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 CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 
 3 1924 088 428 648 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924088428648 
 
War Department — Office of the Chief of Staff 
 
 Second Section, General Staff, No. 13 
 
 American Campaigns 
 
 By 
 
 Matthew Forney Steele 
 
 Major Second United States Cavalry 
 
 In Two Volumes 
 
 Volume I — TEXT 
 
 Washington: Byron S. Adams, 1909 
 
 EV. 
 
War Department 
 
 Document No. 324 
 
 Office of the Chief of Staff 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 These volumes represent a part of my three years' work as 
 lecturer in military history at the Army Service Schools at 
 Fort Leavenworth. It is with a great deal of reluctance that 
 I have consented to let the lectures be printed in their present 
 form, for no one can know better than I how far they fall 
 short of being a finished work. No doubt, however, I should 
 not feel entirely satisfied with them if I had spent twenty years, 
 instead of only a part of three, upon them. 
 
 No man can feel that he has thoroughly mastered any cam- 
 paign or battle, or is fully equipped to lecture upon it, until 
 he has studied everything that has been written upon it. Hence 
 I do not feel that I have mastered a single campaign or battle 
 discussed in this series, because I have not had time to study 
 the tenth of what has been written upon any one of them. 
 The Rebellion Records have virtually been a closed book for 
 me ; I have hardly dared to open them, lest I might yield to the 
 temptation to read on, from one report to another, far beyond 
 the time I have had to spare. Fortunately, however, this great 
 mine of fact — and fiction — has been industriously worked, and 
 its contents have been carefully sifted and reduced, by such 
 skilful craftsmen as Mr. John Codman Ropes, General E. P. 
 Alexander, and dozens of others, who have given many years 
 •of their lives to the task ; and the product of their expert labor 
 has been placed at the disposal of students having less time to 
 spare, like myself. 
 
 There is so much, however, I could do to improve the lec- 
 tures and make them more valuable and acceptable, that I 
 regret I cannot put one more year's work upon them before 
 sending them forth; but they cannot wait longer, for some 
 work of this kind is sadly needed by the students at the Service 
 Schools in connection with their course in military history. 
 These volumes are intended to occupy a space not filled by 
 any other single work, and, until something better shall be 
 provided, they must answer the purpose. 
 
 In preparing the lectures for publication I have been assisted 
 directly or indirectly by many persons without whose aid I 
 should never have succeeded at all. It would be impossible 
 even to name them all. To no one else do I feel so much 
 indebted as to Captain Edwin T. Cole, 6th Infantry, Senior 
 
iv American Campaigns. 
 
 Instructor, Department of Engineering, at the Service Schools,, 
 under whose direction and supervision the maps were made. 
 Indeed, I believe I may say that Captain Cole was the in- 
 itiator of the whole project. The volumes are the outcome 
 of my course of lectures, which were illustrated by means of 
 the stereopticon. For this series of lectures Captain Cole with' 
 his own hand made more than six hundred lantern-slides, 
 nearly all of which had troops represented upon them in colors- 
 laid on by hand under the magnifying glass. In the prepara- 
 tion of the maps, Captain Cole was assisted by Sergeant 
 John Howry, Co. D, 1st Battalion of Engineers, a skilful 
 draftsman, and Sergeant Frank Arganbright, Co. A, Signal 
 Corps, an expert photographer. The final tracings of all the 
 maps were done by Mr. W. J. Jacobi and Mr. A. B. Williams,, 
 expert draftsmen in the Military Information Committee,. 
 Second Section, General Staff, U. S. Army. For the excellence 
 of the plates I am indebted to the personal care of Mr. W. 
 Palmer Hall, of The Maurice Joyce Engraving Co., and for 
 the accurate "registering" of the color-plates to the pains- 
 taking of Mr. D. S. White and Mr. William E. Browne, 
 of the house of Byron S. Adams. To Mr. S. C. Williams,, 
 clerk in the office of the Secretary of the Service Schools, I 
 am particularly obliged for the speed and accuracy with which 
 he made the fair copy of my manuscript for the printer. 
 
 None of the maps were drawn originally for these lectures ; 
 all are photographic reproductions of either official maps or 
 maps accompanying works that have been consulted in the 
 preparation of the lectures. For the privilege of repro- 
 ducing the maps of other works I have had to ask several 
 authors and almost every leading publisher in the country, all 
 of whom, both authors and publishers, have been kind enough 
 to give their consent. Since, however, the maps have been 
 taken from many different sources, they will be found to pos- 
 sess no sort of uniformity in method or in quality. Better maps, 
 no doubt, are in existence than many of those reproduced, but 
 the best one available has been taken in every case. In most 
 cases the colored blocks and lines representing troops and 
 routes of march have been added specially for the lectures. 
 
Preface. v 
 
 It has seldom been possible to represent the troops to a scale, 
 the main purpose having been merely to suggest, by means of 
 blue and red blocks, the relative positions of hostile troops on 
 a battle-field or in a theater of operations. 
 
 All things considered, it has been deemed best to present 
 the maps in a separate volume of the same size as the volume 
 of lectures, and to limit them to such dimensions that none 
 of them shall require folding; but in reducing some of them 
 to a scale small enough to meet these requirements, many of 
 the geographic names have been made rather small to read 
 with the naked eye; but it may be remarked, in passing, 
 that no one can hope to keep his eyes unimpaired who under- 
 takes the serious study of military history without the aid of a 
 reading-glass. Many of the names and details of the originals 
 not mentioned in the lectures have been left out of the repro- 
 ductions and great pains have been taken to see that no im- 
 portant geographic names mentioned in the lectures should 
 be omitted from the corresponding maps. 
 
 While reference is made in foot-notes throughout the text 
 to works that have been quoted or taken as authority, I must 
 here invite the attention of students of American military his- 
 tory to a few works that I believe will be of special interest 
 to them: 
 
 For the study of the colonial period of our history Francis- 
 Parkman has left an immortal work in his series of volumes.* 
 His Montcalm and Wolfe and A Half Century of Conflict are 
 of particular interest to the student of American military 
 history. 
 
 Upon the Revolutionary War, The American Revolution,. 
 by John Fiske,f is too well known to require any recommen- 
 dation from me. Its popularity is due largely to Mr. Fiske's- 
 charming style. Sydney George Fisher's True History of the 
 American Revolution, and his later and more extensive work, 
 The Struggle for American Independence^ are invaluable 
 to the American who wishes to get an unbiased view of our 
 
 ♦Published by Little, Brown and Company, Boston. 
 tPublished by Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. 
 tBoth published by J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia. 
 
vi American Campaigns. 
 
 forefathers' struggle for freedom. The author breaks out of 
 the usual rut of American historians, and gives us a view of 
 the quarrel from the Englishman's side as well as from the 
 American's. To the military student in search of the lessons 
 of the Revolutionary War that relate to his own chosen pro- 
 fession, Battles of the American Revolution* written by Gen- 
 eral Henry B. Carrington, soldier and student of the science 
 of war, makes a special appeal. 
 
 Excellent accounts of the War of 1812 are contained in 
 Henry Adams's History of the United States,^ and A History 
 of the People of the United States, by John Bach McMaster. 
 
 The two little volumes of The Great Commander Series^. — 
 General Taylor, by General O. O. Howard, and General Scott, 
 by General Marcus J. Wright — taken together, give a very 
 pleasing and instructive, but brief, narrative of the Mexican 
 War ; but the fullest and most satisfactory history of that war, 
 in a single volume, is General Cadmus Wilcox's History of the 
 Mexican War.% This work is based upon accounts written 
 from both American and Mexican points of view. 
 
 When we come down to the Civil War, a mere glance at the 
 library shelves given to its literature makes one appreciate to 
 the full the words of The Preacher, "Of making many books 
 there is no end" ; yet there is no single work that covers the 
 whole war concisely and in a way to satisfy the military stu- 
 dent. The subject is so vast that, thus far, no person that has 
 undertaken it has lived to finish his task. The Comte of Paris, 
 in his History of the Civil War in America,^ brought the 
 narrative in full detail well forward into the year 1863. This 
 is a great work. 
 
 John Codman Ropes, in The Story of the Civil War,\\ only 
 lived to complete Parts I. and II., which carry the story 
 through the campaigns of 1862; but I am informed by his 
 publishers that Part III., prepared "from the data which Mr. 
 Ropes left behind," will soon be issued. Could Mr. Ropes 
 bave been spared to finish his great work it would have proved 
 an invaluable boon for the student of the military history of 
 tha^great conflict. No other work that I have seen reviews 
 
 !£ U K- S t ed by A - S ' Barnes a nd Company, New York 
 TPubhshed by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 
 
 s? U Kr S l! e j ^ y S; A % leton and Company, New York. 
 gPublished by The Church Publishing Company, Washington 
 ^Translation published by Porter and Coates, now thf Tohn C 
 Winston Company, Philadelphia. JOnn U 
 
 || Published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York 
 
Preface. 
 
 vn 
 
 the main campaigns of 1861 and 1862 as scientifically and con- 
 vincingly as that of Mr. Ropes. And withal the author's wri- 
 ting is easy and delightful to read. 
 
 In his Military Memoirs of a Confederate* General E. P. 
 Alexander has written an absorbing narrative and critical re- 
 view of the campaigns that he himself took part in, — which 
 include most of the important campaigns of the Civil War, — 
 together with a brief account of some of the others. It is a most 
 scientific and scholarly criticism of the operations. The only 
 cause of quarrel one can find with the able and unprejudiced 
 author is that he has not pointed out the faults of his enemies 
 as plainly and fully as he has pointed out those of his friends. 
 Every military student must be thankful to General Alexander 
 for these memoirs, as everyone must lament that General 
 Stephen D. Lee did not find time to publish a similar memoir 
 of the campaigns that he bore a part in. Such a work along 
 with General Alexander's would have made almost a complete 
 critical review of the great campaigns of the war. 
 
 The Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,\ made up of 
 the great series of war papers that appeared a few years ago 
 in The Century, stands unique in the world's histories of 
 war. It covers every event of any importance from the begin- 
 ning to the end of the great struggle. Told by the very 
 actors themselves, great and little, these narratives have for 
 the American reader an interest that no other history of the 
 Civil War could possess. So long as there shall be Americans 
 to read the story of those times they must remain grateful to 
 The Century Company for these volumes. Precisely the right 
 moment was chosen by the company for carrying out the 
 great work. Had it been undertaken earlier, the time would 
 have been too soon, for the vision of the actors would still 
 have been blurred by the prejudice of section and the smoke 
 of battle; had it been postponed longer, too many of the 
 actors would already have passed away. 
 
 Campaigns of the Civil War* is another excellent history of 
 the main campaigns, issued in a series of small, handy volumes, 
 each written by a man chosen on account of his special fitness. 
 In the list of the contributors we find the names of John H. 
 Nicolay, General Alexander S. Webb, John Codman Ropes, 
 General Winthrop Palfrey, General Abner Doubleday, General 
 Henry M. Cist, General Jacob D. Cox, Captain Francis V. 
 
 ♦Published by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 
 fPublished by The Century Company, New York. 
 
viii American Campaigns. 
 
 Greene, Mr. George E. Pond, and General Andrew A. 
 Humphreys. 
 
 The bookshelves of the young American officer should not 
 long be without the last-named four works — The Story of 
 the Civil War, Military Memoirs of a Confederate, The Battles 
 and Leaders of the Civil War, and Campaigns of the Civil 
 War. Having first read these carefully, following out every 
 movement upon the map, the student will have gained a gen- 
 eral knowledge and appreciation of the main operations of the 
 Civil War; then, if he pleases, he can find interesting and in- 
 structive biographies, memoirs, and histories, too numerous for 
 me to attempt to list, with which to fill in the details of cam- 
 paigns and battles. Of these books, one of the most valuable 
 is the History of the Army of the Cumberland, by Thomas B. 
 Van Home and Edward Ruger.* Few histories that I have 
 seen contain so many excellent maps as accompany this 
 volume. 
 
 Of our war with Spain, no complete history, such as the mili- 
 tary student desires, has as yet appeared. Captain Sargent's 
 work, The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba,f treats the main 
 part of the operations with a fulness and skill that place it 
 among the great military histories that have been written in 
 English, and put its author in the class with Napier and Hen- 
 derson. The only regret one can have in laying the work 
 down is that its author did not include in it a review of the 
 operations in Porto Rico and the Philippines. 
 
 M. F. S. 
 Army War College, 
 Washington, September 23, ipop. 
 
 ♦Published by Robert Clarke & Company, now The Robert Clarke 
 Company, Cincinnati. 
 tPublished by A. C. McClurg and Company, Chicago. 
 
CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. 
 
 Lecture 
 
 I. Colonial Wars 1 
 
 II. The Revolutionary War — Northern Campaigns 21 
 
 III. The Revolutionary War — Southern Campaigns 42 
 
 IV. The War of 1812 56 
 
 V. The Mexican War — Taylor's Campaign 81 
 
 VI. The Mexican War — Scott's Campaign 105 
 
 VII. The First Battle of Bull Run 127 
 
 VIII. Forts Henry and Donelson 150 
 
 IX. The Shijoh Campaign 169 
 
 X. The Peninsular Campaign 191 
 
 XI. Jackson's Valley Campaign 217 
 
 XII. The Second Battle of Bull Run 239 
 
 XIII. The Antietam Campaign 260 
 
 XIV. The Fredericksburg Campaign 284 
 
 XV. Stones River Campaign 308 
 
 XVI. The Battle of Chancellorsville 329 
 
 XVII. The Campaign of Gettysburg— The First Day 353 
 XVIII. The Campaign of Gettysburg — Second and -? 
 
 Third Days pi 
 
 XIX. The Vicksburg Campaign 394 
 
 XX. The Chickamauga Campaign 422 
 
 •XXI. The Battles around Chattanooga 445 
 
 XXII. The Battle of the Wilderness 466 
 
 XXIII. The Battle of Spottsylvania Court House. ... 488 
 
 XXIV. Siege of Petersburg 510 
 
 XXV. The Campaign of Atlanta 535 
 
 XXVI. The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville 555 
 
 XXVII. The Spanish-American War 588 
 
 Appendix 629 
 
 Index 673 
 
LECTURE I. 
 COLONIAL WARS. 
 
 (1*) Almost at the beginning of the seventeenth century 
 Canada became the battle-ground of the French and the Brit- 
 ish. The territory had been in dispute from the earliest 
 discoveries. 
 
 John Cabot, sailing under the flag of Henry VII. of England, 
 in 1497, gave the British their claim to this part of America; 
 but he only touched at the Island of Newfoundland. The 
 French rested their claim upon the discoveries of Verrazzano, 
 who planted their flag on the St. Lawrence in 1524. Jacques 
 Cartier followed, in 1534, and, in the name of France and the 
 Holy Roman Church, carried the flag and the cross higher up 
 the St. Lawrence. 
 
 In 1608 the French, under Champlain, established a trading 
 post at Quebec, which soon became an important town. In 
 1629 Admiral Kirk, with a British squadron, entered the St. 
 Lawrence and captured Quebec ; but it was restored to France 
 at the peace of St. Germain-en-Laye, in 1642. 
 
 Before the end of the seventeenth century the French had 
 pushed westward as far as Lake Superior, and, under the direc- 
 tion of the governor-general, Count de Frontenac, had, by 
 1680, built military posts at Niagara, Michilimackinac and in 
 the Illinois country. Later, Frontenac directed French and 
 Indian attacks against the English frontier of New England 
 and New York, and the English posts in the Hudson Bay coun- 
 try; and, in 1690, repulsed the attack of Sir William Phips, the 
 first royal governor of Massachusetts, who had sailed with a 
 fleet from Boston. A land force under General Winthrop of 
 Massachusetts was to have cooperated with the fleet under 
 Phips ; but it marched no farther than Lake Champlain. From 
 there "Winthrop, finding it impossible to do anything with the 
 disorderly forces of the main body, marched them back to 
 Albany."t A few months before, Phips had sailed with a fleet 
 from Boston, and captured Port Royal (now Annapolis, Nova 
 Scotia). A bloody border warfare, known in our history as 
 King William's War, was kept up until the year 1697. 
 
 *The numerals appearing in this volume refer to the maps numbered 
 serially in the volume of maps. 
 fRossiter Johnson, The Old French War. 
 
2 American Campaigns. 
 
 Queen Anne's War. 
 
 In 1702 the War of the Spanish Succession, known in Ameri- 
 can history as Queen Anne's War, broke out, and was the occa- 
 sion of a renewal of hostilities between the French and English 
 colonists. At length, to put an end to the depredations of the 
 French and Indians along their frontier, the English colonists 
 resolved to capture Canada itself by a combined invasion by 
 land and sea. The mother-country was asked for aid, and she 
 promised to send a fleet. This was to proceed from Boston, 
 while the land force, composed of colonial militia and Indian 
 allies, of the Five Nations [Iroquois], was to march northward, 
 by way of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River, under Col- 
 onel Nicholson, the lieutenant-governor of New York. Nichol- 
 son gathered his troops together and established a camp on the 
 upper Hudson ; and militia was collected and drilled for months 
 at Boston, pending the arrival of the squadron from England. 
 This squadron was also going to bring several regular British 
 regiments. At last, late in the autumn, word came that the 
 squadron and regulars could not be sent — they had to be dis- 
 patched to the Continent of Europe instead. Nicholson's force 
 on the upper Hudson, meanwhile, tired of waiting for the order 
 to advance, had dispersed. 
 
 The next year, however, 1710, a British squadron came over 
 and escorted Colonel Nicholson, with some 1,500 provincial 
 militia and 400 British marines, to Port Royal. Nicholson 
 captured the town and changed its name to Annapolis Royal, in 
 honor of Queen Anne. "Port Royal had twice before been 
 taken by New England men — once under Major Sedgwick in 
 1654, and again under Sir William Phips" (as we have seen) 
 "in the last war; and, in each case, it had been restored to 
 France by treaty. This time England kept what she had got ; 
 and as there was no other place of strength in the province, the 
 capture of Port Royal meant the conquest of Acadia."* 
 
 The following year, 1711, the British government undertook 
 in earnest the conquest of Canada. Seven veteran regiments, 
 five of which came from Marlborough's army, were sent over, 
 under General John Hill ; and a fleet, under Admiral Sir Hov- 
 enden Walker. Hill, known at court as "Jack Hill," was per- 
 fectly incompetent; the only reason for his appointment, was 
 the fact that he was a brother of Lady Abigail Masham, at that 
 
 ♦Parkman, A Half Century of Conflict. 
 
Colonial Wars. 3 
 
 time the favorite woman of Queen Anne's bed-chamber. Ad- 
 miral Walker was no better than Hill. 
 
 Besides the seven regiments of regulars, with artillery, about 
 5,500 men, there were some 800 marines and 1,500 provincial 
 militia. The fleet with this force was to sail for the St. Law- 
 rence and Quebec, while another force of militia, some 2,000, 
 under Colonel Nicholson, was to assemble near Lake Cham- 
 plain and move against Montreal. 
 
 The fleet sailed from Boston, with its army, on the 30th of 
 July ; but it never reached Quebec. In the lower St. Lawrence 
 it was caught in a gale, several of the transports were wrecked, 
 and nearly 900 soldiers perished. Discouraged by this mishap, 
 Walker and Hill, both of whom were faint-hearted, withdrew. 
 The British fleet, with the regulars, sailed back to England, and 
 the American militiamen returned in their transports to Boston. 
 
 Report of the disaster and return was dispatched to Colonel 
 Nicholson, whose army had not gone beyond Lake Champlain. 
 Parkman says, when the colonel "heard what had happened, he 
 was beside himself with rage, tore off his wig, threw it on the 
 ground and stamped upon it, crying out 'Roguery ! Treachery !' 
 When his fit was over, he did all that was now left for him to 
 do— burned the wooden forts he had built, marched back to 
 Albany, and disbanded his army." Thus ended the second 
 attempt to invade Canada by land and sea, and the monks and 
 nuns at Quebec were, no doubt, sure that Canada had been 
 saved from the heel of the unbeliever by their prayers. This 
 was the last serious effort against the French in Canada during 
 Queen Anne's War, which closed with the Treaty of Utrecht 
 in 1713. 
 
 After this treaty, a few years of peace followed between 
 France and England, during which the French in America 
 gradually "extended their dominion in the great West and the 
 Valley of the Mississippi, forming a complete cordon of settle- 
 ments about the English, who now saw that they must either 
 break the chain, or content themselves with the limitation of 
 their territory to the east of the Alleghanies."* 
 
 Canada was linked to the other French province, Louisiana, 
 "by a chain of settlements in the Mississippi Valley ; and, toward 
 the middle of the eighteenth century, French forts occupied 
 points controlling all the chief waterways between these two 
 widely separated colonies. "Niagara held the passage from 
 
 ^Historians' History, 
 
4 American Campaigns. 
 
 Lake Ontario to Lake Erie ; Detroit closed the entrance to Lake 
 Huron, and Michilimackinac guarded the point where Lake 
 Huron is joined by Lakes Michigan and Superior; while the 
 Fort called La Baye, at the head of Green Bay, stopped the way 
 to the Mississippi by Marquette's old route of the Fox River 
 and the Wisconsin. Another route to the Mississippi was con- 
 trolled by a post on the Maumee to watch the carrying-place 
 between that river and the Wabash, and by another on the 
 Wabash, where Vincennes now stands. La Salle's route, by 
 way of the Kankakee and the Illinois, was barred by a fort on 
 the St. Joseph; and even if, in spite of these obstructions, an 
 enemy should reach the Mississippi by any of the northern 
 affluents, the cannon of Fort Chartres would prevent him from 
 descending it."* 
 
 Geography. 
 
 It is now time to study the military geography of Canada, 
 before taking up the next invasion. We shall not consider its 
 geography of to-day, with its numerous cities and its great sys- 
 tems of railways and canals. Canada then, as now, was con- 
 tiguous to the northern frontier of New England and New 
 York ; all the territory north of the St. Lawrence and the Great 
 Lakes was acknowledged to belong to the French. From the 
 lakes southward the territory was claimed by both the French 
 and the English ; and the boundary between Canada, on the one 
 side, and New England and New York, on the other, had not 
 been fixed, and was a constant cause of trouble and border war. 
 
 The country of the Iroquois or Five Nationsf and the Algon- 
 quins lay between the frontiers of the English and the French 
 settlements. The Algonquins were always allies of the French, 
 and the Iroquois were generally allies of the English. 
 
 Canada was then a vast wilderness, without roads or routes 
 of travel, except its waterways and such trails as the Indians 
 had made. Quebec and Montreal were the only towns in the 
 interior; and, as Quebec was the capital, besides absolutely 
 commanding the St. Lawrence, any invasion of Canada must 
 have this town for its main objective. And, as there were no 
 roads, any invasion of Canada must confine itself mainly to 
 
 *Parkman, A Half Century of Conflict. 
 
 tThe original Five Nations were the Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, 
 Cayugas, and Senecas. In 1713 the Tuscaroras from North Carolina 
 joined the confederacy and formed "The Six Nations."— Sloane. 
 
Colonial Wars. 5 
 
 r ater routes. The first of such routes, in importance, was, of 
 Durse, the St. Lawrence, by which ships could ascend right to 
 lontreal, if not stopped by hostile fleets or the cannon of 
 )uebec. 
 
 An examination of the map shows a water-shed, about mid- 
 day between the Atlantic coast of New England and the St. 
 .awrence, in which a number of rivers rise ; they flow toward 
 le Atlantic and the St. Lawrence, respectively. This water- 
 aed was the carrying-place between all the water routes con- 
 ecting these parts of the old French and English provinces, 
 etween the ocean and the great river. 
 
 Starting in the east, first we see the St. John River, whose 
 eadwaters are within ten miles of water that flows to the St. 
 -awrence. The St. John, however, could never be available as 
 
 line of invasion, because, in the first place, its mouth and the 
 reater part of its course lie in territory always acknowledged 
 3 be a part of Canada. Its mouth is too far away from Bos- 
 Dn, or any other base, to reach by land ; and it does not corn- 
 are to the St. Lawrence as a line of invasion to be taken by a 
 eet. Furthermore, its mouth was guarded by a French fort. 
 ?he next river is the Penobscot ; but its headwaters are not as 
 ear the Chaudiere, or any other stream emptying into the St. 
 .-awrence, as are the headwaters of the Kennebec. Then 
 omes the Connecticut River, with the St. Francis on the oppo- 
 ite side of the carrying-place. Next and last is the Hudson, 
 nth Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River on the St. Law- 
 ence slope. This was the shortest and easiest route, and the 
 ne usually taken by the Five Nations, on their incursions into 
 he French settlements of the St. Lawrence. This route, how- 
 ver, if followed to the mouth of the Richelieu, would have 
 Montreal on its flank ; hence an expedition by this line should 
 ave Montreal, and not Quebec, for its primary objective. 
 
 The other two water routes by which Montreal and Quebec 
 nd the heart of Canada could be approached from the south, 
 /ere : first, the route by way of Lake Ontario and down the St. 
 .awrence ; and second, the route across Lake Huron and Geor- 
 ian Bay, and thence by French River, Lake Nipissing and the 
 )ttawa River. These two routes were, of course, not available 
 i the early days. They were too far away from the English 
 ettlements, and too long, and they were perfectly guarded by 
 French forts. Besides, the rapids in the St. Lawrence above 
 Montreal were a serious obstacle to the passage down this 
 iver. 
 
6 American Campaigns. 
 
 King George's War. 
 
 "The Peace of Utrecht had left unsettled the perilous ques- 
 tions of boundary between the rival powers in North America, 
 and they grew more perilous every day . . . yet it was, 
 as before, a European and not an American quarrel that" was 
 to bring the colonists to blows again. "The War of the Aus- 
 trian Succession broke out in 1744. When Frederick of Prus- 
 sia seized Silesia and began that bloody conflict, it meant that 
 packs of howling savages would again spread fire and carnage 
 along the New England border."* 
 
 This was known in America as King George's War. Besides 
 the bloody border warfare, its principal event was the capture 
 of Louisburg by a bold expedition of New England militia, 
 under William Pepperrell. Next to Quebec, Louisburg was the 
 strongest fortress in America. It was also a French naval sta- 
 tion, and, situated as it was on the Island of Cape Breton, it 
 commanded the entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. 
 
 (2) Pepperrell's expedition, about 4,000 strong, sailed out 
 of Massachusetts Bay on the 24th of March, 1745, and, on the 
 2nd of May the first troops landed near Louisburg. The for- 
 tress was garrisoned by 560 regular soldiers and some 1,300 or 
 1,400 militia. The New Englanders captured an outlying bat- 
 tery by assault, and turned its guns on the main fort. Then 
 they laid siege to the place. On the 17th of June the com- 
 mander surrendered, and the New Englanders took possession. 
 The fortress was returned to the French by the Treaty of Aix- 
 la-Chapelle, which terminated the war, in 1748. 
 
 French and Indian War. 
 
 (1) Eight years of peace followed, during which the Eng- 
 lish strengthened their position in America by founding the for- 
 tified city of Halifax, in 1749; and the French established a 
 new line of forts closer about the English frontier on the west. 
 
 The English did not regard these encroachments of the 
 French with complacence. So, late in 1753, Governor Din- 
 widdie of Virginia dispatched Major George Washington, 
 Adjutant-General of the Virginia militia, to Fort Le Bceuf to 
 demand of the French commander, that the French should 
 withdraw from Virginia soil. Early in 1754 Washington was 
 
 *Parkman. 
 
Colonial Wars. 7 
 
 sent back to the country of the Monongahela River, with some 
 militia and one company of British regulars, to oppose the 
 advance of the French. Here he came into contact with the 
 French, near a place called the Great Meadows. This was the 
 opening of the French and Indian War. A few weeks later, 
 Washington was attacked in the fort which he had built and 
 named Fort Necessity ; he was compelled to surrender to supe- 
 rior numbers, but was allowed to march out with the honors 
 of war. 
 
 In February, 1755, General Braddock arrived in Virginia 
 with two regiments of British regulars. He was met at Alex- 
 andria by several provincial governors, and a plan of cam- 
 paign against the French was arranged. The French were to 
 be attacked at four points at once, by independent forces. 
 Braddock was to lead his two regiments and a force of militia 
 against Fort Duquesne; a force of two provincial regiments 
 was to attack Niagara; a body of provincials was to seize the 
 French post at Crown Point; and the fourth column was to 
 operate in Acadia. 
 
 Braddock marched his command to Fort Cumberland, where 
 his troops, all told, numbered some 2,200. He had remarked to 
 Benjamin Franklin, "I shall hardly need to stop more than 
 three or four days at Fort Duquesne ; then I shall march on to 
 Niagara, and from there to Frontenac." He was a veteran 
 British soldier, and had hardly less contempt for provincial 
 troops than he had for the Indian allies of the French. He 
 paid little heed to the advice of Colonel Washington, who ac- 
 companied his expedition as an aide-de-camp.* With 1,373 
 picked men, he moved against Fort Duquesne. On crossing 
 the Monongahela River, about ten miles from the fort, without 
 a single scout to give warning, he fell into an ambuscade set 
 for him by the French and Indians; and in the dense forest, 
 his command was cut to pieces and routed. 
 
 (3), (4) This happened on the 9th of July, 1755. Out of 
 eighty-six British officers, sixty-three were killed or disabled, 
 Braddock being mortally wounded; and only 459 of the rank 
 and file came off unhurt. On the other side, only sixteen white 
 men, and about thirty-five Indians, were killed or wounded, 
 d) The British fell back to Fort Cumberland, whence the 
 commander who succeeded Braddock marched his regulars to 
 Philadelphia, leaving the few provincials to hold the fort and 
 defend the English frontier. 
 
 *Rossiter Johnson. 
 
$ American Campaigns. 
 
 The expedition to Acadia was entirely successful, and re- 
 sulted in the capture of the French forts at Beausejour and 
 "St. John. 
 
 The force to operate against Crown Point assembled at 
 Albany. In July, 1755, there were present about 3,000 provin- 
 cials and 300 Indians of the Six Nations. The command of 
 the enterprise was given to a young Irishman, named William 
 Johnson, who "had never seen service and knew nothing of 
 war."* His chief reputation rested upon his knowledge of the 
 Indians and his great influence among them. "While the Brit- 
 ish colonists were preparing to attack Crown Point, the French 
 of Canada were preparing to defend it."* Baron Dieskau, with 
 3,537 regulars, Canadians, and Indians, was assigned the task 
 of defending it. He led his command up the Richelieu, and 
 .'embarked it in boats and canoes for Crown Point. 
 
 Johnson's main body moved up the river to the carrying- 
 place between the Hudson and Lake George, where it built a 
 fortified storehouse, and called it Fort Lyman, after one of its 
 officers. The name was afterward changed to Fort Edward. 
 Later the army moved to the head of Lake George, leaving 500 
 men to garrison Fort Lyman. 
 
 (5) "While Johnson lay at Lake George, Dieskau prepared 
 to surprise him." He had no thought of waiting at Crown 
 Point to be attacked by a "mob of countrymen," as he consid- 
 ered Johnson's ununif ormed army. So he issued his order for 
 an advance, one paragraph of which directed, that "Indians are 
 not to amuse themselves by taking scalps until the enemy is 
 entirely defeated."* Then he moved upon Ticonderoga, which 
 ^commanded both of the routes by which Johnson might 
 advance. 
 
 A provincial brought in by Dieskau's scouts told him that 
 Johnson's army had fallen back to Albany, leaving but a small 
 garrison at Fort Lyman. Dieskau resolved to capture this 
 garrison. With some 200 regulars, 700 Canadians, and 600 
 Indians, he embarked in canoes, and went to the head of 
 South Bay ; there he began the march through the forest for 
 Fort Lyman. On the way he ran upon some teams from the 
 English camp at the head of Lake George, killed some of the 
 teamsters, and captured two of them. Some fled to their camp. 
 'The two prisoners told Dieskau of the large camp of his enemy 
 
 *Parkman. 
 
Colonial Wars. 9 
 
 at the head of Lake George. So he resolved to attack the 
 camp with his little force, and turned in that direction. Soon 
 his scouts brought in word that a column of English troops 
 was approaching. 
 
 Learning of the advance of the French column from the 
 teamsters that had escaped capture, Johnson sent out two col- 
 umns, of 500 men each, to cut it off. One detachment marched 
 toward Fort Lyman, and the other toward South Bay. It was 
 the latter which was now reported by Dieskau's scouts. Dies- 
 kau prepared an ambush for the column, into which it care- 
 lessly walked. Many of the provincials and their Indian allies 
 were slain, and the rest hurried back to their camp. Dieskau 
 then moved against the camp, defended by "between 1,600 and 
 1,700 rustics" and a lot of Indians, and assaulted it.* Dieskau 
 was wounded and captured, and his force was repulsed and put 
 to flight. "Of the provincial soldiers, he remarked, soon after 
 the battle, that in the morning they fought like good boys, 
 about noon like men, and in the afternoon like devils."* 
 
 But the Crown Point expedition was at an end. Johnson did 
 not follow up his success. He thought only of holding his 
 position. He made a solid breastwork to defend his camp, and, 
 as reinforcements arrived, set them at building a fort. Within 
 a fortnight his enemy was intrenched at Ticonderoga in force 
 enough to defy him. Finally, as winter came on, a small gar- 
 rison was left to hold the fort, which Johnson named William 
 Henry, after one of the King's grandsons, and the rest of John- 
 son's army dispersed to their homes. 
 
 Johnson had shown incompetence from first to last, and what 
 success he had gained, was due to General Lyman. Yet he 
 made no mention of Lyman in his report, but took all the credit 
 to himself; — so Parliament voted him 5,000 pounds, and the 
 King made him a baronet. 
 
 Niagara Expedition. 
 
 (1) The expedition for the capture of Fort Niagara also 
 assembled at Albany, in the summer of 1755. It was about 
 1,500 strong, and Governor Shirley of Massachusetts took com- 
 mand of it in person. It marched up the Mohawk Valley to 
 Oswego. There Shirley was persuaded that it would not do 
 for him to advance against Niagara, leaving the French garri- 
 
 *Parkman. 
 
10 American Campaigns. 
 
 son at Fort Frontenac to capture Oswego in his rear, and cut 
 him off from his communications and supplies; but his force- 
 was not strong enough to attack Frontenac. So the expedition 
 was given up and Shirley returned to Albany. 
 
 Operations of 1756. 
 
 In the summer of 1756 England and France formally de- 
 clared war against each other. General Montcalm was sent 
 over to command the French, and Earl Loudon was made 
 commander-in-chief of the British forces in America. 
 
 In August Montcalm took a force across Lake Ontario, while 
 the English were making preparations at Albany, and captured 
 the little garrison at Oswego. He destroyed the place and 
 returned to Montreal. Montcalm then went to Fort Ticon- 
 deroga, where he took station with some 5,000 regulars and 
 Canadian militia. 
 
