CORNELL 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
Cornell University Library 
 DK 216.M72 1854 
 
 3 1924 028 537 441 
 
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 Library 
 
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 the Cornell University Library. 
 
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 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/cletails/cu31924028537441 
 
THE RUSSIANS 
 
 BULGARIA AND RUMELIA 
 
 In 1828 AND 1829; 
 
 THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE DANUBE, THE SIEGES OF BRAILOW, VARNA, 
 
 SILISTRIA, SHOMLA, AND THE PASSAGE OF ]'HE BALKAN 
 
 BY MARSHAL DIEBITCH. 
 
 BARON VON MOLTKE, 
 
 Majok ih the Prussian Seevice. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET 
 
 1854. 
 
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 QyC^' V/OO \^0O-l'&<^( 
 
 
 M- 
 
 PRINTED BY WJLLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, 
 ANT) rriARlNO PRO^S. 
 
TRANSLATOE'S PREFACE. 
 
 The following work, by Baron von Moltke, contains 
 so lively and accurate an account of the country 
 now once more the theatre of war, and of the 
 Russian campaigns of '28 and '29, that it can scarcely 
 fail to interest the English public at the present time. 
 Baron Moltke, who is now dead, was despatched to 
 the Turkish army by order of his own sovereign, at 
 the express request of Sultan Mahmoud, and served 
 with it through the campaigns here described. His 
 book was published without any preface. 
 
 My first intention was to make an abridgment 
 of the book — leaving out all purely military details 
 — but as I proceeded in the work I was so much 
 interested by the vivacity and clearness with which 
 even technical matters are described, that I thought 
 even those among my readers who are as ignorant 
 of the art of war, as I am myself, would have 
 cause to regret their omission. I have therefore 
 only condensed some of the political speculations 
 
 a 2 
 
IV TRANSLATOE'S PREFACE. 
 
 relating to bygone events, and left out a few unim- 
 portant passages. 
 
 I could not safely have ventured so far beyond 
 my depth in a science of which I know nothing 
 without very eflScient support and assistance, which 
 have been most kindly afforded me by Mrs. Gr. 
 Wrottesley, the daughter of Sir J. Burgoyne, and 
 Mr. Jekyll, late Captain Grrenadier Guards, through- 
 out the work, and by Mr. Charles Izod, surgeon, in 
 the part relating to his profession. 
 
 Thus the correctness of the version of Baron von 
 Moltke's book now offered to the English public has 
 been secured ; but the Translator must crave indul- 
 gence towards any inelegance of style caused by the 
 endeavour to make the book as clear and as short as 
 possible. 
 
 The Translator. 
 
 May, 1854. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PART I.— CAMPAIGN OF 1828. 
 
 INTKODTJCTION. POLITICAL RELATIONS THE TURKISH AND 
 
 RUSSIAN ARMIES ....... 
 
 THE THEATRE OF WAR, WALLACHIA THE DOBRUDSCHA 
 
 BULGARIA THE LINES OF THE DANUBE — THE 
 
 BALKAN 
 
 II. 
 111. 
 
 IV. 
 T. 
 VI. 
 
 VII,' 
 
 VIII. 
 IX. 
 
 X. 
 
 XI. 
 
 XII. 
 
 XIJI. 
 
 PLANS OF OPERATION ...... 
 
 OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN OCCUPATION OF MOLDAVIA 
 
 AND WALLACHIA PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE AT SA- 
 
 TUNOVO ....... 
 
 THE STRONGHOLDS OF THE DOBRUDSCHA . 
 
 SIEGE OF BRAILOW 
 
 ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS INTO BULGARIA — BATTLES AT 
 BAZARDJIK, KOSLUDJA, AND BEFORE VARNA 
 
 THE BATTLE OF JENIBAZAR — DESCRIPTION OF SHUMLA — 
 THE SIEGE OF SHUMLA BY THE RUSSIANS . 
 
 SIEGE OF VARNA 
 
 ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE VARNA 
 FALL OF VARNA 
 
 COMBAT 
 
 AT KURT-TEPE • 
 
 THE INVESTMENT OF SILISTRIA 
 MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WALLACHIA 
 END OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1828 
 CONCLUSIONS .... 
 
 PAGE 
 1 
 
 30 
 54 
 
 67 
 68 
 79 
 
 106 
 
 115 
 138 
 
 191 
 220 
 233 
 244 
 246 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PART II.— CAMPAIGN OF 1829. 
 
 CHAP. PAGE 
 
 introduction 261 
 
 i. taking of sizeboli in the spring — naval enterprises 
 
 of the turks ....... 277 
 
 ii. opening of the campaign in may passage of the 
 
 danube and siege of silisteia .... 284 
 
 iii. offensive operations of the grand vizier skirmish 
 
 of eski-arnautlar and battle of kulewtscha , 325 
 
 iv. cessation of hostilities from the middle of june to 
 
 the middle of july the passage of the 
 
 balkan the battle near aidos, jamboli, and 
 
 slivno the march upon adrianople . . . 364 
 
 v. surrender of adrianople military position of 
 
 constantinople ■ — negotiations demonstrations 
 
 conclusion of peace 410 
 
 vi. concluding remarks 446 
 
 Medical Report, 
 russian losses by disease 461 
 
 LIST OF PLANS. 
 
 PLAN 
 
 1. Map of Isakohi and Passage of the River at Satunovo 
 
 2. Brailow ok Ibrall ....... 
 
 3. Plan op Operations against Shumla ... 
 
 4. Plan and Environs op Varna ..... 
 
 5. Plan op Siege op Silistria ..... 
 
 6. Engagement at Bojelesohi (included in Plan 1) . 
 
 7. Battle op Kulewtscha ...... 
 
 8. Straits of the Dardanelles ..... 
 
 9. Plans of Towns on the Danube and Balkan 
 
 10. Plans of Turkish Towns on the Black Sea 
 
 11. Plans op Turkish Towns on the Black Sea and Dandbe 
 
 12. Passes op the Balkan 
 
 13. General Map ..... 
 
PART 1. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1828. 
 
Drawn & Eno-^ 'bt- J.a- C.Wallier 
 
THE EUSSIAKS 
 
 IN 
 
 BULGARIA AND RUMELIA. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 POLITICAL RELATIONS — THE TURKISH AND RUSSIAN ARMIES. 
 
 The hostility which broke forth between Russia and 
 Turkey in 1828 had been imminent for a number of 
 years. Both powers accused each other of having 
 broken the treaty of Bucharest, and it was only 
 owing to the great zeal and ability of the European 
 diplomatists that the rupture was so long delayed. 
 
 Canning expressed in the clearest language the 
 true cause of the moderation of one party, and the 
 headstrong obstinacy of the other. 
 
 " Let me be understood," said Mr. Canning, in his 
 speech of the 12th of December, 1826, on the affairs 
 of Portugal — " Let me be imderstood, however, dis- 
 tinctly as not meaning to say that I dread war in a 
 good cause (and in no other may it be the lot of this 
 country ever to engage !), from a distrust of the 
 strength of the country to commence it, or of her 
 resources to maintain it. I dread it from an appre- 
 
 B 
 
2 EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS. Introd. 
 
 hension of the tremendous consequences which might 
 arise from any hostihties in which we might be en- 
 gaged I said that I feared that the next war 
 
 which would be kindled in Europe would be a war 
 
 not so much of armies as of opinions I much 
 
 fear that this country (however earnestly she may 
 endeavour to avoid it) could not in such case avoid 
 seeing ranked under her banners all the restless and 
 dissatisfied of any nation with which she might come 
 in contact. It is the contemplation of this new 
 power in any future war which excites my most 
 anxious apprehension." 
 
 In Spain, in Italy, and in Greece, the people had 
 risen simultaneously against their rulers : the gene- 
 ral discontent had manifested itself in every country 
 by insurrectionary movements : even in Russia this 
 feeling had shown itself by conspiracies which re- 
 sulted in the death of the Emperor Alexander. The 
 governments which had to repress this popular ten- 
 dency were banded together at this period to main- 
 tain the public peace and order. Their main object 
 was to keep down the revolution, and a war which 
 was sure to spread over all Europe was the subject of 
 dread to every power. Moreover, the finances of 
 every country were in an unhealthy state, in conse- 
 quence of the heavy expenses attending the wars 
 against the French empire ; so that peace was abso- 
 lutely necessary for all governments. 
 
 The most difficult problem of the day was the 
 
INTROD. THE GEEEK EEVOLT. 3 
 
 revolt of the Greeks against the Turkish govern- 
 ment. The insurrection in the Morea arose from a 
 cause very different from Carbonarism ; excessive 
 oppression had forced the Greeks to rebel. They 
 fought for their religion and their liberty. The 
 Christian powers were hardly justified in taking 
 measures which would have delivered those who 
 professed the same faith over to the vengeance of 
 the savage Moslem ; they wished to remain neutral, 
 and hoped that the Turks would put down the in- 
 surrectionary movement, and tide over the danger 
 by making timely concessions. 
 
 The worst was that it soon became manifest that 
 the Greeks would secure their freedom without the 
 intervention of European diplomacy; and the mo- 
 ment this contingency appeared possible, there arose 
 a vague feeling of distrust among the powers of 
 Europe, lest some neighbour, forgetting the principle 
 of non-intervention, might stretch forth the right 
 hand of fellowship, and thus obtain lasting influence 
 and great political importance. 
 
 Former schemes of conquest, religious sympathies, 
 and the geographical position of Eussia, pointed to 
 that country as the most dangerous neighbour. A 
 war against the old arch-enemy was looked upon in 
 Eussia as the only means of putting an end to the 
 disquiet that had prevailed since the Emperor Alex- 
 ander's death. Eussia was the natural protector of 
 all those who professed the Greek religion and who 
 
 B 2 
 
4 POLICY OF WESTEEN POWERS. Intkod. 
 
 lived under tlie dominion of the Turk. The Turks, 
 contrary to their promises, still kept possession of 
 Moldavia and Wallachia. They had interfered in 
 Servia without the consent of Russia, and had stopped 
 the navigation between the Bosphorus and the Dar- 
 danelles. Why should not Russia occupy Turkey 
 in the same manner that Austria held Italy, France 
 Spain, or England Portugal ? The Russians were 
 clearly in the right, as the treaties had not been 
 fulfilled. It was another question whether these 
 treaties were not decidedly contrary to the laws of 
 nations. They contained within themselves the seeds 
 of future wars ; the mere fact of giving to a foreign 
 monarch rights of protection over the subjects of the 
 Porte might lend an appearance of justice to the 
 most arbitrary attack on the part of that monarch. 
 
 From the meeting of the Congress of Verona, 
 Europe was divided into two hostile camps : on one 
 side was England, on the other the Holy Alliance. 
 Austria remained true to her policy. She required 
 the G-reeks to submit to their liege lords, at the same 
 time that she impressed upon the Porte the necessity 
 of making concessions to its subjects. 
 
 England had as little desire as Austria that the 
 Porte should be weakened, but looked upon the libe- 
 ration of Grreece as a fait accompli ; she was the first 
 European state to recognize Greece as a power de 
 facto in 1824. 
 
 The same motives had their effect in France. An 
 
Introd. TEEATY op LONDON, 1827. 5 
 
 attempt to secure to the Porte, by means of the me- 
 diation of all the European powers, the possession of 
 the territories of which she was then seized, failed, as 
 was to be expected, with the Russian court. From 
 her geographical and commercial position, Russia is 
 destined to exercise a decided influence at Constanti- 
 nople ; indeed, without this she cannot develop the 
 resources, nor secure the frontiers, of her southern 
 provinces. This influence was again secured to her 
 by the treaty of Akkerman, and there was therefore 
 no overpowering reason why Russia should precipitate 
 the downfall of the Ottoman empire. But it was a 
 very different matter to guarantee the stability of a 
 state which threatened to fall to pieces from internal 
 dissensions. An union of the European powers to 
 protect Grreece against the Turks, and Turkey against 
 any other power, was, under the circumstances, im- 
 possible. But it was important so to entangle the 
 northern giant in a treaty with England and Prance, 
 that he should be prevented from entering into any 
 independent or one-sided line of action. The treaty 
 of London of the 6th of July, 1827, in the negotia- 
 tion of which the several parties had opposing ob- 
 jects, was purposely vague in its meaning, and doubt- 
 ful in its terms. Its results were precisely contrary 
 to the intentions of the Enghsh and French govern- 
 ments. 
 
 For seven years European diplomatists had en- 
 deavoured in vain to bend the stubborn obstinacy of 
 
6 BATTLE OF NAVARINO. Intbod. 
 
 the Porte ; the Sultan arrogantly refused to listen to 
 any agreement with the European powers. The 
 Reis-EfFendi declared the treaty of London to be one 
 which his master could not accede to ; the note re- 
 mained unsealed on his divan, and never was an- 
 swered. Political prudence would have suggested to 
 the Porte to agree to the treaty of the 6th of July, 
 1827 : the Glreeks might have been changed from 
 bitter foes to zealous supporters — the example of 
 Servia is to the point — and the Porte might then 
 have relied upon the support of England. It was 
 thought that the appearance of an English, French, 
 and Russian fleet might open the Sultan's eyes ; 
 it was intended as a demonstration by means of 
 which a character like that of Mahmud II. might be 
 intimidated. The " untoward event," the battle of 
 Navarino, destroyed the Turkish naval power. Thus 
 one of the great hindrances to any attack by Russia 
 on the Turkish empire was removed, entirely contrary 
 to the intentions of the contracting powers, and the 
 upshot of the war could no longer remain doubtful. 
 
 The treaty of London and the obstinacy of the 
 Porte placed England in a false position : she was 
 playing into the hands of Russia, as it was impossible 
 for her to wage war in favour of the Turks against 
 the Russians, whose ostensible object was the libera- 
 tion of G-reece. Thus it was that Russia and Turkey 
 were left to fight out their quarrel alone. 
 
 If we ask how it was that the Porte ventured to 
 
INTKOD. THE JANISSARIES. 7 
 
 trust to its own resources, and to oppose the wishes 
 of all Europe, we shall find that, even if Sultan 
 Mahmud had not possessed a determined unbending 
 spirit, he was compelled to assume that character : | 
 he resisted every appeal from foreign governments, ' 
 because he was powerless at home. Every concession : 
 to Christian powers would have been made at the i 
 risk of his life and his throne. 
 
 The bond that unites such various nations, Kurds, 
 Arnauts, and Arabs, under one head, is a common 
 faith, and devotion to a dynasty which has ruled 
 over them for five hundred years. The thirtieth 
 ruler of this race had been borne to power by a 
 revolt of the Janissaries on the 28th of July, 1808. 
 Mahmud had sacrificed his brother Mustafa, and was 
 the last surviving male in direct descent from Osman. 
 Frequent revolts among the Janissaries rendered fresh 
 sacrifices necessary : one vizier after another fell 
 victims to this wild soldiery; it was impossible to 
 take any steps in favour of the Christian population ; 
 and yet these very undisciplined troops, which in- 
 volved the Porte in constant dissensions with other 
 nations, were everywhere beaten in the field, so that 
 the Janissaries might be looked upon as the real cause 
 of the diplomatic embarrassment and the military 
 decrepitude of the Porte. 
 
 Long and bitter experience had taught Mahmud 
 that it was impossible to make his own power felt so 
 long as the Janissaries existed : he was determined 
 
8 EASTERN FEUDALITY. Iktbou. 
 
 to destroy these Moslemite Prsetorian guards : this 
 was an undertaking in which five of his predecessors 
 had already lost their thrones, and two of them their 
 lives. 
 
 When the victorious followers of Osman overran 
 the most fruitful provinces of three parts of the globe, 
 they gave the conquered their choice between death, 
 conversion, or paying tribute. According to the 
 Koran, the soil belonged to the Sultan as Grod's vice- 
 gerent ; the Moslems were not to cultivate the land 
 themselves, but were specially appointed to wage war 
 for the spread of their religion. It was therefore 
 agreeable to them if the greater portion of the con- 
 quered subjected themselves as " Rayahs," for the 
 Moslems had no intolerant lust for conversion. The 
 "Rayahs," or Christian subjects, not only retained 
 the right of exercising their religion, but were left 
 in possession of their properties, paying a capitation 
 and land-tax. The Moslem warriors were, on their 
 side, allowed to raise the taxes paid by the " Rayahs" 
 to a certain extent, with the understanding that for 
 this privilege they were to fight for Islam, or to 
 provide substitutes to fight in their stead. 
 
 Thus it was that a regular feudal system arose in 
 the East. In Turkey the Osmanlis were exactly 
 what the nobles had been in Europe — a privileged 
 class; only they were not, like them, of the same 
 faith or blood with the mass of the population. 
 
 The same circumstances which in Europe replaced. 
 
INTKOD. THE JANISSARIES. 9 
 
 by standing armies, the nobility called into existence 
 by the feudal system, made the Janissaries a neces- 
 sary complement in the East to the Spahis and 
 Timarlys. The corps of Janissaries was recruited 
 originally from Christian children, mostly Bulgarians, 
 who were taken when quite young from their homes, 
 and became the most zealous adherents of their new 
 faith. It was they who conquered Constantinople, 
 Rhodes, and Belgrade, and carried the Crescent tri- 
 umphantly to the walls of Vienna. But this very 
 corps of foot-soldiers, which for three centuries had 
 been the support of the Osmanli empire, became, 
 from causes unconnected with military matters, the 
 source of the ruin of the Turkish empire. 
 
 To protect themselves against an arbitrary go- 
 vernment, the Turks established various corporations — 
 such as the Ulemas, or servants of the law ; the guilds 
 or fraternities in the towns ; but more especially the 
 widely-spread corporation of Janissaries. In Sultan 
 Mahmud's time there were 196 ortas, which reckoned 
 400,000 members — the famous thirty-first orta alone 
 counted 30,000— and yet, out of this 400,000, there 
 were only 40,000 men capable of bearing arms ; for 
 mechanics and civilians, rich and poor, old men and 
 young children, were admitted into the body of 
 Janissaries. 
 
 Sultan Selim had raised the Nizam Dschedid, or 
 regular army, as a check to the Janissaries, but this 
 had led to violent outbreaks, and cost the Sultan his 
 
10 THE JANISSAEIES. Introd. 
 
 life. His nephew, Mahmud, pursued the same course, 
 but with greater cunning and with success. He 
 formed fresh troops, who were paid and exercised in 
 the European form, and whom he lodged in large 
 barracks. The new Aga of the Janissaries, Hussein, 
 was named Pacha, and these new troops, the Askjiri- 
 Muhammidje, were placed under his command. The 
 new Pacha was devoted to the Sultan, and equally 
 determined to break the pride of the wild mass who 
 had selected him to be their chief and protector. 
 After various outbreaks the Janissaries went into 
 open revolt on the night of the 14th of June, 1826, 
 and directed their chief rage against Hussein, whom 
 they suspected of treason. But he took refuge in 
 the Seraglio, surrounded by strong walls, and situated 
 on the tongue of land between the harbour and the 
 Sea of Marmora, where the Sultan was also. The 
 Asiatic troops encamped near Scutari, under Mo- 
 hammed Pacha, were rapidly brought over to Con- 
 stantinople, and united with those under the Sultan 
 on the European side of the Bosphorus. The Sultan 
 unfurled his holy standard and advanced against the 
 rebels, declaring his determination to destroy the 
 Janissaries to the last man. He succeeded in dis- 
 persing the rebels, and their power was broken by 
 death and exile. 
 
 Many thousands were still dispersed about the 
 capital and its provinces, but the body was broken up, 
 and the great work of destruction accomplished ; at 
 
INTROD. DESTEUCTION OF THE JANISSAEIES. 11 
 
 one blow the incubus tbat bad oppressed Turkey dis- 
 appeared, and tbe Osmanli ruler tbougbt himself lucky 
 in having destroyed the Osmanli army, at the very 
 moment when one-half of his subjects was in open or 
 secret rebellion against him, and when the hordes of 
 his dreaded neighbour were ready to pounce upon his 
 possessions in Europe and Asia. 
 
 Under these circumstances the Sultan's great object 
 was to gain time, so as to build up something new in 
 the room of that which was destroyed. Thus it was 
 that after some delay the convention of Akkerman 
 was entered into on the 25th of September, 1827. 
 The terms of this convention were so onerous, that 
 the Sultan would never have signed them, except 
 with the fuU determination to break them on the first 
 opportunity. In his Hatti-scheriff of the 20th of 
 December of that year he declared to his people that 
 they must perceive that " he had only gone to work 
 in this friendly manner with the unbeHevers, so as 
 to gain time ;" every Moslem was the born foe of 
 the unbeliever. 
 
 The war was inevitable, and Sultan Mahmud felt 
 that success was essential to give the necessary sanc- 
 tion to his reforms in the eyes of the Moslems ; and 
 the reconstruction of a force that should be equal in 
 the field to the European armies, and a trusty in- 
 strument in his own hands, was the object of his most 
 strenuous exertions. 
 
 The institution of the Timarlys and the Spahis 
 
12 THE NEW TUEKISH AEMY, Inteod. 
 
 was allowed to continue, as the Government, by with- 
 drawing the fiefs, held the means in its own hand 
 of securing to itself the devotion and faith of these 
 horsemen. On the other hand, instead of the Janis- 
 saries, an army of 48,000 men was shortly raised, 
 clothed, armed, and disciplined after the European 
 fashion. The Sultan directed the drill in person, after 
 learning the cavalry exercise from European ofEcers. 
 The novelty of these measures, the opposition they 
 encountered, the necessity for immediate action, and 
 the want of time, caused everything to be hurried. 
 Among his own followers Sultan Mahmud found no 
 one enlightened man to aid him with his counsel : all 
 had to be done by means of foreigners, and by the 
 Sultan's own iron will. The recruits were seized in 
 their villages, often carried in chains to Constanti- 
 nople, and there kept as prisoners. There was an 
 utter lack of intelligent native officers, and religious 
 prejudice stood in the way of the employment of 
 foreigners. The Eayahs were excluded from the 
 military service. The youngest men were selected 
 from among the Moslems, in the hope that they 
 would sooner get accustomed to the tiresome con- 
 straint of discipline, and remain longest in the 
 service. But the dislike of the Turks to the service, 
 their close quarters in the overcrowded barracks, their 
 vices, and the wretched hospital arrangements, made 
 sad havoc in their ranks, so that new levies were 
 constantly required. The army therefore was com- 
 
Introd. the new TURKISH ARMY. 13 
 
 posed of men disciplined after the European fashion, 
 wearing Enssian jackets and Turkish trowsers ; with 
 Tartar saddles, and French stirrups, and English 
 sabres : it consisted of Timariots, or troops giving 
 feudal service ; of troops of the line, whose service 
 was for life ; and of militia, who served only a term 
 of years, of whom the leaders were recruits and the 
 recruits mere children. The system of organization 
 was French, and the instructors were men from all 
 parts of Europe. The splendid appearance, the 
 beautiful arms, the reckless bravery of the former 
 Moslem horde, had disappeared ; but yet this new 
 army had one quality which placed it above the 
 numerous host which in former times the Porte could 
 summon to the field — it obeyed. 
 
 The Turkish empire, just before the outbreak of the 
 Russian war, stood on the brink of perdition. The 
 Turkish army had been destroyed by the Sultan at 
 Constantinople, the Turkish navy by the Franks at 
 Navarino. The Russians were waiting on the frontiers 
 both of Europe and Asia, ready to advance. The 
 French held the Morea, and Ibrahim Pacha was 
 reduced to great straits. The Greek flag was free, 
 and the Mediterranean was closed by the maritime 
 powers. In addition to this, the finances were 
 much embarrassed, the population partly in open 
 revolt, and all discontented. Well might the Sul- 
 tan exclaim to his vizier—" Keep your wits together, 
 for Allah knows the danger is great ! " 
 
14 EFFORTS OF THE SULTAN. Introd. 
 
 His first object was to put down tlie rebellious 
 Greeks, and tben to attack bis foreign foes. But be 
 was beaten in the Morea. After all this it can sur- 
 prise no one to find the Sultan so utterly unprepared 
 for the emergency, although war with Russia had 
 so long appeared inevitable. 
 
 From the year 1822 the frontier fortresses on the 
 Danube had been restored, and on the land front of 
 Constantinople immense barracks had been con- 
 structed, which might be considered as detached forts. 
 The coinage had been debased, recourse had to 
 oppression to procure money, and every measure 
 taken to raise a military force. But the institutions 
 were too new to take root, and the army in no con- 
 dition to hold its ground against the Russian host in 
 the open field ; it was also too weak for the Sultan, 
 much against his wish, not to have recourse again to 
 the irregular Asiatic hordes. Wallachia and Moldavia 
 were considered untenable, and most of the troops in 
 those Principalities were withdrawn for the defence 
 of the fortresses on the Danube. From Bosnia, a 
 remarkably warlike and Mahommedan province, it 
 was intended to send 40,000 men on to the Drina. 
 But there opinion was strongly opposed to the 
 Sultan's reforms. The Janissaries maintained their 
 influence, and no one would subject himself to the 
 Nizam's control. Abderrahman Pacha preferred to 
 have the Sultan's firman read by one of his officers, 
 but the firman, and the European clothes that accom- 
 
Intkod. war between RUSSIA AND PERSIA. 15 
 
 panied it, were torn to pieces by the infuriated mob, 
 and Bosnia did not contribute one soldier to the 
 Turkish army during the whole campaign : it was 
 with some difficulty that the Bosniaks, who were 
 acting on the Danube, coiJd be retained in the Turk- 
 ish service. Bulgaria was half-peopled with Grreek 
 Christians, whom it was not thought safe to arm. 
 Most of the irregular troops had to be drawn from 
 Asia, and these could not be reckoned upon during 
 the winter. The only hope of the Turks was in the 
 Persians ; but after a short and glorious campaign, 
 Greneral Paskiewitch forced Persia to come to terms 
 on the 2nd of November, 1827- ; the Persians agree- 
 ing to pay a contribution of 18,000,000 rubles, and 
 to give up the Khanat-Erivan. This acquisition of 
 territory enabled the Eussians almost to surround 
 their still unconquered possessions in the Caucasus, 
 and to become the immediate neighbours of the 
 Turks in Asia. Persia attempted to throw off the 
 yoke, but was forced again, by the vigour of the 
 Russian general, to make peace on the 22nd of 
 February, 1828 ; so that, before the Turks entered 
 the field against Russia, Persia was humbled, and 
 a peace, upon still harder terms than before, was 
 forced upon her. The corps of General Paskie- 
 witch could be used against the Asiatic possessions 
 of the Sultan, who was therefore obliged to raise 
 a force especially for this service, and to divide his 
 army. 
 
16 STRENGTH OF THE TURKISH ARMY IN 1828. Intkcd. 
 
 It is impossible to give an accurate account of 
 the number of men the Turks could bring into the 
 field against the Eussians. According to an au- 
 thentic statement, proceeding from the office of the 
 grand vizier, the irregular unpaid horde in Europe 
 and Asia (not including the men who could be sum- 
 moned to bear arms in case of urgent necessity) con- 
 sisted of 97,050 men, chiefly Asiatic horsemen. The 
 paid troops were reckoned at 80,000 men. The 
 infantry of the latter consisted of 33 regiments of 
 
 3 battalions each, 500 strong ; each had besides 
 120 artillerymen, who formed a separate company, 
 and served 10 battalion guns. Besides this there 
 were 2 regiments of Bostangis, or guards, amounting 
 to 6000 men ; so that there were about 60,000 in- 
 fantry. The cavalry consisted of 10,000 Spahis, or 
 men bound by feudal tenure to follow their lords into 
 the field, besides 2600 regular cavalry, who formed 
 
 4 regiments of 6 squadrons, consisting of 152 men — 
 altogether about 12,000 or 18,000 horse. The artil- 
 lery consisted of 8 troops and 84 foot companies, and 
 2600 sappers, miners, and bombardiers ; besides 41 
 companies for the conveyance of the baggage. The 
 number of the field-guns cannot be correctly esti- 
 mated, but, compared with the nature of the service 
 and the number of the forces, it was very small. 
 
 The whole disposable force may therefore be reck- 
 oned at 180,000 men, of whom one-third at least was 
 cavalry. 
 
iNTiiOD. TURKISH INPANTEY DRESS. 17 
 
 The clothing of the new infantry represented the 
 transition from the Oriental to the European dress : 
 it consisted of a woollen waistcoat, over which was 
 a broadcloth coat, reaching to the hips, and fastened 
 m front with hooks and eyes. Instead of the turban 
 the shubarra was used, a sort of cloth cap without a 
 rim, shaped like a melon and of various colours. A 
 red shawl girt many times round the waist protected 
 the body. The Asiatic trowsers were retained ; they 
 were of dark cloth, wide and loose as far as the knee, 
 and then forming a sort of half-gaiter. The gaiters 
 were made of impervious felt, the shoes very broad, 
 and mostly of red leather. The felt cloak had a hood, 
 which in bad weather served as a covering to the 
 head, and in fine weather hung down the back. The 
 musket, of French calibre, and provided with a bay- 
 onet, was mostly of Belgian manufacture ; the sabre 
 very crooked. The cartouch-box was a novelty. The 
 arms and the clothing were altogether well suited to 
 the nature of the troops, of the climate, and of the 
 soil. 
 
 Although it was difficult to teach this infantry 
 regular movements in compact bodies, nevertheless 
 we shall see later, on occasions when their courage 
 carried them away, and they threw off the severe 
 control placed upon them, that they could charge the 
 foe with their old impetuosity. 
 
 The cavalry were clad in a similar manner : they 
 were armed with a broad crooked falchion, a carbine 
 
 c 
 
18 HOBSE AND GEAR, Ikteod. 
 
 and pistols. They were drilled into a sort of disci- 
 pline, but could not manoeuvre, or charge in a com- 
 pact body. The impetuosity of the old Turkish mode 
 of attack was not yet quite broken. 
 
 The horses, especially those of the Asiatic Spahis, 
 were small, but fiery, well broken, capable of enduring 
 great fatigue and privations. The Kurdish and Cap- 
 padocian horses were accustomed to be picketed, and 
 to bear the mid-day heat and the midnight cold. 
 They were only watered once a day, and kept in 
 condition without barley, when fed on the coarsest 
 fodder. The light and easy fitting palanu, or saddle, 
 made of felt, remained on their backs day and night, 
 so that the horseman was ready at any moment to 
 mount. The bit was very severe for so well-broken 
 an animal, and was intended to stop the horse sud- 
 denly in mid career, or to wheel him round in a 
 moment. The bar of the bit was often five or six 
 inches long, and instead of the curb chain there was 
 a ring. The round shoe was admirably suited to its 
 purpose. The steel was forged cold, was thin and 
 light, lasted five or six weeks, and protected the hoof 
 admirably on stony ground, Although they use no 
 cruppers, the Turkish horseman rides down the most 
 precipitous places, covered with brushwood or trees, 
 at full gallop. They ride only stallions, as the mares 
 are kept at home for breeding, and are very dear. 
 
 Althoiigh the Turks had made great improvement 
 in their artillery, still they were very far behind 
 
iNTEOD. TURKISH AETILLEEY-CAMP FOLLOWERS. 19 
 
 their opponents. The Turkish horses are not accus- 
 tomed to draw; for this purpose Wallachian horses 
 are mostly used. Most of the drivers in Turkey are 
 Wallachians to this day. The guns were 3, 6, 8, 
 12, and 24-pounders, roughly mounted, and the shot 
 ill cast. The effect of their artillery in battle 
 could never be very great; nevertheless, as the 
 Turks laid great stress upon this arm, it had its moral 
 worth. 
 
 The camp-followers of a Turkish army were most 
 numerous. Not alone those high in authority and 
 their servants accompanied the Yizier into the field, 
 but also the whole retinue of the Pacha, the Kadi- 
 asker or judge, the post, which was served by Tar- 
 tars, the Imams or clergy, the Dervishes or monks, 
 and a whole array of servants, merchants, mechanics, 
 dancers, jugglers, and other vagabonds swelled the 
 mass. As tents, provisions of corn, oxen and sheep, 
 and even hundreds of dogs, accompanied the army, 
 the number of beings was enormous. This mob of 
 human beings and animals was under the command 
 of the Bonaldbaschi, who had under him hundreds of 
 assistants. 
 
 This force was divided in the following manner : — 
 About 30,000 men remained at Constantinople 
 and on the Bosphorus, so as to keep order in the 
 capital, and protect the fortresses in the straits. The 
 Dardanelles required 7000 men, and other forts not 
 exactly in the seat of war, 25,000 more. 10,000 
 
 c 2 
 
20 DISPOSITION OP TURKISH FOECES. Intbod. 
 
 men were placed in Thessaly as a check upon 
 the Greeks, and 30,000 men were employed in Asia 
 Minor against the Eussians. 25,000 men held the 
 fortresses on the Danube and the Dobrudscha. The 
 reserve in Adrianople consisted of 30,000 men, and 
 there remained only 25,000 to defend Shumla, but 
 these latter were mostly regular troops. These cal- 
 culations, however, are based chiefly on conjecture. 
 The troops were late before they appeared in the 
 field, and it is certain that at the beginning of the 
 campaign the Turks were very weak, and that they 
 increased in numbers during its course : when the 
 Eussians crossed the Pruth, the passes of the Balkan 
 were still unoccupied. It was only on the 31st of 
 May, when Brailow had been already besieged four- 
 teen days, that Hussein Pacha, the Seraskier, left 
 Constantinople for Shumla. Nuri Pacha followed 
 him a little later with a second detachment, and 
 on the 3rd of July Oapitan-Pacha Isset Mohammed 
 marched with horse and foot to Yarna. The Grrand 
 Vizier Mohammed Selim left the capital only at the 
 beginning of August on his way to Adrianople. 
 12,000 Asiatic cavalry under Chapan Oglu did not 
 reach Constantinople until after the fall of Varna. 
 From the very first the Porte had no troops at its dis- 
 posal except the garrisons in the Danubian fortresses. 
 The Principalities — even Bulgaria, with the excep- 
 tion of the fortresses — had been given up as unte- 
 nable, and the defence based upon the chain of moun- 
 
Introd. moderation OF THE BMPEEOB NICHOLAS. 21 
 
 tains. The walls of the fastnesses, the Danube, and 
 the Balkan, the impenetrable nature of the country, 
 the want of subsistence and of means of transport, 
 the climate and pestilence, were the only allies of the 
 Turks. Their fleet, as we have already said, had 
 been destroyed at Navarino. 
 
 Such was the Turkish force. But it is surprising 
 to find, after what we have previously said, how 
 small an army Russia brought into the field. The 
 Emperor Nicholas had taken up the gauntlet flung 
 down by the Sultan, but the great moderation and 
 firmness which marked every step of the young czar, 
 caused him to wish to limit the evils of war to the 
 smallest space. The more powerful his means of 
 attack, the more desperate would be the condition 
 of the Turks, and the greater the anxiety of the 
 other powers. The attention of the court at St. 
 Petersburg was directed as much to the west as to 
 the south. A large portion of the Russian forces 
 was meant to intimidate the people who might revolt 
 in the west and to overawe the European govern- 
 ments. Austria especially was so much interested in 
 any attack of the Russians upon Turkey, that it was 
 scarcely to be expected she would tamely witness 
 such an event. If the Austrians advanced into Wal- 
 lachia, it would necessarily interfere with the plans 
 of the Russians. Moreover the mercantile jealousy 
 of England, and the discontent prevailing in Poland, 
 demanded the greatest attention. 
 
22 EUSSIAN RECBUITING SYSTEM. Inteod. 
 
 Hence it was that Russia had a large army in 
 Poland, Finland, and the Ukraine. Hence it was, 
 too, that the Emperor took with him his whole diplo- 
 matic corps in the campaign: the subsequent coro- 
 nation in Warsaw, and the visit to Berlin, had their 
 origin in this. 
 
 During the interval that preceded the war great 
 reductions and changes had been made in the army. 
 The Cossacks of the Bug and the Ukraine had been 
 formed into lancers, and the unsuccessful experiment 
 of military colonies in the north and the south had 
 been tried. At length the 20th division of infantry, 
 which was most conveniently placed, had been sent 
 to join G-eneral Paskiewitsch in Asia. 
 
 The recruiting system which then prevailed, but 
 which has since been altered, had considerable influ- 
 ence on the army to be sent against the Porte. This 
 system is intimately connected with the peculiar 
 nature of the country, and explains why the Russian 
 armies are always so much weaker than they ought 
 to be, and why they are often stronger at the end of 
 a campaign than they were at its beginning. 
 
 The population of Russia consists of— 1. The nume- 
 rous nobility. This is partly indigenous and heredi- 
 tary, and partly formed of men who have been in 
 the service of the state ; but they are always free 
 from military service. 2, The inhabitants of towns. 
 Of these the upper classes of merchants are free, but 
 pay a certain tax for their freedom. The lower 
 
Intkod. RUSSIAN RECRUITING SYSTEM. 23 
 
 classes of the burghers are Kable to conscription, but 
 can release themselves by paying a fine. 3. The 
 serfs, who form the bulk of the nation and of whom 
 the army is composed. 
 
 The proceeding was generally in this wise. After 
 discovering the exact number of men wanted, an 
 imperial ukase was issued demanding so many men 
 per cent. — a large margin being left for desertions. 
 The whole number required was then equally divided 
 among the governments, the towns, and the various 
 landed proprietors and villages. In the properties 
 belonging to the nobles the choice of those who were 
 to serve lay with the landed proprietor ; in the crown 
 properties with the magistrate. Those were selected 
 first of whom their masters wished to be rid, whether 
 they were married or not, and next those who had no 
 one depending upon them. A sum of 2000 rubles was 
 the price of a substitute, and well-to-do villages paid 
 this sum down to free a certain number of their 
 inhabitants from military service. On the other 
 hand the noble had the right to send a serf whom he 
 wished to get rid of, and to get in return a receipt 
 which secured him when the next conscription was 
 made. It was scarcely possible for any one to escape 
 by flight, and resistance was vain. The men were 
 suddenly seized, and led off in chains to the nearest 
 seat of government. 
 
 The man thus forced to serve gave up his whole 
 former existence. The time of service was then 
 
24 EUSSIAN BECEUITING SYSTEM. Intbod. 
 
 twenty years in the Polish provinces, twenty-two in 
 the line in Eussia, twenty-four in the guards. As a 
 soldier the serf gained his liberty, but he lost all else. 
 Should he ever return after his time of service had 
 expired, he found his place filled by another, and all 
 memory of himself gone. The garrison-town to 
 which he was sent was hundreds of miles off: he 
 lived with men whose language, manners, religion, 
 and race might differ entirely from his own, and if 
 he did not learn some trade by which he might exist, 
 his only resource was to serve on. 
 
 The Emperor Nicholas had shortened the term of 
 service ; but this merely made the conscription fall 
 oftener. Every recruit deducted so much from the 
 value of a man's property, and the returned soldier 
 was no longer a serf. 
 
 This system of recruiting was so odious a measure 
 that it was as seldom had recourse to as possible. 
 The vacancies in the Russian armies were not filled 
 up every year as in European states, but only when 
 the want of men was seriously felt, or when war was 
 imminent. Spite of the war which had threatened to 
 break out, the army had not been recruited for four 
 years, and as, generally speaking, one-tenth of its 
 numbers quitted the army every year, when the war 
 broke out a deficiency of about 40 per cent, had to be 
 made good. But when the men were raised the 
 army was not much the better for them : it took a 
 long time to discipline them, and they frequently had 
 
Intbod. military COLONIZATION. 25 
 
 hundreds of miles to marcli before they reached their 
 destination. 
 
 To get rid of this arbitrary mode of getting sol- 
 diers the Emperor Nicholas had recourse to one still 
 worse — military colonization. At the time in ques- 
 tion, this system had just begun; but the recon- 
 struction of one part of the army, especially the 
 cavalry — the reduction of five divisions of infantry — 
 the alteration in the recruiting system, and in the mode 
 of drill— and lastly, various old-established abuses in 
 the military constitution of Eussia — were sufficient to 
 account for the fact that the army which the Emperor 
 could dispose against the Turks, which was already 
 too small, had not yet nearly reached its proper 
 quota. 
 
 The so-caUed second army, which had been for 
 some years in the south of Eussia under the com- 
 mand of Field-Marshal Count Wittgenstein, consisted 
 of the 3rd, 6th, and 7th corps-d'armee. Later in the 
 campaign the 2nd corps-d'arm6e and a portion of the 
 guards joined Count Wittgenstein. The force ori- 
 ginally at the disposal of the Field-Marshal con- 
 sisted of five divisions of cavalry, eight of infantry, 
 and three of artillery, in all eighty-eight squadrons, 
 ninety-six battalions, and thirty-one batteries. 
 
 In a country where the food is so difficult to obtain, 
 and where large masses of troops can scarcely be 
 kept from starving, such a force would probably have 
 been sufficient for its purpose, if the regiments had 
 
26 STRENGTH OF THE THIRD CORPS D'ARMEE. Tntkod. 
 
 had their full complement of men. On paper the 
 three corps amounted to about 120,000 men. 
 
 This, however, was by no means the real state 
 of the case, for the reasons we have already given. 
 Moreover in every army, but more especially in the 
 Russian — ^where every captain had the right to take 
 six " dentschicks," or servants, out of the ranks for 
 his own private use — a considerable number must 
 be deducted from the ranks of the fighting-men. 
 We have no exact means of discovering the actual 
 strength of the Russian forces in Southern Russia ; 
 it will be sufficient for our purpose to find out how 
 many men under arms appeared on the scene of 
 action, and after allowing ample margin for defi- 
 ciencies it would appear that the 3rd corps-d'armee 
 consisted actually of about 30,000 men ; the 6th of 
 about 20,000 ; the 7th of 15,000 men at the outside : 
 so that we may reckon the real effective strength 
 of this corps-d'armee at 65,000 men. In this number 
 we include 4000 Cossacks, and exclude from it cer- 
 tain troops which were stationed before Anapa at 
 the beginning of the campaign. The subsequent 
 addition to the army, when the 2nd corps and a por- 
 tion of the guards joined, consisted of about 32,000 
 men, so that the whole effective force employed 
 against Turkey in the first campaign may be esti- 
 mated at about 100,000 combatants. 
 
 The whole of the cavalry — even the light horse — 
 were in separate divisions, according to Napoleon's 
 
Intkod. eussian cavalry. 27 
 
 fashion, so that none of it was united with the in- 
 fantry ; a;id when we consider that during the course 
 of the ensuing campaign the infantry would scarcely 
 engage ia any one action without having to do with 
 the enemy's cavalry, this plan seems injudicious. 
 The nature of the service required so many to be 
 detached, that the various corps often advanced into 
 action without their proper support of cavalry. 
 
 A still greater defect was, that the Eussians were 
 weak in that arm, especially compared with a foe 
 whose chief strength lay in their light cavalry. The 
 Eussians were afraid that they should not be able to 
 procure forage for a numerous body of cavalry in 
 Bulgaria. But this want of cavalry rendered them 
 unable to forage. 
 
 The Eussian cavalry, moreover, was too heavy. 
 The horses were large and handsome, but required 
 good food, which could not be always obtained. 
 They were broken down by the difficulties of the 
 march, and the bivouack. The Emperor Nicholas 
 was aware of the disadvantages of the new system, 
 but could not remedy it. The Eussian hussar was 
 heavier and bigger than the heavy Prussian cuiras- 
 sier. In solid squares the cavalry advanced in order, 
 and with, certainty; the light-armed Spahi did not 
 withstand the shock, but hovered round their ranks 
 and surrounded them on all sides. A numerous light 
 cavalry would have been of the utmost importance. 
 In the Cossacks the Eussians possessed an arm homo- 
 
28 EUSSIAN CAVALRY. Inteod. 
 
 geneous to the Spahis, which might be used with 
 advantage in clearing the way, in protecting the 
 camp, in surprises, and in pursuing the enemy. These 
 Cossacks were near to the scene of action, and could 
 be assembled in large bodies. Nevertheless, only 
 eight regiments of them, each one consisting of 500 
 horse, making up about 4,000 men, accompanied the 
 army across the Danube. Moreover, just those regi- 
 ments were selected which had been placed for some 
 time on the frontier, and had, as was usual with 
 them, exchanged their good horses from the Don for 
 bad horses of the country. Of military colonists, 
 only the lancers of the Bug (who had been Cossacks) 
 were with the army, but they did not answer the ex- 
 pectations that had been formed of them. 
 - The cavalry were provided with fire-arms. Besides 
 pistols, the hussars had short firelocks, not rifled ; the 
 dragoons had carbines armed with bayonets. The 
 lancers were not capable of fighting single-handed 
 with the lance against their Turkish adversaries; 
 their horses were ill bitted and worse shod. 
 
 The infantry as well as the cavalry was deficient 
 in light troops, although the nature of the ground, 
 as well as the mode of fighting of their adversaries, 
 required such an arm. There was no such thing as a 
 rifle in the whole army. The dress of the men was 
 inconvenient, and impeded their free action, and they 
 were overweighted. The skirmishers had to carry 
 at least 61 pounds Eussian. 
 
Introd. infantry and ARTILLEBY — NAVY. .29 
 
 Altogether the military education of the soldier, 
 spite of the long period of service and the severe 
 treatment of the men — possibly in consequence of 
 these very complicated arrangements — was incom- 
 plete. Their movements were those of a machine, 
 reduced to certain forms. On the other hand, the 
 infantry went through all their evolutions with per- 
 fect order, and were perfectly steady under fire. 
 
 The materiel of the artillery, which is the arm 
 most prized by Orientals, was excellent. The Rus- 
 sians were in this respect so far superior to the Turks, 
 that the greatest results were expected wherever this 
 arm could be used. They were not, however, very 
 expert in their practice, 
 
 ■ The spirit of the troops was very good ; the Eussian 
 soldier looked to war to better his condition, and a 
 combat with the Mussulman was in his eyes a reli- 
 gious action. The officers were paid in silver, and 
 the soldier was glad to exchange the tiresome duties 
 of the parade, and the petty annoyances of garrison 
 life, for the difficulties and the excitement of the 
 field. 
 
 The superiority of the Eussians at sea was incon- 
 testable. Besides the fleet in the Archipelago, they 
 had in the Black Sea 16 line-of-battle ships with 
 1254 guns, 6 frigates with 286 guns, and 7 corvettes 
 carrying 139 guns. 
 
30 WALLAOHIA. Chap. I. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE THEATRE OP WAR, WALLACHIA — THE DOBRUDSCHA — BUL- 
 GARIA — THE LINES OF THE DANUBE — THE BALKAN. 
 
 Ant one acquainted -with, the present condition of 
 WallacL.ia may easily infer what must have been the 
 state of that province after a period of seven years, 
 during which the Porte had systematically laid it 
 waste, in order to cripple the resources of Russia in 
 that quarter. 
 
 Wallachia is essentially an open country. The 
 rivers and brooks which empty themselves into the 
 Danube in a south-easterly direction, rise in the high 
 range of mountains on the northern frontier, and 
 pursue their rapid course through a vast plain, along 
 deep channels with very steep banks ; but their broad 
 pebbly beds are only filled after very heavy rains or 
 rapid thaws, and may be easily forded at most seasons 
 both in summer and winter. Most of the towns are 
 half in ruins, and without means of defence ; for the 
 inhabitants had been so completely cowed by the 
 constant invasions of the Turks, that they no longer 
 dreamt of offering any resistance, and sought safety 
 only in flight into the mountains, or across the Aus- 
 trian frontier. In the course of forty years, all who 
 
Chap. I. THE THEATRE OP WAE. 31 
 
 had anything to lose fled no less than seven times, 
 and the Boyars were always the first to set the ex- 
 ample. With the exception of a few handsome 
 churches in the Byzantine style, with domed towers, 
 the buildings are all of lath and plaster, and the 
 streets are laid with boards or rough logs. The vil- 
 lages he hidden in the valleys, for those who cannot 
 seek safety in flight endeavour to find it in conceal- 
 ment and poverty. Even yet the villages are without 
 gardens, trees, churches, nay, one might almost say 
 without houses, for their " Kolibes" are mostly under- 
 ground, and merely roofed in with a thatch of brush- 
 wood ; so that after a heavy fall of snow, a horseman 
 might almost ride over a dwelling of this kind with- 
 out being aware of its existence. The traveller may 
 go on for days and days without seeing any farm- 
 houses, mills, avenues, plantations, bridges, or coun- 
 try houses. 
 
 In the hilly district of Lesser Wallachia, on the 
 west of the province, and also on the north, there 
 still are some fine forests ; but throughout Great 
 Wallachia, and especially along the whole course of 
 the Danube, the plains are bare of trees, and over- 
 grown with a stunted underwood of oak, equally 
 difficult to eradicate or to convert into forest. Only 
 a very small portion of the fertile land is cultivated, 
 as the peasantry till but just enough for their own 
 immediate support, knowing only too well that any- 
 thing more would be seized by those in authority. 
 
32 THE WALLACHIANS. Chap. I. 
 
 In the course of seventy years the province was 
 successively governed by no less than forty Hospodars, 
 every one of whom wanted to make a rapid fortune. 
 The Wallachians are of Eoman descent, and their 
 language is not unlike the Italian ; they are a re- 
 markably fine handsome race, but so completely sub- 
 dued by their long subjection to the Turks, that they 
 have completely forgotten how to bear arms. The 
 Wallachian is afraid of every stranger, and submits, 
 without resistance, to all his demands. Indolent by 
 nature, and because industry would avail him nothing, 
 he is perfectly satisfied if he can creep into his hovel 
 underground, dry his wet rags at a blazing fire, roast 
 a few ears of Indian corn for food, and smoke his 
 pipe. As his dwelling contains neither provisions 
 nor furniture of any kind, the Wallachian, when he 
 goes out with his knife, his pipe, and his tobacco- 
 pouch in his girdle, leaves nothing at home wor*h 
 watching, and has pretty much the same to hope and 
 to fear, either from friend or foe. The former cam- 
 paigns taught the Wallachians that a Russian occu- 
 pation, spite of the community of faith, was very 
 little better than the rule of the Ottoman Porte ; but 
 it was equally certain that they would not attempt to 
 resist it, seeing that the Hospodar would not desire 
 to do so, and that they had neither fortresses, arms, 
 nor soldiers. Thus the Russians could reckon with 
 absolute certainty on the resources to be derived from 
 this province, and, thanks to the inexhaustible bounty 
 
Chap. I. THE DOBRUDSCHA. 33 
 
 of nature, these were by no means inconsiderable, 
 even after all tbe ravages of the Turks. Spite of the 
 scanty cultivation, the country afforded a tolerable 
 supply of corn, and cattle for food and for draught ; 
 the extensive meadows along the banks of the Da- 
 nube produced abundance of hay, and some of the 
 Boyars were rich. 
 
 No such supplies were to be hoped for in the Dobrud- 
 scha, which is a barren waste, such as could scarcely 
 be supposed to exist in Europe. There are not above 
 300 inhabitants to five square miles, including the 
 population of the towns. It is true that the country 
 was only laid utterly waste during the retreat of the 
 Tartars, in the former campaigns, but in 1828 it was 
 manifest that the nature of the ground would present 
 great obstacles to the transit of an army. Towards 
 the north of the Dobrudscha are the steep mountains 
 of Matchin, the well-wooded Betschepte, or "five 
 mountains," and the range of Baba-Dagh, or " father 
 of mountains." Towards the south the whole face 
 of the country is undulating and hilly, only a few 
 hundred feet above the level of the sea. The soil is 
 nothing but fine grey sand, which instantly absorbs 
 all moisture, nor is it stopped by the Hmestone rock 
 beneath. The valleys are entirely without springs 
 or streams, so that there is no water even to drink, 
 save the scanty supply which is drawn with ropes of 
 bast, out of wells above 100 feet deep, in the widely 
 scattered villages. What with the dearth of water, 
 
 D 
 
34 BULGARIA. Chap. I. 
 
 and what with the scantiness of the population, there 
 is hardly any cultivation at all in the Dobrudscha, and 
 consequently no hope of finding either stores of grain 
 in the villages or forage in the fields, for the grass is 
 completely withered by the middle of the summer, and 
 nothing is to be seen but a boundless expanse covered 
 with tall dry stalks waving in the wind. The nu- 
 merous flocks of sheep and oxen are driven to pasture 
 on the marsh lands by the side of the Danube, and 
 on the islands in the river. Not a single tree or 
 shrub is to be found even in the villages. The part 
 of Bulgaria lying between the wall of Trajan and 
 Bazardjik is just as desolate and dreary, as desti- 
 tute of wood and water, and even more so of all 
 besides ; so that troops marching across the middle of 
 this district would have to struggle with the total 
 want of all the necessaries of life, during a march of 
 about 120 miles. 
 
 The Bulgarian plain lying between the Danube 
 and the Balkan is not in nearly so desolate a con- 
 dition, for although the Turks committed great ex- 
 cesses there, still they looked upon the country as 
 their own, whereas they despaired of keeping pos- 
 session of the Principalities, and only tried to extort 
 all they could so long as they held them. Through- 
 out the spring until the month of June this plain is 
 covered with verdure ; the sides of the deep valleys 
 are covered with wild pear and lime trees ; the brooks 
 are bordered by rich meadows, and wherever the 
 
Chap. I. BULGARIA. 35 
 
 ground is tilled abundant crops of grain are pro- 
 duced : even the far greater part of the soil which 
 IS totally uncultivated is covered with the most lux- 
 uriant herbage. The villages, in which the whole 
 population is crowded together, are few and far 
 apart ; but they are large, and generally contain 
 considerable stores of provisions. 
 
 In this rich loamy soil the roads are almost im- 
 passable during the wet season, and the descent into 
 the deep valleys often presents the greatest diffi- 
 culties ; moreover there are no bridges across the 
 streams in their bottoms. In the winter the snow 
 falls in such quantities that the roads are often not 
 discernible. In the autumn the vegetation withers, 
 and water becomes scarce, in spite of the fountains, 
 " sheshmehs," which have been erected by Mussul- 
 man piety wherever it was possible to do so. Owing 
 to this, the cavalry especially are often forced to 
 make very long marches. As the strong positions 
 are almost always upon the edges of the valleys, the 
 running water is in front of the troops, so that the 
 difficulties of procuring the necessaries of a camp, such 
 as wood and straw, are increased by that of securing 
 safe places of encampment. In these hot climates 
 plenty of water is so absolutely indispensable, that it 
 becomes necessary, in order not to fatigue the troops 
 beyond endurance, that they should bivouac close to 
 the water, and in front of the actual position. 
 
 The population of Bulgaria is essentially agricul- 
 
 D 2 
 
36 THE LINES OF THE DANUBE. Chap. I. 
 
 tural and pastoral. All the towns are situated on 
 the Danube, or at the foot of the mountains ; in the 
 former the Moslems, in the latter the Christians 
 were most numerous. The latter were partly Greeks, 
 but principally Bulgarians, who are at least equal to 
 the Moslems in number. The Bulgarians are an in- 
 dustrious people, inclined towards the Eussians both 
 by their Slavonic origin and their Grreek faith, and 
 detesting the Turks, who have plundered and op- 
 pressed them. They would not, however, be easily 
 moved to rise against their formidable masters unless 
 they could reckon with certainty upon foreign aid. 
 At all events the Turks in Bulgaria could rely upon 
 nothing but the fortified towns on the Danube and 
 along the mountainous range of the Balkan. ■ 
 
 Ever since the Turks have been liable to invasion 
 from Russian troops, the Danube has been their first 
 bulwark of defence. It will be necessary for our 
 purpose to give a short description of the nature of 
 the lower part of the course of that river. 
 
 Between Grolubracz and Griadova, a distance of 
 about 40 miles, the Danube breaks through the 
 limestone rock which runs from north to south be- 
 tween the CarjDathians and the Balkan. At the 
 former point, where there is an old Servian castle, 
 the stream, which is not less than 2000 paces wide, is 
 suddenly narrowed to a width of only a few hundred 
 paces, and pursues a very winding course between 
 high and in many places precipitous walls of rock 
 
Chap. I. THE LINES OP THE DANUBE. 37 
 
 witli a very rapid fall. At several points, especially 
 Bibnitz and the Iron Gate (Demir Capu) its bed is 
 crossed by reefs of rock which, when the water is 
 low, rise above the surface of the river, and when it 
 is high create prodigious whirlpools, always render- 
 ing the navigation of the river difficult, and at those 
 points impassable. On this point of the river's course 
 are the Turkish fortresses of New Orsova (Ada- 
 Kalessi, the Island Fort) and Grladova (Feti-Islam, 
 the Triumph of the Faith) . The width of the stream 
 throughout this tract is on an average 600 to 900 
 paces, and on both sides lies an almost uncultivated, 
 thickly wooded, and very inaccessible hilly country. 
 
 Yery little below the Iron Grates, however, the 
 character of the stream changes altogether. On the 
 Servian side, it is true, wooded heights still stretch 
 along the right bank of the river as far as the bound- 
 ary stream of Timock, but below that the mountains 
 recede far away on either side, and the river flows 
 on through a plain above a hundred miles in breadth 
 down to its mouth. Lesser Wallachia, as far as the 
 Aluta, and the north of Bulgaria are indeed tra- 
 versed by a few chains of hills branching off from 
 the high mountains, and are altogether less flat and 
 low than the vast plains of Gi-reater Wallachia, never- 
 theless they are on the whole level countries. There 
 is, however, a very marked difference between the 
 opposite banks of the river. On the Bulgarian side 
 (all the way below Widdin) they rise steep and high, 
 
38 THE LINES OF THE DANUBE. Chap. I. 
 
 immediately overhanging the stream, while^ on the 
 Wallachian they are flat and muddy, with extensive 
 meadows intersected by branches of the Danube, and 
 overflowed whenever the water rises. As the river 
 flows on, these low banks become wider and wider, 
 and more and more marshy, and the islands larger 
 and more numerous. Below Eustchuck there is only 
 a single spot, at the mouth of the Dembowicsa oppo- 
 site Turtukai, where the shore is firm and dry, 
 though flat, down to the edge of the river, which 
 at that point is not impeded by any islands. Oppo- 
 site to Silistria, too, a road passable at all seasons 
 leads from Kallarasch to the Danube. 
 
 In the Dobrudscha, too, the right bank is consider- 
 ably the highest ; the opposite low Wallachian shore 
 is for the most part firm and dry down to the edge 
 of the river as far as the Bortisa branch of the 
 Danube, but the islands form a marsh covered with 
 trees and rushes many miles in breadth, which is 
 always flooded when the river is high. Hirsova is 
 the first point at which the valley becomes narrower, 
 and a passage across the river is practicable. At 
 Brailow the left side of the valley of the Danube 
 first begins to rise from the river in perpendicular 
 terraces of clay of about 80 or 100 feet high. From 
 Brailow and Gralatz there are roads across the wide 
 marshes, practicable in the fine season, to Matchin, 
 which place commands their de'bouches, and beyond 
 which the fine picturesque tops of the Matchin and 
 
Chap. I. THE LINES OP THE DANUBE. 39 
 
 Betschepe mountains rise to a heiglit of above 1000 
 feet. 
 
 Below Isakclii the Danube flows through its delta 
 in three branches, of which only one, the Sulina, is 
 navigable, and this is not above 200 paces wide at 
 its mouth. The whole space, 30 miles in width, 
 between the northern and the southern branches 
 (the Kedrilleh and the Kilibogas) is covered by an 
 unbroken waving sea of rushes ten feet high, above 
 which only the rigging of the ships is visible. The 
 Danube below the Iron Grates, except where it is 
 divided by islands into several arms, is nowhere under 
 900 paces in breadth, and in many places it is more 
 than double that width. In places it is as much as YO 
 or 80 feet deep, but at many points it is far shallower. 
 Below Pesth, where a suspension-bridge has been 
 constructed, the mighty river is only crossed by one 
 single bridge of boats, that at Peterwardein. Of the 
 massive bridge built by Trajan at-Grladova nothing 
 now remains but the piers and a sort of tower on the 
 Wallachian shore. The stream at this point is very 
 broad and shallow. At Tultcha the river is diagon- 
 ally crossed by a sandbank which leaves a navigable 
 channel only 14 or 15 feet deep. At this point a bridge 
 on piles might be thrown across the main channel if 
 the approach on the left bank were not rendered im- 
 possible by extensive marshes and islands overgrown 
 with reeds. Everywhere else the passage of the river 
 could only be effected by means of boats or pontoons. 
 
40 THE LINES OP THE DANUBE. Chap. I. 
 
 Although the fall of the Danube is not nearly so 
 great below the Iron Gates, the current on an average 
 does not even then run less than 2i miles an-hour. 
 
 The natural obstacles offered by this mighty river 
 to the passage of troops, are increased by the great 
 number of strongholds on its banks. Within a course 
 of about 300 miles, there are upon the lower Danube, 
 Nikopolis, Sistova, Rutschuk, Griurgevo, Turtukai, 
 Silistria, Hirsova, Matchin, Brailow, Isakchi, and 
 Tultcha, all situated at the points where the stream 
 might otherwise most easily be crossed, which indeed 
 was the very reason why towns rose at those points : 
 wherever the shore could be approached at all sea- 
 sons, ferries were established, roads were made, and 
 houses were built ; these by degrees became towns, 
 which had to be fortified against hostile invasion. 
 Thus Hirsova was not fortified until after the last 
 war, because the Turks then learnt by experience the 
 importance of the possession of this point to a Eus- 
 sian army advancing into Bulgaria, and especially to 
 one marching from thence into Bessarabia. 
 
 Indeed, in the year 1828, there was a Turkish fort 
 at every tolerably practicable point for crossing the 
 river. The outworks of Turtukai alone had not been 
 rebuilt since the former war, and yet that is the most 
 advantageous place for the passage "of an army on the 
 whole of the lower Danube. 
 
 If Schumla and Yarna were to be the first points 
 of operation for the Eussian army, its march thither 
 
Chap. I; THE LINES OP THE DANUBE. 41 
 
 from Bessarabia would lie almost in a direct line 
 through Turtukai. No serious resistance on the part 
 of the Turks could be anticipated in WaUachia, and 
 the march across the Dobrudscha, rendered so difficult 
 by the want of water, and the utter barrenness of the 
 country, would be avoided. The obstacle presented 
 by the commanding height of the right bank was, 
 as we have seen, everywhere the same. Moreover, 
 Turtukai stands in the greatest interval between two 
 fortresses, 24 miles from Silistria, and twice as far 
 from Eutschuk. The Danube is 995 paces in width ; 
 the banks are firm and always passable, and the 
 Dembowicza, which flows past Bucharest, and empties 
 itself into the Danube exactly opposite the town of 
 Turtukai, affords facilities for bringing the means of 
 crossing to the spot. 
 
 It would, however, have been utterly impossible 
 even here to collect the materials for constructing a 
 bridge 1000 paces long. The navigation of the 
 Danube, properly speaking, does not extend above 
 Brailow and Galatz, whence very large supplies of 
 corn are annually shipped for Constantinople. As 
 these ports were not within the Russian dominions, 
 and therefore the ships lying there could not be 
 seized until war had been declared, it was easy to 
 foresee that they would take their departure in time 
 to escape compulsory service in constructing a bridge. 
 Even supposing that nothing was used but portable 
 canvass pontoons, a good many vessels would be 
 
42 THE LINES OF THE DANUBE. Chap. I. 
 
 needed to transport tlie troops who were to cover the 
 bridge, and to resist the Turkish river flotilla. These 
 vessels would have to be brought from Eussian ports 
 and out of Russian rivers, and to ascend the Danube, 
 which was clearly impossible until the strongholds 
 commanding the stream were taken. 
 
 For this reason the passage could only be effected 
 at some point which might be reached from the 
 Dniester, the Pruth, and the Black Sea, without im- 
 pediment, somewhere near the mouth of the river, 
 and below Brailow. In the year 1809 the Russians 
 had crossed the Danube at Gralatz, where their pre- 
 parations were greatly facilitated by the proximity of 
 the mouths of the Pruth and the Sereth. Down the 
 latter especially it would be extremely easy to float 
 an abundant supply of excellent timber for ship- 
 building. The arm of the Danube which flows be- 
 tween Galatz and the island opposite to it is only 
 240, and that between the island and the right bank 
 450, paces in width. The high range which encloses 
 the valley of the Danube recedes at this part of the 
 Bulgarian shore, to about 15 miles from the stream 
 itself, and the marshes which lie between and are 
 covered with tall rushes, can be traversed in separate 
 columns during the dry season. 
 
 On this occasion the passage was effected in the 
 middle of August. It would have been impossible in 
 the spring, as the marshes " Kuntsefane" are under 
 water until the middle of June. This was the reason 
 
Chap. I. THE LINES 01? THE DANUBE. 43 
 
 why Satimovo was the point chosen for the passage, 
 although there the descent to the left bank is as diffi- 
 cult as the debouche' on the right. There too a 
 flooded swamp had to be crossed, which could only 
 be done by means of a dam constructed with fascines. 
 But then this operation took place upon the Eussian 
 side, whereas at Gi-alatz it must have been effected on 
 the hostile shore, where it would have been impos- 
 sible to guard against surprize amid the lofty rushes. 
 Thus the Russians were compelled, by the peculiar 
 nature of the river, to cross at a point peculiarly un- 
 favourable to the undertaking. 
 
 We have already seen that the Russians had little 
 either to fear or to hope from the population on this 
 side of the Balkan. Unless they encountered a 
 Turkish army in Bulgaria, they would have to fear 
 no opposition except from the strongholds on the 
 Danube and on the sea-coast, which, according to 
 European ideas, were of the most miserable descrip- 
 tion. An outer wall with bastions, but without out- 
 works ; a dry ditch with a faced scarp and counter- 
 scarp, but narrow and shallow ; lines that are enfiladed, 
 and in many instances commanded by heights close 
 upon them ; a total absence of casemates ; an enceinte 
 filled up with houses built of lath and plaster, but 
 plentifully supplied with arms, ammunition, and 
 artillery — such are the usual characteristics of a 
 Turkish fort. 
 
 But then the Turkish commanders have the great 
 
44 THE BALKAN. Chap. I. 
 
 merit of being blind to the weak points of their 
 places. Capitulations were not relished by the Divan, 
 and those who made them risked their heads. The 
 garrisons too were defending their own wives, chil- 
 dren, and worldly goods within their walls, and 
 fighting for their faith and for dominion over the 
 Eayahs. They make up for the want of outworks by 
 a skilful use of the dry ditch, and their most vigorous 
 defence commonly begins at the point where with 
 European troops it usually ends — from the moment 
 when a practicable breach has been effected. With 
 us a large number of wealthy householders are a 
 serious impediment to the protracted defence of a 
 fortress ; but in Turkey it is quite the reverse ; every 
 man capable of bearing arms is a soldier, and makes 
 his appearance upon the walls daily. Thus it is from 
 the large towns, and from them only, that a very 
 determined resistance is to be expected. 
 
 The places likely to be most formidable to an army 
 entering Bulgaria are, first Widdin, which, unlike 
 most Turkish fortresses, is not commanded on any 
 side, and presents an unusually strong profile. The 
 garrison was numerous, but then the place lay so 
 far from the actual seat of war, that it was only 
 important on account of the irruptions which might 
 be made from thence into Wallachia. Eutschuk was 
 more formidable, from its vicinity to the seat of war, 
 its tete-du-pont upon the left bank of the river, and 
 the strength of its garrison ; but above all there was 
 
Chap. I. THE BALKAN. 45 
 
 Silistria close upon the flank, and Brailow on the rear 
 of every operation undertaken by the Russians against 
 the Balkan. 
 
 The mountains of the Balkan which divide Eu- 
 melia from Bulgaria, run from west to east, down to 
 the Black Sea ; the ridge gradually decreases in 
 height, and suddenly ends abruptly between the two 
 valleys of the rivers Kamtchik and Nadir, with the 
 point called Cape Emineh. Westward of the sources 
 of the Jantra and Tundscha the tops of the mountains 
 are covered with snow till the middle of June. From 
 thence down to the sources of the Kamtchik the 
 mountains are not more than 5000, and further east 
 not above 4000 feet high. In the eastern part of the 
 Balkan the natural indentations which are used as 
 passes, are but little higher than those in the Thurin- 
 gian forest, with which the Balkan has some resem- 
 blance ; the prevailing character of the range is 
 round hills, richly wooded, and it is only in the 
 valleys that large masses of rock are found. The 
 southern declivity is far the steepest, and the northern 
 is rendered less striking by the low range of hills 
 which lie in front of it. 
 
 The character of these hills is very different from 
 that of the Balkan itself; they are of limestone rock, 
 their tops are perfectly flat, and from these the sides 
 fall in perpendicular walls of rock, varying from 10 
 to 200 feet in height, often forming most singular 
 defiles ; towards the valleys the face of the . rock 
 
46 THE BALKAN. Chap. I. 
 
 slopes more and more as it descends. The hill tops, 
 therefore, are accessible only at a very few points ; 
 they are mostly wooded, not with the magnificent 
 trees of the Balkan, but with almost impenetrable 
 brushwood. The plain at the foot of the mountains 
 is covered for an immense distance with underwood 
 of oak, which renders it impossible for troops to 
 march straight across the country, and in this heavy 
 clay soil the roads are almost wholly impassable 
 during the wet season. 
 
 The notion that the mountains of the Balkan are 
 insurmountable is founded not upon the actual height 
 or formation of the mountains, but partly upon tra- 
 dition, partly upon the number of small difficulties 
 which are accumulated within five or six marches, and 
 which have to be encountered by all the troops in 
 succession, and lastly upon the paucity and badness 
 of the roads across the mountains. These indeed are 
 mere bridle-paths, which could not be traversed by a 
 corps-d'armee, until they had been widened and 
 mended. The defence of the Balkan by the Turks 
 might therefore be carried on not so much by erecting 
 forts on the principal defiles, as by bodies of troops 
 which would occupy them, and with the assistance of 
 barricades, abbatis, &c., oppose a very formidable re- 
 sistance to any force attempting to cross the mountains. 
 
 The small number of passes across the Balkan in 
 any degree practicable for troops, are as follows 
 ( Vide Greneral Map) — 
 
Chap. I. THE BALKAN. 47 
 
 1. That from Tirnova to Kasanlik. The river 
 Jantra flows along a deep and singularly tortuons 
 valley among the low hills at Tirnova, and entirely 
 surrounds the town, which was the stronghold of the 
 last kings of Bulgaria. The position is very strong, 
 and commands the road on every side ; the town 
 itself, which is prosperous and well huilt, is inhabited 
 chiefly by Greeks and Bulgarians. There is a stone 
 bridge over the Jantra at Gabrova, and from thence 
 the road ascends through a fine forest of beeches, 
 towards the pass of Schibka, which is formed by two 
 deep valleys, in which the Jantra and the Schibka 
 take their rise, with a high and very narrow ridge 
 between them. The sides of these valleys are steep, 
 but not rocky, would afford footing to skirmishers, 
 and the pass might be more easily forced than any of 
 the others. A very steep descent of five miles then 
 leads to the village of Schibka. The valley of Ka- 
 sanlik, between the southern slope of the Balkan and 
 the low hills of Eski Sagra, is beautiful and fertile ; 
 the course of the river is marked by walnut-trees, and 
 the villages are surrounded by orchards. The plain 
 is partly covered with rose-bushes, which are grown 
 here for the manufacture of attar of roses; it also 
 abounds in grain, cattle, water, and wood. 
 
 2. The road from Tirnova by Demirkapu to SKvno 
 crosses a very lofty part of the main ridge, and is 
 very little known. There is another road from Tir- 
 nova bv Stararecka to Kasan, which joins — 
 
48 PASSES OF THE BALKAN. Chap. I. 
 
 3. tliat from Osman-basari to Kasan, and thence 
 to Selimno on tlie right, and Karnabat and Dobroll 
 on the left. This road ascends from Osman-basari, 
 across an open country to the summit of the Binar- 
 dagh. Where the roads from Tirnova and Osman- 
 basari join and descend towards Kasan, between 
 two high peaks of rock, there are two old fortifica- 
 tions. Kasan is a small place, squeezed in between 
 high walls of rock. Beyond it the road lies through 
 a narrow defile, called by the same name as the rapids 
 of the Danube, Demirkapu (iron' gate) . This would 
 be extremely difficult to force, and can only be 
 avoided by climbing the very bad zigzag road to 
 Sehmno on the right. Beyond Demirkapu the main 
 road divides into two, both very, bad, one to Karna- 
 bat and the other to Dobroll {vide No. 4). The road 
 to Selimno is rendered very difficult by crossing a 
 number of deep wooded dells, along which brooks 
 run down to join the Kamtchik, and whose steep 
 sides are very hard to descend and to climb. The 
 descent into Selimno is extremely steep and winding, 
 and leads at once down into a new climate ; vines, 
 olives, cotton-plants, and a general richness of vege- 
 tation, mark the plain of Eumelia, from which the 
 snow has quite disappeared while it still lies thick on 
 the table-land of Bulgaria. Nevertheless the country 
 in the direction of Yamboli and Adrianople is by no 
 means so well cultivated as the valley of Kasanlik. 
 There are boundless plains covered with brambles 
 
Chap. I. PASSES OP THE BALKAN. 49 
 
 and tlie lowlands, which, in spring are covered with 
 rich herbage, are dried up in the summer. The 
 numerous tributaries of the river Tundscha swell very- 
 much after rain, and cannot be crossed without port- 
 able bridges. The bare, steep, rocky side of the 
 Balkan is very striking, seen from Selimno. The 
 town contains a small arm manufactory and several 
 cloth factories. 
 
 4. From Shumla, by Tshalikavak and Dobroll, 
 to Kamabat. 
 
 We shall have to describe Shumla hereafter, and 
 need only now observe that it does not close any pass 
 over the Balkan, The celebrated entrenched camp lies 
 at the foot of a separate group of hills in front of the 
 Balkan, round which a circuit may be taken through 
 an open cultivated country, both from Rutschuk to 
 the right, through Eski Djumna and Eski Stamboul, 
 to Tshalikavak, and from Silistria to the left, through 
 Bulanik, Marasch, and Smadova, to Tshalikavak. 
 The country itself presents no difficulty, but of course 
 it is another question whether such a manoeuvre could 
 be executed in the face of a hostile army encamped at 
 Shumla. The Kamtchik is 20 or 30 paces broad, 
 but not deep ; has a fine stony bottom, and is not 
 difficult to cross : this is also the case with the small 
 river Beiram, which has to be forded several times. 
 Tshahkavak, in the Lesser Balkan, is a good halting- 
 place, well supplied with water, green food, and 
 wood. The march from thence to Dobroll is very 
 
 E 
 
50 PARSES OP THE BALKAN. Chap. I. 
 
 difficult. The road winds through deep ravines, and 
 along the sides of precipices to the summit, which is 
 defended by an old fortification, and thence rapidly 
 descends through the Derbent to the Deli Kamtchik, 
 by a long steep defile easy to defend. The river can 
 be forded only at a few points, and is crossed by a 
 wooden bridge. Beyond this the road winds up a 
 steep wooded mountain-side, and then slopes gently 
 down towards DobroU, through an open country. 
 From there to Karnabat the ground is uneven, over- 
 grown with brushwood, and intersected by a number 
 of brooks. Karnabat is a very good halting-place, 
 but between that and Adrianople is the difficult defile 
 of Bujukderbend, besides a great scarcity of grain and 
 forage. 
 
 5. From Kosludja to Pravadi, and by Koprykoi 
 or Jenikoi to Aidos. The little town of Pravadi 
 is at the bottom of a ravine at least 600 or 700 
 feet deep, in the midst of mountains perfectly 
 open and level at top. This ravine is about 1000 
 paces wide, and above 2 miles long, with perpen- 
 dicular walls of rock on either side. The river 
 Pravadi traverses it in a southerly direction, and 
 opens a passage through the mountains. A very 
 narrow point of rock juts out into this ravine and 
 forms a natural fortress, which might be rendered 
 impregnable, although it could easily be surrounded. 
 This defile may, however, be avoided by a circuit 
 on either side, but with some difficulty. Both the 
 
Chap. I. PASSES OP THE BALKAN. 51 
 
 Pravadi and the Kadischoi rivers must be crossed 
 by means of temporary bridges. The passage at Ko- 
 prykoi presents considerable difficulties, whicb may, 
 however, be avoided by crossing 2 miles above or 
 below the village. On the other hand, there is 
 great risk in passing in single file along the 
 deep, narrow valley of Delishdereh, which is 15 
 miles in length. This pass is called Kirk-getschid, or 
 the Forty Fords, because the brook may be forded 
 at all seasons. At Gok-behuet-arakdsche the valley 
 is narrowed between high perpendicular walls of 
 rock to a width of only 50 paces, and could easily be 
 blockaded at this point. 
 
 A more advisable route is that by Jenikoi, where 
 the Kamtchik, 30 paces in width, is crossed by a 
 ferry in winter and forded in summer. The right 
 bank is bare of trees. The Deli Kamtchik is ford- 
 able at almost every point near Tschenga ; beyond 
 which the road rises very rapidly, and may be com- 
 pletely blocked up by an abattis. 
 
 The two roads from Pravadi join at the top of 
 the mountain, upon a tract of open level ground 
 above a mile broad. This plateau, which lies be- 
 tween two rocky hollows, of which one runs to ithe 
 Deli Kamtchik and the other to the DeHshdereh, 
 might easily be defended and fortified. Close to 
 this spot the open ground of Bairamovo affords a 
 good halting-place; and as there is a practicable 
 road from Koprykoi to Varna, a corps posted at 
 
 B 2 
 
52 PASSES OF THE BALKAN. Chap. I. 
 
 Bairamovo could easily debouclie upon that fortress 
 and upon Pravadi. 
 
 6, From Yarna, by Derweesh-jowann, to Burgas 
 and Missivri : Yarna will be described at length 
 hereafter. Beyond that fortress several not very 
 steep forest-roads cross the ridge which terminates 
 in the promontory of Galataburnu upon the sea. 
 At the village of Podbaschi the road crosses the 
 Kamtchik — which at this point is united, 50 paces 
 wide, and very swampy — by a bridge of boats. In 
 1827 the Turks erected a fort close upon the shore 
 at this spot. The stream flows between perpen- 
 dicular banks of earth, from 6 to 13 feet high. 
 There was another fortification at Derweesh-jowann, 
 upon a gentle rise on the opposite side of the valley 
 of the river, which is 5000 paces wide, very marshy, 
 and thickly wooded. Hence two roads, which, though 
 only wide enough for one pair of wheels, are prac- 
 ticable, branch off to Burgas and Missivri. Both 
 cross the eastern extremity of the Balkan by a 
 tolerably gradual ascent, and traverse an almost im- 
 penetrable forest. They traverse the deep valley of 
 the Kosakdereh, besides several smaller dells, which, 
 though not defensible positions, are very trouble- 
 some to cross, especially in wet weather. The forest 
 is everywhere so thick that it would be impossible 
 for troops to fall into order, and the roads form con- 
 tinuous defiles. 
 
 In the mountains there are no cross-roads at all 
 
Chap. I. PASSES OF THP BALKAN. 53 
 
 connecting the several passes, but there are a few in 
 the valleys of the Kamtchik, and at the southern 
 foot of the mountains, from Missivri and Burgas to 
 Aidos, Karnabat, and Selimno. 
 
 Thus, then, if passes 4, 5 and 6 are those most im- 
 portant to a Russian army coming from Bessarabia, 
 it is manifest that an army stationed at Aidos might 
 offer effectual resistance to every successive column 
 as it debouched singly from th6 mountain passes ; 
 and that, so long as Yarna and Shumla, or even only 
 one of them, can maintain itself, passing the Bal- 
 kan will always be a very hazardous undertaking. 
 
54 . PLANS OP OPERATION. Chap. II. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PLANS OF OPEBATION. 
 
 It is impossible to say what were the political 
 schemes which moved the Eussians to begin the 
 Turkish campaign, or by what military movements 
 it was intended to accomplish them. Thus much is 
 certain, — that it was of the greatest importance to 
 Russia not to excite the jealousy of the other Euro- 
 pean governments, and at the same time to deter 
 them, by a great display of strength and a good 
 understanding with Prussia, from interfering in the 
 dispute with Turkey. Accordingly the Russian 
 government officially declared that it had only taken 
 arms in order to enforce existing treaties, and that 
 a compliance with them, and at most an indemnifi- 
 cation for the expenses of the campaign, would end 
 the war. Moreover the main body of Russians 
 remained on the western frontier, while only a small 
 army marched into Turkey, and was reinforced by 
 degrees. No attempt was made to excite the reli- 
 gious enthusiasm of the Servians and Bulgarians, or 
 to arm them against their rulers ; probably because 
 such a course would have been too flagrantly opposed 
 to the principles laid down by the Holy Alliance, and 
 
Chap. II. PLANS OF OPERATION. 55 
 
 would have rendered it difficult to terminate the war 
 suddenly should the condition of affairs in Europe 
 require it. Another great sacrifice made to poHtical 
 at the expense of military expediency was the delay- 
 ing the campaign until late in the spring. 
 
 The Russians cherished a well-founded conviction 
 that they could overcome any Turkish army, how- 
 ever superior to themselves in numbers, in the open 
 field ; the only subject of anxiety was the diffi- 
 culty of communication, transport, and supplies, in 
 Such a country as Turkey. To meet this, the Russian 
 plan of operations must necessarily have included 
 the investment of Brailow and Silistria, before enter- 
 ing Bulgaria, besides a constant watch to be kept 
 upon Rutschuk and "Widdin. Further operations 
 would naturally take place along the coast, as the 
 supremacy of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea 
 would ensure a supply of provisions for the troops. 
 The chief obstacle to their advance was Yarna, and, 
 in order to lay siege to Yarna with effect, it would 
 be necessary to post a body of troops before Shumla, 
 strong enough to hold the Turkish army assembled 
 there in check. We may assume it was within the 
 bounds of possibility and the scope of the Russian 
 plan, to cross the Balkan should Yarna fall in time, 
 and to march upon Constantinople, should they 
 succeed in forcing the Turks out of their entrench- 
 ments at Shumla, and in beating them. 
 
 This plan of operations is so unavoidably marked 
 
56 PLANS OF OPEEATION. Chap. II. 
 
 out by the nature of the country and the circum- 
 stances of the case, that it must be applicable in its 
 general outlines, not only to the campaign of 1828, 
 but to every future Russian campaign in Rumelia. 
 
 The Turkish plan of operations, or rather the 
 course which the Porte was forced by circumstances 
 to pursue, was purely defensive. The Sultan seems 
 to have thought it possible that a Russian army 
 might land close to Constantinople. On no other 
 grounds can it be explained why he kept the bulk 
 of his forces in the immediate neighbourhood of the 
 capital until late in the summer, while the Balkan, 
 Varna, and Shumla, were almost undefended, and 
 only the fortresses on the Danube were garrisoned. 
 
Chap. m. OPENING OP THE CAMPAIGN. 57 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 OPENING OP THE CAMPAIGN — OCCUPATION OF MOLDAVIA AND 
 WALLACHIA — ^PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE AT SATUNOVO. 
 
 The Turkish Hatti-sherif of the 18tli of December, 
 1827, was not answered by a declaration of war on 
 the part of Enssia until the 28th of April of the 
 following year. 
 
 The Russian army was collected in Bessarabia at 
 the end of March, and by the middle of May it was 
 concentrated between the Pruth and the Dniester. 
 On the 7th May the Russians crossed the Pruth in 
 three places, and it was not till the 8th of June that 
 they passed the Danube. The time thus lost by the 
 Russians was employed by the Turks in strengthen- 
 ing their Danubian fortresses. 
 
 The Russian forces were to take the field in the 
 following order : — General Rudjewitsch, with the 
 3rd and strongest corps, was to cross the Danube 
 below Isakchi, to cross the Dobrudscha, and to enter 
 Btdgaria, where he might expect to encounter the 
 enemy at the northern foot of the Balkan. The two 
 other weaker corps were to cover his flank, and to 
 conquer a base for further operations. The seventh, 
 which included the battering train, and was com- 
 jnanded by the Grand-Duke Michael, was to take 
 
58 OCCUPATION OP THE PEINpiPALITIES. Chap. III. 
 
 Brailow, and the sixth, under General Eoth, to occupy 
 Moldavia and WallacMa. On the 7th of May, a 
 detachment from Greneral Eoth's corps, under Greneral 
 Kleist, crossed the river at Sculenie, and entered Jassy 
 next day. The feeble Turkish garrison withdrew 
 immediately, the body-guard of the Hospodar Stourdsa 
 was disarmed, and himself ostensibly taken prisoner. 
 
 The principal passage of the sixth and seventh 
 corps across the Pruth had been effected lower down 
 at Falschi and Woduly Isakchi, where the bridges 
 were kept up and guarded, so as to maintain a con- 
 stant communication with Bessarabia. The Pruth, 
 which was much swollen at this time, is 90 paces 
 wide at Falschi ; the valley is marshy, and between 
 2000 and 3000 paces in width ; the sides of the valley 
 are high and steep. 
 
