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 Let France .explain. 
 
 3 1924 027 830 557 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tiiis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/cletails/cu31924027830557 
 
LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
LET FRANCE 
 EXPLAIN 
 
 BY 
 
 FREDERICK BAUSMAN 
 
 Former Member of the Supreme Court of the 
 State of Washington 
 
 LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD. 
 RUSKIN HOUSE, 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C, i 
 
First published in 1922 
 
 (All rights reserved) 
 
PREFACE 
 
 In the last three years there have been revealed about one 
 thousand documents and diplomatic letters on the relations 
 between France and Russia. All these with fatal uniformity 
 show that between 1904 and 1914 the Government of 
 France gave itself up to the dangerous policies of the 
 infamous Court of St. Petersburg. 
 
 Extraordinary though these revelations are, the world 
 has heard almost nothing of them. Indulgent toward 
 France, we have received them in silence. But her present 
 Government drives Europe to desperation by claims based on 
 outraged innocence. Nothing can be done to bring France 
 to reason untU the truth is known and her Government 
 knows it to be known. 
 
 That Government has been unwilling indeed to discuss 
 documents so embarrassing. The scandalous secret treaty 
 of 1917 made by the Poincard administration with Russia 
 has not, I believe, been discussed by them at all. Even 
 the general treaty with Russia of 1892 was not published 
 untU two years after the outbreak of the war, when its 
 bellicose terms were forced to the light. A special Yellow 
 Book was then tardily issued concerning it. As to the 
 French Cabinet between 1912 and 1914, the recent revela- 
 tions of the Iswolsky correspondence have been ignored, 
 but as the present work goes to press, we are told that a 
 Yellow Book on that will be issued. The Yellow Books of 
 the French Government have been of course only the Govern- 
 ment's selection and not, as in the case of the German and 
 
6 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Russian files, the result of search by hostile and censorious 
 hands. 
 
 At the root of the international adjustments lies, in spite 
 of everybody, the question of guilt. Even if Germany be 
 guilty, there was imdoubtedly guilt also in France, which 
 lately shocks the United States, through no less a person than 
 M. Loucheur, by the hint that after all France does not 
 really owe us what she borrowed. 
 
 People must learn the truth, that the Poincare Govern- 
 ment, exulting in the creation of the greatest standing 
 armies that either t"rance or Russia had ever had, and in keen 
 expectation of English aid, had their war party too. This 
 party was in civil as well as military control. 
 
 Since the Washington Conference, moreover, there is 
 spread in the United States a theory that the late horrible 
 war was the fruit of skilful British intrigues for the crushing 
 of Germany, and that France was a mere victim of the colli- 
 sion. Especially does there exist, even in circles friendly to 
 England, an idea that by speaking out vigorously she might 
 have prevented war. This book wiU show the error of that 
 pernicious argument. 
 
 France is a spoiled child, and a dangerously spoiled child. 
 She must be reminded of her Delcasses, her Millerands, and 
 her Poincares. She and the people of the world must be 
 reminded of those banquets at St. Petersburg in furtherance 
 of an alliance, the terms of which were kept secret so many 
 years and which, after the Russian revolutionists made 
 candour unavoidable, disclosed a really oftensive arrangement 
 by which Germany was so to be dealt with that she would 
 have to defend " on both the east and the west at the same 
 time." 
 
 The world must be reminded of the extent to which 
 France armed Russia, of the immense simultaneous prepara- 
 tions of both, and of the reckless offensive conduct of French 
 
PREFACE 7 
 
 public men toward Germany during a whole decade preceding 
 the war. 
 
 Whatever may be the censure of recent French Govern- 
 ments and their pre-war policies in this book, no German 
 suggested the work, no German contributed to it, no German 
 ever saw the written page. It is the work of an American 
 of stock long settled in the United States, who has but two 
 friends in what was formerly the German Empire, and who 
 has not been in Germany since 1913. 
 
 From an Ulster Protestant mother I have derived a 
 perhaps extreme admiration for English institutions, and 
 from a remote German ancestry a perhaps pardonable belief 
 that Germans — ^though I have never got on very well with 
 North Germans myself — ^have as good a record for peace as 
 Frenchmen. A friend of France, I rejoice in her victory at 
 the Mame ; a friend of European civilization, I rejoice that 
 the German Army was able to prevent the Russian despotism 
 from enjoying its dark bargain of 1917 with France for 
 the division of Central Europe. 
 
 The friends of Europe do not wish Germany to be 
 destroyed. Yet under the Treaty of Versailles Germany 
 has paid to this date the vast sum of 11,400,000,000 gold 
 marks, of which nothing has been applied on her debt. Two- 
 fifths have gone to support the armies of occupation, chiefly 
 French. 
 
 THE AUTHOR. 
 
ERRATA 
 
 Page 6i, line 2, fov indefatigable read indefinable 
 66, footnote 3, /oy 1913 vead 1912. 
 105, line II, for rights read right. 
 134, Une 10, for latter read letter. 
 142, line 26, for bourgeois read bourgeoisie. 
 148, Una 23, for has read had. 
 
 186, footnote, last line, for conceding read concealing. 
 190, Une 21, for was read were. 
 192, footnote 2, for 272 read 271. 
 
 211, line 20, for of read to. 
 
 212, footnote, line i, for come read came. 
 216, line 28, for had read would. 
 224, footnote, for 1914 read 1921. 
 
 226, footnote 3, for 9 read 49. 
 
 227, footnote I, for Revue de France read Revue des 
 Deux Mondes, 1921, p. 248. 
 
 The typographical errors in the French text on pp. 34, 57, 
 73, 209 and 231 have been noticed, and will be corrected in 
 later impressions. 
 
 XVI. A PRINCIPLE WHOLLY OVERLOOKED AT VERSAILLES 
 
 9 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PREFACE 5 
 
 CHAFTER 
 
 I. MARTIAL FRANCE II 
 
 II. THE REAL ROOT OF THE WAR 39 
 
 III. OUR ILLUSIONS AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR , . 58 
 
 IV. THE WAR OF 187O 80 
 
 V. THE PEACE RECORD OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE ... 96 
 
 VI. THE GERMAN STRUGGLE FOR UNITY II O 
 
 VII. RUSSIAN GROWTH AND THE GERMAN FEAR OF IT . . II6 
 
 VIII. THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE I34 *" 
 
 IX. MOROCCO .... 145 
 
 X. THE PREPAREDNESS OF THE ALLIES 1 56 
 
 XI. SERBIA AND THE BALKANS 1 69 
 
 XII. THE CRISIS 177 
 
 XIII. WAS ENGLAND PARTLY RESPONSIBLE ? 2o6 
 
 XIV. M. poincar£'s recent BOOK 228 
 
 XV. THE SEVERITY OF THE PEACE 234 
 
 XVI. A PRINCIPLE WHOLLY OVERLOOKED AT VERSAILLES . . 240 
 
 9 
 
10 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 APPENDIX A. VON MOLTKE'S SECRET REPORT .... 243 
 
 APPENDIX B. THE TREATY OF 1879 BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND 
 
 GERMANY 245 
 
 APPENDIX C. THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE OF 1 892 . . 246 
 
 APPENDIX D. SECRET TREATY OF 19x6-17 BETWEEN FRANCE 
 
 AND RUSSIA 249 
 
 APPENDIX E. THE FOURTEEN POINTS, ETC 253 
 
 APPENDIX F. THE FRENCH NEGRO ARMIES 255 
 
 APPENDIX G. THE RUSSIAN PREPARATIONS AND MILITARY RAIL- 
 WAYS 257 
 
LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 MARTIAL FRANCE 
 
 You have often admired in England, no doubt, those 
 numerous castles which, though ages old, are still good habi- 
 tations! These, together with the villages and sweet greens 
 around them, have been saved by the sea and by Enghsh 
 mariners from the pride of France. 
 
 The English Channel is the moat of liberty. It is the 
 only boundary in Europe that in the last four centuries has 
 never been crossed by a French army of invasion. But for 
 that water RicheHeu, Louis XIV or Bonaparte would have 
 trampled the hedgerows of England. 
 
 Along the Rhine, on the other hand, you see great numbers 
 of burned and fallen towers. Of the^e too many were 
 crumbled by the thimderbolts of Versailles. When Matthew 
 Arnold spoke of " France famed in all great arts, in none 
 supreme," there was one great art which he quite forgot. 
 In the art of war France is and ever has been supreme. She 
 has had many generals of the first rank but not one pre- 
 eminent statesman since the death of Richelieu, himself 
 famous in bloody wars. Neither has she, with all her wealth, 
 produced one master of international finance, industry or 
 transportation. 
 
 No other people in Europe have so often sought glory in 
 
 war, have so weU and frequently written about war, have 
 
 so perfectly laid down the principles of war. Does not every 
 
 country in Europe show the scars of France ? The traveller 
 
 in the streets of Paris need not wholly lose his way if he 
 
 will bear in mind, when he scans the signposts, the names 
 
 of invaded nations. 
 
 n 
 
12 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 During the general war we were inclined to forget the 
 innumerable offensive wars of France, but in the three years 
 of peace just passed she has done everything possible to 
 remind us of them. While sensible England, with her own 
 wounds stiU running, is exerting herself to heal both the 
 victors and the vanquished, France not only maintains vast 
 wasteful armaments, but is peevish with every one of her 
 late allies. With what patience, for example, do I see such 
 a book as that from a French officer, L'Angleterre et Nous, 
 in which he not only counsels a French alliance with Germany 
 but declares that France was the rescuer of England. 
 
 Those who read the present book will find that England 
 saved France in a war into which the Poincar^ administration 
 and the Delcasses pushed Europe by arming Russia to 
 attack Germany, a war in which they well calculated England 
 would have to join them out of simple military necessity, a 
 war which England made reasonable effort to avert, but 
 which the French militarists knew that England, with or 
 without Sir Edward Grey, would be dragged into on the 
 side of France, even if the French themselves provoked the 
 war. 
 
 German diplomatists, blundering at times and blustering 
 at times, obscured the really aggressive designs of the 
 Delcasses, the Millerands and Poincar^s, but the latter 
 gentlemen, you Will find, were more artful by far than Sir 
 Edward Grey, who, though open to criticism, was, com- 
 pared to the diplomatists of the Quai d'Orsay or the felys^e, 
 a paragon of candour. 
 
 One fundamental error was implanted in us at the start, 
 that Russia had greater rights in Serbia than Austria had. 
 This I shall disprove. Russia was trying to get those rights 
 which never had been conceded and which, if Russia was 
 to be kept out of Western Europe, never should have been 
 conceded. To Austria, at least, Serbia was worse than our 
 Mexico. The situation was comparable to that of a black 
 republic in Mexico continually flooding our Southern States 
 with propaganda to create a rebellion in our negro popula- 
 tion, or of an Ireland, backed by France and filling EngUsh 
 workshops with seditious literature by every mail. But, the 
 impression starting among us the other way, the Berlin 
 
MARTIAL FRANCE 13 
 
 Government's support of Austria, though right to begin 
 with and at the last withdrawn, seemed very wrong. The 
 French politicians knew that to keep this state out of 
 Russian hands was as vital to Austria as it was to England 
 to keep Belgium from the powerful hands of Germany, but 
 the Poincar6 Government was in 1912 and 1913 reckless as 
 to war. 
 
 Germany was backing her ally in something essential to 
 the life of both; France backing her ally in the latter's 
 ambition and extension. 
 
 Another error they allowed us to fall into was the belief 
 that France went to war only because Germany declared it. 
 This they have misled us in by not reveahng, until after the 
 passions of war, their unpublished treaty of 1892, by which, 
 as they are forced to argue themselves, France should be 
 automatically at war against Germany when Russia was. 
 
 So saturated is the French temper with mihtarism that 
 they think they can even boast of it without reproach. In 
 them apparently it is no fault. Let me give the most striking 
 illustration. Turn to their Yellow Book, issued after the 
 declaration of war, to Document No. 5, a confidential report 
 made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs before the war, 
 " On the State of Public Opinion in Germany." The German 
 people, it says, are beginning to complain of a certain 
 advantage that the French have been gaining over them. 
 They are just discovering, these Germans, he relates proudly, 
 that France 
 
 our country, conquered in 1870, has never ceased to carry on war, to 
 float her flag and maintain the prestige of her arms in Asia and Africa 
 and to conquer vast territories ; Germany on the other hand has lived 
 on her reputation. 
 
 Such is the language which France thought she could 
 afford to use in a document published to the world, a docu- 
 ment intended to convince mankind that France was wholly 
 peaceable and her neighbour restless and warlike, but which, 
 through her very complacency, betrays what the Germans 
 have always contended, that the greatest single military 
 power in the world, Germany, abstained from war for forty- 
 three years. 
 
14 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Since I began this book there has occurred a conference 
 in Washington for the hmitation of armaments. What will 
 ultimately come of it is not yet clear, but that the French 
 mean to keep themselves in a state of excessive armament 
 if they can is not to be denied. Their proposal to supple- 
 ment a huge army by a vast fleet of submarines is as much 
 a menace to England as they themselves were lately pleased 
 to say that the German Navy was. But these people are 
 going further. They are arming Africans in vast numbers 
 and are boasting of an intention to ferry them across the 
 Mediterranean. Colonial Minister Sarraut points to " our 
 Colonial empire, of which so little account seems to be taken 
 here but which forms for us, among other attributes, a vast 
 reservoir of man power." ^ This assuredly is not comforting 
 to the white races of Europe. 
 
 It is a common saying that people of a pronounced artistic 
 temperament, though they may under many circumstances 
 and for a time conduct themselves with prudence and good 
 sense, are sure to disclose a weakness and in some course 
 of conduct to depart, to the great distress of everybody, 
 from what is practical and wise. We have this folly shown 
 by the French in their insisting upon an indemnity from 
 the Germans which the most noted economists in the world 
 have with one voice proclaimed to be, however justly im- 
 posed, beyond aU possibiUty of collection, and which cannot 
 be collected without the economic destruction of Europe. 
 Yet, contrary to the advice of both Italy and England, which 
 suffered incalculably in the war, and contrary to the advice 
 of the best minds in the United States, which also made 
 great sacrifices in the war, the French at present insist upon 
 a policy of collecting from an exhausted bankrupt — even if 
 the rest of Europe be ruined by the attempt. 
 
 Speaking now of Germany, this is one of the countries 
 which France had been assaulting repeatedly during three 
 hundred years. It was Bismarck's unanswered retort that 
 France had had twenty wars with Germany, in not one of 
 which Germany had been the aggressor, for, as Earl Lore- 
 bum says : " It would be a falsification of history to deny 
 that for many years, under the Bourbons, France repeatedly 
 ? The World, December 28, 1921, 
 
MARTIAL FRANCE 15 
 
 attacked one or another of the German states without provo- 
 cation." I That this was undeniable is known to most 
 students of history, but I did not think that France would 
 make an actual boast of such a thing and proclaim it as a 
 policy until, as I shall now tell you, it has very recently 
 been made plain to me by literature to which their Govern- 
 ment has been pleased to give direct encouragement. 
 
 A few months ago I happened to pick up a little book, 
 on the title-page of which was stamped in the form of a 
 circular seal " Consulat de France." Published in Paris 
 after the war, it was turned into English there as Two 
 Histories Face to Face.^ Some days later in the public library 
 I came upon another copy and subsequently several copies 
 at my club, all stamped with the seal of the local French 
 consulate ; so it became very plain that the French Govern- 
 ment wished Americans to read this Uttle book and attached 
 some importance to it. 
 
 To me this work, when I read it, appeared a very mis- 
 chievous one, an attempt not merely to justify many bad 
 French wars but to exalt them. 
 
 The whole argument, from the beginning to the end, was 
 that anarchy in Germany, and " anarchy " was the word 
 frequently used, was a good thing for France, nay, some- 
 thing due to so fine a people as the French, that France had 
 always done her best to keep the German states divided 
 even though their being divided subjected them to poverty 
 and to invasion by other states. All this seemed to me an 
 astounding policy to avow against a people who wished to 
 tmite imder the same language, the same blood, and the 
 same laws and customs. I wondered what this writer would 
 have had to say if England proposed to throw France back 
 again into the wrangling feuds of Burgundy, Aquitaine. 
 Normandy, Brittany and the like, thinking it better for the 
 security of her island to have France carved in pieces. 
 
 As for this writer, ignoring the frightful prostration of 
 disunited Germany, a prostration which has filled all histor- 
 ians with pity, he dilates on the advantage to France. He 
 
 " How the War Came, p. 251. Earl Loreburn was Lord Chancellor under 
 the Campbell-Bannerman Government. 
 
 » By Jacques Bainville, translated by Paul Lefaivre, Paris, Nouvelle 
 Librairie Nationale (1919) • 
 
16 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 assumes that everybody will want this sort of thing to 
 continue or to be revived in favour of his country, and when 
 he mentions that by reason of the weakness of the divided 
 German states one of Louis XIV's generals was able to 
 ravage a whole German province in an unexampled manner, 
 he assures us that the good king actually " reproved " the 
 man. 
 
 Now there may be many people so bitter against Germany 
 to-day as to rejoice in any kind of injury whatsoever for 
 the future that France may inflict upon Germany, though 
 it be calamitous to Europe in general, but even these people 
 do not like to have it revealed that France may have been 
 to blame to begin with. People look back no further than 
 the war of 1870, which, contrary to the unanimous voice of 
 historians, we have been lately taught was forced upon 
 France by Germany, whereas it was just one of those wars 
 which France herself deliberately sought in this policy so 
 candidly revealed by Bainville of preventing the German 
 ' states from uniting. These people will learn something by 
 reading M. Bainville's peculiar book, which, I think, very 
 much overreaches itself. You will not read long before you 
 will find that historians are correct in sa3dng that that 
 adventurer, Napoleon III, was determined to have a war 
 with Prussia so that the German anarchy or division might 
 continue and no consolidated Germany be created. 
 
 This curious book is not the loose and aimless effusion, 
 you perceive, of some writer essaying on his own accoimt.^ 
 It has the direct encouragement of the French Government, 
 so we can pay strict attention to the extraordinary doctrines 
 which it advances. 
 
 For my part, I was expecting him to show that Germany 
 had been some sort of original assailant far back in the 
 Middle Ages, but this gentleman is at no pains to make any 
 such claim and to get a starting-point of wrongdoing against 
 the Germans. On the contrar}^ he tells us that " before 
 the sixteenth century the wars between France and Germany 
 were simply skirmishes," * or what Milton calls " the mere 
 battles of kites and crows." Thus we have the beginning 
 
 ' M. Bainville is, I believe, the editor of Action Franfaise. 
 > P. 40. 
 
MARTIAL FRANCE 17 
 
 of the sixteenth century to date from, and we do not need 
 to go further than this author himself to show that if ever 
 people had a right to regard the French as their predestined 
 enemies, it is the Germans. 
 
 Nobody can reflect with much patience on the detestable 
 temper of the German military class and of their arbitrary 
 Junkers, but those who have gone even into the surface of 
 history know that the French have given them abundant 
 provocation during the several centuries of which M. 
 Bainville is so proud. 
 
 You must actually hear what this propagandist says in 
 his own words. He quotes with pleasure a German author 
 named Biedermann as saying : " The German patriot can 
 only blush looking back at the time when, while Louis XIV 
 was annexing German states with his haughty ambition, 
 the blossom of the German nobility was rendering him its 
 homage, feeling deeply honoured if the last of his courtiers 
 was good enough to approve so many exertions in aping the 
 French Court." » Then for himself M. Bainville adds : 
 " Under the orders of the King of France thousands of them 
 were making war for us against their own country. The famous 
 name of the Marshal of Saxony evokes the fusion reached by 
 that Europe which a contemporary called French Europe." * 
 
 Coming to a conference at Ratisbon he says it is unneces- 
 sary to charge the French emissaries with fomenting divisions 
 between the German states ; for the emissary of France, he 
 says, " does not occupy his post for any other purpose. He 
 goes there in order to favour German discord." 3 
 
 Arriving at the nineteenth century, he tells us that the 
 whole policy of France " was to prevent Germany from realizing 
 her unity as France had realized her own," 4 which was exactly 
 the policy that made Louis Napoleon in 1870 seek a war, 
 as I have said before, with the states of Germany coalescing 
 under Bismarck, a war which Germany had to win in order 
 to be a united country, but of which you have been given 
 during the last few years many grossly erroneous accounts. 5 
 
 As I say, this writer dates this meddlesome pohcy of 
 France far back. For instance, he says of it as early as the 
 
 I p. 106. = P. 107. 3 p. 93. « P. 63. 
 
 ■ See my chapter on " The War of 1870." 
 
 2 
 
18 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 seventeenth century : " To fix and organize the German 
 anarchy was to be the political masterpiece of the French 
 seventeenth century." ^ 
 
 Neither Americans nor English have ever believed that 
 we were shedding our blood for France in order that she 
 might achieve the permanent destruction of any other 
 country, but if some of us were even in such a passion with 
 Germany as to contemplate that, they surely contemplated 
 it only in the belief that Germany had been a continual 
 aggressor against France. To historians it is not astonishing 
 that the contrary is true, but doubtless it is surprising to 
 people who have not the time for research to know that 
 France had always regarded Germany as a sort of hunting- 
 ground for her kings. There is no gainsaying that the 
 French, with all their fine quahties, ascribe a pecuHar privilege 
 to themselves from their intellectual culture. They still 
 deem themselves what Voltaire proudly caUed them, " the 
 whipped cream of Europe." 
 
 As for the future, this author is at no pains to conceal 
 his purpose. Germany, he says, must be poUtically weakened 
 and divided. " Disunited, the Germans become peaceful, they 
 even contribute their share towards universal civilization. 
 They develop whatever qualities they possess." That is to 
 say, when they can be ordered about by French kings, of 
 course they cannot conduct defensive war. They have to 
 suffer in silence, lose some of their provinces, and even imi- 
 tate their masters. M. Bainville tells us that during this 
 period of subjection by France the Germans produced many 
 poets and artists, which they have ceased to do since, but 
 of course he is not at the pains to tell us that other great 
 industrial nations like England and the United States have 
 during the same period also not been producing great poets 
 and artists ; that as Germany became united she cheapened 
 the products of the earth for the plain people of the world, 
 and that she contributed to social science and the well-being 
 of the working classes incalculably during her growth. 
 
 Nothing but France this writer will have us consider, 
 without admitting that France was never assailed by a 
 German army until after Bonaparte had added the horrors 
 
 ' p. 6i. 
 
MARTIAL FRANCE 19 
 
 of his assaults on Germany to those of Richelieu, Louis XIV 
 and Louis XV, and until Napoleon III had avowed that a 
 union of the German states could not be permitted. I may 
 add that he says as little as he can about Napoleon III, 
 whose f,ve wars in twenty years he has perhaps overlooked, 
 as well as his blackmailing Italy into a surrender of Savoy 
 and Nice as a condition to his "permitting" that divided 
 country also to unite.^ 
 
 He tells us that the prevention of German unity was " a 
 matter-of-fact plan, inspired by good sense and thoroughly led 
 by the clear consciousness of the national interest." * Then he 
 assures us that Europe was very happy after the Thirty 
 Years' War was ended, a war which, he does not remind 
 the reader, was thirty years of internal agony, because 
 Germany was not allowed by foreign kings to form her 
 unity, was brought in many districts to a loss of nine- 
 tenths of her population and to a general starvation by the 
 successive inroads of Russians, French, Swedes and Poles. 
 In other words, the half-djang body beside France, which 
 had never yet attacked France, gave to France sensations 
 of repose. 
 
 He is very frank, is he not, this interesting M. Bainville ? 
 He tells the truth as a robber boasts of his game. The same 
 truth was confessed by a much greater Frenchman, Jean 
 Jaur^s, but with hunuliation : " From Charles VIII to 
 Louis XIV and from the latter to Napoleon, France had too 
 often abused her national unity, attained before that of 
 other countries, by treating brutally nations still divided 
 and unorganized." 3 
 
 For my part, I had always believed that the divided 
 condition of Germany was one of the calamities of Europe, 
 yet I now read a book, distributed by French officials, which 
 would persuade us that, on the contrary, it was an extremely 
 
 ' This abominable concession caused unhappy Cavour the loss of the 
 friendship of his fellow patriot. Garibaldi, whose birthplace was Nice. 
 Cavour could only plead that he must either make France a present of this 
 territory or have a war with her. 
 
 » P. 63. 
 
 ' Jean Jauris par Chas. Rappoport, p. 71. The complacent B6rard 
 pleasantly recounts the German miseries of three hundred years. " Mais 
 durant ces trois si^cles toutes les armies de 1' Europe prirent cette ' bonne ' 
 Allemagne pour un champ de bataille ou de campement . . . tous les soudards 
 la pillerent et mang^rent k I'envi." La France et Guilliaume II, p. 99 (1907)- 
 
20 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 useful thing, that France profited a great deal by it, that 
 she took from Germany whatever parts of that country she 
 could, and that all this misery was beneficial to mankind. 
 
 It will be remembered that it was durmg this period 
 that Louis XIV annexed Alsace and Lorraine, in the greater 
 part of which the language spoken was German. After the 
 long possession of it by France, I nevertheless felt that the 
 Germans ought not to have taken it back, but perhaps I 
 have been overlooking an argument in their favour that is 
 fair. Louis XIV was not the last of the French kings to 
 assault divided Germany. On the contrary, Bonaparte 
 treated her with incredible severities and insults, some of 
 which are typified in the well-known picture of a beautiful 
 queen. As these German states, stimg at last to common 
 action by the scourge of Bonaparte and getting a breathing 
 spell after his fall, proceed to unite under Bismarck, another 
 adventurer appears upon the throne of France and, in 1870, 
 forbids the banns. 
 
 M. Bainville's book has set me thinking as few books have. 
 It is cold, heartless and impudent. It reminds me that in 
 the hills of Alsace-Lorraine was the only natural frontier 
 that Germany could have against French assault, vmless she 
 should retire to the other side of the Rhine and give up 
 provinces that never had been other than German and were 
 not claimed by any French king as part of Alsace-Lorraine. 
 In a word, to interfere with the prescriptive title of France 
 to Alsace-Lorraine and to revoke those countries would have 
 been wicked in a Germany wilfully assaulting France. Was 
 it wicked, though, in a country provoked by determined 
 policy of assault in a martial neighbour, and resolved at 
 last to have fortified positions on which to meet her ? » 
 
 Moreover, this book of Bainville's does not stand as a 
 solitary effusion. Its doctrines have been supported silently 
 during the last three years by an enormous army maintained 
 by France, while herself on the verge of bankruptcy and 
 Germany entirely disarmed. It is fair, when France chal- 
 lenges us with doctrines like these, to examine her own 
 history. 
 
 » The learned Professor Rose, of Cambridge, answers the question 
 squarely : " Probably we would have done the same thing, had we been 
 in the same place." Hose's Germany in the Nineteenth Century, p. 17, 1902. 
 
MARTIAL FRANCE 21 
 
 It is fair to inquire which, after all, has been the most 
 martial nation in Europe. There can be but one answer, 
 France. Since Luther's time, twice have the French 
 crossed the lofty Pyrenees to attack Spain; six times the 
 mighty Alps to strike at Italy. Austria they have several 
 times attacked. As for Germany, that wretched district, as 
 M. Bainville has just been showing, has been but the bloody 
 playground of French kings, who have repeatedly left it to 
 hunger and woe. Holland the French have twice attacked, 
 Belgium they have once annexed. Nor has Russia escaped, 
 invaded once from the north and once from the south. 
 England, saved from powerful French kings only by the 
 sea, they have repeatedly assailed in her colonies because 
 they regarded her as the one remaining obstacle to their 
 domination of Europe. Nay, our neighbouring country of 
 Mexico had to submit, while we were engaged in arms at 
 home, to a French invasion, and China had to surrender 
 part of her country under a French expedition. As for Syria 
 and Morocco, these furnish but trifling additions to a list 
 of slaughters which sit so easily upon those gay conquerors. 
 
 We must let our passions now subside. We must begin 
 to look at some of the immense revelations of historical data 
 made in the last few years through the seizure of the Russian 
 archives and through the frank statements or confessions of 
 exalted participants. It is time, indeed, to inquire into the 
 true causes of this war. 
 
 Our own Ambassador Gerard, surely an impartial critic, 
 has left his testimony that the militarism of the German 
 people arises not from fierceness but from fear.' 
 
 It is my proposal to give the reader the benefit of an 
 enormous mass of new matter and of revelations which could 
 not possibly have been available to us in the first excitements 
 of the European conflict. As I have had to change my 
 mind about many things, I am confident the patient reader 
 will have to change his mind about a good many also. 
 Without going at this time into a citation of authorities, 
 but asking the reader to await the narrative, I may quote 
 one of the most learned of American investigators of the 
 causes of the war, who in three articles of signal acumen 
 
 ' P. 116. 
 
22 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 and research, and with much condemnation of the Germans 
 on many points, has finally said : 
 
 " These new documents from Berlin and Vienna place 
 Austria in a much more unfavourable light than hitherto. 
 They likewise clear the German Government of the charge 
 that it deliberately plotted or wanted the war." ^ The docu- 
 ments that he refers to as not open to us at the outset, 
 were those showing that the Berlin Government did put 
 upon Austria repeated insistent demands to accept the 
 Serbian reply and that the Austrian Government, evading 
 these demands, concealed from Berlin matters relevant and 
 most important. 
 
 In England, always willing to let both sides be heard, a 
 large section already denies that Germany was wholly to 
 blame. Even from France arises a similar protest. M. 
 Georges Demartial in an unanswerable article upraids Viviani 
 with hypocrisy for saying that the declaration of war by 
 Germany on France was " sudden, odious, unheard-of aggres- 
 sion," when in fact it was matter of treaty that France must 
 strike Germany if Germany and Russia were for any cause 
 at war, and strike simultaneously so that Germany must 
 defend on the two fronts at once.» Most recently comes 
 Signor Nitti, whose country suffered a deep wound from 
 German invasion, saying, " Now that Imperial Germany has 
 fallen, it would be absurd to maintain that the responsibility 
 for the war is solely attributable to her." 3 
 
 At the very outset we must remember that Germany 
 had opposed to her two powerful countries, each with a 
 grievance, France and Russia being in an alliance admitted, 
 though not as to its sinister terms and details, then revealed. 
 France was full of the spirit of revenge 4 and desire for 
 
 ■ Professor Sidney B. Fay in the Ameyican Historical Review for October 
 1920. His first article was one for July 1920 and his last article for January 1921. 
 
 ' As we shall see by the details of this treaty in Chapter VIII and 
 Appendix C. 
 
 3 Peaceless Europe (Cassell, 1922), p. 33. Nitti does not absolve Germany 
 from blame by any means, but he scoflEs throughout at the charge that she 
 alone was at fault. 
 
 4 M. PoincarS in his recent Origins of the War (Cassell, 1922) will not 
 deny that the French always had in mind the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. 
 But " revenge " ? No I Now what the world understands by the French 
 desire for a revenge was a successful and punitive war sooner or later to 
 recover those provinces. The intention to get them back in some way he 
 concedes. The Origins of the War, p. 26. 
 
MARTIAL FRANCE 28 
 
 eminence again in Europe, while Russia had long and 
 deservedly found Germany in her path from Constantinople to 
 the Baltic. Let us consequently be fair. Since these two 
 nations overwhelmingly outnumbered the Teutons, which in 
 the ordinary course of events is more likely to have sought 
 the quarrel and had least to fear from it? To these must 
 be added England, naturally irritated by the rising navy of 
 Germany and already, though in no treaty of alliance with 
 the others, on terms of intimacy undenied. 
 
 We have been told that Germany defiantly plunged into 
 a war against all these odds, when she must have known 
 that her very first losses would be colossal. On the mere 
 declaration of war she must forfeit her wonderful merchant 
 marine. Never did she at any time hope to maintain or 
 attempt to maintain the seas against England. Under these 
 conditions, is it likely she sought a conflict or endeavoured 
 to avoid it ? The blockade was a certainty if England should 
 strike, and we now have the unanimous testimony of the 
 German military chiefs that England's taking the seas against 
 them was regarded as a certainty. ' Did Germany therefore 
 seek the fight, or if she sought it, did she seek it only from 
 despair ? These are the interesting things which will be 
 discussed in the following pages. 
 
 Has not everybody at times expressed wonder that 
 Germany should have sought war when she was gradually 
 getting all she wanted without it ? She possessed exceed- 
 ingly able business men whom Government was aiding in 
 every conceivable way at home and abroad. Must we not 
 suppose that a Government that had aided business so long 
 and so well had also the sense to avoid war if it could, when 
 it must enter that war outnumbered before and behind, 
 besides being probably locked in from the sea. Why not 
 listen to the more natural argument that a Government so 
 able went into a war against great odds because France and 
 Russia, with their grievances and, as we shall see, at a height 
 of armament beyond what either had ever before possessed, 
 thought it opportune to force a war in which England would 
 have to join them ? Is this an absurd hypothesis ? 
 
 • The Kaiser had faint hopes, but none of his advisers had except pos' 
 sibly Bethmann. I think that both these men were merely hoping against 
 hope. 
 
24 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Staggering was the sacrifice at which Germany must 
 even begin a war with England also against her. She had 
 no hope that she could live upon the seas a single day. The 
 telegram round the world that England had declared war 
 was a death sentence on the ships of Germany. They fled, 
 like scattered birds, and by the second dawn there was not 
 a sea in which the sun illumined or the breeze fluttered the 
 colours of Germany. I 
 
 In tracing the real cause of the war we shall next find 
 that bellicose France, after a deserved defeat in a war wrong- 
 fully declared by herself,* dedicated her future to revenge. 
 As will appear more fully in the chapter on the Franco- 
 Russian alliance of 1892, she gladly bound herself and her 
 vast wealth in a secret treaty to Russia, the common enemy 
 of the West, and from that time began to bring Europe to 
 its present verge of ruin. It is necessary to add that during 
 the recent war she made another secret arrangement with 
 Russia, by which the latter was to be allowed, in the event 
 of victory, to absorb so much of the West as she desired, 
 France being even bound to use her exertions against Sweden 
 if that little country should seek to escape its doom. Nor 
 was Russia to be bothered with questions about Poland ; 
 on the contrary, she was to push her boundaries without 
 restraint through Germany, a shameful interchange of obli- 
 gations of which England, the common ally, asserts herself 
 to have been wholly ignorant.3 
 
 I believe this to be one of the basest treaties ever 
 recorded. First, it freed the Tsar from what he had pro- 
 mised Poland at the outset of the war. Second, it involved 
 an injury to the simple and peaceful state of Sweden. 
 Third, it was designed to extend the worst existing despotism 
 over a large part of Europe. 
 
 ' Particularly dramatic was the flight of the Kronprincessin Cecilie, 
 which received the fateful message in mid-ocean. Her commander, bursting 
 into tears, put her instantly about and sped, with a speed at which only 
 those engines could drive a ship, to the distant American shore. Even the 
 swift Cecilie could not hazard an hour's delay after England had loosed her 
 hounds. 
 
 ' See the unanimous voice of historians against her in the chapter entitled 
 " The War of 1870." 
 
 3 The Secret Treaties, as revealed by the Soviets and published by Seymour 
 Cocks, London, 191 8. Appendix D. Emile Laloy, in his Les Documents 
 Secrets puhliis par les Bolckeviks, feels obliged to condense and abbreviate 
 this humiliating bargain. See his p. 156. 
 
MARTIAL FRANCE 25 
 
 France, it is clear, was preparing two armies before the 
 war, her own and a still larger one in Russia. The French 
 Army itself was, by the statistics of her own General Buat, 
 more than equal to the German, while the Russian was im- 
 mensely larger.; The policy of France was to delay the first 
 clash until the Russian forces could get to the German frontier. 
 
 To put the matter simply, France was loading the 
 weapons for herself and Russia too ; Russia by general mobil- 
 ization first drew a weapon, but Germany by superior quick- 
 ness was able to fire the first shot and this against France. 
 Thereupon France, uttering loud cries, declared herself shame- 
 lessly and suddenly assailed. Then followed the blockade, 
 nobody could or would hear the real explanations, and rage 
 swept away history, logic and truth. 
 
 Commentators are pointing out to us that while England 
 and Italy strove to prevent the war in that last desperate 
 month, and while Germany also as we know now was, even 
 if too late, endeavouring to control Austria and have Russia 
 wait for discussion, France was doing nothing to dissuade 
 Russia from an unnecessary mobilization which made war 
 against Germany, and therefore a general European war, a 
 certainty. Indeed, France in her Yellow Book discloses that 
 she did not make even an attempt.* 
 
 Particularly noticeable and unfair in every diplomatic 
 document from the side of France is her assumption that 
 in her military increases she simply followed of necessity those 
 of Germany. She concedes nothing against herself, her making 
 the German increases necessary by those which Russia was 
 making at French instance and with French money. Yet even 
 one of her own military authorities conceded that " it was 
 to guard against the Russian danger that Germany made 
 her military law of 1913," 3 and the German Chancellor, in 
 introducing the Army Bill of 1913, distinctly refers to Russia's 
 expanding her military plans against German remonstrance. 4 
 
 " Russia alone," says Signor Nitti, " represented the peril 
 
 ' See chapter on " Allied Preparedness." The Russian standing army 
 was 2,320,000 ; the German 870,000. 
 
 • StoweU's Diplomacy of the War, vol. i, pp. 519, 520, 521. 
 
 3 From L'AlUmagne en Peril, of Colonel Boucher just before the war. 
 I quote from Pre-War Diplomacy, p. 28. 
 
 4 England and Germany, p. 379- This is an American book of very 
 great acumen. 
 
26 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 of the future in German eyes. . , . The continual increases of 
 the Russian Army were her greatest danger." * 
 
 We must remember that Washington and Jefferson did not 
 allow their affection for the French people to obscure the 
 fact that they were essentially martial. The former found 
 himself forced during his presidency to clash with his recent 
 Gallic allies, while a few years afterwards Jefferson, who 
 both loved the French and hated the English, when he heard 
 that the mouth of the Mississippi might pass into French 
 hands, was alarmed in an unwonted degree. The love of 
 the French for war was, he declared, too well known. If 
 the mouth of the Mississippi should pass to a nation with 
 such a temperament, " we must forthwith marry ourselves 
 to the British fleet and nation." 
 
 Let us patiently examine the almost universal opinion 
 of the German people that they fought a war of defence and 
 despair. Von Tirpitz teUs us that when the Kaiser was 
 informed that war was certain, the man grew haggard. We 
 are told by the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that 
 the German Ambassador, faced by the inflexible determination 
 of the Russian Foreign Minister, " completely broke down on 
 seeing that war was inevitable." This is hardly the attitude 
 of insolent power. " He appealed to M. Sazonoff to make 
 some suggestion which he could telegraph to the German 
 Government as a last hope." * In Stockholm too we have 
 a witness whose testimony is incidental and yet most natural. 
 A few days before the guns were fired Nekludoff was in con- 
 versation with the various foreign representatives. It was 
 the German Minister in whom he noticed " pallor and 
 restrained emotion." 3 He does not say this of Viviani whom 
 he saw there at the same time, and who expected war. 
 
 The distress of the German Chancellor in his last inter- 
 view with the EngHsh Ambassador is too well known to be 
 repeated. Here and there, of course, you can find the boast 
 
 ' Peaceless Europe, p. 12. 
 
 ' British White Paper, 97. The French Ambassador also had a chat 
 with the German Ambassador : " His hands trembled and his eyes fiUed 
 with tears." Palfiologue in Revue des deux Mondes, January 1921, p. 254, 
 and yet we are assured that his confident country was setting out to conquer 
 all Europe. 
 
 3 Nekludoff (Russian Ambassador to Sweden) in Diplomatic Reminis- 
 cences, p. 291. 
 
MARTIAL FRANCE 27 
 
 of some German military fool, but those who have read 
 deeply know that embattled Germany was conscious of going 
 to war at an unparalleled disadvantage both on sea and 
 land and that the resources of her enemies were practically 
 inexhaustible. The question is, did she seek that war ? 
 
 The French have turned every circumstance to their 
 advantage to hide their offensive behaviour that tended to 
 provoke war. They point to the German declaration of war, 
 but they say nothing of their own plan to strike Germany, 
 if Germany and the vast empire of Russia should come to 
 blows. They point to their enforced retreat before the 
 German Army at the outset, but do not explain that they 
 fell back because they had not been able to calculate exactly 
 where the whole German Army would be launched ; that 
 their own Army was equal to the German, and that the 
 Russian was still greater. The inferiority of the German is 
 shown by the fact that as soon as the Russians moved into 
 Prussia, the Germans had to withdraw forces from France to 
 meet the mass on the East.^ 
 
 In every country of Europe the vocabulary of war is French. 
 Germany has had to defend herself during three hundred 
 years in the language of her assailant. 
 
 It is astonishing how much sjnnpathy they have created 
 for themselves about Alsace-Lorraine, these delicate French. 
 So many delightful masters have they of the arts of pathos 
 and declamation that they have been persuading us not to 
 regard them as the spoiled children of Europe. They have 
 nice feelings if we may judge by their resentments.^ 
 
 They have been persuading us too that they really did 
 not want this war. They and the Russians have been dis- 
 tributing books called by the names of various colours in 
 which I am sorry to perceive some important things 
 happened, by sheer oversight, to be left out. For example, 
 they left it to the Russian revolutionists to reveal what the 
 Russian Ambassador Benckendorff, in a report from London 
 to his Russian masters, wrote, in February 1913, when, a 
 
 > The immense odds that Hindenburg had to meet in August 191 4 are 
 discussed elsewhere. The German forces were clearly not enough for 
 offensive operations on both fronts. 
 
 » " You have nice feelings, my lord, if we may judge by your resent- 
 ments." — Junius. 
 
28 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 year before the recent war began, an exactly simUar crisis 
 to that of 1914 arose in the Balkans. Benckendorff, who 
 had lived a great deal both in London and in Paris and knew 
 the French well, infinitely preferring them besides to the 
 Germans, actually informs his Government that Germany 
 had been the peaceful agent in settling the troubles of that 
 season. He speaks of " Germany's pressure upon the extra- 
 vagant Austrian Government. // Germany wished war she 
 would not have done so much in this matter." 
 
 But Benckendorff is not satisfied with admitting the 
 German peace tendencies. He goes further and tells us 
 about the belligerent tendencies of the French, even com- 
 menting upon the temper of Poincar6, President of France, 
 of whom I shall have more to relate further on. Let us 
 listen to what he says in this same report of his : 
 
 When I recall Cambon's conversations with me, the words exchanged, 
 and add the attitude of Poincari, the thought comes to me as a conviction 
 that of all the Powers France is the only one which, not to say that it 
 wishes war, would yet look upon it without great regret.^ 
 
 And the Belgian Ambassador at Paris, GuiUiaume, tells 
 his Home Office in February 1913 that the militaristic spirit 
 of the French has been awakened by Poincare. In April of 
 the same year he tells his Minister of Foreign Affairs that 
 Pichon and he have just had a talk, in which Pichon 
 deplored the warlike spirit growing in Paris, where half the 
 theatres were now playing Chauvinistic pieces. Finally on 
 January 16, 1914, he says : " I have already had the 
 honour to tell you that it is MM. Poincard, Delcassd, 
 Millerand, and their friends, who have invented and pursued 
 the nationalistic and Chauvinistic policy which menaces the 
 peace of Europe. It is a danger for Europe and for Belgium.* 
 The attitude of the Barthout Cabinet is in my judgment 
 
 ' It was the rude Bolshevists who revealed this and much similar corre- 
 spondence, of which the Germans were able belatedly to avail themselves 
 in the German White Book of 1919 on the responsibility for the war. See 
 that paper, part 2, p. 75. 
 
 > In his Origins of the War, issued since the foregoing was written, M. 
 Pomcar6 does notice this damaging letter, though he ignores nearly all 
 others. Not controverting it directly, he tells us that M. Guilliaume was 
 a " worthy man," who would have done well to keep his eyes open like 
 Beyens, Belgian Ambassador at Berlin. Now Beyens in his book (Germany 
 
MARTIAL FRANCE 29 
 
 the determining cause of an excess of military tendencies in 
 Germany." i 
 
 From great Frenchmen also come, as I have said, pro- 
 tests and accusations. That of Demartial we have already 
 quoted. To his dissatisfaction may be added that of Henri 
 Barbusse, of Anatole France, and of Emeste Renauld. This 
 last-named historical writer engaged M. Poincar6 in an 
 argument by no means to the happiness of the latter. 
 " The Entente," says Renauld, " wanted the war as much as 
 William II, and you, Mr. President, and your group of friends 
 wanted it more than all," adding some painful shots at the 
 French Yellow Book, of which I shall have more to say 
 hereafter. 
 
 The alliance of France with Russia is something on which 
 at the very outset both Britons and Americans have to 
 receive much explanation. It was the most momentous in 
 modern history, for from the date of that (1892) begins the 
 recent war.« Do not let us deceive ourselves. When a 
 wicked court hke that of Petrograd had wound itself into 
 the wealth of France, and when miUiards of French money 
 must be lost if Russia be lost, war had to come. France 
 had made an alliance with scoundrels whose business was 
 war, who could filch unlimited sums in the vast contracts 
 of war, who had colossal fortunes to expect in the indemnities 
 or the secret negoti^ions of successful war. And they were 
 arranging the final details, the personnel of the assault, in 
 good season as weU as with a keen appetite, these Russians. 
 Listen to the following in a circular which Sazonoff sent to 
 his Russian diplomats, " When the critical moment in inter- 
 national relations arrives, it would be most desirable to have 
 at the head of the Allied Governments, if not Poincard him- 
 self, at least a personality who has the same energetic char- 
 
 Before the War, p. 23) frankly says " the promise which the Kaiser had made 
 to the people when he ascended the throne as to keeping the peace he kept 
 for twenty-five years," see post, p. X05. 
 
 I Diplomacy Revealed, p. 280. Of course, this friendly ambassador 
 adds, like a good diplomatist, the usual saving clause that he really does 
 not believe that France will be ill-behaved, etc. Diplomacy Revealed is 
 the annotated London compilation of the correspondence seized by the 
 Germans in Belgium. Gaps in it have not been explained, but the genuine- 
 ness of no single document has been challenged. 
 
 > Baron Rosen concedes this in his very recent memoirs. Saturday 
 Evtning Post, June 5 and 26, 1920. 
 
80 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 acter and who has as little fear of responsibility as the present 
 French Prime Minister." ' 
 
 As to the position of Germany between these two Powers, 
 let us use our imagination. Were we not lately worried, we 
 this powerful people on a vast continent with all the resources 
 of life inside our own boundaries, because England and Japan 
 were in alliance ? One on each side of us, we would say to 
 ourselves with anxiety ! Imagine, then, what we would have 
 felt if the soil of England touched our Atlantic coast and 
 the soil of Japan touched our Pacific coast, while both these 
 countries were completely armed and at times insolently 
 rejoiced in their common tmderstanding. 
 
 Mr. Lloyd George stated the German situation fairly 
 only five months before the war : 
 
 The German Army is vital not merely to the existence of the German 
 Empire hut to the very life and independence of the nation itself, sur- 
 rounded as Germany is by other nations each of which possesses arms 
 about as powerful as her own. We forget that, while we insist upon 
 a sixty per cent, superiority (so far as our naval strength is concerned) 
 over Germany being essential to guaranteeing the integrity of our 
 own shores, Germany herself has nothing like that superiority over France 
 alone, and she has, of course, in addition, to reckon with Russia on her 
 Eastern frontier. Germany has nothing which approximates to a 
 two-power standard. She has therefore become alarmed by recent 
 events, and is spending huge sums of money on the expansion of her 
 military resources.' 
 
 " Alarmed at recent events " ? Naturally. Russia had 
 at last the greatest standing army ever known on earth, 
 threefold that of Germany, and was clamouring that France 
 increase also an army greater than to that of Germany. 3 
 
 The truth is both France and Russia had become intoxi- 
 cated with their enormous armaments which they knew it 
 
 I SazonofE, Russian Foreign Minister, after one of Poincar6's visits, 
 August 1912. Entente Diplomacy, pp. 652-5. Poincar6 has been vigorously 
 attacked by Gouthenoire de Toury in Poincari a-t-il voulu la Guerre f 
 De Toury dates the warlike course of the President from the day of his 
 going into ofi&ce early m 191 2. The great French work of Alfred Pevet 
 is equally severe on Poincar^. 
 
 > Daily Chronicle of January i, 1914. Shortly after the war began 
 this statesman denounced the Germans as conspirators. Later he frankly 
 admitted that nobody in particular had been in fault, that they " all 
 stumbled " into the conflict. He had learned facts. 
 
 3 See the chapters entitled " The Crisis," and "Allied Preparedness." 
 
MARTIAL FRANCE 31 
 
 was impossible for Germany to compete with against com- 
 bined populations so overwhelming. They began to grow 
 noisy in their impatience, confident in united strength. They 
 knew that they possessed the greatest armies in Europe for 
 joint action and that the standing army of Russia was much 
 the largest in the world. Nor was that army unequipped. 
 The contrary is true. The first Russian armies were well 
 equipped. 
 
 Fancy, then, a semi-official paper like the Birshewija 
 Wjedomosti i of Petrograd stating, on June 13, 1914, a date 
 which was of course before the tragic afEair at Serajevo, 
 " Russia is ready and hopes that France is ready." But 
 who was threatening Russia at all ? It goes on to state 
 that the Russian Army has now 2,320,000 men. France 
 must keep hers up too. Why ? And what was already 
 the latter's ? " Greater in all the principal units than that 
 of Germany," says General Buat. Without assistance from 
 Belgium, a standing army of 910,000.* 
 
 The mischief-making Russian paper continues : " We 
 have, moreover, carried through a great reform. We 
 have projected and begun to build a whole network of 
 strategic railways to concentrate the army as quickly as 
 possible." 3 
 
 Imagine the effect of such language upon a smaller popu- 
 lation, some of whose principal cities were distant but the 
 march of a day or two. Imagine a standing army of more 
 than two million Japanese at Toronto or Montreal. Would 
 New York be calm ? Especially if there were about 800,000 
 fine hostile troops on the south ? And then, how immense 
 are our distances compared to those of Europe ! 4 Would 
 
 ' Bourse Gazette. Baron Rosen admits that this journal was semi- 
 official and that the article was inspired by " the irresponsible recklessness " 
 of SukhomlinofE, Minister of War. 
 
 ^ See the surprising figures in Chapter X from his L'Armie AUemande 
 pendant la guerre. 
 
 3 The article is quoted more at length in Chapter XIII. See also 
 Appendix G. As to the Russian Army, Jofire visiting Russia in 1913 pro- 
 nounced their force " the mighljest army in the world." Appendix G. 
 
 4 So plain to Germans had the intention of Russia to attack them become 
 that their apprehension wa^ said to be a reason why they must have hurried 
 the war and provoked it, but the facts in Chapter XII wiU not bear this 
 out. It might with as much justice be said that the French hurried the 
 war because the opposition there to the three-year military service was 
 growing beyond control in 1914. 
 
32 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 London be calm with a French army of that size in Scotland 
 even in times of peace ? ' 
 
 The Belgian Minister at Paris also informs his Home 
 Office that the warlike spirit of the French arises from their 
 confidence in the revision of the army.* It was in this con- 
 fidence that the President Poincare felt he could talk noisily 
 of foreign policy to a banquet of eighteen hundred persons 
 at Nantes in October 1912, a speech which, coming from 
 the President of France, had a disquieting effect on Europe. 
 
 It is no wonder that the Russian Ambassador at Berlin 
 advises Sazonoff that the Germans are beginning to regret 
 with bitterness this state of things, and are pointing to France 
 as the one " guilty of any future armed conflicts." 3 As 
 early as 1912 the Russian Ambassador at London, in writing 
 to his Home Office, felicitates his chief on the " mighty navy " 
 which Russia would have in a few years. 4 
 
 Nobody was more confident in the situation, nobody 
 more full of assurance, than M. Poincare. SazonofE was 
 right when he spoke of him as having no fear of responsi- 
 bility. Not for a moment did Poincard even pretend, at 
 the outset of the war, that France was unprepared. On 
 the contrary, in his address of August 4th, after the German 
 declaration of war, he exultingly assured the extra session 
 of the French Parliament that " France was watching, as 
 alert as she is peaceful. She was prepared, and our enemy 
 wiU meet on their path our valiant troops." S 
 
 I cannot refrain from giving at this time more of these 
 surprising communications, for they have been only lately 
 revealed, most of them, and they come indeed as a rude 
 awakening to many good people who believed not only that 
 France was unprepared, but that she was merely a parti- 
 
 > The confidence of the French war department even in 191 2 was expressly 
 communicated to St. Petersburg by the Russian Ambassador. Russia and 
 France they were sure would take care of themselves. Livre Noir, p. 326. 
 
 » Dip. Rev. 
 
 3 Ent. Dip., p. 671. This book is a compilation of more than eight 
 hundred communications between Russian diplomats and St. Petersburg. 
 They were given to the world in 192J by de Siebert, former Russian chargi 
 d'affaires at London, and have been printed in Berlin and in the United 
 States late in 1921. SazonofE has had to admit their genuineness. See 
 L' Humanite, January 28, 1922, and Kolnische Zeitung of January 26th. 
 
 4 Ibid., p. 650. 
 
 5 French Yellow Book, 158. 
 
MARTIAL FRANCE 33 
 
 cipant through the necessity of her alliance with Russia or 
 by the German invasion. 
 
 Baron Beyens, the Belgian Minister at Berlin, complains 
 to his Home Office about these French inflammatory dis- 
 courses, which place little Belgium in so dangerous a 
 position. 
 
 At the head of the grumblers is M. Tardieu, the political editor 
 of Le Temps, who omits no opportunity of attacking Germany's policy 
 and all those who are trying to bring about the rapproachement between 
 the two countries.' 
 
 And as late as April 24th of 1914 he tells his Home Office 
 of a conversation with the French Minister, Jules Cambon. 
 The latter, he says, sees the hand of Isvolsky in the Russian 
 and French newspapers, and is hoping that this intriguing 
 diplomat may soon be sent to represent the Tsar at London.^ 
 
 And Baron Guilliaume, the Belgian Ambassador at Paris, 
 writes to his Home Office on the 8th of May as follows : 
 
 There is no doubt that the French nation has become more 
 Chauvinistic and self-sissured during the last few months. Those 
 who two years ago expressed fears on the bare mention of possible 
 difi&culties between France and Germany have now changed their 
 tone, are proclaiming the certainty of victory, lay great stress on the 
 .improvements in the French Army, which is true enough, and declare 
 themselves sure of being able to hold the German Army in check long 
 enough to allow Russia to mobilize, concentrate her forces, and throw 
 herself on her Western frontier. 3 
 
 I ask again what must have been the effect upon a country 
 like Germany, so exposed to invasion by an overwhelming 
 army. The Russian Ambassador at Berlin will tell us how 
 the Germans felt on March 12, 1914 : 
 
 The growing military strength of Russia is causing even more 
 serious anxiety in Berlin. In the opinion of German Government 
 circles the new heavy siege artillery in Russia will be finished in igi6, 
 and from that moment Russia will step into the field as a most for- 
 midable foe with whom Germany will have to cross arms.4 
 
 He adds that Germany is straining every nerve and in 
 
 « Dip. Rev., p. 28. • Ibid., p. 288. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 292. « Ent. Dip., p. 711. 
 
34 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 his opinion is trying to appear not afraid, and that the 
 German fear of Russia is general. 
 
 They had been working together even on the details of 
 their plans, the French and the Russians, for several years. 
 The Russian Ambassador at Paris advises his Home Office, 
 October ii, 1911, that he has talked to Barere of late on 
 that subject and has been informed of the latest plans that 
 the French General Staff were working out, the technical 
 details of which he " presumes are already known at Petro- 
 grad." 1 Even when the French cleared up matters with 
 Germany concerning Morocco in 191 1 they went on with 
 preparations for war and kept the Russians well advised. 
 " I know from a sure source," reports Isvolsky in February 
 1912, " that in spite of the happy adjustment of the Morocco 
 crisis, the war department continues active preparations for 
 miUtary operations in the near future." * 
 
 At times the Russians foimd an obstacle in Paris, as 
 when for instance the Premier was Caillaux. Then they 
 reported the outlook as depressing, but it was not depressing 
 upon the appearance of M. Poincare, with whom, on Sep- 
 tember 12, 1912, Isvolsky reports a conversation. The 
 faithful Poincare assured him of the French loyalty to the 
 Tsar in these terms : 
 
 If a conflict with Austria should involve Germany's armed inter- 
 vention, France will at once recognize it as a casus foederis and will 
 not lose a minute in fulfilling her pledges to Russia.3 
 
 Then SazonofE 4 in the same month made his famous 
 visit to England where, in a confidential chat with Grey, he 
 informed him of the Russian naval agreement with France, 
 under which agreement the French fleet would look after 
 Russian interests in the Mediterranean. He asked if England 
 would do Russia the same service in the North by keeping 
 the German fleet off the Russian coasts in the Baltic. Grey 
 
 " Ent. Dip., p. 607. 
 
 » " Le department de la guerre continue a le preparer activement a des 
 operations militaire dans un proche avenir," Isvolsky from Paris, February 15, 
 1912, Un Livre Noir, p. 194. The Libraiiie du Travail is pubUsbing a very 
 exhaustive collection of the Russian files, many documents from which 
 are not in the de Siebert book. They humorously call it " The Black 
 Book." The second volume Is not yet issued. 
 
 3 Revealed in the Russian Pravda in the summer of 1919. 
 
 4 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
MARTIAL FRANCE 35 
 
 replied without hesitation that " England would do everything 
 to inflict the heaviest blow on German power." i 
 
 We look at each other in astonishment at some of these 
 revelations, so deeply was it our behef that this war was 
 a sudden blow at nations utterly unprepared. More sur- 
 prises have to foUow, one of which is that of the three great 
 powers, Germany was actually the least prepared.^ In a word, 
 our misinformation was universal, fundamental, complete. 
 
 But there is one comfort left us. The Enghsh are the 
 least vindictive of nations. A war finished successfully is to 
 them a war forgotten. The most practical and unemo- 
 tional of races unfailingly seeks, after the peril is past, the 
 real truth of its own record and what may be said for the 
 other side. No less a person than Lloyd George has 
 generously summed up the international mistakes which 
 brought about this war : " The more one reads memoirs and 
 books written in the various countries of what happened 
 before August i, 1914, the more one realizes that no one 
 at the head of affairs quite meant war. It was something 
 into which they glided, or rather staggered and stumbled." 3 
 
 Just before the war Sir Thomas Barclay, whose nego- 
 tiations with France over the Moroccan question had given 
 so much satisfaction to his countr3anen, told us : 
 
 Wedged in between France and Russia, with England dominating 
 all her issues to the outer world, her frontiers open to all the political 
 winds that blow, Germany has a geographical position which forces 
 her statesmen to listen with an anxious ear to any movements, projects 
 or combinations of her neighbours. 4 
 
 It is pleasant to quote another just Briton upon the 
 geographical peril of Germany. 
 
 ' Pravda revelations of 1919. There was, though, no naval alliance 
 of England with Russia, and on just what situation Grey, if he said this at 
 all, meant to act is not clear. 
 
 2 See Chapter X for the details. 
 
 3 Addressing the Empire Parliamentary Association, December 23, 
 1920. Various utterances of this statesman on this question have been 
 called contradictory. To me they do not appear so. In January before 
 the war he told Englishmen frankly that Germany required and did not 
 have an army proportioned to her geographical insecurity. After the war 
 began he was persuaded that German was guilty of conspiracy. This he 
 said at a time when, so far as I can see, he had no knowledge of the EngUsh 
 military collaboration and the extent of the Franco-Russian preparations. 
 After the war he was among the first and most generous, knowing then as 
 I think all the facts, to admit that Germany was not wholly to blame. 
 
 4 Thirty Years' Reminiscences, p. 256 (April 1914). 
 
86 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 We who live behind the ramparts of the sea know little (except 
 in times of panic) of the fear that besets a state which has no natural 
 frontiers and which has to reckon with three great rival empires on 
 its borders.' 
 
 That vivacious writer and shrewd observer. Price Collier, 
 who furnished us so entertaining a book upon England, 
 reminds us that Germany, though in size a fourth less than 
 our State of Texas, has to take care of 4,570 miles of frontier. 
 " Let us be fair," he says, " and admit that if Japan were 
 where Mexico is and Russia where Canada is, and Germany 
 separated from us by a few hours' steaming, certain peace 
 talkers would have been hanged long ago." * 
 
 Now, the restoration of Europe depends upon the ques- 
 tion whether the guilt of bringing on this war was solely or 
 only partly the guilt of Germany. That sixty millions of 
 people in the heart of Europe will not pay the whole charge 
 of this war as deliberate culprits without ultimate resistance 
 is certain, if, as they contend, those who seek to collect the 
 awful penalty are guilty, too, in part. Equally is it clear 
 that if the people of the Allied countries continue to think 
 that the French Government was not at all in fault, they 
 and their present Governments wiU insist upon every dollar 
 imposed by a treaty signed for a nation in hunger. In the 
 opinion of many wise men, this question is at the fovmdation 
 of any enduring peace. 
 
 The reader, having already perused some things which 
 apparently are not widely known in this country, may take 
 a view of what I think wiU convince him that the Republic 
 of France has also been to blame for the world catastrophe. 
 I believe I can make plain : 
 
 First : That the alliance of France and Russia was 
 unnecessary to the safety of France and was hostile to the 
 peace of Europe, by its inviting into Western Europe an 
 overwhelming mass led by irresponsible men who aimed at 
 extending there an irresponsible government and a shameful 
 despotism. 
 
 Second : That France deliberately and continually armed 
 Russia and encouraged her aggressiveness against Germany ; 
 
 ' Rose s Germany in the Nineteenth Century, p. 16 (1902). 
 » Germany and the Germans, pp. 416, 424 (1913). 
 
MARTIAL FRANCE 37 
 
 that French policy was continuously directed to creating a 
 favourable opportunity for war upon Germany to regain 
 her lost provinces, disintegrate Germany as she had kept 
 her disintegrated in previous centuries, and resume her old 
 place at the head of European affairs. 
 
 Third : That the German armaments were, beyond all 
 question, made necessary by the enormous and wholly 
 unnecessary increases in Russian armaments. 
 
 Fourth : That the Serbians were among the most infamous 
 people in Europe, that Russia had no regard for Serbia other 
 than to extend her own empire into the Balkans, and that 
 Russia desired to break up, through Serbia, the Austro- 
 Hungarian Empire, a result that would have left Germany 
 helpless against Russia later. 
 
 Fifth : That the war sprang out of Russian ambition in 
 the Balkans and in nothing vital to the French whatsoever, 
 and that France could have stopped Russia at the outset 
 by telling her that she would not support her Balkan ambi- 
 tions, because Russia would not have gone into the war 
 unless supported by France, which country immediately 
 advised her that she would support her. 
 
 Sixth : That Germany did everything possible to avert 
 the war after discovering that Russia actually would go to 
 war and France support Russian ambitions in the Balkans, 
 the Chancellor imperatively and repeatedly requesting Austria 
 to acquiesce, and the Kaiser personally imploring the Tsar to 
 stop, and that England, though embarrassed by previous 
 relations with the French and Russians, also exerted herself 
 to prevent war, but that the French Government did nothing 
 whatsoever to restrain Russia. 
 