 Loudon had about 10,000 men posted from Albany to Lake- 
 George. Neither army took the offensive. The belligerents- 
 contented themselves with scouting and minor operations ; and, 
 as winter approached, both commanders left small garrisons at 
 their advanced posts, Forts William Henry and Ticonderoga, 
 respectively, and withdrew their armies into winter quarters, 
 the French to Canada, and the British regulars to New York, 
 Boston, and Philadelphia. The provincial militiamen returned 
 to their firesides. 
 
 Operations of 1757. 
 
 The campaign was to be opened in 1757, by the British, with 
 the capture of Louisburg, followed by an advance up the St. 
 Lawrence against Quebec. Accordingly, a squadron sailed 
 from England for Halifax ; and Loudon, having stripped the 
 New York frontier of all its best troops, embarked at New 
 York with about 12,000 men. 
 
 In the early part of July the fleet and Loudon's army were 
 at Halifax; and all was ready for a descent upon Louisburg, 
 when it was learned that a strong French fleet was in the har- 
 bor of Louisburg, and the garrison of that fortress had been 
 increased to 7,000. The enterprise was therefore abandoned, 
 and Loudon sailed back to New York with his army. 
 
 But Montcalm had, meantime, taken advantage of the ab- 
 sence of Loudon's army. In July he gathered together a force 
 
V^vyjLjV^iN J.J-1J-. VV-rt-IYO. 
 
 of about 8,000 regulars, Canadians, and Indians at Ticon- 
 deroga, for a movement against Fort William Henry. (6) In 
 August he laid siege to this fort and compelled its commander 
 to surrender; while the British General Webb rested quietly at 
 Fort Edward, a few miles away, with a considerable force, but 
 refused to march to the assistance of the garrison. 
 
 (1) The honors of war were granted in the terms of capit- 
 ulation, and the paroled English were to be escorted to Fort 
 Edward ; but Montcalm and his officers were unable to restrain 
 their savages, who massacred a number of the English. The 
 French destroyed the fort and withdrew. Had Montcalm 
 marched on to Fort Edward, he could have captured it without 
 an effort, so demoralized with fear were General Webb and his 
 provincials. 
 
 Operations of 1758. 
 
 The war kindled in the American forests was now raging in 
 Europe, where it came to be known as the Seven Years' War. 
 England was joined with Frederick the Great of Prussia, 
 against nearly all the rest of Europe, and had suffered many 
 losses and disasters. 
 
 Finally the great Pitt was made Premier of England, and he 
 soon brought about a change, as much by putting the right men 
 in command of British armies as anything else. He recalled 
 Loudon from America, though, against his judgment, he had, 
 for political reasons, to leave Abercrombie in command there. 
 His first move in America, in 1758, was to fit out a fleet and 
 army to capture Louisburg, with Quebec as the ultimate objec- 
 tive. Delay had thwarted last year's attempt against Louis- 
 burg; it was not going to do so again. So, before the winter 
 had ended, Admiral Boscawen's fleet had sailed. So active 
 was the British navy, also, around the coasts of France that, 
 "of the many ships fitted out this year for the succor of Canada 
 and Louisburg, comparatively few reached their destination."* 
 
 At the end of May the fleet, and the army of 11,000 British 
 regulars, were at Halifax. General Jeffrey Amherst was in 
 command of the land forces, and his most active and trusted 
 lieutenant was General James Wolfe. Both had distinguished 
 themselves on the Continent. 
 
 (2) Amherst's army sailed for Louisburg, and made a 
 landing, in the early days of June. The fleet guarded the 
 
 *Parkman. 
 
12 American Campaigns. 
 
 entrance to the harbor, in which twelve French men-of-war 
 were shut up. The army invested the fortress, and after con- 
 siderable fighting, in which Wolfe greatly distinguished him- 
 self, the garrison was surrendered as prisoners of war, on the 
 27th of July, 1758. 
 
 (S) Let us now see what was doing on the New York fron- 
 tier in the meantime. The year before, Loudon had asked the 
 colonies for 4,000 men, and he could hardly get them ; this year, 
 Pitt asked them for 20,000, and they responded with alacrity. 
 And now, in June, Abercrombie had an army of more than 
 15,000 men, over 6,000 of whom were British regulars, en- 
 camped about the ruins of Fort William Henry, at the head of 
 Lake George. It was the largest body of troops that had ever 
 been assembled on the American continent. Abercrombie was 
 in command, but the "soul of the army" was young Lord 
 Howe, whom General Wolfe called "the best soldier in the 
 British army." He was a brother of the two British Howes of 
 the Revolutionary War. 
 
 Montcalm was at Ticonderoga, with only 3,600 soldiers to 
 defend it. On the morning of July 5 Abercrombie's army em- 
 barked in boats for Ticonderoga. (7) By noon on the 6th 
 the army had landed at the north end of Lake George, and 
 was on its way through the forest, to assault the French fort. 
 Lord Howe was in front with the scouts, and was killed 
 almost immediately. And "the death of one man was the ruin 
 of 15,000," says Parkman. At any rate the attack on the fort, 
 made on the 8th, failed. The English made five assaults 
 against a strong line of abatis, and were repulsed with great 
 slaughter; whereupon Abercrombie retreated in panic, and 
 took to his boats. So disgusted were the Americans with their 
 British general, that from this time forth they called him 
 "Mrs. Nabby Crombie."* 
 
 (1) In another quarter the English had met with better 
 success. Colonel John Bradstreet had led 3,000 provincials, 
 and some Indians, up the Mohawk to attempt the capture of 
 Fort Frontenac. From Oswego, they crossed the lake, and, 
 on the 25th of August, captured the little French garrison with 
 nine war-ships, and great quantities of supplies. They de- 
 stroyed the fort and returned to Oswego. 
 
 "Next to Louisburg, this was the heaviest blow that the 
 French had yet received. Their command of Lake Ontario 
 
 *Parkman. 
 
Colonial Wars. 13 
 
 was gone. New France was cut in two; and, unless the sev- 
 ered parts could speedily reunite, all the posts of the interior 
 would be in imminent jeopardy. If Bradstreet had been fol- 
 lowed by another body of men, to reoccupy and rebuild Os- 
 wego, thus recovering a harbor on Lake Ontario, all the cap- 
 tured French vessels could have been brought thither, and the 
 command of this inland sea assured at once. Even as it was, 
 the advantages were immense. A host of savage warriors, 
 thus far inclined to France, or wavering between the two bel- 
 ligerents, stood henceforth neutral, or gave themselves to Eng- 
 land; while Fort Duquesne, deprived of the supplies on which 
 it depended, could make but faint resistance to its advancing 
 enemy."* 
 
 "Amherst, with five regiments from Louisburg, came, early 
 in October, to join Abercrombie at Lake George" ; but the gen- 
 erals decided that it was too late to make another effort against 
 Ticonderoga. Soon afterwards the two opposing armies with- 
 drew, each to its winter quarters. 
 
 This year, 1758, saw Fort Duquesne fall into the hands of 
 the British. Brigadier John Forbes spent the whole summer 
 chopping a road through the forests, from Fort Cumberland, 
 but found, when he finally reached the fort, in November, that 
 the French garrison had already abandoned it. The abandon- 
 ment had, doubtless, been due more to the capture of Fort 
 Frontenac, and the destruction of the French depot at that 
 point, than to fear of Forbes's provincials. Forbes took pos- 
 session of the place and changed its name to Fort Pitt, in 
 honor of the great Premier. Two months before, in Septem- 
 ber, the advanced force of Forbes's command, under Major 
 Grant, had attacked the French at Fort Duquesne, and met as 
 disastrous a defeat as General Braddock's. An important 
 achievement of Forbes's expedition was its winning to the side 
 of the English several large Indian tribes that had hitherto been 
 allies of the French. 
 
 "So ended the campaign of 1758. The center of the French 
 had held its own triumphantly at Ticonderoga; but their left 
 had been forced back by the capture of Louisburg, and their 
 right by that of Fort Duquesne ; while their entire right wing 
 had been well-nigh cut off by the destruction of Fort Fron- 
 tenac. The outlook was dark. Their own Indians were turn- 
 ing against them."* 
 
 *Parkman. 
 
14 American Campaigns. 
 
 Wolfe. 
 
 In the winter of 1758 and 1759 Pitt planned an expedition 
 against Quebec which was destined to transfer Canada from 
 the French to the British crown. General Wolfe was placed in 
 command of it. On the 26th of June, 1759, the fleet bearing 
 Wolfe's army anchored off the south shore of the Island of 
 Orleans, just below Quebec, and the army, some 9,000 strong, 
 went into camp on that island. 
 
 (8) The French in Canada had expected this movement, 
 and General Montcalm and the governor-general had taken 
 such steps as they could take to oppose it; but they received 
 almost no assistance from France. All available French troops 
 were needed on the Continent; and, furthermore, the British 
 navy kept such close watch over the seas that France did not 
 dare start a fleet of troop-ships for America. But all the 
 Canadian militia were called out, which, with the available 
 regulars, gave Montcalm a force of about 14,000 troops, be- 
 sides some Indians, for the defense of Quebec. 
 
 Quebec, called the "Gibraltar of America," has one of the 
 strongest positions, naturally, in the world, as viewed from the 
 front. It stands upon a high point jutting out into the St. 
 Lawrence, which here suddenly narrows to about 1,200 yards. 
 At the foot of the steep bluff leading down from the Upper 
 City lies a narrow space of flat ground occupied by the Lower 
 City. The place was perfectly protected from the river side by 
 forts and cannon. The principal defensive work was the stone 
 citadel, whose artillery swept the river-front. Just below the 
 town is the St. Charles River, unfordable. Its single bridge 
 was defended by a bridge head, and its mouth was obstructed 
 by a boom of logs. This boom was guarded by a battery of 
 heavy guns, resting upon three sunken ships ; and there were 
 earthworks along the shore on either side. Three or four 
 miles down the river are other high cliffs extending all the 
 way to the Falls of Montmorenci. Between the foot of this 
 line of cliffs and the river, lies a strand two or three hundred 
 yards wide. 
 
 Montcalm did not seriously consider the probability of an 
 attack on the up-stream side of the city — he did not suppose 
 troops could be passed up in boats. So he stretched his army, 
 below the town, from the St. Charles to the gorge of the 
 Montmorenci. Among other means, the French had prepared 
 a number of fire-ships with which they expected to destroy the 
 
Colonial Wars. 15 
 
 British ships. These were set on fire and started toward the 
 British fleet ; but the British sailors grappled them with iron 
 hooks, and pulled them ashore, where they burned without 
 doing any damage. 
 
 Wolfe dispatched a detachment to seize Point Levi, and he 
 posted batteries there to shell Quebec. On the 8th of July 
 several British frigates stood out in the stream and bombarded 
 the part of the French lines on the heights just above the 
 Falls of Montmorenci ; and that night 3,000 British soldiers 
 made a landing just below the falls. There they intrenched 
 themselves. 
 
 On the 18th of July several British vessels safely ran past 
 the batteries at Quebec, and destroyed some fire-ships and other 
 •craft above the town. Now, for the first time, Montcalm be- 
 came alarmed about the defense at the upper side of the city, 
 and dispatched a thousand or more men from his main line 
 to that side. On the other hand, an English detachment 
 dragged a fleet of boats over Point Levi, and made ready to 
 embark in them for the opposite bank of the river. 
 
 Wolfe's army was now stretched from the Falls of Mont- 
 morenci to a point beyond Point Levi, and occupied four de- 
 tached camps, no two of which could assist each other in case 
 of attack. Montcalm lost his opportunity in not taking advan- 
 tage of his condition. But the French stood strictly on the 
 defensive. At the end of July the two armies were still watch- 
 ing each other across the St. Lawrence and the Montmorenci, 
 •each waiting for the other to strike. Wolfe resolved to attack 
 the left wing of the French in front and flank. 
 
 At low tide the mouth of the Montmorenci could be crossed 
 ■on the bar. During the day chosen to make the attack, feints 
 were made along the right of the French line ; but they failed to 
 deceive Montcalm, who massed his troops on the left. The 
 attack was made toward sunset, when the tide was out ; but the 
 British were repulsed with heavy loss. 
 
 TlCONDEROGA AND CROWN POINT. 
 
 ( 1 ) Pitt had directed that a column should move by way of 
 Ticonderoga and Crown Point, to operate in conjunction with 
 Wolfe's against Montreal and Quebec. General Amherst com- 
 manded this column. Toward the end of June [1759], he had 
 reached the head of Lake George, with 11,000 men, half regu- 
 lars and half provincials. 
 
16 American Campaigns. 
 
 Amherst was very cautious and methodical; he moved so 
 slowly, and spent so much time building and repairing forts, as 
 he went along, reconnoitering roads in all directions, and build- 
 ing a fleet on Lake Champlain, that, although the French aban- 
 doned Ticonderoga and Crown Point, without an effort to save 
 them, and fell back to Isle-aux-Noix, cold weather had come 
 on, before Amherst was ready to move beyond Crown Point. 
 Here he stopped and spent the rest of the winter. 
 
 During the same time, a detachment was operating against 
 the French post at Niagara, which it succeeded in capturing 
 toward the end of the summer. "The capture of Niagara was 
 an important stroke. Thenceforth Detroit, Michilimackinac, 
 Illinois, and all the other French interior posts were severed 
 from Canada, and left in helpless isolation."* 
 
 But the expedition against Niagara was none the less a mis- 
 take. "If, at the end of Winter [1758-9], Amherst had begun, 
 as he might have done, the building of armed vessels at the 
 head of Lake Champlain, he would have had a navy ready to 
 his hand before August, and would have been able to follow the 
 retreating French without delay, and to attack them at Isle- 
 aux-Noix, before they had finished their fortifications. And if, 
 at the same time, he had directed Prideaux, instead of attack- 
 ing Niagara, to cooperate with him by descending the St. Law- 
 rence to Montreal, the prospect was good that the two armies 
 would have united at that place, and ended the campaign by the 
 reduction of all Canada. In this case Niagara and all the west- 
 ern posts would have fallen without a blow."* 
 
 Heights of Abraham. 
 
 (•8) After his repulse at the Heights of Montmorenci,. 
 Wolfe made every effort to induce the French to come out of 
 their intrenchments and fight him in the open; but without 
 avail. He had his detachments lay waste the country, devas- 
 tating farms and destroying villages — making the war as un- 
 comfortable as possible for the Canadians. But all their ap- 
 peals for protection could not make Montcalm budge from his 
 position. 
 
 Wolfe was desperate. He felt that he must do something- 
 but the French position was so strong, he could find no point to- 
 strike with any hope of success. To make matters worse, he 
 
 *Parkman. 
 
V^U-LUfllAi. WARS. 1/ 
 
 fell desperately ill. While still confined to his bed, at his camp 
 near the mouth of the Montmorenci, he asked his three briga- 
 dier-generals to confer together and select a point of attack. 
 They suggested attacking the upper side of the town, and 
 Wolfe approved their suggestion. Accordingly, "with every 
 fair wind, ships and transports" and lighters "passed the bat- 
 teries of Quebec" to the upper river, and twelve hundred 
 troops marched overland to embark in the vessels. 
 
 To oppose this force, Bougainville with 1,500 Frenchmen 
 was sent to Cap-Rouge, about eight miles above Quebec. The 
 French governor had made the mistake of running his frigates 
 up the river, and taking away their sailors to man land bat- 
 teries. Had these frigates been available now, they could have 
 destroyed the British ships one at a time, as they came up 
 stream. 
 
 British batteries at Point Levi continued to bombard Que- 
 bec, and on the 3rd of September Wolfe evacuated his camp at 
 the mouth of the Montmorenci. Demonstrations were made 
 against the French position at Cap-Rouge, and also below the 
 city, at B'eauport ; and the fleet above the city drifted with the 
 tide first down stream and then up. Meantime, Wolfe had dis- 
 covered, with his telescope, a trail leading up to the heights 
 above the town from Anse-du-Foulog,- about two miles up- 
 stream from Quebec. It led up to the Plains of Abraham. 
 
 Montcalm had little fear of an attempt to scale these heights. 
 He had said that a hundred men at this point could stop an 
 army; and so they could, if they had stayed awake. The 
 French were greatly perplexed by the movements of Wolfe's 
 troops and ships. Winter was coming on, and they were in 
 hopes it all meant that the English were making ready to sail 
 away, before their ships got caught in the ice. They never- 
 theless kept watch all along the line. Montcalm believed that, 
 if Wolfe attacked at all, he would attack below the city ; so he 
 remained himself at Beauport, and kept the bulk of his force 
 there. 
 
 At 2 o'clock on the morning of September 13 [1759], the land- 
 ing-boats cast off with Wolfe's army; and after twenty-four 
 volunteers had surprised and captured, or put to flight, the 
 company of Canadians guarding the trail leading up the heights 
 from Anse-du-Foulon, the entire British force was put ashore. 
 Up the trail, and through the rocks and brush, the soldiers 
 clambered to the heights above ; by six o'clock they were form- 
 ing line on the Plains of Abraham. 
 
18 American Campaigns. 
 
 "The plains were a tract of grass, tolerably level in most 
 parts, patched here and there with cornfields, studded with 
 clumps of bushes, and forming a part of the high plateau at the 
 eastern end of which Quebec stood. On the south, it was 
 bounded by the declivities along the St. Lawrence; on the 
 north, by those along the St. Charles. ... At the place 
 that Wolfe chose for his battle-field, the plateau was less than 
 a mile wide."* Quebec was hardly a mile away, but the view 
 of the town was cut off by a wooded hill, called Buttes-a- 
 Neveu. Upon this hill the first French soldiers appeared at 
 about six o'clock. 
 
 All the evening before, the main British fleet had shelled the 
 French camp at Beauport, and Montcalm had kept his troops 
 on the alert there all night, fully expecting an attack. At day- 
 break he heard cannon-fire above the town. The French bat- 
 teries up the river were firing at the British ships in that quar- 
 ter. Montcalm mounted his horse and started up the river. 
 Suddenly he caught sight of the British troops on the Plains of 
 Abraham. He had his army brought forward. 
 
 Wolfe's army was in line waiting to be attacked— -he knew 
 now that the French must come out and try to drive him away. 
 
 Montcalm's army was slow in getting up — due mainly to the 
 meddling of the governor-general. Finally it formed, and 
 skirmishing began. At ten o'clock, the French charged in 
 three columns. "The British advanced a few rods, then halted 
 and stood still. When the French were within forty yards," 
 the British opened on them with volleys. "The advancing 
 masses stopped short, and turned into a frantic mob, shouting, 
 cursing, gesticulating."* Then the British charged, driving 
 the French in rout before them. Wolfe led the charge, and 
 was shot three times, and died on the field ; Montcalm was car- 
 ried away in the flight, and was mortally wounded. 
 
 But the British had to stop their pursuit, because the French 
 force from Cap-Rouge was coming up in their rear; they had 
 to turn and repel that foe. The British intrenched themselves 
 upon the battle-field. They could not assault the town, which 
 was defended by a wall and fortifications. 
 
 In this battle Wolfe had about 3,200 men engaged, and Mont- 
 calm, about 5,000. The British had succeeded in dragging one 
 cannon up the heights ; the French had but two on the field. 
 The British loss was 664 ; the French, about 650. In the num- 
 
 *Parkman. 
 
Colonial Wars. 19 
 
 bers engaged the combat was a small affair ; but in its results, 
 it was one of the world's greatest battles; it gave Canada to 
 England. 
 
 Wolfe took great chances. If he had been defeated, he 
 would have been cut off and captured or destroyed. He had 
 no line of retreat, nor way of escape. He fought against supe- 
 rior numbers, and, albeit his British regulars were Hetter sol- 
 diers than the Canadians composing the bulk of Montcalm's 
 force, if Montcalm's army had gone into the fight in better 
 shape, and the detachment from Cap-Rouge, 2,000 men, had 
 got up sooner, it is hard to see how the British could have been 
 victorious. 
 
 Montcalm ought to have waited for the detachment from 
 Cap-Rouge before assaulting. Moreover, there were other 
 troops at Beauport, and in the city, that he ought to have had 
 at his disposal; they were withheld by the governor. Mont- 
 calm also made the mistake of attacking with all his troops, in- 
 stead of holding some in reserve. A strong reserve, put into 
 the fight at the right moment and place, might have saved the 
 day. 
 
 But fortune appears to have been on the side of the British in 
 this engagement. In the first place, the French commander at 
 Cap-Rouge had given orders for some transports to slip down 
 to Quebec, keeping close to the shore, that night ; and sentinels 
 all along the shore had been cautioned not to fire on them, and 
 not to attract the attention of the British ships to them. The- 
 transports were recalled, but the sentinels were not notified of 
 it. This circumstance enabled the British boats to go along- 
 shore without being fired upon, or causing the French camps 
 to be alarmed. Then the neglect of the guard at the trail up 
 the heights let the British pass. There were other lucky cir- 
 cumstances for the British. 
 
 Fall of Quebec. 
 
 The death of Montcalm left Vaudreuil, the dishonest, incom- 
 petent governor-general, in full military, as well as civil, au- 
 thority in Canada. 
 
 He had his routed army collected at Beauport. Instead of 
 uniting it with the troops from Cap-Rouge, and attacking the 
 small British force besieging Quebec, he fled with his com- 
 mand, and did not halt till he had reached Jacques Cartier, 
 thirty miles up the river. Here he was met by General Levis 
 
20 American Campaigns. 
 
 from Montreal, who persuaded him to march back to the relief 
 of the beleaguered city. But hardly had he started the army 
 back, when he received word that the commandant at Quebec 
 had already surrendered. He returned to Jacques Cartier. 
 
 The British navy and all troops, except about 3,000, sailed 
 for England. General Murray was left to command the gar- 
 rison at Quebec. 
 
 During the following winter there was continual petty war- 
 fare between English detachments from the garrison on one 
 side and French and Indians on the other, and constant rumors 
 of the advance of the French army from Montreal, to attack 
 the garrison. But it was not until the end of April, 1760, that 
 Levis actually appeared with his army. Murray marched his 
 little force of 3,000 out to meet his enemy, more than twice as 
 strong ; attacked him ; lost a third of his force ; and was driven 
 back within the city walls. 
 
 Levis laid siege to the town ; but Murray made a stout de- 
 fense, and kept him at bay, until a British fleet appeared in the 
 river. The fleet destroyed Levis's store-ships, which forced 
 the French to raise the siege and retreat to Montreal. 
 
 (1) General Amherst, commander-in-chief of the British 
 forces in America, now, in 1760, planned a combined move- 
 ment of three columns for the capture of Montreal, and the 
 completion of the conquest of Canada. Murray was to move 
 up from Quebec ; Haviland, with a column from Crown Point, 
 •was to advance by way of the Richelieu River; and he himself, 
 with a column, was to march down the St. Lawrence. 
 
 This was a hazardous combination, as it gave the French 
 forces, watching these three armies, the opportunity to unite 
 and fall upon each column separately. But the French failed 
 to take advantage of the opportunity, and opposed little real 
 resistance to the advance of any one of the three British 
 columns. 
 
 Early in September, 1760, the three British columns had 
 united around Montreal; and the French army, under Vau- 
 dreuil, was invested in the town. On the morning of Septem- 
 ber 8 Vaudreuil signed articles of capitulation. By these 
 articles Canada and all its dependencies passed to the British 
 Crown. The cession was confirmed by the Treaty of Paris, 
 signed February 10, 1763. 
 
LECTURE II. 
 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. 
 
 Northern Campaigns. 
 
 (9) However interesting the causes of the American Revo- 
 lution and the political events that led up to it may be to us, we 
 cannot, for lack of time, consider them here in detail. Suffice 
 it to say that the wrongs were not all on one side, nor the 
 rights all on the other. 
 
 All had gone well in the Colonies up to the close of the 
 French Wars and the cession by France to England of Canada 
 and the territory between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi 
 by the Treaty of Paris in 1763. The colonies had furnished 
 their quotas of men and money for those wars, and there had 
 been no disloyalty. There had been a good deal of hard feel- 
 ing on account of the contempt shown by the British regulars 
 for their allies of the American militia in the French and In- 
 dian Wars, and the arrogance of the British officers ; and there 
 had been much discontent and complaint on account of the bil- 
 leting of British troops upon the people. But there had been 
 no rupture. In all those wars, however, the colonies had done 
 about as they pleased. There were laws for their government, 
 but so necessary had been their good-will and support to the 
 mother country during the wars with France, that the laws 
 which did not please them had practically become a dead letter. 
 
 About the only real bond that tied them to the authority of 
 England, was the colonial governors ; but they were dependent 
 upon the behest of the colonial legislatures for their pay; so 
 their vetoes were easily bought off. Of a truth, the provincial 
 legislatures brought the governors to terms, by refusing to vote 
 their salaries.* 
 
 There were customs laws and various other laws for taxing 
 the colonists; but all of them were ignored. Such a state of 
 things England was obliged to tolerate during all the years 
 during which she had the French on her hands in America. 
 
 ♦Franklin's Works. 
 
22 American Campaigns. 
 
 But after the Treaty of Paris rid her of this restraint, she set 
 about treating her colonists as real subjects. 
 
 She imposed a light tax in the shape of stamps on legal docu- 
 ments ; but it was received with such denunciation of word and 
 deed by the colonists that it was soon repealed ; not, however, 
 until the stamp office at Boston and the houses of the stamp 
 distributor and Governor Hutchinson had been destroyed by 
 mobs.* She undertook to collect the tariff; but smuggling 
 went on openly by the colonists. There was a tariff of a shil- 
 ling a pound on tea in England ; while the colonists smuggled 
 theirs in free from Holland. When the government undertook 
 to thwart them, by putting a duty of three pence on the tea, to> 
 be collected from the East India Company in America, in lieu 
 of the shilling in England, the colonists refused to let it be paid, 
 and forced the consignees of the cargoes to resign. From 
 Philadelphia and New York the ships sailed quietly back to 
 England. "In Charleston the tea was landed, but was seized by 
 the collector and stored in damp cellers, where it rotted."f At 
 Boston the ships were surely between Scylla and Charybdis. 
 Governor Hutchinson would not let them return to England;, 
 and that great agitator, Samuel Adams, got up a mob which 
 threw the tea overboard. 
 
 Previous to this event British troops had been quartered on 
 the people of Boston, for the purpose of assisting the governor 
 and customs officers to carry out the law. The billeting of 
 troops was one of the colonists' chief grievances. The people 
 jeered at the soldiers, and insulted them, on all occasions ; and. 
 finally a crowd of them struck a soldier with a missile. This 
 was too much for the British soldiers to submit to. The 
 upshot was, that five or six of Boston's ruffians were killed. 
 
 So matters went from bad to worse. 
 
 All this while, a large part of the people were loyal to Eng- 
 land — probably a majority; certainly a majority of the better 
 classes. Even John Adams admitted that one-third of the peo- 
 ple were loyalists. But while the liberty-loving pamphleteers- 
 were writing about the "rights of man," thousands of our pa- 
 triotic ancestors were subjecting innocent, but loyal, persons to 
 every sort of indignity and torture. Tar and feathers were 
 made use of, but there were other methods, one of which was 
 the "water-cure." The water, however, was strengthened with 
 tea; no doubt without sugar. A contemporary English en- 
 graving illustrates this process. A loyalist, clad in tar and 
 
 *Goldwin Smith. 
 fSloane. 
 
The Revolutionary War. 23 
 
 feathers, is having tea poured down his throat to overflowing, 
 by five patriots, under a tree labeled "Liberty Tree." Above his 
 head dangles a noose ; and in the back -ground the famous Bos- 
 ton Tea Party appears on a ship, casting boxes of tea over- 
 board.* There was absolutely no freedom of press or tongue, 
 save for those that expressed opinions against the government. 
 
 Thousands of loyalists, of course, quitted the country and 
 went to Canada or back to England. A Canadian historian has 
 written as follows : "It is but truth to say the loyalists (that is 
 the Tories of the American Revolution) were the makers of 
 Canada. They were an army of leaders. The most influential 
 judges, the most distinguished lawyers, the most capable and 
 prominent physicians, the most highly educated clergy, the 
 members of the council of various colonies, the crown officials, 
 the people of culture and social distinction — these, with the 
 faithful few whose fortune followed theirs, were the loyalists. 
 Canada owes deep gratitude to her southern kinsmen, who thus, 
 from Maine to Georgia, picked out their choicest spirits, and 
 sent them forth to people our northern wilds. "f 
 
 After the Tea Party, the British authorities closed the port of 
 Boston and demanded that the city should pay for the tea. 
 Closing the port soon threw a great many persons out of em- 
 ployment, and caused much suffering and hardship in Boston. 
 Food and supplies had to be contributed from all parts of the 
 colonies. Then came the Continental Congress, which met in 
 Philadelphia, and passed resolutions, condemning the acts of 
 the government ; and drew up a petition, and a bill of rights, to, 
 present to the King. 
 
 Of course, the colonists got much encouragement from Eng- 
 land. There were two political parties there, and many Ameri- 
 cans believed that, if the Whigs could get into power and stay- 
 in long enough, their grievances would all be redressed ; just 
 as the Philippine insurgents believe that, if Mr. Bryan should 
 be elected, "independencia" would be granted to them forth- 
 with. There are, indeed, many points of likeness between the 
 Philippine Insurrection and our own Revolution; but there is. 
 one main difference : our Revolution succeeded. Had it failed, 
 it would be in the world's annals merely an insurrection, too„ 
 occupying a few pages in British history, and having no na- 
 tional history of its own. 
 
 By the winter of 1774, civil government in Massachusetts 
 
 *See The True History of the American Revolution, — Fisher. 
 ^Historians' History. 
 
24 American Campaigns. 
 
 had ceased. "British officials were driven out of the country 
 by terrorism and mob violence. The rebels had organized a 
 .government of their own, independent of General Gage and the 
 charter." They were drilling a militia of their own, seizing 
 arms, ammunition, and artillery ; casting cannon balls, and look- 
 ing for blacksmiths that could_ forge musket-barrels. Early 
 in 1775 Parliament declared Massachusetts in rebellion, and 
 passed the Fisheries Bill, by which all the trade of the New 
 England colonies was to be confined by force to Great Britain 
 ■and the British West Indies. It prohibited the New England 
 colonies from trading with one another. 
 
 Then fell that 19th of April, 1775, when the first gun was 
 fired at Lexington ; and the Revolutionary War was on. Gen- 
 eral Gage had sent out 800 soldiers in the night, from Boston, 
 for the purpose of seizing a lot of rebel supplies at Concord, as 
 well as those two arch rebels John Hancock and Sam. Adams. 
 But Paul Revere, the silver-smith that rode the galloping horse, 
 had made his famous midnight ride to carry the news. You 
 all know the upshot of it. The British regulars retreated to 
 Boston. (10) Then the patriot farmers shouldered their 
 fowling-pieces or muskets, and flocked to Boston; and soon 
 General Gage's little garrison of British regulars was besieged 
 ■by a motley collection of rebels. 
 
 (11) On May 10, 1775, those two daring spirits, Benedict 
 Arnold and Ethan Allen, had the temerity to attack the two 
 British forts on Lake Champlain, Ticonderoga and Crown 
 Point; and they captured them. Later in this same month, 
 ■General Sir William Howe, with Generals John Burgoyne and 
 Henry Clinton, arrived at Boston with reinforcements, which 
 raised General Gage's army to 10,000. 
 
 (10) On looking over to Breed's Hill, on the morning of 
 June 17, 1775, General Gage saw that it was occupied by a rebel 
 force behind breastworks. It was Prescott with Israel Put- 
 nam, and John Stark, and about 1,500 Americans. Gage sent 
 ■General Howe and Pigott over with about 2,500 red-coats to 
 make the usual English frontal attack, instead of shutting the 
 rebels up by putting troops on the neck of land connecting the 
 ■peninsula upon which Breed's Hill stood with the mainland. 
 Howe knew better; but he obeyed the order of his commander. 
 After several desperate assaults by the British, the Americans 
 'were driven out, for lack of ammunition. The British lost 
 "1,054 men. This was the battle of Bunker Hill. 
 
 The rebels went back to their lines. Here George Wash- 
 
The Revolutionary War. 25 
 
 ington, by appointment of the Continental Congress, which was 
 again in session at Philadelphia, took command of this Conti- 
 nental Army, on July 2, 1775. It was like many another insur- 
 gent force — a rabble without uniforms, without tents, without 
 supplies, without discipline. Washington's task was to turn it 
 into an army, and the only requisite he was to have, was time. 
 Of time there was plenty; for no fighting took place within the 
 northern colonies, until the Battle of Long Island, more than a 
 year later, August 27, 1776. 
 
 In the summer of 1775 the Continental Congress passed a 
 resolution raising eight companies of riflemen in Pennsylva- 
 nia, two in Maryland, and two in Virginia, which were added 
 to Washington's army at Cambridge. The rifles were sup- 
 posed to be able to kill at 300 yards, while the muskets of the 
 British were hardly dangerous at a hundred paces. Washing- 
 ton's army never numbered, this year, more than 16,000 men, 
 and, as its soldiers came and went about as they pleased, it fell 
 to some 10,000 by the winter of 1775-6 ; and there were weeks 
 at a time when it had no powder except what was in the pow- 
 der-horns carried by the men. 
 
 At length Washington got a few cannon, and, on the night of 
 March 4, 1776, posted them on Dorchester Heights ; a few days 
 later he pushed them forward to Nooks Hill. Thereupon 
 General Howe, who had succeeded Gage, evacuated Boston, 
 and sailed with his army for Halifax. And strangest thing of 
 all, he left there, to be seized by the rebels, "more than 200 
 cannon, tons of powder and lead, thousands of muskets, and all 
 sorts of miscellaneous military stores."* It was not until the 
 17th of March that he sailed— twelve days after Washington 
 had seized the heights. He certainly had time to destroy those 
 arms and supplies. This and all of General Howe's subsequent 
 conduct cannot fail to make the impartial student suspect him. 
 He was a Whig, and all the Whigs back in England rejoiced 
 when he withdrew his army to Halifax. 
 
 It must be remembered that the Whig party in England was 
 opposed to the war ; its members did as much by their speeches 
 and writings to encourage the American insurgents in their 
 struggle for liberty, as we saw the same class of patriots in the 
 United States do for the Philippine insurgents, while we were 
 struggling with them in the tropic bosque. 
 
 Why did Howe go to Halifax? Five months before, he had 
 declined the order of the Ministry to take his army to Long 
 
 *Fisher. 
 
