, and published in the Bulletin of the society, 1910, vol. x, pp. 31-36, 43-46. A propos d'un article de Mr. W. B. Pitkin intitule James and Bergson. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods. July, 1910, vol. vii, pp. 385-388. Introduction to Le pragmatisme, Le Brun's translation of William James. Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1911, pp. 1-16. *Preface to Le sens et la valeur de la vie, by R. Eucken, translated by Hullet and Leicht. Paris : Felix Alcan, 1912. PREFACE. This essay is based upon a thorough examination of all Bergson's writSngs. Although the treatment of any special topic is far from full, references are given under each section, in order that the reader may be able to consult all that Berg- son himself has to say on each subject. The writer wishes to express her indebtedness to Professor Dewey. The influence of his thought on her must be evident to all, particularly in those sections dealing with ethics. Although the conclusions reached may not be endorsed by him, the point of view from which these sections have been written is largely due to the fact that the writer has been privileged to study under him. INTRODUCTION. Ethics deals with human conduct considered as right or wrong, good or bad. It must, accordingly, include both the given and the ideal, the "is" and the "ought-to-be" of human action. The "is" must be viewed in the light of the "ought-to-be," and, again, the "ought-to-be" can only be determined with reference to the "is." It is thus essential that we gain an objective view of the facts of human nature — of the individual life and of society. We must find in what way human activity is conditioned and how far it is effective in producing changes. In these concrete facts of life we have the potentialites of what ought to be and the hindrances to its fulfilment. It is here, then, that we must seek to discover the ideal and with it once more return to judge the given. Now, in its examination of these facts, ethical theory must make use of certain hypotheses. All theory, in order to obtain a coordination of its data, involves the use of hypotheses. These hypotheses must be based on the facts they seek to explain, and their adequacy must be tested, once more, by reference to these facts. We are now more prepared to see what is involved in the discovery of the ethical implications of a philosophy. Any philosophy, in so far as it furnishes points of view from which the facts of individual and social experience may be coordinated, has its implications in ethical theory. Ethical theory may, of course, claim its complete independ- ence of any system of metaphysics. It may form its own hypotheses from its own consideration of the facts of human experience. But if philosophy includes within it an unpre- judiced observation and coordination of these same facts, then the spheres of philosophy and ethics will overlap. Ethics may derive its hypotheses from such a philosophy and still be true to an empirical method. Ethical theory is, however, peculiar in the fact that it does not only seek to coordinate its data, but also involves the discovery of ideals. In the facts of human nature it must discern the direction of the fullest human development. Here, too, ethics has complete right to its independence of any ex- ternal point of view, any ready-made ideals, furnished by metaphysics. But here, too, philosophy may be covering the same ground, and from its consideration of human experience may be lead to the discovery of the ideal development of humanity. 11 12 INTKODVCTION Philosophy, it is true, may very probably go further. It may see in this direction of human development part of a vaster process. It may even see in it the fulfilment of some cosmic purpose. Here philosophy and ethical theory may part com- pany. Ethics need not link its discovery of the good in human experience onto any metaphysical or religious view as to the meaning or the purpose of life. Indeed, the good must always be followed for its own sake. Ethics must, however, have the fullest possible insight into its data. Human experience may prove itself to have depths in which it senses its union with forces going beyond it. If this be the case, the suggestions philosophy has to oflfer as to such forces are of the greatest interest to ethical theory. The moral life then acquires fuller and deeper meaning. We shall soon see that the very heart of Bergson's phil- osophy is his insistence upon the fact that experience has depths. Accordingly, we are justified in including among the ethical implications of his philosophy, not only a view of the facts of individual and social experience, but also any vision we may reach of the meaning of the moral life as part of life in general. Our first task must be to gain an adequate view of human life from the standpoint of Bergson's thought. When this has been accomplished we may ask if, on this basis, we can trace an objective good in the structure of things. In other words, is there any justification for believing that life has tended towards the development of values, or even that it has evolved in view of such a development. In either case, we should then obtain objective ideals or goods for life in general, for society, and for the individual. On the basis of these the intrinsic value of human ideals could be appraised. Human conduct in so far as it furthered objective ideals would be right conduct. Once such an objective basis has been established another side of the whole matter presents itself. We must consider moral experience on its subjective side. The meaning of the moral life from the point of view of the individual and of society must be discussed. Bergson himself has not as yet developed any theory of ethics, although he is reported to be engaged on the study of the subject.