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 good man" of the XVIIIth century: 
 
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 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924027096076 
 
THE "GOOD MAN" OF THE 
 XVIII™ CENTURY 
 
RU3nm\riou,5e\^ 
 
THE "GOODMAN" OF 
 THE XVIII th CENTURY 
 
 A MONOGRAPH ON XVIII™ CEN- 
 TURY DIDACTIC LITERATURE 
 
 BY 
 
 CHARLES WHITTUCK, M.A. 
 
 RECTOR OF BEAR WOOD, BERKS 
 LATE FELLOW OF BRASENOSE COLLEGE, OXFORD 
 
 LONDON 
 GEORGE ALLEN, 156, CHARING CROSS ROAD 
 
 1901 
 
 All rights reserved 
 
 VC. 
 
Printed by Ballantvne, Hanson &■* Co. 
 At the Ballantyne Press 
 
The author desires gratefully to acknowledge the 
 help which this volume received during the earlier 
 stages of its preparation from the late Mr. F. H. 
 Peters, who, whilst not responsible for any part 
 of it, revised the preliminary studies for I., III., 
 and VII., besides assisting, both as contributor 
 and critic, in the translation of the selections from 
 Lessing's Nathan. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Place of "the Good Man" in XVIIIth 
 
 Century Literature i 
 
 II. ECLECTIC VIRTUE 
 The English Essay (The Spectator, 1711-1714) . 31 
 
 III. THE "GOOD MAN" HUMAN 
 
 The English Novel (Fielding). "Parson 
 
 Adams" in Joseph Andrews (1740) ... 67 
 
 IV. PERSONAL HOLINESS 
 
 "A Serious Call fro a Devout and Holy 
 
 Life," by William Law (1729) .... 93 
 
viii CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 V. ANTI-CANT 
 
 "Candide," by Voltaire (1759). "Rasselas," by 
 
 Samuel Johnson (1759) .... 135 
 
 VI. PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 
 
 "Lettres Persanes," by Montesquieu (1721). 
 "Citizen of the World," by Oliver Gold- 
 smith (1760) 181 
 
 VII. "ENLIGHTENMENT" 
 
 "Profession de foi du Vicaire Savoyard" 
 (Part of "fimile"), by J. J. Rousseau (1764). 
 " Nathan der Weise," by G. E. Lessing (1779) 233 
 
I 
 
 V 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 THE PLACE OF "THE GOOD MAN" IN 
 XVIHth CENTURY LITERATURE 
 
The personification of types of character 
 is one of the most marked features of 
 the literature of the XVIIIth century. 
 Alike in England, France, and Germany, 
 these personifications found favour with the 
 literary men of that age, indeed they are 
 of more frequent occurrence in general 
 literature than in books of philosophy. In 
 compositions of the most different kinds, 
 e.g. dramatic writings, novels and tales of 
 adventure, educational treatises and books 
 of devotion, recourse is constantly had to 
 the artificial creation of characters for the 
 purpose of illustrating principles. 
 
 Now the portrait which most interests 
 us in this collection is that of "the good 
 man." The latter sometimes appears simply 
 as good, sometimes as rather wise, or at 
 
4 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 all events as one in whose goodness wisdom 
 is the main ingredient. The favourite 
 English ideal took predominantly the first 
 of these two forms, whilst on the Continent 
 the characteristic bias was towards the 
 second. 
 
 This difference between the English and 
 Continental view was partly due to the 
 fact that the typical conception of "the 
 good man " on the Continent was a quasi- 
 revolutionary product, and was associated 
 with the current rationalism, whereas in 
 England this was not so, or was not so 
 to the same extent. Philosophical and 
 theological speculations obviously required 
 an intellectual rather than a simply and 
 purely ethical exponent. But besides this 
 reason for the difference, it must be re- 
 membered that the whole tendency of 
 thought in England at that time was 
 towards the representation of the individual 
 in preference to that of the type, and that 
 this influence connects itself with ethical 
 characterisation far more readily than with 
 
IN XVIIIth CENTURY LITERATURE 5 
 
 intellectual generalisation. The conception 
 of " the good man " arose out of the love 
 of the English for what is concrete, living, 
 and human; that of "the sage" or "wise 
 man " out of the love of abstraction which 
 was everywhere then gaining ground on 
 the Continent. 
 
 Yet the generic conception was the same 
 both in England and abroad, and even that 
 difference, the causes of which have been 
 above explained, may easily be exaggerated. 
 For the English mode of representation 
 often approximates to what we have de- 
 scribed as the Continental model, and in 
 foreign literatures we meet with similar 
 inconsistencies on the other side. There 
 is in short far more of likeness than there 
 is of difference between these two views. 
 Nor should we have anticipated that this 
 would be otherwise, considering the close 
 resemjhnce of sentiment and opinion in 
 the jMflfcases. Hence, what we have to 
 do is To show how the same general idea 
 was differently reflected in England and 
 
6 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 on the Continent, rather than to insist 
 on an antagonism of two distinct ideas. 
 Above all, it should be remembered that, 
 whilst the points of contact were many 
 and various, the divergence was simply 
 and solely due to the double fact that in 
 England there prevailed a less marked 
 religious alienation on the one hand, and 
 a more realistic literary treatment on the 
 other. 
 
 In all cases alike, these personifications 
 were prompted by a desire to make virtue 
 appear simple and to impart to morality 
 a common-sense complexion. The persons 
 portrayed are not as a rule the embodiments 
 of higher ideals with which it is thus sought 
 to familiarise men's minds. So far from 
 anything of this kind are they, that they 
 pointedly disclaim the possession of any 
 superior knowledge, whilst in matters of 
 conduct they are content to walk according 
 to the same rule of life which has been 
 followed by the good in all previous times. 
 Hence the object aimed at was not so 
 
IN X-VIIIth CENTURY LITERATURE 7 
 
 much edification as rather simplification, or 
 more truly, the former by means of the 
 latter. " There is nothing mysterious or 
 incomprehensible in the life of virtue ; " such 
 in nearly all these pattern instances is the 
 presupposition either expressed or implied. 
 " The good man " will, somehow or other, 
 find his way out of every difficulty, and bear 
 up under every trial. And he will do this 
 without asceticism, without "enthusiasm," 
 and in some cases, without deriving any 
 assistance from revealed religion. 
 
 And as "the good man" was himself one 
 who, whether by his superior penetration, or 
 by his good sense, or by his good Jieart, had 
 resolved life into its simplest elements, so 
 the surroundings in which he was commonly 
 depicted as flourishing, exhibited, or were 
 intended to exhibit, a similar simplicity. 
 The influence of what Mr. Ruskin calls 
 "the classical view of life" is apparent in 
 both cases, though, as he bids us observe, 
 conceived "in neither the Greek nor the 
 Roman spirit." " The good man " indeed 
 
8 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 is not more of an abstraction than is the 
 habitat assigned to him. Nay ! he is him- 
 self sometimes drawn with so much power 
 that we scarcely think of him as an abstrac- 
 tion until we endeavour to realise him in 
 relation to his surroundings. When, how- 
 ever, we make this endeavour, we usually 
 discover not only that there is no place for 
 the person, but also that there is no person 
 for the place. 
 
 In point of fact, the XVIIIth century 
 writers experienced the very greatest diffi- 
 culty in fitting "the good man" into the 
 "scene and circumstances in which his lot 
 was cast. The methods which they adopted 
 were chiefly of the following three kinds. 
 Either verisimilitude must be abandoned 
 altogether, or else the accessories of the 
 tale or drama must be derived from some 
 quarter of the world not much known, 
 and seen only through a haze of romance 
 (Egypt, Abyssinia, Persia, China), or else 
 finally, the sage must be allowed to appear 
 as a spectator rather than as an actor, and 
 
IN XVIIIth CENTURY LITERATURE 9 
 
 as standing detached from his environment 
 in lofty isolation. 
 
 The opinion has already been expressed 
 that "the good man" in his Continental 
 garb was a quasi-revolutionary product. Yet 
 such creations as Lessing's Nathan, and in 
 the main also Rousseau's Vicaire, belong 
 much more to the Aufklarung (Illumination) 
 than they do to the Revolution, and in re- 
 ference to the latter have even a conser- 
 vative side to them. For according to his 
 true conception, "the good man" of the 
 XVIIIth century was an eclectic epitome of 
 the ethical residue left over even after the 
 assaults of Rationalism had done their worst. 
 As such, he was not the inaugurator of a 
 new epoch, nor the originator of a new 
 gospel. He is rather to be regarded as 
 having incorporated in himself if not the 
 wisdom of the ages, yet at least all that part 
 of it which remained intact in the age of 
 reason. 
 
 Another mark by which these creations 
 were distinguished was their almost exclusive 
 
io THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 reference to the individual, and their failure 
 to take account of human nature under its 
 social aspects. " The good man " sprang 
 into existence ready made, and without any 
 apparent dependence on present influences 
 or past associations. This result was partly 
 necessitated by the then prevalent ignorance 
 of anthropology and ethnology, but was 
 perhaps even more due to an extravagantly 
 abstract view of life shared in common alike 
 by the philosophic and the vulgar. 
 
 Ideal representatives of contemporary ten- 
 dencies are of course the common stock of 
 literary characterisation at all times. In 
 particular, the initiation of great movements 
 of thought or of social life is usually pro- 
 ductive of a copious assortment of such 
 phenomena. Thus, there is a certain re- 
 semblance between these XVII Ith century 
 ideals and those representations of "the 
 wise man" which found favour with the 
 Greek philosophical schools of the first cen- 
 tury after they had been transplanted to 
 Rome. The similarity consists chiefly in 
 
IN XVIIIth CENTURY LITERATURE n 
 
 the following two points. In the first place, 
 the ideals in both cases were the outcome 
 of an attempt to exhibit the essentials of 
 religion and morality as independent of the 
 accretions of popular superstition. Secondly, 
 in both cases it was as an individual, rather 
 than in his social and political capacity, that 
 man was regarded. 
 
 On the other hand, the difference between 
 these two typical modes of idealisation is 
 fundamental. "In an ascetic severity the 
 aristocratical wise man sought the mental 
 independence which he could no longer find 
 in the institutions under which he had to 
 live. Philosophy in the first century was 
 accepted by the educated class in commuta- 
 tion for political freedom." * In this descrip- 
 tion there is very little to remind us of the 
 ideal of the XVIIIth century, except it be 
 by way of contrast. "The good man" as 
 then conceived (Goldsmith's " Vicar " not 
 excepted), far from being an ascetic, is as 
 often as not an easy-going sort of person 
 
 1 Mark Pattison. 
 
12 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 who indulges in self-reflection rather as an 
 outlet for his own moralising propensities 
 than by reason of his sense of the aggrava- 
 tion of life's miseries. 
 
 Nor was the "good man's" philosophy 
 accepted by him " in commutation for politi- 
 cal freedom." It is of course true that in 
 some countries at that epoch political rights 
 were in a state of relative suspension, and 
 it may also be admitted that during the 
 latter half of the century, the consciousness 
 of this fact made itself felt to some extent, 
 though not to a very great extent, in litera- 
 ture. On the whole, however, in the writ- 
 ings of this period, and especially in writings 
 of the class here referred to, there is not 
 only an almost exceptional remoteness from 
 any such considerations, but there is no sort 
 of reason to suppose that this attitude was 
 adopted as a refuge from the contemplation 
 of the crying evils of the time. Moreover, 
 aristocratic aloofness was not one of the 
 literary characteristics of the XVIIIth cen- 
 tury, though the public which literary men 
 
IN XVIIIth CENTURY LITERATURE 13 
 
 then addressed was no doubt a strictly 
 limited one both as to numbers and ideas. 
 
 In the XlXth century, the conception of 
 character has become much more complex, 
 and its personal embodiments in literature 
 much more many-sided. We need only 
 compare typical examples of personification 
 in the two cases, e.g. the exact reproduction 
 in Schiller's dramas of such abstractions as 
 Virtue, Freedom, Patriotism, with Brown- 
 ing's abhorrence of any like simple and easy 
 method. Or rather (for the personifying 
 tendency was perhaps after all more due 
 to Schiller's idiosyncrasy than to the times, 
 and indeed, as a literary fashion, belonged 
 not so much to his as to the preceding 
 generation), in order to appreciate the ad- 
 vance which has been made in this respect 
 during the last hundred years, we should 
 have to compare the abstract character- 
 isation of "the French XVIIth century 
 working on the age of Lessing " with the 
 XlXth century conception of character as the 
 concrete manifestation of an organic unity. 
 
14 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 Now, by observing the extent of this 
 difference, we may be led to form too de- 
 preciatory an estimate of the previous con- 
 ceptions. Yet European literature would 
 certainly be the poorer if these portraits of 
 ideal excellence were excised from its pages. 
 After all, they represent a real attempt to 
 exhibit the better and loftier side of human 
 nature in an adequate form. The life and 
 thought of those times can in no way be 
 more successfully vindicated from the charge 
 of meanness commonly levelled by critics 
 against the XVIIIth century, than by citing 
 from the classics of that much-abused age, 
 passages in which the glorification of virtue 
 finds expression through the mouth of the 
 ideally "good" or "wise" man. The style 
 in which such passages are written may 
 sometimes give offence by reason of its 
 rounded periods, in other cases by reason 
 of the turgidity due to its Gallic origin, but 
 it at least shows a genuine appreciation of 
 the dignity of its subject. 
 
 As for the limits within which in the 
 
IN XVIIIth CENTURY LITERATURE 15 
 
 XVIIIth century the treatment of this subject 
 was confined, it should be remembered not 
 only that any embodiment of virtue must 
 necessarily be limited by the moral and social 
 state of the world at the time being, but also 
 that this necessity is inherent in personal 
 characterisations even more than in the 
 representation of Utopian forms of society. 
 The materials which go to make up " the 
 vision of a city in the clouds," though 
 derived from contemporary facts and asso- 
 ciations, may be so poetically woven to- 
 gether as to suggest almost no idea of local 
 or temporal limitations. In the case of 
 an idealised person this is a more difficult 
 achievement, all the more so if the person is 
 exhibited with a view to the direct enforce- 
 ment of a principle. There is then great 
 danger either of resolving the person into an 
 abstraction, or else, on the other hand, of 
 obtruding the local and temporal elements 
 at the expense of those which are universal. 
 
 Hence, besides the fact that these repre- 
 sentations of character could not but have 
 
1 6 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 been relative to the age in which they were 
 produced, we require also to bear in mind 
 the further fact that they are representations, 
 the very nature of which is such that the 
 universalising process can only be applied to 
 them with great difficulty. 
 
 We have hitherto distinguished two types 
 of the "good man," the one literary, the 
 other philosophical ; the one ethical, the other 
 intellectual ; the one English, the other 
 foreign. We added that there is much in 
 common between these two conceptions, and 
 that in the representation of the one there 
 is often to be found an admixture of the 
 other. We must now, however, add a few 
 words more to what has been said on this 
 latter point, in order to convey an idea of 
 our sense of its importance. For the right 
 understanding of XVIIIth century thought 
 requires that, whilst distinguishing between 
 English and Continental tendencies, we 
 should yet not consider them wholly apart 
 from each other. This caution ought to 
 be superfluous, but it is unfortunately only 
 
IN XVIIIth CENTURY LITERATURE ij 
 
 too necessary. Certainly, when English 
 people talk (as they constantly are talking) 
 of the XVIIIth century, what they almost 
 invariably mean is, the state of life and 
 thought in England during that century. 
 And often, no doubt, when this limitation 
 is imposed it is strictly in point, the matter 
 referred to being one which has only, or 
 which has chiefly, to do with England. 
 
 In many cases, however, there is no such 
 justification. In such cases, the exclusively 
 English connotation attached to the term 
 XVIIIth century is in more than one sense 
 misleading. For not only is the right under- 
 standing of particular subjects or questions 
 thus frustrated, but the general character of 
 the period, owing to its being too narrowly 
 outlined, receives an inadequate represen- 
 tation. At all events the literature, and 
 especially the didactic literature, of that age, 
 appears very differently when it is regarded 
 from the more extended point of view. It 
 is then seen to be a literature which is not 
 more massive than it is incisive, not more 
 
 B 
 
1 8 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 stately than it is intellectually nimble. No 
 doubt, there have been plenty of good critics 
 in recent times who have treated XVIIIth 
 century literature thus comprehensively. 
 But the popularisation of some such more 
 enlightened treatment is still a desideratum, 
 and to contribute, however slightly, towards 
 this result, is one chief aim of the extracts 
 and comments contained in the present 
 volume. 
 
 Besides, however, that they are thus some 
 English and some foreign, these selections 
 have been chosen (as is indicated by the 
 sub-title of the volume) on account of their 
 more or less avowedly didactic character. 
 The author is especially anxious that this 
 qualification should be observed, in order 
 that it may be realised that the discussion 
 on which he is about to enter, so far from 
 being indefinitely general, is in reality 
 strictly limited. Our inquiry is not as to 
 what we may learn by studying the works 
 of XVIIIth century authors, but rather as 
 to what certain of those authors in certain 
 
IN XVIIIth CENTURY LITERATURE 19 
 
 of their works themselves desired that we 
 should learn from them. 
 
 There is happily no lack of matter avail- 
 able for the purposes of this discussion. 
 Whatever may be thought as to the tone 
 of its teaching, there can be no doubt that, 
 taken as a whole, the literature of the 
 XVIIIth century proposed to itself the 
 role of a teacher, and that its bias is to- 
 wards edification rather than towards the 
 pursuit either of abstract truth or of aesthetic 
 charm. In the following pages, however, 
 only those writings are brought under review 
 which are unmistakably thus characterised. 
 Where this aim is only to a comparatively 
 slight extent noticeable, that particular 
 branch of literary production is treated with 
 corresponding brevity. On the other hand, 
 where the didactic aim is more pronounced, 
 the investigation is confined within less 
 narrow limits. 
 
 A further restriction arises from the 
 fact that, with one exception (Lessing's 
 " Nathan "), the illustrative specimens are 
 
ao THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 selected exclusively from prose literature. 
 Not only would the inclusion of the poetry 
 of the XVIIIth century have been impossible 
 in a volume of moderate dimensions, but 
 it would have deprived the undertaking 
 of the unity of character which the author 
 believes he is not wrong in ascribing to 
 it in its present form. For the contention 
 here maintained is that throughout the 
 century didactic works in prose, resembling 
 those about to be described, formed a 
 distinct branch of literature, and one which 
 is highly characteristic of the age to which 
 it belongs. No doubt, the didactic side 
 of XVIIIth century poetry is not less 
 (in a sense it is perhaps more) worthy 
 of attention. But though in some respects 
 it would admit of a mode of handling 
 similar to that here adopted, in others it 
 would not do so. More particularly (to 
 mention only one consideration), the poetical 
 compositions of the period could scarcely 
 be appropriately, and certainly they could 
 not be exhaustively, analysed in connection 
 
IN XVIIIth CENTURY LITERATURE 21 
 
 with the character of an imaginary "good" 
 or " wise " man. 
 
 The main object of these studies is an 
 ethical one. Questions of literary criticism, 
 of theology and philosophy, of political and 
 social history, are touched upon only inci- 
 dentally and with a view to the elucidation 
 of the central thesis. The paramount point 
 to which attention is directed in each case, 
 has reference to the characteristics of the 
 ''good man" qua his goodness in each case. 
 On the other hand, the order in which 
 these cases are presented is for the most 
 part a chronological one, but is partly also 
 designed to exhibit the development of the 
 English or concrete, into the foreign or 
 abstract, types of goodness. 
 
 The XVIIIth century is here under- 
 stood as ending previously to the French 
 Revolution. Nor has it been thought 
 advisable to treat the state of society and 
 the march of events anterior to the re- 
 volutionary epoch as naturally and neces- 
 sarily leading up to the Revolution as its 
 result. 
 
22 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 There has been too much of this post koc 
 ergo propter hoc criticism indulged in by a 
 certain school of writers, indeed by writers 
 of more than one school, in recent times. 
 Doubtless, the French Revolution was not 
 brought about in a day ; doubtless, its pre- 
 disposing conditions were many and various, 
 and the effect ultimately produced was due 
 to causes which had been in operation not 
 only throughout the century, but also long 
 previously. Doubtless, too, the intellectual 
 revolution of the middle part of the century 
 was, to a greater or less extent, responsible 
 for the subsequent political revolution. It 
 is, however, much more difficult than is 
 commonly supposed to assign the effects 
 to their causes, and to prove to demonstra- 
 tion that what happened was just what 
 might have been expected to have happened 
 under the circumstances. In any case, 
 there is no reason for so constantly import- 
 ing into the consideration of a given period 
 reflections upon its final outcome. This 
 method of procedure, therefore, has been 
 as much as possible avoided. 
 
IN XVIIlTH CENTURY LITERATURE 23 
 
 The uniqueness of these XVIIIth century 
 teachers is to be found in the services 
 rendered by them as popular educators. 
 In this capacity, they acted sometimes as 
 moral reformers, sometimes as expounders 
 and interpreters, sometimes as sworn foes 
 to conventionalism and cant. To the theo- 
 logy and philosophy of their times they 
 stood severally in different relations, but 
 what distinguished them as a class was 
 their manner of adapting the "wisdom of 
 the wise" to popular uses. They were the 
 more easily able to do this inasmuch as the 
 professional teaching of that age was literary 
 rather than technical, and admitted there- 
 fore of being made intelligible to wider 
 circles without losing much in the process. 
 And • as they were sometimes more highly 
 gifted than were the divines and thinkers 
 to whom they acted as interpreters, so it 
 occasionally happened that they suggested 
 openings, and prepared the way for de- 
 velopments, which the divines and thinkers 
 had failed to perceive. In this way, as 
 
24 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 will appear from more than one instance 
 in the following pages, they now and again 
 saw, "as it were afar off," the tendencies 
 of European thought in later times. 
 
 There can indeed be no doubt as to the 
 extent of their influence, though the public 
 to whose education they devoted themselves, 
 was, of course, not the community at large, 
 but was confined to .the upper and upper 
 middle classes. The latter, in the XVIIIth 
 century, divested itself of its bourgeois 
 associations to an extent unparalleled in 
 its previous, and not hitherto equalled in 
 its subsequent, history. 
 
 Since then, the position of a teacher in 
 literature has been affected chiefly by two 
 influences — those, viz., of democracy and of 
 nationality respectively. 
 
 (i) Obviously, the effect of the first influ- 
 ence was, to widen the sphere of the teacher's 
 activity. The public to which writers now 
 address themselves is — or rather tends to 
 become — unlimited. And corresponding with 
 this enlarged sphere of the teacher's activity, 
 
IN XVIIIth CENTURY LITERATURE 25 
 
 are the enhanced opportunities of men of 
 letters when they appear nowadays in the 
 teacher's garb. Didactic, however, in the 
 old sense it is no longer possible for litera- 
 ture to be. Let this not be misunderstood. 
 There is, of course, a place in these days 
 (never more so) for didactic agencies, such 
 e.g. as the spoken word in the pulpit and 
 on the platform and in the lecture-room, 
 and the written word in popular books and 
 magazines and in the higher class journals. 
 But as regards literature, i.e. literature of a 
 quality commensurate with that of the works 
 presently to be noticed in this monograph, 
 it remains true that, though it may and 
 should have a didactic character, this cannot 
 now be what it was in the XVIIIth century. 
 .The function of a teacher who uses litera- 
 ture as his vehicle in a democracy, would 
 seem to be rather an indirect one ; he has 
 to influence those who will influence others. 
 He cannot work on society at large (as the 
 XVIIIth century essay is.t:, or letter-writer, 
 could do on his incomparably smaller entour- 
 age), by face to face presentation. He must 
 
26 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 write for the instruction and edification of 
 those who will then take care that what 
 he says is apprehended more widely — that 
 great army of popular educators of whom 
 mention was just now made. And he is 
 under the necessity of doing this not only 
 on account of the vast dimensions of modern 
 society, but also on account of the vastly 
 more abundant stores of knowledge which a 
 teacher, worthy of the name, is now required 
 to assimilate. 
 
 If it should seem that this is to dispense 
 with direct experience of life and personal 
 sympathy with the masses, as parts of the 
 teacher's qualification for his office, the 
 answer is, that those conditions are as essen- 
 tial for the exercise of influence through the 
 medium of discipleship as they are for the 
 exercise of direct influence. In either case 
 the object is the same, viz. " the increase of 
 the body unto the edifying of itself in love." 
 
 (2) As regards the second factor, owing 
 to which the position of public teachers in 
 literature has been recently affected, we 
 must be very brief. Undoubtedly, however, 
 
IN XVIIIth CENTURY LITERATURE 27 
 
 the European revulsion in favour of national 
 ideals has in this matter, as in so many 
 others, produced a marked effect. 
 
 The general trend of opinion (at all events 
 during the Aufklarung period, and to some 
 extent previously) was, in the XVIIIth 
 century, not national but cosmopolitan. 
 Much of the humanitarianism of the age 
 was allied with this latter tendency ; 
 there was keen delight experienced in the 
 discovery of the prevalence of the same 
 conditions of life all the world over ; inter- 
 national rivalries were discountenanced, and 
 war, except for purely defensive purposes, 
 was reprobated. Religion was treated from 
 the same point of view. Natural religion 
 found favour largely on account of its sup- 
 posed comprehensiveness. A similar feeling 
 found expression not only in didactic litera- 
 ture, but also in literature more generally, 
 as likewise in many of the current concep- 
 tions of morality and law. 
 
 On the other hand, it cannot be denied 
 that in many respects the Nationality Move- 
 ment of our own times has inclined popular 
 
28 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 teachers (not perhaps necessarily, but still as 
 a matter of fact), in an opposite direction. 
 
 Possibly, it may be found when this latter 
 movement has run its course, that its opera- 
 tion is not so antagonistic to cosmopolitan- 
 ism as appearances thus far have sometimes 
 seemed to indicate. It may be that the ami- 
 able intellectualism of our predecessors was 
 in its way as unsubstantial and unrealisable 
 as the recrudescence of national feeling is in 
 its way often partial and one-sided. It will 
 be for posterity to judge. Meantime, there 
 can be nothing more interesting than to 
 study and compare the two views as repre- 
 sented by their best exponents in the two 
 periods respectively. 
 
 Notwithstanding their cosmopolitanism, 
 these writers do not appear to have been 
 cheered to any great extent by the prospect 
 of new and better things to come in the 
 ages yet unborn. According to not a few 
 of them, man's happiness had gone from 
 him when he emerged from the state of 
 nature. Or else, it was held that man's 
 hopes of happiness were destined to be 
 
IN XVIIIth CENTURY LITERATURE 29 
 
 realised only in the world beyond, and 
 after his present life had run its course. 
 Others, whilst more sanguine in their ex- 
 pectations, were yet not any more inclined 
 to anticipate the gradual amelioration of 
 the human lot. Even at its best, and when 
 (as e.g. with the English essayists) it was 
 professedly cheerful, the outlook which dis- 
 played itself to these writers was not an 
 inspiring one. None the less, their pre- 
 vailing tone is strong and healthy. They 
 evince no desire to fold the hands and 
 "to sleep before the evening." Their de- 
 jection is not to be mistaken for despond- 
 ency, nor is even their want of hope the 
 same thing as hopelessness. 
 
 In short, such literature as is here repre- 
 sented, though it may not have much balm 
 to apply to man's wounds, at least teaches 
 him to act bravely, to endure steadfastly, 
 and to discharge faithfully the duties of 
 his life's calling. Above all, it is perfectly 
 honest, so honest that its resolute refusal 
 to accept quack remedies, even when it is 
 
30 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 under every temptation to do so, strikes 
 us as not merely pathetic, but also and 
 much more as positively invigorating. 
 
 As we look back over the history of the 
 century which has just now ended, it may 
 be well for us to ask ourselves whether, 
 and if so how far, the darkness in which, to 
 the XVIIIth century observer, life seemed 
 to be enveloped, has since lifted ? and what 
 reasons there may or may not be from our 
 present ethical and religious point of view 
 for cherishing brighter hopes as regards 
 the future? All, however, that this work 
 attempts to do is to give a clue to the 
 thoughts of the men of that age. The 
 comparison of those thoughts with the ideals 
 of goodness and wisdom now prevalent, 
 has advisedly been left to be undertaken 
 by the reader. Nevertheless, what is here 
 written will not have fully served its purpose, 
 unless it stimulates inquiry in this direction, 
 and facilitates the process of comparing to- 
 gether the XVIIIth and XlXth centuries. 
 
II 
 
 ECLECTIC VIRTUE 
 
 THE ENGLISH ESSAY 
 The Spectator (1711-1714) 
 
II 
 
 At starting, we are met by the question as 
 to which of the characters in the Spectator 
 is to be regarded as par excellence that 
 of the "good man." The answer is that, 
 though there are good men enough drawn 
 for us in these essays (including one or two 
 such who stand out above the rest), yet the 
 character of the "good man" is here not so 
 much actually presented as rather suggested. 
 Not that this character can be discovered 
 merely by making a collection of the points 
 of resemblance in respect to goodness 
 between the several portraits exhibited. 
 Rather, in order to perceive what the Spec- 
 tator wishes us to understand about the 
 ideally "good man," we must pay attention 
 not less to what it says as regards the 
 defects than to what it says as regards the 
 
34 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 merits of those good men whom it describes. 
 For the insistance on these defects is not 
 merely humorous, but serves also a serious 
 purpose, by intimating the nature of the 
 ideal desiderated and of the wants which 
 its satisfaction presupposes as supplied. 
 
 In works of fiction, especially in those of 
 the XVIIIth century, personal limitations 
 usually appear as a theme for ridiculous, 
 and sometimes for farcical, representations. 
 In the Spectator, on the other hand, their 
 treatment is never of the latter kind, whilst 
 even when it is such as to excite ridicule, 
 this is seldom its sole or even its chief aim. 
 The Essayists do not so much make fun 
 of people as reveal to us that the funny side 
 of human nature is one of its most essen- 
 tial characteristics. Their conception of 
 personal limitations is therefore not of the 
 comical kind, but rather of the suggestive, 
 allusive, and quaintly humorous kind. The 
 defects and excesses of good men (Sir Roger 
 is described as "something of a humorist 
 because his virtues as well as imperfections, 
 
ECLECTIC VIRTUE 35 
 
 are as it were tinged by a certain extrava- 
 gance which makes them particularly his, 
 and distinguishes them from those of other 
 men ") are by them regarded as compensated 
 for partly by these same good men's own 
 recognition of them, partly by the supply 
 in their surroundings of that in which they 
 are themselves lacking. We are by these 
 means enabled, if not actually to complete 
 the picture, yet at all events to under- 
 stand in what respects the outlines thus 
 roughly sketched require to be filled in. 
 
