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CORNELL 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
olin,anx 
 
 3 1924 031 765 609 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tinis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924031765609 
 
THE RATIONALISM 
 
 OF 
 
 METAPHYSICS. 
 
SUPPLEMENT 
 
 TO 
 
 THEOLOGY 
 
 AND 
 
 Science of Government, 
 
 Bein^ a Review of a Booh 
 
 BY 
 
 IMMANUEL KANT, 
 
 CALLED 
 
 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. 
 
 BT 
 
 KUKLOS 
 
 (JOBN BABBIS.) 
 
 MontxtnX t 
 
 FEINTED BT TEE LOVBLL PRINTING AND PUBLlSfflNG CO. 
 ST. NICHOLAS STEBET. 
 
 October 1874. 
 
jf^^v-^r?"!' 
 
 CORNELL 
 
 D\ 
 
 Llt^ 
 
 LfBRARV 
 
 / /j 
 
 Entered according to tlte Act of Parliament of the Dominion of 
 Canadaj in the year one thousand eight hundred and seventy -ifourj 
 by John Harris, in the Office of the Minister of Agricultui-e and 
 Statistics at Ottawa-. 
 
SUPPLEMENT 
 
 TO THEOLOGY AND THE SCIENCE OF 
 aOVERNMENT. 
 
 ON THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS. 
 Being a review of a book called Kant's Oritique of Pure Reason*. 
 
 In noticing this book, bringing it again, perhaps, 
 prominently before the public, and calling attention 
 particularly to certain passages in it ; we do so under 
 protest. We protest against any supposition that the 
 book in a correct sense belongs to science ; or that it 
 has in itself any value to recommend its reconsideration 
 by the public. On the contrary, we hold it to be a 
 harmful, baneful book which has been and still is, directly 
 and indirectly, potent for mischief. 
 
 In examining and objecting to this book, however, it 
 is not to it only, but to the class of books, doctrines, 
 and opinions which belong to it and to which it belongs. 
 We do not suppose that the ordinary student, of the man 
 of ordinary education, is in much risk of directly con- 
 founding himself by the serious endeavour to study and 
 comprehend this work as a part of legitimate science. 
 We feel sure that the perusal of a few pages by a person 
 whose mind is in a naturally healthy condition must 
 usually produce a degree of mental nausea suiiicient to 
 protect the ordinary individual from direct injury ; but 
 it by no means follows that such person is not indi- 
 vidually interested in the book, and that he may not 
 receive injury of the most serious description from it. 
 
 * Critiqne of Pure Reason, ] Translated from the German 
 
 BT IMMANUBL KaHT, j g^ j jj_ p_ MeiklejohD. 
 
 Henry G. Bohn, London, 1860. 
 
4 THE EATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Let US consider, with some attention, one way out of 
 several in which he may receive serious injury. A 
 teacher of some department of knowledge, such as 
 physical science, has by the evidence of superior ability, 
 by the clearness- of his explanations, by his sincerity, in- 
 dustry, skUl and sagacity, gained the confidence of a 
 number of persons, it may be, of all the members of a 
 scientific society, or, perhaps, his reputation may have ex- 
 tended throughout the town or, even, the whole country 
 to which he belongs, or, it may be, that he has earned 
 a world-wide renown, and his name has become re- 
 cognized throughout the world of education and civi- 
 lization as of a man whose teaching is authoritative, 
 whose credentials are such as to place his propositions 
 almost above controversy, and such that his certified 
 examination and approval of a doctrine is sufficient of 
 itself to strongly recommend to the student the accept- 
 ance of that doctrine. 
 
 Let us suppose that such teacher has directed his 
 attention especially to one department of Natural Science, 
 to physics, for instance, or some other one department, 
 but has investigated and acquired knowledge in other 
 departments of Natural Science also. Having attained 
 his reputation as a teacher of great ability, he becomes 
 desirous to still further extend the area of his knowledge 
 and thereby his ability to instruct : and he proceeds to 
 commence the study of Ideal Science, to which he has 
 hitherto paid scarcely any attention. Now comes the 
 important question. . . Does his science securely rest 
 upon the fundamental basis of sound science ; that is, 
 upon the primary facts of natural and revealed theology ? 
 If not, we say that such an one is in even greater dan- 
 ger than the intelligent young lad eager for the acquisi- 
 tion of knowledge whose mind is allowed to wander, un- , 
 guided and unprotected, amongst the snares and pitfalls 
 of unsound ideal science. When such a man brings his 
 mind deliberately to the consideration of some system 
 
THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS. 15 
 
 ■5of metaphysics, whether it be a modification of Kant's 
 transcendental system or some other, he will not allow 
 'his mind to be repelled from the study by a mere repug- 
 Tiance or distaste in the first instance. And besides, his 
 previously acquired knowledge and experience spares 
 him the necessity of much of the labour which would 
 have to be undergone by the inexperienced student, for 
 the latter to assimilate the strange doctrines, and to become 
 possessed of them as apart of his own knowledge. 
 
 But the man is a justly renowned teacher. The false 
 and mischievous doctrines, having mingled in the alembic 
 of his mind with the truths and facts of Natural Science, do 
 jQot come forth in the same nauseous state in whicli they 
 are presented in such a work as Kant's Critique ; they 
 now have all the advantages of the persuasive speech, 
 trained skill, earnestness and experience of the teacher 
 himself, and thus the noxious doctrines, disguised by 
 ■truths to which they seem to belong, are rendered accep- 
 table to the unguarded mind of the student. 
 
 We will commence with an analytical examination of 
 that which, assuming the work to have any pretension to 
 scientific arrangement, must be considered the com- 
 mencement proper of the treatise. This will be found at 
 page 212, under the following heading : 
 
 " Of JPure Reason^ the seat of the Transcendentalllluso- 
 ry appearance" 
 
 A. 
 
 • OF REASON IN GENERAL. 
 
