o 5*70 .75 CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBBARY 14 3 1924 103 071 647 ^ mSTomcAu bramch, w/ar PCANS Oiv/ISIOIM O^fsieRAL. 1921 i This book was digitized by Microsoft Corporation in cooperation witli Cornell University Libraries, 2007. You may use and print this copy in limited quantity for your personal purposes, but may not distribute or provide access to it (or modified or partial versions of it) for revenue-generating or other commercial purposes. 670 .73 low A5 1921 1009 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES Monograph No. 7 Prepared in the Historical Branch, War Plans Division ' Gcneral^taff June, 1921 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFE'ICE 1921 - DlSTRlBUTiON CUiILROOM .i^ TO 570 .75 Wab Depabtment Document No. 1009 Offlce of The Adjutant Oeneral WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, Afril 12, 1920. The following monograph, entitled " Organization of the Services of Supply, American Expeditionary Forces," prepared in the His- torical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff, is approved and published for the information of all concerned. [322.06, A. G. O.] By ORDER OF THE Skcretart OF Wae : PEYTON C. MARCH, General, Vhief of Staff. Official : P. C. HARRIS, The Adjutant General. GENERAL SCHEME OF MONOGRAPHS, HISTORICAL BRANCH. (Where a title is given without special mark, the monograph Is contemplated or in preparation ; a title with a single * indicates a monograph completed and awaiting publication; a title with two ** indicates a published monograph.) I. Nabkatpve Histoey of Miutaby Operations. The Major Operations of the A. E. F. (G. O. 83, W. D., 1919.) *" Cambrai." H. B. Monograph No. 5, W. D. Doc. 1017, 1920. " Somme Defensive and Lys." " Aisne and Montdidier-Noyon." " Champagne-Marne and Aisne-Marne." (a) " The 3d Division on the Marne." " Somme Offensive, Oise-Aisne, Ypres-Lys." **(o) "Operations 2d Corps in Somme Offensive." H. B. Monograph No. 10, W. D. Doc. 1016, 1920. " St. Mihiel." " Meuse-Argoune." ** " Blanc Mont (Meuse-Argonne-Champagne.) H. B. Monograph No. 9, W. D. Doc. 1010, 1920. " Vittorio-Veneto." * " Operations in North Russia, 1918-1919." " Operations in Siberia, 1917-1920." " Operations in Italy, 1917-1918." II. Studies of Services of Supply. ** " Organization of Services of Supply, A. E. F." H. B. Monograph No. 7, W. D. Doc. 1009, 1920. " Replacement of Personnel, A. B. F." H. B. Monograph No. 8. " Procurement of Supplies, A. E. F." " Initial Equipment and Supply, A. E. F." III. Spbcial Tactical Studies. ** " A Survey of German Tactics, 1918." H. B. Monograph No. 1, W. D. Doc. No. 883, 1918. ** " A Study in Troop Frontage." H. B. Monogi-aph No. 4, W. D. Doc. No. 992, 1919. ** " A Study in Battle Formation." H. B. Monograph No. 6, W. D. Doc. No. 1012, 1920. IV. Military Activities in the United States. ** " Economic Mobilization in the United States for the War of 1917." H. B. Monograph No. 2, W. D. Doc. No. 885, 1918. ** " A Handbook of Economic Agencies of the War of 1917." H. B. Mono- graph No. 3, W. D. Doc. No. 908, 1919. V. Histories of Troop Units. " Outline History of Divisions." " Outline History of Regular Regiments. 4 PREFACE. It is evident that within the limits of this monograph only a very small part of available material can be included. The difficulties have been those incident to selection rather than location of data. The object of this monograph is to present its subject in its broad- est aspect ; but at the same time, by means of references to available sources, to point out the direction for more exhaustive study. Other more detailed monographs covering the general subject of the Services of Supply are contemplated by the historical branch. Gen- eral Staff. General sources of information are referred to by number. The bibliography appearing at the end of the monograph contains the numbered references. Services and departments that functioned directly under General Headquarters are not discussed in this monograph. 5 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/cletails/cu31924103071647 CONTENTS. Page> I. Conditions Leading to the Selection of the Line of Communi- cations : Gen. Pershing's instructions from the War Department 9 French interest in Paris and British interest In channel ports. 9 Report of the Military Railway Commission 10 Report of the Board on Ports 10 II. The Line of Communications Selected : Summary of Gen. Pershing's problem 11 Memorandum of Gen. Harbord 12 Definite selection of a line of communications 13 Chapter note 13 III. Geogeaphical Division of France foe Fbench Administeativb Pukposes 13 IV. Oeganization of the Line of Communications : Relation of the Services of Supply to the War Department 15 Relation of the Services of Supply to General Headquarters 15 The interior development of the Services of Supply 17 Designation of sections and services 17 RSsumS of advance section, intermediate section, sections No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 20 Authority exercised by section commanders 24 Table of totals of personnel in sections, Nov. 11, 1918 25 V. Oeganization of Headquaeters, Seevices of Supply: Chief of Staif 26 Deputy Chief of Staff 26 The General StafC (chart) 26 Assistant Chiefs of Staff 27 The Adjutant General 27 The Inspector General 30 The Judge Advocate 30 French and British Military Missions 30 VI. The Militabt Boaed of Allied Supply 31 VII. The General Purchasing Boabd 35 VIII. The Aemy Service Coeps, American Expeditionaey Forces 37 IX. Chemical Warfare Service, American Expeditionary Forces 44 X. Chief Engineer, American Expeditionary Forces 49 XI. Medical Corps, American Expeditionaey Forces 56 XII. Motor Transport Corps, American Expeditionary Foeces 62 XIII. Ordnance Department, American ExpiajiTioNARY Forces 69 XIV. Quaetermastee Coeps, Ameeican Expeditionary Forces 77 XV. Signal Corps, American Expeditionary Forces 84 XVI. Transportation Corps, American Expeditionary Forces 89 XVII. Renting, Requisition, and Claims Service, American Expedi- tionary Forces 101 Bibliography 105 Appendices 111 7 10 ORGANIZATION OF THE SEKVICES OF SUPPLY. basin west of Metz, the coal region east of Metz, the vital railroad communications in this same region, and, finally, the fortress of Meta itself, offered important objectives for a strategic offensive launched from Lorraine." (1) (21) (18) But the front selected for the American Army must not only be suitable in itself — it must have a suitable and available line of com- munications. This line, based upon a sufficient number of French ports, must be able to maintain a constant flow of supplies from over- sea bases (ports) to the railheads, and must also meet the require- ments imposed by the movement of sick, wounded, and salvage from front to rear. Previous to. the arrival of Gen. Pershing in France a (2) military railway commission had been sent by the War Department to investi- gate rail transportation. This commission was just (3) completing its task, and its report stated that the railroads in the north of France were already overburdened by the traffic imposed by the French and English Armies, and that the channel ports of France, which were the British bases, were used to their utmost capacity. (4) STUDY OF PORT CONDITIONS. While en route to France, Gen. Pershing had appointed a Board on Ports," which upon arrival investigated port conditions in France. This board fully agreed with the Military Kailway Commission, and recommended that the American Government gradually take over for permanent use the ports of St. Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bassens, and for emergency use, Nantes, Bordeaux, and Pauillac. (5) (21) French ports on the Mediterranean were not considered suitable at this time, owing to their greater distance and the large losses by sub- marine. (2) Marseille and Toulon were congested by the Salonika movements. It will thus be seen that the United States was limited in the selec- tion of ports in France to those on the Atlantic, and was unable to make use of the railroads in northern France. (18) NOTE TO PART I. Several months previous to Gen. Pershing's arrival in France an American military commission had been attached to the American embassy at Paris, and the correspondence of this commission refers to the earliest study made to locate a suitable front and line of communications for the American Expeditionary Forces. The fol- lowing are extracts from this correspondence: • Page 6, Chapter I, Report of the Assistant Chlel of Staff, G-4, General Headquarters, to the commanding general. Expeditionary Forces, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. •Appendix B. OEGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 11 [Memorandum for Chief of Staff, dated May 19, 191T, from Chief, War College Division, General Staff.] This memorandum states that on May 14 a cable was sent to Maj. James A. Logan, jr., at Paris, as follows : " Consult with French authorities relative to points of debarkation and establishment of bases, camps, line of communica- tions, American forces. Inspect English and other bases and report r&sults and recommendations without delay." In his cable reply Maj. Logan states that French General Staff Is preparing complete study of all suitable ports, which Information will be submitted to War Council. In a cable from Paris to the War Department, dated May 18, Maj. Logan states: French contemplate placing principal American advance center of instruction in Belfort zone in camp already partially installed for reception troops. Other centers of instruction echeloned at different existing camps between Belfort and Bordeaux. * * * French General Staff study contemplating American line of communications from Bordeaux to Belfort, utilizing, if necessary, three lines of railroad which are Ht present least congested. * * * French General Staff notified that all ports from Belgium, Including Cherbourg, at disposal of British and Belgian troops. These ports and connecting railroads working at about full capacity. Brest considered very favorable by our naval representa- tive here, but French object on account of congested railroads this point and the fact that some railroads cross laterally all their own existing line of com- munications. * » * Marseille and Toulon good ports ; but I am informed by the French General Staff that these are very congested, due to the Salonika movements, and in addition hardly suitable on account of longer distance from United States and greater submarine danger. This correspondence on file with War College Division, General Staff. Chapter I, Report of the Fourth Section General Staff, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, gives a review of the transportation conditions that existed in France upon arrival of the commanding general, American Expeditionary Forces. II.— THE LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS SELECTED. The problem of the selection of a front and a line of communica- tions which confronted Gen. Pershing was thus reduced to the fol- lowing : (A) Selection of a front — (a) Suitable in size for an army of several million troops. (i) Located where conditions would be favorable to the exercise of American command. (c) Located in a region favorable to an offensive. (d) Located in a region with billeting facilities and favorable for training. 10 ORGANIZATION OF THE SEEVICES OF SUPPLY. basin west of Metz, the coal region east of Metz, the vital railroad communications in this same region, and, finally, the fortress of Metz itself, offered important objectives for a strategic offensive launched from Lorraine." (1) (21) (18) But the front selected for the American Army must not only be suitable in itself — it must have a suitable and available line of com- munications. This line, based upon a sufficient number of French ports, must be able to maintain a constant flow of supplies from over- sea bases (ports) to the railheads, and must also meet the require- ments imposed by the movement of sick, wounded, and salvage from front to rear. Previous to. the arrival of Gen. Pershing in France a (2) military railway commission had been sent by the War Department to investi- gate rail transportation. This commission was just (3) completing its task, and its report stated that the railroads in the north of France were already overburdened by the traffic imposed by the French and English Armies, and that the channel ports of France, which were the British bases, were used to their utmost capacity. (4) STUDY OF PORT CONDITIONS. While en route to France, Gen. Pershing had appointed a Board on Ports," which upon arrival investigated port conditions in France. This board fully agreed with the Military Eailway Commission, and recommended that the American Government gradually take over for permanent use the ports of St. Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bassens, and for emergency use, Nantes, Bordeaux, and Pauillac. (5) (21) French ports on the Mediterranean were not considered suitable at this time, owing to their greater distance and the large losses by sub- marine. (2) Marseille and Toulon were congested by the Salonika movements. It will thus be seen that the United States was limited in the selec- tion of ports in France to those on the Atlantic, and was unable to make use of the railroads in northern France. (18) NOTE TO PART I, Several months previous to Gen. Pershing's arrival in France an American military commission had been attached to the American embassy at Paris, and the correspondence of this commission refers to the earliest study made to locate a suitable front and line of communications for the American Expeditionary Forces. The fol- lowing are extracts from this correspondence : ' Page 6, Chapter I, Report of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, General Headquarters, to the commanding general. Expeditionary Forces, on file Historical Branch, General StaEt. ■Appendix B. ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 11 [Memorandum for Chief of Staff, dated May 19, 1917, from Chief, War College Dlyislon, General Staff.] This memorandum states that on May 14 a cable was sent to Maj. James A. Logan, jr., at Paris, as follows : " Consult with French authorities relative to points of debarliation and establishment of bases, camps, line of communica- tions, American forces. Inspect English and other bases and report results and recommendations without delay." In his cable reply Maj. Logan states that French General Staff is preparing complete study of all suitable ports, which information will be submitted to War Council. In a cable from Paris to the War Department, dated May 18, Maj. Logan states : French contemplate placing principal American advance center of instruction in Belfort zone in camp already partially installed for reception troops. Other centers of instruction echeloned at different existing camps between Belfort and Bordeaux. * * * French General StafE study contemplating American line of communications from Bordeaux to Belfort, utilizing, if necessary, three lines of railroad which are at present least congested. * * * French General StafE notified that all ports from Belgium, including Cherbourg, at disposal of British and Belgian troops. These ports and connecting railroads working at about full capacity. Brest considered very favorable by our naval representa- tive here, but French object on account of congested railroads this point and the fact that some railroads cross laterally all their own existing line of com- munications. * * * Marseille and Toulon good ports; but I am informed by the French General Staff that these are very congested, due to the Salonika movements, and in addition hardly suitable on account of longer distance from United States and greater submarine danger. This correspondence on file with War College Division, General Staff. Chapter I, Report of the Fourth Section General Staff, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, gives a review of the transportation conditions that existed in France upon arrival of the commanding general, American Expeditionary Forces. II.— THE LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS SELECTED. The problem of the selection of a front and a line of communica- tions which confronted Gen. Pershing was thus reduced to the fol- lowing : (A) Selection of a front — (a) Suitable in size for an army of several million troops. (5) Located where conditions would be favorable to the exercise of American command. (c) Located in a region favorable to an offensive. (d) Located in a region with billeting facilities and favorable for training. 12 ORGANIZATION Or THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. (B) Selection of a line of communications — (a) With railroads sufficient to reach the entire length of front. (h) With trunk lines from ports upon which Ameri- can traffic would be superimposed upon that of the French and passing through localities suitable for the location of depots, (c) Available and suitable ports. There was also presented the problem of flexibility in the line of commimications " adopted. If the American forces were called upon to operate along a portion of the front, other than the one selected, our means of supply must be able to reach these forces. (18) FINAL DECISIONS. It is both interesting and pertinent at this point to quote from a memorandum (6) prepared during May, 1919, by Maj. Gen. J. G. Harbord, who was Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, at the time a line of communications was selected. Relative to conditions, as Gen. Pershing found them in France upon his arrival. Gen. Harbord states, as follows: The channel ports and the railroads of northern France were congested by British and French traffic. The Mediterranean ports were 900 miles further from our shores than the other ports of France and submarine activity was greater and under less control in the Mediterranean than in the open Atlantic. This limited our selection to the Atlantic ports south of Brest, which port itself was unsuited for the discharge of supplies and at that time was reserved for naval use. * * * From the ports of western France there were available railroad lines to the northeast, including the double-track lines from Bordeaux and St. Nazaire forming a junction near Bourges, thence running east and north toward Dijon with radiations toward Eplnal and Nancy. It was esti- mated that these lines, assisted by collateral lines which were available, could, handle a traffic for American use of 50,000 tons per day. (21) These considera- tions, with the probability that pressure from the French would dictate the employment of our forces well toward the east, led to the selection of the ports^ of St. Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bassens for permanent use, with Nantes, Bor- deaux, and Pauillac for emergency use. * * * The probability that our forces would be employed well toward the eastern end of the western front indicated the line of communications from the Atlantic to our front of perhaps, an average length of 500 miles. * * * The immediate location of the in- termediate and advance storage depended upon the courtesy of the French. The whole country was more or less given to installations for their own armies^ The great majority of all available institutions were in use by the French or British, and the facilities which adequately served the population in time of peace were totally inadequate to the added strain imposed by our army of. from two to four million men. * * ♦ Certain railroad lines were not avail- • See letter from the commanding general, American Expeditionary Forces, to the com- manding general, Service of Supply, dated 23 May, 1918, quoted on pp. 10-11 in the Report of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, General Headquarters, to the commanding^ general, American Expeditionary Forces, filed in the Historical Branch, General Staff. OEGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 13 able to us; certain lines running parallel to the front must not be crossed by more than a certain number of trains each 24 hours because needed for the rapid movement of troops from flank to flank. The solution of this problem is contained in confidential cable No. 24, received July 2, 1917, by The Adjutant General, from Gen. Pershing. (7) This cable gives in outline the decision as to the front, the line of communications, and oversea bases. The cable states that the only ports then available were those on the Loire and Gironde Rivers, and La Pallice, and La Rochelle. The main railroad line running northeast from these ports passed through districts favorable for the location of supply depots embraced by Orleans, Bourges, Montargis and Nevers. The general area selected for training was included by Neufchateau, Nancy and Epinal. The First Division would be billeted in the vicinity of Gondrecourt (Meuse) and its artillery would go to Valdahon (Doubs). The cable stated further that the use of the ports mentioned would avoid in- terference with the British bases, and the rail routes indicated avoided routes used by French and British armies. The location of proposed depots was such as to facilitate supply, and the area to be used for billeting and training was unoccupied and included villages with ample billets. The cable stated, finally, that American troops would probably enter the lines north of Nancy.' (21) III.— THE GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION OF FRANCE FOR FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES. For their administrative purposes, the French divided the coun- try primarily into two zones — ^the Zone of the Interior (Zone de I'Interieur), and Zone of the Armies (Zone des Armees). The former was under the direction of the Council of Ministers, and the latter under military control. The Zone of the Armies was fur- ther divided into two parts. Army Advance Zone (Zone de I'Avant) and the Army Service Zone (Zone d'Etapes). (18) ZONE SYSTEM. When the American military administrative system was created in France and superimposed upon the French, we followed to a great degree the French system. The French had a supply and transportation organization for the Zone of the Armies distinct from that of the Zone of the Interior. This system we adopted by creat- ing regulating stations, having control of distribution of all supplies to the troops in the advance, acting under direction of General Head- quarters. The responsibility of the Services of Supply ceased when ' Also report of Gen. Pershing to the Secretary of War, November 20, 1918, quoted In full in Report of Secretary of War, 1918. 14 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF STJPPLY. the advance supply depots were filled, and troops from the interior reached these regulating stations. On October 1, 1918, there was transmitted by General Headquar- ters to Headquarters, Services of Supply, a draft of a proposed gen- eral order modifying General Orders, Nos. 31 and 44, General Head- quarters, Expeditionary Forces, series 1918. It is desirable to refer to th*e main features of these proposed general orders, as they repre- sented the opinion of General Headquarters in a matter of reorgani- zation based upon actual experience.* The main features were : (18) It divided territorially the American Expeditionary Forces into two general zones — a zone of supply, and a zone of the armies. The zone of supply would contain the primary services of supply and, territorially, would comprise the intermediate and base sections as they then existed. The zone of the armies would coincide with the French zone of the armies. It was proposed to subdivide the zone of the armies into an army combat zone, the limits of which would be subject to readjustment from time to time, and an Army service zone which would contain such agencies and establishments as were necessary to the immediate and direct service of combat troops. A director of the Army service zone was created who was vested with the command of all service troops in the Army service zone, and he served directly under the Army commander. Whether or not this proposed reorganization was in the interest of good administration it is impossible to determine, as the armistice of November 11 terminated further consideration of the question. It is well to consider in this connection that there was a constant pressure from the French Government to influence us to adopt their military administrative system, and to create zones and geographical divisions corresponding to theirs. Our administrative sections, at the request of the French, were drawn to conform generally to the lines of French military regions. In any study of the Services of Supply it should be kept constantly in mind, when considering our system created in France, that the French Government was always very much concerned that we conform to their already established system, and this we usually did, and thereby prevented many compli- cations. Our supply system in France had to be superimposed upon that of the French, and with the least derangement ,of the French system. ' Two boards of officers were appointed In the American Expeditionary Forces to con- sider questions of reorganization of the American Expeditionary Forces. One board was appointed at Generjil Headquarters on March 14, 1919. Its report is on file with the rec- ords of General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces. The second board was appointed per S. O. No. 141, Service of Supply, May 1, 1919. The report is on file In the Historical Branch, General Staff; 0K6ANIZATI0N OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY, 15 IV.