 On the 12th the Cossacks, and on the 16th the 
 gros of the 6th corps, entered Bucharest, while the 
 7th corps advanced upon Brailow. The Hospodar 
 Ghika placed himself under the protection of Russia. 
 From hence the advanced guard, under General 
 Geismar, pushed forward at once to the river Aluta, 
 and the Cossacks entered Crajova, the capital of Lesser 
 Wallachia, on the 21st. 
 
 Count Pahlen was appointed by the Russian 
 government Governor-General of the two Princi- 
 palities. These unfortunate provinces had been called 
 upon to deliver 20,000 loads of corn, 10,000 head of 
 cattle, 30,000 sheep, and a million of piastres, for 
 
Chap. III. OCCUPATION OF THE PEINCIPALITIES. 59 
 
 the use of the Danubian fortresses. Not half of this 
 ■was collected, but the Arnaut troops had ravaged 
 the country, and both the chief towns were almost 
 entirely burnt down. Nevertheless, the Eussian 
 staff compelled the inhabitants to furnish 250,000 
 measures of grain, 400,000 loads of hay, 50,000 
 kilderkins of brandy, and 23,000 oxen, to be paid for 
 in bills, at a rate fixed by the Russians themselves ; 
 moreover, 16,000 peasants were sent to make hay on 
 the banks of the Danube, and an immense number 
 of waggons and horses put in requisition. Many of 
 the Boyars took refuge within the Austrian frontier, 
 and the peasants fled by thousands into the forests 
 with their cattle. Plague, famine, and devastation 
 reigned triumphant in these provinces, afflicted with 
 the curse of always being the seat of war. 
 
 The 6th corps encountered no resistance until the 
 2nd June, when a small body of Turks crossed from 
 Rutschuk to Slobodja, where they were joined by a 
 considerable force of infantry and cavalry. A skirmish 
 took place, and the Turks were forced to retreat 
 into their fortresses. On the 8th July, at Kalafat, 
 Greneral Greismar, with 4000 men, repulsed a corps 
 of 4000 infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 10 guns, who 
 had made a sortie from "Widdin. On the other hand, 
 the projected passage of the Danube at Oltenitza, for 
 which every preparation was made, had to be aban- 
 doned, partly because the Turks had taken up a 
 position on the opposite bank at Turtukai, and partly 
 
60 PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE. Chap. III. 
 
 because it would have been useless and dangerous for 
 the 6tb corps to enter Bulgaria until the 3rd corps 
 could advance on the same line, and until Silistria 
 could be surrounded, and its numerous garrison 
 confined within its walls. Thus the 6th corps was 
 compelled to remain inactive, while the 7th was 
 besieging Brailow, and the 3rd commenced active 
 operations. 
 
 This corps was in Bessarabia waiting for the com- 
 pletion of the preparations for crossing the Danube 
 at Satunovo, which lies between lakes Kagul and 
 Kortal, upon a point of land surrounded by meadows, 
 always swampy, and frequently flooded. The dis- 
 tance from Satunovo to the shore is about five miles, 
 and the latter half of the way is a marsh, overgrown 
 with rushes, and intersected by pools of water. On 
 tho other side of the river the shore consists of some- 
 what higher meadow-land, which, in places, is boggy 
 and covered with brushwood, but affords sufficient 
 footing for infantry. The edge of the valley on the 
 right is more than 100 feet above the level of the 
 river ; not far above the crossing-point, the ridge of 
 hills which enclose the valley rise immediately from 
 the stream on the right to a height of upwards of 
 50 feet, while below it they slant away to a distance 
 of about 300 paces. About Isakchi the ground is 
 marshy and completely overlooked, both from the 
 fortress itself and from the neighbouring heights. 
 
 This point is very favourable for drawing up 
 
Chap. III. PASSAGE OP THE DANUBE. 61 
 
 troops to defend the passage of the Danube, espe- 
 cially as the vicinity of Isakchi would render it 
 impossible to turn their left flank, while the right 
 would rest behind the brake, upon a large meadow, 
 which might indeed be crossed, but where every 
 hostile movement might be observed and defeated. 
 
 Although a report had been spread that the 
 passage would take place at Ismail, the Turks had 
 inferred the real intentions of the Russians from the 
 preparations they were making, and had entrenched 
 themselves opposite to Satunovo. Their fortifica- 
 tions were admirably adapted to their purpose, both 
 in position and construction ; a and d were well 
 calculated to sweep the opposite shore, and h and c 
 the river itself. ( Vide Plan I.) 
 
 The construction of redoubt a was very peculiar, 
 but well fitted for its purpose. It consisted of two 
 tiers, the lower with embrasures for artillery, the 
 upper surrounded by a rampart 8 feet high, with a 
 parapet 6 feet high and 4 thick, with loopholes 
 intended only for skirmishers. All the escarpments 
 were perpendicular and faced with wattles. The 
 ditch had no revetment, but the escarpments were 
 cut down very steep for one-tenth of their height in 
 a stratum of stiff clay. The facing of the whole 
 redoubt was, in fact, like a gabion. 
 
 Trenches h, c, and d were merely thrown up with 
 earth without any revetment, and with the usual 
 profile of fieldworks. Line e e was intended rather 
 
62 PASSAGE OP THE DANUBE. Chap. III. 
 
 for the protection of an outlying line of skirmishers 
 than as a safe communication between the works. 
 The artillery consisted of 12 guns, 2 howitzers, and 
 1 mortar, all of large calibre. 
 
 Hazardous as the passage of the Danube must 
 appear under the circumstances, it was resolved 
 upon and executed. In the beginning of June a 
 dyke, h, i, k, 7000 paces in length, was begun across 
 the broad marshes on the left bank of the Danube. 
 This was a very difficult undertaking, as a distance 
 of at least 3000 paces could only be rendered passable 
 by wooden bridges, and the neighbourhood afforded 
 neither timber nor brushwood for fascines, &c. 
 Moreover, the men were concealed while at their 
 work by the tall rushes, but by no means protected 
 from the Turkish guns, until at length a battery, 
 mounting 12 24-pounders, able to return their fire 
 with effect, was erected, with infinite labour, at 
 point g. 
 
 The two divisions of infantry, under General 
 Rudjewitsch, which had been directed upon Satunovo, 
 were to force the passage, and on the 7th of June 
 the Emperor arrived there. 
 
 Part of the Danubian flotilla, with the pontoon 
 train, advanced up the stream from Ismail, bringing 
 a battalion of Chasseurs as a reinforcement to the 
 corps that was to cross the river. This was further 
 strengthened by the Zaporogue Cossacks, who had 
 migrated from Russia to the Dobrudscha in con- 
 
Chap. m. PASSAGE OV THE DANUBE. 63 
 
 sequence of religious disputes under the Empress 
 Catherine. They dwelt upon the banks of the Lower 
 Danube, supported themselves by fishing, and had 
 done the Porte excellent service in all its wars with 
 Russia. Their Hetman held the rank of a Pasha 
 of two tails in the Turkish army, but they had re- 
 tained the Grreek faith and the Russian language, 
 and once more took the side of their former rulers. 
 Hetman Grladkoi, and his whole tribe, declared for 
 Russia at Ismail on the 27th of May. Their co-opera- 
 tion was most valuable in the actual passage of the 
 river. Hidden by the flotilla from the enemy, they 
 carried the battalion of Chasseurs ashore in their 
 light boats, and landed them on the right bank 
 behind the brake, /. The Turks did not perceive 
 the landing of their enemies until it was too late, 
 and even then took no effective steps to prevent 
 their forming. The Russians instantly advanced 
 upon entrenchment c, took it by storm with the loss 
 of 50 men, of whom 15 or 20 were killed by fou- 
 gasses, constructed, oddly enough, by the Turks 
 underneath, instead of in front of, their breast- 
 works. 
 
 At this unexpected result the Turkish corps, about 
 10,000 to 12,000 strong, and chiefly cavalry, were 
 seized with such a panic that they abandoned all the 
 entrenchments without further resistance, and fled, 
 partly to Bazardjik and partly to Isakchi. 
 
 By 11 o'clock the Russians were masters of the 
 
64 PASSAGE OP THE DANUBE. Chap. III. 
 
 position, after a short struggle in which the Turks 
 had shown no science and very little courage. 
 
 At 3 in the morning the bridge across the Danube 
 was begun, and by 2 o'clock on the following morn- 
 ing it was completed. It consisted of 63 large 
 wooden praams, 12 feet wide and 36 feet long, 
 pointed at one end and cut off quite square at the 
 other, and constructed like pontoons with knees 
 made of oak. In addition to these praams it took 
 12 canvas pontoons to reach across the river, which 
 is fully 900 paces wide at this point. The bridge 
 itself was 18 feet wide from beam to beam, and the 
 platform rested on a framing fastened with iron bolts 
 and chains instead of ropes. The space between the 
 pontoons was 12 feet on an average. Each pontoon 
 was secured by an anchor — cast alternately one 
 against the stream and the other against the wind. 
 The bridge had a railing on each side. 
 
 This bridge had been constructed by several 
 detachments of pioneers under Greneral Ruppert, 
 who likewise superintended the erection of the two 
 redoubts, t and y, on the right bank. This important 
 passage was further protected by the erection of 
 tete-du-pont P. 
 
 We have seen that on the whole long course of 
 the Lower Danube the Russians could cross nowhere 
 but at Satunovo, and even here it seemed almost 
 impossible to effect a passage. The left bank could 
 only be reached by means of a dyke — which it took 
 
Chap. III. PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE. 
 
 65 
 
 weeks to build, and which betrayed its own destina- 
 tion ; still more difficult was the debouche upon the 
 opposite shore, where the Turks had had plenty 
 of time to entrench themselves strongly upon the 
 heights by which it was commanded. The imme- 
 diate vicinity of a Turkish fortress, the presence of 
 a considerable hostile force, and the fifteen pieces of 
 heavy artillery, masked, and placed so as to direct 
 a most effective fire upon the river and upon the dyke, 
 would have rendered it impossible to construct a bridge 
 at this point in the teeth of any resistance. And that 
 10,000 men should run away at the approach of a 
 handful of newly-landed Cossacks and Chasseurs was 
 hardly a thing to be reckoned upon. 
 
 In fact, the passage of the Danube by the third 
 corps was a brilliant and successful piece of daring ; 
 but it may be questioned whether the first important 
 move in a campaign should be an act of this kind ; 
 and whether it would not have been more advisable to 
 attempt the passage on boats and rafts rather than 
 by means so difficult and hazardous as the bridge. 
 
 The materials for an undertaking of this kind, 
 which must doubtless be executed upon a grand 
 scale, might easily be brought in sufficient quantities 
 down the Pruth and up the Danube, past Isakchi, 
 which does net command the main arm of the river. A 
 landing might have been effected at Reni, or, indeed, 
 at any pointwhere the Turks were not so wellprepared 
 for resistance as at Satunovo. Seventy praams and 
 
 F 
 
66 PASSAGE 0¥ THE DANUBE. Pakt I. 
 
 a proportionate number of rafts would be sufficient 
 to transport a brigade of infantry and a ligbt battery 
 across the river, and to land tbem in the course of 
 10 minutes. The enemy might have been deceived 
 by false demonstrations, and a surprise would almost 
 infallibly have been successful. The success of the 
 affair at Satunovo was owing, after all, to a landing 
 effected by the boats of the Zaporogues. Again, 
 when a Russian division had once gained a firm 
 footing on the right bank of the Danube, and invested 
 Isakchi, a bridge of boats might have then been 
 constructed so as to establish a safe and easy com- 
 munication. The most important point of all was 
 that, by this means, the passage of the Danube might 
 have taken place simultaneously with that of the 
 Pruth, instead of being delayed for more than a 
 month by the construction of the bridge ; the advan- 
 tage that this would have been is evident, when we 
 remember how backward were the Turkish prepara- 
 tions for defence even during the spring. 
 
 Again, supposing it was absolutely necessary to 
 cross the Danube by means of a bridge, it is unin- 
 telligible in a military point of view why the pre- 
 parations for its construction were begun so late. It 
 was notorious that the low banks of the Danube are 
 under water until far into June; and there never 
 could have been -an intention of waiting till the 
 middle of summer for the floods to go down. Even 
 taking for granted that the declaration of war was 
 
CHiP. III. PASSAGE 01" THE DANUBE. 67 
 
 delayed until the end of April by political motives, 
 no one could prevent the Russians from assembling 
 any number of vessels on their own rivers, or from 
 constructing a dyke upon their own bank of the 
 Danube. These preparations might have been made 
 quietly, and the bridge thrown a,cross at once. The 
 invasion of Wallachia, the investment of Brailow, 
 and the advance into the Dobrudscha, would thus 
 have taken place simultaneously and have supported 
 each other ; while, executed as they were at different 
 periods, they excited the jealousy of Europe, roused 
 the Turks from their apathy, and afforded them an 
 inestimable time for completing their preparations. 
 
 P 2 
 
68 ISAKCHI. Pabt I. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE STRONGHOLDS OF THE DOBEUDSCHA. 
 
 When the Eussian army had landed on the right bank 
 of the Danube, and were laying siege to Brailow, the 
 next point for consideration was the nature of the 
 strongholds in the Dobrudscha, which lay on the line 
 of march towards the wall of Trajan. The first of 
 these was Isakchi, which was only 4000 paces distant 
 from the landing-place. The plan of this fortress is 
 given in plan I. ; but it must be borne in mind that 
 at this time the suburbs had been burnt down. 
 
 Isakchi stands near the Danube, upon a hill, sur- 
 rounded within musket-shot by two valleys, which 
 are not commanded by the fortress : no advantage is 
 taken of the lay of the ground, and the correct in- 
 stinct by which the Turks are usually guided in the 
 disposition of their lines seems to have altogether 
 forsaken them here. The profile is shown in the 
 plan ; we have only to add that the ditch was 
 10 feet deep, and the scarp and counterscarp faced 
 with strong walls built of limestone from the left 
 bank of the Danube; but on the northern front, 
 which lay very low, the ditch was altogether want- 
 ing. In the ditch was a weak palisade, made of 
 
Chap. IV. ISAKOHI. 69 
 
 very slight stakes. As usual, there were neither 
 outworks nor covered way, only a narrow footpath 
 inside the glacis, which was 3 feet high. The 
 ramparts were so narrow that there was not room 
 for the guns, except in the bastions, which were 
 tolerably large. The inner scarp of the rampart 
 was supported perpendicularly with wattling ; a 
 measure which in 1810 had so much embarrassed the 
 besiegers of Rutschuk. The inner slope of the 
 parapet was partly lined with palisades, and their 
 outer slopes on the bastions as well as the embra- 
 sures were lined with gabions. 
 
 The stiff clay soil rendered it possible to make 
 excavations beneath the ramparts without any props ; 
 and in like manner the barracks for the troops were 
 mere holes in the earth, covered first with stout 
 planks and then with a layer of clay, and thus ren- 
 dered bomb-proof. The powder was stored in pri- 
 vate cellars, and the arsenal was a mere wooden shed. 
 
 The usual dislike of the Turks to outworks and 
 outposts' had led them to leave an island exactly 
 opposite the town, and only 200 paces distant from 
 it, entirely unoccupied. With the view, however, 
 of commanding the river, they had established a 
 cavalier upon the northern bastion, which was so 
 utterly inefficient that, even before the passage of the 
 river at Satunovo was fully effected, a detachment 
 of the Russian river flotilla sailed up, without let or 
 hindrance, to assist in the attack upon Brailow. 
 
70 MATGHIN. Paet I. 
 
 The point of attack Upon the fortress comprised 
 the two northern sides of the polygon, which could 
 be enfiladed in their whole length from the heights 
 towards the 'Sotith. The besieging force would not 
 need any entrenchments or other \*-orks ; they would 
 only have to erect a battery near the bank of the 
 river at 500 or 600 paces distance from the fortress, 
 to secure themselves from attack by detached bodies 
 of troops, and to effect breaches in the escarps, 
 which at that point is not defended by any ditch. 
 
 It was manifest that no very effectual resistance 
 could be anticipated, but the actual event was 
 equally unexpected. No sooner had the Russians 
 succeeded in crossing the river than the garrison 
 was seized with a panic, and surrendered on the 
 very same day. 
 
 The fortress contained a large store of arms and 
 ammunition, besides 85 guns of large calibre, mounted 
 on very clumsy carriages. 
 
 Of equal importance was the fortress of Matchin, 
 which forms as it were the tete-du-pont t;o Brailow ; 
 the two fortresses mutually support and strengthen 
 each other, especially when the communication be- 
 tween them is secured by a flotilla on the Danube. 
 
 The population of Matchin* at this time was from 
 1000 to 1500 ; it stands upon a ridge which juts out 
 
 * The accompanying drawings of Matchin, Hirsova, and Kostendje 
 ( Vide Plana 9 and 11) were not made by measurement until 1836, but 
 tbey serve to show the state of the places at the time of the campaign. 
 
Chap. IV. MATOHIN. 71 
 
 into the Daiaiibe, and ends in a precipitous descent 
 into the stream ; on the west it is defended by an 
 impassable marsh. The lofty mountains which rise 
 in jagged points on the south-east are too far off to 
 be dangerous, and the intervening ground slopes 
 off" gently towards the fortress, and forms a plain 
 on the eastern side. The walls of the town form 
 a heptagon, defended by six small bastions. The 
 ditch was dry, and the scarp entirely, and the coun- 
 terscarp partially, reveted. On the top of the lofty 
 northern precipice, over the Danube, stands citadel 
 A, upon a granite rock. This citadel commands the 
 town and its walls, the ground in front of it, and the 
 Danube with all the islands, within the range of the 
 guns. Although the citadel had no ditch, it pre- 
 sented a very formidable relief, with escarps 50 feet 
 in height, rising 25 feet above the enceinte of the 
 tovra, which was so small that it was commanded in 
 every part from the high cavalier, even with mus- 
 ketry. Thus it would have been almost impossible 
 for an attacking party to occupy the town while the 
 citadel remained in the hands of the enemy ; and 
 on the other hand, no attack could be made upon 
 the citadel until the enceinte of the town were 
 taken. In fact, the citadel, occupied by a resolute 
 garrison, was impregnable by any other means than 
 a well-directed and vigorous bombardment; and 
 even this would by no means ensure the surrender ' 
 of the place. 
 
72 HIRSOVA. • Part I. 
 
 Hirsova, wMch stands at the point where the 
 Danube may most easily be crossed, is a t^te-dn-pont, 
 formed as it were by nature against the Turks. 
 The town, which then numbered about 4000 inha- 
 bitants, but now contains only 40 families, is an irre- 
 gular quadrangle, enclosed on three sides by rocky 
 heights, which slope gently on the inside and abruptly 
 on the out, and on the fourth side by the Danube, 
 At one point, where a perpendicular face of rock, 80 
 or 100 feet high, rises out of the stream, stood an 
 ancient castle, of which the Russians took possession 
 in 1809. They made trenches round the town, 
 threw a bridge of boats across the river, withdrew 
 again to the other side of the Danube in the follow- 
 ing year, and recrossed it the next. The attention 
 of the Turks was called to the place by these pro- 
 ceedings, and in 1822 they made Hirsova into a 
 fortress, by very slight additions to the natural 
 strength of its position. 
 
 The enceinte consisted of five short fronts, defended 
 by bastions, and without outworks. The ditch was 
 dry, 14 or 15 feet deep, with a scarp and counter- 
 scarp of masonry; the bastions mounted 10 guns 
 each; the inner slope of the parapet was partly 
 protected by palisades. 
 
 Several circumstances combined to render the 
 Turkish fortifications of Hirsova less strong than 
 they might have been made. The enceinte was not 
 carried near enough to the edge of the declivity 
 
CuAP. IV. HIRSOVA. 73 
 
 which formed the natural glacis, so that a consider- 
 able space at the very foot of it was completely 
 hidden from the guns of the fortress. Neither had 
 the Turkish engineers known how to defilade the 
 ramparts against the nearest range of hills. They 
 had endeavoured to remedy this defect by traverses 
 in some places, 50 feet high ; this was done with 
 great labour and difficulty, but to no effect. Finally, 
 they had, as usual, entirely neglected to fortify the 
 island opposite to the town. The platform on the 
 top of the castle, and the high bastion beneath those 
 upon the Danube, were indeed able to direct a few 
 guns upon this island, but the arm of the river be- 
 yond it was not commanded by them at all, so that 
 the Russian flotilla was able to sail up to Silistria 
 quite unmolested. If the Russians succeeded in 
 establishing themselves upon the island, they would 
 thence be able to lay the town in ruins, as it lies 
 like an amphitheatre before it. Moreover, the side 
 of the town abutting upon the river was only de- 
 fended by an embankment about 700 paces in length, 
 with a very insufficient ditch, and 10 pieces of artil- 
 lery. On the other hand, Hirsova was able to offer 
 a very effective resistance to any attack in the direc- 
 tion of the Dobrudscha. 
 
 Matchin and Hirsova then lay on the right flank 
 of the Russian line of march, and on the left were 
 Tultcha and Kostendje. 
 
 The former had been the tete-du-pont of Ismail : 
 
74 TULTCHA. Pabt I. 
 
 since the capture of that place Tultcha, was im- 
 portant to the Turks, inasmuch as no Russian corps 
 could convey materials for the construction of a 
 bridge up the main branch of the Danube, without 
 first taking Tultcha. 
 
 The town stands upon a broad ridge of hills with 
 a steep declivity towards the Danube, but separated 
 from it by a marsh 400 paces wide. On the western 
 side the ground slopes gently down towards the 
 fortress. 
 
 The enceinte formed a slightly irregular hexagon, 
 with bastions and without outworks. The sides of 
 the polygon were 360 paces in length, and the pro- 
 file would seem to have been exactly like that of 
 the fortresses already described. The western 
 bastion, part of the adjoining curtain, and a wall 
 closed at this point against the town, formed a Tiind 
 of citadel. On the northern side it was possible to 
 advance to within 400 paces of the town without 
 being seen or fired upon in a direct line, and accord- 
 ingly there are the traces of a detached entrench- 
 ment upon an isolated hill in this direction. The 
 remains of some still earlier trenches or lines on the 
 western side might be used as parallels by a besieging 
 force. We have no exact account of the condition 
 of the place in 1828. Now the ancient site of the 
 town is completely abandoned, the works have been 
 entirely undermined and blown up by the Russians, 
 and within the walls there is nothing but a heap of 
 
Chap. IV. KOSTENDJE. 75 
 
 ruins and ashes. The new town of Tultcha has 
 been built about a mile lower down the Danube, on 
 a spot eminently fitted to command the navigation 
 of the Sulina, which is not 400 paces wide at this 
 point. The town could scarcely be fortified in its 
 whole actual extent, but, if the southern part were 
 sacrificed, the northern, which is surrounded by the 
 Danube, a marsh, a lake, and a commanding height, 
 might be converted into a small fortress which would 
 require but a slender garrison. But then it would 
 be essential to the safety of the place to erect an 
 outwork upon the further extremity of the island, 
 opposite to the place which, like all the islands in the 
 Danube, was ceded to Russia at the last peace. 
 
 Kostendje stands upon a point of land, so that 
 on three sides it is defended by the sea, and by chalk 
 cliffs upwards of 100 feet in height, and too steep to 
 be scaled, and is therefore only accessible from the 
 west. The total absence of safe harbours on the 
 western coast of the Black Sea gives importance 
 to that of Kostendje, bad as it is, especially for an 
 army whose operations are directed upon Varna. 
 The water in the harbour is not above 7 or 8 feet 
 deep, and it is wholly exposed to the southerly gales. 
 Only a very few small vessels can anchor in it, and 
 ships of war cannot approach within effective range 
 without great danger. In 1828 the population of 
 Kostendje was about 2000, now it does not contain 
 above 40 inhabited houses. The Turks had defended 
 
It 
 
 6 LINE OF MAECH. Part I. 
 
 the side towards the land, only 500 paces in width, 
 by three bastions and short curtains ; the ditch was 
 faced with stone. The old Roman embankment, 
 which connects Trajan's wall with the sea, and now 
 affords a ready approach to the fortress, ought to 
 have taught the Turks how to lay down their lines 
 so as to command the ground. At any rate the three 
 hillocks at the northern corner ought to have been 
 taken into the fortifications. A detached outwork, 
 open at the rear, had been erected on one of them, 
 but it could not be supported by the fortress. 
 
 The country which had to be traversed between 
 the fortresses has already been described. 
 
 By far the best line of march upon Bazardjik lay 
 up the right bank of the Danube, by Kusgun, a 
 route on which there are many villages and a good 
 supply of water and of forage. But then there were 
 the fortresses of Matchin and Hirsova, and the 
 strong and easily defensible position of Tjernavoda 
 behind the marshes and lakes of Karasu,* which 
 can only be avoided by taking a circuit nearly 20 
 miles to the east. In order to operate along the sea- 
 coast, and to base the support of a column upon a 
 
 * These have been erroneously supposed to he a choked-up hranch of 
 the Danube, a supposition upon which the project of a canal to Kostendje 
 was founded. According to the survey made by Major v. Vincke, of the 
 Prussian staff, in 1837, the lowest points of the valley of the Karasu near 
 Kostendje and its commencement are 164 feet above the level of the Black 
 Sea. As there is not a drop of water to be found on the high ground, the 
 canal would have to be cut to that depth for a distance of 10 miles through 
 a bed of limestone rock — evidently an impossible undertaking. 
 
Chap. IV. EUSSIAN FOECE. 77 
 
 fleet, it would have been essential to, have had 
 possession of the strongholds upon the sea-shore — 
 Kostendje, Mangalia, Kavarna, and Baltjik. 
 
 Granting therefore that it was necessary to march 
 straight across the Dobrudscha by Kasimze and 
 Karasu, it was essential that the corps should be no 
 larger than could find means of subsistence, and 
 yet strong enough to answer the purpose in view, 
 namely, to offer effectual opposition to the hostile 
 army in northern Bulgaria. 
 
 The Russian corps which had crossed the Danube 
 at Satunovo consisted, after it had been joined by 
 the 1st division of mounted Chasseurs, of 48 batta- 
 lions, 32 squadrons, 2 regiments of Cossacks, and 128 
 field-pieces, but did not number in all more than 
 24,000 foot and 5000 horse, or at most 30,000 men 
 in all. 
 
 Bat. Squadrons, 
 
 Of these there remained in Isakchi ... 2 
 
 And there were detached — 
 
 Upon Tultcha, under General Uschakow . 4 2 
 
 Upon Matchin, Colonel Eagofski ... 2 
 
 Upon Hirsova, Lieut.-Gen. Prince Matadof 4 2 
 
 Upon Kostendje, Gen. Eudiger .... 4 8 30 guns. 
 
 Upon Bazardjik, as advanced guard ... 4 7 
 
 Total . . . .20 19 30 guns. 
 Or about 14,000 men. 
 
 The main body with which the Emperor advanced 
 upon Karatai, close to the wall of Trajan, to the east 
 
78 EUSSIAN, FOBOB, Pabt I. 
 
 of Karasu, and which was reinforeed by a few 
 squadrons of lancers from the Bug, did not consist 
 of more than 16,000' men. It must also be borne in 
 mind that the detachments sent against the strong 
 places did not on an average consist of more than 
 2000 men, and could scarcely hope to effect anything 
 against at all a determined resistance^ espeoially as 
 they were accompanied only by field-pieces, and the 
 Only Russian battering-train was engaged before 
 Brailow. 
 
 In the mean time the 7th corps, commanded by 
 General Woinow, under the direction of the Grande 
 Duke Michael, was engaged in the siege of Brailow, 
 
Chas. V. SIEGE OF BEAILOW. 79 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 SIEGE OF BRAILOW. 
 
 Brailow, or Ibrail, contained about 24,000 inha- 
 bitants, of whom about 7000 or 8000 were men 
 capable of bearing arms. The place stands upon a 
 plateau,, which falls with an open,, gentle slope 
 towards the fortress, and then with a nearly perpen- 
 dicular wall of clay, about 80 feet high, down to 
 the Danube. On the right bank wide and partly 
 marshy meadows extend as far as Matchin. Thus 
 this fortress, unlike other Turkish strongholds, was 
 not commanded on any side. ( Vide Plan 2.) 
 
 The contour was almost semicircular, surrounded 
 by eight sides of a polygon, lay upon the high 
 ground, and joiaed the lower part of the stream by 
 the enclosed work B. The 9 bastions were un- 
 usually large, their flanks being 20 or 30, and their 
 fronts 50 or 60, paces in length. On each of the 
 former were placed 2, and on the latter 3, pieces of 
 artillery on wooden platforms. All the guns were 
 fired through embrasures, and were protected with 
 timber and wattle blindages, even on the fronts not 
 attacked. Upon the curtain, a few feet beneath, 
 were mortars. 
 
80 SIEGE OP BEAILOW. Part I. 
 
 The profile of these fortifications is remarkable, 
 inasmuch as the escarp wall rises 20 feet above 
 the natural level of the ground, which gives the 
 main wall a command over the ground in front of it, 
 very rare in Turkish fortresses ; altogether the relief 
 is more considerable than in any other place in 
 Rumelia or Bulgaria, 
 
 The inner scarp of the rampart was faced with 
 wattles, and, thanks to the natural hardness of the 
 ground, perpendicular ; the inner scarp of the 
 parapet was lined with palisades, which projected 
 several inches above the summit — a mistaken use of 
 them very common with the Turks, and found at 
 Eutschuk, Silistria, Hirsova, Isakchi, and Varna. 
 The parapet was above 16 feet thick ; the ditch in 
 front of the bastions was 5 or 6 roods, in front of 
 the curtain 8 or 10 roods wide. The rev^tements 
 had been constructed in 1821, and were in perfect 
 repair ; there were no outworks whatever. 
 
 The citadel. A, within the walls, presents the same 
 profile as that which we have already described, but 
 with a somewhat smaller ditch. It had round bas- 
 tions and plenty of artillery. 
 
 Work B was especially intended to command the 
 Danube, by three tiers of terraces. 
 
 The streets of the town were most irregular, and 
 were laid with planks instead of pavement, the 
 houses very slightly built, in many cases only of 
 brushwood and clay. The only bomb-proofs were 
 
Chap. V. SIEGE OP BEAILOW. 81 
 
 excavations behind the curtains sunk in the earth up 
 to the roof-trees, and covered in with 6-inch beams, 
 surmounted by a layer of earth a foot or more deep. 
 The corn was stored in flask-shaped pits dug in the 
 dry hard clay soil, like the silos of the Arabs. The 
 place was more than amply provisioned, and further 
 supplies could always be sent from Matchin so long 
 as the Turkish fleet held possession of the Danube. 
 The place was armed with 278 guns and mortars. 
 
 In short, Brailow was by far the strongest place 
 on the whole of the Lower Danube, not excepting 
 even Widdin, — defended by a numerous and well- 
 provisioned garrison, and might be expected to offer 
 a very determined resistance. 
 
 The seventh corps, with a suitable engineer and 
 artillery park, one battalion of Sappers and Miners, 
 and a working-party equal to two battalions, was 
 sent to besiege Brailow, under the command of the 
 Gi-rand-Duke Michael ; the whole besieging force 
 amounting altogether to 16,000 or 18,000 men. 
 
 G-eneral Suchasaniet was chief in command under 
 the Grrand-Duke, and Grenerals Glerois and Trusson 
 were in command of the engineering department. 
 
 The first detachment of the seventh corps reached 
 Brailow on the 11th of May, and the main body with 
 the battering train of 100 guns on the 21st. 
 
 Operations commenced with the construction of 
 redoubt No. 1 and batteries 2 and 3. 100 Sappers 
 and Miners and a working party of 400 labourers 
 
82 SIEGE OP BEAILOW. Pabt I. 
 
 completed the works witliout the loss of a man by 
 the night of the 19th of May. The object of these 
 works was to fire upon the Turkish ships on the 
 Danube as well as upon the batteries at B, and to 
 keep the garrison in doubt as to which was to be the 
 real point of attack. 
 
 It turned out that the Russian artillery had little 
 or no effect at 3000 paces distance, and it was resolved 
 to abandon these posts and to erect a couple of 
 batteries for 6 12-pounders each on the more effective 
 points, 4 and 5. These forts subsequently played a 
 great part in the victory gained by the Russian 
 flotilla over that of the Turks, 
 
 It is necessary to premise that the besieging force 
 had very insufficient information as to the strength 
 of the garrison and the construction of the fortress. 
 For instance, they mistook the line of contour, a, d, e,f, 
 as laid down in a plan of the year 1810, sent by the 
 engineering department in Petersburg, for the actual 
 line of the enceinte of the town. The garrison was no 
 less erroneously estimated at only 3000 or 4000 men. 
 
 On the bank of the Danube, above the fortress, 
 the ruins of the demolished suburb afforded protec- 
 tion to the trenches, which on every other side had 
 to be made in the open ground. This decided the 
 choice of the point of attack. On the 21st of May 
 the erection of battery 6 was begun. The work 
 lasted two nights, during which time a vigorous fire 
 was kept up from batteries 4 and 5 in order to divert 
 
Chap. V. SIEGE OP BRAILOW. 83 
 
 the attention of the garrison ; the fire was returned 
 with equal vehemence and equally slight effect. 
 Even when battery 3 was sufficiently advanced to 
 be observed by the Turks, but not far enough to be 
 defensible, they neglected making a sortie upon it. 
 This battery was finally armed with 24 pieces, partly 
 24 and partly 12 pounders, in order to silence the 
 guns on the side of attack. 
 
 Between this time and the 25th the Russians were 
 occupied in preparing the gabions and fascines for 
 the trenches and batteries : owing to the total want 
 of brushwood in the neighbourhood, gabions and 
 fascines were made of rushes, which turned out light, 
 durable, and strong. 
 
 During the night of the 25th the Russians opened 
 their first parallel, which lay, under cover of the 
 ruined suburb, at a distance of only 800 or 900 paces 
 on the left wing, and 500 or 600 on the right, from 
 the counterscarp of the fortress. This whole line of 
 parallels was completed in one night by a working- 
 party of 3725 labourers as far as the trace extended, 
 and the breadth of the same was from 14 to 18 feet. 
 The difference in the distance of the two wings occa- 
 sioned the piece extending from g to battery No. 7 
 • to be called the first, and that from the same point 
 to h, where the trench joined on to battery No. 6, 
 the second parallel. 
 
 Every precaution was taken in the execution of 
 this work, complete silence was maintained, and no 
 
 g2 
 
84 SIEGE OF BRAILOW. Pabt I. 
 
 interruption was offered by tlie Turks ; so that there 
 was time to erect the mortar-battery No. 10. It 
 was not till towards morning, when the moon rose, 
 that the garrison observed the construction of the 
 mortar-battery, and directed their fire upon it, but 
 without doing any harm to the Russians. During 
 the same night two large communications were con- 
 structed in its rear to the depots for materials. 
 
 From the 26Lhto the 29th the dismounting batteries 
 Nos. 8 and 9 were erected, and all the other works 
 in the rear completed ; the works being chiefly carried 
 on by night, both for safety and to avoid the heat. 
 
 The garrison directed their fire principally on 
 battery 6, where they did great damage to the em- 
 brasures and dismounted two guns. On the other 
 hand, a heavy fire was kept up from this very 
 battery upon bastion 2 ; the gate of the main wall 
 was so much perforated that the besiegers could see 
 into the town ; and the explosion of a magazine of 
 grenades caused a fire which was put out principally 
 by the rain. 
 
 During this time the Turks had endeavoured to 
 gain some knowledge of the progress of the evening's 
 operations by hghting large fires upon the works 
 at night, but had not attempted any energetic inter- 
 ruption of them. They fired a great deal, even upon 
 single persons who happened to show themselves 
 outside, or even within the trenches. Their best 
 defence was a well-directed fire of shells upon the 
 
Chap. V. SIEGE OP BEAILOW. 85 
 
 second parallel, which caused a daily loss of 10 or 15 
 men, and killed or wounded several officers. Several 
 sorties were made, with great spirit, but in small 
 numbers, and with very little result. 
 
 On the night of the 31st of May battery 7 was 
 erected in order to dismount the guns on the second 
 bastion on the left wing of the fortress, the existence 
 of which had but just been discovered. It had not 
 yet been ascertained whether the fortress had real 
 bastions with faces and flanks, or only small circular 
 ones like the citadel, as the merlons of the embrasure 
 were rounded ofi" on the outside, and embrasures cut 
 in the shoulders, which gave the bastions the appear- 
 ance of round towers externally. By reason of this, 
 and of the small extent of the bastions, the Russians 
 constructed no ricochet batteries, either here or against 
 the curtain. Subsequently the flank redoubt. No. 11, 
 was erected from the first parallel. 200 or 300 men 
 worked all night, and by the 3rd of June the ap- 
 proaches were finished as far as the third parallel, c. 
 Up to this point the works had been traced out with 
 fascines, and consisted of a trenched earthwork, 
 without gabions, thrown up in flying sap ; but from 
 hence they were continued by the full sap, with half 
 and whole traverses alternately, as a very sharp and 
 well-directed fire of musketry had now begun to do 
 a good deal of mischief. 
 
 In order to defend the lines of approach which 
 were made at night, a few light howitzers were 
 
86 SIEGE OP BEAILOW. Part I. 
 
 placed at their heads, which did good service during 
 the day in repulsing sorties, and could be placed 
 very advantageously upon the ruins of the suburb, 
 across which the works had to be carried. 
 
 Between the 4th and 6th of June the 3rd parallel 
 was completed, at a distance of 120 to 150 paces 
 from the counterscarp, and the two branches of the 
 traversed sap were brought to within a few rods of 
 the crest of the glacis-shaped mound ; and now, not 
 satisfied with the effect of the dismounting battery of 
 12 and 24 pounders, the Russians erected batteries 
 12 and 13, as well as the mortar-battery 14 in the 
 3rd parallel, and heightened battery 6, in order to 
 fire from it with 24 pieces of artillery over the works 
 in front. 
 
 All the trenches were made deep enough to afford 
 cover even to a man on horseback ; in the parallels 
 they were 18 or 20 feet wide, and in the approaches 
 12 feet, so that artillery could be moved along them 
 in safety. By this means, of course, it had been 
 possible to construct very strong parapets, but the 
 expenditure of time and labour had been greatly 
 increased without corresponding advantage. Both 
 in the parallels and the approaches, banquettes had 
 been made ; and here and there, especially near the 
 fortress, loopholes for riflemen were formed of sand- 
 bags placed upon the gabions. For the most part 
 there was no other headwork to the gabions than a 
 fascine laid across them to prevent the pressure of 
 
Chap. V. SIEGE OP BRAILOW. 87 
 
 the earth from forcing them out of their places. 
 The great depth of the trenches rendered a regular 
 heading of fascines unnecessary, and moreover the 
 materials were wanted for the batteries. 
 
 The gabions used by the Kussians, both in the 
 saps and for the batteries, were 4 feet high, and 2 
 to 2h wide. Such large dimensions would have 
 rendered it diflScult for one man to handle a gabion 
 woven of fresh brushwood, and nothing but the 
 lightness of the rushes used for the purpose made 
 the manipulation possible. The fascines were always 
 18 feet long, and had to be carried by two men. 
 The tracing was done partly with these fascines, and 
 partly by placing successive rows of gabions upon 
 the intended line, which was done by relays of men 
 running forward with them. In the trenching work 
 two relays of workmen were employed. 
 
 The stiff clay soil rendered the use of pickaxes 
 indispensable in the earthworks before Brailow, and 
 accordingly a third of the workmen were provided 
 with them. 
 
 In order to cover the advance with the double 
 sap, three sap rollers were used, the foremost of 
 which was rolled in front of the interval left be- 
 tween the other two. They were filled with cotton, 
 6 feet long and 4 feet in diameter. These were not 
 made of rushes, like the other sap rollers, but of 
 brushwood. 
 
 The double sap directed against bastion II., on the 
 
88 SIEGE OP BEAILOW. Paet I. 
 
 left wing of attack, presented considerable difficulty, 
 from being carried across a burial-place. The Turks 
 place large stones upon the graves of tbeir dead ; and 
 as tbey never disturb a grave, and there is no lack of 
 ground, their grave-yards are of enormous extent. 
 In making this sap, great labour was required to pull 
 up the stones, and a number of decaying bodies which 
 were dug up caused such a stench in the trenches 
 that it produced illness, aggravated by the heat. 
 
 As soon as this sap had reached the crest of the 
 glacis, a lodgment was formed close to it, in two semi- 
 circular cavaliers, also worked by sap ; and another 
 battery, 15, was erected, partly against the face of 
 the opposite bastion, and partly against the flanks of 
 the adjoining ones. According to eye-witnesses, it 
 was not until this point was reached that any 
 accurate knowledge of the front against which 
 operations were directed was obtained : — and it was 
 now determined to advance by mining from the two 
 lodgments, in order to make a breach. Mining 
 operations began on the 7th June. 
 
 The defence was still carried on in the manner 
 already described. The effect of the mortar-firing 
 became greater and greater as the besiegers ad- 
 vanced. The Turks fired with remarkable precision 
 at a very high elevation ; the shells mostly exploded 
 in the air, and thus did greater damage than if they 
 had burst on the ground. The fire of small arms 
 was likewise kept up with increased vigour ; the 
 
Chap. V. SIEGE OE BEAILOW. 89 
 
 Turks made use of very long wall-pieces, and took 
 excellent aim. Frequent sorties were made by about 
 50 or 100 men, generally at about tbe same hour — 
 a little before daylight ; but tbey were made without 
 plan, and mostly without effect. The Turks rushed 
 out with the greatest fury, every man holding a 
 pistol in either hand and a dagger between his teeth, 
 and fought with the utmost bravery. 
 
 The mining operations proceeded as follows : — 
 
 1. — A globe of compression A (Plan, fig. 2) was 
 prepared, which was to overthrow the counterscarp 
 and make an opening in the scarp : it was loaded 
 with 300 pud, i. e. above 100 cwts. of powder. 
 
 2. — Four mines at B, containing 37 pud each, or 
 almost 50 cwts. the two ; and a globe of compres- 
 sion, C, loaded with above 100 cwts., and which 
 was intended to make an opening in the nearest 
 flank and curtain. 
 
 3. — Four mines at D, behind the counterscarp, and 
 four more at E, behind the scarp, each containing 
 37 pud. 
 
 Figs. 4 and 5 show how the besiegers reached the 
 chamber of the mine ; first by means of a ramp, and 
 then by a flight of 14 steps, of which the lowest lay 
 14 feet beneath the approaches which formed the 
 Eussian lodgment upon the crest of the glacis. A 
 gallery, 6 feet broad and 5i feet high {e,f, fig. 4), ran 
 to a spot beneath the bottom. Without the counter- 
 scarp the principal gallery was crossed vertically by 
 
90 SIEGE OF BEAILOW. Pakt I. 
 
 the horizontal gallery g h, out of which issued four 
 chamhers, D D D D. From /a gallery, 3 feet broad 
 and 4 feet high, ran as far as l, where the besiegers 
 came unexpectedly, and fortunately unperceived by 
 the enemy, upon a cunette 10 feet deep, made by the 
 Turks for purposes of observation, which induced 
 them to fill up the two spaces between c and h. The 
 gallery was accordingly sunk 4feet,and from c another 
 foot deeper ; after which it again rose to meet the 
 horizontal gallery op behind the escarpment, along 
 which four chambers, E E E E, were formed out- 
 side the gallery. Thus, then, the central points of 
 the chambers D and E lay at a depth of 24 feet,. in 
 a perpendicular line respectively beneath the glacis 
 and the crest of the parapet, and distant 18 feet and 
 15' respectively from the nearest points of the sur- 
 face of the counterscarp and scarp. A double cal- 
 culation of the thickness of the walls gives a line of 
 resistance of 21' in the directions of a, B, and y, §. A 
 wooden mantelet was placed over the entrance to the 
 gallery, in front of the communication to the mine, 
 as a protection against vertical fire. 
 
 In gallery e f, which, as the entrance to all the 
 others, had been made for convenience 6 feet wide, 
 frames were placed at regular intervals of 3i feet, 
 but it was only occasionally that roof-planks were 
 driven in ; the side-planks were altogether omitted, 
 and even those for the roof were not laid close 
 together, which indeed was rendered unnecessary 
 
Chap. V. SIEGE OP BRAILOW. 91 
 
 by the tenacity of the soil. In like manner there 
 had been no necessity for making a barrier before 
 the place with boards, &c. 
 
 The door-posts and thresholds were made of 
 cross-beams of oak 5 or 6 inches in the square. 
 Gralleries f h, hi, and m n, were constructed in 
 exactly the same manner, but were neither so high 
 nor so wide. The only exception was gallery op, 
 where the soil was less tenacious, and which was 
 accordingly constructed with Dutch frameworks 
 exactly in the same manner as by Grerman engineers. 
 Chambers D D D D were only hollowed out in the 
 earth without any woodwork, but the chambers 
 E E E E were constructed in the same manner as 
 gallery op. 
 
 The galleries constructed with frames, which was 
 certainly a very expeditious method, were completed 
 on an average at the rate of 35 feet to 38i feet in 
 24 hours. Those constructed with Dutch frames 
 proceeded no faster, because the dimensions of these 
 galleries also were too large, and the Eussians were 
 not yet familiarized with this mode of work. The 
 galleries of the mines A B and C were worked in 
 exactly the same manner as those which have just 
 been described. 
 
 It has been seen that at a ;8 = 18 feet 
 to which the thickness of the wall at the 
 under part of the counterscarp added 
 
 thus giving line of resistance = 21 feet 
 
 = 3 feet 
 
92 SIEaE OF BRAILOW. Part I. 
 
 while at y S =15 feet 
 to which the lower part of the wall of 
 the scarp added = 6 feet 
 
 thus giving line of resistance =21 feet 
 
 Upon this measurement of the shortest lines of 
 resistance were calculated the charges of 27 pud of 
 powder, to each of which 10 pud more was subse- 
 quently added. The whole number of mines intended 
 to be sprimg at the same moment contained the 
 enormous charge of almost 350 cwts. of powder. 
 
 At D D D D, as well as at B, the powder was 
 carried in chests into the chambers, which were 
 not lowered beneath the sole of the galleries. The 
 chests, instead of being cubic, were flattened, ac- 
 cording to Belidorf's plan, so that the horizontal 
 surfaces should be larger than the sides. They 
 were loosely spread in the chambers, and then the 
 gallery g h and o p was completely tamped, and 
 galleries e f and / b, from gallery g h towards 
 e and b, to a distance of 35 feet, which was done by 
 means of earth strengthened with timber from time 
 to time. Mines E E E E were not charged by 
 means of chests ; the powder was placed there in bar- 
 rels merely, and connected with the other chambers' 
 by a saucisson of canvas filled with F powder, and 
 laid in a square channel. This was to be ignited 
 by a port-fire, which went through the top of the 
 channel, and was fastened to the saucisson. 
 
 By the 15th of June all the mines were charged. 
 
Chap. V. SIEGE OP BRAILOW. 93 
 
 The troops advanced into the trenches, with the 
 intention of storming the place through the breaches 
 which would be made by the mines. This movement 
 was executed in the daytime, and observed by the 
 Turks, who took measures accordingly. 
 
 The signal for the explosion was to be given at 9 in 
 the morning, by three rockets. When the third rose 
 the train was to be lighted, and the troops had 
 orders to advance at once upon the breaches. The 
 Russian commanders felt assured that these would 
 not fail to be practicable, as the charges had been 
 made far stronger than needful according to the 
 calculation. 
 
 The troops were drawn up in two columns, and 
 each column in two divisions. One of the divisions 
 was composed of pioneers, who were to construct 
 lodgments upon the two anticipated breaches in the 
 main wall as soon as they should have been entered 
 and taken. The lodgments were to be made by 
 closing the gorges of the two small full bastions 
 which formed the point of attack with ready-filled 
 gabions. Two more divisions were to enter the 
 place, and the fourth to remain in reserve. 
 
 At the appointed hour all was ready for the attack. 
 The three rockets were to go up at intervals of ten 
 minutes. The officer who was to fire the globe of 
 compression at A held his watch in his hand, and saw 
 the first rocket. Ten minutes passed, and no second 
 rocket followed. He waited anxiously for twenty 
 
94 SIEGE OF BRAILOW. Pabt I. 
 
 minutes, wlien he saw another rocket ascend. Misled 
 by the difference between the time appointed and 
 that which had elapsed, <he concluded that this must 
 be the third rocket, and that the second had some- 
 how escaped his attention. On this presumption he 
 fired the train, but, as this rocket was in fact the 
 second, which by some accident had not been let off 
 until ten minutes after the appointed time, the con- 
 sequence was that the globe of compression exploded 
 too soon. A piece of wood which was thrown by 
 the explosion back upon the works of the besiegers 
 struck the officer appointed to fire the mine at B and 
 0, and laid him senseless on the ground. Strange 
 to say, he was quite alone, so that the accident 
 remained unnoticed. Thus, when ten minutes later 
 the third rocket went up, only the mines D and E 
 exploded. 
 
 Mine A only threw down the counterscarp ; D 
 and E fulfilled their purpose, and opened a practi- 
 cable descent into the ditch, and a breach 30 or 40 
 paces long in the main wall. B and C of course did 
 not explode at all. 
 
 In accordance with the previous dispositions, the 
 troops immediately advanced to the assault, with- 
 out further reconnoitring. The smoke and the 
 earth thrown up into the air wholly concealed the 
 scarp from the attacking party. Spite of this, two 
 different divisions of the storming columns, with 120 
 volunteers at their head, threw themselves from the 
 
Chap. V. SIEGE OF BRAILOW. 95 
 
 counterscarp into the ditch, down the descents at A 
 and D. Both divisions were led by officers and 
 generals. 
 
 The first division entered the ditch at A, near the 
 Danube ; the volunteers who headed it sought in 
 vain for a breach in the scarp, at the point at which 
 they had been told there would be . one. In vain 
 did they endeavour to scale the wall by the embra- 
 sures in the revetement of the scarp ; it was un- 
 injured, and the Turks received them with long 
 spears and a well-directed fire of small arms from 
 the embrasures and from the crest of the parapet. 
 The Russians nevertheless continued the struggle 
 with such desperate obstinacy, that of the whole 
 body of volunteers none was left alive but a ser- 
 geant, who was pushed down into the Danube, and 
 saved himself by swimming. 
 
 When all hope of scaling the wall at this point 
 had been abandoned, the assailants turned to the 
 left along the ditch, in order. if possible to force their 
 way through the breach at E. It would have been 
 much better to have gone to the right, where it would 
 have been possible to turn the connecting bastion 
 adjoining the Danube, which they had vainly endea- 
 voured to scale, and to force an entrance into the 
 ill-defended gorge of the fortress up the steep but 
 not inaccessible slope towards the river. An attack 
 of this kind would have divided the Turks, and 
 have taken them in the rear. The Russians were 
 
96 SIEGE OF BRAILOW. Part I. 
 
 too little acquainted with the place to imagine this 
 "way practicable. 
 
 Meanwhile the storming party on the left wing had 
 not been much more successful, for, although mine 
 E had actually made a practicable breach in the main 
 wall, the loosened earth of the entonnoir greatly 
 impeded the assailants, the more so as the whole 
 column followed the forlorn hope and the pioneers 
 too closely, which caused a very mischievous crowd- 
 ing and delay across the loose and broken ground. 
 
 The attention of the Turks must have been excited 
 by the premature explosion of the first mine, and the 
 movement in the trenches caused by the preparations 
 for storming, which were very perceptible in the 
 daylight ; and they were accordingly prepared for 
 vigorous resistance on the breach. The Turkish 
 soldier is better equipped for hand-to-hand fighting 
 than the European, and the defenders of a breach 
 obviously have a great advantage over the assailants, 
 provided their courage does not fail them in the 
 moment of danger. 
 
 The garrison of Brailow offered the most brave 
 and determined resistance, so that the left Eussian 
 storming column was getting very much the worst 
 of the fight, when the right column also pushed up 
 to the narrow breach : this greatly increased the 
 crowd and confusion without adding to the number 
 of the combatants ; and as the Turks had placed 
 some light guns on the flank of the bastion of junc- 
 
Chap. V. SIEGE OP BBAILOW. 97 
 
 tion 1, and kept up a continual fire of musketry 
 and hurling of stones, hand-grenades, and beams 
 of wood into the ditch, it soon became manifest 
 that the attack must fail. The Russian soldiers 
 could not advance and would not retreat ; they 
 undoubtedly displayed the most obstinate bravery. 
 The generals and officers distinguished themselves 
 no less. 
 
 At length the G-rand-Duke Michael ordered a 
 retreat, but not before all the troops, except the 
 reserve, had been engaged. 
 
 The Kasan regiment of infantry had occupied 
 the two semicircular lodgments which had been 
 made by the flying sap close to the crest of the 
 glacis, as well as battery 15 : it now covered the 
 retreat of the columns which had descended into the 
 ditch, and which withdrew to the third parallel. 
 
 While executing this movement the Russians sus- 
 tained a considerable loss from the very effective 
 fire of the Turkish musketry. Several sorties, which 
 followed each other in rapid succession, were, how- 
 ever, repulsed by the Kasan regiment. This terrible 
 engagement was finished by about half-past 11 ; 
 the Russians had not even been able to crown the 
 entonnoirs in the counterscarp, and to keep possession 
 of them, but were forced to retreat into their trenches. 
 On the other hand, the Turks were equally unable 
 to destroy any part of the Russian works, neither 
 did they maintain possession of the counterscarp, 
 
 H 
 
^8 SIEGE OP BRAILOW. Pabt I. 
 
 but withdrew through the breach into the fortress, 
 and did nothing towards closing it. 
 
 The Russians give the following account of their 
 losses on the occasion: — 
 
 Generals Wolf and Timrod killed ; 1 general, 3 
 commanders of regiments, 16 staff and 15 subaltern 
 officers wounded ; 640 non-commissioned officers 
 and privates killed and 1340 wounded. 
 
 Soliman Pasha, who commanded the fortress, 
 rejected a summons to surrender in the most haughty 
 terms. 
 
 The siege of Brailow was much forwarded by the 
 arrival of the Russian Danubian flotilla, under Vice- 
 Admiral Zavadowsky, which arrived before the 
 place on the very night following the passage of 
 Satunovo, that of the 8th of June, and at midnight 
 attacked the Turkish flotilla of 32 gunboats with a 
 squadron of only 18. The wind was unfavourable 
 to the Russian boats, and the Turkish flotilla blocked 
 up both the main stream and the branch which 
 flows past Matchin. Nevertheless the Vice- Admiral 
 advanced towards the Turkish boats under the fire 
 of their guns without firing a single shot until he 
 got within the proper distance, when he suddenly 
 opened upon them a fire of canister from all his 
 guns with murderous effect. The Turks retreated 
 with the loss of 13 gunboats, several others were 
 sunk, and the remainder soon left their position at 
 Brailow and returned to Silistria. 
 
Chap. V. SIEGE OF BEAILOW. 99 
 
 Not less important was the surrender of Matchin, 
 which, took place immediately after the repulse at 
 Brailow. The Eussians had not regularly invested 
 this very strong fortress. They merely bombarded 
 it, and it capitulated without a breach, and without 
 any apparent cause, unless it were that the garrison 
 was afraid of not obtaining tolerably favourable 
 terms if they waited until after the fall of Brailow, 
 which seemed imminent. The badness of the de- 
 fence was not, therefore, to be attributed to military 
 or local causes, but entirely to personal considerations. 
 The defeat of the Turkish flotilla, the surrender 
 of Matchin, and the extraordinary determination 
 shown by the Eussians in their unsuccessful attack, 
 had already shaken the fortitude of Soliman Pasha. 
 On the 16th of June the two mines, B and C, 
 exploded ; the former threw down the counter- 
 scarp, the latter merely formed a large entonnoir in 
 the ditch. 
 
 On the 17th of June the Pasha offered to give up 
 the place on condition that the garrison should be 
 suffered to withdraw unmolested to Silistria. He 
 and most of the Turks in Brailow had a notion that 
 the whole place would be blown up by degrees ; this 
 was shown by the small listening galleries, which 
 had been carried round the faces of all the bastions, 
 and, indeed, was afterwards confirmed by several 
 of the garrison. 
 
 Next to the mines, which were executed with 
 
 H 2 
 
100 SIEaS OF BRAILOW. Paet I. 
 
 greater profuseness than judgment, what struck 
 most terror into the Turks was the manner in which 
 the Eussians advanced, step by step, towards the 
 fortress, always keeping themselves covered. A few 
 Congreve rockets, discharged against the place, like- 
 wise produced a very great effect. 
 
 Soliman Pasha caused the capitulation to be con- 
 cluded by two of the officers in command under him, 
 Ohiboukjee Oglu and Mustapha Aga, but he was 
 himself present at the negotiations, which were car- 
 ried on under a tent pitched for the purpose in front 
 of the fortress. The negotiations lasted 16 hours, 
 and the Pasha declared that he must eat another 
 meal before their final conclusion, which was granted 
 him. 
 
 The garrison of Brailow were allowed to leave 
 the fortress with bag and baggage, and, if they 
 pleased, to continue bearing arms against Russia, 
 and, accordingly, the greater number went to Silistria. 
 The provisions found in the fortress would have 
 been sufficient for a defence of several months. They 
 fell into the hands of the victors, together with 
 17,000 pud of loose powder and nearly 300 guns ; 
 the latter were partly Turkish, of a very ancient 
 date, partly Austrian, English, and French, some of 
 iron and some of brass, and of all sorts of calibres, 
 mostly heavy ones, up to 36-pounders. Among them 
 were a few howitzers and mortars, which threw 
 shells of 150 and 200 lbs. Their most effective 
 
Chap. V. SIEGE OP BEAILOW. 101 
 
 artillery, however, were the small moveable 7-poiander 
 Coehorns, with which the Turks fired with small 
 charges of powder, taking most precise aim with 
 a very high elevation for short distances. The 
 shells were very bad and seldom round ; even the 
 musket-bullets were used with their shanks. Gruns 
 of every calibre were placed without order or me- 
 thod side by side, and in like manner balls of all 
 sizes, both solid and hollow, lay in confused heaps. 
 When the balls were too small the Turks wrapped 
 them in sheepskin. The powder was stored partly 
 in private houses, partly in excavations beneath the 
 walls, and partly in mere wooden sheds. There were 
 no cartridges, and all the pieces had to be loaded 
 with a scoop. Spite of these defects the Turkish 
 garrison artillery had always been very well served, 
 especially the mortars. A 12-lb. shot pierced the 
 parapet of a battery 600 paces off, which was 19 
 feet thick, and formed of the stiffest clay. This 
 may be explained by the very full charges commonly 
 used by the Turks. 
 
 On the other hand, they were totally ignorant of 
 the regular method of attack, and consequently 
 neglected to take advantage of those opportunities 
 when the fire of the besieged can be used with most 
 effect. They fired upon single persons instead of 
 against the batteries or the heads of the sap that 
 were being constructed. It is remarkable, however, 
 that, until the moment of being stormed, the Turks 
 
102 SIEGE OP BBAILOW. Pakt I. 
 
 should still have had guns in full play against the 
 nearest Russian flank. 
 
 The fire of the wall-pieces and of the musketry was 
 most effective at Brailow. Every Turk, be he a 
 soldier or a civilian, has a gun and provides his 
 own ammunition. As the houses afford very little 
 shelter, the whole male population lies dispersed 
 about, behind the parapets of the walls, patiently 
 waiting for an opportunity to bring down a foe. 
 This gives great vivacity to the defence of a Turkish 
 town, especially in the last stages of the assault. 
 
 Altogether we may say that the Turks at Brailow 
 made a gallant and honourable defence under favour- 
 able circumstances. The place, destitute of outworks, 
 held out against a regular attack 27 days after the 
 trenches had been opened, but only two after a 
 practicable breach had been effected in the main 
 wall. 
 
 "With respect to the attack, we must observe that 
 the Eussian artillery was much inferior both in 
 number and calibre to that of the Turks. Besides 
 the field-pieces of the 7th corps, the Russians had 
 12 24-pounders; 48 18 and 12-pounders; 30 mortars 
 of heavy calibre, and a quantity of light ones. 
 
 The Russian batteries were never ready till twenty- 
 four hours after the trenches, and were never com- 
 menced at the same time, as the work was done by 
 the same body of sappers. They lay, in part, at 
 distances of from 1200 to 1800 paces. The effect of 
 
Ohap. V. SIEGE OP BEAILOW. 103 
 
 their fire therefore was insignificant, and, spite of the 
 great numbers of their guns, it was found, after the 
 capture of Brailow, that most of the embrasures in 
 the attacked front were still serviceable, which is the 
 more remarkable, as they were imperfectly protected. 
 Moreover, the Russians had totally neglected to 
 ricochet the curtain of attack, which might have 
 been easily done, and by which means the fire from 
 the mortars and small arms would have been much 
 weakened. 
 
 The number of the working party regularly em- 
 ployed during the coursS' of the siege was 46,260. 
 About 14,789 shot were fired against the fortress, 
 and the enormous charges used for the mines con- 
 sumed a great quantity of powder. 
 
 The Russians estimated their loss before Brailow 
 at 4 generals, 18 staff officers, above 100 officers, 
 and 2251 private soldiers. But this cannot include 
 the sick and wounded, as above 2000 were put hors 
 de combat at the storming on the 15th of June. It 
 may be assumed that the capture of Brailow cost the 
 seventh corps at least 4000 men. 
 
 One consequence of the capture of Brailow was 
 the fall of Isakchi and Matchin, and of all the 
 other places of the Dobrudscha. Hirsova, Tultcha, 
 and Kostendje were invested and bombarded by 
 very distant and weak batteries, which effected little 
 against these places. They were uninjured, and well 
 provided with all kinds of stores, when they offered 
 
104 SIEGE OP BBAILOW. Pabt I. 
 
 to capitulate on hearing of tlae fall of Brailow. 
 Kostendje sent messengers to ascertain tlie trntli of 
 facts on the spot. But by the time they reached 
 Baba-dagh these gentlemen were quite convinced by 
 the heat and difficulties of their ride, and returned 
 with the confirmation of the intelligence. From Tult- 
 cha a Turkish officer really came as far as Brailow, 
 and communicated with the Pasha. The conse- 
 quence was, that the garrison of Tultcha forced the 
 commandant to capitulate on condition of a free exit 
 to Varna and Silistria. 
 
 On the 5th of July eClf the fortresses on the 
 Danube from Silistria downwards were in the hands 
 of the Russians, who were masters of the whole 
 country as far as Trajan's wall. A transport fleet 
 of 26 sail, laden with provisions and warlike stores 
 from Odessa, entered the conquered harbour of Kos- 
 tendje. 
 
 The remarkably bad defence of the last five places, 
 contrasted with the good defence of Brailow, is easily 
 explained. Small fortresses in Turkey can never 
 make a long resistance, however strong their position 
 or their works. The Porte is not in a condition to 
 devote any considerable portion of its army to gar- 
 rison fortresses, and the defence is generally left to 
 the inhabitants themselves. A numerous population 
 is therefore a necessary condition for the efficient 
 defence of their towns, as was proved at Ismail, 
 Rutschuk, Brailow, and Varna. 
 
Chap. V. SIEGE OP BRAILOW. 105 
 
 In Brailow and Isakchi alone the Eussians found 
 8000 cwts. of powder. The guns taken in all the 
 captured places and from the flotilla amounted to 
 800 pieces, of which very few could be used in the 
 field owing to the badness of the carriages. Besides 
 this, a vast supply of stores fell into the hands of the 
 Russians, but what was most important was that the 
 7th corps was now available for further operations. 
 
 Up to this time the Russians had been successful in 
 all their undertakings. They had forced an almost 
 impossible passage over the Danube, and in six weeks 
 they had taken six Turkish fortresses. The belief 
 that it was impossible to resist their arms preceded 
 them, and was sure to have an incalculable influence 
 on adversaries like the Turks, provided this prestige 
 were not destroyed in the subsequent engagements. 
 
106 PROCEEDINGS OF THE RUSSIANS. Paet I. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS INTO BULGARIA — BATTLES AT 
 BAZARDJIK, KOSLUDJA, AND BEFORE VARNA. 
 
 We have seen how the Russians forced the passage of 
 the Danube at Satunovo. On the 11th of June the 
 whole of the 3rd corps had crossed over the bridge, but 
 it took fourteen days to reach Karasu, near Trajan's 
 wall — a inarch of not more than 75 miles. Long, 
 however, as the crossing of the river had been de- 
 layed, and slow as was the subsequent march. General 
 Rudjewitsch reached his rendezvous too soon, if his 
 farther operations were to be conducted in combina- 
 tion with the rest of the corps-d'armee. 
 
 The line from Silistria to Kostendje was the first 
 strategical movement of the Russian army, and was 
 to form the basis of future operations. But Silistria 
 was not yet even besieged, much less taken, as the 
 6th corps, to which this duty had been assigned, had 
 failed in crossing the Danube at Turtukai. The 7th 
 corps was detained till the end of June at Brailow ; 
 for although the place had capitulated on the 18th, a 
 delay of ten days had been agreed upon for evacu- 
 ating the fortress, and the garrison had to be escorted 
 to Silistria. The 3rd corps, therefore, was unsup- 
 ported, and, with Silistria, Rutschuk, and Shumla in 
 
Chap. VI. ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS. 107 
 
 its rear and on its flank, could undertake nothing 
 against Varna. Nor can it be denied that the 3rd 
 corps was in itself too weak. As the Eussian fleet 
 could supply the army with all that it required, and 
 thus rendered the possession of Moldavia and Wal- 
 lachia less indispensable, it would apparently have 
 been better policy not to have occupied those Prin- 
 cipalities until the capture of Brailow had released a 
 portion of the 7th corps. The occupation of the 
 Principalities -alarmed all Europe, gave the Turks 
 time to arm, and weakened the main army to such 
 a degree that it became incapable of acting vigor- 
 ously on the offensive, so as to overwhelm the unpre- 
 pared Turks, and so end the campaign before the 
 European powers could interfere in the matter. 
 
 Even as matters actually stood, it may be doubted 
 whether it would not have been better to give up all 
 other offensive operations, and to march with the 3rd 
 corps directly upon Silistria. This fortress was so ill 
 constructed, that it might very possibly have been 
 taken by a coup-de-main before the brave defenders 
 of Brailow could reach it. At all events the third 
 corps might have invested the place with 12,000 
 men and 80 guns, and have kept the remainder of 
 the corps, 20,000 men and 48 guns, in readiness to 
 act against Shumla and Eutschuk. A party de- 
 tached upon Turtukai, only 24 miles off, would have 
 opened the passage of the Danube to the 6th corps, 
 as Turtukai lies at the foot of the steep edge of the 
 
108 ADVANCE OP THE RUSSIANS. Paet I. 
 
 valley of the Danube, and conld not hold out an hour 
 against an attack from the south. 
 
 But this did not happen : the main army remained 
 inactive for eight days till the 7th of July at Karasu, 
 and then advanced slowly towards Yarna by Ba- 
 zardjik. On the march towards Bazardjik, which 
 town was found totally deserted, the Eussian advanced 
 guard came for the first time during this campaign 
 into action with the Turks in the open field. While 
 G-eneral Eudiger, with 12 squadrons of hussars, 200 
 Cossacks, and 4 battalions, went towards Mangalia, 
 to the left of Kostendje, the advanced guard of the 
 corps under Greneral Akinfief, with 4 squadrons of 
 hussars, 3 of lancers, 4 battalions, and 100 Cossacks, 
 took the straight road from Karasu to Bazardjik. 
 The Seraskier, Hussein Pasha, had pushed forward 
 8000 men, chiefly cavalry, who evacuated Bazardjik 
 on the approach of the Eussians. Greneral Akinfief 
 thought he might attack the Turks without waiting 
 for G-eneral Eudiger ; but scarce had his advanced 
 guard reached the heights to the right of the town 
 when they saw the Turks immediately behind it. 
 The Eussians were beaten back, and the Turks took 
 possession of the town and maintained it against 
 every attack of the Eussian troops until the arrival 
 of the artillery, which at length put the Turks to 
 flight with the loss of 200 men. On this occasion 
 the Turkish horse for the first time displayed order in 
 their movements. They were under the control of 
 
Chap. VI. BAZABDJIK. 109 
 
 their leader, and got into rank again after charging 
 with their -usual impetuosity. The impenetrable steadi- 
 ness of the Eussian infantry saved the honour of the 
 day ; their cavalry had been repeatedly driven back. 
 
 At Bazardjik the 7th corps from Brailow joined 
 the main army on the 11th of July. 10,000 men 
 belonging to the 6th had been despatched a long 
 way round, by Hirsova, and then along the right 
 bank of the Danube, to Silistria, which they reached 
 on the 21st of July, and relieved the corps of 
 Grenerals Benkendorff and Madatow. The latter 
 rejoined their corps at Bazardjik. 
 
 The main army was now provided with every- 
 thing that could be drawn from the interior of Eussia 
 during the course of the campaign. It numbered 68 
 battaHons, 52 squadrons, and 4 regiments of Cossacks; 
 altogether not above 40,000 men, with 194 guns. 
 The advanced guard of 8 battalions, under General 
 Eudiger, was at Kosludja ; about 4 battalions, under 
 Adjutant-General Count Suchtelen, and a few Cos- 
 sacks, were before Yarna ; General Uschakow was 
 on his way from Tultcha to Yarna with 4 other bat- 
 talions ; some troops were employed in escorting the 
 Turkish garrison from Brailow to Silistria ; and 8 
 battahons were left behind at different halting-places, 
 or on the flotilla of the Danube — making altogether 
 about 24 battalions. The main army at Bazardjik 
 under these circumstances consisted of 44 battalions 
 and 20 squadrons. 
 
11,750 1 
 
 men. 
 
 10,750 
 
 J) 
 
 5,500 
 
 )) 
 
 5,100 
 
 ») 
 
 6,000 
 
 jj 
 
 2,000 
 
 3J 
 
 41,100 1 
 
 men. 
 
 110 BAZABDJIK. PabtI. 
 
 According to numbers the distribution of all the 
 forces about the middle of July was as follows : — 
 
 In Wallachia about .... 
 
 Before Silistria ..... 
 
 Escorting troops, on the flotilla, and at 
 
 halting-places in the rear 
 Before Varna ...... 
 
 The advanced guard in Kosludja 
 
 Before Anapa ..... 
 
 Altogether, in the several detached bodies 
 
 The corps at Bazardjik might be reckoned at about 
 24,000 men, of whom not more than 2500 were 
 cavalry — so much in request was that arm of the 
 service elsewhere. We may observe moreover, that 
 the investment of Silistria was not complete, that the 
 Russians had scarce any troops to spare for the ob- 
 servation of Eutschuk and Widdin on the right bank 
 of the Danube, that it was necessary to detach addi- 
 tional troops to Pravadi, and that the two advanced 
 guards sent from Bazardjik to Kosludja and Varna 
 were too weak for their object. 
 
 Greneral Rudiger found Kosludja deserted when 
 he entered it on the 12th of July, but encountered 
 the Turks at a short distance beyond the town, drawn 
 up on the road to Jenibazar. The two Russian 
 squadrons of hussars met with a warmer reception 
 from the 8000 Turkish cavalry than they had expe- 
 rienced shortly before at Bazardjik. Greneral Rudiger 
 himself, who came to the assistance of his hard- 
 
Chap. VI. KOSLUDJA AND VARNA. HI 
 
 pressed cavalry, was severely handled. At length 
 the enemy withdrew behind Jenibazar. 
 
 Still worse was the reception of Adjutant-General 
 Count Suchtelen before Yarna on the 14th of the 
 same month. Without waiting for Greneral Uschakoff, 
 and with only 2500 men, he boldly advanced against 
 the place, but the garrison vigorously attacked him, 
 kiUed 300 Eussians, and drove back the corps to the 
 heights on the north of Varna, whence they next day 
 saw a reinforcement of several thousand men enter 
 the fortress from the side of Burgas. The Turks 
 attacked the Russians again on the 15th, and the 
 latter coidd only act on the defensive behind some 
 earthworks they had hurriedly thrown up. As the 
 garrison ^ now numbered 12 or 15,000 men, Yarna 
 could not well be invested. 
 
 The Turks in these skirmishes had hitherto acted 
 with equal prudence and determination, and accord- 
 ing to their own views they had everywhere beaten 
 the Russians. They certainly had expected that their 
 adversaries would have brought larger masses of 
 men into the field, and were astonished to find that, 
 with the enormous means at Russia's disposal, only 
 a few squadrons of horse and a handful of infantry 
 should have been brought against them. Unim- 
 portant as were the results of these skirmishes, their 
 moral effect was favourable to the Turks,- and the 
 confidence of the Russian cavalry diminished with 
 the strength of their heavy parade horses. 
 
112 VAENA. Pabt I. 
 
 The remark that " wherever you see one turban, 
 you may be sure there are a thousand more," is in 
 the main correct. The Turks know nothing of 
 advanced guards, outposts, and other miHtary pre- 
 cautions, but always remain together in large bodies. 
 This forced their adversaries to do the same if they 
 did not wish to encounter the same checks as hitherto. 
 
 The Turkish way of fighting is like that of the 
 wild boar, which does not seek its foe, but awaits his 
 approach in its thicket and then rushes blindly upon 
 him. An impetuous attack may be expected from the 
 Turks, but not a lasting obstinate defence. Against 
 Orientals it is no use keeping troops in reserve. 
 The best cards should be played out at once. A few 
 hours always decide the fate of the engagement ; and 
 Turkish history affords no example of battles fought, 
 like those in the West of Europe, from sunrise to 
 sunset. 
 
 Hitherto the movements of the Russian troops had 
 shown Yarna to be the principal object of the cam- 
 paign. But on the 16th of July the main army 
 quitted the road thither, and joined the advanced 
 guard under Greneral Rudiger at Kosludja. From 
 thence Greneral Benkendorff was sent on to secure 
 Pravadi. 
 
 The march of the main army to Kosludja was the 
 turning-point in the campaign of the year 1828. 
 
 Of the three roads across the Balkan which have 
 to be considered in a Russian invasion, namely those 
 
Chap. VI. VARNA. 113 
 
 from Shumla, Pravadi, and Varna, the latter is by 
 far the most important, because it is the shortest line 
 from the Russian frontier to the Turkish capital, and 
 because the invading army can be supplied by sea. 
 Varna is of double consequence, as the key of this 
 road and as a maritime town. The whole force of an 
 invading army ought to be directed against Varna, 
 nor is its investment by any means an easy under- 
 taking, as its position is as strong as it is important. 
 Protected on the east by the sea, on the west by 
 Lake Devna, which is ten miles broad, Varna must 
 be invested by two separate corps, one on the north, 
 the other on the south. This would require at least 
 12,000 men, whereas, after G-eneral Benkendorff had 
 been detached to Pravadi, the Russians had scarcely 
 10,000 to repel the attacks of the foe, and to observe 
 from Jenibazar the movements of the Turkish army 
 assembled at Shumla. This was too small a force for 
 these purposes, but the Russians had already disco- 
 vered that their resources were insufficient for the 
 campaign. The guards were ordered from St. Peters- 
 burg, and the 2nd corps was sent immediately after 
 the imsuccessfal storming of Brailow ; but they should 
 have been sent before. The campaigns of 1809-11 
 had shown that an army of 70,000 men in Bulgaria 
 was so fully occupied by the lines on the Danube, 
 that it had no strength left to cross the Balkan ; 
 nevertheless in 1828 the same fault was committed, 
 as the guards could not reach Varna before the end 
 
114 VAENA. Part I. 
 
 of August, and the 2nd corps could not arrive at the 
 Danube before September, when the time for opera- 
 tions was over. 
 
 Another great fault was that three months after 
 the commencement of hostilities the battering train 
 had not yet reached the army drawn up before 
 a fortress on the sea, and that the same park of 
 artillery was intended to serve for both Varna 
 and Anapa. 
 
 Most likely it was these deficiencies which induced 
 the Eussians to give up besieging Yarna for a time, 
 and to direct their attention to the point of the 
 greatest danger. The Eussian army at Bazardjik 
 found itself forced against its will, attracted magneti- 
 cally as it were, towards Shumla. But this change 
 in the original plan of operation was a great strate- 
 gical error. For supposing that the Eussians suc- 
 ceeded in driving Hussein Pasha out of Shumla, 
 which could not be done without great loss, and 
 would be far more difficult than to beat him in the 
 open field, the possession of that extended camp 
 would only be a negative advantage, whereas Yarna 
 in the hands of the Eussians- would have been a posi- 
 tive acquisition, and have formed the basis for further 
 operations. But we must now describe the actual 
 proceedings of the Eussians before Shumla. 
 
Chap. VII. BATTLE OF JENIBAZAR. 115 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF JENIBAZAR — DESCRIPTION OF SHUMLA — THE 
 SIEGE OF SHUMLA BY THE E0SSLANS. 
 
 We have seen that the Russian main army detached 
 only weak divisions under Suchtelen and Benkendorff 
 against Yarna and Pravadi, and then advanced itself 
 by Kosludja against Shumla. After these deduc- 
 tions, but when augmented by the advanced guard of 
 General Rudiger, the strength of the corps amounted 
 to 48 battalions and 36 squadrons, altogether about 
 30,000 men. It marched on the 17th of July from 
 Kosludja towards Jasytepe, whence reconnoitring 
 parties were sent out as far as Jenibazar. Head- 
 quarters reached Turk-Arnautlar, a most fruitful spot, 
 on the 18th, and Jenibazar on the following day. 
 G-eneral Sisciew was sent forward with a detachment 
 to observe the road from Sihstria and Rustchuk to 
 Shumla. On the 20th of July the Emperor advanced 
 from Jenibazar towards Shumla at the head of his 
 army in two columns. The 3rd corps formed the 
 right, the 7th, under the command of General 
 Diebitsch, the left wing. 
 
 The army had advanced in order of battle as far 
 
 I 2 
 
116 BATTLE OF JENIBAZAE. Pabt I. 
 
 as Jenibazar, when the same body of Turkish cavalry 
 which had encountered the Eussian advanced guard 
 with some success at Bazardjik and Kosludja, made 
 its appearance on the plateau behind Bulanlik, 
 strengthened by 5 battalions of regular infantry and 
 18 field-pieces. The strength of this Turkish van- 
 guard might perhaps amount to 10,000 men. This 
 time it had not to deal with a weak force, but with 
 the whole Eussian army. The Turkish position was 
 turned on the right wing by the advance of the 
 enemy, while on the other hand it outflanked the 
 Eussians with the left. The 1st division of mounted 
 chasseurs advanced on the right into the first line : at 
 the same time the 7th corps crossed the brook on the 
 left by Bulanlik to attack the right flank of the 
 Turks. As soon as the Turks on the plateau be- 
 came aware of this movement, their cavalry charged, 
 but were driven back by the artillery. The Eussian 
 hussars likewise retreated before a Turkish battery 
 of 18 guns. The firing was heavy, but ill-directed, and 
 only cost the Eussians seven men, among whom, how- 
 ever, was one officer. The Eussians thought at first 
 that this was an outwork of the Turkish fortified camp. 
 The Turks on their side had crossed the brook of 
 Bulanlik on the right flank of the 3rd corps, and 
 had engaged the Cossacks. Count Orloff advanced 
 against them with the whole division of mounted 
 chasseurs, but owing to the wretched condition of the 
 horses could not get near the light troops of the 
 
Chap. VII. DESCRIPTION OF SHUMLA. 117 
 
 enemy, and was forced to content himself with, a can- 
 nonade to which the Turks replied. 
 
 After General Eudjewitsch should have crossed 
 the brook with the infantry, it was the intention of 
 the Russians to make a general attack. But the 
 Turks, who then became aware of the threefold 
 superiority of their opponents in point of numbers, 
 did not wait for this attack, but withdrew into their 
 entrenched lines. The Russians lost about 150 men, 
 the Turks some few more. The 3rd corps took up 
 its position on the heights of Makak and Bulanlik, 
 the 7th on the right by Kassapla, between the brooks 
 running from Kadikoi to Pravadi and those running 
 from Shumla towards the Kamtchik. 
 
 However desirable it might have been to strike a 
 decisive blow against the Turks, when at length they 
 were fairly encountered in the open field, nevertheless, 
 spite of the numerical superiority of the Russians, 
 the battle of the 20th of July remained without any 
 result. The open nature of the ground, the vicinity 
 of the fortified camp, the prudent conduct of the 
 leaders, and the excellent condition of the Turkish 
 horse, rendered this hope nugatory. 
 
 From the flat plateau of Bulanlik, covered with 
 dry grass, the Russians saw the tops of the trees and 
 minarets of Shumla, a town which had never yet 
 been desecrated by a foreign foe. The famous lines 
 (plan 3) stretched out before them into the plain, 
 and ran along the steep heights, till they joined on 
 
118 DESCRIPTION OF SHUMLA. Part I. 
 
 to the precipitous and rocky walls of the fortress. 
 Detached forts threatened the invaders with their 
 cannon, but the town itself was hidden behind the 
 swelling ground, and it was only on the heights that 
 the green tents of the Turkish outposts could be seen. 
 Shumla itself lies at the eastern foot of a group 
 of hills, completely separated by the valleys of the 
 Kamtchik from the main chain of the Balkan. The 
 flat upper plateau of this group of hills, on which 
 Shumla is placed, is raised about 600 or 800 feet 
 above the Bulgarian plain : the sides of this plateau 
 fall in a precipitous wall of rock and then sink, at 
 first with rapid and afterwards with decreasing steep- 
 ness, into the plain below. Shumla itself is built 
 in a short horizontal valley which ends in precipitous 
 ravines. The hills lying to the east of Shumla are 
 precipitous towards the town, but slope towards the 
 outside like a glacis, so that from a distance the 
 houses of Shumla are visible, but are lost sight of on 
 approaching within 2h miles. The place itself is 
 unfortified, but at the distance of 1000 or 1500 paces 
 the connected lines of the fortified camp run along 
 the crest of the mountain, resting on the left upon 
 the precipitous heights of Strandcha, on the right 
 upon those of Tchengell, which surround Shumla on 
 the north and on the south. The Turks have thought 
 it necessary to continue these lines in their rear and 
 along the steep declivity, where they can be of no 
 use. These lines were mere earthworks without 
 
Chap. VII. DBSCEIPTION OF SHUMLA. UQ 
 
 masonry,* and witli a narrow but deep ditch cut 
 with a small slope into the hard ground. The ex- 
 tent of the lines from Strandcha, as far as the 
 junction with the heights of Tchengell, is about 
 8000 paces. On the northern side, near Strandcha, 
 the lines were double, and comprehended the camp 
 where the infantry was lodged; the cavalry was 
 placed in a valley traversed by two brooks. Thus 
 these troops were completely protected. The town 
 contained about 40,000 inhabitants, three parts of 
 whom were Mussulmans. It had several fountains, 
 five mosques, and three baths, and could draw plen- 
 tiful supplies from its rear. The forts of Tchally- 
 Sultan and Tchengell-Tabiassi did not exist when 
 the Russians first^ sat down before Shumla, but were 
 erected by degrees. They were narrow earthworks, 
 with ditches, of which the escarpments were not 
 lined with masonry ; but they were easily defended 
 from the camp, which was not 1000 yards oflP, and 
 afforded an excellent point-d'appui for the sorties of 
 the Turks. On the other hand, there remained since 
 the former war, on the road to Constantinople, the 
 fort of Ibrahim-Nasiri (now called Feddai-Tabiasi), 
 and the Turks were erecting two large redoubts at 
 the village of Tchengell, to which the Eussians gave 
 
 * The author nowhere found a trace of the walled towers mentioned by 
 travellers ; and as Shumla was never entered, even in 1828-9, by a hostile 
 corps, it can hardly be assumed that they could have totally disappeared 
 had they ever existed. 
 
120 DESCEIPTION OF SHUMLA. Part I. 
 
 the name of MatcMn, from an erroneous impression 
 that the Pasha of Matchin was there. 
 
 The main road from Rutschuk and Silistria to 
 Constantinople does not cross the mountain-ridge, 
 but turns towards the east to Strandcha, Shumla, 
 and Tchengell. Besides the track to Tchengell, 
 passable only for horsemen, the roads from Trudcha 
 Kotesch, Novosil, Bular, Glradechti, and Dormus con- 
 verge to it. By all these roads convoys of provisions 
 and men could be forwarded to the Turkish army 
 from districts not occupied by the Russians. They 
 had, moreover, no reason to fear any attack from 
 these quarters, as the upper surface of the plateau is 
 so covered with thick brushwood that it would be 
 impossible even for a single horseman to advance 
 except by the narrow pathway ; even skirmishers 
 would find it difficult to penetrate the thicket. The 
 few roads run through long defiles in which it would 
 be impossible to manoeuvre. 
 