 Hence, the reader is put in possession 
 of the character of the "good man" as he 
 stands portrayed in the Spectator, not all at 
 once, but as the result of impressions com- 
 municated from many different sides. Nor 
 is the unity of this creation an effect of 
 conscious design, for, not to mention that 
 they were not all written by the same hand, 
 these essays follow each other in no sys- 
 tematic order, except that occasionally some 
 two or three of them are grouped together 
 as bearing on the same subject. None the 
 
36 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 less, it is probable that no serial production 
 has ever been more like-minded in all its 
 parts. And it is in regard to the determina- 
 tion of the character of the " good man " that 
 the thread of connection running through 
 the essays is more especially noticeable. 
 
 Some idea of this diversified unity of the 
 "good man's" character as unfolded in the 
 Spectator, may be gathered from the follow- 
 ing extracts, which, however, in order 
 adequately to embody what is in fact the 
 underlying spirit of the whole series of 
 essays, would not admit of being confined 
 within the limits of our present space. 
 
 In the first place, then, it is insisted that 
 the "good man's" character must be one 
 throughout, by which what is meant is that 
 its moral and intellectual constituents must 
 be exhibited in harmonious concert, and in 
 due subordination to each other. Reason 
 should govern passion, and under morals 
 should be included not only morality (in the 
 narrow sense) but also manners. " I lay it 
 down therefore as a rule, that the whole man 
 
ECLECTIC VIRTUE 37 
 
 is to move together ; that every action of 
 any importance, is to have a prospect of 
 public good ; and that the general tendency 
 of our indifferent actions should be agree- 
 able to the dictates of reason, of religion, of 
 good breeding ; without this, a man ... is 
 hopping instead of walking, he is not in his 
 entire and proper motion. To polish our 
 understandings and neglect our manners is 
 of all things the most inexcusable. I know 
 of no evil under the sun so great as the 
 abuse of the understanding. There is hardly 
 that person to be found, who is not more 
 concerned for the reputation of wit and sense 
 than honesty and virtue. This unhappy 
 affectation of being wise rather than honest, 
 witty than good-natured, is the source of 
 most of the ill habits of life." " The folly 
 of admitting wit and learning as merits in 
 themselves, without considering the appli- 
 cation of them." 
 
 It follows from this that there must be no 
 one-sidedness. The latter, under whatever 
 form it may appear, always meets with 
 
38 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 chastisement ; whilst, on the other hand, 
 the famous club to which the Spectator 
 and his friends belong " is very luckily com- 
 posed of such persons as are engaged in 
 different ways of life, and deputed as it 
 were out of the most conspicuous classes 
 of mankind." Let us then next proceed 
 to give some instances which will serve to 
 illustrate both the rebukes that are here 
 administered to one-sidedness, as also the 
 supply of the deficiencies under which it 
 is shown to labour. 
 
 Let our first instance be that of the cor- 
 rection and supplementation of old English 
 country life, and of Sir Roger as its central 
 figure. The charms of such a life are here 
 not more vividly than they are lovingly 
 depicted. Yet is the essayist by no means 
 unaware of the reverse side of the picture. 
 Not only do rural delights not appear to 
 him as a subject for unmixed eulogy, but 
 he sometimes exhibits rather ruthlessly the 
 drawbacks which are involved in their 
 enjoyment. These candid criticisms are, no 
 
ECLECTIC VIRTUE 39 
 
 doubt, often conceived in a spjfft of playful 
 irony, the aim in such cases being to indicate 
 the unappreciativeness of the town-bred 
 point of view from which the Spectator 
 himself writes. A more serious purpose 
 than this, however, is not infrequently 
 apparent, as, for instance, in the strictures 
 upon country life which proceed from Sir 
 Andrew Freeport. 
 
 Thus, a country gentleman's "charity to 
 the poor and hospitality amongst his neigh- 
 bours " may mean only that " so many hogs- 
 heads are drunk, and so many peasants 
 are made merry at his charge." Many such 
 gentlemen have " to turn out of their 
 seats to make way for such new masters 
 as have been more exact in their accounts 
 than themselves " . . . " their estates dipped 
 and eating out with usury. They preserve 
 this canker rather than it shall be said they 
 are men of fewer hundreds a year than they 
 have been commonly reputed." Similarly, 
 the character of Will Wimble is introduced 
 as a specimen case, "the case of many a 
 
4 o THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 younger brother of a great family who had 
 rather see their children starve like gentle- 
 men than thrive on a profession or trade 
 beneath their quality." Again, the bitterness 
 and bigotry of party spirit are more aggra- 
 vated in the country than in the town : 
 " The Knight is a much stronger Tory in 
 the country than in town." Lastly, country 
 people are remarkable for their suspicious- 
 ness. " It is indeed high time for me to 
 leave the country, since I find the whole 
 neighbourhood begin to grow very inquisi- 
 tive after my name and character." 
 
 Yet, as a lover of solitude and of con- 
 templation, the Spectator takes great delight 
 in his walks abroad when " the rooks and 
 crows that rest upon the tops of the aged 
 elms seem to be cawing in another region," 
 as a student of old-fashioned ways and 
 patriarchal customs he is " always very 
 well pleased with a country Sunday," on 
 moral and sanitary grounds he sets a high 
 value on the country as giving scope for 
 the enjoyment of bodily exercise, and 
 
ECLECTIC VIRTUE 41 
 
 especially of field sports, "the preservation 
 of health, and keeping all the organs of the 
 soul in a condition to execute her orders." 
 
 Hence it appears, that in each sphere of 
 life we may find the correction of some other. 
 " Business and pleasure, labour and rest, re- 
 commend each other ; they take their turns 
 with so quick a vicissitude, that neither be- 
 comes a habit, or takes possession of the 
 whole man ; nor is it possible that he should 
 be surfeited with either." 
 
 Our next, and only remaining, illustration 
 as regards this point, is supplied by the 
 Spectators protest against one - sidedness 
 under the form of pedantry. 
 
 " A man who has been brought up amongst 
 books, and is able to talk of nothing else, is 
 a very indifferent companion, and what we 
 call a pedant. But methinks we should 
 enlarge the title, and give it to every one 
 that does not know how to think out of 
 his profession and particular way of life." 
 
 " Every age a man passes through, and 
 way of life he engages in, has some particular 
 
42 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 vice or imperfection naturally cleaving to it 
 which will require his nicest care to avoid." 
 
 " The Physician and Divine are often 
 heard to dictate in private companies with 
 the same authority which they exercise over 
 their patients and disciples ; while the lawyer 
 is putting cases and raising matter for dis- 
 putation out of every matter that occurs." 
 
 The first great point, then, to be borne 
 in mind is, that the "good man" must be 
 a man, and not a mere section or fragment 
 of a man. 
 
 We come now to consider on what basis 
 this diversified unity of the "good man's" 
 character ultimately rests. Whence is its 
 inspiration derived? 
 
 Now a complete and well - ordered life 
 such as is here kept in view, suggests at 
 first sight, that its unity is due to an artistic 
 motive, or as we ought, perhaps, rather to 
 say (since artistic ideals were not con- 
 genial to XVIIIth century thought, which, 
 indeed, was too strictly practical to be 
 thus affected to any great extent), due to 
 
ECLECTIC VIRTUE 43 
 
 a desire to reduce life to fixed principles of 
 good manners, good taste, good breeding. 
 
 Such an interpretation, however, though 
 superficially plausible, is very far from being 
 correct. Nay, rightly considered, it is the 
 Spectator's rejection of this motive-principle, 
 which gives to his conception of the "good 
 man's" character its specifically religious 
 stamp. For there is much, not only in 
 the general view taken in these essays, but 
 also in the view taken in them of religion, 
 which recommends itself to the "faultily 
 faultless" way of thinking referred to, and 
 it is therefore all the more significant that 
 goodness is not here in the main idealised, 
 still less impersonated, under this aspect. 
 
 We shall do well, on these grounds, to dis- 
 tinguish those cases in which the Essayist 
 regards religion thus merely conventionally, 
 from others in which the view taken ex- 
 tends beyond any such considerations. 
 
 The first of these two cases, is perhaps 
 best illustrated in Papers 185 and 201. In 
 those papers (and in many others), we meet 
 
44 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 with the familiar XVIIIth century repre- 
 sentation of religion as a form of rational 
 piety equally opposed to enthusiasm on the 
 one hand (the special reference is to dissent, 
 "most of the sects that fall short of the 
 Church of England have in them strong 
 tinctures of enthusiasm"), and to supersti- 
 tion (which finds its best illustration in 
 Romanism, the latter being here described 
 as "one huge overgrown body of childish 
 and idle superstitions"), on the other. 
 
 Obviously, then, this mode of conception 
 offers an opportunity for the synthesis alike 
 of religion and of life in accordance with 
 the rules of conventional propriety. 
 
 But though these canons of good taste 
 are frequently uppermost in Mr. Spectator's 
 mind, it is not in this direction that we must 
 look for his deepest and most mature con- 
 viction. These essays in short are written 
 from a religious, and in some cases from a 
 devotional, point of view. Let us then next 
 examine, and at the same time illustrate, the 
 Essayist's appreciation of religion, regarded 
 
ECLECTIC VIRTUE 45 
 
 as a regulative principle in the affairs of 
 life. 
 
 According to the Spectator, the first and 
 most essential thing to be borne in mind is, 
 the indispensable necessity of religion, and 
 the impossibility of constructing a synthesis 
 of experience on any other but a religious 
 basis. The position here maintained is es- 
 sentially different from that which is typical 
 of the bulk of XVIIIth century literature. 
 According to the generality of writers at 
 that time, the necessity of religion arises 
 chiefly, if not solely, from the fact that it 
 would be a reflection on the Divine justice, 
 if somewhere and somewhen the good man 
 was not rewarded and the bad man was not 
 punished. This doctrine, however, is so far 
 from bringing the whole of life under a 
 religious principle, that it is not applied 
 except in regard to the ultimate issue of 
 men's actions : it is not conceived of as 
 being required to enter into the forma- 
 tion of character throughout its whole 
 length and breadth, as inviting men to the 
 
46 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 contemplation of their mission and destiny, 
 and as necessitating watchfulness, prayer, 
 and self-discipline. 
 
 It may, no doubt, be urged that all this 
 only amounts to saying that the Spectator 
 is in part a devotional work, whereas the 
 works Which are thus brought into com- 
 parison with it, are not of this description. 
 Let that be granted. Yet the best of 
 these papers do not cease to be literature 
 when they treat of sacred subjects, not 
 even when they treat of the most sacred 
 of all subjects, as e.g. in Steele's "Good 
 Friday Meditations" (No. 356). Usually, 
 however, in such cases they preserve their 
 literary character, because they do not 
 concern themselves with the arcana of 
 religious devotion, but enlarge either on 
 the presuppositions from which Christianity 
 starts, e.g. the nothingness, transitoriness, 
 vanity, of human life considered under its 
 purely temporal aspect, or else, on some 
 strictly practical thesis, e.g. the efficacy and 
 helpfulness of the Christian religion, both 
 
ECLECTIC VIRTUE 47 
 
 as a principle of guidance and as a source 
 of hope. 
 
 The need for religion and for its appli- 
 cation to the affairs of life, may be thus 
 briefly illustrated. 
 
 Religion is indispensable because " a man 
 cannot be perfect in his scheme of morality 
 who does not strengthen and support it 
 with that of the Christian faith." 
 
 Undoubtedly in this statement is con- 
 tained the most characteristic expression of 
 the Spectator's own belief in the necessity 
 of religion. It indeed appears frequently— 
 and that not least of all in the paper (No. 
 459) from which the above statement is 
 extracted (the pre-eminence of morality over 
 faith being there vindicated on six several 
 grounds) — that the function of religion, ac- 
 cording to the Essayist, consists first and 
 foremost in the satisfaction of man's moral 
 needs. Nay, it is more than once argued, 
 that the moral effects of Christianity would 
 remain even if its theology were disproved, 
 e.g. "It is impossible for those who have 
 
48 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 ears to hear and eyes to see . . . not to 
 be convinced by the received articles of 
 the Christian Religion." ..." But were 
 it possible for anything in the Christian 
 faith to be erroneous, I can find no ill 
 consequences in adhering to it. The great 
 points of the Incarnation and sufferings of 
 our Saviour produce naturally such habits 
 of virtue in the mind of man that, I say, 
 supposing it were possible for us to be 
 mistaken in them, ... no other system of 
 religion could so effectually contribute to 
 the heightening of morality." 
 
 Such being the function of religion in 
 reference to morality, there are three ways 
 in which it may be discharged. 1 
 
 First by "explaining and carrying to 
 greater heights several points of morality." 
 
 This is explained in another paper (No. 
 213) to mean, that actions which are morally 
 indifferent {i.e. neither right nor wrong) 
 may be utilised by religion for higher 
 
 1 i.e. as stated in Paper 459, which very correctly 
 epitomises the Spectator's views on the whole question. 
 
ECLECTIC VIRTUE 49 
 
 purposes. "If instead of prescribing to 
 ourselves indifferent actions as duties, we 
 apply a good intention to all our most 
 indifferent actions, we make our very exist- 
 ence one continued act of obedience, we 
 turn our diversions and amusements to 
 our eternal advantage, and are pleasing 
 Him (Whom we are made to please) in 
 all the circumstances and occurrences of 
 life." . . . "This holy officiousness" ... is 
 recommended in that "uncommon precept," 
 " whether we eat or drink or whatsoever 
 we do." The language here used shows 
 that what the Essayist has in view is 
 essentially a religious, or rather a Christian, 
 enlargement of the sphere of morality. 
 
 " Secondly, by furnishing new and stronger 
 motives to enforce the practice of morality." 
 
 An instance of this may be found in 
 No. 257, the last of three consecutive papers 
 on " Fame." In that paper, after reason- 
 ing against the pursuit of fame on strictly 
 moral and practical grounds, the Essayist 
 remembers that what he has so far said is 
 
So THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 "self-evident to those who are versed in 
 speculations of morality," for which cause 
 he "proceeds to a point of the same nature 
 which may open to us a more uncommon 
 field of speculation," understanding under 
 this last head that "it is the greatest folly 
 to seek the praise or approbation of any 
 being besides the Supreme ; and that for 
 these two reasons, because no other being 
 can make a right judgment of us, and be- 
 cause we can procure no considerable benefit 
 or advantage from the esteem of any other 
 being." These two propositions are in what 
 follows both most amply and most beauti- 
 fully expounded. All that concerns us here, 
 however, is that in this instance we have 
 not merely an extension and consequent 
 heightening of morality by means of religion 
 (as in the first case), but also "a new and 
 stronger motive applied to the enforcement 
 of morality." 
 
 "Thirdly, by giving us more amiable 
 ideas of the Supreme Being, more endear- 
 ing notions of one another, and a true state 
 
ECLECTIC VIRTUE 51 
 
 of ourselves both in regard to the grandeur 
 and vileness of our natures." 
 
 To illustrate, these points severally, would 
 carry us too far. In the following pas- 
 sages, however, we may find indications of 
 the Essayist's meaning. 
 
 (a) " There is still another method which 
 is more persuasive than any of the former, 
 and that is an habitual adoration of the 
 Supreme Being, as well in constant acts of 
 mental worship as in outward forms. The 
 devout man does not only believe, but feels 
 there is a Deity ; he has actual sensations 
 of Him. His experience concurs with his 
 reason ; he sees Him more and more in all 
 his intercourse with Him, and even in this 
 life almost loses his faith in conviction. . . . 
 Faith and devotion naturally grow in the 
 mind of every reasonable man, who sees the 
 impressions of Divine power and wisdom 
 in every object on which he casts his eye." 
 
 [b) " Every particular faculty is capable of 
 being employed on a very great variety of 
 objects . . . the understanding, for example, 
 
52 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 the memory likewise. . . . The happiness of 
 a soul will be adequate to its nature. . . . 
 The happiness is to be the happiness of the 
 whole man. . . . The whole soul is happy 
 in the pleasure which arises from any of its 
 particular acts. . . . Seeing, then, that the 
 soul has many different faculties, . . . and 
 . . . considering that the happiness of an- 
 other world is to be the happiness of the 
 whole man, . . . who can doubt that there 
 is an infinite variety in those pleasures we 
 are speaking of ; and that this fulness of joy 
 will be made up of all these pleasures which 
 the nature of the soul is capable of receiv- 
 ing? . . . Revelation very much confirms 
 this notion under the different views which 
 it gives us of our future happiness. In the 
 description of the throne of God it repre- 
 sents to us all those objects which are 
 able to gratify the senses and; imagination, 
 . . . the raptures of devotion, of Divine 
 love, the pleasure of conversing with our 
 Blessed Saviour, with an innumerable host 
 of angels, and with the spirits of just men 
 
ECLECTIC VIRTUE 53 
 
 made perfect, . . . hierarchies or govern- 
 ments, ... a variety of joys, ... a grati- 
 fication of the soul in its different faculties." 
 
 (c) "If I may be allowed to mention a 
 more serious expedient for the alleviating 
 of absence, I shall take notice of one which 
 I have known two persons practise, who 
 joined religion to that elegance of senti- 
 ments with which the passion of love 
 generally inspires its votaries. This was 
 at the return of such an hour, to offer up 
 a certain prayer for each other which they 
 had agreed upon before their parting. The 
 husband . . . has often told me that he 
 could not have supported an absence of 
 three years without this expedient." 
 
 From all of which instances it appears, 
 that the Spectators religion is intended to 
 touch life at every point and to provide 
 at once a stimulus and a satisfaction to the 
 soul's various promptings. So far from any 
 masterpiece of art being capable of being 
 arrived at as the result of our handling 
 of experience, we are here informed that 
 
54 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 we live in this world in a state of proba- 
 tion, that " now we " do indeed " see through 
 a glass darkly," and that in short the whole 
 of what meets the eye during the course 
 of our journey through this world, sinks 
 into insignificance in comparison with. the 
 illimitable background of possibilities which 
 await their fulfilment in a world beyond. 
 
 Of course, in all this there is nothing 
 new. The old moralities are taken for 
 granted, the old religion is taken for 
 granted, and then it is shown how these 
 two classes of subject-matter stand related 
 to each other. But before we find fault 
 with the Essayists on account of their 
 apparent commonplaceness in this respect, 
 let us try and understand what it implies. 
 We may explain it as due to "that old- 
 world sentiment based on the feelings of 
 hope and awe which may be described as 
 the religion of men of letters (as Sir Thomas 
 Browne has his ' Religion of the Physician ') 
 — religion as understood by the soberer 
 men of letters in the last century, Addison, 
 
ECLECTIC VIRTUE 55 
 
 Gray, and Johnson ; by Jane Austen and 
 Thackeray later. A highway of feeling 
 developed largely by constant intercourse 
 with the great things of literature, and ex- 
 tended in its turn to those matters greater 
 still, this religion lives, in the main retro- 
 spectively, in a system of received senti- 
 ments and beliefs ; received like those great 
 things of literature and art in the first in- 
 stance, on the authority of a long tradition, 
 in the course of which they have linked 
 themselves in a thousand complex ways to 
 the conditions of human life, and no more 
 questioned now than the "feeling one 
 keeps by one of the greatness — say of 
 Shakspere." * 
 
 But Addison's religion was perhaps in- 
 spired as much by his love of what is 
 concrete as by his love of what is ancient. 
 As in other cases his thought upon life 
 appears as only one degree removed from 
 life itself, and indeed as accompanying the 
 actual experience of life in the form of a 
 
 1 Walter Pater's "Appreciations," p. 123. 
 
56 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 running commentary, so when he expresses 
 himself on religious subjects, he seldom 
 expatiates in the world of ideas without 
 recurring at intervals to some specific ob- 
 servance of customary religion. Abstract 
 speculation on sacred things was not at all 
 to his taste. Rather in dealing with reli- 
 gion, as in dealing with everything else, his 
 reflection is distilled from his experience 
 with such faithfulness that it retains the 
 flavour of its original, whilst it reproduces 
 its original in the form of a thought-picture. 
 Naturally, under these circumstances, the 
 result is apparent, and to some extent actual, 
 commonplaceness. Still, we should have 
 to understand this term * in a very different 
 sense from that in which it is usually under- 
 stood, before it could with justice be ap- 
 plied to the Essayists' religious teaching. 
 
 1 It was this quality that Matthew Arnold imputed to 
 Addison more genera'ly. To much the same effect, we find 
 R. L. Stevenson saying : " By the way, I have tried to read 
 the Spectator, which they all say I imitate, and — it's very 
 wrong of me, I know — but I can't. It's all very fine, you 
 know, and all that, but it's vapid" (Letters, vol. i. p. 161). 
 
ECLECTIC VIRTUE 57 
 
 But to proceed. 
 
 Though the relation subsisting between 
 morality and religion, as here conceived, 
 recognises the Christian revelation as a 
 revelation and therefore as breaking new 
 ground, almost as much friendliness is ex- 
 hibited by the Essayists as by the free- 
 thinkers contemporary with them towards 
 non-Christian religions, and especially to- 
 wards the religions of classical antiquity. 
 Addison's own explanation of his conduct 
 in this matter (which was, however, pro- 
 bably as much due to the spirit of the 
 age as to his own design) is as follows : — 
 "When I employ myself upon a paper of 
 morality, I generally consider how I may 
 recommend the particular virtue which I 
 treat of by the precepts or examples of 
 the ancient heathens ; by that means if 
 possible to shame those who have greater 
 advantages of knowing their duty, and 
 therefore greater obligations to perform 
 it, into a better course of life ; besides 
 that many among us are unreasonably 
 
58 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 disposed to give a more fair hearing to 
 a Pagan philosopher, than to a Christian 
 writer." 
 
 One further point remains to be noticed. 
 
 Notwithstanding the seriousness of the 
 Spectators religious position, its outcome 
 is decidedly optimistic. This is so at all 
 events in a practical, if not in a philoso- 
 phical, sense. Nothing pleases the Essayist 
 more than to dilate on religion as predis- 
 posing to cheerfulness, nor are there any 
 persons whom he more dislikes than those 
 who " abstain from all appearances of mirth 
 and pleasantry . . . who, by a natural un- 
 cheerfulness of heart, mistaken notions of 
 piety, or weakness of understanding . . . 
 give up themselves a prey to grief and 
 melancholy." 
 
 " The true spirit of religion cheers as 
 well as composes the soul ; it banishes 
 indeed all levity of behaviour, all vicious 
 and dissolute mirth, but in exchange fills 
 the mind with a perpetual serenity, un- 
 interrupted cheerfulness and an habitual 
 
ECLECTIC VIRTUE 59 
 
 inclination to please others, as well as to 
 be pleased in itself." 
 
 It may perhaps be thought that in thus 
 attempting to exhibit and to estimate the 
 Spectators views of life and of the world, the 
 particular subject of the present inquiry has 
 been too much left out of account. That 
 subject is "the good man." Very possibly 
 it may appear, that though these essays con- 
 tain several distinct character-sketches, there 
 is no such single portrait recognisable in 
 them as that which upon our theory is re- 
 quired, and if so, it may be objected that 
 we have been criticising the character of 
 the essays and not that of any " good man" 
 therein represented. 
 
 Yet probably no one who is at all familiar 
 with the Essayists will be inclined to doubt, 
 that their whole work has for its result (how- 
 ever little this may have been intended), to 
 impress upon us the several aspects under 
 which life presents itself to a supposed " good 
 man." It is this personal element, e.g., which 
 colours the essays on their more discursive 
 
60 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 and argumentative side. The subjects chosen 
 in such cases, are seldom if ever discussed 
 from an abstract point of view ; their treat- 
 ment is interesting to us chiefly as indicating 
 the spirit or temper in which a good man 
 would regard them. Considered as con- 
 tributions to the solution of the questions 
 raised, Mr. Spectator's reasonings on the 
 great problems and mysteries of life, death, 
 and immortality, are for the most part in- 
 effective and, but for the personal point of 
 view intervening, would very little repay 
 our attention. Nor would these disserta- 
 tions be redeemed even by the extreme 
 purity and elegance of their diction, if they 
 were not the outcome of a recognisably 
 characteristic and self-consistent state of 
 mind, admirable per se rather than on 
 account of its alleged justifications. In 
 the lighter essays, on the other hand, what 
 strikes us is not so much the homogene- 
 ousness of the Spectators point of view, 
 as rather its ready power of adaptation to 
 individual instances. Yet even here, the 
 
ECLECTIC VIRTUE 61 
 
 real critic of manners and fashions is after 
 all the " good man," and the criticisms them- 
 selves derive no small part of their point 
 and piquancy from this consideration. 
 
 But though the Spectators "good man" 
 is thus throughout implied, there is also a 
 sense in which it must be allowed that 
 these Essayists do not believe in the "good 
 man " at all. For this latter idealisation, 
 as understood by some of the "heathen 
 philosophers" (i.e. "a chimerical wise man, 
 exempt from passion and pain, and pro- 
 nounced all-sufficient "), we are told (No. 
 634), "when divested of the glare of human 
 philosophy that surrounds it, signifies no 
 more than that a good and wise man 
 should so arm himself with patience, as not 
 to yield tamely to the violence of passion 
 and pain ; that he should learn so to sup- 
 press and contract his desires as to have 
 few wants ; and that he should cherish so 
 many virtues in his soul, as to have a per- 
 petual source of pleasure in himself." And 
 he adds, that the much more practicable 
 
62 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 requirement of the Christian religion is, 
 "that after having framed the best idea we 
 are able of the Divine nature, it should be 
 our next care to conform ourselves to it 
 as far as our imperfections will admit." 
 
 In these essays indeed it is very strongly 
 insisted, that "man's essential perfection is 
 but very little." " There is none who in 
 strictness can be called a virtuous man. 
 Every one has in him a natural alloy, though 
 one may be fuller of dross than another 
 . . . the most perfect man has vices 
 enough to draw down punishments on his 
 head, and to justify Providence in regard 
 to any miseries that may befall him." The 
 turn which this gives to the reflections of 
 the wise man (i.e. wise in the Spectator's 
 sense) is to the effect that he is "humbled 
 by the sense of his own infirmities," and 
 that he " considers what he wants, whilst 
 the fool considers what he abounds in." 
 
 Two other points are noticeable in the 
 "good man's" character as thus interpreted. 
 One is, that not only will he be purified 
 
ECLECTIC VIRTUE 63 
 
 and disciplined through suffering, but also 
 his manner of meeting his sufferings will 
 be a much more vital element in his good- 
 ness than his manner of shining in himself, 
 or of outshining others, by his actions. 
 " A gentleman where I happened to be last 
 night, fell into a discourse which I thought 
 showed a good discerning in him ; he took 
 notice that whenever men have looked into 
 their heart for the idea of true excellency 
 in human nature, they have found it to 
 consist in suffering after a right manner 
 and with a good grace ... in our condi- 
 tion we have no conception of superlative 
 excellence, or heroism, but as it is sur- 
 rounded with a shade of distress." It 
 appears to the Essayist that even on the 
 stage "the instruction and moral are much 
 finer where a man, who is virtuous in the 
 main of his character, falls into distress . . . 
 than when he is represented as happy and 
 triumphant. Such an example corrects the 
 insolence of human nature, softens the mind 
 of the beholder with sentiments of pity and 
 
64 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 compassion, comforts him under his own 
 private afflictions, and teaches him not to 
 judge of men's virtues by their successes." 
 
 The second distinguishing feature is that 
 though " where opportunities and inclina- 
 tions are given to the same person, we 
 sometimes see sublime instances of virtue 
 which so dazzle our imaginations that we 
 look with scorn on all which in lower scenes 
 of life we may ourselves be able to prac- 
 tise," yet that "this is a vicious way of 
 thinking, and it bears some spice of roman- 
 tic madness, for a man to imagine that he 
 must grow ambitious, or seek adventures, to 
 be able to do great actions. It is in every 
 man's power in the world, who is above 
 mere poverty, not only to do things worthy 
 but heroic. . . . Men of public spirit differ 
 rather in their circumstances than their 
 virtue ; and the man who does all he can 
 in a low station, is more a hero than he 
 who does not do any worthy action he is 
 able to accomplish in a great one." 
 
 These several positions, though often 
 
ECLECTIC VIRTUE 65 
 
 supported by instances derived from Greek 
 and Latin literature, are in the main based 
 on the teaching of Christianity, and usually 
 appear in a context appropriate to them 
 under that aspect. The " good man " of 
 the Spectator is in fact penetrated through 
 and through by Christian associations, and 
 it is, as thus understood, that he is to be 
 regarded as supplying to these essays their 
 distinctive inspiration. In virtue of this 
 fact, the Spectator serves to conduct the 
 reader from the secular to the sacred 
 literature of the period, its natural supple- 
 ment, for our present purpose, being the 
 more strictly devotional treatment of the 
 "good man's" character by XVIIIth cen- 
 tury writers. To this latter we shall shortly 
 proceed. Previous, however, to doing so, 
 we shall have to consider another and very 
 different class of literary production, which 
 also is usually regarded as having grown 
 out of the English essay, and that is the 
 English novel. 
 
Ill 
 
 THE "GOOD MAN" HUMAN 
 
 THE ENGLISH NOVEL (Fielding) 
 ; Parson Adams " in Joseph Andrews. Published in 1 740 
 
Ill 
 
 " The rise of the great schools of English 
 novelists — with Richardson and Fielding at 
 their head — was rendered possible by the 
 essayists and party writers of the reign of 
 Anne, by Addison and Steele, by Swift and 
 Defoe." * " The leaflets composing the 
 Tatler and the Spectator are written from 
 the standpoint of a great novelist, and 
 abound in material which might have been 
 wrought into a great novel." 2 
 
 These remarks are in the spirit of a 
 similar one made by Macaulay to the effect 
 that " if Addison had written a novel on an 
 extensive plan, it would have been superior 
 to any that we possess." 
 
 And probably the opinion thus expressed 
 is a sound one, though it would be well not 
 
 1 Raleigh, "The English Novel," p. 109. 2 Ibid. 
 
 69 -^ 
 
70 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 to be too absolute on the subject," having 
 regard to the essential difference between 
 the essay and the novel, and to the fact that 
 in our own days good essayists have not 
 always realised the expectations formed of 
 them as novelists. 
 
 There can, however, be no doubt as to 
 the likeness between the English essay and 
 the English novel of the XVIIIth century 
 in so far as regards such considerations as 
 that they both "accepted the dictatorship of 
 fact and adopted the language of common 
 life ; " also, that they both of them proceeded 
 from men who, in marked contrast to their 
 predecessors, ' ' loved the individual better 
 than the type ; " and finally, that both of 
 them are conspicuous for their humour. 
 
