1 "*.;■*>■■ >»■ ■!*>■ * .,»-"^" I d dorttFll Slatu ^rlynol ffiibtary Cornell University Library KD 1949.C63 1921 The law of torts. 3 1924 022 364 412 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924022364412 THE LAW OF TORTS j: f." clekk. OF THE INNER TEMPLE AND THE SOUTH-EASTERN CIRCUIT, BARRISTER-AT-LAW , AY. H. B. LINDSELL. OF Lincoln's inn and the midland circuit, barrister-at-law. SEVENTH EDITION W. WYATT-PAINE. OF THE INNER TEMPLE AND THE NORTH-EASTERN CIRCUIT, BARRISTER-AT-LAW, AUTHOR OF "a COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS," ETC., ETC.; EDITOR OF THE FOURTH EDITION OF "mACQUEEN'S LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE," THE FIFTEENTH, SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH EDITIONS OF " CHITTY ON CONTRACTS,' AND THE SIXTH EDITION OF " MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES." Jitstiiice partes sunt, non violate homines'^ — cicero. LONDON : SWEET & MAXWELL, LIMITED, 3, CHANCERY LANE, W.C.*2. 1921. PRINTED BY THE EASTERN PRESS, LIMITED, LONDON AND READING. In compliance with a suggestion of the Publishers, this edition {the 8eventh\^of ^^ Clerk and Lindsell on Torts" is produced as a Sbmpamoii volume to the latest edition {the Seventeenth) of " Chitty on Contracts," the combined treatises forming a com- pendious statement of the various legal obligations arising ex delicto and ex contractu. PREFACE TO THE SEVENTH EDITION. Since the publication of the sixth edition of Clerk and Lindsell on Torts in 1912, many important changes have taken place in that wide field of law with which a treatise on so extensive a subject necessarily deals, and in particular divers Acts of Parliament relevant to a treatise on civil wrongs and their appropriate remedies have been added to the Statute Book. In the present edition the common and statute law relating to incorporeal personal property, including tortious infringements of COPYRIGHT and of PATENTS, TEADE-MAEKS, and TRADE-NAMES is (it is believed) adequately dealt with. The treatise further discusses in a comprehensive manner the laws of distress, of defamation, of master and servant (including Workmen's Compensation), the privileges and obligations of judicial and administrative officers of justice, the exemption from liability in tort conferred upon trades unions and their officials by the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, and generally of the duties attaching to the use of property, especial attention being devoted to that lack of care in connection therewith which constitutes negligence in law. In addition to the matters above specified the work deals, it is thought, exhaustively with those multifarious wrongs, independent of contract, for which the appropriate remedy is a common law action. And in this connection (though not germane to the Law of Torts) it may be convenient to emphasise the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of the Attorney- General V. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, Limited (reported in 89 Law Journal Eeports, Chancery Division, at page 417) which finally and satisfactorily decides that the Crown is entitled neither by virtue of its prerogative nor under statutory powers to take possession of the property of a subject, in a period of emergency, without paying compensation therefor. Having regard alike to the number of recent cases of importance and to the necessity for a thorough and complete VI PREFACE TO THE SEVENTH EDITION. revision and expansion of the subject-matter of the treatise, the Editor has found it necessary somewhat to increase the size of the volume. He desires to express his indebtedness to his friend, Mr. John R. Mcllraith of the Middle Temple and Northern Circuit, Barrister-at-Law, for the manner in which the Index has been collated and amplified, and the Table of Cases and of Statutes revised and brought up to date. W. WYATT-PAINE. 4 Habcoubt Buildings, Temple, B.C. ' , July, 1920. TABLE OF CONTENTS. Index op Statutes Index of Cases ... PAGE xi xxi CHAP. I. — Inteodtjctory ... II. — Parties... III. — Felonious Torts IV. — Foreign Torts V. — Notice of Action VI. — Damage VII. — Self-Redress and Self-Protection VIII. — Discharge of Torts IX. — Trespass to the Person X. — Seduction and Loss of Service XI. — Trespass to Chattels and Conversion ... XII. — Distress ... ... XIII. — Trespass to Land and Dispossession XIV. — Nuisance XV. — Duties Attaching to the Use of Property- Negligence XVI.— Fraud XVII.— Defamation XVIII. — Malicious Words and Slander of Title... XIX. — Malicious Prosecution 1 37 119 123 126 136 155 167 190 220 232 282 320 371 420 523 547 625 633 YUl TABLE OP CONTENTS. CHAP. PAGE XX. — Franchises 661 XXI. — Incorporeal Personal Property :■ — Part I. — Copyright ... ... 668 Part II. — Patents 697 Part III. — Trade Marks and Trade Names ... 718 XXII. — Officers of Justice ... ... ... ... ... 743 XXIII. — Remedy by Injunction 794 INDEX 807 INDEX OF STATUTES. [Repealed statutes are printed in italics. ~\ PAGE Magna Charta, 1215 402 52 Hen. III. l-. i (Distress, 1367) ..'.....'............'... 312, 313 c. 15 (Distress, 1267) ' 288 18 Ed. I. CO. 1 and 2 (Statute Quia Emptores, 1289) 282 4 Ed. III. c. 7 (Action by Executors, 1330) 48 15 Ed. III. c. 5 (Action by Executors of Executors, 1341) 48 23 Ed. in. 0. 2 (Statute of Labourers, 1349) 221 5 Eic. II. c. 7 (Forcible Entry, 1381) 170, 325 329 16 Eic. II. u. 2 (Forcible Entry, 139i) 325 829 17 Ric. II. c. 9 {Fisheries, 1393) 402 8 Hen. VI. c. 9 (Forcible Entry, 1429) 326 329 12 Ed. IV. c. 7 (Fisheries, 1473) ' 402 11 Hen. VII. c. 16 (Vexatious Actions, 1495) 634 1 & 2 Phil. & Mary, c. 12 (Impounding of Distresses, 1554-6) 304, 318 5 Eliz. c. 4 (Statute of Labourers, 1563) 221 18 Eliz. c. 5 (Fraudulent Conveyances Act, 1671) 778 43 Eliz. c. 2 (Poor Belief Act, 1601), s. 2 318 21 Jac. I. c. 3 (Statute of Monopolies, 1623), s. 6 697, 703 e. 16 (Limitation Act, 1623) 122, 167, 180, 183, 186-7, 256, • 322, 323, 326, 327, 356, 367, 418, 801 s. 3 179, 353 o. 5 212 s. 7 ISO 12 Car. II. c. 24 (Abolition of Old Tenures Act, 1660), ^. 8 218 29 Car. II. c. 8 (Statute of Frauds, 1677), s. 15 774 u. 7 (Sunday Observance Act, 1677), s. 2 755 g_ Q 290 766 791 1 Will. & Mar. seas. 2, c. 2 (Bill of Eights, 1688) .' ' 578 2 Will. & Mar. c. 5 (Distress for Kent Act, 1690) 301, 315 s. 2 307, 310 s. 3 300, 305, 308 ». 4 313 s. 6 303 4 & 6 Anne c. 3 (Limitations, 1705), s. 19 180, 323, 856 6 Anne c. 31 (Mischiefs by Fire Act, 1707), s. 6 432, 488 7 Anne c. 12 (Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1708) 766 s. 3 302 8 Anne c. 14 (Fraudulent Tenants Act, 1709) 780 s. 1 : 777, 780 ss. 6, 7 288, 779 I Geo. I. St. 2, c. 5 (Eiot Act, 1714) 784 4 Geo. II. c. 28 (Frauds by Tenants, &c., 1730), s. 6 282, 307 II Geo. II. c. 19 (Distress for Eent Act, 1737) 315 s. 1 289 s. 2 290 s. 7 290, 315 a. 8 289, 299, 800, 804, 308, 309 s. 9 805, 30S s. 10 804, 805, 306, 307, 309 s. 19 303, 306,' 807, 810 ss. 20, 21 304 17 Geo. II. e. 38 (Poor Belief Act, 1743), ss. 7, 8 318 19 Geo. II. c. 21 (Profane Oaths Act, 1746), s. 8 784 24 Geo. II. 0. 44 (Actions against Constables, 1750), s. 6 212, 789 14 Geo III. c. 78 (Metropolitan Building Act, 1774), s. 86 432-434 15 Geo. III. c. 53 (Copyright Act, 1775) 678 INDEX OF STATUTES. PAGE 32 Geo. III. c. 56 (Servants' Characters Act, 1792) 533 c. 60 (Libel (Pox's) Act, 1792), s. 1 562 43 Geo. III. u. 59 (Reparation of County Bridges, 1803) 31 56 Geo. III. c. 50 (Sale of Farming Stock Act, 1816) 299, 768 57 Geo. lU. c. 93 (Distress Costs Act, 1817), s. 2 811, 319 s. 6 311 c. 117 (Execution, 1817) 643 0. cxxix. (M. A. Taylor's Act, 1817), s; 7 392 60 Geo. III. & 1 Geo. IV. c. 1 (Unlawful Military Training Act, 1820), s. 2 784 3 Geo. IV. c. 126 (Turnpike Act, 1822) 334 4 Geo. IV. u. 95 (Turnpike Act, 1823) 334 6 Geo. IV. c. 83 (Vagrancy Act, 1824), s. 6 206 7 d: 8 Geo. IV. c. 18 (Spnng Guns, 1826) 159, 160 c. 24 (Turnpike Act, 1826) 384 9 Geo. IV. 0. 14 (Statute of Frauds Amendment Act (Lord Tenter- den's Act), 1828) 58 fi. 6 87, 545 c. 69 (Night Poaching Act, 1828), s. 2 206, 782 rf. 12 206 o. 77 (Turnpike Act, 1828) 884 10 Geo. IV. c. 44 (The Metropolitan Police Act, 1829), s. 4 780, 781 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 22 (London Hackney Carriage Act, 1831) 73 c. 32 (Game Protection Act, 1881) 130 s. 31 206, 210, 782 u. 41 (Special Constables Act, 1881), ss. 5, 6 ... 781, 782 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 71 (Prescription Act, 1832) 384, 412 3 d i Will. IV. c, 15 (Dramatic Copyright Act, 1833) 60 c. 27 (Eeal Property Limitations Act, 1833) ... 185, 328,' 357, 867 s. 3 357, 358, 360 Bs, 4, 7, 8 363 s. 10 357, 359 s. 11 357 s. 12 861 e. 14 366 s. 26 186, 187, 866 «. 29 358 B. 84 357 s. 35 365 e. 42 284 c. 42 (Civil Procedure Act, 1833) 539 B. 2 49^ 52 s. 29 272, 276 u. 90 (Lighting and Watching Act, 1838), a. 42 781 -s. 55 207 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 76 (Poor Law Amendment Act, 1884), s. 92 ... 207 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 50 (Highway Act, 1885) 31 fi. 23 31 s. 34 315 a. 72 27 B- 78 207, 456, 458 8. 79 207 a. 109 132 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 71 (Tithe Act, 1886), s. 81 282 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. t. 28 (Eeal Property Limitation Act, 1837) 323 s- 1 365 1 & 2 Vict. c. 106 (Pluralities Act, 1838) 575 576 c. 110 (Judgments Act, 1688), s. 12 ' 768 2 & 8 Vict. c. 47 (Metropolitan Police Act, 1839) 780, 786 s. 5 ' 780 es. 33-35, 46-48, 54, 63-68 787 s. 60 26 s. 66 207 c. 98 (County Police Act, 1839), s. 8 781, 782 c. xciv. (City of London Police Act, 1839) 781, 787 s. 35 343 8. 50 787 INDEX OP STATUTES. xi PAGE 3 & 4 Vict. c. 9 (Parliamentary Papers Act, 1840), ss. 1, 2 579 s- 3 581, 595 i;. 50 (Canals Police Act, 1840) 781 sa. 9, 10 784 83. 11, 12 207 5 (6 6 Vict. 0. 35 (Income Tax Act, 1842), ss. 60, 103 286 c. 45 {Copyright Act, 1842), s. 18 677 c. 94 (Defence Act, 1842), s. 19 351 c. 97 (Limitations of Actions and Costs Act, 1842), s. 4 134 u. 109 (Parish Constables Act, 1842), s. 15 781 6 (6 7 Vict. c. 23 (Copyhold Act, 1843), s. 2 282 c. 40 (Hosiery Trade Act, 1843), «. 8 789 s. 9 785 g l[g 292 294 c. 96 (Libel Act, 1843), s.' 2 ...'...'.....!.'..'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.".'.'.'.'.!'.'.'.'. ' 622 s. 3 547 7 &,8 Viet. u. 96 (Law of Bankruptcy and Executions Act, 1844), 3. 67 778 8 Vict. c. 18 (Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845} 164, 351 s. 68 407 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20 (Eailways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845), es. 77-79 424 S3. 103, 104, 154 210 c. 100 (Lunacy Act, 1845), s. 15 214 s 99 .. . .. . .... .... 215 c. 127 (Payment of Smail Debts Act, 1845), s. 8 768 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (Fatal Accidentsi Act, 1846) ... 5, 49, 78, 123, 228, 229, 281, 466, 491 s. 1 49 ss. 2, 3 50 10 & 11 Vict. c. 14 (Markets and Fairs Clause® Act, 1847) 662 s. 13 663, 665 6. 14 664 u. 17 (Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847), s. 27 403 c. 89 (Town Police Clauses Act, 1847) 781 s. 8 781 s. 15 207, 787 o. 28 26 s. 53 74 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42 (Indictable Offences Act, 1848), «. 8 750 s. 10 788, 791 ss. 11, 16 788 s. 20 640 3. 21 751 c. 43 (Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848), s. 3 ... 788, 789, 791 3. 7 788, 789 s. 13 749, 750 H. 19 788, 789 S3. 22-24 788 s. 25 746 s. 27 788 c 44 (Justices' Protection Act, 1848), s. 1 747, 756 3. 2 576, 748, 757 ss. 3, 4 757 s. 5 758 s 6 756, 758 s. 9 13^ s. 17 785- c. 63 (Public Health Act, 1848), »•. 131 318 12 & 13 Vict. c. 14 (Costs of Distress for Eates Act, 1849) 318 u. 92 (Cruelty to Animals Act, 1849), s. 5 304 s. 13 786 14 & 15 Vict. c. 19 (Prevention of Offences Act, 1851), s. 11 207 c. 25 (Landlord and Tenant Act, 1861), b. 2 ... 297, 299, 779 c. 100 (Criminal Procedure Act, 1851), s. 19 640 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76 (Common Law Procedure Act, 1852) 255, 256 s. 41 256 ». 49 234 3. 61 566 XU INDEX OF STATUTES. PAGE 16 ct 17 Vict. c. 34 (Income Tax Act, 1853), ss. 35, 40 286 17 & 18 Vict. c. 60 (Cruelty to Animals Act, 1854), s. 1 304 c. 125 (Common Law Procedure Act, 1854), s. 78 256 s. 79 794, 804 B. 82 794 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120 (Metropolis Management Act, 1855) 31, 131 s. 76 36 c. 122 (Metropolitan Building Act, 1855) 378 s. 108 130 19 & 20 Vict. t. 69 (County and Borough Police Act, 1856), s. 6 781 c. 97 (Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856), s. 10 ... 180 s. 11 188 B. 12 180 s. 13 546 20 (£■ 21 Vict. c. 54 (Fraudulent Trustees Act, 1857), s. i 233 c. 85 (Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857), s. 26 46 s. 33 1, 228 s 59 ..1 21 & 22 Vict. c. 27 (Chancery Amendment Act, 1867)', b. 2 804 c. 73 (Stipendiary Magistrates Act, 1857), s. 5 788 22 Vict. c. 12 (Defence Act, 1859), s. 4 351 22 & 23 Vict. c. 17 (Vexatious Indictments Act, 1859) 633 23 Si, 24- Vict. c. 32 (Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act, 1860), ss. 2, 3 209, 785 G. 135 (Metropolitan Police Act, 1860) 780, 781 24 & 25 Vict. c. 70 (Locomotives Act, 1861) 395 s. 13 397 c. 96 (Larceny Act, 1861), ». 3 233 Bs. 18—20 445 s. 84 525 s. 103 128, 202, 203, 207, 6.38, 789 s. 104 785 s. 113 129, 132, 203 c. 97 (Malicious Injuries to Property Act, 1861), s. 13 54, 208 ». 41 446 B. 57 785 s. 61 208 s. 71 132 i;. 98 (Forgery Act, 1861), s. 46 789 c. 99 (Coinage Offences Act, 1861), s. 27 789 s. 31 208 a. 33 132 u. 100 (Offences against the Person Act, 1861), -s. 31 ... 159, 160 SB. 42-44 178 s. 45 178, 179, 188 s. 65 789 s. 66 785 c. 134 (Bankruptcy Act, 1861), s. 73 771 25 & 26 Vict. i;. 68 (Fine Arts Copyright Act, 1862), b. 7 670 c. 89 (Companies Act, 1862), s. 95 53 c. 102 (Metropolitan Management Amendment Act, 1862) 31, 131 c. 114 (Poaching Prevention Act, 1862), s. 2 785 26 & 27 Vict. c. 112 (Telegraph Act, 1863) 883 27 & 28 Vict. u. 55 (Metropolitan Police Act, 1864), s. 1 787 c. 95 (Compensation for Deaths by Accident Act, 1864), s. 1 50 28 S 29 Vict. c. 60 (Dogs Act, 1865) 445 c. 121 (Salmon Fishery Act, 1865), s. 27 782, 786 29 & 30 Vict. c. 122 (Metropolitan Commons Act, 1866) 164 30 & 31 Vict. t. 121 (Turnpike Act, 1867) 334 c. 127 (Railway Companies Act, 1867), s. 4 768 c. 134 (Metropolitan Streets Act, 1867), s. 12 787 31 & 32 Vict. u. 45 (Sea Fisheries Act, 1868) 431 c. 54 (Judgments Extension Act,' 1868) 171 INDEX OF STATUTES. xiii 31 & 32 Yict. c. 99 (Turnpike Act, 1868) ''334 32 & 38 A'ict. u. 62 (Debtors Act, 1869) 200, 762 s- 4 ' 762 s- 5 654, 776 s- 6 654, 762 s- 16 640 c. 70 (Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1869) 28 c. 107 (Metropolitan Commons Act, 1868) 164 i;. 115 (Hackney and Stage Carriages Law Amendment Act, 1869) 73 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23 (Forfeiture Act, 1870) 122 ss. 1, 6 40 ss. 8, 10, 24, 30 41 c. 28 (Attorney and Solicitors Act, 1870), a. 11 660 c. 35 (Apportionment Act, 1870), s. 2 779 c. 52 (Extradition Act, 1870), s. 8 210 c. 78 (Tramways Act, 1870) 538 s. 52 210 34 & 35 Viet. c. 43 (Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Act, 1871) 52, 370 ss. 36, 37 370 c. 56 (Dogs Act, 1871) 446, 448 s. 1 446 s. 2 448 c. 79 {Lodgers' Goods Protection Act, 1871) 311 c. 87 (Sunday Observance Prosecution Act, 1871) 755 c. 96 (Pedlars Act, 1871), s. 18 208, 785 c. 112 (Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871), s. 3 785 s. 7 ; 208, 785 c. 115 (Turnpike Act, 1871) 334 (Railway Eolling Stock Protection Act, 1872), ss. 3, 5 294 (Metalliferous Mines Regulation Act, 1872), s. 18 487 (Parish Constables Act, 1872), s. 7 781 s. 13 307, 310 (Pawnbrokers Act, 1872), s. 84 208 (Licensing Act, 1872) 755 s. 12 785 66 (Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873) ... 124, 187, 328, 795 s. 16 795, 804 ». 25 6, 53, 370, 795, 804 ss. 29, 30, 89 120 s. 89 805 c. 71 (Salmon Fishery Act, 1873), s. 36 782, 786 S3. 37, 88 786 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57 (Real Property Limitation Act, 1874) 357 s. 1 284, 357 s. 2 363 ss. 8, 4, 5 865 c. 62 (Infants Relief Act, 1874) 48 c. 96 (Statute Law Revision Act, 1874) 781 38 & 39 Vict. c. 17 (Explosives Act, 1875) 404, 434, 450 s. 78 785, 789 ss. 74, 75 785 s. 78 208, 786 s. 86 789 c. 25 (Public Stores Act, 1875), s. 6 785 s. 12 202, 207 c. 31 (Railway Companies Act, 1875) 768 c. 55 (Public Health Act, 1875) 31, 34, 115, 318 s. 4 413 8. 16 339 „ 17 389, 399 s.' 66 *81 s 94 431 s'. 112 399 s. 126 495 35 & 36 Vict. c. 50 c. c. 77 92 c. c. 93 94 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 XIV INDEX OF STATUTES. 38 & 39 Vict, c, 55 (Public Health Act, 1875)— page a. 144 393 s. 149 334 S3. 166, 167 662 ». 256 318 s. 264 132 c. 63 (Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875) 747 c. 77 (Judicature Act, 1875), s. 11 281 <^. 86 (Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875) 749 s. 3 69 s. 7 70 c. 90 (Employers and Workmen Act, 1875), s. 10 96 39 & 40 Vict. c. 22 (Trade Union Act Amendment Act, 1876), s. 16... 72 c. 36 (Customs Consolidation Act, 1876), s. 42 687 o. 75 (Elvers Pollution Prevention Act, 1876) 399 83. 4, 16 400 40 & 41 Vict. K,. 21 (Prisons Act, 1877), s. 31 775 41 & 42 Vict. c. 31 (Bills of Sale Act, 1878), s. 8 773 c. 38 (Innkeepers Act, 1878), s. 2 263, 279 . c. 39 (Freshwater Fisheries Act, 1878), ». 8 782, 786 u. 54 (Debtors Act, 1878), a. 1 762 u. 71 (Metropolitan Commons Act, 1878) ■. 164 c. 74 (Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878), s. 33 442 c. 77 (Highways and Locomotives Amendment Act, 1878) 395 3. 23 .•. 396 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49 (Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879), ». 16 179 3. 21 318, 768 b. 24 751 s. 25 642 s. 37 788 3. 38 210, 784 s. 43 318 u. 59 (Civil Procedure Acts Eepeal Act, 1879) 622 Criminal Code (Indictable Offences) Bill, 1879, a. 150 400 43 & 44 Vict. c. 9 (Statutes Definition of Time Act, 1880) 290 c. 19 (Management of Taxes Act, 1880), s. 86 318 s. 88 780 u. 42 (Employers' Liability Act, 1880) 49, 50, 95, 96, 515 3. 1 93, 94 as. 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 95 c. 47 (Ground Game Act, 1880) 661 Criminal Code Bill, 1880, s. 146 400 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41 (Conveyancing Act, 1881), s. 16 256, 275 s. 44 282 i;. 58 (Army Act, 1881), a. 154 208 c. 60 (Newspaper Libel Act, 1881), s. 1 599 45 & 46 Vict. c. 31 (Inferior Courts Judgments Extension Act, 1882) 171 c. 38 (Settled Land Act, 1882), s. 21 30 c. 43 (Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act, 1882).., 347 3. 5 773 =. 7 347 s. 13 289 8. 15 773 c. 50 (Municipal Corporations Act, 1882), s. 191 781 3. 193 787 c. 61 (Bills of Exchange Act, 1882), s. 82 86 u. 75 (Married Women's Property Act, 1882) 227, 365 s. 1 46, 180 s. 12 48 3. 14 46, 184 3. 15 46 46 & 47 Vict. .;. 39 (Statute Law Eevision Act, 1883) 310, 805 S3. 3, 5 805 c. 49 (Civil Procedure Act, 1883) 794 33. 3, 7 805 i;. 52 (Bankruptcy Act, 1883), s. 25 654 s. 37 41, 167 33. 45, 46 251, 771 INDEX OF STATUTES. XV 46 & 47 Vict. K^. 52 (Bankruptcy Act, 1883)— page s. 57 121 ». 145 775 s. 168 771 c. 57 {Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883)... 696, 705, 731 B. 19 699 6. 32 626 s. 33 714 6. 34 703, 705 ». 70 741 a. 76 736 8. 87 704 c. 61 (Agricultural Holdings (England) Act, 1883), s. 45 292 47 & 48 Vict. u. 43 (Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884), s. 3 755 s. 4 788 s. 5 751, 788, 789 48 & 49 Vict. c. 54 (Pluralities Acts Amendment Act, 1886) 675, 576 i;. 69 (Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885), s. 10 639 c. 75 (Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act, 1886), s. 2 782 49 & 60 Vict. c. 27 (Guardianshit) of Infants Act, 1886) 218 c. 33 (International Copyright Act, 1886), s. 6 681 c. 38 (Eiot (Damages) Act, 1886) 2, 181, 206, 453 50 & 51 Vict. c. 28 (Merchandise Marks Act, 1887), s. 2 721 c. 55 (Sheriffs Act, 1887) 634 a. 8 762 ss. 14, 15 776 s. 16 775 51 & 52 Vict. c. 21 (Law of Distress Amendment Act, 1888) 297 s. 4 294, 300 s. 5 307 s. 6 307, 310 B. 7 302 6. 8 304 c. 33 (Hawkers Act, 1888), s. 2 664 c. 41 (Local Government Act, 1888), s. 40 393 c. 43 (County Courts Act, 1888), ss. 33—37 760 ss. 49, 60 777 ss. 52, 55 761 B. 54 212, 761 s. 85 761 a. 116 2 ss. 134^137 267 ss. 142, 143, 144 765 6. 147 768 6. 152 770 a. 154 776 s. 160 780 s. 162 745 c. 50 (Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1888) ... 731 a. 10 728 u. 59 (Trustee Act, 1888), u. 8 186 c. 64 (Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888), a. 1 599 s 3 578, 599, 601, 613 s, 4 678, 603 ss. 6, 6 624 18 (Indecent Advertisements Act, 1889), s. 6 786 46 (Factors Act, 1889) 260 .. 49 (Arbitration Act, 1889), s. 4 754 i; 57 (Eegulation of Railways Act, 1889), o. 5 81, 210 5 (Lunacy Act, 1890) 213, 576, 642 ss. 4-11 213 ss. 12-21 213 ». 27 215 a. 35 213, 214 s. 38 213 s. 40 214 ss. 72-74 214 ss. 75, 77, 78 213 62 & 53 Vict. c. c. c. 53 & 54 Vict. c. XVI INDEX OF STATUTES. PAGE 53 & 54 Vict. c. 5 (Lunacy Act, 1890)— s. 83 214, 216 ». 85 214 s. 222 216 s. 330 214-216 s. 341 and schedule 2 216 u. 59 (Public Health Act Amendment Ac(;, 1890), s. 51 399 c. 64 (Directors' Liability Act, 1890), s. 3 539 54 & 55 Vict. c. 3 (Custody of Children Act, 1891) 217 c. 8 (Tithe Act, 1891), ss. 1, 2 282 c. 40 (Brine Pumping Act, 1891) 376 0. 51 (Slander of Women Act, 1891) 140, 556, 619 c. 54 (Eanges Act, 1891), s. 11 351 c. 65 (Lnnacy Act, 1891) 213 s. 20 215 c. 69 (Penal Servitude Act, 1891), s. 4 208 s. 6 208, 785 3. 7 208 s. 16 785 c. 76 (Public Health (London) Act, 1891) 69 B. 24 379 s. 68 493, 495 55 & 56 -Vict. i;. 32 (Clergy Discipline Act, 1892) 558, 560 56 & 57 Vict. c. 32 (Barbed VV^ire Act, 1893) 390 c. 61 (Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893) ... 29, 65, 102, 691, 758 s. 1 127, 181, 456 s. 2 126, 127, 132 c. 63 (Married Women's Property Act, 1893), s. 1 46 c. 71 (Sale of Goods Act, 1893) 528, 530 s. 14 479 s. 24 122, 157 s. 25 250 s. 55 471 c. 73 (Local Government Act, 1894) 393 BS. 21, 25 393 57 & 58 Vict. c. 57 (Disea,se3 of Animals Act, 1894) 442 ss. 43, 44 786 c. 60 (Merchant Shipping Act, 1894) 398, 459 s. 136 107 a. 287 210 ss. 324, 325 219 s. 530 398 c. ccxiii. (London Building Act, 1894), ». 215 130 59 & 60 Vict. 0. 15 (Diseases of Animals Act, 1896) 442 c. 51 (Vexatious Actions Act, 1896) 633 c. 57 (Burglary Act, 1896) 749 60 d 61 Vict. c. 37 (Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897) 106 8. 1 171 61 & 62 Vict. c. 29 (Locomotives Act, 1898) 395 s- 12 183, 396 c. 31 (Metropolitan Police Courts Act, 1898) 780 62 & 63 Vict. c. 14 (London Government Act, 1899) 393 c. 26 (Metropolitan Police Act, 1899) 730 c. 46 (Improvement of Land Act, 1899), s. 3 282 63 & 64 Vict. c. 51 (Money Lenders Act, 1900) '.'... 532 1 Edw. VII. c. 22 (Factory and Workshop Act, 1901), s. 79 % ss. 140—142 511 2 Edw. VII. c. 15 (Musical Summary Proceedings Copyright Act 1902) : 689 c. 28 (Licensing Act, 1902) 550^ 78g »• 1 ' 786 - s. 5 217 3 Edw. VII. c. 17 (Metropolitan Streets Act, 1903) 736 c. 31 (Board of Agriculture and Fisheries Act, 1903), s. 1 782 c. 36 (Motor Car Act, 1903), s. 4 458 0. 40 (Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1903) 755 INDEX OP STATUTES. xvii 5 Edw. VII. c. 10 (Shipowners' Negligence (Remedies) Act, 1905), s. 1 106 s. 5 107 0. 11 (Railway Kres Act, 1905) 12, 126, 146, 402 s- 2 166 c. 15 (Trade Marks Act, 1905) 10, 724, 731, 733, 739, 798 s. 3 731 s. 8 720, 737- s- 9 723, 726, 728, 733 s. 10 733 ». 11 735 s. 12 732 ss. 13, 14 735 s. 15 733, 737 e. 19 727, 735, 739 B. 20 : 739 s. 21 733 =. 22 731 s. 23 785 S3. 24—27 734 s. 28 732 6s. 32—35 735 s. 38 731, 737, 798 s. 39 727, 798 s. 41 736, 739 s. 42 731, 737 s. 45 738 s. 51 736 ss. 53, 62 785 8S. 66—68 734 6 Edw. VII. c. 7 (Police Superannuation Act, 1906) 780 c. 15 (Extradition Act, 1906) 177 c. 21 (Ground Game (Amendment) Act, 1906) 661 c. 32 (DogsAct, 1906) 440, 448 6. 1 444,445, 448 c. 34 (Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906) 177, 682 c. 36 (Musical Copyright Act, 1906) 689, 690, 691 s. 1 691, 786 s. 2 691, 789, 792 c. 47 (Trade Disputes Act, 1906) 18, 21, 25, 26, 70, 72, 220—222, 672, 587 s. 1 69, 222 s. 2 69, 380 6. 3 26, 222 s- 4 21, 25, 71, 72 s. 5 26 0. 48 (Merchant Shipping Act, 1906), s. 60 107 u. 58 (Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906). ..5, 24, 49, 62, 74, 96, 99, 100, 106, 181, 229, 516, 522 s. 1 99, 105 • s. 2 101, 134 s. 3 51, 107 ss. 4, 6 107 ss. 7, 9 98 s. 13 96, 98, 100 Sched. 1 98, 101, 105 Sched. II 754 7 Edw. VII. c. 9 (Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, 1907) 208 c. 17 (Probation of Offenders Act, 1907) 179 s. 1 179 c. 29 (Patents and Designs Act, 1907) ... 10, 686, 695, 705, 735 6. 1 702, 703, 706 s. 2 706 s. 4 702 ss. 5—7 706 s. 10 709 s. 11 707 s. 13 709 C.T. b XVm INDEX OF STATUTES. PACiE 7 Bdw. VII. c. 29 (Patents and Designs Act, 1907)— s. 14 703, 709, 717 o. 15 702, 705 a. 17 709 s. 18 698, 709 S3. 21—23 708 =.. 24 698, 710, 711 s. 25 698, 711 s. 27 710 3. 29 697, 718 8. 33 711, 798 o. 34 798 s. 36 716 s. 37 697, 703, 704, 705 s. 38 698 s. 43 .". 703 s. 45 702 s. 49 695, 696 8. 50 696 s. 53 695 s. 54 696 3. 56 696 s. 59 695 3. 60 696 B. 71 704 s. 91 704, 737 s. 93 695 c. 53 (Public Health Acta Amendment Act, 1907), ss. 78—86 780 c. clxxi (Metropolitan "Water Board (Charges) Act, 1907) 33 s. 8 394 8 Bdw. VII. c. 5 (Police Superannuation Act, 1908) 780 i 0. 27 (Married Women's Property Act, 1908) 46 c. 28 (Agricultural Holdings Act, 1908), s. 25 286 8. 28 285 3. 29 295, 296, 301 3. 31 286 c. 43 (Local Authorities, Admission of the Press to Meetings Act, 1908) 603 c. 53 (Law of Distress Amendment Act, 1908) 285, 292, 761, 769 3. 1 295 .ss. 4, 5 296 s. 6 295, 296 c. 55 (Poisons and Pharmacy Act, 1908), s. 2 473 c. 66 (Public Meeting Act, 1908) 204 0. 67 (Children Act, 1908), ss. 5, 12 217 a. 19 178, 208, 786 B. 20 178 3. 21 178, 217 33. 22, 23 178 s. 24 789 3. 25 178 s. 40 786 Sched. 1 789 c. 69 (Companies Consolidation Act, 1908) 524, 525 6. 8 731 ». 81 524, 539 s. 84 59, 63, 524, 539 s- 140 766 s- 142 303, 766 s- 148 575 s- 176 767 fi- 200 766 8- 211 303 ss. 215, 216, 217, 218, 281 524 9 Bdw. VII. c. 30 (Cinematograph Act, 1909) 79O c. 40 (Police Act, 1909) 780 INDEX OF STATUTES. PAGE 10 Edw. VII. & 1 Geo. V. u. 24 (Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910) 550 ss. 62, 81, 87 786 1 & 2 Geo. V. c. 27 (Protection of Animals Act, 1911), s. 12 786 c. 46 (Copyright Act, 1911) 315, 668—695 s. 1 672, 691, 692, 694 s. 2 682, 690, 691, 692 s. 3 670, 674, 675 s. 4 674 a. 5 672, 673, 674, 694 B. 6 687 s. 7 688, 695 •sa. 8—9 688 a. 10 688, 691 6. 11 688 s. 12 689 s. 13 678, 689 o. 14 686 s. 15 681 8. 16 674, 675 s. 17 672, 675 s. 18 676 s. 19 676, 678, 685 s. 20 / 685 s. 21 ..: 676 s. 22 685 s. 23 671 s. 24 677 s. 25 678 s. 26 679 S3. 27, 28, 29 680 s. 30 681 s. 81 670, 702 s. 38 678 s. 35 669—672, 682, 695 s. 36 672 c. 52 (Bag Flock Act, 1911) 399 c. 55 (National Insurance Act, 1911), s. 112 763 2 & 3 Geo. V. 0. 80 (Trade Union Act, 1913), e. 1 72 g g _ _ 72 78 c. 31 (paotage'Act\'"i9i3)rs." 15."!!!!!!!!."'."!"!!]]!!!!!!!... ' 68 3 & 4 Geo. V. c. 34 (Bankruptcy and Deeds of Arrangement Act, 1913), s. 12 47 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 16 (Trade Marks Act, 1914) 10 c. 18 (Patents and Designs Act, 1914) 10 c. 59 (Bankruptcy Act, 1914) 200 s. 80 167 s. 35 779 ss. 40, 41 r. 771 s. 125 46, 47 Sched. VI 47 c. 61 fSpecial Constables Act, 1914) 782 6 & 6 Geo. V. i>. 38 (Copyright (British Museum) Act, 1915) 681 c. 90 (Indictments Act, 1915) 200 6 & 7 Geo. V. c. 50 (Larceny Act, 1916), s. 22 122 ss. 41, 48, and Sched 128 c. 58 (Registration of Business Names Act, 1916), ss. 1, 8 742 s. 14 731 9 & 10 Geo. V. c. 79 (Trade Marks Act, 1919), s. 6 725 c. 80 (Patents and Designs Act, 1919) 697 6. 1 710 B. 3 710 =. 7 709 8. 8 718 INDEX OF CASES. Including References to the "Revised Reports." PAGE A. V. B., (1889) 24 L. E. Ir. 234 120 A. V. B., (1907) S. C. 1154 (Ct. of Seas.) 555, 588 A. B., In re, (1914) 83 L. J. P. 67. See also White, In the Estate of 569 A. B. V. Blackwood, (1902) 5 F. 25 (Ct. of Sess.) 550 A. B. V. C. D., (1904) 7 F. 22 (Ct. of Seas.) 551, 559, 576, 602, 653 Abbot V. North British E. Co., [1916] S. C. 306, Sco 507 V. Weekly, (1665) 1 Lev. 176 345 Abbott V. Biggleswade Joint Hospital Board, [19151 W. C & Ins. E. 533— C. A 101 i;. Macfie, (1863) 2 H. & C. 744; 33 L. J. Ex. 177; 9 L. T. (N. S.) 513 : 150, 501 Abelson v. Brockman, (1890) 54 J. P. 119 438 Aberdonian, The, (1910) P. 225; 79 L. J. P. 89; 102 L. T. 543; 11 Asp. M. C. 393 469 Abingdon Eural District Council v. Oxford (City) Electric Tramways, Ltd., [1917] 2 K. B. 318; 86 L. J. K. B. 1247— C. A 395 Abington v. Lipscomb, (1841) 1 Q. B..776; 1 G. & D. 230; 10 L. J. Q. B. 330; 6 Jur. 257 241 Abraham v., Bullock, (1902) 86 L. T. 796 ; 85 L. T. 237 ; 50 W. E. 626; 49 W. E. 653; 18 T. L. E. 701; 17 T. L. E. 557 78 Abrahams v. Deakin, (1891) 1 Q. B. 516; 60 L. J. Q. B. 238; 63 L. T. 690; 39 W. E. 183 76, 82 Abrath v. North Eastern E. Co., (1883-6) 11 Q. B. D. 79, 440; 11 App. Cas. 247; 52 L. J. Q. B. 352, 620; 55 L. J.Q. B. 457; 55 L. T. (N. S.) 63— H. L 57, 643, 646, 647, 649 Acetylene Illuminating Co. v. United Alkali Co., (1902) 1 Ch. 494; 72 L. J. Ch. 214; 20 E. P. C. 161; 71 L. J. Ch. 301; 50 W. E. 361 700, 711 Ackerley v. Parkinson, (1815) 3 M. & S. 411; 16 E. E. 317 752 Ackland v. Paynter, (1820) 8 Price, 95 765, 775 Ackroyd v. Smith, (1850) 10 C. B. 164; 19 L. J. C. P. 315; 14 Jur. 1047 347 Acton V. Blundell, (1843) 12 M. & W. 324; 13 L. J. Ex. 289; 67 E. E. 361 373, 374 Adair v. Young, (1879) 12 Ch. D. 13; 40 L. T. (N. S.) 598 716 Adam v'. British and Foreign S.S. Co., Ltd., (1898) 2 Q. B.'430; 67 L. J. Q. B. 844; 79 L. T. 31; 14 T. L. E. 540 123 V. Ward, [1917] A. C. 309, H. L. ; (1915) 31 T. L. E. 299— C. A 580, 581 Adams v. Batley, (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 625; 56 L. J. Q. B. 393; 56 L. T. 770; 35 W. E. 437 60 V. Grane, (1833) 1 C. & M. 380; 3 Tyr. 326; 2 L. J. Ex. 105; 38 E. E. 624 293 • V. Lancashire and Yorkshire E. Co., (1869) L. E. 4 C. P. 739; 38 L. J. C. P. 277; 20 L. T. (N. S.) 850 518 V. Meredew, (1829) 3 Y. & J. 219 557 V. Elvers, (1851) 11 Barb. (N.Y.) 390 142, 343 V. Thrift, [1915] 2 Ch. 21; 84 L. J. Ch. 729, C. A 63, 524, 539 V. Ursell, [1913] 1 Ch. 269; 82 L. J. Ch. 157 379, 381 Adamson v. Anderson & Co., [1913] S. C. 1038, Sco 102 V. Jarris, (1827) 4 Bing. 66; 12 Moore, 241; 5 L. J. C. P. 68; 29 E. E. 503 62 Adderley v. Great Northern E. Co., (1905) 2 Ir. Eep. 378 499 XXll INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Addiaon v. Overend, (1796) 6 T. E. 766 64,, 189 V. Shepherd, (1908) 2 K. B. 118; 77 L. J. K. B. 534; 72 J. P. 239; 99 L. T. 121 285, 294 Addlestone Linoleum Co., In re, Benson's Case, (1887) 37 Ch. T>. 191; 57 L. J. Ch. 249; 58 L. T. 428; 36 W. R. 227 86 Admiral Fishing Co. v. Eobinson, [1910] 1 K. B. 540; 79 L. J. K. B. 661; 102 L. T. 203; 26 T. L. E. 299; 3 B. W. C. C. 247 — C. A 98 Admiralty Commissioners v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co., (1909) S. C. 835; 46 Sc. L. E. 254 (Ct. of Sess.) 580 V. (1910) S. C. 663; 47 So. L. E. 509 (Ct. of Sess.) 145 Aerated Bread Co.'s Trade Mark, In re. See Baker (Albert) & Co.'s Application, In re. Aga Kurboolie Mahomed v. The Queen, (1883) 4 Moore, P. C. 239 ... 765 Agar Ellis, In re, (1883) 24 Ch. D. 317; 53 L. J. Ch. 10; 50 L. T. 161; 32 W. E. 1 4, 216 Agnew V. British Legal Life Assurance Co., Ltd., (1906) 8 F. 422 (Ct. of Sess.) 550 Agricultural and Technical Instruction Department v. Burke, [1915} 2 Ir. E. 128 .' 86 A. G. S. Manufacturing Co. v. Aeroplane General Sundries Co., (1918) 35 E. P. C. 127— C. A '. 738 Aiken v. Caledonian E. Co., [1913] S. C. 66, See 641 Aimo, The, (1873) 2 Aspinall, M. L. C. (N. S.) 96; 29 L. T. 119; - 21 W. E. 707 460 Ainsworth, Ex parte, E. v. Morton Brown, (1910) 74 J. P. 53 191 Airdrie (Provost and Magistrates of) v. County Council of Lanark, (1910) A. C. 286; 79 L. J. P. C. 82; 102 L. T. 437; 44 Sc. L. E. 916; 47 Sc. L. E. 508— H. L. (And see Coatbridge (Provost and Magistrates) v. County Council of Lanark) 400 Aitken v. Bedwell, (1827) 1 M. & M. 68 197 Ajello V. Worsley, (1898) 1 Ch. 274; 67 L. J. Ch. 172; 77 L. T. 783; 14 T. L. E. 168; 46 W. E. 245 527, 541 Aked V. Stocks, (1828) 4 Bing. 609; 1 M. & P. 346; 6 L. J.' C. P. 100; 6 L. J. M. 0. 62; 29 E. E. 614 133 Aktiebolaget B. A. F. Hjorth k Co. is Trade Mark " Primus," In re, (1910) 2 Ch. 64; 79 L. J. Ch. 448; 26 T. L. E. 463; 54 Sol. J. 476; 27 E. P. C. 461 725 Aktiengesellschaft fflr Auilin Fabrikation in Berlin v. Levinstein, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 177 707, 713 Aktiengesellschaft Hommel Haematogen v. Hommel, (1912) 66 Sol. J. 399 723 Alabaster v. Harness, (1896) 1 Q. B. 339; 64 L. J. Q. B. 76; 71 L. T. 740; 43 W. E. 196 659 Albion Motor Car Co. v. Albion Carriage and Motor Body Works, Ltd., (1917) 34 E. P. C. 257 : 731 Alderson v. Davenport, (1844) 13 M. & W. 42 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 352; 8 Jur. 650 762 Aldred's Case, (1610) 9 Eep. 57 b ; 6 Co. Eep. 102 379 Aldridge v. Merry, [1913] 2 Ir. E. 308— C. A •.... 102 Aldworth v. Stewart, (1866) 4 F. & F. 967; 14 L. T. (N. S.) 862 ... 219 Alexander v. Jenkins, (1892) 1 Q. B. 797; 61 L. J. Q. B. 634;' 66 L. T. 391; 40 W. E. 546 557 V. North Eastern E. Co., (1865) 6 B. & S. 340; 34 L. J. Q. B. 152; 13 W. E. 661 673 V. Southey, (1821) 6 B. & Aid. 247; 24 E. E. 348 242, 243 Algol, The, [1918] P. 7— C. A 459 Allan V. Liverpool, 1874) L. E. 9 Q. B. 180; 43 L. J. M. C. 69; 30 L. T. (N. S.) 93 334 V. Milner, (1831) 2 C. & J. 47 170 AUanson v. Atkinson; (i813) 1 M. & S. 583 167 AUbutt i;. General Council of Medical Education, (1889) 23 Q. B. D. 400; 68 L. J. Q. B. 606; 61 L. T. 685; 37 W. E. 771 600, 744 AUcock V. Eodgers, [1917] W. N. 363— C. A 105 Allcott V. Millar's Karri & Jarrah Forests, (1905) 91 L. T. 722 ... 556, 560, 617, 626, 631 Allen, Be, [1915] 1 K. B. 285; 84 L. J. K. B. 271 168 INDEX OF CASES. xxiii PAGE Allen, Re, Shaw, Ex parte, (1914) 59 Sol. Jo. 130— C. A 47 (W. J.) and Hoey (W.), Re 101 & Sous Bill Posting Co., Ltd. v. King, [1915] 2 Ir. E. 213; affirmed [1916] 2 A. C. 55 H. L 347 V. Flood, (1898) A. C. 1; 67 L. J. Q. B. 119; 62 J. P. 695; 77 L. T. 717; 14 T. L. E. 125; 46 W. E. 258 {See also Plood V. Jackson) 3, 14—16, 18, 20,-23, 149 V. Great Eastern E. Co., [1914] 2 K. B. 243; 83 L. J. K. B. 898— C. A 107 V. London & South Western E. Co., (1870) L. E. 6 Q. B. 65; 40 L. J. Q. B. 55; 23 L. T. (N. S.) 612 82 - V. Original Samuel Allen cc Sons, (1915) 32 E. P. C. 33 723 ^— V. Eivington, (1671) 2 Wms. Saund. Ill 354 V. Sharp, (1848) 2 Ex. 352; 17 L. J. Ex. 209 258 V. Stephenson, (1700) 1 Lutw. 90 (36) 432 V. Wright, (1838) 8 C. & P. 522 205 Allen West v. British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., (1916) 33 E. P. C. 157 695 AUhusen v. Brooking, (1884) 26 Ch. D. 559; 53 L. J. Ch. 520; 51 L. T. (N. S.) 57 328 Alliance & Dublin Consumers' Gas Co. v. Dublin County Council, (1901) 1 Ir. E. 492 405 Alliance Bank of Simla v. Carey, (1880) 5 C. P. D. 429 180 AUman v. Hardcastle, (1904) 89 L. T. 553; 67 J. P. 440; 20 Cox, C.C. 567 26 AUport V. The Securities Co., Ltd., (1895) 72 L. T. 583 796, 803 Allsop V. Allsop, (1860) 5 H. & N. 534; 29 L. J. Ex. 315; 6 Jur. (N. S.) 433 141, 224, 617 AUworthy & Walker v. Clayton, (1907) 2 K. B. 685; 76 L. J. K. B. 934; 71 J. P. 20; 96 L. T. 31 263 Alsager v. Close, (1842) 10 M. & W. 576; 12 L. J. Ex. 50 259, 274 Alsop's Patent, In re, (1906) 1 Ch. 85 708 Alton V. Midland E. Co., (1865) 19 C. B. (N. S.) 213; 34 L. J. C. P. 292; 12 L. T. (N. S.) 703 223 Amalgamated Society of Eailway Servants v. Osborne, (1910) A. C. 87; (1909) 1 Ch. 163; 78 L. J. Ch. 204; 77 L. J. Ch. 769; 101 L. T. 787; 64 Sol. J. 215; 26 T. L. E. 177 72 Amann v. Damm, (1860) 8 C. B. (N. S.) 697; 29 L. J. C. P. 313; 7 Jur. (N. S.) 47 582, 590, 591, 593 Ambergate, &c., E. Co. v. Midland E. Co., (1853) 2 E. & B. 793; 23 L. J. Q. B. 17; 18 Jur. 243 316 Ambler & Fawoett v. Gordon, (1905) 1 K. B. 417; 74 L. J. K. B. 185; 53 W. E. 300; 92 L. T. 96; 21 T. L. E. 206 377, 800 American Braided Wire Co. v. Thomson, (1890) 44 Ch. D. 274; 59 L. J. Ch. 425; 62 L. T. 616 716 Must Corporation v. Hendry and another, (1893) 62 L. J. Q. B.- 388 291 Steel & Wire Co. v. Glover, (1902) 50 W. E. 284 711 Tobacco Co. v. Guest, (1892) 1 Ch. 630; 61 L. J. Ch. 242; 66 L. T. 257; 40 W. E. 364 798 Amerika, The, [1914] P. 167; 83 L. J. P. 167 281 Amorette ■;;. James, [1915] 1 K. B. 124; 84 L. J. K. B. 563-D. C. ... 766 Amys V. Barton, (1912) 1 K. B. 40; 81 L. J. K. B. 66; 105 L. T. i 619; 28 T. L. E. 29— C. A 97 Ancona, The, [1915] P. 200; 84 L. J. P. 183 469 Andalusian, The, (1877) 2 P. D. 231; 46 L. J. P. D. & A. 77 461 Anderson v. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., [1917] W. C. & Ins. E. 71 105 V. Calvert, (1908) 24 T. L. E. 399 624 - V. Collinson, (1901) 2 K. B. 107; 70 L. J. K. B. 620; 84 L. T. 465; 49 W. E. 623; 17 T. L. E. 465 224 V. Croall, (1903) 6 F. 153 (Ct. of Sess.) 238 V. Fife Coal Co., [1910] S. C. 8; 47 Sc. L. E. 3; 3 B. W. C. C. 639 (Ct. of Sess.) 102 . V. Gorrie, (1895) 1 Q. B. 668; 71 L. T. 382 746 0. Lieber Code Co., [1917] 2 K. B. 469; 86 L. J. K. B. 1220; 117 L. T 361; 33 T. L. E. 420 669 XXIV INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Anderson v. Midland E. Co., (1861) 3 E. & E. 614 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 94 ; 7 Jur. fN. S.) 411 283 V. Oppenheimer, (1880) 5 Q. B. D. 602; 49 L. J. Q. B. 708 428, 437 V. Pacific Insurance Co., (1872) L. E. 7 C. P. 65; 26 L. T. (N. S.) 130; 20 W. E. 280 526 Audoni, The, [1918] P. 14 509 Andrew v. Failsworth Industrial Society, Ltd., (1904) 2 K. B. 32; 73 L. J. K. B. 511; 68 J. P. 409; 52 W. E. 431; 90 L. T. 611; 20 T. L. E. 429 97 V. Hancock, (1819) 1 B. & B. 37 ; 3 Moore, 278; 21 E. E. 569 ... 286 V. Kuehnrich, (1913) 30 E. P. C. 677; 29 T. L. E. 771— C. A. 723, 731, 737 Andrews v. Abertillery Urban Council, (1911) 2 Ch. 398 ; 80 L. J. Ch. 724; 105 L. T. 81; 75 J. P. 449; 55 Sol. J. 347; 9 L. G. E. 1009 796 V. Dixon, (1820) 3 B. & Aid. 645; 22 E. E. 518 778 V. Marris and Whitham, (1841) 1 Q. B. 3 ; 1 G. & D. 268; 10 L. J. Q. B. 225; 55 E. E. 174 759, 760 V. Mockford, (1896) 1 Q. B. 372; 73 L. T. 726 59, 543 -^— V. Nott Bower, (1895) 1 Q. B. 888; 64 L. J. Q. B. 536; 72 L. T. 530; 43 W. E. 582 589, 592 V. Waite, (1907) 2 Ch. 500; 76 L. J. Ch. 676; 97 L. T. 428 ... 379 Angle V. Alexander, (1830) 7 Bing. 119; 4 M. oc P. 870 559 Anglo-American Brush Electric Light Corporation v. King & Co., (1892) A. C. 367 701 Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk Co. v. Pearks, Gunston & Tee, Ltd., •(1904) 20 T. L. E. 238; 21 E. P. C. 261 720 Angus V. Clifford, (1891) 2 Ch. 449; 60 L. J. Ch. 443; 65 L. T. 274; 39 W. E. 498 533, 534, 535 V. Dalton, (1881) 6 App. Cas. 740; 50 L. J. Q. B. 689; 44 L. T. (N. S.) 844 412 V. London, Tilbury & Southend E. Co., (1906) 22 T. L. E. 222 496 Annaly v. Trade Auxiliary Co., (1890) 26 L. E. Ir. 394 599 Aponymous Case, (1696) 3 Salk. 46 156 (1704) 6 Mod. 231 211 (1752) 3 Atk. 751 803 (1770) 3 Wils. 126 316 (1774) Lofft, 493 221 (1828) 1 Moll. 390 258, 259 Anonymous v. Cooper, (1768) 2 Wils. 375 282 Anthony v. Haneys, (1832) 8 Bing. 186; 1 M. & Scott, 300 340 V. Midland E. Co., (1909) 100 L. T. 117; 25 T. L. E. 98 518 Ape, The, [1916] P. 303; 84 L. J. P. 81— C. A 459, 509 ApoUinaris Co. v. Duckworth, (1906) 22 T. L. E. 744 740 Apollo (Owners of) v. Port Talbot Co., (1891) A. C. 499; 65 L. T. 590 81, 488 Applebee v. Percy, (1874) L. E. 9 C. P. 647 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 365 ; 30 L. T. (K. S.) 785 448 Appleby v. Franklin, (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 93; 55 L. J. Q. B. 129; 54 L. T. (N. S.) 135 119, 121 Archbold v. Scully, (1861) 9 H. L. C. 360 357, 363 V. Sweet, (1832) 1 Moo. & E. 162; 5 C. & P. 219; 38 E. E. 810 722 Archer, In re, Archer, Ex parte, (1904) 20 T. L. E. 390 41, 654 Argentine, The, (1889) 14 A. C. 519 H. L 148 Ariadne, The, (1911) 27 T. L. E. 304 459 Arkwright v. Newbold, (1881) 17 Ch. D." 301; 50 L. J. Ch." 372- 44 L. T. (N. S.) 393 627, 536 Arlett V. Ellis, a827-9) 7 B. & C. 346 ; 9 B. & C. 671 ; 9 D. & E. 897 - 5 L. J. K. B. 391; 31 E. E. 214, 231 164 Armagh Union v. Bell, (1900) 2 Ir. E. 371— C. A 405 Armistead v. Humber Graving Dock, (1918) 88 L. J. K. B. 140 105 Armitage r. Lancashire & Yorkshire E. Co., [1902] 2 K. B. 178- 71 L. J. Z. B. 778; 66 J. P. 613; 86 L. T. 883; 18 T. L. E. 648 84, 102 Armory v. Delamirie, (1721j 1 Stra. 505; 1 Sm. L. C. 12th ed. 396 266, 275 INDEX OF CASES. XXV PAGE Armstrong, In re, Lindsay, Ex parte, (1892) 1 Q. B. 327; 65 L T. 464; 40 W. E. 159 635 V. Gregson, [1916] W. C. & Ins. E. 226— C. A 103 V. Lancashire & Yorkshire E. Co., (1875) L. E. 10 Ex. 47; 44 L. J. Ex. 89; 83 L. T. (N. S.) 228 510 V. Milburn, (1886) 54 L. T. 247, 723 187 V. Mitchell, (1903) 88 L. T. 870; 67 J. P. 329; 19 T. L. E. 525; 20 Cox, C. C. 497 446 Arne v. Johnson, (1712) 10 Mod. 110 565 Arnitt v. Garnett, (1820) 3 B. & Aid. 440; 22 E. E. 453 778 Arnold v. Hamel, (1854) 23 L. J. Ex. 137 128 V. King-Emperor, [1914] A. C. 644; 83 L. J. P. C. 299; 41 Ind. App. 149 P. 599 V. Morgan, (1911) 2 K. B. 314; 80 L. J. K. B. 955; 103 L. T. 763; 75 J. P. 105; 9 L. G. E. 917 748 Arnott V. Whitby Urban District Council (No. 1), (1909) 73 J. P. 64 802 Arrol & Co.,. Ltd. v. Kelly, (1905) 7 E. 906 (Ct. of Sess.) 100 Arrow Shipping Co. r. Tyne Improvement Commissioners, (1894) A. C. 508; 63 L. J. P. 146; 71 L. T. 346 398 Arrowsmith v. Le Mesurier, (1806) 2 B. & P. N. E. 211 ; 9 E. E. 642 194 Ash V. Dawnay, (1852) 8 Ex. 237; 22 L. J. Ex. 59 775 V. Invicta Manufacturing Co., (1911) 55 Sol. J. 348; 28 E. P. C. 252, 597 726 Ashburton (Lord) v. Pape, [1913] 2 Ch. 469; 82 L. J. Ch. 527— C. A. 797 Ashby V. White, (1703) 2 Lord Eaym. 938; 1 Sm. L. C. 12th ed. 266 5, 139, 140, 337 Ashcroft r. Bourne, (1832) 3 B. c& Ad. 684; 1 L. J. K. B. 209; 37 E. E. 523 753 Asher v. Whitlock, (1865) L. E. 1 Q. B. 1 ; 35 L. J. Q. B. 17; 14 W. E. 26 354, 361 Ashmore Benson Pears & Co. v. Lillie, [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 7 ... 106 Ashton V. Stock, (1877) 6 Ch. D. 719; 25 W. E. 862 320, 323 Ashton's Trade Mark, In re, (1900) 48 W. E. 389 731 Ashworth v. Stanwix, (1861) 3 E. & E. 701; 30 L. J. Q. B. 183; 4L. T. (N. S.) 85 67, 93 Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Lennard's Carrying Co., [1914] 1 K. B. 419; 83 L. J. K". B. 861— C. A. ; affirmed, [1915] A. C. 705 ; 84 L. J. K. B. 1281 H. L 461 Askell V. Gudgeon, (1918) 118 L. T. 258 H.' L 103 Astley V. Tyldesley Coal Co. & Tyldesley Coal Co., In re, (1899) 80 L. T. 116; 68 L. J. Q. B. 252; 15 T. L. E. 154 323, 367 Astrakhan, The, (1910) P. 172; 79 L. J. P. 78; 102 L. T. 539; 26 T. L. E. 329; 11 Asp. M. C. 390 146 Atherton v. London & North Western E. Co., (1905) 21 T. L. E. 671 — C. A 389 Atkins V. Fulham Borough Council, (1915) 31 T. L. E. 564 659 : V. Kilby, (1840) 11 A. & B. 777 ; 4 P. & D. 145 790 Atkinson v. Jameson, (1792) 5 T. E. 25 765 V. Newcastle & Gateshead Waterworks Ccr. , (1877) 2 Ex. D. 441 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 775; 36 L. T. (N. S.) 761 28 Attack V. Bramwell, (1863) 3 B. & S. 520; 32 L. J. Q. B. 146; 7 L. T. (N. S.) 740 303 Attorney-General v. Antrobus, (1905) 2 Ch. 188; 69 J. P. 141; 92 L. T. 790; 21 T. L. E. 471; 3 L. G. E. 1071 321 V. Birmingham, Tame and Eea District Drainage Board, (1908) 2 Ch. 551; 77 L. J. Ch. 836; 72 J. P. 20; 98 L. T. 310: 24 T. L. E. 126 383, 410 V. Brighton & Hove Co-operative Supply Association, (1900) 1 Ch. 276 ; 69 L. J. Ch. 204 ; 48 W. E. 314 ; 81 L. T. 762 ; 16 T. L. E. 144 386 i;. Brighton Corporation, (1908) 77 L. J. Ch. 6, 603; 71 J. P. 535; 72 J. P. 306; 6 L. G. E. 51, 835; 24 T. L. E. 33, 634 410 V. Cambridge Consumers' Gas Co., (1868) L. E. 4 Ch. 71 ; 38 L. J. Ch. 94; 17 W. E. 145 796 V. Cleaver, (1811) 18 Ves. 210; 13 E. E. 267; 18 E. E. 159 385 V. Cole, (1901) 1 Ch. 205; VO L. J. Ch. 148; 65 J. P. 88; 83 L. T. 725 *... 379, 380, 383, 385, 400 XXVI INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Attorney-General v. Conduit Colliery Co., (1895) 1 Q. B. 301 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 207; 71 L. T. 771; 43 W. K. 366 138, 375 V. Gopeland, (1902) 1 K. B. 690; (1901) 2 K. B. 101; 70 L. J. K. B. 512; 71 L. J. K. B. 472; 65 J. P. 581; 66 J. P. 420; 49 W. E. 489; 50 W. K. 490; 84 L. T. 562; 86 L. T. 486; 17 T. L. E. 422; 18 T. L. E. 394 399 V. Dorchester Corporation, (1906) 69 J. P. 363; 70 J. P. 281; 93 L. T. 290; 94 L. T. 682; 21 T. L. E. 695; 22 T. L. E. 480; 4 L. G. E. 675 115 V. Esher Linoleum Co. , (1901) 2 Ch. 647 ; 70 L. J. Ch. 808 ; 50 W. E. 22; 85 L. T. 414; 66 J. P. 71 342 V. Great Northern E. Co., (1908) 72 J. P. 442; 126 L. T. Jour. 98 410 V. Great Northern E. Co., [1916] 2 A. C. 356, H. L. ; (1915) 84 L. J. Ch. 793— C. A 34, 408 -0. Hemingway, (1917) 81 J. P. 112 342 V. Hooper, (1893) 3 Ch. 483; 63 L. J. Ch. 18; 69 L. T. 340 36 V. Horner, (1885) 11 App. Cas. 66, H. L 662 V. Horner (No. 2), [1918] 2 Ch. 140; 82 L. J. Ch. 339 662 V. Lewes Corporation, (1911) 2 Ch. 495; 81 L. J. Ch. 40; 105 L. T. 697; 76 J. P. 1; 27 T. L. E. 681; 55 Sol. J. 703; 10 L. G. E. 26 181, 399 V. London & North Western E. Co., (1900) 1 Q. B. 78; 69 L. J. Q. B. 26; 63 J. P. 772; 81 L. T. 649; 16 T. L. E. 30; (1899) 1 Q. B. 72; 68 L. J. Q. B. 4 408, 800 ^— V. London & South Western E. Co., (1905) 69 J. P. 110 391 V. Metropolitan E. Co., (1894) 1 Q. B. 384; 69 L. T. 811; 42 W. E. 381 403 V. Nottingham Corporation, (1904) 1 Ch. 673; 73 L. J. Ch. 512; 68 J. P. 125; 52 W. E. 281; 90 L. T. 308; 20 T. L. E. 257; 2 L. G. E. 698 380, 381, 404 u. Perry, (1904) 1 Ir. Eep. 247 166, 344 — - V. Plymouth Pish Guano and Oil Co., (1912) 76 J. P. 19 379, 380 V. Pontypridd Waterworks Co., (1908) 1 Ch. 388; 77 L. J. Ch. 237 ; 72 J. P. 48 ; 98 L. T. 275 ; 24 T. L. E. 196 ; 6 L. G. E. 397 410 - V. Preston, (Mayor of), (1896) 13 T. L. E. 14 797 V. Eathmines & Pembroke Hospital Board, (1904) 1 Ir. Eep. 161 372, 380, 381, 404 V. Eeynolds, (1911) 2 K. B. 888; 80 L. J. K. B. 1073; 104 L. T. 852 164 u. Eoe, [1915] 1 Ch. 235; 84 L. J. Ch. 322 417 V. Scott (No. 3), (1905) 2 K. B. 160; 74 L. J. K. B. 803; 69 J. P. 109; 93 L. T. 249; 21 T. L. E. 211; 3 L. G. E. 272 395 i;. Sheffield Gas Consumers' Co., (1852-3) 3 De G. M. & G. 304; 22 L. J. Ch. 811; 17 Jur. 677 797 V. Smith (W. H. & Son), (1910) 103 L. T. 96; 74 J. P. 313; 26 T. L. E. 482; 8 L. G. E. 679 387 - V. Squires, (1906) 5 L. G. E. 99 379 V. Staffordshire County Council, (1905) 1 Ch. 336; 74 L. J. Ch. 153 ; 69 J. P. 97 ; 53 W. E. 312 ; 92 L. T. 288 ; 21 T. L. E. 139 ; 3 L. G. E. 379 32 V. Tod Heatley, (1897) 1 Ch. 560 415, 417 v. Tomline, (1879-80) 12 Ch. D. 214; 14 Ch. D. 58; 49 L. J. Ch. 377 ; 38 L. T. (N. S.) 67 ; 42 L. T. (N. S.) 880 11, 27, 421, 424 V. Trustees of British Museum, (1903) 2 Ch. 598; 72 L. J. Ch. 743; 51 W. E. 582; 88 L. T. 868; 19 T. L. E. 555 661 0. Wimbledon House Estate Co., Ltd., (1904) 2 Ch. 34; 73 L. J. Ch. 593; 68 J. P. 341; 91 L. T. 163; 2u T. L. E. 489; 2 L. G. E. 826 409, 800 Attorney-General (Commonwealth of Australia) v. Adelaide S.S Co., [1913] A. C. 781; 83 ±j. J. P. C. 84— P. C 20, 70 Attorneys and Solicitors Act, In re, (1875) 1 Ch. D. 573 660 Attwood V. Chapman, [1914] 3 K. B. 275; 83 L. J. K. B. 1666 ... 577, 745 V. Small, (1835) 6 CI. & P. 232; 49 E. E. 115— H. L 544 Atwood V. Ernest, (1853) 13 C. B. 881; 22 L. J. C. P. 225; 17 Jur. 603 248, 276 Austin V. Cowling, (1870) L. E. 5 C. P. 534; 39 L. J. C. P. 260; 22 L. T. (N. S.) 721 196, 637 INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Austin V. Great Western E. Co., (1867) L. E. 2 Q. B. 442 463 Austria (Emperor of) v. Day, (1861) 3 De Q. F. & J. 217 794 Avenell v. Croker, (1828) Moo. & Mai. 172 312 Avery v. Wood, (1891) 3 Ch. 115 303 Avery (W. & T.), Ltd., Application, In re, (1919) 36 B. P. C. 89 727 Aynsley v. Glover, (1874) L. B. 18 Eq. 544; 43 L. J. Ch. 777; 31 L. T. (N. S.) 21y 799 Ayr V. St. Andrew's Ambulance Association, [1918] S. 0. 158 Sco. ... 182 Ayre v. Craven, (1834) 2 A. & E. 2; 4 N. & M. 220; 4 L. J. K. B. 36; 41 E. E. 369 560, 619 AysMord v. Murray, (1870) 23 L. T. (N. S.) 170 776 B. A. S., In re, (1898) 2 Ch. 392; 67 L. J. Ch. 463; 78 L. T. 638 213 Bach V. Meats, (1816) 5 M. & S. 200; 17 E. E. 310 289 Bach's Design, In re, (1889) 42 Ch. D. 661 ; 61 L. T. 765 ; 38 W. E. 174 696 Back V. Dick, Kerr & Co., (1905) 2 K. B. 148; (1906) A. C. 325; 74 L. J. K. B. 596; 76 L.-J. K. B. 669; 53 W. E. 615; 94 L. T. 802; 22 T. L. E. 548— H. L 97 Backhouse v. Bonomi, (1858-61) E. B. & E. 622; 9 H. L. C. 503; 28 L.J. Q. B. 378;34L. J. Q. B. 181; 4 L. T. (N. S.) 754 ... 180, 184, 375 439 Baddeley v. Granville (Earl), (1887) 19 Q. B. D. 423; 56 L. J. Q. B. ' 501; 87 L. T. 268; 36 W. E. 63 518 Badische Anilin und Soda Pabrik v. Levinstein, (1883) 24 Ch. D. 156; 52 L. J. Ch. 704; 48 L. T. (N. S.) 822 713 V. The Basle Chemical Works Bindschedler, (1898) A. C. 200; 67 L. J. Ch. 141 ; 77 L. T. 673 ; 14 T. L. E. 82 ; 14 E. P. C. 919 ; 46 W. E. 256 714 Badken v. Powell, (1776) 2 Cowp. 476 306 Bagge V. Mawby, (1863) 8 Ex. 641; 22 L. J. Ex. 236 287 V. Whitehead, (1892) 2 Q. B. 355; 61 L. J. Q. B. 778; 66 L. T. 815; 40 W. E. 472 776 Baglehole v. Walters, (1811) 3 Camp. 164; 13 E. E. 778 630 Bagley v. Furness Withy & Co., [1914] W. N. 327— H. L 106 Bagnall v. Carlton, (1877) 6 Ch. D. 371; 47 L. J. Ch. 30; 37 L. T. 481; 26 W. E. 243 177 Bagot Hulton & Co.'s Application, In re, [1914] 31 E. P. C. 481 720 Trade Mark, In re, (1916) 84 L. J. Ch. 918— C. A 735 Bagshawe v. Goward, (1606) Cro. Jao. 147 306 Bailey v. Gill, [1919] 1 K. B. 41; 88 L. J. K. B. 591 256 Baily v. Merrell, (1615) 3 Bulst. 95 545 Bainbridge v. Chertsey Urban District Council, (1915) 84 L. J. Ch. 626 379 . V. The Postmaster-General and Crane, (1906) 1 K. B. 178; 76 L. J. K. B. 366; 22 T. L. E. 70— C. A 38, 68 Baines v. Baker, (1762) Ambl. 158 381 Baird v. Birsztan, (1906) 8 F. 438 (Ct. of Sess.) 100 - V. Wallace James, (1916) 85 L. J. P. C. 193— H. L 594 V. Williamson, (1863) 15 C. B. (N. S.) 376; 33 L. J. C. P. 101; 9 L. T. (N. S.) 12 423, 425 Baker (Albert) & Co.'® Application, In re, (1908) 2 Ch. 86 ; 77 L. J. Ch. 473; 98 L. T. 721; 24 T. L. E. 467; 25 B. P. C. 513 720, 733 V. Bolton, (1809) 1 Camp. 493 281 -u. Bradford (Earl of), (1916) 85 L. J. K. B. 1031— H. L 104 V. Carrick, (1894) 1 Q. B. 838; 63 L. J. Q. B. 399; 70 L. T. 366; 42 W. E. 338 586, 592 V. Ellison, [1914] 2 K. B. 762; 83 L. J. K. B. 1335 467 „. Eawson, (1890) 45 Ch. D. 519; 63 L. T. 306 736 V. Snell, (1908) 2 K. B. 352, 825; 77 L. J. K. B. 726, 1090; 24 T. L. E. 699, 811 440, 448 V. Walker, (1845) 14 M. & W. 466 X-V-'V Baker and Wife v. Wicks and others, (1904) 1 K. B. 743; 73 L. J. K B 410 ; 68 J P. 263 ; 62 W. E. 566 ; 90 L. T. 706 ; 20 T. L. B. 382; 2 L. G. E. 1156 305, 313, 774 Baldock V. Westminster City Council, (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 602-C. A. 516 XXVlll INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Baldwin v. Casella, (1872) L. E. 7 Ex. 325; 41 L. J. Ex. 167; 26 L. T. (N. S.) 707 448 V. Elphinston, (1774) 2 W. Bl. 1037 567 Baldwin's, Ltd. v. Halifax Corporation, (1916) 85 L. J. K. B. 1769 ... 33 Ball, Ex parte. (1879) 10 Ch. D. 667; 48 L. J. Bk. 57; 40 L. T. (N. S.) 141 119, 120, 121 V. Herbert, (1789) 3 T. E. 253; 1 E. E. 695 344 V. Eay, (1873) L. E. 8 Ch. 467 ; 37 J. P. 500 ; 28 L. T. (N. S.) 346; 21 W. E. 282 379, 382 Ballard v. Bond, (1837) 1 Jur. 7 210 V. Dyson, (1808) 1 Taunt. 279; 9 E. E. 770 342 V. Tomlinson, (1885) 29 Ch. D. 115; 54 L. J. Ch. 454; 52 L. T. (N. S.) 942 373, 374 Balme v. Hntton, (1833) 9 Bing. 471; 3 M. & Scott, 1 233, 260 Bals V. Teutonic (Owners), [1913] 3 K. B. 695; 82 L. J. K. B. 1331 107 Balson v. Megat, (1836) 4 Dowl. P. C. 557 762 Bamfield v. Goole and Sheffield Transport Co., (1910) 2 K. B. 94; 79 L. J. K. B. 1070; 103 L. T. 201 469 V. Massey, (1808) 1 Camp. 460 231 Bamford v. Turnley, (1860) 3 B. & S. 62; 31 L. J. Q. B. 286; 9 Jur. (N. S.) 377 16, 379, 381, 385 Banbury v. Bank of Montreal, [1918] A. C. 626— H. L 85 Bank of Australia v. Harding, (1850)-9 C. B. 661; 19 L. J. C. P. 345; 14 Jur. 1094 171 Bank of British North America v. Strong, (1876) 1 App. Cas. 307; 34 L. T. (N. S.) 627 577 Bank of New South Wales v. O'Connor, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 273; 58 L. J. P. C. 82; 60 L. T. 467 248, 263 V. Owston, (1879) 4 App. Cas. 270; 48 L. J. P. C. 25; 40 L. T. (N. S.) 500 56, 57, 82 Ba&nister i;. Hyde, (1860) 2 E. & E. 627; 29 L. J. Q. B. 141; 1 L. T. (N. S.) 438 291, 314, 765 Barbeary v. Chugg, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 504— C. A 99 Barber v. Lamb, (1860) 8 C. B. (N. S.) 95; 29 L. J. C. P. 234; 8 W. E. 461 171, 177 V. Lesiter, (1869)- 7 C. B. (N. S.) 175; 29 L. J. C. P. 161; 6 Jur. (N. S.) 664 640 V. Penley, (1893) 2 Ch. 447; 62 L. J. Ch. 623; 68 L. T. 662.. .150, 154 Barber & Co. v. Deutsche Bank, [1919] A. C. 304, H. L. ; (1917) 33 T. L. E. 643— C. A 556 Barff V. Probyn, (1896) 73 L. T. 119 271, 274 Barker v. Braham, (1773) 3 Wils. 368 200 . V. Furlong, (1891) 2 Ch. 172; 60 L. J. Ch. 368; 64 L. T. 411; 39 W. E. 621 237, 238, 252, 265 V. Herbert, (1911) 2 K. B. 633; 80 L. J. K. B. 1329; 105 L. T. 349; 76 J. P. 481; 27 T. L. E. 488; 9 L. G. E. 1083 389, 419 V. St.- Quintin, (1844) 12 M. & W. 441; 13 L. J. Ex. 144; 1 D. & L. 642; 67 E. E. 391 763 V. Taylor, (1823) 1 C. & P. 101; 28 E. E. 767 217 Barnardiston v. Chapman, (1714) cited in Heath v. Hubbard, (1803) 4 East, p. 121 248 Barnes v. Fox, [1914] 2 Ir. E. 276— C. A 224 V. Lucile, (1907) 96 L. T. 680; 23 T. L. E. 389 447 V. Nunnery Colliery Co., (1912) A. C. 44; 81 L. J. K. B. 213; 105 L. T. 961; 28 T. L. E. 135— H. L 98 V. Ward, (1850) 9 C. B. 392; 19 L. J. C. P. 196; 14 Jur. 334 14, 389, 430 Barnes Urban District Council v. London General Omnibus Co., (1909) 100 L. T. 115; 73 J. P. 68; 7 L. Q. E. 369 467 Barnett v. Allen, (1858) 3 H. & N. 376; 1 F. & P. 126; 27 L. J. Ex. 412 561, 624 u. Guilford (Earl), (1855) 11 Bxch. 19; 24 L. J. Ex. 281; 1 Jur. (N. S.) 1142 .• 326, 356 V. Woolwich Borough Council, (1910) 74 J. P. 441 181 Barns v. St. Mary, Islington (Guardians), (1912) 76 J. P. 11; 10 L. G. E. 113 117 INDEX OF CASES. xxix TAGB Barnsley British Co-operative Society v. Worsborough Urban District Comicil, [1916] 1 A. C. 291; 85 L. J. K. B. 103— H. L 395 Barr v. Baird & Co., (1904) 6 P. 524 (Ct. of Sees.) 175, 439 . V. Musselburgh Merchants' Association, [1912J S. C. 174, Sco. 589 Barraclough v. Brown., (1897) A. C. 615 397 Barratt v. Kearns, (1905) 1 K. B. 504; 74 L. J. K. B. 318; 53 W. E. 354; 92 L. T. 255; 21 T. L. K. 212 575, 576, 588 Barrett v. Associated Newspapers, (1907) 23 T. L. E. 666 626 V. Day, (1890) 43 Ch. D. 435; 59 L. J. Ch. 464; 62 L. T. 597; 38 W. K. 362 626 V. Long, (1851) 3 H.'L. C. 395 614 Barron v. Willis, (1900) 2 Ch. 121 526 Barry v. Arnaud, (1839) 10 Ad. & E. 646; 2 P. & D. 633; 9 L. J. Q. B. 226; 50 E. E. 516 29 V. Croskey, (1861) 2 J. & H. 1 542, 643 V. Minturn, [1913] A. C. 584; 82 L. J. K. B. 1193— H. L Ill Bartholomew v. Noble, [1914] 31 E. P. C. 419 696 Barton v. Bricknell, (1850) 13 Q. B. 393 ; 20 L. J. M. 0.1; 15 Jur. 668 755 V. Williams, (1822) 5 B. & Aid. 395; 24 E. E. 448 247 Bartonshill Coal Co. v. McGuire, (1858) 3 Macq. 300 89 V. Eeid, (1858) 3 Macq. 266; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 767 89 Bartram & Sons v. Lloyd, (1904) 90 L. T. 357; 88 L. T. 286; 20 T. L. E. 281; 19 T. L. E. 293 532 Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, (1867) L. E. 2 Ex. 259; 36 L. J. Ex. 147; 16 L. T. (N. S.) 461 57, 74, 75, 85— 87, 546 Baschet v. London Illustrated Standard Co., (1900) 1 Ch. 73; 69 L. J. Ch. 35; 48 W. E. 56; 81 L. T. 509 691 Baseb^ v. Matthews, (1867) L. E. 2 C. P. 684; 36 L. J. M. C. 93; 16 L. T. (N. S.) 417 642 Basely v. Clarkson, (1682) 3 Lev. 37 7, 338 Bass V. Hendon Urban District Council, (1911) 28 T. L. E. 8, 317; 76 J. P. 13 '88 Bass, Eatcliffe & Gretton's Trade Mark, In re, (1902) 2 Ch. 579; 71 L. J. Ch. 779; 51 W. E. 86; 87 L. T. 408; 18 T. L. E. 785; 19 E. P. C. 529 733 Bastable v. Little, (1907) 1 K. iJ. 59; 76 L. J. K. B. 77 782 Basten v. Carew, (1825) 3 B. & C. 649; 5 D. & E. 558; 3 L. J. K. B. Ill; 27 E. E. 453 766 Baster v. London and County Printing Works, (1899) 1 Q. B. 901; 68 L. J. Q. B. 622; 63 J. P. 439; 47 W. E. 639; 80 L. T. 757; 15 T. L. E. 331 92 Bastow & Co., In re, (1867) L. E. 4 Eq. 681; 16 L. T. (N. S.) 788 ... 766 Batavier, The, (1845) 2 W. Eob. 407; 10 Jur. 19 460, 497 Batcheller v. Tunbridge Wells Gas Co., (1901) 84 L. T. 765; 65 J. P. 680; 17 T. L. E. 765 371, 375, 428, 435 Batchelor v. Fortescue, (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 474; 49 L. T. (N. S.) 644 462, 463 Batchelour v. Gee, [1914] 3 K. B. 242; 83 L. J. K. B. 1714^D. C. 273 Bate V. Hill, (1823) 1 C. & P. 100; 28 E. E. 766 231 Bateman v. Albion Combing Co., [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 18— C. A. 104 Bates V. Batey & Co., [1913] 3 K. B. 351; 82 L. J. K. B. 846 471 V. John Holding & Co., [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 6— C. A 105 V. Pilling, (1826) 6 B. & C. 38; 9 D. & E. 44 199, 655 Bathurst (Borough of) v. Macpherson, (1879) 4 A. C. 256 33, 394 Batson & Joyner v. The School Board of London, (1903) 20 T. L. E. 22; 67 J. P. 457; 2 L. G. E. 116 351 Batt V. Dunnett, (1899) A. C. 428; 68 L. J. Ch. 557; 81 L. T. 94; 15 T. L E 724; 16 E. P. C. 411; (1898) 2 Ch. 432; 67 L. J. Ch. 576 720, 731, 741 y Metropolitan Water Board, (1911) 2 K. B. 965; 80 L. J. K. B. 1354; 105 L. T. 496; 9 L. G. E. 1123; 75 J. P. 545; 55 Sol. J. 714; 27 T. L. B. 579 33, 394 Battishill V. Eeed, (1856) 18 C. B. 696 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 290 174 Bax V. Jones, (1817) 5 Price, 168; 19 E. E. 566 134 Baxter v. Oliver, (1892) The Times, June 17 205 XXX INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Baxter v. Taylor, (1832) 4 B. & Ad. 72; 1 N. & M. 14; 2 L. J. K. B. 65; 38 E. E. 227 349 Bayley v. Manchester, Sheffield, &o. E. Co., (1873) L. E. 8 C. P. 148; 42 L. J. C. P. 78; 28 L. T. (N. S.) 366 77, 79, 80 Bayliss v. Fisher, (1830) 7 Bing. 153; 4 M. & P. 790; 9 L. J. C. P. 43; 33 E. E. 407 312 Baynes v. Brewster, (1841) 2 Q. B. 375; 11 L. J. Q. B. 24 ; 6 Jur. 392; 1 G. & D. 669; 57 E. E. 707 203 Beamish v. Whitney, (1908) 1 Jr. E. 88 365 Beard v. Bgerton, (1846) 3 C. B. 97 704 V. Knight, (1858) 8 E. & B. 865; 27 L. 'J. Q. B. 359; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 782 780 V. London General Omnibus Co., (1900) 2 Q. B. 530; 69 L. J. Q. B. 895; 48 W. E. 658; 83 L. T. 362; 16 T. L. E. 499 75, 77, 80, 81, 84 V. Moira Colliery Co., [19151 1 Ch. 257; 84 L. J. Ch. 155— C. A. 426, 489 Beare v. Garrod, (1915) 113 L. T. 673— C. A 99 Beatsou v. Skene, (1860) 6 H. & N. 838; 29 L. J. Ex. 430; 2 L. T. (N. S.) 378 579, 580, 587 Seattle v. Mair, (1882> L. E. Ir. 10 C. L. 208 331 V. Tough, [1917] W. C. & Ins. E. 93— G. A 103 Beatty v. Gillbanks, (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 308; 51 L. J. M. C. 117; 47 L. T. (N. S.) 194 153 Beaumont v. Kaye, (1904) 1 K. B. 292; 73 L. J. K. B. 213; 90 L. T. 51; 52 W. E. 241; 20 T. L. E. 188 46 Beavan v. Delahay, (1788) 1 H. Bl. 6; 2 E. E. 696 284 Bebor v. Sales, (1916) 82 T. L. E. 418 465, 480 Becher v. Great Eastern E. Co., (1870) L. E. 5 Q. B. 241 265 Beck V. Denbeigh, (1860) 29 L. J. C. P. 278; 2 L. T. (N. S.) 154; 8 W. E. 392 308 V. Hill, [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 819— C. A 98 V. Pierce, (1889) 23 Q. B. D. 816; 58 L. J. Q. B. 516 184 Becker v. Eiebold, (1913) 30 T. L. E. 142 118, 285 Beckwith v. Philby, (1827) 6 B. & C. 635 ; 9 D. & E. 487 ; 5 L. J. M. C. 182; 30 E. E. 484 205, 784 V. Shordike, (1767) 4 Burr. 2098 445 Becquet v. MacCarthy, (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 951; 36 E. E. 803 432 Beddall v. Maitland, (1881) 17 Ch. D. 174; 50 L. J. Ch. 401; 44 L. T. (N. S.) 248 830 Beddow v. Beddow, (1878) 9 Ch. D. 89; 47 L'. J, Ch. 588; 26 W. E. 570 ; 795 Bedford v. Bagshaw, (1859) 4 H. & N. 538; 29 L. J. Ex. 59 541, 542 V. Leeds. Corporation, (1918) 77 J. P. 480 381 Beechgrove S.S. Co. v. Aktieselskabet Fjord of Kristiania, [1916] 1 A. C. 364; 85 L. J. P. C. 1— H. L 459, 510 Behrens v. Eichards, (1905) 2 Ch. 614; 74 L. J. Ch. 615; 69 J. P. 381 ; 54 W. B. 141 ; 93 L. T. 623 ; 21 T. L. "E. 705 ; 8 L. G. E. 1228 821, 796, 797 Bell V. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 844— C. A 105 , V. Caledonian E. Co., (1902) 4 F. 481 (Ct. of Sess.) 501 - V. Great Northern E. Co. of Ireland, (1890) 26 L. E. Ir. 428 ... 148 V. Marsh, (1908) 1 Ch. 528 ; 72 L. J. Ch. 860 ; 51 W. E. 825 ; 88 L. T. 605 538 V. Midland E. Co., (1861) 10 C. B. (N. S.) 287; 80 L. J. C. P. 273 142, 411 V. Thatcher, (1676) 1 Vent. 275 557 V. Twentyman, (1841) 1 Q. B. 766; 1 G. & D. 228; 6 Jur. 336; 10 L. J. Q. B. 278; 55 E. E. 415 452 V. Walker, (1785) 1 Bro. Ch. C. 451 694 Bellamy v. Burch, (1847) 16 M. & W. 590 557 V. Wells, (1890) 60 L. J. Ch. 156; 68 L. T; 635; 39 W. E. 158 154 Bellyse v. McGinn, (1891) 2 Q. B. 227; 65 L. T. 818 771 Belsize Motor Supply Co. v. Cox, [1914] 1 K. B. 244;, 88 L. J. K. B. 261 262 INDEX OF CASES. XXXi PAGE Belvedere Pish Guano Co. v. Eainham Chemical Works, (1919) 17 L. G. R. 646 Ill Bendle v. United Kingdom Alliance, (1915) 31 T. L. R. 403— C. A. .. 573 Benjamin v. Storr, (1874) L. R. 9 C. P. 400; 43 L. J. C. P. 162; 30 L. T. (N. S.) 862 26, 387, 388 Bennett v. Allcott, (1787) 2 T. R. 166; 81 R. E. 667, n. ... 142, 225, 226, 227 V. Bayes, (1860) 5 H. & N. 391; 29 L. J. Ex. 224; 2 L. T. (N. S.) 156 286 V. Bennett, (1834) 6 C. & P. 588 622 V. Deacon, (1846) 2 C. B. 628; 15 L. J. C. P. 289 590 V. Robins, (1832) 5 C. & P. 379 283 Benson v. Lancashire and Yorkshi^-e E. Co., [1904] 1 K. B. 242; 78 L. J. K. B. 122; 68 J. P. 149; 52 W. E. 243; 89 L. T. 715; 20 T. L. R. 139 ., 97 Benz & Co.'s Application, In re, (1913) 108 L. T. 589— C. A 724 Beresford v. White, (1914) 30 T. L. R. 591— C. A 585 Berg V. Rotterdamsche Lloyd, (1918) 23 Com. Cas. 288 462 Berna Commercial Motors, Ltd., In re, [1915] 1 Ch. 414; 84 L. J. Ch. 416 724 Bernina, The, Mills v. Armstrong and another, (1887-8) 12 P. D. 58; 18 App. Cas. 1 ; 56 L. J. P. D. & A. 17 ; 57 L. J. P. D. & A. 65; 58 L. T. (N. S.) 428 ..' •. 60, 510 Bernstein v. Bernstein, (1893) P. 292; 63 L. J. P. 3; 67 L. T. 529 ... 228 Berringer v. Great Eastern R. Co., (1879) 4 C. P. D. 168; 48 L. J. C. P. 400; 27 W. E. 681 228 Berry v. Adamson, (1827) 6 B. & C. 528; 2 C. & P. 503 194 V. Da Costa, (1866) L. E. 1 C. P. 331 230 V. Heard, (1637) Cro. Car. 242 259, 271 V. Huckstable, (1850) 14 Jur. 718 314 V. Humm & Co., [1915] 1 K. B. 627; 84 L. J. K. B. 918 228 Berthin v. Gartwright, (1796) 2 Esp. 480 228 Bertie v. Beaumont, (1812) 16 East, 33; 22 E. E. 802, n 336, 364 Bessell v. Wilson, (1853) 1 E. & B. 489; 22 L. J. M. C. 94; 17 Jur. 664 767 Bessey v. OUiet, (1683) T. Eaym. 467 8 Best V. Marshall's Patent, (1917) 84 E. P. C. 205 708 Besterman v. British Motor Car Co., [1914] 8 K. B. 181; 88 L. J. K. B. 1014— C. A 61, 144 Beswick v. Smith, (1908) 24 T. L. R. 169 561 Betjemann v. Betjemann, (1895) 2 Ch. 474 187 Betteley v. Reed, (1843)^ Q. B. 511; 12 L. J. Q. B. 172; 7 Jur. 507; 3 G. & D. 561; 62 E. E. 417 269 Betterton's Case, (1695) Holt, 588 150 Betts V. Gibbins, (1884) 2 A. & E. 57; 4 N. & M. 64; 4 L. J. K. B. 1; 41 E. R. 881 62 V. Menzies, (1861) 10 H. L. C. 117; 31 L. J. Q. B. 283; 7 L. T. (N. 8.) 110 700 V. Reiehenberg, (1918) 85 R. P. C. 1 700 V. Stevens, (1910) 1 K. B. 1; 79 L. J. K. B. 17; 101 L. T. 564; 73 J. P. 486 ; 26 T. L. R. 5 ; 7 L. G. R. 1052 ; 22 Cox, C. C. 187 782 V. Wilmott, (1871) L. R. 6 Ch. 289; 25 L. T. (N. S.) 188; 19 W. E. 369 717 Beucker v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Pishing Co., (1910) S. G. 655; 47 Sc. L. R. 513 (Ct. of Sess.) 146 Bickford v. Skewes, (1841) 1 Webst. P. C. 214; 1 Q. B. 988; 1 G. & D. 786 707 Biddle v. Bond, (1865) 6 B. & S. 225; 84 L. J. Q. B. 137; 12 L. T. (N. S.) 178 269, 355 Bideford Urban District Council v. Bideford, Westward Ho, and Appledore Railway, and British Electric Traction Co., Ltd., (1904) 68 J. P. 123 186, 387 Bien, The, (1911) P. 40; 80 L. J. P. 59; 104 L. T. 42; 27 T. L. R. 9; 11 Asp. M. C. 558 467 Biggins V. Goode, (1882) 2 C. & J. 864; 2 Tyr. 447; 1 L. J. Ex. 129; 37 R. R. 738 310 Bignell v. Clerk, (1860) 5 H. & N. 486 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 257 ; 2 L. T. (N. S.) 189 304 XXXll INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Bile Bean Manufacturing Co. v. Davidson, (1906) 8 P. 1181 (Ct. of Sese.) 721 Billericay Rural District Council v. Poplar Poor Law Guardians, (1911) 2 K. B. 801 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 1241 ; 106 L. T. 476 ; 75 J. P. 497 ; 9 L. G. E. 796 396 Binks V. South Yorkshire E. Co., (1862) 3 B. & S. 244; 32 L. J. Q. B. 26; 7 L. T. (N. S.) 350 390 Bird V. Brown, (1850) 4 Bxch. 786 117 V. Holbrook, (1828) 4 Bing. 628; 1 M. & P. 607; 2 L. J. C. P. 146; 29 E. E. 657 14, 159, 515 V. Jones, (1845) 7 Q. B. 742; 15 L. J. Q. B. 82; 9 Jur. 870 ... 194, 195 V. Keep, (1918) 118 L. T. 633 103 V. Eandall, (1762) 3 Burr. 1346; 1 W. Bl. 373, 387 176, 229 Birks V. Stafford Coal and Iron Co., [1913] 3 K. B. 686; 82 L. J. K. B. 1384— C. A 98 Birmingham City Tramways Co. v. Law, (1910) 2 K. B. 965 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 80; 103 L. T. 44; 74 J. P. 355; 8 L. G. E. 667 406 Birmingham (Corporation of) v. Allen, (1877) 6 Ch. D. 284; 46 L. J. Ch. 673; 37 L. T. (N. S.) 207 376 Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co. v. Powell, [1897] A. C. 710— H. L. 738 Bishop Auckland Co-operative Society v. Butterknowle Colliery Co., (1904) 2 Ch. 419; 41 L. J. N. C. 314 137, 164,. 425 Bishop V. Balkis Consolidated Co., (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 77, 512; 59 L. J. Q. B. 565; 39 W. E. 99 546 V. Bryant, (1834) 6 C. & P. 484 310 Bixby V. Dunlap, (1876) 22 Amer. Eep. 475 229 Blachford v. Dod, (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 179; 9 L. J. K. B. 196; 36 R. E. 532 650 Black V. Christchurch Finance Co., (1894) A. C. 48; 63 L. J. P. C. 32; 70 L. T. 77 112 V. North British E. -Co., (1908) S. C. 444 (Ct. of Sess.) 229, 273 Blackburn v. Blackburn, (1827) 4 Bing. 395; 1 M. & P. 33; 3 C. & P. 146; 6 L. J. C. P. 13; 29 E. E. 583 581 Blackett v. Eidout, [1915] 2 K. B. 415 ; 84 L. J. E. B. 1535— C. A. ... 358 Blackham v. Pugh, (1846) 2 C. B. 611; 15 L. J. C. P. 290 592 Blacklock v. Pearson, [1915] 2 Ch. 376; 84 L. J. Ch. 785 693 Blackmore v. Mile End Old Town (Vestry of), (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 451; 51 L. J. Q. B. 496; 46 L. T. (N. S.) 869 394 Blad V. Bamfield, (1674) 3 Swanst. 604; 19 E. E. 285 123 Blades v. Arundalfi, (1813) 1 M. & S. 711; 14 E. E. 555 775 V. Higgs, (1861) 10 C. B. (N. S.) 713; 11 H. L. C. 621; 30 L. J. C. P. 347; 34 L. J. C. P. 286; 12 L. T. 615 157, 267, 330 Blagg V. Sturt, (1847) 10 Q. B. 899; 16 L. J. Q. B. 39; 11 Jur. 1011 ... 613 Blagrave v. Bristol Water Works Co., (1856) I H. & N. 369; 26 L. J. Ex. 57 169 Blair V. Chilton, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1147— F. L 100 103 Blake v. Lanyon, (1795) 6 T. R. 221; 3 R. E. 162 ' 223 c,. Eamsay, [1917] W. C. & Ins. E. 84— C. A 103 V. Stevens, (1864) 4 F. & F. 232; 11 L. T. (N. S.) 543 616 V. Woolf, (1896) 2 Q. B. 426; 67 L. J. Q. B. 813; 62 J. P. 659; 79 L. T. 188; 47 W. E. 8 439 Blakemore v. Bristol and Exeter E. Co., (1858) 8E. & B. 1035. ..471, 478, 530 Blakey 1). Dinsdale, (1777) 2 Cowp. 661 ' 318 Bland V. Yates, (1914) 58 Sol. Jo. 612 379 Blane v. Francis, [1917] 1 X. B. 252; 115 L. T. 850— C. A 416 Blaymire v. Haley, (1840) 6 M. & W. 55 ; 4 Jur. 107 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 147 • 55 E. E. 501 ' 225 Blenkinsop v. Ogden, (1898) 1 Q. B. 783; 67 L. J. Q. B. 537; 78 L T 564; 46 W. E. 542; 14 T. L. R. 360 51I Bliss V. Hall, (1838) 4 Bing. N. C. 183 ; 6 Dowl. P. C. 442 ; 6 Scott, 600; 1 Am. 19; 2 Jur. 110; 9 L. J. C. P. 122; 44 R. R. 697. ..398 399 Blofield V. Payne, (1833) 4 B. & Ad. 410; 1 N. & M. 368; 2 L J ' K. B. 68; 38 E. E. 270 140 739 Bloodworth v. Gray, (1844) 7 M. & G. 334; 8 Scott, N. E. 9; 66 R. E ' 720 : 555 Blovelt V. Sawyer, (1904) 1 K. B. 271; 73 L. J. K. B. 165; 68 J. P. 110; 52 W. E. 603; 89 L. T. 658; 20 T. L. E. 105 97 INDEX OP CASES. xxxiii Btexam v. Hubbard, (1804) 5 Bast, 407 64 189 276 — — f. Saunclsrs, (1825) 4 B. & C. 941; 7 D. & E. 396; 28E'. E.' 519 ' 263 Bluck V. Lovering, (1885) 1 T. L. E. 497 .... 617 Blundell v. Catterall, (1821) 5 B. & Aid. 268; 24 E. E. 353 344 346 — — u. The King, (1905) 1 K. B. 516; 92 L. T. 53 35l' 405 Blyth V. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 11 Ex. 781; 25 L J Ex. 212; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 333 12, 403,'407 454 V. Topham, (1607) Cro. Jac. 158 14 Boal V. Scottish Catholic Printing Co., (1907) S. C. 1120 (Gt. of Sess.) Boaler, In re, [1915] 1 K. B. 21 ; 83 L. J. K. B. 1629-C. A ' 633 Boatwright v. Boatwright, (1873) L. E. 17 Eq. 71 184 Bobbey v. Crosbie, [1915] W. N. 406— H. L 97 Bodega Co., Ltd., In re, (1904) 1 Ch. 276; 73 L. J. Ch. 198; 89'l "t" 694; 52 W. E. 249; 11 Manson, 95 540 Boden v. Eoscoe, (1894) 1 Q. B. 608; 63 L. J. Q.' B. 767 ; 70 L. T. 456- 42 W. E. 445 316 317 Bodger v. Nicholls, (1873) 28 L. T. 441 ' 529 Bodley v. Eeynolds, (1846) 8 Q. B. 779 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 219 ; 10 Jur. 310 275 Bolch V. Smith, (1862) 7 H. & N. 736 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 201 ; 10 W. E. 387 491 Boneham & Hart v. Hirst Bros., (1917) 34 E. P. C. 209 716 Bonnard v. London General Omnibus Co., (1920) 36 E. P. C. 307— C. A .-. , 700 V. Ferryman, (1891) 2 Ch. 269; 60 L. J. Ch. 617; 65 L. T. 506; 39 W. E. 435 796, 802 Bonsall v. Midland Colliery Owners Indemnity Society, [19141 W C & Ins. E. 331— C. A. 106 Bonvelston, The, (1914) 30 T. L. E. 311 459 Boon V. Quanoe, (1910) 102 L. T. 443; 3 B. W. C. C. 106— C. A 98 Boord V. Bagot, [1916] 2 A. C. 382— H. L 727 Boord & Son v. Huddart, (1904) 89 L. T. 718 ; 20 T. L. E. 142 ; 21 E. P. C. 149 720 and Burke Oppositions, (1916) 32 E. P. C. 241— C. A 735 Boosey v. Wood, (1865) 3 H. & C. 484; 34 L. J. Ex. 65; 13 W. E. 317 170 Booth V. Arnold, (1895) 1 Q. B. 571; 64 L. J. Q. B. 443; 72 L. T. 310; 43 W. E. 360 557 V. Briscoe, (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 496; 25 W. E. 838 553 V. Clive, (1861) 10 C. B. 827; 20 L. J. C. P. 151; 15 Jur. 563 ... 127 V. Leeds and Liverpool Canal Co., [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 310— C. A 104 Boots Cash Chemists (Lancashire), Ltd. v. Grundy, (1900) 82 L. T. 769; 48 W. E. 638; 16 T. L. E. 457 23, 741 Borthwick v. Evening Post, (1888) 37 Ch. D. 449; 57 L. J. Q. B. 406; 58 L. T. (N. S.) 252 721 Bostock V. Nicholson & Sons, Ltd., (1904) 1 K. B. 725 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 524; 91 L. T. 629; 53 W. E. 155; 20 T. L. E. 342; 9 Com. Cas. 200 272, 471 Bos worth- Smith v. Gwynnes, (1920) 122 L. T. 15 382 Bothamley v. Jolly, [1915] 3 K. B. 425; 84 L. J. K. B. 2223 496 Bothnia, The, (1860) Lush. 52 460 Bott V. Ackroyd, (1859) 28 L. J. M. C. 207; 7 W. E. 420 752 Botten V. Tomlinson, (1847) 16 L. J. C. P. 138 762 Botterill v. Whytehead, (1879) 41 L. T. 588 563, 584, 588, 591, 609 Bottomley v. Brougham, (1908) 1 K. B. 584; 77 L. J. K. B. 311; 99 L. T. Ill; 24 T. L. E. 262 575 Boulter v. Clerk, (1747) BuUer N. P. 15 a 192 V. Kent Justices, (1897) A. C. 556 .' 745 Bound V. Lawrence, (1892) 1 Q. B. 226 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 21 ; 65 L. T. 844; 40 W. E. 1 96 Bourke v. Davis, (1889) 44 Ch. D. 110; 62 L. T. 34; 38 W. E. 167 ... 346 Bourne v. Fosbrooke, (1865) 18 C. B. (N. S.) 515 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 164 ; 11 Jur. (N. S.) 202 267, 269, 270 V. Swan and Edgar, Bourne's Trade Mark, In re, (1903) 1 Ch. 211; 72 L. J. Ch. 168; 87 L. T. 589; 51 W. E. 213; 19 T. L. E. 69; 20 E. P. C. 105 724, 732 Bouston V. Beauch^mp, (1919) 121 L. T. 196— C. A 106 Bovill V. Moore, (1816) Dav. P. C. 361; 2 Marsh. 211 ; 17 E. E. 514 ... 706 C.T. C XXXIV INDEX OF CASES. PAOE Bovril, Ltd., v. Bodega Co., (1916) 83 R. P. C. 53 738 Bow V. Hart, (1905) 1 K. B. 592; (1904) 2 K. B. 693; 73 L. J. K. B. 901; 74 L. J. K. B. 341; 53 W. E. 372; 92 L. T. 181; 21 T. L R 251' 22 R P C 222 749 Bowden Brake Co. v. Bowden Wire Co., (1915) 32 R. P. C. 30 716 Bowden Wire Co. ■;;. Bowden Brake Co., (1914) 31 E. P. C. 385— H. L. 720 Bowden's Patents Syndicate, Ltd. v. Herbert Smith & Co., (1904) 2 Ch. 86, 122; 73 L. J. Ch. 622, 776; 52 W. R. 630; 21 E. P. C. 438, 596 704, 717 Bowditoh V. Posberry, (1850) 19 L. J. Ex. 339 787 Bowen v. Anderson, (1894) 1 Q. B. 164; 42 W. R. 236 416 V. Hall, (1881) 6 Q. B. D. 333; 50 L. J. Q. B. 305; 44 L. T. (N. S.) 75 „ 18, 151, 220-222 Bower v. Peate, (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 321; 46 L. J. Q. B. 446; 35 L. T. (N. S.) 321 110, 115 Bowker v. Evans, (1885) 15 Q. B. D. 666; 64 L. J. Q. B. 421; 33 W. E. 695 48 Bowles, In re, Underwood, In re, U. v. W., (1903) 51 W. E. 335 654 Bowlston V. Hardy, (1597)-Cro. Eliz. 547 446 Box V. Jubb, (1879) 4 Ex. D. 76 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 417 ; 41 L. T. 97 ... 112, 452 Boxsiua V. Goblet Prferes, (1894) 1 Q. B. 842; 63 L. J. Q. B. 401; 70 L. T. 368; 42 W. E. 392 586 Boyd V. Bilham, (1909) 1 K. B. 14; 78*j. J. K. B. 50; 72 J. P. 495; 99 L. T. 780 .- 285, 294, 300 V. Profaze, (1867) 16 L. T. (N. S.) 431 291 and Eorrest v. Glasgow and South Western E. Co., (1911) S. C. 33 (Ct. of Sess.) 544 Boydell v. Jones, (1838) 4 M. & W. 446; 7 Dowl. P. C. 210; 1 H. & H. 408; 51 E. E. 676 552 Boyle V. Brandon, (1846) 13 M. & W. 738 224 V. Ferguson, (1911) 2 Ir. E. 489 74 Bradbury v. Hotten, (1872) L. R. 8 Ex. 1 ; 42 L. J. Ex. 28; 27 L. T. (N. S.) 460 693,-694 Bradbury, Agnew & Co. v. Day, [1916] W. N. 114 683 Bradford Corporation v. Perrand, (1902) 2 Ch. 655; 71 L. J. Ch. 869; 51 W. R. 122; 87 L. T. 388; 67 J. P. 21; 18 T. L. E. 830 373 V. Myers, [1916] 1 A. C. 242; 85 L. J. K. B. 146— H. L. ... 181, 182 V. Pickles, (1895) A. C. 587; 64 L. J. Ch. 769; 73 L. T. 353; 44 W. E. 190 16, 373, 374 Bradlaugh v. Erakine, (1883) 47 L. T. 618 139 V. Newdegate, (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 1; 52 L. J. Q. B. 454; 31 W. E. 793 144, 656, 668, 669 Bradley v. Baylis, (1881) 8 Q. B. D. 195 335 V. Carr, (1841) 3 M. & G. 221; 3 Scott, N. E. 523 756 V. Copley, (1845) 1 C. B. 685; 14 L. J. C. P. 222; 9 Jur. 699 ... 262 V. Riches, (1878) 9 Ch. D. 189 8'5 V. Wallaces, [1913] 3 K. B. 629; 82 L. J. K. B. 1074— C. A. ... 447 Bradshaw v. Lancashire & Yorkshire R. Co., (1876) L. R. 10 C. P. 189; 44 L. J. C. P. 148; 31 L. T. 847 49 V. Waterlow & Sons, [1915] 3 K. B. 527— C. A 644 Brady v. Warren, (1900) 2 Ir. R. 632— Q. B. D 298, 446, 447 Brame v. Commercial Gas Co. , [1914] 3 K. B. 1181 ; 84 L. J. K. B 570 408 Bramwell v. Halcomb, (1836) 3 My. & Cr. 737; 46 R. R. 378 694 Brannigan v. Robinson, (1892) 1 Q. B. 344; 61 L. J. Q. B. 202- 66 L. T. 647 .' 93 Branscomb v. Bridges, (1822) 3 Stark. 171 312 Brass v. Maitland, (1856) 6 B. & B. 470; 26 L. j. Q. B. 49- 2 Jur (N. S.) 710 ; 468 Bravo, The, (1913) 108 L. T. 430 458 Bray v. Gardner, (1887) 34 Oh. D. 668; 56 L. J. Ch. 497- 66 L t' (N. S.) 292 , :....; 708 V. Kirkpatrick, [1919] W. C. & Ins. R. 161— C. A 97 Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates, In re (No 1) (1911^ 1 Ch. 426; 80 L. J. Ch. 221; 103 L. T. 697; 27 T.' L. R. 109- 18 Manson, 177 '. 455 Brecon (Mayor of) v. Edwards, (1862) 1 H. & C. 51; 31 L. j'.'ex ■368-' 6 L. T. (N. S.) 293 '. 665 Breese v. Jerdein, (1843) 4 Q. B. 586 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 234 ; 7 Jur. 490 ... 133 INDEX OF CASES. XXXV T5 . T. p\as ±iremer s Patent, In re, Braulik, Ex parte; Hogner's Patent, In re Braulik, Ex parte, (1909) 2 Ch. 217 ; 78 L. J. Ch. 550: 101 L T 21; 25 T. L. E. 610; 26 E. P. C. 449 710 Brest V. Lever, (1841) 7 M. & W. 593; 9 Dowl. P. C. 246; io L. J Ex. 337; 56 E. E. 804 354 Brett V. MuUarkey, (1873) I. E. 7 C. L. 120 156 V. Watson, (1872) 20 W. E. 723 584 Brewer v. Dew, (1843) 11 M. & W. 625; 12 L. J. Ex. 448; 7 Jur. 963; 63 E. E. 690 43 142 V. Ehymney Iron Co., (1910) 1 Ch. 766; 79 L. j. cii. 384;' 102 L. T. 392 421 V. Sparrow, (1827) 7 B. & C. 310; 1 M. & E. 2 168 Brice V. Lloyd (Edward), [1909] 2 K. B. 804; 79 L. J. K. B. 37; 101 L. T. 472; 25 T. L. E. 759; 53 Sol. J. 744— C. A 102 Bridge v. Grand Junction E. Co., (1838) 3 M. & W. 244; 49 E. E. 590 502 Bridges v. Hawkesworth, (1851) 21 L. J. Q. B. 75; 15 Jur. 1079 ... 261 266 V. North London E. Co., (1873-4) L. E. 7 H. L. 213; 43 L. J. ' Q. B. 151; 30 L. T. (N. S.) 844 507, 510 Bridgland v. Shapter, (1839) 5 M. & W. 375; 8 L. J. Ex. 246; 52 E. E. 755 318, 665 Brierly v. Kendall, (1852) 17 Q. B. 937; 21 L. J. Q. B. 161 ... 260, 264, 278 Briggs V. Oliver, (1866) 4 H. & C. 403 497 Brighten v. Cavendish, (1916) 32 E. P. C. 229 736 Brinckman v. Harris, [1916] W. C. & Ins. E. 45— C. A 104 . u. Matley, (1904) 2 Ch. 313; 73 L. J. Ch. 160, 642; 68 J. P. 534; 52 W. E. 263; 91 L. T. 429; 20 T. L. E. 180; 2 L. G. E. 1057 344 Brine v. Bazalgette, (1849) 3 Ex. 692; 18 L. J. Ex. 348 613 Brinsmead v. Brinsmead (No. 1), (1913) 29 T. L. E. 706— C. A 730 V. -Harrison, (1871-2) L. E. 6 C. P. 584 ; L. E. 7 C. P. 547 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 281; 41 L. J. G. P. 190; 27 L. T. 99 ... 59, 176, 187, 188, 281 Brinton's, Ltd. v. Turvey, [1905] A. C. 230; [1904] 1 K. B. 328; 73 L. J. K. B. 158; 74 L. J. K. B. 474; 68 J. P. 193; 53 W. E. 641; 92 L. T. 578; 21 T. L. E. 444 97, 102 Bristol Poor (Governors of) v. Wait, (1834) 1 A. & B. 264 258 and West of England Bank v. Midland E. Co., (1891) 2 Q. B. 653; 61 L. J. Q. B. 115; 65 L. T. 234; 40 W. E. 148 256 Britannia, The, (1905) P. 98; 74 L. J. P. 46; 92 L. T. 634; 21 T. L. E. 110; 10 Asp. M. C. 65 458 British Actors Pilm Co. v. Glover, [1918] 1 K. B. 299 673 American Elevator Co. v. Bank of British North America, [1919] A. C. 658— P. C 86 -^ — Cash and Parcel Conveyors, Ltd. v. Lamson Store Service Co., (1908) 1 K. B. 1006; 77 L. J. K. B. 649; 98 L. T. 875 633, 658 Chartered Co. of South Africa ■;;. Lennon, (1915) 31 T. L. E. 585 —P. C ; 471 Columbia Electric E. Co. v. Loach, [1916] 1 A. C. 719; 85 L. J. P. C. 23— P. C '. 500 Drug Houses Trade Mark, In re, (1913) 107 L. T. 756 722 Empire Type-setting Co. v. Linotype Co., (1898) 79 L. T. 8; 81 L. T. 331; 14 T. L. E. 511; 15 T. L. E. 524. (And see Linotype Co. v. British Empire Type-setting Co.) ... 552, 554, 560, 626, 631 Insulated Wire Co. v. The Dublin United Tramways Co., (1900) 1 Ir. Eep. 287 716 Leather Cloth Manufacturing Co. v. Dickens & Cooper, (1914) 31 E P C 337 .. . . 719 Mills Products Co.'s Application, In re, [1915] 2 Ch. 202; 84 L. J. . Ch. 819 727 Motor Syndicate v. Taylor, (1901) 1 Ch. 122; (1900) 1 Ch. 577; 69 L. J. Ch. 377 ; 70 L. J. Ch. 21 ; 49 W. E. 183 ; 83 L. T. 419 ; 17 T. L. E. 17; 17 ft. P. C. 723 -714 Mutoscope*& Biograph Co. v. Homer, (1901) 1 Ch. 671; 70 L. J. Ch. 279; 49 W. E. 277; 84 L. T. 26; 17 T. L. E. 212; 18 E. P. C. 177 292, 347, 714 Mutual Banking Co. v. Charnwood Forest E. Co., (1887) .18 Q. B. D. 714; 55 L. J. Q. B. 399; 34 W. E. 718 85, 87 XXXVl INDEX OF CASES. PAGE British Eeinforced Concrete Engineering Co. v. Lind, (1917) 86 L. J. Ch. 486 703 South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mocambique, (1893) A. C. 602; 63 L. J. Q. B. 70; 69 L. T. 604 53, 124 Thomson Houston Application, In re, [1917] W. N. 88 726 Thomson Houston Co., In re, (1919) 36 E. P. C. 251— C. A 708 Thomson Houston Co. v. Duram, Ltd., (1918) 35 -E. P. C. 161, H. L.; affirming (1917) 34 E. P. C. 117— C. A "00 United Shoe Manufacturing Co. v. Simon Collier, (1909) 25 T. L. E. 74, 415; 26 E. P. C. 21, 534 712 United Shoe Manufacturing Co. v. Standard Eotary Co., (1916) 33 E. P. 0. 245— C. A. ; affirmed, (1917) 35 E. P. C. 33— H. L. 700 United Shoe Manufacturing Co. v. Unique Shoe Co., (1919) 36 E. P. C. 33 -: 700 Westiughouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. v. Electrical Co., (1911) 55 Sol. J. 689; 28 E. P. C. 530 715 Brittain u. Kinnaird, (1819) 1 B. & B. 432; 4 Moore, 50; 21 E. E. 680 753, 756 Broad v. Ham, (1839) 5 Bine. N. C. 722; 8 Sc. 40; 8 L. J. C. P. 357; 50 E. E. 843 644, 646, 650 Broadbent v. Ledward, (1839) 11 A. & E. 209; 3 P. & D. 45 ... 189, 248, 255 Brock V. Copeland, (1794) 1 Esp. 203; 5 E. E. 730 161 & Co. V. Pain, (1912) 105 L. T. 976; 28 E. P. C. 697 738 (H. N.) & Co., In re, (1910) 1 Ch. 130; 79 L. J. Ch. 211 ; 101 L. T. 587; 26 T. L. E. 100; 54 Sol. J. 100; 26 E. P. C. 681 725 Brockbank v. Whitehaven Junction E. Co., (1862) 7 H. & N. 834; 31 L. J. Ex. 349 228 Brocklebank v. Thompson, (1903) 2 Ch. 344; 72 L. J. Ch. 626; 89 L. T. 209; 19 T. L. E. 285 794 Brockman v. Folkestone Corporation, (1912) 76 J. P. 99 166 Broder v. Saillard, (1876) 2 Ch. D. 692; 45 L. J. Ch. 414; 24 W. E. 1011 426 Broemel v. Meyer, (1913) 29 T. L. E. 148 721 Bromage v. Prosser, (1825) 4 B. & C. 247 ; 6 D. & E. 296 ; 1 C. & P. 475; 3 L. J. K. B. 203; 28 E. E. 241 16, 547, 548, 581, 586 Bromley Eural Council v. Croydon Corporation, (1908) 1 K. B. 353; (1907) 2 K. B. 39; 76 L. J. K. B. 599; 77 L. J. K. B. 335; 72 J. P. 17 ; 98 L. T. 165 ; 6 L. G. E. 165 ; 24 T. L. E. 132 ... 343, 395 Brook V. Carpenter, (1825) 3 Bing. 297; 11 Moore, 59 653 V. Lodge, [1918] W. C. & Ins. E. 16— C. A 100 (Jonas, & Bros.) v. Meltham Urban District Council, (1909) A. C. 438; (1908) 2 K. B. 780; 77 L. J. K. B. 1079; 78 L. J. K. B. 719 ; 100 L. T. 818 ; 73 J. P. 353 ; 26 T. L. E. 582 ; 7 L. G. E. 770 373 V. Eawl, (1849) 4 Ex. 521; 19 L. J. Ex. 114 629 Brooke v. Noakes, (1828) 8 B. & C. 537 ; 2 M. & E. 570 313 Brookes v. Blanshard, (1833) 1 Crom. & M. 779; 3 Tyr. 844 592 Brooks & Co., Ltd. v. Lycett's Saddle and Motor Accessory Co., Ltd., (1904) 1 Ch. 512; 73 L. J. Ch. 319; 21 E. P. C. 651, 656 708 V. Hamlyn, (1899) 79 L. T. 734; 63 J. P. 215; 19 Cox C C. 231 753 V. Hodgkinson, (1859) 4 H. & N. 712; 29 L. J. Ex. 93 199 Brookshaw v. Hopkins, (1772) Lofft, 240 212 Broom v. Eitchje, (1904) 6 P. 842 (Ct. of Sese.) 547 Broun v. Lewis, (1896) 12 T. L. E. 465 69 Brown v. Allen and another, (1802) 4 Esp. 157 623 V. Chapman, (1848) 6 C. B. 365; 17 L. J. C. P. 329; 12 Jur. 799 196, 198 V. Cocking, (1868) L. E. 3 Q. B. 672 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 250 ; 18 L T (N. S.) 560 „ ; " 754 V. Dunstable (Mayor, &c., of), (1899) 2 Ch. 378; 68 L J Ch . 498; 63 J. P. 519; 47 W. E. 538; 80 L. T. 650; 15 T. L. E. 386 427, 428 V. Eastern and Midland E. Co., (1889) 22 Q. B. D. 391; 58 L. J. Q. B. 212; 60 L. T. (N. S.) 266 390 V. Edinburgh Corporation, (1907) S. C. 256 (Ct. of Sess.) 650 V. Giles, (1823) 1 C. & P. 118; 28 E. E. 769 445 v.- Glenn, (1851) 16 Q. B. 254; 20 L. J. Q. B. 205; 15 Jur. 189 291, 765 INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Brown v. Hawkes, (1891) 2 Q. B. 718 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 151 ; 65 L. T. 108 205, 644, 647, 652 V. Jarvis, (1836) 1 M. & W. 704 763 V. John Hastie & Co., Ltd., (1904) 7 F. 97 (Ct. of Sess.) 699, 713 V. Jones, (1846) 15 M. & W. 191; 15 L. J. Ex. 210 199, 655 V. Kent, [1913] 3 K. B. 624; 82 L. J. K. B. 1039— C. A 99 V. Lambeth Borough Council, (1915) 32 T. L. E. 61 115 V. Mallet, (1848) 5 0. B. 599; 17 L. J. C. P. 227; 12 Jur. 204 398, 461 V. Perrot, (1841) 4 Beav. 585 768 V. Robins, (1859) 4 H. & N. 186; 28 L. J. Ex. 250 376, 439 V. Shevill, (1834) 2 A. & E. 138 ; 4 N. & M. 277; 4 'L. J. K. B. 50; 41 K. E. 401 293, 310 V. Smith, (1853) 13 C. B. 596; 22 L. J. C. P. 151; 17 Jur. 807 ... 559 V. Watson, (1871) 23 L. T. (N. S.) 745 760 r. , [1915] A. C. 1; 83 L. J. P. C. 307— H. L. Sc 99 V. , [1913] S. C. 593— Sco 99 V. Wootton, (1604) Cro. Jac. 73 187 Browne r. Dawson, (1840) 12 A. & E. 624 ; 4 P. & D. 355 324 V. Flower, (1911) 1 Oh. 219; 80 L. J. Ch. 181; 103 L. T. 557; 55 Sol. J. 108 377 Brownlie v. Campbell, (1880) 5 App. Gas. 925 535—538 Bruce v. McManus, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1860 55 V. Wait, (1837) 3 M. & W. 15 267 Brunsden v. Humphrey, (1884) 14 Q. B. D. 141 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 476 ; 51 L. T. (N. S.) 529 42, 172, 176 Brunswick (Duke) v. Harmer, (1850) 14 Q. B. 185; 19 L. J. Q. B. 30; 14 Jur. 110 567, 589 Brunton v. Hawkes, (1821) 4 B. & Aid. 541; 23 E. E. 382 711 Bryant v. Herbert, (1878) 3 C. P. D. 189, 389; 47 L. J. C. P. 670; 39 L. T. (N. S.) 17 255 1-. Warden, (1848) 2 Ex. 479 264 Bryce v. Ehrmann, (1904) 42 Sco. L. E. 23 (Ct. of Sess.) 271 Buchan v. Scottish Steam Herring Fishing Co., [1917] W. C. & Ins. E. 302 97 Buchanan & Co. v. Baker & Co., (1912) Times Newspaper, February 1 719 Buckland v. Johnson, (1854) 15 C. B. 145; 23 L. J. C. P. 204; 18 Jur. 775 188 Buckley v. Gross, (1863) 3 B. & S. 566; 32 L. J. Q. B. 129; 7 L. T. (N. S.) 743 ' 267 Bull V. Shoreditch (Mayor, &c., of), (1903) 67 J. P. 37 ; 19 T. L. E. 64 ; 1 L. G. E. 81 ; affirmed suh nom. Shoreditch Corporation v. Bull, (1904) 90 L. T. 210 ; 68 J. P. 415 ; 20 T. L. R. 254 ; 2 L. G. R. 756 394 Bnllen v. Swan Electric Engraving Co., (1907) 22 T. L. R. 275; 23 T. L. E. 258 255 Bulli Coal Mining Co. v. Osborne, (1899) A. C. 351; 68 L. J. P. C. 49; 47 W. E. 545 ; 80 L. T. 430; 15 T. L. E. 257 187, 323, 367 Bullock V. London General Omnibus Co., Ltd., (1907) 1 K. B. 264; 76 L. J. K. B. 127 ; 95 L. T. 905 ; 22 T. L. E. 244 ; 23 T. L. E. 62 61 Bulwer v. Bulwer, (1819) 2 B. & Aid. 470 328 Bunbury v. Fuller, (1853) 9 Ex. Ill; 23 L. J. Ex. 29; 1 C. L. E. 893 754 Bunch V. Kennington, (1841) 1 Q. B. 679; 4 P. & D. 609; 5 Jur. 461 298 Bunney v. Poyntz, (1832) 4 B. & Ad. 568; 1 N. & M. 229; 2 L. J. K. B. 55; 38 E. E. 309 279 Burberrys v. J. C. Cording & Co., (1909) 100 L. T. 985; 25 T. L. E. 576* 26 E P C 693 719 Burden iJ-Eigler, (1911) 1 K. B. 337 ; 80 L. J. K. B. iiW; 103 L. T. 758; 75 J. P. 36; 27 T. L. E. 140; 9 L. G. E. 71 343 Burdett v. Home, (1911) 27 T. L. E. 402; 28 T. L. E. 83 47 Burford (H. G.) & Co.'s Application, In re, [1919] 2 Ch. 28— C. A. ... 727 Burgess v. Burgess, (1853) 3 De G. M. & G. 896 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 675; 17 Jur. 292 726, 731, 738, 741 Burley v. Bethune, (1814) 5 Taunt. 580; 1 Marsh. 220 747 Burling v. Eead, (1850) 11 Q. B. 904 330 Burmah Trading Corporation v. Mirza Mahomed Ally Sherazee, (1878) L. E. 5 Ind. App. 130 272 Burman v. Zodiac Steam Fishing Co., [1914] 3 K. B. 1039; 83 L. J. K. B. 1683— C. A 97, 98 XXXVm INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Burn V. Morris, (1836) i Tyr. 485; 2 Or. & M. 579; 3 L. J. Ex. 193; 44 E. R. 891 168, 259 Burnand, In re, Baker, Sutton & Co., Ex parte, (1904) 2 K. B. 68; 73 L. J. Z. B. 413; 52 W. R. 437; 91 L. T. 4«; 20 T. L. B. 377; 11 Manson, 113 261 Burnard v. Haggis, (1863) 14 C. B. (N. S.) 45; 32 L. J. C. P. 189; 8 L. T. (N. S.) 320 45 Burnet i). Wells, (1700) 12 Mod. 420 °°* Burnett v. Tak, (1882) 45 L. T. 743 ^28 Burns, The, (1907) P. 137; 76 L. J. P. 41; 71 J. P. 193; 96 L. T. 684; 23 T. L. R. 258, 323; 5 L. G. R. 676 65, 181 v. Johnston, [1916] 2 Ir. R. 444 19* u. Summerlee Iron Co., [1913] 8. C. 227 (Ct. of Sess.) 10* Buron v. Denman, (1848) 2 Exch. 167 38, 118 Burr V. Smith, (1909) 2 K. B. 306; 78 L. J. K. B. 889 ; 101 L. T. 194 ; 25 T. L. R. 542; 53 Sol. J. 502; 16 Manson, 210 575 Burrell v. Tuohy, (1898) 2 Ir. Rep. 271 481 Burroughes i;. Bayne, (1860) 6 H. & N. 296; 29 L. J. Ex. 188; 2 L. T. (N. S.) 16 234, 244, 246, 250 Burroughs, Wellcome & Co.'s Trade Mark, In re, (1904) 1 Ch. 736; 91 L. T. 58 728 Burrowes v. Lock, (1805) 10 Ves. 470; 8 R. R. 33, 856 535, 537 Burrows v. March Gas & Coke Co., (1872) L. R. 7 Ex. 96; 41 L. J. Ex. 46; 26 L. T. (N. S.) 318 150 V. Matabele Gold Reefs and Estates Co., Ltd. (1901) 2 Ch. 23; 70 L. J. Ch. 434; 49 W. R. 428, 500; 84 L. T. 478; 17 T. L. R. 303, 364 541 V. Rhodes and Jameson, (1899) 1 Q. B. 816 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 645 ; 63 J. P. 532; 48 W. R. 13; 80 L. T. 591; 15 T. L. R. 286 528, 532 Burt V. Moore, (1793) 6 T. R. 329; 2 R. R. 611 316 Burton v. Hughes, (1824) 2 Bing. 173; 9 Moore, 334; 3 L. J. C. P. 241; 27 R. R. 578 262, 266 Burwark v. Leyland & Co., (1912) 107 L. T. 735— C. A 104 Bus'h V. Pox, (1856) 5 H. L. C. 707 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 251 ; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 1029 700 -V. Steinman, (1799) 1 B. & P. 404 113 Busst V. Gibbons, (1861) 30 L. J. Ex. 75 647, 652 Buszard v. Capel, (1828-9) 8 B. & C. 141 ; 2 M. & R. 197 ; 6 Bing. 150; 3 M. & P. 480 ; 3 Y. & J. 344 ; 6 L. J. K. B. 267 ; 32 R. R. 359 ... 288 Butcher's Hide, Skin, and Wool Co. v. Seaoome, [1913] 2 K. B. 401 ; 82 L. J. K. B. 726 399 Butler V. Bimbaum, (1891) 7 T. L. E. 287 94 V. Hunter, (1862) 7 H. & N. 826 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 214 ; 10 W. R. 214 110 V. M' Alpine, (1904) 2 Ir. Rep. 44S 484, 485 Butter or Black v. Eife Coal Co., (1912) A. C. 149; (1909) S. C. 152; 81 L. J. P. C. 97; 106 L. T. 161; 28 T. L. R. 150 455 Butterfield v. Forrester, (1809) 11 East, 60; 10 R. R. 433 504 Butter Knowle Colliery Co. v. Bishop Auckland Industrial Co-operative Co., Ltd., [1906] A. C. 305, H. L 425 Butterley Co. v. New Hucknall Colliery Co., [1910] A. C. 381; 79 L. J. Ch. 411 H. L. ; (1908) 2 Ch. 475; 78 L. J. Ch. 63; 99 L. T. 818; 25 T. L. R. 45— C. A 332, 422 Butterworth v. Butterworth, [1920] P. 128 5 V. West Riding of Yorkshire Eivers Board, (1909) A. C 45; 98 L. T. 47, 789; 72 J. P. 193; 6 L. G. E. 634; 25 T. L. E. 117 373 Butterworthy v. Glanfield [1914] W. C. & Ins, E. 221 102 Butt's Case, (1600) 7 Rep. 23 a; 4 Co. Rep. 98 282, 288 Byne v. Moore, (1814) 5 Taunt. 187; 1 Marsh. 12 636 Bynoe v. Bank of England, (1902) 1 K. B. 467; 71 L. J. K B WB- 50 W. R. 359; 86 L. T. 140; 18 T. L. R. 276 41 635 Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 2 H. & C. 722; 33 L. J. Ex. 13; 9 L. T. 460- ' 12 W. R. 279 462, 497 — — i;. Larrinaga S.S. Co., (1918) 120 L. T. 163— C. A 105 V. Londonderry Tramways Co., (1902) 2 Ir. Rep. 457 76 V. Rogers, (1910) 2 Ir. R. 220 455 V. Statist Co. [1914] 1 K. B. 622; 83 L J. K. B. 625 669 Byron (Lord) v. Johnston, (1816) 2 Mer. 29 ; 16 R. R. 135 722 INDEX OF CASES. XXxix ^ PAGE CababiJ V. Walton-on-Thames U. D. C, [1914] A. C. 102 31 Cackett v. Keswick, (1902) 2 Ch. 456; 71 L. J. Ch. 641; 51 W. B. 69; 87 L. T. 11; 18 T. L. B. 650; 9 Manson, 388 540 Cadbury Bros. Application, In re, [1915] 2 Ch. 30; 1 Ch. 331; 84 L. J. Ch. 242, 828 720, 724, 727, 732, 734 Caird v. Sime, (1887) 12 App. Gas. 326 ; 57 L. J. P. C. 2 ; 57 L. T. (N. S.) 634 684 Oairnbahn (No. 1) [1914] P. 25; 83 K J. P. 11 P. C 458, 460 Calder v. Halket, (1839) 3 Moore, P. 0. 28; 50 B. E. 1 754, 755 Caledonian B. Co. v. MulhoUand, (1898) A. C. 216; 67 L. J. P. C. 1 ; 77 L. T. 570; 46 W. E. 237; 14 T. L. B. 41 465, 476 V. Oglivie, (1856) 2 Macq. Sc. App. 229 387 V. Boper, (1908) S. C. (J.) 69 Ct. of Justiciary 81 California Pig Symp Co., In re, (1910) 1 Ch. 130; (1909) 2 Ch. 99; 78 L. J. Ch. 545 ; 79 L. J. Ch. 211 ; 101 L. T. 587 ; 26 T. L. B. 100; 54 Sol. J. 100; 26 B. P. C. 436 724, 730 — — Pig Syrup Co.'s Trade Mark, In re, (1888) 40 Ch. D. 620; 58 L. J. Ch. 341; 60 D. T. 590; 37 W. E. 268 735 Calliope, The, (1891) A. 0. 11; 60 L. J. P. 28; 63 L. T. 781 ; 39 W. B. 641 485, 486 Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, (1870) L. B. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. B. 181; 18 W. B. 1127 170 Calthorpe v. Trechmann, MacLeay v. Tait, (1906) A. C. 24; (1904) 2 Ch. 631; 22 T. L. B. 149; 20 T. L. E. 710 540 Cameron v. Nystrom, (1893) A. C. 308; 62 L. J. P. C. 86; 68 L. T. 772 8R V. Wynch, (1846^2 c'.'&K. 264 '.".'..... V^ 279 Campania, The, (1914) 30 T. L. B. 608 459 Campbell v. Cochrane, (1905) 8 P. 205 (Ct. of Sess.) 581 V. Paddington Borough Council, (1911) 1 K. B. 869; 80 £j. J. K. B. 739; 104 L. T. 394; 75 J. P. 277; 9 L. G. B. 387; 27 TLB 232 26 377 V. Bitchie, (1907) S. C. 1120 (Ct.' of'Ses's.) " ' 562 V. Scott, (1842) 11 Sim. 31 ; 6 Jur. 186 ; 11 L. J. Ch. 166 ; 54 B. B. 321 693 V. Spottiswoode, (1863) 3 B. & S. 769 ; 82 L. J. Q. B. 185 ; 8 L. T. (N. S.) 201 596—598, 605, 608, 609 Canadian Pacific E. Co. v. Parke, (1899) A. C. 535; 68 L. J. P. C. 89; 48 W. B. 118; 81 L. T. 127; 15 T. L. B. 427 404 V. Boy, (1902) A. C. 220; 71 L. J. P. C. 51; 50 W. B. 415; 86 L. T. 127; 18 T. L. B. 200 402 Cann v. Willson, (1888) 39 Ch. D. 39; 57 L. J. Ch. 1034; 37 W. E. 23 480 Cannington v. Nuttall, (1871) L. B. 5 H. L. 205; 40 L. J. Ch. 739 ... 699 Canot V. Hughes, (1836) 2 Bing. N. C. 448; 2 Scott, 663 238 Canterbury (Viscount) v. Attorney-General, (1842) 1 Phillips, 306; 12 L. J. Ch. 281 ; 7 Jur. 224 ; 65 B. B. 393 37, 38 Cape V. Scott, (1874) L. E. 9 Q. B. 269; 43 L. J. Q. B. 65; 30 L. T. (N. S.) 87 816 Capel V. Powell, (1864) 17 C. B. N. S. 743; 34 L. J. C. P. 168; 11 L. T. (N. S.) 421 46, 47 Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty, (1882) 5 C. P. D. 514 ; 7 App. Gas. 741; 49 L. J. C. P 830; 62 L. J. Q, B. 232; 47 L. T. 662 549, 552, 564, 566, 626 Cardwell v. Midland B. Co., (1904) 21 T. L. B. 22 351 Cargill V. Bower, (1878) 10 Ch. D. 502 68 Carinduff v. Gilmore, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 247— C. A., Ir 97 Carl Lindstroem Aktiengesellschaft's Trade Mark, In re, [1914] 2 Ch. 103; 83 L. J. Ch. 847 724 Carlisle v. Orr (No. 2), [1918] 2 Ir. B. 442 119 Carlton Illustrators v. Coleman, (1911) 1 K. B. 771 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 510; 104 L. T. 413; 27 T. L. B. 65 672 V. Sinclair, Ltd., [1914] S. C. 871, Sess 104 Carpenter v. Smith, (1842) 9 M. & W. 800; 11 L. J. Ex. 213; 60 E. E. 736 700 Carpue v. London, Brighton and South Coast B. Co., (1844) 5 Q. B. 747; 13 L. J. Q. B. 133; 8 Jur. 464 132, 496 Carr v. Clarke, (1818) 2 Chit. 260; 23 B. B. 748 226 si INDEX OF CASES. PAGE •Carr r. Fracis, Times & Co., (1902) A. C. 176; 71 L. J. K. B. 361; 85 L. T. 144; 50 W. R. 257; 17 T. L. E. 657; 8 Asp. M. C. 418 123 ■ V. Hood, (1808) 1 Camp. 355, n. ; 10 E. B. 701, n. ... 548, 598, 605, 608 Carratt v. Morley, 1841) 1 Q. B. 18 ; 1 G. & D. 275 ; 6 Jur. 259 ; 10 L. J. Q. te. 259; 55 E. E. 183 198, 755, 760 Carron Co., Application of the, In re, (1910) 26 T. L. E. 458 ; 54 Sol. J. 476; 27 E. P. C. 412 725 Cars V. Vickers (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 408— C. A W^ Carshalton Urban District Council v. Burrage, [1911] 2 Cli. 133; 80 L. J. Ch. 600; 104 L. T. 306; 75 J. P. 250; 27 T. L. E. 280; 9 L. G. E. 1037 390 Carslake v. Mapledoram, (1788) 2 T. R. 473 555 Carstairs v. Taylor, (1871) L. E. 6 Ex. 217; 40 L. J. Ex. 29; 19 W. B. 723 ......!.. 438, 453 Carter v. Carter, (1829) 5 Bine. 406 ; 2 M. & P. 732 ; 7 L. J. C. P. 224; 30 E. E. 677 286 V. St. Mary Abbott's, Kensington (Vestry of), (1900) 64 J. P. 548 ; 63 J. P. 487 64, 117 Cartwright, In re, (1889) 41 Ch. D. 532; 58 L. J. Ch. 590; 60 L. T. 891; 37 W. E. 612 369 V. Smith, (1833) 1 Moo. & B. 284; 42 E. E. 793 290 Cary v. Kearsley, (1803) 4 Esp. 168; 6 E. E. 846 692 Caryll v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., (1904) 90 L. T. 307 614 Case V. Barber, (1672) T. Eaym. 450 170 Casey v. Bermondsey Borough Council, (1903) 20 T. L. E. 2 ; 67 J. P. 109, 447 55 Cash (J. & J.), Ltd. v. Joseph Cash, (1902) 86 L. T. 211; 84 L. T. 349 ; 60 W. B. 289 ; 18 T. L. E. 299 ; 18 B. P. C. 213 ; 19 E. P. C. 181* 726 Cassella (Leopold) & Co., Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung, In re, (1910) 2 Ch. 240; 79 L. J. Ch. 529; 102 L. T. 792; 26 T. L. E. 472; 54 Sol. J. 505 ; 27 E. P. C. 453 724 Cassidy v. Connochie, (1907) S. C. 1112 (Ct. of Sess.) 555, 620 Oastrique v. Behrens, (1860-61) 3 E. & B. 709; 30 L. J. Q. B. 163; 4 L. T. (N. S.) 62 641, 657, 668 Caswell V. Cook, (1862) 11 C. B. N. S. 637; 31 L. J. M. C. 185 665 Catohpole v. Minster (1913) 12 L. G. B. 280; 109 L. T. 953; 30 T. L. E. Ill, D. C 441, 467 Catterall v. Kenyon, (1842) 3 Q. B. 310; 2 G. & D. 645; 6 Jur. 507; 11 L. J. Q. B. 260; 61 E. E. 235 241 Catteris v. Cowper, (1812) 4 Taunt. 547; 13 E. B. 682 156, 323 Cattle V. Stockton Waterworks Co., (1875) L. E. 10 Q. B. 463; 44 L. J. Q. B. 139; 33 L. T. (N. S.) 476 149 Caudle v. Seymour, (1841) 1 Q. B. 889; 1 G. & D. 454; 5 Jur. 1196; ~ 10 L. J. M. C. 130; 55 E. E. 444 750 Caunce v. Spanton, (1844) 7 M. & G. 903 ._, 247 Cavalier v. Pope, (1906) A. C. 428 ; (1905) 2 K. B. 757 ; 76 L. J. K. B. 609 ; 54 W. E. 68 ; 95 L. T. 65 ; 22 T. L. E. 648— H. L. ... 475, 532 Cavan County Council and Bailieborough Eural District Council v. Kane, (1910) 2 Jr. E. 644 :.... 397 V. Kane, [1913] 2 Jr. E. 250— C. A .: 405 Cave V. Mountain, (1840) 1 M. & G. 257; 1 Scott, N. E 132; 9 L J M. C. 90; 56 E. E. 338 747 753 Cavey v. Ledbitter, (1863) 13 C. B. (N. S.) 470; 32 L. J. C. P. 104; ' 6. L. T. (N. S.) 721 382 Cawthorne v. Campbell, (1790) 1 Anstruther, 205, n 258 Cellular Clothing Co. v. Maxton and Murray, (1899) A. C. 326 ; 68 ij j P. C. 72; 80 L. T. 809; 16 E. P. C. 397 .' 728 Cescinsky v. Geo. Eoutledge [1916] 2 K. B. 325 682 Chadwiek v. Manning, (1896) A. C. 231 '. 524 635 V. Trower, (1839) 6 Bing. N. C. 1; 8 Scott, 1 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 286; ' 43 E. E. 676 496 Chaffers v. Goldsmid, (1894) 1 Q. B. 186; 63 L. J. Q. B. 69; 70 L. T. 24; 42 W. E. 239 5 Challender v. Boyle, (1887) 36 Ch. D. 426 ; 66 L. J. Ch. 995 ; 57 L. T. (N. S.) 734 626 INDEX OF CASES. xU ^, „ PAGE Challenge and the Due d'Aumale, The, (1905) P. 198; (1904) P. 41; 73 L. J. P. 8 ; 74 L. J. P. 55 ; 89 L. T. 481 ; 93 L. T. 890 ; 9 Asp. M. C. 497 . 458 Challis V. London & South Western E. Co., [1905] 2 K. B. 164; 74 L. J. K. B. 569; 58 W. E. 613; 93 L. T. 830; 21 T. L. E. 486— C. A 102 Challoner v. Eobinson, (1908) 1 Oh. 49; 77 L. J. Ch. 72; 71 J. P. 553; 98 L. T. 222; 24 T. L. E. 38 285 Chalmers v. Payne, (1835) 2 C. M. & R. 156; 1 Gale, 69; 5 Tyr. 766; 4 L. J. Ex. 151; 41 R. E. 707 562 Chamberlain v. Boyd, (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 407; 52 L. J. Q. B. 277; 48 L. T. (N. S.) 328 149, 152, 619 V. Hazlewood, (1889) 5 M. & W. 515 221 V. King, (1871) L. E. 6 C. P. 474; 40 L. J. C. P. 273 127, 129, 649 V. White, (1622) Cro. Jac. 647 569 Chamberlaine v. Wilmore, (1621) Palm. 318 62 Chambers v. Donaldson, 1809) 11 East, 65; 10 E. E. 435 328 V. Eeid, (1866) 13 L. T. (N. S.) 703;14 W. R. 370 181 Chandler v. Doulton, (1865) 3 H. & C. 553; 34 L. J. Ex. 89; 11 Jur. (N. S.) 286 812 Channon r. Patch, (1826) 5 B. & C. 987 271 Chaplin, Re, (1915) 31 T. L. E. 279 240 & Co. V. Westminster (Mayor, &c., of), (1901) 2 Oh. 329; 70 L. J. Ch. 679 ; 65 J. P. 661 ; 49 W. E. 586 ; 85 L. T. 88 ; 17 T. L. R. 576 387 Chapman, In re, Edwards, Ex parte, (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 747 200 V. Beecham, (1842) 8 Q. B. 728; 12 L. J. Q. B. 42; 6 Jur. 968; 3 G. & D. 71; 61 R. R. 373 284 V. Pvlde Waterworks Co., (1894) 2 Q. B. 599; 64 L. J. Q. B. 15; 71 L. T. 539; 48 W. E. 1 394 t'. John W. Pearn, Owners, [1916] W. C. & Ins. E. 47—0. A. 104, 105 V. Eawlings, (1909) 101 L. T. 605 ; 73 J. P. 512 ; 26 T. L. E. 15 ; 54 Sol. J. 49; 7 L. G. E. 1158 348 r. Eothwell, (1858) E. B. & E. 168; 27 L. J. Q. B. 315; 4 Jur. (N". S.) 1180 482 Chapman, Morsons & Co. v. Guardians of Auckland Union, (1889) 28 Q. B. D. 294 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 504 ; 61 L. T. 446 797 Chapronier v. Mason, (1905) 21 T. L. E. 633 468, 471 Charing Cross, &c. Electric Supply Co. v. London Hydraulic Power Co. [1913] 3 K. B. 442 ; 88 L. J. K. B. 116 ; affirmed, [1914] 3 K. B. 772; 83 L. J. K. B. 1352 406, 428 Charles v. Taylor, (1878) 3 C. P. D. 492; 88 L. T. (N. S.) 773; 27 W. E. 32 89 Charlesworth v. Rudgard, (1835) 1 0. M. & R. 896 130 Chase V. Goble, (1841) 2 M. & G. 980; 8 Scott, N. E. 245; 10 L. J. C. P. 216; 58 E. E. 605 268 V. Hart, (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 833 87 V. London County Council, (1898) 62 J. P. 184; 14 T. L. E. 177 848, 380 Chasemore v. Eichards, (1859) 7 H. L. C. 349; 29 L. J. Ex. 81; 7 W. R. 685 6, 373—875 Chatfield v. Comerford, (1866) 4 F. & P. 1008 647 Chatterton v. Cave, (1875-8) L. R. 10 C. P. 572; 2 C. P. D. 42; 3 App. Cas. 483; 46 L. J. 0. P. 97 ; 47 L. J. 0. P. 545 ; 38 L. T. 397 ... 694 V. Secretary of State for India in Council, (1895) 2 Q. B. 189; 64 L. J. Q. B. 676; 72 L. T. 858 579, 580 Chauntler v. Robinson, (1849) 4 Exch. 163; 19 L. J. Ex. 170 414 Cheater v. Cater, [1918] 1 K. B. 247— C. A 430 Cheavin v. Walker, (1877) 5 Ch. D. 850; 46 L. J. Ch. 686; 37 L. T. (N. S.) 300 735 Cheesman v. Exall, (1851) 6 Ex. 841 269 Cheetham v. Hampson, (1791) 4 T. E. 818; 2 E. E. 897 415 Chesebrough's Trade Mark, "Vaseline," In re, (1902) 2 Ch. 1; 71 L. J. Ch. 427; 86 L. T. 665; 18 T. L. E. 468; 19 R. P. C. 342 729 Chesham Automobile Supply Co. v. Beresford Hotel, (1918) 29 T. L. R. 584 263 Xlii INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Cheshire v. Bailey, (1905) 1 K. B. 237; 74 L. J. K. B. 176; 53 W. E- 322; 92 L. T. 142; 21 T. L. E. 130 76, 78, 369 Chester (Dean of) v. Smelting Corporation, Ltd., (1901) 85 L. T. 67; 18 T. L. B. 743 796 Chesterfield (Earl of) v. Harding, (1911) Times Newispaper, March 2nd 526 Eural District Council v. Newton and others, (1904) 1 K. B. 62; 73 L. J. K. B. 24; 68 J. P. 33; 52 W. E. 129; 89 L. T. 466; 20 T. L. E. 6; 2 L. G. E. 45 •■■ ^^ Chichester Corporation v. Poster, (1906) 1 K. B. 167 ; 75 L. J. K. B. 33; 70 J. P. 73; 54 W. E. 199; 93 L. T. 750; 4 L. G. E. 206; 22 T. L. E. 18 343, 405 Child V. Affleck, (1829) 9 B. & C. 403; 4 M. & E. 338; 7 L. J. Q. B. 272; 33 E. E. 216 588 , V. Edwards, (1909) 2 K. B. 753; 78 L. J. K. B. 1061; 101 L. T. 422; 25 T. L. E. 706 290 Ohilders v. Wooler, (1859) 2 E. & E. 287; 29 L. J. Q. B. 129; 2 L. T. (N. S.) 49 201 Chilton V. Blair, [1914] W. N. 290— C. A 102 V. Progress Printing and Publishing Co., (1895) 2 Ch. 29; 64 L. J. Ch. 510; 72 L. T. 442; 43 W. E. 456 690 Chinery v. Viall, (1860) 5H. & N. 288 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 180; 8 W. E. 629 263, 278 Ching V. Surrey County Council, (1910) 1 K. B. 736; (1909) 2 K. B. 762; 78 L. J. K. B. 927; 79 L. J. K. B. 481; 102 L., T. 414; 74 J. P. 187 ; 26 T. L. E. 355 ; 54 Sol. J. 360 ; 8 L. G. E. 369 ... 466 Chinkiang, The; China Navigation Co., Ltd. o. Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty and another, (1908) A. C. 251 ; 77 L. J. P. C. 72; 24 T. L. E. 460 458 Chinnick (or Chinnock) v. Potter, [1916] W. C. & Ins, E. 55— C. A. 97 Chivers v. Hand, (1914) 84 L. J. K. B. 304— D. C 756 Christie v. Davey, (1893) 1 Ch. 316; 62 L. J. Ch. 439 16 Christineville Eubber Estates Co., In re, (1911) 28 T. L. E. 38; 56 Sol. J. 53 524 ChristophersoB v. Bare, (1848) 11 Q. B. 473; 17 L. J. Q. B., 109; 12 Jur. 374 192 Christy v. Tipper, (1905) 1 Ch. 1 ; (1904) 1 Ch. 696 ; 73 L. J. Ch. 212 ; • 74 L. J. Ch. 55; 53 W. E. 147; 91 L. T. 712; 21 T. L. E. 53; 21 E. P. C. 97, 755 727 Chubb V. Flanagan, (1834) 6 C. & P. 431 570 Churchill v. Evans, (1809) 1 Taunt. 529; 10 E. E. 600 316 (Lord) V. Hunt, (1819) 2 B. & Aid. 685 ; 1 Chit. 480 ; 22 E. E. 807 550 V. Siggers, (1854) 3 E. & B. 929; 23 L. J. Q. B. 308; 18 Jur. 773 200, 665 Churchward v. Eord, (1857) 2 H. & N. 446; 26 L. J. Ex. 364 349 Chuter V. Eord, [1915] 2 K. B. 113; 84 L. J. K. B. 708— C. A 99 Circe, The, (1906) P. 1; 74 L. J. P. 106; 93 L. T. 640; 21 T. L. E. 525; 22 T. L. E. 625; 10 Asp. M. C. 149 458 Citizens' Life Assurance Co., Ltd. c. Brown, (1904) A. C. 423; 73 L. J. P. C. 102; 90 L. T. 739; 20 T. L. E. 497; 53 W. E. 176 65, 57, 669, 615, 641 City of London Brewery Co. v. Tennant, (1873) L. E. 9 Ch. 212; 43 L. J. Ch. 467 ; 29 L. T. (N. S.) 756 378 Civil Service Co-operative Society, Ltd. v. The General Steam Navi- gation Co., (1903) 2 K. B. 766; 72 L. J. K. B. 933; 52 W. E. 181; 89 L. T. 429; 20 T. L. E. 10 656, 749 Service Supply Association v. Dean, (1879) 13 Ch. D. 512 738 Clanricarde (Marquis of) v. Congested Districts Board for Ireland, (1915) 13 L. G. E. 416— H. L 657 Clare Council v. Wilson, [1913] 2 Ir. E. 89— C. A 395 Claridge v. South Staffordshire Tramway Co., (1892) 1 Q. B. 422; 61 L. J. Q. B. 503; 66 L. T. 655 277 V. Union Steamship Co., (1894) A. C. 186 88 Clark V. Adie, (1877) 2 App. Cas. 315; 46 L. J. Ch. 585; 36 L. T. (N. S.) 923 707, 712, 714 V. Chamberlain, (1836) 2 M. & W. 78; 2 Gale, 217 242 V. Chambers, (1878) 3 Q. B. D. 327; 47 L. J. Q. B. 427; 38 L. T. (N. S.) 454 43, 60, 146, 160, 151, 501 V. Gaskarth, (1818) 8 Taunt. 431; 2 Moore, 491; 20 E. E. 516 ... 299 INDEX OF CASES. xliii ,-,> I ^ -^ PAGE Clark V. G. E. & W. Jamieson, (1909) S. C. 132; 46 Sc. L. E. 74 (Ct. of Sess.) 98 V. Lloyds Bank, (1910) W. N. 187; 79 L. JV ChV645 -ToS L. T.' 211; 74 J. P. 429; 54 Sol. J. 704 380, 797 V. London General Omnibus Co., Ltd., (1906) 2 K. B. 648; 75 L. J. K. B. 907 ; 95 L. T. 435 ; 22 T. L. E. 691 45, 223 V. Molyneux, (1877) 3 Q. B. D. 237; 47 L. J. Q. B. 230; 37 L. T. (N. S.) 694 588, 688, 610, 612 V. Newsam, (1847) 1 Ex. 131 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 297 ; 74 E. E. 615 59, 188, 623 V. Taylor, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 448— H. L 106 V. Woods, (1848) 2 Ex. 395; 17 L. J. M. C. 189 751, 759, 789 • Clarke, In re, Beardmore, Ex parte, (1894) 2 Q. B. 393; 63 L. J. Q. B. 806; 70 L. T. 751 261 In re, (1898) 1 Ch. 336; 67 L. J. Oh. 234; 78 L. T. 275; 14 T. L. E. 274; 46 W. E. 337 774 V. Anderson, [1919] W. 0. & Ins. E. 9— G. A 103 V. Army and Navy Co-operative Society, (1908) 1 K. B. 155; 72 L. J. K. B. 153; 88 L. T. 1; 19 T. L. E. 80 ... 471, 472, 528, 531 V. Clark, (1865) L. E. 1 Ch. 16; 35 L. J. Oh. 151; 13 L. T. (N. S.) 482 384 V. Davey, (1820) 4 Moore, 465 790 V. Holford, (1848) 2 0. & K. 540 274, 352 V. Holmes, (1862) 7 H. & N. 937; 30 L. J. Ex. 139; 31 L. J. Ex. 356; 10 W. E. 405 518, 521 V. Millwall Dock Co., (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 494; 55 L. J. Q. B. 378; 54 L. T. (N. S.) 814 292 V. Morgan, (1877) 38 L. T. (N. S.) 354 619, 620 ■ V. Nicholson, (1835) 1 0. M. & E. 724; 5 Tyr. 233 273 V. Postan, (1834) 6 0. & P. 423 649, 652 V. Taylor, (1836) 2 Bing. N. 0. 654; 3 Scott, 95; 2 Hodges, 65; 5 L. J. C. P. 235; 42 E. E. 680 573 V. West Ham Corporation, (1909) 2 K. B. 858; 101 L. T. 481; 73 J. P. 315, 461; 25 T. L. E. 516, 805; 53 Sol. J. 731; 7 L. G. E. 1118—0. A 141, 406 V. Yorke, (1882) 47 L. T. 381 173 Clarkson v. Lawson, (1830) 6 Bing. 587; 4 M. & P. 356; 8 L. J. 0. P. 193; 31 E. E. 425 575 Clay V. Eoberts, (1863) 8 L. T. (N. S.) 397; 9 Jur. (N. S.) 580; 11 W. E. 649 550 V. Wood, (1803) 5 Sep. 44; 8 E. E. 827 457 Clayards v. Dethick, (1848) 12 6. B. 439 483, 516 Clayton v. Hardwick Colliery Co., (1915) 85 L. J. X. B. 292; [1915] W. N. 395— H. L.; [1914] W. 0. & Ins. E. 343—0. A. ... 103, 104 ,-. Leroy, (1911) 2 K. B. 1031 ; 81 L. J. K. B. 49 ; 105 L. T. 430 ; 75 J. P. 521; 27 T. t. E. 479 240, 242, 255 V. Pontypridd Urban District Council, [1918] 1 K. B. 219 182 Cleary v. Booth, (1893) 1 Q. B. 465; 62 L. J. M. 0. 87 ; 68 L. T. 349; 41 W. E. 391 218 Cleeve v. Mahany, (1861) 9 W. E. 882 797 Clegg V. Dearden, (1848) 12 Q. B. 576 174 Clemens v. Belford, (1883) 11 Bissell's (American) Eeports, 459 722 Clement v. Obivis, (1829) 9 B. & 0. 172; 4 M. & E. 127; 7 L. J. K. B. 189; 32 E. E. 624 550 V. Lewis, (1822) 3 B. & B. 297; 7 Moore, 200; 10 Price, 181; 22 E. E. 533. (And see Lewis v. Clement.) 598, 602 V. Milner, (1800) 3 Esp. 95 317 et Cie's Trade Mark, In re, (1900) 1 Ch. 114; 69 L. J. Ch. 52; 48 W. E. 67; 81 L. T. 400; 16 T. L. E. 28; 16 E. P. C. 173 732 733 Clements v. Ohrly, (1847) 2 C. & K.-686 641,' 647 • V. Tyrone County Council, (1905) 2 Ir. Eep. 542 394 Clerk V. Withers, (1704) 2 Lord Eaym. 1072 : 775 Clerke v. St. Helens Corporation, (1915) 85 L. J. E. B. 17— C. A. 181, 182 Clerkenwell (Vestry of St. James and St. John) v. Peary, (1890) 24 Q. B. D. 703; 59 L. J. M. 0. 82; 62 L. T. 697 36 Clifton V. Hooper, (1844) 6 Q. B. 468; 14 L. J. Q. B. 1 29, 139, 777 Xliv INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Clifton's Patent, In re, (1904) 2 Ch. 357; 73 L. J. Ch. 597; 52 W. K. 629; 91 L. T. 284; 21 E. P. C. 515 711 Clippens Oil Co. v. Edinburgh District Water Trustees, (1904) A. C. 64; 73 L. J. P. C. 32; 89 L. T. 589; 3 P., 156 (Ct. of Sess.) 399 Clissold V. Cratchiey and another,' dsiO) IK. B. Hi; 2 K. B. 244; 79 L. J. K. B. 274, 635; 102 L. T. 620; 26 T. L. R. 409; 64 Sol. J. 442 310, 655 Clover V. Eoyden, (1873) L. R. 17 Eq. 190 586 Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes, [1910] A. C. 242; (1909) 2 K. B. 798; 78 L. J. K. B. 1067; 79 L. J. K. B. 470; 102 L. T. 340; 26 T. L. E. 359 ; 54 Sol. J. 375 ; 47 Sc. L. E. 885 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 275-H. L 99, 102 Clowes V. Staffordshire Potteries Waterworks Co., (1872) L. E. 8 Ch. 125; 42 L. J. Ch. 107; 27 L. T. (N. S.) 521 -796 Clutha No. 147, The, (1909) P. 36; 78 L. J. P. 41; 100 L. T. 198; 11 Asp. M. C. 199 458 Clutterbuck v. Chaffers, (1816) 1 Stark. 471; 18 E. E. 811 567 Clyde Mail Co. v. Eussell, (1916) 33 E. P. C. 291— H. L 707 Coaker v. Willcocks, (1911) 2 K. B. 124; 80 L. J. K. B. 1026; 104 L. T. 769; 27 T. L. E. 357 10, 304, 317, 318 Coaks V. Boswell, (1886) 11 App. Cas. 232; 56 L. J. Ch. 761; 55 L. T. 32 527 Coatbridge (Provost and Magistrates of) v. County Council of Lanark. {See Airdrie (Provost and Magistrates of) v. County Council of Lanark.) Cobb V. Great Western E. Co., (1894) A. C. 419; 63 L. J. Q. B. 629; 71 L. T. 161 153 V. Saxby, [1914] 3 K. B. 822; 83 L. J. K. B. 1817 371 Cobbett V. Gray, (1849-60) 4 Ex. 729; 19 L. J. Ex. 137 193, 195 Cochrane v. Martin, (1911) 28 E. P. C. 284 717 u. Eymill, (1879) 40 L. T. (N. S.) 744; 27 W. E. 776 238, 251, 252, 253 Cock V. Manvers Main Collieries Co., [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 278— C. A 104 V. Wortham,, (1786) 2 Selw. N. P. 10th ed. 1104 141 Cockayne v. Hodgkisson, (1833) 5 C. & P. 543 589 Cocker v. Musgrove, (1846) 9 Q. B. 223 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 365 ; 10 Jur. 922 778 Cockroft V. Smith, (1705) 11 Mod. 43 .-. 165 Codd V. Cabe, (1876) 1 Ex. D. 352; 46 L. J. M. C. 101; 34 L. T. (N. S.) 453 767, 792 Codrington v. Lloyd, (1839) 8 A. & E. 449; 1 P. & D. 157 200 Cohen v. Fidler, (1916) 33 E. P. C. 129 719 V. Huskisson, (1837) 2 M. & W. 477; M. & H. 150; 6 L. J. M. C. 133; 46 E. E. 660 203 V. Kuschke, (1900) 83 L. T. 102 177 V. Mitchell, (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 262; 59 L. J. Q. B. 409; 63 L. T. 206; 38 W. E. 551 43, 53, 261 V. Morgan, (1825) 6 D. & E. 8; 28 E. E. 533 688 Cointat v. Myham, [1913] 2 K. B. 220; 82 L. J. K. B. 551; 84 L. J. K. B. 2253— C. A. 146, 471 Colchester Corporation v. Brooke, (1845) 7 Q. B. 839; 16 L. J. Q. B. 69; 9 Jur. 1090 162, 166, 468 V. Gepp, (1912) 1 K. B. 477; 81 L. J. K. B. 356; 106 L. T. 54; 76 J. P. 97; 56 Sol. J. 160; 10 L. G. E. 109 396 Coldrnan v. Hill, [1919] 1 K. B. 448; 88 L. J. K. B. 491— C. A 240 Coldrick r. Partridge, Jones & Co., (1910) A. C. 77; (1909) 1 K. B. 530; 78 L. J. K. B. 452; 79 L. J. K. B. 173; 101 L. T. 836; 26 T. L. E. 164; 54 Sol. J. 132; 47 Sc. L. E. 610 49, 74, 87, 88 Cole V. Booker, (1918) 29 T. L. E. 296 659 V. Christie, Manson & Woods, (1910) 26 T. L. E. 469 454 V. Be Trafford and Wife, [1918] 2 K. B. 523— C. A. ; [1917] 1 K. B. 911; 86 L. J..K. B. 764 46, 476 V. Miles, (1889) 60 L. T. 146; 57 L. J. M. C. 132; 36 W. R. 784; 58 J. P. 228 748 r. Turner, (1704) 6 Mod. 149 190 Coleman v. Bucks and Oxon Union Bank, (1897) 2 Ch. 243; 66 L. J. Ch. 564; 76 L. T. 684; 45 W. E. 606 242 INDEX OF CASES. xlv PAGE Coleman v. Smith, (1911) 2 Ch. 572 ; 81 L. J. Ch. 16 ; 27 T. L. R. 533; 28 T.-L. E. 65; 53 Sol. J. 649; 28 E. P. G. 645 726 Colgate & Co.'s Trade Mark, In re, (1913) 29 T. L. E. 326 729 CoUard v. Marshall, (1892) 1 Ch. 571 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 268 ; 66 L. T. 248 ; 40 W. E. 473 802 CoUen V. Wright, (1857) 8 E. & B. 647 534 Collett V. Foster, (1857) 2 H. & N. 356 74 Colley V. Hart, (1890) 44 Ch. D. 179; 59 L. J. Ch. 308; 62 L. T. 424; 38 W. R. 501 626 Collins V. Collins, [1907] 2 Ir. R. 104— C. A 102 V. Hungerford, (1857) 7 Ir. C. L. R. 581 184 V. Middle Level Commissioners, (1869) L. R. 4 C. P. 279; 38 L. J. C. P. 236; 20 L. T. (N. S.) 442 151 V. Eenison, (1754) 1 Sayer, 138 158, 331 V. Rose, (1839) 5 M. & W. 194; 7 Dowl. P. C. 796 790 CoUis V. Amphlett, (1920) 89 L. J. Ch. 101— H. L. ; [1918] 1 Ch. 232— C. A 137, 164 V. Cater, (1898) 78 L. T. 613 669 V. Selden, (1868) L. E. 3 C. P. 495; 37 L. J. C. P. 233 475 Colls V. Home and Colonial Stores, (1904) A. C. 179; 73 L. J. Ch. 484; 53 W. R. 30, 462; 92 L. T. 209; 21 T. L. R. 128— H. L. {And see Home & Colonial Stores v. Colls.) ... 138, 377—379, 385, 800 Colonial Bank v. Cady & Williams, (1890) 15 A. C. 267— H. L 254 Coltman v. Morrison, [1914] W. C. & Ins. R. 43— C. A 101 Columbia Gramophone Co. v. Vanner, (1916) 33 R. P. C. 104 714 Colwell V. St. Pancras Borough Council, (1904) 1 Ch. 707; 73 L. J. Ch. 275 ; 68 J. P. 286 ; 52 W. E. 523 ; 90 L. T. 153 ; 20 T. L. E. 236; 2 L. G. E. 518 380, 385, 411, 797 Colyer v. Speer, (1820) 2 B. & B. 67; 4 Moore, 473 780 Combined Weighing and Advertising Co. i'. Automatic Weighing Machine Co., (1889) 42 Ch. D. 665; 58 L. J. Ch. 709; 61 L. T. 474; 38 W. E. 233 626 Commissioners of Trade and Customs v. Bell & Co., (1902) A. C. 563; 71 L. J. P. C. 109; 87 L. T. 156; 18 T. L. E. 765 80 Compagnie Industrielle des P^troles Application, In re, (1907) 2 Ch. 435; 76 L. J. Ch. 646; 97 L. T. 235; 23 T. L. E. 672; 24 E. P. C. 585 735 Compafiia Sansinena v. Houlder, (1910) 2 K. B. 364; 79 L. J. K. B. 1094; 103 L. T. 333; 11 Asp. M. C. 525 553 Compulsory Pilotage Cannel and Trinity House Corporation v. Lowther, Latta & Co., [1914] 3 K. B. 1135; 83 L. J. K. B. 1832 459 Condron v. Gavin Paul & Sons, Ltd., (1903) 6 F. 29 (Ct. of Sess.) ... 100 Conlin v. Patterson, [1915] 2 Ir. R. 169 748, 751 Conolly V. Gorman, (1898) 1 Ir. E. 20 535 Conservators of the Eiver Thames v. Smeed, (1897) 2 Q. B. 334 166 Conshaw v. Chapman, (1862) 7 H. & N. 911 201 Consolidated Car Heating Co. v. Came, (1903) A. C. 509; 72 L. J. P. C. 110; 89 L. T. 224; 19 T. L. R. 692 699, 711, 712 Consolidated Co. v. Curtis & Son, (1892) 1 Q. B. 495; 61 L. J. Q. B. 825; 40 W. R. 426 238, 240, 251, 252, 258 Conway v. Belfast E. Co., (1877) 11 Ir. Rep. C. L. 345 89 V. Wade, (1909) A. C. 506 ; (1908) 2 K. B. 844 ; 78 L. J. K. B. 14, 1025; 101 L. T. 248; 25 T. L. R. 779; 53 Sol. J. 754 26, 70 Cook V. Beal, (1697) 1 Lord Eaym. 176 155 V. Mitcham Common Conservators, (1901) 1 Ch. 387 ; 70 L. J. Ch. 223; 49 W. R. 201; 83 L. T. 519; 17 T. L. R. 63 164 V. Montreal Owners, (1913) 108 L. T. 164— C. A 104 V. Nethercote. (1835) 6 O. & P. 744; 40 E. R. 855 783 „. North Metropolitan Tramways Co., (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 683; 66 L. J. Q. B. 309; 56 L. T. (N. S.) 448 96 V. Palmer, (1827) 6 B. & C. 739; 9 D. & R. 723 762 V. Ward, (1830) 6 Bing. 409; 4 M. & P. 99; 8 L. J. C. P. 126; 31 R. R. 456 660, 617 Cooke V. Birt, (1814) 5 Taunt. 765; 1 Marsh. 333; 15 R. E. 652 764 V. Forbes, (1867) L. R. 5 Eq. 166; 17 L. T. (N. S.) 371 798 V. Midland Great Western Railway of Ireland, (1909) A. C. 229; 2 Ir. E. 499; (1908) 2 Ir. R. 242; 78 L. J. P. C. 76; 100 L. T. 626; 25 T. L. R. 375 440, 462, 464, 465, 508 Xlvi INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Cooke V. Waring, (1863) 2 H. & C. 332; 32 L. J. Ex. 262; 9 L. T. (N. S.) 257 442 V. "Wildes, (1855) 5 E. & B. 328; 24 L. J. Q. B. 367; 1 Jur. (N. S.) 610 582, 584, 587, 611 Coomba v. Coombs, (1866) L. E. 1 P. & D. 288; 14 L. T. (N". S.) 294; 12 Jur. (N. S.) 673 185 Cooper, V. (1768) 2 Wils. 375 282 V. Caledonian E. Co., (1902) 4 F. 880 (Ct. of Sess.) 518 V. Chitty, (1756) 1 Burr. 20; 1 W. Bl. 65 234 V. Crabtree, (1882) 20 Ch. D. 589 410 V. Fife Coal Co., (1907) S. C. 564, 1071 (Ct. of Sess.) 100 u. Harding, (1845) 7 Q. B. 928 ; 9 Jur. 777 198 V. Hawkins, (1904) 2 K. B. 164; 73 L. J. K. B. 113; 68 J. P. 25; 52 W. E. 233; 89 L. T. 476; 19 T. L. E. 620 37 . ... Healy, £1916] 2 Ir. E. 33— C. A. Ir 104 V. Marshall, (1757) 1 Burr. 259; 1 Wils. 51 163 V. N. E. E. Co., (1915) 32 T. L. E. 131— C. A 104 V. Walker, (1862) 2 B. & S. 773 , 391 V. Wandsworth Local Board, (1863) 14 C. B. (N. S.) 180 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 185; 11 W. E. 646 ; 36 V. Whittingham, (1880) 15 Ch. D. 601 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 752 ; 43 L. T. (N. S.) 16 798 V. Willomatt, (1845) 1 C. B. 672; 14 L. J. C. P. 219; 9 Jur. 598 264 Co-partnership Farms v. Harvey Smith, [1918] 2 K. B. 405 579 Cope V. Barber, (1872) L. E. 7 C. P. 393; 41 L. J. M. C. 137; 26 L. T. (N. S.) 891 210 V. Sharpe, (1912) 1 K. B. 496; (1911) 2 K. B. 837; (1910) 1 K. B. 168; 79 L. J. K. B. 281; 80 L. J. K. B. 1008; 81 L. J. K. B. 346; 106 L. T. 56; 56 Sol. J. 187; 28 T. L. E. 157 6, 339, 344 Copestake v. West Sussex County Council, (1911) 2 Ch. 331; 80 L. J. Ch. 673; 105 L. T. 298; 75 J. P. 465; 9 L. G. E. 905 166 Coppen V. Moore, (1898) 2 Q. B. 306 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 689 ; 62 J. P. 453 ; 78 L. T. 520; 46 W. E. 620; 14 T. L. E. 414 74, 80, 641 Corbett V. Hill, (1870) L. E. 9 Eq. 671 333 V. Pitt (H. S.) & Co., [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 295— C. A 103 Corby V. Hill, (1868) 4 C. B. (N. S.) 566 491 Cording, Ltd. v. J. C. Cording, Ltd., (1916) 85 L. J. Ch. 742— H. L. 726 Corea v. Peiris, (1909) A. C. 549; 79 L. J. P. C. 25 ; 100 L. T. 790 ; 25 T. L. E. 631 635 Corelli v. Gray, (1913) 30 T. L. E. 116— C. A 693 V. Wall, (1906) 22 T. L. E. 532 560 Corinthian, The, (1909) P. 260; 78 L. J. P. 121; 100 L. T. 411; 101 L. T. 265; 25 T. L. E. 330, 693; 53 Sol. J. 650; 11 Asp. M. C. 208, 264 459 Cork Eural Council v. Walsh, (1908) 2 Ir. E. 234 496 Cornford v. Carlton Bank, Ltd., (1900) 1 Q. B. 22; (1899) 1 Q. B. 392; 68 L. J. Q. B. 196; 69 L. J. Q. B. 1020; 81 L. T. 415; 16 T. L. E. 12 67, 195, 200 Corsellis v. London County Council, (1908) 1 Ch. 13; 77 L. J. Ch. 120; 98 L. T. 475 ; 71 J. P. 561 ; 6 L. G. E. 78 ; 24 T. L. E. 80 392 Cory & Sons v. Prance, Eenwick & Co., (1911) 1 K. B. 114; 80 L. J. K. B. 341; 103 L. T. 649; 11 Asp. M. C. 499; 55 Sol. J. 10; 27 T. L. E. 18 62 Coryton v. Lithebye, (1671) 2 Wms Saund. 112 569 Cpsgrave v. Anglo-American Oil Co., (1900) 34 Ir. L. T. 56— C. A. ... 97 Costar V. Hetherington, (1869) 1 E. & E. 802; 28 L. J. M. C. 198; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 985 179 Costello V. Kelsall, [1913] A. C. 407; 82 L. J. K. B. 873— H. L 98 Coster V. Headland, (1906) A. C. 286 ; 75 L. J. K. B. 483 ; 70 J. P. 249 ; 94 L. T. 682 ; 22 T. L. E.*441 ; 4 L. G. E. 589. (And see Head- land V. Coster.) 311, 319, 770 Cotterell v. Jones, (1861) 11 C. B. 713; 21 L. J. C. P. 2 ; 16 Jur. 88 ... 656 Cotton V. Wood, (1860) 8 C. B. (N. S.) 568 498 Couch V. Steel, (1854) 3 E. & B. 402 28 Coughlin V. Gillison, (1899) 1 Q. B. 145; 68 L. J. Q. B. 147; 47 W. E. 113; 79 L. T. 627 470 Coulson V. Coulson, (1887) 3 T. L. E. 846 ■. 802 V. South Moor Colliery Co., (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 508 101 INDEX OF CASES. xlvii „ , PAGE Coulaon v. White, (174S) 3 Atk. 21 796, 797 Coulthard v. Consett Iron Co., Ltd., [1905] 2 K. B. 869; 75 L J ' K^B. 60; 54 W. R. 139; 93 L. T. 756; 22 T. L. E. 25 100 Coup6 Co. V. Maddick, (1891) 2 Q. B. 413 ; 60 L. J. O. B. 676 ; 65 L. T. 489 67 Couper V. Balfour of Burleigh (Lord), [1913] S. C. 492, Sco ,... 588 Coupey V. Henley, (1797) 2 Esp. 540 203 Courtney v. CoUett, (1698) 1 Lord Eaym. 272 8 Coventry (Earl) v. Willes, (1863) 9 L. T. (N. S.) 384; 12 W. E. 127 346 Coverdale v. Charlton, (1878) 4 Q. B. D. 104; 48 L. J. Q. B. 128; 40 L. T. (N. S.) 88 320, 322, 336 Coward v. Baddeley, (1859) 4 H. & N. 478; 28 L. J. Ex. 260; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 414 191 V. Wellington, (1835) 7 C. & P. 531 594 Cowes Urban District Council and Bast Cowes Urban District Council V. Southampton and Isle of Wight Eoyal Mail Steam Packet Co., Ltd., (1905) 2 K. B. 287 ; 74 L. J. K. B. 665 ; 69 J. P. 298 ; 53 W. E. 602; 92 L. T. 658; 21 T. L. E. 506; 3 L. G. E. 807 666 Cowles V. Potts, (1865) 34 L. J. Q. B. 247; 11 Jur. (N. S.) 946; 13 W. E. 858 584, 611 Cowley V. Newmarket Local Board, (1892) A. C. 345; 62 L. J. Q. B. 65; 67 L. T. 486 30, 32 Cowling V. Higginson, (1838) 4 M. & W. 245 ; 1 H. & H. 269 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 265; 51 E. E. 555 342 Cowper V. Laidler, (1903) 2 Ch. 337; 72 L. J. Ch. 578; 51 W. E. 539 174, 379, 796, 804 Cowper Essex v. Acton Local Board, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 153 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 594; 61 L. T. 1; 38 W. E. 209 803 Cox V. Burbidge, (1863) 13 C. B. N. S. 430; 32 L. J. C. P. 89; 11 W. E. 435; 134 E. E. 586 11, 442, 443, 446, 447 V. Coulson, [1916] 2 K. B. 177; 31 T. L. E. 390— C. A 482, 515 V. English, Scottish and Austrahan Bank, Ltd., (1905) A. C. 168; 74 L. J. P. C. 62; 92 L. T. 483 643, 653 V. Eeeney, (1863) 4 P. & P. 13 605 V. Glue, (1848) 5 C. B. 533; 17 L. J. C. P. 162; 12 Jur. 185 332 V. Great Western E. Co., (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 106 94 V. Lee, (1869) L. E. 4 Ex. 284; 38 L. J. Ex. 219; 21 L. T. (N. S.) 178 550, 566 V. Leigh, (1874) L. E. 9 Q. B. 333; 43 L. J. Q. B. 123; 30 L. T. (N. S.) 494 779 V. Midland E. Co., (1849) 3 Exch. 308 91 V. Mousley, (1848) 5 C. B. 533 332 V. Paxton, (1810) 17 Ves. 329; 11 E. E. 95 119, 120 V. Eeid, (1849) 13 Q. B. 558; 18 L. J. Q. B. 216; 13 Jur. 563 ... 127 Coxhead v. Eichards, (1846) 2 C. B. 569 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 278 ; 10 Jur. 984 590 Coyle or Brown v. Watson, [1915] A. C. 1 ; 83 L. J. P. C. 307— H. L. 99 Crabb and others v. Lee and others, (1904) The Times, January 26 ... 753 Crabtree v. Eobinson, (1885) 15 Q. B. D. 312; 54 L. J. Q. B. 544; 33 W. E. 936 291, 763 Cracknell v. Thetford (Mayor of), (1869) L. E. 4 C. P. 629; 38 L. J. C. P. 353 36 Craig V. Glasgow Corporation, (1919) 119 L. T. 476— H. L 500 V. Hasell, (1843) 4 Q. B. 481 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 181 ; 7 Jur. 368 ; 3 G. & D. 299;'62 E. E. 400 643, 655 V. Eoyal Insurance Co., [1914] W. N. 442 107 Cramer v. Mott, (1870) L. E. 5 Q. B. 357; 39 L. J. Q. B. 172; 22 L. T. (N. S.) 857 303 Crampton v. Walker, (1893) 31 L. E. Ir. 437 60 Cranch v. White, (1835) 1 Bing. N. C. 414; 6 C. & P. 767; 1 Sc. 314; 1 Hodg. 61 ; 3 Dowl. P. C. 377; 4 L. J. C. P. 113; 41 E. E. 616 241 Crane v. Ormerod, (1903) 2 K. B. 37 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 507 ; 52 W. E. 11 ; 89 L. T. 45 769 V. Price, (1842) 4 M. & G. 580; 12 L. J. C. P. 81; 5 Scott, N. E. 338; 61 E. E. 614 699 V. South Suburban Gas Co., [1916] 1 K. B. 33; 32 T. L. E. 74 116, 150, 462 Crawford & Sons' Application, In re, [1917] 1 Ch. 550 727 Xlviii INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Orawshay v. Thompson, (1842) 4 M. & G. 357; 11 L. J. C. P. 301; 5 Scott, N. B. 562; 61 E. K. 541 739 Creagh v. Gamble, (1888) 24 L. E. Ir. 468 '^8* Creditor, Ex parte, Debtor, In re, (1907) 97 L. T. 140; 23 T. L': E. 618; 14 Manson, 198 *1 Cree v. St. Pancras (Vestry of), (1899) 1 Q. B. 693; 68 L. J. Q- B. 389; 80 L. T. 388 1°1 Creed's and Coulson's Patent, In re, (1917) 34 E. P. C. 11 ™^ Creevy v. Carr, (1835) 7 C. & P. 64 622 Crepps V. Durden, (1777) 2 Cowp. 640 '^56 Cressy v. Sonth Metropolitan Gas Co., (1906) 94 L. T. 790 408 Crippa V. Judge, (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 583; 53 L. J. Q. B. 517; 51 L. T. (N. S.) 182 93 Crisp I'. Holden, (1910) 54 Sol. J. 784 796 V. Thomas, (1890) 63 L. T. 756 497 Crott -v. Alison, (1821) 4 B. & Aid. 590; 23 E. E. 407 76, 84 V. Day, (1843) 7 Beav. 84; 64 E. E. 18 726, 731, 738 V. Stevens, (1862) 7 H. & N. 570; 31 L. J. Ex. 143; 5 L. T. (N. S.) 683 591 Crompton v. Ibbotson, (1828) 1 Webst. P. C. 83, n. ; 1 Carp. P. C. 462; Dan & L. 34; 6 L. J. K. B. 214; 30 E. E. 524 707 V. Lea, (1874) L. E. 19 Eq. 115; 44 L. J. Gh. 69; 31 L. T. (N. S.) 469 442 & Co.'s Trade Mark, In re, (1902) 1 Ch. 758; 71 L. J. Ch. 497 ; 50 W. E. 426; 86 L. T. 657; 18 T. L. E. 398; 19 R. P. C. 265 733 Cronin v. Connor, [1913] 2 Ir. E. 119 164 Crook's Trade Mark, In re, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 79 722 Crooke v. Curry, (1789) cited 1 Tidd. Prac. p. 30, 9th ed 134 Crosby v. Leng, (1810) 12 East, 409; 11 E. E. 437 121 V. Wadsworth, (1805) 6 East, 602; 2 Smith, 559; 8 E. R. 566 ... 332 Crosfield (Joseph) & Sons' Application, In re, (1910) 1 Ch. 118, 130; 79 L. J. Ch. 211; 101 L. T. 587; 26 T. L. E. 643; 26 T. L. E. 100; 64 Sol. J. 100; 26 E. P. C. 561 724, 725, 730 Crosier v. Tomkinson, (1759) 2 Kenyon, 439 293 Cross & Co. u. Matthews & Wallace, (1904) 91 L. T. 500; 20 T. L. E. 603 58, 109, 171. V. Lewis, (1824) 2 B. & C. 686; 4 D. & E. 234 412 CrossfleH v. Such, (1853) 8 Ex. 159, 825; 22 L. J. Ex. 326 255, 276 Crossley Bros. v. Lee, (1908) 1 K. B. 86 ; 77 L. J. K. B. 199 ; 97 L. T. 850; 24 T. L. E. 35 285, 294, 299, 768 V. Lightowler, (1867) L. E. 2 Ch. 478; 36 L. J. Ch. 584; 15 W. E. 801 384, 399 Grossman v. Bristol and South "Wales Union R. Go. , (1863) 1 H. & M. 531; 11 W. E. 981 161 Crouch V. Great Northern E. Co., (1866) 11 Ex. 742; 26 L. J. Ex. 137 239 Crowder v. Long, (1828) 8 B. & C. 598; 3 M. & E. 17 762 V. Tinkler, (1816) 19 Ves. 617; 13 E. E. 267 798 Crowhurst v. Amersham Burial Board, (1878) 4 Ex. D. 5 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 109; 39 L. T. (N. S.) 366 429 Crowther v. Parrer, (1850) 15 Q. B. 677; 15 Jur. 536 169 Crozer v. Pilling, (1825) 4 B. & G. 26; 6 D. & E. 129; 3 L. J. K. B. 131; 28 E. E. 196 655 Crozier v. Cundey, (1827) 6 B. & G. 232; 9 D. & E. 224; 5 L. J. M. C. 50; 30 E. E. 311 791 Crumbie v. Wallsend Local Board, (1891) 1 Q. B. 503 ; 60 L. J Q. B. 392; 64 L. T. 490 175, 184, 375 Crump V. Lambert, (1867) L. E. 3 Eq. 409; 15 L. T. N. S 600; 15 W. E. 417 379 Crystal, The, [1894] A. C. 508 461 Cue V. Port of London Authority, [1914] 3 K. B. 892; 83 L. J. K B. 1445— C. A 106 Guenod v. Leslie, (1909) 1 K. B. 880; 78 L. J. K. B. 695; 100 L. T. 675; 25 T. L. R. 2,374; 53 Sol. J. 14, 340 47 Cullen V. Barclay, (1881) 10 L. R. Ir. 224 243 V. McNair, (1908) 99 L. T. 358 ; 72 J. P. 376 ; 24 T. L. R. 692 ; 6 L. G. R. 753 468 Cullimore v. Savage South Africa Co., (1903) 1 Ir. R. 589 gl Gumming v. Bedborough, (1846) 15 M. & W. 438 286 INDEX OF CASES. xlix ^ -„ , . PAGE Cummms v. Perkins, (1899) 1 Ch. 16; 68 L. J. Ch. 57; 47 W. E 214- 79 L. T. 456; 15 T. L. R. 76 ' 795 Cunnmgton v. Great Northern E. Co., (1883) 49 L. T. (N. 8.) 392 476 Curran, The, (1910) P. 184; 79 L. J. P. 83; 102 L. T. 640 459 Currie and Timmis' Patent, In re, (1898) A. C. 347; 67 L. J. P. C 66 • 15 E. P. C. 63 709 Curtis, In re, (1859) 28 L. J. Ch. 458 4 V. Curtis, (1834) 10 Bing. 477; 4 M. & Scott, 337; 3 L. J. C. P. 158, 38 E. E. 506 555 V. Hubbard, (1841) 1 Hill's New York rep. 336 "".' 763 V. Piatt, (1864) 11 L. T. (N. S.) 245 711 V. Williamson, (1874) L. E. 10 Q. B. 57 ; 44 L J. Q. B 27 ■ 31 L. T. 678; 23 W. E. 236 168 Curzon v. Berkeley, (1909) Times Newspaper, April 3 721 Cutler V. Dixon, (1585) 4 Eep. 14a; 2 Co. Eep. 290 637 Cutts V. Spring, (1818) 15 Mass. 135 324 " Daily News" v. McNamara & Co., (1914) 7 B. W. C. C. 11 107 Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co. v. M'Laughlin, (1904) A. C. 776 ; 73 L. J. P. C. 95; 91 L. T. 233; 20 T. L. E. 674 214 Daimler Motoren Gesellschaft's Patent, (1918) 35 E. P. C. 253 711 Daimler's Application, (1916) 33 E. P. C. 337 726 Dakhyl v. Labouchere, (1908) 2 K. B. 325, n. ; 77 L. J. K. B. 728; 96 L. T. 399; 23 T. L. E. 364 175, 562, 696, 598, 609 Dale V. Hall, (1750) 1 Wils. 281 453 V. Wood, (1822) 7 Moore, 33 155 Dalgleish v. Gartside, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 319— C. A 101 Dallimore v. Williams and Jesson, (1914) 30 T. L. E. 432— C. A 26 D'Almaine v. Boosey, 1835) 1 Y. & C. 288 ; 4 L. J. Ex. Eq. 21 ; 41 E. E. 273 690 Dalton V. Angus, (1881) 6 App. Cas. 740; 50 L. J. Q. B. 689; 44 L. T. (N. S.) 844 66, 110, 337, 496 V. Whittem, (1842) 3 Q. B. 961; 12 L. J. Q. B. 55; 3 G. & D. 260; 61 E. E. 438 167, 292 Daly V. Dublin, Wicklow & Wexford E. Co., (1892) 30 L. E. Jr. 514 49 Damiens u. Modern Society, (1911) 27 T. L. E. 164 553 Dand v. Kingscote, (1840)) 6 M. & W. 174; 2 Eailw. Cas. 27; 9 L. J. Ex. 279; 55 E. E. 560 342 Daniel 1). Ferguson, (1891) 2 Ch. 27; 39 W. E. 599 799 V. Gracie, (1844) 6 Q. B. 145; 13 L. J. Q. B. 309; 8 Jur. 708; 66 E. E. 322 283 V. Eogers, [1918] 2 K. B. 228— C. A 742 V. Stepney, (1874) L. E. 9 Ex. 185; 22 W. E. 662 284, 288 and Arter v. Whitehouse, (1898) 1 Ch. 685; 16 E. P. C. 71 ... 720, 736 Daniels v. Fielding, (1846) 16 M. & W. 200; 16 L. J. Ex. 153; 10 Jur. 1061 654 Dann v. Spurrier, (1802-3) 7 Ves. 231; 3 B. & P. 399 ; 6 E. E. 119; 7 E. E. 797 801 Darby v. Harris, (1841) 1 Q. B. 895; 1 G. & D. 234; 5 Jur. 988; 10 L. J. Q. B. 294; 55 E. E. 449 298 V. Ouseley, (1856) 1 H. & N. 1; 25 L. J. Ex; 227; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 497 ; 583, 593, 614, 617 Darcy v Allin, (1601), Noy. 173 697 Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell, (1884-6) 11 App. Cas. 127; 14 Q. B. D. 125; 55 L. J. Q. B. 529; 54 L. T. 882— H. L. ... 172—175, 184, 375, 417 Darling v. Cooper, (1869) 11 Cox, C. C. 533 198 Dartmouth (Earl of) v. Spittle, (1871) 24 L. T. (N. S.) 67 ; 19 W. E. 444 320 Dashwoodt). Magniac, (1891) 3 Ch. 306; 60 L. J. Ch. 809 368 Dauncey v. HoUoway, (1901) 2 K. B. 441; 70 L. J. K. B. 695; 49 W. E. 546; 84 L. T. 649; 17 T. L. E. 493 559,602,615 Davey v. Hinde, (1903) P. 221 607 V. London & South Western E. Co., (1883) 12 Q. B. D. 70; 53 L. J. Q. B. 58; 49 L. T. rN.S.) 739 510,513 Davies, Ex parte, Sadler, In re, (1882) 19 Ch. D. 86; 45 L. T. (N. S.) 632; 30 W. E. 237 270 C.T. d i INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Davies v. England, (1864) 33 L. J. Q. B. 321 ^^^ V. Mann, (1842) 10 M. & W. 546; 12 L. J. Ex. 10; 6 Jur. 954; 62 E. B. 698 U, 463, 502, 503 V. Powell Dufiryn Steam Coal Co., [1917] 1 Ch. 488— C. A.; affirmed, [1918] A. C. 55— H. L f22 V. Eeeves, (1855) 5 Ir. C. L. B. 79 ^87 u. Snead, (lS70) L. R. 5 Q. B. 608; 39 L. J. Q. B. 202; 23 L. T. (N. S.) 126 „ .584, 585, 586, 588, 590 . V. Solomon, (1871) L. R. 7 Q. B. 112; 41 L. J. Q. B. 10; 25 L. T. (N. S.) 799 1^3' 144 u. Thomas, [1920] 89 L. J. Ch. 1 : 1° V. Vernon, (1844) 6 Q. B. 443; 14 L. J. Q. B. 30; 8 Jur. 871; 66 B. E. 457 241, 242 V. Williams, (1847) 10 Q. B. 725; 16 L. J. Q. B. 369; 11 Jur. 750 225 V. Williams, (1851) 16 Q. B. 546; 20 L. J. Q. B. 330; 15 Jnr. 752 164, 165 Davis V. Aston, (1845) 1 C. B. 746; 14 L. J. C. P. 228 300 V. Benj'a-min, (1906) 2 Ch. 491; 75 L. J. jCh. 800; 95 L. T. 671; 22 T. L. B. 702 669 V. Bromley Urban District Council, (1903) 67 J. P. 275; 1 L. G. B. 668 136, 350 — ^ V. Capper, (1829) 10 B. & C. 28; 5 M. & B. 53; 4 C. & P. 134... 751 V. Curling, (1845) 8 Q. B. 286; 15 L. J. Q. B. 56; 10 Jur. 69 132 V. Duncan, (1874) L. E. 9 C. P. 396; 43 L. J. C. P. 185; 30 L. T. (N. S.) 464 603,-605 V. Gardiner, (1593) 4 Bep. 16b; 2 Co. Eep. 302 618 u. Gyde, (1885) 2 A. & E. 623; 4 N. & M. 462; 4 L. J. K. B. 84 ; 41 E. E. 489 286 V. Hardy, (1827) 6 B. & C. 225; 9 D. & E. 380; 5 L. J. K. B. 91; 30 B. B. 306 645 V. Harris, (1900) 1 Q. B. 729; 69 L. J. Q. B. 232; 64 J. P. 136; 81 L. T. 780; 16 T. L. E. 140 300, 768 V. li. C. C, [1914] 30 T. L. E. 275 75 V. Marrable, [1913] 2 Ch. 421; 821 L. J. Ch. 510 138,379 V. Morton, [1913] 2 K. B. 479; 82 L. J. K. B. 665 750 V. Noake, (1816-7) 6 M. & S. 29; 1 Stark. 317; 18 E. E. 290... 638 V. Bussell, (1829) 5 Bing. 354; 2 M. & P. 590; 7 L. J. M. C. 52; 30 E. E. 637 784 -^ — V. Shepstone, (1886) 11 App. Cas. 190; 55 L. J. P. C. 51; 55 L. T. (N. S.) 1 605 Davison v. Duncan, (1857) 7 E. & B. 229; 26 L. J. Q. B. 104; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 613 : 603 v. Gent, (1857) 1 H. & N. 744 3S4 Davoren v. Wootton, (1900) 1 Ir. E. 273 51 Davys v. Bichardson, (1888) 21 Q. B. D. 202 141 Dawkes v. Coveneigh, (1652) Styles, 346 119 Dawkins v. Paulet (Lord), (1869) L. B. 5 Q. B. 94; 39 L. J. 6. B. 53; 21 L. T. (N. S.) 584 579 V. Prince Edward of Saxe- Weimar, (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 499; 45 L. J. Q. B. 567; 35 L. T. (N. S.) 323 576 u. Bokeby (Lord), (1873) L. E. 8 Q. B. 255; 28 L. T. (N. S.) 134 576 Dawson v. Bingley Urban Council, (1911) 2 K. B. 149; 80 L. J. K. B. 842; 104 L. T. 659; 75 J. P. 289; 55 Sol. J. 346; 27 T. L. B. 308; 9 L. G. B. 502 481, 501 ■;;. Cropp, (1845) 1 C. B. 961; 14 L. J. C. P. 281; 9 Jur. 944 ... 287 0. Great Northern and City R. Co., (1904) 1 K. B. 277; (1905) 1 K. B. 260; 73 L. J. K. B. 174; 74 L. J. K. B. 190; 69 J. P. 29; 92 L. T. 137; 21 T. L. E. 114 52, 53 55 V. M'Clelland and Others, (1899) 2 Ir. Bep. 486 59, 623 V. Vansandau, (1863) 11 W. E. 516 647 ■ V. Wood, (1810) 3 Taunt. 256 773 Day V. Bream (1837) 2 Moo. & B. 54 569 V. Brownrigg, (1878) 10 Oh. D. 294; 48 L. J. Ch. 173; 39 L. T. (N. S.) 553 726 V. Day, ((1871) L. E. 3 P. C. 751; 40 L. J. P. 0. 35; 24 L. T. (N. S-.) 856 364 Daylie v. Alloa Coal Co., [1912] S. C. 549 Sea 99 INDEX OF CASKS. PAGE Dean v. Hogg, (1834) 10 Bing. 345; 3 M. & Scott, 188; 6 C. & P. 54; 3 L. J. C. P. 113; 38 E. E. 443 166, 336 V. Peel, (1804) 5 East, 45; 1 Sm. 333; 7.E. E. 653 4, 225, 226 1'. Eubian Art Pottery Co., [1914] 2 K. B. 213; 83 L. J. K. B. 799— C. A 98 V. Thwaite, (1855) 21 Beav. 621 187 Deane v. Clayton, (1817) 7 Taunt. 489; 2 Marsh. 577; 1 Moo. 2fl3 ; 18 E. E. 553 1.59, 340 Debtor, In re, A, Petitioning Creditor, Ex parte, (1907) 97 L. T. 140; 23 T. L. E. 618; 14 Manaon, 198 41 , In re (No. 5 of 1919), [1919] W. N. 293 742 De Crespigny v. Wellesley, (1829) 5 Bing. 392 ; 2 M. & P. 695 ; 7 L. J. C. P. 100; 30 E. E. 665 622 D'Eyncourt v. Gregory, (1866) L. E. 3 Eq. 382; 36 L. J. Ch. 107; 15 W. E. 186 299 De Falbe, In re, (1901) 1 Ch. 623; 70 L. J. Ch. 286; 84 L. T. 273; 49 W. E. 455 ; 17 T. L. E. 246 (affirmed Leigb v. Taylor, q_.v.) 299 De Francesco v. Barnum, (1890) 45 Ch. D. 430; 63 L. T. 438; 39 W. E. 5 19, 222, 802 De Freyne (Lord) v. Fitzgibbon and others. (See De Freyne (Lord) V. Johnston.) V. Johnston, (1904) 1 Ch. 400, Ir. ; 20 T. L. E. 464 802 De Gondouin v. Lewis, (1839) 10 A. & E. 117 ; 2 P. & P. 283; 3 Jur. 1168; 50 E. E. 356 134 De Hoghton v. Money, (1866) L. E. 2 Ch. 164; 15 L. T. 403; 15 W. E. 214 54 De Jager v. Attorney-General of Natal, (1907) A. G. 326; 76 L. J. P. C. 62; 96 L. T. 857; 23 T. L. E. 616— P. C 461 De Keyser's Eoyal Hotel v. Spicer Bros., (1914) 30 T. L. E. 257 380 De la Bere v. Pearson, Ltd., (1908) 1 K. B. 280; (1907) 1 K. B. 483; 76 L. J. K. B. 309; 77 L. J. K. B. 380; 98 L. T. 71; 24 T. L. E. 120 274, 275, 479, 481 Delaney v. Fox, (1857) 2 C. B. (N. S.) 768; 26 L. J. C. P. 248 355 V. Wallis, (1885) 14 L. E. Ir. 31; 15 Cox, C. C. 525 238, 240 Delegal v. Highley, (1837) 8 C. & P. 444; 3 Bing. N. C. 960; 5 Sc. 164; 3 Hodg. 168; 6 L. J. C. P. 337; 43 E. E. 877. ..616, 617, 642, 646 V. Naylor, (1831) 7 Bing. 460; 5 M. & P. 443 274 Delia Eocca v. Stanley Jones, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 33— C. A 104 De Maid's Application, In re, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 305 739 Demerit. Cook, (1903) 88 L. T. 629 752, 759, 760 De Moranda v. Dunkin, (1790) 4 T. E. 119 762 Denby v. Moore, (1817) 1 B. & Aid. 123; 18 E. E. 444 286 Denison v. Wynn, (1909) 26 T. L. E. 64 68 Denner v. White, (1917) 86 L. J. K. B. 1074— H. L 103 Dennis v. Midland E. Co., [1920] 2 Ir. E. 164.-C. A. Ir 105 u. Taylor, (1919) 121 L. T. 296 105 V. Wetham, (1874) L. E. 9 Q. B. 345; 43 L. J. Q. B. 129; 30 L. T. (N. S.) 514 773 Dent V. Auction Mart Co., (1866) L. E. 2 Eq. 238 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 555; 14 L. T. (N. S.) 827 377, 384 V. Maguire, [1917 2 Ir. E. 59— C. A 227 Denton v. Great Northern E. Co., (1866) 5 E. & B. 860 517 De Pothonier v. De Mattoa, (1858) E. B. & E. 461; 27 L. J. Q. B. 260 ; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1034 189 Dereoourt v. Corbishley, (1856) 5 B. & B. 188; 24 L. J. Q. B. 313; 1 Jur. (N. S.) 870 212 Derry v. Handley, (1867) 16 L. T. (N. S.) 263 568, 620 V. Peek, (1889) 14 App. Cas.. 337; 68 L. J. Ch. 864; 61 L. T. 266; 38 W. E. 33 59, 533-538, 544, 740 V. Sanders, [1919] 1 K. B. 223; 86 L. J. K. B. 410— C. A 342 Despard v. Wilcox, (1911) 102 L. T. 103; 74 J. P. 115; 26 T. L. E. 226; 22 Cox, C. C. 258 782 Devereux v. Barclay, (1819) 2 B. & Aid. 702; 21 E. E. 457 239. Devlin v. Jeffray's Trustees, (1903) 5 F. 130 (Ct. of Sess.) ... 389, 440, 462, 486, 493, 508 Devonport (Mayor, &c., of) v. Tozer, (1903) 1 Ch. 769; (1902) 2 Ch. 183 ; 71 L. J. Ch. 754 ; 72 L. J. Ch. 411 ; 67 J. P. 269 ; 52 W. E. 6; 88 L. T. 113; 19 T. L. E. 267; 1 L. G. E. 421 800 lii INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Devonshire, The, [1912] A. C. 634; 81 L. J. P. 94— H. L ^60 , The, and St. Winifred, The, [1913] P. 13; 82 L. J. P. 61 ....■• 4bU Dewar v. City and Suburban Ba«ecourse Co., (1899) 1 Ir. Bep. 345 154, rfBU V. Tasker & Sons, (1907) 23 T. L. E. 259— C. A. ; 22 T. L. B. 303 ...: 66, 74, 108, 109 Dewar's Patent, In re, (1918) 35 B. P. C. 229 •;■■ 'J^o Dewell V. Sanderfs, (1618) Cro. Jac. 490 400, 401, 44d Dews V. Biley, (1851) 11 C. B. 434; 20 L. J. C. P. 264; 15 Jur. 1159 759 Dexter v. United Gold Coast Mining Properties, Ltd., (1901) W. N. 152 541 Diamond Coal Cutter Co. v. Mining Applances Co., (1916) 32 B. P. C. 569 7" Dibble V. Bowater, (1863) 2 E. & B. 564; 22 L. J. Q. B. 396; 17 Jur. 1054 289 Dibden v. Skirrow, (1908) 1 Ch. 41 ; (1907) 1 Ch. 437 ; 76 L. J. Ch. 268; 77 L. J. Ch. 107 ; 71 J. P. 145, 565 ; 97 L. T. 668 ; 24 T. L. E. 70; 6 L. G. B. 108 667 V. Swan, (1793) 1 Esp. 27; 5 B. B. 717 608 Dickens v. Lee, (1844) 8 Jur. 183 694 Dickenson v. Watson, (1682) T. Jones, 205 9 Dickeson v. Hilliard, (1874) L. B. 9 Ex. 79; 43 L. J. Ex. 37; 30 L. T. (N. S.) 196 : 586 Dickinson v. Ead, (1914) 111 L. T. 378— D. C 785 Dicks V. Brooks, (1880) 15 Ch. D. 22; 49 L. J. Ch. 812; 43 L. T. (N. S.) 71 626, 629 V. Cruikshank and Lacoste (unreported) 336 V. Yates, (1881) 18 Ch. D. 76; 50 L. J. Ch. 809; 44 L. T. (N. S.) 660 669, 721 Dickson v. Hygienic Institute, (1910) S. C. 362; 47 Sc. L. E. 286 (Ct. of Sess.) 465 V. Eeuter's Telegram Co., (1877) 3 C. P. D. 1; 47 L. J. C. P. 1; 37 L. T. (N. S.) 370 481, 534 V. S. A. Scott, [1914] W. C. & Ins. B. 67— C. A 107 Digby V. Financial News, (1907) 1 K. B. 602; 23 T. L. B. 117 596 Dight V. Craster Hall Owners, [1913] 3 K. B. 700; 82 L. J. K. B. 1307 — C. A 101 Dillon V. Balfour, (1887) 20 L. B. Ir. 600 678 Dimes v. Petley , (I860) 15 Q. B. 276 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 449 ; 14 Jur. 1132 162, 165 Dimmock v. Bowley, (1857) 2 C. B. (N. S.) 642; 26 L. J. C. P. 231; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 1059 655 Ditcham v. Bond, (1814) 2 M. & S. 436 ; 3 Camp. 524; 14 B. B. 836 ... 221 Dixon V. Baty, (1866) L. B. 1 Ex. 259; 12 Jur. (N. S.) 1024; 14 W. E. 836 365 V. Beil, (1816) 1 Stark. 287; 6 M. & S. 198; 17 E. B. 308 230,449,464 V. Calcraft, (1892) 1 Q. B. 468; 61 L. J. Q. B. 529; 66 L. T. , 554; 40 W. E. 598 142, 257 V. Dixon, (1904) 1 Oh. 161; 73 L. J. Ch. 103; 89 L. T. 272 ... 220, 222 V. Gayfere, (1853) 17 Beav. 421; 23 L. J. Ch. 60 360, 361 V. Smith, (1860) 6 H. & N. 460; 29 L. J. Ex. 125 556, 619 V. Wells, (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 249; 59 L. J. M. C. 116; 62 L. T. 812; 38 W. B. 606 760 Dobell V. Stevens, (1825) 3 B. & C. 623; 5 D. & B. 490; 3 L. J. K. B. 89; 27 B. B. 441 531, 545 Dobson V. Horsley, [1916] 1 K. B. 634; 84 L. J. K. B. 399—0. A. 475, 487, 490 V. United Collieries, Ltd., (1906) 8 E. 241 (Ct. of Sess.) 100 Dockerell v. Dougall, (1899) 80 L. T. 556; 15 T. L. E. 333 .. . 617 Dod V. Monger, (1704) 6 Mod. 215 306 314 Dodd V. Holme, (1834) 1 A. & E. 493 ; 3 N. & M. 739; 40 B. E. 344 ' 439 V. Norris, (1814) 3 Camp. 519; 14 E. B. 832 231 V. Pearson, (1911) 2 K. B. 383; 80 L. J. K. B. 927; 105 L. T 108 ; 75 J. P. 343 ; 27 T. L. E. 376 ; 9 L. G. E. 646 ; 22 Cox,'C. C. 526 49g Dodwell V. Burford, (1670) 1 Mod. 24 190 Doe V. Barber, (1788) 2 T. B. 749; 1 B. B. 611 354 V. Barnard, (1849) 13 Q. B. 945; 18 L. J. Q. B. 306 ; 13 Jur. 916 354, 361 INDEX OF CASES. liii PAGE Doe r. Benham, (1846) 7 Q. B. 976; 14 L. J. Q. B. 342; 9 Jur. 662 ... 283 V. Brghtwen, (1809) 10 East, 583; 10 E. E. 395 362 V. Carter, (1847) 9 Q. B. 863 359 V. Davis, (1795) 1 Esp. 358 144 V. Dyeball, (1829) Moo. & Mai. 346; 3 C. & P. 610 354 V. Harlow, (1840) 12 A. & E. 40; 54 E. E. 523 356 V. Jones, (1846) 15 M. & W. 580; 16 L. J. Ex. 58 365 V. Knight, (1837) 2 M. & W. 894 ; 1 M. & H. 291 ; 46 E. E. 789 ... 357 V. Summer, (1845) 14 M. & W. 39 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 337 ; 9 Jur. 413 185, 360 V. Turner, (1840-2) 7 M. & W. 22-6 ; 9 M. & W. 643; 10 L. J. Ex. 213; 11 L. J. Ex. 453; 56 E. E. 692; 60 E. E. 850 364 V. Webber, (1834) 1 A. & B. 119; 3 N. & M. 746 ; 3 L. J. E. B. 148; 40 E. E. 268 354 Doherty v. Allman, (1878) 3 App. Gas. 709 368 Dolan V. Anderson, (1885) 12 Eettie, 804 (Ct. of Sess.) 94 Dolph V. Ferris, (1844) 7 Watts & Serg. (Peuns.) 361 443 Dominion Natural Gas Co. v. Collins ; Same v. Perkins (1909) A. C. 640; 79 L. J. P. C. 18; 101 L. T. 359; 25 T. L. E. 831; 47 Sc. L. E. 583 466, 466, 477 Donald v. Suckling, (1866) L. E. 1 Q. B. 586; 35 L. J. Q. B. 232; 14 L. T. 772; 15 W. E. 13 263 Donovan v. Laing, Wharton and Down Construction Syndicate, (1893) 1 Q. B. 629; 63 L. J. Q. B. 25; 68 L. T. 512; 41 W. E. 455. ..67, 109 Dorchester (Mayor of) ■;;. Ensor, (1869) L. E. 4 Ex. 335; 39 L. J. Ex. 11 663 Dormer v. Cook, (1903) 88 L. T. 629 637 Dornan v. Allan, (1900) 3 P. 112 (Ct. of Sess.) 173 Doswell i;. Impey, (1823) 1 B. & C. 163 744 Douglas V. Corbett, (1866) 6 E. & B. 511; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 1247 648 ■ V. Yallop, (1759) 2 Burr. 722 759 , The, (1882) 7 P. D. 151; 51 L. J. P. D. & A. 89; 47 L. T. (N. S.) 502 397 Doulson V. Matthews, (1792) 4 T. E. 503; 2 E. E. 448 124 Doust V. Slater, (1869) 10 B. & S. 400; 38 L. J. Q. B. 169; 20 L. T. (N. S.) 525 131 Dovaston v. Payne, (1795) 2 H. Bl. 527 ; 3 E. R. 497 ; 2 Smith L. C. (12th ed.) 164 316, 342 Dover, Ltd. v. Bernstein, (1910) 64 Sol. J. 250 700 V. Nurnberger Celluloid-Waren Pabrik Gebriider Wolff, (1910) 2 Ch. 25; 79 L. J. Ch. 625; 102 L. T. 634; 26 T. L. R. 470; 64 Sol. J. 250, 504; 27 E. P. C. 175, 498 695 Dowling V. Great Eastern E. Co., [1919] 88 L. J. K. B. 380— C. A. 107 Downing v. Capel, (1867) L. E. 2 C. P. 461; 36 L. J. M. C. 97; 16 L. T. (N. S.) 323 129, 203, 209 Downshire (Marquis of) v. Lady Sandys, (1801) 6 Ves. 107 369 Doyley v. Eoberts, (1837) 3 Bjjig. N. C. 835; 5 Scott, 40; 3 Hodges, 164; 1 Jur. 242; 6 L. J. C. P. 279; 43 E. E. 810 569 Drake, Ex paHe, Ware, In re, (1877) 6 Ch. D. 866 176 V. Mitchell, (1803) 3 East, 251; 7 E. E. 449 177 Draupner" (Owners of S.S.) v. Ovraers of Cargo of S.S. Draupner, The Draupner, (1910) A. C. 450; (1909) P. 219; 78 L. J. P. 90; 79 L. J. P. 88; 103 L. T. 87; 26 T. L. E. 671 177 Draycot v. Plot, (1601) Cro. Bliz. 818 258 Drew V. New Eiver Co., (1834) 6 C. & P. 754 408 Drewell v. Towler, (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 735 344 Driffield and East Eiding Pure Linseed Cake Co. v. Waterloo Mills Cake and Warehousing Co., (1886) 31 Ch. D. 638; 55 L. J. Ch. 391; 54 L. T. (N. S.) 210 626 DriscoU V. Poplar Board of Works, (1898) 62 J. P. 40; 14 T. L. E. 99 406, 434 Drummond v. Nicholson, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 2190 379 Duberley v. Gunning, (1791) 4 T. E. 651 ; 1 Peake, 132 ; 8 E. E. 664... 230 Dublin, Wicklow, &c., E. Co. v. Slattery, (1878) 3 App. Cas. 1165; 39 L. T. (N. S.) 365; 27 W. E. 191 499, 502, 606, 607, 510—613 Dubois V. Keats, (1840) 11 A. & B. 829; 3 P. & D. 306; 4 Jur. 148; 9 L. J. Q. B. 66; 52 E. E. 361 640 Du Bost V. Beresford, (1810) 2 Camp. 511 ; 11 E. E. 782 , 279 Duck V. Mayeu, (1892) 2 Q. B. 611; 62 L. J. Q. B. 69; 67 L. T. 547; 41 W. E. 66 60, 188 liv INDEX OP CASES. PAGE Duck V. North Sea Steam Trawling Co., [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 529 103 Du Cros V. Gold, (1913) 30 E. P. C. 117 ^^" V. Lambourne, (1907) 1 K. B. 40; 76 L. J. K. B. 50; 70 J. P. 535; 95 L. T. 782; 23 T. L. E. 3; 5 L. G. E. 120 11« Du Cros' Application, In re, (1911) 80 L. J. Ch. 644 ; 81 L. J. Ch. 201 ; 28 E. P. C. 413; 29 E. P. C. 65; [1913] A. C. 624; 83 L. J. Ch. 1-H. L J26 Dudderidge v. Eawliugs, (1913) 108 L. T. 802 -• *o' Dudley and West Bromwich Banking Co. v. Spittle, (1860) 1 J. & H. 14; 2 L. T. (N. S.) 47 ; 8 W. E. 851 121 Dufresne v. Hutchinson, (1810) 3 Taunt. 117 1™ Duke V. Courage, (1882) 46 J. P. 453 : °^ Dulieu V. White, (1901) 2 K. B. 669 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 837 ; 50 W. E. 76 ; 85 L. T. 186; 17 T. L. E. 555 1*8, 518 Dumergue v. Eumsey, (1863) 2 H. & C. 777 ^68 Dumphy v. The Montreal Light, Heat, and Power Co., [1907] A. C. 454; 76 L. J. P. C. 71; 97 L. T. 499; 23 T. L. E. 770— P. C. ... 115 Dunbar v. Ardee Union, Guardians of, (1897) 2 Ir. Eep. 76 36 Duncan, In re, Terry v. Sweeting, (1899) 1 Ch. 387 ; 68 L. J. Ch. 253; 47 W. E. 375; 80 L. T. 322; 15 T. L. E. 185 ■ 51 V. Cashen, (1875) L. E. 10 C. P. 554; 44 L. J. C. P. 225 ; 32 L. T. (N. S.) 497 268 V. Thwaites, (1824) 3 B. & C. 556; 5 D. & E. 447 599 Duncombe v. Daniell, (1837) 2 Jur. 32 ; 8 C. & P. 222; 1 W. W. & H. 101 622- V. Eeeve, (1599) Cro. Eliz. 783 306 Dundee Harbour Trustees v. Dougall, (1852) 1 Macq. 317 185 V. Nicol, [1915] A. C. 550; 84 L. J. P. C. 74— H. L 352 Dunk V. Hunter, (1822) 5 B. & Aid. 322; 24 E. E. 390 283 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. David Moseley & Sons, Ltd., (1904) 1 Ch. 164, 612; 73 L. J. Ch. 227, 417; 52 W. E. 189, 454; 91 L. T. 40; 20 T. L. E. 85, 314; 21 E. P. C. 53, 274 699, 713 V. Dunlop Motor Co., (1907) A. C. 430; 76 L. J. Ch. 102; 97 L. T. 259; 28 T. L. E. 717; 24 E. P. C. 527; 8 P. 1146— (Ct. of Sess.) 726 V. Maison Talbot, (1904) 20 T. L. E. 88, 579; 52 W. E. 254 625 627 795 803 V. Neal, (1899) 1 Ch. 807; 68 L. J. Ch. 378; 47 W.'e. 632;' 80 L. T. 746; 16 E. P. C. 247 714 Dunn V. Birmingham Canal Co., (1872) L. E- 8 Q. B. 42; 42 L. J. Q. B. 34; 27 L. T. (N. S.) 683 403 V. Holt, (1904) 73 L. J. K. B. 341 ; 68 J. P. 271 ; 90 L. T. 577 ; 20 T. L. E. 297; 20 Cox, C. C. 625 26 V. Large, (1783) 3 Doug. 335 356 Dunn's Trade Marks, In re, (1899) 41 Ch. D. 439 735 Dunne v. Anderson, (1825) 3 Bing. 88; 10 Moore, 407 ; E. & M. 287; 28 E. E. 591 609 Dunstan v. Paterson, (1857) 2 C. B. (N. S.) 495 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 267 ; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 982 773 Dunwich v. Sterry, (1831) 1 B. & Ad. 831 ; 9 L. J. K. B. 167 ; 85 E. E. 471 •. 261 Durant v. Smith, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 282— C. A 102 Durham C. C. v. South Medomsley Colliery, Ltd., [1916] 80 J. P. 343 184 Dutton V. Sneyd Bycars Co., [1920] K. B. 414; 89 L. J. K. B. 85— Q j^ ^ 99 Dwyer v. Esmonde, (1878) 2 L. E. Ir. 243 ...........!'...".....'..'. 594 Dyer v. Munday, (1895) 1 Q. B. 742; 64 L. J. Q. B. 448; 72 L. T. 448; 43 W. E. 440 74, 76, 78, 81, 85, 179, 188 Dyhouse v. Gt. Western E. Co., (1918) 109 L. T. 193— C. A 104 Dyke v. Duke, (1838) 4 Bing. N. C. 197; 5 Scott, 536 762 Dyson v. Peat, (1917) 86 L. J. Ch. 204 249 Baqee v. Dyott, (1831) 5 C. & P. 4 640 V. Grimwood (1847) 1 Ex. 61; 16 L. J. Ex. 236 224, 225 Eagleton v. Gutteridge, (1843) 11 M. & W. 465; 12 L. J. Ex. 359; 2 Dowl. (N. S.) 1053; 63 E. E. 655 291 Eardley v. Granville, (1876) 3 Ch. D. 826 332 INDEX OF CASES. Iv PAGE Earl V. Lubbock, (1905) 1 K. B. 253; 74 L. J. K. B. 121 ; 91 L. T. 73, 830; 58 W. E. 145; 21 T. L. R. 71 474, 478, 544 Earle v. Holderness, (1828) 4 Bing. 462; 1 M. & P. 254 279 v: Kingscote, (1900) 1 Ch. 203; 2 Ch. 585; 69 L. J. Ch. 202, 725; 81 L. T. 775; 83 L. T. 577; 49 W. E. 3; 16 T. L,. E. 63, 511 ... 46 Earp V. Faulkner, (1875) 34 L. T. (N. S.) 284 442 East v. Berkshire County Council, (1912) 106 L. T. 65; 76 J. P. 35 ... 166 V. Chapman, (1827) 2 C. & P. 570; M. & M. 46 622 East Indian R. Co. v. Kalidaa Mukerjee, (1901) A. C. 396; 70 L. J. P. C. 63; 84 I/. T. 210; 17 T. L. E. 284 114 East London R. Co. v. Thames Conservators, (1904) 68 J. P. 302; 20 T. L. R. 378 406, 799 Eastern and South African Telegraph Co., Ltd., v. Cape Town Tram- ways Co., Ltd., (1902) A. C. 381; 71 L. J. P. C. 122; 50 W. E. 657; 86 L. T. 457; 18 T. L. E. 523 11, 380, 425, 429 Eastern Counties E. Co. v. Broom, (1851) 6 Exch. 314; 20 L. J. Ex. 196; 15 Jur. 297 117 Eastern Trust Co. v. McKenzie Mann & Co., [1915] A. C. 750; 84 L. J. P. C. 152— P. C 39 Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, (1898) A. C. 571; 67 L. J. Ch. 628; 79 L. T. 195 ; 47 W. R. 152; 14 T. L. E. 527 ; 15 R. P. C. 476... 