 The most assailable point of this strong place was 
 and still is that which looks the strongest, the ridge 
 of Strandcha, which falls precipitously towards the 
 south, but has a gradual ascent to the north. The 
 fort built on this spot is faced with masonry, but 
 the profile is weak and by no means secure against 
 an escalade. The height can be reached from 
 Grradechti and Dormus through the valley of Kurt- 
 boghas (wolfs glen). In the campaign of 1810 
 G-eneral Kaminski occupied the rocky wooded hills 
 
Chap.vii. siege op SHUMLA. 121 
 
 to the north of Strandcha, and it is surprising that 
 this advantage was foregone on that occasion, as from 
 these heights troops might approach along the slopes 
 behind Shumla ; and the enemy once in possession of 
 the heights commanding the town, it could no longer 
 be defended. But now Strandcha was included 
 within the lines of defence. The advance of a 
 detachment through the Kurt-boghas would have 
 met with most serious resistance from the Turks, 
 whose mode of fighting is well suited to a rocky 
 and wooded district. A general attack from the 
 north, more especially as neither Silistria nor Eutschuk 
 were yet taken, would have endangered the communi- 
 cation of one part of the Russian army with the other. 
 
 According to the most trustworthy accounts, 
 Shumla, which at the beginning of June had scarce 
 any garrison, now contained 40,000 men under the 
 command of the Seraskier Hussein Pasha. There 
 were 12 regiments, or 10,000 regular infantry, 3000 
 or 4000 cavalry, with 30 field-pieces, and 10,000 
 Arnauts under Omar Vrione. 
 
 Against so large a number of troops, and so strong 
 a fortress — remembering too the defence made by 
 the Turks at Brailow— an assault was not to be 
 thought of. It appeared more feasible to take up a 
 strong position opposite Shumla. This could be done 
 without any great danger, if the invading army were 
 concentrated. But the greatest result to be expe,cted 
 from this was that at the very best the Seraskier 
 
122 SIEGE OP SHUMLA. Paet I. 
 
 would be prevented from quitting Shumla to relieve 
 Varna. But Varna was not yet invested, and could 
 not be so, as all the materials for tbe purpose were 
 employed at Shumla, and the expected battering train 
 from Russia could not reach Varna for at least four 
 weeks. 
 
 The only thing that remained, therefore, was to 
 surround the place. But Shumla, with regard to 
 its supply of provisions, was like a fortress on the 
 seaboard, which, although besieged on one side, can 
 only be blockaded from a distance on the other. 
 The circumference of the high plateau, at the foot of 
 which lies Shumla, amounts to 18 or 20 miles. But 
 unless troops can be placed close under the heights, 
 they must extend their observation of the principal 
 thoroughfares to a much greater distance round the 
 town. To make the investment complete, it would 
 be necessary to detach to distant points numerous 
 divisions, which ought not to be weak, as in the 
 woody and broken ground the enemy could steal 
 upon them unawares, in considerable force, without 
 running any risk of uncovering their own front ; 
 whereas the Russians had to take care that in all 
 such cases they remained strong enough in the plain 
 to resist any sudden attack of the enemy. As the 
 investing party, even when united, was weaker than 
 the invested, it ran the risk of being beaten in detail. 
 
 But supposing that the Russians succeeded in 
 starving out the garrison — and this could never be 
 
Chap. VII. SIEGE OF SHUMLA. 123 
 
 effected, owing to the various and distant means of 
 access to the moutitain fastness — the possession of 
 Shumla would be of no use to them, as the strategical 
 front of this post is towards the north, and could 
 only be maintained by a large army, which the 
 Russians could not command. Shumla would not 
 open the passage of the Balkan ; the subsistence of 
 the Russian army could not be secured in that direc- 
 tion, and they must always fall back upon Yarna. 
 
 Nevertheless, in the false position in which they 
 had once placed themselves, the Russians chose to 
 invest Shumla closely, as the measure which, while 
 less impracticable than storming the place, seemed 
 to them to promise better results than a mere distant 
 observation of the Turks. The latter plan would, 
 however, have been undoubtedly the right measure 
 to have taken, had Varna been besieged at the same 
 time. Nothing, then, would have been more desir- 
 able for the Russians than that the Seraskier should 
 be forced out of his fortified camp at Shumla, by the 
 danger of Varna falling into the hands of the Rus- 
 sians ; and a victory in the open field must have 
 decided the fate of the campaign. 
 
 Sensible of their weakness, the Russians immedi- 
 ately began to intrench themselves in front of the 
 enemy's lines. A line of redoubts was erected at 
 such a distance from the Turkish camp that they 
 could be reached by the artillery on the walls, but not 
 near enough to -return the enemy's fire with any 
 
124 SIEGE OF SHUMLA. Part I. 
 
 effect with the field-pieces. This line of redoubts 
 was to approach the hills by degrees, and then, so at 
 least it was intended by some, the Russians were to 
 try to gain possession of the heights. But the Turks 
 soon threw fresh obstacles in the way, by erecting 
 the outworks which we have already mentioned 
 opposite those redoubts that were nearest to them. 
 A sharp cannonade, which was intended to prevent 
 this, did not effect its purpose. 
 
 On the 27th of July the corps occupied the low 
 heights, then covered with wood, to the north of 
 Strandcha, and at the foot of the precipitous side 
 of the hill on which the fort of Strandcha stands. 
 This induced the Turks to make vigorous sorties on 
 the 27th and the following day. Spite of the hilly 
 and wooded nature of the ground, the Seraskier 
 brought chiefly cavalry into action, and they sur- 
 rounded a regiment of Jagers that got entangled in 
 the brushwood, and fired upon them in battalions 
 from their horses. The Russian artillery did great 
 damage to the Turks, and the 3rd corps maintained 
 their position on the height, upon which they imme- 
 diately entrenched themselves. This spot was a 
 point d'appui for the entrenched position of the 
 Russians, as it commanded the open plain in front of 
 the Turkish camp, and flanked the advance near 
 Jochally-Tabia ; but was itself much exposed, and 
 would have been easily taken if the Turks had been 
 able to occupy the hiU-top to the north of the fort of 
 
Chap. VII. SIEGE OP SHUMLA. 125 
 
 Strandcha, which is equally high, and only 1000 
 yards distant. 
 
 On the left flank the 7th corps had likewise 
 erected a line of redoubts, which extended as far as 
 opposite Fort Matchin near Tchengell. The number 
 of redoubts was by this time 19, and shortly after- 
 wards 27, and the garrisons occupying them were 
 spread over a distance of 9 or 10 miles. But all this 
 time the front only of the camp was invested, and 
 the Eussians daily saw long strings of camels, bring- 
 ing provisions and military stores from Eski-Stambul 
 and Eski-Djuma, come down the steep descent 
 behind Shumla. It was essential to close that side 
 also. 
 
 After Rasgrad had been occupied by Gleneral Schi- 
 row with his Cossacks, Greneral Eudiger started on 
 the 30th July with the above object, at the head of 
 8 battalions of infantry and 8 squadrons of horse, for 
 the south side of the mountains. Near the village 
 of Tjiflik, not far from the narrow pass leading 
 from the heights of Shumla to Trudcha, Greneral 
 Eudiger left General Tarbejef, with 4 battalions and 
 4 squadrons, to secure his communication ; and in 
 order not to expose his men to the danger of passing 
 close under the heights occupied by the Turks, he 
 made a detour by Eski-Stambul, to reconnoitre the 
 pass of Kotesch, which was the one most important 
 to the Turks for keeping open their communication. 
 
 On the 31st of July General Tarbejef was vigor- 
 
126 SIEGE OF SHUMLA. Past I. 
 
 ously attacked on two points, on the road from Trudja 
 and Tjengell. Although the Eussians repulsed the 
 attacking party without any great loss, General 
 Eudiger was forced to return at once, as his position 
 would have been most critical had the enemy suc- 
 ceeded in their attack on Tjiflik. In that village he 
 left Greneral Iwanow, with 4 battalions, 2 squadrons, 
 and some Cossacks, and then joined the rest of the 
 7th corps opposite the fort of Matchin. The detach- 
 ment left in Tjiflik rapidly erected a redoubt in front 
 of the village, and endeavoured to keep up its com- 
 munication with the main body by Marasch, by 
 means of a ford through the Kamtchik. 
 
 The Eussians could no longer fail to perceive that, 
 owing to the passive conduct of the Seraskier, nothing 
 could be effected at Shumla. But something must 
 be done for the weak corps before Varna. The 
 Emperor left Shumla on the 3rd of August, escorted 
 by a regiment of mounted and foot chasseurs, and 12 
 guns, to press the siege of Yarna. General Woinow 
 was put at the head of the whole cavalry force, and 
 the 7th corps d'armee was placed under the command 
 of Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg. The chief of the 
 general staff of the army. Count Diebitsch, who, being 
 more closely acquainted with the Emperor's inten- 
 tions, would have had authority to change the plan 
 of campaign, was to stay with the commander-in- 
 chief, Count Wittgenstein, But Diebitsch was ill, 
 and took no part in the conduct of affairs. 
 
Chap. VII. SIEGE OF SHUMLA. 127 
 
 The original plan was therefore adhered to, but 
 further developed. The 3rd corps was to remain 
 before Shmnla, while the 7th was to act on the 
 offensive in the rear of the Turks. But the 3rd 
 corps was not strong enough even to occupy the 
 numerous redoubts, and had to be reinforced from the 
 7th. Greneral Eudiger, with a part of the 7th corps, 
 was again to push forward to Kotesch, while the 
 small remainder of the corps was to maintain the 
 communication between the defensive and offensive 
 portions of the army. 
 
 On the 7th of August Greneral Rudiger again un- 
 dertook to reconnoitre Kotesch, and succeeded in 
 driving out the enemy's posts, and taking one gun. 
 He then returned by Trudcha and Tjiflik to the 
 central position of the 7th corps, opposite the Matchin 
 redoubt ; for Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, who 
 agreed with General Rudiger in looking upon this 
 advance to the left with inferior forces as an useless 
 measure, pressed iipon head-quarters not to compro- 
 mise that general, or to draw the enemy's attention 
 to the weak side of his position. This view was 
 perfectly justified in a short time, as the Turks 
 entrenched themselves at Kotesch and Trudcha, by 
 which means any further serious enterprise against 
 those positions was rendered very dijGScult. 
 
 Meanwhile the erection of new redoubts in the 
 front of the 3rd and on the right flank of the 7th 
 corps d'arme'e continued, and the Turks, who feared 
 
128 SIEGE OF SHUMLA. Part I. 
 
 an attack in the direction of Ibrahim-Nasiri, raised a 
 new work, called Sultan Tabiassi, between Ibrahim- 
 Nasiri and the fort of Matchin, on the declivity of 
 the heights on the road to Constantinople. 
 
 On the 8th of August a Turkish foraging party 
 from Shumla, under Alisch Pasha, attacked the Rus- 
 sian baggage-train near Jenibazar, and carried off a 
 considerable number of cattle. 
 
 About this time Greneral Woinow undertook an 
 expedition from the right wing, with a division of 
 cavalry, in the direction of Eski-Djuma, in order to 
 harass the enemy on that side, but soon returned 
 to the position of the 3rd corps. In the middle of 
 August Greneral Rudiger was again ordered to march 
 to Eski-Stambul, and thence to Kotesch, with the 
 object of fortifying himself there if possible, so as to 
 cut off the enemy's approaches. This he was to do 
 without the assistance of the rest of the 7th corps, 
 whose presence was required at the entrenched camp 
 before Shumla. General Rudiger surprised a body 
 of 3000 Turks on the morning of the 15th of August, 
 and put them to flight, taking 165 prisoners and 1 
 gun ; but was attacked in his turn by a superior force, 
 against which he could not hold his own in broken 
 ground and a disadvantageous position. On his 
 return through narrow passes and thick woods, he 
 found himself surrounded on all sides, and lost a gun 
 and some hundred killed and wounded. He again 
 took up his original position at Eski-Stambul, and 
 
Chap. VII. SIEGE OP SHUMLA. 129 
 
 was ordered to remain there. Prince Eugene was 
 forced to go to Marasch, with 8 battalions of the 
 18th division, in order to be nearer Greneral Rudiger 
 in case he wanted assistance ; but was immediately 
 summoned again to the right, as the Turks had sud- 
 denly lodged themselves in the neighbourhood of two 
 of the most important Russian redoubts, which they 
 threatened to attack. But Greneral Rudjewitsch had 
 already taken the necessary steps to secure them, and 
 the 18th division retraced its steps to its camp at 
 Marasch, which the prince had surrounded with an 
 enceinte to protect himself against any sudden attack. 
 The events of the 27th of August proved that the 
 Seraskier at length began to comprehend the awk- 
 ward position of the Russians before Shumla. Al- 
 though a night attack is a phenomenon in Turkish 
 military history, a body of Turks, led by Alisch 
 Pasha, suddenly appeared at midnight before the 
 redoubt No. 5, which the Russians had built on the 
 woody heights north of the village of Strandcha. 
 Deserters may have reported the negligent guard 
 kept at this mountain-fort, and thus given the idea 
 of this surprise. The Turks scaled the parapet, 
 killed more than 100 men, and took the guns of the 
 fort. The commandant paid the penalty of his care- 
 lessness with his life. A simultaneous attack on the 
 next redoubt to the east. No. 23, was repulsed, as the 
 attention of the garrison had been roused. On the 
 other hand, the recapture of No. 5 required great 
 
 K 
 
130 SIEGE OP SHUMLA. Pakt I. 
 
 exertions. Greneral Rudjewitsch stormed the fort 
 with tlie small amoimt of infantry lie could collect, 
 without success, and it was only the fire of a powerful 
 battery that induced the Turks to retire, taking with 
 them the guns they had captured. 
 
 But all this was only a feint on the part of the 
 Turks to distract the attention of the Eussians from 
 a still more important undertaking. Prince Eugene, 
 after detaching so many of his troops, remained with 
 only 3800 men, namely 8 battalions of the 18th divi- 
 sion and 6 squadrons of hussars, at Marasch ; and the 
 Seraskier meditated no less a scheme than to crush 
 this weak corps with an overwhelming force, and 
 then to attack Greneral Rudiger, who was equally 
 weak, and had no retreat open to him. For some 
 days Greneral Rudiger had received from Bulgarian 
 spies reports which confirmed one another, that the 
 whole weight of the enemy's force would be directed 
 upon him, and he had consequently fallen back from 
 Eski-Stambul, and crossed the great Kamtchik ; but 
 even so, his communication with the posts of Tjiflik, 
 which Greneral Durnowo occupied with two batta- 
 lions, or with Prince Eugene at Marasch, was not 
 complete. 
 
 Essaad Pasha attacked Prince Eugene at two 
 o'clock in the morning, and drove in the Cossack out- 
 posts. The Turks were at their heels, and reached 
 the camp nearly at the same moment ; but the first 
 pistol-shots had roused the troops, and the Turks 
 
Chap. VII. SIEGE OF SHUMLA. 131 
 
 retreated. But the morning had scarce d&wned when 
 the Russians saw the Whole plain covered with con- 
 siderable masses of hostile troops, and twb compact 
 columns of regular infantry stormed the right wing 
 of the Russian camp, with loud cries. A well-directed 
 fire of grape and musketry made them advance in 
 double quick time in order to return the fire, a 
 manoeuvre they performed in excellent order. Three 
 squadrons of horse prepared to charge the exposed 
 flank of the enemy. Their appearance threw the 
 Turks into confusion, and put them to flight ; but the 
 tired men and horses coUld do little against the light- 
 heeled Moslem; only about 100 of them were cut 
 down with the assistance of the Cossacks. 
 
 During this first attempt of the enemy, another 
 Turkish column, headed by a few battalions of regular 
 infantry, but mainly composed of itregular horse 
 and foot, amounting altogether to about 15,000 men, 
 with 4 guns, moved along the valley of the Kamt- 
 chik, against the left wing of the Russian position, 
 and threatened the village of Marasch, where the 
 hospital was established, with 600 sick, and where 
 the baggage waggons had been collected previous to 
 being sent off as had been intended on that very day. 
 Three battalions had been sent to protect the village, 
 and, as the rest of the detachment was under fire, and 
 could not be spared to assist them, these troops had 
 to stand a very severe contest. Meanwhile, three 
 battalions of Russian infantry and three squadron^ of 
 
 K 2 
 
132 SIEGE OP SHUMLA. Paet I. 
 
 liussars fell on the flank of the enemy, and drove him 
 back into his entrenched camp. General Endiger 
 and Greneral Durnowo did not reach Marasch nntil 
 the fight was over ; but their arrival there before 
 would have been decisive. The Turks, with all their 
 bravery, proved themselves not yet fit to meet the 
 Eussians in the open field ; with such a superior 
 force, especially of cavalry, and in the plain, they 
 ought, after their infantry had opened the way for 
 them, to have overwhelmed a small detachment, 
 which, moreover, was hampered by having to defend 
 the camp and the baggage waggons. 
 
 The Eussians, on their side, now saw the necessity 
 of concentrating their forces. By the so-called in- 
 vestment of Shumla they had not only attained no 
 results, but had suffered great losses in the several 
 skirmishes ; for instance, the number of slain was 
 reckoned at 1500 during the surprise of the 26th 
 August. Above all, they could not but feel a con- 
 viction that the enemy, who had grown bolder and 
 more observant, was likely to obtain still more deci- 
 sive advantages by enterprises of a similar nature, 
 conducted on a larger scale. 
 
 The Eussian troops had already passed six weeks 
 on a bare plain in front of Shumla, with the ther- 
 mometer at 120 to 135 in the sun at noonday. The 
 privations endured in this wholly exhausted district, 
 the labour of erecting forts and of the daily service, 
 had shaken the physical condition, as much as the 
 
Chap. VII. SIEGE pp SHUMLA. 233 
 
 apparent uselessness of the long stay, and the ill- 
 success of most of the skirmishes, had lowered the 
 moral tone of the army. The troops lived on bis- 
 cuit and beef; but the latter was very bad, as the 
 oxen were rendered lean by the long journey, and 
 were sickly. But it was still more difficult, after so 
 long a stay in one place, to procure forage for the 
 horses. The foraging-parties, after exhausting the 
 supplies near them, were forced to extend their 
 search to a distance of above fifteen miles. Had 
 their position been concentrated, they would have 
 allotted especial troops for this service ; but, separated 
 as the detachments were, each division was obliged 
 to shift for itself, and thus it happened that nearly 
 all the cavalry was daily employed in foraging expe- 
 ditions. The smallness of their number was one of 
 the causes why they could not procure food ; had they 
 been more numerous, and stronger in Cossacks espe- 
 cially, they would have had less difficulty in getting 
 forage even in much larger quantities. 
 
 Under such circumstances the loss of the Russians 
 in horses was enormous. The cavalry, which was 
 reduced now to about 3000 men, lost on an average 
 from 100 to 150 horses a day, and with the increasing 
 fatigue of their animals the men lost courage. Two- 
 thirds of the cavalry were dismounted, and could not 
 be relied upon in the field of battle, or even for the 
 service of outposts. 
 
 This chiefly fell upon the infantry, who had to 
 
134 SIEGE OF SHUMLA.' Pabt I. 
 
 do double duty. The wretched food, the bad chalky- 
 water, the over-exertion of the men — lastly, the heat 
 of the days and the comparative cold of the nights — 
 caused much sickness, and the hospitals were over- 
 filled. Scurvy and the itch made sad havoc : there 
 was no water for washing — indeed, scarcely enough 
 to drink ; the condition of the sick was wretched in 
 the extreme, as there was no spot within 100 miles 
 in the rear which was secure against a coup-de-main 
 from the enemy. 
 
 The Turkish cavalry, to whom the northern en- 
 trances into the camp were quite open, could do what 
 they liked, as the heavy and enfeebled Eussian horses 
 could never come to close quarters with them. The 
 Turks made excursions to the rear of the Russian 
 camp as far as Jenibazar, where the depots were kept, 
 and the long trains of loaded waggons and pack- 
 horses fell an easy prey ; the Turks became more bold 
 and troublesome every day. But above all, the Eus- 
 sian position was most dangerous ; it stretched twenty- 
 five miles from Strandcha, as far as Kotesch, in the 
 face of an enemy superior in numbers and able at 
 any moment to direct their whole force Tuaexpectedly 
 on any single point ; the danger became more immi- 
 nent from the time when the Seraskier seemed to 
 perceive the advantages of his position. 
 
 These were the reasons which decided the Eussian 
 commander to draw the 7th corps nearer to the 3rd, 
 In order to save appearances, the redoubts on the left 
 
Chap. VII. SIEGE OF SHUMLA. 135 
 
 flank were held for a few days after the unfortunate 
 combat of the 27th August, when six of them were 
 destroyed ; the Turks were not slow to discover that 
 this concentration of the Eussian force, necessary as 
 it had long been, must still be considered as the con- 
 sequence of their victory. On the 29th August 
 Turkish reinforcements and long strings of camels 
 loaded with provisions entered Shumla by the road 
 now opened through Eski-Stambul. 
 
 Meanwhile the Seraskier was making prepa- 
 rations for greater enterprises. On the evening of 
 the 9th September trustworthy Bulgarians brought 
 certain intelligence that a Turkish attack might be 
 expected on the following night. The Eussians 
 therefore were not unprepared when 8000 Turks 
 attacked the redoubts 11, 12, and 27, in front of 
 General Eudjewitsch's corps, before day-light ; the 
 attack was repulsed with great loss. The enemy 
 likewise showed themselves on the extreme left flank 
 of Prince Eugene. The prince, with 3000 cavalry 
 and a body of infantry, advanced to the village of 
 Kassapla. General Eudiger was ordered to attack 
 with his division, and soon forced the enemy to 
 retreat ; but the hussars could not make their weary 
 horses come up with the mass of the retreating foe, 
 and during the attack sixteen horses fell down dead 
 from fatigue. 
 
 At length General Wittgenstein determined to 
 concentrate his troops at Jenibazar, and to convert 
 
136 SIEGE OF SHUMLA. Pabt I. 
 
 tlie force investing Shumla into an army of obser- 
 vation. But this union, which was to have been 
 effected on the 10th September, was stopped by 
 orders from Varna, and everything remained in statu 
 quo, only four more redoubts on the left flank of 
 Prince Eugene were given up as untenable. 
 
 The Turkish cavalry made an expedition against 
 the Russian baggage depot at Jenibazar ; another 
 horde attacked the foraging party belonging to the 
 3rd division of hussars, and took 5 officers and 200 
 men prisoners. A Russian major of Lancers con- 
 veying despatches from Silistria, and 100 men who 
 formed his escort, were captured, and a swarm of 
 Turkish horse, under Halil Pasha, attacked the en- 
 trenchments at Pravadi, while some thousand men 
 went to the relief of Silistria. The Grrand Yizier, 
 too, at length advanced from Adrianople towards 
 Aidos, and 14,000 men broke up from Shumla in 
 order to reinforce him. 
 
 Such was the state of things before Shumla. About 
 this time the greatest anxiety was felt in Wallachia, 
 for fear of an invasion by the garrisons of Widdin, 
 Nicopolis, and Rutschuk, as the reserve battalions 
 that were intended as reinforcements, and which at 
 the opening of the campaign were only skeleton regi- 
 ments, had not yet reached the Principalities. Prom 
 Silistria General Roth reported the inadequacy of his 
 resources : the mere blockade of the place was so 
 incomplete, that the Russians could not even prevent 
 
Chap. VII. SIEGE OF SHUMLA. 137 
 
 the cavalry sent from Shumla from entering Silistria. 
 Lastly, the siege of Yarna, the covering of which 
 had been the most important result of the enormous 
 sacrifice of military stores and of time before Shumla, 
 had but just begun, as up to this time a corps had 
 been stationed there which was scarce half as strong 
 as the garrison of the place. 
 
 Putting all these circumstances together, there can 
 be no doubt that the Russian army was in a most 
 critical position during the whole of the months of 
 August and September, and that, had the Turkish 
 generals shown greater activity, and had their troops 
 been more to be depended on, the result of the cam- 
 paign would have been disastrous to the Eussians. 
 
138 SIEGE OF VAENA. Part I. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 SIEGE OF VARNA. 
 
 Varna stands where the Devna and its ■ lakes empty 
 themselves into the sea, in a broad open valley, 
 gently undulating, and covered v^ith orchards and 
 vineyards. The northern side of the valley of the 
 river rises above 1000'. and has exactly the same 
 formation as the mountains of Shumla : it falls sud- 
 denly with a rocky precipice from the flat Bulgarian 
 plain, and then gradually slopes down to the level 
 ground. The distance from these hills to Varna is 
 about three miles ; the southern edge of the valley 
 is nearer, rises more abruptly, and displays the pointed 
 hill-tops and fine forests of the real Balkan. The 
 heights nearest to the fortress, and overlooking it, 
 are above 3000 paces distant. The place therefore 
 is not commanded on any side within some distance, 
 but neither does it fully command the surrounding 
 ground within range. 
 
 In 1828 the fortress (Plan 4) was exactly two and 
 a half miles in circumference, but the western half of 
 the space within the walls was not built upon, and 
 was covered only with the graves of the Moslems. 
 The city contained 25,000 inhabitants, and like all 
 
Ohap. VIII. SIEGE OP VARNA. 139 
 
 Turkish towns had very narrow streets ; it lay along 
 the sea-shore and the valley of the Devna. Although 
 the conduits by which the fountains are supplied 
 might easily be cut off, the town can never want 
 water, as there is a plentiful supply, from the wells 
 and from the Devna. On the lowest spot, closely 
 surrounded with houses, is an old castle with walls 
 and towers, the substructure of which is of Byzantine 
 origin, but which is too small and unimportant to be 
 of any use in the defence of the place, and was only 
 used as a powder magazine. 
 
 The main enceinte ends at the tower T, on the 
 edge of the precipice which falls perpendicularly 
 down to the sea to a depth of 40' ; it is then con- 
 tinued to the north and west round Varna as far as 
 the river Devna. The enceinte consisted of an earth- 
 wall of small height, defended by ten bastions, whose 
 faces were capable of holding six guns, while the 
 narrow flanks only had room for one. Altogether 
 Varna was armed with 162 guns, which were all 
 fired through embrasures, the sides of which were 
 Kned with strong wickerwork. The inner scarp 
 of the parapet was faced inside the bastions with 
 strong planks, the outer one with wickerwork. The 
 ramparts along the curtain were so narrow that it 
 was not possible to place guns upon them. Their 
 parapets were protected within by pahsades, the 
 tops of which projected somewhat above the crest^ 
 and thus protected the skirmishers against the 
 
140 SIEGE OF VAENA. Pabt 1. 
 
 musketry of the besiegers. The ditch was narrow, 
 and with a walled scarp and counterscarp ; it was 
 dry everywhere except where a small brook flowed 
 into it at the eastern end. There were no permanent 
 outworks in front of the main wall, and no covered 
 way. On the other hand, the Turks had thrown up 
 three lunettes, f g h, about 500 paces before the west 
 front, and a fort, P, which lay some 1500 paces to 
 the north of the place. Although these were mere 
 earthworks hastily thrown up, the gorges remained 
 open, and although the fort, P, could not be sup- 
 ported by the fire of the fortress, we shall find that 
 the Turks maintained themselves in them at a time 
 when the regular attack had advanced so far as to 
 gain possession of the ditch. Besides this, during 
 the course of the siege a regular labyrinth of Turkish 
 lodgments was formed all round the fortress, as the 
 defenders of Varna made use of every inequality of 
 ground to plant a body of men. We shall presently 
 see in how masterly a manner the Turks used the 
 dry ditch as a means of defence. On the southern 
 front a narrow tete-du-pont stood opposite the stone 
 bridge over the Devna, and behind this, from bastion 
 10 as far as the precipitous rocky wall on the sea- 
 board, the gorge of the fortress was only closed by 
 a detached wall. 
 
 The level between the lower part of the Devna 
 lake and the sea is always marshy, and only passable 
 close to the sea where the waves have covered the 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OP VAENA. 141 
 
 marsh-land with sand. The Devna also has a marshy 
 bottom, and can only be crossed by bridges above the 
 mill. But it is fordable anywhere below the tete-du- 
 pont. It was, therefore, no impossible undertaking 
 to land troops on the sandy flats somewhere near the 
 burial-ground, and supported by the fire of the gun- 
 boats to throw down the detached wall, and thus to 
 force a way into the town past the narrow tete-du- 
 pont. Such a coup-de-main might have been attended 
 with success in May, and even in June, when Varna 
 was unprepared, and the garrison weak. But the 
 Russians were then occupied in erecting the dyke at 
 Satunovo, and the flotilla was cruizing before Anapa. 
 Later, when the place had a garrison of 15,000 men, 
 of whom 7000 were Arnauts, this was out of the 
 question. 
 
 The western side was the natural front of attack in 
 a regular siege. On the narrow road from Pravadi 
 it was possible to approach along lake Devna to 
 within 500 paces of the detached works without 
 being perceived, and a group of low hills afforded 
 shelter as far as g ; moreover the bastions 7, 8, and 
 9 would have been easily enfiladed from the hill over 
 which the road leads from Baltjik. The Turks most 
 likely expected an attack on this point, as this was the 
 side which they attempted to protect by outworks. 
 We shall see, however, that at a subsequent period the 
 Russians attacked the north-eastern front of the 
 fortress along the sea, in order to keep open their 
 
142 SIEGE OF VARNA. Part I. 
 
 cotomunication with the fleets. Considering the 
 smallness of their force, as opposed to a strong and 
 enterprising garrison, it was most important for 
 them to secure at least one flank. Here also a small 
 valley, h — 1200 paces from the main wall— -afforded 
 them shelter from the direct fire of the fortress; 
 several ravines worn by the winter-torrents formed 
 natural approaches ; and as the ditch before the point 
 of junction near the sea was formed by a broad 
 natural valley, half the height of the walled scarp 
 was visible and open to cannonade from the plain. 
 On the other hand, the main wall from bastion No. 4 
 to 1 could nowhere well be enfiladed or reached by 
 ricochet fire ; as the only height whence this could 
 be done was above 2000 paces distant, and moreover 
 was occupied by the fort P. Moreover the ground 
 on which the wall was built sank so much from bas- 
 tion 4 to 1 that little could be expected from ricochet 
 fire. Lastly, on this side the main wall showed the 
 most considerable profile, as the ditch along which 
 the small brook ran into the sea attained a depth of 
 40 feet near its mouth. 
 
 "We have already mentioned how, on the 14th of 
 July, Adjutant-General Suchtelen advanced with a 
 small division upon Yarna, and, even after the arrival 
 of Greneral Uschakoff from Tultcha, could do nothing 
 but observe the town from a distance. On the 17th 
 the Capudan-Pasha arrived from Constantinople with 
 5000 men, mostly regular troops, and entered the 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OE VAENA. 143 
 
 fortress on the soutli side in the face of the Eussians. 
 On the following day General Suchtelen was obliged 
 to return to Kosludja with his corps of 4 battalions 
 and 4 squadrons, leaving General Uschakoff with 
 only 4 battalions and 5 squadrons in front of an 
 enemy far superior to him in point of numbers. 
 
 No sooner had the Turks perceived the departure 
 of General Suchtelen, than they attacked the right 
 wing of the Russians on the morning of the 20th of 
 July. General Suchtelen sent back 1 battalion and 
 2 squadrons, and these troops succeeded in driving 
 back a Turkish division that had crossed over the 
 ford of Gebedje and were attacking General Uscha- 
 kofPs right flank. The Russians offered a most 
 obstinate resistance. Meanwhile General Uschakoff 
 could not but see that it would be imprudent to 
 remain so close to a very superior foe. The corps of 
 observation, therefore, withdrew to the village of 
 Derbent ("pass"), 10 miles from Varna, where they 
 threw up entrenchments and remained a fortnight 
 inactive awaiting the arrival of General Benkendorff 
 with the 1st battalion of the 10th division. 
 
 The fleet, under the command of Admiral Greig, 
 consisting of 8 ships of the line, 5 frigates, some 
 cutters and gunboats, and many transports, after 
 being detained some days by contrary winds at the 
 roadstead of Kavarna, reached Yarna at the begin- 
 ning of August, and anchored about 7 miles off the 
 fortress. It had on board the 3rd brigade of the 
 
144 SIEGE OP VARNA. Part I. 
 
 7th division, which had hitherto been successfully 
 employed in the capture of Anapa. Vice- Admiral 
 Prince Menschikoff, who now took the command of 
 the besieging army, justly appreciating the oppor- 
 tunity afforded by the appearance of the Eussian 
 fleet, broke up his quarters at Derbent, and returned 
 on the 3rd of August to Yarna. The Turks had 
 taken up an advantageous position 3 miles to the 
 south of Yarna, but were routed by the rapid ad- 
 vance of a Eussian battalion, and driven back into 
 the fortress. Hereupon the Eussians took up their 
 position. As the convent of St. Constantine, about 
 7 miles from Yarna, had been abandoned by the 
 Turks, the Eussians built a landing-bridge there, and 
 made a road over the stony but not very high cliffs. 
 A second landing-place was made nearer Yarna, and 
 protected by a redoubt which had a front of 400 
 paces, and abutted in the rear upon the steep preci- 
 pice. These works were made by 283 men, mostly 
 sailors, who were chiefly employed at the commence- 
 ment of the siege of Yarna in throwing up earth- 
 works. They, however, proceeded but slowly, and it 
 took four days to complete the redoubt, as the tools 
 were insufficient, and the men were frequently called 
 off for other services. The communication with the 
 fleet was, however, restored. A brigade of infantry 
 had been put on shore at Kavarna, and this brigade, 
 together with the 19 th regiment of chasseurs on 
 foot, commanded by the Emperor himself, the horse 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OP VARNA. 145 
 
 chasseurs of the regiment Swersk, 50 Cossacks, and 
 12 guns, all coming from Shnmla, arrived on the 5th 
 August before Varna, and raised the investing corps 
 to ahout 9000 men. 
 
 These were as follows : — 
 
 Of the 3rd corps of the 7th division 8 battalions squadrons. 
 
 „ „ 10th „ 6 „ „ 
 
 „ „ mounted chasseurs „ 4 „ 
 
 7th „ 18th division 4 „ „ 
 
 Lancers of the Bug (Cossacks) „ 5 „ 
 
 18 battalions 9 squadrons. 
 
 After the Emperor had reviewed' these troops and 
 the fleet, he gave orders for commencing the siege 
 of Yarna, 
 
 But the means of carrying on the siege with ad- 
 vantage were wanting : the guards had not even 
 reached the Danube, and it was impossible to invest 
 the place on both sides of lake Devna, owing to the 
 strength of the garrison. The Eussians were still 
 unprovided with a battering train, and were obliged 
 to make shift with cannon from the fleet, which were 
 served by artillerymen from the ships and by sailors. 
 
 In order not to witness a second failure, the Em- 
 peror, accompanied by the whole diplomatic corps, 
 sailed to Odessa, where he remained from the 8th of 
 August till the 2nd of September, the period when 
 the much wished-for reinforcements were expected to 
 
 arrive. 
 
 The first thing Prince Menschikoflf did was to 
 
146 SIEGE OF VARNA. Paet I. 
 
 fortify his position— which was 2000 paces distant 
 from the fortress, and stretched from the sea to lake 
 Devna, a distance of 5 miles — by a line of redoubts. 
 The redoubt No. 2, which was begun on the 6th of 
 August, was finished on the following night by a 
 working party of 150 men and one company of pio- 
 neers. A battalion of infantry covered the men 
 while at work, and suffered some loss from the fire 
 of the place, which continued the whole of the fol- 
 lowing day. "We have already said the distance was 
 2000 paces. 150 men and a company of pioneers 
 finished the redoubt No. 1, which was armed with 
 3 guns. Moreover the redoubt No. 3, for 5 pieces of 
 cannon, was begun by 3 companies of pioneers, and 
 was finished and provided with field-pieces on the 
 following day. The Turks in a sortie killed one 
 Russian officer and several men. 
 
 On the 6th August a sort of first parallel was com- 
 menced at a distance of 1000 paces, at a point which 
 was not visible from the fortress. 
 
 On the 7th August the Turks again made an at- 
 tempt to take the redoubt No. 3. Repeated assaults 
 failed, and the combat lasted till nine o'clock at night. 
 The Russians lost 3 officers; 37 men were wounded 
 and 23 killed or missing. A frigate and a bomb- 
 vessel bombarded the town, and on the following 
 night a division of gunboats attacked the Turkish 
 flotilla in the harbour. Spite of the fire of the for- 
 tress, the Turks lost 16 vessels with 5 guns; the loss 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OP VAENA. 147 
 
 of the Eussians was 3 officers and 37 men. The 
 Turks only saved two boats, which were drawn up 
 on shore. 
 
 The redoubt No. 4 was then begun, finished, and 
 armed with three guns on the following night ; two 
 of these were directed against the Turkish fort P. 
 
 On the 9th August the redoubt No. 5 was com- 
 pleted, and commenced firing on the 10th. The 
 Turks again made sorties against the works ; during 
 these combats the Russians lost 2 staff officers, 8 
 officers, and about 190 men killed or wounded. On 
 that same day, at 2000 paces from the fortress and 
 next to the redoubt by the landing-place, the Russians 
 began making a long entrenchment for the skir- 
 mishers ; on the right wing of this, the redoubt No. 6 
 was constructed and armed on the 11th August. 
 
 During the next few days the Russians were occu- 
 pied in completing the entrenchment at the landing- 
 place, and in repairing the latter, which had suffered 
 from the surf. 
 
 During the night of the 12th a working-party of 
 320 erected the redoubt No. 7 about 1100 paces from 
 the fortress. The fire which the Turks directed 
 against them did no harm. 
 
 The Turks still maintained themselves in their fort 
 P, which intersected the whole fortified position of 
 the Russian army. Not wishing to storm the fort, 
 the Russians, during the night of the 12th August, 
 built the redoubt No. 8, in which they placed three 
 
 L 2 
 
148 SIEGE OF VABNA. Part I. 
 
 cannon : the object was to make the Turks uneasy 
 about their retreat. During the same night they 
 began a long trench for skirmishers, which ran 600 
 paces from the redoubt No. 7 to the sea, and was 
 completed on the following day : in it was erected a 
 battery for 2 mortars. 
 
 In order, if possible, to invest Yarna on the 
 southern side, a detachment of cavalry with two 
 guns under the command of a captain of Don Cos- 
 sacks, advanced on the 13th against Grebedje. But 
 the detachment fell in with a far superior body of 
 hostile troops, and could not force the passage. Some 
 days later one battalion of chasseurs was sent to rein- 
 force this detachment, and General Akinfief took the 
 command of the whole division, which was provi- 
 sioned by means of two armed boats which were 
 carried across the land into lake Devna and there 
 floated. So weak a corps could not, however, main- 
 tain its position so near the fortress, but was forced 
 to look on from a distance while a very large trans- 
 port, protected by 3000 infantry and 2000 cavalry 
 with 20 colours, entered Varna ; this was soon fol- 
 lowed by a second transport convoyed by 3000 men. 
 
 During the night of the 15th August the trenches 
 from the redoubt No. 7 were continued to No. 8, and 
 at their jimction D, close to the sea, the first dis- 
 mounting battery was erected at a distance of 1000 
 paces, and armed with eleven 24-pounders from the 
 ships. Their fire was directed against the bastion 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OP VARNA. 149 
 
 next the sea, against a tower, T, armed with a small 
 gun, and against two small flanks of the fortifica- 
 tion upon the shore, from whence the Turks fired 
 upon the Russian works. At the same time the ap- 
 proach of the fleet was by this means to be rendered 
 easier. The fleet carried 800 guns, and it was hoped 
 with these to pour a destructive fire into the town. 
 But it was discovered that the water was too shallow 
 to admit of the approach of the larger vessels. When 
 the fleet sailed by the town, and fired at the distance 
 of 2000 paces, the damage done was very insigni- 
 ficant. Subsequently, one man-of-war and some gun- 
 boats were always employed on this service, and 
 were relieved from time to time. 
 
 (Plan 4, fig. 2.) — At length in the night of the 
 18th August the real first parallel was opened at a 
 distance of only 300 paces from the fortress. The 
 soil was firm ground, sandy in places; but besides 
 the covering troops the working-party amounted 
 to only 430, who could not do more than finish a 
 space of 300 paces (a h). At daybreak, when the 
 besieged perceived the work, they directed a mur- 
 derous fire of cannon and musketry against it, which 
 was continued during the whole time the work 
 lasted. 
 
 At length on the 21st August the parallel was 
 carried as far as the sea-shore, to c; a battery for 
 two ship's mortars was built at h. 
 
 With the view of interrupting the progress of the 
 
150 SIEGE OP VAENA. Paet I. 
 
 works of attack, the Turks determined upon a great 
 sortie. During a vigorous fire from their guns they 
 attacked the 13th regiment of chasseurs near the sea, 
 and attempted to turn the right wing of the 14th 
 regiment of chasseurs, which rested on the redoubt 
 No. 8, occupied by two companies. The 7th brigade 
 of chasseurs repulsed this attack and took two colours. 
 The Russians lost 72 men, and among others Prince 
 Menschikoff himself was severely wounded. General 
 Perowsky took the command until General Wo- 
 ronzow, to whom the Emperor had intrusted the 
 command, should arrive from Odessa. The loss of 
 the Turks was reckoned at 500 men. 
 
 Had the Russians opened their first parallel nearer, 
 namely, at about 300 paces from Varna, the length 
 would have been so much the less, and would not 
 have exceeded 600 paces. The reason why the 
 attack formed such a point against the place was 
 that the Turks not only kept possession of their re- 
 doubt P, and the lunettes / g h, but had fixed 
 themselves outside the ditch of the town, and in the 
 immediate vicinity of the Russian lines, at the burial- 
 ground R, to the north and to the east of the bastion 
 lY. There they took advantage of every inequality 
 in the ground to surround themselves with a laby- 
 rinth of lodgments, and kept up a communication 
 with the garrison in the town by means of the 
 postern in the front III. IV. The Russians were 
 completely protected on the left by the sea and the 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OF VARNA. 151 
 
 fleet, but on their right flank they were very much 
 exposed, and the more so as the lodgments effected 
 by the Turks were there scarcely 150 paces distant 
 from the right flank of the first parallel. The 
 Russians, therefore, at a, built a battery to contain 
 light field-pieces, so as to clear the ground. Some 
 companies of chasseurs were ordered to drive the 
 enemy out of his entrenchments between that point 
 and d, in which they succeeded, but the besieged soon 
 regained their position and kept possession of it. 
 
 The Russians could think of nothing better to do 
 against the Turkish fort than to erect a new redoubt. 
 No. 9 (fig. 1), opposite to it. This new redoubt was 
 made to communicate with No. 8 by enlarging a 
 watercourse. 
 
 Near the mortar-battery of two ship's mortars, in 
 the first parallel h (fig. 2), a dismounting battery, e, 
 armed with two heavy cannon from the ships, was 
 pointed against the bastion III. and was intended 
 to destroy the gate in the curtain III. IV. Be- 
 sides this, a battery was built at /, opposite to the 
 bastion II., and armed with four ship's cannon and 
 one mortar. These works were much impeded by a 
 well-directed fire of shells and musketry from the 
 Turks. The Russians again attacked the Turkish 
 lodgments at d, on the right flank of the first parallel. 
 The chasseurs of the seventh brigade, and one division 
 of foot, charged with the bayonet, and killed the 
 whole garrison of 100 men. The Russians lost thirty- 
 
■ 152 SIEGE OP VARNA. Paet I. 
 
 one men. Meanwhile the Turks maintained their 
 position in the burial-ground R and at g ; and as 
 the Russians feared lest the Turks might advance by 
 mining against the approaches that were being con- 
 structed, two shafts of mines with listening galleries 
 were made at e and /. The first parallel was con- 
 tinued from nia d. In e a barbette was built for two 
 guns, which were pointed against bastion IV, 
 
 During the night of the 28th of August the Rus- 
 sians built two additional dismounting batteries — the 
 first for one gun at h, and the second for five guns at 
 c. Of the latter, four were pointed against bastion 
 I., and one against the right flank of bastions II. 
 and III. At A a shaft of a mine with listening 
 galleries was commenced, and at cZ a redoubt was 
 constructed for 3 field-pieces, in order to secure the 
 workmen against the sorties of the Turks, and to fire 
 into the Turkish lodgments. Moreover a single sap 
 was carried from Ti in the parallel against the bastion I. 
 
 During the night of the 29th of August the be- 
 sieged made a vigorous attack on the redoubt No. I 
 and forced their way through the embrasures, killing 
 and wounding 24 men. A more important attempt 
 upon this redoubt was to take place on the following 
 day. A number of small detachments both of in- 
 fantry and cavalry came out of the north-western 
 gate of Varna, and mustered behind the lunettes and 
 the small hills. Covered by a vigorous fire from the 
 opposite bastions, the Turkish skirmishers advanced 
 
Chap. Vm. SIEGE OP VAENA. 153 
 
 towards the left along lake Devna, in order to turn 
 the Russian right flank. The cavalry remained as 
 much under cover as they could, ready to take ad- 
 vantage of any success of the infantry. General 
 Woronzow, who had arrived at Varna the day before, 
 was in the work I., and, as the fort could only hold 
 30 files of infantry, the rest of the regiment was 
 ordered to remain on both sides and imder cover of 
 the fort. There were only three grape-shot in the 
 work, and the necessary ammunition had to be sent 
 for in great haste from the park of artillery. The 
 Turks had already driven the Russian skirmishers out 
 of their excavations, when three companies of the 
 Mohilev regiment and some Don Cossacks with two 
 guns turned the fortune of the day. After one of 
 the armed boats on lake Devna had hastened to the 
 scene of action and fired upon the rear of the Turks, 
 the latter gave up the attack for the moment, but 
 remained during the whole day outside the wall of 
 Yarna, with their standards flying in their front. 
 The Russians did not venture to attack the Turkish 
 position by daylight, but on the following night a 
 division of the Mohilev regiment advanced and took 
 the Turkish lunettes, which, however, they again 
 deserted at daybreak, as they could not well hold 
 them owing to their proximity to the fortress, and 
 their distance from the point against which the main 
 force of the Russians had to be directed. 
 
 In consequence of these occurrences it was deter- 
 
154 SIEGE OF VARNA. Paet I. 
 
 mined to erect two new redoubts, Nos. 10 and 11, in 
 order better to secure this part of tbe investing 
 lines. The redoubt No. 11 especially commanded the 
 low-lands by lake Devna, and prevented the enemy 
 from making a covered approach upon the redoubt 
 No. 1. 
 
 During the night of the 2nd of September the 
 sap from k to I came across a Turkish lodgment. 
 The Turks had planted themselves without the Coun- 
 terscarp on the edge of the valley forming the ditch, 
 and prevented the sappers from making any further 
 progress. At about nine o'clock at night a party of 
 volunteers advanced out of the head of the sap, and 
 drove out the Turks at the point of the bayonet, 
 with the loss of 38 men. The pioneers and work- 
 men immediately proceeded to crown the lodgment 
 they had taken, by means of a flying sap, and thus 
 commenced the beginning of the second parallel. This 
 work, rendered more difficult by the intricate posi- 
 tion of the Turkish lodgments, and the heavy fire of 
 mortars, cannon, and musketry from the fortress, was 
 so far completed by daylight over an extent of 300 
 paces, that the sentinels and workmen in the trenches 
 were under cover by the morning. The left^ flank 
 of the attacking party was now protected against 
 sorties, and the besieged, driven back on this front 
 within the ditch, could.no longer oppose the crown- 
 ing of the glacis. On the 5th of September the second 
 parallel was continued as far as the prolongation of 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OF VARNA. 155 
 
 tlie capital of the bastion II. From the first sap they 
 made their way by means of a sap with traverses, 
 and at the point of junction a cannon from the fleet 
 was planted against the flank of bastion II. 
 
 The portion of the first parallel between a and d 
 was in the mean time replaced by one from n to to, 
 and a dismounting battery, to, consisting of three 
 30-pounders from the fleet, constructed against the 
 bastion IV. 
 
 A frigate cruizing in the Black Sea captured two 
 Turkish vessels, and destroyed a third. Admiral 
 Grreig effected a landing at Iniada, south of the 
 Balkan, took 12 guns, and then re-embarked. 
 
 On the 8th of September the Emperor arrived 
 before Varna, and took up his head-quarters on board 
 the Paris. He had embarked on the 2nd at Odessa, 
 but was driven back by contrary winds on the 5th, 
 and then made the journey by land through Satu- 
 novo, Kostendje, and Kavarna. He there reviewed 
 the reinforcements that had arrived from Eussia, and 
 which reached Varna on the 8th and 9th of Sep- 
 tember. These reinforcements consisted of three di- 
 visions of the guards — two of infantry and one of 
 cavalry — ^in all 16 battalions and 16 squadrons, with 
 their field-batteries. Four reserve companies of the 
 7th division and the battalion of body-guard sappers 
 had already reached Varna. The whole besieging 
 corps now consisted of 34 battalions and 25 squadrons, 
 and, allowing a margin for losses by death and sick- 
 
166 SIEGE OF VAENA. Paet I. 
 
 ness, the force might be reckoned at from 18,000 to 
 20,000 men. 
 
 This time the Eussians, besides doing great injury 
 to the tower T, had completely silenced the fire of 
 the bastions I., II., III., and IV., and had knocked 
 to pieces the houses which lay beyond the front I. 
 II. on the slope. A view was obtained through to 
 the low-lying bastion I. The scarp of the bastion 
 was injured, and the works of attack were carried on 
 to within 50 paces of the counterscarp. On the 
 other hand, the fire from the guns and musketry of 
 the besieged never slackened. It is true that the 
 shells, of which the Turks generally threw four 
 or five at a time, were so ill made that they only 
 burst into a few pieces, and often dropped close to 
 the mouth of the cannon. But their musketry was 
 admirably directed. The Turks maintained their 
 position bravely, close to the Eussian sappers and 
 miners, not only in their lunettes and in the fort P, 
 but also outside the counterscarp before the bastion 
 lY., and in the ditch on the side that was attacked. 
 The communications of the fortress with the country 
 on the south side, had never been stopped ; stores of 
 provisions and reinforcements of troops entered the 
 town, transports of wounded and sick were sent away 
 without hindrance, and the continual sorties show 
 that the garrison were not disheartened. Numeri- 
 cally they were not much weaker than the besiegers, 
 they must even have been stronger than the Eus- 
 
Chap. Vm. SIEGE OP VAENA. 157 
 
 sians from the time that the latter divided their 
 forces in order to invest the south front; and when 
 we consider that all the dismounting batteries 
 together were furnished with only 27 ship's guns 
 and 3 mortars, and that, now there could no longer 
 be any doubt as to the side of attack, the Turks 
 might easily mount 100 pieces upon it by simply 
 enlarging the rampart of the curtain which was too 
 narrow to receive them, it must be admitted that 
 the probable result of a two-months' blockade and 
 a three-weeks' siege upon a fortress without per- 
 manent outworks, and without a system of mining, 
 were not likely to be brilliant. When, too, the total 
 inadequacy of the means and appliances for the siege 
 are taken into account, the only wonder is that the 
 attack was in any degree successful, and did not end 
 in the destruction of the Russian troops, especially 
 considering the sad plight they were in at this very 
 time before Shumla and Silistria. 
 
 No sooner had the reinforcements arrived at their 
 camp than the Russians proceeded to surround the 
 south side of the fortress (by which a reinforcement 
 of 500 men had reached it on the 10th of September), 
 and to complete the blockade of the northern front, 
 which was still broken by the Turkish work P, 
 lying full in the rear of the works of attack. Ad- 
 jutant-General GoUowin, with a brigade of chasseur 
 guards, 4 pieces of artillery, and 1 company of sap- 
 pers and miners, joined General Akinfief. This 
 
158 SIEGE OF VABNA. Part I. 
 
 corps was further reinforced by a battalion of the 
 regiment Mohilev, a battalion of the regiment "Wel- 
 lington, and 3 guns ; it now consisted of 5 squadrons 
 and 50 Cossacks, 7 battalions and 9 field-pieces, alto- 
 gether about 5000 men, with which force it crossed 
 the ford of Grebedje, an important point of communi- 
 cation which had been secured by a triangular work 
 with bastions. The situation of so feeble a division, 
 placed between a fortress containing a garrison three 
 times their number and the Turkish reinforcements 
 which were expected from Aidos and Burgas — en- 
 camped in the midst of a hilly forest-country, and 
 separated from all support by lake Devna, and a 
 two-days' march — was indeed far from enviable. 
 In order to execute his appointed task without too 
 much endangering his own safety, the Russian 
 commander took up a flanking position on point 
 Galata, protected in the rear by the promontory 
 of Galata Burnu (Plan 4, fig. 1) ; the wings rested 
 upon deep and rather inaccessible fores1>defiles, the 
 front was immediately entrenched, and the corps 
 could be supplied both with provisions and arma- 
 ments for the work from the fleet. On the other 
 hand, a retreat from this point would have been 
 absolutely impossible, and it cannot be denied that 
 the purpose of cutting off supplies and assistance 
 from Yarna was very incompletely answered by its 
 occupation. The high road from Derveesh-Jowann 
 to Yarna ran past the position out of cannon-range 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OF VABNA. 159 
 
 almost all the way, and, even supposing a few re- 
 doubts were thrown forward in that direction, there 
 still remained an interval of 2i miles between the 
 position and the eastern shore of lake Devna, across 
 which several quite practicable roads led from the 
 high forest-ground down to the fortress. Three re- 
 doubts were thrown up, it is true, on the edge of the 
 plain, and close to the foot of the heights between 
 the sea and lake Devna ; but they could receive no 
 support from the main position, and were very much 
 exposed to a surprise in the direction of the forest. 
 Such was the extent of the blockade of Varna on the 
 south side. Had the corps been strong enough it 
 would undoubtedly have been better placed at the 
 point where the Turkish corps, sent for the relief of 
 the fortress, subsequently posted itself, i. e. on the 
 Kurt-tepe (Wolf's hill), an eminence crossed by the 
 high road, and from which all the gullies radiate 
 down towards the sea, the marshes, and lake Devna. 
 
 In order to take the Turkish work P, 8 more 
 field-pieces were set up in battery in redoubt 4, and 
 2 in redoubt 3, which kept up a vigorous fire against 
 it. The batteries of attack redoubled their activity, 
 and even General GoUowin advanced from his posi- 
 tion as far as the marshes, in order to induce the gar- 
 rison to send a detachment in that direction : of this 
 movement, however, no notice was taken. 
 
 Greneral Woronzoff gave the signal for storming P. 
 300 volunteers from the regiment Simbirsk turned 
 
IGO SIEGE OF VARNA. Part I. 
 
 the work, and forced their way in through its 
 gorge, in the teeth of a tremendous discharge of 
 musketry. The Turks were driven out and pursued. 
 Two companies of the regiment Nisoif occupied the 
 northern faces of the work, upon which the fortress 
 now directed its fire. 
 
 The capture of the work P completed the investment 
 of the place on the north side, and materially short- 
 ened the operations. Redoubt 12 was erected in 
 front of it, and the chains of outposts brought into 
 connection with each other. To guard against sorties 
 the 1st battalion of the Paulow lifeguards with 2 guns 
 were posted as a reserve to redoubts 1 and 11 on the 
 right wing, and the 2nd battalion with 2 guns was 
 allotted as a reserve to redoubt 2, In like manner the 
 Ismailoff" regiment of guards was posted as a support 
 between redoubts 4 and 5, and No. 9 was strength- 
 ened by two companies of the 7th division. Finally, 
 three batteries were erected for the discharge of Con- 
 greve rockets, one close to No. 11, one between 2 and 
 10, and the third upon the right wing of the trenches. 
 
 Meanwhile Major-Greneral Trousson had further ex- 
 tended the works of attack. The besiegers proceeded 
 with double sap from the 2nd parallel towards the 
 points of bulwarks I. and II., and had crowned the 
 counterscarp. In order to drive the • Turkish skir- 
 mishers out of the first bastion and the curtain, 
 battery s was erected in the 2nd parallel for 2 
 mortars and 4 field-pieces. 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OP VAENA. 161 
 
 During the night of the 12th of September 5 mine- 
 shafts at a distance of 44 feet apart were completed 
 in the crowning o of the counterscarp of the opposite 
 bastion I, 
 
 At four in the afternoon a large body of Turks 
 made a rapid sortie, first upon the head of the sap 
 proceeding from the 2nd parallel, and then with 
 renewed violence upon the centre and right wing of 
 the line of attack. After very close firing on both 
 sides, which lasted till nearly seven o'clock in the 
 evening, the Turks were at last repulsed, and their 
 lodgment g, next on the right of the 2nd parallel, 
 occupied by the Russians. 
 
 During the following night the 2nd parallel was 
 extended by flying sap as far as g, where a battery 
 was erected for 4 field-pieces, while at the same time 
 the mines at o were charged with 90icwt. of powder, 
 which was brought up from the fleet by marines. 
 The explosion took place at daybreak. The greatest 
 effect was produced in the ditch, whence a number 
 of stones were hurled over the walls into the town, 
 and occasioned a great loss of men to the Turks both 
 there and in the ditch. The interval of 44' between 
 each of the 5 mines, however, proved to be too great, 
 as, instead of forming one large entonnoir for the 
 whole, each mine formed a separate one. For fear of 
 accident, all the artillerymen, pioneers, and covering 
 parties were withdrawn from the nearest trenches 
 until after the explosion had taken place. 
 
 M 
 
162 SIEGE OF VARNA. Part I. 
 
 The prodigious effect produced by the mines did 
 not, however, seem to throw the garrison into any 
 confusion : as at Brailow, it merely becarne the signal 
 for a vigorous bombardment and fire of small arms, 
 which did not cease until they had ascertained that 
 the explosions were at an end, and what were their 
 results. 
 
 Jussuf Pasha did not absolutely reject the proposals 
 of surrender which were sent to him next day, but 
 he employed the time afforded by the negotiations 
 merely in repairing his embrasures, for which reason 
 the Russians declared them at an end on the 15th. 
 
 Meanwhile the scarp of the face of demi-bastion I. 
 had been partly battered down, and formed a breach, 
 50 paces in width, by which a storming party might 
 enter. It was, however, determined to batter 
 another breach in curtain I. II,, where it joins 
 bastion II. 
 
 It was not until this time that a battering train, 
 as to the strength of which there is no information, 
 arrived before Yarna. As the most important bat-, 
 teries were already armed with ship's guns, and 
 the narrow front of attack along the lake afforded 
 but little opportunity for placing artillery, it was 
 resolved to employ the guns, whose arrival had been 
 so ardently desired, only in enfilading the curtains 
 which were already attacked. On reconnoitring the 
 ground more accurately, it appeared tha,t.the only 
 spot from which this would be possible, viz. the 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OF VAENA. 163 
 
 cemetery E (fig. 1), was still in possession of tlie 
 garrison, and that even thence the enfilade fire would 
 be very ineffective, owing to a fall in the ground. 
 Thus the only purpose to which the battering train 
 was put was to mount the guns in redoubt 1 in 
 order to harass the town from that point. But as 
 all the dwellings were situated in the eastern part 
 of the enceinte at the distance of above a mile, the 
 effect was very slight ; only the Pasha's house, which 
 stood high, was destroyed, and the field-pieces, which 
 the Turks had placed in their lodgments outside the 
 town, were silenced. The wall of the counterscarp in 
 front of bastion 1 was carried back in a straight line, 
 V, along the shore to tower T ; it formed, as it were, 
 a batardeau to the ditch, the sole of which was 
 almost on a level with the sea. In order to approach 
 the tower itself, a way secured by traverses had been 
 carried from the dismounting battery e along the 
 slope to §' ; a communication had likewise been made 
 down to the same point from o-. A battery for 3 12- 
 pounders was erected at q, in order to enfilade the 
 coast, and to sweep the flank of the works on the 
 shore. 
 
 The construction of this battery presented great 
 difficulties, owing to the deep cutting required to 
 secure it in the Kght sand of the flat sea-shore. At 
 the same time a way into the ditch was broken 
 through the batardeau v. The fire of a 12-pounder 
 mounted at o set fire to the tower, which was com- 
 
 M 2 
 
164 SIEGE OP VARNA. Paet I. 
 
 pletely gutted; the flank was much, damaged, and 
 the Turks withdrew their artillery, probably in order 
 to reserve it in case the fortress should be stormed. 
 
 On the right wing of attack the sap was finished as 
 far as the counterscarp opposite bastion II., which was 
 done with great labour owing to the rapid slope of 
 the ground towards the ditch. From thence it was 
 carried to the right and to the left, and- a breaching- 
 battery, r, was erected for eight heavy ships' guns 
 and two stone mortars. 
 
 On the morning of the 20th breaching-battery r 
 opened its fire ; the scarp was not high, and before 
 long a slope was formed, at an angle of 45°, against 
 the curtain and even against the flank of bastion 
 II, by the falling earth ; a long-continued fire pro- 
 duced no other result. During the night of the 
 21st the sap made towards tower T very nearly 
 reached its foot. As the assailants advanced open- 
 ings were made in the batardeau in order to clear 
 the ditch by rifle-fire. Small as these openings were, 
 a number of Russian skirmishers were wounded 
 through them. Accordingly embrasures were made 
 in the batardeau for two field-pieces, in order to 
 sweep the ditch more effectually. 
 
 The courage and obstinacy of the garrison in the 
 defence of bastion I, appeared to increase every day ; 
 they likewise kept possession of the shell of the burnt 
 tower, from whence they poured an admirably di- 
 rected and most murderous fire of small arms upon the 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OF VARNA. 165 
 
 adjacent works. The project of entering or turning 
 the tower was therefore abandoned, the rather as the 
 assistance afforded by the fleet was far less than had 
 been expected. Accordingly the sap was not carried 
 any further towards the tower. Two field-pieces had 
 been placed behind the batardeau to sweep the ditch 
 in front of bastion I. and two more to enfilade the 
 curtain I. II. at a considerable elevation; but it 
 turned out impossible to protect them suflSciently by 
 means of traverses against the main wall by which 
 they were commanded, and they were soon silenced 
 by the incessant fire of small arms and discharge of 
 hand-grenades and combustibles from the tower. 
 Spite of the Cohorn mortars, both small ones, and 20- 
 pounders, which were placed in the entonnoir of the 
 mine, the activity of the defence in bastion I. oppo- 
 site only increased ; the besiegers were already short 
 of ammunition, the fragments of the grenades fell 
 back into the trenches, and altogether the Turks 
 threw more shells and grenades out of the fortress 
 than the Russians could throw into it. Another dif- 
 ficulty was the extreme dryness of the soil with which 
 the works of attack had to be constructed, and owing 
 to which a single shell often destroyed the work of 
 many hours. 
 
 There were now two practicable breaches, namely, 
 in bastion I. and in the curtain next to bastion II. 
 The daily losses among the besiegers from the enemy's 
 fire, as weU as from hardship and overwork, were 
 
166 SIEGE OF VABNA. Part I. 
 
 very great ; alarming diseases, according to some ac- 
 counts even the plague, attacked the troops ; the 
 season was far advanced, the position of the main 
 army before Shumla very critical, and a Turkish 
 army was advancing to the relief of Yarna. It was 
 most urgent to end this state of things as soon as 
 possible by the capture of Varna. To take it by 
 storm would, under the circumstances, have been quite 
 in the style of the Russian infantry. The reason 
 alleged for not attempting it was, that in front of 
 the breaches in the ditch there was a watercourse, of 
 which the depth could not be ascertained, as the Turks 
 still kept possession of the ditch with unexampled 
 boldness, and had thrown up some small entrench- 
 ments on the sole of it. It is true that this might 
 have given a serious check at the moment of storm- 
 ing ; but moral causes probably had greater weight. 
 The self-reliance of the assailants was shaken by the 
 long duration and the smallness of the results of their 
 exertions and sufferings, and that of the besieged 
 strengthened by their successful resistance, while they 
 learnt fresh courage in almost daily sorties. Already 
 they saw the horse-tails of Omar Yrione on the 
 wooded heights behind the fortress, and tidings of 
 victory reached them from Shumla. There their bul- 
 warks were in ruins ; but the Turkish soldier, well 
 fed and plentifully supplied with ammunition, was no 
 doubt firmly resolved to defend his wife, his children, 
 his home, and his faith, as long as he could stand in 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OP VARNA. 167 
 
 the breach. The conduct of the Turks in so many 
 sorties had made a great impression on the Russians, 
 who had not yet forgotten Brailow. To be beaten 
 back in an attack would, as matters stood in the 
 autumn of 1828, not only have compelled the Rus- 
 sians to raise the siege, but would unquestionably 
 have led to a disastrous termination of the campaign. 
 
 In order not to break the thread of this narrative, 
 the proceedings on the south side of Yarna shall be 
 related hereafter, the more so as they had no imme- 
 diate effect upon the progress of the siege. 
 
 The Russians, not venturing to stOrm the place, 
 now directed all their efforts towards the further 
 destruction of the front of attack by mining, to 
 crowning the breaches, and to inducing the garrison 
 to capitulate by the terrors of an assault which ap-' 
 peared more imminent every day. The difSculty 
 was to reach the scarp across the ditch so resolutely 
 defended by the Turks. It was resolved to effect this 
 by means of covered galleries, and to batter down 
 with artillery the places in the walls at which the 
 galleries of the mines were to be constructed. 
 
 With this intention three descents into the ditch 
 were undertaken, the first on the left wing in front 
 of the entonnoir o, next to the sea, from which the 
 Russians reacl^d the sole of the ditch and crossed it 
 diagonally by covered sap. The mantelets were let 
 down through the wall with ropes, but, in consequence 
 of the enormous loss of sappers and miners, it took 
 
168 SIEGE OF VARNA. Pakt I. 
 
 three days and nights only to reach the middle of the 
 ditch. 
 
 The two other descents were effected on either side 
 of the dismounting battery r. The besiegers went 
 forward with covered sap, but had scarcely advanced 
 6' towards the left before the mantelet reached the 
 abrupt edge of the watercourse within the ditch. On 
 the following day the sap on the right was met at 
 the end of 12 paces by the same obstacle, which was 
 the more difficult to surmount, seeing that a division 
 of 400 Turks kept their station with inconceivable 
 obstinacy in the ditch before front I. II. These 
 brave fellows had covered themselves as well as they 
 were able on the sole of the ditch by trenches and 
 lodgments. Up to this time they had communicated 
 'with the garrison by the postern in the third front, 
 but this retreat was now cut off by the progress of 
 the works of attack, and the only one left to them in 
 case of necessity was by the breach exposed to the 
 whole fire of the besiegers. Spite of this, and 
 although they had already lost half their number by 
 the enfilading fire from the batardeau v, they main- 
 tained their post with imflinching courage, and mate- 
 rially impeded the progress of the covered sap by an 
 admirably directed fire of musketry, and altogether 
 prevented the possibility of a night surprise. 
 
 The continuation of the second parallel and of the 
 crowning to the right of battery r had to be given 
 up for the present, partly on account of the fire in 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OF VARNA. 169 
 
 the rear from the Turkisli lodgments on the glacis in 
 front of bastion lY., partly for want of pioneers. It 
 likewise became necessary again to direct some guns 
 upon bastion lY., as the Turks renewed their fire 
 from thence. On the night of the 25th Colonel Pose- 
 rowski stormed the lunettes g and h (Plan lY. fig. 
 1), and took a Turkish field-piece. During the fol- 
 lowing night four mine-shafts, u, were sunk to the left 
 of the dismounting battery and the descent, and be- 
 hind the counterscarp ; they were 33 feet apart, and 
 charged with 127 cwt. of powder : towards daybreak 
 they exploded. The wall of the counterscarp in front 
 of the shafts was thrown down, but the earth which 
 was blown up did not fill up the watercourse as was 
 expected. The Turks replied to the explosion by a 
 fire of small arms from the opposite curtain, which 
 lasted several hours, and materially increased the 
 difficulty of replacing in the embrasures the guns 
 which had been withdrawn during the explosion. 
 The descent on the left of r had not been materially 
 damaged ; the edge of the entonnoir in front and the 
 higher part of it at the back were crowned and occu- 
 pied by skirmishers, and two covered saps, of which 
 one was to turn in the direction of bastion II., were 
 carried from it into the ditch. In order at least to 
 dry up the watercourse, an opening was made quite 
 at the bottom of batardeau v, through which the 
 dammed-up water might run off. 
 
 We have seen that the covered sap and the enton- 
 
170 SIEGE OF VABNA. Pabt I. 
 
 noir of the left wing, (?, reached no farther than the 
 middle of the ditch, and great diflSculties stood in the 
 way of their continuation. An attempt was made to 
 carry a subterranean gallery to the foot of bastion I., 
 but the soil consisted of a firm limestone deposit, 
 through which the miners could not penetrate 
 above 6' in forty-eight hours. This work had 
 therefore to be given up and the covered sap to be 
 continued. When the base of the escarpment wall 
 was reached, a gallery was carried beneath the point 
 of bastion I. 
 
 The attack upon bastion II. was intrusted to the 
 sappers of the life-guards. We have seen that at 
 this point the covered sap had advanced as far as 
 the watercourse, which was supposed to be about 
 10 feet deep. Accordingly on the 27th the sap 
 leading into the ditch to the right of battery r was 
 sunk stepwise to a depth of 10 feet, and then car- 
 ried forward with a gradual downward slope. At 
 four in the afternoon of the 28th daylight appeared 
 through an opening in the side of the excavation, 
 and the pioneers discovered to their surprise that 
 they had not reached the sole of the cleft by 12'. 
 The opposite bank was a smooth steep wall of earth 
 22' in height. They likewise saw the Turks moving 
 in great numbers to and fro between the lodgments 
 and bastion I. Under these circumstances, which 
 were the more difficult as the besieged had already 
 observed the works and seemed to be taking measures 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OP VARNA. - 171 
 
 of defence against them, the only thing to be done 
 was to continue the underground gallery so far as to 
 leave only a thin wall of earth which might be broken 
 through in a moment as soon as preparations could 
 be made for a. descent into the cleft. In the mean 
 time two armed sappers and two chasseurs were 
 posted behind the opening, with strict orders to watch 
 the enemy's movements, but not to fire unless in case 
 of extreme necessity. But the Turks, who had 
 already perceived the little opening, slily pulled out 
 the stuff with which it had been filled up. From 
 seven in the evening until midnight the Russians, 
 however, kept perfectly quiet, and at length the 
 Turks seemed to lose their apprehensions, and less 
 frequently came to listen at the opening. At mid- 
 night, when aU was ready, two sappers broke through 
 the thin wall of earth which had been left at the mo- 
 ment just as the Turkish sentinel who was mounting 
 guard in the watercourse moved away from the end 
 of the gallery. Scarcely, however, had they done so 
 before several Turks made their appearance out of 
 the lodgment on the edge of the watercourse ; the 
 sappers hastily withdrew, and two others covered the 
 opening with shields which had been prepared for 
 the purpose. !Now that their intentions were known, 
 nothing was left to the Russians but to act resolutely 
 on the offensive and to take advantage of the care- 
 lessness of the Turks, who had suffered the under- 
 ground passage to be opened. 
 
172 SIEGE OP VARNA. Part I. 
 
 In the course of a few minutes a number of Turks 
 assembled, and were received witb a discharge of 
 musketry through the loopholes in the shield, and 
 with hand-grenades thrown over the top. They dis- 
 persed on either side and endeavoured to creep up to 
 the opening of the gallery, but were always reached 
 by a divergent fire from the safe position behind the 
 shield. This skirmish, which occasioned great loss to 
 the Turks, lasted no less than two hours, at the end 
 of which they withdrew to their nearest entrench- 
 ments, whence they kept up a vigorous fire upon the 
 gallery. The Russians at once proceeded to con- 
 struct the descent, for which purpose two shields, each 
 12 feet long and 3 wide, and made of li-inch planks 
 overlapping each other, were lowered as quickly as 
 possible in a slanting direction from the two side 
 walls of the gallery down to the watercourse. No 
 sooner had the Turks observed this proceeding, 
 which was new to them, than they again advanced 
 towards the works and endeavoured to destroy the 
 shields which had been lowered into the watercourse. 
 Although strongly secured to the second framework 
 from the opening of the gallery, the shields were 
 very nearly thrown down. As soon as they were 
 again set up and made fast, and a few feet of earth 
 cut away, four skirmishers were placed behind them, 
 who swept the ditch through the loopholes and 
 prevented the Turks from coming near the works. 
 Meanwhile two other shields, each 6 feet in length, 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OP VAENA. 173 
 
 were set up and made fast, so that by means of them 
 the water might be reached. Thus much was finished 
 by ten o'clock on the morning of the 28th, and 
 nothing further was done during the day, because the 
 materiel for crossing the watercourse and getting up 
 to the bastion had to be got ready. In order to cover 
 the intended movement, the lodgment in the counter- 
 scarp to the right of battery r, and the second parallel 
 in the direction of beyond y, had been carried on 
 under great difficulties. Loopholes had Hkewise been 
 made in the counterscarp wall in order to post skir- 
 mishers there under cover from those of the enemy 
 on the main wall. 
 
 At eight o'clock in the evening the passage across 
 the watercourse was begun. It was first filled up 
 with fascines, on each side of which were placed side 
 by side a double row of gabions filled with brush- 
 wood, and on the top of these a single row made fast 
 with stakes and with two rows of fascines laid length- 
 ways. On the further side of the watercourse open- 
 ings were left into the gallery, and lodgments con- 
 structed outside them for skirmishers, who would 
 be able to see the approach of the enemy in good 
 time, and thus to avert mischief. By this passage 
 the Turks posted in the lodgments to the left of it as 
 far as bastion I. were completely cut off, and in con- 
 sequence the musketry fire gradually became fainter 
 on that side, though it continued with unremitting 
 violence from the entrenchments on the right of the 
 
174 SIEGE OF VABNA. Part I. 
 
 crossing-place. The rapidity with which the work 
 advanced, and its almost unexpected success, did not 
 give the Turks time or opportunity to make a deci- 
 sive attack upon them during the night. Every 
 nerve was strained by the Russians to carry on the 
 gallery, if possible, as far as the foot of the bastion 
 before daybreak. 
 
 In order to construct a covered way up the scarp 
 of the watercourse, two double rows of gabions filled 
 with brushwood were placed up the slope of the 
 scarp, and on the top of each of these a single row : 
 the gabions were made fast with stakes, and the 
 whole covered in with fascines, so as to protect the 
 pioneers against stones and hand-grenades. More- 
 over, as the gallery advanced, a ladder was con- 
 structed to facilitate the ascent. The work proceeded 
 with such extraordinary rapidity that by daybreak 
 the gallery was carried up to the wall of the bastion, 
 whence a second gallery to the right was constructed 
 to the point of the bastion, and from there along the 
 left face of bastion II. 
 
 At seven in the morning the first miner broke an 
 entrance in the right face of the bastion at a place 
 which had already been battered by artillery, and 
 two hours later a second was made close to the right 
 shoulder of the bastion. The crowning of the counter- 
 scarp had not yet advanced beyond the angle in front 
 of bastion III., beyond which the Turks accordingly 
 could assemble undisturbed, and soon placed guns 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OP VARNA. 175 
 
 in the ditch, with which they swept the left face of 
 bastion II. lengthwise and destroyed the covered way 
 to it, which had not been suiEciently covered in. 
 Moreover the fierce fire of musketry from the lodg- 
 ments in the ditch forced the miners to abandon for 
 a time the works they had just begun. The covered 
 way leading to the second gallery was, however, 
 quickly repaired, and the mining was begun again, 
 so that towards evening the first gallery had ad- 
 vanced 12' and the second 4', 
 
 Towards evening a great concourse of Turks was 
 seen in the ditch, in front of bastion III., among 
 whom, to judge from his numerous suite, was a pasha. 
 After talking for about a quarter of an hour, and 
 pointing frequently towards the works, he withdrew 
 to the fortress, followed by a great number of the 
 assembled Turks. From all this the Eussians inferred 
 that the Turks intended to make a decisive attack 
 upon them, and measures were taken accordingly. 
 
 By two o'clock in the morning the covered way 
 round the left face of the bastion was completed, so 
 that the miners could again get to the last two open- 
 ings in the wall of the escarpment ; by this time the 
 first gallery had advanced 14 feet, and the miners 
 began to sink the shaft, which, in case of necessity, 
 was to be converted into a mine chamber, so that, at 
 the worst, one of the four mines might be charged 
 directly. 
 
 On the 1st of October, at three in the morning, a 
 
176 SIEGE OP VARNA. Part I. 
 
 thick fog arose, which rendered it impossible to 
 observe the enemy from a distance ; at four the alarm 
 was given. A body of Turks, above 1000 strong, 
 had crept quietly along the wall of the counterscarp 
 and in the watercourse, and attempted to approach 
 the passage across the ditch. The skirmishers fired 
 only a few shots upon the Turks, and then withdrew 
 with the pioneers through the gallery to the glacis ; 
 but as this was very narrow, some of the miners 
 and skirmishers had to make their escape from the 
 violent rush of the Turks through the embrasures of 
 the breaching battery. 
 
 The Turks rushed with frantic yells upon the gal- 
 lery, began to pull down and set fire to all the 
 material with furious and fanatical violence, and 
 spread themselves from the commencement of the 
 gallery to the mines, without taking any heed of 
 the canister-shot from six guns placed upon the 
 counterscarp, four which stood near the sea and 
 enfiladed the ditch, or of the close fire of small 
 arms from the embrasures of the counterscarp wall. 
 The Turks, not content with destroying the works, 
 endeavoured even to force their way through the 
 embrasures of the two batteries, but were repulsed 
 with considerable loss, Regardless of the inevitable 
 destruction to which they were exposing themselves, 
 they did not begin to retreat until six in the morning, 
 taking with them their own killed and wounded, the 
 heads of many of their enemies, and a Russian fal- 
 
-Chap. Vm. SIEGE OF VAKNA. 177 
 
 conet, whicli had been placed beyond the wooden 
 mantelet at the end of the sap, on the left face of 
 bastion II., a point upon which four guns from the 
 counterscarp could direct their fixe, in order to sweep 
 the ditch in front of bastion III. No sooner had 
 the Turks retreated than the Russians set to work to 
 restore the whole covered trench up to bastion II., and 
 in a very short time they reconstructed it and rebuilt 
 the wooden walls which had been burnt by the 
 Turks, and which covered the descent into the water- 
 course. By ten in the morning the covered trench was 
 so far repaired that the miners were able to return to 
 the first gaUery, and by two in. the afternoon to 
 resume work in the second. The other galleries were 
 given up, as it was clearly impossible to finish them 
 at the same time with the first two. The covered 
 trench along and behind the wall of the counterscarp 
 was now carried beyond the angle before bastion III., 
 and skirmishers were posted behind loopholes cut 
 aslant in the wall ; their fire forced the Turks, who 
 had hitherto sheltered themselves behind the angle of 
 the counterscarp, to retreat to some distance, taking 
 with them the guns which swept the left face of the 
 bastion. 
 
 At eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 2nd the 
 Eussians suddenly heard the sound made by the 
 advance of a coxmtermine, and endeavoured to mis- 
 lead the Turkish miners by knocking against the 
 walls of the gallery. This unpleasant circumstance 
 
178 SIEGE OF VARNA. Part I. 
 
 delayed the progress of the work considerably ; 
 nevertheless by evening the first gallery beneath 
 bastion I. was carried to a depth" of 10 feet, and the 
 chamber for an overcharged mine was begun. At 
 this time the second gallery was only 9 feet deep, and 
 therefore nothing could be begun there but the cham- 
 ber of an ordinary mine, as the object was to get 
 both finished by the same time, so as to charge them 
 without delay at daybreak. 
 
 As a fresh attack on the part of the Turks was ex- 
 pected that night, every measure of precaution was 
 taken. An alarm was given at about ten at night ; 
 the Turks, who had shoAvn themselves upon the cur- 
 tain, came down to the works through the breach, 
 attacked the covered trench leading to bastion II., and 
 again began to tear down and carry away the ma- 
 terials ; the miners, however, escaped unhurt, having 
 received timely notice. After being exposed for some 
 time to the murderous effects of the artillery and of a 
 tremendous fire of musketry, the Turks gradually 
 retreated into the fortress, after setting fire to the 
 gabions and fascines, and to the covered trench near 
 the bastion ; this was burnt as far as the watercourse, 
 where the fire went out. 
 
 On the following night the Turkish countermining 
 became so audible in the gallery beneath bastion II., 
 that, although the mine had only reached a length of 
 30 feet, and a continuation of it was extremely to be 
 wished, it was resolved that the explosion should take 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OF VARNA. 179 
 
 place at once. Tlie charge consisted of 75i cwt. of 
 powder. 
 
 By nine o'clock in the morning of the 3rd the 
 covered trench to bastion II. was so far restored that 
 nothing remained but for the miners to resume their 
 work. Several volunteers immediately offered to 
 ascertain whether an ambush had been placed for 
 them. A sapper of the Emperor's body-guard, and a 
 miner of the 2nd company of sappers and miners, 
 advanced into the galleries, and came back with the 
 welcome intelligence that the galleries were unin- 
 jured, but that they had found the corpses of several 
 Turkish soldiers at the entrances of them, and that of 
 an officer in the first gallery. Hereupon the miners 
 immediately returned to their places, and the work 
 was finished by about ten o'clock. Although the 
 mines might have been charged at once, this had to 
 be put off till next morning, as an order was issued 
 to explode the mine beneath the bastion, which was 
 quite ready, and to withdraw all the pioneers from 
 the trenches until the explosion was over. By this 
 proceeding the result of the mines beneath bastion II. 
 was rendered very doubtful, as the countermines had 
 already approached so near that the voices of the 
 miners could be distinctly heard; and moreover, a 
 night surprise from the Turks was fully to be ex- 
 pected. Under these difficult circumstances, the only 
 thing to be done after completing the mines was to 
 occupy the attention of the counterminers by knock- 
 
 N 2 
 
180 SIEGE OF VARNA. Part I. 
 
 ing against the sides of the gallery during the whole 
 day until evening, and to mask the entrances to them 
 at night. By this time the second descent into the 
 watercourse had advanced 40 feet, by means of under- 
 ground galleries. 
 
 At ten o'clock in the evening the Turks came down 
 the breach for the third time, and rushed with re- 
 newed fury upon the covered ways leading to the 
 mines in bastion II. For upwards of half an hour 
 they encountered the most tremendous fire of artillery 
 and small arms, most likely in the hopes of discover- 
 ing the galleries of the mines, hut without success, as 
 their entrances had been masked. 
 
 At eight in the morning of the 3rd of October 
 the mine beneath bastion I. was fired. The clouds of 
 dust and smoke thrown up led to the conclusion that 
 its principal effect had been produced upon the coun- 
 terscarp towards the sea ; and in fact a great deal of 
 earth was blown out in that direction. The enton- 
 noir of the exploded mine had made an opening 8 
 paces wide in the inner slope of the breastwork of the 
 bastion, but the bastion itself was very far from being 
 laid open by it, as the garrison had erected a second 
 and much wider breastwork within the first. 
 
 As soon as the explosion was over, the troops fell 
 into their appointed places, and, as aU the guns were 
 loaded, a vehement fire quickly ensued. 
 
 The dust raised by the explosion still hung in a 
 cloud over bastion I. when the Turks returned the 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OP VARNA. 181 
 
 fire with equal vigour, and at the same time took 
 advantage of the damage done to the sap leading to 
 tower T, in order to fire upon the artillerymen posted 
 there. The Russians now availed themselves of the 
 sap which had been reached by the entonnoir, and 
 carried it on so as to crown the left edge of the en- 
 tonnoir. This work was covered by a field-piece set 
 up in lodgment o, over the first entonnoir, to the 
 right of the stone mortar. 
 
 The covered trench before bastion II., which had 
 been but little injured by the enemy, was repaired at 
 nine in the morning of the 4th, whereupon the 
 miners re-opened the entrances to the galleries, and 
 immediately proceeded to charge the mines ; they 
 meanwhile concealed the real end of the work, which 
 they had already reached, by continual feigned noises. 
 The overcharged mine was loaded with 41 cwt., and 
 the second mine with only 14 cwt. of powder. These 
 mines had been intended to receive almost double the 
 quantity ; but the fear lest the Turks should antici- 
 pate the explosion by means of a crushing machine 
 (which the Turks are said to have purposed doing 
 on that very day), and possibly the great diificulty 
 and danger attending the transport of the powder, 
 induced the Russians to content themselves with a 
 less powerful but sure effect. 
 