— ORGANIZATION OF THE LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS (SERVICES OF SUPPLY). (A) Relation of the Services of Supply to the War Department. (B) Relation of the Services of Supply to General Headquarters. (C) The interior development of the Services of Supply. A. Relation of the Services of Supply to the War Department. — LTntil August 6, 1918, there were no direct relations between the Services of Supply and the "War Department. On that date, how- ever, the commanding general, Expeditionary Forces, authorized the commanding general. Services of Supply, to communicate direct with the War Department on all questions of supply and on mat- ters relating to Services of Supply troops, provided no matters of policy were involved.' (21) B. Relation of the Services of Supply to General Headquarters. — General Orders, No. 8, General Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, July 6, 1917, created the Line of Communications of the American Expeditionary Forces, placing the commanding general of the Line of Communications in a relation to the commanding general, Ameri- can Expeditionary Forces, similar to that of the chiefs of services. This organization imposed upon the commanding general. Expedi- tionary Forces, the duty of coordinating directly all the services and the Line of Communications; but as the American Expedi- tionary Forces increased in size it became evident that the General Headquarters thereof must free itself from a portion of these ad- ministrative duties." ORGANIZATION OF SUPPLY SYSTEM. On February 16, 1918, General Orders, No. 31, General Headquar- ters, Expeditionary Forces,^^ were issued which changed the designa- tion of the Line of Communications to Services of Supply, and charged the commanding general of these services with the coordina- tion of all services and departments except the Adjutant General, Inspector General, and Judge Advocate. To facilitate this coordina- tion, all service headquarters, excepting those particularly mentioned above, were moved to Tours, where the headquarters of the Services » General Order No. 130, General Headquarters, Aug. 6, 1918. Also cable No. 1,562 from Pershing to The Adjutant General, Aug. 6, 1918. On file Historical Branch, Gen- eral Staff. 10 A board of officers was appointed per letter Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, Feb. S, 1918, to Investigate and report upon what changes should be made in the organi- zation of the American Expeditionary Forces. Report of board on file in Historical Branch, General Staff. 11 Two General Orders No. 31, General Headquarters, 1918, were issued, both dated Feb. 16. The first changed the designation of the Line of Communications to the Service of the Rear. The second General Order No. 31, or corrected copy, was issued one month later but bore the game date (Feb. 16) and this second order designated the old Line of Communications as the Services of Supply. 16 OEGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY, of Supply were located. The chiefs of the administrative and tech- nical staff services were directed by this order to exercise all of their functions in the matter of procurement, supplies, transporta- tion, and construction under the direction of the commanding gen- eral, Services of Supply. Each chief of service was authorized to designate an officer of his service to represent him with each section of the General Staff, at General Headquarters. A chief of utilities was created who, under the commanding general. Services of Sup- ply, coordinated the Transportation Department, the Motor Trans- port Service, and the Director of Construction and Forestry. This Service of Utilities was abolished by General Orders, No. 114, Gen- eral Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, July 11, 1918. The Di- rector of Construction and Forestry was placed under the Chief of Engineers, and the Motor Transport Corps was created a separate service. General Orders, No. 44, General Headquarters, March 23, 1918, enunciated very fully the duties under General Orders, No. 31 of the commanding general, Services of Supply, and those of the chiefs of services. The commanding general, Services of Supply, was re- sponsible for the procurement of all supplies both from the United States and from European sources. He was charged with the dis- tribution of these supplies to the various depots ; with the unloading of the troops and freight, and their transportation ; the construction, maintenance, and operation of railroads. In these duties he was assisted by a technical staff consisting of the chiefs of the several supply and technical services. Each chief of service was directed to exercise a close personal control over all establishments of his de- partment throughout the theater of operation, and he was responsible that the necessary supplies were delivered and maintained in depots. He was charged with the duty of seeing that the supplies pertaining to his service were replaced. Commanding officers of supply depots were responsible that the supplies shipped by them were delivered, either to the consignee or, if destined for a zone served by a regulating station," to the regulat- ing officer. Regulating officers were responsible for the proper trans- portation and distribution of supplies in their zone. The responsi- bility of the commanding general. Services of Supply, in the matter of supplies I'' ceased when shipments were delivered at advance depots. (18) " " A regulating station is a large railway yard where cars from the supply depots and from the rear are received and made up Into trains for the divlaions." General Orders No. 44, General Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, on file Historical Branch, General State. ^' Chapter III, Report of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, General Headquarters, to the commanding general. Expeditionary Forces, contains detailed statement of the functions of base. Intermediate, and advance storage ; regulating stations. Army depots, and rail heads. On file Historical Branch, General Staff. OEGAKIZATION Oli" THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 17 Previous to August 6, 1918, the General Staff, General Head- quarters, Expeditionary Forces, was charged with all matters of supply and all cables relating to this subject were sent from General Headquarters. A similar course was followed in regard to all cable- grams relating to troop arrivals and replacements. However, on that date. General Orders, No. 130, General Headquarters, Expedi- tionary Forces, was issued, which charged the commanding general. Services of Supply, with all questions of supply under approved policies. This order directed that all cables to the War Department relating to supply matters not involving policy should be sent di- rectly by the commanding general, Services of Supply, and charged him with many details previously handled by General Headquarters. The above constituted the relation between General Headquarters and the Services of Supply as they existed on November 11, 1918. C. The interior development of\ the Services of Sv/pply}^ — -A de- scription of the Services of Supply as they existed on November 11, 1918, would give only a very imperfect conception. The Services of Supply, as they existed on the date of the armistice, were a devel- opment, always in process of evolution; the direction of this evo- lution being toward decentralization. This decentralization appeared in the form of creating new and independent services for activities that before the war did not exist in our Army, or that were pre- viously dependent upon or formed a part of the other services. Important instances are: The creation of the Motor Transport Corps, previously a part of the Quartermaster Corps; the Air Ser- vice, broken from the Signal Corps; also the creation of the Army Service Corps and the Eenting, Eequisition and Claim Service. There was only one effort to centralize activities. This consisted in combining the Transportation Corps, Construction and Forestry, and the Motor Transport Service under one head, directed by the Chief of Utilities. Th" Service of Utilities was, however, abolished after a short trial. The following is a resume of the salient facts in the interior de- velopment of the Services of Supply, arranged chronologically : DEVELOPMENT OF SERVICES OF SUPPLY. When the first American convoy landed at St. Nazaire the com- manding general. Expeditionary Forces, by verbal order, designated that port as " Base Port No. 1," operating directly under his author- ity. On July 4, 1917, an advance section was created with head- " Paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 32, and 33, Report of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, General Headquarters, to the commanding general, Expeditionary Forces, on file Historical Branch, General Staff, quotes two important letters from the commanding general. Ex- peditionary Forces, to the commanding general. Services of Supply, stating the policy of the development of the Services of Supply. 178841°— 20 2 18 OEGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. quarters at Nevers, functioning also directly Under the commanding general, Expeditionary Forces. The next step is found in General. Orders, No. 8, General Headquarters, July 5, which designated a com- manding general. Line of Communications, with territorial com- mand, charged with supply, sanitary and telegraph service, and the facilities relating thereto. He was also charged with all construc- tion work in the Line of Communications. A Transportation De- partment was created to operate, maintain, and construct all railways and canals under American control, also to construct and maintain roads, wharves, shops, and other buildings for railroad purposes; however, all construction work was continued under the commanding general. Line of Communications, as the Transportation Depart- ment at that time had no labor. LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS. On August 13, 1917, General Orders, No. 20, General Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, defined the geographical limits of the Line of Communications as extending from the sea to points where delivery of supplies is made to the field transportation of the combat field forces, less such area as might from time to time be excepted. Paris was designated as the headquarters of the Line of Communications. This order designated the following railroad lines for American use : (a) The line of St. Nazaire-Nantes-Angers-Tours-Bourge&-Ne- vers-Dijon-Is-sur-Tille (regulating station), and points to the front. (6) The line Bordeaux-Perigueux, Limoges-Bourges-Nevers- Dijon-Is-sur-Tille (regulating station), and points to the front. (c) The railroad lines connected with the lines (a) and (&) from any ports at which our troops or materials may be landed, and all railway connections with the various depots and camps established in the vicinity of the same lines of railroad.^' SERVICE OF MILITARY RAILWAYS. The Service of Military Kailways was created, charged with the operation, maintenance, and construction of such railways as might be turned over to our forces while in France, and with the supervision of all movement of troops and supplies over lines operated by the French authorities. This supervision included all railways, both permanent and temporary, except those in the "Zone des Armees." GENERAL PURCHASING BOARD. General Orders, No. 23, General Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, August 20, 1917, created a General Purchasing Board, estab- lished at Paris, with a General Purchasing Agent at its head. Each supply service had a representative on this board for the purpose of making such purchases in Europe as the service required. The " Note to Part IV. OEGANIZATIOET OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 19 General Purchasing Agent coordinated and supervised the purchases, thereby preventing competition. TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT. General Orders, No. 37, General Headquarters, September 14, 1917, established a Transportation Department as one of the separate tech- nical services of the Expeditionary Forces, providing for a Director General of Transportation and giving a general outline of organiza- tion. REMOUNT SERVICE. The Remount Service was organized by General Orders, No. 39, General Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, September 18, 1917, and was attached to the Quartermaster Corps. General Orders, No. 122, General Headquarters, July 26, 1918, reorganized this service and created a Chief of the Veterinary Service, who operated under the Eemount Service. On August 24, 1918, however, General Orders, No. 139, General Headquarters, placed the Veterinary Service under the Chief Surgeon, Expeditionary Forces. MOTOR TRANSPORT SERVICE. On December 8, 1917, General Orders, No. 70, General Headquar- ters, Expeditionary Forces, created the Motor Transport Service as a branch of the Quartermaster Corps. ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE. The Army Transport Service was transferred from the Quarter- master Corps to the Transportation Department on December 18, 1917, by General Orders, No. 78, Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces. GENERAL PURCHASING AGENT. On January 13, 1918, the headquarters of the Line of Commu- nications were moved from Paris to Tours. On March 4, 1918, General Orders, No. 5., Service of the Eear, charged the General Purchasing Agent with procuring civilian labor in Europe. He was directed to organize a Labor Bureau, which bureau was later trans- ferred to the Army Service Corps, created by General Orders, No. 38, Headquarters, Services of Supply, 1918. The city of Paris and the Arrondissement of Tours were exempted from the jurisdiction of the intermediate section on March 20 by General Orders, No. 2, Headquarters, Services of Supply, 1918. RENTS, REQUISITIONS, AND CLAIMS SERVICE. A Eenting, Requisitions, and Claims Service, functioning under the commanding general. Services of Supply, was created by Gen- eral Orders, No. 50, General Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, March 30, 1918. This service was charged with the renting and requisitioning, of land and facilities in France, with billeting, and 20 ORGANIZATION OE THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY, ■with the settlement of certain claims. On July 11, 1918 (General Orders, No. 114, General Headquarters), the Service of Utilities was abolished. ARMY SERVICE CORPS. The Army Service Corps was created August 22, 1918, by Gen- eral Orders, No. 34, Headquarters, Services of Supply. TERRITORIAL SECTIONS. Territorial administrative sections were created and adjusted from time to time as the necessity demanded.^^ These geographical sec- tions may be roughly divided into two classes — ^those built around ports (or base sections), and the interior sections. The interior sections included the advance and intermediate sections. ADVANCE SECTION. The Advance Section was organized to extend the service of terri- torial command of the commanding general. Service of Supply, up to the point where delivery of supplies was made to the field trans- portation of combat forces. It should be noted, however, that when supplies from intermediate and base depots reached regulating stations further distribution was under the regulating officer, an agent of General Headquarters. The authority of the section com- mander would cease where it came into contact with that of the com- manders in the field. The Advance Section included the two impor- tant regulating sections, Liffol-le-Grand (Vosges), and Is-sur-TiUe (Cote d'Or) ;" also the following activities: Air Service : 6 depots, 27 airdromes, 2 schools. Quartermaster: 3 depots, 7 remount depots, 10 veterinary hospitals. Ordnance: 9 supply depots. Medical : 63 hospitals. Motor Transport Corps: 4 overhaul parks, 1 depot, 1 recep- tion park, 2 service parks, 21 centers. Engineers : 1 depot, 1 light railway shop, 4 forestry districts. Chemical Warfare Service: 1 depot. Signal : 1 depot, telegraph and telephone lines. INTERMEDIATE SECTION. The Intermediate Section was the largest section in France. It included the great intermediate storage depot at Gievres (Loir-et- Cher)j where a large part of the supplies of the Expeditionary M (21) Part I, paragraphs 15-16, and Part III, paragraph 1 of Pinal Report of Gen. Pershing to Secretary of War, Sept. 1, 1919, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. w These two regulating stations were the only ones actually constructed by us. The fol- lowing French regulating stations were used by us at various times : Crell (Olse), Mantes (Selne-et-Oise), Le Bourget (Seine), Noisy-le-Sec (Seine), St. Dlzier (Haute-Marne), Gray (HajUte-SaOne), Connantre (Marne), Dunlserque (Nord). For a complete description of the functions of regulating stations see (18) Chapter III, also (21) Part III, par. 2-0. ORGANIZATION OP THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 21 Forces was stored. There was also another large intermediate storage depot under construction at Montierchaume (Indre),^' but this depot was only 50 per cent complete at the time of the aVmistice, Mehun-sur-Yevre (Cher) was an important point where the ordnance' repair shops and the intermediate Ordnance Depot No. 4 were located. The first replacement depot was located at St. Aignan (Loir-et- Cher) .^° At Blois there was a depot for the classification and distri- bution of casual officers and soldiers arriving from the United States. Officers found physically or otherwise unfit for duty with combat troops were classified here.^° The Intermediate Section was the main section for the training activities of the Air Service, which established at Issoudun (Indre) the Third Aviation Instruction Center, where the majority of the American pilots received advance training. The Air Service Production Center No. 2, the Supply Depot No. 3, and an acceptance park were located at Eomorantin (Loir-et-Cher) , one of the largest American aviation projects in France. The Seventh Aviation Instruction Center was at Clermont- Ferrand (Puy-de-D6me), which was also a center for the training of mobile heavy artillery. Important hospital centers were located in this section, the largest of these being at Mars and Mesves (Nievre), AUerey (Saone-et-Loire), Chateauroux (Indre), and Orleans. The headquarters of the section, Nevers, was the center for several hospital trains, the location of an important railroad center and of intermediate Quartermaster Depot No. 1, also a loco- motive repair shop of the American Expeditionary Forces. The Motor Transport repair shops were located at Verneuil (Nievre), 30 miles east of Nevers. The Central Records Office of the Expedi- tionary Forces was located at Bourges (Cher).^^ BASE SECTION NO. 1. The sections built around ports were as follows : Base Section No. 1, with headquarters at St. Nazaire, which developed into the greatest freight port of the Expeditionary Forces. The storage depot at Montoir was built near St. Nazaire. Another important port of this base section was Nantes, on the Loire River. Angers (Maine-et- Loire), Savenay (Loire-Inferieure) , Meucon and Coetquidan (Mor- bihan) , and Saumur were important installations of American activ- ity within this section. At Angers was located the principal training base for engineer officers. Base Hospital No. 27 was also located " See (18) pages 10, 11, 12, for a statement of the functions of Gifevrea and Montier- chaume. i» See monograph on Replacements, Historical Branch. There Is on file in the Histori- cal Branch a complete detailed report on the Replacement System prepared by the D. C. of S., Services of Supply. =" See (3) pages 74-91 for a description of the Reclassification System. See also (21) Part III, par. 10. a Central Records Office operated directly under the Adjutant General, General Head- quarters. 22 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. at Angers, which was in addition a replacement depot for transporta- tion troops. Meucon was an artillery training camp and the loca- tion of an aerial observation school. Savenay (25 kilometers east of St. Nazaire) was an important hospital center of particular value as an evacuation point for sick and wounded. Coetquidan was an artillery training camp and an aerial observation school. Saumur was an important railroad junction and the location of a school of instruction for field artillery officers. BASE SECTION NO. 2. Base Section No. 2 included the ports on the River Gironde and the port of La Pallice (Charente-Inferieure). Later, La Pallice became part of Base Section No. 7. The headquarters was at Bor- deaux, which was a terminus of one of the main lines of communi- cation. There were assigned to the Americans and constructed by them at Bassens (Gironde) large dock facilities. Grouped around these were classification and storage warehouses. There was a large depot at St. Sulpice (Gironde) and a small depot was established at Coutras (Gironde). Ammunition storage facilities were con- structed at St. Loubes (Gironde) and artillery training camps were at Souge and Le Courneau (Gironde) ; remount stations were at Carbon-Blanc and Merignac (Gironde), Bayonne, Biarritz, and Hendaye (Basses Pyrenees) ; a stevedore camp at Bassens; rest and embarkation camps at Grange-Neuve and Genicart (Gironde). Thirteen base hospitals and 13 sawmills were located within this section. BASE SECTION NO. 3. Base Section No. 3 was established primarily for the care of Ameri- can troops passing through England to France. Eest camps for American troops were established along the route, Liverpool- Southampton. A large number of American air personnel were trained in this section and a number of base hospitals constructed. The headquarters were located at London. BASE SECTION NO. 4. Base Section No. 4 was established as an agency for receiving American troops and supplies arriving in France from England. The important points of American activities were Le Havre and Eouen (Seine Inferieure), Calais and Boulogne (Pas-de-Calais). BASE SECTION NO. 5. Base Section No. 5 was built around the port of Brest. Outside of this port was a debarkation port at Cherbourg (Manche) , a loco- motive terminal and repair shop at Rennes (Ille-et-Vilaine), and a coal port at Granville (Manche). The port of Brest was the most imwortant port of debarkation for personnel in France, as it was OEGANIZATION OF THE SEEVICES OF SUPPLY. 23 the only deep-water port available to the American forces. Head- quarters were located at Brest. BASE SECTION NO. 6. Base Section No. 6 was established June 28, 1918, with headquar- ters at Marseille. This port was not used previously by the Expedi- tionary Forces on account of excessive submarine danger in the Mediterranean. No American troops were brought to France through this port and it was used only for freight. It was later used, however, as an embarking port for troops returning to the United States. A Motor Transport bark and a labor camp were maintained at Marseille and a storage depot was under construc- tion at Miramas (Bouches-du-Ehone) . BASE SECTION NO. 7. The first headquarters of this section were at La Pallice (Charente- Inferieure), but later moved to La Rochelle. At this point was received a large part of the coal of the Expeditionary Forces and liere was the principal depot for the storage of oil and gasoline. A remount depot and car erection center were within this section. Important American activities were: La Rochelle, location of Camp Pullman, a car erection plant; La Pallice, port of entry and loca- tion of oil and gasoline storage; Aigrefeuille (Charente-Inferieure), the location of storage and classification yards ; Eochefort (Charente- Inferieure), port of entry for coal and general cargo; Tonnay- Charente and Marens (Charente-Inferieure), Tahnont (Charente- Inferieure), an approved site for a deep-water port; Montatmo (Charente-Inferieure), a cement plant. BASE SECTION NO. 8. Base Section No. 8 consisted geographically of all Italy, with head- quarters at Padua. This section was established to provide control •over the various American activities in Italy. These activities con- sisted of a regiment of Infantry, aviation school at Foggia, hospital and ambulance units. Motor Transport Corps companies, and a de- tachment of aviators in training and on combat duty with the Italian Army. A quartermaster depot was located at Alessandria. BASE SECTION NO. 9. Base Section No. 9 was established to meet the requireme^ats of the American Army of Occupation on the Ehine. The plan contemplated -using the Ehine and Scheldt as a line of communications with Eot- terdam and Antwerp as ports for the handling of suprJies. Head- •quarters were at Antwerp.