728 Easton V. Isted, (1903) 1 Ch. 405 379 V. Richmond Highway Board, (1871) L. E. 7 Q. B. 69; 41 L. J. M. C. 25; 25 L. T. (N. S.) 586 344 Ecclesiastical Commissioners v. North Eastern E. Co., (1877) 4 Ch. D. 845; 47 L. J. Ch. 20; 36 L. T. (N. S.) 174 187, 367 Edelsten r. Edelsten, (1863) 1 De G. J. & S. 185 740- Edge V. Niccolls, (1911) A. C. 693; 1 Ch. 5; 80 L. J. Ch. 744; 105 L. T. 459; 56 Sol. J. 737; 27 T. L. R. 101, 555; 28 R. P. C. 582 698, 720 V. Strafford, (1831) 1 C. & J. 391; 1 Tyr. 293; 9 L. J. Ex. 101; 35 E. E. 746 335 Edgeberry v. Stephens, (1696) 2 Salk. 447 704 Edgington v. Pitzmaurice, (1885) 29 Ch. D, 459; 53 L. T. (N. S.) 369; 33 W. E. 911 ,...: 523, 524, 544 Edinburgh Corporation v. North British E. Co., (1904) 6 E. 620 (Ct. of Sess.) 399 Edmondson v. John Birch & Co. and Horner, (1907) 1 K. B. 371; 76 L. J. K. B. 346; 96 L. T. 415; 23 T. L. E. 234 584, 585 V. Machell, (1787) 2 T. E. 4 221, 226 I,. Nuttal, (1864) 17 C. B. (N. S.) 280; 13 W. E. 53 280 Edmund v. Martell, (1907) 24 T. L. E. 25 656 Educational Company of Ireland r. Fallon, [1919] 1 Ir. E. 62 682 Edwards, Ex parte. Chapman, In re, (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 747 200 V. Bell, (1824) 1 Bing. 403; 8 Moo. 467; 2 L. J. C. P. 42; 25 R. R. 659 573 V. English, (1857) 7 E. & B. 564; 26 L. J. Q. B. 193; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 934 268 V. Jenkins, (1896) 1 Ch. 308; 65 L. J. Ch. 222; 73 L. T. 574 ... 346 V. London & North Western R. Co., (1870) L. R. 5 C. P. 445; 39 L. J. C. P. 241; 22 L. T. (N. S.) 656 82 V. Midland R. Co., (1880) 6 Q. B. D. 287; 50 L. J. Q. B. 281; 43 L. T. (N. S.) 694 57, 641 V. St. Mary, Islington (Vestry of), (1889) 22 Q. B. D. 338; 58 L. J. Q. B. 165; 60 L. T. (N. S.) 725 131 V. Wingham Agricultural Implement Makers, [1913] 3 K. B. 596; 82 L. J. K. B. 998— C. A 103 Edwick V. Hawkes, (1881) 18 Ch. D. 199; 50 L. J. Ch. 577; 45 L. T. (N. S.) 168 330, 331 Eggington's Case, (1853) 2 E. & B. 717; 23 L. J. M. C. 41; 18 Jur. ^^ 224 767, 791 Egyptian, The, (1910) P. 38; (1910) W. N. 109; 79 L. J. P. 26, 57; 101 L. T. 704; 102 L. T. 465; 11 Asp. M. C. 323, 388; 47 Sc. L. R. 905 145 Eldridge v. Stacey, (1863) 15 C. B. (N. S.) 458; 9 L. T. (N. S.) 291; 12 W. R. 51 291 Eleanor, The, (1865) 2 Mar. Law Cas. (0. S.) 240 460 Ivi INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Elkington v. London Aasociation for Protection of Trade, (WH) |!( „ T. L. E. 329; 28 T. L. E. 117-C. A f^; °°° Ella, The, [1915] P. Ill; 84 L. J. P. 97 :-• v;-^'^' tT' Ellen V. Great Northern E. Co., (1901) 49 W. B. 395; 17 T. L. &■ 338 463 ' ' EUerman Lines, Ltd''i;."Grayson',"[1919] 2 K. B. 514-C. A. ; affirmed, [1920] W. N. 87-H. L ?i'^ Elliot 1).. Allen, (1845) 1 C. B. 18 ^J^-V^';^"^:^' EUiotson V. Eeetham, (1835) 2 Bing. N. C. 134; 7 Dowl. P. C. 741; 2 P. & D. 531; 2 S. C. 174; 1 Hodg. 259; 42 E. E. 557 ...... 398, 399 Elliott V. Hall, (1885) 15 Q. B. D. 315 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 618 ; 34 W. E.^ ^^^ V. NicklinV'(m8)"'5' Price, 641 141, 230 V. Norfolk (Duke), (1792) 4 T. E. 789 461 Ellis V. Abrahams, (1846) 8 Q. B. 709 VL'^;" V. Banyard, (1911) 104 L. T. 460; 106 L. T. 51; 55 Sol. J. 500; 66 Sol. J. 139; 27 T. L. E. 417; 28 T. L. E. 122 • H, 440 V. Lottus Iron Co., (1874) L. E. 10 C. P. 10; 44 L. J. 0. P. 24; 31 L. T. (N. S.) 483 333, 442 V. Eowbotham, (1900) 1 Q. B. 740; 69 L. J. Q. B. 379 ; 48 W. E. 423; 82 L. T. 191; 16 T. L. E. 301; 16 T. L. E. 301 779 V. Sheffield Gas Co., (1853) 2 E. & B. 767; 23 L. J. Q. B. 42; 18 Jur. 146 116 V. Taylor, (1841) 8 M. & W. 416 309 Elsee V. Smith, 1822), 1 D. & E. 97 ; 2 Chit. 304 ; 24 E. E. 639 638 Elstob V. Wright, (1861) 3 G. & K. 31 134 Elston V. Eose, (1868) L. E. 4 Q. B. 4; 38 L. J. Q. B. 6; 19 L. T. (N. S.) 280 754 Ely (Bishop) v. Clere, [1913] P. 184 568 Ely Brewery Co. v. Pontypridd Urban District Council, (1904) 68 J. P. 3; 2 L. G. E. 40 161, 162, 429, 452 Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank, (1904) 2 K. B. 870 ; (1905) 1 K. B. 677; 73 L. J. K. B. 993; 74 L. J. K. B. 326; 53 W. E. 92, 306; 92 L. T. 306; 21 T. L. E. 268; 10 Com. Cas. 99 123, 259 Emblem v. Myers, (1861) 6 H. & N. 54 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 71 ; 8 W. E. 666 142 Embrey v. Owen, (1851) 6 Bxch. 353; 20 L. J. Ex. 212; 16 Jur. 633 139, 372 Emerson v. Emerson, (1672) Ventr. 187 48 Bmmens v. Pottle, (18^6) 16 Q. B. D. 354 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 51 ; 34 W. E. 116 570, 571 Empire Typesetting Machine Co. of New York v. Linotype Co., (1898) 79 L T. 8 ; 81 L. T. 321 ; 14 T. L. E. 511 ; 16 T. L. E. 524 ... 626, 741 Engelbach v. Nixon, (1875) L. E. 10 C. P. 645; 44 L. J. C. P. 396; 32 L. T. (N. S.) 831 '. 268 Engelhart v. Farrant, (1897) 1 Q. B. 240 150, 153 England v. Cowley, (1873), L. E. 8 Ex. 126; 42 L. J. Ex. 80; 28 L. T. (N. S.) 67 234 English V. Metropolitan Water Board, (1907) 1 K. B. 588; 76 L. J. K. B. 361; 71 J. P. 313; 96 L. T. 573; 23 T. L. E. 313; 6 L. G. E. 384 404 and Ayling, In re, Murray & Co., Ex parte, (1903) 1 K. B. 680; 72 L. J. K. B. 248; 88 L. T. 127 ; 19 T. L. E. 255 ; 10 Mansou, 34 771 and Scottish Trust Co. v. Elatau, (1888) 36 W. E. 238 62 Englishman, The, (1877) 3 P. D. 18; 47 L. J. P. D. & A. 9; 37 L. T. (N. S.) 412 499 Eno, Ltd.'s, Application, In re, (1920) 37 E. P. C. 1 727, 733 Brskine v. Adeane, (1873) L. E. 8 Oh. App. 756; 42 L. J. Oh. 835; 29 L. T. 234; 21 W. E. 802 112, 430 Esther Lyons, In re. See Lyons, Esther, In re. Estler V. Adjustable Shelving and Metal Construction Co., (1915) 32 E. P. 0. 501 703 Buman v. Dalziel & Co., [1913] S. C. 246— Sco 99 Evans v. Barrow Haematite Steel Co., [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 365— C. A 106 V. Edmonds, (1853) 13 C. B. 777 533 V. Elliott, (1836) 5 A. & E. 142; 6 N. & M. 606 258, 286, 804 V. Evans and Platts, (1899) P. 195; 68 L. J. P. 70; 81 L. T. 60 228 INDEX OF CASES. Ivii PAGE Evans v. Evans and Another, (1906) P. 125; 75 L. J. P. 27; 94 L. T. 616; 22 T. L. R. 322 228 V. Harlow, (1844) 5 Q. B. 624; 13 L. J. Q. B. 130; 8 Jur. 571; D. & M. 507; 64 R. R. 596 554, 630, 632 V. Harries, (1856) 1 H. & N. 251; 26 L. J. Ex. 31 620 V. Holloway, [1914] W. C. & Ins. R. 75— C. A 102 V. Liverpool Corporation, (1905) 21 T. L. R. 558 75 V. Morris, [1913] W. N. 58— D. C 668 V. Roberts, (1826) 5 B. & C. 829 ; 8 D. & R. 611 ; 4 L. J. K. B. 313; 29 R. R. 421 332, 768 V. Walton, (1867) L. R. 2 C. P. 615 ; 36 L. J. C. P. 307 ; 17 L. T. (N. S.) 92 15, 222, 223, 226 V, Wright, (1857) 2 H. & N. 527; 27 L. J.' Ex. 56 240, 310 Every v. Smith, (1857) 26 L. J. Ex. 344 156, 321 Ewbank v. Nutting, (1849) 7 C. B. 797 272 Exchange Telegraph Co. v. Gregory, (1896) 1 Q. B. 147 ; 74 L. T. 83 690 Eydmann •;;. Premier Accumulator Co., [1915] W. C. & Ins. R. 82 — C. A 101 Eyre v. Garlick, (1878) 42 J. P. 68 548 Ezardian, The, (1911) P. 92; 80 L. J. P. 81; 104 L. T. 400; 11 Asp. M. C. 602 460 Faikbubn v. Evans, (1915) 32 T. L. R. 166— D. C 756 Eairman v. Ives, (1822) 5 B. & Aid. 642; 1 D. & R. 252; 1 Chit. 85 ; 24 R. R. 514 585, 593, 595 Eaithfull V. Kesteven, (1910) 103 L. T. 56— C. A 456 Falck V. Williams, (1900) A. C. 176; 69 L. J. P. C. 17 538 Falk V. Fletcher, (1865) 18 C. B. (N. S.) 403; 34 L. J. C. P. 146; 13 W. R. 346 245, 272 Eancy, The, [1917] P. 13 460 Fannin v. Anderson, (1845) 7 Q. B. 811 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 282 ; 9 Jur. 969 188 Farley v. Danks, (1855) 4 E. & B. 493; 24 L. J. Q. B. 244; 1 Jur. (N. S.) 331 638, 639, 653 Farr-y. Newman, (1792) 4 T. R. 621; 2 R. R. 479 770 Farrant v. Barnes, (1862) 11 C. B. (N. S.) 553; 51 L. J. C. P. 137; 8 Jur. (N. S.) 868 114, 468, 472 V. Thompson, (1822) 5 B. & Aid. 826; 2 D. & R. 1; 24 R. R. 571 259, 271 Farrar v. Beswick, (1836) 1 M. & W. 682; 1 M. & R. 527; 42 R. R. 820 240, 248 Farrer v. Nelson, (1885) 15 Q. B. D. 258; 54 L. J. Q. B. 385; 52 L. T. (N. S.) 766 446 Farry u. Great Northern R. Co., (1898) 2 Ir. Rep. 352 77, 635 Faulder & Co.'s Trade Mark, In re, (1902) 1 Ch. 125; 83 L. T. 726; 18 R. P. C. 37, 536 728, 737 Fawcett V. Smethurst, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 473 44 Fawkea v. Joyce, (1689) 2 Vern. 129; 2 Vent. 50; Lev. 260; Pre. Ch. 7; Lutw. 1161 302 Fay V. Prentice, (1845) 1 C. B. 828; 14 L. J. C. P. 298; 9 Jur. 877.. .333, 399 Fear v. Vickers, (1911) 27 T. L. R. 558; 55 Sol. J. 688 372 Fearnley v. Bates, (1917) 86 L. J. K. B. 1000 103 Feather v. The Queen, (1865) 6 B. & S. 257; 35 L. J. Q. B. 200; 12 L. T. (N. S.) 114 ...„ 37, 38, 718 Featherstonhaugh v. Johnstone, (1818) 8 Taunt. 237 238 Fell V. Knight, (1841) 8 M. & W. 269; 5 Jur. 554; 10 L. J. Ex. 277; 58 B. R. 698 27 -V. Whittaker, (1871) L. R. 7 Q. B. 120; 41 L. J. Q. B. 78; 25 L. T. (N. S.) 880 267, 274, 313 Fels u. Thos. Hedley & Co., Ltd., (1903) 20 T. L. B. 69; 20 R. P. G. 85, 437, 443, 447 729 Fenn v. Bittleston, (1851) 7 Ex. 152; 21 L. J. Ex. 41 262, 264 V Miller, [1900] 1 6. B. 788 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 439; 64 J. P. 356; 48 W. R. 369; 82 L. T. 284; 16 T. L. R. 265 97 Fenna v. Clar«, (1895) 1 Q. B. 199; 64 L. J. Q. B. 238 500 Fenning Film Service Co., Ltd. v. Wolverhampton, Walsall & District Cinemas, Ltd., [1914] 3 K. B. 1171; 83 L. J. K. B. 1860 ... 672, 682, 687 Iviii INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Fennings v. Grenville (Lord), (1808) 1 Taunt. 241; 9 B. E. TBO •..^. 247 Penton v. Logan, (1833) 9 Bing. 676; 3 M. & Scott, 82; 2 L. J. C. F. 102; 35 E. E. 666 ■••■■ '^^ Penwick v. Laycock, (1841) 2 Q. B. 108; 1 G. & D. 532; 6 Jur. 346; 11 L. J. Q. B. 146; 57 E. E. 610 • ■ ™ V. Maedonald, Praser & Co., (1904) 6 P. 850 (Ct. of SesB.) 253 Ferguson v. KinnouU (Earl), (1842) 9 CI. & F. 251 ^^^^^}{^^ Fergusson v. Malvern Urban District Council, (1909) 72 J. P. 101, 273; 73 J. P. 361 3^* Ferrand r. Wilson, (1845) 4 Hare, 344; 9 Jur. 860; 15 L. J. Ch. 41; 67 R. E. 70 |o° Perranti's Patent, In re, [1918] W. N. 143; 88 L. J. Ch. 123 709 Fiat Motors' Application, In re, (1911) 1 Ch. 66; 80 L. J. Ch. 48; 103 L. T. 463; 55 Sol. J. 64; 27 T. L. E. 74; 27 E. P. C. 763 710 Field V. Adames, (1840) 12 A. & E. 649; 4 P. & D. 504; 5 Jur. 103; 1 Arn. & H. 17 ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 2 ; 54 E. E. 657 165, 298, 316 V. Jellicus, (1683) 3 Lev. 124 176 —,— V. Mitchell, (1807) 6 Esp. 71 312 V. Musgrove, (1867) 16 L. T. (N. S.) 536 209 0. Eeceiver for Metropolitan Police District, (1907) 2 K. B. 853; 76 L. J. K. B. 1015 ; 71 J. P. 494 ; 23 T. L. E. 736 ; 5 L. G. E. 1121 451 Filburn v. People 'is Palace and Aquarium Co., (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 258; 59 L. J. Q. B. 471; 38 W. E. 706 11, 441 Pilliter v. Phippard, (1847) 11 Q. B. 347 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 89 ; 12 Jur. 202 .....:...... 12, 432, 433 Pinbnrgh v. Moss Empires, Ltd., (1908) S. C. 928; 45 Sc. L. E. 792 (Cf. of Bess.) 568, 569, 615, 635, 641 Pinch V. Finch, (1876) 45 L. J. Ch. 816 180 V. Great Western E. Co., (1879) 5 Ex. D. 254; 41 L. T. (N. S.) 731; 28 W. E. 229 342 Pinchley Electric Lighting Co. v. Pinchley Urban District Council, (1903) 1 Ch. 437; (1902) 1 Ch. 866; 71 L. J. Ch. 450; 72 L. J. Ch. 297 ; 67 J. P. 97 ; 51 W. E. 375 ; 88 L. T. 216 ; 19 T. L. E. 238; 1 L. G. E. 244 333, 336 Findon v. M'Laren, (1845) 6 Q. B. 891; 14 L. J. Q. B. 183; 9 Jur. 369; 66 E. E. 588 293 l^ Parker, (1843) 11 M. & W. 675; 12 L. J. Ex. 444; 7 Jur. 903; 63 E. R. 723 659 Pine Cotton Spinners' and Doublers' Association and John Cash & Sons, Ltd. V. Harwood, Cash & Co., Ltd., (1907) 2 Ch. 184; 76 L. J. Ch. 670 ; 97 L. T. 45 ; 23 T. L. E. 537 ; 24 E. P. C. 533.. .723, 726, 737 Pinlay v. Tullamore Union Guardians, [1914] 2 Jr. E. 233— C. A., Ir 97, 104 Pinnerty v. Tipper, (1809) 2 Camp. 72 621 Pirth V. Bowling Iron Co., (1878) 3 C. P. D. 254; 47 L. J. C. P. 358; 38 L. T. (N. S.) 568 429, 436 Fisher v. Algar, (1826) 2 C. & P. 374 313 V. Magnay, (1843) 5 M. & G. 778; 12 L. J. C. P. 276; 6 Scott, N. E. 588 772 V. Nation Newspaper Co., (1901) 2 Ir. Eep. 465 561 V. Prince, (1762) 3 Burr. 1363 279 r. Prowse, (1862) 2 B. & S. 770; 31 L. J. Q. B. 212; 6 L. T. (N. S.) 711 391 Fitch V. Bawling, (1796) 2 H. Bl. 394; 3 E. E. 425 ^46 Fitter v. Veal, (1701) 12 Mod. 642 172, 173 Fitzgerald v. W. G. Clarke & Son, (1908) 2 K. B. 796; 77 L. J. K. B. 1018; 99 L. T. 101 74, 88 V. Northcote, (1865) 4 P. & P. 656 218, 219 — — v. Watson, [1918] 2 Ir. E. 411 598 Pitzjohn V. Mackinder, (1860-1) 8 C. B. (N. S.) 78; 9 C. B. (N. S.) 606 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 257 ; 4 L. T. (N. S.) 149 640 Fitzpatrick v. Evans & Co., (1902) 1 K. B. 505; (1901) 1 Q. B. 756; 70 L. J. K. B. 353 ; 71 L. J. K. B. 302 ; 50 W. E. 290 ; 86 L. T. 141; 18 T. L. B. 290 95 Fleet !'. Johnson, (1918) 57 Sol. J. 226— C. A 102 Fleming v. Dollar, (1889) 23 Q. B. D. 388 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 548 ; 61 L. T. 230; 37 W. E. 684 575 Fleming and Gale's Patent, In re, (1919) 36 E. P. C. 266 709 INDEX OF OASES. lix PAGE Plemington v. Smithei-s, (1826) 2 C. & P. 292 230 Flemyng v. Hector, a836) q M. & W. 172; 2 Gale, 180; 6 L. J. Ex. 43; 46 E. R. 553 69 Fletcher & Son v. Booth, [1920] 1 K. B. 275 456 V. Bealey, (1884-5) 28 Ch. D. 688 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 424 ; 52 L. T. (N. S.) 541 803 V. Fletcher, (1859) 1 E. & B. 420; 28 L. J. Q. B. 134; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 678 213, 215 V. Eylands, (1868) L. E. 1 Ex. 265; L. E. 3 H. L. 330; 35 L. J. Ex. 154; 37 L. J. Ex. 161; 19 L. T. 220; 1 Smith L. G. (12th ed.), 882 Ill, 421, 427, 428, 434, 436—438, 443, 447 V. Smith, (1877) 2 A. C. 781 422 Flewster v. Eoyle, (1808) 1 Camp. 187 197 Flight V. Leman, (1843) 4 Q. B. 883; 12 L. J. Q. B. 353; 7 Jm-. 557; D. & M. 67; 62 E. E. 495 658 Flint r. Pike, (1825) 4 B. & C. 473; 6 D. & E. 528; 3 L. J. Iv. B. 272 ; 28 R. R. 335 600 Flockton V. Hall, (1850) 14 Q. B. 380 169 Flood V. Jackson, (1895) 2 Q. B. 21 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 665 ; 69 J. P. 388 ; 73 L. T. 161; 43 W. E. 453. (See also Allen v. Flood.) 69 V. Smith and Leishman, [1915] S. C. 726 Sco 101 Floyd V. Barker, (1607) 12 Eep. 23; 6 Co. Eep. 223 746 Fludei). Goldberg, [1915] W. N. 301— C. A., reversing [1915] 2 K. B. 157; 84 L. J. K.' B. 511, D. C 763 Flynn v. Connell, [1919] 2 Ir. E. 427 226 Folkestone Corporation v. Brockman, [1914] A. C. 338; 83 L. J. K. B. 745— H. L 166 Forbes v. Cochrane, (1824) 2 B. & C. 448 ; 3 D. & R. 679 ; 2 L. J. K. B. 67; 26 E. R. 402 222 V. Lea Conservancy Board, (1879) 4 Ex. D. 116; 48 L. J. Ex. 402; 27 W. R. 688 27 V. Smith, (1856) 11 Ex. 161; 24 L. J. Ex. 299; 1 Jm-. (N. S.) 503 181 Force v. Warren, (1864) 15 C. B. (N. S.) 806 582, 589 Ford, In re, Official Receiver, Ex parte, (1900) 1 Q. B. 265; 69 L. J. Q. B. 74; 48 W. R. 173; 81 L. T. 648; 7 Manson, 14 287 V. Beech, (1848) 11 Q. B. 852; 17 L. J. Q. B. 114 171 V. Foster, (1872) L. R. 7 Ch. 611 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 682 ; 27 L. T. 219 728, 729 735 ■ V. Gaiety Theatre Co., [1914] W. C. & Ins. R. 53— C. A ' 99 V. Harrow Urban District Council, (1903) j8 Ti. T. 394; 67 J. P. 248; 1 L. G. R. 256 , 165, 344 v. Leche, (1837) 6 A. & B. 699; 1 N., & P. 737 762 V. Oakdale Colliery Co., [1915] W. C. & Ins. R. 46— C. A. ... 100 Forder v. Great Western R., (1905) 2 K. B. 532; 74 L. J. K. B. 871; 58 W. R. 574; 93 L. T. 344; 21 T. L. R. 625 497 Foreman v. Canterbury (Mayor of), (1871) L. R. 6 Q. B. 214 ; 40L. J. Q. B. 138; 24 L. T. (N. S.) 385 33 Forster 'u. Lawson, (1826) 3 Bing. 452; 11 Moore, 360 64, 552 Forsyth v. Canniff, (1890; 20 Ontario Eep. 478 76 v. Manchester Corporation, (1913) 107 L. T. 600— C. A 78 Forward v. Pittard, (1785) 1 T. E. 27 ; 1 E. R. 142 34, 450 Foster v. Charles, (1830) 6 Bing. 396; 4 M. & P. 61 ; 8 L. J. C. P. 118; 31 E. E. 446 533 ,,. Cookson, (1841) 1 Q. B. 419; 1 G. & D. 58; 5 Jur. 1083; 10 L. J. Q. B. 167; 55 E. E. 294 778 V. Green, (1862) 7 H. & N. 881 269 ^ — • v. Eichmond, (1911) 9 L. G. R. 65 342 V. Stewart, (1814) 3 M. & S. 192; 15 R. R. 459 223 y, Warblington Urban District Council, (1906) 1 K. B. 648 ; 75 L. J. K. B. 514; 4 L. G. R. 736; 70 J. P. 283; 54 W. E. 575; 94 L. T. 876; 22 T. L. R. 421 324, 380, 431 Fouldes V. Willoughby, (1814) 8 M. & W. 540; 5 Jur. 534; 1 Dowl. (N. S.) 86; 10 L. J. Ex. 364; 58 R. R. 803 10, 234—236 Foulger v. Newcomb, (1867) L. R. 2 Ex. 327; 36 L. J. Ex. 169; 16 L. T. (N. S.) 595 557, 560 Poulkes V. Metropolitan District R. Co., (1880) 4 C. P. D. 267; 5 C. P. D. 157 463, 492 Foulkes V. Roberta, (1920) 122 L. T. 169— C. A 100 V. Selway, (1800) 3 Esp. 236 230 Ix INDEX OF CASES. PAGE_ Fountain v. Boodle, (1842) 3 Q. B. 5 ; 2 G. & D. 455; 61 E. E. 121 ... 612" Fourth City Mutual Building Society v. Churchwardens, etc., of East Ham, (1892) 1 Q. B. 661 ]°°. Fowler v. Down, (1797) 1 B. & P. 44, stated 21 E. E. 532, 536 ...... ib\ V. HoUins, (1872) L. E. 7 Q. B. 616 ; L. E. 7 H. L. 757 ; 41 L. J. Q. B. 277 ; 27 L. T. (N. S.) 168. (See also HoUins v.- ^°^^^^v'„_2?^ Fox V. Barrow Hematite Steel Co., [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 321— C. A. 101 V. Broderick, (1864) 14 Ir. C. L. E. 453 ■■ 5™ V. Gaunt, (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 798; 1 L. J. K. B. 198; 37 E. E. 550 206 V. Eees & Kirby, Ltd., [1916] W. C. & Ins. E. 339 103 Foxall V. Barnett, (1853) 2 E. & B. 928 656 France v. Gaudet, (1871) L. E. 6 Q. B. 199; 40 L.-J. Q. B. 121; 19 W. E. 622 273, 275 Francis v. Cockrell, (1870) L. E. 5 Q. B. 501 482 V. Hayward, (1883) 23 Ch. D. 177; 52 L. J. Ch. 291; 48 L. T. (N. S.) 297 344 V. Eoose, (1838) 3 M. & W. 191 ; 1 H. & H. 36 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 66; 49 E. E. 567 555 Francis, Day & Hunter v. Feldman & Co., [1914] 2 Ch. 728; 83 L. J. Ch. 906-C. A 670, 682 Pranconia, The, (1877) 2 P. D. 163— C. A 281 Fraser v. Caledonian E. Co., (1903) 5 F. 41 (Ct. of Sess.) 518 Fray u. Blackburn, (1863) 3 B. & S. 576 746 V. Fray, (1864) 17 C. B. (N. S.) 603; 34 L. J. C. P. 45; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1153 566 Freegard v. Barnes, (1852) 7 Ex. 827; 21 L. J. Ex. 320 790 Freeman v. Cooke, (1849) 4 Ex. 654; 18 L. J. Ex. 114; 12 Jur. 777... 773 V. Edwards, (1848) 2 Ex. 732; 17 L. J. Ex. 258 284 V. Line, (1778) 2 Chit. 673 133 V. Bead, (1863) 4 B. & S. 174; 32 L. J. M. C. 226; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 149 185 V. Eosher, (1849) 13 Q. B. 780; 18 L. J. Q. B. 340; 13 Jur. 881.. .74, 117 Freston, In re, (1883) 19 Q. B. D. 545; 52 L. J. Q. B. 545 ; 49 L. T. (N. S.) 290 635 Friend v. Mapp, (1904) 68 J. P. 589; 2 L. G. E. 1317 496 Fritz V. Hobson, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 542; 49 L. J. Oh. 321; 42 L. T. (N. S.) 225 805 Frost V. Aylesbury Dairy Co., (1905) 1 K. B. 608; 74 L. J. K. B. 386; 53 W. E. 354; 92 L. T. 527; 21 T. L. E. 300 468, 471 V. London Joint Stock Bank, (1906) 22 T. L. E. 760 565 Fry V. Cheltenham Corporation, (1912) 81 L. J. K. B. 41; 105 L. T. 495; 76 J. P. 89; 28 T. L. E. 16; 10 L. G. E. 1— C. A. ... 105, 181 Fryer v. Kinnersley, (1863) 15 C. B. (N. S.) 422; 33 L. J. C. P. 96; 9 L. T. (N. S.) 415 584, 588 Fuente's Trade Mark, In re, (1891) 2 Ch. 166; 60 L. J. Ch. 308; 64 L. T. 196; 39 W. B. 489 736 Fuller V. Chippenham Eural District Council, (1915) 79 J. P. 4 ... 165, 166 - V. Glyn Mills Currie & Co., [1914] 2 K. B. 168; 83 L. J. K. B. 764 254 Fullwood i;. Fullwood, (1878) 9 Ch. D. 176; 47 L. J. Ch. 459; 38 L. T. (N. S.) 380 801 G. (A Solicitor), In re, Law Society, Ex 'parte, (1911) 28 T. L. E. 50; 56 Sol. J. 92 660 Gabriel v. Dresser, (1855) 15 C. B. 622; 24 L. J. C. P. 81 ; 3 C. L. E. 415 169 Gadsen v. Barrow, (1854) 9 Ex. 514 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 134 ; 2 C. L. E. 1063 268 Gaffney v. Dublin United Tramways Co., [1916] 2 Ir. E. 472— C. A. ... 500 Galbraith ■;;. Poynton, (1906) 2 K. B. 258; 74 L. J. K. B. 649 369 Gale V. Abbott, (1862) 8 Jur. (N. S.) 987 ; 6 L. T. (N. S.) 852 ; 10 W. E. 748 801 Gallagher v. Humphrey, (1862) 6 L. T. (N. S.) 684; 10 W. E. 664 90 Gallant v. Gabir, Owners, (1913) 108 L. T. 50— 0. A 102 Galliard v. Laxton, (1862) 2 B. & S. 363; 31 L. J. M. 0. 123; 5 L. T. (N. S.) 886 792 Galloway v. Bird, (1827) 4 Bing. 299; 12 Moore, 547 257 INDEX OF CASES. Ixi PAGE Galwey v. Marshall, (1853) 9 Ex. 294; 23 L. J. Ex. 78; 2 C. L. B. 399 558, 560 Gamble, In re, (1899) 1 Q. B. 303; 68 L. J. Q. B. 195; 63 J. P. 101; 79 L. T. 642; 15 T. 1,. E. 128 751, 757 V. Jordan, [1913] 3 K. B. 149; 82 L. J. K. B. 743 399 Gambrell i-. Ealmouth (Earl), (1835) 4 A. & B. 73 ; 5 N. & M. 359; 43 E. E. 307 288 Gandy v. Jubber, (1864—5) 5 B. & S. 78, 485; 9 B. & S. 15; 33 L. J. Q. B. 151; 9 L. T. (N. S.) 800 •. 415, 416, 419 Garbutt v. Simpson, (1863) 32 L. J. M. C. 186; 8 L. T. (N. S.) 423; 11 W. E. 751 230 Gardner v. Grace, (1858) 1 P. & F. 359 507 V. Slade, (1849) 13 Q. B. 796 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 334 ; 13 Hur. 826 582, 588—590 Garland, Ex parte, (1803—4) 10 Ves. 110; 1 Sm. 220; 7 E. E. 352 ... 770 «). Carlisle, (1837) 4 CI. & P. 693; 4 Bing. N. 0. 7; 3 M. & W. 152 251, 260, 771 Garnett v. Perrand, (1827) 6 B. & C. 611 ; 9 D. & E. 657 ; 5 L. J. K. B. 270; 30 E. E. 467 744 Garrett v. Taylor, (1620) Cro. Jac. 567 20 Garrett's Application, In re, [1916] 1 Ch. 436 725 Garten v. Bristol & Exeter E. Co., (1861) 1 B. & S. 112; 30 L. J. Q. B. 273 27 V. Great Western E. Co., (1859) 28 L. J.. Q. B. 321 ...'..'. 132 Gaskin v. Balls, (1879) 13 Ch. D. 324; 28 W. E. 552 801 Gas Light and Coke Co. v. St. Mary Abbott, (1885) 15 Q. B. D. 1 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 414; 53 L. T. (N. S.) 457 405 Gateley v. Martin, (1900) 2 Ir. E. 269 496 Gates V. E. Bill & Son, (1902) 2 K. B. 38; 71 L. J. K. B. 702; 50 W. E. 546; 87 L. T. 288; 18 T. L. E. 592 74 Gathercole v. Miall, (1846) 15 M. & W. 319; 15 L. J. Ex. 179; 10 Jur. 337 175, 604, 607, 616 Gaulard v. Lindsay, (1888) 38 Ch. D. 38; 57 L. J. Ch. 687; 59 L. T. 44 708 Gaunt V. Pynney, (1872) L. E. 8 Ch. 8 399 Gautret v. Egerton, (1867) L. E. 2 C. P. 371; 36 L. J. C. P. 191; 16 L. T. (N. S.) 17 490 Gawler v. Chaplin, (1848) 2 Ex. 503; 18 L. J. Ex. 42 ... 313, 774, 776, 778 Geary v. Ginzler, (1913) 108 L. T. 286— C. A 93, 102, 514 V. Norton, (1846) 1 De G. & Sm. 9 798 Geddis v. Bann Eeservoir (Proprietors of), (1878) 3 App. Cas. 430 ... 36 Gee V. Metropolitan E. Co., (1873) L. E. 8 Q. B. 161; 42 L. J. Q. B. 105; 28 L. T. (N. S) 282 496, 510 V. Pritchard, (1818) 2 Swanst. 402; 19 E. E. 87 794 Geipel's Patent, In re, (1903) 2 Ch. 715; (1904) 1 Ch. 239; 73 L. J. Ch. 47 ; 20 E. P. C. 545 ; 21 E P. C. 879 ; 89 L. T. 127 ; 52 W. E. 63 699, 707, 708 Geirionydd Eural Council v. Green, (1908) 6 L. G. E. 733; 72 J. P. 321 343, 395 Gelen v. Hall, (1857) 2 H. & N. 379; 37 L. J. M. C. 78 747 General Accident Insurance Corporation v. Noel, (1902) 1 K. B. 377 ; 71 L. J. K. B. 236 ; 50 W. E. 381 ; 86 L. T. 555 ; 18 T. L. E. 164 • 801, 805 General Commissioners v. Sun Office, (1908) Times Newspaper, Peb. 3 (Supt. Ct. of Jamaica) 450 General Estates Co. v. Beaver, [1914] 3 K. B. 918; 84 L. J. K. B. 21 666 General Havelock, The, (1905) 21 T. L. E. 438 458 General Press Association, Ltd. v. "Our Dogs" Publishing Co., [1917] 2 K B. 125; 86 L. J. K. B. 702— C. A 669 Genner u. Sparks, (1704) 6 Mod. 173 211 Gent, In re, Gent-Davis v. Harris, (1888) 40 Ch. D. 190; 58 L. J. Ch. 162; 60 L. T. 355; 87 W. E. 151 635 George v. Chambers, (1843) 11 M. & W. 149; 12 L. J. M. C. 94 ; 7 Jur. 886; 2 Dowl. (N. S.) 783; 63 E. E. 554 258 V. Skivineton, (1869) L. E. 5 Ex. 1; 39 L. J. Ex. 8; 21 L. T. (N. S.) 495 3, 472, 477, 479-481 George Eoper, The, (1883) 8 P. D. 119; 52 L. J. P. D. & A. 69; 49 L. T. (N. S.) 185 461 Ixii INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Gerard ■;;. Dickenson, (1590) 4 Eep. 18a; 2 Co. Eep. 308 628, 631 Gerhard v. Bates, (1853) 2 B. & B. 476; 22 L. J. Q. B. 364; 17 Jur. 1097 543 Gerhold v. Baker, (1919) 63 Sol. Jo. 135 580 Gerson v. Simpson, (1903) 2 K. B. 197; 72 L. J. K. B. 603; 51 W. R. 610; 87 L. T. 117; 19 T. L. R. 544; 10 Manson, 382 ... 63, 524, 539 Gestetner's Trade Mark, In re, (1908) 1 Ch. 513; (1907) 2 Ch. 478; 76 L. J. Ch. 616; 77 L. J. Ch. 298; 98 L. T. 121; 24 E. P. C. 545; 25 E. P. C. 156 728 Ghikis V. Musurus, (1909) 25 T. L. E. 225 40 Giardelli v. London Welsh S.S. Co. , [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 339— C. A. 106 Gibb V. Chadwick, [1915] 2 K. B. 94; 84 L. J. K. B. 1241— C. A. ... 104 Gibbings v. Hungerford, (1904) 1 Jr. E. 211 149, 339, 375, 428 Gibbins v. British Dyes Co., (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 716— C. A 103 Gibbon v. Dudgeon, (1881) 45 J. P. 748 53 Gibbons v. Lenfestey, (1915) 84 L. J. P. C. 158 ■* 339 Gibbs V. Cruikshank, (1873) L. E. 8 C. P. 454; 42 L. J. C. P. 273; 28 L. T. (N. S.) 735 171, 176, 257 V. Great Western E. Co., (1879) 11 Q. B. D. 22; 12 Q. B. D. 208; 48 L. T. (N. S.) 640; 31 W. E. 722; 32 W. E. 329 94 V. Guild, (1881-2) 8 Q. B. D. 296; 9 Q. B. D. 59; 51 L. J. Q. B. 313; 46 L. T. (N. S.) 248 183, 187 V. Pike, (1842) 9 M. & W. 351; 12 L. J. Ex. 257; 6 Jur. 465; 1 Dowl. (N. S.) 409; 60 E. E. 749 655 Giblan v. National Amalgamated Labourers' Union of Great Britain and Ireland,' (1903) 2 K. B. 600; 72 L. J. K. B. 907; 89 L. T. 386; 18 T. L. R. 500; 19 T. L. E. 708 22, 25,, 57, 76 Giblin v. McMullen, (1868) L. R. 2 P. C. 317; 21 L. T. (N. S.) 214; 17 W. E. 445 454 Gibson v. Ireson, (1842) 3 Q. B. 39; 61 E. E. 138 293 V. Minet, (1791) 1 H. Bl. 569; 3 T. E. 481; 2 Br. C. C. 48; 1 E. E. 754 120 V. Preston (Mayor of), (1870) L. E. 5 Q. B. 218; 39 L. J. Q. B. 131; 22 L. T. (N. S.) 293 30, 32 V. Veasey, (1867) 15 L. T. (N. S.) 586 647 V. Wishart, (1914) 83 L. J. P. C. 321— H. L 106 Gilbert v. Stone, (1647) Aleyn, 35 7 V. Trinity House (Corporation of), (1881) 17 Q. B. D'. 795; 56 L. J. Q. B. 85; 35 W. R. 30 39 Gilding v. Eyre, (1861) 10 C. B. (N. S.) 592; 31 L. J. C. P. 174; 5 L. T. (N. S.) 136 200, 642, 655, 657 Giles V. London County Council, (1904) 68 J. P. 10 ; 2 L. G. R. 326 151, 160, 486, 501, 514 V. Spencer, (1857) 3 C. B. (N. S.) 244; 26 L. J. C. P. 237; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 820 301 V. Taff Vale E. Co., (1853) 2 E. & B. 822 81 V. Walker, (1890) 24 Q. B. D. 656 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 416; 62 L. T. 938; 38 W. E. 782 425, 426, 430 Gill V. Parson, [1907] 2 K. B. 674 •.... 26 Gillard v. Brittan, (1841) 8 M. & W. 575; 1 Dowl. (N. S.) 424 278 Gillette Safety Razor Co. v. A. W. Gamage, Ltd., (1909) 25 T. L. E. 808; 26 E. P. C. 745 711 — V. Luna Safety Razor Co., (1910) 2 Ch. 373; 79 L. J. Ch. 672; 103 L. T. 105; 27 R. P. C. 527 708 Gillagan v. National Bank, (1901) 2 Ir. Rep. 518 275 V. Robb, (1910) S. C. 856; 47 Sc. L. E. 733 (Ct. of Sess.) 148 Gilling V. Gray, (1910) 27 T. L. E. 39 380, 796 Gillingham v. Gwyer, (1867) 16 L. T. (N. S.) 640- 288 Gilman v. Elton, (1821) 3 B. & B. 75 ; 6 Moore, 243; 23 E. E. 567 ... 293 Gilpin V. Fowler, (1854) 9 Ex. 615; 23 L. J. Ex. 152; 18 Jur. 292 584, 588, 611 Gilroy v. Mackie, (1909) S. C. 466; 46 Sc. L. E. 325 (Ct. of Sess.) ... 96" Gingell, Son, and Foskett, Ltd. v. Stepney Borough Council, (1909) A. C. 246; (1908) 1 K. B. 115; (1906) 2 K. B. 468; 75 L. J. K. B. 777; 77 L. J. K. B. 347; 78 L. J. K. B. 673; 73 J. P. 273; 100 L. T. 629; 25 T. L. E. 411; 53 Sol. J. 356; 7 L. G. E. 613 413, 662, 665 INDEX OF CASES. Ixiii PAGE Gisbourn v. Hurst, (1709) 1 Salk. 249 293 Gladstone v. Padwick, (1871) L. E. 6 Ex. 203; 40 L. J. Ex. 154: 25 L. T. (N. S.) 96 774 Gladwell v. Blake, (1834) 1 C. M. & E. 636; 5 Tyr. 186 788, 791 V. Steggall, (1839) 5 Bing. N. C. 733; 8 Scott, 60; 3 Jur. 535; 8 L. J. C. P. 361; 53 E. E. 257 ,... 2 Gladys, The, (1909) 26 T. L. E. 66 460 Glamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Federation, (1903) 2 K. B. 545; 72 L. J. K. B. 893; 89 L. T. 393; 19 T. L E. 708; (1905) A. C. 239; 74 L. J. K. B. 525; 53 W. E. 593; 92 L. T. 710; 21 T. L. E. 441— H. L. {See South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co.) 19, 221, 222, 587 V. Standing Joint Committee, Glamorgan Quarter Sessions and C. C, [1915] 1 K. B. 384; 84 L. J. K. B. 362 205 Glancy v. Watson, [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 40 Sco 98 Glasgow and S. W. E. Co. v. Boyd and Forrest, [1915] A. C. 526; 84 L. J. P. C. 157— H. L 481 Glasgow Corporation v. Lorimer, [1911] A. C. 209; 80 L. J. P. C. • 175; 104 L. T. 354— H. L 74, 86 Glassbrook v. David and Vaux, (1905) 1 K. B. 615 ; 74 L. J. K. B. 492; 53 W. E. 408; 92 L. T.'299; 21 T. L. E. 276 770 Glasscock v. London, Tilbury & Southend E. Co., (1902) 18 T L. E. 295; 19 T. L. E. 305 507' Glasspoole v. Young, (1829) 9 B. & C. 696; 4 M. & E. 533; 7 L. J. K. B. 305; 33 E. E. 294 278, 773 Gledstane v. Hewitt, (1831) 1 C. & J. 565; 1 Tyr. 445 255 Gleeson v. Hurley, [1916] 2 Ir. E. 180 785 Glegg V. Bromley, (1912) 81 L. J. K. B. 334; 105 L. T. 897 54 Glenville v. Selig Polyscope Co., (1911) 27 T. L. E. 554 683 Glenwood Lumber Co. v. Phillips, (1904) A. C. 405; 73 L. J. P. C. 62; 90 L. T. 741; 20 T. L. E. 531 276, 324, 333 Glyn V. Weston Feature Film Co., [1916] 1 Ch. 261; 85 L. J. Ch. 261 684. 691 Glyn, Mills & Co. v. East and West India Dock Co., (1880-2) 6 Q. B. D. 475; 7 App. Cas. 591; 50 L. J. Q. B. 62; 52 L. J. Q. B. 146; 47 L. T. 309 234, 239 Glynn v. Clare County Council, (1910) 2 Ir. E. 666 54 Goby V. Wetherell, [1916] 2 K. B. 674; 84 L. J. K. B. 1455 659 Goddard (J. W.) v. Hyam & J. Goddard, (1918) 35 E. P. C. 21 730 Godlonton v. Fulham and Hampstead Property Co., (1905) 1 K. B. 431; 74 L. J. K. B. 242; 92 L. T. 362; 21 T. L. E. 223 296 Godson V. Home, (1819) 1 B. & B. 7; 3 Mo. 223; 29 E. E. 693 583 Godwin v. Schweppes, Ltd., (1902) 1 Ch. 926; 71 L. J. Ch. 438; 50 W. E. 409; 86 L. T. 377 379 GofE V. Great Northern E. Co., (1861) 3 E. & B. 672; 30 L. J. Q. B. 148; 3 L. T. (N. S.) 850 82 Goffin V. Donnelly, (1880) 6 Q. B. D. 307; 50 L. J. Q. B. 303; 44 L. T. 141 579, 603 Gold Ore Treatment Co. v. Golden Horseshoe Estates Co., (1919) 36 E. P. C. 95— P. C 700 Goldrei Foucard & Son v. Sinclair, [1918] 1 K. B. 180; 87 L. J. K. B. 261— C. A 59 Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells Improvement Commissioners, (1865) L. E. 1 Ch. 349; 35 L. J. Ch. 382; 14 L. T. (N. S.) 154 797 Goldstein v. Foss, (1828) 6 B. & C. 154; 1 M. & P. 402; 9 D. & E. 197; 4 Bing. 489; 2 Y. & J. 146; 29 E. E. 610 563 GoUancz v. Dent, (1903) 88 L. T. 358 695 Gomersall v. Davies, (1898) 14 T. L. E. 430 570 Gompertz v. Levy, (1838) 9 A. & E. 282 ; 1 P. & D. 214 ; 2 Jur. 1013 564 Gonsky v. Durrell, [1918] 2 K. B. 71; 87 L. J. K. B. 836— C. A. ... 300 Goodbody v. Poplar Borough Council, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1230 ... 409 Goodfellow V. Prince, (1887) 35 Ch. D. 9; 56 L. J. Ch. 545 ; 56 L. T. 617 736 Goodhart v. Hyett, (1883) 25 Ch. D. 182 137, 138 Goodlet V. Caledonian E. Co., (1902) 39 S. L. E. 759 (Ct. of Sess.) ... 102 Goodman v. Boycott, (1862) 2 B. & S. 1 ; 31 L. J. Q. B. 69 ; 8 Jur. (N. S.) 763 ; 256 Ixiv INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Goodtitle v. Tombs, (1770) 3 Wils. 118 356 Goodwyn v. Cheveley, (1859) 4 H. & N. 631; 28 L. J. Ex. 298; 33 L. T. (N. S.) 284 316, 444 Gordon v. Harper, (1796) 7 T. E. 9; 2 Esp. 465; 4 E. E. 369 262 V. McHardy, (1903) 6 P. 210 (Ct. of Bess.) 163, 472, 479 i;. Mackenzie, [1913] S. C. 109 Sco 448 V. Street, (1899) 2 Q. B. 641; 69 L. J. Q. B. 45; 48 W. E. 158; 81 L. T. 237; 15 T. L. E. 445 532 Gorman v. Moss Empires, Ltd., [1913] S. C. 1, Sco 615, 635, 641 Gorris v. Scott, (1874) L. E. 9 Ex. 125; 48 L. J. Ex. 92; 30 L. T. 431 28 Gorton v. Falkner, (1792) 4 T. E. 567; 2 E. E. 463 299, 300 Gosden v. Elphick, (1849) 4 Ex. 445; 13 L. J. Ex. 9; 13 Jur. 989 ^ 127, 197 Goalin v. Corry, (1844) 7 M. & G. 342; 8 Scott, N. E. 21 617 Gosnell v. Aerated Bread Co., (1894) 10 T. L. E. 661 398 Gotobed v. Petchell, [1914] 2 K. B. 36; 83 L. J. K. B. 429— C. A. ... 106 D. Wool, (1817) 1 M. & S. 128 257 Gould V. Birkenhead Corporation, (1910) 74 J. P. 105; {sub. nam. Gouldson V. Birkenhead Corporation) 8 L. G. E. 395 ... 83, 151, 388 V. Bradatock, (1812) 4 Taunt. 562 291 Governors of Bristol Poor v. Wait. See Bristol Poor (Governors of) V. Wait. Gower v. Couldridge and others, (1898) 1 Q. B. 848; 67 L. J. Q. B. 25^:; 77 L. T. 707; 46 W. E. 214; 14 T. L. E. 165 61 Grace v. Morgan, (1836) 2 Bing. N. C. 584; 2 Scott, 790 144 Gracey v. Banbridge Urban Council, (1^905) 2 Ir. Eep. 209 663 V. Belfast Tramways Co., (1901) 2 Ir. Eep. 322 75, 83 Gracie v. Clyde Shipping Co., [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 354r-C. A. ... 99 Grafton (Duke) v. Hilliard, (1736) cited in Attorney-General v. Cleaver, (1811) 18 Vesey, 219 385 Graham v. Barr, [1913] S. C. 538, Sco 103 V. Peat, (1801) 1 East, 244; 6 E. E. 268 323 Grainger v. Hill, (1838) 4 Bing. N. C. 212 194, 237, 667 Gramophone Co. v. Magazine Holder Co., (1910) 104 L. T. 259; 28 E. P. C. 221 „.. 696, 703 Grand Hotel Co. of Caledonia Springs v. Wilson, (1904) A. C. 103; 73 L. J. P. C. 1 ; 52 W. E. 286 ; 89 L. T. 456 ; 20 T. L. E. 19 ; 21 E. P. C. 117 726, 732 Grand Hotel, Eastbourne, Ltd. v. White, (1914) 84 L. J. Ch. 938— H. L 341 Grand Junction Canal Co. v. Shugar, (1871) L. E. 6 Ch. 483; 24 L. T. (N. S.) 402; 19 W. E. 569 374, 422 Grand Trunk Eailway of Canada v. Barnett, (1911) A. G. 361; 80 L. J. P. C. 117; 104 L. T. 362; 27 T. L. E. 359 464 V. McAlpine, [1913] A. C. 838 ; 83 L. J. P. C. 44— P. C. 499, 502, 503 V. Eobinson, [1915] A. C. 740; 84 L. J. P. C. 194^P. C 406 Grange v. Siloock, (1897) 77 L. T. 340; 18 Cox, C. 0. 644; 61 J. P. 709; 13 T. L. E. 565; 46 W. E. 221 446 Granger v. George, (1826) 5 B. & C. 149; 7 D. & E. 729; 29 E. E. 196 186 Grant v. Fleming, [1914] S. C. 228 Sco '.... 491 V. Glasgow & S. W. E. Co., (1908) S. C. 187 (Ct of Sess.) ... 102 V. Moser, (1843) 5 M. & G. 123; 12 L. J. 0. P. 146; 7 Jur. 854; 6 Sc. N. E. 46; 2 Dowl. (N. S.) 293; 63 E. E. 236 203 0. Secretary of State for India, (1877) 2 C. P. D. 445; 46 L J C. P. 681; 37 L. T. (N. S.) 188 580 V. Thompson, (1895) 72 L. T. 264 660 Granville & Co. v. Firth, (1903) 88 L. T. 9; 72 L. J. K. B 152- 19 T. L. E. 213 656 Gray v. Heathcote, [1918] W. N. 147 400 V. Pnllen, (1864) 5 B. & S. 970; 34 L. J. Q. B. 265; 11 L. T. 569 115 V. Stait, (1879) 11 Q. B. D. 668; 52 L. J. Q. B. 412; 49 L. T. 288 289, 290 Great Central E. Co. v. Hewlett, [1916] 2 A. C. 511— H. L 393 INDEX OF CASES. IxV PAGE Great Eastern E. Co. v. Goldslnid, (1884) 9 App. Caa. 927 ; 33 W. E. 81 663, 665 and London County Council, In re, (1908) 72 J. P. 1; 71 J. P. 95; 98 L. T. 116; 95 L. T. 803; 5 L. G. E. 162 387 Great Southern and Western Eailway v. Gooding, (1908) 2 Ir. E. 429, K. B. D 751 Great Western E. Co. i'. Bennett, (1867) L. E. 2 H. L. 27 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 133; 16 L. T. 186; 15 W. E. 647 424 V. Carpalla United China Clay Co., (1909) 1 Ch. 218; 78 L. J. Ch. 105; 77 L. J. Ch. 673; 99 L. T. 869; 73 J. P. 23; 25 T. L. E. 91 424 Greaves, In re, (1881) 18 Ch. D. 551 187 Green v. Button, (1835) 2 C. M. & E. 707; 1 Tyr. & G. 118; 1 Gale, 349; 5 L. J. Ex. 81; 41 E. E. 818 626 V. Chapman, (1837) 4 Bing. N. C. 92 ; 5 Scott, 340; 44 E. E. 652 598 V. Chelsea Waterworks Co., (1894) 10 T. L. E. 259 403 V. Duckett, (1879) 11 Q. B. D. 275; 52 L. J. Q. B. 435; 48 L. T. (N. S.) 677 306 V. Dunn, (1811) 3 Camp. 215, n 243 V. Goddard, (1704) 2 Salk. 641 157, 190, 323, 331, 338 V. Irish Independent Co., (1899) 1 Ir. E. 386 696 V. London General Omnibus Co., (1859) 7 C. B. (N. S.) 290; 29 L. J. C. P. 13; 1 L. T. 95 ; 8 W. E. 88 57 Greening v. Wilkinson, (1825) 1 C. & P. 625; 28 E. E. 790 272 Greenlands, Ltd. v. Wilmshurst, [1913] 3 K. B. 507 ; 83 L. J. K. B. 1— C. A 188, 578, 581, 586 Greenock Corporation r. Caledonian E. Co., [1917] A. C. 556— H. L. 450 Greenock Steamship Co. v. Maritime Insurance Co., (1903) 1 K. B. 367; 2 K. B. 657; 72 L. J. K. B. 59, 868; 52 W. E. 186; 89 L. T. 200; 19 T. L. E. 107, 680; 9 Com. Cas. 41; 9 Asp. M. C. bo4, 463 458 Green's Application, In re, (1911) 1 Ch. 754; 80 L. J. Ch. 484; 104 L. T. 629; 28 E. P. C. 423 710 Greenway v. Fisher, (1824) 1 C. & P. 190 251 Greenwell v. Howell, (1900) 1 Q. B. 535; 69 L. J. Q. 3. 461; 48 W. E. 307; 82 L. T. 183; 16 T. L. E. 130, 235 182 V. Low Beechburn Coal Co., (1897) 2 Q. B. 165 417 Greenwood, In re, (1855) 24 L. J. Q. B. 148 212, 213 Gregory v. Brunswick (Duke), (1843) 1 C. & E. 24; 6 M. & G. 205, 953; 6 Scott, N. E. 809; 1 D. & L. 518; 13 L. J. C. P. 34; 64 E. E. 759 22, 608 V. (1844) 6 M. & G. 953; 8 Jur. 148; 1 D. & L. 803; 7 So. N. E. 972; 64 E. E. 897 554 V. Cotterell, (1855) 6 E. & B. 571; 25 L. J. Q. B. 33; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 16 761 V. Derby, (1839) 8 C. & P. 749 637 V. Hill, (1799) 8 T. E. 299 158, 331 V. Hurrill, (1826) 5 B. & C. 341; 8 Moore, 189; 1 Bing. 824 ... 180 0. Piper, (1829) 9 B. & C. 591; 4 M. & E. 500; 33 E. E. 268 ... 8, 337 Greta Holme, The, (1896) P. 192; 66 L. J. P. 166— C. A 273, 277 Greyvensteyn v. Hattingh, (1911) A. C. 356; 80 L. J. P. C. 158; 104 L. T. 360; 27 T. L. E. 358 430 Griffin V. Coleman, (1859) 4 H. & N. 265; 28 L. J. Ex. 134 195, 206, 784, 787 - V. Scott, (1727) 2 Lord Eaym. 1424 304 Griffith V. Clay, (1912) 1 Ch. 291; 106 L. T. 68 378 V. Taylor, (1876) 6 C. P. D. 194 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 15 ; 36 L. T. 5 202, 209 Griffiths V. Benn, (1911) 27 T. L. E. 346 560, 627 V. Lewis, (1845) 7 Q. B. 61; 14 L. J. Q. B. 370; 9 Jur. 370 ... 590 - V. London and St. Katharine Dock Co., (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 259; 53 L. J. Q. B. 504; 51 L. T. (N. S.) 533 88, 92, 515 V. Eobins, [1917] W. C. & Ins. E. 44 105 V. Teetgen, (1854) 15 C. B. 344; 24 L. J. C. P. 35 ; 1 Jur. (N. S.) 426 226 Grill V. General Iron Screw Colliery Co., (1866) L. E. 1 C. P. 612; 35 L. J. C. P. 321; 14 L. T. (N. S.) 711 454 C.T. 6 Ixvi INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Grime v. Fletcher, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 847— C. A 105 Grimes v. Lovel, (1698) 12 Mod. 242 ....^ .• 555 Grimwood v. Moss, (1872) L. E. 7 C. P. 360; 41 L. J. Ch. 239; 27 L. T. 268 284 Grinham v Willey, (1859) 4 H. & N. 496; 28 L. J. Ex. 242; 7 W. B. 463 198 Grinnell v. Wells, (1844) 7 M. & G. 1033; 14 L. J. C. P. 19; 8 Jur. 1101; 8 Sc. N. E. 741; 2 D. & L. 610; 66 E. E. 835 220, 225 Groenvelt v. Burwell, (1699) 1 Lord Eaym. 454 744 Grovehurst, The, (1910) P. 316; 79 L. J. P. 124; 103 L. T. 239 459 Groves v. Weslern Mansions, Ltd., (1917) 33 T. L. E. 76 475 V. Wimborne (Lord), (1898) 2 Q. B. 402; 67 L. J. Q, B. 862; 79 L. T. 284; 47 W. E. 87; 14 T. L. E. 493— C. A. ... 29, 92, 105 Grunnell v. Welch, (1905) 2 K. B. 650; (1906) 2 K. B. 555; 74 L. J. K. B. 925; 75 L. J. K. B. 657; 54 W. B. 581; 95 L. T. 238; 22 T. L. E. 688 285, 287, 290 Guest V. Warren, (1854) 9 Ex. 379; 23 L. J. Ex. 121; 18 Jur. 133 ... 172 Guest's Estates v. Milner's Safes, (1911) 28 T. L. E. 59 166 Gulliver v. Cosens, (1845) 1 C. B. 788; 14 L. J. C. P. 215; 9 Jur. 666 285 Gumble v. Preston, [1914] 1 K. B. 270; 83 L. J. K. B. 347 273 Gunter v. Astor, (1819) 4 Moore, 12; 21 E. E. 733 229 V. James, (1908) 72 J. P. 448; 24 T. L. E. 868; 6 L. G. E. 1138 114, 404, 433, 444 Guthrie v. Kinghorn, [1913] S. C. 1155, Sco 103 Gutsole V. Mathers, (1836) 1 M. & W. 495; 2 Gale, 64; 5 Dowl. P. C. 69 554, 625, 627 Gutta Percha and Eubber Manufacturing Co. of Toronto, In re, (1909) 2 Ch. 10; 78 L. J. Ch. 427 ; 100 L. T. 756; 26 E. P. G. 428 ... 727 Guy V. Churchill, (1888) 40 Ch. D. 481; 58 L. J. Ch. 345; 60 L. T. 473; 37 W. E. 504 659 Gwilliam v. Twi&t, (1895) 1 Q. B. 557 ; 2 Q. B. 84; 64 L. J. Q. B. 474; 72 L. T. 679; 43 W. E. 566 80 Gwinnell v. Earner, (1875) L. E. 10 C. P. 658; 32 L. T. (N. S.) 835 343, 392, 414, 417, 440 Gwynn v. South Eastern E. Co., (1868) 18 L. T. (N. S.) 738 ... 573, 574 Gyles V. Wilcox, (1740) 2 Atk. 141 694 Haddan v. Lott, (1854) 15 C. B. 411 625 Haddrick v. Heslop, (1848) 12 Q. B. 267; 17 L. J. Q. B. 313; 12 Jur. 600 650, 652 Hadley v. Perks, (1866) L. E. 1 Q. B. 444; 35 L. J. M. C. 177; 14 L. T. (N. S.) 325 784 Hadwell v. Eighton, (1907) 2 K. B. 345 ; 76 L. J. K. B. 891 ; 71 J. P. 499; 97 L. T. 133; 23 T. L. E. 548; 5 L. G. E. 881— D. C. ... 441 Hadwin v. Shepherd, [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 503 104 Haggard v. Pelicier Frferes, (1892) A. C. 61; 61 L. J. P. C. 19; 65 L. T. 769 747 Haggenmacher's Patent, In re, (1898) 2 Ch. 280; 67 L. J. Ch. 675; 15 E. P. C. 431 700 Hague V. Doncaster Eural District Council, (1909) 100 L. T. 121; 73 J. P. 69; 25 T. L. E. 130; 53 Sol. J. 135; 7 L. G. E. 129— D. C 181 Haigh V. Aerated Bread Co., (1916) 85 L. J. K. B. 880 568 V. West, (1893) 2 Q. B. 19; 62 L. J. Q. B. 532; 69 L. T. 165 ... 322 Hailes v. Marks, (1861) 7 H. & N. 56; 30 L. J. Ex. 389; 7 Jur. (N. S.) 851 650 Hailsham Cattle Market v. Tolman, [1915] 2 Ch. 1; 84 L. J. Ch. 607— C. A 663 Hailstone, In re, Hopkinson r. Carter, (1910) 102 L. T. 877 796 Haines, ■;;. Eoberts, (1857) 7 E. & B. 625; 27 L. J. Ex. 49; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 886 439 Haire v. Wilson, (1829) 9 B. & C. 643; 4 M. & E. 605; 7 L. J. K. B. 302; 33 E. E. 284 S49 Hales V. Kerr, (1908) 2 K. B. 601; 77 L. J. K. B. 870; 99 L. T. 364; 24 T. L. E. 779 466, 494 INDEX OF CASKS. Ixvii PAGE Halestrap v. Gregory, (1895) 1 Q. B. 561 ; 64" L. J. Q. B. 415 ; 72 L. T. 292; 43 W. E. 507 146 Hall V. Barrows, (1863) 4 De G. J. & S. 150; 33 L. J. Ch. 204; 9 L. T. (N. S.) 561 741 V. Booth, (1834) 3 N. & M. 316; 40 E. E. 458 210 V. Dean, (1600) Cro. Eliz. 841 258 . u. Harding, ^768) 4 Burr. 2426; 1 W. Bl. 678 316 V. Hollander, (1825) 4 B. & C. 660; 7 D. & E. 138; 4 L. J. K. B. 39; 28 E. E. 437 224 and Wife v. Lees and others, (1904) 2 K. B. 602; 73 L. J. K. B. 819; 91 L. T. 20; 53 W. R. 17; 20 T. L. E. 678 75 V. Norfolk (Duke of), (1900) 2 Ch. 493; 69 L. J. Ch. 571; 64 J. P. 710; 48 W. E. 565; 82 L. T. 836; 16 T. L. E. 443 174, 184, 414, 417 V. North Eastern E. Co., (1885) 1 T. L. E. 359 94 V. Nottingham, (1875) 1 Ex. D. 1; 45 L. J. Ex. 50; 33 L. T. (N. S.) 697 ...; 345 V. Semple, (1682) 3 F. & E. 337 215 Halley, The, (1868) L. E. 2 P. C. 193; 27 L. J. Adm. 33; 18 L. T. (N. S.) 879 68, 123 Halliday v. Holgate, (1868) L. E. 3 Ex. 299; 37 L. J. Ex. 174; 17 W. E. 13 263 Halsey v. Brotherhood, (1880-2) 15 Ch. D. 514; 19 Ch. D. 386; 49 L. J. Ch. 786; 51 L. J. Ch. 233; 43 L. T. (N. S.) 366; 45 L. T. 640 630 Hambro v. Burnand, (1904) 2 K. B. 10; (1903) 2 K. B. 399; 72 L. J. K. B. 662; 73 L. J. K. B. 669; 52 W. E. 583; 90 L. T. 803; 20 T. L. E. 398; 9 Com. Cas. 251 65, 74, 85, 534 Hamilton v. Clancy, [1914] 2 Ir. E. 514 29 — — V. Long, (1905) 2 Ir. E. 552; (1908) Ir. E. 2 K. B. 407 ... 224, 227 Hamlyn.-y. Houston & Co., (1903) 1 K. B. 81; 72 L. J. K. B. 72; 87 L. T. 500; 51 W. E. 99; 18 T. L. E. 631; 19 T. L. R. 66 ... 229 Hammack v. White, (1862) 11 C. B. (N. S.) 588; 31 L. J. C. P. 129; 5 L. T. (N. S.) 676 455, 458 Hammersmith E. Co, v. Brand, (1868-9) L. E. 4 H. L. 171 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 265; 21 L. T. 238 403, 404 Hammerton v. Dysart (Earl of), (1915) 85 L. J. Ch. 33— H. L 667 Hammond v. St. Pancras (Vestry of), (1874) L. E. 9 C. P. 316; 43 L. J. C. P. 157; 30 L. T. (N. S.) 296 35 Hamond v. Howell, (1677) 2 Mod. 218 754 Hampstead Garden Suburb v. Denbow, (1913) 77 J. P. 318 392 Hancock v. Austin, (1863) 14 C. B. ( N. S.) 634; 32 L. J. C. P. 262; 8 L. T. (N. S.) 429 282 V. Somes, (1859) 1 E. & E. 795 ; 28 L. J. M. G. 196 ; 5 Jur. (N. S.) QQQ YJQ V. SteYe^l'iiQlsrsi'T'/iiyKisi^C.Ar... '...'. 345 Handcock v. Baker, (1800) 2 B. & P. 260 ; 5 E. E. 587 206, 783 Hankinson v. Bilby, (1847) 16 M. & W. 442; 2 C. & K. 440 562 Hannam v. Mockett, (1824) 2 B. & C. 934; 4 D. & E. 518; 2 L. J. K. B. 183; 26 E. E. 591 443 Hanson v. Waller, (1901) 1 Q. B. 390; 70 L. J. Q. B. 231; 49 W. E. 445; 84 L. T. 91; 17 T. L. E. 162 81, 82, 205, 635 Hanson's Trade Mark, In re, (1887) 37 Ch. D. 112; 57 L. J. Ch. 173; 57 L. T. 859 738 Hanway v. Boultbee, (1830) 1 Moo. & E. 15; 4 C. & P. 350 209 Hapelman v. Poole, (1908) 25 T. L. E 155— C. A 97 Harberton, The, [1913] P. 149; 83 L. J. P. 20 460 Hardaker v. Idle District Council, (1896) 1 Q. B. 335; 74 L. T. 69 66, 112, 115, 147 Hardcastle v. South Yorkshire R. Co., (1859) 4 H. & N. 67 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 139; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 150 389, 390 Hardman v. Bellhouse, (1842) 9 M. & W. 596; 11 L. J. Ex. 135 169 Hardy v. Eyle, (1829) 9 B. & C. 603; 4 M. & E. 296 188, 185 Hare and Meller's Case, (1586) 3 Leo. 163 595 V. Bickley, (1577) Plowd. 526 328 Hargrave v. Le Breton, (1769) 4 Burr. 2423 625, 629 Ixviii INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Hargroves, Aronson & Co. v. Hartopp and another, (1905) 1 K. B. 472 ; 74 L. J. K. B. 233 ; 53 W. R. 262 ; 92 L. T. 414 ; 21 T. L. E. 226 439 Harman v. Tappenden, (1801) 1 East, 555; 3 Esp. 278; 6 R. R. 340 ... 58 Harmar v. Playne, (1809) Dav. P. C. 311; 11 Bast, 101; 14 Ves. 133 706 Harper i;. Godsell, (1870) L. R. 5 Q. B. 422; 39 L. J. Q. B. 185; 18 W. R. 954 248- V. Harper, [1916] 2 K. B. 811— C. A 101 ■ V. Kalem Co., (1909) 109 Federal Reports (America) 61 683 V. Luffkin, (1827) 7 B. & C. 387; 1 M. & R. 166; 6 L. J. K. B. 23; 31 R. R. 236 226 Harpur v. Swansea Corporation, [1913] A. C. 597; 82 L J. K. B. 1208— H. L 407 Harrington (Earl of) v. Derby Corporation, (1905) 1 Ch. 206 ; 69 J. P. 62; 92 L. T. 153; 21 T. L. E. 98; 3 L. G. R. 321 183, 384 Harris v. Brisco, (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 504; 55 L. J. Q. B. 423; 55 L. T. 14 659 V. Butler, (1837) 2 M. & W. 539; M. & H. 117; 1 Jur. 608; 6 L. J. Ex. 133; 46 R. R. 695 225 V. Chesterfield (Earl), (1911) A. C. 623; 80 L. J. Ch. 626; 105 L. T. 453; 55 Sol. J. 686; 27 T. L. R. 548 662 V. Dignum, (1860) 29 L. J. Ex. 23 198 V. Fiat Motors, Ltd., (1907). 23 T. Iv. E. 504; 22 T. L. R. 556. ..67, 109 V. Flower, (1905) 74 L. J. Ch. 127; 91 L. T. 816; 90 L. T. 669; 21 T. K E. 13; 20 T. L. R. 501 321, 341 V. Harrison, (1914) 111 L. T. 534; 12 L. G. R. 1304; 78 J. P. 398; 30 T. L. R. 532— D. C ; 164 u. James, (1876) 45 L. J. Q. B. 545 418 V. Mobbs, (1878) 3 Ex. D. 268; 39 L. T. 164; 27 W. R. 154 ... 390 V. Perry, (1903) 2 K. B. 219; 72 L J. K. B. 725; 89 L. T. 174; 19 T. L. R. 537; 388, 470, 474, 489 u. Quine, (1869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 653 124, 180 V. Reynolds, (1845) 7 Q. B. 71; 14 L. J. Q. B. 241; 9 Jur. 808 •■• 170 V. Rothwell, (1887) 35 Oh. D. 416 ; 56 L. J. Ch. 459-; 56 L. T. 552 701 V. Taylor, [1915] 2 K. B. 580; 84 L. J. K. B. 1889— C. A 171 V. Thompson, (1853) 13 C. B. 333 582, 587, 592 Harrison v. Anderston Foundry Co., (1876) 1 App. Cas. 574 707 V. Barry (1819) 7 Price, 690; 21 E. E. 781 779 V. Bevington, (1838) 8 C. & P. 708 64 '■ V. Blackburn, (1864) 17 C. B. (N. S.) 678; 34 L. J. C. P. 109; 11 L. T. 453 355 v. Bush, (1855) 5 E. & B. 344; 25 L J. Q. B. 25 ; 1 Jur. (N. S.) 846 585, 595 V. Ford, [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 272— C. A 102 V. Pearce, (1858) 1 F. & F. 567; 32 L. T. (0. S.) 298 ... 617, 623, 624 — - V. Eutland (Duke of), (1893) 1 Q. B. 142; 62 L. J. Q. B. 117; 68 L. T. 35; 41 W. E. 322 342, 343 V. Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co., (1891) 2 Ch. 409; 60 L. J. Ch. 630; 64 L. T. 864 16, 385 V. Thornborough, (1713) 10 Mod. 196 562, 563 Harrold v. Watney, (1898) 2 Q. B. 320; 67 L. J. Q. B. 771; 78 L. T. 788; 46 W. E. 642; 14 T. L. E. 486 10, 113, 509 Harrop v. Hirst, (1868) L. E 4 Ex. 43; 38 L. J. Ex. 1; 19 L. T. 426 137, 138 Hart V. Aldridge, (1774) Cowp. 54 221 V. Basset, (1681) T. Jones, 156 386 V. Cory Bros. [1915] W. N. 369 106 ■!;. .Gumpach, (1872) L E. 4 P. C. 439; 42 L. J. P. C. 25; 21 W. E. 365 580 ■ V. Leach, (1836) 1 M. & W. 560; 2 Gale, 172; Tyr. & G. 1010; 5 L. J. Ex. 244; 46 R. R. 399 311 V. Marylebone Borough Council, [1915] 76 J. P. 257 181 V. Rogers (1915) 32 T. L. R. 150 438, 439 V. Wall, (1877) 2 C. P. D. 146; 46 L. J. C. P. 227; 25 W. R. 373 566, 626 Hart's Trade Mark, In re, (1902) 2 Ch. 621 ; 71 L. J. Ch. 869; 87 L. T. 426; 51 WR. 107; 18 T. L. R. 778; 19 R. C. P. 569 736 INDEX OF CASES. Ixix PAGE Hartley v. Herring, (1799) 8 T. E. 130 'U4 V. Hindiparsh, (1866) L. E. 1 C. P. 553; 35 L. J. C. P. 254; 14 W. E. 862 179 V. Moxham, (1842) 3 Q. B. 701 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 41 ; 6 Jur. 946 ; 3 G. & D. 1; 61 E. E. 359 246 V. Eochdale Corporation, (1908) 2 K. B. 594; 77 L. J. K. B. 884; 72 J. P. 343; 99 L. T. 275; 24 T. L. E. 625; 6 L. G. E. 858— D. C : 393 Harvey v. Brydges, (1845) 14 M. & W. 437 193, 330, 331 V. Harvey, (1884) 26 Ch. D. 644 784 V. Mayne, (1872) I. E. 6 C. L. 417 158 i;. Pooock, (1843) 11 M. & W. 740; 12 L. J. Ex. 434; 63 E. E. 741 .- 303 Harwood v. Great Northern E. Co., (1864-5) 11 H. L. 0. 654; 35 L. J. Q. B. 27; 12 L. T. 771— H. L 699 V. Wyken Colliery Co., [1913] 2 K. B. 158; 82 L. J. K. B. 414— C. A 99 Haskell Golf Ball Co. v. Hutchinson and Main, (1904) 20 T. L. E. 606; 21 E. P. C. 497 712 Hastings (Lord) v. North Eastern E. Co., (1898) 2 Ch. 674; (1899) 1 Ch. 656 ; (1900) A. C. 260 ; 68 L. J. Ch. 315 ; 69 L. J. Ch. 516 ; 82 L. T. 429; 16 T. L. E. 825 410 Hatch V. Hale, (1850) 15 Q. B. 10; 19 L. J. Q. B. 289; 14 Jur. 459... 287 Hatchard v. Mfege, (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 771; 56 L. J. Q. B. 397; 56 L. T. 662 48 Hatmaker v. Nathan & Co. (1919) 36 E. P. C. 231— H. L 707 Hatschek's Patent, In re, Zerenner, Ex parte, (1909) 2 Ch. 68; 78 L. J. Ch. 404; 25 T. L. E. 457; 100 L. T. 809; 26 E. P. C. 228 710 Havana, The, Richelieu and Ontario Navigation Co. v. Taylor, (1910) A. C. 170; 79 L. J. C. P. 65; 101 L. T. 501; 11 Asp. M. C. 315 459 Haward v. Bowsell and Matthews, [1914] W. C. & Jns. E. 314— C. A. 101, 102 Hawes v. Knowles, (1874) 114 Mass. 518 143 V. Watson, (1824) 2 B. & C. 540; 4 D. & E. 22; E. & M. 6; 2 L. J. K. B. 83; 26 E. E. 448 269 Hawkins v. Walrond, (1876) 1 C. P. D. 280; 45 L. J. C. P. 772; 35 L T 210 . 309 Hawley c. Steele, (1877) 6 Ch. D. 521 ; 46 l!'j. Ch. 782; 37'l. T. 625 379, 405 Hawtayne v. Bourne, (1841) 7 M. & W. 595; 10 L. J. Ex. 224; 5 Jur. 118; 56 E. E. 806 81 Hawthorn Corporation v. Kannuluik, (1906) A. C. 105 ; 75 L. J. P. C. 7 ; 54 W. E. 285 ; 93 L. T. 644 ; 22 T. L. E. 28 ; affirming 29 Victoria L. E. 308 429 Haycraft v. Creasy, (1801) 2 East, 92; 6 E. E. 380 534 Hayes v. King's County C. C, [1917] 2 Ir. E. 496 182 V. Smith, (1825) Sm. & Bat. 378 121 Hayn, Eoman & Co. v. CuUiford, (1879) 4 C. P. D. 182 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 372; 40 L. T. (N. S.) 536 2, 14, 369 Haynes v. Davis, [1916] 1 K. B. 332; 84 L. J. K. B. 441 751 V. De Beck, (1915) 31 T. L. E. 115 570 V. Eord, (1911) 2 Ch. 237; 80 L. J. Oh. 490; 104 L. T. 696; 75 J. P. 401; 27 T. L. E. 416; 9 L. G. E. 702 664 Hayward v. Drury Lane Theatre, Ltd., [1917] 2 K. B. 899— C. A. ... 91 V. West Leigh Colliery Co., [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 21— C. A. 101 Hazeldine v. Grove, (1842) 3 Q. B. 997 ; 12 L. J. M. C. 54; 7 Jur. 262 129 Hazlemere, The, (1911) P. 69; 80 L. J. P. 25; 103 L. T. 890; 11 Asp. M. C. 536— C. A 460 Head v. Briscoe, (1833) 5 C. & P. 484; 38 E. E. 841 47 Headland v. Coster, (1905) 1 K. B. 219; (1906) A. C. 286; 74 L. J. K. B. 210; 75 L. J. K. B. 483; 70 J. P. 249; 94 L. T. 582; 22 T. L. E. 441; 4 L. G. E. 689 311, 319, 770 Heald v. Carey, (1852) 11 0. B. 977; 21 L. J. C. P. 97; 16 Jur. 197 ... 239, •^ 246 Healey v. Healey, [1915] 1 K. B. 938; 84 L. J. K. B. 1454 47 Heap V. Hartley, (1889) 42 Ch. D. 461 717 Heapy, T., In re, (1888) 22 L. R. Ir. 500 152 Ixx INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Heirne v. Stowell, (1840) 12 A. & B. 719; 4 P. & D. 696; 6 Jur. 458; • 11 L. J. Q. B. 25; 54 E. E. 663 567, 595 Heath v. Brighton Corporation, (1908) 98 L. T. 718; 72 J. P. 225; 24 T. L. E. 414 379, 798 V. Deane, (1905) 2 Ch. 86; 74 L. J. Ch. 466; 92 L. T. 643; 21 T. L. E. 404 137, 164 V. Heape, (1856) 1 H. & N. 478; 26 L. J. M. C. 49 652 V. Hubbard, (1803) 4 East, 110; 4 Esp. 205 248 V. Eollason, (1898) A. C. 499; (1898) 1 Ch. 287 ; 67 L. J. Ch. 100, 565; 79 L. T. 1 ; 14 T. L. E. 71, 478; 14 E. P. C. 909; 15 E. P. C. 441 695, 696 V. Unwin, (1852) 12 C. B. 522; 22 I/. J. C. P. 7 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 8 711 Heath's Garage, Ltd. v. Hodges, [1915] W. N. 890; 32 T. L. E. 134; affirmed, [1915] 2 K. B. 370— C. A 440, 441 Hesiton V. Goldney, (1910) 1 K. B. 754 ; 79 L. J. K. B. 541 ; 102 L. T. 451; 26 T. L. E. 383; 54 Sol. J. 391 564 Heaven v. Crutohley, (1904) 68 J. P. 53; 1 L. G. E. 473 753 V. Pender, (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 503: 52 L. J. Q. B. 702 ; 49 L. T. 357 467—469, 474, 476, 477, 481, 490, 544 Hebditch v. Mcllwaine, (1894) 2 Q. B. 54; 63 L. J. Q. B. 587; 70 L. T. 826; 42 W. E. 422 570, 571, 585, 586 Hecla Foundry Co. v. Walker, Hunter & Co., (1889) 14 App. Cas. 560 696 Hector, The, (1883) 8 P. D. 218; 52 L. J. P. D. & A. 51; 48 L. T. 890 510 Hedges i). Chapman, (1825) 2 Bing. 523 212 V. Tagg, (1872) L. E. 7 Ex. 283; 41 L. J. Ex. 169; 20 W. E. 976 227 Hedley v. Piukney and Sons' Steamship Co., (1892) 1 Q. B. 58; (1894) A. C. 222; 61 L. J. Q. B. 179; 66 L. T. 71 89 Heffeman v. Secretary of State for War, [1918] 2 Ir. 466— C. A 103 Hegan v. Carolan, [1916] 2 Ir. E. 27 337 V. Johnson, (1809) 2 Taunt. 148 283 Hegarty v. Shine, (1878) 14 Cox, C. C. 124, 125 193, 493 Heiton & Co. v. McSweeney, (1905) 2 Ir. E. (K. B. D.) 47 74, 76, 80 Hellawell v. Eastwood, (1851) 6 Ex. 295; 20 L. J. Ex. 154 298 Hellwig V. Mitchell, (1910) 1 K. B. 609; 79 L. J. K. B. 270; 102 L. T. 110; 26 T. L. E. 244 555 Helsham v. Blackwood, (1851) 11 C. B. Ill; 20 L. J. C. P. 187; 15 Jur. 861 574 Helsham Jones v. Hennen and Co., (1915) 84 L. J. Ch. 569 185 HemmingB v. Gasson, (1858) E. B. & E. 346; 27 L. J. Q. B. 252; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 834 614 Hemmings and Wife v. Stoke Pogis Golf Club, [1920] 1 K. B. 720— ' C. A 330 Hemsworth Eural Council i;. Micklethwaite, (1904) 68 J. P. 16, 345; 2 L. G. E. 1084 395 Henderson's Patent, In re, (1901) A. C. 616; 70 L. J. P. C. 119; 55 L. T. 358; 17 T. L. E. 676; 18 E. P. C. 449 709 Henderson v. Broomhead, (1859) 4 H. & N. 569; 28 L. J. Ex. 360; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 1175 577 V. Preston, (1888) 21 Q B. D. 362; 57 L. J. Q. B. 607; 59 L. T. 334 760 V. Williams, (1896) 1 Q. B. 521 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 308 ; 72 L. T. 98 ; 43 W. E. 274 239, 269, 272 Hendriks v. Montagu, (1881) 17 Ch. D. 638 731 Hendry, Ex parte, Von Weissenfeld, In re, (1892) 36 S. J. 276 792 Henly v. Lyme Eegis (Mayor of), (1834) 5 Bing. 91 ; 3 B. & Ad. 77; 3 M. & P. 278; 1 B. N. C. 222; 1 8c. 29; 8 Bl. (N. S.) 690; 2 CI. & E. 331; 37 E. E. 125 27 Hennessy v. Keating, (1908) 1 Ir. B. 43 ; 24 T. L. E. 534 ; 25 E. P. C. 125, 361 735 V. Wright, (1888) 21 Q. B. D. 609; 57 L. J. Q. B. 530; 59 L. T. 323 580 Henshaw v. Fielding, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 326— C. A 106 Henwood v. Harrison, (1872) L. E. 7 C. P. 606; 41 L. J. C. P. 206; 26 L. T. 938 682, 596, 606 INDEX OF CASES. Ixxi PAGE Hepburn v. Lordan, (1865) 2 H. & M. 345; 34 L. J. Ch. 293; 11 Jur. (N. S.) 132 798 Herbert v. Fox (Samuel) & Co., [1916] 1 A. C. 405— H. L. ; [191.51 2 K. B. 81; 84 L. J. K. B. 670— C. A 104 Herd v. Weardale Steel Coal & Coke Co., [1915] A. C. 67; 84 L. J. E. B. 121— H. L 194 Herlakenden's Case, (1588) 4 Eep. 62a; 2 Co. Eep. 443 271 Hermann Loog v. Bean, (1884) 26 Ch. D. 306; 53 L. J. Ch. 1128; 51 L. T. (N. S.) 442 802 Hermann v. Seneschal, (1862) 13 C. B. (N. S.) 392; 32 L. J. C. P. 43; 6 L. T. (N. S.) 646 128 Hernaman v. Bowker, (1856) 11 Ex. 760; 25 L. J. Ex. 69 775 Hero, The, (1911) P. 128 ; 80 L. J. P. 66 ; 81 L. J. P. 27 ; 106 L. T. 82; 28 T. L. B. 216; 56 Sol. J. 269 459 Hertfordshire County Council v. Great Eastern E. Co., [1909] 2 K. B. 4u3 34 V. New Eiver Co., (1904) 2 Ch. 513; 74 L. J. Ch. 49; 68 J. P. 652; 91 L. T. 796; 53 W. E. 60; 20 T. L. E. 686; 3 L. G. E. 64 32 Hervey v. Smith, (1855) 1 K. & J. 389 802 Heske v. Samuelson, (1883) 12 Q. B. D. 30; 53 L. J. Q. B. 45; 49 L. T. (N. S.) 474 ; 93 Heslop V. Chapman, (1853) 2 C. L. E. 139; 23 L. J. Q. B. 49; 18 Jur. 348 646, 648, 650, 651 Heugh V. London & North Western E. Co., (1870) L. E. 5 Ex. 51; 39 L. J. Ex. 48; 21 L. T. 676 239 Hewitt V. Duchess (Owners of Ship), [1910] 1 K. B. 772; 79 L. J. K. B. 867; 102 L. T. 204; 26 T. L. E. 300; 54 Sol. J. 325; 3 B. W. C. C. 239— C. A 102 V. Spiers & Pond, Ltd., (1896) 18 T. L. E. 64 66, 83 V. Stanley, (1913) 109 L. T. 384— C. A 99 Hewlett V. Crutchley, (1813) 5 Taunt. 277 649 Hewson v. Cleeve, (1904) 2 Jr. E. 636 673, 592, 596 Heyl Dia v. Edmunds, (1900) 81 L. T. 579; 48 W. E. 167 704 Heywood v. Collinge, (1838) 9 A. & E. 268; 1 P. & D. 202; 1 W. W. & H. 702 657 Hibbins v. Lee, (1864) 4 F. & P. 243; 11 L. T. 541 602 Hickenbotham v. Leech, (1842) 10 M. & W. 361 573 Hickman i,. Maisey, (1900) 1 Q. B. 752 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 511 ; 82 L. T. 321; 48 W. E. 385; 16 T. L. E. 274 342, 343 Hicks V. Faulkner, (1878) 8 Q. B. D. 167; 51 L. J. Q. B. 268; 30 W. E. 545; (1882) 46 L. T. 127 644, 648, 650, 652 Hider v. Dorrell, (1808) 1 Taunt. 383 134 Higgens'a Case, (1606) 6 Eep. 44b; 3 Co. Eep. 344 171 Higgins V. Andrews, )1619) 2 Eolle Eep. 55 340 V. Betts, (1905) 2 Ch. 210; 74 L. J. Ch. 621; 92 L. T. 850; 53 W. E. 549; 21 T. L. E. 562 378, 800, 801 V. Butcher, (1606) Yelv. 89 119, 120 V. Searle, (1908) 72 J. P. 449 441 Highland District Committee of the County Council v. Eattray, [1913] S. C. 794— Sco 396 Highland Loch, The, (1911) P. 261 ; 80 L. J. P. 121 ; 81 L. J. P. 30 ; 106 L. T. 81; 27 T. L. E. 610; 28 T. L. E. 213 462 Highlej V. Lanes, and Yorks. E. Co., (1916) 115 L. T. 494 103 Hill V Balls, (1857) 2 H. & N. 299 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 45 ; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 592 529 V. Hart Davies, (1882) 21 Ch. D. 798 804 V. New Eiver Co., (1868) 9 B. & S. 303 151 V. Tottenham Urban District Council, (1898) 79 L. T. 495; 15 T. L. E. 3 65, 110, 116, 408 V. Tupper, (1863) 2 H. & C. 121; 8 L. T. 792; 11 W. E. 786 ... 346 Hillary v. Gay, (1833) 6 C. & P. 284 329 Hillman r. London, Brighton & South Coast E., [1920] 1 K. B. 284— C. A 101 Hillyer v. Governors of St. Bartholomew's Hospital, (1909) 2 K. B. 820; 78 L. J. K. B. 958; 101 L. T. 368; 25 T. L. E. 762; 53 Sol. J. 714; 73 J. P. 501 {sub nom. Hillyer v. London Corporation) 65, 75 Ixxii INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Hilton V. Granville (Earl), (1841) Cr. & Ph. 283 ••■ 799 V. Woods, (1867) L. E. 4 Bq. 432; 36 L. J. Ch. 941; 16 L. T, 73g 351 Hinde v. Evansr(19b6r96 l"t.'2o';'76 J. P. 458; 4 L. G. E. 1152 ... 458 Hinks and Wells Application, In re, (1916) 33 E. P. C. 281 727 Hinton v. Heather, (1845) 14 M. & W. 131; 15 L. J. Ex. 39 650 Hiort V. Bott, (1874) L. E. 9 Ex. 86; 43 L. J. Ex. 81; 30 L. T. 25 234, 236, 239 V. London & North Western E. Co., (1879) 4 Ex. D. 188; 48 L. J. Ex. 545; 40 L. T. (K. S.) 674 239, 279 Hippisley v. Knee Bros., (1905) 1 K. B. 1; 74 L. J. K. B. 68; 92 L. T. 20; 21 T. L. E. 5 177 Hirschfield v. London, Brighton & South Coast E. Co., (1876) 2 Q. B. D. 1; 46 L. J. Q. B. 1; 35 L. T. 473 526 Hirst V. West Eiding Union Banking Co., (1901) 2 K. B. 660; 70 L. J. K. B. 828; 49 W. E. 715; 85 L. T. 3; 17 T. L. E. 629 ... 87, 545, 546 Hoare v. Metropolitan Board of Works, (1874) L. E. 9 Q. B. 296; 43 L. J. M. C. 65; 29 L. T. 804 344 V. Silverlock, (1848) 12 Q. B. 625 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 306 ; 12 Jur. 695 561 Hobart v. Southend-on-Sea Corporation, (1906) 76 L. J. K. B. 305; 70 J. P. 192 ; 94 L. T. 337 ; 54 W. E. 454 ; 4 L. G. E. 757 ; 22 T. L. E. 307, 530 380, 431 Hobbs V. Brauscomb, (1813) 3 Camp. 420 „ 783 V. London & South Western E. Co., (1875) L. E. 10 Q. B. 116... 147 Hobson V. Leng, [1914] 3 K. B. 1245; 83 L. J. K. B. 1624— C. A. ... 62 V. Thelluson, (1867) L. E. 2 Q. B. 642 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 302 ; 16 L. T. 837 .; 35, 763, 774, 777 Hockley v. West London Timber and Joinery Co., [1914] 3 K. B. 1013; 83 L. J. K. B. 1620— C. A 107 ' Hodder v. Williams, (1895) 2 Q. B. 663; 65 L. J. Q. B. 70; 73 L. T. 394; 44 W. E. 98 763 Hodges V. Lawrance, (1854) 18 J. P. 347 288 Hodgkinson v. Ennor, (1863) 4 B. & S. 229; 32 L. J. Q. B. 231; 8 L. T. (N. S.) 451 373 Hodgson V. Lynch, (1871) I. E. 5 C. L. 363 762 V. Eobins & others, [1914] W. N. 47; [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 65— C. A 101 V. Sidney, (1866) L. E. 1 Ex. 313; 35 L. J. Ex. 182; 14 W. E. 923 41, 42 HodsoU V. Stallebrass, (1840) 11 A. & E. 301 ; 3 P. & D. 200 ; 9 0. & P. 63; 8 Dowl. P. C. 482; 9 L. J. Q. B. 132; 52 E. E. 350 ... 173, 229 0. Taylor, (1873) L. E. 9 Q. B. 79; 43 L. J. Q. B. 14; 29 L. T. 534 143, 230 Hodson V. Pare, (1899) 1 Q. B. 455 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 309 ; 47 W. E. 241; 80 L. T. 13; 15 T. L. E. 171 213—215, 552, 575, 576, 642 Hoe V. Taylor, (1593) F. Moore, 366 333 Hoey V. Pelton, (1861) 11 G. B. (N. S.) 142 147 Hogarth v. Jennings, (1892) 1 Q. B. 907; 61 L. J. Q. B. 601; 66 L. T. 821; 40 W. E. 617 302 Hogg V. Ward, (1858) 3 H. & N. 417 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 443; 6 W. E. 596 647, 648, 784 Holcomb V. Eawlyns, (1695) Cro. Eliz. 640 356 Holden v. King, (1876) 35 L. T. 479 178 V. Thompson, (1907) 2 K. B. 489; 76 L. J. K. B. 889; 97 L. T. 138; 23 T. L. E. 529 659 Holditch V. Canadian Northern Ontario E. Co., (1916) 86 L. J. P. C. 107— P. C : 380 Holdsworth v. McCrea, (1867) L. E. 2 H. L. 380; 36 L. J. Q. B. 297; 16 W. E. 226 696 Hole V. Barlow, (1868) 4 C. B. (N. S.) 334 381 V. Sittingboume E. Co., (1861) 6 H. & N. 488; 30 L. J. Ex. 81; 3 L. T. (N. S.) 750 114, 115 Holier r. Tipping, [1915] 1 Ir. E. 210 27 Holland v. Hodgson, (1872) L. E. 7 C. P. 328; 41 L. J. C. P. 146; 26 L. T. 709 299 V. Northwich Highway Board, (1876) 34 L. T. 137 132 INDEX OF CASES. Ixxiii PAGE Holliday v. National Telephone Co., (1899) 2 Q. B. 392; 1 Q. B. 221; 68 L. J. Q. B. 302, 1016; 63 J. P. 133; 47 W. E. 658; 81 L. T. 2S2; 15 T. li. E. 483 64, 113, 408 HoUinrake v. Truswell, (1894) 3 Ch. 420; 63 L. J. Ch. 719; 71 L. T. 419 669 Hollins V. Fowler, (1875) L. E. 7 H. L. 757; 44 L. J. Q. B. 169.; 33 L. T. 73. (And see Fowler v. Hollins) ... 237, 239, 251, 252, 254 Hollis V. Goldfinch, (1823) 1 B. & C. 205; 2 D. & E. 316; 1 L. J. K. B. 91; 25 E. E. 357 336 Holloway v. Abel, (1836) 7 C. & P. 528; 48 E. E. 810 225 V. Birmihgham Corporation, (1905) 3 L. G. E. 878; 69 J. P. 358 893, 394 V. Bgham District Council, (1908) 72 J. P. 433 ; 6 L. G. E. 929 321 Holmes v. Bagge, (1853) 1 E. & B. 782; 22 L. J. Q. B. 301; 17 Jur. 1095 156 I'. Mather, (1875) L. E. 10 Ex. 261 ; 44 L. J. Ex. 176 ; 32 L. T. 361 8, 9, 192, 456, 458 c. North Eastern E. Co., (1871) L. E. 4 Ex. 254; L. E. 6 Ex. 123; 40 L. J. Ex. 121; 24 L. T. 69 91, 488 v. Pipers, Ltd., [1914] 1 K. B. 57; 83 L. J K. B. 285 721 V. Wilson, (1839) 10 A. & E. 503; 50 E. E. 492 174, 281 Holt V. Scholefield, (1796) 6 T. E. 691; 3 E. E. 818 563 Holywell Union v. Halkyn District Mines Drainage Co., (1895) A. C. 117; 64 L. J. M. C. 113; 71 L. T. 818 334 Home V. Bentinck, (1820) 2 B. & B. 130; 4 Moore, 563; 8 Price, 225; 22 E. E. 748 580 Home and Colonial Stores v. Colls, (1902) 1 Ch. 802 (Eeversed, Colls V. Home and Colonial Stores, q.v.) 378, 799 Homing Pigeon Publishing Co. v. Eacing Pigeon Publishing Co., (1913) 29 T. L. E. 389 564 Hommel v. Gebriider Bauer & Co., (1904) 20 T. L. E. 585 ; 21 T. L. E. 81 727, 728 Honeywood ■;;. Honeywood, (1874) L. E. 18 Eq. 306; 48 L. J. Ch. 652; 30 L. T. 671; 22 W. E. 749 368 Hookham v. Pottage, (1872) L. E. 8 Oh. 91; 27 L. T. 595; 21 W. E. 47 738, 740 Hooper v. Lane, (1856) 6 H. L. C. 443; 27 L. J. Q. B. 75; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 1026 763, 767 Hope V. Evered, (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 338; 55 L. T. 820 689 v, Osborne, [1913] 2 Ch. 349; 82 L. J. Ch. 457 163 Hopkins V. Crowe, (1836) 4 A. & E. 774 ; 7 C. & P. 873 ; 2 H. & W. 21 ; 5 L. J. K. B. 147; 43 E. E. 475 197 V. Great Northern E. Co., (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 224; 46 L. J. Q. B. 265; 36 L. T. 898 666, 667 V. Linotype and Machinery, Ltd., (1910) 101 L. T. 898; 26 T. L. E. 229; 27 E. P. C. 109; 47 Sc. L. E. 622 704 V. Smethwick Local Board, (1890) 24 Q. B. D. 712; 69 L. J. Q. B. 250; 62 L. T. 783; 88 W. B. 499 36 Hopley V. Pool and others, [1915] W. C. & Ins. B. 280— C. A 104 Hopper V. Eeeve, (1817) 7 Taunt. 698; 1 Moore, 407 190 Hopper Barge W. H. No. 1, and the Knight Errant, (1911) A. C. 30; 80 L. J. P. 22; 103 L. T. 677; 11 Asp. M. C. 497— H. L 460 Hopwood V. Thorn, (1849) 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94; 14 Jur. 87 558, 559, 587, 624 Horley v. Sogers, (1860) 2 E. & B. 674; 29 L. J. M. C. 140; 8 W. E. 392 209 Horlick's Malted Milk Co. v. Summerskill, (1916) 32 T. L. E. 63; 61 Sol. Jo. 114— H. L 720, 738 Horn V. Thornborough, (1849) 3 Ex. 846; 18 L. J. Ex. 349 130 Hornby v. Matoham, (1848) 16 Sim. 325 275 Home V. Lewin, (1700) Lord Eaym. 639 287 Horridge v. Makinson, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1294 392, 415 Horsford v. Webster, (1835) 1 C. M. & E. 696 ; 5 Tyr. 409; 1 Gale, 1; 4 L. J. Ex. 100^ 40 E. E. 679 301 Horsley v. Style, (1893) 69 li. T. 222 ^. 655 Horwich v. Symond, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1083 299 Houghton, Re, [1915] 2 Ch. 173; 84 L.J. Ch. 726 214 Ixxiv INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Houghton V. Butler, (1791) 4 T. E. 364; 2 R. E. 411 .. ...^..... 235 V. Pilkington, [1912] 3 K. B. 308; 82 L. J. K. B. 79-D. C . . 91 Houlden v. Smith, (1850) 14 Q. B. 841 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 170; 14 Jur. 598 754, 755 Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank, (1880) 5 App. Cas. 317— HL 57, 00, ob Hounsell i;. Smyth, (1860) 7 C. B. (N. S.) 731; 29 L. J. C. P. 303; 8 W. R. 277 *°°' ■*°'' *^^ Hovenden i;.'Millhoff, (1900) 83 L. T. 41; 16 T. L. E. 506 177 How V. Prinn, (1702) 2 Salk. 694 ffj V. Winterton (Earl of), (1896) 2 Ch. 626 ■■■•■ 366 Howard v. Clarke, (1888) 20 Q. B. D. 558; 58 L. T. 401; 52 J. P. 210 208 v. Crowther, (1841) 8 M. & W. 601 ; 5 Jur. 91 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 335 ; 58 E. E. 823 41, 54, 227, 230 i;. The Press Printers, Ltd., (1905) 74 L. J. Ch. 100; 53 W. E. 98; 91 L. T. 718 °03 Howden v. Standish, (1848) 6 C. B. 504; 18 L. J. C. P. 33; 12 Jur. 1052 ™2 Howell V. Jackson, (1834) 6 C. & P. 723; 40 E. E. 844 204 V. Young, (1826) 5 B. & C. 259; 2 C. & P. 238; 8 D. & E. 14; 4 L. J. K. B. 160; 29 E. B. 237 183 Howells V. Vivian & Sons, (1902) 85 L. T. 529; 50 W. E. 163; 18 T. L. E. 36 100 Howley Park Coal and Cannel Co. v. L. & N. W. E. Co., [1913] A. C. 11 ; 82 L. J. Ch. 76— H. L 375 Hoye V. Bush, (1840) 1 M. & G. 775; 2 Scott, N. E. 86; 1 Drdnk. 15; 10 L. J. M. C. 168; 56 R. E. 530 790, 793 Hubbard v. Woodfield, (1918) 57 .Sol. Jo. 729 803 Hubbuck & Sons v. Wilkinson, Heywood and Clark, (1899) 1 Q. B. 86; 68 L. J. Q. B. 84; 79 L. T. 429; 15 T. L. E. 29 560, 626, 631, 741 Huber v. Steiner, (1835) 2 Bing. N. C. 202; 2 Scott, 304; 1 Hodg. 206; 2 Dowl. P. C. 781; 42 E. E. 598 124 Hubert v. Groves, (1794) 1 Esp. 148 387 Hudd V. Eavenor, (1821) 2 B. & B. 662; 5 Moore, 542; 26 E. E. 526 287, 308 Huddart i'. Eigby, (1869) L. E. 5 Q. B. 139; 10 B. & S. 911; 39 L. J. Q. B. 19; 21 L. T. 641; 18 W. E. 213 165 Hudson V. Bray, [1917] 1 K. B. 520; 86 L. J. K. B. 576 27 V. Egberts, (1851) 6 Exch. 697; 20 L. J. Ex. 299; 86 E. E. 438 447 Huggett V. Miers, [1908] 2 K. B. 278— C. A 487, 488, 491 Huggins V. Waydey, (1846) 15 M. & W. 357; 16 L. J. Ex. 136 130 Hughes r. Bett, [1915] S. C. 150, Sco 103 V. Buckland, (1846) 15 M. & W. 346; 15 L. J. Ex. 233; 10 Jur. 884 130 V. Coed Talon Colliery Co., [1909] 1 K. B. 957; 78 L. J. K. B. 539; 100 L. T. 655— C. A 101 V. Hughes; (1790) 3 Bro. C. C. 87 ; 1 Ves. jun. 161 288 r. Macfie, (1863) 2 H. & C. 744; 33 L. J. Ex. 177; 9 L. T. (N. S.) 513 508 V. Pereival, (1883) 8 App. Cas. 443; 52 L. J. Q. B. 719; 49 L. T. 189 66, 110 V. Quinn, (1918) 11 B. W. C. C. 420— C. A. (Ir.) 97 r. Robertson, [1913] S. C. 394, Sco 192 Hulbert v. Dale, (1909) 2 Ch. 570; 78 L. J. Ch. 457; 79 L. J. Ch. 48; 100 L. T. 777; 101 L. T. 504 341 Hull V. Piokersgill, (1819) 1 Brod. & B. 282; 21 R. R. 598 118 Hulton (E.) & Co. V. Jones, (1910) A. C. 20; (1909) 2 K. B. 444; 78 L. J. K. B. 937; 79 L. J. K. B. 198; 101 L. T. 330, 831; 26 T. "L. R. 128; 54 Sol. J. 116; 47 Sc. L. R. 591 548, 570 Hume c. Oldacre, (1816) 1 Stark. 351; 18 E. E. 779 60 Humphery v. Mitchell, 1836) 2 Bing. N. C. 619; 3 Scott, 44; 2 Hodges, 72 767 Humphries v. Brogden, (1850) 12 Q. B. 739; 20 L.- J. Q. B. 10; 15 Jur. 124 425, 489 V. Cousins, (1877) 2 C. P. D. 239; 46 L. J. C. P. 438; 86 L. T. 180 481 INDEX OF CASES. IxxV „ PAGE Humphrys v. Pratt, (1831) 5 Bligh, N. E. 154; 2 Dow & Clark, 288; 35 E. E. 41 :. 201 Hunt & Co. V. Ehrmann Bros., (1910) 2 Ch. 198; 79 L. J.. Ch. 533; 103 L. T. 101 720 V. Goodlake, (1873) 43 L. J. C. P. 54; 29 L. T. 472 564 V. Great Northern E. Co., (1891) 1 Q. B. 601; 60 L. J. Q. B. 216; 64 L. T. 418 96 V. Great Northern E. Co., (1891) 2 Q. B. 189 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 498 683, 586, 587, 593 V. Highley Mining Co., [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 402— C. A. ... 101 V. Hooper, (1844) 12 M. & W. 664; 13 L. J. Ex. 183; 8 Jur. 203; 67 E. E. 453 774 V. Star Newspaper, (1908) 2 K. B. 309; 77 L. J. K. B. 732; 98 L. T. 629; 24 T. L. E. 452 596, 605 Hunter v. Coleman, [1914] 2 Ir. E. 372, D. C 39 u. Ferguson & Co., (1906) 8 E. 574 (Ct. of Sess.) 565, 611 V. Johnson, (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 225 ; 53 L. J. M. C. 182 ; 51 L. T. 791; 32 W. E. 857 219 V. Sharpe, (1866) 4 F. & P. 983; 15 L. T. 421 609 Huntley v. Simson, (1857) 2 H. & N. 600; 27 L. J. Ex. 134 651 V. Ward, (1859) 6 C. B. (N. S.) 514; 6 Jur. (N. S.) 18 583, 593 Huntsman, The, (1911) 104 L. T. 464; 11 Asp. M. C. 606 459, 460 Hurdman v. North Eastern E. Co., (1878) 3 C- P. D. 168; 47 L. J. C. P. 368; 38 L. T. 339 337, 338, 421, 425, 426 Hurlstone v. London Electric Co., (1914) 30 T. L. E. 398— C. A. ... 55, 64, 108, 388 Hurrell v. Ellis, (1845) 2 C. B. 295; 15 L. J. C. P. 18 232 Hurst V. Picture Theatres, Ltd., [1915] 1 K. B. 1; 83 L. J. K. B. 1837— C. A 347 V. Taylor, (1885) 14 Q. B. D. 918; 54 L. J. Q. B. 310; 33 W. E. 582 390 Huscroft V. Bennett, (1914) 110 L. T. 494— C. A 97 Hutchins v. Chambers, (1758) 1 Burr. 579; 2 Kenyon, 204 ... 287, 312, 318 V. Hutchins, (1845) 7 Hill, N. Y. 104 144, 145 V. L.C.C., (1916) 85 L. J. K. B. 1177— H. L 80 Hutchinson v. Johnston, (1787) IT. E. 729; IE. E. 380 774 V. McKinnon, [1916] 1 A. C. 471— H. L 105 V. York and Newcastle E. Co., (1850) 5 Exch. 343; 19 L. J. Ex. 296; 14 Jur. 837 92, 455 Hutchison v. Birch, (1812) 4 Taunt. 619; 13 E. E. 703 764 Huth V. Huth, [1915] 3 K. B. 32 ; 84 L. J. K. B. 1307— C. A 571 Huttley V. Simmons, (1898) 1 Q. B. 181; 67 L. J. Q. B. 213; 14 T. L. E. 150 23 Hutton V. Byre, (1815) 6 Taunt. 289; 1 Marsh. 603; 16 E. E. 619 188 Huxley v. Berg, (1815) 1 Stark. 98 141 Huzzey v. Field, (1835) 2 C. M. & E. 432 ; 1 Gale, 166 ; 5 Tyr. 855 ; 4 L. J. Ex. 239; 41 E. E. 755 666 Hyde v. Johnson, (1836) 2 Bing. N. C. 776; 3 Sc. 289; 2 Hodg. 94; 5 L. J. C. P. 291; 42 E. E. 737 546 Hyman v. Van der Bergh, (1908) 1 Ch. 167; (1907) 2 Ch. 516; 76 L. J. Ch. 554; 77 L. J. Ch. 164; 98 L. T. 478 379 Hymas v. Ogden, (1905) 1 K. B. 246; 74 L. J. K. B. 101; 53 W. E. 209; 91 L. T. 832; 21 T. L. E. 16, 85— C. A 257 ILLIDGB V. Goodwin, (1831) 5 C. & P. 190; 38 E, E. 798 152, 457, 465 Ilott V. Wilkes, (1820) 3 B. & Aid. 304; 22 E. E. 400 160, 515 Imperial Gas Light and Coke Co. v. London Gas Light Co. , (1854) 10 Ex. 39; 23 L. J. Ex. 303; 18 Jur. 497 186 Imperial Tobacco Co. v. Pasquall, [1918] 2 Ch. 207 735 Ipce V. "Reigaie Education Committee, (1916) 85 L. J. K. B. 1283 105 Inchbald v. Eobinson, (1869) L. E. 4 Ch. 388; 20 L. T. 269; 17 W. E. 459 379 Indermaur v. Dames, (1867) L. E. 1 C. P. 274; L. E. 2 C. P. 311; 35 L. J. C. P. 184; 36 L. J. C. P. 181; 16 L. T. 293; 1 Smith L. C. 12th ed. 847 482, 483, 488, 489, 515, 630 Ixxvi INDEX OF CASKS. PAGE India, Secretary of State for, -u. Chelikani Eama Eab, (1916) L. E. 43 Ind. App. 192-P. C A^-^^-^^' V. Kamachee Boye Sahaba, (1859) 13 Moore P. C. 22; 132 E. E. r? p n llo Indus, The! (ISSeyiiJ Pri).' 46;' 56 l'.'j.'pV D. & A. 88; 56 L. T. 376 460 Ins 1;. Higgs, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 84— C. A 101 Ingle V. Bell, (1836) 1 M. & W. 516 ^ Inglis's Patent, In re, (1917) 34 E. P. C. 157 ■•••• 709 Ingram v. Lawson, (1840) 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 8 Scott, 471; 4 Jur. 151; 9 C. & P. 326; 9 L. J. C. P. 145; 54 E. E. 766 554, 617 Inman v. Stamp, (1815) 1 Stark. 12; 18 E. E. 740 335 Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood, (1894) A. C. 347— H. L 28 Irish Provident Assurance Co., Re, [1913] 1 Ir. E. 352 524 Irving V. Carlisle Eural Council, (1907) 71 J. P. 212; 5 L. G. E. 776 393 Irwin V. Dearman, (1809) 11 East, 23; 10 E. E. 423 224 Isaack v. Clarke, (1613) 2 Buls. 806 ••• 232 Isgoed-Jones v. Llanwrst Urban District Council (No. 1), (1911) 1 On. 393 ; 80 L. J. Ch. 145 ; 103 L. T. 751 ; 75 J. P. 68 ; 9 L. G. E. 222; 27 T. L. E. 133; 55 Sol. J. 125 137, 411 Islington Market Bill, In re, (1835) 3 CI. & F. 513; 12 M. & W. 20, n. 39 E. E. 32— H. L 663, 664, 667 Ivay V. Hedges, (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 80 470, 487 Iveson V. Moore, (1699) 1 Lord Eaym. 486; 12 Mod. 262 385 Izard V. Izard, (1889) 14 P. D. 45; 58 L. J. P. 83; 60 L. T. 399; 37 W. U. 496 228 J. (a person of unsound mind). In re, (1909) 1 Ch. 574; 78 L. J. Ch. 348; 100 L. T. 281 186 Jack V. Kipping, (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 113; 51 L. J. Q. B. 463; 46 L. T. 169; 30 W. E. 441 167 Jacklin^. Fytche, (1845) 14 M. & W. 381; 15 L. J. Ex. 102 133 Jackson v. Denton Collieries Co., (1914) 110 L. J. 559— C. A 102 0. Hopperton, (1864) 16 C. B. (N. S.) 829; 10 L. T. 529; 12 W. E. 913 614 V. London County Council and Chappell, (1911) 28 T. L. E. 66, 359; 76 J. P. 37 ; 10 L. G. E. 75 388, 465, 482 V. Smithson, (1846) 15 M. & W. 563 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 311 ; 4 D. & L. 45; 71 E. E. 763 447, 450 V. Testar, (1919) 36 E. P. C. 289 696 V. Watson & Sons, (1909) 2 K. B. 193; 78 L. J. K. B. 587; 100 L. T. 799; 53 Sol. J. 447; 25 T. L. E. 454— C. A 281, 471 Jacob V. King, (1814) 5 Taunt. 451 ; 1 Marsh. 135 ; 15 E. E. 550 309 Jacobs V. Humphrey, (1834) 2 C. & M. 413; 4 Tyr. 272; 3 L. J. ^x. •^ 82; 39 E. E. 806 775 V. Morris, (1902) 1 Ch. 816; (1901) 1 Ch. 261; 70 L. J. Ch. 183; 71 L. J. Ch. 363; 50 W. E. 371; 86 L. T. 275; 18 T. L. E. 384 81 V. Seward, (1872) L. E. 5 H. L. 464 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 221 ; 27 L. T. 185 247 Jacomb v. Knight, (1863) 32 L. J. Ch. 601 ; 3 De G. J. & S. 533 797 James v. Biddington, (1834) 6 C. & P. 589 143 V. David, (1793) 5 T. E. 141 169 V. Lee, (1911) 28 T. L. E. 92 440 V. Phelps, (1840) 11 A. & E. 483; 3 P. & D. 231; 9 L. J. Q. B. 106; 52 E. E. 423 648 V. Eutlech, (1599) 4 Eep. 17; 2 Co. Eep. 305 555 V. Swift, (1825) 4 B. & C. 681; 2 C. & P. 237 134 Jameson v. Dublin Distillers Co., (1900) 1 Ir. Eep. 43 722, 726, 737 V. Union Bank of Scotland, (1914) 109 L. T. 850 254 Jameson's Patent, In re, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 361 706 Jandus Arc Lamp and Electric Co., Ltd. ■;;. Arc Lamps, Ltd., (1905) 21 T. L. E. 308; 92 L. T. 447 706, 708 Janvier v. Sweeny, [1919] 2 K. B. 316— C. A 148 Jaques v. South Essex Waterworks Co., (1904) 20 T. L. E. 563 140 Jarmain v. Hooper, (1843) 6 M. & G. 827 ; 13 L. J. C. P. 63 ; 8 Jur. 127; 7 Sc. N. E. 663; 1 D. & L. 769; 64 E. E. 861 66, 83 Jarrold v. Heywood, (1870) 18 W. E. 279 693 INDEX OF CASES. Ixxvii PAGE Jarrold v. Houlston, (1857) 3 K. & J. 708; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 1051.. .690, 692,698 Jassy, The, (1906) P. 270; 75 L. J. P. 93; 95 L. T. 363; 10 Asp. M. C. 278 39 Jay V. Ladler, (1888) 40 Ch. D. 649; 60 L. T. 27; 37 W. R. 505 737 Jay's Furnishing Co. v. Brand & Co., [1915] 1 K. B. 458; 84 L. J. K. B. 867— C. A 296 Jefferies v. Buncombe, (1809) 11 East, 227; 2 Camp. 3 548 Jefifery v. Mowlem & Co., [1918] W. C. & Ins. B. 328— C. A 97 Jeffrey i;. Folkestone Corporation, (1909) Kent Assizes, March (n.r.) ... 467 Jeffries v. Great Western E. Co., (1856) 5 E. & B. 802 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 107; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 250 266, 267 V. Williams, (1850) 5 Exch. 792 145, 377 Jegon V. Vivian, (1871) L. R. 6 Ch. 742 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 369; 10 W. E,. 365 351, 353 Jelks V. Hayward; Hackney Furnishing Co., claimants, (1905) 2 K. B. 460; 74 L. J. K. B. 717; 53 W. E. 686; 92 L. T. 692; 21 T. L. R. 527 262, 264, 761, 762 Jenings v. Florence, (1857) 2 C. B. (N. S.) 467; 26 L. J. C. P. 277; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 774 654 Jenkins v. Biddulph, (1827) 4 Bing. 160 144 V. Great Western Eailway, (1912) 1 K. B. 525; 81 L. J. K. B. 378; 105 L. T. 882 466 V. Jackson, (1888) 40 Ch. D. 71 419 c. Plombe, (1704) 6 Mod. 181 260 V. Thomas, (1911) 104 L. T. 74; 75 J. P. 87 ; 9 L. G. E. 321 ... 664 Jenks V. Clifden (Viscount), (1897) 1 Ch. 694 174 Jenner v. A'Beckett, (1871) L. E. 7 Q. B. 11; 41 L. J. Q. B. 14; 25 L. T. 464 563, 608 V. South Eastern E. Co., (1911) 105 L. T. 131; 75 J. P. 419; 55 Sol. J. 553; 27 T. L. E. 445 499 V. Yolland, (1818) 6 Price, 3; 2 Chit. 167; 20 R. E. 608 301, 309 Jennings v. Eundall, (1799) 8 T. E. 335; 4 E. E. 680 44 Jenoure v. Delmege, (1891) A. C. 73; 60 L. J. P. C. 11; 63 L. T. 814; 39 W. E. 388 582 Jessie, The, and Zaanland, The, [1917] P. 138 460 Jewson V. Gatti, (1886) 2 T. L. R. 381, 441 509 John V. Albion Coal Co., (1901) 18 T. L. E. 27; 65 J. P. 788— C. A. 100 V. Jenkins, (1832) 1 C. & M. 227; 3 Tyr. 170 289 Johnson v. Braham, [1917] 1 K. B. 586— C. A. ; [1916] 2 K. B. 529 249 V. Coltson, (1679) T. Eaym. 250 791 V. Emerson, (1871) L. E. 6 Ex. 329; 40 L. J. Ex. 201; 25 L. T. 337 548, 638, 641, 649, 653 V. Evans, (1844) 7 M. & G. 240; 7 Scott, N. E. 1035; 8 Jur. 340 769 V. Faulkner, (1842) 2 Q. B. 925; 2 G. & D. 184; 6 Jur. 832 292 V. Lancashire and Yorkshire E. Co., (1878) 3 C. P. D. 499; 39 L. T. 448; 27 W. E. 459 272, 278 V. Lindsay, [1891] A. C. 371; 6S L. T. 97— H. L 88, 109 V. McAdam, (1789) cited in Dean v. Peel, (1804) 5 East, 45 226 V. Marshall, Sons & Co., Ltd., [1906] A. C. 409; 75 L. J. K. B. 868; 94 L. T. 828; 22 T. L. E. 565— H. L 100 V. Midland E. Co., (1849) 4 Ex. 367 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 366 27 V. Newton Fire Extinguisher Co., [1913] 2 K. B. Ill; 82 L. J. K. B. 541— C. A 106 V. Pickering; Norton, claimant, (1908) 1 K. B. 1; (1907) 2 K. B. 437; 76 L. "J. K. B. 904; 77 L. J. K. B. 13; 98 L. T. 68; 24 T. L. R. 1; 14 Manson, 191, 263 762, 768 V. Pye, (1665) 1 Sid. 258 44 V. Stear, (1863) 15 C. B. (N. S.) 330; 33 L. J. C. P. 130; 9 L. T. (N. S.) 804 236, 278 V. Upham, (1859) 2 E. & E. 250; 28 L. J. Q. B. 252; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 953 309 V. Wyatt, (1863) 2 De G. J. & S. 18; 33 L. J. Oh. 394 801 Johnson's Patent, In re, (1914) 31 R. P. C. 399 711 (No. 2), In re, (1909) 1 Ch. 114; 77 L. J. Ch. 737; 99 L. T. 697; ' 24 T. L. R. 889; 25 E. P. C. 709 709 Johnston v. Great Western E. Co., (1904) 2 K. B. 250; 73 L. J. K. B. 568; 50 W. E. 612; 91 L. T. 157; 20 T. L. E. 455 140 Ixxviii INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Johnston v. O'Neill, (1911) A. C. 552; 81 L. J. P. C. 17; 105 L. T. 587; 55 Sol. J. 686; 27 T. L. B. 545 662 V. Orr-Ewing, (1882) 7 App.' Cas. 219; 51 L. J. Ch. 797; 46 L. T. (N. S.) 216 738 Johnstone v. Loohgelly Magistrates, [1913] S. C, 1078— Soo 440 V. Sutton, (1786) 1 T. E. 493, 510; 1 Bro. P. C. 76; 1 E. E. 257, 269 650, 656 Joliffe V. Baker, (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 255 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 609; 48 L. T. 966 68, 533 - V. Wallasey Local Board, (1873) L. E. 9 C. P. 62; 43 L. J. C. P. 41; 29 L. T. 582 132, 407 JoUey V. Great Eaystern E. Co., cited in Smith v. Midland E. Co., (1888) 57 L. T. at p. 814 497 Jolly V. Kine, [1907] A. C. 1— H. L. {see also Kine v. Jolly) ... 138, 174, 378, 800 Jones V. Arnold, [1916] W. C. & Ins. E. 513 101 V. Beirnstein, (1900) 1 Q. B. 100; (1899) 1 Q. B. 470; 68 L. J. Q. B. 267; 69 L. J. Q. B. 1; 48 W. E. 232; 81 L. T. 553; 16 T. L. E. 30 291, 305, 314 V. Bird, (1822) 5 B. & Aid. 837 ; 1 D. & E. 497 ; 24 E. E. 579 ... 133 V. Brown, (1794) Peake, 233; 1 E«p. 217; stated 7 E. E. 656, n. 223 V. Brown, (1856) 25 L. J. Ex. 345 247 V. Canadian Pacific E. Co., (1913) 83 L. J. P. C. 13; 110 L. T. 83— P. C 87, 90, 93 V. Chapman, (1847) 2 Exch. 803; 18 L. J. Ex. 456 328 V. Chappell, (1875) L. E. 20 Eq. 539; 44 L. J. Ch. 658 368 V. Consolidated Anthracite Colliery Co. and Dynevor, Ltd., [1916] 1 K. B. 123 332, 422 V. Dowle, (1841) 9 M. & W. 19; 11 L. J. Ex. 52; 1 Dowl. (N. S.) 391; 60 E. E. 652 255 V. Pestiniog E. Co., (1868) L. E. 3 Q. B. 733; 37 L. J. Q. B. 214 ; 18 L. T. 902 12, 404, 433 V. Financial Times, (1909) 25 T. L. E. 677; 53 Sol. J. 614 596 V. Foley, (1891) 1 Q. B. 730; 60 L. J. Q. B. 464; 54 L. T. 438; 39 W. E. 510 : 329 V. German, (1896) 2 Q. B. 418 639 V. Gooday, (1841) 8 M. & W. 146; 10 L. J. Ex. 275; 58 E. E. 649 350 V. Great Northern E. Co., [1918] W. N. 192 518 V. Gurdon, (1842) 2 Q. B. 600 750 V. Hough, (1879) 5 Ex. D. 115; 49 L. J. Ex. 211; 42 L. T. 108 245 V. Hulton & Co. See Hulton (E.) & Co. v. Jones. V. James, (1868) 18 L. T. 243 230 V. Jones, (1862) 1 H. & C. 1 ; 8 Jur. (N. S.) 1132 16^ 17. Jones, [1916] 2 A. C. 481— H. L. ; [1915] W. N. 408; 60 Sol. J. 140— C. A 558 V. Joseph, (1918) 87 L. J. K. B. 510 416 V. Lee, (1911) 106 L. T. 123; 28 T. L. E. 92; 56 Sol. J. 125 ... 10, 440 V. Littler, (1841) 7 M. & W. 423 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 171 ; 56 E. E. 745 559 V. Liverpool (Corporation, of), (1885) 14 Q. B. D. 890; 54 L. J. Q. B. 345; 33 W. E. 551 108 V. Llanrwst Urban District Council (No. 1), (1911) 1 Ch. 393; 80 L. J. Ch. 145; 103 L. T. 751; 75 J. P. 68; 9 L. G. E. 222; 27 T. L. E. 133; 55 Sol. J. 125 137, 411 V. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, (1913) 108 L. T. 722 398 V. NichoUs, (1844) 13 M. & W. 361; 14 L. J. Ex. 42; 8 Jur. 989 133 V. Parcell, (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 430; 52 L. J. Q. B. 672; 49 L. T. 197 .„ : 771 V. Pritchard, (1908) 1 Ch. 630; 77 L. J. Ch. 405; 98 L. T. 386; 24 T. L. E. 309 399 V. Eew, (1910) 79 L. J. K. B. 1030 ; l03 L. T. 165 ; 74 J. P. 321 ; 8 L. G. E. 881 392 V. Sawkins, (1847) 5 C. B. 142; 17 L. J. C. P. 92 ; 5 D. & L. 353 169 — ^ 0. Scullard, fl898j 2 Q. B. 565 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 895 ; 79 L. T, 386 ; 14 T. L. E. 500— C. A 108 V. Simpson, (1830) 1 C. & J. 174; 1 Tyr. 32 I34 V. Stevens, (1822) 11 Price, 235; 25 E. E. 714 558 INDEX OF CASES. Ixxix Jones (James) & Sons v. Tankerville (Earl o£), (1909) 2 Ch. 440; 78 L. J. Oh. 674; 101 L. T. 202; 25 T. L. E. 714 794 V. Vaughan, (1804) 5 Bast, 445; 2 Smith, 5; 7 E. E. 736 790 V. Williams, (1825) 3 B. & C. 762; 1 C. & P. 459, 669; 5 D. & E. 654;. 3 L. J. K. B. 112; 27 E. E. 474 130 V. Williams, (1843) 11 M. & W. 176; 12 L. J. Ex. 249; 63 E. E. 564 162, 165 V. Winder, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 37— G. A 106 Jorden v. Money, (1854) 5 H. L. C. 185; 23 L. J. Ch. 865 524 Jordeson i'. Sutton, Southcoates & Drypool Gas Co., (1898) 2 Ch. 614; (1899) 2 Ch. 217; 67 L. J. Ch. 666; 68 L. J. Ch. 457; 63 J. P. 137, 692; 80 L. T. 815; 47 W.. E 222; 15 T. L. E. 374 ... 138, 375, 376, 379, 404, 426 Jordin o. Crump, (1841) 8 M. & W. 782; 5 Jur. 1113 159, 160, 515 Jory V. Orchard, (1799) 2 B. & P. 39; 5 E. E. 537 790 Joule V. Jackson, (1841) 7 M. & W. 450; 10 L. J. Ex. 142; 56 E. E. 757 298 Joynt V. Cycle Trade Publishing Co., (1904) 2 K. B. 292; 73 L. J. K. B. 752; 91 L. T. 155 575, 594, 596, 597 Juson V. Dixon, (1813) 1 M. & S. 601 292 Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, The, (1907) P. 36, 259; 76 L. J. P. 97, 138; 96 L. T. 239; 97 L. T. 366; 10 Asp. M. 0. 361; 23 T. L. E. 554 459 Kaiser Wilhelm 11., The, (1916) 31 T. L. E. 615— C. A : .-. 460 Kane v. Mulvaney, (1866) Ir. Eep. 2 C. L. 402 579 Karno ■;;. Pathi^ Freres, Ltd., (1908) 99 L. T. 114; 100 L. T. 260; 24 T. L. E. 588; 25 T. L. E. 242; 52 Sol. J. 499; 53 Sol. J. 228 688 Kauffman v. Liverpool Corporation, [1916] 1 K. B. 860; 85 L. J. K. B. 1127 181 Kaufman v. Gerson, (1904) 1 K. B. 591; (1903) 2 K. B. 114; 72 L. J. K. B. 596; 73 L. J. K. B. 320; 52 W. E. 420; 90 L. T. 608; 20 T L E 277 C A 123 Kay V. Grover, (1831) 7 Bing. 312 • 3 M. & P. 634; 5 M. & P. 140; 9 L. J. 0. P. 112; 33 E. E. 480 790 - V. Wheeler, (1867) L. E. 2 C. P. 302; 36 L. J. C. P. 180; 16 L. T. 66 453 Kearney v. Lloyd, (1891) 26 L. E. Ir. 268 23 V. London, Brtighton, &c., E. Co., (1871) L. E. 6 Q. B. 759; 40 L. J; Q. B. 285; 24 L. T. 913 408, 436, 437, 497 Keary v. Eussell (Archibald) & Co., [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 201 98 Keates v. Cadogan (Earl), (1851) 10 C. B. 591; 20 L. J. C. P. 76; 15 Jur. 428 580, 532 Keeble v. Hickeringill, (1705) 11 Bast, 574, n. ; 11 E. E. 273, n 20 Keeling v. New Monckton Collieries, (1911) A. 0. 648; 80 L. J. K. B. 1205; 105 L. T. 337; 27 T. L. E. 551; 55 Sol. J. 687— H. L. ... 100 Keen v. Henry, (1894) 1 Q. B. 292; 66 L. J. Q. B. 211; 69 L. T. 671; 42 W. E. 214 74 V. Millwall Dock Co., (1882) 8 Q. B. D. 482 134 V. Priest, (1859) 4 H. & N. 236; 28 L. J. Ex. 157; 82 L. T. . 131 300 V. St. Clement's Press, [1914] W. 0. & Ins. E. 292 104 Keene v. Boycott, 1795) 2 H. Bl. 511 222 V. Thomas, (1905) 1 K. B. 136 ; 74 L. J. K. B. 21 ; 53 W. E. 336; 92 L. T. 19; 21 T. L. E. 2 262 Keevans v. Mundy, [1914] W. 0. & Ins. E. 180 (Ct. of Sess.) 106 Keighlly v. Bell, (1866) 4 P. & F. 763 37 Keightey v. Birch, (1814) 3 Camp. 521; 14 E. E. 837 775 Keith V. Lauder, (1905) 8 F. 356 (Ct. of Sess.) 586, 587 Kelk V. Pearson, (1871) L. E. 6 Ch. 809; 24 L. T. 890; 19 W. E. 655 138, 377, 384, 799 Kellard v. Eooke, (1888) 21 Q. B. D. 367; 57 L. J. Q. B. 599; 36 W. E. 875 94 Kelly V. Heathman, (1890) 45 Ch. D. 256; 60 L. J. Ch. 22; 63 L. T. 517; 39 W. E. 91 708 V. Hopkins, [1908] 2 L E. 84— C. A 100 IxXX INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Kelly V. Lawrence, (1864) 3 H. & C. 1 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 197; 10 L. T. 195 '772 V. Metropolitan K. Co., (1895) 1 Q. B. 944; 64 L. J. Q. B. 568; 72 L. T. 551; 48 W. E. 497 463 V. " Miss Evana " (Owners), [1913] 2 Ir. B. 385 98 V. Morris, (1866) L. E. 1 Eq. 697 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 423 ; 14 L. T. 222 690, 693 V, National Society of Printers' Assistants, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 2236— C. A 70 V. Sherlock, (1866) L. E. 1 Q. B. 686 230 V. Tinline, (1865) L. E. 1 Q. B. 699; 35 L. J. Q. B. 940; 13 L. T. 255 ; 605, 607 Kelly's Directories v. Gavin & Lloyds, (1902) 1 Ch. 631; (1901) 1 Ch. 374; 70 L. J. Ch. 237; 71 L. J. Ch. 405; 50 W. E. 385; 86 L. T. 393; 18 T. L. E. 346 '. 690 Kemp 0. Christmas, (1898) 79 L. T. 233; 14 T. L. E. 572 314 V. Elisha, [1918] 1 K. B. 228— C. A 74 V. Ealk, (1882) 7 A. C. 573 279 V. Lewis, [1914] 3 K. B. 543; 83 L. J. K. B. 1535— C. A 97, 98 V. Neville, (1861) 10 C. B. (N. S.) 523; 31 L. J. C. P. 158; 4 L. T. (N. S.) 640 744, 753 Kendillon v. Maltby, (1842) Car. & M. 402; 2 M. & Bob. 438 620 Kendrick v. Bartland, (1679) 2 Mod. Eep. 253 163 Kennedy v. Hilliard, (1859) 10 Ir. C. L. E. 195 576 V. Shotts Iron Co., [1913] S. C. 1143, Sco 475 Kennet, The, [1912] P. 114; 81 L. J. P. 82; 105 L. T. 880 459, 460 Kenrick v. Pargiter, (1608) Cro. Jac. 208; Yelv. 129 164, 316 Kensington & Knightsbridge Electric Lighting Co. v. Lane Eox Electrical Co., (1891) 2 Ch. 573; 64 L. T. 770; 39 W. E. 650 626 Kensit v. Great Eastern E. Co., (1884) 27 Ch. D. 122; 54 L. J. Ch. 19; 32 W. E. 885 138, 372 V. St. Ethelburga, Bishopsgate Within (Eector of), (1900) P. 80; 15 T. L. E. 549 607 V. St. Paul's (Dean, etc., of), (1905) 2 K. B. 249; 74 L. J. K. B. 454; 69 J. P. 250; 53 W. E. 622; 92 L. J. 601; 21 T. L. E. 426; 20 Cox C. C. 829 210 Kent V. Eittall, (1906) 1 K. B. 60; 24 T. L. E. 830; 25 T. L. E. 41 335 V. Great Western E. Co., (1846) 3 C. B. 714; 16 L. J. C. P. 72 132 i;. Worthing Local Board, (1882) 10 Q. B. D. 118; 52 L. J. Q. B. 77; 48 L. T. 362; 31 W. E. 583 394 Kent County Council v. Folkestone Corporation, (1905) 1 K. B. '620 ; 74 L. J. K. B. 352; 69 J. P. 125; 53 W. E. 371; 92 L. T. 309; 21 T. L. E. 269; 3 L. G. E. 438 342 Kent County Gfis Light and Coke Co., In re, Brown and others. Ex parte, (1907) 95 L. T. 756 539 Keogh V. Incorporated Dental Hospital of Ireland, (1910) 2 Ir. E. 577 ; 44 I. L. T. 191 567, 571 Kerby v. Harding, (1851) 6 Ex. 234; 20 L. J. Ex. 163; 15 Jur. 953 308, 314 Kerr v. Ayr Steam Shipping Co., [1915] A. C. 217 ; 84 L. J. P. C. 1 — H. L 102, 103 Kerrison v. Smith, (1897) 2 Q. B. 445 346 Kershaw v. Bailey, (1848) 1 Ex. 743; 17 L. J. Ex. 129 592 Keyse v. Keyse and Maxwell, (1886) 11 P. D. 100; 55 L. J. P. D. & A. 54 143 Keyworth v. Hill, (1820) 3 B. & Aid. 685; stated 44 E. E. 657, 660 234 Kidgill V. Moor, (1850) 9 C. B. 364; 19 L. J. C. P. 177 138, 410 Kieffer v. Le S6minaire de Quebec, (1903) A. C. 85; 72 L. J. P. C. 18; 87 L. T. 484; 19 T. L. E. 50 414 Kildare County Council v. The King, (1909) 2 Ir. E. 199 37 Kilgour V. Gaddes, (1904) 1 K. B. 457; 73 L. J. K. B. 233; 52 W. E. 438; 90 L. T. 604; 20 T. L. E. 240 399 Kimber v. Gas Light and Coke Co., [1918] 1 K. B. 439— C. A. ... 470, 482, 483 V. Press Association, (1893) 1 Q. B. 65 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 162 ; 67 L. T. 515; 41 W. E. 17 599 Kimp V. Cruwes, (1695) 2 Lutw. 1573 302 INDEX OF CASES. Ixxxi PAGE Kinaston v. Moor, (1627) Cro. Car. 89 258 Kine i;. Everahed, (1847) 10 Q. B. 143; 16 L. J. Q. B. 271; 11 Jur. 673 127 V. Jolly, (1905) 1 Ch. 480; (1907) A. C. 1; 74 L. J. Ch. 174; 76 L. J. Ch. 1; 53 W. E. 462; 95 L. T. 656; 23 T. L. B. 1 138, 174, 378, 800 V. Sewell, (1838) 3 M. & W. 297 ; 2 L. J. Ex. 92; 49 B. B. 603 589 King V. Brown, [1913] 2 Ch. 416; 82 L. J. Ch. 548 164 V. Cole, (1796) 6 T. B. 640 637 V. England, (1864) 4 B. & S. 782; 33 L. J. Q. B. 145 308, 309, 311, 315 & Co. V. Gillard & Co., (1905) 2 Ch. 7; 74 L. J. Ch. 421^ 53 W. B. 598; 92 L. T. 605; 21 T. L. B. 398 656, 723, 738 V. London Improved Cab Co., (1889) 23 Q. B. D. 281; 58 L. J. Q. B. 456; 61 L. T. 34; 37 W. E. 737 74 V. Metropolitan District B. Co., (1908) 72 J. P. 295; 99 L. T. 278 76, 782 V. Patterson, (1887) Law Times Journal, p. 408 (American case) 589 V. Spurr, (1881) 8 Q. B. D. 104; 51 L. J. Q. B. lOS ; 45 L. T. (N. S.) 709 73 V. Waring, (1803) 5 Esp. 14 613 V. Watts, (1838) 8 C. & P. 614 624 King, The, (1911) 27 T. L. B. 524 459 King Alfred, The, [1914] P. 84; 83 L. J. P. 61 460 Kingston, Miller & Co. v. Kingston & Co., (1912) 56 Sol. J. 310; 28 T. L. B. 246 723 Kinnell v. Walker, (1910) 27 T. L. B. 67, 257 555, 621, 635, 656 Kinnis v. Graves, (1898) 67 L. J. Q. B. 583; 46 W. B. 480; 78 L. T. 502 750, 755 Kinsella v. Hamilton, (1890) 26 L. B. Ir. 671 78, 158 Kirby v. Chessizm (Commissioners of Works, Third Parties), (1914) 12 L. G. B. 1136; 79 J. P. 81— C. A 62, 340 V. Paignton Urban Council, [1913] 1 Ch. 337 ; 82 L. J. Ch. 198 392 V. Sadgrove, (1795-7) 1 B. & P. 13 ; 6 T. E. 483 ; 3 Anst. 892 ; 3 E E 239 ... . . 163 V. Simpson, (1854) 10 Ex.' 358 ;"23 L.' T M 127, 128, 747 Kirk V. Gregory, (1876) 1 Ex. D. 55 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 186 ; 34 L. T. 488 ... 9, 232 Kistler v. Tettmar, (1905) 1 K. B. 39; 74 L. J. K. B. 1 ; 53 W. B. 230; 92 L. T. 36; 21 T. L. B. 24 767 Kitchen v. Douglas, [1915] W. N. 414^D. C 494 Kitts V. Moore, (1895) 1 Q. B. 253 795 Kleinwort, Sons & Co. v. Comptoir National d'Bscompte de Paris, (1894) 2 Q. B. 157; 63 L. J. Q. B. 674 259 Knight V. Bennett, (1826) 11 Moore, 227; 3 Bing. 364; 4 L. J. C. P. 95; 28 B. B. 643 284 V. Bucknill, (1913) 57 Sol. J. 245— C. A 96 V. Fox, (1850) 5 Exch. 721; 20 L. J. Ex. 9; 14 Jur. 963 113 V. Gibbs, (1834) 1 A. & E. 43; 3 N. & M. 467; 3 L. J. K. B. 135; 40 B. B. 247 591 V. Isle of Wight Electric Light and Power Co., (1904) 73 L. J. Oh. 299; 90 L. T. 410; 68 J. P. 266; 20 T. L. B. 173; 2 L. G. B. 390 139, 380, 385, 429, 797 V. North Metropolitan Tramways Co., (1898) 78 L. T. 227; 14 TLB 286 76 79 82 635 Knights v. London, Chatham' & Dover E. Co., (1893) 62 L. j. Q.' B. 378 ' 81 Knott V. Studes, (1913) 109 L. T. 181 35, 663 Knotts V. Curtis, (1832) 5 C. & P. 322; 2 Tyr. 307 310 Knowles v. Blake, (1829) 5 Bing. 499; 3 M. & P. 214; 7 L. J. C. P. 228; 30 E. B. 707 314 Knox V. Hayman, (1892) 67 L. T. 137 59 Knuckey v. Bedruth Eural District Council, (1904) 1 K. B. 382; 73 L. J. K. B. 265; 68 J. P. 172; 52 W. B. 558; 90 L. T. 226; 20 T. L. B. 164; 2 L. G. E. 456 487 Knyvett v. Wilkinson, (1918) 87 L. J. K. B. 722— C. A 105 Krehl v. Burrell, (1878) 7 Ch. D. 551; (1879) 11 Ch. D. 146; 47 L. J. Ch. 358; 48 L. J. Ch. 252; 40 L. T. 637 799 C.T. / Ixxxii INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Krom V. Sohoonmaker, (1848) 3 Barb. 647 45 Kynoch v. Eowlandis, (1911) 55 Sol. J. 617 357 La Soci^te Anonyme Dubonnet's Application, In re, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 453 720, 735 Lacey v. Mowlem, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 63— C. A 101 Laoonw. Barnard, (1622) Cro. Car. 35 176 Ladd V. Tbomas, (1840) 12 A. & E. 117 ; 4 P. & D. 9; 4 Jur. 798 306 Lade v. Shepherd, (1734) 2 Str. 1004 344 Lafone v. Smith, (1858) 3 H. & N. 735 022 Laing v. JV-haley, (1858) 3 H. & N. 675 145 Lake v. King, (1668) 1 Wms. Saund. 120 579 Lalonne's Patent, In re, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 322 711 Lamb v. Burnett, (1831) 1 C. & J. 291; 1 Tyr. 265 219 V. Evans, (1898) 1 Ch. 218; 62 L. J. Ch. 404; 68 L. T. 131; 41 W. E. ,405 690 V. Walker, (1878) 3 Q. B. D. 389; 45 L. J. Q. B. 451 ; 38 L. T. 643 173 Lambert v. Great Eastern E. Co., (1909) 2 K. B. 776; 101 L. T. 408; 73 J. P. 445; 25 T. L. E. 734; 53 Sol. J. 732 ... 65, 82, 195, 197, 782 V. Lowestoft (Mayor, &c., of), (1901) 1 Q. B. 590; 70 L. J. K. B. 333 ; 65 J. P. 326 ; 49 W. E. 316 ; 84 L. T. 237 ; 17 T. L. E. 273 35 V. Eowe, [1914] 1 K. B. 38; 83 L. J. K B. 274 663 Lamond v. Eichard, (1897) 1 Q. B. 541; 66 L. J. Q. B. 315 ; 76 L. T. 141; 45 W. E. 289; 61 J. P. 260 27 Lamont v. Southall, (1839) 5 M. & W. 416; 7 Dowl. P. C. 469; 52 E. E. 787 134 Lancashire & Yorkshire E. Co. r. Highley, [1917] A. C— H. L 105 V. MacNiooU, (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 601 235 Lancashire Waggon Co. v. Fitzhugh, (1861) 6 H. & N. 502 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 231; 3L. T. (N. S.) 703 240,264 Lancastrian, The, (1915) 32 T. L. E. 117 486, 488 Lanchbury v. Bode, (1898) 2 Ch. 120; 67 L. J. Ch. 196 ; 62 J. P. 248; 78 L. T. 14; 14 T. L. E. 178 345 Lands Allotment Co., In re, (1894) 1 Ch. 616 122 Lane v. Capsey, (1891) 3 Ch. 411; 61 L. J. Ch. 55; 65 L. T. 375; 40 W. E. 87 164 V. Cotton, (1701) 12 Mod. 472 29 V. Cox, (1897) 1 Q. B. 415 475 V. Dixon, (1847) 3 C. B. 776; 16 L. 3. C. P. 129; 11 Jut. 89 335 V. Lusty & Co., [1915] 3 K. B. 230; 84 L. J. K. B. 1342— C. A. 103 V. Tyler, (1887) 56 L. J. Q. B. 461 289 Lanfranchi v. Mackenzie, (1867) L. E. 4 Eq. 421; 36 L. J. Ch. 518; 16 L. T. (N. S.) 114 378 Langford v. Selmes, (1857) 3 K. & J. 220 282 Langridge v. Levy, (1837) 2 M. & W. 519; 4 M. & W. 337; 6 L. J. Ex. 137; 46 E. E. 689 528, 543, 544 Lansdowne (Marquis of) v. Lynch, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 244, Ir. ... 101 Latham u. Johnson, [1913] 1 K. B. 398 ; 82 L. J. K. B. 258, C. A. 390, 440, 462, 487 Laugher v. Pointer, (1826) 5 B. & C. 547; 8 D. & E. 556; 4 L. J. K. B. 309; 29 E. E. 319 108, 109, 113 Laughland v. Millar, Laughland & Co., (1904) 6 F. 413 (Ct. of Sess.) 540 Laughton v. Sodor & Man (Bishop of), (1872) L. E. 4 P. C. 495; 42 L. J. P. C. 11; 28 L. T. 377; 21 W. E. 204 582, 588, 594, 611 Laverick v. Gray, (1919) 121 L. T. 289— C. A 99 Laveroni v. Drury, (1852) 8 Ex. 166; 22 L. J. Ex. 2; 16 Jur. 1024... 453 Lavery v. Turley, (1861) 6 H. & N. 239; 30 L. J. Ex. 49 170 Law V. Baird & Sons, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 140 (Ct. of Sess.) 106 V. Harwood, (1627) Cro. Car. 140 180 V. Llewellyn, (1906) 1 K. B. 487; 76 L. J. K. B. 320; 70 J. P. 220; 54 W. E. 368; 94 L. T. 359 675, 576 Lawford and Lawrence, In re. The Trustee, Ex parte, (1902) 2 K. B. 445; 71 L. J. K. B. 786; 50 W. E. 592; 86 L. T. 693; 9 Mauson, 254 263 INDEX OF CASES. Ixxxiii PAGE Lawless v. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton Co., (1869) L. E. 4 Q. B. 262; 38 L. J. Q. B. 129; 17 W. E. 498 585, 687 Lawranoe v. Norreys (Lord), (1890) 15 A. C. 210; 89 Ch. D. 213; 59 L. T. 703^H. L 366, 367 Lawrence and BuUen, Ltd. v. Aflalo and Cook, (1904) A. C. 17 ; (1902) 1 Ch. 264i (1903) 1 Ch. 318; 70 L. J. Ch. 797; 72 L. J. Ch. 107; 73 L. J. Ch. 85; 52 W. E. 369; 89 L. T. 569; 20 T. L. E. 42 695 Lawrence v. Great Northern E. Co., (1851) 16 Q. B. 643; 20 L. J. Q. B. 298; 15 Jur. 652 408 V. Hedger, (1810) 3 Taunt. 14; 12 E. E. 571 206 V. Jenkins, (1873) L. E. 8 Q. B. 274 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 147 ; 28 L. T. 406 113, 440, 452 V. Obee, (1815) 1 Stark. 22 337 Lawrenson v. Hill, (1859) 10 Ir. C. L. E. 177 750 Lawson v. Story, (1694) 1 Lord Eaym. 19 318 Lax V. Corporation of Darlington, (1879) 5 Ex. D. 28; 49 L. J. Ex. 105; 41 L. T. 489 35, 488, 516, 667 Lay V. Midland E. Co., (1875) 30 L. T. 529; 34 L. T. 30 13, 508, 509 Layton v. Hurry, (1846) 8 Q. B. 811 ; 15 L. J. Q. B: 244 ; 10 Jur. 616 304 Lazenby v. White, (1871) 41 L. J. Ch. 354, n 729 Lea V. Charrington, (1889) 23 Q. B. D. 45 689 V. Eacey, (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 139; (1887) 19 Q. B. D. 352; 55 L. J. Q. B. 371; 56 L. J. Q. B. 536; 85 W. E. 721 180 Lea's Application, In re, McEwan's Application, In re, (1912) 28 T. L. E. 258; 56 Sol. J. 308; 29 E. P. C. 165 726 Trade Mark, In re, [1918] 1 Ch. 446; 82 L. J. Ch. 241— C. A. 724, 726 Lead Company's Workmen's Fund Society, In re, (1904) 2 Ch. 196; 73 L. J. Ch. 628 ; 52 W. E. 571 ; 91 L. T. 438 ; 20 T. L. E. 504 131 Leader v. Danvers, (1798) 1 B. & P. 359 775 Leaf V. Furze, [1914] 8 K. B. 1068; 83 L. J. K. B. 1822— D. C 107 Leake v. Loveday, (1842) 4 M. & G. 972 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 65 ; 7 Jur. 17; 5 Sc. N. E. 908; 2 Dowl. (N. S.) 264; 61 E. E. 707 269 Leame v. Bray, (1803) 8 East, 598; 5 Esp. 18; 7 E. E. pref. vii. ... 8, 190 Lear v. Edmonds, (1817) 1 B. & Aid. 157; 2 Chit. 801; 18 E. E. 448 308 Leary v. Patrick, (1850) 15 Q. B. 266 ; 19 L. J. M. C. 211 ; 14 Jur. 982 133, 751 Leathern v. Craig, (1899) 2 Ir. Eep. 667 {and see Quinn v. Leathern) 220, 222 Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Cloth Co., (1865) 11 H. L. C. 523; 35 L. J. Ch. 53; 12 L. T. 742 726 Leconfield (Lord) v. Lonsdale (Earl), (1870) L.E. 5 C. P. 657; 89 L. J. C. P. 305; 23 L. T. 155 402 Lecouturier v. Eey, (1910) A. C. 262; 79 L. J. Ch. 394; 102 L. T. 293; 26 T. L. E. 368; 54 Sol. J. 375; 27 E. P. C. 268; 47 Sc. L. E. 892 (and see Eey v. Lecouturier) 719, 720, 735, 736 Ledbury Eural District Council v. Colwall Park Granite Quarries Co., Ltd., (1913) 108 L. T. 1002 396 - V. Somerset, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1897; 12 L. G. E. 850 395 Ledger v. Munro, (1916) 38 E. P. C. 58 738 Lee V Bayes, (1856) 18 C. B. 599; 25 L. J. C. P. 249; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 1098 244 V. Cooke, (1857) 2 H. & N. 584; 8 H. & N. 203; 27 L. J. Ex. 337; 4 Jur. '(N. S.) 168 287 V. Dangar, Grant & Co., (1892) 2 Q. B. 337 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 680; 66 L. T. 548; 40 W. E. 469 776 V. Gansell, (1774) 1 Cowp. 1; Lofft, 374 764 ^ 1,. Haley, (1869) L. E. 5 Ch. 155; 89 L. J. Ch. 284; 22 L. T. 258 735 V. Lancashire and Yorkshire E. Co., (1871) L. E. 6 Ch. 527; 25 L. T. 77; 19 W. E. 729 170 V. Eiley, (1865) 18 C. B. (N. S.) 722; 34 L. J. C. P. 212; 11 Jur. (N. S.) 822 10, 11, 442 V. " St. George" (Owners), [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 17— C. A. 104 V. Simpson, (1847) 8 C. B. 871; 16 L. J. C. P. 105; 11 Jur. 127 692 .„. Wallocks, (1914) 12 L. G. E. 1221 664 Ixxxiv INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Leeds (Duke) v. Amherst (Earl), (1846) 2 Ph. 117; 14 Sim. 357; 15 L. J. Ch. 351; 65 B. E. 609 801 Leete v. Hart, (1868) L. E. 3 C. P. 322; 37 L. J. C. P. 157; 18 L T. 292 128, 209, 649 Legs V. Evans, (1840) 6 M. & W. 36; 8 Dowl. P. C. 177; 4 Jur. 197; 9 L. J. Ex. 102; 55 E. E. 490 262, 769 Legge V. Nixon's Navigation Co., [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 306— C. A. 99 Leggett V. Gibbons, (1916) 85 L. J. K. B. 980 104 Leggott V. Great Northern E. Co., (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 599; 45 L. J. Q. B. 557; 35 L. T. 334; 24 W. E. 784 49 Lehmann & Co.'s Application, In re, (1918) 35 E. P. C. 92 784 Leicester Guardiatts. v. TroUope, (1911) 75 J. P. 197 456 Leigh v. Gladstone and others, (1909) 26 T. L. E. 139 191 V. Jack, (1879) 5 Ex. D. 264; 49 L. J. Ex. 220; 42 L. T. 463 322, 357 V. Taylor, (1902) A. C. 157; 71 L. J. Ch. 272; 50 W. E. 623; 86 L. T 239; 18 T. L. E. 293; affirming De Ealbe, In re, (1901) 1 Ch. 523; 70 L. J. Ch. 286 299 Le Lievre v. Gould, (1893) 1 Q. B. 491; 62 L. J. Q. B. 353; 68 L. T. 626; 41 W. E. "468 480 Le May v. Welch, (1884) 28 Ch. D. 24 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 279 ; 51 L. T. 867 695 Le Mesurier v. Ferguson, (1903) 20 T. L. E. 32 566 Lemmon v. Webb, (1894) 3 Ch. 11; (1895) A. C. 1; 63 L. J. Ch. 570; 64 L. J. Ch. 205; 70 L. T. 712; 71 L. T. 647 162, 166, 338 Lemy v. Watson & Saint, [1915] 3 K. B. 731; 84 L. J. K. B. 1999 721 Lendrum v. Ayr Shipping Co., Ltd., [1915] A. C. 217; 84 L. J. P. C. 1; [1914] W. N. 327— H. L. ; [1913] S. C. 331 (Ct. of Sess.) 102, 103, 104 Le Neve v. Mile End Old Town (Vestry of), (1858) 8 E. & B. 1054; 27 L. J. Q. B. 208; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 660 391 Leng (John) & Co. v. Langlands, [1916] S. C. 102; 53 Sc. L. E. 212; 114 L. T. 665; 32 T. L. E. 255— H. L 596 Leon i;. Edinburgh Evening News, (1909) S. C. 1014 ; 46 Sc. L. B. 705 (Ct. of Sess.) 550 Leslie v. Eeliable Advertising and Addressing Agency, Ltd., [1915] 1 K. B. 652; 84 L. J. K. B. 719 528, 568 V. Shiell, [1914] 3 K. B. 607— C. A 44 v. Young & Sons, (1894) A. C. 335 690 Lessee of Moore v. Doherty, (1843) 5 Ir. L. E. 449 364 Lever v. Masbro' Equitable Pioneers' Society (No. 1), (1912) 105 L. T. 948; 56 Sol. J. 161; 29 E. P. C. 33 719 Lever Brothers, Ltd. v. Bedingfield, (1699) 80 L. T. 100; 16 E. P. C. 3 730 739 Levy V. Johnson, (1913) 29 T. L. E. 507 ' 749 Leward v. Basely, (1695) 1 Lord-Eaym. 62; 1 Salk. 407 156 Lewis, Ex parte, (1888) 21 Q. B. D. 191 , 57 L. J. M. C. 108 ; 59 L. T. 338 343 V. Baker and others, (1905) 1 Ch. 46; 74 L. J. Ch. 39; 91 L. T. 744; 21 T. L. E. 17; 54 W. E. 146 283, 780 V. Clement, (1820) 3 B. & Aid. 702; 3 B. & B. 297; 22 E. E. 530 (and see Clement v. Lewis) 698, 602 V. Great Western E. Co., (1877) 3 Q. B. D. 195; 47 L. J. Q. B. 131 100 V. Levy, (1858) E. B. & E. 537; 27 L. J. Q. B. 282; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 970 ; 576, 600—602 V. Marling, (1829) 1 Webs. P. C. 493; 4 C. & P. 52; 10 B. & C. 22; 5 M. & E. 66; LI. & W. 28; 1 Carp. P. C. 475; 8 L. J. K. B. 46; 34 E. E. 313 707 V. Port of London Authority, (1914) 58 Sol. J. 686— C. A 98 V. Bead, (1845) 13 M. & W. 834; 14 L. J. Ex. 295; 67 E. B. 828 117 V. Eonald, (1909) 26 T. L. B. 30; 101 L. T. 534; 54 Sol. J. 32 483 V. Vine and Vine Perfumery Co., (1914) 31 B. P. C. 21 721, 726 V. Walter, (1821) 4 B. & Aid. 605; 23 B. E. 415 600 Leworthy v. Bees, (1913) 23 Cox C. C. 522 661 Leyman v. Latimer, (1878) 3 Ex. D. 352; 47 L. J. Ex. 470; 37 L. T. 819 574 INDEX OF CASES. IxXXV PAGE Libraoo, Ltd. v. Shaw Walker, Ltd., (1913) 30 T. L. E. 22; 58 Sol. J. 48 669 Licensed Victuallers' Newspaper Co. v. Bingham, (1888) 38 Ch. D. 139; 58 L. J. Ch. 36; 59 L. T. 187 736 Lidster v. Borrow, (1839) 9 A. & E. 654 130 Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. v. Hanbury, (1867) 17 L. T. 298 729 V. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, [1918] 2 K. B. 381; 117 L. T. 380— C. A 483, 485 Liebrand, Ex paHe, [1914] W. N. 310 257 Liford's Case, (1614) 11 Eep. 51 a ; 6 Co. Eep. 85 356 Limpus V. London General Omnibus Co., (1862) 1 H. & C. 526 ... 76, 77, 84, 85 Lindsay v. McGlashan, [1908] S. C. 762; 45 S. L. E. 559 (Ct. of Sess.) 100 Linford v. Fitzroy, (1849) 13 Q. B. 240; 18 L. J. M. C. 108; 13 Jur. 303 744, 747 Linoleum Manufacturing Co. r. Nairn, (1878) 7 Ch. D. 834; 38 L. T. 448 729 Linotype Co., Ltd. i'. British Empire Type-setting Co., Ltd., (1899) 81 L. T. 331; 79 L. T. 8; 14 T. L. E. 511; 15 T. L. R. 524 {and see British Empire Type-setting Co. v. Linotype Co.) ... 552, 554, 560, 626, 631 8 Trade Mark, In re, (1900) 2 Ch. 238; 69 L. J. Ch. 625 ; 82 L. T. 794; 16 T. L. E. 353; 17 E. P. C. 380 728 Lipman v. Pulman & Sons, Ltd., (1904) 91 L. T. 132 802 Lister v. Leather, (1858) 8 E. & B. 1004; 27 L. J. Q. B. 295; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 947 714 ■ V. Ferryman, (1870) L. E. 4 H. L. 521; 39 L. J. Ex. 177; 23 L. T. 269 205, 644, 647 Litchfield v. Eeady, (1850) 5 Exch. 939; 20 L. J. Ex. 51 326 Littledale v. Liverpool College, (1900) 1 Ch. 19; 69 L. J. Ch. 87; 48 W. E. 177; 81 L. T. 564; 16 T. L. R. 44 321, 362 Ldttle Hulton Urban Council v. Jackson, (1904) 68 J. P. 451; 2 L. G. E. 986 395 Liverpool Adelphi Loan Association v. Pairhurst and Wife, (1854) 9 Ex. 422; 2 C. L. E. 512; 23 L. J. Ex. 163; 2 W. E. 233 44 • Corporation v. Coghill, [1918] 1 Ch. 307 399 Gas Co. V. Everton, (1871) L. E. 6 C. P. 414;. 40 L. J. M. C. 104; 23 L. T. 813 754 • Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children v. Jones, [1914] 3 K. B. 813; 84 L. J. K. B. 222— D. C 217 Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., (1880) 5 App. Cas. 25; 42 L. T. 334; 28 W. E. 357 350, 363 Llandudno Urban Dietrict Council v. Hughes, (1900) 1 Q. B. 472; 69 L. J. Q. B. 303; 64 J. P. 357 ; 48 W. E. 366 ; 82 L. T. 147 ; 16 T. L. E. 171 664 Lloyd V. Grace, Smith & Co., (1912) 81 L. J. K. B. 1140— A. C. ; [1911] 2 K. B. 489; 80 L. J. K. B. 959; 104 L. T. 789 65 V. Midland E. Co., [1914] 2 K. B. 53; 83 L. J. K. B. 330 106 V. Powell-Duffryn Steam Coal Co., [1914] A. C. 733; 83 L. J. K. B. 1054— H. L.' 100 V. Boss, [1913] 2 K. B. 332; 82 L. J. K. B. 578 405 V. WooUand Bros., (1903) 19 T. L. E. 32; reversing 18 T. L. R. 578; 87 L. T. 73 92 Lloyd's and Dawson Bros. v. Lloyd's, Southampton, Ltd., (1912) 56 Sol. J. 361; 28 T. L. E. 338 723 Banking Co., Ex parte, (1869) L. E. 4 Ch. 630; 38 L. J. Bk. 9; 20 L. T. 997 29S Lock V. Ashton, (1848) 12 Q. B. 871; 18 L. J. Q. B. 76; 13 Jur. 167 196, 637 Locke V. Matthews, (1863) 13 ~C. B. (N. S.) 753; 32 L. J. C. P. 98; 7 L. T. (N. S.) 824 364 Locke-King v. Woking Urban Council, (1898) 62 J. P. 167 ; 77 L. T. 790; 14 T. L. R. 32 166, 344 Locker-Lampson v. Staveley Coal and Iron Co., (1908) 25 T. L. E. 136 425 Lockett V. Withey, (1908) 25 T. L. E. 16; 72 J. P. 492 449 Ixxxvi INDEX OF CASES. FAOE Lodge's Patent, In re, (1911) 2 Ch. 46; 80 L. J. Ch. 517; 104 L. T. 716; 27 T. L. E. 419; 28 E. P. C. 465 709 Logvie V. PuUarton, (1901) 3 P. (5th Series) 1006 (Ct. of Sess.) 100 Lomax v. Stott, (1870) 39 L. J. Ch. 834 ..'. 424 London & County Contracts, Ltd. v. Tallaok, (1903) 51 W. E. 408; 19 T. L. E. 156 43 and Northern Estates, Ltd. v. Schlesdnger, [1915] W. N. 354 ... 451 Association for Protection of Trade v. Greenlands, [1916] 2 A. C. 15— H. L 578 , Brighton & South CoaSt E. Co. v. Truman, (1885) 11 App. Cas. 45; 65 L. J. Ch. 354; 54 L. T. 250 12, 403, 404 County Council v. Attorney-General, (1902) A. C. 165 ; (1901) 1 Ch. 781; 70 L. J. Oh. 367; 71 L. J. Ch. 268; 86 L. T. 161; 66 J. P. 340; 50 W. E. 497; 18 T. L. E. 298 409 County Council v. Great Eastern R. Co., (1906) 2 K. B. 812; 75 L. J. K. B. 490; 70 J. P. 356; 54 W. E. §37; 94 L. T. 586; 22 T. L. E. 513; 4 L. G. E. 925; 21 Cox C. C. 171 402 & Devon Biscuit Co., In re, (1871) L. R. 12 Eq. 190; 40 L. J. Ch. 574; 24 L. T. 650 766 & Northern Bank, Ltd., The, v. George Newnes, Ltd., (1899) 16 T. L. E. 76 803 & North Western E. Co. v. Buckmaster, (1874) L. E. 10 Q. B. 70; 44 L. J. M. C. 29; 31 L. T. 835 258 - 0. Howley Park Coal Co., (1911) 2 Ch. 97; 80 L. J. Oh. 537; 104 L. T. 546 ; 27 T. L. R. 389— C. A. ; affirmed, [1913] A. 0. 11; 82 L. J. Ch. 76— H. L 424 & Westminster Loan and Discount Co. v. Drake, (1859) 6 C. B. (N. S.) 798; 28 L. J. C. P. 297; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 1407 260 & Yorkshire Bank v. Belton, (1885) 15 Q. B. D. 457; 54 L. J. Q. B. 568; 34 W. E. 31 295 Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan & Arthur, [1918] A. 0. 777— H. L. 86 ■ V. Simmons, (1892) A. 0. '201— H. L 254 — — Trilbury & Southend E. and Trustees of Gower's Walk Eree Schools, In re, (1889) 24 Q. B. D. 326; 59 L. J. Q. B. 162; 62 L. T. 306; 38 W. E. 343 144 Tilbury & Southend E. v. Paterson, (1913) 84 L. J. K. B. 598; 29 T. L. E. 413— H. L 517 , The, (1914) 83 L. J. P. 74 148 Londonderry County Council v. MacArthur, [1917] 2 Ir. E. 49 395 Long V. Clarke, (1894) 1 Q. B. 119; 63 L. J. Q.'B. 108; 69 L. T. 654; 42 W. E. 130 291 V. District Messenger, etc., Co., [1916] W. N. 264 497 V. Larkin, [1915] A. 0. 814; 84 L. J. P. C. 201— H. L. ; affirming [1914] 2 Ir. E. 285—0. A 26 V. Warburton, (1858) E. B. & E. 507 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 31 ; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 634 304 Longford, The, (1889) 14 P. D. 34 127 Longhurat v. Stewart & Son, (1916) 85 L. J. K. B. 1328 103 Longmeid v. Holliday, (1851) 6 Exch. 761; 20 L. J. Oh. 430 478, 479 Longstaff v. Magoe, (1834) 2 A. & E. 167 237 Longton v. Winwick Asylum. Committee, (1911) 75 J. P. 348; 76 J. P. 113 399, 426 Lonsdale (Earl) v. Nelson, 1823) 2 B. & C. 302; 3 Dowl. & Ey. 556; 2 L. J. K. B. 28; 26 E. E. 363 165 Loosemore v. Eadford, (1842) 9 M. & W. 657 ; 1 Dowl. (N. S.) 881 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 284; 60 E. E. 853 259, 275 Lord V. Price, (1874) L. E. 9 Ex. 54 ; 43 L. J. Ex. 49 ; 30 L. T. 271 ... 262 Lord Advocate v. Jacob, (1908) S. C. 90 (Ct. of Justiciary, Scotland) 721 723 V. Suits, Ltd., (1908) S. 0. 1163 (Ct. of Sess.) 721,' 723 Louise & Co. v. Gainsborough, (1903) 87 L. T. 591; 19 T. L. R. 99; 20 R. P. C. 61 728 Love V. Bell, (1884) 9 App. Cas. 286— H. L 137 V. Mack, (1905) 92 L. T. 345; 93 L. T. 352 455, 479 Lovelace v. Curry, (1798) 7 T. R. 631 134 Low V. Bouverie, (1891) 3 Ch. 82 ; 60 L. J. Oh. 594; 65 L. T. 533; 40 W. R. 50 535, 537 INDEX OF CASES. IxXXvii PAGE Lowe V. Dorling & Son, (1905) 2 K. B. 501; (1906) 2 K. B. 772; 74 L. J. K. B. 794; 75 L. J. K. B. 1019; 95 L. T. 243; 54 W. E. 28; 22 T. L. K. 779 '. 296 V. Fox, (1885-7) 15 Q. B. D. 667; 54 L. J. Q. B. 561; 34 W. R. 144; 12 App. Cas. 206 213, 214, 365 V. Pearson, [1899] 1 Q. B. 261; 68 L. J. Q. B. 122; 47 W. K. 193; 79 L. T. 654; 15 T. L. E. 124— C. A 100 Lowery v. Walker, (1911) A. C. 10; 80 L. J. K. B. 138; 103 L. T. 674; 53 Sol. J. 62; 27 T. L. R. 83 11, 14, 161, 389, 440, 443, 447, 462, 464, 487, 514 Lows V. Telford, (1876) 1 App. Cae. 414; 45 L. J. Ex. 613; 35 L. T. ,69 325, 328, 331 Lowther v. Heaver, (1889) 41 Ch. T>. 248 328 ■ V. Radnor (Earl), (1806) 8 Bast, 113; 20 R. R. 542, n 753 Lucan v. Barrett, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 2130 748 Lucas V. Moncrieff, (1905) 21 T. L. R. 683 695 Luckie v. Merry, [1915] 3 K. B. 83; 84 L. J. K. B. 1388— C. A 101 Luckwill V. Auction S.S. Co., (1913) 108 L. T. 52— C. A 98 Lucy V. Bawden, [1914] 2 K. B. 318; 83 L. J. K. B. 523 487, 490 Lumby v. AUday, (1831) 1 C. & J. 301 ; 1 Tyr. 217 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 62 ; 35 R. R. 715 659 Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 2 E. & B. 216; 22 L. J. Q. B. 463; 17 Jur. 827 18 221 229 Lundy Granite Co., In re, (1871) L. R. 6 Ch. 462; 40 L. J. Ch. 588; ' 24 L. T. 922 303 Luscombe v. Great "Western R. Co., (1899) 2 Q. B. 313; 68 L. J. Q. B. 711; 81 L. T. 183 146, 443 Lyde v. Barnard, (1836) 1 M. & W. 101; 1 Gale, 388; Tyr. & G. 250; 5 L. J. Ex. 117; 46 R. R. 269 546 Lyell V. Hothfield (Lord), [1914] 3 K. B. 911; 84 L. J. K. B. 251 ... 356 Lygo V. Newbold, (1854) 9 Exch. 302; 23 L. J. Ex. 108 509 Lyle Samuel v. Odhams, (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 1161— C. A 598 Lyles V. Southend Corporation, (1905) 2 K. B. 1; 74 L. J. K. B. 484; 69 J. P. 193; 92 L. T. 586; 21 T. L. R. 389; 3 L. G. R. 691 ... 182 Lynam v. Gowring, (1880) 6 L. R. Ir. 259 581, 585, 600 Lynch v. Baird, (1904) 6 F. 271 (Ct. of Sess.) 100 V. Knight, (1861) 9 H. L. C. 577 ; 5 L. T. (N. S.) 291 ; 8 Jur. (N. S.) 724 5, 141, 143, 151, 152, 154, 228, 618 V. Nurdin, (1841) 1 Q. B. 29; 4 P. & D. 672; 5 Jur. 797; 10 L. J. Q. B. 73 ; 55 E. R. 191 464, 507, 508, 509 V. Phillips & Co., (1909) S. C. 884; 46 Sc. L. R. 606 (Ct. of Sees.) 713 Lyne, Ex parte, (1822) 3 Stark. 132; 23 R. R. 762 211 V. NichoUs, (1906) 23 T. L. R. 86 627, 631, 632 Lynes v. Snaith, (1899) 1 Q. B.' 486 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 275 ; 47 W. R. 411; 80 L. T. 122; 15 T. L. R. 184 327, 357 Lynnu. Bruce, (1794) 2 H. Bl. 317; 3 R. R. 381 169 Lyon V. Fishmongers' Co., (1876) 1 App. Cas. 662; 46 L. J. Ch. 68; 35 L. T. 569 386 V. Weldon, (1824) 2 Bing. 334 309, 311 Lyons v. Elliott, (1876) 1 Q.' B. D. 210; 45 L. J. Q. B. 159; 33 L. T. 806 293 . V. Financial News and others, (1909) 53 Sol. J. 671 596 V. Martin, (1838) 8 A. & E. 512; 3 N. & P. 509 ; 1 W. W. & H. 500; 7 L. J. Q. B. 214; 47 R. E. 637 77 V. Wilkins, (1899) 1 Ch. 255; 68 L. J. Ch. 146; 63 J. P. 339; 47 W. R. 291; 79 L. T. 709; 15 T. L. R. 128; approving, (1896) 1 Ch. 811 ; 65 L. J. Ch. 601 ; 45 W. R. 19; 74 L. T. 358 380 , Esther, In re, (1869) 22 L. T. (N. S.) 770 217 , Sons & Co. V. Gulliver, [1914] 1 Ch. 631 ; 83 L. J. Ch. 281— C. A. 150 Lythgoe v. Vernon, (1860) 5 H. & N. 180; 29 L. J. Ex, 164 168 Maas v. Gas Light and Coke Co., (1911) 2 K. B. 543; 80 L. J. K B 1313; 104 L. T. 767; 27 T. L. R. 473; 55 Sol. J. 566 644 Mabe v. Connor, (1909) 1 K. B. 515 ; 78 L. J. K. B. 342 ; 100 L. T. 449; 73 J. P. 109; 26 T. L. E. 217 691 IxXXViii INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Macalister v. Steedman, (1911) 27 T. L. E. 217 621, 656 M' Andrew v. Bassett, (1864) 4 De G. J. & S. 380; 33 L. J. Ch. 561; 10 L. T. 442 726, 736, 740 Macandrew v. Tillard, (1909) S. C. 78 (Ct. of Seas.) 457 McArdle v. Swansea Harbour Trust, (1915) 113 L. T. 677— C. A. 99 McArthur v. Dominion Cartridge Co., (1905) A. C. 72; 74 L. J. P. C. 30; 53 W. R. 305; 91 L. T. 698; 21 T. L. R. 47 465 Macartney v. Garbutt, (1890) 24 Q. B. D. 368; 62 L. T. 656 ; 38 W. E. 559 : 40 Macaulay v. Moss Steamship Co., (1910) 102 L. T. 887 ;' 74 J. P. 243; 8 L. G. E. 615 379 McCabe v. Joynt, (1901) 2 Jr. Eep. 115— Q. B. D 575, 577 V. North, (1913) 109 L. T. 369— C. A 104 MoCallum, In re, MoCallum v. McCallum, (1901) 1 Ch. 143; 49 W. E. 129 187, 366 ■ V. North British E. Co., (1908) S. C. 415 (Ct. of Seas.) 518 McCann v. Edinburgh Eoperie Co., (1889) 28 L. E. Jr. 24 564 McCartan v. Belfast Harbour Commissioners, (1911) 2 Ir. E. 143 88 McCarthy v. Kennedy, (1905) Times Newspaper, March 8 659 . V. Young, (1861) 6 H. & N. 329; 30 L. J. Ex. 227; 3 L. T. (N. S.) 785 470, 471 McCartney v. Londonderry & Lough Swilly E. Co., (1904) A. C. 301; 73 L. J. P. C. 73;91L. T. 105; 53 W. E. 385 137, 372 McClelland v. Manchester Corporation, (1911) 9 L. G. E. 1209; 28 T. L. E. 21 26, 388, 390 Macclesfield (Mayor, &c., of) u. Chapman, (1843) 12 M. & W. 18; 67 E. E. 240 664 V. Pedley, (1833) 4 B. & Ad. 397 ; 1 N. & M. 708; 38 E. E. 264 ... 664 M'Combie v. Davies, (1805) 6 East, 538; 2 Sm. 557; 8 E. E. 534 236 245 250 254 McConnell v. G-albraith, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 90— C. A.,'lr. .'. ' 97 M'Cord V. Cammell & Co., (1896) A. C. 57; 65 L. J. Q. B. 202; 73 L. T. 634 94 McCormick v. Caledonian E. Co., (1904) 6 F. 362 499 V. Gray, (1862) 31 L. J. Ex. 42 713 McCreadle v. Thomson, (1907) S. C. 1176 (Ct. of Sess.) 748, 755, 756 McCusker v. Smith, [1918] 2 Ir. E. 432 69 M'Diarmiid v. Ogilvie, [1913] S. C. 1103— Sco 104 MacDonald v. Wyllie, (1898) 1 P. 339 (Ct. of Sess.) 94 McDonnell v. McKinty, (1847) 10 Ir. L. E. 514 353 MacDougall v. Knight, (1886-9) 17 Q. B. D. 636; 14 App. Cas. 194; 55 L. J. q. B. 464; 58 L. J. Q. B. 537; 60 L. T. 762 ... 562, 597, 601 V. (1890) 26 Q. B. D. 1; 69 L. J. Q. B. 517; 63 L. T. 43; 38 W. E. 653 173, 601 McDowall V. Boyd, (1848) 6 D. & L. 149; 2 B. C. Eep. 298; 17 L. J. Q. B. 296; 12 Jur. 990 169 V. Great Western E. Co., (1902) 1 K. B. 618; (1903) 2 K. B. 331; 71 L. J. K. B. 330; 72 L. J. K. B. 652; 88 L. T. 826; 19 T. L. E. 562 60, 149, 464, 465 McEntire v. Potter, (1889) 22 Q. B. D. 438; 60 L. T. 600; 37 W. E. 607 261, 262 Macfadzen v. Olivant, (1805) 6 East, 387 221 McFall V. Adams, (1907) S. C. 367 (Ct. of Sess.) 66 Macfarlane v. Colam, (1908) S. C. 56 (Ct. of Sess.) 152 V. Shaw, [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 32— Sco 103 McGiffin V. Palmer, (1882) 10 Q. B. D. 5 ., 93 McGlennon's Application, In re, (1909) 26 T. L. E. 23; 25 E. P. C. 797 727 McGrath, In re, (1893) 1 Ch. 143; 62 L. J, Ch. 208; 67 L. T. 636; 41 W. E. 97 4 Macgregor v. Clamp, [1914] 1 K. B. 288; 83 L. J. K. B. 240 ... 292, 294, 297 318 McGroarty v. John Brown & Co., Ltd., (1906) 8 F. 809 (Ct. of Sess.) ' 100 McGuire v. Gabbott, [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 32— Sco 103 Machado v. Pontes, (1897) 2 Q. B. 231 123 Machen v. Lancashire & Yorkshire E. Co., (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 371 — C. A .• 499 INDEX OP CASES. Ixxxix ■•«• • , PAGE Maomtosh v. Dun, (1908) A. C. 390; 77 L. J. P. C. 113; 99 L. T. 64; 24 T. L. E. 705; reversing 3 Commonwealth (Australia) L. E. 1134 578, 580, 686, 587, 589, 590 Mclntyre v. Bodger, (1903) 6 F. 176 (Ct. of Sess.) 97, 102 Mackalley's Case, (1611) 9 Eep. 65 B; 5 Co. Eep. 117 791' Mackay v. Commercaal Bank of New Brunswick, (1874) L. E. 5 P. C. 394 74 V. Monks, [1918] A. C. 59— H. L .'.. 96 M'Kean v. M'lvor, (1870) L. E. 6 Ex. 36; 40 L. J. Ex. 30; 24 L. T. 559 23S McKell V. Eider, (1908) 5 Commonwealth (of Australia) L. E. 480 ... 379 McKendry v. Wright, [1919] W. C. & Ins. E. 33— C. A 99 McKenna v. Niddrie & Benhar Coal Co., [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 505 -C. A 101 McKenzie v. Chilliwack Corporation, (1912) 107 L. T. 570— P. C. ... 466, 498 V. Coltness Iron Co., Ltd., (1903) 6 E. 8 (Ct. of Sess.) 97 V. Hardinge, (1906) 23 T. L. E. 15 .'... 224 V. Iron Trades Employers' Insurance Association, (1910) S. C. 79; 47 Sc. L. E. 103 (Ct. of Sess.) 24, 25 V. MoLiBod, (1834) 10 Bing. 385; 4 M. & Scott, 249; 3 L. J. C. P. 79; 38 E. E. 477 77 M'Kewen v. Cotching, (1857) 27 L. J. Ex. 41 241 McKinnon v. Hutchinson, [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 386— Sco 99 V. Penson, (1853) 8 Ex. 319; (1854) 9 Ex. 609; 23 L. J. M. C. 97; 18 Jur. 513 30, 31 Mackintosh v. Trotter, (1838) 3 M. & W. 184; 1 Jur. 825; 49 E. E. 565 260 M'Kone v. Wood, (1831) 5 C. & P. 1; 38 E. E. 787 147, 445, 448 McLaughlin v. Pryor, (1842) 4 M. & G. 48; 4 Scott, N. E. 655; Car. & M. 354; 11 L. J. C. P. 169; 61 E. E. 456 109 McLean v. Laidlaw, (1909) S. C. (J.) 68; 46 Sc. L. E. 877 (Ct. of Justiciary) 44£ V. MacBrayne, [1916] W. C. & Ins. E. 49 97 • V. Monk, (1898) 77 L. T. 663; 18 Cox C. C. 686; 62 J. P. 180 528 Maclenan v. Segar, [1917] 2 K. B. 325; 117 L. T. 376 28, 483 Macleod v. Edinburgh District Tramways Co., [1913] S. C. 624— Soo. 502 V. M'Ghee, (1841) 2 M. & G. 326; 2 Scott, N. E. 604; 58 E. E. 43^ oKQ n<7A 279 McLuckie v. Watson, [1913] S. C. 975— Sco. '. ' 99 McManus v. Bark, (1870) L. E. 5 Ex. 65 ; 39 L. J. Ex. 65 ; 21 L. T. 676 17C V. Fortescue, (1907) 2 K. B. 1; 76 L. J. K. B. 393; 96 L. T. 444; 23 T. L. E. 292 253 McMillan v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., [1913] S. C. 346— Soo 99 McMorrow v. Layden, [1919] 2 Ir. E. 398 390 McNair v. Baker, (1904) 1 K. B. 208; 73 L. J. K. B. 120; 68 J. P. 66; 90 L. T. 24; 20 T. L. E. 95; 2 L. G. E. 143 69, 379 V. Terroni, [1916] 1 K. B. 526; 84 L. J. K. B. 367 273 McNally V. Fitzgerald, [1914] W. C. & Ins. Eep. 7— C. A 97 McNamara v. Sligo (Marquis of), [1918] 2 Ir. E. 215 79 McNicholas v. Dawson & Son, [1899] 1 Q. B. 773; 68 L. J. Q. B. 470; 47 W. E. 500; 80 L. T. 317; 15 T. L. E. 242 102 M'Pherson v. Daniels, (1829) 10 B. & C. 263; 5 M. & E. 251; 8 L. J. K. B. 14; 34 E. E. 397 : 563, 572, 622 McPhie V. Greenock Magistrates, (1904) 7 F. 246 (Ct. of Sess.) 182 McQuire v. Western Morning News, (1903) 2 K. B. 100; 72 L. J. K. B„612; 51 'W. E. 689; 88 L. T. 757; 19 T. L. E. 471 175, 551, 598, 606, 608 McTaggart v. Barr, [1915] S. C. 224— Sco 98 McVie V. Taylor, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 173 (Ct. of Sess.) 106 MoVittie v. Marsden, [1917] 2 K. B. 878; 86 L. J. K. B. 653— C. A. 757 V. Turner, (191ff) 13 L. G. E. 1181 790 Mc William v. Great North of Scotland E. Co., [1914] S. C. 453— Sco. 102 Madden v. Kensington Vestry, (1892) 1 Q. B. 614; 61 L. J. Q. B. 627; 66 L. T. 347; 40 W. E. 390 133 Madoc V. Eyde Pier Co., (1905) Tinies Newspaper, Feb. 3 490 Magdalena Steam Navigation v. Martin, (1859) 2 E. & E. 94; 28 L. J. q. B. 310; 7 W. E. 598 40 XO INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Magnay v. Burt, (1843) 5 Q. B. 381; D. & M. 652; 7 Jur. 1116; 64 E. E. 517 766 Magniez's Patent, In re, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 471 698 Magnolia Metal Co. v. Atlas Metal Co., (1897) 14 E. P. C. 389 140 Magrath v. Finn, (1877) Ir. Eep. 11 C. L. 152 588 Maguire v. Corporation of Liverpool, (1905) 1 K. B. 767; 74 L. J. K. B. 369; 69 J. P. 163; 53 W. E. 449; 92 L. T. 374; 3 L. G. E. 485; 21 T. L. E. 278 :... 32, 393, 394 Main Colliery Co. v. Davies, (1900) A. C. 358; 69 L. J. Q. B. 755; 80 L. T. 674; 83 L. T. 83; 16 T. L. E. 460— H. L 100 Maisel v. Financial Times, Ltd., [1915] 3 K. B. 336; 84 L. J. K. B. 2148— C. A 573 Makin v. Att.-Gen. of New South Wales, [1894] A. G. 57— P. C 647 Malaehy v. Soper, (1836) 3 Bang. N. C. 371; 3 Sc. 723; 2 Hodg. 217; 6 L. J. C. P. 32; 43 E. E. 691 625, 630 Maleverer v. Spinke, (1538) Dyer (an. 29 H. 8) par. 40 6 Mallam v. Eose, [1915] 2 Ch. 222; 84 L. J. Oh. 934 412 Malvern Hills Conservators v. Whitmore, (1909) 100 L. T. 841; 73 J p 329 137 Manby v. Witt, (1856) 18 C. B. 544; 25 L. J. C. P. 294; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 1004 582, 585 Manchester (Mayor of) v. Lyons, (1883) 22 Ch. D. 287; 47 L. T. 677 664, 665 V. Williams, (1891) 1 Q. B. 94; 60 L. J. Q. B. 23; 63 L. T. 805; 39 W. E. 302 553 Manders v. Williams, (1849) 4 Ex. 339; 18 L. J. Ex. 437 264 Mangan v. Atterton, (1866) L. E. 1 Ex. 239; 35 L. J. Ex. 161; 14 L. T. 411 14, 43, 508 Mangena v. Edward Lloyd, Ltd., (1908) 99 L. T. 824 ; 25 T. L. E. 26; 98 L. T. 640; 24 T. L. E. 610 579, 595 V. Wright, (1909) 2 K. B. 958; 78 L. J. K. B. 879; 100 L. T. 960; 25 T. L. E. 534; 53 Sol. J. 485 595 Manley v. Field, (1859) 7 C. B. (N. S.) 96; 29 L. J. C. P. 79; 6 Jur. (N. S.) 300 225 Mann v. Furnival, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 349 698 Mann's Application, In re, (1919) 36 E. P. C. 189 742 Manning v. London and North Western E. Co., (1907) 23 T. L. E. 222 507 Mansel v. Webb, (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 323 389 Mansell v. Gri£6n, (1908) 1 K. B. 160, 947; 77 L. J. K. B. 676; 72 J. P. 179; 99 L. T. 132; 24 T. L. E. 67, 431; 52 Sol. J. 376; 6 L. G-. E. 548 202, 218 Mansergh, In re, (1861) 1 B. & S. 400; 30 L. J. Q. B. 296; 7 Jur. (N. S.) 825 579 Manton v. Manton, (1815) Dav. P. C. 333 703 Manzoni v. Douglas, (1880) 6 Q. B. D. 145; 50 L. J. Q. B. 289; 29 W. E. 425 458 Mapey v. Baker, (1908) 72 J. P. 511 ; 6 L. G. E. 1061 568, 592, 594, 618 Maple & Co. v. Junior Army and Navy Stores, (1882) 21 Ch. D. 369 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 67; 47 L. T. 589 669 Mapp V. Straker & Son, [1914] W. C. & Ins, E. 98— C. A 98 Marconi v. British Eadio-Telegraph and Telephone Co., (1911) 27 T. L. E. 274; 28 E. P. C. 181 712 V. Helsby Wireless Telegraph Co., (1914) 31 E. P. C. 399 712 Marcus v. Crook, [1914] 3 K. B. 173; 83 L. J. K. B. 1376 273 Marks v. Samuel, (1904) 2 K. B. 287 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 587 ; 53 W. E. 88; 90 L. T. 590; 20 T. L. E. 430 551, 593 Marley v. Osborne, (1894) 10 T. L. E. 388 94 Marmion, The^ (1913) 29 T. L. E. 646 459 Marney v. Scott, (1899) 1 Q. B. 986 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 736 ; 47 W. E. 666 ; 15 T. L. E. 320 436, 474, 482, 490 lyEarnham v. Weaver, (1899) 80 L. T. 412 526, 535 Marpesia, The, (1872) L. E. 4 P. 0. 212; 26 L. T. (N. 8.) 333; 8 Moore, P. C. (N. S.) 468 459 Marriott v. Bast Grinstead Gas and Water Co.; (1909) 1 Ch. 70; 78 L. J. Ch. 141; 99 L. T. 958; 25 T. L. E. 59; 72 J. P. 509 ... 404 v. Hampton, (1797) 7 T. E. 269; 2 Esp. 546; 4 E. E. 439; 2 Smith. L. C. 12th ed. 403 276 INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Marrow i'. Flimby and Broughton Moor Coal Co., (1898) 2 Q. B. 588; 67 L. J. Q. B. 976; 79 L. T. 397; U T. L. E. 583 95 Mareden & Sons, Ltd. v. Old Silkstone Chemical Works, Ltd., (1915) 13 L. G. E. 342 399 MaTsden v. Savile Street Foundry Co., (1878) 3 Ex. D. 203; 39 L T. 97; 26 W. E. 784 705 Marsh v. Keating, (1833—4) 1 Bing. N. C. 198; 2 C. & P. 250; 8Bli. N. S. 651; 1 So. 5 ; 37 E. E. 75— H. L 119, 121 ■ V. Pope, (1917) 86 L. J. K. B. 1349— C. A 103 Marshall v. Pitman, (1833) 9 Bing. 595; 2 M. & Scott, 745; 35 E. E. 630 258 V. Eodgers, [1918] W. C. & Ins. E. 39— C. A 103 - V. Boss, (1869) L. E. 8 Eq. 651 ; 39 L. J. Ch. 225 ; 17 W. E. 1086 735 V. Wild Eo«e (Owners of 8.S.), [1909] 2 K. B. 46; 78 L. J. K. B. 536 ; 100 L. T. 739 ; 25 T. L. E. 452 ; 53 Sol. J. 448— C. A. 102 ■ V. York, Newcastle & Berwick E. Co., (1851) 11 C. B. 655 264 Marten v. Burgess, (1886) 3 T. L. E. 96 591 Martin v. Bannister, (1879) 4 Q. B. T>. 491; 48 L. J. 6. B. 667; 28 W. E. 143 805 V. Fuller, (1696) Comb. 371 51 V. LoYibond & Sons, [1914] 2 K. B. 227 ; 83 L. J. K. B. 806— C. A 102, 103 V. Porter, (1839) 5 M. & W. 351; 2 H. & H. 70; 52 E. E. 745 352 V. Price, (1894) 1 Ch. 276; 63 L. J. Ch. 209; 70 L. T. 202; 42 W. E. 262 805 V. Strong, (1836) 5 A. & E. 535; 1 N. & P. 29; 2 H. & W. 336; 6 L. J. K. B. 48; 44 E. E. 487 592 V. Temperley, (1843) 4 Q. B. 298; 12 L. J. Q. B. 129; 7 Jur. 150; 3 G. & D. 497; 62 E. E. 377 67 Martindale v. Smith, (1841) 1 Q. B. 389; 1 G. & D. 1; 5 Jur. 932; 10 L. J. Q. B. 155; 55 E. E. 285 238, 263 Martinez v. Gerber, (1841) 3 M. & G. 88; 3 Scott, N. E. 386; 5 Jur. 463; 10 L. J. C. P. 314 ; 60 E. E. 466 221 Martins v. Upcher, (1842) 3 Q. B. 662; 11 L. J. Q. B. 291 ; 6 Jur. 582 133 Mary's (Eobert) Case, (1612) 9 Eep. Ill b ; 5 Co. Eep. 201 220 Marzetti ■;;. Williams, (1830) 1 B. & Ad. 415; 9 L. J. K. B. 42; 35 E- li 329 2 Mash V. Darley, [1914] 3 K. B. 1226; 83 L. J. X. B. 1740— C." A. "..'.' 224 Mason v. Birkenhead Commissioners, (1861) 6 H. & N. 72; 29 L. J. Ex. 407 134 V. Hill, (1832—3) 5 B. & Ad. 1; 2 N. & M. 747; 2 L. J. K. B. 118; 39 E. E. 354 373 V. Keeling, 1699) 12 Mod. 332 445, 447 V. Lambert, (1848) 12 Q. B. 795 370 V. Paynter, (1841) 1 Q. B. 974; 1 G. & D. 381; 6 Jur. 214 777 Masper v. Brown, (1876) 1 C. P. D. 97 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 203 ; 34 L. T. 254 178, 179 Massam v. Thorley's Cattle Food Co., (1880) 14 Ch. D. 748; 42 L. T. 851; 28 W. E. 966 726, 730 Massey v. Sladen, (1868) L. E. 4 Ex. 13 264 Master v. Miller, (1791—3) 4 T. E. 320 ; 5 T. E. 367 ; 2 H. Bl. 141 ; 1 Anst. 225; 1 Sm. L. 0. 12th ed. 803; 2 E. E. 399 119 Masters v. Farris, (1845) 1 C. B. 715 303 V. Eraser, (1902) 85 L. T. 611; 66 J. P. 100 ... 294, 300, 301, 768, 773 V. Green, (1888) 20 Q. B. D. 807 295 V. Hampshire €. C, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 2194 32 Mathew v. Sberwell, (1810) 2 Taunt. 439 274 V. Times Publishing Co., (1913) 29 T. L. E. 471 ; 552 Mathews, In re, Gates v. Mooney, (1905) 2 Ch. 460; 74 L. J. Ch. 656; 54 W. E. 75; 93 L. T. 158 189 V. Biddulph, (1841) 3 M. & G. 390; 4 Sc. N. E. 54; 1 Dowl. (N. S.) 316; 11 L. J. M. C. 13; 60 E. E. 532 206 Mathieson v. Pollock, (1910) S. C. 11 (Ct. of Sees.) 475, 484, 491 Matiana, The, (1908) 25 T. L. E. 51 458 Mattel V. Vautro, (1898) 78 L. T. 682 45 Matthew v. Ollerton, (1693) Comb. 218 192 Matthews v. Pomeroy, [1919] W. C. & Ins. E. 194 105 Xeii INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Mawe V. Pigott, (1869) Ir. Bep. 4 C. L. S4 550 Maxey Drainage Board v. Great Northern Eailway, (1912) 56 Sol. J. 275; 10 L. G. E. 248 426 Maxson v. Forth & Clyde S.S. Co., [1913] S. C. 921 102 Maxwell v. British Thomson-Houston Co., Ltd., Blackwell & Co., Third Parties, (1904) 2 K. B. 342; 73 L. J. K. B. 644 114, 115 May V. Beeley, (1910) 2 K. B. 722; 79 L. J. K. B. 853; 102 L. T. 326; 74 J. P. Ill; 8 L. Q. E. 166; 22 Cox, C. C. 306 749 V. Brown, (1824) 3 B. & C. 113; 4 D. & E. 670 621 V. Burdett, (1846) 9 Q. B. 101; 16 L. J. Q. B. 64; 10 Jur. 692 11, 441 V. Ison, (1914) 110 L. T. 525— C. A 97, 102 V. Lane, (1894) 64 L. J. Q. B. 237 ,, 52 V. May, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 324 719 V. Waters, (1910) 1 K. B. 431; 79 L. J. K. B. 250; 102 L. T. 180; 74 J. P. 125; 26 T. L. E. 239 661 Maydew v. Chatterley- Whitfield Collieries, Ltd., [1917] 2 K. B. 742 — C. A 105 Mayfair Property Go. v. Johnston, (1894) 1 Ch. 508; 63 L. J. Ch. 399; 70 L. T. 485 142, 349 Mayhew v. Herrick, (1849) 7 C. B. 229; 18 L. J. C. P. 179; 13 Jur. 1078 247, 248, 769 Mayne v. Pleteher, (1829) 4 M. & Ey. 312 569 Maynell v. Saltmarsh, (1665) 1 Keb. 847 386 Mayo 1!. Seaton Urban District Council, (1904) 68 J. P. 7 ; 2 L. G. E. 127 36, 386, 387 Hears v. London & South Western E. Co., (1862) 11 C. B. (N. S.) 850; 31 L. J. C. P. 220; 6 L. T. (N. S.) 190 264 Mechan v. Watson, [1907] S. C. 29— Sco 490 Mediana, The, (1899) P. 127; (1900) A. C. 113; 68 L. J. P. 26; 69 L. J. Q. B. 36 ; 82 L. T. 95 ; 48 W. E. 398 ; 16 T. L. E. 194 ; 9 Asp. M. C. 41 136, 273, 460 Mee V. Cruickshank, (1902) 86 L. T. 708 ; 18 T. L. E. 271 ; 66 J. P. 89; 20 Cox, C. C. 210 158, 195, 202, 637 Meering v. Graham White Aviation Co., (1920) 122 L. T. 44— C. A. 195 Megantac, The, (1915) 31 T. L. E. 190 459 Mehta v. Sutton, (1913) 109 L. T. 529— C. A 250 Mellin v. White, (1894) 3 Ch. 275; (1895) A. C. 154; 64 L. J. Ch. 308; 72 L. T. 334; 43 W. E. 353 {and see White u. Mellin). ..626, 630—632 Mellor V. Leather, (1853) 1 B. & B. 619; 22 L. J. M. C. 76; 17 Jur. 709 129, 258 V. Spateman, (1669) 1 Wms. Saund. 343 137, 138 Mellors v. Shaw, (1861) 1 B. & S. 437 '. 67, 93 Melrose-Drover v. Heddle, (1902) 4 F. 1120 (Ct. of Sess.) 730 Membery v. Great Western E. Co., (1889) 14 App. Cas. 179; 58 L. J. Q. B. 563; 61 L. T. 566; 38 W. E. 145 484, 520 Mennie v. Blake, (1856) 6 E. & B. 842; 25 L. J. Q. B. 399; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 953 233, 250 Menzies v. Breadalbane, (1828) 3 Bli. N. E. 414 11, 161 Mercedes Daimler Motor Co. v. Maudesley Motor Co., (1915) 32 E. P. C. 149 700, 707 Mercer v. Denne, (1904) 2 Ch. 534 ;> (1905) 2 Ch. 538; 70 J. P. 65; 91 L. T. 513; 54 W. E. 303; 21 T. L. E. 760; 3 L. G. E. 1293 ... 345 V. Liverpool, St. Helen's & South Lancashire E. Co., (1904) A. C. 461; (1903) 1 K. B. 652; (1901) 2 K. B. 753; 70 L. J. K. B. 775; 72 L. J. K. B. 128; 73 L. J. K- B. 960; 91 L. T. 605; 53 W. E. 241; 20 T. L. E. 673; 68 J. P. 533 351 Merchant Prinde, The, (1892) P. 9; 67 L. T. 251 460 Merest v. Harvey, (1814) 6 Taunt. 442; 1 Marsh. 135 ; 15 E. E. 548.. .141, 143 Merivale v. Carson, (1887) 20 Q. B. D. 275 ; 58 L. T. 331; 36 W. E. 231 586, 594, 597, 598, 605, 606, 608 Merryweather v. Nixan, (1799) 8 T. E. 186; 1 Sm. L. C. 12th ed. 443; 16 E. E. 810 62, 63 Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Cameron, (1864-5) 11 H. L. C. 443; 35 L. J. M, C. 1; 12 L. T. 643 258 V. Gibbs, (1864-5) L. E. 1 H. L. 93; 14 L. T. 677; 12 Jur. (N. S.) 571 29, 388, 408 INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Merten's Patent, In re, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 373, 499 711 Meters, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Gas Meters, Ltd., (1911) 104 L. T. 113- 28 E. P. C. 157 715 Metropolitan Association v. Petch, (1858) 5 C. B. (N S ) 504 • 27 L. J. C. P. 330 ' '.. 410 Asylum District v. Hill, (1881) 6 App. Cas. 193; 50 L. J. O. B. 353; 44 L. T. 653 12, 380, 381, 404 Bank v. Pooley, (1885) 10 App. Cas. 210; 54 L. J. Q. B. 449; 63 L. T. 163 ^ 200,653 Board of Works v. M'Carthy, (1874) L. E. 7 H. L. 243; 43 L. J. C. P. 385; 31 L. T. 182 387 Police Commissioners v. Hancock, [19151 W. N. 363; 32 T. L. E. 9S-D. C 782 E. Co. V. Jackson, (1877) 3 App. Ca.s. 193; 47 L. J. C. P. 303; 37 L. T. 679 498, 499 E. Co. V. Wright, (1886) 11 App. Cas. 152; 55 L. J. Q B. 401; 54 L. T. 658; 34 W. E. 746. 645 Saloon Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins, (1859) 4"H. & N. 87 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 201; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 226 552 Metzler v. Wood, (1878) 8 Ch. D. 606; 47 L. J. Ch. 625; 38 L. T. 544 721 Meux V. Cobley, (1892) 2 Ch. 253; 61 L. J. Ch. 449; 66 L. T. 86 368 V. Great Eastern E. Co., (1895) 2 Q. B. 387; 64 L. J. Q. B. 657; 73 L. T. 247; 43 W. E. 680 223, 264, 265 Meux's Brewery Co. v. City of London Electric Lighting Co., (1895) ' 1 Ch. 287 411 Meynell v. Morris, (1911) 104 L. T. 667; 55 Sol. J. 480 272 Michael v. Alestree, (1676) 2 Lev. 172; 1 Vent. 295; 4 Keb. 650 458 V. Hart, (1901) 2 K. B. 867; 70 L. J. K. B. 1000; 60 W. E. 164; 85 L. T. 548; 17 T. L. E. 761; but see (1902) 1 K. B. 482; 71 L. J. K. B. 265; 50 W. E. 308; 89 L. T. 422; 18 T. L. E. 254 274, 275 V. Spiers and Pond, (1909) 101 L. T. 352 ; 25 T. L. E. 740 656 Miohell's Patent, In re, (1919) 36 E. P. C. 223 709 Mickel V. M'Coard, [1913] S. C. 896 Sco 407 Mickleham, The, [1918] P. 166— C. A 509 Micklethwait v. Micklethwait , (1867) 1 De G. & J. 604; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 1279; 26 L. J. Ch. 721; 6 W. E. 640 369 Midland Insurance Co. v. Smith, (1881) 6 Q. B. D. 561 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 329; 45 L. T. 411 119, 120 E. Co. V. Martin & Co., (1893) 2 Q. B. 172; 62 L. J. Q. B. 517; 69 L. T. 353 ". 177 V. Withrington Local Board, (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 788 129 Midlothian County Council v. Pumpherston Oil Co., (1904) 6 F. 387 (Ct. of Sess.) 373, 383, 400 Midwood V. Manchester Corporation, (1906) 2 K. B. 697; 74 L. J. K. B. 884 ; 69 J. P. 348 ; 54 W. B. 37 ; 93 L. T. 526 ; 21 T. L. E. 667; 3 L. G. E. 1136 406 Mighell V. Sultan of Johore, (1894) 1 Q. B. 149; 63 L. J. Q. B. 593; 70 L. T. 64 39, 40 Migotti V. Colvill, (1879) 4 C. P. D. 233; 48 L. J. C. P. 695; 40 L. T. 747 195 Mildmay's Case, (1582-4) Co. Bep. 175 a 629 Mildmay v. Smith, (1671) 2 Wms. Saund. 343 775 Mileham v. Borough of St. Marylebone (Mayor, &c., of), (1903) 1 L. G. E. 412 ; 67 J. P. 110 59, 65, 108, 113, 117 Miles V. Forest Eock Granite Co., (1918) 62 Sol. J. 634— C. A 435 V. Furber, (1873) L. E. 8 Q. B. 77; 42 L. J. Q. B. 41, 27 L. T. 756 293, 302 V. Hutchings, (1903) 2 K. B. 714; 72 L. J. K. B. 775; 89 L. T. 420; 52 W. E. 284; 20 Cox, C. C. 655 158, 169, 446 Milgate v. Kebble, (1841) 3 M. & G. 100; 3 Scott, N. E. 368; 10 L. J. C. P. 277; 60 E. E. 475 262 Milisedch v. Lloyds, (1877) 46 L. J. C. P. 404; 36 L. T. 423; 26 W. E. 353 600 Mill V. Hawker, (1874) L. E. 9 Ex. 309; (1875) L. E. 10 Ex. 92; 43 L. J. Ex. 129; 44 L. J. Ex. 49; 33 L. T. 177 66-58 XCIV . INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Millar V. Toulmin, (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 603} 55 L. J. Q. B. 445; 34 W. K. 695 513 Millechamp v. Johnson, (1746) Willes, 205, n 345 Miller v. David, (1874) L. E. 9 C. P. 118 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 84 ; 30 L. T. 68 55C V. Dell, (1891) 1 Q. B. 468; 60 L. J. Q. B. 404; 63 L. T. 693; 39 W. E. 342 185, 253 V. Hancock, (1893) 2 Q. B. 177; 69 L. T. 214; 41 W. E. 578 490 V. Law Accident Insurance Co., (1903) 1 K. B. 712; (1902) 2 K. B. 694; 71 L. J. K. B. 551; 72 L. J. K. B. 428; 51 W. E. 420; 88 L. T. 370; 19 T. L. E. 331; 8 Com. Cas. 161; 9 Asp. M. C. 386 451 V. Eicbardson, [1915] 3 K. B. 76; 84 L. J. K. B. 1366— C. A. ... 101 V. Seare, (1777) 2 W. Bl. 1141 744 Milligan v. Marsh, (1856) 2 Jur. (N. S.) 1083 705 V. Wedge, (1840) 12 A. & E. 737; 4 P. & D. 714; 10 L. J. Q. B. 19; 54 E. E. 677 66, 108 MiUington v. Pox, (1837) 3 My. & Cr. 338; 45 E. E. 271 740, 798 Mills V. Armstrong and Another, The Bemina, (1886-8) 12 P. D. 58 ; 13 App. Cas. 1 ;■ 56 L. J. P. D. & A. 17 ; 57 L. J. P. D. & A. 65; 58 L. T. 423 60 V. Brooker, [1919] 1 K B. 555 235 V. Graham, (1804) 1 B. & P. N. E. 140; 8 E. E. 767 44 V. Spencer, (1817) Holt, N. P. 533 622 MiUwall, The, (1905) P. 155; 74 L. J. P. 13, 61, 82; 93 L. T. 426, 429; 53 W. E. 471; 21 T. L. E. 346; 10 Asp. M. C. 15, 110, 113 : 2 Milton V. Green, (1804) 5 East, 233; 1 Smith, K. B. 402 791 Miner v. Gilmour, (1868) 12 Moore, P. C. 131; 7 W. E. 328— P. C 372 Minter v. Williams, (1835) 4 A. & E. 251 714 Mires v. Solebay, (1678) '2 Mod. 242 242 Mist V. Metropolitan Water Board, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 2041 33, 394 Mitcham Common Conservators v. Banks, (1912) 10 L. G. E. 183 164 V. Cox; Same v. Cole, [1911] 2 K. B. 864; 80 L. J. K. B. 1188; 104 L. T. 824; 75 J. P. 471; 9 L. G. E. 843; 27 T. L. E. 492— D. C 164 Mitchell V. Crasweller, (1853) 13 C. B. 237; 22 L. J. C. P. 100; 17 Jur. 716 83 V. Darley Main Colliery Co., (1884) 14 Q. B. D. 125; 53 L. J. Q. B. 471; 52 L. T. (N. S.) 675 172-175, 184, 375, 417 V. Poster, (1840) 12 A. & E. 472; 9 Dovrl. P. C. 527 ; 4 P. & D. 150 750, 752, 756 V. Jenkins, (1833) 5 B. & Ad. 588; 2 N. & M. 301; 3 L. J. K. B. 35; 39 E. E. 570 661-663 V. Simpson, (1890) 26 Q. B. D. 183 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 355 ; 63 L. T. 405; 38 W. E. 565 776 V. Williams, (1843) 11 M. & W. 205 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 193 662 Mitohinson v. Day, [1913] 1 K. B. 603; 82 L. J. K. B. 421— C. A. ... 100, 104 Mittens v. Foreman, (1889) 58 L. J. Q. B. 40 640 Moens v. Heyworth, (1842) 10 M. & W. 147; 10 L. J. Ex. 177; 62 E. E. 554 527 Moffatt and Paige v. Gill, (1902) 86 L. T. 466 ; 84 Ij. T. 452 ; 50 W. E. 528; 18 T. L. E. 647 690, 693 Mogul Steamship Oo. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., (1892) A. C. 26; 23 Q. B. D. 598; 61 L. J. Q. B. 295; 66 L. T. 1; 40 W. E. 337 ... 22, 24, 25, 631 Molamphy v. Sheridan and Others^ [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 19— C. A. 99 Molloy V. Mutual Eeserve Life Assurance Co., (1905) 22 T. L. E. 525; 94 L. T. 756 186, 528 Monckton v. Gramophone Co., (1912) 106 L. T. 84; 66 Sol. J 270- 28 T. L. E. 205 , 686 c. Path^ Freres Pathephone Co., Ltd., [1914] 1 K. B 395; 83 L. J. K B. 1234— C. A 672 676 Monk, In re, (1887) 36 Ch. D. 583; 56 L. J. Ch. 809; 66 L. T. 856; ' 35 W. E. 691 370 Monro v. Bognor Urban Council, [1915] 3 K. B. 167; 84 L. j. K B 1091-C. A '. 528 INDEX OF CASES. XCV PAGE Monson v. Tussauds, Ltd., (1894) 1 Q. B. 671- 63 L. J. Q. B. 454; 70 L. T. 835 549, 550, 796, 801, 802 Montaignac v. Shitta, (1890) 15 App. Gas. 357 81 Montgomery i'. Hutohins, (1906) 94 L. T. 207 260 V. Thompson, (1891) A. C. 217; 60 L. J. Ch. 757; 64 L. T. 748 725 730 Monti V. Barnes, (1901) 1 K. B. 205; 70 L, J. Q. B. 225; 47 W. E. 147 ; ' 83 L. T. 619 ; 16 T. L. E. 206 ; 17 T. L. E. 88 298 Montreal Lithographing Co. v. Sabiston, (1899) A. C. 610; 68 L. J. P. C. 121; 81 L. T. 135;16E. P. C. 444 730 Moody V. Crescent Automatic Machine Co., (1914) 31 E. P. C. 155 712 V. Steggles, (1879) 12 Ch. D. 261 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 639 ; 41 L. T. 25 344 Moon V. Eaphael, (1835) 2 Bing. N. G. 310; 2 Soott, 489 279 V. Towers, (1860) 8 C. B. (N. S.) 611 641 Moorcock, The, (1889) 14 P. D. 64; 60 L. T. (N. S.) 654 484, 485 Moore (Lessee of) ■;;. Doherty, (1843) 5 Ir. L. E. 4'49 364 t'. Gamgee, (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 244; 59 L. J. Q. B. 505; 38 W. E. 669 750 V. Guardner, (1847) 16 M. & W. 595 655 V. Hall, (1878) 3 Q. B. D. 178 174 0. Lambeth Waterworks Co., (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 462; 55 L. J. Q. B. 304; 55 L. T. 309 393 V. Meagher, (1807) 1 Taunt. 39 144 .'. Metropolitan K. Co., (1872) L. E. 8 Q. B. 36; 42 L. J. Q. B. 23; 27 L. T. 579 82 V. Naval Colliery Co., [1912] 1 K. B, 28; 81 L. J. K. B. 149; 105 L. T. 838— C. A 101 V. Oastler, (1836) 1 Moo. & E. 451, n 621 V. Eobinson, (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 817 ; 1 L. J. K. B. 4 ; 36 E. E. 756 265 V. Wilson, (1903) 5 F. (Jus. Cas.) 88 (Ct. of Sess.) 751 , Nettlefold & Co. v. Singer Manufacturing Co., (1903) 2 K. B. 168 ; (1904) 1 K. B. 820; 73 L. J. K. B. 457 ; 68 J. P. 369; 52 W. E. 385; 20 T. L. E. 366 301. 307, 309, 775 Morant v. Chamberlin, (1861) 6 H. & N. 541; 30 L. J. Ex. 299 391 More V. St. Leonards Gas Co., (1864) 4 P. & P. 324; 142 E. E. 698 ... 407 Morel Bros., Ltd. v. Westmorland (Earl of), (1903) 1 K. B. 64; (1904) A. C. 11; 72 L. J. K. B. 66; 73 L. J. K. B. 93; 52 W. E. 353; 89 L. T. 712; 20 T. L. E. 38 , 58 Mores v. Midland E. Co., (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 2181 429 Morgan, In re. Board of Trade, Ex parte, (1904) 1 K. B. 68; 72 L. J. K. B. 948; 52 W. B. 79; 89 L. T. 452; 20 T. L. E. 2; 10 Manaon, 358 ■, 770, 771 V. Cynon Colliery Co., (1915) 8 B. W. C. C. 499— C. A 104 V. Hart, (1888) Times, Nov. 27 437 V. Hughes, (1788) 2 T. E. 225 642 V. Knight, (1864) 15 C. B. (N. S.) 669; 33 L. J. C. P. 168; 9 L. T. (N. S.) 803 261, 268 V. Leach, (1842) 10 M. & W. 558; 12 L. J. M. C. 4 134 ■ V. Lingen, (1863) 8 L. T. (N. S.) 800 551, 552 ,;. London General Omnibus Co., (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 832; 53 L. J. Q. B. 352; 51 L. T. 213 96 V. Mai;quis, (1854) 9 Ex. 145; 23 L. J. Ex. 21 247 V. Seaward,- (1837) 2 M. & W. 544; 1 Webs. P. C. 170; M. & H. 55; 1 Jur. 527; 6 L. J. Ex. 153; 46 E. E. 700 ... 698, 700, 702, 703, 706, 707, 711 V. Steble, (1872) L. E. 7 Q. B. 611; 41 L. J. Q. B. 260; 26 L. T. 906 41 V. Vale of Neath E. Co., (1864) 5 B. & S. 570; 33 L. J. Q. B. 260 89 V. Wallis, (1917) 33 T. L. B. 495 585 V. Zenaida (Owners of SS.), (1909) 25 T. L. B. 446— C. A 97 Moriarty v. Brooks, (1833) 6 C. & P. 684 155 Morison v. Gray, (1824) 2 Bing. 260; 9 Moo. 484; 3 L. J. C. P. 261; 27 B. E. 624 262 Morison, PoUexfen and Blair v. Walton (n. d.) unreported— H. L. ... 498 Morley v. Pinoombe, (1848) 2 Ex. 101; 18 L. J. Ex. 272 300, 307 Morpeth Eural Council v. Bullock's Hall Colliery Co., Ltd., [1913] 2 K. B. 7— C. A 396 XCVi INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Morris v. Ashbee, (1868) L. E. 7 Eq. 34; 19 L. T. 550 693 V. Carnarvon County Council, (1910) 1 K. B. 159, 840; 79 L. J. K. B. 169, 670; 102 L. T. 524; 26 T. L. B. 137, 391; 74 J. P. 201; 54 Sol. J. 443; 8 L. G. R. 485 466, 482 V. Lambeth Borough Council, (1905) 22 T. L. E. 22 102 V. Eobinson, (1824) 3 B. & C. 196; 5 D. & R. 35 ; 27 E. E. 322 280 V. Eowbotham, [1915] W. C. & Ins. R. 67^C. A 104 V. Salberg, (1889) 22 Q. B. D. 614; 58 L. J. Q. B. 275 201 V. Wise, (1860) 2 P. & P. 51 211 V. Wright, (1870) L. R. 5 Ch. 279; 22 L. T. 78; 18 W. E. 327... 693 Morrifih v. Murrey, (1844) 13 M. & W. 52 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 261 ; 2 D. & L. 199; 67 E. E. 505 764 Morrison v. Harmer, (1837) 3 Bing. N. C. 759; 4 Scott, 524; 3 Hodgea, 108; 43 E. E. 794 574 V. Eitchie, (1902) 4 P. 645 (Ct. of Sess.) 549, 562 V. Sheffield Corporation, [1917] 2 K. B. 866— C. A 457 Morritt, In re, Official Eeceiver, Ex parte, (1886) 18 Q. B. D. 222 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 139; 56 L. T. 42 348 Mortin v. Shoppee, (1828) 3 C. & P. 373; 33 E. E. 682 194 Mose V. St. Leonards Gas Co., (1864) 4 P. & P. 324 407 Mosley v. Walker, (1827) 7 B. & C. 40; 9 D. & E. 863; 5 L. J. K. B. 358; 31 E. E. 146 664 Moss V. Gallimore, (1779) 1 Doug. 279; 1 Smith L. C. 12th ed. 580 ... 308 Mostyn v. Atherton, (1899) 2 Ch. 360; 68 L. J. Ch. 629; 48 W. E. 168; 81 L. T. 356 372 V. Pabrigas, (1774) 1 Cowp. 161; 1 Smith L. C. 12th ed. 662 ... 123, 124, 746 Moul 'V. Croydon Corporation, (1918) 119 L. T. 318 393 Moulis V. Owen, (1907) 1 K. B. 746 ; 76 L. J. K. B. 396 ; 96 L. T. 596 ; 23 T. L. E. 348 123 Mounsey v. Dawson, (1837) 6 A. & E. 752; 1 N. & P. 763 257 V. Ismay, (1863) 1 H. & C. 729; 32 L. J. Ex. 94; 7 L. T. (N. S.) 717 345 Mountney v. Watton, (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 673; 9 L. J. K. B. 298; 36 E. E. 709 574 Mouson & Co. V. Boehm, (1884) 26 Ch. D. 398; 53 L. J. Ch. 932; 60 L. T. 784 737 Mowbray v. Merryweather, (1895) 2 Q. B. 640; 65 L. J. Q. B. 50; 73 L. T. 459; 44 W. E. 49 150 Moxham and others v. Grant, (1900) 1 Q. B. 88; (1899) 1 Q. B. 480; 68 L. J. Q. B. 283; 69 L. J. Q. B. 97 ; 48 W. E. 130 ; 81 L. T. 431; 16 T. L. E. 34; 6 Manson, 120 62 Moy V. Stoop, (1909) 25 T. L. E. 262 379 Mudd V. General. Union of Operative Carpenters and Joiners, (1910) 103 L. T. 45; 26 T. L. E. 518 71 Muddock V. Blackwood, (1898) 1 Ch. 58; 67 L. J. Ch. 6; 77 L. T. 493; 46 W. E. 166; 14 T. L. E. 43 695 Mudge V. Penge Urban District Council, (1917) 86 L. J. Ch. 126 403 Muir's Executors v. Craig's Executors, [1913] S. C. 349, Sco 249 Patent, In re, (1920) 36 R. P. C. 327 709 Mulgrave v. Ogden, (1590) Cro. Eliz. 219 236 Mulhern v. National Motor Cab Co., (1914) 29 T. L. E 677 61, 144 MuUett V. Challis, (1851) 16 Q. B. 239; 20 L. J. Q. B. 161; 15 Jur. 243 776 V. Hulton, (1803) 4 Esp. 247 622 V. Mason, (1866) L. E. 1 C. P. 562; 35 L. J. C. P. 209; 14 L. T. 558; 14 W. E. 898 529 Mulligan v. Cole, (1875) L. E. 10 Q. B. 549; 44 L. J. Q. B. 153; 33 L. T. 12 664, 566 Mulliner v. Florence, (1878) 3 Q. B. D. 484; 47 L. J. Q. B. 700; 38 L. T. 167 263, 279 MuUinger v. Bidewell, [1917] W. C. & Ins. R. 51— C. A 103 Mumford v. Oxford, Worcester, &c., E. Co., (1856) 1 H. & N. 34; 25 L. J. Ex. 265 411 Munce v. Black, (1858) 7 Ir. C. L. R. 476 655 Munster v. Lamb, (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 588; 52 L. J. Q. B. 726; 49 L. T. 252 576 INDEX OP CASES. XOVU PAGE Muratti, Sons & Co.'s Application, In re, (1915) 32 E. P. C. 77 ... 724, 727 Murgatroyd v. Blackburn and Over Darwen Tramway Co., (1887) 3 T. L. E. 451 499 V. Eobinson, (1857) 7 E. & B. 391 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 233 ; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 615 399 Murley Bros. v. Grove, (1882) 46 J. P. 360 90 Murphy and Sandwith v. Cooney, [1914] 2 Ir. E. 76— C. A 104 Murphy v. Halpin, (1874) Ir. Eep. 8 C. L. 127 594 Murray v. East India Co., (1821) 5 B. & Aid. 204; 24 R. E. 325 ... 184 V. Fitzgerald, (1906) 2 Ir. E. 294 223 V. Moutrie, (1834) 6 C. & P. 471 219 Musgrave v. Pendelis, [1919] 2 K. B. 43; 88 L. J. K. B. 915— C. A. 434 Musgrove v. Newell, (1836) 1 M. & W. 582; 2 Gale, 91; Tyr. & Gr. 957; 5 !>. J. Ex. 227; 46 E. E. 403 648 Muspratt v. Gregory, (1836) 1 M. & "W. 633; (1838) 3 M. & W. 677; 2 Gale, 158; 1 H. & H. 184; 7 L. J. Ex. 385; 46 E. E. 435 ... 293, 294 Musurus Bey v. Gadban, (1894) 1 Q. B. 533; 2 Q. B. 352; 63 L. J. Q. B. 621; 71 L. T. 51 40, 180 Mutton V. Peat, (1900) 2 Oh. 79; (1899) 2 Ch. 556; 68 L. J. Ch. 668; 69 L. J. Ch. 484; 48 W. E. 62, 486 ; 82 L. T. 440 ; 6 Manson, 424 254 Myers v. Bradford Corporation, (1915) 85 L. J. K. B. 146— H. L. {See also, Bradford Corporation v. Myers) 181, 182 Nador, The, (1909) P. 300; 78 L. J. P. 106; 100 L. T. 1007; 11 Asp. M. C. 283 459 Nagle V. Shea, (1874) Ir. Eep. 8 C. L. 224 354 Nargatt v. Nias, (1859) 1 E. & E. 439; 28 L. J. Q. B. 143; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 198 297, 301 Nash V. " Eangatera" Owners, [1914] 3 K. B. 978; 83 L. J. K. B. 1496— C. A 104 Nathan v. Cohen, (1812) 3 Camp. 257 212 V. Ogdens, Ltd., (1906) 94 L. T. 126 ; 22 T. L. E. 57 ; 21 T. L. E. 775 169 V. Eouse, (1905) 1 K. B. 527 ; 74 L. J. K. B. 285 ; 69 J. P. 135 ; 92 L. T. 321; 21 T. L. E. 222; 3 L. G. E. 354 345, 431 National Company for the Distribution of Electricity by Secondary Generators, Ltd. v. Gibbs, (1902) 19 E. P. C. 492; 18 E. P. C. 393 5^72 Mercantile Bank 'i. Eymiii',"(i881) ii' 'l."t.' 307 ,' '767 ".'.".'.'.'."".' '236, 238, 252, 253 Phonograph Co. v. Edison Bell Consolidated Phonograph Co., (1908) 1 Ch. 335; 77 L. J. Ch. 218; 98 L. T. 291; 24 T. L. E. 201 15, 18, 21, 23, 25 Society for Distribution of Electricity v. Gibbs, (1900) 2 Ch. 280; 69 L. J. Ch. 457 ; 82 L. T. 443; 48 W. E. 499 ; 16 T. L. R. 348 ; 17 E. P. C. 303; (1899) 2 Ch. 289; 68 L. J. Ch. 503 704 Starch Co.'s Application for the Eegistration of a Trade Mark, In re, (1908) 2 Ch. 698; 78 L. J. Ch. 34; 99 L. T. 724; 25 T. L. E. 13; 53 Sol. J. 13; 25 E. P. C. 802; 21 Cox, C. C. 712 724, 726, 730 733 Telephone Co. v. Baker, (1893) 2 Ch. 186; 62 L. J. Ch. 699;' 68 L. T. 283 403, 429 Natural Colour Kinematograph Co. v. Bioschemes, Ltd., (1915) 32 E. P. C. 256— H. L 707 Ned's Point Battery, In re, (1903) 2 Ir. E. 192 351, 405 Neeld v. Hendon Urban Council, (1900) 81 L. T. 405; 63 J. P. 724; 16 T. L. E. 50 , 344 Neilson v. Betts, (1871) L. E. 5 H. L. 1 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 317 ; 19 W. E. 1121 701, 714, 716 V. Horniman and others, (1910) 25 T. L. E. 684 ; 26 T. L. E. 188 677 Nelson v. Couch, (1863), 15 C. B. (N. S.) 99; 33 L. J. C. P. 46; 8 L. T.