 The powder was brought up covered with hides, 
 but the transport on the spot was a very hazardous 
 affair, as it had to be carried from the bottom of the 
 
182 SIEGE OP VARNA. Pabt I. 
 
 watercourse up to the scarp, along the steep, open 
 sap, exposed to the reverse fire of the Turks from 
 beyond the counterscarp before bastion III., a position 
 still maintained by them even at this advanced stage 
 of the siege. It became necessary to find some means 
 of diverting the fire of shells and grenades ; this was 
 done as follows : — 
 
 The sap to the right of g, which had now almost 
 reached the Turkish lodgments upon the glacis, ad- 
 vanced very slowly. Instead of a mantelet, the 
 besiegers made use of a large box 12 feet long, and 
 open towards the sap ; it was made of 3i-inch plank, 
 and had loopholes in the sides for skirmishers ; as 
 a further protection, slight fascines were laid upon 
 the middle of it, and the whole was moved along by 
 means of levers. On the slightest movement of this 
 blind the Turks immediately directed all their mortar 
 fire upon it. The continuation of the sap was accord- 
 ingly delayed until such time as the mines should 
 be charged, and ten skirmishers were posted in this 
 blind, with orders to keep up a vigorous fire upon the 
 enemy, while the pioneers threw out the earth as 
 quickly as possible behind the box. No sooner had 
 the skirmishers and sappers set to work than the 
 Turks began to throw great numbers of shells and 
 grenades, and opened a tremendous fire of small arms 
 upon the blind, apparently directing their whole 
 strength against this single object, with so much 
 vehemence, that at one moment seventeen shells fell 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OP VARNA. 183 
 
 close to the box, and the eighteenth right into it, 
 killing one skirmisher and wounding three. Spite, 
 however, of the danger attending it, this feiat was con- 
 tinued during the whole time of charging the mines. 
 
 At three in the afternoon the mines at length ex- 
 ploded with great effect, killing and wounding seve- 
 ral hundred men, according to the account given by 
 some Turkish prisoners. One of the coimterminers 
 was actually hurled into the breaching battery. Un- 
 daunted by this terrible destruction and slaughter, the 
 Turks, immediately after the explosion, and just as if 
 they had been prepared for its effects, opened a close 
 fire of small arms from the further side of the enton- 
 noir, from the part of the bastion left standing, and 
 from the rest of the fortress ; they likewise threw 
 shells, hand-grenades, and stones into the entonnoir. 
 Seven Russian guns, which were so placed that they 
 could sweep the edge of the entonnoir unhindered, 
 soon cleared away the palisades, hurdles, &c., thrown 
 up by the explosion, from behind which the Turks 
 fired upon their assailants; so that by evening the 
 Turkish fire was nearly silenced. 
 
 The effect of the mines was highly satisfactory. 
 The whole breastwork of the right face, and part of 
 that upon the right flank, were thrown down, and the 
 watercourse was filled up to a depth of 6 feet. The 
 breach was perfectly practicable, had the Russians 
 been inclined to attempt storming the place. 
 
 The communication with the new entonnoir was 
 
184 SIEGE OF VARNA. Part I. 
 
 immediately restored by means of saps. In order to 
 find out what the Turks were about, Second-lieu- 
 tenant Bem, of the sappers of the lifeguards, ran up 
 the crest of the entonnoir, and fortunately escaped 
 unhurt. After looking about him sufficiently, he 
 returned with the information that the garrison had 
 not yet begun to make any preparations for defence. 
 The besiegers now proceeded to crown the upper 
 edge of the entonnoir with gabions and sand-bags. 
 This was done as quietly as possible, because upon 
 the slightest noise the Turks threw quantities of 
 shells, grenades, and stones into the entonnoir. More- 
 over they fired over the main wall with guns at high 
 elevation. 
 
 The gabions were placed below the edge of the 
 entonnoir, in order at first to conceal the work from 
 the Turks, and the earth which was to be heaped up 
 behind them was scraped from the edge nearest the 
 fortress by means of shovels fastened to long poles. 
 Afterwards the Turks saved their enemies the trouble 
 by erecting a wall of planks behind the entonnoir, 
 and throwing a great deal of the earth across, thereby 
 forwarding the work very much. In order to ease the 
 ascent to the crown of the whole entonnoir, fascines 
 were laid upon the slope so as to form steps up to 
 the crowning. At two points ascending galleries 
 were cut. 
 
 At about ten o'clock at night the Turks made 
 repeated attempts to tear down and set fire to the 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OP VARNA. 185 
 
 material of the crowning, regardless of the loss they 
 sustained from the skirmishers posted behind it. 
 After a while, however, they withdrew, and made no 
 further attempt. 
 
 From the entonnoir saps were carried in various 
 directions ; one towards the right along the crest of 
 the parapet of the left face, a second towards the 
 left along the flank, a third towards the breach next 
 the bastion, and a fourth back again to the entonnoir 
 of the mine, and towards the sap w, which had been 
 carried from thence. Three mine-shafts were sunk 
 in the glacis at a;, in order to throw down the coun- 
 terscarp at that point. On the right of the passage 
 across the ditch lodgments were begun ; at the end of 
 several days they had, however, advanced very little, 
 as the Turks still kept their position in the ditch 
 before bastion III., and even had artillery there. 
 
 The besiegers had been far less successful before 
 bastion I. than upon the right wing. At this point 
 they only succeeded in crowning the edge of the 
 entonnoir nearest to themselves. The ascent to the 
 breach on the left, which had been completed as 
 far as the breastwork, had to be given up because it 
 was impossible to prevent the Turks from tearing 
 down the blinds and gabions next to them. 
 
 The resolution was accordingly taken to storm 
 bastion I. on the 6th of October. Several commu- 
 nications were made beforehand wide enough for 
 columns to advance. 
 
186 SIEGE OF VAENA. PiKT I. 
 
 The orders were as follows : — 
 
 " Before daybreak the volunteers and other in- 
 fentry troops appointed for the service, in all 400 
 men, under the command of Captain Dokudowski, 
 will take bastion I., and immediately after the ruined 
 houses beyond it, which by their commanding po- 
 sition increase the difSculty of effecting a lodgment 
 upon the bastion. These troops will be closely fol- 
 lowed by 200 pioneers and sailors, who will construct 
 a lodgment upon the bastion." 
 
 The pioneers were divided into three sections, and 
 commanded, as soon as they could see the inside of 
 the bastion, to divide themselves along the intended 
 line of the lodgment they were about to construct, so 
 that one detachment should be upon the centre, one 
 upon the right, and one upon the left wing of the 
 line, while the fourth remained behind in reserve. 
 
 The volunteers, who were mostly sailors and sol- 
 diers of the Ismailoff regiment, occupied the sap from 
 the entonnoir in bastion I. long before daybreak ; 
 behind them stood the pioneers carrying gabions : 
 the reserve was placed in the trench behind the 
 batardeau. The other division, intended to occupy 
 the bastion, was drawn up in the 2nd parallel close 
 to u. 
 
 The signal was given before daybreak, and the 
 skirmishers with their reserve advanced upon the 
 bastion. They found the breach perfectly practi- 
 cable ; the only impediment was the palisades, which 
 
Chap. VIII. SIEGE OF A^ARNA. 187 
 
 had been brought down by the falling earth from 
 the inner slope of the parapet. The detachment 
 of infantry, which had stood next to battery u in 
 the 2nd parallel, likewise reached the crest of the 
 parapet just at the angle of the bastion in a very 
 short time. The Russian troops drove the Turks out 
 of the bastion without firing a shot, and then dis- 
 persed among the ruined houses. A few of the 
 Christian inhabitants made their escape out of the 
 town through the breach. 
 
 In the mean time a separate division of infantry, 
 which advanced upon bastion II., out of the enton- 
 noir by the breaching battery, fell upon the Turks 
 who still maintained themselves in the ditch before 
 the principal front, so that no way of retreat was left 
 to them but that through the breach in the curtain 
 next to bastion II., exposed to the canister-shot of 
 the breaching battery. The foot of the breach was 
 strewn with the corpses of these brave men. 
 
 Meanwhile the pioneers instantly set to work ac- 
 cording to their orders, and began to throw up the 
 lodgment, availing themselves of the wall of defence 
 within the gorge of the bastion ; but they were 
 unable to cover the inside of the bastion against the 
 opposite height, which was covered with ruined 
 houses. The advanced divisions, too, soon gave way 
 before the Turks, who had returned in increased 
 force, and retreated into the bastion, and then, after 
 a few unavailing efforts to maintain themselves in 
 
188 SIEaS OF VARNA. Part I. 
 
 the lodgment, they and the pioneers withdrew into 
 the trenches together, just as a reinforcement was 
 coming to join them. 
 
 According to the Eussian statement, 200 men were 
 placed hors de combat in this fight, including almost 
 all the officers of the covering party. According to 
 other accounts, they had 80 killed and 300 wounded, 
 — nearly two-thirds of the men engaged in the affair. 
 
 On the following day an equally abortive attempt 
 was made to reach the top of the breastwork by car- 
 rying forward the sap. This was prevented by a 
 shower of hand-grenades from the Turks, which was 
 feebly returned by the Russian field-artillery. 
 
 The Russians now occupied the lodgments in the 
 ditch before the principal front, which had at length 
 been abandoned by the Turks after a brilliant de- 
 fence. A sap was carried thence towards the scarp, 
 and, as the three large breaches already made were 
 considered insufficient, four new mines were made at 
 y, in order to throw down the whole scarp of the 
 curtain. In the 2nd parallel a battery of field-pieces 
 was set up at z to batter bastion I. The sap in 
 front of the entonnoir in bastion II., which had been 
 directed towards the nearest breach in the curtain, 
 had now reached it, and the digging away of the 
 wall had proceeded 45 paces before it was perceived 
 by the Turks. A shower of hand-grenades now, 
 however, compelled the Russians to desist for a while 
 from their attempt. 
 
Chap. VIII. giEGE OF VAENA. 189 
 
 At one o'clock in the afternoon they resumed the 
 work ; the earth was cut away underneath, and the 
 upper layer which fell in thrown into the watercourse, 
 until the facing of palisades on the inner slope of 
 the parapet was almost reached. The besieged had 
 been forced to abandon bastion II., and to retreat 
 from the works on the sea-shore as far as tower T ; 
 but they still occupied the ruins of the houses behind 
 both these points. 
 
 On the 8th the governor of the place was informed 
 by the Eussians that the attempt to enter the town 
 had only failed owing to the rashness of a few 
 common soldiers; that the very small numbers em- 
 ployed showed that the capture of the fortress by 
 storm was not the real object of the attack, but that 
 the possibility of a real assault and the certainty of 
 its success were sufficiently proved by the expedi- 
 tion. It is hard to say what effect these arguments 
 may have produced upon the Pasha, but it is certain 
 that the courage of the Moslems, which had probably 
 been somewhat shaken by the frequent explosions of 
 numerous mines, must have been mightily raised by 
 the victory lately gained by Omar Yrione before the 
 walls of Yarna — a victory of which more presently — 
 and by the total failure of the assault. Without 
 doubt the Eussians could only have aimed at crown- 
 ing the breach with so small a force : it now, how- 
 ever, became necessary if possible to put an end to 
 the tedious siege, and at the same time to a dan- 
 
190 SIEGE OF VARNA. Part I. 
 
 gerous crisis in the campaign, by storming the place 
 in right earnest. 
 
 Even should they succeed in throwing down the 
 whole wall of the curtain of the principal front by 
 fresh explosions, the storming would still be unavoid- 
 able, supposing the garrison continued to do its duty 
 as it had done hitherto. It was utterly impossible to 
 foresee that Omar Vrione's expedition would end as 
 it did, and that the very Pasha under whose command 
 Varna had so long and so nobly defended itself would 
 turn traitor. 
 
 In order fully to understand the posture of affairs 
 we must now revert to the events of the last four 
 weeks on the southern side of Yarna, and see what 
 had happened since General GroUowin took up his 
 position on Point Galata on the 11th September. 
 
Chap. IX. ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE VARNA. 191 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE VARNA — COMBAT AT KURT-TEPE — • 
 FALL OF VARNA 
 
 We have already seen how ill the measures taken 
 against Shumla, Silistria, and Varna turned out for 
 the Russians from the time that their vphole force 
 had been engaged before these three strongholds, 
 leaving no one corps that could be diverted to the 
 support of any of these three separate divisions. 
 And as yet the main body of the Turkish army had 
 not reached the scene of action. 
 
 The Porte probably felt that the time was now 
 come when a victory at the foot of the Balkan must 
 decide the campaign in their favour. In August, 
 therefore, the Grand Yizier, Mohammed Selim Pasha, 
 moved his army towards Aidos, in which direction 
 Omar Vrione was advancing from Shumla by Tschal- 
 ikawack with a corps of some 14,000 men. 
 
 Unfortunately it is not in our power to calculate 
 the exact strength of the Turkish army which the 
 Grand Yizier, after such long preparation, was now 
 leading to the Balkan. It is remarkable that, after 
 all the time that had been spent in collecting an 
 army, the Turks actually drew men from Shumla 
 for their expedition to relieve Varna instead of send- 
 
192 ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE VARNA. Paet I. 
 
 ing reinforcements thither, as might have been ex- 
 pected. It is probable that the main army was 
 composed chiefly of Asiatic hordes of no great use. 
 Omar Yrione's troops, on the other hand, consisted 
 principally of Arnauts, a wild, undisciplined, but 
 brave soldatesca. They were chiefly Arnauts who 
 by their brave defence of the ditch at Varna had so 
 much impeded the progress of the siege. 
 
 After Omar Yrione had increased his army at 
 Kamtchick to 25,000 or 30,000 men, he proceeded 
 towards Yarna. The advanced guard of Greneral 
 GoUowin was at Petrikoi, on the main road to 
 Kamtchick, when the Pasha reached Hassanlar on 
 the 24th by a side road, and began immediately to 
 entrench himself there. 
 
 The Russian general sent detachments to recon- 
 noitre the enemy, and in working through a thick 
 wood they suddenly came upon the Turkish encamp- 
 ment at Hassanlar. Both parties were equally asto- 
 nished. The Russians commenced firing their field- 
 pieces, to which the Turks replied and made ready to 
 attack. The leader of the Russian detachment fell 
 back with his field-pieces and two squadrons, leaving 
 the infantry in the wood to cover his retreat. No 
 details were given of what subsequently happened, 
 but of the 1500 men only 800 returned : General 
 Harting was killed and a good many oflScers. 
 
 After this occurrence fresh troops were sent to the 
 position of Gralata-Burnu, and the command given 
 
Chap. IX. MOVEMENTS OF THE EUSSIANS. 193 
 
 to General Bistrom, who placed his corps of nine 
 battalions and six squadrons, or about 6000 men, 
 on a spot selected by General GoUowin on his 
 flank. 
 
 On the 28th Omar Yrione continued his advance ; 
 the Grand Yizier, on the other hand, remained on 
 the other side the Kamtchick near Dorwischkoi with 
 some thousand men, and guarded the banks of the 
 river by establishing several posts, among others 
 one at Kioprikoi, near Pravadi. He sent to Omar 
 Yrione all the reinforcements that came to him from 
 the Constantinople side of the Balkan. Field-Mar- 
 shal Count Wittgenstein, whose wish had always 
 been to concentrate his forces near Jenibazar, and to 
 send twenty battalions and as many squadrons to 
 Yarna, now received orders to send all the troops he 
 could collect in that direction. He had already given 
 the regiment Ukraine orders to escort General Die- 
 bitsch to Yarna, and Major-General Simansky was 
 sent with the 20th regiment of Chasseurs in the same 
 direction. Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg followed 
 with the weak 1st brigade, and General Durnowo 
 with the 19th division. This brigade numbered only 
 1700 bayonets, but the Prince received an intimation 
 that he would be joined by four battalions of the 
 10th division under Prince Madatof, three squadrons 
 of the Bug Lancers from Pravadi, besides two batta- 
 lions of the 9th division from Kosludja : he was to 
 take all the reinforcements that were expected from 
 
 
 
194 MOVEMENTS OF THE KUSSIANS. Part I. 
 
 Varna. The 3rd brigade of the 19th division was 
 wanted at Shumla. 
 
 Adjutant-General Suchosanet had previously re- 
 ceived orders to advance in the rear of the enemy 
 by Grebedje and Hassanlar with the 1st brigade of 
 horse-guards consisting of ten squadrons, and to send 
 orders to Major-Greneral Baron Dehngshausen with 
 the two infantry regiments of Ukraine and Odessa, 
 together with some lancers and mounted pioneers, to 
 advance and join him by Devna and Akenji. On 
 the 27th this division attacked a hostile post left in 
 Hassanlar, together with a quantity of workmen, and 
 drove them out. The half-finished works raised by 
 the Turks were of large compass, and seemed to be 
 intended for the reception of an army, and the Rus- 
 sians thought it likely that the Grand Yizier had 
 originally selected this point for his main camp, but 
 had afterwards, on the advance of Omar Yrione, 
 meant to convert it into a smaller entrenchment for 
 a corps of observation. 
 
 Immediately afterwards General Simansky joined 
 General Dehngshausen ; the former had beaten the 
 Turks, who attacked him with several thousand men in 
 the woods between Akindje and the river Pravadi. 
 
 On the 28th September Adjutant-General Sucho- 
 sanet undertook a reconnaissance of the large Turkish 
 camp on the heights of Kurt-tepe ; he was only able 
 to examine one side of it, and estimated the enemy's 
 strength at 6000 men. But on that very day the 
 
Chap. IX. MOVEMENTS OF THE RUSSIANS. 195 
 
 Pasha, as we shall presently see, had brought 15,000 
 men into action against General Bistrom. That 
 general had attempted to take a Turkish entrench- 
 ment, and had been beaten back with considerable 
 loss. On the other hand, he repulsed three assaults 
 on the left flank, the centre, and the right flank of 
 his fortified position. During four hours the fight 
 was continued with great fury ; the Russian artillery 
 and a charge with the bayonet of the 2nd battalion 
 of grenadiers decided the combat : the loss on both 
 sides was considerable. The Pasha, after the failure 
 of this attack on Greneral Bistrom's position, withdrew 
 to the Kurt-Tepe, where the Turks began to fortify 
 themselves in three separate camjos. 
 
 Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg meanwhile ad- 
 vanced by Jasytepe and Devna. According to orders 
 from head-quarters the brigade of Greneral Madatof 
 was not under Prince Eugene's command, but re- 
 mained behind at Pravadi. On the other hand, on 
 the 28th September, the 1st brigade of the 19th divi- 
 sion formed a junction at Hassanlar with the division 
 of Greneral Suchosanet, and Prince Eugene took the 
 command of this corps of ten battalions and fourteen 
 squadrons. This corps consisted of 4500 muskets, 
 from 1200 to 1400 cavalry, making up altogether 
 barely 6000 men, with 46 guns. In Hassanlar he 
 received orders from head-quarters at Yarna to drive 
 the Turks beyond the Kamtchik, in conjunction with 
 General Bistrom. Early on the 29th September 
 
 2 
 
196 MOVEMENTS OF THE RUSSIANS. Part I. 
 
 Bulgarian delegates and some of the Christian popu- 
 lation who had made their escape out of the Turkish 
 fortifications came to the Russian quarters with the 
 intelligence that the Turks had 50,000 men. But 
 still more important than this doubtful intelligence 
 was the information as to the nature of the country 
 between the Russian and the Turkish positions. The 
 leaders who were present and the commander of the 
 outposts were unanimously of opinion that, consi- 
 dering the numerical superiority of the Turks, which 
 was so much greater than had been supposed, and 
 the local advantages of their position, an attack was 
 unadvisable without a more minute consideration of 
 the circumstances. Moreover a consultation with 
 General Bistrom was essential, in order to come to 
 some agreement as to the plan to be adopted, and 
 all this required time. For these reasons the attack 
 was delayed ; General Bistrom was informed of this, 
 and General Suchosanet was sent to the Emperor to 
 lay before him the cause of the delay. In order not 
 to undertake a bold and important step with insuffi- 
 cient means, Prince Eugene asked for reinforcements 
 — for Prince Madatof's brigade from Pravadi, which 
 could be replaced by troops from Shumla, — for the 1st 
 brigade of guards from Yarna, — and further, that Ge- 
 neral Bistrom might be placed under his command. 
 
 At the same time a reconnoitring party was sent 
 out towards the Turkish quarters. From a height on 
 the road from Missiplar the Turkish lines were seen 
 
Chap. IX. MOVEMENTS OP THE EUSSIANS. 197 
 
 along the front, facing the south-west. To an un- 
 practised eye they appeared insignificant enough, but 
 through a good telescope their great extent was dis- 
 covered. It was clear that Omar Vrione had from 
 20,000 to 30,000 men assembled there. The interior 
 of the camp was covered with huts ; and without the 
 camp the smoke arose from the watch-fires of such 
 bodies of men as had come too late to find a place 
 within the lines. The Prince felt convinced that 
 without the necessary preparation the attack must 
 fail, not so much owing to the number of the Turks 
 as to the lay of the ground, where, through thick 
 woods and deep ravines, narrow passes led to a forti- 
 fied camp most advantageously situated, and where 
 there was no space for the play of artillery or the 
 forming of the troops anywhere near the Turkish 
 quarters. It was only on the south side, on the 
 road from Burgas, that the Turkish camp could be 
 assaulted with any chance of success. This plan of 
 attack would cut off the Turkish line of retreat, and 
 they might therefore reckon upon an obstinate de- 
 fence. In order to overcome this, and to turn so far 
 to the right out of the road, it was necessary to be 
 certain of success ; a failure, if the Turks followed 
 up their advantage, might compromise the fate of 
 the army. The Prince represented this strongly in 
 his second report to the Emperor. His plan was to 
 occupy a clear plateau some 2000 paces to the west 
 of the Turkish lines (see the plan of Yarna), upon 
 
198 BATTLE OF KURT-TEPE. Pakt I. 
 
 which the Turks were then erecting a redoubt. From 
 thence the Prince intended to reconnoitre more 
 closely, and to clear the ground for the attack with 
 the axe ; for the thick wood prevented the artillery 
 from being brought into position except at such a 
 distance as to be of no use, or so near that it ran 
 great danger from a dash on the part of the Turks. 
 The Prince and Greneral Bistrom were then to make 
 a simultaneous attack with the infantry when the 
 artillery had produced its due effect on the dense 
 Turkish masses, probably on the next day ; and it is 
 very possible that thus the Turks might have been 
 induced from the danger of their position to fall back 
 previous to the real assault, and before the communi- 
 cation in their rear was cut off. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 30th September an 
 adjutant of General Diebitsch, however, arrived with 
 the express order from the Emperor to attack imme- 
 diately. At the same time the Emperor desired to 
 know exactly when the columns would reach the 
 Turkish position. The Prince gave an assurance 
 that they should be on the spot at two o'clock in the 
 afternoon. At the same moment General Suchosanet 
 arrived and reported that all further reinforcement 
 was refused. The Prince had no choice but to obey, 
 and devote all his energy to an attack undertaken 
 against his convictions. 
 
 On the morning of the 30th of September the 
 Prince marched in two columns. The greater part 
 
Chap IX. BATTLE OP KURT-TEPB. I99 
 
 of the cavalry (10 squadrons) marched from Missi- 
 plar ; 10 battahons, 4 squadrons, and the artillery, 
 under General Suchosanet, from Hassanlar. Both 
 columns united by two o'clock on the flat brow, 
 where the Turks (who had guessed the probable 
 point of attack on the 29th) had pushed forward the 
 entrenchment N. Generals Simansky and Dehngs- 
 hausen with the advanced guard took, without much 
 loss, this fort, which was unfinished, and was com- 
 manded from the plateau. The cavalry, which were 
 drawn up further to the right, marched at the same 
 time up to the one small plateau behind the infantry 
 at b h. On this crowded position the corps was 
 immediately attacked on all sides. The Turkish 
 hordes, among whom were some regular infantry, lay 
 concealed in the wood, and from this secure position 
 directed their fire against the Russians. To clear the 
 way before him, the Prince threw some troops into 
 the wood. One regiment soon disappeared from 
 sight, but their dropping fire gradually becoming 
 more distant made the retreat of the Turks on that 
 point apparent. The regiment Ukraine repulsed 
 every attack made against it near the fort, but to 
 the left a strong corps of Turkish infantry occupied 
 a deep ravine (H), into which it would have been 
 necessary to descend in order to drive them out. The 
 Russians, therefore, contented themselves with bring- 
 ing some guns (a) in the rear to bear upon them, 
 which held them in check. Between the fort N and 
 
200 BATTLE OF KURT-TEPE. Part I. 
 
 the Turkish camp was a thick high wood, which was 
 less dense just in front of the latter. As soon as the 
 Russians came down from the edge of the valley on 
 which the captured fort stood, they could not see 
 on any side of them, and it was impossible to use 
 their artillery. Ten 12-pounders were therefore 
 placed on each side of the fort N ; there was no 
 room for more. The shot, it is true, reached the 
 Turkish camp at a distance of 1500 paces, and the 
 Turkish shot fell among the Russian ranks ; but the 
 damage done on either side was trifling. The rest 
 of the Russian guns could not be brought into play 
 at all, and were left behind under cover of some 
 troops. The cavalry too could only act in small 
 detachments. 
 
 In order, if possible, to find a better position for 
 his artillery, Prince Eugene, who had been wounded 
 in the arm during this hot encounter, ordered General 
 Dumowo to advance with the 2 battalions Azoff to a 
 spot which from the plateau, where they were, looked 
 like an elevation. But this was in reality only a 
 group of high trees, and G-eneral Durnowo, who soon 
 found the Turks, but not the elevation, advanced still 
 further into the wood, against express orders, driving 
 the Turkish skirmishers before him. This advance 
 was the more dangerous, as he left in his rear the 
 Turkish hordes at t, against whom a battalion of the 
 20th regiment of Chasseurs was despatched. 
 
 About this time Adjutant Kuschelow brought from 
 
Chap. IX. BATTLE OF KURT-TEPB. 201 
 
 the Emperor a note written in pencil, in whicli he en- 
 couraged ttie troops to a vigorous attack, and promised 
 tlie most active co-operation from Greneral Bistrom. 
 It was made known' to the troops that his Majesty- 
 had selected a bold corps to do a deed of heroism, 
 which announcement was received with enthusiasm. 
 The troops longed to advance, and were waiting only 
 for news of Greneral Durnowo — ^whose movements in 
 the wood remained hid — to advance as far as possible 
 with the artillery, and to attack the Turks at once 
 with the infantry. For, however hazardous the en- 
 terprise might be, there was now no room for delay, 
 as it was imagined that General Bistrom was already 
 engaged, and the enthusiasm of the troops must not 
 be allowed time to cool. 
 
 Suddenly a close fire of infantry was seen at the 
 edge of the wood, exactly in front of the Turkish 
 camp. Scattered Turks ran in the direction of the 
 camp, pursued by disordered masses of Eussian sol- 
 diers. This was the regiment Azoff, which singly 
 and boldly attacked the Turkish camp. 
 
 That regiment had shown some backwardness in 
 the fight at Kolesch. A soldier, who had been asked 
 whether he belonged to the regiment Azoff, said 
 " God forbid !" The regiment now burned to wipe out 
 the stain, and General Durnowo had foimd it impos- 
 sible to restrain their ardour in presence of the enemy. 
 He had suddenly found himself in the thick wood 
 close upon the Turkish position, and engaged in a hot 
 
"202 BATTLE OP KURT-TEPE. Part I. 
 
 fire. To stand still under sucli circumstances would 
 have cost many men to no purpose, and to retreat 
 before Turks is the most dangerous measure of all. 
 General Durnowo, therefore, had nothing for it but 
 to advance. But the distance from all support deprived 
 this enterprise of all possibility of success. Two 
 adjutants, sent to Gleneral Durnowo with the order 
 to abstain from this partial contest, did not find him. 
 This brave officer was struck down by a bullet in the 
 front ranks. The Prince sent to his assistance a 
 battalion of the regiment Ukraine and one of the 
 regiment Dnieper, but they could only protect the 
 retreat of the regiment Azoff, which, pursued by a 
 swarm of Turks, fell back out of the entrenchments. 
 
 All hope of finding a convenient position for the 
 artillery had vanished, the cavalry was of no use, 
 and nothing now remained but to advance with the 
 infantry in mass. This the Russians did. 
 
 Gleneral Simansky had collected the scattered regi- 
 ment of Azoff, and had joined it to the 1st battalions 
 of Dnieper and Ukraine. To this was added the 2nd 
 battalion of Dnieper, which at the beginning of the 
 contest had pursued the Turks into the wood. The 
 2nd battalion of Ukraine followed as a support. On 
 the left. General Nostitz advanced with the 20th 
 regiment of Chasseurs and some squadrons of lancers 
 of the guard to hold in check the Turkish hordes at t, 
 who had been reinforced by large masses of troops 
 from the entrenched camp : so that now only 2 batta- 
 
Chap. IX. BATTLE OP KUET-TEPE. 203 
 
 lions of Odessa remained behind on the plateau to 
 protect the 36 guns. 
 
 The 5 battalions of the right flank again attacked 
 the Turks, and a fearful contest ensued. The en- 
 trenchments themselves offered no very great impedi- 
 ment ; indeed one battalion of Ukraine actually pene- 
 trated its enclosure, but could not hold its ground 
 against the united forces of an enemy by no means 
 despicable when fighting hand to hand. A tre- 
 mendous attack was made on the rear of the weak 
 Russian division, and it was forced to fall back upon 
 the other battalions ; while on their side the Russians 
 put to flight the Turkish horse which attacked them. 
 Major-General Nostitz forced his way with the 
 Lancers of the guard through the underwood, and, 
 in conjunction with the 20th regiment of Chasseurs, 
 repulsed an attack made by the Turks on the left. 
 On the right the dragoons of the guard and the 
 Cossacks also forced their way through the wood. 
 
 It was, however, impossible to effect an entrance 
 into the Turkish entrenchments, and the tail of the 
 colxmm was exposed for an hour to a terrible fire of 
 canister shot, during which Greneral Simansky fell. 
 
 A few reserve forces and a vigorous attack from 
 Galata might possibly have turned the scale in favour 
 of the Russians. General Bistrom was in an en- 
 trenched position, it is true, but it had no outlet from 
 behind ; and he had only 9 battalions and 6 squadrons. 
 Of these, 2 battalions were in the forts on the Devna 
 
204 BATTLE OF KURT-TEPB. Pabt I. 
 
 lowlands, so that Greneral Bistrom had in fact only 
 4000 men wherewith to protect his lines, which were 
 4000 paces long, and to support Prince Eugene in 
 his assault on the Turkish camp. To compass both 
 objects with such small resources was manifestly im- 
 possible. Already, before the regiments Ukraine and 
 Azoff made their vigorous attack on the southern side 
 of the Turkish encampment,* 2 battalions of body 
 grenadiers had advanced upon the northern camp, 
 but were driven back after a fruitless attempt, with 
 the loss of 500 men ; here too the troops showed no 
 lack of energy. Later in the day they perceived the 
 confusion in the Turkish camp which was caused by 
 the bold assault of the regiment of Azoff. Under 
 these circumstances it seems that Greneral Bistrom 
 should have given up the defensive, and have attacked 
 the Turks with his whole corps. The B,ussian en- 
 trenchments were not more than 1500 paces from 
 the northern camp of the Turks, and the space be- 
 tween them was open and level, so that no impedi- 
 ment was offered by the nature of the ground. 
 Yarna, as we have already said, was but ill covered 
 by the Russian position at Gralata ; and nothing would 
 have attained that object more completely than by a 
 victory over Omar Yrione. The presence of the chief 
 of the Emperor's general staff might justify such a 
 
 * In the position in which Omar Vrione stood, it is hard to say which 
 was his right and which his left flank, as he had to make front on three 
 sides — towards Varna, Galata, and Hassanlar. 
 
Chap. IX. BATTLE OF KURT-TEPE. 205 
 
 venture; and at the worst, Greneral Bistrom could 
 fall back upon Gebedje, and join Prince Eugene of 
 Wirtemberg. But as no simultaneous general attack 
 was made upon the Turkish main camp from Gralata- 
 Burnu, and the Prince had no reserve at his disposal, 
 the only way to prevent the total destruction of the 
 troops was to stop the engagement. This was a diffi- 
 cult measure, as the troops were entangled with the 
 enemy. But the retreat from the Turkish camp was 
 effected in as close order as the nature of the ground 
 allowed, and the whole division was again concen- 
 trated on the before-mentioned small plateau, e, near 
 the redoubt which the Russians had taken. The 
 Turks, who were themselves in great anxiety, and 
 had suffered great loss, did not venture out of their 
 lines until they were quite certain of the cessation of 
 the Russian attack ; then only a few scattered horse- 
 men sallied forth, and they were soon driven back. 
 
 The loss on the side of the Russians amounted to 
 1400 men. The commander-in-chief was wounded, 
 and 2 generals killed. The chief of the brigade, 
 ■the regimental chief, 2 captains of battalions, and 2 
 leaders of companies of the regiment of Azoff were 
 all laid in one grave. The Russian soldiers, on the 
 whole, distinguished themselves highly in this en- 
 gagement. 
 
 Prince Eugene marched back to Hassanlar with 
 his detachment during the night, as the position in 
 front of the Turks in the midst of the wood was 
 
206 BATTLE OF KUKT-TEPE. Paet I. 
 
 "untenable from want of water. From Hassanlar 6 
 battalions and 4 squadrons were sent to join General 
 Bistrom, and fresh reinforcements were sent to him 
 from Varna, as his position was the source of great 
 anxiety : the 3rd brigade of the 19th division, which 
 Prince Eugene had asked for in vain, was likewise 
 sent to General Bistrom. 
 
 The Prince himself, with 4 weak battalions and 
 a few squadrons, occupied the post of Osmandji 
 between Hassanlar and Gebedje, so as to be able, 
 in case of necessity, to render further assistance to 
 General Bistrom. After the action the Prince asked 
 for reinforcements in order to renew the attack 
 against the Turks, but his request was refused, as all 
 the force that could be spared had been sent to Gene- 
 ral Bistrom. The Cossacks of the guard remained at 
 Hassanlar, and made daily demonstrations in the 
 Turkish rear. 
 
 The action at Kurt-tepe was one of the most 
 brilliant of the campaign. Although the attack 
 failed, the moral effect which the courage of the 
 Russian troops produced upon the Turks did much 
 towards bringing the campaign to a successful issue, 
 adding a fresh proof that strict obedience to orders, 
 even in the worst positions, is the first of military 
 virtues. Forced against his will to make an attack, 
 the issue of which he doubted, the Prince followed 
 his instructions to the best of his ability. Only 2 
 battalions remained in reserve ; all the others engaged 
 
Chap. IX. BATTLE OF KURT-TEPE. 207 
 
 in a bloody conflict, in which the infantry, uusupported 
 by the cavalry or the artillery, and groping as it 
 were in the dark, fought with consummate bravery. 
 
 The authorities at head-quarters seem to have 
 wished to attain their object without affording the 
 means. When we remember that about this time the 
 fall of Yarna was daily expected, it is perfectly ob- 
 vious how unwelcome must have been the approach 
 of a Turkish army of relief, which might frustrate 
 the effects of a long and laborious siege, and perhaps 
 alter the issue of the whole campaign. The intelli- 
 gence given by General Suchosanet of the weakness 
 of the Turkish corps was very consoling. The Eus- 
 sians believed it because it jumped with their wishes ; 
 for the contrary reason they put less faith in the 
 representations made by Prince Eugene of Wirtem- 
 berg. It was known that the Grand Yizier intended 
 to send 12,000 or 16,000 men to reinforce Omar 
 Vrione's corps, while he himself stayed on the Kamt- 
 chick. It was for this reason that the Emperor had 
 issued such peremptory orders to attack before the 
 reinforcements could reach the Turkish camp. Prince 
 Eugene of Wirtemberg, on the other hand, main- 
 tained that the reinforcements had already reached 
 Omar Yrione. The circumference of the Turkish en- 
 trenchments, and the bivouacs between them, em- 
 braced a circuit of about two miles, and the weakness 
 of the vizier at Derwisch-Jowann confirmed the view 
 taken by the Prince on the spot, in opposition to 
 
208 BATTLE OF KURT-TEPE. Part I. 
 
 that which the Emperor had adopted on board the 
 " Paris." Moreover, the Emperor expected a favour- 
 able result from the junction of Greneral Bistrom with 
 the Prince ; and indeed the Turkish position could thus 
 have been attacked from every side. What always 
 occurs when forces are divided took place here : and 
 the enterprise failed, owing to the absence of one 
 guiding mind to conduct the whole. When we con- 
 sider that Greneral Bistrom's position by no means 
 hindered the Turks from entering Yarna, the question 
 may be asked whether it would not have been better 
 to have withdrawn the whole division of that Grene- 
 ral from Galata, and to have united it with that 
 under Prince Eugene, for the attack upon the Turk- 
 ish entrenchment at Kurt-tepe. This could have 
 been done by the same route as that by which, after 
 the fight, the reinforcements sent by the Prince 
 reached Gralata. Lastly, when we consider that the 
 attack upon Omar Vrione in all probability would 
 decide the fate of the campaign, it appears to us that 
 to gain so great an object it would have been worth 
 while to have deprived Pravadi of one portion of its 
 garrison, or to have replaced that garrison, as far as 
 was necessary, by troops taken from before Shumla. 
 United with the brigade of Madatof, the corps of 
 Greneral Bistrom, the third brigade of the nineteenth 
 division, and the other reinforcements which were 
 spared, after the fight, from Yarna, Prince Eugene 
 would have been at the head of 15,000 men, which, 
 
Chap. IX. STBATBGY OF THE TURKS. 209 
 
 under one leader, might have proved equal to the 
 enterprise, difficult as it was. Supposing the attack 
 from the west and the south to have been successful, 
 possibly a great part of the defeated Turks would 
 have thrown themselves into Yarna ; but we cannot 
 look upon this as a disadvantage : nor could this have 
 been prevented by the Eussians in position before 
 Galata. The presence of a beaten and disorganized 
 mass of troops in Varna would only have hastened 
 the fall of the besieged fortress. 
 
 To turn to the Turkish leaders, and their opera- 
 tions. It would appear that in the whole of this 
 military drama the Grand Vizier played only a 
 second-rate part. Otherwise he would not have dele- 
 gated to Omar Vrione so important a matter as the 
 relief of Varna, but have gone himself. The period 
 was now past for holding the Turkish troops in re- 
 serve ; the time for operations was slipping away ; 
 the campaign must soon be ended ; and the moment 
 was now come when the last soldier whom the Grrand 
 Vizier could still command in Eumelia ought to have 
 been employed in bringing the campaign to a success- 
 ful issue. 
 
 Undoubtedly the Vizier had given up to his sub- 
 ordinate officer the greatest and the best part of his 
 troops, and had fallen back with merely a nominal 
 army to the banks of the Kamtchik, where he placed 
 his troops in an ill-fortified camp at Derwisch-Jowann. 
 (See the plan of Derwisch-Jowann, Plan 10.) But 
 
 p 
 
210 STRATEGY OF THE TURKS. 1'abt I. 
 
 on a day like that of the 30th of September, the mere 
 appearance of only a few thousand Spahis in the rear 
 of the small corps under Prince Eugene's command 
 would have had the greatest effect. Omar Yrione 
 went straight to his point. When he fortified himself 
 in his quarters, though engaged in a purely offensive 
 operation, he did so in accordance with the old- 
 fashioned custom of the Turks, and with the convic- 
 tion that his troops were not capable of resisting the 
 Russians in the open field. His superior numbers, 
 and the object of the enterprise, ought, however, to 
 have released the Pasha from this old rule. After 
 the rencontre of the 26th of September, and before 
 Prince Eugene had got together his small corps, the 
 Pasha advanced against the position of Gralata, and 
 attacked it. This point was nearest to him, and it 
 was the most advisable measure he could have taken. 
 Had he succeeded in breaking through, either in the 
 front or on the right flank of the Russians, General 
 Bistrom's division was utterly lost, and the commu- 
 nication with Varna completely restored. But such 
 being the case there was the greater certainty of the 
 most obstinate resistance on the part of the Russians. 
 For such an object the four hours' encoimter of the 
 28th of September was not sufficient ; on the other 
 hand, for a mere reconnaissance it was too much. 
 The loss in men was considerable, and the failure 
 depressed his soldiers. 
 
 The entrenched camp at Kurt-tepe appears to have 
 
Chap. IX. STRATEGY OP THE TURKS. 211 
 
 been well chosen under all the circumstances of the 
 case. From thence Omar Vrione was in a position 
 to renew the attack upon the Eussians at Galata ; he 
 could advance if he chose against Grebedsche, Devna, 
 and Pravadi, or could expand his troops to the 
 tongue of land between lake Devna and the sea. 
 But this ought to have been done quickly : advan- 
 tageous as the point was to an army acting on the 
 offensive, it was little calculated for a long stay, 
 situated as the post was in the middle of a wood, and 
 having a dangerous and dissected line of retreat. 
 The complete fortification of the Kurt-tepe was a piece 
 of strategical folly, as the ravines that descended to 
 the plain in every direction from the hill aiforded 
 support on all sides, in the event of an attack. Mean- 
 while the most fortunate thing that could happen to 
 the Turks occurred on the 30th of September : the 
 Russians did the Turks the favour of attacking them 
 in their strong entrenchments. 
 
 After the Arnauts had repulsed the bold attack of 
 the Russians, Omar Pasha's position was a proud one. 
 It was the decisive moment of the whole campaign. 
 But what did occur, or rather what did not occur, is 
 beneath criticism. 
 
 After the retreat of the Prince, and indeed before 
 that, on the 27th of September, Omar Yrione could 
 undoubtedly have opened a communication with 
 Varna. The three redoubts which Greneral GroUowin 
 had raised on the tongue of land between lake Devna 
 
 p 2 
 
212 STRATEGY OF THE TURKS. Part I. 
 
 and the sea, immediately at the foot of the woody 
 heights, were most excellent against a sortie from 
 the fortress, but were most disadvantageously situ- 
 ated in the event of an attack from the south. If 
 Omar Yrione had occupied Gleneral Bistrom's atten- 
 tion by making a false attack on his front, and sent 
 masses of his light troops against the redoubts, more 
 especially that on lake Devna, which it was impossible 
 to relieve, these redoubts could not have made a long 
 resistance. In any case they could not prevent the 
 relieving party from forcing its way into the fortress, 
 a fact of which the Russians at head-quarters seemed 
 fully aware. 
 
 It is a totally different question whether Varna 
 could have been saved by such an addition to its 
 forces. There was no lack, in the Turkish fortress, 
 either of ammunition, provisions, or defenders. The 
 courage of the garrison was not broken, nor was the 
 place yet reduced to great straits. Jussuf Pasha had 
 men enough to defend the breaches, but not quite 
 enough to enable him to quit his stronghold so as to 
 attack the Russians on the northern side and drive 
 them away. A weak addition to his troops would 
 be of no service to him, and Omar Vrione must have 
 entered Yarna with his whole force, and debouched 
 again by the northern gate. We hold the first to 
 have been quite possible, spite of the position occu- 
 pied by General Bistrom ; and the last was easy of 
 execution, as the Turks were not at that time confined 
 
Chap. IX. STRATEGY OF THE TURKS. 213 
 
 within their walls, but maintained themselves in their 
 lodgments outside the ditch of the fortress, and imme- 
 diately in the flank of the Eussian lines of attack. 
 The best thing that Omar Vrione could have done 
 was undoubtedly on the 1st of October to have gone 
 to Osmandjick in pursuit of Prince Eugene's corps, 
 weakened as it was by losses in the battle of Kurt- 
 tepe, and by the detachments that had been sent off, 
 to have crushed it with ten times the number of men, 
 and then to have gone by Gebedje, over or round 
 the small lake Devna, by which means, on the 2nd 
 or 3rd of October, he would have been in the rear 
 of the Eussian besieging corps, which at that time, 
 owing to the great loss it had sustained during the 
 siege, and the detachments that had been sent to 
 Gralata-Burnu and to Grebedje, scarcely amounted to 
 10,000 fighting men. "We will not assert that even 
 with three times that number of men Omar Yrione 
 could have beaten the Eussians in the open field. 
 But at any rate they would have been forced to make 
 head against him; and it may pretty safely be 
 assumed that, under such circumstances, the garrison 
 would have made a sortie to destroy the Eussian lines 
 of attack and the mines, and to take the guns placed 
 in battery against the fortress : by which means the 
 capture of Varna might have been delayed to an 
 indefinite period. 
 
 Of the 72 battalions and 52 squadrons of the third 
 and seventh corps, with which Count Wittgenstein 
 
214 
 
 RUSSIAN FORCE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 intended to take Shumla, the following di-visions had 
 been removed : — 
 
 Battalions. SqtiadTiilis. 
 
 To Varna of the 7tli division 
 
 „ 10th „ 
 
 To stations 
 
 To Pravadi, under Prince 
 Madatof 
 
 ») » 
 
 To Devna, under General 
 Delingshausen . . . 
 
 tJnder General Diehitsoh 
 With General Simansky 
 
 „ Prince Eugene . . 
 
 „ General Bistrom . 
 
 18th „ . - 
 
 Mounted chasseurs 
 Lancers of the Bug 
 
 10th division . . 
 Lancers of the Bug 
 
 9th division . . 
 19th „ . . 
 
 Lancers of the Bug 
 19th division . . 
 10th „ . . 
 
 19th „ . . 
 
 —making altogether 38 battalions and 24 squadrons 
 that had been sent from Shnmla. 
 
 Thus, there were before Shumla at this time only 34 
 battalions and 28 squadrons, which, from losses in battle 
 and by disease, could scarcely amount to above 10,000 
 men. Hussein Pasha, even after the departure of Omar 
 Yrione, must have had double that number of troops. 
 
 Had Omar Vrione succeeded in his enterprise, the 
 campaign would have been ended : the Russians must 
 have fallen back over the Danube, and the whole result 
 of their enormous sacrifices would have been the pos- 
 session of one place on the left bank of the river. 
 
 But Omar Vrione did nothing of all this. For 
 three days he remained idle in his entrenchments in 
 
Chap. IX. PALL OF VAENA. 215 
 
 the wood, heard one mine after another explode 
 before Yarna, witnessed the progress of the siege, 
 and the storming by the Enssians, without taking any 
 part whatever ; and at length, when the Russian flag 
 waved over the ruins of the fortress, he made a hasty 
 retreat, as if the event which he had done his best 
 to bring about had exceedingly surprised him. The 
 connexion between a Pasha of Albania and the Otto- 
 man Porte is very unlike that between an European 
 commander and his sovereign, or his country ; and 
 other reasons, besides military ones, may have influ- 
 enced Omar Yrione's proceedings. 
 
 The Russians, spite of all resistance, had nearly 
 destroyed one whole front of the fortress of Varna by 
 dint of springing mines and by undermining. For 
 fourteen days the Turkish corps sent to reKeve Yarna 
 had remained at a distance of only five miles from 
 the fortress without rendering any assistance to the 
 besieged garrison. The boldest of the defenders had 
 fallen in the ntimerous sorties and in the heroical 
 defence of the ditch, and, while the last hope of help 
 from without disappeared, the example of one high 
 in command within the fortress had the greatest in- 
 fluence on the besieged. 
 
 During the afternoon of the 10th October Jussuf 
 Pasha, accompanied by a portion of the garrison, went 
 to the Russian camp and threw himself upon the mercy 
 of the Emperor. What negotiations preceded this 
 step, and what measures were adopted to bring it about, 
 
216 FALL OF VARNA. Part I. 
 
 are not known. Thus mucli is certain, that it was 
 not owing to the place being untenable, for Isset- 
 Mahommed, the Oapitan Pasha, could not be prevailed 
 upon to capitulate. He retired into the citadel and 
 threatened to bury himself and a small band of faith- 
 ful followers in the ruins of the fort, A heavy fire 
 from all the batteries and from the fleet, which was 
 opened upon Varna at Jussuf's instigation, shortly 
 after he entered the Russian camp, decided the rest 
 of the garrison and many of the inhabitants to quit 
 Varna. At length on the following day, and after 
 free exit had been granted to the Capitan Pasha and 
 to 300 of his followers, the fortress was surrendered 
 to the Russians. The place had resisted 89 days after 
 the first investment, YO days after the beginning of 
 the regular siege, and 27 days after the first practi- 
 cable breach had been effected ; in all three times as 
 long as Brailow. 
 
 The garrison, including the reinforcements that 
 had entered the place by degrees, consisted of 20,000 
 men, not much stronger therefore than that of Brai- 
 low ; but by the end of the siege it had diminished 
 to one-third of that number : 7000 men were sent 
 with Jussuf Pasha as prisoners of war into the Rus- 
 sian territories on the other side of the Danube. 
 But for Jussuf's treachery* and Omar Vrione's ob- 
 
 * The grounds for Jussuf s treachery arose from some palace intrigue. 
 His dismissal and the confiscation of his property in Kumelia had been 
 decided upon while he was still valiantly defending Varna. 
 
Chap. IX. PALL OP VARNA. 217 
 
 stinacy, the brave garrison of Varna might have cut 
 its way out, and, spite of Gleneral Bistrom's position, 
 have formed a junction with the Turkish corps at 
 Kurt-tepe, and thence fallen back with it across the 
 Kamtchik. 
 
 During the siege the Eussians expended above 
 2500 cwt. of gunpowder, of which a large portion 
 had been used for the enormous mines, without reck- 
 oning the somewhat short allowance of ammunition 
 for the numerous field-pieces; 37,000 cannon-balls, 
 2500 ball-cartridges, and 8600 hollow shot : alto- 
 gether about 50,000 shots had been fired against the 
 fortress, more than three times as much as against 
 Brailow. There was not a house in Varna that had 
 not received some injury, and the Christian quarter, 
 which was nearest to the front, was a heap of ruins. 
 Varna had only 162 guns, whereas Brailow was 
 armed with 300. The B,ussians had only placed 65 
 guns in battery, of which 8 were mortars, 23 heavy 
 ships' ordnance, and 34 field-pieces. The real bat- 
 tering-train only reached Varna when it was no 
 longer wanted. In all about 55,000 men out of the 
 weak besieging force, or about 700 daily, were em- 
 ployed in the working parties, about half as many as 
 at Brailow. The loss of the Eussians is not given, 
 but cannot be reckoned at less than at 5000 or 6000 
 men. 
 
 The marine artillery had done most service in the 
 batteries, the 3rd brigade of the 7th division in 
 
218 PALL OF VARNA. Part I. 
 
 covering the movements in the field, and the sailors 
 in carrying on the works. 
 
 The Turks plainly showed that they knew nothing 
 of the progress of a regular siege. They neglected 
 to increase their guns on the point of attack before 
 the Russians raised their batteries against them, and 
 they threw away their shot ; nor did they know how 
 to make a proper use of counter-mines : but they 
 showed the most unshaken courage behind fortifica- 
 tions, thrown up without system or regularity, but 
 defended by them to the last moment. Their defence 
 of the ditch was above all praise, and the resistance 
 of the garrison for three weeks after two practicable 
 breaches had been effected in the main wall is a very 
 rare instance of manly resolution. The defence of 
 Varna deserves mention among the most glorious 
 on record, and has a remarkable character from the 
 manner in which the besieged disputed the debatable 
 ground outside the walls against their assailants. 
 But no less praise should be awarded to the Russian 
 officers and troops who overcame so many difficulties 
 with such insufficient means. 
 
 From Kurt-tepe Omar Vrione could see everything 
 that took place at Yarna. After the surrender of the 
 place, and as if with that his occupation was gone, he 
 made a precipitate retreat beyond the Kamtchik. 
 Prince Eugene, with only four battalions and ten 
 squadrons, naturally did not venture too close to the 
 connecting lines of the Turks, and was still less 
 
Chap. IX. FALL OF VAENA. 219 
 
 able to cut off their retreat ; but he sent some 
 cavalry after the retreating Pasha, and G-enerals 
 Jefreimow and Nostitz came up with him not far 
 from the ford over the Kamtchik. The cavalry 
 fought in the wood ; both generals were wounded, and 
 forty Russians were killed. 
 
 General Bistrom's advanced guard also came up 
 with a portion of the retreating Turks and took a 
 flag. Thus, on the evening of the 11th October, 
 the Prince united under his command at Petrikoi 
 14 battalions and 16 squadrons. Omar Vrione at- 
 tempted to maintain a position on the left bank of 
 the Kamtchik, but Prince Eugene attacked him on 
 the 15th October, and after a hot engagement drove 
 him with great loss across the Kamtchik into the 
 entrenchments at Derwisch-Jowann, which the Pasha 
 quitted the next day of his own accord and fell back 
 upon Aidos, leaving only a weak garrison in the 
 blockhouses at Derwisch-Jowann.* 
 
 * Within tlie last two years, and since Baron von Molkte wrote his 
 book, the fortress of Varna has been provided with a considerable arma- 
 ment of guns and mortars. Many additions have also been made to the 
 fortifications : the ramparts, parapets, platforms, and embrasures have been 
 put in order, and detached redoubts thrown up in advance. The design 
 and arming of the new works have not been judicious in the first instance, 
 but it is presumed will be improved by the French or English engineers 
 now with the allied forces in Turkey. — Tbanslatoe. 
 
220 INVESTMENT OF SILISTBIA. Part I. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE INVESTMENT OF SILISTEIA. 
 
 The position of Silistria is equally important in a 
 strategical point of view, and unfavourable for the 
 purposes of fortification. The fortress was razed 
 after it was taken in 1810, but soon rose again from 
 its ruins, and numbered 24,000 inhabitants* when 
 the Russians besieged it in 1828. Silistriaf (Plan V.) 
 describes a nearly exact semicircle, of which the dia- 
 meter, 2000 paces in length, is turned towards the 
 Danube. The place is surrounded by a fortification 
 with ten fronts each 550 paces long ; but with the 
 exception of the two narrow works, Liman and 
 
 * At present tliree-fourtlis of the space included within the walls are 
 a waste. It is true there is a new city, but it does not contain above 4000 
 inhabitants. These have chiefly settled in the suburb of Wolna, built 
 by the Russians, to the east of the fortress, and on the river. Inside the 
 town a few streets have been built ; there are besides some scattered small 
 houses and the barracks built by the Russians along the curtain. In other 
 respects the fortifications remain much the same as they were ; indeed the 
 Russians would have been very wrong to have altered them. When Sultan 
 Mahmud was there in 1836 the four breaches in the bastions Ordu and 
 Muftiereh-Tabiassi, and in the intermediate curtain, were not repaired, but 
 only filled up with hurdles. Even the traces of the attack of 1810 were 
 perfectly visible. 
 
 t In Russian accounts the tracings and profile of the place are given 
 otherwise ; for instance, the depth of the ditch is said to be above 24 feet. 
 But we can only go by our own observation. 
 
Chap. X. INVESTMENT OP SILISTRIA. 221 
 
 Tchengel Tabiassi, which connect it with the Da- 
 nube and are principally intended to sweep the river, 
 Silistria has neither permanent outworks nor a covered 
 way beyond a few lodgments slightly thrown up out- 
 side the gates of the town, which would else he 
 entirely open to the field, and might be directly bom- 
 barded. The glacis was from 2 to 4 feet high, and 
 the ditch, as shown by the profile, not above 8 or at 
 most 10 feet deep. The scarp and counterscarp were 
 faced to that height with flints. Above the scarp 
 rose a parapet 8 feet high and 20 feet broad, of 
 which the inner slope was faced with palisades. The 
 outer slope of the parapets of the bastions was very 
 steep and set up with wattles ; those of the curtain 
 were faced with sods. The bastions mounted ten 
 guns, which fired through embrasures, of which there 
 were four on each face and only one on each flank, so 
 that the lines of the ditch, which were very short, 
 were very badly flanked. Two gates opened upon 
 the river and two more on the land side.* There 
 was no means of laying the ditch under water, as its 
 bottom is above the level of the Danube, and no 
 streams run into it. As a precaution against the 
 Eussian mines, a cunette 9 feet deep, but quite dry, 
 had been hollowed out on the bottom of the ditch all 
 round the front towards the land. 
 
 The very slight command of the fortress — of not 
 more than 8 or 9 feet — renders the neighbouring 
 
 * Now there is but one, the Stambul Kapu. 
 
222 INVESTMENT OP SILISTBIA. Part I. 
 
 heights more formidable. The table-land of Bulgaria, 
 where it approaches very near to the Danube, is 200 
 feet high and perfectly flat, and at a distance of 
 1500 paces on an average from the main wall of the 
 fortress it descends in a slope which would not be too 
 steep to allow artillery to be mounted upon any part 
 of it. At only 800 paces from the southern bastion 
 (Muftiereh) the whole interior of the fortress can be 
 completely overlooked as far as- the gorge, which is 
 turned towards the Danube. A battery at this point 
 would take the three eastern fronts in reverse, and 
 the two south-west fronts can be seen and enfiladed 
 from D. Some of the heights rise from a distance 
 of only 600 paces from the main wall, and upon these 
 the besieging party might construct their batteries 
 just as near and as high as they pleased, and might 
 serve them until the end of the siege. The Danube, 
 too, is not quite 1000 paces wide at this point, so that 
 a very troublesome fire might be kept up upon the 
 place from the opposite bank. 
 
 The only means of turning Silistria into a good 
 fortress would be to erect four strong detached out- 
 works at A, B, C, and D, and to construct a tete-du- 
 pont on the left bank of the Danube just opposite the 
 town (X). 
 
 We have already seen that the 4th division of 
 lancers and the 16th infantry, consisting of 16 
 squadrons and 12 battalions, with about 36 field- 
 guns, altogether 10,000 men, had been withdrawn 
 
Chap. X. INVESTMENT OP SILISTEIA. 223 
 
 from the corps under Greneral Eoth, and marched 
 upon Silistria by the circuitous route through Hir- 
 sova. Greneral Roth made his appearance before 
 Silistria on the 21st July, at the very time when the 
 main army arrived before Shumla and the corps 
 under Greneral Ushakoff before Varna. Like them, 
 too, he had not a sufficient force, and no siege artil- 
 lery, because only one battering-train had been pro- 
 vided for a campaign during which four sieges were 
 expected to take place. 
 
 The garrison of Silistria was numerous ; it con- 
 sisted principally of the armed inhabitants of the 
 town and its neighbourhood, amounting to about 6000 
 or 7000 men at arms. Besides these the greater part 
 of the garrisons of Brailow, Tultcha, Matchin, and 
 Hirsova had gone to Silistria. Thus at first the 
 besieged were probably more numerous than the 
 besiegers.* As soon as the Russians approached the 
 place several sharp skirmishes took place, in which 
 the Turks had the worst. 
 
 Greneral Roth thought himself obliged at first to 
 take up a purely defensive position beyond the range 
 of the guns of the fortress, and he accordingly selected 
 one upon the above-mentioned heights. The Turks 
 attempted to prevent this by sorties on the 23rd, 
 24th, and 25th of July, but of course without success 
 on ground so unfavourable to their attempt. 
 
 * According to the Russian accounts tliey numbered 22,000 ; but this 
 is greatly exaggerated. 
 
224 INVESTMENT OP SILISTRIA. Part I. 
 
 General Roth's entrenchments consisted of a chain 
 of works (No. I. to XIII.), partly closed and partly 
 open, at the gorge, at the distance, on an average, 
 of ahout 2000 paces from the fortress. The right 
 of the line rested on the Lower Danube at the last 
 redoubt. The high ground farther to the left was 
 still in the possession of the Turks. 
 
 In this position the two hostile forces remained for 
 four weeks, during which nothing took place but a 
 few slight skirmishes by which the Russians could 
 gain no possible advantage. Meanwhile the Turks 
 kept possession of the heights at A and B, which 
 were attacked by the besiegers on the 28th of August. 
 The fight began at midnight, and lasted until the 
 following afternoon. The Turks retook the height 
 A three times, but were forced at length to abandon 
 it to their enemies. Their final attack was made by 
 a column of 3000 men, supported by 5 field-guns. 
 As plateau B was entirely beyond reach of the fire 
 from the fortress, the Turks always found themselves 
 exposed at that point to that of the numerous Russian 
 artillery. On their return to the fortress they were 
 vigorously attacked by the lancer regiments of St. 
 Petersburg and Charkow, and are said to have lost 
 about 500 men. The losses on the side of the Russians 
 are estimated by themselves at 72 killed and 312 
 wounded, including the colonels of both cavalry 
 regiments. 
 
 The Russian position was completed by the con- 
 
<Thap. X. INVESTMENT OF SILISTEIA. 225 
 
 struction of the works to No. XVIII. The left wing, 
 however, remained at the distance of ahout 4000 
 paces from the fortress, and a mile from the Danube. 
 On that side the level ground was commanded by 
 the fortress and the work of Liman Tabiassi, and 
 the events of the 11th of September show that the 
 place had been incompletely surrounded just in the 
 most important direction, towards Rustchuk and 
 Shumla, On this day a corps of 5000 Turks ad- 
 vanced from Rustchuk, and, spite of the Russian 
 position, joined the troops which advanced from 
 Silistria to meet them. An attack made by the 
 Turks upon the cavalry under General Kreutz was 
 unsuccessful, but the Russians lost 8 officers and 
 158 privates. 
 
 Works were erected on the high ground at B, 
 nearer to the fortress than any previous ones, but 
 still at a distance of 1500 paces, and a trench, a a, 
 was slightly thrown up from the redoubts on the 
 right wing along the front of the other entrench- 
 ments half way up the slope : in making this trench 
 the existing enclosures were used, and it served to 
 cover the skirmishers. 
 
 The Russian lines were in a great degree protected 
 from any attacks from the fortress by the heights 
 upon which they stood. On the other hand, they 
 could be but feebly manned, as they extended be- 
 tween three and four miles in length; they were 
 broken by two deep valleys, and would have been 
 
 Q 
 
226 INVESTMENT OP SILISTEIA. Paei I. 
 
 little able to withstand any serious attack from the 
 further side. 
 
 On the 10th of August the 2nd and 3rd squadrons 
 of the Russian Danubian flotilla, in all 36 vessels, 
 arrived before Silistria. It would have been of the 
 highest importance to restore the communication with 
 the Wallachian shore by means of a bridge of boats 
 or rafts. An abundance of brushwood grew on the 
 further side of the river, which on the right bank 
 had to be brought from many miles' distance. A 
 permanent way across the river would have rendered 
 it far more easy to provide for the necessities of the 
 troops, and, in case of misfortune, would have greatly 
 facilitated their retreat, which would otherwise have 
 to be made to Hirsova, at a distance of 70 miles 
 through a hostile country, by no means to be looked 
 upon as subdued so long as the doubtful state of things 
 before Yarna and Shumla might last. There is no 
 doubt that the materials for a bridge might easily 
 have been brought by the Ardshish and the Bortesa 
 branch of the Danube, but all the energies of the 
 Russians seem to have been paralysed towards the 
 end of the campaign. The first point should have 
 been to drive away the Turkish flotilla, which num- 
 bered only 12 vessels, and nothing would have been 
 easier, as the Russians had possession of the left bank 
 of the Danube, only 1000 paces off. We cannot, 
 however, learn that anything of the sort was at- 
 tempted : the only feat performed was the inevitable 
 
Chap. X. INVESTMENT OF SILISTlilA. 227 
 
 repulse of a few sorties made by the garrison. On 
 tlae 15th. of September the two divisions belonging 
 to the 6th corps were ordered to Shumla, and 
 relieved at Silistria by the 2nd corps-d'arme'e of 
 General Tscherbatoff. "When General Eoth marched 
 away a sortie was made by the brave commander of 
 the place, Achmet Pasha, in person, at the head of 
 4000 men, and much blood was shed on both sides. 
 Reckoning the strength of the 2nd corps, which came 
 from the interior of Russia, at only 18,000 men, the 
 number of the besiegers now greatly exceeded that 
 of the besieged. Nevertheless during the next four 
 weeks nothing effectual was done towards ending the 
 siege of Silistria. General Tscherbatoff fell sick, and 
 General Langeron undertook the command. The 
 number of guns had now increased to 120, but there 
 was no ammunition. At the same time disease 
 spread with fearful violence and rapidity among the 
 newly arrived troops, and a scarcity of provisions 
 prevailed. According to the newspaper accounts 
 500 men died on the 4th and 5th of November only, 
 within the Russian lines. 
 
 At Shumla Hussein Pasha had done but little since 
 the middle of August. One of his divisions threat- 
 ened Bazardjik, where the Russian hospitals were. The 
 Russians could only send a small company against 
 him, which was utterly annihilated, but no attack was 
 made on the town. A sortie made from Shumla on 
 the 11th of October was equally ineffectual. 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 INVESTMENT , OP SILISTEIA. Pakt I. 
 
 On the 16th of October G-eneral Eoth, with the 6th 
 corps, marched from before Shumla by Jenibazar and 
 Turkarautlar to Koludja, and General Rudsjewitsch 
 with the 3rd corps to Sihstria. At first the Russian 
 troojss leaving Shumla were but feebly pursued by 
 the Turks, and it was not until the 19th of October 
 and the following days that some sharp encounters 
 took place between the rear-guard and a Turkish 
 division of 8000 men at Aidochda. The Russians 
 themselves owned to the loss of 800 men and the whole 
 of their baggage. On the arrival of these troops at 
 Silistria the Russian besieging corps consisted of two 
 corps-d'armee, in all about 30,000 men. Their in- 
 tention was to continue the blockade all through the 
 winter, but they were soon forced to relinquish it. 
 Incessant rain had flooded not only the trenches, but 
 the whole country upon which they were to be con- 
 structed. Eight degrees of cold set in, and the rain 
 turned to snow, which drifted over the Russian earth- 
 huts and batteries. Fragments of ice floated down 
 the Danube, and broke off all communication with 
 the left bank, and with it the supply of food and 
 ammunition, which were already becoming scarce. 
 Above all, the 3rd corps imperatively needed quieter 
 winter-quarters after the prodigious exertions and 
 losses of the campaign ; accordingly, after an inef- 
 fectual bombardment, which lasted forty-eight hours, 
 the fruitless siege of Silistria was, raised on the 10th 
 of Noveniber. Only a very small part of the be- 
 
Chap. X. INVESTMENT OP SILISTEIA. 229 
 
 sieging corps could cross the riv*er in boats. The 
 remainder had to make a painful retreat across the 
 devastated country, along roads so deep and muddy 
 that it often took the strength of a whole battahon 
 to get along one single heavy gun. It can hardly 
 be doubted that under such circumstances a part of 
 the artillery was left behind in the batteries, and that 
 more fell into the hands of the Turks, who hotly 
 pursued their retreating enemy. 
 
 The accounts of the operatioins against Silis- 
 tria are very incomplete, chiefly perhaps because 
 nothing was done. Instead of history the Turks 
 write only inflated bombast, from which it is impos- 
 sible to gather the truth, and even the superior officers 
 seldom take a large view of events. The Eussians, 
 on the other hand, certainly could have no interest in 
 making public their share in this part of the cam- 
 paign. But if we may form an opinion from the 
 scanty materials extant, and from the event itself, 
 we must look upon the so-called siege of Silistria in 
 1828 as an ill-planned, feebly executed, and wholly 
 unsuccessful attempt. 
 
 Out of the three corps-d'arm6e with which the 
 Eussians had begun the campaign one had been sent 
 into Wallachia, where there was little to be done. 
 The 6th corps was to cross the Danube at Oltenitza 
 (opposite Turtukai). The undertaking was difficult, 
 but easier than that at Satunovo ; nevertheless it 
 failed. It might have been foreseen that the 6th 
 
230 INVESTMENT OF SILISTEIA. Paet I. 
 
 corps would not be able to advance into Bulgaria un- 
 supported until the 3rd corps had got at least as far 
 as Trajan's wall. It would therefore undoubtedly 
 have been better to begin by incorporating with the 
 3rd corps the 10,000 men of the 6th, who were des- 
 tined to act on the offensive on the farther side of 
 the Danube. However slowly this force might have 
 advanced towards the wall of Trajan, Greneral Both 
 would then have certainly been able to reach Silistria 
 on the 28th June, four weeks before he actually did 
 so, and at a time when the defence of the place was 
 left entirely to the inhabitants, and before the brave 
 defenders of Brailow had arrived there. Such a weak 
 fortress as Silistria, defended by a small garrison, 
 might very probably have been taken at the first 
 onset by 10,000 Eussians with 50 guns, and its cap- 
 ture would have been of the highest importance. In 
 the year 1809 this fortress, though feebly attacked, 
 had not been able to hold out more than five days. 
 
 Brailow had fallen on the 18th June, and from 
 that time the battering train, consisting of 100 gtins, 
 was disposable. The fate of this train is, however, 
 involved in mystery — subsequently it was absent 
 everywhere. It appears that single guns were taken 
 from it to Yama, Silistria, and even to Shumla ; but 
 they did not arrive at Varna until months after they 
 were wanted, or at Silistria until the besiegers would 
 have been almost glad to be rid of them again. Now 
 the distance from Brailow to Silistria is about 95 
 
Chap. X. INVESTMENT OP SILISTRIA. 231 
 
 miles ; Wallaclaia afforded plenty of means of trans- 
 port, horses, carts> and draught oxen; there wete 
 practicable roads on either side of the river, or the 
 transport might take place by water, as the Russian 
 flotilla was so superior to that of the Turks both. in 
 number and efficiency that no serious resistance could 
 be apprehended. Supposing fourteen days had been 
 spent in repairs and preparations, and as many more 
 in the transit of 95 miles, the artillery would still 
 have arrived at Silistria at the same time as Greneral 
 Eoth's division. It is therefore perfectly unintelli- 
 gible why the besiegers were left without the most 
 needful siege artillery. 
 
 It mattered not whether the operations of the main 
 corps were directed against Varna or against Shumla;; 
 in either case Silistria lay in their rear. Nothing 
 but the possession of this place could afford a base 
 tolerably secure, though not more than 65 miles in 
 breadth, and would set free 10,000 men who would 
 be of the greatest use at other places, the Russian 
 army being so reduced in numbers : this should have 
 been a sufficient motive for proceeding with the ut- 
 most energy. 
 
 The insufficiency of the means of attack was not 
 peculiar to Silistria, but occurred in a still greater 
 degree before Yarna, the siege of which presented 
 much greater difficulties owing to its more favourable 
 position and the greater strength of its fortifications. 
 There, too, the garrison were stronger than the be- 
 
232 INVESTMENT OF SILISTEIA. Pabt I. 
 
 siegers, and yet the attack was carried on with such 
 vigour that even before the arrival of the guard the 
 latter had approached 50 paces nearer to the place, 
 of which the scarp was already much injured. 
 
 The investment of Silistria was far more easy than 
 that of Yarna, and yet it remained incomplete. The 
 flotilla on the Danube contained 16 vessels, each of 
 them armed with 3 heavy gmis. These 48 guns 
 might, if necessary, have been placed in batteries, 
 like the ships' cannon at Varna, as the remaining 
 16 vessels with 1 gun each were quite strong enough 
 to cope with the Turkish flotilla. In two whole 
 months, however, the besiegers did not approach 
 nearer to the place than 1500 paces with cannon 
 and 700 with trenches for skirmishers. After the 
 arrival of the 3rd corps in the middle of October the 
 number of field-guns before Silistria must have ex- 
 ceeded 100 ; to these were added 64 pieces belonging 
 to the flotilla, and by all accounts 120 battering guns, 
 so that altogether 300 pieces of artillery were as- 
 sembled before the place. To be sure, they could be 
 of no use, but merely an incumbrance, unless care 
 was taken to supply ammunition at the same time. 
 
 It is possible that more accurate information might 
 explain and justify much that seems like want of 
 vigour, a fault of which we do not find the Eussians 
 guilty on any other occasion during this campaign. 
 
.Chap. XI. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WALLACHIA. 233 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 MILITARY OPEEATIONS IN WALLACHIA. 
 
 It now only remains for us to revert to the events 
 which, took place in "Wallachia after Groneral Eoth, 
 with two divisions of his corps, was summoned in the 
 beginning of July to assist in the operations on the 
 right bank of the Danube, and General Greismar re- 
 mained behind on the left bank with 16 squadrons 
 and 12 battalions, besides 2 regiments of Cossacks, 
 making up altogether 10,000 men. 
 
 To Greneral G-eismar was intrusted the difficult 
 task of not only holding in check a wide tract of 
 country, and keeping its nearly exhausted resources 
 at the command of Eussia, but also of guarding the 
 long frontier line of 150 miles from Eustchuk to 
 Widdin, upon which were the towns of Nicopolis 
 and Eahova, with Turkish garrisons. Q-iurgevo and 
 the fortified village of Kalafat were tetes-du-pont by 
 means of which the strong garrisons of Eustchuk 
 and Widdin could invade the unprotected country 
 on the left side of the Danube at any moment. 
 
 We have already mentioned that the sorties from 
 Giurgevo on the 2nd Juno and 3rd July were 
 
234 MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WALLACHIA. Pabt I. 
 
 repulsed. After that the garrison at Eustchuk 
 remained quiet ; on the other hand, the Pasha of 
 Widdin, who had a considerable force under his com- 
 mand, now bestirred himself. Not that the troops 
 deserved the name of an army, but, counting his 
 regular battalions, the Pasha could collect about 
 10,000 to 15,000 Osmanlis for a marauding expedi- 
 tion ; and though the Russians did not much fear 
 these troops of horsemen in the open field, it was very 
 difficult to keep them from harassing the country. 
 
 Greneral Gleismar had advanced to Grolenz close to 
 Kalafat, so as to keep a watch on the enemy's move- 
 ments. There he was attacked on the 18th August 
 by superior numbers, and forced to retreat 25 miles to 
 the fortified camp of Tchoroya, half way to Krajova. 
 When attacked there too, the Russian general main- 
 tained his position behind his redoubts, but could not 
 prevent the Turks from plundering Lesser Wallachia. 
 All the provisions and forage collected in Golenz, 
 30,000 pounds of biscuits and above 1000 quarters of 
 corn, besides immense stores of materials for building 
 bridges, fell into the hands of the Turks, who like- 
 wise drove away numerous herds of oxen, and plun- 
 dered and burned the whole district. The Pasha then 
 returned to Widdin, but made another sortie on the 
 27th August, and drove General G-eismar back to 
 Krajova. This time the predatory hordes extended 
 their incursions 100 miles, through the whole north- 
 ern district of Lesser Wallachia. All the provisions 
 
Chap. XI. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WALLACHIA. 235 
 
 they could find the Turks either carried away or de- 
 stroyed without let or hindrance. General Geismar, 
 however, collected all his forces together, crossed the 
 Schill in two bodies, and the Turks then retreated, 
 loaded with booty, to their fortified camp at Kalafat, 
 where they remained quiet four weeks. 
 
 On the 24th September the Seraskier of Widdin, 
 who had been now made Pasha of Lesser Wallachia, 
 quitted his camp with 26,000 men, chiefly cavalry, 
 and 30 guns, and marched on the 26th to the village 
 of Bojeleschti, on the right flank of the Eussian corps 
 entrenched at Tchoroya, which did not consist of 
 more than 4500 men with 14 guns : 1 battalion and 
 2 squadrons remained behind at the bridge over the 
 Schill. 
 
 G-eneral Greismar felt the danger that threatened 
 the Russian communications, and saw clearly not only 
 that he could not maintain the position of Tchoroya 
 against such overwhelming masses, but also that" 
 something extraordinary must be done at once in 
 order to defeat the object of the Turks and to save 
 the country as well as the Bussian army from great 
 mischief. He therefore determined to disregal-d the 
 numerical superiority of the Turks, and to attack 
 them at once. He was not restrained by the circum- 
 stance that the ground offered him no advantage, for 
 he trus-ied to the bravery and discipline of his men 
 and to the surprise which so bold an attack would 
 cause the Turks. He also counted on the fatigue of 
 
236 MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WALLAOHIA. Pabt I. 
 
 the latter, of whom one portion had only just entered 
 Widdin, and all were only just off a difficult march. 
 The Russian infantry consisted of 16 companies of 
 the Koliwar regiment, the Tomski line regiment, and 
 the 34th regiment of chasseurs. The cavalry, con- 
 sisted of the whole regiment of Kargopol and 3 
 squadrons of the new Russian dragoons and the Cos- 
 sack regiment Solitrow. The distance from Tchoroya 
 to Bojeleschti was about 5 miles, and the ground 
 formed a large plateau, with an almost imperceptible 
 slope towards the latter village, broken here and 
 there by slight elevations, affording an uninterrupted 
 view over the surrounding country. The march of 
 the Russians could not be concealed from the Turks, 
 and, besides determination and courage, it required 
 an accurate knowledge and due appreciation of the 
 Turkish and of the Russian troops to venture upon 
 such an attack. Greneral Greismar led his small force 
 in the following order against the Pasha. 
 
 Two squares formed the head, each square con- 
 sisting of 2 companies of the Tomski line regiment 
 and the 34th chasseurs (A B). The two squares had 
 two 12-pounders between them. (Plan No. 6.) 
 
 Right and left from these, en echelon, the above- 
 mentioned regiments formed on each flank two other 
 squares (0 D). Six light field-pieces were equally 
 distributed between the two divisions. These were 
 followed . by the Kargopol dragoon regiment ; in 
 divisions behind the intervals of the squares on both 
 
Chap. XI. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WALLAOHIA. 237 
 
 flanks (F) ; the 3 squadrons of the new Russian 
 dragoon regiment (Gr), with 4 guns of the horse- 
 artillery, were placed in the middle behind the vacant 
 space of the head, and before that of the reserve. 
 The latter, consisting of some grenadier companies, 
 likewise formed 2 squares, between which were two 
 Hght field-pieces (E). 
 
 The Cossack regiment Solotirow was divided, so as 
 to cover the flanks on both wings (H). At about 
 two o'clock in the afternoon the Russian corps ap- 
 peared in this order opposite the Turks, who were 
 posted advantageously on a height near Bojeleschti, 
 and commenced a cannonade from their 12-pounders, 
 to which the Turks replied from their batteries, 
 without, however, stopping the Russian advance. 
 
 Almost at the same time a very large body of 
 Turkish horse showed itself on the right wing of the 
 Russians, as the latter were manoeuvring in order to 
 threaten the Turkish communications with "Widdin ; 
 and although the Turks suffered severely from the 
 Russian fire, they did not seem to pay much attention 
 to it. A Russian dragoon regiment and some Cos- 
 sacks attacked the Turks in divisions with such order 
 and determination that after a short resistance the 
 latter retired upon Bojeleschti. 
 
 Meanwhile the Russian infantry had continued 
 their advance, and one portion of their guns was so 
 placed on the hill, K, as to pour a heavy fire into the 
 Turkish position. But the Turkish cavalry that had 
 
238 MILITAEY OPERATIONS IN WALLACHIA. Pabt I. 
 
 been driven back on the right wing, retreated under 
 cover of the hedges and the houses of Bojeleschti, 
 made a rapid circuit behind the Russian infantry, 
 and suddenly appeared in increased numbers on the 
 Eussian left wing. One portion attacked the Cos-- 
 sacks, who were scarce able to resist the assault ; 
 another, some 5000 strong, advanced on the road to 
 Tchoroya, where the Russians had their hospitals, 
 their store of provisions, and their array of baggage- 
 waggons. 
 
 The Russian general saw his danger. He ordered 
 Count Tolstoy with 2 squadrons of his regiment to 
 attack them, and that officer charged with such im- 
 petuosity as to drive the Turks back in great dis- 
 order. Meanwhile the 3rd squadron of the new Rus- 
 sian dragoons, supported by the reserve of the gre- 
 nadiers, completed the defeat of the Turks, who 
 retreated, not without loss, into their entrenchments. 
 
 During this encounter the Turkish infantry re- 
 mained quietly in their position, which the Russians 
 had approached by careful manoeuvres to within a 
 distance of 1300 or 1400 paces (K). It was now 
 night, and the Turks showed no wish to continue 
 the engagement. Greneral G-eismar, although he had 
 not only kept his ground, but had also beaten back 
 the Turkish assault, could not feel himself secure. 
 He considered that, in such close proximity to the 
 superior force of the Turks, retreat was at least as 
 dangerous as attack, and that something decisive must 
 
Chap. XL MILITAKY OPEEATIONS IN WALLACHIA. 239 
 
 be done. He therefore deterrained, favoured by tbe 
 excessive darkness of tbe nigbt and the carelessness 
 of tbe Turks, to attack their camp. With this intent 
 he formed all his infantry into 8 columns of attack, 
 each column to consist of 2 companies; 6 columns 
 were appointed for the assault, and 2 were to act as a 
 reserve. 
 
 Four columns advanced straight upon the Turkish 
 position. The 3rd division, likewise composed of two 
 columns, attacked the left wing of the Turks. The 
 4th, of the same strength as the reserve, followed at 
 a short distance, directing their march more against 
 the right wing of the Turks. The whole of the 
 artillery and cavalry remained in their position. 
 
 The Eussians approached the Turkish encampment 
 in the most profound silence, and came with no impedi- 
 ment upon the cavalry, who lay in front of the infantry. 
 The cavalry, alarmed at the report of musketry, and 
 in the greatest disorder, thought only of getting on 
 their- horses, and fled on the road to Widdin. The 
 Vizier himself moxmted a mule; his Seraskier, the 
 Kiaja Bey, escaped on foot followed by the highest 
 officers. Many of the cavalry fell beneath the 
 bayonets of the Eussians ; nearly one-third of the 
 horses were killed or left behind : no one thought of 
 offering any resistance. The Eussians then fell upon 
 the infantry, who stood unmoved in their position, 
 and, undismayed by the , desertion of the cavalry, 
 received the E«ssians with a steady fire. 
 
240 MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WALLACHIA. Part I. 
 
 Colonel Sawadsky, though wounded on the head, 
 threw himself with the tirailleurs into the ditch, and 
 drove out or killed the Turks who were in it. His 
 small but bold columns followed him. The entrench- 
 ment was soon taken, and a gun captured. The 
 Turks threw themselves into the houses in their rear, 
 and made an obstinate defence. 
 
 At the same time Colonel Griwlogado w led his columns 
 up to the retrenchment and took it by storm, spite of 
 the sharp fire with which he was received. All who 
 resisted were cut down, and the rest fled into the 
 houses in the rear, where they renewed their defence. 
 Two guns were taken by the Russians. 
 
 The General offered quarter to the Turks who were 
 firing from the houses, but they only fired the more. 
 He then ordered the reserve of grenadiers to advance, 
 so as to penetrate to the left into the village, and end 
 the fight. Major Danilowitsch, regardless of the 
 murderous fire with which he was received, advanced 
 at the head of his grenadiers through the hollow way 
 leading to the village, but was killed by a bullet in 
 the head. The next in rank took the command, and 
 continued the attack. The Turks were everywhere 
 beaten, and lost a gun. 
 
 Meanwhile Colonel Griwlogadow, who had been 
 sent to the right, had stormed, and, after a strenuous 
 opposition, taken an entrenchment defended by the 
 Turkish regular infantry. One gun and 70 pri- 
 soners were taken. 
 
Chap. XI. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WALLACHIA. 241 
 
 The camp was taken on all sides. In a short time 
 the whole village was in flames, and the Turks only 
 ceased firing when the ruins fell upon them. The 
 survivors made a precipitate retreat towards the 
 fields, but were cut down or made prisoners by the 
 Cossacks. 
 
 It was two o'clock in the morning when Greneral 
 Greismar gathered together his bold soldiers, and the 
 trophies they had won, upon the smoking ruins of 
 Bojeleschti. Besides the guns taken in the entrench- 
 ment, the Cossacks brought in 2 more. They had 
 taken 7 guns altogether, and as many ammunition- 
 waggons. In Bojeleschti alone 1000 men were killed, 
 among whom was one of the five Pashas who accom- 
 panied the expedition. Only 507 prisoners were 
 brought in. Arms for more than 10,000 men lay 
 upon the field of battle. The whole camp — 24 
 waggons laden with military stores and 400 with 
 provisions, 24 standards, two of which belonged to 
 the regular infantry, and the Vizier's correspondence 
 — fell into the hands of the Russians. Among the 
 letters was one from the Sultan expressly ordering 
 the Yizier to destroy Greneral Greismar's corps. The 
 Yizier, who had pompously exhibited this letter on 
 his march from "Widdin, now returned thither a fugi- 
 tive and covered with ignominy. The impression 
 which this event produced upon the Turks was so 
 great that they murdered many of their officers who 
 wanted to prevent them from crossing the Danube 
 
 R 
 
242 MILITARY OPEEATIONS IN WALLACHIA. Pabt I. 
 
 near Kalafat. The Turks themselves reckoned their 
 loss at 3000 men. 
 