26 American Campaigns. 
 
 Island, where it would have been among loyalists, and easily 
 supplied, on the ground that he had not enough shipping. He 
 ought now to have sailed for Long Island or Staten Island. 
 Such a movement would have had the appearance of a change 
 of base, while the withdrawal to Halifax was, in the eyes of the 
 Americans, as much an acknowledgment of defeat, as much 
 a retreat, as if he had sailed for England. So much did it en- 
 courage the colonists that .the Declaration of Independence 
 followed a few months afterwards. 
 
 The British government now redoubled its efforts. It had 
 a plan for the reduction of the colonists. 
 
 Geography. 
 
 (9) It is seen from the map, that the thirteen original colo- 
 nies occupied a comparatively narrow strip of the Atlantic 
 coast, 1,000 miles long. There were about fifteen good har- 
 bors.* All the important towns were on the seashore, or on 
 large waterways not far inland. Hudson River, and Chesa- 
 peake Bay with its tributary the Susquehanna River, divided 
 the country into three parts. If these waters could be held and 
 guarded by the British, the rebellion would be split in three 
 pieces. There were few roads in the country, and those few 
 were poor and lay close to the sea, or in the river valleys. So 
 the British must have their base on the coast, and must stay 
 close to the waterways. Indeed, they never got many miles 
 away from the seashore and the main river valleys. 
 
 Plans of the British. 
 
 The general plan which the British Ministry proposed, but 
 never could get carried out, was as follows : "To occupy such 
 portion of the territory as would effectually break up the union 
 of the patriots, and prevent intercourse among them ; to block- 
 ade the coast and prevent supplies from entering by the sea ; to 
 destroy any organized armies the colonists might form; and 
 then to suppress by degrees the guerrilla warfare into which an 
 unsuccessful insurrection usually degenerates. 
 
 "The strategy" of the British, "as it gradually unfolded it- 
 self, was, first of all, to occupy New York City, and make that 
 the headquarters of British control. From New York City the 
 
 ♦Maine was not one of the separate thirteen original colonies, but 
 was a part of Massachusetts. 
 
The Revolutionary War. 27 
 
 line of the Hudson Valley all the way to Canada must be se- 
 cured, which would immediately isolate New England, the hot- 
 bed of sedition, from the other colonies, and cut off not merely 
 the interchange of ideas, encouragement, and reinforcements of 
 troops; but also the provisions and supplies which New Eng- 
 land drew from the more fertile agricultural communities to 
 the south. 
 
 "In New England itself they finally decided to hold only one 
 point, Newport, because it was the most convenient harbor 
 south of Halifax for vessels to enter and take shelter in. 
 
 "South of New York the strategic position was the line of 
 Chesapeake Bay, with strong positions in Maryland and Vir- 
 ginia, as at Alexandria and Annapolis, with, perhaps, part of 
 the Susquehanna River. This line, if well held, would isolate 
 the middle from the southern colonies and stop communication. 
 As for the South, the best method of controlling it was found 
 to be by occupying Charleston, Georgetown, and two or three 
 points on the Santee River in South Carolina. 
 
 "It is easy to see that, if this strategy had been vigorously 
 carried out with sufficient force, aided by the blockade of the 
 coast, there was every probability that the patriot party would 
 soon have been driven to mere guerrillaism, and from that to a 
 retreat beyond the Alleghanies. . . . 
 
 "As the war developed, only part of the British plan could be 
 carried out. Newport was held during most of the war, as was- 
 also New York, until after the treaty of peace. But . . . 
 the vital line of the Hudson to Canada could not be secured. 
 The position on Chesapeake Bay was not seriously attempted. 
 It would have required a larger force than could be spared 
 from more important places."* 
 
 American Plan. 
 
 The plan of the Americans was the simple defensive — to op- 
 pose the British as best they could at every point, and to hold 
 fast the line of the Hudson. About the only offensive move- 
 ment made bv them, was the joint expedition of Montgomery 
 and Arnold to Canada, in 1775. Montgomery went up by way 
 of Lake Champlain with the main force, and Arnold with 
 1,100 men marched through the forests of Maine. Montgom- 
 ery defeated a British force under Carleton and captured Mon- 
 
 *Fisher. 
 
28 American Campaigns. 
 
 treal. When the two American columns joined in front of 
 Quebec, "there were but a thousand Americans in all, for at the 
 end of their term of enlistment Montgomery's men had left for 
 ;home in troops." They nevertheless invested the town. Car- 
 leton held the citadel with 1,600 men. On the last day of the 
 year the Americans attacked the town and were repulsed. 
 Montgomery was slain. Arnold with the remnant of the force, 
 some 800 men, continued the siege. It did not much incom- 
 mode Carleton, whose men were well housed and well fed ; he 
 patiently allowed the winter's cold and sickness to defeat his 
 courageous foe. In the following spring Washington dis- 
 patched eight regiments of reinforcements ; a little later a large 
 reinforcement of British also arrived. The Americans\ then 
 began a retreat, which was turned into a rout by a sortie of the 
 •enemy. Early in July the remnant of the Americans were back 
 .at Crown Point.* 
 
 The double purpose of this expedition was to forestall and 
 prevent an advance of the British southward through the Hud- 
 son Valley, and to incite a rebellion against the British among 
 the French Canadians. Neither end was achieved. 
 
 (12) The Americans could not keep the British from get- 
 ting possession of New York City ; but, by holding the High- 
 land Passes and the forts near West Point, and by defeating 
 .and capturing Burgoyne's army when it came down from Can- 
 ada, they effectually "prevented the British from securing 
 control of the line of the Hudson Valley. This was the great 
 contention and controlling motive of the first three years of 
 the war." "West Point and the Highland Passes constituted 
 the most important American strategic positions. "f If Bene- 
 dict Arnold's treachery had succeeded in delivering West Point 
 to the British, the war might have ended sooner and otherwise. 
 
 Operations. 
 
 (13) After the withdrawal of Howe's army from Boston in 
 March, 1775, Washington transferred the bulk of his force, 
 only about 8,000 men, to New York City and its vicinity, 
 which, it was believed, would be Howe's next objective. 
 
 Washington was unable to oppose any resistance to the land- 
 ing of the British ; and by June 28, 1776, General Howe had 
 
 *Sloane. 
 fFisher. 
 
The Revolutionary War. 29' 
 
 landed his army on Staten Island. He had about 30,000 
 troops, supported by a powerful fleet under his brother, Ad- 
 miral Howe. Washington, whose army now numbered some 
 18,000 men, knew very well that he could not hold New York, 
 and he ought to have withdrawn at once to the open. But the 
 Continental Congress would not hear to the withdrawal. The 
 city was commanded by Brooklyn Heights, and the only 
 chance Washington had of holding it, was to put his whole 
 force on Brooklyn Heights. But he divided it, keeping part 
 in New York, and placing part in Brooklyn under General 
 Putnam. 
 
 (14) On August 22 Howe took 15,000 or 20,000 troops 
 and forty guns over from Staten Island, landed on Long Is- 
 land, and, after reconnoitering four days, made a skilful turn- 
 ing movement against Putnam, and routed him. 
 
 The British fleet was to have pushed up East River to co- 
 operate with the army, but it was prevented by the wind, which 
 was from the northeast. Washington brought reinforcements 
 across from New York next day. Howe made no effort to 
 push his victory, and Washington succeeded in withdrawing 
 his force back to the New York side of East River. 
 
 Instead of following up his advantage, Howe remained on 
 Long Island more than two weeks. Then he crossed his army 
 over, and landed it about where Thirty-third street is now, 
 "and drove away the militia posted there in headlong flight."* 
 Washington withdrew his army to the north end of the island 
 and took a position on Harlem Heights. Howe took posses- 
 sion of New York City. On the 16th of September he made a 
 frontal attack upon Washington's position at Harlem Heights, 
 and was repulsed. 
 
 (13) Howe now divided his army into three parts. The first 
 was to guard the intrenchments of New York City ; the second 
 was to sail up North River and prevent Washington from 
 crossing into New Jersey. Howe with the third and largest 
 force was to land at Throgs Neck and cut off the American line 
 of supply, which had its base in Connecticut. After another 
 long and unnecessary delay, Howe landed his force at Throgs 
 Neck, on the 16th of October. Here he allowed a small creek 
 and a marsh to detain him six days longer ; which gave Wash- 
 ington time to withdraw his command to White Plains. Not 
 until October the 28th did Howe attack this position. Three 
 
 *Henry Cabot Lodge. 
 
■30 American Campaigns. 
 
 ■days later Washington withdrew to a very strong position at 
 North Castle, a short way from White Plains. 
 
 On November 5 Howe transferred his camp to Dobbs Ferry. 
 He was there in position to move up the Hudson, to unite with 
 a force under Carleton from Canada ; to attack Fort Washing- 
 ton; or to cross the river and move against Philadelphia, the 
 Continental Capital. His real purpose was to draw Washing- 
 ton out of his unassailable position at North Castle. 
 
 To meet these three contingencies, Washington crossed to 
 the west side of the Hudson with 5,000 men ; he sent 3,000 to 
 Peekskill and West Point, to built forts to guard the river; 
 and left 7,000 under General Charles Lee at North Castle, to 
 •cooperate in whatever quarter General Howe's next move 
 should threaten. At the same time, he resolved to abandon 
 Forts Lee and Washington, as they had failed to stop the Brit- 
 ish fleet in its passage up the river, and were therefore of no 
 further use. Congress, however, forbade their abandonment; 
 within a fortnight both were captured by the British. General 
 Greene escaped from Fort Lee, with his little garrison, but at 
 Fort Washington, ISO Americans were killed, and 3,000 cap- 
 tured by the troops under Howe. 
 
 Washington established his camp at Hackensack, but, appre- 
 ciating how unsafe he should be there, between the Hackensack 
 and the Passaic Rivers, in case a large force should come down 
 upon him from the north, he crossed the Passaic River on the 
 21st of November, and marched to Newark. Here he stayed 
 five days, urging General Charles Lee all the while to bring 
 over his command. Lee made one excuse and another, and 
 delayed until December 1. 
 
 On November 28 General Cornwallis, with 5,000 troops, ad- 
 vanced on Newark, and Washington retreated to New Bruns- 
 wick. Cornwallis pursued, not very vigorously, to New 
 Brunswick, and Washington continued his retreat to Prince- 
 ton. By this time Washington had lost so many men, mainly 
 "by expiration of their terms of service, that, without his having 
 risked a fight, his army was reduced to 3,000. 
 
 At New Brunswick General Howe joined Cornwallis with 
 reinforcements, and continued the pursuit of Washington to 
 Trenton. Washington crossed the Delaware, but was pushed 
 no farther by Howe. Howe apparently considered Washing- 
 ton's army so reduced and demoralized as to be unworthy of 
 further pursuit. It had ceased to exert the "power of attrac- 
 tion." So Howe posted his army in comfortable quarters 
 
The Revolutionary War. 31 
 
 along a very extended front, with its center at Trenton, and its 
 headquarters twenty miles in rear, at New Brunswick; de- 
 tached a large force from it to "take possession of Newport as 
 a convenient station for British ships entering Long Island 
 Sound" ;* and he and Cornwallis repaired to New York City. 
 Here he and his brother, the admiral, issued a proclamation 
 granting pardon to all citizens that would take the oath of 
 allegiance to the British Crown. 
 
 Meantime General Charles Lee had brought his command, 
 now reduced to about 4,000, across to Morristown, and, for- 
 tunately for the army, and the American cause, had been him- 
 self captured by the British; and General Gates, with about 
 3,000 Americans, was in the northern part of New Jersey. 
 These troops all joined Washington on the right bank of the 
 Delaware, raising his little army to about 6,000 effectives. 
 
 Seeing how carelessly the British were guarding their camps, 
 Washington determined to take advantage of it. He planned 
 to cross the Delaware in three columns and attack the enemy 
 at Burlington and Trenton. The column led by himself was 
 the only one that got across ; on Christmas night it came down 
 upon the garrison of Hessians at Trenton, surprising them, 
 and capturing 1,000 of them. Washington had two men 
 killed, four wounded, and two frozen to death. He now occu- 
 pied Trenton. 
 
 The victory of Trenton, insignificant as it was in point of the 
 numbers engaged, was a very important one for Washington 
 and the American cause. It was Washington's first victory ; it 
 roused the waning spirits of the people, and hushed the epithet 
 of "Fabius Cunctator" which Washington's friends had applied 
 to him in apology, and his enemies, in derision. 
 
 Cornwallis hastened back from New York, and, quickly col- 
 lecting 7,000 or 8,000 troops at Princeton, set out with them on 
 the 2nd of January, 1777, to attack Washington at Trenton. 
 (IS) Washington withdrew to the south side of the Assanpink 
 River, and kept the British back all one day. Cornwallis 
 planned to cross the next morning above the American posi- 
 tion, fall upon Washington's right flank, and force him back 
 upon the Delaware. But in the night Washington slipped 
 away to Princeton, where he routed three regiments moving 
 out to reinforce Cornwallis at Trenton. (13) Washington 
 moved on to Morristown, where he established his headquar- 
 
 *Fisk<e'5 The American Revolution. 
 
32 American Campaigns. 
 
 ters. Here he was on the flank of the British line of commu- 
 nications with New York. To avoid this danger, Cornwallis 
 withdrew in all haste to New Brunswick. A few days later 
 Putnam advanced from Philadelphia and occupied Princeton. 
 After this the line of the American army extended from Prince- 
 ton to the Hudson River, and the British were confined, in New 
 Jersey, to Paulus Hook, Perth Amboy, and New Brunswick. 
 
 Washington spent the rest of the winter in trying to reor- 
 ganize his army and to make it more efficient. 
 
 Operations of 1777. 
 
 (9) The plans of the British Ministry for their campaign 
 in 1777 contemplated a concerted movement of three columns, 
 to get possession of the Hudson River Valley. Burgoyne, 
 with one column, was to move down from Canada by way of 
 Lake Champlain, and Howe's column was to move up from 
 New York and form a junction with him at Albany. (11) A 
 third column, under Colonel St. Leger, was to move up the St. 
 Lawrence to Lake Ontario, land at Oswego, and, with the 
 assistance of Iroquois Indians and loyalists under Sir John 
 Johnston, capture the American Fort Stanwix, and move down 
 the Mohawk Valley to join the other two columns. 
 
 Burgoyne started with about 8,000 men on June 1, and, on 
 July 1, had reached Ticonderoga. He recaptured this fort, 
 and, leaving a garrison in it, continued south with the rest of 
 his column. He sent 1,000 of his German contingent to cap- 
 ture some horses and supplies that the Americans had col- 
 lected at Bennington ; but the detachment was attacked and 
 defeated, and most of them captured, by the Green Mountain 
 militia, under Colonel John Stark of Bunker Hill fame. Mean- 
 time St. Leger's mixed command, after a hand-to-hand combat 
 at Oriskany with a body of patriots under Nicholas Herkimer, 
 one of the most desperate and bloody in all our annals, had con- 
 tinued the siege of Fort Stanwix. But Arnold soon came up 
 the valley with a relieving force, and, with wonderful skill and 
 daring, managed to disperse the allies of St. Leger, and send 
 him and his British soldiers back in flight to Canada. 
 
 The American forces under General Schuyler had fallen back 
 before Burgoyne, and on August 19 were stationed on the west 
 bank of the Hudson, between Stillwater, and the mouth of the 
 Mohawk ; while Burgoyne's were camped on the eastern bank 
 some thirty miles higher up, from Fort Edward down to the 
 
The Revolutionary War. 33 
 
 Battenkill. For three weeks no movement was made on either 
 side. Burgoyne was waiting for Howe and St. Leger to join 
 him. 
 
 "Burgoyne's situation was now becoming critical. Lincoln, 
 with a strong force of militia was hovering in his rear, while 
 the main army before him was gaining numbers day by day. 
 Putnam had sent up reinforcements from the Highlands; 
 Washington had sent Morgan with 500 sharpshooters; and 
 Arnold was hurrying back from Fort Stanwix. Not a word 
 had come from Sir William Howe, and it daily grew more diffi- 
 cult to get provisions."* 
 
 (16) Schuyler had been relieved by the Continental Con- 
 gress, and General Gates had, by underhand scheming, secured 
 his command. Burgoyne resolved to try to fight his way out 
 of his dilemma. So he crossed the Hudson on the 13th of 
 September, and on the 19th moved against Gates's army in a 
 strongly fortified position on Bemis Heights. Arnold met him 
 and attacked him with 3,000 Americans at Freeman's Farm, 
 while Gates remained in his stronghold with 11,000 more 
 Americans. If Gates had sent reinforcements, as Arnold 
 begged him to do, the Americans would probably have gained 
 a decisive victory. As it was, Burgoyne bivouacked on the 
 battle-field. 
 
 ,(17) Burgoyne renewed the attack on October 7, and tried 
 to turn the American left ; but Morgan fell upon his right, and 
 Arnold struck his center, and he was discomfited. (11) In his 
 attempt to retreat Burgoyne was cut off and surrounded by 
 Gates's army, which now numbered more than 20,000. He 
 surrendered at Saratoga on the 17th of October. 
 
 Howe's Campaign at Philadelphia. 
 
 (13) Meantime let us see what General Howe was doing, 
 whom the British Ministry expected to cooperate with Bur- 
 goyne and St. Leger. Howe's orders were not positive. The 
 Ministry did what is generally the proper thing to do — left him 
 some discretion. It was not, however, best in this case, since 
 Burgoyne had the Ministry's positive order to form a junction 
 with Howe; while Howe made the junction impossible by mov- 
 ing his army in an opposite direction. 
 
 Howe started on June 12, and concentrated 18,000 men at 
 
 *Fiske. 
 
34 American Campaigns. 
 
 New Brunswick, for a movement on Philadelphia, the Ameri- 
 can Capital. Washington moved down 8,000 men from Mor- 
 ristown, and took up a strong position flanking Howe's line of 
 march. Howe then wasted more than two weeks maneuver- 
 ing, instead of attacking Washington; then, on June 30, he 
 evacuated New Jersey, and withdrew his whole army to Staten 
 Island. "Howe next embarked his men on ships, but kept in 
 the vicinity of New York, making a number of feints, first up 
 the Hudson, then into the sound, then past Sandy Hook, so 
 that people might doubt whether his destination were Albany, 
 Boston, or Philadelphia. Washington reasonably supposed 
 Howe would go up the Hudson ; so he moved back to Morris- 
 town, sent a division as far as Pompton to cooperate with West 
 Point, and finally himself went to Haverstraw, sending two 
 divisions across the river to Peekskill."* 
 
 At last Howe put to sea with 18,000 men, leaving General 
 Clinton with 7,000 to garrison New York, and to assist Bur- 
 goyne, "if circumstances warranted." "Clinton did his utmost. 
 He waited for some 1,700 reinforcements that were to arrive, 
 and then started up the Hudson with only two or three thou- 
 sand men, meeting with some success." But he was too late; 
 and his little command was too small to have saved Burgoyne, 
 even if he had been able to join him. 
 
 When Washington was assured that Howe had sailed south- 
 ward, he marched his army to the Delaware, to meet him. 
 
 (9) Howe's ships arrived at the mouth of the Delaware 
 River, then sailed out to sea again ; and Washington was again 
 in a quandary, whether he had sailed back to the Hudson or 
 gone to Charleston. In either case Washington could do no 
 good with his army on the Delaware ; so he was about to start 
 back to New York, to look after Clinton, when Howe's ships 
 appeared at Elkton, at the head of Chesapeake Bay — thirteen 
 miles overland from the mouth of the Delaware, where they 
 had been twenty-four days before. Howe could have landed 
 and marched to Elkton unopposed, and saved his men that 
 voyage of twenty-four days. 
 
 (18) Howe now started toward Philadelphia. Washing- 
 ton met him on the Brandywine, and posted the center of his 
 line at Chadd's Ford. (19) Howe sent Knyphausen against 
 this point, and Cornwallis turned Washington's right flank. 
 The Americans fell back to Chester. This was the Battle of 
 
 *Lecture by Capt. Clarke. 
 
The Revolutionary War. 35 
 
 Brandywine, September 11, 1777. This action was followed 
 by a fortnight of skirmishing and maneuvering; and Howe 
 was kept out of Philadelphia until September 26. (18) Howe 
 made his headquarters at Germantown, and Cornwallis put his 
 in Philadelphia. 
 
 (20) Howe detached a considerable force to aid his broth- 
 er's fleet in reducing Forts Mifflin and Mercer, which guarded 
 the Delaware below Philadelphia. His camp at Germantown 
 was seven miles from that of Cornwallis in Philadelphia. 
 Washington determined to take advantage of the situation to 
 attack him at Germantown. The attack was made early in the 
 morning of October the 4th, and might have succeeded but for 
 blunders and mishaps due mainly to a dense fog. 
 
 (18) Howe's army spent the winter of 1777-8 in Philadel- 
 phia; and Washington's, at Valley Forge, in a bend of the 
 Schuylkill River, about twenty-four miles above Philadelphia. 
 Howe resigned, and Sir Henry Clinton took command of the 
 British Army. 
 
 The capture and occupation of Philadelphia by the British 
 had no important effect on the war. Philadelphia was the 
 Continental Capital; but the Congress had fled to York, 
 where it performed its functions just as well, and just as ill, as 
 at Philadelphia. And Philadelphia was a poor base from which 
 to operate. Sir Henry Clinton purposed conducting a far more 
 vigorous campaign than Howe had conducted. He deter- 
 mined, therefore, to evacuate Philadelphia and take his army 
 back to New York City. For certain reasons he decided to 
 march it across New Jersey, rather than to take it round 
 by water. 
 
 (13) Accordingly he evacuated Philadelphia June 18, 1778, 
 with 10,000 to 15,000 men. Washington's army marched on a 
 road farther north, converging upon the road taken by the Brit- 
 ish. Clinton's only desire was to get his army into New York ; 
 and Washington, whose army was about the size of Clinton's, 
 did not feel like making: an attack without an excellent chance 
 of victory. (21) At Monmouth, on the 28th of June, such a 
 chance was offered him, and he attacked; but, owing to the 
 treachery or cowardice of that pusillanimous deserter from the 
 British army, General Charles Lee, he failed to win a victory. 
 Lee led the attack, but at the critical moment, with everything 
 in his favor, he fell back. Washington came up in time to 
 save a rout ; but gained nothing by the battle. The fine con- 
 duct of the American rank and file in the battle of Monmouth 
 
36 American Campaigns. 
 
 bore witness to the benefits of the drill and training they had 
 received at Valley Forge, under Baron Steuben. 
 
 (13) Clinton marched his army to Sandy Hook, and there 
 embarked it for New York. Washington marched his to White 
 Plains; and after July 20, 1778, the two hostile armies were 
 right where they had started from in 1776. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 General Howe's conduct of the operations in the American 
 Revolution is still an unsolved mystery; and when we study 
 that war, we can but congratulate ourselves that he, and not 
 Sir Henry Clinton, was in command of the British forces for 
 the first three years ; and that Lord George Germain was Colo- 
 nial Secretary, and not John Chamberlain of the next century. 
 
 Judged by the reputation he had already won, General Howe 
 was probably the best general in the British service. He had 
 fought with Wolfe in Canada, and had proved himself a bril- 
 liant, courageous, and active soldier. He was still young for 
 his rank, being not yet fifty years old. So his inactivity, his 
 sloth, his apparent timidity, his lack of persistence, make one 
 marvel for an explanation. 
 
 When he took command at Boston, he had a splendid little 
 army of 10,000 British regulars ; yet he sat there besieged by 
 a motley aggregation of undisciplined Americans ; and, in 
 nearly a year, made not a single effort to break the siege. All 
 the while, too, he had full command of the sea. He knew that 
 Dorchester Heights and Nooks Hill commanded the town, yet 
 he never occupied them. When the Americans put a few guns 
 on them, after months of waiting, he evacuated the town, leav- 
 ing the Americans a large number of cannon and muskets, and 
 vast quantities of ammunition and supplies, which he might 
 just as easily have destroyed. 
 
 Howe was a good tactician, too — he knew how to fight a bat- 
 tle. We saw how prettily he turned Putnam's flank on Long 
 Island, and Washington's at Brandywine; but there it ended. 
 He never pushed his victory. He could easily have killed or 
 captured every American soldier on Long Island, if he had 
 tried; and possibly have ended the rebellion then and there. 
 But he gave Washington plenty of time to take his army back 
 across the East River. 
 
 General Howe constantly exemplified the worst fault that a 
 soldier or an army can have — the fault of inactivity, of moving, 
 
The Revolutionary War. 2,7 
 
 and doing things, slowly. He landed on Staten Island, June 
 28, with his whole army ; but it was not till August 27 that he 
 attacked the Americans on Brooklyn Heights. Then he waited 
 two weeks and crossed to Manhattan Island ; then waited till 
 September 16, before attacking Washington at Harlem 
 Heights. Then he rested again, till the 16th of October, to 
 move his army to Throgs Neck; then, till October 28 before 
 attacking Washington at White Plains. When Washington 
 retreated into New Jersey, instead of pursuing his demoralized 
 little band to its destruction, Howe followed it slowly a short 
 way, and then stopped and gave it time to recruit and reor- 
 ganize. So it was throughout the time that Howe commanded 
 the British troops. He made no attempt to do anything at all 
 during the winter months but riot in the fleshpots and friv- 
 olities of social life in New York or Philadelphia. 
 
 The explanation of it all may be that General Howe .did not 
 care to punish the Continental army too severely. He kept 
 hoping all the while that the colonists would come to their 
 senses, see the hopelessness of their struggle, and lay down 
 their arms. He and Admiral Howe were Whigs, and their 
 sympathies were with the Colonies. "As a member of Parlia- 
 ment he had pledged himself to his constituents not to fight 
 against the Americans, and he must have been fettered by that 
 pledge."* In America the brothers published proclamations 
 offering amnesty to all who would lay down their arms. It 
 is too much to say that he was unfaithful to the trust imposed 
 upon him, although the evidence certainly points to that 
 verdict. 
 
 The plan of capturing the line of the Hudson River, in 1777, 
 by three converging columns was poor strategy. Especially 
 so, because the two columns from Canada had such long lines 
 of march, over such bad roads, and through country in which 
 supplies were so hard to get. It gave the Americans an oppor- 
 tunity to unite their forces and meet the columns one at a 
 time, and defeat them separately — the advantage of "interior 
 lines." Yet, considering that the Americans were but poorly 
 organized insurgents, the British Ministry was probably ex- 
 cusable in adopting such a plan. And the plan probably 
 would have succeeded, if General Howe had marched his 
 army up from New York, to join the other two, as he was 
 expected to do. Instead of which, he took his army to Phila- 
 
 *Goldwin Smith. 
 
38 American Campaigns. 
 
 delphia, and let Burgoyne be captured. There was a time 
 when Burgoyne could have made good his retreat to Canada; 
 but he felt he must push on to form a junction with Howe, 
 who, he supposed, was advancing to meet him. 
 
 No doubt the object of St. Leger's expedition was to get the 
 assistance of the Indians and Sir John Johnson's loyalists. 
 But it cannot be seen what advantage the British Ministry 
 hoped to gain by two converging columns with independent 
 lines of operation, and independent bases hundreds of miles 
 apart, — the columns of Burgoyne and Howe,— which they 
 would not have gained by a single column, equal in strength 
 to both of these, advancing up the Hudson from New York. 
 Burgoyne's troops might better have been sent round from 
 Canada to New York by water. The British Ministry was, 
 doubtless, influenced by the fact that every invasion made into 
 New York in the past, during the French and Indian wars, had 
 gone by way of the Richelieu River and Lake Champlain ; but 
 the case was different now, in that the British held New York 
 City as a base, while the French never had done so. Another 
 purpose of Burgoyne's column was, of course, to cover Canada. 
 
 The British Ministry was a Tory ministry, but so large a part 
 of the British people was opposed to the war and in sympathy 
 with the colonies, that the Ministry undoubtedly wanted to 
 bring about peace with as little bloodshed, and as much con- 
 ciliation, as possible. Otherwise it would not have tolerated 
 the two Whig Howes as long as it did. It is certain, in fact, 
 that the Ministry instructed General Howe as to the manner 
 of conducting the operations, enjoining conciliatory measures ; 
 just as, according to common belief, our Administration at 
 Washington enjoined conciliatory measures upon our com- 
 mander at Manila, in his early dealings with the Philippine in- 
 surgents. The consequences were unfortunate in both cases. 
 
 The lesson the British Government learned by the war, was, 
 not to hold out the sword and the olive branch to rebellious 
 colonies at the same time. The sword first and the olive 
 branch afterwards, — this has been the British policy since ; and 
 we have seen how well it succeeded in the South African War. 
 
 The lesson that the American people might have learned, 
 but did not, is the impossibility of carrying on successfully, 
 sustained operations, extending over many months of time, and 
 many miles of distance, with undisciplined, short-term militia. 
 Washington's complaints of his militia were pathetic. It is not 
 so much the strife of battle that tries the discipline of soldiers, 
 
The Revolutionary War. 39 
 
 as it is the fatigue of long, hard marches; the dreariness of 
 prolonged,, uncomfortable encampments; the disappointment of 
 defeat; the discouragement and hardship of retreat. 
 
 Our history has chosen well in making Washington the hero 
 of the war and the times. It was only his unswerving sense 
 of duty, his patience, tact, strength of purpose, patriotism, and 
 tenacity, that held his little army together during those trying 
 years of defeat and constant retreat. Those qualities of the 
 man and the commander were even more marked in Washing- 
 ton than were his brilliancy and skill as a general. Yet he 
 quickly learned strategy ; his attack at Trenton, and his escape 
 from Cornwallis there, afterwards, and his combat at Prince- 
 ton, and his occupation of Morristown on the flank of the 
 enemy's line of communication, were after the manner of 
 Stonewall Jackson. They were brilliant little feats of strategy; 
 they recovered New Jersey from the British and revived the 
 hopes of the people. His position at Morristown, on the flank 
 of Howe's line of operations from New York to Philadelphia, 
 also thwarted the British commander's overland advance 
 against the Continental Capital in June, 1777, and forced him 
 to take his army round by sea. 
 
 It is not hard, however, to point out mistakes made by Wash- 
 ington ; it is strange that he made no more. Where is the sur- 
 geon that can perform a capital operation without previous 
 study, and training in a hospital? The science of strategy is 
 more complicated than that of surgery, and the masters of 
 strategy have been fewer by hundreds than the masters of sur- 
 gery. The little actual experience that Washington had gained 
 in the French and Indian War, was no more than the experi- 
 ence of surgery gained by the nurse in a hospital. He was not 
 a student of military history; he had certainly never studied 
 "again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, 
 Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick," 
 like Napoleon. If he had, he would not have divided his little 
 army between New York and Brooklyn, thus giving Howe the 
 opportunity to beat it in detail. Nor again would he have split 
 his army into pieces, when Howe, finding it impregnable at 
 North Castle, transferred his own command to Dobbs Ferry. 
 Washington ought to have kept his force intact at North 
 Castle, not so much with the view of covering his line of com- 
 munication with Connecticut, because he could live off the 
 country, but because his strength and his chance of beating the 
 enemy depended upon his keeping his troops in a single body 
 
40 American Campaigns. 
 
 under his own immediate command. When he divided his 
 force, and led a part of it across the Hudson to stand between 
 Howe and Philadelphia, he did precisely what Howe wanted 
 him to do. He also wholly lost control of the larger part of his 
 army, the part left at North Castle under Lee, and he saw his 
 own detachment become so reduced, as no longer to attract 
 Howe's pursuit. It no way barred Howe's march to Philadel- 
 phia, if he had wished to take the city at that time. What it 
 did, incidentally, was to lead the enemy away from New Eng- 
 land, and to leave that favored soil free from the ravages of 
 hostile armies, as it has been in every other war the United 
 States have waged. But Washington did not lead Howe's 
 army jnto New Jersey on purpose ; in truth, he wholly neg- 
 lected to make use of what von der Goltz declares to be the 
 most effective lever that the leader of a retreating army has 
 to guide matters according to his own wishes ; namely, "the 
 power of attraction." 
 
 Another lesson that American statesmen might have learned 
 from the Revolutionary War, is how not to finance a war. 
 That they did not take this lesson to heart, was evidenced 
 later, in the Civil War, when both the United States and 
 the Confederate governments followed the same fiscal method 
 as that of our Revolutionary fathers ; namely, the manu- 
 facture of paper money.* The people of the colonies, as 
 a whole, were rich and prosperous ; yet the Continental Con- 
 gress was too weak in authority or in courage to tax them. It 
 preferred to borrow all it could from France, and to make 
 paper money for the balance ; which immediately began to de- 
 preciate, and soon became a byword for worthlessness. Not 
 to be worth a "continental" was not to be worth anything at 
 all. With such currency the Government paid its troops ; and 
 to this cause alone most of Washington's trouble in keeping his 
 ranks filled may be charged. In respect of its finance, the 
 short-lived insurgent government of Aguinaldo was far ahead 
 of that of our forefathers of the Revolution. It manufactured 
 no paper promises-to-pay; but paid its soldiers in silver coin. 
 Hence there was never a time when there were not thrice as 
 many insurgent soldiers in the Philippine bosque as there were 
 arms for them. The government collected its revenue from 
 
 *In this respect the United States were even worse than the Con- 
 federacy, for they not only manufactured paper money with nothing 
 behind it but the hope and good will of the Government, but they also 
 made it a legal tender for all private and nearly all public debts. 
 
The Revolutionary War. 41 
 
 the people acoording to their means. The rich were made to 
 contribute hard cash. Such was not the case in America dur- 
 ing the Revolution. 
 
 There is no more shameful page in all our national history 
 than the page that relates that Washington had to pledge his 
 own fortune to sustain his barefooted army in the winter of 
 1776-77. John Stark and a few other patriots of the pocket 
 rather than of the lip, followed his example; and Robert 
 Morris collected five hundred dollars from his friends, and, a 
 few days later, raised fifty thousand dollars in cash, by a house- 
 to-house inquest, and placed it at the disposal of the comman- 
 der-in-chief.* 
 
 The battle of Bennington shows how well the American 
 farmer, without any previous service or training, can fight, 
 when he has to do so to defend his own hearthstone. He will 
 not, without training and discipline, fight a long way from 
 home, — he cannot be counted upon for distant and enduring 
 campaigns ; but for single battles, with his own church spires 
 in sight, he makes a dangerous foe to meet. 
 
 There was practically no American navy during the Revolu- 
 tionary War ; but much damage was done to British commerce 
 by privateers manned by "hardy seamen of New England," 
 "and Paul Jones in his Bonhomme Richard made himself the 
 terror of the English coasts."f 
 
 *Sloane. 
 fGoldwin Smith. 
 
LECTURE III. 
 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. 
 
 Southern Campaigns. 
 