* He cannot, however, have been primarily inter- ested in ethics. If he had been, it is probable that not only would he have given expression to the ethical implications of his thought, but his philosophy itself would have dwelt on some aspects of experience which it either imderemphasizes or omits. The vital part of a man's philosophy is his interpretation ^New York Times, March 10, 1912; Feb. 22, 1914, INTRODUCTION 13 of experience. Reality is refracted through the medium of his personality. His own training and opportunities and the accumulated knowledge of his day furnish him with his material, but to this he gives new form and a unique meaning. Bergsoii, combining in himself the scientist and the poet, gives us in his thought an unparalleled blending of artistic vision and scientific analysis. Throughout he is led by the clue that change is the "stuff" of all things; meanings must be sought as they emerge in action. We shall, however, endeavor to show that Bergson has not considered what seem to be some of the most striking implications of his own insistence on the fundamental reality of the dynamic. And, further, that these very omissions have deprived his philosophy of some of the material fundamental to ethical theory. With the attempted filling in of this material some clear-cut distinctions which appear in Bergson's ^writings are modified. Such modifications, however, appear to be in keeping with the underlying tenor of his views, rather than in any way mili- tating against them. We may now briefly suggest those facts which, on the basis of Bergson's view of life, seem to be of fundamental importance to ethics. It will be the chief purpose of this essay to explain and justify the following outline. For Bergson philosophy is vision, and although such a stand- point does not necessarily involve a lack of emphasis on the active personal attitude towards life, yet in Bergson's case, it seems to have to some extent limited his thought. In particular he has underemphasized an important aspect of his own view of intuition. He merely mentions the power our intuition of duration has of going beyond itself, of linking us un with all life. It is interesting to note that it is in his later writings that Bergson dwells most on the essential unity of all things. For instance, he says : "The deeper we plunge into duration, the nearer we feel ourselves approach the principle in which we participate, and whose eternity . is one of life and motion. How otherwise can we live and move in it?""^ And again : "The matter and life that are in the world are also in us : the forces that work in all things we also feel in us. What- ever be the intimate essence of what is and of what is in the making, we are of it."' Briefly, in fact, "ist nicht der Kern der Natur Menschen im Herzen?" But these are isolated pas- sages ; this important aspect of intuition is left undeveloped. If life may be considered as in some degree an interpenetra- tion of all durations, we shall then be in a position to develop iPerc. du chang., p. 37. 2L'Int. phil., Rev. de met. et de mor.. vol. xix, pp. 823-824. 14 JNTRODVGTION a view of human society. It is in his discussion of society that Bergson's most striking omission occurs. He has not in any way followed out his own fundamental view of experience so far as regards society. It is only the more superficial experi- ence of humanity, taken collectively, that is anywhere dealt with — the practical life of action on the material environment. Again, returning to the principle of life in general of vvhich Bergson speaks in one of the passages just quoted, it will be found that here, too, there are omissions of what would seem quite legitimately implied. Here, too, some modification must be made. The "stuff" of all things is mobility and duration. But pure duration is creation, and this implies some direction or directions of struggle. On this subject Bergson has some- thing to say, but he does not deal with it at any length. And yet, in this matter of directions, there is involved the question of the purpose of life and creation. If there is purpose, its achievement must be the good in things, and the very heart of ethics should he the persistent attempt to discern and follow its direction. Through such an investigation we shall attempt to get a realization of the nature of life in general, of society, and of the individual. At the same time we shall hope to be led, through the consideration of these materials which ethics has at its disposal, to some discernment of the purposes of life and so reach not only the "is" but something of the "ought-to-be." Objectively, there would be the "ought-to-be" of society and of the individual, the following out of their purposes as they are implied in that of life in general. The problem of this essay is a difficult one. Although we must limit ourselves to that which has direct bearing on our subject, yet we must at the same time gain some view of Bergson's thought as a whole. No partial view can grasp his meaning. Far less could such a view reach further meanings than those already found. Bergson's philosophy is a vision, and through his inimitable style he has been able to suggest this vision to his readers. Even so, the language of every day often fails him ; it is incommensurable with all he means. His frequent and striking analogies bear witness to this fact. In particular, it is his most fundamental views which are furthest removed from our ordinary modes of thought and are thus inexpressible in direct language. We shall attempt to treat Bergson's thought, as he himself suggests we should do in order to gain a view of the meaning of a philosophy.! This involves seeking for his "center of force," the point at which he most nearly touches reality, and iL'Int. phil., Rev. de met, et de mor., vol. xix, p. 820; and Maine de Biran, Mem. de I'acad. des set. mor. et poL, 1907, vol. xxv, pp. 810, 820. mTRODVOTION 15 whence, receiving an impetus, he evolves his thought. Start- ing from this "center of force," we should be a;ble to follow the underlying current of Bergson's thought and reproduce those aspects of it which are essential to the task we have in hand.' Bergson's philosophy has, of course, been a growth. Through continually further study, he has been led to the discovery of new meanings, and, in the light of some of these, distinctions made in his earlier writings are to some extent modified. In such cases we shall attempt to present his views in their latest formulation. We have taken as Bergson's "center of force" the intuition of duration. In the spirit of his