^^ a For details concerning tlie sections, see the history of every section of the Services of :Supply, on file in the Historical Branch, General Staff. 24 ORGANIZATION OP THE SEKVICES OF SUPPLY. SECTION COMMANDERS. The commanders of sections were usually generally officers ap- pointed by the commanding general, Services of Supply. The section commander bore the same relation to the representative of the vari- ous services in his section as the commanding general, Services of Supply, bore to the chiefs of the services at Tours. Section commanders were responsible for discipline, supply, and sanitation. From time to time questions arose in sections between the commanders and the representatives of services. These ques- tions usually had reference to various projects carried on by the services in the section. Questions also arose regarding personnel pertaining to the various services serving in the section. Chiefs of services at Tours considered that their representatives in sections were the proper channel through which to give instructions. Sec- tion commanders considered that they, as the direct representatives of the commanding general. Services of Supply, were the proper channel. The approved policy covering these difficulties was that the section commander, in addition to his responsibility for atten- tion to duty, discipline, supply, and sanitation, of all personnel in his section, was the proper channel for all communications between chiefs of services and their representatives in the section, excepting those of a purely routine and technical class. On the other hand, section commanders were not authorized to change projects which had been approved at Headquarters, Services of Supply, nor were they authorized to give priority in large matters. Section com- manders were informed by Headquarters, Services of Supply, of all policies, and acting upon these policies they commanded the sec- tions. The tendency of growth was toward increasing the authority of section commanders, transmitting to them policies, and holding them responsible for carrying them out. The Services of Supply was so large territorially, contained such a large personnel, and involved so many different activities, that decentralization was neces- sary. Section commanders pooled all motor transportation in their sections, and controlled the distribution of all labor, including cas- uals, combat and non-combat. When questions arose in sections re- lating to large questions of priority, they were referred to Head- quarters, Services of Supply, where, after consultation with the chief of services involved, a decision was made. STRENGTH OF SERVICES OF SUPPLY. As an indication of the magnitude of its activities in regard to the number of personnel stationed in the Services of Supply, the following table shows the number of troops in the various sections on November 11, 1918 : (3) OEGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 25 Officers. Men. Nurses. Total. Advance Section 4,924 6,365 1,936 4,628 3,801 1,505 219 718 380 375 2,379 101,271 117,214 17,639 93,119 90,301 27,580 3,944 15,211 8,870 11,559 16,544 1,728 1,938 584 502 671 107,923 125,517 20,159 98,249 94,773 29 085 Intermediate Section Paris Base Section No. 1 Base Section No. 2 Base Section No. 3 Base Section No. 4 ... ; 4,163 15,929 9,250 11,934 19,057 5,451 97,944 5,106 Base Section No. 5 Base Section No. 6 Base Section No. 7 Headquarters, S. O. S 134 Casual officers' depot 3,029 334 94,886 4,772 29 Total 30,593 602,910 5,586 644,540 There were also 23,772 civilians employed in the Services of Supply and carried on the strength returns of the American Expeditionary Forces, making a grand total on this date of 668,312. NOTE TO PART IV. The railroads mentioned in General Orders, No. 20, General Head- quarters, 1917, were known as the " first line." The regulating station Liffol-le-Grand was the objective of the second line, which left the first at St. Germain-du-Puy (several miles east of Bourges) and followed the Est Eailway to its objective point by way of Cosne, Etais, Poingon, Chatillon-sur-Seine, and Chaumont. The third line left the first at Tours and ran over the Paris- Orleans system by way of Blois and Orleans, thence over the Est Eailway, through Mont'argis, Sens, and Troyes to Chaumont, where it joined the second line to Liffol-le-Grand. The fourth line left the third at Orleans and ran over the Est Eailway by way of Malesherbes and Eomilly to Troyes, where it joined the third line. v.— ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY. THE COMMANDING GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY. As previously stated, the functions of the commanding general, Services of Supply, were finally defined by General Orders, No. 31, General Headquarters, February 16, 1918; General Orders, No. 44, General Headquarters,^^ March 23, 1918. General Orders, No. 31, General Headquarters, created five sections of the General Staff, assigned to each its functions, and directed that subordinate commands should conform in principle to General Staff organization. (21) This permitted sufficient elasticity in the organization of the General Staff at Headquarters, Services of Sup- 2' Appendixes F, G, H, I, J. 26 OKGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. ply, and authorized such changes and reorganization as were from time to time found necessary. (18) General Orders, No. 1, Head- quarters, Service of the Rear, February 16, 1918, organized the General Staff, Headquarters, Services of Supply, which was then known as the Service of the Eear. Special functions and duties not foreseen at the time General Orders, No. 31, were published were later assigned to the most suitable General Staff section, when the neces- sity arose. The original General Staff of the Services of the Eear consisted of a first, second, third, and fourth sections (G-1, 2, 3, and 4). No fifth section (G-5) was ever established, as training and in- struction were supervised directly by General Headquarters. The Operations Section (G-3) was established and functioned until July 12, 1918, when it wad absorbed by G-4. CHIEF OF STAFF AND DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF. There was a Chief of Staff and a deputy chief of staff. The duties of the former corresponded to those usually exercised by that office. The deputy chief of staff was at first the channel through which papers passed intended for the Chief of Staff, and final action of the commanding general. Services of Supply, but as these papers in- creased in volume this system was changed and the deputy chief of staff was engaged chiefly in questions of classification and assign- ment of personnel with special reference to reclassified personnel from Blois.^^ G-1, SERVICES OF SUPPLY. G-1 was chiefly concerned with : (a) Supervision and direction of the replacing of troops through depot divisions, regional replacement battal- ions, and other agencies designated to handle this class of personnel. (&) Disposition of casual officers and soldiers. (c) Determining the number and kind of Services of Supply troops needed from the United States within the num- ber allotted by higher authority and determining the priority in which said troops should be sent. (d) Preparation of tonnage statistics and designation of priority for all tonnage from the United States. (e) Matters pertaining to the supplies and equipment of Services of Supply troops. (/) General control of leave areas, athletics, and entertain- ment. (g) Preparation of graphics and charts showing Services of Supply activities in operation. •* For a description of the reclassiflcation system, casual offlceis' depot at Blois, see re- port of commanding general, Services of Supply, to commanding general, General Head- quarters, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 27 In addition to the above, general supervision was maintained over .nil welfare activities and militarized societies. Upon the signing of the armistice all matters in connection with the embarkation of troops for repatriation were placed under G-1 and an embarkation section was formed in that section to handle them. A detailed discussion of the functions of this section is contained in the report of the commanding general, Services of Supply, to the commanding general, Expeditionary Forces. (3) (8) G-2, SERVICES OF SUPPLY. The function of G-2 (Intelligence) (3) (9) in the Services of • Supply was to create a system of counterespionage as follows: (a) To prevent enemy agents from entering France. (h) To control the movements of civilians in such a manner as to prevent enemy agents from circulating along the American Army's line of communications. (c) To detect enemy agents who might have succeeded in entering France. (d) To prevent the transmission of information by enemy agents across the frontier. ■CM, SERVICES OF SUPPLY. G-4 Headquarters, Services of Supply, were concerned with sup- plies, construction, hospitalization, transportation, labor, salvage, 'troop movements, grave registration, fire prevention, garden service, and billeting. This section maintained representatives at base ports and in training areas to expedite the arrival of supplies and equip- 'ment. (3) (10) In charge of each section of the General Staff was an assistant -<;hief of staff. A deputy assistant chief of staff was designated to ; act in the absence of the assistant chief of staff. ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF, HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY. The administrative staff at headquarters. Services of Supply, con- -sisted of an adjutant general, inspector general, and judge advocate. ADJUTANT GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY. The Adjutant General's Department was subdivided as follows : Statistical Division. — ^This division embraced the following sub- sections : (a) Personnel section: This subsection kept complete record of •personnel at headquarters, line of communications. On December 3, 1918, statistical subsections were established at each of the technical :and supply services. The personnel section compiled, published and 'distributed various lists and directories. 28 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. cq S s •a I*; I O a c O El ■p s O ■3 e o •p S 8 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF STJPPliY. 29 (b) Troop-movement section: Furnished information covering lo- cation of organizations in the Services of Supply with their shipping, telegraphic, and postal addresses. A serhimonthly station list of the troops in the Services of Supply was compiled and published. (e) Eeturns section: Organized to compile and consolidate monthly returns of all troops in the Services of Supply. (d) Tours section: A statistical section charged with keeping a card file of every enlisted man in Tours. (e) Officers' qualification card section: This branch provided and procured officers on requisition for special services, selected through information covered by their qualification card. (/) Soldiers' qualification card section : From the soldiers' qualifi- cation cards men were selected with special civil vocational qualifi- cations for assignment where their special qualifications could be used to the best interests of the service. These cards were also used to select men with particular military qualifications as a result of specialized training at Army training schools. Records Division. — This division had charge of Adjutant General records. Gable and Code Division. — All cablegrams were indexed and filed in the form of a permanent record. On August 6, 1918, the com- manding general. Services of Supply, was authorized to send cables direct to the War Department where they involved matters other than questions of policy. Orders Division. — Organized to prepare general orders, special ■orders, and bulletins issued from Headquarters, Services of Supply. Personnel Division. — Formed to carry on correspondence pertain- ing to individual officers and soldiers of the Services of Supply. Chief ClerK's Division. — Organized to receive mail. Identification Cards and Information Division. — Organized to issue identification cards to officers and to report and index same. Maying and Courier Division. — Charged with the duty of ad- dressing and forwarding all official mail. Headquarters., Printing Division. — Organized a plant for printing at Headquarters, Services of Supply. Supply Division. — (Blank forms and Adjutant General's Office property.) Furnished the necessary supply of blank forms of the Adjutant General's Office for the Services of Supply. This division supplied officers and men with such post cards as were authorized. Censor Division. — Organized to censor mail. Miscellaneous Division. — To this division was referred, in addi- tion to miscellaneous matter, all translating done in headquar- ters. (3) 30 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. INSPECTOR GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT. This department performed the usual duties assigned to the Inspector General. (3) Organization chart, Inspector General's Department, Services of Supply. INSPECTOR GENERAL. Inspection S. 0. S. Units. Embarljation inspection. Verification of money accounts. Inspectors in base, intermedi- ate, and advance sections. JUDGE ADVOCATE'S DEPARTMENT. General court-martial jurisdiction was granted the commanding general, Services of Supply, by the President under the special pro- visions of the eighth article of war on September 4, 1917. It was also granted to the commanding generals of Base Sections Nos. 1, 2, and 5, the advance section and intermediate section, on April 7, 1918, to the commanding general, District of Paris, on December 23, 1918, and to the commanding general. Base Section No. 8, on November 8, 1918. The general plan of organization in the Services of Supply called for a judge advocate and an assistant judge advocate for each section. Trial judge advocates were secured from line officers. Acting judge advocates were stationed in all sections. The following special matters outside of the duties actually per- taining to his department were referred to the judge advocate: (3) (a) Eecommendations concerning the immunity of members of the American Expeditionary Forces from French criminal jurisdiction. (5) Immunity of members of the American Expeditionary Forces and its agents from French civil jurisdiction. " (c) The establishment of the Eents, Eequisitions, and Claims Service. ^^T^oii^^^^'^'^^^ MISSIONS AT HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OP SUPPLY. Two military missions were established at Headquarters, Services of Supply, French and British. The French mission was originally under the direction of the Organe Central des Eelations Franco- OKGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 31 Americaines. Questions of a purely military nature were, however, referred by the mission directly to the French general staff.-= Organization chart, Judge Advocate's Department, Services oj Supply. JUDGE ADVOCATE. Assistant judge advocate and executive officer. Reviewing board, court martial cases. Trial judge advocate. War Risk Insurance Section. Admiralty Section. Interpretation, statutory and military law. International and French law. Railway Transportation Section. French liaison officer. French officers, constituting a part of the personnel of the mis- sion, were attached to the various technical and supply services at Tours and to headquarters of the various sections to facilitate the settlement of Franco-American matters. The British mission at Headquarters, Services of Supply, repre- sented the'^* British Quartermaster General. It rendered valuable service by assisting the various supply services to obtain supplies and labor in Great Britain. VI MILITARY BOARD OF ALLIED SUPPLY. On April 19, 1918, Gen. Pershing addressed a letter to M. Cle- menceau suggesting that there be vested in a central authority the » There Is on file in the Historical Branch, General Staff, a report by the French mission at Tours, dated April 16, 1919, prepared at the request of Headquarters, Services of Sup- ply, giving a summary of their duties acd a r£sum£ of important questions settled through them. » See memorandum on file In Historical Branch, General Staff, prepared by British mis- sion. Headquarters, Services of Supply, giving a rfeumS of duties. 32 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. power to study questions of supply and adopt measures for the co- ordination of allied resources and utilities. On the same date he sent a cable to The Adjutant General relative to his suggestion. On May 3, Gen. Pershing addressed a second letter to the French Pre- mier on the above subject. On May 6, 1918, a conference v^as held in Paris to consider the unification of the supply service of the Allies. Representatives were present from France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States. At this conference the coordination of the Allies' supply activities was approved in principle, but certain opposition developed as to matters of detail. On May 14 a second conference was held at Paris. British representatives did not appear, but filed a statement of their attitude. As a result of this conference the French and Americans entered into an agreement that provided for an interallied board whose decisions, if unanimous, would have force of law, provided (a) they concerned matters clearly defined; (5) each member had previously received from his government special power to agree to them. The constitution of the Military Board of Allied Supply, after- wards ratified by the French, English, Belgian, Italian, and Ameri- can Governments, was as follows: (11) It is hereby agreed among the allied governments subscribing hereto : (1) That the principle of unification of military supplies and utilities for the use of the allied armies is adopted. (2) That in order to apply this principle and as far as possble coordinate the use of utilities and the distribution of supplies among the allied armies, a board consisting of representatives of each of the allied armies is to be con- stituted at once. (3) That the unanimous decision of the board regarding the allotment of material and supplies shall have the force of orders and be carried out by the respective supply agencies. (4) That further details of the organization by which the above plan is to be carried out shall be left to the board, subject to such approval by the re- spective governments as may at any time seem advisable. We agree to the above and wish it to be submitted to the British and Italian Governments. (11) The field of activity of the board was the rear of the British Army in France, the rear of the American Army in France, and the rear of the French Army only in the zone of the advance. ' The French zone of the interior, as distinguished from the French rear in the zone of the advance, was under French governmental civil authority. The headquarters of the Military Board of Allied Sup- ply was established at Coubert (Seine-et-Marne). The following General Orders authorized American representa- tion on the allied board: (11) ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 33 " General Headquabtees, American Expedition aey Fobces, General Orders.l France, June 20, 1918. No. 100. I Sec. 3, Par. 1. In order to unify, as far as possible, the supply of the allied forces, the principle of closer cooperation in the distribution of supplies in common use among the armies has been unanimously adopted by the allied governments. For the purpose of putting this principle into operation, the appointment of a Military Board of Allied Supply, consisting of one repre- sentative of each of the allied armies, has been agreed upon. In its capacity as the representative body of the several supply departments of the respective armies, this board is expected to study questions of supply, and adopt all proper measures for the coordination of allied resources and utilities. Par. 2. The services of the Board of Allied Supply thus created will be fully utilized by officers of the various supply departments of the American Expeditionary Forces, who are enjoined to seek through this agency the equitable allotment of such supplies, and, in cooperating with corresponding supply officers of the allied armies, to take the most liberal attitude, to the end tha,t every economy in the management and unification of allied supply systems may be accomplished. Par. 3. Col. Charles G. Dawes, E. C, N. A., is designated as the representa- tive of the American Expeditionary Forces on the Military Board of Allied Supply. By command of Gen. Pershing. James W. McAndkew, Chief of Staff. The following communication from Gen. Pershing to Col. Charles s d d 1 t^ c K w u w o 5 i , enlisted men. Base hospitals, 60. Major camp hospitals, 45. Hospital centers, 27. American Red Cross military hospitals, 7. Convalescent hospitals, 2. Convalescent camps, 13. Medical supply depots, 7. Medical laboratories, 6. Medical supplies from United States, 108,753 tons. Medical supplies from Europe, 99,487 tons. Death rate of wounded, 5 per cent. Wounded returned to duty, 75 per cent. Deaths from diseases, 45 men per 1,000. Venereal disease, 35.9 new cases per 1,000.^" Veterinary hospitals, exclusive of those with armies, 21. Capacity of above, 27,614 animals. ORGANIZATION. The first Medical Corps personnel, that of Army Base Hospital No. 5, arrived in France '" May 25, 1917, and went to duty with the British Expeditionary Forces at Dannes (Pas-de-Calais) and Camiers (Pas-de-Calais). On September 4, during an airplane attack on the hospital there, one officer and three enlisted men of this unit were killed and three officers and six enlisted men were wounded. These were probably the first American casualties in the war. The first medical headquarters personnel arrived in Paris June 13, 1917, with Gen. Pershing's party. The office of the chief surgeon. Expe- ditionary Forces, remained in Paris until September 1, 1917, when it was moved to Chaumont with the other departments of general headquarters. It was removed to Tours, March 21, 1918. The first work of the chief surgeon and his assistants was an in- spection to determine the location of hospitals at base ports and '^ Source, Bureau of Statistics, G. S. tables compiled from M. C. reports. " Page 8, report of Capt. E. O. Foster as of Not. 11, 1918, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OV SUPPLY. 57 ^ <1 (^ Z f.^ o e H ^ rt :^ CQ ^- li. B SJ OQ O OJ ^ O 1 « t> i2 to f» h H >-H H o e 1 a e 3 B •a <^ 58 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. along the line of communications. As soon as these locations had been determined, in cooperation with the French and the construc- tion services of the American Army, building was pushed and many of these base hospitals were completed in record time. Wherever possible existing buildings or partly constructed buildings were made use of. The Medical Corps in the Line of Communications was made a separate department on July 18, 1917, when the office of Chief Sur- geon of Base Groups and Line of Communications was created. Until March 21, 1918, this officer had charge of all hospitals, supplies, and personnel in his territory. By General Orders, No. 31, Head- quarters, Expeditionary Forces, 1918, the duties of the chief surgeon, Line of Communications, were merged with those of the chief sur- geon, Expeditionary Forces. By July 28, 1917, the divisions of the chief surgeon's office were as follows: Hospitalisation. — In charge of the location, construction, and re- pair of all hospitals, hospital trains and care of sick and wounded. Sanitation and Statistics. — In charge of camps, quarters, disin- fection and delousing, collection and evacuation of sick, health of commands, report of sick and wounded, statistics, and sanitary reports. Personnel. — In charge of personnel of Medical, Dental, and Veteri- nary Corps, civilian employees and schools of instruction. Supplies. — In charge of hospital equipment, medical, dental, and veterinary supplies, settlement of accounts and all ambulances and motor transportation. Records and Correspondence.