 (13) After the surrender of Burgoyne, France formed an 
 alliance with the United States, and Frederick the Great of 
 Prussia showed his friendliness by prohibiting any more Hes- 
 sian troops from entering the British service. In June, 1779, 
 Spain declared war against England, and in December, 1780, 
 England declared war against Holland. 
 
 We saw in the last lecture that, after the Battle of Mon- 
 mouth, Sir Henry Clinton took his little army into New York 
 City, and Washington stationed his at White Plains. This was 
 in July, 1778. New York and Newport were now the only 
 points held by the British in the United States. 
 
 A French fleet under Count d'Estaing, and a force of 4,000 
 French soldiers, arrived off New York in July [1778]. A plan 
 was formed to attack Clinton in New York, but some of 
 d'Estaing's ships were of too deep draft to pass over the bar at 
 the mouth of the river, and the project had to be abandoned. 
 (9) Later on, a combined land and naval attack upon the 
 British at Newport was undertaken ; it also failed. The French 
 fleet then sailed for the West Indies, to threaten the British 
 possessions there, and immediately 5,000 of Clinton's men had 
 to be withdrawn and sent to those islands. "In the autumn of 
 this year, 1778, Clinton felt himself so much weakened, that he 
 withdrew the garrison from Newport, and concentrated his 
 whole force in New York, which was now the only place held 
 by the British in the rebellious colonies."* 
 
 We have seen that the part of the British Ministry's plan 
 which contemplated splitting the rebellious colonies in two by 
 taking the line of the Hudson Valley and holding it, failed 
 through General Howe's bad management, — if not by reason 
 of his treachery, certainly by reason of his inefficiency. Clinton 
 was not left with troops enough to renew the attempt. The 
 only thing he could do was to hold New York as a base, and 
 
 *Fisher. 
 
The Revolutionary War. 43 
 
 from there to send out raiding expeditions to various places 
 on the American coast. 
 
 Outside of the immediate theater of operations, the Ameri- 
 cans, up to this time, had suffered few of the discomforts of 
 war. It mattered not much materially to the people of Vir- 
 ginia and the Carolinas, or even to the New Englanders, how 
 many months the war kept up, so long as it was confined to 
 New Jersey. The British had already attempted once to make 
 a lodgment in the South. A combined sea and land force un- 
 der Admiral Parker and Sir Henry Clinton, after much bun- 
 gling and delay, had attacked Charleston, toward the end of 
 June, 1776; it was repulsed by the South Carolinians under 
 Moultrie in their fort on Sullivan Island. After this, the 
 southern colonies were not again annoyed by the presence of 
 their enemy until the autumn of 1778. 
 
 Clinton believed that the way to make a rebellious people 
 want peace was to make the war uncomfortable to all of them. 
 That was the purpose of the "wearing-out" policy he now 
 adopted. If, in the execution of this policy, his agents resorted 
 to cruelty and barbarity in many instances, it must be admitted 
 that, in their treatment of the loyalists, the patriots set them 
 many examples. Yet it is hard to believe that Clinton had 
 anything to do with the terrible massacre of Wyoming Valley 
 in Northern Pennsylvania, which occurred in July of this year, 
 1778. This was committed by the Tories and Indians of Cen- 
 tral New York. Equally atrocious was the massacre of 
 Cherry Valley, a village in Central New York, in November, 
 1778. This deed was committed, also, by Tories and Indians. 
 
 In pursuance of his plan, Clinton dispatched a raiding force 
 to the coast of New England, and another to Delaware Bay, 
 this year [1778]. (22) "In the autumn, he sent Colonel 
 Campbell, with 3,500 regulars, to Georgia, where he easily 
 defeated the 1,200 militia of the patriots, and took Savannah 
 and Augusta. At the same time, the British General Prevost 
 entered Georgia from Florida; so Georgia was declared to be 
 out of revolt."* 
 
 "In the hope of checking the British progress in the South, 
 General Lincoln was sent to Charleston. But South Carolina 
 was so much afraid of a rising among her slaves, that the local 
 militia would render him no assistance. He obtained 2,000 
 militia from North Carolina, and at the end of February, 1779, 
 
 ♦Fisher. 
 
44 American Campaigns. 
 
 sent General Ashe with 1,500 men to invade Georgia. The 
 British retired from Augusta, but turned on Ashe at Briar 
 Creek, and defeated him."* 
 
 In April [1779] Lincoln again invaded Georgia, and Prevost 
 promptly entered South Carolina, and devastated it. Prevost, 
 however, could not take Charleston, and was obliged to return 
 to Georgia. This same spring, Clinton sent raiding expedi- 
 tions into Virginia and Connecticut, which wrought great de- 
 struction of property. 
 
 "All these severities, heavy, shocking, merciless blows," says 
 Fisher, "were delivered so as to affect the business and social 
 relations of large districts of country. They were delivered in 
 districts which had heretofore been free from the interference 
 of war, and where the people were enjoying a more or less 
 profitable trade. They told severely on the patriot cause, and 
 Washington was powerless against them." "It is difficult for 
 us now to realize the deplorable state of the country ; devastated 
 and ruined, with paper currency sunk so low that a bushel of 
 corn cost one hundred and fifty dollars, and a suit of clothes 
 two thousand dollars."* 
 
 In September [1779] Lincoln, with the aid of d'Estaing's 
 fleet, laid siege to Savannah, and assaulted it. He was re- 
 pulsed with heavy loss. In December Clinton himself sailed 
 from New York with 8,000 men. He landed at Savannah, 
 and getting some reinforcements from Prevost, marched 
 against Charleston. Lincoln, who commanded Charleston, 
 should have abandoned it, and taken to the open, as Washing- 
 ton did when Howe landed at New York. But Lincoln col- 
 lected all the troops he could, and prepared to defend the 
 town. There was very little fighting; Clinton laid siege, and 
 Lincoln surrendered the town, May 12, 1780, with 5,500 pris- 
 oners and a great lot of ordnance and supplies. "Clinton im- 
 mediately sent out forces which reduced the whole of South 
 Carolina to the possession of the British."* 
 
 General Cornwallis was left by Clinton in command of South 
 Carolina, and "there was now, for a long time, a frightful scene 
 of anarchy and confusion ; with the British and loyalists plun- 
 dering, murdering, and confiscating; the patriots retaliating as 
 best they could." "It was at this time, during the summer of 
 1780, that the patriots, who would not take the oath of alle- 
 
 *Fisher. 
 
The Revolutionary War. 45 
 
 giance, and had retreated to the swamps and mountains on the 
 interior, maintained under Marion, Sumter, Pickens, and Wil- 
 liams, that partisan warfare which became so famous. Their 
 attacking parties were as small as twenty and seldom over one 
 hundred; but the suddenness of their appearance, the fury of 
 their attack, and the swiftness and secrecy of their flight were 
 appalling to European soldiers."* 
 
 In June General Gates was appointed to take command of 
 the patriot troops in the South, and repaired to Charlotte. He 
 found things in a deplorable state ; there was lack of arms, lack 
 of everything, especially lack of funds. 
 
 Lord Rawdon was in command of the British garrison at 
 Camden, which Gates made his objective. Gates had the 
 choice of two roads from Charlotte to Camden, one of which 
 was a little longer than the other, but in every other respect 
 better suited to the march. Against the advice of his officers, 
 Gates took the shorter, apparently in order to reach his objec- 
 tive before it could be reinforced from Charleston. 
 
 Rawdon's command was much smaller than Gates's, but he 
 marched it out fifteen miles to meet Gates, and posted it behind 
 , a creek blocking the way. At this point the two roads were 
 only ten miles apart. A skilful commander might have occu- 
 pied Rawdon's attention in front, and made a turning move- 
 ment by the other road ; a bold commander might, with Gates's 
 preponderance in numbers, have crossed the creek and carried 
 the position by direct attack. Gates did neither; he wavered 
 and hesitated for two days, then moved slowly across to the 
 westerly road, and took up a position at Clermont. 
 
 Meantime Cornwallis had arrived with reinforcements. The 
 Americans, however, still outnumbered the British. There 
 were 3,052 Americans, only 1,400 of whom were regulars, to 
 2,000 British. Gates, however, had not learned of the arrival 
 of Cornwallis, and he detached 400 of his best Maryland regu- 
 lars to join Sumter in cutting the British line of communica- 
 tion with Charleston. 
 
 (23) At ten o'clock at night the two little armies advanced 
 toward each other, each hoping to take the other by surprise. 
 The result was the Battle of Camden, August 16, 1780, on a 
 narrow piece of ground with an impassable swamp on each 
 flank. Gates's Virginia and North Carolina militia threw 
 down their arms, and fled without firing a shot. "Within fif- 
 
 *Fiske. 
 
46 American Campaigns. 
 
 teen minutes," says Fiske, "the whole American left became a 
 mob of struggling men, smitten with mortal panic, and hud- 
 dling like sheep in their wild flight, while Tarleton's [British] 
 cavalry gave chase and cut them down by scores." The Mary- 
 land brigade behaved better; but it also was driven from the 
 field. The patriots were badly defeated. (22) General 
 Gates himself escaped to Hillsboro, riding 200 miles in four 
 days. 
 
 The day before the battle Sumter had captured a British sup- 
 ply train on its way up from Charleston ; but on the 18th that 
 active cavalryman, Tarleton, routed him and retook the train 
 and prisoners that he had captured, and captured 300 of his 
 men besides. 
 
 Cornwallis stayed nearly a month at Camden, resting his 
 troops, and then advanced to Charlotte. Meantime he had sent 
 Major Ferguson — "whom, next to Tarleton, he considered his 
 best partisan officer" — on a raid to the west. Ferguson soon 
 found himself surrounded on all sides by bands of guerrillas 
 under such leaders as Williams, and Campbell, and Isaac 
 Shelby, and John Sevier. He was brought to bay at Kings 
 Mountain, where he and about 400 of his men were slain, and 
 more than 700 were captured. Only twenty of his men es-" 
 caped.* On learning the news of this disaster, Cornwallis fell 
 back to Winnsborough to await reinforcements. "General 
 Leslie had been sent by Sir Henry Clinton to Virginia, with 
 3,000 men, and Cornwallis ordered this force to join him with- 
 out delay."* 
 
 Meantime Marion and Sumter had kept up an active partisan 
 warfare, and the latter defeated Tarleton at Blackstock Hill, on 
 the 20th November [1780]. Reinforcements from the North 
 were also joining the American forces, which had assembled at 
 Charlotte. Gates was relieved, and on the 2nd December 
 General Greene arrived at Charlotte and took command. 
 Arnold, who, after his treason and escape, was now in the Brit- 
 ish service, had been sent to Virginia by Clinton, with 1,600 
 men, to take Leslie's place; and Steuben was in command of the 
 Americans in Virginia. 
 
 Greene's army was too weak to risk a battle with Cornwal- 
 lis; so he divided it, taking 1,100 men himself to Cheraw Hill, 
 and sending 900, under General Morgan, to the westward. 
 Cornwallis could do nothing but divide his army, also. If he 
 
 *Fiske. 
 
The Revolutionary War. 47 
 
 should march his whole command against Greene, Morgan 
 would capture the British posts in the west; and if he should 
 march his whole force against Morgan, Greene would capture 
 Charleston, and cut him off from the coast. "With his main 
 body, 2,000 strong, he advanced into North Carolina, hoping 
 to draw Greene after him; while he sent Tarleton, with the 
 rest of his army, 1,100 strong, to take care of Morgan."* 
 Morgan fell back to a place called The Cowpens, a sort of 
 "round-up" place for cattle. Here he was attacked by Tar- 
 leton. We will quote the description of the battle verbatim 
 from Fisher's True History of the American Revolution. 
 Fiske's description is practically the same. 
 
 (24) Morgan "placed himself with the river in his imme- 
 diate rear, which, if he were defeated, would largely cut off his 
 retreat ; but he did this, he said, to prevent his militia from run- 
 ning too soon. He then prepared a formation which seems to 
 have been entirely original, the result of careful thought and 
 thorough knowledge of his material. 
 
 "He placed the raw militia far in the front to receive the first 
 onset of the British, and told them he expected them to fire only 
 two volleys at killing distance. After that they could run; 
 and he showed them how to run round the left flank of the rest 
 of his troops, and get behind the main body of them, where they 
 could reform at their leisure and recover themselves. 
 
 "About 150 yards behind the militia, Morgan placed his 
 picked troops on a slight hill ; 150 yards farther back he placed 
 his cavalry, under Colonel Washington. 
 
 "Tarleton attacked, in his dashing, eager style, at sunrise. The 
 militia received him better than was expected, and retreated 
 as they had been told. The British instantly spread out and 
 rushed at the second line of Americans, intending to flank them 
 [envelop them] on both sides. The second line avoided this 
 movement by falling back to the position of the cavalry. At 
 the same time the cavalry circled round and attacked the Brit- 
 ish right flank ; and the militia, having been reformed, circled 
 round the other side and attacked the British left. The second 
 line retreated no farther, but, after delivering their fire at 
 thirty yards, charged the British." 
 
 Tarleton escaped, but he lost 230 killed and wounded, and 600 
 prisoners. Morgan's loss was twelve killed and sixty-one 
 wounded. 
 
 *Fiske. 
 
48 American Campaigns. 
 
 (22) Morgan now hastened to rejoin Greene. Cornwallis 
 was between him and Greene, but Morgan beat Cornwallis to 
 the fords of the Catawba River, and, after that, it was a stern- 
 chase for Cornwallis. 
 
 Greene learned of Morgan's victory a week after it took 
 place. At once he started his army northward, under General 
 Huger, and with a small mounted escort set out himself to 
 join Morgan, in order to conduct his column to a junction with 
 Huger's. He found Morgan in the Catawba Valley, and Corn- 
 wallis pushing him. Cornwallis had no cavalry now to send 
 after Morgan, — Kings Mountain and The Cowpens had strip- 
 ped him of all his cavalry. But he kept up the pursuit as best 
 he could, and had destroyed his heavy baggage to hasten his 
 march. The weather had been rainy, and the rivers were high 
 and unfordable; but- Greene dragged some boats along on 
 wheels to use in crossing the swollen streams. 
 
 On the 9th February, 1781, Greene reached Guilford Court 
 House with Morgan's column, and there rejoined the main col- 
 umn under Huger. Here Greene had expected to receive rein- 
 forcements from Virginia, but Arnold had kept General Steu- 
 ben so busy in Virginia that Steuben was unable to send rein- 
 forcements. So Greene continued his retreat, and placed his 
 army on the north side of the Dan River, in Virginia, which 
 Cornwallis had no means of crossing. Cornwallis then turned 
 back, and marched to Hillsboro, where he issued proclamations 
 announcing his conquest of North Carolina, and encouraging 
 the loyalists. 
 
 Greene's main object had been to draw Cornwallis as far 
 away from his base as possible, and, fearing now that he might 
 return to it, Greene recrossed the Dan into North Carolina. 
 Then Greene played with Cornwallis for three weeks, leading 
 him hither and thither, but never coming to battle with him. 
 Greene was playing for time — until his reinforcements could 
 arrive. At last they came, raising his force to about 4,500. 
 Cornwallis had only 2,200. Greene came to a stand at Guil- 
 ford Court House, on the 15th of March. (25) He arranged 
 his lines almost exactly like Morgan's at The Cowpens. But 
 Cornwallis fought better and more carefully than Tarleton 
 had fought at The Cowpens. The battle was stoutly contested, 
 and the losses were heavy on both sides. The British had the 
 advantage of the fight, but both sides withdrew from the field. 
 
 (22) Cornwallis had suffered too much to risk another en- 
 gagement. He retreated to Wilmington, the nearest seaport, 
 starting three days after the battle. Greene followed him as 
 
The Revolutionary War. 49 
 
 far as Ramsay's Mills ; then, supposing that Cornwallis would 
 embark his army at Wilmington and proceed with it by sea 
 to Charleston, he turned south to strike a blow in South Caro- 
 lina and Georgia, before Cornwallis could get there. He pur- 
 posed capturing the cantonments by which the British had held 
 the line of the Santee and Congaree, as far as Ninety-Six. 
 
 While Greene threatened Camden, Marion attacked and cap- 
 tured Fort Watson, on the 23rd of April [1781]. This broke 
 the British line of communication, and compelled Lord Rawdon 
 to come out of Camden. Greene took up a position at Hob- 
 kirk's Hill,' about two miles north of Camden. (26) Lord 
 Rawdon attacked him there on the 25th of April. The 2nd 
 Maryland regiment, which had fought splendidly in every other 
 battle of the campaign, behaved badly in this one, and lost the 
 victory for the Americans. Greene was driven from the field. 
 But the victory was of little value to Rawdon, with his line of 
 supplies cut in two at Fort Watson. (22) Rawdon retreated 
 to Monk's Corners, and Greene took possession of Camden. 
 
 Within three weeks "Light Horse Harry" Lee and Marion 
 had captured Fort Motte and Fort Granby ; Sumter had taken 
 Orangeburg; and, on the 5th of June, Augusta surrendered to 
 Lee. Ninety-Six was besieged by Greene, but held out, until 
 Rawdon got reinforcements from Charleston, and marched to 
 its relief. But it was impossible for Rawdon to hold the post, — 
 he could not keep open his line of communication with Charles- 
 ton. So he evacuated the place on the 29th of June, and 
 retreated to Orangeburg. Greene followed him; but the 
 weather had become so hot that neither army could keep up the 
 campaign. Greene withdrew his army to the High Hills of 
 Santee to rest, and then the two armies lay watching each 
 other until after the middle of August. Within this interval 
 Rawdon went back to England sick, leaving Colonel Stuart in 
 command of the British forces in South Carolina. 
 
 On the 22nd of August Greene, who had spent the time re- 
 cruiting his army, and putting it in as effective shape as prac- 
 ticable, broke camp, and advanced secretly towards Orange- 
 burg. Stuart did not discover his advance, until he was close 
 upon Orangeburg. Thereupon Stuart fell back and took up 
 a strong position at Eutaw Springs. (27) Greene attacked 
 him on the 8th of September [1781]. The British were driven 
 back from their first position ; but they took up a second line, 
 supported by a brick house and a palisaded garden, from which 
 they could not be driven by the Americans. (22) The next 
 
50 American Campaigns. 
 
 evening the British, however, abandoned the position, and re- 
 treated hurriedly to Charleston, with Lee and Marion pursuing 
 them. This was the last battle in the Carolinas, although a 
 sort of partisan warfare kept up for another year. Under the 
 protection of their ships, the British held Charleston till the 
 end of the war. 
 
 In his retreat, after the battle of Guilford Court House, Lord 
 Cornwallis reached Wilmington on the 7th of April [1781]. 
 He remained there a little over two weeks, and then, instead of 
 transferring his army by sea to South Carolina, as Greene ex- 
 pected and as Sir Henry Clinton, the commander-in-chief of 
 the British, supposed he would, he marched it northward into 
 Virginia. (28) He reached Petersburg on the 20th of May, 
 and joined his forces with those of Arnold. Arnold himself 
 returned to New York. 
 
 At this time Lafayette was in command of the American 
 troops in Virginia. He was at Richmond with about 3,000 
 men. Cornwallis now had about 5,000 veterans to fight this 
 little force. He moved toward Richmond, and Lafayette fell 
 back toward Fredericksburg. Cornwallis followed him. 
 
 On the 4th of June Lafayette crossed the Rapidan at Ely's 
 Ford, and Cornwallis stopped the pursuit. Cornwallis prob- 
 ably profited by the lessons Greene had taught him in the Caro- 
 linas, and did not purpose letting himself be drawn too far 
 away from his base again. But he sent Tarleton on a raid to 
 Charlottesville, to break up the Virginia legislature in session 
 there, and to capture, if possible, Thomas Jefferson, whose 
 home, Monticello, was near by. Having failed to capture Jef- 
 ferson, Tarleton started to Albemarle, in order to destroy 
 some American stores collected there. 
 
 In the meantime Lafayette had been joined by 1,000 Penn- 
 sylvania regulars, under General Wayne, and other reinforce- 
 ments ; so that his little army now numbered about 4,000. With 
 this force, Lafayette placed himself between Tarleton and 
 Albemarle; and Tarleton started back eastward to rejoin Corn- 
 wallis. 
 
 Lafayette now felt strong enough to take the offensive, — at 
 least to harass Cornwallis; so he moved toward him. Corn- 
 wallis turned southwest from the North Anna River, and was 
 rejoined by Tarleton at the Point of Forks. Cornwallis con- 
 tinued his retreat through Richmond and down the Yorktown 
 Peninsula to Williamsburg. Here an action occurred between 
 parts of the hostile forces, and the Americans were repulsed. 
 
The Revolutionary War. 51 
 
 The operations ended in the first week of August. Corn- 
 wallis put his army into Yorktown, so as to be close to sea com- 
 munication ; Lafayette occupied Malvern Hill, near the James, 
 to watch him. Meantime Lafayette's army had been reinforced 
 by Steuben with 1,000 men; so that Lafayette now had about 
 5,000 men. Cornwallis had about 7,000 at Yorktown. 
 
 (29) All these months, since the summer of 1778, Wash- 
 ington had held his army in the vicinity of New York City, 
 keeping guard over Clinton, who clung to the city as a base. 
 Washington had with him Count Rochambeau and four or five 
 thousand French troops. In the West Indies Count de Grasse 
 had-a strong French fleet operating against the English in those 
 islands. Washington had hoped, and planned, to wrest New 
 York from Clinton, with the aid of Rochambeau's troops and 
 the French fleet. But the successes of Greene and Lafayette in 
 the Carolinas and Virginia drew his attention to that quarter. 
 
 Washington's actions were all to depend upon the French 
 fleet. De Grasse had orders from France to cooperate with 
 Washington, but had the choice of sailing either for the Hud- 
 son, or the Chesapeake. "On the 14th of August" of this year 
 [1781] , "a message came from de Grasse that he was just start- 
 ing from the West Indies for Chesapeake Bay, with his whole 
 fleet, and hoped that whatever the armies had to do, might be 
 done quickly, as he should be obliged to return to the West 
 Indies by the middle of October." Washington had just received 
 word from Lafayette, "that Cornwallis had established himself 
 at Yorktown, where he had deep water on three sides of him, 
 and a narrow neck in front."* 
 
 Washington determined at once to transfer his army to Vir- 
 ginia. The distance was more than 400 miles. He maneuvered 
 so as to make Clinton think he was going to attack the British 
 in New York. As Clinton had got wind of the French fleet's 
 movement toward the north, he was, of course, looking for it to 
 appear in New York Harbor and cooperate with Washington 
 against him. Clinton was completely fooled. 
 
 "On the 19th of August [1781], five days after receiving the 
 dispatch from Grasse, Washington's army crossed the Hudson 
 at King's Ferry, and began its march. Lord Stirling" [Gen- 
 eral William Alexander] "was left with a small force at Sara- 
 toga, and General Heath, with 4,000 men, remained at West 
 Point. Washington took with him southward 2,000 Conti- 
 
 *Fiske. 
 
52 American Campaigns. 
 
 nentals and 4,000 Frenchmen. . . . None save Wash- 
 ington and Rochambeau knew whither they were going. So 
 precious was the secret," continues Fiske, "that even the gen- 
 eral officers supposed, until New Brunswick was passed, that 
 their destination was Staten Island. So rapid was the move- 
 ment that however much the men might have begun to won- 
 der, they had reached Philadelphia before the purpose of the 
 expedition was distinctly understood."* 
 
 At Chester, Washington received word that de Grasse had 
 arrived in Chesapeake Bay. By the 5th of September, the 
 army had reached the head of Chesapeake Bay. Here it em- 
 barked and had arrived near Yorktown by the 18th. 
 
 The British West Indies fleet had followed the French fleet 
 northward; but had lost sight of it, outsailed it, passed it with- 
 out seeing it; then it scouted Chesapeake Bay, before the 
 French fleet had got there, and finally sailed away for New 
 York, expecting surely to find de Grasse there. This fleet 
 brought Clinton and Admiral Graves, who commanded the 
 British fleet at New York, the first news of what had really 
 happened. So Graves started with his fleet, at once, for the 
 Chesapeake. He arrived there on the 5th of September, the 
 very day on which Washington's army was embarking at the 
 head of the Bay.* 
 
 (30) "Graves found the French fleet blocking the entrance 
 to the bay, and instantly attacked it." After a fight of two 
 hours, in which about 700 men were killed and' wounded in 
 the two fleets, the British ships withdrew.* Three thousand 
 French troops had landed from de Grasse's fleet and joined 
 Lafayette. With his army thus increased to about 8,000, La- 
 fayette felt strong enough to close in upon Cornwallis at York- 
 town. (28) Accordingly he moved down to the narrow neck 
 at Williamsburg, and, on the morning of the 8th of September, 
 had Cornwallis sealed up in Yorktown, — the very morning that 
 Greene, down in South Carolina, was fighting his' last battle, at 
 Eutaw Springs. On the 14th of September Washington 
 reached Lafayette's headquarters, and assumed command; by 
 the 26th the entire force of Continentals and French, 16,000 
 strong, was assembled at Williamsburg. 
 
 (31) Washington now laid siege in the regular way to 
 Yorktown. On the night of the 15th of October the garrison 
 made an unsuccessful sortie; on the 17th, — the fourth anni- 
 
 *Fiske. 
 
The Revolutionary War. S3 
 
 versary of Burgoyne's surrender, — Cornwallis had a white flag 
 raised. On the 19th he surrendered; and 7,247 Englishmen 
 marched out to an old tune, "The World Turned Upside 
 Down," and laid down their arms.* This practically ended the 
 Revolutionary War, though the treaty of peace was not signed 
 until 1783. 
 
 On the very day that Cornwallis surrendered, Sir Henry 
 Clinton, having received naval reinforcement, sailed from New 
 York, with thirty-five ships and 7,000 troops. Five days 
 brought him to the mouth of the Chesapeake, where he learned 
 that he was too late, as he had been four years before, when he 
 went to relieve Burgoyne.* 
 
 Comments. 
 
 General Greene's operations in the Carolinas were more bril- 
 liant, from a strategic point of view, than any other operations 
 of Americans or British in this war. True, Washington's sud- 
 den and secret transfer of his army from New York to York- 
 town resembled very much, on a small scale, Napoleon's march 
 from the English Channel to Bavaria in the Ulm campaign of 
 1805. Neither movement could be repeated in America or 
 Europe to-day, with the electric telegraph and enterprising 
 newspaper reporters to contend with; though they might be 
 achieved under a Japanese or Russian censorship. Both de- 
 pended upon secrecy and swiftness for their success ; which, 
 after preparedness — the preparedness that can only be at- 
 tained in time of peace — are the highest essentials of strategy. 
 
 If Greene had failed, when he divided his little army in front 
 of Cornwallis, in the winter of 1780-'81, he would have been 
 condemned by the critics for dividing his command in the pres- 
 ence of the enemy, and allowing the two parts of it to be de- 
 feated in detail. But General Greene was right, as results 
 proved. There are two cases in which it is safe to divide one's 
 force: first, when either part of the divided force is strong 
 enough to defeat the enemy by itself ; and second, when each 
 part of the divided force is so small that it has no intention of 
 fighting, — the smaller the detachment the faster it can get out 
 of the way of the enemy. This was General Greene's case. 
 If Cornwallis had kept his army together, it would never have 
 caught either Greene's or Morgan's detachment. Yet by divi- 
 
 *Fiske. 
 
54 American Campaigns. 
 
 ding his force, Cornwallis made conditions more nearly equal 
 for the American commanders, and gave Morgan his chance at 
 The Cowpens. 
 
 Cornwallis either did not understand and appreciate the pol- 
 icy of Sir Henry Clinton, or, in his eagerness to win victories 
 and laurels for himself, he wilfully failed to carry out the 
 wishes of his chief. A long and bitter controversy was after- 
 ward carried on between these two noblemen. 
 
 With France and Holland and Spain fighting her in Eu- 
 rope and the West Indies, and Hyder-Ali in India, and all the 
 rest of Europe unfriendly and threatening, England could not 
 furnish Clinton troops enough to enable him to conduct the war 
 as he would have liked to conduct it. So Clinton knew he 
 could not destroy the organized forces of the Americans, and, 
 at the same time, so garrison the conquered territory as to keep 
 down the rebellion. Hence his reason for adopting a "wear- 
 ing-out" policy, — the policy by which he purposed holding New 
 York as a principal base, and establishing one or two smaller 
 bases, like Charleston, from which raids could go out, to make 
 it uncomfortable for the people that were carrying on, or en- 
 couraging the rebellion. He did not intend that the raiding 
 expeditions should go dangerously far from their landing 
 places, or from the posts held in the interior, like Camden and 
 Ninety-Six. As for example, the raiding forces sent to Con- 
 necticut seldom spent the night on shore; but they wrought a 
 lot of destruction. 
 
 Cornwallis never should have followed Greene up into north- 
 ern North Carolina; but Greene showed his strategic skill, in 
 drawing his adversary farther and farther away from his base. 
 General Greene put the "power of attraction" of his little 
 army to its fullest use. Cornwallis defeated Greene in every 
 fight, but gained nothing by his victories. It would have been 
 better for the British cause, if Cornwallis had been defeated, 
 and driven back to Charleston at the start ; it would have saved 
 him the mortification, and England the misfortune, of York- 
 town. 
 
 A remarkable thing about Greene's operations is, that, al- 
 though he was defeated tactically in every battle, his campaign 
 was a strategic success from start to finsh; and it resulted in 
 expelling the British from every post in the Carolinas and 
 Georgia, except Charleston. It was, also, a direct factor in 
 the capture of Yorktown. 
 
 Cornwallis had no business to go to Virginia. When he re- 
 
The Revolutionary War. 55 
 
 treated to Wilmington, he should have gone on back to his 
 base, Charleston, by sea, and made a new start. His move- 
 ment to Virginia disappointed and offended Sir Henry 
 Clinton. No plausible reason can be assigned for it, except 
 that Cornwallis thought a return to Charleston would be an 
 acknowledgment of defeat. General Greene did right to de- 
 sist from pursuing him, and to return to South Carolina, 
 whether Cornwallis went to Charleston, as Greene expected 
 him to do, or marched to Virginia, which was the last thing 
 Greene thought he would do. 
 
 After all is said, it was the presence of de Grasse's fleet in 
 the Chesapeake that compassed the surrender of Cornwallis's 
 army. And if the British fleet had succeeded in gaining a de- 
 cisive victory over the French fleet, when it attacked it at the 
 entrance to the Bay, Washington's march to Virginia would 
 have been in vain, — more than likely his army would have been 
 sunk or captured by the British fleet in Chesapeake Bay, where 
 it would have been caught in its transports without naval es- 
 cort ; the surrender of Cornwallis would not have taken place ; 
 Clinton's "wearing-out" policy would have gone on; the war 
 might have lasted several years longer; and — who knows but 
 we might still be British subjects to-day? 
 
 That was the darkest period of England's history; at war 
 with America, France, Holland, Spain, and her subjects in In- 
 dia; without a friend in all Europe; and, worst of all, with 
 a lot of men at home that were worse enemies than those in 
 foreign lands. Fiske says, and seems to say it with pride rather 
 than contempt, "There were many people in England, however, 
 who looked upon the matter differently irom Lord North. This 
 crushing defeat was just what the Duke of Richmond, at the 
 beginning of the war, had publicly declared he hoped for. 
 Charles Fox always took especial delight in reading about de- 
 feats of invading armies, from Marathon and Salamis down- 
 ward; and over the news of Cornwallis's surrender, he leaped 
 from his chair and clapped his hands. In a debate in Parlia- 
 ment four months before, the youthful William Pitt had de- 
 nounced the American War as most accursed, wicked, bar- 
 barous, cruel, unnatural, unjust, and diabolical." Precisely 
 this kind of language has been used by men in America con- 
 cerning our war in the Philippines ; and all such men, whether 
 Englishmen or Americans, deserve a place in the same pillory 
 of universal scorn as that occupied by Benedict Arnold. 
 
LECTURE IV. 
 THE WAR OF 1812. 
 
 (32) On the 18th of June, 1812, Congress declared war 
 against Great Britain. 
 
 The grounds upon which the declaration was made were 
 just and sufficient, but not more so than they had been for sev- 
 eral years. Nor can it well be seen by a careful review of the 
 case that there was much less cause for war with France than 
 there was for war with England. These two states had been 
 engaged in hostilities for several years. The British Ministry 
 by their "Orders in Council" declared the coasts of France and 
 her allies and colonies in a state of blockade. Napoleon replied 
 with his famous Berlin and Milan Decrees declaring a blockade 
 of British ports. Neither belligerent, of course, was able to 
 maintain an actual blockade of such extensive coast lines ; but 
 each seized all vessels caught violating its "paper blockade." 
 The result of it all was that within three or four years Ameri- 
 can commerce was practically driven from the seas. 
 
 A former Administration, Mr. Jefferson's, undertook to re- 
 taliate by issuing an embargo, prohibiting American vessels 
 from going to sea. This was based on the supposition that 
 Europe could not subsist without American products. It im- 
 posed a great hardship on our commerce, of course, had 
 no effect on the belligerents, and was revoked after fourteen 
 months. The same thing was again resorted to in the present 
 Administration, Madison's, with the same result. Another 
 grievance against Great Britain was based on her monstrous 
 assumption of the right to search American ships for British 
 subjects. In fact, this complaint was given first place in the 
 President's message to Congress, recommending a declaration 
 of war. 
 
 But all these outrages had gone on for five or six years, and 
 would probably have been tolerated till the end, if President 
 Madison could have had his way, — for he was as pacific and 
 long-suffering as his Mentor, Mr. Jefferson. But a squad of 
 younger men, led by Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun, had 
 got control in Congress. They compelled the decision for war. 
 
The War of 1812. 57 
 
 Plans. 
 
 In the technical sense of the word, it cannot be said that 
 either the British or the Americans had any plan of campaign. 
 Sir George Prevost, the governor-general of Canada, had about 
 4,500 regular troops at his disposal, and the British army was 
 too busy on the Continent of Europe to spare any more men 
 for service in America. So all Prevost could hope to do was 
 to defend Canada. He counted, also, upon assistance from the 
 powerful Indian tribes along the outer edge of our western 
 settlements. The famous chief Tecumthe [or Tecumseh] was 
 keeping track with the quarrel going on between the British 
 and Americans, and was ready to take advantage of it. He 
 had gone from Michigan to Alabama, urging the tribes to unite 
 against the Americans. 
 