whole philosophy we shall find the meaning of duration to lie in the fact, that experience has varying degrees of depth and of consequent tension. "Ten- sional" experience is the term used in this essay to describe the intermingling of lived experience and of the experience which is of increasing practical use the more superficial it becomes. The all-important thing to grasp is that everything is the result of some blending of tendencies. In presenting such a view, distinctions must be made whose meaning can only be reached as they take their place once more in the medium whence they have been drawn. All of Bergson's thought is so interrelated, that on no point can final definition be attained until all has been said. Throughout we must remember that our description of tensional experience is but an image, and as such there is a danger that we should conceive it too spatially. Perhaps this tendency may be mitigated if we endeavor to think that the degrees of tension, that is of depths of lived experience and of fuller reality, represent the degrees whereby spatiality is drawn together in what Bergson himself suggests may be another dimension.^ Such an artifice may not present any very clear meaning, but it at least guards against a false meaning. Let us now turn to the argument of this essay and indicate the bearing each topic has upon our problem. It is evident we must start with a discussion of experience and the distinctions which Bergson makes within it. Beginning with immediate experience we find that experience has depths. The sections on duration and motion and change analyze internal and external experience somewhat more fully and bring ont in particular Bergson's view of duration. We are now prepared to give some account of the theory of iSuch a presentation of the fundamentals of Bergson's philosophy does not follow its chronological development. We may here suggest that the clue to the progress of his thought may be found in the fact that, in his successive writings, are presented different stages in a new solution of the problem of matter and mind. 2 Pare, du chang., p. 35. 16 INTRODUCTION knowledge based on such a view of experience. This is es- pecially important in that one form of knowledge is intuition, and, as we have already seen, a modification and development of Bergson's view of intuition furnishes us with some of the facts most fundamental to ethics. The question of intuition and intellect is also essential to a future discussion of moral knowledge. Intellect and intuition, the forms of knowledge adapted re- spectively to grasp the more real and the more superficial aspects of experience, have their spheres and their methods. Science and philosophy are their respective products. It has been sug- gested that Bergson's view of philosophy may be in some degree contributory to the fact that he has not written on ethics. An account of philosophic method is accordingly most important. Science, on the other hand, need be dealt with no further than is required by such an account. The task of the philosopher is vision, and this at once suggests some comparison of art and philosophy. So far we have been engaged in an exposition of Bergson's own views. In this section, however, we try to distinguish between the ideas of visiion and of mere artistic appreciation. Only thus can the necessary emphasis be laid on the active and sympathetic side of vision. We may now ask what is the meaning of reality according to the view of experience here held. A certain unity can be given to all that precedes, through a consideration of Bergson's meaning- when he maintains that experience has different de- grees of tension and depth. In this section, too, ambiguities in the two important terms, ''consciousness" and "knowledge," are discussed. Once such a background is obtained we may turn to ethics. Chapter I concludes with a brief indication of the general bearing of Bergson's philosophy on ethics. Such develop- ments of his thought are mentioned not solely on their own account. They are important in that they give us the general direction of the theory of ethics which we shall be able to suggest when the facts fundamental to this theory have been established. To reach these facts we need some account of life in all its forms. In Chapter II the individual will be first considered, for Bergson's own starting point is frankly that of the in- dividual's consciousness of his personal duration. But, in beginning thus, the meaning and relation of subjective and objective, of internal and external, and finally of matter and consciousness, will come to be determined. We shall thus be led from the individual to the world in general. Bergson's view of the relation of matter and mind is funda- mental to our argument. Accordingly we must start with an INTBODVCTION 17 account of his theories of perception and memory. We are now ready to consider the meaning of freedom. This section is of importance in connection with the future treatment of moral responsibility. The relation of the ideas of freedom and creation further necessitates some account of Bergson's analysis of mental effort, and of the process of creation and invention. We are thus led to the all-important subject of personality. The nature and meaning of the self are fundamental to all that follows. Here we reach the crucial point of the under-emphasis on that aspect of intuition which is of most importance to ethics. Through elaboration of this point, we hope to show that the individual in his deeper experience draws nearer to the principle of life in all its manifestations. But some ac- count of these manifestations is required. We must supple- ment our treatment of the individual by outlining Bergson's view of creative evolution and of life in the world. Chapter II closes with a discussion of the creative activity of the principle of life. Through the development of the same point which was made in connection with personality it is held that purpose may be traced in all creation — not purpose in the sense of a definite plan, but as a direction of development. In Chapter III we turn to human society. In the first place Bergson's conception of society must be given ; then we shall