 The Russians also had lost a great many men in 
 comparison with the number engaged, but few con- 
 sidering the victory they had obtained ; their loss 
 cannot be ascertained with certainty. After this 
 battle Wallachia remained free from the incursions 
 of the Turks : on the 25th of October the Turks, 
 without being attacked, suddenly evacuated their im- 
 portant fortified position at Kalafat, which was imme- 
 diately occupied by the Russians, and works thrown 
 up in the direction of Widdin. 
 
 During the winter the tete-du-pont at Nicopolis was 
 likewise taken. Tschapan-oglu (the Son of the Tiger), 
 sprung from one of the noblest Asiatic families, had 
 gone there with 12,000 horsemen. He sent Count 
 Langeron a pouch of tobacco with a letter in which he 
 announced his intention of driving the Russians out 
 of the Principalities. Count Langeron replied by 
 storming Kaleh. That place had been lately fortified 
 with towers and a moat ; but the water in the moat 
 was frozen, and the town was taken in less than an 
 hour on the 25th of January. 32 guns and 5 stand- 
 ards were taken, 250 Turks killed, and 350 taken 
 prisoners. The commander of the place, Ibrahim 
 Pasha, and 60 officers were likewise made prisoners. 
 
 Greneral MaKnofski immediately ordered an attack 
 to be made on the neighbouring town of Turno. The 
 suburb was taken, and the armed inhabitants cut 
 
Chap. XI. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WALLACHIA. 243 
 
 down, but the citadel resisted. The Eussians lost on 
 that day 6 officers and 330 men. 
 
 On the 11th of February the citadel capitulated. 
 The garrison of 1500 men were allowed free exit 
 with their baggage, but left 51 guns and 3 standards 
 in the hands of the Russians. 
 
 On the 18th of the same month a detachment of 
 volunteers from the 9 th regiment of chasseurs made an 
 excursion over the Danube, and surprised the Turkish 
 flotilla not far from Nicopolis. The Russians de- 
 stroyed 29 vessels, stormed a Turkish fort, and threw 
 the guns into the Danube : they lost only two men. 
 
 These occurrences, which more properly belong to 
 the next campaign, are mentioned here only for the 
 purpose of keeping the narrative connected. 
 
 The task intrusted to Greneral Greismar was a 
 thankless one, inasmuch as the greatest success could 
 lead to no important victory, nor could it influence 
 the issue of the campaign. Considering, however, 
 the small means at his disposal, Greneral Greismar 
 accomplished the difficult mission intrusted to him 
 with equal courage and prudence. 
 
 R 2 
 
244 END OP THE CAMPAIGN. Pabt I. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 END OF THE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 The fall of Yarna gave the whole eastern portion 
 of Bulgaria into the power of the Eussians. Had 
 the Turkish commanders been able to hold that im- 
 portant fortress, the Russians must have retreated 
 across the Danube ; but they could now venture to 
 place some of their troops in winter quarters on the 
 right bank of the river. The 6th and 7th corps, 
 under the command of General Roth, were concen- 
 trated near Yarna, and held Pravadi, Grebedje, Kos- 
 ludja, Devna, and Bazardjik. The fortifications of 
 Yarna were repaired as well as was possible in the 
 time. The guards went into Bessarabia ; the 2nd 
 and 3rd corps wintered for the most part in Mol- 
 davia and Wallachia. The head-quarters of General 
 "Wittgenstein were at Jassy. This position, with the 
 left wing resting on the sea at Yarna, and the right 
 wing at Krajova and on the Schill, extended 250 
 miles : the Danube divided the Russian army into 
 two parts. Silistria lay like the point of a wedge 
 inserted into the Russian winter quarters, and the 
 strong garrison of Rustchuk kept a footing on the 
 Wallachian side of the Danube at Giurgevo. This 
 
Chap. XII. END OF THE CAMPAiaN. 245 
 
 state of things was not witiiout its inconvenience, 
 and even danger, to the Russians. But they reckoned 
 on the want of enterprise which the Turks had shown 
 during the whole summer, upon their ignorance of mili- 
 tary science, and their dislike to a winter campaign. 
 Isset Mahommed Pasha, who had been named Grand 
 Vizier, had pledged himself to retake Varna during 
 the course of the winter. After he had taken the 
 command at Shumla, he actually did advance with 
 some thousand men, on the 20th of November, as far 
 as Pravadi ; but after staying there four days, without 
 doing anything of importance, he retired to Aidos 
 and Shumla. Halil Pasha's expedition against Ge- 
 neral Roth's communications in January was equally 
 abortive. On the 20th of January, Halil Pasha, 
 with a strong division of cavalry, fell in with a post 
 of Cossacks near Kosludja, and occupied the place. 
 An attempt to carry Bazardjik by a coup-de-main, 
 failed. General Ragofsky quickly got together two 
 regiments of chasseurs, some Cossacks, and four guns, 
 with which he retook Kosludja, strengthened Pra- 
 vadi, and drove back the Turks with loss. 
 
 The Asiatic irregular troops could not be restrained, 
 from going home during the severe weather; they 
 said they had left their winter stockings behind. In 
 short, the Turks did just what was expected of them — 
 namely, nothing ; so that the Russians remained un- 
 disturbed during the whole winter in their extended 
 line of quarters. 
 
246 CONCLUSION. Pabt I. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Let us briefly recapitulate the chief events of this 
 campaign. 
 
 The Turkish declaration of war had appeared 
 before the end of the year 1827 ; and yet the Eussian 
 operations, up to the end of May, 1828, had been 
 limited to taking possession of the Danubian Princi- 
 palities, a preliminary measure, in the execution of 
 which no opposition was to be expected. 
 
 The real military operations began with the cross- 
 ing of the Danube at Satunovo, on the 8th of June, 
 so that from that time the Russians could only 
 reckon on five months during which the weather 
 would allow them to keep the field. 
 
 In the event of everything turning out favourably, 
 the march to Constantinople must have been the end 
 . at first contemplated for the campaign. But the dis- 
 tance from the Lower Danube to Constantinople must 
 be above 480 miles; and even under the most aus- 
 picious circumstances, that period of time would barely 
 suffice for marching across so large an extent of coun- 
 try, and overcoming the difficulties by the way. The 
 campaign for which every preparation had been made 
 
Chap. XIII. CONCLUSION. 247 
 
 for the last seven years was therefore opened too 
 late ; the more so as the months of May and June are 
 the most favourable months for marching across the 
 arid and desolate steppes of the Dohrudscha, and 
 towards the Balkan. We have already stated how 
 unprepared the Russians might have taken the Turks 
 in the course of the spring. This delay in offensive 
 operations on the part of the Russians arose from 
 political reasons. 
 
 But the smallness of the force which the greatest 
 military power in Europe brought into the field, 
 compared with the object it had in view, had far 
 more to do with the turn which the campaign took 
 than the delay. If the Russian government was 
 guided by the recollection of the days when Munnich, 
 Romanzoff, and Suwarrow, with 17,000 Russians, beat 
 160,000 Mussulmans, it should have been borne in 
 mind that in the campaign of 1828-9 the Russians 
 had not to fight the Turks in the endless steppes of 
 Bessarabia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, but in the forests 
 of the Balkan. On the former, European tactics have 
 great advantage over undisciplined hordes, but in the 
 forests of the Balkan the Turkish spahi, with his long 
 rifle, mounted on his quick horse, and supported by 
 swarms of skirmishers on foot, is by no means a 
 despicable foe. Moreover experience of all former 
 wars should have taught the Russians to expect an 
 obstinate resistance from the Moslem behind stone 
 walls. 
 
248 CONCLUSION. Part I. 
 
 It has been maintained that the Eussian army was 
 so weak for this reason — that, if the Russians had 
 brought into the field a larger and more costly army, 
 they must, at the conclusion of peace, have demanded 
 from the Porte a larger compensation for war ex- 
 penses. But we must observe that the first object was 
 to gain the victory ; and with so weak a force as the 
 Russians had, it was quite possible to be in no condition 
 to exact any compensation whatever from the Turks. 
 
 So early as when the Pruth was first crossed, and 
 during the siege of Brailow, the second corps was 
 summoned to reinforce the army ; that is to say, 
 before the operations of war had anywhere taken a 
 threatening turn, and the army had as yet suffered 
 no great loss. But what was perceived in May, 
 when no change had taken place in the posture of 
 affairs, ought to have been foreseen previously. The 
 consequence of the delay was, that the reinforcements 
 arrived when the campaign was ended. 
 
 Considering the great weakness of the army of 
 operation, it would have been far better not to have 
 occupied the Principalities at first, but to have left 
 that to the subsequent corps. For the first operations 
 the resources of Wallachia were not needed, as every- 
 thing could be obtained from Bessarabia, or by sea. 
 The occupation of the Principalities excited the 
 jealousy of Europe, roused the Turks, and absorbed 
 20,000 men ; about one-third of the Russian army, 
 Subsequently a portion of these detachments was sent 
 
Chap. XIII. CONCLUSION. 249 
 
 for to head-quarters. In no case could it be riglit to 
 cross the Pruth sooner than the Danube. 
 
 It appears that the Russians expected to meet with 
 far less opposition at Brailow than they really en- 
 countered. It is impossible now to say whether the 
 place could have been taken by storm without a 
 regular siege. The reconnoitring parties asserted 
 that it was possible to approach it along the Danube 
 without being exposed to the fire from the guns, that 
 it was open in the gorge, and that the edge of 
 the valley, which was not rocky, was assailable in 
 several places. The storming of the 15th of June, 
 on a breach that had not been reconnoitred, in the 
 face of a garrison fully prepared, was at least equally 
 hazardous. It would, however, be necessary to know 
 whether the height of the water would have allowed 
 of any approach by the valley ; at any rate the Rus- 
 sians could not have reckoned with certainty upon 
 the success of the enterprise. 
 
 It is only upon the supposition of meeting with 
 little resistance at Brailow that we can account for 
 the original division of the Russian forces. Had they 
 succeeded in taking Brailow without much trouble, 
 the 7th corps would have gone along the right bank 
 of the Danube, with the battering train, to Silistria, 
 thus securing the right flank of the 3rd, and opening 
 the road by Turtukai for the 6th corps to march upon 
 Shumla, whose garrison'the latter corps would watch, 
 while the main army invested Varna. 
 
250 CONCLUSION. Part I, 
 
 But Brailow did not fall so soon ; tlie 3rd corps 
 could not advance imsupported, and the 6tli could not 
 cross the Danube. Hence the slow advance of the 
 3rd corps, and the necessity of bringing one-half of 
 the 6th corps all the way round by Hirsova to join 
 it. The result was that five weeks elapsed after the 
 passage of the Danube, and ten after the tardy opening 
 of the campaign — nearly one-half of the time during 
 which operations could be carried on — before the main 
 corps of the Russians penetrated to within 20 miles of 
 this side of the Balkan. 
 
 Moreover the main corps only amounted to 30,000 
 fighting men, and the Russians only made up this 
 number by contenting themselves with an incomplete 
 investment of Silistria and Griurgevo, leaving Rust- 
 chuk altogether unobserved. With such insufiicient 
 means, it was matter of doubt what to undertake 
 first. 
 
 The march of the Russian army against Shumla 
 at first sight looks like a bold attempt to crush the 
 resistance of the Turks in its very centre. We have 
 already stated our opinion that this attempt on Shumla 
 was so great a strategical error that it necessarily en- 
 tailed the failure of the campaign. Six weeks earlier, 
 when Shumla was almost destitute of defenders, a 
 coup-de-main against that important point might have 
 been justified. But when the Russians formally sat 
 down before it, they did all that the Turks could 
 wish — they gave up the initiative and fought the 
 
Chap. XIII. CONCLtJSION. 251 
 
 Turks exactly where they most excelled, behind walls 
 and entrenchments. - 
 
 But the Russian army seemed irresistibly attracted 
 towards the stronger army of the Turks, and took up 
 in face of it a covering position, which would have 
 been right enough had there been anything to cover, 
 and supposing that the Russians had not been defi- 
 cient in men, in battering-trains, in short in every- 
 thing for the investment of Varna. Under such cir- 
 cumstances mere defensive operations before Shumla 
 could lead to no conceivable result ; but the moment 
 they commenced offensive operations, the Russians 
 exposed themselves to imminent danger, with but 
 small hope of success. 
 
 Forty thousand Turks, amply provided with every- 
 thing they wanted, were posted in a " central and 
 almost unassailable position : opposite to them lay the 
 Russian corps little more than half that number, on 
 the circumference of a circle 20 miles long, which the 
 Turks could cut through at every point by short and 
 covered marches. The Seraskier could everywhere 
 attack them with superior forces, and a concentration 
 of the Russian forces on any threatened point was 
 impossible, not only from the distance, but because 
 in defending one point some other part of the lines 
 of investment -would be left bare of men. The whole 
 Russian army was stretched out in a cordon before 
 Shumla ; there was no reserve, and, had there been 
 one, place it where you would it must always have 
 
252 CONCLUSION. Part I. 
 
 arrived too late, as on sucli ground it was impossible 
 to discriminate beforehand between a real and a false 
 attack. 
 
 But putting aside the immediate danger that threat- 
 ened them, the Russians were in an awkward predi- 
 cament. They were without light cavalry, one may 
 almost say without any cavalry at all, in the face of 
 a swarm of Turkish horsemen, while they might easily 
 have drawn from the numerous hordes of Cossacks 
 under the Russian sway an analogous body of horse- 
 men invaluable for the protection of the army and for 
 collecting provisions. They had not a single point 
 within 100 miles in the rear whither they could 
 transport their sick and wounded ; nor had they any 
 retreat open to them in case the strong garrisons of 
 Rustchuk, Silistria, and Varna should break through 
 the few troops that invested them, and bring together 
 30,000 in the rear of the Russians. 
 
 The Russian Greneral must have seen the critical 
 situation in which he was placed. But after the Rus- 
 sians had placed themselves in a false position by 
 directing the whole offensive force of their army 
 against Shumla, their only resource was to continue 
 in the wrong course upon which they had entered. 
 The Russians reckoned upon the moral superiority of 
 their own troops and the inefficiency of the Turkish 
 commanders. It is true that Hussein Pasha lay for 
 four weeks from the end of July perfectly quiet, sur- 
 veying from his cool, woody quarters the Russians, 
 
Chap. XHI. CONCLUSION. 253 
 
 who, on the b-arnt-up plain, and amid untold priva- 
 tions and exertions, endeavoured in vain to cut off 
 the sources of his abundance and his security. Incon- 
 venienced by the non-arrival of some convoy, and 
 possibly feehng that he ought to do something, he at 
 length, on the 26th August, attacked both wings of 
 the Russian position, and did them much mischief at 
 Strandscha and Marasch. It was only the strenuous 
 resistance offered by Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg 
 that prevented the complete destruction of Greneral 
 Rudiger's and Durnowo's divisions, which were com- 
 pletely cut off from all support and communication. 
 
 This debut of the old destroyer of the Janissaries 
 showed not only the danger in which the Russians 
 were placed, but also that their opponents were now 
 aware of it. Count Wittgenstein unwillingly gave 
 up one position after another, one fort after another, 
 in the rear of the Turks, and collected his troops in 
 front of the Turkish encampment. But that Hussein 
 Pasha, as soon as he had secured a free passage for 
 his supplies, should make no further attempt to drive 
 back the weakened and extended investing Russian 
 corps, was more than the Russians had any right to 
 expect. 
 
 During the month of August the whole Russian 
 army was separated into three distinct besieging corps 
 — before Shumla, Silistria, and Yarna ; the sieges, 
 however, proved incomplete on every point, and there 
 was no reserve anywhere. 
 
254 CONCLUSION. Part I. 
 
 We have already observed that the Eussians, even 
 had they taken Shumla, would have gained but little. 
 They would have deprived their opponents of a good 
 position, but have gained none themselves. The local 
 difficulty of the passage of the Balkan was not at 
 Shumla, but beyond the Kamtchik, and it would be im- 
 possible for a weak army to cross that river unless not 
 only Shumla but Silistria and Varna also were taken. 
 
 We have no intelligence respecting the proceedings 
 of the Eussians before Silistria. Silistria is the worst 
 of all Turkish fortresses, and in the previous cam- 
 paign had only held out five days. The Danube, 
 since the capture of Brailow, had been opened to the 
 Eussian flotilla, and the resources of Wallachia were 
 placed at the disposal of the Eussians. The mate- 
 rials for a siege ought not therefore to have been 
 wanting, and, in fact, the little that was taken there 
 was more, in comparison, than was provided for the 
 siege of other places. Without Silistria the opera- 
 tions of the Eussians against Bulgaria would have 
 no other basis than the sea. This might do so long 
 as the Turks remained perfectly passive ; but the 
 case would be far otherwise were the Seraskier to 
 advance from Shumla against Bazardjik. 
 
 Spite of the weakness of Silistria, and spite of its 
 importance, the place .was not taken. The complete 
 investment of Yarna only began when that of Shumla 
 ceased, namely, with the arrival of the guards on the 
 9 th September. 
 
Chap. XIII. CONCLUSION. 255 
 
 We have seen the di£Eculties and the obstinate re- 
 sistance that the Russians had to encounter before 
 Varna. Considering the utter inadequacy of the 
 means employed, it is doubtful which was most ad- 
 mirable, the persevering energy of the attack, or the 
 steady courage of the defence. 
 
 Let us examine the position of the Russians at the 
 beginning of October. Since the passage of the 
 Danube at Brailow they had nowhere obtained any 
 important success over the foe they so much despised. 
 At Bazardjik, Kosludja, and before Yarna, during 
 the month of July, they had had the worst in the 
 open field against the newly-raised Turkish squadrons ; 
 at Jenibazar they had gained no advantage ; and in 
 surprises and fights before Shumla they had lost many 
 men and even guns. Putting aside these small actions, 
 all their greater enterprises had failed, and the cres- 
 cent glittered on the minarets of Silistria and Yarna, 
 as well as over the Hnes at Shumla. The troops had 
 suffered enormously, and the cavalry was almost de- 
 stroyed. Moreover, the time for operations was over, 
 and, if Yarna held out, the Russians would be com- 
 pelled to retire across the Danube — a retreat that 
 might be fatal to the army. 
 
 Sucb was the state of things before the Turkish 
 main army appeared in the field, and when the Rus- 
 sians only had to deal with the garrisons of four of 
 the larger fortresses. We have already said that the 
 Sultan, either afraid of a hostile landing near Con- 
 
256 CONCLUSION. Pakt I, 
 
 stantinople, or the excitment prevailing among the 
 population in that city, had kept the greater part of 
 his troops there. It was not till towards the end of 
 May that Hussein Pasha advanced from Constanti- 
 nople to Shumla, or till the beginning of August that 
 Isset Mohammed Pasha went to Varna. The Grand 
 Yizier himself, however, delayed his march to Adrian- 
 ople until the beginning of August, and it was only 
 after all the Russian troops had been worn out that 
 he appeared upon the scene of action with an entirely 
 fresh army. His Commander-in-Chief, Omar Vrione, 
 destroyed a Russian division at Hassanlar, and made a 
 successful defence of his camp at Kurt-tepe. 
 
 With this the relief of Yarna and the issue of the 
 campaign appeared certain. The whole strategy of 
 the Turks had hitherto consisted in passive resist- 
 ance ; by this system, and favoured by natural advan- 
 tages of the ground, they had succeeded in driving 
 their foe to the brink of destruction. It required only 
 one last effort to hurl him over, but they were inca- 
 pable of it. 
 
 Neither was it in the least owing to the combina- 
 tions of Russian strategy that matters had come to 
 a tolerable issue. The preparations were insufficient, 
 the campaign begun too late, and the direction of 
 the main army not likely to ensure a successful 
 result. 
 
 But all these faults were atoned for by the innate 
 excellence of the Russian troops. The self-sacrificing 
 
Chap. XIII. CONCLUSION. 257 
 
 obedience of tlie commanders, the steadiness of the 
 common soldiers, their power of endurance and un- 
 shaken bravery in time of danger, were the quahties 
 that enabled them to avert the dangers of their position 
 before Shumla, and to hold the Seraskier in check ; 
 to make up for all deficiencies and overcome all re- 
 sistance at Varna ; and to strike such terror into 
 Omar Yrione that even after defeating the Russians 
 he remained ten days in his camp, as it were thunder- 
 struck, doing nothing, while Varna, the bulwark of 
 the kingdom, fell before his eyes. We cannot say 
 much for the skill of the Turkish commanders, but 
 the conduct of the Turks, from the highest officer to 
 the last soldier, at the storming of Brailow, their 
 courage at Kurt-tepe, their steadiness in the mines 
 and trenches before Varna, are far above all praise. 
 
 The fall of Varna was most fortunate for the 
 Eussians. It decided the campaign. Had Shumla 
 fallen into their hands, instead of Varna, on the 11th 
 of October — and it was against the former place 
 that all their efforts had been directed — they might 
 indeed have destroyed all the weak works of that 
 position, but, with Varna and Sihstria in their rear 
 and cut off from the sea, it would have been impos- 
 sible for them to take up their winter-quarters in 
 Bulgaria. The strategical importance of Shumla is 
 equally great to the Turks with or without earth- 
 works, and the Russians would have had to take the 
 position again in the next campaign. 
 
258 CONCLUSION. Part I, 
 
 If we consider the enormous sacrifices that the war 
 cost the Eussians in the year 1828, it is difficult to 
 say whether they or the Turks won or lost it. It 
 remained for a second campaign to decide the value 
 of the first. 
 
PART 11. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1829. 
 
 2 s 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1829. 
 
 INTEODUCTION. 
 
 Although the campaign of the previous year ended 
 with the fall of Yarna, and although a portion of the 
 Eussian army wintered in Bulgaria on Turkish soil, 
 yet Sultan Mahmud might well look upon the cam- 
 paign as not altogether lost. Considering the unex- 
 ampled embarrassments of his country, it was almost 
 a triumph that he was not completely crushed, when 
 fighting single-handed against so powerful an oppo- 
 nent as Russia. 
 
 The successes of the Russians had been obtained 
 by long exertions and great sacrifices. Brailow, 
 Shimala, and Varna had offered far greater resist- 
 ance than had been expected, and that important 
 place, SiHstria, had withstood a four months' invest- 
 ment. But that which afforded most satisfaction to 
 the Turks was, that newly-raised levies of the Pasha 
 dared to encounter the veteran troops of the Em- 
 peror in the open field, and that even on particular 
 occasions they had obtained over the Russians advan- 
 tages which might almost be looked upon as positive 
 victories. 
 
262 LOSSES IN 1828, Pabt II. 
 
 The loss in stores and men was incontestably no 
 greater on the side of the Turks than on that of the 
 Russians, and was more easily replaced by the former, 
 who were at home, than by the latter, who had to be 
 supplied from the distant provinces of the empire. 
 Oriental armies, too, are never really destroyed, but 
 only dispersed, and can be reassembled in the course 
 of the following campaign. The arms and accoutre- 
 ments of the irregular troops — which constitute the 
 greater portion of the force — belong to those who 
 bear them, and are considered by them as most 
 valuable property. Although the state contributes 
 nothing towards the expense, the Spahi never appears 
 without his horse, his lance, sword, and pistols. The 
 Turkish cavalry had suffered but little ; the Russian, 
 on the contrary, was nearly annihilated. The Turks, 
 had only lost a few field-pieces, as in no case had one 
 of the large divisions of their army been beaten. The 
 garrisons of Brailow and of the strong places, in the 
 Dobrudscha had been allowed free exit to Silistria, 
 Shumla, and Yarna ; the garrison of Yarna was the 
 only one that after a brave and obstinate defence had 
 surrendered as prisoners of war to the Russians. 
 
 The condition of Constantinople in the spring of 
 1829 appeared one of profound peace, and the state 
 of feeling was on the whole good. The peiople 
 exulted over long processions of Russian prisoners of 
 war, who were purposely paraded through the streets 
 of Constantinople. The prisoners were well treated, 
 
INTROD. PEOSPBOTS IN THE SPEINa OF 1829. 263 
 
 and lodged for the most part in the Island of Princes. 
 Even the unexpected sight of a Eussian brig of war, 
 which had been captured by the Turkish navy, and 
 brought triumphantly into the Bosphorus, still far- 
 ther flattered the national pride. The Balkan still 
 passed with the Tutks for an impregnable line of 
 defence, which never had been and never could be 
 crossed by an army of unbelievers ; Shumla as the 
 victorious bulwark against which all hostile efforts 
 had again expended themselves in vain. Lastly, the 
 delay in the opening of the campaign was considered 
 at Constantinople as a proof of the complete exhaus- 
 tion of Russia : it was not till June that the first 
 news from the seat of war reached Constantinople — 
 news, moreover, which sounded favourably for the 
 cause of Islam. The Sultan could not believe that 
 the rest of Europe would stand quietly by and see 
 him utterly crushed. It was but lately that the am- 
 bassadors of England and France, who were staying 
 at Corfu, had refused, as derogatory to the dignity 
 of their respective governments, to return to Con- 
 stantinople, until the Sultan signed the treaty of the 
 6th of July, 1827. Sultan Mahmud still obstinately 
 refused this. Nevertheless, on the 18th of June, Sir 
 Eobert Gordon and Count Gruilleminot, whose ser- 
 vices to Turkey were recognised even by Moslems, 
 had a solemn audience of the Sultan at Bujukdereh. 
 The people greeted their appearance with joy, and 
 flattered themselves that the frigate Blonde, which 
 
264 RELATIONS OF ENGLAND AND TURKEY. Pakt IL 
 
 had been suffered to pass the Dardanelles with her 
 cannons masked, was the forerunner of an English 
 fleet which would free the Black Sea from the do- 
 minion of the Eussians. 
 
 Nevertheless, the diplomatic relations were un- 
 changed, and the only way to obtain the assistance 
 of England was the acceptance, by the Porte, of the 
 treaty of London. But this was the sore point — the 
 one that touched Sultan Mahmud's personal pride to 
 the quick. Every concession made to the Grreeks in 
 the Morea would have led to similar demands on the 
 part of the other " rayahs" in Macedonia, Rumelia, and 
 Bulgaria. It is remarkable enough that Sultan Mah- 
 mud, who, as he subsequently showed, had greater 
 sympathy for his Christian subjects than probably 
 any one of his predecessors, was driven by the insur- 
 rection of the Grreeks to appear as their bitterest op- 
 pressor and persecutor. But had the Sultan actually 
 signed the treaty which sanctioned the insurrection 
 of his Christian subjects, it is matter of doubt whether 
 England was then in a position to deprive the Rus- 
 sians of the advantages which she had won for them 
 against her will over the Turks at Navarino. Un- 
 doubtedly the advance of a Russian army upon Varna 
 without holding Sihstria, or upon Adrianople without 
 Shumla, was only possible whilst Russia held the 
 undisputed command of the Black Sea. To restore 
 this to the Turks would have been of the utmost im- 
 portance; but the Russian fleet in the Euxine in the 
 
Introd. FEANCE and AUSTRIA. 265 
 
 year 1829 consisted of 11 ships of the Hne, 2 of 
 which were three-deckers ; 8 frigates, 2 of which had 
 60 guns; and 12 corvettes and brigs of war: the 
 squadron carried altogether 1800 guns, and had 
 Sebastopol to fall hack upon. Admiral Heyden's 
 Russian squadron in the Mediterranean, which block- 
 aded the Dardanelles, consisted of 8 ships of the line, 
 7 frigates, and about 20 smaller vessels, carrying alto- 
 gether 1500 guns. All that the Turks had to oppose 
 to this fleet were 8 ships of the line, 3 of which were 
 three-deckers, 2 frigates, 5 corvettes, and 3 brigs — 
 altogether about 1000 guns — for the much-wished-for 
 Egyptian fleet never came. Had Admiral Malcolm's 
 squadron entered the Dardanelles in order to join the 
 Turkish fleet, it does not follow as a matter of course 
 — spite of the acknowledged superiority of the British 
 navy — that the Russians must have retreated to 
 Sebastopol ; to say nothing of the effect such a step 
 on the part of England would have had upon the 
 peace of Europe. 
 
 France was preparing for her Algerian expedition, 
 and General Schneider's brigade was then in the 
 Morea for the protection of the Greeks. She could 
 scarcely change suddenly from this hostile attitude to 
 a friendly one. Moreover, public feeling in France 
 was so excited by the ordonnances of the 8th of 
 August, 1829, that the government would avoid 
 taking any step likely to lead to an Eliropean war. 
 
 In Vienna the Austrians had gone from excessive 
 
266 THE SULTAN'S PEEPAEATIONS. Part II. 
 
 fear to excessive hope. From the small success of 
 the first campaign, they had concluded that a second 
 would completely exhaust the resources of the Czar, 
 and they flattered themselves that Austria would be 
 called upon to assume the part of mediator. It ap- 
 pears that the Porte was even advised by Austria to 
 continue the war, although no promise of assistance 
 was held out. 
 
 Nothing at that time did so much to preserve 
 general peace as the attitude of Prussia. The court 
 of Berlin was anxious for the termination of a war 
 which might at any moment plunge Europe into con- 
 fusion ; but at the same time it desired that the terms 
 should be honourable for Russia, with which power 
 Prussia was intimately connected by the ties of policy 
 and relationship. 
 
 Thus it was that in the year 1829 also the poli- 
 tical conjuncture was such that Russia and Turkey 
 were again left to fight out their quarrel single- 
 handed. 
 
 For the reasons we have before stated. Sultan 
 Mahmud was little inclined to give way, but made 
 every preparation for a vigorous resistance. He 
 made a general change in the commanders of his 
 troops. The passive system adopted by Hussein 
 Pasha, which had borne such good fruit in July and 
 August of the former year, had not been considered 
 sufficiently effeclive in September and October. The 
 Sultan, however, appreciated the former services of 
 
Introd. TURKISH COMMANDERS. 267 
 
 his aged conunander, and his power over the troops. 
 He therefore gave him the command over the forces 
 assembled in the camp at Aidos. Omar Yrione dis- 
 appeared altogether from the scene of action, and the 
 next year found him in open revolt against the Porte. 
 Jussnf Pasha — strange to relate — ^had gone over to the 
 Unbelievers. He sprang from one of the few aristo- 
 cratic families in Turkey. As Dereh-Bey, or Prince 
 of the Yalley, he was an object of suspicion to the 
 Sultan, who strove to destroy every hereditary power 
 but his own. It was determined in the Divan to 
 confiscate the extensive property belonging to him in 
 the neighbourhood of Aidos, while Jussuf Pasha was 
 still arresting the progress of the Eussians at Yarna. 
 How far the then Capitan Pasha was a stranger to 
 these intrigues ; how far he was in earnest in his, 
 refusal to be a party to the capitulation which, with 
 his handful of men, he could not prevent; why he 
 did not cut his way out of Yarna and join Gmar 
 Yrione — are questions that must remain unanswered. 
 At any rate the Capitan Pasha reaped all the advan- 
 tages, and was shortly afterwards made Grand Yizier. 
 Isset Mohammed had promised to retake Yarna during 
 the course of the winter, but we have seen how little 
 he was able to carry out his scheme. By his pro- 
 motion as Rumeli Yalessi at Eodosto, he disappeared 
 from the scene of action, and his subsequent conduct 
 in the campaign of 1839 justifies the conjecture that 
 the honour of the. defence of Yarna belongs mainly 
 
268 PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. Part II. 
 
 to Jussuf Paslia, althougli he tarnished it by the final 
 capitulation. 
 
 Eeschid Mohammed Pasha, who was then in Epirus, 
 was named to the command of the army. He had 
 solved the difficult problem of keeping the Arnauts 
 in obedience to the Porte, and was known for his 
 firmness, rigour, justice, and personal courage. 
 
 The new Vizier went to Constantinople to receive 
 his instructions, and thence to Shumla on the 21st of 
 March, accompanied only by a small staff. In Shmnla 
 he found not more than 10,000 men. One portion of 
 the corps which Hussein Pasha had collected there 
 had been sent to Silistria, another to Aidos ; the 
 larger half, however, had dispersed of its own accord 
 during the winter, and gradually reassembled in the 
 camp near the Balkan. 
 
 Thus the spring passed away without any consi- 
 derable military enterprises, as both the contending 
 powers were occupied in making preparations. In 
 Constantinople the troops were drilled under the per- 
 sonal inspection of the Sultan, and the regular army 
 raised again to 60 battalions and 31 squadrons, or 
 about 50,000 men, most of whom were sent to Shumla. 
 This year again the Porte could only get the most 
 unwarlike, the poorest, and worst class of the Osman- 
 lis to serve in the regular army. It was only those 
 who had scarce reached man's estate that could be 
 induced to subject themselves to compulsory disci- 
 pline; all the veteran soldiers were excluded as 
 
Introd. change in THE TUEKISH AEMY. 269 
 
 attached to the Janissaries. The recruits mostly 
 came from Asia, and were obtained by violent mea- 
 sures. It cannot be doubted that at Constantinople 
 the spirit of European tactics had made little pro- 
 gress ; certain outward forms and details were looked 
 upon as magical charms to insure victory. The 
 foreign " officers of instruction" were not respected 
 as a class ; they could teach, but could not command. 
 The command over the troops was never given but 
 to Turks, whose knowledge of military tactics was 
 exceedingly limited. Many of the innovations were 
 absurd : for instance, the cavalry was by no means 
 improved by substituting the long English stirrups 
 for the short Turkish shovel stirrups, especially as the 
 men wore no spurs ; or by giving them lances, which 
 only impeded them in the use of the sabre. They 
 learned to ride in masses, but they lost the impe- 
 tuosity of the wild Turkish charge ; and with their 
 endurance of new customs the old fanatical inspira- 
 tion vanished. What was good in barbarian warfare 
 was lost without gaining much benefit from the 
 resources of civilization; popular prejudices were 
 shaken, but the national spirit was destroyed at the 
 same time, and the only change for the better was 
 that the troops obeyed the orders of their leaders 
 more than before. 
 
 "We will not attempt to give an account of the 
 whole force that the Turks could bring into the field, 
 as it would rest chiefly upon mere conjecture, but we 
 
270 THE TURKISH ARMY. Part II. 
 
 will mention the strength of the separate divisions as 
 they come before us in action. The Bosniacks refused 
 this year again to furnish their contingent, a great loss 
 to the Turkish army, as they are one of the most war- 
 like of the Mohammedan races. The same occurred 
 with the warlike Arnauts, who held back until the 
 Porte could find the high pay they asked for 30,000 
 men. No assistance was naturally to be expected 
 from the Servians ; indeed it would have required 
 but little persuasion on the part of Russia to induce 
 them and a portion of the Bulgarians to take up 
 arms for her against their Turkish ruler. This course 
 of proceeding, however, was contrary to the principles 
 of the Czar, and might have led further than the 
 Cabinet of St. Petersburg was then inclined to go. 
 The Porte was therefore compelled to draw the greater 
 part of its reinforcements from Asia. It may be 
 assumed that by the beginning of the summer the 
 Sultan had replaced the losses he had sustained in 
 the previous campaign both in men and in the mate- 
 rials of war, and that the Turkish army was much in 
 the same condition as it had' been at the beginning of 
 the war. 
 
 The assertion that the Emperor of Russia was 
 ready at the commencement of the year 1829 to make 
 peace with the Porte on payment of the expenses of 
 the war is not compatible with the stern and haughty 
 spirit of that monarch, who declared openly that he 
 would not sheath the sword he had once drawn until 
 
Intbod. RUSSIAN LOSSES. 271 
 
 ihe honour and the claims of his country had been 
 satisfied. Eussia had far greater interests at stake 
 than a few millions of rubles or an extension of terri- 
 tory. The question at issue was the influence that 
 Russia must needs possess in the Bosphorus, and the 
 honour of her arms; for although the Russians had 
 fought with great bravery in the campaign of 1828, 
 they had not been altogether victorious, and the de- 
 spised Turks had offered a resistance that no one had 
 expected. The enemies of Russia saw with malicious 
 pleasure the failure of her exertions, and the Czar 
 resolved to carry on the war to a successful issue. 
 
 The Russian army had lost many men, not so much 
 from war as from the climate, sickness, exhaustion, 
 and privations arising from the crowding together of 
 large masses of men for months together on the same 
 spot. The greatest loss was before Shumla, where 
 nothing was gained in return ; thousands of Russians 
 died at Yarna after they had taken possession of the 
 fortress and during the winter, owing to the sudden 
 transition from violent exertion to complete inac- 
 tivity. The severity of the winter of 1828 caused 
 fresh sufferings to the troops, and many a Russian 
 soldier, after coming above 1000 miles southward, 
 fell a victim to intense cold under the 42nd degree of 
 latitude, where but a short time before he had had to 
 bear all the torments of a burning sky. Moreover 
 the plague was making terrible havoc, and the army 
 lost altogether 40,000 men, or, reckoning the guards 
 
272 THE RUSSIAN ARMY. Part II. 
 
 and the 2nd corps, about one-half of its number. To 
 this loss was added that of a very large portion of the 
 military materials, — for instance, nearly all the horses. 
 All this had to be replaced from the interior of Eussia 
 and with great difficulty. Even the food for the 
 army had to be got from a great distance, as Wal- 
 lachia was utterly exhausted, and south of the Danube 
 most of the villages had been deserted. The seed 
 was not sown, as the tiller of the soil had no hope of 
 reaping the harvest, and, in consequence of the arbi- 
 trary measures and oppressions of the Russians, so 
 difficult to avoid during war, many of the Bulgarians 
 who had greeted the Russians as their deliverers were 
 now ready to take up arms against the Czar. 
 
 Although in the previous campaign the army had 
 been incontestably too small, in the succeeding one it 
 was not only not reinforced but actually diminished. 
 It is true that the 2nd corps remained with the army, 
 but the guards and the division of mounted chasseurs 
 were withdrawn and took no further part in the war. 
 Fresh recruits had been raised the year before, but 
 only reached the Danube in small bodies in the spring. 
 Besides these additions the army of operation was only 
 strengthened by reserves of the army and by Cossacks 
 from the shores of the Black Sea and the Caucasus. 
 
 The Czar had determined not to be present during 
 the campaign of 1829, and intrusted the chief com- 
 mand to Count Diebitsch, his former chief of the 
 general staff. Count Diebitsch reached Jassy on the 
 
Intbod. EEORGANISATION OF THE ARMY. 273 
 
 24tli February, where Count Wittgenstein gave up 
 tlie command and took leave of the army in a pro- 
 clamation. Many other changes took place in the 
 command of the troops and the government of the 
 Principalities. 
 
 It cannot be denied that Count Diebitsch's position 
 was a far more important and favourable one than 
 that of his predecessor in command. The experience 
 of tile former campaign was of great benefit to him 
 and those under his command. No diplomatic body 
 hung upon his heels, impeding his freedom of action ; 
 politics could have little influence on his plans, and 
 from his great distance from St. Petersburg he was 
 empowered and forced to act on purely military con- 
 victions and according to his own judgment. The 
 present aspect of affairs guided him in his actions, 
 and he had not at some critical moment to wait for 
 his sovereign's sanction to take some step which was 
 useless by the time the sanction arrived. His respon- 
 sibility was increased, but with it he gained greater 
 freedom of action and unusual authority. 
 
 General Diebitsch immediately devoted the greatest 
 attention to the reorganisation of his army. The 
 treatment of the soldier was much improved, the in- 
 tolerable restraint and the unnatural stiff carriage 
 somewhat abated. Nevertheless much still remained 
 to be done; for instance, skirmishers were always 
 forced to keep step and rank ; for this reason they 
 were only of use on level ground. The men's dress 
 
274 EBOEGANISATION OP THE ARMY. Pakt II. 
 
 and accoutrements were changed for others better 
 suited to the chmate ; the commissariat, a most im- 
 portant matter for the coming campaign, was put on 
 a different footing ; an immense baggage-train was 
 unavoidable over uncultivated or wasted provinces. 
 Long columns were composed of thousands of wag- 
 gons drawn by oxen, which served a double purpose 
 — for draught and for food. The parties covering 
 these columns were armed and had two guns, so as to 
 be able to defend themselves if necessary ; but as 
 these waggons could not be used on the other side of 
 the Balkan, thousands of camels had been bought on 
 the steppes of Asia for the use of the army. This 
 useful, patient, and strong animal, which can carry a 
 heavy burden even through snow and on the smallest 
 amoimt of food, is especially fitted to follow the 
 movements of an army. Spite, however, of all the 
 measures taken, provisions were scant. Each soldier 
 received one pound of meat and a glass of brandy 
 three times a week, besides 12 biscuits and some 
 oatmeal daily. 
 
 The cavalry made a splendid appearance at starting 
 —they were entirely remounted. The front rank of 
 the hussar regiments was provided with lances so as 
 to keep out of the reach of the spahis' sabres, and 
 the number of the Cossacks was much increased. 
 The infantry bore traces of the hardships they had 
 undergone in their bad winter quarters. According 
 to the testimony of an eye-witness the men's faces 
 
Introd. • STRENGTH OF THE AEMY. 275 
 
 wore an expression of sadness and pain. After all 
 that they had suffered in the former campaign they 
 looked upon themselves as martyrs to their religion 
 and their emperor. Nowhere in the Eussian quarters 
 were to be seen or heard the jokes that never fail 
 among German soldiers when in tolerable plight. 
 Singing was the only expression of joy that was 
 heard, but the songs had the melancholy character 
 peculiar to the Sclavonian ' race. The soldiers were 
 much given to religious ceremonies and crossed them- 
 selves at every meal ; in every camp a tent was fitted 
 up as a church, and mass celebrated daily. 
 
 The ordre de bataille of the preceding year gives 
 the strength of the Eussian army, minus the guards 
 and the mounted chasseurs. The organisation of the 
 corps d'armee, of the divisions and brigades, remained 
 unaltered, but many changes took place among the 
 commanders. 
 
 Count Pahlen commanded the 2nd corps d'armee, 
 G-eneral Krassowsky the 3rd corps d'armee, Greneral 
 Eoth the 6th, and Lieut.-Greneral Eudiger the 7th. 
 
 There were besides 22 regiments of Cossacks. The 
 squadrons, and especially the battalions, were weaker 
 in numbers than in the preceding year; the com- 
 panies, taken one with another, contained 32, the 
 squadrons from 50 to 60 troopers : the Cossack regi- 
 ments consisted of 200 or 250 men each ; many were 
 much weaker. 
 
 T 2 
 
276 STRENGTH OF THE AEMY. ' Part II. 
 
 The cavalry consisted of 2 divisions of hussars, 2 of lancers, and 1 of 
 dragoons — 
 
 Altogetlier about 88 squadrons, or . . 10,500 men. 
 Of Cossacks there were about • . . . 5,500 „ 
 
 Altogether ' . 16,000 „ 
 
 The infantry consisted of 10 divisions, making 
 
 up 120 battalions : at most 48,000 „ 
 
 The artillery of 7 horse batteries, or 60 guns 
 
 And 30 foot batteries, or . . . 240 „ 
 
 Altogether 300 guns 4,000 „ 
 
 Or of actual combatants 68,000 men. 
 
 The army, taken altogether, was just as strong as 
 it had been during the previous campaign until the 
 guards and the 2nd corps d'armee joined it : it was, 
 however, somewhat stronger in artillery and light 
 cavalry. 
 
Ch^p- I- TAKING OF SIZBBOLI. 277 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 TAKING OF SIZEBOLI IN THE SPRING — NAVAL ENTERPRISES OF 
 
 THE TURKS. 
 
 As the Eussian army advanced into the Dobrudscha 
 and Bulgaria during the last campaign, it took pos- 
 session of the places on the coast of the Black Sea 
 opened its ports to the Eussian fleet, and thus pre- 
 pared for fresh advances on land by securing the 
 supply of provisions by sea. Thus the march to 
 Bazardjik was based upon Kostendje and Mangalia, 
 and the siege of Yarna upon Kavarna and Baltjik. 
 Yarna afforded a harbour for the fleet and a camp for 
 the army, and was equally important as a defence for 
 winter quarters and as a point of departure for further 
 offensive operations. 
 
 As soon, however, as these were to be carried be- 
 yond the Balkan, it became necessary to secure a sea- 
 port on the further side of the mountains, across which 
 the transport of provisions and military stores pre- 
 sented almost insuperable difficulties. It was of great 
 importance to possess a place of this kind before the 
 army crossed the Balkan, in order that, at the end of 
 so laborious and hazardous an enterprise, the troops 
 
278: TAKING OP SIZEBOLI. Part II. 
 
 might find all that was necessary for their support at 
 the southern foot of the mountains ; the various divi- 
 sions would by this means also be rendered far more 
 independent in their movements than they could be 
 so long as a communication with Varna remained 
 a vital condition with them. Hitherto the fleet had 
 followed the movements of the army, but now it pre- 
 ceded it, and thus indicated the direction it was about 
 to take. 
 
 Around the large shallow bay to the southward of 
 Emineh-Dagh (the promontory which forms the 
 eastern termination of the Balkan) are scattered the 
 seaport towns of Missivri, Ahiolo, Burgas, and Sizeboli 
 {vide Plans of these towns). Of these places Burgas 
 was the most considerable and the most conveniently 
 placed for supplying a corps operating from Yarna 
 upon Rumelia. At the same time Burgas would be 
 easily taken by sea, and might be defended advan- 
 tageously towards the land. On the other hand, a 
 tolerably strong body of troops would be required for 
 the affair, as the close proximity of the Turkish corps 
 d'armee stationed at Aidos rendered it difficult to 
 make a coup de main upon Burgas, as well as to 
 maintain possession of it. 
 
 Missivri and Ahiolo, when once taken, would require 
 very slight means of defence, especially the former. 
 But both lay too far in the rear if the army was 
 to proceed further south. Accordingly Sizeboli was 
 fixed upon, which lay further from the Eussian lines 
 
Chap, I. TAKING OP SIZEBOLI. 279 
 
 of operation tlian Burgas, but in a very strong posi- 
 tion, and possesses by far tbe best and safest barbour 
 on tbe wbole western coast of the Black Sea. More- 
 over tbe Turks would find far greater difficulty in 
 sending assistance from Aidos to Sizeboli tban to any 
 of the other places. 
 
 On the 15th February the Russian vice-admiral 
 Kumani undertook to make a coup de main upon 
 Sizeboli with a few ships of war and some gunboats, 
 1 regiment of infantry, and 50 Cossacks. The de- 
 fence of the place had been intrusted to a detachment 
 of 1000 Albanians, who had recently marched out, 
 leaving only a handful of their number behind. 
 These surrendered after a mere cannonade from the 
 ships' guns ; tbe Russians took possession of the town, 
 and at once erected two works, A and B, with good 
 profiles and provided with blockhouses upon heights 
 to tbe south of the place which immediately com- 
 mands it. They subsequently erected a coast battery 
 at D, and a work on the " Small Island" (Kutschuk 
 Ada), upon which magazines and depots were esta- 
 blished. A few gunboats were moored so as to sweep 
 the ground in front of the redoubts on the land side : 
 in this manner the garrison as well as the fleet was 
 completely covered. 
 
 The Sultan was extremely indignant that such an 
 attempt should have been made so near Constanti- 
 nople, and that it should so easily have succeeded. 
 He commanded Hussein Pasha to retake the place, 
 
280 TAKING OP SIZBBOLI. Part II. 
 
 and sent orders to the Capitan Pasha to set sail at 
 once with his whole fleet for the same purpose. 
 
 Although Aidos is only three short days' march 
 from Sizeboli, it took Hussein no less than seven 
 weeks to make his appearance before the latter place 
 with a detachment of 4000 infantry and 1500 horse. 
 Meanwhile the Russian entrenchments had been 
 completed and the garrison was doubled. Greneral 
 Wachten was at Sizeboli in command of 3 regiments 
 of infantry, or 3000 men, and 2 field-guns. 
 
 Early in the morning of the 9th April Hussein 
 Pasha made a vigorous attack upon the works A 
 and B. Regardless of the case-shot from the 
 8 ships' guns set up in the works, the Turks 
 rushed into the ditch with fierce yells ; a few more 
 daring than the rest climbed the breastwork, and a 
 Tchochodar, or cloak-bearer of the Pasha, was struck 
 down within the redoubt. Upon the first alarm the 
 garrison had hastened out of the town. Two batta- 
 lions drew up upon the right and two upon the left 
 of work A in order of attack, and the field-pieces 
 were placed in line with them. Meanwhile Greneral 
 Wachten with the 5th battalion fell upon the rear of 
 the storming party and drove them from the work. 
 The Turks soon retreated before the combined fire of 
 the work, the field-guns, and the fleet, which crossed 
 each other upon the narrow neck of land. They were 
 pursued as far as the high ground, and left 250 men 
 dead upon the ground : the Russians lost 100 men. 
 
Chap. I. NAVAL ENTERPRISES OF THE TURKS. 281 
 
 Bold as the first onslauglit of the Moslems had 
 been, their courage was not enduring. No fresh 
 attempt was made upon Sizeboli, and the Russians 
 were left in tranquil possession of their important 
 conquest until the end of the war. An attempt made 
 by the Russians to take Ahiolo failed, but was attended 
 with no great loss. 
 
 Nothing could be more unexpected than the ap- 
 pearance of a Turkish fleet in the Black Sea. The 
 captain of the Russian ship Raphael, 45 guns, which 
 was cruising in company with another vessel on the 
 coast of Anatolia, fell in during the night with several 
 ships which he took for his own squadron. He ac- 
 cordingly joined company with them without making 
 any signal. Great was the amazement of the Turks 
 next morning when they found the number of their 
 ships increased by two, and still greater the alarm of 
 the Russian captain, who found himself in the very 
 midst of the enemy's ships. Such was the inexpe- 
 rience of the Turkish sailors that they would have 
 remained in doubt which was the friend and which 
 the foe if the Raphael had but hoisted the red flag ; 
 but the captain lost his head, and lowered the blue 
 cross at the first shot from the admiral's vessel. The 
 brig Mercury, on the other hand, which Was to 
 leeward, set every stitch of canvas, her gallant com- 
 mander, Lieutenant Kasarski, nailed his flag to the 
 mast, and the oiEcers swore that the last of them left 
 alive would fire a pistol into the powder-magazine 
 
282 NAVAL ENTERPRISES OF THE TURKS. Paet II. 
 
 and blow the brig to pieces rather than let her fall 
 into the hands of the Turks. The Mercury succeeded 
 in escaping from the awkward pursuit and ill-directed 
 fire of the Capitan Bey. 
 
 The Turkish Admiral had made a prize, he himself 
 knew not how or why. Allah had literally sent it to 
 him in his sleep. It was none the less a subject of 
 pride and exultation. St. Eaphael was replaced by a 
 fir cone and the vessel taken to Constantinople in 
 triumph. 
 
 On the 5th July the Capitan Pasha once more set 
 sail with the purpose of attacking the Russian 
 squadron at Sizeboli. The Turkish fleet consisted 
 now of 6 ships of the line, 3 frigates, 5 corvettes, and 
 3 brigs, the Russian prize included : this was nearly 
 the whole naval force of the Porte. After ten days' 
 sail they appeared before Sizeboli, giving chase to a 
 Russian frigate. The Russian squadron lying at 
 anchor there consisted of only 3 ships of the line and 
 2 frigates, and of course expected to be attacked in 
 the harbour next morning by a force so much supe- 
 rior to their own. But, surprising as had been the 
 arrival of the Ottoman flag, its disappearance was far 
 more astonishing. Without firing a single shot, the 
 Capitan availed himself of a north-east wind to sail 
 back that same night into the Bosphorus, where he 
 cast anchor on the following day. 
 
 Admiral Grreig now blockaded the Bosphorus, 
 and Admiral Heyden the Dardanelles. They cut off" 
 
Chap. I. NAVAL ENTERPRISES OF THE TURKS. 283 
 
 the communication on both sides, made numerous 
 prizes, and harassed the coast. Achmet Papudji 
 (the Shoemaker, so called from his former trade) did 
 not tarnish his laurels by attempting any fresh enter- 
 prise, and the Turkish fleet remained quietly in safe 
 anchorage. 
 
 If the respective expeditions of Hussein and Ach- 
 met, by land and by sea, had only been made at the 
 same moment, which might easily have been done, 
 Sizeboli might have been retaken from the Russians ; 
 but singly they both failed. 
 
284 OPENING OP THE CAMPAIGN. Pakt II. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 OPENINO OF THE CAMPAION IN MAY — PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE 
 AND SIEGE OF SILISTRIA. 
 
 This year again the commencemeiit of tlie great 
 operations was postponed until the month of May. 
 UnfavoTirable weather, bad roads, and the height of 
 the water in the Danube, are the causes assigned, but 
 the real reason was that the regiments could not be 
 filled up, or the preparations completed before. The 
 passage of the Danube was to be effected by means of 
 two bridges, one at Hirsova, and the other a little 
 below Silistria, where the main stream might be 
 approached by the road from Kalarasch, through the 
 floods which covered the banks. At the former point 
 a passage was effected in the beginning of May. 
 
 The 6th and 7th corps were already on the right 
 bank of the Danube between Varna and Pravadi, 
 where they had been quartered through the winter. 
 They were now joined by 25 battalions of foot, and 5 
 regiments of horse, belonging partly to the 2nd and 
 j)artly to the 3rd corps ; these advanced by Hirsova. 
 
 Greneral Diebitsch, in command of these troops, 
 arrived on the 8th of May at Czernavoda, where the 
 
Chap. II. SIEGE OF SILISTEIA. 285 
 
 Karasu lakes empty themselves into the Danube. 
 The remainder of the 2nd and 3rd corps was left in 
 Wallachia awaiting the completion of the bridge at 
 Kalarasch, in order to cross over to the right bank of 
 the Danube. 
 
 General Diebitsch had to open his campaign with 
 a siege which ought to have been ended the year 
 before. The garrison of SUistria was very numerous, 
 and lay at a distance of only two days' march, right 
 on the flank of every possible line of operation upon 
 the Balkan. It was therefore necessary to begin by 
 taking the place. As the shortest road thither, that 
 by Rassova, was impassable by reason of the floods, 
 the corps had to take the difficult and circuitous route 
 by Kusgun. It took 9 days to march the 43 miles, 
 and they did not reach Silistria until the 17th of 
 May. 
 
 The fortifications of Silistria have already been 
 described, and no alteration had been made in them 
 since the siege of the previous year was raised, except 
 a few temporary works, thrown up or rather dug out 
 — for the main wall had a command of only 9 feet — 
 before the eastern front of Stambul Tabia and the 
 western gate of Rasgrad ; these, however, were mere 
 slight earthworks or lodgments, by means of which 
 the Turks had enabled themselves to defend the 
 ground in front in the same manner as at Varna. 
 
 The respect felt by the Russians for Turkish resist- 
 ance, even behind the weakest walls, and their great 
 
286 SIEGE OF SILISTEIA. Part II. 
 
 disinclination to repeat any sucli attempts at storming 
 as that of Brailow, is shown by the plan of attack 
 drawn up by Greneral SchUders, and approved by 
 the General in command. Even the Turkish 
 lodgments outside the ditch were not to be taken 
 by attack when the works should reach them, but 
 to be blown up by mining in order to dislodge the 
 Turks. As the ditch was only 30 feet wide and 
 12 deep from its sole to the top of the glacis, it 
 seemed possible that two or three mines in front of 
 each bastion would throw the counterscarp against 
 the main wall, so as completely to cover the revet- 
 ment, which was not above 8 feet high, and make a 
 practicable ascent. This would enable the Russians 
 to take possession of the ditch by making descents, 
 erecting batteries on the glacis, and using the cunette 
 as a lodgment, whereupon they might make fresh 
 mines beneath the flanks of the bastions and beneath 
 the curtain, and then crown the entonnoirs under 
 cover of the batteries on the glacis. Should the gar- 
 rison still refuse to surrender, the crownings might 
 be extended to the ruined bastions and curtain, and 
 artillery be brought to bear upon the interior of the 
 fortress, which must then be given up. 
 
 The southern front, between bastions 5 and 6, was 
 manifestly that which could be attacked with most 
 advantage. It could be fully enfiladed from D, and 
 it would be possible to erect batteries in terraces on 
 the slope of B, which would co-operate in the attack 
 
t'HAP. II. SIEGE OP SILISTRIA. 287 
 
 up to the last moment. Moreover the fortress had no 
 outworks on this side ; the valley between the heights 
 A and B woidd cover the approach, and general 
 watercourses and hollows might be converted into 
 communications by means of traverses. Nevertheless 
 it was resolved at head-quarters to attack the place on 
 the eastern side, for the same reason that had decided 
 the front of attack at Yarna, namely, in order to 
 profit by the support of the fleet. At both places, 
 however, this turned out quite insufficient to warrant 
 such a determination. The real attack accordingly 
 commenced upon front 2 — 3, but was changed during 
 the course of the siege to 5 — 6, upon which at first 
 only a feigned attack had been made. 
 
 We must now revert to the measures formerly 
 taken for the projected investment of Varna. 
 
 In order to re-establish the needful communication 
 between the two banks of the Danube, the materials 
 for a bridge of rafts had been collected at Bucharest, 
 and put together at the mouth of the Ardshish. 
 From Oltenitza the bridge was to be floated along 
 the flooded marshes on the left bank of the river, at 
 a sufficient distance from the fortress, as far as the 
 dyke of Kalarasch. The attempt was, however, de- 
 layed so long, that the Turks had time to assemble 
 a river flotilla at Rustchuk, and to bring it to Silis- 
 tria ; this was a great impediment to the Russian 
 scheme. But the irresolution and want of concert in 
 the proceedings of the Moslem allowed the transport 
 
288 SIEGE OP SILISTEIA. Part II. 
 
 to be safely effected almost before their eyes. The 
 rafts were moored at first in the mouth of a small 
 stream, the Bott, which empties itself into the Danube 
 9 or 10 miles above Silistria, and then transferred 
 without danger to the crossing point, a little below 
 the fortress, where they lay for the moment. 
 
 In order to cut off the communication by water 
 with Eustchuk, batteries had been erected at the 
 mouths of the Ardshish and the Bott. The Turks 
 made four attepapts to attack these batteries with 
 their flotilla, but were repulsed with loss each time. 
 The Eussian infantry likewise occupied an island in 
 the Danube, 2i miles above Silistria, as well as the 
 left bank of the river opposite to the fortress, but 
 beyond the reach of its fire, and occupied themselves 
 in making gabions, fascines, and other materials for a 
 siege, with the brushwood which grew there in abun- 
 dance. The heavy wood-work for mining operations, 
 &c. &c. was mostly made at Gralatz, and sent up the 
 Danube. 
 
 The Russians had 96 pieces of artillery disposable 
 for the siege — 65 Eussian guns, and 31 Turkish cap- 
 tured at Brailow. 
 
 On the 17th of May, at nine in the morning, 
 General Diebitsch advanced upon the fortress from 
 Czernavoda, with a part of the 2nd and 3rd corps 
 drawn up in three columns. He found the Turks in 
 possession of the works which the Russians had 
 erected the year before, and had neglected to destroy. 
 
Chap. II. SIEGE OF SILISTEIA. 289 
 
 They immediately offered a determined resistance, 
 especially on the Eussian left wing, where the troops 
 had to take an hour's rest before they could renew 
 the attack. At length, however, the trenches were 
 taken. The Turks were reported to have lost 800 
 men, and the Russians 50 officers and 190 men. 
 
 The forts which had been begun during the former 
 siege, 14 and 23 on height B, 19 on A, and 21 on 
 C, were now completed, and the trench for skir- 
 mishers a a occupied by the Russian outposts. 
 
 The 3 1 guns taken at Brailow were placed together 
 in a battery on the left bank of the Danube, opposite 
 the fortress, and at a distance of not more than 1000 
 paces. The remainder of the siege artillery was like- 
 wise on the left bank, waiting to cross ; 11 vessels 
 belonging to the river fleet were moored below, and 5 
 above the fortress, so as to shut up the Danube altoge- 
 ther, and prevent the relief of the fortress by water. 
 
 The right wing of the Russian army was composed 
 of the 9th division of infantry, 2 regiments of horse, 
 3 field batteries, and the 6th battalion of pioneers. 
 In the centre was the 1st brigade of the 7th division 
 of foot, with 1 field battery ; on the left wing were 
 2 brigades of the 6th division of foot, 3 regiments of 
 horse, and 3 field batteries. Head-quarters were 
 established behind the right wing, and covered by a 
 battalion of chasseurs. The besieging force was se- 
 cured in the rear by the Cossacks, who patrolled on 
 the roads to Shumla, Rustchuk, and Turtokai. Six 
 
 V 
 
290 SIEGE OF SILISTEIA. Pabt II. 
 
 battalions of the 8tli division of foot, and 3 field bat- 
 teries, 2 of tbem heavy ones, formed the reserve, 
 which remained at a distance of 2^ miles from 
 the fortress during the night before the investment, 
 after which it was placed at Kaorgu, at the junction 
 of the roads from Kalopetra and Almaluga. They 
 drew up with two battalions on the front towards 
 Silistria, and four towards Shumla, so as to cover the 
 besieging force, and entrenched themselves in that 
 order. The force of which the Russians could at first 
 dispose for the attack amounted to 26 battalions, 2 
 squadrons, and 7 batteries, or about 14,000 or 15,000 
 men, and 56 field-guns. The garrison of Silistria, 
 under Sert Mahommed Pasha, was estimated by the 
 Russians, perhaps too highly, at 13,000 soldiers and 
 8000 armed inhabitants. 
 
 On the 19th of May, at two in the afternoon, the 
 Turks made their first sortie, and advanced in seve- 
 ral troops upon the left wing of the Russian skir- 
 mishers, whom they drove back, supported by the 
 fire from the fortress ; but they were finally repulsed 
 with considerable loss. On the following night the 
 Russians began operations without waiting for their 
 artillery to cross the river. In order to cover the 
 left flank, redoubt 30* was erected within cannon- 
 shot of the fortress, on the road to Rasgrad, and on 
 
 * The works whicli liad been abandoned the year before, and were 
 repaired in part, retained tbeir original numbers, with wbich the troops 
 were familiar. Those which did not come into play during this siege have 
 mostly been omitted in the plan to avoid conflision. 
 
Chap. II. SIEGE OF SILISTBIA. 291 
 
 the western slope of height A. A communication 
 was made along a deep watercourse between battery 
 22 on the right wing at D, and lodgments belong- 
 ing to the line of skirmishers b b ; the latter were 
 enlarged, and the batteries 31, 32, and 33, for 8 guns, 
 erected not so much to play upon the fortress itself, 
 as to prevent sorties and divert the attention of the 
 enemy from the eastern front. At the northern 
 point of the nearest island below Silistria, a battery 
 was armed with the guns of 5 yawls, which directed 
 its fire upon the place from a distance of 1500 paces. 
 The boats themselves were used to complete the 
 bridge, as owing to the floods the materials at hand 
 were insufficient. The lodgment b b was extended 
 on the right as far as the river. 
 
 The Turks made a fresh sortie in thick darkness on 
 the night of the 20th. They stole up to the lodgment 
 a a between 19 and 23, and killed a few Russians, 
 but were soon forced to retreat before the approach of 
 the reserve. The garrison kept up a vigorous fire of 
 artillery and threw a number of shells into 19, which 
 did not, however, stop the works. 
 
 Meanwhile the rest of the 2nd corps had crossed 
 the river on rafts and boats, and the 5th division now 
 formed the right wing, the 6th the centre, and the 
 9th the left wing of the corps of investment. The 
 3rd battalion of pioneers, which had been occupied in 
 preparing material on the left bank, now joined the 
 corps, and a regiment of Cossacks joined General 
 
292 SIEGE OP SILISTEIA. Part II. 
 
 Kreutz, who now commanded the whole 8th division 
 of foot, 1 regiment of Cossacks, and 3 batteries. Thus 
 38 battalions, 20 squadrons, and 11 field-batteries, in 
 all 21,000 men, now lay before Silistria with 88 field- 
 guns : there were in reserve 12 battalions, 3 batteries, 
 and 1 regiment of Cossacks, or 6500 men with 24 guns. 
 
 Between the 23rd and 26th of May the left wing of 
 the Russians erected the dismounting batteries 34 and 
 35 at a distance of 600 paces from the main wall, and 
 connected them by trenches : the guns for arming 
 them had not yet arrived. All these works had 
 hitherto been carried on by night, and as the batteries 
 only had to be cut in the earth, a working party of 
 200 could finish a battery for 4 guns in one night. 
 Henceforth, however, they were continued by day 
 also, and, spite of the proximity of the Turkish gxms, 
 but little mischief was done. The attention of the 
 Turks was now drawn to the front, 5, 6, before which 
 they began to construct lodgments. 
 
 As it was still the intention at head-quarters to at- 
 tack the fortress on the east front, the right wing of 
 lodgment b b was converted into the first parallel 
 during the night of the 25th. The batteries on the 
 south side succeeded in engaging the attention of the 
 garrison so completely that the works on the right 
 wing were completed without the loss of a single 
 man. The Russians then erected the works from 1 
 to 5 in the new parallel. The feigned attack was 
 carried on at the same time, and the 2nd parallel, c e, 
 
Chap. II. SIEGE OF SILISTEIA. 293 
 
 was begun at 600 paces from tlie main wall. The 
 lodgments which already existed, the watercourses, 
 and the embankments formerly surrounding vine- 
 yards, were taken advantage of, so that the works 
 were covered from the first and could be completed 
 without loss. Nearly all the shells thrown from the 
 fortress next day fell behind the 2nd parallel at 31 
 and 32, damaged several guns and carriages, and 
 ploughed up the ground all around. 
 
 The timber for batteries 34 and 35 was carried 
 during the night of the 27th to the slope of the hill 
 and the necessary embrasures were cut. The 2nd 
 parallel, c c, was extended from the road to Shumla 
 almost as far as to that to Rasgrad. 
 
 At half-past two in the morning the Turks made a 
 sortie against the left wing of the Russians ; two co- 
 lumns of 500 men each stole along the hollow road to 
 Rasgrad to the work 19, while a third column advanced 
 further to the right upon 30. It so happened that 
 they reached it at the moment of relieving guard in 
 the trenches, and though the outposts were forced to 
 retreat, the fresh guard, with the assistance of the 
 reserve and the old guard, repulsed the Turks at the 
 point of the bayonet. They left 30 men dead on the 
 spot, while the Russians lost 1 officer and 40 men 
 killed and wounded. 
 
 During the night of the 28th, battery 37 for 4 guns 
 was begim opposite to bastion 5, and finished on the 
 ensuing day. Some battering gims arrived in the 
 
294 SIEGE OP SILISTRIA. Part II. 
 
 mean time and battery 34 was armed witli 3 pieces, 
 the embrasures of which remained blinded, as this 
 battery was not to open its fire until all the others 
 were ready. The parallels on the right were ex- 
 tended as far as the road to Bazardjik, a commtmica- 
 tion opened between them, and the old lodgments 
 and work 38 erected. Battery 31 was changed 
 into a mortar-battery and armed with 2 13-inch 
 mortars. One of the five guns which had been set 
 up there was taken to 34 and 2 to 37, which now 
 therefore mounted 8 guns in all. As soon as the 
 morning mist had cleared off and the embrasures were 
 unmasked, these batteries opened their fire at a dis- 
 tance of 600 paces. The Turks replied by a vigorous 
 cannonade, but were forced to discontinue it at the 
 end of a quarter of an hour, as their embrasures 
 were ruined. Some deserters from the fortress, who 
 joined the Russians on that day, reported that great 
 alarm prevailed among the inhabitants of the town, 
 that many had been killed, that the guns which had 
 been dismounted and destroyed in the embrasures 
 were several times replaced by fresh ones, which were 
 likewise soon rendered imserviceable, and that the 
 Pasha, amazed at the effect of the batteries, had pro- 
 mised the troops a large sum of money to take them. 
 This information redoubled the watchfulness of the 
 besiegers. 
 
 By the 3rd of June batteries 36, 39, and 40 were 
 erected opposite to bastion 6, and armed partly with 
 
Chap. 11. SIEGE OP SILISTRIA. 295 
 
 battering guns and partly with heavy field-pieces. 
 They quickly silenced the fire in the flanks of bas- 
 tions 5 and 6. The Turks, however, continued to 
 erect lodgments before the attacked front, cut three 
 embrasures in them, and armed them with artillery : 
 they likewise re-established the embrasures in the 
 curtain, placed fresh guns in them, and opened a 
 vigorous fire upon the working parties by day as well 
 as by night. They threw a vast number of shells 
 into 32 and 34. It was now determined at head- 
 quarters, as the feigned attack upon front 5, 6, had 
 proved so successful, to turn it into a real one. That 
 against the eastern front 2, 3, was to be kept up at 
 the same time, partly in order to cover the passage 
 about to be made across the Danube, and partly to 
 prevent sorties on that side. 
 
 On the left wing the siege was greatly advanced 
 during the night of the 3rd June by the carelessness 
 of the Tvirks. The Russians intended to make use of 
 a watercourse as a communication with a half parallel) 
 which was to be formed 200 paces in advance of the 
 2nd parallel. When, however, the covering party 
 was drawn up, it was discovered that the Turks had 
 placed no posts of observation in front of their lodg- 
 ments, and that it would be possible to advance with 
 the working party 324 paces farther, where a ditch 
 parallel with the counterscarp, and only 250 paces 
 distant from it,- afforded an admirable opportunity of 
 immediately forming the 3rd parallel. Posts were 
 
296 SIEGE OP SILISTRIA. Paet II. 
 
 placed immediately below the Turkish lodgments and 
 the work began. The noise roused the garrison and 
 a sharp fire began from the lodgments and from the 
 main wall ; but owing to the darkness and the uncer- 
 tainty of the Turks as to the direction of their fire, 
 the loss was comparatively trifling : 1 officer and 4 
 men were killed, and 5 officers and 28 men wounded. 
 The attempt was as successful as it was bold, and the 
 3rd parallel, / /, was carried to the right of the 
 watercourse d, as far as the graveyard, and finished 
 that same night. On the left it could only be carried 
 on for about 75 paces, as a heavy fire of canister pre- 
 vented the work until daybreak. It cost 1 officer 
 and 16 men to finish a single traverse. It was gene- 
 rally expected that the Turks would make a sortie on 
 a large scale during the night of the 4th, and mea- 
 sures were taken for their reception. Accordingly 
 no sooner had night fallen than a numerous body 
 of Turks sallied forth to destroy the parallels before 
 even the working party was wholly placed which was 
 to carry on the 3rd parallel towards the left. The 
 Turks first assembled in tolerably large numbers in 
 the lodgments before the curtain, and then rushed 
 upon the parallel, where they fought hand to hand 
 with 17 chasseurs, and at the same time opened a 
 close fire of musketry. Two other columns advanced 
 at the same time, one against redoubt 30, the other 
 along the bank of the Danube, so as to take the 
 enemy in the rear. The Russian outposts attacked 
 
Chap. II. SIEGE OF SILISTRIA. 29 Y 
 
 these columns with the bayonet and drove them back 
 and their reserved troops then came up and forced 
 the Turks back into the fortress after a severe struggle. 
 The Turks carried their wounded with them and left 
 40 men dead on the field ; the Russians lost no less 
 than 5 oflScers and 113 men. The 3rd parallel could 
 not be continued that night, but a sap with traverses 
 was begun from battery 37 to join its right wing : 
 No. 32 was likewise turned into a mortar-battery. 
 
 The movements of the G-rand Yizier upon Greneral 
 Roth, which will be described hereafter so as not to 
 break the thread of our present narrative, had deter- 
 mined the Greneral-in-chief to proceed with part of the 
 corps of attack to the Balkan. He had been delayed by 
 the expectation of the sortie we have just described, but 
 at daybreak on the 5th Greneral Diebitsch left Silistria 
 with the 2nd corps-d'arm6e ; 1 division of hussars 
 and 1 brigade of foot had already been sent to Ge- 
 neral Kreutz at Kaorgu. Thus 20 battalions of foot, 
 2 of pioneers, and a few squadrons belonging to the 
 3rd corps-d'armee, were left before the fortress. The 
 Russian accounts give their numbers at only 8000 
 in all, i. e. 300 men to each battalion. Even with the 
 addition of 5 battalions belonging to the 8th division, 
 8 squadrons, and 3 regiments of Cossacks, which had 
 until now been placed so as to cover the siege, the 
 attacking force did not amount to more than 10,000 
 or 12,000 men, and the besieged were, without doubt, 
 stronger than the besiegers. The only hope for the 
 
298 SIEGE OF SILISTEIA. Paht II. 
 
 Russians was to conceal the emallness of their num- 
 bers and to hasten the works as much as possible, so 
 as entirely to confine the Turks within the fortress 
 and to prevent them from making fresh sorties. 
 
 The canister and musketry from the lodgments both 
 on the front of attack, 5, 6, and at the next, 6, 7, 
 became very inconvenient at a distance of only 200 
 paces; nevertheless the besiegers carried the 3rd 
 parallel 300 paces further beyond the road to Rasgrad 
 and erected in it battery 42 for 6 guns and 43 for 7, 
 besides a site for two 5i-inch mortars. Battery 41 
 for 8 guns was erected at c, c, opposite to bastion 
 4, in order to fire upon the lodgments before the 
 front 4, 6. 
 
 No sorties were now to be feared except those 
 which might be made by the Turks along the Upper 
 Danube. To guard against these, battery 44 for 8 
 guns was erected on the left wing. This was in- 
 tended to silence the fire from Liman Tabia and act 
 against the gate Rasgrad Kapu in the 7th front- 
 During the night of the 5th the Turks again at- 
 tempted a sortie from this gate, but were driven back 
 with little loss on the side of the Russians. 
 
 A violent fall of rain, which lasted twenty-four 
 hours, flooded the trenches to such a degree that wells 
 had to be dug in order to drain them. The works 
 could not be resumed until the 9th. 
 
 The advantageous terraced position of the Russian 
 batteries and their nearness to the fortress caused 
 
Chap. 11. SIEGE OP SILISTEIA. 299 
 
 their fire to tell with destructive effect not only on 
 bastions 5 and 6, but likewise on the faces and flanks 
 of the contiguous bastions 4 and 7, which were turned 
 towards the attack, as well as on the lodgments in 
 front. The Shumla and Easgrad gates were completely 
 shattered, together with their respective bridges, and 
 great damage was done within the town. Neverthe- 
 less the Turks continued to unmask fresh embrasures, 
 and kept up a heavy fire of canister during the night 
 in aU directions, and an uninterrupted fire of small arms 
 by day. On the 12th a powder-magazine accidentally 
 exploded in the Turkish lodgment before the 4th 
 front, which was thereupon abandoned by its gar- 
 rison. On the other hand, the Turks threw up fresh 
 lodgments before the front threatened with attack, and 
 assembled behind them when about to make sorties. 
 
 All the deserters from the town stated that counter- 
 mines were being made against the works of attack 
 upon the bastions 5 and 6, and the curtain between 
 them, and that some of these countermines were 
 already charged. Moreover the nights had become 
 so light, that it was utterly impossible to advance any 
 further with flying sap. The Eussians thought 
 themselves too weak in numbers to attempt storming 
 the lodgments, and confined themselves to the covered 
 sap, which proceeded very slowly, owing to the 
 various inequahties of the ground and its general fall 
 towards the glacis, as well as to the close fire of the 
 Turkish musketry. In this manner 6 branches were 
 
300 SIEGE OF SILISTEIA. Part II. 
 
 carried forward from the 3rd parallel F F, and 
 directed not upon the salient of the bastion, but 2 
 against each bastion, and 2 against the middle of the 
 curtain between them. They hoped in the sorties 
 always to defend one sap by means of the other, and 
 in case of the explosion of a mine, to have one of the 
 two left uninjured. These saps had to be cut 5 or 6 
 feet deep, in order to protect them against the enfilad- 
 ing fire from the fortress, and to be blinded with a 
 double row of planks, or with fascines laid across. 
 
 On the evening of the 13th news arrived of a 
 victory won by the Russian general-in-chief at Ku- 
 lewtsha. The corps of attack immediately opened a 
 vigorous fire of artillery and small arms amid loud 
 hurras, and the Turks conceiving that they were on 
 the point of storming the fortress immediately manned 
 their walls. Next day Te Deum was sung, and all 
 work ceased. Information was received that disputes 
 had arisen between the commandants of the fortress. 
 Sert Mohammed Pasha was a weak and peaceable 
 man ; and although Mahmud Pasha of Three Tails, 
 who held the command under him, would not hear of 
 a capitulation. General Krassowski sent a polite letter 
 into Silistria, giving an account of the Russian vic- 
 tory, and recommending the Turks to surrender at 
 the mercy of the Emperor. The Pasha replied that 
 " he was commanded by the law to defend himself to 
 the very last." Meanwhile, in order to ascertain the 
 truth, he sent two pigeons by a detour to Shumla, to 
 
Chap. II. STEGE OP SILISTRTA, 301 
 
 tlie Vizier, begging him, if the battle were really 
 lost, to let % the black, and if won the white. It is 
 said that the messenger of evil tidings soon returned. 
 
 On the 16th a new closed work, 46, was thrown up 
 on the left wing of attack, and a sortie upon it re- 
 pulsed. Moreover branches were carried from sap 
 VI. {fig. 2) towards the left, and from 46 towards the 
 Turkish lodgments before the 6th front. 
 
 The sap No. I. first reached the crest of the-glacis, 
 whereupon the crowning works were begun on either 
 side, and shafts sunk for 4 double mines, a, a. The 
 Russians determined, if necessary, to blow in the 
 counterscarp at this point at once, without waiting for 
 the termination of the works against bastion 6. 
 
 When sap II. approached the glacis, the Turks aban- 
 doned the part of lodgment 8 which lay nearest, and 
 which seems to have been little more than a cleft in 
 the earth, fully commanded in the rear from the small 
 places of arms in the sap. The continuation of sap 
 III. was thus rendered much more easy, but the 
 Turks still held possession of the western part of their 
 lodgment 5, and only retreated by degrees as they 
 were reached by the saps which had to be provided 
 with branches as lodgments for sharpshooters. 
 
 On the 20th of June the last heads of the sap 
 reached the crest of the glacis, the crownings were 
 continued, and mine-shafts were sunk and listeners 
 constructed before bastion 6. The saps VIII. and 
 IX. reached the Turkish outworks R and P. A sortie 
 
302 SIEGE OP SILISTEIA. Part II. 
 
 against the extreme left wing of the 3rd parallel was 
 repulsed. 
 
 It had been observed that the Turks watched the 
 movements of the besiegers from two minarets near 
 the front of the attack, and that they redoubled their 
 fire and threw shells whenever a good many men 
 were assembled in the 3rd parallel and the communi- 
 cations leading into it ; for instance, when the work- 
 ing parties or the sentries were relieved. Orders 
 were accordingly given to concentrate the fire of the 
 whole artillery upon these minarets, which were 
 knocked down before ten rounds had been fired. 
 
 Although a Bimbashi who had been taken prisoner 
 at Kulewtsha had been admitted into Silistria to give 
 a report of the battle, and two Turkish officers visited 
 the Russian camp as negotiators, no capitulation was 
 made. Negotiations were therefore broken off on the 
 20th, and, in the evening of that day, the mines a, 
 before bastion 5, exploded. 
 
 "When the shafts had been carried deep enough, 
 horizontal galleries had been carried from the bottom 
 of them, and then driven perpendicularly towards the 
 counterscarp. At the end of them mines were made 
 13 feet from the revetment of the wall, and 8 feet 
 below the bottom of the ditch. Each mine was 
 charged with at least 21 cwt. of powder, on the 
 calculation of 28 pounds of powder to one cubic sas- 
 chen, or 140 cubic feet of earth, owing to the nature 
 of the soil. It was expected that, as the shortest line 
 
Chap. n. SIEGE OF 8ILISTRIA. 303 
 
 of resistance was 21 feet, entonnoirs would be made 
 having a radius of 28 feet. 
 
 The explosion not only destroyed the Turkish 
 countermine,* but also filled up the ditch. The earth 
 thrown against the escarpment out of the 1st and 
 4th entonnoirs, reached as high as the cordon of 
 the revetment, and formed two easy ascents to the 
 bastion, of which the parapet had already been 
 knocked down by the dismounting battery. From 
 the two middle entonnoirs the earth had only been 
 thrown to the foot of the revetment wall, which 
 turned out very advantageously, as men could be 
 drawn up under cover in the hollow so produced. 
 The main wall of the fortress might undoubtedly 
 have been scaled after the explosion of these mines, 
 and the Turks, expecting to be stormed, manned the 
 exposed front. But the Eussians had no intention of 
 the kind, as they considered themselves much too weak; 
 both sides, therefore, restricted themselves to a sharp 
 fire, by which the Eussians lost 3 officers and 43 men. 
 
 The damaged saps were immediately repaired, and 
 descents made into the entonnoirs. It might be 
 assumed, that as soon as the Turks had experienced 
 the effect of the mines, they would not allow those in 
 progress opposite to bastion 6 to be completed, but 
 would play off their countermines against them. 
 
 * It was afterwards ascertained that the countermines had been carried 
 forward 62 feet, and had lain close to sap I. : and yet the besieged suffered 
 themselves to be forestalled. 
 
304 SIEGE OP SILISTRIA. Part II. 
 
 And accordingly, when the shafts b b had reached to 
 a tolerable depth, the Russians heard the movements 
 of the Turkish miners not far from the right service 
 shaft ; the mining-work itself was not heard. 
 
 On the night of the 20th, mine d, beneath the 
 point of the counterscarp of the Turkish open-work 
 W, close to bastion 6, was finished and charged 
 with 10 cwt. of powder, with 21 feet line of least 
 resistance. The object of this mine was to throw 
 down the counterscarp, so as to fill up the ditch, and 
 to create an entonnoir which would render the erec- 
 tion of a lodgment for skirmishers possible, so that 
 the Turks might be driven out of their advanced 
 work, which was not a strong one, without a hand-to- 
 hand assault. A mine, e, had been begun for the 
 same purpose beneath the centre Turkish outworks R. 
 
 At midnight mine d exploded, the ditch of the 
 work was completely filled up, and an entonnoir 
 created well-adapted to the construction of the lodg- 
 ments ; the angle of the counterscarp, however, was 
 less damaged than had been hoped. 
 
 The discharge of small arms, and the shouts of the 
 besiegers again caused the Turks to expect an assault ; 
 they therefore made a very ill-timed explosion of two 
 of their mines {q q) in front of bastion 6, and next to 
 sap y. ; but they were so far in advance, that the 
 mines in front of the crest of the glacis were not 
 destroyed, and only a few men in the sap were hurt. 
 
 Towards daybreak the two mines b b were com- 
 
Chap. II. SIEGE OF SILISTRIA. 305 
 
 pleted, and charged with 21h cwt. each, the line of 
 least resistance being 21 feet. They exploded simul- 
 taneously at 9 o'clock, and answered their purpose so 
 far, that the counterscarp was thrown out against 
 the bastion, the ditch completely filled up, and the 
 Turkish gallery destroyed. 
 
 Soon after the mine e beneath the left projecting 
 angle of the middle outwork exploded, and made an 
 entonnoir large enough to contain a lodgment from 
 which the Russians might drive the enemy out of 
 their work by the fire of small arms alone, without 
 recourse to the bayonet, and then occupy it them- 
 selves. 
 
 Next day the crowning of the glacis and the en- 
 tonnoir were continued, two shafts sunk at // oppo- 
 site to the right face of bastion 6, in order to throw 
 down the counterscarp, and a gallery, g, carried from 
 the shaft beneath the Turkish outwork P. 
 
 Some heavy rain, which began in the evening 
 and lasted 24 hours, interrupted nearly all the works 
 by sap, as the general fall of the ground towards 
 the glacis soon caused them all to be fiUed with 
 water. At several points where the saps were 6 feet 
 deep, the coromunication with the crowning work was 
 entirely cut off, a circumstance of which the Turks 
 neglected to avail themselves for making a sortie. 
 
 After great exertion the water was drained off next 
 day, the communication with the aforesaid work 
 restored, and the mining operations continued. The 
 
 x 
 
306 SIEGE OP SILISTRIA. Paet II. 
 
 descent into the ditch from sap II. opposite to bastion 
 5, was to be effected by means of a gallery, which 
 proceeded rapidly. As the counterscarp had no sunk 
 foundation to impede the progress of the work, the 
 miners proceeded unawares both too far and too deep, 
 which they discovered when light fell into the gallery 
 from the cunette of the ditch. It was now resolved 
 to carry the gallery beneath the right shoulder of the 
 bastion, although it would have been more easily 
 reached by covered sap along the bottom of the ditch. 
 But the Turks discovered the miners in the cunette 
 while an attempt was being made to parley with them, 
 rushed down with loud cries of " Allah," and hurled 
 stones, small powder-barrels, and hand-grenades at 
 them. Three miners were killed, and three more 
 taken prisoners. Hereupon the Turks began to ram 
 up the opening of the gallery with stones which they 
 took from a part of the counterscarp, which was built 
 without mortar. In so doing they accidentally 
 reached the spot at which a small branch, intended 
 to contain a few skirmishers as a reserve, had been 
 carried from the gallery to the left along the revet- 
 ment. Here the Turks made a large opening through 
 which they fired at an angle into the gallery, and 
 threw a number of lighted shells and hand-grenades. 
 This continued till evening, when they withdrew, 
 either because they had got tired of firing, or because 
 they suffered too much from the grenades thrown into 
 the ditch from cohorn mortars. 
 