 Seventh : That the Russians, finding themselves certain 
 of French support and possibly of English support too, 
 pushed, at first by stealth, and then openly a general mobi- 
 lization ; that they brought two millions of well-equipped 
 troops toward the German frontier and refused, after reason- 
 able notice from Germany, to stop the mobilization ; that 
 France and Russia knew that they could ultimately drive 
 England into the war, because England could not risk the 
 conquest of France by Germany under any circumstances, 
 and that Italy would not aid Germany at all. 
 
38 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Eighth : That Russia wanted a war, that France knew 
 that Russia wanted a war, and that the Government of 
 Poincare did all that was possible to lash up the people of 
 France against Germany before the war because his Govern- 
 ment believed that the combined forces of France and 
 Russia, especially if aided by England, were invincible. 
 
 Ninth : That the French and Russians, neither of them 
 surprised but on the contrary long prepared, went into the 
 war at the height of their overwhelming strength, the French 
 Army being alone equal to that of Germany and the fully 
 equipped part of the Russian much larger. 
 
 Tenth : That if the war had ended successfully for 
 Russia, the best part of Central Europe would have been 
 absorbed by her ; that France during the war actually made 
 a secret treaty to that effect ; that the Germans were com- 
 pelled to resist with enormous loss the spread of the Slavs 
 into Western Europe and have contributed to its protection ; 
 and that the English, compelled by sheer miUtary necessity 
 to save France from defeat, have suffered incalculably in life, 
 trade and wealth. 
 
 Eleventh : That France should bear a part of the gross 
 losses of Europe and proportionate reduction in her claims 
 under the Treaty of Versailles to restore the economic balance 
 of Europe. 
 
 Twelfth : That the policy of France ever since the peace 
 has been such as must inevitably drive Germany into some 
 combination with the Slavs, notwithstanding the hatred of 
 the Germans for that race and their historic struggle against 
 it during the last five centuries. 
 
 A single telegram from the French Government to the 
 Russian would have prevented this war, a simple telegram 
 warning Russia that France would not support her in a conflict 
 concerning the Balkans when Russia herself was not attacked 
 by the Central Powers, neither of which had even mobilized 
 against her. Germany had not mobilized at all. One such 
 message, I repeat, would have saved civilization its catas- 
 trophe, for the Russian Grovernment at the outset had stated 
 that it would not venture into this war unless " secure ol 
 the support of France." ' 
 
 t » British White Paper, 17. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE REAL ROOT OF THE WAR 
 
 The women of France having long refused to increase the 
 race, the French national policy after 1871 should have changed. 
 It did not change. France was determined through her wealth 
 to be a power of the first rate by importing Muinfericar.jace 
 into the conflicts of Western Europe. Rather than be STpowCT 
 of the second class, she dedicated Europe to blood by an 
 alliance with Russia. Now that Russia has collapsed, France, 
 to the infinite anxiety of Caucasian nations, is pursuing the 
 same course to-day by organizing vast armies of blacks in 
 Africa, a course so unjust to Europe and so cruel to the blacks, 
 hauled to the cold North to be hacked in wars of which they 
 cannot conceive the cause, that England rightfully opposes 
 in France any form of navy that can protect the transport of 
 negro armies across the Mediterranean.^ 
 
 When we discuss the Russian alliance, it will be shown that 
 France sought it not only without provocation from Germany, 
 but after repeatedly repulsing friendly advances by the latter, 
 and after the Kaiser had twice spared her when she was at 
 his mercy.* 
 
 As to preventing the war, I began my inquiries in the belief 
 that of the three members of the Triple Entente, England was 
 chiefly at fault, but I am clear now that the fault of England 
 was far the least. England at an early stage might possibly 
 have prevented, but Russia and France were determined to 
 
 ' So startling from a military aspect is the French enthusiasm for their 
 African negroes that I have set out in Appendix F General Mangin's recent 
 eulogium on their social excellence and mental equality with the whites. These 
 ideas cannot be taken lightly. Mr. Ray Stannard Baker in the New York 
 Times of February 12, 1922, has just thrown most interesting light on 
 Clemenceau's violation, by private order to the secretaries, of a clear agree- 
 ment with Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson that colonial blacks be 
 used only for colonial defence. It is a case of startling bad faith. See 
 Appendix F. 
 
 » See the chapter, "The Peace Record of the German Empire." 
 
40 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 have a war. Once the latter powers were resolved on war, 
 England could not stop them. 
 
 That the English Foreign Office counselled deeply with 
 France before the war can of course be no longer denied by 
 fair-minded men. Yet there was this difference between the 
 French and the English policy, that the former was an active 
 creation of combined attack on Germany whenever favourable 
 occasion should arise. The Enghsh, though vigilant, were 
 passive. Indeed, a very great body of the English were 
 exceedingly cordial to Germany, with whom trade relations 
 were vast and mutual. 
 
 But most important to be remembered is that, no matter 
 whether England should wish war with Germany (and in my 
 opinion only a few there desired that) France had the power 
 to drag England in spite of herself into such a war. The 
 fundamental truth must be borne in mind that England could 
 not afford to see France conquered by Germany, any more 
 than Germany could afford to see Austria conquered by Russia, 
 whether the ally be right or wrong. This the French politicians 
 knew. On this they counted. A more explicit arrangement 
 they of course desired, and that was wisely denied them, but 
 still they felt reasonably sure that England would have to 
 support them in the long run. This Russia also exultingly 
 felt. 
 
 France, in my opinion, dragged England into this war. 
 We shall see how she armed Russia until the latter became 
 as dangerous as she was unscrupulous ; how she forced Germany 
 to arm against Russia ; how it became certain that Russia 
 would some day assail Germany. In the latter event, France 
 would gladly join Russia, and England would have to partici- 
 pate on the side of France. Grey's policy, consequently, though 
 open to grave criticism, did not in my opinion change the 
 ultimate result caused by the arming of Russia by France. 
 The two latter powers would have their war with Germany 
 sooner or later, aided by England if possible, but if not aided 
 by her, then without her.i 
 
 ' M. Alfred Pevet concedes that France should have refused to mobilize. 
 That writer says the war became " Europeanized " when France took that 
 step. " By its mobilization, on which depended Germany's action in the 
 West, the position of Belgium, the final decision of England, the attitude, 
 present and future, of Italy and Roumania, Europeanized the war, made 
 
THE REAL ROOT OF THE WAR 41 
 
 As to the conferences between the English Foreign Office 
 and France, these were subject to ratification by the English 
 Parliament. The conferences indeed were secret, and when 
 revealed on the eve of war, several members of the Cabinet, 
 including Lord Morley, resigned. This question I discuss 
 later. 
 
 So far as the English people were concerned, they were in 
 a state of happy ignorance. The story of thoughtless Mr. 
 Britling was a probable tale. All stood astounded in England 
 because none knew of the tremendous military preparations 
 of the three allies.' 
 
 The responsibility of England will be examined in a separate 
 chapter.* To dwell upon it now is not necessary, for it is in 
 France that the impartial student of these tragic events wiU 
 find the beginning of the European catastrophe. Long did 
 her intrigues, her love of revenge, and her baleful alliance with 
 half-Asiatic Russia precede any contributions of England to 
 the final animosities. It is France that created the situation 
 which caused armament to follow armament, both on land and 
 sea. It is France that disdained the voice of Tolstoi against 
 this baleful union, France that shut her ears to the protests 
 even of student bodies in Russia that ventured, at no small 
 peril to themselves, to warn her against strengthening the 
 hands of a despot. 3 
 
 To France is due the excited appetite of the Vladimirs, 
 the Cyrils and the Rasputins, vile creatures controlling millions 
 of men and finding in war the certain, quick gratification of 
 their lust for money. It was by war and not by peace that 
 Russian depotism could exist. 4 Once possessed of a mortgage 
 on the French Treasury, she could be stopped by no power 
 through peace and persuasion, and after getting her first 
 
 the dream of St. Petersburg a reality." Les Responsables de la Guerre, p. 453. 
 I have insisted that France should at least have remonstrated against the 
 Russian mobilization. I may be in a bargain to stand by a man in a quarrel, 
 but should I not counsel him to avoid it ? 
 
 ' Recent books by Lord Haldane and Earl Loreburn, the former in the 
 secret and the other not, have revealed relations contrary to the traditions 
 of the English people. 
 
 > Chapter XIII. 
 
 3 In Chapter VIII will be found considerable quotation from Tolstoi's 
 remarkable pamphlet holding up this treaty to mockery and scorn. 
 
 4 See Dr. Dillon's analysis of this inherent feature of the Russian political 
 structure in Chapter VII. Russia was the natural enemy of every Western 
 neighbour. 
 
42 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 milliards from France she got in truth a mortgage on the 
 rest. I 
 
 In fine, if it shall appear that France has after all been 
 in whole or in part to blame for this horrible catastrophe, 
 we are met by a question both present and practical- In what 
 light shall her costs of war and her claims for indemnity be 
 reviewed ? Hitherto it has been assumed that she has not 
 only not been to blame, but was assailed in spite of herself 
 and contrary to every possible expectation. 
 
 In the final accounting, France must bear her share of the 
 blame for this appalling war. Terrible was the day when she 
 pledged her youth and threw open her Treasury to a Tsar of 
 Russia. War on Germany by Russia was from that time a 
 certainty. From that sad day the German military party 
 possessed not only an excuse, but could boast of an obUgation 
 to arm. What would England, for instance, do if across the 
 Scotch border there were one hundred and fifty million Irish, 
 an independent nation, supplied from the Treasury of France ? 
 What would we do in the United States if there were a like 
 number of Japanese on the Canadian border, supported even 
 by no other Treasury than their own ? Opposition to armament 
 would be called treason. No Government could stand that 
 should do less than prepare the highest force to face the 
 possibility of war on two fronts.* 
 
 How little did we know, at the outbreak of the war, the 
 real situation in Europe. I remember that, when I first 
 mentioned to a friend the dangerous position of Germany 
 between two great powers with no natural frontier, he did 
 not immediately see what I meant. 
 
 This man had never thought of Russia as cause of worry 
 to Germany. Not at all. A hundred and fifty millions of 
 
 I A sad but amusing story is told by Shelking, formerly secretary of 
 the Russian embassy at BerUn. He relates that on the Russian collapse 
 of 1905 Witte sent Kokowtzofi to Paris for further loans, where he met the 
 violent opposition of Clemenceau, then Minister of the Interior. KokowtzofE 
 finally threatened to throw Russia into that bankruptcy which would achieve 
 the ruin of the previous French investors. Clemenceau afterwards remarked 
 to Shelking : " ' This KokowtzofE of yours is not a minister, he is a black- 
 mailer of the first water,' ' but,' adds Shelking, ' Clemenceau had to agree 
 to the loan.' " Recollections of a Russian Diplomat, p. 270. 
 
 » The Russian offer of disarmament through a Hague Conference is 
 clearly proved to have been disingenuous, a trick. See Chapter V. Had 
 Germany ever dismantled that wonderful war machine on the promises 
 of Vladimirs, Sazonoffs and Sukhomlinoffs, she would have been lost indeed 
 
THE REAL ROOT OF THE WAR 43 
 
 an utterly different race, a large part of them as near to Germany 
 as New England is to New York, or Liverpool to London, why, 
 what of that ? A war on two fronts ! Had the Germans been 
 conjuring that up too ? Yet after we ourselves went to war, 
 this very man was fretfully anxious lest the Germans break 
 through a wall of fire and steel, cross the Atlantic, and assail 
 New York. In the same way during profound peace people 
 on our Pacific Coast fret about every new Japanese keel, worry 
 about the navy of a smaller power four thousand miles over 
 the sea, and even persuade themselves that we should prepare 
 against the landing of its infantry. 
 
 These people must at least consider the German proximity 
 to Russia and how we should regard a standing army of several 
 millions on the other side of the Canadian border, absolutely 
 subject to the orders of a despot, who could fling them into 
 the bosom of our country without other authority than his own, 
 with perfect secrecy until time for action, or even without so 
 much as a parliamentary vote of supplies. 
 
 To-day, three years after the overthrow of her enemies, 
 France justifies her keeping up a powerful army, the largest 
 ever maintained by either France or Germany in a time of 
 peace, through fear of Russia which, she teUs us, may yet 
 assail her over a disarmed Germany, tells us of her fears of 
 distant Russia, fallen, stricken Russia, of Russia without a 
 transportation system, of Russia exhausted by years of war. 
 If France really thought a substantial army still necessary 
 after the disarmament of Germany, 250,000 would surely 
 have been ample considering that she had millions of seasoned 
 soldiers in reserve, and a complete machine, which Germany 
 no longer had, to call them into action. Besides, she would 
 have the instant appUcation of the blockade again by England 
 to Germany. 
 
 In the words of Lord Loreburn : " There can be no question 
 that the Franco-Russian Alliance caused great uneasiness 
 in Berlin, as it naturally should, for the besetting apprehension 
 of German Governments had been a combination against them 
 of France and Russia. The German people have always 
 dreaded it." ^ 
 
 Is no account to be taken of what Germany feared from 
 
 • How the War Came. 
 
44 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Russia in her strength, Russia armed with the treasure of 
 France, Russia separated from Germany only by a few miles 
 of open plain, Russia hostile to Germany and in alliance with 
 France ? 
 
 For my own part, with no kindly remembrance of the 
 arrogant martinets who strutted in the Friedrichstrasse or 
 Unter den Linden, I have coolly reflected on the conditions 
 that brought them into existence and caused their own people 
 to tolerate them, until I have no doubt from the perusal of 
 innumerable books and documents that had this war not 
 occurred in 1914, it would have occurred within two years 
 more from the determined policy of the Russian court. 
 
 The Franco-Russian Alliance was formed in 1892, when to 
 the immemorial dislike of the Russian people for the Germans 
 was added a growing conflict in the policies of their Govern- 
 ments. It was celebrated with offensive pomp both in Russia 
 and in France, with such unparalleled festivities ' as 
 characterized no other alliance between nations and as conveyed 
 without mistake to the people of Germany the ill meaning 
 behind it. Russia was determined to have the Dardanelles 
 and so much of Germany on the Baltic as she could obtain.* 
 France was to be again a leader among nations, even if Europe 
 were to be deluged in blood. 
 
 Since in the twenty-one years that preceded that alliance 
 not one provocation had been given France by Germany, and 
 both Holland and Denmark, whose territories would be of 
 infinite value to Germany, had continued safe beside her 
 during long years without support from a half barbarous 
 host pressing on Germany from behind, we may ask, why did 
 France seek such an alliance ? In that deplorable union will 
 be found the beginnings of the recent war. Russia insatiably 
 expanding westward at last found an associate behind the 
 wall ; the Vladimirs, the rotten Cyrils discovered treasure 
 indeed to wallow in, fattening themselves and preparing their 
 armies for war. 
 
 The French, says a popular American professor of history, 
 " have been ready for a war with Germany whenever they 
 
 ' See Tolstoi's account of these revels in Chapter VIII. 
 
 " How much Russia expected in 1892 is not exactly clear. However, 
 she lived in a succession of wars, and in 1916 made plain to her partner her 
 terrible demands in Western territory. See The Secret Treaties, Appendix D. 
 
THE REAL ROOT OF THE WAR 45 
 
 saw a chance for the last forty years." ' This fact, perfectly 
 obvious to every well-informed traveller, seems not to be in 
 the mind of that numerous class among us who during the recent 
 war have so often had upon their lips a certain little sentence, 
 always uttered in exactly the same number of syllables : 
 " Germany, you know, has been preparing for this war for forty 
 years." With the truth of this last exclamation nobody can 
 quarrel, for Germany was always prepared and existed as a 
 nation only because she was always prepared. The provoking 
 thing is that nobody considers that France and Russia too 
 were also thoroughly preparing during many years indeed 
 before this war, and were actually better prepared than 
 Germany when the war broke out.» 
 
 Let us -ask ourselves again how France behaved herself 
 after the himaihation which, by the unanimous voice of 
 historians, she brought on herself in 1870. 
 
 No longer increasing her population, France should have 
 composed herself like Holland, like Denmark, and like Sweden, 
 to a modest position in the world's affairs. Those states had 
 once been great, proud and strong, but when they fell from 
 eminence they did not fall to degradation. These wiser peoples 
 resolved on husbanding their blood ; they counted upon 
 retaining their national boundaries by skilfully avoiding in 
 future the irritating of their neighbours. To be sure, it is no 
 pleasant thing for a nation to come down in its way of living, 
 just as it is unpleasant for an individual to drop the company 
 of the rich, but as self-respecting men prefer plain living to 
 living beyond their means, so Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, 
 self-respecting, law-abiding nations, assumed the simpler 
 station, have been happy, and have not been despoiled.3 
 
 But the simpler station among nations would never be 
 sufficient for Frenchmen. The incorrigible activity of her 
 public men, their love of the military French past, their 
 exultation in driving along boulevards which take their names 
 
 ' Albert Hart in The War in Europe, p. 139. 
 
 ' See the chapter on "Allied Preparedness." 
 
 3 I do not overlook here the Schleswig-Holstein affair of 1864. Nobody 
 claims that Prussia was there wholly in the wrong, for a large part of the 
 population was German, preferred German rule, and has been allotted to 
 Germany even by the recent adjustment during the war. It seems to me 
 that Dr. Demburg's explanation of this affair in the New York Times of 
 October 5, 1914, is conclusive. 
 
46 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 from the humiliation of outside nations, all combined to make 
 the rational course of peace and simplicity impossible. France 
 must again be queen of nations. 
 
 War in Europe became from the day of the alliance of 
 France with Russia a certainty. The only question was, how 
 long could it be deferred ? Germany must forthwith increase 
 her armaments in self defence, increase proportionately the 
 general uneasiness, and cause a coimter increment in the 
 arms of other powers. No man in his senses can doubt, who 
 has read the history of Russia, that she would sooner or later 
 have a war of conquest against Germany, and France it is 
 clear would rejoice at the opportvmity.^ 
 
 Children may believe otherwise. Those who think that 
 because France has a multitude of thrifty and peaceful farmers 
 she speaks with the voice of the peasantry on foreign policies, 
 may be credvdous, but those who know her international 
 career wUl not be trustful. The latter will think of Bonaparte, 
 of Louis Napoleon, and of Boulanger, suppressed only through 
 fear of Germany. They wiU think of Gambetta's maxim that 
 France should always think of 1870 and never mention it. 
 They wiU think of the statue of Strasboiorg in the Place de la 
 Concorde covered with perpetual mourning to blow the zeal 
 of fiery striplings. They will think of the intriguing Delcasse, 
 the kisses exchanged with the chief despot of the world, 
 militarism gone mad in the perjuries against Dreyfus, the 
 lenity shown to the murderer of the reaUy great Jaurfe, who was 
 shot because he wanted peace. They wiU think of CaiUaux, 
 trampled on because he, too, wanted peace. 
 
 Equally will thoughtful men recall the humour of French 
 poHticians, the striking temperamental difierence between 
 the intellectual and the working classes. In no other country 
 is this difierence so marked. In England, in our own covintry, 
 the same degree of prudence and self control appears in the 
 governing classes as in the multitude. The Roman gravitas 
 pervades Englishmen from the public commons to the Houses 
 of ParUament, the deUberateness of a race accustomed and fit 
 to rule.^ Our own representative bodies are equally a just 
 
 " To quote Professor Hart again, " Every Power in Europe knew that 
 if Russia went to war with Germany, France would attack on the West." 
 
 ' Even Ireland to-day appears absolved from Macaulay's " reproachfully 
 pointed at by all who either feared or envied the greatoess of England." 
 
THE REAL ROOT OF THE WAR 47 
 
 average of the prevailing common sense, of a temper quicker 
 indeed than that of Britons, but of a people who have a contempt 
 for hasty action in high place. 
 
 Of this calmness in government the French have little. 
 Either of two things is true ; the French are very subject to 
 emotional appeal or they leave their government to men who 
 are vain, jealous, and inconstant. To an Englishman the 
 French Parliament is an intellectual mob. 
 
 The French Republic has been tried the last forty years 
 under circumstances exceedingly favourable, under popular 
 though unjustified apprehension of Germany. This appre- 
 hension has imposed self restraint upon French pohticians. 
 The shadow of the German eagle, they exclaim in those beautiful 
 rhetorical phrases of theirs, has been over them these forty 
 years, but are we quite sure that the fear of the German eagle 
 has not been a good thing for France ? May not the Republic 
 have grown more solid under that fear, even though their own 
 contentious disposition increased the apprehension ? 
 
 How long did the Republic last under Bonaparte ? As 
 soon as Bonaparte could win foreign victories the French fell 
 to adoring him and rejoiced in the emperor. When did France 
 settle down to the arts of peace ? Only when all Europe in 
 her rage had crushed her lying and invading Bonaparte. But 
 what did France do with her next Republic, France, the lover 
 of liberty ? Within a year or two after she had entrusted the 
 adventurer Louis Napoleon with the title of President she again 
 surrendered the republic to a tyrant and adored the emperor 
 who repeatedly came back from successful invasions. It 
 was the terrible right arm of outraged Germany that restored 
 France to sanity under that wanton prince. But did France 
 even then settle down to actual peace and recognize her true 
 situation ? No. 
 
 Consider the true temper of French politicians, their vanity 
 in oration, their love of the dramatic, their petulance in high 
 place, the sudden resignation after flights of patriotic declama- 
 tion, the hysterical accusation, the frenzied reply. Consider 
 that the average Ufe of a French cabinet has been since the 
 foundations of the Republic little more than a single year. 
 
 Consider their screaming Press, of which one journal 
 charges another with accepting bribes from foreign Powers, 
 
48 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 while all assail public men with catlike ferocity and with 
 shameful tales of private or public dishonour. The French 
 Press, it is proper to observe, has none of that partial in- 
 dependence which ours has from advertisements. It depends 
 on an immense and yet not very profitable circulation to begin 
 with, and then chiefly on subsidies from financial sources, 
 notably from such syndicates as the Financial Publicity 
 S57ndicate, which floats, with some Government encouragement, 
 the loans of friendly foreign powers. In the Caillaux trial, 
 the extent of these subsidies was terribly exposed. It is a 
 vicious Press, that of Paris. ' 
 
 For example, in the month of November 1921 the British 
 Government was compelled to ask France, upon whose soil so 
 much English blood was poured out for her safety, to restrain 
 her journals from continuous derision and contempt of the 
 Government of England. 
 
 I mention again the venality and vicious temper of the 
 French Press, because in popular government newspapers have 
 a particularly dangerous power, and the uses that they could 
 be put to by Russian agents in Paris are most obvious. Indeed, 
 we are not without proof of such activities. 
 
 The Russian Ambassador assures his Government in July 
 1912 that his " energetic personal influence on the principal 
 French newspapers " has had a desired effect. In August of 
 the same year the Russian charge d'affaires, worried about an 
 article in the Echo de Paris, contrived to have the thing cor- 
 rected in an invented despatch from London through the 
 Havas Agency. ^ When the Credit Lyonnais desired to make 
 a loan to Buda-Pesth, the Russian Ambassador found a way 
 to stop it. 3 
 
 The vigilant Russians had also a Chief of Police for France, 
 who in a report of May 1914 says he was able to forestall 
 adjustment of a dispute among the stockholders of the Austrian 
 Southern Railway by an article in the Echo de Paris, and that 
 
 ' It is difficult for Americans to realize of what vilification they are 
 capable. Terrible charges are made on mere suspicion and without proof 
 whatsoever. Frenchmen often assert that, if it had not been for England, 
 France would have been the supreme influence in the world. Those who 
 think that had best compare the temper of Paris with that of London, or 
 ask themselves why the French newspapers, the best of them, are utterly 
 inferior to the wonderful dailies of England. 
 
 » EnU Dip., pp. 651-2. 3 Ibid., pp. 310-11. 
 
THE REAL ROOT OF THE WAR 49 
 
 when Austrian bankers hoped to get a holding in a new Serbian 
 railway, it sufficed for Russia to have it noised about that the 
 Russian group would not participate. This gentleman adds 
 in his information to his principals that " We must establish 
 a rule that we are not to leave France alone with the Austrians 
 in any question in any country where we have an interest." ' 
 
 Nor were the Russians satisfied with casual attention 
 to the Press. They had some journals on their regular list. 
 For instance, the Russian Foreign Office advises Isvolsky at 
 Paris on August 29, 1916, that Le Temps, already in the pay 
 of the Tsar, wanted 150,000 francs a year. " The paper is 
 already indirectly subsidized by our Minister of Finance and 
 the telegraphic expenses of its Petrograd correspondent are 
 paid by us." * 
 
 Never did the indefatigable Isvolsky leave the Paris Press 
 unfed ; their wants were ever on his mind. 
 
 I have established very good relations with the serious organs, 
 which has been of great assistance to me in the immediate instance, 
 but it is necessary to have in critical moments means to influence 
 rapidly the hungry pack of little ones.3 
 
 And a little later he advises the vigilant Sazonoff that while 
 he himself was succeeding in keeping the public from " false 
 impressions " by personal exertions on the Press, " Poincare 
 was taking similar steps and naturally more effectual ones." 4 
 But this corrupt minister gives us information still more 
 surprising. Referring to the Press again he says : 
 
 As you know, I don't myself get into the distribution of subsidies, 
 but this distribution, in which the French ministers take part {the Ministers 
 of Foreign Affairs and of Finance) is, as it would seem, efficacious and 
 accomplishes its purpose. For my own part, I try in every way to 
 influence the more important Paris journals like Le Temps, Journal 
 des Dibats, Echo de Paris, etc. 5 
 
 I Ent. Dip., p. 313- 
 
 » Quoted by the New York Nation, October 12, 1921, as revealed by 
 L'Humaniti of August 6, 1921. Le Temps was M. Tardieu's paper. 
 
 3 Isvolsky from Paris, May 23, 1912, Livre Noir, p. 259. 
 
 4 July 18, 1912 ; ibid., p. 300. " En mSme temps Poincar^ faisait des 
 demarches analogues et naturellement plus ef&caces." 
 
 5 December 18, 1912 ; ibid., p. 371. He adds : " En somme, la presse 
 parisienne d'aujourd'hui ne saurait Stre comparee a celle de 1908-9 ; je 
 dois surtout signaler I'attitude du Temps, qui se distinguait, il y a quatre 
 ans, par ses tendances austrophiles." 
 
60 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 I pray God that never shall an American Chief of Stafi 
 have to state his country's military position as gloomily as 
 Von Moltke in December 1912, surrounded on every side and 
 under the accumulating shadow of war.' Italy will clearly 
 not assist. He has so been told by the Italian Chief of Stafi, 
 and the promised Itahan Third Army that was so much 
 counted upon will not be available. Italy will hesitate, 
 ultimately drop out. As for France, she can put into the field 
 even a larger infantry than that of Germany.* The only 
 German superiority is in heavy artillery. The Russian Army 
 already grossly exceeds the German, is constantly being 
 increased, and cannot be equalled by German conscription. 
 On the seas England will be a certain adversary. This 
 memorandum of Von Moltke's is a simple, eloquent refutation 
 of the popular belief that Germany was overwhelmingly armed 
 by miUtary chiefs planning triumphant and easy conquest. 
 The language is the bare diction with which great commanders 
 have expressed themselves from the time of Caesar, no rhetoric, 
 no argument, nothing but a cold statement of appalling odds, 
 as to which he merely adds : " We do not approach our heavy 
 task with confidence." 
 
 Moltke's report was prepared under what appeared the 
 certainty of war with Russia in 1913 through the Balkan 
 conflicts. There were brutes, doubtless, at Potsdam, and 
 numbers of boastful men in uniform, but neither fools nor 
 blockheads were in command. 
 
 Far be it from me, in anything that I may say in this book, 
 to underrate the true character of the French people. They 
 are in my opinion the most intellectual in Europe. To the 
 versatiUty of the Italians they add a patience almost German 
 in research and all their contributions to human knowledge 
 they illumine with sentiment and imagination. Every depart- 
 ment of learning they have successfully explored. Their deep 
 scholarship accompanies their exquisite art. Nor has any 
 
 ' See his secret report in Document No. 23 of LudendorfE's The General 
 Staff and its Problems, vol. i, p. 57. I have set out most of it as Appendix A. 
 That it stated the truth is known now by everything that happened. 
 
 ^ Owing to her drafting a wider range of years and at times using the 
 three-year service France alone actually had at the beginning of the war 
 an infantry larger than that of Germany. See the frank statements of 
 General Buat and the standard statistics in my chapter on " Allied Pre- 
 paredness." 
 
THE REAL ROOT OF THE WAR 51 
 
 race exceeded them in flinging from the human mind whatever 
 weights have been hung upon it by rehgious bigotry or pohtical 
 tyranny. 
 
 The French literature is probably the richest in the world. 
 Lacking to be sure, such sublimities as Homer, Dante, Goethe, 
 and Shakespeare, and a genius so original as Swift, it neverthe- 
 less exceeds every other, ancient or modem, in variety of 
 excellence. France first brought the culture of Greece and 
 Italy to the West of Europe, and is to-day the last refuge of 
 polite literature. With what deUght do we peruse the M6rim^es, 
 Montesquieus, Daudets, Lamartines, F6nelons, Pascals, and 
 Sainte-Beuves of France ! Where can we find in our own 
 tongue an eloquent Rousseau, a melodious Chateaubriand, 
 the versatile, the trenchant, the sparkling Voltaire ? And 
 yet I have said nothing of that glorious line of writers in 
 comedy from Moliere to Labiche. To me France has always 
 been a coimtry of romance, always what their old Du Bellay 
 called " France mere des arts, des armcs et des lots." 
 
 But aU this does not blind me to the history of France, 
 its continual wars, its fretfulness in prosperous mediocrity, 
 its immediate abuse of power on acquiring it, its intolerable 
 habit of committing its government to impassioned orators 
 and to men of characters not substantial, i 
 
 The beauty of the French writers, their great number, and 
 the fact that five of us speak or read French to one who speaks 
 or reads German, have enabled them to appeal continuously 
 and disingenuously to the consideration of the world in many 
 circumstances where they have been gravely in error. 
 
 Let me illustrate. The fertile Tardieu prefaces his book. 
 The Truth about the Treaty, with a short sketch of France since 
 the year 1870. It is impossible not to comment on the heroism 
 which he attributes to France while she lived under the mere 
 superiority of Germany. With all his ingenuity he cannot 
 cite one circumstance of real hardship on his people before 
 the recent war. Yet he says France " nobly endured " the 
 
 ' We Americans axe credited with being somewhat emotional, but the 
 man has never risen among us who with the name of " The Tiger " could 
 possible get a high place in our Government. Indeed, our country has 
 always rejected great orators: Webster, Clay, Blaine, and Bryan. I may 
 add in much severer reproach, no man could rise to great heights in this 
 country who could boast of having driven the name of God out of the public 
 schools. 
 
52 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 situation. Nobly endured what ? It was a prosperous country 
 growing all the time in her colonies and accumulating great 
 wealth. What stronger phrase could M. Tardieu use if his 
 country had actually had fresh provinces wrested from it, its 
 citizens stolen away, its ships sunk at sea ? What France was 
 nobly enduring was her own discontent at not being again one 
 of the great powers of the world, her discontent at seeing 
 great nations consult without considering it necessary to submit 
 their plans to a Louis Napoleon or a Napoleon Bonaparte. 
 The Germans did not even forbid France in 1871 to maintain 
 again as large an army as she might desire, a prohibition 
 which aU Europe then would have gladly seen imposed upon a 
 country of continual wars.^ 
 
 And Tardieu is perfectly disingenuous in his way of stating 
 the French case. He leaves out, for instance, what he himself 
 has admitted in another book,* that the German Kaiser, in 
 his earlier years, did everything he could to be in friendship 
 with France, a fact sufficiently well attested for that matter by 
 other writers. Most remarkable of all, Tardieu actually 
 mentions the collapse of Russia in 1905, and complains of the 
 Kaiser's immediately speaking his mind about the celebrated 
 Moroccan affeiir. This writer boldly mentions the Moroccan 
 Treaty, which it has now been proved beyond all debate was 
 a deceitful performance on the part of M. Delcasse, who in the 
 same day made two treaties, one public and one private, the 
 latter giving the lie to the former and the former only being 
 exhibited to the German Government.3 
 
 Instead of allowing the Kaiser some praise for his having 
 spared France while the rest of the world expected him in the 
 helplessness of Russia to punish her, he actually mentions those 
 circumstances in which he spared her while upbraiding him for 
 uttering simple complaints against deceitful treatment. 
 
 ' The French have complained so loudly of the " severity " of the in- 
 demnity of 1870, that we may add to the foregoing Nitti's remark that 
 the Treaty of Frankfort was " humanitarian " compared with that of 
 Versailles. It did not strip France of its colonies or its fleet or control of 
 its transportation. Peaceless Europe, p. 64. 
 
 » France and the Alliances, p. 151. This book, of course, was written 
 long before the war. Ren6 Pinon, France et Allemagne, pp. 88, 89. The 
 latter writer also concedes the vast expansion of France under her colonial 
 policy deliberately encouraged by Bismarck, ibid., p. 57. Yet he complains 1 
 
 3 Morocco in Diplomacy (sometimes entitled Ten Years of Secret Dip- 
 lomacy). See my chapter " Morocco." 
 
THE REAL ROOT OF THE WAR 58 
 
 ' But these Frenchmen have our ear and^they will tell us 
 of their grievances. They will tell them in language which 
 we can scarcely resist. Those exquisite writers know how to 
 bleat and to bleat most tunefully. The wrongs which their 
 armies used to commit upon Europe they wholly forget, but let 
 them receive one injury themselves and it is never forgotten. 
 It is cast in immortal prose. As for M. Tardieu and his " nobly 
 endured," if nations had nothing harder to endure than France 
 had under Germany's forty-three years of peace, it would be 
 well for mankind. 
 
 To French politicians it is plain that " the German question " 
 was a useful thing, the advocate of rapprochement being always 
 at a disadvantage against the ranting preacher of wrongs, 
 and, as the Russian Army grew to gigantic size, it is noticeable 
 that the fiery class of speakers was permitted to inflame the 
 multitude in a way which public common sense in the earlier 
 days forbade. Caillaux was right. ' In 1914 had come again 
 the situation of 1870. There was a French Government that 
 wanted war with Germany. " For the Due de Gramont 
 substitute M. De Selves." 
 
 With what skiU does French hterary art beguile us to their 
 side of every question ! Since the Drej^fus scandal died down, 
 we have heard nothing more of that. It is the Zabern incident 
 of Prussian militarism that has been portrayed to us with so 
 much animation. Yet in the whole history of Prussian 
 militarism I doubt if one thing can be cited so terrible as the 
 former persecution in a time of peace. Dreyfus, an innocent 
 man, was conspired against by his fellow officers, whose 
 perjuries were supported by a military clique. When these 
 last were exposed and the sentence was sought to be reversed, 
 nearly the whole French people, including the overwhelming 
 bulk of the mihtary circle, combined to oppose the reopening 
 of the inquiry. "It is better that one innocent suffer than 
 that the dishonour of army officers be exposed." To prove him 
 falsely convicted by fellow officers was to dishonour the army.* 
 
 I repeat, it is reckless French pubhc men and their desire 
 to be again a great figure in the world that has brought on the 
 
 ' Mes Prisons. 
 
 « The French people deserve praise for restoring Dreyfus to Uberty, 
 but after what dif&culty and time was it achieved ! The nation is deeply 
 militaristic from sentiment and ancient glory. 
 
54 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 late catastrophe. In the Morocco incident ^ Delcasse delighted 
 in affronting Germany. The remonstrances of the latter 
 Power, it will be remembered, were sufficient to cause his 
 removal, since a great many public men in France believed he 
 had been grossly imprudent. No sooner, though, did he re- 
 appear in French poUtics than he made the Chamber resound 
 with his sneers at Germany, which was not attempting to crush, 
 and, though it had the power at that particular time, did not 
 crush his country. For the unreasonableness of his behaviour 
 we have the testimony of a Belgian Minister who, noting the 
 disagreeable effect at Berlin, remonstrates to his own Govern- 
 ment against this dangerous and offensive talk. Baron Greindl 
 says : 
 
 The speech bristles with illusions of a kind irritating to Germany. 
 When has M. Delcasse found Germany attempting to impose her 
 superiority upon the other nations of Europe ? We are her nearest 
 neighbours, and in twenty years I have never perceived the least 
 desire on the part of the Imperial Government to presume on its 
 strength and our weakness. When has the tranquillity of Europe 
 been menaced except by French dreams of revenge ? ^ 
 
 Here we have an impartial witness as to what it was that 
 France was, in the language of M. Tardieu, " nobly enduring." 
 The diligent people of France were really not conscious of 
 enduring anything hard. They were happy. They were 
 wonderfully prosperous. Why does this splendid race forever 
 turn over its Government to factious journalists, literary 
 dabblers, and men of fragrant volubility. M. Noir stabs a 
 cabinet minister with a new adjective and becomes an officer 
 of state. M. Blanc gets into a duel with M. Vert over an 
 adverb. Those who retire from cabinets embark in journalism 
 to assassinate their successors. They govern France to gratify 
 their vanity.3 
 
 As M. Tardieu is in my opinion one of those responsible 
 for the late war, I think some further comments may be 
 
 I See the chapter entitled " Morocco." 
 
 > Dip. Rev. 
 
 3 Goldsmith in his Traveller allowed the French a happy disposition, 
 which in one sense they have and another have not. In a pleasant way, 
 one might rather apply to this remarkable people what Gibbon in his boy- 
 hood journey said of the ancient Romans : "I am convinced that there 
 never, never existed such a nation, and I hope, for the happiness of mankind, 
 there never will again." Correspondence, vol. i, p. 67. 
 
THE REAL ROOT OF THE WAR 55 
 
 appropriate upon his book, The Truth about the Treaty. The 
 poUtical editor of Le Temps, it seems to me, is in an unenviable 
 position under the revelations of diplomatic documents that 
 his journal was under subsidy from the Tsar, nor has he, 
 I think, in some things shown himself grateful to our country. 
 This would perhaps be an immaterial circumstance in the 
 present discussion, were it not that every doctrine he is now 
 supporting in his published utterances would lead to another 
 war. He illustrates to my mind the militaristic tendency of 
 the existing French Government. With all his flow of words, 
 M. Tardieu has shown poor taste and httle gratitude toward 
 us. As late as 1921 he kept insisting that a promise had been 
 made by President Wilson to waive the French debt to our 
 country, insisting after repeated denials, until Secretary 
 Houston had to use toward him in the public prints language 
 equivalent to the he.' 
 
 In his present long book he practically ignores both the 
 English and American mihtary assistance to France. He 
 at least goes as far in that direction as delicacy permits him, 
 and as to Woodrow Wilson, whose very smile he once was 
 proud to receive and from whose presence, either at Washington 
 or Paris, he would emerge briskly mysterious, he now reminds 
 us that the Treaty of Versailles and the Armistice were not 
 made by an " American dictator." There is not in his whole 
 book one generous outburst of eloquence or anything more 
 than tepid compliment toward a Briton or an American. 
 
 I may note that since he reminds us that this treaty was 
 made by France, one cannot help observing that the French 
 want only so much of it as is profitable to them. The rest 
 they do not desire or obey, for instance, the exceedingly plain 
 requirement in the covenant of the League of Nations that all 
 treaties must be public and also filed with the Secretariat. 
 Before the ink was dry on this bargain, France made an 
 offensive and defensive alliance with Belgium, the terms of 
 which she refused to disclose, in downright violation of her 
 signature to the treaty. How much of the terms of the alliance 
 
 ' " From start to finish of the Peace Conference, President Wilson and 
 his advisers, without exception, opposed vigorously and finally any such 
 suggestions or proposition of cancellation. The question in one form or 
 another always arose. It was always ' stepped on ' by the American dele- 
 gation." What Really Happened at Paris, p. 289 (Mr. Lament's portion). 
 
56 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 has been extorted by the Secretariat to save appearances 
 perhaps M. Tardieu can tell. 
 
 How much we can rely upon his statements or his arguments, 
 we may judge from his treatment of well-known history. 
 With the usual recklessness of a Parisian journalist, he repeats, 
 for instance, Bismarck's " forgery " of the Ems telegram 
 when nobody knows better than he that this legend (as the 
 reader may easily see in Chapter IV of the present book) is 
 utterly exploded both by French and English historians. He 
 tells us that the frontiers of France have been wantonly violated 
 twice in fifty years without sajdng that his Napoleon III 
 declared the war of 1870 and hurried to invade Germany him- 
 self. In summing up the wrongs of France at the hands of 
 Germany he is practically unable to mention one in the last 
 fifty years, and concedes that in all diplomatic movements 
 of the last quarter of a century, France has had the better of 
 the manoeuvre. Of the infinite wrongs done by France to 
 Germany before the war of 1870, he is as silent as he is con- 
 cerning the provocations given by France to Qermany for 
 that war, too. 
 
 Lloyd George, he is sure, is to blame because France got 
 too little at Versailles. But he has at least the tact not to 
 repeat the insinuation which he made in an earlier book ' 
 that England had a habit of stirring up wars on the Continent 
 for an invariable profit to herself. My own recollection is 
 that England continually had to intervene in Continental 
 wars to save the Continent from the ambition of France. 
 But perhaps this is not the reason why M. Tardieu does not 
 repeat the unkind remarks in this respect which he made in 
 a book written some years before the recent war. 
 
 But the great evil of this gentleman's book is its attempt to 
 defy the infinitely superior arguments of the infinitely superior 
 Keynes. M. Tardieu woiold exact from a country exhausted 
 by four years of war and five of blockade what no great 
 economist has ever said Germany could pay, what great 
 economists have said she never can pay, and what her 
 very attempts thus far to pay have brought Central Europe 
 to an abyss, France aggravating the economic situation by 
 a most expensive army of occupation, and the moral situa- 
 ' France and the Alliances, p. 71. 
 
THE REAL ROOT OF THE WAR 57 
 
 tion by an unnecessary use of black-skinned troops over white 
 Europeans. 
 
 Walking early one Sunday morning in the Avenue des 
 Champs Elysees I approached, beneath chestnuts blooming 
 in the mild air of spring, the most imposing square in Europe. 
 All around me was peace, the silence broken only by the 
 twittering of the birds and the distant bells that called the 
 pious to prayer. There had been years without war, I reflected ; 
 surely the day of peace and common sense had come at last. 
 But what was that which, as I came upon it suddenly, stopped 
 my step and broke the pleasant dream ? It was the Monu- 
 ment de Strasbourg, still draped in mourning after thirty 
 years. A young French boy happening to pass it as I did, 
 I pointed to the black wreaths. " Oui, oui, Monsieur," he 
 exclaimed, " nous verrons, nous verrons." Yes, we have seen. 
 
 As I turned away, I said to myself, this is not peace. 
 
 Then something more came to my mind. There passed this 
 monument yearly tens of thousands of travellers who, knowing 
 little of history, were taking home and diffusing a sympathy 
 with France. Nobody will be at the pains to educate these 
 aright. Not one in twenty of them will ever know that Alsace- 
 Lorraine was stolen from Germany by a French king to begin 
 with, and that the Germans made no attempt to recover those 
 provinces until another French monarch avowed a policy of 
 preventing the union of the German States and until, upon 
 the flimsiest pretext ever used, he actually declared war and 
 ordered his armies to cross the Rhine."^ 
 
 ■ Even the most audacious French propagandists shrink from justifying 
 Louis Napoleon's war of 1870. The fluent Bainville, for instance, has to 
 dodge the year 1870 almost entirely. ,With equal delicatesse does B6rard 
 in L'Eternelle Allemagne steer his course around a shoal so dangerous. 
 
 But amid the swarm of infatuated partisans, hired pamphleteers and 
 subsidized editors there has always arisen in France an uncontrollable voice 
 of truth insisting upon the exposure of deceit. The reader who wishes to 
 pursue details of what has been rapidly sketched in my preceding chapters, 
 and is to be referred to again, may well peruse Dupin's Considerations sur Us 
 Responsabilitis (Paris 1921), the Bulletins Officiels de la Sociiti d'itudes 
 documentaires . The printing of the Isvolsky correspondence {Livre Noir) 
 was also a signal performance. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 OUR ILLUSIONS AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 
 
 It was in the Tiergarten I think, only eight months before 
 the Great War, that I saw last the German Emperor. William 
 II was then at the height of that renown which had spread 
 from the River Spree to the remotest fountains of the Yang-tze, 
 a monarch happy amid a happy people, and able to look back 
 upon a whole generation of Germans rejoicing under his rule 
 in the fruits of security and peace. 
 
 In that monarch I beheld Germany fully knitted together 
 after many unquiet ages, a spectacle, indeed, of grandeur. 
 At the mere frown of one man, I said to myself, inexhaustible 
 armies will pour into the field from the Baltic to the Rhine, 
 while the fleets of England flock homeward in alarm from 
 the four corners of the earth. Opposite his palace I could 
 see the most inspiring monument ever reared by sentiment 
 or power. In the centre of a colossal group the serene grand- 
 father of this prince was led by smiling Peace, but below, 
 at each angle of the pedestal, four mighty lions crouching 
 upon the emblems of Victory and War bellowed to North 
 and South and East and West the triumphs of Sadowa and 
 Sedan, glorying in the fallen eagles of Austria, and warning 
 the foes of Germany never to provoke again the furious paw 
 that felled the Empire of France. 
 
 Fuit Ilium et ingens gloria ! Can I without curiosity or 
 emotion compare what I then was glad to see with what now 
 the groans of nations compel me to behold ? Is it possible 
 that a mind' fond of inquiry should not seek the original cause 
 of a catastrophe so gigantic ? Was this the work of one set 
 of men ? Of one people ? Of one ambition ? What was 
 the Europe in which I was then travelling ? A region in 
 which one nation was armed while all the rest were peaceful ? 
 
 68 
 
OUR ILLUSIONS AT OUTBREAK OF WAR 59 
 
 No. Wherever I sojourned the gay uniforms went by, the 
 manoeuvre was preparing, the detestable cannon scowled. 
 All the races, all were armed. In every country of Continental 
 Europe youth was fed and drilled and praised and bullied 
 in the devilish art of destruction. 
 
 But if Germany reminded me of power, equally did it 
 remind me of peace. During forty-three years up to 1914 
 Germany alone of the Great Powers had not been at war, 
 though she possessed throughout the whole of that period 
 and up to 1913, the most powerful and mobile army in Europe. 
 Nay, more, in 1902 and in 1905 Germany had deliberately 
 spared France when her Russian ally was, according to 
 universal military opinion, absolutely helpless.' 
 
 It is a fair question to ask during what period in the last 
 three hundred years the French Government has remained at 
 peace with her neighbours while possessing the principal 
 military strength in Europe. 
 
 When, at the outbreak of the war, I sometimes suggested 
 to my friends that all the Powers were equally prepared, 
 they heard me with incredulity. Had not Germany suddenly 
 belched into smiling Champagne a host masterfully equipped 
 with every conceivable tool of battle ? Was not the voice 
 of Europe that of unexpected horror ? Had we not the 
 word of the AlUes that the stroke came like a thunderbolt ? 
 
 To-day, in the light of our new knowledge, one smiles 
 at any pretence that the Allies were surprised. The truth 
 we know at last. Governments have fallen, archives have 
 suddenly been laid bare, memoirs are issuing, and the stern 
 hand of the censor muzzles speech no longer. 
 
 That two great Russian armies, well equipped, began to 
 enter East Prussia within a fortnight after the declaration 
 of war ; that preparations between France and Russia for 
 simultaneous mobilization had long been complete ; that 
 France was to strike Germany with Russia and for Russia ; 
 that Russia had been prodigiously preparing every depart- 
 ment of her army for attack, that with vast French loans she 
 had been laying military railways to the German frontier ; 
 that by 1916 Russia would have had Germany, with the aid 
 of France, at a terrible disadvantage ; that England and 
 
 I See chapter on "The Peace Record of the German Empire." 
 
60 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 France had been in actual military collaboration for no less 
 than nine years, measuring through their general staffs, the 
 very vales near the Belgian frontier ; that the fleet of England 
 had been remodelled for battle and blockade against Germany 
 a decade before ; that even the British colonial heads had 
 been instructed to co-operate long, long in advance ; of all 
 these things we Americans were ignorant. It is only now, 
 as I shall narrate, that we know these facts, many of them 
 through the present candour of English statesmen. 
 
 One day in Washington, chatting with the wife of a 
 Frenchman of some rank, I congratulated her on the retreat 
 of the Germans from the Marne, and added my felicitations 
 that vast English armies were pouring into Northern France. 
 She shrugged her shoulders : " We are not rid of them yet, 
 you understand." I looked at her in amazement. " It is 
 our problem — after the war," she continued. For my part 
 I was tr5dng to find some words other than those of irritation 
 with which to continue the conversation, when her husband 
 took a seat beside us. 
 
 " Your wife," I said to him, " has just put an idea in my 
 head." Then I repeated her remark. Compressing his lips, 
 he looked grave, and when she had moved off, leaving us 
 alone, he whispered : " You understand that England is, 
 of course, our friend to-day. We adore England. France 
 is always grateful, but the war must end with a large part 
 of our territory in F;nglish hands. It is a problem — a 
 problem." 
 
 To the credit of the good people of France, be it said, 
 I did not always hear this kind of comment from Frenchmen ; 
 but I am sorry to say that I did afterwards hear it from 
 others of their race. 
 
 That a single intelligent Frenchman, however, should 
 make such a remark at such a time filled me with vexation. 
 Then I fell to reflecting on the French character. What is 
 the most notable characteristic of this able and peculiar 
 people ? What does one notice most in the French when 
 you have intercourse with them, when you deal with 
 their shopkeepers, or when you find them describing 
 their own manners in their unrivalled comedies ? In their 
 extraordinarily able women a scepticism as to human 
 
OUR ILLUSIONS AT OUTBREAK OF WAR 61 
 
 motives; in their men a sensitiveness, an undue quickness 
 to feel themselves neglected, that indefatigable change of 
 humour for which they have supplied our language with the 
 word, pique. This last weakness is in an individual of no 
 serious moment, but is big with the most terrible consequences 
 in those who have the power to fling army corps into the 
 field. 
 
 After the war there occurred in France a signal illustration 
 of this prevailing trait. 
 
 To President Wilson more than to any one human being 
 do the French owe our coming into the war. As for the 
 multitude in this country, though not pro-German, it still 
 voted for peace after the invasion of Belgium, after the 
 horrifjdng incident of the Lusitania, and after all the real 
 and exaggerated woes of the German invasion. A general 
 feeling prevailed that we could never settle satisfactorily the 
 quarrels of Europe. On an undeniable referendum of "He 
 kept us out of war," our people gave President Wilson three 
 million more votes in 1916 than they had given him in 1912, 
 raising him from a President by minority to a President by 
 majority.' 
 
 It was after this vote, following the most irritating acts 
 of the Germans, that he gave Bernsdorff his passports. More- 
 over, in his first term he had submitted to undeniable wrongs 
 from the Allies concerning mail and shipments abroad, and 
 had let us continue in that respect at a disadvantage clearly 
 useful, to them. 
 
 Whether this famous man erred before or erred after the 
 second election, one thing is clear, he was the last man in 
 the world whom the French ought to have grown impatient 
 
 ■ Mr. Wilson, whether or not he reflected the early sentiment of the 
 country, said to Congress on December 8, 1914 : " This is a war with which 
 we have nothing to do," and on December 7, 1915 : " We have stood apart 
 studiously neutral. It was our manifest duty to do so." Even at the 
 beginning of the canvass in 1916 he said : " No voice has ever kept coming 
 to any public man more audibly, more unmistakably, than the voice of 
 this great people has come to me, bearing the impressive lesson. We are 
 counting upon you to keep this country out of war." 
 
 It is a sad truth that our President was, when we declared war upon 
 Germany, in little better possession of the truth concerning its. diplomatic 
 origin than the rest of us. That he was ignorant of the secret treaties made 
 during our neutrality is confessed, and of course he could have had not the 
 remotest idea of what the Russian and even the Belgian archives were to 
 reveal. 
 
62 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 with. The best friend their country ever had was Woodrow 
 Wilson. Now let us observe their patience. 
 
 Do we not all remember the indescribable fervour of the 
 French toward Wilson when, after the Armistice, he first 
 reached their shores ? All the adjectives of Voltaire and 
 Victor Hugo were exhausted in his praise ; since the beginning 
 of the world there had been no other such man. 
 
 Unhappily our President felt under some obligations to 
 allow the Germans a fragment of the Fourteen Points, upon 
 which all had agreed with her to stop the war when she could 
 still repair to formidable defences upon her own soil. He 
 did not seek to keep all his promises, but he asked to keep 
 some. Instantly there was a change. France had trusted 
 the American President, and had been deceived. With 
 difficulty were journals full of diatribes against him kept 
 from his eyes. With difficulty were they persuaded to show 
 some continuation of respect to the guest of the nation. 
 The godlike Wilson had lost his halo. When, after the short 
 return to Washington, he landed again on the shores of France 
 he beheld bare wharves and streets deserted. He had not 
 understood that fine creature, Fraiice. No. He had just 
 discovered that France, or her Govermnent, was at heart 
 mihtary. He had discovered that at any cost she must have 
 " la preponderance legitime de la France." ^ 
 
 That the English, too, lost some of their temporary 
 admiration for Woodrow Wilson is true, but the Press of 
 that country had the decency to let him off without abuse. 
 They had a sense of dignity. No English newspaper, for 
 example, was ever guilty of such black ingratitude as the 
 Petit Bleu, which, as late as March 1921, complaining of our 
 Senate's refusal to vote an appropriation for an embassy 
 building at Paris, had the shamelessness to say : " Of all 
 the profiteers of the war, the Americans are the greatest, 
 or in the last analysis the only ones." * 
 
 Had we not aided France by sending a vast army over- 
 seas ? Had any other country ever done as much before, 
 
 ■ Thompson's Peace Conference Day by Day, p. 26. This book, which 
 has the prefatory encomium of Colonel House, is an entertaining narrative 
 of how President Wilson was defeated in his Fourteen Points by the foreign 
 diplomats, and chieily through the revengeful and none too scrupulous 
 Clemenceau. 
 
 » New York World, March 2, 1921. 
 
OUR ILLUSIONS AT OUTBREAK OF WAR 63 
 
 enlisted in another's cause, and when in no peril itself enforced 
 conscription for service across an ocean ? Had we asked 
 anything in return? Having multiplied our national debt 
 twenty-fold, had we asked a dollar of indemnity from the 
 conquered, a single contribution from our Allies ? We had 
 gone into the war the most lightly taxed of all countries. 
 We came out of it one of the most heavily taxed. ^ 
 
 The French have always assumed one thing, that the 
 people (not their leaders by any means) too generally beUeved 
 to be true — ^that this war was an attack utterly unforeseen ; 
 that it was utterly unprovoked ; that it was launched upon 
 nations utterly unprepared ; that Germany was wholly in 
 the wrong ; that neither France nor Russia was in the wrong 
 at all. Germany was, consequently, a bandit, an outlaw, 
 from which fact it became the duty of a people like ours 
 instantly to take up arms against her. Our dallying, our 
 debating, our hesitating, was cowardice and love of profit. 
 When at last we joined the Allies we did so from a sense of 
 danger. The French in consequence owed us nothing, except 
 reproaches for delay. 
 
 When I think of the noble host we sent abroad, when I 
 think of their bojdsh hope, their sanguine ardour to aid 
 mankind, when I think of the goodwill we hoped to bring 
 about, the lasting peace between nations that had hacked 
 each other in so many wars, I know that no army ever embarked 
 in pursuit of a purer glory. No, there never went to battle 
 legions with so little desire to bring back anything for them- 
 selves or their native land. It was not America we were 
 saving ; not one in a thousand beheved we were ourselves 
 
 ' While our national debt is now about twenty-three thousand millions, 
 the total cost of the war, so much did we tax ourselves while it proceeded, 
 was nearly double that, or, according to the formal estimates filed in the 
 Senate, March 5, 1921, forty-four thousand millions, that of Great Britain 
 fifty-one thousand millions. This was the gross cost, from which we had 
 small deductions by indemnities, the English ten thousand miUions. The 
 money cost of the war to each was, in the net, nearly the same. 
 
 To our public disbursements must be added private bounty to France 
 without parallel. Yet when in February 1922 we, after long patience, pro- 
 posed ultimate though very deferred repayment of the pubUc part, petulance 
 and discourtesy greet us in the French Senate, where a member cries out, 
 " Has Shylock passed to the other side of the Atlantic ? " Associated Press, 
 February 6, 1922. It was in that month or early in March that M. Loucheur 
 delicately reminded us that a good many people in France did not think 
 that France really owed us the loans. 
 
64 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 in danger. It was England that we would aid, France that 
 should not die. 
 
 Not since the Crusades has a soldiery gone forth with 
 a purpose so high. The Australians, indeed, as well as the 
 fine Canadians sets ail with lofty resolution, but still their 
 own flag was already under fire, their own empire liable to 
 fall. Not one American in a thousand, I say again, felt that 
 we were in danger, not one in a thousand doubted that we 
 could defend this continent against a victorious Germany.' 
 
 Woe to the administration which, had our national 
 sentiment of saving France been less, should have proposed 
 conscription for service overseas ! From one end of the 
 country to the other there would have been riots and tumul- 
 tuous meetings. I feel safe in saying that no administration 
 would have dared to enforce such a conscription statute 
 simply because it was a written law. What gave it vitality 
 was the romantic feeling, even of those who did not favour 
 the Allies altogether, that this was an opportunity for our 
 country, by one enormous exertion and sacrifice, to put an 
 end to war for ever. That was our dream. When it was 
 subsequently shattered, this bitterness was added to our 
 awakening, that those whom we sacrificed so much to save 
 believed us incapable of such a dream. 
 
 If there be any misunderstanding between ourselves and 
 the people of the Allies, it comes of the multitudes having 
 been in all countries uninformed of many details of the 
 growing friction between European Governments, facts which 
 had they been frequently disclosed, might have aggravated 
 or created the very evil. I say in all countries, though in 
 England truth was allowed voice which, before we went into 
 the war, she felt it essential to herself in the stress of war 
 not to impart to us, and which, after we went into the war, 
 we would not allow ourselves to hear. Of the first situation 
 a striking instance is Morel's Truth and the War, a book which 
 
 » In our military circles it was well known that the German fleet was 
 not bunkered for service across the Atlantic, or even for long cruises beyond 
 the North Sea, and in declining a share of them as prizes of war our Naval 
 Department included this reason. As for the plain people, so little did 
 they conceive of danger to our own shores that, during the war, I was advised 
 that the soundest argument to the multitude was not that this country 
 was itself in danger, but that it was our duty to support those already under 
 arms. 
 
OUR ILLUSIONS AT OUTBREAK OF WAR 65 
 
 it was made criminal to export to any neutral country, and 
 yet a book which England permitted to be printed, as an 
 Englishman's right, at home. 
 
 How utterly false were some of the beliefs which in the 
 early years of the war we deemed true as Holy Writ ! How 
 devoutly we beheved, for instance, that the other Govern- 
 ments were overwhelmed with surprise at the German 
 declaration of war ! We were positive they were surprised. 
 Had not many of us, travelUng in Europe, failed to hear a 
 word about any approaching danger ? How quickly did we 
 accept a story now utterly exploded ! 
 
 As to this error. Lord Haldane, Minister for War up to 
 the conflict, and then Lord Chancellor, tells us frankly that 
 he was ordered to prepare in 1905, when he first came into 
 office ; that he reorganized the British Army against war ; 
 that the Navy was put into unexampled condition ; that his 
 own staff and that of France went into collaboration as early 
 as 1905 ; and that he even advised the heads of the colonial 
 governments that they, too, should prepare themselves. » 
 In the view I take, the preparations by England were neces- 
 sary to a Government that would be brought into the 
 conflict between the others, should that conflict occur, but 
 it is well to be fair and see that the men at the head of her 
 affairs were not as surprised as her people. 
 
 The British War Office even sent over to France General 
 French, who relates the secret mission which he had there 
 years before the conflict,* and the lively Repington gives his 
 usual interesting details on this point, telling how surprised 
 the French were at the offer of EngUsh military concert 
 when he came upon members of their staff practising a little 
 war game of how to invade England. 3 
 
 Then there is Earl Lorebum, a member of the War Cabinet. 
 This distinguished man has written a book, in which he shows 
 that the arrangement with France was kept a secret for 
 years even from part of the Cabinet, 4 to say nothing of Parlia- 
 ment, where Grey always eluded his questioners. Indeed, 
 
 » Before the War, pp. 48, 181. 
 
 » " 1914." P- 4- 
 
 3 Diary, vol. i, pp. 4, 10. I refer to this book as " Diary," though the title 
 is the First World War. 
 
 4 How the War Came, pp. 78-81. 
 
 5 
 
66 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Lorebum's book is written for the very purpose of showing 
 that this power in the English Foreign 0£&ce of making inter- 
 national bargains in secret is a bad power. 
 
 The EngMsh make no pretence that they were surprised. 
 A book by Captain Wright, assistant secretary of the Supreme 
 War Coimcil, equally disabuses our minds of the impression 
 that the Allies had not prepared. He informs us that the 
 reason why he preferred Sir Henry Wilson for Chief of the 
 Imperial General Staff was that Sir Henry had prepared for 
 this war aU his life. " He had been over the ground on 
 which it was to be fought time after time on his bicycle." ^ 
 There is also Sir Julian Corbett's summary in his Naval 
 Operations that, " Given the scale which we dehberately chose 
 to adopt, there is no doubt that the machinery for setting 
 our forces in action had reached an ordered completeness in 
 detail that has no parallel in history." 
 
 There is, besides, the book by a former Member of 
 ParUament, a Mr. Neilson, who very early pointed out that 
 the preparations of France and Russia for war vastly exceeded 
 those of Germany both on land and sea,* and that the greater 
 preparations of France, Russia, and England were seldom 
 mentioned. 
 
 Thus one of our most sacred suppositions was aU wrong. 
 The Allies were thoroughly prepared. But there was another 
 thiag not to be doubted. The German Army at aU events 
 was perfect, always at maximum strength. " They had 
 been preparing for this war for forty years." Now, here 
 again we were wrong. It was easy to have figured the thing 
 from the Statesman's Year Book, or any good statistical 
 compilation, but let us at last have the truth from an eminent 
 EngHsh reviewer and authority on German affairs in 1912.3 
 
 How great the neglect of the German Army has been and how 
 insufficient its strength can be shown to any layman. Germany has 
 a population of 66,000,000, France of only 38,000,000. From these 
 figures we might conclude that Germany would have a standing army 
 
 ■ At the Supreme War Council, p. 39. Wright is one of the most pleasing 
 writers produced by the war. Some of the passages in his book are so 
 eloquent as to create a wonder why his profession was not literature. 
 
 » How Diplomats Make War. See Chapter X, infra. 
 
 3 J. EUis Barker in the Nineteenth Century, June 1913. See Repington 
 strongly to the same effect in Chapter X. See the full details in the chapter 
 on " Allied Preparedness." 
 
OUR ILLUSIONS AT OUTBREAK OF WAR 67 
 
 at least fifty per cent, larger than that of France. However, a glance 
 at the reference table shows that the standing armies of France and 
 Germany are nearly equal. The German war material also is scarcely 
 up to date. The miUtary outfit of France is superior, according to 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Bezel of the French artillery and many other 
 experts, the German artillery is inferior to the French. The tactics 
 of the German army have become antiquated. 
 
 It is observable, too, that this contemporary critic is 
 comparing Germany simply with France, and not stating 
 what further allowance she ought to have against the combina- 
 tion with Russia. 
 