 The standing army of the United States at this time "was 
 only 6,744 strong, notwithstanding that Congress had six 
 months before passed a bill increasing it to 35,000."* Still our 
 statesmen had no thought of anything but an offensive cam- 
 paign. Canada was to be invaded and conquered at once. 
 Mr. Jefferson, who was a man of peace and detested a stand- 
 ing army, wrote from Monticello, his Virginia home: "The 
 acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighborhood of 
 Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching, and will give us 
 experience for the attack of Halifax the next, and the final ex- 
 pulsion of England from the American Continent/'f — a proph- 
 ecy that showed no less ignorance of the science of war than 
 of the horoscope. We never acquired any part of Canada; and 
 England has not yet been expelled from the American Con- 
 tinent. This, however, was the general opinion in the United 
 States, and the plan of campaign adopted by the War Depart- 
 ment proposed, "that a main army should advance by way of 
 Lake Champlain .upon Montreal, while three columns, com- 
 posed chiefly of militia, should enter Canada from Detroit, 
 Niagara and Sacketts Harbor." The details of the plan were 
 not settled; nor was the time fixed for the combined move- 
 ment.J After overrunning Upper Canada, the President ex- 
 pected these columns to unite on the St. Lawrence and advance 
 to the capture of Montreal.§ 
 
 ♦Upton's Military Policy of the United States. 
 ^History of the United States, by Henry Adams. 
 t Adams. 
 
 %A' History of the People of the United States, by John Bach Mc- 
 Master. 
 
58 American Campaigns. 
 
 Geography. 
 
 At that time the American frontier war guarded by garri- 
 sons at the following widely separated points: Plattsburg, 
 Sacketts Harbor, Fort Niagara, Detroit, Fort Dearborn [Chi- 
 cago], and Fort Mackinac at the junction of Lakes Huron 
 and Michigan. 
 
 On the Canadian side of the line were the garrisons of Mon- 
 treal in Lower Canada; Kingston opposite Sacketts Harbor; 
 Forts Erie and George opposite Buffalo and Fort Niagara ; and 
 Fort Maiden at the mouth of the Detroit River. The British 
 had possession of the lakes, — that is to say, they had small fleets 
 on them, — which enabled them to concentrate troops promptly 
 at different points ; while the Americans must march overland, 
 and, in some cases, cut their roads through the forests, and 
 build them through the swamps. 
 
 Operations. 
 
 (33) Governor Hull of Michigan Territory, who had been 
 an officer in the Revolutionary War, was to command the col- 
 umn that was to advance by way of Detroit. In April and 
 May, 1812, he had assembled at Dayton,* Ohio, a force consist- 
 ing of the 4th U. S. Infantry (300 effectives), three regiments 
 of Ohio militia infantry, and one troop of Ohio dragoons,- — 
 about 1,600 men in all. Two regiments of Michigan militia 
 were to join at Detroit. 
 
 Detroit was 200 miles to the north, and Hull's troops had to 
 "cut a road through the forest, build bridges and construct 
 causeways . . . but they made good progress. "f The 
 march was begun on the 1st of June [1812], and Detroit was 
 reached on the 5th of July. On the way Hull received word of 
 the declaration of war, which Congress had made on the 18th 
 of June; but the British commander at Maiden had also re- 
 ceived the news. On reaching the Miami or Maumee River, 
 General Hull forwarded his personal baggage, hospital stores, 
 and a trunk containing his orders and muster-rolls, to Detroit 
 by a schooner, — all of which fell into the hands of the British, 
 who seized the schooner as it was passing Maiden. 
 
 (34) On July 12 General Hull crossed the Detroit River. 
 
 *In Southwestern Ohio. 
 fAdams. 
 
The War of 1812. 59 
 
 The British militia guarding the river retired behind the Ca- 
 nard River, twelve miles below, without firing a shot. Hull 
 occupied Sandwich, was well received by the inhabitants, and 
 issued a proclamation calling upon the people to give their alle- 
 giance to the United States. This proclamation had some ef- 
 fect for a time. The people seemed inclined toward the United 
 States. Several hundred sought the protection of Hull's 
 troops, and the Canadian militia deserted by scores. So Gen- 
 eral Hull conceived the notion that he was going to have a 
 bloodless conquest of Canada. Besides his militia, however, 
 the British commander at Fort Maiden had 280 regulars and 
 about 230 Indians, with whom to contest the conquest. The 
 left flank of his position was covered and supported by a fleet. 
 Hull called a council of war, which decided against storming 
 Maiden, and advised delay. A few days later Hull wrote Mr. 
 Eustis, the Secretary of War : "It is in the power of this army 
 to take Maiden by storm, but it would be attended, in my opin- 
 ion, with too great a sacrifice under the present circumstances." 
 In the same letter he said, "If Maiden was in our possession, 
 I could march this army to Niagara or York [Toronto] in a 
 very short time."* 
 
 But every day's delay lessened Hull's chances of success. 
 The Ohio militiamen were clamoring for a fight. Nothing is 
 so trying to raw troops as lying idle in camp. "Detachments 
 scoured the country, meeting at first little resistance, one de- 
 tachment even crossing the Canard River. But on the 19th and 
 24th of July, strong detachments were driven back with loss, 
 and the outlook became suddenly threatening."* 
 
 Thenceforward every day brought Hull fatal news. His 
 army lost respect for him in consequence of his failure to at- 
 tack Maiden ; the British strengthened the defenses of Maiden, 
 and, on August 8, received sixty fresh men of the 41st Regi- 
 ment, under Colonel Proctor from Niagara."* (32) But 
 worse than all this, on the 3rd of August the garrison of Fort 
 Mackinac arrived at Detroit as prisoners of war on parole, 
 announcing that Mackinac had capitulated to a force of Brit- 
 ish and savages, and that a horde of Indians from the North- 
 west were on their way to fall upon Detroit * A day or two 
 later a party of Indians under Tecumthe crossed the river, and 
 routed a detachment of the Ohio regiment on its way to pro- 
 
 *Adams. 
 
60 American Campaigns. 
 
 tect a train of supplies coming up from Ohio. Hull decided at 
 once to recross the river, which he succeeded in doing on the 
 night of August the 8th without interference from the enemy. 
 
 (34) At this time Detroit contained about 800 inhabitants, 
 within gunshot of the British shore. The fort was a square in- 
 closure of about two acres, surrounded by an embankment, a 
 dry ditch, and a double row of palisades. It did not command 
 the river, but was capable of withstanding a siege as long as its 
 supplies would hold out.* (33) It was 200 miles from any 
 American station from which reinforcements or supplies could 
 come; and its only road of communication lay for sixty miles 
 along the shore of Lake Erie, where a British fleet on one side, 
 and bands of savages on the other, could always make it impas- 
 sable. The road was also within easy striking distance of the 
 British garrison at Maiden. 
 
 Hull appreciated the danger of his position at Fort Detroit, 
 and wanted to retreat behind the Maumee without delay. But 
 Colonel Cass informed him, "that, if this were done, every man 
 of the Ohio militia would refuse to obey, and would desert 
 their general. . . . Hull considered that this report obliged 
 him to remain" at Detroit.f 
 
 He ordered out a body of 600 men, including the 4th U. S. 
 Infantry, to restore his communication with Ohio and to fetch 
 some supplies stopped at the Raisin River. Fourteen miles 
 south of Detroit, the detachment encountered a force of about 
 200 British and twenty-five Indians, and routed it. But the 
 detachment did not push on to the Raisin River after the sup- 
 plies ; the next day it marched back to Detroit. 
 
 "The next four days were thrown away by the Americans. 
 August 13 the British began to establish a battery on the Cana- 
 dian side of the river to bombard Detroit. Within the Ameri- 
 can lines the army was in secret mutiny. Hull's vacillations 
 and evident alarm disorganized his force. The Ohio colonels 
 were ready to remove him from his command, which they of- 
 fered to Lieutenant-Colonel Miller of the 4th U. S. Infantry ; 
 but Colonel Miller declined this manner of promotion, and Hull 
 retained control."f 
 
 On the 14th of August Hull sent the two Ohio colonels, Mc- 
 Arthur and Cass, with their best men, about 350, to make an- 
 other effort, by a long and circuitous route, to bring up the sup- 
 
 ♦Lecture by Lieutenant Chapman. 
 fAdams. 
 
The War of 1812. 61 
 
 plies, which were still at the Raisin River, thirty-five miles 
 south. (34) The next day [August 15, 1812], the British 
 General Brock, who had arrived on the night of the 13th, with 
 reinforcements, at Maiden, and had taken command of the gar- 
 rison, sent a summons to Hull to surrender. After some delay 
 Hull declined, and then sent orders recalling McArthur's 
 detachment. 
 
 As soon as Hull's reply reached the British lines, two British 
 armed vessels moved up the river near Sandwich, while a bat- 
 tery opened fire on the town and fort from the Canadian shore. 
 "The fire was returned, but no energetic measures were taken 
 to prepare either for an assault or a siege."* During the night 
 Tecumthe and 600 Indians crossed the river, some two miles 
 below, and filled the woods, cutting the communication between 
 McArthur's detachment and the fort. 
 
 A little before daylight of August 16, Brock himself, with 
 330 regulars and 400 militia, carrying with them five little can- 
 non, crossed the river to storm the fort. General Hull had 
 about 1,000 soldiers within the fort, and McArthur's detach- 
 ment was only a few miles away. General Brock and his little 
 detachment ought to have been killed or captured to a man. 
 But they were not. As Brock came up the slope to reconnoiter 
 the fort, he saw a white flag displayed. Within an hour Hull 
 had surrendered, not only the fort and its garrison, but Mc- 
 Arthur's detachment and the small force guarding the supplies 
 at the River Raisin. Hull was afterward tried by court- 
 martial for treason and cowardice, convicted of cowardice, 
 sentenced to be shot, but pardoned by President Madison. 
 
 General Brock sent the American regulars that he captured, 
 about 300 officers and men of the 4th Infantry, down Lake 
 Erie to British prisons; but he showed his contempt for our 
 militia, 2,000 prisoners, by giving them leave to return to their 
 homes. 
 
 (33) The day before this, August 15, an overwhelming 
 body of Indians massacred the little American garrison of Fort 
 Dearborn ; "and with it the last vestige of American authority 
 on the western lakes disappeared. Thenceforward the line of 
 the Wabash and the Maumee became the military boundary of 
 the United States in the Northwest, and the country felt pain- 
 ful doubt whether even that line could be defended."* 
 
 ♦Adams. 
 
62 American Campaigns. 
 
 Operations in the East. 
 
 (32) In the meantime what were the other columns of in- 
 vasion proposed in the War Department's plan of campaign 
 doing ? 
 
 General Henry Dearborn, who had been called from the 
 position of collector of the port at Boston to the highest com- 
 missioned office in the military service of the United States, 
 was to have charge of the operations in the east. But so slow 
 did the recruitment and mobilization proceed, through the in- 
 capacity and neglect of Congress and the War Department and 
 General Dearborn, and the opposition of the governors of some 
 of the New England States, that October had arrived before a 
 single offensive movement had been made by Americans in 
 that quarter. In fact, Dearborn had, in August, without any 
 authority from Washington, concluded an armistice with Pre- 
 vost, the governor-general of Canada, in spite of the fact that 
 his orders "were plain, distinct and positive. He was to sup- 
 port Hull by a vigorous offensive movement on Canada at 
 Niagara. He knew that Hull was in Canada. He knew that 
 every available British soldier in Canada was hurrying toward 
 Hull. He knew that time was precious." Yet he gladly agreed 
 to a suspension of arms in his front.* 
 
 This long delay had enabled the British General Brock to 
 transfer troops from the Niagara frontier to Detroit, and to 
 achieve the overthrow of General Hull ; then to bring them 
 back to Niagara, in time to meet any offensive movement there. 
 With less than 2,000 men, this active commander now guarded 
 nearly forty miles of front along the Niagara River. 
 
 (35) On the opposite side, with his headquarters at Lewis- 
 ton, Major-General Stephen Van Rensselaer of the New York 
 militia, commanded the American forces, about 5,000 strong, 
 including the 13th U. S. Infantry. Queenstown was held by 
 two companies of British regulars and a few militia, about 
 300 in all. 
 
 On the night of October 10 General Van Rensselaer tried to 
 cross the river to attack Queenstown, but "was prevented by 
 some blunder with regard to the boats."f On the night of the 
 13th the effort was repeated, and a force of regulars and vol- 
 unteers was landed on the Canadian shore. The Americans 
 
 *McMaster. 
 fAdams. 
 
The War of 1812. 63 
 
 got possession of Queenstown Heights; but British reinforce- 
 ments arrived from Fort George and Chippewa, and the 
 Americans were finally driven off the Heights, and forced to 
 surrender ; while a large force of militia stood upon the oppo- 
 site bank, overcome with fear, and refused to cross to the aid 
 of their countrymen.* Among the British killed was General 
 Brock, and among the American prisoners was Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Winfield Scott of the 2nd U. S. Artillery. Ninety 
 Americans were killed, and "not less than 900 surrendered, in- 
 cluding skulkers and militiamen who never reached the 
 Heights."f 
 
 General Van Rensselaer, disgusted at the behavior of his 
 militia, sent in his resignation the next day, and was succeeded 
 by General Alexander Smyth, an Irish brigadier-general of the 
 regular army. Smyth announced his assumption of the com- 
 mand by issuing several bombastic orders, which make very 
 amusing reading to-day. 
 
 (36) Smyth planned to cross the Niagara River at Black 
 Rock, on the night of November 28, and issued the order ac- 
 cordingly to his army. Among the paragraphs of this order 
 we find this amusing detail: "At twenty yards' distance, the 
 soldiers will be ordered to trail arms, advance with shouts, fire 
 at five paces' distance, and charge bayonets. The soldiers will 
 be silent above all things. "f 
 
 A party of regulars and sailors crossed the river and spiked 
 the enemy's guns. But the main force did not finish embark- 
 ing before the afternoon ; so the general ordered them to disem- 
 bark and dine. The army was furious. Two days later, 
 Smyth issued another order to embark. He would not cross 
 with less than 3,000 men, and only enough of his militia vol- 
 unteered, to raise his force to 1,500. The expedition was, 
 therefore, again recalled. So enraged were the militia of 
 Smyth's army now, that they threatened his life. The general 
 had to pitch his tent in the midst of the camp of the regulars 
 for protection. The militia went home, and Smyth took leave 
 of absence. Three months later he was dropped from the 
 rolls of the army4 
 
 (37) All this time General Dearborn, who was to command 
 in person the main expedition against Montreal, which was to 
 
 ♦McMaster. 
 tAdams. 
 $McMaster. Adams. 
 
64 American Campaigns. 
 
 advance by way of Lake Champlain, had made no move. On 
 the 19th of November he marched his army to the Canadian 
 boundary, — twenty miles. There his militia refused to go any 
 farther, and he marched his army back to Plattsburg. 
 
 (33) "Meantime the people of the United States demanded 
 that the lost territory of Michigan should be regained. A force 
 of Kentucky militia was assembled at Fort Harrison* with a 
 view to crushing the strength of the Indian tribes and thus re- 
 . opening the way to Detroit. General Hopkins was placed in 
 command. Four days out from Fort Harrison, the command 
 became frightened by a prairie fire, and, abandoning their gen- 
 eral," retraced their steps and dispersed to their homes.f 
 
 Another army was organized under General William Henry 
 Harrison to retake Detroit. It consisted of about 10,000 mili- 
 tia from Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, Ohio, and Pennsylva- 
 nia. Harrison, who afterwards became President, had gained 
 a national fame as a general by his victory over the Indians at 
 the battle of Tippecanoe, in the autumn of 1811. His army 
 was to march in three columns and concentrate at the rapids 
 of the Miami River — one column from Newport, Kentucky; 
 one from Urbana, Ohio ; and the third from Erie, Pennsylva- 
 nia. The Kentucky column mutinied when a few days out, 
 and was kept in service only by the personal entreaties of Gen- 
 eral Harrison. The troops from Urbana had a slight skir- 
 mish with the Indians and then, in defiance of orders, returned 
 to their homes. The third column never got started until the 
 following year. It must be admitted that the mutinous con- 
 duct of the troops was occasioned chiefly by the hardships they 
 had to suffer for lack of clothing, subsistence, and transport.* 
 Thus ended the land operations of the year 1812. 
 
 Troops Engaged. 
 
 "The militia called into service during the year 1812 num- 
 bered 49,187, of whom 208 were from Massachusetts, and none 
 from Connecticut. Adding 15,000 regulars, we find that the 
 total strength of the troops that drew Government pay during 
 the year 1812 was not less than 65,000." As the regulars were 
 nearly all newly enlisted and without any training, they were 
 little better than the militia.J 
 
 The British regular force in Canada did not number 4,500 ; 
 
 *In Western Indiana. 
 
 tUpton. 
 
 JMcMaster. 
 
The War of 1812. 65 
 
 but they were trained soldiers. The Canadian militia was no 
 better than our own, and the Indian allies could not be counted 
 upon. 
 
 Operations of 1813. 
 
 During the winter of 1812-'13, Congress passed laws increas- 
 ing the regular army to forty-four regiments of infantry, four 
 regiments of artillery, two regiments of dragoons, one regiment 
 of rifles, and the corps of engineers: Aggregate strength, 
 57,351. But the aggregate strength of the regular army for 
 this year never actually rose above 19,036.* 
 
 In December, 1812, General Harrison had pushed forward a 
 detachment of about 1,300 men, under General Winchester, to 
 the Miami Rapids. The detachment was composed of the Ken- 
 tucky militia regiments and the 17th U. S. Infantry. At 
 Frenchtown, on the Raisin River, the enemy had a garrison of 
 about fifty Canadian militia and 200 Indians. A part of Win- 
 chester's detachment captured the village, without much loss, 
 and Winchester occupied it. No outposts • were placed, 
 although they were recommended to the commanding-general 
 by his subordinate officers. The result was, that on the night 
 of January 21 [1813], General Proctor, with about 500 British 
 regulars and 600 Indians, from Brownstown and Maiden, sur- 
 prised the garrison, killed 397 of them, wounded twenty-seven, 
 and captured General Winchester and 522 men. 
 
 Meantime General Harrison had moved to the Miami Rap- 
 ids, with the rest of his force; and General Proctor, fearing' 
 Harrison would move against him, abandoned his wounded 
 prisoners and hurried away to his intrenchments at Maiden. 
 Then Harrison, fearing that Proctor would return against him, 
 burnt his post at Miami Rapids and hastened back to the Por- 
 tage or Carrying River. A week later Harrison went back to 
 the Rapids, where he spent several months having Fort Meigs 
 built, and collecting troops and supplies. 
 
 Toward the end of April Proctor brought over a force of 
 about 1,000 whites and 1,200 Indians, and laid siege to Fort 
 Meigs. On the 5th of May Brigadier-General Green Clay ar- 
 rived with 1,200 Kentucky militia to relieve the beleaguered 
 garrison. He surprised the enemy, captured his guns, and al- 
 most won a victory. But the British and Indians soon made 
 a counter-attack, and either captured or massacred nearly the 
 
 *Upton. 
 
66 American Campaigns. 
 
 whole body "under the eyes of Harrison at Fort Meigs."* 
 Proctor's Indians dispersed within the next day or two, and on 
 the 9th of May Proctor abandoned the siege, and, unmolested 
 by Harrison, withdrew to Maiden. 
 
 In July Proctor returned with a much larger force of Brit- 
 ish and Indians to the siege of Fort Meigs, which had been left 
 under command of General Clay. "Failing to coax the Ken- 
 tucky commander out of the fort to fight, Proctor left his In- 
 dians to continue the siege, while he moved with his white 
 troops against Fort Stephenson on the lower Sandusky. This 
 post was garrisoned by 160 men of the 17th U. S. Infantry 
 under young Major Croghan. On August 2 Proctor assaulted 
 the post, but was severely repulsed. "f Immediately after- 
 wards Proctor raised the siege of Fort Meigs and fell back to 
 Canada. 
 
 The Administration at last awakened to an appreciation of 
 the impracticability of recovering the territory lost in the West, 
 and of invading Canada from that quarter, without the posses- 
 sion of Lake Erie and the cooperation of an American fleet. 
 So the Secretary of War, now General Armstrong, who had 
 succeeded Mr. Eustis, had ordered General Harrison to main- 
 tain a strict defensive, guarding the line of the Maumee, until a 
 fleet should be built on Lake Erie. This was accomplished, 
 and possession of the Lake was achieved by Commodore Perry's 
 victory on the 10th of September. 
 
 On September 12 Harrison, at Seneca, on the Sandusky 
 River, received Perry's famous dispatch : "We have met the 
 enemy and they are ours." This meant that it was now Har- 
 rison's turn to act. Harrison's army consisted of about 2,500 
 regulars, 3,000 Kentucky volunteer infantry, and Colonel Rich- 
 ard M. Johnson's mounted Kentucky regiment. While the 
 mounted regiment marched to Detroit, Harrison transferred 
 his infantry by water to a point about three miles below 
 Maiden. 
 
 Proctor, believing that he could not maintain himself at Mai- 
 den with Lake Erie in possession of the American navy, fell 
 back by the road up the Thames River. The Americans pur- 
 sued, and on the 5th of October overtook the enemy near the 
 Moravian Town, where the engagement known as the battle of 
 the Thames was fought. Colonel Johnson's regiment alone 
 
 *Adams. 
 
 fLecture by Lieutenant Chapman. 
 
The War of 1812. 67 
 
 fought the battle on the American side ; it was enough. Part 
 of the regiment, mounted, charged the British lines in front, 
 and broke through them ; while the rest of the regiment, dis- 
 mounted, turned the enemy's right, and completed the victory.* 
 The British were routed, losing twelve killed, twenty-two 
 wounded, and 600 captured. Tecumthe was among the slain, 
 and, as a result of the battle, the Indians deserted the British 
 cause. 
 
 The United States had regained the lost territory of Mich- 
 igan, with the exception of Fort Mackinac, which remained in 
 possession of the British till the restoration of peace. After 
 this victory the militia and volunteers were discharged ; regular 
 garrisons were left at Detroit and other frontier posts; and 
 Harrison, with about 1,300 regulars, moved by the Lake to 
 Sacketts Harbor. 
 
 (32) The plan of campaign proposed by the War Depart- 
 ment for the operations in the east this year [1813], contem- 
 plated, first, the capture of Kingston and Fort Prescott, which 
 controlled the upper St. Lawrence River, and then the main ex- 
 pedition against Montreal. The possession of the St. Law- 
 rence by the United States would sever Upper from Lower 
 Canada; for it was the only line of communication between 
 the two. 
 
 General Dearborn commanded the American forces about 
 Lake Ontario, some 7,000 men, regulars and militia. The Brit- 
 ish forces on the opposite shore numbered about 1,800 regulars 
 and 500 militia. 
 
 General Dearborn did not follow the exact plan as proposed 
 by the Secretary of War. On the 27th of April he crossed the 
 Lake with about 1,700 men, and captured York, now Toronto, 
 driving away the small British garrison, and burning the Par- 
 liament House.f A month later, on May 27, his forces 
 captured Fort George, after a sharp engagement, driving 
 the Brtiish garrison toward Hamilton at the head of Lake 
 Ontario. 
 
 Dearborn, who personally had remained on shipboard during 
 the engagement, sent General Winder with about 1,000 men in 
 pursuit. Winder halted and sent back for reinforcements, and 
 General Chandler marched out with another thousand men, and 
 himself took command of the united forces. He pushed on to 
 
 *McMaster. 
 
 fFrancis A. Walker, The Making of the Nation. 
 
68 American Campaigns. 
 
 Stony Creek, where he camped without outposts, within ten 
 miles of the British position at Hamilton. 
 
 In the night, the British commander, Vincent, surprised his 
 camp and attacked it with about 700 men. Great confusion en- 
 sued, with considerable loss on each side. Both American 
 generals, Chandler and Winder, were captured; and the two 
 hostile forces retreated in opposite directions, leaving their 
 dead unburied. Two days afterwards, June 8, the Americans 
 were back at Fort George. 
 
 On the morning of June 24, Colonel Boerstler, with some 540 
 men of the 14th U. S. Infantry and two field-pieces, marched 
 from Fort George to Beaver Dam, about seventeen miles, to 
 destroy a store-house. He found himself surrounded by In- 
 dians and tried to retreat ; but a British lieutenant with a squad 
 of soldiers barred his way. Becoming utterly demoralized, 
 Colonel Boerstler surrendered his 540 men to the British lieu- 
 tenant, who had only 260 Indians, militia, and regulars. 
 
 The withdrawal of troops for the expedition against York 
 and Fort George left Sacketts Harbor with a very weak gar- 
 rison. The possession of this place was of as much import- 
 ance to the British as the capture of Kingston would have been 
 to the Americans. So on the night of May 26, Sir George Pre- 
 vost himself embarked about 800 regulars at Kingston for its 
 capture. The expedition landed next morning, and was met on 
 the beach by General Jacob Brown, with a line of American 
 militia in front, backed up by a line of regulars. "The militia 
 instantly fled. The regulars fell back to the barrack and the 
 block-house, and there checked the British advance." Prevost 
 then retreated to his vessels, leaving a third of his force killed, 
 wounded or missing.* 
 
 Kingston and the St. Lawrence River were still in the pos- 
 session of the British ; so was Lake Ontario ; and General Dear- 
 born's operations had really accomplished very little. He was 
 now replaced by General James Wilkinson; and Major-General 
 Wade Hampton was placed in command of the forces at Lake 
 Champlain, some 5,000 regulars. Hampton was under Wilkin- 
 son's command ; but these two generals mutually despised each 
 other, and Hampton ignored Wilkinson's orders and refused 
 to serve under him. "The Secretary [of War] pacified Hamp- 
 ton as well as he could, consented that all orders and reports 
 should go out from and be made to the Department of War," 
 
 *McMaster. 
 
The War of 1812. 69 
 
 and moved that department from Washington to Sacketts 
 Harbor.* This enraged General Wilkinson. 
 
 After more than a month of ludicrous and unseemly wrang- 
 ling between the Secretary and the General over a plan of 
 operations, it was finally decided that Wilkinson with some 
 8,000 regulars should move down the St. Lawrence, form a 
 junction with Hampton, and march the combined force against 
 Montreal. 
 
 Embarking his men in bateaux, Wilkinson sailed down the 
 St. Lawrence on the 17th of October. Twelve hundred men 
 under General McComb were placed on the north bank to 
 march as a flank-guard abreast of the flotilla. A brigade under 
 General Brown, also on the north bank, marched as advance- 
 guard. British gunboats and 800 troops from Kingston set out 
 in pursuit. On November 11, at Christler's Farm, the troops 
 attacked the American rear. General Boyd was landed, with 
 three brigades, to drive back the enemy, but was defeated; 
 2,000 American regulars, commanded by regular officers, re- 
 tired before 800 British. The next day Wilkinson took his 
 command to the south bank, and fled with it to French Mills, 
 where it went into winter quarters. 
 
 (37) Meantime General Hampton had, toward the end of 
 September, moved his force to Chateaugay. He had about 
 4,000 effectives. On October 22 he started down the Chateau- 
 gay River and marched as far as Spears. Here he found him- 
 self opposed by the British, and, judging rightly from letters 
 received from the Secretary of War and from General 
 Wilkinson, that the combined movement against Montreal had 
 been suspended for the winter, he marched his command back 
 to Plattsburg. 
 
 (35) A garrison of 500 New York militia had been left at 
 Fort George under General McClure. Learning that Colonel 
 Vincent with a force of British was advancing against them, the 
 militia refused to serve any longer; so McClure burned the 
 town of Newark near the fort, set fire to Queenstown, and 
 withdrew to the American side. Then the militia returned to 
 their homes. (36) On the 18th of December a British de- 
 tachment retaliated by burning Buffalo, Black Rock, and other 
 towns, and destroying all public and private property along the 
 frontier for thirty miles. Fort Niagara was captured by sur- 
 prise, and held by the enemy until peace was restored. 
 
 *McMaster. 
 
70 American Campaigns. 
 
 (38) In April of this year the British Rear-Admiral Cock- 
 burn, "with a few boats and one hundred and fifty men, ter- 
 rorized the shores of the Upper Chesapeake." Cockburn was 
 opposed by only a few militia; so he plundered farms and 
 burned villages in real buccaneer fashion* Admiral Warren, 
 also, undertook to capture Norfolk in June by a land attack, 
 but was repulsed. 
 
 Troops Employed in 1813. 
 
 General Upton in his valuable book, The Military Policy of 
 the United States, says: "The false economy of making, in 
 time of peace, no preparation for war, was made increasingly 
 apparent by our experience in the foregoing campaigns. 
 
 "Exclusive of volunteers and rangers, in reference to whom 
 data for the campaign is wanting, the number of troops called 
 out during the year [1813] numbered: 
 
 Regulars 19,036 
 
 Militia 130,112 
 
 Total 149,148 
 
 "The only compensation was the destruction of Proctor's 
 force of 800 regulars, a feat that would have been impossible, 
 but for the victory of Commodore Perry on Lake Erie."f 
 
 Campaign of 1814. 
 
 In the first months of 1814 Congress passed bills increasing 
 the regular army to 62,733 men ; but by the following Septem- 
 ber enlistments had brought its numbers up to only some 38,000. 
 There was, however, a marked improvement in the quality of 
 the troops. "The regular troops at Buffalo passed the winter 
 and spring of 1814 in drilling and improving their discipline. 
 . . . Brigade commanders, like Scott, personally taught 
 their officers the elements of squad drill, so that they in turn 
 might more thoroughly instruct their men."f 
 
 (32) In February, 1814, General Brown was ordered to 
 Sacketts Harbor with 2,000 men, from French Mills, and Gen- 
 
 *Adams. 
 fUpton. 
 
The War of 1812. 71 
 
 eral Wilkinson fell back to Plattsburg with the rest of his 
 army. At this time there were some 8,000 British troops at 
 Montreal and in posts along the River Richelieu [Sorel]. (37) 
 Two hundred occupied an advanced post in a stone mill at La- 
 colle Creek. On March 30 Wilkinson led 4,000 men with two 
 field-guns against this mill. He was unable to batter down the 
 walls with his cannon, and, after losing 200 of his men by the 
 fire from the building, he gave up the attempt and returned to 
 his station. This was General Wilkinson's last military ex- 
 ploit. On the 1st of May General Izard took command of the 
 army at Lake Champlain. 
 
 (32) The war in Europe was at an end, and in July four- 
 teen of the best regiments of Wellington's army sailed for Can- 
 ada. The British still had possession of Lake Ontario, the 
 American fleet being practically blockaded at Sacketts Harbor. 
 So General Brown determined to cross the Niagara River and 
 operate against the British in that quarter. Brown's army con- 
 sisted of two small regular brigades under Winfield Scott, now 
 a brigadier-general, and Ripley; a volunteer militia brigade, 
 including some 600 Indians,- under General Peter B. Porter; 
 and a battalion of artillery under Major Hindman : in all about 
 3,500 men for duty. On their side of the river the British 
 had some 4,000 effectives under General Riall. 
 
 (36) On the 3rd of July Brown crossed the river and cap- 
 tured Fort Erie. He then moved down the river toward the 
 other British posts. (39) On the 5th of July Porter's bri- 
 gade was in the lead, and met the British just beyond Street's 
 Creek. The brigade, after a short fight, "broke and fell back 
 in confusion"; but Scott came on with his brigade, and the 
 "British line broke and crumbled away." Henry Adams says 
 in his history: "The battle of Chippewa was the only occa- 
 sion during the war when equal bodies of regular troops met 
 face to face, in extended lines on an open plain in broad day- 
 light, without advantage of position; and never again after 
 that combat was an army of American regulars beaten by 
 British troops."* Had the historian looked farther ahead in 
 our annals, he might have added, "nor by any other troops." 
 (35) Brown pursued the British beyond Queenstown, where 
 he remained more than a fortnight ; then, learning that British 
 reinforcements were arriving, he fell back to Chippewa, July 
 24. Then Scott's brigade moved forward to reconnoiter, and 
 
 ♦Adams. 
 
72 American Campaigns. 
 
 encountered the British at Lundy's Lane, at 5 p.m., July 25. 
 (40) This brought on the battle of Lundy's Lane, which 
 lasted till ten o'clock at night. (41) The British were driven 
 back from their first position, but the Americans withdrew 
 from the field at the end of the engagement. In this combat 
 the British numbered 3,045 and the Americans, less than 2,000. 
 The losses were 743 killed and wounded on the American 
 side, and 643 on the British. Generals Brown and Scott were 
 both badly wounded.* 
 
 (36) The army fell back to Fort Erie. The British did not 
 pursue at once, — this battle and that of Chippewa had increased 
 their respect for American soldiery. (42) At length, on the 
 15th of August, after elaborate preparation with siege artil- 
 lery, the British assaulted the American position at Fort Erie, 
 and were severely repulsed. On the 17th of September the 
 Americans made a sortie, which was so far successful that the 
 British fell back on the 21st toward Chippewa. 
 
 (32) Meantime a British fleet had ascended the Sorel River 
 into Lake Champlain; and Sir George Prevost, with upwards 
 of 11,000 of Wellington's veterans, advanced from Mon- 
 treal against Plattsburg, held by a small, but well intrenched, 
 garrison. (43) On September 11 the British attacked at 
 Plattsburg by land and water. The American navy saved the 
 army. Lieutenant Macdonough practically captured or de- 
 stroyed the British fleet ; and the next day Prevost retreated to 
 Canada. 
 
 (44) From the beginning of the war, Washington City 
 had been left to the protection of Providence. Not a thing 
 had been done for its defense. Finally, in July of this year, 
 1814, Brigadier-General Winder, "to please the governor of 
 Maryland," was charged with the command and defense of 
 the city.* 
 
 On August 18 word reached Washington that a British fleet 
 was at the mouth of the Patuxent River, and troops were 
 landing at Benedict about forty miles from the Capital. Mr. 
 Monroe, the Secretary of State, mounted a horse and rode off 
 to reconnoiter the enemy. General Winder gathered together 
 some 2,000 men, including about 300 regulars of different regi- 
 ments, and marched them out to Woodyard, where he was 
 joined by Mr. Monroe. 
 
 Meantime General Robert Ross was leisurely marching his 
 
 *Adams. 
 
The War of 1812. 73 
 
 5,000 red-coats toward Washington. Winder's army at Wood- 
 yard watched them go by, but did not molest them. Then 
 Winder fell back to Old Fields, where he stayed till the Brit- 
 ish approached; then he retreated across the Navy Yard 
 bridge. The President and all the cabinet had joined him; and 
 when they found for sure that the British had taken the Bla- 
 densburg road, they all hurried with the army to that point. 
 Mr. Monroe was in the lead. 
 