- — Name describes its duties. Gas Service. — This work was early taken over by the Chemical War- fare Service and is described in the section devoted to that service. This division of duties remained until the office of the chief sur- geon was moved from Chaumont to Tours. When this occurred a representative of the chief surgeon was assigned to general head- quarters with an assistant on duty with each of the several General Staff groups. The work of the chief surgeon, after the removal to Tours, was divided into the following groups : (1) Hospitalization, evacuation, and hospital administration. (2) Sanitation, sanitary inspection, and medical accounting. (3) Personnel. (4) Medical supplies. (5) Finance and accounting. (6) Veterinary. When war was declared the Army Nurse Corps contained only 400 nurses scattered over the United States and its possessions. The reserve had been organized under the American Eed Cross. This OEGAHIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 59 agency, therefore, under a former superintendent of Army nurses, had plans ready and had enrolled several thousand reserve nurses. The character, qualifications, and antecedents of each were care- fully investigated before enrollment, the result being that the 10,008 nurses sent to the Expeditionary Forces formed a body of remark- ably trained women who gave a service the standard of which was exceptionally high. When the first call was made only graduate nurses who had registered in accordance with the laws of their re- spective States were accepted. Later this requirement was waived and graduate nurses were accepted with the understanding that they would register within a year after they left active service. Ex- perience showed that units definitely organized by a head nurse in civil hospitals and colleges, among women accustomed to work together, were more efficient. MATERIAL. There were over 3,000 items in the supply table of the Medical Corps. These varied all the way from delicate and expensive scien- tific instruments and hospital equipment to soap, gauze, and medi- cines. The Expeditionary Forces received 208,240 tons of these sup- plies, about 95 per cent coming from the United States and the bal- ance from European markets.'^ The first medical supplies arrived with the first convoy which reached St. Nazaire June 26, 1917, and from this time on there was a steady flow. Storage facilities at ports governed the method of handling medi- cines and accessories at each port. At St. Nazaire, Bordeaux, and Marseille, where storage facilities were more extensive, medical offi- cers were stationed to supervise the segregation of their supplies from those of other services. Generally all supplies for the corps were loaded into cars and shipped to base storage as rapidly as might be where they were divided into two classes. One class was placed in storage at the base ports and was known as " controlled stores." The other class, consisting of miscellaneous supplies in mixed boxes of small volume, was shipped directly to the intermediate depots. The base storage depots entered all " controlled stores " on warehouse re- ceipts and copies of these receipts were forwarded daily to the Chief Surgeon at Tours, where stock records of all storage stations were kept. Medical stores were received from time to time at Brest, Le Havre, Cherbourg, Les Sables-d'Olonne, La Pallice, La Rochelle, and Eochefort, where the Medical Corps had no storage facilities. At these ports the supplies were shipped directly to Gievres regard- less of class. « Page 116 of " Some Achievements of the Services of Supply " on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 60 ORGANIZATION OP THE SERVICES OF SUPPLV. Purchases in Europe were made by the raedical member of the General Purchasing Board at Paris under the direction of the chief surgeon. Such supplies were shipped at times directly from the place of purchase to the hospital or depot requiring them, but generally all purchases in England or France were shipped to inter- mediate depots and distributed like supplies from the United States. The stores for combat troops were controlled by the armies and were independent of the chief surgeon, who was concerned only with keeping a proper reserve for the armies' needs. All requisitions were disposed of according to the quantities re- quired. When items were large enough to make carload lots they were extracted to "Shipping notices" and sent to base storage depots for direct shipment. When less than carload lots or miscellaneous items of less than original packages were called for, the requisition was forwarded to the nearest issue depot. Requisitions from small hospitals were forwarded to nearest issue depot after modification and approval by the chief surgeon. The locations of Medical Corps facilities were as follows : Base hospitals: Vichy (Allier). Vicq (Allier). Vauclaire (Dordogne). Boulogne ( Pas-de-Calais ) . Tours ( Indre-et-Loire ) . Chateauroux (Indre). Nantes ( Loire-Inf firieure ) . Limoges (Haute-VIenne). Dijon (C6te-d'Or). Chatelguyon (Puy-de-D6me). Beau Desert (Gironde). AUerey ( Saone-et-Loire ) . Tottenham ( England ) . Portsmouth (England). Dartford (England). Salisbury (England). Horsley Park (England). Pougues-les-Eaux ( Nigvre ) . Toul (Meurthe-et-Moselle). Mesves ( Ni6vre ) . Langres ( Haute-Marne ) . Caen (Calvados). Neuf chateau (Vosges). Etretat (Selne-Inf6rleure). Rouen (Seine-Infgrieure). Bordeaux (Gironde). Savenay (Loire-Inffirieure). Treport (Seine-Infgrieure). Dannes (Pas-de-Calais). Camlers (Pas-de-Calais). Mars (Ni6vre). Base hospitals — Continued. Chaumont (Haute-Marne). Bazoilles ( Vosges ) . Vittel (Vosges). Angers ( Maine-et-Loire ) . Royat ( Puy-de-D3me ) . Contrexgville ( Vosges ) . Hen decou rt (Pas-de-Calais ) . St. Denis (Seine). Romorantin (Loir-et-Cher). Blois (Loir-et-Cher). Beaune (C6te-d'0r). Rimaucourt (Haute-Marne). Paris (Seine). Kerhornou ( FinistSre ) . Pau (Ba.sses-Pyr6n6es). Revigny (Meuse). Commercy (Meuse). Pruniers (Loir-et-Cher). St. Nazaire (Loire-Inf€rieure). Clermont-Ferrand (Puy-de-DOme). Vannes (Morbihan). Autun (SaSne-et-Loire). Qniberon (Morbihan). Perigueux (Dordogne). Mont-Dore (Puy-de-DOme). HySres (Var). Brest (FinistSre). Lafauche (Haute-Marne). Orleans (Loiret). Poitiers (Vienne). Vincenza (Italy). OEGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OP SUPPLY. 61 ■Camp hospitals: Roanne (Loire). Gondrecourt (Meuse). Bourmont (Haute-Marne). Genicart (Gironde). Humes (Haute-Marne). Chateauvillain ( Haute-Marne ) . Prautlioy (Haute-Marne). Mailly-le-Camp (Aube). Coetquidan (lUe-et-Vilaine). Souge (Gironde). Langres (Haute-Marne). Tours (Indre-et-Lolre). Le Corneau (Gironde). Meucon (Morbihan). Eomsey (England). Winchester (England). Southampton (England). Liverpool (England). Bar-sur-Aube (Aube). Gifivres (Loire-et-Cher). Riom (Puy-de-D6me). Aix-les-Bains ( Sa vole ) . Le Mans (Sarthe). Bassens (Gironde). Joinville (Seine). Barisey-la-Cote ( Meurthe-et-Mo- selle). Montigny-le-Roi (Haute-Marne). St. Nazaire (Loire-Inttrieure). Le Valdahon (Doubs). Issoudun (Indre). La Courtine (Creuse). Bourbonne (Haute-Marne). Noyers ( Loir-et-Cher ) . Nevers (Ni^vre). St. Maixent (Deux-S&vres). Brest (FinistSre). Bomorantin ( Loir-et-Cher ) . Chatillon-sur-Seine (Cete-d'Or) . LaRochelle (Charentelnfgrieure). Is-sur-Tille ( C6te-d'0r ) . Landerneau ( Finistfire ) . Recey-sur-Ource (C6te-d'0r). Laignes (CSte-d'Or). Tonnerre (Tonne). Marseille ( Bouches-du-RhSne ) . Hospital centers : AUerey ( SaSne-et-Lolre) . Bazoilles-sur-Meuse ( Vosges ) . Beau Desert (Gironde). Beaune (Cate-d'Or). Clermont-Ferrand (Puy-de-D6me). Hospital centers — Continued. Commercy (Meuse). Lgrouville (Meuse). Kerhornou (Finistfire). Langres (Haute-Marne). Mars (NlSvre). Mesves (Nifivre). Pau (Basses-Pyrgn^es). Perigueux (Dordogne). Rimaucourt (Haute-Marne). Riviera (Alpes-Maritimes). Savenay (Loire-Infgrieure). Toul ( Meurthe-et-Moselle ) . Tours (Indre-et-Loire). Vannes (Morbihan). Vichy (Allier). Vittel (Vosges). Gontrex6ville ( Vosges ) . Nantes ( Loire-Infgrieure ) . American Red Cross military hos- pitals : Neuilly (Seine). Paris (Seine). Auteuil (Seine). Liverpool (England). Paddington (England). London (England). Bellevue (Seine). Convalescent hospitals : Nice (Alpes-Maritimes). St. Raphael (Var). Convalescent camps : Savenay ( Loire-Inf erieure ) . Nantes ( Loire-Infgrieure ) . Angers ( Maine-et-Loire ) . Paris (Seine) Langres ( Haute-Marne ) . LifCol-le-Grand ( Vosges ) . Limoges ( Haute-Vienne ) . Tours (Indre-et-Loire). Beau Desert (Gironde). Mesves (Nigvre). Mars (NiSvre). Allery ( Sa6ne-et-Loire ) . Beaune (C6te-d'0r). Bledical supply depots and stations : Brest (FinistBre). St. Sulpice (Gironde). GiSvres (Loir-et-Cher). St. Nazaire ( Loire-Inf Srieure). Marseille ( Bouches-du-RhSne ) . Is-sur-Tille (Cote-d'Or). Cosne (Ni6vre). OEGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. Medical laboratories: Brest (Finistere). Bordeaux (Gironde). Neuf chateau (Vosges). St. Nazaire (Loire-InKrieure). Dijon (C6te-d'Or). Tours (Indre-et-Lolre). Veterinary hospitals: Neuilly-l'Eveque ( Haute-Marne ) . Triconville (Meuse). Treveray (Meuse). Valdahon ( Doubs ) . Carbon Blanc (Gironde). Souge (Gironde). Toul ( Meurthe-et-Moselle ) . Veterinary hospitals— Continued. Neuf chateau (Vosges). Coetquidan (Morbihan). Meucon (Morbihan). Bourbonne ( Haute-Marne ) . Gifivres ( Loir-et-Cher ) . Commercy (Meuse). Lux (C5te-d'0r). Epinal (Vosges). Longuyon ( Meui-the-et-Moselle ) . Sougy (Nifevre). Verdun (Meuse). Nevers (Ni6vre). Treves (Germany). St. N.izalre (Loire-Inf6rieure). XII.— MOTOR TRANSPORT CORPS, AMERICAN EXPEDI- TIONARY FORCES. The Motor Transport Corps had technical supervision over all motor transportation in the Expeditionary Forces. Authorized strength, 1,985 officers and 44,486 enlisted men. Strength at armistice, 1,135 officers and 26,957 enlisted men.^' Vehicles for which Motor Transport Corps (20) was responsible : Passenger cars 7, 551 Trucks 36,943 Motor cycles 13, 784 Trailers 4,323 Bicycles 17,577 Reception parks, 9; service stations, 52; heavy repair shops, 5; reconstruction parks. ORGANIZATION. The Motor Transport Service, as it was first called, was controlled at first in the Expeditionary Forces by the Quartermaster Corps and was authorized as a division of the duties of the chief quartermaster, by General Orders, No. 70, Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, De- cember 8, 1917. (20) It was charged with the supply of motor vehicles, spare parts, tools, and accessories, the technical supervision of motor vehicles and their repair. No authority was given the Motor Transport Service for the operation of its vehicles and units after their assignment by competent orders to the other services. The chief of the Motor Transport Service was an assistant to the chief quartermaster. The Engineer and Signal Corps, the Ordnance and Transportation Departments, and the Field Ambulance Service as- signed officers, one from each, to serve as assistants to the chief. The «* Page 1, Motov Transport Corps Section, Part I, Appendix A — Report board appointed by paragraph 79, S. O. 141, headquarters Services of Supply, 1919, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 63 duty of these officers was to represent their own services in motor transportation matters. The chief quartermaster of each army was designated as the chief of Motor Transport Service for that army and he had as assistants representatives from each of the foregoing services just as the chief of the Motor Transport Service did; but the chief of each army motor transport service was subordinate to the particular army commander concerned, although authorized to com- municate directly with the chief of the Motor Transport Service and the officer in charge of Advance Motor Transport Service Group, Services of Supply, in technical ^' matters. (20) This plan of organi- zation remained in force until February 16, 1918, when the Motor Transport Service was removed from the control of the Quartermas- ter Corps and made a part of the Service of Utilities.*" Under all these orders the Motor Transport Corps was given technical super- vision and operation in the Services of Supply. In July, 1918, the Service of Utilities was abolished and the Motor Transport Service, as the " Motor Transport Corps," was made an independent service of the Services of Supply.*^ The duties of the service had already been defined in General Orders, No. 74, General Headquarters, May 11, 1918, as follows : (a) The technical supervision of all motor vehicles. (h) The procurement, reception, storage, maintenance, and replace- ment of all motor vehicles. (c) The procurement, storage, and supply of spare and repair parts, tools, accessories, and supplies of all motor vehicles. (d) The establishment and operation of all Motor Transport Serv- ice garages, parks, depots, and repair shops. (e) The organization and technical training of Motor Transport Service personnel. (/) The salvage and evacuation of damaged motor vehicles. , (g) The homogeneous grouping of motor vehicles. (h) The operation, in accordance with instruction from the proper commanding officer as to their employment, of groups of motor ve- hicles of Class A as defined in paragraph 5. Class A, as defined in paragraph 5, included all cargo carrying or passenger carrying motor vehicles for general transportation pur- poses in the Services of Supply, and the motorized portion of such reserve trains as might be held for general transportation in or in the rear of the army under control of the army commander. Class B included all motor vehicles other than in Class A. When the Motor Transport Service became the Motor Transport Corps the " chief " gave place to a " director." Assisting the direc- « General Orders, No. 70, General Headquarters, 1917. M General Orders, No. 31, General Headquarters, 1918. « General Orders, No. 114, Headquarters, Services of Supply, 1918. 64 OEGANIZATION OF THE SEEVICES OF SUPPLY. tor was a deputy director and an executive officer. The work of the director was handled through nine divisions, viz, Executive, Supply, Repair, Operations, Inspection and Engineering, Training, Liaison, and Plans and Projects. The Executive Division coordinated the work of all other divi- sions and, in addition, controlled personnel, publications, finance, and accounting and statistics. The Supply Division handled all the Expeditionary Force motor supplies. The Eepair Division had entire direction of repairs to all motor vehicles and controlled the distribution of spare parts and other accessories. The Operations Division was charged with the assignment and distribution of motor vehicles, operation of convoys, and the super- vision of motor vehicle operation in the Services of Supply. The Inspection and Engineering Division inspected all Motor Transport Corps activities and handled the technical problems which were arising continually. The Liaison Division maintained, largely by officers who made regular trips between Tours and Washington, close relation between the director of the Motor Transport Corps, Expeditionary Forces, and the chief of the Motor Transport Corps in the United States. The Plans and Projects Division planned all buildings and other Motor Transport Corps projects. For a few weeks there was a Reconstruction and Main Supply Depots Division, but its duties were absorbed by the Repair Divi- sion before it got fairly started. REPAIR. The beginning of all motor transport activities in France nat- urally was at the base ports where vehicles were received from ships and taken to reception parks. Here they were assembled, painted, numbered, registered and placed in perfect running order. Then they were sent to points of distribution. The reception parks were at St. Nazaire, La Pallice, Rochefort, Brest, Le Havre, Rouen, and Nantes. Repair work was accomplished through three agencies: Service parks, overhaul parks, and reconstruction parks.*^ Service parks were units for minor repair work. They proved invaluable both in the Services of Supply and the Zone of the Armies. Some of them were equipped with machine shop trucks, tire presses and the like, which enabled them to take a part of the burden oflF the busier *2 Page 15, Motor Transport Corps Section, Part I, App. A — Report board appointed by par. 79, S. 0. 141, Headquarters, Services of Supply, 1910, on file Historical Branch General Staff. ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OE SUPPLY. 65 and better equipped shops. Others had only hand tools, but could be sent to points where needed on short notice. In general prac- tice the personnel of a service park consisted of 1 first lieutenant and 35 enlisted men, but often it was found necessary to increase it to meet peculiar conditions. Usually the commanding officer of the unit was an expert mechanic and among the enlisted personnel were some men of unusual mechanical ability. These men were picked because they could do a great deal of work with very little equipment. The service parks were located in many sections of the Services of Supply, and in many centers in the Zone of the Armies, and three were assigned to each division. Overhaul parks received vehicles for repair and overhaul from units to which assigned and also from service parks when the repair was too heavy to be handled at the service parks within reasonable time.^^ They were permanent or semipermanent, required heavy machinery and, in some cases, specially constructed buildings. These overhaul parks were established at Neuf chateau (Vosges), Sampigny (Meuse), Dijon, and Paris. Eeconstruction parks were establishments where vehicles damaged or worn beyond repair could be actually reconstructed or rebuilt. There were two: One at Verneuil (Nievre) and one at Romorantin (Loir-et-Cher). That at Verneuil handled American makes of vehicles and that at Romorantin handled foreign makes and special light and heavy aviation trucks and trailers. POOLING. In the early months of the Expeditionary Forces, motor transpor- tation was issued to units or to authorized individuals who operated the vehicles practically independent of central control. All vehicles thus assigned were devoted to the individual use of the assignee. There was neither coordination of operation nor proper control of vehicles. (20) This condition also necessitated more motor trans- portation than was required under a pooling arrangement, and a pool therefore would make motor transportation available to more persons in the military service. The same conditions had prevailed with regard to cargo transportation. Moreover, assignment to units or individuals made for excessive repair work and excessive con* sumption of spare parts. Consequently it was decided forthwith to pool all motor vehicles. By pooling was meant collecting all motor vehicles under one au- thority for general transportation and assigning them from such " Page 15, Motor Transport Corps Section, Part I, Appendix A — Report board appointed by paragraph 79, S. 0. No. 141, Headquarters, Services of Supply, 1919, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 178841°— 20 5 66 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. collection to meet the actual needs in each specified case. Creation of a vehicle pool meant unity of control and did not mean that all vehicles must be parked in one place. (20) The general assignment of vehicles in the Services of Supply to the several sections was made by the Chief of the Motor Transport Corps, subject to policies laid down by G-4, Headquarters, Services of Supply, and the sec- tion commanders controlled section pools. The pool justified itself fully in the opinion of high command. It was found that it made for proper operation and maintenance, brought a greater return from a given amount of vehicle equipment, and tended to eliminate waste or misuse of motor transportation and needless varieties of vehicles. The pool was established first at Headquarters, Services of Supply, by General Orders, No. 1, Headquarters, Services of Supply, March 13, 1918. PERSONNEL. When war was declared and voluntary enlistments were at their maximum there was no motor transport service to absorb thousands of experienced motor men. When the Motor Transport Service was a part of the Quartermaster Corps it received only such personnel as the Quartermaster Corps thought it could afford to take away from other duties. When it began as a separate service it received only such per- sonnel as the Quartermaster Corps and other services had already as- signed to it. It was not until about three months before the armistice that the Motor Transport Corps was able to get definite action on its statements of personnel needs. The result was that personnel, or rather the lack of it, was conspicuously the great Motor Transport Corps problem in the Expeditionary Forces. (20) Personnel was always short ; never more than 33 per cent of the requirement. It was necessary in the Services of Supply to use every possible makeshift in the way of operating and mechanical personnel. Men had to be secured from other services, no matter whether they had much or practically no motor experience. For months at the base ports the chief motor transport officer had to borrow thus from arriving organizations and after a time had to release men thus acquired to their own organizations and borrow other inexperienced personnel as replacement. Even line regiments were drawn upon. It was natural that these men would take no particular pride in equipment they were handling only in passing. Consequently equipment suf- fered.*"* Anybody who knew anything at all about repair work, no matter how little, had to be put on repair work. Commissioned officers for the Motor Transport Corps came from the ranks of motor experts in the United States, where they were " Page 18, Motor Transport Corps Section, Part I, Appendix A — Report board convened by paragraph 79, S. 0. 141, Heiadquartera, Services of Supply, 1919, on file Historical Branch. General Staff. ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OE SUPPLY. 67 more numerous in 1917 than in any other country. These officers had had long training in civil life and this training showed itself in the Expeditionary Forces, especially in what they accomplished with such a paucity of materiel and men. A number of Americans who had been in the service of the French joined the American Army. These men were of a high average of intelligence and ability and, in addition, were thoroughly experienced in war-time motor transportation. Many of them reached commis- sioned rank and the rest occupied responsible positions as noncom- missioned officers. Organization chart, Motor Transport Corps, A. E. F. DIRECTOR. Deputy. Executive Officer. Executive Division. Supply- Division. Inspection and Engineering Division. Training Division. Repair Division. Operations Divisiou. Liaison Division. Flans and Projects Division. Eeoons traction Paries and Main Supply Depots. When the tables of personnel requirement were submitted in August, 1918, the corps asked for 44,485 men and 1,985 officers for an army of 1,300,000 in the Expeditionary Forces. This amount of personnel never was furnished. The strength of the Expeditionary Forces had passed that figure when the tables went into effect. The final result was that when the Motor Transport Corps had procured about half the number of officers and men needed for an army of 68 OEGANIZATION OP THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 1,300,000 it had only about one-third the number needed to do the Work for an army of the size which the Expeditionary Forces had then attained. In September, 1918, the War Department transferred the enlisted personnel of divisional supply trains to the Motor Trans- port Corps, but this increased the strength of the Motor Transport Corps only on paper, because this personnel was engaged in combat work, and Expeditionary Forces, by order, did not come under Motor Transport Corps control ; at least it was impracticable to move them. A number of Engineer units which had been working with the Motor Transport Corps were transferred also in September, 1918. Newly arrived personnel was trained in schools at the base ports and at other points in France. MATERIEL. The materiel used by the Motor Transport Corps in the Expedi- ' tionary Forces consisted of passenger automobiles, light and heavy trucks, trailers, motor cycles, bicycles, spare parts, and repair equip- ment. About 2^ per cent of this materiel came from European markets and the rest from the United States.