 We all remember another story that the Germans had 
 had a Crown Council on July 5th, nearly a month before the 
 war, at Potsdam, where all the heads of both the Austrian 
 and German ruling families, together with their military 
 chiefs, assembled and decided on war. No story seemed to 
 us more satisfactorily proved. Had not the German Wangen- 
 heim told our own minister at Constantinople about it, 
 giving Morgenthau the very details ? We all know now that 
 this Wangenheim was romancing, or was repeating a story 
 that was spread over Europe, and even part of Germany, 
 and which is as hard to get out of the heads of the multitudes 
 as the story that President Wilson encouraged the Czecho- 
 Slovakian cause so zealously because Masarsky's wife was 
 a sister-in-law of President Wilson's wife.' Will the people 
 never accept what has so often been set right, that Roosevelt 
 did not charge up a certain hill in Cuba ? He was for years 
 the hero of the wrong hill. We still have, too, the Battle 
 of Bunker Hill. 
 
 That there was a Crown Council on July 5th is discount- 
 enanced by Sir Horace Rumbold, British charge d'affaires at 
 Berlin during all that month of July, a diplomat surrounded 
 by those who kept him informed of the movements of all 
 royal personages, and by Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British 
 Ambassador at Vienna. Rumbold's opinion was that no 
 resolution for war was taken by the Germans until the 29th 
 of July, or a day or two after the beginning of the Russian 
 mobilization.' 
 
 > See Bass, The Peace tangle. 
 
 « See the ofi&cial English pamphlet. Outbreak of the War, by Oman, 
 pp. 16 and 17 (1919). M. Poincarfe apparently abandons this story too. 
 The Origins, p. 175. 
 
68 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Bethmann-Hollweg tells us that he himself attended the 
 so-called Council at Potsdam on July 5th, that none of the 
 Royal Austrian personages were there, nor any of the German 
 royal personages, except the Kaiser, nor any military experts 
 or chiefs at aU ; that the Kaiser and he had luncheon with 
 the Austrian Ambassador, who handed the Kaiser the well- 
 known personal commimication of the Emperor of Austria.' 
 He further says that the slightest inquiry will show that all 
 these great chiefs and royalties were not only not at Potsdam, 
 but could not at that time even have been in Berlin. Von 
 Moltke, Chief of Staff, and Von Tirpitz, head of the Navy, 
 were both at watering-places.* 
 
 We Americans in truth know nothing of European 
 politics. Take the case of Sweden. People in this country 
 were exceedingly vexed because the Swedes dvuring the war 
 were in a degree pro-German. Why should they not have 
 been such, at least at the outset of the war ? Was not 
 Russia the inevitable geographical enemy of Sweden ? What 
 would have happened to Sweden if Russia had prevailed in 
 the war ? The fate of Finland. And the Swedish intuition 
 and knowledge of the situation have proved correct, for, 
 as we have seen,3 and shall see again, the Russians were, by 
 a secret treaty with France during the war, to have Central 
 Europe very largely at their disposal, and their obUgation 
 to Sweden dishonoured. If we had even known a little of 
 the European situation we could have divined this reason 
 in the Swedish attitude. Russia wanted to reach the warm 
 Atlantic. The weakest obstacle in her way was Sweden. To 
 the Swedes accordingly Germany was a degree of protection. 
 
 Then there was the Lichnowsky story, a story true enough 
 in so far as it tended to prove that there were military mad 
 men in Berlin, as there were in several other countries, who 
 dearly longed for war, but a book clearly wrong in its attempt 
 
 ' Reflections on The World War, p. Il8. 
 
 » Professor Fay's searching article already cited destroys this tale. But 
 what better shows its absurdity than the Kaiser's departure to the Norway 
 coast immediately after it ? He had resolved on war against two, and 
 some insist three, of the principal nations of Europe, and yet he goes off 
 where none of his great chiefs could be conferred with ! Impossible ! Russia 
 and France alone would engage the utmost strength of Germany fighting 
 on two fronts. Nevertheless we preferred to add the very departure to his 
 offences by calling it a part of a conspiracy. 
 
 3 Chapter I and Appendix D. 
 
OUR ILLUSIONS AT OUTBREAK OF WAR 69 
 
 to prove that the Government of Germany was bent on war. 
 Not only is his story disproved by subsequent revelations, 
 but It bore at that time so many frailties on its face that had 
 It not been favourable to the side we then favoured ourselves 
 it would have been punctured by every country editor in 
 the land. 
 
 Now that we have been able to see below the surface, 
 that Lichnowsky was at odds with his Home Office and dis- 
 posed to injure it, and that he was little less than an ass, 
 it seems incredible that a man in his position could be 
 ignorant of what was so general around him, so soon revealed, 
 and so hostile to his own country. He tells us that on a 
 visit to Berlin a short time before the conflict he found 
 Bethmann-HoUweg worried over the Russian armaments, 
 yet he admits that he assured the Chancellor that there was 
 no cause to worry about Russia, since Russia could have 
 no reason to quarrel with Germany. This man apparently 
 had not noticed what all the diplomatic world was talking 
 of, that Russia was building military railways to the German 
 frontier and raising a vast army with French money. More- 
 over in this book ' he confessed that " In Petrograd the saying 
 was that the road to Constantinople lay through Berlin." 
 Just before, in the year 1913, a war between the two countries 
 had been prevented with the utmost difficulty. 
 
 This fooUsh fellow, as late as the ist of August, 1914, 
 the day when Germany declared war on Russia, actually 
 telegraphs to the Chancellor asking whether Germany would 
 let the French alone if France would remain neutral. One 
 can scarcely keep from laughing. So absurd was his sugges- 
 tion that the next day he had to cancel it because the folly 
 of it had been made plain to him by the English Foreign 
 Office itself.* 
 
 For everybody knew that France would in such a situation 
 instantly attack Germany. Grey had been told this by the 
 French Ambassador three days before in plain words 3 ; nay, 
 more, Grey had already told this same Lichnowsky that even 
 
 ' The Guilt of Germany, p. 13. 
 
 » See the correspondence in Schreiner's The Craft Sinister, p. 64. See 
 Chapter XIII and the I-ondon Daily Telegraph of November 11, 1921, as 
 to the confusion he created in German military circles. 
 
 3 British White Booh, 87. 
 
70 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 if Belgium were not invaded England would probably not 
 stay out of the war.i Nor did this Ambassador appear to 
 know that the Enghsh fleet had been recalled from manoeu- 
 vres and kept assembled for war as early as July 27th.* Did 
 Lichnowsky suppose that this fleet was to be used on the 
 side of Germany ? Schreiner relates that he had it from 
 one well informed that on the eve of the catastrophe the 
 German miHtary attach^ advised Lichnowsky that the 
 Enghsh fleet was being put in condition for war, and that 
 the Home Ofiice should be advised of this ; whereupon 
 Lichnowsky said he did not wish to create trouble between 
 two countries who were at peace. Von Tirpitz relates that 
 in the spring of 1914 Lichnowsky assured him that there 
 would be no trouble with England ; the rapprochement was 
 growing ! 3 
 
 However, the truth is we fell into such a rage that we 
 wanted to believe Germans to be demons. To the truth we 
 come back to-day reluctantly. We almost hate to have 
 Lord Haldane remind us that the " Germans and the Enghsh 
 resemble each other more than they differ," 4 and to hear 
 Mr. H. G. Wells say that everybody who is not crazy knows 
 that man for man the Germans are very Hke the Americans, 
 the Enghsh, the French, and the Itahans,5 and to read the 
 British Ambassador's address at Princeton, in which he 
 stated that " Germany was being forced into a position in 
 which she almost had to fight," a conclusion upon her 
 economic situation, but a concession that would have been 
 regarded at one time as no less than treasonable.^ Equally 
 is it odd now to hear Earl Lorebum say that he feels some 
 sympathy with the Germans for what they had to suffer 
 from the repeated invasions by the kings of France. 7 
 
 Then there was our behef that this war was entered upon 
 by France as a war of democracy against autocracy. Yet 
 the slightest reflection ought to have shown us the absurdity 
 
 I British White Booh, 89. 
 » Ibid., 47. 
 
 3 Von Tirpitz, My Memoirs, vol. i, p. 309. 
 
 4 Before the War, pp. 26, 40. 
 
 s His article in the American newspapers, November 1921. 
 ^ Sir Auckland Geddes, June 15, 1920. New York Times of the following 
 day. 
 
 ' How the War Came, p. 251. 
 
OUR ILLUSIONS AT OUTBREAK OF WAR 71 
 
 of this. If it was ever less than absurd, it was not less than 
 absurd at the outbreak. Think of it ! The most absolute 
 despot in Europe, the despot most disdainful of the people, 
 the most surrounded by a corrupt and tyrannous aristocracy, 
 had the greatest army of aU against the Germans. Let us 
 think what would have happened to Europe if Russia had 
 won this war. All Scandinavia would have shared the fate 
 of Finland, the better part, and perhaps all, of Germany 
 would have gone to the Tsar, who would have extended an 
 absolute autocracy to the Rhine. But at that time, no. He 
 was the good Tsar, and all his drunken relatives were good 
 men, gentle fellows too, who had felt a great change come 
 over them for the better when they wished to have us join 
 them in the war. It is a sorry business to think of the noble 
 young Frenchmen and Enghshmen that feU to aid those 
 scoundrels. One does not know whether to weep or to 
 laugh because such idle tales were believed. 
 
 And aU this was propaganda. The most curious thing 
 is that most of it began before the war, a precaution we can 
 now realize from experience, but which at that time would 
 have been regarded as ridiculous. 
 
 Let us hear what that stout anti-German, the learned 
 Dr. DiUon, states about the preparatory propaganda. DiUon, 
 though he hated the Germans, knew that Russia was a danger- 
 ous Power to encourage. As to his efforts to educate his 
 cotmtrjmien, though, he says he met with nothing but dis- 
 couragement. Everything counter to friendliness to Russia 
 was, he says, thrust aside as malevolent or unfounded. 
 He says he tried to have laudatory statements about Russia 
 corrected, " and more than once systematic efforts were put 
 forth to have me punished by the Tsar's Government for my 
 temerity." This author depicts the adulation of the French 
 Press for the Tsar Nicholas and their exaggerations of his 
 personal and pubUc reforms. ^ 
 
 Bertrand Russell tells us the same thing,* for he says : 
 " So long as enmity between England and Russia was desired, 
 our newspapers were fuU of the cruel treatment meted out 
 
 ■ Dillon, Eclipse of Russia, pp. 231, 232. Dillon, being in Russia as 
 i correspondent as well as semi-diplomatist, was doubtless made uncomfort- 
 able for the efforts he describes. 
 
 » Proposed Roads to Freedom, p. 144. 
 
72 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 to Russian political prisoners, the oppression of Finland and 
 Russian Poland, and other such topics. As soon as our 
 foreign policy changed, these items disappeared from the 
 more important newspapers, and we heard instead of the 
 misdeeds of Germany." 
 
 No wonder there were in France many people suspicious 
 of this glittering alliance with Russia, which might prove so 
 much more profitable to that coimtry than to France, at 
 the expense of inestimable French blood and money. These 
 people wished to know more, but they were cried down. 
 The really great Jaurfes was finally shot under the rage lashed 
 up against him by the newspapers, some of which, we know 
 now, were under partial subsidy from Russia. The treaty itself 
 with Russia had been a secret since the year of its making. ' 
 
 It is actually true that young Frenchmen went to battle 
 not knowing whether the treaty called them out for their 
 Government or for the Government of Russia, and the brilliant 
 orators, especially Viviani, were determined that nobody 
 should know that it was after aU a Russian affair in the 
 Balkans, or, as Earl Loreburn says of the whole thing, " a 
 Russian quarrel into which we were led by being tied to 
 France in the dark," pointing besides to Sir Edward Grey's 
 famous war speech, where he admits that this conflict did 
 not originate in anything that was vital to France. ^ 
 
 Indeed, Grey had reminded the French Ambassador of 
 this in an interview a few days before the fatal First of 
 August, and Cambon had replied that France would join 
 Russia " if she were attacked," without adding any quaHfica- 
 tion as to the cause.3 At that stage the greatest man in 
 France would have hesitated to tell the French people plainly 
 that if Germany and Russia went to arms over the Russian 
 policy in the Balkans, France would join Russia, though not 
 attacked herself. 
 
 So carefully did the French Government conceal the 
 treaty of 1892, that in 1914 it was still imknown in its terms. 
 As will be seen later, M. Poincare informs us now that Viviani 
 
 » The negotiations were begun in 1891 and took definite form in 1892. 
 Ratifications continued for two or three years, but we may regard the treaty 
 as that of 1892. To Viviani's boast that this treaty bore the signature of 
 France, Dupin makes the terrible retort that 600 members of Parliament in 
 Paris had never been able to see it. La Guerre Infernale, p. 63. 
 
 » How the War Came, pp. 221-3. ' British White Paper, 87. 
 
OUR ILLUSIONS AT OUTBREAK OF WAR 78 
 
 brought it down to the French Parliament after the German 
 declaration of war, and kept it in his pocket, only to produce 
 it if demand should be made, and not producing it because 
 the declaration of war by Germany, made necessary by that 
 very document in his pocket, put the people in a humour 
 when they no longer cared or had time to debate ! ' 
 
 In no country was the multitude let into the vital secret. 
 For instance, the thoughtful Viviani kept out of the French 
 Yellow Book, which was supposed to state to the French 
 the faultless behaviour of their Government, that the Tsar's 
 Foreign Minister had, a week before the German declaration 
 of war on Russia, thanked the French for the support which 
 France was to give to Russia,* This telegram was considered 
 infelicitous. It was deemed unfair to the French people to 
 let them know the truth. It was considered more delicate 
 to suppress as far as possible the whole story that the Russian 
 mobilization was a prior mobilization, that honest Russia 
 had really started the mobilization which precipitated the 
 war, for the French people knew what mobilization meant 
 in a region so compact as Europe, and would regard the first 
 general mobilization as really the first declaration of war. 
 
 Above all things did the French Yellow Book and the 
 Russian Orange Book both omit that upon the Kaiser's per- 
 sonally imploring the Tsar in the last days to stop the Russian 
 mobilization until a conference could be had, the Tsar ordered 
 his military chiefs to wait, but that they lied to him, first 
 concealing that the mobilization was general, and, second, 
 going on with it after he told them to stop. This, though 
 perfectly well known to both the French and Russian foreign 
 offices, was not revealed to the world until after the Russian 
 Revolution, when that scoundrel SukhomUnofE was brought 
 to trial at Petrograd and confessed.3 
 
 Accordingly, even in 1917, a French " Committee for the 
 Resumption of International Relations " had the courage to 
 issue pamphlets pointing to such cunning in the heads of 
 their Governments. These pamphlets appear to me to be 
 
 ' See Chapter XIV. 
 
 ' The telegram is set out in the German White Book of 1919 on " The 
 Responsibility for the War," Part XX. The latest exposure of this conceal- 
 ment is in Bulletins Officiel de la Sociiti, etc., April 1922, p. 2. 
 
 3 See the English official book of 1919 called Oman's Outbreak of the War. 
 
74 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 unanswerable. They denounce Viviani's charge in his war 
 speech that this war by Germany upon France was wholly 
 unprovoked. On the contrary, they show that France was 
 simply the tool of Russia. " It was our secret treaty with 
 Russian Tsardom, the Russian Alliance, and that alone, which 
 dragged France into the war." ^ The treaty was never pub- 
 lished imtil after the war had made its dangerous terms 
 unimportant. It was then produced in a special Yellow Book. 
 This Yellow Book and treaty must not be confounded with 
 the special treaty of 1917, secretly made for the partition of 
 Central Europe. On that no comment has issued from the 
 Quai d'Orsay. 
 
 Moreover, we know that before the Germans declared war 
 upon France they put the question to her whether she would 
 be neutral in the war that was then coming on between 
 Germany and Russia, whereupon France made the evasive 
 reply that she would do whatever best concerned her interests.' 
 
 Then there was the theory that the war was begun to 
 protect the rights of small states, the rights, for instance, 
 of Belgium. We were told that England went into the war 
 just for the sake of Belgium. This, too, was beUeved like 
 Holy Writ. Now Sir Edward Grey himself never claimed 
 that. On the contrary, in his war speech of August 3rd he 
 justified the English intervention on the groimd that the 
 German violation of Belgiimi made it necessary for England 
 to intervene in her own interests. It was a good reason, too. 
 Belgium was England's eastern frontier in a military sense, 
 or she certainly had a right to caU it such. England had a 
 right to go to war against Germany on that invasion because 
 her own safety was concerned, a matter solely for her own 
 judgment. But this plain and sensible reason would not 
 suflBce after the passions of war were once let loose. 
 
 So we went on giving that as the ideahstic motive, though 
 in the debates in Parliament at the outset of the war all 
 agreed, as to the old guaranty of Belgian neutrality, that 
 both Gladstone and other EngUsh ministers had refused to 
 
 ' See quotations from this clrculax in the 4th edition of Morel's pamphlet, 
 Tsardom's Part in the War, p. 18. 
 
 ' France mobilized, by way of answer, on the ist of August. Germany 
 and Russia were then at war. The placards announced that the mobilization 
 was not for war but for peace ! Dupin, Considerations, etc., p. 8. 
 
OUR ILLUSIONS AT OUTBREAK OF WAR 75 
 
 interpret it as a guaranty which must be enforced by England 
 under any and all conditions. For it was plain that, there 
 being other guarantors who might go directly contrary to 
 England, the latter might have to fight them all, should her 
 obligation be considered unqualified. The intelligent body 
 which Sir Edward Grey was addressing was too well informed to 
 be deceived on that point, and it came to this, that Grey argued, 
 and properly argued, that it was in the interest of England 
 to protect Belgium as a part of the English national defence. 
 
 Thus we were in a foohsh rage with Bethmann-Hollweg 
 about his expression " scrap of paper." What he meant 
 was that the English themselves would not regard the treaty 
 as any sacred and solemn obligation at aU, that they never 
 had so regarded it, and that they would be acting now simply 
 from their own business interests and not from any lofty 
 idealism. Perhaps I can test this thing in a simple way. 
 Suppose Germany had respected the neutrality of Belgium, 
 that England had stayed out of the war, and that France 
 had been the one to violate the neutrality of Belgium. Does 
 anyone suppose that England would then have declared war 
 on France ? Of course not ! 
 
 I am not now justifying at all the invasion of Belgium 
 by the Germans, but it is well to remind people that we 
 surrounded ourselves with ideahstic arguments which had 
 no real basis in the minds of those who were at the heads 
 of these gigantic transactions. ^ 
 
 Lastly, on this point, we also forget that Grey refused 
 to assure the Germans that, even if Germany should respect 
 the neutrality of Belgium, England would stay out of a war 
 between Germany and France,* and since the war no English 
 writer has pretended that she would have done so. 
 
 It is no condemnation of a nation's Government that in 
 so momentous a thing as war it looks to its own interest. 
 It is not necessary to demand of a Government motives 
 exalted and sacrificial. 
 
 With war propaganda we must of course have much 
 
 ' See Stowell's Diplomacy of the War, pp. 454, 621. 
 
 ' British White Book, 89. " Some Englishmen greatly err as to 
 the reasons that forced England to draw the sword. . . . Our honour and 
 our interest may have compelled us to join France and Russia, even if Ger- 
 many had scrupulously respected the right of her small neighbours." 
 London Times, March 8, 1915. 
 
76 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 patience, for, as we say of business, war is war, and when 
 nations struggle for their existence, we must expect them 
 to use pohcies that are not very frank. What we must protect 
 ourselves against is the believing that all is truth that was 
 created by propaganda. We must endeavour to realize the 
 greatness of this propaganda. In any careful inquiry into 
 this subject we must question everything we formerly accepted 
 as fundamental truth. 
 
 For my part I have always tried to be patient with the 
 AUied propaganda. What vexes me is that the AUies at the 
 time they were conducting it denied us our undoubted right 
 of mail communication with Germany, an injustice which, 
 it may be added, our own Government made little attempt 
 to overcome. We were never in a position after the war 
 began to hear the other side, and the Allies could not only 
 create propaganda, or exaggerate what had in it some truth, 
 but, as to any contradiction, they could denounce that with 
 safety as German propaganda, since neither the German- 
 Americans nor neutrally minded Americans could get from 
 Germany the materials for denial, or even for plausible inven- 
 tion. But, since our own Government did not insist on our 
 rights, we need waste little time abusing the AUies for doing 
 just what we would have done ourselves if not compelled 
 to do otherwise. Denpng neutral countries a knowledge of 
 your enemy's facts is a part of war. 
 
 It is not, though, a very pleasant thing to pick up a book 
 like Repington's Diary and find him saying : " Went down 
 to the Foreign Office to see Max Miiller, and told him that 
 Mr. Marshall had a very good character as a journalist in 
 America. We discussed the propaganda question in the 
 Middle West of America, and are quite clear how it is to 
 be done." ' 
 
 The extent of the propaganda during the war and the 
 manner in which matter was prepared for the public is stagger- 
 ing when we get it in detail. Mr. Schreiner » gives almost 
 pathetic stories of his struggles as Associated Press corre- 
 spondent in the Central Empires to furnish our Press a fair 
 
 " Repington's Diary, vol. i, p. 114, for January 27, 1916. See also his 
 entries for July 13 and 16, 1916, and for August 11, 1916, vol. i, pp. 279 
 and 304. TMs very able military critic is an interesting diarist as well, 
 
 » The Craft Sinister, passim. 
 
OUR ILLUSIONS AT OUTBREAK OF WAR 77 
 
 degree of information. The censors did as they pleased 
 with everything he wrote. Mr. Stone, at the head of the 
 Associated Press, woiold send telegram after telegram inquiring 
 why he could not get more news. Even some of these tele- 
 grams were confiscated. It is impossible to read Schreiner's 
 narrative without seeing the utter impossibility we were 
 under of getting the truth. 
 
 Another most estimable newspaper correspondent, John 
 Foster Bass, has left us, in a book treating generally of the 
 disordered condition of Europe since the war, some account 
 of the abominable censorship exercised upon the American 
 people ruthlessly and continually. He tells us that some of 
 the French heads of departments did not hesitate to say 
 in secret that they freely invented such stories as would 
 keep up the resentment of the population. This journalist 
 tells us more. He tells us that some of the stories published 
 as taken from the diaries or letters of Germans were really 
 inventions, conceived in the patriotic purpose of sustaining 
 the fury of the Alhes. As to the Fourteen Points, which to 
 our country meant so much, and which might have meant 
 a great deal to the multitudes in the countries of the Allies, 
 the Press of those countries, with few exceptions, avoided 
 all reference to the fact that " a solemn agreement was made 
 as a basis of peace terms before the Armistice." * 
 
 What does all this prove, except that war is hell in more 
 senses than one, that you beHeve your enemy to be vile, 
 and you therefore feel that you have a right to resort even 
 to villainy to thwart him. There never, for instance, was 
 the shghtest justification of the English violation of our right 
 at sea respecting the mails, but they speedily found a pretext 
 in a general charge that the Germans were not treating the 
 mails properly either. This charge an American authority 
 has shown to be quite unfoimded, the German record being 
 rather favourable. It would not, however, have mattered 
 what the Germans did. The English believed it essential 
 to their safety that we should not have free communication 
 by mail with Germany.' 
 
 > Foster Bass, The Peace Tangle, pp. 135, 136. 
 
 » The protests of Lansing and the impropriety of the English position 
 are discussed by Scott in Survey of International Relations between the United 
 States and Germany, pp. 63, 144. 
 
78 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 But, however bad the English may have been, we our- 
 selves, once we came into the war, surpassed everybody in 
 intolerance. To the credit of the English be it said they 
 knew better than this, knew better how to preserve that 
 civil liberty which is just as valuable as the soil of one's 
 country. 
 
 While we were causing books with disagreeable truths 
 to be withdrawn from the public libraries and to be reported 
 as missing, the English were actually allowing Morel to print 
 Truth and the War. In the United States he would have been 
 sent to a Federal prison for not less than twenty years. The 
 treatment that England gave him for sending a single copy 
 to Romain Rolland was indeed severe, for it was a sentence 
 of an educated gentleman to six months' confinement with 
 common felons. The author was permitted, though, to have 
 truth as he understood it published within the bounds of 
 his own country. Even within the sound of the German 
 guns the right of adverse publication was upheld, and England 
 exhibited again that her Government was fundamentally 
 strong. The real strength of a Government, Lord Acton 
 long ago remarked, is in its power to protect a minority. ^ 
 
 Returning to the subject of English breaches of our 
 neutrality rights, wrongs like these at their hands it behoves 
 us to forget as soon as we can, though we may not accept 
 them as precedents. On the other hand, we must not, as 
 I said before, relax our scrutiny as to the pro-Ally arguments 
 and statements made us during the war. England had a 
 natural motive to get us into the war. We were, in fact, 
 the greatest prize possible to her. It has been said that her 
 propaganda in this country cost between fifty millions and 
 a hundred millions of dollars, but that was a small sum to 
 a country which was paying out in war expenses perhaps 
 twenty million dollars a day. All this is a part of modem 
 war, the false being disseminated with the true, partly by 
 blind enthusiasm, partly by reckless determination to win, 
 partly by belief that the enemy is doing the same thing. 
 
 I Repington tells us that there were " one hundred peace meetings a 
 week, chiefly in Wales, and that they were not reported " to the Press. In 
 our country no peace meeting would have been permitted. A chat in a 
 farmer's parlour between half a dozen rustics on how to end the war by 
 overtures of peace would have been regarded as treason. 
 
OUR ILLUSIONS AT OUTBREAK OF WAR 79 
 
 From the English point of view it was natural, but they them- 
 selves will now be the first to admit that, as I said before, 
 it was a hard wrong to us that such propaganda should be 
 carried on in our neutral country, while we were denied the 
 right to hear the other side from a country with which we 
 were not at war, and through the ordinary and hitherto 
 respected postal service of the seas. 
 
 Exasperating as all this has been, one thought never 
 departs from my mind. What we want is peace, and peace 
 is most easily preserved when that horrible enemy of peace, 
 that breeder of contempt, that mother of distrust, does not 
 exist, a difference of tongues. Of all the woes of nations 
 this is the most difficult to overcome. Let us then never 
 forget that England, her Colonies, and the United States 
 are the only group of nations that can argue, explain, or plead 
 in a common language of the fireside, the playground, commerce 
 and public affairs. A man who speaks with a foreign accent 
 is always an alien. A certain distrust or indifference towards 
 him is inherent in our very blood, but the Canadian seems 
 no foreigner, nor the Australian, nor except to a few the 
 EngUshman. How indifferent, for example, would this 
 country have been to the Irish if they had had to speak 
 with an accent Spanish, Italian, or Russian. 
 
 This chapter I may conclude with one sad reflection. 
 France has never by any Governmental act acknowledged 
 that our joining her was a deed of kindness, or less than our 
 own necessity. She has taken us, shrewdly enough, at our 
 own word, our specific technical allegation that we had a 
 grievance against Germany sufficient to justify war. Her 
 parhament has never by solemn, imperishable vote dedicated 
 to everlasting memory its gratitude for that army which, 
 created, as it were, by the hand of God and rising from the 
 distant seas, brought youth and hope and fresh resource to 
 her thin, exhausted rear, while at the same time it brought 
 despair to an invading host which had hurled back Italy, 
 which had flung ofi Roumania, which had humbled gigantic 
 Russia, which, after struggling four years against odds, was 
 again chanting its battle hymn hard by imperilled Paris, 
 and which dreaded nothing in war except the voice of its 
 conmiajider. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE WAR OF 1870 
 
 It is extraordinary how easily we adapt our memories to 
 our resentments ; wonderful how deftly we alter facts to suit 
 our prejudices. In the year 1870, when the English-speaking 
 world could see with its own eyes and hear with its own ears, 
 its sympathies with Prussia were overwhelming. France was 
 a restless, an ambitious country ; France was a quarrelsome 
 country ; the Emperor of France was a dangerous imitator 
 of Bonaparte, an intriguer at home, a bully abroad, a per- 
 petual disturber of the peace of Europe. Such was the general 
 judgment of men who saw and knew the great leaders, military 
 and civil, in the Franco-Prussian War. Not a country in 
 Europe joined France in defence. Not one of them would 
 even argue her claims for indulgence. The opinion of Europe 
 was absolutely against her.' 
 
 Nor during the succeeding generation did opinion even 
 in France uphold Napoleon III in that rash business ; the 
 very histories in its public schools advising the young that 
 he bad been himself the cause of that and many other assaults 
 upon nations.* 
 
 I " In reopening the dispute after it had seemed to be so happily settled, 
 the French Government alienated the last remnant of sympathy felt for 
 it in neutral countries." Dawson, German Empire, vol. i, p. 343. Bismarck 
 was able to remind Favre and Thiers without contradiction that in this war 
 they had had behind them practically every newspaper and pubhc man in 
 France. 
 
 » " Napoleon III a declare sans rime ni raison la guerre aux Russes, 
 aux Autrichiens, aux Mexicains, aux Prussiens, et finalement il nous a fait 
 enlevSes 1' Alsace et la Lorraine." L' Instruction Civique. Paul Bert. 
 
 " Napoleon III avait promis la paix. Pourtant, sous le Second Empire, 
 la France fut toujours en la guerre." L'Annip preparatoire d'Histoire de 
 France. Lavisse, 1908. 
 
 The popular history by Victor Duruy states the thing to his countrymen 
 as mildly as possible : " But Napoleon was surrounded by influences hostile 
 to the maintenance of peace with Prussia, and was also urged towards war 
 by considerations of the internal poHtics of France. Toward the end of 
 
 80 
 
THE WAR OF 1870 81 
 
 In the face of all contemporary opinion is it not surprising 
 to find Germany now denounced for the Franco-Prussian 
 War ? Is there any other way of accounting for this change 
 of view than that rage invents or pardons a favourable lie ? 
 
 The true account of the origin of that war is indeed 
 too clearly written in history to be permanently changed, 
 but it is proper that it be not obscured to-day. Without 
 going back to the invasions of Germany by Louis XIV and 
 Louis XV, or even to those by Bonaparte, one can rest assured 
 that Prussia was in 1870 as free from the causes of the war 
 as she was from the actual declaration. Louis Napoleon and 
 his Court had resolved that the German States should not be 
 a united nation. ' 
 
 Of all men that came to the head of European govern- 
 ments during the last century, not one was so detestable as 
 the nephew and stupid imitator of Bonaparte. The shallow 
 Napoleon III was, nevertheless, able to command the French 
 during more than twenty 'years, after violating his oath by 
 murdering the French Republic to begin with, nor would 
 he have had much trouble to command them longer had he 
 continued to bring back to the Place de la Concorde the flags 
 of humiliated nations. It was because he could no longer 
 lead them to victory that the French finally threw him over. 
 
 For nothing is more conclusively proved than that France 
 must accept the blame of tolerating so long a ruler who 
 manifestly would let no other country alone. This adventurer, 
 in his reign of twenty years, had no fewer than five distinct 
 wars,2 in not one of which does he seem to have had real 
 provocation, but which he plunged into without any serious 
 organization among his countrymen to stop him. The 
 
 May 1870 the Duke of Gramont, a bitter opponent of Prussia, was made 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs." Duruy, History of France, p. 659. 
 
 » In the earlier stages of Prussian growth he was not averse to her 
 absorbing Schleswig-Holstein, for he felt that this tended to set ofE Prussian 
 strength in fair balance against Austrian. He even plotted to annex 
 Belgium, with Prussia's consent, an intrigue which Bismarck gladly betrayed 
 later to the disgusted world. Rose, Development of European Nations, vol. i, 
 pp. 29, 30. 
 
 » The list is actually as follows : The Crimean War, the Austrian V^ax, 
 the Assj^ian Expedition, an expedition to China to force open her ports ; 
 war against the Emperor of Anam, which secured the cession of Cochin- 
 China ; the invasion of Mexico, and finally the war with Prussia. Interesting 
 monarch ! We are told that this vainglorious and meddlesome creature 
 would have let Prussia alone had she not irritated him. 
 
 6 
 
82 LET FRANCE ^EXPLAIN 
 
 Crimean War was in no reasonable sense the business of France; 
 the Austrian War it plainly conducted for political and 
 territorial gain; the Mexican invasion was sheer military 
 infatuation; the seizure of Rome wholly without intelligible 
 purpose. 
 
 As for the War of 1870, it is astonishing that anybody 
 should not sympathize with the Prussians who has any respect 
 for history and the almost universal opinion of men then 
 living, for never was monarch more determined than Louis 
 Napoleon to have a conflict with Prussia when he could afford 
 to have it. Indeed, the fact was so plain, his manner so 
 undeniably aggressive, his terms so obviously offensive, that 
 dif&culty has been had by the present enemies of Germany 
 to find her at fault. That fault they affect to discover in 
 Bismarck's despatch of the famous message known as the 
 Ems telegram which, since it is so often talked of, it may 
 be well to do more than mention here. 
 
 Summed up, the incident amounts to this : that Bismarck 
 and Moltke, finding that their sovereign was making a mild 
 reply to an impudent demand unfairly repeated, decided to 
 make his answer appear a stem and formal reply to an im- 
 pudent demand unfairly repeated. Contemporary Europeans 
 who heard the demand as well as the reported reply found 
 no fault with the answer. What Bismarck did was not to 
 make the reply for the King of Prussia, but to state to the 
 Press, as he was authorized to do, what that reply had been. 
 It required ingenuity, indeed, to say that in reporting the 
 thing to the Press he altered anything ; but whether he altered 
 it or not, the real words of the King were known by the 
 French agent Benedetti, and by him in his own language to 
 Paris. Benedetti arrived in Paris four days before the 
 declaration of war, and he has left his testimony that in his 
 interview with the King of Prussia there was neither " insulter 
 nor insulted." 
 
 And what were the facts ? They were simple enough. 
 The French adventurer, fretful over the growth of Prussia 
 which he felt was yet small enough in a still divided Germany 
 and flanked by unfriendly Austria, to be easily overcome, 
 and anxious to carry the flag of his impatient subjects into 
 fresh kingdoms, advised Wilhelm I that the royal house of 
 
THE WAR OF 1870 88 
 
 Prussia must not permit one of its members to be a can- 
 didate for a vacancy which then happened to exist on the 
 throne of Spain. To this notification, itself barely reasonable, 
 Wilhelm I made courteous compliance, and caused the pro- 
 posal of his relative to be withdrawn. War was thus avoided. 
 Did this suit the Emperor of France ? Far from it. War was 
 what this creature wanted. He accordingly pressed the 
 gentle king further ; a promise must be given by the house 
 of Prussia that at no time thereafter would one of that family 
 ever be a candidate for the throne of Spain. 
 
 Such a demand, had it been addressed to the Emperor 
 of France, would have been deemed an insult justifying 
 nothing less than war, if we may allow to the people of France 
 that sensitiveness which some now say should have been 
 expected by Bismarck when he, instead of having his royal 
 master declare war on what amounted to an affront, caused 
 his answer to be merely cold, stem, or brusque. Sensitiveness, 
 the right to go to war on incivility between ambassadors, is, 
 it appears, reasonable at Paris and unreasonable at Berlin. 
 
 Louis Napoleon, not Prussia, declared war. He declared 
 war with the enthusiasm of his people, who huzzaed when 
 he appeared, amid public rejoicings, the boastful eulogies of 
 the Press, resolutions of city councils, and the blessings of 
 pulpits. 
 
 Insensate people ! Mad and cruel war ! France as one 
 man decided to invade Germany, with which she had been 
 at peace more than half a century ; to invade Germany because 
 after a German sovereign had renounced for his relative a 
 neighbouring throne, he would not promise never to let a 
 relative of his at any time be a candidate for that throne. 
 What throne was that ? Of a country controlled by France 
 or a country whose people had been enemies of France ? 
 No ! Spain never has been hostile to France and is separated 
 from France by lofty mountains. Never was war more sense- 
 less. There was nothing to cause it except vain and foolish 
 pride, a shallow sovereign, a people fond of battle, of mobi- 
 lizations, of manoeuvres, of victorious entries into distant 
 capitals, of triumphant marches home. Such were the French 
 of 1870. Changed they may since have become, but no fair, 
 candid student of history can question that in that period 
 
84 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 the French were still exceedingly martial, that they deemed 
 military prowess the highest glory of a state, and that they 
 exulted in the Eylau and Tilsit of Bonaparte as they had 
 been recently rejoicing in the Magenta and Solferino of Louis 
 Napoleon. 
 
 Nor had any people in Europe done more to perpetuate 
 among their youth the spirit of war. Not satisfied with those 
 monuments and statues with which all nations honour their 
 great commanders, not satisfied with what the skill of their 
 great artists and sculptors could do to commemorate to 
 posterity the victories of France, they stamped upon in- 
 numerable squares and avenues the names of those battles 
 in which they had slaughtered the foe, though themselves 
 invaders, as if they were resolved to blister the eyes of such 
 of their former enemies as might in times of peace visit the 
 brilliant capital of France. Through six lordly avenues the 
 Arc de Triomphe radiates the exultation of France over one 
 particular nation, repeatedly assaulted by the great French 
 masters of the art of war. 
 
 The attempt made in recent years to load Prussia with the 
 hateful fame of military industry is neither unsuccessful nor 
 wholly unfair, but what kind of man is he who shuts his eyes 
 for that reason to the insensate wars of France, which from 
 her earliest history has exulted and been successful in war ? 
 The very vocabulary of war is French, and such in nearly 
 every European tongue ; in that business we must seek in 
 vain for a single noun or verb that has another source. 
 Accordingly, what Bismarck and Moltke had to face was 
 folly led by an unscrupulous master. Nor must we forget 
 what the name of that master was, what memories and appre- 
 hensions must have been awakened in the German mind by 
 the word Napoleon. During twenty years that name had 
 been, as it was even in England, a terror to children and 
 women. A hundred villages throughout the German States 
 recalled the awful traditions of his swift, triumphal campaigns. 
 Over all of Gennany were his many seals of blood. Her 
 ransacked capitals could conceal from no beholder the scars 
 of Bonaparte. 
 
 The descendant of the great conqueror plainly essayed 
 the same career, which he had already been foUowing in 
 
THE WAR OF 1870 85 
 
 offensive war and which he had commemorated to posterity 
 by his own hand as a royal author in pompous folios em- 
 blazoned with the Imperial arms. That he would sooner or 
 later attack the race whom famous French monarchs had so 
 often bloodily attacked was scarcely to be doubted. His 
 defeat of Austria had been as quick as that of Austria by 
 Prussia. He was determined, and all Germany knew it, 
 not to allow the German States to terminate their internal 
 discords and to solidify themselves against outside assault by 
 becoming one nation. Such was the fear that even Bismarck 
 had of French invasion that he was compelled to reject, shortly 
 before 1870, the petition of Baden to join the German con- 
 federation and to admit that, if he should permit Baden 
 to come in, he must have a war with France. 
 
 The problem before Bismarck and Moltke, then, appealed 
 to their common sense and was decided by their love of 
 country. Themselves perfectly prepared for action and 
 Napoleon, though he was not aware of it, unprepared, they 
 nevertheless declared no war on France. They simply made 
 such a statement to the Press as caused her dictator to appear 
 to have been answered in the style in which he had addressed 
 their sovereign. ' That statement they were authorized to 
 make and no language was prescribed for them. They could 
 have used their own and harder language. If Napoleon 
 wanted war at once, he could have a willing adversary. He 
 did want war. His foolish people, too, wanted war, and they 
 seized the most trivial of all excuses. The vote of the French 
 legislative assembly was overwhelmingly for war.^ 
 
 The reflections of Bismarck himself on this subject in his 
 
 ' Aside from the importunate manner of Benedetti, we must remember 
 that his seeking a direct audience with the King was a diplomatic impro- 
 priety. He should have approached him only with his consent and through 
 the Chancellor. What he did was to force an interview upon him in the 
 promenade at a watering-place. 
 
 ' That up to the eve of war Napoleon believed his forces to be in excellent 
 condition is the general view, but it is clear that when the Prussian reply 
 left him where he must either declare war or suffer a revolution that had 
 been steadily approaching, he was much depressed because his Staff was 
 no longer able to conceal from him the disorder of its affairs. Personal 
 observers mention his gloom. See Madame Moulton's In the Courts of 
 Memory, p. 250 ; Memoirs of Monsieur Claude, the head of the Paris police, 
 p. 265. The latter relates, we may add, that in the Imperial train starting 
 to the front, a train of thirty cars, were several state carriages prepared for 
 a triumphal entry into Berlin 1 
 
86 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 serene later years must be approved by such as wish to be 
 fair. " It was hard to find in the law of nations," he says, 
 " a pretext for France to interfere with the freedom of Spain 
 to choose a king."^ 
 
 No eminent French historian during half a century has 
 sought to excuse the precipitancy of their Government in 
 1870. On the contrary, their own fault they have almost 
 always admitted. As to Bismarck's part in it the friends of 
 France can scarcely object to the judgment of the Histoire 
 Politique.^ 
 
 " The Franco-German War," states an eminent authority 3 
 as late as September, 1914, " was not caused by Bismarck's 
 alteration of the Ems telegram, but by the pent-up and century- 
 old hatred existing between France and Germany by the 
 passionate desire of the German states to form a united empire, 
 and by the determination of Napoleon III to prevent such 
 a union and to rule the continent of Europe." 3 If it had been 
 Prussia that was bent on war, she had only to decline to 
 withdraw the relative's name and have a war. The name, 
 however, was withdrawn, and still France was not satisfied. 
 " Prussia in 1870," Lloyd George himself has said,4 " was 
 fighting against a restless military Emperor dominated largely 
 by military ideals." 
 
 Nor can we omit the comments of our then Minister to 
 France : " The French Ambassador, M. Benedetti, denied 
 that he received the slightest indignity from the King. . . . 
 It really appeared that the Government of France had deter- 
 mined to have war with Germany coute que coute. The talk 
 that Germany was to put a German prince on the throne of 
 
 » Reminiscences, vol. ii, p. 87. To me this seems a correct conclusion 
 whether Bismarck did or did not suggest the candidate to Spain. 
 
 » " The Due de Gramont. He it was who embroiled France in the war 
 with Prussia. . . . They were counting on a sure victory." Of the Ems 
 telegram he says : " It is enough to compare the two texts to show that 
 there was no falsification. . . . The note pubUshed by Bismarck has nothing 
 which is not in the original dispatch ; it simply abbreviates." Seignobos, 
 pp. 184, 810, American edition, 1900. " To describe this as ' forgery ' is 
 childish," Sir Adolphus Ward in Germany, vol. ii, p. 442 (1918). The Ems 
 dispatch was " neither a falsification nor a forgery." Robertson's Bismarck 
 (19 1 8), a biography by no means indulgent. 
 
 3 J. EUis Barker in the Fortnightly Review, September 1914. The author 
 of Modern Germany, who in 1904 had declared the German fleet an intentional 
 menace to England, may be reckoned impartial enough. 
 
 < July I, 1917. 
 
THE WAR OF 1870 87 
 
 Spain was but a mere pretext. The courtiers and adventurers 
 who surrounded the Emperor seemed to think it about time 
 to have a war." i 
 
 The opinion of that brilliant French publicist, Gabriel 
 Hanotaux, would seem conclusive to most students. The 
 final defeat, he says, had the additional drop of bitterness 
 to French public men that they had to admit every one of 
 them, " We have sinned, all, all." He does not fail to cite 
 also the resolution passed by the National Assembly, in which, 
 accepting the abdication of Napoleon III, it laid to him the 
 " responsibility for the ruin, the invasion and the disruption 
 of France."* 
 
 An accurate English writer's opinion may be added. 
 Referring to the Prussian King's withdrawing the candidate on 
 Napoleon's first ultimatum, he says : 
 
 Bismarck's luck, however, did not desert him at this supreme 
 hour of his country's fate. France had won a great victory over 
 Prussia. With egregious folly she now determined to add humiliation 
 to defeat.3 
 
 So frequently is this affair of the Ems telegram distorted 
 nowadays, that I have appended to this chapter in parallel 
 columns the telegram which Bismarck received from his 
 king and the telegram which he gave out to the Press. 
 
 For my own part I may add that in several journeys 
 through France before 1914, I frequently sounded the opinion 
 of both scholars and business men there as to the causes of 
 the Franco-Prussian War, without hearing from a single one 
 a contention that the Prussians were to be charged with it, 
 or that they could long have avoided it. What Frenchmen 
 have always bitterly denounced in that war was the seizure 
 of Alsace and Lorraine. 4 
 
 " Recollections of a Minister to France, Washburn, ch. ii. The Prussian 
 Queen implored William I with tears to remember Jena and Tilsit and not 
 to go to war. Bismarck, Reminiscences, vol. ii, p. 98. Eugenie (if most gossips 
 can be believed), spurred Napoleon to the conflict. 
 
 » Hanotaux, Contemporary France, vol. i, pp. 23, 134. 
 
 3 Evolution of Prussia, Marriott, p. 363. 
 
 4 The general reader will find an entertaining and impartial sketch of 
 the career of Napoleon III in France since Waterloo, by the English writer, 
 Grinton Berry. " The French nation as a whole cannot evade its respon- 
 sibility for the Second Empire. Napoleon was the arm of the nation and 
 he was invested with very wide powers because the nation desired a strong 
 arm unfettered," p. 199. 
 
88 
 
 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 In conclusion, let me advert to the preparations of Louis 
 Napoleon to interfere with German unity several months 
 before this incident of the Spanish succession by quoting 
 from still another English authority. " The general details 
 of that dispute," says Professor Rose, " are well known. 
 What is far less known is a factor vital to the whole discussion, 
 namely, that by order of the French Emperor a French general, 
 Lebrun, had in the month of January 1870 gone to Vienna 
 to discuss plans for a Franco-Austrian alliance, with a view 
 to a joint attack on the North German Confederation in the 
 spring of the next year.''^ 
 
 Two great errors seem to me to have occurred in European 
 policies. First, Germany in 1871 should have forbidden 
 France, long odious to Europe for her wars, to maintain a 
 large army. Second, England should have forbidden Germany, 
 to create a large navy. By the former inhibition Germany, 
 free in the West, would have had no fears from Russia and 
 her militarists would have gradually sunk before her mer- 
 chants ; by the latter inhibition England could at all times 
 have protected France. 
 
 Bismarck's Statement 
 TO THE Press. 
 
 After the news of the renun- 
 ciation of the hereditary Prince 
 of Hohenzollern had been com- 
 municated to the Imperial French 
 Government by the Royal Span- 
 ish Government, the French 
 Ambassador afresh required 
 at Ems of His Majesty, the 
 King, authorization to telegraph 
 to Paris that His Majesty, the 
 King, undertook for the future 
 not again to give his consent if the 
 
 » Germany in the Nineteenth Century, p. 14 (1912). Whether the 
 Prussian Court then knew of this he is not sure, but he deems it exceedingly 
 probable. See Sybel's Foundation of the German Empire, vol. vii, p. 281. 
 Professor Rose details Lebrun's errand in Development of European Nations, 
 vol. i, p. 39. See Lebrun's own Souvenirs Militaires. This bad incident 
 is, of course, accepted history. See Ward's Germany, vol. ii, pp. 416-18 
 (1918). Sir Adolphus Ward and Professor Rose enjoy in England the same 
 pre-eminence on German poUtical history that Dawson does on German 
 economics. 
 
 Abeken TO Bismarck. 
 Ems, July 13, 
 
 3.40 P.M. 
 
 " His Majesty, the King, writes 
 to me : 
 
 " 'Benedetti approached me on 
 the Promenade to ask me finally, 
 in a very pressing way, to author- 
 ize him to telegraph that I would 
 for the future not again give my 
 approval if the HohenzoUerns re- 
 newed their candidature. I re- 
 fused in a serious enough tone at 
 
THE WAR OF 1870 
 
 89 
 
 HohenzoUerns should renew their 
 candidature. His Majesty, the 
 King, therefore refused to receive 
 the French Ambassador again 
 and informed him by his aide- 
 de-camp that His Majesty had 
 nothing further to communicate 
 to the Ambassador. 
 
 the end of our conversation, for 
 one must not and cannot take 
 such engagements forever. 
 
 " ' I told him very naturally 
 that I had not received anything 
 more, and that he could easily 
 understand, as he was informed 
 before me of news from Paris and 
 Madrid that my Government was 
 not concerned in the matter." 
 
 " His Majesty received imme- 
 diately afterwards a letter from 
 the Prince. As his Majesty had 
 told Benedetti that he expected 
 news from the Prince, he decided, 
 on the suggestion of Prince Eulen- 
 berg and myself, and in consider- 
 ation of the opinions expressed 
 above, not again to receive Bene- 
 detti, but to inform him by his 
 aide-de-camp that His Majesty 
 had received from " Prince " 
 Bismarck confirmation of the 
 news that Benedetti had already 
 received from Paris, and that His 
 Majesty had nothing further to 
 say to the Ambassador. 
 
 " His Majesty leaves it to your 
 Excellency to decide whether the 
 new demand of Benedetti and 
 the refusal with which he met it 
 should be communicated to our 
 ministers abroad and to the 
 Press." 
 
 Bismarck did not communicate with France or its Ambassador, nor was 
 he asked by his King to do so. He was permitted to address the Press and 
 in his own language. On the foregoing, peaceful France declared war and 
 started toward the Rhine. 
 
 From the War of 1870 to the Franco-Russian Alliance. 
 
 The Government of the new German Empire settled down 
 immediately to the arts of peace, for amid the general rejoicings 
 it was the universal sense of the nation that, though remaining 
 always fully armed, it should have many years of thrift and 
 repose. Only during the year 1875 were the relations of France 
 
90 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 and Germany strained again. ^ The thing passed away quickly. 
 Nobody had any great desire for war. The most that can 
 be said is that the Germans, though victorious and strong, 
 distrusted France, which had been so often able to assail them. 
 Germany had found her freedom at last in a unity which she 
 knew was distasteful to her ancient enemy. 
 
 In the midst of all this calm there occurred an event which 
 was destined to have a direct influence toward the tragedy 
 of 1914. Russia in 1876 plunged into a war with Turkey. 
 
 The reader will bear in mind that in 1853 Russia had 
 made an attempt to secure her long-desired outlet to the 
 Mediterranean, and had been thwarted by France and England 
 in what is known as the Crimean War. France having now 
 fallen, what partner could England have against Russia should 
 the latter renew her assault on the Straits ? England could 
 have no partner. Exhausted France dare not attempt to aid 
 her ; Germany had every reason not to provoke Russia by 
 joining England in a field in which at that time Germany 
 had not even the remotest interest and which Bismarck had 
 declared was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian 
 grenadier. Neither Italy nor Austria was willing to go into 
 a war on the side of England on a mere question of the Dar- 
 danelles. The result was that the Tsar, shortly after the 
 defeat of the French by Prussia, declared himself no longer 
 bound by provisions imposed upon him in the unsuccessful 
 Crimean War, and in 1876 found cause, as I have just stated, 
 for a conflict with Turkey. 
 
 The conflict was short, and from the point of view of 
 Russia entirely satisfactory, her victorious armies concluding 
 the Peace of San Stefano in the suburbs of Constantinople. 
 
 The Treaty of San Stefano had been indeed a triumph. 
 What Russia could not by its terms either seize for herself 
 or dare to accept, she at least tore from the vanquished Turk 
 and flung to the greedy little states of the Balkan Peninsula. 
 Reduced, indeed, was the western territory of Turkey.. To 
 Montenegro, to Serbia, to Bulgaria and to Roumania were 
 given portions of the carcase, all except Greece getting some- 
 
 ■ What is called the war scare of 1875 is sufi&ciently well narrated by 
 De Blowitz, the famous correspondent of the London Times in his most 
 agreeable Memoirs. 
 
THE WAR OF 1870 91 
 
 thing. For. herself Russia obtained, besides a substantial 
 indemnity, a large part of Armenia. 
 
 Loud was the clamour concerning these gains among the 
 other European Powers, who forthwith resolved by concert 
 to reduce them. Chief among the dissatisfied was England, 
 which still saw in Turkey, as she had seen during the Crimean 
 War, a fence against Russian progress toward the Mediterranean 
 and India. The sagacious Beaconsfield had little trouble in 
 arranging the 1878 conference known to history as the Congress 
 of Berlin. There the plunder collected by Russia was taken 
 from her piece by piece, her donees in the Balkans trimmed 
 of their enlarged domains. Greece, ever the client of England, 
 received a territorial award ; Austria was allowed military 
 occupation and administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina ; 
 while Russia herself gave up all the Armenian cession except 
 a free harbour at Batum, together with a minor strip along 
 the Armenian shore. 
 
 The unspeakable vexation of Russia now centred itself 
 upon Bismarck, the bluntest of the arbitrators and not the 
 most untruthful. A storm of abuse was discharged upon 
 him. The commonest civilities of diplomatic intercourse 
 were for a time wholly dropped. Russian tariffs were levelled 
 against German goods, Russian troops were assembled on the 
 German frontier. 
 
 History generally has acquitted Bismarck of unfriendliness 
 to Russia in this revision, which was vastly more important 
 to England, and at any rate more consistent with her long 
 support of Turkey against Russia. ' 
 
 The congress had been held at Berlin because it was obvious 
 to all that Germany was the least interested in the contentions, 
 and it is impossible at this day to say that as compensation 
 for the mischiefs that subsequently befell her out of this 
 settlement she got a single thing to her advantage. All that 
 has ever been pointed out as gain to her was Austria's super- 
 vising privileges in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but at that 
 
 I For a brief, clear sketch of the Berlin Congress, see that popular book, 
 The Diplomatic Background of the War, p. 27. Earl Loreburn cheerfully 
 acknowledges his country's fault at that Congress. " A great opportunity 
 to settle the Balkan trouble was lost," he says, " through the antagonism 
 between Russia and Great Britain. Our policy of supporting the Turk 
 for fear of Russian aggrandizement and aggression in India or elsewhere 
 bore its natural fruits." See How the War Came, p. 33. 
 
92 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 time there was neither aUiance nor treaty between Germany 
 and Austria-Himgary, and, on the other hand, complete 
 accord between the royal houses of Russia and Germany. 
 
 The result of the congress must be considered a wonderful 
 triumph of Enghsh diplomacy. Russia and England had 
 been on the verge of war over the Treaty of San Stefano. 
 Indeed, England had even been in secret treaty with Turkey, 
 from which, in return for assured protection, England was 
 to obtain, and subsequently did obtain, the Island of Cyprus, 
 so that without striking a blow she got everything she wanted 
 and left Bismarck and his country to take the blame. An 
 English fleet, which had been stationed at the Dardanelles 
 to scowl on the Russian advance, was now recalled, and such 
 was the adroitness of Beaconsfield, that the whole ill-humour 
 of Russia turned, as I have said, from London to Berlin.' 
 
 With the Congress of Berlin ended the friendly relations 
 which the royal famiUes of Prussia and Russia had so long 
 maintained. The change, full of mischief to the future of 
 Europe, filled Bismarck himself immediately with alarm. 
 The student of history cannot be told too often that dread of 
 the Russian monster inhered in every Teuton, the dread 
 of a thing incalculable, vast, and though unwieldy, continually 
 increasing in size and power. Such became the imeasiness 
 of Bismarck that he sought forthwith some kind of defensive 
 alliance with Austria, on whose ribs the gigantic creature 
 of the East equally rested. 
 
 In September 1879 he was able to make Austria an ally 
 under an arrangement which, when Italy subsequently came 
 into it, was known as the Triple AUiance. Russia was specially 
 referred to in it. Each was to defend the other if either was 
 attacked by that Power, but if " another " Power should 
 attack either, then the ally not attacked was to be merely 
 neutral unless, which was the third condition, Russia should 
 then take the part of the " other " Power, in which event 
 the non-attacked ally should automatically come to the rescue 
 of the ally attacked. It was, in other words, not an aUiance 
 
 " The return of Beaconsfield to London was a sort of triumph. The 
 year before he had made the Queen " Empress of India," and was now at 
 the height of his career. The Congress of Berlin, I may add, is not to be 
 confounded with the " Conference " held there two years later to pass upon 
 Turkey's non-compliance with some of the decrees. 
 
THE WAR OF 1870 93 
 
 against France unless France, attacking either Austria or 
 Germany, should be assisted by Russia. ' 
 
 The dread which both Austria and Germany had of Russia 
 is clear in the readiness with which the two former Powers 
 united under this treaty, for they had both disliked each other 
 many generations and had been but a few years before at 
 war. According to Hohenlohe-Schillingfurst, the Austrians 
 could not at first believe that Bismarck was serious. Andrassy, 
 when he saw that Bismarck actually was serious, " jumped 
 to the ceiling for joy."* 
 
 Italy an Uncertain Partner. 
 
 The attachment of Italy to Germany and Austria was 
 but slight. She went into the Triple Alliance for a variety 
 of motives, transitory, not deep. Between Germany and 
 Austria-Himgary the alliance was based on concern for 
 national existence against a gigantic alien race, from whom 
 Italy was sufficiently shielded for the present by sea and 
 mountains. 
 
 The most noticeable feature of the Italian engagement 
 appears at the very beginning — she was not to be bound if 
 Great Britain be involved. Upon that point so sure did this 
 partner wish to be that on a renewal of the treaty in 1897 
 a clause was added that she would not be bound even against 
 France in case that Power became allied with England against 
 the Central Powers, a prophetic caution indeed. 
 
 One thing must be borne in mind. The adding of Italy 
 to the alliance of Austria and Germany was not aggression. 
 The necessity of the latter to have Italy at least neutral is 
 absolutely plain, because the friction between Italy and 
 Austria was racially deep, so deep that the Central Empires 
 could never feel secure against the terrible combination of 
 
 » See the full and short text. Appendix B. See also Tardien, France 
 and the Alliances, p. 128. 
 
 » Hohenlohe-Schillingfurst, Memoirs, vol. ii, p. 253. This statesman 
 was unfavourable to the alliance, which he did not think would prevent 
 France and Russia from ultimately joining, but he says that Bismarck 
 believed the treaty would insure peace. De Blowitz, Memoirs, p. 144, 
 entertains us with Bismarck's story of how he spared Austria after Sadowa 
 because he had in mind that he must ultimately have her friendship in some 
 such situation. 
 
94 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Russia and France, if Italy should join against them in the 
 West. It is useless for the French to justify their subsequent 
 course by pointing to this frail partner. 
 
 One thing was clear, Italy could not be counted upon 
 by the Central Empires in any war in which England should 
 be adverse. An easy prey would Naples, Genoa and Venice 
 be, and all the Italian commerce and all the African colonies 
 of Italy, to the navy of England. Accordingly France and 
 Russia counted surely upon defection by Italy as they saw 
 the cautious Grey drawn slowly into their circle. 
 
 Even before that, however, they began to detach Italy 
 from the Triplice. An estrangement from France on account 
 of Tunis was composed about 1896. In October of that year 
 there was also executed a navigation agreement, and in 
 November of 1898 a stipulation as to commerce, between the 
 two nations. I 
 
 After England joined them, so sure did the Entente feel, 
 that they reaUy preferred to have Italy remain an ostensible 
 associate of her old allies, to be to the Central Empires, as 
 they called it, "a dead weight."* 
 
 The despair of Von Moltke in respect to Italy we have 
 seen in his sombre view of the situation in his memorandum 
 of December, 1912.3 
 
 " Few Germans," said an eminent reviewer before the 
 war, " believe that Germany can coimt on Italy's support 
 in the hour of need. Italy would not think of supporting 
 Germany in a war against France and stiU less in a war against 
 Great Britain or Great Britain and France combined. Most 
 Germans think that in a great European war Italy will either 
 remain neutral or will be found on the side of Germany's 
 enemies." 4 
 
 Every step in the progress of Italy put her more under 
 the power of France and England. " Italy's actual needs 
 point in the direction of the Three Entente Powers. Italy's 
 dependence on France and England has been increased by 
 her establishing herself in Libya. Wedged between the two 
 
 ■ Tardieu, France and the Alliances, pp. 87, 88. 
 
 > Sazonoff's Memorandum of a conference with Poincar6 in August, 
 1912. Ent. Dip., p. 653. 
 
 3 See Chapter II and Appendix A. 
 
 4 Nineteenth Century, June 1912. 
 
THE WAR OF 1870 95 
 
 Powers on the Northern Coast of Africa, Italy is more than 
 ever in need of them.''^ 
 
 When in 191 1 Italy had to remove some of her home 
 troops to Tripoli, it was noticed with satisfaction by the 
 Russian Ambassador that she took away regiments on the 
 French frontier and left those on the Austrian.* 
 
 Summing up, two things are perfectly plain. First, that 
 the Triple Alliance was purely defensive, and second, that 
 in a war in which England should be adverse, it was but a 
 Dual Alliance of Austria-Himgary and Germany, and that it 
 was probably no better after 1896 even if England should 
 not be a belligerent on the side of France. 
 
 " From the earUest times," says Hindenberg, " it appeared 
 to me doubtful to rely on any effective help from Italy. It 
 was an uncertain quantity. It was questionable even if 
 the Itahan statesmen favoured the idea." 3 
 
 The terms of the alliance by which the Central Powers 
 sought to protect themselves against Russia have been public 
 since 1888. The terms of the bad alliance between Russia 
 and France of 1892 were never made public until after the 
 commencement of the war. 
 
 ■ Russian Ambassador at Rome to Sazonofi, March 25, 1912. Ent. 
 Dip., p. 167. 
 
 ' Russian Ambassador at Rome to Petrograd, October 24, 191 1. Ibid., 
 p. 608. 
 
 3 Out of My Life, vol. i, p. 98. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE PEACE RECORD OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Founded in 1871, the German Empire was able to boast to 
 mankind in 1914 of forty-three years imblemished by war. 
 During all that period until about the year 1912 Germany 
 had the most formidable army in Europe.' By the war of 
 1870, forced upon them, as we have seen, by Louis Napoleon 
 the German States achieved their unity, and from that time 
 until 1914 they let every state in Europe alone. Before they 
 achieved their unity few of the others would let them alone. 
 
 On the other hand, we have seen in our first chapter 
 the confession of Jaures, that as soon as modern France 
 achieved her unity, she fell to assailing her weak, divided 
 neighbours. 
 
 Crowded on the sidewalks of Berlin by haughty young 
 officers though I indignantly found myself in former years, 
 now that we have recovered our composure, the question 
 recurs to me : If Germany was what we have been saying, 
 the incarnation of mihtarism, actuated intensely by love of 
 gain through arms, and nursing her people at all times to 
 successful war, why did she not avail herself of her power 
 during the period when that power was unquestionably the 
 greatest in Europe ? Why did she not seize Denmark ? 
 Why did Holland escape ? Why Belgium ? 
 
 Very justly do we condemn those German writers, who 
 at one time preached world dominion and the superman, 
 some of whom in the language of Burke may be called cannibal 
 philosophers. Do we not forget, though, that many of them 
 were dead long before the war, and that most of their excessive 
 
 ' As has already been stated and will appear in Chapter X, the Germans 
 ceased to have the greatest army in Europe toward the close of 1912, and 
 in the commencement of the war in 1914 did not have a greater standing 
 army than that of France alone. 
 
 96 
 
PEACE RECORD OF GERMAN EMPIRE 97 
 
 talk had been uttered a generation with no attack by Germany 
 on any other Power ? Just as our Homer Lea and some like 
 him failed to lash the busy American people up to a war 
 fever, so these German philosophers grew up, preached, died 
 and produced no wars. Officers in the German Army passed 
 from boyhood to old age without witnessing more than the 
 manoeuvres of peace. As Repington remarked in 1911, the 
 German nation was growing less militaristic. It was for 
 the first time tasting riches.^ 
 
 Unamiable though the Prussian often seemed to me, I 
 do not see why we should shut our eyes to facts that are 
 undeniable. We have been telling ourselves that for forty 
 years Germany was preparing for a war with France, yet we 
 have been overlooking at least three periods in which she 
 did not even have to prepare, periods when she could have 
 seized France with comparative safety and when others 
 expected her to do so. 
 