Chap. II. SIEGE OF SILISTEIA. 307 
 
 This accident turned to the advantage of the Rus- 
 sians ; for while the Turks directed their whole 
 attention to the gallery they had discovered, and 
 endeavoured to hinder its completion, the former were 
 able to carry on their other works of attack unmo- 
 lested. 
 
 After the Turks had quitted the ditch, the opening 
 into the gallery which they had rammed up was 
 immediately cleared, the large opening in the revet- 
 ment of the counterscarp filled up with sacks stuffed 
 with earth, between which were left loopholes for 
 skirmishers, so as to do as much damage as possible 
 to the Turks whenever they should attack this point 
 again. 
 
 At the same time a battery, h, was erected on the 
 glacis opposite to the postern. In order to cover the 
 postern the Turks had thrown up a tambour with 
 two rows of gabions, filled with earth, and dug a 
 separate entrance into the cunette. The battery h 
 was intended to destroy the postern as well as the 
 earthwork thrown up before it, and thus to deprive 
 the Turks of access to the ditch. It would undoubt- 
 edly have been quite possible to drive the Turks out 
 of the ditch long before by main force, which would 
 have greatly abridged the subsequent works ; but it 
 could only have been done at the expense of a great 
 loss of men, who could ill be spared. As it was, the 
 Eussians had lost 1 staff officer, 9 officers, and 153 
 
 men during the last three days. 
 
 X 2 
 
308 SIEGE OF SILISTBIA. Part II. 
 
 On the morning of the 23 rd the Turks made 
 another attack upon the works in the ditch, and, spite 
 of the fire of the skirmishers from behind the coun- 
 terscarp, they soon reached the cunette, forced the 
 working party and their coverers to retreat, and again 
 rammed up the opening of the gallery with stones. 
 They then broke a second opening in the revetment 
 of the counterscarp, threw shells and grenades into 
 the gallery, and finally attacked the crowning work of 
 the glacis to the left of the sap III. They set fire to 
 the mantelet, threw a number of hand-grenades and 
 stones, and kept up a close fire of musketry. The 
 explosion of the mine //, which took place at this 
 time, at length forced them to leave the crest of the 
 glacis. Towards evening they withdrew from the 
 descent into the ditch, whereupon the work in front 
 of the gallery was immediately resumed by the 
 Russians. 
 
 The mines / in front of the right face of bastion 6, 
 had produced the same result as those in front of the 
 left face. 
 
 The crowning of the glacis was no-^iir continued ; at 
 every point two more descents into the ditch were 
 begun, and the mine g, beneath the furthermost 
 Turkish outwork P, was finished. 
 
 During the night of the 23rd the Turks resolved 
 to attack the entonnoir opposite to bastion 5, and 
 approached it from the fourth side of the polygon at 
 the same time that they advanced in the cunette and 
 
Chap. II. SIEGE OP SILISTRIA. 309 
 
 along tlie counterscarp. The Eussian volunteers, 
 however, broke out from the crowning work, occupied 
 the edge of the entonnoir, and prevented the Turks 
 from entering it, while 2 companies sallied out of the 
 entonnoir upon the Turks in front of it, and cut them 
 down. 
 
 After the enemy was repulsed the working party 
 proceeded to crown the entonnoir and to erect lodg- 
 ments for skirmishers, which were completed by 
 daybreak, although the Turks not only kept up a 
 close fire of canister and small arms, but likewise 
 threw shells, stones, hand-grenades and combustibles 
 at the working party from the bastion 5. 
 
 As the gallery could not be continued, a blinded 
 descent was begun, and the covering party placed 
 behind the hillock thrown up by the explosion of the 
 outer mine. 
 
 At midday on the 24th the Turks renewed their 
 attack both upon the gallery opening into the cunette, 
 upon the sap III., and upon the crowning work carried 
 on opposite to the curtain. The working party was 
 ordered to withdraw from the gallery, and were fol- 
 lowed by their small covering party, which had stood 
 behind the opening in the revetment of the counter- 
 scarp, and at the opening from the gallery into the 
 cunette. This time the Turks were unable to set fire 
 to the mantelet, and therefore endeavoured to pull it 
 into the ditch with large hooks ; they kept up a close 
 fire of musketry all the time, and as usual threw a 
 
310 SIEGE OF SILISTRIA. Pabt II. 
 
 number of grenades, shells, and combustibles upon 
 the saps ; they were at length repulsed by the Eus- 
 sian reserve which hastened to the spot. The Turks 
 now, for what reason we do not Icnow, blew up their 
 countermines r r, opposite the centre of the curtain, 
 and situated between saps III. and IV., as far from 
 the glacis as the one which had already exploded 
 opposite to bastion 6. The explosion only shghtly 
 hurt a few men who happened to be in the commu- 
 nication nearest at hand. 
 
 On this day the battery opposite to the postern 
 was finished, and from the moment that it began to 
 play the Turks made no further attempt to enter the 
 ditch. The whole of the cunette was occupied by 
 the Eussians, widened and defiladed with traverses 
 made of gabions filled with fascines, and placed in 
 double rows upon planks or fascines, which were laid 
 across the cunette. 
 
 On the 25th of June the mine 1 beneath the right 
 shoulder of bastion 5 was begun, and shortly after- 
 wards a second mine, h, beneath the point of the same 
 bastion, in order, by their explosion, to take the 
 scarp, and to create an entonnoir fitted for the con- 
 struction of a lodgment. The Eussians hoped at the 
 same time to destroy any works beneath the flanks of 
 the bastion, which the Turks might be presumed to 
 have made in order to reach the gallery which opened 
 into the cunette, as their previous attempts upon it 
 showed how much they dreaded it. 
 
Chap. II. SIEGE OP SILISTEIA. 311 
 
 When the Turks perceived that it was no longer 
 possible for them to attack the entonnoir opposite to 
 bastion 5, they hit upon a singular mode of defence. 
 On the morning of the 25th they began to roll down 
 from the parapet of bastion 5 burning tubs filled 
 with powder and some stinking material ; when these 
 tubs exploded, they spread such a suffocating smoke 
 and stench, that the working party and their coverers 
 were forced to retreat. The covering party, how- 
 ever, were soon led back by two officers, and re- 
 occupied the entonnoir, after cutting down the Turks 
 who had already established themselves there. As 
 the Turks had thus had an opportunity of observing 
 the mining operations, and must be expected to take 
 measures in consequence, those operations were acce- 
 lerated as much as possible. 
 
 At seven in the evening of the same day, the mine 
 g, beneath the Turkish work P, exploded, and tbe 
 right projecting angle of the work was wholly 
 thrown down. The garrison took flight on the first 
 alarm, and the Russian chasseurs entered the work 
 without opposition. Hereupon Greneral Berg took 
 upon himself to storm the two adjacent Turkish 
 works, B. and W, which had also been almost aban- 
 doned by their defenders. The Russian volunteers 
 took them with little trouble, and cut down a few 
 Turks. Communications were then restored between 
 the captured works, and their lines towards the 
 fortress raised. 
 
312 SIEGE OP SILISTRIA. Part II. 
 
 A descent as well as lodgments and commnnica- 
 tions was constructed from the entonnoir opposite to 
 bastion 6, towards the right into the ditch and the 
 cnnette. 
 
 At six in the evening the Turks made a fresh 
 attack upon the entonnoir, which they approached 
 from the left along the ditch, but were repulsed by- 
 Russian volunteers. This was the last sortie made 
 by the Turks ; after this they confined themselves to 
 musketry and to throwing stones and grenades. 
 
 During the night of the 25th the miners in the 
 gallery under bastion 5 convinced themselves by lis- 
 tening that the Turks were carrying on extensive 
 mining operations somewhere under the left flank of 
 the bastion. Accordingly as soon as mine i beneath 
 the shoulder of the bastion was finished it was charged 
 with 16 cwt. of powder, as the object was to create 
 an entonnoir with a radius of 25 feet, while the 
 line of least resistance was 21 feet; and accord- 
 ingly 25 lbs. of powder were allowed to 1 cubic 
 saschen, or 140 cubic feet. The mine was fired at 
 three in the morning, and at the explosion, which 
 was very violent, two distinct reports were heard. 
 It had been expected that this mine would only throw 
 down part of the flank of the bastion, but it turned 
 out that it had carried away not only the whole flank 
 but likewise part of the curtain, which had manifestly 
 been caused by the simultaneous explosion of a Rus- 
 sian and a Turkish mine. The Turks afterwards 
 
Chap. II. SIEGE OP SILISTEIA. 313 
 
 asserted that they had fired their countermine, al- 
 though it was not quite ready, at the very moment at 
 which they saw the Eussians preparing to fire theirs. 
 It is, however, far more probable that the fire spread 
 from the Eussian mine to the Turkish one, which lay 
 close beneath. By the combined action of the two 
 mines fragments of masonry from the revetment of 
 the scarp were hurled much further than had been 
 anticipated, so that 3 officers and 15 men, who were 
 standing behind the crowning of the glacis before 
 the middle of the curtain, were killed or wounded. 
 During the night the mine beneath the point of bas- 
 tion 5 was finished and loaded with 12 cwt. of powder, 
 so as to create an ordinary entonnoir with the line 
 of least resistance of 21 feet. The explosion took 
 place at one in the morning, threw down the scarp, 
 and made an entonnoir fitted for the erection of a 
 lodgment. 
 
 After every one of these explosions the Turks, as 
 usual, opened a sharp fire of musketry on every point 
 of the front of attack ; and, apparently in the expecta- 
 tion of being stormed, threw a number of shells, 
 grenades, stones, and combustibles into the entonnoir. 
 The besiegers advanced from the cunette towards the 
 curtain to the left of the postern, first with single and 
 then with covered sap, and soon after they carried a 
 second sap towards the postern to the right of the 
 first. Hereupon they broke through the walled re- 
 vetment of the scarp in order to make mines k and I. 
 
314 SIEGE OP SILISTRIA. Pakt II. 
 
 On the crest of the glacis, opposite the curtain, four 
 batteries were erected, the two outer ones, T and U, 
 in such a manner as to take the attacked flanks of the 
 bastions 5 and 6 en echarpe ; the middle ones, on the 
 other hand, were directed against the points at which 
 the curtain was to be thrown down. The two de- 
 scents into the ditch m were completed. On the right 
 wing of the lodgment, opposite bastion 5, a site was 
 constructed for a gun to defend the entonnoirs of the 
 mines and to fire upon the inside of the town. Mean- 
 while an experienced officer of engineers was directed 
 to make two mines, n, n, one beneath the left flank of 
 bastion 6, the other beneath the curtain, in such a 
 manner that their simultaneous explosion would blow 
 up the main wall, and that the battery T, which was 
 being constructed on the glacis opposite the left flank 
 of bastion 6, would be able to take the adjoining sixth 
 side of the polygon 6, Y in the rear. The object was 
 to create a large entonnoir, not for the purpose of 
 storming, but in order to construct in it a lodgment 
 for skirmishers under cover of the battery, and from 
 •that lodgment to fire upon the inside of the bastion 
 and upon a retrenchment which the Turks had thrown 
 up behind the front of attack. The mines were 
 finished in twenty-four hours and charged in the fol- 
 lowing manner. In consideration of the nature of the 
 soil, 25 lbs. of powder were allowed to each 140 cubic 
 feet of earth ; the focus, n', with the line of least 
 resistance of 21 feet, was overcharged with 29 i cwt. 
 
Chap. II. SIEGE OP SILISTRIA. 315 
 
 of powder ; the focus, n, was as usual, and was charged 
 with 1\ cwt. at the same hne of resistance. 
 
 At eight o'clock in the evening the mines exploded. 
 At Ti an elliptical entonnoir was formed, of which 
 the largest radius was 64 and the smallest 51 feet. 
 Focus n threw down 38 feet of the flank with all its 
 masonry. The entonnoirs of the two mines, when 
 dug out, formed a wide opening' of which the sole lay- 
 so Iqw that battery T, upon the glacis, was able to 
 sweep the whole curtain of the sixth front in the rear 
 with diagonal fire. As usual, the Turks appeared 
 upon the wall immediately after the explosion, and 
 opened a vigorous fire in spite of the loss which they 
 each time sustained from the Russian artillery. They 
 were soon, however, forced to abandon the sixth front, 
 as the traverses upon it no longer protected them from 
 the fire in the rear through the entonnoir of the mine. 
 The Turks declared that a single bullet from thence 
 had killed 15 men. 
 
 Not content with this, and in order to make a 
 similar opening in bastion 5, through which they 
 might fire in the same manner upon the fourth front, 
 the Russians carried the gallery beneath the right 
 flank of this bastion. Moreover a third gallery at c 
 was added to the galleries h and I. At daybreak on 
 the 29 th the Russians fired their mine I under the 
 curtain. It was charged with 16 cwt. of powder, and 
 with 21 feet line of least resistance it created an 
 entonnoir 28 feet in diameter, threw down the revet- 
 
316 SIEGE OP SILISTRIA. Part II. 
 
 ment, and buried among other things Sert Mahom- 
 med Pasha's earth hut beneath the rampart which 
 he had only just quitted. The canister fire from the 
 battery on the glacis opposite the mine prevented the^ 
 Turks from occupying the edge of the entonnoir, and 
 the construction of the ascent to it was immediately 
 begun. On the evening of this day the second mine, 
 k, also exploded with like effect, so that by this time 
 five large openings had been effected in the main 
 wall. At the moment when the third mine, c, next 
 to the postern, was about to be fired, envoys appeared 
 from the fortress to negotiate a siirrender. The fire 
 of artillery was therefore suspended for the present, 
 though the works of attack, especially the lodgment 
 on bastion 6, were continued. 
 
 The envoys spun out the negotiations with Oriental 
 dilatoriness, perhaps intentionally, in order to gain 
 time to make fresh retrenchments within their half- 
 ruined walls. The Russians therefore declared in 
 very positive terms that they must either desist from 
 all their unreasonable demands, and accept the terms 
 which had already been offered to them, or prepare 
 themselves for a renewal of the attack. Hereupon a 
 protocol of surrender was signed at nine that evening 
 by the Pasha's plenipotentiaries, according to which 
 the garrison were to be prisoners of war. At ten 
 o'clock the Turks compelled Sert Mahommed Pasha 
 to go to the Eussian camp and deliver himself up as 
 a hostage for the fulfilment of the capitulation. Next 
 
Chap. II. SIEGE OP SILISTRIA. 317 
 
 day 9000 men, among whom were three regiments of 
 regular infantry, laid down their arms. The fortress 
 was given up to the Eussians, and 8000 imarmed in- 
 habitants and 1500 sick and wounded were left in 
 the town. Assuming that half of the townspeople 
 took part in the defence, and that the loss on the side 
 of the Turks was severe (the Eussians estimated it at 
 7000 men), the original strength of the garrison can- 
 not be reckoned at less than 15,000 men : 230 pieces 
 of artillery on the walls of the town, 31 on board 
 gunboats, and 40 standards fell into the hands of the 
 victors. 
 
 At Silistria the Turks had once more displayed 
 their well-known bravery and resolution in the de- 
 fence of strongholds, but they had likewise betrayed 
 great ignorance and incapacity. Silistria had held 
 out 44 days since the first investment, 35 since the 
 opening of the first parallel, 25 since the completion 
 of the third parallel, and 9 even after a perfectly 
 practicable breach had been effected by mining at 
 bastion 5. If we compare this defence with that of 
 Brailow, which took place imder somewhat analogous 
 circumstances, we shall find that the latter held out 
 only 38 days from its first investment, 27 from the 
 opening of the trenches, 11 from that of the third 
 parallel, and 3 from the construction of a practicable 
 breach ; 14,789 shots were fired against Brailow and 
 29,576 against Silistria, where the fire must have 
 taken far greater effect, inasmuch as a very numerous 
 
318 SIEGE OF SILISTKIA. Part II. 
 
 garrison was crowded together with the townspeople 
 within a very narrow space. Moreover Brailow had 
 not, like Sihstria, been wholly isolated from its very 
 first, but had communicated with Matchin by means 
 of the flotilla on the Danube during the earlier part 
 of the siege. Brailow was a far stronger fortress, 
 showed a much better profile, and was neither com- 
 manded nor capable of being bombarded from the 
 opposite bank of the river like Silistria. In all these 
 respects, then, Silistria may claim the glory of a much 
 longer and more vigorous defence. It is true that at 
 Brailow 8000 Turks were besieged by 18,000 Eus- 
 sians, whereas at Silistria the garrison was from the 
 first quite as strong, and at last considerably stronger, 
 than the corps of attack. Moreover the average 
 number daily employed in the working parties before 
 Brailow was 1500, while before Sihstria it was not 
 above 900 or 1000. The very fact that here, as at 
 Yarna and Shumla, a superior force should allow 
 itself to be besieged at all, sufficiently proves the 
 real superiority of a European regular army over 
 the undisciplined Turkish hordes. This numerous 
 garrison, which did not venture to face the Rus- 
 sians in the open field, was therefore only of ad- 
 vantage indirectly, inasmuch as they prevented the 
 besiegers from storming, which they would scarcely 
 have attempted even against a weaker garrison ; 
 while on the other hand it greatly increased the 
 scarcity and sufferings of the town, which are said 
 
Chap. II. SIEGE OF SILISTRIA. 319 
 
 to have become very great after a total isolation of 
 six weeks. 
 
 The only real advantage that the Turks could have 
 derived from their numbers would have been in the 
 sorties, and indeed their courage and energy in this 
 respect were unbounded, but the ground was deci- 
 dedly unfavourable to their success. Their expedi- 
 tions were always undertaken in small numbers, and 
 nowhere gained any decisive advantage such as might 
 have arrested the progress of the siege. Their sorties, 
 moreover, instead of being directed against the works 
 of attack, were chiefly made upon the right flank of 
 the investing corps, where only an attack en masse 
 could have led to any result ; but the Turks were just 
 as little disposed to hazard a regular battle outside 
 the walls of the fortress as the Russians were to risk 
 storming it in full force. The greatest want of skill 
 was shown by the Turkish counterminers ; they suf- 
 fered themselves to be forestalled at every point, fre- 
 quently only by a few minutes. The counter-mines 
 which they did fire exploded at wrong times and 
 places, and produced scarcely any effect. Several 
 shafts were never used at all, as after such repeated 
 failures the garrison lost all hope of resisting the Rus- 
 sian miners. 
 
 The Turks at Silistria showed great courage in de- 
 fending the weak retrenchments, which the Russians 
 called lodgments, by means of which they endea- 
 voured to supply their total want of outworks. A very 
 
320 SIEGE OF SILISTRIA. Part II. 
 
 humble idea must be formed of the nature of these 
 entrenchments when we consider that the main wall 
 had a command of only 8 feet, that the ground rose 
 in front of it, and that the lodgments were constructed 
 after the opening of the second parallel under the fire 
 of the Russian dismounting batteries. Revetments 
 were evidently out of the question, and although the 
 works W, R, and P figure as imposing outworks on 
 our plan in Fig. 2, which is borrowed from a Russian 
 account of the siege, it is manifest that in reality they 
 could not have been anything more than trenches 
 some 4 or 5 feet deep, with the earth that had been 
 dug out thrown up behind them to form a breastwork. 
 The defence of the ditch was brilliant, and the erec^ 
 tion of a retrenchment all along the front of attack 
 plainly shows that a still longer resistance was in- 
 tended. The principal causes of surrender seem to 
 be disunion between the commandants and scarcity of 
 provisions. 
 
 With regard to the attack, it was undoubtedly 
 creditable to the Russians to have compelled a foe 
 double their own number, and behind walls, to sur- 
 render ; especially with means so insufficient at com- 
 mand ; it is true that they were greatly assisted by 
 the badness of the fortress and the mistakes committed 
 by the garrison. The siege of Silistria was very 
 remarkable, inasmuch as the artillery played a quite 
 subordinate part in it, and the chief instrument was 
 the earthwork and mining operations. It is true that 
 
Chap. II. SIEGE OF SILISTRIA. 321 
 
 a vast number of projectiles were thrown into the place 
 from the batteries which surrounded it on every side ; 
 but the line of attack was neither enfiladed nor subject 
 to ricochet fire, favourable as its position was for the 
 purpose. Not above 16 or 20 guns were employed to 
 dismount the guns, and not a single breach was effected. 
 One would almost suppose that a great part of the 
 Russian siege artillery never reached the right bank 
 of the Danube, and indeed there is no account of the 
 actual completion of the bridge. Every point was 
 taken by means of the pickaxe and shovel. When 
 the Eussian miners once reached the foot of the scarp, 
 they always contrived to finish and to charge a mine 
 within twenty-four hours. At this rate they would 
 have been able to blow up the whole front by degrees^ 
 provided they had sufficient powder; but entrench- 
 ment XX, made by the Turks, sufficiently proves that 
 the end could not have been attained by these means 
 only. Moreover, the 1 1 mines which exploded in the 
 course of eight days, consumed no less than 336 cwt. 
 of powdef. Neither would it have been easy to reach 
 the foot of the scarp by the method of attack pursued 
 by the Russians. The reluctance displayed by them 
 to venture a general assault upon so strong a garrison 
 after the experience they had already had, or to risk 
 on one day the success they could not fail to obtain 
 by time and patience, was natural and justifiable, 
 especially on this occasion, and at the beginning of a 
 campaign. On the other hand it is impossible not to 
 
322 SIEGE OP SILISTRIA. Part II. 
 
 feel that they might frequently have proceeded with 
 much greater rapidity. It was paying far too much 
 respect to the lodgments to approach them step by 
 step with double sap. If they and the ditch had been 
 taken by assault, it would have materially shortened 
 the siege. Owing to the course pursued, the works 
 which at first proceeded so quickly lasted twenty-four 
 days from the opening of the 3rd parallel, until the 
 crowning of the glacis. The nearer the besiegers 
 approached to the lodgments and the main wall, the 
 more difficult did the continuation of the sap become ; 
 and it should be borne in mind, that the last ten days 
 cost 35 officers and 870 men. killed and wounded. 
 Thus the advance of each day was purchased on an 
 average by 4 officers and 90 men, or no less than a 
 whole company, without counting those who fell sick 
 at the work. It is not likely that more would have 
 fallen in storming the lodgments and taking forcible 
 possession of the entonnoirs of the mines ; that is, if 
 We may judge from the result at the lodgments on the 
 6th front, the taking of which was a departure from 
 the system adopted by the Russians. 
 
 On the whole, however, it is imdeniable that a 
 saving of men was effected by the expenditure of time 
 and labour. The siege of Silistria cost — 
 
 In killed ... 1 general . . 1 staff officer . . 13 officers . . 819 men. 
 In wounded 16 „ . . 84 „ . . 1747 „ 
 
 115 officers . .-2566 men. 
 — not so many in all as had been killed on one day 
 
Chap. II. SIEGE OP SILISTEIA. 323 
 
 at the storming of Brailow, If to the above list we 
 add those who fell sick, or were otherwise hurt during 
 the siege, we shall find that the capture of Silistria 
 was purchased at the expense of 3000 combatants and 
 seven weeks of time. Silistria was to the campaign 
 of 1829 what Brailow had been to that of 1828— the 
 basis of all future operations. 
 
 It seems that the Russians had hoped to besiege 
 and take Rustchuk before the time should arrive for 
 operations in the open field. But Silistria had held 
 out much longer than could have been expected from 
 such a place when vigorously attacked. Moreover 
 the force disposable at the termination of the siege 
 was much too weak to undertake a second, and the 
 moment of the great struggle rapidly drew near. 
 
 A concluding glance at the three sieges which have 
 been described, will show us that Brailow, Silistria, 
 and Varna occupied 50,000 Russians during a period 
 of two to three months, and that this number was 
 scarcely suflScient for the most pressing exigencies of 
 the case. 
 
 If the Russians intended, and it can scarcely be 
 doubted they did, to cross the Balkan during the first 
 campaign, the three sieges should have been under- 
 taken at the same time. Even then, as the Russians 
 did not cross the Danube until the middle of June, the 
 decisive operation must have been undertaken late in 
 the autumn. At the beginning of the war the army 
 consisted of only 65,000 men ; and the tardy arrival 
 
 Y 2 
 
324 SIEGE OF SILISTRIA. Part II. 
 
 of the guards and the 2nd corps-d'armee did little more 
 than cover the enormous losses it had sustained : thus 
 only 15,000 men were left for offensive action. The 
 reciprocal action of time versus power was exempli- 
 fied afresh on this occasion, and the Russians were 
 compelled, by the weakness of their forces, to extend 
 over two campaigns what might have been effected 
 in one. 
 
CHA.P. III. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF THE TURKS. 325 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 OFFENSIVE 0PEEATI0N3 OF THE GRAND VIZIER — SKIRMISH OF 
 ESKI-ARNAUTLAR AND BATTLE OF KULEWTSCHA. 
 
 The first care of Reschid Mohammed Pasha, the new 
 G-rand Vizier, on reaching Shumla towards the end of 
 March, had been to strengthen and organize the 
 troops assembled in that place. The separate detach- 
 ments of Asiatics were incorporated with the regular 
 troops from Constantinople. The commissariat was 
 established, and new communications opened. By 
 his personal watchfulness and rigour, the Pasha estab- 
 lished a discipline hitherto unknown in a Turkish 
 army ; and the fame of his justice to the Rayahs 
 secured to Reschid Mohammed Pasha the affection 
 of the Rumelian Christians. A common plan of 
 operations for the coming campaign was arranged 
 between him and Hussein Pasha, who was collecting 
 a Turkish corps near Rutschuk, and they hoped in 
 time to get together a body of 60,000 men, for 
 whom provisions could be brought down the Upper 
 Danube. 
 
 After Reschid Mohammed had organised his corps, 
 he went a step further and led them into action : for 
 the first time during the course of this war a Turkish 
 
326 OFrENSlVE OPEEATIONS of the TURKS. Part II. 
 
 commander took the initiative. On the 10th of May, 
 just as the Russian General-in-chief had reached 
 Trajan's Wall, the Yizier broke up his quarters at 
 Shumla, and advanced in the direction of Pravadi. 
 His strength during this expedition is estimated by 
 the Russians at 40,000. It is not, however, at all 
 probable that so large a force could have been col- 
 lected at Shumla, and still less likely that the Turks 
 would have left that place totally undefended. The 
 Turkish corps destined for this active warfare, exclu- 
 sive of the numerous baggage-train, could scarcely 
 have exceeded 15,000 or 20,000 combatants. 
 
 The 7th corps-d'armee of the Russians had suffered 
 excessively during the last campaign : the regiment 
 Ufa had been almost destroyed at Marasch ; the regi- 
 ments Odessa and Azof at Kurt-tepe. These losses 
 had been in some measure filled up by recruits from 
 Russia, but ague and dysentery had made great havoc 
 among the troops during the winter. 6 battalions had 
 been sent to Sizeboli; 2 others were at Devno; 2 
 of the Kasan regiments were at Bazardjik ; so that 
 only 14 weak battalions of the 7th corps, or scarcely 
 more than 5000 or 6000 men, were disposable. From 
 the 6th corps-d'armee the 1st division of dragoons and 
 the 17th of infantry had been sent into Wallachia 
 to Greneral Greismar ; 4 battalions of the 16th division 
 were at Pravadi ; so that only 8 battalions of the 6th 
 corps remained available for service. The 10th divi- 
 sion formed the garrison of Varna, and had lost above 
 
Chap. III. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF THE TUEKS. 327 
 
 one-half of its men during the winter from illness. 
 The whole available force of the Russians in the field, 
 on the right bank of the Danube, consisted, therefore, 
 of only 22 battalions and some 30 squadrons, or from 
 12,000 to 14,000 men, 
 
 Could Eeschid and Hussein Pasha have finished 
 their preparations a few weeks sooner, they would 
 only have had to encounter this number of Russians 
 in the open field, against whom they could muster 
 60,000 men. With Shumla and Silistria as his base 
 of operations, the Grrand Vizier would have had the 
 most perfect security and freedom of action ; whereas 
 all General Roth's communications lay on his right 
 flank, and, spite of all the moral superiority of the 
 Russians, their position would have been very critical. 
 But even as it was, the conditions were not unfavour- 
 able for offensive operations. 
 
 The Turks advanced in 2 colimins from Shumla 
 upon Pravadi : one column, under Halil Pasha, went 
 the straight road over the plateau ; the second, under 
 the Vizier himself, took the line to the left by Jeni- 
 bazar and Newtscha (see the general map), threaten- 
 ing Greneral Roth's communications with the Danube. 
 
 On the 17th of May, the same day that General 
 Diebitsch appeared before Silistria, Reschid Moham- 
 med reached Eski-Arnautlar, The Russians had 
 erected five redoubts about this spot, advantageously 
 situated on a height, and had made it into a central 
 position, communicating on the left with the fortified 
 
328 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF THE TURKS. Pabt II. 
 
 village of Pravadi, distant only about 2h miles. There 
 the Eussians had about 6 battalions, 12 field-guns, 
 and a few Cossacks ; the Eussian force consisted of 
 about 3000 men, according to their own account, 
 which agrees with our estimate of the strength of 
 their battalions. 
 
 The Turkish column of the left wing, under the 
 command of the Grand Yizier, might number about 
 10,000 men, among whom were a few thousand 
 horse. It was accompanied by an adequate park of 
 artillery. After leaving a few troops as a reserve 
 at convenient points, the Vizier at once attacked the 
 Eussian entrenchments. Three Turkish divisions, 
 whose fronts were concealed behind some rising 
 ground, deployed in good order, protected by skir- 
 mishers. They made a bold attack on the Eussian 
 entrenchments, and some few Turks forced their way 
 into a Eussian redoubt. Gleneral Eoth, whose pre- 
 sence inspired his troops with life and vigour, drove 
 the Turks out again, and for four hours maintained 
 the unequal fight. At about nine o'clock in the 
 morning, General Wachten hastened from Devno, 
 with 4 battalions, 2 regiments of Cossacks, and 4 
 guns, threw himself upon the left flank of the Turks, 
 and thus forced them to desist from the attack upon 
 the position of Eski-Arnautlar. Some disorder in the 
 Turkish troops, shown by their falling back upon 
 the column of the right wing, and the belief that 
 General Kuprianof, who commanded at Pravadi, must 
 
Chap. III. SKIRMISH OF ESKI-ARNAUTLAR. 329 
 
 certainly have repulsed the attack made upon him by 
 the right wing of the Turks, induced Greneral Roth to 
 send 4 battalions and 6 guns in pursuit of the Turks* 
 Another battalion and a regiment of Chasseurs with 
 4 guns were sent as a support to this detachment. 
 Greneral Rynden pressed the Turks into the gorge of 
 Derekoi (Tillage of the Yalley) ; but where the gorge 
 opens into the wide valley of Pravadi, he came sud- 
 denly upon the Turkish reserves, which had been ori- 
 ginally intended to support the attack on Pravadi, and 
 which now received the Grrand Yizier in his retreat. 
 The Turkish infantry, supported by 10 guns, opened 
 such a heavy direct fire upon the advancing troops, 
 as to mow down the front ranks of the Russian squares 
 in a few minutes. The 6 Russian guns had only 
 fired two rounds before all the gunners were killed. 
 A swarm of 3000 or 4000 surrounded the Russians 
 so closely that they were unable to cut their way 
 through to the two battalions left at the upper en- 
 trance of the valley. It was equally impossible for 
 those two battalions, spite of the greatest exertions on 
 their part, to break their way through to their hardly 
 pressed brethren in arms. General Rynden was 
 killed ; the regiment Ochorzk lost 22 officers out of 
 31, and was nearly cut to pieces by the Turks. Even 
 the two reserve battalions were only saved by the 
 appearance of Captain Lischin, who with a small 
 force charged with the bayonet on the right flank of 
 the Turks, who had broken their ranks to plunder the 
 
330 SKIRMISH OF BSKI-ARNAUTLAR. Pakt II. 
 
 fallen Eussians. At length General Kuprianof, who 
 had made a sortie from Pravadi into the valley, 
 appeared, and forced the Turks to retire, after a con- 
 test that had lasted from 5 in the morning until 8 
 in the evening. The Turks again collected their forces 
 on the plateau of Eowno, whence they threatened a 
 new attack upon Pravadi, and kept up their commu- 
 nications with Shumla. 
 
 The column of the right wing of the Vizier had 
 stormed Pravadi in vain. The Eussians had fortified 
 the place on the north and south by embankments 
 right across the valley, abutting on the steep 
 acclivity on either side (see the Plan of Pra- 
 vadi). Above the town also they had flooded the 
 meadows. Towards the east the inaccessible rocks 
 formed a natural citadel. Eemains of towers, a door- 
 way hewn into the rock, caves and cisterns, showed 
 that the position had been previously used for pur- 
 poses of defence. To the west, on the contrary, the 
 Eussians had been forced to erect a sort of crowning 
 work on the level open edge of the valley which com- 
 manded the town. This consisted merely of an earth- 
 work with palisades, not protected by a ditch, as the 
 shallowness of the soil did not allow of deep cuttings. 
 Covered batteries had been made out of the beams 
 of the houses that were pulled down, and two mosques 
 afforded bomb-proof shelter for the anununition. But 
 everything depended upon keeping possession of 
 the work, as in the event of its falling into the 
 
Chap. III. SKIRMISH OP ESKI-AEKAUTLAE. 331 
 
 handa of the Turks the town would no longer be 
 tenable, though the citadel might still be held. But 
 this naturally weak position resisted all the attacks of 
 the Turks. It was an error in the arrangements of the 
 Grand Yizier to combine an attack upon the entrenched 
 position of Pravadi with the assault upon the Eussians 
 at Eski-Arnautlar. It would have been more to the 
 purpose had he stationed a sufficient force in the 
 valley to the north of Pravadi, to prevent any attack 
 from that quarter, and had he kept his reserve in the 
 rear of his left instead of his right wing. Had he 
 succeeded in breaking through Greneral Eoth's posi- 
 tion at Eski-Arnautlar, and in beating successively 
 the Russian forces which had not yet formed a junc- 
 tion in. the rear, the result would have been far more 
 important than if he had taken Pravadi : most pro- 
 bably the Russians must in that case have evacuated 
 Pravadi of their own accord. 
 
 The issue of this battle was of no advantage to the 
 Turks, In that night and during the following morning 
 2 battalions and 4 guns from Devno entered the Rus- 
 sian camp; 6 battalions and 12 guns then came by 
 forced marches from Bazardjik, and the Yizier soon 
 fell back upon Shumla, Nevertheless he had reason, 
 on the whole, to be well satisfied with his expedition. 
 The Russians estimated their loss at 1000 killed and 
 wounded, about one-seventh of the whole number of 
 troops engaged on their side. Supposing the loss to 
 have been equal on both sides, it was worse for the 
 
332 SKIRMISH OF ESKI-AKNAUTLAE. Part II. 
 
 Russians, already so weak in numbers, than for the 
 Turks* At any rate the Turks were two or three times 
 as numerous as their opponents, had fought with them 
 for fifteen hours in the open plain, had even attacked 
 them behind their entrenchments, and had captured 
 some gims. The battle had been fought with unpa- 
 ralleled fierceness, and the skirmish of Eski-Arnautlar 
 gave evidence of a revival of the old Turkish 
 impetuosity and military ardour, which left room for 
 the hope that — given a superiority in point of num- 
 bers, which was not unlikely to occur — the Turks 
 would be able to cope with their Russian adversaries. 
 Rescind and Halil, the two commanders, were wounded; 
 they had given to their troops an example of personal 
 bravery ; and even the Russians confessed that the 
 Turks, in their attack, had manifested a determination 
 and combined action hitherto unknown in Turkish 
 warfare. 
 
 The Yizier prepared for a fresh attack on a greater 
 scale, but Greneral Roth retired upon Kosludja, where 
 he now concentrated his troops. The advanced guard 
 alone kept possession of Devno and Arnautlar : Pra- 
 vadi was garrisoned by 6 battalions. 
 
 Towards the end of May Reschid Mohammed left 
 Shumla at the same time that Hussein Pasha advanced 
 from Rutschuk, but they did not act sufficiently in 
 concert. Hussein Pasha directed his march from 
 Rutschuk upon Rasgrad, where he attempted to raise 
 the Bulgarian peasantry, who showed but little incli- 
 
Chap. III. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF THE TURKS. 333 
 
 nation to take up arms. We have already observed 
 that General Kxeutz, with the 8th division and a few 
 regiments of cavalry, chiefly Cossacks, had taken up a 
 post of observation at Kaorgu, where he had en- 
 trenched himself, and had directed his chief attention 
 to covering the rear of the besieging corps, and to 
 keeping open its communications with the 6th and 
 7th corps. The communications between Pravadi by 
 Kosludja, Bazardjik, and Kaorgu with Silistria, a dis- 
 tance of nearly 100 miles, were kept up by means of 
 relays, and took 16 hours. An officer of Cossacks, 
 who had ridden on the same horse that distance in 
 12 hours, had been promoted on the spot to be Major. 
 
 On receiving intelligence of the advance of Hus- 
 sein, General Kreutz intrusted the command of the 
 post of Kaorgu to General Madatof, and marched 
 immediately with 8 battalions, 12 squadrons, and 12 
 guns to Easgrad, where, on the 29th May, he dis- 
 persed the Turks who had begun to concentrate their 
 forces. The Turks attempted to maintain themselves 
 at Turtukai, but two Russian squadrons defeated the 
 Turkish rear-guard which opposed them, and Hussein, 
 who was not supported by the Vizier, fell back upon 
 Rutschuk. General Kreutz, on the other hand, took 
 up a position at Aftolar, about 10 miles to the south- 
 east of Silistria. 
 
 The Grand Vizier meanwhile advanced upon Kos- 
 ludja on the 28th May with 40,000 men : 20 regiments 
 of regular infantry and 6 regiments of regular cavalry 
 
334 ATTACK ON PRAVADI. Paet II. 
 
 formed the kernel of his army. It ie possible that 
 Hussein Pasha's movement was only as a feint, to 
 keep Greneral Diebitsch at Silistria, so that the 
 Vizier might have to deal only with Greneral Eoth. 
 But General Roth, after reinforcing himself with a 
 part of General Madatof's troops from Kaorgu, had 
 brought together at Kosludja 24 battalions and 36 
 squadrons, which the Yizier, spite of his superior 
 numbers, did not dare to attack in their advantageous 
 position. He contented himself with a cannonade, 
 and then withdrew to the plateau of Kuriwna, whence 
 he made a regular attack upon Pravadi, which, how- 
 ever, proceeded badly. 
 
 After the Yizier had vigorously cannionaded the 
 Russian crownwork with all his guns, he sent a Dehli, 
 or fanatic, to examine the effect of his fire. This man 
 galloped to within 50 paces of the wall, and although 
 hundreds of shots were fired at him, he returned un- 
 hurt, and reported that " everything was as it was" 
 ("Bit schei yok"). The Pasha, who had expected 
 to hear that not one stone of the fortifications had 
 been left upon the other, would not believe that the 
 garrison was still within them, and accused th& 
 Dehli of not having ridden near enough : the Dehli 
 answered by showing his cloak pierced with bullets. 
 
 On receiving intelligence of the appearance of the 
 Turkish main army in the open field, Greneral Diebitsch 
 determined to leave the further conduct of the siege 
 of Silistria to G-eneral Krassowski with the greater 
 
Chap. III. RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS. 335 
 
 part of the 3rd corps, and himself to advance with 
 the 2nd corps, and 4 battalions and 16 squadrons of 
 the 3rd corps, to Pravadi ; to strengthen the garri-' 
 son there on his march by the addition of General 
 Kreutz ; and then to fall upon the Grrand Yizier, in con- 
 junction with the 6th and 7th corps, commanded by 
 GTenerals Eoth and Rudiger. Should he succeed in 
 forcing the Turks into action in the open field before 
 they could reach Shumla, there could be scarcely any 
 doubt as to the issue of the battle, spite of the nume- 
 rical superiority of the Turks, and it was this rapid 
 determination on the part of Greneral Diebitsch that 
 decided the fate of the whole campaign. 
 
 As we have before remarked, the gros of the 
 2nd corps, commanded by General Pahlen, viz. the 
 5th and 6th divisions of infantry and the 2nd of 
 hussars, altogether about 15,000 men, left their po- 
 sition before Silistria early on the morning of the 
 5th June. The first day they marched as far as 
 Kutschuk Kainardji ; and although the distance was 
 only 10 miles, the infantry did not reach their 
 bivouac till nine o'clock in the evening. The bag- 
 gage-train of the corps-d'armee was enormous, as 
 several days' provision for man and horse had to 
 be taken with them. Every village was deserted, 
 the country desolate and wasted ; not a living soul 
 Was to be seen, scarcely a trace to show that the land 
 had ever been cultivated or inhabited. 
 
 On the 6th June the march was continued, but Very 
 
336 EUSSIAN MOVEMENTS. Part II. 
 
 slowly, owing to the oppressive heat. They hoped 
 to reach Kaorgu, but were forced to halt after 
 marching 19 miles. The head-quarters were fixed 
 in the midst of cherry and walnut trees at Bairam- 
 punar ; the corps encamped near Kissedjik. A re- 
 freshing shower towards evening gave the troops 
 some relief. On the third day they reached Kaorgu : 
 the distance was about 12 miles. The infantry 
 started at five o'clock in the morning, but did not 
 arrive till late in the afternoon. The country, which 
 hitherto had been covered with brushwood and 
 occasional clumps of trees, now became open and 
 clear. At Kaorgu the junction with Greneral Kreutz 
 took place. This Greneral had advanced from Afto- 
 lar with 4 battalions and 8 squadrons, and covered the 
 right flank of the corps during the march. The 8 
 squadrons were sent forward on the same day under 
 the command of Greneral Kreutz as far as Kisild-^ 
 schilar as an advanced guard. Greneral Madatof 
 had already left the entrenched position of Kaorgu 
 with 2 regiments of infantry and the 3rd regiment of 
 hussars in order to effect a junction with General Roth. 
 The entrenched position of Kaorgu was an isolated 
 height with fovocflSches protected in their gorges with 
 palisades; it was held by only one regiment of infantry 
 and one of Cossacks. Greneral Roth reported that 
 his advanced guard, composed of 2 squadrons of 
 hussars and 2 regiments of Cossacks, had repulsed 
 6000 Turkish horse, and that his infantry had; taken 
 
Chap. III. RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS. 33Y 
 
 a redoubt, so that the communication with Pravadi 
 had heen restored and the garrison of that place 
 strengthened with 2 battalions. The troops, he 
 added, were in good spirits, and were singing while 
 the firing went on: only 20 prisoners had been 
 brought in, from whom the Eussians learned that the 
 Grand Yizier, before leaving Shumla, had received 
 68,000 rations daily. 
 
 Early on the 8th June, first the cavalry, then the 
 head-quarters, and lastly the infantry, began their 
 march. They only went 12 miles that day, ad- 
 vancing on the following day through Alesfak. Half 
 way, G-eneral Wachten, the chief of the staff of the 
 6th corps-d'arm^e, and at Alesfak General Delings- 
 hausen, the chief of the staff of the 7th corps-d'armee, 
 joined General Diebitsch. Their reports agreed in 
 stating that the Vizier's position on the plateau of 
 Rovno and Kuriwna was very strong and difficult 
 to attack in the front ; that the approaches to this 
 position were narrow and fortified ; and that in 
 front of it was stationed the Turkish cavalry in the 
 valley of the river Pravadi, which flowed down from 
 Newtscha. General Wachten was of opinion that 
 the Yizier knew nothing of the march of the Eus- 
 sians, but General Delingshausen, on the contrary, 
 thought that he was informed of it, but that he 
 hoped to take Pravadi before the Eussians should 
 arrive. At head-quarters opinions as to the mea- 
 sures to be adopted were divided. General Buturlin 
 
338 RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS. Part I]. 
 
 wanted to advance upon Shumla by forced marches, 
 and to take that place by surprise, as, besides the in- 
 habitants, there were not above 6000 Turks left in 
 it ; others wished to relieve Pravadi. But Greneral 
 Diebitsch decided upon placing himself between Pra- 
 vadi and Shumla, so as to intercept the return of the 
 Grand Yizier upon Shumla, and force him to fight. 
 Before this, however, the junction of the troops under 
 Generals Roth and Eudiger was to be effected. The 
 cavalry was pushed forward the same day towards 
 Jasytepe, while the infantry lay on the other side of 
 Kasildschilar, with the valley of Newtscha in their 
 front. The advanced guard to the left at Molatsch 
 restored the communication with General Roth, who 
 had advanced from Kosludja to Eski-Arnautlar. In 
 the evening divine service was celebrated. With 
 the utmost exertion the Russians had taken five 
 days to march the 60 miles from Silistria. The 
 heat, the want of roads, the fatigue of the troops, 
 but especially the necessity of an enormous baggage- 
 train, were the causes of their slow advance. 
 
 The river Pravadi forms the boundary between 
 the flat swelling land of Bulgaria and the range of 
 limestone hills forming the northern abutments of 
 the Balkan. To the north of the Pravadi the undu- 
 lating ground falls in gradual slopes easy of ascent, 
 but to the south are precipitous rocks which sur- 
 round the flat, high plateau, as with a wall. The 
 heights are covered with brushwood, the valleys 
 
Chap. III. EUSSIAN MOVEMENTS. 339 
 
 eminently fruitful ; but at that time they were quite 
 uncultivated, as every hamlet was burnt and lay 
 in ruins. The spot where a village had once stood 
 was frequently marked by tall thistles which grew 
 amid the ruins of the houses. The water of the 
 brooks is muddy, and deposits a slimy clay in their 
 beds : it is only in particular places that even the 
 smallest brook is fordable. 
 
 As in order to advance upon Jenibazar it was 
 necessary to surmount a height visible from the 
 Turkish encampment on the plateau of Rowno, the 
 Russians began their march at six in the evening. 
 A thick fog hid the movements of the Russian 
 troops, who reached Tauschan-Kosludja unobserved : 
 they did not venture to light any fires during the 
 night. General Roth had received orders to follow 
 in the same direction after the others had gone. 
 An advanced guard had been previously sent on 
 to Jenibazar, whither 1000 Turkish cavalry had 
 been pushed forward from Shumla. A Turkish 
 aga, who was making a reconnaissance with 100 
 horse, was taken prisoner : he reported that at 
 Shumla nothing was suspected of Greneral Diebitsch's 
 advance. 
 
 By daybreak the heads of General Roth's columns 
 made their appearance. General Roth had left his 
 watch-fires at Eski-Arnautlar burning, and executed 
 his perilous flank movement parallel with the front 
 of the Turkish encampment unperceived and with 
 
 z 2 
 
340 EUSSIAN MOVEMENTS. Part II. 
 
 success. One regiment of the 3rd hnssars and one 
 of the 4tli lancers were left behind in Pravadi, hidden 
 in the valley, to follow the Yizier when he should 
 break up his quarters. Greneral Roth remained at 
 Tauschan-Kosludja in his camp to close the valley; 
 Greneral Pahlen, on the other hand, advanced to 
 Jenibazar, where a narrow bridge over the brook, 
 just below the town, very much delayed the defiling 
 of the troops. Two regiments of Cossacks of the 
 advanced guard defeated the Turkish vanguard be- 
 yond the town, pursued them without drawing bit 
 close to Shumla, and made some hundred prisoners. 
 
 From Jenibazar Greneral Pahlen turned to the left 
 towards Matara, and at midday on the 10th June 
 took up a position with his front towards Pravadi. 
 Greneral Kreutz, with 2 regiments of lancers and 
 2 Cossack regiments, was sent forward towards 
 Bulanik to keep a watch upon Shumla. Yely Bey, 
 a son of the Vizier, with some thousand horsemen, 
 had been despatched from Shumla to collect the van- 
 guard that had been dispersed at Jenibazar. He 
 vainly attempted to hold the retrenchment at the 
 brook of Bulanik. General Kreutz (A A) pushed 
 his way through the defile (Plan No. 7), and drove 
 the Turks out of their position (a a) . The Turks 
 then took up their position in b b, while another 
 body of horse (c, c), concealed in the valley, ad- 
 vanced on their right, in order to fall upon the left 
 flank of the Russians should they continue their 
 
Chap. III. RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS. 341 
 
 attack. General Kreutz took up his poBition oppo- 
 site to tliem at B B, with the lancers in column, 
 while the Cossacks deployed on either side : two 
 guns, covered by a squadron, were placed on a 
 hill on the left wing. Later in the day Greneral 
 KJreutz was reinforced by the 1st brigade of the 2nd 
 division of hussars, who advanced from Matara 
 against the right wing of the Turks drawn up in 
 the valley (C). Veli Bey then fell back upon 
 Shumla ; the Turkish cavalry, however, concealed in 
 the valley, remained to watch the movements of the 
 Russians. 
 
 On the morning of the 10th June it was rumoured 
 that the Turks were preparing to debouch out of 
 the mountains by the way of Kulewtscha. It was 
 known through a deserter that the Yizier had ob- 
 tained information from Shumla of the skirmish at 
 Jenibazar, and of the advance of the Russians upon 
 Shumla ; that he had raised the siege of Pravadi at 
 about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and had marched 
 in the direction of Markoftscha. The Russians 
 could already see some bodies of Turks on the edge 
 of the wooded heights, and expected an attack towards 
 evening. This caused great alarm in the Russian 
 camp, as the troops were undoubtedly much scat- 
 tered and the head-quarters greatly exposed. 
 
 The force with which General Diebitsch had un- 
 dertaken to cut off the Vizier's retreat upon Shumla 
 consisted of the following troops : — 
 
342 
 
 RUSSIAN POECB. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 Of the 2nd corps :^- 
 
 2iid hussar div. . 
 5th inf. div. . . 
 6th „ . . 
 
 Squad. 
 . 16 
 
 Of the 3rd corps : — 
 3rd hussar div. . 
 
 . 12 
 
 7th inf. div. . . 
 
 . - 
 
 Of the 6th corps :— 
 4th lancer div. 
 16th inf. div. 
 
 . 12 
 
 12 
 
 Guns. 
 24 
 16 
 24 
 
 }The brigade of chasseurs re- 
 mained before Silistria. 
 
 16 "Wittgenstein's regiment was 
 at Praradi. 
 8 The regiments Murom and 
 Nescbnigorod. 
 
 8 1 regiment at Pravadi. 
 
 20 Since the sMrmish of Arnaut- 
 lar the Ochotzk and the 
 31st regiment of chasseurs 
 had been formed into 1 bat- 
 talion. 4 battalions "were 
 at Pravadi. The 17th divi- 
 sion was in "Wallachia. 
 
 Of the 7th corps :— 
 
 
 
 
 
 Lancers of the Bug . 
 
 20 
 
 - 
 
 12 
 
 
 18th inf. div. . . . 
 
 - 
 
 10 
 
 10 
 
 2 batt. Kasan in Bazardjik. 
 
 19th „ . . . 
 
 - 
 
 4 
 
 8 
 
 2 batt. at Devno. 4 at Sizeboli. 
 
 60 
 
 44 
 
 146 Ofwliicli40werel2-poimders. 
 
 — altogether, with Cossacks, but excluding the gar- 
 rison of Pravadi, about 7000 horse, 21,200 infantry, 
 or in all 28,000 fighting men with 146 guns, a divi- 
 sion of the army fully able to cope with the 40,000 
 Turks. 
 
 But on the 10th June, the Eussian force of 31,000 
 or 32,000, including the garrison of Pravadi, was 
 distributed in the following manner : — 
 
 Squad. Batt. Men. 
 
 Under General Kreutz at Bulanik, of Cossacks 16 42 2,500 
 
 „ „ Pahlen at Matara 20 24 1,400 
 
 „ „ Both and Eudiger at Tauschan- 
 
 Kosludja 24 20 12,000 
 
 „ ,, Kuprianof at Pravadi ... 8 4 2,800 
 
 According to this, the Eussian force on the 10th 
 
Chap. III. STEBNGTH OP THE TUEKS. 343 
 
 June was divided and lay at Pravadi, Tauschan- 
 Kosludja, Jenibazar, Matara, and Bulanik, over a 
 curve 25 miles in length. The Grrand Vizier, on the 
 contrary, was encamped on the plateau between 
 Markoftscha and Tjirkowna, in the centre of this 
 curve, at an equal distance from the two extreme 
 points, Pravadi and Shumla, and his army was 
 three or four times as strong as each of the two 
 main divisions of the Russian force, taken singly, 
 viz. the nearest corps of Grenerals Pahlen and Roth. 
 In order to effect a junction with the other, one of 
 these two corps must march ten long miles by the 
 defile of Jenibazar, and the first attack of the Turks, 
 which is never to be despised, would have been de- 
 cided one way or the other long before the junction 
 could have taken place, had the Yizier attacked 
 them on that day. 
 
 It remains doubtful whether the Vizier was ac- 
 tually aware while at Pravadi that the main army 
 of the Russians was united under the commander-in- 
 chief ; but the appearance of a Russian force before 
 Shumla induced him at once to return thither. The 
 brigade of cavalry posted at Pravadi attempted to 
 pursue him, but the Turkish horse turned upon the 
 two Russian regiments with superior numbers, killed 
 many men, and took four guns. The Vizier now 
 had the choice between three ways — to the north 
 by Newtscha and Jenibazar, in the middle by Mark- 
 oftscha and Tjirkowna, or to the south by Kamarna 
 
344 STRBN&TH OF THE TURKS. Pabt II. 
 
 and Marasch. By the first he could only reach 
 Shumla after beating Greneral Roth ; the last was 
 the safest, but the roads through the numerous val- 
 leys of the Kamtchik were so bad that he could not 
 have taken his artillery with him. He therefore 
 naturally selected the middle nearest road on the flat 
 plateau, by which he could go with perfect safety to 
 within 10 miles of Shumla. From thence he could 
 see the Russian camp at Tauschan-Kosludja and at 
 Matara spread out as on a map, and must have con- 
 vinced himself that he had to deal with a considerable 
 force. An attack upon the first encampment could 
 only be effected by giving up all his communica- 
 tions, and even then it would not lead him directly to 
 Shumla. It would therefore have been quite natural 
 that he should attack Greneral Pahlen. Whether, 
 with his threefold superiority in point of numbers, 
 he could have beaten that corps, we cannot say ; but 
 it is probable that he would have forced his way to 
 Shumla, though he might have lost part of his guns 
 and baggage. Besides, according to trustworthy 
 accounts, since the Vizier's departure 5000 Alba- 
 nians had joined the 6000 Turkish troops and the 
 population capable of bearing arms in Shumla, so 
 that simultaneously with the Vizier's attack a body 
 of at least 10,000 men might have operated in the 
 rear of Greneral Pahlen, against whom General 
 Kreutz could only have opposed 2500 men. 
 
 It had already been proposed during the march of 
 
Chai'. III. NEGLECT OF THE VIZIER. 345 
 
 the previous day in the Eussian head-quarters, to 
 effect a junction with G-eneral Roth, and advance 
 from Newtscha upon the plateau and attack the 
 Vizier at Pravadi itself. But the height could only 
 be reached by one difficult defile ; and as this arduous 
 enterprise would have to be carried out in the im- 
 mediate neighbourhood of the enemy, the com- 
 mander-in-chief very properly rejected it. On the 
 other hand, it would have been quite possible to 
 have united the Russian forces on the 10th June at 
 Matara. It is true that the 6th and 7th corps had 
 performed a night march of 15 miles, but, thanks 
 to the supineness of the Turkish cavalry in the 
 ITewtscha valley, this had been effected without im- 
 pediment ; the Russians, moreover, had rested on 
 the previous day, and after some repose at Taus- 
 chan-Kosludja they might have crossed the brook 
 of Jenibazar at noon. Gleneral Diebitsch would then 
 have been ready with his whole force at Matara to 
 oppose every advance of the Turks, whichever road 
 they might take. This, however, had not been done, 
 and it cannot be denied that Greneral Diebitsch's 
 position on the 10th June was very critical, had the 
 Turks concentrated their forces against the separate 
 Russian divisions, and had the garrison of Shumla 
 co-operated with the corps at Pravadi. 
 
 But the Yizier would not have been a Turk, or 
 fitted to command Turks, had he not put off to the 
 following day everything that could, or even could 
 
346 EUSSIAN POSITION. Paet II. 
 
 not be postponed. Fortune smiled upon him during 
 but a few hours — in war most precious. They passed 
 unheeded, and Greneral Diebitsch, who knew how 
 to take advantage of his position, summoned the 
 corps of G-enerals Eoth and Eudiger to join him 
 during the night. On the forenoon of the 11th 
 June 28,000 Eussians barred the Yizier's passage to 
 Shumla. 
 
 As soon as the heads of the columns of the 6th 
 and 7th corps were visible on the 11th June, the 
 2nd corps was pushed forward on to the right bank 
 of the brook Bulanik (Plan 7). Greneral Eoth did 
 not reach Matara until eleven o'clock in the fore- 
 noon. The following was the position of the Eus- 
 sians : — The head-quarters at the burial-ground to 
 the right of Matara were covered by 5 battalions 
 and 1 brigade of lancers ; the artillery belonging to 
 them was drawn up in front. 
 
 The 6th corps of Greneral Eoth and the 7th of 
 Greneral Eudiger formed the left wing. This first 
 line of battle consisted of 12 battalions and 34 guns, 
 which were posted in the intervals : the second line 
 consisted of 8 battalions with 24 guns. On the left 
 wing, even with the first line of battle, were 3 regi- 
 ments of the 3rd hussars, 2 of the lancers of the 
 Bug, 1 of the 4th division of lancers drawn up in 3 
 brigades, with 2 flying horse artillery batteries : some 
 Cossacks covered the left flank. 
 
 Fourteen battalions of the 2nd corps under Gre- 
 
Ch4p. III. BATTLE OP KULEWTSCHA. 347 
 
 neral Pahlen, with their artillery drawn up in two 
 lines, formed the right wing on the further side of 
 the brook Bulanik. The rest of the infantry of the 
 corps had been sent forward under Greneral Ostro- 
 schenko as an advanced guard. It consisted of the 
 brigade of chasseurs of the 6th division, 4 battalions 
 of the 11th and 12th regiments of chasseurs, 1 bat- 
 talion Murom, 3 squadrons of the hussar regiments 
 Irkutzk, the 2nd division of hussars, a detachment 
 of Cossacks, and 4 flying horse artillery guns. This 
 advanced guard (D D) was placed in and behind 
 the villages Kulewtscha and Tjirkowna. 
 
 To the right of the last-named spot advanced 
 posts of Cossacks (B E) stretched out towards the 
 south as far as the village of Tjermedin, where the 
 regiment Elizabethgrod was drawn up with the 2nd 
 division of hussars : the two remaining regiments of 
 this division were summoned to his assistance during 
 the fight by General Kreutz (0). The Cossack posts 
 extended along the brook Strandscha from Tjermedin 
 as far as Greneral Kreutz' s position. 
 
 Early in the morning G-eneral Buturlin had made 
 a reconnaissance along the road to Marasch and had 
 seen nothing of the Turks. It seemed therefore very 
 likely that the troops which had been seen on the 
 previous day on the ridge of the high plateau over 
 Kulewtscha, on both sides of the road leading from 
 that village to Tjirkowna, were the advanced guard 
 of the Turkish main corps, and that it was advancing 
 
348 BATTLE OP KULEWTSCHA. Part II. 
 
 along the shortest road from Pravadi to Shumla. 
 Two Turkish battalions of regular infantry had 
 formed hollow squares and placed 2 guns in the 
 intervals. On the road itself was a strong battery ; 
 a mass of irregular infantry stood half hidden on the 
 wooded ridge of the declivity ; they were reckoned 
 at from 6000 to 8000 men. As the Turks remained 
 in this position till midday, General Diebitsch, in 
 order to ascertain what the enemy's force really 
 was, ordered Gleneral Ostroschenko to reconnoitre 
 with his advanced guard. 
 
 This detachment crossed the bottom to the south 
 of Tjirkowna, placed its right wing a little in front, 
 and advanced with the artillery in the intervals 
 against the height (Gr Gr). A concealed Turkish 
 battery immediately opened a heavy canister fire, 
 while masses of infantry and cavalry rushed upon 
 the Russian columns, which had not time to form 
 into squares. The Spahis charged at full gallop 
 down the steep, broken, stony ground, where Eu- 
 ropean cavalry could scarcely have gone at a foot's 
 pace. The attack on the front was light, but both 
 Russian flanks were enclosed by the Turks from the 
 surrounding heights. The regular Turkish infantry, 
 extending its line, fell upon the battalions of the 
 11th and 12th regiments of chasseurs, engaged 
 them at close quarters, and drove them back upon 
 Kulewtscha. On the right wing the battalion 
 Murom, separated from the rest of the Russians by 
 
Chap. III. BATTLE OF KULBWTSOHA. 349 
 
 a ravine, was eore pressed. The hussar regiment 
 Irkutzk, taken in the right flank by the Turkish 
 horse, attempted to form into column in order to 
 turn, but, not having time, charged full upon the 
 Turks, and beat them ofP, but were immediately sur- 
 rounded and driven back (Gr). The whole Turkish 
 force then surrounded the battalion Murom, fired at 
 50 paces into the mass, and destroyed the whole bat- 
 talion in a few minutes. After a momentary delay 
 the Turkish mass rushed upon the hussars (d d). 
 Meanwhile the brigade of chasseurs had been forced 
 to fall back ; the Turks pursued them and took the 
 villages of Kulewtscha and Tjirkowna. Here the 
 Russians not only lost a quantity of men, but two 
 guns fell into the hands of the Turks. The hussars 
 then rallied, attacked the enemy, far superior to them 
 in numbers, and recovered their guns. 
 
 In order to support the advanced guard, Greneral 
 Pahlen had gone to the right with his corps in three 
 lines of echelons. The first echelon (H) consisted of 
 2 battalions of the 1st brigade of the 6th division ; the 
 second (J) of the rest of that division, 4 battalions ; 
 the third (L) of 2 brigades of the 5th division, 8 
 battalions. 
 
 The first Echelon had advanced as far as the ra- 
 vine, to receive the remnant of the battalion Murom ; 
 but the Turks, who fought with great courage, 
 pressed over the ravine, and Greneral Pahlen's first 
 Echelon (H) fell back into a line with the second 
 
350 BATTLE OF KULEWTSCHA. Paet II. 
 
 (J). This was the moment when the Vizier should 
 have brought the rest of his troops down from the 
 height, so as to surround the left wing of the 2nd 
 corps-d'armee, a manoeuvre which the covered ground 
 towards Tjermedin would have greatly favoured. 
 The villages in the hands of the Turks covered 
 their right flank ; the corps of Grenerals Eoth and 
 Rudiger were more than two miles apart, and the 
 Yizier had only to deal with 14 battalions and 12 
 squadrons, at most 8000 Russians. The fight lasted 
 about an hour, and during that time the Russians lost 
 at least 1500 men. The Vizier had brought 15,000 
 men into action ; he must have had at least as many 
 more in reserve : nevertheless this first successful 
 attack was not followed up. On debouching beyond 
 the villages the Turkish right wing was exposed to 
 a concentric fire of grape-shot. The repulsed ad- 
 vanced guard had formed again at M, and was re- 
 inforced by a battery of 12 guns belonging to the 
 division of the lancers of the Bug from Matara. 
 This battery fired at N and afterwards at 0, within 
 a short distance of the Turks, advancing from Ku- 
 lewtscha, and poured a destructive fire of grape-shot 
 upon the thick masses in the valley. On the right 
 wing Greneral Pahlen alone had placed 35 guns in 
 battery. The Turks could not return this fire, as 
 they were unable to bring their clumsy guns into 
 action. Thus the fight at last came to a stand, but 
 was still continued with great vigour. 
 
Chap. III. BATTLE OF KULEWTSCHA. 351 
 
 Meanwhile the 1st brigade of the 2nd division of 
 hussars, which had been sent to strengthen Greneral 
 Kreutz at Bulanik (C), had been again withdrawn and 
 placed on Greneral Pahlen's right wing (at J). Ge- 
 neral Budberg attacked the Turks from thence with 
 two regiments and drove them back, but did not 
 pursue his advantage. The Turks retreated unpur- 
 sued, and attempted no further attack ; they took 
 their wounded and dead with them, and cut off the 
 ears of their Russian prisoners. By four o'clock in 
 the afternoon the Turks had resumed their original 
 position on the wooded heights, and, when the corps 
 of Grenerals Eoth and Rudiger had arrived, General 
 Diebitsch determined to attack the Turks in their 
 position (see the Plan 7). 
 
 The chasseur regiments of the 6th division under 
 General Ostroschenko formed on the eastern outlets 
 of Tjirkowna and to the south of the village (P) ; the 
 8 battalions of the 5th division, which stood at L, 
 crossed the brook in a line with the advanced guard 
 before Q ; the 1st brigade of the 2nd division of 
 hussars, with the horse artillery battery of 12- 
 pounders, made a junction with them (at Q 1), and 
 2 battalions of the 16th division of General Roth's 
 corps formed the extreme right wing of the line of 
 attack (Q 2) : 6 battalions of the 6th division, which 
 had before formed the Echelons H and J, and the rest 
 of the 6th and 7th corps-d'armee, 18 battalions, toge- 
 ther with a hussar regiment, remained in reserve (R). 
 
352 BATTLE OF KULBWTSCHA. Part II. 
 
 The 2nd brigade of the 2nd division of hussars 
 was sent back to General Kreutz, the division of 
 lancers of the Bug to Marasch. 
 
 After these movements had been effected, 4 bat- 
 talions of the 5th division, with General Arnoldi's 
 horse artillery battery of 12-pounders at their head, 
 and followed by the brigade of hussars and 2 bat- 
 talions of the 16th division with another battery of 
 12-pounders, marched forward (to S). 
 
 The gorge between the steep hills became narrower 
 and narrower, and the Russian front with it. The 
 artillery opened its fire against the Turkish position 
 on the wooded height, but with little effect. More- 
 over, the batteries,by advancing a little further, would 
 be exposed to the fire of the Turkish skirmishers, 
 supposing the latter to defend the mountain-pass. The 
 cavalry could take no part in the attack, but for this 
 the Turks did not wait. Some of their ammunition 
 waggons exploded, either through their own negli- 
 gence, or fired by the Russian shells; and this 
 was the signal for a general retreat, which indeed 
 had already partially commenced. The Russians 
 succeeded in gaining the height : the Turkish bat- 
 tery at X was taken, and the Turks were pursued 
 by the 5th division, the hussars of the 2nd division, 
 and the Cossacks, as far as Markoftscha, where these 
 troops met General Kuprianof advancing towards 
 them from Pravadi, 
 
 The Turks, who had shown such courage but a 
 
Chap. III. BATTLR OF KULEWTSCHA. 353 
 
 few hours before in their attack, now offered scarce 
 any opposition in the defence of their strong posi- 
 tion. Their retreat soon turned into a disorderly 
 flight. The Russians no longer found any resist- 
 ance ; the Turks broke their ranks, and disappeared 
 singly in the wood ; so that on that day scarce any 
 prisoners were taken. The roads were full of artil- 
 lery and other waggons, and, after all the material 
 had fallen into the hands of the Russians, General 
 Pahlen returned from the pursuit, because the foe 
 was no longer to be found ; but during the following 
 day a number of prisoners were brought in. Among 
 other trophies, besides a very large number of am- 
 munition waggons, 56 guns were taken, all in bad 
 condition and of different calibres ; but still more 
 various were the shot : among the canister-shot 
 were balls of every size, mixed with bullets. The 
 axles of the guns were of iron and very massive, 
 the wheels clumsy. The guns, which were drawn 
 partly by horses, partly by mules, had drag-ropes by 
 means of which they could be moved by men during 
 the action. A quantity of Turkish tents, of woollen 
 material painted green, were immediately turned to 
 use during the rain which had begun to fall. Huts, 
 covered with larkspur and wild poppies, were built 
 for the wounded. 
 
 If we examine the course of the battle of Ku- 
 lewtscha, we find that Greneral Diebitsch naturally 
 took up his position so as to oppose the Vizier, upon 
 
 2 A 
 
354 BATTLE OF KULEWTSCHA. Part II. 
 
 whicliever of the three roads to Shumla he should 
 happen to advance, and to cut him off from that im- 
 portant post. The position selected by the Eussians 
 was therefore on the middle road of the three, which, 
 moreover, was the shortest and most probahle line 
 of retreat for the Turks, and from which, by a 
 march of four miles, the Russians could oppose the 
 Yizier on either of the two other roads. We have 
 already observed that it was not possible to ascend 
 the plateau from Newtscha ; it was equally difficult 
 from Matara, where the ridge of the heights was 
 already occupied by the Turks. Nor would the 
 Russians in that case have been able to command the 
 roads by Jenibazar or Kamarna, which the Turks 
 might take. Nothing therefore remained but to 
 take up a position between Tjirkowna and Shumla. 
 The distance between these two places was at most 
 ten miles. "While, on the one hand, it was not plea- 
 sant to take up a position close under the height, 
 whence every movement could be seen, on the other 
 hand, the nearer the Russians got to Shumla, the 
 greater was the danger of being exposed to two 
 attacks at the same time, one from the Vizier, and 
 another from the garrison at Shumla. For this 
 reason the position assigned to General Pahlen, near 
 Tjirkowna, where he opposed the Vizier immediately 
 on his debouching from the heights, was undoubt- 
 edly the right one. But it would appear that 
 G-enerals Roth and Riidiger should also have been 
 
Chap. III. BATTLE OF EULBWTSCHA. 355 
 
 sent thither. In that open country a brigade of 
 cavalry pushed forward to Jenibazar would have 
 discovered the march of the Vizier towards the 
 northern road quite soon enough to have gone from 
 Kulewtscha with the whole army to meet him in the 
 district of Kalugro, without the necessity of Greneral 
 Eoth's stay at Matara. The Vizier was just as likely 
 to advance by Kamarna, and in that case Greneral 
 Eoth at Matara was some miles distant from that 
 road. When the Turks did eventually debouch by 
 Tjirkowna, the battle was actually decided before the 
 6th or 7th corps could be brought up. As a reserve 
 these two corps were too far off at Matara ; to act 
 on the offensive there was impossible ; one half of 
 the Russian army stood facing an almost inaccessible 
 cliff not 1000 paces from them, so that the Turks 
 could count every battalion, and could have fired 
 upon the Russians in perfect safety if they had 
 taken a battery up on the heights. Out of the whole 
 infantry of the 6th and 7th corps, only two batta- 
 lions took any part in the battle of Kulewtscha. 
 
 To return to the battle itself. The advanced 
 guard, under General Ostroschenko, which, in the 
 villages of Kulewtscha and Tjirkowna, was already 
 above a mile from General Pahlen's corps, without 
 any support, and in a mountain-pass surrounded on 
 all sides by the Turks, was pushed still further for- 
 ward. The commander-in-chief, it seems, wished to 
 ascertain at any risk whether he had the main army 
 
 2 A 2 
 
356 BATTLE OF KULEWTSCHA. Paet II. 
 
 or only a division of it before him, so as not to 
 engage in a skirmish, while the Yizier escaped by 
 some other road. There was reason for doubt, as the 
 Turks, up to midday of the 11th of June, made no 
 show of advancing, but waited for the attack. The 
 advanced guard obtained the desired certainty, but 
 paid dear for it. For the second time during this war 
 an opportunity was afforded to the Turks of falling, 
 with greatly superior numbers, upon a weak Eussian 
 division. The vicinity of the villages, and the 
 admirable conduct of 3 squadrons of hussars, saved 
 General Ostroschenko's battalions from being utterly 
 cut to pieces ; nevertheless, immediately after the 
 battle, the 11th and 12th Chasseurs, and the regiment, 
 Murom — each regiment reduced to one battalion — 
 had to be sent back to Jasytepe to form again. 
 
 The advance of Greneral Pahlen put a stop to the 
 battle which had begun so unfavourably to the 
 Russians ; but it is doubtful whether it would have 
 cut off the Yizier' s approach to Shumla, had the 
 latter simply advanced with all the troops he had, 
 in the direction of Tjermedin. It is probable that 
 he would have lost the greater portion of his bag- 
 gage and artillery, but his retreat upon Kotesch, the 
 back-door of Shumla, could scarcely have been pre- 
 vented. But the Vizier paused ; his vanguard — most 
 likely the best portion of his army — fell back ; and 
 in the interval Grenerals Roth and Riidiger had 
 reached the field of action. 
 
Chap. III. BATTLE OF KULEWTSCHA. 357 
 
 As soon as it was certain that the Vizier was really 
 before him, Greneral Diebitsch, after collecting his 
 forces, determined to act on the offensive. The pro- 
 ject of attacking so strong a foe upon a rocky height, 
 immediately after receiving a decided check, shows 
 the determination of the Eussian general and the 
 confidence he had in his troops. The Russians could 
 scarcely expect to meet with so little opposition as 
 was actually the case. The attack, if the Turks only 
 waited for it, could not be supported by either artil- 
 lery or cavalry, and the infantry had to advance 
 into a woody district, eminently unfavourable to the 
 Russian mode of fighting. 
 
 But the Turks, to speak plainly, ran away. They 
 again passed from the most foolhardy courage to 
 utter cowardice, and their first impetuous charge 
 changed at once into a disorderly flight. According 
 to the report of a bimbaschi, or commander of a 
 battalion, who had been taken prisoner, the Vizier 
 knew nothing of General Diebitsch' s march. He 
 thought that Greneral Roth alone attempted to cut 
 off his communication with Shumla, and determined 
 to attack him and then to return to Pravadi. After 
 discovering that he had to do with a stronger force, 
 it appears that the Vizier wished to gain the 'road 
 from Kamarna to Marasch by a detour to the left, 
 to which object a rear guard was destined. But 
 such an army as the Vizier had under his command 
 is always better fitted to make a bold attack than 
 
358 BATTLE OF KULEWTSCHA. Part II. 
 
 to retreat in the face of an enemy. The explo- 
 sion of some ammunition-waggons (which it appears 
 happens to the Turks in every engagement) gave 
 the signal for a general dispersion. There may 
 have heen some treachery in this. The regular in- 
 fantry, who could not accustom themselves to the 
 trammels of discipline, were especially dissatisfied. 
 " Whenever there was danger or difiSculty to be en^ 
 countered," said the deserters from that corps, " they 
 were ordered forward. Above all, they were made to 
 march too much." Many saw in this defeat a triumph 
 of the old usages of Islam over the hated reforms, 
 and a great portion of the regular infantry threw 
 away their muskets, which were not their own pro- 
 perty. Others fought on their own account, fired 
 upon their officers, and plundered the neighbouring 
 villages. It had been reported and believed among 
 the regular troops that the Sultan intended to brand 
 the men upon the forehead, so that they should be 
 known if they deserted. Moreover the Turkish 
 army appears to have been greatly in want of pro- 
 visions. The prisoners were quite exhausted, and 
 immediately asked for food, as they had fasted for 
 several days. Many pf the Asiatics lost their way 
 and died in the woods of starvation. The Yizier 
 himself reached Shumla by way of Marasch with 
 only 6Q0 horse. 
 
 The Hussians stated their loss in the battle at 
 1500 killed and 1000 wounded, about 10 per cent. 
 
Chap. III. BATTLE OF KULEWTSOHA. 359 
 
 of their whole force ; but the loss fell upon a small 
 portion of their army, almost exclusively upon the 
 advanced guard and some battalions of the 6th divi- 
 sion. Among the wounded were G-enerals Ostro- 
 schenko and Glasenap, besides 61 staff and other 
 officers. 
 
 The loss on the side of the Turks in the battle was 
 probably less : during the retreat the disbanding was 
 universal ; but a Turkish army is not easily de- 
 stroyed — it can only be dispersed. "Within fourteen 
 days portions of the beaten army gradually found 
 their way into Shumla in detached bodies and by 
 various roads. 
 
 The Vizier's first enterprise in May, against Grene- 
 ral Roth, when no other enemy was in the field 
 against him, cannot be considered a failure. It caused 
 the Russians great loss, and improved the bodily 
 training and the moral courage of the Turkish army. 
 The second great enterprise in June was much 
 more doubtful, "Whichever way Reschid Mohammed 
 moved, whether towards Silistria or Pravadi, he 
 always found a Russian corps at a distance of only 
 4 marches from him, either on his right or his left, 
 who were sure to make their presence be felt if he 
 halted. Silistria was not so pressed as to require 
 instant relief; besides, this could be more easily 
 effected by Hussein Pasha from Rustchuk. The 
 Vizier therefore directed his march against Greneral 
 Roth a-t Kosludja, where he no longer found his foe 
 
360 BATTLE OP kULEWTSCHA. Part 11. 
 
 scattered in winter quarters, but collected and ready 
 to receive him. He then turned against Pravadi, 
 and pertinaciously attacked a place the possession 
 of which could be but of small benefit to him For 
 eight days he stormed a weak hornwork on the 
 western height in vain, and thus gave Gleneral Die- 
 bitsch time to come up with him and cut off his 
 retreat upon Shumla. The attempt to regain that 
 point cost him his army. 
 
 The former campaign was lost by the inactivity 
 of Hussein Pasha and his subordinate Omar Vrione ; 
 the campaign of 1829 was ruined by the enterpris- 
 ing spirit of Eeschid Pasha. There is this material 
 difference, that Hussein Pasha, at the close of opera- 
 tions against a worn-out hostile force, might have 
 acted with a great prospect of success and very little 
 danger ; whereas it was incumbent upon Reschid 
 Pasha, at the beginning of a campaign, and against 
 a fresh and strong army, to have proceeded with 
 greater prudence. The Russians could desire nothing 
 better than a battle in the open field with the main 
 army of the Turks. 
 
 The battle of Kulewtscha changed the whole aspect 
 of affairs, and the next step that Greneral Diebitsch 
 would take was anxiously looked for. 
 
 The naval expedition to Sizeboli, on the other 
 side of the Balkan, and the whole posture of affairs, 
 made it evident that it had from the first been the 
 intention of the Russian commander to cross that 
 
Chap. III. CONSEQUENCES OP THE BATTLE. 361 
 
 bulwark of the Ottoman empire. G-eneral Diebitsch 
 could scarcely have to send for fresh instructions to 
 Warsaw, as nothing had occurred beyond what had 
 been attempted and wished for from the beginning 
 of the campaign — a victory over the Turkish main 
 army. Moreover on the 2*7th a courier arrived 
 bringing the reward for the victory that had been 
 achieved. If therefore the passage across the Balkan 
 was an essential part of the original plan of cam- 
 paign, it appeared that the time was now come to 
 carry it into effect, and any further delay could only 
 render the undertaking more difficult. 
 
 It is true that Shumla had not fallen into the 
 hands of the Russians, but this point only gains im- 
 portance by the presence of an army. Its warlike 
 population still gave Shumla a strong power of 
 defence ; but the remains of a beaten army without 
 artillery afforded it no offensive strength that could 
 not be paralysed by the presence of a corps of ob- 
 servation. Silistria was completely invested, Yarna 
 taken, and, with their operations based upon the 
 Dobrudscha and the sea, the Russians could now 
 cross the Balkan. The season was favourable for 
 the purpose ; the heat had not yet risen beyond 
 95° ; grass and corn for the horses were to be found 
 on the mountains, as well as on the southern side of 
 the Balkan ; heavy showers kept even the plain 
 green. Immediately after the battle of Kulewtscha 
 the appearance of a Russian army would every- 
 
362 CONSEQUENCES OP THE BATTLE. Part II. 
 
 where cause a panic, whereas longer delay on their 
 part would give the Turks time to collect their 
 forces, and to fortify themselves in Aidos, Kar- 
 nabat, and other strongholds, while the Eussians 
 would be daily losing a portion of their army by 
 disease. The plague had already broken out in 
 Pravadi, and the condition of the troops at Varna 
 was frightful. 
 
 All these reasons were in favour of crossing the 
 Balkan immediately, but the Eussians were too 
 weak. Greneral Diebitsch had no more than 25,000 
 men ; if he detached only 10,000 to observe the 
 Vizier at Shumla he would have but 15,000 left to 
 force his way through the defiles of the Balkan, to 
 penetrate into the heart of an enemy's country, and 
 possibly to withstand a popular and religious war. 
 Silistria was hard pressed, and its fall was daily ex- 
 pected. Thus, if Greneral Krassowski's corps was 
 the only reinforcement that Greneral Diebitsch could 
 hope for, it was natural and justifiable in him to 
 wait for the arrival of that corps before making so 
 important an advance. 
 
 Other weighty considerations were superadded : 
 negotiations had begun ; the need of getting supplies 
 sufficient to last the troops for many days, and 
 which could not be procured on the spot, — the un- 
 avoidable necessity for sending out parties to dis- 
 cover the real extent of the victory the Eussians 
 had gained, — the desire of giving the troops some 
 
Chap. III. CONSEQUENCES OP THE BATTLE. 363 
 
 rest, — and lastly, tlie intention of covering the in- 
 vestment of Silistria against any attempt at relief 
 on tlie part of the Turks in Eustchuk,* — and a 
 thousand other minor considerations which gene- 
 rally escape the eye of the critic, and which Gleneral 
 Clansewitz so aptly calls " the friction of the ma- 
 chine of war," — all these together caused the truce 
 that now intervened. 
 
 * Eustcliuk is now well defended : it has extensive curtains with 
 flanking defences and large bastions enclosing the whole city. The 
 enceinte comprises 5 miles ; the river-side defences are very strong ; the 
 batteries from 3 to 45 feet above the water. The heavy gims, if well 
 laid, will command the opposite bank of the river, and even as far as 
 Giurgevo. There are boats enough in the creek to transport 5000 men 
 across, and a gunboat flotilla. — Teanslatoe. 
 
364 CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. Part II. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES FEOM THE MIDDLE OF JUNE TO THE 
 MIDDLE OF JULY^ — THE PASSAGE OF THE BALKAN — THE 
 
 BATTLE NEAR AIDOS, JAMBOLI, AND SLIVNO THE MARCH 
 
 UPON ADRIANOPLE. 
 
 The day after the battle a Te Deum was sung for 
 the victory ; Greneral Eoth then marched to Ma- 
 rasch and Greneral Riidiger to Bski-Stambul to cut 
 off the retreat of the dispersed Turks upon Shumla. 
 Greneral Pahlen after returning from the pursuit 
 remained stationary at Matara. 
 
 On the march to Eski-Stambul on the 12th of 
 June, the hussars of the 3rd division under Greneral 
 Madatof came near some forts which the Turks had 
 erected close to the old Russian redoubts No. 3 and 
 4. (See the Plan of Shumla.) The hussars attacked 
 one of these forts, entered it by the gorge, and took 
 it ; the second fort offered some resistance, where- 
 upon the hussars got off their horses and took it 
 lance in hand. The third fort repulsed the attack 
 of the hussars until the infantry arrived and put the 
 garrison to the sword. 600 Turks were killed; 12 
 stands of colours, 5 guns, and a large camp behind 
 the forts were taken ; the Russians lost only 100 
 killed and wounded. 
 
Ohap. IV". NEGOTIATIONS. 365 
 
 On the following day Greneral Diebitsch and his 
 staff reconnoitred the camp before Shumla. In the 
 Russian head-quarters they were inclined to believe 
 that during the panic immediately after the battle 
 Shnmla might be taken by a bold assault ; and the 
 result of the fight of the 12th, when even cavalry 
 charged and took forts, appeared to countenance 
 such an opinion : at all events, this exploit had 
 great moral influence. On the other hand, it might 
 well be surmised that 18,000 armed inhabitants 
 could easily offer an obstinate resistance ; that a 
 failure might imperil the success which the Russians 
 had already achieved ; and even under the most 
 favourable circumstances the possession of Shumla 
 offered no positive advantage to the Russians, as 
 after driving the Turks out of their encampment 
 they would find them again on the other side of the 
 Balkan ; moreover, the Russians could not spare 
 from offensive operations the troops necessary to 
 keep such extended lines. 
 
 In the afternoon a heavy cannonade was heard in 
 the direction of Marasch and Eski-Stambul ; the fire 
 was directed against detachments of Turkish cavalry 
 that attempted to reach Shumla, in which they were 
 successful. • A sortie made by the Turks from the 
 Matchin redoubt was unsuccessful. 
 