 In passing from the essay to the novel, 
 it might appear that, as we are concerned 
 only with the more didactic characters of 
 XVIIIth century literature, so we should 
 necessarily have recourse to Richardson for 
 the representative "good man" or good 
 men of this chapter. For it may be said of 
 
HUMAN 71 
 
 the Richardsonian novel not less than of 
 the essay (though in a different sense), that 
 it exhibits a direct tendency to edification : 
 indeed one of Richardson's works has been 
 described as "a delightful nursery of virtue," 
 whilst he himself was declared by Dr. 
 Johnson "to have taught the passions to 
 move at the command of virtue." 
 
 But though Richardson is didactic enough, 
 he is not human enough for our present 
 purpose, which is (as our chapter heading 
 indicates) to find the "good man" portrayed 
 as a human being. It is solely from this 
 latter point of view that the English novel 
 will now be discussed. We shall confine 
 ourselves to the concrete or human side of 
 this school of fiction, which is, however, by 
 far its most important side. 
 
 In order to succeed in this object, we 
 must turn to that writer whose spirit has 
 never been better delineated than in the 
 following terms : "No enchanted light of 
 old romance ... no tender regret for past 
 forms of society or passionate aspirations for 
 
72 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 the future . . . insight into the motives of 
 contemporaries ; a power of seeing things as 
 they are ; sympathy with homely virtues ; 
 contempt for shams and hypocrites . . . the 
 strong healthy common-sense and stubborn 
 honesty of the sound English nature." 1 
 
 Now the special reference of this appre- 
 ciation is to Fielding. Fielding's represen- 
 tative character, indeed, is now generally 
 admitted. It is emphasised in the con- 
 cluding words of the chapter from which the 
 above passage is extracted: "A complete 
 criticism of the English artistic literature of 
 the XVIIIth century would place Fielding 
 as the centre, and measure the complete- 
 ness of other representatives pretty much 
 as they recede from or approach to his 
 work. Others, as Addison and Goldsmith, 
 may show finer qualities of workmanship 
 and more delicate sentiment ; but Fielding 
 more than any one gives the essential — the 
 very form and pressure of the time." 
 
 1 Leslie Stephen, "English Thought in the XVIIIth 
 Century," vol. ii. p. 380. 
 
HUMAN 73 
 
 As then Fielding is admittedly thus 
 representative, we will proceed to consider 
 the " good man's " character as reflected 
 in Fielding's novels. 
 
 But before entering on this attempt, we 
 would remark on the significance of the 
 mere fact, that there is a place found for , 
 "the good man," and even for the idealised / 
 "good man," in literature of this description. 
 For that literature, as we all know, " was 
 more careful to keep its heroes human than 
 to keep them heroic," whereas, in repre- 
 sentations of " the good man " there could 
 not but be an exhibition of heroism, or at 
 all events of exceptional virtue. It seems 
 to us that the hold which the conception 
 of this ideal obtained in the XVII Ith 
 century, is in no way more strikingly illus- 
 trated than by the fact in question, from 
 which it appears, that even writers the least 
 inclined to idealism were none the less 
 constrained to a certain extent to idealise 
 good men. 
 
 At all events, in the literature which was 
 
74 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 " most careful to keep its heroes human," 
 these " good men " occasionally make their 
 appearance. They do so sometimes in- 
 consistently, i.e. they are not in keeping 
 with the prosai-comi-epos (Fielding's own 
 self-applied term) in which they take 
 part. Sometimes, however, this character 
 is exhibited as at once frankly human and 
 yet as none the less heroic, or rather, as a 
 combination of heroism and saintliness. 
 
 The first of these two alternatives finds 
 its best illustration in the Squire Allworthy 
 of Fielding's "Tom Jones." Of this 
 character Mr. Austin Dobson has truly 
 remarked, that he " remains always a little 
 stiff and cold in comparison with the 
 'veined humanity' around him. We feel 
 of him as of another impeccable personage 
 that we cannot breathe in that fine air, 
 that pure serenity of perfect light. . . . 
 Allworthy is a type rather than a character." 
 
 Perhaps, however, it would be nearer 
 the mark to say that Allworthy's character 
 is unsatisfactory, not so much because it 
 
HUMAN 75 
 
 is thus shadowy, as because it is a blend 
 of what is in part substance with what is 
 almost if not altogether shadow. In other 
 words, the two parts which he sustains, 
 that of an immaculate and imperturbable 
 philosopher, and that of a most estimable 
 but somewhat spiritless country gentle- 
 man, do not cohere. They may not be 
 necessarily inconsistent, but they are so 
 as here presented. In his local character, 
 Allworthy is a "good man" of the upright, 
 benevolent, amiable, and gullible type, of 
 that type, in short, which, in XVIIIth 
 century literature, was such an especial 
 favourite. England had not yet become, 
 though (as has been shown in Seeley's 
 "Expansion of England") she was then 
 in process of becoming, "the commercial 
 State " par excellence. Hence an irreducible 
 minimum of " cuteness " in the affairs of 
 life, was not yet regarded as a condition in 
 the absence of which goodness is apt to 
 degenerate into flabbiness. Moreover, for 
 literary purposes, a foil is well known to 
 
76 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 be invaluable. Admirable play can be 
 made (as Thackeray and Dickens after- 
 wards found under like circumstances) by 
 contrasting the guilelessness of an Allworthy 
 with the duplicity of the hypocrites and 
 knaves by whom he is surrounded. Thus 
 considered, Allworthy, though not a very 
 strongly drawn character, is a fairly suc- 
 cessful one, and it is therefore, as thus 
 considered, that we have spoken of this 
 character as not altogether wanting in 
 substance. 
 
 But Allworthy is also an XVIIIth 
 century philosopher, or at all events, a 
 moralist. This side of the Squire's charac- 
 ter, however, has inconsistencies peculiar 
 to itself, in virtue of which it appears, 
 not merely in relation to the other side, 
 but also intrinsically, as mere shadow. 
 Thus, it is clear that by associating both 
 Thwackum and Square with Allworthy (the 
 one representing conventional orthodoxy, 
 the other Deism), Fielding intended to re- 
 present his ideal sage as susceptible in 
 
HUMAN 77 
 
 part to both these influences, a fact which, 
 besides being implied generally, is in one 
 passage expressly indicated." 1 
 
 On the other hand, Allworthy occasionally 
 comes before us as a devout Christian, and 
 even, in an ironical sense, as a quasi- 
 mystic. It is on this account that the 
 author makes a playful apology to the 
 reader on his behalf, as when he says 
 on his opening page, "This loss" (that 
 of his wife i.e.) " he bore like a man 
 of sense and constancy, though, it must 
 be confessed, he would often talk a little 
 whimsically on this head : for he some- 
 times said he looked on himself as still 
 married, and considered his wife as only 
 gone a little before him, a journey which 
 he should most certainly sooner or later, 
 
 1 Square (in reference to the smallness, as he considers 
 it, of his own legacy from the apparently moribund All- 
 worthy) : " I know to what it is owing ; it proceeds from 
 those narrow principles which you " (i.e. Thwackum) " have 
 been so long endeavouring to infuse into him, in contempt 
 of everything which is great and noble." ..." I wish," cries 
 Thwackum, in a rage, " I wish for the sake of his own soul 
 your damnable doctrines have not perverted his faith. ..." 
 
78 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 take after her, and that he had not the 
 least doubt of meeting her again in a place 
 where he should never part with her more 
 — sentiments for which his sense was 
 arraigned by one part of his neighbours, 
 his religion by a second, and his sincerity 
 by a third." 
 
 Of course, if Allworthy's character had 
 been more vividly outlined, there might 
 have been a resulting unity, notwithstand- 
 ing that he is thus inconsistently presented. 
 As it is, his chief value, regarded from 
 the ethical and speculative point of view, 
 consists in the fact that he is the embodi- 
 ment of distinct and contrasted tendencies 
 which, however, in the XVIIIth century 
 often coexisted. 
 
 Needless to say, the allusion above made 
 to another and more felicitous rendering 
 of the "good man's" character a la Field- 
 ing, was intended to refer to Parson 
 Adams. 
 
 Now in the XVllIth century, there was 
 a preconceived model to which the literary 
 
HUMAN 79 
 
 treatment of clergymen and things clerical 
 was more or less expected to conform. 
 
 The parson must at all events appear as 
 an object of ridicule, he must be easily 
 imposed upon, must have but a scanty pit- 
 tance on which to depend, must cringe to 
 his patron or else suffer for not doing so, 
 must be either an ignoramus, or else, if 
 learned, a mere pedant. 
 
 These conventional attributes of the 
 clerical life are many of them exhibited by 
 Adams in a semi-burlesque form, so much 
 so indeed that his experiences not infre- 
 quently remind us of the rough-and-tumble 
 adventures of Mr. Pickwick. 
 
 On ' the strength of this fact it may be 
 urged that, inasmuch as he is a laughing- 
 stock and does not command respect, Adams 
 cannot be a really good man. Nor are we 
 concerned to claim for one who so con- 
 stantly serves as a butt, the character of a 
 moral exemplar. It should be remembered, 
 however, in the first place, that virtue (or, 
 at least, • didactic virtue) could not have 
 
80 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 been conceived, much less have been re- 
 presented, by a writer of Fielding's stamp 
 on any other terms. The sublime, if it 
 exists at all in the world, must necessarily 
 be ridiculous. That, from Fielding's point 
 of view, is an axiom which there is no 
 disputing. 
 
 But there is a second and much more 
 important thing to be borne in mind, and 
 that is, the complete identification of the 
 humour of this character with its pathos. 
 .Adams is indeed a masterpiece not only of 
 literary invention but also of ethical in- 
 sight, nor is there any other example of 
 the merses pro/undo pulchrior evenit kind, 
 which is at once so strikingly original and 
 so exquisitely touching. The "Vicar of 
 Wakefield" is a prose idyll, the charm of 
 which lies in its mingled simplicity and 
 sweetness. On Adams' own ground, how- 
 ever (and the Vicar when he appears as 
 aimlessly wandering about towards the 
 close of the story, somewhat resembles 
 him), Goldsmith's creation is of vastly 
 
HUMAN 81 
 
 inferior workmanship. For neither is the 
 contact with experience in the latter case 
 at all comparable with the many-sided pic- 
 ture presented in the former, nor does the 
 camaraderie of Adams, his friendship with 
 all mankind, find more than a pale reflec- 
 tion in the similar characteristics of Dr. 
 Primrose. 
 
 A firm and sincere believer himself, 
 Adams' "own opinion hath yet always 
 been that a virtuous and good Turk, or 
 Heathen, are more acceptable in the sight 
 of their Creator than a vicious and wicked 
 Christian, though his faith was as perfectly 
 orthodox as St. Paul's himself." Correctness 
 of belief is indeed much less his object than 
 purity of life. At the same time, he is no 
 veiled rationalist, nor even a Tillotsonian 
 Churchman impressed with the desirability 
 of satisfying the scruples of rationalism. 
 Adams, in fact, goes as far in the way of 
 belief as it was possible in the XVIIIth 
 century for a man to be represented as going 
 by any but a purely devotional writer, such 
 
8 2 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 e.g. as William Law. Yet, the importance 
 which he attaches to the practical side of 
 Christianity, no doubt, to a large extent de- 
 termines his view of its other sides. Thus, 
 with regard to the life here, the foremost 
 position is occupied by the "doctrine of 
 good works " ; with regard to the life here- 
 after, by the "doctrine of future rewards 
 and punishments." The former tenet is 
 brought into strong relief not only in 
 the passage above quoted, but constantly 
 throughout the whole work. It is sufficient 
 here to quote the Parson's criticism (which 
 is independently of great interest) on the 
 preaching of Whitfield : — 
 
 "When he began to call nonsense and 
 enthusiasm to his aid, and set up the detest- 
 able doctrine of faith against good works, I 
 was his friend no longer; for surely that 
 doctrine was coined in hell, and one would 
 think none but the devil himself could have 
 the confidence to preach it. For can any- 
 thing be more derogatory to the honour 
 of God, than for men to imagine that the 
 
HUMAN 83 
 
 ill- wise Being will hereafter say to the good 
 ind virtuous, ' Notwithstanding the purity 
 >f thy life, notwithstanding that constant 
 ule of virtue and goodness in which you 
 valked upon earth, still as thou didst not 
 )elieve everything in the true orthodox 
 nanner, thy want of faith shall condemn 
 hee ? ' Or on the other side, can any doc- 
 rine have a more pernicious influence on 
 iociety than a persuasion, that it will be a 
 rood plea for the villain at the last day : 
 Lord, it is true, I never obeyed one of Thy 
 :ommands, yet punish me not, for I be- 
 ieve them all ? '" 
 
 Of scarcely less importance than the 
 loctrine of good works in Adams' view, 
 s the doctrine of future retribution. This 
 ikewise appears from many passages, of 
 vhich the following is perhaps as good a 
 specimen as can be found : — 
 
 "'Why,' says Adams very gravely, 'do 
 rou not believe in another world ? ' To 
 vhich the host answered, 'Yes, he was 
 10 atheist.' 'And you believe you have 
 
84 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 an immortal soul?' cries Adams. He an- 
 swered, 'God forbid he should not.' 'And 
 heaven and hell?' said the Parson. The 
 host then bid him not to profane, for 
 those were things not to be mentioned 
 nor thought of but in church. Adams 
 asked him, why he went to church if what 
 he learned there had no influence on his 
 conduct in life ? ' I go to church,' answered 
 the host, 'to say my prayers and be- 
 have godly.' 'And dost not thou,' cried 
 Adams, 'believe what thou hearest at 
 church?' 'Most part of it, master,' re- 
 turned the host. 'And dost not thou then 
 tremble,' cried Adams, 'at the thought of 
 eternal punishment ? ' 'As for that, master,' 
 said he, ' I never once thought about it. 
 But what signifies talking about matters so 
 far off? The mug is out, shall I draw 
 another ? ' " 
 
 Passing from the sphere of belief to that 
 of conduct, what strikes us in Adams is, on 
 the one hand, his freedom from restraint, 
 his disregard of clerical propriety, his love 
 
HUMAN 85 
 
 of social, and especially of convivial, inter- 
 course — in short, his enjoyment of life ; on 
 the other hand, and not less, the strictness 
 of many of his views, the unworldliness of 
 his disposition, the loftiness of his aims. 
 
 Adams' easy, ddbonnaire nature, as evi- 
 denced by his pipes and ale, is probably 
 his best known characteristic, and stands 
 therefore in no need of illustration. On the 
 other hand, attention is sometimes diverted 
 from the fact that the Parson's view of 
 life was in its essentials not only simple, 
 but also, within certain limits, strict. Of 
 this the following quotations may serve to 
 remind us : — 
 
 On the duty of resignation and submis- 
 sion. — " You are too much inclined to passion, 
 child, and have set your affections so abso- 
 lutely on this young woman, that if God re- 
 quired her at your hands, I fear you would 
 reluctantly part with her. Now, believe 
 me, no Christian ought to set his heart on 
 any person or thing in this world, but that, 
 whenever it shall be required or taken 
 
86 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 from him in any manner by Divine Provi- 
 dence, he may be agreeable, peaceably, 
 quietly, and contentedly, to resign it." And 
 be it remarked, that though this somewhat 
 over-wrought sentiment is immediately after- 
 wards toned down by the announcement 
 of Adams' own utter collapse on his being 
 made acquainted that his youngest son was 
 drowned, yet that the comfort administered 
 to the Parson on this occasion by his faith- 
 ful Joseph, is said to have been largely 
 derived from the Parson's own discourses 
 both in private and public, "for he was a 
 great enemy to the passions, and preached 
 nothing more than the conquest of them 
 by reason and grace." 
 
 On the luxury of the Established Church. 
 — ■" I do not by the flourishing estate of the 
 Church understand the palaces, equipages, 
 dress, furniture, rich dainties, and vast for- 
 tunes of her ministers. Surely those things, 
 which savour so strongly of this world, be- 
 come not the servants of One who pro- 
 fessed His kingdom was not of this world." 
 
HUMAN 87 
 
 On serving God rather than man. — 
 " Madam," answered Adams, " I know not 
 what your ladyship means by the terms 
 master and service. I am in the service 
 of a Master who will never discard me for 
 doing my duty . . . whilst my conscience is 
 pure, I shall never fear what man can do 
 unto me." 
 
 Theatrical performances. — " There is no- 
 thing but heathenism to be learned from 
 plays. ... I never heard of any plays fit 
 for a Christian to read, but ' Cato ' and ' The 
 Conscious Lovers.' " 
 
 With regard to Adams' views more gene- 
 rally, we may remark that, like those of 
 Fielding's contemporaries, and still more like 
 those of his immediate successors, they 
 incline strongly to a belief in the superior 
 innocence and happiness of a life lived " far 
 from the madding crowd." The spectacle of 
 the private and domestic bliss enjoyed by 
 Mr. Wilson (that blase man of the world who 
 has exhausted all the possibilities of experi- 
 ence which town life has to offer), provokes 
 
88 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 Adams to the remark that " this was the 
 manner in which the people had lived in the 
 golden age." The same preference appears 
 when (speaking of Wilson) Adams says, 
 " Believe me, child, all that gentleman's mis- 
 fortune arose from his being educated at a 
 public school," a thesis which he then pro- 
 ceeds to defend on the ground that, "if 
 great schools are little societies where a boy 
 of any observation may see in epitome 
 what he will afterwards find in the world at 
 large" (as is objected to him by Andrews), 
 Hinc ilia lachrimce, for that very reason. 
 I prefer a private school, where boys may 
 be kept in innocence and ignorance, for 
 according to that fine passage in the play 
 of ' Cato,' the only English tragedy I have 
 ever read, 
 
 ' If knowledge of the world must make men villains, 
 May Juba ever live in ignorance.'" 
 • • . ... 
 
 The function discharged by these charac- 
 ter-sketches is not merely that of envisaging 
 certain phenomena in a lifelike shape (for 
 
HUMAN 89 
 
 which indeed the drama is better suited 
 than the novel), but also that of throwing 
 light on the nature of men's moral ideals. 
 The net result of Fielding's contributions to 
 our knowledge in this direction, so far as 
 concerns our present subject, appears to be 
 as follows : — 
 
 The "good man " is neither of the ancient, 
 nor of the mediaeval, nor of any of the modern, 
 types of perfection. Though not particularly 
 squeamish as regards other people, he does 
 not himself swerve from the path of virtue, 
 which latter, however, he pursues sponta- 
 neously and without effort. Yet though in 
 these respects the "good man" appears as 
 a child of nature, he is not thereby saved, 
 as it might be supposed that he would be 
 (for true naturalness is or ought to be the 
 best of all safeguards against any such re- 
 sult), from making himself ridiculous. Nor 
 is he gifted with insight enough to detect, 
 nor with strength enough to correct, evil in 
 his surroundings. 
 
 In some cases he is liable to make 
 
90 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 great mistakes in his judgments, and is 
 seldom, if ever, sufficiently on the look- 
 out for charlatanry and imposture. From 
 the many awkward dilemmas in which he 
 comes to be placed owing to this cause, 
 he must escape as he best can, nor in ordi- 
 nary cases must he expect to be exempted 
 from the inconveniences thus occasioned. 
 Where, however, he is brought face to 
 face with graver dangers and his ruin or 
 disgrace appears inevitable, he usually 
 comes off victorious. In his contemplation 
 of human life, he is more moved by men's 
 miseries than by any other consideration 
 affecting them. His pity and sympathy 
 on these grounds form in themselves attri- 
 butes of his goodness, without his being 
 thus to any great extent prompted either 
 to the investigation of preventable calami- 
 ties or to reflections on men's adversities 
 as due to their own fault. 
 
 In seeming contrast to the "good man's" 
 tenderness, yet in reality as its other side, 
 is his scorn. The chief exciting cause of 
 
HUMAN 91 
 
 this latter, is the spectacle of hypocrisy, 
 meanness, dissimulation. On the other hand, 
 the weaknesses of human nature seldom 
 meet with chastisement at his hands. Nor, 
 though absolutely fearless, is he much given 
 to rebuking men's sins of pride. He may 
 no doubt do this where cruelty and oppres- 
 sion are in question ; but he does not make 
 war on pride of power and position, nor 
 on wickedness in high places. It is indeed 
 important to remember that our author's 
 " good man " nourished previous to the 
 French Revolution and went out of the 
 world (Fielding himself died in 1754) two 
 years before William Godwin came into it. 
 
 Finally, at those times when the " good 
 man" is seen at his best, the inwardness of 
 his disposition is unmistakably due to the 
 influence of Christianity. Occasionally, we 
 may discern a first-hand and original impres- 
 sion received from Christ Himself, indeed 
 the character of Parson Adams cannot but 
 have been due largely to inspiration from 
 this source. But though the pattern of the 
 
92 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 " good man's " life is in great measure 
 modelled on these lines, he has no sense 
 for Christianity as a view of the Universe, 
 whilst even as regards the life of man, he 
 values it chiefly in relation to the moral 
 conduct of the individual, i.e. as a persua- 
 sive to virtue and as a deterrent from vice. 
 It is an inaccurate mode of statement, how- 
 ever, to say that Fielding's " good man " is 
 insensible to all doctrinal influences, since 
 these latter are at all events to some extent 
 involved in the above-mentioned considera- 
 tions. Nor is this same "good man" either 
 consciously or otherwise a Deist, though in 
 some cases, as in that of Allworthy, he may 
 not regard leanings in this latter direction 
 with any marked abhorrence. 
 
IV 
 
 PERSONAL HOLINESS 
 
 "A SERIOUS CALL TO A DEVOUT AND 
 HOLY LIFE" 
 
 By William Law. Published in 1729 
 
IV 
 
 As the Spectator is in the first place 
 a literary, and only secondarily a religious, 
 work; so in Law's "Serious Call" this 
 order is inverted. In the latter work, how- 
 ever, the subordination was of course in- 
 tended to be incomparably more thorough- 
 going. For not merely is the " Serious 
 Call" a book of religious devotion, but it 
 eschews everything which is not service- 
 able to this end. We may even say that 
 this volume is not more remarkable for its 
 soul-stirring appeal than it is for its close 
 adherence to its subject. 
 
 Such being the case, it may not unreason- 
 ably be required that the "Serious Call" 
 should be discussed by us exclusively from 
 its author's own point of view. 
 
 Now if in what follows, we do not 
 
 95 
 
96 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 altogether comply with this demand, this 
 will not be because we do not in great 
 measure recognise its justice, but because 
 there is at any rate one feature of this 
 book in regard to which it seems to us 
 that there is an excuse for our not doing 
 so. In so speaking, what we refer to is, 
 Law's character - sketches. The latter, 
 though by their author designed to conduce, 
 not less than any other part of his work, 
 to the advancement of religion, yet suggest 
 reflections which are not only religious but 
 also literary and ethical. These sketches 
 are indeed many of them very similar to 
 some of those drawn for us ^in the Spec- 
 tator, similar i.e.\ not to the recurrent 
 portraits of the members of the club, but 
 to the more fugitive of such creations, e.g. 
 the characters of Cinna and Gloriana in 
 Paper 206, Polycarpus in 280, Emilia 
 and Honoria in 302, and Sombrius in 
 494. In the last-named case, the likeness 
 to one of Law's impersonations is almost 
 startling. 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 97 
 
 Law is described by Gibbon (whose father 
 had been at one time his pupil, and whose 
 aunt was his life-long friend) as "the most 
 agreeable religious writer of his day." This 
 encomium may no doubt have had partly 
 in view Law's general style of writing, which 
 is the most apt that could have been chosen 
 for his own particular object, besides being 
 of great merit independently. And perhaps 
 it is as well that this fact should be stated, 
 in order that it may not seem to be implied 
 by our previous remarks that, because in the 
 case before us the writer's aim was not a 
 literary [one, he was therefore wanting in 
 literary qualifications. But probably what 
 the historian saw to admire in Law's writings 
 was not only his style, but also his employ- 
 ment of fictitious characters for purposes of 
 illustration. At all events, it is in virtue 
 of our author's skill and success in this 
 department, that Gibbon's language will 
 seem to a modern reader to be more appro- 
 priately applied to him than on any other 
 ground. 
 
 G 
 
98 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 What then was Law's conception of an 
 ideally good man ? 
 
 The ideal in this case is, of course, a much 
 more determinately Christian . one than was 
 that of the essayists. That the latter could 
 not dispense with the Christian view is 
 no doubt true, just as this is also true, 
 though in a less marked degree, of the 
 novelists. But the essayists were not theo- 
 logians, nor was it any part of their aim 
 to interpret the loose and vague notions 
 of popular orthodoxy in a more exact sense. 
 They cared for Christianity chiefly because 
 life appeared to them to have a much en- 
 hanced value if it was set in a Christian 
 framework. The Christian religion was to 
 them a great addition, an ornament (the 
 word is their own), an envisagement of 
 the totality of existence under a sublime 
 aspect, as well as a support to the " good 
 man's " ■ hopes, of which he stands sorely 
 in need. 
 
 Law, however, (the point does not need 
 labouring) was a much more definitely 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 99 
 
 religious writer. We are not on this account 
 to be understood as praising him at the 
 expense of the essayists. The ideals were 
 different, and it is only in order to indicate 
 that fact that they are here contrasted. 
 
 Now the two views which run more or 
 less through all Law's writing (the first pre- 
 dominating in his earlier, the second in his 
 later productions) may be distinguished re- 
 spectively as hortative and mystical. But 
 matters of doctrine are not in either case, 
 nor in a writer thus characterised should we 
 have expected that they would have been, 
 very prominently brought forward. Hence, 
 though no one would for a moment suppose 
 that Law was indifferent to such matters, the 
 precise nature and extent of their influence 
 on his teaching — alike practical and mystical 
 — may easily escape notice. 
 
 It therefore becomes important to know, 
 in what this more definitely Christian view 
 consists. And this seems to be all the more 
 required in Law's case, because his position 
 is in some respects different, not only from 
 
ioo THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 that of the typical XVIIIth century man 
 of letters, but also from that of the typical 
 XVIIIth century dogmatist. 
 
 The central principle of Law's theology 
 and the manner of its application to the life 
 of the Christian, are perhaps nowhere better 
 or more clearly stated than in the seventeenth 
 chapter of the " Serious Call." The pas- 
 sage must necessarily here be abbreviated, 
 but in order to arrive at a full understanding 
 of its meaning, the reader is recommended 
 to study it in its entirety. 
 
 "The Christian's great conquest over 
 the world, is all contained in the mystery 
 of Christ on the Cross. . . . The state of 
 Christianity implieth nothing else but abso- 
 lute conformity to that spirit which Christ 
 showed in the mysterious sacrifice of Him- 
 self upon the Cross. Every man therefore 
 is only so far a Christian as he partakes of 
 this spirit of Christ . . . To have a true 
 idea of Christianity, we must not consider 
 our blessed Lord as suffering, in our stead, 
 but as our representative, acting in our name, 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 101 
 
 and with such particular merit, as to make 
 our joining with Him acceptable unto God 
 ... we are to suffer, to be crucified, to die, 
 and rise with Christ; or else, His cruci- 
 fixion, death, and resurrection will profit us 
 nothing. The necessity of this conformity 
 to all that Christ did, and suffered upon 
 our account, is very plain from the whole 
 tenor of Scripture. 
 
 "First — as to His sufferings, this is the 
 only condition of our being saved by them, 
 ' If we suffer with Him, we shall also reign 
 with Him.' " 
 
 " Secondly — as to His crucifixion, ' Know- 
 ing this, that our old man is crucified with 
 Him,' &c. (Rom. vi. 6). Here, you see, 
 Christ is not crucified in our stead ; but 
 unless our old man be really crucified with 
 Him, the Cross of Christ will profit us 
 nothing." 
 
 " Thirdly — as to the death of Christ the 
 condition is this : ' If we be dead with Christ, 
 we believe that we shall also live with Him.' 
 If therefore Christ be dead alone, if we are 
 
102 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 not dead with Him, we are as sure from 
 this Scripture, that we shall not live with 
 Him." 
 
 "Lastly — as to the resurrection of Christ, 
 the Scripture showeth us how we are to 
 partake of the benefit of it : ' If ye be risen 
 with Christ, seek those things which are 
 above, where Christ sitteth on the right 
 hand of God' (Col. iii. i). . . . All true 
 believers conforming to the sufferings, 
 crucifixion, death, and resurrection of Christ, 
 live no longer after the spirit and temper 
 of this world, but their life is hid with 
 Christ in God." 
 
 " This is the state of separation from 
 the world to which all orders of Christians 
 are called." 
 
 These words, inasmuch as they embody 
 the sum and substance of Law's whole 
 teaching, may also be otherwise regarded 
 as representing his ideal of aspiration and 
 endeavour. His "good man," however 
 variously portrayed in other respects, is 
 always the same in so far as that he always 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 103 
 
 aims at satisfying the above-mentioned 
 requirements. 
 
 This ideal enters into the character- 
 sketches of the "Serious Call" both posi- 
 tively and negatively, being in the former 
 case the object which the characters de- 
 picted are represented as keeping in view ; 
 in the latter, that which they are represented 
 as disregarding, or more commonly, as pro- 
 fessing to regard without doing so. As, 
 however, the author's main concern is the 
 illustration of unreality and indifference, he 
 occupies himself chiefly with typical in- 
 stances which bear out this description. On 
 the other hand, thfr good men and good 
 women to whom we are introduced in this 
 book, not only make their appearance much 
 less frequently, but are also much less care- 
 fully studied. Law's most felicitous render- 
 ings of character are those in which he 
 employs himself as a religious satirist. As 
 so often happens in writings of this class, 
 examples of "eminent Christians" leave 
 an impression of decided tameness when 
 
104 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 compared with examples of frivolity, worldli- 
 ness, and self-indulgence. 
 
 Nor, if we were obliged to confine our- 
 selves to Law's more favourable specimens 
 of character, would the material thus supplied 
 be sufficient to put us in full possession of 
 the "good man's" character as it is here 
 represented. In point of fact, the construc- 
 tion of this portrait is facilitated almost as 
 . much indirectly by Law's negative instances 
 as it is directly by his positive ones, and 
 we shall therefore, in what follows, make 
 use of the former as well as of the latter. 
 
 Having now explained the doctrinal pre- 
 supposition of Law's ideal, and having called 
 attention to the necessity of consulting his 
 negative not less than his positive character- 
 sketches, we shall next endeavour to fill in 
 the portrait upon which we are engaged by 
 the addition to it of certain characteristic 
 touches without which it would not be com- 
 plete. 
 
 And first, as regards the so-called mys- 
 ticism which enters more or less into all the 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 105 
 
 best of the characters which are here de- 
 scribed. 
 