- (N. S.) 577 177 V. Liverpool Brewery Co., (1877) 2 C. P. D. 311; 46 L. J. C. P. 675; 25 W. E. 877 416 Neuchatel Asphalte Co.'s Application, [1913] 2 Ch. 291; 82 L. J. Ch. 414 ■• 731 C.T. 9 XOVni INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Nevill V. Fine Arts and General Insurance Co., (1895) 2 Q. B. 156; 64 L. J. Q. B. 681; 72 L. T. 525 57, 549, 565, 588, 612 Neville & Son v. Express Newspaper, [1919] A. C. 368— H. L 658 New Ixion Tyre and Cycle Co. v. Spilsbury, (1898) 2 Ch. 137, 484; 67 L. J. Ch. 324; 79 L. T. 229; 15 K. P. C. 380, 567 ; 46 W. B. 567 704, 717 Land Development Association and Gray, In re, (1892) 2 Ch. 138 43 Monckton Collieries v. Keeling, (1911) A. C. 648; 80 L. J. K. B. 1205; 27 T. L. E. 551; 105 L. T. 337; 55 Sol. J. 687 100 Biver Co. v. Johnson, (1860) 2 E. & B. 435; 29 L. J. M. C. 93; 8 W. E. 179 374 Sharlston Collieries Co. v. Earl of Westmorland, (1900) 82 L. T. 725; 80 L. T. 846; and see (1904) 2 Ch. 443, n 375, 425 Newberry v. Bristol Tramways and Carriage Co., Ltd., (1913) 107 L. T. 801— C. A 406 Newbould v. Coltman, (1851) 6 Ex. 189; 20 L. J. M. C. 149 758 Newcastle (Duke of) v. Clark, (1818) 8 Taunt. 602; 2 Moore, 666; 20 E. E. 583 336 V. Worksop Urban District Council, (1902) 2 Ch. 145 ; 71 L. J. Ch. 487; 86 L. T. 405; 18 T. L. E. 472 665 Newcombe v. Yewen and Croydon Eural Council, (1913) 29 T. L. E. 299 63, 568 Newcomen v. Coulson, (1877) 5 Ch. D. 133; 46 L. J. Ch. 459; 36 L. T. (N. S.) 385 842 Newell V. Starkie, [1919] 2 Jr. E. 325— H. L., affirming [1917] 2 Ir. E. 73 182 Newholm, The, (1917) 86 L. J. P. 131, affirmed (1918) 34 T .L. B. 306— C. A 509 Newman v. Bourne & Hollings worth, fl915) 31 T. L. T. 209 239 -0. Hardwick (Earl), (1838) 8 A. & E. 124; 3 N. & P. 368; 1 W. W. & H. 284 757 V. Zachary, (1646) Aleyn, 3 618 Newport (Mayor of) v. Saunders, (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 411; 1 L. J. K. B. 147; 37 E. E. 456 664 Newsam v. Carr, (1817) 2 Stark. 69; 19 E. E. 675 648 Newson v. Burstall, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 535— C. A 96 Newstead v. " Labrador" Owners, [1915] W. N. 360 — C. A 97 Newton v. Cubitt, (1862) 12 C. B. (N. S.) 32; 31 L. J. C. P. 246; 6 L. T. (N. S.) 860 663, 666 V. EUia, (1855) 5 E. & B. 115; 24 L. J. Q. B. 337; 1 Jur. (N. S.) 850 132 V. Harland, (1840) 1 M. & G. 644; 1 Scott, N. E. 473 ; 2 Jur. . 350; 10 L. J. C. P. 11; 56 E. E. 488 329—331 Newton- in-Makerfield Urban District Council v. Lyon, (1900) 81 L T 766; 69 L. J. Q. B. 230; 48 W. E. 222 664 Nichol v. Martyn, (1799) 2 Esp. 732; 5 E. E. 770 221 Nichols V. Briton Urban District Council, [1915] W. N. & Ins E. 14-C. A 101 V. Marsland, (1875-6) L. E. 10 Ex. 255; 2 Ex. D. 1; 46 L. J. Ex. 174; 35 L. T. 725 112, 450, 452 Nicholson v. Chapman, (1793) 2 H. Bl. 254 340 V. Coghill, (1825) 4 B. & C. 21 '.'.".!"!!! 651 Nicol V. Young's Paraffin Light, &c., Co., [1915] S. C. 439 Sco 103 NicoU V. Strachan, [1913] S. C. 18 Ct. of Just 348 Nicolls V. Bastard, (1835) 2 C. M. & E. 659; 1 Gale, 295; Tyr. & Gr 156; 5 L. J. Ex. 7; 41 B. E. 814 264 Nield V. London & North Western E. Co., (1874) L. E. 10 Ex 4- 44 L. J. Ex. 15; 23 W. E. 60 6 11 161 Nisbet V. Golf Agency, (1907) 23 T. L. E. 370 690 V. Potts' Contract, In re, (1905) 1 Ch. 391; (1906) 1 Ch. 386; 74 L. J. Ch. 310; 75 L. J. Ch. 238; 54 W. E. 286 ; 94 L. T. 297 ; -22 T. L. E. 234 358 Nitro-Phosphate and Odams Chemical Manure Co. v. London and St. Katharine Docks Co., (1878) 9 Ch. D. 503; 39 L. T. 433: 27 W. E. 267 36, 450 N. K. Pairbank Co. v. Cocbs Butter Manufacturing Co., (1903) 20 T. L. E. 53; 21 B. P. C. 23 729 INDEX OF CASES. XOIX PAGE Nobel's Explosives Co. v. Jones, Scott & Co., (1882) 17 Ch. D. 721; 8 App. Cas. 1; 50 L. J. Ch. 582; 52 L. J. Ch. 839; 48 L. T. 490— H. L 715 Norbury (Lord) v. Kitchin, (1863) 9 Jur. (N. S.) 132; 7 L. T. (N. S.) 685 372 Nord, The, [1916] P. 53 509 Norfolk County Council v. Green and another, (1904) 90 L. T. 451; 68 J. P. 223; 2 L. G. E. 652 342 Norman v. Great Western R. Co., [1915] 1 K. B. 584; 84 L. J. K» B. 598— C. A 482, 517 V. Villars, (1877) 2 Ex.'D. 359; 46 L. J. Ex. 579; 36 L. T. 788 47 Norris v. Birch, (1895) 1 Q. B. 639; 64 L. J. M. C. 91; 72 L. T. 491; 43 W. R. 271 2b;i V. Seed, (1849) 3 Ex. 782; 18 L. J. Ex. 300; 13 Jur. 830 213 i;. Smith, (1839) 10 A. & E. 188; 2 P. & D. 353; 8 L. J. Q. B. 274; 50 R. E. 374 134 Norrish v. Richards, (1835) 3 A. & E. 733; 3 N. & M. 269; 1 H. & W. 437 653 North V. Smith, (1861) 10 C. B. (N. S.) 572; 4 L. T. (N. S.) 407 457 V. Wood, [1914] 1 K. B. 629; 83 L. J. K. B. 587 147 North American Land and Timber Co. v. Watkins, (1904) 2 Ch. 233; 1 Ch. 242; 73 L. J. Ch. 117, 626; 52 W. E. 360; 91 L. T. 425; 20 T. L. R. 81, 642 122, 187 North Cheshire and Manchester Brewery Co. v. Manchester Brewery Co., (1899) A. C. 83; (1898) 1 Ch. 539; 67 L. J. Ch. 351; 68 L. J. Ch. 74; 46 W. p. 515; 79 L. T. 645; 15 T. L. E. 110 727, 731 North Eastern E. Co. v. Wanless, (1874) L. E. 7 H. L. 12; 43 L. J. Q. B. 185; 30 L. T. 276 506 North Staffordshire E. Co., Ex parte, (1874) L. E. 19 Eq. 60; 44 L. J. Ch. 162; 31 L. T. 716 766 V. Hanley Corporation, (1910) 26 T. L. E. 20; 73 J. P. 477; 8 L. G. E. 375 34 Northam v. Bowden, (1855) 11 Ex. 70; 24 L. J. Ex. 237 266 Northampton's Case (Earl), (1612) 12 Eep. 132; 6 Co. Eep. 384 622 Northumberland (Duke of) v. Bowman, (1887) 66 L. T. 773 801 Norton v. Ashburton (Lord), [1914] A. C. 933; 83 L. J. Ch. 784— H. L. 456 V. London & North Western R. Co., (1879) 13 Ch. D. 268; 41 L. T. 429; 28 W. R. 173 362 Norton's Application, In re, (1919) 36 R. P. C. 153 724 Novello V. Toogood, (1823) 1 B. & C. 554; 2 D. & R. 833; 1 L. J. K. B. 181; 25 R. R. 607 302 Nugent V. Kerwan, (1838) 1 Jebb & Symes, 97 294 ■ V. Smith, (1876) 1 C. P. D. 423; 45 L. J. C. P. 697; 34 L. T. 827 449 Nuttall V. Bracewell, (1866) L. E. 2 Ex. 1 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 1 ; 15 L. T. 313 346 V. Pickering, [1913] 1 K. B. 14; 82 L. J. K. B. 36— D. C 467 V. Staunton, (1825) 4 B. & C. 61 ; 6 D. & R. 165 ; 3 L. J. K. B. 135; 28 R. R. 207 284 Nyberg v. Handelaar, (1892) 2 Q. B. 202; 61 L. J. Q. B. 709 ; 67 L. T. 361; 40 W. R. 646 248 Nye V. Niblett, [1918] 1 K. B. 23 446 Oakbs v. Wood, (1837) 2 M. & W. 791; M. & H. 237 157 Oakey & Sons v. Dalton, (1887) 35 Ch. D. 700; 66 L. J. Ch. 823; 57 L. T. 18 741 V. Jackson, [1914] 1 K. B. 216; 83 L, J. K. B. 712 217 O'Brien v. Brabner, (1886) 49 J. P. 227 211 V. Mitchelstown Loan Fund, (1903) 1 Ir. Rep. 282 181 O'Connor v. Foley, (1905) 1 Ir. Rep. 1 526 O'Dea V. Crowhurst, (1899) 80 L. T. 491 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 666; 63 J. P. 424; 15 T. L. R. 320; 19 Cox, C. C. 260 664 Odger V. Mortimer, (1873) 28 L. T. 472 609 O'Donoghue v. Hussey, (1871) Ir. Rep. 5 C. L. 124 694 Officer V. Davidson, (1917) 10 B. W. C. C. 480 Sco 103 Official Receiver, Ex parte, Morritt, In re, (1886) 18 Q. B. D. 222; 56 L. J. Q. B. 139; 56 L. T. 42 348 Ogden V. Lancashire, (1866) 16 W. E. 158 227 INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Ogdenu. Turner, (1703) 6 Mod. 104; 2 Salk. 696 ; Holt, 40 636 O'Gorman v. O'Gorman, (1903) 2 Jr. Eep. 573 428, 440 Ogston V. Aberdeen District Tramways Co., (1897) A. C. Ill— H. L. 404—406 O'Keefe v. Walsh, Condon and others, (1903) 2 Jr. Rep. 681 59, 170 O'Kelly V. Harvey, (1882) 14 L. E. Ir. 105 153 Oliver v. Bank of England, (1901) 1 Ch. 652; (1902) 1 Ch. 610; (1908) A. C. 114 ; 70 Li. J. Ch. 377 ; 71 L. J. Ch. 388 ; 72 L. J. Ch. 402 ; 65 J. P. 294; 51 W. E. 513; 88 L. T. 244; 19 T. L,. E. 312; 8 Com. Caa. 142 (in H. L. sub nom. Starkey v. Bank of England) 254, 534^537, 542 OUiet V. Bessey, (1682) T. Jones, 214 760 Olympic (owners) and H.M.S. Hawke, [1915] A. C. 385 ; 84 L. J. P. 49— H. L 460 O'Neil V. Marson, (1771) 5 Burr. 2813 451 O'Neill V. Bansha Co-operative Agricultural and Dairy Society, [1910] 2 Ir. E. 324; 44 Ir. L. T. 52— C. A 100 Onslow 0. Home, (1771) 3 Wils. 177 557 Ophelia, -The, [1914] P. 46; 83 L. J. P. 65— C. A 459 Opperman v. Smith, (1824) 4 D. & E. 33; 2 L. J. K. B. 108; 27 E. E. 507 290 Oram v. Hutt, [1914] 1 Ch. 98; 83 L. J. Ch. 161— C. A 73, 658, 659 Orduna, The, [1919] P. 381—0. A 460 Ore Concentration Co. v. Sulphide Corporation, Ltd., [1914] 31 E. P. C. 206— P. C : 713 O'Eeilly v. Glavey, (1892) 32 L. E. Ir. 316 225 Orlwoola Trade Mark, In re, (1909) 25 T. L. E. 695 ; 53 Sol. J. 672 ; 26 E. P. C. 681; suh nom. Brock (H. N.) & Co., In re, q. v. ... 728 Ormerod v. Todmorden Joint Stock Mill Co., (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 155; 52 K J. Q. B. 445; 31 W. E. 759 139, 383 Ormiston v. Great Western E., [1917] 1 K. B. 598 56, 79, 555, 556 Orr V. Eleeming, (1855) 2 Macq. 14 444 Orr-Ewing v. Colquhoun, (1877) 2 A. C. 839— H. L 161 Orton V. Butler, (1822) 5 B. & Aid. 652 259 Osborn v. Gillet, (1873) L. E. 8 Ex. 88; 42 L. J. Ex. 53; 28 L. T. 197 : 121, 122, 223 V. Gough, (1803) 3 B. & P. 551 134 0. Metropolitan Water Board, (1910) 102 L. T. 217 ; 74 J. P. 190; 26 T. L. E. 283 33, 394, 406, 407 V. Veitch, (1858) 1 F. & P. 317 194 Osborne v. Amalgamated Society of Eailway Servants, (1910) A. C. 87 ; (1909) 1 Ch. 163; 79 L. J. Ch. 87; 78 U. J. Ch. 204; 77 L. J. Ch. 759; 101 L. T. 787; 54 Sol. J. 215; 26 T. L. E. 177— H. L. ... 72 V. Chocqueel, (1896) 2 Q. B. 109 447 V. London & North Western E. Co., (1888) 21 Q B. D 220; 57 L. J. Q. B. 618; 50 L. T. 227 516 Osmond v. Campbell and Harrison, Ltd., (1905) 2 K. B. 852; 75 L. J. K. B. 1; 93 L. T. 724; 54 W. E. 117; 22 T. L. E. 4^C. A. ... 100 Osram Lamp Works v. British Union Lamp Works, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 309 712 Osram-Robertson Lamp Works, Ltd. v. Pope's Electric Lamp Co., (1917) 34 E. P. C. 369— H. L .. 713 Otto V. Steel, (1885) 31 Ch. D. 241; 55 L. J. Ch. 196; 54 L. T. 157 ... 701 Outram v. London Evening Newspapers, (1911) 27 T. L. E. 231; 55 Sol. J. 255; 28 E. P. C. 308 727 Ouvah Ceylon Estates v. Uva Ceylon Eubber Estates, (1910) 103 L. T. 16, 416; 27 E. P. C. 645, 753; 27 T. L. E. 24 719 Owen V. Paversham Corporation, (1909) 72 J. P. 404 .. 380 V. Legh, (1820) 3 B. & Aid. 470; 22 R. E. 455 !...!!!!!!! 311 Owen's Patent, In re, (1899) 1 Ch. 157 ; 68 L. J. Ch. 63 ; 47 W. E. 180 ; 79 L. T. 458; 15 E. P. C. 755 • 699 Owens V. Campbell, (1904) 2 K. B. 60; 73 L. J. K. B. 634 ; 68 J. P. 410; 52 W. E. 481; 90 L. T. 811; isO T. L. E. 459 97 V. Wynne, (1855) 4 E. & B. 5.9 288 Oxley V. Holden, (1860) 8 C. B. (N. S.) 666; 30 L. J. C. P. 68; 2 L. T. (N. S.) 464 714 0x0, Ltd. V. King, (1917) 34 E. P. C. 165 726 INDEX OF CASES. CI PAGE Paddington Borough Council v. Attorney-General, (1906) A. C. 1; (1903) 2 Ch. 557; 72 L. J. Ch. 695; 75 L. J. Ch. 4; ,70 J. P. 41; 54 W. R. 317; 93 L. T. 673; 22 T. L. E. 55 ; 4 L. G. E. 19 ... 413 Page V. Cowasjee Bduljee, (1866) L. E. 1 P. C. 127 278 Paget V. Birkbeck, (1863) 3 F. & P. 683 60 Painter, Ex parte, (1895) 1 Q. B. 85 654 V. Liverpool Gas Co., (1836) 3 A. & B. 433; 2 H. & W. 233; 6 N. & M. 736; 5 L. J. M. C. 108; 42 E. E. 423 198, 212 Palmer v. Bramley, (1895) 2 Q. B. 405 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 42 ; 73 L. T. 329 286 V. Barith, (1845) 14 M. & W. 428; 14 L. J. Ex. 256 266 V. Harrods, (1916) 85 L. J. K. B. 1659 104 V. Hutchinson, (1881) 6 App. Cas. 619; 50 L. J. P. C. 62; 45 L. T. 180 38 V. Wick & Pulteney Town Steam Shipping Co., (1894) A. G. 318; 71 L. T. 163— H. L 62, 63 Palmer's (J. B.) Application, In re, (1882) 21 Ch. D. 47; 51 L. J. Ch. 673; 46 L. T. 787 736 Trade Mark, In re, (1883) 24 Ch. D. 504; 50 L. T. 80; 32 W. E. 306 736 Pauhard et Levassor (Society Anonyme Anciens Btablissements) v. Pan- hard Levassor Motor Co., (1901) 2 Ch. 513; 70 L. J. Ch. 738; 85 L. T. 20; 50 W. E. 74 738 Pankhurst v. Jarvis, (1911) 101 T. L. 946 ; 74 J. P. 64 ; 26 T. L. E. 118 ; 22 Cox, C. C. 228 782 Panton v. Williams, (1841) 2 Q. B. 169; 1 G. & D. 504; 10 L. J. Ex. 545; 57 E. E. 631 644 Papworth v. Battersea Corporation (No. 2), [1916] 1 K. B. 583; 84 L. J. K. B. 1881— C. A 115, 391, 393 Paquin v. Beauclerk, (1906) A. C. 148; 75 L. J. K. B. 395; 54 W. E. 521; 94 L/. T. 350; 21 T. L. E. 361; 22 T. L. E. 395— H. L. ... 513 V. Eobinson, (1901) 85 L. T. 5 268 Paradine v. Jane, (1647) Aleyn. 26 461 Paris V. Levy, (1860) 9 C. B. (N. S.) 342; 30 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 3 L. T. (N. S.) 323 576, 600, 608 Park Gate Waggon Works Co., In re, (1881) 17 Ch. D. 234 53 Parker v. "Black Eock " (ovfners), [1915] A. C. 725; 84 L. J. K. B. 1373— H. L. ; [1914] 2 K. B. 39; 83 L. J. K. B. 421— C. A. ... 104 V. First Avenue Hotel, Co., (1883) 24 Ch. D. 282; 49 L. T. 318; 32 W. E. 105 378 V. London County Council, (1904) 2 K. B. 501 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 561 ; 68 J. P. 239; 52 W. E. 476; 90 L. T. 415; 20 T. L. E. 271; 2 L. G. E. 662 183 V. London General Omnibus Co., (1910) 100 L. T. 409 ; 101 L. T. 623; 74 J. P. 20; 26 T. L. E. 18; 53 Sol. J. 867; 7 L. G. E. 1111 397, 467 V. Plomesgate Eural Council, (1903) 9 Com. Cas. 107 486 V. Smith, (1832) 5 C. & P. 438; 38 E. E. 828 377 Parkes v. Prescott, (1869) L. E. 4 Ex. 169; 38 L. J. Ex. 105 ; 20 L. T. 537 568, 618 Parkinson r. Garstang and Knott End E. Co., (1910) 1 K. B. 615; 79 L. J K. B. 380 ; 102 L. T. 234 ; 74 J. P. 204 ; 26 T. L. E. 290 500 V. Lee, (1802) 2 East, 314; 6 E. E. 429 530 Parlement Beige, The, (1880) 5 P. D. 197 ; 42 L. T. 273 ; 28 W. E. 642 39 Parlograph Trade Mark, In re, [1914] 2 Ch. 103; 83 L. J. Ch. 847 ... 724 Parmiter v Coupland, (1840) 6 M. & W. 106; 4 Jur. 701; 9 L. J. Ex. 202; 65 E. E. 629 ■ 549, 606 Parr v. Lancashire and Cheshire Miners' Federation, [1913] 1 Ch. 366; 82 L. J. Ch. 193 73 Parrett Navigation Co. v. Strower, (1840) 6 M. & W. 564; 8 Dowl. P. C 405; 9 L. J. Ex. 180; 55 E. E. 729 314 Parry v Smith, (1879) 4 C. P. D. 326 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 731 ; 41 L. T. 93 475 and Hopkin, In re Arbitration between, (1900) 1 Ch. 160; 69 L. J. Ch 190; 64 J. P. 137; 81 L. T. 807; 48 W. E. 345 369 Parsons' Patent, In re, (1898) A. C. 673-^H. L 709 Parsons v. Barclay & Co., (1910) 103 L. T. 196 ; 26 T. L. E. 628-C. A. 86 V. Gillespie, (1898) A. C. 239 ; 67 L. J. C. P. 21 ; 14 T. L. E. 142; 15 E. P. C. 57 740 Oii INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Parsons v. Gingell, (1847) 4 C. B. 545 ; 16 L. J. P. C. 227 ; 11 Jur. 437 293 V. Hambridge,- (1917) 33 T. L. E. 346— C. A 295 V. Lloyd, (1772) 3 Wils. 341 199 V. S. W. & Mid. Eys., [1916] W. C. & Ins. K. 254^0. A 97 V. Vestry of St. Matthew, Bethnal Green, (1867) L. R. 3 C. P. 56; 37 L. J. C. P. 62; 17 L. T. 211 , 31 Parton v. Williams, (1820) 3 B. & Aid. 330; 22 R. R. 414 „ 127 Partridge v. General Council of Medical Education, (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 90; 59 L. J. Q. B. 475; 62 L. T. 787; 38 W. R. 729 36 V. Whiteley, [1915] W. C. & Ins. B. 56— C. A 103 Pasley v. Freeman, (1789) 3 T. E. 51 ; 1 R. R. 634 ; 2 Smith, L. C. 12th ed. 71 • 532 Pater v. Baker, (1847) 3 C. B. 831; 16 L. J. C. P. 124 11 Jur. 370 628, 629, 631 Paterson v. Norris, (1914) 30 T. L. R. 39J 455 V. Wallace & Co., (1864) 1 Macq. 748 92 Paton V. Dixon, [1913] S. C. 1120 Soo 99 Patrick v. Colerick, (1838) 3 M. & W. 483; 7 L. J. Ex. 135; 49 R. R. 696 315, 340 Patterson v. Gas Light and Coke Co., (1877) 3 App. Cas. 239; 47 L. J. Ch. 402; 38 L. T. 303 700, 701 V. Landsberg, (1905) 7 P. 675 (Ct. of Sess.) 527, 531 Pattison v. Jones, (1828) 8 B. & C. 578 ; 3 M. & By. 101 ; 3 C. & P. 383 ; 7 L. J. K. B. 26; 32 R. R. 490 581, 590, 615 Paul V. Robson, [1914] L. E. 41 Ind. App. 180; 83 L. J. P. C. 304— P. C 377 V. Summerhayes, (1878) 4 Q. B. D. 9; 48 L. J. M. C. 33; 39 L. T. 574 340 Pawsey & Co. v Scottish Union and National Eire Insurance Co., (1908) Times Newspaper, Feb. 3; P. C. July 23 to Oct. 17 450 Payne v. Ecclesiastical Commissioners, (1913) 30 T. L. R. 167 661 V. Grey (No. 2), Stamford and Warrington (Earl), In re, (1911) 1 Ch. 648; 80 L. J. Ch. 361 ; 105 L. T. 12; 75 J. P. 346; 9 L. G. R. 719; 55 Sol. J. 483; 27 T. L. R. 356 30 V. Partridge, (1691) 1 Salk. 12 665, 667 V. Rogers, (1794) 2 H. Bl. 350; 3 R. R. 415 415—417 Payton v. Snelling, Lampard & Co., (1901) A. C. 308; 70 L. J. K. B. 644; 85 L. T. 287; 16 R. P. C. 283; 17 R. P. C. 48, 628 739 Peach's Patent, In re, (1902) A. C. 414; 71 L. J. P. C. 98; 87 L. T. 153; 19 R. P. C. 65 709 Peachy v. Rowland, (1863) 13 C. B. 182 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 81 ; 17 Jur. 764 115 Peacock v. Purvis, (1820) 2 B. & B. 362 ; 5 Moore, 79; 23 R. R. 466 ... 299 Pearce v. Croydon Rural District Council, (1910) 74 J. P. 429 ; 8 L. G. R. 909 ; 339, 399 Pearson v. Dublin Corporation, (1907) A. C. 361; 2 I. R. 82, 537— H. L ; 65, 181, 183 V. Lemaitre, (1843) 5 M. & G. 700; 12 L. J. Q. B. 253; 7 Jur. 748; 6 Sc. N. R. 607; 63 E. R. 447 142, 616,617 Pearson Bros. v. Valentine & Co., (1917) 34 E. P. C. 267 719 Pease v. Chaytor, (1863) 1 B. & S. 668 ; 3 B. & S. 620; 31 L. J. M. C. 1; 32 L. J. M. C. 121; 8 L. T. (N. S.) 613 756 Pechell V. Watson, (1841) 8 M. & W. 691; 11 L. J. Ex. 226; 58 R. R. 843 656 Peck V. Hindes, (1898) 67 L. J. Q. B. 272 ; 15 E. P. C. 113 ; 14 T. L. R. 164 699 Peddie, Kerr & La Grue v. Kyle, (1900) 2 Ir. R. 265, Q. B 553 Pedley v. Davis, (1861) 10 C. B. (N. S.) 492; 30 L. J. C. P. 374; 6 L. T. (N. S.) 263 758 Peebles v. Oswaldtwistle Urban Council, (1897) 1 Q. B. 626 34 Peek V. Derry, (1889) 37 Ch. D. 541; 57 L. J. Ch. 347; 69 L. T. 78; 14 App. Cas. 337— H. L 69, 633—538, 644 V. Gurney, (1873) L. R. 6 H. L. 377; 43 L. J. Ch. 19; 22 W. R. 29 ^79, 626, 627, 633, 641—543 Peel V. Lawrence, (1912) 28 T. L. R. 318— C. A 97, 98 Peggie V. Wemyss Coal Co., (1910) S. C. 93; 47 Sc. L. R. 149 (Ct. of Sess.) 101 Pelschelt v. Preis, [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 11 99 INDEX 0^ CASES. PAGE Pemberton v. Colls, (1847) 10 Q. B. 461; 16 L. J. Q. B. 403; 11 Jur. 1011 561 Perm v. Jack, (1867) L. E. 5 Eq. 81; 37 L. J. Ch. 136 715 V. Ward, (1835) 2 C. M. & E. 338 „ 218 Pennington v. Brinsop Hall Coal Co., (1877) 5 Ch. D. 769 373 Penny v. Slade, (1839) 5 Bing. N. C. 319; 7 Scott, 285; 1 Am. 539; 8 L. J. C. P. 200; 50 E. E. 698 752 0. Wimbledon Urban District Council, (1898) 2 Q. B. 212; (1899) 2 Q. B. 72; 67 L. J. Q. B. 754; 68 L. J. Q. B. 704; 63 J. P. 406; SOL. T. 615; 47 W. E. 565; 15 T. L. E. 348 ... 110, 118, 171, 388 Pennyman v. Eubanks, (1595) Cro. Eliz. 427 628 Penruddock's Case, (1597) 5 Eep. 101; 3 Co. Eep. 205 163, 409, 414 Penryn (Mayor of) v. Best, (1878) 3 Ex. D. 292; 48 L. J. Ex. 103; 38 L. T. 805 664 Penton v. Brown, (1664) 1 Sid. 186 763 V. Murduck, (1870) 22 L. T. 371 442 Pepper v. Sayer, [1914] 3 K. B. 994; 83 L. J. K. B. 1756— C. A. ... 97, 103 Peppercorn v. Hofman, (1842) 9 M. & W. 618; 12 L. J. Ex. 270 304 Percival v. Stamp, (1854) 9 Ex. 167; 23 L. J. Ex. 25 765 Perkins v. Stead, (1907) 23 T. L. E. 433 67 Perring & Co. v. Emerson's Law Times Paper, (1906) IK. B. 1; 75 L. J. K. B. 12; 54 W. E. 47; 93 L. T. 748; 22 T. L. E. 14 75, 285, 302 Perry v. Pitzhowe, (1846) 8 Q. B. 757; 15 L. J. Q. B. 239; 10 Jur. 799 164 V. Jackson, (1792) 4 T. E. 516; 2 E. E. 452 189 V. London General Omnibus Co., [1916] 2 K. B. 335— G. A. ... 95 Perth General Station Committee v. Eoss, (1897) 24 E. (H. L.) 44 Sco. 463 Peru (Eepublic of) v. Dreyfus Bros., (1888) 38 Ch. D. 348 803 Peruvian Guano Co. v. Dreyfus Brothers & Co., (1892) A. C. 166; 61 L. J. Ch. 749; 66 L. T. 536 353 Pessers, Moody & Co. v. Newell & Co., (1914) 31 E. P. C. 510 712 Peter v. Kendal, (1827) 6 B. & C. 703; 5 L. J. K. B. 282; 30 E. E. 504 667 Peter Benoit, The, (1916) 85 L. J. P. 12— H. L 459 Peters v. Jones, [1914] 2 K. B. 781; 83 L. J. K. B. 1115— C. A 224 Petition of Eight, In re, [1915] 3 K. B. 649 ; 84 L. J. K. B. 1961— C. A. 351 Petre v. Eerrers, (1892) 65 L. T. 569 256 (Lord) V. Heneage, (1701) 12 Mod. 519 236 V. Petre, (1852) 1 Drew, 371 187 Petrie v. Lamont, (1842) Car. & Marsh. 93; 3 M. & G. 702 59, 200 V. Eostrevor, The (Owners of), (1898) 2 Ir. Eep. 556 462 Pettey v. Parsons, [1914] 2 Ch. 653; 84 L. J. Ch. 81— C. A 341 Peytoe's Case, (1611) 9 Eep. 77 b ; 5 Co. Eep. 141 169 Pharmaceutical Society v. Jacks, (1911) 2 K. B. 115 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 767; 104 L. T. 640; 75 J. P. 351; 27 T. L. E. 373 473 V. Nash, (1911) 1 K. B. 520; 80 L. J. K. B. 416; 103 L. T. 802; 75 J. P. 151; 55 Sol. J. 156; 27 T. L. E. 147 473 Philippart v. William Whiteley, Ltd., Philippart's Trade Mark " Diabolo," In re, (1908) 2 Ch. 274; 77 L. J. Ch. 650; 99 L. T. 291; 24 T. L. E. 707; 25 E. P. C. 565 728 Philips V. Eobinson, (1826) 4 Bing. 106; 12 Moo. 308; 6 L. J. C. P. Ill; 29 E. E. 518 270 Phillips V. Berryman, (1783) 3 Doug. 286 176 V. Claggett, (1843) 11 M. & W. 84; 12 L. J. Ex. 275 171, 188 V. Eyre, (1870) L. E. 6 Q. B. 1; 40 L. J. Q. B. 28; 10 B. & 8. 1004 123, 124 V. Harbro Eubber Co., (1919) 36 E. P. C. 79— C. A 696 V. Homfray, (1871) L. E. 6 Ch. 770; (1883) 24 Ch. D. 439; 52 L. J. Ch. 833; 49 L. T. (N. S.) 5; (1890) 44 Ch. D. 694; 59 L. J. Ch. 647; 62 L. T. 897; 39 W. E. 45 51, 349, 351 V Naylor, (1859) 4 H. & N. 655 ; 28 L. J, Ex. 225 ; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 996 649 PhiUipson V. Hayter, (1870) L. E. 6 C. P. 38; 40 L. J. C. P. 14; 23 L. T. (N. S.) 556 566 Philp V. Squire, (1791) Peake, 114; 3 E. E. 659 228 Philpot v. Bath, (1904) 20 T. L. E. 589; 21 T. L. E. 634 344, 357 Philpott V. Kelley, (1836) 3 A. & E. 106; 4 N. & M. 611 186, 245, 246 GIV INDEX or CASES. PAGE Philpott V. Lehain, (1877) 35 L. T. (N. S.) 855 308 Phipps V. New Claridge's Hotel, Ltd., (1905) 22 T. L. R. 49 240, 455 Pickard v. Smith, (1861) 10 C. B. (N. S.) 470; 4 L. T. (N. S.) 470 112—114 Pickavance v. Pickavanoe, (1901) P. 60; 70 L. J. P. 14; 84 L. T. 62 765 Pickering ■;;. Belfast Corporation, (1911) 2 Ir. E. 224 406 V. Rudd, (1815) 4 Camp. 219; 1 Stark. 56; 16 E. E. 777 333 V. Truste, (1796) 7 T. E. 53 279 Pickford v. Grand Junction E. Co., (1841) 8 M. & W. 372; 9 Dowl. P. C. 766; 2 Ely. Cas. 592; 10 L. J. Ex. 342; 5 Jur. 731; 58 E. E. 742 ^ Picton, The, (1910) P. 46; 79 L. J. P. 53; 101 L. T. 917; 11 Asp. M. C. 358 459 Pictou (Municipality of) v. Geldert, (1893) A. C. 524; 63 L. J. C. P. 37; 69 L. T. 510; 42 W. E. 114 28, 32 Pidgeon V. Legge, (1857) 5 W. E. 649 109 Pidoux and Cook v. Benckendorff, Berger & Co., (1914) 31 E. P. C. 66 62 Pierce v. Ellis, (1856) 6 Ir. C. L. E. 55 603 V. Street, (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 397 643, 658 Piggott V. Birtles, (1836) 1 M. & W. 441; 2 Gale, 18; Tyr. & G. 729; 5 L. J. Ex. 193; 46 E. E. 349 287, 301, 308, 313 V. Middlesex County Council, (1909) 1 Ch. 134; 77 L. J. Ch. 813; 99 L; T. 662; 72 J. P. 461; 52 Sol. J. 698; 6 L. G. E. 1177 ; 410 Pike V. Carter, (1825) 3 Bing. 78; 10 Moore, 376 755 V. Nicholas, (1869) L. E. 5 Ch. 251; 39 L. J. Ch. 435; 18 W. E. 321 693, 694 Pilgrim V. Simmonds, (1911) 105 L. T. 241; 75 J. P. 427; 9 L. G. E. 966 395 Pilkington v. Riley, (1849) 3 Ex. 739; 18 L. J. Ex. 323; 6 D. & L. 628 134 Pillott V. Wilkinson, (1864) 3 H. & C. 345; 34 L. J. Ex. 22 241, 243 Pilmore v. Hood, (1838) 5 B. N. C. 97; 6 Sc. 827; 1 Am. 390; 7 Dowl. P. C. 136; 8 L. J. C. P. 11; 50 E. E. 622 545 Pirn V. Currell, (1840) 6 M. & W. 234; 55 E. E. 600 666 Pimm V. Clement-Talbot, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 350— C. A 101 Pinet et Cie. v. Maison Louis Pinet, Ltd., (1898) 1 Ch. 179; 67 L. J. Ch. 41; 77 L. T. 613; 46 W. E. 506; 15 E. P. C. 65; 14 T. L. E. 87 719, 722 Pinn V. Eew, (1916) 32 T. L. E. 451 441, 458 Pirie & Sons, Ltd. v. Kintore (Earl of), (1906) A. C. 478; 75 L. J. P. C. 96, H. L. ; affirming, (1904) 5 P. 818 (Ct. of Sess.) 402 Pitt V. Donovan, (1813) 1 M. & S. 639; 14 E. E. 635 629 V. Shew, (1821) 4 B. & Aid. 206 309 Pittard v. Oliver, (1891) 1 Q. B. 474; 60 L. J. Q. B. 219; 64 L. T. 768; 39 W. E. 311 583, 584 Plant V. Cotterill, (1860) 5 H. & N. 430; 29 L. J. Ex. 198 ... 184, 185, 259 Plantza v. Glasgow Corporation, (1910) S. C. 786; 47 Sc. L. E. 688 (Ct. of Sess.) 501, 507 Playfair v. Musgrove, (1845) 14 M. & W. 239; 15 L. J. Ex. 26; 9 Jur. 783 767 Plevin -v. Henshall, (1833) 10 Bing. 24 279, 280 Plimpton V. Malcolmson, (1876) 3 Ch. D. 531 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 605 ; 34 L. T. 340 701, 703, 706, 707, 708 Plomley, Re, (1882) 47 L. T. 283 4 Pluckwell V. Wilson, (1832) 5 0. & P. 375 457 Plumb V. Cobden Elour Mills Co., [1914] A. C. 62; 83 L. J. K. B. 107, H. L.; (1913) 108 L. T. 161— C. A 104 Plumley v. Ewart & Son, [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 317— C. A 101 Plunkett V. Cobbett, (1804) 5 Esp. 136 616 Poisson and Woods v. Eobertaon and another, (1902) 86 L. T. 302; 50 W. R. 186. 260 247 Polhill V. Walter, (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 114; 37 R. E. 344 533 Polkinhorn r. Wright, (1845) 8 Q. B. 197; 15 L. J. Q. B. 70; 10 Jur. 11 167 Pollen V. Brewer, (1859) 7 C. B. (N. S.) 371; 6 Jur. (N. S.) 609 330 V. Welch, [1914] 3 K. B. 1020; 83 L. J. K. B. 1852— C. A 101 INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Polley V. Fordham, [1904] 2 K. B. 345; 20 T. L. E. 639; 91 L. T. 525 198, 746—748, 753, 755, 756, 758 Polsue & Alfieri v. Bushmer, (1907) A. C. 121; (1906) 1 Ch. 234; 75 L. J. Oh. 79 ; 76 L. J. Ch. 365 ; 54 W. E. 161 ; 96 L. T. 510 ; 23 T. L. E. 362. {And see Eushmer v. Polsue & Alfieri 139 380—382, 800 Polynesian, The, (1910) P. 28; 79 L. J. P. 45'; 101 L. T. 749; 11 Asp. M. C. 354 459 Pomfret v. Eicroft, (1669) 1 Wms. Saund. 321 344 Ponting V. Noakes, (1894) 2 Q. B. 281; 63 L. J. Q. B. 549; 70 L. T. 842; 42 W. E. 506 159, 389, 430 Poole V. Longuevill, (1669) 2 Wms. Saund. 288 302 V. Stokes, (1914) 110 L. T. 1020 217 (Mayor of) v. Whitt, (1846) 15 M. & W. 571; 16 L. J. Ex. 229 ... 355 Pope V. Hills Plymouth Co., (1912) 105 L. T. 678— H. L 98 V. Outram, (1909) S. C. 230 (Ct. of Sess.) 551 Pope's Electric Lamp Co.'s Application, In re, (1911) 2 Ch. 382; 80 L. J. Ch. 682 ; 105 L. T. 580 ; 27 T. L. E. 567 ; 28 E. P. C. 629 727 Popham V. Piciiburn, (1862) f H^ft N. "891 ; 31 l! J. E^^^ (N. S.) 846 598, 603, 605 Popplewell V. Hodkinson, (1869) L. E. 4 Ex. 248; 38 L. J. Ex. 126; 20 L. T. 578 376 Postmaster-General r. Great Southern and Western Eailway, [1916] 1 Ir. E. 74— C. A 68 V. Hendon Urban District Council, [1914] 1 K. B. 564 ; 83 L. J. K. B. 618— C. A. ..•. 336 Potter V. Faulkner, (1861) 1 B. & S. 800; 31 L. J. Q. B. 30; 5 L. T. (N. S.) 455 91 V. North, (1669) 1 Wms. Saund. 347 c 118 Potts V. Guildford Syndicate, Ltd., [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 330— C. A. 106 Poulson V. Thirst, (1867) L. E. 2 C. P. 449; 36 L. J. C. P. 225; 16 L. T. 324 132 Poulton r. London and South Western E. Co., (1867) L. E. 2 Q. B. 534; 36 L. J. Q. B. 294; 17 L. T. 11 56, 79 V. Moore and others, [1915] 1 K. B. 400; 84 L. J. K. B. 462; 83 L. J. K. B. 875; 109 L. T. 976 61, 341, 342 Pounder v. North Eastern E. Co., (1892) 1 Q. B. 385; 61 L. J. Q. B. 136; 65 L. T. 679; 40 W. E. 189 153 Powell and Thomas r. Evan Jones & Co., (1905) 1 K. B. 11; 74 L. J. K. B. 115; 53 W. E."277; 92 L. T. 430; 20 T. L. E. 329; 21 T. L. E. 55; 9 Com. Cas. 166; 10 Com. Cas. 36 177, 532 V. Aiken, (1858) 4 K. & J. 343 350 V. Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co., (1894) 3 Ch. 449; 71 L. T. 393 729 V. Fall, (1880) 5 Q. B. D. 597; 49 L. J. Q. B. 428; 43 L. T. 562 404, 433, 444 i;. Gelsto'n, [1916] 2 K. B. 615 570, 571 V. Hoyland, (1851) 6 Ex. 67; 20 L. J. Ex. 82 237 V. Lanarkshire Steel Co., (1904) 6 F. 1039 (Ct. of Sess.) 100 V. Salisbury, (1828) 2 Y. & J. 391 146 V. Thorndike, (1910) 102 L. T. 600; 26 T. L. E. 399 487 Power V. Fleming, (1870) Ir. Eep. 4 C. L. 404 83 Poynter v. Buckley, (1833) 5 C. & P. 512 176, 309 Praed v. Graham, (1889) 24 Q. B. D. 53; 59 L. J. Q. B. 230; 38 W. E. 103 616 Praeger v. Bristol and ExeterE. Co., (1871) 24 L. T. 105 507 Pratt V. British Medical Association, [1919] 1 K. B. 244; 88 L. J. K. B. 628; 63 Sol. Jo. 84 21, 24 V. Martin, (1911) 2 K. B. 90; 80 L. J. K. B. 711; 105 L. T. 49; 75 J. P. 328; 27 T. L. E. 377 343 V. Swaine, (1828) 8 B. & C. 285; 2 M. & E. 350 184 Prentice v. Harrison, (1843) 4 Q. B. 852 199 Pressly v. Burnett, [1914] S. C. 874, Sco 506 Preston v. Liverpool, Manchester and Newcastle E. Co., (1856) 5 H. L. C. 605— H. L .,. 87 V. Mercer, (1656) Hardres, 60 8, 338 Ovi INDEX OP CASES. PAGE Pretty v. Bickmore, (1873) L. E. 8 C. P. 401; 28 L. T. 704; 21 W. E. 733 392, 414 Price & Co. V. The Union Lighterage Co., (1904) 1 K. B. 412; (1903) 1 K. B. 750; 72 L. J. K. B. 374 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 222 ; 52 W. E. 325; 89 L. T. 731; 20 T. L. E. 177; 9 Com. Cas. 120; 9 Asp. M. C. 398 497 V. Hewett, (1852) 8 Ex. 146; 17 Jur. 4 44 V. Messenger, (1800) 2 B. & P. 158; 3 Esp. 96; 5 E. E. 559 .... 791 ,;. Tredegar Iron and Coal Co., (1914) 68 Sol. Jo. 632 104 Price's Patent Candle Co., Ltd. v. London County Council, (1908) 2 Ch. 626; 72 J. P. 315, 429; 99 L. T. 571; 24 T. L. E. 607, 822 112, 339, 376, 380, 409, 427, 428 Prickett v. Gratrex, (1846) 8 Q. B. 1020; 15 L. J. M. C. 146; 10 Jur. 556 133, 761 Priest V. Manchester Corporation,' (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1734 380 Priestley v. Fowler, (1837) 3 M. & W. 1 ; M. & H. 305 ; 1 Jur. 987 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 42; 49 E. E. 495 88, 487 Primrose v. Waterston, (1902) 4 P. 783 (Ct. of Sess.) 576 Prince v. Lewis, (1826) 5 B. & C. 363; 3 D. & E. 121 ; 2 C. & P. 66; 4 L. J. K. B. 188; 29 E. E. 265 665 Prince of Wales' Feathers Imperial Tobacco Co. Trade Marks, In re, [1915] 2 Ch. 27; 84 L. J. Ch. 643— C. A 723, 734 Pringle v. Gloag, (1879) 10 Ch. D. 676; 48 L. J. Ch. 380; 40 L. T. 512; 27 W. E. 574 i.i2 Pritchard v. Peto, [1917] 2 K. B. 173 475 V. Torkington, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 271— C. A 104 Pritty V. Child, (1902) 71 L. J. K. B. 512; 18 T. L. E. 460 ... 481, 533, 534 Proctor V. Bayley, (1889) 42 Ch. D. 390; 59 L. J. Ch. 12; 38 W. E. 100 798 V. Bennis, (1887) 36 Ch. D. 740; 57 L. J. Bky. 11; 57 L. T. 662 707, 713 V. Cumisky, (1904) 6 F. 832 (Ct. of Sess.) 102 V. Serbino S.S. (Owners), [1915] 3 K. B. 344; 84 L. J. K. B. 1381— C. A 103 ■ V. Webster, (1885) 16 Q. B. D. 112. (And see Webster v. Proctor) 680, 694,595 Prophet V. Eoberts, (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 976— C. A 101 Prosser v. Edmonds, (1835) 1 Y. & C. 481; 41 E. E. 322 54 Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott, (1875) L. E. 10 Ch. 142; 44 L. J. Ch. 192; 31 L. T. 866 795 Pryse, In the goods of, (1904) P. 301; 73 L. J. P. 84; 90 L. T. 747 51 Pugh V. Dudley (Earl), [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 265 104 - V. Eiley Cycle Co., (1912) 28 T. L. E. 249 695 PuUeyne v. France, (1913) 67 Sol. Jo. 173— C. A 379 Pulling V. Great Eastern E. Co., (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 110; 51 L. J., Q. B. 453; 30 W. E. 798 49 Pullman v. Hill, (1891) 1 Q. B. 524; 60 L. J. Q. B. 299; 64 L. T. 691; 39 W. E. 263 .' 571, 584, 585 V. Pullman, (1919) 35 E. P. C. 240 738 Purcell V. Sowler, (1877) 1 C. P. D. 785; 2 C. P. D. 215; 46 L. J. C. P. 308; 36 L. T. 416 596, 603, 605, 606 Purfleet Belle, The, [1918] P. 72 459 Pursell V. Clement Talbot, Ltd., (1915) 111 L. T. 827— C. A 93 V. Horn, (1832) 8 A. & E. 602; 3 N. & P. 664 190 Purton V. Honnor, (1798) 1 B. & P. 205 666 Pusey V. Pusey, (1684) 1 Vern. 273; 2 White & Tudor L. C, 8th ed. 459 266 PwUbach Colliery Co. v. Woodman, [1916] A. C. 634; 84 L. J. K. B. 874— H. L 379, 380 Pym V. Great Northern E. Co., (1863) 4 B. & S. 396; 32 L. J. Q. B. 377; 11 W. E. 922 50 Pynian S.S. Co. v. Hull and Barnsley E. Co., [1915] 2 K. B. 729; 84 L. J. K. B. 1235— C. A. 484, 485 Pyne v. Dor, (1785) 1 T. E. 56 271 INDEX OF CASES. CVll QtJAEMAN V. Burnett, (1840) 6 M. & W. 499; 4 Jur. 969; 9 L. J. Ex. 308; 56 E. K. 717 108 Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co. v. Beall, (1882) 20 Ch. D. 501; 51 L. J. Ch. 874; 46 L. T. 746 794 V. Eyre, (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 674; 52 L. J. Q. B. 488; 49 L. T. 249 634, 635, 638, 639, 645, 649, 652—664, 656 Quick V. Staines, (1798) 1 B. & P. 293; 2 Esp. 57 ; 4 E. B. 801 770 Quicke i;. Chapman, (1903) 1 Ch. 659; 71 L. J. Ch. 879; 72 L. J. Ch. 373; 88 L. T. 610; 51 W. E. 452; 19 T. L. E. 284 379 Quickstep, The, (1890) 15 P. D. 196; 59 L. J. P. 66 108, 510 Quinn V. Leathern, (1901) A. C. 496; (1899) 2 Ir. E. 667, 744; 70 L. J. P. C. 76; 65 J. P. 708; 60 W. E. 139; 85 L. T. 289; 17 T. L. E. 749 4, 18, 20— 23,. 26, 26, 220, 229 Quirk V. Thomas, [1915] W. N. 91, 147 62 Each v. Ward, (1855) 4 B. & B. 702; 24 L. J. Q. B. 153; 1 Jur. (N. S.) 704 345 Eadcliffe i;. Anderson, (1858) E. B. & E. 819 326 Eadde v. Norman, (1872) L. E. 14 Eq. 348; 41 L. J. Ch. 526; 26 L. T. 788 725 Eadley v. London and North Western E. Co., (1876) 1 App. Cas. 764; 46 L. J. Ex. 578; 35 L. T. 637 502, 504, 506 V. L.C.C., (1913) 109 L. T. 162 76 Eafael v. Verelst, (1776) 2 Wm. Blacks. 983, 1063 195, 639 Eagget V. Findlater, (1873) L. E. 47 Eq. 29; 43 L. J. Ch. 64; 29 L. T. 448 : 725 Eaikes v. Townsend, (1804) 2 Sm. 9; 7 E. E. 776 162 Eainbow v. Howkins, (1904) 2 K. B. 322; 73 L. J. K. B. 641; 53 W. E. 46; 91 L. T. 149; 20 T. L. E. 608 263 Eains v. Buxton, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 637; 49 L. J. Ch. 473; 43 L. T. 88 367, 367 Ealeigh v. Kinematograph Co., (1914) 31 E. P. C. 143 721 Ealston v. Smith, (1866), 11 H. L. C. 228; 35 L. J. C. P. 49; 13 L. T. 1 699 Ealston's Patent, In re, Preston and EaUton's Patent, In re, (1909) 100 L. T. 386; 26 R. P. C. 313 711 Earn Coomar Coondoo v. Chunder Canto Mookerjee, (1876) 2 App. Cas. 186 656 Eamsay v. Margrett, (1894) 2 Q. B. 18 260 Eamus v. Dashwood, (1909) Times, March 10 527 Eand v. Craig, [1919] 1 Ch. 1— C. A 65, 79 V. Vaughan, (1835) 1 Bing. N. C. 767; 1 Scott, 670 >.l Hodg. 173; 4 L. J. C. P. 239; 41 E. E. 671 289 Eandall v. Stevens, (1863) 2 E. & B. 641 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 68 ; 18 Jur. 128 364 Eandell v. Trimen, (1856) 18 C. B. 786 533 Eangeley v. Midland E. Co., (1868) L. E. 3 Ch. 306; 37 L. J. Ch. 313; 18 L. T. 69 346 Eanson v. Piatt, (1911) 2 K. B. 291; 80 L. J. K. B. 1138; 104 L. T. 881 265 Eaphael u. Verelst, (1776) 2 W. Bl. 1065 197 Eapier v. London Tramways Co., (1893) 2 Ch. 688; 68 L. J. Ch. 36; 69 L. T. 361 403 EatcMe v. Evans, (1892) 2 Q. B. 524; 61 L. J. Q. B. 636; 66 L. T. 794; 40 W. E. 578 150, 618—620, 626, 630 Eatt V. Parkinson, (1851) 20 L. J. M. C. 208 752 Eavenga v. Mackintosh, (1824) 2 B. & C. 693; 4 D. & E. 107; 1 C. & P. 204; 2 L. J. K. B. 137; 26 E. E. 521 649 Eavenna, The, [1918] P. 297— C. A 460 Eawling ■;;. Till, (1837) 3 M. & W. 28 191 Eawlins v. Ellis, (1846) 16 M. & W. 172; 16 L. J. Ex. 5; 10 Jur. 1039 791 Eayson v. South London Tramways Co., (1893) 2 Q. B. 304; 62 L. J. Q. B. 693; 69 L. T. 491; 42 W. E. 21 ..: 196,685 Eea V. Sheward, (1837) 2 M. & W. 424; 6 L. J. Ex. 125; 46 E. E. 633 340 CVni INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Bead V. Baker, [1916] 1 K. B. 927— C. A 104 V. Coker, (1853) 13 C. B. 850; 22 L. J. C. P. 201; 17 Jur. 990 128 129 193 V. Edwards, (1864) 17 C. B. (N. S.) 245; 34 L. J. C. P.'31;' 11 L. T. 311 444, 446 V. Friendly Society of Operative StonemaaonB, &c., (1902) 2 K. B. ■ 88, 732; 71 L. J. K. B. 634, 994; 51 W. K. 11'5; 87 L. T. 493; 19 T. L. E. 20; 66 J. P. 822 19, 587 V. Great Eastern E. Co., (1868) L. E. 3 Q. B. 555 ; 18 L. T. 822; 16 W. E. 1040 50 V. Hudson, (1700) 1 Lord Eaym. 610 552 V. King, (1858) Times, Jan. 27 448 V. Stella Conduit Co., (1916) 33 E. P. C. 191— C. A 699, 700 Eeade v. Conquest, (1861) 9 C. B. (N. S.) 755; 11 C. B. (N. S.) 479; 30 L. J. C. P. 209; 31 L. J. C. P. 153; 5 L. T. (N. S.) 677 ... 692 Eecketta v. Tilling, [1915] 1 K. B. 644; 84 L. J. K. B. 342— C. A. 75, 80, 84 Eeddaway u. Banham, (1896) A. C. 199; 65 L. J. Q. B. 381 ... 719, 725, 728, 730 • 0. Bentham Hemp Spinning Co., (1892) 2 Q. B. 639; 67 L. T. 301 737, 740 Eeddell v. Stowey, (1841) 2 Moo. & E. 358; 62 E. E. 806 770 Eeddie v. Scoolt, 1795) 1 Peake, 316 230 Eedeu. Burley, (1597) Cro. Eliz. 596 ; 292, 294, 316 Bedford v. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 850... 103 v. Birley, (1822) 3 Stark. 76 205 Eedgrave v. Hurd, (1881) 20 Ch. D. 1 545 Bedhead v. Midland E. Co., (1869) L. B. 4 Q. B. 379; 38 L. J. Q. B. 169; 17 W. B. 737 478 Bedway v. MoAndrew, (1873) L. E. 9 Q. B. 74 ; 29 L. T. (N. S.) 421 ; 22 W. E. 60 655 Beed v. Nutt, (1890) 24 Q. B. D. 669; 59 L. J. Q. B. 311; 62 L. T. 635; 38 W. B. 621 178 ^— V. Taylor, (1812) 4 Taunt. 616; 13 E. E. 701 651 Eeedie v. London and North Western B. Co., (1849) 4 Exch. 244; 20 L. J. Ex. 65; 80 E. E. 541 108, 112, 113 Beeks v. Kynoch, Ltd., (1901) 18 T. L. B. 34; 50 W. E. 113— C. A. 100 Beese Biver Co. v. Smith, (1869)- L. E. 4 H. L. 64 ; 39 L. J. Ch. 849 533 Beeve v. Palmer, (1858) 5 C. B. (N. S.) 84, 93; 28 L. J. C. P. 168; 6 Jur. (N. 8.) 916 255 Beg. V. Adama, (1888) 22 Q. B; D. 66; 58 L. J. M. C. 1; 59 L. T. (N. S.) 903 ; 571 V. Aden, (1873) 12 Cox, 512; 29 L. T. (N. S.) 467 259 V. Ardley, (1871) 12 Cox, 23 526 V. Aspinall, (1876) 2 Q. B. D. 48 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 145 ; 36 L. T. (N. S.) 297 '. 541, 561 V. Barnardo, (1889) 23 Q. B. D. 305; 58 L. J. Q. B. 553; 61 ■ L. T. 547; 37 W. E. 789 635 V. (1891) 1 Q. B. 194 216 V. Birchall, (1866) 4 E. & P. 1087 511 V. Bishop, (1880) 5 Q. B. D. 259 216 V. Bolton, (1841) 1 Q. B. 66; 4 P. & D. 679; 10 L. J. M. C. 49; 5 Jur. 1154; 55 B. B. 209 577, 753 V. Brickhall, (1864) 33 L. J. M. C. 156 751 V. Carden, (1879) 5 Q. B. D. 1; 49 L. J. M. C. 1; 41 L. T. (N. S.) 604 604 V. Clarence, (1888) 22 Q. B. D. 23; 5 L. J. M. C. 10; 59 L. T. 780; 37 W. E. 166 193, 495 — — V. Cockshott, (1898) 1 Q. B. 582 750 — — V. Comptroller-General of Patents, Tomlinson, Ex parte, (1899) 1 Q. B. 909; 68 L. J. Q. B. 568; 47 W. E. 567; 80 L. T. 777; 15 T. L. E. 310; 16 B. P. C. 233 701 V. Coney, (1882) 8 Q. B. D. 534; 51 L. J. M. C. 66; 46 L. T. (N. S.) 307 192 D. Cooper, (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 510; 46 L. J. M. C. 219; 36 L. T. (N. S.) 671 524 V. Cotesworth, (1704) 6 Mod. 172 190 INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Beg. V. Dayman, (1857) 7 E. & B. 672; 26 L. J. M. C. 128; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 744 754 - i;. De Banks, (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 29; 58 L. J. M. C. 132; 50 L. T. (N. S.) 427 259 v. Druitt, (1867) 10 Cox C. C. 592 3 V. Flattery, (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 410; 46 L. J. M. C. 130; 36 L, T. (N. S.) 82 193 ii. Gordon, (1889) 23 Q. B. D. 354; '58 L. J. M. C. 117; 60 L. T. 872 524 V. Great Yarmouth (Justices of), (1850) 4 New Sess. Cas. 313 ... 758 u. Green, (1861) 8 Cox C. C. 441 204 V. Gyngall, (1893) 2 Q. B. 232 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 559 ; 69 I>. T. 481 5, 217 V. Hassall, (1861) 30 L. J. M. C. 175; 4 L. T. (N. S.) 561; 9 W. E. 708 : 259 V. Holbrook, (1877) 3 Q. B. D. 60; 47 L. J. Q. B. 35; 37 L. T. (N. S.) 530 568 V. Hopley, (1860) 2 F. & F. 202 218 V. Howes, (1860) 3 E. & E. 332; 30 L. J. M. C. 47 ; 7 Jur. (N. S.) 22 4 V. Hughes, (1879) 4 Q. B. D. 614; 40 L. T. 685 750 v. Jackson, (1891) 1 Q. B. 671; 60 L. J. Q. B. 346; 64 L. T. 679; 39 W. K. 407 5, 217, 228 V. Jones, (1870) 11 Cox C. C. 544; 22 L. T. 2i7 511 <;. (1898) 1 Q. B. 119; 67 L. J. Q. B. 41; 77 L. T. 503; 46 W. E. 191; 19 Cox C. C. 87; 14 T. L. E. 79 528 t: Kew, (1872) 12 Cox C. C. 355 511 V. Lefroy, (1873) L. E. 8 Q. B. 134; 42 L. J. Q. B. 121; 28 L. T. 132 745 V. Light, (1857) 1 Dears. & Bell, 332; 7 Cox C. C. 389; 27 L. J. M. C. 1; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 1130 912 783 V. McDonald, (1885) 15 Q. B. D. 323; 52 L. T. 583; 33 W. E. 735 44 V. Manchester (Justices of), (1899) 1 Q. B. 571; 68 L. J. Q. B. 358; 63 J. P. 360; 47 W. E. 410; 80 L. T. 531 745 V. Marsden, (1868) L. E. 1 C. C. E. 131; 37 L. J. M. C. 80; 18 L. T. 298 783 V. Miles, (1890) 24 Q. B. D. 42S 179 V. Morris, (1867) 10 Cox C. C. 480 752 V. Munslow, (1895) 1 Q. B. 758; 64 L. J. M. C. 138; 72 L. T. 301; 43 W. E. 495 547 V. O'Shay, (1898) 19 Cox C. C. 76 193 V. Pratt, (1855) 4 E. & B. 860; 24 L. J. M. C. 113; 1 Jur. (N. S.) 681 343 V. Riley, (1853) 1 Dears. & Pearce C. C. 149; 22 L. J. M. C. 48; 17 Jur. 189 232, 249 V. Eobinson, (1840) 12 A. & E. 672 179 V. Eoebuck, (1856) 7 Cox, 126 526, 530 V. Saunders, (1867) L. B. 1 C. C. E. 75; 36 L. J. M. C. 87; 16 L. T. 331 790 V. Simmonds, (1893) 57 J. P. 324 758 I'. Southport (Mayor, &c., of), (1901) 65 J. P. 184 393 V. Studd, (1866) 14 W. E. 806 329 V. Suter, (1867) 10 Cox, 577 526 ■ V. Swindall, (1846) 2 C. & K. 230; 2 Cox C. C. 141 511 V. Taylor, (1895) 59 J. P. 393 204, 211 V. Train, (1862) 2 B. & S. 640; 31 L. J. M. C. 169; 10 W. E. 539; 127 E. E. 513 389 -v. Truscott, (1899) 81 L. T. 188 751 V. Walker, (1854) 1 Dears. & Pearce C. C. 358; 23 L. J. M. C. 123; 6 Cox C. C. 371 783 V. Watts, (1703) 1 Salk. 357 388 „. Weil, (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 701; 47 L. T. 630; 31 W. E. 60 ... 210, 784 Eeginald, The, (1909) P. 43; 97 L. T. 608; 10 Asp. M. C. 519 458 Eesistered Trade Mark No. 37, 760 of David Gestetner, (1908) 1 Ch. 513; (1907) 2 Ch. 478; 76 L. J. Ch. 616; 77 L. J. Ch. 298; 26 E. P. C. 156; 98 L. T. 121 728 ex INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Eesiatra.r of Trade Marks v. Du Cros, [1913] A. C. 624; 83 L. J. Ch. 1 726 Eeichardt v. Shard, (1914) 31 T. L. B. 24— C. A 64, 153 Eeid V. Fairbanks, (1853) 13 C. B. 692; 22 L. J. C. P. 206; 17 Jur. 918 273, 276 Beigate Eural Council v. Sutton District Water Co., (1908) 99 L. T. 168; 72 J. P. 301; 6 L. G. E. 936; reversed (1909) W. N. 28; 78 L. J. K. B. 315 ; 73 J.'P. 161 ; 25 T. L. E. 266 ; 53 Sol. J. 243 343, 395 BeiUy V. Thompson, (1877) 11 Ir. Bep. C. L. 238 321 E«inhardt v. Mentasti, (1889) 42 Ch. D. 685; 58 L. J. Ch. 787; 61 L. T. 328; 38 W. B. 10 385 Bemorquage k H^lice (Soci^t^ anonyme) v. Bennetts, (1911) 1 K. B. 243; 80 L. J. K. B. 228; 27 T. L. B; 77; 16 Com. Cas. 24 146 Bendall v. Blair, (1890) 45 Ch. D. 139 127 Benee HyafBl, The, [1916] W. N. 292— C. A 178 Benfrew v. McCrae, [1914] S. 0. 539 Sco 104 Bepublic of Peru v. Dreyfus Bros., (1888) 38 Ch. D. 348 803 Eevis V. Smith, (1856) 18 C. B. 126 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 195 ; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 614 577 Eex V. Amendt, [1915] 2 K. B. 276; 84 L. J. K. B. 1259— C. A 764 V. Amphlit, (1825) 4 B. & C. 35; 6 D. & E. 125; 28 E. B. 206 ... 567 V. Antonelli, (1906) 70 J. P. 4 603 V. Armagh Justices, [1913] 2 Ir. B. 410 746 V. Arnesby, (1820) 3 B. & Aid. 584 4, 218 V. Astor, Ex parte Isaacs, (1913) 30 T. L. B. 10— D. C 745 o. Ball, [1911] A. C. 47— H. L 647 V. Barnard, (1837) 7 C. & P. 784 528 0. Barraclough, (1906) 1 K. B. 201; 75 L. J. K. B. 77; 70 J. P. 14; 54 W. E. 147; 94 L. T. Ill; 21 Cox, C. C. 91; 22 T. L. E. 41 549 i,. Barron, [1914] 2 K. B. 570; 83 L. J. K. B. 776—0. C. A. ... 752 V. Bartholomew, (1908) 1 K. B. 554; 77 L. J. K. B. 275; 72 J. P. 79; 98 L. T. 284; 24 T. L. B. 238; 6 L. G. B. 262; 21 Cox, C. C. 556 343 V. Bath County Court Judge, (1908) 1 K. B. 958; 77 L. J. K. B. 402; 72 J. P. 67; 98 L. T. 505 ; 6 L. G. B. 160 343,395 V. Beacontree Justices, [1916] 3 K. B. 388 ; 84 L. J. K. B. 2230... 747 r. Beesby and another, Justices of Birmingham, (1909) 1 K. B. 849; 78 L. J. K. B. 482; 100 L. T. 486; 73 J. P. 234; 26 T. L. B. 337; 35 Sol. J. 289 749 V. Boulter, (1908) 72 P. 188 600, 603 V. Bow County Court Begistrar, [1914] 3 K. B. 266; 83 L. J. K. B. 1806 106 V. Brentford Justices, Long, Ex parte, (1911) 102 L. T. 325 ; 8 L. G. E. 234; 74 J. P. 110; 26 T. L. E. 225 ; 22 Cox, C. C. 304 749 v. Bridport County Court Judge, Edwards, Ex parte, (1906) 2 K. B. 108; 74 L. J. K. B. 464; 92 L. T. 571; 53 W. B. 527; 69 J. P. 221; 3 L. G. E. 679 770, 774 I. Brown (Morton), Ainsworth, Ex parte, (1910) 74 J. P. 53 ... 191, 211 V. Burchett, (1722) 1 Stra. 567 268 V. Burdett, (1820) 4 B. & Aid. 95; 22 E. E. 539 568 V. Butcher, (1909) 99 L. T. 622; 72 J. P. 464; 24 T. L. B. 797; 52 Sol. J. 716; 21 Cox, C. C. 697 721, 722 V. Byles, Ex parU Hollidge, (1913) 108 L. T. 270— D. C 746 V. Carlile, (1819) 3 B. & Aid. 167; 1 Chit. 451; 22 E. B. 338 ... 600 V. (1834) 6 C. & P. 636; 40 B. B. 832 160, 154 V. Carter, (1904) 68 J. P. 466 182 - V. Clarke, Crippen, Ex paHe, (1910) 103 L. T. 636; 27 T. L. B. 32 746 V. Clay, (1910) 74 J. P. 56 121 r. Cork Justices, [1910] 2 Ir. E. 271 746 V. Cork Justices ,Jl910] 2 Ir. B. 668 746 V. Cork Justices, [1913] 2 Ir. B. 391 748 r. Costello (or ConoUy), (1910) 1 K. B. 28; 79 L. J. K. B 90- 101 L. T. 784; 74 J. P. 16; 26 T. L. B. 31; 54 Sol. J 13- 22 Cox, C, C. 215 533 539 INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Eex 1-. Cotton, (1751) Parker, 112 315 V. Creevy, (1813) 1 M. & S. 273; 14 E. R. 427 579 V. Crompton Urban Council, (1902) 86 L. T. 762 ; 66 J. P. 566 ; 20 Cox, C. C. 243 393 V. Daly, Newson, Ex parte, (1911) 104 L. T. 892; 75 J. P. 333 • 311 319 V. Davies, (1909) 1 K. B. 892; 78 L. J. K. B. 363; 100 L. T. 305 ; ' 73 J. P. 151; 25 T. L. E. 279 748 V. Davison, [1913] 2 Ir. B. 342 746 V. Delvin Union, (1908) 2 Ir. R. 15 (K. B. D.) 213 V. Dibdin, Thompson, Ex parte, (1910) P. 57; 79 L. J. K. B. 517; 101 L. T. 722; 26 T. L. E. 150. {And see Thompson r. Dibdin and others.) 15, 588 V. Doherty and others, Isaacs, Ex parte, (1910) 74 J. P. 304; 26 T. L. E. 502 745 V. Dublin Justices, (1904) 2 Ir. E. 75 746 V. Dymock, (1901) 49 W. E. 618; 17 T. L. E. 593 449 V. Edgar, (1914) 109 L. T. 416 642 V. Emerson, [1913] 2 Ir. E. 377 746 V. Eleet, (1818) 1 B. & Aid. 379; 19 R. E. 344 599 V. French, Roberts, Ex paHe, (1902) 1 K. B. 637 ; 71 L. J. K. B. 382;66 J. P. 487; 50 W. E. 555;86L. T. 587; 18 T. L. E. 440; 20 Cox, C. C. 200 750 V. George, (1901) 65 J. P. 729 122 V. Gillespie, West Ham Overseers, Ex panrte, (1904) 1 K. B. 174; 73 L. J. K. B. 106; 52 W. R. 367; 90 L. T. 15 ; 2 L. G. R. 59; 68 J. P. 11; 20 T. L. R. 113 319, 743, 758 i;. Goodhall, (1821) R. & R. 461 524 V. Grubb, [1915] 2 K. B. 683; 84 L. J. K. B. 1744^C. C. A. ... 235 V. Halkett, Butinck, Ex parte, (1910) 1 K. B. 50; 79 L. J. K. B. 12; 101 L. T. 603; 74 J. P. 12; 22 Cox, C. C. 202 755 V. Harvey, (1823) 2 B. & C. 257 ; 3 D. & E. 464 ; 2 L. J. K. B. 4 ; 26 E. E. 337 551 V. Hertford Union; Ex parte Pollard, (1915) 111 L. T. 716 181 V. Hewitt (Mary), (1912) 28 T. L. E. 378 453 v. Howarth, (1828) 1 Moo. C. C. 207 209, 791 V. Joachim (Maud), (1912) 28 T. L. R. 380 453 V. Jones, (1910) 26 T. L. R. 226; 74 J. P. 168 121 V. Kempthorne, (1910) 27 T. L. R. 132; 55 Sol. J. 126 191 V. Kettle, (1905) 1 K. B. 212; 74 L. J. K. B. 254; 69 J. P. 55; 53 W. R. 364; 92 L. T. 59; 21 T. L. R. 151; 3 L. G. R. 112; 20 Cox, C. C. 753 746 V. King, (1914) 110 li. T. 788— C. C. A 47 V. Lewes Prison Governor; Ex parte Doyle, (1917) 86 Ii. J. K. B. 1514 746 . V. Londonderry (Justices of), (1902) 2 Ir. Rep. 266 750, 753 V. Louth Justices, (1904) 2 Ir. R. 64 751 V. Lynch, (1903) 1 K. B. 444; 72 L. J. K. B. 167; 67 J. P. 41; 51 W. R. 619; 88 L. T. 26; 19 T. L. R. 163; 20 Cox, C. C. 468 451 V. Lyndon, Moffat, Ex parte, (1908) 72 J. P. 227; 6 L. G. E. 890 458 V. Madge, Ex parte, Isaacs, (1913) 30 T. L. E. 10— D. C 745 V. Marshland, Smeeth, and Fen Commissioners, [1920] 1 K. B. 155; 17 L. G. E. 679 181, 431 V. Martin, Smythe, Ex parte, (1911) 2 K. B. 450; 80 L. J. K. B. 876; 105 L. T. 220; 75 J. P. 425 ; 27 T. L. E. 460; 22 Cox, C. C. 560 747, 749 V. Mawbey, (1796) 6 T. R. 619; 3 R. E. 282 534 - V. Milton, (1827) 1 M. & M. 107 157 V. Mitchell; Ex parte, Livesey, [1913] 1 K. B. 561; 82 L. J. K. B. 163 749 V. Montgomery and others. Justices, Long, Ex parte, (1910) 102 L. T 325; 74 J. P. 110; 26 T. L. E. 225 ; 8 L. G. E. 234 ... 749, 750 V. Moore, (1832) 3 B. & Aid. 184 ; 1 L. J. M. C. 30 ; 37 E. E. 383 154 V. Morton-Brown, Ainsworth, Ex parte, (1910) 74 J. P. 53 ... 191, 211 V. Myers, (1786) 1 T. R. 265; 1 R. R. 199 791 V. Norfolk County Council, (1910) 26 T. L. E. 269 33 INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Eex V. Nottinghamshire Justices, Pitney, Ex parte, (1909) 73 J. P. 183 749 V. Oakley, (1832) 4 B. & Ad. 307; 1 N. & M. 58 329 V. Oliver, (1717) Bunbury, 14 258 V. Owen, (1908) 72 J. P. 60 747 V. Pagham CommiBsioners , (1828) 8 B. & C. 355; 2 M & E. 468; 6L. J. K. B. 338; 32 a. E. 406 11, 161 V. Paine, (1696) 5 Mod. 163 569 V. Parke, (1903) 2 K. B. 432; 72 L. J. K. B. 839; 67 J. P. 421; 89 L. T. 439; 52 W. R. 215; 19 T. L. E. 627 599,602,745 V. Pease, (1832) 4 B. & Ad. 30; 1 N. & M. 690; 2 L. J. M. C. 26; 38 E. E. 207 402 V. Pedly, (1834) 1 A. & E. 822 ; 3 N. & M. 627 ; 3 L. J. M. C. 119 ; 40 R. R. 444 415, 416, 418 V. Philbrick & Morey, Edwards, Ex parte, (1905) 2 K. B. 108; 74 L. J. K. B. 464 ; 69 J. P. 221 ; 53 W. E. 527 ; 92 L. T. 571 ; 3L. G. E. 679 311, 319 V. Phillips (Joseph), Phillips (Philip), Phillips (David), (1909) 73 J. P. 458; 25 T. L. E. 764 721, 722 V. Pierce, (1683) 2 Shower, 327 879 V. Pinckney, (1904) 2 K. B. 84 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 448 ; 68 J. P. 361 ; 52 W. E. 513; 90 L. T. 468; 20 T. L. E. 363 216, 750 V. Pinney, (1832) 5 C. & P. 254; 3 B. & Ad. 947; 37 E. E. 599 38, 205 V. Plaisted, (1909) 22 Cox, C. C. 5 547 V. Porter, (1910) 1 K. B. 369 ; 79 L. J. K. B. 241 ; 102 L. T. 255 ; 74 J. P. 159 ; 26 T. L. E. 200; 22 Cox, 0. C. 295 636, 744 V. Pridgeon, (1910) 2 K. B. 543; 79 L. J. K. B. 805; 103 L. T. 539; 26 T. L. E. 570; 54 Sol. J. 617 643 -v. Ehodes, (1915) 79 J. P. 527 134 V. Eodley, [1913] 3 K. B. 468; 82 L. J. K. B. 1070— C. C. A. ... 647 V. Eosewell, (1699) 2 Salk. 459 163 V. SchuU Justices and Whitley, (1910) 2 Ir. E. 601 ; 44 I. L. T. 120 747 V. Shipley, (1784) 4 Doug. 73 561 V. Shuttleworth, Tickle, Ex parte, (1908) 72 J. P. 329; 6 L. G. E. 1026 743, 758 V. Simpson, Ex parte, Smithson, [1914] 1 K. B. 66 ; 83 L. J. K. B. 233— D. C 746 V. Skinner, (1771) Lofft, 55 576 v. South Shields Licensing Justices, (1911) 2 K. B. 1 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 809; 105 L. T. 41; 75 J. P. 299; 27 T. L. E. 330; 55 Sol. J. 386; 22 Cox, C. C. 431 746 V. Southampton Justices, L/ebern, Ex parte, (1907) 96 L. T. 697 ; 71 J. P. 332 751 V. Sunderland (Justices of), (1901) 2 K. B. 357; 70 L. J. K. B. 946 ; 65 J. P. 584, 598; 85 L. T. 183; 17 T. L. E. 484, 551 746 V. Swifte, [1913] 2 Ir. E. 113—0. A 283 V. Tempest, (1902) 86 L. T. 585; 66 J. P. 472 746 V. Thetford County Court Eegistrar, [1914] W. N. 438 106 . V. Thompson, (1909) 2 K. B. 614 ; 78 L. J. K. B. 1085 ; 100 L. T. 970; 73 J. P. 403; 25 T. L. E. 651 ; 7 L. G. E. 979 749, 750, 788 V. Trafford, (1831) 1 B. & Ad. 874; 8 Bing. 204; 1 Moo. & Sc. 401; 2 Cr. & J. 265; 34 E. E. 680 161 V. Turner, (1910) 1 K. B. 346; 79 L. J. K. B. 176; 102 I>. T. 367; 74 J. P. 81 ; 26 T. L. E. 112; 54 Sol. J. 164 127 V. Tyrone Justices, (1906) 2 Ir. E. 124 752 V. Tyrone Justices (1912) 2 Ir. E. 44 755 V. Vantandillo, (1815) 4 M. & S. 73 ; 16 E. E. 389 494 V. Walker, (1901) 65 J. P. 729 122 V. Ward, (1836) 4 A. & E. 384; 6 N. & M. 38; 1 H. & W. 703; 5 L. J. K. B. 221; 43 E. R. 364 389 V. Waterford (Justices of), (1901) 2 Ir. E. 548 746 v. Watson, (1788) 2 T. E. 199; 1 R. E. 461 58 V. Watson, [1916] 2 K. B. 385; 85 L. J. K. B. 1142— C. C. A. 238 V. Weir, (1823) 1 B. & C. 288; 2 D. & E. 444 788 V. Whitaker, [1914] 3 K. B. 1283; 84 L. J. K. B. 225— C. C. A. 532 V. Whitaker Wright, (1904) Times, Jan. 27 525 INDEX OF CASES. oxiii Eex V. White, (1912) 107 L. T. 528— C. C. A ^267 V. Wilkins, (1907) 2 K. B. 380 ; 76 L. J. K. B. 722 : 71 J. P 327 • 96 L. T. 721 745 753 V. Williams, (J910) 26 T. L. E. 290 : ...'.' ." ' 217 V. Williams, Ex parte, Phillips, [1914] 1 K. B. 608; 83 L. J. K. B. 528— D. C 746 V. Wilts and Berks Canal Co., Berkshire County Councii, Ex parte, [1912] 3 K. B. 623— D. C 33 V. Windham, cited in Harman v. Tappenden, (1801) 1 East, at P- 561 , 58 V. Zossenheim, (1908) 20 T. L. R. 121 746 Eey r. Lecouturier, (1908) 2 Ch. 715; 78 L. J. Ch. 181; 98 K T. 197; 25 E. E. C. 265. (And see Lecouturier v. Eey.). ... 719, 722, 735 736 738 Eeynolds v. Ashby & Son, (1904) A. C. 466; (1905) 1 K. B 87 ; 72 L. J K. B. 61; 73 L. J. K. B. 946; 53 W. E. 129; 91 K T. 607; 20 T. L. E. 766 ! 299" V. Clarke, (1725) 2 Lord Eaym. 1399 338 V. Tilling, Ltd., (1903) 20 T. L. E. 57; 19 T. L. E. 539 504 Ehodes v. Hull, (1857) 26 L. J. Ex. 265 767 V. Moules, (1895) 1 Ch. 236; 64 L. J. Ch. 122; 71 L. T. 559; 43 W. E. 99 272 V. Smethurst, (1840) 4 M. & W. 42 ; 6 M. & W. 351; 4 Jur. 702; 9 L. J. Ex. 330; 51 E. E. 461 184 Ehymney Iron Co. v. Gelligaen District Council, [1917] 1 K. B. 589 431 Eice V. Eeed, (1900) 1 Q. B. 64; 69 L. J. Q. B. 33; 81 L. T. 410 280 V. Swansea Vale (Owners of Ship), (1910), 102 L. T. 270; 26 T. L. E. 276; 3 B. W. C. C. 152— C. A 102 Eich V. Basterfield, (1847) 4 0. B. 783; 16 L. J. C. P. 273; 11 Jur. 696 416, 418, 419 V. Woolley, (1831) 7 Bing. 651 ; 5 M. & P. 663 ; 9 L. J. C. P. 219 ; 33 E. E. 596 290, 315 Eichards v. Harper, (1866) L. E. 1 Ex. 199 377 V. Jenkins, (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 451; 17 Q. B. D. 644; 66 L. J. Q. B. 293; 66 L. T. 591 269, 270, 774 ■ V. Johnston, (1859) 4 H. & N. 660; 28 L. J. Ex. 322; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 520 774 V. Morris, [1915] 1 K. B. 221 ; 84 L. J. K. B. 621 ; 110 L. T. 496— C. A 102, 103 V. Eichards, (1844) 2 Moo. & E. 567; 62 E. E. 831 622 V. Eoae, (1854) 9 Exch. 218; 23 L. J. Ex. 3; 96 E. E. 675 Ill V. West Middlesex Waterworks Co., (1885) 16 Q. B. D. 660; 54 L. J. Q. B. 551; 33 W. E. 902 ■ 78, 85 Eichardson v. Atkinson, (1723) 1 Stra. 576 236, 246 • V. Denton Colliery Co., (1913) 109 L. T. 370— C. A 102, 614 V. Morris, (1914) 110 L. T. 496 102, 103 • V. Silvester, (1873) L. E. 9 Q. B. 34; 43 L. J. Q. B. 1; 29 L. T. 393 641 — ^ V. Trundle, (1860) 8 C. B. (N. S.) 474; 29 L. J. C. P. 310; 2 L. T. (N. S.) 568 776 Eickards v. Bartram, (1908) 25 T. L. E. 181 72, 572 V. Lothian, [1913] A. C. 263; 82 L. J. P. C. 42— P. C 435, 453 Eicket V. Metropolitan E. Co., (1867) L. E. 2 H. L. 175; 36 L. J. Q. B. 205; 16 L. T. 642; 6 B. & S. 149, 166— H. L 26, 386, 388 Eicketts v. Tilling, [1916] 1 K. B. 644; 84 L. J. K. B. 342— C. A. 75, 80, 84 Eiddell v. Clydesdale Horse Co., (1886) 12 P. 976 (Ct. of Sess.) 601 V. Pakeman, (1835) 2 C. M. & E. 30 199, 655 Eideal v. Fort, (1866) 11 Ex. 847; 25 L. J. Ex. 204 766 Eidge V. English Illustrated Magazine, (1913) 29 T. L. E. 692 ... 657, 722 ■;;. Young, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 324 98 Eidgway v. Stafford (Lord), (1851) 6 Ex. 404; 20 L. J. Ex. 226 309 Eiding v. Smith, (1876) 1 Ex. D. 91 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 281; 24 W. E. 487 144, 620, 627 Eiggs, In re, Lovell, Ex parte, (1901) 2 K. B. 16; 70 L. J. K. B. 541; 41 W. E. 624; 84 L. T. 428; 8 Mans. 233 327 Eiley v. Pugh, (1914) 31 E. P. 0. 266— H. L 698 C.T. h CXIV INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Eipley's Trade Mark, In re, (1898) 78 L. T. 367; 77 L. T. 495; 14 T. L. E. 299; 15 E. P. C. 151 728 Eipon (Earl) v. Hobart, (1834) 3 M. & K. 169; 3 L.. J. Ch. 146; 41 E. E. 40 803, 804 Eisdale v. " Kilmarnock " (Owners), [1915] 1 K. B. 603; 84 L. J. K. B. 298; 59 Sol. J. 145— C. A 102, 103 Eiseley v. Ryle, (1843) 11 M. & W. 16; 12 L. J. Ex. 322; 63 E. E. 500 ■^ 778—780 Eisk Allah Bey v. Whitehurst , (1868) 18 L. T. 615 175, 602, 616 Eist V. Paux, (1863) 4 B. & S. 409; 32 L. J. Q. B. 386; 8 L. T. (N. 8.) 737 227 Eitchie v. Kerr, [1913] S. C. 613 Sco 99 Eitchie's Patent, In re, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 1 698 Eiver "Wear CJommissioners v. Adamson, (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 546 ; 2 App. Gas. 743; 47 L. J. Q. B. 193; 37 L. T. 543 36, 451 Eivis V. Watson, (1839) 6 M. & W. 256 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 67 ; 62 E. E. 710 ... 288 Eoads V. Trumpiugton, (1870) L. E. 6 Q. B. 56; 40 L. J. M. C. 35; 23 L. T. 821 334 Eoanoke, The, (1908) P. 231 ; 77 L. J. P. 115 ; 99 L. T. 78 ; 24 T. L. E. 526; 52 Sol. J. 426; 11 Asp. M. C. 253 459 Eobbins v. Jones, (1863) 15 C. B. (N. S.) 221 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 9 L. T. (N. S.) 523; 137 E. E. 475 392, 415 Eobert Marys's Case. (See Marys's (Eobert) Case.) Eoberts v. Battersea Borough Council, (1914) 110 L. T. 566— C. A. ... 181 V. Camden, (1807) 9 Bast, 93; 9 E. E. 513 562 V. Charing Cross, Buston & Hampstead E. Co., (1908) 87 L. T. 732; 19 T. L. E. 160 403, 406 ,.. Bellowes, (1906) 94 L. T. 279 383 -0. Gwyrfai Eural Council, (1899) 1 Ch. 583; 2 Ch. 608; 68 L. J. Oh. 233, 757; 64 J. P. 52; 48 W. E. 51; 81 L. T. 465; 16 0. Orchard, (18637 2 H.' & C. 769; 33 L. J. Ex. 65; 9 L. T. (N. S.) 727 128 V. Bead, (1812) 16 East, 216; 14 E. E. 335 183 V. Eoberts, (1864) 6 B. & S. 384; 33 L. J. Q. B. 249; 10 L. T. 602 143 V. Rose, (1865) 4 H. & C. 103; 35 L. J. Ex. 62; 13 L. T. 471 ... 163 V. Tayler, (1846) 1 C. B. 117; 14 L. J. C. P. 87 ; 9 Jur. 330 156 r. TroUope & Sons, [1914] W. G. & Ins. E. 269— C. A 102 V. Williams, (1836) 2 C. M. & E. 661; 4 Dowl. P. C. 486 134 V. Wyatt, (1810) 2 Taunt. 268; 11 E. E. 566 264 Robertson v. Balmain New Ferry Co. (See Robinson v. Balmain New Eerry Co.) u. McDougal,. (1828) 4 Bing. 670; 1 M. & P. 692 ; 3 C. & P. 269; 6 L. J. C. P. 171; 29 E. E. 684 584 V. Portpatrick and Wigtonshire Joint Committee, [1919] S. C. 293 Sco 389 V. Purdey, (1907) 23 T. L. E. 343; 24 E. P. C. 273 700 V. Wilson, [1912] S. G. 1276 Sco 457 Eobin Electric Lamp Co., In re„[1914] 2 Ch. 461; 84 L. J. Ch. 49 ... 698 (No. 2), [1915] 1 Ch. 780; 84 L. J. Ch. 500 698 Robinson, Ex parte, (1912) 28 T. L. E. 288 746 V. Balmain New Ferry Co., (1910) A. 0. 295; 79 L. J. P. C. 84; 26 T. L. E. 143 /. 195 V. Gell, (1852) 12 G. B. 191; 21 L. J. G. P. 156; 16 Jur. 615 ... 759 V. London General Omnibus Co., (1910) 74 J. P. 161 ; 26 T. L. E. 233 380 V. Marchant, (1846) 7 Q. B. 918; 16 L. J. Q. B. 135 ; 10 Jur. 156 562 V. Eobinson, (1897) 13 T. L. E. 664 683 V. Smith, [1915] 1 K. B. 711; 84 L. J. K. B. 1783— C. A 526 V. Waddington, (1849) 13 Q. B. 753; 18 L. J. Q. B. 250; 13 Jur. 537 309 V. Workington (Mayor, &c., of), (1897) 1 Q. B. 619 34 Eob! V. Palace Theatre, (1911) 28 T. L. E. 69 683 Eobshaw v. Smith, (1878) 38 L. T. 423 589 Rochdale Canal Co. i. King, (1861) 2 Sim. (N. S.) 78 796, 801 Rochford v. Essex County Council, (1916) 85 L. J. Gh. 281 350 INDEX OP CASES. OXV PAGE Bochford Eural Council v. Port of London Authority, [19141 2 K. B. 916; 83 L. J. K. B. 1066 399 Eochfort V. Bynd, (1881) 8 L. E. Ir. 204 128 Eoden v. Eyton, (1848) 6 C. B. 427 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 12 Jur. 921 ... 309, 312 Eodgers v. Maw, (1846) 15 M. & W. 444; 16 L. J. Ex. 137 167 V. Parker, (1856) 18 C. B. 112; 25 L. J. C. P. 220; 2 Jur. (N. S.) . 496 310, 311 Eoe V. Birkenhead, &c., E. Co., (1851) 7 Exch. 36; 27 L. J. Ex. 9 ... 117 V. Mutual Loan Eund, (1887) 19 Q. B. D. 347; 56 L. J. Q. B. 541; 35 W. E. 723 167 Eo£E V. British and French Chemical Manufacturing Co., [1918] 2 K. B. 677— C. A 585 Roger V. J. P. Cochrane & Co., (1909) A. C. 285; 78 L. J. P. C. 124; 25 E. P. C. 757; 26 E. P. C. 591 712 Eogers v. Cardiff Corporation, (1905) 2 K. B. 832; 75 L. J. K. B. 22; 54 W. E. 35; 70 J. P. 9; 93 L. T. 683; 4 L. G. E. 1 ; 22 T. L. E. 22 97 V. Clifton, (1803) 3 B. & P. 587 589, 612 V. Great Northern E. Co., (1889) 53 J. P. 484 399 V. Jones, (1824) 3 B. & C. 409; 5 D. & E. 268; E. & M. 129; 3 L. J. K. B. 40; 27 E. E. 389 751 V. Kennay, (1846) 9 Q. B. 592; 15 L. J. Q. B. 381; 11 Jur. 14 ... 768 V. Lambert, (1891) 1 Q. B. 318; 60 L. J. Q. B. 187; 64 L. T. • 406; 39 W. R. 114 267, 270, 355 V. Macnamara, (1863) 14 C. B. 27; 23 L. J. C. P. 1 232 V. Eajendro Dutt, (1860) 13 Moore, P. C. 209; 9 W. E. 149 3, 37 V. Spence, (1844) 13 M. & W. 571; 15 L. J. Ex. 49; 12 CI. & F. 700; 67 E. E. 736— H. L 43, 136, 324 Eolle V. Whyte, (1868) L. E. 3 Q. B. 286; 37 L. J. Q. B. 105; 17 L. T. 560 402 Eolls V. Isaac, (1882) 19 Ch. D. 268; 51 L. J. Ch. 170; 45 L. T. 704 703 V. St. George, Southwark, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 785; 49 L. J. Ch. 691; 43 L. T. 140 336 Eooke -v. Dawson, (1895) 1 Ch. 480 127 Eoope V. D'Avigdor, (1883) 10 Q. B. D. 412; 48 L. T. 761 ; 47 J. P. 248 120 Booth V. Wilson, (1817) 1 B. & Aid. 59; 18 E. E. 431 264 Eoper V. Hussey Freke, [1915] 3 K. B. 222 ; 84 L. J. K. B. 1351— C. A. 97 ■ V. Works and Public Buildings Commissioners, [1915] 1 K. B. 45; 84 L. J. K. B. 219 38, 39 Eosalia, The, [1912] P. 109; 81 L. J. P. 79 458 Eose V. Buckett, (1901) 2 K. B. 449; 70 L. J. K. B. 736; 50 W. E. 8; 84 L. T. 670; 17 T. L. B. 544; 8 Manson, 259 43 V. Groves, (1843) 5 M. & G. 613; 12 L. J. C. P. 251; 6 Scott, N. E. 645; 7 Jur. 951; 63 E. E. 415 387 V. Kempthome, (1910) 27 T. L. B. 132; 55 Sol. J. 126 191 V. Miles, (1815) 4 M. & S. 101; 16 B. B. 405 386 . V. Eiddle, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 48— C. A 739 Eosenbaum v. Metropolitan Water Board, (1910) 103 L. T. 284; 74 J. P. 378; 26 T. L. E. 510; 8 L. G. E. 735; 27 T. L. E. 103 ... 33, 394, 406, 407 Boskell V. Whitworth, (1871) 19 W. E. 804 398 Eoskill's Trade Mark, In re, (1915) 32 E. P. C. 577 733 Boss V. Edwards, (1895) 73 L. T. 100; 11 E. 574 246, 270, 355 V. Fedden, (1872) L. E. 7 Q. B. 661; 41 L. J. Q. B. 270; 26 L. T. 966 438 V. Johnson, (1772) 5 Burr. 2825 239 • V. London, County, Westminster and Parr's Bank, [1919] 1 K. B. 678; 88 L. J. K. B. 927 86 V. Norman, (1850) 5 Ex. 359; 19 L. J. Ex. 329 200 V. Taylerson, (1898) 62 J. P. 181 664 Eossiter v. Waterford Harbour Commissioners, [1920] 2 Ir. E. 172 -C. A 100 Eoswell V. Prior, (1701) 12 Mod. 635 413, 414, 417 Bothschild's Application, In re, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 305 739 Eoundwood Colliery Co., In re, Lee v. Eoundwood Colliery Co., (1897) 1 Ch. 373 283, 284 CXvi INDEX OF CASES. PAGE KoTjrke V. White Moss Colliery Co., (1877) 2 C. P. D. 205; 46 L. J. C. P. 283; 36 L. T. 49 109 Howe V. Eoach, (1813) 1 M. & S. 304 628 Bowley v. Tottenham Urban District Council, [1914] A. C. 95; 83 L. J. Ch. 411— H. L 166 Eowning v. Goodchild, (1773) 3 Wilson, 443; 2 W. Bl. 906 29 Roworth u. Wilkes, (1807) 1 Camp. 94; 10 E. R. 642 693 Eoyal Acquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society v. Par- kinson, (1892) 1 Q. B. 431; 61 L. J. Q. B. 409; 66 L. T. 513; 40 W. E. 450 132, 676, 612 Eoyal Baking. Powder Co. v. Wright, Croasley & Co., (1901) 18 E. P. C. 95 626 Eoyal Baking Powder Co.'s Trade Mark, In re, (1902) 50 W. E. 454; 18 T. L. E. 423; 19 E. P. C. 261 783 Eoyal Warrant Holders' Association v. Boguslavsky, (1915) 32 E. P. C. 83 734 V. Deane and Beal, (1912) 1 Ch. 10; 81 L. J. Ch. 67; 105 L. T. 623; 56 Sol. J. 12;28T. L. E. 6;28E. P. C. 721 723,784 V. Matthews, (1915) 32 E. P. C. 81 : 784 V. Sullivan, [1914] 1 Ir. E. 236 784 Eoyal Worcester Corset Co.'s Application to Register a Trade Mark, (1909) 1 Ch. 459; 78 L. J. Ch. 309; 100 L. T. 235; 25 T. L. E. 241; 26 E. P. C. 185 724 Euben and another v. Great Fingall Consolidated and others, (1904) 2 K. B. 712; (1906) A. C. 439; 73 L. J. K. B. 872; 75 L. J. Ch. 843; 53 W. E. 100; 95 L. T. 214; 22 T. L. E. 712; 13 Mauson, 248 56, 85 Euddiman v. Smith, (1889) 60 L. T. 708 ; 5 T. L. E. 417 77, 84 Eumbold v. London County Council, (1909) 25 T. L. E. 541; 53 Sol. J. 502 450 Eunciman & Co. v. Smyth & Co., (1904) 20 T. L. E. 625; but see Temperley S.S. Co. v. Smyth & Co., (1905) 2 K. B. 761; 74 L. J. K. B. 876; 93 L. T. 471; 21 T. L. E. 739; 54 W. E. 150; 10 Com. Cas. 301; 10 Asp. M. C. 123 754 Eundle v. Hearle, (1898) 2 Q. B. 83 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 741 ; 78 L. T. 561 ; 46 W. R. 619; 14 T. L. E. 440 30, 32 Euoff V. Long & Co., (1916) 85 L. J. K. B. 364; 32 T. L. E. 82 153, 154, 458 Euscoe V. Grounsell, (1903) 89 L. T. 426; 20 T. L. E. 5 378, 399 Eushmer v. Polsue & Alfieri, Ltd., (1907) A. C. 121; (1906) 1 Ch. 234 ; 75 L. J. Ch. 79; 76 L. J. Ch. 365 ; 64 W. E. 161 ; 96 L. T. 510 ; 23 T. L. E. 362. {And see Polsue & Alfieri v. Eushmer.) ... 139, 380—382, 411 Eushworth v. Taylor, (1842) 3 Q. B. 699 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 80 ; 6 Jur. 945; 3 G. & D. 3; 61 R. R. 358 242 Eussell V. Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and others, (1910) I K. B. 506; 79 L. J. K. B. 507; 102 L. T. 119; 26 T. L. E. 228; 54 Sol. J. 213 71 V. Corn, (1703) 6 Mod. 127 142, 227 V. London & South Western R. Co., (1908) 24 T. L. R. 548 498 V. Men of Devon, (1788) 2 T. R. 667; 1 R. R. 685 30, 31, 38, 393 V. Murray, [1915] W. C. & Ins. R. 532 104 V. Niemann, (1864) 17 C. B. (N. S.) 171 451 V. Shenton, (1842) 3 Q. B. 449; 2 G. & D. 673; 6 Jur. 1069; II L. J. Q. B. 289; 61 R. R. 249 415 Russo-Chinese Bank v. In Yau Sam, (1910) A. C. 174; 79 L. J. P. C. 60; 101 L. T. 689; 26 T. L. E. 203; 47 Sc. L. E. 688 66 Euetell V. Macquister, (1807) 1 Camp. 49, n 614 Eutland's Case (Countess of), (1605) 6 Eep. 53; 3 Co. Eep. 360 760 Eyall V. Kidwell, [1914] 3 K. B. 135; 83 L. J. K. B. 1140— C. A. ... 475 Eyalls V. Leader, (1866) L. E. 1 Ex. 296; 35 L. J. Ex. 186; 14 L. T. 563 676, 599 Eyan v. Clark, (1849) 14 Q. B. 66 365 V. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., [1914] 3 K. B. 731; 83 L J K. B. 1563— C. A ■ ■ 408 V. Shilcock, (1861) 7 Ex. 72; 21 L. J. Ex. 66; 15 Jur. 1200 291, 763 INDEX OF ^ASES. CXvii _ _. PAGE Ryan v. Tipperary County Council, [1915] W. C. & Ins. Eep. 22— C. A. (Ir.) 97 Byder v. Wombwell, (1868) L. E. 4 Ex. 32 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 8 ; 19 L. T. „ , 491 512, 661 Eylands v. Fletcher, (1866) L. E. 1 Ex. 265 ; (1868) L. E. 3 H. L. 330 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 161; 19 L. T. 220— H. L Ill, 421, 427—429, 434, 436—438, 443, 447 Eyppon V. Bowles, (1615) Cro. Jac. 373 414 S. V. S. (1889), 16 Cox, C. C. 566 121 Saccharin Corporation r. Anglo-Continental Chemical Works, (1901) 1 Ch. 414; 70 L. J. Ch. ]94; 48 W. E. 444; 17 E. P. C. 307 714 V. Chemicals- and Drugs Co., (1900) 2 Ch. 556; 17 E. P. C. 28 ... 716 V. Quincey, (1900) 2 Ch. 246; 69 L. J. Ch. 530; 64 J. P. 633; 82 L. T. 792; 16 T. L. E. 384; 17 E. P. C. 530 713 V. Eeitmeyer, (1900) 2 Ch. 659; 69 L. J. Ch. 761; 49 W E. 199; 16 T. L. E. 494; 17 E. P. C. 606 715 V. White, (1903) 88 L. T. 850; 20 E. P. C. 454 713 V. Wild, (1903) 1 Ch. 410; 72 L. J. Ch. 270; 88 L. T. 101; 19 T. L. E. 154; 20 E. P. C. 243 713 Sadgrove v. Hole, (1901) 2 K. B. 1 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 455 ; 84 L. T. 647 ; 49 W. E. 473; 17 T. L. E. 332 567, 571, 684 Sadler v.' Great Western E., (1896) A. C. 450; (1895) 2 Q. B. 688; 65 L. J. Q. B. 26, 462 ; 74 L. T. 561 ; 45 W. E. 51 61 V. Henlock, (1855) 4 E. & B. 570; 24 L. J. Q. B. 138; 1 Jur. (N. S.) 677 67 ^ V. South Staffordshire Tramways Co. , (1889) 23 Q. B. D. 17 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 421; 37 W. E. 582 405 Saffery v. Elgood, (1834) 1 A. & B. 191 ; 3 N. & M. 346 ; 3 L.. J. K. B. 151; 40 E. E. 280 292 V. Jones, (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 598 761 Sage V. Eicholz, [1919] 2 K. B. 171 ; 88 L. J. K. B. 816 177 St. Catherine's College and others v. Eosse and others, [1919] — A. C; 468— H. L 137 St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, (1865) 11 H. L. C. 642 ; 35 L. J. Q. B. 66; 12 L. T. 776 372, 382, 383 St. Ives Corporation v. Wadsworth, (1908) 6 L. G. E. 306 ; 72 J. P. 73 322 St. Paul, The, (1908) P. 320; 99 L. T. 552 458 Salaman v. Warner, (1891) 60 K J. Q. B. 624; 65 L. T. 132 542 Salbstein v. Isaacs, [1915] W. N. 372; 85 L. J. K. B. 109 768 Salford (Mayor) v. Lever, (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 363; (1891) 1 Q. B. 168; 60 L. J. Q. B. 39; 63 L. T. 658; 39 W. E. 85 177, 188 Salisbury v. Gould, (1904) 68 J. P. 168 182 Salmon v. Edwards, (1910) 1 Ch. 652; 79 L. J. Ch. 296; 102 L. T. 456 ; 74 J. P. 177 ; 26 T. L. E. 325 ; 54 Sol. J. 406 ; 8 L. G. E. 405 164 V. Isaac, (1869) 20 L. T. 885 601 Salomons r. Knight, (1891) 2 Ch. 294; 60 L. J. Ch. 743; 64 L. T. 589; 39 W. B. 506 803 Salt V. Tomlinson, (1911) 2 K. B. 391 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 897 ; 105 L. T. 31 ; 75 J. P. 398 ; 27 T. L. E. 427 ; 9 L. G. E. 822 ; 22 Cox, C. C. 479 496 Salt Union, Ld. v. Brunner, Mond & Co., (1906) 2 K. B. 822; 76 L. J. K. B. 55 ; 95 L. T. 647 ; 22 T. L. E. 835 426 Salvesen (Ch. & Co.) i\ Eederi Aktiebolaget Nordstjernan (Owners of the Oscar II.), (1905) A. C. 302; 74 I/. J. P. C. 96 ; 92 L. T. 575 117 Sampson v. Hoddinott, (1857) 1 C. B. (N. S.) 590; 26 L. J. C. P. 148; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 243 ,.... 137, 373 Samson v. Aitcheson, [1912] A. C. 844; 82 L. J. P. C. 1— P. C 109 Samuels v. Townsend, (1916) 32 T. L. E. 356 74 Sandback v. Thomas, (1816) 1 Stark. 306; 18 E. E. 771 144 Sanders Application, In re, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 196 723 Sanders v. Sanders, (1881) 19 Ch. D. 874 361 Sanders-Clark v. Grosvenor Mansions Co. and d'Allessandri, (1900) 2 Ch. 373; 69 L. J. Ch. 579; 82 L. T. 758; 48 W. E. 570; 16 T. L. E. 428 139, 380, 385, 419 . CXVIU INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Sanderson v. Collins, (1904) 1 K. B. 628; 73 L. J. K. B. 358; 51 W. R. 558; 52 W. E. 354; 89 L. T. 42; 90 L. T. 243; 20 T. L. E. 249 ... 74, 76, 83, 240, 369 V. Henry "Wright, Ltd., (1914) 110 L. T. 517 102 Sandford v. Clarke, (1888) 21 Q. B. D. 398; 57 L. J. Q. B. 507; 59 L. T. 226 416 Sandon v. Jervis, (1858) E. B. & B. 935, 942; 28 L. J. Ex. 156; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 860 211, 765 Sanitary Commissioners of Gibraltar v. Orfila, (1890) 15 App. Cas. 400 115 Santen v. Busnach, (1913) 29 T. L. E. 214^0. A 70 Saragasso, The, [1912] P. 192; 82 L. J. P. 9 458 Sarason v. Er^nay, [1914] 2 Oh. 474 ; 83 L. J. Ch. 909— C. A 698 Sarch v. Blackburn, (1830) 4 C. & P. 297; M. & M. 505; 34 E. E. 805 161, 515 Sarson v. Eoberta, (1895) 2 Q. B. 395 ; 65 L. 3. Q. B. 37 ; 73 L. T. 174 ; 43 W. E. 690 494, 496 Saunders v. Edwards, (1662) 1 Sid. 95 180 V. Mills, (1829) 6 Bing. 213 ; 3 M. & P. 620 ; 8 L. J. C. P. 24 ; 31 E. E. 394 622 0. Seyd and Kelly's Credit Index Co., Ltd., (1896) 75 L. T. 193— C. A • 568 V. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, (1894) 1 Ch. 537 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 247; 69 L. T. 755; 42 W. E. 315 726 V. Teape, (1884) 51 L. T. 263; 48 J. P. 757 445 V. Wiel, (1898) 1 Q. B. 470; 62 L. J. Q. B. 341; 68 L. T: 183; 41 W. E. 356 695 Savill V. Langman, (1898) 79 L. T. 44; 14 T. L. E. 504 669 V. Eoberts, (1698) 12 Mod. 208 633, 634, 636, 656 Savory, Ltd. v. World of Golf, [1914] 2 Ch. 666 ; 83 L. J. Ch. 824 682 Saxby v. Easterbrook, (1878) 3 C. P. D. 339; 27 W. E. 188 794 V. Manchester & Sheffield E. Co., (1869) L. E. 4 C. P. 198; 38 L. J. C. P. 153; 19 L. T. 640 419 Scarborough and Wife v. Cosgrove, (1905) 2 K. B. 805 ; 74 L. J. K. B. 892; 93 L. T. 530; 54 W. E. 100; 21 T. L. E. 670, 754 455 Scarf V. Jardine, (1882) 7 App. Cas.-345 168 Scarlett v. Hanson, (1883) 12 Q. B. D. 213 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 62 ; 60 L. T. 75 769 Schicht Actiengesellsohaft, Re a Trade Mark, (1912) 28 T. L. E. 375 726 Sohmarr, In re, (1902) 1 Ch. 326; 71 L. J. Ch. 219; 86 L. T. 71; 60 W. E. 246; 18 T. L. R. 270 656 Schneider v. Heath, (1813) 3 Camp. 506; 14 E. E. 826 630 Schofield V. Bolton Corporation, (1910) 26 T. L. E. 230; 54 Bol. J. 213 462, 467 Scholes V. Brook, (1891) 63 L. T. 837 480 Schove V. Schminck^, (1886) 33 Ch. D. 546; 65 L. J. Ch. 892; 65 L. T. 212 736 Scobie V. Collins, (1896) 1 Q. B. 376 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 10 283 Scott V. Brown, (1885) 51 L. T. 746 156 V. Buckley, (1867) 16 L. T. 573 291 V. Denton, (1907) 1 K. B. 456 ; 76 L. J. Kx B. 330 ; 71 J. P. 66 ; 95 L. T. 760 ; 23 T. L. E. 73; 5 L. G. E. 251 311 V. Dixon, (1859) 29 L. J. Ex. 62, n 541 V. London Dock Co., (1865) 3 H. & C. 596; 34 L. J. Ex. 220; 13 L. T. 148 90, 436, 462, 497 V. Long Meg Plaster Co., (1914) B. W. C. C. 502— C. A 106 V. National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children, (1909) 26 T. L. E. 789 658 V. Sampson, (1882) 8 Q. B. D. 491; 51 L. J. Q. B. 380; 46 L. T. 412 230, 628 V. Scholey, (1807) 8 East, 467; 9 E. E. 487 769 V. Scott, [1913] A. C. 417— H. L 746 V. Seymour (Lord), (1862) 1 H. & C. 219; 32 L. J. Ex. 61; 8 L. T. (N. S.) 511 124 V. Shepherd, (1772) 2 W. Bl. 892; 3 Wils. 403; 1 Smith L. C. (12th ed.) 513 13, 151, 162 0. Stanford, (1867) L. E. 3 Bq. 718; 36 L. J. Ch. 729; 16 L T. 51 693 INDEX OF CASES. oxix „ PAGE Scott V. Stansfield, (1868) L. E. 3 Ex. 220; 37 L J. Ex 155- 18 .L. T. 672 576, 577 Scottish Co-operative Society v. Glasgow Fleshera' Association, (1898) 35 Sc. L. E. 645 : 24, 25 Scottish Union and National Fire Assurance Co. v. Alfred Pawsey & Co., (1908) Times Newspaper, July 23— October 17 450 Scottish Vacuum Cleaner Co. v. Provincial Cinematograph Theatre, Ltd., and others, (1915) 32 E. P. C. 363 717 Screw Collier Co. v. Webster or Kerr, (1910) A. C. 165; 79 L. J. P. C. 57; (1910) S. C. (H. L.) 26; 47 Sc. L. E. 99 460 Scullion V. Cadzon Coal Co., [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 129 Sco 98 Seaman v. Netherclift, (1876) 2 0. P. D. 53; 46 L. J. C. P. 128; 35 L. T. 784 676, 578 Searby v. Tottenham E. Co., (1868) L. E. 5 Eq. 409 362 Searle v. Barrett, (1834) 4 N. & M. 200 141 V. Lund, (1904) 90 L. T. 529; 88 L. T. 863; 19 T. L. E. 509; 20 T. L. E. 390; 9 Asp. M. C. 567 145 Searles v. Scarlett, (1892) 2 Q. B. 56; 61 L. J. Q. B. 573; 66 L. T. 837 ; 40 W. E. 696 564, 699 Sears v. Lyons, (1818) 2 Stark. 317; 20 E. E. 688 : 141 Secretary of State for India v. Chelikani Eama Eab (1916) L. E. 43 Ind. App. 192— P. C 186 V. Kamachee Boye Sahaba, (1859) 13 Moore, P. C. 22; 132 E. E. 7— P. C 118 Secretary of State for War v. Wynne and others, (1905) 2 K. B. 846; 75 L. J. K. B. 25 ; 50 W. E. 235 ; 93 L. T. 797 ; 22 T. L. E. 8 286 292 302 Sedgworth v. Overend, (1797) 7 T. E. 279 .'.. 64^ 189 Seear v. Lawson, (1880) 16 Ch. D. 426; 49 L. J. Bky. 69; 42 L. T. 893; 28 W. E. 929 55 Seed V. Higgins, (1860) 8 H. L. C. 560; 30 L. J. Q. B. 314; 6 Jur. (N. S.) 1264 713 Selby V. Greaves, (1868) L. E. 3 C. P. 694; 37 L. J. C. P. 261; 19 L. T. 186 282 283 Seller v. Boston R. D. C. [1914] B. W. C. C. 99— C. A. .............' ' 102 Selliswood v. Winch, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 87— C. A 101 Selmes v. Judge, (1871) L. E. 6 Q. B. 724; 40 L. J. Q. B. 287; 24 L. T. 906 129 Semayne's Case, (1604) 6 Eep. 91 a; 1 Smith L. C. (12th ed.) 115 ... 764, 765 Senior v. Brodaworth Main Colliery Co., (1917) 86 L. J. K. B. 1387 — C. A 106 V. Founta,ins and Burnley, Ltd., [1907] 2 K. B. 563; 76 L. J. K. B. 928; 97 L. T. 562; 23 T. L. R. 634— C. A 100 V. Medland, (1858) 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1039 694 V. Ward, (1859) 28 L. J. Q. B. 139 92 Sen Sen Co. v. Britten, (1899) 1 Ch. 692; 68 L. J. Ch. 250; 80 L. T. 278; 47 W. R. 358; 16 T. L. E. 238; 16 R. P. C. 137 ... 719, 730, 804 Seroka v. Kattenburg, (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 177; 56 L. J. Q. B. 375; 54 L. T. 649 46 Sewell V. National Telephone Co., Ltd., (1907) 1 K. B. 557; 76 L. J. K. B. 196; 96 L. T. 483; 23 T. L. R. 226 198,637 Sexton and Hosford, Re, [1916] W. C. & Ins. E. 216— C. A 103 Seymour v. Butterworth, (1862) 3 P. & F. 372 606, 606 V. Greenwood, (1861) 7 H. & N. 366; 30 L. J. Ex. 327; 4 L. T. (N. S.) 835 79, 80 V. Maddox, (1861) 16 Q. B. 326 93 Shadwell v. Hutchinson, (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 97 ; M. & M. 350; 4 C. & P. 333; 9 L. J. K. B. 142; 36 E. E. 497 174, 410 Shaffers v. General Steam Navigation Co., (1883) 10 Q. B. D. 366; 62 L. J. Q. B. 260; 48 L. T. 228 94 Shanahan, In re, (1862) 20 L. T. (0. S.) 183 4 Shannon, The, (1842) 1 W. Rob. 463 469 Shannon v. Shannon, (1804) 1 Sch. & Lef. 324; 9 R. E. 36 267 Sharman v. Merritt, (1916) 32 T. L. R. 360 578, 603 Sharp V. Johnson & Co., Ltd., [1905] 2 K. B. 139 ; 74 L. J. K. B. 566 ; 53 W. E. 597; 92 L. T. 675; 21 T. L. E. 482— C. A 102 OXX INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Sharp i;. Powell, (1872) L. E. 7 C. P. 253; 41 L. J. C. P. 95; 26 L. T. 436 145. 147 V. Skues, (1909) 25 T. L. R. 336 571 Sharpe v. Fowle, (1884) 12 Q. B. D. 385 ; 58 L. 3. Q. B. 309; 50 L. T. 758 310, 311 Sharpe, Ltd. v. Solomon Bros., (1915) 84 L. J. Ch. 290— C. A 725, 728 Sharpe's Trade Mark, In re, (1915) 84 L. J. Ch. 290— C. A 725, 728 Sharpingtou v. Fulham Guardians, (1904) 2 Ch. 449; 73 L. J. Ch. 777; 52 W. R. 617 ; 68 J. P. 510 ; 91 L. T. 739 ; 20 T. L. R. 643 ... 181, 182 Sharpness New Docks and Gloucester and Birmingham Navigation Co. V. Att.-Gen., [1915] A. C. 654; 84 L. J. K. B. 907— H. L. ... 33, 34 V. Worcester Corporation, [1913] 1 K B. 422 34 Shaw V. Allen, (1914) 30 T. L. R. 631 47 V. Port Philip Gold Mining Co., (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 103 85 V. Savill & Albion Co. v. Timaru Habour Board, (1890) 15 App. Cas. 429 ; 59 L. J. P. C. 77 ; 62 3j. T. 913 118 Shawsrigg Fire Clay and Enamelling Oo. v. Larkhall Collieries, (1903) F. 1131 (Ct. of Sess.) 353 Sheane v. Wicklow County Council, [1919] 2 Ir. E. 115— C. A 454 Shearburu v. Chertsey Rural District Council, (1914) 12 L. G. R. 622 166 Shearer v. Shields, [1914] A. C. 808; 83 L. J. P. C. 216— H. L 205 Sheerin v. Clayton & Co., [1910] 2 Ir. R. 105 ; 44 Ir. L. T. 23 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 583— C. A 102 Sheers v. Brooks, (1792) 2 H. Bl. 120; 3 R. R. 357 764 Sheffield & South Yorks Building Society v. Harrison, (1884) 15 Q. B. D. 358; 54 L. J. Q. B. 15; 51 L. T. 649 299 Sheffield- (Mayor, &c., of) v. Barclay, (1903) 2 K. B. 580; reversed (1905) A. C. 392; 72 L. J. K. B. 777; 74 L. J. K. B. 747; 21 T. L. R. 642; 69 J. P. 385; 54 W. R. 49; 93 L. T. 83; 10 Com. Cas. 287 ; 12 Manson, 248 ; 3 L. G. R. 992 63 Shelbury v. Scotsford, (1603) Yelv. 22 269 Sheldon v. Needham, (1914) 58 Sol. J. 652 104 Shelf er v. City of London Electric Lighting Co., (1895) 1 Ch. 287; 64 L. J. Ch. 216; 72 L. T. 34; 48 W. R. 238 805 Sheperd v. Wakeman, (1661) 1 Sid. 79 627 Shepherd v. Hack, (1917) 86 L. 3. K. B. 1480 ; 74 Shepton Mallet Rural District Council v. John Wainwright & Co., (1908) 24 T. L. E. 894; 72 J. P. 459; 6 L. G. R. 1121 343, 395 Sheridan v. New Quay Co., (1858) 4 C. B. (N. S.) 618; 28 L. J. C. P. 58; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 248 251 Sheringham Urban District Council v. Holsey, (1904) 91 L. T. 225 ; 68 J. P. 394; 20 T. L. R. 402; 2 L. G. E. 744 344 Sherriff v. Cadell, (1798) 2 Esp. 616 267 Sherwell v. Alton Urban District Council, (1909) 25 T. L. E. 417 466 Shingleton v. Smith, (1700) 2 Lutw. 1481 157 Shipway v. Broadwood, (1899) 1 Q. B. 369 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 360 ; 80 L. T. 11; 15 T. L. E. 145 177 Shoppee v. Natham, (1892) 1 Q. B. 245 776 Shoreditch (Corporation of) r. Bull, (1904) 2 K. B. 756; 90 L. T. 210; 20 T. L. E. 254; 68 J. P. 415 33, 115, 394, 408,467 Short V. Hammersmith Corporation, (1911) 104 L. T. 70; 75 J. P. 82; 9 L. G. R. 204 32 V. Stoy, (1836) 1 Roscoe, N: P., 17th ed., pp. 64, 87 143 Shorts, Ltd. v. Short, (1914) 31 R. P. C. 294 737 Shotts Iron Co. v. Inglis, (1882) 7 App. Cas. 518 381 Shreeve's Trade Mark, In re, (1913) 80 T. L. E. 167 ; (1914) 81 E. P. C. 24 737 739 Shrewsbury v.' Blount ,' ' (1841)' 2 M.' & G. 475;' 2 Scott , N. e! 588 ; 58 ' E. E. 446 534 Shrimpton v. Hertfordshire County Council, (1911) 104 L. T. 145; 75 J. P .201 ; 27 T. L. R. 261 ; 66 Sol. J. 270 ; 9 L. G. R. 397 465 Siegert v. Findlater, (1878) 7 Ch. D. 801 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 233 ; 88 L. T. 349 729 Siloock V. Golightly, [1915] 1 K. B. 748; 84 L. J. K. B. 499— C. A. ... 106 Silkin V. Pinlayson, [1914] S. C. 770— Sco 99 Silles V. Fulham Borough Council, (1903) 1 K. B. 829; 72 L J K B 397 ; 67 J. P. 273 ; 88 L. T. 753 ; 51 W. E. 598 ; 19 T L E 398; 1 L. G. E. 643 428 INDEX OF CASES. CXXl PAGE Silverton i\ Marriott, (1888) 59 L. T. 61 436 Simmons !•. Heath Laundry Co., (1910) 1 K. B. 543; 79 L. J K. B. 395; 102 L. T. 210; 26 T. L. E. 326; 54 Sol. J. 892; 3 B. W. C. C. 200— C. A 96 V. Lillystone, (1853) 8 Ex. 431; 22 L. J. Ex. 217 246 c. Mitchell, (1880) 6 App. Cas. 156; 50 L. J. P. C. 11; 43 L. T. 710 555, 564 Simpson v. Att.-Gen., [1904] A. C. 476— H. L 667 V. Hartopp, (1743) WiUes, 512; 4 T. E. 568, n. ; 2 E. E. 466, n. ; 1 Smith's L. C, 12th ed., 493 292, 294, 297—300 r. Hill, (1795) 1 Esp. 431 194 V. London & North Western E. Co., (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 274 272 V. Metropolitan Water Board, (1917) 15 L. G. E. 629 394 V. Eobinson, (1848) 12 Q. B. 511; 18 L. J. Q. B. 73; 13 Jur. 187 614 r. Savage, (1856) 1 C. B. (N. S.) 347; 26 L. J. C. P. 50 ; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 161 411 V. Sinclair, [1917] A. C. 127— H. L : 103 Sinclair v. Eldred, (1811) 4 Taunt. 7 144 Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Clark, (1880) 5 Ex. D. 37 264 V. Loog, (1882) 8 App. Cas. 15 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 481 ; 48 L. T. 3 ... 719, 738 V. Wilson, (1876) 2 Ch. D. 434 ; 3 App. Cas. 376 ; 34 L. T. 858 ; 38 L. T. N. S. 303 10, 719, 722, 741 Singleton v. WilHamson, (1861) 7 H. & N. 410; 31 L. J. Ex. 17; 5 L. T. (N. S.) 664 316 Sirdar Eubber Co., Ltd. v. Wallington, Weston & Co., (1905) 1 Ch. 451; (1906) 1 Ch. 252; 74 L. J. Ch. 315; 75 L. J. Ch. 233; 97 L. T. 113; 53 W. E. 346; 22 T. L. E. 246; 24 E. P. C. 539 713, 714 Six Carpenters' Case, (1610) 8 Eep. 146 a ; 4 Co. Eep. 432; 1 Smith L. C. (12th ed.) 145 202, 285, 303, 339, 341 Skinner & Co. v. Shew & Co., (1893) 1 Ch. 413; 62 L. J. Ch. 196; 67 L. T. 696; 41 W. E. 217 626 Skrim, The, (1914) 80 T. L. E. 555 461 Skuse V. Davis, (1839) 10 A. & E. 635 178 Slack V. Barr, (1918) 82 J. P. 91 567 Slade V. Taylor, [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 53— C. A 104 Slazenger v. Spalding & Bros., (1910) 1 Ch. 257; 79 L. J. Ch. 122; 102 L. T. 390; 27 E. P. C. 20 727 Slazenger's, Ltd., Application, In re, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 501 724 Sleigh V. Glasgow and Transvaal Options, (1904) 6 F. 420 (Ct. of Sess.) 541 Slim V. Crouoher, (1860) 1 De G. E. & J. 518 535 Slobodinsky, In re, Moore, Ex parte, (1903) 2 K. B. 517; 72 L. J. K. B. 883; 89 L. T. 190 r 52 W. E. 156; 19 T. L. E. 651; 10 Hanson, 341 773 Sly V. Finch, (1618) Cro. Jac. 514 776 Smart v. Hutton, (1833) 8 A. & E. 568, n. ; 2 N. & M. 426 761 Smith V. Ashforth, (1860) 29 L. J. Ex. 259 305, 313 V. Ashley, (1846) 11 Metcalfe, 367 (Mass.) 570 V. Baker, (1873) L. E. 8 C. P. 850; 42 L. J. C. P. 155; 28 L. T. 637 167, 168 V. Baker, (1891) A. C. 325; 60 L. J. Q. B. 683; 65 L. T. 467; 55 J. P. 660; 40 W. E. 392 92, 93, 497, 515, 520 V. Browne, (1891) 28 L. E. Ir. 1 499 V. Buxton, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 697— C. A 97 V. Chadwick, (1882) 20 Ch. D. 27; 9 App. Cas. 187; 51 L. J. Ch. 597;-53 L. J. Oh. 873; 50 L. T. 697 534, 545 (W. H. & Son) V. Clinton and another, (1908) 25 T. L. E. 34 62, 568 V. Cocke, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 959 748 V. Cook, (1875) 1 Q. B. D. 79; 45 L. J. Q. B. 122; 32 L. T. 722; 24 W. E. 206 442 V. Davis, [1915] A. C. 528— H. L 99 V. D. Davis & Sons, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 71— C. A 99 r. Dear, (1903) 88 L. T. 664; 67 J. P. 244; 20 Cox, C. C. 458 159, 168 V. Bgginton, (1837) 7 A. & E. 167; 6 Dowl. P. C. 38 ; 2 N. & P. 143 . .• 202, 775, 792 OXxii INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Smith V. Enright, (1893) 63 L. J. Q. B. 220; 69 L. T. 724 142, 257 V. Fife Coal Co., Ltd., [1914] A. C. 723— H. L. ; [1913] S. C. 662 (Ct. of Sesa.) 102, 104 V. Giddy, (1904) 2 K. B. 448; 73 L. J. K. B. 894; 91 L. T. 296; 53 W. R. 207; 20 T. L. E. 596 163, 338, 389, 430, 799 V. Goodwin, (1833) 4 B. & Ad. 413; 2 N. & M. 114; 2 L. J. K. B. 192; 38 B. E. 272 287 V. Hodson, (1791) 4 T. E. 211; 53 E. E. 93; 2 Smith L. C. 12th ed. 139 167 V. Hopper, (1847) 9 Q. B. 1005; 16 L. J. Q. B. 93; 11 Jur. 302 129 V. Horlock, (1913J 109 L. T. 196—0. A 97 V. Howard, (1870) 22 L. T. 130 92 V. Kaye and another, (1904)^0 T. L. E. 261 5, 228 V. Keal, (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 340; 51 L. J. Q. B. 287; 47 L. T. 142 : 66, 83 V. Kendrick, (1849) 7 C. B. 515; 18 L. J. C. P. 172; 13 Jur. 362; 78 R. E. 745 422, 425 V. Lewis, (1917) 33 T. L. E. 195 581 V. Lloyd, (1854) 9 Exch. 562; 23 L. J. Ex. 194 322, 331, 358 V. London & North Western E. Co., (1853) 2 B. & B. 69; 17 Jur. 1071 713 V. London & St. Katharine Docks Co., (1868) L. E. 3 C. P. 326 489, 493 V. London & South Western E. Co., (1870) L. E. 6 C. P. 14; 23 L. T. 678 146,, 461 V. Martin and Kingston-on-Hull Corporation, (1911) 2 K. B. 775; 80 L. J. K. B. 1256; 105 L. T. 281; 75 J. P. 433; 55 Sol. J. 535; 27 T. L. E. 468; 9 L. G. E. 780 465 V. Midland E. Co., (1887) 57 L. T. 813 498 V. Milles, (1786) 1 T. E. 475 261 V. Musgrave, (1877) 2 App. Gas. 781 162 V. NicoUs, (1839) 5 Bing. N. C. 208; 7 Scott, 147; 1 Am. 474; 7 Dowl. P. C. 282; 8 L. J. C. P. 92; 50 E. E. 658 171, 177 V. North Metropolitan Tramways Co., (1891) 55 J. P. 630 80 V. Parker, (1844) 13 M. & W. 459; 14 L. J. Ex. 52; 2 D. & L. 394; 67 E. E. 676 „ 574 V. Pritcbard, (1849) 8 C. B. 565; 19 L. J. C. P. 53; 14 Jur. 224 761 V. Scott, (1847) 2 C. & K. 580 599 v. Selwyn, [1914] 3 K. B. 98; 83 L. J. K. B. 1339-0. A. ... 119, 120 V. Shaw, (1829) 10 B. & C. 277; 5 M. & E. 225 131 ■ V. Smith, (1875) L. E. 20 Eq. 500; 44 L. J. Oh. 630; 32 L. T. 787 799 V. South Eastern E. Co., (1896) 1 Q. B. 178; 73 L. T. 614; 44 W. E. 291 500, 506 V. Spooner, (1810) 3 Taunt. 246; 12 E. E. 645 629 V. Streatfield, [1913] 3 K. B. 764; 82 L. J. K. B. 1237 583, 614 V. Sydney, (1870) L. E. 5 Q. B. 203; 39 L. J. Q. B. 144; 22 L. T. 16 199 V. Thackerah, (1866) L. E. 1 0. P. 564; 35 L. J. C. P. 276; 14 L. T. 761 138, 375, 376 V. Tonstall, (1687) Carthew, 3 658 V. West Derby Local Board, (1878) 3 C. P. D. 423; 47 L. J. 0. P. 607; 38 L. T. 716 33, 133 V. Wilson, (1903) 2 Ir. K. B. 45 162, 398 V. "The Winning Post," (1910) Times Newspaper, July 7th ... 548 V. Wood, (1813) 3 Camp. 323; 14 E. E. 752 567 V. Wright, (1861) 6 H. & N. 821; 30 L. J. Ex. 313; 7 Jur. (N. S.) 1169 306, 315 Smith's Patent, 7n re, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 237— C. A 711 Smithies v. National Association of Operative Plasterers, (1909) 1 K. B. 310; 78 L. J. K. B. 259; 100 L. T. 172; 25 T. L. E. 205 25, 69 Smurthwaite v. Hannay, (1894) A. C. 494; 71 L. T. 157 553 Snark, The, (1900) P. 105; (1899) P. 74; 80 L. T. 25; 82 L. T. 42; 68 L. J. P. 22; 69 L. J. P. 41; 47 W. E. 398; 16 T. L. E. 160; 9 Asp. M. C. 50 65, 110, 113, 397 Sneary i). Abdy, (1876) 1 Ex. D. 299; 45 L. J. Q. B. 803 ; 34 L. T. 801 776 Sneddon v. Addie, (1904) 6 P. 992 (Ct. of Sess.) 100 Snee v. Durkie, (1903) 6 P. 42 (Ct. of Sess.) 114, 152, 457, 458, • 465, 497, 506 INDEX OF CASES. OXXlll PAGE Sneesby v. Lancashire & Yorkshire B. Co., (1875) 1 Q. B. D. 42; 45 L. J. Q. B. 1 146 Snell V. Bristol Corporation, [1914] 2 K. B. 291 ; 83 L. J. K. B. 353— C. A 106 Snelling v. Norton Hill Colliery Co., (1913) 109 L. T. 81 101 Snow V. Whitehead, (1884) 27 Ch. D. 588; 53 L. J. Ch. 885; 51 L. T. 253 374 Snowden v. Baynes, (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 193; 59 L. J. Q. B. 325; 38 W. R. 744 94 Soane v. Knight, (1827) Moo. & Mai. 74; 31 E. R. 714 609 Soci^t6 Anpnyme des Manufactures de Glaces v. Tilghman's Patent Sand Blast Co., (1883) 25 Ch. D. 1 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 1 ; 49 L. T. 451 717 Social des Hotels E^unis v. Hawker, (1914) 30 T. L. E. 423— C. A. ; 29 T. L. E. 578 123, 749 Soci^t^ le Ferment Trade Marks, In re, (1912) 28 T. L. R. 175; 29 R. P. C. 149 728 Solicitor, In re, [1915] 1 Ir. R. 152 636 , In re. Law Society, Ex parte, (1911) 27 T. L. R. 535 ; 55 Sol. J. 670 636 (G., A), In re, Law Society, Ex parte, (1911) 28 T. L. R. 50; 56 Sol. J. 92 660 Solomons v. Stepney Borough Council, (1905) 69 J. P. 360; 3 L. Q-. R. 912 484, 475 Soltau V. De Held, (1851) 2 Sim. (N. S.) 133; 21 L. J. Ct. 153; 16 Jur. 320 , 379, 398, 400, 401, 796 Some V. Barwish, (1609) Cro. Jac. 231 409 Somerville v. Hawkins, (1851) 10 C. B. 583; 20 L. J. C. P. 131; 15 Jur. 450 582, 587, 593, 596 V. Mirehouse, (1860) 1 B. & S. 652; 3 L. T. (N. S.) 294; 9 W. R. 53 755 Soutar V. Clark, (1904) 7 P. Just. Cas. 1 (Ct. of Just.) 64 South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Beige du Chemin de Fer du Nord, (1898) 1 Ch. 190; 67 L. J. Ch. 92; 77 L. T. 555; 46 W. E. 151 40 South Eastern & Chatham E. Co. v. London County Council, (1901) 84 L. T. 632; 65 J. P. 568; 19 Cox, C. C. 721 126, 379, 402 South Hetton Coal Co. v. North Eastern News Association, (1894) 1 Q. B. 133; 63 L. J. Q. B. 293; 69 L. T. 844; 42 W. R. 322 552, 598, 605, 607, 608 South London Electric Supply Corporation v. Perrin, (1901) 2 K. B. 186; 70 L. J. K. B. 643; 65 J. P. 627; 49 W. R. 539; 84 L. T. 630; 17 T. L. E. 475; 19 Cox, C. C. 717 379 South Staffordshire Waterworks Co. v. Sharman, (1896) 2 Q. B. 44; 65 L. J. Q. B. 460; 12 T. L. R. 402 10, 255, 261, 266 South Wales and Liverpool S.S. Co. v. Neville Dock Co., (1913) 108 L. T. 568 145 South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., (1905) A. C. 239; 74 L. J. K. B. 525; 53 W. R. 593; 92 L. T. 710; 21 T. L. R. 441; (1903) 2 K. B. 545; 72 L. J. K. B. 893; 89 L. T. 393; 19 T. L. R. 708. (And see Glamorgan Coal Co. V. South Wales Miners' Federation) 19, 221, 222, 587 Southcote V. Stanley, (1856) 1 H. & N. 247; 25 L. J. Ex. 339 90, 487 Southcote'a Case,' (1600) 4 Rep. 84 a; 2 Co. Rep. 487 451, 775 Southwark & Vauxhall Water Co. v. Wandsworth District Board of Works, (1898) 2 Ch. 603; 62 J. P. 519, 756; 79 L. T. 132; 47 W. R. 107; 14 T. L. R. 508, 576 405, 406 Sowell V. Champion, (1837) 6 A. & E. 407 ; 2 N. & P. 627 ; W. W. & D. 667; 7 L. J. K. B. 197; 45 E. E. 514 200 Sowerby v. Coleman, (1867) L. E. 2 Ex. 96; 36 L. J. Ex. 57; 15 W. E. 451 345 Spacey v. Dowlaia Gas and Coal Co., Ltd., (1905) 2 E. B. 879; 75 L. J. K. B. 5 ; 93 L. T. 685 ; 54 W. R. 138 ; 22 T. L. R. 29 ... 97 Spackm.an v Poster, (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 99; 52 L. J. Q. B. 418; 48 L. T. 670 184, 235, 253, 254 Spaight V. Tedcastle, (1881) 6 App. Cas. 217; 44 L. T. 589; 29 W. R. 761 509 Spalding v. Gamage, (1916) 84 L. J. Ch. 449— H. L. ; (1918) 35 R. P. C. 101 719, 738, 741 INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Sparke v. Osborne, (1909) 7 C. L. B. 51 (H. C. of Australia) 425, 430 Speake v. Hughes, (1904) 1 K. B. 138 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 172 ; 89 L. T. 576 561, 615, 617 Speight V. Gosnay, (1891) 60 L. J. Q. B. 231 150, 618 V. Oliviera, (1819) 2 Stark. 493; 20 E. E. 728 226 Spence, In re, (1847) 2 Ph. 247 4 Spice V. Webb, (1838) 2 Jur. 943 303 Spicer v. Spalding, (1915) 32 E. P. C. 62 719 Spill V. Maule, (1869) L.. E. 4 Ex. 232 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 138 ; 20 L. T. 675 612 Spilsbury v. Micklethwaite, (1808) 1 Taunt. 146; 9 E. E. 717 204 Staoey v. Sherrin, (1913) 29 T. L. E. 555— D. C 339 Staffordshire and "Worcestershire Canal Navigation v. Bradley, (1912) 1 Ch. 91; 81 li. J. Ch. 147; 56 Sol. J. 91 662 Stagg V. Wyatt, (1838) 2 Jur. 892; 1 Am. 327 363 Stahlwerk Becker Aktiengesellschaft's Patent, In re, (1918) 35 E. P. C. 210— C. A.; affirmed, (1919) 36 E. P. C. 13— H. L 711 Stamford and Warrington (Earl), In re, Payne v. Grey (No. 2), (1911) 1 Cb. 648; 80 L. J. Ch. 361.; 105 L. T. 12; 75 J. P. 346; 9 L. G. E. 719; 27 T. L. E. 366 30 Stamp V. Williams, (1896) 12 T. L. E. 616 88 Stanbury v. Exeter Corporation, (1905) 2 K. B. 838; 75 L. J. K. B. 28 ; 70 J. P. 11; 64 W. E. 247; 93 L. T. 795; 22 T. L. E. 3; 4 L. &. E. 57 76 Standard Ideal Co. v. Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co., (1911) A. C. 78; 80 L. J. P. C. 87; 103 L. T. 440; 27 T. L. E. 63; 27 E. P. C. 789 725, 728 Standard Woven Fabric Co.'s Application, In re, (1918) 35 E. P. C. 53 725 Stanhope v. Stanhope, (1886) 11 P. D. 103; 55 L. J. P. 36; 54 L. T. 906; 34 W. E. 446; 50 J. P. 276 47 Stanley v. Jones, (1831) 7 Bing. 369; 5 M. & P. 193; 9 L. J. C. P. 51 ; 33 E. E. 513 55 V. Powell, (1891) 1 Q. B. 86 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 52 ; 63 L. T. 809 ; 39 W. E. 76 9, 456, 461 V. Wharton, (1821-2) 9 Price, 301; 10 Price, 138; 23 E. E. 683 290 Starkey v. Bank of England, (1903) A. C. 114; 72 L. J. Ch. 402; 51 W. E. 613; 88 L. T. 244; 19 T. L. E. 312; 8 Com. Gas. 142 (in C. A. sub nom. Oliver v. Bank of England, g. v.) 534 Statham v. Statham and the Gaekwar of Baroda, (1911) Times News- paper, Dec. 22nd 39, 40 Stead V. Williams, (1844) 7 M. & G. 818; 13 L. J. C. P. 215; 8 Scott, N. E. 440; 2 Webs. P. C. 126; 8 Jur. 930; 66 E. E. 797 700 Stearn v. Prentice, [1919] 1 K. B. 394; 88 L. J. K. B. 422 446 Steeds V. Steeds, (1889) 22 Q. B, D. 637; 58 L. J. Q. B. 302; 60 L. T. 318 188, 189 Steel V. Cammell, Laird & Co., Ltd., [1902'] 2 K. B. 232; 74 L. J. TK. B. 610 ; 63 W. E. 612 ; 93 L. T. 357 ; 21 T. L. E. 490— C. A. 102 Steele v. Brannan, (1872) L. E. 7 C. P. 261; 41 L. J. M. C. 85; 26 L. T. 509 600 Steers v. Sogers, (1893) A. C. 232 704 Steggles V. New Eiver Co., (1865) 13 W. E. 413 407 Stephens, In re, Warburton v. Stephens, (1889) 43 Ch. D. 39 r 59 L. J. Ch. 109; 61 L. T. 009 185 V. Elwall, (1816) 4 M. i& S. 269; 16 E. E. 458 242, 251, 253 V. Myers, (1830) 4 C. & P. 349; 34 E. E. 811 155, 194 Stephenson v. Garnett, (1898) 1 Q. B. 677; 67 L. J. Q. B. 447; 78 L. T. 871; 46 W. E. 410 173 V. Hart, (1828) 4 Bing. 476 ; 1 M. & P. 367 ; 6 L. J. C. P. 97 ; 29 E. E. 602 239 , Blake & Co. v. Grant, Legros & Co., (1917) 86 L. J. Ch. 439— C. A 744 Stepney Spare Motor Wheel Co. v. Hall, (1911) 1 Ch. 514; 80 L. J. Ch. 391; 104 L. T. 666; 27 T. L. E. 283; 28 E. P. C. 381 709 Stevens v. Chown, Stevens v. Clark, (1901) 1 Oh. 894 ; 70 L. J. Ch. 671 ; 65 J. P. 470; 84 L. T. 796; 49 W. E. 460; 17 T. L. E. 313 662 V. Hinshelwood, (1891) 65 J. P. 341 82 V. Insoles, Ltd., [1912] 1 K. B. 36; 81 L. J. K. B. 47; 105 L. T. 617— C. A 101 INDEX OF CASES. Stevens v. Midland Counties R. Co., (1854) 10 Ex. 352; 23 L. J. Ex. 328; 18 Jur. 932 57, 662 V. Sampson, (1879) 5 Ex. D. 53; 49 L. J. Q. B. 120; 41 L. T. 782 598, 599, 613, 615 V. Woodward, (1881) 6 Q. B. D. 818; 50 L. J. Q. B. 231; 44 L. T. 153 77, 83, 84, 438 Stevenson r. Newnham, (1853) 13 C. B. 285 16 V. Rossal Steam Fishing Co., (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 677 98 Steward v. Gromett, (1859) 7 C. B. (N. S.) 191; 29 L. J. C. P. 170; 6 Jur. (N. S.) 776 637, 638, 642, 657 V. Young, (1870) L. R. 5 C. P. 122; 39 L. J. C. P. 85; 22 L. T. 168 628, 629 Stiles V. Nokes, (1806) 7 East, 493; stated 31 E. E. •400 602 Stimson v. Farnham, (1871) L. E. 7 Q. B. 175; 41 L. J. Q. B. 52; 25 L. T. 747 777 Stockdale v. Hansard, (1839) 9 A. & E. 1 ; 2 P. & D. 1 ; 3 Jur. 905; 11 A. & E. 297; 8 L. J. Q. B. 294; 48 E. E. 826 579 V. Onwhyn, (1826) 5 B. & C. 173; 7 D. & E. 625 ; 2 C. & P. 163; 4 L. J. K. B. 122; 29 E. E. 207 691 Stocks V. Wilson, [1913] 2 K. B. 235 44 Stoker v. Wortham, (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 457— C. A 96 Stone V. Burn, (1911) 1 K. B. 927; 80 L. J. K. B. 560; 103 L. T. 540; 74 J. P. 456; 27 T. L. E. 6 719 i;. Cartwright, (1795) 6 T. E. 411; 3 E. E. 220 68 V. Marsh, (1827) 6 B. & d. 551; 9 D. & E. 648; E. & M. 364; 5 L. J. K. B. 201; 30 E. E. 420 119-122 Storer v. Gordon, (1814) 3 M. & S. 308 ; 15 E. E. 499 171 Storey v. Ashton, (1869) L. E. 4 Q. B. 476; 38 L. J. Q. B. 223; 17 W. R. 727 83 V. Eobinson, (1795) 6 T. E. 138; 3 E. E. 137 297, 316 Stott V. Gamble, [1916] 2 K. B. 504 15 Stowe V. Benstead and another, (1909) 2 K. B. 415; 78 L. J. K. B. 837 ; 101 L. T. 38 ; 73 J. P. 370 ; 25 T. L. E. 546 ; 53 Sol. J. 543 785 Street v. Union Bank of Spain and England, (1885) 30 Ch. D. 156; 55 L. J. Ch. 31; 58 L. T. 262 726 Stroyan v. Knowles, (1861) 6 H. & N. 454 376, 439 Stuart V. Bell, (1891) 2 Q. B. 341; 60 L. J. Q. B. 577; 64 L. T. 633; 39 W. E. 612 580, 586, 587, 590, 591 Stubbs, Ltd. V. Mazun, (1919) 88 L. J. P. C. 135— H. L 578 V. Eussell, [1913] A. C. 386— H. L 561, 564, 578 Studdert v. West, (1902) L. J. Newsp. Feb. 15, p. 358 270, 769 Sturees v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch. D. 852; 48 L. J. Ch. 786 ; 41 L. T. 219 139, 882, 399 Sullivan v. Creed, (1904) 2 Ir. Rep. 317— C. A 147, 150, 151, 449 464, 465, 480, 501, 644 V. Waters, (1864) 14 Ir. C. L. R. 460 492 Sutton V. Card, (1886) W. N. 120 428 V. Clarke, (1815) 6 Taunt. 29; 1 Marsh, 429; 16 R. R. 563 29 V. Johnstone, (1786-7) 1 T. R. 493, 784; 1 Bro. P. C. 76; 1 R. R. 257 • • 579 Swaine v. Great Northern R. Co., (1864) 4 De G. J. & S. 211 385, 797 Swainson v. North Eastern R. Co., (1878) 3 Ex. D. 841; 47 L. J. Ex. 372; 38 L. T. 201 87, 88, 90 Swann v. Falmouth (Earl), (1828) 8 B. & C. 466 ; 2 M. & R. 534; 6 L. J. K. B. 374; 34 R. E. 441 -. 287, 291, 303, 305, 314 Sweet ■!;. Cater, (1841) 11 Sim. 572; 5 Jur. 38 693 Sweetapple v. Jesse, (1833) 5 B. & Ad. 27 ; 2 N. & M. 36 ; 2 L. J. K. B. 181; 39 R. R. 374 563 Swift V. Jewsbury, (1874) L. E. 9 Q. B. 301 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 56 ; 30 L. T. 32 546 V. Winterbothamr(i873)'L. E. 8 Q. B. 244; L. E. 9 Q. B 301; 42 L. J. Q. B. Ill ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 56 ; 30 L. T. 31 87, 640, 542 Swindon Waterworks Co. v. Wilts and Berks Canal Navigation Co. (1875) L E. 7 H. L. 697; 45 L. J. Ch. 638; 33 L. T. 513 372 Swire V. I>ach, (1865) 18 C. B. (N. S.) 479 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 150 ; 11 L. T. 680 ' ^^^ OXXVl INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Sydney (Municipal Council of) v. Bourke, (1895) A. C. 433; 64 L. J. P. C. 140; 72 L. T. 605 32, 33, 85 V. Young, (1898) A. C. 457; 67 L. J. P. C. 40; 71 L. T. 365; 46 W. K. 561— P. C 336 Syeds V. Hay, (1791) 4 T. E. 260; 2 E. E. 377 238 Symmonds v. King, [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 282— C. A 104 Symonds v. Kurtz, (1889) 53 J. P. 727 790 Symons v. Hearson, (1823) 12 Price, 369 315 V. Leaker, (1885) 15 Q. B. D. 629; 54 L. J. Q. B. 480; 53 L. T. 227 412 Taapb v. Downes, (1812) 3 Moore, P. C. 36, n. ; 50 E. E. 14 747 Tabart v. Tipper, (1808) 1 Camp. 356 598 Tackey v. McBain, (1912) A. C. 186; 81 L. J. P. C. 130 540 Tadman v. Henman, (1893) 2 Q. B. 168 284 Taff Vale E. Co. v. Jenkins, [1913] A. C. 1— H. L 50 Tait V. Beggs, (1905) 2 Ir. Eep. 525 622 Talbot de Malahide v. Dunne, [1914] 2 Ir. E. 125 746 Talbutt V. Clark, (1840) 2 Moo. & E. 312; 62 E. E. 803 622 Tallerman v. Dowsing Eadiant Heat Co., (1900) 1 Ch. 1, 9 ; 68 L,. J. Ch. 618 ; 69 L. J. Ch. 46 ; 48 W. E. 146 738 Tamworth Colliery Co. v. Hall, [1911] A. C. 665; 81 L. J. K. B. 159; 105 L. T. 449; 55 Sol. J. 615— H. L 100 Tancred v. AUgood, (1859) 4 H. & N. 438; 28 L. J. Ex. 362 264, 769 V. Leyland, (1851) 16 Q. B. 669; 20 L. J. Q. B. 316; 15 Jur. 394 . 308, 312 Tapling v. Jones, (1865) 11 H. L. C. 290; 34 L. J. C. P. 342 ; 12 L. T. ggg ^ 4]^2 Tarleton -w.McGawiey, '({793) 1 ipeake, 270; 3 E. E. 689 20 Tarpley v. Blabey, (1836) 2 Bing. N. C. 437; 2 Sc. 642; Hodg. 414 ... 621 Tarrant v. Webb, (1856) 18 C. B. 797; 25 L. J. C. P. 261 92 Tarry v. Ashton, (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 814 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 260; 34 L. T. 97 111, 112, 114, 436, 437 Tate V. Latham & Sons, (1897) 1 Q. B. 502 93 Tatem v. Gaumont, (1917) 84 E. P. C. 181 727 Tatton V. Wade, (1856) 18 C. B. 871 544 Taunton «. Costar, (1797) 7 T. E. 431; 4 E. E. 481 330 Tayler v. Waters, (1816) 7 Taunt. 374; 2 Marsh. 551; 18 E. E. 499 ... 347 Taylerson v. Peters, (1837) 7 A. & B. 110; 2 N. & P. 622; 1 Jur. 497; W. W. & D. 644; 45 E. E. 689 284 •Taylor, In re, (1912) 105 L. T. 973; 28 T. L. E. 206 745 V. Aston, (1843) 11 M. & W. 401 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 363 ; 7 Jur. 978 ; 63 E. E. 685 534 V. Best, (1854) 14 C. B. 487 ; 28 L. J. C. P. 89 ; 18 Jur. 402 40 V. Cripps, [1914] 3 K. B. 989 ; 83 L. J. K. B. 1538— C. A 106 V. Fenwick, (1782) 3 B. & P. 558, n. ; 7 T. E. 635, n 134 V. Great Southern and Western E. Co., (1909) 2 Ir. E. 330— C. A. 499 V. Hawkins, (1851) 16 Q. B. 308; 20 L. J. Q. B. 313 ; 15 Jur. 746 582, 590, 610 V. Lanyon, (1830) 6 Bing. 536; 4 M. & P. 316; 8 L. J. C. P. 180; , 31 E. E. 485 779 ■ V. Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire E. Co., (1895) 1 Q. B. 134 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 6; 71 L. T. 596 ; 48 W. E. 120 223,468 V. Mostyn, (1886) 33 Ch. D. 226 ; 55 L. J. Ch. 893 ; 55 L. T. 651 358 V. Nesfield, (1854) 3 B. & B. 724; 28 L. J. M. C. 169; 18 Jur. 747 183, 747 V. Newman, (1868) 4 B. & S. 89; 82 L. J. M. C. 186; 8 L. T. (N. S.) 424 159 V. Nicholson & Sons, [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 42— C. A 101 V. Perkins, (1606) Cro. Jac. 144 556 V. Pritchard (1910) 2 K. B. 320; 79 L. J. K. B. 749; 108 L. T. 224; 74 J. P. 872; 26 T. L. E. 496 786 V. Eichardson, (1800) 8 T. E. 505 762 V. Yorkshire Insurance Co., [1913] 2 Ir. E. 1 250 Taylor's Agreement Trusts, In re, (1904) 2 Oh; 737; 73 L. J. Ch. 557; 52 W. E. 602; 21 E. P. C. 722 717 INDEX OF CASES. CXXVll PAGE Taylor's Patent, In re, (1912) 28 T. L. E. 293 710 Patent, In re, (1918) 34 E. P. C. 247 709 (William) Patent, In re, (1916) 33 E. P. G. 138— C. A 700 Tear v. Preebody, (1858) 4 C. B. (N. S.) 228 236, 254 Temperton v. Eussell, (1893) 1 Q. B. 715; 62 L. J. Q. B. 412 ; 69 L. T. 78; 41 W. E. 565 18 Tempus, The, [1913] P. 166; 83 L. J. P. 33 459 Tenant v. Goldwin, (1704) 2 Lord Eaym. 1089; 1 Salk. 21, 360 338, 427 Tennant v. Field, (1857) 8 E. & B. 336; 27 L. J. Q. B. 33; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 1178 305, 306, 310 Teofani & Co.'s Trade Mark, [1913] 2 Ch. 545; 82 L. J. Ch. 490— C. A 726 Termagant Cargo Owners v. Page, Son & Eart, (1914) 19 Com. Cas. 239 486 Terrell v. Parker, (1915) 32 T. L. E. 48 74, 80, 86 Terry v. Hutchinson, (1868) L. E. 3 Q. B. 599 ; 37 L. 3. Q. B. 257 ; 18 L. T. 521 225 V. Sweeting, Duncan, In re, (1899) 1 Ch. 387 ; 68 L. J. Ch. 253 ; 47 W. E. 375; 80 L. T. 322; 15 T. L. E. 185 51 Tessymond's Case, (1828) 1 Lewin, C. C. 169 473 Thames Conservators v. Smeed, (1897) 2 Q. B. 334 166 Tharpe v. Stallwood, (1843) 5 M. & G. 760; 12 L. J. C. P. 241; 6 Scott, N. E. 715; 7 Jur. 492; 1 D. & L. 24; 63 E. E. 474 51, 233, 260 Theobald v. Crichmore, (1818) 1 B. & Aid. 227; 19 E. E. 297 129 Thorn V. Sinclair, [1917] A. C. 127— H. L 103 Thomas v. Bradbury, Agnew & Co., (1906) 2 K. B. 627 ; 75 L. J. K. B. 726; 54 W. E. 608; 95 L. T. 23; 22 T. L. E. 656 23, 575, 596, 597, 605, 614 V. Churton, (1862) 2 B. & S. 475; 31 L. J. Q. B. 139,; 8 Jur. (N. S.) 795 576 V. Harries, (1840) 1 M. & G. 695 ; 1 Scott, N. E. 524 ; 4 Jur. 723 ; 9 L. J. C. P. 308; 56 E. E. 511 305, 306 V. Marsh, (1833) 5 C. & P. 596 156 V. Mirehouse, (1887) 19 Q. B. D. 663; 66 L. J. Q. B. 653 780 V. Quartermaine, (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 685; 56 L. J. Q. B. 340; 57 L. T. 537 88, 95, 484, 513—516 V. Eussell, (1854) 9 Ex. 764; 23 L. J. Ex. 233 ; 2 C. L. E. 542 ... 652 V. Sorrell, (1674) Vaughan, 330 ; 1 Levinz, 217 31,348 V. Thomas, (1835) 2 C. M. & E. 34; 1 Gale 61; 5 Tyr. 804; 4 L. J. Ex. 179; 41 E. E. 678 399 V. Williams, (1880) 14 Oh. D. 864; 49 L. J. Ch. 605; 43 L. T. 91 554 V. Winchester, (1852) 6 New York Eep. 397 473 Thompson v. Belfast, etc., B. Co., (1871) I. E. 5 Oh. 517 507 V. Bradford Corporation and Tinsley, [1915] 3 K. B. 13 ; 84 L. J. K. B. 1440 • 408 V. Brighton Corporation, (1894) 1 Q. B. 332; 63 L. J. Q. B. 181; 70 L. T. 206; 42 W. E. 161 394 V. City Glass Bottle Co., (1902) 1 K. B. 233; 71 L. J. K. B. 145 ; 85 L. T. 661; 18 T. L. E. 69; reversing (1901) 2 K. B. 483; 70 L. J. K. B. 817 9i V. Dibdin, [1912] A. C. 533; 81 L. J. K. B. 918— H. L. (And see Eex v. Dibdin; Thompson, Ex parte) 588 V. Gibson, (1841) 7 M. & W. 456; 9 Dowl. P. C. 717; 10 L. J. Ex. 330; 56 E. E. 763' 409, 413, 414 V. Hickman, (1907) 1 Ch. 550; 76 L. J. Ch. 254 323 V. Hill, (1870) L. B. 5 0. P. 564 142 V. Ingham, (1850) 14 Q. B. 710; 19 L. J. Q. B. 189; 14 Jur. 429 754 V. Johnson (Eichaord), Ltd., [1914] 3 K. B. 694; 84 L. J. K. B. 168—0. A 106 V. Lacy, (1820) 3 B. & Aid. 283; 22 E. E. 385 27 V. London County Council, (1899) 1 Q. B. 841 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 625; 47 W. B. 433; 80 L. T. 612 61 V. Montgomery, (1889) 41 Ch. D. 35 730 V North Eastern Engineering Co., [1914] W. N. 22— C. A. ... 101 V. Pettitt, (1847) 10 Q. B. 101; 16 L. J. Q. B. 163; 11 Jur. 748 352 V. Bobs, (1860) 5H. & N. 16; 29 L. J. Ex. 1; 1 L. T. (N. S.) 43 227 CXXVlii INDEX OP CASES. PAGE Thompson v. Shackell, (1828) Moo. & Mai. 187; 31 E. E. 728 608 V. Shirley, (1798) 1 Esp. 31 242 Thompson's Patent, In re, (1909) 2 Ch. 447; 78 L. J. Ch. 690; 101 L. T. 261; 25 T. L. E. 824; 26 E. P. C. 673 709 Thomson v. Clanmorris, (1899) 2 Ch. 523; (1900) 1 Ch. 718; 68 L. J. Ch. 717; 69 L. J. Ch. 337; 48 W. E. 39, 488; 82 L. T. 277; 16 T. L. E. 296 539 V. Mutter, [1913] S. C. 619— See 99 V. Newton & Co., [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 413— C. A 106 Thorley v. Kerry (Lord), (1812) 4 Taunt. 355; 13 E. E. 626 554 Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 763; 42 L. T. 851; 28 W. E. 966 552, 554 Thorn v. Humm & Co., (1915) 112 L. T. 888— C. A 103 Thome v. Heard, (1895) A. C. 495; (1894) 1 Ch. 599; 63 L. J. Ch. 356; 70 L. T. 541; 42 W. E. 274 85, 86, 187, 366, 367 V. Tilbury, (1858) 3 H. & N. 534; 27 L. J. Ex. 407 243, 270 Thorneloe v. Hill, (1894) 1 Oh. 569; 63 L. J. Ch. 331; 70 L. T. 124; 42 W. E. 397 731, 741 ThomhiU v. Weeks, [1915] 1 Ch. 106; 12 L. G. E. 597; 84 L. J. Ch. 282 166 Thornton v. Adams, (1816) 5 M. & S. 38 ; 17 E. E. 257 289 Thornycroft's Patent, In re, (1899) A. C. 415; 68 L. J. P. C. 68; 16 E. P. C. 202 709 Thorogood v. Bryan, (1849) 8 C. B. 115; 18 L. J. C. P. 336 510 V. Eobinson, (1845) 6 Q. B. 769; 14 L. J. Q. B. 87 ; 9 Jur. 274; 66 E. E. 567 :•■■ 237, 244 Thorpe v. Priestnall, (1897) 1 Q. B. 159 637 Threlkeld v. Smith, (1901) 2 K. B. 531; 70 L. J. K. B. 921; 85 L. T. 275; 50 W. E. 158; 17 T. L. E. 612 156, 298 Thurgood v. Eichardson, (1831) 7 Bing. 428; 5 M. & P. 270; 4 C. & P. 481 779 Thurman v. Wild, (1840) 11 A. & E. 453; 3 P. & D. 489 170, 188 Thurn and Taxis (Princess) v. Moffit, [1915] 1 Ch. 58; 84 L. J. Ch. 220 123 Thurrook, Gr^ys, etc., Sewage Board v. Goldsmith, (1915) 79 J. P. 17 400 Thurston -w. Charles, (1905) 21 T. L. E. 659 238, 567 Thwaites v. Wilding, (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 421; 12 Q. B. D. 4; 52 L. J. Q. B. 734; 53 L. J. Q. B. 1; 49 L. T. 201, 396 287 & Co. V. M'Evilly, (1904) 1 Ir. E. 310 723 Tidman v. Ainslie, (1854) 10 Ex. 63 622 Tighe V. Cooper, (1857) 7 E. & B. 639 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 215 ; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 716 574 Tillett V. Ward, (1882) 10 Q. B. D. 17; 52 L. J. Q. B. 61; 47 L. T. 546 10, 316, 443, 458 Tilling, T., Ltd. v. Dick, Kerr & Co., Ltd., (1905) 1 K. B. 562; 74 L. J. K. B. 359; 69 J. P. 172; 53 W. E. 380; 92 L. T. 731; 21 T. L. E. 281; 3 L. G. E. 369 29, 114, 116, 182 Timothy v. Day, (1908) 2 Ir. E. 26 768 — — V. Simpson, (1835) 1 C. M. & E. 757-; 5 Tyr. 244; 6 C. & P. 499; 4 L. J. Ex. 81; 40 E. E. 722 203, 783 Tinsley v. Lacy, (1863) 1 H. & N. 747 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 535 ; 11 W. E. 876 693, 694 Tipping V. Jepson, (1906) 22 T. L. E. 743 656 Titley v. Foxall, (1758) 2 Ld. Ken. 308 155 Tobin V. The Queen, (1864) 16 C. B. (N. S.) 310; 33 L. J. C. P. 199; 10 L. T. 762 37, 68 Todd V. Flight, (1860) 9 C. B. (N. S.) 377 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 21 ; 3 L. T. (N. S.) 325 414 V. Hawkins, (1837) 8 C. & P. 88; 2 M. & Eob. 20; 56 E. E. 834 587 V. Lynes, (1873) Times, July 26 5, 217 Tokalon, Ltd., v. Davidson, (1915) 31 E. P. C. 74; 32.E. P. C. 133 (Ct. of Sess.) 720, 739 Tolhurst V. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers and others, (1903) A. C. 414 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 834 ; 89 L. T. 196 ; 19 T. L. E. 677; 52 W. E. 143 54 Tollerton (Overseers of). Ex parte, (1842) 3 Q. B. 792 753 Tomlinson v. Brittlebank, (1833) 4 B. & Ad. 630; 1 N. & M. 455; 2 L. J. K. B. 105; 38 E. E. 335 563 INDEX OP OASES. OXXIX PAGE Tomlinson v. Consolidated Credit and Mortgage Corporation, (1889) 24 Q. B. D. 135; 62 L. T. 162; 38 W. R. 118 „ 289 Tompson v. Dashwood, (1833) 11 Q. B. D. 43; 52 L. J. 0. B. 425: 48 L. T. 943 „ 570 Toogood V. Spyring, (1834) 1 C. M. & R. 181; 4 Tyr. 682; 3 L. J. Ex. 347; 40 R. R. 523 580, 584, 591, 610, 611 Toronto Corporation v. Consumers' Gas Co. of Toronto, [19161 A. C. 618— P. C 115 Power Co. v. Kate Paskwan, [1915] A. C. 734; 84 L. J. P. C. 148— P. c: 92 Railway v. Toronto Corporation, (1904) A. C. 809; 73 L. J. P. C. 120; 20 T. L. R. 774; 91 L. T. 541 751 V. Regem, (1917) 86 L. J. P. C. 195— P. C 386 Torrance v. Ilford Urban District Council, (1909) 25 T. L. R. 355; 99 L. T. 847; 73 J. P. 225; 53 Sol. J. 301; 7 L. G. R. 60, 554 467 Tottenham v. Byrne, (1861) case in Exchequer Chamber cited in Reilly V. Thompson, (1877) 11 Ir. Rep. C. L. 238 321 Tottenham Urban Council v. Rowley, [1912] 2 Oh. 633— C. A 392 Tough V. Hopkins, (1904) 1 K. B. 805; 73 L. J. K. B. 628; 68 J. P. 274; 52 W. R. 605; 90 L. T. 672; 20 T. L. R. 323; 9 Asp. M. C. 562; 20 Cox, C. C. 650 379 V. North British B. Co., [1914] S. C. 291— Sco 464 Towne v. Lewis, (1849) 7 C. B. 608 242 Towns V. Mead, (1855) 16 C. B. 123 188 Towusend (Lord) v. Hughes, (1677) 2 Mod. 150; 1 Freem. 217 173 Towsey v. White, (1826) 5 B. & C. 125; 7 D. & R. 810 133 Tozer v. Child, (1856) 6 E. & B. 289; 7 E. & B. 377; 25 L. J. Q. B. 327; 26 L. J. Q. B. 151 36 V. Mashford, (1851) 6 Ex. 539 .- 555 Trafford v. St. Faith's Rural District Council, (1910) 74 J. P. 297 ... 165, 797 Trail & Sons v. Actieselskabat Dalbeattie, Ltd., (1904) 6 F. 798 (Ct. of Sess.) 52, 53, 470, 474 Traill v. Baring, (1864) 4 De G. J. & S. 318 636 Trantom's Patent, In re, (1917) 34 R. P. C. 28 709 Travers v. Cooper, (1914) 83 L. J. K. B. 1787— C. A 496 Trebeck v. Croudace, [1918] 1 K. B. 158; 87 L. J. K. B. 272— C. A. ... 785 Tredegar v. Roberts, [1914] 1 K. B. 283— C. A 52 Tredway v. Machin, (1904) 91 L. T. 310 ; 20 T. L. R. 726 ; 53 W. R. 136 416 Trent v. Hunt, (1853) 9 Ex. 14; 22 L. J. Ex. 318; 17 Jur. 899 ... 308, 769 Trevilian v. Pyne, (1705) 1 Salk. 107 323 Trigg V. Vauxhall Motors, Ltd., [1914] W. C. & Ins. R. 251 99 Trim Joint District School Board of Management v. Kelly, [1914] A. C. 667; 83 L. J. P. C. 220— H. L 102, 103, 104 Trinder v. Great Westerp B. Co., (1919) 35 T. L. R. 291 500 Trinidad Asphalt Co. v. Ambard, (1899) A. C. 649; 68 L. J. P. C. 114; 48 W. E. 116; 81 L. T. 132 376 Tripp V. Thomas, (1824) 3 B. & C. 427 ; 4 D. & R. 276 ; 1 C. & P. 477 615 Trott V. National Discount Co., (1901) 17 T. L. R. 37 87 Trotter v. Maclean, (1879) 13 Ch. D. 674; 42 L. T. 118; 28 W. B. 244 363, 367 Trufort, In re, TraJEord v. Blanc, (1887) 36 Ch. D. 600; 67 L. J. Ch. 135; 57 L. T. 674; 36 W. R. 163 171 Trustees, Executors, and Agency Co. ■;;. Short, (1888) 13 App. Cas. 793; 58 L. J. P. C. 4; 59 L. T. 677 324, 359 Tryst, The, (1909) P. 333; 79 L. J. P. 17; 101 L. T. 716; 11 Asp. M. C. 333 459 Tuberville v. Savage, (1669) 1 Mod. 3 191, 194 V. Stamp, (1697) 12 Mod. 162 432 Tuck, In re, Murch v. Loosemore, (1906) 1 Ch. 692; 76 L. J. Ch. 497; 94 L. T. 697; 22 T. L. R. 425 767 Tucker v. Newman, (1839) 11 A. & E. 40; 3 P. & D. 14 ; 3 Jur. 1146; 9 L. J. Q. B. 1; 52 R. R. 276 411 V. Wright, (1826) 3 Bing. 601; 11 Moore, 500 279 Tuff V. Warman, (1868) 5 C. B. (N. S.) 573; 27 L. J. C. P. 322; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 222 503 Tughan v. Craig, [1918] 1 Ir. R. 245 677 Tullidge V. Wade, (1769) 3 Wils. 18 143 CT. ■ J CXXX INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Tummons v. Ogle, (1856) 6 E. & B. 571; 26 L. J. Q. B. 403; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 82 257 Tunnicliffe and HMnpaon, Ltd. v. West Leigh Colliery Co., (1908) AC 27; (1906) 2 Ch. 22; 74 L. J. Ch. 649; 75 L. J. Ch. 512; 77 L J Ch. 102;98L. T. 4;24T. L. B. 146 418,426,439 Tunno i;. Morris, (1838) 2 C. M. & R. 298 756 Turley v. Daw, (1906) 94 L. T. 216; 22 T. L. E. 231 183 V. Thomas, (1837) 8 C. & P. 103; 56 E. E. 839 437 Tumbull V. Vickers, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 323— C. A 101 ^. Wieland, (1917) 38 T. L. E. 143 441 Turner v. Ambler, (1847) 10 Q. B. 252 ; 11 L. J. Q. B. 158 ; 6 Jur. 346 644, 646, 650 i;. Cameron, (1870) L. E. 5 Q. B. 306 292 u. Coates, [1917] 1 K. B. 670 44J V. Ford, (1846) 15 M. & W. 212; 15 L. J. Ex. 215 266, 315 V. Great Eastern E. Co., (1875) 33 L. T. 431 67 V. Haulwen Owners, [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 50— C. A 106 ... Hockey, (1887) 56 L. J. Q. B. 301 238 u. Meymott, (1823) 1 Bing. 158 329 V. Ogden, (1703) 6 Mod. 104 636 V. Stallibrass, (1898) 1 Q. B. 56; 67 L. J. Q. B. 52; 77 L. T. 482; 46 W. E. 81 2 ... Turner, (1818) Gow, 20 206 and another v. Hagi Goolam Mahomed Azam, (1904) A. C. 826; 74 L. J. P. C. 17; 91 L. T. 216; 20 T. L. E. 599; 9 Asp. M. C. 588 245 (or Fraser) v. Eiddell, [1914] S. C. 125— Sco 102 Turners, Ltd. v. Whitefield, (1904) 6 F. 922 (Ct. of Sess.) 100 Turquoise, The, (1908) P. 148; 77 L. J. P. 97; 96 L. T. 588 459 Turton v. Turton, (1889) 42 Ch. D. 128; 68 L. J. Oh. 677; 61 L. T. 671; 38 W. E. 22 726, 730 Tuaon v. Evans, (1840) 12 A. & E. 733; 4 P. & D. 396; 54 E. E.-674 584, 593 Tussaud & Sons v. Tussaud, (1890) 44 Ch. D. 678; 59 L. J. Ch. 631; 62 L. T. 633; 38 W. E. 503 731 Tutton V. Daj-ke, (1860) 5 H. & N. 647; 29 L. J. Ex. 271; 6 Jur. (N. S.) 983 290, 291 Tweddle v. Atkinson, (1861) 1 B. & S. 393; 30 L. J. Q. B. 265; 4 L. T. (N. S.) 468 472 Twyne's Case, (1601) 3 Rep. 80 b ; 2 Co. Eep. 212; 1 Smith L. C. 12th ed. 1 773 Tyrringham's Case, (1584) 4 Eep. 38 b ; 2 Co. Rep. 379 340 Tyson v. Smith, (1838) 9 A. & E. 406 ; 1 P. & D. 307 ; 1 W. W. & H. 749; 48 R. R. 539 345, 346 TJllmann & Co. V. Cesar Leuba, (1908) A. C. 443; 99 L. T. 531; 25 R P C 673 . 731 Underwood,' In re, Bowles, In re V. v. W., (wosi'biw. R. 335 654 V. Hewson, (1724) 1 Strange, 596 9 Uneeda Trade Mark, In re, (1902) 1 Ch. 783; (1901) 1 Ch. 560; 70 L. J. Ch. 318; 71 L. J. Ch. 363; 86 L. T. 439; 50 W. E. 467; 18 T. L. E. 453; 19 E. P. C. 281 728 linger v Howell, [1914] W. C. & Ins. E. 58— C. A 101 Union Credit Bank v. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, (1899) 2 Q. B. 206; 68 L. J. Q. B. 842; 81 L. T. 44; 4 Com. Oas. 227 236 Union Lighterage Co. v. London Graving Dock Co., (1902) 2 Ch. 658; (1901) 2 Ch. 300; 70 L. J. Ch. 558; 71 L. J. Ch. 791; 87 L. T. 381; 18 T. L. E. 754 377 Uniona, The, [1914] P. 141; 83 L. J. P. 106 460 United Collieries Co. v. McGhie, (1904) 6 P. 808 (Ct. of Sess.) 100 United Horse Shoe & Nail Co. v. Stewart, (1888) 13 App. Ca«. 401; 59 L. T. 561 : 715, 716 United Land Co. v. Great Eastern E. Co., (1875) L. R. 10 Ch. 586; 44 L. J. Ch. 686; 33 L. T. 292 342 United Telephone Co. v. Dale, fl884) 25 Ch. D. 778; 53 L. J. Ch. 296 ; 60 L. T. 86 713 INDEX OF CASES. CXXXl PAGE ■United Telephone Co. v. Harrison, (1882) 21 Ch. D. 720; 51 L. J. Ch. 705; 46 L. T. 620 701 V. London & Globe Telephone & Maintenance Co., (1884) 26 Ch. D. 766; 53 L. J. Ch. 1158; 51 L. T. 187 712 V. Sharpies, (1885) 29 Ch. D. 164 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 633 ; 52 L. T. 384 715 Universal Winding Co. v. G. Hattersley & Sons, (1915) 33 E. P. C. 479 720 University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press, [19161 2 Ch. 1601 669 Upmann v. Forrester, (1883) 24 Ch. D. 231; 52 L. J. Ch. 946; 49 L. T. 122 798 Usher v. Martin, (1889) 24 Q. B. D. 272; 59 L. J. Q. B. 11; 61 L. T. 778 268 UsiU V. Hales, (1878) 3 C. P. D. 319; 47 L. J. C. P. 523; 38 L. T. 65 577, 600 Utopia, The, (1893) A. C. 492; 62 L. J. P. C. 118 398 Utting V. Berney, (1888) 5 T. L. E. 39 639 Vachke & Sons, Ltd. v. London Society of Compositors, [1913] A. C. 107 ; 82 L. J. K. B. 232— H. L 71, 572 Valdes, The, (1915) 31 T. L. E. 144 469, 497 Valentine v. Hyde, [1919] 2 Ch. 129 70 "Valentine Meat Juice Co. v. Valentine Extract of Meat Co., Ltd., (1900) 83 L. T. 259; 16 T. L. E. 33, 522; 17 E. P. C. 1, 673; 48 W. E. 127 726 Vallance v. Palle, (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 109; 53 L. J. Q. B. 459; •51 L. T. 158 28 Valmont, The, [1918] P. 310 459 Valpey v. Sanders, (1848) 5 C. B. 886 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 249; 12 Jur. 483 168 Van Berkel v. Simpson, (1907) S. C. 165 (Ct. of Sess.) 699, 707, 713 Vandenburgh v. Truax, (1847) 4 Denio, 464, N. Y 8 Van Den Eynde v. Ulster E. Co., (1871) 5 Ir. Eep. C. L. 328 82 Van Der Leeuw's Trade Mark, In re, (1912) 1 Ch. 40; 81 L. J. Ch. 100 ; 105 L. T. 626 ; 66 Sol. J. 53 ; 28 T. L. E. 35 ; 28 E. P. C. 708 721 Vandervell v. Lundberg, (1916) 33 E. P. C. 60 695 Vane v. Barnard (Lord), (1716) 2 Vera. 738 369 V. Vane, (1872-3) L. E. 8 Ch. 383; 42 L. J. Ch. 299; 28 L. T. 320 366 Vaspor V. Edwards, (1901) 12 Mod. 658 304, 317 Vaughan o. Menlove, (1837) 3 Bing. N. C. 468 ; 4 Scott, 244 ; 3 Hodges, 51; 1 Jur. 215; 6 L. J. C. P. 92 ; 43 E. E. 711 433, 434 V. Taff Vale E. Co., (1860) 5 H. & N. 679; 29 L. J. Ex. 247; 2 L. T. (N. S.) 394 12, 402, 406, 437 «. Watt, (1840) 6 M. &'W. 492; 9 L. J. Ex. 272; 65 E. E. 712 ... 244 Vavasseur v. Krupp, (1878) 9 Ch. D. 351 ; 39 L. T. 437 ; 27 W. E. 176 39, 715 Venezuela E. Go. v. Kisch, (1867) L. E. 2 H. L. 99; 36 L. J. Ch. 849; 16 L. T. 600 545 Venner's Cooking and Heating Electrical Appliances v. Thorpe, [1915] 2 Ch. 404; 84 L. J. Oh. 925— C. A 284 Vera Cruz, The (No. 2), (1884) 9 P. D. 96— C. A 281 Vere v. Cawdor (Lord), (1809) 11 East, 568; 11 E. E. 268 158 Vernon v. Keys, (1812) 12 East, 632; 4 Taunt. 488;' 11 E. E. 499 ... 526 Verrall v. Eobinson, (1835) 2 C. M. & E. 495; 1 Gale, 244; 6 Tyrw. 1069; 4 Dowl. P. C. 242; 41 E. E. 780 241 Verschure and Zoon'e Trade Mark, In re, (1905) 74 L. J. Ch. 684; 22 E. P. C. 568 728 Vicars v. Wilcocks, (1806) 8 East, 1; 9 E. E. 361; 2 Smith L. C. 12th ed. 513 151, 152, 618 Vickers, Son & Co. v. Siddell, (1890) 15 App. Gas. 496 ; 63 L. T. 590 706 Victoria Insurance Co. v. King, (1895) 6 Queensland L. J. Eep. 202; (1896) A. C. 250— P. C 53 Victorian Bailways Commissioners v. Coultas, (1887-8) 13 App. Cas. 222; 57 L.-J. P. C. 69; 52 J. P. 500;. 37 W. E. 129; 58 L. T. 390; 12 Victorian Law Eep. 895 148, 149, 518 Villars, Ex parte, Sogers, In re, (1874) L. E. 9 Ch. 432; 43 L. J. Bk. 76; 30 L. T. 348 775 Ville de S. Nazaire, The, (1903) 52 W. E. 68; 51 W. E. 590 485 Vine V. National Motor Cab Co. and another, (1913) 29 T. L. E. 311 144 C.T. ' OXXxii INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Vines v. Serell, (1836) 7 C. & P. 163; 48 E. R. 778 616 Violett V. SympsoD, (1857) 8 E. & B. 344; 27 L. J. Q. B. 138; 3 Jur. (N. S.) 1217 183 Vizetelly v. Mudie's Select Library, (1900) 2 Q. B. 170; 69 L. J. Q. B. 645; 16 T. L. R. 352 567-569 Volkl V. Rotunda Hospital, [1914] 2 Ir. E. 543 125 Von Heyden v. Neustadt, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 230; 50 L. J. Ch. 126; 42 L. T. 300 714 Von Weissenfeld, In re, Hendry, Ex parte, (1892) 36 S. J. 276 792 Wadhuest r. Damme, (1604) Cro. Jac. 45 158 Waide & Co.'s Application (Anchola Trade Mark), (1916) 33 E. P. C. 320 724 Wainford v. Heyl, (1875) L. E; 20 Bq. 821; 44 L. J. Ch. 567; 33 L ■ T 155 47 Waite V. North B-astern'E!" 00:7(1859)' E. B. & E. 719; 27 L. J. Q. B. 417 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 258; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1300 ; 5 Jvir. (N. S.) 936 510 Waites v. The Franco-British Exhibition, (1909) 25 T. L. E. 441— C. A. 96 Wake V. Dyer, (1911) 104 L. T. 448; 75 J. P. 210; 9 L. G. E. 348; 22 Cox, C. C. 413 662 Wakelin v. London and South Western E. Co., (1886) 12 App. Cas. 41 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 229; 55 L. T. 709 500, 510, 511, 513 Wakeman v. Liudsey, (1849) 14 Q. B. 625 308 V. Ecbinson, (1823) 1 Bing. 213; 8 Moore, 63 ; 1 L. J. C. P. 70; 25 E. E. 618 457 Wakley v. Johnson, (1826) Ey. & Moo. 422; 27 E. E. 767 621 Waldock V. Winfield, (1901) 2 K. B. 596 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 925 ; 85 L. T. 202; 17 T. L. E. 661 88 Waldron v. Junior Army and Navy Stores, (1910) 2 Ir. E. 381 74, 87 Wales V. Lambton and Hatton Collieries (1917), 86 L. J. K. B. 1346 103 Walker, In re, (1905) 1 Ch. 160; 74 L. J. Ch. 86; 53 W. E. 177; 91 L. T. 713 214 . V. Brewster, (1867) L. R. 5 Eq. 25 ; 37 L. J. Ch. 33 ; 17 L. T. 135 154 V. British Guarantee Association, (1852) 18 Q. B. 277 453 V. Brogden, (1865) 19 C. B. (N. S.) 65; 12 L. T. 495; 13 W. R. 809 605, 607 V. Crystal Palace Football Club, (1910) 1 K. B. 87 ; 79 L. J. K. B. 229 ; 101 L. T. 645 ; 26 T. L. R. 71 ; 54 Sol. J. 65 ; 8 B. W. C. C. 5S. 96, 97 ... Great Northern R. Co. of Ireland, (1891) 28 L. E. Ir. 69 ... 45 V. Jackson, (1842) 10 M. & W. 161 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 165 ; 62 R. E. 564 667 V. Murphy, [1916] 1 Ch. 71; 83 L. J. Ch. 917— C. A. ... 137, 351, «62 V. Needham, (1841) 3-M. & G. 557 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 222 256 V. South Eastern R. Co., (1870) L. R. 5 C. P. 640 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 346; 23 L. T. 14 76, 79, 117, 644 Wallace v. Bergius, [1915] S. C. 205— Sco 457 v. Carroll, (1860) 11 Ir. C. L. E. 485 587 V. Kelsall, (1840) 7 M. & W. 264; 8 Dowl. P. C. 841; 4 Jur. 1064; 10 L. J. Ex. 12; 56 R. R. 707 171, 188 V. King, (1788) 1 H. Bl. 13 311 V. McCartan, [1917] 1 Ir. R. 377 403 Waller -v. Loch, (1881) 7 Q. B. D. 619 589 Walley v. M'Connel, (1849) 13 Q. B. 903; 19 L. J. Q. B. 162; 14 Jur. 193 201, 772 Wallsend, The, (1907) P. 302; 76 L. J. P. 131; 96 L. T. 851; 10 Asp. M. C. 476; 23 T. L. E. 356 „„. 398 Walsh V. Locke & Co., (1914) 110 L. T. 452 , 99 V. Lonsdale, (1882) 21 Ch. D. 9; 52 L. J. Ch. 2; 46 L. T 868 283, 328, 779 V. Waterford Harbour Commissioners, [1914] W. C. & Ins E. 16-C. A. Ir.' :.. 97, 98 Walter D. Wallett, The, (1893) P. 202 ; 62 L. J. P. 88 ; 69 L. T. 771 ... 655 Walter v. Ashton, (1902) 2 Ch. 282; 71 L. J. Ch 839; 87 L T. 196; 18 T. L. E. 446; 51 W. E. 131 - 527 INDEX OF CASES. OXXxiii Walter t-. Lane, (1900) A. C. 539; (1899) 2 Ch. 749; 68 L. J Ch 760- 69 L. J. Oh. 699; 83 L. T. 289 ; 49 W. R. 95 ; 16 T. L E. 27 551 690 V. Kumbal, (1695) 1 Lord Raym. 58 308 r. Selfe, (1851) 4 De G. & Sm. 315; 20 L. J. Ch. 433; 15 jnr. 416 379 Sftl 1-. Steinkopff, (1892) 3 Ch. 489; 61 L. J. Ch. 521; 67 L T. 184 • ' 40 W. E. 599 ' 798 Walters v. Smith (W. H.) & Son, Ltd., [1914] i K. B. 595; "83 L." if.' K. B. 335 ]_9g 205 Waltham Holy Cross Urban District Council v. Lea Conservancy' Board, (1910) 103 L. T. 192; 74 J. P. 253; 26 T. L. E. 483; 8 L. G. E. 579 334 Walton V. Vanguard Motor Bus Co., (1909) 72 J. P. 505 ; 25 ij T E 13; 53 Sol. J. 82; 7 L. G. B. 349 467 V. Waterhouse, (1672) 2 Wra. Saund., 7th Ed. 826 '. 355 Wandsworth Board of Works v. United Telephone Co., (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 904; 53 L. J. Q. B. 449; 51 L. T. 148 333 Wansbrough 1;. Maton, (1836) 4 A. & E. 884 ; 6 N. & M. 367 ; 2 H. & W 37; 5 L. J. K. B. 150 ; 43 R. E. 510 237, 247 Ward V. Freeman, (1852) 2 Ir. C. L. E. 460 744 759 V. Hobbs, (1877) 3 Q. B. D. 150; 4 App. Cas. 13; 47 L. J. Q. B. ' 90; 48 L. J. Q. B. 281; 40 L. T. 73 28, 529 V. London General Omnibus Co., (1873) 42 L. J. C. P. 265 76 V. Webster, (19 — ) unreported 229 V. Weeks, (1830) 7 Bing. 211; 4 M. & P. 796 568, 619 Warden v. Bailey, (1811) 4 a?aunt. 67; 13 R. E. 560 657 Wardle v. Enthoven & Sons, (1917) 86 L. J. K. B. 309— C. A 105 Ware, In re, Drake, Ex parte, (1877) 5 Ch. D. 866 176 Wareham v. Fyffe, (1910) 74 J. P. 249; 8 L. G. R. 620 413 Waring & Gillow v. Giilow & Gillow, (1916) 33 E. P. C. 173 726 Warne v. Chadwell, (1819) 2 Stark. 457; 20 E. R. 716 616 Warner v. Couchman, (1912) A. C. 35; (1911) 1 K. B. 351; 80 L. J. K. B. 526; 81 L. J. K. B. 45; 105 L. T. 676; 28 T. L. E. 58— H. L 97 V. Riddiford, (1858) 4 C. B. (N. S.) 180 194 Warr v. Jolly, (1834) 6 C. & P. 497 560 Warren, Ex paHe, (1885) 15 Q. B. D. 48; 54 L. J. Q. B. 320; 53 L. T. 68 770, 771 V. Baring Bros. & Co., (1910) 54 Sol. J. 720 241 V. Brown, (1902) 1 K. B. 15 ; (1900) 2 Q. B. 722 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 842; 71 L. J. K. B. 12; 85 L. T. 444; 50 W. E. 97; 18 T. L. E. 55 385 V. Murray, (1894) 2 Q. B. 648; 64 L. J. Q. B. 42; 71 L. T. 458; 43 W. E. 3 363 V. Warren, (1834) 1 C. M. & E. 250; 4 Tyr. 850; 3 L. J. Ex. 294; 40 R. R. 547 567, 583 . V. Wilder, (1872) 41 L. J. C. P. 104, n 89 Warwick Tyre Co. t\ New Motor and General Rubber Co. , (1910) 1 Ch. 248; 79 L. J. Ch. 177; 101 L. T. 889; 27 R. P. C. 161 720, 738 Washborn v. Black, (1774) 11 East, 405, n. ; 10 R. R. 538, n 305, 310 Waaon, Ex parte, (1869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 573; 38 L. J. Q. B. 302; 17 W. R. 881 578 V. Walter, (1868) L. R. 4 Q. B. 73; 38 L. J. Q. B. 34; 19 L. T. 409 , 588, 599, 602, 605, 606 Waterer v. Freeman, (1619) Hob. 205, 266 658 Waterman v. Ayres, (1888) 39 Ch. D. 29; 57 L. J. Ch. 893; 59 L. T. 17 729 Waters v. Phillips, (1910) 2 K. B. 465; 79 L. J. K.' B. 1062; 103 L. T. 288; 74 J. P. 343; 26 T. L. R. 564 661 Watkin v. Hall, (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 396; 37 L. J. Q. B. 125; 18 L. T. 561 554, 555, 563, 566 Watkins v. Lee, (1839) 5 M. & W. 270; 7 Dowl. P. C. 498; 3 Jur. 484; 8 L. J. Ex. 266; 52 R. R. 721 653 Watson V. Bodell, (1845) 14 M. & W. 57; 14 L. J. Ex. 281; 9 Jur. 626 760 V. Charlesworth, (1905) 1 K. B. 74; (1906) A. C. 14; 74 L. J. K. B. 155; 75 L. J. K. B. 137; 94 L. T. 6 425 OXXxiv INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Watson V. Jones, (1905) A. C. 480; 74 L. J. P. C. 151; 93 L. T. 489; reversing A. B. v. C. D., (1904) 7 P. 42 (Ct. of Sess) ........ 575-577 . V. McLean, (1858) E. B. & B. 76 ". 269 Watson, Laidlaw & Co. v. Pott, Cassels and Williamson, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 104— H. L. ; [1913] S. C. 762 (Ct. of Sess) 715, 716 Watts V. Praser, (1837) 7 A. & E. 223; 7 C. & P. 369; 1 M. & Bob. 449; 2 N. & P. 157; W. W. & D. 451; 6 L. J. K. B. 236; 1 Jur. 671; 45 E. E. 711 567, 621, 622 . V. Kelson, (1871) L. E. 6 Ch. 166; 40 L. J. Ch. 126; 24 L. T. 209 342 Weatherby & Sons v. International Horse Agency and Exchange, (1910) 2 Oh. 297; 79 L. J. Ch. 609; 102 L. T. 856; 26 T. L. E. 527 669 Weaver v. Bush, (1798)' 8 T. E. 78 157, 323 V. Lloyd, (1824) 2 B. & C. 678; 4 D. & E. 230; 1 C. & P. 295; 2 L. J. K. B. 122; 26 E. E. 515 574 V. Ward, (1616) Hob. 134 9, 45, 190 Webb V. Beavan, (1844) 6 M. & G. 1065; 7 Scott, N. E. 936 157, 340 V. (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 609 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 644 ; 49 L. T. 301 655, 636 V. Bell, (1669) 1 Sid. 440 298 V. Pox, (1797) 7 T. E. 391; 4 E. E. 472 276 Webber v. Sparkes, (1842) 10 M. & W. 485; 12 L. J. Ex. 41 165 V. Wansborough Paper Co., [1915] A. C. 51; [1914] W. N. 290— H. L. ; [1913] 3 K. B. 615; 84 L. J. K. B. 127— C. A. 102, 103, 104 Webster v. Bakewell E. D. C, [1916] 1 Ch. 300; 85 L. J. Oh. 326 ... 21 V. Cohen, (1913) 108 L. T. 197— C. A 101 V. Proctor, (1885) 16 Q. B. D. 112; 55 L. J. Q. B. 150 ... 580, 594, 596 V. Watts, (1847) 11 Q. B. 311; 17 L. J. Q. B. 73; 12 Jur. 243 167 203 Wedge V. Berkley, (1837) 6 A. & E. 663 ; 1 N. & P. 665 ; W. W. & D. ' 271; 46 E. E. 683 128 Weedon v. Timbrell, (1793) 5 T. E. 357 228 Wegman v. Corcoran, (1878-9) 13 Ch. D. 66 ; 41 L. T. 358 ; 28 W. E. 331 707, 708 Weiner v. Gill, Weiner v. Smith, (1905) 2 K. B. 172; (1906) 2 K. B. 574; 74 L. J. K. B. 845; 76 L. J. K. B. 916; 95 L. T. 438; 63 W. E. 563; 22 T. L. E. 699; 11 Com. Cas. 240 271 Weiugarten Bros v. Bayer & Co., (1905) 92 L. T. 511; 89 L. T. 56; 19 T. L. E. 604; 20 E. P. C. 649 721, 736, 738 Weir V. Bell, (1878) 3 Ex. D. 238; 47 L. J. Ex. 704; 38 L. T. 929 ... 68 . V. Thomas and Abron, (1915) 79 J. P. 54 496 Weld-Blundell v. Stephens, [1920] A. C. 956; [1920] W. N. 205; [1919] 1 K. B. 620— C. A. ; [1918] 2 K. B. 742 568, 569, 671 Weldeu v. Bridgewater, (1592) P. Moore, 302 332 Weldon v. Dicks, (1878) 10 Oh. D. 247 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 201 ; 39 L. T. 467 669, 721 V. Times Book Co., (1912) 28 T. L. E. 143 567 V. Winslow, (1884) Times, March 14 561 Welldon v. Butterley Co., (1919) 88 L. J, Ch. 496 422 Weller v. Toke, (1808) 9 East, 364; stated 3 R. E. 355, n 129 Wellington (Coi-poration of the City of) v. Lower Hutt (Corporation of the Borough of), (1904) A. C. 773; 73 L. J. P. C. 80; 20 T. L. E. 712; 91 L. T. 539 34 Wellington, The, (1915) 85 L. J. P. 12 460 Wellock V. Constantine, (1863) 2 H. & C. 146; 32 L. J. Ex. 285; 7 L. T. (N. S.) 751 120 Wells V. Abrahams, (1872) L. E. 7 Q. B. 554; 41 L. J. Q. B. 306; 26 L. T. 326 119-121 V. Gurney, (1828) 8 B. & C. 769 765 V. Moody, (1836) 7 C. & P. 59; 48 E. E. 769 312 V. Ody, (1836) 7 C. & P. 410; 1 Gale, 137; 2 Gale, 12; 6 Tyr. 726; 8 Dowl. P. C. 95; 5 L. J. Ex. 199; 1 M. & W. 462; Tyr. & Gr. 715; 46 E. B. 368 377 V. Smith, [1914] 3 K. B. 722; 88 L. J. K. B. 1614 86 V. Watling, (1778) 2 W. Bl. 1233 137 INDEX OF OASES. OXXXV PAGE Welsbach Incandescent Gas Light Co. r. New Incandescent Sunlight Patent Gas Light Co., (1900) 1 Ch. 843; 69 L. J. Ch. 342; 82 L. T. 293; 48 T. L. E. 520; 16 W. E. 632 ; 17 E. P. C. 237 699, 703, 706 Welsh V. Bell, (1669) 1 Vent. 36 306 V. Canterbury and Paragon, Ltd., (1894) 10 T. L. E. 478 482 r. Glasgow Goal Co., [1915] S. C. 1020— Soo 99 V. Lawrence, (1818) 2 Chit. 262 458 Wenman v. Ash, (1853) 13 C. B. 836; 22 L. J. C. P. 190; 17 Jnr. 579 567 Wennhak r. Morgan, (1888) 20 Q. B. D. 635; 57 L. J. Q. B. 241; 59 L. T. 28 ■. 232, 567 Werner Motors, Ltd. r. A. W. Gamage, Ltd., (1904) 1 Ch. 264; 2 Ch. 580; 73 L. J. Ch. 266, 770; 91 L. T. 588; 20 T. L. E. 144, 796; 21 E. P. C. 137, 621; 53 W. E. 167 696 Wernher, Beit & Co. v. Markham, (1902) 18 T. L. E. 143, 763 575 Werth V. London and Westminster Loan Co., (1889) 5 T. L. E. 521 ... 290 West V. Bristol Tramways Co., a908) 2 K. B. 14; 77 L. J. K. B. 684; 72 J. P. 145, 243; 24 T. L. E. 299, 478; 99 L. T. 264; 6 L. G. E. 609- 391 V. Nibbs, (1847) 4 C. B. 172; 17 L. J. C. P. 150 285, 286, 306 r. Smallwood, (1838) 3 M. ; & W. 418; 6 Dowl. P. C. 680; 7 L. J. Ex. 144; 2 Jur. 328; 49 E. E. 666 198 Westbury v. Powell, {n. d.) cited in Co. Litt. 1, s. 68 31 West Cumberland Iron and Steel Co. v. Kenon, (1879) 11 Ch. D. 782; 48 L. J. Ch. 793; 40 L. T. 703 421, 424 West Ham Central Charity Board v. East London Waterworks Co., (1900) 1 Ch. 624 368 West Houghton Urban District Council v. Wigan Coal and Iron Co., (1919) 88 L. J. Ch. 60— C. A 184 West Leigh Colliery Co., Ltd. v. Tunnicliffe and Hampson, Ltd., (1908) A. C. 27; (1906) 2 Ch. 22; 75 L. J. Ch. 512; 77 L. J. Ch. 102; 98 L. T. 4; 24 T. L. E. 146 174, 175 West London Commercial Bank v. Kitson, (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 360; 53 L. J. Q. B. 345; 50 L. T. 656 526 West Eiding of Yorkshire Eivers Board v. Butterworth & Co., (1909) A. C. 45; 98 L. T. 47, 789; 72 J. P. 193; 6 L. G. E. 634; 25 T. L. E. 117; 53 Sol. J. 97 373 -- — V. Lenthwaite Urban District Council, [1915] 2 K. B. 436; 84 L. J. K. B. 793— C. A 400 V. , (No. 2), (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1610 400 V. Preston & Sons, (1905) 92 L. T. 24 ; 69 J. P. 1 ; 3 L. G. E. 289 373 Western Bank of Scotland v. Addie, (1867) L. E. 1 Sc. Ap. 145 ... 55, 534 Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co., (1874) L. E. 9 Ex. 218; 43 L. J. Ex. 171; 23 W. E. 5 626, 629, 632 Westminster and Brymbo Coal and Coke Co. i\ Clayton, (1867) 36 L. J. Oh. 476; 11 L. T. 366; 13 W. E. 134 423 Westminster Corporation v. Army and Navy Auxiliary Co-operative Supply, Ltd., (1902) 2 K. B. 125; 71 L. J. K. B. 546; 66 J. P. 727; 50 W. E. 631; 87 L. T. 7^ 758 Westminster Fire Office v. Glasgow Provident Investment Society, (1888) 13 A. 0. 699— H. L 432 Westmorland (Earl of) v. New Sharleston Collieries Co., (1900) 80 L. T. 846; 82 L. T. 725; and see [1904] 2 Ch. 443, u 375, 425, 439 Weston •;;. Beeman, (1858) 27 L. J. Ex. 57 641 Weston-super-Mare Urban District Council v. Butt, [1919] 2 Ch. 1 ; 88 L. J. Ch. 249— C. A 395 Wetherman v. London & Liverpool Bank of Commerce, Ltd., (1914) 31 T. L. E. 20 243 Whalley v. Lancashire and Yorkshire E. Co., (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 131; 53 L. J. Q. B. 285; 50 L. T. 472 11, 161, 162, 421, 424 Wharton v. Brook, (1669) 1 Vent. 21 557 V. Naylor, (1848) 12 Q. B. 673; 17 L. J. Q. B. 278; 6 D. & L. 136 297, 778 Whatman v. Pearson, (1868) L. E. 3 C. P. 422; 37 L. J. C. P. 156 ... 131 Wheatley v. Patrick, (1837) 2 M. & W. 650; 6 L. J. Ex. 193 ; 46 E. E. 731 67 Wheeler v. Morris, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1435— C. A 154 INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Wheeler v. Whiting, (1840) 9 C. & P. 262; 62 E. E. 749 204 Whelan v. Great Northern Steam Shipping Co., (1909) W. N. 135; 78 L. J. K. B. 860; 100 L. T. 913; 25 T. L. E. 619— C. A 98 Whenman v. Clark, [1915] 1 K. B. 548 ; 84 L. J. K. B. 825— D. C. ; [1915] W. N. 385— C. A 743, 758 Whitaker v. Forbes, (1875) 1 C. P. D. 51 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 140 ; 33 L. T. 582 124 « Whitbourne v. Williams, (1901) 2 K. B. 722; 70 L. J. K. B. 933; 85 L. T. 271; 17 T. L. E. 707 225—227 Whitbread v. Arnold, (1908) 99 L. T. 103— C. A 102 White, In the Estate of, [1914] P. 153; 83 L. J. P; 67. See also A. B., In re 569 V. Avery, [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 594 103 V. Bayley, (1861) 10 C. B. (N. S.) 227; 30 L. J. C. P. 253; 7 Jur. (N. S.) 948 336, 364 V. Crisp, (1854) 10 Bxch. 312; 23 L. J. Ex. 317; 2 C. L. E. 1215 397 V. France, (1877) 2 C. P. D. 308; 46 L. J. C. P. 823; 25 W. E. 878 484, 489, 491, 493 V. Hindley Local Board, (1875) L. E. 10 Q. B. 219; 44 L. J. ^ Q. B. 114; 32 L. T. 460 33, 394 X. Jameson, (1874) L. E. 18 Eq. 303 419 V. London General Omnibus Co., (1914) 58 Sol. J. 339 379 V. Mellin, (1894) 3 Ch. 275; (1895) A. G. 154; 64 L. J. Ch. 308; 72 L. T. 334; 43 W. E. 353. {And see Mellin v. White) 626, 630—632, 804 V. Morris, (1852) 11 C. B'. 1015 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 185 ; 16 Jur. 500 266, 760 ... Mullet, (1851) 6 Ex. 713; 20 L. J. Ex. 291 269 V. Phillips, (1864) 33 L. J. C. P. 33 483, 485 V. Spettigue, (1845) 13 M. & W. 603; 14 L. J. Ex. 99; 9 Jur. 70; 1 Car. & K. 673; 67 E. E. 753 122 V. Steadman, [1913] 3 K. B. 340; 82 L. J. K. B. 846 447, 471 & Sons V. White & Sons, (1906) A. C. 72; 75 L. J. P. C. 14; 94 L. T. 64 373 Tompkins & Courage v. United Confectionery Co., (1914) 31 E. P. C. 430 723 Whitechurch (George), Ltd. v. Cavanagh, (1902) A. C. 117; 71 L. J. K. B. 400; 50 W. E. 218 ; 85 L. T. 349; 17 T. L. E. 746 ... 57, 85, 546 Whitehead v. Farmer, (1918) 35 E. P. C. 241 697 0. Taylor, (1839) 10 A. & E. 210; 2 P. & D. 367; 4 Jur. 247; 50 E. E. 385 118 V. Wellington, (1911) 55 Sol. J. 272 669' Whitehorn v. Davison, (1911) 1 K. B. 463; 80 L. J. K. B. 425; 104 L. T. 234 122 Whitehouse v. Birmingham Canal Co., (1858) 27 L. J. Ex. 25 403 I.. Fellowes, (1861) 10 C. B. (N. S.) 765; 30 L. J. C. P. 306; 4 L. T. (N. S.) 177 174 Whitely i;. Adams, (1863) 15 C. B. (N. S.) 392; 33 L. J. C. P. 89; 9 L. T. (N. S.) 483 582, 586, 593 Whiteman v. King, (1791) 2 H. Bl. 4 316 Whitfield V. Lambert (1915) 112 L. T. 803— C. A 104 ■ V. Lord Le Despencer, (1778) 2 Cowp. 754 29, 38 0. South Eastern E. Co., (1858) E. B. & E. 115; 27 L. J. Q. B. 229; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 688; 6 W. E. 545 57 Whitfield's Bedsteads, Ltd., In re Application of, for Eegistration of a Trade Mark, (1909) 2 Ch. 373; 78 L. J. Ch. 677 ; 101 L. T. 29; 53 Sol. J. 598; 26 E. P. C. 657 724 Whitham v. Kershaw, (1885-6) 16 Q. B. D. 613; 54 L. T. 124; 34 W. E. 340 369 Whitmore v. Black, (1844) 13 M. & W. 507 ; 2 D. & L. 445 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 19; 8 Jur. 1103; 67 E. E. 705 273 V. Humphries, (1871) L. E. 7 C. P. 1; 41 L. J. C. P. 43; 25 L. T. 496 365 Whitney v. Moignard, (1890) 24 Q. B. D. 630; 59 L. J. Q. B. 324 152 Whittaker v. London County Council, [1915] 2 K. B. 676; 84 L. J. • K. B. 1446 77, 79 Whitwham v. Westminster Brymbo Coal Co. , (1896) 1 Ch 894 ; 2 Ch. " 538 351 INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Whitworth v. Hall, (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 695 ; 9 L. J. K. B. 297 ; 36 R. E. 715 653 Whuir r. Devenish, (1904) 20 T. L. B. 385 253 Wickham v. Gatrill, (1854) 2 Sm. & G. 353; 23 L. J. Oh. 783; 18 Jur. 768 122 Wicks V. Dowell & Co., Ltd., [1905] 2 K. B. 225 ; 74 L. J. K. B. 572 ; 53 W. R. 515; 92 L. T. 677; 21 T. L. R. 487— C. A 102 Wieland c. Butler Hogan, (1904) 73 L. J. K. B. 513; 68 J. P. 310; 53 W. E. 63; 90 L. T. 588; 20 T. L. R. 419; 20 Cox, C. C. 630 ... 476, 496 Wiffen V. Bailey and Eomford Urban District Council, [1915] 1 K. B. 600; 84 L. J. K. B. 688; 31 T. L. E. 64— C. A 196, 634, 636 Wilbraham v. Snow, (1669) 2 Wma. Saund. 47 a 260, 775 Wilcox V. Steel, (1904) 1 Ch. 212; 73 L.. J. Ch. 217; 89 L. T. 640; 68 J. P. 146; 20 T. L. R. 78 413, 662, 665 Wild r. Simpson, [1919] 2 K. B. 544— C. A 660 r. Waygood, (1892) 1 Q. B. 783 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 391 ; 66 L. T. 309; 40 W. E. 501 94 Wilde V. Waters, (1855) 16 C. B. 637; 24 L. J. C. P. 193 ... 237, 244, 341 Wilder, Ex parte,. (1902) 66 J. P. 761 746 1-. Speer, (1838) 8 A. & E. 547 ; 3 N. & P. 536 ; 1 W. W. & H. 378 ; 7 L. J. Q. B. 249; 47 R. R. 656 304 Wiles, Ex parte, (1903) 20 T. L. E. 150; 90 L. T. 225 319, 743, 75g Wilkes V. Hungerford Market Co., (1835) 2 Bing. N. C. 281; 1 Hodges, 281; 2 Scott, 446 388 Wilkins V. Day, (1883) 12 Q. B. D. 110; 49 L. T. 399; 32 W. E. 123 390 c. Miller, (1918) 35 E. P. C. 257— C. A 700 V. Weaver, [1915] 2 Ch. 322; 84 L. J. Ch. 929 223 Wilkinson and Car and General Insurance Corporation, Ltd., Re, (1915) 110 L. T. 468— C. A 135 V. Downton, (1897) 2 Q. B. 57; 66 L. J. Q. B. 493 148 r. Pairrie, (1862) 1 H. & C. 633 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 73 ; 7 L. T. (N. S.) 599 483, 492 V. Howel, (1830) Moo. & Mai. 495 653 V. Peel, (1895) 1 Q. B. 516; 64 L. J. Q. B. 178; 72 L. T. 151; 43 W. R. 302 284 V. Verity, (1871) L. R. 6 C. P. 206 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 141 ; 24 L. T. 32 186, 241, 256 Willans V. Taylor, (1829-31) 6 Bing. 183 ; 3 M. & P. 350 ; 2 B. & Ad. 845 ; 7 L. J. C. P. 250 ; 1 L. J. K. B. 17 ; 31 R. R. 379 ... 643, 644, 651 Willetts V. Watt & Co., (1892) 2 Q. B. 92; 61 L. J. Q. B. 540; 66 - L. T. 818; 40 W. R. 497 93 Williams, Ex parte, Davies, In re, (1872) L. R. 7 Ch. 314; 41 L. J. Bky. 38; 26 L. T. 303 774 V. Archer, (1847) 5 C. B. 318; 17 L. J. C. P. 82 275, 276 V. Assheton Smith, (1913) 108 L. T. 200— C. A 102 V. Banks, (1859) 1 P. & F. 557 651 V. Birmingham Battery and Metal Co., (1899) 2 Q. B. 338; 68 L. J. Q. B. 918 ; 47 W. R. 680 ; 81 L. T. 62 ; 15 T. L. R. 468 ... 92, 93 V. Breedon, (1798) 1 B. & P. 329 48 V. Burgess, (1810) 3 Taunt. 127 134 V. Bwlfa & Merthyr Dare Steam Collieries, [1914] 2 K. B. 30; . 83 L. J. K. B. 442— C. A 106 V. Clough, (1858) 3 H. & N. 258; 27 L. J. Ex. 325 515 V. Curzon Syndicate, [1919] 35 T. L. R. 475— C. A 240 V. Eady, (1893) 10 T. L. E. 41 465 I'. Glenister, (1824) 2 B. & C. 699; 4 D. & R. 217 ; 2 L. J. K. B. 143; 26 R. E. 525 210 V. Golding, (1865) L. R. 1 C. P. 69; 35 L. J. C. P. 1; 13 L. T. 291 131 V. Great Western R. Co., (1874) L. R. 9 Ex. 157 508 V. James, (1867) L. R. 2 C. P. 577; 36 L. J. C. P. 256; 16 L. T. 664 342- V. Jones, (1864-5) 3 H. & C. 256, 602; 33 L. J. Ex. 297; 13 L. T. 300 •• 84 V. Linotype and Machinery, Ltd., (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1620 ... 88 ■- V. Llandudno Coaching Co., [1915] 2 K. B. 101; 84 L. J. K. B. 655— C. A 100 CXXXVUl INDEX OF CASES. Williams v. Maritime S. S. Owners, [1915] 2 K. B. 137 ; 84 L. J. K. B. gOQ n p^ ^ Qy V. Mason, (1873) 28 L. T. (N. S.) 232;' 21 W. E. 386 546 V. Morris, (1841) 8 M. & W. 488 340, 848 V. Mostyn, (1838) 4 M. & W. 145; 7 Dowl. P. C. 38; 2 Jur. 646 139, 777 V. Ocean Coal Co., [1907] 2 K. B. 422; 7^ L. J. K. B. 1073; 97 L. T. 150; 23 T. L. B. 584—0. A , 100 V. Parsons and Parsons, (1909) 25 T. L. E. 569; 26 T. L. E. 78; 54 Sol. J. 64 „ 466 V. Peel Eiver Land and Mineral Co., (1886) 55 L. T. 689 275 V. Protheroe, (1829) 5 Bing. 309 ; 2 M. & P. 779 ; 3 Y., & J. 129 ; 30 E. E. 608 54 V. Eichards, (1852) 3 C. & IK. 81 457 V. (1907) 2 K. B. 88 ; 76 L. J. K. B. 589 ; 71 J. P. 222 ; 96 L. T. 644; 23 T. L. E. 423 446, 449 V. Smith, (1863) 14 C. B. (N. S.) 596 199 V. (1888) 22 Q. B. D. 134; 58 L. J. Q. B. 21; 59 L. T. 757* 37 W E 93 . . 599 V. St'iven, (1846) 9 q'."£ 14; IS L.'j'.' Q.' B. 321 ; 10 Jur. 804 "!!.".' 283 V. Vauxhall Colliery Co., [1907] 2 K. B. 433; 76 L. J. K. B. 854; 97 L. T. 559; 23 T. L. E. 591— C. A 100 Williamson v. Barbour, (1877) 9 Ch. D. 529; 50 L. J. Ch. 147; 37 L. T. 698 187 V. Freer, (1874) L. E. 9 C. P. 393; 43 L. J. C. P. 161; 30 L. T. 332 567, 583 Willis V. Howe (Earl), (1893) 2 Ch. 545; 62 L. J. Ch. 690; 69 L. T. 358; 41 W. E. 433 358, 360, 366, 367 Willonghby v. Backhouse, (1824) 2 B. & C. 821 ; 4 D. & E. 539 ; 2 L. J. • K. B. 174; 26 E. E. 566 312 V. Horridge, (1852) 12 C. B. 742; 22 L. J. C. P. 90; 17 Jur. 323 667 Wills V. Wells, (1818) 8 Taunt. 264; 2 Moore, 247 274 Wilmerson v. Lynn & Hamburg S.S. Co., [1913] 3 K. B. 931; 82 L. J. K. B. 1064— C. A 97 Wilson & Sons v. Owners of Cargo ex Galileo, (1914) 83 L. J. P. 102 486 Wilson V. Amalgamated Society of Engineers, (1911) 2 Ch. 324; 80 L. J. Ch. 469 ; 104 L. T. 715 ; 27 T. L. E. 418 ; 55 Sol. J. 498 72 V. Anderton, (1830) 1 B. & Ad. 450; 9 L. J. K. B. 48; 35 E. E. 348 243 V. Barry Bail. Co., (1917) 86 L. J. K. B. 432— C. A 470 V. Bennett, (1904) 6 P. 269 (Ct. of Sess.) 193, 642, 790, 792 0. Blyth Shipbuilding and Dry Docks Co., (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 27— C. A 98 V. Brett, (1843) 11 M. & W. 115 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 264 ; 63 E. E. 528 464 V. Ducket, (1676) 2 Mod. 61 300 V. Farnley, (1905) 69 J. P. 165 ; 92 L. T. 647 ; 3 L. G. E. 470 ... 210 V. Glasgow and South Western Eail. Co., [1916] S. C. 216 478 •.;. Halifax (Mayor of), (1868) L. E. 3 Ex. 114; 37 L. J. Ex. 44; 17 L. T. 660 132 V. London & N. W. Eail. Co., (1918) 87 L. J. K. B. 843— G. A. 105 V. Macreth, (1766) 3 Burr. 1824 332 V. Merry, (1868) L. E. 1 Sc. Ap. 326; 19 L. T. 30 88 V. Newberry, (1871) L. E. 7 Q. B. 31; 41 L. J. Q. B. 31; 26 L. T. 695 435 V. Nightingale, (1846) 8 Q. B. 1034; 16 L. J. Q. B. 309; 10 Jur. 917 308 V. Eobinson, (1846) 7 Q. B. 68; 14 L. J. Q. B. 196; 9 Jur. 726 588, 614 V. Shepherd, [1913] S. C. 300 Sco 797 V. Tumman, 1843) 6 M. & G. 236 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 306 ; 6 Sc. N. E. 894; 1 D. & L. 513; 64 E. E. 770 201 u. United Counties Bank, Ltd., [1920] A. C. 102— H. L 86 V. Waddell, (1876) 2 App. Gas. 95; 35 L. T. 639 421, 423 Wimbledon, &c. v. Dixon, (1875) 1 Ch. D. 362; 45 L. J. Ch. 363; 35 L. T. 679 342 Wiudlesham Urban District Council v. Seward and others, Eveleigh, Third Party, (1912) 11 L. G. E. 324; 77 J. P. 161— D, C ... 397 INDEX OF OASES. OXXXIX PAGE Wing V. London General Omnibus Co., (1909) 2 K. B. 7S2; 78 L. J. K. B. 1063"; 101 L. T. 411; 73J. P. 170, 429; 25 T. L. E. 729; 53 Sol. J. 287, 718; 7 L. G. B. 1093 430, 467 Winget, Ltd.'s Application, In re, (1919) 36 E. P. C. 75 727 Winkfield, The, (1902) P. 42; 71 L. J. P. D. & A. 21; 50 W. E. 246; 85 L. T. 688; 18 T. L. E. 178; 9 Asp. M. 0. 259 2, 64, 264, nrjQ Oyg OQJ^ QQ4 Winkle v. Gent, (1914) 31 E. P. C. 473—0. A .' ' 696 Winn V. Ingilby, (1822) 5 B. & Aid. 625 ; 1 D. & Ey. 247 ; 24 E. E, 503 768 Winsborrow v. London Joint Stock Bank, (1903) 88 L. T. 803; 67 J. P. 289; 19 T. L. E. 500; 20 Cox, C. C. 478 26 Winsmore v. Greeubank, (1745) Willes, 577 5, 228 Winter v. Banks, (1901) 84 L. T. 504 ; 65 J. P. 468 ; 44 W. E. 574 ; 17 T. L. E. 446; 19 Cox, 0. 0. 687 233, 250, 280, 793 Winterbottom v. Derby (Lord), (1867) L. E. 2 Ex. 316; 36 L. J. Ex. 194 26, 165^387 V. Wright, (1842) 10 M. & W. 109; 11 L. J. Ex. 415; 62 E. E. 534 478 Winterbourne v. Morgan, (1809) 11 East, 395 ; 2 Camp. 117 ; 10 E. E. 532 309 Wintle V. Bristol Tramways Co., (1917) 86 L. J. K. B. 936 457 Wirth's Patent, In re, (1879) 12 Ch. D. 303 705 Wise V. Dunning, (1902) 1 K. B. 166 ; 71 L. J. K. B. 165 ; 66 J. P. 212 ; 50 W. E. 317 ; 85 L. T. 721 ; 18 T. L. E. 85 ; 20 Cox, C. C. 121 164, 204 V. Perpetual Trustee Co., Ltd., (1903) A. C. 239; 72 L. J. P. C. 31; 51 W. E. 241; 87 L. T. 569 ; 19 T. L. E. 125 68, 69 Wittman 1;. Oppenheim, (1884) 27 Ch. D. 260; 54 L. J. Ch. 56; 50 L. T. 713 696 Wolfe V. Great Northern E. Co., (1890) 26 L. E. Ir. 548 49 Wombwell v. Belasyse, (1825) 6 Ves. 110, n 369 Womersley v. Church, (1867) 17 L. T. 190 374 Wood V. Boosey (1868) L. E. 3 Q. B. 223 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 84 ; 18 L. T. 105 690 V. Clarke, (1831) 1 C. & J. 484; 1 Tyr. 315; 9 L. J. Ex. 187; 36 E. E. 758 293 1;. Conway Corporation, [1914] 2 Ch. 47 ; 83 L. J. Ch. 498—0. A. 379 V. Durham, 1888) 21 Q. B. D. 501 623 V. Edinburgh Evening ISTews, (1910) S. 0. 895; 47 So. L. E. 786 (Ct. of Sess.) •. 549 V. Hall, (1916) 33 E. P. C'. 16 729 V. Lake, (1751) Sayer's Eep. 3; 13 M. & W. 848, n. ; 67 E. E. 839, n - 348 V. Leadbitter, (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 14 L. J. Ex. 161; 9 Jnr. 487; 67 E. E. 831 340, 347, 348 - V. Mackay, (1906) 8 F. 625 (Ct. of Sess.) 92, 470 V. Manley, (1839) 11 A. & B. 34; 3 P. & D. 5; 3 Jnr. 1028; 9 L. J. Q. B. 27; 52 E. E. 271 340, 348 V. Morewood, (1841) 3 Q. B. 440, n. ; 61 E. E. 234 259, 362 V. Nunn, (1828) 5 Bing. 10; 2 M. & P. 27 ; 6 L. J. C. P. 198; 30 E. E. 528 305, 315 V. Sutcliffe, (1851) 2 Sim. (N. S.) 163 799—801 V. Waud, (1849) 3 Bxoh. 748; 18 L. J. Ex. 305; 13 Jur. 742 ... 37.^. 375, 384 . V. Wood, (1843) 4 Q. B. 397; 12 L. J. Q. B. 141; 7 Jur. 235 ... 768 V. Zimmer, (1805) 1 Webst. P. C. 82, n. ; Holt, N. P. 58; 17 E. E. 605 707 Woodall and Duckham's Patent, In re, (1917) 117 L. T. 216 709 Woodham v. Atlantic Transport Co., (1899) 1 Q. B. 15; 68 L. J. Q. B. 17; 47 W. E. 106; 79 L. T. 395; 15 T. L. E. 51 97 Woodhouse v. Midland Bail. Co., [1914] 3 K. B. 1034; 83 L. J. K. B. 1810— 0. A 106 V. Newry Navigation Co., (1898) 1 Ir. E. 161 799, 801 V. Walker, (1880) 5 Q. B. D. 404; 49 L. J. Q. B. 609; 42 L. T. 770; 28 W. E. 766 369 Wooding V. Oxley, (1839) 9 C. & P. 1 204 0X1 INDEX OF CASES. PAGE Woodley v. Metropolitan District E. Co., (1877) 2 Ex. D. 38i; 46 L. J. Ex. 521 ....••• 520 Woodman v. PwUbaoh Colliery Co., Ltd., [1915] A. C. 634; 84 L. J. K. B. 874— H. L 139 Woods V. Durrant, (1846) 16 M. & W. 149; 16 L. J. Ex. 313 305 V. Einnis, (1852) 7 Ex. 368; 21 L. J. Ex. 138; 16 Jur. 936 761 V. Wilson (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1067— H. L 99 V. (1918) 29 T. L. E. 726— C. A 99 Woodward v. Boulton, (1915) 32 E. P. C. 173 720 Woodyer v. Hadden, (1813) 5 Taunt. 125 392 Woolfe V. Automatic Picture Gallery, Ltd., (1903) 1 Ch. 18; 72 L. J. Ch. 34; 51 W. E. 121; 87 L. T. 95, 539; 19 T. L. E. 94; 20 E. P. G. 177 708 Woollen V. Wright, (1862) 1 H. & C. 554; 81 L. J. Ex. 715; 7 L. T. (N. S.) 73 201 Woolley V. Broad, (1892) 1 Q. B. 806; 61 L. J. Q. B. 259; 66 L. T. 680; 40 W. E. 511 696 Woolston V. Eoss, (1900) 1 Ch. 788; 69 L. J. Ch. 363; 64 J. P. 264; 48 W. E. 556; 82 L. T. 21 769 Woolwich Corporation v. Gibson, (1905) 92 L. T.'538; 69 J. P. 361; 21 T. L. E. 421; 3 L. G. E. 961 664 Wootton V. Sievier, [1913] 3 K. B. '499; 82 L. J. K. B. 1242— C. A. 573 V. (No. 2), (1913) 29 T. L. E. 724 621 Wormer v. Biggs, (1845) 2 C. & K. 31 317 Worsborough Urban Council v. Barnsley British Co-operative Society, (1913) 77 J. P. 450 396 Worth V. Gilling, (1866) L. E. 2 C. P. 1 447 Wotherspoon v. Currie, (1872) L. E. 5 H. L. 508; 42 L. J. Ch. 180; 27 ,L. T. 393 725, 729, 738 Wragg's Trade Mark, In re, (1885) 29 Ch. D. 551; 54 L. J. Ch. 391; 52 L. T. 467 736 Wray v. Milestone, (1839) 5 M. & W. 21 169 V. Taylor Bros., (1913) 109 L. T. 369— C. A 103 Wren v. Stokes, (1902) 1 Jr. E. 167 2^7, 299, 773 V. Weild, (1869) L. E. 4 Q. B. 730; 10 B. & S. 51; 38 L. J. Q. B. 327 626, 629 Wright V. Child, (1866) L. E. 1 Ex. 358; 35 L. J. Ex. 209; 15 L. T. 141 762, 776 V. Court, (1825) 4 B. & C. 596 ; 6 D & E. 623; 2 C. & P. 232; 4 L. J. K. B. 17; 28 E. E. 418 210, 211 V. Glyn, (1902) 1 K. B. 745; 71 L. JT K. B. 497; 50 W. E. 402; 86 L. T. 373; 18 T. L. E. 404 81 V. Lefever, (1903) 51 W. E. 149 470, 480, 488, 514 V. Leonard, (1861) 11 C. B. (N. S.) 258; 30 L. J. C. P. 365; 5 L. T. 110 ..