 It is worth while ito examine these three periods. The 
 first was after the quarrel between England and France in 
 1898 concerning Fashoda. That estrangement was a violent 
 one, so violent as to occasion the most serious talk of war. 
 France at that time had no friend in Europe except Russia, 
 whose armies in 1898 were but poorly developed. At that 
 time the German Army was complete. As for England, not 
 one particle of sympathy would have been extended to France. 
 It is true no good pretext for a war at that time existed 
 between Germany and France, but to what purpose do we 
 say there was no pretext when we have been taught to believe 
 that these Germans were a people who cared nothing for 
 a pretext but only for an opportunity ? 
 
 The second period was between 1899 and 1902, the period 
 of the Boer War. That war, while it did not exhaust the 
 naval resources of the English, enormously occupied her 
 shipping, greatly increased her taxation, and was regarded, 
 so little did we know of the cost of future wars, as a burden 
 of the first magnitude. Nor had England at that time at 
 all recovered from her perennial irritation toward the French 
 and her special irritation about Fashoda. Salisbury was 
 still in office ; Salisbury always the opponent of France, always 
 » Quoted at some length in Chapter X. 
 7 
 
98 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 the opponent of Russia, Here was an excellent chance for 
 the sudden throwing of the great German nailitary machine 
 across the Rhine. Why was it not employed ? We have to 
 do, now, with a nation supposed to be lying in wait to assas- 
 sinate or rob an ancient enemy, an enemy for that matter 
 that had for nearly three centuries continually assaulted 
 Germany, and yet we have to admit that Germany let France 
 alone again. 
 
 The third opportunity was indeed a great one, so great 
 that all the diplomats of Europe took notice of it. In 1905 
 the Russian Government was in a state of collapse, a collapse 
 so complete that xmtil it is detailed to the reader, he can 
 have no conception of it. Coimt Witte says that on his return 
 from the Peace Conference which terminated, at Portsmouth 
 in the United States, the Japanese War, the Government had 
 neither troops nor funds with which to fight the revolution. 
 Only two things could save the dynasty, a large foreign loan 
 and the return of the troops from Transbaikalia. The whole 
 vast body of the Russian Army was in a state of complete 
 physical and moral prostration. European Russia was prac- 
 tically denuded of troops. " We had at our disposal neither 
 troops nor rural police." The policemen in Moscow often 
 reported for duty with empty cases. There were extensive 
 agrarism disturbances. Owing to the railroad strikes in Euro- 
 pean Russia and in Siberia, the Far East was often cut off 
 from the rest for weeks together, i 
 
 Nor on this third opportunity was the pretext lacking, 
 the affair of Morocco,^ the affair in which Delcasse had wilfully 
 deceived Germany in the preceding year. A serious occasion 
 was this for France. Her Government had treated Germany 
 with marked discourtesy as well as secret imfaimess, executing 
 simultaneously a public and private treaty in contradiction, 
 and not commimicating even the public one to Germany. 
 It was a better pretext for a war than Louis Napoleon had 
 in 1870, infinitely better. 
 
 So far as the French alliance was concerned, Witte made 
 a report to the Tsar in 1906 as follows : 
 
 The international situation is at present such that Germany has 
 an excellent opportunity to push France to the wall. Russia is not 
 I Witte, Memoirs, pp. 285-9. • See Chapter IX. 
 
PEACE RECORD OF GERMAN EMPIRE 99 
 
 in a position at present to render any considerable military assistance 
 to France. Austria and Italy will not stand in Germany's way. As 
 for Great Britain, she is unable to help France on land, and there 
 is no doubt that from the military standpoint Germany is perfectly 
 able to give France a sound beating. The temptation to Germany 
 is great.' 
 
 Isvolsky gives us also a picture. " The revolutionary 
 movement," he says, " had resulted from the reverses of the 
 Russian army in Manchuria, culminating in a general strike 
 which not only stopped aU means of commtmication, but 
 also completely paralysed the economic life of the country. 
 Violent disorders broke out in the provinces and the agitation 
 assumed a menacing aspect throughout the Empire." « 
 
 The situation was so bad that Repington, looking back 
 on it in his recent diaries, remarks, " It was Germany's 
 chance." 3 It surely must seem luiaccoimtable to some people 
 that Germany did not think it worth while to hazard a war 
 with all the chances in her favour and yet waited until 1914, 
 when Russia had whoUy recovered, when the French Army 
 had been brought up to its highest perfection, and when 
 Germany was whoUy estranged from England. 
 
 Let us cite another Russian, Baron Rosen, on the con- 
 dition of Russia in 1905 and the years immediately following : 
 
 Revolutionary sentiment had spread over all the country. News 
 of riots and disorders was arriving from all sides ; mutiny in the 
 navy, burning and looting of country houses ; strikes in aU branches 
 of industry, as weU as railroads, posts and telegraphs ; all communi- 
 cation by rail, post or telegraph cut. In a word, a state of almost 
 complete anarchy.4 
 
 It was at this desperate juncture that Witte began to 
 search the world for a loan, and it is interesting to note that 
 he applied to our Morgans in New York in vain.S That the 
 Germans knew of his efforts to get the loan and did not assist 
 him is also his testimony ; so they were aware both of the 
 physical and political condition of the Empire, as well as its 
 
 ' Witte, Memoirs, p. 298. 
 
 » Isvolsky, Reminiscences of a Foreign Minister, pp. 10, 11. 
 
 3 Diaries, vol. i, pp. 2-13. 
 
 4 Saturday Evening Post, March 6, 1920. 
 Witte, Memoirs, pp. 303-5' 
 
100 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 financial condition.* The loan was at last obtained through 
 a French group of bankers who played the leading part with 
 some assistance from England. » 
 
 When Brockdorff-Rantzau first saw Clemenceau at Ver- 
 sailles, he was able to look the unrelenting enemy of Germany 
 in the face and to say that for Germany to admit that she 
 was solely to blame for this war was not true. That Germany 
 had her share in the general militarism of Europe he woiald 
 not gainsay, but that she alone was to blame for the European 
 catastrophe would in his mouth be a lie. 
 
 That the German people as a whole were peaceably disposed 
 seems to be the testimony of all qualified observers. Even 
 the bitter author of J' Accuse tells us that the great mass of 
 the labouring poptilation, the industrial middle class, the 
 banking and manufacturing circles in South Germany not 
 yet Prussianized, that all these, without doubt, desired peace. 
 " In the middle of July, any one who had asserted in Germany 
 that on August ist we would be face to face with an European 
 war would have been in danger of a lunatic asylum." He 
 admits that the war party was formed only of a minority 
 of the German people, and " that the policy of peace which 
 the Emperor William had taken as a guiding line of conduct 
 after the first stormy days of his youth had for long ceased 
 to find favour in certain circles." 3 
 
 Loreburn's opinion is that the commercial classes as a 
 whole desired peace.4 He continues : 
 
 Not only, were good re lations growing between us, but we acted 
 together in 191 2-13. When the Balkan War of 191 2 and its sequel, 
 the Second Balkan War in 1913, brought about the imminent danger 
 of a rupture between Russia and Austria, our co-operation with Ger- 
 many became intimate and cordial. It prevented a general con- 
 flagration. Full acknowledgment was made on both sides by the 
 ministers in London and Berlin. 5 
 
 ' Witte, Memoirs, pp. 298-9. 
 
 " Ibid., p. 293. This is the loan which was opposed by many of the 
 liberal classes in Russia, who felt they could extort from the Tsar soine con- 
 cessions to liberty. They got a first but only consultative Duma. They 
 wished to obtain a legislative Duma. This, had it been granted to them, 
 would have preserved Russia on a constitutional basis through the union 
 of ancient authority and a parliament. Ibid., p. 294. 
 
 3 J'Accuse, pp. 134, 135. This unexpected concession in his attacks 
 upon a people whom he still claims as his own is at this passage interrupted 
 by a blank imposed by the censor. 
 
 4 How the War Came, p. 91. 5 Ibid., p. 97. 
 
PEACE RECORD OF GERMAN EMPIRE 101 
 
 This is the period at which, as we have seen,' even the 
 Russian Minister informed his own office that " if Germany 
 wished war, she would not have done so much in this 
 matter." 
 
 Lord Haldane bears his testimony to the same effect : 
 " Notwithstanding all that had been done to educate them 
 up to it, I do not think that the German people ever indorsed 
 the implication of German militarism." There was in Germany, 
 of course, a military party. There was in every capital of 
 Europe a military party. Wherever there is a large standing 
 army there will be some military hotheads along with some 
 military wise men. But in Germany it seems to me that the 
 militarists had always the best argument, since no other country 
 was so cruelly exposed on its frontiers to instant invasion. 
 How different the situation in France ! Most of her exposure 
 is on the sea, with few harbours and no large cities within 
 range of guns. She is protected from Spain and Italy by high 
 mountains. She has but one exposure, the German frontier, 
 but Germany has an exposure on every side. 
 
 People during the recent war pointed* gleefully to a docu- 
 ment in which, as war approached, the German military 
 party assured themselves that it was necessary that the 
 people realize a sense of danger and educate themselves to 
 a perception of impending war. Her foes, we know now, 
 were actually preparing on both sides and with overwhelming 
 force. Neither should we forget that even in our own secure 
 country many people have felt it necessary at times to arouse 
 our population to a sense of insecurity.* 
 
 Of course I do not mean to compliment the German people 
 upon a peculiarly pacific disposition, since the bulk of the 
 French people are peaceful too. This I do say, though, 
 that there is in the French character throughout all classes 
 something that can be more suddenly roused to war than 
 there is in the Germans. They are more easily animated 
 
 « Chapter I. 
 
 > I do not know any more striking instance than Homer Lea's Valour 
 of Ignorance, in which he felt it his duty to alarm us about the Japanese 
 on the other side of the Pacific. During the recent Disarmament Conference 
 at Washington, one of the leading papers of New York, expressing the most 
 violent discontent with those who were precipitant or extreme in their desire 
 for discirmament, suggested that the Government would find some means 
 of suppressing their agitation. 
 
102 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 by brilliant writers and talkers to revive the perennial glory 
 of France in arms. 
 
 But it is only natural that during the recent war little 
 advertisement should be given of things favourable to the 
 Germans. The Zabem incident, which I have spoken of 
 before, has been given the widest circulation. Yet everybody 
 forgets that in Germany itself this outrage was received with 
 such indignation that the Reichstag broke loose in denun- 
 ciation. When this public indignation has been mentioned, 
 the circumstance again has been turned by our partisan feeling 
 against the Germans, and some people have reasoned that 
 the German military party plunged into this war against the 
 most appalling odds, because they felt that militarism was 
 expiring in Germany. 
 
 Such people can now read that there were other good reasons 
 for this war. Undoubtedly there were some militarists who, 
 perhaps, patriotically reasoned that, if the German mihtary 
 machine was ever to save the country from the impending 
 attack of France and Russia combined, it had better be put 
 to use without delay. Just as in the EngUsh Navy many 
 patriots approved Lord Fisher's suggestion that seizing 
 (" Copenhagening ") the German Fleet would be proper without 
 even a declaration of war, so in France, where the three- 
 year military law was coming under increasing attack, there 
 were undoubtedly pure-minded patriotic militarists who 
 believed that France should go into and win a war over 
 Germany without waiting longer. 
 
 Frequently brought up against Germany, next, is its refusal 
 to disarm at a Hague conference. The hoUowness of this 
 proposal for disarmament, which arose in Russia, is cruelly 
 exposed by Dr. Dillon. 
 
 " Isvolsky," he says, " who can, I am sure, bear out 
 what I say, knew perfectly that the Hague Conference appeal 
 was a shameful fraud which Maravieff and the Tsar were 
 practising on the world. "^ Isvolsky in his book published 
 two years later. Recollections of a Foreign Minister, though 
 he discusses many other statements of Dillon and frequently 
 expresses his high opinion of him, does not contradict this 
 statement directly, inviting contradiction. Dillon, we may 
 
 < Eclipse of Russia, p. 254, 
 
PEACE RECORD OF GERMAN EMPIRE 108 
 
 add, gives many instances of mendacity in Nicholas II and 
 of a shifting of promises, together with concealment. His 
 disgust for Nicholas II is extreme. Bogitsevich, Serbian 
 charge d'affaires at Berlin, also tells us flatly that the Russian 
 peace proposal at the Hague was not in good faith, but simply 
 to gain time.i 
 
 While the civil heads of the Government of France were, 
 according to the testimony of the Ambassadors of their Allies, 
 full of martial and fretful spirit, the civil heads of the German 
 Government were unquestionably peaceful. Bogitsevich, who 
 certainly was in a good position to observe and who, as a 
 Serbian, must have felt at least impartial, assures us that 
 Von Jagow was as peacefiil as Kiterlen-Waechter, whom he 
 succeeded in of&ce in 1912.' 
 
 Turning now to the Chancellor, I have never found one 
 writer who accuses him of being less than peaceful. Lord 
 Haldane assures us that Bethman-Hollweg was sincerely 
 averse to war. 3 
 
 Many writers on Germany, especially some discussing 
 Prince Billow's Imperial Germany, have dwelt on Germany's 
 desire in her diplomacy to maintain what they call the idle 
 or pretentious thing, prestige. Now these people must think 
 twice on that subject. The English and all other Great 
 Powers are fully alive to prestige. Lord Haldane gives us 
 an idea of it in a very unexpected illustration. He affords 
 us a new glance at prestige : 
 
 We could not sit still and allow Germany so to increase her navy 
 in comparison with ours that she could make other Powers believe 
 that their safest course was to throw in their lot and join their fleet 
 with hers.4 
 
 In a word, the larger planet draws the little orbs into her 
 circuit and increases her immensity. 
 
 Let us take up finally the Kaiser, not, indeed, the suc- 
 cessful t57rannical ruler of a Germany which at times could 
 assert its feelings against him, but sufficiently the head of 
 affairs to be reckoned responsible. What was his disposition ? 
 Was he in truth a martial or warlike man ? My answer is 
 that he may be called a military man in some senses, but was 
 
 I Causes of the War, p. 8, » Ibid., p. 47. 
 
 ' 3 Before the War, p. 73. * Ibid., pp. 21-2. 
 
104 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 far from warlike. If the testimony of innumerable observers 
 can be accepted, this man, during the last twenty years at 
 least of his reign, exulted in peace and in the consequent 
 prosperity and grandeur of his people. 
 
 I never can think of this exile, fallen from infinite glory, 
 without recalling what Poultney Bigelow tells us of the simple 
 lodge which the German Kaiser had at Romentin in East 
 Prussia : 
 
 His study is a room of equal simplicity with the others, so arranged 
 that should he arrive at an hour's notice, he would find it ready for 
 work. On the table in front of him stands a little framed photograph 
 of his wife.' 
 
 We see at a glance in this little picture two characteristics 
 of the most powerful monarch in Europe, his domestic affections 
 and his attention to business. The next picture I have of 
 him, when I reflect upon his fall and the collapse of greatness, 
 is his exclamation on his yacht when the news was brought 
 to him of that murder at Sarajevo, which he well knew would 
 place Austria in a ferment beyond his control. In the pre- 
 ceding year, as we have seen in this chapter, he had, with the 
 aid of England, controlled Austria. Now he could control 
 her no more, and when this news was brought to him, he 
 uttered, according to Beyens, Belgian Ambassador, this tragic 
 exclamation : "So my work of the past twenty-five years 
 will have to be started all over again."* 
 
 In the history of the ten years preceding the war I fail 
 to find one instance in which the Berlin Government behaved 
 itself in a way provocative of war against France. In the 
 question with England about the Bagdad Railway, Lord 
 Haldane informs us, the Kaiser was most reasonable.3 Another 
 illustration occurs in January 1914, when there was composed 
 a squabble concerning Germany's having a Military Mission 
 at Constantinople on a basis somewhat similar to that of the 
 English Naval Mission or representation there. The Germans 
 
 ' Borderland of Tsar and Kaiser, p. 233. Bigelow's general impression 
 of the Kaiser, though, is not flattering. 
 
 " Baron Beyens, Germany before the War, p. 276. M. Poincar§, in his 
 very recent Origins of the War, admits that this same exclamation wa? 
 reported to him by the Prince of Monaco. He finds in it something 
 mysterious. 
 
 J Before the War, p, 63. 
 
PEACE RECORD OF GERMAN EMPIRE 105 
 
 yielded the point. " I must needs testify," says the Russian 
 Ambassador, "that the Berlin Cabinet has done everything 
 in its power to fulfil our justifiable wishes."i I am not over- 
 looking the action of the Kaiser in 1905 when, deceitfully 
 treated by Delcasse, he insisted successfully that France 
 remove her Minister. This action, far from being brutal, 
 was proper, and had the Kaiser wished to go further, he had 
 an excellent pretext for war during the terrible prostration 
 of Russia.' The stupid error of the Berlin Government in 
 not consenting to a " naval holiday " with Britain, whose 
 rights to a pre-eminent navy is plain, I discuss in Chapter XIII. 
 
 " The promises," says Beyens, " which the Kaiser had 
 made to the people when he ascended the throne as to keeping 
 peace, he kept for twenty-five years." 3 Beyens also concedes 
 that the monarch was sincere in his efforts to reconcile France,4 
 though he relates that in later years the Kaiser grew tired 5 
 and told the King of Belgium at Potsdam in November 1913 
 that war with France was inevitable and close at hand.* The 
 Kaiser, he adds, denounced the Press of Paris, an outburst 
 which, to those who have seen in my first two chapters that 
 part of it was in the pay of the Tsar and that the very diplomats 
 of Belgium were complaining of the militaristic hotheads in 
 charge of the French Government, may not appear unnatural. 
 
 Even M. Tardieu admits the repeated kindnesses and 
 courtesies of the Kaiser in the early part of his reign, friendly 
 advances, alas ! to no purpose.? Nor does Rene Pinon in 
 France et AUemagne decline to enumerate his early marked 
 
 " To Sazonoff, Ent. Dip., Document, No. 836. 
 
 " See Chapter on " Morocco." Professor Rose is one of the many who 
 acquits the Kaiser of any desire for war on account of Morocco. Origins 
 of the War, p. 86. ■ 
 
 3 Beyens, op. cit., p. 23. 
 
 4 Ibid., pp. 33-4. 
 
 5 As well he might after all the repulses he had received, and with Poincarfi 
 making such speeches as the one at Nantes in October 1912. 
 
 ' Baron Beyens, Germany before the War, p. 36. It is regrettable that 
 Beyens attributes this candour to a desire that Belgium join Germany. 
 Had the Kaiser not thus advised the King, his enemies would have said 
 that the deceitful fellow had been entertaining the King of Belgium while 
 meditating his destruction. For my part, I see in his telling the King of 
 Belgium what he did an example of his well-known impulsiveness. Of 
 course, he knew that Albert would in all probability repeat this story to 
 the French, which he did. French Yellow Book, 6, November 22, 1913. 
 
 ? France and the Alliances, pp. 151-2. Poincar6 admits it too. The 
 Origins, p. 25. 
 
106 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 civilities : the Order of the Red Eagle bestowed on General 
 Billot ; the sympathy in words " particularly well chosen " 
 on Camot's assassination ; the invitation to a French Squadron 
 to the opening of the Kiel Canal, and finally " his not con- 
 cealing his wish for a rapprochement with France." As late 
 as January 1914 Viviani prevented a prominent French 
 public man from accepting entertainment from the Kaiser.' 
 Why should he have done this ? Why not let good humour 
 be at least attempted ? 
 
 Haldane tells us that the Emperor himself had said to 
 him that, tr57ing to cultivate friendly relations with France, 
 he was finding it difficult,* and the late Lord Chancellor frankly 
 states that he did not doubt that the German Emperor really 
 desired peace, just as Bethmann-Hollweg did.3 Those who 
 believe that the Germans were maliciously warlike will have 
 to accept universal testimony that they were not so when 
 they were relatively better prepared for war. " Realizing 
 the terrible danger of an armed conflict, responsible leaders 
 of German policy have in general shown great moderation 
 of late," says the Russian emissary at Berlin.4 A Russian 
 Ambassador tells us the same thing, people are surprised that 
 Germany has yielded so gracefully to France on the Morocco 
 question. " Cambon 5 tells me they are still wondering at 
 Paris how the German attitude can be explained. "^ 
 
 We have even Sir Edward Grey testifying to his pacific 
 
 disposition. " I do not believe that the Emperor William 
 
 wanted war when this incident occurred."? I do not believe 
 
 he wants war to-day."^ Repington concedes as much. " My 
 
 own opinion," he says, " is he did not wish for war, but was 
 
 carried along by the tumult of events." 9 Von Tirpitz tells 
 
 ■ Paleologue in Revue des deux Mondes, January 1921, p. 231 et seq. 
 ' Before the War, p. 43. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 117. 
 
 4 Russian chargi d'affaires to Home Office, March 20, 1909, Ent. Dip., 
 
 V- 493- 
 
 5 Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, 
 
 ^ Russian Ambassador at London to Home Office, January 28, 1909, 
 Ent. Dip., p. 487. Relatively Germany was better prepared for war in 
 1909 than in 1914. 
 
 ' Sending of the Panther to Agadir in 191 1. 
 
 ^ Grey to the Russian Ambassador at London, August 3, 1911, Ent. Dtp., 
 p. 599- 
 
 » Diaries, Repington, vol. i, p. 18. The tumult of events was indeed 
 a tumult, the mobilization of more than 2,000,000 Russians a few days' 
 distance from his principal cities. 
 
PEACE RECORD OF GERMAN EMPIRE 107 
 
 us that the Emperor's love of peace was "notorious," and 
 he says : 
 
 When the Emperor reaUzed the failure of his efforts for peace 
 he was stirred to the very depths. An old confidential friend of his 
 who saw much of him during the first days of August declared that 
 he had never seen such a tragic and disturbed face.' 
 
 The peaceful turn of the man is in the very diplomatic 
 documents now invoked against him. When toward the 
 close of July the Serbians had yielded almost entirely to the 
 Austrian ultimatum, the Kaiser was satisfied. He expressed 
 instant and profound joy, and the very memorandum in his 
 handwriting upon the Kautsky document bears the expression, 
 " Now there is no need for war."* Most curiously of all, 
 the very Yellow Book, the French, acquits him, for the expert 
 who was reporting the state of public opinion in Germany 
 for the French Government adds this significant clause, " Apart 
 from the pacific disposition of the Emperor and Chancellor." 3 
 In fine, I think that it is difficult to discover among serious 
 writers and observers a single witness to ferocity or warlike 
 lust in this man's disposition. It was the misfortune of 
 William II to be judged by his emotions and not by his policies. 
 Even the angry Sarolea concedes, " I have no doubt that 
 the Kaiser is perfectly sincere, and I believe him to be animated 
 with the most cordial feelings for this country. "4 
 
 I would not throw a halo around Wilhelm II, who had his 
 full share of faults, but, as he had the disadvantage of being 
 bom to a throne, we must wonder that he had not more. 
 
 My own opinion is, that this monarch possessed most 
 virtues that become a king. His worst fault was an inability 
 to hold his tongue. Immeasurable mischiefs have come 
 upon his country from his emotional expressions of ferocity 
 and vengeance, which are contrary to what everybody tells 
 us of him that was brought within the circle of his acquaintance, 
 or that had to do with him in public affairs. 5 For these 
 
 I Von Tirpitz, My Memories, vol. i, p. 368. 
 » See Kautsky Documents, No. 272. 
 
 3 French Yellow Booh, 5, Report of July 1913 to Pichon. 
 
 4 German TroUems, p. n- 
 
 s The dentist Davis in The Kaiser as I Know Him, a book intended, I 
 think, to give an unfavourable impression of the monarch, afiords us infinite 
 views of a really amiable character and of a man without any haughtiness 
 in private relations. The English lady who became Princess Blucher gives 
 many illustrations of the Kaiser's kindliness in An English Wife in Berhn. 
 
108 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 excited remarks Germany has had to pay, outbursts capable 
 of being quoted with the most deadly consequences, just as 
 she has had to pay for that military manner which in thousands 
 of her officers vexed multitudes of travellers in Germany. 
 
 These travellers brought away a very natural, ineradicable 
 dislike. They forgot or they did not know that, strong 
 though the German military party was, the real heads of the 
 Government were peaceful. They did not know, and until 
 now we did not know, that during the whole month of July, 
 whUe Germany was in the most imminent danger from the 
 preparation of the Russian hosts, the civil Government of 
 Germany kept affairs out of the hands of the military tmtil 
 the Russian mobilization had actually occurred, whereas in 
 France the civil heads of the Government, the Poincares, 
 the Delcasses, and the rest of them, were all eager for war 
 and doing nothing to prevent it. 
 
 What is known as the " Willy-Nicky " correspondence 
 (between the Kaiser and the Tsar) shows that at one time the 
 Kaiser endeavoured to bring the Tsar to his side by imputing 
 dangerous schemes to England with little sense, considering 
 that by a " naval holiday " he might have brought the 
 sagacious islanders to his side. 
 
 There is one little incident which ultimately Englishmen 
 will perhaps recall with feelings not disagreeable. When the 
 Kaiser, during a visit to London, gave an interview to the 
 London Telegraph,^ he reminded England that during the 
 Boer War he had been invited by both France and Russia 
 to j oin in calling upon England to end the war. He telegraphed 
 to those countries that he declined to do so.' Then he tele- 
 graphed to Windsor Castle the negative answer that he had 
 sent, and he reminded his English interviewer that in Windsor 
 Castle at that time the telegram could be seen. I have never 
 heard it denied that this is what he did, and it is known that, 
 when Kruger afterwards sought an audience with the Emperor, 
 it was refused. What has been remembered too frequently 
 is, not these things that he did in a friendly way toward 
 England, but that at one time in an impulsive way he sent 
 to Kruger a telegram of sympathy. England afterwards 
 
 • October 28, igo8. New York Times: Current History of the War, vol. i. 
 No. 2, p. 213. 
 
PEACE RECORD OF GERMAN EMPIRE 109 
 
 found associates against him in war, who in the matter of the 
 Boers had apparently been willing to be more hostile to her. 
 
 A pleasant incident in 1907 further illustrates the genial 
 side of the Kaiser. A guest at Windsor Castle, he was con- 
 sidering a suggestion of Haldane's, then Minister for War, 
 that England and Germany compromise the Bagdad Railway 
 question by a certain concession to England on the Persian 
 Gulf. After dinner they talked till past midnight, and, 
 several prominent Germans joining them, Haldane would 
 have left the room, saying pleasantly, " I find myself at a 
 meeting of the Imperial Cabinet." " Come back," cried the 
 Kaiser, "and be one of my Cabinet to-night." Haldane 
 returning, the compromise was agreed upon.' 
 
 In the " Bjorkoe Treaty," which was to detach Russia 
 possibly from France, I find no reason for censure, for by its 
 terms it was to be made known to France. Russia and France 
 were equally busy in seducing Italy from the alliance with 
 Germany. Witte succeeded in having the memorandum 
 cancelled. 
 
 ' Before the War, p. 63. But on its being submitted to Grey, the latter 
 would not confirm it without the voice of France and Russia. The Kaiser 
 then declined. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE GERMAN STRUGGLE FOR UNITY 
 
 To most persons it would seem self-evident that wherever 
 people speak the same language, have the same national 
 customs and the same general system of law, they should 
 unite. He would be a fool who should deny that Italy is 
 happier because she is now one iountry ; a fool indeed who 
 should wish to see France spht into her original provinces, 
 even though it might suit the convenience or promote the 
 security of some other state to have her dismembered. 
 
 That German science and social progress were held back 
 by internal divisions nearly two hundred years is weU known. 
 Indeed, her prostration under these discords has drawn, in 
 every country except France, the tears of historians. But 
 the evil was not simply an evil to Germany. It was an evil 
 to all Europe. Large populations were repeatedly reduced 
 to beggary, and that was a weak neighbour indeed which was 
 not able to ravage some of the small governments until lately 
 happy and prosperous in the German Empire. At one time 
 these separate governments were as numerous as three hundred. 
 Even by the Peace of Westphaha, which ended the Thirty 
 Years' War, they were still ridiculously numerous, their 
 boundaries confused by ancient and ill-settled claims, their 
 frontiers still exposed to the rapacity of any other country 
 that chose to violate them. 
 
 The great opponent of German unity was France, who, 
 so long as she had the power, played against Germany, and, 
 with some success against the rest of Europe, the very game 
 with which she so loudly reproaches the English. 
 
 " The game of the French," says Andrew D. White,^ 
 
 " Seven Great Statesmen p. 248. 
 110 
 
THE GERMAN STRUGGLE FOR UNITY 111 
 
 " especially after Bonaparte had arrived, was easy ; they 
 played the Continental Governments against each other, 
 bribing some, crushing others, and to prevent the larger states 
 from becoming too powerful they grouped the smaller states 
 and tied them by their ambitions to France, thus in due time 
 creating the kingdoms of Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, Westphalia, 
 the Confederation of the Rhine, and various petty satrapies 
 in which hopes of gain from France were substituted for 
 loyalty to Germany." 
 
 Let us not recount the wars of Richelieu and of Louis XIV 
 against these helpless little countries. It is enough to remind 
 the reader of Bonaparte, who tore up the country from time to 
 time according to his whim. The kingdom of Prussia he once 
 reduced from 5,000 German square miles to a little over 2,000, 
 and from about 10,000,000 population to about 6,000,000, 
 taking from her everything between the Elbe and the Rhine, 
 and leaving her defenceless, while he exacted besides an 
 enormous indemnity. ^ 
 
 In what way up to that time Germany had ever been a 
 danger to France or in what wars Germany had assaUed France 
 is not pointed out by French historians. 
 
 Gradually among these German States there arose one which, 
 after enduring the torments of repeated invasion, determined 
 to create an everlasting weapon of defence. Prussia arose. 
 A succession of kings, strong and tyrannical, yet devoted in 
 an unparalleled degree to the good of their country, » gradually 
 began to create a power, still inferior indeed to the great states 
 of Europe, but not to be despised. Frederick the Great, 
 equal in the cunning, surpassed the endurance of his un- 
 principled foes, and before the time of Bonaparte had erected 
 a Prussian State upon soHd foundations. This country, 
 however, did not border upon France. Far from being any 
 menace to that nation, it was on the contrary compelled to 
 
 I Seven Great Statesmen, pp. 248, 252, 253, 254. 
 
 » Henri Lichtenberger of the Sorbonne : " Prussia was guided to her 
 destiny by a dsmasty inspired by a high sense of duty, solicitous above all 
 for the good of the state, living for their sovereign mission alone, for the 
 greatness of the kingdom. Her nobility, bound to the monarch by ties 
 of the most ardent loyalty, formed a military caste in which the virtues of 
 the warrior were transmitted from father to son. . . . The Germans had 
 an instinctive tendency to reconcile the principle of authority with that 
 of free initiative of the subject." Evolution of Modern Germany, pp. 78-80. 
 
112 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 guard its frontiers continually against dangerous kingdoms 
 nearer at hand. 
 
 In Germany, at the end of the reign of Frederick the Great, 
 there at last were two great states, Austria and Prussia. The 
 former, as we shall see, came to be reckoned as foreign to the 
 others, and in her declining glory could win to her side from 
 time to time only such of the Northern States as might from 
 various reasons be out of humour with the group in the 
 north. 
 
 At the time of the French Revolution Germany was still 
 a hopelessly divided country, and when Bonaparte rose to 
 power nothing was easier to him than to wreck these disordered 
 countries with a twitch of his arm. 
 
 But so terrible became the lash of Bonaparte, so insatiable 
 the greed of France for glory and the spoils of war, that modem 
 Germany may be said to have risen under her whip. The 
 German Army, which had been dissipated, the military system 
 which had been practically dug up from the roots by Napoleon, 
 revived under attacks that knew no cessation. The modem 
 German Empire may, in short, be called the creation of France. 
 It was bred in suffering. The obedience of the Germans to 
 mihtary burdens, their willingness to be led by and to obey 
 a single ruler implicitly, comes from the lessons of two hundred 
 years. In no other way could Germany possibly live. To 
 one man must largely be trusted the Government, since he, 
 from the perils of the common situation, would probably 
 administer Government well. 
 
 After the fall of Bonaparte, the Germans obtained some 
 respite. France had at last been compelled, by the united 
 energies of Europe, and by her own exhaustion, to abstain from 
 her scandalous wars. There ensued a whole generation in 
 which Europe was allowed by France to be at peace. In that 
 period the German states began to consolidate themselves into 
 a loose alliance, derisively and jealously watched by Austria, 
 Russia and France. The sentiments created by this frail 
 imion continued to grow until it became apparent that there 
 could ultimately be achieved a national unity. On the other 
 hand, a new tyrant was rising in France. In the year 1848 
 that country, having again overthrown a monarchy and 
 established a second Republic, in an evil hour attached to the 
 
THE GERMAN STRUGGLE FOR UNITY 113 
 
 Presidency the ominous name of Napoleon. This new Napoleon 
 lost no time in imitating the first. He overthrew the Republic 
 with which he had been trusted and straightway devoted 
 himself to those wars of which he had more in the same period 
 than any other sovereign in Europe except his mighty uncle. 
 In these ways the French so delighted that they forgave him 
 the betrayal of a public trust. 
 
 Louis Napoleon at first amused himself with wars in Italy, 
 and, as is well known, when that country under Cavour desired 
 to imite, levied a blackmail upon her and stole a province. 
 His patriotic eye was accordingly vigilant as to events beyond 
 the Rhine, where the Germans, naturally disturbed by the rise 
 of a second Napoleon, began to huddle together again in the 
 common fear. 
 
 And now arose the gigantic talents of Bismarck. This 
 is the man who was reproached with the expression " blood 
 and iron " by people who do not understand that no other 
 policy could possibly have succeeded. When states are 
 hopelessly divided, when it Hes in the power and the desire 
 of powerful outside Governments to keep them divided by 
 bribes and threats, there is but one policy, that of arms. 
 Bismarck was right when he said that the question of German 
 unity could never be settled by debates and votes. It could 
 be settled only by war. 
 
 Almost equal to France as a disturber of German unity 
 was Austria, who made it plain that the Northern Germans 
 from the Danube to the Baltic could never be united so long 
 as the Hapsburgs could have the controlling voice in German 
 affairs. From this ensued a war between Prussia and Austria 
 known as the Seven Weeks' War, which ended with the utter 
 defeat of Austria at a place called Koeniggratz or Sadowa. 
 The marvellous movement of the Prussian mihtary machine, 
 the completeness of its success, the prostration of ancient 
 Austria, was a great surprise to Europe, and to no part of Europe 
 a greater surprise than to France. 
 
 The contemptible Louis Napoleon now made clear that 
 he would continue the French poUcy of preventing the definite 
 union of the German States. " I can guarantee peace," said he 
 to Lord Clarendon in October 1868, " only so long as Bismarck 
 respects the present status ; if he draws the South German 
 
 8 
 
114 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 States into the Northern Confederation, our guns will go off 
 of themselves." ' 
 
 When a little later Baden made formal overtures for 
 admission into the North German Confederation, the disgust 
 of Louis Napoleon became undisguised.* It will be remembered 
 that Bismarck had to postpone the admission of Baden into 
 the Confederation because admitting her would be the same 
 thing as asking France to declare war against Germany, surely 
 an extraordinary situation in which a whole country should 
 be placed. 3 
 
 The trouble was that the inflammable French people were 
 behind Louis Napoleon in the calamitous step which he was 
 about to take. " Revenge for Sadowa ! " became the cry. 
 That is to say, the French people wished to inflict some sort 
 of punishment upon one of the German States because it had 
 had a successful war with Austria, an infamous attitude which 
 possibly can be pardoned in a people who had successfully im- 
 posed their will upon Italy in an exactly similar situation. 4 
 
 When Louis Napoleon demanded from Prussia a " compensa- 
 tion " for Sadowa, he had to deal with a power growing even 
 more rapidly than he reckoned, for Prussia had already added 
 fresh German States to her side. Bismarck, however, did not 
 refuse him. He led him on. Something of the kind, he 
 intimated, might be considered. Would the Emperor outline 
 a degree or shadow of a proposal, a proposal that should bind 
 nobody, only furnish an idea for discussion ? He was of course 
 merely gaining time in which to see how he could deal with 
 so irresponsible a monarch, whose insistent importunities for 
 some bribe to acquiescence were presented to victorious Prussia 
 on the very field of Sadowa. 5 
 
 ' Dawson, The German Empire, vol. i, p. 315. 
 
 » Ibid., p. 286. 
 
 3 The Evolution of Prussia, by Mariott and Robertson, p. 361. 
 
 ♦ " ' Revenge for Sadowa ' was the cry often heard henceforth. Its 
 meaning was that if one state like Prussia should be increased in area and 
 power, France also for consenting to it had a right to a proportionate increase. 
 The hold of the Emperor on his own people was greatly weakened." Hazen, 
 Europe since 1815, p. 288. In other words, the French people felt that 
 Napoleon had not been sufficiently warlike already, and should have prevented, 
 if necessary by a war, the victory of Prussia over a state in a local quarrel. 
 Lichtenberger, though a Frenchman, frankly acknowledges that this was 
 the policy of that day. Evolution of Modern Germany, p. 133. See Sybil's 
 quotation of Thiers in Founding oj German Empire, vol. vi, p. 217. 
 
 5 " It is France which has been conquered at Sadowa," was one of the 
 
THE GERMAN STRUGGLE FOR UNITY 115 
 
 At first Benedetti demanded no less than Mainz and the 
 Bavarian Palatinate, and Bismarck, while evading him, drew 
 these unprincipled negotiators into a suggestion that what 
 the greedy Frenchman should take should be Luxembourg and 
 Belgium. This piece of business was conducted by Bismarck 
 with wonderful skill, for he actually induced the French 
 Ambassador to outline a proposed treaty for the transfer of 
 Belgium to France.' 
 
 Whether Bismarck at that very time had resolved that 
 any such treaty should ever be signed is not clear. He would 
 of course have been willing to aUow France to have Belgium 
 rather than that German unity should fail, but he doubtless 
 believed that he could at last achieve the German unity and 
 France not enrich herself by the seizure of Belgium. Later 
 events have shown that it woiHd have been better for Germany 
 if Belgiimi had become a part of France and so not neutral. 
 Bismarck, at all events, kept the memorandum, and when 
 later Louis Napoleon forced upon Germany the war of 1870, 
 he made the infamous proposal pubhc through the London 
 Times, to the utter extinction of any sympathy, if England 
 had any, with so bad a neighbour as the Emperor of France. 
 
 exclamations of the military party. " Even before the preliminaries of 
 peace at Nikolsburg had been signed, the French Ambassador to Berlin, 
 Benedetti, had followed Bismarck to the Prussian headquarters, insistent 
 to secure a ' compensation ' for France. Bismarck put him off with fair 
 words." Mariott, op. cit., p. 356. 
 " lUd., pp. 357, 358. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 OF RUSSIAN GROWTH AND THE GERMAN 
 FEAR OF IT 
 
 " To the outsider," says our late Ambassador Gerard,' " the 
 Germans seem a fierce and martial people. But in reality, the 
 mass of the Germans, in consenting to the great sacrifice 
 entailed by their enormous preparations for war, have been 
 actuated by fear." 
 
 Had this truth been better known, we would have seen 
 more reason why Germany plunged into this war, and would 
 have shown her more toleration on the stern day of peace. 
 Our people, however, have been grossly ignorant of European 
 politics, and particularly of complications beyond the Rhine, 
 for the overwhelming bulk of our travellers confine their little 
 journeys, as I did my own first journeys, to France and England. 
 The longer excursions are those extended to Italy, where one 
 can enjoy the softness of winter amid incomparable accumula- 
 tions of art. As for Germany, about one traveller in ten, I 
 should say, goes eastward of the Rhine or Switzerland. We 
 are not deeply interested in its mediaeval history, which to 
 most of us appears to have continued down to Waterloo. 
 In fine, until Germany began to unfold the wonders of 
 industrialism, very few of us sought the centre of the empire, 
 the customs and traits of her inhabitants were largely unknown, 
 and those who wandered into South Germany and Austria 
 were chiefly students of music, desiring to see the haunts of 
 Mozart, the Danube vocal with immortal strains, and the 
 wooded hills where Schubert poured his melancholy soul. 
 
 It is accordingly necessary to enlarge somewhat patiently 
 upon the pecuUar geographical situation of Germany, and 
 particularly her baleful proximity to Russia. 
 
 ' My Four Years in Germany, p. 92, 
 116 
 
RUSSIAN GROWTH AND GERMAN FEAR 117 
 
 If we look at the map of Europe, we see at once the strikingly 
 advantageous situation of England, who needs only a fleet 
 to excuse her people from the burdens of continuous 
 conscription. Next, the situation of France. From Spain 
 and from Italy she is protected by high mountains. The 
 sea furnishes her a reasonable insurance against any other 
 invasion than such as might be in its nature deliberate, slow, 
 and exposed to favourable resistance. Only on one side, 
 that toward Germany, has she any exposure. Spain is a 
 country also well protected against invasion by land. Italy 
 has nothing to fear if she can guard those mountain passes 
 which seem to be created to protect her, nothing to fear except, 
 of course, the guns of English battleships to which she is an 
 easy mark. Russia seems to be free from exposure in every 
 respect. It is true she has a long line of land boundary, but 
 it is also true that the enormous depth of her country makes 
 invasion of her as useless as invading the ocean ; to such an 
 extent indeed that it is doubtful if any Power would deliberately 
 plan her conquest. Never has the conquest of Russia by 
 Germany been seriously discussed, though Germany had 
 the most perfect military organization since that of Bonaparte, 
 Hungary is a country which though entirely inland has 
 around her many high ranges of mountains. Austria enjoys 
 too some security in that respect. It is Germany, and Germany 
 alone, that has no natural frontier and yet is in the middle of 
 different races. The eye of the traveller can nowhere discern 
 by any natural object where Germany leaves off and Russia 
 begins, and on the long line from Saxony to the Baltic the 
 land constantly grows more level, so that the invader has 
 nothing else in nature to oppose him than sands and woods, 
 unless it be the furrows of the trembling farmer. 
 
 The country of Russia has had a rapid growth. It is not 
 long since it was confined to a plain to the east of Poland and 
 remote from the sea. In two hundred years it has increased in 
 area from two hundred and seventy-five thousand square miles 
 to nine million square miles, waxing in population in the same 
 period from twelve millions to one hundred and fifty millions, so 
 that it has been computed that, unless reduced by war or 
 famine, it must within another century have a population of 
 four hundred millions. Nor has it failed within the same period 
 
118 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 to increase in riches. The revenues of two hundred years 
 ago have multiplied forty fold. A popular writer has com- 
 pared it to a glacier, "What it does not crush it erodes; 
 what it does not erode it forces on into some crevasse. It 
 moves on." ^ 
 
 This same writer has made us serious by enumerating the 
 wars of this gigantic power. For the control of the Baltic 
 he tells us it waged twenty-one years of war. Those were the 
 great campaigns in which it pushed back to the Swedish 
 peninsula that far superior people who have in the last war 
 so greatly dreaded the possibihty of Russian success. To gain 
 Little and White Russia, required, he tells us, three wars with 
 Poland. The conquest of the Black Sea borderland took 
 four wars with Turkey. To establish absolutism in Finland 
 called for a war of one year and fifteen months. To extend 
 the Black Sea conquests later, as well as consolidate them, 
 resulted in three more wars with Turkey, besides the Crimean 
 War with the European Coalition. Then there were two wars 
 to subject the Caucasus and the district of the Caspian, besides 
 sixty-two years of war with the highlanders of the Caucasus. 
 In Central Asia there were thirty years of war to establish 
 to its satisfaction the Afghan frontier. 
 
 It is noticeable that this writer enumerates aU this appalling 
 progress out of a sympathy with the English, whose empire 
 he fears must ultimately be disturbed. I do not recall a single 
 one of his pages in which he expresses concern for the German 
 peasants, their wives, daughters, and mothers, who have to 
 dwell within the shadow of so vast a monster. What, we may 
 ask, has England to fear from Russia except the loss of distant 
 possessions that constitute a source of wealth, prestige, and 
 power ? No English islander has to tremble at the dreadful 
 whisper that the Russians across the fields are arming 
 for war. 
 
 The contest between the Teutons and the Slavs is not a 
 new one. If there is a Teutonic people to-day, if there is a 
 Germany that has been able to protect its citizens, to scatter 
 its products over the earth and to contribute to the arts, 
 sciences and erudition of mankind, it is because it has been 
 able to resist stubbornly and bloodily the pressure of the Slavs. 
 ? Homer Lea, Bay of the Saxon, p. io6. 
 
RUSSIAN GROWTH AND GERMAN FEAR 119 
 
 There was a time when the Teutons were pushed back almost 
 to the Rhine, when valour at last turned the tide. It has well 
 been said that the history of the Middle Ages in Central Europe 
 is to a considerable extent the story of the reconquest of lands 
 by the Germans from the Slavs. East Prussia was built up by 
 just this heroic patience.' 
 
 And what kind of a people are these pressing continually 
 on the ribs of those industrious Germans who, in whatever 
 part of the earth they have been scattered, have given such 
 proofs of industry, social progressiveness, and respect for 
 authority ? Let us take the opinions of Dr. E. J. Dillon, who 
 undoubtedly has had the best opportunities of any European 
 writer to study these people in all their relations of life, civil, 
 social, and of&cial, during a long term of years. * 
 
 Of the Russian Government he has a philosophic conception 
 such as one might form by reading Montesquieu. He tells 
 us that all its internal arrangements were adjusted to foreign 
 conquest, which lent its policy a steadfastness and uniformity 
 that were currently attributed to a grandiose Machiavellian 
 scheme. " In a word, the development of Tsardom postulated 
 a state of warfare with its neighbours." He gives a correct 
 analysis of the only possible policy upon which such a despotism 
 as that of Russia could continue, the policy of continued 
 growth. In a state of repose it must die. No Russian dynasty 
 could continue which did not pursue the policy of aggression. 
 A Tsar might give up the predatory policy, but from that 
 instant he must submit to those internal reforms which would 
 either end the character of his power or throw the country 
 into revolution.3 
 
 Nor did any change come on Russia with the mild character 
 of Nicholas II. His mildness was that of evasion and mendacity. 
 When he was not guilty of some deception, he was shifting 
 openly from a former position, still a Tsar, still imbued with the 
 
 ' Turner's Europe Since 1870, p. 433. 
 
 » Mackenzie Wallace had also great opportunities, which are reflected 
 in his most excellent work, but in my opinion he was a far less discerning 
 observer than the accompUshed Dillon, who, it will be remembered, was 
 during many years a member of the faculty in a Russian university, was 
 intimate with the leading Russian statesmen, and was the Russian corre- 
 spondent of EngUsh journals. He seems to have familiarized himself with 
 every department of Russian affairs. 
 3 Eclipse of Russia, pp. 23-9. 
 
120 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 tradition of foreign conquest. " It was the old spirit of the 
 predatory Tsarist state revived for the last time." ' 
 
 Nor is Dillon, who had as good opportunity as any one to 
 see whatever might be lovable in Russian life, more indulgent 
 to the inherent temper of the race, of whom he says that, 
 while richly gifted and with a keen, subtle imderstanding, 
 and even with surprising quickness of apprehension, they 
 have a " changeful temper, a capacity for fiendish cruelty 
 comparable to that of the Redskins of North America." 
 Numerous writers during the recent Revolution have told us 
 of the abominations of cruelty to which the excited Russian 
 masses at times descended. Dillon particularly instances their 
 direct torture of officers after the fall of the Empire.* 
 
 The Russian is never settled. He is so frequently stung with the 
 mania for travelling that it seems to be a call of the blood. He will 
 sometimes rise up suddenly and wander for days or months or years. 
 The lower orders are Oftener possessed of this overmastering passion 
 than their superiors. Love of destruction is inherent; only genera- 
 tions can expel it from the blood. 3 
 
 Only those who peruse books of travel in Russia have any 
 conception of the vile conditions under which its multitudes 
 are willing to live and the uses that can be made of such 
 creatures by unscrupulous leaders in war. Accustomed to 
 the most wretched fare, they endure the hardships of campaigns 
 far more easily than do the troops of the West ; accustomed 
 to obey, they yield quickly to the sharp oath of an officer. 
 In fact, while they were the allies of France and England, 
 these very qualities were matters of exultation in London and 
 Paris. It is only lately that, through fear for themselves, 
 the French seem to be considering that this ignorant docility 
 
 • Eclipse of Russia, p. 124. 
 
 » Ibid., p. 14. 
 
 3 Jtid!.,p. 24. Dillon did not form his convictions of Russian depravity and 
 weakness by the excesses of the Revolution, a period of madness from which 
 many hasty conclusions have been drawn by shallow travellers. He had 
 known them long: An eminent Russian diplomatist confirms his view, 
 quoting with approval his own countrymen. Count Solytofi : "' The weak 
 and resigned Russian of NesterofE and the raging and blasphemous Russians 
 of Lenin are equally genuine phases of the same double-headed Russian. 
 Nearly all Russian characteristics make for oppositions, anarchy and chaos. 
 The Russian detests moderation. He does not like civihzation." See 
 Baron Rosen's " Forty Years of Diplomatic Life," Saturday Evening Post, 
 February 14, 1920. 
 
RUSSIAN GROWTH AND GERMAN FEAR 121 
 
 and valour might be a dangerous combination in a neighbour. 
 Did I not lately read that M. Briand, in explaining why France 
 has not reduced an army that, three whole years after the war, 
 was still kept at eight hundred thousand men, reminds us that 
 as the German wall is crumbling, the people of France have to 
 prepare themselves against a possible inundation from 
 Russia ? I 
 
 "It is a terrible power," said Frederick the Great to his 
 brother, " and in half a century it will make all Europe tremble." 
 A man must be hopelessly ignorant of German life not to know 
 that the fear of Russia was the predominating influence in 
 German militarism. For my own part, after innumerable 
 conversations with German people as to how and why they 
 bore the great military expense, I found them always coming 
 back in explanation to their fear, not so much of France as of 
 Russia. The bulk of the people, I found, were tired of 
 militarism, but the talk would generally end with, " What 
 are we going to do with France and Russia on either side of 
 us ? " This was, in fact, the very remark which the Kaiser 
 made to Lord Haldane in 1906. " A splendid machine I 
 have in this army, Mr. Haldane, now, isn't it ? And what 
 could I do without it, situated as I am between the Russians 
 and the French ? " » 
 
 A very excellent little summary of the European question 
 quotes an American as saying something which is very much 
 confirmed by my own observation : " Shortly before 1914, 
 an American familiar with Germany declared that the great 
 majority of the Kaiser's subjects undoubtedly dreaded the 
 Russians, despised the French, and hated the English. There 
 is little doubt that the Germans lived in genuine dread of the 
 great mass of Slavs stretching from their Eastern border to 
 the Pacific. ' We never can defeat Russia,' they would 
 say." 3 
 
 ' Associated Press from Washington, November 9, 1921. " The only 
 bamer is Poland." M. Briand was nervous notwithstanding several hundred 
 miles of Germany and all of Poland lie between him and that charming 
 people whose despot had lately kissed the President of France on the eve 
 of an exalted war. I wonder how great an army would have made M. Briand 
 feel safe had he lived in Brandenberg I 
 
 » Before the War, p. 51. 
 
 3 Roots of the War, p. 74. There was terrible force in Gortchakoff's 
 comment on his country's good temper under reverses that, after all, could 
 be but temporary. " La Russie ne boude pas, elle se recueille." 
 
122 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Not only did the Russian Government from policy adhere 
 to a system of conquest, and, as Dillon said, live only on the 
 principle of conquest, but the Russian people themselves 
 were imbued with curious and absurd notions about their having 
 what is called a mission to perform. There arose among them 
 a class known as Slavophils, whose purposes became more than 
 a passing whim. Some were moved by religion, others by 
 fantastic idealism, to spread their doctrines all over Western 
 Europe, a favour which, if we may judge by anything they have 
 recently introduced, would indeed be a calamity. We are 
 told by a competent observer that the Russian feels that he 
 is called to give to the world the Russian religious faith in all 
 its purity, and that the lover of Russian institutions, going 
 still further, proposes to bestow upon all civilization a new 
 foundation in the shape of an autocracy. ' 
 
 Isvolsky, in his recent Memoirs, reminds us of Danilevsky's 
 Russia and Europe, a book which proclaimed in inflammatory 
 terms the profound antagonism between Russia and the 
 Occidental world and the inferiority of European culture to 
 that of Russia. Russia, according to Danilevsky, should 
 unite all the Slavs, a thing which could be accomplished only 
 by an armed conflict not only with the Orient but with the 
 rest of Europe. In this conflict the Greco-Slavs, led by Russia, 
 " should establish the definite triumph of its civilization over 
 that of the Germano-Roman people." * 
 
 To the sorrow of Germany and Austria, the political and 
 religious sentiments of Russia united in a purpose to acquire 
 Constantinople. From this, as is weU known, Russia had been 
 during many generations withheld by the patient and political 
 friendship of England for the Turk. There came at last a 
 time, however, when England could afford, for a season at 
 least, to drop this opposition. That vigilant country had not 
 
 ■ Rudolph Martin, Future of Russia, p. 38. This author speaks of a 
 belief prevalent at the time he wrote (1906) that Peter the Great, by his 
 last will, consigned to the Russian people dominion over Europe and Asia. 
 
 > Recollections of a Foreign Minister, pp. 163-4. See also Geoffrey 
 Drage's Russian Affairs, p. 43, and Leroy-Beaulieu's famous work. There 
 is, of course, a distinction between Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism, the former 
 being sociological and the latter poUtical, but to my mind they end in the 
 same thing. At the bottom of aU Russian idealism is an intention to spread 
 the artel and the stupid mir. The painstaking author of the life of John 
 Marshall has given us a more amiable view of these Russian charac' 
 teristics. Russian Advance, by Albert J. Beveridge, pp. 367 and 385. 
 
RUSSIAN GROWTH AND GERMAN FEAR 123 
 
 failed to discern that as Russia required an outlet through 
 the Bosphorus, so also did the Central Empires ; that a conflict 
 of interests would naturally arise between Russia and the 
 Central Empires, and that England need not be at the pains 
 and expense longer to bolster the Turk. Be this as it may, 
 the Enghsh did not hesitate to forfeit all claims upon the 
 friendship of the Porte by the seizure of Egypt. 
 
 Now, it is impossible for Russia to accomplish the possession 
 of Constantinople in the face of unfriendly Balkan States. 
 Indeed, it was essential to her to make a conquest of those 
 States, or if she could not make a conquest of them, that she 
 make them her tools. There were accordingly prosecuted for 
 a quarter of a century before the present war undeviating 
 Russian intrigues in the Balkans. These were met, as was 
 natural, by counter intrigues from the Central Empires, which 
 last, in the prevailing iU-humour, have had to stand the reproach 
 of a policy which seems to be more reprehensible when pursued 
 by them than when pursued by the dastardly Government of 
 the Tsar. It is in truth astonishing that Western Europeans 
 could prefer in the Balkans the spirit of a Court swayed by 
 Rasputin, Cjril, and Vladimir, to the spirit of Berlin and 
 Vienna, which, whatever their faults, were at least not sunk 
 in Asiatic debauchery, and were contributing to the arts, 
 science, and culture of what we are pleased to deem our own 
 valuable civilization. 
 
 Thus to the natural antagonism between races wholly 
 different was added the ground of dissension that each must 
 struggle for the same area of expansion. Fear everjTwhere 
 prevailed throughout the Central Empires. Religion and 
 territorial lust were combining to make one hundred and fifty 
 million Russians, or bad men who could command them, 
 covet the fat valleys of thrift and prudence in Central Europe, 
 and since it was known that the richest people of Western 
 Europe were furnishing arms and money in military alliance 
 with these barbarians, it is easy to understand the anxiety 
 at every fireside in Germany, and the pride felt in the army 
 even by those who detested the glamour, pomp and waste 
 of war. The very fact that two such wrangling neighbours as 
 Austria and Hungary could combine with each other and both 
 with Germany, whom they equally disliked, is proof to ^.ny 
 
124 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 man of sense that there was a great and constant danger in 
 the minds of all three.' 
 
 As for the Russians, it became a settled policy of their 
 Court, expressed too often in language undisguised, that the 
 road to Constantinople lay through Berlin.* This route, as 
 we shall see later, they were preparing with the money of 
 France in strategic railways, besides which fact their European 
 army, which at one time had to be divided for Siberian Service, 
 was, through the rapid increase of population in Siberia, be- 
 coming less under the necessity of being sent to the Far East.3 
 
 The poHcy of the Central Empires to maintain pre-eminence 
 in the Balkans was one of necessity. Even if they did not 
 desire to expand there themselves, they could not possibly 
 allow Russia to do so. The Balkan States, if not acquired 
 by the Teutonic coimtries, must not be acquired by Russia. 
 Fancy the position of either Germany or Austria if Russia, 
 with one arm around them on the Baltic, should extend another 
 around them to the Adriatic. 
 
 Why do people waste time in saying that either Germany 
 or Austria-Himgary was busy at the Courts of Sofia, Belgrade 
 or Bucharest ? Why should they not have been busy there ? 
 Was not a power infinitely more unscrupulous terribly busy 
 there too ? Instead of looking with hostihty upon every 
 Teutonic measure in the Balkan Peninsula, why should we 
 not look with favour upon everything that could exclude from 
 that region a power which menaced the civiUzation of Europe ? 
 Let the Germans, the Austrians or the Hungarians be hated 
 as much as one will, there is still some common social basis 
 between them and ourselves by which we can understand each 
 other. They have our literary traditions, our art, and our 
 music. Their philosophy of hving is like our own. Essentially 
 Western are their views of life and home and property. 
 
 « This is one subject upon which all writers on this topic agree. See, 
 for instance, Fyfe's Germany between the Two Wars, p. 27. 
 
 • Schmidt's England and Germany. This American graduate of Oxford 
 will be found generally very impartial in his fairly extended review of the 
 European complications. On this matter he cites the Russian Professor 
 Mitrofanof, of St. Petersburg, who contributed in June 1914 an article 
 to the Prussische JahrbUche, which article and one by Delbriick he considers 
 invaluable. Even Lichnowsky, in no good humour with the military party 
 in his own country, concedes this. " In Russia, therefore, the opinion 
 arose that the way to Constantinople and to the Mediterranean lay through 
 Berlin." Guilt of Germany, p. 13. 
 
 > Frobenius, Germany's Hour of Destiny, p. 41. 
 
RUSSIAN GROWTH AND GERMAN FEAR 125 
 
 The unanimous voice of travellers is that there pervades 
 the Russian in every rank, class, and condition of society, a 
 lack of good faith, an unwillingness to adhere to any principle 
 at grave cost, a willingness to corrupt and to be corrupted, 
 to buy virtue public and private, and to sell it.' 
 
 The extent of these vices is appalling enough in the lower 
 classes, but it becomes more dangerous to mankind when 
 discovered in those who have a right to put armed multitudes 
 into the field. The royal grand dukes were, under whatever 
 may in Imperial Russia have been called a constitution, sacredly 
 exempt from the process of any court either civil or criminal. 
 For murder itself they were not answerable to any tribunal. 
 Their relative, the Tsar, alone could rebuke or punish them. 
 One may imagine the lives of such unbridled creatures, to 
 whom money must of course be the first of all necessities and 
 insatiably desired. For money these men did and would do 
 anything. Shame never could redden the cheek of a Romanoff. 
 
 A Russian writer has given a number of instances almost 
 incredible of the corruption of some of these grand dukes.« 
 Vladimir, he says, was made custodian of a fund for the building 
 of a memorial temple to the deceased Alexander. Ten millions 
 were collected, but after some years there was neither temple 
 nor money, a fraud so gross as to excite a murmur even in 
 that degraded empire. The Tsar, at last, unable to postpone 
 inquiry, ordered an investigation. Vladimir, seeing that 
 exposure was a certainty, required his secretary to acknowledge 
 the general theft. The secretary recoiling in horror from 
 
 » The pecuniary corruption of the Russians is the complaint of almost 
 every traveller. The poUceman on the street expects his tip. A book- 
 keeper will deny you access to the merchant until he has had his fee. The 
 corruption of the Tchinovnik class, or bureaucracy, is so notorious that 
 Russians themselves assume it an inevitable feature of official life. Even 
 the Tsar had to laugh, it is said, when he first saw Gogol's Inspector General. 
 That writer was equally felicitous on the same subject in Dead Souls, a work 
 the gloomy title of which conveys no conception of its exquisite humour. 
 
 How infinite and involved was the corruption can be seen in what Baron 
 Rosen tells us of Father Gapon, one of the few characters that we thought 
 stood in Russian life for purity of ideal. In a very temperate article Rosen 
 savs that Gapon was " a contemptible personage who had begun his career 
 in the employment of the secret police, had then joined the Revolutionary 
 SociaUsts had afterwards re-entered the service of the Department of 
 Police and ended by being hanged by the Revolutionists as a traitor to 
 their cause." " Forty Years of Diplomatic Life," Saturday Evening Post, 
 
 Tanuarv 3i, 1920. 
 
 » U^r, Rtissia from Within, passtm. 
 
126 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 what would be both a lie and his own damnation, Vladimir 
 upbraided him with lack of loyalty to the House of Romanoff. 
 The poor creature still shrinking from such odium, the royal 
 scoundrel intimated the use of the secret administrative process, 
 by which the subject is arrested without right of trial in the 
 courts, hurried off by the poUce, and inquiry silenced for ever. 
 The end of course is obvious. The secretary, rather than 
 accept permanent life in some wretched cabin in Siberia, 
 gave up his honour, assumed the shame, and escaped with a 
 comfortable exile of five years. 
 
 The same author teUs us another story of the greedy 
 Vladimir. There was a demand during the Japanese War 
 for further gifts by the public to the troops and their families, 
 whereupon there was assessed a large sum indeed to a certain 
 manufacturer of clothing in Moscow. This tradesman had 
 the sturdiness to refuse to give more. When pressed, he 
 explained that his first contribution had been half a million 
 roubles in clothing, all of which, far from going to the soldiers 
 or their families, had, he discovered, been on sale in other 
 Moscow shops within a week after he had made his gift. He 
 would not say what royal or honourable gentleman had 
 pocketed the proceeds, but he would not give more. The 
 knaves who had robbed him then proposed to send him to 
 Siberia, or put him possibly in the fortress of Peter and Paul 
 if he should continue to be obstinate. He stood his ground 
 successfully, for he reminded them that if he went to prison his 
 factory at least would not continue to run. 
 
 When Kuropatkin, Ular continues, was preparing for the 
 Japanese front, he was unable to find some special batteries 
 of Creusot howitzers, and at last had his curiosity gratified 
 by discovering that this equipment had been some years 
 before taken from the Imperial arsenal under the order of a 
 a grand duke and pawned to one of the Balkan States. 
 
 These things seem incredible, but still we remember, aU 
 of us, how Cyril went to the Japanese front with a trainload 
 of harlots and cargoes of champagne, how Admiral 
 Rojestvensky's wake from the Baltic to the Sea of Japan was 
 easily traced by myriads of bottles. 
 