*' Altogether 160 makes of vehicles were used, of which 112 makes were European, but these 112 makes represented' less than 3 per cent of the total number of vehicles. The history of the acquisition of American materiel does not form a part of this paper, but relates to the supply in the United States. Gasoline and lubricating oils were handled by the Quartermaster Corps. ACTIVITIES. The locations of the various Motor Transport Corps activities in the Expeditionary Forces were as follows : Reception parks : St. Nazaire (Lolre-Inf&rieure). Bordeaux (Gironde). Nantes ( Loire-Inf grieure ) . La Pallice (Charente-InKrieure). Rochef ort ( Charente-Inf firieure ) . Brest (FinistSre). Le Havre (Seine-Inffirieure). Rouen (Seine-Inf6rieure). Overhaul parks: Neuf chateau (Vosges). Sampigny (Meuse). DlJon (Cete-d'Or). Paris (Seine). Reconstruction parks : Verneuil (NlSvre). Romorantin (Loir-et-Cher). Spart parts depots: Langres ( Haute-Marne ) . Verneuil (Nifivre). Nevers (Ni6vre). Nogent-en-Bassigny ( Haute-Marn< Supply depots : Verneuil (Nigvre). Romorantin (Lolr-et-Oher). Service parks : Coetquidan (Morbihan). Meucon (Morbihan). St. Nazaire (Loire-Inf6rieure). Savenay (Loire-InKrieure). Nantes ( Loi re-Inf grieure ) . Angers (Maine-et-Loire). La Pallice (Charente-Infgrieure). Rochefort (Charente-Infgrieure). " Appendix D, Report ot G-4, General Headquarters, to the commajjding general, Ameri- can Expeditionary Forces, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. OEGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY, 69 Service parts — Oontinued. Souge (Gironde). Lormont (Gironde). Libourne (Gironde). Le Corneau (Gironde). Bordeaux (Gironde). Poitiers (Vienne). Le Mans (Sartlie). Paris (Seine). Blois (Loir-et-Oher). Montiercliaume (Indre). Bourges (Clier). Clermont-Ferrand (Puy-de-D5me). Haussimont (Marne). Chatillon-sur-Seine (05te-d'0r). St. Dizier (Haute-Marne). Triaucourt (Meuse). Sampigny (Meuse). Colombey-1 e s-Belles (Meurthe-et- Moselle). Is-sur-Tille ( C6te-d'0r ) . Dijon (Cote-d'Or). Lyon (Rhone). Marseille ( Bouches-du-Rli6ne ) . Service parks — Continued. Vannes (Morbihan). Melun ( Seine-et-Marne ) . Saumur (Maine-et-Loire). Tours ( Indre-et-Loire ) . Le Havre (Seine-Inf6rieure). Rouen ( Seine-Inf grieure ) . St. Aignan (Loir-et-Cher). Limoges (Haut- Vienne). La Courtine (Creuse). Nevers (NiSvre). Verneuil (Ni&vre). Chaumont (Haut-Marne). Donjeux (Haut-Marne). Toul ( Meurthe-et-Moselle ) . Neuf chateau (Vosges). Langres (Haut-Marne). Valdahon (Doubs). Allerey (Cote-d'Or). Decize (NiSvre). Cannes (Alpes-Maritlmes). Loud6ac ( C5tes-du-Nord ) . Issoudun (Indre). XIII.— ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT, AMERICAN EXPEDI- TIONARY FORCES. The problem of the Ordnance Department, Expeditionary Forces, was to acquire materiel from the United States and Europe and dis- tribute it to meet the needs of American forces, and to requisition, distribute, and administer the personnel necessary to carry out this work. Outstanding facts about the department in the Expeditionary Forces are: Strength : « Authorized, 4,471 officers and 100,084 enlisted men. On November 11, 1918, 1,661 officers and 20,339 enlisted men. Maximum, 1,804 officers and 22,172 enlisted men. ORGANIZATION. The establishment of the Ordnance Department of the Expedi- tionary Forces was provided in General Orders, No. 1, Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, May 26, 1917, issued before Gen. Pershing and his party sailed from the United States, in which order the department was charged with administration matters overseas, through a chief ordnance officer. The first officers of the oversea department were chosen from line officers particularly qualified for ordnance work. (13) The chief ordnance officer reported di- " History Ordnance, A. E. F., vol. 1, page 205, on flle Hist. Branch, G. S. 70 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. ORGANIZATION OP THE SERVICES OE SUPPLY. 71 rectly to the commanding general, Expeditionary Forces, and was also later a staff officer of the conamanding general. Services of Sup- ply. He had his headquarters in Paris until March, 1918, when he moved to Tours with the other supply services. Properly and efficiently to conduct his department, the chief ord- nance officer distributed the work among six divisions. These were, Administration, Supply, Construction and Maintenance, Personnel, Engineering and Eequirements. The Administration Division coordinated the work of the other divisions and collected for record or distribution all information of general character. The Supply Division was just what its name im- plies, and had charge of all depots and of the distribution of ma- teriel to forces in the field. The Division of Construction and Main- tenance provided and maintained ordnance buildings and their fa- cilities ; was responsible for the installation of the necessary machin- ery, tools and other equipment and their upkeep ; operated the gen- eral ordnance repair shops; supervised the operation of all other ordnance repair shops, cooperated in the assignment of the personnel therefor, and cooperated with the salvage service in the repair and disposition of ordnance materiel. The Personnel Division secured, assigned, instructed, and moved personnel, and had general supervision of aU personnel in the Ord- nance Department, and maintained a record of all. The Engineering Division was charged with everything pertain- ing to the design, experiment, and determination of types ; prepared all technical pamphlets, drawings, charts, and specifications pertain- ing to ordnance and ordnance stores that it was necessary to prepare in France; investigated defects in ordnance materiel and prescribed corrective measures; operated proving grounds and laboratories; advised and instructed other divisions in technical matters; main- tained technical relations with allied forces and other American Expeditionary Forces services ; and established, maintained, and ad- ministered courses of instruction in all ordnance activities. The Eequirements Division established and maintained tables of requirements of all ordnance materiel; prepared priority schedules for procurement and shipping of materiel from the United States and in Europe and made estimate of tonnage requirements; sub- mitted all requisitions to the Ordnance Department in the United States ; cooperated with the salvage service in matters pertaining to salvage as a source of ordnance supply ; and maintained such records and statistics as were necessary for the performance of its duties. PERSONNEL. Like all other services in the Expeditionary Forces, the Ordnance Department was handicapped by a shortage of personnel, but plans were well under way when hostilities ended for the acquisition 72 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. of sufficient force to take care of the program already mapped out and to allow for a reasonable expansion. Ordnance personnel was supplied from officers and men in the military service before the declaration of war who were familiar with ordnance work, from civilians in the United States with technical and scientific train- ing, and from Class B and Class C officers and men from combat units. Those from the first source were found efficient in nearly every case ; those from the second became fairly efficient when prop- erly trained, but courses of instruction were always necessary ; while those from the third class were generally found unsatisfactory, a condition that prevailed in all services of supply. The first call for ordnance personnel was for 351 officers and 9,798 men to take care of 20 combat divisions and 10 replacement and training divisions which were to be organized into 5 corps. This estimate was forwarded to the United States by the commanding general. Expeditionary Forces, on July 6, 1917. He asked at the same time for 11,000 laborers, expecting that this labor could be sup- plied partly from the United States and partly from Europe.*^ Soon it was found that this estimate was too small and that the proper kind of labor could not be had, and accordingly the work had to be done by skilled enlisted ordnance personnel. The estimate for personnel went through various changes until June 27, 1918, when a project was submitted calling for 10,819 officers and enlisted men. On July 18, 1918, the War Department was asked to ship 27,600 men be- tween October, 1918, and July, 1919, and on July 21 of the same year a project was forwarded for 2,398 officers to be in France by July 1, 1919. This latter project was approved but subsequent changes were made in the personnel program until 4,471 officers and 100,084 en- listed men were authorized. It was contemplated that these forces should be organized into companies of 250 men, each one to have two officers for military administration. But in August, 1918, the Ord- nance Department was ordered to take over the Ammunition Supply Service, which had been operated previously by the French. To carry on this work it was necessary to take away much of the ord- nance personnel from the Services of Supply depots and many skilled mechanics. To replace these men, the commanding general. Ex- peditionary Forces, forwarded a cable calling for 21 officers and 1,641 men for Ammunition Supply for the First Army and a like number for the Second Army. It was intended to transfer the men thus procured to the units which had lost because of the assumption of the supply work ; but the Services of Supply never regained the men taken away from it. Properly to handle ammunition supply, one company was planned to accompany each division from the •* Vol. V, page 30, History of Ordnance Department, American Expeditionary Forces, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. ORGANIZATION 01" THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 73 United States. Each company was to consist of 6 officers and 216 enlisted men. (13) There was confusion over the control of ordnance officers on duty with divisions. Whether they should be controlled by the chief ordnance officer or by the division commanders, never was definitely decided. Much confusion resulted over this dual claim to control and finally a check was made whereby it was found that some ordnance officers were claimed by two divisions and some were claimed by none. (13) Steps were being taken to remedy this situation when the armistice intervened. On August 1, 1918, a classification of the personnel was completed which showed approximately the following results: Per cent. One year at college 3. 2 Two years at college 3. 6 Three years at college 2. 6 College graduates 5. 7 Post graduates (two degrees) 0.9 College, no length stated 3. Total college men 19. High school 24. Business special schools 6. 8 Grammar schools and nondeclarants 50. 2 Total 100.0 The ordnance personnel sent overseas was divided into seven classes as follows : (a) Personnel attached to line organizations. (6) Automatic replacement troops. (c) Mobile ordnance repair shops. (d) Heavy mobile ordnance repair shops. (e) Provisional ordnance depot companies and battalions. (/) Casual officers. (g) Casual enlisted men. The movement of Class A men was automatic. They were assigned to line organizations in the United States and kept with them in France. Class B personnel was also sent overseas without special request and ordered to the concentration barracks at Mehun and then to ordnance schools before being distributed. Class C personnel was sent automatically also, one unit for each division, the units being given intensive training at Is-sur-Tille before joining divisions. Class D men were included in the original troop projects and went to or- ganization and training centers before entering the Army area. Class E personnel was sent overseas upon request from headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, and went to the concentration bar- racks at Mehun, whence the men were distributed to stations in the Services of Supply. Class F officers were ordered automatically 74 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. from the base ports to Tours for a one-day conference before assign- ment to duty. Class G personnel was ordered automatically to Mehun for classification and assignment. For a time it was thought that many of the ordnance activities could be carried on by reclassified officers and men, but time proved that personnel, from combat divisions, classed physically as B or C, could not be used successfully except on very light duty. These men were geaerally returned to combat divisions when they got well. However, reports on reclassification finally showed that about 2,000 officers and men were on the lists who could be used in ordnance work, and on October 16, 1918, request was made for 1,000 of these officers. (13) On July 17, 1918, the educational section of the Development Division was established for personnel instruction. This was made a function of the Engineering Division, which replaced the Develop- ment Division, and it was transferred to the Personnel Division when that division was created November 11, 1918. It was the duty of the educational section to establish, maintain, and administer courses of instruction for ordnance personnel in all branches of ordnance work and to provide such military instruction as might be necessary, and to cooperate with and assist the Personnel Division in the classifica- tion and assignment of personnel.*' These schools were served by instructors picked from the commissioned personnel with special care ; and from the outset the improvement in the men was so marked that the courses were constantly elaborated so that every phase of ordnance work was included finally. The location of these schools is given in the list of ordnance facilities below. MATERIEL. The greater part of the materiel for the Ordnance Department of the Expeditionary Forces was bought in Europe, this being especially true in the case of the heavier items. Broadly, Europe and the United States were the two sources of supply."" The principal reason for this was that the need for materiel became serious even before anybody could outline the requirements. Artillery, artillery ammunition, fire control instruments, and trench warfare materiel, were practically all furnished by France and England. Until the summer of 1918" machine guns and automatic rifles were supplied largely by the Allies and up to the same period much personnel and horse equipment had to be provided for by commercial substitutes purchased in the European markets. Requirements were handled through estimates based on initial equipment, wastage, consumption «» History of Ordnance Department, American Expeditionary Forces, Vol. I, pages 51 to 240 ; on flle Historical Branch, General Staff. »> History of Ordnance Department, American Expeditionary Forces, Vol. I, pages 133, 137, 138, and 139 ; on file Historical Branch, General Staff. ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 75 and reserves, which estimates were filled from foreign availabilities and from the United States through automatic and exceptional supply." Spare parts, accessories, etc., were procured on schedules by individual items and by sets ; but changes finally settled the sys- tem down to schedules of so many spare parts for each 25,000 men in France, thus making the supply automatic. A resume of the combat materiel supplied through the Ordnance Department ^^ is given : From France. l|3 From England Total. Guns: 76mm.guns 1,862 796 160 2 71 26 74 2,022 155 mm. howltiers 4.7-inch guns 71 . 5-incli S. C. guns 26 6-inch S. C. guns 155 mm. guns 233 233 8-inch howitzers S8 120 40 9.2-inch howitzers 40 8-inch S. C.guns 6 15 18 g lO-inch S. C. guns 15 66 Total 2,957 ■460 160 3,577 Caissons: 1,862 796 4,948 1,198 219 6,810 1,944 219 155 mm. howitzer. 4.7-inch gun Total 2,658 6,365 9,023 Trench mortars: 8-inch Stokes 843 914 1,757 136 136 48 513 661 240 mm. trench 101 101 Total 237 891 1,427 2,555 Automatic machine and 37 mm. guns; 30,089 10,411 30,089 Vipkfirsmfifhinp, gnns .. ., ..., , , .. 10,411 TTntc^lri>^ TTlachlTifl gnnq 5,255 5,265 43,368 19,241 43,368 Chauchat, cal..30 19,241 15,988 641 15,988 60 701 Total 41,125 83,928 125,053 Tanks: 227 10 12 14 237 Mark IV 12 14 24 28 227 36 26i 289 Artillery, 2i tons 6 1,618 933 226 83 5 1,018 933 225 451 Artillery 20 tons 83 28 104 28 Renault 104 Total 132 . 2,265 225 2,622 ^^ History of Ordnance Department, American Expeditionary Forces, Vol. I, pages 133, 137, 138, and 139 ; on file Historical Branch, General Staff. " History of Ordnance Department, American Expeditionary Forces, Vol. I, page 205 ; on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 76 ORGANIZATION OF THK SERVICES OF SUPPLY, Sliells: From France From United States . From England 1,983,600 6,972,300 427,100 Total. 9,382,900 Small arms and ammunition: From France rounds. . 47, 559, 000 From United States do.... 1,475,649,000 Total do.... 1,623,108,000 FACILITIES. The facilities of the department in the Expeditionary Forces con- sisted of ammunition depots, general storage depots, ordnance repair shops, schools of instruction, organization and training centers, and proving grounds and laboratories. The locations of these several fa- cilities, as shown by the History of the Ordnance Department, Ameri- can Expeditionary Forces, are as follows : Ammunition depots : St. Loubes (Gironde). Foecy (Cher). Issoudun (Indre). Jonchery (Haute-Marne). Donges ( Loire-Inf ^rieure ) . General storage depots : Calais (Pas-de-Calais). Demange-aux-Eaux (Meuse), GlSvres ( Lolr-et-Cher ) . Is-sur-Tille (CSte-d'Or). Mehun (Cher). Miramas (Bouches-du-Rhone). Montoir (Loire-Inttrieure). Nevers (N16vre). St. Sulpice (Gironde). Ordnance repair shops: Angers (Maine-et-LoIre). AngoulGme ( Charente ) . Bourg (Gironde). Bourges (Cher). Challndrey (Haute-Marne). Clermont-Ferrand (Puy-de-D6me), Coetquidan (Morbihan). Colombey-les-Belles ( Meurthe-et- Moselle). Courbevoie (Seine). Demange-aux-Eaux (Meuse). Doulaincourt (Haute-Marne). Fo6cy (Cher). Gifivres ( Loir-et-Cher ) . Haussimont (Marne). Is-sur-Tille (05te-d'0r). La Courtlne (Creuse). Langres (Haute-Marne). Ordnance repair shops — Continued. Le Blanc (Indre). Le Corneau (Gironde). Libourne (Gironde). Limoges ( Haute-Vienne) . Mehun (Cher). Meucon (Morbihan). Neuvy-Pailloux ( Indre ) . Orly Field (Seine). Romorantin ( Loir-et-Cher ) . St. Jean-de-Monts (Vendue). Sauniur ( Maine-et-Loire) . Souge (Gironde). Valdahon (Doubs). Void (Meuse). Schools of instruction : Bourges (Cher). Foecy (Cher). Is-sur-Tille ( C<5te-d'Or ) . St. Jean-de-Monts (Vendue). St. Aignan (Loir-et-Cher). Jonchery (Haute-Marne). Organization and training centers : Angers ( Maine-et-Loire ) . Angoulfime (Charente). Clermont-Ferrand (Puy-de-D6me). Libourne (Gironde). Limoges ( Haute-Vienne ) . Proving grounds and laboratories : Bourges (Cher). Gavre et Quiberon (Morbihan). MontluQon (Allier). Mehun (Cher). Versailles ( Seine-et-Olse ) . ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OE SUPPLY. 77 XIV.— QUARTERMASTER CORPS, AMERICAN EXPEDI- TIONARY FORCES. The chief duties of the Quartermaster Corps in the Expeditionary Forces were to feed, clothe, and pay the Army, although it was charged with many others, including the supply of fuel and forage, salvage, grave registration, and, at one time, dock operation and motor transportation. It had to perform these varied functions for an Army of 2,000,000 men and, at the same time, prepare for an Army twice that size. Maximum strength, 4,229 officers, 96,451 men, and 42 field clerks on December 15, 1918. Strength at armistice, 4,027 officers, 96,006 men, and 38 field clerks. Forage received, 824,410 tons; from United States, 391,215, and from Europe, 30,122. Animals received, all sources, 243,560. Eemount depots, 35. Mechanical bakeries, 4 ; field bakeries, 61 ; coffee-roasting plants, 3. Ice-making plants, 7 ; cold-storage plants, 21. Main gasoline-storage depots, 6; gasoline-storage and distributing stations, 28. Motor gasoline consumed, 87,663,056 gallons; aviation gasoline consumed, 5,627,572 gallons. Coal receipts to May 1, 1919, 1,953,777 tons. Salvage depots, 4; salvage shops, 17. Decreasing and rendering plants, 4. Clothing received, 119,461 tons ; from United States, 107,429 ; from Europe, 12,032. Food, from United States, 1,313,525 tons; from Europe, 248,150; total, 1,561,675, in the following commodities : Tons. Meat 421, 322 Sugar 74, 455 Tobacco 24, 986 Butter 21, 907 Flour 412, 050 Beans 58, 767 Milk 39, 756 Pepper 871 Tons. Fruits 88, 800 Vinegar 15, 961 Rice 29, 974 Coffee 40, 972 Cinnamon 424 Salt 21, 249 Potatoes 309, 478 Tea 203 Reserve of above on hand November 11, 1918, 93.75 days.'^^ ■* Some achleyements of the Services of Supply Section, table " Subsistence In Depots Nov. 11, 1918." 78 OKGANIZATION OF THE SEEVICES OF SUPPLY. Food consumption, pounds per man per day : "* Salt 0. 0477 Vinegar . 0332 Candy . 0228 Soap . 0228 Baking powder . 0051 Pepper . 0019 Flavoring . 0013 Cinnamon . 0009 Total 4.2887 Potatoes 1. 1770 Meat 1. 0729 Flour . 8527 Sugar . 2409 Fruit . 2302 Beans . 1793 Milk . 0976 Coffee . 0794 Rice and hominy . 0734 Butter .0686 Tobacco . 0576 ORGANIZATION. Under General Orders, No. 8, July 5, 1917, the Quartermaster Corps in the Expeditionary Forces was charged with " the trans- portation of personnel and supplies; the supply of quartermaster transportation ; repairs to all vehicles of all services, except artillery vehicles; clothing, quartermaster equipment; subsistence; fuel; forage; lights; water; camp sites; quarters and offices and equip- ment therefor ; pay of personnel and general disbursements, laundries and baths ; remounts ; claims ; salvage ; quartermaster workshops and storehouses; burials; cemeteries; labor; quartermaster personnel; and coal storage and refrigerating plants. The same order that established the Transportation Department of the Expeditionary Forces determined the duties of the Quartermaster Corps.