 " All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to under- 
 standing, and ends with reason,' beyond which nothing higher can be 
 discovered in the human mind for elaborating the matter of intuition 
 and subjecting it to the highest unity of thought. At this stage of our 
 enquiry it is my duty to give an explanation of this, the highest 
 faculty of cognition, and I confess I find myself here in some difK- 
 culty. Of reason, as of the understanding, there is a merely formal, 
 that is, logical use, in which it makes abstraction of all content of 
 
6 THE RATrOKALISM OF METAPHTBICS". 
 
 cognition ; but there is also a real use, iiiasmuch as it containB- i» 
 itself the source of certain conceptions and principles, which it does= 
 not borrow either from the senses or the understanding. The- 
 former faculty hsts been long defined by logicians' as the faculty 
 of mediate conclusion in contradistinction to> immediate eonclusions- 
 (consequeniicB immediatcB^) But the nature of the latter, which 
 itself genera,tes conceptions,- is not to be understood from this de-- 
 flnition . Now, as a division- of reason into a . logical and a tran- 
 scendental faculty presents itself h«re, it becomes necessary to seek 
 for a higher conception of this source of cognition which shall com- 
 prehend both conceptions. In this we may expect, according to the- 
 analogy of the conceptions of the understanding,, that the logical con- 
 ception will give us the key to the transcendental,- and that the table- 
 of the functions of the former will present us with the clue to the- 
 conceptions of reason. 
 
 " In the former part of our transcendental logicy we defined the- 
 understanding to be the faculty of rules ; reason maybe- distinguished 
 from understanding as the faeulty of principles, 
 
 " The term principle is ainbiguous, and commou-ly signifies merely 
 a cognition that may be employed as a principle ; albhough it is not. 
 in itself, and as regards its proper origin, entitled to the distinction.. 
 Every general proposition, even if derived from experience by the 
 process Of induction, may serve as the major in a syllogism ; but it 
 is not for that reason a principle. Mathematical axioms (for exampler 
 there can be only one straight line between two points,) are general d 
 priori cognitions, and are therefore rightly denominated principles, 
 relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them. But I 
 cannot, for this reason, say that I cognize this property of a straight 
 line from principles. I cognize it only in pure intuition. 
 
 " Cognition from principles, then, is that cognition, in which I cog- 
 nize the particular in the general by means of conceptions . Thus 
 every syllogism is a form of the deduction of a cognition from a prin- 
 ciple. For the major always gives a conception through which every 
 thing that is subsumed under the condition thereof, is cognized 
 according to a principle. Now, as every general cognition may serve 
 as the major in a syllogism, and the understanding presents us with 
 such general d priori propositions, they may be termed principles, in 
 respect of their possible use. 
 
 " But if we consider these principles of the pure understanding in 
 
T?Hi: NATIONALISM OF METAPHTSIOS. 7 
 
 Telation to their origin, we shall find them to be anything rather than 
 ■cognitions from conceptions.' For they would not even be possible d, 
 priori, if we could not rely on the assistance of pure intuition (in 
 ■mathematics), or on that of the conditions of -a possible experience- 
 That everything that happens has a cause, cannot be concluded from 
 ■the general conception of that which happens ; on the contrary, the 
 principle of causality instructs us as to the mode of obtaining from 
 that which happens a determinate empirical conception. 
 
 " Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot 
 supply, and they alone are entitled to be called principles. At the 
 ■same time, all general propositions may be termed comparative prin- 
 .ciples. 
 
 " It has been a long-cherished wish that, (who knows liow late) may 
 ■one day be happily accomplished — that the principles of the endless 
 variety of civil laws should be investigated and exposed ; for in this 
 way alone can we find the secret of simplifying legislation. But in 
 this case, laws are nothing more than limitations of our freedom upon 
 conditions under which it ^bsists in perfect harmony with itself; 
 they consequently have for their object that which is completely otir 
 •own work, and of which we ourselves may be the cause by means of 
 these conceptions. But how objects, as things in themselves — how 
 the nature of things is subordinated to principles and is to be deter- 
 xnined according to conceptions, is a question which it seems well 
 nigh impossible to answer. Be this, however, as it may — ^for on this 
 point our investigation is yet to be made — it is at least manifest from 
 ■what we have said, that cognition from principles is something very 
 •different from cognition by means of the understanding, which may 
 indeed precede other cognitions in the form of a principle, but in itself 
 —so far as it is synthetical — is neither based upon mere thought, nOr 
 XJontams a general proposition drawn from conceptions alone. 
 
 " The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity 
 .of phenomena by virtue of rules ; the reason is a faculty for the pro- 
 duction of unity of rules (of the understanding) under principles. 
 Reason, therefore, never applies directly to experience, or to any sen- 
 suous object ; its object is, on the contrary, the understanding, to the 
 manifold cognition of which it gives a unity d priori by means of 
 conceptions — a unity which may be called rational unity, und which 
 is of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the 
 •undsrstanding. 
 
8 THE RATIONALIBM OP METAPHTSICSi 
 
 " The above is the general conception of the faculty of reason, in so 
 far as it has been possible to make it comprehensible in the absence' 
 of examples. These will be given in the sequel." 
 
 The very first part of the first sentence- " all our know- 
 fedge begiiiK with sense "' appears' to' be in violer't contra- 
 diction to the general teaching of the work, which 
 sometimes assumes and' sometimes purports to demon- 
 strate that knowledge is quite independent of sense,, 
 and. that sense itself belongs only to one class- of effects 
 ©r consequents, to which intuitions, conceptions, and 
 cognitions, stand in the relation of causes or antece- 
 dents. 
 
 In the second part of this first sentence, '' proceeds 
 thence to understanding; and ends with reason,"" beyond 
 which nothing can' be discovered in' the human mind for 
 elaborating the matter of intuition; understanding as a 
 mental process or faculty is made to precede reason-. 
 Now, this appears to be evidently erroneous in the sense 
 which Kant indirectly attaches to those expressions-. 
 Reason is described' as the mental process or a part of 
 the process by which the matter of intuition is elaborated, 
 but knowledge (all knowledge is necessarily compound,) 
 whether it be in the form of a statement, proposition 
 or conclusion,, cannot be understood unless its, elements 
 be first arranged by the intellectual faculty of the inind. 
 We neither affirm nor admit 1;hat there are any two 
 such distinct processes as reason and understanding, as 
 supposed by Kant ; but we say that the meaning of the 
 term understanding, whether it be considered aprocess; a 
 " faculty or anything else, imphes that it is subsequent to 
 that process of the intellectual faculty by which the ele- 
 ments of the knowledge are arranged, for it is not an in- 
 coherent and disorderly collection of ideas, but the clear 
 and distinct statement which is said to be understood as 
 a cognition by the mind. When (compound) knowledge 
 IS under stood;hjth.& mind, the whofe process of elaborafr- 
 in<T the matter of intuition (which we think is preferably 
 