be prepared to suggest how this may be modified and supplemented by a broader view. We may now discern something of the ideal development of human society and we find this to involve the fullest development of its individual members. Through this reciprocal development the purpose of the life-principle as manifested in humanity is found to accomplish itself. Thus we may trace an objective good and absolute values whence all human values derive their significance. If there be a direction of development whose furtherance is the good, how is this direction known in general and in the specific situations which make up human life? The attempt is made to answer this question in the section on the good and how it is known. Again we must ask how far the individual is free to discover and to follow the direction of the good, and ac- cordingly what is meant by moral responsibility. Vohtntary action and responsibility is the title of our next section. The last section of this essay deals with the moral life as a growth, in order to emphasize the fact that process and change are fundamental in any theory claiming Bergson's philosophy as its 'basis. We deal here with the moral growth of the individual through social influences and again with social growth through individual initiative. In this process of growth the most impor- tant distinctions of moral theory are found to have their place. CHAPTER I. Experience and Reality. immediate experience.^ Life, experience, reality — these are, from the standpoint of immediacy, synonymous terms ; and it is at the point of view of immediacy that empiricism worthy of the name must, in the first instance, place itself. It must seek purely and simply for what is, and it must seek for all that is. As Bergson says: "empiricism must tread the long and arduous paths of facts''^ and seek "to follow reality in all its windings."^ No single de- tail of experience, infinitely rich, varied and complex as it is, can empircism afiford to disregard; however vague and fleeting such a detail may be, it is a part of experience and must not be neglected. But such observation requires effort. In the first place, preconceived ideas must, as far as possible, be eliminated. There is no question here of conceivability or inconceivability, possibility or impossibility; whatever is part of life and of ex- perience, as such is positive and is real in its quality of im- mediacy. And not only must we endeavor to observe, but we must take care that our observation is as exhaustive as possible. It is at once evident that we are aware of different parts of experience in differing degrees. Indeed, if we may so express it, there is much in experience that we are not aware of at all. Let us take any ordinary experience of something perceived in the world around us — say the words I am writing on this page. The words I am most clearly aware of at the moment are, in the first place, set in an indefinite spatial context. In being aware of them, I am also aware of the paper, the table, the room, and so on in decreasing degrees of clearness. Where can one set any limit to a context all parts of which are in continuity? The parts that appear at first so clear-cut are all interacting with the experience in the focus of attention ; all parts of it, in a sense, are penetrating one another. iQf importance in connection with this subject are the following; Paral. psycho-phys., Bulletin de la soc. fr. de phil, vol. i, pp. 33-71 ; L'eff. intelL, Rev. phil., vol. liii, pp. 23, 25-27; note on the word, "immediat," Bulletin de la soc. fr. de phil., vol. viii, pp. 331-333 ; L'Int. phil.. Rev. de met. et de mor., vol. xix, p. 823. 2Paral. psycho-phys., Bulletin de la soc. fr. de phil, vol. i, p. 55. 3Id., p. 54. 19 20 EXPERIENCE AND REALITY Again let us take another context of the same words on the paper; they are not only set in a spatial context; they have a meaning; the experience of them has, so to speak, depth. They may superficially appear to be a repetition, or nearly so, of some former experience, but this they cannot be. In some form or other all our past experience is influencing our present. This awareness I now have could not be the same if my past experience had been in any way different. We thus find that this experience of what, in every day language, we call the outer world, presents itself to us in two forms according as we superficially observe or as we make the effort to go deeper. Its obvious tendency is to present itself to us in the form of facts in juxtaposition to other facts. Such facts are, for all practical purposes, repeated, and they tend to distinct multiplicity and spatiality. But if we go a little deeper, we find a tendency for this experience to present itself under the form of reciprocal interpenetration. It is true that, in its spatial context, this tendency may seem slight, but the moment we take experience as influenced by the past, that is, as an experience in time, we find this tendency much stronger. Let us turn, then, to the form of experience where this latter tendency can be most clearly studied. Let us leave experience as spread out around us and turn to the unfolding of our ex- perience in time. Here we shall at once reach the heart of the distinction between the two tendencies of experience; its superficial form, shown most clearly when we perceive facts juxtaposed in space, and its interpenetrating form shown best as it evolves in time. Here we have Bergson's "center of force."' From his insistence on this fundamental form of ex- perience all his thought has sprung.^ DURATION.