 This is usually regarded as an unhealthy 
 product of Law's later development. And 
 no doubt it is true that as his life advanced, 
 certain continental influences (of which the 
 chief was that of Jacob Behmen) obtained 
 such an ascendency, over him, that his 
 thought became less clear, his style less 
 simple, and that he not infrequently laid 
 himself open to the charge of obscurantism. 
 Yet if by mysticism what is meant is, an 
 immediate apprehension of divine truth as 
 opposed to a conviction arrived at by pro- 
 cesses of reasoning, it cannot be questioned 
 that Law was throughout, and not less in 
 his earlier than in his later stages, of a 
 mystical turn of mind. The only difference 
 was that his mysticism was at first kept 
 within due bounds, whilst afterwards it was 
 allowed, to a certain extent, to run wild. 
 
 This essential characteristic of Law's tem- 
 per and tone of mind is what distinguishes, 
 and indeed what chiefly distinguishes, 
 
106 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 his method of treatment from that of 
 his contemporaries. Except when it is 
 thus inspired, the motives to which the 
 " Serious Call " appeals are of the cus- 
 tomarily prudential kind. Not that even 
 if the mystical element were eliminated 
 from it, this book would be wanting, as 
 prudential theology so often is, in pietistic 
 fervour ; not perhaps that in that case, it 
 would be any the less solemn, serious, and 
 telling. At the same time if Law's mys- 
 ticism were taken away from him, his 
 method of treatment would not differ radi- 
 cally from that which was then commonly 
 in vogue. And indeed there are many 
 passages in Law's works, and especially 
 in his " Serious Call," which admit of a 
 verification of this statement being made, 
 by the simple process of asking ourselves 
 what would be the nature of the remainder 
 after the removal in question had been 
 effected. 
 
 A further point to be noticed with regard 
 to this same habit of mind in William 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 107 
 
 Law's case (as in that of most other persons 
 mystically disposed), is the manner in which 
 it affects his view of devotional religion 
 and of devotional exercises. Joy, rapture, 
 happiness, ecstasy, these are but faint and 
 inadequate terms by which to express Law's 
 sense of the attitude of the devout man 
 "who makes all the parts of his common 
 life parts of piety, by doing everything in 
 the name of God and under such rules as 
 are conformable to His glory. 1 Hence, 
 there will be nothing irksome in the 
 devotions of "the good man." The prac- 
 tice of offering up prayer at each of the 
 canonical hours (which, however, in this 
 treatise are never so called), " is not 
 pressed upon any sort of people, as ab- 
 solutely necessary, but recommended to all 
 people as the best, the happiest, and most 
 
 1 It should always be remembered to Law's credit that 
 he does not restrict the province of devotion merely to 
 devotional observances. " Devotion," he says, " is neither 
 private nor public prayer ; but prayers, whether private 
 or public, are particular parts or instances of devotion. 
 Devotion signifies a life given or devoted to God" 
 (" Serious Call," ad initium). 
 
108 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 perfect way of life. If you are of a devout 
 spirit, you will rejoice at these returns of 
 prayer, which keep your soul in an holy 
 enjoyment of God ; which change your 
 passions into divine love, and fill your heart 
 with stronger joys and consolations than 
 you can possibly meet with in anything 
 else." There are indeed few books of 
 this kind in which piety is so much ap- 
 preciated for its own sake, few in which 
 the imposition of artificial restraints is so 
 conspicuously absent, and in which the 
 devout man is so consistently represented 
 as finding in his devotions the true secret 
 of happiness. 
 
 So far then it appears both that the 
 motive of Law's religion is mystical, and 
 that this motive is the source of his 
 devotional rapture. Yet, as has been al- 
 ready observed, mysticism, at all events 
 in the "Serious Call," is kept within due 
 bounds. There is here none of the un- 
 healthy self-absorption, the indifference to 
 practical affairs, the vagueness and unreality, 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 109 
 
 to which this disposition is so commonly 
 prone. We may even notice traces of 
 Law's more sober side prevailing over 
 his more impressionable side. This comes 
 out more particularly in his view of the 
 relation between the religion of ordinary 
 men and that of persons more advanced. 
 Clearly Law's inclination was, to insist on 
 the distinction of two modes of apprehen- 
 sion, two ways of life, " two orders or ranks 
 of Christians." Thus, all men may be 
 "made wise" by "reflections on the vanity 
 of a worldly life," whereas "to meditate 
 upon the perfection of the divine attributes, 
 to contemplate the glories of Heaven, to 
 consider the joys of saints and angels . . . 
 these are the meditations of souls advanced 
 in piety, and not so suited to every 
 capacity." 1 Again, " ever since the be- 
 ginning of Christianity, there hath been 
 two orders or ranks of people amongst 
 good Christians — the one that feared and 
 served God in the common offices of a 
 
 1 Chap. XII. adflnem. 
 
no THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 secular worldly life ; the other, renouncing 
 the common business and common enjoy- 
 ments of life, as riches, marriage, honours, 
 and pleasures, devoted themselves to volun- 
 tary poverty, virginity, devotion, and retire- 
 ment, that by this means," &c. 
 
 Such is the common language of the 
 mystic and religious recluse at every epoch 
 in history. Yet, on the whole, Law does 
 not indulge his inclination in this direction. 
 At all events, in the "Serious Call" there 
 is nothing on which he insists more strongly 
 than on the proposition, that "a great and 
 exemplary devotion is as much the greatest 
 happiness and perfection of a merchant, a 
 soldier, or a man of quality, as it is the 
 greatest happiness and perfection of the 
 most retired contemplative life." 1 
 
 What saved Law from the temptation 
 to which he was thus exposed appears to 
 have been, in the first place, his view that 
 the Spirit of Christ (the possession of 
 
 1 See Chap. XX., the larger part of which is taken up with 
 the support of this thesis. 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS in 
 
 which by the Christian is, as we have 
 seen, the sole object of his concern) re- 
 quires not merely to be received into the 
 heart passively, but also to be studied and 
 cultivated actively — i.e. not only through 
 emotional channels, but also ethically and 
 intellectually. There is nothing finer in 
 Law's character-sketches than that touch 
 in the portrait of Classicus, who "does not 
 think that he has done enough when he 
 has only learnt languages ; but that he must 
 be daily conversant with the best authors, 
 read them again and again, catch their 
 spirit by living with them," &c, and of 
 whom, after he has been thus described, 
 it is remarked, "How wise might Classicus 
 have been, and how much good might he 
 have done in the world, if he had but 
 thought as justly of devotion as he does 
 of learning ? " 1 A man who holds, as Law 
 held, that "the spirit of devotion, like any 
 other sense or understanding, is only to 
 be improved by study, care, application, 
 
 1 See Chap. XIV. in loco. 
 
ii2 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 and the use of such means and helps, as 
 are necessary to make a man a proficient 
 in any art or science," 1 such an one cannot 
 fail to be preserved from any undue re- 
 liance on his own feelings and from the self- 
 delusions of mysticism falsely so-called. 
 
 Another counteractive operating in the 
 same direction, may be traced to Law's 
 conviction that "we are to use outward 
 helps as well as inward meditation, in 
 order to beget and fix habits of piety in 
 our hearts. . . . For because religion is 
 justly placed in the heart, some have pur- 
 sued that notion so far as to renounce 
 vocal prayer, and other acts of worship, 
 and have resolved all religion in a quietism, 
 or mystic intercourses with God in silence." 
 
 But perhaps what most of all diverted 
 Law from indulging in these excesses of 
 mystical self-absorption, was his sense of 
 "the necessity and benefit of intercession, 
 considered as an exercise of universal love." 
 It is indeed scarcely possible to imagine a 
 1 See Chap. XIV. in loco. 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 113 
 
 more universalising influence than that 
 which Law brings to bear upon himself 
 when he considers, and asks us to consider, 
 "how all orders of men are to pray and 
 intercede with God for one another, and how 
 naturally such intercession amends and re- 
 forms the hearts of those that use it." Such 
 one-sided mysticism as that of which we are 
 now speaking, is very unlikely to obtain an 
 ascendency over a man who is thus disposed, 
 though it may even then, as in the case 
 before us, not be altogether extinguished. 
 
 We see then that a "good man," who 
 reproduced the ideal of goodness aimed at 
 in this treatise, would be a religious mystic, 
 though in no objectionable sense. We see 
 also that this mysticism would not be a 
 merely general affection, but would have 
 strict reference to the first principle of the 
 "good man's" faith and to the application 
 of that principle in his own life and conduct 
 {i.e. Christ's death and resurrection accom- 
 panied by a corresponding death and resur- 
 rection on the part of the Christian). 
 
 H 
 
114 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 The next point to be noticed, because 
 the next most necessary to the personal 
 realisation of his religious ideal, is Law's 
 enforcement of the practice of humility. The 
 goodness of the "good man," inasmuch as 
 it is rooted in the doctrine of the Cross, will 
 naturally consist very largely in the culti- 
 vation of this virtue. Here, again, it is 
 important to observe that what Law has in 
 view is, not conformity with any merely 
 general requirement, but with a definitely 
 Christian one, and in fact with one which is 
 part and parcel of his own apprehension of 
 Christ crucified. 
 
 It must be confessed, however, that our 
 author's conception of humility, as thus un- 
 derstood, is in some ways disappointing. 
 The line taken is unexceptionable in itself, 
 but it might have been expected that even 
 from his own point of view Law would 
 have made a more comprehensive study. 
 Humility is here chiefly recommended on the 
 ground that the absence of it involves the 
 grossest and gravest of all inconsistencies 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 115 
 
 in a Christian believer. That a Christian, 
 i.e. one who accepts the truth that Christ 
 "humbled Himself, and became obedient 
 unto death, even the death of the Cross," 
 that a Christian should not follow the ex- 
 ample of his Master in this respect, this is a 
 form of unreality than which there is none 
 more culpable and none more common. 
 
 In its exposure and condemnation of this 
 besetting sin, the "Serious Call" cannot 
 fail to enlist the sympathy of all Christian 
 readers, we may perhaps say, of all readers. 
 Nevertheless, it can scarcely be questioned, 
 that there is a tendency displayed in this 
 work to lay excessive stress on one parti- 
 cular kind of humility, and to deplore too 
 exclusively the neglect of that one kind. 
 Law, in fact, was over-inclined to identify 
 humility with asceticism, and pride with 
 luxury and ostentation. There is no doubt 
 an inconsistency — and in some cases a 
 very glaring one — between true Christian 
 humility and "the great, the honourable, 
 the desirable things to which the spirit of 
 
n6 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 the world turns the eyes of all people," viz. : 
 "to abound in wealth, to have fine houses 
 and rich clothes, to be attended with splen- 
 dour and equipage, to be beautiful in our 
 persons, to have titles of dignity, to be above 
 our fellow-creatures, to command the bows 
 and obeisance of other people, to be looked 
 on with admiration, to overcome our ene- 
 mies with power, to subdue all that oppose 
 us, to set ourselves in as much splendour as 
 we can, to live highly and magnificently, to 
 eat and drink and delight ourselves in the 
 most costly manner." And there is as little 
 doubt that by the avoidance of these aims, 
 and by the cultivation of a simpler manner 
 of life, we are trampling under foot our 
 pride, i.e. if these are really the things on 
 which our pride feeds itself. 
 
 But after all, the constant and over and 
 over again repeated insistance on the neces- 
 sity of our sacrificing our pride precisely 
 under this form, and on the value of the 
 practice of humility precisely as thus under- 
 stood, all this does not bring us very far 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 117 
 
 towards appreciating the deep-seated nature 
 and the many-sided forms either of pride 
 or of humility. 
 
 At the same time, we must remember that 
 we are now dealing not with a book of 
 ethics, but with a book of religious devo- 
 tion. There have no doubt been some re- 
 ligious writers, especially such as have taken 
 their stand on the doctrine of the Cross 
 (e.g. the author of " The Imitation "), who 
 have had a sort of natural gift for laying 
 bare that pride of self which Law never 
 quite succeeds in unmasking, and for the 
 elevation of humility into a Christian virtue 
 of the loftiest and purest type. But such 
 writers must as a rule attack men's sins of 
 pride rather with reference to particular in- 
 stances in which these find expression, and 
 must extol the practice of humility under 
 circumstances familiar to mankind in general. 
 For all that the " Serious Call " has at times 
 a strong flavour of " The Imitation," it is a 
 book not of the cloister and of the Middle 
 Ages, but of the open places of the world 
 
n8 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 and of the XVIIIth century. Hence, we 
 cannot be surprised that Law should not 
 have exhibited in this matter the same fine 
 sense which was exhibited by certain of 
 his predecessors, and which was exhibited 
 even by one who was not such a great 
 way from being his contemporary — but who 
 lived under essentially different conditions — 
 viz. the saintly Archbishop of Cambray. 
 
 Yet it must not be supposed that what 
 Law has to impart on this subject is of no 
 value. Let us then select a few instances, 
 not indeed of the rebukes which are here 
 administered to pride, but of some of the 
 chief characteristics which will distinguish 
 the " good man " in his endeavours after 
 humility. 
 
 "As all virtue is founded in truth, so 
 humility is founded in a true and just sense 
 of our weakness, misery, and sin." 
 
 "God has given no one the power of 
 knowing the true greatness of any sins but 
 his own ; and therefore the greatest sinner 
 that every one knows is himself. ... A 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 119 
 
 serious and frequent reflection upon these 
 things will mightily tend to humble us in 
 our own eyes." 
 
 " Reckon yourself only so far humble, as 
 you impose every instance of humility on 
 yourself, and never call for it in other 
 people." * 
 
 (Paternus addressing his son) — " Never 
 do anything in order to excel other people, 
 but in order to please God, and because it 
 is His will, that you should do everything in 
 the best manner that you can." 
 
 " There is but one man in the world with 
 whom you are to be in perpetual contention, 
 and be always striving to exceed him, and 
 that is yourself." 
 
 " The greatest trial of humility, is an 
 humble behaviour towards our equals in age, 
 estate, and condition of life." 
 
 (Eusebia addressing her daughters) — " A 
 serious earnest application to God for the 
 whole spirit of humility . . . that you may 
 
 1 Cf. the admirably drawn character of Caecus— preced- 
 ing this remark — Chap. XVI. in loco. 
 
120 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 always appear poor and little, and mean in 
 your own eyes, and be fully content that 
 others should have the same opinion of 
 you. 
 
 " That the whole course of your life, your 
 expense, your house, your dress, your man- 
 ner of eating, drinking, conversing and doing 
 everything may be so many continual proofs 
 of the true, unfeigned humility of your 
 heart. 
 
 " That you may look for nothing ; claim 
 nothing, resent nothing . . . neither seeking 
 vain applause, nor resenting neglects, or 
 affronts, but doing and receiving everything 
 in the meek and lowly spirit of our Lord and 
 Saviour Jesus Christ." 
 
 (From the character of Ouranios) — "At 
 his first coming to this little village ... he 
 thought his parish was too full of poor 
 and mean people, that were none of them 
 fit for the conversation of a gentleman. 
 This put him upon a close application to 
 his studies. He kept much at home, writ 
 notes upon Homer and Plautus, and some- 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 121 
 
 times thought it hard to be called to pray 
 by any poor body, when he was just in the 
 midst of one of Homer's battles. . . . But 
 now he can not only converse with, but 
 gladly attend and wait upon, the poorest 
 kind of people. He is now daily watching 
 over the weak and the infirm, humbling 
 himself to perverse, rude, ignorant people 
 wherever he can find them, and is so far 
 from desiring to be considered as a gentle- 
 man, that he desires to be used as the 
 servant of all." 
 
 When from the consideration of humility 
 we pass to that of the more active virtues, 
 and ask ourselves how the "good man" 
 of Law's conception would comport himself 
 in the practical affairs of life, it at once 
 appears that the information supplied on 
 this subject is exceedingly scanty. Not 
 that there is much fault to be found with 
 Law on this account. It is not fair to 
 expect that a devotional writer should dis- 
 cuss questions of morality except as regards 
 matters which lend themselves obviously to 
 
122 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 treatment from a devotional point of view. 
 It is no doubt true that the whole sphere 
 of morality admits of being considered, and 
 was by Law in fact considered, as falling 
 within the domain of religious devotion. 
 But we must be satisfied if this truth is 
 insisted on as a general axiom, without re- 
 quiring that it should be amplified in detail. 
 
 Whilst, however, conceding to Law the 
 reasonableness of his self-limitation in this 
 respect, we cannot but sometimes feel pro- 
 voked that he should not have thrown more 
 light on certain questions which even from 
 his own point of view he might, at all 
 events in passing, have discussed. For ex- 
 ample, what is the use of secular know- 
 ledge ? At a later time, Law would no doubt 
 have depreciated its value. 1 In the " Serious 
 Call," on the other hand, what he does is 
 
 1 How far Law would have gone in this direction at a 
 later time, is not so easily determined as by some writers 
 has been assumed. His opinion, no doubt, tended to be- 
 come more depreciatory. But of any real and serious con- 
 tempt for knowledge the present writer has not been able 
 to find much trace in Law's works. 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 123 
 
 to show just enough appreciation on this 
 subject to make us wish that he should show 
 more. Take e.g. the following (from the 
 address of Paternus to his son) : " I teach 
 you these languages " {i.e. Latin and Greek) 
 "that at proper times you may look into 
 the history of past ages, and learn the 
 methods of God's providence over the world. 
 That reading the writings of the ancient 
 sages, you may see how wisdom and virtue 
 have been the praise of great men of all 
 ages, and fortify your mind by their wise 
 sayings." It is the same in regard to many 
 matters of practical concern. Law often 
 makes us see that he is not indifferent 
 to these latter, without, however, enabling 
 us to discover in what precise light he re- 
 garded them. 1 
 
 1 Law's general principle as regards such matters is to 
 the effect that " Piety requires us to renounce no ways of 
 life where we can act reasonably and offer what we do to 
 the glory of God. . . . Whatever you can do, or enjoy, as 
 in the presence of God, as His servant, as His rational 
 creature that has received reason and knowledge from 
 Him : all that you can perform conformably to a rational 
 nature, and the will of God, all this is allowed by the laws 
 of piety "(Chap. XL). 
 
124 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 Yet, on the whole, we must be content 
 if Law only occupies himself with the pur- 
 pose which he had most nearly at heart. 
 Now, there is just one practical matter 
 which he does not consider to be foreign 
 to this purpose, but rather to be essen- 
 tially involved in its pursuit. No review of 
 the "good man's" character as conceived 
 by Law, would be complete, if it omitted 
 to notice that department of duty which 
 is concerned with active benevolence, 
 almsgiving, works of charity, and philan- 
 thropy. 
 
 On this subject Law's own statements 
 speak very much for themselves, and it will 
 therefore be sufficient merely to furnish ex- 
 tracts from them. It will be noticed that 
 in this matter, as in all others, the line 
 taken by Law is strictly derivative from 
 his starting-point, and can only be under- 
 stood by being considered in connection 
 with the benefits of Christ's redemption. 
 The essence of his whole argument, in 
 fact, consists in a perverted application of 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 125 
 
 the words, " Freely ye have received, freely 
 give." 
 
 " If there be nothing so glorious as doing 
 good, if there is nothing that makes us so 
 like God, then nothing can be so glorious 
 in the use of money as to use it all in 
 works of love and goodness, making our- 
 selves friends, fathers, benefactors, to all 
 our fellow-creatures, imitating the Divine 
 love," &c. 
 
 "He that is not ready to give to every 
 brother, that wants to have something 
 given him, does not give like a disciple 
 of Christ." 4 
 
 (From the character of Miranda) — " To 
 relate her charity would be to relate the 
 history of every day for twenty years ; for 
 so long has all her fortune been spent that 
 way. She has set up near twenty poor 
 tradesmen . . . educated several poor chil- 
 dren ... as soon as any labourer is con- 
 fined at home with sickness, she sends him 
 till he recovers, twice the value of his wages 
 ... If there is any poor man or woman, 
 
126 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 that is more than ordinary wicked and re- 
 probate, Miranda has her eye upon them, 
 she watches their time of need and adver- 
 sity ; and if she can discover that they are 
 in any great straits or affliction, she gives 
 them speedy relief . . . There is nothing in 
 the character of Miranda more to be ad- 
 mired than this temper. For this tender- 
 ness of affection towards the most abandoned 
 sinners, is the highest instance of a divine 
 and godlike soul. She has a great tender- 
 ness to old people that are past their work 
 . . . never treats beggars with disregard or 
 aversion. ' It may be,' says Miranda, ' that 
 I may often give to those that do not de- 
 serve it, or that will make an ill use 
 of my alms. But what then ? Is not 
 this the very method of the divine good- 
 ness ? Does not God make His sun to 
 rise on the evil and on the good ? Besides, 
 where has Scripture made merit the rule 
 or assurance of charity ? Do I beg of God 
 to deal with me, not according to my merit 
 but according to His own great goodness 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 127 
 
 . . . shall I use a measure towards my 
 brother, which I pray God never to use 
 towards me ? ' " 
 
 With regard to the point last mentioned, 
 viz. that no consideration of "merit" is to 
 be "the rule or measure of charity," the 
 present writer's attention has been called 
 by a friend to the strangeness of the coinci- 
 dence of this doctrine with the conclusions 
 arrived at, on very different and purely 
 secular grounds, in our own days, by that 
 school of rational philanthropists which is 
 most intent on regulating the distribution 
 of public charity according to scientific 
 principles. 1 
 
 Enough, it is hoped, has now been said 
 to indicate the essential features of " the 
 character of the 'good man' devotionally 
 considered, as illustrated by William Law. 
 That that character is in many ways 
 conceived in a spirit of reaction against 
 
 1 i.e. a system of poor-law relief, having in view simply 
 and solely the provision of the necessaries of life to persons 
 who (whether by their own fault or otherwise) are com- 
 pletely destitute. 
 
128 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 XVIIIth century tendencies, cannot be 
 denied. It is, however, not less true, 
 that Law's view is also in many ways a 
 representative phenomenon, in the sense 
 that there is much in common between 
 him and his contemporaries, and that the 
 soil from which he and they sprang is as 
 clearly evidenced in his case as it was in 
 theirs. This element in common between 
 Law and his contemporaries is especially 
 noticeable as regards a certain primary 
 axiom of his and their philosophy of 
 religion. 
 
 For after all, a " good man " of Law's 
 way of thinking would conceive of religion 
 — alike natural and revealed — pre-emi- 
 nently as serving a rational purpose, and 
 the fact that it serves this purpose would 
 appear to him — in the true spirit of 
 XVIIIth century theology — as constitut- 
 ing the strongest of all possible arguments 
 in its support. . On this point, Law agrees 
 fundamentally with Butler, the only differ- 
 ence between them having reference not 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 129 
 
 to the importance and cogency of this 
 apologetic argument, but to the applica- 
 tion made of it in the two cases respec- 
 tively. In the view > of both of them, the 
 natural light of conscience, together with 
 the superadded light of the Gospel, enable 
 — and can alone enable — man to obtain the 
 rational guidance of which he stands in 
 need. Merely, Butler's aim is to show 
 that religion is credible because it is thus 
 rational, whereas Law (writing with a 
 strictly practical object in view) contends 
 that, inasmuch as religion does but direct 
 us in the path of reason, the demands which 
 it makes and the restraints which it imposes, 
 ought not to be regarded as superfluous 
 and therefore as irksome. 
 
 Thus, whilst Butler says that " Christ 
 published anew the law of nature which men 
 had corrupted ; and the very knowledge of 
 which, to some degree, was lost among them," 
 and again that "In this darkness, or this 
 light of nature, call it which you please, 
 revelation comes in . . . supposes the world 
 
t 3 o THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 to be in a state of ruin," 1 &c, Law writes, 
 " Man is placed in a world full of variety 
 of things ; his ignorance makes him use 
 many of them as absurdly as the man that 
 puts dust in his eyes, to relieve his thirst, 
 or puts on chains to relieve pain. Religion 
 therefore here comes in to his relief, and 
 gives him strict rules of using everything 
 that is about him ; that by so using them 
 suitably to his own nature and the nature 
 of the things, he may have always the 
 benefit of receiving a right benefit from 
 them." 2 
 
 As however has been already remarked, 
 it is not so much with a view to demon- 
 strating the credibility, as rather with a 
 view to enforcing the "strict rules," of 
 religion, that Law thus argues. And in- 
 deed he uses almost exchangeably, and 
 combines in one sentence, "So far as you 
 reduce your desires to such things as nature 
 and reason require; so far as you regulate 
 
 1 "Analogy," Part II. Chap. V. 
 2 Chap. XI. 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 131 
 
 all the motions of your heart by the strict 
 rules of religion." 
 
 The presupposition then of Law's " Philo- 
 sophy of Religion " (apart from his own 
 practical application of it), was strictly in 
 accordance with the view taken by many 
 other theologians at that time. 
 
 Nor would it be fair to ignore the 
 advantage which Law obtained from his 
 participation in this view. Had he not 
 held that even "the strict rules of religion" 
 are intended to subserve a rational end, 
 these might have been regarded by him 
 as mere mechanical exercises rather than 
 as spiritual helps. It is all very well to 
 say that Law's mysticism would have saved 
 him from this result, but the genuine mystic 
 is not by any means always the person 
 who finds the observance of religious forms 
 most congenial to his spiritual life ; some- 
 times the inner consciousness of such an 
 one is in Heaven, whilst the obligations 
 imposed on his outward behaviour are 
 discharged slavishly and unintelligently. 
 
132 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 The words "natural" and "rational" were 
 no doubt often in the XVIIIth century 
 used as mere catch-words, but when, as 
 in the case of a man like Law, these 
 words stood for realities, the effect made 
 itself felt not only in the theological but, 
 also in the devotional sphere. No doubt, 
 Law contributed to his environment much 
 that was original as well as much that 
 was highly beneficial, but there is all the 
 less reason on this account for refusing 
 to recognise his position of indebtedness. 
 
 The following appears to be the most 
 concise description of a "good man's" 
 general characteristics which the " Serious 
 Call" contains. It shall be our last extract. 
 
 "He is to believe that it is the effect 
 of God's great wisdom and goodness, that 
 the world itself was formed at such a parti- 
 cular time, and in such a manner. That 
 the general order of nature, the whole 
 frame of things, is contrived and formed 
 in the best manner. He is to believe 
 that God's providence over States and 
 
PERSONAL HOLINESS 133 
 
 Kingdoms, times and seasons, is all for 
 the best. That the revolutions of State, 
 and changes of Empire, the rise and fall 
 of monarchies, persecutions, wars, famines 
 and plagues, are all permitted, and con- 
 ducted by God's providence, to the general 
 good of man in this state of trial. A good 
 man is to believe all this, with the same 
 fulness of assent as he believes that God 
 is in every place, though he neither sees 
 nor can comprehend the manner of his 
 presence. This is a noble magnificence 
 of thought, a true religious greatness of 
 mind, to be thus affected with God's general 
 providence, admiring and magnifying his 
 wisdom in all things ; never murmuring 
 at the course of the world, or the state 
 of things, but looking upon all around, at 
 heaven and earth, as a pleased spectator ; 
 and adoring that invisible hand which gives 
 laws to all motions, and over-rules all events 
 to ends suitable to the highest wisdom and 
 goodness." 1 
 
 1 Chap. XXII. 
 
V 
 
 ANTI-CANT 
 
 » CANDID E" 
 By Voltaire. Published in 1759 
 
 " RASSELAS " 
 By Samuel Johnson. Published in 1759 
 
V 
 
 That acute sense of the miseries of human 
 life which is undoubtedly one chief note 
 of the literature of the XVIIIth century, 
 is sometimes regarded as characteristic of 
 this whole period ; sometimes, on the other 
 hand, as due to a reaction of men's 
 minds during the middle and later portions 
 of the century against standards of life 
 and thought which had won acceptance 
 during its earlier decades. 
 
 These two views are both true as far 
 as they go, though that perhaps is not 
 very far. Nor are they in reality so much 
 contrasted as from the statement of them 
 may appear. Certainly, there are traces 
 of pessimism in the literature of the first 
 part of the century (e.g. in Swift's " Gul- 
 liver "and in Gay's "Beggar's Opera" and 
 
138 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 its sequel "Polly"), but as certainly, pessi- 
 mism was not then a dominant, or even 
 a conspicuous, feature in literature. The 
 gloomy view prevailed in part throughout 
 the whole period, but the century grew 
 less well-satisfied with itself as it advanced, 
 and the expression of its disgust, from the 
 year 1759 onwards, became increasingly 
 pronounced. 
 
 The explanation of XVIIIth century pes- 
 simism by reference to the contemporary 
 state of civilisation, is tempting but falla- 
 cious. That there was an abundance of 
 human misery at that time may, of course, 
 be shown without difficulty. The facts 
 are only too naked and glaring. But when 
 we go beyond this and represent that the 
 sadness which on the whole characterises 
 the literature of the XVIIIth century im- 
 plies an exceptional aggravation of the 
 wretchedness of the world as its ante- 
 cedent cause, we tread on uncertain ground. 
 The truth is, we have no test by which 
 to decide whether the amount of misery 
 
ANTI-CANT 139 
 
 prevalent at any given time, is or is not 
 exceptional. Moreover, the import of such 
 terms as happiness and misery is too sub- 
 jective and fluctuating to admit of our 
 drawing comparisons between the centuries 
 in respect to this consideration. 
 
 It is safer to start by assuming the ex- 
 istence of a vast amount of human misery 
 at all times, and then to inquire, how and 
 why, at some times rather than at others, 
 the literary treatment of this fact is a pessi- 
 mistic treatment ? 
 
 Now what leads to the pessimistic view 
 in literature, is not merely the sense of 
 the ills to which flesh is heir, but the 
 coincidence of this sense with the felt 
 absence of any accompanying ideals, in the 
 contemplation of which these ills may be 
 conceived of as subordinate to a yet greater 
 good. The literature of all ages treats 
 very largely of man's woes, but happily, 
 in most cases, what has to be endured is 
 looked at in the light of the objects for 
 the sake of which it is alone endurable, 
 
140 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 such e.g. as religion, love, patriotism, duty. 
 On the other hand, an abnormal state of 
 dejection necessarily sets in where (as in 
 the XVIIIth century) the consciousness of 
 suffering is unaccompanied — either wholly 
 or to a great extent — by a spirit of devo- 
 tion to ideals. 
 
 Then, again, as during this epoch there 
 were no great ideals to raise man aloft, so 
 neither were there any great non-human 
 interests to divert his attention from his 
 own concerns. Physical Science no doubt 
 exercised its attractions, more especially in 
 England ; * but there has never been a 
 century in which human nature and human 
 happiness have monopolised more attention. 
 