 A people led by scoundrels and debauchees may not indeed 
 achieve the greatest results in war, but he must be a dull man 
 
RUSSIAN GROWTH AND GERMAN FEAR 127 
 
 indeed who does not see that a people led by scoundrels like 
 these will very frequently be in war. The natural occupation 
 of despots is war. From war people with such imlimited powers 
 derive profits proportioned to their mercenary characters. 
 Every contractor pays them tribute. No movement can 
 succeed without contribution to them. All stand in dread 
 of them and wiU pay to escape their displeasure. All who 
 hope for promotion can reach eminence only by submitting 
 to their extortion. 
 
 Thus the Teutonic people were on their native soil 
 continually called upon to raise a barrier of their bodies against 
 a half -Asiatic horde led by the most unscrupulous of mankind. 
 Between Germany and Russia there was not and could not be 
 anything in common. The rudest German farmer of the 
 coast of East Prussia was capable of raising and creating 
 agriculture as a science among the lazy, tipsy and sordid moujik 
 on the Russian plains. Nor was anything more contemptible 
 than the belief of these that they had a superiority over the 
 Germans and the people of the West. Dostoievsky, expressing 
 the self-satisfaction of the intelligentsia, might revel in this 
 fancied superiority and find words with which to express it, 
 but the people around him were but a herd. " The character 
 of the Russians," he says, " differs so greatly from that of aU 
 the other European nations that their neighbours are really 
 incapable of understanding them. Russia is a country which 
 resembles Europe in nothing. How can we expect Russia to be 
 enthusiastic about a civihzation which she has not created?" ^ 
 
 The prejudices of races against each other are, of course, 
 irremovable, and in their origin inscrutable. The more useful 
 the Germans showed themselves to the Russians, the more 
 they were despised, for no race will by accepting the instruction 
 acknowledge the superiority of another. It consequently 
 only made matters worse that the German farmers, wherever 
 they have settled in Russia, have set examples of thrift and 
 
 ' Gregor Alexinsky's Russia and Europe, p. 305. This Muscovite writer, 
 formerly a deputy to the Duma, is fairly well satisfied with his good people. 
 The reader can get a fair account of some of the Russian stupidities, and 
 particularly the institution of the mir, in Stepniak's Russian Peasantry, 
 and Mackenzie Wallace has also a clear general account. After reading 
 very many books, the Russians seem to me very like our rural negroes, 
 utterly improvident, lazy, fond of strong drink, but good-natured when 
 not frenzied by drink or by some sense of wrong. 
 
128 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 industry and that their larger settlements are oases in a vast 
 desert of slovenly husbandry. Their very excellence increased 
 the discontent against them. 
 
 It must be borne in mind that Russia never had a feudal 
 aristocracy in the Western sense, the virtues of which have in 
 so many lands more than ofEset its vices and which has so often 
 created civil liberty for aU in the defence of itself against a 
 tyrant. No error is more common than that the Russian 
 nobiUty resembles that of England, say, or of France or of 
 Germany. For example, there are no great old castles in 
 Russia. A nobleman's country estate is a poor thing indeed 
 to look at. Isvolsky, in his Recollections of a Foreign Minister, 
 gives perhaps the best description of what he calls the " Pro- 
 vincial Nobility." 
 
 Poultney Bigelow quotes an instructive conversation with 
 one Alvenstorm, who, though his family had been for two 
 hiuidred years resident in Russia, was under some disfavour 
 by reason of Swedish ancestry. The Russian peasant, according 
 to Alvenstorm, disliked the Courlanders, a good farming class 
 of German stock brought in by the Russian landlord, but 
 jealously watched by the peasants. The Courlanders had 
 become obnoxious " for getting on in the world. The Russian 
 peasant, in a country where land is sold for almost nothing, 
 finds himself crowded out by a strange people who convert 
 swamps into meadows and become rich in lands which they 
 have always regarded as waste." ' 
 
 Thus far I have said nothing about those sombre aspects 
 of Russian tyranny that must have been at all times in the 
 minds of the East German population. To fear foreign rule 
 is bad, but to fear it in the shape of a gloomy despotism is 
 infinitely worse. To be in dread of an alien pohce in your 
 streets, magistrates speaking a strange tongue in courts of 
 justice, swaggering assessors and collectors of taxes and 
 inquisitors violating with strange oaths the immemorial customs 
 of your race — this, I say, is agony. 
 
 But what shall we think of those who to such fears have 
 to add the apprehension that all this base machinery will be 
 spurred to exaction by universal corruption ? Nay, more : 
 
 « The Borderland of Tsar and Kaiser, p. 267. On this subject see 
 Chapter II of Annette Meakin's valuable Russia. 
 
RUSSIAN GROWTH AND GERMAN FEAR 129 
 
 what if you have to fear that a conquering tyrant will bring 
 in a system which denies you the right of trial, a tyranny 
 that can at any time pronounce your offence one solely for 
 the executive department, remove you from your home by a 
 process called administrative, hold you without trial, without 
 arraignment and without even the knowledge of any friend 
 as to where you are, as to where you have been removed, and 
 in what you are supposed to have offended ? 
 
 Such was the Russian system even under Nicholas II. 
 A husband and father, for example, is called from his dinner 
 table by a knock at the door. He returns deadly pale. The 
 secret police are there. On what errand they will not say 
 except that he must go with them to prison that night without 
 so much as communicating with a friend. Not to-morrow, 
 now ! No warrant, no explanation, only an order from the 
 executive head of the district. The next day the unfortunate 
 man's wife or other relatives beseech an interview with him. 
 It is denied. Later perhaps the secret police will concede 
 it. The thing is an affair of Government. It belongs to the 
 Imperial department at St. Petersburg. Friends call to inquire. 
 They even persist. If they get any answer it is that in a few 
 days the department may feel free to give an explanation. 
 At present it is doing them no good to meddle in this way, 
 for the department knows too much. If they wish to keep 
 themselves out of trouble they and this man's family had best 
 let the matter drop. But where is the prisoner ? No matter. 
 The Imperial Government will do him no harm. Be quiet, 
 or you wiU get into trouble yourself. Your husband has had 
 the misfortune to get into bad company and the Imperial 
 Government knows it. 
 
 Horrible nightmare, under which thousands of honest, 
 hard-working men and women have been hurried to Siberia 
 or to the gloomy prison of Peter and Paul, and from which 
 escape was possible only by bribery in high places, themselves 
 not accessible without the applicant's submitting to blackmail 
 to beg^n with. Under these circumstances what would one 
 do but tremble at the thought of being accused ? You would 
 shun in conversation the very topic of public affairs.' 
 
 ' I remember the story of an American who happened to remark in a 
 drawing-room to three Russians that a certain prominent official was in his 
 
 9 
 
130 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 From the time when a friend disappeared under admini- 
 strative process, nobody asked questions or introduced his 
 name. It was not safe to talk of him and was unfair to your 
 friends to put them in a position where they could not deny 
 that there had occurred a conversation concerning him at 
 which more might have been said than was admitted. The 
 victim entirely disappears. He never was. 
 
 Looking at this tyranny, the shadow of which overspread 
 the greater part of Germany, the humblest German knew one 
 thing. In Germany he must be charged with an offence ; 
 charged with an offence, he must be tried for it ; tried for it, 
 he was sure of having trial in an open court. 
 
 And under the Russian system what punishments, just 
 God ! What horrors ! That long, deathlike march from home 
 to desolation, from life to the living tomb ! That horrible 
 monument marking the dividing line between Europe and 
 Asia, at the sight of which the banished fell prostrate in woe ! 
 Those convict barges on the half-frozen streams, those rafts 
 which neither a Dante could imagine nor a Dore depict ! 
 This was the Government which Germany had to fear, which 
 France was supplj'ing out of her unlimited resources with arms 
 for war. 
 
 Did not the Germany of at least the Baltic Provinces 
 expect that in a successful war by Russia these lands would 
 be annexed to that dark empire ? Does anybody doubt that 
 they would have been annexed ? Who could have stopped 
 Russia ? Would the Allies even have felt inclined to stop 
 her ? Had Russia, then, no incentive to a war which would 
 have gained her the lovingly tilled soil from Tilsit to the 
 Oder ? Mild prophecy indeed ! 
 
 opinion ultra-conservative. " By no means," exclaimed all three with great 
 haste, " he is a most liberal man in his views." The surprised American 
 a little later happened to have a chat with one of these three Russians alone 
 when he was assured by him voluntarily that on account of the presence 
 
 of the other two he had not been able to be quite candid. " Yes, is 
 
 as you say an ultra-conservative man, very conservative indeed." This 
 led the American to detach another of the group who whispered, " Now, 
 
 to be frank, is extremely conservative, in fact just a bit reactionary, 
 
 but it would not have been discreet in me to make such a comment when 
 more than one other person is present." To have admitted that the official 
 was conservative would have been a remark which, if repeated, could be 
 misconstrued and placed in connection with other remarks as unkindly 
 criticism. Thus the thing would lead on. Spies were everywhere. ,The 
 third Russian afterwards unblushingly confessed the same to ^e American. 
 
RUSSIAN GROWTH AND GERMAN FEAR 131 
 
 Has the reader at hand George Kennan's famous book ? 
 Let him turn to a certain interview which he describes as 
 having occurred in a wretched cabin on the everlasting snow, 
 an interview dangerous to him and to two exiled women. 
 The pathos of that scene will linger long in the reader's memory. 
 The women had almost lost the power of speech in the long cold 
 monotony of their isolation. Kennan knocked at 'the door 
 and whispered identification. " She looked at me for almost 
 a minute in silence and half incredulous amazement." But 
 why describe what only tears can tell ? " For being present 
 at the time of an armed resistance to the police, although she 
 had not participated in it. Miss Armfeldt suffered fourteen 
 years and ten months of penal servitude, with deprivation of 
 all civil rights and exile to Siberia for life." ^ 
 
 Nor was all this abandoned under the gracious Nicholas II. 
 Do not be deceived. With trifling relaxations it went on. 
 Those who moulded the public opinion of the world soon, 
 on account of their alliances with Russia, found means to keep 
 this horror from being so talked about,* but it went on. For 
 instance, the case of Catherine Breshkovsky, released only 
 by the Revolution. A refined, highly educated woman, she 
 was compelled to trudge to her chill cabin a thousand miles, 
 one of a party in which there were only two women among 
 one hundred criminal men. This fine creature was at last 
 considered harmless in a snow-covered hut one hundred miles 
 from any other of her own sex.3 Was she released by the late 
 Tsar, the amiable Nicholas ? No. 
 
 Just across the water from the Germans was also the example 
 of Finland. Unhappy country, detestably betrayed ! No 
 monarch ever more unblushingly lied by breach of faith. The 
 Finns, happy in their local self-government, had given him no 
 offence and were upon the whole the most prosperous part of 
 his population. It was, however, time to move westward. 
 Their ancient privileges were accordingly ruthlessly annihilated, 
 annihilated contrary to the express promise of the Tsar. The 
 head of their affairs, freely selected by themselves, was 
 
 ' Siberia and the Exile System, vol. ii, p. 184. 
 
 ' See Dr. Dillon's comments and those of Bertrand Russell on the quick 
 decline in publicity against Russia after the alliance of France and the 
 friendly relations of England with that Power. Chapter III. 
 
 3 Her hfe can be found in a book called The Little Grandmother of the 
 Russian Revolution, p. gS. 
 
132 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 impatiently deposed, and in his stead was set up a thorough 
 tyrant of the brutal school of Petrograd. The tears and sighs 
 of that unhappy people it is needless to describe. Their 
 tears and sighs did them no good, for Russia was moving on to 
 Sweden. 
 
 The peculiar hardiness of the Russian soldier is equalled 
 by his stolid indifference to death, which, according to all 
 accounts, it is besides extremely difficult to administer to him. 
 An incident during the Moscow campaign of Bonaparte is 
 related by Constant. He says that they came upon a Russian 
 who, having lost both legs, had hollowed a dead horse for 
 shelter against the wind, and during the Japanese War I 
 remember an account of a Russian who, being wounded, feU, 
 where he remained half exposed to further bullets, of which 
 he received forty through his legs and arms afterwards without 
 collapsing. They are the last extensive race out of barbarism. 
 They possess only that low nervous system which might be 
 expected from such as can endure a long winter in one room with 
 a cow, a horse, and a numerous family, amid a stench at which 
 a European turns sick. 
 
 " Under Souvoroff and Koutesoff," says an English military 
 correspondent, " the Russian soldier withstood the best troops 
 of Napoleon, and frequently defeated them. If the Poles, 
 Finns, Caucasians, Little Russians, and the inhabitants of 
 the Baltic Provinces are loyal and give no trouble, Russia 
 should not only be able to inflict a crushing defeat on Germany, 
 but might also annex Galicia and the Slavonic provinces of 
 Austria." Elsewhere he remarks, " Even if she should by 
 chance be defeated, it will only delay the day when she will 
 be the predominating Power of Europe." ' This writer has the 
 felicity to live in an island possessing the greatest battle fleet 
 in the world. 
 
 " William II listened long and intently as I developed the 
 many reasons for his stepping forth in 1891 as the champion 
 of Western civilization against the barbaric tendencies of 
 Russia." * Here we note one of the earliest discussions of 
 the Yellow Peril which the young Kaiser did not plainly perceive 
 
 ' The Russian Army from Within, W. Barnes Steveni, pp. 34, 169 (1914). 
 
 " Poultney Bigelow, Prussian Memories, p. 106. WilUam expressed a 
 belief that the two monarchs could keep the peace. It was in 1891 that 
 France began her combination with Russia. 
 
RUSSIAN GROWTH AND GERMAN FEAR 188 
 
 in 1891. Most of us laughed at him subsequently when he did 
 see it and warned us of it, warned us of it after French money 
 had armed so thoroughly the rough hordes of Russia. 
 
 Never was that peril far removed from Germany. It was 
 the black cloud that continually hung over her and against 
 which various Prussian kings had been able to guard their 
 people by dynastic influences. In another chapter we have 
 seen Witte's own story that before the war of 1904 between 
 Russia and Japan his country was so near going to war with 
 Germany as actually to prepare her field organization for 
 movement and to select her principal commanders, i What 
 manifestly prevented this was the diverting of their belligerency 
 to Japan, an enterprise in which it is lately the habit to impute 
 the Kaiser with encouraging the Tsar. If this last be true, 
 those who know how terrible an anxiety Russia was to Germany, 
 how traditional it was in the German Court to keep from 
 quarrelling with Russia, how diplomatic and personal friend- 
 ships alone have kept this dangerous giant off the tempting 
 soil of Germany, will do the Kaiser the justice to say that in 
 turning the greed of Russia away from his own land to some 
 far distant field he was acting in a manner patriotic and 
 natural. 
 
 " It is difficult for us to understand how real the Slav peril 
 appeared to Germany and Austria," says Lord Haldane,* 
 who distinctly attributes the Great War to the Teuton's appre- 
 hensions of Russia. He must be a dull or prejudiced 
 investigator who in respect to this last comes to any other 
 conclusion. 
 
 Iteration and iteration is necessary to enforce at a distance the fact 
 of extreme tension all along the frontier between Slavs and Germans. 
 The German people believed themselves in the widest sense engaged 
 in a never-ending struggle for the supremacy of a higher over a lower 
 civilization. 3 
 
 ' Witte, Memoirs, p. 123. 
 
 » Before the War, pp. 91, 219. 
 
 3 Sloane's The Balkans, p. 254. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 
 
 As may be seen in an appendix, this treaty was arranged 
 in the years 1891 and 1892, that is to say, about thirteen 
 years after the alHance of Austria and Germany against 
 Russia, who had become estranged from the Central European 
 Powers by the Congress of Berhn. About the latter alliance 
 there was no longer any secret, for it had been pubhshed in 
 1888. Italy had indeed become a member of that union 
 which thenceforth bore the name of the Triple Alliance, 
 but a member poorly bound.^ 
 
 There was nothing in the latter or the spirit of the 
 dual alliance of Austria and Germany to begin with, 
 or in the later Triple Alliance to give France a particle 
 of alarm. On the contrary, the union of these Govern- 
 ments was natural against the expanding power of colossal 
 Russia. 
 
 Nor had France up to 1892 a single act of the Germans 
 to reproach them with or to consider as a menace to her 
 safety. Twenty-two years had passed since the Prussian 
 victory at Sedan, in which period the German Empire 
 had been rejoicing in peace, was obviously fond of peace, 
 and was observing that peace was as profitable as war. 
 There was growing up in Germany, moreover, a strong 
 anti-mihtarist faction who, feeling that Germany had at 
 last attained her union and was safe, were willing to discard 
 that sterner system of government and of mihtary organiza- 
 tion which centuries of misery had taught them was their 
 only protection. Fortunate, indeed, had it been for Europe 
 
 ' See the concluding part of Chapter VI. Not bound against Great 
 
 Britain at all, or against France if the latter and Great Britain became 
 allies. 
 
 131 • 
 
THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 185 
 
 if the French temper had permitted them to avail themselves 
 of this growing sentiment in Germany. What the French 
 did was to take just that course of action which placed 
 this sentiment at a hopeless disadvantage in Germany, 
 and enable the mihtary party to justify itself by unanswerable 
 arguments in a sustained pohcy of arms. 
 
 It was only in 1875 that there had occurred any event 
 in Germany wliich might give alarm to France. The incident 
 is known as the war scare of 1875, to which I have made 
 allusion before, and which was nothing more than a burst 
 of Bismarck's anger at what he deemed the machinations 
 of the French politicians. 
 
 Seventeen years had now passed since that affair. The 
 friends of France may in vain be challenged to produce 
 one act of Germany which would justify their allying a free 
 and popular Government with that dark despotism which 
 no writer has found words adequately to describe. To link 
 France to the country of the Azeffs and the Plehves, of 
 agents provocateurs, of the BastiUe of Peter and Paul, and 
 of the icy prison huts of Siberia, was an act unjustifiable 
 at the time and a crime under any circumstances short of 
 invasion and despair. 
 
 France was in point of fact at that time an exceedingly 
 prosperous country. As for Germany, the young Kaiser 
 had come upon the throne in 1888 only to ofier, and speedily 
 offer, every overture for future friendly relations with his 
 neighbour west of the Rhine. ^ 
 
 Moreover, the treaty has a progressive history. As first 
 formed it was to be a defensive alliance, at least such on 
 its face, against anything that might be done hostile to 
 France by the Triple Alliance. This, however, was not 
 enough for M. Delcass^. In the year 1899 that statesman, 
 whose name is inseparably Unked with the consequent 
 miseries of his country, made a visit to Petrograd, where 
 he achieved what he considered a great diplomatic gain. 
 As will be seen in the appendix, he reports it with no small 
 satisfaction. He had been afraid, he relates, that the union 
 with Russia might expire when the Triple Alliance expired, 
 a condition of the engagement. M. Delcass6, however, 
 
 » See the chapter on the " Peace Record of the German Empire." 
 
136 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 did not feel that the alliance with Russia ought to terminate 
 when the only thing it was to provide against, or which 
 could possible justify so base a union, had also expired. 
 It would be too bad to have it expire when France was 
 safe. It ought to continue when some one else would be 
 too weak to resist it. 
 
 In reporting to President Loubet in August 1899 he 
 asks what would happen " if the Triple AlUance should 
 dissolve otherwise than by the volition of its members ; 
 if, for example, Emperor Franz Joseph, who seems at times 
 the only bond between rival and even enemy races, should 
 suddenly disappear ; if Austria were threatened by a dis- 
 memberment, which perhaps is after all desirable, which 
 perhaps might be countenanced, and which in any case 
 one might become anxious to turn into account. What could 
 be more capable of compromising the general peace and 
 of upsetting the balance between the European forces? 
 and what situation, furthermore, would more deserve to 
 find France and Russia not only united in a common plan, 
 but ready even for its execution ? " 
 
 Now, a man must be wholly unacquainted with the 
 language of diplomacy who does not perceive in the foregoing 
 an evil intent. If, Delcasse reasons, the Triple Alliance 
 dissolves, France and Russia should be able to take advantage 
 of the weakness of the Central Powers. Austria and Prussia 
 he admits are not particularly friendly to begin with. When 
 Franz Joseph dies the aUiance may fall apart, Italy, of 
 course, having no particular fondness for Austria at any 
 time. A people inclined to peace would say that this 
 would be a good opportunity for France, with its 
 exalted ideas of freedom, to rid itself of its alliance with 
 the debauched court of St. Petersburg. Delcasse, on the 
 contrary, thinks that is just the time when France ought 
 to rivet this chaste alliance more firmly and " turn it to 
 account." 
 
 Gleefully, therefore, he invites the commendation of 
 President Loubet by reporting to him his success in inducing 
 that friend of freedom, the Tsar, to continue the alliance 
 with France even after the Triple Alliance may dissolve. 
 Nor can he wholly conceal, even in the language of diplomacy, 
 
THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 137 
 
 the rascally business at which he aims. Referring to the 
 new bargain that he has made, he says : 
 
 The arrangement of 1891 is solemnly confirmed, but the scope 
 is singularly extended; while in 1891 the two Governments expressed 
 anxiety only for the maintenance of the general peace, my plan provides 
 that they shall concern themselves just as much with the " main- 
 tenance of the balance between the European forces." ' 
 
 It is not suifprising if M. Delcasse's happy emendation 
 of this document became known to the Germans. At Paris, 
 as de Blowitz once remarked, the very fishes talk. 
 
 Those who know the temper and the subsequent history 
 of Delcasse, those who are aware of the deceitful and 
 dangerous trick which he played upon the Germans in 
 the Morocco transactions, and the ferocity with which he 
 always bore himself towards the Germans in debate, will 
 not be surprised that this alUance with Russia finally took 
 the turn of an intentional assault upon Germany. To be 
 sure, there were obstacles to be overcome. Between the royal 
 families at Berlin and St. Petersburg there existed, even after 
 the Congress of Berlin, a great deal of friendly intercourse, 
 and the aristocracy of the two countries had upon the whole 
 remained friendly, but every year was bringing the situation 
 to a point more favourable for revengeful action by the 
 French. As for Russia, she must, of course, sustain herself 
 by foreign wars. No other policy was possible to the 
 principle of her existence. But from a war on Germany 
 she was deterred a long time by many circumstances, not 
 the least among which was the power of the Triple Alliance 
 to resist her. In 1904 she was diverted from what might 
 have been an attack upon the Central Powers only by her 
 ambition to seize a dominating position on the north of 
 China and the Pacific Ocean. 
 
 » Delcass6's language connected an avowedly defensive to an avowedly 
 offensive arrangement. Neither do I see what M. Poincarfe means by the 
 innocent terms applied to the original treaty, " preparatory diplomatic 
 accord." That treaty was an alliance of arms. 
 
 The intentions of Delcass£ are so plainly mischievous in this thing that 
 I am not surprised to find M. PoincarS in his recent book gliding over this 
 amendment as swiftly as possible, yet I do not see with what regard for 
 fairness he can, though refraining from quoting Delcass^, briefly dispose of 
 the transaction with the words, " M. Delcassi deemed it prudent that it 
 should remain in force, like the preparatory diplomatic accord of 1891, as 
 long as the common interests of the two countries demanded it." Origins of 
 the War, p. 56. 
 
138 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 There were always those in France who distrusted this 
 Russian engagement, and to quiet their discontent it was 
 the common habit of the Chauvinists to raise a cry about 
 the evil intentions of Germany. But again I say it is 
 impossible to discover in any German act a hostility greater 
 towards France than was displayed towards Holland or 
 towards Denmark. For some reason this very belligerent 
 German people were not attacking small and weak states 
 with fine and useful harbours. 
 
 I have previously referred to the profound secrecy in 
 which the Russian Treaty was kept during thirty-two 
 years. Even when the war came it was not disclosed, for 
 its arrangement of joint simultaneous action, of mihtary 
 continuous collaboration and the like did not sound well 
 to a considerable section of the French people who beUeved 
 that Russia was making use of their country. M. Poincare, 
 disturbed by such criticism and anxious to appease it, 
 makes the matter worse by relating that so great was the 
 candour of his administration that Viviani, addressing 
 Parliament, had a copy in his pocket which he did not 
 show because invaded France no longer cared. That is 
 exactly the argument, though, against the Poincares.^ 
 
 " France," says Jaures, " has lost all control of the 
 alliance ; it is Russia alone which fixes its meaning ; it 
 is Russia alone which determines its direction ; she can 
 transform a pact of mutual guaranty into a pact of adventure, 
 of which France is to pay the expense and the Russian 
 Tsar to collect the profits. "» 
 
 Baron Rosen, though a Russian, quotes with approval 
 Earl Loreburn's argument that under the Franco-Russian 
 aUiance France had an implied right to forbid Russia to 
 precipitate the war by mobUization. He recalls Jaures' 
 urging France to notify Russia that if she mobiUzed without 
 French consent, France would not be bound. Still more 
 interesting is Rosen's admission that Russia was not bound 
 to intervene for Serbia and thus get into the war at all. 
 
 I See The Origins, pp. 53-4. 
 
 » Vie de Jean Jaurds, by Charles Rapoport, Paris, 1916, p. 72. This 
 work being published during the war was necessarily much limited in expres- 
 sion. Its author has not pressed upon the reader the many vigorous public 
 utterances of Jaurfes to delay miUtary action. 
 
THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 139 
 
 As will be seen in a later chapter, he concedes that Russia 
 was not really a Slav state. ^ 
 
 From the first year of the alliance Russia began to help 
 herself to the lion's share of the profits. Once that paw 
 got within the French Treasury, the door never could be 
 closed against it. What other fate has a banker who makes 
 a reckless loan to unscrupulous debauchees ? By the year 
 1906, with the assistance of the active Financial Publicity 
 Syndicate and the chorus of a well-paid Press, Russia had 
 obtained from France in general flotations no less than two 
 and one-half thousand millions of dollars. How much 
 besides she got on private undertakings will never be known, 
 nor am I aware how much was added of a public sort between 
 1906 and the beginning of the Great War. 
 
 It was a vast drain on the resources of France, which 
 must thenceforth lend more or lose all. 
 
 In the year 1905 the debtor was in almost total financial 
 collapse* and on the verge of revolution, but the energy 
 of Witte, along with the helplessness of the creditor to refuse, ' 
 procured more money. The bankrupt was again set upon 
 its feet, and from that time became more than ever the 
 master of France, following only the injunctions of the 
 latter as to using the bulk of this money in the equipment 
 of a vast new army and navy and the building of strategic 
 railways to the German frontier.3 
 
 A deplorable bargain, fraught with inevitable ruin to 
 mighty states ! The fund from which that new indebted- 
 ness was to be repaid was no longer doubtful. It was to 
 be, in the Russian mind at least, the spoils of Germany. 
 
 Is it possible that the French Government was ever 
 unaware of that object, that it was ever without hope of 
 
 ' " Forty Years of Diplomatic Life," in Saturday Evening Post, August 21, 
 1920. 
 
 » See the details in the chapter on " The Peace Record of the German 
 Empire," where it is shown that all military experts expected Germany to 
 take advantage of an unexampled opportunity to crush France when the 
 latter could not have obtained a single army corps from Russia. 
 
 3 It is always to be borne in mind that the Russian gauge is wider than 
 the German gauge. Assuming what soon occurred, the creation of an over- 
 whelming Russian army, these forces would have two advantages. They 
 could be poured into Germany on these new railways, and yet if they fell 
 back the Germans could not adapt their own railway equipment to pursuit. 
 The retreating Russians would, of course, destroy so much of the Russian 
 railway equipment as was not necessary to convey them back to safety. 
 
140 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 liquidation through such a source ? Where had the first 
 French loan been spent by Russia ? In war — war on Japan. 
 What had been the history of Russia in preceding centuries ? 
 A long tale of expansion by stealth or assault. After she 
 was checked on the Pacific, in what direction did Russian 
 ambition turn ? Had not French politicians heard that 
 in Petrograd " the road to Constantinople lay through 
 Berlin " ? Did the French not suppose that Russia desired 
 to be and would be a richer country and better able to 
 repay her loans if she did seize the whole German coast 
 as far as Hamburg, or if, following the absorption of 
 Finland, she seized at least the Scandinavian Peninsula ? 
 
 Into what an abyss of blood and misery have sunk the 
 appalling total of the savings of France ! Milliards vanished 
 at Mukden, milhards at Tannenberg. 
 
 But it was reserved for one of the greatest masters of 
 prose to foretell the sorrowful end, to warn France at the 
 outset, and to hold up to mockery the incestuous marriage 
 of a free government to a despotism. Let us hear the voice 
 of Tolstoi. Well may France and Europe recall to-day 
 one of the greatest exertions of his intellect.' 
 
 The French and Russian peoples, he related, had 
 had a knowledge of each other during many centuries 
 without many emotions of love or hate when of a sudden, 
 because the officers of a French squadron drank and ate 
 enormously at Kronstadt, and because a number of Russian 
 officers ate and drank enormously at Toulon, the two races 
 discovered that they loved each other devotedly, that there 
 was a strange bond of union between them, that they were 
 so near and dear to each other that nothing in the future 
 could ever divide them or make them have the least 
 misunderstanding. 
 
 " In France," he continued, " the people would burst 
 into tears at sight of a Russian sailor, salutes followed 
 salutes, the national hymn of each was learned by the 
 other, vast dins of joy accompanied the tramp of Russian 
 feet ; great banquets and concerts and merrymakings in 
 the streets, in the greens, and in the gilded haUs, reminded 
 the cheerful guests that never had such a union as this 
 
 ■ " Patriotism and Christianity." 
 
THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 141 
 
 been found among nations. So vast were the crowds that 
 persons were often crushed to death in the struggle to get 
 a glimpse of these beloved Russian sailors. During the 
 whole fortnight the festivities were prolonged, every detail 
 of which was set out, even the endless menus, in the daily 
 Press. ' Long live the Russian Emperor ! We love him 
 and peace.' The Marseillaise, denouncing tyrants, followed 
 the battle hymn of the Romanoffs. Telegrams by the 
 thousand were flashed across Germany to loving Russia 
 and back to loving France." 
 
 All the French suddenly became extraordinarily religious and care- 
 fully deposited in the rooms of the Russian mariners the very images 
 which a short time previously they had as carefully removed from their 
 schools as harmful tools of superstition, and they said prayers incessantly. 
 
 But this great genius who employed with such terrible 
 force the irony of Swift in the style of the Scriptures, still 
 does not desist from portraying the hyprocrisy of this alliance. 
 
 Besides the throwing of flowers and various little ribbons and the 
 presenting of gifts and addresses, the French women in the streets 
 threw themselves into the arms of Russian sailors and kissed them.' 
 
 I have not space for more of this wonderful piece of 
 writing, except for his awful and prophetic quotations 
 from certain French school-books which taught the little 
 boys of France : 
 
 It is for you, boys in our schools, to avenge the defeat of your fathers 
 at Sedan and Metz. It is your duty, the great duty of your life. You 
 must ever bear that in mind. 
 
 But let me not forget one weak voice of truthful warning, 
 to which France at that time should have lent a willing 
 ear, " An Open Letter to French Students," from the 
 United Council of Moscow Students. 
 
 These receptions represent a sad but we hope a temporary condition 
 — the treason of France to its former great historical r61e. This 
 
 • We all remember with what emotion French women fell upon such 
 of our troops as first arrived in France, kissed them and wept. They were 
 at that time upbraiding these same Russians for not continuing longer in 
 a war in which millions of Russians had died under this abominable alliance. 
 Perhaps they had even forgotten that Paris had been saved in 19 14 by the 
 enormous armies which Russia poured into East Prussia with greater speed 
 than even German sagacity had deemed possible. 
 
142 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 antagonism [to Germany] keeps all Europe under arms and gives 
 the deciding vote in European affairs to Russian despotism.' 
 
 Only by a miracle has Europe escaped conquest of its 
 greater part by the Russian arms, a catastrophe that would 
 indeed have been a fulfilment of the prophecy of these 
 humble students. How much of Europe the Tsar would 
 have taken, had he been victorious, we know now by the 
 rapacious Secret Treaty with France made during the 
 war.* 
 
 What shall be said of a nation's having self-control or 
 love of peace when it taught its Httle boys revenge for 
 defeat in a war so wrongfully declared by itself as that of 
 1870, condemned even by its own historians ? 
 
 But there was wrong besides which France signally 
 did to the Russian people. In 1905 a great turning-point 
 had come in the Russian poMtical development. The 
 Russians still had a Tsar whom they by tradition would 
 obey. On the other hand, they were trying to develop 
 a free government through a Duma or national assembly 
 lately conceded. The Tsar, in his financial prostrations, 
 must either get money from French bankers or yield to 
 the Duma's demand for constitutional government. Then 
 might have come, as in the case of England and some other 
 countries, a gradual development of civil Hberty and con- 
 stitutional government through the quiet, gradual struggle 
 of the multitude, led by the bourgeois against the Crown, 
 the latter 5delding from time to time and yet preserving 
 the ancient authority. The Tsar implored France for 
 money. That money was for a soldiery which should make 
 him independent of the Duma. That money he got from 
 France, in spite of the protests of the Russian hberal. 
 These were disdained. France preferred the continuation 
 of despotism in Russia to any weakening of the power of 
 her arms and the authority of a tyrant. 
 
 To the wickedness of this alUance in itself must be added 
 these frenzied jubilations. What other agreement between 
 nations was ever celebrated in this delirious, offensive way ? 
 
 ' Tolstoi's Works, edition by Du Mont, article on " Patriotism and 
 Christianity," p. 10. 
 » See Appendix D. 
 
THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 148 
 
 Of all the treaties ever made how many were accompanied 
 by more than official congratulations ? The purpose of 
 all that noise, those parades, those frolics, those tumultuous 
 rejoicings, those cataracts of fireworks, was to taunt a people 
 whom these merry-makers hated and wished to insult and 
 whom they nearly encircled. 
 
 Again, one asks how long can the French people, with 
 that inflammable temper of theirs, be trusted with power ? 
 How long have they ever possessed, without abusing, great 
 power ? Examine their history. 
 
 I cannot forbear adding here a curious infelicity of 
 observation in that really great writer Romain RoUand. 
 It is in his Alove the Battle, when, replying to a reproach 
 by German savants that France should have allied herself 
 to such a Power as Russia, he says that the Germans quite 
 under-estimate Russia. What great spiritual voice had 
 Germany lately produced ? " Look," he says, " at Tolstoi." 
 Had he forgotten that awful denunciation by Tolstoi of 
 this very treaty ? Great wits, it is said, have short memories. 
 They are charming, these French, these children whom we 
 dare not trust with loaded weapons. 
 
 We have not done yet with the evils of this alliance. 
 Russia has fallen, but remorseless France demands her 
 money. France, having squandered her fortune in an 
 evil love, upbraids her paramour in his bankruptcy. Of all 
 peoples of the world none has shown to Russia so little 
 compassion. While all mankind has pitied Russia in her 
 prostration and has tried to help her, France screams for 
 repayment by a corpse. Resolutely does she discountenance 
 any government in Russia which, though it may help the 
 people of that country to rise again and so promote, besides, 
 the general restoration of Europe, will not promise to 
 France repayment in full of loans made to a tyrant for the 
 extension of tyranny. ' 
 
 She will have her money though the Continent collapse. 
 Even her own history she ignores in her rage. France 
 
 ' I have shown little enthusiasm for the Russian people, but in their 
 misery I have pity, and must remark that while all the other Allies have 
 tried to help starving Russia, France has done nothing. Poincar6 has to 
 admit this truth to the Chamber of Deputies. New York Times, February 17, 
 1922. 
 
144 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 that once rose in honest rage against foreign monarchs 
 that would have forced back upon her the system she had 
 overthrown ; France, that perpetuates in her inspiring battle 
 hymn the wrong they did her, heartlessly arms against 
 Russia in a siniilar revolution every force that she can 
 purchase or gather together, equipping adventurers, organiz- 
 ing new nations to assail Russia on fancied principles of 
 liberty, which at the same time she is ready to surrender 
 at the first payment on an immoral debt. 
 
 The country that dishonoured its assignats trembles with 
 indignation at the impoverished rouble of an impoverished 
 partner in military adventure. 
 
 Of Russia it can at least be said that she tried to keep 
 her bargain. By a million of her dead boors she saved 
 Paris at the outset of the war. Eight hundred thousand 
 of her soldiers poured into East Prussia in a time so short 
 that even German vigilance did not forecast it, and Germany 
 was saved only after the ravage of half a province. The 
 German position was so desperate that the battle against 
 such great odds was perhaps saved by one of those accidents 
 that occur in war. According to Hindenberg the enemy's 
 plan was found in the pocket-book of a dead Russian 
 officer.' 
 
 ' Hindenburg had to hurry to meet Rennenkampf and the auxiliary 
 Russian army with only 200,000 men. His opponents had approximately 
 four times that number in two armies. Out of My Life, p. 108. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 MOROCCO 
 
 As the Congress of Berlin in 1878 began the estrangement 
 of Russia from Germany, so the treaties between France, 
 England and Spain concerning Morocco in 1904, began 
 the estrangement of Germany from France and possibly 
 from England also. That the Germans were unfairly treated 
 and that upon the whole they behaved themselves with 
 considerable self-control cannot be doubted by any man 
 who is at the pains to read history. Indeed, this is confessed 
 by many writers not friendly to that country. France took 
 the path of war in Morocco. 
 
 Not to go back too far into the French connection with 
 Morocco, it is sufficient perhaps to say that France, having 
 established colonies in Algiers with considerable success, 
 looked with natural longing toward the attractive region 
 westward along the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. That 
 littoral is a far more fertile region than might at first be 
 imagined. Separated from the Sahara by high mountains, 
 it is, though a warm country, not what would be considered 
 a hot one, as the climate is relieved by the breezes of the 
 Atlantic. In general, it may be said of Morocco that it 
 has the situation of Southern California in latitude, in 
 exposure to a western sea, and in a lofty ridge behind which 
 at once separates it from the hot blasts of the interior and 
 furnishes the resources of irrigation. 
 
 As early as the 'eighties the eyes of several European 
 countries had fallen upon Morocco, still an independent 
 Government under its sultan. The policy of the open door, 
 as it is called, had not only been acquiesced in but formally 
 announced, and was part of the public law of Europe.' 
 
 ' Morocco in Diplomacy, p. 18, the most exhaustive work on this affair. 
 
 10 "5 
 
146 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 The chief interests in the country, so far as trading was 
 concerned, were those of France and England, but it is 
 not denied that Germany, too, had an interest there and 
 that it was a growing one. At all events she had been 
 reckoned as a country always to be taken into account 
 and consulted with in anything which might disturb the 
 independence of Morocco. 
 
 Up to the year 1904 it would require ingenuity, indeed, 
 to prove in the attitude of Germany towards France a single 
 hostile intent or even a gross discourtesy. That the French 
 would have nothing to do with the Germans beyond what 
 trade intercourse compelled them to, is equally clear, 
 though thirty-four years have passed since they had failed 
 in a war unjustly declared by themselves against the 
 country beyond the Rhine. So far from settling down 
 to what may be called common sense, so far from 
 reconciling themselves to their powerful and prosperous 
 neighbour and securing with her that union which would 
 have made France safer and richer even than she was, the 
 French retained a resentment. The time now came when 
 they first had an opportunity to gratify that ill will. It 
 was in 1904 when England, turning from her old enmity 
 against Russia, was more disturbed by the rising power 
 of Germany. 
 
 The French Government, under Delcasse, decided to 
 leave Germany out of an arrangement about to be made 
 with the Sultan, but whether this idea came of his own 
 aggressive mind or was suggested by England will probably 
 never be known. No matter by whom it was suggested, 
 and I think myself it arose entirely in the brain of Delcassd, 
 a man of the most combative temperament, it at all events 
 should have been rejected by the French as a policy too 
 dangerous and wholly unprovoked. 
 
 What happened was that in April 1904 two treaties 
 were made by the Governments of France, Spain, and 
 England concerning Morocco. One of these treaties was 
 made public, the other kept secret. The public treaty 
 assured the world, which of course included Germany, 
 that the open door should remain, or, in diplomatic language, 
 that the integrity of Morocco should be respected. The 
 
MOROCCO 147 
 
 secret treaty gave the country over to the ultimate domination 
 of France.! 
 
 That the Germans heard of this deception within a year 
 may be surmised. 1904, it will be remembered, was the 
 year in which the Russians embarked on their disastrous 
 campaign in Manchuria. By the following year Russia was 
 a country in positive collapse.* 
 
 She was utterly unable to help France in any way 
 whatsoever, and as has been seen this collapse afforded 
 Germany an opportunity for a declaration of a successful 
 war against France. In 1905 the Kaiser took occasion to 
 assert the rights which, notwithstanding this deception, 
 Germany possessed. In April he himself made a visit to 
 Tangiers where, in exchanging civihties with the Sultan, 
 he assured him that he might count on Germany as an 
 upholder of the integrity of his empire. He next brought 
 before the French Government with sufficient emphasis the 
 trick that had been played upon him, behaving, I think, 
 very much as our own country would have behaved if in 
 case of any arrangement to secure the open door in China, 
 deception of the same kind had been practised upon us. 
 As for the French, they could not defend the actions of 
 Delcasse. He was censured by the most eminent men and 
 in public debates. He was humiliated and had to resign. 
 
 But here we must note a curious consequence of his 
 removal. Germany, not desiring to drag EngUsh diplomatists 
 into the broil and, by exposing any impropriety on their 
 part, create friction across the Channel, gave to the deception 
 no pecuUar pubUcity. The consequence was that the part 
 of the British Press that was hostile to Germany was able 
 successfully to sympathize with the French as a people 
 imposed upon. The public, in other words, being kept 
 in ignorance of the secret treaty, which was the real wrong 
 to Germany, could not kelp thinking it unfair in Germany 
 to resent the public one which secured the open door. The 
 English Press was little disposed to air at great length 
 a transaction so dubious, the more especially as the reason 
 for England's going into business was that she desired to 
 
 ' The contradictory treaties can be seen in Morocco in Diplomacy, p. 58. 
 I See the extent of this collapse in Chapter V. 
 
148 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 settle those differences with France regarding Africa that 
 had been continuous since the disagreeable incident of 
 Fashoda in 1898.' The English people believed that there 
 was no other treaty than that that had been published. 
 They were in a humour, consequently, to be suspicious of 
 the Kaiser's complaining about anytMng in Morocco, when 
 everything in Morocco had been so fair, and his visit to 
 Tangiers seemed, instead of the natural thing that it was, 
 a very unnecessary display of power. 
 
 This affair of 1905, the removal of Delcasse, is what is 
 termed the first crisis over Morocco. 
 
 The complaints of Germany, instead of taking the 
 violent form of war, ended in her proposing conference 
 and arbitration. This, achieved at Algeciras in 1906, 
 ended in a manner entirely satisfactory to the French, 
 and it is conceded by all writers that the behaviour of 
 Germany, after the decisions there made more or less adverse 
 to her, was extremely dignified and peaceful.^ However, 
 as Beyens tells us, Delcasse's behaviour started the final 
 dissentions between France and Germany. Nobody could 
 expect the Germans thenceforth to trust the policy of 
 France. In a long chat that Haldane had with the Kaiser 
 the latter said plainly that Delcasse's plan has been to 
 create a quarrel which would force England to take a per- 
 manent and open stand with the French. On what that 
 meant with Russia arming he remarked, " There are no 
 Himalayas between Germany and Russia." 3 Pinon dates 
 the " second stage " of France after Sedan with King Edward's 
 visit to Paris in 1903, and Loubet's return visit, in which 
 he was accompanied by Delcasse. La terrain d'entente est 
 trouvd ; c'est le MarocA True, indeed ! 
 
 We come now to the second crisis over Morocco. This 
 occurred in 1911 on account of a French expedition to Fez, 
 
 » It is generally supposed that the " encircling policy " of England began 
 with this negotiation. Edward VII had come upon the throne in 1901. 
 In 1902 Lord Salisbury, who held the anti-Russian and anti-French tradi- 
 tional policy of England, had resigned. In 1903 King Edward had visited 
 Paris. In 1904 Russia had collapsed and Germany had become all powerful. 
 It was a natural time for EngUsh uneasiness to begin. 
 
 " See infra this chapter. 
 
 3 Before the War, pp. 53-4. 
 
 4 France et Allemagne, p. 127. This second stage he assigns to 1898-1911, 
 " I'arrivfie de M. Delcass6 au Ministfere des Affaires 6trang6res." 
 
THE PREPAREDNESS OF THE ALLIES 157 
 
 cally every man, woman and child in the United States. 
 We believed it as gospel. 
 
 How absurd is such a pretence in the light of what we 
 know to-day. For example, Paleologue, who was transferred 
 from Sofia to Petrograd in the early part of 1914, relates 
 in his recent reminiscences that Viviani even then warned 
 him that war would soon break out, though this same Viviani 
 in his open speech to the French Parliament after the German 
 declaration of war complained that nothing was more 
 atrociously sudden.^ I have already quoted Isvolsky's 
 message from Paris in February 1912, where he states 
 that, though the French have happily settled the Morocco 
 question with Germany, " the War Department continue 
 to prepare actively for military operations in the near 
 future." ■>■ 
 
 It is not strange, then, to read the following admissions 
 by a member of the French General Staff.3 People 
 generally believe, he says, that at the beginning of the 
 attack of 1914, Germany, in assailing us, was the stronger. 
 People credit her with a considerable superiority of resources 
 and that her first armies comprised a very strong proportion 
 of divisions exclusively made up of reservists. This is 
 lending credence to two ideas which the facts contradict. 
 After showing that the mobile forces of France were an 
 active army of 910,000 men with reserves of 1,325,000, he 
 continues : " One can say, then, that without taking any 
 account of the Belgian Army or the four British divisions, 
 France alone was at the beginning at least equal if not 
 superior to her formidable adversary in the number of the 
 principal units." 4 
 
 Even in 1912, the period of the earlier Balkan strain, 
 France was ready, Isvolsky so hastens to assure Sazonov 
 to that effect, " La mobilization a la fronti^re de Test est 
 verifiee ; le material est pret." 5 In July preceding he 
 had advised his Home Office that " the regular conferences 
 
 " Paltologue in Revue des deux Mondes, January 1921. Viviani's speech 
 can be seen in the beginning of the French Yellow Book. 
 " Livre Noir, Tome i, p. 194. 
 
 3 L'Armee Allemande pendant la Guerre de 1914-1918, par Gen. Buat, 
 p. I, 1920. 
 
 4 Ibid., p. 9. 5 December 18, 1912, Livre Noir, p. 370 
 
160 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Of Russia we have thus far taken no account, since 
 England with her navy brought to the unparalleled height 
 which Haldane and Corbett describe could certainly enforce 
 the fatal blockade against Germany.' With even ordinary 
 Russian efficiency, indeed, even without it, it would seem 
 as if France were abundantly protected. The truth is, 
 France was too well protected. With each passing year 
 her officials exulted more and more in the growing 
 and enduring strength of the entente, in the increasing 
 might of the EngHsh Navy, in the size, the excellence of 
 the French Army. The correspondence of the Belgian 
 Ambassadors, quoted in the first chapter, throws a terrible 
 light on the assuredness of French officials, who now began 
 to pass from a sense of security to an attitude of insolence. 
 With each passing year was not the Russian Army growing 
 greater ? Was not the combined force of the three nations 
 such as Germany could not possibly withstand ? France 
 that formerly observed a proper caution, France that once 
 believed it wise to be discreet in international utterances, 
 felt she could at last spread the wings of the GaUic 
 cock.^ 
 
 I am not deciding at this time whether the English 
 preparations or even their collaboration with France was 
 wise or unwise, for as will be seen in the chapter on 
 England's Responsibility the English situation was 
 curiously complicated. I do say that on a people hke 
 the French it could have but one effect. 
 
 Returning now to the subject of Russian preparation, 
 we know that their arms were badly shattered and their 
 political system almost disorganized in 1905, when the 
 country may be said to have been in a practical revolution. 
 
 ' Haldane leaves no doubt in our minds that the English preparations 
 were in every sense complete before the war. See his book, pp. 44, 177, 
 181, 185. Of the navy he uses the words " brought to an unparalleled 
 height." The army of England, it is true, was not to be a large one, one 
 of only 160,000 men, but that army was, Haldane says, a completely re- 
 organized one, and it was intended to be, as it proved to be, a tremendous 
 aid to France in the first German assaults through Belgium, in fact, a much 
 more potent factor than France has generally acknowledged. But if 
 England had brought only her navy to perfection, what greater contribution 
 could be made to successful war against a country which had to fight on 
 two fronts nations whose armies were so well organized as those of France 
 and Russia, and which besides were overwhelming in number ? 
 
 I See the quotations from Isvolsky, ante, on the French confidence. 
 
THE PREPAREDNESS OF THE ALLIES 161 
 
 This was, from the German point of view, the fatal year 
 in which the Kaiser spared France, at his mercy, but 
 France, spared by Germany, resolved not to trust the 
 Power that spared her. She poured into Russia fresh 
 money and saw to it that those vast sums restored the 
 Russian military force. She did more. She saw to it 
 that not only armies were prepared, but that railways were 
 built by Russia to the German frontier. For what purpose 
 could strategic military railways be built to the German 
 frontier except for assault ? Such means of transportation, 
 built by a nation overwhelmingly larger than the one it 
 approached and threatened were a menace. Not only 
 should the Germans not have submitted to it so long, but 
 they should have imposed upon Russia the necessity of 
 stopping it. Every country has the right of self-preservation. 
 No country should submit to a visible armed preparation 
 for attack against itself. 
 
 The hostility of Russia to Germany had been acute 
 even years before. " Several months before the outbreak 
 of hostilities in the Far East, we were busy preparing for 
 what appeared an inevitable war with Germany and Austro- 
 Hungary. We went so far as appointing army commanders." ^ 
 And yet there are people who wonder why the Germans 
 were alarmed at the course of sentiment in Russia. This 
 situation that Witte describes was, moreover, before the 
 reorganization of the Russian Army with the fresh funds 
 of France, and in 1913 the Russian Army was a formidable 
 military machine, backed by enormous reserves. Every 
 year it was growing stronger. 
 
 " A large part of the loan of five hundred million 
 dollars obtained from France," says Frobenius, " had to 
 be used for purposes of completing with the greatest 
 possible haste the network of railroad lines from the 
 interior of the Empire to the German and Austro- 
 Hungarian frontiers." * Frobenius points also to the great 
 
 ' Witte, Memoirs, p. 123. This of 1904 ! 
 
 ' Frobenius, Germany's Hotir of Destiny, p. 43. Gerard mentions these 
 railways too : " Another reason for an immediate war was the loan made 
 by France to Russia on condition that additional strategic railways were 
 to be constructed by the Russians to Poland." My Four Years in Germany, 
 P- 99- 
 
 11 
 
162 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 increase of Russian fortresses, citing the statistics of the 
 Minister of War for June 1912. There was the fortified 
 Kovno-Niemen hne. There was a fortified line opposite 
 Galicia, an advance seat of war, the centre of which was 
 in the triangular fortifications of Warsaw, Novo-Georgevich 
 and Zegrze. There was an impregnable Une of new forts 
 at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. ' 
 
 I have condensed in Appendix C the account by the 
 German officers, Von Eggeling and Von Kuhl, of the Russian 
 miUtary and railway preparations for offensive operations 
 against Germany. 
 
 That the Russian armies were in a high state of 
 preparation, that they had been gradually assembled close 
 to the German frontier, and that the speed with which 
 they could throw an enormous force into East Prussia 
 had been underestimated by the Germans, is now apparent. 
 It is hut the other day that Lieutenant-General Macdonough, 
 who during the war was an EngUsh Director of Military 
 Intelligence, said that Germany grossly overestimated the 
 time Russia would require to mobilize her armies. " The 
 Germans calculated that Russia could not advance any 
 force before the middle of September 1914, and consequently 
 that there would be six weeks available to defeat the enemy 
 on the Western Front before it became necessary to turn 
 to the East."* And we have already quoted the figures 
 of Hindenburg that within the months of August and 
 September Russia brought no fewer than eight hundred 
 thousand men and seventeen hundred guns into East 
 Prussia, for the defence of which, he states, the Germans had 
 only two hundred thousand men and six hundred guns.3 
 
 Well might Sukhomlinoff boast in 1914 that Russia 
 
 was now fully prepared. 4 Prepared for what ? Not for 
 
 defence. Prepared for attack. Nobody ever intended to 
 
 invade and attack the vast receding plains of Russia. It 
 
 is a maxim of European militarism that nothing can be 
 
 gained by such an invasion ever since the disastrous attempt 
 
 of 1812 by the greatest miUtary genius of modern times. 
 
 ' Frobenius, pp. 43-46. 
 
 « New York World, London Despatch, November 25, 1921. 
 
 Out of My Life, vol. i, p. 108. 
 « Bogitsevich, Cause of the War, p. 9. 
 
THE PREPAREDNESS OF THE ALLIES 168 
 
 I repeat that every circumstance shows a resolute intention 
 of the Russians to attack, as soon as their army was in 
 their opinion at its height, the country next to them to 
 the west, inferior in population, and to break that power 
 which alone stood between them and the dominion of the 
 greater part of Europe. The document known as the 
 Durnovo Memorandum is one of the most calmly villainous 
 papers in existence, a tranquil reasoning of the adviser of 
 the Tsar as to how soon and when it will pay to assault 
 Germany.^ There is not one line in the whole dissertation 
 that discusses the morahty and humanity of such an 
 enterprise. 
 
 Just why people think Germany could afford to wait 
 a few days after the Russians began their mobilization is 
 not clear to me. It is clear to me that France should have 
 insisted upon Russia's pausing in the last days of July, when 
 the Berlin Government notoriously took in hand itself the 
 matter of stopping the strife by personal appeals to the 
 Tsar. For my part, I have never been able to find one 
 communication from the Quai d'Orsay to Petrograd imploring 
 them or even requesting them to wait. The Germans, in 
 my opinion, were thoroughly frightened. The remark to 
 that effect by the Russian Ambassador at Berlin to his 
 Home Office was correct. The Germans were trjdng to 
 appear not afraid.' 
 
 Even the military correspondent of the London Times, 
 by no means friendly to Germany, remarks : 
 
 There are signs that Russia has done with defensive strategy. 
 The increased number of guns in the Russian Army, the growing 
 efficiency of the army, and the improvements made in the strategic 
 railways, are matters which cannot be left out of account. These 
 things are well calculated to make Germany anxious.3 
 
 The same correspondent reports large extraordinary 
 military and naval credits in a secret session of the Duma. 
 The Russian Army has now attained an effective strength 
 unprecedented, 4 and as Professor Fife tells us, during the 
 preceding year Russian journals and publicists took on an 
 
 ' This document can be found in the Living Age for May and June 192 1. 
 • Despatch of March 12, 1914, Ent. Dip., p. 711. 
 
 3 June 1914, Dip. Rev., p. 276. 
 
 4 Dip. Rev., p. 276. 
 
164 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 increasingly bitter tone towards Germany. The organization 
 of the Russian Army after the Japanese War seemed complete, 
 while " it was well known that the Tsar's Government was 
 busy with the construction of strategic railways in the 
 Western borderland." i 
 
 Exactly what composure our own countrymen would 
 show under these circumstances we may imagine. I say 
 again that if there were in Mexico a population of one 
 hundred and fifty millions, possessing even a respectably 
 organized, drilled and equipped army of three million men, 
 not to speak of reserves, St. Louis, as far from the scene 
 of invasion as Paris from Berlin, would have been in a state 
 of panic, and would have been wondering what the Govern- 
 ment at Washington was doing in that it permitted the 
 continuation of so bold a menace. The force that menaced 
 Germany was most of it no further distant than Albany is 
 from New York. 
 
 And all this time Russia was collaborating in a very 
 considerable degree, just as France was, with England. 
 Even so late as May 1914 Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign 
 Minister, informed the Tsar that Grey had empowered the 
 Admiralty Staff to negotiate with France and Russia for 
 technical conditions of possible action by France, England 
 and Russia, through their navies. But if Germany turned 
 to the South and expected any assistance from Austria, 
 she could find little comfort. Austria, aside from the assault 
 which she must expect from Russia, would, indeed, have 
 her hands full with Serbia. 
 
 On the 19th of February, 1914, Paschitch, the Serbian 
 President, was received by the Tsar, whom he felicitated 
 upon the fact that Russia had armed herself so thoroughly. 
 The emissary of regicide Serbia asked the Tsar for one 
 hundred and twenty thousand rifles, and munitions and 
 howitzers, and when the Tsar asked him how many soldiers 
 Serbia could provide, and was told that it would be about 
 half a million, Nicholas was pleased.* 
 
 Russia, in short, had reached such organization and 
 
 amplitude of force as would have made her alone a formidable 
 
 ' German Empire between Two Wars, p. 37. 
 
 ' Dip. Rev., p. 275. This and the preceding despatch were not revealed 
 until 191 9. 
 
THE PREPAREDNESS OF THE ALLIES 165 
 
 antagonist in 1914, and in 1916 an antagonist which Germany 
 might have been unable to withstand at all. Had the war 
 been delayed two years longer, different, indeed, would 
 have been the result. To defer it until about 1916 was un- 
 doubtedly the original policy of the Russian Court, which was, 
 however, finally carried away by what Baron Rosen mildly 
 calls the irresponsible recklessness of those vast knaves 
 Sazonoff, Sukhomlinoff, and Yanouchkevitch.^ The truth 
 was that the affair at Serajevo precipitated the murder of 
 Germany, which they had intended to perpetrate later. 
 The strategic railways and the heavy artillery would by 
 1 916 have been complete. Nothing, it is clear from all 
 sources of information on this subject, is plainer than that 
 Sukhomlinoff was infatuated with what he deemed the 
 perfection of the Russian forces. Those forces had now 
 grown far beyond what he had ever dreamed to see, and he 
 therefore believed them to be invincible. Invincible they 
 were, except against a nation fighting for its existence. 
 
 Let us now turn to the actual statistics, which can be 
 perhaps readily assembled. The following figures have 
 been frequently published, though, I am sorry to say, not 
 much advertised, and have never thus far been disputed. 
 In the decade from 1905 to 1914, the various powers made 
 military expenditure as follows : 
 
 Russia . . . . . . . . ;f495,i44,622 
 
 France 347,348,259 
 
 Germany . . . . . . . . 448,025,543 
 
 Austria . . . . . . . . 234,668,407 
 
 In other words, France and Russia in combination had, 
 during the past ten years, spent £159,798,931 (about 
 $798,946,550.00) more than Austria and Germany in 
 preparing for war. 
 
 In 1914 alone the expenditures were the following : 
 
 Russia . . . . ;£io5,955,98o 
 
 France . . . . 81,065,967 
 
 England . . . . 80,430,000 
 
 Total . . ;£267,45i,947 (or about $1,337,259,735) 
 
 " First-named Foreign Minister, second Minister for War, and the last- 
 named Chief of Stafi. 
 
166 
 
 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Germany 
 Austria . 
 
 Total 
 
 ;£59,034.77o 
 24,992,000 
 
 ^84,026,770 (or about $420,133,850) 
 
 When the armies were about to take the field the following 
 were the numbers of men and guns which they could muster 
 for immediate action : 
 
 Men. 
 
 Russia . . . . 1,284,000 
 
 France . . . . 818,532 
 
 England .. .. 255,438 
 
 Italy 305.033 
 
 Russia 
 France 
 England 
 Italy 
 
 Guns. 
 
 4.432 
 2,936 
 1,170 
 1.470 
 
 Total 
 
 Germany 
 Austria 
 
 Total 
 
 2,663,003 
 
 806,016 
 370,725 
 
 1,176,741 
 
 Total 
 
 Germany 
 Austria 
 
 . . 10,008 
 
 • • 3.866 
 .. 1.854 
 
 Total 
 
 5.720 
 
 General Buat's figures' gave the German active army 
 at 870,000 men, the French active army at 910,000 men, 
 their immediate reserves respectively at 1,180,000 and 
 1,325,000. It was only in the ultimate reserves that 
 Germany would, as against France, have a superiority, 
 but that superiority she would more than need on the 
 other front against Russia. Thus the fight began with 
 great armies equal as between Germany and France, Russia 
 totally overtopping any possible immediate force of Germany. 
 In 1914 Russia, which in 1913 had spent about two hundred 
 and fifty millions of dollars, spent three hundred and seventy 
 millions.* 
 
 I will not here burden the reader with the enormous 
 increases in the navies of these Powers, but it is enough 
 to say that Russia had increased her naval budget in the 
 following proportions : 
 
 1911-12 
 1912-13 
 1913-14 
 
 ;f I 1,500,000 
 ;^l8,000,000 
 
 ;^25,000,00O 
 
 » L'Armie Allemande, etc., pp. 7 and 9. 
 « The Statesman's Year Book for 1913 and 1914. 
 are in sterling. 
 
 The figures given there 
 
THE PREPAREDNESS OF THE ALLIES 167 
 
 From these figures can we imagine that the nerves of 
 the Germans were perfectly calm ? Can we blame them if 
 they thought a ring of enemies was encircling them ? Is it 
 fantastical to suppose that these three adversary nations 
 would act in common when one of them would discharge 
 the first weapon, and who was more likely to discharge 
 the weapon than a Sukhomlinoff after a night of debauch 
 or after those heavy losses at play which he could recoup 
 in the profits of war contracts ?' 
 
 It is not to be overlooked that Belgium, too, was preparing 
 a considerable army, and nobody could expect Belgium to 
 be friendly to Germany. Belgium, however, neutral in 
 determination, was French at heart, and her war strength 
 was raised to three hundred and forty thousand men.^ 
 
 The following table gives an analysis of the military 
 units of the various Powers : 
 
 Iniantry and Field and 
 
 Rifle Horse Heavy Guns of Horse 
 
 Battalions. Batteries. Batteries. or Field, 
 
 Germany . . . . 669 633 210 4,998 
 
 Austria-Hungary . . 684 413 28 2,370 
 
 Central Powers . . 1,353 1,046 238 7,368 
 
 Russia . . . . 1,344 622 24 6,516 
 
 France . . . . 673 705 58 4,108 
 
 2,017 1,327 82 10,624 
 
 With these astounding proofs that the AlUes were 
 making, and all three of them, enormously greater 
 preparations than the Germans, we may now recall 
 what the most competent English critics themselves have 
 said as to the preparedness of the Germans. The reader 
 has already seen Barker's summary of 1912.3 He there 
 tells us that the German war material is scarcely up to 
 date, that the military outfit of France is superior, and that 
 
 ' As will subsequently be seen, Sukhomlinofi was a man of infamous 
 character. When he was tried after the Revolution, he confessed that he 
 had lied to the Tsar and ordered a general mobilization without the Tsar's 
 orders, and then continued with it after he had promised the Tsar to recall 
 it. " Yes," he said, " I lied to the Tsar." Oman's account of his trial, 
 Outbreak of the War. 
 
 » Neilson, How Diplomats Make War, p. 178. 
 