^ At any moment, what are we conscious of? First, we per- ceive more or less clearly defined objects all around us, and, at the same time, these perceptions call forth recollections that help us to interpret them. These recollections seem a part of us, drawn out, as it were, by perception ; looking back on them, we imagine them as distinct from one another, arranged some- how in the order of their occurrence. We feel tendencies to iL'Int. phil., Rezi. de met. et de mor., vol. xix, p. 820 ^Letter, Rev. phil., vol. Ix, p. 230. SQf importance in connection with this subject are the followino- : Donn. immed., pp. 57-106; Introd. met., Rev. de met et de mor vol xi pp. 4-9, 17-23; L'Evol. creat., pp. S-12, 42, 49-50, 323, 343, 367-369, 382; Percep. du chang., pp. 17, 26-36; L'Int. phil., Rev. de mSt. et de mor vol' xix, pp. 823, 826-827. DURATION 21 act, and perhaps some emotion or affection. As we watch ourselves, these seem distinct states, and the more we analyze, the better defined do they become. They seem, too, to repeat former states. But if, instead of watching and analyzing, we make an effort to reach what we feel is our very selves, our living and acting selves, the result is very different. There are no longer distinct states; they fuse and interpene- trate till there is simply a continuity, indivisible perpetual becoming. In this ceaseless change, no one moment is the same as any other moment; there is complete qualitative heterogeneity and incommensurability between past and pre- sent. No sensation, no feeling can repeat itself. The present is forever unforeseeable and new, though organized with the past and so animated by a common life that the whole soul may express itself in one state. This indivisible continuity of change is what Bergson calls duration. He claims that it is "the clearest thing in the world" ;^ it is simply time perceived as indivisible. No roundabout methods wijl suffice to reach the consciousness of duration, "we must begin by placing our- selves in it."^ It is experienced and lived time, the unfolding of our conscious life, of states that only become distinct when it suits us to divide them. When we speak of the present we really mean a certain interval of duration, and with an effort we find this interval to be extensible. The distinction between past and present is relative to the extension of the field of our attention. That in which we are not actually interested forth- with falls back into the past. Living as we do, with our atten- tion turned almost ceaselessly to the future, the past as a whole seems dead to us, but it is there, following us cease- lessly, undivided from the present. In cases of accident, where the shock is so great as to disturb the normal direction of our attention, the past may once more become vivid and present. Although duration is the very "stuff" of our experience, al- though we live it, it is almost impossible for us to represent it to ourselves. Duration is a qualitative multiplicity, yet it ex- cludes all idea of reciprocal exteriority or juxtaposition, all idea of extension and number. It is an organic development, and yet this must not be considered as a growing quantity that can be measured. But we and the things around us certainly appear to be in a time that can be measured, whose moments can be num- bered. Looking backward, we represent to ourselves the coincidence of definite happenings with definite points of time which we picture as stretching backward in an ordered line iPercep. du chang., p. 26. 2L'Evol. creat., p. 323. 22 EXPERIENCE AND REALITY of moments. What is this time that has all the aspect of a homogeneous medium, and what relation does it bear to ex- perienced time, that is, to duration? The image of a continuous line implies the perception of a before and after given not purely in succession but simul- taneously. So that order may be established between terms, these terms must first be distinguished, and then there must be comparison of their respective places. Again we are able to number the moments of this time. If we represent number to ourselves — not only the figure or word which we use for that number, we find that it is a collection or multiplicity of parts which, for the purpose of being counted, are provision- ally considered as units, and as identical with one another. Their only distinction for this purpose is that they occupy different positions in space, for only in space can there be clear distinction of parts external to one another. Consequently, in the representation of number, space is necessarily involved. To count the material objects we see and touch is easy enough ; it can be done directly, for they appear to us as localized in space. But when we come to representations other than sight or touch, and still more to the purely affective states, some other method must be devised. The method seems pointed to at once by the way we count the objects of the external world. We distinguish them first in space and then combine them into a sum. Although this cannot here be done directly, it may be achieved by symbolical representation. It has already been seen how, at first sight, our states of con- sciousness appear as distinct and well-defined. It is only by going deep into ourselves that we discover the superficial nature of such distinct states; they represent just a certain way of looking at something that is itself pure succession and heterogeneity. Memory can arrange its recollections in a row in an ideal space, for past succession, no longer in the act of creation, can be represented in the form of juxtaposition. And so the illusion arises that our experience consists of distinct states arranged one after the other. As a matter of fact this is how we usually do represent it, but we should remember that it is only the aspect that conscious life takes when, so to speak, "refracted" through space. Let us take some examples. We can follow a melody with- out any idea of distinct notes. If one of the notes is unduly emphasized, there is a qualitative change in the whole musical phrase, which, rather than the change in the length of a note as length, tells us of the mistake. Each note is representative of the whole and does not become isolated except to thought cap- able of abstraction. If we do cut the melody into distinct notes, it is because spatial images have been mixed with our impression of pure succession. In the same way, when the hour strikes DURATION 23 on the clock, we may get the qualitative impression of the sounds as a whole or we may count each sound by disso- ciating it and so in thought putting it in space. The two types of multiplicity represented in each case are absolutely different. Multiplicity may be qualitative, in whidh case it is a multiplicity of organization, a multiplicity that has no con- nection with number. Or, again, we