THE RATIONALISM pP METAPHYSICS. 9 
 
 expressed as the process of arranging and combining the 
 elements of knowledge) has been completed. It is true 
 the knowledge may be misound, the process of arranging 
 may have been badly or incompletely performed and the 
 conclusion or cognition, being disapproved by the judg- 
 ment (reason), may require to be rearranged ; but this is 
 to undo and to repeat the process, not to elaborate or to 
 cany further the process. We opine, for ourselves, that 
 understanding is a term applicable only to compound 
 knowledge, and its use is to express appreciation by the 
 mind that theelements of such compound knowledge have 
 been logically and coherently arranged. If the elements 
 were sufficient and of such kind as to be capable of com- 
 bining together, then, if the process of arrangement has 
 been complete and perfect, the knowledge (conclusion or 
 cognition) is completely, clearly, and distinctly under- 
 stood by the mind. This is quite an end of the process 
 of elaboration which Kant is here treating of ; although 
 it by no means follows that such knowledge is sound, 
 is such that the mind may lawfully accept it, or that, 
 having accepted, may retain it. But this considera- 
 tion belongs to the relationship between knowledge and 
 the mind ; and applies equally to compound knowledge, 
 already combined and complete, presented from without 
 for acceptance by the mind. It is quite a distinct con- 
 sideration from that of the process of compounding the 
 knowledge from its elements which alone is here brought 
 under consideration by Kant. 
 
 Wherefore if reason were a process or a part of the 
 process by which the mind compounds the elements or 
 elaborates the elementary matter of knowledge, reason- 
 ing would necessarily precede understanding, not follow 
 it. 
 
 The last part of the sentence, " subjecting it to the 
 highest unity of thought," can only become intelligible 
 by a defiilition of the meaning which it is intended to 
 express by " the highest unity of thought." In the ab- 
 
10 THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHTSICS, 
 
 sence ot any definition, we would suggest judgment or 
 reason as the correct expression ; but then if Kant means 
 judgment why does he say ' the highest unity of thought 1 
 and reason he has described as something, less high, 
 which has already operated and performed its func- 
 tion before the elaborated matter of intuition is subjected 
 to the highest unity of thought. 
 
 " At this stage of our inquiry, it is my duty to give an 
 explanation of this the highest faculty of cognition. " 
 After some consideration it appears that the word this 
 is intended to apply to reason, we have therefore the defini- 
 tion of reason that it is the highest faculty of cognition. 
 Now we say that reason is manifestly not a faculty of 
 cognition ; it may be said to be related to or to belong to 
 cognition, but its function is to supervise cognition, to 
 guide, direct and advise the mind in respect to its cogni- 
 tions. A proposition or conclusion which has been cog- 
 nized, and is distinctly understood by the mind, may, 
 nevertheless, be unreasonable ; therefore reason is not a 
 part of cognition and not a necessity to cognition, but it 
 is quite necessary to the mind in order that the quality 
 and character of its cognfbions may be determined ; an 
 unreasonable, false, or unsound conclusion in the mind, 
 is a compound cognition which is disapproved by rea- 
 son. 
 
 " Of reason, as of the understanding, there is a merely 
 formal, that is, logical use, in which it makes abstraction 
 of all content of cognition "; bat there is also a real use, 
 inasmuch as it contains in itself the source of certain 
 conceptions and principles, which it does not borrow 
 either from the senses or the understanding," That is to 
 say, putting the definition of reason just previously given 
 in its place, the highest faculty of cognition makes ab- 
 straction of aU content of cognition ; that is, when used 
 
 logically but it also has a real Use 'inasmuch as it 
 
 contains in itself the source of certain conceptions and 
 principles.' There seems to lurk beneath this phrase a 
 
THE EATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS. 11 
 
 confusion of the elements of knowledge with mental pro- 
 cesses operating upon those elements. The elements of 
 knowledge have been spoken of as the matter of intui- 
 tion, and reason has been described as a faculty of the 
 mind by which this matter is elaborated ; are we now to 
 understand that the faculty itself is also the source of the 
 matter (elements) upon which it operates ? We say that 
 reason is distinct from the mind, is the intellectual guide 
 and director of the mind, and being such may supply 
 knowledge, or the elements of knowledge, to the mind ; 
 but this is very different from affirming reason to be a 
 part of the mental organization, namely a faculty thereof 
 by which the mind elaborates the matter of intuition, 
 and then supposing that the faculty itself generates that 
 matter. 
 
 " The former faculty has been long defined by logi- 
 cians as the faculty of mediate conclusion in contradis- 
 tinction to immediate conclusions {consequentice immedi- 
 atice) ; but the nature of the latter, which itself generates 
 conceptions, is not to be understood from this definition." 
 The former of which two faculties 1 There has been but 
 one faculty spoken of — namely, the highest faculty of 
 cognition, of which a logical use and a real use have 
 been just noted. Putting this difficulty aside, we are told 
 that " the nature of the latter faculty" (qy, the real use 
 of reason) " is not to be understood from this definition. 
 What definition ? The mediate conclusion 1 With respect 
 to the latter faculty, to the nature of which this definition 
 doesnot apply, we now have the distinct statement that 
 it generates conceptions. . . . (The reader may note that 
 this is almost the only distinct statement as yet made.) 
 
 We wiU suggest, that perhaps what Kant is here trying 
 to explain, without having first apprehended the condi- 
 tions of the case himself, is that .... in the process of 
 compounding knowledge, the intellectual faculty of the 
 mind having combined certain elements into a simple 
 cognition or conclusion, may then take this simple con- 
 
12 THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS. 
 
 elusion as an element together with other elements, and 
 therewith continue the process of compounding .... thus 
 obtaining, from the simple-compound, the compound- 
 compound or complex, and so on. 
 
 " Now, as a division of reason into a logical 
 and a transcendental faculty presents itself here, " 
 We had at first one faculty with a particular use. We 
 were next told of two uses of this one faculty, then we 
 found two faculties, and we nowhave the faculty dividing 
 itself into two, namely, into a logical and transcendental. 
 " It becomes necessary to seek for a higher conception 
 of this source of cognition which shall comprehend both 
 conceptions." What source of cognition 1 reason I But 
 reason ' has ]3een defined to be a faculty, one phase or 
 form of which generates conceptions, and which faculty 
 has divided itself into two, the logical and transcen- 
 dental. Bearing this in mind it is not apparent to us 
 what conception is referred to by the words ' it is neces- 
 sary to seek for a higher conception ;' surely a faculty 
 which elaborates the matter of intuition, and includes a 
 sub-faculty which generates conceptions, cannot be 
 itself a conception. Yes, it appears that it is, for 
 ;accordiug to the end of the sentence, the logical and 
 transcendental faculties are both of them conceptions. 
 