 Even foreign countries were often de- 
 scribed solely with reference to the some- 
 what narrow question, as to whether their 
 inhabitants were more, or less, happy than 
 those of the countries with which the author 
 and his readers were familiar. Nor when 
 
 1 Lecky, "History of England during the XVIIIth Cen- 
 tury," vol. vi. p. 164. 
 
ANTI-CANT 141 
 
 writers expressed their preference for man- 
 ners and customs of primitive simplicity, and 
 for a life removed from the busy haunts 
 of men, did this mean that the happiness 
 which they desired was that of entering into 
 intercourse with nature rather than with man. 
 On the contrary, the insipidity of the ideal 
 they then presented, shows perhaps more 
 clearly than anything else, how incapable 
 its votaries were of conceiving of happiness 
 otherwise than as regards the connection 
 of human beings with each other in a state 
 of society like that of their own times. 
 
 But when man's thoughts are thus al- 
 most if not altogether confined to his own 
 circumstances, the darker side of the pic- 
 ture must necessarily predominate over its 
 brighter side. The mystery of human 
 suffering then assumes a quite appalling 
 significance. For the gruesomeness of the 
 thought of man's misery cannot then be 
 mitigated by being taken in connection with 
 any supplemental considerations. There 
 can then be no idea, for instance, of a 
 
142 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 redemptive office served by pain in the 
 case not only of man, but also of all other 
 created beings, "the whole creation groan- 
 ing and travailing in pain . . . waiting for 
 the adoption, to wit the redemption of our 
 body." And, again, there can then be no 
 idea of an evolution of happiness by a 
 process of selection, and as a result of the 
 survival of the fittest. 
 
 It is not of course here suggested that the 
 mystery of human suffering disappears by 
 being regarded in the light either of the 
 religious, or of the scientific, doctrines adum- 
 brated in the above remarks. Still, there 
 can be no doubt that the habit of conceiving 
 of man not merely as self-centred, but as 
 having a place in the world, offers loopholes 
 to the imagination, even if it does not lead 
 to a satisfactory solution ; nor can it any 
 more be doubted, that the vogue of these 
 wider views acts as a counteractive to pessi- 
 mism. Or rather, what we ought to say is, 
 that it acts as a counteractive to such pessi- 
 mism as that which obtained currency in 
 
ANTI-CANT 143 
 
 the XVIIIth century. For we do not for a 
 moment contend that this latter ever sounded 
 the depths of misery as profoundly as they 
 have sometimes been sounded in times sub- 
 sequent. The men of the XlXth century 
 have both believed more and despaired 
 more than the men of the XVIIIth century. 
 And what causes the difference between 
 ourselves and our predecessors is in both 
 cases the same thing, viz. our less limited 
 outlook and our less exclusively literary 
 apprehension. 
 
 But this restriction, if it narrowed the 
 horizon, and by so doing intensified the 
 melancholy, of the XVIIIth century phil- 
 anthropist, made itself not less felt as a 
 bond of sympathy between the literary man 
 and mankind at large. The literature of 
 the XVIIIth century was indeed never 
 more in earnest than it was in its expres- 
 sion of the deep-seated pity thus aroused. 
 It is this feature which alone justifies us in 
 regarding " Candide " as an outcome of the 
 feelings of a "good man." The savagery of 
 
144 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 the incidents related in that work, its scorn 
 and raillery, its misanthropic sentiments, 
 these all proceed straight from the heart of 
 one whose sense of the magnitude of human 
 sufferings amounted to a life-long agony. 1 
 
 The almost simultaneous appearance of 
 "Candide" and of " Rasselas," together 
 with the striking similarity between the 
 two works, has always been regarded, and 
 will always remain, as a most noteworthy 
 literary phenomenon. On this point, Bos- 
 well writes : " Voltaire's ' Candide,' written 
 to refute the system of Optimism, which it 
 has accomplished with brilliant success, is 
 wonderfully similar in its plan and conduct to 
 Johnson's ' Rasselas,' insomuch that I have 
 heard Johnson say, that if they had not been 
 published so closely the one after the other 
 that there was not time for imitation, it 
 would have been in vain to deny that the 
 scheme of that which came latest was taken 
 from the other." 
 
 1 In the year 1713, i.e. forty-six years before the publica- 
 tion of "Candide," Voltaire had written an ode, Sur les 
 Malheurs du Temps (Henry Morley). 
 
ANTI-CANT 145 
 
 " Rasselas " is a noble composition. It 
 is pervaded by the same consciousness of 
 life's miseries which distinguishes "Can- 
 dide," though its spirit is grave and reflec- 
 tive rather than bitter and incisive. Both 
 works contain remarks applicable to the 
 conduct of life quite apart from any general 
 questions as regards the possibility of happi- 
 ness. In this respect, however, as might be 
 supposed, " Rasselas " is the more notice- 
 able. The argument in both cases leads to 
 the same conclusion, but it is only in John- 
 son's case that we can apply those words 
 of a then lately deceased poet (Dyer) — 
 
 " There is a kindly mood of melancholy 
 That wings the soul, and points her to the skies." 
 
 Deep seriousness indeed rather than 
 despair of life is the impression most 
 likely to be left on the mind by the 
 perusal of " Rasselas." Boswell tells us 
 that this more hopeful tone is due to the 
 fact that his master's creation was in- 
 tended, "by showing the unsatisfactory 
 nature of things temporal, to direct the 
 
 K 
 
146 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 hopes of man to things eternal." And 
 there can be no doubt that the Princess' 
 conclusion at the end of the book, is to this 
 effect, and does express its author's main 
 purpose in writing it. But even had this not 
 been so, it may be conjectured that John- 
 son's love of edification, or more plainly, of 
 preaching, would have intervened to pre- 
 vent his not less characteristic gloominess 
 from having the whole field to itself. 
 
 Again, " Rasselas " is much less than is 
 " Candide " a squib on a system of philo- 
 sophy. The only clear reference of this 
 kind in Johnson's work is that made in 
 Chapter XXII., "On the happiness of a 
 life led according to nature." * But, of 
 course, even in the case of " Candide," 
 the satire is aimed not so much at the 
 Leibnitzian system as at the mere travesty of 
 that system, which had come to be accepted 
 as a substitute for it. All philosophical 
 ideas admit of, and most such receive, a 
 merely popular representation which easily 
 becomes mistaken for the genuine article. 
 
 1 See especially adfinem. 
 
ANTI-CANT 147 
 
 Every charlatan then makes use of "the 
 system" as a means of explaining the 
 mysteries of the Universe. Such pretended 
 explanations very properly excite ridicule. 
 Only let us remember that it is these de- 
 velopments, and not the speculations of 
 which they are the spurious outcome, which 
 were satirised by Voltaire, and in a less 
 degree, by Johnson. 
 
 Strictly speaking, these and other like 
 writers raise the question of the possibility 
 of happiness not so much positively as 
 rather negatively. The inquiry " Can happi- 
 ness be] found on earth ? " as formulated in 
 the XVIIIth century, meant for the most 
 part, "Is there anywhere on earth an absence 
 of the causes which produce ««happiness ? " 
 In other words, "Is there any place dis- 
 coverable in which there is no pain, oppres- 
 sion, fraud, crime, war, and bloodshed?" 
 
 At the present day, such merely nega- 
 tive happiness is not by the wisest of our 
 teachers admitted as a legitimate object of 
 human aspiration. At all events, it is held 
 
148 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 that happiness understood in some more 
 positive sense — viz. as consisting in the 
 fulfilment either of duty, or of God's pur- 
 poses concerning man, or of the moral 
 order of the world — ought in the first 
 instance to be proposed as an ideal, and 
 only then ought the question of happiness, 
 understood as consisting in immunity from 
 life's troubles, to be mooted. That is to 
 say, happiness in this latter sense ought at 
 most to be annexed as a condition to hap- 
 piness interpreted as = blessedness. 
 
 The XVIIIth century anti-cant writers, 
 however, did not thus proceed. Not that 
 the higher view of happiness was strange 
 to them. On the contrary, they con- 
 stantly, indeed usually, represent unhappi- 
 ness as a consequence of unrighteousness, 
 whilst they picture happiness as in some 
 way or other dependent on virtue. Still, 
 they drew no clear distinction between the 
 moral and the material aspects of happiness. 
 Their treatment of the whole question was 
 in fact a merely popular one. They found 
 
ANTI-CANT 149 
 
 a shallow optimism or eudsemonism in 
 undisputed possession of men's minds. 
 This, to quote Boswell once more, they 
 "refuted with brilliant success." But having 
 done this, instead of shifting their position, 
 they remained at the same point of view, 
 though they were thus led not to optimism 
 but to pessimism. An El Dorado was 
 what they wanted, just as this was what 
 their opponents wanted. The only differ- 
 ence was, that the fact of widespread human 
 misery convinced them that there was no 
 such thing as happiness anywhere. 
 
 It would be ridiculous, however, to make 
 this misconception a reason for fault-finding. 
 We are not to blame these writers merely 
 because, whilst helping their contemporaries 
 to get rid of cant, they did not at the same 
 time start them on a new ethical scent. 
 All that we mean is, that the starting-point 
 of the investigation of happiness by Voltaire 
 and Johnson must be clearly perceived, 
 before its further course can be understood. 
 Let us remember then what has been 
 
150 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 already stated, viz. that " the question 
 of the possibility of happiness was then 
 raised not so much positively as rather 
 negatively." 
 
 It may perhaps be thought, that as it 
 was thus a negation from which these two 
 writers started, therefore the satisfaction 
 of their wants would be met by the enjoy- 
 ment of a state of passionless repose. But 
 though the absence of unhappiness was 
 the object proposed, both writers agree in 
 disclaiming the idea that a man can be 
 called happy if his life is monotonously 
 uniform, and if his days are spent in idle- 
 ness and listlessness. " I would be glad 
 to know," says the disreputable old woman 
 in "Candide," "which is the worst, to be 
 ravished a hundred times by negro pirates 
 ... to run the gauntlet among the Bul- 
 garians, to be whipped and hanged at 
 an auto-da-ft, to be dissected, to be 
 chained to an oar in a galley ; and in 
 short, to experience all the miseries through 
 which every one of us has passed, or 
 
ANTI-CANT 151 
 
 to remain here doing nothing?" "This," 
 said Candide, "is a grand question. This 
 discourse gave birth to new reflections, 
 and Martin especially concluded that man 
 was born to live in the convulsions of 
 disquiet, or in the lethargy of idleness. 
 Though Candide did not absolutely agree 
 to this, yet he did not determine anything 
 on this head." This is at the end of the 
 first part of the story. But the question 
 is decisively settled at the beginning of 
 the second part. "We soon became tired 
 of everything in life ; riches fatigue the 
 possessor ; ambition when satisfied leaves 
 only remorse behind it ; the joys of love 
 are but transient joys ; and Candide, made 
 to experience all the vicissitudes of fortune, 
 was soon disgusted with cultivating his 
 garden." * 
 
 More familiar, but to the same effect, 
 is " The discontent of Rasselas in the 
 Happy Valley " 2 and " The wants of him 
 
 1 The late Professor Henry Morley's translation has 
 been used for the English of the selections from " Candide." 
 
 2 Chap. II. 
 
152 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 that wants nothing." 1 "I can discover 
 within me no power of perception which 
 is not glutted with its proper pleasure, yet 
 I do not feel myself delighted." " Pos- 
 sessing all that I want, I find one day and 
 one hour exactly like another, except that the 
 latter is still more tedious than the former." 
 
 This then being granted, the hopes of 
 the youthful aspirant are naturally directed 
 to the search for a state of things in 
 which he will find happiness (or rather an 
 absence of unhappiness) in active employ- 
 ment. Now, in order to show that happi- 
 ness, as thus conceived, does not exist, it 
 was scarcely possible for the authors of 
 these fancy sketches not to derive their 
 evidence from the current life of their own 
 time. Accordingly, what they make their 
 characters say on this point, takes the form 
 of a criticism of contemporary civilisation. 
 This is much more so in the case of 
 " Candide " than in that of the companion 
 volume, which latter usually avoids details 
 
 1 Chap. III. 
 
ANTI-CANT 153 
 
 and confines itself to the statement of 
 general principles. 
 
 Some of the particulars thus presented are 
 of no small interest on historical grounds, 
 as e.g. the account given of Paris, which 
 is described as "a chaos, a confused mul- 
 titude, where every one seeks for pleasure 
 without being able to find it," and of the 
 theatre and matters theatrical in that city, 
 of the Jesuit fathers, who "wage war in 
 this part of the world against the troops 
 of Spain and Portugal, at the same time 
 that they hear the confessions of those very 
 princes in Europe, who kill Spaniards in 
 America, and send them to heaven in 
 Madrid " ; of monks who " dispute, govern, 
 intrigue, and burn people who are not of 
 the same opinion as themselves" ; of " Jan- 
 senists against Molinists, the Parliament 
 against the Church, and one armed body 
 of men against another " ; of the English 
 who "have expended much greater sums 
 in the contest than all Canada is worth " ; 
 and finally, of the Westphalian Baron, with 
 
154 ™E "GOOD MAN" 
 
 his seventy-two quarterings, who refuses his 
 sister in marriage to Candide because "he 
 will never be reproached that his nephews 
 are not qualified for the first ecclesiasti- 
 cal dignities in Germany," and who will 
 not allow "his sister to be the wife of any 
 person below the rank of a baron of the 
 Empire." 
 
 But what in the present connection con- 
 cerns us more than any of these historical 
 references is, the position taken by these 
 writers with regard to the question, How 
 far does the pursuit of the objects which 
 life offers lead to happiness ? 
 
 More particularly, the spheres of activity 
 into which life is divided being twofold, 
 viz. intellectual and practical, this question 
 means, What sort of happiness is that which 
 is obtainable from the pursuit of the ob- 
 jects which belong to these two spheres 
 respectively ? 
 
 i. The intellectual sphere. Under this 
 category, we may consider how human hap- 
 piness is here made to appear (a) with 
 
ANTI-CANT 155 
 
 respect to knowledge, (6) with respect to 
 art. 
 
 Starting,, then, with (a), i.e. the pursuit 
 of knowledge and the search after truth — 
 the conception formed, alike by the French 
 and by the English savant, is a disappoint- 
 ing one, or at least it would be so, if it were 
 altogether serious. Serious it no doubt in 
 both cases is, so far as regards the con- 
 clusion that these intellectual pursuits do 
 not and cannot produce happiness. But the 
 reasons for this belief, and the representa- 
 tions given of the claims of knowledge, are 
 obviously such as the requirements of this 
 "truth in tale" literature demanded, rather 
 than criticisms of a more thorough-going 
 kind. 
 
 Voltaire indeed contents himself with 
 satirising the dulness, incompetence, vanity, 
 egotism, maliciousness, prevalent in literary 
 circles such as he knew them himself. 
 "Who was that overgrown beast?" said 
 Candide. "A very good-for-nothing sort 
 of man, I assure you," answered the Abbe ; 
 
156 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 "one who gets his livelihood by abusing 
 every new book and play that is written or 
 performed. He abominates to see any one 
 meet with success. . . . He is one of those 
 vipers in literature who nourish themselves 
 with their own venom ; a pamphlet-monger." 
 "A pamphlet-monger ? " said Candide ; " what 
 is that ? " " Why a pamphlet-monger," re- 
 plied the Abbe, "is a writer of pamphlets, 
 a fool." A supper - party composed of 
 literary men is described, at which " seve- 
 ral insipid jokes passed and repassed, 
 with false reports, false reasonings, a little 
 politics, and a great deal of scandal." The 
 conversation then turned upon the new 
 productions in literature. " Pray," said the 
 Abbd, "good folks, have you seen the 
 romance written by the Sieur Gauchat, doc- 
 tor of divinity?" "Yes," answered one of 
 the company, "but I had not patience to 
 go through it. The town is pestered by 
 a swarm of impertinent productions, but 
 this of Dr. Gauchat's outdoes them all." 
 Similarly, Archdeacon T. is described as "a 
 
ANTI-CANT 157 
 
 tedious creature who . . . tells one things 
 that all the world knows . . . labours an 
 argument . . . makes use of other people's 
 wit . . . mangles what he has pilfered from 
 them." 
 
 Or else, Voltaire finds (in the person 
 of Signor Pococurante — a noble Venetian), 
 that the most esteemed authors of the 
 world do not please, and in this sense he 
 passes under review Homer, Virgil, Horace, 
 Tully, fourscore volumes of the Memoirs 
 of the Academy of Sciences, a prodigious 
 number of plays, English books (on these 
 there is some qualified praise bestowed, 
 though Milton is severely handled), and 
 German poetry. 
 
 Other branches of knowledge are simi- 
 larly ridiculed with a view to showing, if 
 not their intrinsic worthlessness, yet at all 
 events that of their professors. Thus "a 
 northern sage at the Academy of Sciences 
 at Bordeaux demonstrated by A plus B 
 minus C, divided by Z, why the sheep must 
 necessarily be red, and die of the mange." 
 
158 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 " This concussion of the earth is no new 
 thing," replied Pangloss ; "the city of Lima 
 in America experienced the same thing last 
 year : the same cause, the same effect : there 
 is certainly a train of sulphur all the way 
 underground from Lima to Lisbon." 
 
 Of course, in estimating these and other 
 like criticisms, we must remember that 
 " Candide " is after all only a skit, just as 
 the " Stultitise Laus" of Erasmus (which 
 in some respects it resembles) is also only 
 a skit. Still, we may regret, though we 
 cannot be surprised, that the most eminent 
 literary man of the XVIIIth century should 
 have even poked fun at optimism, without 
 so much as conveying by a hint his appre- 
 ciation of knowledge if not as a source of 
 happiness, yet at all events as an allevia- 
 tion of misery. 
 
 In Johnson's "Rasselas" the conception 
 of knowledge in relation to happiness is 
 not, like Voltaire's, that of the satirist, but 
 rather that of the moralist. In the first 
 place, it is urged that "the proper study 
 
ANTI-CANT 159 
 
 of mankind is man." " My curiosity," said 
 Rasselas, "does not very strongly lead me 
 to survey piles of stone or mounds of earth. 
 My business is with man." "What have 
 I to do," said the Princess, "with the 
 heroes or the monuments of ancient times 
 — with times which can never return, and 
 heroes whose form of life was different 
 from all that the present condition of man- 
 kind requires or allows ? " 
 
 In answer to this contention, the sage 
 points out that the present depends on 
 the past; "the present state of things is 
 the consequence of the former . . . the 
 most useful part of history is that which 
 relates to the progress of the human mind, 
 the gradual improvement of reason, the 
 successful advances of science, the vicissi- 
 tudes of learning and ignorance," &c. 
 
 These remarks are made in contempla- 
 tion of a visit to the Pyramids. But at 
 the conclusion of this visit, it appears 
 pretty clearly, that the real use of such 
 knowledge as that above described, is held 
 
160 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 to be its applicability for purposes of re- 
 flection upon life from the moralist's point 
 of view. " I consider this mighty struc- 
 ture as a monument of the insufficiency 
 of human enjoyments. A king whose 
 power is unlimited, and whose treasures 
 surmount all real and imaginary wants, 
 is compelled to solace, by the erection 
 of a pyramid, the satiety of dominion and 
 tastelessness of pleasures . . . Who- 
 ever thou art that, not content with a 
 moderate condition, imaginest happiness 
 in royal magnificence, and dreamest that 
 command or riches can feed the appetite 
 of novelty with perpetual gratifications, 
 survey the Pyramids, and confess thy 
 folly." 
 
 There is no more characteristically 
 XVIIIth century conception of knowledge, 
 than that which regards it as serving to 
 point this melancholy moral. Though not 
 an ignoble view, it is an extremely limited 
 one, and indeed is usually combined in 
 actual fact with a very considerable 
 
ANTI-CANT 161 
 
 indifference to knowledge except under its 
 most immediately practical aspects. 
 
 In "Rasselas" also we are warned 
 against the delusions — resulting in one- 
 sidedness and even in monomania — to 
 which the ardent pursuit of knowledge 
 is apt to lead. These warnings occur in 
 Chapter XL. ("The history of a man of 
 learning") and in the four following chap- 
 ters ; so great is the importance which 
 the author of the work ascribes to this 
 danger! "The man of learning" (the 
 reader need scarcely be reminded) is an 
 astronomer, who has become so far in- 
 fatuated by his studies, as to believe him- 
 self in possession of power to control the 
 movements of the heavenly bodies. The 
 recital of the astronomer's experiences 
 suggests a discourse on " The dangerous 
 Prevalence of Imagination." 
 
 Here Imlac runs amuck against "the 
 love of solitude," "silent speculation," 
 "visionary schemes," "feasting on luscious 
 falsehood," "fictions beginning to operate 
 
i62 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 as realities," "false opinions fastening upon 
 the mind," " life passing in dreams of rap- 
 ture or of anguish," and much more to 
 the same effect. 
 
 The whole passage is an exceedingly 
 interesting one, not only in reference to 
 our present subject, but also in reference 
 to Johnson himself. The remarks made, 
 moreover, considered in their bearings on 
 the theory of madness (as expounded, for 
 instance, in our own times by Dr. Mauds- 
 ley), contain much practical wisdom. But 
 undoubtedly the passage is intended also, 
 to warn people against passing their time 
 "in the attainment of sciences which can 
 for the most part be but remotely useful 
 to mankind." That is not really the 
 lesson of the incident, but it is certainly 
 one of the lessons drawn from it by the 
 philosopher himself. Knowledge must not 
 move far away from the contemplation of 
 man's estate. That is assuredly what 
 Johnson thought, and what he would have 
 us think. 
 
ANTI-CANT 163 
 
 On the whole, then, Johnson entertained 
 no very exalted conception of knowledge 
 as an ingredient of happiness. Knowledge 
 indeed, when it is thus confined and re- 
 stricted, does not (nor in the case of 
 Johnson or of his contemporaries did it) 
 produce even relative happiness. Rather, by- 
 turning man's eyes in on himself, the pur- 
 suit of knowledge fails to cheer his heart 
 or to lessen his melancholy. 
 
 Let us now pass to the second class of 
 pursuits which are included under the in- 
 tellectual sphere, viz. {b) the pursuit of Art. 
 
 This part of the subject may be treated 
 briefly, since it fills no great space in 
 either volume, whilst from one of them 
 (" Rasselas ") it is altogether absent. 1 
 
 Here the same chapter of " Candide," 
 from which extracts were previously made, 
 must be laid under contribution again. 
 Let it be understood, however, that neither 
 in that former case nor in this one, do we 
 
 1 Unless Chapter X. — one of the least effective parts of the 
 story — can be considered as an exception. 
 
164 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 maintain that Voltaire is necessarily ex- 
 pressing his own opinion. What we do 
 interpret him to mean, in the case both 
 of intellectual and artistic pursuits, is, that 
 the disparaging opinions attributed to 
 Signor Pococurante, illustrate the incapacity 
 of knowledge and of art to satisfy man's 
 desire for happiness. The world, what- 
 ever it ought to do, certainly does not, as 
 a matter of fact, obtain what it wants 
 from these sources. Look at Signor Poco- 
 curante ! 
 
 "'Pray,' said Candide, 'by what master 
 are the two first of these paintings ? ' 
 ' They are Raphael's,' answered the sena- 
 tor. ' I gave a great deal of money for 
 them seven years ago . . . but I cannot 
 say they please me.' 
 
 "While dinner was getting ready, Poco- 
 curante ordered a concert. Candide praised 
 the music to the skies. ' This noise,' said 
 the noble Venetian, ' may amuse one for 
 a little time, but if it was to last above 
 half- an - hour, it would grow tiresome to 
 
ANTI-CANT 165 
 
 everybody, though perhaps no one would 
 care to own it.' 
 
 "They went down into the garden, when 
 Can'dide commended the several beauties 
 that offered themselves to his view. ' I 
 know nothing on earth laid out in such 
 bad taste,' said Pococurante." 
 
 But it is time that we should attempt 
 to convey an idea of the light in which 
 (2) the practical sphere of life presents 
 itself to these two writers. 
 
 In dealing with this side of the question, 
 the chief difficulty is to do justice to the 
 copiousness of the more or less pessimistic 
 judgments pronounced. Speaking gener- 
 ally, " Candide " and " Rasselas " are dis- 
 tinguished in relation to this subject by 
 the fact that the first lays more stress on 
 man's cruelty, rapacity, and inhumanity ; 
 the second, on the illusiveness of the ap- 
 parent pleasures of human life, even when 
 its lot is comparatively tranquil and its 
 circumstances such as by the majority of 
 persons would be deemed enviable. 
 
1 66 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 It would be difficult to find a more un- 
 relieved picture of harshness and ferocity, 
 cunning and treachery, indignity, outrage, 
 injustice, and oppression, than that which is 
 displayed in the pages of "Candide." The 
 scene of these various horrors is shifted 
 from one part of the globe to another, in 
 order to show that no single part has a 
 monopoly of them. The world thus appears, 
 sometimes as a Pandemonium ("What 
 demon or foe to mankind lords it thus 
 tyrannically over the world ? " asks Can- 
 dide) ; sometimes as a madhouse (" To say 
 exactly whether there are a greater number 
 fit to be members of a madhouse in the 
 one country or the other," i.e. England or 
 France, " exceeds the limits of my im- 
 perfect capacity." So speaks Candide's 
 companion, Martin). 
 
 It is not necessary to furnish details illus- 
 trative of this diseased state of mankind 
 and of the world (for physical disasters and 
 human crimes are lumped together in the 
 general medley indiscriminately). What 
 
ANTI-CANT 167 
 
 seems to be more required is, that we 
 would take note of some of the reflections 
 to which the contemplation of this hell 
 upon earth gives rise. 
 
 In the first place, is this evil plight of 
 mankind a permanent necessity ? The 
 gloomiest of all answers to this question 
 appears to be the only one of which, ac- 
 cording to the teaching of this book, it is 
 susceptible. " Do you think," said Can- 
 dide, "that mankind always massacred each 
 other as they do now ? Were they always 
 guilty of lies, fraud, treachery, ingratitude, 
 inconstancy, envy, ambition, and cruelty ? 
 Were they always thieves, fools, cowards, 
 gluttons, drunkards, misers, calumniators, 
 debauchees, fanatics, and hypocrites ? " 
 " Do you believe," said Martin, " that hawks 
 have always been accustomed to eat pigeons 
 when they came in their way ? " " Doubt- 
 less," said Candide. "Well, then," replied 
 Martin, "if hawks have always had the 
 same nature, why should you maintain that 
 mankind change theirs ? " 
 
1 68 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 The notion that there is any superior 
 Being interested in ameliorating man's dis- 
 tressed condition, receives scornful notice in 
 the following terms : "My reverend father," 
 says Candide to a famous dervish, who 
 passed for the best philosopher in Turkey, 
 "there is a horrible deal of evil on the 
 earth." " What signifies it," says the der- 
 vish, " whether there is evil or good ? 
 When his highness sends a ship to Egypt, 
 does he trouble his head whether the rats 
 in the vessel are at their ease or not ? " 
 " What must then be done ? " says Pangloss. 
 " Be silent," answers the dervish. 
 
 Such then being the conclusion, what is 
 its practical effect ? 
 
 Well ! the proper course to be pursued 
 in order to secure relative happiness {i.e. 
 the least possible amount of unhappiness 
 under the circumstances), is to confine the 
 sphere of life within narrow limits, and 
 then to "work without disputing." "It is 
 the only way to render life supportable." 
 In other words, we must imitate the example 
 
ANTI-CANT 169 
 
 of the good old man, who "never knew 
 the name of any mufti or vizier breathing," 
 who "never inquired what is doing at 
 Constantinople, but who was contented with 
 sending thither the produce of his garden, 
 which he cultivated with his own hands, 
 his own labour and that of his children, 
 keeping off from them three great evils — 
 illness, vice, and want." 
 
 " Let us take care of our garden." Para- 
 phrased, this means, " The world is a bad 
 place to live in, let us keep as far away from 
 it as we can, and mind our own business." 
 
 That this solution did not really satisfy 
 the seekers after happiness, has been already 
 seen. Has Voltaire then nothing beyond 
 this to recommend? Is this his ultima 
 Thule in this direction ? 
 
 On this point it may be observed that, 
 as we draw near the close of " Candide," 
 glimpses of certain more positive con- 
 clusions make their appearance, at the 
 same time that the design of the whole 
 book as a protest against cant, rather than 
 
170 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 as an independent expression of opinion, 
 becomes increasingly clear. 
 
 The nature of the more positive con- 
 clusions above indicated may be illustrated 
 as follows: (1) "We are all children of 
 the same Divine Father who loves us, 
 but who has not exempted us from the 
 most callous sorrows, the most grievous 
 maladies, an innumerable tribe of miseries 
 that afflict the human race. What we 
 call life is a compound of pleasure and 
 pain. It is the passing away of a certain 
 stated portion of time that . . . every one 
 ought to employ in doing good to the 
 community in which he is placed ; in the 
 enjoyment of the works of Providence, 
 without idly seeking after hidden causes ; 
 in squaring his conduct by the rules of 
 conscience ; and above all, in showing a 
 due respect to religion. Happy is he 
 who can follow this unerringly. 
 
 (2) "... respect the impenetrable veil 
 with which the Deity envelops his man- 
 ner of operating upon us. It is perhaps 
 
ANTI-CANT 171 
 
 man who precipitates himself into the 
 abyss of misfortunes, under which he 
 groans. Of a frugivorous animal he has 
 made himself a carnivorous one. The 
 savages which we have seen eat only 
 Jesuits, and do not live on bad terms 
 among themselves. These savages, if 
 there be one scattered here and there 
 in the woods, only subsisting by acorns 
 and herbs, are, without doubt, still more 
 happy. Society has given birth to the 
 greatest crimes." In this passage, Voltaire 
 enunciates the favourite XVIIIth century 
 theory (against which, however, Johnson's 
 masculine mind rebelled) of the superiority 
 of man in a state of nature. 
 
 (3) " Dear Cacambo ! Adorable Zeno- 
 ida ! " cried Candide, " you efface from my 
 heart the deep traces of my misfortunes. 
 Love and friendship prepare for me future 
 days of serenity and uninterrupted delights 
 . . . everything is for the best in regard to 
 me ; all is good in nature." This goes rather 
 beyond the passage about the cultivation 
 
172 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 of the garden, since it brings into pro- 
 minence the importance of social, and 
 especially of domestic, relationships, as 
 helping man to the recovery of that state 
 of nature from which he has lapsed. 
 
 In " Rasselas," as has been already re- 
 marked, Human Nature is not contemplated 
 as a seething mass of iniquity, or as a 
 prey to the direst ills capable of being 
 conceived. Rather, what here appears is, 
 that the experience of life everywhere dis- 
 appoints its promise. There are no real 
 pleasures to be enjoyed either in solitude 
 or in society. The gaiety of dissipation, 
 the life of a hermit, the position of per- 
 sons placed in high stations, not less than 
 that of those who spend their days in 
 pastoral seclusion, these are all alike un- 
 satisfying, whilst in some cases they be- 
 come unendurable. 
 