 (45) Other militia troops had assembled at Bladensburg, 
 also; so there were nigh 7,000 Americans on the ground, on 
 August 24. The head of the British column deployed, and ad- 
 vanced straight against the Americans, who stood their ground 
 and received it with fire. But when the next British regiment 
 crossed the little stream, and threatened to turn its left, the 
 American line broke. Some of the Americans retired in order, 
 "but the mass, struck by panic, streamed westward toward 
 Georgetown and Rockville." The only redeeming feature of 
 the whole affair was the conduct of Captain Joshua Barney and 
 his four hundred sailors and marines. Barney had commanded 
 a gunboat flotilla in the Chesapeake, and had been obliged to 
 destroy it to save it from the British fleet. With his sailors he 
 trailed along behind Winder's army without any orders, and 
 took his place in the battle. And his men stood their ground 
 till they were overwhelmed in front, and enveloped in flank. 
 But this time the navy was not strong enough to save the army. 
 
 (44) General Winder and his army never stopped in their 
 flight, until they had gone sixteen miles beyond Washington. 
 The British marched into Washington, burned the Capitol, the 
 White House, and other public buildings ; "and," the historian 
 states, "from the distant hills of Maryland and Virginia the fly- 
 ing President and Cabinet caught glimpses of the ruin their 
 incompetence had caused."* 
 
 The British marched back to their ships and sailed for Balti- 
 more. They landed near North Point, and the fleet pushed 
 into Patapsco River to shell the city. Baltimore had made 
 ready for a stouter defense than Washington's. A brigade of 
 militia met the invaders and delayed them some time, killing 
 General Ross; and two days later, September 14, the British 
 withdrew to their transports without having assaulted the 
 American intrenchments. 
 
 ♦Adams. 
 
74 American Campaigns. 
 
 Operations at New Orleans. 
 
 The British troops that captured Washington sailed for Ja- 
 maica, where they were reinforced by other veteran regiments. 
 Sir Edward Pakenham, "the brother-in-law of Wellington, and 
 the ablest of his lieutenants,"* then took command of the whole 
 force and embarked it for the capture of New Orleans. (46) 
 He entered Lake Borgne, an arm of the Gulf of Mexico, and 
 landed his troops near the head of Bayou Mazant, about ten 
 miles east of New Orleans. 
 
 General Andrew Jackson was in command at New Orleans, 
 and had got together a force of about 5,000 men, mostly militia. 
 (47) On the evening of December 24 Jackson with part of 
 his force surprised the advanced troops of the enemy in their 
 camp at the Villere plantation, and, aided by the guns of the 
 Carolina, in the Mississippi, attacked them. A confused com- 
 bat took place in the fog and darkness, and the Americans 
 were repulsed. Jackson then placed his command behind a 
 strong field : work, stretching across a space about a thousand 
 yards wide, between the river on one side and a cypress brake 
 on the other. A canal flowed along the front of the work. 
 
 On the 1st of January, 1815, the British batteries opened fire 
 upon the American position. Their fire was immediately re- 
 turned, and by noon they had been silenced. Pakenham then 
 waited for more of his troops to come up, and, on the 8th of 
 January, assaulted the American line with more than 5,000 of 
 the best British veterans. "Behind the line," says McMaster, 
 "were gathered as motley an array of men as ever at any time 
 fought under one banner. On the extreme right, just where 
 the line joined the levee, were some regulars, a company of 
 New Orleans Rifles, some dragoons grouped about a howitzer, 
 some sailors from the Carolina who served a small battery, and 
 a battalion of Louisiana Creoles resplendent in gay uniforms. 
 In the midst of the battalion were Dominique You and Beluche, 
 with the swarthy crews of their pirate ships serving two 
 twenty-fours. Then came a battalion of free negroes, more 
 sailors with a thirty-two pound gun, a battalion of San Domin- 
 gans, more regulars, some old French soldiers under one of 
 Napoleon's gunners named Flaujeac tending a brass gun, a 
 long line of Carroll's Tennesseeans in brown homespun hunting 
 shirts, some more sailors, some more regulars with a long brass 
 
 *McMaster. 
 
The War of 1812. 75 
 
 culverin, then John Adair and his Kentuckians, and last of all, 
 standing knee-deep in the water of the swamp, Coffee's Ten- 
 nesseeans." 
 
 Jackson had altogether about 5,700 men of whom "barely 
 one-third fired a gun." The British were repulsed with a loss 
 of about 2,000 men killed, wounded, and prisoners. General 
 Pakenham was among the slain.* The American loss was 
 seven killed and six wounded.f There was some fighting on 
 the opposite side of the river in which the British were suc- 
 cessful. 
 
 This was the last battle of the war, and it was fought after 
 the treaty of peace had been signed at Ghent, December 24, 
 1814. This treaty merely ended hostilities. Not a question 
 upon which the war had been based was settled. The question 
 of blockade ceased with the war in Europe; and the impress- 
 ment of American seamen, though not mentioned in the treaty, 
 was discontinued, as it would have been without the war. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 The achievements of our navy during the War of 1812 were 
 such that they will always be a subject of just pride to us ; but 
 the management and behavior of our land-forces were in many 
 cases so unhappy, so discreditable, so bad, so burlesque, that a 
 contemplation of them arouses in us mingled feelings of disap- 
 pointment, shame, disgust, and amusement. 
 
 The war was, nevertheless, full of lessons for the military 
 student, but especially for the American citizen — the man that 
 votes and makes the legislators that make the laws. He is 
 the one primarily responsible; for all the failures of this war, 
 like the failure to end the Civil War in a single month, fifty 
 years later, were due to a lack of preparedness,— to bad legis- 
 lation. 
 
 George Washington by sad practical experience had learned 
 the hopelessness of trying to conduct war with men that had 
 been taught nothing about the business of war. Raw militia 
 were the burden of his complaint from the beginning to the 
 end of the Revolutionary War ; and in his very last message he 
 admonished the people that "timely disbursements to prepare 
 for danger, frequently prevent much greater disbursements to 
 repel it." But Mr. Jefferson, who never saw a battle, and dur- 
 
 *Adams. 
 fUpton. 
 
76 American Campaigns. 
 
 ing whose administration our regular army was reduced almost 
 to zero, said, in his last message, while war with England was 
 threatening: "For a people who are free and who mean to 
 remain so, a well-organized and armed militia is their best 
 security."* 
 
 The lesson that the War of 1812 held out above all others, 
 was that our militia furnished no security at all, and that a 
 reliance upon it only resulted in a vast expense to the Gov- 
 ernment and an immortal national shame. The men that went 
 out with our militia regiments certainly had as much natural 
 courage as any other Americans — all they lacked was military 
 training and educated leaders. They were just as good in bat- 
 tle as regulars with no more training; as was shown by the 
 equally bad behavior of newly-enlisted regulars, under newly- 
 appointed officers, on several occasions. 
 
 As we all know, it is the discipline that is instilled into sol- 
 diers in garrison and camp and march, under qualified officers, 
 which counts in campaign, far above mere excellence in the 
 manual of arms and the movements of the drill-book. These 
 latter are useful mainly as an aid to discipline. The value 
 and importance of training is shown by a comparison of the 
 conduct of Scott's and Ripley's brigades, at Chippewa and Lun- 
 dy's Lane, with that of our troops in other battles of the War 
 of 1812. 
 
 The disadvantage of short terms of enlistment, which re- 
 sulted in the discharge of men, and the melting away of whole 
 regiments, just about the time when they became fit for cam- 
 paign, early became apparent ; and the term was changed from 
 one to five years for the regular troops. 
 
 The difficulty of recruiting the regular regiments in time of 
 hostilities was shown in this as in all our later conflicts ; and 
 the importance of maintaining a standing army of a size pro- 
 portionate to our needs and to the population of the country, 
 to serve as a training school for officers, and as a nucleus and 
 a first line, in case of war, was made very evident. 
 
 General Upton says, that with a standing "army of 15,000 
 men, so organized as to have been capable of expansion by the 
 aid of voluntary enlistments and obligatory service to double 
 or triple its numbers, there is little reason to doubt that Can- 
 ada would have been ours, and the war brought to a close on 
 a single campaign." 
 
 The Administration was, during the first two years, greatly 
 
 ♦Upton. 
 
The War of 1812. 77 
 
 at a loss for higher commanders. The trade of a general has 
 to be learned ; and our army was so small in 1812 that it con- 
 tained no officers that had had any experience in command- 
 ing considerable bodies of men. So the Administration was 
 forced to select its generals from among the territorial gov- 
 ernors and other civil officials, like Hull and Dearborn, some 
 of whom had seen a little service in the Revolutionary War, 
 more than thirty years before. Not until they had gone through 
 two years of training in the actual school of war, the best of 
 all military schools, were Jacob Brown and Andrew Jackson 
 and Winfield Scott able to show that they knew how to com- 
 mand men in battle and campaign. The chief qualities of 
 these generals, the qualities that achieved success, were their 
 energy, activity, and readiness to fight. 
 
 In its prosecution of the war the Administration was greatly 
 hampered by the opposition of the New England States. The 
 governors of some of those States refused to let their militia 
 leave the States, and took so little pains to enforce the laws 
 of war, that the British army in Canada was fed and supplied 
 by New Englanders, and paid with money furnished by New 
 England banks. The British army also purchased supplies in 
 New York.* 
 
 From the beginning to the end of the war, there were called 
 out on the American side 56,032 regulars and 471,622 militia 
 and volunteers; while "the largest force of British regulars 
 opposed to us was 16,500" ;f and the British regulars were 
 probably never at any one time aided by more than 800 Cana- 
 dian militia and 2,500 Indians. 
 
 When we remember that the British government sent up- 
 wards of 450,000 troops to South Africa rather than submit to 
 defeat there, we must congratulate ourselves that England had 
 her hands full with her war on the Continent of Europe ; that 
 the American war was no more in favor in England than it 
 was in America; that the British really had no cause to fight 
 us, except to keep us out of Canada ; and that the causes for 
 which we were fighting ceased with the cessation of hostilities 
 between Napoleon and the British government. 
 
 Strategy and Tactics. 
 
 Of strategy and tactics there was not an example worthy of 
 
 *Adams. 
 fUpton. 
 
78 American Campaigns. 
 
 emulation shown by either Americans or British in any cam- 
 paign of the entire war; unless it was in General Brock's oper- 
 ations. The campaigns are valuable as professional studies 
 only on account of their blunders ; and these are so apparent, 
 it should seem that no officer that has passed the primer of his 
 military education could be guilty of repeating them. 
 
 In 1812 we saw an invasion of Canada planned for three 
 separate columns between which there could be no cooperation 
 nor concert of action. Each moved, or tried to move, without 
 any regard to the others. So the British met them, and re- 
 pelled them one at a time, and with the same troops. 
 
 General Hull's invasion of Canada by way of Detroit, while 
 Lake Erie was still controlled by a British fleet, was doomed 
 to failure from the start. His only line of communication was 
 by a road 200 miles long, exposed to attack from the British at 
 Maiden, exposed for many miles along the lake-shore to fire 
 from the British fleet, and passing through more than a hun- 
 dred miles of forest and swamp, filled with hostile Indians. 
 The chances of keeping a wagon-train going and coming with 
 supplies along such a route, were very slim. 
 
 General Wilkinson's line of communication, also, was in peril 
 when he moved his army down the St. Lawrence with Kings- 
 ton still in possession of the British in his rear. The Secretary 
 of War saw the importance of the capture of Kingston, and 
 urged it; but both General Dearborn and General Wilkinson, 
 and later, also, General Brown, were dissuaded by Commo- 
 dore Chauncey, who commanded the American fleet on Lake 
 Ontario, from undertaking the capture. Then Chauncey, who 
 was to guard the entrance to the St. Lawrence with his fleet, 
 performed his duty so badly as to allow the British gunboats 
 to slip by him and fall upon the rear of Wilkinson's flotilla. 
 
 The disasters at the Raisin River and Stony Creek were both 
 due to the failure of the American commanders to secure their 
 camps by outposts. 
 
 Even where our troops achieved victory, their success was 
 not due to good tactics, but rather to valor, marksmanship, good 
 discipline, or courageous leading. At Chippewa Scott "tempted 
 destruction by quitting his secure position behind Street's 
 Creek," and marching his little command across the bridge 
 over the creek with the British twenty-four pounders play- 
 ing on it. Again at Lundy's Lane Scott charged a British 
 force about twice the strength of his own, when he was only 
 out on a reconnaissance, and might better have fallen back, or 
 
The War of 1812. 79 
 
 taken up a defensive position and waited for Ripley's brigade 
 to come to his assistance. Still the fault of attacking superior 
 numbers, and attacking vigorously, as General Scott always 
 did, is one seldom to be censured in a leader. Scott, like all 
 courageous, dashing leaders, had the quality of inspiring his 
 men with something of his own spirit. 
 
 In the battle of New Orleans, one of the most remarkable in 
 all history, General Jackson, although two-thirds of his troops 
 had not fired a shot, failed to complete the destruction of the 
 British by a counter-attack. This, however, was probably not 
 practicable with raw, undisciplined, heterogeneous troops, such 
 as his were. 
 
 In the first two years of the war the British government had 
 no thought of taking the offensive. With its army engaged in 
 Europe, it only undertook to defend Canada, and to blockade 
 the American coast from New York to Georgia. To maintain 
 the friendship of New England, the ports of that section were 
 not subjected to the blockade. But in 1814, with its armies set 
 free, Great Britain began a more vigorous campaign. 
 
 The expedition of Prevost against Plattsburg was under- 
 taken for the purpose of cutting off the Eastern States from 
 the rest of the Union, with the hope of regaining them for the 
 British crown in the treaty of peace. The avowed objects of 
 the expedition to New Orleans were two: "first, the command 
 of the mouth of the Mississippi so as to deprive the back set- 
 tlements of America of their communication with the sea ; sec- 
 ond, 'to occupy some important and valuable possession by the 
 restoration of which we may improve the conditions of peace, 
 or which may entitle us to exact its cession as the price of 
 peace.' "* The purpose of General Ross's expedition, as shown 
 by his instructions, was "to effect a diversion on the coasts of 
 the United States in favor of the army employed in the defense 
 of Upper and Lower Canada" . . . and not "for any ex- 
 tended operation at a distance from the coast." This explains 
 why Ross did not follow up General Winder's fleeing militia 
 at Washington.* 
 
 The capture of Washington rather than Baltimore or some 
 other city, had no strategic significance, and might not have 
 been undertaken at all, had not its defenseless condition invited 
 capture. Being the capital of the country, its capture was of 
 some political importance, and was very humiliating to Ameri- 
 
 * A dams. 
 
80 American Campaigns. 
 
 can pride. The excuse for the destruction of the public build- 
 ings, as well as for other burning and plundering done by the 
 British, was, to quote from their instructions, to make the 
 Americans "sensible of the impropriety as well as of the inhu- 
 manity of the system they have adopted." This referred to the 
 destruction of villages and buildings by American militia in 
 Canada.* 
 
 *Adams. 
 
LECTURE V. 
 THE MEXICAN WAR. 
 
 Taylor's Campaign. 
 
 (48) This war grew out of the annexation of Texas and 
 our dispute with Mexico over the boundary line. Texas had 
 achieved her independence of Mexico in 1836, and in less than 
 a year her sovereignty was acknowledged by our Government. 
 Soon afterwards Texas applied for annexation to the United 
 States, and a bill to that effect, after much discussion in Con- 
 gress, finally passed in March, 1845. 
 
 As had been anticipated, Mexico showed her resentment of 
 this act, by recalling her minister at once from Washington, 
 and terminating further diplomatic intercourse with the United 
 States. On account of this attitude on the part of the Mexican 
 government, and hostile demonstrations and rumors along the 
 Rio Grande, Colonel Zachary Taylor, 6th Infantry, U. S. 
 Army, acting under orders from the War Department, estab- 
 lished a large camp of troops at Corpus Christi, at the mouth 
 of the Nueces River, in the autumn of 1845. The first troops 
 to arrive were eight companies of the 3rd Infantry, which Gen- 
 eral Taylor took with him by transport from New Orleans. By 
 the end of October General Taylor's command consisted of the 
 following regiments: 
 2nd Dragoons, 
 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Artillery, 
 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th Infantry. 
 Aggregate, 3,554 officers and men. 
 
 This was the entire regular army of the United States, as it 
 then existed, with the exception of one regiment of dragoons 
 and three of infantry. The weakest of the regiments con- 
 tained only 169 rank and file, and the strongest only 375.* The 
 Mexican forces, including state troops and rural guards, were 
 estimated at about 30,000 ; but a revolution led by General Pa- 
 redes had just overthrown the government. The changes 
 
 *Upton. 
 
82 American Campaigns. 
 
 among the higher officers, and the jealousies and confusion,, 
 occasioned by this event, greatly hindered the mobilization and 
 hampered the operations of the Mexicans. 
 
 Geography. 
 
 The territory between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande, 
 about 130 miles wide along the coast, was in dispute. Texas- 
 claimed the Rio Grande as her boundary, but as yet had exer- 
 cised no jurisdiction south of Corpus Christi. For several 
 hundred miles back from the coast this country was low and 
 flat, covered with prairie grass, chaparral [thickets of mez- 
 quite], and cactus flats in irregular patches of greater or less 
 area. There were also many marshes and lagoons, especially 
 near the coast. There were trails and roads practicable for 
 troops and artillery in almost any direction. Along the coast 
 were several low islands ; the principal one, Padre Island, 
 stretching from the mouth of the Nueces to that of the Rio 
 Grande, formed a perfect barrier separating the main coast 
 from the Gulf of Mexico between these two points ; and with- 
 out the mouths of these two rivers there were sandbars over 
 which only lighters and boats of light draft could pass. Simi- 
 lar craft could navigate Laguna de la Madre, the narrow pas- 
 sage between Padre Island and the mainland. 
 
 South of the Rio Grande the Gulf coast and the country are 
 of similar character westward to the slopes of the Sierra 
 Madre — a part of the great mountain-chain that forms the 
 backbone of the continent, — the great divide between the At- 
 lantic and Pacific slopes. But the country is more densely cov- 
 ered with trees .and vegetation; and the climate is hotter, un- 
 healthier, more unbearable. This is the Tierra Caliente. It 
 generally contains plenty of water and grass, but in no other 
 •respect is it fit for the march of troops. The mountain-slopes 
 lead up to the high interior table-land, which falls away gradu- 
 ally from a general elevation of about 7,500 feet at the City o-f 
 Mexico, to about 4,000 feet above sea-level at El Paso. 
 
 The main road southward to this table-land broke into the 
 mountains at Monterey; and at Saltillo, seventy miles farther 
 southward, came out upon the high plateau. From Saltillo. 
 on to San Luis Potosi, some 300 miles, the country was so dry 
 and barren as almost to be a desert. There was not a running 
 stream between those points. From San Luis Potosi south- 
 
The Mexican War. 83 
 
 ward the country was excellent in every way — fertile, cool, 
 well-watered, thickly settled, and traversed by good roads. 
 There were two roads from Camargo to Monterey, and an- 
 other which, starting at San Antonio, Texas, crossed the Rio 
 Grande at Laredo, and, passing through Monclova, joined the 
 road through Monterey at Saltillo. From there the direct road 
 to the City of Mexico led southward through San Luis Potosi. 
 
 Plans. 
 
 General Taylor's instructions were, "to defend Texas from 
 invasion . . . and should Mexico invade it . . . [to] 
 employ all his forces to repulse the invaders, and drive all 
 Mexican troops beyond the Rio Grande." Further instruc- 
 tions from the Secretary of War said, "The assembling of a 
 large Mexican army on the borders of Texas, and crossing 
 the Rio Grande with a considerable force, will be regarded by 
 the Executive here as an invasion of the United States and 
 the commencement of hostilities. An attempt to cross the 
 river with such a force will also be considered in the same 
 light. ... In case of war . . . your main object will 
 be the protection of Texas; but the pursuit of this object will' 
 not necessarily confine your action within the territory of 
 Texas."* Taylor was also authorized to call on Texas and 
 several other near States, for volunteers, if he should need! 
 them. He was not, however, to call for volunteers until in- 
 vasion actually took place, hence was to have no opportunity 
 to train them in his winter camp at Corpus Christi. He spent 
 the time, however, in training and drilling his regulars. They 
 had never been assembled in large bodies before, but "four- 
 fifths of his officers had received the benefits of professional 
 training at the Military Academy, or in the Florida war."* 
 
 Mexico's plan was to assemble as large a force as practicable 
 at Matamoros, and drive all American troops beyond the 
 Nueces. 
 
 Operations. 
 
 (49) Better to carry out his instructions, General Taylor 
 marched his little army to the Rio Grande, and at the end of 
 March, 1846, established a camp opposite Matamoros, and a 
 depot of supplies at Point Isabel, nine miles to the northeast on 
 
 *Upton. 
 
84 American Campaigns. 
 
 the coast. On his way he was met by a Mexican delegation 
 sent to protest against his invasion of Mexican territory; and 
 he himself issued a proclamation announcing the purpose of 
 his occupation, and promising protection to the people. 
 
 Meantime a Mexican army estimated at 6,000 had assembled 
 on the opposite side of the Rio Grande, at Matamoros, under 
 General Ampudia. On the 12th of April Ampudia sent Gen- 
 eral Taylor an order to break up his camp within twenty-four 
 hours and withdraw to the Nueces River, or accept war as the 
 alternative. Ampudia was superseded in command within a 
 few days by General Arista, who was as eager for action as 
 Ampudia. 
 
 (50) On the 24th of April Arista ordered a considerable 
 detachment under General Torrejon to cross the Rio Grande at 
 La Palangana, six miles above Matamoros. The next day this 
 detachment encountered a small reconnoitering party of the 2nd 
 Dragoons, under Captain Thornton, and killed one officer and 
 sixteen men, and captured the rest. The entire American loss, 
 killed and captured, was four officers and fifty-nine dragoons. 
 
 This was the beginning of the war. General Taylor at once 
 asked the governors of Texas and Louisiana each for four 
 regiments of volunteers. The mouth of the Rio Grande was 
 blockaded by an American revenue cutter and the brig Law- 
 rence, to prevent supplies from entering by water for Arista's 
 army. 
 
 On April 30 General Arista, leaving General Mejia in com- 
 mand at Matamoros, marched the bulk of his army to Longo- 
 reno, about five miles below Matamoros, where he expected to 
 cross the river, in order to cut off the communications of the 
 American army with its base of supplies at Point Isabel. A 
 scarcity of boats caused a delay of twenty-four hours in his 
 passage. 
 
 General Taylor had caused his camp to be fortified and pre- 
 pared for defense. Anxious about the safety of his base of 
 supplies, he left Major Jacob Brown with the 7th Infantry and 
 two batteries at this camp, and started himself with the rest of 
 his force, on the afternoon of May 1, for Point Isabel, arriving 
 there the next day at noon. 
 
 Arista's delay in crossing had prevented his capturing the 
 ■depot at Point Isabel, or getting between Taylor's army and 
 tthat place. But he was anxious for a battle with the little 
 American army. So he marched to Palo Alto, on the road be- 
 
The Mexican War. 85 
 
 tween Taylor's camp and Point Isabel; and to hasten General 
 Taylor's return, he dispatched orders to General Mejia to open 
 with artillery on the American camp, and sent General Ampu- 
 dia with four cannon and a considerable force to attack it 
 on the northern bank of the river. Ampudia opened fire upon 
 the camp on the morning of May 5, and kept it up until mid- 
 night of the 7th, when he was recalled by Arista to aid him 
 against Taylor, who had started back from Point Isabel to the 
 relief of Major Brown's garrison. 
 
 (51) At about noon on May 8 Taylor found Arista's army 
 in line of battle near Palo Alto. The right of the Mexican line 
 rested on a sort of low ridge, about 3,000 yards to the east of 
 Taylor's road ; the left reached to the road, which passed along 
 the edge of a swampy chaparral. The right of the line was cov- 
 ered by a squadron of cavalry, and the left by eight squad- 
 rons. The guns were in the intervals between the infantry 
 regiments. The line faced nearly north and had a clear field 
 of fire over a stretch of prairie with several swampy places in 
 it. The left of the line rested on a marsh, and there were 
 two large marshes immediately in rear of the line. 
 
 The left of the Mexican line was the weaker, and the chapar- 
 ral on that flank offered some cover for the Americans. So 
 General Taylor made his main attack against that flank. Cap- 
 tain May's squadron covered the left of Taylor's line, while 
 Captain's Ker's squadron guarded the exposed right, and the 
 rear where the train was parking. As with the Mexican line, 
 the artillery was posted between the infantry regiments. 
 
 Taylor's line advanced in regimental columns until the Mexi- 
 can artillery opened upon it. Thereupon it deployed. The 
 Mexican cavalry under General Torrejon now moved through 
 the chaparral to attack the right and rear of the American 
 line ; but it was repulsed by the 5th Infantry, which was on the 
 right flank, and a section of artillery. The Mexican left was 
 now drawn back. Taylor changed the direction of his line to 
 conform to the new position of the enemy. There was now 
 about an hour's cessation of the battle. 
 
 May's squadron was sent round against the Mexican left 
 flank ; but finding itself greatly outnumbered it did not charge, 
 but withdrew to the rear. 
 
 Just before dark Arista massed his troops in his right wing 
 and moved them against the American left flank and rear, 
 sending Torrejon again with his cavalry against the American 
 right. The main attack was repulsed by Duncan's battery, 
 
86 American Campaigns. 
 
 supported by the 8th Infantry and Ker's squadron of cavalry. 
 The cavalry attack was also repulsed. At this moment there 
 was great confusion in the Mexican line, and, if the Americans 
 had followed up their success by a vigorous counter-attack, 
 the Mexicans would probably have been routed.* It was now 
 dark and the Mexicans retired into the chaparral in rear of 
 their position ; the Americans bivouacked on the battle-field. 
 
 Although General Taylor took the offensive in this battle and 
 advanced to the attack, he found himself outnumbered by 
 Arista's army, especially in cavalry, and was immediately 
 thrown upon the defensive. General Wilcox in his account 
 says : "The action of May 8 oh the plains of Palo Alto was, 
 on the part of the United States forces, defensive and mainly 
 of artillery against Mexican artillery and cavalry supported by 
 infantry."f 
 
 One incident occurred in the combat that might happen, 
 with like effects, even in our day of long-range magazine fire: 
 the prairie grass was set on fire by bursting shells, and the 
 smoke for a time concealed the movements of the hostile armies 
 from each other. 
 
 At Palo Alto the Americans numbered 2,288, and the Mexi- 
 cans were estimated at about 6,000. The Mexican account of 
 the combat gives the number of the Mexicans as only 3,000. 
 
 At dawn the next morning the hostile armies were in sight 
 of each other, but by sunrise the Mexicans had begun a retreat 
 for Matamoros. The American army, with its front well cov- 
 ered by scouts, took up the pursuit. About three miles from 
 the battle-field of the day before, Arista in his retreat came 
 upon what he conceived to be a very strong position. Here he 
 decided to halt his army. (52) He placed his line in a re- 
 saca, or narrow shallow swale, which crossed the road in the 
 midst of a thick chaparral and ended in a pool of water at each 
 end. Arista appears not to have believed that the Americans 
 would seriously attack him in this position; he had his tent 
 pitched and was busy writing, when General Taylor opened 
 fire on his line, and began the battle of Resaca de la Palma. 
 Some Mexican artillery in and near the road on both sides of 
 the swale could not be driven back; so Captain May was or- 
 dered to charge it with his squadron. On account of the dense 
 growth May could only move in the road, and had to charge in 
 
 *The Other Side, a Mexican account of the war, translated and 
 edited by Colonel Albert C. Ramsay, U. S. Army. 
 ■fffistory of the Mexican War, by General Cadmus M. Wilcox. 
 
The Mexican War. 87 
 
 ■column of fours. He captured seven guns and a Mexican gen- 
 eral. He was driven from the battery by Mexican infantry, 
 but the guns were soon retaken by American infantry. The 
 action in the chaparral lasted for some time, but the Mexicans 
 were finally routed. (50) They dispersed and fled, never 
 stopping till they had crossed the Rio Grande. 
 
 Ker's dragoons, Duncan's battery, and the 3rd Infantry fol- 
 lowed in pursuit. The Mexican account states that if Taylor 
 "had pursued with his whole available force, and followed the 
 fugitives across the river, "it is undoubted that he would have 
 completely destroyed them and taken Matamoros without op- 
 position."* But Taylor had no means of crossing the river. 
 The Mexican batteries at Matamoros opened on the pursuers, 
 and the American guns in Fort Brown (as the fort built oppo- 
 site Matamoros was afterwards named in honor of Major 
 Jacob Brown, who was killed there during the siege and at- 
 tack by the Mexicans) "were directed upon the mass of flee- 
 ing Mexicans while crossing at the upper ferry. "f 
 
 The losses of the Americans in the two engagements were 
 170 killed and wounded, and the estimated losses of the Mexi- 
 cans, 1,0004 Arista's baggage and all sorts of plunder were 
 abandoned to the Americans. 
 
 The next day, May 10, the American army was again assem- 
 bled opposite Matamoros. Several days were spent by its com- 
 mander in arranging with Commodore Connor, who com- 
 manded the American squadron at the mouth of the Rio 
 Grande, for the proper defense of the American base at Point 
 Isabel, and for the complete opening and holding of the river. 
 
 On his way back to Fort Brown from Point Isabel, Taylor 
 received word that Mexican reinforcements were coming into 
 Matamoros, and that Barita and other points near the mouth 
 of the Rio Grande were being fortified ; so he dispatched a de- 
 tachment of 300 volunteers, several regiments of which had 
 joined the army, to Brazos, there to be ferried across by the 
 navy. The detachment seized Barita on the 17th of May. 
 The same day Arista sent Taylor a written request for an 
 armistice, until the two governments could arrange terms. 
 The request was promptly declined. The next day, May 18, 
 Taylor crossed his army in boats and launches to the Mexican 
 
 *The Other Side. 
 
 fWilcox. 
 
 JUpton. 
 
88 American Campaigns. 
 
 side, and took possession of Matamoros, without any resist- 
 ance. 
 
 (49) Arista had withdrawn his army toward Linares, 150 
 miles southwest, whence it could march promptly to Monterey 
 or Victoria, according to the direction the enemy should take.* 
 Taylor started all of his cavalry, regular and volunteer, in pur- 
 suit on the 19th. It followed the enemy sixty or seventy miles, 
 but was then forced to return by the lack of water for men and 
 animals. After a march of great hardship, due to scarcity of 
 food and water, Arista's dispirited army reached Linares on 
 the 28th of May. Arista was relieved from command and 
 ordered before a court-martial. 
 
 The victories of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma gave the 
 Americans control of the Rio Grande; but for lack of troops, 
 especially cavalry, and more so for lack of land and water 
 transportation, Taylor was unable to follow up the Mexican 
 army. He had made timely requisition for boats and wagons ; 
 yet for want of them, his army had to lie idle for three months. 
 He reestablished his camp opposite Matamoros. 
 
 The Sierra Madre range was to be the new line of defense 
 for the Mexicans, and Monterey was selected as General Tay- 
 lor's first objective. Camargo was the natural place for his 
 advanced or secondary base, because the road from that point 
 to Monterey was shorter than that from any point farther down 
 the Rio Grande; and, more important still, it lay in the valley 
 of the San Juan River, where plenty of water and wood could 
 be found. The depot at Camargo could be supplied by water 
 transport from the base at Point Isabel, and the route all the 
 way down the river was practicable for artillery and wagons 
 on both banks. 
 
 The Battle of Monterey. 
 
 Toward the middle of August Taylor had his invading force 
 gathered together at Camargo. For lack of transportation he 
 had been obliged to leave some 6,000 volunteers at Fort Brown, 
 but still had about 6,000 men with him. He organized them 
 into two divisions of regulars under Generals Worth and 
 Twiggs, and one of volunteers under General Butler. He 
 established another depot at Cerralvo, connected with Camargo 
 by two roads, each about seventy-five miles long. 
 
 *The Other Side. 
 
The Mexican War. 89' 
 
 With its cavalry in advance, the American army began its- 
 march from Camargo on August 19, the rear division, the vol- 
 unteers, not leaving till September 6. By the 13th of Septem- 
 ber the entire army was concentrated at Cerralvo. The march- 
 was resumed on the 18th. The Mexican cavalry, which had 
 now shown itself, fell back before the American squadrons, 
 and, on the night of the 19th of September, the American army 
 bivouacked at Walnut Springs, three miles from Monterey. 
 The Mexican army, now again commanded by General Am- 
 pudia, had anticipated the movement against Monterey, and 
 had itself moved thither and prepared the town for defense. 
 
 (53) Monterey is inclosed on the west and south by high 
 ridges of the Sierra Madre through which the San Juan River 
 breaks. The river here flows eastward and then turns toward' 
 the northeast. The town lies in the bend thus formed. Through 
 the northern edge of the town runs a smaller stream, branch 
 of the San Juan, spanned by a fortified stone bridge. Beyond 
 this stream to the northward the ground rises in gentler 
 slopes than those south of the town. The defensive works 
 consisted of the masonry citadel, 1,500 yards north of the main 
 plaza and close to the Camargo road, and several small forts 
 and buildings on other sides of the city. On the east were two- 
 small forts and a stone tannery prepared for defense. On the 
 west, covering the roads entering from that side, three or four 
 small forts occupied commanding points, and a stone building, 
 the Bishop's Palace, stood upon a very prominent isolated hill. 
 South of the town the gorge of the river was impassable, and 
 no roads entered from that side. The stone wall of the ceme- 
 tery in the western edge of the town, and the stone parapets 
 around the flat roofs of the houses, also gave excellent protec- 
 tion for the defenders. 
 
 The line of communication of the Mexican garrison was the 
 Saltillo road, leading from the western side of the town. Gen- 
 eral Taylor's attack had for its main purpose to get possession 
 of this road. The "main attack" was therefore to be made by 
 a turning movement of General Worth's division against the 
 works on the west, while the "secondary attack" would be 
 made against the north and east of the town, by Twiggs's 
 regular and Butler's volunteer divisions. 
 
 Worth started out on his turning movement in the afternoon 
 of the 20th September. The next morning he was received 
 with a charge of cavalry west of the hill upon which the Bish- 
 op's Palace stood. Thus the battle of Monterey began. The 
 
90 American Campaigns, 
 
 Mexican cavalry was repulsed. The battle lasted until the 
 evening of the 23d. The Americans took one work after 
 another, until they were in possession of all except the citadel ; 
 this stronghold held out to the last. At length, after much 
 fighting in the streets and from the housetops, the Mexicans 
 were driven in about the main plaza ; and at 3 a.m., on the 24th 
 of September, General Ampudia sent a note to Taylor propo- 
 sing terms of surrender. The battle was, thereupon, suspended ; 
 and after some hours of conference, terms were agreed upon. 
 "The terms were, briefly, the Mexican army to retire, the infan- 
 try and cavalry carrying their arms . . . the artillery to 
 retain one battery not to exceed six pieces . . . the Mexi- 
 can flag, when struck at the citadel, to be saluted by its own 
 battery."* 
 
 (49) "In addition, it was agreed that the Mexican armed 
 forces should retire within seven days beyond the line Rinco- 
 nado-Linares-San Fernando, and that the forces of the United 
 States were not to advance beyond this same line before the 
 expiration of eight weeks, or until the orders of the respec- 
 tive governments be received." 
 