 " In this we may expect, according to the analogy of 
 the conceptions of the understanding, that the logical 
 conception will give us the key to the transcendental, 
 and that the table of the functions of the former will 
 present us with the clue to the conceptions of reason." 
 
 The statement of this expectation assumes (appa- 
 rently) that the understanding is strictly analogous to 
 reason and divides itself into two faculties each-of which 
 is a conception, but further than this we are entirely at a 
 loss ; why the logical conception, which is one of the 
 divisions of the faculty of reason, should give us the key 
 to the transcendental conception, which is' the other 
 division of the same faculty, we are not told ; and, even 
 
THE EATIO^TALISM OF METAPHTSICS. 13 
 
 if we had the table of the functions of the logical con- 
 ceptions of the faculty, we should not be hopeful of 
 obtaining thereby a clue to the conceptions of reason^ 
 which has heen itself reduced to a conception ; for, 
 reason was first defined to be a certain faculty, and that 
 faculty is afterwards spoken of as a conception. 
 
 By attributing some definite meaning to the various 
 phrases here made use of,, these last statements might be 
 made intelligible, and in such a manner a number of 
 persons might understand them as conveying a variety 
 of meanings, each person obtaining a meaning depen- 
 dent on the sense which he thinks proper to attribute to 
 those expressions. But we do not think that these 
 statements, as they are put before the reader, can be 
 fairly considered to convey any definite intelligible 
 meaning ; it is not sufficient to say that other parts of 
 the work may define the sense in which these statements 
 are to be understood because they are, many of them, 
 inconsistent with each other, in any sense,, incoherent 
 and almost contradictorv. 
 
 " In the former part of our .transcendental logic, we 
 defined the understanding to be the faculty of rules ; 
 reason may be distinguished from understanding as the 
 facultyi of principles." 
 
 We certainly hoped for the moment that we had here 
 a more "intelligible definition of what Kant understood 
 by reason, but on looking a little further to find out 
 whether the expression principle was itself defined ; we 
 find by the very next sentence that '' the term principle 
 is ambiguous and commonly signifies merely a cogni- 
 tion ; which may be employed as a principle although it 
 is not in itself, and as regards its proper origin, entitled 
 to the distinction." We are afraid the only interpreta- 
 tion this admits of is that it means, or may be used.ta 
 mean, just any thing that it suits the metaphysician at 
 the moment to employ it as meaning. We note that here 
 the natural relationship of reason and understanding is in 
 
14 THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS. 
 
 verted. However vague andindefinite the sense attached 
 hj 'Kant to the expression ' principle ' may be, it must 
 be something of the character of a proposition. Now 
 when the question is of reason and understanding, the 
 compound expression ' rules of reasoning ' is a sound 
 combination of words and quite inteUigible ; so, also ' a 
 proposition understood,' or 'a, proposition misunder- 
 stood ' is inteUigible, but, the rules of understanding ' 
 or ' a proposition reasoned ' are false verbal combinations 
 belonging to un sense. 
 
 "Every general proposition, even if derived from ex- 
 perience by the process of induction, may serve as the 
 major in a syllogism ; but it is not for that reason a prin- 
 ciple." No ? If it was we should at least have a distinct 
 definition of a principle, and thence another definition of 
 reason which would then become a faculty of general 
 propositions, but this would not very well harmonize 
 with the previous definitions as elaborating the matter of 
 intuition, &c., &c. " Mathematical axioms (for example : 
 there can be only only one straight line between two 
 points) are general a priori cognitions, and are therefore 
 rightly denominated principles, relatively to the cases 
 which can be subsumed under them. But I cannot for 
 this reason say that I cognize this property of a straight 
 line from principles — I cognize it only in pure intui- 
 tion." 
 
 Giving Kant the benefit of a doubt, we are inclined to 
 think this is a confused statement of that which is essen- 
 tially correct ; if, however, we correctly appreciate his 
 meaning in this statement we should prefer to express it 
 somewhat in this manner. ' Mathematical axioms (for ex- 
 ample : there can be only one straight line between two 
 points) are compound facts, that is, they are self-demon- 
 strated propositions the absolute truth of yvhich is at 
 once manifest to the mind; they, are presented to the 
 mind and accepted by it as a whole with the approval of 
 
THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS. 15 
 
 reason and without the necessity of any rearrangement 
 or adjustment of their elements.' 
 
 " Cognition from principles, then, is that cognition in 
 which I cognize the particular in the general by means 
 of conceptions." But since a principle is an a priori 
 cognition, what necessity is there for the conceptions ? 
 and where do the conceptions come in ? " Thus every 
 syllogism is a form of the deduction of a cognition from 
 a principle." A few sentences back we were told that 
 '' cognitions are rightly denominated principles," there- 
 fore the syllogism is merely the form of a deduction of a 
 principle from a principle. " For the major always gives 
 a conception, through which everything that is subsumed 
 under the condition thereof is cognized according to a 
 principle." 
 
 This statement is too hopelessly vague to allow it to 
 be supposed that Kant himself could have attached any 
 distinct mean: ng to such combination of words : the rea- 
 der may, however, here note a glaring instance of the 
 misuse (perversion) of language — namely, "for the major 
 always give a conception." Now a conception belongs 
 to the internal operation of the mind ; it belongs to the 
 imagination and to the inner consciousness ; a simple con- 
 ception is a simple idea conceived by the imagination in 
 the mental organization ; a compound conception is com- 
 pounded of ideas generated within the mind ; if received 
 from without, as a (compound) cognition, it is not gene- 
 rated within ; or, if generated within,* it cannot be receiv- 
 ed from vsdthout. "Through which eveiy thing that is sub- 
 sumed under the condition thereof is cognized according 
 to a principle." But what is a principle ? We have been 
 told the term is ambigious but have not been told what 
 meaning it is intended to convey. By the next sentence it 
 appears that principles are general propositions presented 
 
 * That 13, if compounded within the mind from conceptions by the inner 
 consciousness. 
 