 That under these circumstances man is 
 not capable of improvement, and that his 
 chances of happiness may not be multi- 
 plied, we do not find stated, nor perhaps 
 
ANTI-CANT 173 
 
 did the English moralist go to this length. 
 At the same time, in " Rasselas" there does 
 not appear to be much hope entertained of 
 any very great results being thus brought to 
 pass. Thus, the redistribution of property 
 is seen to be ineffectual as a factor of hap- 
 piness, on the ground that though "there 
 may be community of material posses- 
 sions, there can never be community of 
 love or of esteem. It must happen that 
 one will please more than another ; he that 
 knows himself despised will always be 
 envious." And later on in the book (in 
 a passage already referred to) the Prince 
 confesses " an indulgence of fantastic de- 
 light. ... I have frequently endeavoured 
 to imagine the possibility of a perfect 
 government, by which all wrong should 
 be restrained, all vice reformed, and all 
 the subjects preserved in tranquillity and 
 innocence" . . . "Such," said Imlac, "are 
 the effects of visionary schemes." 
 
 Moreover, in addition to these and other 
 like remarks (which, of course, do not 
 
i»74 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 preclude useful and beneficent undertakings 
 in the interests of human welfare), the 
 doctrine of " Rasselas " (deeply rooted in its 
 author — vide Boswell — Dr. Hill's edition, 
 ii. 22, note) is to the effect, that man's 
 power of forecasting the future is so nar- 
 rowly limited, that he has " no other rule for 
 choice than to remove from all apparent 
 evil." This doctrine applies both to the 
 state and to the individual, though the 
 quotation given is actually applied only to 
 the latter. At all events, the possibilities 
 of progress by the initiation of social and 
 political reforms do not, in the Johnsonian 
 view, extend very far. 
 
 On the subject of what we have called 
 relative happiness, " Rasselas " is excep- 
 tionally strong. The phrase has indeed, in 
 this case, a special appropriateness, since 
 the relation of things to each other and to 
 their attendant circumstances, was John- 
 son's favourite theme. From this point of 
 view, he here discusses the advantages of 
 matrimony as compared with celibacy, of 
 
ANTI-CANT 175 
 
 early as compared with late marriages, of 
 the monastic as compared with the secular 
 life, his usual method being to decide in 
 favour of some given course as intrinsically 
 preferable, whilst at the same time admit- 
 ting that there may sometimes be reasons 
 for preferring the alternative. The discus- 
 sions are carried on in the spirit of the 
 familiar table-talk, which they reproduce in 
 a more polished form. They have a good 
 healthy ring about them, and lend no coun- 
 tenance either to an affected or to an exag- 
 gerated insistance on the extent of human 
 wretchedness. " Dear Princess," said Ras- 
 selas, " you fall into the common errors of 
 exaggeratory declamation by producing . . . 
 examples of national calamities which are 
 found in books, rather than in the world, 
 and which, as they are horrid, are ordained 
 to be rare. Let us not imagine evils which 
 we do not feel, nor injure life by misrepre- 
 sentations. . . . While courts are disturbed 
 with intestine competitions, and ambassa- 
 dors are negotiating in foreign countries, 
 
176 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 the smith still plies his anvil, and the hus- 
 bandman drives his plough forward ; the 
 necessaries of life are required and obtained, 
 and the successive business of the season 
 continues to make its wonted revolutions." 
 (Note that here we meet with the same 
 trend of thought which we saw followed in 
 " Candide." In both cases, comfort is ob- 
 tained by fixing attention on the realities 
 of life under its domestic and work-a-day 
 aspects, rather than by engagement with 
 the affairs of the world in a more ambitious 
 sense.) 
 
 And what a depth of tenderness and of 
 human sympathy there is in the melancholy 
 of " Rasselas " ! Its sorrows spring from 
 the heart of mankind, and are such as make 
 themselves felt always and everywhere ; 
 e.g. " Praise," said the Sage with a sigh, "is 
 to an old man an empty sound. I have 
 neither mother to be delighted with the 
 reputation of her son, nor wife to partake 
 the honours of her husband. I have out- 
 lived my friends and my rivals. Nothing is 
 
ANTI-CANT 177 
 
 now of much importance ; for I cannot 
 extend my interest beyond myself. Youth 
 is delighted with applause, because it is 
 considered as the earnest of some future 
 good, and because the prospect of life is far 
 extended ; but to me, who am now declining 
 to decrepitude, there is little to be feared 
 from the malevolence of men, and yet less 
 to be hoped from their affection or esteem. 
 Something they may take away, but they 
 can give me nothing." 
 
 But the sense of man's misery which finds 
 expression in ' ' Rasselas " is but the other 
 side of its author's "larger hope." The 
 latter is not obtruded and indeed is very 
 seldom allowed to appear. Explicitly, it is 
 not more than twice mentioned, and even 
 then the language in which it finds utter- 
 ance, restricts itself to the most general 
 statements. But this sober and restrained 
 character attaching to the words used, ren- 
 ders them all the more weighty, especially 
 in a composition of this kind. It would 
 have been easy for Johnson to have 
 
 M 
 
178 THE "GOOD MAN' 
 
 improved the occasion by the employment 
 of " words in season " more confident and 
 cocksure as well as more specifically Chris- 
 tian. Not such, however, was the course 
 taken. Man's present unhappiness was far 
 too awful a subject to be utilised by a 
 writer of Johnson's sincerity as a mere foil 
 to the state of bliss provided, by way 
 of compensation, in a future life. What 
 " Rasselas " has to say about " eternal hope " 
 amounts, in the first place, to an expression 
 of belief that, in spite of darkness, bewil- 
 derment, and tears, man can never really 
 be punished by God for doing his duty. 
 "When we act according to our duty, we 
 commit the events to Him by whose laws 
 our actions are governed, and who will suffer 
 none to be finally punished for obedience." 
 
 The other religious conviction proclaimed 
 in this volume is that, not indeed of the 
 immortality of the soul (since "the Being 
 which made the soul can destroy it "), but 
 rather that which springs from "humbly 
 learning that the soul will not be annihilated 
 
ANTI-CANT 179 
 
 by Him that made it." "This," says Imlac, 
 "must be learnt from 'a higher authority' 
 than that of philosophy." 
 
 And then Rasselas continues and con- 
 cludes (as also we must conclude), by re- 
 citing what he regards as the main lesson 
 suggested by a visit to the Pyramids. 
 "How gloomy would be these mansions 
 of the dead to him who did not know 
 that he should never die ; that what now 
 acts shall continue its agency, and what 
 now thinks shall think on for ever. Those 
 that lie here stretched before us, the wise 
 and the powerful of ancient times, warn us 
 to remember the shortness of our present 
 state; they were perhaps snatched away 
 while they were busy, like us, in the ' choice 
 of life.'" 
 
 " To me," said the Princess, " the choice 
 of life is become less important ; I hope 
 hereafter to think only on the choice of 
 eternity." 
 
VI 
 PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 
 
 "LETTRES PERSANES" 
 By Montesquieu (1721) 
 
 "CITIZEN OF THE WORLD" 
 By Oliver Goldsmith (1760) 
 
VI 
 
 The class of literature which we shall next 
 attempt to represent, is that which criti- 
 cises European society from a cosmopolitan, 
 or rather from a pseudo-oriental, point of 
 view. 
 
 The attempt to invest these criticisms 
 with an Eastern character would have to 
 be pronounced a failure, if there were any 
 reason to believe that it was seriously made. 
 There is, however, no such reason, though 
 Montesquieu's description of court and 
 harem life in Persia is vividly drawn. The 
 disguise in which these critics appear can 
 only be regarded as a literary artifice, and 
 is indeed too transparently unreal to pro- 
 duce any other impression. 
 
 Yet though realistic verisimilitude was 
 
 neither achieved nor seriously attempted 
 
 183 
 
184 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 by these writers, the orientalism which they 
 affected served a very definite purpose. It 
 did so, in the first place, on the merely 
 subordinate ground that it was at that 
 time extremely fashionable, and contributed 
 therefore to the success of those authors 
 who knew how to avail themselves of it. 
 We have indeed quite sufficient evidence 
 in the Lettres Persanes and the Citizen of 
 the World (to go no further) of the attrac- 
 tion exercised by Asia upon Europe during 
 the XVIIIth century. Alike the Persian, 
 in the one case, and the Chinaman, in the 
 other, are exhibited as meeting with Euro- 
 peans who claim to know more of Persia 
 and China respectively than they know 
 themselves. 1 Nor are "Persian Tales" 
 more appreciated by the French court lady, 2 
 than are Chinese ornaments by the English 
 " Lady of distinction." 3 " The English 
 are . . . generally pleased with everything 
 that comes from China. . . . They have 
 
 1 Lettres Persanes, LXXII. ; Citizen, XXXIII. 
 
 2 Lettres Persanes, CXI I. 3 Citizen, XIV. 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 185 
 
 filled their houses with our furniture, their 
 public gardens with our fireworks, and 
 their very ponds with our fish." J 
 
 It was not, however, merely in order to 
 secure popularity for their writings, that 
 Montesquieu and Goldsmith clothed them 
 in an Eastern garb. Their object was to 
 place themselves, as far as possible, in the 
 position of detached observers, and for that 
 purpose these oriental accessories afforded 
 them an invaluable scaffolding from which 
 to make their survey. The expedient was 
 one which in fact just satisfied their re- 
 quirements. For whilst, on the one hand, 
 they had no thought of judging the morals 
 and manners of Western Europe by refer- 
 ence to an ideal standard, they were yet, 
 on the other hand, anxious to escape from 1 
 the necessity of shaping their criticisms I 
 in accordance with conventional demands. 
 Moreover, they were both of them (Mon- J 
 tesquieu especially) lovers of paradox, and 
 no better excuse for the statement of 
 
 1 Letter CX. 
 
1 86 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 paradoxical opinions could possibly have 
 been devised than that of attributing them 
 to an imaginary Persian or Chinaman. Vol- 
 taire has given it as his opinion, that if 
 Montesquieu had been speaking in his 
 own person, he would not always have 
 ventured to express himself as he has 
 done when speaking in his character as a 
 Persian, 1 and this seems highly probable. 
 In any case, the pseudo-oriental method of 
 criticism is full of piquancy, though it of 
 course suffers owing to its having lost 
 the novelty which it did not altogether 
 possess even a hundred and eighty years 
 ago. 
 
 ' The Citizen of the World was obviously 
 suggested by the Lettres Persanes. The 
 later volume, however, resembles the earlier 
 one chiefly in the merely general sense 
 
 1 " II risque souvent, pour s'egayer avec le lecteur, ce 
 qu'il n'aurait peut-etre pas risque en son propre nom. Lui 
 m6me a soin de nous en avertir, lorsqu'il fait dire a son 
 philosophe persan qu'il a pris le g6ut du pays oii il est (la 
 France), oii l'on aime a soutenir des opinions extraordin- 
 aires, et a reduire tout en paradoxes." 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 187 
 
 that, like its predecessor, it is a series of 
 letters written by an Eastern traveller who 
 is engaged in studying European civilisa- 
 tion. Also, the subjects of the criticisms 
 made are, to a certain extent, the same in 
 both cases. But even when they are so, 
 what Goldsmith has to say on them is 
 almost entirely his own. Goldsmith in- 
 deed was not only a most original writer, 
 but his originality found in this species 
 of composition a most congenial mode of 
 expression. He was not likely therefore 
 to borrow largely from Montesquieu, who 
 besides was a man of a wholly different 
 order of intelligence. 
 
 It was, however, of course inevitable J 
 that certain things in the XVIIIth cen- 
 tury should present themselves to two 
 independent observers in the same light. 
 Thus, both Montesquieu and Goldsmith 
 revolted (as did also Voltaire) against the 
 contemporary manner of conducting fune- 
 rals, 1 they both of them condemned the 
 
 1 Lettres Persanes, XL.; Citizen, XII. and XCVI. 
 
1 88 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 severity of the contemporary penal laws, 1 
 and they were both of them scandalised by 
 the extravagance and outrageousness of the 
 contemporary fashions in dress. 2 
 
 Both works were the means of first 
 securing for their authors a literary reputa- 
 tion. On the other hand, they are both 
 of them to be looked upon, in a certain 
 sense, merely as studies preparatory to 
 the production of chefs d'ceuvre. For the 
 j Lettres Persanes furnish only a bare out- 
 line of the teaching of the Esprit des Lois, 
 whilst the character-sketches of the Citizen 
 of the World do not attain to the perfec- 
 tion of those with which we are familiar 
 in the "Vicar of Wakefield." Hence, if 
 it were merely a question of indicating and 
 illustrating the best work done by these 
 two authors, we should not have recourse 
 to either of these two volumes of letters, 
 though neither of them now receives, and 
 one of them (the Citizen of the World) 
 
 1 Lettres Persanes, LXXXI ; Citizen, LXXX. 
 
 2 Lettres Persanes, C. ; Citizen, LXXXI. 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 189 
 
 perhaps never has received, its due share 
 of appreciation. 
 
 But for the purpose of our present dis- 
 cussion — which is to form an idea of the 
 "good man" of the XVIIIth century 
 from a cosmopolitan point of view — we 
 cannot do better than to confine ourselves 
 to the Lettres Persanes and the Citizen y 
 of the World, the one of which was pub- 
 lished in 172 1, the other in 1760. 
 
 The former work is, in the first in- 
 stance, a satire on XVIIIth century society, -j 
 The satire is delicate and refined rather 
 than scathing ; it neither deals knock-down 
 blows nor inflicts poisonous wounds. The 
 fact that Montesquieu was received into 
 the French Academy, which he had pre- 
 viously ridiculed in these letters, is signifi- 
 cant of their general effect, which was 
 not such as to arouse profound or lasting 
 resentment. 
 
 In the earlier part of the volume, there, 
 is an abundance of personal satire. In- 
 stances in point are, Letter XLVIII., 
 
igo THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 which consists in a series of lampoons on 
 certain typical representatives of Parisian 
 society; Letter LI I., on middle-aged and 
 old women attempting to appear young ; 
 Letter LVII., on confessors and casuists; 
 Letter LVII I., on charlatans and quacks; 
 Letter LIX., on Laudatores temporis acti. 
 
 But in this field, Montesquieu has been 
 surpassed by many other satirists, notably 
 by our own Goldsmith. He had none of 
 the latter's insight into individual foibles 
 (Beau Tibbs, for example, in Letters LIV. 
 and LV. of the Citizen would have been 
 quite beyond him). The fact is, that Mon- 
 tesquieu was a man who did not really 
 care for anything about persons, so much 
 as he cared for tendencies, principles, in- 
 stitutions, culture, the condition of society 
 and of states and nations. Now a satirist 
 cannot but be placed to some extent at 
 a disadvantage who is thus situated. 
 
 On the other hand, his employment of 
 oriental illustrations is more quaintly hum- 
 orous than is that of Goldsmith. A 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 191 
 
 further compensation is, that even towards 
 classes of men whom he disliked and 
 whom for the most part he chastises, 
 Montesquieu was not altogether wanting 
 in sympathy. Thus, few writers have 
 ever shown a juster appreciation of the 
 difficulties of the clergy in reference to the 
 laity, than that which we find exemplified 
 in Letter LXI. 1 Per contra, his treatment 
 of individuals is sometimes not a little one- 
 sided, as may be seen if only from his 
 hyperbolical characterisation of Louis XIV. 
 in Letter XXXVII. 
 
 But we have in the Lettres Persanes, 
 not only a satire on XVIIIth century 
 society, but also an anticipatory sketch of 
 the tendencies of XVIIIth century thought. 
 It would be difficult indeed to find any 
 book which breathes the spirit of the age 
 in which it was produced to the same 
 extent. The points discussed or referred 
 to relate to such questions as : the origin 
 and growth of society ; the significance of 
 1 Cf. also Letter CXXV1I. 
 
192 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 luxury ; the relations of the sexes ; matri- 
 mony ; the value of religious toleration ; 
 Christianity and other religions ; war ; 
 suicide ; the variations of population ; the 
 basis of Civil and of International Law — all 
 of them questions which recur again and 
 again throughout XVIIIth century specu- 
 lation. 
 
 Enough has now been said in order to 
 prepare the way for the more particular 
 inquiry upon which we are engaged. Of 
 course we should look in vain, if we 
 attempted to discover in these letters the 
 character of a "good man," either cosmo- 
 politan or otherwise. But if our object is, 
 to ascertain the standpoint from which in 
 the XVIIIth century a "good man" of 
 this cosmopolitan kind was conceived, we 
 shall find plenty of materials available for 
 this purpose in the Lettres Persanes. 
 
 The root principle then of this "good 
 man's " view of life is his belief in the 
 supremacy of the moral law. For the 
 French word justice, as understood in 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 193 
 
 Letter LXXXIV., means really the prin- 
 ciple of justice, i.e. righteousness. 1 This 
 principle of justice is spoken of as divine 
 and eternal, and is, for practical purposes, 
 identified by Montesquieu with the idea 
 of God. Here is what he says on this | 
 subject : "If there is a God, He must 
 necessarily be just, for if He were not so, 
 He would be the worst and most degraded 
 of all existences. This justice consists 
 in an objective relationship of mutual fit- 
 ness between two things. The relation- 
 ship is always the same, no matter whether 
 it is to the eye of God, or of an angel, or 
 
 1 "The Latin- and Romance-speaking peoples have 
 but a single word for 'justice' and for righteousness. 
 The almost inevitable consequence is to lose sight of the 
 larger meaning in the smaller" (Professor Sanday in the 
 Journal of Theological Studies for July 1900). In the 
 passage from Letter LXXXIV., translated in the above 
 paragraph, the tendency seems to be in this direction. 
 For at the outset of that passage the chief if not sole 
 reference is to justice, in the objective sense of that term, 
 whilst the passage closes by recognising justice on its moral 
 side as = equiti. The latter, i.e. the sense of justice, is 
 really as necessary as is the former to Montesquieu's 
 conclusion. 
 
 N 
 
194 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 of a human being, that it presents itself. 
 It is true that men often do not see wherein 
 the relationship consists. Often too, even 
 when they do see it, they turn away from 
 it. . . . Justice raises her voice, but it is 
 with difficulty that amidst the tumult of 
 passions she makes herself heard. 
 
 " Men are of course liable to commit 
 acts of injustice. They do so, because it 
 serves their interest, and because they 
 prefer to gratify themselves rather than 
 other people. It is always because they 
 take count of themselves that they thus 
 behave. There is no such thing as a 
 wrong-doer without a motive. There must 
 be a reason which determines men's actions, 
 and this reason always proceeds from self- 
 interest. 
 
 " God, however, cannot possibly do any- 
 thing that is unjust. Granting that He has 
 a sense of justice, He must necessarily give 
 effect to it. For seeing that He has need 
 of nothing, and is self-sufficing, He would 
 be the most evil of all evil-doers, inasmuch 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 195 
 
 as He would transgress without having any 
 interest in doing so. 
 
 " Hence, even if there were no God, 
 we should be under a continual obligation 
 to love justice : i.e. to do our best 
 to become more like Him of whom we 
 have such an exalted idea, and who, if 
 He was a real being, would necessarily 
 be a righteous being. Though then no 
 longer bound by the restraints of religion, 
 we should have no right not to be bound 
 by those of equity." 1 
 
 Montesquieu thus argues in favour of J 
 the underivative supremacy of the moral 
 law in human nature, as against the view 
 which ascribes the origin of morality and 
 justice to a convention entered into between 
 human beings. It would indeed have been 
 disastrous, he remarks (in terms which to 
 a present-day reader may seem prelusive 
 of Mr. Benjamin Kidd's "Social Evolu- 
 tion"), if there had not been this "inward 
 principle" influencing the strong in favour 
 
 1 Letter LXXXIV. 
 
196 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 of the weak. The security of the latter 
 depends not on any convention or contract, 
 but on the blessed fact that there is in the 
 hearts of all men an inherent sense of 
 justice. " But for this, we should be in a 
 continual state of alarm ; we should move 
 about amongst men as if we were in the 
 presence of lions, and we should never for 
 a moment feel assured of our lives, our 
 property, or our honour." 
 
 Though, however, Montesquieu thus 
 maintains the supremacy of the moral 
 principle in the world both of nature and 
 of human life, he does not understand the 
 assertion of this axiomatic truth as equi- 
 valent to a solution of all the difficulties 
 suggested by the contemplation of human 
 affairs. Still less does he propose to him- 
 self anything in the shape of a Thtodicde. 
 ''His main interest (as has been already 
 explained) centred on states and nations ; 
 the law of righteousness presents itself to 
 him in connection with communities rather 
 than with individuals. But it was no 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 197 
 
 part of his aim even in regard to com- 
 munities, "to justify the ways of God to 
 man," or to construct a synthesis of his- 
 tory having this for its object. His view \ 
 of God is not that of a theologian but of a 
 philosopher, and especially it is the view 
 of a political philosopher. 
 
 Rather, the fundamental position (as 
 above determined) is here further de- 
 veloped as follows. The " good man " 
 will in the first place long after, and 
 endeavour to realise, a state of things in 
 which the rule of law prevails over that 
 of arbitrary caprice. Therefore, he will 
 be a lover of constitutional government, 
 of just administration, 1 of punishments 
 neither too lax nor too severe, 2 and of 
 
 1 Letters CIII. and CIV. Montesquieu did not visit 
 England until five years after the publication of the 
 Lettres Persanes. His political preferences, therefore, as 
 expressed in these letters, were not due to his admira- 
 tion of the English, whom he here represents as not 
 estimating highly enough the virtues of submission and 
 obedience, and as holding questionable views with regard 
 to their own constitutional obligations (Letter CV.). 
 
 2 Letters LXXXI. and XCVI. 
 
198 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 scientific jurisprudence. 1 In this connec- 
 tion, the contrast between East and West 
 is utilised with admirable effect. "The 
 power of the sovereigns of Europe is 
 very considerable ; indeed it may be said 
 that what they possess in this way is what 
 they desire. But the extent to which 
 they exercise this power is by no means 
 what it is with our sultans, the reason 
 being, in the first place, that they have 
 no wish to outrage the manners and re- 
 ligion pf their subjects, and, secondly, that 
 it is not to their interest to carry matters 
 to such extreme lengths." 2 
 
 But further, the law of righteousness 
 or, more correctly, righteousness as law, 
 must enter into the relations of States with 
 each other, and must likewise regulate the 
 conduct of each State in reference to its 
 own citizens. Montesquieu's speculations 
 on International Law fall under the first 
 
 1 Letters LXVIII. and CI. 
 
 2 Letter CI 1 1., and much more to the same effect both in 
 this and the following letter. 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 199 
 
 head, those on Liberty and Equality and 
 on Religious Toleration, under the second. 
 The ideas maintained in respect to both 
 these branches of inquiry were, of course, 
 worked out by their author in much greater 
 detail subsequently. What he here says 
 about them is of interest chiefly, as showing 
 his sense of the importance of such con- 
 siderations from a political, and perhaps 
 still more from an ethical, point of view. 
 
 (1) International Law. These two 
 points of view are indeed to a great 
 extent identified, when it is urged 1 that 
 International Law is to be regarded as 
 affecting States after precisely the same 
 manner in which the Civil Law affects 
 individuals. " It is said that there are two 
 quite different kinds of justice, the one of 
 which regulates men's private affairs, and 
 which obtains in the Civil Law ; the other 
 of which regulates the questions which arise 
 between nations and which is dominant in 
 International Law ; just as if this latter was 
 
 1 Letters XCV. and XCVI. 
 
200 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 not itself Civil Law, a part i.e. of the civil 
 law, not indeed of any particular country, 
 but of the world ! " * 
 
 This analogy is, in the following chapter, 
 explained and illustrated. Thus, with re- 
 gard to the right of one State to make 
 war upon another, we are told that this 
 right is neither more nor less than that of 
 a private citizen to defend himself in the 
 event of his being attacked, or to defend 
 his neighbours, in the event of their being 
 attacked. The resort to force is not for 
 any other reason legitimate, in the case 
 either of the individual or of the State. 
 And just as in private life there may be 
 hostile measures taken of reprisal, of ex- 
 clusion from privileges, of renunciation of 
 intimacy, without any personal attack being 
 made on the offending person or party, so 
 when nations are concerned, the supreme 
 arbitrament of war is only to be employed 
 where nothing else but the destruction of 
 the enemy can compensate for the injury 
 
 1 Letter XCV. 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 201 
 
 done by him, there being, in this case 
 likewise, a possibility of making reprisals, 
 of excluding others from advantages pre- 
 viously enjoyed by them, and of renouncing 
 their alliance. 
 
 We have no concern here either with 
 the merits of these doctrines, or with their 
 historical antecedents. They are referred 
 to simply as instances of the extension of 
 the " good man's " morality (or of what 
 we have called his "law of righteousness"), 
 so as to make it cover not only the moral, 
 but also the political, sphere of action. 
 
 We have the same purpose in view when 
 we refer (2) to the teaching of these letters 
 on the subject of Liberty and Equality and 
 of Religious Toleration. 
 
 Montesquieu (to whom the device of 
 "Liberty and Equality" seems originally 
 to have been due *) praises, as the best form 
 of government, that one " which secures itsj 
 
 1 Cf. Bodley's "France," vol. i. p. 202, "Fraternity 
 alone of the three national virtues owes its legend entirely 
 to the Revolution." 
 
202 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 ends with the least effort." Hence, that 
 one will be "nearest to perfection which 
 rules over men in the manner which is 
 most agreeable to their leanings and in- 
 clinations." 1 The liberty thus conceded 
 increases men's love of the State, by making 
 them feel that they are themselves a part 
 of it and that it belongs to themselves. Its 
 glory becomes their own, and owing to their 
 being possessed by this feeling, they will 
 do for the State voluntarily, what not all 
 the arbitrary rewards and punishments of 
 despotic rulers would induce them to do by 
 bribery and menaces. 2 
 
 Political liberty is thus recommended, 
 because it is only by means of such 
 liberty that the individual can associate 
 himself morally with the government of 
 the State. No doubt it is self-interest of 
 the material, as well as of the moral, kind 
 which thus operates. 3 None the less, the 
 " good man " desires that he may be 
 politically free, in order that he may 
 
 1 Letter LXXXI. 2 Letter XC. 3 Letter CXXIII. 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 203 
 
 attain to the possession of higher moral 
 privileges, or, in other words, that he may 
 better realise righteousness as a law. 
 
 In Letter CXXIII., the advantages of 
 Equality are maintained on very much 
 the same grounds, though in this case, it 
 must be admitted, the ethical point of 
 view is to some extent subordinated to 
 motives of self-interest as more ordinarily 
 understood. 
 
 Lastly, Religious Toleration. The "good 
 man's" conviction on this point springs, 
 partly from his sense of " the inhumanity 
 of inflicting burdens on men's consciences," 
 partly from his belief that the coexistence 
 of a multiplicity of religions is helpful 
 rather than injurious, 1 partly again from the 
 constantly repeated spectacle of the hor- 
 rors produced by intolerance. 2 The ideal 
 state of things, according to our "good 
 man," would perhaps be that which is 
 desiderated in Letter XLVI. There, those 
 
 1 Letter LXXXVI. 
 
 2 Histoire d 'Apheridion et dAstarte, Letter LXVII. 
 
204 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 who dispute about matters of religion are 
 exhorted to remember, that "the surest 
 way of pleasing the divinity is to conform 
 to ' the demands of society and the duties 
 of humanity." A moral regime, broad 
 enough and binding enough to enable 
 men to live together in peace and happi- 
 ness, notwithstanding their differences of 
 religious belief, such, it would appear, is 
 the true solution of the difficulties arising 
 out of that spirit of proselytism, which 
 " originated with the Jews, and was by 
 them derived from the Egyptians." 
 
 All these instances are intended to illus- 
 trate the "good man's" love of justice 
 or righteousness. Yet is this veneration 
 for morality and law not so much that 
 of the mystic, as rather that of the would- 
 be moral and legal reformer. It issues 
 not so much in attempts to exhibit the 
 embodiments which justice has already 
 received, as rather in the employment 
 of rational analysis, in order to make 
 the approximation to ideal justice more 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 205 
 
 perfect. For Montesquieu's view is pre- 
 eminently that of the "good man" en- 
 
 lightmed by- reason, nor is there any 
 
 other view which is more characteristic of 
 all that side of XVIIIth century specu- 
 lation to which the term "enlightenment" 
 was soon to be applied. That term was 
 afterwards understood to imply pretty much 
 what Montesquieu's "good man" has been 
 shown to have possessed, viz. : lucidity ; 
 simplicity ; humanitarianism ; desire to re- 
 strict the powers of government ; love of 
 liberty and equality and of religious tolera- 
 tion. 
 
 Yet neither in our "good man's" case, 
 nor in that of the Aufklarung more 
 generally, did these tendencies of XVIIIth 
 century enlightenment degenerate into re- 
 volutionary tendencies. 1 They did not do so 
 in the former case, owing to Montesquieu's 
 
 1 How little revolutionary Montesquieu was in the 
 political sense, may be seen from Letter LXXIX. ; cfi. 
 especially " Quelles que soient les lois, il faut toujours les 
 suivre et les re'garder comme la conscience publique, a 
 laquelle celle des particuliers doit se conformer toujours." 
 
206 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 sense of justice as founded and rooted 
 in the very nature of things, and owing to 
 his reasonableness as thence arising ; they 
 did not do so in the latter class of cases, 
 owing to the operation of some analogous 
 influence, as e.g. that of Natural Reli- 
 gion. And as we know (though with that 
 fact we are not here concerned), Montes- 
 quieu became, as he advanced, more con- 
 stitutional and less revolutionary, so much 
 J so, that he is to be regarded as the author 
 of that French parliamentary system, for 
 which, according to Mr. Bodley, France 
 owes him no thanks. 1 
 
 There are other points which deserve to 
 be added to the picture of the "good man" 
 as he is made to appear in these letters. Of 
 these, however, only a very few can be here 
 mentioned. 
 
 (i) The "good man's" love of goodness. 
 " What a satisfaction for a man, on ex- 
 amining himself, to find that he is possessed 
 by a sense of justice ! By such a pleasure, 
 
 1 " France," vol. ii. p. 246. 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 207 
 
 notwithstanding its seriousness, he must 
 needs be enchanted. To be sensible of it 
 is, to see oneself lifted as far above those 
 who have no knowledge of it as one is 
 lifted above tigers and bears. Yes! if I 
 could be sure of never for a moment falter- 
 ing in the pursuit of that goodness which I 
 have before my eyes, I should deem myself 
 the foremost man in the world." 
 