 3 Ante Chapter III, Nineteenth Century, for June 1912. 
 
168 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 the German artillery is inferior to the French. Their tactics, 
 too, he says, have become antiquated. We have seen, too, 
 what Repington, a most astute military critic, had to 
 say in October 1911, after witnessing the German manoeuvres. 
 This critic who, it will be remembered, was in the secret 
 of the military collaboration between the French and English 
 General Staffs, may be quoted now more at length : 
 
 The writer has not formed a wholly favourable opinion of the 
 German Army, which appears to him to be living on a glorious past 
 and to be unequal to the repute in which it is commonly held. There 
 was nothing in the higher leading at the manoeuvres of a distinguished 
 character, and mistakes were committed which tended to shake the 
 confidence of foreign spectators in the reputation of the command. 
 The infantry lacked dash, displayed no knowledge of the use of ground, 
 entrenched themselves badly, were extremely slow in their movements, 
 offered vulnerable targets at medium range, ignored the service of 
 security, performed the approach marches in an old-time manner, 
 were not trained to understand the connection between fire and move- 
 ment, and seemed totally unaware of the effect of modern fire. The 
 cavalry was in many ways exceedingly old-fashioned. The artillery, 
 with its out-of-date material and slow and ineffective methods of 
 fire, appeared so inferior that it can have no pretension to measure 
 itself against the French in anything approaching level terms, and 
 finally, the dirigibles and aeroplanes presented the fourth arm in a 
 relatively unfavourable light. A nation which after all gives up 
 little more than half its able-bodied sons to the army has become less 
 militarist than formerly.' 
 
 Again and again will an American who has the patience 
 to read these pages marvel at the success with which a contrary 
 idea of the German preparedness was either spread among 
 us or gradually invented by our own resentments. Believing, 
 as we devoutly have believed, that the Germans were 
 always first in military reform, enterprise and equipment, 
 with what astonishment do we read the report by the 
 Russian Ambassador at Berlin in 1909, that by next year 
 the infantry armament of Germany will probably catch 
 up with that of Russia and France ! * 
 
 ' London Times, October 28, 1911. 
 
 ' Les Documents Secrets, p. 36, Laloy, Paris, 1920. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 SERBIA AND THE BALKANS 
 
 It has been said, and, with substantial truth, that 
 during several generations every King of Serbia was 
 either assassinated or died in exile. ' This is the tender 
 Serbia for whom France thought it better to drench Europe 
 in blood than that she become the vassal state of Austria 
 instead of the vassal state of Russia. 
 
 Who first taught us that Russia had a peculiar right 
 to protect Serbia ? Why did it come into our heads that 
 the tie between Russia and Serbia was sympathetic and 
 profound ? Between Russia and Serbia there intervened 
 two ranges of mountains, a kingdom or two, and a mighty 
 river. Political right of interference, consequently, Russia 
 had none. Whatever rights she had must have sprung 
 from a humanity which does not appear in her counsels 
 and is not exhibited by her history. 
 
 Serbia, to begin with, is not wholly a Slav state. Most 
 surprising of all to Americans is that Russia herself is not 
 a Slav state. " Russia," says a former Russian Ambassador, 
 " is no more a Slav state than Great Britain is a Teuton 
 power because of race af&nity."^ In considering the Russian 
 nation, we must remember that a large part of the population 
 is not Slav at all, that Russia has absorbed in her history 
 populations of different descent. " The Poles," said Pro- 
 fessor Namier,3 " had neither Slav feelings nor Slav traditions, 
 nor did the other Slav nations feel much brotherly love 
 for them." The most curious thing of all is that when we 
 deduct from the great population of Russia all the non-Slav 
 
 I Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle, p. 67. 
 ' Baron Rosen, Saturday Evening Post, August 21, 1920. 
 5 Germany and Eastern Europe, p. 46. 
 
 169 
 
170 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 elements, Austro-Hungary, with her eighteen million Slavs, 
 becomes an equally substantial Slav power. 
 
 Between Russian and Serbia there never existed any 
 affection whatsoever. When one could use the other to 
 advantage it did so. At all other times each intrigued for 
 or against the other. " However great Russian influence 
 may be, she is intensely hated by Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek 
 and Turk alike."' The feeling of rage most frequently 
 disturbed their consultations. Repeatedly the Serbians 
 have felt themselves used by Russia and cast off.^ The well- 
 known journalist Stillman speaks of the Russian agents 
 who " systematically provoked hostility to Turkey, which 
 was natural and consistent with the good of the people, 
 but also against Austria, which was unjust and aggravated 
 the troubles more. "3 
 
 The intrigues of Russia in the Balkans are so innumerable, 
 they were so incessant, that to ascribe any other motive 
 to them than that of world policy is ridiculous. To detail 
 them would be a waste of time.4 
 
 The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia of July 23, 1914, was such as 
 could only have come from those who had made up their mind to cut 
 once for all the web' which Russian diplomacy had spun about the 
 dual monarchy and who knew that the help of the German ally could 
 be reckoned upon. Whatever the issue of the conflict should be it 
 should relieve Austria from the nightmare of Slavonic pressure. 3 
 
 The situation is fairly expressed by Fox as follows : 
 
 The European Congress of Berlin which revised the Treaty of 
 San Stefano, recognized that the motive of Russia was to create in 
 Bulgaria a vast but weak state which would obediently serve her 
 interests and in time fall into her hands.' 
 
 The policy of creating a greater Serbia by Russia was 
 the same. " At Belgrade," says Professor Sloane, " the 
 trade of politics has been on a level unknown elsewhere, 
 unless it be at Constantinople. The overthrow of one 
 
 ' Reginald Wyon, The Balkans from Within. 
 
 2 " The Serbian who feels almost as acutely as the Roumanian that he 
 was made the catspaw of Russia." Serbia, by Herbert Vivian, p. 42. 
 
 3 Autobiography of a Journalist, vol. ii, p. 148. 
 
 4 See Bogitsevich, Causes of the War, passim. 
 
 5 Fife, German Empire between Two Wars, pp. 40-44. 
 ' The Balkan Peninsula, p. 44. 
 
SERBIA AND THE BALKANS 171 
 
 king and the setting up of another was a matter of money, 
 and it was the Russian Ambassador who provided the 
 funds. The whole conspiracy has been traced to its source ; 
 there is not a step for which the documentary evidence 
 cannot be produced." ' _. 
 
 Nitti is equally clear. t_Russia alone promoted and 
 kept alive the agitations in Serbia and of the Slavs in 
 Austria. It was on account of Russia that the Serbian 
 Government was a perpetual cause of disturbance, a per- 
 petual threat to Austria-Hungary. The Russian policy 
 in Serbia was really criminalj* 
 
 The whole purpose of the Serbian policy seemed to be 
 strife, and against Austria she had every excuse for strife. 
 That country had legislated against her in tariffs and had, 
 as is weU known, a vast body of Slavs with whom Serbia 
 was in secret aUiance. " Twice, in 1912 and 1913, had 
 the dual monarchy mobilized against Russia and Serbia," 
 says Professor Fife.3 " The Vienna ministry was itself 
 condemned to stand always on guard against Serbian 
 aggression. There seemed no choice save between the 
 continuance of a maddening condition of irritation with 
 bankrupting miUtary crises and a sharp and decisive war." 
 
 Nobody pretends in these things, who is informed at 
 all on the subject, that Russia was not constantly fomenting 
 these discontents, the fruits of which, if they ended in the 
 disruption of the Austrian Empire, were to Russian ambition 
 of incalculable value.4 With each year as we approach 
 1914 we see the increasing intimacy between St. Petersburg 
 and Belgrade. In 1908 the Tsar assured Paschitch, the 
 Serbian Minister, that the Bosnia-Herzegovinian question 
 would be decided by war alone, for which meantime they 
 could preserve a calm attitude with military preparation.? 
 At a later time, as we shall see, the Tsar was delighted to 
 
 1 Sloane's The Balkans, p. 143 (May 1914)- 
 
 2 Peaceless Europe, pp. 12, 83-4, 87. 
 
 3 Germany between Two Wars, p. 40. 
 
 4 The murder of Alexander and Queen Draga of Serbia has almost always 
 been laid to Russian intrigue. Alexander was of the Obrenovitch dynasty 
 and friendly to Austria, whereas the succeeding or Karageorgevitch dynasty 
 was and remains undeviatingly Russian in its sympathies. Bogitsevich, 
 p. 12. 
 
 s Bogitsevich, quoted in Dip. Rev., p. loi. 
 
172 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 know that Serbia could furnish half a million men. Just 
 why anybody should suppose that it would be useful to 
 Europe to have the armies of Serbia and Russia unite in 
 destroying Austria- Hungary, and that it would be a benefit 
 to mankind to have Russia rescue such a state as Serbia 
 by a general European war, is past understanding. 
 
 What European diplomats really thought of Serbia 
 may be summed up in Grey's remark in the first document 
 of the EngHsh White Book. " That any of the Great Powers 
 should be dragged into a war with Serbia," he says, " would 
 be detestable." 
 
 The whole history of Serbia is one of crime and violence. 
 During the very Peace Conference at Versailles, after the 
 world had been wrecked to save this worthless httle province 
 from being a vassal state of some nation or other, the Serbs 
 fell to slaughtering the Albanians.' So bad was their 
 record that for a long time, as we all know, the European 
 Powers would not countenance the last and prevailing 
 dynasty, that of Karageorgevitch, which had estabUshed 
 itself by a peculiarly wanton murder of the head of the 
 preceding dynasty and his Queen. A people so given over 
 to cruelty can hardly be conceived. Miss Durham, the 
 best informed of Balkan travellers, tells us that on the 
 murder of Alexander and Draga, portions of Draga's skin 
 were cut off by an officer, who dried and preserved it as 
 a trophy. She tells us that one of the officers later showed 
 a friend of hers a bit which he kept in his pocket book.* 
 Their habit of cutting off the heads of the killed or captured 
 is well known.3 Miss Durham further tells us that a Serbian 
 officer nearly choked with laughter when, over his beer, 
 he told her how his men had bayoneted the women and 
 children of a certain town.4 
 
 An English writer of note in a book published during 
 
 ' See the annoyance which this caused the Peace Conference. What 
 Really Happened at Paris, p. 19. 
 
 » Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle, p. 74. 
 
 3 I have read somewhere of the answer which a Serb made to one who 
 remonstrated against this Balkan practice of placing the ghastly heads on 
 the tops of poles. The gentle Serbian confessed that he, too, did not like 
 it. However, he could stand the thing so long as the children refrained 
 from putting cigarettes in the mouths. This he thought indelicate. 
 
 ♦ Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle, p. 235. 
 
SERBIA AND THE BALKANS 173 
 
 the war, when everything favourable was said of Serbia 
 by the Allies, is surely frank enough. " With a fierce 
 and excitable temper the Serb is not easily satisfied. The 
 continual unrest has given advantages to intriguers and 
 opportunists of a low type." Education extends to only 
 one-fifth of the population. Their whole talk is of fighting 
 which was the occupation of their fathers before them. The 
 murder of the King and Queen Draga was by officers of 
 the army who committed " terrible indignities on the 
 dead."' 
 
 The Austrian Archduke, whose murder at Serajevo 
 brought on the European catastrophe, had, it is said, a plan 
 of uniting sill his Slavs together with some of the neighbour- 
 ing Slav states in one kingdom, which should be united 
 with Hungary and Austria under a form of union similar 
 to that binding the two latter. While this may not have 
 been an easy thing to accomplish, it was an honest thing 
 to aim at, but of course it would have ended Russian in- 
 fluence in the Balkans for ever. There was not one Balkan 
 State which, whatever service it might get from Russia, 
 desired to be placed under her sway.^ 
 
 However, the Archduke's plan was good cause in Balkan 
 politics for his murder. None of the Balkan States, though 
 resentful of Russian rule, desired permanent union with 
 each other, since each preferred the policy of building up 
 his own state by robbing his neighbour. The agents both 
 of Russia and of the Balkan States would accordingly regard 
 as their enemy the future Emperor of Austria in any such 
 scheme, however honourable and wise. 
 
 At the outbreak of the war none of us knew anything 
 about Serbia. We devoured greedily stories of her innocence 
 
 ■ History of Serbia, Temperley (London, 1917), p. 280. Draga, he tells 
 us, was of very low origin, which was distasteful to the Serbs. They fretted 
 under this. Nevertheless, " Russia made use of the opportunity (afforded 
 by Draga's marriage to the King) to renew her friendship with Serbia and 
 Czar Nicholas sent a representative to act as best man and was the first to 
 congratulate the Queen," ibid., p. 278. Draga was a notorious character 
 in the Balkans. 
 
 ' " When the Balkan States form a compact body opposing firm resist- 
 ance to every attempt against their union, all controversies will cease and 
 the East will no longer be a menace to the peace of Europe " Signor Tittoni, 
 December 3, 1908, quoted by Rosen in Origins of the War, p. 115. See 
 Sloane's The Balkans, p. 255. 
 
174 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 and of the sad things that must happen to her if she were 
 punished by Austria, for what we did not know was a long 
 series of dangerous and criminal offences. The relation of 
 Serbia towards Austria was hke that of Mexico to us at 
 its worst, multiplied tenfold. Let us imagine that in the 
 United States there were several milUons of Mexicans, and 
 that a constant intrigue went on between Mexico and this 
 body of our citizens. To make the illustration simpler, 
 suppose that Mexico was a negro repubhc, and that it was 
 in constant agitation of the negroes in the United States 
 against our government. Is not this a question which we 
 would insist upon setthng ourselves, and if some great 
 Power hke Russia resolved upon supporting Mexico in any 
 such course of conduct or upon taking out of our hands 
 the right of private settlement of our disputes with Mexico, 
 would we not regard that other Power as aiming at our 
 destruction ? 
 
 Always must it be borne in mind that the question between 
 Austria and Serbia was one vital to Austria-Hungary. 
 Nothing in it was vital to Russia, nothing even remotely 
 vital to France. At the very outset France should have 
 warned Russia that she would not join her in a war growing 
 out of the Balkans. On that warning we should, indeed, 
 have escaped war. 
 
 The world has httle conception of the extent to which 
 Austria was tormented and endangered by this bitter httle 
 Kingdom of Serbia. In the enclosure and appendix to 
 Document No. 19 of the Austro-Hungary Red Book will 
 be found considerable detail of a system of attacks and 
 murderous propaganda such as probably never occurred 
 before in modern times between adjacent kingdoms. No 
 country could possibly have tolerated it as Austria did so 
 long unless she was in dread of the superior Power aUied 
 with her would-be assassin. Societies openly existed and 
 met across the river from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
 plotting and debating the means of disturbing the larger 
 country. 
 
 The Austrian Government was compelled to examine 
 constantly the mails which were flooded with publications 
 from Serbia, the least of which, if sent by Mexico into our 
 
SERBIA AND THE BALKANS 175 
 
 southern states to agitate our negro population, would put 
 millions of our white people in a ferment. 
 
 Among the expressions of the Serbian Press after the 
 murder of the Archduke and his wife, we find not one word 
 of sympathy or horror. On the contrary, more than twenty- 
 five detestable comments were made by journals which 
 are not even at pains to feign regret. 
 
 It is, therefore, not surprising that Austria had been 
 before this time on the verge of war with Serbia. That she 
 kept out of the war we have seen was due in part to the 
 efforts of the Berhn Cabinet in 1913, aided by the English. 
 The peace eiffort was, in appearance at least, aided also 
 by the French, for whom, however, it is unfortunate to 
 have to quote a letter of April 9, 1913, from the Serbian 
 Minister at Paris to the Prime Minister, Peischitsch, at 
 Belgrade. 
 
 A competent person with whom I have confidentially discussed 
 the matter during the Icist days informs me that about the middle of 
 last week we stood upon the brink of a general European war, and 
 that the reason, amongst others, why this war had been at present 
 avoided, with certain moral sacrifice, was also to be traced to the 
 wish to give the Balkan AUies an opportunity for recovery, rallying 
 and preparation for any emergencies which might happen in the not 
 distant future.' 
 
 Miss Durham, in the work already cited, refers to the 
 impatience of a Russian agent at the tendency of the Serbs 
 to precipitate the war before plans were complete. He 
 was very much vexed that the Serbs could not wait until 
 1914, when Russia would be ready. The fact that England 
 had joined the Franco- Russian Alliance gave them great 
 glee in Serbia. ^ " Now you can fight Germany," said one 
 of them to the crowd, which replied, " Of course, for what 
 else is this Entente ? " 
 
 It may be recalled that Sazonoff, in September 1912, 
 while Russian Foreign Minister, paid a visit to England, 
 where he passed, it is said, a whole week at Balmoral, con- 
 ferring with Sir Edward Grey and Bonar Law. " He left 
 this country," says an English writer, " on the 28th of the 
 
 I This is one of the documents revealed after the war. German White 
 Book, igig. Part II, 51. 
 
 i Twenty Years, etc., p. 178. 
 
176 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 month and on the 30th the Balkan States mobiUzed. The 
 inference was unavoidable."' 
 
 The activities of Russia in the Balkans were, as I have 
 said, incessant. The war of 1913 having been postponed, 
 preparations by the Allies continued. I have already 
 mentioned, and it is well to refer to it again, that before 
 the murder at Serajevo, the Serbian Prime Minister visiting 
 Petrograd had an audience with the Tsar. This occurred 
 on the 2nd of February, 1914, and the following from his 
 report is significant : 
 
 I begged of him that Russia might assist us by the supply of 
 120,000 rifles and munitions and some guns which might be dispens- 
 able from their magazines. . . . The Czar asked me whether I had 
 spoken about the matter with one of the Russian Ministers. I 
 answered I had spoken with the Minister of War, Sukhomlinoff, and 
 with Sazonoff, and that the Minister of War had said it could be 
 done if the political position allowed of it. At this opportunity, I 
 told the Czar how welcome it was to us that Russia had equipped 
 herself so well. It infuses us with calmness in the hope of a better 
 future. The Czar said that they had done and were still doing as much 
 as they could. . . . He then asked me how many soldiers Serbia 
 could now muster. He said Serbia had astonished the world by 
 raising 400,000 men. I answered, we think we can raise half a million 
 weU-clothed and well-armed soldiers. He replied, that is satisfactory ; 
 it is no small matter and one can accomplish much by means of it.' 
 
 Here we have a situation probably unexampled, as 
 I have said, in the history of modern nations. A cruel 
 and relentless little people propose, with the backing of an 
 enormous despotic Power, to keep up such incessant propa- 
 ganda as will work the dissolution of a neighbouring country 
 which, year after year, was compelled to acquiesce in this 
 villainy, to keep always prepared for war, and to swallow 
 in silence a policy that it would ordinarily be allowed to 
 extinguish by war. 
 
 « Abbott's Turkey, Greece and the Great Powers, p. 165. It would be 
 unjustifiable to assume as true anything a Russian statesman might say, 
 as that he got authority and encouragement from English statesmen to 
 work up a war in the Balkans. But the writer's inference is probably true 
 to this extent, that Sazonoff wa.s able to advise his Balkan friends that 
 England without question had committed herself to the Entente, for in 
 November of the same year, 1912, Grey and Cambon exchanged memoranda 
 as to the association of France and England in the event of war. British 
 White Book, 105. 
 
 » German White Book, 1919. Part II, 53. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE CRISIS 
 
 Martial France we have seen in the preceding pages all 
 aglow for war. The perilous geographical situation of 
 Germany we have also seen. Let us approach now the 
 end, the calculated, the desired horror of war ; war for 
 revenge and prestige by France, for conquest by Russia. 
 
 With new information do we now contemplate the final 
 act in this awful drama. The preceding pages have shown 
 that not only was the German Army, in the opinion of the 
 best English critic, deteriorating, and the German people 
 less miUtaristic,' but that the French Army, to say nothing 
 of the Russian, was, on the recent official statements of 
 a member of its own staff, at the outbreak of the war in 
 its perfection and of equal size with the German.* Forty^ 
 three yeaxs of peace had relaxed the Germans while the 
 others were preparing.3 Nor were the Germans ignorant of 
 this. The contrary we see in Von Moltke's secret memoran- 
 dum, in which he confesses the perils of his country and the 
 inferiority of its forces under the gathering clouds of war.4 
 But the Germans could see still more. Can we blame 
 them if they believed themselves encircled by a ring of 
 enemies ? Can we believe that they were glad to plunge 
 into this war when they knew the foUowihg : first, the old 
 Alliance between France and Russia ; second, the building 
 of military railways by Russia to the German frontier ; 
 third, the enormous improvement of the Russian Army ; 
 fourth, a firm and even threatening junction of France 
 and England in 1905 over Morocco against the German 
 
 ' Repington and Barker, Chapter X. « See Buat, Chapter X. 
 
 3 See p. 2 ante and Repington supra. 
 
 4 See Chapter II, Appendix A. 
 
 12 
 
 177 
 
178 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 contention ; fifth, a peaceful adjustment in 1907 between 
 Russia and England of the Persian controversy ; sixth, 
 the elevation of Poincare to Premiership in France in 1912 ; 
 seventh, a naval agreement between France and Russia 
 in 1912 ; eighth, the naval agreement between France and 
 England in 1912 ; ninth, the election of Poincare to the 
 Presidency in 1913 ; tenth, naval negotiations between 
 Russia and England in 1913 and 1914 ; eleventh, a 
 notorious unity of action between Russia, England and 
 France on every diplomatic question that arose ; twelfth, 
 a constant increase in the military and naval budgets of all 
 three during ten whole years. 
 
 While I fully agree with Professor Fay that the Germans 
 were to blame, for the general reason that they were too 
 military, at least in their manners, I also agree with the con- 
 clusion, and the only conclusion which he could come to, 
 that Germany did not plot or want this particular war.^ 
 Who then could have averted this war ? Are we willing 
 to beHeve at last that France and Russia could have saved 
 us from it ? Such is my opinion, formed after long and 
 patient study of this subject. 
 
 Suppose, upon the quarrel between Austria and Serbia 
 the French Government had notified Russia that if the latter 
 went to war on account of Serbia, France would not join 
 her. Do we imagine then that Russia woiild even have 
 mobilized ? Remember that there was not even the beginning 
 of a warlike movement by Germany against any Power or 
 of Austria against Russia, at the beginning of the Austro- 
 Serbian controversy, or even on the declaration of war 
 against Serbia. Had France taken this position, there 
 could have been no general European War. A httle country, 
 described by everybody before the war and by most writers 
 since the war as among the most vexatious and infamous 
 in the world, would have been punished by a superior 
 Power which she had been long tormenting. I do not even 
 suggest yet that the French Government ought to have 
 recognized what they well knew, that Serbia was but the 
 
 I See the quotation from Professor Fay in Chapter I. His articles are 
 the most exhaustive yet prepared on the immediate causes of the war, the 
 events of June and July 1914. His larger work is printing. 
 
THE CRISIS 179 
 
 tool of Russia ' for breaking up the Austro- Hungarian Empire 
 and the clearing of her own path to Constantinople and the 
 Adriatic. Leave this fact entirely out and stiU, since Ger- 
 many was making not even a threat of war against Russia, 
 why should not France have taken this position ? 
 
 That the controversy between Russia and Austria was 
 over an affair which did not concern the interests of France 
 as a Power has to be admitted even by the friends of France. 
 Sir Edward Grey himself has said so. In his speech of 
 August 3, 1914, when the crash had at last come, he states 
 so to the English ParUament. The war, he says, did not 
 originate in ansrthing vital to France,' and he himself told 
 the French Ambassador this in an interview.3 If England 
 were to go into the war with France, he made it plain, 
 England could not do so on the ground that she was pro- 
 tecting something vital to France, but must justify herself 
 on the ground that her own interests were affected in case 
 France and Germany came to war. Even in this latter 
 event he was not clear that England could intervene unless 
 Belgium were violated. 
 
 Moreover, a large section of the French public, both 
 before the war (a few indeed during the war) and since 
 the war have protested that the Government of France 
 allowed itself to be dragged into a phase of Russian predatory 
 ambition. Russia beyond quesl^ion made the war general 
 in Europe by taking up the cause of Serbia, and France 
 brought Western Europe into the conflict by backing Russia 
 in that quarrel. It is perfectly plain from every document 
 and the whole course of diplomatic correspondence that 
 Russia went into the war because she was sure the existing 
 French Government would not fail to follow her, which 
 action on the part of France would inevitably bring in 
 England sooner or later to the side of France. 
 
 The chain of events is simple and plain. The French 
 could have stopped the whole thing at the outset. If wrongs 
 were done to Serbia, they could be otherwise redressed. 
 The Austrian Government for that matter had avowed 
 
 \ See the chapter " Serbia and the Balkans." 
 
 » Earl Loreburn's How the War Came, pp. 221-3. 
 
 3 British White Paper, 87, 116. 
 
180 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 that it would not attempt the annexation of that kingdom, 
 but that it would simply endeavour to punish a state which, 
 in malevolence toward a neighbour and in internal crime, 
 was far worse than Mexico is to the United States. France 
 and Russia, however, would not permit Austria to impose 
 that punishment upon an outrageous neighbour which the 
 United States would claim for itself the exclusive privilege of 
 determining as between ourselves and the RepubUc of Mexico. 
 
 Accordingly the present lamentations of a vigorous portion 
 of the French people concerning the actions of the Poincare 
 Government in 1914 have a solid basis, and should be borne 
 in mind by the reader when he peruses the following chapters. 
 
 The question to France originally was not whether she 
 should support a Russia attacked by Germany, but whether 
 she should stand by Russia in a war between the two. What 
 she did was to back Russia into the war with Germany. 
 Long before the fatal Russian mobilization, she had an 
 opportunity to prevent it. After it was begun she still 
 had an opportunity to stop it. No mobilization by Germany 
 ever preceded the hostile attitude and actions of Russia. 
 This last is something which all have to admit. 
 
 I am not overlooking the question whether the Berlin 
 Government knew the terms of the Austrian ultimatum 
 to Serbia. Since Berchtold had his reasons to conceal 
 the vigour of his steps (lest Germany, as it later did, tell 
 him to stop), it is possible that the precise language was not 
 communicated to the Wilhelmstrasse, but still I believe the 
 substance of it was sufficiently known there. My view is, 
 though, that Austria had a right to make the ultimatum 
 as strong as she pleased. If Russia then tried to make 
 a European war out of this, Russia would commit a wilful 
 wrong. When Russia did take this position, and began 
 to mobihze, Germany pressed Austria to sdeld and Russia 
 to wait, but the latter, glad of the opportunity, would not. 
 Russia forced the war. 
 
 The casual reader may wish to refresh his memory, as we 
 now discuss the most momentous week in the annals of 
 diplomacy. 
 
 To sum up, after several years of horrifying Balkan wars 
 and ceaseless Serbian and Russian intrigue, and after Austria's 
 
THE CRISIS 181 
 
 twice mobilizing against her offensive neighbour, a murder 
 occurred at Serajevo, Bosnia, Austrian territory, close to 
 the Serbian Une. The heir to the Austrian crown, together 
 with his wife, was assassinated there on the 28th of June, 
 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Government immediately 
 charged the Serbian Government with complicity, and 
 diplomatic notes were rapidly exchanged. In the first week 
 of July, the German Kaiser went on his usual summer voyage 
 to Norway. In the middle of July, the President of France 
 and Viviani visited the Czar at Petrograd, returning to 
 Paris in the last week of that month. On the 23rd, Austria- 
 Hungary delivered an extremely severe ultimatum to Serbia. 
 The latter did not wholly accept, but for the most part 
 did accept the terms of the ultimatum. The Austrians, 
 however, declared that the excepted part was vital in dealing 
 with a dynasty founded on assassination and with a people 
 industriously cruel, untruthful and quarrelsome. The 
 Kaiser returned from the North on Sunday, the 26th. In 
 the six following days the fate of Europe was decided. 
 
 I may now resume my contention that it was the duty 
 of France to warn Russia that she would not follow her in 
 a war about the Balkans. 
 
 But how easily were we all deluded in August 1914 ! 
 If Russia did not have her way, Serbia would become a 
 " vassal state." That never, never should be permitted. 
 Our good Russian brothers were rising with the most lofty 
 motives to save little Serbia from being a vassal state. Not 
 one of us seemed to be wise enough to reflect that if Russia 
 prevailed in the war, Serbia was sure to be a vassal state, 
 the vassal state of Russia. Other much fairer and purer 
 parts of the European population would also have been 
 the vassals of Russia. 
 
 In those days we did not know what kind of people the 
 Russians were, or what kind of rvilers they had. They 
 were our Russian brothers then. Those who will be at 
 the pains to read this book will learn just what kind of 
 rascals there were in control of the Petrograd Government, 
 what kind of assassins ruled Serbia, and what kind of people 
 those assassins had the privilege to rule. Then we can 
 look back upon the events of four terrible years and decide 
 
182 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 whether the French Government of 1914, knowing these 
 things far better than we could ever hope to know them, 
 was justified in following Russia in her Balkan ambitions 
 at the cost of a war involving many nations. 
 
 I am not overlooking the argument that Frajice is thus 
 invited to desert her ally. The argument is fallacious. 
 Her ally was embarking on something which did not 
 vitally concern her. When we say, on the other hand, 
 that Germany was justified in standing by Austria in an 
 unusual degree, we say it because to Austria the punishment 
 of Serbia was vital. It is useless to argue with those persons 
 who will not see that this question was, as I say, vital to 
 Austria. I have compared the situation before, and I 
 compare it again, to that of a black Repubhc in Mexico 
 filling our southern states with hterature by every mail 
 intended to rouse the blacks of the United States to a union 
 with Mexico. This, and years of it, was, in effect, what 
 Austria was enduring. Her own statement of it to Serbia 
 and the world was even milder than what historians portray.' 
 To Austria as a principal, therefore, there was a question in- 
 volved more vital by far than any to which Russia could appeal. 
 
 The ally of Germany, in other words, was exposed to 
 a peril to which the ally of France was not exposed. I 
 lay aside, because I disdain them as both untrue in fact 
 and unfounded in history, that Russia had either a sphere 
 of influence in the Balkans, or disinterested sentiment in 
 any of the Balkan States.* Her interests and intentions 
 there were predatory only. Serbia was but the wedge, 
 as at one time Bulgaria was to be the wedge, with which 
 Austro-Hungary should be broken up. Thus, the interests 
 of the Austrians were plainly the greatest as this crisis 
 came on — the outrages against her undeniable. 
 
 Passing now from Austria, let us consider the position of 
 Germany That country had, and nobody knew it better 
 than Poincare and his friends, or Sazonoff and his coterie, 
 
 1 British White Book, 13. Austrian Red Book, 19 and enclosure, also 
 the Appendices to that book detailing the Serbiai^ crimes and propaganda. 
 
 2 Never had Austria-Hungary or Germany conceded to Russia a sphere 
 of influence in the Balkans. On the contrary, as far back as 1854, they had 
 warned her against any such claim. Indeed, one of the reasons for which 
 Russia was wiUing to get into the recent war was the estabUshment of just 
 that sphere of influence which had never yet been acknowledged. 
 
THE CRISIS 183 
 
 but one friend left among the Great Powers of Europe. These 
 men knew, and exultingly knew, that Germany was com- 
 pletely encircled by the most powerful possible combination 
 of European military and naval strength. To Germany, 
 accordingly, the maintenance of the Austro-Hungary dominion 
 was of the very utmost importance. Obstinate, indeed, is 
 the man who will say that either Russia or France had, in 
 the Serbian question, any kind of interest as great as that 
 of Germany. In a word, to reason that France, before 
 Russia proclaimed or pretended affection to Serbia, should 
 desist from taking that necessarily offensive position was 
 not asking her to desert an ally. On the other hand, to 
 say that Germany should at the outset have warned Austria 
 not to take some independent action against this turbulent 
 and insulting Httle Government, would have been asking 
 Germany to desert an ally and not to support the course 
 of justice between nations. 
 
 The whole consideration of the crisis of July 1914 has 
 hitherto gone upon the unjustifiable presumption that 
 Russia had a sphere of influence, a tenderness of feeling, 
 and even an historic mission in the Balkans. Perhaps 
 we can now think of the thing in a different way. We have 
 seen revealed, what for that matter we ought to have seen 
 before the war, the utterly degraded character of the Russian 
 Court ; the absurdity of ascribing to any of its actions 
 motives elevated or humane. Its inconceivable debauchery 
 has been laid bare. But the point I make is that no outside 
 Government, except possibly the German, was aware so 
 much as France of the corruption of that Court. The 
 extent of bribery, its ordinary daily use in every channel of 
 Russian affairs, the use of Russian money on the French 
 Press, these and a thousand marks of the unreliability of 
 the Russian were perfectly well known to the Government 
 of France. That there was no real sympathy in the Court 
 of Nicholas II even for the free Republic of France was 
 perfectly well known to those negotiators, who so often 
 rejoiced in the banquets of Petrograd.' 
 
 ' Professor Fay, op. cit., mentions that on the last visit of Poincarfi to 
 the Czar, the miUtary bands were welcoming the President of France with 
 the Marseillaise, while the Cossacks of the suburbs were beating strikers 
 for singing it. 
 
184 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 The second thing that we notice during the tragic month 
 of July was that while England was making laudable efforts 
 to accomplish an adjustment, the French, according to 
 their own record, were doing little. One might almost 
 say they were doing nothing. They were behaving them- 
 selves just as we have seen in the first chapter they might 
 be expected to behave themselves. Let us not forget the 
 words of the Belgian Ambassador to his Home Office : 
 
 I have already had the honour to tell you that it is MM. Poincare, 
 Delcasse, MiUerand and their friends who have invented and pursued 
 the nationalistic and chauvinistic policy which menaces the peace 
 of Europe, and is the determining cause of an excess of military 
 tendencies in Germany. 
 
 This surely is from a friendly source, this criticism, and 
 it was in January 1914. Let us not forget either what 
 Benckendorif had to say just a Uttle while before^hat 
 France was the only one of the Great Powers which would 
 look upon war without great regret. 
 
 One would think from the horror and indignation which 
 France poured out to mankind upon Germany's declaring 
 war against her, that during the month of July, when war 
 was so clearly approaching, she would have left an indelible 
 record of remonstrances and caution to her unscrupulous 
 ally. Industry indeed would it require, though, to find this 
 in the French Yellow Book or in any other of&cial corre- 
 spondence of that period. Indeed, one accustomed to the 
 language of diplomacy will not be at a loss to read between 
 the lines of many communications from the Quai d'Orsay 
 a silent satisfaction that the hour of revenge was approaching. 
 
 Let us take, for instance, Viviani's telegram of July 
 30th, the day before the public admission by Russia of her 
 general mobilization.^ On the preceding day Pal6ologue * 
 had warned him that Russia was mobilizing. Remember 
 now, that at this time Germany was not mobilizing at all 
 and that Austria had mobilized only a few army corps against 
 Serbia remote from the Russian frontier. Viviani, instead 
 
 ' French Yellow Book, loi. Numerous commentators have pointed 
 out discrepancies and suppressions in this State paper. See, for example, 
 Alfred Pevet's Les Responsables de la Guerre, pp. 207. 451 ; also Dupin. 
 
 » Ibid., 100. Pal6ologue was the French Ambassador at Petrograd. 
 
THE CRISIS 185 
 
 of imploring Petrograd to be patient, ingeniously tells her 
 that in taking any " defensive measures " they refrain from 
 doing anything that may give the Germans a pretext for 
 mobilization. 
 
 What cant is this " defensive measures " ! Nobody was 
 threatening to invade Russia. That either Austria or 
 Germany should, with the French Army in the rear of them, 
 begin an attack on the enormous territory of Russia, in 
 which they would be lost, was an absurdity. What Viviani 
 craftily meant was that Russia should go on with her mobi- 
 lization in as secretive a way as she could.' Nor am I satisfied 
 with Pal^ologue's telegram in answer to this from Viviani. 
 He tells the latter* that the Russian Government is again 
 showing that it neglects nothing to avert the conflict. He 
 tells him3 that the night before the Russians have even 
 stopped their mobilization. This was untrue. 
 
 The hypocrisy of Pal6ologue is unmistakable. Russia, 
 he says, is mobilizing on account of " most serious danger " 
 and " reasons of strategy." The latter phrase was honest 
 enough for there was strategy to steal a march upon the 
 Germans, as, to the misery of East Prussia, it did steal a 
 march ; but when Paleologue speaks of Russia mobilizing 
 because of danger to herself, he says that which is not true, 
 and which he knew was not true. It is interesting to note 
 at this point the contempt of French critics of Poincare for 
 this ambassador to Petersburg. Paleologue had been in 
 the Home Office at Paris and, it is charged, was substituted 
 as a more aggressive type for Georges Louis to please the 
 bellicose Isvolsky.4 
 
 Here we must bear in mind that Viviani and Poincare had, 
 
 ' It is curious to notice the way in which Paleologue and Viviani are 
 apparently trying to make for subsequent use what lawyers call " a good 
 record." The Ambassador, in communicating with Viviani, never speaks 
 of mobilization in his early telegrams, but only of " military preparations," 
 and this is the phrase that Viviani uses in reply. Nobody knew better 
 than the two that Russia was in mobilization, at first partial and then general, 
 and that " mobilization " was the truthful word. 
 
 » French Yellow Book, 103. 
 
 3 Ibid., 102. 
 
 4 De Toury, op. cit., Pevet's Les Responsables de la Guerre. Delcass6 
 first took Louis's place by appointment from PoincarS, who had intended 
 to send Paleologue at once, but who heard some newspaper gossip and was 
 deterred. De Toury, op. cit., Paleologue went to St. Petersburg in January 
 1914- 
 
186 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 a day or two before, returned from Petrograd, where, in 
 all reason we may suppose, the strategy of correspondence 
 had been carefully laid down. The visit of the French 
 statesmen so late in July to the Czar of Russia must be 
 regarded by sensible men as a council of war. The French 
 Ambassador at Petrograd must unquestionably have been 
 present at many of these conferences. He must, according 
 to all reason, have been thoroughly informed by the French 
 President and by Viviani exactly as to what steps should be 
 taken on each hypothesis of action by Germany or Austria. 
 We know now that immediately after the departure of 
 Poincare and Viviani on their return to Paris, the Russian 
 mobilization secretly began. Though not made formal and 
 exposed until the last day of July, it was actually going on.' 
 
 Pal6ologue, on the 29th, had advised Paris that the 
 Germans would remonstrate against " Russia's noihtary 
 preparations." Viviani was then on his way back to Paris. 
 On the 30th, Pal6ologue reaches Viviani and tells him that 
 the German Ambassador has again asked Russia to cease 
 her mihtary preparations and has stated that Austria would 
 not infringe the territorial integrity of Serbia. 
 
 All this time Germany was not arming and Russia was. 
 All this time Austria was not arming against Russia and 
 Russia was arming against Austria. Since no haste in 
 Russian mobilization could save Serbia, her mobiUzation 
 would only tend to force a German mobilization, and, as 
 I have said, we look in vain for any French remonstrance 
 against this fatal step. 
 
 It was on the 31st that Paleologue sent to Viviani the 
 following telegram. He who understands the language of 
 diplomatic dispatches can expect the French Ambassador 
 to send a message which, if exhibited, will make good 
 matter for his side. This practice is common enough in 
 diplomacy. It is, however, seldom carried further than 
 either a misstatement or a concealment of facts, or the use 
 
 » See Professor Fay's article. See also Eggeling and Hoeniger and 
 Bogitsevich, Causes of the War, where he states that going from Berlin 
 to Warsaw on the 28th of July, he could see no German preparations, but 
 that as soon as he crossed to the Russian side, he could perceive mobilization 
 on a great scale. Dupin, in Considerations, etc., p. lo, and Le Bulletin 
 Offidel de la Sociiti d' Etudes documentaires de la Guerre, April 1922, specifically 
 argue a falsehood of Viviani in conceding the Russian mobiUzation. 
 
THE CRISIS 187 
 
 of vague terminology. When it expands into argument, 
 we have a pecuhar reason to suspect the writer. Bearing 
 this in mind, we ask why Pal^ologue thought it necessary 
 in the following dispatch to tell Viviani, who had just been 
 in Petrograd, more than the simple fact that Russia announced 
 herself as constrained, in the circumstances, to order mobiUza- 
 tion. 
 
 St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914. 
 
 As a result of the general mobilization of Austria and of the measures 
 for mobilization taken secretly but continuously by Germany for the 
 last six days, the order for the general mobilization of the Russian 
 Army has been given, Russia not being able, without most serious 
 danger, to allow herself to be further outdistanced. Really, she is 
 only taking military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. 
 
 For imperative reasons of strategy, the Russian Government, 
 knowing that Germany was arming, could no longer delay the con- 
 version of her partial mobilization into a general mobilization.' 
 
 In this short telegram there are three improper state- 
 ments. First, Austria had not yet made her general mobi- 
 lization, which only occurred on the same day as the Russian,* 
 and for that matter was not ordered at all until after positive 
 knowledge that the Russians had been secretly organizing, 
 as they have to admit they had been partially mobilizing 
 during several days previous against Austria. The next 
 improper statement was that the Russian general order 
 resulted from measures secret or open taken by Germany 
 that could furnish any fair pretext for this action by Russia. 
 Undoubtedly, Germany had been cautioning her military 
 chiefs and looking generally to her defences, but the evidence 
 is overwhelming that nothing was attempted by her remotely 
 comparable to the partial and general mobihzation by Russia. 
 
 Plain, indeed, did this appear after the war broke out. 
 The devastation of East Prussia showed that the Germans 
 had delayed too long, and that Russia had made a most 
 successful mobilization in secret. 
 
 What does Paleologue mean, too, by sasdng that Russia 
 must not allow herself to be " further out-distanced " ? She 
 
 » French Yellow Booh, 118. 
 
 ' " Practically simultaneous," Fay. British White Booh, 127, reports 
 August I St. Morel's Analysis of Events shows that the Austrian mobilization 
 was several hours later. Later French students think the same. 
 
188 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 was already out-distancing everyone else. She was able 
 to pour 800,000 troops into East Prussia several weeks 
 before even the Germans thought it possible. ' 
 
 Why also was it necessary for this Ambassador, who 
 had been talking to Viviani in Petrograd a few days before, 
 to explain that " really " Russia was only taking military 
 measures corresponding to those of Germany, a statement 
 both untrue and argumentative ? The more we read this 
 telegram, the more we see that it was out of the course of 
 diplomatic advice between parties on the same side. 
 
 Much has been made by thoughtless persons of that action 
 of the French Government ordering their mobiUzed troops 
 to keep back ten kilometres from the German border. This 
 was on July 30 — a peaceful step, which Viviani asks his 
 London Ambassador to mention to Grey.* 
 
 Now let us remember that this was on the 30th. Germany 
 had not yet declared war on Russia, and, of course, not yet 
 upon France. Germany had not yet even mobihzed. Let 
 us think a moment. Let us recur to the terms of the Alliance 
 between France and Russia. Have we not already seen 
 that, not leaving all strategy to their generals when war 
 should break out, these two Powers, in the very terms of 
 their treaty, had prescribed that the armies of each should 
 so act with reference to the other that Germany should 
 have to fight both countries at the same time on both fronts ? 3 
 The French were able to make the merit of this peaceful 
 appearance because their treaty with Russia was still a 
 secret. 
 
 In an instant the peaceful appearance of this French 
 precaution is gone. It was part of the strategy of war. 
 What folly would it have been in France to have precipitated 
 the war by any accidental collision of troops at the border ! 
 The policy of France obviously was, while mobilizing, to 
 delay the actual conflict until the vast Russian forces were 
 well collected on the German frontier. Every day that 
 
 • Ante, Chapter X. Lieut.-Gen. Macdonough's statement that Germany 
 had calculated that Russia could not advance any force before the middle 
 of September, an erroneous calculation, obviously based on Russian deception. 
 As we have seen, ante, Hindenburg could call but 200,000 troops to meet 
 the Russian armies of 800,000. 
 
 > French Yellow Book, 106. 
 
 3 See Chapter VIII and Appendix C. 
 
THE CRISIS 189 
 
 she delayed the actual war between herself and Germany 
 after she was sure that the conflict between Germany and 
 Russia must occur, she was gaining vastly in the helplessness 
 of Germany to dispatch to the French frontier the great 
 forces necessary to meet an army which, even on that side, 
 was equal to her own. One might aUow a doubt in favour 
 of France about this matter of the ten kilometres if we 
 had seen on her side urgent and strenuous invocations 
 to her ally to defer that mobilization which after all could 
 not be quick enough to save distant Serbia for whom it 
 was said to be ordered. But there is no record of French 
 endeavour to restrain Russia. 
 
 In the chapter following this, I shall point out something 
 else in the French behaviour — a deliberate attempt to make 
 the war certain by forcing England to declare that she would 
 be on the side of France and Russia. This argument about 
 England was indeed plausible, but when analysed it will 
 be found to be just what the English knew it to be when 
 coming from so militant a Government as that of Poincare. 
 All that Russia was waiting for was the certainty that England 
 also would be on their side. It was not Germany but Russia 
 that had to be restrained. Most diligently, however, from 
 all sides did the French and Russians move upon England 
 to make public such an assurance.^ Those who have but 
 lightly looked at the surface may at first applaud this 
 importunity by France and Russia, but it is impossible 
 for anybody who has studied the whole situation to look 
 at it that way. 
 
 To resume as to Germany's situation : France was 
 seeking advantage for her ally, Germany only safety for 
 hers. Austria-Hungary could not possibly permit the plots 
 of Serbia to continue. She maintained, and maintained 
 to the last, that she had a right to make a settlement directly 
 with that country. Did not our own country finally have 
 to throw into Mexico, without proclaiming a state of war, 
 such bodies of troops as would punish in Mexico a banditry 
 which the Government of Mexico either could not or would 
 not control ? Does anybody believe that the United States 
 or England, in a similar trouble as that between Serbia 
 
 « British White Book, 99, 116, 119. 
 
190 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 and Austria, would have permitted any distant third Power, 
 even though related by blood and actuated by pretended 
 affection, to control or to throw into the general poUtics of 
 the world for conference a punishment directly merited 
 between the original parties ? We must remember always 
 that never had the Central Empires acknowledged a Russian 
 sphere of influence in the Balkans. England never had 
 recognized it in any clear fashion until after the Sahsbury 
 Ministry came to an end in 1902. Nor must we forget a 
 certain fair historical comparison. England and France 
 had gone to war to keep Russia out of the Dardanelles, 
 an action on the part of the two former not necessary to 
 their immediate safety, but necessary to what they thought 
 the safety of their remoter possessions. The argument of 
 Austria-Hungary, and for that matter of Germany, too, 
 for a sphere of influence over that of Russia in the Balkans, 
 was every way stronger than that asserted by England 
 and France against Russia in the Crimean War. 
 
 At all events, two things were clear — a decisive settle- 
 ment of the Serbian question and prompt and vigorous 
 punishment of Serbia was vital to Austria ; and the 
 deternodnation of Russia to make this her quarrel was a 
 determination to destroy if she could the power of Austria- 
 Hungary. At this point, the necessity of Germany was 
 plain. As Sir Edward Grey admits, Germany could not 
 afford to see Austria crushed. She must stand by her " with- 
 out any reference to the merits of the dispute." ' Such 
 was the painful situation of Germany ; such the situation 
 of which France determined to take advantage. 
 
 We have seen in preceding pages the enormous military 
 and naval preparations of the Allies. We have seen the 
 secret confession by the German Chief of Staff that the odds 
 against Germany were tremendous. We have seen that 
 Germany was a country without a single natural frontier 
 for defence. We know that France, protected from Spain 
 by the Pyrenees, from Italy by the Alps, and by the sea 
 against any great invading force, had but the German 
 frontier to watch. We know that Russia could deride even 
 a threat of invasion and could make herself immediately 
 « British White Book, 46. 
 
THE|CRISIS 191 
 
 safe by mere retirement. But Russia was on the offensive. 
 In addition to the boastful threats in the Bourse Gazette ' 
 reckless disclosures of her bad purpose were common, as 
 when the military journal Raswjaldtschik on New Year's Day, 
 1914, exclaimed : " We are arming for a war of extermina- 
 tion against the Germans." » Fancy such talk in responsible 
 journals in a time of peace. This was months before the 
 war. Yet no German army had in many centuries attacked 
 Russia. There had been long, profound peace. What was 
 wrong then ? Germany would not permit Russia to expand 
 into the Balkans. 
 
 Germany, of all the Great Powers, was the one most 
 exposed, and Germany knew herself to be outnumbered. 
 Now what was her behaviour ? The time has passed when 
 any fair student of that terrible era will argue that Germany 
 set' out to conquer the world. This language, which we 
 were so fond of uttering in the period of our ignorance and 
 at the height of our irritation, must be abandoned. Every- 
 thing shows no such hope inspired the breast of any German 
 military chief. The question was, could they preserve 
 their ally in what they deemed a just cause by stiffness in 
 negotiation ? 
 
 There is no doubt that from the start the Germans 
 were determined that Austria should have, as far as possible, 
 a free hand in the settlement of this dispute with Serbia. 
 Germany had interfered once before, in 1913, after Austria 
 had gone to the great expense of mobihzation. The Serbians 
 were continuing, with fuU reliance upon the Russians, that 
 policy of ceaseless intrigue and of organized, hostile pro- 
 paganda which must sooner or later break up a country 
 which was adjacent to Serbia and which had as good a moral 
 and poUtical right to regulate her behaviour as the Court 
 of Petrograd. It was Russia that was determined to have 
 her hand in this business. If she could succeed by diplomatic 
 pressure and a show of military strength in forcing the 
 Austrians to throw the Serbian question into a European 
 conference, she would obtain the thing which she wanted, 
 
 ' Note, ante, p. 31. 
 
 ' Von Eggeling, who cites other such utterances on Poincar^'s visit of 
 1912, Die Russische Mobilmachung, passim, Eggeling was German Military 
 Attach^ at St. Petersburg. 
 
192 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 but which was dangerous to European peace, a right of 
 being first consulted in Balkan disputes. That it was her 
 purpose to gain a foothold in the Balkans and thus ultimately 
 control both the Dardanelles and the Adriatic is too plain 
 to be repeated. 
 
 I will frankly say that if the Germans had thought 
 themselves strong enough, they would have gone to war 
 with Russia voluntarily, rather than admit her to any power 
 in the Balkans, for the whole Russian history proved her 
 policy of gradually encircling and strangling the country 
 to the West. But Germany well knew that she was not 
 strong enough to carry on a war with Russia and fight a 
 war on two fronts with the undoubted policy of England 
 (apart from any special agreement) to protect France against 
 any considerable loss at the hands of Germany.' 
 
 The pohcy of Berlin in the diplomatic controversy is per- 
 fectly plain. Germany would support Austria to a diplomatic 
 victory. Second, Germany must not get into war with 
 Russia even if the diplomatic conflict be lost. 
 
 We, accordingly, see in the first part of July a determined 
 attitude at Berlin against throwing this Serbian question 
 into a proposed European conference in which Austria 
 would be outvoted. To what extent the Germans had 
 advance knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia 
 is not definitely known, nor is this to my mind of final 
 importance, because after the ultimatum was served and 
 Serbia almost totally acquiesced, the Berlin Government 
 was satisfied. The delight of the Kaiser is undeniable. 
 His very handwriting, quoted by his worst enemy, Kautsky, 
 discloses this, the memorandum which he endorsed on the 
 communication that Serbia had yielded. Now, he cried, 
 there is no need for war ! On such a record, he would not, 
 like Austria, have ordered mobilization against Serbia.* 
 
 ' The British White Book shows that Germany conceded England's 
 never being willing to see France crushed by Germany. The most the 
 Germans hoped for was the neutrality of England, and most of the German 
 heads did not even hope for that. It was perfectly clear at Berlin that an 
 invasion of France by Germany, if successful, would amount to a clash with 
 England. 
 
 » Kautsky Document, No. 272. On the fall of the Empire the Imperial 
 archives were submitted by the new Government to free search and public 
 report by this bitter enemy of the Hoheuzollerus. 
 
THE CRISIS 198 
 
 The monarch seemed to be perfectly happy. The Kaiser, 
 who up to this time had been stern against a Russian diplo- 
 matic foothold for future pressure in the Balkans, now 
 becomes determined that Austria must avail herself of a 
 peaceful settlement. He resolved that Austria should not 
 force a war. He so instructed Bethmann.' 
 
 Events followed rapidly. Let us consider a week fatal 
 to mankind. On the night of Monday, the 27th, Bethmann 
 telegraphed to Tschirsky, the German Ambassador at 
 Vienna, the latest proposal received from Grey. A mediation 
 instead of a conference should be had. The Kaiser had been 
 invited to be himself a mediator. Bethmann's telegram 
 was as follows : 
 
 We cannot reject the r61e of mediator and must place the English 
 proposal before the Vienna Cabinet for consideration. Request 
 Count Berchtold's opinion on the British proposal, as well as on 
 Sazonofi's wish to negotiate directly with Vienna. 
 
 He supplements this on the next day with another telegram : 
 
 The refusal of every exchange of views with Petrograd would be 
 a serious mistake if it provokes Russia precisely to armed interference, 
 which Austria is primarily interested in avoiding. We are ready, to 
 be sure, to fulfil our obligations as an ally, but must refuse to allow 
 ourselves to be drawn by Vienna into a world conflagration frivolously 
 and in disregard of our advice. Please say this to Count Berchtold 
 at once with all emphasis and with great seriousness.' 
 
 This telegram was sent late Tuesday night, and still 
 without any response. Wednesday now came, the 29th, 
 and Bethmann's alarm became apparent. He became 
 suspicious that something was being concealed from him. 
 Again telegraphing Tschirsky, he says : 
 
 I regard the attitude of the Austrian Government and its un- 
 paralleled procedure toward the various Governments with increasing 
 astonishment. ... It leaves us wholly in the dark as to its programme. 
 ... I must conclude that the Austrian Government is harbouring 
 plans which it sees fit to conceal from us in order to assure herself in 
 all events of German support and avoid the refusal which might 
 result from a frank statement. 
 
 ' Kauisky Document, No. 293. " No cause for war any longer exists.* 
 » Die Deutschen Dokumente, No. 396. 
 
 13 
 
194 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Austria had indeed been concealing something which 
 the world has supposed the Germans knew, but which it is 
 now plain they did not — the Wiesner report. The latter 
 had been sent by Berchtold to discover whether the Serbian 
 Government had been directly or indirectly the backers of 
 the murderers at Serajevo. His report had been adverse. 
 He did not go so far as to say in it that the Serbian Govern- 
 ment might not have been connected with the murders, 
 but that it could not be proved. Doubtless Berchtold 
 was infuriated at what he believed to be the usual alibi 
 of the Serbian Government. No doubt he felt the maddening 
 perplexity of one who is practically convinced that habitual 
 criminals have been repeating their crimes, but who has 
 to confess that he has not the proof to convict them. What- 
 ever may have been his feelings he saw at once that he could 
 not make the record known to Berlin and expect the Berlin 
 Government to go nearer to the verge of war in order to 
 support Austria.! Berchtold's guilt is plain. 
 
 Returning now to Bethmann. Thursday had been 
 reached, the thirtieth. In his endeavours to get an answer 
 from Vienna, he now becomes more insistent : 
 
 If Austria refuses all negotiations, we are face to face with a con- 
 flagration in which England will be against us, Roumania and Italy, 
 according to all indications, will not be for us, and we shall stand 
 two against four Powers. Through England's opposition the main 
 blow will fall on Germany. Austria's political prestige, the military 
 honour of her army, £is well as her just claims against Serbia, can 
 be adequately satisfied by her occupation of Belgrade or other places. 
 Through her humiliation of Serbia she will make her position in the 
 Balkans, as well as in her relation to Russia, strong again. Under 
 these circumstances, we must urgently and emphatically press upon 
 the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the adoption of mediation 
 in accordance with the above honourable conditions. The respon- 
 sibiUty for the consequences which would otherwise follow would be 
 for Austria and for us an uncommonly heavy one.» 
 
 Germany, it is plain, was doing her best to force Austria 
 to come to her senses. In the Berlin Cabinet, indeed, the 
 
 I German White Book, 1919, presents the German evidence of this 
 concealment of Wiesner's report, and investigators have uniformly accepted 
 this proof. The translations that I am setting out at this point in the narrative 
 are from Professor Fay's treatise. 
 
 » Ibid., 395. Why could not France have sent a similar telegram to 
 her ally, begging her not to mobilize that tremendous army ? 
 
THE CRISIS 195 
 
 opinion may have been that Austria was still morally in 
 the right and that the time had at last come when she should 
 be allowed to settle directly between herself and Serbia 
 the continuous eternal wrong. Whatever may have been 
 the opinion of the Berlin Cabinet as to Austria's rights, 
 that Cabinet, nevertheless, was determined to force a com- 
 promise. The opinion so widely held by the public that 
 Germany backed Austria to the last in delight at an oppor- 
 tunity for aggressive war is manifestly unsound and by all 
 investigators of the subject is now abandoned. The only 
 reproach that can be put upon the Berlin Government is 
 that it did not exert itself upon Austria early enough. In 
 my opinion that criticism is not fair. Austria had a moral 
 right to punish Serbia in a military manner. Germany 
 believed, and in my opinion rightly believed, that remon- 
 strances, councils, reprimands, formal humiliation and 
 promises of good behaviour, meant to a Government like 
 that of Serbia neither shame for the present nor decorum 
 for the future. I 
 
 Abstract right, however, could no longer be considered. 
 Austria must abandon her policy. She must accept the 
 merely diplomatic victory she had gained which, while it 
 would insure her no peace for the future from Serbia, would 
 at least defeat either Russian intervention or distinct 
 recognition of a Russian sphere of influence in the Balkans. 
 Up to the beginning of the fatal week Germany probably 
 expected that the Government of Russia would be actuated 
 by the principles of peace, or that if she were not, either 
 her ally France or the English Cabinet, so friendly 
 to Russia would prevent herf rom seizing every possible 
 pretext for invasive war. One has only to look at the map 
 of Europe to see the falsity and hypocrisy of Sazonoff's 
 remark that the protection of Serbia was " to Russia a 
 question of life and death." » Russia nowhere touches 
 
 I Pevet in his Les Responsdbles de la Guerre (p. 242) notes the German 
 change of policy at this juncture and comments on the favourable pressure 
 at once exerted. The reasons (he says) were " fear of war under conditions 
 unfavourable both internal and external. They are too natural, too human 
 to be thought less than sincere." 
 
 " Sazonofi to the English Ambassador, Buchanan, August 1st, after 
 his refusal to stop mobiUzation on the German demand. British White 
 Booh, 139- 
 
196 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Serbia, nowhere is near Serbia. Austria, bordering on 
 Serbia, had twice before 1914, that is to say in 1912 and 
 1913, had to mobilize on account of her policy and her wars. 
 Thursday having expired without a reply from Austria, 
 it now became plain from the increasing mobilization in 
 Russia that the Berlin Government must exert itself directly 
 in Petrograd. The Kaiser had returned from his Scandinavian 
 cruise on Sunday, the 26th. He, accordingly, had been 
 watching the events of the past four days and he, too, became 
 alarmed because Austria was not accepting the compromise 
 that would save her face, and preserve a considerable degree 
 of her rights. He now began to take things in hand himself 
 with his relative, the Czar. On Tuesday night, the 28th, 
 while Bethmann was sending his first peremptory telegrams 
 to Vienna, he wired the Czar as follows : 
 
 July 28, 10.45 P-M. 
 
 I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which 
 is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia. The 
 unscrupulous agitation which had been going on for years in Serbia 
 has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand 
 has become a victim. The spirit which made the Serbians murder 
 their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubt- 
 less you will agree with me that both of us, you as well as I, and all 
 other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who 
 are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved 
 punishment. 
 
 On the other hand, I by no means overlook the difi&culty encoun- 
 tered by you and your Government to stem the tide of pubUc opinion. 
 In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long 
 time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria- 
 Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with 
 Russia. I hope confidently that you will support me in my efforts 
 to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise. 
 
 Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin, 
 
 WiLHELM.' 
 
 To which the Czar replied the next day, Wednesday, the 
 
 29th, as follows : 
 
 Peterhof Palace, 
 
 July 29, I P.M. 
 
 I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment 
 I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been 
 I Oman's Outbreak of the War, p. 6i. 
 
THE CRISIS 197 
 
 declared against a weak country, and in Russia the indignation, 
 which I fully share, is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall 
 be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall 
 be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent such 
 a calamity as a European War would be, I urge You in the name of 
 our old friendship to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from 
 going too far. 
 
 (Signed) Nicholas.' 
 
 At the close of the afternoon of the same day that the fore- 
 going telegram was sent by the Czar, the German Emperor 
 replied as follows : 
 
 July 29, 6.30 P.M. 
 I have received Your telegram and I share your desire for the 
 conservation of peace. However, I cannot — £is I told You in my ■ 
 first telegram— consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an " igno- 
 minious war." Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the 
 promises of Serbia, as long as they are merely on paper, are entirely 
 unreliable. According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary 
 is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the 
 promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this 
 opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet 
 that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of 
 Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for 
 Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian War without 
 drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I behave 
 that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your 
 Government and Vienna, an understanding which — as I have already 
 telegraphed You — my Government endeavours to aid with all possible 
 effort. Naturally, military measures by Russia, which might be 
 construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a 
 calamity which both of us desire to avoid, and would undermine my 
 position as mediator, which — upon Your appeal to my friendship 
 and aid — I willingly accepted. 
 
 (Signed) Wilhelm.' 
 
 And to this the Czar, late on the night of Wednesday, the 
 29th, immediately responded : 
 
 Thanks for your telegram, which is conciliatory, while the official 
 message presented by your Ambassador to my Foreign Minister was 
 conveyed in a very difierent tone. I beg you to explain the differ- 
 ence. It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem 
 to the Hague Conference. I trust in your wisdom and friendship. 3 
 
 I Oman's Outbreak of the War, p. 61. There was no " pressure " except 
 from the military party, which no doubt dictated this communication. 
 » Ibid., p. 68. 3 Ibid., p. 69. 
 
198 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 The next day, Thursday, while Bethmann's fusillade of 
 telegrams to Vienna had produced no restilts, the German 
 Emperor, perceiving that Russia was continuing that mobiliza- 
 tion, which it would be absurd in her to say was required 
 by that vast country for defence, and which no German 
 mobihzation had yet provoked, immediately answered : 
 
 July 30, I A.M. 
 
 My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your 
 Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobiliza- 
 tion. I have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary 
 has mobiUzed only against Serbia and only a part of her army. If 
 Russia, as seems to be the case, according to your advice and that 
 of Your Government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part 
 of the mediator, with which You have entrusted me in such friendly 
 manner and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is 
 threatened, if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision 
 now rests upon Your shoulders ; You have to bear the responsibility 
 of war or peace. 
 
 WiLHELM." 
 
 We now quote the Czar's answer of Thursday to the 
 preceding telegram of the German Emperor : 
 
 Peterhof, 
 
 July 30, 1914, 1.20 P.M. 
 
 I thank you from my heart for your quick reply. I am sending 
 to-night TatischefE (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with in- 
 structions. The mihtaxy measures now taking form were decided 
 upon five days ago, and for the reason of defence against the pre- 
 parations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures 
 will not influence in any manner Your position as mediator, which 
 I appraise very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria 
 so that an understanding can be arrived at with us. 
 
 Nicholas.* 
 
 Nothing apparently could stop Russia, and we shall soon 
 see the reasons why, reasons which at once justify the German 
 military party's lack of faith in Russia and make almost 
 pathetic the efforts of the German Emperor to stop, through 
 the Czar, the scoundrels who had charge of the great weapon 
 
 I Oman's Outbreak of the War, p. 77. This telegram and the Czar's, 
 which is quoted, probably passed each other in transmission. There has 
 been some discussion of this, though I think it unimportant. It was clear 
 that Russia could wait. German White Book, 1915, 33. 
 
 » Ibid., p. 79. German White Booh, 1915, 23-A. 
 