may have quantitative multiplicity where the parts are distinct, space consequently being involved. It is by using this second type of multiplicity as a sign of the first that we are able to number and arrange all those facts that cannot be directly counted. Time taken as a homogeneous medium is just the spatial symbol of real time or duration. It serves as a common denominator to all pos- sible concrete durations, and is represented by discontinuous moments replacing each other in an infinitely divided line. When we say that suc?h and such a phenomenon took such and such a time, we are counting a number of units which have been agreed upon as a standard in this measurable time. Ab- straction is made of the real stuff of that interval of time. Time as a homogeneous medium can scarcely be distinguished from space. For since a homogeneous medium is devoid of qualities, it is hard to see how there could be two such mediums distinct from one another. Measureable time is really a mixed idea for, in so far as it involves duration, it is succession and yet, in so far as it is homogeneous, there has been an intrusion into it of the idea of space. It has been said that we usually represent time in what has been shown to be a symbolical fashion. The fact is that if there were not some such common denominator chaos would be the result, and social life and language would be comoletely impossible. What the mind does is to dissociate the internal life into separate states by means of space and then, taking these states in their most impersonal form, to give them names. We become so obsessed with this essentially useful idea of space that we can only with an effort see what is at the root of our experience. In addition, it is almost impossible for us to ex- press this; language was not made to embody individual ex- perience. It expresses only what is static, common and hence impersonal in the impressions of humanity and at least covers, if it does not crush, our individual experiences. But still the duration in which we act is continuity really lived, and this is very different from the artificial decomposition of duration in which it is useful for us to watch ourselves act. Why, where order now reigns, should we try to reintroduce confusion? We have no reason to do so practically; but theoretically, if we wish to penetrate to the more fundamental aspect of things, it is obvious that this cannot be reconstructed from the symbols in which, for utilitarian purposes, we usually 24 EXPERIENCE AND REALITY express it. Further, the normal conditions of our experience are bound to be modified by this method of habitual symbolical representation. MOTION AND CHANGE.^ We have seen that duration is, for practical purposes, repre- sented as motion in space. It seems that if a line measures the duration of a motion, duration can be divided into instants, just as the line can be divided into points. But here we are brought to the consideration of the general question of motion and change. Motion takes place in space, and so once more we return to experience in its spread-out character and are able to indicate more fully its tendency to assume two aspects. Once more the effort must be made to see and experience motion and change not only on the surface but deeply. When dealing with external objects we certainly need not represent them symbolically, yet there may be conditions making it useful, and thus usual, that we should perceive things in a superficial form. Let us take a simple example of motion in space. If we lift a hand, what is our immediate experience? We have a simple muscular sensation and we see that the hand describes a cer- tain interval, say ab. Now this interval of space can be divided into as many points of space as we wish, so we imagine that the motion itself can also be regarded as infinitely divisible. But we must distinguish between the act of motion and the space traversed. This act has duration which coincides with the internal aspect it has for consciousness ; it is thus indivis- ible and escapes space, although the successive positions through which it passes are in space. For how can motion coincide with the immovable or be made up of immobilities ? How is a moving object at a point in its path? It passes such a point and, if stopped, would be there. Of course, we could stop moving at any point in ab, say at c; but then this would not be one motion, but two motions; the sensation would be quite different. One motion, as a passage from rest to rest, is indivisible. Once the line ab has been traversed it may be taken to symbolize the act that is over and to measure the length of past time it occupied, but it cannot really represent the motion as it is in the making or in its duration. The points of the line ab are not in or under the motion, but we project them beneath it as so many places where a moving object might stop, when, by hypothesis, it does not do lOf importance in connection with this subject are the following: Donn. immed., pp. 84-87 ; Mat et mem., pp. 207-23S ; Introd. met., Rev. de met. ct de mor., vol. xi, pp. 19-25 ; Percep. du chang., passim. MOTWN AND CHANGE 25 SO. They are, Bergson says, "not really positions but sup- positions,"^ merely points of view; and how can motion be constructed from such? Once more, Bergson insists, motion, like duration, should be seized in its essence. Certainly our muscular sensation of motion gives us something fundamentally real, and so does our visual sensation. If we start with motion itself, we see that there is more in motion than in the immovable or than in the successive positions it passes through. We cannot derive motion from the motionless but, on the contrary, the effect of immobility is easily obtained when two moving objects are at rest relatively to one another. If two trains travel along parallel lines at the same velocity, they are relatively at rest. Now there never is true immobility if, by this term, absence of all motion is meant; but there is relative and apparent mi- mobility in all cases analogous to that of the two trains. This situation is really the exception, but to us it appears normal, just because it allows us to act on things and let them act on