 (2) The use of adversity. " Adversity is 
 less a chastisement than a warning. Pre- 
 cious indeed are the days which lead us 
 to expiate our offences. The seasons which 
 require to be shortened are rather those of 
 our prosperity. What do all our impatient 
 outcries serve to show, except that we desire 
 to be happy independently of Him who 
 bestows happiness because He is happiness 
 itself? " 
 
 (3) In praise of modesty. " Approach, ye 
 modest, that I may embrace you ! You give 
 to life its sweetness and its charm. You 
 fancy that you possess nothing, and I tell 
 you that you possess everything. You 
 
208 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 think that you humble nobody, , whereas 
 you humble all the world. And when I 
 compare you in my mind with those 
 absolute persons whom I see on all sides 
 of me, I hurl them headlong from their 
 pedestal and deposit them at your feet." 
 
 As regards the " good man's " bearing 
 in private life and in social intercourse, this 
 seems to have been the virtue on which 
 Montesquieu set the highest value, just as 
 his bite noire was, ignorant, arrogant, ego- 
 tistical self-assertion. 1 
 
 (4) Sympathy with distress. " I confess 
 that I have never seen any one shed 
 tears without being touched. My sense of 
 humanity towards the distressed is such that 
 there might have been, except them, no other 
 human beings. And even the great folk, 
 -though when they are raised aloft I find that 
 
 my heart hardens towards them, the moment 
 that they are fallen from their high estate, 
 love them." 
 
 (5) Cosmopolitan sympathy, "The heart 
 
 1 Cf. Letters L.-LIV., LXXII.-CXLIV., &c. 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 209 
 
 is a citizen of every country. ... In what- 
 ever country I have been, I have lived in it 
 just as if I had to pass my life there. And 
 always I have experienced the same warmth 
 of affection towards the virtuous, the same 
 compassion or rather the same tenderness 
 towards the distressed, the same respect for 
 those whose prosperity has not blinded them. 
 Such is my character. Wherever I find 
 men, I make for myself friends." 
 
 Revelations of his own personal experi- 
 ence are not to be expected from a writer 
 who was so much attracted by the spectacle 
 of life as it is lived in the great world. 
 Moreover, Montesquieu disliked the subjec- 
 tivity ("que nous ne jugeons jamais des 
 choses que par un retour secret que nous 
 faisons sur nousm&nes ") which lends itself 
 to such revelations. Still, the man himself 
 is recognisable in this his first published 
 work (estate 32; likewise the age of Gold- 
 smith when he published the Citizen of 
 the World) as easily as is the epoch-making 
 jurist in his more mature productions. 
 
 o 
 
210 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 The Citizen of the World consists of a 
 series of fictitious letters, originally con- 
 tributed to a weekly journal called the 
 Public Ledger, and afterwards collected 
 and reprinted in book form. 
 
 Such being the case, it would be absurd 
 to regard this work as characterised by 
 unity of design, and as intended by its 
 author to give expression to opinions 
 mutually co-ordinated and systematised. 
 At the time that he wrote these letters, 
 Goldsmith was a mere literary aspirant 
 living from hand to mouth on his earn- 
 ings (two letters a week at a guinea 
 apiece), and the idea of a reduction of his 
 views to fixed principles (with all that that 
 implies) would not have been likely to have 
 occurred to him, still less to have taken 
 shape, under these circumstances. Need- 
 less to say, no such idea ever crossed his 
 mind. 
 
 But the want of synthetic connection 
 between its parts, is only injurious to 
 a book when a coherent treatment is 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 2 1 1 
 
 demanded either by the nature of the sub- 
 ject-matter, or by the idiosyncrasy of the 
 author. In the case before us, there was 
 no demand for a treatment of this kind 
 on either of the two grounds mentioned. 
 Epistolary literature is necessarily more or 
 less unsystematic, and owes no small part 
 of its popularity to that fact. Nor did 
 Goldsmith's genius, in order to do itself 
 justice, require that his thoughts should 
 follow a prescribed order, though no doubt 
 he knew how to impart to his creations 
 artistic unity of a higher type. 
 
 The "good man," in this case, is 
 "tinctured with miscellaneous knowledge, I 
 and his manners are humanised by an > 
 intercourse with men." x " The chief busi- 1 
 ness of his life has been to procure wisdom, 
 and the chief object of that wisdom was 
 to be happy. . . . Everything is calculated 
 to increase the sphere of his happiness, 
 not his curiosity ... he is desirous of 
 understanding the heart . . . leaves home 
 
 1 Letter CVIII. 
 
212 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 to mend himself and others . . . travelling 
 has not more steeled his constitution against 
 all the vicissitudes of climate and all the 
 depressions of fatigue, than it has his mind 
 against the accidents of fortune, or the 
 accesses of despair." 1 
 
 Such is that "traveller" whom in this 
 work and in his most ambitious poem, in- 
 deed to some extent in all his writings, 
 Goldsmith has so lovingly idealised. The 
 conception of this character is, however, 
 very little what the name seems to suggest. 
 For the travelling referred to is in reality 
 the journey through life ; it does not neces- 
 sarily imply any acquaintance with foreign 
 lands, and not much even with the " tra- 
 veller's " own native land. " ' You have 
 been a traveller then, I presume ? ' in- 
 terrupted I. 'I cannot boast much of 
 travelling,' continued- he, ' for I have 
 never left the parish in which I was born 
 but three times in my life, that I can 
 remember ; but then there is not a street 
 1 Letter VII. 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 213 
 
 in the whole neighbourhood that I have 
 not lived in at some time or another.' " 1 
 Yet this cobbler is represented as having 
 arrived at a view of his vocation in life, 
 such as has not been arrived at in their 
 own case by " European travellers," who 
 "cross seas and deserts merely to measure 
 the height of a mountain, to describe the 
 cataract of a river, or tell the commodities 
 which every country may produce." 2 
 
 The "traveller," indeed, is so far from 
 being a mere tourist, that he is sharply 
 contrasted with this latter as being ex- 
 hypothesi a "good man," and one who 
 "grows wiser as well as better the farther 
 that he departs from home," whilst the 
 tourist " who goes from country to country, 
 guided by the blind impulse of curiosity, 
 is only a vagabond." 3 On the other hand, 
 Goldsmith's "good man," in his capacity 
 as traveller, is likewise strongly contrasted 
 with the character of the "recluse," the 
 
 1 "The History of a Philosophic Cobbler," Letter LXV. 
 
 2 Letter VII. 3 Ibid. 
 
214 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 ;man who fights shy of life and who accepts 
 poverty and obscurity, without any real 
 knowledge of what is thus involved. Then 
 finding that these fancied sweets are really 
 bitter, at the same time that "the world turns 
 its back upon him, and gives him leave to 
 act the philosopher in all the majesty of 
 solitude," and not having " the satisfaction 
 even of self- applause ... he regards all 
 mankind with detestation, and commencing 
 man-hater, seeks solitude to be at liberty 
 to rail." 
 
 " It has been said that he who retires to 
 solitude, is either a beast or an angel. The 
 censure is too severe, and the praise un- 
 merited ; the discontented being, who retires 
 from society, is generally some good-natured 
 man, who has begun life without experi- 
 ence, and knew not how to gain it in his 
 intercourse with mankind." x 
 
 Clearly then the "good man's" tra- 
 vels through the world, are to be under- 
 stood as meaning simply his acquisition of 
 
 1 Letter LXVII. 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 215 
 
 experience, with a view at once to the fur- 
 therance of his own self -enlightenment, 
 and the gratification of his human sympa- 
 thies, (these two motives being in fact one). 
 And not less clearly it appears, that the 
 "good man" in question will conduct himself 
 neither in the spirit of a mere novelty- 
 hunter, nor yet in that of a mere " recluse." 
 
 But let us now inquire more particularly 
 as regards the ad vantag es intended to result 
 from this diversified experience of the life of 
 mankind. 
 
 Of these the first is, a juster appreciation 
 of human nature and of the human race. 
 What this means, may be seen perhaps best 
 from Letter CXV., "On the Danger of 
 having too high an Opinion of Human 
 Nature." 
 
 "The most ignorant nations have always 
 been found to think most highly of them- 
 selves. The Deity has ever been thought 
 peculiarly concerned in their glory and pre- 
 servation . . . examine a savage in the 
 history of his country and predecessors ; 
 
216 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 you ever find his warriors able to conquer 
 armies, and his sages acquainted with more 
 than possible knowledge. . . . But whatever 
 success this practice of making demigods 
 might have been attended with in barbarous 
 nations, I do not know that any man became 
 a god in a country where the inhabitants 
 were refined." 
 
 This point is not mentioned in connection 
 with the advantages to be derived from a 
 more extended experience of life, but a close 
 study of the Citizen of the World will 
 show that this was one of the results of 
 experience on which its author set most 
 store. The demigods and heroes raised 
 aloft by mankind in the interests of its own 
 self-love, no matter whether that self-love 
 be personal, national, or sectional, these are 
 one and all dethroned by the "traveller," 
 the cosmopolitan truth-seeker, the enlight- 
 ened inquirer. 
 
 This is really the gist of the many and 
 various satirical sketches contained in the 
 Citizen of the World. All men alike 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 217 
 
 belong to the human family, and those who 
 seem not to do so by reason of their appa- 
 rent elevation above the human level, are 
 shown on examination to be just like the 
 rest, and often to be even inferior when they 
 fancied themselves superior. All alike are 
 liable to human weakness, to ignorance and 
 self-deception, to unreality and affectation, 
 to ostentation and love of display. And 
 the "traveller," inasmuch as he makes a 
 study of life and learns to look below the 
 surface of things, sees all this, and sees it 
 ever more and more clearly in proportion as 
 his experience widens and deepens. 
 
 There can be no better illustrations of this 
 progress in knowledge than those furnished 
 by Letter LXXIV. ("The Description of a 
 Little Great Man") and Letter CIV. ("The 
 Chinese Philosopher attempts to find out 
 Famous Men") respectively. In the first 
 we read, " I have reckoned up not less than 
 twenty-five great men, seventeen very great 
 men, and nine very extraordinary men, in 
 less than the compass of half-a-year. ... I 
 
218 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 wonder how posterity will be able to re- 
 member them all, or whether the people, in 
 future times, will have any business to mind 
 but that of getting the catalogue by heart. 
 Never did I enter a town which could not 
 produce ten or twelve of these little great 
 men, all fancying themselves known to the 
 rest of the world, and complimenting each 
 other upon their extensive reputation." . . . 
 "The same idea of undeserved adulation 
 that attends our great man while living, 
 often also follows him to the tomb "... &c. 
 
 " For you and I, my friend, who have no 
 humble admirer thus to attend us, we, who 
 neither are, nor ever will be, great men, 
 and who do not much care whether we 
 are great men or no, at least let us strive 
 to be honest men, and to have common 
 sense." 
 
 In the second case referred to, the philoso- 
 pher, after mixing with different classes of 
 persons in the vain endeavour to obtain a 
 true verdict as to who are " the truly great," 
 adopts the expedient of " conversing with 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 219 
 
 men of real merit," in order to find out 
 those characters which really deserve, though 
 they strive to avoid, applause. I found the 
 vulgar admiration entirely misplaced." 
 
 From the same point of view, he exposes 
 the false pretensions of the members of "the 
 Authors' Club," 1 of "the English Nobility," 2 
 of "Dr. Richard Rock (FUN) and Dr. 
 Timothy Franks (F O G H), 3 and of " Men 
 of Learning." * 
 
 This then is the first result which will 
 accrue from increased familiarity with human 
 life, provided of course that the " traveller " 
 is a good and intelligent man. 
 
 But, secondly, the effect of this juster 
 appreciation of human nature will not be, 
 to produce contempt or to engender cyni- 
 cism, but rather to draw closer the bond 
 of sympathy which unites the "traveller" 
 both to individual men and to mankind at 
 large. 
 
 This consideration is really more crucial 
 
 1 Letter XXIX. 2 Letter XXXI 1 1. 
 
 3 Letter LXVIII. 4 Letter CIV. 
 
220 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 in reference to our "good man's" char- 
 acter than is the one already mentioned. 
 It is also, not indeed more applicable, but 
 more distinctively applicable, to Goldsmith 
 himself. 
 
 For the correction of false estimates of 
 men's claims, the reduction of all men to 
 a common level having regard to their 
 common humanity, this is in a sense the 
 aim of all satire which is not simply and 
 purely vindictive. What distinguishes satir- 
 ists is, the next step that they take after 
 this point has been reached. Does the 
 conviction that men are " none good no 
 not one" lead to wholesale depreciation, to 
 unmeasured obloquy, to disbelief in virtue, 
 in a word, to distrust of the whole human 
 race? or does it lead to a more tender 
 pity and a more heartfelt love? Gold- 
 smith's "traveller" would not have been 
 ^ here exhibited as a " good man," unless his 
 progress in knowledge had been followed, 
 or rather accompanied, by progress in sym- 
 pathy. As a matter of fact, however, the 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 221 
 
 sympathetic side of this author, and by 
 consequence of his "traveller'' or "good 
 man," predominates to such an extent over 
 his more critical and strictly satirical side, 
 as for the latter to be almost lost sight 
 of in the former, or rather, so as for 
 it to find in the former its necessary 
 supplement. 
 
 We may form some idea of the pity and 
 tenderness induced by the "good man's" 
 experience of life from the following in- 
 stances. 
 
 (1) His experience makes him love his 
 friends better. "If we become poor, we 
 shall at least have the pleasure of bearing 
 poverty together : for what is fatigue or 
 famine when weighed against friendship 
 and freedom ? " 1 
 
 (2) His experience teaches him that even 
 " an important trijier " {Beau Tibbs) is 
 still a man and a brother. "As I knew 
 him to be a harmless amusing little thing, 
 I could not return his smiles with 
 
 1 Letter XL VI I. 
 
 • 
 
222 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 degree of severity ; so we walked forward 
 on terms of the utmost intimacy." 1 
 
 (3) His experience teaches him not to be 
 hard on the foibles of the great. "The 
 great have their foibles as well as the 
 little. I am almost ashamed to mention 
 it : let the foibles of the great rest in 
 peace." 2 
 
 (4) His experience teaches him that life 
 improves on acquaintance. " The life of 
 man is a journey. . . . If in the begin- 
 ning it is found dangerous, narrow, and 
 difficult, it must either grow better in the 
 end, or we shall by custom learn to bear 
 its inequality." 3 
 
 (5) His experience of life teaches him to 
 love better his own home. " Whatever 
 vicissitudes we experience in life, however 
 we toil, or wheresoever we wander, our 
 fatigued wishes still recur to home for 
 tranquillity : we long to die in that spot 
 
 1 Letter LV. 2 Letter LXVIII. 
 
 3 Letter XCV., and cf. on this point Letter LXXIIL, one 
 of the most beautiful of the whole series. 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 223 
 
 which gave us birth, and in that pleasing 
 expectation opiate every calamity." 1 
 
 (6) His experience of mens woes causes 
 him to exclaim against his own incapacity 
 to relieve them. "Why, why was I born 
 a man, and yet see the sufferings of 
 wretches I cannot relieve! . . . Why was 
 this heart of mine formed with so much 
 sensibility! or why was not my fortune 
 adapted to its impulse ! Tenderness, with- 
 out a capacity of relieving, only makes 
 the man who feels it more wretched than 
 the object which sues for assistance." 2 
 
 (7) His experience specially inclines him 
 to sympathise with the poor. " The 
 miseries of the poor are entirely dis- 
 regarded ; though some undergo more real 
 hardships in one day than the great in 
 their whole lives. It is indeed inconceiv- 
 able what difficulties the meanest English 
 
 1 Letter CI 1 1. Cj>. the well-known lines from "The 
 Traveller "— 
 
 " Where'er I roam, whatever realms I see, 
 My heart untravelled fondly turns to thee." 
 
 2 Letter CXVII. 
 
224 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 sailor or soldier endures without murmur- 
 ing or regret." 1 
 
 As regards the two last of these quota- 
 tions, the sympathy therein expressed is 
 more profound and more passionate than 
 it is in any of the previous cases. The 
 remarks made on the condition of the 
 English poor who are thus compassion- 
 ated, 2 should be compared with the parallel 
 passages of the Lettres Persanes, in 
 which reference is made to the social 
 and agrarian condition of France forty 
 years earlier. 3 The historical questions 
 suggested by this comparison, though of 
 the utmost interest and importance, can- 
 not be here discussed. It more concerns 
 us to note, that whilst the "good man" 
 of the French writer comments on the 
 state of affairs which he describes in the 
 spirit of a political philosopher keenly 
 alive to the significance of contemporary 
 
 1 Letter CXIX. 
 
 2 Letters XCL, CXVIL, CXIX. 
 
 3 Lettres Persanes, CXXXII. and CXXXVIII. 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 225 
 
 movements, 1 the companion picture (that 
 of Goldsmith i.e.) represents the "good 
 man '' as being affected solely by pity 
 and anguish. 
 
 Though, however, the "citizen of the 
 world " is a " good man " chiefly on account 
 of his human-heartedness, and scarcely if 
 at all on account of his bias in a techni- 
 cally political direction, he is yet not with- 
 out certain political leanings. But even 
 these proceed from his tender heart rather 
 than from the more intellectual part of his 
 constitution. Thus, his contemplation of 
 the political history of Europe could lead 
 him to no practical conclusions for the 
 simple reason that it filled him with no- 
 thing but loathing. " On whatever side 
 we regard the history of Europe, we shall 
 perceive it to be a tissue of crimes, follies, 
 
 1 The troubles which Montesquieu had particularly in 
 view are those which arose out of the collapse of the credit 
 system initiated by the Scotchman, John Law, Comptroller- 
 General of the French finances, during the minority of 
 Louis XV. (1718). The state of France more generally is, 
 however, occasionally also referred to. 
 
 P 
 
226 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 and misfortunes, of politics without design, 
 and wars without consequence." 1 
 
 The "citizen" is more reasonable in 
 arguing against national ambition and ag- 
 gressiveness. 2 His more general conten- 
 tion on this subject grows out of a topical 
 reference to the Anglo-French war, in re 
 the possession of Canada. This war is 
 here (as often elsewhere in writings of the 
 period) held up to odium as "a very de- 
 structive war," in which " they " (the Eng- 
 lish and French i.e.) " have already spilled 
 much blood, are excessively irritated, and 
 all upon account of one side's desiring to 
 wear greater quantities of fur than the 
 other." 
 
 But the discussion thus initiated, instead 
 of being continued for the purpose of advo- 
 cating a conciliatory and temperate policy 
 on the part of the nations between whom 
 there has arisen friction, soon develops 
 into a denunciation of colonial expansion. 3 
 
 1 Letter XLII. 2 Letter XVII. 
 
 3 Montesquieu had used similar arguments in Letter 
 CXXII. 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 227 
 
 On this question Goldsmith felt strongly, 
 as may be judged from his further discus- 
 sion of it in Letter XXV. "The natural 
 rise and decline of kingdoms exemplified 
 in the 'History of the Kingdom of Lao'" 
 reduces itself in effect to this single prin- 
 ciple, that it is with all nations as it was 
 with the inhabitants of Lao, who ",had 
 risen in strength by a love of their country, 
 and fell by indulging ambition." 1 
 
 The love of non-intervention and self- 
 contraction which characterised so many 
 literary politicians in the XVIIIth cen- 
 tury, presents a curious appearance when 
 it is remembered that, in the field of prac- 
 tical politics, the tendency towards foreign 
 intervention and colonial expansion was, 
 
 1 " Happy, very happy, might they have been, had they 
 known when to bound their riches and their glory ; had 
 they known that extending empire is often diminishing 
 power ; that countries are ever strongest which are inter- 
 nally powerful ; that colonies, by drafting away the brave 
 and enterprising, leave the country in the hands of the 
 timid and avaricious . . . that too much commerce may 
 injure a nation as well as too little ; and that there is a 
 wide difference between a conquering and a flourishing 
 empire.'' 
 
228 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 during the greater part of the century, in 
 the ascendant, as indeed the wars waged 
 and the territories acquired are sufficient 
 to prove. 
 
 But we are dispensed from the neces- 
 sity of entering: into an explanation on 
 this point not only by its irrelevance to 
 our subject in general, but also by the 
 fact that, in the case of Goldsmith and his 
 "good man," it is a point of quite second- 
 ary importance. What Goldsmith has to 
 say on foreign and colonial matters, is in- 
 deed chiefly if not solely interesting, first, 
 as an indication of his humane disposition, 
 and secondly, as showing that he shared 
 the views which largely prevailed at that 
 time amongst literary men. 
 
 The only other constituent feature of 
 these "letters" which seems to demand 
 notice, is their writer's reliance on a sort 
 of popular philosophy, by recourse to which 
 the "good man" is represented as keep- 
 ing himself within the bounds of modera- 
 tion, and as avoiding both excess and defect 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 229 
 
 by an observance of the juste milieu. There 
 is certainly quite enough of such talk scat- 
 tered up and down through these pages. 
 It is most of it in a strain which is char- 
 acteristic of the age in which Goldsmith 
 lived rather than of the man himself, as 
 e.g. that mankind is "like a vessel sail- 
 ing on a vast sea. Our prudence is its 
 sails, the sciences serve us for oars, good 
 or bad fortune are the favourable or con- 
 trary winds, and judgment is the rudder." 1 
 Recommendations conceived in this spirit 
 are, in other cases, offered with a view to 
 the furtherance of tranquillity of disposi- 
 tion. In this spirit, too, "the pursuit of 
 wisdom " is treated allegorically in Letter 
 XXXVII., and "religious sects in Eng- 
 land " are unfavourably criticised in Letter 
 CXI. 
 
 But a good deal of this is not Gold- 
 smith, and much more of it is not of his 
 best. And sometimes he corrects this 
 way of thinking (or rather of trifling with 
 
 1 Letter LXXXIII. 
 
230 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 thought), by exposing, as in Letters LXI. 
 and CIX., the fallacies which spring from 
 it. Nor was any writer of his time less 
 really in bondage than he was to the senti- 
 ments which, occasionally in these letters, 
 he attributes to "Philosophy" or to a sup- 
 posed " Philosopher." 
 
 Let us then think finally of him and of 
 his "good man" not as thus limited, but 
 rather as of the number of the "truly 
 great," whom and whose critics he has de- 
 scribed in the letter last cited. 1 
 
 " The truly great, possesed of numerous 
 small faults and shining virtues, preserve 
 a sublime in morals as in writing. They 
 who have attained an excellence in either, 
 commit numberless transgressions, observ- 
 able to the meanest understanding. The 
 ignorant critic and dull remarker, can readily 
 spy blemishes in eloquence or morals, whose 
 sentiments are not sufficiently elevated to 
 observe a beauty. But such are judges 
 neither of books, nor of life ; they can 
 
 1 Letter CIX. 
 
PSEUDO-ORIENTALISM 231 
 
 diminish no solid reputation by their cen- 
 sure nor bestow a lasting character by their 
 applause. In short, I found by my search 
 that such only can confer real fame upon 
 others, who have merit themselves to de- 
 serve it." 
 
VII 
 
 " ENLIGHTENMENT " 
 
 "PROFESSION DE FOI DU VICAIRE 
 SAVOYARD" (Part of "Emile") 
 
 By J. J. Rousseau. Published 1764 
 
 •'NATHAN DER WEISE" 
 By G. E. Lessing. Published 1779 
 
VII 
 
 The "good man," conceived as rationalist 
 and religious free-thinker, is a peculiarly 
 characteristic product of the XVIIIth 
 century. Though such conceptions are 
 primarily intellectual, their connection with 
 ethics is by no means an arbitrary one. 
 For the ascendency of the reason which 
 they emphasise was not advocated for the 
 purpose of exalting the intellect, but rather 
 with a view to counteracting the extrava- 
 gancies of one-sided tendencies. Thus, it 
 was to be the office of reason to attempt 
 a survey of man's moral and spiritual out- 
 look, to correct what was erroneous in his 
 religious views, and after having ascertained 
 the residuum left over from this process, to 
 insist on its importance as the common pro- 
 perty of all good men. 
 
236 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 The class of writers with whom we have 
 now to do attempted to realise these general 
 aims in reference to the then existing state 
 of religious belief. 
 
 In this field the problem was, how to 
 reconcile reason and revelation — a very 
 different problem from that which now-a- 
 days presents itself as regards the recon- 
 ciliation of religion and science. By reason 
 what people then meant was that which, 
 late on in the century, Kant distinguished 
 from reason as understanding. This was 
 conceived as a concrete entity consisting 
 of " ideas ' r acquired during the lifetime of 
 the individual and capable of enumeration 
 and definition. Locke's essay, indeed, con- 
 tains a list of these ideas as thus analysed. 
 
 Now reason in this limited sense was 
 neither by Locke himself, nor for the most 
 part by his English disciples, regarded as 
 inconsistent with revelation. The compact- 
 ness, however, of this theory of knowledge, 
 as likewise its seeming intelligibility, pro- 
 duced indirectly a disposition to recognise 
 
"ENLIGHTENMENT" 237 
 
 its tests as the alone sufficient criteria of 
 truth and falsehood. According to Boling- 
 broke's well-known dictum, "Every man's 
 reason is every man's oracle." But if so, 
 it could not but appear that the claims 
 of revelation, if tenable at all, must admit 
 of being thus tested. So strongly was 
 this felt, that alike those who asserted 
 and those who denied the truth of the 
 Christian revelation, occupied the same 
 position in so far as that both appealed 
 to the same organ of authority — i.e. to 
 what Carlyle calls "the logical, mensura- 
 tive faculty as king over them." And in 
 both cases the theory of knowledge adopted, 
 either avowedly or implicitly, was that of 
 the school of Locke. 
 
 But this dependence on the dominant 
 philosophy of the period no doubt charac- 
 terised to a peculiar and exceptional extent 
 the unorthodoxy, and especially the Deism, 
 of the XVIIIth century. Deism was, of 
 course, recommended in that age on many 
 other grounds besides that of its congruity 
 
238 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 with the tenets of the English school of 
 philosophy, nor were its chief exponents 
 either in England or abroad for the most 
 part philosophers in any technical sense. 
 Still, it owed no small part of its plausi- 
 bility (particularly in the eyes of its more 
 enlightened advocates) to the at all events 
 apparent discrepancy between a belief in 
 the more direct participation of the Deity 
 in human experience, and a theory of 
 knowledge which treats human experience 
 as automatically acquired. Some of the 
 French encyclopaedists, indeed, associated 
 Deism directly with the Experimental Phil- 
 osophy, both of these having been originally 
 derived by them from English sources. 
 But apart from any such direct connection, 
 Deism obtained support not only because 
 revealed religion was regarded as an effete 
 superstition and as the creation of self- 
 interested politicians, but also because the 
 Deistic solution appeared to save all the 
 more important interests of natural religion 
 without involving any, even the slightest, 
 
"ENLIGHTENMENT" 239 
 
 disturbance of the course of experience. 
 Deism in short found favour not of course 
 exclusively, but still largely, because it 
 did not conflict with the then prevailing 
 psychology. 
 
 Thus reason, i.e. the administrative organ 
 of this resulting compound of individual 
 experiences, came to be invested with an 
 almost sacred character. It is necessary 
 that this should be understood, since the 
 glorification of reason in the abstract, far 
 more than any historical or scientific evi- 
 dence, was what, in the XVIIIth century, 
 discredited the claims of revelation. 
 
 But besides that this helps us better to 
 understand the revolt against orthodoxy, 
 it helps us better also to understand how 
 it was quite possible in that age for a 
 good man to turn rationalist. The great 
 European movement in philosophy and 
 literature of the later XVIIIth and early 
 XlXth century has, to some extent, in- 
 capacitated us from doing justice to the 
 ideals of the preceding period. And 
 
240 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 doubtless those ideals were limited and im- 
 perfect enough. Yet there was something 
 healthy and beneficial in this reliance on 
 the reason of the individual, something in 
 it which represented the best that was 
 possible under the circumstances in which 
 it originated. For the forms of social and 
 ecclesiastical membership had at that time 
 become destitute of any real life. There 
 was little in what men saw around them 
 to quicken their faith or to foster in them 
 a love of virtue for its own sake. In a 
 world which displayed so few traces of 
 any higher reason, there seemed to be 
 nothing else for a man to do but to walk 
 by the light of his own reason. 
 
 At the same time, recourse to this alter- 
 native was not likely to give rise to the 
 production of typically "good men." It 
 did not do so in theology or liter- 
 ature any more than in real life. The 
 English Deists furnished no embodiment 
 of this description. Shaftesbury's writings 
 contain much matter which is of value for 
 
"ENLIGHTENMENT" 241 
 
 incorporation into a theory of moral essen- 
 tials, but, needless to say, we must not 
 look to their easy-going, cynical author 
 for a concrete impersonation of goodness 
 Matthew Tindal, notwithstanding his en- 
 deavours, did not succeed in imparting to 
 Deism an ethical character, much less in 
 holding up before us the character of "a 
 good man." The plant of which we are 
 here in search appears in fact to have 
 been incapable of being reared on a soil 
 of this kind. Neither in its more highly 
 educated, nor in its more vulgar, manifes- 
 tations was Deism a creative influence. 
 And least of all did it exhibit this char- 
 acter in the ethical sphere, though in that 
 sphere, it ought, according to its own prin- 
 ciples, to have achieved results which 
 had not been, and which could not have 
 been, achieved previously. Upon the ex- 
 planation of this fact there is no need for 
 us to dwell. Contemporary anti-deistical 
 writers would have suggested the loose 
 living of the deists as a cause, though 
 
242 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 of this there was little proof. Others, both 
 then and since, would account for the fact' 
 by reference to the inherent defects of 
 Deism itself. All, however, that concerns 
 us is the simple truth, that there is no 
 typically illustrative specimen of moral 
 goodness to be derived from this quarter. 
 
 When, however, Deism came to be 
 transplanted to the continent, it in more 
 than one way underwent a change. In 
 some of these cases, it passed by a 
 natural, and as some would say a logical, 
 transition into Materialism. In others, it 
 was retained as a religious doctrine, but 
 without being connected with Locke's 
 theory of knowledge. A third alternative 
 was, to accept both the religious doctrine 
 and the philosophical theory, but to sub- 
 ordinate both of these to an impulse of 
 passionate conviction which, for want of a 
 better name, we must call Sentimentalism. 
 This was the position of Jean Jacques 
 Rousseau. Finally, it might happen that 
 Deism was either never held, or else 
 
"ENLIGHTENMENT" 243 
 
 abandoned, but that notwithstanding this, 
 something in common with it might char- 
 acterise the line taken by a writer or 
 thinker in certain respects. Thus Lessing 
 was not strictly a deist at all, but never- 
 theless his attitude towards the historical 
 revelation of Christianity was to some ex- 
 tent like that of the deists. 
 