 During the following days negotiations were 
 entered into with the Turks. A tent was erected 
 between the outposts, in which the Russian Privy 
 
366 MOVEMENTS OF THE RUSSIANS. Part II. 
 
 Councillor Fonton met the Vizier's Plenipoten- 
 tiaries. G-eneral Diebitsch caused the Turk to be 
 informed, that in accordance with the Czar's in- 
 structions he looked upon the victory he had just 
 obtained only as a step towards putting an end to 
 the war by negotiation. 
 
 The Yizier replied, "that victory or defeat de- 
 pended on the will of God, according to whose immu- 
 table decrees victory had inclined first to one side 
 and then to the other at Pravadi and Kulewtscha. 
 He himself was only a military vicegerent, and unac- 
 quainted with the political state of affairs." Without 
 completely refusing to treat, the Yizier would not 
 enter into any definitive terms. The Turks ob- 
 tained leave to bury their dead at the redoubts 3 
 and 4. They buried on the spot only such corpses 
 as had been gnawed by the dogs, the rest they 
 carried with them to Shumla. 
 
 On the 15th of June the head-quarters were re- 
 moved to before Shumla, and after pitching the tents 
 a regular siege began. The Russians evacuated 
 Eski-Stambul and Marasch. General Pahlen with 
 the 2nd corps forni,ed the right wing near the 
 redoubt No. 26 (see the Plan of Shumla) ; General 
 Both with the 6th corps occupied the middle by 
 Kassaply ; General Eudiger' with the 7th corps the 
 left wing towards Marasch. The battalions lay in 
 columns towards the middle, the divisions in two 
 lines, the artillery in the intervals between the 
 
Chap. IV. MOVEMENTS OF THE EUSSIANS. 367 
 
 columns. A division of the battalion 300 strong, 
 newly raised by G-eneral Liprandi at Jassy, entered 
 the camp. This battalion was composed of all sorts 
 of vagabonds, of Arnants, "Wallachians, and Ser- 
 vians, armed after the Turkish fashion, who were to 
 be used in the guerilla warfare in the Balkan. 
 
 On the 10th of June the Commander-in-Chief, 
 accompanied by a small staff, again made a recon- 
 noissance towards Shumla. They met with no 
 Turks, but were regularly attacked by an enormous 
 pack of dogs devouring the corpses on the field of 
 battle. Some movement was taking place in the 
 Turkish camp. A great number of the tents in the 
 plain were struck, and appeared shortly afterwards 
 on the heights of Strandscha, Hereupon the Rus- 
 sian army was pushed on to the right. The head- 
 quarters and the 2nd corps were at Injekoi ; the 6th 
 to the right, the 7th to the left of Bulanik. The 
 lancers, under Greneral Kreutz, were sent forward on 
 the road from Silistria ; the 3rd division of hussars, 
 under Prince Madatof, to Easgrad, whither a corps 
 of Arnauts was said to have advanced from Shumla, 
 in order, after forming a junction with Hussein 
 Pasha, to attempt the relief of the besieged town. 
 Prince Madatof, however, returned 4 days after- 
 wards without having met the enemy. The day 
 before he reached Djummaja (or Eski-Shumla), a 
 fresh force of 2000 men from Constantinople had 
 passed through. The hamlets of this district were 
 
368 MOVEMENTS OP THE RUSSIANS. Part II. 
 
 inhabited and prosperous, but, on seeing the Eus- 
 sians, the inhabitants took to flight or prepared to 
 resist. Proclamations were issued, exhorting the 
 people to remain quiet, and to stay in their houses ; 
 generally speaking, however, the feeling in Bulgaria 
 was very hostile to the Russians. A number of 
 Turks who had escaped from the field of battle at 
 Kulewtscha were scattered among the villages and 
 interrupted the communications ; a strong detach- 
 ment of cavalry had been despatched by the Turks 
 from Shumla, in order to assemble the able-bodied 
 men from the surrounding districts. The forests 
 were full of Bulgarians, who waged war on their 
 own account. Owing to the country being covered 
 with underwood it was extremely difficult to keep 
 open the communication with the Danube. Eleven 
 staff officers had already been killed at the head of 
 their columns by the skirmishers lying in ambus- 
 cade near the roads. In order to put a stop to this 
 evil, 7 battalions and the whole 3rd division of hus- 
 sars were detached to Djummaja, Rasgrad, and the 
 surrounding districts. Two villages in the rear of 
 Jenibazar were burnt, as some Russian officers had 
 been fired at there. 
 
 On the 1st of July Colonel Howe was sent with 2 
 battalions to the Kamtchik, to reconnoitre. News 
 soon arrived that he had been surrounded and 
 attacked. Only one of the Cossacks whom he had 
 despatched made his way back, and a brigade sent 
 
Chap. IV. THE EUSSIANS BEFORE SHUMLA. 369 
 
 to his assistance no longer found him. Meanwhile, 
 Colonel Howe returned in safety on the 4th of July. 
 He had advanced as far as Jenikoi, on the Kamtchik. 
 Attacked by 3000 horsemen, he had formed his 2 
 battalions into open squares, thrown out skirmishers, 
 and had fallen back, fighting all the way, as the 
 Turkish infantry advanced. He had brought back 
 40 wounded on camels, and had only left 9 dead. 
 
 Meanwhile, matters went on very quietly at 
 Shumla. Many reconnaissances were made without 
 much result. The hostile outposts were placed close 
 to each other, without any shots being exchanged. 
 The Turkish double videttes were established after 
 the European fashion, their advanced posts being 
 covered. The troops were exercised with the firelock 
 in the camp. Tliere were 12 regular battalions, of 
 which one was dressed in red uniform. They 
 moved in 2 lines, in column and line, with admirable 
 precision ; they deployed at double quick time ; and 
 were even exercised in skirmishing. Russian officers 
 who were prisoners in Shumla sent for their bag- 
 gage, and some Turks rode to the advanced posts, 
 stuck their lances into the ground, laid aside their 
 pistols, and begged leave to send money and provi- 
 sions to their captive brethren ; others inquired if it 
 was really the intention of the Russians to cross the 
 Balkan. When the news of the fall of Silistria 
 reached head-quarters on the 2nd of July, the Rus- 
 sians fired a feu-de-joie of 101 guns. Alarmed 
 
 2 B 
 
370 THE RUSSIANS BEFORE SHUMLA. Paet II. 
 
 by this, the Turks advanced in strong columns 
 towards the outworks of the camp : a Turkish 
 officer of rank, sent to reconnoitre, sat leisurely down 
 on a carpet before the fortress, and sent his Tscho- 
 chodar, or cloak-bearer, to the nearest post to ask 
 what the firing meant. On receiving the answer, 
 the Turks went quietly back to their quarters. It 
 was reported in Shumla that the Eussians were 
 afraid of an attack, and wished to show that they 
 still had plenty of powder and shot ; that Greneral 
 Diebitsch was dead, and that a new commander had 
 arrived. 
 
 As the Turkish irregular troops already began to 
 desert, the Vizier cut the ears of all those who were 
 discovered going towards their homes. In spite of 
 all inducements held out to them, very few deserters 
 came over to the Russians. 
 
 On the 1st of July a convoy of 200 waggons 
 approached on its way from Eski-Stambul. The 
 escort skirmished with the Russian outposts, and a 
 troop of 150 Turkish horse sallied forth from the 
 Matchin redoubt. The Cossacks made some pri- 
 soners ; but the convoy succeeded in entering the 
 Turkish lines. 
 
 On the 11th the Turks sent a division of cavalry 
 to forage near Marasch. The Cossacks on the Rus- 
 sian left flank intercepted them, and made a few 
 prisoners. The lancers of the Bug went to the 
 assistance of the Cossacks, but a body of 3000 
 
Chap. IV. THE RUSSIANS BEFORE SHUMLA. 371 
 
 Turkish horse advanced, and drew up in 3 lines 
 before the Russian entrenchments. Gleneral Riidi- 
 ger received orders to attack only in the event of 
 the Turks advancing still farther. They did ad- 
 vance, and a skirmish took place, in which the Turks 
 had the best of it. They, however, fired at too great 
 a distance, and the loss on both sides was trifling ; as 
 there seemed no intention on either side of putting an 
 end to the fight, the Turks brought up first 2, then 4, 
 and lastly 8 guns, whereas General Riidiger had but 
 4. Thus, from the vast superiority in artillery, the 
 Russians were the weakest. The Russians did not 
 fire their guns at all ; the Turks galloped singly out 
 of the ranks and fired off their carbines. At length 
 G-eneral Riidiger attacked them with 2 squadrons in 
 advance, and 2 others in echellon on both wings. 
 The 1st line of the Turks consisted of skirmishers, 
 the 2nd was drawn close up to the guns, the 3rd 
 was in reserve. When the Russian squadrons ad- 
 vanced, the 2 first lines of the Turkish troops fled, 
 and their artillery was near falling into the hands 
 of the Russians. But the echellons were too far in 
 the rear, the Turkish reserve advanced, and both 
 sides came to a dead stop. The Turks began to fire, 
 the 2 Russian squadrons in front fell back, and the 
 whole swarm of Turks rushed upon them until they 
 in their turn encountered the 2 squadrons in Echellon 
 on the two flanks. The Turks then retired within 
 their lines. Meanwhile, their artillery had found 
 
 2 B 2 
 
372 ATTACK ON RAHOVA. Pakt 11. 
 
 time to move oflf. The G-rand Yizier himself was in 
 great danger during this skirmish ; two Cossacks 
 closely pursued him, and one of his pages was cut 
 down. At length a Dehli, who saw the danger to 
 which he was exposed, attacked the Cossacks, and 
 saved the Pasha. In this' skirmish the Eussians lost 
 50 horses. 
 
 While this was going on in Bulgaria, in Wal- 
 lachia General Geismar, with the small force at his 
 disposal — the 1st division of dragoons and the 17th 
 of infantry, together with the 10th infantry bri- 
 gade — had succeeded in holding in check the gar- 
 risons of the Upper Danube. He announced that 
 an attack which he had made upon Rahova (on 
 the Danube, between Nicopolis and Widdin) had 
 been successful. Considerable cargoes of corn and 
 other provisions were being continually carried from 
 Widdin down the Danube ; these went partly to 
 provision Giurgevo and Rustchuk, and were partly 
 conveyed thence by land to Shumla. In order to 
 put a stop to this traffic. General Geismar deter- 
 mined to take up a strong position, a cheval, on the 
 Danube, by taking Rahova, which the Turks had 
 fortified. 
 
 With this view, the battalion of the 34th regiment 
 of chasseurs, stationed with 2 guns on the Schyll, was 
 reinforced with 2 battalions of the regiment Tomsk 
 1 battalion of the regiment Kolywan, and 1 battalion 
 of the regiment Tobolsk ; besides this, 8 heavy guns 
 
Chap. IV. ATTACK ON RAHOVA. 373 
 
 and 8 horse-artillery guns, the dragoon regiment 
 Moscow, 1 squadron of mounted pioneers^ and 1 so- 
 tuja of Cossacks were ordered to join the chasseurs : 
 80 boats and 10 punts, built at Crajova, were floated 
 down the Schyll as far as the confluence of that 
 stream with the Danube, whither the whole detach- 
 ment under the command of Count Tolstoi marched 
 during the night of the 27th of May. 
 
 On the Turkish side of the Danube were 2 re- 
 doubts on the height, and 1 on the river side. The 
 latter was armed with 3 guns, and, supported by 
 some boats carrying a few light guns, commanded 
 the mouth of the Schyll. At daybreak the Eussians 
 opened a heavy fire from 22 guns. At the same 
 time 200 volunteers and 1 battalion of the 34th 
 regiment of chasseurs crossed the Danube, in spite 
 of a heavy fire from the houses, and made good their 
 landing. Captain Grabbe was the first to spring 
 on shore ; at the head of his volunteers he attacked 
 one of the redoubts on the hill. Although wounded, 
 he stormed the fort with his weak detachment with- 
 out waiting for the rest of the corps, and took it 
 after an obstinate fight of 4 hours. Two companies 
 occupied the heights which commanded the town. 
 The garrison of the Turkish battery on the Danube 
 was thus cut off from Rahova. Meanwhile, the 
 regiment Tobolsk had landed below this battery, in 
 which the Turks defended themselves with the cou- 
 rage of despair, and refused quarter : they were all 
 
374 PASSAGE OF THE BALKAN. Part II. 
 
 cut to pieces. Several of the houses in the town had 
 to be stormed singly, until at length the Pasha gave 
 up the citadel : one of the Turkish vessels, with 1 gun, 
 was taken. The Eussians lost in this engagement 
 3 officers, 47 men ; 11 officers and 175 men were 
 wounded. One pasha, 6 pair of colours, and 5 guns 
 were the trophies of the victory ; the loss of the 
 Turks amounted to 1500 men. The Christian popu- 
 lation of Eahova was removed to the province of 
 Kasan, where dwellings were provided for them. 
 
 But it was impossible at this time to penetrate 
 further into Servia, and General Geismar had quite 
 enough to do to protect the Principalities. — which 
 were now visited by a fearful pestilence — against 
 fresh attacks from Widdin. For this reason the 
 Russian troops evacuated Rahova. 
 
 Shumla had again kept the Russian troops four 
 weeks under its walls, when at length the 3rd corps 
 followed by an immense baggage-train advanced 
 from Silistria. At first the 8th division, consisting 
 of 8 battalions and 8 12-pounder8, entered the camp. 
 Then came the 9th division, and preparations were 
 now made for crossing the Balkan. General Kras- 
 sowski, with the 3rd corps, was left to watch Shumla ; 
 General Roth, with the 6th corps, was to proceed 
 along the road from Varna to Burgas ; while Gene- 
 ral Rudiger, with the 7th corps, was to cross the 
 mountains by the road from Pravadi to Aidos. 
 General Pahlen, with the 2nd corps, was to act as 
 
Chap. IV. PASSAGE OP THE BALKAN. 3Y5 
 
 a reserve to these two columns. The head-quarters 
 followed with this corps. 
 
 The troops marched in caps, in uniform, and in 
 linen trowsers. Their great-coats were rolled and 
 strapped over the left, the knapsack over the right 
 shoulder. In the latter the soldiers carried only- 
 one shirt and one pair of trowsers ; but then each 
 man took ten days' provisions. Their chacos and 
 all their baggage remained behind. 
 
 Although the defence of the Balkan and of the 
 Kamtchik was absolutely necessary under existing 
 circumstances, Eeschid Mohammed sent for a corps 
 of 9 regiments of infantry destined for that purpose, 
 and some thousand Albanians who were in the 
 Balkan, to join him at Shumla. The surrender of 
 Shumla, hitherto reckoned impregnable, would have 
 produced the worst impression in Constantinople, 
 which was already in a state of great fermentation. 
 Before the Russians marched to the Balkan, Divine 
 service was solemnly celebrated, and prayers were 
 put up for the successful issue of the war. 
 
 The evening, before the 8th division entered the 
 camp. General Eoth, with 4 battalions of the 7th 
 and 6 battalions of the 16th division of infantry — 
 making altogether 10 battalions — -16 squadrons, 2 
 regiments of Cossacks, and 32 guns, had proceeded 
 in the direction of Devno. The 8th division then 
 took up its position before Shumla. Early on the 
 15th of July, Gi-eneral Riidiger, with 10 battalions of 
 
376 PASSAGE OF THE BALKAN. Part II. 
 
 his corps, 2 regiments of Cossacks, and 24 guns, 
 marched in the direction of Koprikoi, on the Kamt- 
 chik. His place in the camp was occupied by the 9th 
 division under Greneral Krassowski. Of the 10th 
 division 5 battalions had remained behind to garri- 
 son Silistria ; the remainder had gone to reinforce 
 Generals Griesmar and Kisselef, to Eustchuk and 
 Widdin. With the baggage of the 3rd corps- 
 d'arme'e were 80 waggons containing Turkish fami- 
 lies, who by the terms of the capitulation had free 
 passage from Silistria to Shumla. 
 
 After G-eneral Pahlen, with 17 battalions, 8 
 squadrons, and 30 guns, had marched to the station 
 of Jenibazar, General Krassowski broke up his 
 quarters late in the evening of the 17th of July, as 
 quietly as he could, in order there to take up a post 
 of observation, with 24 battalions of the 3rd corps- 
 d'armee, the regiment Wiatka, and the 38th regi- 
 ment of chasseurs of the 7th corps, the 3rd division 
 of hussars, a brigade of lancers of the Bug, and a 
 brigade of the 2nd hussars — making 28 battalions, 
 34 squadrons, 2 regiments of Cossacks, and a nume- 
 rous artillery — altogether about 15,000 men. A. 
 general staff-officer placed in observation on the left 
 wing reported that this movement was not visible 
 from Shumla. Most likely, however, the march was 
 betrayed by a Eussian officer who had deserted, as 
 early on the morning of the following day the Turks 
 sent oiit a strong reconnoitring party of 1000 men ; 
 
Chap. 17. PASSAGE OP THE BALKAN. 377 
 
 and after finding no Russians before Shumla, tlie 
 Turks quietlyreturned to their quarters there. 
 
 It is evident that with reference to the march upon 
 Koprikoi, Greneral Krassowski had better have gone 
 with his covering party to Marasch : indeed, he sub- 
 sequently went thither. Possibly the Eussians 
 wished to find out, while the 2nd corps was still 
 at hand to give its support, what the Yizier would 
 do when he was free. He did exactly what was ex- 
 pected — nothing at all. 
 
 Before daybreak, head-quarters with the 2nd 
 corps left Jenibazar on the 18th of July : they 
 halted from seven o'clock in the morning till four in 
 the afternoon at Beilikoi, and towards dark they 
 reached Devno, after marching 23 miles. The vil- 
 lage was completely destroyed and deserted, but the 
 Russians built some temporary barracks in the two 
 redoubts with the ruins of the houses, and made a 
 good road to connect Devno with Yarna, in place 
 of the old Turkish one, which was often flooded. 
 
 News came from Greneral Roth that he had found 
 3000 Turks with 12 guns in an entrenched camp on 
 the other side of the river near Podbaschi, not far 
 from the mouth of the Kamtchik. The camp of 
 Podbaschi was separated by a broad morass from 
 another position still further in the rear, at Der- 
 wisch-jowan (see the Plan). Old oaks, thick-spread- 
 ing ivy, and the rank vegetation of boggy land, 
 rendered the place an impenetrable wilderness. 
 
378 PASSAGE OF THE BALKAN. Paet II. 
 
 which could only be crossed by one very bad road 
 2f miles long. The Turks had encamped close to 
 the banks of the Kamtchik : the entrenchment was 
 600 paces long, but open in the gorge : there were 
 embrasures for their guns. To give effect to their 
 fire they had cut down the wood to within 500 or 
 600 paces in front ; but this had the effect of ex- 
 posing their entrenched position, which could be 
 overlooked and commanded from the left edge of 
 the valley. The river was 50 paces broad at that 
 spot, very deep and rapid ; the ground was marshy 
 and the banks were from 8 to 10 feet high. A 
 bridge of boats used for crossing the river was 
 drawn across to the Turkish side. 
 
 The works of Derwisch-jowan lay at the foot of 
 the right edge of the valley, and consisted of a 
 breastwork formed of wattles. After the Turks at 
 Podbaschi had been cannonaded the whole day, Ge- 
 neral Eoth marched to the right to turn the posi- 
 tion, by crossing the river at a very diflScult ford 
 five miles higher up. 
 
 Meanwhile Greneral Eiidiger had crossed the 
 Kamtchik on the same day at Koprikoi. There he 
 foimd Jussuf, a pasha of two tails, entrenched with 
 3000 men. While occupying his attention in front 
 with 2 battalions, and 1 regiment of Cossacks under 
 Greneral Schirow, he himself crossed the river on 
 pontoons at a place two or three miles lower down 
 called Czalymale. There, towards daybreak, he 
 
Chap. IV. PASSAGE OP THE BALKAN. 379 
 
 came upon 1000 Turks, who fled, leaving 2 pairs of 
 colours. G-eneral Eiidiger left 2 battaKons at Czaly- 
 male and marched with 10 battalions to Koprikoi, 
 where Jussuf Pasha had taken up a position on a 
 height near the village. The Turkish entrench- 
 ments were now attacked by the brigade of chasseurs 
 of the 19th division. The Turks only fired six rounds 
 of canister-shot and fled. The 27th regiment of 
 chasseurs threw aside their knapsacks and great-coats 
 and pursued them. The Turks, during their retreat, 
 defended their guns at the point of the bayonet ; 
 nevertheless 4 guns and 5 pairs of colours were 
 taken : only 1 6 prisoners were captured, but many 
 Turks were killed during the pursuit : the Russians 
 lost in killed and wounded about 65 men and 2 
 ofiicers. The whole camp and the baggage of the 
 Turks fell into the hands of the Russians. 
 
 In order to secure the important passage of the 
 river at Koprikoi (Bridge Yillage) a brigade was 
 left there ; the bridge over the Kamtchik was re- 
 stored and a tete-du-pont built in front of it. This 
 post formed the shortest means of commimication 
 between the army crossing the Balkan and the corps 
 of observation before Shumla, which now received 
 orders to remove to Marasch so as to secure the rear 
 of the advancing army. 
 
 On the 19th of July the head-quarters advanced 
 in the direction of Derwisch-jowan. The march 
 led by Grebedje, where a bad dyke crosses the 
 
380 PASSAGE OF THE BALKAN. Part II. 
 
 marsh and a wretched bridge spans the rapid river 
 Devna. A triangular redoubt defends the defile 
 on the right bank. The weather was wet when 
 Gi-eneral Eoth took this road, and the deep clay soil 
 was much cut up. In the narrow hollow ways oppo- 
 site Bujuk-Alladin and beyond Osmandjik the Eus- 
 sians had to leave the greater part of their waggons 
 behind, and could not recover them till the following 
 day. The order kept during this march was not 
 much commended by eye-witnesses : the baggage- 
 train was very great, but the confusion was still 
 greater. 
 
 General Eoth had left behind on the main road 
 Greneral Froloff with some battalions, and had gone 
 himself to Dulgerarda (about 5 miles above Pod- 
 baschi on the Kamtchik). The roads were very 
 bad, and four bridges had to be made across as 
 many arms of the river. On the other side the 
 Turks had thrown up some earthworks, which, how- 
 ever, were not provided with artillery, and at day- 
 break on the 19th of July the Eussians crossed 
 over. General Wiliamow, at the head of 4 batta- 
 lions, attacked and took the nearest entrenchment. 
 Hereupon General Eoth prepared to attack the 
 fortified camp of Derwisch-jowan. The greatest 
 difficulty lay in the badness of the road, which had 
 to be opened with the axe; the smallest was the 
 resistance of the Turks. The entrenchments on the 
 height were immediately taken. On this occasion 
 
Chap. IV. PASSAGE OF THE BALKAN. 381 
 
 a remarkable fight with cavalry occurred. A newly- 
 formed regiment of Turkish lancers received the 
 charge of a body of Cossacks, standing still and 
 with couched lances. The Cossacks rushed on with 
 wild cries, but turned round or turned aside on 
 finding that the Turks held their ground. The 
 lancer regiment of St. Petersburg followed the Cos- 
 sacks, and the Turks hoped that the manoeuvre would 
 be repeated ; but the lancers actually charged, dis- 
 persed the Turks, cut down a good many, and made 
 the rest prisoners : 5 guns and 4 colours were taken 
 in the fort. The position of Podbaschi would now 
 have been easy to take in the gorge, but the 5th 
 division of Greneral Pahlen's corps had already 
 effected this operation while the attack upon Der- 
 wisch-jowan was made : 200 volunteers of the 9th 
 and 10th regiment of chasseurs had plunged into 
 the river above the bridge and swam across. The 
 Turks were so alarmed at this, that after one dis- 
 charge they retreated, taking their guns with them. 
 The Cossacks captured one gun during the retreat. 
 
 The head-quarters and the 2nd corps marched on 
 the 20th of July as far as Derwisch-jowan. Although 
 Greneral Eiidiger had gained the passage over the 
 river at Koprikoi, he did not pursue his march 
 straight by Nadir-Dubrut to Aidos, but determined 
 to go a great way round. The great difficulties of 
 the Kirkgetjid valley (see the chapter on the Passes 
 of the Balkan), and the ease with which any advance 
 
382 PASSAGE OP THE BALKAN. Part II. 
 
 in that pass could be stopped, determined him to 
 march along the right bank of the river as far as 
 the bridge of Podbaschi, with the view likewise of 
 opening this defile for General Eoth, should the 
 Turks still contest the passage across the Kamtchik. 
 On the 20th, therefore, he went by Derwisch-jowan 
 to Arnautlar. General Roth lay at Aspros, a large 
 Bulgarian village in a ravine on the Black Sea. The 
 inhabitants met him, bearing the cross before them. 
 
 On the following day the head-quarters advanced 
 towards evening to Arnautlar ; Grenerals Roth and 
 Riidiger likewise made short marches, the first to 
 Erekliajakoi on the sea, the latter to Aiwadchik on 
 the Kosakodereh. The roads were heavy, and in 
 order to get the waggons along, the pioneers had 
 to be assisted by numerous working parties from 
 the infantry. The heat on that day was most op- 
 pressive ; even in the evening the thermometer was 
 at 82°, but stormy, cold weather set in, and it went 
 down on the same day to below 54°. 
 
 The Russian engineers also threw up entrench- 
 ments at Arnautlar, but in a very unskilful manner, 
 so as to be overlooked from the heights behind 
 within musket-shot. An abattis was constructed 
 with the fruit-trees belonging to the village, although 
 the forest was just as near : this was done ostensibly 
 in order to keep the well in the place under fire. 
 Large provisions of hay had been got together at 
 every halting place. 
 
Chap. rv. BATTLE NEAR AIDOS. 383 
 
 At four in the morning the head-quarters were 
 removed to Erketsch, on the edge of the valley of 
 the Nadir, where they were joined by the 7th corps. 
 Some Turkish cavalry appeared in the valley below, 
 was reinforced from Aidos, and brought up one 
 gun. But no sooner had Greneral Schirow set him- 
 self in motion with 2 regiments of Cossacks, in 
 order to attack a foe five or six times stronger than 
 himself, than the latter took flight without offering 
 any resistance beyond firing one pistol-shot. The 
 Cossacks pursued the fugitives for five miles before 
 they could overtake them. A great number of 
 Turks, when they found the strength of their horses 
 failing, quietly dismounted and surrendered them- 
 selves prisoners : 130 prisoners and 2 standards were 
 taken. 
 
 A sharp cannonade was now heard from the direc- 
 tion of the sea. Towards evening Greneral Roth had 
 fallen in with a Turkish division of 7000 men which 
 was drawn up at Monastirkoi. This was a part of 
 the corps under Abdur Rachman, the former Pasha 
 of Bosnia, to whom had been intrusted the defence 
 of the seaports and the blockade of Sizeboli, and 
 who at the same time commanded the whole of the 
 troops on the Kamtchik. Greneral Roth occupied 
 the attention of the Turks with 2 squadrons in front, 
 while 4 -others turned their right flank. The Turks 
 soon fled, some towards Missivri, and some to Bur- 
 gass, leaving behind them 2 cannon, 9 standards. 
 
384 SURRENDER OP MISSIVRI. Part II. 
 
 and 800 prisoners. G-eneral Eoth pursued them to 
 Missivri and took the redoubt which stands in front 
 of the narrow tongue of land (vide Plan), 
 
 A general shout of joy burst forth when the 
 Russians came down from the mountains and saw 
 the flags of their ships flying over the broad 
 shining surface of the bay of Burgass. Admiral 
 Grreig lay there at anchor with 3 ships of the line, 
 5 frigates, and a number of transports loaded with 
 provisions. The Turks now found themselves com- 
 pletely shut up in Missivri, but they might per- 
 fectly well have prolonged the defence of the place. 
 The town stands upon a height which rises out of 
 the sea, with perpendicular chalk cliffs, and is joined 
 to the shore by a low neck of land nearly 1000 
 paces long, defended by a massive old tower.* The 
 place can be bombarded from the redoubt and from 
 the sea, but it would be difficult to take if well 
 defended. On the other hand, the maintenance of 
 Missivri would have little influence on the issue of 
 the campaign, as it is difficult for the garrison to 
 debouch out of the place ; moreover, terms of capitu- 
 lation had already been entered upon. The Turks 
 demanded free exit, which was refused; and the 
 commander of the place, Osman, a pasha of two 
 tails, surrendered himself and his garrison of 2000 
 men prisoners of war. The Russians took 12 guns, 
 
 * This, as well as the gate and the beautiful Byzantine church, was 
 huilt by the Emperor Theophilos. 
 
Chap. IV. FALL OF AHJOLO AND BUEGASS. 385 
 
 10 colours, and a new Turkish corvette pierced for 
 22 guns whicli was still on the stocks. 
 
 On the 23rd of July the Russian army concen- 
 trated itself still more to the east towards the 
 sea, the head-quarters went as far- as Injekoi-Tu- 
 retzki, the 6th corps to Barakli, the 7th to Ahiolo ; 
 so that the whole body of troops were only distant 
 one, march from each other. Greneral Schirrow's 
 Cossacks captured 1000 puds of powder and 2000 
 measures of maize at Dautly. 
 
 Greneral Diebitsch visited the admiral on board 
 the Paris, whither a steamer from Sizeboli brought 
 the news that the Turks had already quitted 
 Ahiolo, and that the crew of a Russian frigate 
 had already occupied the place, which was difficult 
 to take from the land side (see the Plan), and had 
 found there 12 guns, 1 mortar, 3 magazines of 
 powder, and 1 of salt. On his return from the 
 admiral's ship, Greneral Diebitsch visited the Archi- 
 mandrite in Missivri, 
 
 On the following day General Roth advanced 
 upon Burgass. The Turks appeared before the 
 town, where they found an advantageous position 
 (Plan of Burgass). Attacked by the Russian chas- 
 seurs -under General Nabel, they fled without ojffering 
 any resistance, and the 6th Russian corps entered the 
 town, where 10 guns and stores of all kinds fell into 
 their hands. Intelligence arrived from General 
 Poncet, who commanded at Sizeboli, that he had 
 
 2 c 
 
386 SUCCESSES OF THE RUSSIANS. Part II. 
 
 driven back the Turkish investing corps. All the 
 maritime places round the broad basin of Burgass, 
 so strong by nature, and so easy of defence, thus fell 
 into the hands of the Eussians. The 7th corps went 
 that same day to Rumelikoi, a part of the 2nd to 
 Eski-Baschly, to be near Generals Roth and Eiidiger 
 in case of necessity. The rest of the 2nd corps 
 and the head-quarters remained at Turetzki. 
 
 On the 24th of July the 6th corps from Burgass, 
 and half the 2nd corps from Eski-Baschli, joined the 
 7th corps at Rumelikoi ; the head-quarters with the 
 remainder of the 2nd corps advanced as far as 
 Bski-Baschli, which is only 3 miles from Rume- 
 likoi, Here, on the 9th day from the time the 
 head-quarters broke up from before Shumla, all the 
 forces destined for offensive operations were assem- 
 bled. In this short time the Russians had effected a 
 march of above 100 miles through an unknown and 
 difficult mountainous country. The formidable bar- 
 rier of the Balkan had been crossed, the resistance 
 at the Kamtchik and the Nadir had been overcome. 
 By the capture of 4 strongholds on the sea-board, 
 immediately in the rear of the corps of observation, 
 the provisioning of the army was secured ; the wet 
 weather had supplied forage for the horses ; and 
 the fortifications of Pravadi, Devna, and Yarna, Ko- 
 prikoi and Arnautlar protected the communications 
 with Bulgaria. The population on the southern 
 side of the Balkan, consisting chiefly of G-reeks, who 
 
Chap. IV. SUCCESSES OP THE RUSSIANS. 387 
 
 had not yet suffered from tlie presence of an army 
 nominally friendly to their cause, received the Rus- 
 sians with open arms, as their brethren in religion, 
 and as their deliverers. The people remained at 
 home, went about their daily avocations, and took 
 advantage of the flight of their Turkish oppressors 
 to carry their harvest. Many villagers begged to 
 have Russians quartered upon them, as a protection 
 against the wrath of the fugitive Osmanlis. 
 
 Many thousand Turkish families had fled to the 
 mountains and woods. Emissaries were sent under 
 the protection of a battalion to induce these families 
 to return home quietly, on condition that they 
 should deliver up their arms and give hostages for 
 their good conduct. On receiving the assurance that 
 they should not be sent to colonize Russia, they did 
 not absolutely refuse the proffered terms, but asked 
 for 5 days to consider them, as they wished to come 
 in a body or not at all. At the end of that time, 
 pressed by sheer want, the Turkish inhabitants of 18 
 villages gave up their arms and came back. 
 
 Up to this time General Diebitsch had undoubt- 
 edly acted with consummate vigour, decision, and 
 good fortune. What stood him in good stead was the - 
 over-estimate of the Russian forces by the Turks. " It 
 were easier," said an officer sent by Osman Pasha 
 to reconnoitre, " to count the leaves of a forest than 
 the heads of the enemy." The Turkish com- 
 manders believed that G-eneral Diebitsch was at 
 
 2 c 2 
 
388 RUSSIAN COUNSELS. Part II. 
 
 the head of at least 100,000 men. But the Grand 
 Vizier still remained behind his walls at Shumla ; 
 and in the Russian head-quarters there were many- 
 influential voices in favour of a retreat. They said 
 that " it was impossible to give up the communi- 
 cations; that it was essential to hold the places 
 on the coast, and then to fall back with the rest of 
 the corps so as to take Shumla first, for which 
 purpose a battering train should first be sent thither 
 from Silistria. But above all they must wait for 
 reinforcements ;" although these, as it appeared, 
 only consisted of the skeleton of the reduced 12th 
 division which was to be shipped off to Sizeboli. 
 It is true that the Archimandrite of Ahiolo was 
 desired to work upon the Christian population, and 
 induce such as were capable of bearing arms to 
 assist in the liberation of their country. They were 
 to be fed and paid, if necessary to be armed, to be 
 incorporated as tirailleurs in the weakest regiments, 
 and to assist in garrisoning the strongholds in the 
 rear of the Russian army. But this reinforcement 
 was neither numerous nor serviceable. On the 
 other hand, there were not wanting voices to urge 
 "that after once crossing the Balkan they ought not 
 to halt halfway. That the victories they had already 
 achieved, the dispersion and demoralization of the 
 Turkish forces, and the friendly disposition of the 
 Christian population, made up for the numerical 
 inferiority of the Russians. That it was notorious 
 
Chap. IV. RUSSIAN DOUBTS. 389 
 
 that there was only a small Turkish army at Adrian- 
 ople. That longer delay would give the enemy time 
 to strengthen and entrench this force. That if any- 
 thing could induce the Yizier to quit his hiding-hole 
 and advance into the plain, it would be a march upon 
 the second metropolis of the state, distant only 65 
 miles, and that they would be sure to beat the 
 Turks, however numerous, in the open field, as in 
 this case General Krassowski's corps could be brought 
 into play." 
 
 But their very success made the Eussians uneasy. 
 They had encountered so little opposition on the 
 most difficult ground, that they could not but think 
 that hitherto they had only had to contend with un- 
 disciplined hordes who were merely the forerunners 
 of a real army, and this they expected to meet no- 
 where so certainly as at Aidos. 
 
 The same valley into which the sea at Burgass 
 advances so deep inland stretches out into a wide 
 plain between the Balkan and the Strandscha range 
 of mountains as far as Karnabat. The gently undu- 
 lating surface of the valley is plentifully supplied 
 with wood and water, and is exceedingly fruitful. 
 The rich clay-soil, the pasture-lands covered with 
 herds of buffaloes, the luxuriant woods, the quantity 
 of springs and streams, the number of prosperous 
 villages, and the vicinity of seaports, render this dis- 
 trict one of the most thriving in Turkey in Europe. 
 This district is admirably adapted to be the station 
 
390 AIDOS. Paet n. 
 
 of a military colony, if the Turkish government 
 were able to carry out such a scheme, after the 
 example of Austria on her frontier-lands. Under 
 good management the colony would thrive rapidly : 
 protected by the mountains in their front, and 
 situated upon the most important road to the capital, 
 and the one most exposed to attack, such a military 
 colony would defend the approaches to Constan- 
 tinople far better than any fortress. 
 
 On the northern edge of this plain, and close to 
 the foot of the Balkan, rise the minarets of Aidos, 
 a considerable but open town of 25,000 inhabitants. 
 The lay of the ground is unfavourable to fortifica- 
 tions. To the east the ridge of the valley through 
 which the brook Aidos flows, and which commands 
 the town, might be included in the fortifications, but 
 to the west, where the heights are from 1000 to 1800 
 paces distant, it would be difficult to include them 
 within the lines. 
 
 On the 25th of July the 7th corps was pushed 
 forward against this place. The Cossacks scoured the 
 country close up to the town, but General Riidiger 
 had orders to avoid a general engagement. 
 
 Alarmed at the progress of the Eussians, the 
 Grand Vizier, after sending for Hussein Pasha from 
 Rustchuk, had sent 10,000 or 12,000 men from 
 Shumla to Aidos : these forces advanced against 
 General Riidiger on the heights to the east of the 
 town, where the Turks had begun to throw up some 
 
Chap. IV. CAPTURE OF AIDOS. 391 
 
 entrenchments. The Eussians brought up their guns 
 and cannonaded the Turks. A brigade of lancers 
 advanced to the attack, and the Turks, whose skir- 
 mishers had been beaten back, retired into Aidos. 
 Without firing a shot the 37th regiment of chas- 
 seurs advanced against Aidos. The Turks fled, many 
 were killed during the pursuit, 125 taken prisoners, 
 and 3 guns captured, one of which was a Eussian 
 piece taken in the previous campaign. In the town 
 were found 600 tents, 500 tons of powder, 3000 
 military cloaks, as well as great store of arms and 
 ammunition. 
 
 On the following day as Greneral Diebitsch was about 
 to advance upon Aidos he received intelligence of its 
 capture. The 2nd corps then assembled at Eumeli- 
 koi, the 6th joined the 7th at Aidos, the head-quarters 
 were removed thither, and General Diebitsch took 
 possession of the palace of Jussuf Pasha, the defender 
 of Varna, which had been inhabited during the 
 previous autumn by the Grand Yizier. On the 
 following day everything was quiet. 
 
 The filth of the Turkish camp at Aidos, and of 
 the town itself, was frightful: hundreds of dead 
 bodies of men, horses, and camels lay festering in 
 the streets and courts. The atmosphere was poisoned 
 to such a degree that the seeds of the diseases which 
 henceforth raged among the Eussian troops were 
 probably sown during their stay in Aidos. 
 
 General Eagofsky, with the regiment Wiatka, the 
 
392 DIEBITSCH'S FOECB. Part II. 
 
 38tli regiment of chasseurs, and 10 guns, joined 
 the rest of the corps. He had come the straight 
 road from Shumla by Kbprikoi and Nadir-Derbent, 
 having found a few small abattis in his way, but 
 no Turkish troops. The 2nd division of hussars 
 and a brigade of lancers of the Bug under General 
 Petrischkof likewise joined the corps : they had come 
 from Jenibazar by Grebedje and Erhetsch. The 
 Eussians had brought very little cavalry with them 
 on their march across the Balkan, as they thought 
 they would not be much needed and were afraid of 
 getting no forage for the horses. These reinforce- 
 ments were, therefore, very necessary for further 
 offensive operations, and the want of more cavalry 
 was much felt. 
 
 The Grand Vizier remained immoveable at Shumla. 
 Exclusive of the male population fit to bear arms, but 
 not to march, he could scarcely have had more than 
 15,000 men. General Krassowski had almost as many 
 men, and if, instead of going back to Jenibazar, he 
 fixed his head-quarters atEski-Stambul, there was little 
 fear of any force being detached to annoy the right 
 flank of the Russians. All the troops that General 
 Diebitsch could collect for offensive operations were 
 assembled at Aidos : the force consisted of 41 batta- 
 lions, 52 squadrons, and a numerous train of artillery 
 • — altogether 25,000 men and 9 6 guns. By the capture 
 of the seaports the provisioning of the troops was 
 placed on a new and secure basis. Intelligence came 
 
Chap. IV. DIEBITSCH'S ADMINISTEATIVE MEASURES. S93 
 
 from Adrianople that there were only a few thousand 
 men in the place, and that the Christian popula- 
 tion longed for the arrival of the Eussians. The 
 battle of Aidos had produced its moral effect ; every- 
 day the Turkish inhabitants came to the Russian 
 outposts, and gave up their arms. They received in 
 return a white flag which was to protect their hamlet 
 from all hostilities on the part of the Russians. It 
 was distinctly stated in Greneral Diebitsch's procla- 
 mation that no soldiers should be quartered in the 
 houses of the Turks, as that would have been into- 
 lerable to them on account of their hareems. Greneral 
 Diebitsch likewise promised that the women should be 
 respected, the mosques were to remain open for reli- 
 gious service, the name of the Sultan to be mentioned 
 as usual in the Friday's prayer, and the Turks, even 
 in the provinces occupied by the Russians, were not 
 to be considered as subjects of the Czar but of the 
 Sultan. The Turkish Aynes or magistrates con- 
 tinued in office, subordinate, however, to the Russian 
 military authorities. The Russians promised to pay 
 ready money for everything. 
 
 Owing to these rational administrative measures 
 the war on the south side of the Balkan lost the 
 fearful character of a contest of nationalities and 
 religions. The spirit of the Moslem seemed com- 
 pletely broken, and since the battle of Kulewtscha 
 no trace remained of the courage of which the 
 Turks had before given so many proofs. The 
 
394 DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROOPS. Part II. 
 
 Russians did not expect any considerable rein- 
 forcements, and, if Adrianople was ever to be at- 
 tacked by a weak force, the time was now come. 
 On the 28th of July Gleneral Pahlen marched with 
 the 2nd corps in a southerly direction by Russo- 
 castro to Karapimar, and sent an advanced guard 
 under Greneral Montresor to Umur-Faki. No enemy 
 was to be seen : the Turks had everywhere fled, after 
 first plundering and ill treating the Christian popu- 
 lation of the villages. But the rest of the Russian 
 army did not follow this movement of Greneral 
 Pahlen ; several detachments were sent towards the 
 Balkan, as the Russians were still anxious about their 
 right flank, and feared an attack from Shumla. Greneral 
 Sawadski, with the 14th regiment of chasseurs, some 
 Cossacks, and 4 light hill-guns, advanced to Tjenga 
 on the Deli-kamtchik, whence the road leads by 
 Jenikoi to Pravadi, and where the Turks were sup- 
 posed to have established a small post in the Balkan ; 
 Greneral Nabel, with the Petersburg regiment of 
 lancers, 2 battalions, and 2 guns, went to Tschali- 
 kawak on the Kutschuk-Kamtchik, on the road from 
 Dobroll to Shumla ; and the Cossacks occupied Jam- 
 boli and Slivno, where the road from Shumla by 
 Djumaja and Osmanbasar to Kasan leaves the moun- 
 tain pass. General Scheremetef followed them to 
 Jamboli with the 2nd brigade of the 4th division of 
 the lancers. Thus the corps, which had only just been 
 concentrated, was again distributed from Burgass 
 
Chap. IV. FIGHT AT JAMBOLI. 395 
 
 to Slivno, and from Tjenga to Umur-Faki, over an 
 area nearly 70 miles in diameter. 
 
 On reaching Jamboli on the 31st of July, Greneral 
 Scheremetef sent 3 squadrons into tlie town ; they 
 were received with a heavy fire of musketry and 
 artillery and driven out of the place. At the 
 same time 6000 Turkish horse left their camp, on a 
 height above Jamboli, and surrounded the place on 
 both sides, in order to cut off the Russian cavalry. 
 The latter had but just time to quit the town, and a 
 fight of cavalry took place, in which the Russians, 
 who were barely 800 strong, had to contend with an 
 immensely superior force, for they had come across 
 the 15,000 men sent by the Vizier on the 28th of 
 July from Shumla, unperceived by General Kras- 
 sowski at Jenibazar, 
 
 A Turkish regiment of regular cavalry attacked 
 a Russian battery. These new regulars, in conse- 
 quence of the discipline they had so laboriously 
 acquired, advanced in a measured trot, without any 
 of the wild impetuosity of the Spahis : they suffered 
 so severely from the canister-shot, that they turned 
 and fled. 
 
 The loss of the Russians was, however, very great. 
 Fortunately for them, night put an end to the combat. 
 Spite of their enormous numerical superiority, the 
 Turks evacuated Jamboli, and retired during the 
 darkness, the infantry to Adrianople, the cavalry 
 towards Shumla, without being pursued. They left 
 
396 PREPAEATIONS TO ATTACK SLIVNO. Pakt II. 
 
 enormous stores in their camp : 39,000 pud of bis- 
 cuits and 100,000 cartridges fell into the hands of 
 those who, the day before, had lost the battle, and 
 who fully expected to be cut to pieces next day in 
 their isolated position. 
 
 G-eneral Krassowski announced that he had now 
 advanced as far as Eski-Stambul, had fought there, 
 and had sent detachments to Djumaja, whither 
 almost all the disposable Turkish troops had gone 
 from Shumla on the 7th of August ; moreover, that 
 the chasseurs on this occasion very nearly took the 
 heights behind the Matchin redoubt. 
 
 As news was brought by the inhabitants of the 
 country and by spies that Turkish troops had assem- 
 bled in considerable force at Slivno, and that the 
 Grand Yizier (which, however, was not true) had 
 gone thither himself, Greneral Diebitsch determined 
 to make an expedition against that place with all 
 the troops he could muster, excepting the 2nd corps, 
 which, as we have before said, had already gone to 
 Karapunar, in the direction of Adrianople. Even 
 the isolated detachments in the Balkan were sum- 
 moned for the purpose. The 1st brigade of the 12th 
 division was embarked at Sebastopol and landed at 
 Sizeboli. It relieved there, and in the other seaports, 
 the 1st and 2nd brigades of the 19th division, which 
 joined General Pahlen's corps. This wa'fe but a small 
 reinforcement : scurvy had raged frightfully in Size- 
 boli : there were only 128 men left out of the whole 
 
Chap. IV. MARCH ON SLIVNO. 397 
 
 regiment of Azof, and the regiments Dnieper and 
 Ukraine had suffered quite as severely. 
 
 General Pahlen was ordered to push forward his 
 5th division on the road from Adrianople to Slivno, 
 so as to cut off the enemy's retreat. 
 
 On the 9th of August the head-quarters and the 
 6th corps marched 15 miles, from Aidos to Kar- 
 nabat, which the 7th corps had already reached. 
 They set out at 4 o'clock in the morning of the 
 10th of August, rested at midday at Kassaply, and 
 encamped in the evening at Dragodana. They 
 marched above 20 miles that day. Greneral Nabel 
 was to have joined the main army with his detach- 
 ment. He mustered his troops at Dobroll, but could 
 not march till 10 o'clock in the morning, and only 
 reached the bivouac at 12 o'clock at night, after a 
 iriountain march of nearly 28 miles, A halt was 
 made on the following day, not only to rest his 
 troops, but also in order to wait for the 5th division, 
 which was to arrive on that day in a line with the 
 main army. All this shows that General Diebitsch 
 expected to find serious resistance at Slivno. The 
 reports as to the strength of the enemy were ex- 
 ceedingly contradictory. Several pashas, the Yizier 
 himself, and a large body of regular troops, were 
 reported to have assembled there. In a letter from 
 the Christian clergy of the place, the Eussian 
 General was implored to come as speedily as possible 
 to put an end to the oppression of the Turks. 
 
398 PROPOSAL FOR AN ARMISTICE. Part IT. 
 
 During the marcli to Slivno every hamlet was found 
 deserted, and some burnt ; their inhabitants had been 
 driven into the woods by the Turks. 
 
 On the way to Dragodana a despatch was 
 brought by an emissary of the Grand Yizier in 
 answer to the proposals which Greneral Diebitsch 
 had made after the battle of Kulewtscha. Its purport 
 was as follows : — " The Vizier had at that time been 
 unable to accept the terms, as he was not then 
 informed as to the state of things at Constantinople. 
 But now that the foreign ambassadors had again met 
 there, the negotiations for peace had taken so favour- 
 able a turn, that further bloodshed was unjustifiable." 
 The Vizier therefore proposed an armistice, and re- 
 quested to know the spot to which he should send 
 his negotiators. 
 
 This intelligence caused general satisfaction, as all 
 were heartily tired of the war and very uncertain 
 as to the eventual issue of the enterprise on the 
 other side of the Balkan. But as the Vizier's object 
 clearly was to gain time to reach Adrianople, Grene- 
 ral Diebitsch had left the despatch unanswered till 
 now, when he sent an officer to Slivno. This officer 
 fell among some outposts before the town, who took 
 away his papers : the increasing darkness and a dense 
 wood prevented him froni making out anything about 
 the relative position or strength of the Turkish force. 
 Thus much, however^ he learnt, that the Turks had no 
 suspicion whatever of the approach of the Russians. 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MARCH ON SLIVNO. 
 
 399 
 
 In the evening, after the tattoo, G-eneral Eiidiger 
 broke up his quarters, and marched with his infantry 
 and the greater part of the disposable cavalry 
 — namely, 1 brigade of the lancers of the Bug, 1 
 of the 2nd hussars, and 1 of the 4th division of 
 lancers — to within 5 miles of Slivno. No watch- 
 fires were allowed that night. 
 
 Between 12 and 3 the rest of the 6th corps fol- 
 lowed; and after all the troops had assembled at 
 about 5 o'clock in the morning of the 12th of Au- 
 gust, a reconnaissance was made. 
 
 On that day there were present : — 
 
 
 Batt. 
 
 Squad. 
 
 Guns 
 
 Of the 16tli division . . . 
 
 6 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 „ 18tli , 
 
 8 
 
 - 
 
 24 
 
 ,. 19th , 
 
 i 
 
 - 
 
 8 
 
 „ 5th „ .... 
 
 10 
 
 - 
 
 24 
 
 » 7th „ .... 
 
 2 
 
 - 
 
 4 
 
 „ lancers of the Bug . . 
 
 - 
 
 12 
 
 8 
 
 „ „ 4th division 
 
 - 
 
 16 
 
 8 
 
 „ hussars of the 2nd ,, 
 
 - 
 
 12 
 
 8 
 
 „ artillery of the Don 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 12 
 
 
 30 
 
 40 
 
 96 
 
 — making altogether about 20,000 men. 
 
 At 7 o'clock all the troops advanced ; the Cos- 
 sacks in front, then the whole of the cavalry, and 
 after them the 6th and the 7th corps, and the 5th 
 division : 2 miles from Slivno they came upon the 
 Turkish outposts. Some of the prisoners said that 
 the Vizier had arrived the day before at Kasan, and 
 was expected on that very day at Slivno. Here- 
 upon the 2nd brigade of the lancers of the Bug, 
 
400 FIGHT AT SLIVNO. Past U. 
 
 a regiment of Cossacks, and the 4tli regiment of 
 chasseurs, were sent forward 2h miles to the right, 
 towards the road debouching from the mountains. 
 
 G-eneral Riidiger advanced to within gun-shot of 
 the Turkish entrenchments, but was prevented by a 
 thick wood from reconnoitring them thoroughly. 
 On their right wing the ground was somewhat more 
 open, and some Turkish infantry and cavalry were 
 seen apparently making their way towards Jeni- 
 saagra. General Riidiger received orders to go to 
 the left to stop them ; he had been joined by Gene- 
 ral Scheremetefs brigade, and had with him 24 
 squadrons and 28 guns. After using his artillery, 
 he was to charge the enemy. On the right. Prince 
 Gortschakoff, with 8 battalions and 24 guns of the 
 18th division, was to advance straight forward, and, 
 with his right wing resting on the foot of the Bal- 
 kan, to attack the Turks in an oak coppice in front. 
 
 A brisk cannonade soon forced the Turks to retire. 
 As General Riidiger advanced, the Turks opened a 
 fire upon him from the entrenchments of their right 
 wing. Meanwhile, Prince Gortschakoff commenced 
 his attack, and as the Turks, after firing twice, with- 
 drew their guns, he gained the top of a hill, whence 
 he could overlook Slivno : it was already evacuated, 
 and the Turks were flying in all directions, pursued 
 by the Cossacks. The Christian inhabitants advanced 
 in procession towards the Russians, the clergy 
 bearing the cross and the holy water, the Bulgarians 
 
Chap. IV. FIGHT AT SLIVNO. 401 
 
 presenting bread and salt in token of submission; 
 the 36tli regiment of cbasseurs took possession of 
 tbe place without opposition. 
 
 On the Russian left wing the Courland regiment 
 of lancers ascended the hills covered with vine- 
 yards to the south of Slivno, and approached the 
 Turkish line of retreat upon Saagra and Kasanlik. 
 The Turks seized upon a favourable opportunity to 
 attack with superior forces two squadrons of the 
 Courland lancers, who maintained a severe contest ; 
 after being thrice driven back, a third squadron 
 came to their assistance, and they drove the Turks 
 out of the field. 
 
 In this fight, which only lasted 3 hours, the Rus- 
 sians lost 1 officer and 12 men : the infantry had not 
 fired a shot. The Turks, likewise, had but few men 
 killed ; during the pursuit, however, the Russians 
 made 500 prisoners, and took 10 guns and 6 ammu- 
 nition-waggons. The town was set on fire by the 
 Turks, but the fire soon died out of itself. The 
 prisoners said that 13 regiments of regular infantry 
 and 2 of regular cavalry, under Halil Pasha, besides 
 some thousand irregular horse, under Kosseh and 
 Ibrahim Pasha, had been stationed at Slivno. The 
 Turks, however, had only 10 guns to oppose to 96 
 Russian pieces. The report of the G-rand Yizier's 
 presence had only been spread in order to inspire 
 the troops with greater courage. General Roth 
 pursued the Turks in the direction of Kasanlik, as 
 
 2 D 
 
402 ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS. Part 11. 
 
 far as the heights of the" Balkan, and then returned. 
 The Russians pitched their camp at Slivno. A Cos- 
 sack regiment was sent to Kasan in the Balkan, 
 where 500 Turks were said to be posted. The 
 deserted Turkish camp was immediately plundered 
 by the Christian inhabitants of the town, who sought 
 above all things to provide themselves with larms, 
 and gave as much as a silver ruble to the Cossacks 
 for a musket. The Turks who had fled from Slivno 
 soon sent deputies with a flag of truce, and received 
 permission to return. 
 
 At Aidos, Jamboli, and Slivno, on the 25th and 
 31st of July and 12th of August, all the corps were 
 easily dispersed which the Vizier had detached on 
 the right flank of the Russians, in order to prevent 
 their advance upon Adrianople. The Russians were 
 in possession of all the passes of the Balkan, from 
 Cape Emineh to Kasan, and Reschid Mohammed's 
 direct communication with Adrianople was cut ofi". 
 He had scarcely any army left, and the defence of 
 Shumla depended mainly upon the armed population 
 of the town. 
 
 The Russians had gradually advanced from Bur- 
 gas as far as Slivno, about 70 miles, along the foot 
 of the Balkan, and were still at the same distance 
 from Adrianople as they had been at Burgas. Some 
 reinforcements had joined Greneral Krassowski, who 
 had nevertheless returned to Jenibazar ; but none 
 had joined the main army, unless indeed the 2nd 
 
Chap. IV. MARCH UPON ADEIANOPLB. 403 
 
 brigade of the 19 th. division at Sizeholi were now 
 disposable ; on the contrary, the Eussians had lost 
 great numbers by the fevers, which were on the 
 increase. However, the utter demoralization of the 
 Turks, who gave up fortified positions on the mere 
 appearance of hostile cavalry, even when, as at 
 Jamboli, they were vastly superior in numbers to 
 the Russians, clearly proved that the latter might 
 venture anything against such a foe. They therefore 
 determined to advance at once upon Adrianople. 
 
 The 37th regiment of chasseurs remained to gar- 
 rison Slivno ; all the other troops advanced on the 
 14th of August, two days after the fight, to Jamboli. 
 At this place 30 Turkish families, with their moUah, 
 had remained quietly in their houses, and the Chris- 
 tian population advanced in a long procession to 
 meet the Russians, There was an ample supply of 
 provisions in the town. A market, which was esta- 
 blished in the camp, was plentifully supplied with 
 poultry, and fruit of all sorts, especially melons and 
 grapes. On the following day, the 15th of August, 
 everything was quiet, and the Bulgarians attended 
 Divine worship in the Russian camp in great 
 numbers. 
 
 The first day's march took the 7th corps, on the 
 16th of August, to the village of Graza-beili, on a brook 
 which empties itself into the Tundscha, on its right 
 bank. The rest of the army marched to Papaskoi, 
 a distance of 24 miles. Only 2i miles beyond 
 
 2 D 2 
 
404 MARCH UPON ADRIANOPLE. Part II. 
 
 Jamboli the infantry had to wade through a ford 3 
 feet deep, although there had been time enough on the 
 previous day to build a temporary bridge. Several 
 of the small tributaries of the Tundscha, which had 
 to be forded, were marshy at bottom, and had been 
 rendered almost impassable by the cavalry which 
 went through first. The 5th division, which formed 
 the advanced guard, had started at three in the 
 morning ; but the head of the infantry did not reach 
 Papaskoi until eight in the evening. The com- 
 manding ofScer, displeased at their delay, rode to 
 meet them, and expressed his anger to the leaders. 
 In order to appease his resentment they sent the 
 singers in advance, who received a present of 100 
 rubles. The troops were terribly knocked up by 
 such forced marches ; there was no lack of water 
 on the march, and the troops might just as well 
 have halted for the night earlier on the road. It 
 was certainly impossible for the Russians to march 
 as quickly as the Turks, who had been dispersed at 
 Slivno. 
 
 To advance upon Adrianople, by far the most 
 difficult road — that along the left bank of the Tund- 
 scha — was chosen ; probably in order to avoid cross- 
 ing the river near the town, and so as to have the 
 right flank covered by the stream against any attack 
 from Philippopoli. 
 
 The Russians marched again at seven o'clock on 
 the following morning : the 2nd corps formed the 
 
Chap. IV. MARCH UPON ADRIANOPLE. 405 
 
 advanced guard : the second division of lancers, 
 v^^hicli. grumbled at having to march behind the 
 infantry, was put at the head after the first halt. 
 The 7th corps came up across the bridge at 
 Jenidschely, and followed the gros. Greneral Bud- 
 berg and his corps were despatched towards the left 
 upon Kirklissa (Forty Churches). 
 
 Beyond Papaskoi the ground is more hilly and 
 broken. The rocks have hardly any covering of 
 earth, and marching on this burning stony ground 
 was very painful and fatiguing. The Turks had 
 destroyed all the fountains which afford such needful 
 refreshment to the traveller in these regions, and 
 the want of water was very distressing. After a 
 march of nearly 20 miles, the Russians reached 
 Bujuk Derbent, where they halted for the night and 
 rested the following day. The 7th corps halted 
 before, at Kutschuk Derbent. The troops suffered 
 far more in this rocky desert than in crossing the 
 Balkan ; the heat was insupportable, and fever 
 spread with increased virulence. The officers, espe- 
 cially those belonging to head-quarters, were the 
 first to sink under the disease. The distance from 
 Slivno to Derbent is nearly 60 miles, and five days 
 had been consumed in marching it, so that the 
 Russian troops had only advanced at the rate of 12 
 miles a-day ; but as they had rested 2 days at Jam- 
 boli and Derbent, they had to make forced marches 
 on the other days, which exhausted their strength. 
 
406 MARCH UPON ADKIANOPLB. Part ]I. 
 
 The Bujuk Derbent (great pass) is a very difficult 
 defile, but not a Turk was there to defend it. The 
 Cossacks scoured the country towards Adrianople by 
 Jenidje and Akbunar, and made several prisoners, 
 who all agreed in reporting the garrison of the 
 town at 8000 or 10,000 soldiers, and as many armed 
 citizens. A reinforcement of 10,000 men was ex- 
 pected there every day, and entrenchments had 
 lately been begun. 
 
 General Budberg sent word from Erekli, that 
 Kirklissa seemed very feebly garrisoned, and re- 
 ceived instructions to take the place as soon as his 
 detachment should reach it. 
 
 Greneral Krassowski sent from Shumla a second 
 letter from the Grand Vizier, with whom General 
 Madatof had had an interview. The Vizier re- 
 quested General Diebitsch to halt, and to fix a place 
 where negotiations might be begun — a proposal 
 which could not but be very welcome to the Russian 
 General. 
 
 On the 19th, just four weeks after the army had 
 crossed the Balkan and taken the seaport towns, it 
 advanced upon Adrianople. The troops encamped 
 opposite the town in three lines, so that "the right 
 wing rested on the Tundscha. On the first line was 
 the 2nd corps, with the old Seraglio on the further 
 side of the river on their right ; on the left a hill 
 below which runs the high road from Derbent to 
 Adrianople, and whence the whole town can be 
 
Chap. IV. POSITION OF ADEIANOPLE. 407 
 
 overlooked. The 5tli corps was on tlie second, and 
 the 7th on the third line. The Cossacks occupied all 
 the heights as far as the ancient Justinian road to 
 Constantinople. The commanding officer rode with 
 the chief of the general staff, G-eneral Toll, and a 
 small suite, to reconnoitre the town and the Turkish 
 entrenchments. From a distance of many miles the 
 Russians had seen the four tall minarets of the mas:- 
 nificent mosque of Sultan Selim; but it was not 
 until they came very near to the town that the 
 astonishing spectacle afforded by the former capital 
 of the Ottoman empire met their eyes. 
 
 Adrianople lies at the confluence of the Tundscha, 
 the Maritza, and the Arda, three considerable streams 
 which can only be crossed by means of bridges, which 
 meet in the town almost at right angles, and then 
 pursue a united course. Four broad valleys are thus 
 formed in the shape of a cross. Between these the 
 hills rise gently but to a considerable height, and 
 are covered with vineyards and orchards. The town 
 itself lies partly on the low ground, partly on the 
 foot of the nearest slope- above the valley between 
 the Tundscha and the lower Maritza. Upon the 
 highest point rises the gigantic cupola of the Selim- 
 midje. The old part of Adrianople is surrounded by 
 a wall, but it is completely hidden by new buildings, 
 and the town is overlooked on every side, although 
 only from a distance. Without the town hollow 
 roads, ditches, and garden-walls, afford great facili- 
 
408 ADEIANOPIfE. Pabt II. 
 
 ties for its defence, and the approaches may be 
 covered by troops drawn up so as to rest upon the 
 rivers, but only in corps of not less than 30,000 or 
 40,000 men. The new Turkish fortifications con- 
 sisted merely of a ditch between the Tundscha and 
 the upper and lower Maritza, flanked by a few unfi- 
 nished batteries. 
 
 The first view of Adrianople is wonderfully beau- 
 tiful : the white minarets and the lead-roofed cupolas 
 of the mosques, baths, and caravanserais rise in 
 countless numbers above the endless mass of flat 
 roofs and the broad tops of the plane-trees. Magni- 
 ficent stone bridges stretch across the rapid rivers ;■ 
 the dazzlingly white cotton sails of the vessels con- 
 trast with the broad green meadows, and gilded 
 crescents glitter on every turret against the dark 
 blue sky. On the right, beyond the Tundscha, over 
 a grove of dark cypresses, rise the towers of the old 
 Seraglio, in which dwelt the Ottoman rulers while 
 they threatened the Byzantine Empire 400 years 
 ago, just as the Ottoman Empire is now in its turn 
 menaced by the Russians. As far as the eye can 
 reach over the boundless landscape it sees nothing 
 but fertile fields, groves of fruit-trees, and flourishing 
 villages. 
 
 Such a sight was indeed enough to make the Rus- 
 sian soldier forget the toils, sufferings, and dangers 
 he had undergone, and dream only of comfortable 
 quarters and well-supplied markets. The sick hoped 
 
Chap. IV. ADEIANOPLE. 409 
 
 for rest and recovery within those walls where most 
 of them were destined to find a grave. Those, how- 
 ever, who understood the actual state of affairs 
 must have felt that they were either at the end of 
 the war or at the beginning of their destruction ; 
 for the Russians had indeed reached Adrianople, but 
 they had reached it with at most 20,000 men, while 
 the town, if seriously bent upon defence, could bring 
 into the field at least as many armed inhabitants. 
 The Turkish corps which had been dispersed in the 
 Balkan* marched to Adrianople by the most various 
 routes, and a fresh Turkish army was advancing 
 towards it from Sophia. Considerations, not of a 
 military nature, must now decide the issue of the 
 campaign, and we shall not have to relate any more 
 purely military proceedings. 
 
 * The passes from Stumla and Varna over the Balkan are now all 
 practicaiale for artillery, and even for a siege train : they remain so all the 
 year, except in very wet or snowy weather. They are strongly fortified : 
 those nearest Sophia are the easiest to pass, and are also fortified. — Teans. 
 
410 ■ EUSSIAN FORCE AT ADBIANOPLE. Part II. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 SURRENDER OP ADRIANOPLE — MILITARY POSITION OF CONSTANTI- 
 NOPLE — NEGOTIATIONS — DEMONSTRATIONS — CONCLUSION 
 OF PEACE. 
 
 The exertions of two campaigns, an expenditure of 
 100 millions of rubles, and the sacrifice of consider- 
 ably above 50,000 men, had brought 20,000 Eussians 
 to the gates of Adrianople. Such a force was totally 
 inadequate to the task still to be accomplished, if 
 that was to compel a peace at the point of the sword. 
 The successes achieved by the Russians were by no 
 means sufficient to exhaust all the means of defence 
 of the Ottoman empire, but they had called into 
 action elements of dissolution which were far more 
 powerful than any hostile army in forcing the Porte 
 to conclude a peace on terms unfavourable to itself. 
 The unavoidable exclusion of the Rayahs, ^'. e. the 
 larger half of the population, from the defence of 
 the country, the discontent of the Mussulmans, the 
 destruction of the old system of popular arming in 
 consequence of the reform, the habitual insubordi- 
 nation of the Pashas of distant provinces, and, above 
 all, the influence of European policy, led to a course 
 of events which was no longer guided by the Rus- 
 
Chap. V. THE DEFENDERS. • 411 
 
 sian army, but wHch, on the contrary, it was com- 
 pelled blindly to follow. Greneral Diebitscli's career 
 of conquest was a slope upon wliich it was impos- 
 sible to retreat or stand still, and which must lead 
 him to fresh successes or to total destruction. But 
 under the circumstances, even an army which seemed 
 melting away under the hands of its leader was 
 sufficient to urge on the Porte in the course it had 
 already entered. 
 
 Greneral Diebitsch was fully aware that in his 
 position the greatest boldness was the greatest pru- 
 dence, and he displayed both in a high degree when, 
 with the wreck of an army and only a few remaining 
 weeks of time, he ostensibly commenced under- 
 takings which under any other circumstances would 
 have required a fresh campaign and a fresh army. 
 
 We will not, however, anticipate events, but re- 
 turn to the Eussian corps before Adrianople. 
 
 The town contained 80,000 inhabitants, of whom 
 the greater part were Moslems, who had to defend 
 their property, their wives, and their faith against 
 the Eussians. The corps under Abdurrahman Pasha 
 had been scattered at Monastirkoi, and all the de- 
 tachments successively sent by the Vizier had been 
 dispersed at Aidos, Jamboli, Karnabat, and Slivno, 
 without much loss on either side. The fugitives 
 from an army of 40,000 or 50,000 men had many of 
 them gone to Adrianople, and it was certain that a 
 number of defenders at least equal to the attacking 
 
412 NEGOTIATIONS. Paet II. 
 
 force coulci be posted behind garden-walls, hedges, 
 and ditches, if the townspeople capable of bear- 
 ing arms took part in the defence. Even if the 
 Turks had no mind to defend the place, and were 
 ready to surrender trophies and resources such as 
 were contained in Adrianople without firing a shot, 
 there was nothing to hinder Halil Pasha from 
 marching southwards to Constantinople with 10,000 
 or 12,000 men, mostly regular infantry, and 2000 
 horse on the very day on which Greneral Diebitsch 
 approached from the north ; for Greneral Budberg's 
 detachment, which menaced this retreat, consisted of 
 only 2000 men in all, and did not reach Kirklissa 
 until the evening of the 20th. It seemed quite in- 
 credible that, under such circumstances, the Turkish 
 leaders would remain at Adrianople merely in order 
 to capitulate ; nevertheless they did so. 
 
 As early as the afternoon of the 19th of August, 
 besides secret emissaries from the Christian clergy, 
 Turkish delegates came to the Russian head-quarters 
 to negotiate a free exit. This the Turkish corps might 
 have made on the day before totally unopposed, and 
 could still force it on the following day with six-fold 
 numbers to those of the Russians, should Budberg 
 venture to oppose their passage at Lule Burgass. 
 Nothing could be more welcome to Greneral Diebitsch. 
 He professed himself not indisposed to grant what he 
 was in fact totally unable to refuse, but he imposed 
 certain conditions. Halil and Ibrahim Pasha and 
 
Chap. V. NEGOTIATIONS. 413 
 
 their troops received permission to return to their 
 several homes, but not to retreat in the direction of 
 Constantinople. They were first to deliver up their 
 arms — a condition with which irregular troops would 
 never have complied — as well as their standards, their 
 artillery, and their stores of provisions and ammu- 
 nition, into the hands of the Russians. In return the 
 Eussian commander promised the inhabitants security 
 for their persons and properties, and the undisturbed 
 exercise of every form of religious worship. G-eneral 
 Diebitsch allowed the Turks only fourteen hours, i. e. 
 till nine o'clock on the following morning, to decide 
 whether they would accept or reject these condi- 
 tions, for he very wisely reflected that the Pashas, 
 who had now completely lost their heads, might 
 otherwise collect their senses again. Moreover, if 
 Adrianople did not surrender next mqrning he would 
 be compelled to attack it, and he did not choose to 
 betray the weakness of his forces by a longer delay. 
 But the storming of Adrianople would be a very 
 hazardous enterprise if any defence at all were 
 made, and, even supposing the approaches were 
 taken, 20,000 men would almost lose themselves in 
 the labyrinth of streets of a town ten miles in cir- 
 cumference. It would then be impossible to prevent 
 them from plundering, burning, and committing all 
 sorts of excesses, which would rouse even the most 
 peaceable citizens to resistance. Indeed, the military 
 occupation of large towns, without previous agree- 
 
414 SUEEENDER OP ADEIANOPLE. Part II. 
 
 ment, is a problem for tHe solution of whicli the his- 
 tory of war oflfers few precedents. 
 
 The Russian army passed the night of the 19th 
 of August under arms, in a state of anxious expec- 
 tation. A great disturbance and movement pre- 
 vailed in the town, and the torches and lights, which 
 kept shifting from place to place, shone through the 
 darkness up to the Russian camp. Before daybreak 
 the Russian army was formed into 2 columns ; the 
 2nd and 4th corps threatened the town, while the 
 7th corps, with the greater part of the cavalry and 
 horse-artillery, made preparations to advance by 
 Arnautkoi on the road to Kirklissa, so as to cut off 
 the retreat upon Constantinople. 
 
 But the Pashas did not even wait for the expira- 
 tion of the delay granted them for surrender. Two 
 hours before the appointed time their envoys ap- 
 peared to treat for more favourable terms. Greneral 
 Diebitsch replied by ordering his columns to ad- 
 vance, and, when they got near the advanced en- 
 trenchments, dense masses of townspeople, Turks 
 and Christians, crowded out of the gates to offer 
 their submission to the Russians. They brought with 
 them wine, sweetmeats, fruit, and bread, so that the 
 place looked like a fair. The Turkish troops threw 
 away their detested firelocks and bayonets, and 
 abandoned the works before the formalities of con- 
 cluding a treaty could be gone through. The Pashas 
 only had time to congratulate the Russian Greneral, 
 
OiiAP. V. THE RUSSIANS I5f ADRIANOPLE. 415 
 
 who made his entry into Adrianople like into a 
 friendly town, where nothing but the garrison is 
 being changed. 
 
 The cavalry at once moved off upon the main road 
 to Constantinople : this movement was followed by 
 the 2nd corps^ which drew up before the gate on 
 that road. The 6th corps occupied the road to 
 Kirklissa, and the 7th took possession, for the pre- 
 sent, of the handsome barracks standing high up on 
 the hill between the Tundscha and the upper Maritza ; 
 the artillery also was placed in front of the barrack. 
 The Rijssian commander established his head- 
 quarters in thfe apartments which had been prepared 
 for the Sultan in the old Seraglio. The numerous 
 green tents of the Turks afforded very welcome 
 shelter to the Russian soldiers. Fifty-six guns, 
 several thousand firelocks, considerable stores of 
 munitions of war, and the abundant resources 
 ajBforded by a great town for the clothing and main- 
 tenance of an army, and, above all, the moral effect 
 which its capture could not fail to produce through- 
 out Europe, and especially at Constantinople, formed 
 the bloodless trophies of the day. 
 
 A solemn service was performed next morning 
 in the market-place. A Russian General was ap- 
 pointed commandant of the town, and the inhabit- 
 ants were compelled to give up their arms. The 
 Turkish Pasha continued to exercise the functions 
 of civil governor. The mosques and other public 
 
416 THE EUSSIANS IN ADBIANOPLE. Part II. 
 
 places of meeting were guarded by Russian troops, 
 but the corps itself occupied a bivouac upon a 
 green island, shaded by the most magnificent 
 plane-trees, and situated next to the Seraglio, 
 between the Tundscha and the Maritza. Possibly 
 the low position of the place, the excessive heat, 
 the sudden transition from violent exertion to com- 
 plete repose, and lastly, the want of good and suf- 
 ficient food, greatly contributed to develop the seeds 
 of disease already lurking in the Russian army. 
 The constant rains soaked the ground and the beds 
 of rushes upon which the Russians lay. The nights 
 now began to be bitterly cold. Thousands of sick, 
 chiefly diarrhoea patients, had to be brought into 
 hospital in the town, and the corps, already so weak, 
 became less numerous every day. The sojourn in 
 Adrianople, which was undoubtedly most destruc- 
 tive to the troops, has often been made matter of 
 reproach to Greneral Diebitsch, and he has been 
 blamed for not marching at once upon Constanti- 
 nople. Before assenting to this we will examine 
 the position of the Russian commander.* 
 
 * Baron v. Muffling, who was sent hj the Prussian Government in 
 1829-30^ to Constantinople, to watch the course of events, states in his 
 Memoirs (' Aus Meinem Leben ') that he represented to General Diehitsch 
 the necessity of keeping the Russian troops at Adrianople until the treaty- 
 was signed, as on the first detachment reaching Constantinople the Sultan 
 would quit it, and great confusion would ensue ; — that Diebitsch accord- 
 ingly gave his troops the necessary orders. Baron v. Miiffling adds that 
 his messenger, on returning from Adrianople, found the roads filled with 
 disorderly Turkish troops, marching towards Constantinople without their 
 
CUAP. T. ADVANCE OF GENEEAL DIEBITSCH. 417 
 
 Mustapha, Pasha of Scodra in Albania, an old 
 Janissary, and a determined opponent of reform, was 
 in close communication with the rebellious Bos- 
 niaks. It quite accorded with his interests that the 
 military power of the Porte should be weakened, 
 but by no means that the Ottoman rule in Turkey 
 should be overthrown. He had hitherto contrived 
 to evade the repeated commands of the Sultan under 
 all sorts of pretexts, and had kept his forces intact 
 until all the newly-raised armies of his master had 
 -been beaten and scattered by the Russians. He had 
 taken no part in the war in Bulgaria, had arrived 
 too late to defend the Balkan, or to save Adrian- 
 ople ; but when the capital of the Ottoman empire 
 was threatened with an attack by the infidels, he 
 was ready to defend it. He now appeared with 
 40,000 men, and, what is more, 40,000 Arnauts, at 
 Sophia, while his advanced troops scoured the coun- 
 try as far as Philippopoli, 90 miles from Adrian- 
 ople. 
 
 General Diebitsch still had 150 miles between 
 him and the capital of Turkey. Between Adrian- 
 ople and Karistiran, the ancient Justinian way is 
 intersected by 40 tributaries of the Ergineh^ which 
 afford positions of defence at every two or three 
 
 officers, who kept at a distance from fear of being murdered by them ; 
 that the interpreter heard the Turkish soldiers say one to another that 
 on reaching Constantinople they would set the old place on fire at every 
 corner. Baron Mufding informed the Sultan of these plans; and 
 these wild hordes were not allowed to enter Constantinople, but were 
 shipped across to the Asiatic coast. — Trans. 
 
 2 E 
 
418 SITE OF CONSTANTINOPLE. Part II. 
 
 miles, supposing any Turkish, corps had been dis- 
 posed to occupy them. The ruins of the wall of 
 Athanasius, extending right across the isthmus, 
 form a fresh retrenchment ; and the positions on 
 the main road at Bujuk, and especially at Kutjuk 
 Tchekmedje, are absolutely impregnable. They 
 may, however, be avoided by a circuit on the 
 north, as the so-called Strandscha mountains are, 
 in fact, a mere chain of wooded hills from 600 to 
 800 feet high, and passable for infantry in every 
 part. Two practicable roads from Serai by Jataldji 
 and Litros, and from Kara-Burnu on the Black Sea 
 by Boghaskoi, likewise lead to the capital. Although 
 all these roads offer excellent positions for retrench- 
 ments, their capabilities of defence mattered little 
 under existing circumstances. But it was impos- 
 sible for the Eussians to march upon Constantinople 
 without leaving at least a few thousand men in so 
 considerable a town as Adrianople, were it only to 
 maintain order and protect the sick ; it was, more- 
 over, quite out of the question to advance while 
 such an army as that commanded by the Pasha of 
 Scodra remained in the rear unwatched. If only 
 6000 or 8000 men were appointed for this duty the 
 Russian army would not number above 10,000 by 
 the time it reached Constantinople. 
 
 The actual city of Constantinople, as our readers 
 are- well aware, occupies a triangukr space between 
 the sea of Marmora and the Grolden Horn — the third 
 front, facing the land, is about 8000 paces long from 
 
Chap. V.. CONSTANTINOPLE. 419 
 
 the seven towers of the Blaquernal, and is protected 
 by a wall 30 or 40 feet high ; the top of the wall is 
 4 or 5 feet wide, so that there is ample room to 
 move about upon it ; and as in most parts the battle- 
 ments are still in good repair, the wall may be 
 occupied by sharpshooters without further prepara- 
 tion. At regular intervals of 60 or 80 paces are 
 projecting towers of several vaulted stories, which, 
 however, were built by the Emperor Julian, and 
 are, therefore, not calculated to resist artillery. As 
 a defence against cannon-shot, earthworks might be 
 thrown up against the wall, which might easily be 
 lowered in places if necessary, as there is no want of 
 space or material. 
 
 At a distance of 15 or 20 paces in front of the 
 main wall is a lower one with small towers, and out- 
 side that a dry ditch from 10 to 15 feet deep with 
 a faced scarp and counterscarp. The great wall 
 extends for 17,000 paces more on the side towards 
 the harbour and the sea, and is defended by 300 
 large towers in all. Immense fragments of the wall 
 and halves of towers have fallen, and lie on the 
 ground unbroken, but there is no regular breach on 
 the side towards the land. In those parts which 
 have remained standing, the stones and mortar have 
 hardened in the course of fourteen centuries to the 
 consistency of solid rock, and the whole is overgrown 
 with gigantic ivy. Although the lofty battlements 
 are visible from a distance of four or five miles off, on 
 an approach within cannon-shot range the wall com- 
 
 2 E 2 
 
420 EASIEST APPROACH TO THE CITY, Part IT. 
 
 pletely disappears behind a thick wood of cypresses 
 which covers the extensive graveyards of the Mos- 
 lems. It would, therefore, be very difficult to batter 
 breaches in it, especially with field artillery ; the 
 effect produced by mortars would likewise be but 
 trifling, as a space of more than 1000 paces behind 
 the wall is occupied almost entirely by gardens., 
 The actual city, which is chiefly inhabited by Mus- 
 sulmans, does not begin for a whole mile within the 
 walls at the gigantic mosque of Sultan Mahmoud. 
 The seraglio, which stands upon the extreme point 
 of land, is surrounded by massive walls and towers 
 and forms a strong citadel against the town, and the 
 ancient Cyclobion at the southern extremity of the 
 landward wall affords a safe redoubt with towers 80 
 feet high, and extremely thick. Five gates, pro- 
 tected by double towers, are open in the wall on the 
 landward side, and a sixth is bricked up. The centre 
 gate, which the Turks call Topkapu, or gate of 
 artillery, and the Greeks the gate of St. Romanus, 
 is the same that Mahmoud Grazi bombarded with his 
 large cannon, and before which Oonstantine Palseo- 
 logus fell. 
 
 The easiest approach to the wall of Constantinople 
 is across the ground which lies between the brook 
 Topjilar and the harbour. The hill, which falls with 
 a rapid slope towards the latter and the open suburb 
 of Eyoob, would favour a covered advance at this 
 point. But at the foot of the hill, above a mile in 
 advance of the landward wall, is a huge building 
 
Chap. V. ENORMOUS BARRACKS. 421 
 
 500 feet long, 300 wide, and flanked by lofty towers. 
 Tills is the barrack of Eamis-tcbiflik, built to contain 
 5000 or 6000 men. In front of it are some badly 
 traced lines of entrenchment, which were thrown 
 up on the first intelligence that the Eussians had 
 crossed the Balkan. 3000 paces further towards 
 the left, on the high road to Adrianople, stands a 
 still larger turreted edifice in the midst of the well- 
 known plain of Daood Pasha, where for three centuries 
 the Janissaries assembled before taking the field. 
 From this spot marched the armies which conquered 
 Hungary, threatened Vienna, and penetrated even 
 into Styria. After the destruction of the Janissaries, 
 Sultan Mahmoud built a barrack for 8000 of his 
 newly-raised Nizam-jeditt on this spot. The bar- 
 racks contain a mosque, a bath, and a kiosk for the 
 Sultan, and measure 800 paces in the front. These 
 enormous barracks (beyond comparison the largest 
 buildings in Constantinople, not excepting even the 
 mosques and palaces) form, as it were, detached 
 forts in connexion with the large and massive Hasta- 
 hane or hospital situated between them. These three 
 buildings would contain 14,000 men, and afford an 
 excellent support for the wing of a large army, 
 which might encamp in safety between them and 
 the landward wall. Some well-constructed trenches 
 would render it extremely difficult to attack an army 
 closely backed by the resources of so large a city. 
 Neither is there any want upon these heights of the 
 water so indispensable to a Turkish corps, as the 
 
422 GAL AT A AND PEEA. Paet II. 
 
 great conduits which supply Constantinople run 
 right under both barracks through subterranean 
 channels, and bring water in abundance. 
 
 The suburbs situated upon the steep slope to the 
 north of the harbour, Pera Kassim-pasha, Haskoi, 
 &c., are far less protected than Constantinople itself. 
 They are quite open, and contain a population of 
 above 100,000, of which more than half are Grreeks, 
 Armenians, Franks, and Jews. Yery unwisely, all 
 the great establishments belonging to the army and 
 navy have been erected in this quarter, — the arsenal, 
 the dockyards, the shipping stores, the artillery 
 workshops, the cannon-foundry, the gun-manufac- 
 tory, and the barracks of the bombardiers and artil- 
 lerymen. It is true that Gralata, the old Genoese 
 factory, which once prescribed laws to the falling 
 Byzantine empire, likewise is a kind of citadel. It 
 is surrounded with high walls, behind which the 
 streets descend like staircases so steeply, that they 
 cannot even be overlooked from Pera, which stands 
 above it. An immense round tower rises like a 
 giant above this town still devoted to the trade with 
 Europe. But it faces the harbour, and could con- 
 tribute nothing to the defence of the place towards 
 the land, neither does it protect any of the above- 
 named establishments. 
 
 The approaches on this side might, however, 
 be defended without difficulty; and supposing the 
 Sultan had only a few thousand men left in the 
 field, and were threatened by land both on the west 
 
Chap. V. SUPPLY OF WATER. 423 
 
 and on the north, he might leave Constantinople to 
 defend her own landward front, and draw up his 
 little army on the plateau to the north of Per a. 
 The advanced guard might take up a very favour- 
 able position on the grip at the post of Sindchir- 
 likuju on the high road to Bujuk-dereh ; the front 
 would not be more than 1000 paces in length, and 
 easily defended by temporary earthworks ; both 
 wings would rest on deep rocky ravines. The en- 
 trances into the "vale of sweet waters" are few 
 and difficult, and might easily be guarded by special 
 outposts. In order to attack this position in front, 
 the invaders would be forced to detach a corps 
 whicb would have to cross the valleys of the rivers 
 Cydaris and Barbyses, passable only by means of 
 bridges, and would be separated from the main body 
 by a distance of 10 miles, and many very difficult 
 passes. Such a corps would be in great danger of 
 being surprised by the Turks from Eyoob, and it 
 would have to be provisioned from Kilios or Derkos 
 on the Black Sea. Eather greater numbers and 
 some resolution would likewise enable the Turks to 
 entrench themselves with great advantage on the 
 narrow tongue of land to the west of the village of 
 Kahathaneh. 
 