us. Our action needs immobility, or at least the appearance of it; and so it is convenient for us to see in it something funda- mental and in motion something superimposed on immobility. In our practical life two facts about motion are important: that it describes space and that, at each point of space, it might have stopped. This is why our tendency is to consider motion as though it were made up of a series of positions, as though it coincided with motionless points of space. We think that we can divide it indefinitely without noticing its natural divisions. All this is perfectly legitimate in ordinary practical life, but, if such a point of view is carried into theory, it makes us close our eyes to the most fundamental thing in experience. So far we have been speaking of motion in space, but all that has here been said can, Bergson holds, be applied to all forms of change. All change is indivisible ; and though we like to consider it as composed of a series of successive states, there is more in any change than its successive states. We have seen that our in- ternal experience is fundamentally one continuous indivisible change of quality. Let us now deal with change in the things about us. A material object presents itself to us as a system of qualities. Resistance and color take the central position, and the other qualities adhere to these two. But though we touch a body in a certain point in space, physics has established the fact that all parts of matter are in interaction with one another. As for the colored patch we see, we know it to be a series of infinitely rapid vibrations. Further, our perceptions change as a part of our ceaselessly changing personality. And so, within and with- ilntrod. met., Rev. de met. et de mor., vol. xi, p. 19. 26 EXPERIENCE AND REALITY out, there is mobility. But, once more, in order that we may act on things, a condition of things is necessary analogous to the two trains. We need a static view of things and, if we have such conditions that the change which is ourselves is at rest relatively to the change which we call an object, we have the appearance that is called a state. The first function of perception is thus to seize a series of elementary changes in the form of quality — it, so to speak, condenses all these vibra- tions in a simple and stable state. As in the case of motion and the points of its trajectory, we at once proceed to recom- pose change with its states. Around us there is a moving continuity, but in it we dissociate two terms; permanence and change. Permanence we represent by bodies and change by homogeneous movements in space. Our action tends always towards certain centers ; the eye cuts out these relatively invariable objects for us in the visual field and they become apparently independent. In practical experience, it is useful to distinguish between bodies and actions exercised on them. It is useful to fix the limit of the object where it can be touched, and we see in its action some indefinable thing that is detached and different from it. Even our auditory images are immediately attached to visual and tactual ones. In this way we re-establish continuity. For our perception only lets us seize from moment to moment the discontinuous effects of numberless vibrations. Change is everywhere deep down, but we localize it here and there on the surface of things, for this is the view of things that is useful to us. However, once more, if we wish to get at what is most fundamental, we must eliminate these practical habits of perception. We must take off the spectacles through which we are enabled to act on the things around us and try to look at these things in a dis- interested fashion. By abstracting our action on things and the paths cut by perception in "the entanglement of reality,"^ independency of bodies will be reabsorbed in universal inter- action. In physics, the representation of all things by means of solid atoms acting and reacting on one another seems clear to us, 'but this is simply because contact is our means of acting on our environment. As a matter of fact, the solidity of the atom seems to dissolve more and more, the further physical research is carried. The support given to motion retreats further and further till it becomes so infinitely small that it is a mere concession to our ordinary method of looking at things. Force and matter thus draw together, converging to a common limit in continuity of change. It is useless to seek beneath change for what changes ; change needs no support, it is itself fundamental. iL'Evol. creat., p. 12. MOTION AND CHANGE 27 We have thus seen why experience immediately presents itself in two forms. Superficially we only perceive what is useful for our action. Man is in perpetual struggle with his environment; he must act on the things around him if he would preserve himself. And this is why it is so important for him to per- ceive things in the form most conducive to his being able to make use of them. Around him he perceives an extended continuity, but, in order to divide this as he wills, beneath concrete extension he spreads ideal space. ^ This space is a concept, a mere abstraction, the symbol of fixity an infinite divisibility. Nowhere do we perceive such an empty, homo- geneous medium, devoid of qualities, of which every part is absolutely external to every other. This idea of space is a reaction against the heterogeneity that is at the basis of experience. Of such service is this con- cept that, the more intelligent a being, the clearer is the idea of space. Many animals, Bergson suggests, cannot perceive space as in any sense homogeneous, since they travel immense distances seemingly through some sense of direction. The idea of space is so inrooted in man that, as we have seen, he not only uses it to aid him in his action on the ex- ternal world, but by its means he symbolically represents his own conscious life and the inner life of other beings. In order to distinguish its moments and to relate them to the existence of things about him, he imagines an abstract scheme of suc- cessive, homogeneous time. Homogeneous space and time are not properties of things ; they are the abstract expression of our efforts at