16 THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS. 
 
 to US by the understanding ; but for the understanding to 
 do this, either they must be iirst presented to the under- 
 standing or else they must be generated (conceived) with- 
 in the understanding, and on this point, namely, whether 
 the principles have any origin outside the understanding, 
 we are uninformed. In this connection we must not 
 forget the definition of understanding and reason given a 
 few sentences back. — that t understanding is the faculty 
 -of rules and reason the faculty of principles. We have 
 therefore, a relationship between reason and understand- 
 ing here suggested of a very peculiar character, namely ; 
 that the faculty of rules conceives principles of which 
 reason is the faculty. " Now as every general cognition 
 may serve as the major in a syllogism, and the under- 
 standing presents us with such general d priori proposi- 
 tions^ they may be termed principles, in respect of theil: 
 possible use." This sentence again appears to directly 
 contradict the statement made shortly before that a gen- 
 eral proposition which may serve as the major of a 
 syllogism was not for that reason a principle ; it seems to 
 be now asserted that it is a principle for that very rea- 
 son, namely, " in respect to its possible use as the major 
 of a syllogism." It is sufficiently evident that the term 
 principle is indeed very ambiguous. 
 
 " But if we consider these principles of the pure under- 
 standing in relation to their origin, we shaU find them to 
 be anything rather than cognitions from conceptions." 
 
 But we have not been informed as to that origin in re- 
 lation to which we are to consider them ; we were told 
 just now that they are presented to us by the under- 
 standing : therefore whence does the understanding get 
 them 1 Because if this origin be in the understanding, 
 they must be conceptions by the understanding ; and if 
 they be cognitions it would seem to follow that they 
 must be cognitions from conceptions ; but we are told 
 that we shall find them to be anything rather than cogni- 
 tions from conceptions. 
 
THE RATIONALISM 0¥ METAPHYSICS. 17 
 
 " For they would not even be possible a priori if we 
 could not rely on the assistance of pure intuition (in 
 mathematics) or in that of the conditions of a possible 
 experience." 
 
 The meaning which seemed to be attached to the ex- 
 pression pure intuition, when last used, was that faculty 
 by which the mind at once cognizes or recognizes the 
 truth of a manifest fact when presented to it ; but if this 
 be the meaning we do not see why it should not apply 
 to a cognition froni a conception ; for if a manifest ideal 
 fact be conceived by the inner consciousness, it will be 
 cognized or recognized by the mind just as certainly as if 
 presented from without ; the very meaning of the expres- 
 sion ' manifest ' is the necessary and unhesitating accep- 
 tance of the proposition, as true, by the mind. "That 
 everything that happens has a cause, cannot be conclud- 
 ed from the general conception of that which happens ; 
 on the contrary the principle of causality instructs us as 
 to the mode of obtaining from that which happens a de- 
 terminate empirical conception." 
 
 This statement does not seem consistent with sense ; 
 if we are not to conclude that everything that happens 
 has a cause from the general conception (cognition) of that 
 
 which happens whence are we to so conclude ? The 
 
 conclusion is in fact a cognition (or recognition) of that 
 relationship known as cause and eifect. And it is empi- 
 rical because a generalization of experience, the general 
 result of common observation in numberless cases — 
 that every known eifect has a cause. The principle of 
 causality or as it is usually and preferably written ' the 
 law of causality,' expresses the conclusion that such re- 
 lationship of cause to effect is a necessary and univer- 
 sal relationship. All conceptions of the mind, or, pro- 
 perly speaking, by the imagination in the mind, if true, 
 real, and sound, must harmonize with sound knowledge 
 received (cognized) by the mind from without ; and all 
 
18 THE EATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS. 
 
 such conceptions are empirical in the sense that the germ 
 of such conception, that is of the knowledge so conceiv- 
 ed, must have been firstcognized(i.e.,receivedfrom with- 
 out) by the mind. We do not say that all cognition must 
 , be ordinary cognitidn, on the contrary we believe that 
 knowledge may be introduced into the human mind 
 at any time by the Creator directly by spiritual 
 agency, and which we should term an extraordinary 
 cognition of that knowledge by the mind, but what we 
 deny is that the mind or nieutal organization can generate 
 knowledge within itself, of which the germ has not been 
 first introduced into, it 
 
 The spontaneous generation of animals and vegetables 
 (of animal and vegetable existence) has not been as yet 
 demonstrated ; it is now universally, or almost univer- 
 sally rejected by men of science as an undemonstrated 
 theory and most improbable conjecture ; in which esti- 
 mate we quite concur ; but the spontaneous generation 
 of knowledge within the mental-organization of man is 
 certainly yet more improbable ; indeed the one impro- 
 bability is so related ,to the other, that any one believ- 
 ing or admitting the spontaneous generation of know- 
 ledge in the human mind cannot consistently deny the 
 spontaneous generation of animal life ; for, if the first 
 supposition were true, the last would be at least extreme- 
 ly probable, if indeed ^lot quite a certainty. . 
 
 The proposition of the spontaneous generation of 
 knowledge if directly presented to the perceptive faculty 
 of the educated mind, as a bare and distinct statement, 
 would be rejected as absurd (in the sense in which that 
 expression is used by Euclid). Therefore any one who, 
 having become unawares possessed of this notion and, 
 having constructed an elaborate system of theories and 
 hypotheses, finds that the whole scheme rests upon this 
 supposition as its basis, must either relinquish the whole 
 as false and untenable or else he must disguise the unreal 
 and chimerical character of his basis. This is what we 
 
THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHTSIOS. 19 
 
 incline to think is the actual purpose of the extremely- 
 ambiguous, incoherent, and, for the most part, scarcely- 
 intelligible propositions and statements -we have just put 
 before the reader. We do not intend to say that Kant is 
 here -wilfully and purposely deceiving the student ; there 
 is manifold evidence in the -work that he is quite sincere 
 in the supposition, not only that his (so-called) system 
 is really something belonging to knowledge and to 
 science, but that it possesses value as such in a very high 
 degreee. The appearance of system under which this 
 vaguenes and incoherency is presented to the student 
 indicates the -work of Unreason, to which Kant has sub- 
 jected himself Deceit a,nd treachery in the most insi- 
 dious guise are therefore to be expected. The studept is 
 to be attracted by an appearance of definiteness and logi- 
 cal distinctness, is then' to be led on by a desire for the 
 profound knowledge and wisdom of which these state- 
 ments are supposed to be the vehicle ; and when he has 
 become entangled in a maze of inconsistencies and utterly 
 bewildered in a labyrinth of paths which, continually in- 
 tersecting each other, have no apparent commencement or 
 terminus, the fundamental proposition of the spontaneous 
 generation of knowledge is made to present itself again 
 and again -with increasing distinctness to his mental -vision 
 as the only intelligible mode of egress. 
 