 A very important matter in the defence of Con- 
 stantinople is the supply of. water. As the town is 
 entirely built on rocky heights, and the wells within 
 the walls contain but little water, and that bitter, 
 the first care of the Grreek Emperors was to supply 
 
424 AQUEDUCTS. Part II. 
 
 the town with this first of necessaries by means of 
 very large canals. A vast quantity of moisture falls 
 in the shape of snow and rain during the spring and 
 winter months upon the range of wooded hills on 
 the north of Constantinople towards the Black Sea. 
 Here whole valleys were dammed up by gigantic 
 walls, and so much water was collected in these arti- 
 ficial lakes that, in spite of the evaporation, it sup- 
 plied the vast consumption of the city throughout 
 the summer until the next rainy season. From these 
 reservoirs the water was conveyed to the city for a 
 distance of above 20 miles in arched brick conduits 
 which followed a very winding course. Hills were 
 cut through, and valleys crossed by aqueducts, many 
 of which are 100 feet high, and above 1000 paces 
 long. But as these conduits would have only to be cut 
 in a single place in order to dry up all the fountains 
 of Constantinople, the Emperors had taken the pre- 
 caution of constructing large basins on elevated 
 places within the walls, which were filled in times of 
 peace, and could supply the city in case of a siege. 
 The carelessness of the Turks has suffered all these 
 great works to decay. The open cisterns are now 
 filled up with gardens and houses, nay in one there 
 is even a mosque, and are called Tchukur Bostan, or 
 deep gardens. The vaulted ones, as, for instance, 
 the Bin Bir Direk, or thousand columns, serve as a 
 habitation to the silk-spinners, and are half filled 
 up with rubbish. The successors of Mahmoud and 
 Suleiman never dreamed that their descendants 
 
Chap. V. FACILITY OP GETTING PEOVISIGNS. 425 
 
 could ever be besieged ; but things are greatly 
 cbanged since tbeir times, and it would now be 
 liigbly advisable to restore the cisterns to their 
 original purpose, which might easily be done. In 
 the event of a complete investment of Constan- 
 tinople, the numerous population could only subsist 
 for a very short time on the bad water of the wells ; 
 but so long as the city is only attacked by land, 
 good water can be got in abundance from the mag- 
 nificent springs on the Asiatic shore, from Scutari 
 Tchamlidje, Kara Kulak, and above all from the 
 inexhaustible springs of Sultanieh, close to the sea- 
 shore, at which whole fleets take in their supplies. 
 
 Neither can the city be short of provisions so 
 long as the Turks remain masters of the sea of 
 Marmora. The banks of this splendid inland sea 
 feed numerous flocks, and grow wheat, olives, wine, 
 fruits, and vegetables in abundance. The fertile 
 plains of Broussa are in constant communication 
 with the capital by the port of Mudania, and the 
 sea affords an endless supply of excellent fish : the 
 myriads of Palamedae, which are hauled up by a single 
 large net at the time of their passage through the 
 Bosphorus, would alone prevent an actual famine ; and 
 even if a hostile fleet appeared in the Hellespont, it 
 would scarcely be able to cut off the communications 
 between Constantinople and Scutari and the coast 
 of Asia. The Bosphorus between the two towns is 
 only 1850 paces wide, and is completely commanded 
 from the lofty shore of the Seraglio. The broad 
 
426 DESCRIPTION OF THE DARDANELLES. Part II. 
 
 quays and the plateau of Grulhane are admirably 
 adapted for placing artillery, and in the course of a 
 few days the Turks, animated by the energy and 
 activity of one man, General Sebastiani, mounted 
 upon them several hundred pieces, sufficient effectu- 
 ally to prevent any hostile fleet from anchoring 
 between the two towns, or even from interrupting 
 the communication between them for a moment. 
 
 In order, therefore, to invest Constantinople com- 
 pletely, it would be necessary to have two armies in 
 Europe, a third in Asia, and a fleet in the Sea of 
 Marmora. The latter presupposes that the Turkish 
 fleet should first be destroyed, and that one of the 
 approaches to the capital, either the Dardanelles or 
 the Bosphorus, should be forced. 
 
 The Dardanelles, our readers are aware, form a 
 channel nearly 20 miles long, 2i wide at their 
 southern entrance between the so-called new castles, 
 only 1980 paces between the old castles, and 2830 
 again at Nagara, the ancient Abydos. The real 
 defence rests with the batteries erected on a space 
 of 8000 paces between Sultan Hissar and Nagara ; 
 in fact, the only use of the new castles was to prevent 
 a hostile fleet from anchoring within the straits. A 
 few successful undertakings made of late years by 
 the English and the French have given rise to a 
 pretty general opinion that batteries cannot be de- 
 fended against fleets, as the latter are able to concen- 
 trate hundreds of guns against each separate battery. 
 Now, although the Dardanelles are armed with no 
 
Chap. V. FIRE PROM SHIPS AND BATTERIES. 427 
 
 less than 585 pieces mostly of very heavy calibre, 
 there can be no doubt that the guns of a tolerably 
 large fleet would be far more numerous. Moreover, 
 a ship which can sail 10 knots an hour with a 
 favourable wind, is not exposed to the fire of a bat- 
 tery for above six minutes at a time. On the 
 other hand, it must not be forgotten that the condi- 
 tions under which artillery acts at sea and on shore 
 are very different and far more favourable to the 
 latter. The utmost damage done by a cannon-ball 
 from a ship is to kill a few men and to dismount a 
 gun, whilst it is very possible that one fired from a 
 battery may put a ship hors de combat. Men, guns, 
 and munitions are infinitely safer behind breastworks 
 than behind the wooden walls of a ship. The former 
 offers a mark only 5 feet high, and the slightest 
 rocking of a ship affects the elevation of the guns so 
 greatly, that whole broadsides may go off too high 
 or too low. The guns of the battery, on the other 
 hand, are steady, the gunner can take aim quietly at 
 a surface 30 feet high, 200 long, and vulnerable 
 at every point, although certainly in motion. More- 
 over, the balls which strike too low, may still 
 damage the ship by ricochet, and those which go too 
 high may shatter the rigging. The conditions would 
 be still more favourable to the shore artillery if 
 (with the exception of Eski Hissarik and a few 
 pieces upon the towers) all the guns did not fire a 
 fleur deau. Batteries standing at a height of 20 
 or 30 feet have nothing to fear from ricochet from 
 
428 FORTIFICATIONS OF THE DARDANELLES. Paet 11. 
 
 the water, but only from direct fire from the sliips, 
 and they are very unlikely to be bit at all. An- 
 other unfavourable circumstance in the fortifica- 
 tions on the Dardanelles is that all the breastworks 
 and platforms are constructed of stone. 
 
 Another material point is the diff"erence of calibre, 
 for while ships usually carry at the utmost only 
 3 2-pounders,* the batteries on the Dardanelles contain 
 108 44-pounders, 19 60-pounders, 30 121-pounders 
 throwing iron balls ; besides 63 kemerliks or guns 
 which throw stone balls, some of which are 1570 
 pounds in weight. These gigantic guns are some 
 of them 28 in. in diameter, and a man may creep 
 into them up to the breech ; they lie on the ground 
 on sleepers of oak, instead of on gun-carriages, with 
 their butts against strong walls, so as to prevent the 
 recoil, as it would be impossible to run them forward 
 again in action — some of them are loaded with as 
 much as 1 cwt. of powder. Baron de Tott gives 
 a somewhat highflown description of the " earth- 
 quake" produced by their discharge. In most of 
 them the touch-holes are as large as the barrel of a 
 musket ; the great mass of powder ignites slowly, 
 and a good deal of it is always blown out of the 
 mouth. The report is very violent, but dead, and is 
 not nearly so painful to the ear as that of an 18- 
 pounder in a casemate. It is easy to follow the ball, 
 blackened with powder, with the eye, and it is fre- 
 quently seen to split into two or more pieces ; huge 
 
 * It must be borne in mind that tills was written in, 1845. — Teans. 
 
Oha]'. V. EFFECT OF A GRANITE BALL. 429 
 
 jets of water are thrown up where it strikes the sur- 
 face of the sea, as the ball fired off in Europe slowly 
 ricochets across the water till it reaches the Asiatic 
 shore. 
 
 These giant cannons of the Dardanelles have this 
 disadvantage, that they can only fire straight before 
 them, and that they take very long to load, but 
 then the effect of a single ball that does hit is tre- 
 mendous. 
 
 When Admiral Duckworth sailed through the 
 straits in 1807, all the preparations for defence were 
 in the most wretched condition, nevertheless his 
 fleet suffered considerable injury, especially from the 
 kemerliks : a granite ball of 800 pounds' weight, 2 
 feet 2 inches in diameter, to the great astonishment 
 of the sailors, broke through the whole bed for the 
 anchor on board the Active, and after crushing thi^ 
 mass of strong timber, rolled slowly across the deck. 
 Another ball carried away the wheel of the Republic, 
 and killed or wounded 24 men. The mainmast of 
 the Wyndham was carried away, and the forecastle 
 of the Royal Greorge, a 110-gun ship, was shattered 
 by a single ball, so that she was near sinking, and 
 could only be saved by very great exertions. 
 
 Our readers are no doubt aware that in sea-fights 
 the holes made by the cannon-balls below the ship's 
 water-line are plugged, by men appointed for the 
 purpose, with conical pieces of wood, to prevent the 
 water from pouring in. But it would manifestly be 
 impossible to plug a hole 2i feet in diameter. 
 
430 CONTEAEY WIND. Pakt II. 
 
 Another circumstance by which the difficulty of 
 attacking the Dardanelles is increased is that through- 
 out the summer months the wind is always in the 
 north. Merchant-ships frequently have to wait 6 
 weeks for a southerly wind strong enough to carry 
 them up against the current which sets strongly 
 towards the ^gean Sea. Sometimes a light southerly 
 breeze blows at the new castles, but ceases at 
 Nagara, while at Gallipoli the wind is all the time 
 in the north. 
 
 A fleet coming from the Mediterranean can, there- 
 fore, never be certain of reaching Constantinople at 
 the decisive moment, but may get there weeks too 
 soon or too late, either of which may be equally dis- 
 advantageous. With a fresh and favourable wind, a 
 ship could do nothing better than to keep to the right, 
 and sail past immediately below Sultan Hissar ; it 
 will thus keep as far as possible from the 111 guns 
 of Kilid Bahar, on the European side, and will only 
 be exposed for one minute to the 197 at Sultan His- 
 sar, on the Asiatic shore. It is true that in this one 
 minute it may possibly be destroyed. 
 
 It may be said, that all these dangers and diffi- 
 culties might be avoided by disembarking a body of 
 troops, for which the safe roadstead between Tenedos 
 and the Troad on the Asiatic coast presents the most 
 favourable point. Most of the batteries there are 
 closed at the gorge by very slight walls, and are 
 commanded in the immediate neighbourhood. This 
 is not, however, the case in all instances ; for ex- 
 
Chap. V. ATTACK FROM THE BLACK SEA. 431 
 
 ample, Kum Kaleh and Sultan Hissar, on the Asiatic 
 side, are not commanded at all. These Hissars have 
 walls 40 feet high and 18 feet thick. In the midst 
 of Sultan Hissar is a donjon 70 feet high, and so 
 massive as to form almost one block of stone, the 
 platform of which contains 28 guns. This is also 
 the case with the singularly shaped fort of Kilid 
 Bahar, on the European side, and with such a profile, 
 a fort, even if though it be commanded, is not to be 
 taken at the first assault. 
 
 In and near Sultan Hissar and Kilid Bahar, at 
 the narrowest point of the channel, are in all 290 
 guns, among which are 45 kemerliks, which would 
 neither be easily passed by sea nor taken by land. 
 
 We do not mean to assert that it is impossible to 
 force the Dardanelles. The reverse has already been 
 proved, and there is no attempt, however daring, 
 that may not be successful against a careless or 
 cowardly foe. We only wish to show the real 
 weight of an enterprise which has often been too 
 lightly judged. 
 
 With respect to the second access to Constanti- 
 nople by sea, the Bosphorus, here the elements seem 
 to second a fleet coming out of the Black Sea. 
 An almost uninterrupted northerly wind, which 
 blows during the summer months, and a current 
 which flows towards the south at the rate of 2i miles 
 an hour, are sure to carry the ships right down to 
 Constantinople, but in what sort of condition they 
 would arrive there is quite another question. 
 
432 FOETS OF THE BOSPHOEUS. Part II. 
 
 The Bosphorus is a winding channel, 19 miles 
 long, and only half the width of the Dardanelles, 
 armed with 392 guns. The terraced batteries by 
 the side of the European and Asiatic light-houses, 
 on either side of the entrance, are 2i miles asunder, 
 but between the castles of Karibsche and Poiros the 
 distance is only half as great. These forts, built 
 by Baron Tott, of soft green sandstone, have three 
 stories of artillery, of which the second is casemated. 
 The lowest is completely flooded at high water by 
 the waves of the Euxine. These forts are defended 
 towards the land by round casemated towers, which 
 stand detached on the high ground. 
 
 Next to these batteries are Bujuk Liman, which 
 lies on the European shore, a fleur-dC eau, and Fil- 
 burnu on the Asiatic, perched high up on the side 
 of a rocky cliff. These were built in 1794, by the 
 French engineer, Mounnier. But the real defence 
 consists in the co-operation of the four great forts, 
 Roumeli and Anadoli Kawak, Telli-tabia, and 
 Madjar Kalessi. Between these forts the Bosphorus 
 is only 1497 and 1245 paces wide, and 166 heavy 
 guns are so placed that they can concentrate their 
 fire and support each other. A ship, while engaged 
 in the closest fight with one of the batteries, is raked 
 from stem to stern by all the rest. Nothing can be 
 more favourable in this respect than the position of 
 Madjar Kalessi, especially as the plateau, 30 or 40 
 feet above the 60 guns a fleur-d'eau, affords facilities 
 for the construction of a terraced battery. The still 
 
Chap. V. DEFENCES OF THE BOSPHORUS. 433 
 
 defensible ruins of an old Genoese castle protect the 
 fort from a coup-de-main from the land. Lower 
 down the Bosphorus again widens, and there are 
 only a few small batteries on the European side. In 
 fact, only the northern end of the Bosphorus is cal- 
 culated for defence, as the suburbs of Constantinople 
 extend along its beautiful shore for nearly 14 miles 
 without interruption. 
 
 The heights between which the Bosphorus winds 
 like a broad river, rise towards the Black Sea to an 
 elevation of 800 feet. Near the Sea of Marmora they 
 are much lower and flatter, but fall steeply, in many 
 places precipitously, down to the straits. This form- 
 ation of the ground causes the batteries on the shore 
 to be commanded, and greatly facilitates an attack 
 upon them from the land, which could scarcely be 
 prevented by the detached forts in their gorges. 
 The disembarkation of troops for this purpose on the 
 Asiatic coast would present considerable difficulty, as 
 it is bounded almost on every side by steep basaltic 
 cliffs. The nearest bay on the European coast, that 
 of Kilios, is defended by a square fort with narrow 
 bastions, and a wall 20 feet high ; but a landing 
 might be effected by means of flat-bottomed boats on 
 any part of the low sandy beach between Kilios and 
 Lake Derkos. 
 
 In order, however, to open the Bosphorus to a 
 fleet by these means, it would be necessary to land 
 troops on both shores, as the batteries of either side 
 are sufficient to prevent the passage ; and this might 
 
 2 r 
 
434 POSITION OF BYZANTIUM. Part II. 
 
 not be so easy, on account of the immediate vicinity 
 of the capital, where a few thousand men could 
 always be found to oppose such an attempt. 
 
 Moreover, the two old castles, Rumeli and Ana- 
 doli Hissar, which were built by the Turks imme- 
 diately after the conquest of Constantinople, at the 
 narrowest point of the Bosphorus, where the shores 
 are only 958 paces asunder, afford excellent sites for 
 two large batteries. It would be impossible to take 
 them by a coup-de-main upon the gorge, especially 
 in the case of the European fort, which is secured 
 against any attempt of the kind, by walls 40 feet 
 high, with strong battlements and gigantic towers. 
 The ground falls so suddenly within the walls, that 
 no view of it can be obtained from the hills behind, 
 though they are much higher. Lastly, on the 
 Seraglio Point, and the lofty open place of the Gul- 
 hane, 100 cannon might be mounted, which would 
 be perfectly safe, and would command the passage 
 between Constantinople and Scutari, which at this 
 point is no wider than the narrowest part of the 
 Dardanelles. 
 
 Such is the continental and maritime position of 
 Byzantium, which stands on two quarters of the 
 globe, and between two seas, and seems destined by 
 nature to be the capital of the ancient continent. 
 
 We have dwelt at length upon the military im- 
 portance of this city, because it had a great influ- 
 ence on the measures taken by General Diebitsch, 
 and must always play a principal part in every 
 
Chap. V. DESTETJCTION OF THE JANISSARIES. 435 
 
 eastern war. For many years the Lower Roman 
 empire was in fact confined within the environs of 
 Constantinople. Towns of half-a-million of inhabit- 
 ants cannot be taken by force of arms ; they fall by 
 their own weakness. It is only when the population 
 is utterly degraded like the Byzantine Romans of 
 the 15th century, or divided against itself like the 
 Parisians in the beginning of our own, that a hostile 
 army can dare to enter it. 
 
 It is true that in Constantinople also, ever since 
 the destruction of the Janissaries, a powerful faction 
 had been waiting for a favourable moment to raise 
 the standard of revolt. The embarrassment of the 
 Turkish government since the Russians had per- 
 formed the feat hitherto held impossible, of crossing 
 the Balkan, went near to cause an outbreak of this 
 feeling. But Sultan Mahmoud was beforehand with 
 the Janissaries. Chosreef Pasha, an excellent head 
 of the police for a Turkish city, had long been upon 
 the traces of the conspirators, and a wholesale exe- 
 cution took place, with very little heed as to how 
 many hundreds of innocent persons suffered, pro- 
 vided only the guilty did not escape. By these 
 measures discontent was by no means appeased, but 
 for the moment it was stifled. If, however, any- 
 thing could reconcile the opposing parties, it was the 
 appearance of a Russian force before the gates of a 
 city which for four centuries had not beheld a foe. 
 What the discontented Moslems wanted was the 
 restoration of the old order, or disorder, of things, 
 
 2 P 2 
 
436 THE RUSSIANS BEFORE CONSTANTINOPLE. Paet II. 
 
 not the rule of unbelievers. They rejoiced to see 
 the Porte in difficulties, but they felt that its destruc- 
 tion would involve theirs. Nearly all the Grreek 
 and Armenian Christians lived on the opposite side 
 of the harbour, and in Constantinople itself they did 
 not constitute above one-fourth of the population ; 
 added to which they are thoroughly servile from 
 long habit, and would certainly not have joined 
 either party until the Russians and Turks had 
 fought it out. At the same time, though they no 
 doubt sincerely wished the Porte to surrender on 
 unfavourable terms, they had no wish to see the city 
 stormed and their own property destroyed. The 
 Russian bayonets might have been counted from the 
 tops of the towers and minarets, as they glittered 
 upon the plain of Daood Pasha ; and the smallness 
 of their numbers would have brought even the most 
 cowardly upon the walls to defend what was dear to 
 all against a handful of enemies. There were 15,000 
 men in the fortified camp at Ramis Tchiftlik, and as 
 many more in the forts and batteries on the Bos- 
 phorus. Without counting the armed inhabitants, the 
 Sultan could oppose the enemy with a superior force 
 close before the walls of Constantinople, or he could 
 employ it in defending them; and it is difficult to 
 see how the Russians were to attack them. The 
 winter was drawing near, and the fate of the in- 
 vaders would have been a sad one if they had been 
 forced to retreat while Mustafa and his Albanians 
 were advancing from Philippopoli. After the de- 
 
Chap. V. POSITION OF GENERAL DIEBITSCH. 437 
 
 scription we liave given, the reader can judge for 
 himself how far Greneral Diebitsch could rely upon 
 the assistance of the fleets which were cruising in the 
 Black Sea and in the Archipelago ; and it must also 
 be borne in mind, that, even if the Russian ships had 
 effected a passage through either of the straits, they 
 would in all probability have been followed into the 
 Sea of Marmora by the English fleet under Admiral 
 Malcolm, which would have joined the Turkish fleet 
 lying at anchor in the Bosphorus. 
 
 It is pretty clear that the time of action was over 
 for Greneral Diebitsch ; he could only make demon- 
 strations which might overawe the Turks : this he 
 accordingly did. The Russian army at Adrianople 
 was estimated, even by the European ambassadors at 
 Pera, at 60,000 men : if he had marched upon Con- 
 stantinople this delusion would have been dispelled. 
 At St. Petersburg the war was by no means looked 
 upon as ended because the Balkan had been crossed, 
 as is shown by the ukase of the 10th of August, 
 ordering a levy of 3 souls upon every 500, which 
 in Russia amounts to about 90,000 men. A few re- 
 serve regiments and companies of invalids were now 
 directed upon Adrianople, Admiral Heyden's fleet 
 was strengthened by three ships of the line and 
 several frigates from the Baltic, and the second half 
 of the loan of 42,000,000 florins negotiated with 
 Holland was now raised. The position of Greneral 
 Diebitsch with 20,000 men in a hostile town of 
 80,000 inhabitants, half way between 30,000 Turks 
 
438 NEGOTIATIONS FOB PEACE. Pabt II. 
 
 at Constantinople and 30,000 Albanians at Sophia, 
 while his own corps was exhausted by exertion and 
 disease, must have given rise to Very serious un- 
 easiness at St. Petersburg. Greneral Krassowski had 
 endeavoured to make himself master of Shumla, but 
 had failed. He had commenced a regular siege, 
 opened trenches, and had several skirmishes without 
 taking one of the Turkish works. Prince Madatof 
 had been mortally wounded, and General Kisselef 
 found great difficulty in keeping the Turks out of 
 Wallachia. Widdin, Nicopcilis, Sistorvo, Eustchuk, 
 and Giurgevo still held out, and the communication 
 between these places by the Danube was restored. 
 General Geismar, it is true, had crossed the river, 
 but only in order to follow and observe the menacing 
 movements of the Pasha of Scodra, 
 
 In consideration of these circumstances, no doubt, 
 the Emperor Nicholas had already appointed Adju- 
 tant-General Count Alexis Orloff and privy coun- 
 cillor Count Pahlen to conduct negotiations for peace. 
 The Russian plenipotentiaries arrived at Burgass on 
 the 28th of August, and on the same day the envoys 
 from the Porte reached Adrianople. The Sultan 
 could not yet be convinced that the Russians were 
 really so strong, and that his own resources were so 
 wholly exhausted, as his own advisers and the Euro- 
 pean diplomatists assured him they were. The 
 former were far more afraid of a tumult in the 
 streets of the capital, which would cost them their 
 places and their heads, than of a disadvantageous 
 
Chap. V. NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE. 439 
 
 peace which would cost the Ottoman empire a few 
 provinces. The diplomatists, on their part, while 
 Diebitsch rested on his arms, were diligently work- 
 ing in his behalf. As representatives of their several 
 courts they of course had to support interests alto- 
 gether foreign to those of Turkey, and were anxious 
 in the first place to put aii end to a war which for 
 two years had threatened the peace of Europe. 
 Prussia especially was desirous to obtain an honour- 
 able and advantageous peace for an allied power 
 whose ruler was nearly related to her own king, and 
 moreover to avoid the endless difficulties which 
 must arise if, under existing circumstances and be- 
 fore the conclusion of a treaty, an insurrection in 
 Constantinople should put an end to the existence of 
 the Ottoman empire. The important influence exer- 
 cised by G-eneral Baron von Muffling, who was sent 
 to Constantinople by the Prussian government, is 
 well known, but any account of the negotiations is 
 altogether beside our purpose. At all events, nothing 
 could be more welcome, and indeed more indispen- 
 sable, to Greneral Diebitsch than a negotiation. As 
 soon therefore as Mahmoud Sadik Eff"endi, the Def- 
 terdar or treasurer, and Abd-el-Kader Bey, the 
 Kadi-Asker or chief magistrate of Eumelia, both 
 men of high rank, arrived at Adrianople, he em- 
 powered General Gortschakoff and privy councillor 
 Fonton to open the negotiations until the arrival of 
 the imperial plenipotentiaries. They commenced on 
 the 1st of September, and at first proceeded most 
 
440 NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE. Part H. 
 
 satisfactorily, as the great object at Constantinople 
 was to gain time enough to stifle the insurrection in 
 blood. When this had been done, and perhaps also 
 ■when the plenipotentiaries had convinced themselves 
 of the weakness of the Eussian army, and gained 
 fresh courage from learning the position of Mus- 
 tapha Pasha, of which they had known nothing 
 until then, they raised fresh difficulties, and on the 
 8th of September declared that they had no instruc- 
 tions respecting the indemnity for the war claimed 
 by Russia. 
 
 General Diebitsch assumed an appearance of per- 
 fect tranquillity founded on a conviction of his supe- 
 rior strength. He affected to be equally ready to 
 conclude a peace on reasonable terms or to enforce 
 one at the point of the sword. No sooner therefore 
 did the Turks show any hesitation with respect to 
 the point in question than some Eussian divisions 
 advanced towards Constantinople in order to give 
 greater effect to the Eussian demands. 
 
 In the course of a few days Admiral Grreig, who 
 was with his fleet in the Black Sea, took the ports 
 of Wasiliko, Ajeboli, and Iniada (on the 29th of 
 August), while Admiral Heyden sailed to Enos in 
 the JEgean Sea, 
 
 General Pahlen had pushed forward with the 2nd 
 corps to Kirklissa. On the 5th of September he 
 quitted his camp there, and on the 6th reached Yisa, 
 a small town in the Strandja mountains, from whence 
 he opened communications with the fleet which in 
 
Chap. V. ADVANCE OP THE RUSSIANS. 441 
 
 tlie mean time had entered the bay of Midia, and 
 now made its appearance at the mouth of the 
 Bosphorus, where the Turkish fleet lay idly at 
 anchor. 
 
 On the Russian right wing 1 regiment of Bug 
 lancers, 4 pieces of horse artillery, and a few Cos- 
 sacks had been pushed forward towards Demotika. 
 This detachment was followed by Greneral Sievers 
 with 2 regiments of foot and 1 division of lancers. 
 He took possession of the towns of Demotika and 
 Ipsala without resistance and advanced upon Enos. 
 The country people everywhere received him in a 
 friendly manner, the Turks laid down their arms, 
 and the Rayahs only implored protection for their 
 homes. A troop of horse, the advanced guard of 
 1500 men which the Pasha was sending from Salo- 
 nika to Constantinople, was scattered by the Rus- 
 sians, who reached Enos on the 7th of September. 
 This place, defended by 64 guns, surrendered next 
 day by capitulation. In the centre Greneral Roth 
 advanced with the 4th corps along the great road 
 to Constantinople. He reached Eskibaba on the 7th 
 and Luleh Burgass on the 8th. The advanced guard 
 went on to Karistiran and foraged as far as Tchorlu 
 and Rodosto. 
 
 Thus on the day when the Turkish plenipoten- 
 tiaries broke off the negotiations the advanced troops 
 of the Russian army stood with their right- wing at 
 Midia on the Black Sea, and their left at Enos on 
 the ^gean, covering a space of 110 miles. The 
 
442 SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY OF PEACE. Part II. 
 
 two corps at Visa and Luleh Burgass amounted in 
 all to about 8000 men, and might therefore pass for 
 the advanced corps of a considerable army. As 
 they had already marched halfway from Adrianople 
 to Constantinople it was time that the main body 
 should make its appearance. This consisted of the 
 7th corps at Adrianople ; from this corps 1 detach- 
 ment with 2 guns had been sent to Hermanly in the 
 direction of Philippopoli ; the 37th regiment of 
 chasseurs had remained at Slivno, and one regiment 
 of Bug lancers had been sent to Enos. Thus, then, 
 the so-called Glros consisted of 10 battalions and 15 
 squadrons; in all, after deducting the numerous 
 sick, about 4000 or 5000 men. Such was the army 
 which was to make head against 30,000 Arnauts, to 
 keep in subjection a town of 80,000 inhabitants, and 
 finally to conquer another city containing 500,000 
 souls. 
 
 G-eneral Diebitsch had allowed the Effendis five 
 days to send for instructions to the Porte ; if they 
 did not arrive at the end of that time he threatened 
 to go himself to Constantinople to fetch them. The 
 affair had now reached its utmost point of tension, 
 and some decision must speedily be taken. On the 
 14th of September the peace was actually signed. 
 How far it would have been possible for the Eussian 
 Gi-eneral to take a single step towards putting his 
 threats into execution if this signature had been re- 
 fused our readers may judge. It is certain that this 
 ratification released General Diebitsch from a posi- 
 
Chap. V. POSITION OF GENERAL DIEBITSCH. 443 
 
 tion as anxious as could well be conceived, and 
 wliich, if prolonged for a few days more, might have 
 caused him to be hurled from the summit of victory 
 and success to the lowest depths of ruin and de- 
 struction. 
 
 Serious danger still threatened on the part of 
 the Arnauts. General Kisselef had followed the 
 Pasha of Scodra to Yrazza, where he received news 
 of the conclusion of the peace, and immediately 
 halted. Mustapha, who had acted as a traitor to 
 his sovereign, by his former delay; repeated his 
 offence by his present disobedience. The campaign, 
 the final issue of which he might have so greatly 
 affected, appearing, as he did, last in the field with 
 a numerous intact army composed of good materials, 
 was now at an end. To the reiterated orders of the 
 Sultan to withdraw his troops, he only replied that 
 he had no money to pay them off. Regardless of 
 the armistice he at the end of September pushed 
 forward his advanced guard to Haskoi, between 
 Philippopoli and Adrianople, and made preparations 
 for seizing the town of Demotika. Greneral Riidiger 
 was obliged to hasten with the 7th corps to the 
 village of Mustapha Pasha, and Greneral Scheremetef 
 with his brigade of lancers to Demotika ; but on the 
 2nd of October these divisions were recalled to 
 Adrianople, which was almost without troops. The 
 Pasha of Scodra now actually marched upon Phi- 
 lippopoli with 30,000 men, and sent word to General 
 Diebitsch that on the following Saturday, 10th of 
 
444 HOSTILITIES EEOOMMBNCBD. Pakt II. 
 
 October, he should arrive at Adrianople, and take 
 up his winter-quarters there. 
 
 Hereupon Greneral Kisselef received orders to 
 advance : his advanced guard, consisting of 4 bat- 
 talions and 8 squadrons, 300 Cossacks, and 30 guns, 
 fell in on the 16th of October with 1700 Turks, the 
 Pasha's rear-guard, who were entrenched with 3 
 guns at Arnaut Kalessi. The Eussian flag of truce 
 was received with musket-shots, and the Arnauts 
 made the attack, although the Turks wished for 
 peace. The fight lasted until night, and was re- 
 newed on the following day, but the slaughter does 
 not seem to have been great. The end was that 
 the Arnauts were routed. Greneral Greismar, how- 
 ever, expressly forbade his men to pursue them ; he 
 even allowed their baggage to follow them, and 
 gave up the cannon which had been taken from 
 them. Greneral Kisselef halted at Grabrowa, and the 
 Russians anxiously avoided the chance of a fresh 
 collision, and took pains to spread the news that 
 peace had been concluded. 
 
 It is hard to say what turn events might have 
 taken if the Pasha of Scodra had carried on the war 
 on his own account after the Sultan had given it 
 up. But he now abandoned all hostilities against 
 the Russians, and allied himself with the Cossacks 
 in order to plunder the Turkish provinces. For a 
 great part of the winter the Arnauts remained at 
 Philippopoli, and then withdrew to their moun- 
 tains loaded with booty, after laying waste the whole 
 
Chap. V. CLOSE OP THE CAMPAIGN. 445 
 
 surrounding country, and losing 7000 of their number 
 by disease. 
 
 All the otber armies wbicb the Sultan had brought 
 into the field were scattered. Shumla, where the 
 Grrand Vizier still remained, was not entered at all 
 by the Russians either during or after the campaign, 
 and the commandant of Griurgevo, Kutshuk Achmet 
 Pasha, refused to deliver up the key of his fortress, 
 according to the conditions of peace, because it had 
 not been taken. It was not until he had given way 
 that the Russians quitted Adrianople, on the 20th of 
 November, exactly three months after they had en- 
 tered it. They left 5000 men behind them in hos- 
 pital, of whom by far the greater number died. The 
 head-quarters of Greneral Diebitsch were removed to 
 Burgass. 
 
446 RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAiaN. Part II. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
 
 If we look back upon the events of this last cam- 
 paign, we find that operations were again delayed 
 till the beginning of May, and that this time also 
 the means employed were out of all proportion to 
 the object to be attained. The whole campaign 
 lasted four months. If we deduct the sojourn in 
 Adrianople, the operations occupied a period of only 
 three months, and consisted of one siege, one battle, 
 and one march of somewhat under 500 miles. 
 
 In this year also the troops stationed for the 
 defence of "Wallachia against the Turkish hordes 
 assembled at Rustchuk and Widdin were very in- 
 sufficient, and General Greismar with his weak 
 corps crossed the Danube and acted on the 
 offensive. 
 
 It was a great advantage to the Eussians that 
 Varna had been captured during the previous cam- 
 paign, and not less was the occupation of Sizeboli 
 during the winter. The provisioning of the army 
 on both sides of the Balkan, by means of the fleet 
 in the Black Sea, was thus ensured. 
 
 But in order to secure a firm basis for his opera- 
 tions, General Diebitsch was forced in 1829 to renew 
 
Chap. VI. RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN. 447 
 
 the siege of Silistria, in whicli he had been foiled 
 during the last campaign. It occupied one-third of 
 the army during two-thirds of the whole campaign 
 (from 17th of May to iSth of July, when Greneral 
 Krassowski's corps joined the main army), and the 
 capture of the fortress cost the Eussians 3000 men. 
 The battle of Kulewtscha cost them as many more in 
 about four hours, but it destroyed the whole 
 Turkish army, and decided the campaign. Ku- 
 lewtscha was the first and only occasion during both 
 campaigns on which the Russians succeeded in 
 collecting a sufficient force for decisive action, and 
 thus ensured success. Considering the absolute 
 weakness of the Russian army, the merit of its 
 commander was the greater, as the junction of 
 the corps of Silistria and Eski-Arnautlar, as well 
 as the subsequent flank march, had to be executed 
 in the face of the Yizier's army. Greneral Diebitsch 
 had judged the state of affairs correctly, and quickly 
 made up his mind to act on the offensive. The 
 preparations for the battle were boldly and well 
 arranged, and the Vizier found himself placed in an 
 unfavourable strategical position. Much cannot be 
 said for the conduct of the battle, and General 
 Ostroschenko appears to have been sacrificed without 
 sufficient cause. 
 
 The question is forced upon us, what would have 
 been the issue of the campaign had Reschid Mo- 
 hammed either omitted his second offensive opera- 
 tion altogether, or, informed in due time of the 
 
448 EETEOSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN. Pakt II. 
 
 advance of the Eussian main army, immediately 
 retired into his fortified camp ? It is certain that 
 Greneral Diebitsch would not have invested the 
 place again as he did in the previous campaign, A 
 regular assault would have been equally ineffectual, 
 and the strategical importance of Shumla would have 
 been as great as in the previous campaign. After 
 the fall of Silistria, the Russians could have placed 
 20,000 men before Shumla to keep the corps of the 
 G-rand Vizier in check : but whether under such 
 circumstances they would have ventured — basing 
 their operations upon Varna and Sizeboli — to cross 
 the Balkan with at most 20,000 men, is a question 
 we are unable to decide. 
 
 The very wreck of an army in Shumla detained 
 the Russians for five weeks under the walls of that 
 fortress — a delay entirely owing to the numerical 
 weakness of the Russians, which forced them to wait 
 for the corps occupied in the siege of Silistria. 
 
 The passage of the Balkan was in fact only effected 
 by one route, as the 7th corps advanced from Koprikoi 
 by Podbaschi to join the 6th and 2nd corps. Nine 
 days after quitting Shumla the Russian army was 
 united on the southern side of the mountains, not 
 far from Aidos. The Turks had not defended the 
 mountain-passes, the stand they made at Kamtchik 
 and Nadir was feeble and desultory. This by no 
 means lessens the merit and reputation of Greneral 
 Diebitsch. For when he boldly undertook with a 
 weak army to penetrate into the heart of the Ottoman 
 
Chap. VI. RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN. 449 
 
 empire, lie could not have foreseen that the Turks 
 would offer so feeble an opposition. Until this 
 period in the campaign, the Turks had fought well 
 on all occasions. But from this time the demorali- 
 sation of the Turks, and the certainty of victory in 
 the open field, freed the Eussians from the necessity 
 of any strategical combinations beyond the care of 
 provisioning the army. It was only before the walls 
 of some large Turkish town that the success of the 
 Russians could end. 
 
 The obstinacy of Reschid Mohammed in remaining 
 in Shumla can scarcely be approved. For full 14 
 days after G-eneral Diebitsch had broken up his 
 camp before Shumla, and after the Russian general 
 had beaten Abdur Eachman's corps, the Yizier, after 
 leaving 10,000 men to support the armed inhabit- 
 ants of the place, could have advanced with 20,000 
 by Kotesch, Bski-Stambul, and Kasan, to Slivno. 
 Without exposing himself to the chance of a battle 
 on the south side of the Balkan, which would 
 probably have ended like that of Kulewtscha, the 
 Yizier could have continued his march undisturbed 
 on the right bank of the Tundscha to Adrianople, 
 have there united his force with 12,000 Turks who 
 came from Constantinople, and taken up an en- 
 trenched position ; under these circumstances he 
 might possibly have induced the Arnauts under 
 the Pasha of Scodra to advance. Had a man of 
 Reschid Mohammed's rank and determination been 
 at Adrianople, this important town would certainly 
 
 2 G 
 
450 RETBOSPBCT OF THE CAMPAIGN. Part II. 
 
 not have fallen without a blow, and at any rate the 
 further advance of the Eussians would have again 
 been put in question. 
 
 Nevertheless the Vizier was very near being justi- 
 fied by the issue of events. It is certain that the 
 opinion that it was impossible to penetrate further 
 into Eumelia with a weak force until Shumla was 
 taken, prevailed among officers high at head-quarters. 
 The march upon Adrianople did not take place till 
 full three weeks after the passage of the Balkan, and 
 then only after the Grrand Yizier's army had been 
 beaten in three separate divisions at Aidos^ Karna- 
 bat, and Slivno. If, on the contrary, the Pasha had 
 kept his troops together in the camp, it is not 
 improbable that the powerful attraction of Shumla 
 in a strategical point of view would even yet have 
 seized the Eussians, and the Balkan would not have 
 been crossed, or its spell broken. 
 
 The Eussians arrived before Adrianople in so 
 weak a state that they could effect nothing more by 
 force of arms. But the Porte, owing to its obstinate 
 adherence to the course upon which it had once 
 entered, and to influences not of a military nature, 
 persisted in the conclusion of a disadvantageous 
 peace. Most undoubtedly, in this difficult position 
 General Diebitsch showed himself to be an able 
 diplomatist, as well as a successful general. 
 
 The terms of the treaty of Adrianople are well 
 known ; we have only to consider it in its military 
 point of view, and in so far as it altered the means 
 
Chap. VI. TREATY OF ADEIANOPLE. 451 
 
 of resistance that the Turks could in future com- 
 mand. It cannot be denied that the peace was unfa- 
 vourable to the Porte, but this is the natural 
 condition of the conquered party. The Sultan 
 might have avoided the appeal to arms by a much 
 smaller sacrifice, but he elected war, and lost the game, 
 or rather gave it up for lost from the moment that 
 Adrianople fell. From the day on which the EuS' 
 sians appeared in the ancient metropolis of the king- 
 dom, the Sultan and General Diebitsch played for 
 high stakes, which might end fatally for either side. 
 
 The greatest danger for the Sultan was that of 
 an insurrection in Constantinople. Nevertheless, 
 Sultan Mahmoud for a long time resisted the pusilr 
 lanimous advice of his ministers, who trembled for 
 their heads, and the pressure of foreign powers, not 
 one of whom had assisted him in the war, or was in a 
 condition to support him in his extremity. He shed 
 bitter tears when, on the 14th of September, he was 
 compelled to bow his iron will to the still harder 
 force of necessity, and for weeks he shut himself 
 up in his palace at Therapia, crushed in spirit. For 
 in signing that treaty he acknowledged that he 
 had failed in the object for which he had striven all 
 his life. Rivers of blood had been shed, the old 
 institutions and sacred traditions of his country had 
 been destroyed, the faith and the pride of his people 
 had been undermined for the sake of reform- — and 
 now that reform was condemned by the event. 
 
 At the very commencement of the first campaign 
 
 2 a 2 
 
452 TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE. Paet II. 
 
 the Czar had loudly proclaimed that increase of ter- 
 ritory was not the object of the war into which he 
 had been forced, whatever might be the end. True 
 to his word, the Czar restored to the Porte all the 
 cities, harbours, fortresses, and districts that his 
 armies had conquered in Rumelia and Bulgaria, from 
 the Danube to the Hellespont. Even the Princi- 
 palities on the left bank of the Danube remained 
 subject to the Porte ; the Pruth and the Danube 
 were still, as before the war, the European boundary 
 between Eussia and Turkey. But, although Servia, 
 Wallachia, and Moldavia remained subject to the 
 Turk, they were placed under the protection of 
 Eussia. The six districts severed from Servia were 
 restored; and the Turks (with the exception of those 
 dwelling in the fortresses of Belgrade and of New 
 Orsova)were ordered to quit the territory within 18 
 months. The undisturbed exercise of their religion, 
 a national and independent administration, perfect 
 security and free commerce, were insured to the 
 Christian population of those districts. The fortresses 
 
 held by Turkey on the left bank of the Danube 
 
 namely, Turnu, Kaleh, and Griurgevo — -were to be 
 given up, their fortifications, as well as those of 
 Brailow, to be razed and not to be rebuilt, the towns 
 incorporated with the Principalities, which were no 
 longer to allow Turkish garrisons within their 
 frontiers. There was no denying that the resources 
 of these provinces were completely lost to the Turks 
 in the event of a future war. 
 
Chap. VI. TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE. 453 
 
 The Danube, too, no longer formed the strong 
 barrier which in former wars had occupied the 
 Russian army during a whole campaign, 
 
 Brailow was destroyed, even to the fort on the 
 right bank of the Danube. Tultcha, Isakchi, and 
 Matchin, as well as Kostendje, had been razed 
 during the winter of 1828-9. Not so Hirsova, 
 which, although easy to take from the Wallachian 
 side of the Danube, forms an admirable tete du pont 
 •against the Turkish shore. For the same reason the 
 Russians left standing the walled bastions of Griur- 
 gevo upon the river. It was laid down by the treaty 
 that the valley of the Danube — that is to say, its most 
 southern arm (Kedrilleh Boghas) should so mark 
 the boundary between the two countries that all the 
 islands belonged to' the Russians. It is true that the 
 latter bound themselves to erect neither forts nor 
 houses upon these islands, but they claimed the right 
 to establish their quarantine posts there, and accord- 
 ingly, on the Sulina mouth of the river, the only 
 navigable one, a very considerable settlement has 
 sprung up by degrees in a place most important to 
 Germany, from the strength of its position. Thus 
 the curious fact occurs that, as the valley of the 
 Danube towards the mouth of the river becomes 
 broader and larger, the Russian frontier gradually 
 approaches nearer to the Turkish. At Silistria the 
 distance from the Wallachian shore is 1000 paces ; 
 at Hirsova it is only 500 ; and opposite Isakchi there 
 are Russian posts within 200 paces of the Turkish 
 
454 TREATY OF ADBIANOPLE. Paet II. 
 
 town. At Tultcha, also, tlie distance is not above 
 a musket-sliot. 
 
 The quarantine stations can very easily be turned 
 into military posts : with, tbe exception of Tultcha, 
 the above-named towns without the islands do not 
 command the navigable channel of the Danube, 
 and, consequently, lose their importance. Tultcha 
 itself, in its new extended position, cannot be for- 
 tified. The treaty does not prevent the rebuilding 
 of these towns, but they still lie open and defence* 
 less. Silistria — which was held by the Eussians 
 till the end of 1835, until the 11 J millions of ducats, 
 the sum levied upon the Turks as compensation for 
 the war, had been paid — was not razed, but the 
 breaches in the walls remained unrepaired. The 
 inhabitants have almost all disappeared, and the 
 interior of the town is desolate ; while towards the 
 east, immediately in front of the walls, the important 
 suburb of Wolna has sprung up, which would much 
 impede the defence of the town. Silistria can be 
 turned into a good fortress only by the erection of 
 4 strong detached forts on the heights to the south, 
 and by a tete du pont to the north : for the former 
 the Turks have no money, and the latter is con- 
 trary to existing treaties. Lastly, Eustchuk has lost 
 all offensive importance against the basis of a Eussian 
 army by the destruction of Griurgevo, its tete du 
 pont.* 
 
 * The reader must recollect that this work was published in 1845. 
 — Trans. 
 
Chap. Vl. TREATY OP ADEIANOPLE. 455 
 
 The more it has become necessary for the Porte 
 since its repeated disasters to concentrate its forces, 
 the more certain is it that the defence of Turkey in 
 Europe, in the event of any future war, can only 
 begin at the Balkan. 
 
 In spite of the enormous sums which he had to 
 pay to Russia, Sultan Mahmoud, in the years 1834 
 to 1836, rebuilt Varna, the most important fortress 
 of his empire, according to a plan in favour of 
 which there is not much to be said. Shumla, which 
 has lost nothing of its strategical importance, has 
 been materially strengthened by the stone forts of 
 Strandscha, Tschally, Feddai, and Tschengel, as well 
 as by the erection of large massive barracks, hos- 
 pitals, and storehouses. Pravadi may be temporarily 
 fortified with very slender means, and these three 
 places will in future be able to arrest the progress of 
 an army of 50,000 or 60,000 men for months beneath 
 their walls. The difficulty of crossing the Balkan 
 was formerly much over-estimated, but the result of 
 the campaign of 1828-9 has caused many persons 
 to imagine that it is no impediment at all.* We 
 must not, however, forget that in that year the 
 mountains were not defended at all. On the lowest 
 pass, which is above 1800 feet high. General Roth 
 had to assist his battalion of pioneers by a working 
 party of 4000 men during two days, in order to break 
 a way ; and yet no enemy impeded his advance : 
 
 * "Wtat molehills to make such a fuss about!" exclaims a travelling 
 English officer. 
 
456 TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE. Pabt II. 
 
 it was not until he reached the southern foot of the 
 mountains that a few bodies of Turks appeared, none 
 of whom offered any serious resistance. Were the 
 Porte to establish military colonies of Ottoman race 
 on the plain of Aidos and Karnabat, the Balkan 
 would unquestionably become a very formidable 
 barrier. 
 
 The war with Eussia had annihilated the newly 
 raised and laboriously-trained Turkish army, and, 
 what was worse as regarded the future, had destroyed 
 it in the opinion of the Mussulmans. If Turkey had 
 enjoyed ten years of peace after the destruction of 
 the Janissaries, Sultan Mahmoud's military creation 
 might in that time have gained some strength ; and, 
 supported by an army upon which he could depend, 
 the Sultan might have carried out the needful re- 
 forms in the administration of his country, have 
 infused new life into the dead branches of the Otto- 
 man Empire, and have made himself formidable to 
 his neighbours. 
 
 All this was prevented by Eussia, which nipped 
 the Sultan's military reforms in the bud ; and since 
 that time the Porte has never been able to form an 
 army, but what it has been immediately destroyed 
 in fresh wars against the Arnauts, the Egyptians, 
 and the Kurds. 
 
 By the treaty of Adrianople, moreover, the 
 Sultan acknowledged the independence of Oreece. 
 This was far more than a mere loss of territory. 
 Narrow as were the confines of the new Hellenic 
 
Chap. VI. TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE. 457 
 
 kingdom, to which perhaps so great a future is 
 opened, its mere existence affords to hundreds of 
 thousands of Grreeks, who are scattered throughout 
 the other provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the ex- 
 ample of a successful rebellion. All the discontented 
 Christian subjects of the Porte could now find foreign 
 support and encouragement ; the Wallachians and 
 Moldavians looked towards Russia, the Bulgarians 
 towards Servia, the Grreeks towards Hellas. Besides, 
 the inhabitants of the Morea and the Cyclades had 
 hitherto supplied the Turkish fleets with crews, or at 
 all events with its best seamen. Ever since these 
 were lost to Turkey, it may be taken for granted 
 that the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, with all its 
 deficiencies, will always be superior to the Turkish. 
 
 Thus, in the event of a new war, there can be no 
 doubt as to which power would have dominion in the 
 Euxine. And it seems far from improbable that the 
 Russians might land their army at once on the Thra- 
 cian Chersonese, and by that means avoid a long 
 march through a desolate country, as well as the 
 resistance of the fortresses and the difficulties of the 
 Balkan, and decide the fate of the war at once by an 
 attack upon Constantinople. 
 
 During the fourth crusade the Venetians trans- 
 ported 40,000 Latin Christians to Byzantium. For 
 this purpose they employed no less than 360 ships, 
 accompanied by 70 provision transports, and con- 
 voyed by 50 galleys. The city was taken. In the 
 year 1833 a peaceful manoeuvre of the same kind 
 
458 TREATY OP ADRIANOPLE. Pakt II. 
 
 was executed. The Russians were invited by the 
 Porte, their embarkation was prepared, and no 
 opposition offered to their landing. Eleven ships 
 of the line and a proportionate number of smaller 
 vessels were able to convey a corps of 10,000 men 
 to Unkiar Skelessi. It cannot be denied that such 
 a body of troops as this would be sufficient to decide 
 the fate of the Turkish capital, either in case the 
 Christian population were to take up arms against 
 the Ottomans, or if the discontent among the 
 Moslem were ever to break out into open insur- 
 rection, or if the dynasty of Osman, which seldom 
 numbers more than two representatives at a time, 
 were to become extinct ; and it is manifest that the 
 Russians, and the Russians only, are near enough 
 and well enough prepared to take instant advantage 
 of any event of the kind. 
 
 But unless we admit that the Sultan's throne is 
 likely to become so rotten that it would crumble at 
 the slightest pressure from without ; — if, on the con- 
 trary, we believe that the Porte may be able to 
 maintain its authority over its Mussulman and 
 Christian subjects, and even to win over the latter 
 to its interests ; — we can by no means look upon such 
 a rapid mode of military proceedings as possible. 
 In this case neither 10,000 nor yet 20,000 men 
 would be able to take Constantinople by storm. 
 
 Taught by the experience of the last campaigns, 
 the Russians will probably in their next war enter 
 Bulgaria with a much larger force. If the army 
 
Chap. VI. TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE. 459 
 
 were to cross the Danube at Hirsova witli a real 
 effective force of 120,000 men, to invest Silistria 
 with 20,000, Yarna with a like number, and to 
 place 30,000 in observation before Shumla, it is 
 not altogether impossible that the remaining 50,000 
 men based upon the seaports of the Black Sea might 
 at once cross the Balkan, But then it is by no 
 means certain that Adrianople would again fall into 
 their hands without resistance, and, at any rate, the 
 final decision of the question must at last take place 
 under those ancient walls which delayed the fall of 
 the lower Roman empire for a whole century. 
 
( 461 ) 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Besides the enemy by whom they were openly opposed, the 
 Russians had to contend with another invisible foe which hung 
 upon their footsteps, crossed the Balkan with them, and at- 
 tacked them with fearfiil yiolence after they had concluded a 
 most advantageous peace ; this foe was disease. 
 
 Formerly the European powers took the field with 40,000 
 or 50,000 men, who carried with them provisions, ovens, and 
 tents, conquered a province and concluded a peace. In western 
 Europe war has gradually become more and more a national 
 struggle, but in such a country as Turkey, levies en masse, 
 conscriptions, and other expedients of modern warfare are inap- 
 plicable. The want of roads, and of agriculture, the almost 
 nomadic habits of the population, and the small number of at 
 all considerable towns, make it necessary to adhere to the old 
 system. The army had to be followed by immense magazines, 
 and in the event of rapid and distant manoeuvres, each soldier 
 had to carry with him provisions for 10 days. Even these 
 measures would have been insufficient had not the Russian 
 operations been carried on near the coast of a sea of which 
 they were absolute masters. 
 
 These are no doubt heavy shackles upon a General conduct- 
 ing an invasion, and they therefore give an incalculable ad- 
 vantage to the force which acts upon the defensive ; but a still 
 more serious difficulty is presented by the thought to be taken 
 of the health of the troops and the care of the sick. Supplies of 
 food might be brought by sea, but the erection of vast hospitals 
 requires a firm footing on shore ; whereas, only 3 months before 
 the conclusion of the peace, neither Silistria nor Shumla, both on 
 the flank of the Russian line of operations, were taken. But this 
 
462 RUSSIAN LOSSES BY DISEASE. Appendix. 
 
 difBculty was nothing compared to that which arose out of the 
 enormous spread and intense malignity of the diseases hy which 
 the Russian troops were attacked. Owing to the former, all 
 the preparations for sickness turned out totally insufficient ; and 
 owing to the latter, those who were appointed to heal and to 
 tend the sick were among the very first to die. 
 
 Several German surgeons in the Russian service have drawn 
 a fearful picture of the state of an army which, though victorious 
 in the field, was completely vanquished in the hospitals. 
 
 We know of old that armies which took the field in Dacia 
 and Pannonia have always been visited by pestilence, although 
 the country cannot be said to be unhealthy to the inhabitants, 
 whose clothing, diet, and habits are fitted to the climate. In 
 this part of Turkey, as in all others, no such thing is known 
 as really hard labour. The life of an Oriental is simple and 
 tranquil : he rises early, eats his first meal at 9 o'clock, sits 
 during the heat of the day under a vine-clad trellis or a plane- 
 tree, drinks sherbet, and tastes no stimulant more powerful 
 than coifee and a pipe ; towards sunset he eats another frugal 
 meal of vegetables, and goes to bed so early that in a Turkish 
 village no one is seen out of doors after 8 o'clock. As soon as 
 the great heats begin, usually in May, epidemic fevers fre- 
 quently break out even among the natives, who then go into a 
 sort of voluntary quarantine in their summer houses, or up into 
 the mountains. By the middle of July the spring fevers usually 
 subside owing to the want of communication ; for the villages 
 are almost empty during that time, and there are towns in 
 Asia Minor, as, for instance, Malatia, where in summer not a 
 soul is to be seen — the 20,000 or 30,000 inhabitants having 
 removed to their summer quarters several miles off by the side 
 of flowing streams, and beneath the cool shade of trees. The 
 whole Kurdish and Turkoman population pass the summer 
 under tents of goat's hair, and remove higher up the mountains 
 in proportion to the increase of the heat. 
 
 The clothing of the natives is as well adapted to the climate 
 as their food and dwellings. They never go uncovered, but 
 protect their heads by a thick covering against the dangerous 
 stroke of the sun. Furs, which in our northern climate are so 
 
Appendix. RUSSIAN LOSSES BY DISEASE. 463 
 
 seldom used, are there worn by every one : a temperature of 
 70°, so refreshing to us after sunset, is there felt as intense 
 cold after a heat of from 90° to 108° in the shade, and very 
 warm clothing becomes indispensable. Moreover, on the north 
 of the Balkan no sooner has the short twilight begun than a 
 dew falls which wets the clothes and bedding of those who 
 sleep in the open air like a heavy rain. 
 
 Still greater than the difference of temperature between noon 
 and night is that between summer and winter. On the Danube 
 the winter is at least as long, and at least as severe, as on the 
 Elbe. Early in November the plains are covered with deep 
 snow, which, even south of the Balkan and in the valleys about 
 Constantinople where the sun does not penetrate, lasts until 
 late in the spring ; on the mountains and high table-lands the 
 traveller frequently has to ride during the month of March 
 under a burning sun across interminable fields of snow so 
 dazzling as almost to blind him. 
 
 In the year 1838 the Porte assembled an army of 36,000 
 men at the foot of the Taurus. Although encamped upon the 
 plain of Charpat, 3000 feet above the level of the sea, and 
 composed entirely of natives, mostly Kurds, the change in 
 their mode of life, and the European clothing, caused a terrible 
 mortality. Fever, dysentery, and typhus prevailed to such an 
 extent that several regiments lost half their numbers within the 
 year. The pernicious influence of the climate could not fail to 
 be much more strongly felt by a foreign army. The easy, 
 indolent life of the Orientals was impossible in the Russian 
 camp. During the heat of the day the soldiers had to undergo 
 the greatest fatigue, and to sleep during the cold nights exposed 
 to the dew on the steaming earth ; their clothes, which they 
 could scarcely ever take off, were tight and inconvenient, and the 
 covering of the head especially heavy and useless. The food was 
 that eaten by the soldiers in northern latitudes and in winter : it 
 consisted of meat, oatmeal, and brandy ; the latter was intended 
 always to be mixed with water, but this was often neglected. 
 Vegetables were not to be had, nor any other bread than the 
 black biscuit, which is so convenient to keep and to carry ; but 
 it is stated by the surgeons that this biscuit, though softened in 
 
464 RUSSIAN LOSSES BY DISEASE. Appendix. 
 
 water and broken up, passed through the bowels wholly undi- 
 gested owing to the enfeebled state of the men's stomachs. In 
 Wallachia and Bulgaria the water was for the most part bad, 
 muddy, and chalky, and at Shumla it was so scarce that they 
 had barely enough to drink, and none for washing and bathing, 
 so that want of cleanliness was added to their other ills. For 
 great numbers to live together in a small space is always 
 unwholesome, and how much more must this have been the 
 case where so many of the number were sick and enfeebled, 
 and where numbers of corpses were buried every day ! 
 
 No sooner, indeed, had the Russian army entered the Princi- 
 palities than a vast number of the soldiers fell ill. The surgeons 
 were unanimous in considering the disease to be of a very ma- 
 lignant character, but they differed as to whether it were a low 
 gastric or a putrid fever,- — whether typhus or the plague. The 
 name, it is true,' did not matter much, as the plague is closely 
 related to those diseases, and indeed is perhaps merely another 
 form of them aggravated by the influences of soil and climate. 
 The characteristic symptoms, such as buboes, carbuncles, and 
 boils, made their appearance, but no one liked to utter the 
 dreaded name, or to resort to quarantine regulations which 
 were hardly compatible with a campaign. 
 
 Some measures of the kind were, however, indispensable ; for 
 though a few recent experiments * have appeared to prove the 
 contrary, long and frequent experience has shown that infection 
 may be communicated by the touch of plague-stricken persons, 
 and still more by that of their clothes, t 
 
 Before the breaking out of the war there were in Russia 
 two lines of quarantine, on the Dnieper and the Pruth : the 
 former had been taken off at the beginning of the campaign in 
 order to facilitate communication. But before the entrance of 
 the Russian troops, scattered cases of plague had appeared in 
 Wallachia, and the Hospodar had established a plague-hospital 
 
 * In 1837 and 1838 Dr. Bulard shut himself up in the plague hospitals — touched 
 the sick and the dead, slept heside them in their beds, inoculated himself with the 
 matter from the buboes, and remained well. In like manner an Ai-menian priest lived 
 fur many years in the plague hospital at Pera. 
 
 t A Russian physician lost, one after another, four attendants who brushed his 
 clothes, while he himself was spared. 
 
Appendix. RUSSIAN LOSSES BY DISEASE. 465 
 
 at Dudeshteh. The cases became more numerous in the spring, 
 and by the middle of May four convents were filled with the 
 sick. Now the quarantine on the Pruth was taken off and that 
 on the Dnieper reimposed with a duration of 16 days, and 
 boards of inspection were organised at Bucharest and Jassy. 
 A little later the main army before Shumla had to be pro- 
 tected by quarantine regulations, not only against Turkish 
 deserters, but also against Wallachia. Unfortunately, the 
 plague broke out in Hirsova, the principal point of com- 
 munication between, the army and Russia, and it became 
 necessary to establish a quarantine at Bazardchik. At Varna 
 the troops were inspected every week, and these precau- 
 tionary measures were" so far successful that the main corps in 
 Bulgaria remained free from the plague all through the year 
 1828. As the inhabitants had foretold, the character of the 
 disease in the Principalities changed when the hot weather set 
 in ; it did not however die out, as the communication could not 
 be entirely stopped ; at one time the Russians were infected by 
 the natives, at another the natives by the Russians ; it was in 
 vain that the sick soldiers were lodged in separate huts of 
 brushwood, that the clothes, linen, and even the munitions of 
 whole battalions were cleansed, and a number of suspected 
 houses burnt. Spite of all these precautions, the sickness con- 
 tinued to spread in the Principalities throughout the autumn, 
 and by the middle of November 40 villages were infected. It 
 was not until the severe cold set in in December that the 
 plague entirely ceased among the troops that were besieging 
 Giurgevo and Kalarash, and in the hospitals at Bucharest it 
 still continued. What made the matter worse was that those 
 hospitals were only calculated for the reception of 500 sick, 
 whereas thousands were brought thither from all directions, of 
 whom a great number proved to be infected with the plague. 
 On the 11th of February, 1829, 61 villages were purified by 
 order of General Roth. 
 
 Hitherto we have spoken only of the plague, but nervous, 
 intermittent, and putrid fevers, dysentery, scurvy, and inflam- 
 matory disorders, prevailed everywhere, and destroyed ten times 
 
 2 H 
 
466 
 
 RUSSIAN LOSSES BY DISEASE. 
 
 Appendix. 
 
 as many soldiers as the plague, which had hitherto been con- 
 fined within narrow limits. 
 
 Meanwhile the opening of the new campaign drew near ; the 
 cycle of diseases of the first campaign was closed, and in Feb- 
 ruary, 1829, the number of the sick and dead was at its mini- 
 mum between the two campaigns. The diseases had reached 
 their acme in September and October ; during the latter month 
 alone 20,000 sick had been received in the hospitals, without 
 counting the field hospitals. The greatest number of deaths 
 had occurred in January, 1829 ; for in this month, during 
 which there was an armistice, 6000 men died ; but the relative 
 mortality of the first campaign did not reach its highest point 
 until February, 1829, when one out of four of the sick died. 
 The intensity of the disease is shown in the following table. 
 
 The number of deaths per cent, were, in — 
 
 
 1828. 
 
 1829. 
 
 
 May. 
 
 1-8 
 7.4 
 
 June. 
 
 2-7 
 7-2 
 
 July. 
 
 2-0 
 10-2 
 
 Aug. 
 
 2--7 
 16-6 
 
 Sept. 
 
 5-6 
 18-9 
 
 Oct. 
 
 7 2 
 22-3 
 
 Nov. 
 
 10 '9 
 23-4 
 
 Deo. 
 
 10-5 
 23-3 
 
 Jan. 
 25-5 
 
 Feb. 
 
 In the Regimental Hospitals 
 In the Hospitals .... 
 
 28-8 
 
 The vast amount of illness is shown by the fact, that during 
 the ten months from May, 1828, to February, 1829, no less 
 than 75,226 of the less serious cases were treated in the field 
 hospitals, and 134,882 serious cases in the hospitals, making 
 altogether 210,108 sick. 
 
 Reckoning the whole strength of the Russian army, including 
 non-combatants, 'at 100,000 men, which is a very liberal calcu- 
 lation, every man had, on an average, therefore, been twice in 
 hospital. From this positive information, and the rates of per 
 centage given in the table, it appears that during the first cam- 
 paign, and the subsequent winter quarters, the Russians lost at 
 least 82,000 men in the hospitals. This number does not of 
 course include those who were killed on the field of battle, and 
 therefore were not brought into hospital at all. It may there- 
 fore be said, without exaggeration, that this first campaign cost 
 the Russians nearly one-half of their actual efifective force. 
 
Appendix. RUSSIAN LOSSES BY DISEASE. 467 
 
 In the middle of May, 1829, symptoms of plague broke out 
 for the first time on the right bank of the Danube, at Czerna- 
 voda, Babadagh, Kostendje, Mangalia, Bazardchik, Kavarna, 
 and at last in Varna, the most important point of all, at which 
 were the reserves, magazines, and arsenals of the whole army, 
 and a depot of 4000 invalids. The infection was supposed to 
 have been spread by the distribution of the munitions which had 
 belonged to the deceased soldiers of the 16th division of in- 
 fantry, and which had been kept shut up for a long time in 
 a magazine. At all events the guardians of the arsenal were 
 the first who died with positive symptoms of plague. How- 
 ever, the close quarters of the troops, the bad food, and the 
 exhalations from so many dead bodies, generated scurvy and 
 the most malignant forms of fever. In the middle of June the 
 numbers daily admitted into the hospital at Varna amounted to 
 from 50 to 80, and the death of eight surgeons deprived the 
 sick of almost all assistance. A few battalions were removed 
 to an encampment outside the town ; the men were made to 
 bathe in the sea ; the tents were fumigated with vinegar ; the 
 munitions were aired ; the clothes of the dead burnt ; and a 
 space enclosed with ditches set apart for plague-stricken patients. 
 
 The appearance of this plague-hospital, if such it can be 
 called, was frightful. The sick staggered about, gasping 
 beneath the burning sun among the dying and the dead. In 
 June the plague reached such a height, that above 1000 
 men a -week were brought into the plague - hospital. By 
 the 26th of August 5509 sick had been received there : of 
 these 3959 died. 
 
 On one day, the 25th of June, there were 300 deaths ; the 
 corpses were heaped up like logs, and carted away. Out of 41 
 surgeons 28 were infected, and of these 20 died. Out of 7 
 apothecaries 4 died, besides 30 dressers, hospital attendants, 
 &c. As the surgeons only arrived a few at a time, intervals 
 occurred during which there was only one doctor to take care 
 of all these sick. The enormous mortality among the surgeons 
 was the more unfortunate, as they were replaced for the most 
 part by inexperienced young men, generally foreigners and 
 unable to speak the language. Not only in the hospitals, but 
 
 2 H 2 
 
468 RUSSIAN LOSSES BY DISEASE. Appendix. 
 
 on every road into the town, in every field, and behind every 
 hedge, were found dead and dying men, while drinking and riot 
 was going on in the tents of the cantiniers. 
 
 The state of things was no better in other places. Brailow 
 was completely deserted ; even the posting-house was removed 
 out of the town, so that travellers might not be forced to enter 
 it ; 1200 men were treated there for plague in June ; of these 
 774 died ; almost all the surgeons and hospital officers were dead. 
 In Slobodjeh the entire management of the plague hospital was 
 left in the hands of one single non-commissioned ofiicer. The 
 plague had also broken out in Bessarabia. At this time the 
 main corps of the Russian army lay before Shumla, and it was 
 of course of vital importance to protect it from the fearful pes- 
 tilence. The corps was surrounded in the rear by a cordon of 
 outposts. The large convoys which had been despatched with 
 proper precautions were suffered to pass free, but the carts 
 of the cantiniers, which were to supply the head-quarters, were 
 stopped here in crowds, while the greatest scarcity prevailed in 
 the camp. Spite of all, the infection crept through, but the 
 cases of plague were scattered, and on the whole the state of 
 health of the main army was good. What the troops chiefly 
 suffered from was dysentery. 
 
 As soon as the army had begun to cross the Balkan, all the 
 sick in the ambulances of head-quarters were transported to 
 Balchik. The troops which had to pass through suspected 
 places marched between cordons of outposts, to prevent all 
 communication with the inhabitants. All the convoys from 
 Varna were purified before starting, and re-examined on their 
 arrival. A strict quarantine was introduced along the course 
 of the Kamtchik, and the seaports in the bay of Burgass were 
 provided with lazarettos. 
 
 A great number of men sunk under the fatigue during the 
 first few days' march. By the time they had reached Devno 
 the number of sick in the ambulance had reached 400, who 
 were suffering from diarrhoea, jaundice, and scurvy. Many of 
 the men threw away their ten days' provision of oatmeal and 
 biscuit, unable to bear the weight. The corps reached the first 
 ascent of the mountain with sadly thinned ranks, and even at 
 
Appendix. RUSSIAN LOSSES BY DISEASE. 469 
 
 Derweesh-Jowarin a hospital had to be established under tem- 
 porary huts for the accommodation of 600 sick. 
 
 At the southern foot of the mountain the troops rested from 
 their long fatigues and privations, beneath the shade of fine 
 oaks and beeches, and amid gardens affording regetables and 
 half-ripe grapes. The soldiers were rejoiced and encouraged 
 by their successful passage of the Balkan, and were filled with 
 fresh life and hope. Only about 50 men had been wounded 
 at the taking of Aidos, and there were not 100 sick in the 
 towa In Aidos the streets had to be cleared of the dead 
 bodies of the besieged, and the houses to be cleansed from dirt. 
 No symptom of plague showed itself here, but the army was 
 now attacked by intermittent fevers. In a very few days both 
 officers and men complained of inconceivable languor and 
 fatigue, insomuch that many of them could scarcely walk. 
 Besides the intermittent, they were attacked by continued 
 fever, accompanied by delirium, and such relaxation of the 
 capillaries, that the slightest blow, or even touch, caused blue 
 marks in the skin ; the bite of the flies, which attacked these 
 patients with especial avidity, produced purple spots half an 
 inch in diameter, in a few moments. On the fifth or sixth day 
 the patients died in a state of unconsciousness, and their bodies 
 immediately began to decompose like those of hunted animals. 
 The intermittent fevers, with redoubled paroxysms, rendered the 
 patients weary of life, and were worse than the plague. Very 
 few had been wounded, but these were attacked by tetanus ; 
 more than half the number of deaths, however, were caused 
 by dysentery. 
 
 Every day hundreds left the ranks of the army already so 
 much enfeebled ; some lost their senses for thirty-six hours 
 in the paroxysms of fever, others were perishing of thirst. The 
 hospitals on the further side the Balkan filled so fast that there 
 was neither room to receive the sick nor clothes and linen for 
 their use. Most of the necessaries had been left behind in 
 Bulgaria, where, during the month of July alone, 19,000 sick 
 had been added to the 18,000 who had been left there. Thus 
 during the month of July no less than 40,000 men, more than 
 half the active force of the army, lay in hospital. As yet the 
 
470 EUSSIAN LOSSES BY DISEASE, Appendix. 
 
 plague had not followed the main army, but it hung like a 
 black cloud over the northern horizon of Bulgaria. The qua- 
 rantine establishment on the Kamtchik was filled with persons 
 suspected of plague, and the character of the continued fevers 
 became so malignant that it threatened to turn to plague. 
 During the month of September 209fi men lay sick at Burgass, 
 6 of whom had buboes. In October, out of 2117 sick, 53 had 
 the plague, and in November one half the whole number of 
 sick were plague-stricken. The quarantine had been kept up 
 with the utmost rigour, and it seems probable that the plague 
 had developed itself from the fever without contagion. 
 
 Meanwhile the main army was advancing upon Adrianople. 
 During the forced marches thither from Slivno half the pack- 
 horses died of fatigue. The number of sick in the ambulance 
 rose to 800 ; these were left behind in Bujukderbent, but 
 during the two days' march to Adrianople the ambulance was 
 again filled with 26 officers and 226 privates : a great number 
 died on the march. In the Kamschatka reserve regiment, 
 which had followed the corps from Sizeboli, symptoms of 
 plague appeared, but it was kept down, by immediate separa- 
 tion. At Adrianople an hospital was established in the newly- 
 erected Turkish barracks, a large square building standing on 
 a height to the west of the town. The building consisted of 
 two stories, with 100 windows on each of the shorter fronts 
 and 150 on the longer ones. It contained a mosque with a 
 tall minaret, large marble baths, spacious kitchens, and a kiosk 
 commanding a magnificent view of the town in the valley be- 
 neath. In front extended a large green, a grove of plane- 
 trees, and several gardens and cemeteries. An invading army 
 might be considered fortunate in finding such quarters for their 
 sick in this country ; but owing to the probability of being 
 soon forced to return home, the needful arrangements were 
 made in the most temporary manner. We have already seen 
 how long the stay of the Russians at Adrianople was protracted, 
 and diffing three whole months they made shift as though 
 they were to leave it at the end of three days : they were not 
 prepared either for the enormous increase in the number of 
 sick, or for the rigour of the winter. The hospital filled fast : 
 
Appendix. RUSSIAN LOSSES BY DISEASE. 471 
 
 by the time the army had been in Adrianople a week 1616 
 sick were taken there ; by the 1st of September it contained 
 3666, and by the middle of the month 4641, one-fourth of the 
 whole remaining disposable force. After the conclusion of the 
 war the plague broke out in the hospital in its most fearful 
 shape, and in the midst of peace carried off those who had 
 , withstood the sword, fatigue, and disease until the end of the 
 campaign. 
 
 To these immense numbers of sick nothing could be afforded 
 but a bare shelter. Adrianople did not contain a supply of 
 stores sufficient to last any length of time ; the most ordinary 
 food was wanting ; there was not even hay or straw to litter 
 down the sick upon the wooden pallets of the barracks ; they 
 were laid upon torn-up Turkish tents with knapsacks as pil- 
 lows and no covering but their cloaks. The winter set in with 
 fearful severity ; most of the windows were unglazed, and the 
 doors would not shut. In a short time the beautiful grove of 
 plane-trees had disappeared, for even the healthy troops wanted 
 firewood, and the very bones of the dead out of the cemeteries 
 were used as fuel. At first there was no lack of surgeons, but 
 the work they had to do was beyond human powers : there 
 were no dressers to be found at all and scarcely any hospital 
 attendants. The doctors were forced to prepare and administer 
 their remedies themselves, and when the plague broke out they 
 nearly all fell victims to it, as was the case wherever it prevailed. 
 
 One of the greatest evils was the very defective arrangements 
 for maintaining cleanliness. With 5000 patients, half of them 
 suffering from dysentery, it was more than fifty men could do 
 to keep up any cleanliness at all. In addition to this the drains 
 had got stopped up, and the most horrible stench pervaded the 
 whole building. 
 
 During the first months spent by the Russians at Adrianople 
 intermittent fevers swept off the sick by hundreds. The pa- 
 roxysms appeared in a double form, the first lasting sometimes 
 as long as 18 hours, the second paroxysm beginning after the 
 interval of an hour, so that the patients were 36 hours under the 
 influence of tjie disorder and only 12 hours free from it. They 
 generally died at the end of 18 or 21 days ; if the disease lasted 
 
472 RUSSIAN LOSSES BY DISEASE. Appendix. 
 
 longer it usually terminated in scurvy or dropsy. The only 
 remedy was quinine, and of this they had no supply. Accord- 
 ing to the report of the Russian surgeon-general there were 
 not more than 500 men in the whole army who could say that 
 they had not been attacked by fever at all, and many of these 
 were seized after their return home with the disorder in an 
 aggravated form. 
 
 The most harassing of all the diseases was dysentery. Ad- 
 ministering the medicines was the easiest part of the task ; the 
 proper nursing of the sufferers, which would have required 
 almost as many attendants as patients, and the washing of linen, 
 was impossible, and accordingly the most frightful want of 
 cleanliness was unavoidable. Linen and fur coats for 2000 
 men were sent from Ahiolo to Adrianople, but did not arrive 
 until December, having been delayed by the badness of the 
 roads and by the breaking out of the plague among the drivers 
 of the baggage-waggons. During the last half of September 
 all diseases and all relapses, as well as the intermitting and 
 continued fevers, took the form of the most exhausting diarrhoea 
 and fatal dysentery. 
 
 During the month of October 1300 men died at Adrianople 
 alone of diarrhoea ; 1500 were sent thither from Kirklissa suf- 
 fering under the same disease, and scarcely able to reach the 
 hospital from exhaustion. The diarrhoea patients, whose vital 
 powers were completely exhausted, perished with cold like flies 
 in autumn with the thermometer at about 41°. In order to 
 protect their feet against cold they kept on their boots until 
 they complained of violent pains in their feet, and upon their 
 feet being examined, about the 16th of October, they were 
 found to have mortification in the toes, arising from want of 
 external and of vital heat.* 
 
 According to the terms of the treaty of peace the Russian 
 army was to go into winter quarters at Burgass, but it was 
 absolutely impossible to transport such a number of sick people 
 along such roads : 4700 sick, with 300 or 400 men commanded 
 to serve as attendants, had to remain at Adrianople under 
 
 * During the winter of 1838-39 14 men had their feet frozen in bed in the hospital 
 at Malatia. At that tirne dysentery again raged among the Russian troops. 
 
Appendix. RUSSIAN LOSSES BY DISEASE. 473 
 
 cover of the 36tli regiment of chasseurs, making altogether 
 about 6000 men. 
 
 Before the departure of the corps on the 29th of October the 
 first case of plague occurred in the hospital, and soon after- 
 wards the disease spread with irresistible violence until not one 
 of the 300 wards was free from it. 
 
 The external symptoms of the plague are described by the 
 Russian physicians as follows. The outbreak of the disorder 
 usually takes place at sunset ; it begins with shiverings, which 
 soon become rigor, and change towards midnight into violent 
 heat with delirium, resembling an inflammatory fever. In this 
 stage the patient is very talkative, and maintains that his illness 
 is of no consequence. If any one approaches him, he jumps 
 up, but immediately staggers backwards, or falls as if struck by 
 lightning : the face is swollen, the expression altered, and the 
 eyes fixed and covered with a white film. The patient sees and 
 hears imperfectly and speaks thick, but much and fast ; his 
 memory is so weak that he often does not know his own name 
 or that of his regiment : on the whole his appearance is that of 
 a drunken man. In a subsequent stage of the disease he sinks 
 into torpid silence and plucks at his clothes ; he complains of 
 cold, crawls about on the earth, heedless of the injuries he in- 
 flicts upon himself, and often dies at the very moment that he 
 is tearing his neighbour in order to drag oflF his clothing for 
 himself. The breaking out of the buboes does not save him 
 from death, which ensues at the end of forty-eight, or twenty- 
 four, and sometimes of even four hours. The only favourable 
 crisis is violent perspiration. 
 
 In a disease of which the course was so rapid all internal 
 remedies were found unavailing. At Varna, pouring cold 
 water over the patients had sometimes cured and always re- 
 lieved them, but at Adrianople the weather was too unfavour- 
 able, and the patients too sensitive to cold, to admit of this 
 treatment, and the only thing which afforded any relief was 
 external friction with oil. Towards the end of September the 
 plague reached its utmost height ; from 50 to 70 men died 
 every day, and the disease only died out in the following March 
 from want of more victims. 
 
 2 I 
 
474 
 
 RUSSIAN LOSSES BY DISEASE. 
 
 Appendix. 
 
 Only two transports went to Burgass at all, one in December 
 with 300 convalescents, and one in May with 170 sick. They 
 were escorted by 300 or 400 men in good health ; all the rest 
 had perished. Of the 6000 who stayed behind in Adrianople 
 5200 died. 
 
 The plague also spread in the winter quarters on the other 
 side of the Balkan — not a regiment, not an hospital, not even 
 the head-quarters at Burgass were exempt. The whole army, 
 if such a wreck deserves the name, was subjected to a purifi- 
 cation, and was not suffered to re-enter Russia until it had 
 performed a quarantine of twenty-one days. One ship of the 
 line and two frigates had to be devoted to fetching the sick, 
 who still amounted, after all the mortality at Burgass, to 3684, 
 of which 600 were plague-stricken : they were conveyed to 
 Kinburn and Ovidiopol. It was not till the 25th of June, 1830, 
 that head-quarters reached Tultchia 
 
 The enormous increase in the mortality in the Russian army 
 during the campaign of 1829, as compared with that of the 
 former, great as it was, may be seen at a glance by comparing 
 the following table with the one given above. 
 
 The number of deaths per cent, was as follows : — 
 
 1829, 
 
 In the Reginiental Hospitals 
 In the Hospitals .... 
 
 Mar. 
 
 20-4 
 
 Apv. 
 
 25-6 
 
 May. 
 
 9-3 
 
 29-2 
 
 June, 
 
 10-7 
 56'6 
 
 July. 
 
 lO'O 
 41'1 
 
 Aug. 
 
 11-1 
 33-7 
 
 Sept. 
 
 14-3 
 34-6 
 
 Oct. 
 
 18-8 
 42-0 
 
 Nov. 
 
 27-3 
 45-6 
 
 Dec. 
 
 19 '6 
 39-1 
 
 On an average, therefore, there died in 1828 — ' 
 
 In the Field Regimental Hospitals, 5 per cent. In the Hospitals, 19*2 per cent. 
 And in 1829— 
 
 In the Field Regimental Hospitals, 14" 6 per cent. In the Hospitals, 37'0 per cent. 
 
 The mortality in the regimental hospitals was therefore three 
 times as great as that of the former year ; in the hospitals it was 
 double. It is impossible to say what the proportion might have 
 been had a third campaign become necessary. 
 
 The number of the sick and dead in the year 1829 is no- 
 where fully given, but the following data may be taken for 
 granted. 
 
Appendix. RUSSIAN LOSSES BY DISEASE. 475 
 
 la the regular hospitals alone were — 
 
 1829. Received. Of these there died. 
 
 In March . . . 12,170 Sick . , . ^ = 2,434 „ 
 
 . 17,625 „ . . . • = 4,406 „ 
 
 . 14,419 „ . . . 1 = 4,806 „ 
 
 . 18,000 „ . above | = 9,500 „ ■ 
 
 . 19,000 „ . . . I = 7,600 „ 
 
 April 
 May . 
 June 
 July 
 
 That is, during 5 months 81,214 Sick. 28,746 died. 
 
 During the following months the mortality rose from one- 
 third to two-fifths, and even to one-half. The number of sick 
 continued to increase in the small army at Adrianople, and the 
 deaths during the five last months of the year were at least as 
 numerous as during the five previous months. We know that 
 5200 men more died out of the number left behind there. If 
 to all these we add the deaths which took place in the field 
 hospitals and the number of those killed in battle, we shall pro- 
 bably fall far short of the truth if we reckon the loss sustained 
 by the Russians during their last campaign at 60,000 men. 
 
 This estimate no doubt includes part of the great body of 
 non-combatants and of the small reinforcements which followed 
 the main body from Sizeboli to Adrianople. We may, how- 
 ever, assume that not more than 10,000 or 15,000 combatants 
 returned home across the Pruth, and that the Russian army 
 was almost wholly destroyed during the second campaign. 
 
 Such an extraordinary state of health, or rather of sickness, 
 could not have been foreseen ; it far exceeded all calculation, 
 and it is diflBcult to form a conception of an army engaged in 
 ofifensive operations of which the larger half is lying sick in the 
 hospitals. The blame which has been cast upon the higher 
 branches of military^ administration in this respect appears to us 
 unjust ; it was manifestly impossible in such a country to carry 
 the means and appliances for nursing and curing 40,000 sick, 
 or to enforce during a campaign the quarantine regulations 
 necessary in a time of plague. But such a state of things as 
 that which we have just described must not be left out of our 
 calculations in forming an opinion as to the performances of an 
 army and its leaders. 
 
 The Russian soldier would seem to be as patient and enduring 
 
476 RUSSIAN LOSSES BY DISEASE. Appendix. 
 
 under hardship, fatigue, privation, and suflfering as he is brave, 
 in the moment of danger. As far as the commander is con- 
 cerned, it was the hard fate of Prince Sabalkanski to be opposed 
 in each of the two campaigns in which he commanded not only 
 by the armed foe but by a secret and fatal enemy — in Turkey 
 by the plague and in Poland by the cholera, to which he himself 
 at length fell a victim. Not to mention the diminution in the 
 material forces at his command, it requires boundless strength 
 of purpose in the leader of an army, while witnessing such ter- 
 rible and wide-spread suffering, not to lose sight of the final 
 object, which cannot be attained by waiting or temporising, but 
 only by incessant vigour and rapid action. 
 
 With regard to the campaign in Turkey, we think that his- 
 tory will say thus much in praise of General Diebitsch. lie 
 undertook nothing with the inadequate means at his command 
 but what was indispensable for the attainment of his object. 
 He besieged one fortress and fought one battle, but this brought 
 him into the very heart of the hostile empire. He arrived 
 there followed by the shadow of an army, but with the reputa- 
 tion of irresistible success. To the sagacious, bold, and pru- 
 dent conduct of General Diebitsch at Adrianople Russia owes 
 the fortunate issue of a campaign which would have led to far 
 difierent results if the Sultan and the European diplomatists 
 had been at all aware of the real state of things. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 LONDON : PRINTED BT WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFOKD STKEET, 
 AND CHAKING CBOSS. 
 
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