THE CRISIS 199 
 
 of Russia. A desperate attempt having been made for 
 mediation by the Berlin and British Cabinets, and the wil- 
 lingness of Germany to participate in the mediation having 
 been evidenced, the Czar now, on Friday, telegraphs the 
 Kaiser again : 
 
 July 31, 1914, 
 I thank you cordially for Your mediation, which permits the hope 
 that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible 
 to discontinue our mihtary preparations which have been made 
 necessary by the Austrian mobiUzation. It is far from us to want 
 war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia con- 
 tinue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You 
 my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace 
 of God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for 
 the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe. 
 
 Your cordially devoted, 
 
 Nicholas.' 
 
 The reader now pauses and wonders why, with this 
 telegram from the Czar, the thing could not have ended 
 peaceably. He must, therefore, hear that the efforts of 
 the Czar and the Emperor were defeated by the Czar's 
 military officials. The whole bad thing was revealed after 
 the Russian Revolution, when the new Government of Russia 
 resolved to expose the infinite debauchery and corruption 
 of the Russian Court. Particularly was the new Government 
 determined to find the reason why Russia, who had no fear 
 whatever of invasion, could not have waited, but threw upon 
 Germany, a country which was much more dangerously 
 situated, the burden of sitting quietly by during the mobi- 
 hzation of the colossal Russian Army and its perceptible 
 movement toward the German frontier. 
 
 Professor Oman, in a brochure issued in 1919, as a semi- 
 official publication from His Majesty's Stationer Office, 
 has given some detail of the intrigues of Sukhomlinoff, 
 Minister of War, and Jaunuschkevitch, Chief of Staff, as 
 revealed at their impeachment and trial. Though Pro- 
 fessor Oman's book is prepared with a distinct bias against 
 Germany, it reveals enough to show that no English Govern- 
 ment, with either an enormous navy mobilizing in France 
 
 ' Oman's Outbreak of the War, p. 88 ; and his general mobilization went 
 on just the same. 
 
200 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 or a colossal and hostile army mobilizing in Scotland would 
 have had half the patience that the Kaiser showed at this 
 time. Sukhomlinoff confessed that after the Czar had 
 received these telegrams from the Kaiser, the Czar called 
 the Minister of War up by telephone and told him to stop 
 the mobilization. At that time the Czar thought the 
 mobilization was only partial. It was reaUy already general, 
 a procedure for which the direct authority of the Czar was 
 necessary and had not been given. Sukhomlinoff confessed 
 that in making the mobilization general, he had concealed 
 this from the Czar ; nay, more, that he did not reveal it to 
 him in the conversation by telephone. He next admitted 
 that he promised the Czar to stop the further mobihzation 
 and not to issue a general mobilization. He frankly admits 
 that he lied to the Czar. He hung up the telephone with a 
 false promise to the Czar, and, he says, went on with the 
 mobilization. His fellow-rogue, Jaunuschkevitch, floundering 
 in his testimony, and confronted at all points with contra- 
 dictions, left the stand in the same disgusting and humiliated 
 condition. It is too bad that Professor Oman, in a brochure 
 otherwise so excellent, should have attempted any apology 
 for the actions of rogues who were playing with the lives 
 of millions, and that he should suggest that, while it was too 
 bad that they should act in this way, their motives, after 
 aU, were " patriotic." ^ 
 
 The reader will ask why it was patriotic in a country 
 so secure as Russia to violate the orders of the head of the 
 Government in the direction of peace and with a knowledge 
 that the head of the country which they were about to 
 assail was in direct and friendly overture with their own 
 sovereign. Saddest of all is it to reflect that a military 
 attache at Petrograd was, on the Czar's changed attitude, 
 about to depart for Berlin with a commission for quick 
 adjustment of the military situation. 
 
 The Czar, as we have seen, thought he was stopping 
 the mobilization, but the mobilization went on and, of course, 
 the Germans heard of it. The Kaiser now sent the last 
 message to the Czar before it became necessary to send 
 the subsequent ultimatum to Russia that within twelve 
 
 I Oman's Outbreak of the War, p. 68. 
 
THE CRISIS 201 
 
 hours she cease her mobilization. The telegram from the 
 Kaiser to the Czar is as follows : 
 
 Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my 
 aid, I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and 
 the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking 
 place. Your troops were being mobilized against my ally, Austria- 
 Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my 
 mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this I have con- 
 tinued it, and I now receive reliable news that serious preparations 
 for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for 
 the security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I have 
 gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preser- 
 vation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the respon- 
 sibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civihzed 
 world. It rests in your hand to avert it. No one threatens the 
 honour and peace of Russia, which might well have awaited the 
 success of my mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, 
 bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always 
 been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it 
 was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace 
 of Europe can still be preserved by You, if Russia decides to discon- 
 tinue those miUtary preparations which menace Germany and 
 Austria-Hungary. ■ 
 
 But the military party at Petrograd had now entire 
 control. Deceiving the Czar, they pressed forward to a 
 point at which something would be done by Germany that 
 would furnish a justification for their course, as lawyers 
 say, by relation. The Russian mobilization continued. 
 That mobilization had gone already far beyond where it 
 should have been permitted by the Germans to proceed. 
 To me, the patience of the Kaiser is incredible. The extent 
 of the Russian standing and prepared army was well known — 
 more than 2,000,000 men. Every day it was being brought 
 up from the interior. Every day while the German repre- 
 sentative at Petrograd protested to Sazonoff that they had 
 evidences of this dangerous assembling of troops, the fact 
 was vigorously denied and the Germans quieted by repre- 
 sentations now known to be falsehoods.* 
 
 ' Oman's Outbreak of the War, p. 89. Professor Fay, in the work so 
 frequently cited, has exceeded Oman in an investigation of the Sukhomlinofi 
 trial. He has revealed most interesting data from Russian newspapers and 
 many contemporary sources, and has analysed the testimony in a manner 
 judicial as well as academic. 
 
 > The books by Eggeling and Hoeneger contain convincing data to show 
 the unexpected success of the Russian deception in regard to mobilization. 
 
202 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 The fact is that if we look at this thing purely from 
 the standpoint of German safety, the Kaiser should have 
 ordered general mobilization a week sooner than he did, 
 or at least have served on Russia his ultimatum that her 
 military preparations cease. The argument of some that 
 Germany, after discovering that Russia was going so far 
 in mobilization and that even after Russia had refused 
 on the German ultimatun to stop the mobilization, should 
 merely have moved her troops toward the frontier is, from 
 a military standpoint, from the standpoint of ordinary 
 common sense, easily answered. This course would have 
 increased the dangers of Germany. It was in a sense, next 
 to Germany's not mobilizing at all, exactly what the 
 Russian militarists would desire. They would then have 
 gained time. They would have had just so much longer 
 period to bring up their forces from the interior. The 
 French mobilization would meantime go on, and France 
 and Russia, under their old but still vigorous and yet un- 
 published treaty, would act in common and strike at the 
 same time. The French were keeping back from their 
 frontier.! 
 
 Fundamental in military circles of Europe was this 
 principle in regard to Germany, that if she had to fight 
 both France and Russia, she must strike with extraordinary 
 quickness against France. Russia had the man-power, 
 Germany the swiftness. The totally outnumbered army 
 must depend upon its speed and must act before the two 
 adversaries had all their resources assembled, both before 
 and behind the country that had to defend. 
 
 The last sad step had to be taken. On Friday, the 31st, 
 
 the German Government notified the Russian Government 
 
 that within twelve hours its mobilization must cease. The 
 
 mobilization did not cease, and on Saturday, the ist of 
 
 ' The opinion of all impartial investigators and witnesses accumulates 
 against the Russians because of their mobilization. The latest voice is 
 Nitti's : " When it will be possible to examine carefully the diplomatic 
 documents and to judge calnily, it will be seen that the underlying cause 
 of the world conflict was Russia's attitude." Peaceless Europe, p. 12. And 
 again : " One point wiU always remain inexplicable — ^why Russia should 
 have taken the superlatively serious step of general mobilization, which 
 could not be and was not a simple measure of precaution. It is beyond 
 doubt that the Russian mobilization preceded even that of Austria. Ibid., 
 p. 84. 
 
THE CRISIS 203 
 
 August, Germany declared war on Russia. Even on the 
 day of the German declaration of war something had occurred 
 which would have enabled an absolute ruler like Nicholas 
 to stop on the brink. of the abyss. Austria accepted the 
 mediation — the mediation which, as she accepted it, was 
 to be between herself and Serbia as two sovereign Govern- 
 ments.' Petrograd knew of this acceptance, which was 
 disclosed to Grey in London on the ist of August.* 
 
 Another incident may be added. During the close of 
 1921, Sazonoff, in a Parisian journal, tells that the Czar 
 received a telegram from the Kaiser, begging the Czar, 
 notwithstanding the declaration of war, to keep the troops 
 from the German frontier.3 
 
 I have said before what I think all impartial persons 
 will agree in, that the actual hostilities were precipitated 
 by the determined policy and resolute corruptness of the 
 Russian Court. Baron Rosen gives it as his opinion that 
 the Russian mobilization necessarily led to war and was 
 prosecuted at the last when both Germany and Austria- 
 Hungary were coming back to their senses. He places the 
 guilt upon all three Russian heads, Sazonoff, Sukhomlinofi, 
 and Jaunuschkevitch.4 He gives us, too, some details. 
 At dinner with Sukhomlinoff when the latter received a 
 telegram that Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia, 
 he heard the War Minister exclaim, " Cette fois nous 
 marcherons."5 The people, he tells us, were indifferent, 
 but the intelligentsia and the military party were for war.^ 
 It was Sazonoff and Jaunu§ctikevitch who, after the military 
 representative was to proceed^? Berlin for a conference, 
 obtaining the Czar's ear at Peterhof, stopped the dispatch 
 of the officer and secured on Thursaay a re-ordering of the 
 general mobilization. 7 
 
 The horror and hate of war have now passed, I hope, 
 sufficiently into the past to leave us in that tranquillity of 
 
 ' Austrian Red Book, III, p. 65. » British White Book, 133. 
 
 3 La Revue de France, November 15, 1921. Sazonoff concedes that the 
 German Emperor was nearly frantic. 
 
 4 " Forty Years of Diplomatic -Life," Saturday Evening Post, August 2i, 
 1920, p. 85. 
 
 5 Ibid., July 24, 1920, p. 132. ' Ibid., August 21, 1920. 
 
 7 Ibid., August 21, 1920. Re-ordering means first lawful ordering of 
 the general mobilization. 
 
204 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 mind in which we may ask ourselves whether we would 
 have put off a mobilization of our army so long as Germany 
 did with such colossal forces organizing against us on two 
 frontiers no further apart than Albany and Richmond, 
 Virginia, and the larger of those armies in control of men 
 desirous to glut themselves with the profits of war, incapable 
 of good faith and almost everyone of them spendthrifts 
 and debauchees. 
 
 When at last Wilhelm of Germany found himself con- 
 fronted by a Russia determined on war, when he saw un- 
 mistakably that France was cheerfully following, was 
 probably encouraging, and was not, at all events, restraining 
 the military ardour of a Court which no promise could bind, 
 and which looked with lust upon the clean villages, the rich 
 farms and the thriving cities on the level frontier, he saw 
 with fear and emotion that the dreaded day had come, the 
 day predicted by his ancestors, the day by every artifice 
 long postponed, the day when his country must face battle 
 on two fronts against forces united, superior, and led by 
 the genius and valour of France. 
 
 To the military ability of the latter, well prepared, were 
 added the inexhaustible reserves of Russia, who, not indeed 
 at the ultimate height of her incessant armament, was 
 nevertheless able to throw into the field at once, without 
 calling on her reserves, more than two million soldiers, 
 equipped as no Russian force had ever been equipped 
 before. To these appsJling hosts must probably be added 
 the hostility of England, the certain hostility of England 
 if he should adopt the only mode of defence by which, 
 according to the strategists of Europe, it was possible for 
 him to contend against such odds, a swift campaign against 
 France through Belgium before the Russian Army could 
 be well afield. Merely to defend was sure defeat. To attack 
 France on her own defences meant through delay destruction 
 by Russia. What he had to decide was whether his nation 
 should be overrun by Cossacks or be saved by his hurling 
 her forces through a neutral state which did not like Germany, 
 which spoke an alien tongue and which might later yield her 
 level ground to his foes for a flank assault upon him even if 
 he let her alone. 
 
THE CRISIS 205 
 
 In a situation so desperate we behold the last of the 
 Hohenzollerns. Where should he turn ? What friend 
 remained ? The German Army ! Invoking the wounds that 
 Germany had received from Bourbon kings and Bonaparte, 
 invoking the French hatred of German unity, to that arm) 
 he now appealed, an army that forty years of peace had 
 perhaps relaxed, but that still possessed the traditions 
 and was still inspired by the memory of a long line of able 
 kings who had raised Prussia from obscurity to power and 
 had secured to sixty million people both glory and repose. 
 
 Though three years have passed, the din of that terrible 
 struggle is still in our ears — ^the first triumphant dash toward 
 Paris, the blows in the rear by the Russians, the retreat 
 from the Marne, the hard and varying campaigns on the 
 Austro-Russian front, the despair of Germany when Italy 
 also turned against her. How the Germans could survive 
 even a year of combat so universal none could see, but from 
 a thousand hamlets new armies poured forth, as armies 
 arise in a nation when it believes that it is struggling for 
 existence. Roumania is suddenly added to the number of 
 her foes. Germany is surely lost. But Mackensen appears, 
 and three bold strokes render Roumania a ruin, its King 
 and Queen refugees to Russia. 
 
 In another terrible year Italy pressed her wedge into 
 Austria, which approached collapse. Then rose again the 
 unterrified spirit of the Baltic. Gathering fresh legions 
 from his hungry realm and stiU further resources for assault, 
 the Kaiser flings his fury on the Eastern Alps, until the grim 
 ranks of Prussia, bursting through the lofty barrier, rolled 
 on in one great torrent to the Po. Vast Russia fell besides. 
 The world was aghast at the marvel, but the resolution 
 of his enemies was unshaken. What remained ? One last 
 colossal effort. In the fourth year of the war, to the astonish- 
 ment of the world, half-famished Germany bursts upon 
 the Western front a new advance, shocking and bending 
 the mighty line of England — only to fall exhausted at the 
 gates of Paris. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 WAS ENGLAND PARTLY RESPONSIBLE? 
 
 The eye of England incessantly scans the worldi Should 
 we be told that the fate of this or that little country is of 
 no moment to England, we should be told what is not and 
 cannot be true, for every quarter of the globe is either 
 occupied by her subjects or trafficked in by her merchants. 
 Let the least of nations so much as murmer, the sound will 
 attract her sleepless ear. 
 
 We must approach a discussion of this question by con- 
 ceding to England what none of us willingly concede, what 
 she is not entitled to in any abstract or theoretical sense, 
 and what has enabled her to preserve a pre-eminence over aU 
 the nations of Europe, and, until recently, over all the nations 
 of the world. That England should arrogate a privilege of 
 always possessing a navy equal to those of any two European 
 Powers combined is a claim which, upon its mere face, 
 is exasperating. Equally, though, is it exasperating to 
 European Powers, including England, that our own country 
 should set up the Monroe Doctrine. Each of these policies 
 is indispensable to the national security, yet neither involves 
 territorial conquest, the prevention of other states from 
 uniting when kindred, or the dismemberment of any country 
 whatsoever. We, for our part, found at an early day that 
 we must either exclude European force from our neighbours 
 on this continent or adopt standing armies and dedicate 
 ourselves to war or the fear of war. 
 
 Equally fair is the English policy. An island country, 
 she could not have been safe during the last century against 
 the great standing armies of continental Europe unless she 
 absolutely controlled the sea, or, acquiescing in a mere 
 equality or inferiority of naval force, should adopt conscrip- 
 
 206 
 
WAS ENGLAND PARTLY RESPONSIBLE? 207 
 
 tion, the policy of a nation in arms. Those who upbraid 
 her for insisting upon the superior navy had best reflect 
 what would have happened to Europe if England also had 
 given herself over to a large standing army, which, it can- 
 not be denied, she had abundant riches to support. What 
 safety from British arms would any continental power have 
 felt ? The insecurity any part of Europe may have suffered 
 from the British Navy is but trifling to what it would have 
 suffered from a British Army and even a moderate navy 
 combined. 
 
 By nobody has the British argument for naval pre- 
 eminence been better stated than by Balfour, who in mere 
 writing, when we are not under the enchantment of his 
 address, puts it thus : 
 
 There are two ways in which a hostile country can be crushed. 
 It can be conquered or it can be starved. If Germany masters our 
 home waters, she could apply both methods to Britain. Were Britain 
 ten times master of the North Sea, she could apply neither to Germany. 
 Without a superior fleet, Britain could not even count as a Power. 
 Without any fleet, Germany would remain the greatest Power in 
 Europe. ' 
 
 The truth is that while a masterful navy can inflict great 
 mischiefs upon hostile countries, it can injure them for the 
 most part only in their maritime activities. To be sure 
 in the late war, the British Navy did conduct a blockade, 
 the propriety of which in international law is doubtful, and 
 the effect of which upon Germany was internally disastrous. 
 But it was disastrous to the latter internally only because 
 it was also at war with Russia. Had it not been for this 
 last feature, Germany would have derived inexhaustible 
 supplies of food and of many war materials from the eastern 
 part of continental Europe. It is then true, as a general 
 statement, that the navy of England cannot be used as a 
 means of conquest. 
 
 It always seemed to me, therefore, that Germany should 
 have accepted from the outset the policy of England. Her 
 
 I England and Germany, 1912, a symposium issued by Stein of the 
 German journal Nord und Siid. In spite of ourselves we have to agree 
 with Urquhart, the Member of Parliament, who in 1862 made the often 
 quoted utterance, " The sea threatens while it serves us. . . . England 
 will be the sea's victim the day she ceases to be its queen." 
 
208 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 position, I admit, was a hard one. As Germany grew in 
 industry she had to import more from abroad. Her 
 ferries had to pass not only under the guns of England, 
 but under the guns of France to the Atlantic. But while 
 it was distasteful to submit to that situation, nothing could 
 be plainer than that to such a situation she had to submit. 
 She must take her chances in this respect as Holland had 
 taken her chances and had prospered under those risks. Just 
 as France, according to my argument, should have kept 
 away from the dangerous Russian alhance and trusted to 
 her stout army and the natural associations of her neighbours, 
 including England, to protect her, and like Holland be thus 
 preserved from German assault, so Germany should have 
 calculated that if she did not start into a naval competition 
 with England, she would be left alone in her commerce. 
 For she should have reflected that the trade of England 
 itself with Germany was so vast that public opinion in England 
 could never be brought to war with Germany for anything 
 less than the national safety. 
 
 The German arguments for a navy, good in the abstract, 
 were wrong from the standpoint of the practical. Never 
 was a more unfortunate poUcy devised than that of the Kaiser 
 in his longing for the sea. It seized him early and remained 
 with him to the last.' True he had excellent argument for 
 it, which some Englishmen have conceded. Even Sir 
 Thomas Barclay, in the symposium of Stein that I have 
 already quoted, drew attention to the fact that Germany 
 had to provide a naval force against France as well. " Will 
 the French Navy," he asks, " be free to increase indefinitely, 
 while the German Navy is in agreement with us not to do so ? " 
 
 It has obviously become imperative for Germany to increase her 
 fleet in proportion to the needs of its protection against an ef&cient 
 French fleet.» 
 
 Nor can we refrain from quoting a revealed dispatch 
 that must in some degree be mortifying to the fair-minded 
 
 ' Our own famous Andrew D. White, in his delightful autobiography, 
 relates conversations with the Kaiser in the early part of his reign. The 
 Kaiser quoted the famous book of Captain Mahan, with which he seemed 
 to be extremely famihar. Baleful preceptor I It was Mahan's book that 
 intensified the EngUsh resolution to possess a dominating navy. 
 
 > Stein's England and Germany, p. 63. 
 
WAS ENGLAND PARTLY RESPONSIBLE? 209 
 
 people of England, a dispatch from the Russian Ambassador 
 at Berlin, when there was talk of an arrangement between 
 Germany and England for an " exempt year." 
 
 My French colleague, whose opinion Goschen • had asked, replied 
 that he could in no wise approve of the idea because all the savings 
 which Germany would make in interrupting shipbuilding would be 
 directed to strengthening the army.» 
 
 All these things may be true, but the policy of a great 
 German Navy was fatal to ultimate peace with England. 
 The latter may have been selfish, undoubtedly was selfish, 
 but her policy was a world policy, which had in no way 
 brought her to the invasion, or at any rate to the conquest 
 of continental soil. 
 
 Every nation that comes into the world must take into 
 account the policy of preceding powers. Germany for a 
 long time did so and may at heart have felt toward the last 
 that she was not really taking any attitude which England, 
 even from the English standpoint, had a right to dispute. 
 The building of the fleet, however, was a dangerous step 
 in the alienation of English pubUc opinion, and there never 
 was a greater error in policy or diplomacy than the refusal 
 of the German Government to agree to a " naval holiday " 
 with England. It was a stupid mistake. 
 
 It is impossible for one to consider the responsibiUty 
 of England concerning the recent war without taking a view 
 of her extraordinary history. It is the one country that has 
 aspired to world dominion without continuity of territory. 3 
 For my own part, I approach the discussion while she is 
 still bleeding, as Burke once expressed it, as one should 
 approach the wounds of a father, " with pious awe and 
 trembling solicitude." 
 
 Never pre-eminent in music or painting, England, like 
 
 ' English Ambassador at Berlin. 
 
 > Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Sazonofi, February 13, 1914 (see Ent. 
 Dip., 710). In other words, the ally of England was glad to have Germany 
 increase that kind of armament which would either endanger England or in- 
 crease her heavy naval outlay. Isvolsky from Paris, years before, also 
 reports military circles there as fearful of an agreement between England 
 and Germany to abandon naval rivalry — " Les miUtaires craignent notam- 
 ment ... la cessation de leur rivalte," February 29, 191 2 {Litre Noir, 
 p. 200). 
 
 3 Venice had a similar poUcy to be sure, but never ruled more than a 
 small part of the Mediterranean littoral. 
 
 14 
 
210 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Rome, exercised equally the genius of policy and arms. 
 But she exercised something more, a colonization of the 
 vacant parts of the earth by her offspring. As Rome 
 conquered foreign countries by arms alone, so the English 
 conquered the world by colonists as well as arms, each race 
 exhibiting in a singular degree abihty to adjust itself to 
 the strange laws of such half-barbarous countries as also 
 came under their sway. Both were unemotional and taciturn. 
 Both, proud of their power, were fond of exhibiting it over 
 foreign nations, the English greatly exceeding the Romans 
 in the quality of mercy. Both were tenacious of custom 
 and obstinate against change. Both have distrusted briUiant 
 and eloquent talent. Neither has ever excelled in courtly 
 graces or softness of manner. The British, rejoicing in manly 
 sports, were the first to prove to the modem world that 
 judgment which comes of health is better than learning 
 and the world was conquered on the playgrounds of England. 
 There were these modern Romans bred. A race of women 
 at the same time was developed singularly resembling the 
 Roman matron, fit to be consorts of determined men, and 
 stoically sending forth their sons to Africa, Australia, Canada 
 and Hindustan. Swallowing their tears, they bowed before 
 the destiny of England. On both England and Rome 
 has been bestowed the glory of bequeathing to distant races 
 and remote posterity works of mighty construction, a 
 universal language and a system of laws. 
 
 Let us now consider how England came to take part 
 in this war. In one sense, the story would have to begin 
 in 1904 with Morocco. In another sense, it began with the 
 Franco-Russian alliance. That it began with the latter 
 could be asserted because in my opinion that alliance made 
 war upon Germany by Russia inevitable, a joining of Russia 
 by France inevitable, and a retahatory blow by Germany 
 upon France inevitable. The last-named event must bring 
 England into the quarrel in spite of herself. France clearly 
 dragged England into this war. England could not stand 
 by and see France conquered, even if France were in the 
 wrong. Just as Germany could not suffer Austria to be 
 overrun by Russia, so England could not suffer France to 
 be overrun by Germany. 
 
WAS ENGLAND PARTLY RESPONSIBLE? 211 
 
 One may say that if France were in the wrong, England 
 should have let her suffer the consequences. She could 
 not do so. No matter what guarantees Germany might 
 give England that after a successful war, she would spare 
 France, England could not accept those guarantees. The 
 rage of triumphant war cannot be restrained. Promises 
 which rulers give in advance yield to the passions of their 
 own multitudes. That England had confidence in Bethmann 
 and that most of the English statesmen had confidence in 
 the personal word of the Kaiser would not be enough. These 
 men themselves might die during the contest, and at all 
 events would find in the behaviour either of France or Russia 
 during the war some unexpected injustice which the people 
 of Germany would insist should be made good by annexation 
 of territory. 
 
 Believing that England could thus be dragged into the 
 war by France and believing, as I do, that the war resulted 
 from the arming of Russia by France to a degree utterly 
 unnecessary and intolerable, I might let the subject drop 
 and ascribe the English intervention of fate, for I do not 
 think England went into war on account of the violation 
 of Belgian neutrality, but because the invasion of Belgium 
 was the same as the invasion of France, and contrary, in 
 English opinion, to the safety of England. ' 
 
 The English foreign policy is conducted in a manner 
 different from what most Americans believe. England, 
 the most democratic of aristocracies, is also the most 
 aristocratic of democracies. While the people have a free 
 Parliament, they have never ceased to respect the ancient 
 nobility of the realm and to these hands has been confided, 
 and successfully confided, the guidance of England. Out 
 of this has grown the privilege of the Foreign Office to act 
 in secret and to report treaties either not at all or only in 
 such parts as they deem advisable. Even Parliament 
 must not question them further than in formal interrogatories. 
 The safety of the State is presumed to be in the hands of 
 
 ' This is substantially the English attitude as disclosed by their White 
 Book and by Grey's speech of August 3, 1914. In the former, as has been 
 mentioned before. Grey finally advised the German Ambassador that even 
 if Belgian neutrality were respected, he would not say that England would 
 stay out of the war. 
 
212 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 those who possess the most ancient pledges of loyalty to 
 the kingdom. Only general questions can be put to the 
 Minister, as whether a certain treaty has been made or 
 not. That he should reveal its terms is not proper or 
 expected. We have here, it is perceived, a Venetian Council 
 of Ten, an aristocratical feature heightened by the fact 
 that the Foreign Ofl&ce is officered either by the landed 
 gentry and nobility or by persons of their class. The 
 advantages of this system are apparent, the continuity of 
 purpose, the secrecy, the handing down from one generation 
 to another of a pohcy not disclosed by public memoranda, 
 but confided to the memory and the honour of gentlemen. 
 At the head of the Foreign Ofiice after the Salisbury 
 Government and Lord Lansdowne passed away, was Sir 
 Edward Grey. He came, not only as the successor, but 
 as the initiator of the new diplomatic position and attitude 
 of England. Russia was no longer to be feared. It was 
 the rising power of Germany that must be silently dealt 
 with, a power of the first miUtary consequence, and an 
 invader also of English commerce to such an extent that 
 she would have been regarded as an inevitable enemy at 
 once if the commerce between Germany and England had 
 not itself been so great. The successive steps of Grey 
 under the reign of King Edward must be noticed. While he 
 was not party to Delcasse's deception of the Germans in 
 the first Morocco controversy, in which his predecessor, 
 Lansdowne, participated, he accepted the position of not 
 revealing what his predecessor had secretly done and of 
 standing stoutly by France in the concealments and mis- 
 understanding that ensued. What had been concealed 
 concerning Morocco was not revealed to the English Par- 
 liament or public during several years. ^ His place was hard. 
 The English people were allowed to judge the Germans 
 by the published record without their knowing anything 
 of the secret record. One misunderstanding led to another. 
 The Kaiser acted as was natural for a man to act who knew 
 he had been deceived by France and that the English Foreign 
 Office knew it. The people of England, however, regarded 
 
 > It first come before the public, it is stated, in an article in Le Matin, 
 in November 1911. 
 
WAS ENGLAND PARTLY RESPONSIBLE? 213 
 
 him as acting saucily because they knew only of the published 
 record. The worst of it for Grey was that after a while 
 questions were put to him in the House, and a man must 
 have all the casuistry from La Croix to Bellerini to justify 
 his evasions in answering these questions. It is not worth 
 while repeating them for they have been often made public 
 and are probably well known to the reader. 
 
 In effect it amounts to this : At the beginning of 1905 
 the English and French general staffs were in collaboration, 
 as Lord Haldane, then Minister of War, relates, by orders 
 of the Cabinet, but this fact was concealed and until the 
 outbreak of the war it remained concealed. The intimacy 
 between France and England grew steadily greater, until in 
 1912 it was actually reduced to a memorandum ' between Grey 
 and the French Ambassador, Paul Cambon. One dislikes 
 this paper, which in effect was an alliance, the more so as 
 several years of military collaboration had preceded it. 
 It affected to leave both parties perfectly free, while both 
 parties were engaging to go forward as partners. 
 
 AU this time the armament of France and Russia was 
 tremendously increasing. The English now supplemented 
 their arrangement with France by a naval arrangement, 
 which should leave the French fleet free to leave the north 
 coast of France and assemble in the Mediterranean, while 
 the Enghsh fleet should protect, in the event of hostihties 
 with a Power which was not named, the northern coast 
 of France. This also was not made public. Rumours were 
 in the air that some such agreement had been made. The 
 House again interrogated Grey. Nothing, the House was 
 assured, had occurred, other than had been made public, 
 that was binding upon England. 
 
 While I have already said that England could take no 
 other course than that of military preparation when a war 
 between France and Germany, no matter who was to blame, 
 would be sure to drag her in, it cannot be denied that the 
 closer England allied herself to France, the greater was the 
 exultation in Petrograd, where, we may well believe, such 
 news was quickly received. Upon the French Government, 
 too, what certainly must have been the effect ? It is useless 
 
 ' See British White Book, 105. 
 
214 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 to deny that the effect of such a memorandum as that between 
 Grey and Cambon would be to create a reckless insolence 
 in the French Cabinet of Poincar^, Millerand and Delcass^. 
 
 England, it may be humorously said, has a religious 
 perception of her own advantage and every profit she makes 
 is ordained of God. I do not, accordingly, ascribe to her 
 policy anything else than that it was dictated by the interests 
 of England. At the same time, I believe that Grey, while 
 he did much that encouraged the others, was, at heart, not 
 seeking the war, and I have full faith in the sincerity of 
 his motives in the last month, the terrible month of July. 
 
 Grey, nevertheless, must be in part condemned. He 
 allowed Russia to aspire in the Balkans where he knew she 
 would extend her evil power. He knew that everything 
 he did in concert with France was instantly communicated 
 to the court of the Isvolskys, Sukhomlinoffs and Rasputins, 
 to whose unprincipled character he could not shut his eyes. 
 He could not receive Sazonoff, the representative of that 
 bad court and entertain him in 1912, without knowing 
 the consequences of it. He must have known too that 
 Russia would never go to war against Germany unless she 
 were sure of the backing of France, for Sazonofi himself 
 had told the British Ambassador this is Petrograd. " His 
 Excellency rephed that Russia could not allow Austria 
 to crush Serbia and become the predominant power in the 
 Balkans, and, if she feel secure of the support of France, she 
 will face all the risks of war." » 
 
 But though Sir Edward well knew that France could 
 prevent Russia's going to war by saying that she would not 
 follow on a Balkan question, he could hardly have compelled 
 France to take this attitude by announcing that he would 
 leave France to her chances in such a war, for he also knew 
 that if France and Germany went to war, no matter for 
 what reason, England would probably have to intervene 
 for France. What he is to be censured for is his not having 
 discouraged Russia and France sternly years before on the 
 Balkan interference. Long, undoubtedly, had the English 
 Foreign Minister known of the rotten intrigues Of Russia 
 in Serbia, of the sinister objects she had against Austria, of 
 
 • British White Book, 17. 
 
WAS ENGLAND PARTLY RESPONSIBLE? 216 
 
 the utter baseness of every Russian motive in any Balkan 
 State, and finally of the grave ultimate consequences to 
 Western Europe if the Balkans became Russian. This is 
 his fault. He had wily men to deal with in his Continental 
 friendships and in the end he was made use of by them. 
 
 Here we may notice again, as we do at all points in 
 the Russian correspondence, that there was no real Russian 
 affection for Serbia, that the Russian diplomats speak of 
 Serbia's possible fate at the hands of Austria, only as a loss 
 to Russia, who might, therefore, not become the " pre- 
 dominant power " in the Balkans. I cannot refrain from 
 adding as to this a quotation from a telegram which the 
 Czar sent to King George on Saturday, the first of August, 
 when, having refused to stop mobilization, he received the 
 declaration of war from Germany. Referring to Austria's 
 action, he says " Object of that action was to crush Serbia 
 and make her a vassal of Austria. Effect of this would have 
 been to upset balance of power in Balkans, which is of such 
 vital interest to my empire."' 
 
 It is to be regretted that while Sir Edward Grey so fre- 
 quently acknowledges that this war arose in something 
 not essential to France and had even told the French Ambassa- 
 dor so, he should not also have told the French Ambassador 
 that it was the business of France to keep herself and Russia 
 out of a war on that account. It is too bad that we owe to 
 him the coinage of those phrases " vassal state " and 
 " humiliation of Russia."* No baser country than Serbia 
 ever existed and he himself had expressed his contempt for 
 Serbia, as we have already seen, by saying that it would 
 be " detestable " that any of the Great Powers should get 
 into a war concerning her. As for the humiUation of Russia, 
 
 " Oman's Outbreak of the War, p. 105. It will be noticed that the Czar 
 does not make the safety of Serbia " a question of life or death to Russia," 
 as Sazonoff had expressed it. It is, he says, a matter of vital interest to 
 his empire. It was, indeed, a matter of vital interest to Russian ambition. 
 To Austria only, which bordered upon Serbia, was it really vital. 
 
 " British White Book, pp. 90-91. As to Grey's relations with Russia, 
 the Russian Ambassador writes home about a month before the Serajevo 
 incident, sa3ring that in a talk with Sir Edward the latter had remarked 
 that the three Powers had been growing so close as to be almost allies. 
 About this time the Russians were endeavouring to arrange naval concert 
 of action should they attack the Germans on the Pomeranian coast. Ent. 
 Dip., p. 731. 
 
216 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 how ridiculous does that sound now ? Did the gentlemen 
 at Petrograd seem even in 1914 so excellent and the Govern- 
 ment of that country so just and true, that an English 
 statesman would consider a chance of a European war 
 rather than that Russia be abashed ? Nobody knew better 
 than Grey, that it would be very well indeed for the peace 
 of Europe if Serbia were made a vassal state of some great 
 Power and compelled to be decent. To no Power did the 
 right of controlling Serbia more belong than to Austria. 
 
 The trouble was, though, that Grey had deeply involved 
 himself and his country in his consultations and oral, if 
 not written, commitments to France and Russia. 
 
 His country, though, he had in one sense not committed. 
 England knew nothing of what her Foreign Office was doing 
 in this dangerous series of negotiations, the revelation of 
 which Grey undoubtedly awaited with apprehension. When 
 the last day of the fatal week arrived and it became clear 
 that war was to ensue, bitter protest arose from many 
 quarters in England against what was now plainly an 
 enmeshment of England. When, a day or two later, war 
 between Russia and Germany having actually began. Sir 
 Edward had to address the House and reveal his hand, he 
 could not tell all. 
 
 He did not tell, and afterwards was reproached for not 
 telling, what the German Ambassador had suggested to 
 him on August i, that is to say on the German declaration 
 of war against Russia, that England remain neutral providing 
 Germany had respect the neutrality of Belgium.' In my 
 opinion England could not have remained neutral even if 
 Germany respected the Belgian neutrality. 
 
 From my point of view it is perhaps immaterial, but I 
 may relate that Grey was challenged as to this on August 27th 
 by Keir Hardie. In his war speech of August 3rd he had 
 not told the House, and, replying to Keir Hardie, he would 
 not say that he had told even the Cabinet.' Grey's speech 
 of August 3rd was indeed a masterpiece of shrewdness and of 
 that kind of candour which, while it is not really candour, 
 is a discourse of nimble refinements. What he actually 
 
 ' British White Book, 123. 
 
 ' Hansard, 66, No. 121. Price, Diplomatic History of the War, p. 260. 
 
WAS ENGLAND PARTLY RESPONSIBLE? 217 
 
 presented England with was fait accompli. He addressed 
 a House which was supposed to have the right of deciding 
 on peace or war. But was it actually in a position to decide ? 
 Had not the decision already been made for it ? What 
 Sir Edward admitted was that the arrangements between 
 England and France had gone so far that the French had 
 been allowed to strip their northern shores, where the 
 Germans would, of course, first attack them, of their fleet. 
 This had been sent to the Mediterranean under an arrange- 
 ment by which England was to protect the north shores. 
 What was this arrangement, except a practical commitment 
 to war ? Was it not, indeed, nearly an act of war ? 
 France he said, had been acting upon this arrangement. The 
 arrangement involved the honour of England, for France 
 was now helpless on her northern coast. It seems to me 
 that it would have been hard for Parliament not to follow 
 into war that Minister who told them he had left them, in 
 spite of this, perfectly free not to foUow him into war. 
 
 Thus I agree with English critics of Grey who complain 
 of his presenting the House with a fait accompli, but still 
 I cannot see what difference there would have been in the 
 result. England could not risk the chance of a French 
 defeat. 
 
 Professor Fay, though he holds the Germans guiltless 
 of wanting or provoking this war, blames them for giving 
 carte blanche to Austria. This act of the Berhn cabinet 
 was undoubtedly improper. Turning now to France, we 
 see that she, too, had given an ally carte blanche, a circum- 
 stance so embarrassing now to the French politicians who 
 gave it then, that it has been as httle as possible referred 
 to in their memoirs but abimdantly revealed in the diplo- 
 matic dispatches published at the time by England and by 
 Russia. " France would fulfil all her obligations under the 
 alliance." It was no obligation of that alliance, to be sure, 
 that France follow Russia into a Balkan war, yet the promise 
 was speedily given at the outset, was never withdrawn, and 
 in its final definite form was acknowledged by Sazonoff 
 on the 29th of July, with thanks, while his mobihzation 
 was under way.' 
 
 « Post, this chapter. 
 
218 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Which had the fairer right to give the carte blanche to 
 his ally ? The ally of Germany was again in turmoil with 
 an insolent bordering state against which she had twice 
 previously gone to the expense of mobilizing her forces.' 
 The ally of Germany was struggling with a question vital 
 to her existence. It was not unnatural, after the terrible 
 murder at Serajevo, that the German Government should 
 give its ally the assurance of complete backing. It was 
 not natural that France should give to Russia an assurance 
 of complete backing in an interference by her concerning 
 the affairs of a country separated from Russia by mountains, 
 kingdoms and rivers. 
 
 And if it was wrong for Germany to give carte blanche 
 to Austria, this at least is now plain that Germany, when 
 she saw that Austria's abusing this privilege might bring 
 on a general war, sternly withdrew the privilege and used 
 every possible exertion to prevent a war. France, on the 
 other hand, did nothing to withdraw the improper and 
 dangerous carte blanche which she had given to Russia. 
 To the last, though she did not disclose it to the people, 
 the French Government delivered to Russia not one remon- 
 strance against her pressing her claims beyond diplomacy, 
 nay, continued to support the Russian policy, even after 
 Russia ordered that mobilization, which no German Govern- 
 ment in its senses could misinterpret. 
 
 Grey then had to do with a French Government resolved 
 upon the risks of war. He was partly to blame for the 
 situation that had arisen. He now would like to put out 
 the fire that the others had created. Could he do it ? He 
 had waited too long. 
 
 The Enghsh White Book begins its disclosures under 
 date of July 20th, but the murder at Serajevo had occurred 
 on June 28th. Within that interval, what consultations 
 had been had, what mutual encouragements exchanged by 
 letter, telegram or conversation between Petrograd, Paris 
 and London ? We do not know. Perhaps we shall never 
 
 ' It is difficult for American readers, and indeed for British, to realize 
 what the cost of a general mobilization is. It means that all your clerks, 
 your butchers, your bakers, a large part of your bricklayers, plumbers and 
 the mass of your artisans are suddenly whisked from their occupations. 
 Trade for a while stands still. The State incurs enormous expense. 
 
WAS ENGLAND PARTLY RESPONSIBLE? 219 
 
 know. Neither London nor Paris have offered their archives 
 to the investigator. Sir Edward's position was indeed a 
 desperate one. As the people of England saw themselves 
 drifting into a war that must, if it were successful, augment 
 the power of Russia, protests arose from quarters not to 
 be disregarded. A journal of vast influence in England 
 and widely known among the English-speaking race ^ poured 
 out remonstrance after remonstrance. " If Russia," it 
 cried, " makes a general war out of a local war, it will be 
 a crime against Europe." "» On the fatal 3rd of August, 
 after Germany had declared war, it exclaimed : " Germany 
 was not free to choose ; whether war was to come depended 
 not so much upon what she did as upon what Russia meant to 
 do. Having convinced herself, and not without cause, 
 that Russia meant war, she conceived that her policy was 
 one for her soldiers to determine upon purely miUtary 
 grounds. . . . Germany's position is graver than at any 
 time since the days of Frederick the Great. ... If we step 
 in and wantonly back Russia, we do not back her against 
 Austria alone. We back her against her own maltreated 
 and semi-insurgent subjects ; we strengthen her brute 
 fist in Finland ; we set her up again as a persecutor of the 
 Jews ; we put back the clock of free and civilized govern- 
 ment throughout far the largest area that the misconduct 
 of any one power of Europe can injure." 
 
 Such protests were, as we now sadly know, in vain. 
 England was partially committed to France, and France 
 fatally committed to unscrupulous Russia. 
 
 In a preceding page I have conceded to England propriety 
 of war against Germany, if the latter for any reason should 
 invade Belgium. Now what Belgium is to England, the 
 Balkans were to the Teutonic powers. To admit Russia 
 there was ultimate doom. The encirclement by Russia 
 would not be merely economical ; it would be military, 
 and it would be conceding to a state with ample territory 
 already an enlargement by no means necessary. 
 
 Keeping this in view, the duty of Grey was to let Russia 
 know from the outset that Russian ambitions in Balkan 
 territory could have no assistance from England, and he 
 
 ' Manchester Guardian. » Ibid., July 30. 
 
220 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 should have let France know the same. On this basis the 
 Triple Entente would have been an alliance for peace, 
 whereas it became one for war, just so soon as the court of 
 Nicholas II learned that it could possibly have EngUsh 
 and French support in its Balkan expansion. That Grey 
 gave some encouragement to Russia is plain from his own 
 words — ^that Russia must not be " humiliated " and Serbia 
 (for which he contemptuously denied any regard in England) 
 must not be a " vassal state " of the neighbouring Austria, 
 whom with Russian support she was continually vexing 
 and insulting. 
 
 Caution by Grey in this matter was all the more necessary 
 because, as I have already stated, it was certain that if 
 France got into war with Germany for any reason whatso- 
 ever, England would have to join her. 
 
 But to this I return that, no matter whether Grey had 
 committed England to France or not, it lay in the power 
 of France to prevent this war and it did not lie in the power 
 of England to prevent it. France and Russia had outgrown 
 control by England in any war they might desire to launch 
 against Germany. It was a telegram from the Quai d'Orsay 
 to Petersburg that would have put a stop to mobilization 
 and the joyous making of war contracts. France was the 
 only power in Europe that could have stopped Russia. 
 
 As for France and her obligations under the Russian 
 alliance, I may have, as I have said before, a bargedn to help 
 a man if he be attacked, nay, to help him even if he provoke 
 attack, but is it not my duty to persuade him, if I can, not 
 to give provocation ? 
 
 Not to be overlooked, though it was left out of the 
 original Collected Diplomatic Documents, was a telegram 
 from Poincare direct to King George.^ The date is the 31st, 
 the day before Germany's declaration of war against mobihzed 
 Russia. Nothing throws into stronger light the relative 
 policies of Fremce and England. The telegram of the 
 President was a spirited rhetorical appeal to the King of 
 England to prevent the war. How ? By sa5dng that 
 England would be upon the side of France and Russia. 
 Well is it worth while to reflect upon this request. The 
 
 " This is to be found in Oman's Outbreak of the War (1919). 
 
WAS ENGLAND PARTLY RESPONSIBLE? 221 
 
 English King declined it. Again, why ? Because he knew 
 perfectly well that the moment he repUed favourably to 
 Paris, jubilation would ensue at Petrograd. So, far from 
 Poincard's desiring by this declaration on the part of England 
 to avert a war, I have not the least doubt that he intended 
 through it to make the war certain. Well, indeed, was King 
 George advised. 
 
 Let us look at the immediate diplomatic history of the 
 thing. What had this Poincard done hitherto in this 
 desperately exciting month to prevent a war ? What 
 record have we anywhere that Poincar^ was a man of peace ? 
 We know, on the conrary, that everyone regarded him as 
 ardent for war. The very Austrians deferred their ultimatum 
 to Serbia until after Poincar6 should leave Petrograd on 
 his last visit, saying plainly in their letters that with such a 
 man at Petrograd, Russia would be lashed to war.^ In a word 
 the ardour of the President of France for a military clash 
 had been for two or three years incessantly revealed. This 
 man, then, who never has elsewhere left a record of urging 
 peace, suddenly, at the eleventh hour, makes an impassioned 
 appeal to the King of England to arrest the terrible forces 
 wMch the President of France had been and was then setting 
 in motion. It was a telegram sent after the Russians had 
 ordered general mobihzation. It was disingenuous in its 
 object. Should it achieve a favourable reply, nothing on 
 earth could prevent the Russians from hurling their armies 
 on Germany. It would take away the last possible hesitation 
 in Russian nailitary circles concerning war. Russia was 
 already in the hands of those circles. It was the Czar 
 only who might hesitate and hold back, the Czar, a timid, 
 hesitating monarch. Let England now declare herself on 
 the side of the AUies and the military elements of Russia 
 would sweep all before them. M. Poincar^ was clever 
 indeed. From any point of view, the telegram served his 
 purpose. Should he be subsequently reproached concerning 
 his ardour for war, he could exhibit this telegram. Should 
 the war be prevented, he could exhibit this telegram. The 
 
 • Austrian Red Book, pp. ig-21. Die Deutschen Dokumente zum 
 Kriegsausbruch, No. 50. The Austrian letter classes Isvolsky and Poincar6 
 as men " always wanting war.". 
 
222 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 King of England he placed in a hard position. The argument, 
 was plausible. Let Germany but once see that aU the powers 
 were collected against her, she would not fight. If this 
 argument be admitted sound, then it must be admitted that 
 the King, under the advice of his Minister, committed a 
 great wrong. 
 
 At first one is easily caught by the plausibility of the 
 plea ; but when one has studied very deeply the whole 
 situation he knows that nothing could have more certainly 
 precipitated the war than Petrograd's knowing that England 
 also was with them. It was not Germany that had to be 
 restrained, but Russia.' 
 
 What had M. Poincare done to stop the Russian mobihza- 
 tion, which, organizing more than 2,000,000 men on the German 
 border, made mobilization by Germany an act of common 
 necessity. It may be added that several days preceding 
 this 31st of July, the French and Russian diplomats had 
 been extremely busy to have England so declare herself. 
 They had always applied in vain. England would decide 
 at the last moment what it was best to do. For my own 
 part, I was at first disposed to censure the English Foreign 
 Minister for withholding an utterance which did seem 
 calculated to settle this question. Later study has shown 
 me that he did exactly right. True, he intended in the 
 event of war to be upon the side of France and Russia, but 
 I do not beheve that he wanted the war and I am sure 
 that he clearly saw that the knaves of Petrograd could not 
 possibly be restrained should they hear that they could 
 count upon England, too. 
 
 I cannot help adding what finally induced the French 
 Foreign Office to have their President send this telegram. 
 It was because they had been failing through all the ordinary 
 channels. At last, July 29, came Sazonoff' s telegram which 
 is worth while setting out in fuU. Let us contemplate the 
 following message, sent by a Minister of Foreign Affairs on 
 the eve of a terrible conflict. Can we find in it one word 
 
 I Since the foregoing was written there has appeared M. Poincarfi's 
 Origins of the War, in which he sets out both his letter to the King and the 
 latter's negative reply, without, what seems to me essential, an explanation, 
 such as I have made, of the English position. 
 
 " British WhitejBooh for the last week of July. 
 
WAS ENGLAND PARTLY RESPONSIBLE? 223 
 
 of anxious solicitude ? One word of invocation that every 
 possible power be exerted for peace ? No ; Sazonoff tele- 
 graphs to Paris, cold-bloodedly, as follows : ' 
 
 The German Ambassador declared to me to-day the resolution 
 of his Government to carry out its own mobilization if Russia does 
 not cease her present military preparations. These, however, are 
 only a consequence of the mobilization of the VIII Corps in Austria, 
 which has already taken place, and the obvious disinclination of 
 Austria to agree to any form of peaceful settlement of its own conflict 
 with Serbia. 
 
 Inasmuch as we cannot fulfil Germany's request, we have no 
 option but to accelerate our armament and to reckon with the probable 
 inevitability of war. WiU you bring this to the knowledge of the 
 French Government and express to them our most sincere thanks 
 for the French Ambassador's statement to me, made on their behalf, 
 that we could depend upon the fullest measure of support from our 
 Ally, France.^ Under the present circumstances this declaration is 
 of special worth to us. It is extremely desirable that also England, 
 without any loss of time, should attach itself to France and Russia, 
 as only in this way will it succeed in averting the dangerous disturbance 
 of the European balance of power. 
 
 This, as we have seen, is the callous Foreign Minister 
 before whom the German Ambassador as the British 
 Ambassador tells us, " completely broke down " and from 
 whom he begged some concession as " a last hope " which 
 he could telegraph to Berlin. 3 
 
 Sazonoff, sure now of French support, was resolved on 
 war. The world has been imagining that it was the Germans 
 who were bullying vast Russia, when in fact they dreaded 
 Russia and were bullied by her. I have no doubt that 
 while Sazonofi was talking to the German Ambassador 
 the grand dukes and the tchinovniks were closeted in dis- 
 cussions over vast war contracts and the profits to be divided. 
 
 How recklessly the French Government had resolved to 
 stand by Russia in what was not at all essential to the 
 safety of either nation, and armed interference between 
 Serbia and Austria in an affair actually vital to the latter, 
 
 ' German White Book, 1919, part ii, p. 120. Notice again, instead of 
 " mobilization " by Russia, " military preparations." 
 
 8.' This advance promise the Poincar6 Government did not reveal to the 
 French or the world in their Yellow Book. 
 
 3 British White Boob, 97. «»'«• P- 26- 
 
224 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 may be seen in a little reminiscence by Raymond Recouly, 
 one of the editors of Figaro in July 1914.' The complacency 
 with which this gentleman recounts the events of the final 
 ten days when the French Government by a single telegram 
 might have stopped Russia in her mad policy is interesting. 
 
 Germany, he held, was standing by Austria. Not con- 
 sidering for a moment how desperate the situation of Austria 
 was becoming under the propaganda of Serbia, protected 
 year after year by Russia, and how important it was to 
 Germany that Austria should not be dissolved and Russia 
 practically take her place, not considering how just the 
 grievance of tormented Austria was against Serbia, he 
 assumes at once both the right of Russia to make this affair 
 her own and of France to foUow her into the BaJkans. Could 
 anything show better the recklessness of France than the 
 following observations by M. Recouly ? The British 
 Ambassador happening to meet him asked half -jestingly, 
 " Do you trust the Russians ? We have only half-way 
 faith in them. I may say the same of the Serbs. That's 
 why it would be hard to make my country intervene in a 
 quarrel which concerns only the Serbs and the Russians." 
 " Wait a moment," said I, " I fear that other nations, we 
 for example, may find ourselves immediately involved." 
 " In that case," said he, " the situation will be quite different." 
 With that Sir Francis Bertie left him. 
 
 Here we have the English diplomatist's simple view of 
 the thing that France ought not to follow Russia into this 
 horrible business. On the Frenchman his suggestion of 
 the true policy had apparently not had any effect. 
 
 Recouly's article is still further worth reading. Nothing 
 can he state fairly. He writes to-day in full knowledge 
 of the diplomatic files that we have seen in the preceding 
 pages but he calmly mis-states them. For example, " The 
 German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had used most 
 threatening language to Sazonoff." This of Wednesday 
 the 29th. The German Ambassador had not used threaten- 
 ing language. He had naturally remonstrated with a man 
 mobilizing and yet deceiving the Germans who had not 
 mobilized. " The previous night William II had sent a 
 " La Revue de France, December 15, 1914. 
 
WAS ENGLAND PARTLY RESPONSIBLE? 225 
 
 threatening telegram to the Czar." He had not, as the reader 
 can see for himself, and as Recouly, when writing now, 
 will know. But here is a better illustration. " On Friday 
 the 31st Germany sent a veritable ultimatum to St. Peters- 
 burg demanding a reply within twelve hours." Why not ? 
 Germany had delayed day after day and had been lied to 
 as Recouly must know, and had been deferring mobilization 
 against a vastly superior force several days. But nothing 
 shakes the complacency of the Parisian journalist. 
 
 " Since Russia could not commit suicide by yielding." 
 Think of any responsible writer saying this to-day ! Let 
 him name any loss of territory or treasure that Russia apart 
 from her bad Court, would have lost by stopping. Recouly 
 writes as one of a war party writes. He writes as a diplomat 
 thinks, in terms of keeping one's face and of not suffering 
 a diplomatic defeat. Rather than that Russia should have 
 a diplomatic defeat where she was seeking to acquire an 
 expansion of power and territory that she did not need, 
 Recouly assumes that it is perfectly fair to throw Europe 
 into war. 
 
 M. Recouly is at a loss to understand why the Germans 
 delayed two or three days in declaring war on France, but 
 he guesses that during that period they were inventing 
 a pretext. This is most insincere, for M. Recouly knows 
 that the pretext existed in advance, the alliance of 
 France with Russia to begin with, a pledge specially given 
 by France in the last days of July to support Russia, and 
 finally in the refusal of the French Government to answer 
 the German inquiry as to what side France would take 
 now that Germany and Russia were going to war. 
 
 I have dwelt at some length upon Recouly's article 
 because it is a perfect sample of the innumerable articles 
 with which the English-speaking world is deluged, and the 
 totally false impression of the real facts and of the true 
 reasoning about the causes of this momentous event in 
 human affairs. 
 
 Sir Francis Bertie's remark to Recouly and the way in 
 which it was received fairly illustrated the difference between 
 the English attitude before the war and that of the French 
 and Russians. Take Sir George Buchanan's immediate 
 
 15 
 
226 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 advice to the Russian Foreign Minister. On Saturday the 
 25th of July, when, as we since know, the Russian mobilization 
 or " military preparations " were becoming rather apparent, 
 the British Ambassador gave SazonofE sound advice. " I 
 said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs and warned him that if Russia mobilized, 
 Germany would not be content with mere mobiHzation or 
 give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably 
 declare war at once." ' Sazonoff repUed that Russia could 
 not allow Austria to crush Serbia and " become the predomi- 
 nant Power in the Balkans." * We see here again the thought 
 only of Russian power, territorial or diplomatic advancement. 
 
 The Enghsh, in short, always had some suggestion toward 
 peace. The French, graciously acquiescing, would do really 
 nothing. At aU events, they initiated nothing. The under- 
 standing between St. Petersburg and Paris was complete. For 
 another example, take the Quai d'Orsay's languid and 
 conditional acceptance of Grey's proposal of Monday, the 
 27th that, during a consultation, all military operations 
 should be suspended.3 Why did not France tell Russia 
 to suspend ? Russia had partly mobihzed, though not in 
 danger ; Germany had not mobilized at aU ; Russia, I 
 repeat, could wait. France was merely what is called now- 
 adays " receptive." Berlin, to be sure, had been no more 
 than that towards peace offers at first, but she was rightfully 
 resisting a Russian wrong, a Russian intrusion into fields 
 encircling Germany and her ally, and, at all events, Berlin 
 did in the final days emphatically exert herself for peace. 
 France never. 
 
 When one looks back upon the appalling suffering in 
 this war, when one thinks, for instance, of the freezing 
 mothers who helplessly died, half-naked, with babes in their 
 arms on the plains of Poland, one's mind goes back to the 
 banquets with which the French were entertained at St. 
 Petersburg. Paleologue describes these with evidently happy 
 memory in Revue des deux MondesA 
 
 ' British White Book, 17. > Ibid. 
 
 3 Ibid., 36, 9. The French reply is the enclosure in British White 
 Book, p. 51 — they would if Berlin would, etc., no hearty concurrence or 
 speedy action. 
 
 4 For January and February 1921. 
 
WAS ENGLAND PARTLY RESPONSIBLE? 227 
 
 The diplomat warms in his descriptions of the gaieties 
 in the third week of July, when Poincar^, Viviani, and he 
 drank champagne in a bevy of Grand Dukes and Grand 
 Duchesses while they talked of war. He dwells on the 
 sumptuous scenes, the gracious ladies. He forgets that the 
 three Frenchmen were under an influence deliberately 
 calculated to turn their heads, to afEect men of comparatively 
 simple origin by the endearments of the most powerful 
 personages in European royalty. Poincar6 drank to " Two 
 countries with one ideal of peace in strength, honour, and 
 dignity," receiving particularly hearty applause from those 
 manly, conservative fellows, the Grand Dukes. 
 
 All the while, during that week, both the French and the 
 Russians were pressing the English Ambassador to take 
 their side, and were disappointed at his telling them England 
 would be neutral. I 
 
 Before Paleologue was sent to St. Petersburg in January 
 1914 he had been Minister at Sofia several years. Then he 
 had served in the Foreign Office at Paris. Yet he says that it 
 occasioned him great surprise when Viviani, on his departure 
 six months before the great conflict, told him there surely 
 would be war. Why ? Pray what could cause it, exclaims 
 the astonished Paleologue. He really could not see a reason. 
 Viviani is mysterious.^ Now Paleologue knew perfectly 
 well that the Balkans would sdeld another crisis in which 
 Russian pressure through Serbia would be again exerted on 
 Austria. What he does not roundly tell us is that Russia 
 was insisting that France maintain the intolerable armaments 
 which an increasing number in France were opposing as 
 unnecessary. The Russians were bullying their ally. They 
 were making it plain that they wanted French armaments or 
 no alhance.3 
 
 I La Revue de France, p. 248. Buchanan, upon the whole, seems to me 
 not to have been neutral at heart, but he had both sense and self-control. 
 
 " Ibid., p. 231. 
 
 3 The quotation, p. 31 ante, from the Bourse Gazette is only one of many 
 half-threatening articles in the inspired part of the Russian Press that France 
 keep up the three-year military service which was so unpopular. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 M. POINCAR^'S RECENT BOOK 
 
 That Raymond Poincare was from the first an aggressive 
 enemy of Germany is as plain as his blind infatuation for 
 the Russian alliance. As to the latter, we have the report 
 of Isvolsky on their first interview in January 1912 when 
 Poincare became Minister for Foreign Affairs. Poincare has 
 given him, he states, " Assurance of his firm intention to 
 keep with us the most strict relations and to direct the foreign 
 policy of France in complete accord with her ally." ' 
 
 This statesman, after having been President of France, 
 is again its Premier, because he represents in vengeance the 
 same opinions which were good at the French polls before 
 the war, but, galled by a resolute minority of his countrymen, 
 who are making deadly use against him of the Russian 
 archives, he has written a book called The Origins of the WarP- 
 
 It is well indeed that M. Poincare addresses, for the 
 most part, ears that are willing. What shall be said of 
 a work that commences by intimating that the German 
 Ambassador at Paris was exposing himself wilfully to insult 
 on the streets after the war between Russia and Germany 
 had begun, in order to provoke an occasion for a declaration 
 of war by Germany on France ! How ingenious and how 
 unnecessary from any point of view. Germany already 
 had that cause. Did not the Franco-Russian alliance, 
 at least as M. Poincard had interpreted it, call for French 
 armies against Germany if Russia and the latter should 
 be at war ? Nay, during those two or three days in which 
 the German Ambassador was still at Paris, was he not 
 waiting for a reply from France as to what she would do 
 
 ' Un Livre Noir, tome i, p. 180. " Telegramme Secret du Mastre de 
 Cour Isvolsky," Paris 2/15 Janvier 1912. 
 
 » Les Origines de la Guerre. The Paris edition appeared late in 1921, 
 the English (Cassell) early in 1922. 
 
 228 
 
M. POINCARfi'S RECENT BOOK 229 
 
 as Russia's ally ? Had not Germany put the question to 
 France ? Had not France replied merely that she would 
 follow her own best interests, though the French Government 
 had secretly pledged itself to action ? The French Govern- 
 ment was simply gaining time for the Russians to assemble 
 at the German frontier. 
 
 Why does M. Poincare waste time in trying to show 
 that the Germans were then seeking a cause of war against 
 France ? It is because he knows that many good people 
 think that France might not have gone into the war if 
 Germany had let her alone. But is M. Poincare so bold 
 as to say that ? By no means. He would be compelled by 
 innumerable documents now disclosed, including his own 
 ambassador's statements to Sir Edward Grey, to admit 
 that even if Germany had let France alone, his country 
 would have attacked Germany on behalf of Russia. 
 
 In this book of M. Poincare's the following things are 
 wholly omitted, (a) The abominable secret treaty of 1917, 
 made while he was President, with Imperial Russia for the 
 division of a great part of Europe between Russia and 
 France. (6) Delcasse's deceit about Morocco, the first 
 Morocco affair not being touched.' (c) The de Siebert 
 diplomatic documents, {d) A direct contradiction of the 
 Belgian Minister's charge of 1912-13 that Poincare and his 
 friends were bringing on a war. (e) The positive fact of 
 Bethmann-HoUweg's insistence that Vienna submit. (/) The 
 Russian mobilization. 
 
 What M. Poincare has to admit in spite of himself is 
 (a) that the Kaiser made repeated efforts to come to a 
 good understanding with France.^ (6) That Delcass^ made 
 a revision, which he misquotes, of the Franco-Russian 
 treaty,3 (c) that France had always in mind the recovery of 
 the lost provinces.4 (d) That the Franco-Russian treaty was 
 never disclosed before the war and that Viviani, with a copy 
 in his pocket, refrained from reading it to the Parliament 
 (e) That the pacific Georges Louis was recalled from St. 
 Petersburg because the Russians wanted a different sort of 
 
 ' He gives a list of books for perusal on the Morocco question, but wholly 
 omits the one English book that had unanswerably exposed the deceit of 
 DelcassS. 
 
 > The Origins of the War, p. 25. 3 Ibid., p. 56, « Ibid., p. 26. 
 
230 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 man, but he does not answer De Toury's charge that Isvolsky 
 was behind that change. 
 
 What M. Poincare seems to me to evade is the charge 
 so generally pressed against him, that he committed France 
 irrevocably to Russia, before the war, in her Balkan and 
 all her other policies. 
 
 M. Poincare reinforces his argument by the suggestion 
 that the Archduke Ferdinand and his wife either sought 
 or were sent to Serajevo that they might be murdered and 
 cause a war. This he infers from the extreme deficiency of 
 guards in their progress.' 
 
 Such as have read the preceding part of my book may 
 well be astounded to see M. Poincare stating that he " fails 
 to find in the direction of our policy in the past either the 
 shadow of a bellicose will or even an imprudence, blunder, or 
 omission that might have been sufficient to justify Germany's 
 declaration of war." ^ This from a statesman whose ministers 
 have always pointed to a downright treaty compelling them, 
 as they argued, " to fulfil the condition of their alliance " and 
 make war upon Germany when Russia should clash with her. 
 