 In this battle the aggregate strength of the American army 
 was 6,650; that of the Mexicans about 10,000* The Ameri- 
 can losses were 488 killed and wounded. The loss of the 
 Mexicans is not accurately known. 
 
 (48) The Mexican army retreated to San Luis Potosi, 
 where General Santa Anna took command of it, and set about 
 reorganizing it. Santa Anna with the connivance of the Amer- 
 ican authorities, had lately returned from exile. He was imme- 
 diately elected President of the Republic, and he personally 
 conducted all the subsequent operations against the invaders 
 of his country. 
 
 The Administration at Washington disapproved the armis- 
 tice granted at the surrender of Monterey, and ordered Taylor 
 to resume hostilities at once; but the order reached Taylor in 
 time to shorten the armistice by only about a week. Accord- 
 ingly General Worth's division was started forward on the 
 13th of November to take and hold Saltillo. The place was 
 occupied without opposition. 
 
 Saltillo was strategically an important point. As we have 
 seen, it was where the road to the capital passed from the 
 mountains into the high central table-land; there, also, a road 
 
 *Wilcox. 
 
The Mexican War. 91 
 
 ■came in from Parras, a town a hundred miles farther west, 
 •where there was another American column, under General 
 Wool. Parras was situated in a very fertile region, from 
 -which General Taylor could draw provisions for his troops. 
 Furthermore, Saltillo was the capital of Coahuila, which gave 
 it a political importance. General Taylor did not contemplate 
 any farther advance toward the City of Mexico along this line. 
 
 General Wool's column, about 2,000 strong, had marched in- 
 dependently from San Antonio, Texas, by way of Monclova. 
 It had met no opposition and had now, at Parras, come under 
 Taylor's command. 
 
 The Administration at Washington was desirous of having 
 the state of Tamaulipas occupied as a means of making the 
 Mexican government and people want peace. Accordingly the 
 important port of Tampico, from which Santa Anna had with- 
 drawn its garrison, was taken by Commodore Perry about the 
 middle of November ; and General Taylor marched an expedi- 
 tion from Monterey to Victoria, the capital of the state. A de- 
 tachment under General Shields was sent down from the Rio 
 Grande to garrison Tampico, and the port was afterwards used 
 as a base for the fleet and army in the operations against Vera 
 Cruz. 
 
 In December Santa Anna, taking advantage of Taylor's 
 movement against Victoria, threatened to advance against 
 Worth at Saltillo. General Wool, therefore, moved his com- 
 mand from Parras and joined Worth. Santa Anna remained 
 at Potosi. 
 
 On the 4th of January, 1847, General Taylor was at Victo- 
 ria with Twiggs's division of regulars from Monterey and Pat- 
 terson's division of volunteers, which had marched down from 
 Camargo. A few days later Taylor received orders detaching 
 from his command to General Scott's expedition against Mex- 
 ico City, all of his regulars, except four batteries of artillery 
 and two squadrons of dragoons, and all of his volunteers, ex- 
 cept some 4,000 at the front, and a few thousands guarding 
 his line of communications. With so small a force Taylor 
 could hope to do no more than hold the advanced position of 
 Saltillo or Monterey. General Worth had been taken from 
 him, but Wool was left in command at Saltillo. General Taylor 
 arrived at Saltillo, and resumed command there February 2. 
 
 Several small detachments sent forward by Wool to recon- 
 noiter had been attacked, and some of them captured. (54) 
 
92 American Campaigns. 
 
 "To restore confidence among the volunteers, shaken by the 
 late captures," Taylor moved the bulk of his little force, Feb- 
 ruary 5, eighteen miles farther south to Agua Nueva. 
 
 Santa Anna got possession of General Scott's dispatch to> 
 Taylor detailing all the plans for the expedition against Vera 
 Cruz, including the reduction of Taylor's forces ; so Santa 
 Anna resolved to march his army from San Luis Potosi to de- 
 stroy Taylor's weak force. Egged on by the press of the capi- 
 tal city, he started on his march of 300 miles before he had 
 provided adequate subsistence and clothing for his army. The 
 march was begun on the 28th of January, and the troops suf- 
 fered almost every hardship incident to campaigning — heat,, 
 cold, rain, snow, hunger, thirst, rags, bare feet, sickness. Be- 
 fore the end of the journey, the army had lost a fifth of its- 
 numbers by death, sickness, straggling, and desertion. On the 
 morning of February 21, May brought in the news that Santa- 
 Anna's army was advancing rapidly. 
 
 The Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 Back on the road some thirteen miles, near the hacienda of 
 Buena Vista, was an excellent defensive position at the north- 
 ern end of a narrow defile, or angostura. Here Taylor re- 
 solved to stand for battle with the enemy. Leaving his vol- 
 unteer cavalry as a rear-guard to forward the stores and burn 
 such as it should not have time to move, Taylor withdrew at 
 once to Buena Vista. As soon as Santa Anna learned of the 
 withdrawal and the burning of stores, he was convinced that 
 the Americans had begun a precipitate retreat. His chief con- 
 cern was to overtake them and bring them to battle. 
 
 (55) The road back to Buena Vista and Saltillo passed' 
 through the angostura. Along the western side of the road' 
 was a small stream flowing between banks twenty feet high and' 
 almost vertical. It could be crossed at a few points only. 
 High mountain ridges rose on each side of the defile. On the 
 western side the space between the foot of the mountain-slope 
 and the stream was so cut up by deep gulches as to be impassa- 
 ble for any troops. On the eastern side, between the stream 
 and the foot of the mountain, was a flat plateau forty or fifty 
 feet above the roadway, cut into narrow tables by ravines run- 
 ning from the foot of the mountain-slope down to the valley 
 of the stream. Most of the ravines could be crossed by in- 
 fantry, but with difficulty. 
 
The Mexican War. 93 
 
 It was on these narrow tables, and around the heads of the 
 ravines, that the main part of the fighting at Buena Vista was 
 done. One of the tables was from one to three thousand feet 
 wide, and the point in which it terminated came down so close 
 to the bank of the stream as barely to leave space wide enough 
 for a wagon to pass. At this narrow point of the road five 
 guns of Captain Washington's battery were placed behind an 
 embankment. They were supported by the 3rd Indiana regi- 
 ment posted on a hill between the two branches of the road 
 back of the defile. From there the American line of battle ex- 
 tended up the middle of this table some 3,000 yards. Lieu- 
 tenant O'Brien had the other three guns of Washington's bat- 
 tery at the left of the infantry line, and still farther to the left 
 the volunteer cavalry and riflemen were guarding the flanks on 
 the mountain-slopes. Bragg's battery with a regiment of in- 
 fantry took position on a table to the right [west] of the an- 
 gostura. 
 
 Santa Anna's army came up the next day, February 22, and 
 finding the Americans in position for battle made its disposi- 
 tions for attack. General Ampudia, with a brigade of light 
 troops, pushed out to the right of the Mexicans, and driving 
 back the dismounted American cavalry and riflemen in that 
 quarter, took up a position on the mountainside. Two divi- 
 sions, Lombardini's and Pacheco's, were formed abreast of each 
 other to the right [east] of the road, with Ortega's to their 
 (right and rear in reserve. Mejia's brigade got across the 
 stream and took position to the left [west] of the road. Blanco's 
 column formed in the road. 
 
 The Mexican army was strong in cavalry. So General 
 Minon's cavalry division had been detached to make a swift 
 turning movement by the mountain roads to the east, in order 
 to cut off the retreat of Taylor's army. The rest of the cav- 
 alry was in three bodies, one supporting each flank, and the 
 reserve under Andrade behind the center of the line. The 
 artillery was posted in two strong bodies behind the wings of 
 the army. These were about the positions of the two hostile 
 forces, when the battle opened in earnest, at dawn on the 
 morning of February 23. 
 
 Fearful of the capture of his supplies by Minon's cavalry, 
 Taylor, taking Jefferson Davis's regiment of Mississippi Rifles 
 and May's squadron of dragoons, went back to Saltillo, six 
 miles away, on the evening of the 22nd, and was there when 
 the battle began at dawn on the 23rd. 
 
94 American Campaigns. 
 
 Ampudia opened the fight on the extreme left of the Ameri- 
 can position; his purpose was to turn that flank. Soon the 
 divisions of Lombardini and Pacheco advanced against the 
 American left flank, and Blanco's moved by the road against 
 the right. This division soon came under such destructive fire 
 from the batteries of Washington and Bragg, and their sup- 
 ports, that it was ordered by Santa Anna to halt under shelter 
 of the ground. Mejia's brigade crossed to the east of the road. 
 Pacheco's division, composed of recruits, almost immediately 
 broke and fled from the field ; but the rest of the Mexican 
 forces pushed forward. 
 
 An Indiana regiment supporting O'Brien's guns was the first 
 part of the American line to break ; and soon the whole line 
 was forced back. Finally the American left was turned and 
 the Mexican cavalry was in pursuit of the fleeing regiments. 
 At this crisis Taylor returned from Saltillo with May's cavalry 
 and all but two companies of Davis's Rifles. This regiment 
 was deployed to the left of Buena Vista, and with reinforce- 
 ments that were hastened to it, it succeeded in checking the en- 
 veloping Mexicans. But the battle kept up till dark. 
 
 The Americans were so greatly outnumbered by the Mexi- 
 cans, and they had to defend a position so much too extensive 
 for their strength, that their regiments, batteries, and squad- 
 rons were kept shifting their positions all day long. They would 
 be driven back from one point, only to reform and take up 
 a new position. Bragg's battery was posted first on the right 
 flank, then it had to be withdrawn, and sent to the hacienda. 
 Later on it went into position in support of Davis's Rifles, 
 and wherever else it could do the most good. And so with 
 the other batteries. 
 
 Finally, the Mexican reserve, Ortega's division, advanced 
 upon the broad plateau, along which the main position of the 
 Americans had rested in the morning. American troops were 
 hurried to this quarter from other parts of the field as quickly 
 as possible. At last Bragg's battery, General Taylor states in 
 his report, "without infantry to support it, and at the imminent 
 risk of losing its guns, came rapidly into action, the Mexican 
 line being but a few yards from the muzzles of the pieces. The 
 first discharge of cannister caused the enemy to hesitate, the 
 second and third drove him back in disorder and saved the 
 day."* 
 
 *Wilcox. 
 
The Mexican War. 95 
 
 This ended the battle. The Mexicans withdrew from the 
 field and fell back to Agua Nueva. Meanwhile, Minon's cav- 
 alry had attacked at Saltillo, but had been driven off by the 
 guard of mixed troops at that point. 
 
 In the Battle of Buena Vista the strength of General Tay- 
 lor's army was 4,757 men and sixteen guns. All the troops 
 were volunteers, except the artillery and two squadrons of 
 dragoons. The American loss in the two days' engagement 
 was 756, of which number 267 were killed, 456 wounded, and 
 23 missing.* 
 
 Santa Anna started from San Luis Potosi with some 18,000' 
 rank and file, but the hardships of his long march had been 
 such that it is probable he had no more than 14,000 to put into- 
 the battle. His loss was between 1,500 and 2,000 men, 294 
 of whom were prisoners. 
 
 General Taylor was in no condition, of course, to pursue 
 Santa Anna's army. "He fell back to Monterey," says Wilcox, 
 "where he remained for some months keeping open communi- 
 cations with the Rio Grande, superintending the forwarding 
 of troops to reinforce Scott, and gaining the encomiums of the 
 Mexican authorities by his wise and conciliatory civil admin- 
 istration."* 
 
 In all the annals of American warfare, no other such vic- 
 tory as that of Buena Vista can be pointed out. Upon ground' 
 unprepared for defense, with its left flank practically in the 
 air, — the space was so much too wide for the force defending 
 it that the heights on the left could not be properly guarded, — 
 this little body of well-trained volunteers successfully resisted' 
 from daylight till dark the assaults of an enemy of three times 
 its own strength ; and at last repulsed him and kept the field. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 With the question of the right or wrong of this war, from a 
 political or a moral point of view, we are not concerned — we 
 leave that to "Hosea Biglow" and Mr. Polk's Cabinet. Only 
 as a military study furnished by the history of our own country- 
 does the war concern us here. 
 
 In the strategy of General Taylor's campaign and the tactics 
 of his battles, there is little fault to find. In the first opera- 
 
 *Wilcox. 
 
'96 American Campaigns. 
 
 tions, those north of the Rio Grande, the student cannot help 
 feeling, however, that the general was not quite as bold and 
 aggressive as he ought to have been ; that he was more taken 
 up with defending his own base of supplies, and holding his 
 intrenched camp opposite Matamoros, than with destroying the 
 forces of the enemy that had crossed the Rio Grande. 
 
 It would appear that when Taylor learned on May 1 that the 
 Mexican army was crossing the river at Longoreno, five miles 
 below his camp, he should have marched all of his available 
 force promptly against it, instead of withdrawing to his base. 
 His surest way to protect his base was to destroy the enemy; 
 and this he would undoubtedly have done, if he had attacked 
 vigorously while the enemy was in the act of crossing, or im- 
 mediately afterwards. The Mexican army had only two boats, 
 and made its passage very slowly. Taylor's dragoons ought 
 to have kept him perfectly informed as to the progress of the 
 passage — the point of passage was less than a half-hour's gallop 
 from the American camp. 
 
 In the combat of Palo Alto, also, there was the appearance 
 of over-caution on the part of the American commander — it 
 is evident that he believed himself greatly outnumbered. The 
 Mexican account gives Arista only 3,000 men in the engage- 
 ment ; this number is probably nearly right. Taylor had 2,288. 
 If our troops had not been content with repulsing the enemy 
 and holding their ground, but had made a counter-attack at the 
 right moment, they would have routed the enemy. After de- 
 feating the Mexicans at Resaca de la Palma all available troops 
 ■ought to have taken part in the pursuit. But only a regiment 
 •of infantry, a squadron, and a battery followed the fugitives ; 
 the rest of the American army bivouacked on the battle-field. 
 Judged by the sum of their success, however, General Taylor's 
 operations in those few days were well-nigh faultless. They 
 could hardly have achieved more. 
 
 Strategically, the campaign on the part of the Americans was 
 a defensive-offensive campaign. General Taylor was told by 
 the Administration that he was to defend Texas, in case of war, 
 and was not to begin the hostilities. But in case the Mexicans 
 resorted to hostile acts, then he was not necessarily to confine 
 his action within the territory of Texas. And we have seen 
 how Taylor waited till the Mexicans crossed the Rio Grande, 
 then, after the first two engagements, pushed the campaign as 
 hard and as fast and as far as the means at his command would 
 ;permit. 
 
The Mexican War. 97 
 
 There was delay, weeks and months of it, of which an army 
 better prepared than that of Mexico would have taken advan- 
 tage ; but from beginning to end there was never a day of delay 
 for which General Taylor or his subordinates were responsible. 
 The system of supply in our service was centralized in Wash- 
 ington, and there was no electric telegraph and no railway mail. 
 Every requisition for a wagon or a steamboat had to go back 
 by the slow postal means of the time, and the army at the front 
 had to sit and wait. 
 
 When an army is equipped in all of its details beforehand; 
 when the system is such that supplies and means of transporta- 
 tion can be quickly obtained ; when, in other words, the fighting 
 machine is ready for work, before it takes the field, like the 
 Japanese army in its war with Russia, the question of logistics 
 is subordinate to the question of successful strategy and tac- 
 tics. In such cases the general has merely to decide at the out- 
 set of his campaign what is to be his objective ; and with each 
 change in his operations, where is the best place to put his army 
 in his next move, just as in a game of chess ; and whether the 
 route is practicable, and how long it will take to march his 
 troops thither; and whether he can whip the enemy when he 
 gets there. He must, of course, in every case, leave adequate 
 forces to guard his depots and line of communication ; but the 
 mere means of transportation, the wagon-trains, and boats, and 
 pack-trains, he does not need to worry about — he knows that 
 they will be looked after by the proper staff department. The 
 plan of his campaign must not be arranged to fit his means of 
 transportation; they will be arranged to fit his plan of cam- 
 paign. 
 
 With General Taylor's campaign it was just the reverse of 
 all this ; every movement was at the mercy of boats, or wagons 
 and mules. (48) After the rout of Arista's army at Resaca 
 de la Palma, for lack of a pontoon-train Taylor had to sit on 
 the left bank of the Rio Grande, and watch the scattered Mexi- 
 can force gather itself together again, and, unmolested, march 
 out of Matamoros in a quiet and orderly manner, taking all of 
 its stores and property with it. Yet General Taylor had fore- 
 seen his need of pontoons, and had made timely requisition for 
 them. 
 
 He had to wait three months in his camp opposite Mata- 
 moros, and then leave 6,000 troops, half of his army, behind, 
 for want of transportation to keep them supplied with food. 
 And again at Monterey, his main reason for granting Ampudia 
 
98 American Campaigns. 
 
 an armistice of eight weeks, was simply that he did not have 
 enough wagons and pack-mules to carry food for his army, if 
 he stretched his line of communications with his base at Ca- 
 margo any farther at that time. 
 
 From every consideration, Monterey was General Taylor's 
 first proper objective, after he got possession of the line of the 
 Rio Grande to serve as his base of operations. Monterey is the 
 capital of the province of Nuevo Leon, and it was the largest, 
 most important city in the northern part of Mexico. It was 
 on the main road from the Rio Grande to the City of Mexico — 
 the road that passed through the important capital towns, Sal- 
 tillo and San Luis Potosi. It was the northern gateway of this 
 route through the Sierra Madre Mountains. These mountains 
 formed a barrier between the lowlands of the northeast and the 
 table-lands of the central region, impassable except at a few 
 places. Monterey was also in a healthful region, whereas all 
 the towns in the lowlands toward the coast were subject to 
 yellow-fever and other diseases. When one considers that the 
 losses in an army are always greater from disease than from 
 battle, the importance of selecting, if possible, a healthful 
 region and season for a campaign is apparent. 
 
 And after the choice of Monterey for an objective, Camargo 
 was the best place for the base. It was 180 miles from the 
 main base, Point Isabel, at the mouth of the Rio Grande ; but a 
 navigable river or other body of water is always the best and 
 easiest line of communication, and a few leagues more or less 
 make little difference. Camargo was not only nearer to Mon- 
 terey than any other point of the river, but there were two 
 roads, both good enough, connecting the two points ; and both 
 roads lay in the valleys of streams, and were therefore well 
 supplied with water and wood, two items of chief considera- 
 tion when campaigning in Mexico. 
 
 While an advance on Monterey threatened the interior of 
 Mexico, and even the City of Mexico, General Taylor never 
 designed to go beyond Saltillo. "To seize the Rio Grande, to 
 conquer the northern states of Mexico, and to hold them te- 
 naciously, at least as far as the Sierra Madre Mountains, was 
 General Taylor's real work."* It was hoped that this might 
 make Mexico willing to agree to peace upon our terms. 
 
 After Taylor reached Saltillo, the Administration wanted him 
 to push on to San Luis Potosi ; but General Taylor knew what 
 a perilous task it would be to march an army across the 300 
 
 *General Taylor, by General O. O. Howard. 
 
The Mexican War. 99 
 
 miles of desert between Saltillo and that town. Without fight- 
 ing a battle Santa Anna lost 4,000 men out of 18,000 in his 
 march from San Luis to Saltillo. So Taylor advised the Ad- 
 ministration that, if it were necessary to capture the Mexican 
 capital in order to conquer peace, it should be done by the way 
 of Vera Cruz — the very campaign that General Scott had 
 already proposed. 
 
 The topographical difficulties of a land campaign from the 
 Rio Grande to the City of Mexico would be somewhat less to- 
 day, by reason of the railways leading southward from the Rio 
 Grande; but a railway can never serve as a "line of operations" 
 — it can never take the place of a wagon road, with water at 
 camping places, for an army to advance by. It can only be 
 used as a "line of communication," by which an army at the 
 front will draw its supplies and reinforcements from its base, 
 and send back its prisoners and sick and wounded. Even for 
 these purposes, a long line of railway, like that from the Rio 
 Grande to the City of Mexico, passing through the enemy's 
 country, requires so many troops to defend it, that it is probable 
 that even to-day, if we undertook to capture the Mexican cap- 
 ital, we should follow the same route that General Scott fol- 
 lowed, and that Cortez had followed before him. We shall see 
 in our study of the South African War that Lord Roberts, with 
 more than 200,000 soldiers in the field, could only muster a 
 force of 30,000 to lead against Pretoria. The rest were mostly 
 guarding his railway communications, a thousand miles long. 
 
 Mexico's lack of an adequate navy simplified Taylor's cam- 
 paign, as well as the later one under General Scott. In fact, 
 if Mexico had possessed a navy strong enough to hold control 
 of the Gulf of Mexico, and to prevent Taylor from landing 
 supplies at Corpus Christi, and afterwards at Point Isabel, it is 
 not seen how Taylor could have supplied his army, or made 
 his invasion of Mexico. To-day, however, there would be no 
 difficulty in transporting stores to the Rio Grande by railways. 
 
 So in this, as in many other American campaigns, the army 
 was dependent upon the cooperation of the navy. Not only 
 did the navy guard the army's transports ; it blocked the mouth 
 of the Rio Grande, and cut off the supplies of the Mexican 
 army at Matamoros, and it captured the City of Tampico. 
 
 When he had to take away so many of Taylor's veteran 
 troops for his own campaign, General Scott advised Taylor to 
 fall back to Monterey ; in the light of history it is not certain, 
 but this was the best thing Taylor could have done. He had to 
 
100 American Campaigns. 
 
 fall back anyway a little later. Taylor's reasons for holding 
 Saltillo have already been stated — its strategic position at the 
 junction of the roads from Monclova, Monterey, Linares, Par- 
 ras and San Luis Potosi ; the fertile country to the west of it, 
 from which the Americans might have got supplies and the 
 Mexicans would have got them, via Saltillo ; the disheartening 
 effect of a retrograde movement upon his army, etc. But, in 
 looking back at it, the chief objection we can find to such a 
 movement is, that it would have robbed our history of Buena 
 Vista, a victory of which we have as just cause to be proud as 
 of any other in our history. 
 
 President Polk disapproved the liberal terms granted by Tay- 
 lor to Ampudia at the surrender of Monterey. General Tay- 
 lor gives the following reasons for granting the terms: first, 
 his army was too small to invest the town and prevent Am- 
 pudia's troops from escaping with their arms by some of the 
 mountain trails, and reasons of humanity urged a suspension 
 of the assaults ; second, as to the eight weeks' armistice, Tay- 
 lor, as stated before, was unable to go farther for lack of 
 transportation. General Taylor gave other reasons. The mil- 
 itary student will prefer to accept the judgment of General 
 Taylor and his officers on the ground, rather than that of Presi- 
 dent Polk and his advisers two thousand miles away at Wash- 
 ington. 
 
 At Palo Alto Taylor's line of battle was formed nearly paral- 
 lel to the road he was marching on — his line of communication 
 with his base at Point Isabel. Could the Mexicans have driven 
 him back, or turned his left flank, they might have captured 
 his wagon-train and cut him off from his base. Of course, 
 with so small a force, this was not as serious a consideration 
 as it would be with a great army. Taylor undoubtedly 
 fought the battle in that way, because the chaparral west 
 of the road gave him some cover through which to approach 
 the Mexican left flank. An attack directly from the front, or 
 against the Mexican right, would have had to be made over 
 the open prairie without any sort of cover. Had Taylor been 
 defeated in this combat, he would probably have lost his 
 depot at Point Isabel, and his field-work and garrison at Fort 
 Brown. 
 
 The effect of this victory and that of Resaca de la Palma was 
 very important. By these triumphs Mexican authority was 
 wholly and forever expelled from the soil of Texas ; and the 
 American troops gained a morale and prestige that they never 
 
The Mexican War. 101 
 
 have lost to this day. Up to that time American troops had sel- 
 dom known what it was to go after an enemy and defeat him. 
 All their offensive campaigns — unless we except Yorktown,. 
 where they had the moral and physical support of the French 
 — had been failures. All their strategic successes had been 
 achieved in retreats, and nearly all their tactical victories had 
 been gained by standing on the defensive. 
 
 At Resaca de la Palma Arista's army fought with the Rio 
 Grande at its back ; under like conditions a large army would 
 have been captured. This little force, with no impedimenta, was 
 able to scatter and cross wherever the men could find boats. 
 Many were drowned. We have seen that Taylor could not 
 cross the river and complete the rout and dispersion of his. 
 enemy for lack of a pontoon-train. 
 
 Arista did well to abandon Matamoros and retreat. Had he- 
 kept his army shut up in that town, he would surely have lost 
 it soon or late, as every general does that allows his army to> 
 be invested in a town; as Ampudia did with this same army 
 a few months later at Monterey. 
 
 General Taylor risked a great deal at the battle of Buena 
 Vista. The chances of victory appeared very slender, and the- 
 consequences of defeat would have been very serious for the 
 United States. General Wilcox says in his history of the- 
 Mexican War: "Had Santa Anna been successful at Buena. 
 Vista there is hardly a doubt, under the excitement that would' 
 have prevailed in Washington, that a garrison would have been 
 left at Vera Cruz to run the gantlet of the vomito [yellow- 
 fever] , General Scott with his remaining forces ordered to the 
 Rio Grande, and the war prolonged another year." While we 
 do not believe Santa Anna would have "taken and sacked New 
 Orleans," as he boasted he would, or even that he would ever 
 have got across the Rio Grande, he might have thrown the- 
 Americans back to that line, and set the war back where it was- 
 nearly a year before, with the best general the Mexicans had 
 and the prestige of victory on the Mexican side. 
 
 If Taylor's army had fallen back to Monterey, or farther,, 
 without making a decisive stand, it is hard to say what might 
 have been the outcome. If in such case Santa Anna had con- 
 tinued to pursue, and could have been long enough detained' 
 in the north, it would have made General Scott's advance 
 against the capital easier. 
 
 On the part of Santa Anna, Buena Vista was a mistake- 
 strategically and tactically. He was cognizant of General". 
 
102 American Campaigns. 
 
 Scott's plan for a compaign against Vera Cruz and the City of 
 Mexico ; he should have moved his army southward to oppose 
 Scott's landing, and the taking of Vera Cruz. But he had or- 
 ganized an army of some 20,000 officers and men, all eager to 
 meet the invaders of their country; he was urged forward by 
 an ignorant and nagging press at the capital ; and he could not 
 resist the temptation to throw his overwhelming numbers 
 against the handful of Americans left with Taylor; he and 
 «very officer and man of his army felt sure of destroying Tay- 
 lor's little army, or 'of driving it in flight beyond the Rio 
 Grande and reconquering their lost territory. 
 
 But he ought to have appreciated the difficulties and perils 
 of the long march before him. In his journey from San Luis 
 Potosi to the field of Buena Vista and return, he lost four times 
 as many men as he lost in the battle ; he brought back to San 
 Luis a ragged and demoralized remnant, less than half the men 
 he had led away;* and he left the way clear for Scott to land 
 his army and march it to the capital practically unopposed. Of 
 this opportunity, however, General Scott was unaware. Noth- 
 ing short of the direst necessity, or the sure prospect of de- 
 cisive results, should ever tempt a commander to lead his army 
 across such a dry and barren waste as the 300 miles from San 
 Luis Potosi to Saltillo. 
 
 The main tactical mistake of the battle of Buena Vista con- 
 sisted in a lack of order and concert in the attack. After the 
 American line was driven back and turned, it seems almost 
 certain that, if the entire Mexican force had closed in together 
 on the defenders, it could not have failed to defeat and capture 
 them. But by Santa Anna's bringing into the battle first one 
 column and then another against different points of the posi- 
 tion, Taylor was enabled to shift regiments and batteries so as 
 always to check the attacks. 
 
 Never has the advantage of drill and training and discipline 
 under educated officers been better exemplified than in the bat- 
 tles of this campaign. In the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca 
 de la Palma, the American soldiers were all trained regulars. 
 In the battle of Buena Vista, they were all volunteers except 
 the artillery and two squadrons of dragoons. It is true that 
 this victory could not have been won without the regular bat- 
 teries which did such fine work ; but with the exception of one 
 or two regiments, no troops ever fought better than those vol- 
 
 *The Other Side. 
 
The Mexican War. 103 
 
 •unteers. But they had all been in camp at Fort Brown and Ca- 
 margo drilling, and in campaign serving with regular troops, 
 for nearly a year; and in this battle, the regiments that ac- 
 quitted themselves the best were under officers, like Colonel 
 Jefferson Davis and Henry Clay, Jr., who had received a mili- 
 tary training in the regular army. Without question the best 
 purpose of our small standing army in time of peace, is to edu- 
 cate officers against a time of war ; and it is to be regretted, as 
 has been pointed out by an American general in a magazine 
 article,* that more of the wealthy young men of the country 
 do not seek commissions in the army, and serve with it a 
 term of years, merely to fit themselves to command troops in 
 case of war. 
 
 There is no difference between American volunteers and 
 American regulars — they are both volunteers; but there is a 
 difference between trained soldiers and untrained soldiers ; 
 hetween discipline and indiscipline; between a knowledge of 
 how to take care of one's self in campaign and a lack of such 
 knowledge; between soldiers rightly trained and soldiers 
 wrongly trained. 
 
 In this campaign there was the same deplorable mixing of 
 personal and party politics with field operations that we have 
 had in all our wars, and that we shall doubtless have in every 
 future war. The Administration actually made arrangements 
 to send General Patterson (a politician without any military ex- 
 perience) in command of an expedition against Vera Cruz, with 
 two other politicians, Generals Pillow and Shields, as his divi- 
 sion commanders, while General Scott and other professional 
 soldiers, who had given their lives to the study of arms, were 
 to sit still and look on ! And after Scott had finally been given 
 command of the expedition against Mexico City, and while 
 Taylor was still in command of the army in the north, the Ad- 
 ministration introduced a bill in Congress to create the office of 
 lieutenant-general, in order to place Senator Benton, of the 
 right party, but of no military experience whatever, in com- 
 mand of both of these veteran major-generals, who were of the 
 wrong political party. Fortunately, Congress refused to perpe- 
 trate such an outrage upon the country and the honorable pro- 
 fession of arms; and left the pages of our history free from 
 that blot. 
 
 In this war, also, as in the War of 1812, and in every other 
 
 ♦General W. H. Carter. 
 
104 American Campaigns. 
 
 war that we have entered into, a large part of the people were 
 opposed to it, and from the beginning to the end talked, and 
 wrote, and worked against it and against the interests of the 
 Government. This is deplorable; but so long as we are hu- 
 man, and so long as the country is vast in area and interests,, 
 we must expect it. 
 
LECTURE VI. 
 THE MEXICAN WAR. 
 
 Scott's Campaign. 
 
 (48) From the opening of hostilities with Mexico in the 
 spring of 1846, Major-General Winfield Scott, Commanding 
 General of the United States Army, had asked to be allowed 
 to command the forces in the field in Mexico. But not until 
 November, 1846, after the news had reached Washington that 
 Ampudia had surrendered to General Taylor at Monterey, did 
 President Polk, after much vacillation and with much reluc- 
 tance, give his consent for General Scott to go to Mexico to 
 conduct a campaign in person. 
 
 Plan. 
 
 General Scott's plan was to capture Vera Cruz, and, with 
 this port as his base, to march his army to the City of Mexico. 
 Fifteen thousand troops he estimated to be the smallest number 
 with which he could hope for success in such a campaign, 5,000' 
 of which must be regulars. To make up his army, he took 
 from General Taylor 4,000 regular and 4,000 volunteer in- 
 fantry, two light batteries, 500 regular and 500 volunteer cav- 
 alry. This left Taylor with a command of only some 7,000' 
 men, with which he was expected to act strictly on the de- 
 fensive. The rest of the complement of 15,000 troops that 
 General Scott counted upon, were to be volunteers raised imme- 
 diately in the States. Congress, however, failed to authorize 
 these volunteers until the end of February, 1847. 
 
 Owing to the recurrence of yellow-fever on the coast of Mex- 
 ico, Scott felt that he must be at Vera Cruz with his army by 
 the 1st of February; and he made all of his plans accordingly. 
 He arranged with Commodore Connor, who commanded the 
 American fleet in Mexican waters, for his cooperation ; he sub- 
 mitted, in full time, requisitions for transports, lighters, land 
 transportation, siege trains, and everything that he should 
 need; he selected the Island of Lobos as the place where he 
 should assemble his army. 
 
106 American Campaigns. 
 
 There were all sorts of delays, for which Scott was noway 
 to blame; and the end of February was at hand. Only 13,000 
 troops were present, and there was shortage of transports, 
 lighters and all materiel. But the expedition could not wait; 
 if it were delayed any longer, it would have to be put off till 
 the next fall or winter. 
 
 Operations. 
 
 So on the 2nd of March, the order was given to weigh anchor 
 at Lobos ; and by the 7th, the fleet had cast anchor again at An- 
 ton Lizardo, eighteen miles southeast of Vera Cruz. "Scott 
 was at this time ignorant of the movement of General Santa 
 Anna toward Monterey, and expected on landing or attempt- 
 ing to land, to be met by a formidable force of the enemy" ; so 
 every precaution was taken.* (56) Having selected the place 
 for landing, well without the range of guns in the city and the 
 castle of San Juan de Ulloa, he had the fleet moved up on the 
 '9th March, and anchored in front of it. The naval guns shelled 
 the beach, and the sand hills beyond, and the sailors landed the 
 troops with surf-boats. No Mexican troops appeared, and by 
 10 p.m. the entire force had landed without an accident. 
 
 Scott's army, at this time, was organized in two regular divi- 
 sions, under Generals Worth and Twiggs, respectively, and 
 a volunteer division under General Patterson. The cavalry 
 and artillery, and the company of engineers, were not attached 
 to the divisions, but remained under the direct orders of the 
 commanding-general. 
 
 A complete line of investment was immediately established, 
 extending from shore to shore on either side of Vera Cruz ; and 
 batteries were set up to shell the city. Owing to delay in get- 
 ting the siege materiel ashore, the batteries were not ready to 
 begin work until the afternoon of the 22nd [March]. General 
 Scott then called upon the Mexican commander to surrender 
 the town and the fort [ San Juan de Ulloa] . The Mexican com- 
 mander declined to surrender, and the batteries opened fire. 
 The guns of the town and fort returned the fire. The bom- 
 bardment was kept up until the 26th, when Scott received a 
 proposal of surrender from the Mexican commander; terms 
 were agreed upon the next day. The city and fort, 5,000 pris- 
 
 * General Scott, by General Marcus J. Wright. 
 