• 46 V. London & N. W. E. Co., (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 252; 46 L. J. Q. B. 570; 33 L. T. 830 91 V. London General Omnibus Co., (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 271; 46 L. J. Q. B. 429; 36 L. T. 590 177 ■ V. Pearson, (1869) L. E. 4 Q. B. 582; 38 L. J. Q. B. 312; 20 L. T. 849 445 V. Eobotham, (1886) 33 Ch. D. 106; 55 L. J. Oh. 791; 55 L. T. 241 248 V. Sneyd Collieries Co., [1915] W. C. & Ins. E. 354— C. A 99 V. Stavert, (1860) 2 E. & E. 721 ; 29 L. J. Q. B. 161 ; 8 W. E. 413 335 V. Tallis, (1845) 1 C. B. 893; 14 L. J. 0. P. 283; 9 Jur. 946 691 V. Williams, (1836) 1 M. & W. 77 ; 1 Tyr. & G. 375 ; 1 Gale, 410; 5 L. J. Ex. 107; 46 E. E. 265 399 V. Woodgate, (1835) 2 C. M. & E. 573; 1 Tyr. & G. 12; 1 Gale, 329; 41 E. E. 788 ' 611 Wyatt V. Att.-Gen. of Quebec, [1911] A. C. 489; 81 L. J. P. C. 63; 105 L. T. 259— P. C 662 0. Harrison, (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 871; 1 L. J. K. B. 237; 37 E. E. 566 376 V. Palmer, [1899] 2 Q. B. 106 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 709 ; 80 L. T. 639 ; 47 W. E. 549— C. A ^. 200, 644, 653 V. White, (1860) 5 H. & N. 371; 29 L. J. Ex. 193; 8 W. E. 307 638, 642 INDEX OF CASES. Oxli PAGH Wylie V. Birch, (1843) 4 Q. B. 566; 3 G. & D. 629; 12 L. J. Q. B. 260 777 Wythera v. Henley, (1614) Cro. Jac. 379 195 Yabd v. Ford, (1670) 2 Wms. Saund. 172 663 Yarmouth v. France, (1887) 19 Q. B. D. 647; 57 L. J. Q. B. 7 ... 94, 521 Yates V. Eastwood, (1851) 6 Bxch. 805 240 V. Jack, (1866) L. E. 1 Ch. 299; 14 L. T. 151; 14 W. E. 618 ... 384 v. Beg., (1885) 14 Q. B. D. 648 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 258 ; 52 L. T. 305 637 Yeatmau v. Homberger, (1913) 107 L. T. 742— C. A 730 Yellowly v. Morley, (1910) 27 T. L. E. 20 337 Yorkshire West Eiding Council v. Holmforth Urban Sanitary Authority, [1894] 3 Q. B. 842 399 Young V. Brompton Waterworks Co., (1861) 1 B. & S. 675; 31 L. J. Q. B. 14; 5 L. T. 310 257 V. Davis, (1862) 7 H. & N. 760 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 250 ; 6 L. T. 363 ... 31, 393 V. Higgon, (1840) 6 Mow. 49; 8 Dowl. P. C. 212; 4 Jur. 125 ... 134 V. Hoffmann Manufacturing Co., Ltd., [1907] 2 K. B. 646; 76 L. J. K. B. 993; 97 L.. T. 230; 23 T. L. E. 671—0. A 105 V. Macrae, (1862) 3 B. & S. 264 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 6 ; 7 L. T. 354 ... 631 - V. Peck, (1913) 107 L. T. 857— D. C 70 V. Young, (1903) 5 F. 330— Ct. of Sess 567, 583 Zinc Cobpobation, Ltd. & Eomainb v. Skipwith, (1914) 31 T. L. E. 107— C. A 125 COEEIGENDUM. Page 119, Chapter IIL, line 1. Delete "or misdemeanour. THE LAW OF TORTS. CHAPTEE I. INTRODUCTORY . PAGE PAGE What constitutes a Tort 1 Negligence 12 Classification of Torts 3 Moral Misconduct 14 Acta ■wrongful in themselves 7 Public Eights and Duties 27 A TORT may be described as a wrong independent of contract, What consti- for which the appropriate remedy is a common law action. In order, therefore, to discover what a tort is, we must examine the various kinds of action which the law has from time to time recognised, not on any systematic theory, but according to the dictates of experience and convenience, and eliminate from the list those which are dependent on contract. It is impossible to define the general term otherwise than by an enumeration of particulars (a). In every action there must be a plaintiff and a defendant, the former alleging a right in himself and a corresponding duty on the latter, which right has been infringed, and which duty has been broken. A cause of action of contract arises not merely where one party has broken a legally binding agreement with the other, but where two parties stand in such a mutual relation that a sum of money is legally due from the one to the other, in which case the law is said to imply a contract to pay the money. Where a statute imposes a penalty on one man in favour of another, the penalty is recoverable usually in an action of debt, which in form is an action of contract. But where there is a breach of duty imposed by the law apart from any consent of (a) Formerly an injured husband could sue the seducer of his wife in an action of criminal conversation. The seduction, therefore, was a tort. As the law now stands, the husband's remedy is by a petition in the divorce court (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, ss. 33, 59). The alteration is merely in procedure, for the same redress is given as before and on the same principles. Yet it would seem that as the essential character of a tort is the form of remedy, the change must be considered as taking the seduction of a married woman out of the class of torts. y C.T. 1 2 INTRODUCTORY. the person owing the duty, ^and the remedy claimed is not the payment of a definite sum of^ money but pecuniary compensation for the injury, then we have a wrong independent of contract which gives rise to an action of tort (6). Independent The expression " independent of contract " is one that requireB of contract. explanation, for there may be a tort which arises out of a breach of contract and yet is independent of it. At a time when the forms of action wer5 strictly distinguished in pleading, it was often allow- able to declare in tort on a breach of duty which arose simply in consequence of the agreement of the parties. Thus, if a banker improperly dishonoured a customer's cheque, at the branch where the account was kept (c), he might be sue'd in tort (d). So if a bailee by some careless act damages goo'ds entrusted to him, he probably commits a breach of the express or implied contract of bailment, but he is also guilty of a tort, for everyone is bound to take care that he does not damage the property of another (e). As between the parties to the contract themselves the fact of the existence of this double remedy is immaterial, for the law looks at the substance of the thing, and does not permit the form of action to alter rights which are defined beforehand by the consent of those immediately concerned (/) ; but as regards the rights of third parties an act is none the less a tort because it is also a breach of contract. If a father employs a medical man toattend on his son, and the latter is injured by unskilful treatment, the father has a remedy for the breach of the contract, but the son has also a remedy for the tort (g). " Suppose A. lets B. a horse, B. with C.'s hcence puts up at C.'s stables for reward to C. from B., C. turns into the stables loose a vicious horse, known to be so, not to injure A.'s horse, but not thinking of the matter ; there cannot be a doubt thai C. would be liable to A. if the horse was injured (h). So if he gave the horse bad oaits which injured the horse he would be liable " (i)- So if A. in breach of contract supplies to B. a chattel dangerous by reason of a latent defect, and B. using it in the way contem- (b) The statutory remedy of an action against the police authority of a district in respect of property damaged in riots, which has been substituted for the oU action against the hundredors (49 & 50 Vict. c. 38), stands outside this classification altogether. •• (c) Clare S Co. v. Dresdner Bank, (191S) 2 K. B. 576 ; 84 L. J. K. B. 1443. (d) Marzetti v. Williams, (1830) 1 B. & Ad. 415 ; 9 L. J. K. B. 42 ; 35 E. B. 392. (e) Hayn v. Culliford, (1879) 4 C. P. D. 182; 48 L. J. C. P. 372. An action founded on the common law liability of a bailee is an action founded on tort within the meaning of s. 116 of the County Courts Act, 1888 {Turner v. Stallibrass, (1898) 1 Q. B. 56 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 62, C. A.). if) Marzetti v. Williams, supra. ig) Gladwell v. Steggall, (1839) 5 Bing. N. C. 733; 8 L. J. C. P. 361; 53 E. ^■ 257. {h) Although B. would also have a right of action against C. (The Winkjieli, (1902) P. 42 ; 71 L. J. P. D. & A. 21) ; see also The Millwall, (1905) 91 L. T. 695; 74 L. J. P. 13, 61, 82. (i) Per Bramwell, L.J., Hayn v. Culliford, (1879), 4 C. P. D. p. 185; 48 L. J. C. P. 372. CLASSIFICATION OF TORTS. 3 plated by the parties, entrusts it to C, who thereby sufiers damage, C. has an action of tort against A. (k). In all these cases the injury arises out of a breach of contract;^, the injured party has to show how the duty arose towards him by proving the contract as one of the facts of the case, but the wrong is independent of contract because the defendant has not contracted with the plaintiff to perform any duty; the law has imposed it upon him. There is another kind of case which, although the cause of action involves a breach of contract, is yet independent of contract, inasmuch as there is no contract between the parties. If A. know- ing that B. has made a contract with C. for his own purposes induces B. to break that contract, and C. is thereby damnified, the latter can not only sue B. for his breach of contract, but has also an action of tort against A. for procuring that breach (l). Torts may be classified from the point of view of the plaintiff or Clasaificatioa from that of the defendant, from the nature of the right infringed o'™™- or the damage done on the one hand, or from the nature of the wrongful act on the other. First, to consider them from the point of view of the plaintiff. There must be an infringement of some personal right. "It is essential to an action in tort that the act complained of should under the circumstances be legally wrongful as regards the party complaining : that is, it must prejudicially affect him in some legal right; merely that it will, however directly, do a man harm in his interests, is not enough" {m). What then are the rights the invasion of which will constitute a tort? Although it is impossible to lay down any general principle to which all actions of tort may be referred, it will be found that they are in the main directed to. afford the simple remedy of pecuniary satisfaction for invasions of the three elementary rights of civilised society — the right of personal liberty and security, the right of reputation, and the right of property. The right of personal liberty is not confined to liberty of the body. Eight of it includes liberty of the will also. Every man has a right to li^^^ty. determine for himself with whom he will have dealings. He is at liberty to earn his living in his own way. " The liberty of a man's mind and will to say how he should bestow himself and his means, his talents and his industry, is as much a subject of the law's protection as is that of his body " (n). (k) George v. Skivington, (1869) L. E. 6 Ex. 1; 39 L. J. Ex, 8; Elliot v. Hall, (1685) 15 Q. B. D. 315 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 518. (l) See below, pp. U, 18—26. (m) Rogers v. Bajejidw Dutt, (1860) 18 Moore, P. C. 209. (n) Per Bramwell, B , Reg. v. Druitt, (1867) 10 Cox, C. C. 600, and quoted with approval by Lord Halsbury in Allen v. Flood, (1898) A. C. p. 73 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 4 INTRODUCTORY. Bight of Under this last head must be included not merely those various property. rights and interests, corporeal and incorporeal, with their respective incidents, which are capable of transfer from one to another, and which in ordinary language are intended when the term property is used, but also all those collateral rights of a personal nature by means of which men are enabled to acquire, enjoy, and preserve their property. " Private property," it has been said, " is either property in possession, property in action, or property that an individual has a special right to acquire. ... A man in trade has a right in his fair chances of profit, and he gives up time and capital to obtain it " (o). In other words, the right to earn a living by all lawful means, whether by way of hiring and service, trading, or othervwse, may in a certain limited sense be said to be a right of property as well as a branch of the right of personal liberty. Domestic rights, in so far as they are recognised in the law of torts, may be classified as rights of property. A father has a right to the service of his child up to the age of twenty-one years, and for the loss -of that service he may have his action (p) ; but a child 119; and by Lord Brampton in Quinn v. Leathern, (1901) A. C. p. 625; 70 L. J. P. C. 76. And see per Lord Lindley, (1901) A. C. p. 534. (o) Per Cur., Hannam v. Mockett, (1824) 2 B. & C. p. 937; 2 L. J. K. B. 185; 26 B. E. S91. (p) This right of the father to the custody (In re Agar Ellis, (1883) 24 Ch. D. 317 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 10) ; and to the services {Dean v. Peel, (1804) 5 East, 45; 7 E. B. 653) of his child exists up to the age of twenty-one. But the extent to which that right can be enforced has been considerably modified in modern times. From the point of view of the early common law the status of a child was one of qualified servitude ; it was regarded as the chattel of the father. In course of time, however, even the Courts of Common Law came to limit the parent's rights to this extent, that after the child had arrived at a certain age — fourteen in the case of boys {In n Shanahan, (1852) 20 L. T. 183), sixteen in that of girls {Beg. v. Howes, (1860) 3 E. & B. 332; 30 L. J. M. C. 47; 122 E. E. 723)— they refused to assist the father to regain possession of the child for the ' purpose of enforcing his rights, even though no misconduct on the father's part were proved ; and they also refused to allow a father to apprentice his child to another person without the child's consent {B. v. Amesby, (1820) 3 B. & A. 584, dissenting from the earlier authority of Com. Dig. tit. Justices of the Peace, B. 56). But though the Coyrt! of Common Law would not assist the parent in enforcing his rights against his child after the age of fourteen or sixteen as the case might be, they apparently allowed him to take the law into his own hands and to maintain his rights by force (see below, p. 216), and they also allowed him to recover damages for any interference with his rights by a third person, by injuring, debauching, or enticing away the child, up to the age of twenty-one. On the other hand, the Court ot Chancery looked at the question of the custody of the child from the point of view, not of the father's rights, but of his duties. It considered only the welfare of the child, and claimed under the authority delegated to it by the Crown, as the supreme parens patrice, to control and, if necessary, to supersede the natural right of the parent {per Lord Cottenham, In re Spence, (1847) 2 Ph. 247; 16 L. J. Ch. 309; 78 E. E. 82). The Court had an absolute discretion to regulate the custoayof the child up to the age of twenty-one ; but in the absence of misconduct on the pw of the parent, or of facts showing that it was obviously for the benefit of the chiM that it should live elsewhere, it would only exercise its discretion in one way, that of giving the custody to the father. Eor primd facie the Court, " whatever be «» authority or jurisdiction, has no right to interfere with the sacred right of a father over his own children" {per Bacon, V.-C, In re Plomley, (1882) 47 L. T. N. S. p. 284), it being primd, facie of the greatest benefit to the child to be with w father {per Eindersley, V.-C, In re Curtis, (1859) 28 L. J. Ch. 458; 118 E. B. 8«; per Lindley, L.J., In re McGrath, (1893) 1 Ch. 143; 62 L. 3. Ch. 208). In the RIGHT OF PROPERTY. by the common law has no corresponding remedy for the loss of the protection and support of his father, insomuch as he has nothing therein in the nature of a right of property. By statute (g), how- ever, he may recover compensation for the pecuniary loss caused by an act wrongful in itself, and resulting in the death of his father. It is, to say the least, very doubtful, however, whether, except under the statutes above referred to, a wife can recover for the loss of the corusortium of her husband (r). But a husband may sue for the loss of his wife's service; and although he can no longer compel his wife to live with him by taking forcible possession of her person (s), it is apprehended that his right to the consortium and services of his wife must still be regarded as a valid and subsisting right available as against third persons, and that the case of Winsmore v. Greenbank (t), where an action was held to lie for persuading a wife to continue absent from her husband, is still good law (u). The decision in Ashby v. White {x), that the malicious refusal of a returning officer to accept the vote of a duly qualified elector was a tort as well as a breach of public duty, probably rested on the notion that the political franchise, like other franchises, was to exercise of this discretion, the Court of Chancery did nab, like the Courts of Common Law, refuse to restore a child to its father after the age of fourteen or sixteen (Todd V. Lynes, Times, 26 July, 1873). Now by 8. 25, ss. 10, of the Judicature Act, in questions relating to the custody of infants, the rules of equity prevail. The net result of the common law, as modified by that provision, may be expressed in the following propositions : — 1. A father has, in the absence of misconduct on his part, and until interference by the Court, a right to the custody and services of his children of either sex unmarried up to the age of twenty -one, for infringements of which right he has as against third persons a remedy in damages ; and for the purpose of enforcing it as against the child he probably may keep or retake possession of his child's person by force. 2. He probably loses those rights by misconduct, even without the intervention of the Court (see below, pp. 317, 218). 3. The Court, upon its aid being invoked to recover possession of the child, has an absolute discretion to dispose of the child's custody, even though there be no misconduct on the part of the parent. But, except in extreme cases, it will always consider it to be to the best interests of the child to be with its father. 4. That discretion the Court will exercise so long as the child is under twenty- one. The, old common law distinction between children under the age of fourteen or sixteen and children over those ages must be regarded as obsolete. (It is sub- mitted that the dicta of Lord Esher, M.B., and Smith, L.J., in Reg. v. Gyngall, (1893) 2 Q. B. at pp. 245, 253; 62 L. J. Q. B. 559; to the contrary, are not law. It will be observed on reference to that case, that Kay, L.J., did not express any assent to their proposition.) (q) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 ; and see 6 Ed. VII. c. 58. (r) In Lynch v. Knight, (1861) 9 H. L. C. 577 ; 181 E. K. 347 ; Lord Wensleydale expressly held that she could not. The other law lords expressed opinions in the contrary sense, but their judgments did not turn on this point; and see Butterworth V. Butterworth, (1920) P. 128, at p. 180, apparently the law differs in the U.S.A. : see below, p. 228. (s) Beg. V. Jackson, (1891) 1 Q. B. 671 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 346. (t) (1745) Willes, 577. (u) And see Smith v. Kaye and Another, (1904) 20 T. L. B. 261. (x) (1708) Lord Eaym. 938. An action will not lie against a member of Parlia- ment for refusing to present a petition to Parliament (Chaffers v. Goldsmid, (1894) 1 Q. B. 186; 63 L. J. Q. B. 69). INTRODUCTORY. Conflict of Tights. How adjusted. be regarded as a right of property. It is, perhaps, doubtful whether at the present date such a principle would, apart from authority, find acceptance. It is obvious that unless the rights of individuals are modified and limited they must be frequently in conflict one with another. No man can always do as he pleases, except by preventing other people doing as they please. " The due regulation and subordina- tion of conflicting rights constitute the chief part of the science of law. It is impossible to give any rule applicable to all cases which may arise, except the general one that whenever damage is caused to one man by another the law, in deciding which shall bear the loss, .is governed by principles of expediency, modified by public sentiment " (y). Moreover, there is some old a,uthority for saying that in certain cases a man can justify the commission of a tort on the ground of necessity. Thus in Maleverer v. Spinke (s) it was stated that " we will well agree that in some cases a man may justify the commission of a tort, and that is in cases where it sounds for the common weal; as in time of war a man may justify making fortifications on another's land without licence; also a man may justify pulling down a house on fire for the safety of the neighbouring houses; for these are cases for the ' public good.' " In many cases where there is a conflict of interests the law does not interfere, but leaves each individual to do the best he can for himself. If one landowner has a well, and his neighbour digs a well in the adjoining close, which drains away the percolating water and leaves the first well dry, the owner cannot complain, for his neigh- bour has as good a right as he to the subterranean flow. His remedy is to dig deeper («.). So, a landowner may ward off a sudden flood, although the effect be to throw the water on to another man's land (6). Sometimes a right or licence is given subject to the condition that it be used with care. Thus the highway is open to all, but every passenger is bound to do his best not to impede or injure other passengers. Sometimes the only limitation to a right is that it must be exercised in good faith. Sometimes, again, the law subordinates the one right to the other. Thus, a landowner has a right to dig and carry away his own soil, but if in so doing (y) Addison on Torts, 8th ed. p. 17. (z) Dyer (1538) (An. 29, H. VIII.), par. 40; see also a case recorded in Tear Book, 9 E. IV., p. 36, pi. 10, in which Littleton, J., expresses the opinion that in case of fire a man might demolish an intervening house belonging to another in order to prevent his own property being damaged by the advancing flames. For a modern exemplification of this principle see Cope v. Sharpe, {1910) 1 K. B. 168; 79 L. J. K. B. 281. (o) Chasemore v. Richards, (1859) 7 H. L. C. 349; 29 L. J. Ex. 81; 115 E. E. 187. (b) Nield v. London dt North Western R. Co., (1874) L. E. 10 Ex. 4; W L. J. Ex. 15. ACTS ■WRONGFUL IN THEMSELVES. 7 he lets down the soil of his neighbour he is answerable; for the right of the latter to have his soil supported is the better right of the two. Secondly, torts may be classified according to the nature of the Eight implies wrongful act. Where a right exists there must be a corresponding °°™^PO'i'Ji'^g duty to observe that right, and a tort may be spoken of either as a breach of duty or an infringement of a right. It is convenient to use the latter expression where the act is wrongful in itself apart from its consequences, for then its injurious character is best ascer- tained by an accurate definition of the right of the party aggrieved. But where an injury is consequential only it is more convenient to consider the nature of the duty. If a defendant has been guilty of negligence it makes no difference in the character of his liability whether he injured the person or th« goods or the land of the plaintiff. Wrongful acts may be divided into three classes : first, those in Three classes which a party is liable simply because he has done or omitted to do of ^ro"gf»l something, which of itself amounts to an infringement of right or a breach of duty; secondly, those in which the conduct of the wrong- doer has been unlawful only by reason of his failure to 'exercise proper care and skill; thirdly, those in which there must be an element of moral misconduct. 1. A trespass, that is to say, a direct physical interference with Aotswrong- the person, land, or goods of another, is as a rule actionable in ^ '" tnem- itself, however innocent the conduct of the wrong-doer may be. If Trespass A. walk over B.'s field without permission, he may have no know- ledge of the owner's right nor intention to injure him; he may reasonably believe that he is using a public footpath; but his good faith and absence of negligence, although they may be very material in considering the damages that shall be awarded against him, do not alter the fact that he has been guilty of a legal wrong (c). The only question is whether the very act which constitutes wilful the trespass is his act. That is a man's act which he wills to do, trespass, exercising a choice between acting and forbearing, and the strongest moral compulsion still leaves freedom of such choice. Therefore- where the defendant had formed one of a party who committed a trespass, it was held no answer to plead that his co-trespassers had compelled him by menaces to accompany them (cZ). So it will seem that if a man finding himself in the neighbourhood of a dangerous animal goes where he has no right, in order to secure his safety, he is a trespasser; but if being pursued, in the blindness of fear, he takes refuge in the same place, then since he exercises no choice he cannot be considered a voluntary agent and commits no (c) Basely v. Clarkson, (1682) 3 Lev. 37. (d) Gilbert v. Stone, (1647) Aleyn. 35. INTEODUOTOKY. , wrong. This proposition would seem to be involved in the well- known American decision (e), where it was held that the defendant was liable in trespass, because a boy whom he had pursued with uplifted weapon rushed headlong into a shop and did damage there, for if the boy were a trespasser, other than in relation, his entry could not well be the act of the defendant. If A. driving along the high road and seeking to avoid a collision with B. comes into contact with C, ha may be liable to C. if he be negligent, but not otherwise. But if, in order to avoid B., he directs his vehicle lagainst C, making as it were a choice of evils, this of itself con- stitutes a good cause of action, because he has chosen to do the very thing which infringes C.'s right (/). Negligent It is to be observed that under the form of the action of trespass were included wrongs essentially diverse in their nature. If a man aims at aniother with his gun and wounds him, here the wounding is the very thing which he intends; but if he fires carelessly and hits a pass«r-by, in this case the wound cannot be said to be his act, that is to say, the thing which he chooses to do; it is rather the consequence of his act (g). In both cases alike, however, it was said that there was a wrong done by direct physical force, therefore a trespass ; and the form of action being the same, it has been sometimes supposed that the pririoiples of liability are also the' same, and that a party may be liable without more for the unforeseen consequences of his act, provided they are sufficiently direct. Observations to that effect may be found in the reports, but little authority. Thus it is said, " If a man assault me, and I lift up my staff to defend myself, and in lifting it hit another, an action lies by that person, and yet I did a lawful thing " {h). In Leame v. Bray (i) Grose, J., says, " Looking into all the cases from the Year-Book in 21 Hen. VII. down to the latest decision on the subject, I find the principle to be that if the injury be done by the act of the party himself at the time or he be the immediate cause of it though it happen accidentally or by misfortune, yet he is answerable in trespass." The authority referred to in the Year- (e) Vandenburgh v. Truax, (1847) 4 Denio, 464. if) Holmes v. Mather, (1875) L. E. 10 Ex. 261 ; 44 L. J. Ex. 176. As to the liability of infants of tender years, and lunatics for their trespasses, see below,, pp. 43, 45. (g) In the old authorities trespass seema to have been allowed as a form oJ action, where the injury was clearly consequential, and was in fact averred with a per quod. Thus in Fitzherhert, N. B. p. 89, it is said if a man fill a ditch with mud and earth by which another man's land is overflowed he shall have a writ of trespass, " where with force and arms he filled a certain ditch . . . insomuch that the water being hindered of its ancient course overflowed," &c. See, too, Preston V. Mercer, (1656) HardrSs, 60; Courtney v. Collett, (1698) Lord Eaym. 273. Id the more recent case of Gregory v. Piper, (1829) 9 B. & C. 591; 33 E. E. 268, trespass was maintained, where only in a highly artificial sense could i* be said that force was directly applied. (h) Bessey v. Olliet, (1683) T. Eaym. p. 468. (i) (1803) 3 East, p. 600; 7 E. E. pref. vii. ACTS WRONGFUL IN THEMSELVES. 9 Book simply amounts to this, that he who shoots and wounds another unintentionally may be liable in trespass, though he commits no felony (k). However, in spite of the scantiness of direct authority, the law may be thus summed up (I) : — "As to the cases cited, most of them are really decisions on the form of action whether case or trespass. The result of them is this, and it is intelligible enough; if the act that does an injury is an act of direct force, vi et armis, trespass is the proper remedy (if there is any remedy) where the act is wrongful, either as being wilful (ni), or the result of negligence. Where the act is not wrongful for either of these reasons, no a-ctioQ is maintainable, though trespass would be the proper form of action if it were wrongful." If one man takes the chattel of aiiother without authority, prim a The un- facie it is a trespass, but this is not a universally true proposition. t^in°i'ff^ " The finder of goods is justified in taking steps for their protection chattel not and safe custody till he finds the true owner" (w.). So a stranger tj-eapass^ may in the absence of the executor do what ig immediately necessary for the preservation of the goods of a deceased person (o). In these cases, therefore, the question of trespass depends not upon the act, but upon the motive. If the finder deals with the goods with the object of benefiting the owner, he does not commit a trespass, but if not, he does. If a man not merely takes the chattel Conversion of of another, but also makes use of it in a manner inconsistent with "'^^"^l- the title of the real owner, he is guilty not merely of a trespass but of a conversion (p), and generally is liable for the total value of the article. Where an act is ambiguous in its nature, it must depend upon the motive of the doer whether it is a trespass or a conver- (k) In another case from the Year-Books (6 Ed. IV. 7, pi. 18) it was said to he a trespass where a man was cutting his hedge and the thorns se invito fell on his neighbour's land; but here there was clearly negligence. In Weaver v. Ward, (1616) Hob. 134, the defendant had wounded the plaintiff by a shot and pleaded that it was done casualiter et per infortunium et contra voluntatem suam, and the plea was adjudged ill because he ought to have: set out the facts specially so that it might appear whether he had been negligent or not. This case appears an authority for the proposition that where the plaintiff proves a primA facie case of trespass, the burden of proof is on the defendant to negative both intention and negligence. In Dickenson v. Watson, (1682) T. Jones, 205, and Underwood v. Hewson, (1724) Stra. 596, which were cases of trespass by gunshot wounds, there was, as far as can be gathered from the meagre reports, evidence of negligence. In Stanley v; Powell, (1891) 1 Q. B. 86; 60 L. J. Q. B. 52, where the defendant whilst firing at a pheasant accidentally and without negligence wounded the plaintiff with a pellet from his gun, it was held that no action lay. And see the discussion on this subject in Holmes on the Common Law, pp. 87, et seq. (I) Per Bramwell, B., Holmes v. Mather, (1875) L. K. 10 Ex. p. 268; 44 L. J. Ex. 176. (m) " Wilful " here clearly means not that it was intended to commit a trespass, but that it was intended to do the very thing which constitutes a trespass. (n) Per Blackburn, J., Fowler v. Hollins, (1872) L. E. 7 H. L. p. 766; 41 L J. Q. B. 277.' As to what taking constitutes a trespass, see below, pp. 233 et seq. (o) Kirk V. Gregory, (1876) 1 Ex. D. 65; 45 L. J. Ex. 186. (p) See below, pp. 235 et seq. 10 INTRODUCTOKY. Straying cattle. Injuries to servants. Injuries to incorporeal rights. sion (g), and the motive agaid may depend upon his knowledge of the title of the true owner (r). Although it is customary to speak of an injury done by straying cattle as a trespass, and trespass in such a case was formerly the appropriate form of action, yet the liability does not rest on the mere invasion of right but on the breach of duty. While a man's cattle are on his own land, he is bound to ensure that they do not stray (s) ; while they are passing on the high road he is only bound to take care that they do not stray (i). A trespass to the person of a servant which has the effect of depriving the master of his service is of itself an injury to the master, who is considered to have a property in the person of the servant. Hence, for an assault on the servant he could sue in trespass, though an allegation of per quod servitiiim amisit was also necessary, and the real gist of the action was the consequential injury. An act which amounts to a direct invasion of a definite incor- poreal right of property is of itself a tort, just as trespass is in the case of corporeal property. In an action for the disturbance of an easement the sole questions are whether the plaintiff has the right he claims, and whether it has been in fact disturbed by what the defendant has done. So with regard to personal property : a copy- right or a patent right confers a monopoly in the sale of a certain article. If the monopoly is infringed the possessor of the right has his action, however innocent the infringement may be. It has been said that the right in a trade mark or in a trade name is a right of property which will be protected in the same manner as a patent right. This is, however, apparently not absolutely certain («), although the trend of recent legislation and notably of the Trade Marks Act, 1905 (x), is to affirm the_ existence of such a right. At common law the ground of action for the infringement of a trade mark or name has always been said to be that the defendant has (q) FouUes v. Willoughby, (1841) 8 M. rfe W. 540; 10 L. J. Ex. 364; 58 B. E. 803. (r) See per Blackburn, J., Fowler v. HolUns, (1872) L. E. 7 H. L. pp. 766-7; 41 L. J. Q. B. 277. As to the question of title by mere possession, see South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, (1896) 2 Q. B. 44 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 460. (s) Lee V. Riley, (1865) 18 C. B, N. S. 722 ; -34 L. J. C. P. 212; 144 E. E. 644. For limitations on this proposition see Coaker v. Willcocks, (1911) 2 K. B. 124; 80 L. J. K. B. 1026, C. A., and the perhaps too sweeping dictum of Bankes, J-, in Jones v. Lee, (1911) 28 T. L. E. 92. For though there may be no commoa law duty to fence land so as to keep animals from straying on to the highway, if land be in fact fenced, there may be a positive duty to maintain the fence in good condition, and if, by reason of a breach of such duty, animals stray and commit damage, the breach of the duty to maintain the hedge may amount to actionable negligence : see Harrold v. Watney, (1898) 2 Q. B. 320; 67 L. J Q. B. 771, C.A. (t) Tillett V. Ward, (1882) 10 Q. B. D. 17; 52 L. J. Q. B. 61. (m) See the question discussed, Singer Machine Manufacturers v. . Wilson, (1876) 3 App. Gas. 376 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 481. See Ch. XXI. (x) For Amending Act, see 4 & 5 Geo. V. o. 16. See also the Patents and Designs Act, 1907 (7 Ed. VII. c. 29). For Amending Act, see 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 18. ABSOLUTE DUTIES. 11 defrauded the plaintiff by palming off his own goods on the public as those of the plaintiff. Since, however, trade marks are now regulated by statute and registered, there may be some ground for regarding them as property in the strict sense. There are many duties which, subject to the exception of the act Absolute of God (Jj/) and the King's enemies, are unqualified in their nature. ""*'*^- Among the most important are those which arise out of the use and enjoyment of land. Here, subject to certain natural rights (2) of mining, quarrying, and cultivation, the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non Isedas applies. Nothing must be done on the land to damage those outside it. Whatever the owner brings there he must keep in at his peril (a). A riparian proprietor may not bank his land against the flooding of a stream if the effect is to send more water on to his neighbour's (b); although where the sea encroaches or there is an inundation of land water, this is a common daiiger against which everybody may guard without regard to the efiect on other proprietors (c). If water is on a man's land which he did not bring there, he is not bound to keep it in, but he may not artificially send it away (d). The duty of the occupant of land to keep cattle from straying is unqualified (e). So also is the duty to keep animals ferx naturse, or of known vice, from doing harm in accordance with their propensities (/). Though in a case of damage resulting from cattle straying on the highway through an open gate abutting thereon the mere fact of it bein^ open (apart from any evidence as to the person by whom it was opened) was held not to place the onus of disproving negligence upon the owner of the cattle (g). But in such cases, in order to entitle a plaintiff to recover, there must be some affirmative proof of negligence on the part of the defendant in respect of a duty owing by him to the person injured (h). So, if a man light or maintain a fire he must see that (y) For the explanation of this expression, see Ch. XV. (z) As to distinction between naturarand non-natural user, see Ch. XV. (a) See Ch. XV. (6) Menzies v. Breadalbane, (1828) 3 Bli. N. E. 414 ; 32 B. B. 103. See below, pp. 161, 162. (c) Nield V. London "' consequently interested in such repairs, see Mayor and Councillors of the City 'I Wellington v. Mayor and Councillors Of the Borough of Lower Hutt, (1904) A. C. 773; 73 L. J. P. C. 80. (t) Robinson v. Corporation of Workington, (1897) 1 Q. B. 619; 66 L. J. Q-* 388, C. A.; Peebles v. Oswaldtwistle Urban Council, (1897) 1 Q. B. 625; 65 L.J' Q. B. 499, C. A. (k) Forward v. Pittard, (1785) 1 T. E. 27; 1 R. Br 142. (0 Buller, N. P., p. 63. STATUTORY LIABILITY. 35 must be proved against him. If there is an unnecessary delay in the execution of a fi. fa. and the process is thereby rendered abortive, it is still a question for the jury whetHer this amounts to negligence (m). He who has a franchise of a market, is under a liability towards those who use the- market to take reasonable care that the premises are in a safe condition (n-), and that there is due compliance with statutory requirements (o). The extent of a statutory liability must of course in each case depend Liability upon the scope and intention of the particular statute in question, arise" ourof The liability imposed may be absolute and subject to no exception statute. whatever. "If an Act of Parliament declares that a man shall be liable for the damage occasioned by a particular state of circum- stances, I know of no reason why a man should not be liable for the damage occasioned by that state of circumstances, whether the state of circumstances is brought about by the act of man or by the act of God. There is nothing impossible in that which on such an hypo- thesis he ... is by the statute ordered to do, namely, to be liable for the damages " (p). Where, without any consideration in return, a public duty is imposed by statute, the presumption is that the person owing the duty is only liable in case of negligence. " It would seem to me," says 'Brett, J., '.' to be contrary to natural justice to say that Parliament intended to impose upon a pubHc body a liability for a thing which no reasonable care or skill could obviate. The duty may notwithstanding be absolute ; but if so it ought to be imposed in the clearest possible terms. The intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language used and the subject-matter. Where the language used is consistent with either view it ought not to be so construed as to inflict a liability imless the party sought to be charged has been wanting in the exercise of due and reasonable care in the performance of the duty imposed " (q). Thus a local authority in whom a sewer is vested, is not, in the absence of negligence, liable for an accident arising from the sewer being out of repair (r). Nor is a local authority amenable to action when, in the reasonable exercise of its powers and for the public convenience, it decides on a (m) Hobwn v. Thelluson, (1867) L. E. 2 Q. B. 642; 36 L. J. Q. B. 302. (n) Lax V. Corporation of Darlington, (1879) 5 Ex. D. 28 ; 79 L. J. Ex. 105. (o) Knott V. Strides, (1913) 109 L. T. 181. (p) Per Lord Caima, River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, (1876) 2 App. Gas. p. 750; 47 L. J. Q. B. 193. See, too, Nitro-Phosphate and Odam's Chemical Manure Co. V. London and St. Katharine Dock Co., (1878) 9 Ch. D. 503. (g) Hammond v. Vestry of St. Pancras, (1874) L. E. 9 C. P. 322; 43 L. J. C. P. 167. (r) Hammmd v. Vestry of St. Pancras, (1874) L. E. 9 C. P. 316; 43 L. J. C. P. 157; Lambert v. Lowestoft Corporation, (1901) 1 Q. B. 590; 70 L. J. K. B. 333, in which latter case dicta of Lord Herschell to the contrary in Municipal Council of Sydney v. Bourke are explained. INTEODUCTOEY. Duty involving the exeicise of a discretion. course of action in a particular locality which adjacent owners fear will injure their property (s). Where a corporation was empowered to make, erect, alter, main- tain, repair, widen, deepen, scour, and cleanse certain water channels, it was held that they were bound to use these* powers whenever occasion required for the purpose of preventing the flooding of the adjoining. lands (t). But where certain powers were given solely for the purpose of the navigation of a river, and the defendant in pursuance of those powers erected certain staunches which caused accumulation of mud and weeds, and the river thereby overflowed and damaged the plaintiff, it w'as held that the defendants were not liable because they had no right or duty to do anything except for navigation purposes, and the mud and weeds did not interfere with the navigation (m). As a general rule, where the discharge of a public duty involves the exercise of a discretion no action lies if the discretion has been fairly and honestly exercised (x). Thus, it has been decided that guardians of the poor are not responsible, in their corporate capacity, for the negligence of their officials in the treatment of patients in a workhouse hospital, apparently upon the ground that the neghgenceof of&cials, in the selection of whom the guardians had exercised due diligence, could not relate back to the guardians, because the duty of selection had been fairly and honestly exercised by them (y). How- ever, in Cooper v. Wandsworth Local Board («), where the defendants under 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, s. 76, had power, in default of notice given by a building ovraer, to order the demolition of the house, arid exer- cised it without giving the owner an opportunity of being heard, it was held that they were liable in trespass, insomuch as the discretion vested in them was not arbitrary in its nature, but judicial, and had not been exercised at all (a). (s) Mayo v. Seaton Urban District Council, (1904) 68 J. P. 7. (t) Geddis v. Proprietors of the Bann Reservoir, (1878) 3 App. Gas. 430. («) Cracknell v. Mayor of Thetford, (1869) L. E. 4 C. P. 629 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 353. {x) Tozer v. Child, (1856) 6 E. & B. 289; 7 B. & B. 377; 25 L. J. Q. B. 327; 26 L. J. Q. B. 151; 106 E. E. 602; 110 E. E. 633; Partridge v. General Council oj Medical Education, (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 90; 59 L. J. Q. B. 475. iy) Dunbar v. Guardians of Ardee Union, (1897) 2 Ir. E. 76. (z) (1863) 14 C. B. N. S. 180; 32 L. J. C. P. 185; 135 E. E. 643. (a) See Hopkins v. Smethwick Local Board, (1890) 24 Q. B. D. 712; 59 L. J. Q. B. 250 ; and cp. Vestry of Clerkenwell v. Feary, (1890) 24 Q. B. D. 703; 59 L. I M. C. 82; and Attorney -General v. Hooper, (1893) 3 Ch. 483; 63 L. J. Ch. 18. CHAPTER II. PARTIES. PAGE Officers of State 37 Foreign Sovereigns and Ambas- sadors 39 Felons 40 Bankrupts 41 Infants 43 Lunatics 45 Husband and Wife 46 Personal Kepresentatives 48 ■guees 32 PAGE Corporations 55 Joint Tort-feasors 59 Joint Plaintiffs in Tort 63 Principal and Agent 64 Master and Servant 67 ■Employers' Liability and Work- men's Compensation Acts 93 Independent Contractors 107 Eatifieation of Torts 116 As a general rule all persons are entitled to sue and liable to be sued in actions of tort; but this rule is subject to certain exceptions. The sovereign cannot be sued. A petition of right will not lie for Tbe Crown a tort (a), for "the king can do no wrong" (b), although the cannot be principle that " the king can do no wrong ' is no answer to a petition tort but its of right to recover moneys to which the supplicants are entitled under agents can. a grant (o). But, this exemption of the sovereign from liability is personal; and does not extend to public officers of state acting on behalf of the Crown ; for the maxim that the king can do no wrong involves the proposition that he cannot authorise a wrong, and, " as the sovereign cannot authorise a wrong to be done, the authority of the Crown would afford no defence to an action brought for an illegal act committed by an officer of the Crown "(d). The agent is respon- sible, even though the act be directly ordered by the Crown (e). Whether the case of a soldier acting under the orders of his superior officer forma any exception to the general rule has never been decided, but presumably it does not (/). An action of tort when brought (a) Tohin v. Queen, (1864) 16 C. B. N. S. 310 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 199 ; 139 E. E. 604 Feather v. Queen, (1865) 6 B. & S. 257; 35 L. J. Q. B. 200; 141 E. E. 405 Viscount Canterbury v. Attorney -General, (1842) 1 Phillips, 306 ; 12 L. J. Ch. 281 65 E. E. 393. Nor is the Crown bound by a by-lavp even though made under the provision of a statute : Chase v. Hart, (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 833. (b) Hale, P. C, Vol. 1, p. 43. (c) Kildare County Council v. The King, (1909) 2 Ir. E. 199, K. B. D. (d) Per Cockburn, C.J., (1865) 6 B. & S. p. 296; but in the absence of express statutory inclusion, the Crown cannot be sued for a breach of the provisions of an Act of Parliament : Cooper v. Hawkins, (1904) 2 K. B. 164 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 113. (e) Rogers v Rajendro Dutt, (1860) 13 Moore, P. C, p. 236 ; 132 E. E. 82. (/) See Keighly v. Bell, (1866) 4 F. & F. 763, Willes, P., pp. 790 and 805. With respect to the responsibility of soldiers who fire upon a riotous mob, it has been said that ' ' the law acknowledges no distinction in this respect between the 38 PARTIES. against an ofiScer of state must be brought against him personally; the Government revenue cannot be reached by an action against a public officer in his official capacity (g). To this rule, however, that agents of the Crown are perBonaDy liable for torts committed by them as such, an exception exists in oases in which the party injured is the subject of a foreign state. An injury inflicted upon a foreigner, if done by the authority of or ratified by the Crown, cannot give rise to a cause of action. Thug, where a commander of a British ship, employed in the suppression of the slave trade, burnt the barracoons of a Spanish slave-dealer, and his act was subsequently ratified by the British Government, it was held that such ratification was a defence to an action against him at the suit of the slave-dealer {h), upon the ground that " where an act injurious to a foreigner, and which might otherwise afiord a ground of action, is done by a British subject, and the act is adopted by the Government of this country, it becomes the act of the State, and the private right of action becomes merged in the international question which arises between our Government and that of the foreigner " (t). Again, the liability of public officers of state is limited to torts which they have personally committed or actually authorised; they are not responsible for the negligence or unauthorised torts of their subordinate officials (k). " The Keeper of the Great Seal and other persons holding high situations in the State have authority to appoint to many offices, and also to remove the persons so appointed at their pleasure. But they are not on that account subject to make com- pensation for injury occasioned by the neglect or misconduct of the persons so appointed. The mere selection of the officers does not create a liability " (I). The reason of this is, that the subordinate officials are the servants of the Crown and not of the superior officer who selects them (w). And even in the case of a subordinate officer, the mere circumstance that all formalities necessary to clothe an act with legality have not been complied with when overt action is taken, soldier and the private individual. The soldier is still a citizen." Per Tindal, C.J., (1832) 5 C. & P., p. 263 (n.). And although it may be (as has been suggested in Sir J. Stephen's History of the Criminal Law, Vol. 1, p. 205, and in Dicey on The Constitution, p. 284) that a soldier, who, in obedience to an order of a superior officer, unjustifiably given, fires upon and kills or injures persons engaged in a riot, is not- criminally responsible if the order was given under such circumstances that the soldier might reasonably suppose the superior to have good grounds for giving it, that question will not affect his civil responsibility, which must be wholly indepen- dent of his belief. For further discussion on this subject, see below, p. 68. (g) Palmer v. Hutchinson, (1881) 6 App. Cas. 619; 50 L. J. P. C. 62; Bainbridge v. The Postmaster- General, (1906) 1 K. B. 178 ; 75 L. J. K. B. 366, C. A. (h) Buron v. Denman, (1848) 2 Exch. 167 ; 76 E. E. 554. (i) Per Cockburn, C.J., (1865) 6 B. & S. p. 296 ; 141 E. E. 414. (&) Whitfield V. Lord Le Despencer, (1778) 2 Cciwp. 754; Bainbridge v. The Postmaster-General, supra. Roper v. Works and Public Buildinqs CommissioneTS, (1915) 1 K. B. 45 ; 84 L. -J. K. B. 219. (l) Per Lord Lyndhurst, Viscount Canterbury v. Attorney-General, (1842) 1 Phillips, p. 324 ; 12 L. J. Ch. 281 ; 65 E. E. 393. (to) See below, p. 68. FOKEIGN RULERS AND AMBASSADORS. 39 will not in every case confer a right of action upon the person against whom the officer has proceeded (n). Moreover, this general non- liability of Government officials for torts committed in their official capacity is unaffected by the fact that such officials may constitute a corporation (o). There is, however, no doubt that it is alike the duty of the Crown and of every branch of the Executive to abide by and obey the law. And if there be any difficulty in ascertaining the law in a particular matter, the Courts are open for the purpose of deciding the question, in order that the law may be obeyed, not disregarded. And the duty so to ascertain the law is incumbent alike on the Crown and on the Executive in cases where the Crown cannot be sued either by petition of right or through an appointed officer (p). The fact, however, that a public body acts for the whole nation at large does not necessarily make it a Crown department for this purpose ; such a public body, if it employs its own subordinate officers and other agents on its own behalf and not on behalf of the Crown, is liable for the torts of its agents to the same extent as any private employer would be liable (g). And although, as a general proposition of law, every man has a right to the enjoyment of his land, nevertheless, when the king's enemies attack the realm, it is lawful for the Crown to enter upon private land for the defence of the country (r), but compensation therefor must be made to the owner (rr). An action will not lie against a foreign sovereign, for he is- exempt Foreign from, the jurisdiction of our Courts, on the ground that " the exercise sovereigns, of such jurisdiction would be incompatible with his regal dignity, that is to say, with his absolute independence of every superior authority "(s). And not only can he not be sued personally, but neither can an action in rem be brought against his property, -for the attaching of the res is an indirect impleading of its owner (t), and the fact that the foreign sovereign uses the res for trading purposes, and not for public purposes directly connected with the jus coronm, makes no difference («) . Ambassadors also who are accredited to this country by a foreign Ambasstwiors. government are free from the jurisdiction of our Courts, on the ground (n) Hunter v. Coleman, (1914) 2 Ir. E. 372, Div. (o) Roper v. Works and Public Buildings Commissioners, (1915) 1 K. B. 45; 84 L. J. K. B. 219. (p) Eastern Trust Co. v. McKenzie Mann d Co., (1915) A. C. 750, P. C. ; 84 L. J. P. C. 152. (g) Gilbert v. Corporation of Trinity House, (1881) 17 Q. B. D. 795 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 85. (r) Petition of Right, In re, (1914) 3 K. B. 649. (rr) De Keyser's Royal Hotel v. The King, (1920) A. C. 508. (s) Per Brett, L.J., The Parlement Beige, (1880) 5 P. D., p. 207 ; and see Mtghell V. Sultan of Johore, (1894) 1 Q. B. 149 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 593, C. A. See also Statham V Statham and the Gaekwar of Baroda, Times Newspaper, Dec. 22nd, 1911. (t) The Parlement Beige, (1880) 5 P. D. 197 ; Vavasseur v. Krupp, (1878) 9 Ch. D. 351 ; The Jassy, (1906) P. 270. («) The Parlement Beige, supra. 40 PARTIES. that they are the representativea of the sovereign or state which sends them ; and the fact that an action brought against an ambas- sador may arise out of commeroial transactions in which he is engaged is immaterial {xj. " This immunity extends not only to the person of the minister but to his family and suite, secretaries of legation and other secretaries, his servants, movable eSects, and the house in which he resides " (y). This rule holds good even when the ambas- sador so accredited to this country is a British subject, unless he has been received by the British Government on the express terms of his being subject to the jurisdiction of our Courts (a). The privilege of an ambassador extends up to a reasonable time after presenting his letters of recall (a). Whilst the privilege continues the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run against his creditors (b). A foreign sovereign or ambassador may waive his privilege, and if he appears and defends up to judgment, it is then too late to have the proceedings stayed (c). But nothing short of appearance will amount ■ to submission to the jurisdiction. The privilege cannot be waived by anything done before action brought. Thus the fact of a foreign sovereign residing in this country and entering into a contract under an assumed name, as if he were a private individual, does not amount to a subijiission to the jurisdiction (d). Moreover, where a foreign sovereign by suing in the Courts of this country actually submits to the jurisdiction, such submission is strictly limited in its character, and will only entitle the defendant to obtain discovery of docurftents and set up a counterclaim by way of defence (e). "When felons ^ felon could not by the common law sue for torts to his property, may sue. fo]. }jjg property was forfeited to the Crown ; but forfeiture for felony has now been abolished by the Felony Act, 1870 (/). By that Act the right to sue for any injury to the property of a convict (which term is defined to mean any person against whom judgment of death or penal servitude shall have been pronounced on any charge of treason or felony (g)) is vested in the administrator or interim curator, as the case may be, during the time that the convict is subject to the operation of the Act, that is to say, until the convict's death, bankruptcy, or the (x) Magdalena Steam Navigation v. Martin, (1869) 2 B. & E. 94; 28 L. J. Q. B. 310 ; 119 K. E. 640. (y) Wheaton, Int. Law, Ed. 1866, s. 225. See also Ohikis v. Musurus, (1909) 25 T. L. E. 225 (wife of ambassador). (z) Macartney v. Garbutt, (1890) 24 Q. B. D. 368. (ffl) Musurus Bey v. Gadban, (1894) 2 Q. B. 352 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 621. (b) Ibid. (c) Taylor v. Best, (1854) 14 C. B. 487 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 89; 98 E. E. 717. {d) Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, (1894) 1 Q. B. 149; 63 L. J. Q. B. 593; and see Statham v. Statham and the Gaekwar of Baroda, supra. (e) South African Republic v. Compagnie Franco-Beige du Ghemin de Far du Nord, (1898) 1 Ch. 190; 67 L. J. Ch. 92. (/) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, s. 1. (g) S. 6. FELONS AND BANKRUPTS. 41 completion of his term of punishment, original or substituted, or until he shall have received a royal pardon (h) ; subject to this exception, that a convict may sue in respect of any property acquired by him while lawfully at large under a ticket of leave (i). A felon who is not a convict as above defined, such as one who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment only, may apparently sue for torts to his property in his own name. Even at common law a felon might sue for any personal wrong, such as assault or slander (fc) ; and it is appre- hended that he may still do so in his own name, notwithstanding the language of s. 8 of the above Act, which provides that no action for the recovery of ' ' any damage whatsoever ' ' shall be brought by any con- vict while he is subject to the operation of the Act, for the term " damage " in that section must probably be understood as confined to damage to property. If it were otherwise, the convict might be altogether without redress, for actions for personal damage do not pass to the administrator. But a convict— so long as the sentence is unreversed — is not entitled to maintain an action against a vidtness for negUgently giving false evidence upon his trial, although such evidence largely conduced to his wrongful conviction, a determination of the proceedings in favour of the accused being a condition precedent to action under such circumstances (Z). Bankrupts may be sued for torts of all kinds, wli'ether committed Bankrupts, before or during the bankruptcy; bankruptcy does not operate as a discharge of a tort, for demands for unliquidated damages founded on tort are not debts provable against the bankrupt's estate (m). .And a creditor who sues and obtains a judgment in detinue for the return of a specific chattel, together with damages for its deten- tion, is not deprived of his right to a receiving order in bankruptcy, for the damages awarded, by reason of a return of the chattel subse- quently to the judgment (n). A bankrupt cannot sue for any direct tort to property belonging to him at the date of the bankruptcy ; the cause of action for any injury whereby the estate divisible among the creditors is directly diminished belongs to the trustee (o). But for injuries of a personal character, such as libel or assault, or the seduction of his servant (p), a bankrupt may sue. In some cases the act complained of may be such as to give rise to both kinds (h) Ss. 10, 24. (j) S. 30. • (fe) Com. Dig. Forfeiture, B. 2. {I) Bynoe v. Bank of England, (1902) 1 K. B. 467; 71 L. J. K. B. 208, C. A. (to) 45 Geo. V. c. 59, a. 30. As to whether the action of a judgment debtor presenting his own petition in bankruptcy to avoid payment amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court, see Archer, In re ; Archer, Ex parte, (1904) 20 T. L. K. 890. (n) A Debtor, In re; Creditor, Ex parte, (1907) 97 L. T. 140. (o) Hodgson v. Sidney, (1866) L. E. 1 Ex. 313; 35 L. J. Ex. 182; Morgan v. Stehle, (1872) L. E. 7 Q. B. 611 ; 41 L. J. Q. B. 260. (p) Howard v. Crowther, (1841) 8 M. & W. 601 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 385 ; 58 E. E. 823. 42 PARTIES. of damage, both a damage to property, and also a damage of a personal character ; and in such cases the question as to what extent the cause of action will pass to the trustee seems to depend upon the following rules: — (a) If only one of the two kinds of damage suffered is the direct consequence of the defendant's act, and the other is consequential merely, so that there is but one cause of action, then if the damage which is directly suffered is a damage to property, the cause.of action passes to the trustee, and the bankrupt's remedy in respect of the injury to himself is gone; but if the damage which is directly suffered is of a personal -character, the whole cause of action remains in the bankrupt. Thus, where the bankrupt is induced by the defendant's fraud to incur liabilities in consequence of which he is rendered insol- vent and injured in credit and character, the primary damage being the pecuniary loss and the cause of action in respect of it passing out of the bankrupt, he is not entitled to say that enough of that cause of action remains in him to enable him to recover in respect of the consequential injury to his character (q), for a single cause of action cannot in such circumstajices be split (r). So, on the other hand, where a person has been libelled, and the injury occasioned by the libel to such person's reputation has brought about his insolvency, the trustee cannot sue for the damage to the bankrupt's estate (s). (b) If the act of the defendant be such as to give rise simul- • taneously to two distinct causes of action, one in respect of a damage to property, the other in respect of a personal damage, as for instance where a carriage which the bankrupt is driving is run into, and both carriage and driver are injured (t), the trustee rnay sue for the one and the bankrupt for the other (u). (c) Intermediate between the two above classes of cases is that of a trespass to land or goods of which the bankrupt has the bare possession, and the trustee has the property ; in which case it appears that the bankrupt may sue for the invasion of his possession, and recover damages nominal or substantial according as the trespass was or was not accompanied with matter of aggravation, and the trustee may sue in respect of his property or right of possession, and recoTer damages for any injury done to the land or any damage to or conver- sion of the goods. The authorities, indeed, only decide that the bani- rupt may sue in respect of his possession ; they do not expressly decide that he cannot recover in such action for the injury to the property, (g) Hodgson v. Sidney, (1866) L. E. 1 Ex. 313; 35 L. J. Ex. 182; Morgan v. SUble, (1872) L. E. 7 Q. B. 611 ; 41 L. J. Q. B. 260. (r) Per Bramwell, B., (1866), L. E. 1 Ex. p. 316 ; 35 L. J. Ex. 182. («) Per Alderson, B., (1841) 8 M. & W. p. 604 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 835 ; 58 E. K. 823. (t) Brunsden v. Humphrey, (1884) 14 Q. B. D. 141 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 476. («) Per Bramwell, B., (1866), L. E. 1 Ex. p. 316 ; 35 L. J. Ex. 182. INFANTS. 43 but they seem so to suggest (x). The point, however, is not absolutely clear (y). Any 'property except real estate (2) which a bankrupt may acquire after his adjudication and before his discharge is, until the trustee intervenes, to be regarded as the property of the bankrupt (a). For any torts to such property, therefore, the banltrupt, in the absence of any intervention by the trustee, may sue. Infants are liable to be sued for torts of all kinds, and, except Infants— when the action is founded upon mahce or want of care, the tender- tg'^emess of ness of the infant's age is immaterial (b). Thus a child, however age material young, will be liable for the consequences of a direct trespass, although J.° Sf^^ his youth may have rendered him unable to foresee those con- sequences; it will be sufficient to fix him with liability that he intended to do the physical act which constituted the trespass. In Mangan v. Atterton (c), where a child aged four put his fingers between the cogs of a machine while his school-fellows turned the handle, and then sought to recover damages from the owner of the machine for exposing it unfenced in a public place, Bramwell, B., said : " Suppose this machine had been of very delicate construction and had been injured by the child's fingers, would not the child in spite of his tender years have been liable to an action?" But where the cause of action depends on the malice or the negli- gence of the defendant, the child's age will be material, and it will be a question for the jury whether he was of such an age that he ought to have foreseen the consequences of his act, and that malice or want of due care could reasonably be predicated of him (d). Where a cause of action is really founded upon . contract, the Infant when plaintiff cannot avoid the defence of infancy by framing his action '}^'>^^ ^^ in tort. If goods are delivered to an infant under a contract of sale, goods and the infant was not guilty of any deception in concealing his ^^''^^''^^ *° infancy from the vendor, the latter cannot in an action of trover contract, recover the goods or their value. This was always the rule at common law, and it is apprehended that the Infants' Belief Act, 1874 (e), makes no difference in this respect ; the enactment that all contracts (x) Brewer v. Dew, (1843) 11 M. & W. 623 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 448 ; Rogers v. Spenee, (1844) 13 M. & W. 571 ; 12 CI. & F. 700 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 49 ; 67 E. E. 736. (y) See in this connection, Rose v. Buckett, (1901) 2 K. B. 449; 70 L. J. K. B. 736 C A. (z) London and County Contracts, Ltd. v. Tallack, (1903) 51 W. E. 408; New Land Development Association and Gray, In re, (1892) 2 Ch. 138; 61 L. J. Ch. 323, 495. ' (a) Cohen v. Mitchell, (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 262 ; 59 L. J. Q. B. 409. (b) As, however, apart from special contract, a parent is not responsible to a third party for the debts or torts of his child, the utility of taking proceedings against a child is, in the majority of cases, problematical. See McQueen, Law of Husband and Wife, 4th ed. p. 82. (c) (1866)L. E. IBx. p. 240;35L. J. Ex. 161. .^^-r, (d) See Clark v. Chambers, (1878) 3 Q. B. D. 327 ; at pp. 338-9 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 427. See also Ch. XV., and cases there cited. (e) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62. 44 PARTIES. for goods supplied to infants which were theretofore by law voidable should be void, presumably merely meant that they should be incapable of ratification, and not that the party contracting with the infant should be entitled to> treat the contract as a nullity. Moreover, in spite of the general rule of law that an infant is not liable, apart from deceit, for a misrepresentation that he was sui juris, whereby a party was induced to contract vwth him (/), it has been held in equity that if the infant, at the time of obtaining the goods, was actually guilty of fraud in concealing his minority, the vendor may rescind the contract, and as the infant would rio longer hold the goods under the contract the vendor may recover them in trover (g). But if before discovery of the "iraud the infant has parted with the goods for value, it is then too late to rescind, and the vendor is without remedy ; he cannot sue in deceit for damages, for that would be in substance a means of enforcing the contract to pay the price (k). Moreover, although .an infant may be liable in tort generally, he is not answerable for a tort directly connected with and arising out of a eontraot which, as an infant, he would be entitled to avoid. Where therefore an infant, by fraudulent misrepresentations as to his age, obtained advances from a money-lender it was held that the latter could not recover the money from the former, the cause of action beihg in substance ex oontractu (i). Infant bailee. Where goods have been delivered to an infant under a contract of bailment, the bailor, in the absence of any fraudulent concealment of the infancy, cannot bring trover to recover the goods so long as the agreed term of bailment continues. But as soon as the bailment.has ceased (fc), either by effluxion of time, or by some act on the part of the infant, so inconsistent with the terms of the bailment as to entitle the bailor to treat it as determined, as, for instance, where the infant pledges the goods, the bailor may sue for the goods or their value. "When in ^^ infant bailee may be sued for any independent trespass coin- trespass, mitted by him to the goods bailed. Whether in any particular case an improper dealing by the infant with the goods bailed to him is a mere breach of the contract or amounts to an independent tort it is not always easy to determine. It has been held that if an infant hire a horse, the riding of the horse for an improper distance is a mere excess of the hirer's rights under the contract, and if the horse be thereby injured he will not be liable (l); but if he jump the horse (/) Liverpool Adelphi Loan Association v. Fairhurst and Wife, (1854) 9 Ex. 422; 23 L. J. Ex. 153; 96 E. E. 778. (g) Mills V. Graham, (1804) B. & P. 1 N. E. 140 ; 8 E. E. 767 ; Stocks v. Wilson, (1913) 2 K. B. 236. (h) Johnson v. Pye, (1665) 1 Sid. 268 ; Price v. Hewett, (1852) 8 Ex. 146. (i) Leslie, Ltd. v. Shiell, (1914) 3 K. B. 607, C. A. (&) See per Gave, J., in Beg. v. McDonald, (1885) 15 Q. B. D. p. 326. (l) Jennings v. Rundall, (1799) 8 T. E. 335 ; 4 E. E. 680. And see Paweett v. Smethurst (case of a motor-car), (1916) 84 L. J. K. B. 478. LUNATICS. 45 knowing it to be in an unfit condition to be jumped and being expressly prohibited from jumping it, that is an independent tort for which he will be liable (m). The question whether in such cases the wrongful act is a mere excess or outside the contract altogether, is one of degree. An action for personal injuries will not lie at the suit of an infant injury to which was en ventre sa mere at the time of the accident (n). And no '"™°* ^^ *■ ' ventre sa action is maintainable by a parent for the funeral expenses of an mire. infajit child whose death was caused by the negHgence of a tort- feasor (o). But an acceptance by an infant of a lump sum down as Agreement to settlement in, full of an action already commenced by the infant's settle action •' _ •' voidable, guardian ad litem constitutes no bar to the proceedings (p). There is no reported instance of an action of tort ever having been Lunatics, brought in this country against a lunatic, but it is apprehended that lunatics are liable for torts to the same extent as sane persons, provided that the torts are committed by them while in that condition of mind which is essential to liability in sane persons. If a lunatic commit a trespass while in a state of frenzy he will not be liable any more than a sane person who does a similar act while under the influence of sudden terror which deprives him of all power of deliberate choice; but subject to that exception the defendant's lunacy will be no answer to an action of trespass, for he is capable of intending the physical act which he does (g). Whether a lunatic can be sued for a libel would seem to depend upon the question whether he was insane upon the subject to which the libel related ; if he was, then presumably he would not be liable, for liability in libel depends upon a consciousness that the matter published is defama- tory; but if he was sane on that subject, then, although insane on other subjects, he ought to be held answerable in damages (r). But there is no authority on the point to be found in the books. The liability of a lunatic in an action for negligence seems to stand on the same footing as the liability of a young child in a similar action, that is to say, it is a question for the jury whether he was sufficiently self-possessed to be capable of taking care. [m)Bumard v. Haggis, (1863) 14 C. B. N. S. 45; 32 L. J. C. P. 189; 135 K. B. 593 (n) Walker v. Great Northern B. Go. of Ireland, (1890—1) 28 L. E. Ir. 69. (o) Clark v. Lon. Gen. Omnibus Co., Ltd., (1906) 2 K. B. 648; 75 L. J. K. B. 907. (p) Mattel V. Vautro, (1898) 78 L. T. 682, (q) In Weaver v. Ward, (1616) Hob. 134, it is said without qualification that " if a lunatic hurt a man he shall answer in trespass," but this proposition would appear too wide. , ,.,,.., n In Krom v Schoonmaker, (1848) 3 Barb. 647, it was decided in the Supreme Court of the United States that an action of false imprisonment lay against a lunatic who in his capacity of justice of the peace caused the plaintifC to be wrongfully imprisoned ; but it is presumed that the extent of the insanity m that case was not great. (r) See Ch. XVH. 46 PARTIES. Husband By the common law a married woman could not either sue or be when liable g^g^ unless her husband were joined with her as plaintiff or defendant, torts. but now by the Married Women's Property Acts, 1882 and 1893, she may both sue and be sued in tort in all respects as if she were a feme sole, and any damages or costs recovered by her in any such action shall be her separate property, and any damages or costs recovered against her shall be payable out of her separate property (s). She is also liable for the maintenance of her parents (t). And every married woman who carries on a trade or business, whether separately from her husband or not, is liable to the bankruptcy laws as 'if she were a feme sole (w). For torts committed by a woman before her marriage her husband was formerly liable to the full extent of the damages recovered, but by the Act of 1882 his liability is limited to the extent of the property acquired by him through his wife (x). But for the wife's torts committed during coverture (where the tort does not arise out of an antecedent contract) [y) the husband's liability continues to be unlimited («). And as the old common law action against the husband and wife jointly in respect of the torts of the wife still exists, there cannot be separate judgments with regard to the husband and wife. Con- sequently a payment into Court by the husband in satisfaction of the claim, coupled with a denial of liability by the wife, is not an admissible method of pleading (a). The reason why a husband was liable at common law for his wife's antenuptial and postnuptial torts was simply that during coverture she could not be sued without him (6). Therefore, as soon as the coverture comes to an end by divorce (c), or by the wife's death (d), the husband's liability ceases, even though an action to establish it may have already been commenced. It has also been expressly provided by statute that for torts committed by a wife while separated from her husband under a judicial separation he shall not be liable (e), and this rule has been held to apply (though it is submitted incorrectly) in cases where a decree for judicial separation has been obtained while the action (s) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 1; 56 & 57 Vict. c. 63, s. 1. The Act of 1893 extendB the liability of married women for costs of litigation to separate estate restramed from anticipation. (t) 8 Ed. VII. c. 27. (tt) 5 Geo. V. c. S9, s. 125. (x) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, ss. 14, 15. (y) Cole V. De Trafford and Wife, (1917) 1 K. B. 911 ; 86 L. J. K. B. 764. (z) Seroka v. Kattenburg, (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 177; 55 L. J. Q. B. 375; and see ^arle v. Kingscote, (1900) 1 Ch. 203; 69 L. J. Ch. 202, 725. (a) Beaumont v. Kaye, (1904) 1 K. B. 292; 73 L. J. K. B. 213, C. A. (b) Per Erie, C.J., Gapel v. Powell, (1864) 17 C. B. N. S. p. 748; 34 L. J. C. P. 168 ; 142 E. E. 609. (c) Capel V. Powell, (1864) 17 C. B. N. S. p. 743; 34 L. J. C. P. 168; 142 B. E. 609. (d) Per Willes, J., WngU v. Leonard, (1861) 11 C. B. N. S. p. 266; 30 L. J. C. P. 365 ; 132 R. E. 654. (e) 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 26. HUSBAND AND WIFE. 47 in respect of the tort was still pending (/). But the husband still continues liable if his motive in petitioning for a judicial separation was only a desire to avoid liability for a fraudulent act of his wife in the profit of which he participated (g). A husband remains liable for his wife's torts committed during coverture although living apart from him under a voluntary separation {h), and probably also during the currency of a decree nisi (t). In the case of a married woman carrying on a trade or business, whether separately from her husband or not, it is provided by s. 12 (which is apparently retrospective) of the Bankruptcy and Deeds of Arrangement Act, 1913 (3 & 4 Geo. V. c. 84), since repealed and re-enacted by s. 125 and Schedule VI. of 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59, that every such married woman shall be subject to the bankruptcy laws as if she were a feme sole. Consequently if a married woman when carrying on a business incurs a liability in tort she can be proceeded against by bankruptcy notice for non-payment of a judgment debt founded on such liability, whether or not expressed to be payable out of her separate property, even though at the time when such proceedings were initiated she may have ceased to carry on business (fc). And it is submitted, though there is apparently no direct authority to support the proposition, that the commission of a marital ofience by a wife living, by agreement, apart from her husband should avoid the husband's liability for a tort committed by her, subsequently to the adultery. In Wainford v. Heyl (l), Jesell, M.E., took a different view as to the ground of a husband's common law liability for his wife's torts; he said, " Strictly speaking, she cannot commit torts; they are the torts of her husband, and therefore she creates as against her husband a liability;" but this view seems irreconcilable with the judgments in Gapel v. Powell (m), for if it were sound the husband's liability for his wife's tort ought to survive notwithstanding the determination of the coverture, which it does not. A wife without the intervention of the trustee of her settlement (n) Wife may sue may sue her husband by way of civil or criminal proceedings for a J|j"j''to°^g*°'^ tort to her separate property (o), but he has apparently no oorre- separate property. (/) Cuenod v. Leslie, (1909) 1 K. B. 880; 78 L. J. K. B. 695, C. A. (g) Burdett v. Home, (1911) 27 T. L. E. 402; affirmed (1911) 28 T. L. E. 83, C A ' (h) Head v. Briscoe, (1833) 5 C. & P. 484; 38 E. E. 841. (i) Norman v. Villars, (1877) 2 Ex. D. 359; 46 L. J. Ex. 579; and see Stanhope V. Stanhope, (1886) 11 P. D. 103, at p. 109; 55 L. J. P. 36. (k) Allen, In re, Shaw, Ex parte, (1914) 59 S. J. 130, C. A. As to whether or not s. 12 of 3 & 4 Geo. V. c. 34, replaced by s. 125 of 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59, is retrospective, see Shaw v. Allen, (1914) 30 T. L. E. 631. (l) (1876) L. E. 20 Eq. p. 324; 44 L. J. Ch. 567. m) 1864) 17 C. B. N. S. 743 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 168 ; 142 E. E. 609. (n) Healey v. Healey, (1915) 1 K. B. 938; 84 L. J. K. B. 1454. 0) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 12. See Rex v. King, (1914) 110 L. T. 783, C. C. A. 48 PARTIES. Personal representa- tives. 1. Bemedies survive for torts to pergonal estate of deceased. sponding right of action against her for torts to his property. Neither husband nor wife can sue the other for a tort of any other kind (p). It was a general principle of the common law that actions of tort died with the person, whether the person so dying was the party injured or the tort-feasor (q). At common law the personal representatives of a deceased person could never sue in respect of torts committed in his lifetime to his person or his property, and with two exceptions they could never be sued for torts committed by him. But by the statute 4 Edw. III. c. 7, executors were enabled to sue for any injuries to the personal estate of their testator for which he might have sued if he were living, and this remedy has been extended by the Courts to administrators. The statute 15 Edw. III. c. 5, gives a like remedy to the executors of executors. The former statute speaks only of trespasses, but this term includes all injuries whereby ■ the personal estate has directly been rendered less beneficial (r). Slander of title to a tradfe mark is an injury of this nature, and the action for it will survive to the executors of the party slandered (s). Where one person wrongfully digs and removes the coal or minerals of another person, the owner may waive the trespass to the realty and sue in trover for the coals or minerals as chattels (t), consequently executors may sue for the value of any minerals wrongfully dug and carried away during their testator's Hfetime, although the wrongful act was committed more than six months (u) before the testator's death, for they may treat it as an injury to his personal estate under the statute of Edw. III. Anything which having formed part of or been attached to the freehold of an owner in fee or other person not impeachable of waste is severed from the freehold, becomes from the moment of severance part of the owner's personal estate, and for the removal of it or any injury to it after severance the cause of action passes to the executor. Thus, an executor may sue in trover for trees wrongfully cut down by a stranger in the testator's lifetime (x). But where a testator sustains personal injuries from a tortious act, and in consequence is prevented from earning his liveUhood and is put to expense in obtaining medical attendance, such special damage does not constitute an injury to his personal estate which will pass (p) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 12. (q) The clause usually inserted in an order of reference to arbitration, to the effect that in case of death of either party before making the award it shall be delivered to their personal representatives, is inoperative where the action is for a tort (Bowker v. Evans, (1885) 15 Q. B. D. 565 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 421). (r) Williams on Executors, Pt. ii. Bk. iii. Ch. i. § i. (s) Hatchard v. Mige, (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 771 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 397. (f) See below, ^. 352. (u) Which is the limitation for injury to real estate. See below, p. 49. {x) Williams v. Breedon, (1798) 1 B. & P. 329. The decision in Emerson v, Emerson, (1672) Ventr. 187, to the effect that the executor could not sue for the wrongful cutting and asportation of growing grass in the testator's lifetime, turned merely upon a point of pleading. PERSONAL REPRESKNTATIVES. ^Qi to the executor (y). But on the other hand where similar actions were brought by the exeoutrices of persons who while travelling as passengers on the defendants' lines were injured in. railway accidents, it was held that they might recover for medical expenses and for loss occasioned by the inability of the deceased persons to attend to their business, on the ground that the maxim actio personalis moritur cum, persona, never applied to damage to the deceased's estate when such damage was caused by breach of contract (z). The Statute of Limitations will run as against executors and administrators from the date of the accrual of the cause of action to the deceased. By 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, s. 2, it is provided that the personal 2. For torts representatives of a deceased person may within twelve months after '" "^^^^rf^*^ his death maintain an action for any injury to his real estate within six committed in his lifetime, and not more than six months before his ™o"*s before death. The only cases in which an action for injuries to the person survives 3. Actions the death of the party injured are those providefd by the Workmen's ^'^'^^'^J'fp'^ Compensation Act, 1906 (6 Edw. VII. c. 58) (a) ; by the Employers' Act. Liability Act, 1880; and by Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, which last Act enacts that " whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such ease the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony " {b). " Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and child of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator of the person deceased; and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought (c); (y) Pulling v. Great Eastern R. Co., (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 110; 51 L. J. Q. B. 453. In this case the deceased, who was not a passenger on the defendants' line, was run over by one of their trains while he was crossing the railway at a level crossing, so that the damages sought to be recovered were the result of a pure tort. (2) Bradshaw v. Lancashire benefited by his tortious act ; the benefit must consist in the direct acquisition of property or its proceeds (g). Thus if a person trespass on the land of his neighbour, and wrongfully use the roads and passages on such land for the conveyance of his own minerals, although his personal estate may have derived indirect benefit from such user the remedy for the trespass dies with the person (r). If a tenant for life " has wrongfully cut timber, the timber or its proceeds or value can be ioUowed. But no action for waste, permissive or voluntary, as such lies against the executors of a tenant for hfe. By non-repairing a house, or by ploughing up an ancient meadow, the tenant for life may have indirectly benefited himself or saved his own pocket. But neither law nor equity recognise in this indirect benefit which he may have received any ground for proceedings against his executors " (s). Nor can pecuniary loss .suffered by a woman through giving up an employment in contemplation of marriage be properly treated • (I) This Act came into operation on July 1st, 1907. (m) Williams on Executors, Pt. i. Bk. iv. Ch. i. § ii. (n) Martin v. Fuller, (1696) Comb. 371. Co) 1 EoUe, Abr. 917, A. 2. „„ ^ ^ (p) Tharpe v. Stallwood, (1843) 5 M. & G. 760; 12 L. J. C. P. 241; 63 E. E. 474; Pryse, in the Goods of, (1904) P. 301; 73 L. J. P. 84, C. A. (g) Davoren v. Wotton, (1900) 1 Ir. E. 273, C. A. ; Duncan, In re, Terry v. Sweeting, (1899) 1 Ch. 387; 68 L. J. Ch. 253. (r) Phillips V. Homfray, (1883) 24 Ch. D. 439; 52 L. J. Ch. 833 (s) Per Bowen, L.J., Phillips v. Homfray, (1883) 24 C. D. p. 455; 52 L. J. Ch. 833. 52 PARTIES. 5. Repre- sentatives of beneficed elerk may be sued for dilapidations. 6. For torts to property committed by deceased within six months before death liability survives. Assignees. as special damage flowing from the breach of promise so as to render the estate of a deceased promisor Hable therefor (t). And a like rule applies to legal costs incurred by the promisee in prosecuting the claim (u). An action for tort lay at common law against the executors of a beneficed clerk at the suit of his successor for dilapidations of the building upon his benefice. For such remedy there has now been substituted by statute (x) an action of debt. A third exception to the general rule is created by statute 3 & 4 Will. IV. e. 42, s. 2, which provides that an action may be brought against the executors or administrators of any person deceased for any injury committed by him in his lifetime to the real or personal property of another, if the injury was committed within six months of his death, and provided the action be brought within six months after the executors or administrators shall have taken upon themselves the administration of the deceased person's estate (y). And it is also provided by Order XVIII. r. 5, E. S. C, that " claims by or against an executor or administrator as such may be joined with claims by or against him personally, provided the last-mentioned claims are alleged to arise with reference to the estate in respect of which the plaintiff or defendant sues or is sued as executor or Eidministrator " («). The question whether a right of action for a tort is assignable so as to entitle the assignee to sue in his owif name, a-W^-ough always highly problematical, was not at one time the subject of an actual decision. It has, however, been held in recent cases, that the assignment of a mere right of litigation, such as accrues in the case of a legal claim to recover damages arising out of an assault, is not admissible, presumably upon the ground that such assign- ments would materially affect the existing laws against champerty and maintenance (a). No doubt s. 25 of the Judicature Act, 1873, which enacts, that " any absolute assignment by writing ... of any debt or other legal chose in action of which express notice in writing shall have been given to the debtor, trustee, or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to receive or claim such debt or chose in action," shall be effectual t6 transfer the legal right to such debt or chose in action, will include the assignment of a (t) Quirk V. Thomas, (1915) W. N. 91. (u) S. C. (1915) W. N. 147. (x) 34 & 35 Vict. c. 43; as to which see below, p. 370. iy) And see ante, p. 49. (z) Tredegar (Lord) v. Roberts, (1914) 1 K. B. 283, C. A. (a) May v. Lane, (1894) 64 L. J. Q. B. 237, C. A. ; Dawson v. Great Norihem and City R., (1905) 1 K. B. 260 at p. 270; 74 L. J. K. B. 190, C. A.; but see contra Trail & Sons v. Actieselskabat Dalbeattie, Ltd. (1904) 6 F. 798, Ct. of Ses8. ASSIGNEES. 53 claim for compensation for damage resulting from the lawful exercise of statutory powers (6). But there are two objections in the way of holding that that section authorises the legal transfer of a right of action in tort. In the first place, although a right of action in tort is a chose in action in the widest sense of that term (c), the words " or other legal chose in action " seem to point to something ejusdem generis with debts, i.e., causes of action arising out of contract. And secondly, as the Judicature Act is a mere statute of procedure, it was not intended to affect the rights of parties (d). This section cannot therefore be regarded as making that assignable in law which was not assignable in equity before, but only as enabling an assignee to sue in his own name in cases in. which before the Act he could have sued in the name of his assignor. This, view is supported by the decision of Wright, J., Whether in the case of Datvson- v. Great Northern and City R. Co. (e), in "^^.^^ °^ ^ ^ *' \ /' ' action m tort which it was held that a right to sue for damages in tort is not a assignable, legal ^hose in action within the meaning of s. 25 of the Judicature Act, 1873. There seems indeed to be but little authority' in this country for the general proposition, that an assignee of a right of action in tort can sue either in his own name or in that of his assignor (/). It was, however, held in the Park Gate Waffgon Works Co., In re {g), that claims against the directors of an insolvent company for misfeasance were capable of assignment by the official liquidators to a third party, under s. 95, subs. 3, of the Companies Act, 1862 (gg). In the case of Cohen v. Mitchell (h), where a cause of action for the conversion of goods was assigned, and the action was carried on in the name of the assignor, the judgment of the Court of Appeal involved the assumption that the assignment was good; (b) Dawson v. Great Northern and City R., (1905) 1 K. B. 260; 74 L. J. K. B. 190, C. A. (c) Termes de la Ley. (d) See per Lord Herschell, British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mozam- bique, (1893) A. C. p. 628 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 70. (e) (1904) 1 K. B. 277; 73 L. J. K. B. 174; this case was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeal on another point, (1905) 1 K. B. 260; 74 L. J. K. B. 190. (/) But see Trail d Sons v. Actieselskabat Dalbeattie, Ltd., (1904) 6 F. 798, Ct. of Sess. (g) (1881) 17 Ch. D. 234, C. A. ; and see Gibbon v. Dudgeon, (1881) 45 J. P. 748. The doctrine of "subrogation " appears to be recognised in colonial legisla- tion. See Victoria Insurance Co. v. King, (1895) Queensland L.J. Keports, vol. vi., p. 202; affirmed, (1896) A. C. 250. igg) See also 8 Bdw. VII. c. 69, s. 151 (2). (h) (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 262; 59 L. J, Q. B. 409. Whether the goods in that case had been converted into money by the defendant, or still remained in his possession, did not appear. It may be that where goods have been wrongfully seized and converted by the defendant into money the cause of action, may be assigned, for the plaintiff may waive the tort and sue on an implied assumpsit for money had and received to his use. But where the goods remain unsold in the defendant's hands, it is apprehended that the cause of action cannot be assigned. The plaintifE may indeed assign the goods, and then upon a fresh demand and refusal after the assignment the assignee may bring trover. But that was not the case in Cohen v. Mitchell. The cause of action there assigned was one in respect of which the action had been commenced before the date of the assignment. 54 PARTIES. but the point was not argued, and no decision was given upon it, In Williams v. Protheroe (t) the Court are reported to have said that there is no objection to the validity of an agreement by the vendor of an estate that the purchaser should be entitled to sue in the vendor's name for " injuries done to it previously to the purchase ' ' ; but on reference to the facts of the case, it appears that the action to which the agreement related was an action against a tenant for dilapidations arising from non-repair, which was a mere breach of contract, and actions upon contracts have always been assignable in equity (fc). That case is therefore no authority for saying that a cause of action for active injury would be assignable. Apparently, however, a cause of action for malicious damage survives to the representatives of a deceased person (I). Although' in De Hoghton v. Money (m). Turner, L.J., said that "a right to complain of a fraud is not a marketable commodity," and the same view has been expressed by Lord Abinger in Prosser v, Edmonds (n). But if a right of action for fraud is not assigpable, then neither ought a right of action for any other tort to be so, though it has been held that damages recovered in an action of tort are assignable (o). There seems, indeed, to be no valid reason in principle for any distinction as regards their assignability between rights of action for torts to property, and rights of action for torts to the person or reputation. The reason given by Lord Abinger in Howard v. Crowther (p) for holding that actions for torts of the latter class do not pass to trustees in bankrupty, while those for torts of the former class do, namely, that in actions of the latter clas^ the trustees would get no sufficient damages, has no application to the case of assignment of such rights of action by a solvent assignor. In the case of bankruptcy it would be unjust for the law to compulsorily deprive the injured person of a substantial claim for damages, unless by so doing it conferred a corresponding benefit upon the creditors; but in the case of a voluntary assign- ment by the injured person, the fa-ct that the assignee will get but little damages, though it may present a formidable difficulty in the way of finding a purchaser, can, apart from the encwwage- ment it would give to champertous actions, afford no good reason why the injured person should not sell his c-ause of action for (i) (1829) 5 Bing. 309; 30 B. E. 608. (fc) And see TolhuTst v. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers and Others, (1903) A. C. 414 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 834. (I) Glynn v. Glare Gounty Gouncil, (1910) 2 Ir. E. 666, C. A. Malicious injury to buildings by tenants is a misdemeanour, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 13. (m) (1866) L. E. 2 Ch. 164. (n) (1835) 1 Y. & C. 481 ; 41 E. E. 322. (o) Glegg v. Bromley, (1912) 81 L. J. K. B. 384, Div. . (p) (1841) 8 M. & W. 601; 10 L. J. Bx. 335; 58 E. E. 823. " How can they (the trustees), he said, at p. 603, "represent his aggravated feelings?" CORPORATIONS. (^5 what it will fetch if he likes. And yet if a right of action for a purely personal tort were assignable, this strange result would follow, that the assignee would have only a cause of action determinable upon the death of another person by reason of the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona. But such a limita- tion has never been heard of. It is apprehended that actions for purely personal torts are not assignable, and, consequently if they are not, neither are actions for torts to property (g), even though they purport to be assigned along with the injured property itself. Assuming, however, that rights of action in tort are in general not assignable, there are two exceptions to that rule : first, a chose in a-ction may be assigned to the Crown (r); and, secondly, rights of action of any kind which pass to a trustee in bankruptcy (including rights of actions for torts to the debtor's property) are, it appears, assignable by the trustee to a stranger (s). But as the objection to the purchase of a cause of action on the score of champerty must be wholly independent of the character of the vendor, this case may be difficult to reconcile with other authorities. Corporations are liable to be sued for torts of all kinds com- Corporations mitted by their agents (t), to the same extent to which an individual r^o* liable for • T i_i ,e J.1 i i 1. 1 • torts outside 18 liable for the torts oi his agent, provided that the act or class of scope of of acts, in the course of the doing of which the torts are committed, corporate pow6rs, are within the scope of the corporate powers (u). What classes of acts are within the scope of the powers of a particular corporation, and what are without it, it is fi-equently a matter of very great difficulty to determine. At what point a tortious act ceases to be a mere excess in the exercise of the (g) See per Wright, J., in Dawson v. Great Northern <£■ City R. Co., (1904) 1 X. B. 277; 73 L. J. K. B. 174; and Park, J., in Stanley v. Jones, (1831) 7 Bing. p. 375; 9 L. J. C. P. 51; 33 E. R. 513, arguendo, seems to have suggested otherwise — sed queer ef (r) Co. Litt. 232 b, Hargrave and Butler's note. (s) Seear v. Lawson, (1880) 15 Ch. D. 426; 49 L. J. Bkcy. 69. There the action was in the name Of the trustee. Queere whether the assignee could have sued in his own name. The distinction between the right of an assignee to sue in his own name and his right to sue in the name of the assignor may be very material. See on this point Western Bank of Scotland v. Addie, (1867) L. JR. 1 H. L. Sco. Ap. 145, at p. 166. (t) Citizens' Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Brown, (1904) A. C. 423; 73 L. J. P. C. 102, P.C; Hurlstone v. London Electric Co., (1913) T. L. E. 514. Subsequently reversed on the ground that owing to the land being demised by the company to the parties immediately guilty of the tort, the company were merely reversioners on the determination of the lease and therefore npt liable, (1914) 30 T. L. E. 398, C. A. Where the corporation is a local authority an action for damages must be commenced within six months (Casey v. Bermondsey Borough Council, (1903) 20 T. L. E. 2). (tt) To fix a corporation with liability for the acts of its agents, two conditions must be fulfilled; 1st, the act must have been within the scope of the agent's employment; 2nd, that employment must have been within the scope of the corporate powers. As to the former, see below, pp. 75, et seq. As to when a corporation and not its agent is "occupier" of premises in connection with which a statutory tort has been committed, eee Bruce v. McManus, (1916) 84 L. J. K. B. 1860. 56 PARTIES. Torts within scope of corporate powere. corporate powers, and becomes something altogether outside the scope of those powers, is necessarily a question of degree; just as, in the analogous case of principal and agent, it is a question of degree whether a particular class of acts is within or without the scope of the agent's employment (a). It has, however, been held that positive evidence should be adduced showing that the particular tortious act complained of was in fact within the scope of the duties and class of acts which the agent was authorised to perform on behalf of his principal. And a person who deals with an agent whose authority he knows to be limited does so at his own peril (y). In the case of false imprisonment;, the general proposition of law is that the authority of the agent of a corporation to arrest an offender can only be implied where the duties which the officer or agent is employed to discharge cannot be efficiently performed unless he has the power to prosecute or summarily to apprehend the offender («). In Poulton V. London dt South Western B. Co. (a) not only was it held that no authority was to be implied from a railway company to its station-master to apprehend » person travelling on their railway for non-payment of the carriage of goods, but Blackburn, J., went further and expressed an opinion that the apprehension of a person for such a reason was outside the scope of the corporate powers, and that consequently even if the station- master had been given express authority to arrest under such circumstances, the company would not have been liable (b). In Mill V. H'Ofwker (c) a resolution passed by a highway board, directing their surveyor to remove an obstruction placed across a path alleged to be a public highway, was held by Pigott and Cleasby, BB., Kelly, C.B., dissenting, to be outside the scope of the board's corporate powers. This case afterwards went to the Exchequer Chamber (d), but no decision was given on this point, though the members of the Court intimated that there was considerable difference of opinion between them upon it. But assuming that the business, in the course of which the tort is committed by the agent, is within the scope of the corporate powers, as well as within the scope of the agent's employment, (x) See Ruben ajud Another v. Great Fingall Consolidated and Others, (iSOi) 2 K. B. 712; 73 L. J. K. B. 872 ; affirmed, (1906) A. C. 439; 75 L. J. Ch. 843. (y) Busso-Chinese Bank v. Li Yau Sam, (1910) A. C. 174; 79 L. J. P. C. 60, P. C. . (z) Bank of New South Wales v. Owston, (1879) 4 A. C. 270; 48 L. J. P. C. 2S, P C. (a) (1867) L. E. 2 Q. B. 534; 36 L. J. Q. B. 294; see also Ormiston v. G. W. By., (1917) 1 K. B. 598. (b) Ibid, (1867) L. E. 2 Q. B. at p. 540. (c\ (1874) L. B. 9 Ex. 309; 43 L. J. Ex. 129. (d) (1875) L. E. 10 Ex. 92; 44 L. J. Ex. 49. CORPORATIONS. 57 it matters not what the nature of the tort is, the corporation will be liable even though it be one involving fraud (e) or malice (/). It was formerly thought that a corporation, being incapable in its corporate character of a malicious intention, could not be Hable to an action in which it was necessary to prove actual malice, such as an action for malicious prosecution (g), or for libel published on a privileged occasion, or for slander of title, but the better and indeed conclusive opinion at the present day is that it can (h); it having been decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the modem case of The Citizens' Life Assurance V. Brown, that a corporation is liable to an action for malicious hbel, when such libel was published by its servant acting in the course of his employment.- And this rule applies even though the servant may have had no actual authority, either express or implied, -to issue the libel complained of (t). To the general rule, however, that corporations may be liable to be sued for torts of all kinds there is possibly one exception; it may be that a corporation practically cannot be held responsible (e) Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, (1867) L. E. 2 Ex. 259; 36 L. J. Ex. 147; Whitechurch v. Cavanagh, (1902) A. C. 117; 71 L. J. K. B. 400 (note, p. 140). (/) Citizens' Life Assurance Co. v. Brown, (1904) A. C. 423; 73 L. J. P. C. 102; Giblan v. National Amalgamated Labourers' Union, (1903) 2 K. B. 600; 72 L. J. K. B. 907; Whitfield v. South Eastern B. Co., (1858) E. B. & B. 115; 27 L. J. Q. B. 229; 113 R. E. 568; Green v. London General Omnibus Co., (1859) 7 C. B. N. S. 290; 29 L. J. C. P. 13; 121 E. R. 497; Edwards v. Midland B. Co., (1880) 6 Q. B. D. 287 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 281. (g) Stevens v. Midland Counties B. Co., (1854) 10 Ex. 352; 23 L. J. Ex. 328. (h) Gornford v. Carlton Bank, (1900) 1 Q. B. 23; 69 L. J. Q. B. 1020, C. A. It is true that the point was not expressly decided hy the Court of Appeal in that case, the decision in Comford v. Carlton Bank turning on another point. And in Nevill v. Fine Arts and General Insurance Co., (1895) 2 Q. B. 156; 64 L. J. Q. B. 681, where the action was for a libel published on a privileged occasion, but there was no evidence of actual malice on the part of the agent who published it, the Court of Appeal left open the question whether, if such actual malice on the part of the agent had been proved, that would have been sufficient to charge the corporation. On the other hand, in Edwards v. Midland. B. Co., (1880) 6 Q. B. D. 287; 50 L. J. Q. B. 281, Pry, J., refused to follow Stevens v. Midland Counties B. Co., (1854) 10 Ex. 352; 23 L. J. Ex. 328, and held that an action for malicious prosecution would lie against a corporation; and in Bank of New South Wales v. Owston, (1879) 4 App. Cas. 270; 48 L. J. P. C. 25, which was also an action for malicious prosecution, counsel of the highest eminence abandoned the old doctrine as untenable. Moreover, if the decision in Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, (1867) L. E. 2 Ex. 259; 36 L. J. Ex. 147, that a corporation may be responsible for the fraud of their agent, was correct, as Lord Selborne in Houldswojth v. City of Glasgow Bank, (1880) 6 App. Cas. p. 326, conceded, it is difficult to see how any different view could prevail in the case of an action founded upon malice. For fraud is just as much a state of mind as is malice. The real reason why a corpora- tion is responsible for the fraud of its agent is not that the fraud is imputable to the corporation itself, for that it cannot be ; it rests simply on the principle of respondeat superior. " It is," as Lord Selborne said in Houldsworth Case (p. 326), " a principle, not of the law of torts, or of fraud or deceit, but of the law of agency, equally applicable whether the agency is for a corporation (in a matter within the scope of the corporate powers) or for an individual." And the same principle must equally apply to malicious wrongs. (t) (1904) A. C. 423; 73 L. J. P. C. 102; disapproving Abrath v. North Eastern R., (1883-6) 11 App. Cas. 247; 56 L. J. Q. B. 457. 58 PARTIES. Where corporation liable for torts of eorporatore. for a fraudulent misrepresentation as to the credit of a third person, owing to the difficulty of complying with the terms of Lord Tenterden's Act, which requires that the representation should be in writing, personally signed by the party to be charged (k). But although a tort committed by an agent in the course of a business within the scope of the corporate powers will render the corporation responsible, a similar act done not by an agent but by the corporators themselves will not necessarily render the corporation liable. For on the one hand the sum of the individual corporatorB, even when acting in a matter within the corporate powers, is not identical with the corporation itself, nor on the other hand do they stand to the corporation in the same relation as an ordinary agent stands to his principal. If an ordinary agent commits a tort of such a kind as to render his principal liable, the agent will be liable also; their liabilities are cumulative. But it is otherwise witib torts committed directly by corporators : their liability and that of their corporation is in the alternative ; they cannot both be liable (l). And if a plaintiS elect to sue the agent and not the corporation, he must abide by such election, and is estopped from afterwards fining the corporation in respect of the same matter (m). If the corporators, acting in their corporate capacity in a matter within the scope of their corporate powers, under a horn fide mistake of fact order an act to be done which turns out to be tortious, the corporation will be Hable and the corporators will not (re). But if the corporators commit a wilful tort, whether fraudulent or malicious, as for instance where they publish a libel knowing it to be such (o), inasmuch as it would be imjust that they should escape liability by purporting to do it under the cloak of their corporate character, they must be held liable, from which it follows that the corporation will not be eo. And this rule wiU presumably hold good even though the corporators may commit the tort, not for their own private ends, but with the object of furthenng the interests of the corporation. (ft) See this subject discussed below, in Ch. XVI. In Houldsworth v. City oj Glasgow Bank, (1880) 5 App. Gas. p. 340, Lord Blackburn treated it as an open question, whether an action of deceit could be brought against a coni|!»ny n™^' any circumstances for damage caused by fraud of the directors inducing the Jilsintm to enter into a contract with the company, while the contract remained unrescindea, but the other law lords do not seem to have assented to this view. (I) Barman v. Tappenden, (1801) 1 Bast, 566; 6 E. R. 340; Rex v. WmdUn, ibid., cited by Lord Kenyon, p. 661; Mill v. Hawker, (1874) L. E. 9 Ex. 30S; 43 L. J. Ex. 129; S. C. in Ex. Ch. (1875) L. E. 10 Ex. 92; 44 L. J. Ex. 49. (m) Cross S Go. v. Matthews and Wallace, (1904) 91 L. T. 500; Morel v. Westmorland, (1904) A. C. 11; 73 L. J. K. B. 93, H. L. (n) Per Kelly, C.B., Mill v. Hawker, (1874) L. R. 9 Ex. p. 322; 43 L. J- ^^ 129. This was not disputed by the other members of the Court. (o) Rex V. WaUon, (1788) 2 T. E. 199 ; 1 E. E. 461. JOINT TORT-FEASORS. 59 As a general rule a corporation is liable to its own corporators Corporation for the torts of its agents to the same extent as it is liable to !P^,®°j'^^^ strangers ; it is, of course no defence to an action against a railway torts to its company for personal injuries to plead that the plaintiff was a oy=°'^P°- shareholder. Moreover a person who has been induced by fraudulent misrepresentation to subscribe for shares, or debenture stock in a corporation or company, is entitled to bring an action of deceit against those who have deceived him, as an alternative or additional remedy, to the statutory remedies prescribed in section 84 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 (p). In the action of deceit it is, however, not sufficient to show non- disclosure; there must be such an actual misrepresentation of an existing fact as to render the statement based thereon false and therefore fraudulent to the knowledge of the person or persons who made it (q). Where several persons join in committing a tort, "each is Joint tort- responsible for the injury sustained by their common act" (r), '^^^° "j^ '* thgir and the jxuy have no powers to apportion the damages (s), but liability. apparently a party to a conspiracy is not liable for the damage flowing from the conspiracy before the date of his joining it, and in such cases a severance of damages is probably admissible (t). If one of several joint tort-feasors be sued alone it matters not that he did but a small part of the damage, he is liable for the whole. Where a tort is joint there can be only one action, a recovery of judgment against one of the several wrong-doers being a bar to any further action against the others (u). It is material, therefore, to enquire under what circumstances a tort can be said to be joint. Persons are said to be joint tort-feasors when their respective Definition of shares in the commission of the tort are done in furtherance of a 1^°'^*°'''" common design. " All persons in trespass who aid or counsel, direct, or join, are joint trespassers " (x). If one person employs another to commit a tort on his behalf, the principal and the agent are joint tort-feasors, and recovery of judgment against the principal is a bar to an action against the agent (y). But mere (p) See Andrews V. Mockford, (1896) 1 Q. B. 372; 65 L. J. Q. B. 302, C. A. iq) Derry v. Peek, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337; 58 L. J. Ch. 864; see also Knox v. Hayman, (1892) 67 L. T. 137. ^ ^ -r. „„, (r) Per Eolfe, B., Clark v. Newsam, (1847) 1 Ex. p. 140; 16 L. J. Ex. 297; 74 E. K. 616; Mileham v. Corporation of Marylebone, (1903) 67 J. P. 110. is) Dawson V. M'Cletland and Others, (1899) 2 Ir. B. 486. (t) O'Keefe v. Walsh Condon and Others, (1903) 2 Ir. E. 681. («) Brinsmead v. Harrison, (1871-2) L. E. 6 C. P. 584 ; L. E. 7 C. P. 547 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 281; 41 L. J. C. P. 190. , „_ „ .,,,., q« n t t (x) Per Tindal, C.J., Petrie v. Lament, (1842) Car. & Marsh, p. 96; 11 L. J. fl p CO («)■ Brinsmead v. Harrison, (1871-2) L. E. 6 C. P^ 584; L E. 7 C. P. 547; 40 T, 1 c V 281- 41 L J C. P. 190. Goldrei Foucard £ Son v. Sinclair, mS) ll-B:im,'c\^6il J. K. B. 261, 0. A.; E. S. C.. Ord. XXVH., rr. 3 and 5, do not alter the rule laid down m Brinsmead v. Harrison. 60 PARTIES. similarity of design on the part of independent actors, causing independent damage, is not enough; there must be concerted action towards a common end. In one case, indeed, Lord Ellenborough, at nisi prius, ruled that where a huntsman rode after his hounds over the plaintiff's lands, he was liable for the whole damage done by the concourse of people who followed him, on the ground that the parties were co-trespassers (a). The ruling can hardly be supported on that ground, for it seems to be based on a mistaken notion as to the object of fox-hunting, though it may possibly be supported on the principle of Clark v. Chambers (a), that a person who does an unlawful act, the probable consequence of which is that third persons will negligently do something injurious to the plaintiff, is liable to the plaintiff for the injury done by such third persons (ii). It must not be inferred from Lord Ellenborough 's ruling that wherever persons independently commit similar trespasses at the same time in the same place, they are co-trespassers within the meaning of the rule. Indeed it has been expressly held that one member of a hunt, not being the master or huntsman, is not liable for damage done by the houses of the other members of the hunt (c). Whether the several persons who join in the unauthorised performance of a play are joint tort-feasors, so that recovery of judgment against one for the 40s. penalty given by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, discharges the others, was left open by the Court of Appeal in Duck v. Mayeu (d). But probably all that the Court meant was, that they doubted whether the 40s. was given as damages by way of compensation, or whether it was inflicted as a penalty in the strict sense of the term, in which case the unauthorised performance could not strictly be regarded as a tort at all (e). The independent tortious acts of several persons, even though contributing to produce but one joint damage, will not constitute a joint tort. Thus, if a person wrongfully leave unfenced a pit, which he has dug by the side of a high road, and another wrong- fully does some act in the road whereby horses passing along it take fright and swerve into the pit, or if one person negligently (z) Hume v. Oldacre, (1816) 1 Stark, p. 352; 18 B. E. 779. (a) (1878) 3 Q. B. D. 327; 47 L. J. Q. B. 427. See below, pp. U9, 150. (b) McDowall v. G. W. R. Co., (1902) 1 K-. B. 618; 71 L. J. K. B. 330; see also Mills V. Armstrong, " The Bernina," (1888) 13 A. C. 1 ; 57 L. J. P. 65, H. !■ (c) Paget v. Birkbeck, (1863) 3 F. & F. 683. (d) (1892) 2 Q. B. 611; 62 L. J. Q. B. 69. But where one of two debtors, and apparently the same rule applies to tort-feasors against whom judgment has been recovered, makes the creditor his executor, and the latter receives assets adequate to discharge the liability, the debt is extinguished ; Crampton v. Walker, (1893) 31 L. B. Ir. 437. (e) In the earlier Case of Adams v. Batley, (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 626; 66 L. J. Q. B. 393, the Court of Appeal had held that the 40s. was in the nature of damageSi with the consequence that the plaintiff might administer interrogatories. It may be that the Court in Duck v. Mayeu doubted the correctness of that decision. JOINT TORT-FEASORS. 61 allows an escape of gas which another person negligently causes to explode by taking a lighted candle into the room, though each party will be liable for the whole damage done, they will not be joint tort-feasors. Thus in Thompson v. London County Council (/) where the plaintiff having brought an action against the defendants for excavating near his house and withdrawing the support, whereby it was damaged, sought to add a water company as co-defendants upon the ground that they contributed to the damage by negligently allowing water to escape from their main, the Court refused to- ;dlow the water company to be joined, being of opinion that the facts did not constitute a joint tort. So, where two railway companies, which had parcel offices on opposite sides of the plaintiff's shop, caused their carts to stand in the street in front of their respective offices for an unreasonable length of time, and by their combined acts in so doing prevented all access to the plaintiff's premises by vehicles and thereby injured him in his trade, though the acts of either company alone would not have had that effect, it was held that the two companies could not be made co-defendants in an action to recover damages for the obstruction, but that each must be sued separately (g). Again where several persons are sued in respect of a particular tort, the action in respect thereof cannot be combined with a second action for another tort alleged against certain of the persons who are being sued for the first tort (h). But where separate causes of action in tort arise out of the same transaction and the several defendants are rightly joined, if the Court upon entering judgment for the plaintiff with costs against one defendant awards a verdict for the other defendant with costs against the plaintiff, it is competent for the judge to order that there shall be included in the costs recoverable in the successful action the costs that the plaintiff has had to pay to the other defendant (i). The converse of this rule, however, applies where the defendants are not rightly joined (k). And where in an action for a libel co- defendants sever in pleading, the one admitting liability and the other justifying, and a verdict is recovered against both, the (/) (1899) 1 Q. B. 841 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 625, C. A. (g) Sadler w. Great Western R. Co., (1896) A. C. 450; 65 L. J. Q. B. 26, 462. (h) Gower v. Couldridge and Others, (1898) 1 Q. B. 348; 67 L. J. Q. B. 251, C A ' (i) Bullock V. London General Omnibus Co., (1907) 1 K. B. 264; 76 L. J. K. B. 127, C. A. See also Besterman v. British Motor Car Co., (1914) 3 K. B. 181, C. A.; 83 L. J. K. B. 1014; Mulhern v. National Motor Cab Co., (1914> 29 T. ii. E. 677. (fc) Poulton V. Moore and Others, (1913) 109 L. T. 976; 83 L. J. K. B. 875- See S. C. in Court of Appeal, (1915) 1 K. B. 400; 84 L. J. K. B. 462. 62 PARTIES. Contribution between joint tort-feasors. defendant who justifies is alone liable for the costs arising out of the plea which he has placed on the record (l). It is apprehended that torts of all kinds may be joint, and that in this respect libel and slander (m) form no exception. If the writer of a libellous paragraph send it to the publisher of a newspaper for insertion, he will be jointly liable with the publisher for its pubUcation in the newspaper, though possibly he may also be severally liable in respect of the publication to the publisher. In an old case (w) it was held that slander cannot be joint any more than the tongues of the slanderers can be said to be one, a line of reasoning which would equally prevent the possibility of trespasses being joint. As a general rule there can be no contribution between joint tort-feasors, that is to say, if an action be brought for a joint tort, and one wrong^doer pay the whole damages recovered, he cannot recover over a proportion of the damages from the others (o). Where several persons combine to do some act which at the time of its commission they know to be unlawful, as where they combine to commit an assault or to publish a libel, no promise of contribution or of indemnity can be implied (p). For any express promise to pay would be void as founded on an illegal consideration, and for the same reason any promise to be implied from the conduct of the parties would, of course, be equally void. But where the party seeking contribution from the other wrong-doers did not, at the time of doing the act, know it to be unlawful, the objection on the score of illegality does not hold good (g). And generally where a defendant is entitled to an indemnity from a co- defendant upon a special agreetment, such defendant is entitled to sign judgment against his co-defendant for the amount of his (the defendant's) liability before he has actually paid anything in discharge thereof (r). But even in those eases in which the joint wrong-doers did not intend to do anything imlawful, the mere fact (l) Hobson V. Leng, (19U) 3 K. B. 1245, C. A. ; 83 L. J. K. B. 1624. {m)E.g., a defamatory chorus of a song. (n) Chamberlaine v. WillmoTe, (1621) Palm. 313. (o) Merryweather v. Nixan, (1799) 8. T. E. 186; 16 E. E. 810. This rule applies to tort-feasors under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, Cory v. France d Co., (1910) 27 T. L. E. 18, C. A. (p) W. H. Smith d Son v. Clinton and Another, (1908) 25 T. L. E. 34. (q) Adamson. v. Jarvis, (1827) 4 Bing. 66; 5 L. J. C. P. 68; 29 E. E. 503; ' Betts V. Gibbons, (1834) 2 A. & B. 57 ; 4 L. J. K. B. 1; 41 E. E. 381; and per Lord Herschell in Palmer v. Wick and Pulteney Town Steam Shipping Co., (1894) A C. at p. 324; Kirby v. Ghesswm {Commissioners of Works third parties), (19U)> 12 L. G. E. 1136, C. A. For an application of this proposition, to the case of directors, who, upon a reduction of capital, with the assent of the shareholders unlawfully distributed a certain portion of the assets of the company' among eueh shareholders, see Moxham and Others v. Grant, (1900) 1 Q. B. 88; 69 L. J- Q. B. 97, C. A. (r) English and Scottish Trust Co. v. Flatau, (1888) 36 W. E. 238; Pidovx i Cook V. Benekendorff, Berger d Co. and Bruce ; Beriekendorjf., Berger d Co. v. Bruce [third party issue), (1914) 31 E. P. C. 66. JOINT PLiAINTIFFS IN TORT. 63 that the damages have been levied wholly against one does not of itself give rise to an obligation upon the others to contribute. It might well be considered reasonable that as in the case of joint debtors such an obligation should exist, but according to the better opinion it does not. The rule of Meiryweather v. Nixan, which in this respect is anomalous and " does not appear to be founded on any principle of justice, or equity, or even of public policy " (s), has been too long the law of the land to be now open to question. In order to give rise to an implied promise of indemnity or con- tribution there must be the relationship of principal and agent between the tort-feasors, or at all events, a request by one party to the other to do the act complained of (t). Upon the rule, however, that there can be no contribution where the party seeking it knew at the time of doing the act that it was unlawful, an exception has been engrafted by the Companies (ConeoHdation) Act, 1908 (8 Edw. VII. c. 69). By s. 84 (1) of that Act, directors, promoters, and persons authorising the issue of a prospectus are to be liable to subscribers for loss sustained by reason of any untrue statement in the prospectus, subject to certain limitations (u). And by s. 84 (4), " every person who by reason of his being a director, or named as a director, or as having agreed to become a director, or of his having authorised the issue of the prospectus, becomes liable to make any payment under this section may recover contribution, as in cases of contract, from any other person who, if sued separately, would have been liable to make the same payment, unless the person who has become so liable was, and that other person was not, guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation." Persons who fraudulently issue a prospectus which they know to be false are no doubt liable at common law, but that fact does not exclude their being also liable under the provisions of the Act, and they are consequently, so far as regards persons in pari delicto, entitled to the relief afforded by the section (x). Where a tort was committed to some subject-matter in which joint several persons were jointly interested, non-joinder of any of the f^^'^^^ parties so interested as plaintiffs was formerly matter for a plea in (s) See per Lord Herschell, Palmer v. Wick and Pulteney Town Steam Shipping Co (1894) A C at p. 324. For a modem exception to this rule, see Newcombe V. Yewer and Croydon Rural Council, (1913) 29 T. L. E. 299. . ,. ^. (t) As to the circumstances under which a request will raise an implication of the promise, see Sheffield Corporati^ v. Barclay (1903) 2 KB. 580; 72 L J K. B. 777 (reversed (1905) A. C. 892; 74 L. J. K. B. 747), where all the earlier authorities are considered. . « j "_„„„„„ (tt) The uncorroborated statements of a vendor and promoter afford no reason- able ground " for belief that such statements are true, and consequen ly do not entitlf a directo? who acts thereon to the protection afforded by the Act. Adams v. Thrift, (1915) 2 Ch. 21, C. A. ; 84 L. J. Ch 729 (X) Gerson v. Simpson, (1903) 2 K. B. 197; 72 L. J. K. B. 603. 64 PARTIES. abatement, but if no such plea was raised, the parties who sued were entitled to recover damages in proportion to their interests in the subject-matter. Thus one of several joint owners of a chattel might recover for the injury to his share {y), leaving his co-owners to recover in another action for the injury to their shares (a). Pleas of abatement are now abolished (a), and the present mode of objecting to non- joinder is by application at chambers to have the necessary parties added (6), but if no such application be made or, being made, is refused, the old rule will presumably stUl hold good, that the party suing may recover in proportion to his interest and no more. This rule does not, however, apply where a bailee in possession of goods sues a third party in respect of negligent damage thereto— although the bailee may not be personally responsible to the true owner of the property (c). In the case of libel on a member of a firm there may well be a double injury, one to the reputation of the individual member (d), and another to the reputation of the firm (e), for which distinct actions will lie; and presumably the individual member, after recovering in an action for the injury to himself personally, may sue alone in a second action for the damage to the firm in respect of his interest in it. Priiicipal Not only is a person Liable for torts committed by iimself, but he is and agen . also, subject to certain conditions, liable for torts committed by his agents. Though where there is complete delegation, by a principal, of the superintendence of work to a skilled agent or sub-eontraotor the principal is not necessarily liable to a third party for an accident arising through the negligence of the actual tort-feasor (/). If indeed the tort of the agent has been either primarily authorised or subsequently ratified by the principal, it is the act of the principal himself, and no difficulty as to his liability arises {g). Moreover, under certain circumstances, the principal, whether an individual or a corporate body, will be liable even for the unauthorised torts of his agents (h). (y) Bloxam v. Hubbard, (1804) 5 East, 407; Addison v. Overeni, (17^) 6 T. R. 766. (z) Sedgworth v. Overend, (1797) 7 T. E. 279. See below, p. 188. (a) Ord. XXI. rule 20. (b) Ord. XVI. rule 11. (c) " The Winkfield,'' (1902) P. 42; 71 L. J. P. 21, C. A. (d) Harrison v. Bevington, (1838) 8 C. & P. 708. (e) Forster v. Lawson, (1826) 3 Bing. 452. 00 Mosdell V. Mitchell, Times Newspaper, Jan. 20th, 1891. 3ut see contra, Hurlstone v. London Electric Ry., (1913)^ T. L. E. 514. (g) Carter v. St. Mary Abbott's Kensington, (1900) 64 J. P. 548, C. A. ; Soidar V. Clark, (1904) 7 F. Juat. Cas. 1 (Ct. of Justiciary). And see above, p. 55. (h) Holliday v. National Telephone Co., (1899) 2 Q. B. 392; 68 L. J. Q. B. 902, 1016, C. A. ; Beichardt v. Shard, (1914) 31 T. L. R. 24, C. A. The governors of MASTER AND SERVANT. 65 And a fortiori the principal is liable if the tortious act complained Arrest by of is within the scope of the agent's employment thus— if a railway "^'^^^L constable, appointed under a private Act, make an arrest under suspicion of felony, without reasonable grounds for so doing, an action for damages will lie against the railway company (i). And in cases where the agent of a corporation has so acted that an action for damages for fraudulent misrepresentation will lie against his principals, the provisions of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, do not apply (k). Nor will the fact that the act complained of, although within the scope of the agent's employment, was done in the interests of the agent himself and not of his principal exonerate the latter from liability to third parties (l). And this rule applies even in oases where the terms of the written authority under which the agent acted were unknown to the third party at the time when the act complained of was committed (m). But e Gonverso if the tortious act complained of was not within the sphere of the servant's employment the master will not be liable (n). In considering what those circumstances are, which render a Two classes principal liable for the unauthorised torts of his agent, it is necessary °* agents— in the first place to distmguish between those cases m which the contractors. principal, by the terms of the employment, express or understood, reserves to himself a power of controlling the agent in the execution of the work that he is employed to do, and of dismissing him for disobedience of orders, and those cases in which the principal does not reserve to himself any such power. Agents of the latter class are generally spoken of as independent contractors; though even when an independent contractor is employed, recent decisions seem to show that a principal cannot always divest himself of responsibility towards third parties by proving, in evidence, that the actual tort-feasor was a person over whom he had reserved no control (o). Those agents of the former class whose employment is more or less continuous are usually styled servants, while those whose employment is intermittent or confined to a particular occasion, are usually called a hospital are not liable for the negligence of a consulting physician or surgeon, although he may be assisted by members of the hospital staff (Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital, (1909) 78 L. J. K. B. 958, C. A. (i) Lambert v. Great Eastern R. Co., (1909) 2 K. B. 776; 79 L. J. K. B. 32, C. A. (k) Pearson v. Dublin Corporation, (1907) A. C. 351; 77 L. J. P. C. 1, H. L. (Ire.). Nor does the Public Authorities Protection Act apply to an action in rem: " The Bums," (1907) P. 137; 76 L. J. P. 41, C. A. (l) Hambro v. Burnand £ Others, (1904) 2 K. B. 10; 73 L. J. K. B. 669, C. A. (toI S. C, see in this connection the decision of the House of Lords in Lloyd V. Grace Smith . 104 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 105. 74 PAETIKS. Limits of liability of master for torts of servant. the registered proprietor of a hackney carriage is in all cases as responsible for the acts of the driver whilst he is plying for hire as if the relationship of master and servant existed between them (I), But in the case oi a corporation evidence may be tendered that the person whose name appears in the register is no more than a managing director or agent of the company (m). Liability is not, however, confined to the actual person to whom the carriage licence is granted. Consequently where the name of only one member of a partnership appears in the register of oab licences, action is maintainable against the firm (n). And in the case of cab-drivers it is an offence within s. 53 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, for a driver, without reasonable excuse, to refuse to obey the direction of a person hiring or wishing to hire his carriage (o). Where the relationship of master and servant exists the employer, who is the person having immediate control over the servant (p), is liable for all torts committed by the party employed, provided first that they were within what is usually termed the scope of the employment (q), and secondly, were either unintentional, that is to say, amounted to mere acts of negligence; or, if intentional, were intended to be done in the interest and for the benefit of the employer. But an employer is not liable under the Workmen's Compensation Act for an injury to a workman caused by the tortious act of a fellow-servant when such act was not in the scope of the employment (r). Subject to these qualifications the master is liable for his servant's torts of all kinds, even for those involving fraud, crime (s), malice and slander (t). But a principal is not always liable in trespass for the act of his agent, unless he authorised it beforehand, or subsequently assented to it, with knowledge of what had been done (u). Although (I) King v. London Improved Cab Co., (1889) 23 Q. B. D. 281; 58 L. J. Q. B. 456; Keen v. Henry, (1894) 1 Q. B. 292; 66 L. J. Q. B. 211. (to) Kemp V. Elisha, (1917) W. N. 365, C. A. ; (1918) 1 K. B. 228, 0. A. (m) Gates v. R. Bill S Son, (1902) 2 K. B. 38; 71 L. J. K. B. 702, C. A. (o) Shepherd v. Hack, (1917) 86 L. J. K. B. 1480. (p) Samuels v. Townsend, (1916) 32 T. L. E. 356. (q) As to what constitutes scope of employment, see Sanderson v. Collins, (1904) 1 K. B. 628; 73 L. J. K. B.. 358, C. A. ; Heiton v. McSweeney, (1905) 2 Ir. E. 47, K. B. D. ; see also Dewar v. Tasker, (1907) 23 T. L. E. 259, C. A. ; and Boyle v. Ferguson, (1911) 2 Ir. E. 489, K. B. D. (r) Fitzgerald- V . Clarke, (1908) 2 K. B. 796; 77 L. J. K. B. 1018, C. A.; see also Coldrick v. Partridge, (1910) A. C. 77 ; 79 L. J. K. B. 103, and Waldron v. Junior Army and Navy Stores, (1910) 2 Ir. E. 381, C. A. (s) Goppen v. Moore, (1898) 2 Q. B. 306; 67 L. J. Q. B. 689; Mackay v. Comm. Bank of New Brunswick, (1874) L. E. 5 P. C. 394; 43 L. J. P. C. 31; Barwick V. English Joint Stock Bank, (1867) L. E. 2 Ex. 259; 36 L. J. Ex. 147; Dyer v. Munday, (1895) 1 Q. B. 742 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 448, C. A. See also Hamhro v. Bumand, (1904) 2 K. B. 10 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 669, C. A. (t) Glasgow Corpn. V. Larimer, (1911) A. C. 209; 80 L. J. P. C. 175, H. L. (Sc.) (slander held not to be within scope of employment). (tt) Freeman v. Rosher, (1849) 13 Q. B. 780; 18 L. J. Q. B. 340; 78 E. B. 514; Terrell v. Parker, (1915) 32 T. L. E. 48. . As to what constitutes authorisation, see Collett v. Foster, (1857) 2 H. & N. 356; 26 L. J. Ex. 412; 114 E. E. 586. SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT. 75 with regard to intentional torts or tortious methods of performing an initially legal act (x) " the general rule' is. that the master is answerable for every such wrong as is committed in the course of the service and for the master's benefit, though no express command or privity of the master be proved " (y), and in this respect no sensible distinction can be drawn between the case of fraud and the case of any other wrong (0). There is, however, of course no liability where the circumstances Eelationship show that, though closely allied to such a connection, the actual and^seryant relationship of master and servant does not exist between the parties, most exist. Thus where the principal of a nursing association — established for the purpose of supplying duly qualified persons — sent a qualified nurse, and the plaintiff was injured by reason of her negligence, it was held that the principal of the association was not liable (a). Nor are the governors of a hospital liable for the negligence of a consulting physician or surgeon, although he may be assisted by members of the hospital staff (b). And for similar reasons a county council have discharged their duty towards a plaintiff who has suffered injury from the incompetence of a medical officer if they engage a duly qualified professional man to perform an operation (c). An act is said to be within the scope of the servant's employ- Scope of the ment when, although itself unauthorised, it is so directly incidental ^™^ oymen . to some a-ct or class of acts whicii the servant was authorised to do that it may be said to be a mode, though no doubt an improper mode, of performing them. For an impropriety or excess on the part of the servant in the course of doing something which was authorised the master will be responsible, but not for an act wholly imconnected with the class of acts which the servant was authorised to do (d). In short, the master's liability for the unauthorised torts of his servant is limited to unauthorised modes of doing authorised acts (e). The above-stated view, though probably correct, is not easily reconcilable with the decision of the Court of Appeal in the later case of Reck&tts v. Tilling' (/), in which it was held that if the driver of a motor omnibus or other vehicle allow another person to drive, it is his duty not only to select a competent driver but also, (x) Perring v. Emerson, (1906) 1 K. B. 1; 75 L. J. K. B. 12, Div. (y) Banoick v. English Joint Stock Bank, (1867) L. B. 2 Ex. p. 265; 36 L. J. Ex. 147. (z) Ihid. (a) Hall f agency ; the case may possibly come within the principle that a person who permits another to commit a nuisance on his premises is responsible for it, although the parties may not stand in the relation of principal and agent. Where, how- ever, the employee is a trespasser, no responsibility attaches to his master. Thus when under similar circumstances to the above, a clerk, in spite of the express prohibition of his eijciployer, entered his room in his absence, and after washing his hands in the lavatory left the tap running, it wa^ held that the master was not liable for the damage caused thereby (g). As a rule, in order to render a master liable for his servants' torts, the actual misconduct itself must, if intentional, have been done on the rnaster's behalf (r). If, though in other respects within the scope of the employment, it be done from any other motive, than that of benefiting the master, the master cannot be held responsible. " If a servant driving a carriage, in order to effect some purpose of his own, wantonly strike the horses of another person and produce the accident, the master will not be liable " (s) ; but if he do precisely the (n) Beard v. London General Omnibus Co., (1900) 2 Q. B. 630; 69 L. J. Q. B. 895. Compare Ricketts v. Tilling, (1916) 1 K. B. 644, C. A. ; 84 L. J. K. B. 342. (o) (1864—6) 3 H. & C. 602 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 297 ; 140 E. E. 426. (p) (1889) 5 T. L. E. 417. (q) Stevens v. Woodward, (1881) 6 Q. B. D. 320 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 231. (r) Armitage v. Lancashire S Yorkshire R. Co., (1902) 2 K. B. 178; 71 L. J- K. B. 778, C. A. (s) Croft V. Alison, (1821) 4 B. & Aid. p. 592; 23 E. E. 407; Limpus v. London WILFUL TORTS OF SERVANT. 85 same act with the object of extricating his master's carriage from a difficulty his master will be liable (i). So where a bank manager made a false representation as to the pecuniary position of a customer of the bank, with the view of inducing the plaintiff to supply goods to the customer upon credit to enable him to carry out a Government contract, and did so with the object of enabhng the customer, on receipt of the Government contract money, to reduce the amount of his indebtedness to the bank, the bank was held responsible for the fraud of the manager (w), because the particular representation was within the scope of the bank manager's authority. But e converse where the negligent act complained of is altogether outside the scope of the duties of a bank manager, the bank is not bound by, nor respon- sible for, the act of their manager (x). And in like manner where a secretary of a company, in answer to questions put to him as to the validity of certain debenture stock of the company, made fraudulent statements for his own private ends and not for the benefit of the com- pany, it was held that the company were not Uable, although the answering of such questions was within the scope of his employ- ment {y). This proposition is not, however, easily reconcilable with the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Hamhro v. Bumand (a). And apparently a false statement made by a third party to an agent who at the time when it was made to him knew of its falsity does not affect the principal of the agent, to whom it was repeated, with knowledge of its inaccuracy. Consequently if the principal by reason of collusion between his agent and the third party suffer damage, the fact that the agent knew the statement which he con- veyed to his principal was untrue does not disentitle the principal to recover damages from the third party (a). Although, on the other hand, the presumption that a solicitor has communicated to his client facts which he ought to have made known to him cannot be rebutted by proof that it was to the solicitor's interest to conceal such facts (b). Oeneral Omnibus Co., (1862) 1 H. & C. 526; 32 L. J. Ex. 34; 130 E. R. 641, Ex. Ch. (t) Croft V. Alison, supra. And cp. Dyer v. Munday, (1895) 1 Q. B. 742; 64 L. J. Q. B. 448, with Richards v. West Middlesex Waterworks Co., (1885) 15Q. B. D. 660; 54L. J. Q. B. 651. .„ „„ -r -r (a) Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, (1867) L. E. 2 Ex. 259; 36 L^. Ex. 147; and a3 to general principle see Whitechurch, Ltd. v. Cavanagh, (1902) A. C. 117, at p. 140 ; 71 L. J. K. B. 400. (x) Banbury v. Bank of Montreal, (1918) A. 0. 626, H. L. (B.) ^„ . ^ _ («) British Mutual Banking Co. v. Charnwood Forest R. Co., (1887) 18 Q. B. U. 714; 55 lb. J. Q. B. 399; Thome v. Heard, (1894) 1 Ch. 699, and (1895) A. C. 495; 63 L J Ch. 356; and see Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated and Others (iyU4) 2 K B 712 • 73 L J K B 872, C. A. The case of Shaw v. Pmt PUUp Gold Mining Co.,' (1884:) 13 Q. B. D. 103; 53 L. J: Q. B. 369, must be treated as overruled. iz) (1904) 2 K. B. 10; 73 L. J. K. B. 669, C. A (a Wells V. Smith, (1914) 3 K. B. 722; 83 L. J. K. B. 1614. (6) Bradley v. Riches, (1878) 9 Ch. D. 189. 86 PARTIES. Measure of maBter's liability for fraud of servant. But it is no part of the duty of a banker, or his representative, when asked for information as to the financial position of a customer, to do more than answer honestly the question he is asked from what he knows by reference to the books and accounts before him (c). It is, however, negligence sounding in damages (without proof of special damage) for a banker, after undertaking the supervision of his customer's business and the maintenance of his credit during his absence, to fail in so doing (d). And in like manner where bankers honour a stolen cheque the tenor of which should have put them on enquiry, they are not protected by s. 82 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, from liability to the true owner (ej. And where bankers are knowingly acquiescent in the misappropriation of a trust fund by crediting to an agent's private account cheques drawn by the agent's principals for other purposes, they are liable for the malversations of the agent (/). But, on the other hand, a customer of a bank is under an obligation to take reasonable and ordinary precautions against forgery or other fraud (g). Provided the tortious act is within the scope of the servant's employ- ment and is committed with the object of benefiting the master, the measure of the master's liability will be precisely the same as if the act had been committed by himself, that is to say, it will not be confined to the amount of the benefit he has actually received, but will extend to the whole amount of the loss suffered by the plaintiff; and this will apply as well to frauds as to trespasses (h). A master is liable for the fraud of his servant beyond the extent to which he has profited by such fraud (i) ; though, in order to charge any person with a fraud which has not been personally committed by him, the agent who actually committed the fraud must have done so while acting within the scope of his authority (k). But as regards his Hability for his servant's torts, " no sensible distinction can be drawn between the case of fraud and the case of any other wrong " (I). In none of the (c) Parsons v. Barclay, (1910) 26 T. L. E. 628, C. A. (d) Wilson V. United Counties Bank, Ltd., (1920) A. C. 102, H. L. (B.). (e) Ross V. London County Westminster d Parr's Bank, (1919) 1 K. B. 678; 88 L. J. K. B. 927. (/) British America Elevator Co. v. Bk. British North America, (1919) A. C. 658, P. C. (g) London Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan i Arthur, (1918) A. C. 777, H. L. (E.). (h) As to scope of employment, see Glasgow Corp. v. Larimer, (1911) A. C. 209; 80 L. J. P. C. 175, H. L. (Sc.) ; Agricultural d Technical Instruction {Dept. of) V. Burke, (1915) 2 Ir. E. 128 (Mens rea). (i) Semble per Lord Selborne, Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank, (1880) 5 App. Cas. p. 329. And the same rule applies to responsibility for damages resulting from breach of contract (Addlestone Linoleum Co., In re, (1887) 37 Oh. D. 191, at pp. 203 et seq ; 57 L. J. Ch. 249). (A:) Thome v. Heard, (1895) A. C. 495 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 356 ; see also Terrell v. Parker, (1915) 32 T. L. E. 48. (I) Per Cur., Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, (1867) L. E. 2 Ex. p. 265; 36 L. J. Ex. 147. master's liability for servants' fraud. 87 oases, indeed (with apparently one exception), in which a master has been held liable in tort for his servant's fraud, did this question arise, the amounts of the benefit and loss respectively having been in all such cases co-extensive; but in Swift v. Winterbotham (m), where a bank manager, within the scope of whose employment it was to answer enquiries as to the credit of customers of the bank, in reply to such an enquiry made a fraudulent statement as to a particular customer's credit, whereby the person on whose behalf the enquiry was made sold goods to the customer on credit and lost their price in consequence of hia insolvency, the bank were held liable to the extent of the value of the goods, although they in fact derived no benefit whatever from the false statement. This case was decided on the authority of Barwick V. English Joint Stock Bank, and therefore it must be assumed that the manager in making the false statement intended to act in the interest of the bank, his object being probably to do a service to the customer and thereby retain his custom. This decision, indeed, was reversed in the Exchequer Chamber upon the ground of non-com- pliance with the requirements of s. 6 of Lord Tenterden's Act (n) ; but notwithstanding such reversal, it must, as an authority on the point now under discussion, be treated as standing good (o). In the British Mutual Banking Co. v. Chamwood Forest Railway Co. (p), Bowen, L.J., doubted whether statutory corporations can be made liable beyond the actual benefit received, on the ground, apparently, that, their powers being limited, they cannot bind themselves to answer for the consequences of the representation made. But this doctrine apparently applies only when the statutes by which the corporation is created or regulated are either expressly or by implica- tion violated ; or, in other words, where the tortious act was originally ultra vires (g). To the rule that a master is liable for injuries caused by the negli- For injury gence of his servant in the course of his employment, an exception servant to exists where the party injured is not a stranger but a fellow-servant fellow-servant ^ ,"' ■*. , T . 