finding points of application in moving contin- uity within and without, in order that we may produce changes in it. They are the schemes of our action and it is through their use that experience appears to us in the first of the two forms that were mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, as tending towards distinct multiplicity and spatiality. It tends also to repeat itself, for it is useful to us always to perceive things in terms of what has already been experienced. Only in this way can language and habits of action be formed. But even in the external world which most obviously appears in this form, it has been shown that a more fundamental experi- ence finds continuity and perpetual interaction. Our inner life is more easily experienced as continuous even though we lln Donn. immed. Bergson treats the external world as being in pure conceived space and as not having duration. It is thus made to contrast absolutely with the internal life of duration having no connection with space. But from Mat. et mem. (cf. pp. 275 et seq, in particular p. 277) and his later writings, reality is seen to admit of no such clear-cut dis- tinctions ; it is a blending of tendencies ; there are degrees of spatiality in extension, of which mathematical space is only the ideal limit, and degrees of tension in duration. 28 EXPERIENCE AND REALITY may be accustomed to see it in its superficial form. In it we experience duration and, noticing that not only conscious beings but all things around us also persist, we attribute duration to all things. This leads us to regard duration as a homogeneous medium in which states succeed one another in ourselves and in the world around. But, in truth, all things have duration. Within and without, change, variability, interaction are what are most fundamental. Everything is in the making. But all change has duration. It is not only our own past that is preserved, but, in any one indivisible change, there is the conservation of the past in the present. Even the qualities we perceive are the result of vibrations, of concrete motion whose successive moments are united by a thread of quality. Such motion, Bergson thinks, cannot be without some analogy with our consciousness. It is the unfolding of a diluted, relaxed existence. In one moment of our intense life, we perceive enormous periods of it. On account of the short duration in which so many vibrations are contracted, their result, a quality, seems incommensurable with another quality, the result of a dififerent set of vibrations. If we could live these lives, that is, adopt these slower rhythms, colors would pale and lengthen, Bergson suggests, till we approached nearer pure vibration. As it is, in the deeper notes of the scale we perceive vibrations united by quality. In this case, the motion is slow enough to comply with the rhythm of our duration. And so we have a vision of endless differing durations. Our consciousness lives a duration that has a determined rhythm, while there are durations of such infinitely quicker rhythm that, for instance, to live the life of the motion that we seize as a second of red light would take us 250 centuries at our rate of living.^ We can also imagine a duration more tense than ours and, in fact, all degrees of tension. Bergson says that, if we really place ourselves in duration, we have "the feeling of a certain well-defined tension whose determination seems the choice between an infinite number of possible durations."^ In our own experience of duration, we have given, as it were, the possibility of endless other durations whose rhythm would fix them in the scale of beings. Not only do we feel it to be the basis of our exist- ence, but the "stufif" of all things. "To him installed in becom- ing, duration appears as the very life of things and the funda- mental reality."' Succession is everywhere a fact. The velo- city of the unfolding of our own conscious lives and of all that is around us seems to be absolute. The future is condemned iMat et mem., p. 229. 'Introd. met., Rev. de met. et de mor., vol, xi, p. 23. 'L'Evol. creat., p. 343. INTELLECT AWD INTUITION 29 to succeed the past and is not given with it. Duration, Bergson says, is "a stream one cannot reascend" ;^ "it gnaws things and leaves on them the imprint of its teeth; the same concrete reality never repeats itself."^ Image after image is given to his readers to place them where they can realize the meaning and gain the intuition of duration. If we can only seize our- selves in a broad elastic present, we can dilate it backward and "push back the screen masking us from ourselves."' We should also be able to reseize the world around us, not only at an actual moment and superficially, but we should experi- ence it more deeply organized with the past which gives it its impetus. At bottom all is change within and without. And concrete change has duration, or rather is duration ; that is, there is in all things some analogy with our consciousness. By seizing what is fundamental in ourselves, we are led to ■see that this is at the basis of all things. To do this is to accustom ourselves, as Bergson says, to see all things sub specie durationis.* The more we do this, the more do we establish our- selves in pure duration and the closer are we to the fundamental nature of things. INTELLECT AND INTUITION.^ In our practical life, to make such an effort to deepen our perception would only introduce confusion. We have seen that for our material needs perception cuts out from a broader field objects with distinct contours, motionless and in de- termined positions in space. It notes resemblances and neglects the heterogeneity of experience as much as possible. In fact it is the more superficial form of experience on which our every day life is based. Perception shows us things in the form in which they will best satisfy our needs. This explains why the artist who perceives without utilitarian purpose has a deeper and broader perception than other men. So far we have tried to take the point of view of immediate perception, although there has necessarily been some mention iL'Evol. creat., p. 42. 2Id., p. 49. 'L'Int. phi!.. Rev. de met. et de mor., vol. xix, p. 827.