^^ This order charged each with the transportation of supplies and personnel, but the function of the Quartermaster Corps was confined by prac- tice and not by order to the issue of transportation requests for the Expeditionary Forces. Later this function also passed to the Trans- portation Corps. By General Orders, No. 20, Headquarters, Expedi- tionary Forces, August 13, 1917, the Service of Military Eailways was established and it was charged with the transportation of per- sonnel and supplies in the place of the Quartermaster Corps, but the latter aontinued operating the ports through its Army Transport Service. On September 14, 1917, the Service of Military Eailways became the Transportation Service, and on December 18, 1917, by General Orders, No. 78, Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, the Army Transport Service was transferred to the Transportation Serv- ice with its equipment and personnel. On February 16, 1918, there was a reorganization, under General Orders, No. 31, Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, whereby the Quartermaster Corps became one of the services of the Service of the Eear, later the Services of Sup- ply. In this order the corps was charged with pay of personnel and " Some achievements of the Services of Supply Section, table " Food — Total Issues and Rate o£ Consumption." "» General Orders, No. 8, General Headquarters, July 5, 1917, all on file Historical Branch, General Staff. OEGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 79 general disbursements; quartermaster materiel, including clothing, subsistence, fuel, and forage; transportation of water beyond the water point; remount service; laundries and baths; disinfection of clothing; salvage service; quartermaster shops, depots, and store- house ; cold storage and refrigeration ; grave registration and inspec- tion of Quartermaster Corps activities. To these later were added sales stores and rolling sales stores, effects depots, and garden service. The initial work of the chief quartermaster, Expeditionary Forces, was to take care of the troops already in France and those coming with the first convoy, which arrived at St. Nazaire June 26, 1917, before the chief quartermaster had had time to organize his office on anything like a permanent basis. St. Nazaire had been se- lected as one of the French ports for American use and by the time the first convoy reached there officers and men were on hand to take care of it. Unloading the first convoy was done by French labor. It was at this port that the Army Transport Service began oper- ations. It branched out to the other ports as they became available and its work was not interrupted by the transfer to the Transporta- tion Department. The chief quartermaster moved from Paris to Chaumont with the commanding general, and then removed to Tours on March 11, 1918. The office of the chief quartermaster, line of communications, was absorbed by the office of chief of quartermas- ter when the latter moved to Tours. In the final plan of organiza- tion the chief quartermaster was assisted by a deputy chief quar- termaster and assistants to the chief quartermaster and the follow- ing divisions : ^^ Administrative Division, which handled all records, mail, tele- grams, and cablegrams, messenger service, precedent and research and administrative action on contracts. Supplies Division, the work of which was distributed among 15 branches, viz, clothing, subsistence, bakeries, animal-drawn transpor- tation, traffic, traveling officers, supplies and stationery, fuel, forage, cold storage and refrigeration, administration, storage and warehous- ing, garden service, gasoline and oil, and miscellaneous. Personnel Division handled all quartermaster personnel in the Expeditionary Forces, preparation of priority schedules of quarter- master troops in the United States for shipment overseas, organiza- tion of new units in the Expeditionary Forces, and distribution of all quartermaster personnel, including labor organizations. Finance Division handled supply of disbursing officers and funds for their disbursements, instruction of finance officers, and adjust- ment of certain classes of oJaims. "Quartermaster Section, Part II, Appendix A — Report board conyened by paragraph 79, Special Order No. 141, 1919, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 80 ORGANIZATION OF THE SEEVICES OF SUPPLY. Ins-pection Division, through traveling officers, inspected and re- ported on the several activities of the Quartermaster Corps. Accounting Division examined and analyzed the accounts, both property and funds, and audited subsistence returns of all quarter- masters in the Expeditionary Forces. Salvage Service operated salvage depots and shops, rendering plants for the recovery of fats, kitchen economic activities, and laundries and disinfectors and police of the battle fields. Remount Division acquired by purchase in Europe and shipment from United States all animals of the Expeditionary Forces. Constrviction and Repair Division designed equipment, chevrons, and other insignia, made maps and organization charts, and did quartermaster illustrating. This division had no construction or repair function. Graves Registration Service acquired, maintained, and controlled cemeteries, identified the dead, registered burials, and corresponded with relatives of deceased soldiers. PERSONNEL. The quartermaster personnel accompanying Gen. Pershing to France consisted of 16 officers, 10 enlisted men, and 12 field clerks. By November 11, 1918, there v^ere 4,027 officers, 96,006 enlisted men, and 38 field clerks. The maximum was 4,229 officers, 96,451 enlisted men, and 42 field clerks. Besides these the Quartermaster Corps had transferred 600 officers and 18,000 enlisted men to the Motor Trans- port Corps and 300 officers and 13,000 enlisted men to the Trans- portation Corps. The commissioned personnel was drawn from the line of the Regular Army, from former quartermaster non- commissioned personnel of the Army, and from men with wide experience in commercial life. The enlisted men came from the usual sources — the selective draft and voluntary enlistments. Quar- termaster personnel was slow in arriving. Although troops began to arrive in the latter part of May, 1917, there were less than 2,500 quartermaster officers and men in France by October 6 of the same year. Labor organizations did not appear in any appreciable amount until the middle of December, 1917, despite repeated representations of the commanding general. Expeditionary Forces. During January and February, 1918, the corps began to catch up with its quota, but in March and April the demand for combat troops became pressing, and priority schedules were changed so radically that Quartermaster Corps troop arrivals fell off seriously, and the shortage began to grow again. By the middle of April general headquarters had to take up this question and numerous cablegrams were sent urging an increase in the shipment of Quartermaster ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 81 Corps troops. In May, June, and July these shipments increased and the shortage became less serious, although it never did disappear. MAT]fiRIEL. The aim of the American Expeditionary Forces was to have always 90 days' reserve of supplies based upon the entire number of Ameri- can troops in Europe. This decision was arrived at after a series of conferences with the chiefs of several services apd the War Depart- ment was notified by cable September 7, 1917. It was told that this reserve was to be based on authorized issues where such issues were regular and on actual periodic consumption of other articles based on British and French experience. It was the aim of the Quartermaster Corps to keep the reserve at that figure, but it was able to do so only in the matter of subsistence. • Other articles fell short just as in other services. The flow of tonnage was always worked out as nearly as possible so as not to interfere with the flow of troops. At no time was there as much ship tonnage available as was needed. This forced the purchase of many quartermaster supplies in Europe, as it did in other services. The principal base storage depots were at Montoir (Loire-In- ferieure), St. Sulpice (Gironde) and Miramas (Bouches-du-Ehone). The intermediate depots were at Gievres (Loir-et-Cher) and Mon- tierchaume (Indre) , with an auxiliary depot at Paris. The advance depots were at Is-sur-Tille (Cote-d'Or) and Liffol-le-Grand (Vos- ges). Gievres had the largest depot in the Expeditionary Forces and one of the largest storage places in the world. The American soldier in France consumed 4.2887 pounds of food a day. The Quartermaster Corps managed to keep ahead of him all the time in subsistence, but was often behind in clothing. The daily production of bread increased from the first baking of 11,378 pounds on August 3, 1917, to 1,830,000 pounds on November 30, 1918. At the time of the armistice bakeries were being operated in practically every section of France. The largest bakery was at Is-sur-Tille, which was put into operation on December 1, 1918, This bakery had a capacity of 550,000 pounds a day, which could be increased to 750,000 in case of emergency. When hostilities ended plans were under way for two additional mechanical bakeries there. The Garden Service was started in the spring of 1918 and dur- ing the period of its operation it produced 76,000,000 pounds of vegetables at cost, not including the pay and subsistence of en- listed men, about one-third the prices prevailing in the open markets. Four cold storage plants were added after the armistice. On November 11 there were 17 in operation, with a capacity of 10,374 178841°— 20 6 82 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. tons, and 15 more were projected, with an additional capacity of 15,065 tons. The largest plant was at Gievres. It had a capacity of 5,200 tons." Forage was always a serious problem in France because of the scarcity of ship tonnage. In all, the receipts were 824,410 tons, the bulk of which came from the United States. At one time the French refused to permit the American forces to buy in the open market, but offered' to turn over certain monthly credits of hay from their reserve on condition that it be replaced pound for pound from America. At the signing of the armistice, the French had delivered only about 30 per cent of their contract, but in spite of this the American Forces had built up a 21-day reserve. Organization chart, Quartermaster Corps, A. E. F. M Assistant to 0. Q. M. Deputy C. Q. M. Inspection Division. Administrative Division. Finance Division. Personnel Division. Accounting Division. Supplies Division. Service. Kemount Division. Construction and Eepalr Division. Graves Registration Service. Coal for the Expeditionary Forces came from England, and gaso- line, oils, and other greases from the United States. Wood was pro- cured from French forests and cut by American Forestry troops. FACILITIES. The facilities of the Quartermaster Corps were found in nearly every section of France. They were located with a view to the needs of the troops they were to serve or the sources of supply they were to draw from. The storehouse locations were governed by the line of communications and those of other activities depended "" Quartermaster Section, Part II, Appendix A — Report board convened by paragraph 79, Special Order No. 141, 1919 ; on file Historical Branch, General Staff. ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 83 upon climatic, geographical or agricultural conditions. The loca- tions of these facilities were as follows : Field bakeries — Continued. Pontenx-les-Forges (Landes). Valbonne (Alpes-Marltimes). Vichy (Allier). Mars (Nifivre). Nevers (Nifivre). Mesves (NlSvre). Mehun (Clier). Allerey (CSte-d'Or). Is-sur-Tllle (C5te-d'0r). Langres ( Haute-Marne ) . Chaumont (Haute-Marne). Mallly (Sadne et-Loire), Vlttel (Vosges). Neuf cliateau (Vosges ) . Gondrecourt ( Meuse ) . Montlgny-le-Roi (Haute-Marne). Rimaucourt ( Vosges) . LifEol-le-Grand (Vosges). Toul ( Meurthe-et-Moselle) . Cold storage plants : Brest (Finist6re). Grand Blotterau (Loire-Inffiri- eure). La Pallice (Charente-Infgrieure). Arcachon (Gironde). Tours ( Indre-et-Loire ) . Orleans (Loiret). Vichy (Allier). Rimaucourt (Vosges). Bazoilles-sur-Meuse ( Vosges ) . Bendorf (Germany). Savenay ( Loire-Inf firleure ) . Angers ( Maine-et-Loire ) . Bassens (Gironde). Le Havre (Seine-Inferleure). Blols (Lolr-et-Cher). Gifivres (Lolr-et-Cher). Beaune (C6te-d'0r). Vittel (Vosges). Toul (Meurthe-et-Moselle). Hools of Holland (Holland). Ice-making plants: Savenay (Loire-Inffirleure). Allerey (SaSne-et-Lolre). Bazoilles-sur-Meuse (Vosges). Gi§vres (Loir-et-Cher). Rimaucourt (Vosges). Grand Blotterau (Loire-Inf6rl- eure). Beaune (C6te-d'Or). Coffee roasting plants: Le Havre (Seine-Inf6rieure). Bordeaux (Gironde). Corbeil ( Seine-et-Oise ) . Mechanical bakeries: Bordeaux (Gironde). St Nazaire (Lolre-Inf6rieure). Is-sur-TiUe (COte-d'Or). Field bakeries: Brest (Flnistfere). St. Nazaire (Loire-Inf6rieure). Savenay ( Lolre-Inf 6rieure ) . Nantes (Loire-Inffirieure).. Montierchaume (Indre). Issoudun ( Indre ) . Gifevres ( Loir-et-Clier ) . St. Aignan (Loir-et-Cher). Orleans (Loiret). St. Maixent (Dordogne). Montmorillon ( Vienne ) . Angoulgme (Charente). Pons (Charente-Inffirieure). Genicart (Gironde). Beautiran (Gironde). Le Corneau (GSronde). Marseille ( Bouches-du-RhSne ) . Clermont-Ferrand (Puy-de-DOme). St. Amand (Cher). Verneuil (NiSvre). Bourges (Cher). St. Florent (Cher). Beaune (C8te-d'0r). Dijon (CSte-d'Or). Chatillon Oote-d'Or). Paris (Seine). Meucon (Morbihan). Coetquidan ( Morbihan ) . Angers (Maine-et-Loire). Saumur ( Maine-et-Loire ) . Le Mans (Sarthe). Chateau-du-Loire ( Sarthe ) . Tours (Indre-et-Loire). Blois (Lolre-et-Cher). Cour-Che verny ( Loir-et-Cher ) . La Pallice ( Charente -Inf6ri- eure) : Limoges ( Haute- Vientie ) . La Courtine (Creuse). Neuvic (Dordogne). Souge (Gironde). St. Sulpice (Gironde). 84 ORGANIZATION OF THE SBBVICBS OF SUPPLY. Main gasoline storage depots: La Pallice (Cliarente-Inf6rieure). Furt (Gironde). Gi6vres ( Loir-et-Cher ) . Blaye (Gironde). St. Loubes (Gironde). Gasoline and oil distributing stations : St. Nazaire (Loire-Infgrieure). Angers ( Maine-et-Loire ) . Tours (Indre-et-Loire). Limoges ( Haute- Vienne ) . St. Aignan (Loir-et-Cher). Eomorantin (Loir-et-Cber). Orly Field (Seine). Sens (Yonne). Nevers (NiSvre). Clermont-Ferrand (Puy-de-D6me). Toul (Meurthe-et-Moselle). Neuf cbateau ( Vosges ) . Gasoline and oil distributing sta- tions — Continued. Langres (Haute-Marne). Is-sur-Tille (CSte-d'Or). Miramas ( Bouches-du-Rh6ne ) . Chatenay (Loire-Infgrieure). Le Mans (Sartbe). Bordeaux ( Gironde ) . CMteauroux (Indre). Issoudun (Indre). St. Amand (Cher). Silly-le-Poterie (Aisne). Coincy (Aisne). Verneuil (Ni^vre). Clermont-en-Argonne (Meuse)'. Gondrecourt (Meuse). Rimaucourt (Vosges). Ohavelot ("Vosges). Marseille ( Boucbes-du-RhSne ) . XV.— SIGNAL CORPS, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES. The Signal Corps installed, leased, maintained, and operated the general service telephone and telegraph for the American Expedi- tionary Forces in the Services of Supply as well as in the Zone of the Advance. It maintained radio, press, and intercept stations and, on the formation of the Third Army, provided a network in that area as an auxiliary to the wire telegraph system. (14) (3) Initial strength, 13 officers and 286 enlisted men. Maximum strength, 1,665 officers and 34,206 enlisted men. Strength November 11, 1,462 officers and 33,038 enlisted men. Pole lines constructed, 1,742 miles. Wire run on above, 20,708 miles ; wire run on other than S. C. pole lines, 1,984 miles. Leased wire maintained by the French and operated by S. C, 12,333 miles; leased wire both maintained and operated by S. C, 3,019 miles. Stations served from 260 telephone offices, 8,152. Number of local calls, 25,184,000; number of long-distance calls, 870,000. Telegraph offices in operation, 102. Messages handled to January 1, 1919, 8,685,960. Still pictures taken, 40,344; moving picture film taken, nearly 2,000,000 feet. Covered storage, 350,000 square feet ; open storage, 1,500,000 square feet. Miles of lines in combat area, 38,750. ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 85 ORGANIZATION. This corps had the same experience as all other services in that it went through several reorganizations. By the terms of General Orders, No. 8, Headquarters, Expeditionary Forces, July 5, 1917, the chief signal officer was made a member of the Administrative and Technical Section of the staff of the commanding general. Expedi- tionary Forces, and was charged with the control of Signal Corps personnel and material and wire communication; message receipt and transmission; radio telephone and telegraph services; pigeon service; pyrotechnics; American codes and ciphers; photography; meteorology; technical inspection of signal organizations and estab- lishments, and dispatch riders. The definition of these functions was elaborated somewhat but not changed in General Orders, No. 25, General Headquarters, August 12, 1917. (14) Wlien the Service of the Rear, which became the Services of Supply, was created, the ' chief signal officer exercised his functions as a member of the tech- nical staff of the commanding general. Expeditionary Forces, through the commanding general. Services of Supplj', although re- taining his status as a member of the staff of the former, through a representative at general headquarters. The work of the corps was separated broadly into that done in the Services of Supply and that in the Zone of the Armies. The former was accomplished through departments or divisions, and the latter through the corps, divisional or regimental signal officers. The headquarters of the chief signal officers were located first at Paris and then at Tours, moving to the latter place when the general headquarters were moved to Chaumont in March, 1918. Originally the Air Service was a function of the Signal Corps, but this service was made a separate corps early in the history of the American Expeditionary Forces, and was so recognized in General Orders, No. 8, July 5, 1917, the first general order dealing with organization in the Expeditionary Forces. The administration of the corps' affairs was distributed among nine divisions. These were Personnel, Telephone and Telegraph, Supply, Engineering, Photographic, Eesearch and Inspection, Eadio, Eecords, and Special Services. , The Personnel Division had the functions usually charged to the personnel office of any corps. It handled, in addition to supply and distribution of personnel, much of its special training, and it also was responsible for matters relating to the supply of officers and men from the United States. The Telephone and Telegraph Division handled all wire commu- nication for the American Army. It was one of the first divisions 86 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. of the Signal Corps' activities to begin functioning. What it accom- plished can be seen in the second paragraph of this chapter. (14) The Supply Division began to function coincidentally with the Telephone and Telegraph Division. It had to organize so that it could expand as the number of troops in the Expeditionary Forces increased, and after hostilities it contracted in the same ratio. Its first depot was at Nevers, but soon it became necessary to have larger establishments, and the depot at Gievres was the first one of the more extensive program. It had branches at the base ports and at all the base storage depots." Its depot for supplying the Photo- graphic Section was opened at Paris in August, 1918, and after that all the supplies for that section were shipped there directly from the base ports. The division had to take care of purchases in Europe, as well as requisitions on the United States for material. The Engineering Division had charge of all Signal Corps con- struction in France. This duty carried its members to every sec- tion of the country, and over to England and into the occupation area after the armistice." The Photographic Division was just what its name implies. It had representatives with each division and units in the Services of Supply. It paralleled every activity of the Army, but was handi- capped seriously because of a lack of photographers with sufficient familiarity with military affairs. Often views of actions and of activities in the Services of Supply which would have been of inesti- mable value were missed, and many views, both still and motion, that were taken could have been left out and the material used to better advantage."' The Eesearch and Inspection Division grew out of the necessity for laboratories for the development of ideas at the battle front, and for the study of ideas to meet new needs in signaling as demonstrated by modern warfare. The inspection feature was the result of the necessity for testing signal apparatus arriving from the United States and from European factories, it having been found that fac- tory inspection was not a safe guide because of the hard usage scien- tific instruments often had in transit. (14) Their names best describe the functions of the Radio and the Rec- ords Divisions. The Special Service Division looked after the work of such services as were not taken care of by the divisions already mentioned. The Pigeon Service, Meteorology, Codes and Ciphers, and Visual Signaling were its most important branches. The divi- sion was created purely for organization purposes. M Volume I, page 67, History of Signal Corps, American Expeditionary Forces; on file Historical Branch, General Staff. •"Volume I, pages 18 and 19. History of Signal Corps, American Expeditionary Forces: on file Historical Branch, General Staff. ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 87 PERSONNEL. Suitable personnel was hard to get and, moreover,™ had to be specially trained in signal work after it had been acquired. In the rank and file of the National Guard, Signal Corps, there was a grati- fying percentage of very fine types of young manhood, but there was a lack of organic strength and a disconcerting range in efficiency. Steps had been taken to organize the Signal Corps Eeserve with the active cooperation of the officials of telephone, telegraph, and electric companies. These officials had helped in enrolling the men of their companies, and had even specified those of more advanced positions capable of becoming officers. From this source the most desirable recruits were had. Organization chart, Signal Corps, A. E. P. CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER. Executive Officer. Personnel Division. Director o£ Supply Service. Assistant Executive Officer. Photo- graphic Di- vision. Hadio Division. Records Division. Director Telephone and Telegraph Services. Engineer Division. Research and Inspection Division. Special Service Division. Because of the nature of the work, the Signal Corps had been dis- tributed over vast territory in more or less small detachments en- gaged on telegraph, telephone, and kindred lines of work, including wireless and cable operation and maintaining communication be- tween temporary field forces. When the Eegular Army was ex- panded to full strength to meet war needs the National Guard units were also placed on a war footing. With the Signal Corps Eeserve, these formed the nuclei for Signal Corps units of the Expeditionary Forces. Chambers of commerce, brokers' offices, public utilities com- ™ Summary S. C. activities during period of preparation in United States ; on file in the Historical Branch, General Staff. 88 OBGANIZATION OF THE SEKVICES OF SUPPLY. panies, and like concerns kept the needs of the corps to the fore and aided materially in recruiting. Skilled men mustered into other arms of the service were transferred and the balance were obtained through the selective draft. A course of standard instruction prepared by the chief signal officer was issued to signal units, through the general staff, in the form of training circulars. Divisional signal officers supervised the schools and field exercises of the field signal battalions. Practically all the Signal Corps officers were commissioned directly from civil life.'^ Men from telephone and telegraph companies found their way naturally into Signal Corps units and were valuable men. But other young men were needed, and it was necessary to instruct these in the elementary principles of electricity and their application to modern means of rapid communication. For this work facilities were provided at several colleges in the United States, and the work was continued after the units arrived in France. MATERIAL. Signal Corps material came from the United States on requisi- tion and from the markets of Europe. In many cases it was neces- sary to install special machinery in French shops to turn out new instruments that were made especially to meet peculiar needs that had developed at the front. The call upon the American, market made necessary the expansion on broad lines of many of the factories in the United States, and the conversion of other plants into estab- Jishments for the manufacture of signal supplies for the Army. From the standpoint of production the following broad classifica- tion °^ of Signal Corps material may be made : (14) (1) Telephone and telegraph apparatus. (2) Kadio apparatus. (3) Line construction material. (4) Electrical supplies. (6) Wire and cable. (6) Wire reels and carts. (Y) Photographic supplies. (8) Tool chests and kits, m,echanical signals, meteorological apparatus and pigeons. (9) Field glasses, wrist watches, etc. (10) Signal equipment common to all branches of the service, such as pyrotechnics, flags, smoke signals, cloth panels, and panel lights. (11) New devices growing out of the present war. M Monograph on S. C. In file of Historical Branch, General Staff. " Appendices to Vol. I, History of Signal Corps In American Expeditionary Forces, on file Historical Branch, Genera] Staff. OKGANIZATION OF THE SEKVICES OE SUPPLY. 89 The principal Signal Corps facilities were located as follows: Supply depots : Army parks : GISvres (Loir-et-Oher). Toul (Meurthe-et-Moselle). Is-sur-Tille (Cote-d'Or). Lieusaint (Seine-et-Marne). Montlerchaume (Indre). Parois (Meuse). Montoir (Loire-Infgrieure). St. Sulpice (Gironde). Paris (Seine). Orly Field (Seine). XVI.— TRANSPORTATION CORPS, AMERICAN EXPEDI- TIONARY FORCES. This corps landed troops and supplies at 31 ports on the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts of France and carried them to the 'front or to points in the interior, over 5,831 miles of railway, with an aver- age haul of 580 miles. The facts about it between June 1, 1917, and June 1, 1919, are : Authorized strength, 6,000 officers and 200',000 enlisted men to take care of an army of 4,000,000. Maximum strength, 1,935 officers, 58,353 enlisted men, January 1, 1919. Strength at armistice, 1,810 officers and 46,976 enlisted men. Cargo landed, 9,577,945 tons. Animals landed, 64,918. Troops debarked, 1,967,267. Troops embarked, 1,275,251. Locomotives erected, 1,610. Cars erected, 18,664. French cars repaired, 57,533. French locomotives repaired, 1,947. Shops built and equipped, car erecting shops at La Rochelle, locomotive erecting shops at St. Nazaire, and car and loco- motive repair shops at Nevers. Railroads made use of, Paris-Orleans, Etat, Est, Midi, Nord, and the Paris-Lyon-Mediterranean. CONDITION OF FRENCH RAILROADS IN 1917. The railroad situation in France was first studied by a commission sent over by the Secretary of War in May, 1917. It found that the French had to tear up a great deal of second track from double-track lines in order to get the necessary rails, and that the railroad systems were 1,200 locomotives short of normal because none had been bought to replace those seized or destroyed by the enemy and none of the bad order locomotives had been repaired. The shortage of freight cars was even greater in proportion. The French, therefore, had 90 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. Organization chart, Transportation Corps, A. E. F. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF TRANSPORTATION Deputy D. G. T., French Ministry. Business Manager. Adjutant. Deputy D. G. T., Zone of Advance. Deputy D. G. T., S. 0. S. Railroad Operation. Deputy Director General, General Affairs. Deputy D. G. T., British Ministry. Supt. Army Trans- port Serv. Port Operation. Director of Military Affairs. Engineer of Con- struction. Hist. OIT. ORGANIZATION OP THE SEEVICES OF SUPPLY, 91 been compelled to call on the British to furnish additional rolling stock and assume a greater share of British transportation in North- ern France. It was seen that similar demands would have to be made on the Americans. (2) (4) At the beginning transportation was a function of the Corps of Engineers and was under the chief Engineer officer of the Expedition- ary Forces. The service had to be organized in this way tentatively to meet immediate conditions. A permanent and satisfactory organi- zation was not authorized until June 25, 1918, and not finally "^ accomplished until November 12, 1918. The location of the ports immediately available for the American Forces fixed the lines of communication and determined the transportation problem and, in the final analysis, affected to a great degree the selection of the field of American operation. UNDER THE COMMANDING GENERAL, LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS. In the absence of any organization, transportation was put in charge of the chief Engineer officer, and was first known as the " Transportation Department " by General Orders, No. 8, Headquar- ters, Expeditionary Forces, July 5, 1917. This arrangement was only intended to hold while the commanding general, Expeditionary Forces, and his staff were making a study of the general problem of supply. The Line of Communications became an established fact by General Orders, No. 20, general headquarters, August 13, 1917, whereby transportation was made a Department of Military Eail- ways with a director who was a staff officer of the commanding gen- eral. Line of Cummunications. The Department of Military Rail- ways was charged with the operation, maintenance, and construc- tion of such railways as might be turned over by the French and the supervision of all movements of American troops and supplies over lines operated by the French. Construction was retained tem- porarily by the Engineers, until such time as enough transportation construction troops had arrived overseas to take care of the work. This arrangement was never changed and the Engineers always constructed transportation facilities, although transportation offi- cials designed them. TECHNICAL SERVICE OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. Further study led the commanding general, Expeditionary Forces, to the conclusion that " rail transportation should be organized as a separate department of army field headquarters and coordinate with existing administrative and supply departments, since it occupies in this war a function apart from the Quartermaster and Engineer " Chapter III, History of Transportation Corps, American Expeditionary Forces, con- taining General Orders, No. 52, Services of Supply, 1918, and General Orders, No. 35, Transportation Department, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. 92 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. Corps." °* Acting on this conclusion, the commanding general ap- pointed a director general of transportation by General Orders, No. 37, general headquarters, September 14, 1917, wherein the "Trans- portation Service" was created as a technical service of general headquarters. PART OF THE SERVICE OF UTILITIES. Soon the burden on general headquarters became so heavy that it was determined to create a general supply service. This was done in General Orders, No. 31, general headquarters, February 16, 1918, wherein the Transportation Service was made a part of the Service of the Eear, the first name for the Services of Supply. A few weeks later it was thought best, however, to coordinate the rail and motor transportation services and construction, and General Orders, No. 31, corrected, were issued March 12, 1918, whereby the name " Service of the Eear " became " Services of Supply " and a Service of Utilities was created, the component parts of which were the Transportation Service, the Motor Transport Service, the Department of Light Kail- ways and Eoads, and the Department of Construction and Forestry. The Army Transport Service had been made a department of the Transportation Service on December 8, 1917, the transfer being made by General Orders, No. 78, general headquarters. The (Service of Utilities, however, was ended July 11, 1918, by General Orders, No. 114, Headquarters, Services of Supply. By the redistribution of the services under this order the Department of Light Eailways and Eoads and the Department of Construction and Forestry were charged to the chief engineer, Expeditionary Forces, and the Trans- portation Service and the Motor Transport Service were made separate departments of the Services of Supply. The railroad and dock organization continued in this relation to the commanding general. Services of Supply, even after the Transportation Corps was organized by General Orders, No. 52, Headquarters, Services of Supply, November 12, 1918. A glance at the railroad map of France will show that the princi- pal roads of France radiate from Paris like spokes from the hub of a wheel. With this condition, it is obvious that the bulk of traffic is always north and south and that Paris is the general receiving and distributing point for all of France. This peace-time situation was not adequate during the war, especially after the Americans arrived. With the theater of American operations almost directly east of the ports the American Army was to use, it was necessary that supplies be carried over the most direct route and over the route least likely to interfere with the densest flow of railway traffic. This " Cable 171, paragraph 12, commanding general, American Expeditionary Forces, to Tlie Adjutant General, Sept. 21, 1917, on file Historical Branch, General Staff. OEGANIZATION OF THE SEKVICES OP SUPPLY. 93 was the east and west route through Tours, Nevers, and Dijon. The line of communications as set forth in General Orders, No. 20, general headquarters, 1917, took in a route covered mostly by the Paris-Orleans Railroad and by a small part each of the Est and Paris-Lyon-Mediterranean systems. This line took care of opera- tion from the South Atlantic ports, beginning at St. Nazaire. But early in November, 1917, it was seen that Brest would have to be used by the American Army, and it became eventually the principal troop port. This necessitated the use of the Etat railway from Brest to Tours by way of Le Mans. When Marseille was opened, after the submarine situation in the Mediterranean was under con- trol, the main line of the Paris-Lyon-Mediterranean Railroad on the east side of the Rhone was put into use. The second line of communication used portions of the Est-Paris- Lyon-Mediterranean Railways, while the third and fourth lines of communication ran entirely over the Est system. INTERNAL ORGANIZATION. The internal organization of the Transportation Corps remained fairly constant at headquarters, but the general field organization was evolved only after many months of study and experiment. The director general of transportation was assisted by a deputy director general for general affairs, a deputy director general for the Services of Supply, a deputy director general for the Zone of the Advance, and deputy directors general with the British and French ministries, a business manager, an engineer of construction, a director of the Army Transport Service, and a director of military affairs. The deputy director general. Services of Supply, had charge of railroad operation within the Services of Supply; the deputy for the Zone of Advance had similar functions within that zone, and the deputies with the British and French ministries were the representatives of the director general with those two governments. The business manager had charge of requisitions, contracts, claims, accoimts, and statistics. The engineer of construction designed all railroad and port facilities, and the director of the Army Transport Service had charge of port operations, and the director of military affairs of personnel. The rail lines of communication were divided into grand divisions with a general superintendent at the head of each. Each of the principal ports was made a grand division and similar disposition was made of the inland water transport and the transportation serv- ice in England. (22) At first the transportation field organization was by regiments on the engineer regimental table. It was soon found, however, that an engineer regimental table would not furnish enough troops for a 94 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. grand division to operate with efficiency and it vras decided that organization on the basis of an infantry regiment v?ould meet the needs better. But before a reorganization on this basis had gone very far the transportation problem had grown so that a more fluid organization was thought necessary. In the first place the regiment would have to be scattered if made up of entirely one kind of trans- portation specialist, and if made up of all kinds needed, there would not be enough of any kind. The same thing would hold true of a battalion. Then, too, the needs were not the same in any two grand divisions because of relations with the French. Finally it became evident that the unit of organization for transportation purposes should be a company of 250 men with 6 officers, 1 of whom, a lieuten- ant, should be the military administrator. The number of troops needed to operate a grand division was reckoned in multiples of 250. (2) This plan of organization was put into effect November 12, 1918, by General Orders, No. 52, Headquarters, Services of Supply, and General Orders, No. 35, Transportation Corps, and may be considered as the result of our experience in France. PERSONNEL. The Transportation Corps had to train most of its enlisted per- sonnel and the greater portion of its junior officers. (2) Out of the draft it should have had all the stevedores, engineers, firemen, con- ductors, brakemen, yardmasters, and switchmen. Many of these men got away, however, to combatant units, and it was only possible to find enough of them in the Expeditionary Forces for five trans- portation battalions. The recruiting officers in the United States had to accept volunteers at the valuation placed on them by the rail- road officials of America and these railroad officials frequently classi- fied switchmen as yardmasters, firemen as engineers, and traffic men as railroad operators. The laborers supplied for the docks knew nothing about stevedoring and had to be trained. The Transporta- tion Corps made hundreds of railroad men and stevedores out of green material. All the time taken to train these men could have been used to much better advantage if the right kind of men had been selected through some system whereby their qualifications could have been checked adequately. The commissioned personnel in the junior grades was in as bad shape. Men were commissioned as stevedores who had no experience. Former Army noncommissioned officers were given the higher grades because they showed up better in camps before the troops went overseas than the technical officers did. The result was that when technical operations began the technical officers did not have sufficient rank to enforce their orders and no promotion was possible for many months. ORGANIZATION OF THE SEEVICES OF SUPPLY. 95 Another source from which commissioned and enlisted personnel was supplied for transportation was from reclassified men from the front or who had been disabled. Generally the former class failed just as badly in transportation and the latter class was equally un- able to work along the railroads or at the docks. Promotions served in the end to give the technical men the neces- sary rank, and time and teaching made the unskilled labor and un- skilled commissioned personnel fairly skillful. The higher transportation officials, both on the railroads and on the docks, were especially selected men and men of mark in their lines in civil life. These officers were efficient, and it was owing to this efficiency that the Transportation Corps was able to discharge its duties and deliver supplies promptly and in sufficient volume. MATERIAL. The first major projects for transportation were designed by en- gineer officers, but these were men who had been commissioned for railway work. They were reconunissioned later in the Transporta- tion Corps. After the ports and lines of communication had been selected, the necessity became obvious for the construction of such facilities as the new docks at Bassens, near Bordeaux, much double tracking, storage yards, and the like. Two officers drew up what was known as Requisition No. 6. This was the initial order for transportation material. The requisition was so drawn that prac- tically everything that would be needed for transportation in France was listed, although the quantities were for initial work only. Everything from locomotives and freight cars to nails and screws, including all the necessary machinery for locomotive and car erection and repair, was mentioned. As the months went by it was found, generally, that it was only necessary to order in multiples of the items of Requisition No. 6. (12) Although transportation was a separate service in the Expedition- ary Forces, it was a function of the Corps of Engineers in America, and all material was ordered through the Chief of Engineers and shipped to France and distributed by the Engineer Supply Depot. This was logical because the service which did the designing naturally should do the ordering, while the distribution of the material should go to the service which was to use it in construction. FACILITIES. The facilities constructed for transportation were of the following general classes : Locomotive and car erection and repair shops. Inland waterway barge docks. Piers and lighterage wharves. Ammunition docks. Port equipment and facilities. Multiple tracking and cut-ofCs. Wye connections. 96 OKGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. Passing sidings. Forestry sidings. Hospital sidings. Camp spurs. Water facilities. Coal-storage yards. General shop and factory spurs. Many of these facilities were too numerous, too small, and too much a matter of routine to list here ; such as sidings, spurs, multiple tracking, etc. The major facilities, however, were : Troop forwarding facilties. Gasoline station spurs. Artillery unloading spurs. Storage depots. Regulating stations. Engine terminals. Regulating stations: Is-sur-Tille ( CSte-d'Or ) . Liff ol-le-Grand ( Vosges ) . St. Dizier (Haute-Marne). GiSvres (Loir-et-Cher). (During the German offensive in the spring of 1918.) Railheads : Neuf chateau (Vosges). Epinal (Vosges). Toul ( Meurthe-et-Moselle ) . Locomotive and car repair shops, Nevers (-Nievre). Locomotive erecting shops : Parc-de-Mean (St. Nazalre). Rennes (lUe-et-Vilaine). Car erecting shops, La Rochelle (Cha- rente-Infgrieure) . General storage depots : Montoir ( Loire-Inf grieure ) . GiSvres (Loir-et-Cher). St. Sulpice (Gironde). Montierchaume (Indre). Is-sur-Tille ( Cate-d'Or ) . Ammunition storage depots : St. Loubes, near Bordeaux. Foecy (Cher) in the Intermediate Section. Issoudun (Indre). Jonchery (Haute-Marne) in the Advance Section. Donges, on the Loire River near Nantes. Engine terminals : Saumur (Maine-et-Loire). Perigueux (Dordogne). La March (Nifevre). At each general storage depot. The ports at which Americans operated and the kind of freight handled were: Debarkation: Brest and Cherbourg, St. Nazaire. Heavy lifts and general cargo : St. Nazaire, Bassens, Nantes, La Pallice, Marseille, Bordeaux, Caen (Calvados), Honfleur (Calvados). General cargo: Le Havre, Rouen, Montoir, Pauillac, French Bassens, Cette (Herault). Explosives: St. Loubes, St. Pardon (Gironde), Donges. Coal: Eochefort, Bayonne, Les Sables-d'Olonne (Vendee), La Rochelle, St. Malo (lUe-et-Vilaine), St. Brieuc (Cotes- du-Nord), Lorient, Granville, Marens (Charente-In- f6rieure), Surrol (Gironde), and Tonnay-Charente (Cha- rente-Inferieure) . Oil: Furt (Gironde) and Blaye (Gironde). Troop debarkation: Liverpool and Glasgow. Troop embarkation: Southampton. Coal: Cardiff, Barry, Penarth, Newport, Newcastle. ORGAjS-JZATIOlsr OF THE SERVICES OE SUPPLY. 97 General cargo: London, Swansea, and Portsmouth. Lumber : Hull and West Hartlepool. Potatoes : Belfast. General cargo, slightly : Leith, Blythe, Sunderland. The rolling stock used by the American Army was of the Ameri- can type for locomotives and both American and French type for cars. The corps received from America consolidation locomotives with a tractive effort of 36,000 pounds. They were shipped over knocked down and were erected at the St. Nazaire and Eennes shops. The American cars were shipped over the same way and were erected at the shops at La Rochelle. These cars were of 60,000 pounds capacity and included box cars, low and high side gondolas, and flat cars. In addition, as many French freight cars as could be spared were used by the American Forces. These cars were of the same classification but the range of their capacity was only from 10,000 to 20,000 pounds. As the track facilities at the ports and other points along the lines of communication were improved to allow switching other than by small turntables, as in the French practice, the use of French cars for other than shuttle service decreased until, at the time of the armistice, the greater part of freight of the Amer- ican Expeditionary Forces was being transported in American cars. The Transportation Corps did not operate the French railroads; it operated on them subject to French regulation. The reason for this was obvious. The French railroad traffic was a large part of the business of the roads and only French methods of operation, of which the Americans knew comparatively little, was necessary as long as French personnel was employed. The Americans ran their own trains, but under French regulation. Yard operation for Amer- icans was wholly and entirely American, however. Just before the armistice the French requested the Transportation Corps to take over the Paris-Orleans Eailroad entirely and operate it both for the French and the Americans after American methods. Had the war continued this transfer of entire control of this railroad was to have been effected January 1, 1919. 178841°— 20 7 98 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. .2 "a pa fe OS rR fe I I OS a *" as e.£ to « a fe oi M ;* H ^ t> e ■ Oo O O ■ »ft O) 1^ N N OO QOiCO^^^iH Sm meoi- > N CO CO ■* O (O t^ cs icoeo C4 »0 t" (D t^ OS h-t-iHi- r^Sjeciooi^ HMCSOI «Ni- ■ N .(OCOOOOO ■ ■^TfiiOMC^l^MMOie SQOccosi-iaoccot^ -IOau3t^5weoM ., ^r-i>.t-i- H CD"0) 06 O) CO O -r OS-* MCO i lilMi si If b* • II « ORGANIZATION OF THE SEKVICES OF SUPPLY 99. ea m § ; i ; i i»a S t— Sm OS O ff 1 •aS 03 S5Sd's-~ 3" q «i si i i i a < c3 : g ^1 SS-~ : : • « 1 s"i¥il " S" Sii coco lO .>-i m ea "1 if die oa It §1 i W ^1 i-( ^>. cDtoa g : S & igeDC 11 1 si sis ^1 "'"S's: ■ s- s MO n o ■ lb 03 "■«■«■ ■*■* g^Si? z = ^ S o««i- SSS O ^g M"-" S^T:: Ph g¥s s .-i ; ; U O.S gs 5 «i o: s| 00 r* : : S II it ig i !88 H« Hg tr) *^ ^1 is 1 ti gs 1 «i gs c9 It ® CO r- |i t-T ■^a CD'^iO ^H *^ is Is ooa oTt-T CO «g 1-9 e5 gsss i si- s' 00 S3 H J ,£ ', ill CO s )s t> : : ° ; : « s > o i &S : ■ • H &S : i 1 :3 c < 100 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OE SUPPLY. •a a> a "a o CO ft. o •s s (1. as M Eh ■a OS m Eht) (3 W O «3S Eh 13 I y-t C*i r-t CO OO oi 00 -^P US CO ■^ cfl N com to ^ i-H tq«D ssssss o-. iQ r— r- lOt-i.-* CS Tp cp lO o C5 iO ^ i-l lO i*^rt toco ooo t- o eo(N c- 6 1 s 1 sg i it sg ; I eq 1 OiO ' i 2 c5 1 SS3 •: i 8 "3 m It Is ; !§ OICO • : ^ P) 1 or.— At every port that the board visited it was impressed by the great scarcity and poor quality of the labor used in discharging vessels. Due- to the scarcity of labor and the prevailing practice of piecework payment,- the cost of discharging cargoes is extremely high. But the scarcity of labor is of even greater importance than its high cost, as all available labor is now occu- pied in commercial work and none could be diverted to work of discharging 118 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. our vessels without seriously crippling the present commercial facilities. Every- where the board was met by statements from the local authorities that addi- tional labor was of the greatest importance and that labor for doing all of our construction work and work of operation should be given first consideration. In addition to the foregoing the commercial labor that we would have to use would not be subject to the necessary control in discharging ships, either in the conduct of the. work or the efficiency and time in which the work was done, as they will not work overtime or nights except as it may suit their pleasure. The board is of the opinion that the labor question should receive immediate consideration and is of immediate importance, and also that the only solution is the supply of labor regularly enlisted in the military forces of the United States. The board feels that this question should be taken up at once and jfleflnltely settled. In connection with the question of scarcity of labor it became apparent to the ?board that the American forces in Prance would have to provide the necessary ■man-power to cut and deliver the timber for use not only in connection with the idocks, but also for fuel. It is, therefore, recommended that any plan of bring- ing laborers to France from the United States should include foresters. The scarcity of labor for handling merchandise at all of the ports is re- ferred to above. The remarks which are there made relative to the scarcity of labor for handling all classes of material apply equally to all classes of construction work. The only materials we can expect to find on the French markets would be cement, sand, stone, and timber. The French officials were very emphatic in their statements that we could not expect any reinforced iron structural beams or shapes, nor any skilled men or laborers for its erec- tion. It became very evident that a large number of skilled workmen would be required for the dock construction and other forms of construction which must be undertaken in the establishment of the bases and ports. It is, there- fore, recommended that the organization of a regiment of skilled laborers, in- cluding bridge carpenters, masonry workers, plumbers, steam fitters, etc., be taken under consideration without delay. 2. Lumber. — The board learns that there is a large supply of lumber avail- able In the forests between Bordeaux and the Spanish border that will be available for dock construction and other construction purposes. The most advantageous manner of obtaining timber from the standing trees would be by having a portable sawmill which could be installed near where the trees are feUed. Whether one mill will be sufficient to produce the amount of lum- ber which will be required or not the board is unable to say. It believes that one complete portable savmiill should be shipped as early as practicable and that the future needs should be investigated by some competent man with as little delay as possible in order that such additional machinery as might be required for future needs could be ordered without unnecessary delay. 3. Refrigerating plants. — The board found practically no facilities in the •way of ice plants or cold-storage plants at any of the ports investigated. The hoard believes that these are necessary for the supply of American forces in France and that steps should he taken without delay to have all of the material ■except lumber, necessary for the construction of these plants, brought from the United States. The labor required for the construction of these plants should be American, specially skilled in this kind of work. 4. Slaughtering of animals. — The board finds that the French in supplying beef to their troops follow the system of driving cattle on the hoof and slaugh- OKGASriZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. H9 teiing them near the issue points in the zones of the army. Whether this system or the one of supplying cold-storage beef is followed by the American forces, men trained as butchers will be needed. Steps should le taken to have men skilled m this loork attached not only to each division, hut also to the line of communication and its various bases. 