1 , m common of the party causing the injury and engaged m a common employment employment with him (r) (provided he be not an infant of such tender years as to master not liaoxe at common law. (m) (1873) L. E. 8 Q. B. 244; 42 L. J. Q. B. 411. , (n) 9 Geo. IV. c. 14. This Act applies to cases where the principal is an incorporated company (Hirst v. W. Biding Banking Co., (1901) 2 K. B. 560; 70 L. J. K. B. 828, C. A.). (0) Trott V. National Discount Co., (1900) 17 T. L. E. 37. (p) British Mutual Banking Co. v, Chamwood Forest R. Co., (1887) 18 Q. B. D. p. 719 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 399. -rr -r n a^K iq) Preston v. Liverpool, Manchester 39 Sco. L. E. 759- Proctor v.Gumisky, (1904) 6 P. 832, Ct. of Sess. ; Wicks v. Dowell, (1905) 2 K. B. 225; 74 L. J. K. B. 572, C. A.; Challis v. London and South Western R. Co., (1905) 2 K. B. 154; 74 L. J. K. B. 569, C. A. ; Sharp v. Johnson, (1905) 2 K. B. 139; 74 L. J. K. B. 566, C. A. ; Brintons, Ltd. v. Turvey, (1906) A. C. 230; 74 L. J. K. B. 474; Steel v. Gammell, LSird & Co., Ltd., (1905) 2 K. B. 232; 74 L. J. K. B. 610, C. A.; Morris v. Mayor, dc, Lambeth (watchman in Bhanty on highway), (1905) 22 T. L. K. 22). But where an accident occurs through the tortious act of a fellow-workman, it is not in the " course of employ- ment " (Armitage v. Lancashire and Yorkshire R. Co., (1902) 2 K. B. 178; 71 L. J. K. B. 778; but see Mclntyre v. Bodger, (1904) 6 P. 176, Ct. of Sess.; and the same rule applies to the tortious act of a third party {Collins v. Collins, (1907) 2 Ir. E. 104, C. A.). Por other cases illustrative of course of employment, see Grant v. Glasgow and S. W. R., (1908) S. C. 187, Ct. of Sess.; Whitbread V. Arnold, (1908) 99 L. T. 103, C. A.; Marshall v. " Wild Rose" S.S., (1909) 2 K. B. 46; 78 L. J. K. B. 536, C. A.; Rice v. ''Swansea Vale" (Owners), (1910) 26 T. L. E. 276, C. A.; Hewitt v. "Duchess" (Owners), (1910) 26 T. L. E. 300; 79 L. J. K. B. 867, C. A. ; Sheenn v. Clayton, (1910) 2 Jr. E. 105, C. A.; Anderson v. Fife Coal Co., (1910) S. C. 8, Ct. of Sess.; Brice v, Lloyd, (1909) 2 K. B. 804; 79 L. J. K. B. 37, C. A.; Clover Clayton & Co. v. Hug/ies, (1910) 26 T. L. E. 359; 79 L. J. K. B. 470, H. L. (E.). Accidents arising out of and in the course of employment. — Slip whilst discharging cargo ; Gallant v. " Gabir" (Owners), (1913) 108 L. T. 50, C. A. ; bums from shavings accidentally set on fire, Maxson v. Forth and Clyde S.S. Co., (1913) S. C. 921; gardener slipping on footpath, Williams v. Assheton Smith, (1913) 108 L. T. 200, C. A.; injury by falling slate during gale, Adamson v. Anderson S Co., (1913) S. C. 1038; dangerous ceiling in servants' bedroom, Aldridge v. Merry, (1913) 2 jr. Eep. 308, C. A. ; accident arising out of obedience to order of superior fellow-wprkmaji, Geary v. Ginzler, (1913) 108 L. T. 286; unauthorised act of workman- connived at by agent of employer, Richardson v. Denton Colliery Co., (1913) 109 L. T. 370, C. A. ; reasonable inference that death resulted from accident (an unsatisfactory case), Fleet v. Johnson, (1913) 57 S. J. 236, C. A. ; assault in course of duty, Trim Joint District School Board of Management v. Kelly, (1914) A. C. 667 H. L. (Ir.) ; 83 L. J. P. C. 220 ; boat only means of transit, Richards or Richardson V. Morris, (1914) 110 L. T. 496; brewer's drayman crossing road, Martin v. Lovibond S Sons, (1914) 2 K. B. 227, C. A. ; 83 L. J. K. B. 806; collier hewing prohibited coal face, Jackson v. Denton Collieries Co., (1914) 110 L. T. 569, C. A.; commercial traveller, inspecting railway trucks, Sanderson v Henry Wright, Ltd., (1914) 110 L. T. 517 ; lighterman waiting for tide. May v. Ismi, (1914) 110 L. T. 525 C. A. ; railway porter committing dangerous act in breach of rules, M'William V. Great North of Scotland R. Co., (1914) S. C. 453; miner acting in breach of mining regulations. Smith v. Fife Coal Co., Ltd., (1914) A. C. 723, H. L. (So.); operative working in forbidden manner, Chilton v. Blair, (1914) W. N. 290, C. A.; workman giving lift to fellow-employee in accordance with recognised custom, Evans v HolUmay, (1914) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 75, C. A.; driver of traction engine falling whilst intoxicated, Turner or Fraser v. Riddell, (1914) S. C. 125, Ct. of Sess. ; accident occurring during delegation of supervision by foreman. Seller v. Boston R. D. C, (1914) B. W. C. C. 99, C. A.; slip from ladder affixed to ship side, Webber v. W ansborougK Paper Co., (1914) W. N. 290, H. L. (E.); explosion caused by enemy's floating mine, Risdale v. " Kilmarnock " (Ow.ners), (1914) 69 S. J. 145, C. A. ; window cleaner climbing along dangerous ledge, Butterworthy v. Glanfield, (1914) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 221; death by fall from scaffold, Roberts v. Trollope iC Sons, (1914) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 269, C. A. ; inference of injury deduced from admitted facts (bicycle side-slip), Haward v. Rowsell, (1914) W. C. & Ins- Eep. 314, C. A.; seaman found drowned (scintilla of evidence), Lendrum v. Ayr . Shipping Co., Ltd., (1914) W. N. 327, H. L. (So.); scintilla of evidence, allegation of larking, Durant v. Smith, (1914) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 282, C. A. ; fall from broken scaffold — workman warned of danger, Harrison v. Ford, (1915) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 272, C. A. (Accident arising outside scope of employment). — Employer's instruction, workmen's compensation act, 1906. 103 And where notice of an accident has been duly given by an injured workman who subsequently dies no further notice of the accident Lane v. Lusty d- Co., (1915) 3 K. B. 230, C. A. ; 84 L." J. K. B. 1342 ; firing shots in mine without instruction, Corhett v. H. S. Pitt c£- Co., (1915) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 295, C. A. ; doing work in wrong way, Blair v. Chilton, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1147, H. L. (E.) ; using hoist intended for materials, M' Quire v. Oabbott, (1915) W. C. & Ins. Rep. 32, Ct. of Sess. ; accident arising out of assault by third party, MacFarlane V. Shaw, (1915) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 32, Ct. of Sess.; mines laid by enemy, Risdale v. S.S. Kilmarnock {Owners), (1915) 1 K. B. 503, C. A.; 84 L. J. K. B. 298; removal of floor board by motor driver, car defective to employer's knowledge. Partridge v. Whiteley, (1915) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 56, C. A. ; coachman cycling on master's business, Hughes v. Bett, (1915) S. C. 150, Ct. of Sess. ; accident to boat provided by employers, Richards v. Morris, (1915) 1 K. B. 221, C. A.; 84 L. J. K. B. 621; seaman slip from plank connecting ship with shore, Webber v. Wansborough Paper Co., (1915) A. C. 51, H. L. (E.) ; 84 L. J. K. B. 127; tortious act, fellow-workman, Clayton v. Hardwick Colliery Co., (1915) W. N. 395, H. Ij. (E.) ; war risk, taxi driver shot by sentry when driving officer to fort. Thorn v. Humm d Co., (1915) 112 L. T. 888, C. A.; workman injured while going to work, Nicol Y. Young's Paraffin Light dc. Co., (1915) S. C. 439, Ct. of Sess.; seaman, unexplained drowning. Proctor v. Owners S.S. " Serhino," (1915) 3 K. B. 344, C. A.; 84 L. J. K. B. 1881, (same point); Kerr or Lendrum v. Ayr Steam Shiy-ping Co., (1915) A. C. 217, H. L. (So.); 84 L. J. P. C. 1; farm bailiff imprudently taking short cut. Pepper v. Sayer, (1914) 83 L. J. K. B. 1756, C. A.; premeditated assault at industrial school. Trim Joint District School Board, v. Kelly, (1914) 83 L. J. P. C. 220 H. L. (Ir.) ; workman using employer's boat, Richards (or Richardson) v. Morris, 110 L. T. 496 ; street accident to brewer's drayman, Martin v. Lovibond, (1914) 83 L. J. K. B. 806, C. A. ; baker oiling dough-making machine. Sexton d Hosford, an arbitration, In re, (1916) W. C. & Ins. Rep. 216, C. A. (Ir.) ; carpenter's labourer tailing down hatchway, Armstrong V. Gregson, (1916) W. C. & Ins. Rep. 226, C. A. ; railwayman crossing line, Highley v. Lancashire and Yorkshire R., (1916) 115 L. T. 494; seaman going ashore to collect money for himself and his employers. Duck v. North Sea Steam Trawling Co., (1915) W. C. & Ins. Rep. 529; carpenter at work on ship drowned in private dock on way home, Longhurst v. Stewart d Son, (1916) 85 L. J. K. B. 1328; workman using railway line to go to work. Fox v. Rees d Kirby, Ltd., (1916) W. C. & Ins. Rep. 339; injury by fall on slippery road. White v. Avery, (1915) W. C. & Ins. Rep. 594; injury by stone thrown by fellow- workman, Clayton v. Hardwick Colliery Co., (1916) 85 L. J. K. B. 292; injury by fall of wall adjacent to workroom, Simpson (or Thorn) v. Sinclair, (1917) A. C. 127, H. L. (Sc.) ; slip on tram rail on employer's premises, Marsh v. Pope, (1917) 86 L. J. K. B. 1349, C. A. ; miner slipping on ice on colliery premises, Wales V. Lambton and Hatton Collieries, (1917) 86 D. J. K. B. 1346; slipping on wood lying in employer's yard, Fearnley v. Bates, (1917) 86 L. J. K. B. 1000; workgirl removing obstruction from machinery in motion, Beattie v. Tough, (1917) W. C. & Ins. Rep. 93, C. A. ; hotel porter slipping on snow, Blake v. Ramsay, (1917) W. C. & Ins. Rep. 84, C. A. ; ship's engineer drowned in dock (dark night), Officer v. Davidson, 10 B. W. C. C. 480, Ct. of Sess. (Sc); injury by being thrown from cart, MulHnger v. Bidewell, (1917) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 51, C. A. ; bicycle accident (use of cycle necessary for employ- ment), Denner v. White, (1917) 86 L. J. K. B. 1074, H. L. (E.) ; see also Heffernan V. Secretary of State for War, (1918) 2 Ir. E. 466, C. A., and Askell v. Gudgeon, (1918) 118 L. J. 258, H. L. (B.); lift accident, Gibbins v. British Dyes Co., (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 716, C. A. ; assisting another workman according to instruc- tions. Cars V. Vickers, (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 408, C. A.; slip on employer's premises, Bedford v. Armstrong, Whitworth, (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 850; sawyer's assistant caught by circular saw, Clarke v. Anderson, (1919) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 9, C. A.; bomb dropped by aircraft (special risk). Bird v. Keep, (1918) 118 L. T. 633; injury in lift, Marshall v. Rodgers, (1918) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 39, C. A. Accidents not arising out of or in the course of the employment.— 'Workman killed whilst returning from work, Graham v. Barr, (1913) 8. C. 538, Ct. of Sess.; Edwards v. Wingham Agricultural Implement Makers, (1913) 3 K. B. 596, C. A. ; 82 L J K B. 998 ; injury by fall of sheet of corrugated iron during gale, Guthrie V Kinghorn, (1913) S. C. 1155, Ct. of Sess. ; death by gas fumes in cottage on employer's land Wray v. Taylor Bros., (1913) 109 L. T. 369, C. A. ; performance 104 PARTIES. need be given by his dependants. But e converso an omiesion to of act outside sphere of employment, McCahe v. North, (1913) 109 L. T. 369 C A ■ M'Diarmid v. Ogilvie, (1913) S. C. 1103, Ct. of Seas.; Smith v. Pife Coal Co' (1913) S. C. 662, Ct. of Sess. ; Burns v. Summerlee Iron Co., (1913) S. C. 227| Ct. of Sess. ; leaving work on termination of engagement, Webber v. Wansborouah Paper Co., (1913) 3 K. B. 615, C. A. ; 84 L. J. K. B. 127; Cook v. " Montrea! " {Owners), (1913) 108 L. T. 164, C. A.; assault by drunken man, Mitchinson y Day, (1913) 1 K. B. 603; 82 L. J. K. B. 421; improper method of doing work' Plumb V. Cobden Flour Milts Co., (1913) 108 L. T. 161, C. A., affirmed (1914) A. C, 62 H. L. (B.); 83 L. J. K. B. 107; unexplained disappearancei of seaman from ship, Burwash v. Leyland d Co., (1912) 107 L. T. 735, C. A.; Lendrum v. Ayr Steamship Co., (1913) S. C. 331, Ct. of Sees. ; body of engine driver found on line, Dyhouse v. G. W. R. Co., (1913) 109 L. T. 193, C. A.; injury while taking * milk from dangerous place. Keen v. St. Clement's Press, (1914) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 292; workman alighting from train before stopping. Price v. Tredegar Iron i Coal Co., (1914) 58 S. J. 632; intoxicated sailor returning to duty, Nash v. "Rangatera" (Owners), (1914) 3 K. B. 978; 83 L. J. K. B. 1496, C. A. ; drunken seaman, fall from bridge of vessel. Murphy S Sandwith v. Cooney, (1914) 2 Ir. B. 76, C. A. ; seaman, accident while returning to ship after buying provisions (an unsatisf actor j case), Parker v. " Black Bock " (Owners), (1914) 2 K. B. 39, C. A.; 83 L. J. K. B. 421 (see post) ; ship's steward deviating from direct route between veasel and stores, Lee v. " St. George " (Owners), (1914) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 17, C. A.; carman assisted by fellow-servants working for third party, Carlton v. Sinclair, Ltd., (1914) S. C. 871, Ct. of Sess.; commercial traveller (drunk) run over by train, Renfrew v. M'Crae, (1914) S. C. 539, Ct. of Sess. ; charwoman slipping on banana skin, Sheldon v. Needham, (1914) 58 S. J. 652 ; tortious act of third party, Clayton v. Hardwick Colliery Co., (1914) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 343, C. A. (but compare Trim School Board v. Kelly, (1914), A. C. 667 Ir.); voluntary exposure to risk for own convenience, Cock v. Manvers Main Collieries Co., (1914) W. C. 4 Ine. Eep. 278, C. A. ; injury by object thrown from window, Bateman v. Albion Combing Co., (1914) W. 0. & Ins. Eep. 18, C. A.; man found drowned, Booth y. Leeds <* Liverpool Canal Co., (1914) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 310, C. A.; blasting operations in mine, Pugh v. Dudley (Earl), (1914) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 265; voluntary exposure to risk not incidental to employment, Pritchard v. Torkington, (1914) W. C. & Ins. Rep. 271, C. A. ; workman handling sewage, death by typhoid, Finlay v. Tullamare Union Guardians, (1914) 2 Ir. Eep. 233, C. A.; permanent injury owing to unskilful treatment, Delia Bocca v. Stanley Jones, (1914) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 33, C. A.; bicycle accident, manager on employer's business, Slade v. Taylor, (1915) W. C. & Ins. Eep. 53, C. A.; carter walking along railway line, Morris v. Rowbotham, (1915) "W. C. & Ins. Eep. 67, C. A.; engine driver injured by hostile bombardment. Cooper v. N. E. By. Co., (1915) 32 T. L. E. 131, C. A.; disobedience to express prohibition, Hopley v. Pool i Others, (1915) W. C. k Ins. Eep. 280, C. A. ; shunter exposing himself to prohibited risk, Herbert v. S. Fox . question for the jury, and is so treated m all the '"fm^*Sv Olive (1851) 10 C. B. 827; 20 L. J. C. P. 151; 84 E. E. 795; CaL i Cd, (mSis Q B. 558; 18 L. J. Q. B. 216; Gosden v. Elphick, (1849) 128 NOTICE OF ACTION. Party should have believed that face's county court judge acted in defiance of a prohibition addressed to him, under the belief that it was his duty so to do; and he was held entitled to notice of action. But as a general proposition of law the existence of facts upon which a belief can be based is a condition precedent to notice of action being requisite (n). In such and cognate cases, it is, apparently, for the Court to decide whether notice of action is necessary (o), although it is for the jury to decide the question of bond fides, on which the defendant's right to such notice depends (p). In some of the judgments in these cases expressions may be found which might be quoted to prove that defendants are entitled to notice when acting on mere " vague opinion of their own power " (g). It is clear, however, that something more definite than this is needed (r). A defendant" existed which may be entitled to notice as acting under a statute of the very justification existence of which he was ignorant, but to be so entitled he must have believed, however mistakenly, in the existence of facts which would have justified him (s). " Where the question is whether a defendant is entitled to notice of action under an Act of Parliament of this nature, the proper way of leaving the question to the jury is this : ' Did the defendant honestly believe in the existence of facts which, if they had existed, would have afforded a justification under the statute?' ... It has been contended that it is enough' if the defendant bond fide thought he was acting according to law, and ' that it is not necessary that he should believe that he was acting under an authority conferred upon him by law. To a certain extent that argument is well founded; that is to say, in order to entitle a defendant to notice of action, it is not necessary that he should know of the existence of the particular enactment. But all difficulty is obviated by the rule of law to which I have adverted " (t). Thus s. 103 of the Larceny Act, 1861 (repealed and re-enacted by the Larceny Act, 1916, ss. 41, 48 and Schedule) authorised the arrest of persons found committing certain offences 4 Ex. 445; 19 L. J. Ex. 9; 80 E. E. 657; Bead v. Coker, (1853) 13 C. B. 850; 22 L. J. C. P. 201; 93 E. E. 769; Wedge v. Berkley, (1837) 6 A. & B. 663; 6 L. J. M. C. 86 ; 45 E. E. 583. Dicta to the contrary in Leete v. HaH, (1868) L. E. 3 C. P. 322; 37 L. J. C. P. 157, were explained away in Chamberlain v. King, (1871) L. E. 6 C. P. 474; 40 L. J. C. P. 273. (w) Chamberlain v. King, (1871) L. E. 6 C. P. 474, at .p. 478 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 273. (o) Kirby v. Simpson, (1854) 10 Ex. 368; 23 L. J. M. C. 165; 102 E. E. 624; Arnold v. Hamel, (1854) 23 L. J. Ex. 137. (p) Roberts v. Orchard, (1863) 2 H. * C. 769, at p. 774; 33 L. J. Ex. 65; 133 E. E. 791. (q) See particularly Read v. Coker, (1853) 13 C. B. 850; 22 L. J. C P. 201; 93 E. E. 769. (r) See Chamberlain v. King, supra. (s) Hermann v. Seneschal, (1862) 13 C. B. N. S. 392; 32 L. J. C. P- *o; 134 E. E. 569; RoberU v. Orchard, (1863) 2 H. & C. 769; 33 L. J. Ex. 65; 133 E. E. 791; Rochfort v. Rynd, (1881) 8 L. E. Ir. 204. (t) Roberts v. Orchard, (1863) 2 H. & C. 769; 33 L. J. Ex:. 65; 133 E. B. 791, Williams, J., at p. 774. PAHTIES ENTITLED TO NOTICE. 12& under the Act, and s. 113 (ft) entitled a party to notice of action for anything done in pursuance of the Act. If, therefore, an arrest was made under a behef that the person arrested was caught in the act, notice of action had formerly to be given, but if the arrest was not made until some time after the supposed offence had been committed and the supposed offender had got away, there was no right to notice of action, because the defendant could not have believed that the plaintiff was found committing the offence (u). It is not, however, universally true that it is only where a person Notice where has acted wrongly through a mistake of fact that he is entitled tlie mistake is to notice of action. It has been frequently decided that if a magistrate, constable, or other person invested with special powers by virtue of his office or position, mistook the extent of those powers, and consequently, while intending simply to execute them, acted in a manner unauthorised by the law, he nevertheless could not be sued without due notice. And this was the case wliether the mistake arose out of misinterpretation of some particular section of an Act, or a general misapprehension of the extent of power (x). In Elliot V. AUen (y) it was indeed held that the defendants as overseers having imprisoned the plaintiff under the authority, as they supposed, of a local Act without following the prescribed procedure, were not entitled to notice as having acted in "pursuance" of the Act, and the Court distinguished Hazledine V. Grove, where under analogous circumstances it was held that notice must be given, because in that case the defendant was . entitled to notice ' ' for anything done or omitted to be done in pursuance of this Act or in the execution of the powers and authorities under this Act." It may be doubted, however, whether this decision is not in effect overruled by the later cases (2). It can rarely, if ever, happen that a member of the general public can be entitled to notice of action on the ground that in seeking to exercise a statutory power he went wrong through a mistake of law. He is certainly not protected by reason of enter- taining a " vague opinion " that his illegal act is one in which the law will bear him out. (tt) Eepealed 56 & 67 Vict. c. 61. ^ , ,, „ „, (u) Downing v. Capel, (1867) L. E. 2 C. P. 461; 36 L. J. M. C. 97; see, too, Chamherlain v. King, (1871) L. B. 6 C. P. 474; 40 L. J. C. P. 273. Reid v. Coker, supra, in so far as it is inconsistent with these cases, would seem to be ovfirmlGQ (X) Weller v. Take, (1808) 9 East, 364; 3 E. E. 355, n. ; Theobald vGrichmore, (1818) 1 B & Aid. 227 ; 19 E. R. 297 ; Smith v. Hopper, (1847) 9 Q. B. 1005 ; 16 L. J. Q.'b. 93; Selmes v. Judge, (1871) L. E. 6 Q. B. 724; 40 L. J. Q. B. 287; HazeldiniY. Grove, (1842) 3 Q. B. 997; 12 L. J. M. C. 54_ For co^jnent on the last mentioned case, see Mellor v. Leather {1853) I m& Bl. at p. 626 ; 22 L. J. M. C. 76; 93 E. E. 310. (y) (1845) 1 C. B 18; 14 L. J. C. P. 136. (.) See, especially, Smith v. Hopper supra, ^ni Selmes v^ Judge, supra. See also' Midland R. Co. v. Withmgton Local Board, (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 788; 52 L. J. Q. B. 689, C. A. 9 C.T. 130 NOTICE OF ACTION. Mistake as to If a defendant is sued for an act done in the mistaken belief offioe^^'°° ° ^^^* ^® possesses the authority of an office or position not in fact belonging to him, his right to notice of action will depiend upon the precise words of the statute in question. If those words give a right to notice to, a certain class of persons only, a defendant cannot bring himself within their protection simply by supposing, whether through error of law or fact, he belongs to that class (a); but if all persons acting in pursuance of the statute are entitled to notice, the expression is sufficiently wide to include the ease of a defendant innocently usurping an authority or jurisdietioa which he does not in truth possess. Accordingly a person acting as a magistrate without being duly" appointed was held not entitled to notice of action under a statute providing that without notice no writ should be served " on any justice of the peace for anything by him done in the execution of his office " (b). But where the defendants were sued for a trespass which they justified as done in the exercise of their powers as surveyors of highways, and it appeared that they had bond fide acted in that capacity although fheir appointment was informal, it was held that they came within the protection of a section entitling to notice " any person " sued " for anything done in pursuance of or under the authority of this Act "(c). In Lidsier v. Barrow (d), the plaintifi supposed himself to be a gamekeeper under 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 32 but in fact had never been duly authorised. It was held that he was not entitled to notice of action under a section which gave it in case of any action " against any person for anything done in pursuance of this Act." This case therefore must be taken to be overruled, as being inconsistent with the law as laid down in the later authorities. The Metropolitan Building Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 122, s. 108) (e) gave a right of notice of action to any district surveyor or other person for anything done or intended to be done under the pro- visions of the Act. It has been held that this provision did not cover every case where a person thought he was carrying out the Act, but' that it only included persons ejusdem generis as district surveyors, that is to say, the workmen, servants, and others (o) Per Parke, B., Hughes v. Buckland, (1846) 15 M. & W. p. 356; 15 L. J. Ex. 233 ; 71 E. E. 701. (b) Jones v. Williams, (1825) 3 B. & C. 762; 3 L. J. K. B. 112; 27 E. E. 474. (c) Huggins v. Waydey, (1846) 15 M. & W. 357; 16 L. I. Ex. 136; see, too, Horn V. Thornborough, (1849) 3 Ex. 846 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 349. In the case of Lea V. Facey, (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 139; 56 L. J. Q. B. 371; (1887) 19 Q. B. D. 352; 56 L. J. Q. B. 536, it was held that a defendant who had acted as member of a local board without qualification could not be sued for penalties without n°t'ce. An older decision to the contrary effect (Charlesworth v. Budgard, (1835) 1 C. M. & E. 896 ; 4 L. J. Ex. 89) was not quoted. (d) (1839) 9 A. & B. 654; 8 L. J. M. C. 27. (e) Eepealed 57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii., sec. 215, sch. 4. PARTIES ENTITLED TO NOTICE. 131 who acted under their orders. A defendant to be entitled to notice had to bring himself within this class and prove that he was in - fact under the directions of the surveyor, not merely that he thought himself so to be (/). It has, however, been held (with a view to saving expense where the contributories were very nuiiierous) that valid notice of a winding up order, in a form prescribed by the Court, might be served either by circular or by advertisement in the pubUo press upon the members of an unregistered friendly society (g). No notice can be required unless when the act in question either Wrongful act is or is supposed to be one of the things which a statute directly collateral to ii • 1 T TIT, , execution of authorises or orders. In Whatman v. Pearson (h), the defendant, statutory a contractor, was constructing a sewer under the provisions of the P°^^'^- Metropolitan Management Acts, and in so doing employed a number of carts and horses. One of the workmen injured the plaintiff by his negligent driving. It was held that no notice of action need be given, inasmuch as the driving was not a thing done under the powers of the Act, but merely collateral to the exercise of those powers. In the case of Edwards v. Ve»try of St. Mary, Islington (i), a contractor supplied horses and drivers for the carts employed by the defendants in watering the streets. The plaintiff was one of the drivers and sustained damage through the breaking down of one of the carts, which was ia an unsafe condition by reason of the negligence of the defendants. It was held that the employment of carts was a thing " done or intended to be done under the powers of the vestry," and that they had a right to notice of action, their negligence having been not in a matter collateral but in one of the very things it was their duty to provide for. In Smith v. Sham (k), the defendant was the public of&cer of a dock company, who under their Act appointed a dock-master with powers to superintend and direct the mooring and unmooring of vessels. By his negligent performance of this duty the plaintiff's vessel was injured. It was held that the dock-master had been acting in pursuance of the statute. But where a railway company were empowered to make a line with liberty to permit the use of it by others or to use it themselves as carriers, it was held that their right to notice for things done or omitted to be done in pursuance of the Act, or in the execution of the powers or authorities given by (/) Williams v. Golding, (1865) L. K. 1 C. P. 69; 31 L. J. C. P. 1; Doust v. Slater, (1869) 38 L. J. Q. B. 159; Chambers v. Reid, (1866) 13 L. T, N. S. 703. ig) Lead Company's Workmen's Fund Society, In re, (1904) 2 Ch. 196; 73 L. J. Ch. 628. (h) (1868) L. B. 3 C. P. 422 ; 37 L. J. 0. P. 156. (j) (1889) 22 Q. B. D. 338; 58 L. J. Q. B. 165. (it) (1829) 10 B. & C. 277 ; 8 L. J. K. B. HI. In this case the question was as to limitation and not as to notice of action. 132 NOTICE OF ACTION. Wrongful omissions. Form of notice. Wrongful act should be described with substantial accuracy. it, was confined to their acts and omissions as owners of the line and not as carriers (l). Spoken words do not amount to an act or thing dpne. Notice of action, therefore, is never necessary in an action of slander (m). Under the expression things done in pursuance of a statute are included wrongs of omission as well as of commission. In Davis v. Curling (n), a surveyor of highways was held entitled to notice of action when sued for negligence in not removing certain heaps of gravel by the roadside for the deposit of which he was not responsible. It was held that he had in effect been guilty of a positive act in continuing an obstruction. So if an act not unlawful in itself has been done, the omission to take proper precautions against injurious consequences resulting does not afford a good cause of action without notice (o). The case of Wilson v. Mayor of Halifax (p) goes still further. This was clearly a case of non-feasance. The defendants had omitted to erect a fence which by statute they were ordered to do, and it was held that notice must be given. The provisions as to the form of the notice vary considerably in different statutes. For example, the Highway Act (g) simply directed that notice must be given in writing. The Larceny, Malicious Injury to Property, and Coinage Acts (r) required the cause of action " to be stated ; all these provisions are, however, now repealed by 56 & 57 Vict. o. 61, s. 2. By 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, s. 9, it had to be " clearly and explicitly " stated, by the Public Health Act " clearly " stated (sj. In some cases the name and address of the party and his solicitor must be given, in others it is particularly required that such name and address should be indorsed. Sometimes, again, the Court in which the action is to be brought must be mentioned. The main requisite is that the party to whom the notice is addressed should be given to understand with reasonable certainty what are the facts relied on against himi, in order that he may decide whether he will tender amends or not. It is by no means necessary (Z) Garpue v. The London and Brighton B. Co., (1844) 5 Q. B. 747; 13 L. J. Q. B. 138 ; 90 E. B. 911. But in an action for extorting unfair rates a railway company are entitled to notice {Kent v. Great Western B. Co., (1846) 3 C. B. 714; 16 L. J. C. P. 72); but see Garton v. Great Western B. Co., (1859) 28 L. J. Q. B. 321; commenting on Kent v. Great Western B. Co., supra. (m) Boyal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society v. Parkinson, (1892) 1 Q. B. 431 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 409. (n) (1845) 8 Q. B. 286; 15 L. J. Q. B. 56. (o) Poulson V. Thirst, (1867) L. E. 2 C. P. 449; 36 L. J. C. P. 226; Jolliffe v. Wallasey Local Board, (1873) L. E. 9 C. P. 62; 43 L. J. C. P. 41; Newton V. Ellis, (1855) 5 E. & B. 115 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 337 ; 103 E. E. 396. (p) (1868) L, E. 3 Ex. 114; 37 L. J. Ex. 44. See, too, Holland v. Northmeh Highway Board, (1876) 34 L. T. N. S. 137. For Form of Noticfi see Holland v. Northwich Highway Board, (1876) 34 L. T. p. 188. (g) 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 60, s. 109. (r) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 113; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 71 ; 24 & 25 Vict. o. 99, B. 33. • (s) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 264 (repealed by 66 & 67 Vict. u. 61, s. 2). FORM OP NOTICE. 133 that the alleged cause of action should be described with technical accuracy, or with great amplitude of detail (t). Thus in Smith v. West Derby Local Board (it), the cause of action was for improperly filling up a trench made in the highway. The notice of action was for leaving the highway in an insufficient state of repair. It was objected that the notice of action was for a mere non-feasance, the cause of action for a misieasance. It was held, however, that the notice was sufficient. In Jones v. Bird (x), the notice alleged that the defendant had altered certain sewers in so negligent a manner that the plaintiff's house fell down. The defendant in fact while doing the work had neglected to shore up a chimney-stack adjoining the plaintiff's premises, which consequently fell down and caused the damage alleged. It was held that the notice need not specify the immediate cause of the injury. In Taylor v. Nesfield (y), the defendant was a magistrate and the alleged cause of action against him was a malicious abuse of jurisdiction. The notice, however, was for a trespass and false imprisonment, and it was held that this pointed only to an act done without jurisdiction and that it did not clearly and explicitly state the cause of action, but on the contrary was likely to mislead the defendant as to the real charge which he had to meet. In Aked v. Stocks {z), the defendants were sued for a trespass committed by them in issuing an illegal warrant. The notice mentioned a certain person as having been entrusted with the warrant to whom it was not in fact directed, and was held insufficient on that ground. It may be doubted whether in the present day such an error in mere matter of surplusage and not likely to mislead would be considered fatal. The time and place of the alleged cause of action should be stated Time and with such accuracy as the circumstances admit of, but the plaintiff is not to be held to an impossibility, and may be relieved from giving particulars which he does not know (a). Cases may be conceived in which he could not state the place. An inaccuracy which cannot -possibly mislead does not vitiate a notice (b). In a like manner the Courts in dealing with the mere technical Formal requirements. (t) However, a mere general allegation of a breach of the law will not do. Sufficient facts must be disclosed to constitute a cause of action. See Towsey v. White, (1826) 5 B. & C. 125; i L. J. K. B. 61; Freeman v. Line, (1778) 2 Chit. 673. (u) (1878) 3 C. P. D. 423; 47 L. J. C. P. 607. (x) (1822) 6 B. & Aid. 837 ; 24 E. E. 579. (y) (1854) 3 E. & B. 724; 23 L. J. M. C. 169. (z) (1828) 4 Bing. 509; 6 L. J. C. P. 100; 29 E. E. 614. (a) Martins v. Upcher, (1842) 3 Q. B. 662 ; 11 L. J. Q. B. 291 ; Breese v. Jerdein, (1843) 4 Q. B. 585; 12 L. J. Q. B. 234; Jones v. Nicholls, (1844) 13 M. & W. 361 14 L. J. Ex. 42 ; Jacklin v. Fytche, (1845) 14 M. & W. 381 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 102 Prickett V. Gratrex, (1846) 8 Q. B. 1020; 15 L. J. M. C. 145; 70 E. E. 721 Leary v. Patrick, (1850) 15 Q. B. 266 ; 19 L. J. M. C. 211. (b) Madden v. Kensington Vestry, (1892) 1 Q. B. 614; 61 L. J. Q. B. 527. 134 NOTICE OF ACTION. requirements of notices have avoide 155 Justifiable means of Protection .... 158 Defence of Property 166 Abatement of Nuisances 162 Becaption and Ee-Bntry 157 There are certain classes of injuries in respect of which the party injured is not necessarily bound to resort to the Courts for his remedy, but is entitled to take the law into his own hands and redress the wrong himself. Such is the right in case of trespasses to the person or property. It is lawful for one man to use force towards another in the Defence of defence of his own person, but this force must not transgress the '^* person, reasonable limits of the occasion. Nor does the mere assumption of an attitude of defence, by one party, without actual physical contact with his opponent, necessarily justify the other in making active reprisals (a). Where, however, an assault actually takes place the assailed person is not bound to stand on a passive defence, for it is a reasonable means of repelling an attack to attack in return. Nor does the law require that a man when labouring under a natural feeling of resentment consequent on gross provocation should very nicely measure the weight of his blows. A mere assault may justify a battery (6), but there must be some proportion between the aggression and the defence. Ordinary violence must be repelled by ordinary means, and a deadly weapon should not be used except against a deadly attack. " A man cannot justify a maim for every assault; as if A. strike B., B. cannot justify the drawing his sword and cutting off his hand; but it must be such an assault whereby probably his life may be in danger " (c). A husband has the same licence in defending his wife as in Defence of defending himself, and so a wife in defending her husband. It is imgband said also that a man may justify an assault in defence of his parent or master, because protection and allegiaiice are due to him. So he may or gepv^^t^. " (a) Moriarty v. Brooks, (1833) 6 Car. & P. 684; contra in case of attack, Stephens v. Myers, (1830) 4 Car. & P. 349; 34 B. K. 811. (b) Dale v. Wood, (1822) 7 Moore, 33; Titley v, Foxall, (1758) 2 Ld. Ken. 308. (c) Per Cur., Cook v. Beal, (1697) 1 Lord Baym. p. 177. See Cockroft v. Smith, (1705) 11 Mod. 43. 156 SELF-KEDEESS AND SELF-PROTECTION. Defence of property. Actual possession. Becaptiou of chattels. justify a defence of his fatlier or mother or children under age (d). But it is also said that a master cannot so justify in defence of his servant, because the master might have an action per quod servitium amisit (e). The distinction and the reason given seem hardly satisfactory. Force again may be used in defence of property real or personal, but it can only be so used in resisting something in the nature of a trespass, and in defence of actual possession or the right of possession (/). In Dean v. Hagg {g), the defendant had engaged a steamboat for the conveyance of himself and a party, but the vessel remained under the management and control of the captain. The plaintiff having come on board was ordered to withdraw by the defendant, and on refusal was forcibly expelled. It was held that the defendant had not such possesion of the vessel as to justify him upon his own axlthority in expelling an intruder. In Holmes v. Baggie (h), the plaintifi and defendant were both members of a cricket club ; a match was going on and the plaintiff interfered with the game, and persisted in remaining on that part of the ground reserved to the players, of whom the defendant was one. The latter had him removed forcibly, and in an action of assault justified, among other pleas, on the ground that he was defending the posses- sion of the two elevens engaged in the game. It was held, however, that such a plea could not be supported (i). Actual possession without, or without proof of, title is sufficient to justify the use of reasonable force in repelling a mere wrong- doer (k). He who is entitled to the immediate possession of a chattel may commit an assault to recover it from any one who has it in his actual possession aJid wrongfully detains it, provided that such possession was wrongful in its inception, as, for example, if the party assaulted has taken the chattel by a trespass, or even as an innocent purchaser has acquired it by an act of conversion from (d) Anon., (1696) 3 Salk. 46. As will be seen (below, pp. 201, et seq), any one may use force in order to prevent another being assaulted. But greater latitude is allowed in self-defence and in the defence of a wife or child, than in the defence of a stranger. In the one case the defendant, according to the old form of pleadings, might allege that in resisting the plaintiff, insultum fecit. In the other he had to allege that in the first place molliter manus imposuit. (e) Leward v. Baseley, (1695) 1 Lord Eaym. 62. (/) Scott v. Brown, (1885) 51 L. T. 746. (g) (1834) 10 Bing. 345; 3 L. J. C. P. 113; 88 E. E. 443. See, too, Roberts v. Tayler, (1845) 1 C. B. 117 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 87 ; 68 E. E. 678. (h) (1853) 1 E. & B. 782; 22 L. J. Q. B. 301 ; 93 E. E. 888. (i) It is suggested in the judgment (1 E. & B. p. 789) that it would have been a good plea if the defendant had alleged that he caused the plaintiff to be removed on the ground that he was disturbing persons lawfully playing a lawful game. (k) Every v. Smith, (1857) 26 L. J. Ex. 344 ; 112 E. E. 942 ; JBrett v. Mullarkey, (1873) Ir. Eep. 7 C. L. 120; Thomas v. Marsh, (1838) 5 C. & P. 596; Catteris v. Gowper, (1812) 4 Taunt. 547 ; 13 E. E. 682. For litoitations on this proposition, see Threlkeld v. Smith, (1901) 2 K. B. 531 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 921. DEFENCE OF PROPERTY. 157 some one without title (I). But it is apprehended that if a person has a chattel bailed to him, and unlawfully refuses to give it up on the termination of the bailment, the owner must bring his action, and cannot use force to recover his property, since the original possession was lawful {m), and the same rule would apply where the vendor of a chattel wrongfully refuses to make delivery to the purchaser. He who is entitled to the immediate possession of realty may Re-entry make an entry, and may, according to the better opinion (n.), justify °° l'^'^^- in a civil action the use of so much force as is necessary to enable him to effect the entry and to expel the intruder therefrom, pro- vided the degree of violence used does not exceed a common assault ; but a forcible entry, though justifiable in an action, renders the party committing it liable to indictment. It is not lawful as a rule to use force in resisting a trespass to land or goods unless warning be first given. The trespasser should first be requested to desist, and if he refuses so to do, so much force only may be used as is necessary to overcome his resistance. If in resisting he commits an assault, the question then becomes on^ of defence of person as well as defence of property (o). In case, however, of a violent trespass, the trespasser may be Violent resisted at once with the strong hand and without any parley. " It trespass, is lawful to oppose force to force, and if one breaks down the gate or comes into my close vi et armis, I need not request him to be gone, but may lay my hands upon him immediately, for it is but returning violence with violence. So if one comes forcibly and takes away my goods, I may oppose him without any more ado, for there is no time to naake a request " (p). It is not necessary in order to justify the use of. force that the Attempts to person against whom it is employed should have actually at the time trespass. committed a trespass. It is enough if he is endeavouring to do so, and that force is reasonably necessary to prevent him succeeding in such attempt (q). (I) Blades v. Htggs, (1861) 10 C. B. N. S. 713; 30 L. J. Ch. 107; 128 E. E. 336; Rex V. Milton, (1827) 1 M. & M. 107. As to re-vesting of goods in owner upon conviction of thief, see 66 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 24, and 6 & 7 Geo. V. c. 50, s. 45. (m) It is on this principle that the cases of entry upon land' for the recaption of goods have been decided (see note to Webb v. Beavan, (1844) 6 M. & G. p. 1056), and it is to be presumed that as you may not go upon the land of another to recover your goods, d fortiori, you may not commit an assault for such a purpose. As to the circumstances under which an unauthorised entry on land may be justified for the purposes of recaption of chattels, see below, pp. 339, et seq. (n) See cases collected below, pp. 329—331, where the subject of Forcible Entry •is fully dealt with. (0) Polkinhorn v. Wright, (1845) 8 Q. B. 197; 16 L. J. Q. B. 70; Webster v. Watts, (1847) 11 Q. B. 311; 17 L. J. Q. B. 73; 75 E. E. 393. See Oakes v. Wood, (1837) 2 M. & W. 791. „ „ ■,„ -n -, (p) Per Gut., Green v. Goddard, (1704) 2 Salk. p. 641. See Weaver v. Bush, n 7Qft^ ft 'P T? 78 iq) Polkinhorn V. Wright, (1845) 8 Q. B. 197 ; 15 L J Q. B. 70 See, however, Shmgleton v. Smith, (1700) 2 Lutw. 1481 ; as to whether bond fide belief, by a 158 SELF-REDRESS AND SELF-PROTECTION. Limit in use of force in defending property. Duress. Protection of game. Under no circumstances is it lawful merely for the purpose of resisting a trespass to property to use violence likely to imperil life or limb, even though such violence be necessary for the purpose (r). Land or goods may be defended by assault and battery, but not by wounding. In Collins v. Renison (s) the plaintiff sued for an assault committed by throwing him off a ladder. It was pleaded that the plaintiff was trespassing, and had persisted in the trespass though requested to desist, and that thereupon the defendant " gently shook the ladder, which was a low ladder, and gently over- turned it, and gently threw the plaintiff from it upon the ground, thereby doing as little damage as possible to the plaintiff." It was held that this plea was bad, since it disclosed a degree of violence which could not be justified for the purpose of preventing the trespass alleged (f). Force can only be used in direct assertion of a right of possession. It is not lawful to imprison a man for the purpose of compelling a restitution of property (u). And an assault is committed, sounding in damages against the gaoler, when a prisoner is detained by the warders after his acquittal (x). Whether a landowner can justify shooting a dog which is tres- passing upon his land in pursuit of game, depends upon the question whether the game pursued is in actual peril at the time. Where to an action of trespass for shooting the plaintiff's dog, it was pleaded in justification that the dog was chasing hares in the defendant's close, and that the defendant's gamekeeper shot the dog for the preservation of the hares, the Court held the plea bad on demurrer for not alleging that it was necessary to kill the dog to save the hares (y). But where it is necessary to kill the dog to save the game it may lawfully be done, and the landowner is not to be deterred from that mode of protection by mere considerations of the relative value of the game protected and of the dog shot. " A man servant, that the act complained of was necessary for the protection of his master's property will justify the commission of a statutory offence, see Miles v. Hiitckings, (1903) 2 K. B. 714; 72 L. J. Q. B. 775. (r) 2 Inst. 316. -And see Kinsella v. HamilUyn, (1890) 26 L. E. Ir. 671. The statement in the Report on the Peatherstone Riots (as to which, see below, p. 204), to the effect that " the taking of life can only be justified by the necessity of protecting persons and property against various forms of violent crime," &o., was presumably not intended to negative the proposition above stated, for property can hardly be in peril of seizure or destruction by rioters without life bein^ imperilled at the same time. (s) (1754) Sayer, 138. (t) See, too, Gregory v. Hill, (1799) 8 T. R. 299. (u) Harvey v. Mayne, (1872) Ir. Rep. 6 C. L. 417. (x) Mee V. Cruickshank, (1902) 86 L. T. 708. (y) Vere v. Lord Cawdor, (1809) 11 East, 568; 11 E. E. 268. The earlier case of Wadhurst v. Damme, (1604) Cro. Jac. 45, "where a plea that the dog was used to kill conies in the defendant's warreu7 and was at the time chasing conies there, was upheld, cannot now be regarded as law. MEANS OF PROTECTION. 1^9 might shoot even a valuable greyhound which was chasing a hare if the hare was in peril " (»). As, the only practical mode of protecting crOps from the ravages of pigeons is to shoot them, a man may justify shooting his neighbour's tame pigeons if found damaging the crops (a). With regard to the nature of the means that may lawfully be Distinction employed for the protection of property, a distinction is to be drawn according as between eases in which the owner of the property is present at the property time of the injury being inflicted on the invader, and cases in which '^^^adecl is the damage is suffered by the invader in his absence. The means pres"nt°at which are lawful in the latter class of cases are wider than those *'™® ?* which are lawful in the former. " Is it illegal," says Dallas, J., in Deane v. Clayton (b), " to place spikes or glass upon a wall, and if a party cHmbing over be thereby wounded or cut, can he bring an action? And yet if I were to see a trespasser coming down my area, or getting over the garden wall, I could not drive the spike into his hand or cut him with the glass. The doctrine depends on a broad distinction. Presence in its very nature is more or less protection; absence is abandonment and dereliction for the time; presence may supply means and limit what it supplies ; but if during absence property can only be protected by such means as may be resorted to in the case of presence, all property lying open to inroad can have no protection, at least by any act of the party himself; for to say that he can only be protected when absent by such means as he could use if present, is a contradiction in the nature of things." Therefore the owner of a wood may lawfully set dog spears in it for the protection of the game, and if a trespassing dog be killed by running against one of the spears, no action will lie at the suit of the owner of the dog, notwithstanding that no game may have been in peril at the time (c). But under no circumstances can a person, for the purpose of Setting protecting his property in his absence, justify the setting of a ^°f' "Igj jq spring-gun or man-trap or other instrument intended to cause cause serious serious bodily injury to human beings. Thus in Bird v. ^°°-"^y injuiy. Holbrook (d), where the defendant, having had flowers stolen from (2) Per Blackburn, J., Taylor v. Newman, (1863) 4 B. & S. p. 91; 32 L. J. M. C. 186; 129 E. E. 657; and see Miles v. Hutchings, (1903) 2 K. B. 714; 72 L. J. K. B. 775. (a) Taylor v. Newman, (1863) 4 B. & S. 89; 32 L. J. M. C. 186 ; 129 E. E. 657 ; as to when criminal action will lie against a person for shooting pigeons, and as to who may institute proceedings, see Smith v. Dear, (1903) 88 L. T. 664. (b) (1817) 7 Taunt, p. 521 ; 18 E. E. 553. (c) Per aibbs, C.J., and Dallas, J., Deane v. Clayton, (1817) 7 Taunt. 489; 18 E. E. 553, and Jordin v. Crump, (1841) 8 M. & W. 782; 11 L. J. Ex. 74; 90 E. E. 929. Absence of notice to the owner of the dog is immaterial, ibid. See, also, Ponting v. Noakes, (1894) 2 Q. B. 281 at p. 289; 63 L. J. Q. B. 549. (d) (1828) 4 Bing. 628; 6 L. J. C. P. 146; 29 E. E. 657. This decision went upon the common law, the cause of action having arisen prior to the passing of the 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 18 (re-enacted by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 31), as to 160 SELF-REDRESS AND SELF-PROTECTION. his garden, set in the garden for its future protection a spring-gun, and the plaintiff, a boy who was in search of a fowl which had strayed into the garden", and who had no knowledge of the existence of the gun,' got over the garden wall and, coming into contact with the gun, was damaged, the defendant was held liable. In the earlier case of Ilott v. Wilkes (e), where the plaintiff was wounded by a spring-gun set for the protection of game in a wood where he was trespassing, with knowledge that there were guns set there, the Court held that the action would not lie, but they did so entirely upon the grourid that the plaintifi, having had notice of the guns and so having wilfully courted the danger, brought himself within the maxim volenti non fit injuria. The Act of 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 18 (/), which prohibited the setting of spring-guns, man-traps, and other engines calculated to destroy human life with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm, was merely declaratory of the common law (g), except in so far as it made the mere act of setting such an engine with the above intent a mis- demeanour whether without notice or not. Though the statute makes it a criminal offence to set the prohibited engines even with notice, still a trespasser who, having notice, is injured by such an engine, will not be entitled to an action, for the maxim volenti non fit injuria will apply notwithstanding the statute (h). Whether it is lawful to set a spring-gun or man-trap in a dwelling-house at night to protect it against burglars is doubtful, but perhaps it is so on the principle suggested by Dallas, J. (i), that a man may resort to wider means for his protection when he is absent or asleep than when he is awake and on the spot. The above statute contains a proviso that nothing in the Act shall be deemed to make it a mis- demeanour to set from sunset to sunrise any spring-gun, man-trap, or other engine which shall be set in a dwelling-house for the pro- tection thereof. Though the proviso does not expressly legalise the setting of such an engine under siich circumstances, it suggests that it is lawful. Watoh-dogs. But every man has a right to keep even a fierce dog for the which see text, supra. But the correctness of the decision has been doubted : see Jordin v. Crump, (1841) 8 M. & W. p. 789; 11 L. J. Ex. 74; 90 E. E. 929. (e) (1820) 3 B. & Aid. 304 ; 22 E. E. 400. (/) Ee-enacted by 24 & 25 Vict. u. 100, s. 31. (g) Per Best, C.J., (1828) 4 Bing. p. 642. (h) As to a recent application of this maxim, see Giles v. London County Council, (1904) 68 J. P. 10. It has, mdeed, been laid down that where a person^ in breach of a statutory, as opposed to a common law duty, creates a source oi danger, into contact with which another person comes and is damaged, the mere fact that the latter had notice of the danger will not necessarily make his running of the risk voluntary within the meaning of the maxim (see below, Ch. XV.) ; Mt it is apprehended that this doctrine does not apply where the party running the nsK is a trespasser. (») See above, p. 156. MEANS OF PROTECTION. 161 protection of his property against trespassers (k), for though a dog if savage is likely to injure a trespasser to some extent, it is not likely to do very serious damage (l). Analogous to the cases of self-protection above dealt with are Protection of those in which an act causing damage to an innocent t)erson is P'^°P^'^*y sought to be justified on the ground that it was necessary for the incursions protection of the doer of it, against either the forces of nature or the °* '^and^' wrongful act of a third party; but the justification in these latter floods, cases is restricted within much narrower limits. An owner of land, situate on the sea coast, is entitled to protect his land from the incursions of the sea by building a groin or sea wall, and if the effect of his so doing is to cause the sea to flow with greater violence against the land of the adjoining owners and do damage he will not be responsible (m). But the converse of this proposition is not allowable, an owner of foreshore not being entitled to remove a deposit of beach, or other natural safeguard against incursions of the sea, if such removal imperil the adjacent country (n). Even in the case of inland water a landowner may, however, lawfully erect a barrier to protect his land from inundation by an extraordinary flood, that is to say, if he anticipates that the flood-water, rising to an unprecedented height, will seek a new course in the direction of his land, over which the ordinary flood- water has not been accustomed to flow (o). Nor is a landowner responsible to an adjoining owner for the results of the wrongful act of a third party over whom he has no control, although the mediate, as opposed to the immediate, cause of the damage may arise out of some act of the first landowner (p). But he cannot interfere with the coiu-se of ordinary flood-water; and, therefore, if a river in times of ordinary flood has been used to overflow its banks and find an outlet over the lands of the adjoining owner, such owner cannot, for the protection of his lands, lavirfully raise the bank of the river if the effect will be to throw the flood-water against the lands of the proprietors on the other side (g). And evert where the flood is (k) Per Tindal, C.J., Sarch v. Blackburn, (1830) 4 C. & P., p. 300; 34 E. E. 805 ; and per Lord Kenyon, Brock v. Copeland, (1794) 1 Bsp. p. 203; 5 E. E. 730. (0 Compare Lowery v. Walker, (1911) A. C. 10; 80 L. J. K. B. 188, H. L. (E.). (m) Rex V. Commissioners for Pagham, (1828) 8 B. & C. 355; 6 L. J. K. B. 338; 32 E. E. 406. (n) Grossman v. Bristol & South Wales Union R., (1863) 11 W. E. 981; and see Whalley v. Lancashire d: Yorkshire R. Co., (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 131, pp. 136, 137; 53 L. J. Q. B. 285. ^ ^ (o) Nield V. London d North Western R. Co., (1874) L. E. 10 Ex. 4; 44 L. J. Ex. 15; and per Lord Eldon, Menzies v. Breadalbane, (1828) 3 Bligh, N. S., (p) Ely Brewery Oo. y. Pontypridd Urban District Council, (1904) 68 J. P. 3, '{q) Menzies v. Breadalbane, (1828) 3 Bligh, N. S 414; 32 E. E. 103; Orr Ewing V. Colquhoun, (1877) 2 A. C. 839 at p. 857 ; Rex w. Trafford, (1831) 1 B. & Ad. 874; 8 Bing. 204; 9 L. J. K. B. 72, 129; 34 E. E. 680. C.T. 162 SELF-REDRESS AND SELF-PROTECTION. extraordinary, if the water has already invaded the land and collected on it, the owner may not, in order to protect himself against the consequences of the water remaining there, dig a cut fgir'the purpose of getting rid of the water, if by so doing he will cause damage to the parties on whose land he discharges it (r), for " there is a difference between protecting yourself from an injury which is not yet suffered by you ajad getting rid of the consequences of an injury which has occurred to you " (s). And this principle probably applies equally to the case of a wrongful deposit upon a man's premises by a third party of something calculated to do damage, in which case it is apprehended that the owner of the premises could not justify removing the noxious thing to the damage of his innocent neighbour, at all events, if the act of removal was deliberate. In Scott V. Sheipikerd) (i), Gould, J., suggested that if a squib was thrown into a coach full of company, the person throwing it out again would not be answerable for the consequences; but probably what he meant was, the suddenness of the thing and the terror inspired by it would leave no time for reflection, and so would deprive the act of ejection of that volimtary character which is essential to liability (u). And where the injury to one proprietor, though immediately proceeding from natural causes beyond human control, has been mediately caused by the lawful acts of a neigh- boming proprietor, it is very doubtful if the injured party has a remedy (x). Abatement of Another class of injuries in respect of which the party injured is entitled to take the law into his own hands, and provide his own remedy, is that of nuisances. As a general rule, every one who is damaged by a private nuisance is entitled to abate it. A man may enter upon his neighbour's land, and abate a nuisance of overhanging trees {y), or of filth which his neighbour has placed there (a), provided he suffers special damage thereby, and is not injured merely as a member of the public (o). One may justify breaking down a gate which obstructs a private right of way, or cutting off those portions of one's neighbour's trees which project over one's boundary (b). And this is apparently the (r) Whalley v. Lancashire d Yorkshire B. Co., (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 131; 53 L. J. Q. B. 285. (s) Per Lindley, L.J., ibid., 13 Q. B. D. p. 140. U) (1772) 2 W. Bl. 892. («) See above, pp. 7, 8. (x) Smith v. Musgrave, (1877) 2 App. Cas. 781; 47 L. J. Ex. 4; Ely Brewery Co. V. Pontypridd Urban District Council, (1904) 68 J. P. 3, C. A. iy) Lemmon v. Webb, (1895) A. C. 1; 64 L. J. Ch. 205. («) Jones V. Williams, (1843) 11 M. & W. 176; 12 L. J. Ex. 249; 63 E. K. 564 ; see also Raikes v. Townsend, (1804) 2 Smith, 9 ; 7 E. E. 776. (a) Colchester Corporation v_ Brooke, (1845) 7 Q. B. 339; 15 L. J. Q. B. 173; 68 E. E. 458; Dimes v. Petley, (1850) 15 Q. B. 276; 19 L. J. Q. B. 449; 81 B. B. 573. See also Smith v. Wilson, (1903) 2 Ir. K. B. 45, at p. 75. "•(b) Lemmon v. Webb, (1895) A. C. 1; 64 L. J. Oh. 206. nuisances. ABATEMENT OF NUISANCES. ,163 case even when the person damnified has an alternative remedy by injunction (c). Indeed, it has been said that " ii H. builds a house so near mine that it stops my lights or shoots water upon my house, or is in any other way a nuisance to me, I may enter upon the owner's land and pull it down" (d). Whether that proposition can without qualification be regarded as law at the present day may be doubted; an owner of lights which are obstructed it is presumed cannot pull the obstructing house down under circumstances where ■ the Court would refuse a mandatory injunction for its demolition. But in any case the party abating a nuisance must be careful not to interfere with the property of the wrong-doer in excess of what is necessary to abate the nuisance (e), and if there are alternative methods of abatement, one of which will be less injurious to the wrong-doer than the other, the least injurious method must be adopted, subject to this, that " where the alternative way involves an interference either with the property of an innocent person or the wrong-doer the interference must be with the property of the wrong-doer " (/). The abator need not wait until actual damage has happened, if in the nature of things it is certain to happen ; thus, if his neigh- bour's eaves improperly project over his land, he may pull them down before any rain has fallen {g). And it has been said that the fact that a party has personally abated a nuisance does not disentitle him to recover damages for the damage which he has sustained before the abatement (h). In the case of nuisances to common rights, abatement by a Nuisaneea commoner is only allowed where the act causing the nuisance is ri'ght™'"" prima facie imlawful. Thus, where the lord of the manor puts rabbits on the common or plants trees there, inasmuch as such acts are prima facie lawful, and only become wrongful if by reason thereof a sufficiency of common is not left, the onus of proving which insufficiency lies on the commoner, the latter, however great the nuisance may be, cannot justify digging up the rabbit-burrows (i) or cuttirig dovm the trees (fe), but is left to his remedy by action; if the lord has exceeded the boimds of his right it is for the law to determine the quantum of the excess. But where the lord makes an inclosure on the common, inasmuch as an inclosure is prima fade wrongful, the onus of proving that a (c) Smith V. Giddy, (1904) 2 K. B. 448; 73 L. J. K. B. 894. (d) Rex V. Bosewell, (1699) 2 Salk. 459. (e) Roberts v. Rose, (1865) 4 H. & C. 103; 35 L. J. Ex. 62; 143 B. K. 516. 0) Per Blackburn, J., ibid. 4 H. & G. p. 106. (g) Penruddock's Case, (1597) 5 Bep. p. 101. .-□,,* (h) Kendrick v BartUnd, (1679) 2 Mod. Bep. 253; but see, contra, Blackstone, 2l8t ed., vol. 3, pp. 219—220. (i) Cooper v. Marshall, (1757) 1 Burr. 259. (fe) Kirby V. Sadgrove, (1795-7) 1 B. & P. 13; 3 E. B. 239; Hope v. Osborne, (1913) 2 Ch. 349; 82 L. J. Ch. 457. 164 SELF-REDRESS AND SELF-PROTECTION. sufl&cienoy of common is left lying in such case upon the lord, the comm.oner may justify an abatement of the nuisance by pulling down the fence, if the lord is unable to establish that he had left a sufficiency of common (I). The building of a house upon a common, at all events if done by a stranger or another commoner (m), or any substantial interference with the rights of fellow-commoners by a commoner (n.), are primA facie unlawful acts, and therefore a commoner may justify abating the nuisance even to the extent of pulling down a house, and may lawfully do so, although the occupier be living in it at the time, provided he has previously given the occupier reasonable notice to remove it (o), but in the absence of such notice he cannot lawfully pull it down while the parties are in it (p). And generally any overt act of the lord which derogates sub- stantially from the rights of the commoners renders him liable to action (g). Thus where conservators, duly appointed under the Metropolitan Commons Acts, seek permanently to restrict the general right of access of the commoners or the public at large to the amenities of a common by according especial and exclusive privileges to a particular class they exceed their legal powers, the commoners and the public at large being equally entitled to recreate themselves upon such a common as the particular class in whose favour the conservators have discriminated (?•), But on the other hand, where Ein ancient house is pulled down and a new house is erected in substitution therefor, the rights of common appurtenant to the ancient house survive to the new erection (s). If the abatement of a nuisance involve an entry upon the (0 Arlett V. Ellis, (1827-9) 7 B. & C. 346; 5 L. J. K. B. 391; 31 E. E. 214. See also Cook v. Mitcham Common Conservators , (1901) 1 Ch. 387; 70 L. J. Ch. 223. As to when a commoner may distrain the cattle of the lord damage feasant on the waste, see Kenrick v. Pargiter, (1608) Cro. Jac. 208; Yelv. 129. As to conditions precedent to the establishment of a valid right of common of pasture, see Mitcham Common Conservators v. Banks, (1912) 10 L G. E. 183. (m) And semble also if the house be built by the lord. Perry v. Fitzhowe, (1846) 8 Q. B. 757; 16 L. J. Q. B. 239; 70 E. E. 626. (n) King v. Brown, (1913) 2 Ch. 416; 82 L. J. Ch. 548; Cronin v, Connor, (1913) 2 Jr. E. 119. (o) Davies v. Williams, (1851) 16 Q. B. 546; 20 L. J. Q. B. 330; 83 E. E. 592; Lane v. Capsey, (1891) 3 Ch. 411; 61 L. J. Ch. 55. (p) Perry v. Fitzhowe, (1846) 8 Q. B. 767; 15 L. J. Q. B. 239; 70 E. E. 626; Jones v. Jones, (1862) 1 H. & C. 1; 31 L. J. Ex. 506; 130 E. E. 338. (g) Bishop Auckland Co-operative Society v. Butterknowle Colliery Co., (1904) 2 Ch. 419; 41 L. J. N. C. 314, C. A. ; Heath v. Deane, (1905) 2 Ch. 86; 74 ,L. J. Ch. 466 ; Gollis v. Amphlett, (1920) 89 L. J. Ch. 101, H. L. (B.). As to the position of parties in cases where commonable rights are extinguished under the provisions of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, See Salmon v. Edwards, (1910) 1 Ch. 552; 79 L. J. Ch. 296. (r) Mitcham Common Conservators v. Cox, (1911) 104 L. T. 824, Div. As to what regulations are and are not ultra vires in such circumstances, see Harris v. Harrison, (1914) 111 L. T. 534. (s) Att.-Gen. v. Reynolds, (1911) 104 L. T. 852 ; 80 L. J. K. B. (1911) 1073. ABATEMENT OF NUISANCES. 165 offender's land, and such entry be resisted, the abator probably cannot justify a resort to force, even though the abatement cannot be effected without it; it has been said that the party aggrieved is only entitled to abate "so as he commits no riot in the doing of it " (t). This seems in strict analogy to the rule that goods cannot be distrained while they are in Actual use (m). In the case of Davies v. WHUams, mentioned above, there, was no averment of any assault, and the jury expressly found that the defendants did not actually endanger the lives or limbs of the plaintiff or his family {x). Where the abatement of a nuisance involves an entry upon the Notice. land on which the nuisance exists, and such land is in the occupation of a person who was not the original creator of the nuisance, the right of abatement cannot be exercised without previous notice to the occupier (j/), except perhaps where there is such immediate danger to life or health as to render it unsafe to wait (a). Probably in no other case is previous notice to the occupier necessary (a). Thus, an owner of land overhung by trees growing on his neigh- bour's land is entitled to cut the overhanging branches without any previous notice if he can do so without going on to his neighbour's land (b). In the case of an obstruction to a public way, such as the placing Public of posts and rails across it, any member of the public may abate the nuisance and pull the obstruction down (c), so far as is necessary to the exercise of his right of passage (d). But he cannot justify doing more than the necessity of the case requires. Consequently where a public footpath passes through a lane of varying width, also used as an occupation road, there is no prima facie presumption that the public right of user extends over the whole surface of the lane at its widest part (e), although as a general proposition of law (t) 3 Bl. Com., Ch. 1, s. 4. (u) Field v. Adames, (1840) 12 A. & B. 649; 10 L. J. Q. B. 2; 54 E. E. 657. (i) (1851) 16 Q. B. p. 555; 20 L. J. Q. B. 330; 83 E. E. 592. iy) Jones v. Williams, (1843) 11 M. & W. 176; 12 L. J. Ex. 249; 63 E. E. 564. (z) Per Lord Abinger, ibid. 11 M. & W. at p. 182. (a) There is a dictum of Best, J., in Earl of Lonsdale v. Nelson, (1823) 2 B. & C. 302; 2 L. J. K. B. 28; 26 E. E. 363, to the effect that in case of nuisanceB of omission notice is necessary except in the case of cutting trees. This point was Itft open by the House of Lords in L-emmon v. Wehh, (1895) A. C. 1. (h) Lemmon v. Webb, (1895) A. C. 1 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 205. (c) Webber v. Sparkes, (1842) 10 M. & W. 485; 12 L. J. Bx. 41; Huddart v. Eigby, (1869) L. E. 5 Q. B. 139; 39 L. J. Q. B. 19, Bx. Ch. (d) Dimes V. Petley, (1850) 15 Q. B. p. 283; 19 L. J. Q. B. 449; 81 E. E. 573. The proposition in the headnote to this report, to the effect that "a private individual cannot justify damaging the property of another, on the ground that it is a nuisance to a public right, unless it does him a special injury," is somewhat misleading. The right of abatement is not limitedjo cases in which the party might bring an action : see Winterbottom v. Lord Derby, (1867) L. E. 2 Ex. 316; 36 L. J. Bx. 194. And see, as to the right of the public to user of a bridle path, Trafford v. St. Faith's Rural Council, (1910) 74 J. P. 297. (e) Ford V. Harrow Urban Council, (1903) 88 L. T. 394; Fuller v. Chivpenham 166 SELF-EEDEESS AND SELF-PEOTECTION. the dedication of the whole of the land between parallel fences may be presumed (/), and dedication may be inferred from continuous unchallenged user {g). But in order to constitute a vahd dedicatioji to the public of a highway by the owner of the soil, there must be an intention to dedicate, there must be an ammus dedicandi of which the user by the public is evidence and no more ; and a single act of interruption by the owner is of much more weight upon the question of intention than many acts of enjoyment Qi). Again, where property is wroiig- fully placed in the channel of a navigable river so as to cause a nuisance to the public right of passage, a private individual navi- gating a vessel in the river cannot justify damaging such property by wilfully passing over that portion of the channel where it is placed, if he might with reasonable convenience have exercised his right of passage by going over some other portion of the channel (i). But in the case of a pathway over which a right of way is claimed by a limited class, it is an obstruction to a person's free right of passage if another person locks gates across such way, and it is no answer to a complainant to say that keys will be supplied (fe). Distress The subject of distress damage feasant will be found dealt with in damage ^j^e chapter on Distress (I). feasant. -^ ^ ■' Bailwav Files ® Eailway Fires Act, 1905 (which came into operation on Act, 1905. January 1st, 1908), confers by s. 2 a statutory right upon railway companies not only to enter on any land and do all things reasonably necessary for extinguishing any conflagration that may be caused by sparks emitted from engines, but also (subject to payment of full compensation, including compensation for loss of amenity, and to certain other restrictions) to remove from land adjacent to a railway any wood, undergrowth, or trees likely to catch fire (w). Rural District Council, (1915) 79 J. P. 4 ; but see East v. Berkshire County Council, (1912) 106 L. T. 65. (/) Locke-King v. Woking Urban Council, (1898) 77 L. T. 790; Rowley v. Tottenham Urban District Council, (1914) A. C. 95; 83 L. J. Ch. 411; and see Attorney -General v. Perry, (1904) 1 Ir. E. 247, C. A.; Copestake v. West Sussex County Council, (1911) 2 Cli. 331 ; 80 L. J. Cli. 673. As to what is primi facie (thougli rebuttable) evidence of dedication, see Brockman v. Folkestone Corpora- tion, (1912) 76 J. P. 99. (3) Thornhill v. Weeks, (1914) 12 L. G. E. 697; 84 L. J. Ch. 282; (1915) 1 Ch. 106; Shearburn v. Chertsey Rural District Council, (1914) 12 L. G. B. 622. Qi) Folkestone Corporation v. Brockman, (1914) A. C. 338, at p. 362; 83 L. J- K. B. 745. (i) Mayor of Colchester v. Brooke, (1845) 7 Q. B. 339; 15 L. 3. Q. B. 173; 68 E. E. 458. As to the extent of the right of the Thames Conservators in the bed of the river, see Conservators of the River Thames v. Smeed, (1897) 2 Q. B. 334, C. A. (fe) Guest's Estates, Ltd. v. Milner's Safes, Ltd., (1911) 28 T. L. B. 69. (I) p. 315. (m) 5 Ed. VII., 0. 11. CHAPTEE VIII. DISCHARGE OF TORTS. PAGE PAQB Waiver by Election 167 Effect of Proceedings before Accord and Satisfaction 168 Magistrate 178 Release 171 Statutes of Limitation 179 Eecovery of Judgment 171 Concealed Fraud 186 Continuing Injury 173 Joint Wrong-doers 187 Satisfied Judgments 176 Joint Plaintiffs 188 When there is a vested right of action for a tort it may be dis- charged by the death of one of the parties, by waiver, by accord and satisfaction, by release, by judgment recovered, and by the Statute of Limitations. Discharge by death has been dealt with in the chapter on Parties; it remains to consider the other methods (a). 1. If a man has more than one remedy for the same wrong and Waiver by elects to pursue one of them, giving the go-by to the others, he must stand or fall by his election; the other remedies are waived. " If a man's goods are taJsen by an act of trespass, and are sub- sequently sold by the trespasser and turned into money, he may maintain trespass for the forcible injury; or waiving the force he may maintain trover for the wrong; or waiving the tort altogether he may sue for money had and received " (b). Thus, if a trespass to realty is committed, and portions of it such Trespass as minerals, timber, or fixtures, are severed, the injured party, suing in waiving the unlawfulness of the severance, may sue in trover for trover, the value of the severed chattels (c). So, if a man is unlawfully Trover deprived of the possession of his property, which is afterwards sold ^^J^^f^^-'' or pledged (d), the owner may affirm the transaction, and sue the money bad wrong-doer on a contract implied in law to refimd the proceeds (e). and received. (o) By the repealed 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 37 (1), now 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 59, s. 30 (1), damages for a tort are not provable in bankruptcy; bankruptcy, there- fore, can never discharge a tort. The decision in Jack v. Kipping, (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 113; 51 L. J. Q. B. 463, does not, it is apprehended, constitute any exception to this rule. (6) Per Cur. Badgers v. Maw, (1846) 15 M. & W. p. 448; 16 If. J. Ex. 137. (c) Dalton v. Whittem, (1842) 3 Q. B. 961 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 55 ; 61 E. E. 438. (d) Allanson v. Atkinson, (1813) 1 M. & S. 583. (e) Smith v. Hodson, (1791) 4 T. E. 211; 53 E. E. 93; Smith v. Baker, (1873) L E SO P 350; 60 L. J. Q. B. 683; Roe v. Mutual Loan Fund, (1887) 19 Q. B. D. 347, at p. 350; 56 L. J. Q. B. 541, C. A. 168 DISCHARGE OF TORTS. By agreeing to accept payment. Accord and satisfaction. Accord without satisfaction. The commencement of an action or of proceedings in bankruptcy to recover the money is evidence of an election to waive the tort, but not necessarily conclusive evidence. If, however, a final judgment or order is obtained in the action or proceedings, then the election is final (/), and such judgment is a business debt {g). A mere demand of the money does not amount to an election {h); but in a case where the demand was assented to and a sum paid on account, it was held that the tort was waived (i). It would seem that the result would have been the same even though no payment had been made. In Brewer v. Sparrow (fc), the defendant had sent to the plaintiff an accoimt of the proceeds of certain goods con* verted by him, and after deducting expenses had paid over the balance, and it was held that the plaintiffs had waived their right to treat him as a wrong-doer. It is not, however, in every case that the mere receipt of the proceeds of a conversion operates as an election not to sue in tort. Thus, where the finder of a note had cashed it, and he being afterwards arrested on a charge of larceny, some of the money was handed over to the owner, the latter sued successfully in trover for the balance. The plaintiff, by the receipt of money under the circumstances, did not elect to treat the case as one of debt (I). Moreover, if a party agree to accept a sum certain in satisfaction of all demands, and a sub- sequent damage arises from the original tort which was not within the contemplation of either of the parties when such agreement was arrived at, the original accord and satisfaction apparently will not in every case debar the injured party from bringing a further action for damages against the tort-feasor (m). 2. Any one who has a cause of action may agree with the party against whom the action lies to accept in substitution for the right any good legal consideration, and by such acceptance his cause of action is satisfied, and he can proceed with it no further. This is called an accord and satisfaction. A criminal offence, although involving a tort, cannot, however, be compounded for by an accord and satisfaction (n). A bare accord amounts simply to an understanding between the parties that something shall be done in future which the aggrieved person shall take in satisfaction of his claim, and so long as it (/) Smith v. Baker, supra; Curtis v. Williamsmi, (1874) L. B. 10 Q. B. 57; U L. J. Q. B. 27 ; Scarf v. Jardine, (1882) 7 App. Cas. 345 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 613. (g) Allen, In re, (1915) 1 K. B. 285 ; 84 L. J. K. B. 271. (h) Valpey v. Sanders, (1848) 6 C. B. 886; 17 L. J. C. P. 249; 75 E. E. 844. (t) Lythgoe v. Vernon, (1860) 5 H. & N. 180; 29 L. J. Ex. 164; 120 E. E. 536. (fc) (1827) 7 B. & C. 310 ; 6 L. J. K. B. 1. (!) Burn v. Morris, (1836) 4 Tyr. 485; 3 L. J. Ex. 193; 44 E. E. 891. As to the effect of waiver where the cause of action is by or against joint parties, see below, pp. 187—188. {m) Ellen v. Great Northern R. Co., (1901) 49 W. E. 396. (n) Smith v. Dear, (1903) 88 L. T. 664. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 169 remains executory cannot be enforced by either party. The plaintiff cannot sue upon it in substitution for his original cause of action (o), nor can the defendant set it up as a defence to that cause of action. " If divers things are to be performed by the accord, the performance of part is not sufficient, but all ought to be per- formed. . . . Also, if the thing be to be performed at a day to come, tender and refusal is not sufficient without actual satisfaction and acceptance " (p). If one man agree to take a bill of exchange from another in satisfaction of a claim and receive it by post, he may, nevertheless, at once repudiate the transaction, for the mere receipt is not an acceptance; and unless he assent to the receipt he is not satisfied (g). Nor does a plea that a bill of exchange was given for and on account and in payment and discharge of a debt amount to a satisfaction or an extinguishment of the debt (r). And in like manner the payee of a cheque is not bound by a printed and signed statement on the back thereof that the amount for which the cheque is drawn is in full satisfaction of his claims on the drawer (s). The arrangement, however, may be that the cause of action shall Mere agree- be satisfied, not in the future on certain things being done, but P^°' J'*'^" forthwith by the mere agreement to do certain things. " There faction, may be two kinds of accord : the making of the agreement itself may be what is stipulated for, or the doing, the things men- tioned in the agreement. In the latter case the plea . . ought to aver that the things have been done, and the agreement without that affords no answer. Where the making of the agreement is itself the thing looked to, the plea must aver that it has been accepted in satisfaction; that averment in truth carries with it the fact of the performance of all that was to be done in order to settle the action; it leaves nothing in fieri, nothing incomplete " (t). Sometimes the accord is self-executing, as, for instance, where Self-exeout- parties agree mutually to. relinquish claims which they have against i"g accord, each other. Such agreement ipso facto puts an end to the rights of action on either side (u). (o) Lynn v. Bruce, (1794) 2 H. Bl. 317 ; 3 B. E. 381. (p) Peytoe's case, (1611) a Kep. p. 77 b ; Wray v. Milestone, (1839) 5 M. & W. 21; 9 L. J. Ex. 39; Gabriel v. Dresser, (1855) 15 C. B. 622; 24 L. J. C. P. 81; 100 E. E. 514. For comments on this case, see Blagrave v. Bristol Water Works Co., (1856) 1 H. & N. 369, at p. 387 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 57 ; 108 E. E. 629. (g) Hardman v. Bellhouse, (1842) 9 M. & W. 596 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 135. (r) McDowall v. Boyd, (1848) 6 D. & L. 149 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 295. (s) Nathan v. Ogdens, (1906) 94 L. T. 126, C. A. (t) Per Coleridge, J., Flockton v. Hall, (1850) 14 Q. B. p. 386 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 1. lu) Jones V. Sawkins, (1847) 5 C. B. 142; 17 L. J. C. P. 92; Crowther v. Farrer, (1850) 15 Q. B. 677; 20 L. J. Q. B. 298; 81 E. E. 745; cp. James v. David, (1793), 5 T. E. 141, where there was an agreement to settle matters in dispute, and to execute bonds not to sue. Here the accord was clearly executory because it was contemplated that further steps should be taken. 170 DISCHARGE OF TORTS. Accord without binding contract. There must be good con- sideration. Aeeqyd and satisfaction by arbitra- tion. Conditional accord and satisfaction. An executory accord need not fulfil all the requirements of a binding contract, since ex hypothesi till it is executed it binds neither side, and after execution the question is not whether it could have been enforced, but whether 'it has in fact been accepted (as). But where a party agrees to take in satisfaction of his cause of action not the fulfilment of a promise, but the promise itself, all conditions must be present to make that promise legally binding, since otherwise he will obtain nothing in return for the surrender of his cause of action (j/). In both cases alike there must be good legal consideration. " Iri an action upon the statute of Eichard II., if the defendant saith that after the entry an accord was made between them that the plaintiff should re-enter the land and the defendant should deliver the evidence of the plaintiff to the plaintiff, this is not any bar of the action, for the delivery of the plaintiff's evidences cannot be any satisfaction of the tortious entry. But otherwise it is if he says that the accord was that he should deliver certain evidence concerning the land to the plaintiff and that he delivered them accordingly, this is a good bar if he makes title to the evidences " (a). If a claim to damages be referred to arbitration and the award be made, it may be pleaded as an accord and satisfaction though not performed; but before award the pendency of an arbitration is no defence to an action, though it may be a ground of stay (o). It would appear that it is possible to make an accord and satisfac- tion conditional. A man may accept a sum as satisfaction of personal injuries on the understanding that if the mischief should turn out worse than it appears to the medical men at the time, he is not precluded from bringing his action (b). And even without a specific understanding, under certain excep- tional circumstances, action has been held to be maintainable (c). But accord and satisfaction with one of several enures to all ; con- sequently the acceptance of satisfaction from a joint tort-feasor discharges co-wrong-doers (d). Where, however, joint tort-feasors put in separate defences and one pays into Court a sum. exceeding the award of the jury the other (x) Lavery v. Turley, (1861) 6 H. & N. 239; 30 L. J. Ex. 48; 123 E. E. 485. (y) Case v. Barber, (1672) T. Eayna. 460. (z) Vin. Ab. Accord. A 4, citing 9 Edw. IV. 19. As to consideration, see McManus v. Bark, (1870) L. E. 5 Ex. 65 ; 89 L. J. Ex. 65 ; Boosey v. Wood, (1865) 3 H. & C. 484; 34 L. J. Ex. 65. The abandonment of claims bond. f,de made though in fact unfounded is good consideration (Callisher V. Bischoffsheim, (1870) L. E. 5 Q. B. 449; 39 L. J. Q. B. 181). (a) Allan v. Milner, (1831) 2 C. & J. 47; 1 L. J. N. S. Ex. 7; Harris v. Reynolds, (1845) 7 Q. B. 71; 14 L. J. Q. B. 241. (b) Lee v. Lancashire d Yorkshire R. Co., (1871) L. E. 6 Ch. 527. (c) Ellen V. Great Northern R. Co., (1901) 49 W. E. 395; affirmed, (1901) 17 T. L. E. 453. (d) Dufresne v. Hutchinson, (1810) 3 Taunt. 117; Thurman v. Wild, (1840) 11 Ad. & E. 453; O'Keefe v. Walsh, (1903) 2 Ir. E. at p. 717. RELEASE. 171 tort-feasor cannot plead the payment into Court by his co-defendant as a satisfaction of the cause of action against himself (e). But it is not necessary in a plea of accord and satisfaction with one of several plaintiffs to aver authority from the others (/). 3. Any surrender of a right of action may be spoken of as a Belease. release ; but the term is usually applied where the surrender is by deed, and, therefore, requires no consideration {g). A release by indenture is only available in favour of those who are expressed as parties thereto Qi). An absolute covenant not to sue is equivalent to a release, and may be so pleaded (i). 4. When an action is brought and proceeds to final judgment, judgment the original right of action is in any case destroyed. If the recovered, plaintiff fails, he is estopped from asserting his alleged right in any other form of legal proceedings against the same party (fc). If he succeeds, the original right in respect of which he sued is merged in the higher and better right which he obtains by his judgment, and he must either bring a fresh action on his judgment or proceed to obtain its fruits by execution. Again, action by a third party against an agent bars a subsequent action, in respect of the saome matter, against his principal (l). There is, however, no merger by a judgment which is not of Judgment record. The judgment of a foreign court only creates a simple ™"^'^^°* contract debt (m), and, although it may possibly (n) estop the foreign parties from disputing the matters of fact, there decided, does not J'^dg™«'i*s. destroy the cause of action (o). It is otherwise, however, if the judgment be satisfied (p). " The test whether a previous action is a bar is not whether the damages sought to be recovered are different, but whether the cause of action is the same " (g). Damages resulting from one and Damages for the same cause of action must be assessed and recovered once and °^^ "^"^^ °* action must be recovered (e) Penny v. Wimbledon Urban Council, (1899) 2 Q. B. 72; 68 L. J. Q. B. 704. o„oe for all C. A. (/) Wallace and Others v. Kelsall, (1840) 7 M. & W. 264; 56 B. B. 707. (g) For an example of a release of an action of tort, see Phillips v. Claggett, (1843) 11 M. & W. 84; 11 L. J. Ex. 349. (h) Storer v. Gordon, (1814) 3 M. & S. 308; 15 B. B. 499. (t) Per Cur., Ford v. Beech, (1848) 11 Q. B. p. 871; 17 L. J. Q. B. 114; 75 E. B. 638. As to the effect of accord and satisfaction and release to or by joint parties, see below, pp. 187 — 188. (k) For statutory exception to this, see 6 Ed. VII. c. 58, e, 1, sub-s. 5. (I) Cross d Co. v. Matthews and Wallace, (1904) 91 L. T. 500. (m) As to when such a judgment may be enforced in England, see Harris v. Taylor, (1915) 2 K. B. 580, C. A. ; 84 L. J. K. B. 1839. (n) TrufoH, In re, (1887) 36 Ch. D. 600, at p. 615 ; 57 L. J. Ch. 135. (o) Higgens' Case, (1605) 6 Eep. p. 45; Smith v. Nicolls, (1839) 5 Bing. N. C. 208; 8 L. J. N. S. C. P. 92; 50 B. B. 658; Bank of Australia v. Harding, (1850) 9 C. B. 661 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 345 ; 82 B. B. 491. (p) Barber v. Lamb, (1860) 8 C. B. N. S. 95; 29 L. J. C. P. 234; 125 B. B. 690. See below, p. 176. As to the registration of Scotch and Irish judgments in this coniitry, see 31 & 32 Vict. c. 54; 45 & 46 Vict. c. 31. (g) Per Bovill, J., Gibbs v. Gruikshank, (1873) L. E. 8 C. P. p. 460; 42 L. J. C. P. 273. 172 DISCHARGE OF TORTS. When causes of action are the same. Successive damages. Beceipt no bar to subsequent action. for all on the principle " Interest repuhlicse ut git finis litium." But in applying this rule it is often a matter of difficulty to determine whether the cause of action in respect of which damages are being sought is the same cause as that for which damages have already been recovered in an earlier action. A plaintiff is not bound to bring forward in one action all the grievances which he may have against the defendant arising out of the same transaction. Thus, if A. wrongfully charges B. with some crime and has him arrested and prosecuted, there is no objection to B. bringing two separate actions, one for the maliciouB prosecution and one for the false imprisonment (r), and the plea of judgment recovered in one of these actions will not be any bar to the maintenance of the other. Even where there is but one wrongful act, if by means of it two distinct rights are infringed^ the infringement of each right will give rise to a distinct cause of action (s). For this purpose it has been determined that injury to property and injury to the person, although caused by one and the same wrongful act, are infringements of difierent and independent rights, and therefore a recovery of damages in such case for the injury to the property will not operate as a bar to a subsequent action in respect of the injury to the person (t); and this is so whether the damage was the result of a direct trespass or the result of negligence (m). On the other hand, where a man sufier^ in respect of one and the same right, whether of the person, property or reputation as the case may be, successive damages as the result of the same wrongful act, then if the act is not a continuing act, but one over the consequences of which when done the doer has no further control, such as a blow struck or a slander spoken, the causes of action in respect of the several heads of damage are the same, and after recovery in an action for the damage first accruing no fresh action can be brought; and this is so whether the act be actionable per se or only derives its actionable quality from the occurrence of some damage (x). Thus, it has been held, if after judgment recovered in an action of assault some bodily injury develops itself which was unsuspected at the time of assessing the damages, a second action will not lie (y). But this doctrine, at least in civil cases, is not easily reconcilable with the decision (r) Guest v. Warren, (1854) 9 Ex. 379; 23 L. J. Ex. 121; 96 E. E. 756. (s) National Company for Distribution of Electricity v. Gibbs, (1901) 18 Patent Cases, 393. (t) Brunsden v. Humphrey, (1884) 14 Q. B. D. 141 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 476. (a) Per Bowen, L.J., ibid. 14 Q. B. D. p. 149. (x) In Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell, (1886) 11 App. Cas. p. 145; 56 L. J. Q. B. 529, Lord Bramwell suggested that the question whether successive actions vpould lie depended upon whether the act complained of was actionable without proof of damage or not. But this view will not fit the cases. iy) Fitter v. Veal, (1701) 12 Mod. 542. CONTINUING INJURY. 173 of the Court of Appeal in the case of Ellen v. Great Northern Railway Company (a), in which it was held that the following document: "Received of the Great Northern Eailway Company the sum of one hundred and ninety pounds in full satisfaction and discharge of all claims, legal and medicEil charges included, in respect of injuries sustained by Mr. T. E. J. Ellen, near Babworth Crossing, Eetford," was no more than a receipt for money, and did not constitute such an agreement as would bar a subsequently accruing ground of action for damage not within the contemplation of the parties when the receipt was given. It When no has, however, been held inl an action by a master for beating his for fresh apprentice per quod servitium amisit that a fresh action could not damage is be brought from time to time as fresh damage accrued, and that consequently prospective damages might be given (a). And the same rule holds with regard to the action for slander, whether the words be actionable in themselves {b) or not (c). And presumably the same rule will apply to the case of fraud not- withstanding that until damage happens there is no cause of action ; thus, if in consequence of a fraudulent misrepresentation a person on difierent occasions buys different parcels of stock, it is apprehended that he cannot have a separate action for each parcel. It has been said that for the purpose of this rule, — that different damages in respect of the same right must, if caused by one and the same act, be recovered in the same action, — injuries to different parts of a man's person caused by different blows struck in the course of the same assault are to be treated as caused by the same wrongful act (d). A fortiori a pubhcation containing a number of defamatory statements is to be regarded as but one wrongful act; so that it is not open to the aggrieved party to pick out certain sentences and sue upon them, and then after judgment recovered to sue upon other portions of the libel (e), and this rule is of general application (/). If the act complained of creates a continuing source of injury Continuing and is of such a nature as to render the doer of it responsible for "i"'^'- the continuance, then in cases in which damage is not of the (z) (1901) 17 T. L. E. 453, C. A. ; but see Dornan v. Allan, (1900) 3 F. 112, Ct. of Sess. (an unsatisfactory case). „ „„, „ -r -r ,-kt a •. r^ -a im (a) Hodsoll V. Stallebrass, (1840) 11 A. & B. 301; 9 L J. (N S.) Q- B. 132; 52 B K 350; and see Clarke v. Yorke, (1882) 47 L. T. 381; 52 L. J. Oh. 32. (b) Per Lord Holt, Fitter v. Veal, (1701) 12 Mod. p. 544 , r, -r -n c) Per Lord Holt, ibid; per Manisty, J., Lamb v. Walker, (1878) 3 Q. B. D. r> 395'- 45 L J B 451; per Lord Blackburn, Barley Mam Golhery Co. v. (e) Macdougall v. Knight, (1890) ^5 Q- B. D. 1 ; 59 L. J. Q. B 517. (J) Stevhenson v. Gamett, (1898) 1 Q. B. 677; 67 L. J. Q. B. 447, C. A. 174 DISCHARGE OF TORTS. essence of the action, as in trespass, a fresli cause of action arises de die in diem, and in cases in which damage is of the essence of the action, as in nuisance, a fresh cause of action arises as often as fresh damage accrues (g). Whenever one person wrongfully puts something upon the land of another, he is not only liable to pay damages for the trespass in placing the tKing there, but he is further under an obHgation • to remove it, and is guilty of a continuing trespass as long as he neglects to do so. Thus, where the trustees of a turnpike road built buttresses to support it on the land of the plaintiff, who sued them in trespass for the erection and accepted money paid into Court in full satisfaction of his claim, it was held that the acceptance of such money was no bar to a subsequent action of trespass for continuing the buttresses there (h). But where a man wrongfully interferes with another's land otherwise than by placing some foreign substance on it, as for instance where he digs a hole in it, although such interference may create a continuing source of injury, he is liable only to pay compensation for the original trespass, and is under no further obligation to prevent the continuance of the state of things which he had created (z); consequently in such cases the damages must be recovered once and for all. In the case of continuing nuisances successive actions may from time to time be brought in respect of their continuance (k), and therefore in actions for a nuisance prospective damages cannot be given (I), except perhaps in the case of obstruction of ancient lights (m), though even then the point is a very doubtful one, for either the Court will grant a mandatory injunction which abolishes the nuisance altogether (n.), or, should the circumstances not warrant the adoption of such a course, will probably grant as damages, once and for all, the difference between the original and the diminished value of the plaintiff's property (o). But though it seems probable for the above reasons that there can be no continuing dam!ages in nuisance, (g) West Leigh Colliery Co. v. Tunniclijfe d Others, (1908) A. C. 27; 77 L. J. Ch. 102. (h) Holmes v. Wilson, (1839) 10 A. & E. 503; 50 E. E. 492; and see Darley Mam Colliery Co. v. Mitchell, (1886) 11 App. Cas. 127; 55 L. J. Q. B. 529. Aa to the personal reBponsibility of an owner of realty for damage caused by the acts of his predecessor in title, see Hall v. Norfolk (Duke of), (1900) 2 Ch. 493; 69 Xi. J. Ch. 571. (i) Clegg v. Dearden, (1848) 12 Q. B. 576; 17 L. J. Q. B. 233; 76 E. E. 360. (fc) Whitehouse v. Fellowes, (1861) 10 C. B. N. S. 765; 30 L. J. C. P. 305; Shadwell v. Hutchinson, (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 97 ; 9 L. J. K. B. 142 ; 36 E. E. 497. (Z) Battishill V. Beed, (1856) 18 C. B. 696; 25 L. J. C. P. 291; 107 E. E. 465; and see West Leigh Colliery Co. v. Tunnicliffe, (1908) A. C. 27, at pp. 80—34; 77 L. J. Ch. 102. (m)Jenks v. Clifden (Viscount), (1897) 1 Ch. 694; 66 L. J. Ch. 338. (n) Cowper v. Laidler, (1903) 2 Ch. 337 ; 72 L. J. Ch. 578. (o) Kine v. Jolly, (1905) 1 Ch. 504; 74 L. J. Ch. 174, C. A. ; see S. C. in H. L. sub nom. Jolly v. Kine, (1907) A. C. 1; Moore v. Hall, (1878) 3 Q. B. D. 178. MATTER OP AGGRAVATION. 175 there may be two or more actions arising out of the same tort. Thus if a- lessee of premises, demised by a life-tenant, with remainder over, sues and recovers damages from a neighbouring householder for having blocked his ancient lights, the damages recovered in such action will not preclude the life-tenant from also recovering compensation for the loss he will sustain upon the termination of the lease through the depreciated value of his property, while the reversioner will be entitled to sue for the damage he wiU ultimately experience from the same cause upon the death of the hfe-tenant. In the case of damage caused by the withdrawal of support to land a fresh action may be brought as each fresh subsidence occurs, although the several subsidences result from the same excavation (p), for where an excavation is made, and the adjoining land is left unsupported, there is " not merely an original act the results of which remain, but a state of things continued " (q). Although it is generally true that where an action has been Matter of brought and judgment recovered damages which might have been ^'^^rava ion. obtained in that action cannot be subsequently sued for, it must be remembered that in many oases a plaintiff may allege what is in itself a distinct and separate cause of action as mere matter of aggravation of some other cause of action. Thus, if A. breaks and enters the close of B. and outs down a tree and carries it away, he is guilty of two torts, one the trespass to the land, and the other the conversion of the chattel. B. may, in an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, recover the whole damage which he has sustained including the loss of the tree, but it is apprehended that he is not bound to do so, and that if he brings his action for trespass without alleging or recovering the damage by the loss of the tree, he may afterwards recover such damage in a separate action. So, where a libel is published in a newspaper, it is customary to aggravate the damage by proving the circulation of the paper (r). But the sale of every separate copy of a news- paper is a separate wrong, and it is apprehended that, theoretically speaking, there is nothing to prevent an action on the sale of (p) Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell, (1886) 11 App. Gas. 127 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 529; Crumbie v. Wallsend Local Board, (1891) 1 Q. B. 503; 60 L. J. Q. B. 392; West Leigh Colliery Co. v. Tunnicliffe 1. (n) Harrington {Earl of) v. Derby Corporation, (1905) 1 Ch. 205; 74 L. J. Oh. 219 (o) Hardy v. Ryle, (1829) 9 B. & C. 603; 7 L. J. M. C. 118. (p) Harrington {Earl of) v. Derby Corporation, (1905) 1 Ch. 205; 74 L. J. Ch 219 (g) v'iolett V. Sympson, (1857) 8 B. & B. 844; 27 L. J. Q. B. 138; 112 E. E. 591. 184 DISCHARGE OF TORTS. Where no person capable of saing. No suspen- sion after time has once begun to run. subsidence is aji independent cause of action, and may be sued for within the period limited (r), and when the subsidence is a con- tinuing process, each fresh damage caused by its continuance is a fresh wrong (s). But the owner of minerals is not liable for a subsidence caused by the acts of his predecessor in title (t). Though on the other hand assigns of the original freeholder of the surface have a like right of support to that possessed by their assignors (w). The liability of a husband under 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 14, for a pre-matrimonial tort of the wife does not constitute a fresh cause of action. When the action is statute-barred as against the wife it is statute-barred also against the husband (a;). It sometimes happens that there is no person in existence capable of availing himself of a cause of action otherwise complete. In such cases it appears that the statute begins to run not from the time when the wrongful act is done or the damage occurs, but from the time when the plaintiff first acquires title. " It cannot be said that a cause of action exists unless there is also a person in existence capable of suing" (y). Thus, if between the death of an intestate and the taking out letters of administration any act of trespass or trover is done to his chattels, the administrator can sue within six years of grant of administration (a). But the same rule does not apply in the case of an executor, who may commence an action on his title before taking out probate, though he cannot succeed at the trial unless he has proved the will in the interval (a). When the period of limitation once commences it is not broken by any subsequently accruing disabiUty, nor by the fact that for the time being there was nobody in existence who could sue. If a person having a vested cause of action dies before he can commence proceedings, and no personal representative is appointed until the time has expired, the action is barred (b). (r)' Backhouse v. Bonomi, (1858-61) B. B. & E. 622; 9 H. L. C. 503; U L. .T. Q. B. 181; 131 E. B. 305; Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell, (1886) 11 App. Cas. 127. See also Durham C.C. v. South Medomsley Colliery, Ltd., (1916) 80 J. P. 343; 55 h. J. Q. B. 529; and see ante, p. 174. (s) Crumbie v. Wallsend Local Board, (1891) 1 Q. B. 503; 60 L. J. Q. B. 392. (t) Hall v. Norfolk (Duke of), (1900) 2 Ch. 493; 69 L. J. Ch. 571. (u) West Houghton Urban District Council v. Wigan Coal and Iron Co., (1919) 88 L. J. Ch. 60, C. A. (x) Beck V. Pierce, (1889) 23 Q. B. D. 316; 58 L. J. Q. B. 516. (y) Per Cur., Murray v. East India Co., (1821) 5 B. & Aid. p. 214; 24 E. E. 325. (z) Pratt V. Swaine, (18^8) 8 B. & C. 285 ; 6 L. J. K. B. 353. ^) See Williams on Executors, Pt. i. Bk. iv. Ch. i. § ii. See, too, Plant v. Gotterill, (1860) 5 H. & N. 430 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 198, a case of the assignees of a bankrupt suing for a tort committed between the bankruptcy and their appoint- tnent. As to when the statute begins to run in case of a fraudulent pledge of Jeeds, see Spackman v. Foster, (1888) 11 Q. B. D. 99; 52 L. J. Q. B. 418. (b) Rhodes v. Smethurst, (1838-40) 4 M. & W. 42; 7 L. J. Ex. 273; 51 E. E. 461 ; 6 M. & W. 351 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 330 ; 51 E. E. 461 ; Boatwright v. Boatwright, a873) L. E. 17 Eq. 71; 43 L. J. Ch. 12. STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 185 But in the case of a payment of debts charged on real estate the limit is twelve years (c). In computing the time of hmitation the day on which the cause How time of action arose is, as a rule, to be excluded, and the day on which computed. the action is commenced is to be included. The principle is that , " where the act done from which the computation is made is one to which the party against whom it runs is privy, the day of the act done may reasonably be included ; but where it is one to which he is a stranger it ought to be excluded " (d). Moreover, apart from mercantile transactions in the City of London, the word "month" prima facie means a "lunar" and not a " calendar " month, save where the latter is necessarily to be implied from the context (e). Subject to the exception pointed out hereafter, the right to Limitation recover possession of a chattel is not affected by lapse of time. °rove"°"^ °* With regard to realty the law is clear that possession for a sufficient lapse of time confers an indefeasible title. The efiect of 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, is to " make a parliamentary conveyance of the land " (/). The effect of the statute of James, however, is different. It does not bar the right, but the remedy. Thus, in the case of a debt more than six years old, if the defendant does not plead the statute, the law will " treat the debt as an existing obligation, and lend the process of the Court to enforce its discharge " (g), and on the same principle a statute-barred debt may without further consideration be renewed by acknowledgment. It follows, there- fore, that when the owner of a chattel has been wrongfully deprived of it, although by lapse of time he may be prevented from suing the wrong-doer, yet he does not lose his property by mere con- tinuance of dispossession, and consequently he may sue for every fresh wrongful act. Thus in Miller v. Dell (h), A. was possessed of a lease which more than six years before the action had been fraudulently deposited by B. with C. as security for a loan. C. . became bankrupt, and his trustee made over the lease to D. A. thereupon demanded the lease from D., and upon his refusal sued (c) Stephens, In re, (1889) 43 Ch. D. 39 ; 59 L. J. Ch. 109. (d) Per Cur., Hardy v. Ryle, (1829) 9 B. & C. p. 608; 7 L. J. M. C. 118; Freeman v. Bead, (1863) 4 B. & S. 174, Cockbum, C.J., at p. 184; 32 L. J. M. C. 226 ; 129 E. E. 705. (e) Helsham-Jones v. Hennen d Co., (1915) 84 L. J. Ch. 569. (/) Per Parke, B., Doe v. Sumner, (1845) 14 M. & W. p. 42; 14 L. J. Ex. 337; 69 E. E. 653; Trustees of Dundee Harbour v. Dougall, (1852) 1 Macq. H. L. 317. (3) Per Lord Penzance, Coombs v. Coombs, (1866) L. E. 1 P. & D. p. 289; 36 L. J. P. & M. 25. (h) (1891) 1 Q. B. 468 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 404. The reasoning of the case is perfectly general. However, Lord Bsher (pp. 471-2) adverts to the fact that the subject-matter of the rction was a title deed and therefore probably stood on a special footing. It has been said that, the possession of title deeds being simply ancillary to the possession of land, the right to recover the deeds is not lost so long as the right to recover the land remains. See per Pollock, C.B., Plant v. Cotterill, (1860) 5 H. & N. p. 440; 29 L. J. Ex. 198. 186 DISCHARGE OP TORTS. Crown debts. Concealed fraud. him for a conversion, and recovered. It was held that the statute only barred the remedy against B. and C, and that though D. claimed under them, time only began to run in his favour from the date of the wrong which he himself had committed. If, however, one and the same person, being a stranger to the party entitled, is guilty of successive acts of conversion with respect to the same chattel, the period of limitation begins to run from the date of the first act, and is not extended by any subsequent act {ij. It is, however, otherwise as between bailor and bailee. If a bailee is sued for refusing to deliver up to his bail9r the chattel entrusted to him he cannot be heard to say that more than six years before he had converted it to his own use (fc). And where the Crown seeks to enforce a legal liability the Statute of Limitation does not apply (E). Moreover, where a transaction between two parties is tainted by an original misrepresentation by one of them, neither laches nor condonation will be imputed to a plaintiff who has continued to make payments (under protest) after finding out the misrepresenta- tion. Such payments being held not to amount to an affirmation of the contract by him, but as soon as the plaintiff actually becomes aware of the nature of the contract the statute runs against him (m). The mere fact that a person possessing a right of action was unable to sue by reason of his ignorance of his right was not in the Courts of Common Law an answer to a plea of the Statutes of Limitation (n.). The Courts of Equity, however, which did not consider themselves strictly bound by these statutes, introduced an exception in cases of " concealed fraud " (o), which by 3 & 4 Will. IV. o. 27, 8. 26, received a statutory recognition with respect to actions relating to real property. The doctrine of " concealed fraud," or, as it perhaps might be more conveniently termed, fraudulent concealment (p), is that so long as a party is ignorant that he possesses any right at all or knowing of his right is ignorant that it has been infringed, the statute does not run against him, provided that in the first place (t) Philpott V. Kelley, (1835) 3 A. &,E. 106; i L. J. K. B. 139; Wilkinson v. Verity, (1871) L. R. 6 C. P. 206; 40 L. J. C. P. 141. (k) Wilkinson v. Verity, supra. Even if the bailee no longer has the goods in his possession, he may be sued in detinue though the action of trover may be barred {Granger v. George, (1826) 5 B. & C. 149; 29 E. E. 196). (I) J. (a person of unsound mind), In re, (1909) 1 Oh. 574; 78 L. J. Ch. 348, C. A. But this rule is not of universal application in the Colonial Empire of Great Britain. See Secretary of State for India v. Chelikani Rama Rab, (1916) L. E. 43 Ind. App. 192, P. C. (m) Molloy v. Mutual Reserve Life Assurance Co., (1905) 22 T. L. E. 69. in) Imperial Gas Light and Coke Co. v. London Gas Light Co., (1854) 10 Ex. 39; 23 L. J. Ex. 303. (o) This subject is considered more fully below, p. 366. (p) Fraud or fraudulent breach of trust prevents the statute running in favour of a trustee (Trustee Act, 1888, a. 8 (1)). JOINT WRONG-DOERS. 187 his ignorance is not due to his own negligence, and secondly it is due to the misconduct of the person relying on the statute or of some one privy with him (g). Thus it was held that the statute did not run in a case in which an agent, who was an express trustee, aiter receiving moneys on account of his principal, wilfully omitted to account for them (r) ; and proof of one fraudulent overcharge has been held sufficient (s). Where, however, - the "fraud" is neither that of the person setting up the statute nor that of his predecessors in title, s. 26 of the Eeal Property Limitation Act, 1833, does not apply (t). In one case, indeed, it w£is said (u) that a, mining trespass innocently committed was concealed fraud, but this seems altogether opposed to the other authorities (x), and has since been disapproved by the Privy Council (y). The application of the doctrine in common law actions has been discussed in two cases since the Judicature Act {z). It is clear that where the action is brought for relief which was within the original equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, as, for example, an action of fraud, the Chancery decisions apply (a). But it has been denied that their authority extends to actions which could formerly have been brought nowhere but in a Court of Common Law (6). But at the present day as a general proposition alike of law and equity, ' ' where any action is properly described by the statute of James, that statute applies . . whether it is brought in one court or another " (c). The general rule is, that where there ia a joint cause of action joint against two or more persons, a discharge as against one of them wrong-doers. opera,tes as a discharge against all. Thus, if one of two joint tort-feasors (d) be sued, and judgment be recovered against him, although not satisfied, yet the whole of the original cause of action is gone, and the other tort-feasor is free (e). The same rule applies if accord be made with one joint tort-feasor and satisfaction (q) Thome v. Heard, (1895) A. C. 495; 63 L. J. Ch. 356. See below, p. 367. (r) North American Land d: Timber Co. v. Watkins, (1904) 2 Ch. 233; 73 L. J. Ch. 117, 626, C. A. (s) Williamson v. Barbour, (1877) 9-Ch. D. 529; 50 L. J. Ch. 147. (t) McCallum, In re, McCallum v. McCallum, (1900) 49 W. E. 129. (u) Per Malin3, V.-C, Ecclesiastical Commissioners v. North Eastern R. Co., (18?7) 4 Ch. D. p. 860 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 20. (x) Per Kindersley, V.-C, Petre v. Petre, (1852) 1 Drew. p. 397; 94 E. E. 703; Dean v. Thwaite, (1855) 21 Beav. 621; 111 E. E. 228. («) Bulli Coal Mining Go. v. Osborne, (1899) A. C. 351; 68 L. J. P. C. 49. (z) Gibbs v. Guild, (1882) 8 Q. B. T>. 296; 9 Q. B. D. 59; 51 L. J. Q. B. 313; Arrnstrong v. Milburn, (1886) 54 L. T. N. S. 247, 723. See also, Betjemann v. Betjemann, (1895) 2 Ch. 474 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 641, C. A. (a) North American Land d Timber Go. v. Watktns, supra. (b) Per Mathew, J., Armstrong v. Milburn, (1886) 54 L. T. N. S. p. 248. (c) Greaves, In re (1881) 18 Ch. D. 551, at p. 554; 50 L. J. Ch. 817. (d) As to what constitutes a joint tort, see above, pp. 59 et seq. (e) Brown v Wootton, (1604) Cro. Jao. 73 ; Bnnsmead v. Harrison, (1871—2) L E 6 C P 584 7 C P. 547 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 281 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 190. But the obtaining of compensation for an assault against one tort-feasor m a proceeding 188 DISCHARGE OF TOKTS. Covenant not to sue. Different measure of damages. Where one of joint wrong-doers is beyond the seas. Joint plaintiffs. accepted (/), or if he be released under seal (g). But a co-venant not to sue does not get rid of the cause of action, and therefore only operates in favour of the person to whom it is given (h). Where a party purports to release one wrong-doer with a reservation of his right of action agains.t another, this is to be taken as an agreement not to sue rather than as a release (i). It is apprehended that if a tort be waived by electing a different remedy against one of the tort-feasors, the election is binding as against the other (fc). Hardship may sometimes arise from this rule of law. The measure of damages against joint tort-feasors is by no means always the same. One may have acted maliciously, and the other mistakenly (l). Yet, nevertheless, the award of different damages against different tort-feasors in a single cause of action is unjusti- fiable (m), although it is quite possible an injured party may sue and recover moderate damages against a defendant whom he afterwards discovers to have been the mere agent of some person in the background against whom he might have obtained aggravated damages, but he must be content with his first judgment. It does not appear to have been decided how the absence of one joint tort-feasor beyond the seas affects the limitation of the right of action against the other. Before 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 11, it was held that the statute did not run in favour of joint debtors if one of them was beyond the seas, insomuch as both were necessary parties, and moreover it was not just that the creditor should be compelled to sue the one within the seas, and thereby lose his remedy altogether against the other (n). The latter of these reasons would apply to actions against joint tort-feasors. Where two or more persons have a joint action of tort in respect of a joint interest, any one of them may release it, make accord and accept satisfaction, or it is presumed waive it (o). If, however, before a magistrate under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 45, does not discharge the cause of action against another joint tort-feasor. See Dyer v. Munday, (1896) IQ. B. 742; 64 L. J. Q. B. 448. (/) TKurman v. Wild, (1840) 11 A. & E. 453. See Mayor of Salford v. Lever, (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 363; (1891) 1 Q. B. 168; 60 L. J. Q. B. 89. (g) Co. Litt. 232. (fe) Hutton V. Eyre, (1815) 6 Taunt. 289 ; 16 E. E. 619. (») Duck V. Mayeu, (1892) 2 Q. B. 511 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 69. (k) Buckland v. Johnson, (1854) 15 C. B. 145 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 204 ; 100 B. E. 280. This was a converse case, where the plaintiff having sued one tort-feasor in trover was not allowed to sue the other for the money had and received. The reason given by Jervis, C.J., that the judgment in trover changed the property, is wrong. See Brinsmead v. Harrison, (1871) L. E. 6 C. P. p. 589; 40 L. J. C. P. 281. Maule, J., puts the decision on the ground of the election. In Mayor of Salford v. Lever, (1890) 25 Q. B. D. 363; (1891) 1 Q. B. 168 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 39, the remedies of the plaintiff were cumulative and not alternative. (I) See Clark v. Newsam, (1847) 1 Ex. 131; 16 L. J. Ex. 296; 74 E. E. 615. (m) Greenlands, Ltd., v. Wilmshurst, (1913) 3 K. B. 507, C. A. ; 83 L. J. K. B. 1. (n) Fannin v. Anderson, (1845) 7 Q. B. 811; 14 L. J. Q. B. 282; 68 E. E. 573; Towns v. Mead, (1855) 16 C. B. 123; 24 L. J. C. P. 89; 100 E. E. 648. (o) Phillips v. Claggett, (1843) 11 M. & W. 84; 11 L. J. Ex. 349; Wallace v. Kelsall, (1840) 7 M. & W. 264; 10 L. J. Ex. 12; 56 E. E. 707 ; Steeds v. "'- "■ JOINT PLAINTIFFS. 189 he does so in fraud of his co-plainfiffs, and in collusion with the wrong-doer, the fraud is a good equitable reason to prevent the transaction being set up in answer to the action (p). If one of such persons brings an action, although the other May recover parties jointly interested ought to be joined with him, yet if no separately to , , , , til© 6Xt6Ilt objection is taken in the proper way, he can proceed and recover of interest, to the extent of his interest, and the other parties can maintain an action subsequently in respect of their interest. Thus, one of several part owners of a chattel suing by himself in trover is entitled to damages to the value of his share (q). The disability of one of the parties in whom a joint right of Disability action vests does not prevent the statute running, for the party °|''°t"g not under disability may use the name of the other to sue, just as he may release or accept satisfaction on his behalf (r). (1889) 22 Q. B. D. 537 ; is not an authority to the contrary. A compromise of action by one of several co-plaintiffs does not, as of course, entitle him to have his name struck off as a co-plaintiff : Mathews, In re, (1905) 2 Ch. 460 ; 74 L. J. Ch. 656. (p) De Pothonier v. De Mattos, (1858) B. B. & E. 461; 27 L. J. Q. B. 260. (g) Addison v. Overend, (1796) 6 T. E. 766; SedgwoHh v. Overend, (1797) 7 T. E. 279; Bloxam v. Hubbard, (1804) 5 East, 407. See above, pp. 63, 64. See, however, Broadbent v. Ledward, (1839) 11 A. & E. 209 ; 52 E. E. 321. This limitation of damage applies where the part owner seeks to recover on the strength of his title. If he ia in actual possession the rule is probably the same. See this subject discussed telow, pp. 276 et seq. (t) Perry v. Jackson, (1792) 4 T. E., 516 ; 2 E. E. 452. CHAPTER IX. TRESPASS TO THE PERSON. PAGE ' PAGE Battery 190 (b) Arrest for Felony 205 Assault 193 (c) Statutory Powers of Ar- False Imprisonment 194 rest 206 Arrest by Officers of Justice 197 Eecaption 211 Judicial Acts 198 Confinement of Lunatics 212 Valid Pleas in Justification of Domestic Discipline and Parental Trespass to the Person 201 Authority 216 (a) Breach of the Peace 202 Authority of Ship Master 219 Battery. The security of a man's person, which is the most elementary of civil rights, may be directly attacked by actual violence inflicted or menaced, or by a deprivation of liberty. There are accordingly three kinds of trespass to the person — battery, assault, and false imprisonment. 1. Any physical damage to the person immediately caused by the act of a wrong-doer may amount to a battery. Thus, of course, anything that can be called a blow, whether inflicted with hand, weapon, or missile, is a battery. It is a battery to throw water over a man or to spit in his face (a). It is a battery to overturn the chair in which a man is sitting (b). In Dodwell v. Burford (c), the defendant struck the horse which the plaintiff was riding. The latter, having been thrown and injured, recovered in this form of action (d). Hostile It has been already pointed out that a trespass is a direct exercise intent. qJ force to the person or property of another, either negligently or wilfully. If one man fires a gun carelessly and hits another, it is a battery, though he never designed the shot to touch him (e). With regard to those cases where the act is done on purpose, it is frequently said that in order to constitute a battery there must be ' a hostile intent. " The least touching of another in anger is a battery " (/). If a tap be given on the shoulder for the purpose of (o) Pursell V. Horn, (1832) 8 A. & B. 602; Reg. v. Cotesworth, (1704) 6 Mod. 172. (b) Hopper v. Reeve, (1817) 7 Taunt. 698 ; 18 E. E. 629. (c) (1670) 1 Mod. 24. (d) It is said that to forcibly take a chattel from the possession of a man is in itself an assault : per Powell, J., Green v. Goddard, (1704) 2 Salk. 640. (e) Weaver v. Ward, (1616) Hob. 134; see Leame v. Bray, (1803) 3 Bast, 93; 7 E. E. Pref. VII. See above, pp. 8, 9. (/) Per Holt, C.J., Cole v. Turner, (1704) 6 Mod. p. 149. BATTERY. 191 €£Eecting an arrest, and the arrest be unlawful, the mere tap con- stitut«s a battery (g). " If two or more meet in a naiTow passage, and without any violence or design of harm, one touches the other gently, it will be no battery." But " if any of them use violence against the other to force his way in a rude and inordinate manner it will be a battery, or any struggle about the passage to that degree as may do hurt will be a battery "(h). "If one strike another upon the hand or arm, or breast in discourse, it is no assault, there being no intention to assault" (i). On principle, however, it would seem Implied that the true test is not whether a hostile intent on the part of the <'°"^®°''- defendant, but whether an absence of consent on the part of the plaintiff, can be inferred (fc). Where, however, the circumstances are such that the actual assault committed by a properly appointed administrative officer of the Crown is absolutely necessitated by the conduct of the person assaulted, the absence of consent on the part of the latter does not turn a technical battery thus committed by the former into an actionable wrong, provided the assault be limited to that minimum of force which is necessary for effectuating an essential purpose. Thus the forcible feeding, by an administrative prison official, of a recalcitrant prisoner is not an actionable trespass, the obvious duty of preserving the health or the life of those persons properly entrusted into such administrative officer's custody raising a presumption of necessity which will negative the right of action (Z). And a like rule seems to apply where a process-server places the citation inside the coat of the person to be served upon a refusal by the latter to accept service of the document in another manner (m). It is, however, a battery for a medical practitioner to vaccinate a person against his will. And an unauthorised post moHem examination constitutes an actionable wrong, though, of (g) Rawling v. Till, (1837) 3 M. & W. 28 ; 7 L. J, Ex. 6. (h) Per Holt, C.J., Cole v. Turner, (1704) 6 Mod. p. 149. (j) Per Cur., Tuberville v. Savage, (1669) 1 Mod. p. 3. (k) There is perhaps no great practical difference between the two ways of stating the law, but the distinction may be material. In Coward v. Baddeley, (1859) 4 H. & N. 478; 28 L. J. Ex. 260; 118 E. E. 562, the plaintiff sued for an assault and false imprisonment. The defendant justified on the ground that he had been assaulted by the plaintiff. The facts were that the defendant had been engaged in extinguishing a fire, and the plaintiff came up and told him he was managing the hose improperly. The defendant told the plaintiff to mind his own business. The plaintiff then pUt his hands on the defendant's shoulders and turned him round, pointing out all the while how the hose, ought to be managed. The defendant thereupon gave the plaintiff into custody for an assault. The jury were directed that the defendant was not justified unless the plaintiff had acted with hostile intent, and this direction was held correct. But the Court, though holdmg that in the absence of intent there could be no criminal assault such as to justify an arrest seem to have doubted whether under the circumstances the plamtiff might not have been liable to an action of battery ; obviously because the defendant could not have been said under the circumstances to have impliedly assented to the manner in which the plaintiff laid hands on him. ,„„ „ „ , (l) Leigh v. Gladstone and Others, (1909) 26 T. L. E. 139; Rex v. Morton Brown; Ainsworth, Ex parte, (1910) 74 J. P. 53. (m) Rex v. Kempthorne, (1910) 55 S. J. 126. 192 TRESPASS TO THE PERSON. course, it is no battery (w). If one man goes on to the land of his neighbour in a reasonable and peaceable manner for the purpose of speaking to him, it is no trespass, because, although there is no express permission, yet leave and licence may be inferred. In the same way, it may be said, that if one man touches another fof the purpose of calling his attention, there is an implied assent to the act which makes it no battery (o). It is to be observed, however, that under the old forms of pleading a distinction with regard to the defence of consent was made between a trespass to the person and other kinds of trespass. A defendant in trespass to land or goods who relied upon this defence had to confess and avoid by a plea of leave and licence; but in trespass to the person he might prove his case imder the plea of not guilty, inasmuch as it was considered a contradiction in terms to speak of an assault by consent (p). How far It has been doubted whether the maxim of volenti non fit injuria defence ^ applies to all cases of trespass to the person. If two men fight together by agreement for a prize or otherwise and without any animosity against each other, simply for the purpose of testing which is the better boxer, they are clearly both consenting parties to the injuries which they mutually inflict on each other. Nevertheless, their conduct may amount to a breach of the peace, and if so, they may be convicted of an assault (g). This is quite in accordance with the general principles of the criminal law, for the gist of the matter being the injury to the public peace, the consent of the parties is immaterial. It has further been ruled at rdsi prius that for an action founded on a battery criminal in its nature, the defence of consent is not available (r). And the same opinion is expressed in Reg. v. Coney. " The true view is, I think, that a blow struck in anger or which is likely or intended to do corporal hurt is an assault, but that a blow struck in sport and not likely nor intended to cause bodily harm is not an assault, and that an assault being a breach of the peace and unlawful the consent of the person struck is immaterial " (s). It is not, however, in every case that a criminal offence causing damage to another is a ground of action. Thus, a forcible entry is an indictable ofience, but if the party so entering has the right of possession he is not, it would seem, civilly respon- (n) Hughes v. Robertson, (1913) S. C. 394, Ct. of Sess. (o) Force majeure also constitutes a, defence : Holmes v. Maiherd, (1875) L. B. 10 Ex. 261; 44 L. J. Ex. 176. (p) Ghristopherson v. Bare, (1848) 11 Q. B. 473; 17 L. J. Q. B. 109; 75 B. B. 454. (g) Reg. v. Coney, (1882) 8 Q. B. D. 534 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 66. (r) Boulter v. Clerk, (1747) BuUer, N. P. p. 16. See, too, Matthew v. Oiler- ton, (1693) Comb. 218. (s) Per Cave, J., (1882) 8 Q. B. D. p. 539; 51 L. J. M. C. 66. See, however, per Hawkins, J., ibid. 8 Q. B. D., p. 563. ASSAULT. 193 sible {t). Nor in the case under consideration does there seem any reason why the plaintiff should be in a better position because he was a party to the crime. If two men are guilty of indecent con- duct towards each other they commit a misdemeanour, but it would seem strange to allow them for such conduct reciprocally to bring actions. A summary conviction for assault is, however, no bar to the person convicted subsequently instituting a civil action for damages against the prosecutor for an alleged antecedent assault by him (w). A consent induced by the fraud of the person doing the act is a Consent mere nullity, where the misapprehension of the consenting party '°d"?^'l ''y goes to the root of the whole transaction, and alters the whole nature and quality of the act done. Thus, where a girl allowed a man to have carnal knowledge of her under the belief that she was sub- mitting to a surgical operation, it was held that he was guilty of a rape («). It has, however, been held by Ridley, J., in the more recent ease of Reg. v. O'Shay (y), that if a woman, even though induced by fraudulent misrepresentation, gives conscious permission to the act of connection, the offence does not amount to rape. And a mere mistake as to the effect and consequences of the act done does not annul the assent so as to make the act an assault. If one man administers a poison to another who takes it in ignorance of its noxious character, this is no trespass at common law, although he may be found guilty of a graver charge. The same rule applies where contagion is conveyed by physical contact. If there is con- sent to the contact the remedy for the wrong, however great, cannot be obtained in this form of action (2). 2. An assault may be defined as an attempted battery. That is Assault. to say, there must be an overt act indicating an intention to commit a battery, coupled with the capacity of carrying that intention into effect (a). There are obvious reasons why in dealing with security of the person the law should treat the mere attempt as a substantive wrong. " If you direct a weapon, or if you raise your fist, within those limits which give you the means of striking, that may be an assault ; but if you simply say, at such a distance as that at which you cannot commit an assault, ' I will commit an assalalt,' I think that is not an assault " (ib). It is an assault to present a gun in a hostile manner within shooting distance, although it may be at half- (f) See per Parke, B., Harvey v. Brydges, (1845) U M. & W. p. 442; 14 L. J. Ex. 271; 69 B. E. 718. See below, pp. 329, et seq. (u) Wilson V Bennett, (1904) 6 F. 269, Ct. of Sess. (x) R. V. Flattery, (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 410 ; 46 L. J. M. C. 130. iy) (1898) 19 Cox, C. C. 76 ,„ „ .r t n.^ ^ m a (z) B. V Clarence, (1888) 22 Q. B. D. 23, at p. 42; 57 L. J. M. C. 10. See Hegarty v. Shine, (1878) 14 Cox, C. C. 124, 145. „o t, -d r,an (a) Read v. Coker, (1853) 13 C. B. 850; 22 L. J. C. P. 201; 93 E. E. 769. (b) Per Pollock, C.B., Cobbett v. Grey, (1849-50) 4 Ex. p. 744; 19 L. J. Ex. 137. CT. ^^ 194 TRESPASS, TO THE PERSON. cock, because the cocking is a momentary operation (c). There may be an assault although the defendant is not within striking distance, as, for instance, if he makes a rush at the plaintiff but is stopped before he is near enough to deal, a blow (d). In Mortin v. Shoppee (e), the defendant pursued the plaintiff with an uphfted whip intending to strike him, but the latter made his escape, and it was held an assault. A mere gesture, however menacing, is not actionable if it appear at the time that there is no intention to put the menace into immediate effect. In Tuberville v. Savage (/), the defendant put his hand to his sword and said, " If it were not assize time I would not take such language from you." It was held to be no assault. False im- 3. A false imprisonment is complete deprivation of liberty for prisonment. ^j^g ^jj^^ being without lawful cause. The prisoner may be con- fined within a definite space by being put under lock and key, or his movements may simply be constrained by the will of another. The constraint may be actual physical force, or merely the appre- hension of such force, or it may be submission to a legal process {g). But merely giving a person in charge without actual arrest, is not an imprisonment which will support an action {h). Nor is it imprisonment to compel a person to proceed in a certain direc- tion (i). Nor does a refusal to afford facilities to a person to leave an enclosed place by parties who were under no contractual obliga- tion towards the person detained constitute grounds for an action for false imprisonment (fe). If a writ or warrant for a man's appre- hension is exhibited to him, and he thereupon for the time submits himself to the orders of the officer executing it, he becomes a prisoner though his person be never touched (I). . In Arrowsmith v. Le Mesurier (m), a constable was entrusted with a warrant for the apprehension of the plaintiff. He showed the warrant, and the plaintiff afterwards accompanied him before a magistrate. It was held that there had been no intention to apprehend on the one hand or submission to arrest on the other, that the warrant had been simply used as a summons to indicate to the plaintiff that he was required to appear to the charge, and that consequently there had been no arrest. In Berry v. Adamson (n), the plaintifi sued (c) Per Willes, J., Oshom v. Veiteh, (1858) 1 F. & F. p. 318; 115 E. B. 914. (d) Stephens v. Myers, (1830) 4 C. & P. 349; 34 E. E. 811. (e) (1828) 3 C. &*P. 373; 33 E. E. 682. (/) (1669) 1 Mod. 3. (g) Warner v. Biddiford, (1858) 4 C. B. N. S. 180; 114 E. E. 658. (h) Simpson v. Hill, (1795) 1 Esp. 431. (t) Bird V. Jones, (1845) 7 Q. B. 742, at p. 752; 15 L. J. Q. B. 82; 68 E. E. 564. (k) Herd v. Weardale Steel, Coal S Coke Co., (1915) A. C. 67, H. L. (B.) ; 84 L.J. K. B. 121. See also Bums v. Johnston, (1916) 2 Ir. E. 444. (0 Grainger v. Hill, (1838) 4 Bing. N. C. 212 ; 7 L. J. C. P.. 85. (to) (1806) 2 B. & P. N. E. 211 ; 9 E. E. 642. (n) (1827) 6 B. & C. 528 ; 5 L. J. K. B. 215. FALSE IMPRISONMENT. 195 for a malicious arrest. A writ had been placed in the hands of a sheriff's officer, who gave him notice of it and asked him to attend and give a bail bond, which the plaintiff did. He was non-suited on the ground that this did not amount to an arrest. A mere partial interference with freedom of locomotion does not amount to an imprisonment. If a road is blocked so that a man is thereby pre- vented from exercising a right of way and he is compelled to return on his steps, it cannot be said that he has thereby been made a prisoner (o). And a Eke rule has been held to apply where a person who had paid a reasonable and legal charge for access to a pier refused to pay a similar and lawfully leviable sum for egress therefrom, and in consequence of such refusal was temporarily prevented by the officials of the pier company from leaving the premises (p). The above decision must, however, be distinguished from the case of officials of a British railway company refusing to permit a railway passenger to leave the company's premises without either delivering up his ticket or paying his fare. And trespass lies for procuring by awe, fear, influence and contrary to his own inclination a sovereign independent absolute prince to imprison a subject of the British Crown (q). Any one, including a corporation (?•), who either initiates or helps Continuance to continue a wrongful detention, is guilty of false imprisonment, °* imprison- though he be not responsible for the original wrong (s). If a prisoner in lawful custody acquires a right to his discharge, the failure of the person who has him in charge to let him go constitutes a false imprisonment (i). And it is no justification in an action for false imprisonment for the defendant to prove some grounds of suspicion against the plaintiff, for suspicion only, without the actual com- mission of a felony, is no excuse for an arrest (m). If there is authority to confine a prisoner in one place and Imprison- he be confined in another, this is a wrongful confijaement. In ^^j^g^j'geJ'' Cobbett V. Orey (x), the plaintiff being in custody as an insolvent place, had been improperly removed to a wrong part of the prison and confined among a wrong class of prisoners. The majority of the (o) Bird v. Jones, (1845) 7 Q. B. 742 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 82 ; 68 E. E. 564. And see Meeting v. Graham-White Aviation Co., (1920) 122 L. J. 44, C. A. (p) Robinson v. Balmain New Ferry Co., (1910) A. C. 295;. 79 L. J. P. C. 84, P. C. (o) Rafael v. Verelst, 2 Wm. Bl. 983, 1053. (r) Cornford v. Carlton Bank, Ltd., (1900) 1 Q. B. 22; 69 LI J. Q. B. 1020; and see Lambert v. Great Eastern R. Co., (1909) 2 K. B. 776; 79 L. J. K. B. 32, (*) Griffin v. Coleman, (1859) 4 H. & N. 265; 28 L. J. Ex. 134; 118 E. E. 426. Except where in the course of duty he acts under a warrant good on the face of it. See Ch. XXII. , ' ' „ , .„ „„„„, (t) Wvthers v. Henley, (1614) Cro. Jac. 379. See Migotti v. Colvill, (1879) 4 C P D 233; 48 L J. C. P. 695; Mee v. Cruikshank, (1902) 86 L. T. 708. («) Walters V. Smith, (1914) 1 K. B. 595; 83 L. J. K. B. 335. (x) (1849-50) 4 Ex. 729; 19 L. J. Ex. 137; see Bac. Ab. Trespass, D. 3. 196 TRESPASS TO THE PERSON. Agency of an officer of the law. Ministerial and judicial proceedings. Court held that this was a trespass. Pollock, C.B., however, dis- sented on the ground that the governor of the jail had general authority to confine him within the walls of the prison, and that if he had neglected the rules with regard to the classification of prisoners, this was a breach of his official duty for which he might be responsible to his superiors, but not in an action of trespass at the suit of each prisoner aggrieved. The question of responsibility of a defendant for a trespass in which- he has not personally participated, but which is alleged to have been committed by his authority, is dealt with elsewhere in the chapter on Parties. There is, however, a special kind of agency which it is convenient here to consider. An act amounting to a trespass may have been committed through the instrumentality of some officer or minister of the law, and it may be sought in con- sequence to charge some party as principal because he initiated the proceedings under which the alleged wrong was inflicted. Legal proceedings may be either ministerial or judicial. In case of the former, the party employs the machinery of the law entirely at his own risk, and is directly responsible for the consequences. In case of the Tatter, he appeals to the discretion of some judge or magistrate, and the steps thereupon taken result immediately from the exercise of that discretion and not from the act of the party {y). Under such circumstances a man may indeed be liable in an action of malicious prosecution if he has wrongfully set the law in motion, but he cannot be sued in an action of trespass, which is only the remedy for a direct and immediate wrong (z). If a party is arrested without a warrant and taken before a magistrate, who thereupon remands him, he must seek his remedy for the first imprisonment in an action of trespass, for the imprison- ment on remand in an action for malicious prosecution (a). The distinction between a ministerial and judicial act is illustrated by the case of Brown v. Chapinan (b). The plaintiff had gone before a magistrate voluntarily to meet any charge which the defendant might bring against him. The magistrate declined to deal with the case unless a definite charge was made. The defendant said that the plaintiff had been embezzling. The magis- trate said, "Do you give him into custody?" The defendant replied, " I do give him into custody." It was held that he was not liable in an action of trespass, because the imprisonment was the judicial act of the magistrate. " The particular expression," (y) Austin v. Dowling, (1870) L. B. 5 C. P. 534; 39 L. J. C. P. 225. (z) See Bayson v. South London Tramways Co., (1893) 2 Q. B. 304; 62 L. J. Q. B. 593, C. A. Compare Wi^en v. Bailey and Romford U. D. C, (1915) 1 K. B. 600, C. A. ; 84 L. J. K. B. 688. (a) Lock V. Ashton, (1848) 12 Q. B. 871 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 76 ; 76 E. E. 434. (b) (1848) 6 C. B. 365; 17 L. J. C. P. 329; 77 E. E. 347. ARREST BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE. 197 said the Court, " which alone can properly be argued to be evidence of an authority given by the defendant for the imprisonment of the plaintiff was addressed to the magistrate, and no other person could properly act upon it; and we think that such an expression used by a party to a magistrate in the course of preferring a charge cannot be considered as constituting the magistrate the agent of the suitor or as calling upon him to act ministerially upon the authority of such suitor " (c). On the same principle, if the authorities of a foreign State acting on their own judgment corporally punish a man, no action of trespass lies against the instigator of the proceedings, however wrong or malicious his conduct may have been. In Rafwel v. Verelst (d), however, where the plaintiff had been imprisoned by a sovereign Indian prince, who, as the jury found, " was under the awe and influence of the defendant and acted contrary to his own inclination, being fearful of offending him," it was held that, the prince having acted merely as agent of the defendant, the latter was answerable in trespass. In Aitken v. Bedwell (e) the plaintiff had been handed over by his captain, the defendant, in a Eussian port to the authorities on a charge of misconduct. After some days he was brought out and flogged by Eussian soldiers, the defendant standing by and ordering the punishment. It was left to the jury to say " whether the punishment was done by the constituted authorities on the mere complaint of the defendant, or whether the defendant was the actor and immediate promoter. If the arrest or other trespass is effected by a purely ministerial Arrests by ofl&cer and not under the authority of any Court, the defendant ^°era*"* must clearly be answerable if he in fact authorised the act in question. It is not necessary that he should in terms have made a request or demand ; it is enough if he makes a charge on which it becomes the duty of the constable to act (/). But it is quite a different thing if a party simply gives information, and the constable thereupon acts according to his own judgment, and in such a case the informer incurs no responsibility (g). But if a railway constable, appointed under a private Act, make an arrest on suspicion of felony, without reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person arrested was guilty, an action for false imprisonment will lie against the company (h). (c) 6 C. B. p. 376; 77 L. J. C. P. 329; 77 E. E. 347. (d) (1776) 2 W. Bl. 1055. . E. 5 Q. B. 203; 39 L. J. Q. B. 144. is) Brown v. Jones, (1846) 15 M. & W. 191 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 210; Bates v. Pilling, (1826) 6 B. & C. 38; 5 L. J. K. B. 40; Barker v. Braham, (1773) 3 Wils. 368; see Parsons v. Lloyd, (1772) ibid, 341. it) (1863) 14 C. B. N. S. 596; 135 E. E. 830. 200 TRESPASS TO THE PERSON. Besponsi- bility of solicitor. Eemedy where prooeedings cannot be set aside. Imprison- ment under judge's order. Party personally intervening. result of the prosecution Tias shown that there was no ground for it (u). Both the party and his solicitor are answerable for what is done under a process improperly taken out and subsequently avoided (x). It is not in every case that irregular proceedings will be set aside. Thus where an execution has been taken out contrary to good faith for a sum greater than is really due, it is allowed to stand if in accordance with the judgment, but the injured party may have his remedy in an action on the case for any special damage caused (y). So formerly if a party had been wrongfully arrested on mesne process or after judgment on a ca. sa., he did not apply to set the proceedings aside and recover for the false imprisonment, but alleged the arrest as a damage consequential on proceedings instituted maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause. The power of imprisonment in respect of debt, whether before or after judgment, now depends upon the provisions of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62 (z). It can only be exercised judicially and upon sworn information. Therefore, however wrongfully and fraudulently the judge's order may have been obtained, it is nevertheless a purely judicial act, and consequently an arrest in pursuance of it cannot be a trespass, and the injured party must sue for maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause procuring the order (a), and this action will lie against a limited company or a corporation as well as against an individual (6). However, just as a party may make himself liable for what is done under process issued without jurisdiction by officiously intervening in its execution (c), so where the process is within the jurisdiction of the Court, if he takes on himself to give orders or directions to the officer entrusted with its execution, and in consequence of those orders and directions a wrongful act is com- mitted, he will be liable, since he will have made the officer his agent to do that very thing (d), and this hability attaches by (u) Metropolitan Bank v. Pooley, (1885) 10 A. C. 210, at p. 216; 54 L. J. Q. B. 449. (x) Bates v. Pilling, (1826) 6 B. & C. 38 ; 5 L. J. K. B. 40; Barker v. Braham, (1773) 3 Wils. 368; Codrington v. Lloyd, (1839) 8 A. & B. 449; 8 L. J. Q. B. 41; and see Edwards, Ex parte. Chapman, in re, (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 747. (y) Gilding v. Eyre, (1861) 10 C. B. N. S. 592; 31 L. J. C. P. 174; Churchill v. Siggers, (1854) 3 E. & B. 929 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 308. See Ch. XIX. It is doubtful, in the absence of special damage, if action will lie for maliciously presenting a bankruptcy petition, Wyatt v. Palmer, (1899) 2 Q. B. 106 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 709, C. A. (z) This Act is much varied by the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, and the Indictments Act, 1915. (a) Por instances of this kind of action, see Petrie v. Lamont, (1842) 3 M. & G- 702; Ross v. Norman, (1860) 5 Ex. 359; 19 L. J. Ex. 329. See Ch. XIX. (b) Cornford v. Carlton Bank, (1899) 1 Q. B. 392; 68 L. J. Q. B. 196; affirmed on other grounds, (1900) 1 Q. B. 22; 69 L. J. Q. B. 1020, C. A. (c) See above, pp. 198, 199. (d) Sowell v. Champion, (1837) 6 A. & E. 407; 7 L. J. K. B. 197; 45 E. E. 514. JUSTIFICATION OF TRESPASS. 