 M. Poincare boasts that the Bolshevists in their exposure 
 of the wicked files of Petrograd were unable to find any 
 letters of his. Quite true. This statesman had the felicity 
 to be free from the necessity of putting his hand to any 
 communication with the Russian Court. Fortunate man, he 
 was not only privileged, but by diplomatic usage obliged, 
 to deal with Russia through her Ambassador in Paris, 
 where aU the mischievous consultations were by word of 
 mouth. It is Isvolsky who left writings, Isvolsky whose 
 record of M. Poincare from day to day has been exposed 
 and not referred to by the latter in his charming book. 
 Where M. Poincare, either as minister or as President, desired 
 to communicate directly and in secret with Sazonoff or the 
 Czar, he went in person to St. Petersburg where, enjojdng the 
 smiles of an Empress and the embraces of an Emperor, he 
 could, between salvos of artillery or draughts of champagne, 
 tell in whispers his devotion to those policies by which 
 an infamous despotism was to make Europe safe. 
 
 I The Origins of the War, p. 164. 
 
 • English edition, pp. 15-16. Les Ofigines, p. 18. 
 
M, POINCARfi'S RECENT BOOK 281 
 
 What a record of Poincar^ has Isvolsky left us ! The 
 de Siebert and the Livre Noir collections are a veritable 
 moving picture of the principal man in French affairs. ' 
 
 Not once in all that correspondence do we find M. Poincare 
 in the slightest objecting to that policy of Russia in the 
 Balkans which must ultimately lead to a general war, and 
 probably give Russia a firm hold not only on the Dardanelles 
 but on the route to the Adriatic and a supreme voice in 
 Europe. 
 
 On the contrary, M. Poincard outdid Russia herself 
 in his zeal. When, for instance, Russia in 1912 was so 
 puzzled by the complications of Bulgaria, Turkey and Serbia 
 as to be for a moment undecided, the man felt grieved. 
 The Austrians were mobilizing against Serbia while Russia 
 was doing nothing ! There might be peace ! 
 
 Not long ago the French Government and the Press were inclined 
 to accuse us of stirring up Serbia, and the dominating note was 
 " France wants no war about a Serbian seaport." Now, on the con- 
 trary, they see, with astonishment and uneasiness unconcealed, our 
 indifference to the Austrian mobilization.' 
 
 Isvolsky tells us this not only of Poincare but of the 
 French cabinet, which views with unconcern the fact that 
 Russian interference will draw in Germany and then France 
 too, "which is resolved to fulfil the obligations of the alliance." 
 
 Isvolsky's letters show how keenly he had analysed the 
 character of Poincare. He understood the strength as well 
 as the " vanity " of that man and saw how Russia could 
 make use of both. Isvolsky himself was for a war. He 
 makes no disguise of his desires. The Slavs are to triumph 
 not only over the Turk but over Teutons. He can see 
 no other way out of it all than by a " big European war, 
 general and decisive." 3 
 
 ' At this writing only Volume I of Livre Noir has been issued. The 
 collection is, to this date, the correspondence of Isvolsky. 
 
 » Isvolsky from Paris, December i8, 1912. Livre Noir, p. 369. " En 
 visage cette possibility avec conscience et sang-froid firmament decid k 
 remplir ses obligations d'aUie." What obligations ? To help Russia's 
 spreading into the Balkans ? 
 
 3 See his extraordinary reflections in a letter revealed by Hartwig, 
 Russian Ambassador at Belgrade, Livre Noir, p. 333, dated October 23, 
 1912. " Dans ce cas 11 est douteux qu'on pourrait avoir foi en n'importe 
 quels pallatifs et il foudrait se preparer 4 une grande guerre Europfiene 
 gSnirale et dfcisiv." 
 
232 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Poincard he held firmly in hand, for he had learned 
 how to influence him through the gorgeous flattery of an 
 Imperial Court. The surrender of the French minister was, 
 in fact, complete ; the surrender of the man who in the next 
 year was to be the President of a great and free people. 
 Let us see an instance of the submission to which they brought 
 Raymond Poincare. Russia having concluded with Italy a 
 secret arrangement at Racconigi concerning the Balkans, 
 Sazonoff sent a copy of it to Isvolsky with these instructions : 
 
 M. Poincare hastens to express to me his hearty consent to the 
 conditions you impose, i 
 
 It seems a terrible thing that one able man should in 
 so important a post as Poincare's have given himself up 
 bUndly to the ambitions of such a Court as that of Nicholas II. 
 Even now, while he has the sense to refrain from any kindly 
 allusions, and indeed any allusions at all to Isvolsky, he has 
 no perception of the way in which the rest of the world must 
 to-day look upon his intimacy with that Court. The man 
 even repeats with pride the ghastly toast he drank to the 
 Czar in July 1914, when they were on the eve of war, " France 
 will pursue, in close and daily operations with her ally, the 
 cause of peace and civilization for which the two Governments 
 have never ceased to labour." '^ 
 
 Rasputin, Vladimir, Cyril and the rest, nay, the Czar 
 himself labouring for those noble objects ! Had M. Poincare 
 shut his eyes to literature, to the common complaints of 
 mankind to the fact that after Nicholas II got his loans in 
 1905 his Cabinet took methodical vengeance on the Duma 
 and the multitude that had tried to obtain a constitutional 
 government while he was too weak, for want of that loan, 
 to set up his army and secret police over the people again ? 
 Intelligent people throughout Europe were not ignorant of 
 all this. The book by Prince Kropotkin had made notorious 
 what was commonly understood.3 
 
 After 1905 the daily average of prisoners rose from 85,000 
 
 1 Livre Noir, pp. 357, 360. " M. Poincarfi s'empressa de m'exprimer 
 son entier consentement aux conditions pos£es par vous." 
 
 2 The Origins of the War, p. i8. 
 
 3 The Terror in Russia (1909). Quotations from it can be found in 
 various pamphlets by Mr. Brailsford, so excellently informed on Russian 
 affairs. 
 
M. POINCARfi'S RECENT BOOK 238 
 
 to 181,000. Torture previously omitted, because it had 
 been thought sufficient to let men rot, was now regularly 
 applied. In one year there were 160 suicides. Every day 
 about three persons were hanged without civil trial. In 
 Siberia were added 74,000 poUtical prisoners. Even the 
 timid Duma was roused to a feeble enquiry when suicides in 
 one place in Eastern Siberia became an epidemic. Prisoners, 
 on their arrival, were flogged until they would fall in a 
 faint. I 
 
 There never was a time, under the administration of 
 M. Poincare, when even his representatives at foreign courts 
 had any other idea than that they were expected to further 
 Russian ambition in the Balkans. For example, Phillipe 
 Crozier in a recent review relates that during the crisis he 
 took occasion to tell this in plain words to the Emperor Franz 
 Joseph at Vienna : " Russia would not stand by indifferent 
 and see Serbia wiped out and, if Russia goes into that game, 
 France will foUow." « Pray why ? Russia would still be 
 a safe and strong power, no matter what should happen to 
 Serbia. 
 
 But let us hear the most damaging, the most abominably 
 naive contribution to the truth. In September 1914 
 Paleologue had a conversation in Petrograd with Russia's 
 greatest statesman. Count Witte, long retired. The latter 
 told him bluntly that it was time to wind up (liquider) the 
 war, " a stupid adventure." Warmly did the Ambassador 
 of France, the Ambassador of Poincare, exclaim : 
 
 "Permit me to assure you that if the world to-day is in fire 
 and blood, it is for a cause chiefly important to Russia, a cause 
 eminently Slav, a cause which nowhere touches France or 
 England." 3 
 
 Infatuated, blind man ! This he relates with pride 
 to-day in his own book! 
 
 Is M. Poincare glad or sorry that Russia did not win the 
 war and get the benefits of her secret treaty, made during 
 his administration ? Is he glad or sorry that a Czar does 
 not rule the greater part of Western Europe ? 
 
 » The Terror in Russia (1909), passim. 
 » La Revue de France, May 15, 1921, p. 35^. 
 
 3 La Russie des Tsars, tomeji, p. 120; "Pour une cause qui ne 
 touchait ni la France ni FAngleterre." 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 THE SEVERITY OF THE PEACE 
 
 France, stalking through the cemetery of Europe, arms 
 herself against phantoms and would collect unheard of 
 revenue from the tomb. What is to be said of a treaty 
 in the making of which the victors employ Clemenceau ? i 
 What is to be said of a treaty which imposes sums that no 
 economist will say can be collected, that strips a country 
 of her colonies, of her vessels of commerce, of much of her 
 territory, of a large part of her natural resources, and 
 requires her to pay, after four years of adverse war and 
 nearly five years of blockade, a sum that can be calculated 
 only in the mathematics of astronomers ? " This cursing 
 of the guilty people," exclaims Signer Nitti, " has no 
 parallel in modern history. We must go back to the early 
 ages of mankind to find anything of the kind." ' 
 
 Before this treaty could be made, it had to be signed 
 by the vanquished. The vanquished were told that they 
 must either sign it or continue to starve. They signed it. 
 They protested, saying that it was impossible of fulfilment. 
 They were commanded again to sign it or starve. They 
 signed it. 
 
 Since the Germans signed this treaty under a protest 
 and amid the cries of their women and children for nourish- 
 ment, many people throughout the world have joined them 
 in sa3dng that no matter whether the Germans were guilty 
 or not, the sums to be exacted of them were ridiculous 
 and oppressive. To this has been added the voice of 
 financiers and statesmen in every country except France 
 
 ■ Of Clemenceau's bold attempt to deceive Mr. Lloyd George and Presi- 
 dent Wilson in a most important detail, I have already made note in 
 Appendix F. 
 
 ' Peaceless Europe. See his chapter on " The Indemnity." 
 
 234 
 
THE SEVERITY OF THE PEACE 235 
 
 that a persistent attempt to collect these sums would com- 
 plete the ruin of Europe. These remonstrances and cautions 
 have had no effect at the Quai d'Orsay. 
 
 Before the Germans were brought to a point where 
 they could be required to sign any treaty, what had recently 
 occurred ? Where were they when the war ended ? In 
 France. Were they in a general rout, or a great body of 
 them prisoners of war ? Very far from it. Though retreat- 
 ing, they had not even yet reached the line of defences 
 on German soil, defences, some of which were most 
 formidable, and all well prepared. " The Germans were 
 retreating in good order. If Germany could hold out for 
 months, as was probable, and the Allied Governments did 
 not make peace on some reasonable terms, there would 
 have been revolution in all the Allied countries." i 
 
 For some time before the German retreat the President 
 of the United States had been uttering to the world his 
 theory of a lasting peace, for which he prescribed what are 
 known as the " Fourteen Points." Other utterances of his 
 bore upon the same question and these I have collected 
 in an appendix. Everybody wanted peace. How long a 
 nation which had fought the world during four years could 
 still resist was doubtful. They might resist for half a year 
 it was estimated by some, perhaps a year, but that year 
 would be as much an agony to the conquerors as to the 
 conquered. Among the first principles of the settlement, 
 this had been laid down by President Wilson — that he 
 would not care to deal with the existing Government of 
 Germany. The Germans forthwith attempted to accom- 
 modate their Government to this requirement, and our 
 President was asked by Prince Max of Baden to " take 
 in hand the restoration of peace under the programme set 
 out in the President's memoranda of January 8, 1918, and 
 in his later pronouncements." * These terms were com- 
 piunicated to all the Allies and were agreed to with but 
 two changes, one in which England guarded herself against 
 
 " What Really Happened at Paris, p. 12. This book is a collection of 
 articles from Americans prominent in the Peace Conference at Versailles. 
 It has a preface or introduction by Colonel House and gives a very fair view 
 of each question by a writer presumed to be particularly qualified. 
 
 » Ibid., p. 9. 
 
236 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 the term " freedom of the seas," and the other, which 
 Germany accepted, that she make reparation for damage 
 done to the civilian population of the AUies and their 
 property at sea and from the air, and not from land 
 only. I 
 
 What became of these terms after the Germans had 
 laid down their arms and the victors began to prepare the 
 terms of punishment ? They were forgotten. According 
 to Secretary Lansing, they were found unsuitable for dis- 
 cussion as too general. This is what he says of the Fourteen 
 Points alone, for he makes no comment as to the " subse- 
 quent utterances." By those subsequent utterances the 
 Germans were protected against purely punitive damages. 
 Most people would have thought that this was the bargain, 
 and that there were abundant principles of compensation 
 remaining out of which the victors might have inordinately 
 reimbursed themselves. So far as I can see, however, any 
 such moderation as this was treated with contempt. 
 " Clemenceau made no pretence of considering himself 
 bound by the Fourteen Points and left chiefly to others 
 such concoctions as were necessajy to save the scruples or 
 the face of the President." » 
 
 All fair critics of the Versailles Treaty concede that it 
 broke the terms upon which the Germans had been induced 
 to lay down their arms, yet nearly all the French and many 
 misinformed people outside of France revile the Germans 
 for now attempting to break their word in the payments 
 or even to obtain delay in the payments promised on the 
 faith of promises broken by the Allies themselves. 
 
 The fact was that the Fourteen Points were vastly 
 better known in our own country than they were in Euro- 
 pean countries, for Clemenceau and his friends had no 
 intention of letting the populace get into their heads a 
 doctrine so liberal and so inconvenient. " The French and 
 British Press had given no adequate account of the nego- 
 tiations between President Wilson, the Germans and the 
 Allied countries concerning the pre-Armistice agreement. 
 The people, therefore, had no idea, and I believe still have 
 
 ' What Really Happened at Paris, p. 13. 
 
 > Keyne's Economic Consequences of the Peace, p. 35. 
 
THE SEVERITY OF THE PEACE 287 
 
 no realization that a solemn agreement was made as the 
 basis of the peace terms before the Armistice." ' 
 
 The spirit of Clemenceau prevailed. We can see him 
 as he sat there, for he has been described by so many, 
 " an expression of bored tolerance, his arid humour, his 
 biting sarcasm." His more reasonable associate, Pichon, 
 " he used and abused without recognition." » 
 
 Are we to leave it to an Italian to acknowledge among 
 Statesmen that " on the basis of these principles (the Four- 
 teen Points) Germany, worn out by famine, demanded peace, 
 as a solemn pledge. No one can afifirm that the Treaty 
 of Versailles is based even remotely on the declarations of 
 the Entente or Woodrow Wilson's pledges." 3 
 
 One thing was made known to Europe in advance as 
 respects lenity. There had been regularly preached in 
 England, at least, the principle that the Allied nations 
 were not making war on the German people. We all 
 remember that our President Wilson had often told us 
 this Often had he told us that the fault of Germany was 
 in its Government. When, therefore, he induced the 
 Germans to overthrow that Government, many expected 
 that this would be regarded as a contribution towards the 
 future peace of Europe, as well as an atonement in part 
 for the national offence. As to the impression in England, 
 Mr. Wells teUs us : 
 
 Germany, exhausted and beaten, surrendered in 1918, upon the 
 strength of these promises and upon the similar promises in President 
 Wilson's Fourteen Points, but the Conference at Versailles treated 
 promises as " scraps of paper." The peace imposed on the new Ger- 
 many was a punitive peace.4 
 
 He says again : 
 
 It was repeatedly declared by the British and the Americans, 
 if not by others, that they fought not against the German people, 
 
 ■ Bass, The Peace Tangle, p. 136. 
 
 » What Really Happened, etc., pp. 93, 25. " Not since Rome punished 
 Carthage has such a treaty been written." New York Tribune, May 8, 
 1919. 
 
 3 Nitti, Peaceless Europe, pp. 54, 58. Nitti had been an actor in every 
 phase of the great struggle and of the Peace Conference at Versailles. He 
 takes up the promises and their abandonment seriatim. 
 
 4 H. G. Wells, in the American newspapers, November 10, 1921. 
 
288 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 but the German imperialism. The British war propaganda, in par- 
 ticular, did its utmost to saturate Germany with that assurance and 
 to hold out the guaranty of generous treatment provided there was 
 a renunciation of German imperialism and militarism. Germany in 
 1918 surrendered upon the strength of these pronouncements.' 
 
 The whole plan of Clemenceau was to divert President 
 Wilson, and successfully, indeed, did he divert him, from 
 the policies which he had in his bosom and had proclaimed 
 to the world before he sailed to France. Most interesting 
 are the descriptions of the methods employed to keep his 
 mind from his first principle and to throw around him an 
 atmosphere which would unconsciously change his will. 
 Those who are at the pains to foUow up the melancholy 
 end, which is in itself a new beginning of the world 
 catastrophe, may read it in the very pleasant book by 
 Thompson The Peace Conference Day by Day and in Bass's 
 excellent and serious The Peace Tangle, together with What 
 Really Happened at Paris. Of course, we are not to forget 
 at aU the graphic pictures in the economic discussion by 
 Keynes. 
 
 Enough is it to say that when Mr. Lloyd George 
 finally reported the terms to Parliament he confessed them 
 to be " terrible." They have been denounced in our own 
 United States Senate.^ Caillaux among Frenchmen has 
 exposed at least the absurdities of the indemnity, if not 
 its cruelty.3 
 
 While assessing, as has been said, almost incalculable 
 indemnity upon the Germans, and before proceeding to 
 carye off pieces of their territory and to regulate their 
 internal affairs, the Allies appropriated a very considerable 
 item which might, as Lansing says, have been used by the 
 Germans in ordinary settlements to pay the principal debt. 
 What they did, besides appropriating the German merchant 
 marine, was to take away Germany's colonies and put 
 them under the sequestration known as mandate. Thus 
 the vast colonial asset of Germany was, technically, as 
 
 • H. G. Wells, in the American newspapers, November 10, 1921. 
 
 » The late Senator Knox's contempt for them was well known. Senator 
 Johnson, California, was not moderate in his terms : "In my judgment 
 the reparation provisions of the Versailles Treaty are revolting to advocates 
 of future peace and every lover of Uberty." October 18, 1 921. 
 
 3 Ou va la France (1922). 
 
THE SEVERITY OF THE PEACE 239 
 
 Lansing says, not given to anybody. In the long run that, 
 however, is just what would happen. The country receiv- 
 ing the mandate for any particular colony would in the 
 end possess the colony. From Germany, at all events, 
 the colony was taken away, and this being done in advance, 
 she lost that asset entirely as a resource of payment. 
 
 Many are the details in which the bargain was broken, 
 both in letter and in spirit, and a punitive assessment 
 inflicted. The world knows them and they need not be 
 dwelt upon any further in this volume. Under the terms 
 of reparation the Germans were to pay enough even to 
 provide pensions for the soldiery of the Allies. How 
 language could be strained to mean this is inconceivable 
 and that it was never meditated at the outset is admitted. 
 Our own country got nothing and claimed nothing. To 
 what extent, through our being represented in the Con- 
 ference at Versailles, we are in part responsible for 
 vindictive terms, it is not necessary to decide. If we 
 helped to impose more than it was possible for the 
 vanquished to bear, and more than we had led them to 
 fear, we at least took nothing ourselves. 
 
 Only one thing could result from the complete enforce- 
 ment of a treaty condemned by every competent statistician 
 or economist in the world. Either Germany must be 
 allowed by slave labour to under-sell every other country, 
 or she must in destitution ally herself with Russia to get 
 what aid or resource she can from the race she despises 
 and has fought so long.^ 
 
 « As this work goes to press the Germans have signed what is partly a 
 commercial and partly a political treaty with Russia, and this without first 
 consulting the Allies in Conference at Genoa. France, which, behind 
 England's back made a treaty with the Kemalist Turks, is outraged at such 
 breach ot faith. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 A PRINCIPLE WHOLLY OVERLOOKED AT 
 VERSAILLES 
 
 The schoolboy in future years, told of a gigantic struggle 
 in 1914 between the Teutons and the Slavs, will turn to 
 the page of Tannenberg.' The victory on the Marne, in 
 which we rejoice, saved one of two kindred races from 
 domination by another, but the victory at Tannenberg 
 flung back an alien host that would have engulfed them 
 both. Between France and Germany there existed, indeed, 
 a different governmental policy ; between their artisans, 
 their peasants and their clergy, scarcely a^y difference at 
 all. Between both these fine races, on the one hand, and 
 the Russian on the other, existed a difference in customs, 
 in moral ideas, in conception of government and society, 
 and in nearly every aspiration of life. 
 
 When the present shall have become the past, when 
 the voice of anger shall at length be still, when reason can 
 again be heard, signally will it stand forth that the origin 
 of the recent war was the alliance in 1892 between France 
 and Russia, an alliance at that very time exposed as false 
 and wrong by the one great moral genius in Russia whom 
 even a despot could not silence; an alliance then unpro- 
 voked by any German act ; an alliance by which a non- 
 European race, led by the most wicked of all courts, got 
 for the first time a military partner in the West together 
 with supplies of unlimited wealth, while the Germans, 
 practically surrounded, were hated by each and over- 
 whelmingly outnumbered by both. 
 
 > strangely enough. Teuton and Slav met on this same field of Tannen- 
 berg in 1410, when the Slavs prevailed and invaded the present Germany. 
 It was around a monument which commemorates this ancient struggle that 
 the one of 1914 was fought. Hindenburg, Out of My Life, vol. i, p. 114. 
 
 240 
 
A PRINCIPLE WHOLLY OVERLOOKED 241 
 
 The unimpassioned historian will record that in the 
 year 1914 the Teutonic race was compelled to defend on 
 its own soil the civilization of Western Europe against an 
 enormous, half-Asiatic race, which, led by a despotic, 
 ignoble court, had been successfully pressing during many 
 ages toward the warm Atlantic, which, encircling where it 
 could not directly crush the more civilized nations of Central 
 Europe, had absorbed the rich plains of Poland, both shores 
 of the Gulf of Finland and the Teutonic provinces on the 
 Baltic, and which by incessant menace or intrigue in the 
 Balkans was pushing its baleful foot toward the Eastern 
 Adriatic. 
 
 History will record that had the Great War ended 
 according to all that was probable when it began, the 
 Russian despotism, gorged as well as armed with the spoils 
 of Westphalia and doubled in power at home and abroad, 
 would have scorned the protests of her puny allies. The 
 Russian despotism would have been indefinitely prolonged. 
 Russian battleships would have anchored at Kiel and 
 occupied the Elbe ; Russian governors would have flaunted 
 their prostitutes through new scenes of extortion in the 
 cultured cities of Prussia and Bavaria, and Russian legions 
 would have flung their drunken challenges to France and 
 England across the Rhine. 
 
 History will record that England, seeing this conse- 
 quence possible, would at the last moment have held back 
 from joining in war the basest of Governments against a 
 race high in arts and public order and desired peace, but 
 that the Government of France, linked exultingly to the 
 Vladimirs, the Sukhomlinoffs, the Sazonoffs, and the Ras- 
 putins, hastened with Russia to mobilize ; that, war being 
 forced upon Germany by Russia, the alliances were put 
 into action and England was compelled either to expose 
 France to possible loss of territory on the British Channel 
 where Britain would be herself endangered, or to support 
 Russia in a war of conquest. 
 
 Signally indeed will it appear that the Treaty of 
 Versailles in assessing penalties upon Germany proceeded 
 upon two fundamental errors, one in holding Germany to 
 be guilty alone, the other in allowing to the guilty nothing 
 
 16 
 
242 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 for circumstances undeniably extenuating. Germany had 
 been dangerously encircled by three powerful countries in 
 common military conference, one vexed by her navy, the 
 second impelled by revenge, the third greedy for territory 
 on the Baltic, at the Dardanelles, and in the Balkans, The 
 last named had actually mobilized. 
 
 For these reasons the decision of Germany to resort to 
 military action was made in a perilous hour and under 
 direct menace from Russia. Next, Germany had at enor- 
 mous sacrifice saved Europe from the Slav, who had been 
 instigated by France, now the loudest claimant for reim- 
 bursement. Finally, it is clear that the German Govern- 
 ment did, though late, endeavour with England to stop the 
 general mobilization by Russia, but that France did not 
 exert herself in that respect at all. In the assessment of 
 indemnities France should bear part of the charge. 
 
 Eleven thousand four hundred miUion gold marks have 
 thus far been paid by Germany under the awful terms of 
 Versailles, and yet the point has not been reached at which 
 any part can be apphed on her penalties and debt. Stripped 
 of her armies, she at last hes naked to the Slav. Must she 
 seek an alliance with that hated race, either to escape 
 bondage from the West or to get repose from the East ? 
 Fatal day, as every German knows ! Once the Slav armies 
 occupy Germany, even to assist her, they will never volun- 
 tarily quit her soil. Germany thenceforward passes into 
 anarchy. ,. .7 
 
APPENDIX A 
 VON MOLTKE'S SUMMARY OF DECEMBER 1912 
 
 In December 1912, Von Moltke made a long " Memorandum " 
 of the military situation to the War Ministry. It is too long for 
 complete quotation here, but can be found in the book by Ludendorff, 
 called Problems of the General Staff, in Volume I at page 57. He 
 reviews the certainty that England will be against Germany, with 
 France and Russia, but Italy " has no vital interest in a conflict 
 between Austria and Russia. While Germany and Austria will be 
 fighting for their existence, Italy will hardly be threatened." 
 
 He has had an interview a few days since with a representative 
 of the Italian General Staff, who says that " no matter what the 
 pretext," Italy will not contribute her third army, which had been 
 counted upon. 
 
 He then adds three appendices, of which I give the two pertinent 
 ones, as follows : 
 
 " Under I. of the Appendix are the forces which Germany 
 can put into the field in the West in a war with the Triple Entente, 
 in battalions, squadrons and batteries, which can be opposed to 
 the forces at the disposal of France and England. The tables show 
 an inferiority on the side of Germany of 124 battalions ; if Belgium 
 be added to the number of our enemies, the figure is 192 battalions. 
 The ItaUan Army is left out of account, as it will not participate. 
 On the other hand, the French Alpine army, which will be im- 
 mobihzed by the Italians, is also left out of the calculation." If 
 the Itahan third army were brought to Germany, the two aUies 
 would have a slight superiority. But it is immaterial to us whether 
 Italy assembles two or twelve army corps behind her Alpine 
 frontier. It would be an extraordinary operation to force that 
 frontier. Until it is opened the whole ItaUan army wiU be standing 
 idle, rifle in hand, without being able to fire a shot. Germany 
 must gain the decision alone and unaided. While in 1870 she 
 had a superiority in infantry of 106 battaUons over France, as weU 
 as an immense preponderance of artillery, and fought this one 
 opponent with her rear secured, she has now to take the field against 
 France taith a great inferiority in infantry {though still with a slight 
 superiority in artillery), and will further he attacked in the rear by 
 Russia. The superiority of our artillery rests at the moment on 
 our more marked development of high-angle fire (field-howitzers) 
 and our heavy artillery of the field army. Moreover, we are ahead 
 of the French with the provision of field-kitchens and tents, as 
 well as our infantry rifle. But it is only a question of money 
 for France to catch up with us in these respects. In time she 
 
 I " Things turned out otherwise in 1914, and our inferiority was consider' 
 ably greater." — ^Ludendorff. 
 
244 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 will be able to get level with us and even overtake us. On the 
 other hand, she cannot overtake us as regards the number of men 
 fit for service who are at our disposal as long as we manage to 
 secure them for the army. 
 
 " Part II of the Appendix shows that in the East, Russia enjoys 
 a very great numerical superiority. A comparison of the forces 
 which Germany, Austria and Roumania combined can put into the 
 field against Russia reveals a Russian superiority of 1,374 battalions, 
 319 squadrons and 82 batteries. At the present moment Russia 
 is still very much behind-hand with the reorganization, equipment 
 and arming of her forces, so that for the time being the Triple 
 Alliance need not be afraid of an armed conflict even with her 
 in spite of her numerical superiority. But when we look forward 
 into the future, we must keep present in our minds the fact that 
 in view of the enormous sums Russia is spending on the reorganiza- 
 tion of her army, she will be stronger with every year that passes. 
 It is just as impossible for Germany to try and compete with 
 Russia as a land power, as it is for her to attempt to catch up 
 with England as a sea power. But it is just as incumbent upon 
 her to leave no stone unturned to employ all the resources which 
 are still at her disposal on a large scale, in order to maintain that 
 position vis-a-vis our neighbours which we enjoyed before they 
 brought their armed forces up to the present level and began to 
 think of increasing them. 
 
 " The military situation in our frontier provinces requires 
 special attention. We have to expect, certainly in the East, and 
 possibly in the West also, an attack immediately on the proclama- 
 tion of mobilization. If such an attack were not beaten off, by 
 the destruction of railways, bridges and tunnels, our mobilization, 
 the arming of the fortresses and ctar deployment, would be seriously 
 interfered with. It is of the very greatest importance that our 
 troops in these regions should be reinforced and our fortresses 
 be put into an advanced state of defence. 
 
 " I believe I have established the necessity of increasing our 
 military forces and improving our home defences in what I have 
 said above. The political situation will make these measures an 
 inexorable necessity. Of course, the satisfaction by the nation 
 of the demands made here and dealt with in greater detail in 
 Part II of the Memorandum, will involve great personal and 
 pecuniary sacrifices. But in any case these sacrifices will be far 
 less than those we should have to face in case of a lost war. 
 
 " We must also point out that our neighbours have made, 
 and are now making, similar sacrifices in order to strengthen their 
 military forces. 
 
 " France makes much greater personal demands on her popula- 
 tion than we do on ours. During the first Morocco crisis she spent 
 about 300 millions on the strengthening of her eastern fortresses. 
 " This year Russia demanded and obtained from her national 
 assembly, 1,300 million marks. 
 
APPENDIX B 245 
 
 " In the last three years England has spent large sums to give 
 effect to the Haldane reforms. 
 
 " Switzerland has introduced a new army organization at a 
 heavy cost. 
 
 " Belgium is now carrying through a new Defence Bill, by 
 which her army will be brought up to a mobilization strength of 
 300,000 men. She has laid out enormous sums to modernize the 
 fortifications of Antwerp. 
 
 " Under the pressure of the political crisis Austria has been 
 compelled to demand very large credits for that reorganization of 
 her army which is long overdue. 
 
 " Germany, too, must be prepared to make sacrifices. The 
 programme for the provision of the most urgent requirements 
 which is drawn up in Part II must be carried through with the 
 greatest energy, so that in the future Germany, trusting to her 
 own strength, can give the political leaders of the nation a support 
 which is soUd enough to meet all emergencies." 
 
 APPENDIX B 
 
 THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE, OCTOBER 7, 1879, 
 BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND GERMANY 
 
 Considering that their Majesties, the Emperor of Austria and King 
 of Hungary, and the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia, must 
 esteem it to be their unavoidable duty as sovereigns to watch under 
 all circumstances, over the safety of their Empires and the tranquillity 
 of their peoples ; 
 
 Considering that the two Monarchs will be able, by a solid alliance 
 of the two Empires, in the kind of that which previously existed, more 
 easily to accompUsh this duty, as also more efficaciously ; 
 
 Considering, in fine, that an intimate agreement between Austro- 
 Hungary and Germany can threaten no one, but is rather calculated 
 to consolidate European peace as created by the stipulations of the 
 Treaty of Berlin ; 
 
 Their Majesties, the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary 
 and the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia, promising to each 
 other solemnly never to give any agressive tendency whatsoever to 
 their purely defensive agreement, have resolved to conclude a reciprocal 
 alUance of peace and protection ; 
 
 In this aim, their Majesties have appointed as their plenipotenti- 
 aries : 
 
 For his Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, 
 his real Privy Councillor, the Minister of the Imperial House, as also 
 for Foreign Affairs, Lieutenant Julius, Count Andrassy, etc. ; 
 
 For his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, his Ambassador and 
 plenipotentiary extraordinary, Lieutenant-General Prince Henry VII 
 of Reuss, etc. ; 
 
246 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Who have both entered into relations with each other to-day 
 in Vienna, and, after showing each other their powers, duly recognized 
 as good and suf&cient, have settled what follows : 
 
 Article I. If, contrarily to what may be hoped and contrarily to 
 the sincere wishes of the two high contracting parties, one of the two 
 Empires were to be attacked by Russia, the two high contracting parties 
 are bound to lend each other reciprocal aid with the whole of their 
 Imperial military power, and, subsequently, to conclude no peace 
 except conjointly and in agreement. 
 
 Article II. If one of the two high contracting parties were to 
 be attacked by another Power, the other high contracting party 
 binds itself, by the present act, not only not to uphold the aggressor 
 against its high Ally, but at the least, to observe a benevolent neutrality 
 with regard to the contracting party aforesaid. 
 
 If, however, in the case previously mentioned, the Power attacking 
 were to be upheld by Russia, whether by way of active co-operation 
 or by military measures that should threaten the Power attacked, 
 then the obligation of reciprocal assistance, with entire mihtary forces 
 — obUgation stipulated in Article I of this treaty — ^would immediately 
 become executory, and the mihtary operations of the two high con- 
 tracting parties would also, in such circumstances, be conducted 
 jointly until the conclusion of peace. 
 
 Article III. This treaty, in conformity with its pacific character 
 and to avoid all false interpretation, will be held secret by all the high 
 contracting parties. 
 
 It may only be communicated to a Third Power with the knowledge 
 of the two parties and after a special agreement between them. 
 
 Considering the intentions expressed by the Emperor Alexander 
 at the Alexandrowo interview, the two contracting parties nourish 
 the hope that Russia's preparation will not, in reality, become threaten- 
 ing to them ; for this reason, there is at present no motive for com- 
 munication. 
 
 But, if, against all expectation, this hope should be rendered vain, 
 the two contracting parties would recognize that it was a duty of 
 loyalty to inform the Emperor Alexander, at least confidentially, that 
 they must deem any attack directed against one of them as being 
 directed against both. 
 
 To testify which, the plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty 
 with their own hands and have fixed their seals thereto. 
 
 Made at Vienna, on the 7th of October, 1879. 
 {^Signed) Andrassy, 
 
 Prince Henry VII of Reuss. 
 
 /■ 
 'APPENDIX C 
 
 THE FRANCO -RUSSIAN ALLIANCE OF 1892 
 
 The French issued after the war, when they first disclosed the 
 terms of this agreement, a special Yellow Book upon this subject. 
 
APPENDIX C 247 
 
 The essential terms of it can be found in the pamphlet of March, 1919, 
 No. 136, of the Amercan Association for International Conciliation. 
 The body of the engagements is as follows : 
 
 Draft of Military Convention. 
 
 " France and Russia, animated by a common desire to preserve 
 the peace, and having no other end in mind than to ward off the 
 necessities of a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces 
 of the Triple Alliance against either of them, have agreed upon 
 the following provisions : 
 
 " I. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported 
 by Germany, Russia shall employ all its available forces to fight 
 Germany. 
 
 " 2. In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of one of the 
 Powers which are a party to it, should be mobiUzed, France and 
 Russia, at the first indication of the event, and without a previous 
 agreement being necessary, shall mobilize all their forces immediately 
 and simultaneously, and shall transport them as near to their 
 frontiers as possible. 
 
 "3. The available forces which must be employed against 
 Germany shall be, for France, 1,300,000 men ; for Russia, from 
 700,000 to 800,000 men. 
 
 " These forces shall begin complete action with the greatest 
 dispatch, so that Germany will have to fight at the same time 
 in the East and in the West. 
 
 "4. The Staffs of the Armies of the two countries shall con- 
 stantly plan in concert in order to prepare for and facihtate the 
 execution of the measures set forth above. 
 
 " They shall communicate to each other, in time of peace, all 
 the information regarding the armies of the Triple Alliance which 
 is in, or shall come into, their possession. 
 
 " The ways and means of corresponding in time of war shall 
 be studied and arranged in advance. 
 
 "5. France and Russia shall not conclude a separate peace. 
 
 " 6. The present Convention shall have the same duration as 
 the Triple Alliance. 
 
 " 7. All the clauses enumerated above shall be kept absolutely 
 secret." 
 
 An exchange of letters of transmission and of unimportant com- 
 ment upon this document by General de Boisdeffre, the army repre- 
 sentative who conducted the affair for the French in St. Petersburg. 
 Two letters from MontebeUo, French Ambassador, to Casimir 
 P6rier, President at Paris, and one by Mouravieff, Russian Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs, to Delcass6, French Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 A reply by Delcass6. 
 
 All these intermediate documents are summed up in the report of 
 Delcass6 himself to Loubet, President of the French Republic, on 
 the 12th of August, 1899, when Delcass6 has to report what he considers, 
 after a visit to St. Petersburg, a strengthening of this alliance, so that 
 
248 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 it will outlive even the dissolution of the Triple Alliance, against which 
 the original arrangement was supposed to be a justifiable protection. 
 The following is Delcass6's report in full : 
 
 Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Loubet, President of 
 the French Republic. 
 
 " Paris, 12 August, 1899. 
 " My dear Mr. President, 
 
 " Your Excellency knows with what idea in mind I went 
 to St. Petersburg. Our arrangements with Russia are of two 
 kinds : a general diplomatic agreement, expressed in the letters of 
 9/21 August, 1891 and 15/27 August, 1891, signed by Giers, Mohren- 
 heim and Ribot, and which stipulated that the two Governments 
 will consider in concert any question capable of putting the peace 
 of Europe in jeopardy ; and a military convention of 23 December 
 1893 to January 1894, which concerns an aggressive act on the 
 part of one of the Powers of the Triple Alliance, and whose duration 
 is limited to the duration of the Triple Alliance. 
 
 " But what would happen if the Triple Alliance should dissolve 
 otherwise than by the volition of all its members ; if, for example, 
 Emperor Francis Joseph, who seems at times the only bond between 
 rival and even enemy races, should suddenly disappear ; if Austria 
 were threatened by a dismemberment which, perhaps, is after all 
 desirable, which, perhaps, might be countenanced and which, in any 
 case, one might become anxious to turn to account ? What could 
 be more capable of compromising the general peace, and of upsetting 
 the balance between the European forces ? And what situation, 
 furthermore, would more deserve to find France and Russia, not 
 only united in a common plan, but ready even for its execution ? 
 
 " Now it is just at the precise moment when the military 
 convention should work, that it would cease to exist : bom of the 
 Triple Alliance, it would vanish with it. That is a deficiency 
 which has troubled me constantly since I became Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs ; and it has been my firm resolve to neglect no 
 opportunity to overcome it. I have found in your lofty and prudent 
 patriotism a powerful support. Sure of receiving from Emperor 
 Nicholas a friendly welcome, I decided to return to Count Mouravieff, 
 whose views have always been in perfect accord with mine, the 
 visit which he paid me in Paris last October. Arriving in St. 
 Petersburg Friday evening, the fourth of August, I was invited 
 to breakfast with Their Majesties on Sunday, at Peterhof. After 
 breakfast, the Emperor took me into his study : first he was good 
 enough to tell me what esteem and approval my conduct during 
 the last Franco-Enghsh crisis had aroused in him. We ran over 
 the different problems which had arisen during the course of the 
 year, and reviewed the general world situation. Then, approaching 
 the relations between France and Russia, I revealed to the Emperor 
 my belief and apprehension that the aUiance would be disarmed 
 in case one of those very events should arise in view of which it 
 was formed : ' Since our agreement of August, 1981, extends to 
 
APPENDIX D 249 
 
 all important questions, does not Your Majesty think that the 
 military Convention of 1894, which is the instrument for making 
 that agreement effective, should have the same duration, that is 
 to say, as long as the general and permanent interests of our two 
 nations remain solidary ; and do you not think also that the work 
 of Emperor Alexander III ajid of President Carnot will surely 
 receive the confirmation of Your Majesty and of the new President 
 of the French Republic ? ' 
 
 " The Emperor assured me that such was his feeling ; that he 
 was anxious to continue essentially in the path indicated by his 
 father, and to draw closer the bonds forged for the common good 
 of France and Russia. At that moment, I took the liberty of sub- 
 mitting to the Emperor the draft of a declaration which I had 
 drawn up that morning. In it the arrangement of 1891 is solemnly 
 confirmed ; but the scope is singularly extended ; while in 1891 
 the two Governments expressed anxiety only for the maintenance 
 of the general peace, my plan provides that they should concern 
 themselves just as much with ' the maintenance of the balance 
 between the European forces.' 
 
 " In short, by attaching the military Convention to the dip- 
 lomatic arrangement, this plan assures to it the same duration. 
 
 " The Emperor seemed to think that I had expressed his idea 
 exactly ; he called Count Mouravieff, to whom at His Majesty's 
 request I read the declaration. An understanding already existed 
 between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and myself on the funda- 
 mental basis of the plan. It was decided that the new arrange- 
 ment, of which the contents and the very existence should remain 
 absolutely secret, should be established undeniably in the form of 
 letters which Count Mouravieff and I would exchange. That was 
 done Wednesday morning, the day I left St. Petersburg. 
 
 " Delcass." 
 
 APPENDIX D 
 
 SECRET AGREEMENT OF 1916-17 BETWEEN 
 FRANCE AND RUSSIA 
 
 The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (M. Sazonoff) to the Russian 
 Ambassador at Paris. February 24 (March 9), 1916. 
 
 (No. 948) 
 
 " Petrograd. 
 
 " Please refer to my telegram No. 6063 of 1915. At the forth- 
 coming Conference you may be guided by the following general 
 principles : 
 
 " The political agreements concluded between the Allies during 
 the war must remain intact, and are not subject to revision. They 
 
250 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 include the agreement with France and England on Constantinople, 
 the Straits, Syria, and Asia Minor, and also the London Treaty 
 with Italy. All suggestions for the future delimitation of Central 
 Europe are at present premature, but in general one must bear 
 in mind that we are prepared to allow France and England complete 
 freedom in drawing up the Western frontiers of Germany, in the 
 expectation that the allies on their part would allow us equal freedom 
 in drawing up our frontiers with Germany and Austria. 
 
 " It is particularly necessary to insist on the exclusion of the 
 Polish question from the subject of international discussion and 
 on the elimination of all attempts to place the future of Poland under 
 the guarantee and the control of the Powers.^ 
 
 " With regard to the Scandinavian States, it is necessary to 
 endeavour to keep back Sweden from any action hostile to us, 
 and at the same time to examine betimes measures for attracting 
 Norway on our side in case it should prove impossible to prevent 
 a war with Sweden. 
 
 " Roumania has already been offered all the political advantages 
 which could induce her to take up arms, and therefore it would 
 be perfectly futile to search for new baits in this respect. 
 
 " The question of pushing out the Germans from the Chinese 
 market is of very great importance, but its solution is impossible 
 without the participation of Japan. It is preferable to examine 
 it at the Economic Conference, where the representatives of Japan 
 will be present. This does not exclude the desirability of a pre- 
 liminary exchange of views on the subject between Russia and 
 England by diplomatic means. 
 
 (Signed) " Sazonoff." 
 
 II 
 
 Confidential Telegram from M. Pokrovsky (M. Sazonoff's second 
 successor as Foreign Minister) to the Russian Ambassador at Paris. 
 January 30 (February 12), 1917. 
 
 (No. 502) 
 
 " Petrograd. 
 " Copy to London confidentially." At an audience with the 
 Most High,3 M. Doumergue 4 subinitted to the Emperor the desire 
 
 ' It is interesting to compare this declaration of the Russian Government 
 in February 1916 with President Wilson's statement in his speech to the 
 American Senate on January 22, 1917. President Wilson said : " I take it 
 for granted . . . that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should 
 be united, independent, and autonomous Poland," and, speaking at Leeds 
 on September 26, 1917, Mr. Asquith said : " There is Poland, as to whom. I, 
 and, I believe, all our people, heartily endorse the wise and generous words 
 of President Wilson." 
 
 « Mr. Balfour stated (House of Commons, December 19, 1917) that 
 " London " did not mean the British Foreign Office. He added : " We 
 had never heard of it at all at that time." " London " therefore probably 
 means the Russian Embassy in London. 
 
 3 The Tsar. 
 
 4 French Ambassador at Petrograd. 
 
APPENDIX D 251 
 
 of France to secure for herself at the end of the present war the 
 restoration of Alsace-Lorraine and a special position in the valley 
 of the River Saar, as well as to attain the political separation from 
 Germany of her trans-Rhenish districts and their organization on 
 a separate basis, in order that in future the River Rhine might 
 form a permanent strategical frontier against a Germanic invasion. 
 Doumergue expressed the hope that the Imperial Government 
 would not refuse immediately to draw up its assent to these sug- 
 gestions in a formal manner. 
 
 " His Imperial Majesty was pleased to agree to this in principle, 
 in consequence of which I requested Doumergue, after communi- 
 cating with his Government, to let me have the draft of an agree- 
 ment, which would then be given a formal sanction by an exchange 
 of Notes between the French Ambassador and myself. 
 
 " Proceeding thus to meet the wishes of our Ally, I neverthe- 
 less consider it my duty to recall the standpoint put forward by 
 the Imperial Government in the telegram of February 24, 1916, No. 
 948, to the effect that ' while allowing France and England complete 
 liberty in delimiting the Western frontiers of Germany we expect 
 that the AlUes on their part will give us equal liberty in delimiting 
 our frontiers with Germany and Austria Hungary.' 
 
 " Hence the impending exchange of Notes on the question 
 raised by Doumergue will justify us in asking the French Govern- 
 ment simultaneously to confirm its assent to allowing Russia 
 freedom of action Lq drawing up her future frontiers in the west.' 
 Exact data on the question will be supplied by us in due course 
 to the French Cabinet. 
 
 " In addition we deem it necessary to stipulate for the assent 
 of France to the removal at the termination of the war of the dis- 
 qualifications resting on the Aland Islands.' Please explain the 
 above to Briand and wire the results. 
 
 {Signed) " Pokrovsky." 
 
 Ill 
 
 A telegram from the Russian Ambassador in Paris to M. Pokrovsky, 
 January 31 (February 13), 1917 : 
 
 (No. 88) 
 
 " Copy to London. Referring to your telegram No. 507, con- 
 fidentially, I immediately communicated in writing its contents 
 to Briand, who told me that he would not fail to give me an official 
 
 ' I.e. the west of Russia. 
 
 » The Aland Islands are situated at the entrance of the Gulf of Bothnia, 
 close to the Svfedish coast, and less than 100 miles from Stockholm. They 
 belong to Russia, and after the Crimean War a Convention, which was an- 
 nexed to the Treaty of Paris, was made between Russia, France, and Britain 
 that they should not be fortified and that no miUtary or naval establishments 
 should be maintained upon them. The population of these islands is Swedish 
 by descent, and numbers about 19,000. 
 
252 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 reply of the French Government, but that he could at once declare, 
 on his own behalf, that the satisfaction of the wishes contained 
 in your telegram will meet with no difficulties. 
 
 {Signed) " Isvolsky." 
 IV 
 
 On February i (14), 1917, the Russian Foreign Minister addressed 
 the following note to the French Ambassador at Petrograd : 
 
 " In your Note of to-day's date your Excellency was good 
 enough to inform the Imperial Government that the Government 
 of the Republic was contemplating the inclusion in the terms of 
 peace to be offered to Germany the following demands and guaran- 
 tees of a territorial nature : 
 
 " I. Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France. 
 
 "2. The frontiers are to be extended at least, up to the limits 
 of the former principaUty of Lorraine, and are to be drawn up at 
 the discretion of the French Government so as to provide for the 
 strategical needs and for the inclusion in French territory of the 
 entire iron district of Lorraine and of the entire coal district of 
 the Saar Valley. 
 
 "3. The rest of the territories situated on the left bank of 
 the Rhine which now form part of the German Empire aire to be 
 entirely separated from Germany and freed from all political and 
 economic dependence upon her.' 
 
 " 4. The territories of the left bank of the Rhine outside French 
 territory are to be constituted an autonomous and neutral State, 
 and are to be occupied by French troops until such time as the 
 enemy States have completely satisfied all the conditions and 
 guarantees indicated in the Treaty of Peace. 
 
 " Your Excellency stated that the Government of the Republic 
 would be happy to be able to rely upon the support of tl^e Imperial 
 Government for the carrying out of its plans.- By order of. his 
 Imperial Majesty, my most august master, I have the honour, in the 
 name of the Russian Government, to inform your excellency by the 
 present Note that the Government of the Republic may rely upon_ the 
 support of the Imperial Government for the carrying out of its pkins' 
 as set out above." 
 
 Finally, on February 26 (March 11), 1917, the Russian Ambassador 
 at Paris sent the following telegram to M. Pokrovsky : 
 
 (No. 168) 
 
 " See my reply to telegram No. 167, No. 2. The Government 
 of the French Republic, anxious to confirm the importance of 
 
 « This would include Rhenish-Prussia with the cities and towns of Cologne, 
 Aix-la-Chapelie, Gablenz, Treves, Crefeld and Bonn, a detached fragment 
 of Oldenburg ; a part of Hesse, with the towns of Mayeace, Worms and 
 
APPENDIX E 258 
 
 the treaties concluded with the Russian Government in 1915, 
 for the settlement on the termination of the war of the question 
 of Constantinople and the Straits in accordance with Russia's 
 aspirations, anxious, on the other hand, to secure for its Ally in 
 military and industrial respects all the guarantees desirable for 
 the safety and the economic development of the Empire, recognize 
 Russia's complete liberty in establishing her Western frontiers, 
 
 {Signed) " Isvolsky." 
 
 On the very next day (March 12), the Russian Revolution took 
 place, and on March 15th the Tsar abdicated. 
 
 The Present Position. 
 
 Apparently the design of driving Germany back to the left bank 
 of the Rhine has now been abandoned by the French Government, 
 although there has been no official statement to this effect. 
 
 Mr. Balfour, in the House of Commons on December 19, 1917, 
 said of this plan : 
 
 " We have never expressed our approval of it, nor do I believe 
 it present's the policy of successive French Governments who have 
 held office during the war. Never did we desire, and never did 
 we encourage the idea, that a bit of Germany should be cut off 
 from thfe parent State and erected into some kind of . . . inde- 
 pendent Government on the left bank of the Rhine. His Majesty's 
 Government were never aware that was seriously entertained by 
 any French statesman." 
 
 It must be noted in this connection that by the Declaration of 
 September 5, 1914, the Allies undertook to make peace in common. 
 Any arrangement between France and Russia, therefore, equally 
 affects Great Britain. 
 
 APPENDIX E 
 
 PRESIDENT WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINTS AND 
 PUBLIC UTTERANCES AS TO THE BASIS 
 OF PEACE 
 
 It will be remembered the Armistice was accepted by the Germans 
 and their arms laid down not on the Fourteen Points alone but on 
 President Wilson's other utterances respecting the moderation of the 
 victors. 
 
 On February 11, 1918, Mr. Wilson asserted : 
 
 " There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive 
 damages. . . . ' Self-determination ' is not a mere phrase. . . . 
 
 Bingen ; and the Palatinate with the towns of Ludwigshafen, Kaiserslautern 
 Zweibrucken, Neustadt, and Landau. 
 
264 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in 
 the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned and 
 not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims 
 among rival states." 
 
 In his speech of July 4, 1918, President Wilson urged : 
 
 " The settlement of every question . . . upon the basis of the 
 free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately con- 
 cerned, ajid not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage 
 of any other nation or people which may desire a difierent settle- 
 ment for the sake of its own external influence or mastery." 
 
 On September 27, 1918, he said : 
 
 " The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination 
 between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom, we do 
 not wish to be just. 
 
 " No special or separate interest of any single nation or any 
 group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settle- 
 ment which is not consistent with the common interest of all. 
 
 " There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and 
 understandings within the general and common family of the 
 League of Nations. . . . 
 
 " There can be no special, selfish, economic combinations within 
 the League and no employment of any form of economic boycott 
 or exclusion, except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion 
 from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of 
 Nations itself as a means of discipline or control. 
 
 " All international agreements or treaties of every kind must 
 be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world." 
 
 The foregoing were more essential as a bargain with which to induce 
 Germany to the Armistice than were the Fourteen Points, the essential 
 parts of which are as follows : 
 
 " 3. The removal so far as possible, of all economic barriers 
 and the establishment of an equahty of trade conditions among 
 all the nations consenting to the Peace, and associating themselves 
 for its maintenance. 
 
 " 4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national arma- 
 ments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic 
 safety. 
 
 " 5" A free open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment 
 of all Colonial claims. 
 
 "6, 7, 8, and 11. The evacuation and restoration of invaded 
 territory. 
 
 "8. The righting of the " wrong done to France by Prussia in 
 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine.' 
 
 " 13. An independent Poland is to be established of ' territories 
 inhabited by indisputably Polish populations,' which shall be 
 ' assured a free and secure access to the sea.' " 
 
APPENDIX F 255 
 
 From the pre-armistice agreement itself : 
 
 " Compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done 
 to the civilian population of the Allies and their property, by the 
 aggression of Germany, by land, by sea, or from the air." 
 
 APPENDIX F 
 
 THE FRENCH NEGRO ARMIES 
 
 Following the bestowal of the Goncourt literary prize on the 
 Martinique Negro Maran, General Mangin gave out some utterances 
 which are reported in the New York World of January 8, 1922. The 
 question of the social equality of blacks with whites does not interest 
 us in the present discussion, except as the French blend it with a justi- 
 fication of their use of black troops for armies in Europe. It may be 
 added that Mangin is of high rank in the French Army and is a man 
 of both ability and culture. I have reduced without altering, the 
 article in the World as follows : 
 
 Paris, December 28. — " ' An end must be put to this absurd 
 legend of the inferiority of the black races. It is based solely on 
 the tradition of slavery and is not at all flattering to the white 
 races ! ' 
 
 ***** 
 
 " The General gained his affection for the coloured races during 
 the twenty years he spent in colonial military and administrative 
 commands. He is not merely a soldier, but has considerable 
 competence in literary talent, which gives weight to his remarks 
 on culture among the negro races. 
 
 " ' There really is an intellectual eUte among the blacks, whom 
 Hberty has introduced to our culture,' he asserted in an interview. 
 ' And experience has demonstrated that this eUte possesses the 
 ability to excel in every domain of human activity. 
 
 " ' CiviUzation has its source in YeUow Asia, Black India and 
 Black Egypt. Greece dates only from 1,200 or 1,500 years before 
 Christ, and Rome was only a tardy parvenu in the history of world 
 development. Our alphabets are Asiatic and our figures Arab. 
 In short, the white race is only a stage in humanity, not the first 
 nor probably the last. There is no guarantee that it will not be 
 outdistanced by the coloured races in future ages.' 
 
 " ' By its haughty manner toward the masses of negroes within 
 its territory the great American democracy, otherwise so generous 
 and humane, seems to forget at this point the Good Samaritan/ 
 writes M. Grosclaude. ' With us the old regime did not wait for 
 
256 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 the proclamation of the League of the Rights of Man to treat 
 our coloured subjects as members of the family. In truth we have 
 never been a race of slave dealers. Doubtless a few were recruited 
 among our coastal population at the time of the great adventure, 
 but our friends of Great Britain and the Low Countries were always 
 our superiors in this sort of navigation. Even since the abolition 
 of slavery, the Hollanders have always exploited their possessions 
 in the strong manner, though with a marvellous practical sense. 
 The English have excelled in the exploitation of the most populous 
 colonies by an infinitesimal number of white officials. But the 
 English do not admit — I do not say legally but morally — ^the union 
 of white men and black women. 
 
 " The Frenchman is infinitely more cordial with his black male 
 cousins and more gallant with his black female cousins. Generally 
 the French resident, civilian or military, lives on excellent terms 
 with the local population as soon as they reaUze we are not there 
 to persecute them or hold them to ransom, and that there is every 
 advantage in supporting themselves on our tempered tutelage and 
 good fellowship. That is what distinguishes us from the English 
 — correct, loyal and haughty, who know better how to make them- 
 selves feared than to make themselves loved. 
 
 " ' I believe we are the only nation in the world which treats 
 the blacks as brothers — ^as inferior brothers, if, in default of suffi- 
 cient moral or intellectual emancipation, they have not attained 
 their social majority ; as equals when their rich primitive nature, 
 brought to value by our teaching, is raised above the common 
 level. 
 
 " ' The awarding of the Goncourt prize to a coloured writer 
 has a high significance. It is a witness to the fraternal sentiment 
 of our country for all her sons, without distinction of shades or 
 origins, when those sons honour the country by their words or 
 by their deeds.' " 
 
 Since the foregoing was written, Mr. Ray Stannard Baker's illu- 
 minating articles have appeared in the New York Times with excep- 
 tionally valuable documents, apparently from the private files of 
 President Wilson. Graphically it is shown that both Lloyd George 
 and Mr. Wilson deplored the use, and foresaw the dangers to Europe, 
 of the importation of black armies from French Africa. 
 
 Nothing can be more explicit than the results of the conversation 
 between Clemenceau and these two statesmen on this point. To M. 
 Clemenceau it was made specific that the pacts of the Covenant relating 
 to mandatories were to exclude other use of colonial blacks than that 
 of local defence and police. The very minutes of the conversations 
 as recorded by the Secretaries, are reproduced in the New York Times 
 of February 12, 1922, and these show that Clemenceau could not have 
 misunderstood the others. At all events, he must be set down as 
 pretending to acquiesce. 
 
 Now the Covenant being prepared according to the Lloyd George- 
 Wilson understanding, what occurred ? The article came out of the 
 
APPENDIX G 257 
 
 drafting committee altered. Why ? Sir Maurice Hankey, the Secre- 
 tary, reported : 
 
 " The alteration in Article XXII was made under instructions 
 given personally to M. Fromageot by M. Clemenceau, the President 
 of the Conference." 
 
 Then, continues Mr. Baker, a discussion ensued. Clemenceau 
 insisted the change was necessary to France. Mr. Wilson demurred. 
 He referred to the prior understanding and prevailed. The language 
 was to be altered back again to forbid the " training of natives for 
 other than poUce purposes and defence of territory." 
 
 But Clemenceau would not stop. Though the reading was restored, 
 a chance remained of achieving his purpose in those provisions which 
 give powers to the mandatories to work out the application, so the 
 following is what he accomplished. While in the mandatories section 
 the British and the Belgians are kept down in their colonial adminis- 
 trations to the strict words of the Covenant, the French get this sudden 
 exception in Article. Ill as to French Togoland arid the Cameroons : 
 
 "It is understood, however, that the troops thus raised may, 
 in the event of a general war, be utilized to repulse an attack or 
 for defence of territory outside that over which the mandate is 
 administered." 
 
 This unfairness, being exposed by the Secretariat, may not yet 
 succeed, for the Mandatories Sections have not yet been accepted 
 by the League of Nations. " Meantime," says Mr. Baker, " the 
 process of militarizing Africa goes on." He very properly draws 
 our attention to the instance of ancient Rome in her decline, resorting 
 to her savages to fight more virile neighbours in the North. 
 
 APPENDIX G 
 
 RUSSIAN MILITARY AND RAILWAY PREPARA- 
 TIONS AND MOBILIZATION 
 
 The contributions by Germany to this subject are not readily 
 obtainable in this country, so the following from Von Eggeling, German 
 Military Attach^ at St. Petersburg and from General H. Von Kuhl, 
 formerly chief of staff of the First Army, will be of interest. The book 
 by the former was published in 1919, The Russian Mobilization and 
 the Outbreak of the War ; von Kuhl's, pubUshed in 1920, is The German 
 General Staff in Preparation and Conduct of the World War. They 
 have not been translated. 
 
 Russian Increases. Reorganization was begun in 1910, with as 
 much secrecy as possible (Eggeling, 9)- The losses of the Japanese 
 War were replaced by 1911. In 1914 the military expenditures were 
 two thousand six hundred miUion marks (Kuhl, 60). The universal 
 
 17 
 
258 LET FRANCE EXPLAIN 
 
 service law required four years with the colours. The German staff 
 reckoned in 1913 on a Russian total of 38 reserve divisions ; the 
 force would be. 
 
 Reservists. 
 
 For active formations . . . . . . . - 748,000 
 
 For reserve formations . . . . . . . . 876,000 
 
 For replacement . . . . . . . . . . 205,000 
 
 For communication formations . . . . 40,000 
 
 1,869,000 
 
 In both categories of reserve or a surplus of 2,292,000 
 
 423,000 
 (Von Kuhl, 61-62) 
 
 This was in 1913. For the following year increases were planned, 
 and in part carried out. Excluding Siberian and Turkestan troops, 
 the strength of the Russian Army was 30 Army Corps, comprising 
 35J cavalry or Cossack Divisions, 35 Reserve Divisions, and 40 National 
 Defence Divisions. 
 
 The peace strength in the summer of 1914 was 1,581,000 officers 
 and men ; the war strength 3,461,750 (Kuhl, 104, 105). 
 
 The ultimate aim became that of creating an army which could 
 take the offensive against Germany. All Russian Army questions 
 after J910 were viewed by the press in Russia from this angle (Egge- 
 ling, 9). 
 
 The Military Railways. These were created to permit the immediate 
 transport of troops from Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kazan, to the 
 German and Austrian frontiers. In peace times the forces were 
 divided along the new lines to be rushed to the front (Kuhl, 76) 
 France made a loan for these lines — one thousand milhon francs. 
 The Siberian Railway was also double tracked to bring up the forces 
 from there. In 1912 two great private roads (from Sosnowice to 
 Warsaw and from Alexandrovs to Warsaw), were purchased by the 
 Government. The Polish Railway officials were supplanted by 
 Russians in 191 2 [ib.). 
 
 Russian Military Menaces in 191 4 beforb the Serbian 
 Trouble. 
 
 In 1 911 the French Chief of Staff, Dubail, attended the Russian 
 manoeuvres, and the next year the Russian Chief, Shilinski, attended 
 the French. France demanded Russian rnilitary increases in exchange 
 for her seventeen thousand million francs (Kuhl, 72) . This was charged 
 by the Russian journal Rjetsch, on July 19, 1914 (ib., 70). The Grand 
 Duke Nicholas, desiring war in 1912, Sukhomlinoff answered that 
 they were not yet ready, whereupon the former renewed his pressure 
 
APPENDIX G 259 
 
 on preparations (Eggeling, 49-50). Nicholas planned a military 
 deinonstration for 1913, but was stopped by remonstrances that two 
 years would yet be necessary (Eggeling, 16). 
 
 In 1913 the German General Staff believed that the Russian field 
 forces of the first line could be ready on the fifth day of mobilization, 
 and of the second line on the eighth (Kuhl, 82). The spring of 1914 
 witnessed enormous preparations, the Duma sanctioning increases 
 equal to the entire peace strength of the Austrian and Hungarian 
 Armies (Eggeling, 18). Continual test mobilizations were occurring, 
 supplies were imported, coal reserves increased and rolling stock added. 
 Grain export was stopped {ib., 16-17, Kuhl, 66-67). 
 
 Peace Reviews and Strengthening of Fortresses. These were very 
 common. In the autumn of 191 3 General Joffre headed a mission to 
 St. Petersburg to examine her mihtary ef&ciency, and departing, 
 remarked, " The Russian Army is at this moment the mightiest in 
 the world " (Eggehng, 12-22). The troops around VUna and Warsaw 
 were presumed to concentrate against Germany, the Kiev forces against 
 Austria. Sukhomhnoff announced himself ready in 1914 (ib., 22). 
 
 Final Movements after Serajevo. Von Eggehng goes into great 
 detail of the eventful last week. He discusses the revelations also 
 of the SukhomlinofE's trial. As to actual movement to the German 
 frontier, Kuhl says that the plan carried out was that of 1912 (which 
 was captured during the war), of crossing the German borders without 
 declaration of war. " Our measures must in this connection be con- 
 cealed by apparent diplomatic negotiations." On the very first day 
 of August, that of Germany's declaration of war, " the border was 
 crossed in four places by enemy patrols" (Kuhl, 79-80). 
 
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