 Now Deism was not unproductive of 
 exemplars of goodness when, as in the 
 two last of the above cases, it came to be 
 allied with other influences more stimula- 
 ting than itself. Though not in itself 
 capable, nor even with the assistance of 
 the philosophy most congenial to it capable, 
 of serving as a formative agency, it might 
 yet in such cases be employed as a nega- 
 tive background. This is how it in fact 
 was employed in the first of the two char- 
 acter-sketches to which in this chapter we 
 shall refer, viz. the "good man" as he 
 appears in Rousseau's Profession de foi du 
 Vicaire Savoyard, 
 
 In some of the earlier portions of this 
 
244 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 statement of his beliefs the Vicaire argues 
 in a spirit more like that of Kant than like 
 that of Rousseau's master, Locke. This 
 especially applies to what is urged as re- 
 gards the activity of thought in relation to 
 the deliverances of the senses. It is here 
 laid down, though in merest outline, that 
 what the senses convey has no meaning until 
 it is interpreted by thought, that there must 
 be something to which all sensations are 
 relative in order for them to be cognisable 
 as parts of experience, and that man is a 
 rational and intelligent being precisely by 
 virtue of his power of reducing his detached 
 impressions to an ordered unity through 
 the agency of thought. This certainty ap- 
 proximates — though of course only as a 
 distant prophecy — to what Kant was soon 
 to declare more explicitly as to the imma- 
 nence in the ego of forms of intuition and 
 thought presupposed by experience, and so 
 far justifies T. H. Green's assertion that 
 "the recognition of the constructive energy 
 of reason, though but in abstract glimpses, 
 
" ENLIGHTENMENT " 245 
 
 had forced itself on the introspective gaze of 
 Rousseau," who therefore "was a heretic 
 among the contemporary philosophers, yet 
 contributed directly to the new birth of 
 speculation that was gathering shape in the 
 brain of the remote professor at Konigs- 
 berg." 1 
 
 Yet it is only fitfully and perhaps uncon- 
 sciously that Rousseau's Vicaire thus makes 
 his way towards principles such as those 
 which afterwards became the presuppositions 
 of the " Critical Philosophy." The feeling or 
 sensibility which was what always prompted 
 Rousseau both as man and as writer, and 
 which is really only thought disguising itself 
 under the form of an ipse sensi, enabled him 
 in this case, as in so many others, to pene- 
 trate into regions which it was beyond his 
 power further to explore. Merely, it is of 
 interest to note that in the construction of an 
 ideal portrait intended to illustrate the way to 
 think rather than the way to live, the prin- 
 ciples on which the construction proceeds, 
 
 1 Nettleship's "Works of T. H. Green," vol. iii. p. 114. 
 
246 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 are not in all respects such as one who is 
 said to have been acquainted with no other 
 philosophy but that of Locke, would have 
 been expected to have approved. 
 
 When we pass from the "good man's" 
 philosophical first principles to his views on 
 the subject of Christian evidences, we find 
 that the objections urged against a super- 
 natural revelation are rationalistic. Yet it is 
 the "good man's" goodness, not his intel- 
 lect, which is said to revolt against the tra- 
 ditional forms. The appeal made is not to 
 the dry light of reason, but to the common 
 sense of the better part of mankind. The 
 religious scruples entertained are practical 
 rather than speculative, particular rather than 
 general. 
 
 Nor is the scepticism of Rousseau's "good 
 man" produced by negative solutions so 
 much as by the despair of any solution. 
 Needless to say, he was unacquainted with 
 modern criticism, and only superficially ac- 
 quainted with XVIIIth century rationalism. 
 Nay, more ; he seems on principle not to 
 
"ENLIGHTENMENT" 247 
 
 have greatly troubled himself to apply the 
 knowledge which was then accessible to the 
 determination of his religious point of view. 
 In his case, it was not merely that there 
 were wanting many of the helps which are 
 now available for the discussion of religious 
 subjects, but, in one passage at any rate, he 
 suggests that right thinking on such subjects 
 is attainable without much, if any, technical 
 knowledge of the matters relating to them 
 being required. 
 
 " Consider, my friend," says Rousseau's 
 idealised Vicaire, " what a horrible discus- 
 sion was that in which I now came to be 
 engaged ! what immense erudition was re- 
 quired to enable me to make my way back 
 to the most remote antiquity ! to examine, 
 weigh, confront, the prophecies, revelations, 
 facts, as well as all the records, of religion 
 in all the countries of the world ! to assign 
 to them their time, place, authorship, ori- 
 ginating circumstances ! What accuracy of 
 criticism must be mine in order to distin- 
 guish between the genuine and spurious 
 
248 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 writings ! to compare the objections with 
 the answers to them ! the translations 
 with their originals ! to judge as to the 
 impartiality of witnesses, their good sense, 
 their qualifications! to satisfy myself that 
 nothing has been suppressed, nothing added, 
 nothing transposed, changed, falsified ! to 
 remove the contradictions which remain ! to 
 iudge what weight the silence of adversaries 
 ought to have in regard to the facts alleged 
 against them ; to decide whether these alle- 
 gations were known to them and as to 
 whether they thought them of sufficient 
 importance for it to be worth while to make 
 a reply to them ! to ascertain whether books 
 were widely circulated enough for those 
 which we possess to have reached them ; 
 whether we have had honesty enough to 
 give currency to their books amongst our- 
 selves, and to allow the most forcible of 
 their objections to remain just as they 
 made them." 
 
 This highly rhetorical argument issues in 
 a protest against the supposition that the 
 
"ENLIGHTENMENT" 249 
 
 machinery of religious information stands 
 in any necessary relation to religion. "It 
 is absurd," says Rousseau's "good man" in 
 effect, "to imagine that the truth about 
 God is arrived at after any such fashion as 
 this." In the first place, such testimony is 
 throughout merely human ; it is not know- 
 ledge of God at first hand. In the second 
 place, this infinity of intellectual painstaking 
 cannot have been required of man by God 
 as a means of access to Himself. "What! 
 Are we always to rely on these merely 
 human evidences? Must it always be men 
 who are to report to me what other men 
 have reported to them? Is man thus to 
 come between God and myself? Are we 
 on every occasion to investigate, examine, 
 compare, verify? Oh! if God had thought 
 fit to excuse me from all this toil, should 
 I have served Him any the less willingly?" 
 
 The position thus taken is further ampli- 
 fied at considerable length, but its meaning 
 is made sufficiently clear in the passages 
 above quoted. The "good man's" own 
 
250 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 view, which is of course intimated long 
 before it is explicitly announced, finds 
 expression in such language as the fol- 
 lowing : — 
 
 "My son, keep your soul always in a 
 state of desiring that there may be a God, 
 and you will never doubt that there is one. 
 Moreover, be the position which you adopt 
 what it may, bear in mind that the real 
 duties of religion are independent of human 
 institutions ; that an upright heart is the 
 true temple of the Divinity ; that in every 
 country and in every sect the love of God 
 above all else and of one's neighbour as 
 oneself, is the sum of the law ; that there 
 is no religion anywhere which can dispense 
 with the duties of morality ; that there is 
 nothing truly essential but these latter ; 
 that spiritual worship is the first of such 
 duties, and that without faith no genuine 
 virtue can exist." 
 
 Now one thing is quite evident from these 
 citations, and indeed from the Vicaire's 
 whole discourse, and that is, that though 
 
"ENLIGHTENMENT" 251 
 
 Rationalism resulting in Deism is the creed 
 of Rousseau's "good man," i.e. the con- 
 clusion at which he arrives, nothing can 
 be less rationalistic than this statement of 
 belief in so far as regards its spirit and 
 manner. The animus of the discussion 
 may even be said to be opposed to ration- 
 alism. For w hat Rousseau desires is, not 
 knowledge of GocT convey^"^mecTiately" 
 through intellectual and argumentative pro- 
 cesses, but immediately through direct 
 apprehension. He repudiates trains of 
 reasoning ; he is a sentimentalist, and senti- 
 mentalism far rather than rationalism is the 
 leading characteristic of his religious atti- 
 tude. This might be shown to be true 
 also as regards his treatment of the specific 
 doctrines of Christianity. But the point 
 needs no labouring. Rousseau remains a 
 deist, but his religion is essentially that of 
 the heart. It is not indeed Mysticism, for 
 there is in his experience no realised sense 
 of the Divine presence, no reception of 
 God, either ecstatic or meditative, into his 
 
252 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 own soul. Rousseau's "good man" rather 
 believes (subject to the requirements of 
 Deism) that that must be which his heart 
 \ desires should be — not mysticism then, but 
 ^always and before everything else, senti- 
 ptentalism} 
 
 The point, however, most relevant to our 
 present purpose is that, as in his view 
 of the speculative groundwork of religion 
 Rousseau's "good man" is not exclusively 
 the product of XVIIIth century rationalism, 
 so this applies also to his view as to the 
 necessity of religion in a more positive 
 sense. In the first case, he diverges some- 
 what from the school of Locke. In the 
 second case, though he is to be regarded as 
 an unimpeachable deist, his prevailing dis- 
 position is not that which is commonly 
 associated with Deism. 
 
 1 "Sentimental," as here understood, really = sensitive. 
 But there is no term which will express what "sentimental" 
 means without suggesting any of the depreciatory associa- 
 tions with which that word has come to be connected since 
 Carlyle denounced sentimentalism as " twin sister of cant." 
 
"ENLIGHTENMENT" 253 
 
 Leaving Rousseau's Vicaire, let us now 
 make a short study of Lessing's Nathan. 
 In so doing, we find ourselves no doubt 
 in, a very different atmosphere of thought. 
 At the same time, there is likeness as 
 well as difference. We may perhaps even 
 say that the contrast between these two 
 compositions, by reason of the personal 
 characteristics distinguishing their authors 
 respectively, is not more marked than is 
 the resemblance between them by reason 
 of their common participation in the spirit 
 of the XVIIIth century. It should be 
 emphasised, however, that Rousseau is a 
 mere child as compared with Lessing in 
 respect to critical power and technical know- 
 ledge. Moreover, there is as regards at 
 least one point (to be noticed later) an 
 entire dissimilarity between them. 
 
 In his Nathan Lessing does not 
 merely ventilate his own opinions, but 
 aims also at the production of a work 
 of art. The historical portraiture is the 
 result of study, nor can the persona 
 
254 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 dramatis be understood without reference 
 to the age in which they are represented 
 to have lived and to the circumstances in 
 which they are shown to have been placed. 
 This fact has been too often either not 
 observed or else ignored. "Nathan has 
 been assumed to be a pronouncement 
 against all revelation, a satire upon the 
 Christian Religion." . . . "A dramatic 
 poem is one thing, a theological trea- 
 tise another. If this simple truth had 
 been recognised, judgment of condemnation 
 would not have been passed by theologians 
 upon ' Nathan the Wise.' In dramatic 
 art it is a primary law that the characters 
 should have reality and individuality, not 
 less in connection with their period than 
 in respect to their behaviour. Such are the 
 aesthetic conditions with which, from its very 
 nature, a work of art must conform." 
 
 This general proposition is by Danzel 
 and Guhrauer (from whose admirable ac- 
 count of " Lessing's Life and Works " the 
 above extracts are quoted) elaborated in 
 
"ENLIGHTENMENT" 255 
 
 detail. It is, for example, pointed out by 
 them, that the specifically Christian char- 
 acters of the play (illustrated, as it seems 
 to them, most typically neither by the 
 Patriarch nor by the Knight Templar, but 
 by the lay-brother) are not intended, as 
 has sometimes been supposed, to be dis- 
 advantageous^ compared with the Jewish 
 and Mohammedan characters. Lessing 
 himself, we are reminded, has adverted to 
 the charge urged against him of having 
 written with a view to the disparagement 
 of Christianity, and has defended himself 
 on the double ground, (1) that if he credits 
 the Jews and Mohammedans with more 
 learning than was possessed by the Chris- 
 tians at that epoch, this is only in accord- 
 ance with the known facts ; (2) that the 
 age of the Crusades was one which more 
 than any other in history would have struck 
 a rational spectator as exemplifying the 
 mischievous effects produced by revealed 
 religions. 
 
 As regards these same "mischievous 
 
256 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 effects," a passage is cited by Danzel and 
 Guhrauer (Act ii. scene 5), in which, so 
 far from being ascribed in any invidious 
 sense to Christian influences, they are by 
 the Knight Templar shown to have been 
 due originally to the Jews, whose pride of 
 exclusiveness was then transmitted to Chris- 
 tians and Mohammedans. 
 
 From these and from other similar in- 
 dications it is abundantly evident, that 
 Nathan is conceived from an historical 
 point of view. It is no mere Tendenz- 
 Schrift. 
 
 At the same time, it would be equally 
 inaccurate to say that the play was not 
 written with a distinct purpose, and to deny 
 that it was inspired by a theological motive. 
 A didactic aim is apparent throughout, nor 
 can there be any doubt that Lessing wrote 
 Nathan in order to give expression to his 
 own views. 
 
 Thus, the well-known story of the Ring, 
 narrated by Nathan in his colloquy with 
 Saladin, depicts, under the form of a legend, 
 
"ENLIGHTENMENT" 257 
 
 the philosopher's conviction that no one of 
 the historical religions can claim exclusive 
 possession of the truth — 
 
 " The genuine ring, we must suppose, was lost, 
 And, to conceal this loss and make it good, 
 The father bid make three in place of one " ; 
 
 that when they attempt to do so, they 
 necessarily become involved in mutual an- 
 tagonisms — 
 
 " The father being dead, forthwith each son 
 Comes forward with his ring and claims to be 
 The head of the house. There follow questionings 
 And quarrels and complaints. 
 
 " Each declared on oath 
 He had the ring straight from his father's hand " ; 
 
 that they are in fact all of them no more 
 than broken reflections of an ideal unity 
 which God has not permitted to man to 
 grasp in its completeness — 
 
 " In vain ! to know 
 The true ring passed their wit— as ours, to know 
 The true faith " ; 
 
 but which nevertheless every man may 
 realise in his own life, and sufficiently for 
 
258 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 his own purposes, by loving God above 
 all things and his neighbour as himself. 
 By means of adherence to these cardinal 
 duties, all men of all creeds may both work 
 out each his own salvation, and at the same 
 time become united together amongst them- 
 selves ; 
 
 " That father's love, unprejudiced and pure, 
 Let each essay to emulate, let each 
 Strive to be first in showing forth the power 
 That is hidden in the ring, calling it out 
 By gentleness and hearty friendliness 
 And kindly deeds and utter trust in God." 
 
 Finally, Lessing's view of the historical 
 evidences of the Christian religion (indeed 
 of all historical evidences in relation to 
 any and every religion) is, in its results, 
 the same as Rousseau's, though it rests 
 upon a characteristically different ground. 
 For Lessing's objection is not so much that 
 the testimony is merely human, and there- 
 fore ipso facto incapable of substantiating 
 its proofs, as rather that different religions 
 make in this respect assertions which are 
 
"ENLIGHTENMENT" 259 
 
 mutually incompatible, and which there- 
 fore, as they cannot all be true, must all 
 be rejected as untenable, i.e. in any exclu- 
 sive sense — 
 
 " For are not all alike on history based, 
 Traditional or written ? 
 How can I trust my forbears less than you 
 Trust yours ? or, take it the other way : 
 Can I require that you should give the lie 
 To your forefathers just to save my own ? " 
 
 The "ring" episode, however, is not so 
 easy to interpret as, from what has been 
 said, may have appeared. Lessing's teach- 
 ing, indeed, as thus illustrated, may be 
 directed rather against the notion that 
 there is any talismanic virtue inherent in 
 the merely external profession of religious 
 beliefs ; the emphasis may lie chiefly, if 
 not solely, on the requirement that faith 
 (be it of what kind it may) should evidence 
 its reality by works of love ; the contrast 
 suggested may be simply that between 
 formal observances, on the one hand, and 
 inwardness of conviction and earnestness of 
 
260 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 life, on the other. This view would have 
 the advantage of connecting the " ring " 
 story, and indeed Nathan more generally, 
 with the opinions expressed in other parts 
 of Lessing's writings as regards the almost 
 infinite possibilities thus far unrealised 
 by Christianity, and which, by becoming 
 realised, would exhibit it not merely as 
 Christianity, but also as the religion of 
 Christ and (in virtue of its correspondence 
 with that character) as the true Gospel of 
 salvation. It may even be meant that 
 Christianity is both inherently fitted, and 
 as a matter of fact destined, to prove its 
 claims to supremacy in an altogether ex- 
 ceptional and unique manner. 1 
 
 This indeed is probably the light in 
 which Lessing's Nathan was desired by 
 its author to be understood. For it must 
 be remembered that the father, in the 
 story, reserves until the final judgment 
 his decision upon the question as to prior- 
 ity of claim to the possession of the truth. 
 1 See Danzel and Guhrauer, in loco. 
 
"ENLIGHTENMENT" 261 
 
 It is therefore by no means implied (though 
 this has often been assumed) that, in Less- 
 ing's opinion, the religions of the world are 
 all equally true, and that no one of them 
 is better than any other or than all the rest. 
 What does seem to be implied is (1) that 
 the decision upon this point is reserved ; 
 (2) that superiority of merit is a thing to 
 be proved by performance, and not a thing 
 which attaches to the profession of any re- 
 ligion by prescriptive right ; (3) that the 
 comparative merit of religions will be tested 
 by reference to ethical considerations ; (4) 
 that the religions of the world are united 
 by ties of kinship (just as in the story, the 
 claimants to the ring were brothers before 
 they became rivals), and are therefore under 
 an obligation to act towards each other in 
 a spirit befitting the members of one and 
 the same family. 
 
 Such teaching, though not orthodox, is 
 neither that of a deist nor of a rationalist in 
 the XVIIIth century sense of those terms. 
 Nor, of course, was Lessing's conception of 
 
262 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 the nature of God a deistic one. 1 No doubt, 
 as regards the credibility of the Christian 
 Revelation on its historical side, his view, 
 though not exactly in agreement with Deism, 
 was still less in agreement with Orthodoxy. 
 As has been seen, however, Nathan was 
 not written in order to establish anti-ortho- 
 dox conclusions, nor is there much that 
 points in this direction to be found in its 
 pages. It was written chiefly, if not solely, 
 with a view to moral edification. In this 
 respect, it differs from Rousseau's Vicaire, 
 the motive of which is, however, likewise 
 far more practical than it is speculative. In 
 other respects, there is not much divergence 
 between the two works. In both of them, 
 there is the same insistance on the extent 
 of human ignorance ; the same protest 
 against exclusiveness ; the same moralisa- 
 tion of religion ; the same plea for mutual 
 tolerance ; the same desire to sink what are 
 
 1 What Lessing thought on this subject, will be found 
 well stated in Zeller's Geschichte der Deutschen Philosophic 
 (PP- 36S-37o). 
 
"ENLIGHTENMENT" 263 
 
 regarded as non-essentials and to exalt what 
 are regarded as fundamentals. And as the 
 tone of Rousseau's composition is such 
 as to distinguish him from an ordinary 
 XVIIIth century rationalist, so there is 
 a like distinction in the case of Lessing, 
 though arising from a different cause. For 
 the teaching of the latter, though it contains 
 some of the elements both of Deism and 
 of rationalism, is yet, rightly understood, 
 neither deistic nor rationalistic in so far as 
 regards its primary aim. 
 
 The question which we have now to con- 
 sider is, how do the tenets of Rousseau and 
 Lessing taken together throw light on the 
 XVIIIth century ideal of the "good man," 
 or rather, of the " wise man " ? 
 
 Now in this as distinct from the other 
 subjects of our study, it is the doctrine 
 which is in question rather than its per- 
 sonification, the latter being employed not 
 so much with a view to the presentation of 
 a portrait as rather for didactic purposes. 
 
264 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 The creation of a character is indeed, in 
 the case of the Vicaire, not only not 
 achieved, but is scarcely even so much as 
 attempted. 
 
 , What then is the aim of the personi- 
 fication in such cases? 
 
 The object (not, it is true, always ap- 
 parent in the result) would seem to be 
 that of divesting the opinions maintained 
 of their doctrinaire character, and of im- 
 parting to them a semblance at any rate 
 of conformity with the results of personal 
 experience. It was a point of capital 
 importance with these writers to exhibit 
 their own utterances not as their own, 
 but as proceeding from men at once 
 competent to form a judgment, and, at 
 the same time, not divorced in sympathy 
 from the more enlightened sections of the 
 general (as opposed to the merely profes- 
 sional) public. Thus, Rousseau's portrait is 
 that of a dishonest priest whose private 
 beliefs are totally at variance with his offi- 
 cial professions and ministerial functions ; 
 
" ENLIGHTENMENT " 265 
 
 Lessing's, that of a philosopher who is 
 also a merchant. In each of these cases, the 
 representative spokesman is intended to 
 reflect, not indeed popular opinion in the 
 wide sense, but rather the mature convic- 
 tions of men of " enlightenment." 1 
 
 Thus considered, the purpose served by 
 these creations was somewhat similar to 
 that discharged in subsequent times by 
 the hero of the religious novel. The latter, 
 however, is of course much more elabo- 
 rated in respect to colour and detail. 
 
 1 The Vicaire no doubt apparently speaks to his supposed 
 confidant as man to man, e.g. " I am but a man, and as 
 such, ignorant and liable to error. ... I have opened to 
 you my heart without reserve ; that of which I am certain 
 I have represented as certain ; I have placed my doubts 
 before you as doubts, my opinions as opinions. I have 
 given you my reasons both for my doubts and for my beliefs. 
 It rests now with yourself to decide." At the same time, the 
 Profession de Foi, though it thus makes its appeal to the 
 human heart " without reserve," was meant to address itself 
 only to those of Rousseau's contemporaries who were quali- 
 fied for its appreciation by their rational enlightenment. 
 What else is the significance of the fact that the Vicaire so 
 scrupulously observes the forms (whilst privately dissenting 
 from the credenda) of the Catholic Church ? 
 
 Nathan similarly does not take all mankind into his con- 
 fidence, but only the more enlightened classes. His point 
 
266 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 That it is to be preferred because its 
 outlines are thus more definitely filled in, 
 cannot with justice be maintained. The 
 exposition of a religious programme may 
 
 of view indeed is characterised by no small amount of intel- 
 lectual hauteur. Witness the following : — 
 
 Saladin. Your name is Nathan ? 
 
 Nathan. Yes. 
 
 Saladin. Nathan the Wise ? 
 
 Nathan. No. 
 
 Saladin. You disclaim it, but it is the title 
 
 The people give you. 
 Nathan. Yes ! may be the people. 
 Saladin. You cannot think I hold in light esteem 
 
 The people's voice. Long have I wished to know 
 
 The man to whom the people give that name. 
 Nathan. And what if it be given in jest ? What if 
 
 "Wise" be to them no more than clever? and 
 clever 
 
 No more than]," keen to see his own advantage " ? 
 Saladin. You surely mean " to see his true advantage " ? 
 Nathan. Then the most selfish were the cleverest, 
 
 Then clever and wise for certain were but one. 
 Saladin. You make a show of proving what you wish 
 
 To gainsay — yes ! man's true advantage which 
 
 The people know not, that is known to you, 
 
 Or at the least you have essayed to know it, 
 
 Have deeply thought thereon and that's enough 
 
 To justify the title " wise.' 1 
 Nathan. Which each 
 
 Thinks he deserves 
 
 Fancies his due. 
 
"ENLIGHTENMENT" 267 
 
 sometimes with advantage be assigned to 
 a fictitious character, provided that the 
 character is allowed to remain general. 
 But if reality of portraiture be attempted, 
 there must necessarily be a failure either 
 in the execution of this attempt, or else 
 in the exposition of the programme. Not 
 that a return to the XVIIIth century 
 type of characterisation would, in the pre- 
 sent age, be either possible or desirable. 
 It is merely suggested that in its own 
 day, that type answered perhaps better 
 than another and more complex one has 
 done in our day. 
 
 So far as regards the form in which these 
 ideals are embodied. We come now to 
 consider their matter. 
 
 The following quotation may help to 
 show the direction in which we must look 
 in order to form a true ethical appreciation 
 of these attempts : " It was they" (i.e. the 
 representatives of what is known as the 
 Aufklarung, or Illumination, period) "who 
 sought for the first time to give full force 
 
268 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 to the peculiar value of the moral individual, 
 in setting aside all conventional hindrances 
 — a task for which very strong motives 
 are offered in Christianity." 1 
 
 The assertion of the moral character of 
 , the individual, is indeed by far the most 
 | valuable part of the benefit which has 
 , accrued from its presentation in the person 
 : of the "good" or "wise" man. It is true 
 that virtue as thus presented is too sophis- 
 ticated and self-conscious, nor is wisdom 
 in all respects justified of her children 
 either in the case of the sentimentalist 
 Vicaire, or in that of the oracular Nathan, 
 or in other similar cases. Yet it cannot 
 be denied that these views and their repre- 
 sentative embodiments, besides widening 
 men's ideas at the time, have exercised a 
 permanent, and in the main a salutary, 
 influence on the progress of religious 
 thought. Freedom of discussion in matters 
 of religion was thus made to appear as 
 
 1 Ritschl, " History of the Christian Doctrine of Justifica- 
 tion and Reconciliation" (English Translation by Black, 
 vol. i. p. 344)- 
 
" ENLIGHTENMENT " 269 
 
 valuable not merely in the interests of 
 truth, but also as an element in the forma- 
 tion of character. 
 
 But how are we to conceive of this same 
 moral individual ? For that which we so de- 
 signate is after all only an abstraction, and it 
 remains to be considered, therefore, whether 
 it is with a mere abstraction that these 
 authors are concerned. In order to become 
 more than this, the "good man" would have 
 to be exhibited, as finding in the society to 
 which he belongs if not his own alter ego, 
 yet at least something with which he can 
 make terms. Nor can a religion of the heart, 
 such as is here depicted, be realised imme- 
 diately, and at first hand. Such a religion 
 must necessarily be localised under some 
 specific, even if not historical, form. Can 
 we then say that this necessity is recognised 
 by Rousseau and Lessing ? 
 
 By Rousseau it appears not to have been 
 recognised. No doubt, he lays stress on the 
 fulfilment by the individual of his social 
 obligations {i.e. of his duty towards his 
 
270 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 neighbour). No doubt also, he is com- 
 pelled to accept the practical necessity of 
 differences of religious profession. But 
 there is an absence in his religious, just as 
 there is in his political, philosophy, of the 
 conception of a society, relatively to which 
 the individual becomes no longer an abstrac- 
 tion, but a reality. According to the doctrine 
 which he held, positive religion (like the 
 positive state in reference to natural right) 
 was either a nuisance and a hindrance, or 
 else, merely a means of re-establishing the 
 individual in the possession of that which 
 had all along belonged to him inherently. 
 
 In this respect, however, there is an essen- 
 tial difference between Rousseau and Lessing, 
 and the marked contrast between them 
 already referred to thus arises. Lessing's 
 position on this subject is liable to escape 
 notice for two reasons ; one, that, like Rous- 
 seau, he is, both in his religious and in his 
 political, teaching, an individualist ; the other, 
 that, also like Rousseau, he finds in positive 
 religion, distinctively so called, a stumbling- 
 
"ENLIGHTENMENT" 271 
 
 block. These undeniable data are then 
 misinterpreted to mean that Lessing's indi- 
 vidualism is mere atomism, and that his 
 natural religion was intended by him, after 
 having driven all positive religions out of 
 the field, to take their place. 
 
 Now Nathan gives no real support to 
 either of these views, though there are cer- 
 tain passages in it by which either or both 
 of them may seem to be justified. But in 
 order to show that these views are based on 
 an entire misconception, it would be neces- 
 sary to have recourse to the Gesprdche fur 
 Freimaurer, a series of discussions devoted 
 almost exclusively to the determination of 
 the " natural " in reference to the " posi- 
 tive," though not confined to the treat- 
 ment of this question under its religious 
 aspects. These discussions (the character 
 of which has sometimes been compared with 
 that of the Platonic dialogues) are strictly 
 germane to the thesis of Nathan, more so 
 perhaps even than is The Education of the 
 Human Race. 
 
272 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 From them it appears, on the one hand, 
 that Lessing's individualism is not self-cen- 
 tred, but exists only correlatively to a regu- 
 lative principle of reason ; on the other hand, 
 that the element of difference is involved in 
 the very essence of things, instead of being, 
 as Rousseau thought, a mere distortion of the 
 "natural" due to human perversity. The 
 one State is not to be set over against the 
 many forms of government and the diver- 
 sity of political and social institutions, nor is 
 the one religion to be regarded as incon- 
 sistent with varieties of belief and of ecclesi- 
 astical procedure. In both cases, the one 
 and the many require and support each 
 other, and it is only as thus mutually de- 
 pendent, that either of them has any real 
 existence. 
 
 It is not, however, necessary for us to 
 attempt to unwind the coils of this dialectic 
 further. For Nathan, though it contains 
 much (for a drama, indeed, too much) that 
 reminds us of the Gesprache, is yet neither in 
 form nor in substance a dialectical composi- 
 
"ENLIGHTENMENT" 273 
 
 tion. The Gesprache have been mentioned in 
 connection with it, because its full purpose 
 could not otherwise have been explained. 
 
 But we have had also a biographical 
 reason for bringing these two works to- 
 gether, a reason which is full of significance 
 as regards both Lessing and his " good 
 man." For the spirit of calmness which 
 characterises Nathan throughout, and which 
 throughout, but especially towards the close 
 of his life, characterised Lessing (he died 
 two years after the play appeared), may not 
 unreasonably be ascribed to the now culmi- 
 nating conviction which in the Gesprache, 
 written not long before, had been thus ex- 
 pressed : "If Civil Society had in it no 
 other good but this, that only where it exists 
 can human reason be cultivated, I should 
 give it my blessing, even though its ills 
 were far greater than they are." 
 
 These words (a plain contradiction to Rous- 
 seau) contain as much perhaps in the way of 
 consolation as at the time they were written 
 {i.e. within little more than ten years of the 
 
274 THE "GOOD MAN" 
 
 French Revolution) the facts seemed to 
 justify. The sentiment may not to all per- 
 sons convey as much comfort as it did to 
 Lessing, but it is not unworthy of the 
 "enlightenment" on its best side, or of 
 the noblest of its sons. 
 
 There is just this one suggestion of a more 
 general kind to be urged in conclusion. In 
 the present age, we are not likely to for- 
 get those conditions of imperfect develop- 
 ment which are sometimes too contemp- 
 tuously spoken of as "XVIIIth century 
 limitations." It is quite right that we 
 should not forget them, and that we should 
 observe how, notwithstanding his " en- 
 lightenment," the " good man " was subject 
 to them. Yet from his moral disposition, 
 his love of truth, the temper and tone of 
 his mind, and the largeness of his out- 
 look, we shall not fail, if we are wise, to 
 derive both instruction and edification. 
 
 Printed by Ballantyne, Hanson S- 3 Co. 
 Edinburgh &° London 
 
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