201 relation to the principal of an agent who has acted illegally (e). But, on the other hand, where a person simply gives advice or information to the officer or urges him to do that which it is his duty to do, he does not thereby become the author of the subsequent proceedings (/). It is not always very easy to draw a distinction between what is What is an mere advice and what is a direction. The question is one of fact, intervention. In Morris v. Salberg (g), the plaintiff's goods had been seized under a writ of jfi. fa. directed against his son. The solicitor of the defendant, the execution creditor, had indorsed on the writ, " The defendant is a gentleman who resides at Samau Park, Llandyssil, Cardigan, in your bailiwick." The address sp given was that of the father, and not that of the son. The jury found that the sheriff seized the goods because he was misled by the direction given to him. It was held that the jury had found in effect that the sheriS had acted under the direction of the defendant, that the question was one for them, although it turned in reality on the construction of a written document. The plaintiff accordingly recovered judgment. If the execution creditor positively affirm to the officer of the Court that a certain person is the man, or that certain goods are the property of the man against whom the process issues, that amounts to an authority to the officer, and the creditor is answerable for the consequences of obeying his direction (/i). If no previous authority has been given a party does not become ^^ ratifica- liable by subsequently availing himself of the execution. A man tionofunlaw- can only ratify where the act has been done at the time in his j^jgg name. But a ministerial officer of justice purports to act in the name of the Court to which he belongs and not in the name of the suitor (i). A trespass to the person may be justified on the ground (1) that justification the defendant was acting in defence of his person or property; of trespass. (2) that he was stopping a breach of the peace, putting down a riot, or apprehending an offender against the criminal law ; (3) that the plaintiff had escaped from lawful custody ; (4) that the defendant was acting in aid of officers of the law; (5) that the plaintifi was in such a state as to be dangerous to himself and others; (6) that the defendant was administering reasonable chastisement in the exercise of parental or other authority. In all these cases what is (e) Morris v. Salberg, (1889) 22 Q. B. D. 614; 58 L. J. Q. B. 275, C. A. (/) Conshaw v. Chapman, (1862) 7 H. & N. 911. (a) (1889) 22 Q. B. D. 614; 58 L. J. Q. B. 275. This case overrules Childers v. Wooler, (1859) 2 B. & B. 287; 29 L. J. Q. B. 129; 119 E. E. 725. (h) Humphrys v. Pratt, (1831) 5 Bligh. N. E. 154; 35 E. E. 41; Walley v. M'Connel (1849) 13 Q. B. 903; 19 L. J. Q. B. 162; 78 E. E. 552. (TmisonTTurnman, (1843) 6 M. & G. 236 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 306 ; 64 E. E. 770 ; Woollen v. Wright, (1862) 1 H. & C. 554; 31 L. J. Ex. 513. As for the respon- sibility of officers of justice, whether judicial or ministerial, see Gh. XXll. 202 TRESPASS TO THE PERSON. Use of force In defence of person or property. In support of criminal law. In cases of breaches of the peace. prima facie a wrongful act is committed under the authority of the law, and if this authority is abused, it altogether fails as a protection, and the party is liable not merely in respect of the way in which he exceeded his right, but also for all that he did in exercise of the right. He is said to be a trespasser ab initio, on the assumption that his subsequent misconduct evidences an intention from the first to commit unlawful acts under the colour of a lawful authority (fc). This artificial assumption in many cases does not accord with the real justice of the case. If a schoolmaster unmerci- fully beats a pupil, it is reasonable enough that he should be made to pay damages as for an entirely unauthorised assault, without taking into account the fact that he was entitled to inflict some punishment (I). But if a person, having taken a horse under distress darmige feasant, subsequently works it, it would appear more just to exact from him adequate compensation than to make him liable in trespass for the original taking as unlawful ab initio. If A. being in lawful custody is detained after he has acquired a right to discharge, this, as has already been seen, is treated as a fresh imprisonment, and does not make the prior imprisonment unlawful, for it is said that in such a case unlawful prolongation cannot have been contemplated on the original arrest (m). 1. The question of the lawfulness of the use of force in defence of person or property is considered elsewhere (n). 2. The right and duty of using force towards, and apprehending without warrant, persons offending or- suspected of oiJending against the criminal law is given both by common law and st-atute, in some cases to all members of the public, in others to owners and custodians of property, in others to persons filling certain special positions, and in particular to officers of the peace (o). Any person may forcibly interpose to stop a breach of the. peace while continuing, or to prevent its renewal. He niay apprehend any one engaged in breaking the peace, and having done so it is his duty to hand over the prisoner to a constable or himself to take him before a justice of the peace, who may enquire into the matter and bind over the offender to keep the peace or otherwise deal with him according to the law (p). But. the person so interposing is only justified if he himself is the witness of the disturbance; (/c) Six Carpenters' ease, (1610) 8 Rep. 146 a. (I) As to the right of an assistant teacher in a public elementary school to inflict corporal punishment, see Mansell v. Griffin, (1908) 1 K. B. 160; affirmed, (1908) 1 K. B. 947; 77 L. J. K. 6. 676, C.^A.. (m) Smith v. Egginton, (1837) 7 A. & E. 167; 6 L. J. K. B. 206. See also as to illegal detention subsequent to an originally lawful custody, Mee v. Cruikshank, (1902) 86 L. T. 708. (n) See above, pp. 155* 156. (o) As to this last class of persons see Ch. XXII. (p) Larceny Act, 1861, s. 103 (incorporated in 38 & 39 Vict. c. 25, s. 12), and see Griffith v. Taylor, (1876) 2 C. P. D. 194; 46 L. J. C. P. 15. BREACH OF THE PEACE. 203 he cannot act on the information of others (g). " It is unquestion- able that any bystander may and ought to interfere to part those who make an affray and to stay those who are going to join in it, till the affray be ended. It is also clearly laid down that he may arrest the affrayers and detain them until the heat be over, and then deliver them to a constable. . . . And if that be so, what reason can there be why he may not arrest an affrayer after the actual violence is over, but whilst he shows a disposition to renew it by persisting in remaining on the spot where he has committed it? Both cases fall within the same principle, which is that for the sake of the preservation of the peace any individual who sees it broken may restraui the liberty of him; whom he sees breaking it, so long as his conduct shows that the public peace is likely to be endangered by his acts. In truth, while those are assembled together who have committed acts of violence and the danger of their renewal continues, the aiiray itself may be said to con- tinue " (r). But when once the danger is over the right is gone (s). If a man having committed a breach of the peace runs off, he cannot without warrant be apprehended, however fresh the pursuit and immediate the capture. It is not necessary for a bystander who finds two people fighting together to enquire which was the aggressor. He may arrest either of them if it is reasonably requisite to do so in order to prevent a continuance of the affray (t). A breach of the peace -takes place when either an actual assault What is a is committed on an individual or public alarm and excitement is ^^^^'^^ °* ^-^^ peace, caused. Mere annoyance or insult to an individual, stopping short of actual personal violence, is not a breach of the peace. Thus a householder — apart from special police legislation — cannot give a man into custody for violently and persistently ringing his door- bell (u). But it is a breach of the peace to collect a number of persons before a man's house and to use violent and abusive language, or otherwise behave in a disorderly manner, because public excitement may be thereby created and a riot ensue (x). It (5) A constable on the other hand can act on what he hears (see Ch. XXII.), though at common law he is not entitled to arrest for a mere assault that he has not witnessed (Coupey v. Henley, (1797) 2 Esp. 540). The word "immediately" where used in 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 103, means immediately after the commission of an offence, and not immediately after its discovery ■ Downing v. Capel, (1867) L. E. 2 C. P. 461 ; 36 L. J. M. C. 97. (r) Per Cur., Timothy v. Simpson, (1835) 1 C. M. & E. pp. 762-8; 4 L. J. N. S. Ex. 81 ; 40 E. E. 722. is) Baynes v. Brewster, (1841) 2 Q. B. 375 ; 11 L. J. M. C. 6 ; 57 E. E. 707. ■ (t) Timothy v. Simpson, (1835) 1 C. M. & E. 757 ; 4 L. J. Ex. 81 ; 40 E. E. 722 ; Baynes v. Brewster, (1841) 2 Q. B. 375; 11 L. J. M. 0. 5; 57 E. E. 707; Ingle v. Bell, (1836) 1 M. & W. 516; 6 L. J. M. C. 85. (u) Grant v. Moser, (1843) 5 M. & G. 123; 12 L. J. C. P. 146; 63 E. E. 236. (s) Cohen v. Huskisson, (1837) 2 M. & W. 477 ; 6 L. J. M. C. 133; 46 E..E. 660; Ingle v Bell, (1836) 1 M. & W. 516; 5 L. J. M. C. 85; Webster v. Watts, (1847) 11 Q. B. 311; 17 L. J. Q. B. 73; 75 E. E. 393. 204 TEESPASS TO THE PERSON. Degree of force lawful. Use of mili- tary forces. is not a sufficient justification of an airest to plead that the plaintiff was " in heat and fury ready and desirous to make an affray and commit a breach of the peace," but the plea is good if it allege that his conduct was such as to alarm Etnd disquiet the neighbour- hood (y). Mere noise and interruption at a public meeting do not of themselves constitute a breach of the peace, but it is otherwise if the disturbance amount to the obstruction of a public officer in the execution of his duty (z) ; and it is now a statutory offence to act in a disorderly manner at a public meeting for the purpose of preventing the transaction of the business for which the meeting was called together (a). It is only lawful to use such violence as is reasonably necessary to restrain the offending party from executing further disturbance. The proper plea is that in the first instance the defendant molliter nrnnus imposuit (b). But in face of public tumult and violence it is the right and duty of all citizens to unite in putting it down, and for this purpose to use all necessary force, even to the" taking of life. " Every one is bound to aid in the suppression of riotous dis- turbances. The degree of force which may be lawfully used in their suppression depends upon the nature of such riot, for the force used must always be moderated and proportional to the circumstances of the case and of the end to be obtained. The taking of life can only be justified by the necessity for protecting persons and property against various forms of violent crime, or by the necessity of dispersing a riotous crowd which is dangerous unless dispersed, or in the case of persons whose conduct has become felonious through disobedience to the provisions of the Eiot Act and who resist the attempt to disperse or apprehend them " (c). And justices have jurisdiction in cases where the speaker at a meeting in a public place uses language tending to a breach of the peace to order him to enter into recognisances to be of good behaviour (d). If the military forces of the Crown are employed in suppressing a riot their status is that of ordinary citizens. The fact that they possess special arms and organisation is simply a reason for not iy) Wheeler v. Whiting, (1840) 9 C. & P. 262 ; 62 E. E. 749; Howell v. Jackson, (1834) 6 C. & P. 723 ; 40 E. E. 844. (z) SpiUbury v. Micklethwaite, (1808) 1 Taunt. 146 ; 9 E. K. 717 ; Wooding V. Oxley, (1839) 9 C. & P. 1. As to what amounts to obstructing apprehension, see Beg. v. Green, (1861) 8 Cox, C. C. 441. (a) The Public Meeting Act, 1908 (8 Edw. VII. c. 66). (b) BuUen & Leake, 3rd ed. p. 797, 6th ed. p. 928, 7th ed. p. 845, et seq. As to justification for handcuffing, see Reg. v. Taylor, (1895) 69 J. P. 393. (c) Eeport on the Featherstone Eiots, pp. 9, 10, Parliamentary Papers, 1898. The late Lord Bowen was the principal author of this Eeport. (d) Wise V. Dunning, (1901) 20 Cox, C. C. 121. ARREST FOR FELONY. 205 lightly employing them (e). It is sometimes .supposed that it is never lawful to fire at a mob until the Riot Act has been read, or, at any rate, until a magistrate's order has been given. This, however, is erroneous. "No officer is justified by English law in standing by and allowing felonious outrage to be committed merely because of a magistrate's absence. . . . An order from a magistrate who is present is required by military regulations (/), and wisdom and discretion are entirely in favour of such a practice. But the order of the magistrate at law has no legal effect. Its presence does not justify the firing if the magistrate is wrong, its absence does not excuse the officer in declining to fire when the necessity exists " (g). It must frequently happen that in the suppression of a riot the innocent suffer along with the guilty. But if the force used is reasonable and proper under the circumstances, the person employing it is none the less protected, though he may cause damage to one entirely guiltless of participation in the misconduct of the mob (h). If a felony or treason has in fact been committed, it is lawful Where felony to arrest and take before the magistrate any one suspected on committed, reasonable and probable grounds of being the guilty person (t). But in order to justify one citizen in arresting another on suspicion of having committed a felony there must be (a) a reasonable suspicion of actual felony, i.e., an actual and reasonable suspicion that the person has committed felony, and (b) reasonable ground; for suspecting that a felony has in fact been committed (k). The question of reasonableness is one for the judge to decide as in an action of malicious prosecution (I), but the burden of proof is different. A defendant who justifies an arrest has to prove affirmatively that he acted on good grounds (m). And malice in fact need not be proved by the plaintiff (n-). But proof of malice (e) Eeport on Peatherstone Riots; see also R. v. Pinney, (1832) 5 C. & P. 254; 26 E. B. 375 ; Bedford v. Birley, (1822) 3 Stark. 76. if) King's Begulations, 1912, 955—957. (g) Eeport on the Featherstone Eiots, p. 10. See also, King's Eegulations, 1912, 962. As to claims for compensation for damage to property through riot or other civil disturbances, see Glamorgan Coal Go. v. Standing Joint Committee, Glamorgan Quarter Sessions S C. C, (1915) 1 K. B. 884; 84 L. J. K. B. 362. (h) See Baxter v. Oliver, " Times," June 17th, 1892. For compensation see- Eiot (Damages) Act, 1886 (49 & 50 Vict. c. 38). (i) 2 Inst. p. 52, per Lord Tenterden, Beekwith v. Philby, (1827) 6 B. & C. p 638; 5 L. J. M. C. 132; 30 E. E. 484. A constable can act on reasonable suspicion even though no offence has been committed. Ibid. See Ch. XXII. (fe) Walters v. W. H. Smith d 'Son, Ltd., (1914) 1 K. B. 595; 83 L. J. '(/) ' Lister v. Ferryman, (1870) L. E. 4 H. L. 521 ; -39 L. J. Ex. 177. See also Brown v. Hawkes, (1891) 2 Q. B. 718; 61 L. J. Q. B. 151., As to what .s reasonable, see Ch. XIX. ,,nrvii i t^ t> (w) Allen V. Wnght, (1838) 8 C. & P. 522 ; Hanson v. Waller, (1901) 1 K. B, ^^%)''sh^arlr v.' Fhieul', (1914) A. C. 808, H. L. (Sc); 83 L. J. P. C. 216. 206 TRESPASS TO THE PERSON. To prevent deadly injury, treason or felony. In case of misde- meanour. Statutory powers. Vagrant Act. Poaching. is no evidenee of want of probable cause (o). A plaintiff who alleges himsie'lf injured by a legal process has to establish a negative and show that the proceedings against him were destitute of foundation. It is an d fortiori case .that an actual felon may be arrested, and for this purpose it' appears that after demand and refusal it is lawful to break open the outer door of a dwelling- house (p). It is lawful to arrest in order to prevent a deadly injury being inflicted, or a treason or felony being, committed, and in this case also an outer door may be broken for the purpose of effecting the arrest (q). .But as this power is given rather for the prevention than for the punishment of crime, it would seem that unless the arrested person has actually broken the peace he cannot be detained after the danger is over. There is no authority at comrnon law to arrest without warrant on suspicion of misdemeanour, although a misdemeEinour has in fact been committed, nor although the party arrested be actually guilty (r). It is indeed said in Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown that in certain cases an offending party may be detained if caught in the act (s). There appears, however, to be no case in which this statement of the law has been acted upon. It is also said that suspicious nightwalkers may be arrested (t), biit this again can hardly be accepted as an accurate statement of the law in the present day. However, by statute very extensive power is given to private individuals of arresting in case of misdemeanour. By the Vagrant Act (u) any person may apprehend any person found offending against the Act, and forthwith take him before a justice of the peace or deliver him to^ a constable. By 9 Geo. IV. c. 69, s. 2, night (x) poaohers found committing the offence may be arrested either immediately or on pursuit by owners and occupiers of land, lords of manors, and their servants, and taken before a magistrate. By 1 & 2 Will. IV. o. 32, s. 31, any person found trespa,ssing in pursuit of game at any time may be required to give his naihe and quit the land. If he refuses to do either he may be arrested by persons occupying or possessing sporting rights over land, and their servants, and taken before a magistrate. (o) Turner v. Turner, (1818) Gow. 20 (N. P. B.). (p) Hale, P. C, Vol. 2, p. 77 sgg.; Fost. C. C. 320. (g) Handcopk v. Baker, (1800) 2 B. & P. 260; 5 E. E. 587; Hawkins, P. C, 7th ed.. Vol. 3, p. 183. (r) Per Tjndal, C.J., Mathews v. BidduJpt, (1841) 8 M. & G. p. 39S; 11 L. J. M. Q. 13; 60 E. E. 532; Griffin v. Coleman, (1859) 4 H. & N. 265; 28 L. J. Ex. 134; 118 E. E. 426. See Fox v. Gaunt, (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 798; Bast, P. C, Vol. 1, p. 303; 1 L. J. K. B. 198; 37 E. E. 550. (s) 8th ed. Vol. 2, p. 120. (t) Ibid. ; and see Lawrence v. Hedger, (1810) 3 Taunt. 14; 12 E. E. 571. («) 5 Geo. IV. c. 83, s. 6. (x) The time is defined by s. 12. STATUTORY POWERS OF ARREST. 207 By the Lighting and Watching Act (j/) persons who wilfully Lighting and damage lamps and other property may be apprehended by persons "patching witnessing the offence and handed over to a constable. By the General Highway Act (s) offenders against the Act whose Highway Act. names are unknown may be apprehended by or under the authority of surveyors of highways or by persons witnessing the ofiEence and taken before a magistrate. Offenders against s. 78 may be appre- hended by those witnessing the offence. By the Poor Law Amendment Act (a) masters of workhouses Masters of and persons acting on their authority may apprehend persons ^°^'^^°"s«s- bringing into a workhouse without authority spirituous or fermented liquors, and take them before a magistrate. By 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 66 (one of the Metropolitan Police Acts), Metropolitan " any person found committing any offence punishable either upon P°'"=^ •*-<=*^- indictment or as a misdemeanour upon summary conviction ' ' under the Act ..." may be apprehended by the owner of the property on or in respect to which the offence shall be committed, or by his servant or any person authorised by him, and may be detained until he can be delivered into the custody of a constable to be dealt with according to law. ' ' There is a corresponding provision in the Towns Towns Police Police Clauses Act (6). <^'^"'^' ^''*- By the Canal Act (c) persons found committing any offence Canal Act. punishable under the Act by summary conviction may be appre- hended by the owners of property with respect to which such offence shall be committed, or by their servants or agents, and handed over to a constable. If property is offered to any person and he reason- ably suspects that any such offence under the Act has been committed with respect to it, or that it has been stolen or unlaw- fully obtained, he may apprehend the party offering the property and hand him over to a constable. By 14 & 15 Vict. c. 19, s. 11, any person may arrest " any person Indictable who shall be found committing " any indictable oSence at night (d), °?^"^^^* and may " convey him or deliver him to some constable or other peace officer." Any person "found committing" any offence Larceny Act. punishable by virtue of the Larceny Act (e), with the exception of the offence of angling in the daytime, " may be immediately appre- hended without a warrant by any person and forthwith taken . . . before some neighbouring justice of the peace," "and any person to whom any property shall be offered to be sold, pawned, or (y) 3 &. i Will. IV. c. 90, a. 55. (z) 6 & 6 Will. IV. c. 50, 88. 78, 79. (a) 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 76, s. 92. (b) 10 & 11 Vict. c. 89, s. 15. (c) 3 & 4 Vict. c. 50, ss. 11, 12. (d) I.e., between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m., see s. 13. (e) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 103 (incorporated in 38 & 39 Vict. c. 25„8. 12). See, too, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 25, 6. 12, as to naval stores, &c. 208 TRESPASS TO THE PERSON. Injuries to Property Act. Coiners Act. Pedlars Act. Prevention of Crimes Act. Pawnbrokers Act. Aimy Act Explosives Act. Children's Act, 1908. delivered, if he shall have reasonable cause to suspect that any such offence had been committed on or with respect to such property," is authorised and required to apprehend the party offering the pro- perty, and to take him and it before a justice. Similar powers are given against any person " found committing " an offence punish- able under the Malicious Injuries to Property Act to " the owner of the property injured or his servant or any person authorised by him " (/). Any person may apprehend any person " found -committing any indictable offence against the Coinage Act and hand him over to an officer of the peace " (g). By the Pedlars Act (?i) any person on whose ground a pedlar is, or to whom he offers goods, may demand inspection of his certificate, and on refusal may arrest and take him before a magistrate. By the Prevention of Crimes Act (i) owners and occupiers of property and their tenants may arrest and hand over to a con- stable persons twice previously convicted whom they find on their property and who give an unsatisfactory account of themselves. By the Pawnbrokers Act (k) a pawnbroker reasonably suspect- ing (I) that an article offered in pawn to him has been stolen or otherwise illegally and clandestinely obtained, may seize and detain and deliver as soon as may be to a constable the article itself and the person offering it or either of them. Under the Army Act (m) " upon reasonable suspicion that a person is a deserter " he may be apprehended by any constable, and in the absence of a constable by any person, and taken forth- with before a magistrate. By the Explosives Act (w) persons found committing offences against the Act under circumstances of danger may be arrested by the occupiers of endangered property, local authorities', and the servants of railway and canal companies. By the Children's Act, 1908, any constable may take into custody, without warrant, any person who within view of such constable com- mits any offence mentioned in either Part II. or in the First Schedule to the Act in cases where the name and residence of such person are unknown and cannot be ascertained by the constable (o). (/) 24 & 25 Vict. 0. 97, s. 61. Sect. 13 of this Act makes it a misdemeanour for tenants of houses maliciously to injure their landlord's property. ig) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 99, s. 31. {h) 34 & 35 Vict. c. 96, s. 18. (i) 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, s. 7 (extended by 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, ss. 4, 6, 7). (ft) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 93, s. 34. (I) See Howard v. Clarke, (1888) 20 Q. B. D. 558. (m)44 ■& 45 Vict. c. 58 lS. 154. Application to militia extended to territorial forces by 7 Bdw. VII. c. 9. (n) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 17, s. 78. (o) 8 Edw. VII. c. 67, s. 19. STATUTORY POWERS OF ARREST. 209 It will be observed that in nearly all these statutes it is a con- Found dition of the power to apprehend that the person apprehended oommitting. should have been " found committing " some oSence or " found offending." He must be detected in the physical perpetration of the crime (p). Thus when the gist of the offence is the state of the man's mind, or where the offence is one of omission, there is no power of summary arrest. A man cannot, for example, well be found committing the offence of embezzlement or of neglecting to maintain his family (g). The person who discovers the act must be aware of its criminality at the time. If A. sees B. taking away property and from what he afterwards hears from C. disoovers-that B. was guilty of larceny, A. does not find B. committing the larceny (r). A man cannot be found committing an offence which , he is merely attempting to commit (s). He must be detected at its completion or during its continuance. A thief who is found in possession of stolen property during the continuance of the asporta- tion, however long, is found committing the theft (t). The offender must be either apprehended in the very act or at any rate must be immediately pursued. " Suppose a party seen in the act of com- mitting a crime were to run away and immediate and fresh pursuit to be made, I think that would be sufficient " (u). It will be observed that in some of the statutes authority is given ' ' immediately ' ' to apprehend, while in others the word " immediately " does not occur. There seems, however, to be no practical difference between the two classes of enactments. In both the intention is to enable parties who discover a criminal at work to act then and there. What is an immediate apprehension is a question of fact for the jury (a;). If the pursuit be sufficiently fresh it does not appear to be material that the offender is not actually apprehended by the person who found him offending (y). In certain cases of offences against Owner of property the owner and his agents are allowed to arrest. The word ^^° ^ ^' " owner," it is apprehended, would include generally a possessor. By 23 & 24 Vict. c. 32, s. 2, riotous and indecent behaviour in Brawling in any church or registered place of worship and interruption of an f^g^gj^jp officiating minister are offences punishable on summary conviction. By s. 3 of the same Act offenders may be immediately, apprehended (p) It is insufficient to justify arrest for the offence to have been committed very recently {Griffith v. Taylor, (1876) 2 C. P. D. 194; 46 L. J. C. P. 15). (5) Field V. Musgrove, (1867) 16 L. T. N. S. 536; Horley v. Rogers, (1860) 2 B. & E. 674 ; 29 L. J. M. C. 140; 119 E. B. 903. (r) See Downing v. Capel, (1867) L. B. 2 C. P. 461; 36 L. J. M. C. 97. (s) Leete v. Hart, (1868) L. B. 3 C. P. 322; 37 L. J. C. P. 157. (t) Griffith V. Taylor, (1876) 2 C. P. D. 194 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 15. (u) Per Tindal, C.J., Hanway v. Boultbee, (1830) 1 Moo. & E. p. 19; see Rex V. Howarth, (1828) 1 Moo. C. C. 2(7! ; Downing v. Capel, supra; Griffith v. Taylor, supra. (x) Griffith v. Taylor, supra. (y) See Downing v. Capel, supra. C.T. 1^ 210 TRESPASS TO THE PERSON. Offences in respect of passenger steamers. Offences against railway companies. Duty of party arresting. by a churchwarden of the place and taken before a magistrate (a). It appears, however, that in the absence of indecorous conduct a request to leave is a necessary preliminary to ejectment (a). By 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 287, the master or other oflBcer of any duly surveyed passenger steamer, and any person called by him to his assistance, may apprehend and take before a magistrate any person of unknown name and address who is guilty of evading payment of fares, injuring the vessel, molesting the passengers or crew, or of certain other kinds of disorderly conduct defined by the Act. By 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, ss. 103 (b), 104, 154, and 52 & 53 Vict, c. 57, s. 5, power is given to the officers and servants of railway companies to arrest persons whose names and addresses are unknown, or who refuse to give their names and addresses, and who have committed certain specified offences, such as refusing to pay their fares, deliver up tickets, etc. By the Tramways Act (c) servants of tramway companies may arrest and take before a magistrate passengers committing or attempting to commit frauds, if their names and addresses are unknown (d). Whenever power of summary arrest on a criminal charge is given it is for the purpose of immediate investigation before a magistrate, and no arrest can be justified which is not for this purpose (e). It is a bad plea to say that a felony had been committed, that there was reasonable and probable cause for suspecting the plaintiff, and that he was arrested and taken to a certain spot for identifica- tion (/). It is not lawful to detain a man in custody without warrant while evidence against him is being collected, since it is for the magistrate to grant a remand if the case is not ripe for hearing (g). The statutes authorising arrests without warrant generally provide that the arrested party shall be taken immediately or forthwith before a justice of the peace, but these provisions are only declaratory of the common law (h). So jealous is the law on (z) Aa to what constitutes the offence, see Kensit v. St. Paul's Dean and Chapter, (1905) 2 K. B. 249; 7i L. J. K. B. 454; Williams v. Glenister, (1824) 2 B. & C. 699; 2 L. J. K. B. 143; 26 E. E. 525; Cope v. Barber, (1872) L. E. 7 0. P. 393; 41 L. J. M. C. 137. (a) Ballard v. Bond, (1837) 1 Jur. 7 ; 49 E. E. 733. (b) The first part of this section is repealed by the Statute Law Eevision Act of 1892. (c) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 78, s. 52. (d) In this connection see Wilson v. Pearnley, (1905) 69 J. P. 165. (e) For statutory rule in cases of arrest without warrant see b. 38, Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879. (/) Hall V. Booth, (1834) 3 N. & M. 316 ; 40 E. E. 468. (g) Wnght v. Court, (1825) 4 B. & C. 596 ; 4 L. J. K. B. 17 ; 28 E. E. 418. (h) A person arrested under the Game Act, 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 32, s. 31, must be discharged unless brought before a justice in twelve hours. For rule in extra- dition cases see 33 & 34 Vict. u. 52, o. 8, and Reg. v. Weil, (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 701; 53 L. J. M. C. 74. ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY. 211 this point that if the prisoner be conducted by a circuitous- instead of the ordinary direct road he may recover for a false imprison- ment (i). No greater restraint may be placed on a prisoner than is necessary for his safe detention. If there be reasonable apprehension of a rescue or escape he may be handcuffed, but not otherwise (k). But it is not an actionable assault, when a person is legally in custody, for an administrative officer of the law to do all things necessary to preserve a prisoner in health, although, for the purpose of so doing, it is necessary forcibly to administer food (I). 3. A person who has escaped from lawful custody is still con- Escape from sidered theoretically a prisoner, and his recapture is but a custody. continuance of his former imprisonment (m). It may therefore be effected without the restrictions as to time or place which may have been attached to the original execution of the process against him. Thus a sheriff may not enforce a civil writ on a Sunday, but he may on that date retake a person who, being in custody by virtue of such a writ, has escaped (w). So a person privileged from arrest is not privileged from recapture (o). So in effecting a recapture, at any rate upon a fresh pursuit, it is lawful to break open the outer door of a dwelling-house (p). And on this principle, it was held that where a party had been formally arrested by touching him through a broken window it was lawful thereupon to break into the house in order to effect his actual apprehension (qj. A principal is always considered to be in the custody of his bail, and tJie bail may discharge himself at any time by making the custody actual and handing over his prisoner to the custody of the law. In so doing he has the same licence of procedure as in any- other recapture (r). 4. If a private individual acts as the mere servant or assistant Assisting of a constable or other of&cer engaged in effecting an arrest or carrying out any other process of the law, and the circumstances are such as to justify the conduct of the officer, the person assisting will also be justified, although he would not have been entitled to act by himself, for it cannot be unlawful to take part in a lawful act. And it may sometimes happen that a man may be justified in (i) Morris v. Wise, (1860) 2 F. & F. 51; 121 E. B. 763; O'Brien v. Brabner, (1885) 49 J. P. 227. (k) Reg. v. Taylor, (1895) 59 J. P. 393, and Wright v. Court, supra. (l) Rex V. Morton-Brown, Ainsworth, Ex parte, (1910) 74 J. P. 53, Div. (to) Anon., (1704) 6 Mod. 231. (n) Ibid. (o) Ex parte Lyne, (1822) 3 Stark. 132; 23 E. E. 762. (p) Fost. C. C. 320; Bast, P. C. Vol. 1, p. 324; Genner v. Sparks, (1704) 6 Mod. 173. (<7) Sandon v. Jervis, (1858) E. B. & E. 935 and 942; 27 L. J. Q. B. 279; 113 E. E. 963; 28 L. J. Ex. 156; 113 E. E. 956. (r) Anon., (1704) 6 Mod. 231_! Ex parte Lyne, supra, p. 215. officers of the law. 212 TRESPASS TO THE PERSON. Statutory proteotioD. Lunatics. actually directing an arrest which it would have been unlawful for him to effect personally. If A. suspect B. of felony, no felony having in fact been committed, and thereupon make a charge against him to C, a constable, who in consequence arrests, C. is justified, because he had a right to act on A.'s information, but A. is riot (s). But if C. reasonably suspect B. apart from any informa- tion supplied by A., then he can make the arrest on his own authority; and if under such circumstances A. give B. in charge to C, he does not become thereby the originator of the arrest. He simply calls upon C. to do what C. would apart from any such invitation be authorised and bound to do, arid if liable at all is only liable to the same extent as C. So if a constable have a right to arrest for a breach of the peace, a bystander who calls upon him to do so is not liable, although the circumstances might not have justified the bystander had he made the arrest himself (f). The protection (u) given by 24 Geo. II. c. 44, s. 6, to constables and other officers executing irivalid warrants of magistrates, and by 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 54, to county court of&cers executing invalid process of the county court, includes private individuals acting by the order and in aid of such officers. The language would appear to point rather to the case of persons who act in a subordinate capacity as mere assistants and who do not take upon themselves to direct the proceedings (a;). 5. A private person may without an express warrant confine a person disordered in his mind who seems disposed to do mischief to himself or any other person (y). There is no power at common law to apprehend or detain a lunatic simply because he is a lunatic. It has already been pointed out that it is always lawful to use such force as to prevent a deadly act of violence being done, and it seems to be simply an exemplification of this principle that a person, whose state of mind is such from frenzy and delirium as to render him a standing danger to others and himself, may be subjected to such restraint as is necessary to prevent that danger (a). (s) Hedges v. Chapman, (1825) 2 Bing. 523; 3 L. J. C. P. 91; 27 E. B. 704. (t) Derecourt v. Corbishley, (1855) 5 E. & B. 188; 24 L. J. Q. B. 313; 103 E. E. 424. For a case in which a constable was held to be justified in arresting a person twenty minutes after the commission of an overt act of violence, see Reg. v. Light, (1857) 1 Dears. & Bell, 332. (u) See Ch. XXU. (x) Cp. Painter v. Liverpool Gas Co., (1836) 3 A. & B. 433; 5 L. J. M. C. 108; 42 B. B. 423. In Nathan v. Cohen, (1812) 3 Camp. 257, the defendant had caused a warrant to issue against the plaintiff, directed to three constables, had gone with them and pointed out the plaintiff as the person to be arrested. IJord Bllenborough held that he was within the protection of 21 Jac. I. c. 16, ». 5, which speaks of certain officers and those who act " in their aid and assistance or by their command- ment," the words being disjunctive. In the statutes referred to in the text, the act for which protection is claimed must have been by the order and also in aid of the officer. (y) Bac. Ab. Trespass, D. 3. (z) Per Lord Mansfield, Brookshaw v. Hopkins, (1772) Lofft, p. 243; see Re DETENTION OF LUNATICS. 213 The permanent care and control of lunatics is regulated by the Detention Lunacy Act, 1890 (a). Their detention {b) must as a rule take °'^'^^'^^- place under a detention order made by the judicial authority defined by the Act (c). But in cases of urgency the lunatic can be detained for a short time under an urgency order signed by a private individual and accompanied by a medical certificate (d). A judicial reception order must be made upon petition (e), but pauper lunatics, • wandering lunatics, and lunatics not properly cared for, may be oonfined under orders made in a summary way (/) ; and such sum- mary proceedings being of a judicial character, any statement of particulars adduced in furtherance thereof is absolutely privileged (g). The requirements of the Act must be strictly complied with, and failure in any particular entitles the person detained to be discharged upon habeas corpus, provided this can be done without danger to himself or others (h). Thus a medical certificate which is riot in substantial accordance with the form provided in the Act is altogether invalid (t). An urgency order remains in force only for seven days {k). A judicial order is in force for a year, and may thereafter be from time to time continued in the manner provided by the Act (I). A patient may at any time be discharged on a writ of habeas corpus if the Court is satisfied that he is not a fit person to be detained {m), or by the order of the Lunacy Commissioners (n), or of the visitors of an asylum, whether private or public (o). The persons on whose petition a reception order is made, or the authority liable for the Greenwood, (1855) 24 L. J. Q. B. 148. In Fletcher v. Fletcher, (1859) 1 E. & E. 420; 28 L. J. Q. B. 134; 117 B. E. 271, the Court used general language which might seem to convey the notion that the mere fact of lunacy justified the confine- ment of the sufferer. The judges did not, it is conceived, mean this. The distinction betvfeen harmless and dangerous lunatics was not material for them to consider. (a) 63 & 54 Vict. c. 5, as amended by the Lunacy Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 65). See also Lunacy Rules, 1895. (b) As to the removal to the place of detention, see s. 35. (c) ss. 9, 10. (d) s. 11. (e) 6. 4; as to procedure thereon, see ss. 5 — 8. (f) 6S. 13 — 21. As to lunatics found so by inquisition, see s. 12. (g) Hodson v. Pare, (1899) 1 Q. B. 455; 68 L. J. Q. B. 309, C. A. As to what constitute " reasonable expenses " for procuring an order, see Rex v. Delvin Union Guardians, (1908) 2 Ir. E. 15. (h) See Re Greenwood, (1855) 24 L. J. Q. B. 148. (i) See Re Greenwood, supra; Lowe v. Fox, (1885—7) 12 App. Cas. 206; 54 L. J. Q. B. 561. (fe) s. 11 (ey. (I) s. 38. (to) See per Parke, B., Norris v. Seed, (1849) 3 Ex. p. 792; 18 L. J. Ex. 300; 77 R. E. 831. (n) B. 75. , . (o) Bs. 77, 78. But an order for a patient's discharge does not act as an automatic discharge of an order of Court appointing a receiver and manager of the patient's property (B. A. S.,In re, (1898) 2 Ch. 392; 67 L. J. Ch. 453). 214 TRESPASS TO THE PERSON. Execution of deed by lunatic. Becaption. Means of restraint. Effect of reception order. Statutory protection. maintenance of a pauper lunatic, may direct his discharge (p). It is further the duty of the custodian of a patient upon the patient's recovery to give due notice to the persons responsible, and there- upon to discharge the patient at the end of seven days, if he is not removed in the interval (g). It may be convenient to mention that the execution by a lunatic, so found by inquisition, of any deed or instrument disposing of his property, even if the deed be executed in a lucid interval, is altogether invalid so long as the inquisition is not superseded (r). Nor will the fact that a lunatic in an access of delirium murdered a near relation prevent him from taking a share in the property of the murdered person (s). If a person lawfully in custody under a reception order escapes, the custodian may cause him to be recaptured at any time within fourteen days from the time of the escape, without any fresh order or certificate (t). It is unlawful to use mechanical means of bodily restraint against a patient " unless the restraint is necessary for purposes of surgical or medical treatment, or to prevent the lunatic from injuring himself or others " (u). A reception order good on the face of it is a sufficient authority for the reception and detention of a lunatic at the place named in the order, and " the order may be acted on without further evidence of the signature or of the jurisdiction of the person making the order" (x). It is further provided that any person presenting a petition, any person signing or carrying out or doing any act with a view to sign or carry out what is or purports to be a reception order or certificate, and finally any person doing anything in pur- suance of the Act, shall not be liable to any civil proceedings, whether on the ground of want of jurisdiction or on any other ground, if he has actpd in good faith and with reasonable care (y). There are several classes of persons with regard to whose conduct in the detention and restraint of alleged lunatics questions may arise, namely, persons making urgency orders, persons presentirig (p) S3. 72, 73. But in spite of such order there is power to detain the patient if dangerous (s. 74). As to what amounts to an order of discharge, see Lowe v. Fox, (1885—7) 12 App. Cas. 206; 54 L. J. Q. B. 561. (q) 6. 83. (r) Walker, In re, (1905) 1 Oh. 160; 74 L. J. Ch. 86, C. A. ; as to the execution of a power of attorney by a lunatic in a luci3 interval,- see Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co. v. M'Laughlin, (1904) A. C. 776; 73 L. J. P. C. 95. (s) Houghton, In re, (1915) 2 Ch. 173; 84 L. J. Ch. 726. (t) 8. 85. (u) s. 40. (x) s. 35. In the corresponding section of the repealed Act (8 & 9 Vict. c. 100, s. 15), there are words enabling the order to be pleaded in answer to any action. iy) B. 330. It is apprehended that the issue of good faith and reasonable care 18 on the plaintiff. See Lowe v. Fox, (1885—7) 12 App, Cas. 206 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 561. A " statement of particulars " is absolutely privileged, Hodson v. Pare, (1899) 1 Q. B. 455; 68 L. J. Q. B. 309, C, A. DETENTION OF LUNATICS. 215' petitions for reception orders, judicial authorities making reception orders, medical men signing certificates, and the persons actually in charge of the limatics un'der reception orders and their subordinates. A person who signs an urgency order is liable for the consequent Parties sign- imprisonment if, in fact, it is wrongful, either by reason of any insurgency irregularity of procedure, or because the state of mind of the person against whom the order is made is not such as to justify his detention (z). But this liability is limited by the provisions of s. 330. A person who procures a reception order from a judicial authority Parties pro- is hable, it is apprehended, only to an action in the nature of an <=uringjudi- action of malicious prosecution, that is to say, if he has acted maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause (a). He has therefore a better protection by the common law than that which is given him by s. 330, which does not excuse a party who has acted in bad faith or unreasonably. A judicial authority is only liable where there is absence of juris- Judicial diction (6), and then subject to the provisions of s. 330. authority. A medical man signing a certificate is in no case liable to an Medical man. action of false imprisonment, because the confinement of the sup- posed lunatic is not directly his act. He is only answerable, if at all, when he commits a breach of duty in giving a certificate without reasonable grounds, or in bad faith (o). With regard to the persons having custody of lunatics under Keepers of reception orders valid on the face of them, there seems some doubt asylums. whether such orders are an absolute protection (as they apparently were under the repealed 8 & 9 Vict. c. 100, s. 99), or whether, in spite of such orders, they do not act unlawfully in receiving and detaining persons whom they know to be entitled to their liberty (d). If the latter view is taken there would seem to be no difference between the protection afforded by an order good on the face of it, and that afforded by an order bad on the face of it, except that the apparent defects of an order may supply cogent evidence of negligence or bad faith (e). The use of force towards a lunatic in a manner unnecessary or forbidden by the statute of course constitutes an assault. It is equally clear that a detention after the reception order has run out (z) See Fletcher v. Fletcher, (1869) 1 B. & B. 420; 28 L. J. Q. B. 184; 117 B. E. 271. „ ^ , (a) And see Hodson v. Pare, (1899) 1 Q. B. 455; 68 L. J. Q. B. 309, C. A. (b) See Ch. XXII. (c) See Hall v. Semple, (1862) 3 F. & F. 337 ; 130 E. E. 843. (d) The manager of a hospital or licensed house is not bound by any public duty to receive any particular lunatic. S. 27 (4) expressly so provides with respect to lunatics sent under summary reception orders and orders of Commissioners, and d fortiori must it be so in the case of other lunatics. (e) As to the statutory notices of reception required to be given by the keepers of private institutions licensed under the Lunacy Acts, see 54 & 55 Vict. u. 65, d. 20. 216 TRESPASS TO THE TBRSON. Place of reooption. Parental authority. or otherwise been invalidated is a false imprisonment (/), subject to the provisions of s. 330. No doubt also an action would lie if any custodian of a lunatic neglected to give notice of the recovery of a patient and to liberate him as provided by s. 83. A reception order may be for the detention of a patient in an institution for lunatics or as a single patient. An institution for lunatics, other than' an asylum or hospital, means a licensed institution (g!), and the order must state whether the lunatic is to be detained in an asylum, hospital, house, or as a single patient (h). It is apprehended that an order directing a lunatic's detention as a single patient would be no justification for any person detaining him. in a place where other lunatics were kept. If the licence of the keeper of a lunatic asylum is revoked or expires, it would seem to follow that his whole authority is thereupon gone (i). Nor will bond fide belief, by the owner of a sanatorium, that persons under medical treatment therein are not insane justify their reception' and detention, or avoid penalties, if such patients are found upon inquisition to be, in fact, lunatics (fc). A father (or, with certain qualifications, a mother in the case of an illegitimate child (l)) has a right to the custody and control of the persons of his children up to the age of twenty -one years (m). This right does not vary in kind according to the age of the child, though no doubt an exercise of authority which might be just and lawful towards a child of tender years might be outrageous towards one approaching full age (n). He is entitled to prevent the child from leaving his roof against his will. And it makes no difference in this respect that the child is above the age (o) at which the Courts of Common Law refused to grant a habeas corpus to restore a child to its father's custody (p). Thus it has been suggested that an action of false imprisonment would not lie against a father who forcibly stopped his daughter aged sixteen from eloping to Gretna (/) And is also a statutory misdemeanour by s. 222. (3) s. 341. (h) Schedule 2, form 3. (t) S. 222 makes it a misdemeanour on the part of the keeper of a house if two months after the expiration or revocation of a licence there are two or more lunatics in the house. (fc) Reg. v. Bisliop, (1880) 5 Q. B. D. 259; 49 L. J. M. C. 45. (!) Reg. v. Barnardo, (1891) 1 Q. B. 194, C. A. (m) Black. Com. Vol. 1, p. 458 ; In re Agar Ellis, (1883) 24 Oh. D. 317 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 10. This right, however, is not only liable to be forfeited by misconduct or abandonment, but also to be superseded by the superior right of the Crown as parens patriae acting through the Court as its delegate, as to which see above, pp. 4 — 5, note (p). (n) Per Bowen, L.J., In re Agar Ellis, (1883) 24 Ch. D. p. 338; 53 L. J. Ch. ID. (o) Fourteen in the case of boys, sixteen in that of girls. If) Whatever the age of the child, there is no power in a Court or judge to order the issue of a writ of habeas corpus directed to a person who at the date of the order is out of the jurisdiction {Rex v. Pinckney, (1904) 2 K. B. 84; 73 L. J. K. B. 448, C. A.). DOMESTIC DISCIPLINE. 217 Green (q). And it is apprehended that if the child leaves the father's house against his parent's will he may, unless the Court interferes to restrain him from so doing (r), resort if necessary to the use of force for the purpose of regaining possession of the child, just as he may in the case of the recaption of chattels (s). In Beg. V. Jackson (t), where it was held that a husband could not forcibly retake possession of his wife's person for the purpose of enforcing his right of con.sortmin, the Court were careful to distinguish the case from that of a father retaking possession of his child under age {u). The apparent effect of the Custody of Children Act, 1801, is however to give an unlilnited discretionary power to the Court in all matters relating to the custody of children under the age of twenty-one years (x). It is also provided by s. 21 of the Children's Act, 1908 (y), that where a person having the legal charge of a child (under the age of sixteen years) is convicted of an offence against the Act, the Court adjudicating on the offence naay, in its discretion, make an order as to the future custody of the child. And it is further provided by s. 5 of the Children's Act, 1908 (8 Edw. VII. c. 67), that in certain specified cases any person appointed or authorised to execute the provisions of Part I. of that Act may remove an infant from improper custody to a place of safety. Moreover it has been held in order to constitute' the offence of " exposing " created by s. 12 of the Act that it is unnecessary to show that there was in fact a physical placing of the child some- where with intent to injure it (a). While a child remains in the custody of the father the latter may beat or imprison the former either to punish past or, it may be, (q) Per Bowen, L.J., In re Agar Ellis, (1883) 24 Ch. D. p. 321; 53 L. J. Ch. 10; per Parke, J., Barker v. Taylor, (1823) 1 C. & P. 101; 28 E. E. 767. The dicta of Lord Esher, M.E., and Smith, L.J., in Reg. \. Gyngall, (1893) 2 Q. B. pp. 245, 253 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 569, as to a girl over sixteen being emancipated and having a right to act on her own views as to where she should reside are opposed to earlier authority. In Todd v. Lynes (Times, 26 July, 1873), Malins, V.-C, ordered a boy of seventeen, against his wish, to be delivered up to his father. (r) Which the Court will do if for the benefit of the child (In re Esther Lyons, (1869) 22 L. T. N. S. 770). (s) See above, p. 156. It may be that if the father made his house a place imfit for a virtuous girl to live in, the daughter might lawfully leave it, and that if he attempted to retake her for the purpose of bringing her back then he would be cuilty of false imprisonment. (t) (1891) 1 Q. B. 671; 60 L. J. Q. B. 346. (u) Ibid. (1891), 1 Q. B. pp. 681, 685. (x) 54 & 55 Vict. c. 3. (u) 8 Edw. VII. c. 67; see also 2 Edw. VII. o. 28 (the Licensing Act, 1902), s. 5, ^^Yzliex'l' Williams, (1910) 26 T. L. E; 290, C. C. A. For other offences against fhi« apction of the Act, see Liverpool Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children TlZes a9U) 3 K. B. 813, Div. ; 84 L. J. K. B. 222; Poole v. Stokes, (1914) lie L T. mo'oakey v. Jackson, (1914) 1 K. B. 216; 83 L. J. K. B. 712. 218 TRESPASS TO THE PERSON. restrain threatened misconduct (a). The force used must be reason- able in itself. Anything outrageous or cruel on a father's part clearly is an assault. But it is submitted that if a father acts in good faith and believes in the existence of a state of facts which would justify the use of force, he is not to be held guilty of an assault because his belief is unreasonable. However great the misconduct of the father, even though it be such that if brought before the Court it would cause him to be deprived of his paternal custody, it does not, it is apprehended, operate to invalidate his general authority so loiig as the custody in fact endures. But the authority exists only for the benefit of the child, and the main- tenance of domestic discipline. A father must not punish arbitrarily, nor for disobedience to unlawful commands. If he orders his son to commit a crime, and beats him because he refuses, this is clearly an assault. Guardians, other than the father, are practically those appointed by the Court or by will (12 Car. II. c. 24, s. 8), or the surviving mother (under 49 & 50 Vict. c. 27). Generally as to the law relating to the custody, education and maintenance of infants, see Macqueen's Law of Husband and Wife, 4th ed. (1905), pp. 423 sqq. As to illegitimate children, see Simpson on Infants, 3rd ed., p. 120. A child with no guardian may, it seems, elect one for himself {ibid. p. 211). A person who undertakes the care and nurture of a child though without legal right would be entitled, it is apprehended, to chastise the child while the custody in fact continued. Usually where a person stands to a child in loco parentis he does so by virtue of delegation of authority by the parent, but it seems that such delegation is not essential to the establishment of that relation. Authority of " The authority of a schoolmaster is, while it exists, the same as schoolmaster, {^jj^t of a parent (b). A parent, when he leaves his child with a schoolmaster, delegates to him all his own authority, so far as is necessary for the welfare of the child " (c). The authority of a master over his apprentice stands on the same footing (d). The only difference is that a child can be compelled to go to school, but by the common law no one can be bound apprentice without his own consent (e). A father, it is suggested above, is not liable to an action for the chastisement of an offending child so long as he acts (a) 1 Bl. Com. 452. (b) A echoolmaster may inflict reasonable chastisement on his scholar : deary M. Booth, (1893) 1 Q. B. 465 ; 62 L. J. M. C. 87. (c) Per Cockburn, C.J., Fitzgerald v. NoHhcote, (1865) 4 P. & P. p. 689; 142 E. E. 703; see Reg. v. Hopley, (1860) 2 P. & P. 202; and see also Mansell v. Griffin, (1908) 1 K. B- 160; 77 L. J. K. B. 676; S. C. in Court of Appeal, (1908) 1 K. B. 947; 77 L. J. K. B. 676. (d) Penn v. Ward, (1835) 2 C. M. & E. 338; 4 L. J. Ex. 304. (e) H. V. Arnesby, (1820) 3 B. & Aid. 584. DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY. 219 m good faith, but a schoolmaster, it would seem, can never be justified unless he acts with reasonable and probable cause (/). A man who takes on himself such an office may fairly be required to show prudence and judgment in the exercise of discipline. The authority of a schoolmaster is not strictly limited to the time during which the pupil is under his actual care. If the pupil on his way to or from school act in a manner detrimental to scholastic discipline, the master may punish him {g). The master of a vessel on the high seas or in a foreign port (h) Master of may be considered as standing in the position of the head of a ®^'P' family (i), and has disciplinary powers not only over the crew but the passengers also (k). The power is " based upon necessity and is hmited to the preservation of necessary discipline and the safety of the ship " (I). It is obvious that the master of a vessel at sea may frequently be compelled to act in a very decisive and severe manner, if he is to maintain discipline and carry out his voyage, and therefore a licence will be accorded to him which would not be tolerated in the case of a parent or master. (/) Fitzgerald v. Northcote, (1865) 4 P. & F. 656; 142 E. E. 703. (g) Gleary v. Booth, (1893) 1 Q. B. 465; 62 L. J. M. C. 87. But the master of a public elementary school may not without the consent of the parent set a child lessons to be done out of school, and punish for failure to learn such lessons {Hunter V. Johnson, (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 225; 53 L. J. M. C. 182). (h) Lamb v. Burnett, (1831) 1 C. & J.' 291; 9 L. J. Ex. 55. (i) Per Tindal, C.J., Murray v. Moutne, (1834) 6 C. & P. p. 473. Ik) Aldworth v. Stewart, (1866) 4 P. & P. 957. In the case of emigrant ships these are defined by ss. 324, 325, of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. (l) Per Channell, B., Aldworth v. Stewart, supra, at p. 961. CHAPTER X. SEDDCTION AND LOSS OF SERVICE. Eight to service a species of property. Historical origin of action for loss of service. PAGE PAGE Eight to Service 220 Seduction of Wife and Loss of Enticing away Servant 221 Consortium 228 Seduction of Daughter 223 Measure of Damages for Seduction 229 Where the relation of master and servant exists the right which the one has to the service of the other is regarded by the law as a species of property or interest, a wrongful infringement of which causing actual damage is a good cause of action (a-). . It has been already pointed out that an action lies for maliciously procuring a breach of contract, whether the contract be of service or other- wise (b). This remedy, which is now somewhat restricted by the trend of legislation (c), is merely a particular application of the general principle that each man shall be ajiswerable for the damage which he intentionally causes to his^ neighbour without any legal excuse or justification, but has only of late years been fully recog- nised in the English law (d). Actions for loss of service, on the other hand, are of great antiquity, and had their origin in a state of society when service as a rule was a matter not of contract but of status (e). At common law if A. took the servant of B., he took what originally at any rate was regarded as the chattel of B., and thereby he committed a trespass. So if a servant was beaten this was a trespass on the property of the master. It was early settled, however, that such a trespass was not actionable "per se, but that it was necessary to allege, with a per quod, actual damage by reason of the loss of service (/). The action, therefore, though founded on a notion of trespass, was in substance for the consequential damage, and there was considerable fluctuation of opinion as to its proper (a) Per Cur. Grinnell v. Wells, (1844) 7 M. & G. p. 1041; 14 L. J. C. P. 19; 66 E. E. 835. The Court will restrain a person from inducing the servant of the receiver of a business to leave his employment and engage in the service of a rival if the original business is thereby damaged . Dixon v. Dixon, (1903) 73 L. J. Ch. 103. (b) See above, pp. 18 — 25. (c) See Trade Disputes Act, 1906 (6 Bdw. VII. c. 47). (d) In Bowen v. Hall, (1881) 6 Q. B. D. 333; 50 L. J. Q. B. 305. As to the further extension in Quinn v.- Leathern, (1901) A. C, note p. 610; 70 L. J. P. C. 76; see above, p. 18. See also Leathern v. Craig, (1899) 2 Ir. E. 667, C. A. (e) Year Book, 11 Hen. IV. fol. 2, M. 22; Hen. VI. fol. 30. (/) Bobert Marys's case, (1612) 9 Eep. p. 113 a. RIGHT TO SERVICE. 221 form (gf). It was, however, finally settled that the plaintiff might declare either in trespass or case (h). If a female servant was debauched and carnally known and through a consequent illness her master was deprived of her service, the carnal knowledge being a physical act committed against the will of the master was considered a trespass, and so alleged in the old form of pleading ({). If the injury to the servant is produced not by a trespass but by an act of negligence, the master has nevertheless a right of action for loss of service (k). By the first Statute of Labourers it was made a criminal offence statute of for a servant to leave his service before the end of his term, or for Labourers, any party to receive and keep a servant who had so left (l). Sub- sequently to the passing of this Act the Courts began to entertain actions founded on the breach of duty thereby created both for knowingly enticing servants away from their employment and for knowingly harbouring servants who had previously left their employ- ment (m). The statute was repealed by 5 Eliz. c. 4, but the class ■ of actions which had originated under it had by this time become inveterate. It will be observed that the words of the statute are directed No action against dealings with servants " ante finem termini concordati " servlnt where (before the end of the term agreed), and this seems to show the he breaks no action lies only where there is a breach of contract. If the servant does no wrong in leaving his employment neither does the person who instigates him. Therefore if a man has contracted to serve for a definite period, it is lawful to induce him to leave at the con- clusion of such period, even though otherwise he would in fact have continued in the old service (n). So it is lawful to procure a piece- worker to leave his employ as soon as the work in hand is finished (o). (gr) Macfadzen v. Olivant, (1805) 6 East, 387. (h) Ditcham v. Bond, (1814) 2 M. & S. 436; 14 E. B. 835; Chamberlain v. Hazlewood, (1839) 5 M. & W. 515 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 87. It is to be noticed that the question of form of action may still be important with reference to the period of limitation. (i) See Edmondson v. Machell, (1787) 2 T. E. 4. (k) MaHinez v. Gerber, (1841) 3 M. & G. 88; 10 L. J. C. P. 314; 60 E. E. 466. (/) 23. Edw. III. The second chapter of the statute is as follows : "If any reaper, mower, or other workman or servant, of what estate or condition he be, retained in any man's service, do depart from the said service without reasonable cause or licence before the term agreed, he shall have pain of imprisonment ; and that none under the same pain presume to receive or to retain any such in his service." (m) See the argument of Coleridge, J., on this point in Lumley v. Gyp, (1853) 2 E & B. pp. 258 sqq. ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 463; 95 E. E. 501, which is approved in Bowen v. Hall, (1881) 6 Q. B. D. 333 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 305 ; and see South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., (1905) A. C. 239; 74 L. J. K. B. 525; but see Trade Disputes Act, 1906 (6 Edw. VII. c. 47), discussed at pp. 18—25, an no (n) JPer Lord Kenyon, Nichol v. Martyn, (1799) 2 Bsp. p. 734; 5 E. E. 770. (o) Hart V. Aldridge, (1774) 1 Cowp. 54; but see Anon., (1774) Lofft, 493. contraet. 222 SEDUCTION AND LOSS OF SERVICE. When service determined no action for harbouring servant. Harbouring with knowledge. However, in Keene v. Boycott (p), the servant in question was an infant and employed under a voidable contract with the plaintiff. He did avoid this contract and left his service at the induce- ment of the defendant, and it was held that there was a good cause of action (g). But this case seems contrary to the general principle and is cert-ainly opposed to the decision of the Court of Appeal in De Francesco v. Bamum (r). The defendant there had enticed away an apprentice of the plaintiff. But the indenture contained unreasonable stipulations, and it was held that it might be avoided by the apprentice, and that it was not unlavsrful for the defendant to persuade the apprentice to do that which was lawful. It is different, however, if malice (s), force, or fraud be used to take or decoy the servant away. In such case, the master has a right of action, even though the servant be under no binding obligation (t). And a fortiori it was held unlawful for persons to combine together to induce a breach of contract of service in others (w). But it is now provided by s. 1 of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, that " an act done in pursuance of an agreement or combination by two or more persons shall, if done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, not be actionable unless the act, if done without any such agreement or combination, would be actionable " (x). It is at any rate clear that if a service is once lawfully determined no action can lie against anyone who receives or harbours the servant. In Forbes v. Cochrane (y) the defendant sheltered on board of a British man-of-war certain slaves who had escaped from the service of the plaintiff in Florida, and it was held though the enticing of the slaves would have been actionable, since according to the law of Florida their servitude was lawful, yet that such servitude ceased directly they came under the British flag and consequently that they might lawfully be harboured. So long as the obligation of the servant to his first master con- tinues, there lies on all other people who know that fact a duty at common law not to aid and abet such servant in breach of his contract of service. Therefore if a person ignorantly takes into his employment one who ought to be serving elsewhere, he is bound on (p) (1796) 2 H. Bl. 511. iq) And see Dixon v. Dixon, (1903) 73 L. J. Ch. 103. (r) (1890) 43 Ch. D. 430; 60 L. J. Ch. 63. (s) Leathern v. Craig, (1899) 2 Ir. E. 667, C. A.; Bowen v. Hall, (1881) 6 Q. B. D. 333; 50 L. J. Q. B. 446, C. A. (f) mr Willes, J., Evans v. Walton, (1867) L. E. 2 C. P. pp. 621—2; 36 L. J. C. P. 307. (u) South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Goal Go., (1905) A. C. 239; 74 L. J. K. B. 525. (x) 6 Edw. VII. c. 47. See also s. 3 o£ the same Act, vifhich removes the legal liability resulting from an interference with the business of another person. (y) (1824) 2 B. & C. 448; 2 L. J. K. B. 67; 26 E. E. 402. SEDUCTION OF DAUGHTPIK. 223 becoming aware of the breach of contract to dismiss him, otherwise he becomes liable to an action for harbouring with knowledge (z). The old forms of pleading in actions for enticing away or harbour- Motive ing servants, besides alleging knowledge of the service, always ^'^'^rial. alleged that the defendant did the act complained of, " contriving and intending to injure the plaintiff." Whether the latter aver- ment was regarded as material and traversable was not very dear; though doubtless in the majority of cases the fact of knowledge is practically conclusive of malice. It was held in Osbom v. Gillet (a), that a master could not Wrongful act recover damages for a loss of service caused by a wrongful act "^^^^'^g ^^"-^-^ 1 ■ !_ li. J ■ j_i ■ T of servant. which resulted m the immediate death of the servant. And the maxim 'S (iffi'c. B.l^r 96; 29 L. J. C. P. 79; 121 E. E. 395. g HoUoZy^- Abell, (1836) 7 C. & P. 528; 48 E E. 810. (a) 0'Reilly\. Glavey, (1892) 32 L. B. Ir. 316. The actual decision may be justified on the ground mentioned below, pp. 226, 227. 16 C.T. 226 SEDUCTION AND LOSS OF SERVICE. Married daughter. Service how proved. Termination of service fraudulently procured. Continuance of service in temporary absence. If a married daughter lives apart from her husband with her father and does acts of service the father may have a cause of action for her seduction (b). Any participation in household affairs or the performance of trivial domestic duties will afiord sufficient evidence of service. " Making tea has been held to be an act of service " (c). In Speight v. OUviera (d) the defendant under pretence of providing a place for the plaintiff's daughter, who was twenty- three years old, caused her to leave home and debauched her. She subsequently returned to the plaintiff and had a child. Abbott, C.J., held that as there had been no real engagement of service with the defendant the relation of master and servant originally existing between the father and the daughter had continued unchanged throughout. This decision would clearly have been right had the daughter been under age. It would seem, however, that the fact of her being sui juris made a substantial distinction. It was not necessary in order that the father should lose his right that she should form another valid contract; it was sufficient that she should in fact cease to serve him, which was the case. There was neither a right of service nor an actual service. If actual service or a right of service is shown, the relationship continues though the servant be temporarily absent on a visit • without entering any fresh service (e). In Griffiths v. Teetge'n (/) the defendant had requested the plaintiS to allow his daughter temporarily to look after the defendant's shop, his wife being absent, and it was agreed that some payment should be made for her assistance. The defendant seduced the daughter, while resident with him, and she returned home and was there confined. It was held that the plaintiff had a good cause "of action, as the daughter must be considered the visitor rather than the servant of the defendant, and generally the actioii is maintainable, in the case of an infant, where there is evidence of animus revertendi on the part of the person seduced {g). Conversely if the daughter goes regularly into service away from home, but is permitted to return on a visit, she will not during (b) Harper v. Lujfkm, (1827) 7 Bi & C. 387 ; 6 L. J. K. B. 23; 31 B. E. 236. (c) Per Abbott, C.J., Carr v. Clarke, (1818) 2 Chit, p 261; 23 E. E. 748; Bennett v. Allcott, (1787) 2 T. E. 166. But performing domestic duties weekly on a holiday granted by the defendant as an act of grace — and not as a condition of the service — will not gupport this action : Whithourne v. Williams, (1901) 2 K. B. 722; 70 L. J. K. B. 933, C. A. id) (1819) 2 Stark. 493; 20 E. E. 728,' followed in Flynn v. Gbnnell, (1919) 2 Ir. E. 427. In Speight v. OUviera, it would have been different if the action bad been for decoying away and not for debauching. See Evans v. Walton, (1867) L. E. 2 C. P. 615; 36 L. J. C. P. 307. (e) See Edmondson v. Machell, (1787) 2 T. E. 4, a case in which an aunt was held to be in loco parentis although the girl's mother was living. if) (1854) 16 C. B. 344; 24 L. J. C. P. 35; lOOE. E. 376. Ig) Dean v. Peel, (1804) citing Johnson v. McAdam, 5 Bast, at p. 47 ; 7 E. E; 655. ,, SEDUCTION OF DAUGHTEai,. 227 the time of such visit become her, father's- servant though she do acts of service to him (h). If a daughter resides at home but goes out to work during the day, such service is not inconsistent with the relationship of master and servant existing between herself and her father; and the Court will not b6 curious to enquire whether she is debauched while abroad or while at home (f). Although ill an action of seduction the plaintiff must allege and prove loss of service, yet it would seem that in some cases damage may be obtained for a seduction without loss of service. If the seduction takes place under the father's roof, the circum- stances being such as to negative a licence express or implied for the seducer being there, or such as to make him a trespasser ah irdtio, the father; according to Lord Holt's opinion (fe), may bring his action of trespass for breaking and entering the house and lay the seduction as matter of aggravation. " No action lies for the master for the battery of his servant without a per quod, yet it may well be put in as matter of aggravation. Suppose a man get another's maid or daughter with child, no trespass lies for it. Yet if he th^t has done it comes into the house without the owner's leave, he may put the getting his daughter with child for aggravation." The right of action for seduction does not, however, pass to a master's assignees on his bankruptcy (I); nor does it survive the death of the parent on whose loss of service, had he lived to the birth of the child, it might have been founded. Thus in the Irish case of Hamilton v. Lonff (m) (where a daughter, debauched two months before the death of her father, continued residing with, and performing acts of service for, her mother up to the date of her confinement) it was held that neither at common law nor under the Married Women's Property Acts could the mother maintain an action for the seduction of her daughter. But where a girl in domestic service was by arrangement with her mistress, sent home to her mother, for a week and was seduced during that period, it was held there was evidence that the mother was at the time; of the seduction ejititled to the girl's services, and action could therefore be maintained (n). ■ > (h) Thompson v. Ross, (1860) 5 H. & N. 16 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 1; 120 E. E. 451; Hedges v. Tagg, (1872) L. E. 7 Ex. 283; 41 L. J. Ex. 169; Whitbourne v. Williams, (1901) 2 K. B. 722 ; 70 L. J. K. B. 933. (i) Ogden v. Lancashire, (1866) 15 W. E. 158; Rist v. Faux, (1868) 4 B. & S. 409; 32 L. J. Q. B. 386; 129 E. E. 783. . ,. ^„ ., • (k) Per Holt, C.J., Russell v. Corn, (1703) 6 Mod. 127, cited by Buller, J., m Bennett v Allcott, (1787) 2 T. E. p. 167. U) Howard v. Croivther, (1841) 8 M. & W. 601 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 335; 58 E. E. 823. (rn) Hamilton v. Long, (1903) Ir. E. 2 K. B. 407. (n) Dent v. Maguire, (1917) 2 Ir. E. 59, C. A. 228 SEDUCTION AND LOSS OF SERVICE. Action by husband for loss of wife's service. Action of orim. con. abolished. Action for enticing aWay and harbour- ing wife. Action for personal injuries to wife. Eight of wife to sue for loss of consortium of husband. A husband has a right to the society and service of his wife just as a father has to the service of his daughter, and for injury to this right the law gives analogous remedies (o). The old action for criminal conversation was an action for loss of service, and could not be maintained where, the husband had entirely abandoned his right to the society of the wife (p). This action no longer exists at common law, but by 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 33, a husband may present a petition in the Divorce Court solely for damages on the ground of the respondent's adultery with the petitioner's wife, and such petition is to be decided on the same footing as the old action for criminal conversation subject to this, that if a husband cannot succeed in a petition for divorce he cannot succeed in a claim for damages. If there has been oondona-fcion no damages can be recovered, which was not the case at common law (g). But where damages are recoverable the measure of such damages is not to be assessed solely upon the basis of loss of society, although one main ground is the breaking up of the household (r). The remedy, how- ever, is still at common law if a wife is merely induced to leave her husband, or if, after having left, she is harboured and maintained (s). It is, of course, a defence to such action if the husband have so mis- conducted himself that the wife is justified in quitting him, and it would seem that it is also a defence if it be honestly believed that such a state of facts exists (f). A husband may sue apart from his wife for personal injuries done to her by trespass or negligence, in consequence of which she is rendered less able to discharge her domestic duties or otherwise to render assistance to him in his aSairs (m) ; and in the event of her decease may recover exemplary damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts {x). It would seem to be an open question whether under any circumstances a wife can have a right of action for deprivation of her husband's society. In Lynch v. Knight (y) the majority of the (o) Smith v. Kaye and another, (1904) 20 T. L. R. 261. (p) Weedon v. Timbrell, (1793) 5 T. B. 357. , (g) Bernstein \. Bernstein, (1893) P. 292; 63 L. J. P. 8. But in Izard v. Izard, (1889) 14 P. D. 45; 58 L. J. P. 83, it was held that a husband living apart from his wife under a separation deed might recover damages. (r) Evans v. Evans, (1899) , P. 195; 68 L. J. P. 70; see also Evans v. Evans, (1906) P. 125; 75 L. J. P. 27. ' («) Winsmore v. Oreenbank, (1745) Willes, 577. This cause of action seems to be untouched by the decision in Reg. v. Jackson, (1891) 1 Q^ B. 671; 60 L. J. Q. B. 346. It is 'apprehended that the husband in that case, though he could not compel the wife to live with him, would have had a good cause of action against her relations who harboured her and persuaded her not to return to him. See above, p. 5. (t) Berthon v. CartwrigU, (1796) 2 Esp. 480; Philp v. Sguir&, (1791) Peake, 114 ; 3 E. B. 659. (u) Brockbank v. Whitehaven Junction R. Co., (1862) 7 H. & N. 834; 81 L. J. Ex. 349. (x) Berry v. Humm d Co., (1915) 1 K. B. 627; 84 L. J. K. B. 918. iy) (1861) 9 H. L. C. 577; 131 E. E. 347. MEASURE OF DAMAGES. 229 law lords expressed an opinion in favour ol such an action being maintainable, although they decided against the plain tiS on the ground that the alleged consequential injury was not sufficiently con- nected with the alleged wrongful act. Lord Wensleydale, on the other hand, expressly held that no such action would lie. The right of the wife, if any, must stand on a footing very different from the right of the husband, for the latter has a right of control and a claim of service which the former has not. It has never been held or suggested that a wife can sue by reason of an injury to her husband which prevents him from maintaining her as well as he might otherwise have done, although in case of his death she may have a remedy under 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93; or under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 (a). In the case of an ordinary servant the master may recover not Damages in merely the actual damage sustained up to the time of action "^p brought, but also in respect of the future service which he is likely servant, to lose (a). It would seem, however, that he ought to be limited to the period for which he has a binding contract of service. Any further damage founded on a speculation that the service would continue beyond the agreed time would be too remote. If, however, Damages the action is based on the malice of the defendant, there is no such ^gK''*™^" limitation, and if the justice of the case requires it, exemplary damages may be given'. In Gunter v. Astor (b) the plaintiff's work- men were employed simply by the piece. The defendant induced them all to quit suddenly, leaving their work linfinished, and the business of the plaintiff was thereby ruined. He recovered £800 damages, being the amount of two years' profits, and it was held not to be an excessive sum (c). In an ordinary case, however, the damages for procuring a breach of contract will not exceed those which might be recoverable for the breach of the contract itself (d). Thus, in Hamlyn v. Houston ^ Co., in which the plaintiff suffered loes by reason of the defendants' bribing a servant in the plaintiff's employ to divulge his master's trade secrets, the measure of damages awarded was apparently the loss actually sustained (e). (z) 6 Edw. VII. 0. 58. (a) Hodsoll V. Stallehrass, (1840) 11 A. & B. 301; 9 L. J. Q. B. 132; 52 " B E 350 (b) (1819) 4 Moore, 12 ; 21 K. B. 733. (c) See too per Crompton, J., Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 2 B & B. p. 230; 22 L. J. Q. B. 463; 95 K. E. 501; Bixby v. Dunlap, (1876) 22 Amer. Eep. 475. As to the general doctrine of " exemplary damages " see Black v. N. British Ry., (1908) S. C. 444 (Ct. of SesB.). (d) Bird v. Randall, (1762) 3 Burr. 1346 ; Quinn v. Leathern, (1901) A. C. 495 ; 70 L. J. P. C. 76. (e) (1903) 1 K. B. 81; 72 L. J. K. B. 72, C. A. In the unreported case of Ward V. Webster (decided in the King's Bench Division before Channell, J.), the jury awarded the plaintiff substantial damages for the injury which he had sustained by' reason of the defendant inducing a clerk in his (the plaintiff's) employ to betray his business secrets. 230 SEDUCTION AND LOSS OF SERVICE. Damages for injury to feelings. Where the plaintifE stands in a parental or quasi-parental relation to the person the loss of whose service he alleges,' he' cart generally recover for the injury to his feelings as well as for the actual loss sustained-. 'This is not, however, so in every case, as, for instance, where the defendant" has' simjily befea guilty of an act of negligence without any intentional wrong-doing (/) towards the plaintiff: It is, however, customary to allovs*- the plaintiff to recover any expense for cursing, attendance, and the like to which he may have been put, although it would not of itself apart from loSs of service be an actionable' damage (g). Diimages in action of seduction. When the action is for debauching a female servant the injury to the plaintiff's feelings is always a matter of aggravation, whether he occupy a parental relation or not (h). In this kind of action the whole conduct of the parties and their position in life, though not their means, are to be taken into consideration (i). It is an aggravation of the damage if the defendant did the wrong while received as an honourable suitor (fc) ; on the other hand it is a mitigation if the plaintiff has himself been a negligent, and imprudent guardian (Z). The defendant may further seek to reduce the damages by proving the woman to be of bad reputation, but he cannot give in evidence specific acts of rr;iisconduct on her part (m) except with a view of attributing the paternity of her child to some one else, in which case the evidence is admissible not on the question of damages, but as a defence to the action (n). Evidence of the woman's good character cannot be given in the first place, but only after the question has been raised by the defendant (o). Lord Ellenborough decided in two cases that the mere fact that she had been ofoss-examined as to her character did not put it in (/) Flemington v. Smithers, (1826) 2 C. & P. 292. (g) Flemington v. Smithers, supra; Dixon v. Bell, (1816) 1 Stark. 287; 17 \h) Howard v. Growther, (1841) 8 M. & ,W. 601 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 335 ; 58 B. E. 823. (t) Hodsoll V. Taylor, (1873) L. R. 9 Q. B. 79; 43 L. J. Q. B.'l4. (k) Elliott V. Nicklin, (1818) 5 Price, 641; Berry v. Da Costa, (1866) L. E. 1 C. P. 331; 35 L. J. Cli. 119. (l) In Beddie v. Scoolt, (1795) Peake, 316, the plaintiff had suffered the defendant, whom he knew to be married, to court his daughter on the representa- tion that he was about to procure a divorce, and Lord Kenyon directed a nonsuit. It would seem, however, that nothing short of absolute connivance would deprive the plaintiff of all right of action. See Duberley v. Gunning, (1791) 4 T. E. 651; 3 B. E. 664. (m) Scott v. Sampson, (1882) 8 Q. B. D. 491; 51 L. J. Q. B. 380. As to evidence of a plaintiff's personal conduct in reduction of damages, see Kelly v. Sherlock, (1866) L. B. 1 Q. B. 686 ; '35 L. J. Q. B. 209. (n) Foulkes v. Selway, (1800) 3 Esp. 236; Jones v. James, (1968) 18 L. T- N. S. 243. (o) Garbutt v. Simpson, (1863) 32 L. J. M. C. 186. MEASURE OF DAMAGES. 231 issue (p), but must be taken simply as an impeachment of her credit; on the other hand, in a later case, after such cross- examination evidence of good character was held admissible (q). (p) Bamfield v. Massey, (1808) 1 Camp. 460; Dodd v. Norris, (1814) 3 Camp. fil9 ; 14 E. E. 832. (g) Bate v. Hill, (1823) 1 C. & P. 100 ; 28 R. E. 766. CHAPTEE XL TRESPASS TO CHATTELS AND CONVERSION. Injuries to chattels. Physical Asportation. When aspor- tation no Asportation Conversion (a) Conversion (b) Conversion (c) Conversion Overt . (d) Conversion (e) Conversion (f) Conversion (g) Conversion (h) Conversion , FAOE 232 232 by Taking 235 by Transfer 237 by Sale in Market 240 by Keeping 240 by Destruction ... 246 by Co-owner .... 247 by Agent 249 by Auctioneer ... 252 PAOB Detinue 254 Eeplevin 257 Subject-matter of Conversion 258 Special and General Property in Chattels 261 Right of Possession 261 Possession of a Bailee 262 Title by Possession 266 Jus Tertii and Estoppel 267 Measure of Damages 271 In dealing with rights of action arising out of injuries done to property movable and tangible in its nature, there are two main things to be octosidered : first of all, the nature of the wrongful act; secondly, the nature of the right or interest which is infringed by such act. It is cleaj that he who actually damages a chattel belonging to another, whether indirectly by reason of his negligence, or directly by some act done to the chattel in the nature of a trespass, is guilty of a wrong. Where a cab-driver had deposited his licence with his employer and the latter on discharging him from his service indorsed his reasons for so doing on the licence without any authority, it was held that there was a good cause of action, and that it was no defence to plead the truth of the indorsement (a). There may be a trespass without the infliction of any material damage by a mere taking or asportation. The removal of a chattel from one room to the other without any authority, express or implied from the circumstances (&), may be a good cause of action, although but for nominal damages (c). It is apprehended, how- ever, that for a taking to constitute a trespass it must not merely be an unlawful act, but ynlawful as against the party from whom (o) Rogers v. Macnamara, (1853) 14 C. B. 27; 23 L. J. C. P. 1; 98 E. R. 516; see Hurrell v. Ellis, (1845) 2 C. "B. 295; 15 L. J. C. P. 18; 69 E. E. 487; Wennhak v. Morgan, (1888) 20 Q. B. D. 635; 57 L. J. Q. B. 241; Norris v. Birch, (1895) 1 Q. B. 639; 64 L. J. M. C. 91. (b) As where property derelict or endangered is taken with the intention of preserving it for the owner, see per Coke, C.J., Isaack v. Clarke, (1613) 2 Buls. p 812; per Pollock, C.B. Beg. v. Riley, (1853) Dears. 0. C. p. 157; Kirk v. Gregory, (1876) 1 Ex. D. 65 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 186. (c) Kirk V. Gregory, supra. CONVERSION. 233 possession is taken (d). Thus, if goods belong to A., and B. being unlawfully possessed of them transfers them to C, the taking of them by C, though it may give a good cause of action in trover, is not a trespass (e). And it makes no difference, it would seem, if C. is aware of the infirmity of B.'s title. The receiver of stolen goods does not commit a trespass when he takes the goods from the thief with the thief's consent. If it were otherwise every receiver might be indicted for larceny. Formerly if a sherifi seized goods under an execution and it turned out ultimately that the execution debtor had previously committed an act of bankruptcy, and that consequently his assignees in bankruptcy acquired a title by relation to the goods seized in the execution, they might sue the sheriff in trover for the value of the goods, but they could not treat him as a trespasser, because his act was not wrongful as against the debtor from whose possession the goods were taken. But it was different where the original taking was, in every sense, unauthorised, for in such case mere title by relation would enable the party possessing it to maintain an action of trespass. Thus an administrator may sue for an illegal distress made between the death of his intestate and the grant of letters of administration (/)•. There may sometimes be an unlawful taking of a chattel Taking although the trespasser has it in his physical custody and control. '^™'"^' ^ Formerly (g), a bailee could not be indicted for larceny merely possession. because he dishonestly converted to his own use the subject-matter of a bailment. He did not interfere with the possession, and there was consequently no trespass and no larceny. But if he " broke bulk," that is to say, abstracted from the bale, barrel, or parcel, as the case might be, a portion of its contents, he committed a trespass and was indictable for larceny. The most important class of cases to consider is that in which ConYeraion. the person entitled to the possession of a chattel is permanently deprived of that possession, and the chattel is converted to the use of some one else. Here the wrong is not done to the thing itself but to the abstract right in the thing. It may of course happen that the one wrong will involve the other. If A. takes the chattel of B. from him he commits an act of trespass; if he takes it and keeps it he is guilty of both trespass (d) See on this point Balme v. Mutton, a833) 9 Bing. 471, at p. 477; 1 L. J. Ex. 27. (e) See Mennie v. Blake, (1856) 6 B. & B. 842; 25 L. J. Q. B. 399; Winter v. Bancks, (1901) 84 L. T. 504. (f) Tharpe v. Stallwood, (1843) 5 M. & G. 760;, 12 L. J C. P. 241; 63 E. E. 474 ■ explaining Balme v. Hutton, (1833) 9 Bing. 471 ; 1 Jj. J. Ex. 27. (a) Larceny by a bailee was first made an offence by 20 & 21 Vict. c. 54, B. 4, re-enacted by the repealed 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s; 3. See now 6 & 7 Geo. V., c. 60, s. 20 (iv). 234 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS AND CONVERSION. Eemedies for deprivation of possession. Trover and conversion. and conversion (h). A man may, however, be deprived of his property by many other means than a, wrongful taking, as, for instance, by a Wrongful detention. Apart from trespass, there were at common law three forms of remedy open to the person who' had been tortiousJy deprived of his goods. He might proceed by trover, detinue, or replevin. The action of trover, according to the original form of declara- tion, was applicable only to cases where the plaintiff had lost his. goods and they were subsequently found and appropriated by the defendant. However, the averments of loss and finding had long been considered immaterial, and were not traversable by the defendant. Lord Mansfield thus describes the action of trover: "In form it is a fiction, in substance a ' remedy to recover the value of personal chattels wrongfully converted by another to his own use. The form supposes the defendant may have come lawfully into the possession of the goods. The action lies, and has been brought in many cases where in truth the defendant has got the possession lawfully. Where the defendant takes them wrongfully and by trespass, the plaintiS, if he thinks fit to bring this action, waives the trespass and admits the possession to have been lawfully gotten." (f). It will be seen afterwards, however, that the mere unlawful taking may of Itself be a good cause of action in trover. By the first Common Law Procedure Act (k) the fictitious aver- ments were abolished, and by the form of declaration given it was simply alleged that ' ' the defendant converted to ' his own use or wrongfully deprived the plaintifi of the use and possession of the plaintiff's goods" (I). These alternative allegations are in truth exactly equivalent to one another, and it is the latter that most correctly describes the nature of the action, since the plaintiff sues in respect of the loss of goods which he has suffered, irrespective of any particular appropriation of them which may have been made by the defendant (m). The word conversion, however, is the recognised legal expression for the wrongful deprivation of the possession of goods, and its use in this artificial and fictitious sense has now probably become inveterate (n). (h) Fouldes v. Willoughby, (1841) 8 M. & W. 540; 10 L. J. Ex. 364; 58 E. E. 803. (i) Cooper v. Chitty, (1756) 1 Burr. p. 31. (k) 15 & 16 Vict. e. 76, o. 49. (l) It is said that this alternative allegation was in reality intended as a substitute for the first , and that the two were printed together by an oversight ; . see Day, C. L. P. Acts, p. 185. (m) See KeywoHh v. Hill, (1820) 3 B. & Aid. 685. (n) See per Bramwell? L.J., Glyn v. East India Dock Co., (1880) 6 Q. B. D. p. 490; 50 L. J. Q. B. 62; Burroughes v. Bayne, (1860) 5 H. & N. p. 309; 29 L. J. Ex. 188; 120 E. E. 594; England v. Cowley, (1873) L. E. 8 Ex. p. 129; 42 L. J. Ex. 80 ; Hiort v. Bott, (1874) L. E. 9 Ex. p. 89 ; 43 K J. Ex. 81. CONVERSION BY TAKING. 235 An act of conversion may be committed, (1) when property is wrongfully taken, (2) when it is wrongfully parted with, (3) when it is wrongfully sold in market overt although not delivered, (4) when it is wrongfully retained, and (6) when it is wrongfully destroyed or changed in natiu-e (o). And the complete ofience of fraudulent conversion of property entrusted to a person may be committed although the chattel has neither been delivered to the defendant by the true owner nor does ' the latter know of the defendant's existence (p). 1. Any one who without authority takes possession of another Conversion man's goods with the intention of asserting some right or dominion ^ taJtmg. over them is prima facie guilty of a conversion; or, in other words, anyone who deals with goods in a manner inconsistent with the right of the true owner is guilty of a wrongful conversion; provided there is an intention on fce part of the person so dealing with them to negative the right of the true owner or to assist a right inconsistent therewith (q). And this statement applies even when the abatement of a nuisance and the conversion of the property causing the nuisance are involved in one and the same act. Thus where the overhanging branches of fruit-trees ' extend beyond the boundary of the owner's land a neighbour, although entitled to lop the overhanging branches; is guilty of a conversion should he appropriate the fruit growing thereon (r). It seems, however, that a person who seeks to acquire some property in a chattel not being aware of the title of the true owner is not guilty of a conversion by the mere fact of taking possession. This question is discussed later on (s). A mere taking unaccompanied by an intention to exercise per- intention to manent or temporary dominion may be a trespass, but is no ^^"j^^^^^ conversion. In Fouldes v. Willoug'hbTj {t) the plaintifE had embarked in the defendant's ferry-boat two horses, and had paid for their passage. Subsequently the latter without justification refused to carry out his contract and desired the plaintiff to remove the horses from the boat, which the plaintiff refused to do. The defendant then took them from the plaintiff and turned them loose on the landing-place. At the trial the jury were directed that by so doing he was guilty of a conversion. It was held that this was a misdirection, because the jury ought to have been asked to consider what the intention of the defendant had been, whether he (o) Richardson v. Atkinson, (1724) 1 Stra. 576. ^ ^^ ^ ,„,, (v) Rex V. Grubb, (191S) 2 K. B. 683, C. C. A. ; 84 L. J. K. B. 1744. (a) iTncashire and Yorkshire R. dc. v. MacNicoll, (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 601. (r) Mills V. Brooker, (1919) 1 K. B.^555 iir.TtT.QQ \s) See below, pp. 2S1 et seq. ; and Spackman v. Foster, (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 99 ; ^^m (IBii) SM & W. 540; 10 L. J. Ex. 864; 58 E. R. 803; see also Houghton V. Butler, (1791) 4 T. R. 364 ; 2 R. E. 411. 236 TEBSPASS TO CHATTELS AND CONVERSION. Need not be intention to acquiie ownership. Constructive taking. had intended to get rid of the horses from his boat or to assert any right or' dominion over them. " It has never yet been held that the single act of removal of a chattel independent of any claim over it, either in favour of the party himself or any one else, amounts to a conversion of a chattel. In the present case, there- fore, the simple removal of the horses by the defendant for a purpose whoUy unconnected' with any the least denial of the right of the plaintifi to the possession and enjoyment of them is no conversion " (u). The taking need not be with the intention of acquiring a full ownership. It is enough if any interest is claimed inconsistent with the right of the person truly entitled. In Tear v. Freehod]f (x) the defendant wrongfully took possession of certain goods, with the intention of acquiring a lien, and it was held that he was guilty of a conversion. Even a still , more transitory exercise of dominion may, it would seem, amount to a conversion. " If a man takes my horse and rides it and then redehvers it to me nevertheless I may have an action against him, for this is a con- version, and the redelivery is no bar to the action but shall be merely a mitigation of damages " (y). Any asportation of a chattel for the use of the defendant or a third party amounts to a conversion (z). If, therefore, a man takes and uses the chattel of another in an unauthorised manner, and without further default on his part it is lost, injured, or destroyed before it can be returned to the owner, he is liable for the whole damage. The taking may be constructive merely, as by a transfer on the books of a warehouseman or an indorsement of a document of title (a). But a man does not convert goods simply by making a contract for their purchase ; the conversion takes place on the acceptance of delivery of the goods or of the document which represents them. A broker, so long as he confines himself to his regular business as a medium of comrtiunication between the parties, is unaffected by the lack of lawful authority in his principals to deal with the goods which .are the subject-matter of the contract (b); But if he does something more than make the (u) Per Lord Abinger, p. 547. The distinction between trespass and conversion, although in many respects now unimportant, may be very material on the question of damages. (x) (1858) 4 C. B. N. S. 228 ; 114 E. E. 688. (y) Eolle Ab. tit. Action sur Case, p. 5, (2) rer Alderson, B., Fouldes v. Willoughby, (1841) 8 M. & W. p. 648; 10 L. J. Ex. 364; 58 E. E. 803. See per Holt, C.J., Petre v. Heneage, (1701) 12 Mod. p. 520 ; Mulgrave v. Ogden, (1590) Cro. Eliz. 219. (a) M'Combie v. Davies, (1805) 6 Bast, 538. So there may be a conversion if goods are constructively parted with {Hiort v. Bott, (1874) L. E. 9 Ex. 86 ; 43 L. J. Ex. 81 ; Johnson v. Stear, (1863) 15 C. B. N. S. 330; 33 L. J. C. P. 130; 137 E. E. 532; and see Union Credit Bank v. Mersey Docks d Harbour Board, (1899) 2 Q. B. 205; 68 L. J. Q. B. 842). (b) National Mercantile Bank v. Rymill, (1881) 44 L. T. 767, 0. A. CONVERSION BY TRANSFER. 237 contract, if the goods themselves or the document representing them pass through his hands and he actively intervenes in the transfer of possession, then if that transfer is unlawful he becomes himself a wrong-dt)er (c). If a man takes possession of premises on which goods are By taking deposited, it is a question for the iury whether it was his intention possession of . T premises, also to take possession of the goods themselves. In Thorogood V. Babinson (d) the defendant had entered on some land under a writ of possession. ■ He found there two men loading on a barge some lime which was the property of the plaintiff. He turned them off, and refused to let them complete the loading or remove any of the lime. The plaintifi thereupon sued in trover. The jury were asked to consider whether there had been any act indicating an intention to deprive the plaintiff of his property, and if they thought not, to give a verdict for the defendant. It was held that this direction was at least sufficiently favourable to the plaintiff, and some of the Court seem to have doubted whether there was any evidence at all of a conversion (e). Nor does a forcible taking possession of premises, under an assignpaent of lease, and subsequent refusal to deliver up fixtures contained therein amount to a conversion of the premises (/). In Grainger v. Hill (g) the defendants obtained from the Taking by plaintiff, under threat of executing a warrant of ca. sa., a ship's 'i"'^^^^- register, and it was held this amounted to an act of conversion because they had taken it without right, and against the plaintiff's will. But it is not enough if property is surrendered under a threat of unpleasant consequences. There must be such duress as to be equivalerit to a forcible taking (h). 2. A plaintiff who sues for conversion and relies on the fact that Conversion the defendant unlawfully parted with the possession of his goods ^^th^gJofg. gives the go-by to the question whether that possession was originally acquired wrongfully or innocently ; for the moment he is content to treat it as lawful. The defendant on this assumption cannot be guilty of any wrong by merely giving a temporary custody to some (c) See HolUns v. Fowler, (1874-5) L. E. 7 H. L. 757 ; 44 L. J. Q. B. 169. The point was not finally decided in this case by the House of Lords, because they held that the defendant (plaintiff in error) had taken possession of the goods as a principal. The statements in these last two paragraphs may seem opposed to the opinion of Brett, J. (pp. 775 et seq.), but it is apprehended that his observations, though perfectly general in form, were only intended to apply to the case of an agent dealing with goods in ignorance of the true title This case is dealt with below, p. 252; see also Barker v. Furlong, (1891) 2 Ch. 172; 60 L J. Ch. 368. (d) (1845) 6 Q. B. 769; 14 L. J. Q. B. 87; 66 E. E. 567. „,, , (e See Wilde v. Waters, (1855) 24 L. J. C. P. 195 cited below p. 24* note (h); Wansborough v. Maton, (1836) 4 A. & B. 884; 5 L. J. K. B. 150; 43 E. E. ^^m Lonorfo/ V^Maj/oe, (1834) 2 A. & E. 167; 4 L. J. K. B. 28. ffl-) (1838) 4 Bing. N. C. 212 ; 7 Ij. J. C. P. 85. (h) Powell V. Hoyland, (1851) 6 Ex. 67; 20 L. J. Ex. 82; 86 E. E. 193. 238 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS AND CONVERSION. Intention to confer special property. Assisting in ■unlawful transfer. servant or agent, since by eo doing he does not alter bis position (i), the wrongful act is done when he purports to give to some stranger, along with the mere possession, some right over the property itself, whether as owner or dominus pro tempore. The taking and the giving are, in fact, whether, actuaL or constructive, the, different sides of one unlawful trarisaetion, and. the transferor and the trans- feree roay be considered as joint wrong-doers. Nor are damages for a conversion in all cases limited to the actual value of the thing converted. Thus where -the defendant wrongfully, handed over to another person a letter which had been written to the plaintiff by a third party, substantial damages were held to be recoverable (fc). It is clear that any one who under a contract of sale hands over property in a manner adverse to the right of the person really entitled is guilty of a conversion (Z). And.it would seem to make no difference whether he is the actual vendor or merely entrusted with the property for the purpwse of sale as a commission agent or auctioneer (m). In the latter case, however, the mere fact of an auctioneer sub- mitting goods for sale raises a legal presumption that he is authorised to sell. Consequently, although he may have innocently exceeded his authority by so doing, he is nevertheless liable to a purchaser, as distinguished from a, bidder, for loss of bargain (n). As the unauthorised taking of goods with the intent of thereby asserting a lien or special property is a conversion, so it is a. con- version if a man hands over goods to another so as to give him a lien or special property. " If a person take my horse to ride and leave him at an inn that is a conversion; for though I may have the horse on sending for him and paying for the keeping of hirh, yet it brings a charge on me " (o). ' > ' ■ But apparently a bare agent or negotiator for the sale of goods which he knows to have been stolen cannot 'be convicted of receiving the goods unless they have actually been in his possession or under his control (p). Any one who finding himself in possession of goods hands them (t) Canot v. Hughes, (1836) 2 Bing. N. C. 448; 6 L. J. C. P. 177. (k) Thurston v. Charles, (1905), 21 T. L. E. 659. (I) Martindale v. Smith, (1841) 1 Q. B. 389; 10 L. J. Q. B. 155;. 55 B. B. 286. (m) Featherstonhaugh v. Johnstone, (1818) 8 Taunt. 237 ; Cochrane v. Rymill, (1879) 40 L. T. N. S. 744; Delaney v. Wallis, (1886) 14 L. B. Jr. 31; Barker v. Furlong, (1891) 2 Ch. 172; 60 L. J. Ch. 368; Consolidated Co. v. Curtis, (1892) 1 Q. B. 495; 61 L. J. Q. B. 326; Cp. National Mercantile Bank v. Rymill, (1881) 44 L. T. N. S. 767. The case of Turner v. Hockey, (1887) 56 L. J. Q. B. 301, if it is to be taken as deciding .anything contrary to what is stated in the text above, is not good law. It has been dissented from both in Barker v. Furlong and Consolidated Co. v. Curtis. in) Anderson v. Croall, (1903) 6 F. 153, Ct., of Sess. (o) Per Buller, J., Syeds v. Hay, ,(1791) 4 T. B. p. 264. (p) Rex v. Watson, (1916) 2 K. B. 386, C. C. A.; 85 L. J. Ki B. 1142. , NECESSARY CONCOMITANTS , TO CONVERSION. 239 over to another takes on himself the risk that such person may have no right to receive them ; for if so, he has made himself a party to an unauthorised transfer of possession. In Hiort v. Bott (q), the plaintiffs, in consequence of a telegram from their agent, consigried certain barley to the defendant, and sent him a delivery order on production of which he was entitled to receive the barley from the carriers. The defendant had, in fact, ordered nb barley. The agent called on him next day and said that it was a mistake. The defen- dant thereupon by way of setting matters right, and believing that he was in effect returning the barley to the plaintiffs, indorsed over the delivery order to the agent, who thereby obtained the barley and absconded with the proceeds. It was held that the defendant was liable for a conversion, since .he had in effect parted with the plaintiff's property to a person who had no right to receive it. It is the duty of a carrier or warehouseman to deliver the goods Misdelivery with which he is entrusted to the person designated by his employer, ^^jelhouae"'^ and, as a general rule, a misdelivery is a Conyersion (r). The duty, man. however, is not absolute ; it is enough if a reasonable and usual course of business is followed, and where there is no breach of duty there can be no conversion (s). * Therefore if bills of lading in more than one part have been given for goods shipped on board a vessel and the first part is indorsed over for value, the master may nevertheless deliver the goods to the holder of one of the other parts who first presents himself, pro- vided he has no notice of the, right of the indorsee for value (t). There can be no conversion where there is no voluntary act. Goods lost or Therefore if goods are by accident or carelessness lost or destroyed the bailee or other possessor cannot be sued in this form of action. He may be liable on his contract or for- negligence (u), or in detinue (a;). And where goods are given into the sole custody of a person and accepted by him as a bailee, should they be lost or damaged while in (g) (1874) L. E. 9 Ex. 86; 43 L. J. Ex. 81;. and see HolHns v. Fowler, (1874) L. B. 7 H. L. 757 ; 44 L. J. Q. B. 169. (r) Devereux v. Barclay, (1819) 2 B. & Aid. 702; 21 K. B. 457; Sephenson v. Hart, (1828) 4 Bing. 476; 6 L. J. C. P. 97; 29 B. E. 602; Hiort v. London & North Western R. Co., (1879) 4 Ex. D. 188; 48 L. J. Ex. 545. See, however, the observations of Martin, B., Crouch v. Great Northern B. Co., (1856) 11 Ex. pp 756-7 ■ 25 L. J. Ex. 137 ; 105 B. E. 763. :^or effect of the estoppel raised by attornment, see Henderson v. Williams, (1895) 1. Q. B. 521 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 308. (s) Heunh v. London d North Western R. Co., (1870) L. B. 5 Ex. 61; 39 L J Ex 48; M'Kean v. M'lvor, (1870) L. B. 6 Ex. 36; 40 L. J. Ex. 30. (t) Glyn, Mills S Go. v. East d West India Dock Co., (1880-2) 7 App. Gas. 591- 52 Iv.'j. Q. B. 146. (u) Ross V. Johnson, (1772), 5 Burr. 2825; see Heald v. Carey ^ (1852). 11_ C B 977- 21 L J. G. P. 97; 87 B. E. 833. See also Newman v. Bourne A HoUingsioorth, (1915) 31 T. L. B. 209. (i) See below, p. 254. destroyed. 240 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS AND CONVERSION. Duty of distraining landlord. Conversion by sale in market overt. Conversion by keeping. Demand and refusal. his custody, the onus hes on him to show circumstances negativing negligence on his p'art {y). And a fortiori a bailee for reward cannot discharge himself from liability merely by showing that the chattels with which he was entrusted were stolen without his default if it be proved he could have recovered them by. the exercise of reasonable diligence («). Apparently, however (apart from special agreement), a bailee is not liable to his bailor for damage to the chattel bailed when such damage was caused by the bailee's servant negligently doing some act, resulting in damage to the chattel, that was not within the scope of his employment (a). A landlord who has removed goods und6r a distress is not bound to hand over the ' surplus which may remain after he has sold sufficient to satisfy his rent to the true owner, even if he have notice of his claim. He has a legal right over them derived from the fact of their being found on the demised premises, and in the exercise of this right is not bound to concern himself with questions of title (b). It seems probable, however, that if he retain the surplus, after demand, an action will lie against him for money had and received. 3. Unless it be in market overt, there can be no conversion by a mere bargain and sale without a transfer of possession; such an act is voi(i" and does not change the property or the possession (c) ; but in market overt the property is passed to the purchaser by the sale, which is therefore equivalent to physical destruction, and the vendor is liable in trover to the true owner (d) though the goods be never delivered to the purchaser in pursuance of such sale. It is, moreover, a question of fact in each case whether or no the premises upon which goods are' sold constitute a " shop " within the custom of market overt (e). 4. The ordinary way of showing a conversion by unlawful reten- tion of property is to prove that the defendant having it in his possession refused to give it up on demand made by the party erititled (/). And it is no answer to such a demand for the bailee (y) Phipps v. New Claridge's Hotel, Ltd., (1905) 22 T. L. B. 49; Williams v. Curzon Syndicate, (1919) 35 T. L. E. 475, C. A. («) Goldman v. Hill, (1919) 1 K. B. 443, G. A. ; 88 L. J. K. B. 491. (a) Sanderson v. Collins, (1904) 1 K. B. 628; 73 L. J. K. B. 358, 0. A. (b) Evans v. Wright, (1857) 2 H. & N. 527; 27 L. J. Ex. 50; 115 E. E. 679; Yates V. Eastwood, (1851) 6 Ex. 805; 20 L. J. Ex. 303; 86 E. E. 482. (c) Lancashire Waggon Go. v. Fitzhugh, (1861) 6 H. & N. 502; 30 L. J. Ex. 231; 123 B. E. 645; Consolidated Co. v. Curtis S Son, (1892) 1 Q. B. p. 498; 61 L. J. Q. B. 325, per Collins, J. (d) See per Parke, B., in Farrar v. Beswick, (1836) 1 M. & W. p. 688; 5 L. J. Ex. 225 ; 42 E. E. 820 ; Delaney v. Wallis, (1885) 14 L. E. Ir. 31. As to the allocation of the proceeds of sale of goods belonging to a third party when such .proceeds are in the hands of a liquidator, see Chaplin, In re, (1915) 31- T. L. E. 279. (e) Clayton v. Le Roy, (1911) 27 T. L. E. 479; 81 L. J. K. B. 49, C. A. if) The demand is a condition precedent to action : S. C, (1911) 27 T. L. E. 479 ; 81 L. J. K. B. 49, C. A. CONVERSION BY KEEPING. 241 to plead (save in cases where the proceeding is in rem) the pressure of a jus terta, for such a plea does not operate so as to attach the property in the hands of the party on whom the writ is served [g). But this demand must be for specific chattels; where therefore a plaintiff entitled to claim five best beasts as heriots marked seven and allowed all to remain in the custody of the defendant, a general demand by the plaintiff for the heriots, without specifying the particular beasts claimed by him, would not support an action for the conversion of any one of them (h). It is not, however, necessary that at the time of the demand made the defendant should be so far in a position to return the property, that he has it in his custody or under his control. If he has been in possession but has pre- viously destroyed it or parted with it voluntarily, such dealing amounts to a conversion, and the plaintiff, after demand and refusal, is entitled to sue the defendant in detinue (i). If, however, the goods in question are actually seized under a legal process while in the defendant's possession, he is not answerable in trover because he does not do what is out of his power and deliver them on demand (fc). It not unfrequently happens that by the defendant's language or conduct at the time of the demand he expressly or impliedly admits that he could return them if he thought fit. In Catterall v. Kenyan (I), an action was brought against an innkeeper and his wife. Certain cattle of the plaintiff wrongfully taken in execution had been left in a stable of the inn. The plaintiff demanded them several times of the wife, who after some negotia- tion finally refused to hand them over, on the ground that she had received an indemnity. It was held that this was good evidence of possession and a conversion by the wife, for which both husband and wife, by reason of the relation existing between them, were answerable to the plaintiff in trover (m). Although it is no answer for a person who unlawfully refuses to Conversion give up property of which he has the custody to say that he was p^arge'cf ° merely acting as an agent or servant (n), yet in enquiring whether goods. a defendant was actually possessed it may be material to Consider his exact position towards the- goods in question. A servant who has the care of goods on his master's premises cannot, as a general (a) Warren v. Baring Bros., (1911) 54 'S. J. 720. ^ ^ ^ ^ „„„ feMbmStonv. Lipscomb, (1841)1 Q.B. 776;10L J. Q.B. 330 (i) Wilkinson V. Verity, (1871) L. E. 6 C. P. 206; 40 L. J. C. P. 141. As wil be seen where the defendant is under a contractual duty to return a chattel which is not in his possession, he is liable in detinue if he, contrary to the terms of his contract, fails to return it on demand. See below, pp. 254— 256. , (k) Verrall v. Robinson, (1835) 2 C. M. & E 495; 41 «• K /SO^ ^'^^To '° Pillott v Wilkinson, (18Q4) 3 H. & C. 345; 34 L. J. Ex 22; 140 E. E. 493. (1) (1842) 3 Q. B. 810; 11 L. J. Q. B. 260; 61 E. E. 235. (m)See, too, M'Kewen v. CotcUng, (1857) 27 L. J. Ex. 41, for implied ad- mission of a possession and destruction. T/^-Diia^iTj-D (n) Cranch v. White, (1835) 1 Bmg. N. C. 414; 4 L. J. C. P. 113; 41 E. E. 616 DaZ V. Vernon, (1844) 6 Q. B. 443; 14 L. J. Q. B. 30; 66 E. E. 457. 16 242 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS AND CONVERSION. Non-liability of agent for conversion by principal. Befusal only evidence of a conversion. Demand must be uncon- ditional. Befusal must be uncon- ditional. rule, be said to be in possession of them (o). In Alexander v. Southey (p), the defendant had the charge of a warehouse for hh employers and kept the key. The plaintiS demanded certain of his goods which were deposited there, and not obtaining them, at once commenced an action. The point decided was that the defendant had not refused in such a manner as to afford reasonable evidence of a conversion. The majority of the Court were, however, of opinion that had a sufficient refusal been proved the servant might have been liable. Where, however, an agent in good faith and without notice does some act which is ancillary to a breach of trust by his principal the agent is not liable for such breach of trust to the parties injured thereby (g). The mere fact of a refusal in answer to a demand is never of itself a conversion, though it may be very strong evidence of it. In Mires v. Solehay (r) the Court refused to give judgment on a special verdict showing a demand and refusal, saying that the fact of the conversion ought in terms to have been found by the jury. The demand, which is a condition precedent to action (s), should be unconditional in its terms. In Rushworth v. Taylor (t) the defendant, having been entrusted with the plaintiff's gun, damaged it. The plaintiff sent him a written notice to return the gun in the same good plight and condition as he had received- it. It was held that a failure on the part of the defendant to comply with the demand could not by itself be sufficient evidence of a conversion. But a demand for the value of the goods has been held to coiistitute a valid demand of the goods [u). The refusal must also be unconditional. A person on whom a demand for goods is made may not have them in his immediate custody though they are under his control; he may be the agent of another, or he may be under the belief that he has himself some right or title to the property. In all these cases it is not reasonable that he should' be called upon to act at a moment's notice {x). He requires time to get the goods into his own hands, (o) Mires v. Solehay, (1678) 2 Mod. 242, explained in Duvies v. Vernon, supra. It is said in the case itself, that a servant can never be liable for a mere non-feasance when he acts on his master's behalf, but only for a misfeasance. This distinction, however, is not recognised in modern cases. (p) (1821) 5 B. & Aid. 247; 24 B. E. 348. But see Stephens v. Elwall, (1815) 4 M. & S. 2S9 ; 16 B. B. 458. iq) Coleman v. Bucks and Oxon Union Bank, (1897) 2 Ch. 248 ; 66 L. J. Ch. 564. (r) (1678) 2 Mod. 242. (s) Clayton v. Le Boy, (1911) 27 T. L. E, 479; 81 L. J. K. B. 49, C. A. (t) (1842) 3 Q. B. 699; 12 L. J. Q. B. 80; 61 B; B. 358. («) Thompson v. Shirley, (1793) 1 Esp. 31. (x) Alexander v. Southey, (1821) 5 B. & Aid. 247; 24 B. E. 348; Towne v. Lewis, (1849) 7 C. B. 608; 78 B. B. 787; Clark v. Chamberlain, (1836) 2 M. & W. 78. COA'VERSION BY KEEPING. 243 to consult his priilcipal, to satisfy himself as to the claimant's right (y). , If he refuses simply in order to gain this time, and not intending a final denial of the claimant's right, it is no conversion. In Alexander v. Southey (z) the defendant being in charge of a warehouse, as servant of an insurance company, in v(?hich vi^ere certain goods of the plaintiff's, declined to give them to him without an order from his employers. Upon this the plaintiff at once brought his action. It was left to the jury to say whether the defendant had acted reasonably, and, they having found in his favour, the Court refused to disturb the verdict; doubting even whether there was any evidence of a conversion. " If," said Bayley, J., " the plaintiff in this case had informed the defendant that he had previously made application to the insurance company and that they had refused permission for the delivery of the property, or had told the defendant that he expected him to go and get an order authorising the delivery of the property, and after that the defendant had refused either to deliver the goods or to go and get such an order, I think it would have amounted to a conversion on his part, but here the defendant • had the goods' in his possession as the agent of the insurance , company, and he would not have done his duty if he had given them up without an application to his eniployers " (a). Accord- ingly in a later case (b), where a warehouseman refused to give up goods without an order, and being thereupon invited to consult with his principal and warned that it was intended to bring an action against him, neglected to take any further steps, the Court inferred that he was guilty of a conversion. But apparently a refusal to deliver up goods to the true owner by a person who was ignorant of his identity is not evidence of a conversion (c). In Pillott V. Wilkinson (d) the plaintiff had bought certain Delay in wine warehoused -with the defendant, and was the indorsee of the wiSf/emand. warrant. He called at the warehouse to demand possession, and was told by a clerk, as was the fact, that notice of an attachment of the wine had been served out of the Mayor's Court, and that consequently there was a difficulty about the matter. The plaintiff then went to look for the defendant, but' not finding him. sent a letter to intimate that unless he received a satisfactory (y) As to what is sufficient time see Pillott v. Wilkinson, (1864) 3 H. & C. 345 ; S4 L. J. Ex. 22 ; 140 E. B. 493. (z) (1821) 5 B. & Aid. 247; 24 K. E. 348. (a) (1821) 5 B. & Aid. at p. 248; 24 E. E. 348. (fa) Wilson V. Anderton, (1830) 1 B. & Ad. 450; 9 L. J. K. B. 48; 35 E. E. 348. For an interesting risumi of the law of detinue, see Cullen v. Barclay, (1881) 10 Li E Ir. 224; and note the judgment of Scrutton, J., in Wetherman v. London ,i Liverpool Bk. of Commerce, Ld., (1914) 31 T. L. B. 20. (c) Green V Dunn, (1811) 3 Camp. 215 n., and see Thorrie v. Tilbury, (1858) 3 H & N. 534 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 407 ; 117 E. B. 844. (d) (1864) 3 H. & C. 345; 34.L. J. Ex. 22; 140 E. E. 493. 244 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS AND CONVERSIOK. Besponsi- bility on qnalified refusal. Other evidence of unlawful keeping. answer by next morning he should take proceedings. In reply the defendant wrote requesting further time for consideration, and thereupon a writ was issued. The plaintiS having obtained a verdict, the Court below and the Exchequer Chamber refused to order a new trial (e), it being a question for the jury whether the defendant had a bond fide doubt as to the plaintiff's right of possession, and whether a reasonable time had elapsed for clearing up such doubt (/). It would seem that if a defendant has given a qu^fied refusal, it becomes his duty, after reasonable opportunity of enquiry and consideration, to hand over the goods, and he cannot excuse him- self when the time has come by showing that in the interval they have passed out of his control, at any rate, if there has been any default on his part. In Burroughes v. Bayne (g) the defendant had seized certain furniture under a bill of sale by putting a man in possession. The plaintiffs claimed a billiard table, which was part of the furniture. The defendant asked time to consider. Two days later the plaintiffs sent for their billiard table, having previously given notice of their intention to do so ; but they were unable to obtain possession as it was locked up in a room. This had not been done by the defendant's authority, as he had in effect given up his claim and withdrawn from possession. Bramwell, B., held that there was no evidence of a conversion, because the plaintiffs had agreed to the first delay,, and, subsequently on the second demand, the defendant had no control over the table or responsibility for it. The majority of the Court, however, decided that as the defendant had had an opportimity of handing over the table and delayed doing so for his own purposes, he had taken on himself the duty of carrying out the delivery on a subsequent occasion (h). A demand and refussd is not the only eviderice of an unlawful keeping. There may be a conversion of a chattel by the use and enjoyment of it in a manner altogether inconsistent with the right (e) Bramwell, B., diss. if) See, too, Vaughan v. Watt, (1840) 6 M. & W. 492; 9 L. J. N. S. Ex. 272; 55 E. E. 712; Lee v. Bayes, (1856) 18 C. B. 699; 25 L. J. C. P. 249; 107 E. E. 424. (g) (1860) 5 H. & N. 296; 29 L. J. Ex. 188.; 120 E. E. 594. {hy It is suggested by Maule, J. {Wilde v. Waters, (1855) 24 L. J. C. P. p. 195), that under certain circumstances a man may be in possession of a chattel without title, and yet not be bound to deliver it on the demand of the owner. " Where an outgoing tenant leaves a picture hanging on a wall, the new tenant may refuse to admit the owner of the picture to take it, and may not choose to put himself to the trouble of giving it, but the picture is still theowner's chattel. The question in such a case would be whether the jury could infer from the refusal that the new tenant exercised any dominion over the chattel. If it appeared that he had merely said, ' I don't want your chattel, but I shall not give myself any trouble about it,' that would not give the owner an action of trover." The view here expressed, however, seems inconsistent with Thorogood v. Robinson, (1845) 6 Q. B. 769; 14 L. J. Q. B. 87; 66 E. E. 567; see above, p. 237. CONVEBSION BY KEEPING. 245 of the owner. Thus if a person is entrusted with the custody of a cask of wine, and bottles the wine for hia own consumption, it would seem there is some evidence of a conversion even though none of the liquor be actually drunk (/). In Falk v. Fletcher (k) the plaintifi having shipped a certain portion of a cargo on board the defendant's vessel, disputes arose, and the master subsequently refused to give the plaintifi bills of lading in his own name and sailed on his voyage, and ultimately refused to deliver the goods to the plaintifi 's agent at the port of destination. It was held that there had been a conversion when the ship sailed away. But in a later case (I) where the master had refused to sign bills of lading except in a certain form, and sailed away, but subsequently made a proper tender of the cargo to the plaintifi at the port of destination, it was held that though the master had committed a breach of contract by not giving bills of lading, yet he had not been guilty of a conversion, because he had always held the goods for the plaintiff; whereas in Fa-Ik v. Fletcher there had been a repudiation of the rights of the owner of the cargo in the very inception of the voyage. In the modern case of Turner and Aru>ther v. Hagi Goolam Mahomed Azam (m), where, though no allegation of a conversion was made, the refusal to deliver seems to have amounted to one, the ship owners claimed a right of lien on goods belonging to the sub-charterer of the ship in respect of a, debt that was due to them from the original charterer. It was, however, held that no such right existed, and that the sub-charterer, having paid his bill of lading freight, was entitled to his goods free of any lien. In no case has it been decided that a possessor of a chattel renders Befusal to himself answerable for a conversion merely by a refusal to attorn * °™ '^ •' •' conversion. to the real owner and acknowledge his title, apart from any unlaw- ful dealing with the chattel itself. Thus if a man purchase goods in a warehouse he can bring an action against the warehouseman if there is a refusal to deliver on payment of charges, although there would probably be no liability incurred by a refusal to enter the purchaser's name on the books of the warehouse (n). Where, how- ever, a warehouseman receiving goods from a consignee, who has actual possession of them, to keep for his use, subsequently learns (jj Philpott v. Kelley, a835) 3 A. & E. 106 ; 4 L. J. K. B. 139. (fe) a865) 18 C. B. N. S. 403; 34 L. J. C. P. 146; 144 E. E. 542. (I) Jones V. Hough, (1§79) 5 Ex. D. 115; 49 L. J. Ex. 211. (m) (1904) A. C. 826; 74 L. J. P. C. 17, P. C. (re) In M'Combie v. Davies, (1805) 6 East, 638; 8 E. E. 534, the defendant's name appeared on the books of the King's warehouse as the owner of certain tobacco deposited there. The plaintiff being the real owner called upon him to give a delivery order. The defendant refused. Lord EUenborough held that this was no conversion, apparently considering it a mere neglect to acknowledge the plaintiff's title. The other judges more correctly treated the case as one of demand and refusal. 246 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS AND CONVERSION. Conversion by destruction. Conversion by preventing removal of chattel. that the right of his bailee has been evicted by title paraniount, he may refuse to redeliver them without being guilty of a conversion (o).- 5. A conversion by destruction takes place not merely when a chattel is burnt or broken to pieces, but when it is so dealt with that its identity is destroyed, provided the destruction is wilful (p). Therefore, if a man draw wine out of a cask and fill up the deficiency with water, he converts the whole cask as to part by taking the wine, as to the residue by turning, it into something different and therefore destroying it (g). So to spin cotton into yam, to grind com into flour, or to apply any process of manufacture to raw material, may undoubtedly be an act of conversion if done without the authority of the person entitled (r). But provided the chattel continues to exist as such, any injury done to it is a trespass and nothing more. Therefore in Simmons v. Lillyston-e (s), where the defendant having sawn asunder a log of timber belonging to the plaintiff was sued for a conversion, it was held that this particular form of action did not lie. The above classification will be found to include the great majority of instances in which the question of conversion can arise, but it is perhaps impossible to frame a definition which shall cover every conceivable, case (t). In England v. Cowley (u), it was much dis- cussed whether a defendant who has never had any possession of the property in question, constructive or actual, can be held liable in trover simply by preventing the owner exercising over it his right of property. The plaintiff was the holder of a bill of sale over certain goods in a house of which the defendant was landlord. He had put a man in possession and was about to remove the goods. The defen- dant was also desirous of seizing under a distress, but the time being after sunset he could not lawfully effect his purpose until the next rhorning. He, however, informed the plaintiS that the removal would not be permitted, and stationed a man to prevent it. The plaintiS therefore desisted from the attempt and subsequently brought an action in which he relied upon the interference with the removal as an act of conversion. It was held by Martin, B., that the action was maintainable; by Pollock, B., that a mere threat unaccompanied by any forcible act could not be called an inter- ference with the plaintiff's property;, by Bramwell, B., and (o) Boss V. Edwards, (1895) 73 L. T. 100, P. C. (p) Heald V. Carey, (1852) 11 C. B. 977 ; 21 L. J. G. P. 97 ; 87 E. E. 833. . (q) Richardson v. Atkinson, (1723) 1 Stra. 576; cp. Philpott v. Kelley, (1835) 3 A. & E. 105; 4 L. J. K. B. 139. (r) Com. Dig. Action Trover E. (s) (1853) 8 Ex. 431; 22 L. J. Ex. 217; 91 E. E. 569. (t) As to the difference between an actual conversion and what is evidence of one; see Burroughes v. Bayne, (1860) 5 H. & N. 296; 29 L. J. Ex. 188; 120 E". E. 594. (u) (1873) L. E. 8 Ex. 126; 42 L. J. Ex. 80; see, too, Hartley v. Moxham, (1842) 3 Q. B. 701; 12 L. J. Q. B. 41; 61 E. E. 359. CONVERSION BY CO-OWNER. 247 Kelly, C.B., that the plaintifi had simply been prevented from using the furniture in a particular way, and that therefore there was no conversion. In Wansborough v. Maton (x) the plaintiff had occupied land of the defendant which he subsequently quitted, and a new tenant entered. The plaintiff left on the land a certain movable barn, which he subsequently sent men to remove, but the • defendant meeting them on the ground ordered them off. It was held that the plaintiff had a good cause of action, although the defendant was not in possession. In neither of these cases was there any interference w^ith the goods themselves or any unlawful detention ; in the latter there would seem to have been an absolute denial and repudiation of the plaintiff's right, in the former not. If two or more people own a chattel either jointly or in common. Actions one of them cannot bring an action against the others merely for between an interference with his right of possession, since the possession of each is alike lawful, and the manner of its exercise is left by the law to be settled among the parties themselves (y). Although there is apparently no " rule of law which would debar the other co-owner from bringing an action for that conversion," if the particular facts of the case show that (z) one co-owner has deprived the other of all possible use and enjoyment of the property, either in the present or the future, then he has been guilty of an act of conversion. " It is well established that one tenant' ini common cannot maintain an action against his companion unless there has been a destruction of the particular chattel or something equivalent to it" (a). Short, therefore, of " destruction or something equivalent," one co-owner may exercise the full rights of property over a chattel in defiance of the wishes of the other co-owners, without being guilty of a tort. He may destroy its identity by the process of manufacture (b); he may create a lien on it (c) ; he may sell it otherwise than in market overt (d). And this immunity extends to those who stand in his shoes. If a sheriff seizes partnership property under an execution againfet one of the firm, he becomes part owner, and this part ownership protects him, even though he purports to sell the entire (x) (1836) 4 A. &.E. 884; 5 L. J. K. B. 150; 43 E. B. 510. See also Caunce v. Spanton, (1844) 7 M. & G. 903; 14 L. J. C. P. 23; 66 E. E. 817. (y) Co. Litt. p. 200a. (z) Poisson V. Robertson and Another, (1902). 86 L. T. 302. (a) Per Parke, B., Morgan v. Marquis, (1854), 9 Ex. p. 148; 23 L. J. Ex. 21; 96 E. E. 624. ♦ (b). Fennings v. Lord Grenville, (1808) 1 Taunt. 241; 9 E. E. 760; Jacobs v. Seward, (1872) L. E, 5 H. L. 464; 41 L. J. C. P. 221. (c) Jones V. Brown, (1856) 25 L. J. Ex. 345 ; 105 E. E. 354. (d) Mayhew v. Herrick, (1849) 7 C. B. 229; 18 L. J. C. P. 179; 78 E. E. 611. In Barton v. Williams, (1822) 5 B. & Aid. 395; 24 E. E. 448, some of the judges held that » mere sale might be an act of conversion as between two co-owners, but this has been repeatedly disapproved of. 248 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS AND CONVERSION. Destruction of interest of co-owner. Defendant's ignorance of plaintiff's title. interest in the goods (e). But where "by arrangement between two co-owners it was agreed that one of them should: have exclusive possession of a chattel, and the other having obtained temporary possession unlawfully pledged it, the first successfully maintained an action against the pledgee in respect of his exclusive right of possession (/). But detinue will not lie for the retiu:n of deeds deposited as security for a loan until actual repayment, an unaccepted tender of the loan being insufficient (g). If co-owners jointly pledge property, and one of them without the authority of the other afterwards demands the property back tendering the amount due, the pledgee is not guilty of a conversion by refusing to deliver [h). But if a bailee receive a deposit from joint bailors, in the absence of . a special contract to deliver only to a joint application, a plea of delivery to one bailor is a sufficient answer to an action for conversion by the others (z). A sale in market overt by one co-owner without authority from the other is ' ' equivalent to a destruction, ' ' because it transfers the .property and entirely defeats the interests of the non-consent- ing party, who therefore would be altogether without remedy unless he might sue his companion (k). And although an ordinary taking or selling may not be a conversion, yet if the result is, even as a somewhat remote consequence, that it becomes impossible for the property to be restored, an action of trover will lie. .This appears from the case of Barnardiston v. Chapman (I). The plaintiff was the tenant in common of one moiety of a ship, the defendants tenants in common of the other moiety. The defendants forcibly took the ship out of the plaintiff's possession, secreted it from him, changed the name, and afterwards handed it over to a third party, who sent it on a voyage, in the course of which it became a total loss. It was left to the jury to say whether there had not been a destruction by the defendants' means, and they having found for the plaintiff the Court refused to disturb the verdict. The question not unfrequently arises in actions of trover how far the defendant's ignorance of the unauthorised character of his act can be relied upon as a defence. In most cases of conversion (e) Mayhew v. Herrick, supra; and see Harper v. Godsell, (1870) L. E. 5 Q. B. 422 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 185. (/) Nyberg v. Handelaar, (18.92) 2 Q. B. 202; 61 L. J. Q. B. 709. ig) Bank of New South Wales v. O'Connor, (1889) 14 A. C. 273; 58 L. J. P. C. 82, P. C. (h) Harper'^. Godsell, (1870) L. R. 5 Q. B. 422; 39 L. J. Q. B. 185; see Atwood V. Ernest, (1853) 13 C. B. 881; 22 L. J. C. P. 225; 93 E. E. 788, a case of detinue; see also Wright v. Robotham, (1886) 33 Ch. D. 106; 55 L. J. Ch. 791. (i) Broadhent v. Ledward, (1839) 11 A. & E. 209; 52 E.,E. 321. (k) Per Parke, B., Farrar v. Beswiok, fl836) 1 M. & W. p. 688; 5 L. J. Ex. 225; 42 E. E. 820. (I) Cited Heath v. Hubbard, (1803) 4 East,, p. 121; see, too, Mayhew v. Herrick, (1849) 7 C. B. 229; 18 L, J. C. P. 179; 78 E. E. 611. CONVERSION BY AGENT. 249 — not in all, as for instance where there is conversion by destruction — there are two elements, first of all, a dealing with the goods in a manner inconsistent with the right of the person entitled to them; secondly, an intention in so doing to deny his right or to assert a dominion which is in fact inconsistent with such right. Ignorance of the right will not afiect the quality of the act done, but it may have a material bearing on the question of intention. If a man taking a flock of sheep from a market by mistake drives among them a sheep which does not belong to him, it is a trespass, for it is an asportation of a chattel without the owner's consent (m), but it is not, it is apprehended, a con- version, for there is no intention to assert dominion over that particular sheep or to interfere with the right of the true owner. When a person is induced by the negligence of an agent to enter Agents. upon an adventure from which loss ensues he is entitled to recover so much of that loss as wiU restore him to the position in which he would have been had not the agent been guilty of the breach of duty towards him. But as a rule he cannot add to that loss speculative profits which he might have made if he had had his time or money at his disposal instead of having embarked in the adventure which miscarried (n). And when an agent has so acted as to impose on his principal a liability towards third parties, and moneys belonging to such principal subsequently come into his hands, the agent has no lien on such moneys to answer possible future liabilities of his principal toward the third parties (o). It is, however, principally in considering the liability of agents when dealing with goods and their knowledge of the true ownership of such goods that it becomes material to discuss the obligation of agents towards their principals. Where a man deals with goods as principal an intention to exercise dominion may be generally inferred from the nature of the act itself, but such inference does not equally arise in the case of an agent who acts on his instructions without necessarily knowing what the intention of his principal is. It may further be laid down as a general proposition of law in cases of principal and agent, that not only every act of an agent, within the scope of his authority, is the act of the principal but also that all knowledge acquired by the agent, . when acting within the scope of his authority, is the knowledge of the principal (p). Both these statements are, however, subject to the limitation that the act done or the knowledge acquired must be done or acquired during the course of the agency and not before. Consequently, knowledge lm)Beq v. Riley, (1853) 1 Dears. & Pearce C. C. 149; 22 L. J. M. C. 48. (n) Johnson v. Braham, (1916) 2 K. B. 529; affd. (1917) 1 K. B. 586, C. A. (0) Dyson v. Peat, (1917) 86 L. J. Ch. 204. ■ Ip) As to when owing to non-disclosure by the agent, the principal was held not affected by the agent's knowledge, see Muir's exors. v. Craig's exors., (1913) S. C. 349, Ct. of Sess. 250 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS AND CONVERSION. Exercise of dominion in right of self. On behidf of another. acquired by the agent antecedently to the existence of the relation of principal and agent ought not to be imputed, ahd riecoUection or forgetfulness by the agent of matters known prior to the relation ought not to affect the liability of the principal save in cases in which the principal purchases, as one , Of the conditions of the agency, the previously obtained knowledge of the agent in relation, to a particular subject-matter (g). ' (a) A defendant is always liable if "he has taken the goods as his own, or used them as if they were his own " (r). The rule is that " persons deal with property in chattels or exercise dominion over them at their peril " (.s). On this principle it was decided in M'Combie v. Davies (t) that a defendant who innocently took goods in pledge from a person wrongfully dealing with them was Hable in trover at the suit of the real owner. Where, however, a mercantile agent is, with the consent of the owner, in possession of goods or of the documents of title to goods, any sale, pledge, or other disposition of the goods, made by him when acting in the ordinary course of business of a mercantile agent to a person taking under the disposition in good faith, shall, subject to the provisions of the Factors Act, 1889 (even though in fraud of the true owner), be as valid as if he were expressly authorised by the owner of the goods to make the same. It is also provided by s. 25 (sub-s. 2) of the Sale of Gi-oods Act, 1893, that where a person (other than a factor) having bought, or agreed to buy goods obtains possession of them with the consent of the seller, any subsequent sale of the goods (though fraudulent) to a purchaser in good faith and without notice, shall absolutely vest the property in such purchaser. (b) When a person, though only as agent, takes part in a transaction which purports to efiect a transfer of property in a ehatt-el, and it turns out that his principal had no title, his ignorance of this fact does not protect him, for he has clearly intended an act which is inconsistent with the right of the true owner (m). Thus, where the defendant's employer had bought goods of a bankrupt, and the defendant not knowing of the bankruptcy took dehvery of the goods and forwarded them, it was held that he was liable in trover to the assignees of the (a) Taylor v. Yorkshire Insurance Co., (1913) 2 Ir. E. 1 K. B. D. (r) Per Brett, J., Fowler v. Hollins, (1872) L. E. 7 Q. B. p. 627 ; 41 L. J. Q. B. 277. («) Per Cleasby, B., ibid. p. 639. (t) (1805) 6 East, 538; 8 E. E. 534. See, however the dictum of Bramwell, B. (Burroughes v. Bayne, (1860) 5 H. & N. p. 310; 29 L. J. Ex. 188; 120 E. E. 594); and of Coleridge, J., in Mennie v. Blake, (1856) 6 E. & B. p. 851 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 399 ; 106 E. E. 822. „„ ^ m (u) Winter v. Bancks, (1901) 84 L. T. 504; Mehta v. Sutton, (1913) 109 L. T. 529, C. A. CONVERSION BY AGENT. 251 bankrupt (x). " The clerk acted under an unavoidable ignorance and for his master's benefit when he sent the goods to his master ; but nevertheless, his acts may amount to a conversion, for a person is guilty of conversion who intermeddles with my property and disposes of it, and it is no answer that he acted under authority from another who had himself no authority to dispose of it " (y). So, formerly, if a sheriff seized and sold under execution, and the debtor had then committed a secret act of bankruptcy on which he was afterwards adjudicated bankrupt, the assignees might sue the sheriff for the conversion of the bankrupt's goods (z). *So, if an auctioneer sells goods and hands over the proceeds to his prin- cipal without notice of any defect in his title, the true owner may recover from him the value over again (a). (c) If an agent intermeddles merely with the custody of a chattel Agent not in ignorance of his principal's lack of title, and also in ignorance t"'a"ter°^ that any alteration of property is intended, he is not guilty of a property, conversion. " The true proposition as to possession and detention and asportation seems to be that a possession or detention which is a mere custody or mere asportation made without reference to the question of the property in goods or chattels is not a conversion " (b). On this principle a forwarding agent who packs and ships goods does not render himself liable because his employer had no title (c), apparently upon the ground that the act of the forwarding agent is so purely ministerial that, if performed in good faith and without notice, no presumption of a conversiori can be raised therefrom. So, a carrier who receives goods and delivers them in accordance with -the directions of the consignor, without notice of any adverse title, is free from responsibility (d). This case of the carrier has been put on the, special ground that he exercises a public employ- ment and has no choice as to refusing or accepting goods. But it is really only an exemplification of the wider principle. Even a common carrier, if he knowingly assisted at a transfer of property, might be answerable, just as the sheriff was in Garland v. Carlisle, though he, too, was bound to perform his pubhc duty. (x) Stephens v. Elwall, (1815) 4 M. & S. 359; 16 R. E. 458; and see McEntire v. Potter, (1889) 22 Q. B. D. 438. (y) Stephens v. Elwall, per Lord Bllenborough , 4 M. & S. at p. 261; 16 E. E. 459- , , .„ . (z) Garland v. Carlisle, (1837) 4 CI. & F. 693. Now, however, the sheriff m such cases is protected : 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, ss. 45, 46. (o) Cochrane v. Bymill, (1879) 40 L. T. N. S. 744; see below, p. 252; and see The Consolidated Co. v. Curtis, (1892) 1 Q. B. 495 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 325. (b) Per Brett, J., Fowler v. HolUns, (18T2) L. E. 7 Q. B. p. 680; 41 L. J. Q. B. 277. (c) Greenwav v. Fisher, (1824) 1 C. & P. 190. (d) See ver Willes, J., Sheridan v. New Quay Co., (1858) 4 C. B. N. S. p. 650; 28 L J C P 58; 114 E. E. 873; per Martin, B., Fowler v. Holhns, (1872) L. E.' 7 Q. B. p. 632; 41 L. J. Q. B. 277. 252 TRESPASS TO., CHATTELS AND CONVERSION. Lord Blackburn's view. Lord Esher's view. Auctioneer selling and delivering. Selliilg without delivering. Delivering without selling. The principle is explained in HoUins v. Fowler {e) in the following manner. Blackburn, J.^ after pointing out that the action of trover assumed an originally innocent possession by finding by a defendant, goes on to say: "I cannot find it anywhere distinctly laid down, but I submit to your lordships that on principle one who deals with goods, at the request of a person who has the actual custody of them, in the bona fide belifef that the custodier is the true owner or has the authority of the true owner, should be excused for what he, does if the act is of such a nature as would be excused if done by the authority of the person in possession if he was the finder of goods or entrusted with their custody. ' ' Accordingly, if a farrier shoes a horse and sends it hortie, if a warehouseman stores goods and then returns them, if a carter shifts furniture from one house to another — in none of these cases will the agent or bailee be liable simply because his principal or bailor had no right over the goods. On the other hand, in the application of the principle that an asportation without reference to the question of the property is no conversion, Brett, J. (/), in the same case took a view much more favourable to the agent. He thought that an agent who forwarded goods on behalf of his principal to a purchaser, though with the object of carrying out the sale, did so without reference to the question of property (g). An auctioneer who sells and delivers in the ordinary course is more than a mere brcker or intermediary, and more than a packer or carrier of goods who merely purports to change the position of the goods and not the property in them; if he receives goods for sale, and on selling them hands them over with the view of passing the property in them, he will be liable for conversion if the vendor had no title Qi). But an auctioneer may act as a mere broker, confining himself to the negotiation of the sale, and leaving his principal to deliver possession, in which case his act is no conversion (i). In National Mercantile Bank v. RymiU (fc) the plaintiffs were the holders of an absolute bill of sale whereby one Seaman assigned to them inter alia certain horses and harness. Seaman afterwards, without the knowledge of the plaintiffs, took the horses and harness to the defendant's repository and entered them for sale in his books, (e) (1874-5) L. E. 7 H. L. pp. 766-7 ; 44 L. J. Q. B. 169. And eee per Cave, J., McEntire v. Potter, (1889) 22 Q. B. D. p. 441. (/) L. E. 7 H. L. pp. 779-785; 44 L. J. Q. B. 169. (g) See the remarks of Collins, J., upon these opposing views, in GomoUdated Co. V. Curtis S Son, (1892) 1 Q. B. p. 501 ; 61 L. J. Q. B: 325. (h) Consolidated Co. v. Cttrtis it Son, (1892) 1 Q. B. 495; 61 L. J. Q. B. 325; Cochrane v. RymUl, (1879) 40 L. T. N. S. 744 ; Barker v. Furlong, (1891) 2 Ch. 172 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 368. (i) See the case put by , Bramwell , Tu. J., Cochrane v. Rymill, (1879) 40 L. T. K S. p. 746. (&) (1881) 44 L. T. N. S. 307, 767. CONVERSION BY AUCTIONEER. 