 We do not, however, intend these remarks to apply 
 exclusively to the passages now examined, nor yet exclu- 
 sively to the book now under consideration, but we be- 
 lieve them to apply with more or less force to all (so called) 
 systematic treatises purporting to teach metaphysics. 
 
 It might be supposed that in passages such as we have 
 just now examined, the unsense must be so manifest as 
 to deprive them of the power of mischief; but history 
 and experience show that such is not the case ; there is 
 much ground for believing that.this very work has been 
 the means of partially wasting the lives of many educated 
 men and, probably, of perverting the intellects of some 
 
 B 
 
20 THE EATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS. 
 
 men of great ability, and through them of exercising a 
 pernicious influence over a great part of the domain of 
 human knowledge. 
 
 Let us proceed with the examination. 
 
 " Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the under- 
 standing cannot supply, and they alone are entitled to be 
 called principles ". This seems to be a wholly gratuitous 
 statement, without the support of evidence of any kind ; 
 we do not opine that the term understanding can be cor- 
 rectly applied to denote an active faculty or organ for 
 supplying the mind with anything. The true use of the 
 expression, as already stated, is to denote the distinct cog- 
 nition by the mind of knowledge which may have been 
 presented to it and accepted in a complete state — as an 
 axiom or as a compound demonstrated proposition, for 
 instance — or which may have been arranged by the reason 
 and compounded within the mental organization itself. 
 
 If, however, it were admissible to consider it an inde- 
 pendent active faculty or organ for supplying cognitions 
 to the mind, its function, we should suppose, would bejust 
 that which Kant here says it is not — namely, it would 
 be to supply cognitions harmoniously and regularly com- 
 pounded of simple conceptions or of elementary cogni- 
 tions. We say that the authorized meaning of the term un- 
 derstandingbelongs to compound knowledge distinctly cog- 
 nized by the mind, because compounded in such wise as to 
 be intelligible. Dr. Johnson's dictionary will show that to 
 the English word understanding this characteristic meaning 
 fundamentally and essentially belongs, and any good Ger- 
 man dictionary will show that the same sense belongs to 
 its G-erman equivalent (Verstandung). " And they alone 
 are entitled to be called principles." Only a little way 
 back we were told that any general proposition whicb 
 may serve as the major in a syllogism is entitled to be 
 called a principle ; " at the same time all general pro- 
 positions may be termed comparative principles " ; thait 
 is to say, in other words, we may no longer term gene- 
 
THE RATIONALISM OP METAPHYSICS. 21 
 
 ral propositions prindples (which only a little while be- 
 fore we were told we might do) but we are not debarred 
 from calling them comparative priciples. 
 
 "It has been a long-cherished wish t];iat, (who knows 
 how late,) may one day be happily accomphshed — ^that the 
 principles of the endless variety of civil laws should be 
 investigated and exposed, for in this way alone can we 
 find the secret of simplifying legislation. " "The princi- 
 ples of all just civil laws were long since written by the 
 finger of God on tables of stone, and brought down from 
 mount Sinai by Moses, expressly for the information of 
 men, and to furnish them vsdth a sound, reliable and suffi- 
 cient basis for all human legislation. 
 
 " But in this case, laws are nothing more than limitations 
 of our freedom, upon conditions under which it subsists 
 in perfect harmony with itself ; they, consequently, have 
 for their object that which is completely our own work, 
 and of which we ourselves may be the cause by means, of 
 these conceptions*" We are aware that all history and 
 experience teach that men, whose passions and wilfulness 
 are not restrained and limited by obedience to just law, 
 are liable to quarrel with each other ; but that, freedom 
 is liable to quarrel with itself, or that it can subsist 
 otherwise than in perfect harmony with itself, is what 
 we are not prepared to believe. Perfectlyjust human laws 
 must be in perfect harmony with the will of the Supreme 
 Grovernor of the Earth ; with the will of Him, whose 
 service is perfect freedom, because, if the harmony be 
 perfect and the obedience be complete and perfectly will- 
 ing, the freedom will then be perfect. 
 
 " But how objects as things in themselves — how the 
 nature of things is subordinated to principles and is to 
 be determined according to conceptions, is a question 
 which it seems well-nigh impossible to answer." Assu- 
 ming the objects as things in themselves ( we don't see 
 how they can be otherwise) a question suggests itself 
 as to whether the nature of things be indeed subordinated 
 
22 THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS. 
 
 to principles ? And if this be sHown, then, what are 
 the principles to which nature is subordinated 1 The last 
 definition we have of 'principles' is that they are synthe- 
 tical cognitions from c onceptions. Now if the nature of 
 things be subordinated to these, it would seem to follow 
 that there must be a great uncertainty about the nature 
 of things. 
 
 " Be this however as it may — ^for on this point our 
 investigation is yet to be made-it is at least manifest from 
 what we have said, that cognition from principles is 
 something very different from cognition by means of the 
 understanding, which may indeed precede other cogni- 
 tions in the form of a prkciple ; but in itself — in so far as 
 it is synthetical — is neither based upon mere thought, 
 nor contains a general proposition drawn from concep- 
 tions alone." If we assume that this is intended to 
 convey some definite meaning, and make a guess as to 
 what it might mean if put into intelligible language : we 
 would suggest, that the result of inductive combination 
 (reasoning) carried on within the mind itself may differ 
 much from knowledge, such as a proposition (the ele- 
 ments of which are derived from a source outside the 
 mind) which is presented to the mind as a whole and 
 complete combination. But whether Kant has here 
 intended to' say something to this effect, we cannot be at 
 all sure. 
 
 " The understanding may be a faculty for the produc- 
 tion of unity of phenomena by virtue of rules; the rea- 
 son is a faculty for the production of unity of rules (of 
 the understanding) under principles." The uniierstanding 
 was at first defined as a faculty of rules. Now, ' it may 
 be a faculty for the production of unity of phenomena by 
 virtue of rules' ; and reason which was formerly the 
 faculty of principles has now become ' a faculty for the 
 production of unity of rules (of the understanding) 
 under" principles.' 
 
 "Eeason, therefore, never applies directly to expe-. 
 