5. Wells.~In investigating the water supply at the various ports the board found that in only one case did this supply come from artesian wells. In the other cases the water supply came from surface wells. Conversations with the inhabitants and French engineers lead the board to believe that artesian wells are practicable in a number of localities along the coast line. It is recom- mended that the question of bringing from the United States a creio of skilled well diggers loith the necessary tools and machinery be considered. 6. Bases.— The board has considered the system of establishing our bases in the interior in accordance with the French plan instead of along the coast line, as contemplated by our field service regulations. In view of the congestion existing at the various ports and also of the evident prevalence of venereal disease at these ports, the board believes that concentration camps for troops and bases for supplies should be established in the interior of France, in the general zone to be controlled by the American forces. This will result in the use of the ports as reshipping points. 7. Railroad control. — The question has come to the board as to the system to be followed in connection with the management and operation of railroad Unes running from the reshipping ports to our bases and concentration points. The French advocate the system of their retaining control of these lines, using their own personnel for the operation thereof. In other words, they desire to be considered as the railroad company which transports the American troops and their supplies. The board has considered this point in connection with the other phase of the situation ; that Is, our complete control of the railroads needed for the supplies, etc., of our troops. The board has come to the con- clusion that the nwst efficient supply of the American forces in Prance will be secured by the control and operation of the railroad lines running from reshipping ports to our bases and our zone of operations. However, the board realizes that for the present it is undesirable and unnecessary for the Ameri- can military forces to take over the railroads. Nevertheless, the board believes that ultimately this will have to be done. The board therefore recommends that in the initial agreement made vMh the French Government provision be included for our control at any time when the situation develops the neces- sity therefor of the railroad lines and communications used to supply the American forces. The board feels that the accomplishment of such an under- standing in the initial agreement will avoid serious difficulties In the future. 8. Ports. — The French plan contemplates the American use of the following ports : Wltli berthage of — Nantes 4 ships.' St. Nazalre 5 ships. La Palliee 3 ships. Bordeaux 3 ships.' Bassens 6 ships. Pauillac 2 ships.' '■ These ports looked upon as emergency ports only, on account of shallow water and poor dockage and railway facilities. 3,20 ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICI The board's conclusions as to the port facilities which should be turned over to the American forces were as follows : For permanent use : Berthage. St. Nazaire 3 ships. La Pallice 6 ships. Bassens 10 ships. For emergency use : Nantes 4 ships. Bordeaux 3 ships. Pauillac 2 ships. The board further recommends that steps he taken without delay for the construction of the necessary additional wharves, storage 'buildings, etc., at the following ports on the basis indicated: At Saint Nazaire for the disembarkation and forwarding of supplies and ani- mals, a maximum of 150,000 men and 80,000 animals, with a rest camp for 15,000 men and 2,500 animals. At La Pallice for the disembarkation and forwarding of supplies and animals, a maximum of 350,000 men and 100,000 animals, with a rest camp for 15,000 men and 2,500 animals. At Bassens for the disembarkation and forwarding of supplies and animals, a maximum of 500,000 men and 200,000 animals, with a rest camp for 25,000 men and 10,000 animals. 9. Control of ports. — The hoard recommends that the American forces have absolute control of all camps, barracks, stables, and other features connected with rest camps at the ports; also the docks, storehouses, railroad tracks, cranes, and other features pertaining to unloading ships at each port mentioned above; that in all other matters relating to the ports the American official at these ports confer wifh the designated French official in charge. It is under- stood that the French contemplate placing at each one of the ports a French staff officer for the above purpose. 10. Americam, commander for service of rear. — The hoard recommends that steps he taken tcithout delay to secure from the United States a general officer of the line of the Regular Army for the duty of commanding the service of the rear of the American forces. This officer should be sent to France without, delay and be supplied with an efficient state. All questions relating to the service of the rear should be turned over to this officer for settlement under such general instructions as the commanding general may see fit. In order to secure cooperation and coordination and to free the general headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces of the many minor but important details of the service of the rear, the board believes that the above action is necessary and should be taken without delay. (Signed) D. E. McCaktht. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS. 1. The French plan of establishing concentration camps (instruction camps) and bases of supplies in the interior, and utilizing the ports as reshipping points, be accepted. 2. The initial agreement with the French Government relating to railroad facilities includes a provision which will insure American control of railway lines of communication whenever the situation makes such control necessary for the successful supply and operation of the American Army in France. 3. The French Government turn over gradually to the American forces for exclusive use the following port facilities : ZATION OF THE SEEVIGES OF SUPPLY. 121 For permanent use: At St. Nazaire, berthage for 3 ships; at La Pallice, berthage for 6 ships ; at Bassens, the present dock facilities and sufficient river front to extend these facilities for berthage of 10 ships. For emergency use : At Nantes, berthage for 4 ships ; at Bordeaux, berthage for 3 ships ; at PauiUac, berthage for 2 ships. 4. Steps be taken for the construction of wharves, storehouses, camps, etc., for the reshipping and transit accommodations indicated at the following points : At St. Nazaire, 150,000 men and 50,000 animals; at La Pallice, 350,000 men and 100,000 animals ; at Bassens, 500,000 men and 200,000 animals. 5. American forces have absolute control at ports of all camp arrangements and facilities and all dockage and warehouse facilities connected with the berths assigned the American ships ; all other features of port control to be arranged through French military staff officers. 6. A general officer of the line of the American Army, with a sufficient staff, be sent to France without delay and detailed as commander for the service of the rear. 7. A definite understanding be had with the French Government at the present time relative to reimbursement for use of docks, wharves, railroads, etc. 8. Americans enlisted in the military forces of the United States be brought to France for the following purposes : Dock laborers, foresters for construction work, including bridge carpenters, masonry workers, plumbers, etc. 9. Personnel and material be sent to France without delay for the following purposes : Collecting and sawing of timber in the French forests ; for construc- tion and operation of refrigerating plants; for the operation of slaughter- houses ; and for the driving and operation of artesian wells. 10. There be accepted from the French Government, or the American Govern- ment immediately start the construction of, bases in the interior of France sufficient to provide ultimately for the maximum American force to be sent to France. Colonel, Quartermaster Corps, President. Appendix C. EXTRACT FROM MEMORANDUM DICTATED AT TOURS, FRANCE, DURING MAY, 1919, BY MAJ. GEN. J. G. HARBORD, COMMANDING GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY. The Field Service Begulations of tlie United States Army prior to the war contained an outline of a supply service through a line of communications. It contemplated a commanding general and a staff for that command, with an assistant chief of staff competent to give orders in the name of the command- ing general In the several subsections of the line of communications. The conditions which confronted the American Expeditionary Forces on arrival in Europe were without precedent in our history. The distance of 3,000 miles from our own shores, the growing submarine menace, the unknown factor of the amount of tonnage that would be available, and the uncertainty as to the part of France In which we would operate, complicated our supply situation as compared to any other in our history. The channel ports and the railroads of northern France were congested by British and French, traffic. The Mediter- ranean ports were 900 miles farther from our shores than the other ports of France, and submarine activity was greater and under less control In the Mediterranean than in the open Atlantic. This limited our selection to the Atlantic ports south of Brest, which port Itself was unsuited for the discharge of supplies and at that time was reserved for naval uses. It became evident, however, early in 1918, that the French Atlantic ports would not suffice for our needs, and arrangements were made for the use of Mediterranean ports in spite of the longer distance and the submarine menace. From the ports of western France there were available railroad lines to the northeast, including the double track lines from Bordeaux and Saint Nazaire forming a junction near Bourges, thence running east and north beyond Dijon, with radiations toward Epinal and Nancy. It was estimated that these lines, assisted by collateral lines which were available, could handle a traffic for American uses of 50,000 tons per day. These considerations, with the probability that pressure from the French would dictate the employment of our forces well toward the east, led to the selection of the ports of Saint Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bassens for permanent use, with Nantes, Bordeaux, and Pauillac for emergency use. Several smaller ports, such as Saint Malo, Sables d'Olonne, and Bayonne, were used chiefly for the importation of coal, and from time to time certain ships were sent to Cherbourg and Le Havre. Brest later became a great passenger port. The probability that our forces would be employed well toward the eastern end of the western front indicated a line of communications from the Atlantic to our front of perhaps an average length of 500 miles. The forces on the western front were still very evenly balanced. The probability of an offensive from any one of several directions had to be considered. Manifestly, with an aggressive enemy of equal strength, it would be unwise to crowd all our supplies immediately behind the front, even if transportation facilities per- mitted it. The probability of Interruption by storm, congestion by develop- ment of new theaters, air attacks, etc., made it imprudent to divide the storage between that at the seaboard and that Immediately behind the forces, and to limit the advance storage to merely the necessities of the time with the main storage at the bases. This led to the division of our supplies Into base, inter- mediate, and advance storage. This system of distribution, with half the 122 DKGAmZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY. 123 Storage at tbe base, would give us our supplies echeloned in depth, and ready to be shipped with equal facility to various portions of the allied front, eliminat- ing back and cross railroad hauls. The state of the submarine warfare in June, 1917, was by no means en- couraging. The Navy was hopeful but not to the point of confidence, and the enemy was building submarines faster than they were being destroyed. The resources of Europe in allied and neutral countries were unlinown to us. Our allies were by no means sanguine as to our ability to transport, land, and supply a considerable army at a distance of 3,000 miles sea travel from our own country. The study by the French general staff placed the extreme limit of tonnage which we could ever hope to land in France at 30,000 tons per day. All these things considered by the General Staff led to the adoption of a reserve of 90 days' supplies for the American Expeditionary Forces, this for a force contemplated at that time as a maximum of 2,000,000 men. The same con- sideration determined a division of the storage into one-half at the base, one- third in the intermediate, and one-sixth In the advance. The immediate loca- tion of the intermediate and advance storage depended on the courtesy of the French. Their whole country was more or less given over to Installations for their own armies. The great majority of all available institutions were in use by the French or British, and the facilities wMch adequately served the popu- lation In time of peace were totally inadequate to the added strain imposed by our Army 'from two to four million men. For these reasons it was neces- sary for us to construct entirely or to very greatly enlarge installations that were contemplated for the supply of our Army. Certain railroad lines were not available to us. Certain lines running parallel to the front must not be crossed by more than a certain number of trains each 24 hours because needed for the rapid movement of troops from flank to flank. The question of streams affording water for Installations ; the existence of power already developed for such Installations as would require machinery ; quantity of land available ; topography suitable for the rapid erection of large storehouses and attendant tracks ; and the amount of labor, particularly female labor for such Installa- tions as those for salvage ; were considerations that weighed in the determina- tion of the location of the intermediate storage. One-third of the storage facilities were provided at GI6vres and Montierchaume, the location of which points would admirably serve as a second line of supply for almost any part of the western front, and from there supplies could move east or north, de- pending upon the location of our armies. It was very evident to all that the initiative during the first half of 1918 would rest with the enemy and that we would have to place our forces to meet his attack; and this central location of the intermediate depots would admirably serve any part of the western front, a condition which was not true of any advance depot which we could locate. The location of GiSvres was such that when Paris was seriously threatened in July, 1918, this depot was able to supply direct the American divisions operating before Paris. Advance depots were planned in the advance section north of Dijon and in the neighborhood of Chaumont to serve what seemed as our most probable sector of activity. These depots directly served our Army when we were forced by the enemy to operate In the part of the line northeast of Paris. In August, 1918, the diminution of the submarine menace and other condi- tions justified a reduction of the reserve to be carried from 90 to' 45 days, distributed in the same proportion. The size of the force which we were then estimating upon had Increased from two million to four million and the same depots which served the smaller army for 90 days would suffice for the larger army for 45 days. Appendix D. PULL COPY OF CABLEGRAM RECEIVED FROM PERSHING, JULY 2, 1917. 2 00. Paris. The Adjutant General, Washington: Number 24. Confidential. Question of handling American Army and its cooperation with French Army, including points of debarkation, use of railroad lines, location of depots of hospitals, and zone(s) of operation has been fully discussed with Gen. Petain. Plan proposed well considered and finally agreed upon subject to such alterations as military situation may demrand. Only available ports as yet already reported are those on Loire and Gironde Rivers and La Pallice, Eochelle, all of which are also commercial ports. Main railroad lines leading northeasterly pass through districts favorable for location supply depots embraced by Orleans, Bourges, and Montargis and Nevers. The general area for training is included by Neufchateau, Nancy, Espinao. Method of training contemplates division of French troops camped near division of American troops, utilizing French ofiicers and noncommissioned officers to instruct in various new appliances and tactical formations developed during the war. First division will be billeted in the vicinity of Gondrecourt. Artillery of First Division will go to Valdehon, near Besancon, where barracks and stables are available, and later joining infantry for liaison work. Use of the ports above mentioned avoids interference with British bases, while railway routes indicated avoid French and English line and staff with whom front. Location of area(s) for depots permit shipment supplies and direction training area(s) not hitherto used and contains considerable quantities supplies, with villages ample for billeting. After thorough discussion agreed our troops gradu- ally occupy sections of the French lines instead of entering between French and English, as latter would unquestionably lead to confusion. American troops will probably enter north of Nancy, where country is open and fighting less severe, but will not be put in until thoroughly ready. Later on American troops will be used as circumstances dictate and as may be agreed upon. Most cordial relations have been established with French war office and with Gen. Petain, whose headquarters I have already visited several times. Have detailed American liaison ofiicers with Gen. Petain, and several French ofllcers are already on duty at my headquarters. Everything working harmoniously and to my entire satisfaction. Shall visit British headquarters next week. Pershing. 124 Appendix E. RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION ■PRINCIPAL LINES OF FRENCH RAILWAYS USED BY AMERICAN EXPED FORCES .AND_CENTERS.OF AMETRICA^N RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION Tm| AMcwtun ( I HAS cOPtlTWUCTED M»fTrc«llT ITo'VAnt iTHmut MAieonVtNED ITS frrbnTt TO TERNnNHV. A no ■ TOMAOI JVACXk raiMMPALLT IkCOUl 1M* CLKIttS SHOWN TH( TOTAL O' WHICM JS yUMOST OMr THO^KAND NIL CI CIPITEP.? bC AMKIIC H n CON.tSUCr.ON/"*""" '"P'CATC HUMBIR OF MILGS OrJ, Is O. TDAOK CONiyUCTCD av AMEPt w rf O !MAIN LINES " SECOND LINE* ^■■•i^" 125 Appendix F. ORGANIZATION CHART OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION, AUGUST 29, 1917. [G. O. 1, L. of C, 1917; also F. S. R.] COMMANDING GENERAL, L. OF C. 1 Aide-de-Camp. Chief of Staff. Assistant Chief of Staff. Adjutant. , Administrative and Technical Staff. Judge Advocate, L. of C. Quartermaster, L. of C. A. C. of S. in Charge of Base Section No. 1. Surgeon, L. of C. Engineer, L. of C. A. C. of S. in Charge of Base Section No. 2. Ordnance Ofacer, !>. of C. A. C. of S. in Charge of Base Section No. 3. SignalOfBcer, L. etc. A. C. of S. in Charge of Inter- mediate Section. Aviation OfBcer, L. of C. Assistant Director of Railways. 126 Appendix G. ORGANIZATION CHART OF SERVICE OF THE REAR. (UNDER FIRST COPY OF G. O. 31.) [G. 0. 1, S. O. R., February 16, 1918.] COMMANDING GENERAL, 3. O. E. Aide-de-Camp. Chief ot Staff. Deputy C. of S. Secretary, G. S. A C. of S., G-1. A. C. of S., G-2. A. C. of S., G-3. A. C. of S., G-4. Adjutant General, S. O. E. Chief of Gas Service. Inspector General, S. O. K. General Purchasing Agent. Judge Advocate, S. 0. E. Chief of Air Service. Director, Motor Transport Corps. Chief Signal Officer. Provost Marshal General. Chief Ordnance Officer. Director General of Trans- portation. Chief Engineer Officer. War Eisli Section. Chief Surgeon. Chief Quartermaster. 127 Appendix H. ORGANIZATION CHAKT OF SERVICES OF SUPPLY. (UNDER SECOND COPY OF G. O. 31, ISSUED ABOUT MARCH 31, 1918.) COMMANDING GENERAL, S. O. S. Aide-de-Camp. Chief of Staff. Deputy C. of S. Secretary, G. S. A. C. of S., G-1. A. C. of S., G-2. A. C. of S., G-3. A. C. of S., G-4 Adjutant General, S. O. S. Chief of Utilities. Inspector General, S. 0. S. Judge Advocate, S. 0. S. Transportation Dept. Dept. Con. and Forestry. Dept. Lt. Rys. and Roads. Motor Trans. Service. Provost Marshal General. Chief Signal Officer. War Risk Section. Chief Ordnance Officer. Chief of Gas Service. Chief Engineer Officer. General Purchasing Agent. Chief Surgeon. Chief of Air Service. Chief Quartermaster. 128 Appendix I. OF.GAMZATION CHART OF SERVICES OF SUPPLY, JULY 12, 1918. lleputyC. ofS. Asst.C. ofS., G-1. COMMANDING GENERAL, SERVICES OF SUPPLY. Aide-de-Camp. CUef of Staff. Secretary, General Staff. Asst. C. of S., G-2. Asst. C. of S., G-4. Adjutant General, S. O. S. Inspector General, S. O. S. Judge Advocate, S. 0. S. Chief Engineer. Dept. Const, and Forestry. D. M. E.andE. S. I Dept. Lt. Eys. and Roads. Provost Marshal General. Director, Motor Transport Corps. War Risk Section. Chief Signal Officer. Chemical Warfare Service. Chief Ordnance Officer. General Purchasing Agent. Chief Surgeon. Asst. Chiefs of Air Service. Supply— Tours. Personnel— Paris. 178841"— 20 9 Chief Quartermaster. Director General of Trans- portation. 129 Appendix J . ORGANIZATION CHART, HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY, NOVEMBER 11, 1918. COMMANDING GENERAL, S. 0. S. Aides. Chief of Stall. I Deputy Chief of Staff. Assists Chief of Stall and acts as suph during his absence. Assignment of commissioned personnel. Secretary of Gen. Stall. Asst. Chief of Stafl, G-1. 1. Ocean tonnage. 2. Requisitions on War De- partment. 3. Priority of oversea ship- ments. 4. Replacement of losses in men. 6. Organization and equip- ment of S. O. S. troops. 6. GeneralPurchasingBoard. 7. Renting, Requisition, and Claim Service. 8. Disposition of casual offi- cers and soldiers. 9. Administration of replace- ment and casual officers depots. 10. Organization and adminis- tration of leave areas. 11. Provost Marshal Service. 12. War Risk Bureau. 13. Red Cross, Y. M. C. A., and other similar agen- cies. 14. Questions of liaison with alhed authorities and services. 15. Data, graphics, and charts of S. O. S. activities. 16. War diary. Asst. Chief of Stafl, G-2. 1. Counter-espionage in S. O. S. 2. Railway, steamship, garni, transport, and passport regulation and control. 3. Register of American civil- ians in France. 4. Censorship reports on mo- rale of troops and civil- ians. 5. Control of civilian labor of A. E. F. 6. Prevention of sabotage and enemy propaganda. I Asst. Chief of Stafl, G-4. 1. Supply, construction, and transportation in France including location of railway and supply es- tablishments. 2. Statistics concerning above. 3. Hospitalization and evac- uation of the sick and wounded. 4. Movements of troops. 5. Assignment of all new S. O. S. units arriving in France. 6. Assignment of all labor and labor troops. 7. Remount and Veterinary Services. 8. Labor Bureau. 9. Salvage Service. 10. Graves Registration Serv- ice. 11. Garden Service. 12. Fire protection and se- curity against enemy air attaclc's. 13. Billets and billeting. 14. Military board ol allied supply. 15. All operations of the serv- ices of supply not as- signed to other sections of the General Stafl. Functions of Pro curoment, Supply, Transportation, Construction, Hospitalization, and Communication. Chief Quartermaster. C. Q. M. Chief Surgeon. C. S. Chief Ordnance Officer. C. O. O. Air Service Supply and Personnel. ; Chief Chemical Warfare Ser. C. W. S. Chief Signal Officer. C. S. 0. Difeetor Motor Transport Corps. M. T. C. • Chief Engineer Officer. C. E. O. Director General of Transportation. D.Q.T 130 Adjutant General. S. O. S. Inspector General. S. O. S. Judge Advocate. S. O. S. Provost Marshal Department. Array Service Corps. War Risk Bureau. Renting, Requisition, and Claim Service. General Purchasing Agent. G. P. A. Headquarters Commandant. o 178841° 21. , (To laco p. 130.) N