253 and they were catalogued for sale by auction on the following day. Before they were put up for auction, Seaman sold them privately to Townsend, who paid the purchase-money to the defendant, and the latter after deducting his commission paid the balance to Seaman, and ordered the delivery of the horses and harness to Townsend. It was held, that as there was no sale by Rymill he was not guilty of a conversion, and the case was therefore dis- tinguished from Cochrane v. Rymill (I), where the defendant himself sold, being entitled to a hen for ari advance which he had made, and where he purported to transfer the right of property in the goods. The existence of the defendant's lien in Cochrane v. Rymill makes no difference except as a fact flegativing the suggestion that he was a mere agent or conduit-pipe in that particular case (m), and the real distinction, if the cases be not inconsistent, must be that in Cochrane v. Rymill the defendant in fact sold, in National Mercantile Bank v. Rym^ill he only dehvered the goods, but with knowledge of the sale and with the intention of enabling it to be carried out. Whether the latter case is consistent with Stephens V. Elwall (n) may be doubted. It is a breach of warranty, sounding either in damages as against Breach of the auctioneer or justifying a rescission of contract as against a auct^neer^ principal, for an auctioneer to make a specific stat-emerit with respect to the chattel that he is selling which, to his knowledge, is not a fact. Thus if an auctioneer sell a chattel as being the property of a particular person, of known repute, and that person has prior to the sale, to the knowledge of the auctioneer, parted with his interest in' the chattel to a third party, on whose behalf the sale is actually made, the alteration in ownership has been held to constitute a sufficient ground for rescinding the contract (o). Again, a secret limitation of authority at a sale " without reserve," such as reserve price, if known to the auctioneer but not known to the buyer, will entitle the latter to damages for non- delivery (p) as soon as the hammer has fallen and he has been declared purchaser (q), provided a note or memorandum of the sale has been made, but the converse of this rule apphes at a sale subject to a reserve price (r). In the case of Spackman v. Foster (s) certain title deeds of the plaintiff had been pledged with the defendant by a third party (I) (1879) 40 L. T. N. S. 744. (to) Per Collins, J., Consolidated Co. v. Curtis d Sons, (1892) 1 Q. B. p. 502; 61 L. J. Q. B. 325. In) As to which, see above, p. 251. (o) Whurr v. Devenish, (1904) 20 T. L. B. 385. (v) Rainbow v. Hopkins, (1904) 2 K. B. 322; 73 L. J. Q. B. 641. (a) Fenwick v. Uacdonald, Fraser d Co., (1904) 6 P. 850, Ct. of Sees. (r) McManus v. Fortescue, (1907) 2 K. B. 1; 76 L. J. K. B. 893, C. A. (s) (1883) 11 Q- B. D. 99; 52 L. J. Q. B. 418; approved by Kay, L.J., Miller v. Dell (1891) 1 Q B. p. 473; 60 L. J. Q. B. 404. The principle of Spackman v. 254 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS AND CONVERSION. Detinue. Sur trover and sur bailment. wrongfully. It was held that the defendant had not been guilty of a oonversion by taking them in pledge. "The defendant when he received these deeds had no knowledge that the person who pledged them had no title to them. He kept them as depositee or bailee bound to return them on payment of the money he had advanced. He held them against the person who had deposited them, but not against the real owner" (t). A pledgee, however, takes the pledge with a warranty of title, intending to obtain a special property which gives him a power of sale (m). He is acting just as inconsistently with the right of the true owner as if he actually purchased (a;). This decision is directly in conflict with Lord EUenborough's judgmeBt in M'Combie v. Davies {y), and the earlier case seems more in accordance with the general course of the authorities', and with the observations in HolUns v. Fowler. In cases of an unauthorised deposit of securities, belonging to a third party, by a solicitor, broker, or other agent, with . bankers to secure an advance, the claim of the true owner is subordinated to that of the pledgee, who receives in good faith and without notice, the equitable principle underlying such transaction apparently being that, where one of two innocent persons has to suffer a loss, it should fall on that one of the two who could most easily have prevented the happening or recurrence of the mischief («). But this rule does not apply where the particular circumstances of the case should have put the beinker on enquiry, or where the banker had either actual or constructive notice of the right of the third party (a). The action of detinue was based upon a wrongful detention of the plaintiff's chattel by the defendant, evidenced by a refusal to deliver it up on demand, and the redress claimed was not damages for the wrong but the return of the chattel or its value. The old form of declaration was either in detinue sur trover, alleging a finding by the defendant, or in detinue sur bailment, alleging a bail- ment to him. These' allegations, which were immaterial and not Foster seems fo be that a person who innocently takes a chattel by assignment from one who is not the true owner is not guilty of a conversion by the mere taking, but only becomes so if and when, either by parting with it or by damaging it, he has put it out of his power to deliver it on demand to the true owner in the same condition as that in which he received it. (t) Per Grove, J., at p. 100. (u) See Story on Bailments, ss. 308, 354. (x) In Tear v. Freebody, ■ il65B)'4: C. B. N. S. 228; 114 E. E. 688, it was held that a taking with a view to acquiring a lien might be a conversion. See above, p. 236. (y) (1805) 6 East, 538 ; 8 E. E. 534. (z) Mutton V. Peat, (1900) 2 Ch. 79; 69 L. J. Ch. 484, C. A. See also Oliver v. Bank of England, (1902) 1 Ch. 610; 71 L. J. Ch. 388, C. A." Fuller v. Glyn, Mills, Currie S Co., (1914) 2 K. B. 168; 83 L. J. K. B. 764; London Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons, (1892) A. C. 201, H. L. (B.). (a) Colonial Bank v. Cady S Williams, (1890) 15 A. C. 267 H. L. (B.) ; Jameson V. Union Bank of Scotland, (1914) 109 L. T. 850. DETINUE. 255 traversable, were abolished by the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852 (6). In truth, however, though the two kinds of detinue were thus confused, the distinction between detinue where there had been a bailment and detinue where there had not was a fundamental one. The former was essentially an action in contract, the latter especially in tort (c). It has been already pointed out" that there cannot be a conversion Distinction by mere demand and refusal unless at the time of the demand the ^'^'^^^^^ ''^° defendant had it in his power to return the property (cJ). If, bailment however, a bailee unlawfully or negligently loses or parts with where goods 1, i , -H . , . ,,..,. have been possession he cannot get rid of his contractual liability to restore parted wit^i. the bailor's property on the termination of the bailment (e), and if he fails to do so he may be sued in detinue (/). But this rule does not always seem to apply in the case of a defendant who is a mere stranger. It was very early said (g) that " if a man comes into possession by a bailment then he is answerable by virtue of the bailment, and if he bails the goods over, or they are taken from his possession, still he is answerable to the bailor "by virtue of the bail- ment. But otherwise, if a man comes by goods by finding, for he is only answerable by reason of his possession, and if, without wrongful act (loialment), he is out of possession before he who has the rigifb has brought his action, he is not answerable " (h). It must, however, be remembered, in the case of a person in bond fide possession of goods to which he has a defective title, that there is no conversion, in respect of which an action will lie,, until there be an actual and specific demand and a refusal to redeliver to the true owner, the gist of the action being the detention of the goods with the object of depriving the person actually entitled to their possession of his dominion over them (i). In accordance with the above-stated principle, that if a man comes by goods by finding he is only answerable by reason of his possession, it was held in Crossfi.eld v. Such (k), that an adminis- tratrix could not recover in detinue against a defendant who had (b) Chitty on Pleading, 7th ed. Vol. 1, p. 135; Vol. 2, p. 428; Gledstane v. Hewitt, (1831) 1 C. & J. 565; 9 L. J. Ex. 45; 15 & 16 Viot. c. 76, s. 49. (c) See note, Walker v. Needham, (1841) 3 M. & G. p. 561. As to whether detinue was contract or tort, see Broadbent v. Ledward, (1839) 11 A. & E. 209; 52 E. E. 321; Oledstane v. Hewitt, supra; Bryant v. Herbert, (1878) 3 C. P. D. 189; and 389; 47 L. J. C. P. 670. (d) See above, p. 241. (e) Nor will a magistrate's order to give up the goods absolve the bailee : Banson v. Piatt, (1911) 2 K. B. 291; 80 L. J. K. B. 1138, C. A. (/) Reeve v. Palmer, (1858) 5 C. B. N. S. 84, 93; 28 L. J. C. P. 168; 116 E. E. 573- Jones v. Dowle, (1841) 9 M. & W. 19; 11 L. J. Ex. 52; 60 E. E. 652. ig) 27 Hen. VIII. 13, pi. 35. (h) See South Staffordshire Waterworks Co. v. Sharman, (1896) 2 Q. B. 44; 65 L J (2 B. 460. As to the measure of care required from a gratuitous bailee, see Bullen V Swan Electnc Engraving Co., (1907) 23 T. L. E. 258, C. A. (i) Clayton v. Le Roy, (1911) 27 T. L. E. 479; 81 L. J. K. B. 49, C. A. \k) (1853) 8 Ex. 825; 22 L. J.' Ex. 325; 91 E. E. 789. 256 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS AKD CONVERSION. Detinue ae a tort merely one form of conversion. taken possession of certain property of the intestate on her decease and parted with it before administration was granted. This rule does not, however, apply where there is a wrongful conversion by a bailee — =thus, in Wilhinson v. 'Verity (I), the plaintiffs' predecessors in title had bailed certain goods to the defendant, who wrongfully sold them. More than six years later the plaintiffs demanded the property back, and not obtaining it, brought an action of detinue. The Statute of Limitations being pleaded it was held that a fresh cause of action had arisen on the refusal to deliver. " But," said the Court (m), " where the action of detinue is founded upon a wrongful conversion of the property only, as it needs must where there is a bare taking and withholding of the property of another without any circumstances to show a trust for the owner, or to found an option to sue either for the wrong, or the breach of the original terms, the statute would run from the time at which the property was first wrongfully dealt with." It therefore appears (n.) ■ that detinue, considered as a tort, does not substantially differ from conversion by detention. It was originally a convenient form of action, because counts in detinue might be joined with counts in contract. This advantage ceased to be peculiar when the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852 gave a very general liberty of joining different cAises of action (o). By the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 (p) the Courts acquired, for the first time, a right in actions of detinue to issue a writ ordering the return of the chattel detained, without giving the option of retaining it on payment of the value assessed. But now in aU cases there is jurisdiction to order the specific restora- tion of property wherever special reasons exist which make damages an inadequate remedy (g) ; and in event of the defendant refusing to (i) (1871) L. E. 6 0. P. 206; 40 L. J. C. P. 141. (m) Ibid. L. E. 6 C P., p. 210. (ji) In Goodman v. Boycott, (1862) 2 B, & S. 1; 31 L. J. Q. B. 69; 127 E. E. 240, the plaintiff sued in detinue for title deeds. The defendant pleaded that one Goodman deceased has deposited deeds with him, that he had lost them in Goodman's lifetime, that the plaintiff's only title to them was as devisee of Good- man, and that the detention sued on was the loss in Goodman's life. Wightman, J., held the plea bad; Blackburn, J., held it good. Ijord Blackburn's view turned on a mere question of pleading, and, according to Wilkinson v. Verity, it would seem that his difficulty would have been got rid of if the plaintiff had new assigned and alleged as the detention sued on a demand by him and a refusal by the defendant, or, according to Bristol and West of England Bank v. Midland R. Co., (1891) 2 Q. B. p. 661; 61 L. J. Q. B. 115, if the vendor to the plaintiff had been co-plaintiff. In the latter case the decision of Wightman, J., in Goodman V. Boycott was approved; and it was held that it was no answer to the plaintiff's .claim to say, "We made away with the goods'before your title accrued." For statutory right of a mortgagor to inspect deeds, see 44 & 45 Vict. *;. 41, s. 16 (sub-s. 1). (0) 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, s. 41. (p) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, s. 78. (q) See Pusey v. Pusey, (1684) 2 White & Tudor, L.C. 459, 8th ed., and Petre V. Ferrers, (1892) 65 L. T. 569; see also Bailey v. Gill, (1919) 1 K. B. 41; 88 L. J. K. B. 591. REPLEVIN. 257 obey the orders of the Court (including a county court) his person may be attached for the contempt (7-). Replevin is a summary process by which a man out of whose Replevin, possession goods have been taken may obtain their return until the right to the goods can be determined by a Court of law. The procedure is now regulated by statute (s). The plaintiff goes before a county court registrar (t) and either deposits a sum as security or enters into a bond with securities conditioned to com- mence an action of replevin within a week, to prosecute it with effect (m) without delay, and to make return of the goods if return thereof shall be awarded. If he succeed in his action he may recover in respect of any special damage sustained and also the value of the goods if, in fact, they have not been redelivered (x) to him under the process of the county court. He may also reCover the expenses of the replevin bond and any special damage which he has sustained by the wrongful taking (y). In Smith v. Enright [z) it was held that such special damage may include annoyance and injury to credit and reputation in trade (a). If the defendant succeeds he is, at common law, entitled only to a judgment for the return of the goods (b). Under certain statutes now repealed the defendant was entitled to recover any special damage which he had suffered. It appears that in spite of the repeal such damage is still recoverable (c). The defendant has also the remedy on the replevin bond for a breach of any of its conditions. Replevin can only be brought when there has been a taking by Eeplevin trespass, whether under colour of some legal process or otherwise (d). °j tre^ass.^ In Mennie v. Blake (e) the plaintiff had lent a cart and horse to one Facey, who handed them over to the defendant in satisfaction of a debt. The plaintiff proceeded by replevin, but it was held that (r) Hymas v. Ogden, (1905) 1 K. B. 246; 74 L. J. K. B. 101, C. A. All applications to a Court for attachment for contempt must be made by counsel : Liebrand, Ex parte, (1914) W. N. 310. (s) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, ss. 134—137. (t) As to the responsibility of registrars in taking the bond, see Young v. Brompton Waterworks Co., (1861) 1 B. & S. 675 ; 31 L. J. Q. B. 14; 124 K. E. 7()9. (u) I.e., to a not unsuccessful termination {Tummons v. Ogle, (1856) 6 E. & B. 571; 25 L. J. Q. B. 403; 106 B. R. 714). (x) An action, it would seem, lies if the person who has taken the goods disposes of them with notice of the replevin proceedings (Mounsey v. Dawson, (1837) 6 A. & E. 752; 6 L. J. K. B. 261). ^ • . „ -r. nao (y) Gihhs V. Cruikshank, (1873) L. K. 8 C. P. 454; 42 L. J. C. P. 273. (z) (1893) 69 L. T. N. S. 724. (a' But that case appears to be opposed to Dixon v. Galcraft, (1892) 1 Q. B. pp. 464 466- 61 L J Q- B. 529, as to which see above, p. 142. (b> Gotobed V. Wool, (1817) 6 M. & S. 128. (c) Smith V. Enright, (1893) W. N. 173; and see Mayne on Damages, 9th ed., "^'m Shannon v. Shannon, (1804) 1 Sch. & Lef. 324; 9 R. E. 36; Galloway v. Bird, (1827) 4 Bing. 299; 5 L^J C P- 180. (e) (1856) 6 E. & B. 842 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 399 ; 106 E. B. 822. ^ ' • ' 17 C.T. 258 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS AND CONVERSION. When not. the action was not maintainable, because the possession of the defendant was peaceable (/). If, however, a distrainor before impounding refuses a due tender, ^ the owner may still replevy, because, it is said, the subsequent When it lies, detention is equivalent to a fresh taking. The reason given is of doubtful validity (g). The ordinary use of replevin is in cases of distress for rent or distress damage feasant. It has, however, been frequently employed by parties complaining of a seizure of their goods under process of an inferior Court issued without juris- diction {K); and in this way questions of rating liability have, on more than one occasion, been brought to the test {i). But there can be no replevin against an execution of a superior Court (fc), rior against a revenue seizure or distress for any Crown due {I). In.Mellor v. Leather (m) the plaintiff's property had beeii seized by a constable on information that the plaintiff had stolen it. It was held that, assuming the seizure to be unlawful, an action of replevin was maintainable, although an unusual form of remedy in such a case. An action can be brought for the taking or conversion of any corporeal personal property (n), includirig papers and title deeds (o). It is sometimes said that current coin of the realm is an exception to this rule, and money, unless " in a bag," cannot be sued for in an action of tort. This, however, is incorrect (p). Of course if a man simply receives a sum to be repaid on request the property in it passes, and his only liability is for the debt, but if the undertaking is that he should return or hand over the specific coins entrusted to him and he converts them to his own use an action of trover will What kind of property can be sued for. Money. (/) The Court seems to have been of opinion that the possession of the defendant was not only peaceable but lawful until the plaintiff should demand the property back. It would seem, however, that the taking was an act of conversion (see above, p. 233) though doubtless no trest)as3. ig) Evans v. Elliot, (1836) 5 A. & E. 142; 6 L. J. K. B. 259. See below, p. 285, note (k). (h) Rex V. Burchett, (1722) 1 Str. 567; George v. Chambers, (1843) 11 M. & W. 149; 12 L. J. M. C. 94; 63 B. R. 554; Allen v. Sharp, (1848) 2 Ex. 362; 17 L. J. Ex. 209 ; 76 E. E. 621. (t) Governors of Bristol Poor v. Wait, (1834) 1 A. & E. 264; 5 L. J. M. C. 133; 44 E. E. 370; Mersey Docks S Harbour Board, v. Cameron, (1864—5) 11 H. L. C. 443; 35 L. J. M. C. 1; 145 E. E. 255; Marshall v. Pitman, (1833) 9 Bing. 595; 2 L. J. M. C. 33; 35 R. E. 630; London £ North Western R. Go. v. Buckmaster, (1874) L. E. 10 Q. B. 70 ; 44 L. J. M. C. 49. (fc) Per Parke, B., George v. Chambers, (1843) 11 M. & W. p. 160; 12 L. J. M. C. 94; 63 E. E. 554. (I) Rex V. Oliver, (1717) Bunbury, 14; per Eyre, C.B., Cawthorne v. Campbell, (1790) 1 Anstruther, p. 212. (m) (1853) 1 B. & B. 619; 22 L. J. M. C. 76; 93 E. E. 310. in) Allen v. Sharp, (1848) 2 Ex. 352; 17 L. J. Ex. 209; 76 E. E. 621. (o) Anon., (1828) 1 Moll. 390; but see Bacon's Abr. tit. Eeplevin E. (p) Hall V. Dean, (1600) Cro. Eliz. 841; Draycot v. Piot, (1601) ibid. 818; Kinaston v. Moor, (1627) Cro. Car. 89. \ SUBJECT-MATTER OF CONVERSION. 259 lie (g), and the same action lies for the conversion of a lost bank note (r). It is an a fortiori case if there has been an unauthorised taking out of the actual possession of the owner; but if • the coins are paid over to an innocent third party, then the property is trans- ferred and the money cannot be followed in his hands (s). Whenever the facts are such that a charge of larceny, whether by a taking or as bailee, could be supported, it would seem to follow that there is also a conversion (t). Negotiable instruments and other securities, such as guarantees Negotiable and bonds, considered as corporeal property, are simply pieces of ^"^''■""lents. paper. Their sole value is as choses in action. If, however, they are unlawfully converted and detained, the person entitled may recover full damages to the extent of his loss (u). Although title deeds are not, properly speaking, chattels, it has Title deeds, always been held that they can be sued for in trover or detinue (aj). It is said, however, that they cannot be replevied (y). If the plaintiff sues in trover, his damage is prima facie the whole value of the estate to which they appertain (z). If a portion of realty is severed and taken away the owner, Eealty when instead of suing in respect of the injury to the realty, may elect to severed, treat the severed portion as his chattel and sue for its conversion. In this way a remedy may be obtained for coal wrongfully worked, American timber wrongfully cut, fixtures wrongfully removed (a). In certain measure of American States it has been held, where the taking was wilful and danmges in tortious, that if subsequently to the conversion the nature of the chattel was altered (as, for example, if logs were sawn into boards, or growing wheat was harvested and threshed), the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of the chattel in its new forms (b), but this principle finds no place in modem Enghsh law. But even tenants' fixtures, while they remain unsevered, are part of the (q) Orton v. Butler, (1822) 5 B. & Aid. 6-52. (r) Burn v. Morris, (1834) 2 Cr. & M. 579; 3 L. J. Ex. 193; 44 E. B. 891. (s) Foster v. Green, (1862) 7 H. & N. 881 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 158 ; 126 E. R. 742. (t) See Reg. v. Hassall, (1861) 30 L. J. M. C. 175; Reg. v. Aden. (1873) 12 Cox, 512; Reg. v. De Banks, (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 29; 53 L. J. M. C. 132. This last case seems open to some question. (a) Alsager v. Close, (1842) 10 M. & W. 576; 12 L. J. Ex. 50; Watson v. McLean, (1858) E. B. & E. 75; 113 E. E. 549; M'Leod v. M'Ghee, (1841) 2 M. &' G. 326; 58 E. E. 434; Kleinwwt, Sons S Co. v. Gomptoir National d'Escompte, Paris, (1894) 2 Q. B. 157; 63 L. J. Q. B. 674. But see Embericos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank, (1904) 2 K. B. 870; 74 L. J. K. B. 993. (x) Plant V. Cotterill, (1860) 5 H. & N. 430; 29 L. J. Ex. 198 ; 120 E. E. j675. (y) Vin. Ab. Eeplevin A. 9; Bacon's Abr. tit. Eeplevin E. ; but see Anon., (1828) 1 Moll. 390. {z) Per Alderson, B., Loosemore v. Radford, (1842) 9 M. & W. p. 659; 11 L. J. Ex. 284 ; 60 E. E. 853. (a) Wood V Morewood, (1841) 3 Q. B. 440, note; 10 L. J. C. P. 239; 61 -E. E. 234- Berry v. Heard, (1637) Cro. Car. 242; Farrant v. TJiompson, (1822) 5 B. & Aid. 826 ; 24 E. E. 571. (b) Sedgwick on Damages, 8th ed.. Vol. 2, s. 502. 260 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS AND CONVERSION. Plaintiff should have right of possession. Title by relation. Possession and property. realty, and therefore trover cannot be brought in respect of them (c). There may, however, be a special action on the case if there be an interference with the exercise of the right of removal (d). The general rule is that the right to bring an action for an injury committed in respect of a chattel belongs to him who either has the actual possession or the right of immediate possession at the time when the cause of action arises (e). To this rule there is an apparent but not a real exception in the ease of title by relation. If the goods of a deceased person are unlawfully taken by a stranger between the time of his death and the grant of probate or letters of administration,- even if the executor or the administrator had no right of possession at the time of the conversion, yet after his title is perfected it relates back to the death of the testator or intestate, and he is treated as if he had had the right of possession throughout (/). On the same principle a trustee in bankruptcy may sue in respect of a conversion committed between the date of the act of bankruptcy and bis appointment (g). It was indeed frequently said that in trover a plaintiff sues in respect of his property, in trespass in respect of his possession, and this doctrine finds expression in the old forms of pleading. On this ground it has been broadly laid down that a plaintiff who makes title by relation can sue only in trover Qi). This, however, is incorrect. A title which relates back, as has already been seen, avails to support an action of trespass, if trespass ha,s been in fact com- mitted (i). On the other hand, an action in trover does not decide any question of ownership. An owner cannot sue for a conversion unless he has also a right of possession; a mere possessor can, although he has no title beyond his possession. The use of the word " property," therefore, in respect of actions of trover, is mis- leading, and requires explanation. The ownership of chattels is, as a general rule, absolute except in the case of title deeds, the property of which follows the nature of the land to which they belong. There may, however, be a double ownership. An undischarged bankrupt may acquire the property in goods, subject to the right of his trustee to intervene and claim (c) Mackintosh v. Trotter, (1838) 3 M. & W. 184; 49 E. E. 565. (d) See London is innate to the one by reason of his ultimate title to the goods, and to the other by reason of his legal possession; it merely acts as an estoppel to further action against the defendant in respect of that particular tort for which the damages have been recovered, upon the well-known principle of law Nemo debet bis^ vexari pro una et eadem causa, although where " both the bailee and the bailor have suffered damage by the wrongful act of a third party each may bring a separate action for the loss suffered by himself" (g). Up to the date of the decision in The Winkfield it must be con- ceded that the rulings in the various cases which have arisen on this particular point are quite irreconcilable. For though the consensus of opinion of both the judges and the text-books is in favour of the ultimate decision arrived at by the Court of Appeal, in the comparatively recent case of Claridge v. South Staffordshire Tramway Go. (already referred to), an exactly opposite decision was given by the Court, and leave to appeal refused ; it being held in this case that the plaintiff, who was bailee of a horse which was injured while in his possession by the neg- ligence of the defendants, could only recover nominal damages, he being under no liability to his bailor for the injury done to the chattel whilst in his custody. (/) 2 Wms. Saunders, 47 f. (g) Claridge^ v.- South Stajfordshire Tramway Co., (1892) 1 Q. B., per Haw- kins J at p 424 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 503. As to the measure of damages recoverable, see " The Greta Holme," (1896) P. 192; 66 L. J. Q. B. 166, C. A. 277 278 TEESPASS TO CHATTELS AND CONVERSION. Between parties both having an interest. Between mortgagor and mortgagee. Between pledgor and pledgee. Between vendee and vendor. Where vendor re- takes goods. 0. W. Holmes, jun., in his very learned disquisition on "The Common Law " (h), attributes the principle underlying the right of the bailee to sue a tort-feasor for the conversion of, or for damage to, a chattel in his possession, to an early ,Germanio origiu, con- eiderably antedating the bailee's claim to recover to that sub- sequently allowed to the bailor. Whether this statement can be substantiated or not there can be little doubt that from very early times legal possession of a chattel has been held to carry with it, as an inherent right, all legal remedies pertaining to complete dominion. Consequently the view arrived at by the Court of Appeal in the case of The Winkfield possesses the sanctions of high antiquity as weU as those of modem expediency. When the action is between persons both ha'ving an interest in the chattel, as, for example, between bailor and bailee, then the measure of damages is the injury actually sustained, and limited, therefore, to the amount of the plaintiff's interest. Thus, in Brierly v. Kendall (i), the plaintiff had assigned to the defendant certain chattels under a bill of sale which gave him exclusive right of possession until default. The defendant seized before default, and it was held that the plaintiff could recover only^ what his right of possession against the defendant was worth. Johnson v. Stear (k) was a converse case, being an action by the owner against the pledgee, who was held to have unlawfully parted with the goods pledged. The plaintiff recovered only nominal damages, the property having been pledged for its fuU value. On the same principle an unpaid vendor who, having sold goods on credit, resold them before the term of credit expired, was held to be liable only to the extent of the difference between the money due under the contract and the value of the goods at the time of the resale (I). But where a vendor had parted with the goods to the vendee and afterwards being unpaid retook possession,- it was held that he was liable to the vendee for the whole value without deduction, the law regarding with disfavour a principle that would admit of a party setting off a debt due in one case against damages in another, though, on the other hand, the vendee was held liable for the price of the goods in a cross action (m). Qi) Lecture V., "Bailment." (j) (1852) 17 Q. B. 937 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 161. (k) (1863) 15 C. B. N. S. 330; 33 L. J. C. P. 130; 187 E. E. 532. (l) Ghinery v. Viall, (1860) 5 H. & N. 288; 29 L. J. Ex. 180; 120 E. E. 588. As to whether in this case, and Johnson v. Stear, it was correctly held that there was a conversion, see above, p. 263, note (g). (m) GillaTd v. Brittan, (1841) 8 M., & W. 575; 11 L. J. Ex. 133. See, too, Johnson v. Lancashire S Yorkshire R. Co., (1878) 3 C. P. D. 499. See also Page v. Cowasjee Eduljee, (1866) L. E. 1 P. C. 127 at pp. 146-7. MEASURE OP DAMAGES. 279 In the case of an ordinary lien there is no right in the holder of Lien- the goods who converts them to deduct, in an action at the suit of the owner, the amount for which he had the lien from the value of the goods. The right is purely personal and is altogether forfeited by the unlawful act (n). When a chattel has been wrongfully taken, detained or otherwise Betum of converted, there is a vested cause of action which cannot be defeated " * ^ • merely by the fact that the plaintiff subsequently gets his goods again. But after such redelivery the action is merely for the special damage or deterioration in value, faihng which the plaintiff, though he recover nominal damages, is considered in effect as a defeated party and may be made to pay costs (o). The position is the same if the plaintiff, after action brought, thinkS' proper to take the chattel back (p). The .Court has besides power to stay any action on delivery of the chattel and payment of costs, if the cir- cumstances are such as to show that the plaintiff thereby clearly obtains the full redress to which he is entitled (q). If the plaintiff obtains a verdict for the value of the chattel it is common to provide, that it shall be reduced to a nominal sum on return being made. But this is simply a matter of arrangement between the parties (r). • Even though no such provision is made, yet if, in fact, the plaintiff gets his property back again, the Court will treat this as pro tanto a satisfaction and reduce the verdict accordingly (s). And upon a similar principle if certain. of the chattels in question arc given up the action may be stayed in part (t), provided the bulk is severable without diminution of value {u). And the same rule applies to an unpaid vendor who recovers a proportion of the money value of the goods sold (a;). In some cases a transaction by which the plaintiff got the benefit Transaction of the property, though it never came back into his hands, has been eqnivalent treated as equivalent to a redelivery. In Hiort v. London & 'North Western R. Co. (y), the defendants held certain com as warehouse- men, deliverable to the plaintiff's order. ■ They improperly delivered it to one G. The plaintiff afterwards sold the same corn and made (n) Mulliner v. Florence, (1878) 3 Q. B. D. 484 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 700. For two exceptional cases in which on moral grounds the plaintiff was rtefused the full value of his goods, see Du Bost v. Beresford, (1810) 2 Camp. 511 ; 11 E. E. 782 ; Cameron V. Wynch, (1846) 2 C. & K. 264; and see 41 & 42 Vict. c. 38, s. 2. (o) Hiort V. London d North Western R. Co., (1879) 4 Ex. D. 188; 48 L.' J. Ex. 545. (p) Moon V. Raphael, (1835) 2 Bing. N. C. 310. (a) Fisher v. Prince, (1762) 3 Burr. 1363 ; Pickering v. Truste, (1796) 7 T. E. 53 ; Tucker v. Wright, (1826) 3 Bing. 601; 4 L. J. C. P. 190. (r) M'Leod v. M'Ghee, (1841) 2 M. & O. at p. 328 ; 58 B. E. 434, note (a). (s) Plevin v. Henshall, (1833) 10 Bing. 24; 2 L. J. C. P. 53. (t) Earle v. Holderness, (1828) 4 Bing. 462 ; 6 L. J. C. P. 68. (u) Bunney v. Poyntz, (1832) 4 B. & Ad. 568; 2 L. J. K. B. 55; 38 E. E. 309. (x) Kemp V. Falk, (1882) 7 A. C. 573 ; 52 L.' J. Ch. 157. (y) Supra. 280 TRESPASS TO CHATTELS AND CONVERSION. Successive conversions. Effect of satisfied judgment. out a delivery order to the purchaser. It was indorsed by him to G., and by G. handed to the defendants. The Court pointed out that the plaintiff had not been damnified, because he had an action for the price against his purchaser, and they held that what had occurred was the same thing as if the defendants had got back the corn from. G., and afterwards delivered it under the plaintiff's order. In Plevin v. Henshall [z) the plaintiff had obtained a verdict in trover against the defendant. The goods in question in the action were lying in a house for the rent of which the plaintiff was liable, and the landlord distrained upon them. The verdict was reduced by the amount of the distress, it being held that the parties were in the same situation as if, after verdict, the defendant had gone and paid the plaintiff the sum in question. Otherwise the plaintiff would have had the benefit of the goods twice over, while the deferi- dant, without getting the goods, would have paid their fuU value. But in Edmonson v. Nuttall (a) the defendant unlawfully detainted certain chattels of the plaintiff and afterwards caused them to be taken in execution and sold in satisfaction of a judgment which he had against the plaintiff. It was contended that only nominal damages could be recovered, since the proceeds of the goods had been applied to the benefit of the plaintiff. The Court, however", held that a creditor could not be permitted in this way to take advantage of his own wrongful act, and gave the plaintiff the full value. They pointed out that the defendant suffered no injustice, because he was remitted to his original right on his judgment (b). It may not unfrequently happen that the owner of a chattel who has wrongfully been: deprived of his possession may have a remedy against more than one person. A. may have wrongfully taken it and B. may afterwards have wrongfully detained it. A. and B. are not joint tort-feasors; there is a perfectly independent 'right of action against each (ci). It has been suggested that in an action against one of these wrong-doers a jury ,may take into consideration the fact that the plaintiff can also have recourse to the other (d). This suggestion, however, has not been subsequently acted upon, and seems contrary to principle. Nor does a waiver of tort against one wrong-doer, when coupled with a reservation of rights against others, constitute so conclusive a waiver of the original wrong by the plaintiff as to debar him from proceeding against the remaining tort-feasor (e). But if judgment is obtained and satis- fied for the full value of a chattel, the property is thereby changed (z) Supra, p. 279. (a) (1864) 17 C. B. N. S. 280. (b) The judgments could be set off against each other, and therefore the question was really one of costs. (c) Winter v. Bancks, (1901) 84 L. T. 504. (d) See Morris v. Eobinson, .(1824).3 B. & C. pp. 205—6 ; 27 E. E. 322. (e) Rice v. Reed, (1900) 1 Q. B. 54; 69 L. J. Q. B. 33, C. A. y MEASURE OF DAMAGES. 281 as from the date of the wrongful act, and the plaintiff will con- sequently lose all right of action against any subsequent wrong- doer (/). He might still, however, it would seem, be entitled to nominal damages in respect of anything done previously. Eecovery of less than the full value does not transmute the Part satis- property or affect any other right of action {g), but it canilot be f'^°''°°- doubted that no plaintiff will be allowed to recover twice over, and therefore any damages which he may have actually received in one action will have to be taken into consideration in the other {h). Apparently in the Admiralty Division of the High Court there is Beoovery of no right of action under Lord Campbell's Act in a case where the fatalaooidents ddath of a human being results from some damage done to a ship in Courts of by reason of another vessel negligently colliding therewith. The reasons being — (a) that, apart from statute, alike in a Court of Admiralty and by the common: law, the death of a human being cannot be complained of as an injury to a third party (i), and (b) that upon the coming into operation of the Judicature Acts it is expressly provided by sub-s. 3 of s. 11 of the Judicature Act, 1875, that no person shall assign any cause or matter to the Admiralty Division unless he would have been entitled to commence the same in the Court of Admiralty if that Act had riot been passed (fc). But on the other hand apparently, as a general pro- position of law, it would be held, where the death of a human being is not an essential part of the cause of action, but only an element in ascertaining the damages, there is no rule of law rendering such damages irrecoverable (1). (J) Brinsmead v. Harrison, (1871) L. E. 6 C. P. 584 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 281. (g) Morris v. Robinson, (1824) 3 B. & C. 196; 27 E. E. 322; see note Holmes v. Wason, (1839) 10 A. & E. p. 511; 50 E. E. 492. (h) "If, indeed, the plaintiffs were to recover the full value of the goods in each action, a Court of Equity would interfere to prevent them having double satis- faction." Per Bailey, J., Morris v. Bohinson, 3 B. & C, at p. 205; 27 E. E. 322 ; and see The Winkfield, (1902) P. D., Collins, M.E., pp. 60, 61 ; 71 L. J. P. D. & A. 21. . (t) Baker v. Bolton, (1809) 1 Camp. 493. (k) The Franconia, (1877) 2 P. D. 163, C. A. See also The Vera Cruz {No. 2), (1884) 9 P. D. 96, C. A. ; The Amerika, (1914) P. 167 ; 83 L. J. P. 157. (1) Jackson v. Watson, (1909) 2 K. B. 193, C. A. CHAPTEE XII. DISTRESS. Who may Distrain 283 Distress when Barred 285 Eepeated and Separate Distresses 287 Bemoval to avoid Distress 289 Rules to be observed in Levying Distress 290 Goods Privileged from Distress ... 292 Irregular Distress 303 Povcer of Sale 307 Excessive Distress 312 Bescue and Pouhd Breach 313 Distress Damage Feasant 315 Distress, what it is. Distress for rent. DiSTEESS is a remedy given by the common law, whereby a party in certain oases is entitled to enforce a right or obtain redress for a wrong in a summary manner, by seizing chattels and retaining them as a pledge until satisfaction is obtained. The most important head of distress is for rent, whether it be the return due from the tenant holding the land to the lord of whom it is held, or an annual sum charged on the land in favour of a person who, apart from such Bent-charges, rent, has nothing further in the land. Rents of the latter kind were known as rent-charges or rents seek, according as the power of distress was incident to them or not, but now by statute the distinction is abolished, and all such rents may be distrained for as rents reserved on lease (a). It has been said that neither a rent- charge nor a rent-seek can be created by a person having an interest less than freehold (b). The former kind is known as rent-service. It includes ancient quit rents created before the statute of Quia Emptores, copyhold rents, rents payable in respect of enfranchised copyholds (c), and rents incident to a reversion, or, which is prac- tically the same thing, rents reserved by lease. With regard to this kind of rent, it is impossible here to deal at large with the law of landlord and tenant (d) ; it is enough to say for the right of distress to exist there must in the first place be an actual occupation of land by the tenant, not a mere incorporeal right in the land (e) ; there must be a certain rent — the consideration for the use of the land in Bent- service. (a) 4 Geo. II. c. 28, s. 5. See, too, 44 & 45 Vict. t. 41, s. 44 (amended as to improvement charges, 62 & 63 Vict. ch. 46, s. 3). (b) V. Cooper, (1768) 2 Wils. 375; followed Langford v. Selmes, (1857) 3 K. & J. 220; 112 B. B. 118. See, however. Butt's case, (1600) 7 Bep. 23 a. (c) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 23, b. 2. That rent, however, is spoken of throughout the Copyhold Acts as a rent-charge. As to tithe rent-charge, see 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 71, s. 81, and 54 & 55 Vict. c. 8, ss. 1 and 2. (d) As to law of Landlord and Tenant, see Chitty on Contracts, chap. xii. (e) Hancock v. Austin, (1863) 14 C. B. N. S. 634; 32 L. J. C. P. 252; and cp. Selhy v. GreaSs, (1868) L. B. 3 C. P. 594; 87 L. J. C. P. 251. WHO MAY DISTEAIN. 283 money, kind or actual service (/) must be ascertained by the terms of the demise itself, or ascertainable on some definite principle, as in the case of royalties (g) ; and finally the relation of landlord and tenant must exist in the fuU sense of the term at the time of the distress. Mere use and occupation, or a tenancy on sufferance, can give no right to distrain; there must be at the very least a tenancy at will (h). But an express power in a mining lease for a landlord to distrain for rent in arrear on chattels belonging to his tenant situated in mines adjacent to that actually demised has been decided by the Court of Appeal to confer a right of distress on the chattels in such neighbouring mines, provided the workings in the adjacent properties are on the same seam of coal as that in the mine demised, with which therefore they might be connected underground (i). A receiver appointed by the Court may distrain, but if the tenant has not attorned to him it must be in the name of the person who has the legaL estate (k). And an agent may in certain oases be an owner by estoppel (I). But if a lessee with an original lease and a reversionary lease, or an agreement therefor, sub-lets the premises for a term ex). But it is now provided by 14 & 15 Vict. c. 25, s. 2, " that in case lall or any part of the growing crops of the tenant of any . . lands shall be seized by any . . . officer by virtue of any writ ... of execution, such crops, so long as the same shall remain on the farms or lands, shall, in default of sufficient distress of the goods land chattels of the tenant, be liable to the rent which may accrue and become due to the landlord after any such seizure arid sale, and to the remedies by distress for the recovery of such rent " (t). (d.) Things which cannot be restored in the same condition are Things which not distrainable, because with regard to them the right of the owner cannot be to get his goods back by replevin would be nugatory (w). Two in same condition . (I) As between tenant for life and reversioner, Leigh v. Taylor, (1902) A. C. 157; 71 L. J. Ch. 272; De Falbe, In re, (1901) 1 Ch. 623; 70 L. J. Ch. 286, C. A. (m) Harwich v. Symond, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1083. (m) Crossley v. Lee, (1908) 1 K. B. 86; 77 L. J. K. B. 199; Reynolds v. Ashhy aisi(mt that if a sufficient tender is made while the goods are in a private pound the tender is in time (a). It may be thought questionable how far this case is consistent with the other authorities. If impounding on the premises makes a tender too late it would seem that impounding ofi the premises is an a fortiori case. The ground given for the decision is that goods in a private pound are not in the custody of the law, which is much the same thing as saying that a private pound is no pound at all (b). If, however, the distrainor after impounding thinks proper to accept a tender, a refusal to give up the goods or any subsequent dealing with them is a conversion or a trespass (c). The distrainor hasi only a right to keep the thing as it is when taken. If he otherwise deals with it, it is an abuse of the distress and a trespass (d). Formerly this rule was carried to very great length, and it was said to be a trespass to milk a distrained cow (e), and in one case it appears to have been held that a dis- trainor became a trespasser by cording a trunk for ■ its better security (/). The better opinion, however, appears to be that it is lawful to do anything for the better preservation of the chattel which cannot possibly injure the owner. In Duncomb v. Reeve (g) the plaintiff alleged a trespass by tanning certain raw hides, and the defendants pleaded that they tanned them because otherwise they would have rotted, and it was held an ill plea "because thereby the property is quasi altered and the marks to know them again are taken from the owner so as he cannot have it again, and although one may in some oases meddle with and use a distress where it is for the owner's benefit, as where one distrains armour he may cause them to be scoured to avoid rust, so if one distrains raw cloth he may cause it to be fulled, for that is for the owner's benefit. But here this tanning is not for his benefit." However, considerations of this sort cannot well arise, since 11 Geo. II. (z) Thomas v. Harries, (1840) 1 M. & G. 695; 9 L. J. 0. P. 308; 56 E. E. 511; Ladd V. Thomas, (1840) 12 A. & B. 117; 9 L. J. Q. B. 345. In the former case, Maule, J., dissented, holding that while the goods were on the premises a tender was in time, and that the cases on common law impounding did not apply. Erie, J., expressed his approval of this view in Tennant v. Field, (1857) 8 E. & B. p. 344; 27 L. J. Q. B. 33; 112 E. E. 586. As will be seen, a tender after impounding may make a subsequent sale unlawful. See below, p. 309. (a) Green v. Duckett, (1879) 11 Q. B. D. 275; 52 L. J. Q. B. 435. (b) See above, p. 304, note (p), and the authorities there referred to. An action lies for pound breach from a private pound. Eitz. N. P. p. 100. (c) West V. Nibbs, (1847) 4 C. B. 172; 17 L. J. C. P. 150; 72 E. E. 576. (d) Under some circumstances it niay amount to an abandonment of the distress. See below, p. 314; Smith v. Wright, (1861) 6 H. & N. 821; 30 L. J. Ex. 13; 123 E. E. 855. (e) Vin. Ab. Distress, P. 8. (/) Per Twysden, J., Welsh v. Bell, (1669) 1 Vent. p. 37. Ig) (1599) Cro. Eliz. 783. See, too, Bagshawe v. Goward, (1605) Cro. Jac. 147. POWER OF SALE. 307 c. 19, s. 19, has made some real damage necessary to a cause of aotion for any wrongful act subsequent to seizure. It" is still, however, a rule of law that perishable goods, such as the carcases of recently-slaughtered animals, are privileged from distress — upon the ground that they are commodities which .cannot be restored in the same plight and condition as thait in which they were when taken (h). In all cases of distress for rent there is by statute a power of Power of sale. sale. By 2 Will. & Mar. c. 5, s. 2, " where any goods or chattels shall be distrained for any rent reserved and due- upon any demise, lease or contract whatsoever, and the tenant or owner of the goods so distrained shall not within five days next after such distress taken and notice thereof, with the cause of such taking, left at the chief mansion-house or other most notorious place on the premises charged with the rent distrained for, replevy the same, with sufficient security, to be given to the sheriff according to the law, then in such case after such distress and notice aforesaid, and the expiration of the said five days, the person distraining shall and may . . . cause the goods and chattels so distrained to be appraised by two appraisers, to appraise the same truly according to the best of their understanding; and after such appraisement shall and may lawfully sell the goods and chattels so distrained for the best price that can be gotten for the same towards satisfaction for the tent for which the said goods and chattels shall be distrained and the charges for such distress, appraisement and sale " (i). As already stated, however, the distrainor may not hiiliself purchase the goods (k). By 4 Geo. II. c. 28, s. 5, this remedy is extended to cases of distress for rent seek and rent charges. It exists where goods are impounded on the premises under 11 Geo. II. c. 19, s. 10. However, by 51 & 52 Vict. c. 21, s. 5, no appraisement is now required, except where the tenant or owner of the goods by writing requires it to be made, and for the purposes of sale, the goods and chattels distrained shall, at the request in writing of the tenant Or owner, " be removed to a public auotion-foom 'or some other fit and proper place specified in such request and there be sold." The expenses of such appraisement and the expense and risk of such renaoval are to be borne by the party making the request. By the same Act (I) the time for holding the goods before sale is extended to a period not exceed- (h) Morley v. Pincombe, (1848) 2 Ex. 101; 18 L. J. Ex. 272; 76 E. E. 508. (i) Certain omitted words are repealed by 85 & 36 Vict. c. 92. s. 13. For existing procedure in replevin, see above, p. 257. (k) Moore v. Singer Manufacturing Co., (1903) 2 K. B. 168; 73 L. J. K. B. 457. (I) S. 6. 308 DISTRESS. DiBtiainor need not sell. Exceptions. How served. ing fifteen days, if the tenant or owner of the goods so requests in writing and gives security for any additional expense that may be caused. They may be sold at any time previously at the written request or with the written consent of the tenant or owner. The distrainor has been held not bound to exercise the power of sale given him by these provisions, the words " shall and may " being permissive only (m). However, corn, hay, straw, growing crops and cattle found depasturing on commons must, in all oases, be sold, since the method of. dealing with them is directed by the very statutes making them distrainable (n,). If the option to sell is exercised all the conditions precedent laid down by the statute must be strictly fulfilled, otherwise the distress will become irregular. There must be, in the first place, a proper notice of the distress, with the cause of the taking. It must inform the tenant what goods are taken and what is the rent in arrear (o). A general notice of seizure of all the goods on the premises is sufficient (p). But where the notice was of certain specified articles and everything else on the premises that might be required to satisfy the rent, it was held bad because it left it uncertain what goods were taken and what not (q). The want of notice does not, however, render the distress invalid, it only makes it irregular (r). The notice in ordinary cases must be " left at the chief mansion-house or other most notorious place on the premises," and therefore it must be in writing, because a verbal notice cannot be left (s). Where, however, the goods of a stranger are distrained, notice in writing may be given to him instead of to the tenant, and in such a case the words above quoted do not apply (i). The sale, except by written consent, must not take place until {m)Lear v. Edmonds, (1817) 1 B. & Aid. 157; 18 E. E. 448; Hudd v. Ravenor, (1821) 2 B. & B. 662; 23 E. E. 626; Philpott v. Lehain, (1877) 351 L. T. N. S. 855; but see King v. England, (1864) 4 B. & S. 782; 33 L. J. Q. B. 145; 129 E. E. 923. (n) 2 Will. & Mar. c. 5, e. 3; 11 Geo. 11. c. 19, s. 8; per Parke, B., Piggott v. Birtles, (1836) 1 M. & W. p. 448; 5 L. J. Ex. 193; 46 E. E. 349. (o) Per Cur., Kerby v. Harding, (1851) 6 Ex. p. 241; 20 L. J. Ex. 163; 86 E. E. 260. The statute allows a sale where goods are taken for " rent due." The rent due, therefore, must be the cause of the taking and must be truly stated. Tancred v. Leyland, (1851) 16 Q. B. 669; 20 L. J. Q. B. 316; 83 U. E. 603, which shows that a distress need not be excessive merely because too much is, claimed, is not inconsistent with this view, for there the giving of a wrong notice under the statute was not alleged. The absence or incorrectness of notice will not make the distress void or excessive, but it will make the sale irregular {per Cur., Trent v. Hunt, (1853) 9 Ex. p. 20; 22 L. J. Ex. 318; 96 E. E. 517). The date when the rent fell due need not, it seems, be given (Moss v. GalUmore, (1779) 1 Doug. 279). (p) Wakeman v. Lindsey, (1849) 14 Q. B. 625; 19 L. J. Q. B. 166. (g) Kerby v. Harding, (1851) 6 Ex. 234; 20 L. J. Ex. 163; 86 E. E. 260. (r) Trent v. Hunt, (1853) 9 Ex. 14; 22 L. J. Ex. 318; 96 E. E. 517. (s) Wilson V. Nightingale, (1846) 8 Q. B. 1034; 15 L. J. Q. B. 809; 70 E. E. 727. (t) Walter v. Bumbal, (1695) Lord Eaym. 53. RESTRICTIONS ON POWER OF SALE. 309 after the whole statutory period has elapsed. Thus, in the ordinary case under the principal Act, there must be five days, not counting the day on which notice is given {u), and on the sixth day the sale is lawful, unless meantime the goods have been replevied or a tender of the rent and expenses has been made, in which case the sale is irregular (a;). After this time it is too late to tender, but so long as the goods remain unsold the property in them is not altered, and they may be replevied (y). By the express terms of 11 Geo. II. o. 19, ss; 8, 9, growing crops Time of sale are not to be sold until they are ripe and gathered, and up to that °^ crops, time a tender may be made. Where appraisement is necessary, it must be made by indepen- Appraise- dent persons, and therefore neither the distrainor nor his agent ™ent. in the distress are fit for the purpose («). It is not necessary that the appraisers employed should be professional, but they must be reasonably competent persons (a). ' If thei goods are impounded on the premises under 11 Geo. II. Sale on c. 19, s. 10, by the terms of the section a reasonable time after Pi^emises. the appointed interval is allowed for the conduct of the sale Time and the removal of the goods, but if such time is exceeded the allowed, unnecessary interference with the possession of the tenant is a trespass (b). The goods must be sold at the best price, therefore the distrainor gale under is answerable for the proper and reasonable conduct of the sale (c). ''alue. If he has distrained growing crops, which by the terms of the tenancy are to be consumed on the premises, he must sell at market and not at consuming price (d). He is not bound to postpone the sale of goods conditionally privileged until he has seen whether he can realise sufficient without them (e). Being the seller of the goods he cannot likewise be the buyer, and if he endeavours to take them at a valuation the transaction is a nullity (/). It was formerly the duty of the distrainor, if there was any Overplus, overplus at the sale, to leave it in the hands of the sheriff, under- sheriff or constable who aided and assisted in the distress, and if (it) Robinson v. Waddington, (1849) 13 Q. B. 753; 18 L. J. Q. B. 250; 78 R. B. 504. (x) Johnson v. Upham, (1859) 2 E. & B. 250; 28 L. J. Q. B. 252; 119 E. E. 706 ; overruling Ellis v. Taylor, (1841) 8 M. & W. 415 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 432. (y) Jacob V. King, (1814) 5 Taunt. 451; 15 E. E. 550. (z) Per Best, C.J., Lyon v. Weldon, (1824) 2 Bing. p. 336 ; 3 L. J. C. P. 27. (a) Roden v. Eyton, (1848) 6 C. B. 427; 18 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 77 R. E. 357. (b) Pitt V. Shew, (1821) 4 B. & Aid. 206; Winterbourne v. Morgan, (1809) 11 East, 395; 10 E. E. 532. (c) See Poynter v. Buckley, (1833) 5 C. & P. 512. (d) Ridgway v. Lord Stafford, (1851) 6 Ex. 404; 20 L. J. Ex. 226; 86 E. E. 347; Hawkins v. Walrond, (1876) 1 C. P. D. 280; 45 L. J. C. P. 772. (e) Jenner v. Yolland, (1818) 6 Price, 3; 20 E. E. 608. (/) King v. England, (1864) 4 B. & S. 782; 33 L. J. Q. B. 145; 129 E. E. 929; Moore v. Singer Manufacturing Co., (1903) 2 K. B. 168; 73 L. J. K. B. 457. 310 DISTRESS. Waiving irregularity. Special damage this was not done an action lay for the breach of duty (g). By 35 & 36 Vict. o. 92, s. 13 (h), the aid and assistance of such officers was not required, but no provision was made for the overplus. It is to be presumed that the owner of the goods can sue for it in an action for money had and received (i). It is to be observed that throughout all the proceedings in a distress the maxim " Volenti non fit injuria," applies. A man cannot recover in trespass for any act done with his leave and licence nor for any other irregularity which has been committed with his assent (fc). In an action for an irregular distress the plaintiff can only recover satisfaction for the special damage occasioned by the irregularity, and if there is no damage there is no cause of action (I). It would seem, however, that where the injury alleged is a. pure trespass, as for example an unreasonable disturbance of the plaintiff's possession of the premises, it is not intended that he shall be put to prove some definite pecufiiary loss. The Act contemplates that trespass may be brought in fitting cases for an irregularity {m). And without proof of malice action is maintainable where a successful litigant levies for costs which in fact, though without his knowledge, have been paid {n). Where the action is brought for an irregular sale it is enough irregular sale, to prove that the Conditions prescribed by the Act were in some respect broken and that the goods realised less than their value, but it is not necessary to prove that the damage was the direct consequence of the breach of duty. If, for instance, goods are not appraised, the failure to appraise may not cause them to be sold less favourably, but it will make the sale irregular, and if such sale is at an undervalue it is the cause of the loss (o). The general rule is that in such a case the party is entitled to recover the true value of the goods, less the proper expenses of the sale and the rent actually satisfied (p). Damage for (g) 2 Win. & Mar. c. 5, s. 2. (h) Eepealed by 46 & 47 Vict. c. 39 (S. Ii. E. 1883). (t) See on this point Evans v. Wright, (1857) 2 H. & N. 527 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 50 : 115 R. R. 679. (k) Washhorn v. Black, (mi) 11 East, 405, n. ; Tennant v. Field, (1857) 8 E. & B. 336; 27 L. J. Q. B. 38; 112 R. B. 686; Bishop v. Bryant, (1834) 6 C. & P. 484. The proviso, however, in 51 & 52 Vict. o. 21, s. 6, which speaks of a written consent, would seem in the case provided for to exclude a mere verbal assent. (Z) 11 Geo. n. c. 19, s. 19; Rodgers v. Parker, (1856) 18 C. B. 112; 25 L. J. C. P. 220; 107 R. R. 280. (m) Brown v. Shevill, (1834) 2 A, & B. 138; 4 L. J. K. B. 50; 41 E. R. 40l. (n) Clissold v. Cratchley,. (1910) 2 K. B. 244, C. A.; 79 L. J. K. B. 274, 635. (o) Per Parke, B., Knotts v. Curtis, (1832) 5 C. & P. p. 323. See, too, Sharpe V. Fowle, (1884) 12 Q. B. D. 385; 58 L. J. Q. B. 309. (p) Biggins v. Goode, (1832) 2 C. & J. 364; 1 L. J. Ex. 129; 37 R. R. 788; Knotts v. Curtis, supra. IRREGmAR SALE. 311 If tile owner of the goods is not the person who is liable for Damages the rent it is obvious that the measure of damages in an irregular belong to distress may be difierent, for the satisfaction of the rent is no stranger. benefit to him and therefore cannot be taken into consideration as a diminution of damage. In Sharpe v. Fowle (g), the plaintiff was a lodger. The defendant, the superior landlord, distrained and sold within the five days, and the plaintiff recovered the whole value of his goods. The ground of the decision was that the premature action of the landlord interfered with the lodger's right of serving a declaration under the repealed Lodgers' Goods Protection Act, 1871. This consideration would not apply to a complete stranger, and if his goods were sold within the five days it is apprehended that he could not recover unless he showed that he had suffered actual damage from the landlord's irregularity. However irregular a sale may be, it is not a mere nullity, and Effect of will avail to pass the property. Therefore the tenant or owner i^j^egular sale of the goods cannot follow them into the hands of third parties or recover of the distrainor in trover (r). It was indeed held in Owen V. LegJi (s) that a mere sale of growing crops imaccompanied by any dealing with them was a mere nullity and afforded no ground of action, but this decision seerras inconsistent with the subsequent cases. Where, however, the landlord took the goods distrained at a valuation, it was held that, there being no sale at all, no property passed (i). By 57 Geo. III. c. 93, s. 6, every broker or person levying a Broker's distress is bound to give a copy of the charges to the person whose charges. goods are distrained, but this does, not affect the person who caused the distress to be levied, nor does it make the distress irregular (w). Where, however, a bailiff in distraining has retained, out of the amount realised, an unreasonable charge for costs in connection with the distress, the remedy of the distrainee is not confined to the statutory application prescribed tinder s. 2 of the Distress (Costs) Act, 1817 (x), the County Court having jurisdiction to try an action in which repayment is claimed of so much of the charge as is unreasonable (y). (g) (1884) 12 Q. B. D. 385 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 309. (r) Wallace v. King, (1788) 1 H. BJ. 13; Lyon v. Weldon, (1824) 2 Bing. 344; Rodgers v. Parker, (1856) 18 C. B. 112; 25 L. J. C. P. 220; 107 E. E. 230. (s) (1820) 3 B. & Aid. 470; 22 E. E. 455. (t) King V. England, (1864) 4 B. & 8. 782; 33 L. J. Q. B. 145 ; 129 E. E. 929. (u) Hart v. Leach, (1836) 1 M. & W. 560 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 244 ; 46 E. E. 399. As to amount of charges, see Distress for Eent Eules and Headland v. Coster, (1905) 1 K. B. 219; 74 L. J. K. B. 210, C. A. (x) As to imprisonment in default of distress for ofEences under this Act, see Bex V. Daly, Newson, Ex parte, (1911) 104 L. T. 892, Div. iy) Rex V. Philbrick dt Morey, Ex parte Edwards, (1905) 2 K. B. 108; 74 L. J. K. B. 464. A charge for the keeping of goods distrained is valid, notwithstanding that prior to sale the chattels were removed from the plaintiff's premises {Scott v Denton, (1907) 1 K. B. 456; 76 L. J. K. B. 330). 312 DISTRESS. Excessive distress. Excessive claim. Excessive seisure. An excessive distress is a breach of the duty imposed by 52 Hen. III. c. 4 (which is declaratory of the common law), enacting that distresses shall be reasonable and not too great. Merely to distrain under an excessive claim is not necessarily an excessive distress. An action nevertheless lies if the party distrained on is thereby put under a difficulty in his replevin («). The ordinary kind of excessive distress, however, consists in the seizure of an amount of goods which is altogether out of propor- tion with the debt really to be satisfied. It will be, of course, an aggravation of the damage if there be Subsequently an excessive sale. A mere constructive seizure will suffice to give a cause of action, because not being wholly unlawful or a trespass (a) the tenant cannot treat it as a nullity, and his dominion is thereby impaired (6), and it makes no difference that he has, in fact, enjoyed a permissive use of the property (c). A distrainor is not guilty of an excessive distress merely by slightly exceeding the amount requisite. " He is not bound to calculate very nicely the value of the property seized, but he must take care that some proportion is kept between that and the sum for which he is entitled to take it " (d). Thus in the time of Edward III. (1327 — 77) distresses of forty sheep for 2d. and sixteen oxen for 9d. were held excessive (e). And a like decision was arrived at in Branseombe v. Bridges (/), where goods of the value of between £30 and £40 were distrained for ten guineas rent; but in Roden v. Eyton (g) the property taken exceeded the amount due by 50 per cent., and it was held not excessive. If there is but one thing to be distrained it may be taken, however excessive its value, since otherwise the distress would be altogether defeated (h). It seems to have been at one time thought that no action could lie for an excessive distress if the goods fairly sold did not realise the amount of the rent (i), their value in the sale being their value to the distrainor; but it has been held that the party distrained on is not thereby absolutely (z) Tancred v. Leyland, (1851) 16 Q. B. 669; 20 L. J. Q. B. 316; 83 B. E. 663. See above, p. 308, note (o). (a) Hutchins v. Chambers, (1758) 1 Burr. 579. (b) Chandler v. Doulton, (1865) 3 H. & C. 553; 34 L. J. Ex. 89; 140 B. E. 602. It is otherwise where the seizure would be a trespass. See above, p. 303. (c) Bayliss v. Fisher, (1830) 7 Bing. 153; 9 L. J. C. P. 43; 33 E. E. 407. (d) Per Bayley, J., Willoughhy v. Backhouse, (1824) 2 B. & G. p. 823; 2 L. J. K. B. 174; 26 E. B. 566. (e) Eg. Abr. 674. (/) Branseombe v. Bridges, (1822) 3 Stark. 171 ; 1 L. J. K. B. 64; 25 B. B. 325. (g) (1848) 6 C. B. 427 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 77 E. E. 357. (h) 2 Inst. p. 107; Avenell v. Croker, (1828) M. &, M. 172; Field v. Mitchell, (1807) 6 Esp. 71. (i) Wells V. Moody, (1835) 7 C. & P. 59; 48 B. B. 759. EXCESSIVE DISTRESS, 313 concluded. " You cannot make the sale under the distress a test of value; if so, probably no distress could be deemed excessive " (7c). If the distrainor goes on selling after he has realised sufficient it is conceived that this would be a trespass and not merely an excess (I). Things distrainable only by statute are within the protection Excess of 52 Hen. III. o. 4, just as much as things distrainable by the ^gtrainable^ common law (m). by statute. If chattels are taken under an excessive distress an action may Interest be maintained by anyone who has such an interest in them as Jo support would support an action of trover («.). If, in an excessive distress, action. the goods of the tenant and a stranger are taken together, the latter has a right of action (o). It has, however, been held (in an action for damages for illegal and excessive seizure of distress for rates), that the wrongful act of an assistant overseer does not relate back to the overseers, on whose behalf he purported to act, so as to render them liable for his tort (p). It remains to point out the remedies which the law gives where Interference the right of distress is improperly interfered with. ^'^■^ distress. The rights of landlords to follow goods in case of fraudulent Fraudulent removal have already been dealt with. An action of debt also '^°'°'*""- lies for double the value of the goods against all who are parties to such fraudulent removal with knowledge of the fraud (g). If a person coming to make a distress is impeded and obstructed Preventing so that he is thereby prevented from seizing, the intending dis- '^ ^^^^' trainor has a right of action for the damage thereby caused (r). If after goods are seized and before impounding they are wrong- Eescue and^ fully taken out of the baihff's possession, the distrainor may ^°"" "^^^^ ' bring an action of rescue, but if they are taken out of the pound the form of action is pound breach. These remedies existed at common law in favour of any party distraining. By statute (s) upon any pound breach or resoous of goods or chattels distrained for rent the persons grieved thereby have a right of action for treble damages and treble costs (t) without proof of any special (k) Per Martin, B., Smith v. Ashforth, (1860) 29 L. J. Ex. p. 260; 121 E. R. 889. The decision as to whether a particular distress is excessive or not, being one of fact, is apparently for the jury {Smith v. Ashforth, supra). (l) This is so in the case of an execution (Gawler v. Chaplin, (1848) 2 Ex. 503; 18 L. J. Ex. 42; 76 B. E. 682). im)Piggott v. Births, (1836) 1 M. & W. 441; 5 L. J. Ex. 193; 46 E. R. 349. (n) Fell V. Whittaker, (1871) L. E. 7 Q. B. 120; 41 L. J. Q. B. 78. (o) Fisher v. Algar, (1826) 2 C. & P. 374. (p) Baker and Wife v. Wicks and others, (1904) 1 K. B. 743; 73 L. J. K. B. 410. (g) See above, pp. 289—290; 11 Geo. 11. c. 19, s. 3. See Brooke v. Noakes, (1828) 8 B. & C. 637 ; 6 L. J. K. B. 375. (r) Pitz. N. B. p. 102. (s) 2 Will. & Mar. c. 5, s 4. (t) Lawson v. Story, (1694) 1 Lord Eaym. 19. 314 DISTRESS. damage being suSered by them (w), not only against the parties proved to have been concerned in the act, but also against the owners of the goods distrained in case they are proved to have subsequently come into their possession. A rescue may either be in deed by an actual taking, or in law as where cattle on their way to the pound escape and come into the hands of their owner. If he refuse to deliver them, this is a rescue in law (x). If the seizure on any ground is illegal the owner rnay lawfully rescue When rescue his goods. He has the same right of recaption as against any lawful. other trespasser (jj). If between seizure and impounding the party making the distress voluntarily quits actual possession this is an abandonment. The owner is restored to his fuU dominion, and any thing which he may do with the goods is no rescue («). Lawful When the impounding is once complete the- goods are in the impounding, oustody of th© law, and whether the original taking was lawful or not it is a pound breach to remove them from the pound (a). It is difficult, however, assuming that the distress be illegal, to see what the damage can be, and no action lies under the statute because there is no party grieved (6). If, however, a pound be left open the owner of goods improperly distrained may, it seems, come and retake them, for there is no real impounding (c). After abandonment there can be no pound breach because the distress is thereby determined. It has been already pointed out that in impounding a co"ntinuance of possession is not necessary, but if a man is left in possession his subsequent withdrawal may be evidence of an intention to abandon (d). Where If a distrainor abuses the distress when impounded the owner abused ^^^ ^^ entitled to interfere and resume possession for the protection of his property. It is not, however, for every abuse that he is allowed to take this course. The mere fact of a distrainor making himself a trespasser ab initio at common law only puts him in the same position as though the original taking were illegal; and, as has been seen, the illegality of the distress does not justify the breaking of the pound. It would seem that to (tt) Kemp V. Christmas, (1898) 79 L. T. 233, C. A. (x) Co. Litt. p. 161 b. iy) Co. Litt. p. 47 b, p. 160 b. (z) Per Holt, C.J., Dod v. Monger, (1704) 6 Mod. p. 216; Knowles v. Blake, (1829) 5 Bing. 499; Com. Dig. Distress D. 1 ; 7 L. J. C. P. 228; 30 K. E. 707. (a) Co. Litt. p. 47 b ; Parret Navigation Go. v. Strower, (1840) 6 M. & W. 564; 9L. J. Ex. 180; 55 E. E. 729. (b) Berry v. Huckstable, (1850) 14 Jur. 718. (c) Co. Litt. p. 47 b. id) See above, p. 291. Swann v. Earl of Falmouth, (1828) 8 B. & C. 456 6 L. J. K. B. 374; 32 E. E. 441; op. Bannister v. Hyde, (1860) 2 B. & E. 627 29 L. J. Q. B. 141; 119 E. E. 878; see, too, Kerhy v. Harding, (1851) 6 Ex. 234 20 L. J. Ex. 163; 86 E. E. 260; and Jcmes v. Beirnstein, (1900) 1 Q. B. 100 69 L. J. Q. B. 1, C. A. DAMAGE FEASANT. 315 justify a retaking the abuse of the distress must be so great as to amount to an abandonment or forfeiture of. the distrainor's right, thereby putting an end to the impounding (e). It might possibly happen that goods impounded on the premises Where no might be removed by a purchaser from the distrainee without any impounding, notice of the impounding. It is submitted that in such a case the innocent purchaser might not be Liable under the statute which gives treble damages against the " offender " (/). When the goods are in the pound the distrainor has no possession Property of or right of possession, since they are in the custody of the law. The consequence is that in case of pound breach his remedy is confined to the immediate wrong -doers. He cannot sue in trover any third person into whose hands the goods subsequently came. The case might be supposed to be different where a rescue takes place before impounding, for then the distrainor has an actual j)OBseBsion, coupled — in case of distress for rent — with a power of sale, which might seem a sufficiexLt special property to enable him to follow the goods. Authority, however, is against this view, and the distrainor must be considered as standing on a peculiar footing, and not enjoy- ing the rights ordinarily incident to possession (g). If, however, goods distrained are rescued or taken out of the pound, the distrainor has a right of recaption on a fresh pursuit Qi). As is elsewhere pointed out, this right confers a licence in law to go on the land to which the goods have been removed, but not to enter forcibly (i). If a man find the chattel of another unlawfully on his land and Distress doing damage, he may seize and detain it impounded, in order to fg^^nt compel the owner of the offending chattel to make compensation for the damage done. This right is known as distress damage feasant. The manner of the exercise of this right is regulated by the sarrie rules of the common law as in the case of distress for rent, subject to the modifications hereafter pointed out. "With regard to the statute law, 2 Will. & Mar. c. 5, and 11 Geo. II. c. 19, have no application to distress damage feasant. In this kind of distress, (e) Smith v. Wright, (1861) 6 H. & N. 821 ; 30 L. J. Bx. 13 ; 123 E. E. 855. (/) But a man may be an innocent "offender" against the Copyright Acts. See Ch. XXI. (g) See 2 Wm. Saund. p. 47 b in note; Rex v. Cotton, (1751) Parker, 112; Turner v. Ford, (1846) 15 M. & W. 212 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 215 ; 71 E. E. 624. Per Blackburn, J., King v. England, (1864)' 4 B. & S. p. 785; 33 L. J. Q. B- 145; 129 K. E. 923. It was said, however, in Symons v. Hearson, (1823) 12 Price, ,p. 386, that a distrainor might bring trespass in respect of his actual possession if goods were rescued. (h) Rich v. Woolley, (1831) 7 Bing. 651; 9 L. J. G. P. 219; 33 E. E. 596; see, too, Wood v. Nunn, (1828) 5 Bing. 10; 6 L. J. C. P. 198; 30 E. E. 528. As to additional rights when accompanied by a constable, see 11 Geo. II. c. 19, s. 7. (i) Patrick V. Golerick, (1838) 3 M. & W. 483; 7 L. J. Ex. 135; 49 E. E. 696. See below, pp. 339—341. 316 DISTRESS. What may be distrained. Who may distrain. No trespass, no distress. therefore, there is no power of sale, and the doctrine of trespass ab initio fully ap^plies. Distress damage feasiaint is usually taken of straying cattle, but it may be equally well taken of any other chattel which unlawfully encumbers and damages a man's land (&). There is no privilege from distress damage feasant, "it being but natural justice that whatever doth the injury should be a pledge to make compensation for it " (I). A single exception exists in the case of things in actual use. This is for the sake of avoiding breaches of the peaoe (m), although it has been said, but apparently without sufficient authority, that a horse may be led to the pound with the rider on him (n). The well-known case of Mr. Pickwick in the wheelbarrow may perhaps be cited in support of the same doctrine. The distress being a remedy for trespass, the right can, as a rule, be exercised only by a person who has a sufficient possession of land to entitle him to maintain an action of trespass (o). But no action for trespass is maintainable so long as the distress is retained (p). A commoner may distrain beasts which are grazing on his common without any colour of right, but not where there is merely a case of surcharging (5). But a power of distraint accrues to the person in possession when tenants in common by mutual agreement severally exercise, during a specific period, complete dominion over the whole of the land (r). "Where there is no trespass there is no right of distress. Thus, if > cattle on being driven along a road stray on to the unfenced land adjoining, without default on the part of their drivers, they cannot be distrained until there has been a reasonable opportunity of driving them back again (s) : and on the other hand, if cattle are not lawfully on the road they may be distrained directly they stray from it to the adjoining land (<). In Singleton v. Williamson (w), the (k) Ambergate, dc, B. Co. v. Midland R. Co., (1853) 2 B. & B. 793: 23 L. J. Q. B.- 17 ; 95 E. E. 810. (l) Gilbert on Distress, 4th ed., p. 49. (m) Storey v. Robinson, (1795) 6 T. E. 138; 3 E. E. 137; Field v. Adames, (1840) 12 A. & B. 649; 10 L. J. Q. B. 2; 54 E. E. 657; Rede v. Burley, (1698) Cro. Eliz. 596. (n) Gilbert on Distress, 4th ed., p. 49. (0) Burt V. Moore, (1793) 6 T. E. 329; 2 E. E. 611; Churchill v. Evans, (1809), 1 Taunt. 529; ICE. E. 600. (p) Boden v. Roscoe, i;i894) 1 Q. B. 608; 63 L. J. Q. B. 767. (3) Anon., (1770) 3 Wils. 126; Hall v. Harding, (1768) 4 Burr. 2426; Cape V. Scott, (1874) L. E. 9 Q. B. 266 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 65. See Kentick v. Pargiter, (1608) Cro. Jac. 208. (r) Whiteman v. King, (1791) 2 H. Bl. 4. is] Goodwyn v. Cheveley, (1859) 4 H. & N. 631; 28 L. J. Ex. 298; 118 E. E. 658. It was held in this case that the reasonableness of the time must be estimated with regard to all the circumstances, and that if part of a drove strayed, the drover was not bound at once to go after them, but might first take proper precautions for the safety of the rest ; and see Tillett v. Ward, (1882) 10 Q. B. D. 17; 52 L. J. Q. B. 61 (case of an ox in an ironmonger's shop). (t) Dovaston v. Payne, (1796) 2 H. Bl. 527; 3 E. E. 497. (li) (1861) 7 H. & N. 410; 31 L. J. Bx. 17; 126 E. E. 488. DAMAGE FEASANT. 317 defendant owned a close adjoining a close of the plaintiff's, and was under a liability to repair the fence between the two closes. The fence being insufficient, the plaintiS's cattle strayed through it, and ultimately broke through another fence into a third field also belong- ing to the defendant. He there distrained them, and it was held that the distress was unlawful, inasmuch as the damage of which he complained was the natural consequence of his own breach of duty. There is, however, apparently no duty cast upon an owner of land to fence against trespass by animals of an especially aggressive or wandering disposition or who are peculiarly addicted to jumping (x). To justify the distress there must not only be a trespass but also Actual actual damage, as where cattle tread down and devour grass or (i) Cox v. Glue, (1848) 5 C. B. 533; 17 L. J. C. P. 162; 75 E. E. 788. (7i;) Cox V. Mousley, (1848) ibid. (l) Butterley Co. v. New Hucknall Colliery Co., (1910) A. C. 381; 79 L. J. Ch. 411, H. L. (B.); Jones v. Consolidated Anthracite Colliery Co. • ah initio, his misconduct relating back so as to make his original entry tortious. The reason given for this rule is that " the law adjudges by the subsequent act quo animo or to what intent he «. entered " (/). Thus, "if he who enters into the inn or tavern doth a trespass, as if he carries away anything; ... or if he who enters to see waste breaks the house or stays there all night; or if the commoner outs down a tree ; in these and the like cases the law adjudges that he entered for that purpose " (g). So too one who having lawfully entered for the purpose of levying a distress, subsequently abused his authority, was liable at co'mmon law as a trespasser; and this is still the law as regards distress dam-age feasant. But as regards distress for rent and rates, the law on this subject has been altered by a variety of statutes (h). Of justification arising by the act of the plaintiff or his pre- Justification decessors in title the commonest case is that of a right of way. "inier right " ■'of way. Any user of a way in excess of the right of the party using it will render him a trespasser (j); it is, therefore, material in each case to determine what the extent of the right is (k). And such ascertainment is in nearly every case a question of fact to be ^decided by the Court (I). Private rights of way may, as regards the purposes for which the Private way. way may be used, be either general or limited, and in such cases where there is evidence of unchallenged user for a considerable number of years a lost grant will be presumed (m). "Where the right is created by express grant or by Act of Parliament the extent of the right will depend upon the actual terms of the grant or Act (d) Wilde v. Waters, (1855) 24 L. J. C. P. 193; and see above, p. 244, note (h). (e) Wilde v. Waters, (1855) 24 L. J. C. P. 193, per Maule, J., at p. 195. (/) Six Carpenters' case, (1610) 8 Eep. 146 b. (g) Ibid. (h) As to which see above, pp. 318, 319. (i) Grand Hotel, Eastbourne, Ltd. v. White, (1914) 84 L. J. Ch. 938 H. L. (E.). (k) Harris v. Flower, (1905) 74 I>. J. Ch. 127. (/) Pettey v. Parsons, (1914) 2 Ch. 653, 0. A.; 84 L. J. Ch. 81; Poulton v. Moore, (1915) 1 K. B. 400, C. A. ; 84 L. J. K. B. 462. (m)Hulbert v. Dale, (1909) 2 Ch. 570; 78 L. J. Ch. 457, C. A. 342 TRESPASS TO LAND AND DISPOSSESSION. as the case may be. If the terms be general, the purposes for which the way may be used will be general. The user will not be restricted to access to the dominant tenement for purposes for which access would be required at the date of the grant (?i). But where the grant of a right of way is merely ancillary to a demise or mortgage or other disposition of the property to which it relates and either by effluxion of time or payment off of the mortgage debt, the original obligation ceases to exist, then the amortization of ' the mortgage debt or termiriation of the demise automatically releases the right of way (o). Where a right of way or other easement is claimed by prescription the general rule is that the extent of the right is to be gathered from the user. But it will not necessarily be limited by the actual user proved. " You must generalise to som.e extent " (p), although cases are conceivable in which the right to an easement on land may be strictly limited to one particular purpose (q), though, on the other hand, there is little question that a proof of user for one class of purposes may be evidence of a right of user for another class of purposes not involving a substantially greater burden on the servient tenement (r). A terminus a quo and a terminus ad quern are essential to the claim of a private way (s) ; but so long as the termini are clear it seems that the intermediate track need not necessarily be defined (<). But such a right, over copyhold land, will be extinguished, so far as the lord of the manor is concerned, by enfranchisement without special reservation (m). Public way. The right of the public in respect" of a highway is limited to the use of it for the purpose of passing, and repassing (x), and for ordinary as opposed to extraordinary and excessively weighty traffic (y) ; if a member of the public use it for any other purpose (n) Watts V. Kelson, (187Q-1) L. B. 6 Gh. p. 169; 40 L. J. Ch. 126, per Eomilly, M.E. ; United Land Co. v. Great Eastern R. Co., (1875) L. E. 10 Ch. 686; 44 L. J. Ch. 685; Newcomen v. Coulson, (1877) 5 Ch D. 133; 46 L. J. Ch. 459; Dand v. Kingscote, (1840) 6 M. & W. 174; 9 L. J. Ex. 279; 55 E. E. 660, as explained by Malins, V.-C, (1877) 5 Ch. D. p. 139; 46 L. J. Ch. 459; Finch v. Great Western R- Co., (1879) 5 Ex. D. 254. (o) Poulton v. Moore, (1915) 1 K. B. 400, C. A. (p) Per Parke, B., Cowling v. Higginson, (1838) 4 M. & W. p. 257; 7 L. J. Ex. 265 ; 61 E. E. 555. (g) Foster v. Richmond, (1910) 9 L. G. E. 65. (t) Ballard v. Dyson, (1808) 1 Taunt. 279; 9 E. E. 770, per Bovill, C.J., Williams v. James, (1867) L. E. 2 C. P. p. 580; 36 L. J. C. P. 256; and per Mellish, L.J., Wimbledon, Sc. v. Dixon, (1875) 1 Ch. D. p. 371; 45 L. J. Ch. 353; and see Att.-Gen. v. Esher Linoleum Co., (1901) 2 Ch. 647; 70 L. J. Ch. 808; and Att.-Gen. v. Hemingway, (1917) 81 J. P. 112. (s) Com. Dig.. Chimin., D. 2. (t) Per Mellish, L.J., Wimbledon, dc. v. Di^con, (1875) 1 Ch. D. p. 369; 45 L. J. Ch. 353. («) Derry v. Sanders, (1919) 1 K. B. 223, C. A. ; 86 L. J. K. B. 410, C. A. (x) Dovaston v. Payne, (1796) 2 H. Bl. 527 ; 3 E. E. 497 ; Harrison v. Duke of Rutland, (1893) 1 Q. B. 142; 62 L. J. Q. B. 117; Hickman v. Maisey, (1900) 1 Q. B. 752; 69 L. J. Q. B. 611, C. A. iy) Norfolk County Council v. Green and another, (1904) 90 Lf. T. 461 ; Chesterfield Rural District Council v. Newton and others, (1904) 1 K. B. 62; 73 L. J. K. B. 24, C. A. ; Kent County Council v. Folkestone Corporation, (1905) PUBLIC RIGHT OF WAY. 343 than that of passing and repassing he will be a trespasser. Thus, where a person while standing on a high road shot at a pheasant it was held that he was rightly convicted of trespassing in pursuit of game (a), although merely sending a dog on private land to search will not suffice (a). And a like observation applies where a dog is sent to retrieve dead or wounded game (b). But where the defen- dant was the owner of a grouse moor crossed by a highway the soil of which was vested in him, and the plaintifE on the occasion of a grouse drive went upon the highway for the purpose of interfering with the defendant in the enjoyment of his right of shooting, it was held that the plaintiff was a trespasser and that the defendant's servants were justified in forcibly preventing the plaintiff from con- tinuing such interference (c). So where a trainer of racehorses was an owner of land traversed by a highway and the defendant, a racing tout, used the public thoroughfare for the purpose of watching therefrom the trials of racehorses upon the plaintiff's land, it was held that such user was unwarranted, and consequently that the defendant was guilty of a trespass (d). So under a private Act (2 & 3 Vict. c. xciv. s. 35, sub-s. (1) ) it was held that the repair of a motor-bus in a public thoroughfare in the City of London con- stituted a nuisance (e). And in an American case where the soil of the high road opposite the plaintiff's house was vested in him it was held that a person who stopped upon such portion of the high road for the purpose of slandering the plaintiff was guilty of trespass (/). The public have no right of holding public meetings in a public Public meet- thoroughfare (g), although the mere fact that a public meeting is t^groSkh- held in a highway does not necessarily make the meeting un- fares, lawful (h). What will amount to an improper user of a highway is a question of degree (i). Wherever an act done upon a highway is 1 K. B. 620; 74 L. J. K. B. 352, C. A. It haa been held in a modem case {The Mayor, Sc. of Chichester v. Foster, (1905) 22 T. L. B. 18), where a traction engine, of unusual weight, in passing along a highway damaged pipes laid thereunder, that the owner of the engine (even in the absence of negligence) was liable for the injury so caused. For other cases of extraordinary traffic see Bromley Rural Council v. Croydon Corporation, (1908) 1 K. B. 353; 77 L. J. K. B. 335, C. A.; Geirionydd Rural Council v. Green, (1908) 6 L. G. E. 733; Shepton Mallet Rural Council v. Wainwright, (1908)' 24 T. L. E. 894 ; Reigate Rural Council v. Sutton District Water Co., (1908) 99 L. T. 168; Ren: v. Bath County Court Judge, (1908) 1 K. B. 958; 77 L. J. K. B. 402. (z) Reg. V. Pratt, (1855) 4 E. & B. 860; 24 L. J. M. C. 113; 99 E. R. 792. (o) Pratt V. Martin, (1911) 2 K. B. 90 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 711. (b) Nicoll V. Strachan, (1913) S. C. 18, Ct. of Just. (c) Harrison v. Duke of Rutland, (1893) 1 Q. B. 142; 62 L. J. Q. B. 117. (d) Hickman v. Maisey, (1900) 1 Q. B. 752; 69 L. J. Q. B. 511, C. A. (e) Chapman v. Rawlings, (1909) 26 T. L. E. 15. (/) Adams v. Rivers, (1851) 11 Barb. (N.Y.) Eep. 390. (g) Ex parte Lewis, (1888) 21 Q. B. D. 191 ; 57 L. J. M. C. 108. (h) Burden v. Rigler, (1910) 27 T. L. R. 140, Div. (i) Gwinnell v. Earner, (1875) L. R. 10 C. P. 658; and see Chase v. London County Council, (1898) 62 J. P. 184. A coffee stall is not necessarily a nuisance : Rex V. Bartholomew, (1908) 1 E. B. 654; 77 L. J. K. B. 275. 344 TEESPASS TO LAND AND DISPOSSESSION. Justification under ease- ments of other descriptions. such as to amount to a public nuisance (fe), the doer of it, in addition to being liable to an indictment, is liable to the owner of the soil in trespass (i). With regard to the width over which the public right of passage may extend, " in general where the highway is between two fences all the ground that is between the fences is presumably dedicated as highway unless the nature of the ground or other circumstances rebut that presumption " (m), but where there are no fences at the side of the road there is no presumption that anything beyond the actual road has been dedicated (n). There is no general right in the public to pass over the foreshore for the purpose of bathing in the sea (o). Nor is there any right in the public at common law to tow on the banks of a navigable river (p). There are also a variety of easements under which a person may have a right to do some act on the land of another other than that of merely passing across it. Thus the owner of a house may have an easement to hang lines across his neighbour's yard for the purpose of drying linen washed in the house (g). So the owner of a public-house may have an e&sement to erect a sign-board on the adjoining land (r), or a fascia on the adjoining house (s). Again, as incident to certain easements, such as a right to use a putnp or a watercourse, there exists a right to enter upon the land for the purpose of repairing the subject-matter of the easement, " for when the use of a thing is granted, everything is granted by which the grantee may have and enjoy such use (t). As if a man gives me a licence to lay pipes of lead in his land to convey water to my cistern, I may afterwards enter and dig the land to mend the pipes, though the soil belongs to another and not to me " (m). (k) As to what constitutes a public nuisance, eee Sheringham Urban District Council V. Holsey, (1904) 91 L. T. 225. (I) Lade v. Shepherd, (1734) 2 Str. 1004. (m) Per Blackburn, J., Easton v. Richmond Highway Board, (1871) L. E. 7 Q. B. p. 75; 41 L. J. M. C. 25; Locke-King v. Woking Urban Council, (1898) 77 L. T. 790. For limitations on this proposition, see Att.-Gen. v. Perry, (1904) 1 Ir. E. 247, C. A.; Neeld v. Hendon Urban Council, (1900) 81 L. T. 405; Ford V. Harrow Urban Council, (1903) 88 L. T. 394. (n) Att.-Gen. v. Perry, (1904) 1 Ir. E. 247, C. A. (o) Blundell v. Catterall, (1821) 5 B. & Aid. 268; 24 E. E. Brinckman v. Matley, (1904) 2 Ch. 313; 73 L. J. what constitutes an exclusive right to a foreshore. 20 T. L. E. 589. (p) Ball v. Herbert, (1789) 3 T. E. 253; 1 E. E. 695. (g) Drewell v. Towler, (1831) 3 B. & Ad. 735 ; 1 L. J. K. B. 228. (r) Hoare v. Metropolitan Board of Works, (1874) L. E. 9 Q. B. 296; M. C. 65; Moody v. Steggles, (1879) 12 Ch. T>. 261; 48 L. J. Ch. 639. (s) Francis v. Hayward, (1883) 22 Ch. D. 177 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 291, C. A. Where, however, as in these cases, the right claimed consists in the permanent occupation of a portion of the servient soil it may occasionally be difficult to determine whether the case is one of easement or possession, a distinction which becomes material in considering the period of user which will confer a title. (t) See in this connection Cope y. Sharpe, (1910) 1 K. B. 168 ; 79 L. J. K. B. 281, Div. (trespass to preserve sporting rights). («) Pomfret v. Ricroft, (1669) 1 Wm. Saund. p. 322. 353; and see Ch. 160, 642, C. A. As to eee Philpot v. Bath, (1904) 43 L. J. OUSTOMAEY RIGHTS. 345 In the case of a nuisance resulting from the defective character of a pipe draining more than one set of premises, it has, however, been held that the repair by the owner of one portion of the land of that part of the pipe which passes through his premises, though con- ducing to the general advantage, will not entitle him to contribution for his outlay from the other users (x). There may exist by virtue of immemorial custom a right in the Justification inhabitants of a particular locality to exercise a variety of easements "^arv'riKhts as in gross; such, for instance, as a right of fetching pot- water from of recreation, a spring {y), or a right to dry fishing nets on a person's land {z), or a *''■ light to use it for purposes of sports and recreation (a), and where the sea has gradually receded, land added by accretion takes the character of, and becomes subject to the same customs as, the land to which it is added {h). It has sometimies been said that a custom to be valid inust be reasonable (c), but what meaning is to be attached to that phrase is not clear. At all events as regards customary rights of recreation, the cases seem to show that the indefiniteness of the modes of recreation, or of the times of the year at which they are to be enjoyed, is no objection to the validity of the custom, even though the practical effect of such indefiniteness may be to deprive the owner of the soil of all beneficial enjoyment of it {d). If indeed that were any objection to the validity of a custom there could be no village greens. The place in which a right to a customary easement is claimed to be exeroiseable must be situate within the area- within which the persons claiming the right reside. Thus a custom for the inhabitants of one parish to train horses at a place situate in another parish cannot be supported (e). And generally the mere fact that persons have been admitted into a private edifice or upon private land, without protest, confers no legal right to continue such intrusion against the will of the owner m cases where there is no evidence of dedication (/). Moreover, a custom cannot exist longer tian the estate in respect of which the right to the custom is vested. Where, therefore, an incorporeal hereditament is abolished by Act of Parliament a custom appur- tenant thereto is also, by implication, abolished [g). (x) Nathan v. Rouse. (1905) 1 K. B. 527; 74 L. J. K. B. 285. (y) Race v. Ward, (1855) 4 B. & B. 702; 24 L. J. Q. B. 153; 99 B. E. 702. (z) Per Tindal, C.J., Tyson v. Smith, (1838) 9 A. & E. p. 421; 6 L. J. K. B. 189; 48 E. E. 639; Mercer v. Denne, infra. (a) Hall V. Nottingham, (1876) 1 Ex. D. 1 ; 46 L. J". Ex. 50. (fc) Mercer v. Denne, (1904) 2 Ch. 534; 74 L. J. Ch. 71. (c) Bl. Com. Vol. 1, p. 77. (d) Abbot V. Weekly, (1793) 1 Lev. 176; Mounsey v. Ismay, (1863) 1 H. & C. 729; 32 L. J. Ex. 94; 130 E. E. 753; Hall v. Nottingham, (1875) 1 Ex. D. 1; 46 L. J. Ex. 50, overruling Millechamp v. Johnson, (1746) Willes, 206 n. (e) Sowerby v. Coleman, (1867) L. E. 2 Ex. 96; 30 L. J. Ex. 57. See Mounsey V. Ismay, (1863) 1 H. & C. 729; 32 L. J. Ex. 94; 13(5 E. E. 753, contra, but the point was not there taken. (/) Hancoclc v. Stevens, (1915) 31 T. L. E. 434, C. A. (g) Lanchbury v. Bode, (1898) 2 Ch. 120 ; 67 L. J. Ch. 196. 346 TRESPASS TO LAND AND DISPOSSESSION. To what persons customary rights extend. Bare licence revocable. Bights of licensees. Althougii customs are usually eonfined to the inhabitants of a particular town, manor, or parish, there is no rule of law requiring that the area of a custom should not be wider in extent provided that district be one known to and defined by the law, suoh as a hundred. A custom for the inhabitants of two or more adjoining parishes to exercise rights of recreation over lanci situate in one of them is bad {h). How wide the area may be is not clear, but it seems that it may be at least as wide as a county. A custom for all the men of Kent to dry their fishing nets upon a particular close adjoining the sea shore has been held good (j). It cannot, however (at all events where, as is usually the case, the right is claimed to be exercised gratuitously), be co-extensive with the whole realm; a custom for the general public to go upon a common such as New- market Heath and stay there to witness horse races without payment is void (fe). Though it is otherwise where the benefit of a custom is claimed only to be enjoyed on payment. Thus, a custom for all members of the public exercising the trade of a victualler to enter upon a close at certain fairs and erect booths there, paying twopence to the owner, has been held to be good (I). It was at one time held that although a person having a right to exercise an easement upon the land of another may justify entering upon the land for the purposes of its exercise such an easement, where claimed otherwise than under a custom, can only be lawfully claimed as appurtenant to a tenement (m,). And it has been stated on high authority that a grant of an easement in gross will confer no interest in the soil, but will operate merely as a personal Ucence. Such a licence, even though it may have been made by deed and for valuable consideration, being revocable at any time by the licensor, and that the licensee cannot after revocation justify enter- ing upon the land for the purpose of using the privilege; his only remedy against his licensor, where the revocation is wrongful, being upon the contract (n). But the above doctrine is much whittled down by the admirable decision of the Court of Appeal in the recent (h) Edwards v. Jenkins, (1896) 1 Ch. 308 ; 65 L. J. Ch. 222. (i) 8 Bdw. IV. 18, 19; cited at length by Holroyd, J., in Blundell v. Catterall, (1821) 5 B. & Aid. p. 296; 24 E. E. 353; Mercer v. Denne, (1904) 2 Ch. 534; 74 L. J. Ch. 71. (k) Earl of Coventry v. Willes, (1863) 9 L. T. N. S. 384; see, too, Fitch V. Bawling, (1795) 2 H. Bl. 394; 3 E. E. 425; and Bourke v. Davis, (1889) 44 Ch. D. 110. (I) Tyson v. Smith, (1838) 9 A. & B. 406; 6 L. J. K. B. 189; 48 E. E. 539. (m) See per Lord Cairns, Rangeley v. Midland R. Co., (1868) L. E. 3 Ch. p. 310; 37 L. J. Ch. 313. And see Hill v. Tupper, (1863) 2 H. & C. 121; 32 L. J. Ex. 217; 133 E. E.-605. Bramwell, B., in Nuttall v. Bracewell, (1866) L. E. 2 Ex. p. 11; 36 L. J. Ex. 1, suggested the contrary, as also did Mr. Willes in his edition of Gale on Easements, 5th ed. p. 13 n. But their view is counter to the current of authority. (n) Kerrison v. Smith, (1897) 2 Q. B. 445 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 762. EIGHTS OF LICENSEES. 347 case of Hurst v. Picture Theatres, Ltd. (o), in which it was held that the forcible removal of the plaintiff by the defendants' servants from the seat which he was occupying in the defendants' theatre — and for which he had paid — constituted an assault for which the defendants were liable in damages, the principle underlying the decision in the case being that the licence conferred upon the plaintiS by his paying the price of admission constituted a licence to enter the building and see the spectacle from its commencement until its termination; and, further, that there was included in the contract between the parties an undertaking not to revoke the licence until the spectacle had run to its termination. Consequently the forcible ejection of the plaintiff constituted such a tortious breach of an existing contract as to render the defendants liable in damages. The effect of this decision is to overrule the well-known case of Wood V. Leadbitter (p), which, since the passing of the Judicature Act, is no longer good law, and to reinstate the doctrine held in the earlier case of Tayler v. Waters (g), in which it had been decided that a silver ticket purporting to entitle the holder to admission to a theatre was iirevocable. But a licence, being purely personal, is not assignable, and, Bare licence therefore, will afford no justification for acts done under it by an ^ble^^^'^"" assignee even prior to revocation (r). It has frequently been said that a licence if coupled with an Meaning of interest is irrevocable, but in none of the judgments where dicta counled wlth^ to that effect occur does it appear to have been precisely deter- an interest." mined what is meant by the term "interest." If the interest to which the licence is annexed is an interest in the land itself, as where the licence is to go upon land for the purpose of taking a profit out of it, or of enjoying an easement as appurtenant to a tenement, then undoubtedly the licence is irrevocable provided it be in due form; but whether it is enough to render a licence irrevocable that it should be annexed to an interest in mere personal property seems doubtful. As, for instance, where a vendor of chattels lying on his premises sells them on the terms that the purchaser shall come and fetch them away, and after- wards revokes the licence to enter the premises; or where an ordinary bill of sale (apart from the provisions of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882 (s) ) gives the grantee a power of entry and seizure (o) Hurst V. Picture Theatres, Ltd., (1915) 1 K. B. 1, C. A.; 83 L. J. K. B. 1837; and compare Allen & Sons Bill Posting Co., Ltd. v. King, (1915) 2 Ir. E. 213; affirmed, (1916) 2 A. C. 55, H. L. (Ir.). (p) (1845) 13 M. & W. 838 ; 67 E. R. ^31. iq) (1816) 7 Taunt. 374 ; 18 E. E. 499, (r) Ackroyd v. Smitht (1850) 10 C. B. 164; 19 L. J. C. P. 315; 84 E. E. 507; and see British Mutoseope Co. v. Homer, (1901) 1 Ch. 671; 70 .L. J. Ch. 259. (s) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43. Possibly s. 7 of this Act may be construed to give a statutory power of entry for the purposes of seizure in the several events therein 348 TRESPASS TO LAND AND DISPOSSESSION. Bule in case of bailments. Other licences. on default, and the grantor revokes the power; jn such cases it is thought that upon principle the licensee could not justify entry after revocation, and that his proper remedy is to sue in detinue. In Viner's Abridgment it is said that " when a man bails goods to another to keep it is riot lawful for him, though the doors are open, to enter into the house of the bailee, and to take the goods, but he ought to demand them, and if, they are denied to bring writ of detinue and to obtain them by law " (t) ; and it is difficult ■ to see that an express licence given, and subsequently revoked, could improve his position. The case put by Vaughan, C.J. (u), of a licence to hunt in a man's park and carry away the deer when killed to his own use, which licence Parke, B,, in Wood v. Leadbitter (x), says would be irrevocable supposing the grant of the deer to be good, is not in reality a case of a licence coupled with an interest in a chattel, for no property in the deer would pass until it were killed, but seems to amount to nothing less than a grant of a profit a prendre which would (provided it were in due form, i.e., by deed) necessarily be irrevocable as passing an interest in the soil. In Wo'od V. Mardey (y), where the plaintiff sold a rick of hay then standing on his close to the defendant, with the condition that it might remain there up to Lady Day, and that until that date the defendant might enter the close' as often as occasion required for the purpose of removing portions of the stack, it was held that such licence could not be revoked, and that the defendant could justify entry against the plaintiff's will. But that case may be explained on the ground that the licence in fact operated as a demise till Lady Day of the spot of ground on which the stack stood («), to which a right of way across the close would be annexed by law as an easernent of necessity, so that the express licence was in fact superfluous. The better opinion seems to be that the revocation of a licence to go upon land is inoperative only where an express grant of it is superfluous; where, that is to say, the licence would by operation of law be impliedly annexed to the grant of the interest to which by the terms of the grant it is expressly annexed; and that apparently can only be where the interest is an interest in land (a). specified. The Act gives an implied power of seizure (Ex parte Official Receiver, In re Morritt, (1886) 18 Q. B. D. 222 ; 56 L. J. Q. B. 139). it) Trespass, H. a. 2, 12. See, too, 9 Edw. IV. 35, pi. 10. («) Thomas v. Sorrell, (1674) Vaughan, p. 351. (x) (1845) 13 M. & W. p. 845; 14 L. J. Ex. 161; 67 B. E. 831. (J/) (1889) 11 A. & E. 84 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 27 ; 52 E. E. 271. (z) See on this subject Lord St. Leonards' criticism of Wood v. Lake ( (1751) Sayer, 3) in Sugd. V. & P., 14th ed., p. 124, where he suggests that there is no distinction between an exclusive licence and a demise. (a) In Williams Y. Morris, (1841) 8 M. & W. p. 493; 11 L. J. Ex. 126, Parke, B., says, " it certainly strikes me as a very strong proposition to say that such a licence, (i.e., to go on land) can be irrevocable unless it amount to an interest in land, which must, therefore, be conveyed by deed." MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN TRESPASS. 349 Although, in general, the only person who can sue for a trespass when is the person who was in possession, actual or constructive, at reversioner^ the time of the trespass committed, yet where the trespass caused trespass, a permanent injury to the land affecting the value of the inheritance, a person who is entitled in reversion may sue for the injury to his interest, and he may do so at once without waiting until his future estate falls into possession. Thus a reversioner may sue for cutting down timber trees, or destroying a building, or cutting and carrying away turf, or any similar act involving a partial destruction of the freehold. But for a bare trespass, even though committed under a claim of a right of way, and therefore presumably intended to be indefinitely repeated, and intended to furnish evidence against him, the reversioner cannot sue (b). In an action of trespass to land the measure of damages to Measure of which the plaintiff will be entitled will vary according as the damages in trespass belongs to one or other of the three following classes : — First, the trespass may consist of a mere entry, a user of the Trespass soil by passing over it without doing any damage. In such case the productive of damages recoverable will, as a general rule, in the absence of matter defendant of aggravation, be nominal only. There is no case to be found in ■wit'^oi* . . . . damage to the books in which a trespasser having tortiously used an easement plaintiff. above ground, such as a way, has been made to pay compensation upon the basis of the benefit which has thereby accrued to himself (c). A claim for compensation on such basis cannot be made under the head of an account of profits, for the benefit arising from the use of an easement, even though it involve the saving of expense to the trespasser, is not a profit in that sense of the term (d). There is no substantial analogy between such a case and that of an infringement of a patent or copyright, in which cases the allowance of an account of profits, though nominally resting upon the artificial rule that the plaintiff may waive the tort and sue for money had and received, is, in substance, nothing more than a rough mode of arriving at a calculation of the damage that the plaintiff has suffered, the profit and the damage being presumably proportional to one another. And to this rule, that an account of profits cannot be claimed in respect of the tortious user of an easement where no damage has been done thereby, it is apprehended that the case of such user in (b) Baxter v. Taylor, (1832) 4 B. & Ad. 72; 2 L. J. K. B., 65; 38 R. E. 227; .Mayfair Property Go. v. Johnston, (1894) 1 Ch. 508; 63 L. J. Ch. 399. As to when reversioner may sue for a nuisance, see below, p. 410. (c) Nor can such compensation be claimed under the head of use and occupation, except under circumstances under which a contract to pay for the user can reasonably be implied; and no implication of such a contract can be made where the plaintiff was ignorant of the existence of the user (Churchward v. Ford, (1857) 2 H. & N. 446; 26 L. J. Bx. 354). (d) See judgment of Bowen, L.J., Phillips v. Homfray, (1883) 24 Ch. D. p. 461; 62 L. J. Ch. 833. 350 TRESPASS TO LAND AND DISPOSSESSION. mines underground forms no exception (e). Thus for the tortious user of passages in a mine which had been worked out and aban- doned, the damages would presumably be merely nominal. So where the plaintiff owned a plot of ground so small that he could not profitably have worked the underlying coal himself, and the defendants wrongfully worked the plaintiff's coal and sub- sequently carried other coal over the ways which they had made under the plaintiff's land. Lord Hatherley was of opinion that the plaintiff was entitled only to the value of the coal wrongfully worked, and not to any compensation by way of wayleave in respect of the carriage of the other coal over his land (/). Physical Secondly, the trespass may involve, in addition to the entry, an ^f^th'^^'^'^r actual physical disturbance of the soil, as where a roadway is cut up by constant user of it, or a bank is dug away (g). In such cases, if the nature of the damage is such that an ordinarily prudent person having no one to look to for damages would restore the soil to its former condition, as in the case of the roadway put above, the measure of the damage will be the cost of restoration; but if the damage is such that no prudent person would restore it at his own expense, the measure of the damages is the difference in value of the land in the market before and after the injury was com- mitted, and not the expense of restoration (h). If it were other- wise " it would follow that a party who has let the sea in upon the land of another, the land itself being worth only £20, would have to pay by way of damages the expense of excluding it again by exten- sive engineering operations " (i). But this rule as to the measure of damages in trespass cannot be considered as of universal application, punitive damages having been sometimes awarded. Thus in the case of Davis v. Bromley Urban Council (fc) (in which the defendant council wrongfully entered upon the plaintiff's land, and demolished a wall he was erecting thereon) it was held by the Court of Appeal that the measure of damages was not necessarily confined to the actual pecuniary loss sustained by the plaintiff, but might also include compensation for matters of aggravation. In the case of a tortious user of an easement which has been productive of damage to the soil, as, for instance, where the owner of two portions of a coalfield has wrongfully, and to save himself expense, carried his coal from one portion to the other over the underground passages of an intervening mine of the plaintiff, and in so doing has damaged (e) Powell v. Aiken, (1858) 4 K. & J. 343; 116 E. E. 358. See minute of decree where compensation by way of wayleave was not allowed. (/) Livingstone v. Rawyards Goal Co., (1880) 5 App. Gas. p. 38. ig) See, for example, Rochford v. Essex County Council, (1916) 85 L. J. Ch. 281. (h) Jones v. Gooday, (1841) 8 M. & W. 146; 10 L. J. Ex. 275; 58 E. E. 649. (i) Per Alderson, B., ibid., p. 147. (k) Davis v. Bromley Urban Council, (1903) 67 J. P. 275. DAMAGES IN TKESPASS. 351 the passages and thereby increased the plaintiff's difficulty in getting his own coal, the Court has sometimes, by way of compensation for the damage, decreed an inquiry into the sum which the defendant would presumably have been \\-illing to pay for the right to enjoy the easement {/), proceeding apparently upon the assumption that the benefit accruing to the defendant from the user is proportional to the damage caused thereby to the plaintiff (m). In the case of Whitwharn v. Westminster Brymbo Coal Co. (n) Damages (in which the defendants had committed trespass by tipping spoil ^^g^jj ° irom their colliery on the land of the plaintiff) it was held by the Court of Appeal that in estimating the measure of damages the amount of the depreciation in value of that portion of the adjacent property not taken by the wrong-doers must be added to the value of the land actually appropriated by them, the criterion in assessing the worth of the latter beinjg its value to the wrong-doers for the particular purpose for which it was used. Again where land was eompulsorily taken under the Defence Acts (o) for the erection of a fort, it was held that the owner was entitled to compensation for loss of amenity to his adjoining lands arising from the natural and ordinary use of the lands taken for the purpose of a fortification and the firing of guns placed thereon (p). But, on the other hand, it has been held a tenant has no right to compensation where, after notice to treat under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, but before completion of the agreement (which contained a clause stating that the purchase-money included com- pensation for all injurious affection), the landowner demised a portion of the lands comprised in. the notice (q). Where, however, the action of the authority or corporation possessing, for certain purposes, compulsory powers of acquisition is ultra, vires of those powers, the notice to treat is invalid (?•). And where the action of a corporation is ultra vires the mere fact that the parties proceeding (l) Hilton v. Woods, (1867) L. E. 4 Eq. 432; 36 L. J. Ch. 941. And see minute of decree in Jegon v. Vivian, (1871) L. E. 6 Ch. p. 762 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 369 ; see, too, Whitwharn v. Westminster Brymbo Coal S Coke Co., (1896) 1 Ch. 894; 65 L. J. Ch. 741. (m) Per Lord Hatherley, Jegon v. Vivian, (1871) L. E. 6 Ch. p. 758; 40 L. J. Ch. 369; and Phillips v. Homfray, (1871) L. E. 6 Ch. p. 780. (n) (1896) 2 Ch. 538; 65 L. J. Ch. 741; as to when the converse of this rule, as to assessment of damages, applies, see Walker v. Murphy, (1915) 1 Ch. 71, C. A. ; 88 L. J. Ch. 917. (o) 5 & 6 Vict. c. 94, s. 19, as amended by 22 Vict. c. 12, s. 4; 54/& 56 Vict. i;. 54, s. 11. (p) Blundell v. The King, (1905) 1 K. B. 516; 74 L. J. K. B. 91; Ned's Point Battery, In re, (1903) 2 Ir. E. 192, K. B. D. As to general principle, see Att.-Qen. V. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, (1920) A. C. 508, H. L. (E.) ; but see Petition of Right, In re, (1915) 3 K. B. 649, C. A. ; 84 L. J. K. B. 1961. (g) Mercer v. Liverpool, St. Helen's S South Lancashire R. Co., (1904) A. C. 461 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 960; and see Cardwell v. Midland R. Co., (1904) 21 T. L. E. 22. (r) Batron & Joyner v. The School Board of London, (1903) 20 T. L. E. 22. 352 TRESPASS TO LAND AND DISPOSSESSION. Severance and removal of portions of the soil. Wrongful working of coal. against them, are rival traders of the corporation does not avoid their right of action (s). Thirdly, the trespass may involve the severing and carrying away of things attached to the soil or of portions of the soil itself. In respect of this class of injury the old common law rule -was that the plaintifi might at his option sue either in trespass for the damage to the land, or in trover for the value of the things severed in their character of chattels. Where the lihings severed were of a higher value before severance than after, the plaintiff would, of course, elect to sue in trespass, and in, such action he was entitled to recover the diminution in the value of the land ; thus, in trespass for taking fixtures he could recover their value as fixtures (t), though if he made the mistake of suing in trover he could only recover their lower value as chattels (u). ^o, too, if a trespasser cuts down and removes ornamental timber, the owner may in an action of tres- pass recover the value of the trees when standing. So long as the plaintiff's option of suing in trespass or trover was confined to cases where the thing severed was of a higher value before severance than after, the plaintiff could not by the exercise of such option recover more than the actual damage that he had suffered. But when the option came to be applied to oases where the thing severed acquired a higher value by reason of the severance a difficulty arose. In Martin v. Porter (x), which was an action of trespass for wrong- fully working coal, Parke, B., said that had the action been in trover the plaintiff would have been entitled to the value of the ooal as a chattel at the pit's mouth or on the canal bank, or wherever he found it, without any deduction whatever (y). But in Wood v. More-wood (z), where the plaintiff sued in trover for working and removing his, coal, the same judge abandoned the notion that the plaintiff by suing in one form of action rather than the other could increase the damages, and treated trespass and trover as standing on the same footiag; and further, whereas in the earlier case of Martin v. Porter (a) it was held, somewhat inconsistently with principle, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover in trespass the value of the coal at the time when it first became a chattel at the pit's bottom without any deduction for the cost of severance, and thereby to recover compensation in excess of his actual damage, in the later case of Wood v. Morewood (b), there was introduced (s) Dundee Harbour Trustees v. Nicol, (1915) 550, H. L. (Sc.) ; 84 L. J. P. C. 74. (t) Thompson v. Pettiti, (1847) 10 Q. B. 101; 16 L. J. Q. B. 162. («) Clarke v. Holford, (1848) 2 C. & K. 540; 80 E. E. 853. (x) (1839) 5 M. & W. 351 ; 52 E. E. 745. iy) S. C. p. 352. (z) (1841) 3 Q. B. 440, n. ; 61 E. E. 234.. (a) Supra. (b) Supra, note (z). EJECTMENT. 353 into that rule the quahfioation that if the defendant was not guilty of any fraud or negligence, but acted fairly and honestly in the full behef that he had a right to do what he did, the plaintiff could only recover the fair value of the minerals, as if the seam had been purchased from him by the defendant. The rule so qualified was adopted by the Equity Courts (c), and is now the recognised rule upon the subject (d). In oases coming within this qualification the plaintiff recovers the amount of his damage and no more, namely, the difference in the value of the soil before and after the abstraction of the minerals. Where, however, the defendant has worked the minerals fraudulently, that is to say, wilfully and without any belief of title, or where he has worked them negligently, the penal rule laid down by the Court in Martin v. Porter apparently still obtains (e). At what point the dividing-hne between negligence and inadvertence is to be drawn, or in what the difference (if any) between them consists, seema never to have been decided. It may be convenient to mention that where on different' dates separate demises of different minerals were granted to two lessees — the rights of the earlier of the two were upheld by the Court, and an injunction granted against the later (/). It is apprehended that the measure of damages applicable to the tortious taking of coal and other minerals is equally applicable to the taking of other things which are increased in value by severance from the freehold, such as ripe crops or timber ready for cutting, but the point has never been decided. In general and subject to the exceptions for disabilities mentioned Limitation above (g), all actions of trespass quare dausum fregit must be trespasT^"^ brought within six years next after the cause of action arose (h). In an action for the recovery of possession of land the plaintiff is Ejectment, put to proof of his title, for the defendant by virtue of his bare possession has a good title as against all who cannot show a better («). Proof that the plaintiff was in possession before the defendant, no matter for how short a time, is prima facie evidence of his having title, for such prior possession raises a presumption that he was seised in fee; but though such presumption cannot be rebutted merely by showing that the plaintiff did not derive his (c) Jegon v. Vivian, (1871) L. E. 6 Ch. 742. Minutes of decree, p. 762; 40 L. J. Cli. 369. (d) Taylor v. Mostyn, (1886) 33 Ch. B. 226; 55 L. J. Ch. 893; Livingstone v. Rawyards Goal Co., (1880) 5 App. Cas. 25. And see Peruvian Guano Go. v. Dreyfus Brothers & Go., (1892) A. C. pp. 175—6; 61 L. J. Ch. 749. (e) Trotter v. Maclean, (1879) 13 Ch. D. 574; Taylor v. Mostyn, (1886) su-pra. if) Shawsrigg Fire Glay and Enamelling Co. v. Larkhall Gollieries, (1903) F. 1131, Ct. of Sess. (g) pp. 180, 181. (K) 21 Jac. I. c. 16, s. 3. (i) See above, p. 323. c.T. 23 354 TRESPASS TO LAND AND DISPOSSESSION. In ejectment jus term is a defence. Estoppel between landlord and tenant. possession from any person who had title (k), the weight of authority is in favour of the view that it may be rebutted by showing that the title is in fact in a third person; to an action of ejectment jus tertii is a good defence (l). The cases of Doe d. Carter v. Barnard (m), Brest V. Lever (n), Ndgle v. Shea (o), and the judgment of Mellor, J., in Asher v. Whitlock (p), are aU direct authorities to that effect, and the case of Doe d. Crisp v. Barber (g) also seems to have proceeded upon the assumption that such is the law. Apparently the only authorities which are to be found the other way are the following: — In the headnote to the case of Allen v. Rivington (r) it is said, " In ejectment, if it appear by the record of a special verdict that the plaintiff has a priority of possession,- and no title is found for the defendant, the plaintiff shall have judgment. ' ' But Serjeant Williams, in his note to Saunders' report of that case, dismisses it with the curt criticism that it " is evidently in direct contradiction of the well-established rule that the plaintiff in ejectment must recover by the strength of his own title, vnthout an,y regard to the weakness of the defendant's." Moreover, the wide propositi m contained in that headnote is not borne out by the facts of the case, for it did not appear who the true owner was. In Davison v. Gent (s) the Court of Exchequer did indeed directly decide that jus tertii could not be set up as an answer to an action of ejectment. But the point had never been argued by counsel, the defendant's case having been directed to a wholly different point. Moreover, that case was expressly dissented from by the Irish Court in the subsequent case of Nagle v. Shea (t). In Asher v. Whitlock (u), Cockbum, C.J., also took the view that disseisor's title was good against all but the disseisee, and that a defendant in ejectment could not rely oh the jus tertii; but he went upon the authority of Doe v. Dyeball (x), in which case it did not appear who the true owner was. Though in general jus tertii is a good defence in an action of eject- ment, there are cases in which a defendant will be estopped from setting it up. Just as in an action of trover by a bailor of goods against his bailee the bailee is estopped from disputing his bailor's (fc) Doe d. Smith v. Webber, (1834) 1 A. & E. 119; 3 L. J. K. B. 148; 40 E. E. 268; Doe d. Hughes v. Dyeball, (1829) M. & W. 346; Allen v. Rivington, (1671) 2 "Wms. Saund. 111. In none of these cases did the question of jus tertii arise. (Z) Whether this is the more convenient or more desirable doctrine is another question. (to) (1849) 13 Q. B. 945; 18 L. J. Q: B. 306; 78 E. E. 564. (n) (1841) 7 M. & W. 593; 10 L. J. Ex. 377; 56 E. E. 804. (0) (1874) Ir. Eep. 8 C. L. 224. (p) (1865) L. E. 1 Q. B. p. 6; 35 L. J. Q. B. 17. (3) (1788) 2 T. E. 749; 1 E. E. 611. (r) (1671) 2 Wms. Saund. 111. (s) (1857) 1 H. & N. 744; 26 L. J. Ex. 122; 108 E. E. 804. (t) Supra. (u) (1865) L. E. 1 Q. B. p. 5 ; 35 L. J. Q. B. 17. (x) (1829) M. & M. 346. ESTOPPEl,. 355 title, so in the case of ejectment by landlord ' against tenant the tenant is estopped' from disputing his landlord's' title. ' There is, however, this distinction between the two cases, that, whereas, with the sole exception of a plea of eviction by title paramount (y), the bailee is equally estopped from showing that his bailor had no title at the date of the bailment, or that his bailor's title has determined since that date (a), the tenant of land is always entitled to show that his landlord's title has expired in the interval, either by reason of his having assigned his reversion, or by reason of the landlord having been himself a tenant under a limited interest which has since determined (a). The tenant need not allege that he is defend- ing by the authority of the true owner. This distinction, which can- not be regarded as satisfactory, is merely an illustration of the rule stated on the preceding page that jus tertii is a good defence in ejectment, a rule which has no counterpart in the case of an action of trover by a prior possessor. It may be that the authorities on this subject require reconsideration. It has been held that if a party claiming a right to demised premises under a title paramount to that of the lessor compels the tenant to attorn to him under a threat of eviction, the tenant though continuing in possession may dispute his lessor's title, for that the compulsory attornment operates as a constructive eviction (b). This proposition, however, has been denied (c). It was at one time thought that a lessee for years could not bring an action to recover possession: of the demised premises untU after entry, on the ground that until entry his title was not complete (d). This, however, is not so. " The interest and legal right of possession, where the term is to commence immediately and not in futuro, vests in the lessee before entry " (e). Jn an action for the recovery of possession of land (/), the plaintiff Mesne profits. may in addition recover as against the original pai^y who wrongfully entered into possession, or as against the heir or devised of such party, damages for the value of the mesne profits which the plaintiff has lost by reason of such wrongful possession. Whether, however, he can recover such mesne profits from a From whom recoverable. {y) Ross V. Edwards, (1895) 73 L. T. UOO, P. C. ; Biddle v. Bond, (1865) 6 B. & S. 225 ; 34 L. J. Q. B. 137 ; 141 E. E. 387. (z) Rogers v. Lambert, (1891) 1 Q. B. 318; 60 L. J. Q. B. 187. (o) See the caraes collected in the notes to Walton v. Waterhouse, (1672) 2 Wms. Saund. 7th ed. 826 (1). (b) Mayor of Poole v. Whitt, (1846) 15 M. & W. 571, at p. 577; 16 L. J. Ex. 229; 71 E. E. 765. (c) Delaney v. Fox, (1857) 2 C. B. N. 8. 768 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 248 ; 109 E. E. 879. (d) Bac. Ab. Ejectment, B. (e) Per Patteson, J., Ryan v. Clark, (1849) 14 Q. B. p. 73; 18 L. J. Q. B. 267; Harrison v. Blackburn, (1864) 17 C. B. N. S. 678; 84 L. J. C. P. 109; 142 E. E. 680. (/) Eules of Supreme Court, Ord. 18, r. 2. As to which see above, p. 328, note (b). 356 TRESPASS TO LAND AND DISPOSSESSION. What they inclade. Statutes of Limitation. party wrongfully in possession, who has disseised the original disseisor or has entered under a grant from the original disseisor as lessee for years or as a purchaser in fee, seems doubtful. In Holcomb V. Rmvlyns {g) it was held that in either case, alike against the second disseisor and against the grantee of the first disseisor, mesne profits could be recovered by the owner after re-entry. There are, however, cases to be found in the Year Books the other way, which cases were approved in Liford's Case (h). The supposed c.bjection to holding such parties liable for mesne profits to the true owner is that they would thereby be charged twice over, the presump- tion being that they have already paid the original disseisor. This objection, however, seems very unsatisfactory, for if valid it ought equally to be an answer to the action of ejectment itself; while, with regard to the case of the second disseisor, the presumption that he has paid the first disseisor is^n the highest degree artificial. The probability is that a:t the present day, whenever such a case arises for decision, the Court will prefer to follow the decision in Holcomb V. Bawlyns. Under the head of mesne profits are included compensation for the value of the use and occupation of the premises, whether occupied by the defendant himself or by a tenant holding imder him (-i), and also any damage which has been caused to the premises themselves (fe), for the term " mesne profits " is not confined to the profits which have accrued to the defendant, but extends to all loss that the plaintiff has sustained {I). In considering the value of the use and occupation the net annual value must be taken. Under the old law of limitation, which was in force down to 1833, not only did the possession of another person not operate as a dis- possession of the owner if such possession was not adverse in fact to the owner's title, but neither did it operate as such a dispossession if, though adverse in fact, it was what was termed " non-adverse," under which description were included many kinds of possession which were wholly inconsistent with the title of the owner {m). Of such non-adverse possession the old doctrine of possesisio fratris was an illustration; if upon the death of an owner in fee intestate, in the absence of the real heir, the party " next entitled as heir entered and enjoyed the land, hie possession was deemed (g) (1595) Cro. Eliz. 540. (h) (1614) 11 Sep. 51 a. The resolution there on this point was unnecessary to the decision, and the earlier case of Holcomb v. Rawlyns, (1595) was not cited. In Barnett v. Guildford, (1855) 11 Bxch. p. 30; 24 L. J. Ex. 281; 105 B. E. 871, however, Parke, B., obiter, approved the resolution in Liford's case. (i) Doe V. Harlow, (1840) 12 A. & E. 40; 64 E. E. 523. (7c) Dunn v. Large, (1783) 3 Doug. 385. (!) Goodtitle v. Tombs, (1770) 3 Wils. p. 121. (m.) The terms " adverse " and " non-adverse " were a cross division, not being mutually exclusive; as to what is "contentious user," see Lyell v. Hothfield (Lord), (1914) 3 K. B. 911; 84 L. J. K. B. 251. STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 357 non-adverse, and though continued for the statutory period did not bar the owner. By the statute of "Will. IV. (n), however, the whole doctrine of non-adverse possession was swept away (o). In general the and the only question now, in cases in which the party notrununless has entered without title, is whether there has been aoi exclusive the possession occupation of the land by him as owner ; though in two classes of ^ adverse, eases in which the party "has entered with title, namely, those of tenaricies at will and tenancies from year to year, the statute of Will. IV., not content with abolishing the fictitious doctrine of non- adverse possession, went a step further and did away with the requirement that the possession should be adverse in fact. A tenant at will or tenant from year to year who remains in possession during Exceptions, the statutory period without payment of rent now acquires a title as against his lessor notwithstanding that his lessor may have entered upon the property to do repairs, or that he may have from time to time during the tenancy made verbal admissions that the occupation was permissive (p). The following are the principal provisions of the statute of When the Will. IV. as amended by the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874. 'f *^^^ ''^'°* No person is to make an entry or bring any action to recover any land but within twelve years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or to bring such action shall have first accrued to him or to some person through whom he claims (g), and at the determination of the period, so limited by the Act to any person for making an entry or bringing an action, the right and title of such person is to be extinguished (r). Where the person claiming the land, or his predecessor in title, shall have been in possession and shall have been dispossessed or have discontinued possession, the statute is to run from the time of such dispossession or discon- tinuance of possession (s). The difference between dispossession and discontinuance of possession seems to be that the one is where a person comes in and drives out the other from possession, the other is where the person in possession goes out and is followed into possession by another (t). If the person entitled has been in possession, mere non-user by him will not amount to a discon- tinuance of possession. To constitute such a discontinuance there (n) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27. (o) Per Lord Denman, Doe d. Nepean v. Knight, (1837) 2 M. & W. p. 911; 2 L. J. K. B. 150; 46-E. E. 789. (p) Lynes v. Snaith, (1899) 1 Q. B. 486; 68 L. J. Q. B. 276. But see Arch- bold V. Scully, (1861) 9 H. L. C. 360; .131 R. R. 223. (q) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, s. 1. (r) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s. 34. (s) S. 3. For observations on discontinuance and acquisition of possession under the "Real Property Limitation Acts, see Kynoch v. Rowlands, (1911) 65 S. J. 617. (t) See per Fry, J., Rains v. Buxton, (1880) 14 Ch. D. p. 539; 49 L. J. Ch. 473. And see Leigh v. Jack, (1879) 5 Ex. D. 264; 49 L. J. Ex. 220. As to what constitutes an exclusion of the rightful owner see Philpot v. Bath, (1904) 20 T. L. R. 589. 358 TRESPASS TO LAND AND DISPOSSESSION. must not only be a dereliction by the owner but ^.ctual enjoyment by another person (u)., But where the person entitled has never been in possession, as where he derives his title as heir or devisee of a person who died seised, or as alienee of a former possessor, and has neglected to enter, mere non-user for the statutory period will extinguish his title, even though no one else was in possession. The statute in such cases runs from the date of his predecessor's death or from that of the alienation, as the case may be (x). Thus if a person becomes entitled to a field as devisee and never enters, and the field remains unoccupied for eleven years, and then a trespasser occupies for a year, th© owner's right will be barred, and the tres- passer will have a good title. Though in such case the squatter's enjoyment of the land is qualified by any restrictive covenants as to user that were obligatory on the earlier possessors of the property, and constructive notice of such covenants will be implied (y). There is, however, this qualification to the title of a squatter that if the land occupied by the intruder has been allotted by an award imder the Inclosure Acts to a corporation sole the title of the allottee or his successor is not ousted by the adverse occupation of the tres^ passer until a full period of sixty years has elapsed from the actual date of the allotment. Nor will the fact that the squatter and his predecessors in occupation have been in actual possession of the land for a total period of sixty years improve his position, if a portion only of that period was before and the other portion after the date of the allotment (z). In some of the cases there are sugges- tions that the statute will not run unless there be some person in whose favour or for whose protection it will operate (a). But there does not appear to be anything in the Act itself to support that view. On the contrary, s. 34 read together with s. 3, seems expressly to say that in certain cases the owner's title may be extinguished without any title being invested in any one else. The dictum of Parke, B., in Smith v. Lloyd (b) that " there must be both absence of possession by the person who has the right, and actual possession by another, whether adverse or not, to be protected, to bring the case within the statute, ' ' was intended to be confined to a case in which the owner had once been in possession and had ceased to occupy, and was not intended to apply to a case where the owner had never been in possession at all (o). Mere formal entry upon («) Per Blackburn, C.J., McDonnell v. McKinty, (1847) 10 Ir. L. B. p. 526. (a;) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, a. 3. iy) Nisbet S Potts' Contract, In re, (1905) 1 Ch. 391; 74 L. J. Ch. 310. (z) See 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s. 29 and Blackett v. Ridout, (1915) 2KB. 415, C. A. ; 84 L. J. K. B. 1535. (a) Per Blackburn, C.J., McDonnell v. McKinty, (1847) 10 Ir. L. E. 514; per Kay, L.J., Willis v. Earl Howe, (1893) 2 Ch. p. 554; 62 J. J. Ch. 690. (b) (1854) 9 Exch. 562, 572; 23 L. J.' Ex. 194; 96 E. E. 837.. (c) This seems clear from the actual decision upon the pleadings, ■vphich were as follows : — Action for trespass to a close. Plea that defendant's predecessor in trespassers. STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 359 the land by a disseised owner without expulsion of the disseisor will niot revest the possession in the owner so as to prevent the statute from running against him (d). It seems to have, been treated in the old Digests (e) as well- Successive settled law that an owner who has been disseised could not before i^^.tP-t"!^!?* re-entry sue for any trespass committed after the date of the disseisin, because at the time of such trespass he was necessarily out of possession. He was in the same position as an heir or devisee who had never been in possession (/). Consequently from the date of his disseisin the period of limitation would continue to run against him until re-entry made or action of ejectment brought; and the fact that the disseisor had gone out of possession in the interval would apparently make no diiierence. If, therefore, this view is still to be regarded as law, in cases in which land has successively been occupied by a series of trespassers, it is, for the purpose of determinin'g whether the owner is barted, obviously unnecessary to inquire whether such trespassers claimed through one another or whether their possession was continuous. However independent or however discontinuous their possession may have been, after twelve years from the date of the first disseisin the title of the owner would be extinguished (gi). There is, indeed, modern authority to the contrary. In Trustees, Executors, & Agency Go. v. Short (h), more than forty years before action of ejectment brought, a trespasser had entered into occupa- tion of the plaintiffs' land, but, before he had acquired a statutory title, had abandoned it. The plaintiffs never re-entered, and the land remained unoccupied till less than twelve years before action, when the defendants entered into possession. It was held by the Privy Council that the title of the owner was not barred, and it was there laid down that " if a person enters upon the land of another, and then, without having acquired a title under the statute, abandons possession, the rightful owner, on the abandonment, is in the same position in all respects as he was before the intrusion took place. There is no one against whom he can bring an action. title, 130 years previously, had owned the surface and the minerals, and had con- veyed the surface to the, plaintiff's predecessor, reserving the minerals, vrith a right of access to them through the close. Eeplication that no entry had been made by the defendant within twenty years after the right of, entry accrued. Bejoinder that the defendants had not been dispossessed or discontinued possession. This rejoinder was held bad, on the ground' that it did not negative the right of entry having accrued on the death of another (which having regard to the date of the reservation of the minerals, must have been the case), and did not aver any entry. (d) 3 & 4 Will. rv. c. 27, s. 10. (e) E'olle, Abr. Trespass, K. 1; Com. Dig. Trespass (B. 2);' Co. Lit. 257 (d), B. 430. if) See above, p. 358. ig) Doe d. Goody v. CaHer, (1847) 9 Q. B. 863; 18 L. J. Q. B. 305; 72 E. E. 472. (h) (1888) 13 App. Cas. 793 ; 58 L. J. P. C. 4, P. C. 360 TRESPASS TO LAND AND DISPOSSESSION. He cannot enter upon himself. There is no positive enactment, nor is there any principle of law which requires him. to do any act, to issue any notice, or to perform any ceremony in order to rehabilitate himself. No new departure is necessary. The posses- sion of the intruder, ineffectual for the purpose of transferring title, ceases upon its abandonment to be effectual for any purpose." And in Willis v. Earl Howe (i), Kay, L.J., while of opinion that a series of independent trespassers occupying in the aggregate for the statutory period would bar the title of the owner if their possession were continuous, seems to have conceded that if there was a break in the continuity by reason of an interval of vacant possession, as in the case last mentioned, the owner would not be barred. In neither of those cases was any earlier authority cited in support of the proposition so laid down, nor does there appear to be any such authority, while the proposition itself seems directly at variance with the foundation of the whole doctririe of trespass by relation (fe). ' But if the view of the Privy Council be right, in a case of enjoyment had by successive independent trespassers, the true owner would be barred only in the event of each succeeding triespasser disseising his immediate predecessor ; for if any one of the series went out voluntarily there would necessarily be some interval of vacant possession before the successor came in, and the length of the interval could make no difference. But assuming that the successive occupation by a series of independent trespassers occupying in the aggregate more than twelve years will suffice to bar the title of the true owner, the question remains which of those trespassers is at the expiry of the period entitled to the possession of the land? The true answer seems to be that suggested by Eomilly, M.E., in Dixon v. Gay fere (L), that the person in actual possession at that date is entitled to retain it, not because he has got a statutory title, but because he is in possession and no one else has got any title at all. It has been said that " the effect of the Act is to make a parlia- mentary conveyance of the land to the person in possession after that period of (twelve) years has elapsed " (m), but that proposition is to be understood as limited to cases in which the person so in possession has by himself or his privies been in possession during the whole period, in accordance with the view taken by the Court in (t) (1893) 2 Ch. 546 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 690. (k) See above, p. 326. If there is no necessity for entry where the land is vacant, it is difficult to see why s. 3 of the Act of 1838 provided that as between heir and abator the statute should run not from the abatement but from the date of the ancestor's death. (/) (1853) 17 Beav. 421; 23 L. J. Ch. 60; 99 E. E. 218. (m)Per Parke, B., Doe d. Jukes v. Sumner, (1845) 14 M. & W. p. 42; 14 Ii. J. Ex. 337 ; 69 E. E. 053. STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 361 Doe d. Garter v. Barnard (n). It is one thing to say that the owner's title is extinguished; it is another thing to say that his title has been transferred to any one else. It seems that where the possession during the statutory period has been had by a series of independent trespassers, the one in possession at the end of the period, though entitled to retain that possession so long as he has got it, cannot, if he once allows himself to be dispossessed, bring aiiy action for its recovery (o). On the other hand, it has been suggested that the person entitled to the land is the first of the series of trespassers who has not been out of possession for more than twelve years, and that he is entitled to recover on his prior possession (p). But that view is based upon the assumption that jus tertii is no defence to an action of ejectment, whereas the weight of authority is, as stated above (g), the other way. The first tres- passer could not, immediately upon his losing possession, have brought an action to recover it, for the title of the true owner, not being barred at that date, would have afforded an answer; and it cannot be that his position would be bettered by reason of a subsequent possession had not by himself but by a stranger holding adversely to him. Possession or receipt of the entirety, or of more than his due share, of the land or of the profits thereof by one of several joint tenants or tenants in common, is to be regarded as pro tanto a dis- possession of the others (r). And when once by the effluxion of time the title is barred no payment of rent or acknowledgment by the disseisor can restore the title extinguished by the statute (s). Possession is never to be regarded as the dispossession of another When posses- if it can be referred to a lawful title, for no man shall be heard to siomstobe regarded as set up his own wrong. In one case in a marriage settlement copy- adverse, hold lands of the wife had been settled on the husband in fee in the ' event of his surviving his wife, but there was no surrender to the uses of the settlement, and the husband having survived her, was admitted expressly to hold ' ' pursuant to the uses of the settlement, ' ' and being so admitted remained in possession' until his death more than twenty years afterwards. On ejectment being brought by the heir-at-law of the wife against one claiming as devisee of the husband, it being proved that by the custom of the manor the (n) (1849) 13 Q. B. 945; 18 L. J. Q. B. 806; 78 E. E. 564. (o) Doe i. Carter v. Barnard, (1849) 13 Q. B. 945 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 306 ; 78 E. E. 564. (p) In Asher v. Whitlock, (1865) L. E. 1 Q. B. p. 4; 35 L. J. Q. B. 17; Cockburn, C.J., arguendo, said he doubted the correctness of Lord Eomilly's dictum in Dixon v. Gayfere, (1853) 17 Beav. 421; 23 L. J. Ch. 60; 99 E. E. 218. But the case upon which he relied for the contrary does not bear him out, in that case no tertius being shown. (q) See above, p. 354. (r) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s. 12. (s) Sanders v. Sanders, (1881) 19 Ch. D. 374; 51 L. J. Ch. 276, 0. A. 362 TRESPASS TO LAND AND DISPOSSESSION. hus.band was entitled to hold by curtesy for his life, it was held that, notwithstanding the express terms of the admission, the husband's possession was to be referred to the custora and not to the settle- ment, which, there having been no surrender to uses, could have given him no title {t). An act which, though amounting to a trespass, is beneficial to the owner, is not necessarily to be regarded as aji adverse act, and as constituting a dispossession. Thus it has been held that the clipping of a hedge from both sides from time to time as occasion required by the owner of the adjoining land, did not after the statutory period confer a title to the site of the hedge, on the ground that to keep a person's hedge in repair for him is not an adverse act (m). But where a railway company erected a post and rail fence as their boundary and planted a hedge inside it at a distance of four feet from the fence ; and as the hedge grew up allowed the fence to decay so that the four-foot strip came to be thrown into the adjoin- ing field, it was held that the owner of the field having occupied the strip for twenty years had acquired a statutory title to it, notwith- standing that the company's servants had annually stepped over the hedge on to the four-foot strip for the purpose of clipping the hedge, for that their doing so must be referred to an intention to discharge their duty towards the adjoining owner of keeping the .hedge in a proper state of repair, and not to an intention to retain actual possession of the strip (x). But, on the other hand, it was held by the Court of Appeal in the more recent case' of Littledale v. Liverp\ool College (y) that a merely equivocal act of possession, though exercised during a period exceeding twelve years, was not necessarily adverse to the original owner, and consequently did hot operate as a statutory transference of title. Bemainder- In the case of future estates the right accrues at the time when the estate becomes an estate in possession, subject to this, that if the owner of the particular estate was out of possession at the time when his interest determined, then the action shall only be brought within twelve years after the owner of the particular estate ceased to be in possession, or within six years after the future estate falls into possession, whichever period shall be the longer, provided that if under such circumstances the owner of the future estate be once barred, all persons claiming to be entitled to any subsequent estates (t) Doe V. Brightioen, (1809) 10 East, 583; 10 B. E. 395. This case was decided under the old law, but it is equally applicable to the present. (u) Searby v. Tottenham R. Co., (1868) L. E. 5 Bq. 409. The doubts expressed as to this ease by James, I/.J., (1879) 13 Ch. D. p. 271, n., do not seem to touch the point for which it is here cited. (x) Norton v. London <* North Western R. Co., (1879) 13 Ch. D. 268. (y) (1900) 1 Ch. 19; 69 L. J. Ch. 87. man. STATUTES OP LIMITATION. 