THE RATIONALISM 01' METAPHTSIOS.' 23 
 
 rience, or to any sensuous object ; its object is, on the 
 contrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition of 
 which it gives a unity d priori by means of conceptions 
 — a unity which may be called rational unity, and which 
 is of a nature very different from that of the unity pro- 
 duced by the understanding." On the contrary, reason 
 appHes constantly to experience ; for the frequent obser- 
 vations and cognitions by the mind of evidence is expe- 
 rience, and such is particularly the material (so to speak) 
 with which reason works. From the experience of a 
 number of particular cases reason conducts the mind to 
 the general conclusion or judgment. We should say 
 that the carefully observed result of a chemical experi- 
 ment clearly belongs to experience, and that the subject 
 of chemical science investigated by means of the expe- 
 riment would belong to sensuous objects. On the other 
 hand, to say that reason has the understanding for its 
 object is to confound language, because the understand- 
 ing belongs to the mental organization and is that analy- 
 tical perceptive faculty of the mind by which it distinctly 
 cognizes knowledge. This last paragraph, however, sug- 
 gests that when Kant writes 'the understanding,' he may 
 perhaps mean ' the imagination'. ' The appheation of the 
 reason to the manifold conceptions of the imagination' 
 would be a phrase quite intelligible. 
 
 In works of this description three classes of offences 
 are exhibited : 
 
 1. Disregard of verbal science. 
 
 2. Disregard of the rules of reason. 
 
 3. Disregard of the primary laws of theology. 
 
 Each of these is intellectually a very grave offence. The 
 first and second, however, arise primarily from the third ; 
 although apparently the second, i.e., disregard of the 
 rules of reason, is the immediate cause of the mischief. 
 
 The rules of reason, in their application to human 
 knowledge, are stated, explained, and taught under two 
 systems ; one of them belonging to the older civiliza 
 
24 a?HE RAMONALISM OP METAPHTSIOS. 
 
 tion, the other to the modern, namely : Euclid's Ideal 
 Philosophy, taught and illustrated in the work called 
 Euclid's Elements of Geometry, and the Inductive Sys- 
 tem of Bacon. 
 
 These two systems, as we have already explained else- 
 where*, when correctly taught, harmonize perfectly, and 
 are, in fact, merely different methods of illusti'ating and 
 explaining, the same invariable and unchangeable rules. 
 In Euclids Treatise the application of the system being 
 confined to the subjects of one science only, that of 
 ',Form and Magnitude,' and being applied to those sub- 
 jects with a close and rigorous adherence to method, the. 
 injurious consequences which would arise from even a 
 very slight neglect of the rules of reason, are therein 
 very readily perceptible j for it is evident that, had 
 Euclid left some of his definitions ambiguous and vague, 
 some of his axioms open to doubt and controversy, and 
 his postulates such that the mind would have rejected or 
 hesitated to accept them, the demonstrations would have 
 been imperfect and everything would have been left in 
 uncertainty. 
 
 In the practical application of the rules of reason 
 to other departments of Natural Science, the necessity 
 of attention and close adherence to those rules is 
 not so immediately evident. It was, however, clearly 
 shown by "Francis Bacon" that the same, necessity 
 did exist in each and all of the Natural Sciences, 
 and that necessity has now been for a long time past 
 distinctly and universally recognized as belonging to 
 the successful prosecution of scientific research in the 
 cultivation of all the departments of Natural Science. 
 But,notwithstanding that the application of Ideal Philo- 
 sophy to Natural Science has been for so long a time un- 
 derstood, the necessity for its application to Ideal Science 
 has not been, even to the present time, distinctly realized. 
 
 * Introduction to the " Cirde and Straight Line." ; 
 
THE RATIONALISM OP METAPHYSICS. 25 
 
 In consequence of the non-recognition of this necessity, 
 writers on certain subjects of Ideal-Science more 
 particularly on psychology and spiritual philosophy, who 
 assume the title and authority of teachers of Science, 
 consider themselves at liberty each to apply rules and 
 methods of his own contrivance. The result is now the 
 same in respect to Ideal Science as it was formerly in 
 respect to Natural Science at the time previous to the ap- 
 plication of the inductive system. .. .namely, no real 
 progress is made j each apparent advance is followed 
 after a short time by a falling back almost to the starting 
 place ; an occasional increase in volume which seems to 
 promise an unlimited expansion suddenly terminates in a 
 collapse and subsidence to the old level. 
 
 One fault, which almost suffices of itself to deprive the 
 works of many of these vmters of any real and perma- 
 nent value, is a neglect to recognize the claim which 
 Science has upon words, and the especial duty which 
 belongs to Science to -protect and preserve words from 
 being tampered with and misused. AU nouns substan- 
 tive belong to General Science, each of them is the re- 
 presentative of a reality, either of a natural or an ideal 
 reality. In the first instance any one word might be 
 chosen to represent any particular reality, but having 
 been selected,and the choice having been ratified and au- 
 thorized by Science, that word then becomes definitiely 
 related to that particular reality, and the relationship 
 being authorized and guaranteed by Science must not be 
 Adolated or disturbed. So important is the observance of 
 this rule that, not only the existence of Science but ulti- 
 mately of all definite knowledge, is dependent upon it, 
 and, if it were not to some extent universally observed and 
 insisted upon, the intercommunication of meaning by 
 language would become difficult and uncertain. But, 
 notwithstanding that the imperative necessity of this 
 strict regard to the inviolability of words is obvious to 
 persons educated in even a very slight degree, so long as. 
 
26 THE EATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS; 
 
 those words are used on subjects to which language 
 is ordinarily applied, it seems to be considered that, on 
 subjects of the most difficult, important and serious 
 character, regard to the definite and authorized meaning 
 of the words is no longer necessary. 
 
 We may, perhaps, safely assume that the reader wUl 
 be satisfied from the examination of the part of Kant's 
 Critique, which we have put before him, that these 
 remarks apply to that treatise. If that be so, the reader 
 may accept our positive statement and assurance that 
 they apply also to all the other metaphysical treatises, 
 and treatises on metaphysics. Some of them are written 
 with a superficial appearance of greater clearness and 
 coherence, but thfey are not on that account less deceitful 
 and dangerous : quite the contrary. 
 
 We h'ave said that the second ofience committed by 
 this work (Kant's Treatise) is disregard to the rules of 
 reason. In fact as a reasonable work it has no beginning 
 and no parts, nothing is substantiated, no proposition or 
 statement is demonstrated anywhere throughout the 
 book, and no endeavour, even, to demonstrate anything 
 in a reasonable sense is made, for the necessity to do so 
 is not recognized. It is true that the word demonstrate 
 is used in this book, indeed it is a singularity of this as 
 a metaphysical treatise that a word peculiarly obnoxious 
 to metaphysicians is here brought into service. We find 
 an intention to demonstrate is stated as part of the plan 
 of the book, and occasionally afterwards an assumption 
 that something has been demonstrated ; but the word is 
 used in a metaphysical sense, that is to say it becomes 
 an expression so vague and indefinite as to have no par- 
 ticular and distinct meaning. There is no natural 
 sequence of parts or coherence from inter-relation and 
 dependence of the parts between and upon each other. 
 The book for aught we can see might be separated into 
 divisional parts, and these be arranged in a number of 
 
THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHrSICS. 27 
 
 different ways, without essentially injuring or improving 
 the book as a whole. 
 