363 under any deed, will, or settlement, executed or taking effect after the accrual of the right of action of the owner of the particular estate, shall be barred also («). Where land is let under a lease, though the landlord may under Beveraioners. the terms of the lease have a right of entry for any forfeiture or breach of condition, if he does not choose to avail, himself of such right and waives the forfeitiire, then for the purposes of the statute the right is to be deemed to accrue upon the expiry of the lease (a), and mere non-payment of rent for the whole statutory period will not afiect the landlord's title to the reversion; though his right to recover any rerit reserved by the lease is limited by the statute to six years' arrears ('b). But if, the rent reserved by the lease being more than forty shillings, the tenant not merely does not pay it to the landlord, but pays it wrongfully to a third person, in such case the statute runs not from the expiry of the lease but from the date of the first wrongful receipt of rent by such third person!. Where a remainderman has a right of entry by reason of a forfeiture, omission to take advantage of the forfeiture will not set the statute running (c). In the case of a tenancy from year to year under a lease not in writing, the statute runs from the end of the first year or from the last receipt of rent, whichever shall last happen (d). But where the tenancy is from year to year under a lease in writing, in the absence of something done by the tenant amounting to a repudiation of the landlord's title, it seems that the statute does not run until the landlord chooses to give a notice to quit (e). In the case of possession had under an agreement for a lease the statute does not run during the period of the intended term (/). Where a person is in possession of premises as tenant at will, the Tenancies right of entry of the landlord shall, if there has been no previous determination of the will, be deemed to accrue at the expiry of one year from the commencement of such tenancy, at which time suijh tenancy shall be deemed to have been determined (gr). If a person be in possession of premises as tenant at will, and the landlord enters and does any act of ownership without the tenant's consent, that determines the tenancy at will, and the occupation of the tenant, if contiiiued, is thereby converted into a tenancy at (z) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, s. 2. (a) 3 &4 Will. rv. c. 27, s. 4. (b) Archbold v. Scully, (1861) 9 H. L. C. 360 ; 131 B. E 233. (c) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s. 4. (d) a. 8. (e) But aee Stagg v. Wyatt, (1838) 2 Jur. 892, as to when a notice to quit is tc be presumed. (/) Warren v. Murray, (1894) 2 Q. B. 648; 64 L. J. Q. B. 42. (3) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, a. 7. 361 TRESPASS TO LAND AND DISPOSSESSION. suSerance (h). If nothing further takes place to give rise to a new tenancy at will, such tenancy at sufferance will coalesce with the earlier tenancy at will, and the statute will run from the expiry of the first year of the tenaricy at will or from the date of its deter- mination, whichever was the earliest (i). But if a new tenancy at will is created the statute runs from the end of the first year of such new tenancy (fe). The question whether»a new tenancy at will has been created is one for the jury; but very slight evidence will warrant them in so finding (l). If, when a person is in possession as tenant at will, the landlord not merely determines the will, but actually puts the tenant out of possession for ever so short a time, the tenant cannot by wrongfully resuming possession cause his subsequent possession to coalesce with his earlier tenancy at will; the statute will in such case run from the date of resumption of possession (m). Oeoupation Where a servant is permitted to occupy gratuitously premises y servan s. belonging to his master, for the purpose of the more convenient discharge of his duties, he does not thereby acquire any tenancy at will therein, for such occupation is to be treated as the possession of his master and not as an independent possession of his own (n.) ; and this is so even though the servant may by the terms of his employment be permitted to carry on an independent business on the premises (o). Consequently, however long such occupation by the servant may be continued, it will never give him a good title against his master. Thus, where a landowner built a school-house on his property and appointed a schoolmaster, giving him a small stipend, but allowing him to charge fees to the scholars, and permit- ting him to occupy the premises as a school, it was held that, the schoolmaster being in the position of a servant, twenty's years' occupation did not give him a good title (p). But to prevent the statute from running in such case there must be actual service during the period of occupation; there must be some duties performed. The mere fact that the person occupying the premises was once a servant of the owner and is pensioned off, will not pre- vent him from acquiring a title if his occupation is not conditioned by the performance of some duty. If a tenant at will, not only verbally admits the title of his lessor, (h) Doe V. Turner, (1840-2) 7 M. & W. 226; 9 M. & W. 643; 10 L. J. Ex. 213; 56 E. E. 692. (i) Day v. Day, (18711 L. E. 3 P. C. 751 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 35. (k) Locke v. Mattheivs, (1863) 13 C. B. N. S. 753; 32 L. J. C. P. 98; 134 E. E. 715. (I) Doe V. Turner, (1840-2) 9 M. & W. 643; 10 L. J. Ex. 213; 56 E. E. 692. (m) Randall V. Stevens, (1853) 2 E. & B. 641; 23 L. J. Q. B. 68; 95 E. E. 738. (n) Bertie v. Beaumont, (1812) 16 East, 33. (o) White V. Bayley, (1861) 10 C. B. N. S. 227; 30 L. J. C. P. 253; 128 E. E. 681. (p) Lessee of Moore v. Doherty, (1843) 6 Ir. Ii. E. 449. STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 365 but also pays him rent, that will prevent the statute from running, for the receipt of rent payable by any tenant from year to year, or other lessee (which latter term would seem to include a tenant at will), is as against such lessee to be deemed to be the receipt of the profits of the land for the purposes of the Act (g). A tenant who avails himself of the opportunity afforded him by Enoroaoli- his tenancy to make encroachments upon the adjoining land of f'^^^jj'^ third persons, is presumed to have intended to make them for the benefit of his lessor, unless there be circumstances pointing to an ' intention to take the land for his own benefit exclusively (r). And the assent of the lessor to the making of the enclosure makes no difference (s). The tenant, therefore, in general cannot acquire a statutory title to the subject-matter of the encroachment by posses- sion had during the tenancy; the statute only begins to run in his favour after the tenancy has expired. But the above presumption does not apply unless the relation of landlord and tenant existed at the date of the encroachment made. Moreover one who occupies, as his own, land belonging to another, and subsequently becomes tenant to the latter of land adjacent to the land so occupied, does not thereby change the character of his possession, but can, whilst he remains tenant, acquire as against his landlord a prescriptive title to the land so occupied by him (f). The right of entry or action by a mortgagee is barred after twelve years from the date of the last payment of principal or interest (m). If at the time of the accrual of his right of entry or action the Disabilities, party entitled is under a disability by reason of his being infant, idiot, or lunatic, a further extension" of time is allowed of six years from the termination of the disability (x), subject to this, that the entry or action must be made or brought within thirty years after the accrual of the right (y). No extension of time, however, is allowed for absence of the party entitled beyond seas («) ; and the disability which formerly existed in the case of coverture is now removed by the effect of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (a). When any signed acknowledgment in writing of the title of the person entitled to any land or rent is given to such person or his agent by the person in possession of such land or rent then such fg) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s. 35. (r) Doe V Jones, (1846) 15 M. & W. 580; 16 L. J. Ex. 58; 71 R. E. 772. (s) Whitmore v. Humphries, (1871) L. R. 7 C. P. 1 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 43. (t) Dixon V. Baty, (1866) L. E. 1 Ex. 259. («) 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 28, s. 1. For a conflict of evidence as to payment of interest in kind, see Beamish v. Whitney, (1908) 1 Ir. E. 38. (x) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 67, s. 3. iy) s. 5. (z) s. 4. (a) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75. See Lowe v. Fox, (1885) 15 Q. B. D. 667; 54 L. J.' Q. B. 561. 366 TRESPASS TO LAND AND DISPOSSESSION. acknowledgment shall vest possession of the land or rent in the person to whom or to whose, agent such acknowledgment is given (b) and the statute is set running afresh from the date of such acknowledgment. Concealed In every case of a "concealed fraud " the rig'ht of a person to fraud. g^Q £qj. ^jjg recovery of any land " of which he. or any person through whom he claims may have been deprived by such fraud," is to be deemed to accrue at the time when the fraud is, or with reasonable diligence might have been discovered, except as against a bond fide purchaser for value (c). What is the exact . meaning of the expression " concealed fraud " it is not very easy to determine. It is settled that mere ignorance by the owner of his rights is not enough to prevent the statute from running (d) ; such ignorance must be the result of a fraud on the part of some person or other ; but whether the word " concealed " adds anything is doubtful (e). In Lawrane-e v. Lord Norreys (/), Stirling, J., was of opinion that fraudulently obtaining possession of the plaintiff's evidences of title and destroying them was a concealed fraud, but this point was left open by the Court of Appeal (g) and also by the House of Lords {h). In Vane v. Vane (i) it was held that if a father brought up his young©r son in the belief that his elder illegitimate brother was legitimate, whereby upon the father's death the younger son was induced to allow the elder brother to enter and enjoy the estate, that was a concealed fraud within the rule. Although it was once thought otherwise, (fe), it is now well settled that the fraud must be the fraud of the person in possession or of his predecessor intitle (I) : the fraud of a stranger is not enough. But it is to be observed that a plaintiff who seeks to bring himself within the exception of con- cealed fraud must show that by means of such fraud he or some person through whom he claims was ' ' deprived ' ' of the land ;. and the authorities establish that a person cannot be said to have been deprived by the fraud, if the fraud was subsequent to the wrongful entry which gave him a right to bring ejectment. Fraud, however active, the effect of which is merely to conceal the existence of a (b) S & i Will. IV. c. 27, s. 14. (c) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, b. 26. (d) Willis V. Earl Howe, (1893) 2 Ch. 545; 62 L. J. Ch. 690; Thorne v. Heard, (1895) A. C. 496; 63 L. J. Ch. 366. A trustee guilty pf a breach of trust is (with certain exceptions) entitled to the protection of the statute : How v. Winterton (Earl), (1896) 2 Ch. 626, pp. 640 et seq.; 65 L. J. Ch. 832. (e) See per Lindley, L.J., (1893) 2 Ch. 560; 62 L. J. Ch. 690. (/) (1888) 39 Ch. D. 213; 59 L. J. Ch 681. (g) Ibid. (h) (1888-90) 15 App. Cas. 210 ; 59 L. J. Ch. 681. (i) (1872-3) L. E. 8 Ch. 383; 42 L. J. Ch. 299. (k) Per James, L.J., Vane v. Vane, (1872-3) L. E. 8 Ch. p. 397; 42 L. J. Ch. 291. (l) Willis V. Earl Howe, (1893) 2 Ch. 545; 62 L. J. Ch. 690; Thorne v. Heard, (1895) A. C. 495; 63 L. J. Ch. 356; McCallum, In re, McGallum v. McCallum, (1901) 1 Ch. 143 ; 70 L. J. Ch. 206. CONCEALED FRAUD. 367 cause of action already vested will not suffice (m). The statute' having once begun to run, np amount of subsequent fraud will pre- vent it from continuing to do so. The owner's ■ ignorance of his right of action may result eithei: from his ignorance of the existence of his title, or from his ignorance of the fact of the other party's enjoyment. "Where that enjoyment is underground, as for instance where an adjoiniug mine-owner by driving levels through his neighbour's coal seam takes possession of the seam (n), or where one digs and occupies a cellar under his neighbour's house, the mere conscious violation of the owner's right itself amounts to fraud (o). It has indeed been said that an under- ground trespass, even though innocently committed, must be con- sidered to be a concealed fraud (p). This, however, does not accord with the other authorities. To amount to a fraud within the mean- ing of the statute the act must be done neither by inadvertence nor under a bond fide belief of title (q). But the onus of proof in respect of such belief must lie on the party setting it up, for every secret underground trespass is prima facie fraudulent. Where therefore the necessary conditions of wilful and secret trespass on the part of the wrong-doer and ignorance coupled with absence of laches on the part of the aggrieved person are fulfilled, nothing more is necessary to establish the existence of a concealed fraud which will prevent the running of the Statute of Limitations (r). The subject of injuries to reversionary interests in land caused Waste, by an act of trespass on the part of a stranger has already been dealt with above (s). It remains to deal with those injuries to the reversion which are caused by a person in possession of the land under a limited interest, and which are known by the name of waste. Waste has been defined to be " the committing of any spoil or destruction in houses, lands, &c., by tenants, to the damage of the heir, or of him in reversion or remainder" (f). The old writ of waste having been abolished by statute (w), the present common (m) Lawrance v. Lord Norreys, (1888-90) 15 App. Cas. 210; 59 L. J. Ch. 681; Willis V. Earl Howe, (1898) 2 Ch. 545; 62 L. J. Ch. 690; Thorne v. Heard, (1895) A. C. 495; 68 L. J. Ch. 356. (n) See above, p. 322, Bulli Coal Mining Co. v. Osborne. (1899) A. C. 351; 68 L. J. P. C. 49, P. C. (o) In Rains v. Buxton, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 537 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 473, where fraud was negatived, there was a door to the underground cellar opening into the area, so that the fact of the occupation was patent. (p) Per Malins, V.-C, Ecclesiastical Commissioners v. North Eastern R. Co., (1877) 4 Ch. D. p. 860 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 20. Pee above, p. 186. iq) Trotter v. Machan, (1879) 13 Ch. D. 574; 49 L. J. Ch. 256. See aUo Astley S Tyldesley Coal Co., and Tyldesley Coal Co., In re, (1899) 80 L. T. 116. (r) Bulli Coal Mining Co. v. Osborne, (1899) A. C. 351; 68 L. J. P. C. 49, P. C. (s) p. 349. (t) Bac. Abr. Vol. 8, p. 379. (tt) 3 & 4 Will. rV. c. 27. 368 TRESPASS TO LAND AND DISPOSSESSION. law remedy for such injury is an action on the case. The gist of such action is damage; nominal damages cannot be recovered, nor unless the damage be substantial will the Court interfere by injunc- Whaii tion (a;). It was formerly thought that any alteration of the amounts to tenement amounted to waste everi though it had the effect of improving the value instead of diminishing it; thus it was said that " if the tenant build a new house it is waste " (y). But that is no longer the law. It is essential to show that the new building or other act complained of is an injury to the inheritance (a). The breaking up of a permanent pasture wiU be waste (o). So will the working of mines unopened at the commencement of the tenancy (b). So will the accumulation of large quantities of rubbish (c) ; and so the^ cutting of timber, except for the purpose of repairs, is an act of waste. To that rule, however, there is apparently an exception in the case of what have been termed ' ' timber estates ' ' : that is to say, estates which are cultivated merely for the produce of sale- able timber, and upon which the practice has been to cut the timber periodically, and treat the proceeds as part of the annual profits of the land (d). Another head of damage whicli in former times was treated as highly material in considering whether an act amounted to waste was the destruction of the evidence of the reversioner's title. Any act which so altered the character of the tenement as to diminish the means of identifying it, even though not in other respects prejudicial to the inheritance, was treated as an act of ' waste. But that head of damage, at all events in the case of rural estates, may at the present day be regarded as obsolete, as ' ' nowadays, when there are ordnance surveys . . . and where the property is marked out on a map . any damage in regard to evidence of title is quite wild and chimerical, or is at least merely nominal" (e). Where, however, the tenant has made a material and enduring alteration in the character of the land, even though such alteration may tend to enhance its value, the mis- feasance ivill support an action for waste, in respect of which a court will award substantial damages for the past wrong, and an injunction restraining future acts of a similar character (/). In ad (x) Doherty v. Allman, (1878) 3 App. Gas. 709. {y) Co. Litt. 53 a. (z) Jones V. Chappell, (1875) L. E. 20 Eq. 539; 44 L. J. Ch. 658; Meux v. Gobley, (1892) 2 Ch. 253; 61 L. J. Ch. 449 (a) Co. Litt. 53 b. (b) Ibid. (c) West Ham Charity Board v. East London Waterworks Co., (1900) 1 Ch. 024; 69 L. J. Ch. 257. (d) Dashwood v. Magniac, (1891) 3 Ch. 306; 60 L. J. Ch. 809; per Jeseel, M.E., Honeywood v. Honeywood, (1874) L. E. 18 Bq. p. 309; 43 K J. Ch. 652; Perrand v. Wilson, (1845) 4 Hare, 344; 15 L. J. Ch. 41; 67 R. E. 70. (e) Per Lord Blackburn, Doherty v. Allman, (1878) 3 App. Cas. p. 735. And see per Jessel, M.E., Jones v. Chappell, (1875) L. E. 20 Eq. p. 542; 44 L. J. Ch. 658. (/) West Ham Central Charity Board v. East London Waterworks Co., (1900) 1 Ch. 624; 69 L. J. Ch. 257. WASTE. 36& action for waste the measure of damages is (in the absence of any matter of aggravation) the diminution in the value of the reversion, less a discount for immediate payment {g). All the kinds of waste above referred to belong to the class known as " voluntary waste," which consists of acts of misfeasance. There is another class of waste known as " permissive," which Permissive consists of omission, in neglecting to keep the premises in a state of repair, in cases in which a duty to repair exists. Actions of tort for waste of the former class usually arise between remainderman and tenant for life. But they may also arise between landlord and tenant. Just as an act of misfeasance on the part of a bailee of a chattel is none the less a tort because it is also a breach, of the contract of bailment (h), so with an act of voluntary waste on the part of a tenant for a term of years. Actions for permissive waste, on the other hand, rarely arise except as between landlord and tenant, and as between such parties, whatever the form of action may have been in its origin, it can hardly at the present day be regarded otherwise than as an action for breach of contract. No action of tort will lie against a tenant for life foF permissive waste (i), even in the case of leaseholds (k), unless by the terms of the will or deed creating the settlement he is expressly required to keep the premises in repair (l). And the same rule of non-liability applies to copyholders in the absence of a special custom (to). It is not unusual in instruments of settlement to provide that the Equitable tenant for hfe shall be unimpeachable of waste. The effect of such waste. a provision at law was to enable the tenant to cut down all the timber on the estate or commit any other acts of voluntary waste with impunity (w). But from comparatively early times the Court of Chancery interfered to prevent him from committing what was ' known as " equitable waste," that is to say, making an uncon- scientious use of his legal right (o), such as wantonly destroying the mansion house (p), or cutting down ornamental timber (g). Such (g) Whitham v. Kershaw, (1885-6) 16 Q. B. D. 613. {h) Hayn v. Culliford, (1879) 4 C. P. D. 182; 48 L. J. C. P. 372. As to when a bailee is not responsible for the tortious or* criminal act of his servant, see Sanderson v. Collins, (1904) 1 K. B. 628; 73 L. J. K. B. 358; Cheshire v. Bailey, (1905) 1 K. B. 237; 74 L. J. K. B. 176, C. A. (i) Cartwright, In re, (1889) 41 Ch. D. 532; 58 L. J. Ch. 590. (k) Parry and Hopkins, In re, (1900) 1 Ch. 160; 69 L. J. Ch. 190. (l) Woodhouse v. Walker, (1880) 5 Q. B. D. 404; 49 L. J. Q. B. 609. (m) Galbraith v. Poynton, (1905) 2 K. B. 258; 74 L. J. K. B. 649. (n) Per Turner, L.j., Micklethwait v. Micklethwait, (1857) 1 De G. & J. p. 524; 26 L. J. Ch. 721; 118 B. E. 198. (o) Micklethwait v. Micklethwait, (1857) 1 De G. & J.'at p. 524; 26 L. J. Ch. 721 ; 118 E. E. 198. (p) Vane v. Barnard, (1716) 2 Vem. 738. (q) Marquis of Downshire v. Lady Sandys, (1801) 6 Ves. 107. By this term "ornamental" must be understood not trees which are in fact ornamental, but tree^ which are planted for the purposes of ornament : Wombwell v. Belasyse, (1825) 6 Ves. 110, a (note). C.T. 24 370 , TRESPASS TO LAND AND DISPOSSESSION. equitable waste, however, not being a breach of any legal duty was not at common law the subject of an action for a tort. But now the legal right to commit waste of that description has been taken away by the Judicature Act, which provides by s. 25, sub-s. (3), that " an estate for life without impeachment of waste shall not confer or be deemed to^ have conferred upon the tenant for life any legal right to commit waste of the description known as equitable waste, unless an intention to confer such right shall expressly appear by the instrument creating such estate." By that provision the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere to prevent equitable waste in the future seems to be rested upon a new ground, naniely, the pre- sumption of absence of intention on the part of the settlor to confer a right to commit it. Ecclesiastical The action which by the common law lay against the executors of a dilapidations, (jeceased incumbent of an ecclesiastical benefice at the suit of his successor for dilapidations was an action of tort in the nature of waste (r). The position of an incimabent was analogous to that of a tenant for life with this difference., that he was liable for per- missive as well as vO'\jmtary waste. The damages recovered in such action were not payable by the executor until after all the simple contract debts of the testator had been satisfied ; and, when paid, the party receiving them was under no obligation to expend them in repairs. But the law on this subject has been altered by the Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Act, 1871 (s), which provides that, the amount of the dilapidations having been ascertained by the bishop's surveyor, the bishop shall make an order stating the costs of the repairs for which the late incumbent's estate is liable, and the sum stated in the order is to be a debt (<), which debt is payable pari passu with the other debts of the deceased (w). The action being now in form an action of debt, it seems doubtful whether ecclesiastical dilapidations can any longer be regarded as coming within the category of torts. The new incumbent upon recovery of the money is not now entitled to retain it for his own use, but is bound to pay it over to the Governors of Queen Anne's Bounty (a;), to be applied for repairs. (r) As to this action, see the judgment of Lord Denman in Mason v. Lambert, a848) 12 Q. B. 795, 799; 17 L. J. Q. B. 366. • (s) 34 & 35 Vict. c. 43 (amended 35 & 36 Vict. u. 96; 44 & 45 Vict. u. 25). (t) s. 36. (u) In re Monk, (1887) 36 Ch. D. 583; 56 L. J. Ch. 809. (i) s. 87. CHAPTER XIV. NUISANCE. PAGE PAGE Private Nuisance 371 Special Damage from Public Percolating Water 373 Nuisance 885 Withdrawal of Support" 375 ^"'J^*""! to Highway 388 , • , T ■ i-i. nr,r, UDstruction to Navigation 397 Ancient Lights 377 Definition of Public Nuisance 400 Personal Discomfort, when action- Effect of Statutory Powers 402 able ; 379 Who may sue ' 409 Locality, how far material 381 Who are liable to be sued 413 Nuisances are of two kinds, private and public. A common Private nuisance is either an overt unlavs^ful act or omission to discharge a °"'^*°°* public duty, which act or omission endangers the lives, safety, health, property, or comfort of the public, or by which the public are obstructed in the exercise or enjoyment of any right common to all His Majesty's subjects. A private nuisance has been defined to be " anything done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another and not amounting to a trespass " (a). It includes all kinds of damage arising from water (other than that caused in certain cases by mine water), filth, fire, electricity, gases (b), or other noxious things being caused or permitted to pass from the defendant's land on to the plaintiff's (c), all damage arising from improper use of a natural stream, damage arising from > the excavation of the defendant's lata.d, and the consequent withdrawal of the support to which the plaintiff's land is entitled, obstructions of easements, of all kinds, injuries to rights of, pirofit a prendre, and also any invasion of the private rights which a person may possess by reason of the contiguity of his premises to a public highway although such invasion may not amount to an actual obstruction (d). But to amount to a nuisance the degree of hurt or annoyance must in each case be substantial. Thus where the plaintiff com- plained that the trees and other vegetation on his land were damaged by the escape of fumes from the defendant's smelting works, the jury were held to have been rightly directed ' ' that the law did not (a) Stephen's Com. 1st Ed. Vol. 3, p. 499. (6) Batcheller v. Tunbridge Wells Gas Co., (1901) 84 L. T. 765. (c) As to the duty to prevent damage of this- kind, see below, pp. 426 et sea. {d) Cobb V. Saxby, (1914) 3 K. B. 822; 83 L. J. K. B. 1817. stream. 372 NUISANCE. regard trifling inconveniences; that everything must be looked at from a reasonable point of view; and therefore in an action for nuisance to property, arising from noxious vapours, the injury, to be actionable, must be such as visibly to diminish the value of the property and the comfort and enjoyment of it " (e). Nuisance to With regard to interferences with the water of a natural stream, however, it is to be observed that there is one case in which the injury even though substantial will not amount to an actionable nuisance. It has been laid down that, in the course of what is termed the ordinary use of water, the use, that is to say, ad lavandum et -poiandum, for domestic purposes and for cattle, a riparian owner may without regard to the necessities of the lower owners take water from the stream without limit, even to the exhaustion of the whole supply (/), and the rule is usually so stated; but the proposition has been doubted {g). If by the use of the water for ariy other purposes, such as irrigation, or manufacture, or the supply even for domestic use of persons whose premises are situate on land not riparian, or by interference with the bed of the stream {h), an upper riparian owner sensibly diminishes the volume of the stream., he will be liable as for a nuisance (i). But the abstraction and subsequent re-introduction of water, unpolluted and undiminished in volume affords no ground for action (k). The law with regard to the rights of riparian owners is thus admirably sum- marised in Kent's Commentaries (i) : " Every proprietor of lands on the banks of a " (natural) ' ' river has . . an equal right to the use of the water which flows in the stream adjacent to his lands as it was wont to run " [currere solebat) " without diminution or altera- tion. No. proprietor has a right to use the water to the prejudice of other proprietors above or below him, unless he has a prior right to divert it, or a title to some exclusive enjoyment. He has no property in the water itself, but a simple usufruct while it passes along. . . . Though he may use the water while it runs over his land as an incident to the land, he cannot unreasonably detain it, or give it another dirfection, and he must return it to its ordinary (e) St. Helens Smelting Go. v. Tipping, (1865) 11 H. L. C. 642; 35 L. J. Q. B. 66; 145 E. E. 348. See also Attorney- General v. Rathmines d Pembroke Hos- pital Board, (1904) 1 Ir. E. 161, C. A. (proposed erection of small-pox hospital, injunction refused). (/) Per Lord Kingsdown, Miner v. Gilmour, (1858) 12 Moore, P. C. p. 156; 124 E. E. 3. !g) Lord Norbury v. Kitchin, (1863) 9 Jur. N. S. 132. (h) Fear v. Vickers, (1911) 27 T. L. E. 558, C. A. (i) McCartney v. Londonderry S Lough Swilly R., (1904) A. C. 301; 73 L. J. F. C. 73; and see Swindon Waterworks Go. v. Wilts & Berks Ganal Navigation Co., (1876) L. B. 7 H. L. 697; 45 L. J. Ch. 638; per Parke, B., Emhrey v. Owen, (1851) 6 Bxch. p. 371; 20 L. J. Ex. 312; 86 E. E. 331; Mostyn v. Ather- ton, (1899) 2 Ch. 360; 68 L. J. Ch. 629. (k) Kensit v. Great Eastern R. Co., (1884) 27 Ch. D. 122, 0. A. (l) 12th ed. Vol. 3, p. 439. 37S PERCOLATING WATER. channel when it leaves his estate. Without the consent of the adjoining proprietors, he cannot divert or diminish the quantity of water which would otherwise descend to the proprietors below, nor throw the water back upon the proprietors above." Moreover, a riparian proprietor will be liable as. for a nuisance if he substantially pollutes the stream by discharging foul matter into it (m), or raises its temperature by abstracting water from it for the purpose of his mill and then returning it into the stream again in a heated state (n), or interferes with the regularity of the flow (o) by temporary penning back the water (p). Nor is a plea that the defendants use every reasonable practicable and available means of rendering the pollution harmless any excuse in law (5). But provided a riparian owner does not interfere with the rights of other proprietors above or below him he is entitled to construct a mill-race (r). Although Percolating the right to have water flowing above ground in a natural stream con- tinue so to flow is a natural incident of ownership of riparian land, and a similar right pertains to subterranean water flowing in an ascertained channel (s), there is no corresponding natural right in respect of percolating water flowing un'derground in no defined channel (t), or in a channel which, though defined, can only be ascertained by excavation (u), nor can such a right be acquired by long enjoyment (x). Every person may (subject to one limitation) appropriate the whole of the water percolating under his land, " even though the consequence may be that he takes not only the water which at first was under his property, but all the adjoining water which by natiural force comes under his land when he has taken that which was there in the first instance " {y). Therefore an action will not lie for intercepting the percolation of water into (m) Wood V. Waud, (1849) 3 Exch. 748; 18 L. J. Ex. 305; 77 R. R. 809; West Riding of Yorkshire Rivers Board v. Preston d Sons-, (1905) 9!2 L. T. 24 ; Hodgkin- son V. Ennor, (1863) 4 B. & S. 229 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 231 ; 129 E. E. 728 ; West Ridinrt of Yorkshire Rivers Board v. Butterworth, (1908) 98 L. T. 789, C. A.; see also Brook V. Meltham Urban Council, (1908) 2 K. B. 780; 77 L. J. K. B. 1079, C. A. Nor is it necessary for a plaintiff to adduce proof of actual damajj'S : Pennington v. Brinsop Hall Goal Co., (1877) 5 Ch. D. 769; 46 L. J. Ch. 773. (n) Mason v. Hill, (1832-3) 5 B. & Ad. 1; 2 L. J. K. B. 118; 39 E. E. 354. (0) Roberts v. Owyrfai Rural Council, (1899) 2 Ch. 608; 68 L. J. Ch. 233, 757, C A (p) Sampson v. Hoddinott, (1857) 1 C. B. N. S. 590; 26 L. J. C. P. 148. (g) Midlothian County Council v. Pumpherston Oil Co., (1904) 6 F. 387, Ct. of Sess. (r) White v. White, (1906) A. C. 72 ; 75 L. J. P. C. 14. (s) Chasemore v. Richards, (1859) 7 H. L. C. 349; 28 L. J. Ex. 81; 115 E. R. 187. (i) Acton V. Blundell, (1843) 12 M. & W. 324; 13 L. J. Ex. 289; 67 R. R. 361; Corporation of Bradford v. Pickles, (1895) A. C. 587; 64 L. J. Ch. 759. (u) Bradford Corporation v. Ferrand, (1902) 2 Ch. 655; 71 L. J. Ch. 859. {x) Chasemore v. Richards, supra. (y) Per Cotton, L.J., Ballard v. Tomlinson, 1885) 29 Ch. D. p. 123; 54 L. J. Ch. 454. 374 NUISANCE. Fouling underground water supply. the plaintiS's well (a), or into a running stream (a), nor for causing water which has already collected on the plaintiff's land and was stationary there, as in a well, to percolate away from it (i»). Nor will the motive with which the defendant so intercepts the water be material. Thus if a landowner sink a tunnel on his land, the effect of which is to cut off the underground water supply from his neigh- bour, no action will lie, even though his object was not to benefit his own land but to extort money from his neighbour by forcing him to buy him out at his own price (c). A distinction, however, has been drawn, though on what grounds is not clear, between the case of draining water out of a well and that of draining it out of a running stream, and the latter has been held to be actionable (d) ; but this forms the sole limitation upon the otherwise absolute right of an owner of land by sinking wells in his own soil to drain his neigh- bour's land with impunity. The reason why a right to have percolating water flow as it was wont to flow cannot be acquired by long enjoyment, seems to be founded upon the indefiniteness of the right, and the inability of the servient owner to prevent the user by which the right is claimed to be acquired (e). But although there can be no property in percolating water, it has been decided that an action will lie against one who allows his sewage to foul the water supply existing in the underground strata, so that the water reaches the plaintiff iri an impure condition (/). Whether a person is deprived of his right of appropriation of under- ground water by reason of his neighbours having exhausted the supply, or by reason of their having contaminated it (g), the result is practically the same ; but in the one case such deprivation is actionable, in the other it is not. Possibly the grounds of this dis- • tinction may be that the objections which were urged in Chasemore (z) Acton V. Blundell, (1843) 12 M. & W. 324; 13 L. J. Ex. 289; 67 B. B. 361. (a) Chasemore v. Richards, (1859) 7 H. L. C. 349; 28 L. J. Ex. 81; 115 E.E. 187. (b) New River Co. v. Johnson, 1860) 2 B. & B. 435; 29 L. J. M. C. 93; 119 B. E. 786 ; Acton v. Blundell, (1843) 12 M. & W. 324; 13 L. J. Bx. 289; 67 E. E. 361. (c) Corporation of Bradford v. Pickles, (1895) A. C. 687; 64 L. J. Ch. 759. See above, p. 16. (d) Grand Junction Canal Co. v. Shugar, (1871) L. B. 6 Ch. 483. (e) See per Wightman, J., Chasemore v. Richards, (1859) 7 H. L. C. 349; 28 L. J. Ex. 81; 115 B. E. 187. (/) Womersley v. Church, (1867) 17 L. T. N. S. 190; Snow v. Whitehead, (1884) 27 Ch. D. 588; 53 L. J. Ch. 885; Ballard v. Tomlinson, (1885) 29 Ch. D. 115 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 454. (g) In the modern case of Ferguson v. Malijern Urban Council, (1909) 73 J. P. 361, H. Ij. (B.), a somewhat similar right of action was negatived upon the ground that the finding of the jury failed to show that the plaintiff was legally entitled to enjoyment of the water. The general principle, therefore, that one who fouls percolating water is liable in damages for any loss thereby occasioned is consequently unimpeached. ■*£* WITHDRAWAL OP SUPPORT. 375 V. Richards (h), against holding that the prevention of percolating water from coming from the plaintiff's land oould giv& rise to a cause of action, do not apply with equal force to holding that the fouling of such water could do so. Eainwater falls from heaven indefinitely over the earth's surface, manure does not, and there is not the same difficulty in tracing manure or other impurities to their source as in tracing the cause of the diminution of the water supply (i). In this respect an artificial watercourse above ground stands Fouling on the same footing as underground percolating water. A person watercourse, through whose land the watercourse flows, although he may have no right to have the flow continue, is entitled to sue for a nuisance any owner higher up the stream who pollutes it so as to deprive him of the beneficial enjoyment of the water whilst it continues to run (fc). The right to support is a natural right of property, there being a Withdrawal natural obhgation on an owner of land so to use his property as not °' support, to injure that of his neighbour (Q. But the mere withdrawal of the support to which a person's land is entitled, whether as a natural incident of ownership or as an easement, froin the land of the adjoining owner, is not of itself a nuisance; there is nothing per se wrongful in the excavation or removal of the supporting soil; it only becomes wrongful if and when a subsidence of the plaintiff's soil follows (m). And further, a subsidence to create a cause of action must be something more than merely nominal, it must be appreciable (w.). But a demise or sale of minerals does not, apart from express contract, deprive a vendor who retains the surface of his right to support (o). The right of support is generally limited to support by soil, it does not as a rule extend to the hydrostatic pressure afforded by underground water percolating through the soil (p),' and therefore (h) (1859) 7 H. L. C. 349; 28 L. J. Ex. 81; 115 E. E. 187. (t) As to the pollution of water supply by a gas company, acting under statutory powers, see Batcheller v. Tunbridge Wells Gas Co., (1901) 84 L. T. 765 ; and as to the foiling of surface water see Gibbings v. Hungerford, (1904) 1 Ir. K. 211, C. A. See also Price's Candle Works v. London County Council, (1908) 2 Ch. 526; 78 L. J. Ch. 1, C. A. (fc) Wood V. Waud, (1849) 3 Exch. p. 779; 18 L. J. Ex. 305; 77 E. E. 809. (I) Howley Park Coal and Cannel Co. v. L. S N. W. R. Co., (1913) A. C 11, H. L. (E.); 82 L. J. Ch. 76. (to) Backhouse v. Bonomi, (1858-61) 9 H. L. C. 503; 84 L. J. Q. B. 181 131 B. E. 305; Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell, (1886) 11 App. Cas. 127 55 L. J. Q. B. 529; Crumble v. Wallsend Local Board, (1891) 1 Q. B. 503 60 L. J. Q. B. 392. (n) Smith v. Thackerah, (1866) L. E. 1 C. P. 564; 35 L. J. C. P. 276. This is apparently all that that case was intended to decide, see above, p. 138 (r). And see per Collins, J., in Attorney-General v. Conduit Colliery Co., (1895) 1 Q. B 301 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 207. (o) New Sharlston Collieries Co. v. Westmorland, Earl of, (1900) 82 L. T. 725, H. L. (p) Eor an exception to this rule, see Jordeson v. Sutton, Southcoates and Drypool Gas Co., (1899) 2 Ch. 217; 68 L. J. Ch. 457, C. A. 376 NUISANCE. one who by draining his own land withdraws from an adjoining owner the support of water theretofore lying beneath the land of that owner, and thereby causes the surface of that land to subside, has been held not liable for the damage inflicted (q). To this rule an exception is created by statute in certain cases of subsidence caused by brine pumping operations (r). The general principle involved in the above proposition will not, however, apparently, be extended by the Courts to cases in which the with- drawal of support results in a subsidence of the adjacent surface by the oozing out of wet sand, silt, or other partially liquid substance (s). And in the case of the Trinidad Asphalt Co. v. Ambard (t), an injunction was granted and damages recovered by the plaintiffs from the defendants, who by reason of the removal of lateral support, caused a semi-fluid substance of commercial value to ooze out on to their own land, where it was appropriated by them. Again, the right of support, apart from any easement to have a greater degree thereof, is limited to support afforded to Isind in its natural state, that is to say, to land on the one hand unburdened with the weight of buildings, reservoirs of water or other artificial erections which would tend to increase the natural dovwiward or lateral thrust (u) ; and, oh the other hand, \m.weakened by any artificial excavation on any intervening strip of land (whether belonging to the plaintiff or a third party) lying between it and the soil from which the right of support is claimed (x). But if, in an action against the adjoining owner for removing the supporb afforded to the soil under the plaintiff's house and thereby causing the plaintiS's house to fall, it be proved that the land on which the house stood would have subsided appreciably even if it had been unburdened with the weight of the house (y), the plaintiff is entitled to recover in respect of the damage to the house, although it may be modem and no right of support for it has been acquired (2). Moreover, it has been held, though possibly the decision is open to exception, that an express reservation by a vendor of the right of lateral severance, in a conveyance of one or two adjacent properties, will not disentitle the purchaser to damages should the vendor subsequently to the sale (by reason of such lateral severance of support), in fact, let the (g) Popplewell v. Hodkinson, (1869) L. E. 4 Ex. 248; 38 L. J. Ex. 126. (t) 54 & 55 Vict. c. 40. is) Jordeson v. Sutton, dc, Gas Co., (1899) 2 Ch. 217; 68 L. J. Ch. 457, C. A. (t) (1899) A. C. 594; 68 L. J. P. C. 114, P., C. (a) Per Lord Tenterden, Wyatt v. Harrison, (1832) 3 B. & Ad. p. 876 ; 1 L. J. K. B. 237 ; 37 E. E. 566. (x) Corporation of Birmingham v. Allen, (1877) 6 Ch. D. 284; 46 L. J. Ch. 673. iy) Smith v. Thackerah, (1866) L. E. 1 C. P. 664 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 276. (z) Brown v. Robins, (1859) 4 H. & N. 186; 28 L. J. Bx .250; 118 E. E. 382; Stroyan v. Knowles, (1861) 6 H. & N. 454; 30 L. J. Ex. 102; 123 E. E. 622. ANCIENT LIGHTS. 377 purchaser's property down (a). An. owner of a modem house which de facto enjoys the support of the adjoining soil, though not entitled as against the adjoining owner not to have that support withdrawn, is so entitled as against a wrong-doer (b). But where such support is not an easement of absolute necessity although essential to reasonable enjoyment it may apparently be withdrawn in cases where the owner of the servient land or tenement had no knowledge of the existence of the easement (c). It is moreover fairly certain, as a general proposition, that the Prospect or law does not recognise any easement of prospect or privacy (d). ^"^°' ^' With regard to the access of light to ancient windows the extent Nuisance to of the right is " to have that amount of light through the windows ancientlighta. of a house which is sufficient, according to the ordinary notions of mankind, for the comfortable use and enjoyment of that house as a dwelling-house, if it is a dwelling-house, or for the beneficial use and occupation of the house, if it is a warehouse, a shop, or other place of business " (e). And in neither case wiU the Court intervene by way of manda- tory injunction for the removal of the obstruction if damages would constitute an adequate remedy (/). There is, however, a great distinction between a nuisance of this Distinction description in the case of business premises and a similar nuisance business in the case of a dwelling-house. premises and In the former, the question is whether the plaintiff is prevented jj^ygg"^ from carrying on his business as beneficially and as profitably as before the defendant entrenched on his light; in the latter, the question is, whether the plaintiff's house has to a sensible degree been rendered less fit for habitation than it was before; that is to say, whether the light has been so materially diminished as to render those particular portions of the dwelling actually interfered with by the obstruction complained of appreciably less comfortable and convenient than they were. In either case, when the nuisance is such as to give a right of action, the question as to whether the remedy shall be in damages, (a) Richards v. Harper, (1866) L. B. 1 Ex. 199; 35 h. J. Ex. 120. (b) Jeffries v. Williams, (1850) 6 Bxch. 792; 20 L. J. Ex. 14. Presumably the same principle would apply to modern lights where blocked by a hoarding on a highway causing a nuisance. But the point has never arisen for decision. (c) Union Lighterage Co. v. London Graving Dock Co., (1902) 2 Ch. 558; 71 L. J. Ch. 791, C. A. (d) Browne v. Flower, (1911) 1 Ch. 219; 80 L. J. Ch. 181; but see Campbell T. Paddington Borough Council, (1911) 1 K. B. 869; 80 L. ,T K. B. 739. (e) Per James, L.J., Kelk v. Pearson, (1871) L. E. 6 Ch. p. 811. See, too, Parker v. Smith, (1832) 5 C. & P. 438; Wells v. Ody, (1836) 7 C. & P. 410; 5 L. J. Ex. 199; 46 R. R. 358; Dent v. Auction Mart Co., (1866) L. R. 2 Eq. p 245; 35 L. J. Ch. 655; Ambler v. Gordon, (1905) 1 K. B. 417; 74 L. .J. K. B. 185; Paul v. Robson, (1914) L. E. 41 Ind. App. 180; 83 L. J. P. C. 304; and Colls V. Home d Colonial Stores, infra. If) Colls V. Home and Colonial Stores, (1904) A. C. 179; 73 L. J. Ch. 484. 378 NUISANCE. or by mandatory injunction, apparently dep&nds on the degree of obstruction. If the damage be irremediable, it seems probable that as a mandatory injunction to abate the nuisance is the only adequate remedy it will be granted as a, matter of course. But, on the other hand, if the discomfort or pecuniary loss, though considerable, is capable of appraisement, and is not such as to render the business premises or residence absolutely unfitted for comfortable and convenient or profitable occupation, the remedy will be probably in damages {g). In one case, indeed, Malins, V.-C, suggested that if a person can show enjoyment of an extraordinary amount of Ught for twenty years to the knowledge of the servient owner, he will be entitled to the access of . an amount of light equal to that which he has enjoyed, and not merely to an amount sufficient for all ordinary purposes Qi). This dictum, however, seems opposed to the principle of the cases above cited, and it is apprehended that the servient owner's knowledge of the user could make no difference. Apparently at one time there existed a notion that an obstruction which left forty-five- degrees of sky unobsoured could not amount to an actionable interference witl^ the plaintiff's lights. This notion, which seems to have arisen from a reference to the Metropolitan Building Act, an Act passed wholly alio intuitu, has been pronoimced to be a mistaken one (i). Whether there has been a substantial obstruction or not is a question of fact in each case. But at the same time it appears that, " if forty -five degrees are left, this is some prima facie evidence of the light not being obstructed to such an extent as to call for the interference of the Court — evidence which requires to be rebutted by direct evidence of injury and not by the mere exhibition of models " (/{). When once it is established that the interference with the plaintiff's light will produce substantial damage, the plaintiff will be • prima facie entitled to an injunction in general terms without referring to the angle of incidence of the light, unless there is some special evidence justifying the insertion of such a clause (I). More- over, where evidence is adduced that the obstruction is actually (g) Kine v. Jolly, (1905) 1 Ch. 481; 74 Lr. J. Ch. 174, C A. ; S. C. in H. of L., sub nom. Jolly v. Kine, (1907) A. C. 1; Higgins v. Betts, (1905) 2 Ch. 210; 74 L/. J. Ch. 621. As to the measure of damages, see Orifjith v. Clay, (1912) 1 Ch. 291 ; 81 L. J. Ch. 809. ih) Lanfranchi v. Mackenzie, (1867) L. K. 4 E. Q. pp. 430, 431; 36 L. J. Ch. 518; and see Ruscoe v. Grounsell, (1903) 89 Li. T. 426. (i) Per Cotton, Ii.J., Parker v. First Avenue Hotel Co., (1883) 24 Ch. D. p. 2S9; Home <£• Colonial Stores v. Colls, (1902) 1 Ch. 302; 71 L. J. Ch. 146, C. A., reversed on appeal by House of Lords, sub nom. Colls v. Home S Colonial Stores, (1904) A. C. 179; 73 L. J. Ch. 484. (k) Per Lord Selborne, City of London Brewery Co. v. Tennant, (1873) L. E. 9 Ch. p. 220; 43 L. J. Ch. 457. (I) Parker v. First Avenue Hotel Co., (1883) 24 Ch. D. 282. ACTS CAUSING PERSONAL DISCOMFORT. 379 productive of substantial loss, the plaintiff is, almost as a matter of course, entitled to an injunction, damages not constituting a sufficient vindication of his legal right (m). And a similar rule applies where there is a threatened interference with a clearly vested legal right to an easement of light (n). It has, however, been decided that a plaintiS is not necessarily entitled to receive light from a particular direction provided the quantum actually received is not diminished (o). Acts which are productive of mere personal discomfort may Nuisances amount to an actionable nuisance, as, for instance, where the pe^g^ar^ ° defendant creates stenches by the carrying on of an offensive discomfort, manufaottire or otherwise (p), or causes excessive volumes of smoke to pass from his chimneys on to the plaintiff's property (5), or raises clouds of coal dust (r), or makes unreasonable noises upon his land (s), or impairs the amenity of a neighbourhood by vibration and im)Jordes(m v. Sutton, £c.. Gas Co., (1899) 2 Ch. 217; 68 L. J. Ch. 457, C. A. (n) Cowper v. Laidler, (1903) 2 Cli. 337 ; 72 L. J. Ch. 578. For modern decisions on " ancient lights," see Boston v. Isted, (1903) 1 Ch. 405 ; 72 L. J. Ch. 189, C. A.-; Quiche v. Chapman, (1903) 1 Ch. 659 ; 72 L. J. Ch. 373, C. A. ; Godwin v. Schweppes, Ltd., (1902) 1 Ch. 926; 71 L. J. Ch. 438; Colls v. Home S Colonial Stores, supra; Andrews v. Waite, (1907) 2 Ch. 500; 76 L. J. Ch. 676; Hyman v. Van der Bergh, (1908) 1 Ch. 167; 77 L. J. Ch. 154, C. A. (0) Davis V. Marrable, (1913) 2 Ch. 421 ; 82 L. J. Ch. 510. (p) Brick-burning, Walter v. Selfe, (1851) 4 De G. & Sm. 315 ; 21 L. J. Ch. iHTi; 87 E. E. 387; Bamford v. Turrdey, (1860) 3 B. & S. 62; 31 L. J. Q. B. 286; 129 E. E. 235; soap-boiling. Rex v. Pierce, (1683) 2 Show. 327; effluvia from factory chimney, Crump v. Lambert, (1867) L. E. 3 Eq. 409; Attorney-General v. Squires, (1906) 5 L. G. E. 99; keeping swine, Aldred's case, (1610) 9 Eep. 57 b; fat-melting, Attorney-General v. Cole, (1901) 1 Ch. 205; 70 L. J. Ch. 148; keeping fried-fish shop, Adams v. Ursell, (1913) 1 Ch, 269; 82 L. J. Ch. 157, and see Pulleyne v. France, (1913) 57 S. J. 173, C. A.; fish guano works, Att.-Gen. v. Plymouth Fish Guano £ Oil Co., (1912) 76 J. P. 19; gas fumes, Wood v. Conway ' Corporation, (1914) 2 Ch. 47, C. A.; 83 L. J. Ch. 498; manure heap. Bland v. Yates, (1914) 58 S. J. 612; noise and smell. White v. London General Omnibus Co., (1914) 58 S. J. 339 ; offensive smells from sewage farm, Bainbridge v. Chertsey V.D.C., (1915) 84 Lt. J. Ch. 626. (q) Crump v. Lambert, (1867) L. E. 3 Eq. 409; and see South London Electric Supply Corporation v. Perrin, (1901) 2 K. B. 186; 70 L. J. K. B. 643; McNair v. Baker, (1904) 1 K. B. 208; 73 L. J. K. B. 120; Tough v. Hopkins, (1904) 1 K. B. 805 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 628. All offences under s. 24 of the Public Health (London) Act, 1891 : South Eastern S Chatham R. Co. v. London County Council, (1901) 84 L. T. 632, locomotive emitting black smoke; see also McKell v. Rider, 1908) 5 Commonwealth L. E. 480 (H. C. of A.). As to emission of smoke from vessels trading directly with foreign ports, see Macaulay v. Moss S.S. Co., (1910) lOSi L. T. 887. As to emission of smoke from furnace constructed to consume its own smoke, see Drummond v. Nicholson, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 2190. (r) Pwllbach Colliery Co. v. Woodman, (1915) A. C. 634, H. L. (B.); -34 L. J. K. B. 874. (s) Eevolving machinery of factory, Crump v. Lambert, supra ; using ground- floor of a house in a residential street as a stable for horses, Ball v. Ray, (1873) L. E. 8 Ch. 467; holding circus performances, involving music and shouting, Inchbald v. Robinson, (1869) L. E. 4 Ch. 388; ringing chapel bell, Soltau v. De Held, (1851) 2 Sim. N. S. 133 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 153 ; 89 E. E. 245 ; firing on rifle range, Hawley v. Steele, (1877) 6 Ch. D. 521; 46 I/. J. Ch. 782; Polsue S Alfieri v. Rush- mer, (1907) A. C. 121 ; 76 .L. J. Ch. 36 ; night working of printing machinery. Heath v. Brighton Corporation, (1908) 98 L. T. 718, electric lighting works — alleged nuisance to church worshippers— injunction refused ; May v. Stoop, (1909) 25 T. L. E. 262 (unavoidable crying of children in nursing charity — iujunction refused). Owners of lands taken conipulsorily are not entitled to compensa,tir,n 380 NUISANCE. noise (t), even though the nuisance be of a temporary character (u), or uses a building as a hospital for infectious diseases whereby the adjoining owners live in perpetual dread of infection (x), or interferes with the quiet enjoyment of the inhabitants of a residential neighbourhood by holding horse-races on Sunday (y), or injures adjacent property by the collection of crowds (z), or by watching and besetting a man's house compels him to do or not to do that which it is lawful for him not to do or to do (a), or causes excessive heat to pass into an adjacent tenement comprised in the same block of buildings (b). Or by screening coal dust injures an adjacent occupier in his trade (c) or by tipping refuse stops up a surface water- course and thus creates a dangerous cavity in a public place (d). And generally a right of action accrues whenever there is a non- natural or exceptional user of property resulting in substantial damage or annoyance to neighbouring residents (e). And this general proposition applies to any act of an individual or corporation which unwarrantably prejudices the existing rights of another party. Where, therefore, a municipal corporation, under a drainage scheme, discharged sewage into tjie sea and thereby polluted an existing oyster bed, it was held that such pollution was illegal (/). Nor is there apparently, at least in Great Britain, any right to the reasonable and proper use of business premises for an admittedly offensive trade when such reasonable user constitutes a substantial nuisance (g), though these latter propositions are subject to certain for loss of amenity by noise, smoke, and vibration on other land not immediatel^i' adjacent to that taken, Holditch v. Canadian Northern Ontario R. Co., (1916) 85 L. J. P. C. 107. (t) Knight v. Isle of Wight Electric Light d Power Co., (1904) 73 L. J. Ch. 299; Bushmer v. Polsue d Alfieri, Ltd., (1905) 21 T. L. E. 183; S. C, (1907) A. C. 121; 76 L. J. Ch. 365; Robinson v. London General Omnibus Co., (1910) 26 T. L. E. 233; Gilling v. Gray, (1910) 27 T. L. E. 39; pile-driving at night, De Keyser's Royal Hotel v. Spicer Bros., (1914) 30 T. L. E. 257. (u) Colwell v. St. Pancras Borough Council, (1904) 1 Ch. 707 ; 73 L. J. Ch. 275; but see contra Clark v. Lloyd's Bank, (1910) 103 L. T. 211. (x) Metropolitan Asylum District v. Hill, (1881) 6 App. Cas. 193 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 353. But see Att.-Gen. v. Nottingham Corporation, (1904) 1 Ch. 673; 73 L. J. Ch. 512; Att.-Gen. v. Rathmines d Pembroke Hospital Board, (1904) 1 Ir. E. 161, C. A. (y) Dewar v. City d Suburban Racecourse Co., (1899) 1 Ir. E. 845. (z) Chase v. London County Council, (1898) 62 J. P. 184. (a) Lyons v. Wilkins, (1899) 1 Ch. 255; 68 L. J. Ch. 146. Peaceful picketing is admissible, see s. 2, Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Bdw. VII. c. 47. (b) Sanders-Clark v. Grosv^nor Mansions Co., (1900) 2 Ch. 373; 69 L. J. Ch. 579. (c) Pwllbach Colliery Co. v. Woodman, (1915) A. C. 634, H. L. (E.) ; 84 L. J. E. B. 874. {d) Priest v. Manchester Corporation, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1734. (e) Eastern Telegraph Co., Ltd. v. Cape Town Tramways Co., Ltd. (1902) A. C. 381; 71 L. J. P. C. 122, P. C. ; Price's Patent Candle Co. v London County Council, (1908) 2 Ch. 626; 78 L. J. Ch. 1, C. A. (/) Hobart v. Southend-on-Sea Corporation, (1906) 22 T. L. E. 307 ; 75 L. J. K. B. 305; compromised in C. A.; 22 T. L. E. 530; Foster v. Warblington Urban Council, (1906) 1 K. B. 648; 76 L. J. K. B. 514; Owen v. Faversham Corporation, (1909) 73 J. P. 33, C. A, (injunction granted). (g) Attorney-General v. Cole, (1901) 1 Ch. 205; 70 L. J. Ch. 148; Attorney- General V. Plymouth Fish Guano and Oil Co., (1912) 76 J. P. 19. LOCALITY HOW FAR MATERIAL. 381 qualifications, discussed in the ensuing pages. But the general requirement that a nuisance, to be actionable, should be substantial, applies with even greater force to cases 'in which the nuisance com- plained of is one causing personal discomfort than where it causes an injury to the land itself. When it is said that a house-owner is entitled to have the air in his house untainted and unpolluted by any acts of his neighbour, by that is meant that he is entitled to have " not necesssirily air as fresh, free and pure as at th© tdm© of building the plaintiff's house the atmosphere then was, but air not rendered to an important degree less compatible, or at least not rendered incompatible, with the physical comfort of human existence " (h). Moreover, the discomfort must be substantial not merely with reference to the plaintiff; it must be of such a degree that it would be substantial to any person occupying the plaintiff's premises, irrespective of his position in life, age, or state of health ; it must be "an inconvenience naturally interfering with the ordinary comfort physically of human existence, not merely according to elegant or dainty modes and habits of living, but according to plain and sober and simple notions among the English people " (t). It was at one time thought that interference with the enjoyment How far of property, produced by the carrying on of a noxious trade, could ^'^^^I'^^i^ not be actionable, however substantial the annoyance might be, if, question of having regard to the public interests, and apart from the con- ""isanee or ° '■ no nuisance, sideration of the individual annoyance to the plaintiff, it was carried on in a convenient place (fc). And it was apparently upon this principle that Lord Hardwicke, in Baines v. Baker (l), refused to grant an injunction to restrain the erection of a smaU-pox hospital in Coldbath Fields, being of opinion that such a hospital must not be far from a town, because those attacked with such a disorder would not be in a condition to be carried far. But that doctrine was overruled by the Exchequer Chamber in Bamford v. Turnley (m), where it was laid down that the mere fact that the place where the trade complained of was carried on was convenient, in the sense that it was for the convenience of the general public that it should be carried on there, was no answer to an action. And the law as so laid down has since been uniformly approved (n.). But although the (h) Per Knight Bruce, V.-C, Walter v. Selfe, (1851) 4 De G-. & Sm. p 321- 21 L. J. Ch. 433; 87 E. E. 393. (i)-Ibid., p. 322. (k) Hole V. Barlow, (1858) 4 C. B. N. S. 334; 27 L. J. C. P. 207. (Z) (1752) Ambl. 168; and see Attorney-General v. Nottingham Corporation, (1904) 1 Ch. 673; 73 L. J. Ch. 512; Attorney-General v. Rathmines d Pembroke Hospital Board, (1904) 1 Ir. E. 161, C. A. But see contra. Metropolitan Asylum District v. Hill, (1881) 6 App. Cas. 193; 50 L. J. Q. B. 353. (m) (1860) 3 B. & S. 62 ; 31 L. J. Q: B. 286 ; 129 E. E. 235. (n).See Shotts Iron Co. v. Inglis, (1882) 7 App. Cas. 518; and Polsue d: Alfieri v. Rushmer, (1907) A. C. 121. As to the quantum of disoomifort which will justify 382 NUISANCE. fact that the locality in which the trade or manufacture complained of is carried on is convenient, in the sense that it is devoted to trades or manufactures of that class, is per se no justification of a person carrying it on to the substantial annoyance of his neighbour, it is nevertheless an element in the case which the jury are bound to take into consideration in determining whether the annoyance amounts to an actionable nuisance. And this is especially the case where the nuisance complained of is one productive only of personal discomfort. A person who lives in the heart of a large manufactur- ing town cannot reasonably expect the same purity of air or freedom from noise as in a secluded country district. " The affairs of life in a dense neighbourhood cannot be carried on without mutual sacrifices of comfort ; and in all actions for discomfort, the law must regard the principle of mutual adjustment; and the notion that the degree of discomfort which might sustain an action under some circumstances must therefore do so under aU circumstances, is as untenable as the notion that, if the act complained of was done in a convenient time and place, it must therefore be justified, what- ever was the degree of annoyance that was occasioned thereby " (o). Thus, Rolfe, B., in an anonymous case (p), where the action was for annoyance arising from smoke in the town of Shields, and it was proved that the smoke did, in some degree cause annoyance to the plaintiff, directed the jury that they " must look at it not with a view to the question whether, abstractedly, that quantity of smoke was a nuisance, but whether it was a nuisance to a person living in the town of Shields." So again in Sturges v. Bridgman (q), where the nuisance complained of was that of a noisy trade, Thesiger, L.J., laid it down that " whether anything is a nuisance or not is a question to be determined, not merely by an abstract consideration of the thing itself, but in reference to its circumstances ; what would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey ; and where a locality is devoted to a particular trade or manufacture carried on by the traders or manufacturers in a particular and established manner not constituting a public nuisance, judges and juries would be justified in finding, and may be trusted to find, that the trade or manufacture so carried on in that locality is not a private or actionable wrong" (r). action, see Adams v. Ursell, (1913) 1 Ch. 269; 82 L. J. Ch. 157, and compare Bedford v. Leeds Corporation, (1913) 77 J. P. 430. (o) Per Erie, C.J., Gavey v. Ledbitter, (1863) 13 C. B. N. S. p. 476; 32 L. J. C. P. 104; 134 E. E. 610. (p) Cited in St. Helens Smelting Co. v. Tipping, (1865) 11 H. L. C. p. 653; 35 L. J. Q. B. 66; 145 E. E. 348. (g) (1879) 11 Ch. D. p. 865 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 785. See too Ball v. Ray, (1873) L. E. 8 Ch. pp. 470, 471. (r) But see Rushmer v. Polsue d Alfieri, (1906) 21 T. L. E. 183; S. C. in House of Lords, (1907) A. C. 121; 76 L. J. Ch. 365; and note Bosworth-Smith v. Gwynnes, (1920) 122 L. T. 15. LOCALITY HOW PAR MATBEIAL. Nor is the question of locality altogether immaterial even in the case of nuisances producing physical damage to property. Thus in St. Helens Smelting Co. v. Tipping (s), where the plaintiff complained of damage caused to his trees by the noxious fumes from the defendant's smelting works, the judge was held to have rightly directed the jury that they were bound to take into consideration, along with the other circumstances, the fact that the locus in quo was situate in the middle of a manufacturing district studded with tall chimneys, and that there were several alkali works in the immediate vicinity of the plaintiff's property. Still the character of the neighbourhood is less material in such a case than in one of miere personal discomfort. " The submission which is required from persons living in society to that amount of discomfort which may be necessary for the legitimate" and free exercise of the trade of their neighbours, would not apply to circumstances the immediate result of which is sensible injury to the value of property " (t), especially as it may be laid down as a general proposition that a " reasonable " nuisance has no existence in law (u). So again in the case of a user involving interference with water rights, ancient lights, or other easements, the degree of interference which will be actionable will to so^me limited extent probably depend upon the nature of the locality. Thus, although in general a proprietor of land on the bank of a natural stream may complain if a higher riparian owner, in using the water for Extraordinary (as opposed to domestic) purposes, diminishes the volume or purity to a substantial extent (x), yet it has been doubted whether owing to the development of trade in a particular district, the use of water in such district for trade purposes may not under certain circum- stances be regarded as an ordinary user (y), so as to disentitle a lower owner to complain even of a sensible diminution in the supply. And it may also be doubted whether the fact of the district being devoted to trades may not also diminish to some extent the degree of purity to which the lower riparian owners will be entitled. Still at the most it can only be an element in the case (z). On the other hand, where it was attempted to be set up as a defence to an action against a higher riparian owner for discharging soapsuds into the (s) (1865) 11 H. L. C. 642; 35 L. J. Q. B. 66; 145 E. E. 348. (t) Per Lord Westbury, (1865) 11 H. L. C, at p. 650; 35 L. 3. Q. B. 66; 145 '(u)' Attorney-General v. Cole, (1901) 1 Ch. 205; 70 L. J Ch. 148. (x) Roberts v. Fellowes, (1906) 94 L. T. 279. (y) Per Brett, M.E., Ormerod v. Todmorden Mill Co., (1883) 11 Q. B. D. p. 168; 62 L. J. Q. B. 445; and see especially Attorney-General v. Birmingham, Tame £ Rea District Drainage Board, (1908) 2 Ch. 551 ; 77 L. J. Ch. 836. (z) A plea that the defendants " were using every reasonably practicable and available means of rendering the pollutions harmless " has been held no defence, Midlothian County Council v. Pumpherston Oil Co., Ltd., (1904) 6 P. 387, Ct. of 383 384 NUISANCE. stream, that the plaintiSs had suffered no damage because the water, before it reached the defendants' mill, was already so polluted by other mills and dye-works higher up the stream, that the pollution by the defendants did not make the water less applicable to useful purposes than it was before, the Court held that this fact afforded no defence, for " the defendants, by continuing the practice for twenty years, might establish the right to the easement of dis- charging into the stream the foul water from their works (a). If the dye-works and other manufactories, and other sources of pollution above the plaintiffs, should be afterwards discontinued, the plaintiffs, who would otherwise have had in that case pure water, would be compellable to submit to this nuisance, which then would do serious damage to them " (b). So, again, in dealing with the question whether an obstruction of light is sufficiently substantial to amount to an actionable nuisajace, the locality in which the house is situate is a matter which may be considered. The authorities, however, on the subject are conflicting. In Clarke v. Clark (c) Lord Cranworth is reported to have said that " persons who live in towns, and more especially in large cities, cannot expect to enjoy continually the same unobstructed volumes of light and air as faU to the lot of those who live in the country," and that the Court will take the fact of the house being so situate in a populous town into consideration in estimating the dama^g© caused by obstructing an ancient light. But in the subsequent case of Yates v. Jack (d), the same judge took the opposite view, and referred to the fact of the Prescription Act having expressly repealed the customs of certain cities, whereby the owners of houses were permitted to raise their houses and thereby obstruct their neighbours;' Ughts with impunity, as indicating that in the opinion of the Legislature no distinction in this respect was to be drawn between towns and country districts. And this latter view was adopted by Page-Wood, V.-C, in Dent v. Auction Mart Co. (e), where he treated the dictum in Clarke v. Clark as overruled. In Kelk V. Pearson (/), however, James, L.J., seems to have preferred the case of Clarke v. Clark, and to have intimated that the Court would have been less ready to interfere with a similar degree of obstruction of light occurring in a street in the city of London, where the defendant was using his house for city purposes, than (a) See in this connection, Waltham Cross Urban District Council v. Lea Conservancy Board, (1910) 103 L. T. 192, and cases mentioned therein. (b) Wood V. Waud, (1849) 3 Bxoh. 748; 18 L. J. Ex. 305; 77 E. E. 809; Crossley v. Lightowler, (1867) L. E. 2 Ch. 478; 36 L. J. Ch. 584. See also Harrington (Earl of) v. Corporation of Derby, (1905) 1 Ch. 205; 74 L J. Ch. 219. (c) (1865) L. E. 1 Ch. p. 18 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 151. (d) (1866) L. E. 1 Ch. 299; 35 L. J. Oh. 539. (e) (1866) L. E. 2 Bq. 238 ; 85 Li. J. Ch. 555. (/) (1871) L. E. 6 Ch. 809. SPECIAL DAMAGE. 385 in the case before them, which was that of open building land at Netting Hill. It has, however, been held by the Court of Appeal, in the more recent case of Warren v. Brown (g), that the question of position or environment is of secondary importance in oases where an occupier of business premises in a crowded neighbourhood, who requires for the particular purposes of his trade an exceptional amount of light, has enjoyed such an easement for the requisite statutory period. It has been decided that the maintenance in a house of an Kuisanoe ordinary kitchen stove, the heat of which rendered the cellar of *™™ ^^^^ °^ . . stove, the adjoining house unfit for storing wine, was restrainable as a nuisance (h)', notwithstanding that the judge found that the defendants in maintaining the stove were making a reasonable use of their house. But the correctness of that decision may be doubted, although there can be no " reasonable use " of that which is found, as a fact, to constitute an actionable nuisance (i). It is apprehended that the question as to whether the passage of heat from one house to another amounts to a nuisance or not, must depend entirely upon the amount of the heat, and not upon the peculiar use to which the plaintiS chooses to devote his premises (k). The fact of a nuisance being temporary only is no answer to an Temporary action for damages, if the nuisance is in other respects substantial (I), nuisance. Thus, a nuisance caused by brick-burning cannot be justified on the ground that it is only temporary in order to build a house on the land (m), though the temporary character of the nuisance may be ground for refusing an injunction (n). Although for a pubhc nuisance (o), so. far as it afiects the public Special generally, the proper remedy is indictment, yet an individual who ^^^^^ ^°^ suffers from especial damage in greater degi-ee. than the rest of the nuisance king's subjects may have an action in respect of that special ^'''^°°^'''^' damage (,p). (g) (1902) 1 K. B. 15; 71 L. J. K. B. 12. But see Colls v. Home i Colonial Stores, (1904) A. C. 179; 20 T. L. B. 475; 73 L. J. Ch. 484, H. L. ; and ante, p. 377. (h) Bernhardt v. Mentasti, (1899) 42 Ch. D. 685 ; 58 L. J. Cli. 787. (i) Attorney-General v. Cole, (1901) 1 Ch. 205; 70 L. J. Ch. 148; and see Knight v. Isle of Wight Electric Light Co., (1904) 73 L. J. Ch. 299. (k) Sanders-Clark v. Grosvenor Mansions Co., (1900) 2 Ch. 373; 69 L. J. Ch. 579. As to whether motive can ever make a nuisance actionable where it would not otherwise be so, see above, pp. 16, 17. (0 Colwell V. St. Pancras Borough Council, (1904) 1 Ch. 707; 73 L. J. Ch. 275. (m) Per Bramwell, B., Bamford v. Turnley, (1860) 3 B. & S. p. 84; 31 L. J. Q. B. 286 ; 129 R. R. 235. (n) Duke of Grafton v. Hilliard, (1736) cited in Att.-Oen. v. Cleaver, (1811) 18 Ves. p. 219; Swaine v. Great Northern R. Co., (1864) 4 De G. J. & S. 211; 33 L. J. Ch. 399; 146 R. R. 283; Harrison v. Southwarh d Vauxhall Water Co., (1891) 2 Ch. 409; 60 L. J. Ch. 630. In the last case indeed damages were claimed as ancillary to the injunction, but no damage was proved. , (o) As to what constitutes a public nuisance, see below, p. 4(X). (p) Iveson V. Moore, (1699) Lord Raym. 486. As to the quantum of special c.T. 25 386 NUISANCE. What is sufficient special damage. And it is submitted that this latter proposition (as to the right of a member of the pubho to maintain action) is not aSeoted by the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Toronto Railway v. Begem (q), in which it was held that a railway company running tramoars along the streets of a town under an agreement with the corporation, which agreement contained a provision as to over-crowd- ing — was not guilty of a common nuisance by allowing their cars to be over-crowded — their obligation being a contractual obligation to the corporation and not a duty to the public generally. In Iveson v. Moore (r), where the plaintiff was prevented by the defendant's obstruction of the highway from using the way for carting coals from his colliery, and the coal was deteriorated by the delay, the special damage was held sufficient to support the action, it being the primary object of a public highway to afford free passage to the public (s). So, too, in Mayn^ll v. Saltmarsh (t), where the plaintiff was prevented by the defendant's obstruction from carrying his corn, whereby the com was damaged by the rain; in Hart v. Basset {u), where the plaintiff, a farmer of tithes, was prevented by the defendant's obstruction from carrying them home; and in Rose v. Miles (x), where the plaintiff, being prevented from navigating his barges on a public navigable creek, was obliged to convey his goods overland at considerable expense, the actions were held to be maintainable. If by reason of some obstruction the access from the highway to the plaintiff's premises abutting thereon be cut off, and the value of the premises be consequently diminished, such deprivation of access , will be sufficient special damage (y). And the same principle applies to a navigable river. A riparian proprietor on such a river, in addition to the right connected with navigation to which he is entitled as one of the public, has, in virtue of his property, a right of access to the stream, for an interference with which an action wiU lie («). Where the plaintiff kept a cofiee-house in a narrow street, and the defendants caused horses and vap.s to stand in the street outside the door of damage which will constitute a ground of action see Mayo v. Seaton Urban District Council, (1904) 68 J. P. 7. (q) (1917) 86 L. J. P. C. 195. (t) Supra. (s) Att.-Gen. v. Brighton d Hove Co-operative Supply Association, (1900) 1 Ch. 276 ; 69 L. J. Ch. 204. (t) (1665J 1 Keb. 847. («) (1681) T, Jones, 156. (x) (1815) 4 M. & S. 101; 16 E. E. 405. See cases collected in judgment of Erie, C.J., in Ricket v. Metropolitan R. Co., (1864-5) 5 B. & S. p. 159; 34 L. J. Q. B. 257. (y) Metropolitan Board of Works v. McCaHhy, (1874) L. E. 7 H. L. 243; 43 L. J. C. P. 385. And see Great Eastern Ry. £ London County Council, In re, (1908) 72 J. P. 1, C. A. (z) Lyon v. Fishmongers' Co., (1876) 1 App. Cas. 662; 46 L. J. Ch. 68. SPECIAL DAMAGE FHOM PUBLIC NUISANCE. the plaintiff's shop for an unreasonable length of time, so that the access to his shop was obstructed and his custom fell off in con- sequence, he was held entitled to maintain an action (a). But mere personal inconvenience caused by the plaintiff being delayed by an obstruction in the high-road, without pecuniary damage, wiU not sufBce {b) ; nor is it enough that the plaintiff has been put to expense in exercising his right of abating the obstruction (c). And it is immaterial that the degree of personal inconvenience suffered may be in excess of that suffered by the rest of the public, for the Court cannot enter into the consideration of the quantum (d). Lord Penzance's dictum in MetropoUtan Board of Works v. MoCa-rthy (e), that to entitle a person to an action for obstruction of a highway the damage suffered by him need not be different in kind from that suffered by his fellow-subjects, provided it be more than that suffered by them, seems hardly consistent with the authorities. In Hubert v. Groves (/), where by reason of an obstruction the plaintiff was. compelled to carry his goods by a circuitous route, but no proof of any pecuniary loss resulting therefrom was given, the plaintiff was nonsuited. And in Chaplin v. Westminster Corporation (g) it was held that the erection of an electric standard in a public thoroughfare, opposite to the plaintiff's premises, whereby the transit of merchandise, from'vans to warehouse across the public pathway, was impeded, afforded no ground for action. And it has been decided that a tradesman whose shop abuts on a thronged highway, is entitled, during business hours, to load and unload goods from vans, and transport them, across a crowded foot- path in spite of some evidence that the transit of the goods across the footway seriously interferes with the user thereof by the public (h). Even if the plaintiff do suffer actual pecuniary damage from an obstruction of a highway, still he cannot bring an action for it unless that damage be the direct consequence of the obstruction. The fact that by reason of an obstruction, which does not interfere with the plaintiff's access from his premises to the street, the public traffic is diverted into another street, and the public in consequence cease to resort to his shop, whereby his profits fall off, is too remote to (a) Benjamin v. Storr, (1874) L. E. 9 C. P. 400 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 162. See too Rose V. Groves, (1843) 5 M. & G. 613; 12 L. J. C. P. 251; 63 E. E. 415; and see Great Eastern B. Co. S London County Council, In re, (1908) 72 J. P. 1. (6) Winterbottom v. Lord Derby, (1867) L. E. 2 Ex. 316; 36 L. J. Ex. 194. (c) (1867) L. E. 2 Ex. 316 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 194. (d) Caledonian R. Co, v. Ogilvie, (1856) 2 Macq. 229; and see Mayo v. Seaton Urban District Council, (1904) 68 J. P. 7. (e) (1874) L. E. 7 H. L. p. 263; 43 L. J. C, P. 385. (/) (1794) l.Esp. 148. ig) Chaplin d Co. v. Westminster Corporation, (1901) 2 Ch 329 ; 70 L. J, Ch, 679. (h) Att.-Gen. v. W. H. Smith d Son, (1910) 26 T. L. E. 482, C. A. 387 388 NUISANCE. Obstructions to highway. Misfeasance and non- feasance. form a ground of action (i). The directness of the damage will in such case depend upon the distance at which the point of diversion of traffic is from the plaintiff's door (fc). Any one who creates a source of danger upon a highway, as by digging a trench across it, or placing a log or pile of stones in the middle of the roadway, or driving piles into the bed of a navigable river, is responsible in damages to any member of the public who, while using the highway, without notice of the danger, suffers any injury by reason of the dangerous obstruction (l). And a like rule has been held to apply to an unguarded truck on a temporary line of rails (m). And this rule may be enlarged so as to include the case of any person or public authority, who having undertaken a duty, so negligently does or so negligently omits to do some act, the due and diligent performance of which is essential, as to cause injury to that person or to those persons towards whom the duty is owed (n-). Moreover, if the performance of the duty be omitted, the fact of such person or corporation having intrusted it to a person who also neglected it, furnishes no excuse to the principal or principals (o), either in good sense or law. Or in other words this responsibility is not confined to the actual tort-feasor, even though he be an independent contractor, it having been held ' ' that when a person employs a contractor to do work in a f)lace where the public are in the habit of passing, which work will, unless precautions are taken, cause danger to the public, an obhgation is thrown upon the person who orders the work to be done to see that the necessary precautions are taken, and if the necessary precautions are not taken, he cannot escape liability by seeking to throw the blame on the contractor " (p). Further, the occupier of premises immediately adjoining a highway is under a positive obligation to prevent them from getting into such a condition as to be dangerous to passengers in the highway. Thus to permit a house abutting on a highway to be ruinous and likely to fall down is a public nuisance (g), and if any portion of the house fall and injure a passer-by an action lies. Again, it has been held to be negligence, sounding in damages, in case of accident, for a railway company to omit to provide a (i) Per Lord Chelmsford, Ricket v. Metropolitan R. Co., (1864-7) L. E. 2 H. L. p. 196; 36 L. J. Q. B. 205. The. earlier case of Wilkes v. Hungerford Market Co., (1835) 2 Biug. N. C. 281, contra, must be regarded as no longer law. (k) Cp. Ricket v. Metropolitan B. Co., (1864-7) L. E. 2 H. L. 175; 36 L. J. Q. B. 205, with Benjamin v. Storr, (1874) L. B. 9 C.-P. 400; 43 L. J. C. P. 162. (I) Gould V. Birkenhead Corporation, (1910) 8 L. E. G. 395. (m) Harris v. Perry, (1903) 2 K. B. 219; 72 L. J. K. B. 725, C. A. in) McClelland v. Manchester Corporation, (1911) 28 T. L. E. 21. (o) Mersey Dock Trustees v. Gihhs, (1866) L. E. 1 H. L. 93, note especially p. 114; 35 L. J. Ex. 225; see also Jackson v. London County Council and Chappel, (1911) 28 T. L. E. 66. (p) Penny v. Wimbledon Urban Council, (1898) 2 Q. B., Bruce, J., at p. 217; 67 L. J. Q. B. 754; affirmed (1899) 2 Q. B. 72; 68 L. J. Q. B. 704. But see contra, Hurlstone v. London Electric R. Co., (1914) 30 T. L. B. 398, C. A. (q) Reg. v. Watts, (1703) 1 Salk. 357. NUISANCE TO HIGHWAY. 389 screen at an exit from their station which was especially exposed to danger from sparks emitted by passing engines (r). And in like manner the emission of sparks from a steam locomotive engine traversing a highway constitutes (even in the absence of negligence) an actionable nuisance in the event of damage resulting therefrom (s). Whether an obstruction of a highway is of such a degree as to amount to a nuisance is in each case a question of fact for the jury. It is no answer to a complaint of a nuisance by obstructing a public highway that the obstruction is for the convenience of the public generally. Thus a tramway in a town may be of great convenience to the general public, but if it be laid down without the statutory authority, the owners will be liable for any damage it may cause to vehicles using the way (i) ; so, too, the projection of a quay into a public harbour to the hindrance of the navigation, is none the less a nuisance because that hindrance is counterbalanced by the advan- tages afforded by the quay in respect of other uses of the harbour (it). If, again, the occupier of the adjoining land wilfully and with Dangerous conusance (x) suffer an' excavation immediately adjacent to the high- ^dtoiSna'^ way to be unfenoed so as to be dangerous to persons using the way, high-road. he wiU be responsible as for a nuisance (y). But the excavation must be substantially adjoining the way, " so that a person walking upon it might by making a false step, or being affected with sudden giddiness, or in the case of a horse or carriage way, by the sudden starting of a horse, be thrown into the excavation " (z). When the excavation is made some distance from the way, so that the person falling into it would be a trespasser upon the defendant's land before he reached it, the case is different, and for an accident happening . under such circumstances there is no remedy (a). The excavation must substantially adjoin the highway; it is not enough that the (r) Atherton v. London d North-Western R. Co., (1905) 21 T. L. E. 671, C. A. (s) Mansel v. Wehb, (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 323. (t) Reg. V. Train, (1862) 2 B. & S. 640; 31 L. J. M. C. 169; 127 E. E. 513. («) Rex V. Ward, (1836) 4 A. & E. 384; 5 L. J. K. B. 221; 43 R. E. 364. See also, as to duty of harbour-master to warn, Robertson v. Portpatrick d Wigtonshire Joint Committee, (1919) S. C. 293 (Ct. of Sess.). (x) Barker v. Herbert, (1911) 2 K. B. 633; 80 L. J. K. B. 1829, C. A. (y) Barnes v. Ward, (1850) 9 C. B. 392; 19 L. J. C. P. 195; 82 E. E. 375. On the same principle it may be questioned -whether, where yew trees grow on land immediately adjoining a highway, even though they do not project over the boundary, there is not a duty on the owner to fence them so as to prevent cattle passing along the highway from browsing on them. See per Collins, J., in Panting v. Noakes, (1894) 2 Q. B. p. 291 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 549, and d fortiori this obligation exists when they do project over : Smith v. Giddy, (1904) 2 K. B. 448; 73 L. J. K. B. 894. (z) Hardcastle v. South Yorkshire R. Co., (1859) 4 H. & N. p. 74; 28 L. J. Ex. 139; 118 E. R. 331; and see Devlin v. Jeffrey's Trustees, (1902) 5 F. 130, (Ct. of Sess.). (a) Hardcastle v. South Yorkshire R. Co., infra; but see Lowery v. Walker, (1911) A. C. 10; 80 L. J. K. B. 138, H. L. (E.). 390 NUISANCE. Barbed wire. Objects causing fear to horses. Creosote on highways. jury think it dangerous (b). In one case, where a canal company made a canal parallel to a public footway, but separated from it by an open strip of land twenty-four feet wide over which there was no right of way, it was held that the canal did not substantially adjoin the footpath, and that the company were consequently under no obligation to fence it (c). Under certain exceptional circumstances, however, the liability for not fencin'g may be independent of the question whether the source of danger substantially adjoins the high-road, as, for example, in the case of a chalk pit (d) or quarry (e) or where the locus in quo is the site of a former public way which has been diverted, and no gate has been placed across the entrance to the old way so as to indicate to passers-by that it has ceased to be a public thoroughfare (/) ; but the liability in such a case seems to be founded upon the implied representation that the locus in quo is a public road, and as such may be safely used (g). The use of barbed wire as a fence to land so immediately adjoin- ing a highway as to be likely to injure persons or animals lawfully using the highway is a nuisance (h). Again, it is a nuisance to leave upon the side of a public way (?'), or eveni upon private land immediately adjoining the way (fc), any unusual object calculated to frighten horses passing along the road, and if a horse shies at such object, and damage results, the party placing the object in such position will be responsible. The fact that other horses besides the plaintiff's have shied at the particular object complained of is admissible in Evidence to show that the object was likely to inspire fear, and as such was a public nuisan'ce (I). It is moreover a nuisance, sounding in damages to any person thereby injured, for either an individual or a corporation (when there is an alternative, though possibly more expensive, article procurable) to employ any noxious substance or thing upon a public highway. Nor will the fact that the corporation using the harmful substance is invested with statutory powers excuse them from liability. Where, therefore, a tramway company who were required by their (b) Hardcastle v. South Yorkshire R. Co., (1859) 4 H. & N. 67 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 139 ; 118 E. E. 331. (c) Binks v. South Yorkshire R. Co., (1862) 3 B. & S. 244; 32 L. J. Q. B. 26; 129 E. E. 317. See also Latham v. Johnson, (1913) 1 K. B. 398, C. A. ; 82 L. J. K. B. 258. (d) Carshalton Urban Council v. Burrage, (1911) 2 Ch. 133; 80 L. J. Ch. 500. (e) M'Morrow v. Layden, (1919) 2 Ir. E. 398. (/) Burst V. Taylor, (1885) 14 Q. B. D. 918 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 310. ig) See in this connection, McClelland v. Manchester Corporation, (1911) 28 T. L. E. 21. (h) See the Barbed Wire Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 32 (i) Wilkins v. Day, (1883) 12 Q. B. D. 110 ; Harris v. Mobbs, (1878) 3 Ex. D. 268. (k) Brown v. Eastern d Midland R. Co., (1889) 22 Q. B. D. .391; 58 L. 3. Q. B. 212. (0 Ibid. NUISANCE TO HIGHWAY. 391 special Act to lay down wood pavement laid down creosoted soft wood blocks instead of hard wood blocks, and thereby destroyed the plants and flowers growing in the plaintifi's nursery garden, it was held that neither the circumstance that at the time when they used the creosoted wood they were unaware of its noxious character, nor the fact that they were acting under statutory powers exonerated them from liabiHty (w.). Although, if premises adjoining a highway be caused or permitted Dedication by their occupier to be in a condition dangerous to persons using the ° u^'^tTo^ way, and such dangerous condition first came into existence after existing the way had be^ii dedicated to the public, the occupier will be °"i^*™®- responsible for any damage that may result, yet if the existence of the source of danger was prior to or contemporajieous with the dedication of the highway, " the dedication must be taken to be made to the public, and accepted by them subject to the incon- venience or risk arising from the existing state of things " (n). Therefore where the defendant occupied a house and a cellar in a public street, and the flap of the cellar projected slightly above the footway, and had so projected as long as living menlory went back, and the plaintiff stimibled over the flap in the dark and was injured, the defendant was held not liable, on the groimd that the jury ought to infer that the cellar had existed in that condition as long as the street, and that consequently there was nothing wrongful 'in main- taining it in such condition (o). Again, a highway inay be dedicated to the pubhc subject to a pre-existing right of user by the occupiers of the adjoining land for the purpose of depositing goods on it (p) ; but the mere fact that they have been accustomed as far back as , living memory extends to make such use of the highway does not raise a conclusive presumption that the commencement of the user was anterior to the dedication; such presumption as it afiords is liable to be rebutted by the other circumstances of the case (5). It appears, however, that there is no evidence of dedication where when the user of a way by the public is, owing to particular circumstances, dangerous necessarily subordinated to an anterior private use fraught with highway especial danger to passengers. Where, however, there is no such precludes special danger an' attempt to close a way subsequently to dedication will be restrained by injunction (r). (to) West V. Bristol Tramways Co., (1908) 2 K. B. 14; 77 L. J. K. B. 684, G. A. (n) Per Blackburn, J., Fisher v. Prowse, (1862) 2 B. & S. p. 780; 31 L. J. Q. B. 212; 127 K. E. 547. And compare Papworth v. Battersea Corporation (No. 2), (1915) W. N. 409, C. A. ; and see S. C. 84 L. J. K. B. 1881. (0) Fisher v. Prowse, (1862) 2 B. & S. 770; 31 L. J. Q. B. 212; 127 E. E. 547. See too Cooper v. Walker, (1862) 2 B. & S. 773; 31 L. J. Q. B. 212 ; 127 E. E. 547. (p) Per Cur., Morant v. Chamberlain, (1861) 6 H. & N. p. 564; 30 L. J. Ex. 299; 123 E. E. 672; Le Neve v. Vestry of Mile End Old Town, (1858) 8 E. & B. 1054; 27 L. J. Q. B. 208 ; 112 E. E. 890. (g) Morant v. Chamberlain, (1861) 6 H. & N. 541; 30 L. J. Ex. 299; 123 R R 672 (r) Att.-Oen. v. London S South Western R. Co., (1905) 69 J. P. 110. 392 KUISANCE. Further rules as to dedication. Defective gratings, coal- plates, &c., in pavement. It may, however, be pointed out that there can be no efiectual dedication to the public by a lessee or termor even though the lessee may have acquiesced in certain acts of the local authority which had he been the freeholder of the land would have constituted strong evidence of dedication (s). Nor will the fact of the user of a cul de sac by persons traversing it for the purpose of committing a trespass on private land immediately abutting thereon raise any presumption of dedication (f). And where there is no public right of way an overt act by a mem- ber of the public, on private lajid, which is justifiable only on the ground of dedication may be restrained by injunction (m). Where, however, there is evidence of dedication it is very doubtful if a partial or qualified dedication is possible in law, the dedication must either be absolute or non-existent (au). And if the proof of dedication be positive no particular time is necessary, it is not like a grant, presumed from length of time, con- sequently if the act of dedication be unequivocal it may take place immediately (j/).' Where the area or basement of a house in a public street receives its access of light and air through a grating in the footway, such grating having been placed there contemporaneously with the dedica- tion of the street, the occupier of the house is under no obligation to keep the grating in repair if it be permanently fixed in the pavement so that he has no control over it, for under such circumstances the grating forms part of the pavement of the highway, and the high- way authority are bound to repair it just as much as any other part of the pavement. Consequently, if by reason of such a grating being defective a passer-by fall through and sustain injury, the occupier of the house for the benefit of which the grating exists is not respon- sible (a). And the same rule as to non -liability has been held to apply to an. iron carriage plate fixed over a gutter (a). But if the grating be movable and under the control of the occupier of the house, as where it is used for the purpose of affording access to a cellar, he will be bound to repair it (b), and if he fail to do so will be liable for the consequences. The same rule applies to the case of an ordinary coal plate (c). (s) CoTselUs V. London County Council, (1907) 1 Ch. 13; 77 L. J. Ch. 120, C. A. (t) Kirhy v. Paignton Urban Council, (1913) 1 Ch. 337; 82 L. J. Ch. 198. (u) Hampstead Garden Suburb v. Denbow, (1913) 77 J. P. 318. (x) Tottenham Urban Council v. Rowley, (1912) 2 Ch. 633, C. A. ; approving dictum in Woodyer v. Hodder, (1813) 5 Taunt. 125 at p. 137. (y) Att.-Gen. v. Hemingway, (1917) 81 J. P. 112, and cases therein referred to. (z) Bobbins v. Jones, (1863) 15 C. B. N. S. 221; 33 L. J. C. P. 1; 137 E. E. 475; Horridge v. Makinson, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1294. (a) Jones v. Rew, (1910) 103 L. T. 165, C. A. (b) Gwinnell v. Earner, (1875) L. E-. 10 C. P. 658. (c) Pretty v. Bickmore, (1873) L. E. 8 C. P. 401; and see 57 Geo. III. c. cxxix., s. 7, M. A. Taylor's Act, 1817. NUISANCE TO HIGHWAY. 393 To the general rule that an action will lie for any special damage Nuisance caused by a nuisance in a highway there is an exception where the Qo™£)a^r of nuisance arises from the non-repair of, the road (d), provided the highway, work was carried out with reasonable care and skill (e). As already, pointed out (/), in rural districts the duty to repair the highways rests on the rural district council (g), in urban districts on the urban district council (h), in boroughs on the corporation or council of the borough, and in the Metropolis by virtue of the London Govern- ment Act, 1899 (i), on the Metropolitan borough councils, with the exception, in the last ease, of the Thames Embankment, respon- sibility for the repair of which rests on the London County Council as successor to the Metropolitan Board of Works (fe). Prior to the enactment of the Local Government Act, 1894, and the other statutes referred to above, the duty to repair the highways rested ordinarily upon the parish, and for a breach of that duty the only remedy was an indictment of the inhabitants. Probably this liability to indictment is now transferred to district councils (l), by s. 25 of the Local Government Act, but if this be not so the liability of the inhabitants still continues. Apparently no action for damage result- ing from non-repair wiU lie against either the inhabitants (m), their surveyor (n), or the district council. And the same immunity from action which attaches to the surveyor at common law attaches also to the corporate highway authority, to whom under the London Government Act, 1899, or the Local Government Act, 1894, the duties of the surveyor are transferred (o). Where, therefore, in con- sequence of the wearing away of the roadway, some hard substance, such as a fireplug, which has been lawfully placed in the highway, and which was originally level with the surface of the highway, is caused to project above the surface so as to be a nuisance, a passenger who suffers injury by falling over it has been held to have no remedy by action against any one (p). Nor does it make any difference in this (d) A failure to clean out a ditch by the roadside is non-feasance and not misfeasance, Irving v. Carlisle Rural Council, (1907) 5 L. G. E. 776. Bulging of wood blocks in a road after heavy rain is non-feasance : Moul v. Croydon Corpora- tion, (1918) 119 L. T. 318. (e) PapwoHh v. Battersea Corporation (No. 2), (1916) 1 K. B. 583, C. A. if) P. 31. (3) 56 & & 57 Vict. c. 78, s. 25. Ih) Ibid., s. 21; and see Public Health Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 65, s. 144. (i) 62 & 63 Vict. c. 14. (k) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 41, s. 40 (sub-s. 8). (I) For indictment of a corporation, see Reg. v. Corporation of Southport, (1901) 65 J. P. 184; see also Rex v. Crompton Urban Council, (1902) 86 L. T. 762. (m) Russell v. Men of Devon, (1788) 2 T. E. 667; 1 E. E. 585; Maguire v. Liverpool Corporation, (1905) 1 K. B. 767; 74 L. J. K. B. 369, C. A. ' («) Young v. Davis, (1862) 7 H. & N. 760; 31 L. J. Ex. 250; 126 E. E. 686. (o) Holloway v. Birmingham Corporation, (1905) 69 J. P. 358. (p) Moore v. Lambeth Waterworks Co., (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 462; 55 L. J. Q. B. 304; Papworth v. Battersea Corporation, (No. 2), (1916) 1 K. B. 583, C. A.; Great Central R. Co. v. Hewlett, (1916) 2 A. C. 611 H. L. (E.) ; but see Hartley v. Rochdale Corporation, (1908) 2 K. B. 594 ; 77 L. J. K. B. 884, Div. 394 NUISANCE. respect that the highway authority happen, also in some other character to be owners of the projecting substance [q). And a fortiori this is the rule when the dangerous projection is the result of the malicious act of a third party (r). Where, however, the foreign sub- stance becomes a nuisance, not by reason of the soil wearing away, but by reason of itself becoming defective, its owners are responsible for any damage that may arise from its defective condition, and none the less so because the ovmers happen to be the local authority who have charge of the repair of the roads (s). In Chapman v. Fylde Waterworks Go. (<) the stopcock of a service pipe leading from the defendants' main' to a house was protected by a guard-box let into the pavement, the hinge of which box got out of repair, whereby a passer-by tripped over it and was injured. The apparatus could not be repaired without breaking up, the pavement. It was held that whether the apparatus was the property of the defendants or riot, as they alone had power to break up the street for purposes of repairing the apparatus, they were responsible for the injury (u). And a similar responsibility, on the ground of mis- feasance, as opposed to non-feasance, devolves on a local authority when, subsequently to breaking up a highway, they restore its sur- face in such a negligent and perfunctory manner as to render it, after a few days, dangerous for ordinary traflSc (a;). The terms extraordinary and excessive traffic signify a carriage of articles over a highway, on either one or more occasions so exceptional in the quality or quantity of articles carried or in the mode or time of user of the road, as substantially to alter and (q) Thompson v.l Mayor, dc, of Brighton, (1894) 1 Q. B. 332; 63 L. J. Q. B. 181 ; overruling Kent v. Worthing Local Board, (1882) 10 Q. B. D. 118 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 77. (r) Simpson v. Metropolitan. Water Board, (1917) 15 L. G. E. 629. (s) White V. Hindley Local Board, (1875) L. E. 10 Q. B 219; 44 L. J. Q. B. 114 (grid of sewer giving vray) ; Blackmore v. Vestry of Mile End Old Town, (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 451; 51 L. J. Q. B. 496 (flap of water-meter worn smooth and slippery); Bathurst Corporation v. Macpherson, (1879) 4 A, C. 256; 48 L. J. P. C. 61, P. C. (defective barrel drain). (t) (1894) 2 Q. B. 599; 64 L. J. Q. B. 15. See also Batt v. Metropolitan Water Board, (1911) 27 T. L. E. 579; 70 L. J. K. B. 1354, C. A.; Mist v. Metropolitan Water Board, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 2041 ; Rosenbaum v. Metro- politan Water Board, (1911) 27 T. L. E. 103, C. A, ; in the former of these cases it was held by the Court of Appeal that s. 8 of the Metropolitan Water Board (Charges) Act, 1907, ch. clxxi., being retrospective, the obligation to keep in repair all stopcocks and other fittings is shifted from the Metropolitan Water Board to the owner or occupier of the premises. (u) See also on this point, Osborne v. Metropolitan Water Board, (1910) 26 T. L. E. 283. ■ ^ (x) Bull V. Shoreditch Borough, (1903) 67 J. P. 37 ; 1 L. G. E. 5l, C. A.; affirmed sub norri. Shoreditch Corporation v. Bull, (1904) 90 L. T. 210, H. L. ; and see Clements v. Tyrone County Council, (1905) 2 Ir. E. 542, C. A. ; for cases of non-feasance see Maguire v. Liverpool Corporation, (1905) 1 K. B. 767; 74 L. -J. K. B. 369, C. A.; Holloway v. Birmingham Corporation, (1905) 3 L. G. E. 878. EXTRAORDINARY TRAFFIC.' 395 increase the burden imposed by ordinary traffic on the road and thereby cause damage and expense beyond what is common (y). In the case of nuisances created on pubho highways by extra- Extra- ordinary and excessively heavy traffic (z) coming within the above l^^^^^^J^ definition, it may be laid down as a general — though not universal (a) highways. — proposition that an injunction wiU not be granted against the tortious user of a road when the authority responsible for its repair are guilty of contributory negligence by omitting to execute necessary repairs (b). Nor will an action for damages, for extraordinary user of a highway, lie under the Locomotive Acts (c) until the local authority have reinstated the road and executed the necessary repairs (d). But where these conditions are fulfilled the local authority is entitled to proceed against the person using the roads for extra- ordinary traffic (e) ; provided the damage has been such as to entail additional and extraordinary expenditure. It may, however, be laid down as a general proposition that " extraordinary " traffic remains extraordinary until the road is adapted for it (/), although it is a rather difficult question to decide as to when and under what conditions a class of traffic which was originally " extraordinary " and " abnormal " becomes by con- stant user " ordinary " upon a road adapted to bear it. It seems, in order to effect such transformation, that it is not only the character of the traffic or the method of haulage which must be considered, but also the fact that the traffic has become "ordinary " in the sense that it is ordinarily to be seen upon that road, and may be expected thereon as a regular constituent of the traffic (g). (y) Weston-super-Mare U. D. G. v. Butt, (1919) 2 Ch. 1, C. A.; 88 L. J. Ch. 249. {z) For recent decisions with regard to extraordinary traffic see Bromley Rural Council V. Croydon Corporation, (1908) 1 K. B. 353; 77 L. J. K. B. 335; Geirionydd Rural Council v. Green, (1908) 6 L. G. E. 753; Shepton Mallet Rural Council V. Wainwright, (1908) 24 T. L. E. 894; Reigate Rural Council v. Sutton District Water Co., (1908) 99 L. T. 168; Rex v. Bath County Court Judge, (1908) 1 K. B. 958; 77 L. J. K. B. 402, Div. (o) Hemsworth Rural Council v. Micklethwaite, (1904) 68 J. P. 345 (an action for damages). And see generally Barnsley British Co-operative Society v. Worsborough Urban District Council, (1916) 1 A. C. 291 H. L. (E.) ; 85 L. J. K. B. 103; Abingdon Rural District Council v. Oxford {City) Electric Tramways, Ltd., (1917) 2 K. B. 318, C. A.; 86 L. J. K. B. 1247. The obligation of County Councils or Kural District Councils or Urban District Councils, to keep public roads in good condition and repair is absolute : Londonderry County Council v. MacArthur, (1917) 2 Ir. E. 49. (b) Att.-Gen. v. Scott, (No. 2), (1905) 2 K. B. 160; 74 L J. K. B. 803, C. A.; 68 J. P. 502. (c) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 70 ; 41 & 42 Vict. o. 77 ; 61 & 62 Vict. c. 29. (d) Little Hulton Urban Council v. Jackson, (1904) 68 J. P. 451. (e) As to the regulations respecting heavy motors cars, and their maximum weight, see Statutory Eules and Orders, 1904 (Order 1809) and 1907 (Order 68); see also Pilgrim v. Simmonds, (1911) 9 L. Gr. E. 966. (/) An action to recover expenses of extraordinary traffic is not an action within O. 11 r. 1 of E. S. C. : Clare Council v. Wilson, (1913) 2 Ir. E. 89, C. A. (g) Ledbury Rural District Council v. Somerset, (1914) 12 L. G. E. 850; affirmed, (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1897. 396 NUISANCE. And in order that the expense of maintenance may be extra- ordinary within the meaning of s. 23 of the Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act, 1878, as amended by s. 12 of the Locomotives Act, 1908, it must be shown that tho highway rate of the district was in fact so substantially increased by the damage as to place an undue and unfair burden on the ratepayers (h). But where there is evidence of such substantial increase of cost the measure of damages recoverable is the difference between the amount actually expended for repairing the same section of the road before the introduction of the extraordinary traffic and that expended on its repair subsequently thereto, excluding therefrom any expenditure incurred for the purpose of improving the general standard of the highway (f). Moreover the defendants in such an action are entitled to require the plaintiffs to adduce evidence of the average expense of repairing comparable highways in the neighbourhood, such evidence of cost being germane to the enquiry for the purpose of determining whether or not the expenses incurred in respect of the particular highway were in fact abnormal (k). But apparently a road authority is not barred from recovering damage done to a road merely because it is of less width than is prescribed by statute (I). Where, however, there is an increase of traffic by development, without material change in its character, such increase, if gradual, does not constitute extraordinary traffic (w). As regards procedure and, the person or persons against whom proceedings may be taken to recover the cost of road repairs necessitated by extraordinary traffic, it is provided by s. 23 of the Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act, 1878, as amended by s. 12 of the Locomotives Act, 1898, that where by a certificate of their surveyor it appears to the authority which is liable or has undertaken to repair any highway, whether a main road or not, that having regard to the average expense of repairing highways in the neighbourhood, extraordinary expenses have been incurred by such authority in repairing such highway by reason of the damage caused by excessive weight passing along the same, or {h) Billericay Rural District Council v. Guardians of Poplar Poor Law Union, <1911) 2 K. B. 801; 80 L. J. K. B. 1241,. C. A.; see also Colchester Corporation v. Gepp, (1912) 1 K. B. 477; 81 L. J. K, B. 856, C. A. (i) Ledbury Rural District Council v. Golwall Park Granite Quarries Co., Ltd., (1913) ;L08 L. T. 1002. (fc) Morpeth Rural Council v. Bullocks' Hall Colliery Co., Ltd., (1913) 2 K. B. 7, C. A. (!) Highland District Committee of the County Council v. Rattray, (1913) S. C. 794 (Ct. of SesB.). (m) Worsborough Urban Council v. Barnsley British Co operative Society, (1918) 77 J. P. 450. OBSTRUCTION TO NAVIGATION. 397 extraordinary traffic thereon, such a,uthority may recover (the sum so expended) if not exceeding £250 in the County Court and if exceeding that sum in the High Court within twelve months after the damage has been done, or in the case of work extending over a long period within six months after the completion of the work, from any person, by or in consequence of whose order such weight or traffic has been conducted, the amount of such expenses as may be proved to the satisfaction . of the Court having cognizance of the case to have been incurred by such authority by reason of the damage arising from such weight or traffic as aforesaid (n.). It has, moreover, been held that the use of a traction engine which, by reason of its excessive weight, does substantial and abnormal damage to a public road, adequate for ordinary traffic, is a public nuisance (q). Although, on the other hand, it has been decided that a motor skidding car company are not liable in damages as for a nuisance (under the ™°'°'' provisions of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 70, s. 13), by reason of their putting a skidding motor omnibus upon the highway when the skidding was caused by a sudden and unforeseen emergency and the road was in a greasy state. It is, however, submitted that if it could be shown that the motor omnibus company, for economical or other reasons, had not used their best endeavours to provide a car which would not skid, then, and in such circumstances, they would come within the mischief contemplated by the Act (p). Where a vessel is sunk by accident' in the tideway of a navigable Obstruction river, the ovsmer in order to prevent damage arising from other |° navigation vessels striking against her is bound to give notice of the fact by vessel, lighting or buoying the spot where she has gone down (q). This done, his obligation is at an end, in all cases in which the vessel has sunk without any negligence on the part of those in charge of her ; he is under no duty to remove her and prevent the continuance of the obstruction to the navigation. And even the obligation to give riotice of the vessel's position continues only so long as the owner retains the possession and control of the vessel (r). If he sell her at the bottom of the water, the obligation passes to the purchaser (s) ; if he abandon her as not worth the expense of raising, the liability at common law ceases altogether (t). But under the Merchant (n) And see Windlesham Urban District Council v. Seward & others, Eveleigh, Third Party, (1912) 11 L. G. R. 324; 77 J. P. 161, Div. (o) Cavan C. C. v. Kane, (1910) 2 Ir. E. 644, K. B. D. (p) Parker v. London Gen. Omnibus Co., (1909) 101 L. T. 623, C. A.; 26 T. L. E. 18. (q) The Snark, (1900) P. 105 ; 69 L. J. P. 41, C. A. (r) Brown v. Mallett, (1848) 5 C. B. 599; 17 L. J. C. P. 227; 75 E. E. 806. (s) White V. Crisp, (1854) 10 Ex. 312; 23 L. J. Ex. 317; 102 E. E. 597. (t) Per Brett, L.J., The Douglas, (1882) 7 P. D. p. 160 ; 51 L. J. P. D. & A. 89 ; Barraclough v. Brown, (1897) A. C. 615; 66 L. J. Q. B. 672, H. L. (B.). And 398 NUISANCE. Doctrine of coming to nuisance exploded. Shipping Act, 1894 (u), the haj-bour or conservancy authority may remove the wreck if in such a position as to be a danger to the navigation, and sell it, and out of the proceeds of the sale reimburse themselves for the expenses of the removal. Nor is a merely formal act, such as the reduction of a judgment into writing, a condition precedent to the exercise of statutory powers by a harbour authority when such judgment has in fact been delivered by the authority appointed for that purpose (x). Moreover, so far as the Thames is concerned, if the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to defray the cost, the owner of the vessel may be sued for the balance (y), and this power of removal apparently imposes upon such authority an imperative duty to remove the obstruction as soon as notice is given of its existence (z). But under the Act of 1894, as at common law, an owner who has been in no default ceases to be the owner upon abandonment (a). And even where the owners do not abandon the wreck, if the harbour authorities undertake the duty of buoying and lighting, arid neglect that duty, the owners are not responsible (b). It was at one time thought, and there was much old authority for the proposition, that one who came to a private nuisance could not complain of it; that is to say, that if the nuisance had been in existence for ever so short a time before the plaintiff became possessed of the adjoining land, that was enough to justify its con- tinuance. But this doctrine is no longer law (c). Nor does the fact that the matter complained of is a public nuisance preclude a particular person who is especially aggrieved from obtaining an injunction (d). But apparently a temporary nuisance, e.g., the noises incidental to the reconstruction or rebuilding of adjacent premises, will not be restrained by injunction (e). see Arrow Shipping Co. v. Tyne Improvement Commissioners, (1894) C. A. 508; 63 L. J. P. 146. In the former case, Brett, L.J., indeed suggested that the owner of a ship which sinks through his negligence is under no greater liability than if it had sunk without negligence. This view, however, is probably not correct. All the law lords in Arrow Shipping Co, v. Tyne Improvement Com- missioners, (1894) A. C. 508; 63 L. J. P. 146, laid stress on the fact that the vessel in that case had sunk without any negligence, as did also Maule, J., in Brown v. Mallett, (1848) 5 C. B. 599; 17 L. J. C. P. 227; 75 E. E. 806. Presumably an owner who has negligently caused his ship to become a wreck and a nuisance to the navigation cannot get rid of his liability by abandonment. (u) 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 530. (x) Jones V. Mersey Docks latter for market purposes) are dedicated to the public subject to market rights Gingell v. Stepney Borough Council, (1908) 1 K. B. 115; 77 L. J. K. B. 347, C. A.; affirmed, (1909) A. C. 245; 78 L. J. K. JB. 673, H. L. (B.). (s) Per Cur. , Roswell v. Prior, (1701) 12 Mod. p. 639. (t) Roswell V. Prior, supra. 414 NUISANqE. Nuisance caused by physical con- dition of premises resulting from wrong of omission. purchaser in fee («), an aption will lie from time to time against the builder for continuing the obstruction notwithstanding the lease or sale (a;). Whether in the case of a lease the , lessee would also be liable is not quite clear, but presumably- he would (y). In Byppon v. Bowles (z) Lord Coke inclined to the view that he would not, on the ground that it would be waste in him to alter the structure, but the rest of the Court seem to have doubted, and no judgment was given on the point. In the later case of Roswell v. Prior, Lord Holt denied Lord Coke's view to be law, anid maintained that, whether it were waste in the lessee to abate the nuisance or not, he would be liable for its continuance, for it was his " fault to contract for an interest in land on whioh there was a nuisance " (a). In the case of a sale it is probable that, after liotice to abate, the purchaser would be liable as well as the vendor (b), though in event of the purchaser being sued it is probable he would have a remedy against the vendor. And not only does the erector of a nuisance of the above character remain liable for its continuance where it was originally erected for his benefit upon his own land, but the same principle applies to a contractor who is employed to erect it on the land of third persons (c). The purchaser of land with an existing nuisance upon it cannot be sued for continuing the nuisance until after a request made to abate it (d). 2. "Where the physical condition of the premises complained of is the result of a wrong of omission, as where the owner of a house suffers it while in his possession to get into a ruinous state so that portions of it are likely to fall upon the adjoining land and do damage (e), or where the owner of a coal-plate (/) or grating {g) in the footway of a public street permits it while in his possession to be in such an insecure condition as to be dangerous to persons using the street, such owner cannot rid himself of liability for the possible consequences of his breach of duty. by merely letting the premises to tenants without taking a covenant from the tenants to repair them. If he lets them without such a covenant, both landlord and' (m) Roswell V. Prior, (1701) 12 Mod. p. 639. {x) For exemplification of this principle, see Hall v. horfolk (Duke), (1900) 2 Ch. 493 ; 69 L. J. Gh. 571. (y) Kieffer v. Simmaire de Quibec, (1903) A. C. 85 ; 72 L. J. P. C. 18. (z) (1616) Cro. Jac. 373. (a) (1701) 12 Mod. p. 640. (b) Penruddock's case, (1597) 5 Eep. 100 b. (c) Thompson v. Gibson, (1841) 7 M. & W: 456; 10 L. J. Ex. 330; 36 E. E. 762. (d) Penruddock's case, supra. (e) Toddiv. Flight, (1860) 9 C. B. N. S. 377; 30'L. J. 0. P. 21; 127 E. E. 684; Chauntler v. Robinson, (1849) 4 Ex. 163.; 19 L. J.. Ex. 170; 80 E. E. 507. (/) Pretty v. Bickmbre, (1873) L. E. 8 0. P. 401. ig) Gwinnett v. Earner, (1875) L. E. 10 0. P. 658. WHO MAY BE SUED. tenant are liable for any damage arising from the condition of dis- repair existing at the date of the lease. And the liability of the lessor in such a case is independent of the question whether at the time of the lease he had or had not any actual knowledge of the state of disrepair (h). Apparently, however, if the defective grating or other article of a cognate character, was immovably fixed in position contemporaneously with the dedication of the street, it forms such an integral part of the highway as to shift the burden of responsibility from the owner or occupier of the premises on to the local authority (t). It has been said that if while premises are on lease a party buys the reversion he is liable for any nuisance existing upon the premises for which the original reversioner would have been liable, although he has no opportunity of putting an end to the tenant's interest or abating the nuisance (k); but the correctness of this proposition may well be doubted, for the mere receipt of rent does not amount to a continuance of the nuisance (i). It is, however, the common law duty of an owner of pixvperty in possession absolutely to prevent it from becoming a public nuisance ; consequently the fact that he has exercised, though ineffectually, all reasonable diligence in abating the nuisance will not protect him froin liability (m). On the other hand, if premises leased for a term of years were Covenant in a sufficient state of repair at the time of the lease, and are ° '^^P"'''^- subsequently suffered to get out of repair during the lease, for any damage arising therefrom to third persons, in the absence of a covenant by the lessor to repair, the lessee alone is liable (n). The principle here stated, though probably inveterate, is, nevertheless, alike unsatisfactory and illogical (upon the ground that no private arrangement between a lessor and lessee whereby either of the parties undertakes to indemnify the other by covenanting to repair the demised property should be permitted to avoid the responsibility of both for allowing the demised property to become a public nuisance), the alleged reason for the principle viz., the avoidance of circuity of action, being, it is submitted, altogether inadequate (o). Where premises are let to a tenant from year to year, the fact that they are allowed by the tenant to get out of repair does not (^i) See per Brie, C.J., Gandy v. Jubber, (1864) 5 B. & S. p. 492; 136 E. R. 642, where fie so states the rule without any qualification. (i) Bobbins v. Jones, (1863) 15 C. B. N. S. 221 ; 83 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 137 E. E. 475 ; Horridqe v. Makinson, (1916) 84 L. J. K. B. 1294. (k) Per Littledale, J., Rex v. Pedly, (1834) 1 A. & B. p. 827 ; 3 L. J. M. C. 119 ; 40 E E 444. He cites no authority for the proposition. il) Gandy v Jubber, (1864-5) 9 B. & S. 15 ; 33 L. J". Q. B. 151; 136 E. E. 646. (m) Attorney-General v. Tod Heatley, (1897) 1 Ch. 560; 66 L. J. Ch. 275, C. A. (n) Cheetham v. Hampson, (1791) 4 T. E. 318 ; 2 E. E. 397 ; Russell V. Shenton, (1842) 3 Q. B. 449; 11 L. J. Q. B. 289; 61 E. E. 249. (o) Payne v. Rogers, (1794) 2 H. Bl. at p. 351; 3 R. E. 415. 415 416 NUISANCE. Where disrepair amounts to nuisance. apparently impose on the landlord the obligation of determining the tenancy by notice to quit, and omission to give such notice does not amount' to a reletting so as to rendei* him liable for continuance of a nuisance arising from the disrepair (p), though at one time it was thought otherwise (g). And the same rule applies to the case of a tenancy from week to week (r). But it has been held that where a tenant holds over after the expiration of a lease and fails to perform the covenants contained in the expired lease an assignee of the reversion cannot sue on the express covenants contained in the lease if the agreement for holding over is by parol only (s). Where premises while in the occupation- of a tenant are in such a state of disrepair as to cause a nuisance, then, whether that state of disrepair existed at the tim.e of the letting or only arose during the tenancy, if either landlord or tenant covenanted with the other to repair, the party so covenanting alone is liable (t). If the lessor has covenanted with the tenant to repair, he and not the tenant is liable for any injury sustained by a stranger during the lease from the premises having got out of repair (w). But in the absence of an express covenant, a landlord is not liable to his tenant for per- sonal expenses caused by the defective condition of the demised premises (x). And a covenant by the tenant to do all, except certain specified ' repairs, does not impose any liability upon the landlord during the lease to do the excepted repairs; therefore, where an owner let a house in good repair at the time of the letting, the tenant covenanting to do all necessary repairs to the premises except main walls, roof, and main timbers, and the owner made no agreement to repair the excepted portions, and by reason of a part of the main walls being out of repair a chimney fell down and injured the plaintiff, it was held that the owner was not liable (y) ;- the lessee in such case, though under no obligation as towards his landlord to do the repairs, being as towards third persons respon- sible for the non-repair. (p) See the undelivered judgment of the Exch. Oh. in Gandy v. Jubber, (1864-S) 9 B. & S. 15 ; 33 h. J. Q. B. 151 ; 136 E. E. .646. (g) See per Littledale, J., Rex v. Pedly, (1834) 1 A. & E. p. 827; 3 L. J. M. 0. 119; 40 E. E. 444; and Gandy v. Jubber, in the Q. B., (1864) 5 B. & S. 78 ; 33 L. J. Q. B. 151 ; 136 E. E. 490. (r) Bowen v. Anderson, (1894) 1 Q. B. 164, disapproving Sandford v. Clarke, (1888) 21 Q. B. D. 898, contra. ' . . , is) (1917) 1 K. B. 252, C. A. (t) A covenant to keep in good repair is broken by a , tenant allowing premises tc become infested by vermin : Jones v. Joseph, (1918) 87 L. J. K. B. 510. («) Payne v. Rogers, (1794) 2 H. Bl. 350; 3 E. E. 415. See too Rich v. Basterfield, (1847) 4 C. B. 783; 16 L. J. C. P. 273; 72 E. E. 716; and per Lopes, J., Nelson v. Liverpool Brewery Co., (1877) 2 C. P. D. p. 313; 46 L. J. C. P. 675. (x) Tredway v. Machin, (1904) 91 L. T. 310. iy) Nelson v. Liverpool Brewery Co., (1877) 2 C. P. D. p. 311; 46 L. J. C. P. 675. WHO MAY BE SUED. 417 On the other hand, a covenant by the lessee to repair will apparently exonerate the lessor from the consequenoes of a nuisance arising from the disrepair of the premises at the date of the lease, even though at such date the lessor had full knowledge of the disrepair (2). This rule, that a private agreement between landlord and tenant as to the repairs can determine the question as to which of them is responsible to third parties for a nuisance arising from disrepair, a rule which must be regarded as somewhat anomalous, is said to be founded upon the desirability of avoiding circuity of action (a). Whether an owner who sells to a purchaser premises which by Sale of pre- his neglect he has permitted to be id a dangerous condition can by ^'^isrepalr* ^ such sale get rid of his liability for future damage arising from that condition, whether, that is to say, such sale will operate in the same way as the taking of a covenant from the tenant in the case of a lease, there is no authority to show ; but it is presumed that it will do so, and that upon the sale, without more, the liability will be transferred to the purchaser (b) presumably upon the ground that he allows a nuisance to continue. But if this be so, then a person who excavates his land for mining or other purposes, and then sells it in that condition, will by the fact of sale discharge himself from liability to the owners of the adjoining land for any subsidences occurring subsequently to the date of the sale, the excavation itself not being a wrongful act so as to bring the case within the rule of Roswell V. Prior (c), and the only breach of duty committed by the Vendor being a wrong of omission in neglecting to substitute artificial support in lieu of that taken away. And if this principle apply it is apprehended that a similar transfer of liability would take place in the case of a devolution upon heir (d), devisee or vendee (e). The general proposition, as stated above, must, however, be taken with considerable reservation, it having been held in the modem case of Hall v. Duke of Norfolk (/) that an owner in possession is not responsible for a subsidence of land primarily caused by the acts of his predecessor in title; and further that, under such circum- stances, an original owner by parting with the property does not thereby divest himself of responsibility for the damage occasioned (z) Per Brett, J., Owinnell v. Earner, (1875) L. E. 10 C. P. p. 661. (a) Payne v. Rogers, (1794) 2 H. Bl. p. 351; 3 E. E. 415. (b) And see Attorney-Oeneral v. Tod Heatley, where the defendant's respon- sibility was transferred to the succeeding owner, (1897) 1 Ch. 560; 56 L. J. Ch. 275 (c) (1701) 12 Mod. 635. (d) Lord Blackburn in Darley Main Colliery Co, v. Mitchell, (1886) 11 App. Cas. p. 144; 55 L. J. Q. B. 529; th'ought otherwise, but he dissented from the judgment of the majority. (e) Attorney-General v. Roe; (1915) 1 Ch. 235; 84 L. J. Ch, 322. (/) (1900) 2 Ch. 493; 69 L. J. Ch. 571; and see Greenwell v. Low Beechburn Coal Co., (1897) 2 Q. B. 165; 66 L. J. Q. B. 643. C.T. 27 418 NUISANCE. Nuisance caused by mode of user of premises. by such subsidence. Nor can the Statute of Limitations be pleaded in such cases, the right of action accruing from the date of the subsidence, and not from the date of the act by which such subsidence was originally caused {g). 3. Where the nuisance arises, not from the physical condition of the premises themselves, but from the mode of their user, then if the premises are, at the time of the nuisance arising, in the occupa- tion of a tenant, the better opinion seems to be that the tenant is liabl© and the landlord is not, even though the latter may have contemplated the premises being used in the very way which brings about the state of things complained of. The case of Bex v. Pedly (h) no doubt gives countenance to the opposite view. There the indictment charged that the defendant erected certain privies and a sink near a highway, and caused persons to resort to and use them, and thereby create such a stench as amoimted- to a nuisance. On proof that the defendant was landlord of certain houses which together with the privies and sink were let to tenants who used them in the manner stated, he was held liable, although neither privies nor sink were a nuisance apart from their user by the tenants. But the grounds of the decision are not very clear; and in the later case of Bich v. Basterfield (i), the Court observed that if Bex V. Pedly "is to be taken as a decision that a landlord is responsible for the act of his tenant in creating a nuisance by the manner in which he uses the premises demised, we think it goes beyond the principle to be found in any previously decided cases, and we cannot assent to it." In this last case an action was held not to lie against the landlord of a house under lease to a tenant for a nuisance caused by the chimneys smoking to the annoyance of the adjoining occupier, on the ground that the chimneys per se were not a nuisance, and the lighting the fires which was purely optional on the part of the tenant was in no sense the act of the landlord. The Court laid it down that " if a landlord lets premises, not in them- selves a nuisance, but which may or may not be used by the tenant so as to become a nuisance, and it is entirely at the option of the tenant so to use thern or not, and the landlord receives the same benefit whether they are so used or not, the landlord cannot be made responsible for the acts of the tenant " (fe). No doubt it is in ig) As to the method of assessing damages in such cases, see Tunniclife and Hampson v. West Leigh Colliery Co., (1905) 74 L. J. Ch. 649; S. C. (1908) A. C. 27, H. L. (h) (1834) 1 A. & B. 822; 3 L. J. M. C. 119; 40 E. E. 444. (i) (1847) 4 C. B. 783; 16 L. J. C. P. 273; 72 E. E. 716. (fc) But see the case of Harris v. James, (1876) 45 L. J. Q. B. 545, where the lessor of a lime-kiln was held liable for a nuisance caused by the smoke of the kiln, on the ground that such nuisance was a necessary consequence of the use of the kiln in the mode contemplated by the demise. The case of Rich v. Basterfield was there criticised and spoken of as a case " of excessive refinement." WHO MAY BE SUED. 419 one sense optional with the tenant whether he uses the privies or fireplaces, but practically it is not. The Court, however, declined to recognise any distinction on that score. " To bring liability home to the owner the nuisance must be one which is in its very essence and nature a nuisance at the time of the letting, and not merely something which is capable of being thereafter rendered a nuisance by the tenant " (I). Where a person permits third parties to commit a nuisance upon Occupier premises of which he himself is in occupation at the time of the nujsanoe nuisance committed, the occupier permitting such acts of nuisance committed on is responsible therefor, notwithstanding that they be not done on ^jj^hu''^^^ his behalf or for his benefit (m), and as a general proposition of law permisaion. it is probable than an occupier of premises becomes responsible for the continuance of a nuisance thereon if it can be shown that it is in fact continued by his permission or with his conusance (n). But mere omission by the occupier of premises to abate a nuisance created thereon without his authority and against his will does not amount to a continuance of it by him so as to render him respon- sible for it (o). (l) Per Crompton, J., Qandy v. Jubber, (1864) 5 B. & S. p. 87; 33 L. J. Q. B. 151; 136 E. E. 490; but see Sanders-Clark v. Grosvenor Mansions Co. and D'Allessandri, (1900) 2 Ch. 373; 69 L. J. Ch. 579. (m) Per Cur., Rich v. Basterfield, (1847) 4 C. B. p. 804; 16 L. J. C. P. 273; 72 E. E. 716; and see White v. Jameson, (1874) L. E. 18 Eq. 303; and Jenkins V. Jackson, (1888) 40 Ch. D. 71 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 124. (n) Barker v. Herbert, (1911) 2 K. B. 633, at p. 643; 80 L. J. K. B. 1329, C A (o) Saxby v. Manchester d Sheffield B. Co., (1869) L. E. 4 C. P. 198; 38 L. J. C. P. 153. CHAPTER XV. DUTIES ATTACHING TO THE USE OF PROPERTY. NEGLIGENCE. PAGE PAGE Natural User of Property 420 Negligence of Boarding House Working Minerals 422 ^^c^^—'i^;^--:::::::: 456 Agricul ura Operations .. 424 ^^^^.g^ ^^ g^^^^^^ ^^ ^ ^gg Non-natural User of Land 426 p^^^j^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ ■ IS a Negligent User of Fire and ^^^ ^^ ^^j^^ C^^g_ Explosives 431 (^^ Generally 466 Limitations on Liability for ^j,^ Persons coming on Negligence 434 Business 482 Escape of Solid Bodies 435 (o) Bare Licensees 490 Leakage of "Water and With- Negligent Communication of drawal of Support 436 Infectious Disease 493 Damage by Animals 440 Onus of Proof of Negligence 496 Act of God and Vis Major 449 Contributory Negligence 501 Degrees of Care 454 Doctrine of Acquiescence 513 All kinds of material property, whether land or chattels, are capable of bein'g sO' used as to become instruments of mischief. But it is not in every case of user of property that any duty attaches to the party using it to prevent mischief arising. In the case of certain classes of property the owner may, subject to certain limita- tions, use it in the manner most beneficial to himself without regard to the injury which such user may inflict on his neighbours. Again in those eases in which there is a duty to prevent injury arising from the mode of user the extent of the duty is not always the same. In some it is an absolute duty to prevent damage ensuing, in others it is a limited duty to take care. Of injurious acts of user of property there are therefore three classes : those acts which may be done with absolute impunity; those acts lawful in themselves which the doer does at his peril, and liability for which is independent of any question of negligence ; and thirdly, those acts which (in the absence of wilfulness) create liability only if done negligently. Acts which 1- The class of cases in which injurious acts of user of property may be j^i^y j^e done with impunity is very limited ; it includes no cases of impunity. user of chattels, and is restricted to those modes of user of land which afe generally described by the expression " natural." " The eases have decided that where the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum LEGITIMATE USER OF PROPERTY. 421 non Iseda^ is applied to landed property, it is subject to a certain modification, it being necessary for the plaintiff to show not only that he has sustained damage, but that the defendant has caused it by going beyond what is necessary in order to enable him to have the natural use of his own land. If the plaintiff only shows that his own land is damaged by the defendant's using his land in the natural maimer he cannot succeed" (a). This term "natural use of land" as descriptive of the kind of user which will beget no responsibility is employed in a somewhat artificial and restricted sense. There are many modes of user of land which are riatural, in the sense that they are customary in relation to the particular class of land to which they are applied, which if productive of damage to adjoining land cannot be justified. For instance, it is natural, in the ordinary sense of the term, to put manure upon land used for agricultural purposes, but if the manure soak through the soil and percolate away into the plaintiff's well, the defendant will be liable. Again, the erecting of a privy is a natural use of house property in the ordinary sense of the term, yet nevertheless the owner will erect it at his peril, and if the filth escape from it, he will be liable to his neighbour for any damage resulting frorn such escape. The expression " natural user " itself was first employed by Lord Cairns in Fletioher v. Rylands (fa), and has since been adopted by various judges (c) as a convenient expression by which to designate those acts of user which may be done with impunity, but there has not as yet been given from the bench any definition of the expression, nor any exhaustive enumeration of the kinds of user which it would include. Foremost, however, among the kinds of user included under' it comes the working of minerals according to the recognised course of mining. It is now well-settled law that ' ' the owner of minerals has a Damage by right to take away the whole of the minerals in his land, for such 2^'"^ water is the natural course of user of minerals " (d), and (subject to an by natural exception in the case of subsidence arising from the withdrawal of g''*''*'>''''o°- support (e) ) for any injury caused to the land of the adjoining own'er by the removal of such minerals if the removal be conducted in the ordinary way the party injured will be without redress (/). (a) Per Brett, L.J., West Cumberland Iron £ Steel Co v. Kenyan, (1879) 11 Ch. D. p. 787 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 793. (b) (1866-8) Ij. R. 3 H. L. p. 338; 35 L. J. Ex. 154. (c) Per Fry, J., Attorney-General v. Tomline, (1879) 12 Ch. D. p. 230; 49 L. J. Ch. 377; per Cotton, L.J., Hurdman v. North Eastern R. Co., (1878) 3 C. P. D. p. 174; 47 L. J. C. P. 368; per Brett, L.J., West Cumberland Iron d Steel Co. v. Kenyan, supra; per Brett, M. E. , Whalley v. Lancashire it York- shire R. Co., (1884) 13 Q. B. D. p. 141; 53 L. J. Q. B. 285. (d) Per Lord Blackburn, Wilson v. Waddell, (1876) 2 App. Gas. p. 99. (e) See below, p. 425. (/) Where there are alternative methods of working that method which will conform most nearly with the covenants contained in the lease is to be preferred : Brewer v. Rhymney Iron Co., (1910) 1 Ch. 766; 79 L. J. Ch. 334. 422 DUTIES ATTACHING TO THE USE OF PEOPEETY. Damage caused by tapping stream in course of mining. Thus where the plaintiff and defendant were owners of two adjoin- ing mines, and in the upper part of the defendant's mine, which was on the rise, there was collected a large subterranean body of water supported by a thick horizontal bar of coal, and the defendant worked this bar of coal, whereby the body of water flowed down and flooded the plaintiff's mine, the defendant was held to be free from liability, notwithstanding that at the time of working of the coal he knew that the effect of his so doing would be to cause the damage which occurred (g). Moreover, where, in demises to separate, lessees, the reasonable working of one seam of coal underlying another would inevitably cause a subsidence of the upper seam, leave to cause such subsidence is clearly implied (h), although the lessor might be liable under the terms of the demise for the damage so caused (i). It seems, however, where leave is clearly implied the proportion, which the benefit to be gained by the defendant bears to the injury to be inflicted on the plaintiff, is not a material element for consideration, and a mine owner proposing to remove certain minerals in his mine may do so with impunity none the less because the minerals when got wiU be but of trifling value, and the injury caused to his neighbour by their removal incalculable. The exemption from liability for damage resulting from the causing of water to flow down in the course of mining operations is not con- fined to the case of mere drainage percolating through the soil, but extends to the release of water already collected in a defined basin (fc). But whether that exemption extends to the case of tapping a rimning stream seems doubtful (I). It has been held that a mine owner who in the course of mining taps a stream and thereby diminishes the flow of water in such stream is responsible therefor to a lower riparian owner (m), but the question whether he is also liable to the adjoining owner whose mine or land he floods must be regarded as an open one. The head-note to the case of Crompton v. Lea (n.) suggests indeed that he would be liable, but a reference to the judgment will show that the decision in that case did not proceed upon any distinction between a running stream and a stationary pool. There the bill averred that the defendants threatened to work certain seams in a mine which it was inipossible further to work for any mining purpose, and that the effect of (g) Smith v. Kenrick, (1849) 7 C. B. 515; 18 L. J. C. P. 172; 78 E. E. 745. (h) Butterley Co. v. New Hucknall Colliery Co., Ltd., (1910) A. C. 381; Welldon v. Butterley Co., (1919) 38 L. J. Ch. 496. See also Davies v. Powell Dugryn Steam Goal Co., (1917) 1 Ch. 488, C. A. ; affirmed, (1918) 55 A. C, H. L. (E.). (i) Jones v. Consolidated Anthracite Co., (1916) 1 K. B 123. (k) Smith V. Kenrick, supra. (!) Fletcher v. Smith, (1877) 2 A. C. 781. (m) Grand Junction Canal Co. v. Shugar, (1871) L. E. 6 Ch. 483. (n) (1874) L. E. 19 Eq. 115; 44 L. J. Ch. 69; see also Fletcher v. Smith, (1877) A. C. 781. GRAVITATION OP SUBTERRANEAN WATER. 423 working them would be to let in a river and flood the defendants' mine, and through it the plaintiS's mine, and prayed an injunction. A demurrer to the bill was overruled by Hall, V.-C, apparently on the ground that the act which the defendants proposed to do was not for any legitimate mining purpose. Lord Blackburn in Wilson V. Waddell (o) refers to the point, but does not decide it. But though a mine owner is not answerable for water flowing interference down by natural gravitation into his neighbour's mine, he must withnatural not, as a general rule, purposely interfere with the gravitation of of mine water the water so as to make it more injurious to the lower mine, or more advantageous to himself. Thus where the defendants, having in their mines two seams, A. and B., made a crut between them inclining downwards in the direction of seam B. as a means to the more convenient conveyance of the minerals in seam A. to the surface, and in order to enable them to work the minerals in the lower part of seam A., pumped water therefrom up to the level of the crut, which water flowed down the crut into seam B. and thence into the plaintiff's mine and did damage, it was held that the defendants were liable (p). In the same case it was also held that for water flowing down by natural gravitation from the upper (part of seam A. into the crut, and so into the plaintiff's mine, the defendants were not liable. At the same time, however, the Court intimated that if the crut had been made for the purpose of turning water into the plaintiff's mine, which would not other- wise have arrived there, and not for the purpose of the convey- ance of minerals from one seam to another, the action would have lain (q). And in Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co. v. Clayton (r), where the barrier between the plaintiff's and the defendant's mines having been perforated, the defendant con- structed an artificial trough leading from his mines to the per- forations, for the purpose of carrying off water raised by pumping from below and also the drainage from the upper strata, Wood, V.-C, granted an injunction to restrain the defendant from so using the trough, drawing no distinction between the two classes of water. But where the defendants worked two adjoining mines, A. and B., and the water from A. had been accustomed to flow through a certain artificial opening into B., and the defendants, to save the expense of pumping in B., stopped up the opening, thereby causing the water thus penned back to rise in A. so high as to fiow through certain other openings made by the plaintiffs' predecessors (8) (1876) 2 App. Cas. p. 98. (p) Baird v. Williamson, (1863) 15 C. B. N. S. 376; 33 L.'J. C. P. 101; 137 E. E. 561. iq) Baird v. Williamson, (1863) 15 C. B. N. S. p. 391; 33 L. J. C. P. 101; 137 E. E. 561. (r) (1867) 26 L. J. Ch. 476. 424 DUTIES ATTACHING TO THE USE OF PROPERTY. Eight of lateral support under Eail- way Clauses Consolidation Act. Agricultural operations. into the plaintiffs' mine, it was held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief, on the ground that the stopping up of the opening between A. and B. had the same effect as though the opening had never been made (s). Another mode of interfering with the natural gravitation of mine water similar to that of making a trough to guide its course is that of boring a hoi© to get rid of the water, and the making of such bore-hole, though it may not amount to a trespass, will not be permitted if its effect wiU be to cause the water to enter the plaintiff's land to a greater extent than it did before (it). Although a railway eompany purchasing subjacent minerals under the provisions of ss. 77-79 of the Railways Clauses Con- solidation Act, 1845, cannot by virtue of such statutory purchase claim the benefit of the common law right of an ordinary purchaser of the surface to subjacent and adjacent support, the statute having created a specific law for such matters by which alone the respective rights of the company and of the mine owner are to be regulated (u) ; nevertheless, as the provisions of the above-men- tioned sections do not apply outside the forty yards hmit pre- scribed by s. 78, a railway company is entitled to enjoy the common law right of lateral support for its undertaking from mines lying beyond the prescribed limit (tq). A like immunity to that which attaches to the removal of minerals underground, attaches also to the digging and removal of portions of the soil on the surface (y), such as gravel, brickway, etc. (a). It also, apparently, attaches to certain agricultural operations. " If a man be so situated with regard to his neighbour that by an ordinary act in the use of his neighbour's land, such as by deep ploughing, the ordinary flow of water is sent from that land on to his land, he would be in tha position of having his land subject to the defect, and, therefore, could not recover for the injury he might suffer " (a). So where a farmer by ploughing up (s) Lomax v. Stott, (1870) 39 Ij. J. Ch. 834. it) West Cumberland Iron d Steel Go. v. Kenyan, (1879) 11 Ch. D. 782; 48 L. J. Ch. 793; and cp. Whalley v. Lancashire S Yorkshire R. Co., (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 131 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 285. (m) Great Western R. Co. v. Bennett, (1867) L. E. 2 H. L. 27 ; 86 L. J. Q. B. 133. (x) L. d N. W. R. Go. V. Howley Park Goal Co., (1911) 2 Ch. 97; 80 L. J. Ch. 537, C. A. ; affirmed, (1913) A. C. 11 H. "L. (E.) ; 82 L. J. Ch. 76. (y) See per Fry, J., Attorney-General v. Tomline, (1879) 12 Ch. D. p. 230; 49 L. J. Ch. 377. (z) China clay is a "mineral" excepted out of the conveyance to a, railway company under the provisions of s. 77 of the Eailways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, see Great Western R. Co. v. Garpalla United China Clay Co., (1908) 25 T. L. E. 91, C. A. (a) Per Brett, M.E., Whalley v. Lancashire