 The offence of disregard to verbal science may be said 
 to arise from disregard to the rules of reason, because, if 
 the latter had been recognized, the inviolable and exclu- 
 sive right of each word, expression and phrase, to that 
 essential meaning allotted to it by Science, would have 
 become apparent. 
 
 But the great offence — ^that which is fundamental to 
 the others and out of which they have, at least in great 
 measure, arisen — is disregarded to the primary laws of 
 theology. A practical disbelief in the living God, in the 
 Creator, as the, Supreme Ruler over the men that He 
 has made, the world that He has created, and the science 
 that He has arranged. If the positive belief had been 
 possessed by^the mind and active therein, reason would 
 have made it plain that many of the subjects which it 
 proposed to investigate were not subjects proper for 
 unauthorized human investigation ; and that the plan of 
 the book in regard to its objects was unreasonable and 
 unlawful : unreasonable because unnecessary and certain 
 to be unsuccessful, and unlavirful because irreverent and, 
 by implication, rebelHous towards God. Moreover, such 
 a practical belief, even though only rudimentary, would 
 have suggested and necessitated the recognition of the 
 probability of some particular revelation of God, and of 
 His relationship to men ; consequently any alleged par- 
 ticular revelation believed in by other educated men 
 would have had its claim reasonably investigated and 
 attentively considered. 
 
 On reference to Johnson's dictionary we find the mean- 
 ing of the word — blasphemous — " impiously irreverent 
 vnth regard to God." 
 
 Now what can be said of the character of a book in 
 which whole sections are headed thus : — " Of the impos- 
 sibility of a Cosmological iproof of the existence of God." 
 " Of the impossibility ofaphysico-theologicalproof." "■ Gri- 
 
28 THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS. 
 
 ' tique of all theology based upon speculative principles of 
 Reason." If Kant had professed pure Atheism,, denied 
 the existence of Grod, disputed the facts of Creation as 
 such, and based his system distinctly upon the spontane- 
 ous generation of knowledge, of reason, of animal exist- 
 ence, and of every thing else, the .impious irreverence 
 would not have been^ so manifest — ^but neither would it 
 have been so harmful. For a man to acknowledge a Su- 
 preme Intellectual Being as his Creator and God, and 
 then, quietly setting aside all considerations of reverence, 
 to set himself to argue whether there be or be not a ne- 
 cessity for any such Being ; whether paan might not get 
 on just as well without ; whether we are not essentially 
 self-existent, owing whatever we have mainly to our- 
 selves and to our own exertions ; and whether, after aU, 
 the existence of any Supreme Being may not be a mere 
 superstitious notion with which ignorance has infested our 
 minds, or which our imagination has conjured up. We say 
 that such arguments in themselves, whatever the profess- 
 ed result of them may be, constitute a sort of intellectual 
 deliberate blasphemy which cannot reasonably be con- 
 sidered otherwise than as blasphemy of the worst type, 
 far worse and more offensive towards God than any vio- 
 lent and passionate outbreak of rebellion against His au- 
 thority and government. 
 
 So far as a verbal professsion may go, Kant himself, 
 almost at the close of his work, declares his belief not 
 only in the existence but even in the particular revelation 
 of God. It does seem indeed that he has, or is under 
 the impression that he has, retained such a belief as a 
 sort of extraordinon'y belief. In one place he expresses a 
 recognition of the importance to himself of retaining this 
 extraordinary belief; that without it he would feel dissa- 
 tisfied and uncomfortable ; and, he states with some degree 
 of distinctness, that he finds his metaphysical philosophy 
 a vain thing to trust to. We have no right or desire to 
 pass any judgement upon Kant as an individual man. 
 
THE RATIONALISM 0? METAPHYSICS. 29 
 
 We hope and think that this extraordinary belief may- 
 have been of real value and comfort to him ; but we 
 must point out that such professions of religious belief 
 introduced into metaphysical works have the effect only 
 of making them more dangerous and hai-mful. The stu- 
 dent, whose mind is unguarded and unsettled, is thereby 
 led on into the slough. The belief itself appears, per- 
 haps, as an inconsequential conclusion to some vague 
 reasoning, and, at best, the truth is contaminated and 
 defiled by the unsense with which it is mingled. Many 
 persons, we believe, who on the whole disapprove, per- 
 haps much disapprove, such works, are disposed to give 
 them a partial approbation. They express sympathy 
 with the industry and natural ability displayed in them 
 and the evident desire to impart knowledge. But it 
 should be considered that unlawful industry is evil indus- 
 try, and that wilfulness and lawlessness are at the very 
 root of such works ; they (wilfulness and lawlessness) may 
 indeed be considered fundamental to the disbelief in the 
 facts of theology, for it is they which have ejected, or 
 prevented the mind fiom laying hold of, such belief. 
 There are apparent evidences in the work that Kant 
 was gifted with talents and ability of high order, it may 
 be of the highest. It is certain that, amongst his pre- 
 decessors, one at least of the most profound and grandest 
 human intellects the world has ever seen was not less fear- 
 fully confounded, and that he is responsible in a higher 
 degree than Kant for the baneful consequences of per- 
 verted ability and misapplied industry: consequences which 
 now impede and render weU-nigh impossible the acqui- 
 sition of sound knowledge, by which civilization is endan- 
 gered, and the intellectual well-being of the human-race 
 collectively placed in jeopardy. 
 
30 THE EATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS. 
 
 The particular subject of Kant's work is professedly 
 Reason. From the commencement to the end of the work 
 it never seems to have occurred to him that — ^as the 
 intellectual Guide provided by the Creator for man, 
 and as the medium of communion between man and 
 God, through whom only the knowledge of God can 
 be at first obtained and afterwards perfected, — the 
 spiritual and sacred character of the divine nature be- 
 longs likewise to the immediate representative, and that, 
 therefore, reverence and obedience, as well as trustfulness 
 and reliance, are also especially due to Reason. — 
 
:^B 
 
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