The Mexican War. 107 
 
 oners, and 400 guns were turned over to the Americans. Gen- 
 eral Scott's loss was sixty-seven killed and wounded. 
 
 In this investment the navy not only bombarded the enemy's 
 works from the sea, but also set up a battery in line on land, 
 which did effective work. During the siege the only interfer- 
 ence with the Americans from the outside, was occasioned by 
 a considerable cavalry force, which hovered around, and had 
 to be chased away two or three times. 
 
 Geography. 
 
 (57) From Vera Cruz two roads led westward across the 
 Tierra Caliente, up through the mountains, to the Plateau of 
 Anahuac, as the great interior table-land is called, and on, to 
 the Valley of Mexico, and the capital city at the lowest point of 
 this bowl-shaped valley. The two roads, however, came to- 
 gether at El Pinal, east of Puebla. The northernmost of these 
 roads passed through the towns of Jalapa, Perote, and Puebla, 
 and was almost the identical route that Cortez took in 1519. 
 This road was, in 1847, the main post-road, the better of the 
 two, and, therefore, the one selected by General Scott. The 
 other road passed through Orizaba. The French followed this 
 road in their invasion of Mexico in 1863. 
 
 The road chosen crossed the Tierra Caliente to the foot-hills 
 at Plan del Rio, about thirty miles from Vera Cruz. There it 
 began the ascent of the mountains to the great Plateau ; thence 
 it led on to the City of Mexico, more than 200 miles from 
 Vera Cruz. Many strong defensive positions there were be- 
 tween the Plan del Rio and the Valley of Mexico. 
 
 As far as Jalapa the road lay in the Tierra Caliente ; but from 
 there on, to the capital, the country crossed possessed as fine a 
 climate for campaigning as any in the world; but there was 
 a scarcity of water from Jalapa to the Valley of Mexico. 
 Toward the Valley of Mexico, the country became more fertile 
 and thickly/settled, and subsistence supplies in abundance could 
 be obtained for an army. 
 
 The topography was of such character much of the way from 
 Vera Cruz to the capital that troops could march only on the 
 roads. In the Tierra Caliente there was high grass and dense 
 vegetation ; over the mountains the road was shut in the passes ; 
 in the Valley of Mexico all roads rested upon causeways. 
 
 There were five lakes in the Valley of Mexico, the remains of 
 a single large ancient lake which had been gradually drying up 
 
108 American Campaigns. 
 
 for ages. Lake Chalco, which existed at the time of Scott's-- 
 campaign, is dry to-day. There were no impassable rivers be- 
 tween Vera Cruz and Mexico, behind which an army could 
 take a defensive position. The chief natural obstacles in 
 Scott's way were the mountains with their impassable heights; 
 and gorges, and the lakes and marshes around the capital city. 
 
 Operations After Vera Cruz. 
 
 After the fall of Vera Cruz the army was still short of trans- 
 portation. Several expeditions were, therefore, sent out into 
 the interior for the purpose of finding markets in which to 
 purchase horses and mules. By this means General Scott eked 
 out his transportation enough to enable him to start his army 
 on the road to the interior before the return of yellow-fever. 
 Twigg's division started for Jalapa on the 8th of April, and 
 was followed on the 9th by part of Patterson's volunteer 
 division. Two batteries were attached to Twiggs's division, 
 and one to Patterson's. Worth's division, and part of Patter- 
 son's, had to remain for the present at Vera Cruz, for want 
 of transportation. 
 
 (48) After his defeat at Buena Vista (Bebruary 22-23), 
 Santa Anna fell back with his army to San Luis Potosi, where 
 he arrived after a march of great hardship with less than 
 10,000 effectives.* After resting here four days, he resumed 
 the march to the capital with two brigades. 
 
 A new revolution had, meantime, broken out in the City of 
 Mexico, and, when Santa Anna arrived there, he found armed 
 partisans confronting each other in the streets. (57) He 
 managed to compose the dissensions, and on the 2nd of April 
 set out for Cerro Gordo, a strong position on the road to Vera 
 Cruz, where he purposed stopping the progress of Scott's army. 
 A part of the troops he had commanded at Buena Vista, some 
 5,600, had already turned toward the same point ; the rest re- 
 mained for the present at San Luis Potosi. From the capital 
 Santa Anna took the National Guards of that city.f Cerro 
 Gordo [Big or Fat Hill] is on the Jalapa- Vera Cruz road, 
 some twenty or twenty-five miles east of Jalapa, at the foot of 
 the Sierra Madre— the last step from the great Plateau of 
 Anahuac to the Tierra Caliente. 
 
 (58) Here the road from Vera Cruz crosses a small river 
 
 ♦Wilcox. 
 
 fTke Other Side. 
 
The Mexican War. 109 
 
 and a narrow stretch of level ground, the Plan del Rio ; then it 
 -zigzags upwards and to the west, following the easiest grade 
 from one bench to the next. To the right of the road, as one 
 goes west, are first rugged cliffs and then an impassable ravine. 
 Between the ravine and the road are two prominent wooded 
 knolls, Atalaya and Telegrafo, a few hundred yards beyond 
 which the road passes the Cerro Gordo Ranch. From the Plan 
 •del Rio to this ranch, and probably farther westward, the 
 stream flows in an impassable gorge; and about midway of the 
 distance is a commanding table. On this table the right of the 
 Mexican line rested. The left was on Telegrafo, and the re- 
 serve was at the ranch. 
 
 The position as occupied was strengthened with parapets, 
 trenches, palisades, and abatis ; and the trees were cleared away 
 from the field of fire in front. Artillery was so placed as to 
 command the road and sweep all the approaches to the position. 
 
 (57) Owing to the ferocious heat and deep sand, the march 
 of Scott's army across the Tierra Caliente, from Vera Cruz to 
 Plan del Rio, was very hard and trying. Twiggs's division, 
 which started on the 8th of April, did not reach Plan del Rio 
 until the evening of the 11th. Twiggs had been informed on 
 the way that Santa Anna was at Jalapa with troops, and he ex- 
 pected to meet him at Cerro Gordo. 
 
 As soon as General Scott received report that the divisions 
 of Twiggs and Patterson had found the enemy in force at 
 'Cerro Gordo, he hastened forward from Vera Cruz himself, 
 and joined the troops at the front on April 14. Having gotten 
 more transportation, General Worth, also, marched his division 
 forward, and had reached the camp of the other divisions at 
 Plan del Rio, by the evening of April 17. 
 
 (58) Meantime the American engineer officers had been 
 reconnoitering the Mexican position. They reported that the 
 position, though fortified and very strong in front, could be 
 turned by its left and struck in rear; and that the intrench- 
 ■ments on Telegrafo could be carried by assault. Telegrafo 
 was the key to the position. 
 
 On the 17th Twiggs's division followed the route picked out 
 by the engineers ; and, after an action in which it lost ninety- 
 seven officers and men, it got possession of Atalaya. General 
 Scott thereupon issued an order for a general attack, for the 
 morning of the 18th. Worth's division of regulars with 
 Shields's brigade of volunteers, was to follow up and support 
 die "main attack" against the Mexican left and rear ; and Pil- 
 
110 American Campaigns. 
 
 low's brigade of volunteers was to make the "secondary at- 
 tack" against the front. The main attack carried Telegrafo, 
 put the left of the Mexican line to flight, and got possession of 
 the Jalapa road. Seeing escape impossible, the entire right of 
 the Mexican line then surrendered. The American cavalry 
 pursued the routed Mexicans, but was not fleet enough to do> 
 them much damage. 
 
 General Scott reported his strength at this battle as 8,500, 
 and his killed and wounded, thirty-three officers and 398 en- 
 listed men. He estimated the Mexican strength at 12,000, and 
 the losses 1,000 to 1,200 killed and wounded, and 3,000 cap- 
 tured. The prisoners, like those taken at Vera Cruz, were, for 
 lack of means to care for them, paroled. 
 
 (57) Without escort, almost without companions, Santa 
 Anna escaped by difficult mountain trails to Orizaba. The 
 Mexican cavalry was the only part of the defeated troops that 
 quitted the field in a body; the infantry dispersed and fled 
 without organization or command. The cavalry went to San 
 Andres. Many of the other troops found their way to Orizaba, 
 and after some days Santa Anna succeeded in organizing a 
 force of 4,000 men. Then he moved this force and the cavalry 
 to Puebla.* 
 
 Without delay the American army moved to Jalapa. Here, 
 on April 27, Scott received word that the reinforcements in- 
 tended for him had been diverted to Taylor, on the Rio Grande 
 frontier, by order of the War Department. The term of the 
 one-year volunteers had nearly expired; they were clamoring 
 to be discharged in order to be able to pass through the 
 Tierra Caliente before the return of yellow-fever. As General 
 Scott knew that he could not complete his campaign before 
 their term would expire, he had nothing to do but to wait 
 for reinforcements; so he discharged the one-year volunteers 
 at Jalapa on the 4th of May and let them go home. 
 
 With the remainder of his army, Scott resumed the march to 
 Puebla. Santa Anna sent his cavalry forward for the purpose 
 of surprising or ambushing the American advance; but the 
 Mexican cavalry was itself taken by surprise, and was glad to 
 make its escape. Without making further resistance, Santa 
 Anna evacuated Puebla and retreated to the City of Mexico. 
 Worth's division took possession of Puebla on the 15th of 
 May* 
 
 *The Other Side. 
 
The Mexican War. Ill 
 
 The American army remained at this place three months, 
 awaiting reinforcements. Its numbers fell as low as 5,820 
 effectives. At last reinforcements were received sufficient to 
 raise the aggregate to 12,776 men, of whom more than 3,000 
 were sick. The army was now organized into two regular 
 divisions under Worth and Twiggs, and two volunteer divi- 
 sions under Pillow and Quitman. 
 
 It was known that another Mexican army had in the mean- 
 time been organized to defend the capital city. This army 
 was believed to be 30,000 strong ; it actually numbered not more 
 than 20,000.* Scott's army was now 150 or more miles from 
 Vera Cruz, and the road was beset by guerrillas. With so 
 small a force Scott could not proceed farther and, at the same 
 time, guard so long a line of communication. Abandoning 
 his communications, therefore, — cutting loose from his base, — 
 and leaving his sick and convalescent at Puebla, he resumed 
 the march for the City of Mexico on the 7th of August ; by 
 the 12th his leading division, without encountering any serious 
 resistance, had arrived at Ayotla in the Valley of Mexico. 
 
 (59) After the authorities at the Mexican capital became 
 convinced that General Scott was going to continue his advance 
 on that city, and that there was no longer any hope of check- 
 ing him on the way, they displayed great energy in preparing 
 for the defense of the city. The foundries and powder-mills 
 were worked to their utmost capacity in the manufacture of 
 arms and powder; the part of the Army of the North which 
 had remained at San Luis Potosi to watch for the Americans 
 in that direction, was now ordered to Guadalupe ; the various 
 states were asked for troops, but only a few responded; the 
 best men of all ages and classes of the capital enrolled them- 
 selves in the ranks of the National Guard; and field-works 
 were built covering all the approaches to the southern side of 
 the city. It was rightly supposed that the invaders would not 
 advance by the northern shore of Lake Texcuco. The follow- 
 ing points were fortified: El Penon, Mexicalcingo, San An- 
 tonio, and the convent and bridge of Churubusco ; while on 
 the southwest the fortress of Chapultepec stood at the junc- 
 tion of two of the main causeways leading into the city, and 
 from its high position commanded with its artillery all space 
 within range. All of the garitas (points at which the cause- 
 ways entered the city) were fortified. 
 
 It was confidently believed that the Americans would try to 
 
 *The Other Side. 
 
112 American Campaigns. 
 
 force an entrance into the city by way of El Pefion ; so the Na- 
 tional Guard was posted at that strong position to block their 
 way; while the Army of the North, now under General Va- 
 lencia, took station at Texcuco for the purpose of falling upon 
 their flank and rear and completing their destruction.* 
 
 The Valley of Mexico, surrounded by mountains, is more 
 than 7,500 feet above sea-level, and is about eighteen Spanish 
 leagues long from north to south, by twelve wide. It is very 
 fertile, and, besides the capital city, contains numerous smaller 
 towns. The valley is nearly level, the City of Mexico being 
 near its lowest point. The lakes overflow, and submerge the 
 valley more or less every year ; all the roads within the valley 
 are built upon causeways protected* by ditches on either side. 
 The country, so far as the roads are concerned, is probably 
 very like that with which we are so well acquainted in the rice 
 fields of the Philippines. At the time of the American invasion 
 it was not practicable for troops to march across country in 
 any direction. 
 
 (60) The main road from Ayotla lay between the foot of 
 the strongly fortified hill, El Pefion, and Lake Texcuco. The 
 roads around Lake Texcuco, which enter the city from the 
 north, were not reconnoitered, probably not considered, on 
 account of their length and roundabout direction. The way 
 around the south side of Lakes Chalco and Xochimilco was, at 
 first, supposed to be impracticable; but by reconnaissance it 
 was later found to be practicable. This route had the advan- 
 tage of passing through ground firm enough for troops to 
 maneuver upon, but, at the same time, very rocky and rugged. 
 
 Reversing the order of march, therefore, Worth's division, 
 which had been in rear, was started, on the 15th of August, by 
 this southern road for San Augustin. Twiggs's division, which 
 had been in the lead, and was camped at Ayotla, was held there 
 for a time, in order to keep up the appearance of an ad- 
 vance by way of El Pefion. The Mexicans, however, gained 
 a knowledge of the movement on the 16th [August] ; and on 
 the 17th the bulk of the National Guards at El Pefion, and 
 Valencia's Army of the North at Texcuco, were withdrawn. 
 The National Guards were placed at Churubusco ; on the 19th 
 two of their battalions advanced to San Antonio. Valencia 
 •marched first to San Angel, and then, contrary to Santa Anna's 
 orders, put his command into an isolated position upon an open 
 
 *The Other Side. 
 
The Mexican War. 113 
 
 ridge just north of Contreras and west of the southern end 
 of the Pedregal, a large space covered with volcanic rocks. 
 He placed a part of his troops, also, several hundred yards in 
 front of his main position, at the ranch of Padierna.. Valencia 
 was planning to fall upon the flank and rear of the Americans, 
 as they moved on the capital by way of San Antonio. 
 
 The American army reached San Augustin on the 17th Au- 
 gust, and occupied it without serious opposition. This place 
 then became the base of operations. The engineers discovered 
 the position of Valencia's army ; they also ascertained by recon- 
 naissance that a road could be made over the Pedregal, by 
 which Valencia's position could be turned, his rear attacked, 
 and his line of retreat to the main army and the capital cut off. 
 
 On the 18th of August Worth's division moved forward to 
 San Antonio, and on the 19th masked that place. (61) On 
 this day the divisions of Twiggs and Pillow advanced against 
 Valencia's position. While part of this force attacked and 
 captured the advanced post at Padierna, driving back the 
 enemy from there, three brigades, under General Persifor F. 
 Smith, made their way across the Pedregal to the wood around 
 San Geronimo, less than 2,000 yards to the left and rear 
 of Valencia's main position. Here Smith's detachment was 
 wholly separated from the rest of the American army, and his 
 rear was exposed to attack from the direction of San Angel. 
 Santa Anna, in fact, hurried forward a brigade, which ap- 
 peared on the Hill of Toro, 1,500 yards north of Geronimo, at 
 5 p.m. ; but before it made any movement of attack, it received 
 orders from Santa Anna to retire to San Angel, where he 
 himself spent the night with other troops. The only assault 
 upon Smith at San Geronimo was made by Valencia's cavalry, 
 which was easily repulsed. 
 
 That evening the Americans vacated the ranch of Padierna, 
 which was reoccupied by the Mexicans. During the night 
 General Scott sent Shields's brigade to reinforce Smith. Santa 
 Anna sent an order to Valencia directing him to withdraw to 
 Coyoacan. (60) Valencia refused to obey the order, and 
 held his position. 
 
 (61) Leaving Shields to hold Geronimo, protect his rear, 
 and cut off the enemy's retreat, Smith moved forward the rest 
 of his detachment before daybreak on the 20th, and fell upon 
 the rear of Valencia's position. Scott had ordered Worth and 
 Quitman to support this attack by assaulting the front of the 
 position. This "secondary attack" was quite unnecessary, for 
 
114 American Campaigns. 
 
 Smith's assault took the enemy by surprise and put him to 
 flight. The victory was complete. 
 7 While the Americans were thus routing Valencia's command, 
 Santa Anna was at San Angel, less than three miles distant 
 from the battle-field, with three brigades. He started forward 
 with part of his force, but was almost immediately met by 
 Valencia's flying troops. Thereupon he turned about and 
 hastened toward the city, sending orders for all the Mexican 
 troops to concentrate upon the inner line of defense at the 
 garitas of the capital.* 
 
 In this engagement, which Americans call the battle of Con- 
 treras, and the Mexicans call the battle of Padierna, the Ameri- 
 cans engaged numbered 4,500; the Mexicans, 4,000. The 
 Americans lost fewer than 100 men; the Mexicans lost 700 
 killed, 813 prisoners.f 
 
 (60) The Americans pursued to Coyoacan and Churubusco. 
 Pillow's division from Coyoacan turned toward San Antonio, 
 to attack the rear of the Mexicans at that point, while Worth's 
 division attacked them from the direction of San Augustin. 
 (62) One of Worth's brigades [Clarke] also made a turn- 
 ing movement to the left, through the edge of the Pedregal. 
 Pursuant to Santa Anna's orders the two Mexican battalions 
 at San Antonio fell back toward Churubusco without making 
 any serious resistance. In their retreat they were attacked 
 in flank by Clarke's brigade, and scattered through the marshes 
 in every direction. The divisions of Worth and Pillow pushed 
 on by the San Antonio causeway to Churubusco. In passing, 
 Santa Anna had given orders that this point must be held 
 at all risk.* 
 
 Meantime Twiggs's division, with part of Quitman's, had 
 continued the pursuit from Contreras through Coyoacan to 
 Churubusco. Here they had engaged a Mexican force strongly 
 posted in and about the Convent of San Pablo, on the west 
 side of the town. Worth and Pillow, without stopping to 
 reconnoiter, attacked the Mexicans at the bridge-head at the 
 Churubusco River. The brigades of Shields and Pierce were 
 sent across fields to the left, and north of the Churubusco 
 River, to get in rear of the Mexicans ; and Major Sumner was 
 
 *The Other Side. 
 
 fWright. Wilcox. The Other Side. La Batalla de Padierna, by 
 Teniente-Coronel Miguel Ruelas, in Revista del Ejercito y Marina, 
 Tomo IV., Num. 21. 
 
The Mexican War. 115 
 
 sent with a detachment of mounted rifles and dragoons to 
 their support. 
 
 (60) At last the Mexicans gave way and fled in great con- 
 fusion down the causeway to the San Antonio garita. The 
 Americans pursued until Worth gave the command to halt; 
 Colonel Harney, not receiving the command, did not stop his 
 dragoons until they had ridden up to the muzzles of the Mexi- 
 can cannon at the fortified garita. 
 
 The garrison in the convent of San Pablo held out for three 
 hours. It made a stout and gallant defense, but was at last 
 forced to surrender. Among the prisoners, none had fought 
 more desperately than the San Patricio companies — deserters, 
 mostly Irishmen, from the American army. 
 
 Referring to the work of this 20th of August, General Scott 
 says in his report: "After so many victories, we might with 
 but little additional loss have occupied the capital the same 
 evening." But he thought the attainment of peace would be 
 favored by his remaining outside of the capital for the present, 
 and granting an armistice until terms of peace could be con- 
 sidered by Mr. Trist, American peace commissioner accom- 
 panying his army, and representatives of the Mexican govern- 
 ment.* The Mexican account confirms General Scott's opin- 
 ion of the American successes, in the following words : "The 
 unfortunate day of the 20th of August had terminated; the 
 loud sound of cannon even yet rang in the ears of the Mexi- 
 cans ; the sanguinary battles of Padierna and Churubusco had 
 passed; and the invading army triumphed at the gates of the 
 city. The spirits were worn out; the remnant of our troops 
 demoralized and lost; confusion and disorder had overcome 
 all classes of society."f 
 
 On the 23rd of August an armistice was agreed to, which 
 "was to continue as long as the commissioners of the two gov- 
 ernments" should "be engaged in negotiations; or until the 
 commander of either army" should "give formal notice to the 
 other of its cessation," and forty-eight hours thereafter.* 
 
 General Scott established his headquarters, with Worth's 
 division, at Tacubaya; Quitman's division remained at San 
 Augustin, Twiggs's at San Angel, and Pillow's at Mixcoac. 
 The head and tail of the army were within eight miles of each 
 other. 
 
 *Wilcox. 
 
 ■fThe Other Side. 
 
116 American Campaigns. 
 
 The peace commissioners came to no agreement, and the 
 Mexican army had violated several of the terms of the armis- 
 tice. So, on September 6, Scott notified the Mexican com- 
 mander that the armistice would cease. On the 8th September 
 the army closed up. Quitman moved up to Coyoacan from 
 San Augustin ; one of Twiggs's brigades took post on the Nino 
 Perdido causeway, to threaten the city in that direction ; one of 
 Pillow's brigades occupied the San Borja hacienda, the other 
 joined Worth at Tacubaya, and took part in the battle of 
 Molino del Rey, fought that day. Mixcoac was to be the 
 general depot.* 
 
 All the southern and western garitas of the city were strongly 
 fortified, and defended by artillery; and outside of the city 
 there were strong garrisons and defensive works at the Castle 
 of Chapultepec, Molino del Rey, and the Casa de Mata. Santa 
 Anna's cavalry, 4,000 strong, was at the hacienda of Morales, 
 two miles west of Chapultepec. 
 
 (63) The Molino del Rey consisted of a huge pile of stone 
 buildings, 200 yards long, in a part of which cannon and pow- 
 der had formerly been made. Some three hundred yards west 
 of it was a four-sided bastioned fort, inside of which was the 
 Casa de Mata, a large building used for the storage of powder. 
 Southward the ground rose in a gentle slope to Tacubaya, and 
 a short distance west there was a deep ravine. "The Well-for- 
 tified castle of Chapultepec," the national military academy, 
 "on a height in rear, commanded these buildings and the 
 ground beyond, toward Tacubaya."* 
 
 "General Scott had received a credible report that there was 
 a cannon foundry in the Molino del Rey, and a large quantity 
 of powder in the Casa Mata."* He determined, therefore, to 
 attack and destroy the buildings, and assigned the task to Gen- 
 eral Worth with his own division, one of Pillow's brigades, 270 
 horsemen under Major Sumner, and five guns. The assault 
 was set for the morning of September 8. 
 
 Santa Anna got possession of General Scott's order for this 
 attack, and spent the 7th in arranging to meet it. He placed 
 five brigades of infantry with artillery in and about the build- 
 ings to receive the assault, and stationed his cavalry, 4,000 
 horsemen, under General Alvarez, in position to charge the 
 flank and rear of the assaulting columns and destroy them.f 
 
 *Wilcox. 
 
 ■{The Other Side. 
 
The Mexican War. 117 
 
 At the first light of day the American guns opened on the 
 buildings, and the assaulting columns soon moved out. The 
 battle lasted two hours, at the end of which the Americans 
 stood in possession of the buildings. The defenders that es- 
 caped death and capture took refuge under the guns of Chapul- 
 tepec* Eight hundred were taken prisoners. Worth had 
 only 3,100 men; he lost 116 killed and 671 wounded. There 
 must have been 14,000 Mexican troops in the engagement, or 
 within supporting distance, but they lacked a single directing 
 head; Santa Anna was in the city, and there was no single 
 commander directing the defense. It was one of the most 
 remarkable victories ever gained by American troops, but the 
 percentage of their loss was frightful. Santa Anna published 
 a proclamation, and sent it abroad in the land, announcing that 
 the Mexicans had gained the victory, and that he had led them 
 in person.f 
 
 During the engagement General Alvarez and his cavalry sat 
 idle in their saddles. He claimed to be unable to cross the 
 ravine between him and Worth's assaulting columns. Sumner 
 led his little band of American horsemen across the same ravine 
 to the side of Alvarez ; they were not charged by the Mexican 
 cavalry.f Alvarez was probably kept at bay by the American 
 artillery. 
 
 (64) Chapultepec was the next stronghold to be attacked. 
 This stone castle stands on "an isolated mound rising 150 feet 
 above the valley ; nearly precipitous on the northern, eastern, 
 and part of the southern side, it declines gradually on the west 
 to a cypress grove separating it from Molino del Rey." The 
 grounds were inclosed by. a high wall on the southern side, and 
 on the northern side by the San Cosme Aqueduct. The castle 
 commanded two of the causeways leading into the City of 
 Mexico about two miles east of it. The position was de- 
 fended with cannon.* 
 
 To mislead the Mexicans as to the objective of the attack, a 
 feint was made against the southern garitas. On the 9th Sep- 
 tember a battery and a brigade took position at the Hermitage 
 on the Nino Perdido causeway; and on the afternoon of the 
 11th Quitman and Pillow marched their divisions to Piedad. 
 After dark these divisions were withdrawn to Tacubaya; for 
 
 *Wilcox. 
 
 fThe Other Side. 
 
118 American Campaigns. 
 
 they were designated to make the assault on Chapultepec. 
 Twiggs's division remained on the causeways south of the city 
 to keep up the demonstration ; and the battery at the Hermitage 
 shelled the Candelaria and San Antonio garitas. 
 
 (65) Batteries were placed, and they shelled the fortress of 
 Chapultepec all day of the 12th September. The bombardment 
 was resumed on the morning of the 13th, followed by "two col- 
 umns of attack, one led by Quitman against the southern face 
 of the castle, advancing along the road leading from Tacu- 
 baya ; the other under General Pillow" from Molino del Rey 
 through the cypress grove, against the western side. Each 
 division was accompanied by a storming party some 250 strong, 
 with ladders and pick-axes and crow-bars. The assault was 
 successful, and the commander of the stronghold surrendered 
 after a gallant defense, in which the young cadets of the Mexi- 
 can National Military Academy bore a conspicuous part. 
 
 About 7,500 Americans took part in the attack of Chapul- 
 tepec. The Mexicans claim they had only 800 muskets in the 
 grounds; but from the outside they had some 4,000 infantry 
 aiding the defense, and the same number of cavalry. This 
 infantry, however, did very little, and the cavalry nothing 
 whatever. 
 
 (66) "The pursuit, with a short pause at Chapultepec, was 
 pressed vigorously on the two causeways leading into the city. 
 The more direct of these, the one followed by Quitman, led to 
 the Garita de Belen, about two miles distant. Worth" (who 
 had supported Pillow) "advanced over the other and longer, 
 which entered the city through the San Cosme Garita. These 
 roads were broad, level avenues. In the center of each was an 
 aqueduct consisting of an open stone trough, resting upon 
 arches springing from stone piers, and right and left of the 
 causeways were ditches filled with water."* 
 
 The columns on both roads met with stout resistance; but 
 neither was stopped till it had entered the capital. Quitman's 
 column passed the Belen Garita at 1.20 p.m., and pushed a 
 short way into the city ; but the fire from the houses and streets 
 was so severe, the column was driven back to the gate, and 
 remained there during the night. Worth passed the San 
 Cosme Garita and halted in front of the convent of San Fer- 
 nando for the night. 
 
 ♦Wilcox. 
 
The Mexican War. 119 
 
 (60) During the night the city was evacuated by Mexican 
 troops. Santa Anna went to Guadalupe. (66) "At dawn 
 of the 14th September a white flag was sent from the Citadel 
 to the Belen Gate, the bearers of which requested General 
 Quitman to take possession."* Thereupon Quitman marched 
 his command to the Grand Plaza. About 8 a.m. General Scott, 
 accompanied by his staff and an escort of cavalry, rode into 
 the Plaza. He appointed General Quitman military governor 
 of the City of Mexico. 
 
 Soon after General Scott's arrival on the morning of the 
 14th, shots were fired at the American troops from the houses 
 and the streets, by inhabitants and straggling soldiers. It was 
 necessary to clear the streets with artillery and musketry, many 
 houses had to be entered, and armed bands were killed or cap- 
 tured. This disturbance kept up much of that and the next 
 day, and quiet was not wholly restored until the 16th. 
 
 (57) On the night of September 16, at Guadalupe, Santa 
 Anna resigned the Presidency of Mexico and the chief com- 
 mand of the army, and, with 1,500 volunteer cavalry and three 
 or four pieces of artillery, set out for Puebla to capture the 
 American garrison there. He laid siege to the garrison's little 
 stronghold, Cuartel de San Jose, and summoned the com- 
 mander to surrender. This was refused, and, a few days later, 
 Santa Anna raised the siege, and marched away to El Pinal, 
 where he expected to capture an American train. He en- 
 countered an American force under General Joe Lane, and was 
 defeated. The next day he received an order directing him to 
 turn over his command and await a trial by court-martial. 
 After various ups and downs Santa Anna died in the City of 
 Mexico, in 1876, poor and neglected. 
 
 "A provisional government was established" by General 
 Scott and "expeditions were sent against numerous guerrilla 
 bands which still carried on their operations in rear of the 
 army. ... In all these expeditions, the Americans were 
 successful ; but in many severe losses were incurred."f 
 
 (60) Scott's campaign was over; but it was not until Feb- 
 ruary 2, 1848, that the treaty of peace was concluded at Guada- 
 lupe Hidalgo. (48) Ratifications were exchanged at Quere- 
 taro, May 30, 1848 ; peace was proclaimed July 4, 1848 ; and on 
 August 1 the last American soldier quitted Vera Cruz. 
 
 ♦Wilcox. 
 
 fLecture of Lieutenant Haight, 4th U. S. Cavalry. 
 
120 American Campaigns. 
 
 The Navy. 
 
 The cooperation of the American navy throughout the Mexi- 
 can War was most effective. Not only did it escort the trans- 
 ports of the armies of both Taylor and Scott, guard their bases 
 from the side of the sea, put Scott's army ashore at Vera Cruz, 
 and join in the siege of that city; but it also maintained an ef- 
 fectual blockade of the Mexican coasts on the Gulf and on the 
 Pacific sides, and, besides Tampico, captured several other im- 
 portant coast towns. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 General Patterson and others were provoked at General 
 Scott because he would not capture Vera Cruz by storm. But 
 Scott preferred the more sensible, certain, humane, and scien- 
 tific, if less spectacular, method of siege, which succeeded with 
 the loss of sixty-seven men killed and wounded. After recon- 
 naissance had been made, General Scott said to his chief en- 
 gineer: "Vera Cruz must be taken with a loss of not to ex- 
 ceed 100 men; for every one over that number I shall regard 
 myself as his murderer." His chief concern was to get on 
 into the highlands in the interior before the yellow-fever 
 appeared. If the place could not haye been taken by siege in 
 time for this, Scott would have carried it by storm. "The 
 capture of Vera Cruz was an affair, in the main, of the staff 
 and the artillery. The engineers located and constructed the 
 batteries with such good judgment and care, that there were 
 few casualties."* 
 
 If General Scott had had the transports and siege material 
 at hand that he had asked for, and had a right to expect, he 
 could have begun the bombardment of Vera Cruz at least a 
 week earlier; that is, on the 15th instead of the 22nd March. 
 By the 20th the city would have fallen, and by the 22nd, if he 
 had, also, had the necessary land transportation, he could have 
 been on his way to the City of Mexico — before Santa Anna 
 would have had time to return from his defeat at Buena Vista 
 [February 23] and to organize an army with which to meet him 
 at Cerro Gordo. With all his energy and exertion, Santa Anna 
 did not have all his army at Cerro Gordo until the 12th of 
 April ; but Scott was not ready to attack him before the 17th. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Robles, the Mexican engineer that forti- 
 
 *Wilcox. 
 
The Mexican War. 121 
 
 fied Cerro Gordo, gave it as his opinion, that the position was 
 only suitable for "harassing an invading army," — that is, for 
 fighting a delaying action, a rear-guard action, — and not for 
 fighting a defensive battle with the hope of winning a decisive 
 victory. He reported that the position could be turned pre- 
 cisely as it was afterwards turned by the Americans. He "ad- 
 vised that the main defense be made at Corral Falso, six or 
 eight miles in rear." But Santa Anna insisted upon fortifying 
 Cerro Gordo. It was here that the patriots had made a famous 
 stand against the Spanish in the War for Independence.* Nor 
 did Santa Anna make any provision against the turning move- 
 ment. Even after the Americans had got possession of the 
 hill, Atalaya, on the first day of the battle, he persisted in be- 
 lieving that the main attack would be made against his right 
 and front, and he made his dispositions accordingly. 
 
 "All of Santa Anna's army, except one brigade of National 
 Guards, had reached Cerro Gordo by April 12, while one-half 
 of the American regular force did not leave Vera Cruz until the 
 13th, and Quitman's brigade of volunteers not until the 15th. 
 It cannot be supposed that the Mexican commander was igno- 
 rant of the condition of the hostile army in his immediate front. 
 He should therefore have attacked it within a day or two after 
 he reached Cerro Gordo ; his failure to do so can be explained 
 only upon one of two suppositions: first [he believed] the 
 position held by him could not be forced, and his enemy with 
 inferior numbers must fight in order to escape from the Tierra 
 Caliente ; second, if the enemy delayed his advance awaiting re- 
 inforcements, he would certainly be scourged by yellow-fever, 
 and, with his thinned ranks, be easily captured or dispersed. 
 
 "A want of adequate transportation, and a desire to get his 
 army away from the seacoast before the fever appeared, com- 
 pelled General Scott to march with his various detachments on 
 separate days, at the risk of being attacked in detail."* 
 
 By the victory of Cerro Gordo the road to the Mexican capi- 
 tal was opened to the American army, and Santa Anna's army 
 was so badly routed, demoralized, and dispersed that, "had 
 General Scott been provided with the requisite force and trans- 
 portation," he might have pushed on to the capital and speedily 
 terminated the war. But with the. discharge of seven regi- 
 ments (the one-year men) at Jalapa, and with no reinforce- 
 ments, Scott was forced to wait with his army three months at 
 
 *Wilcox. 
 
122 American Campaigns. 
 
 Puebla. He wrote to the War Department : "With the addi- 
 tion of ten or twelve thousand new levies in April and May, 
 asked for, and until very recently expected, or even with the 
 addition of two or three thousand new troops, destined for this 
 army, but suddenly, by order of the War Department, directed 
 to the Rio Grande frontier, I might, notwithstanding the un- 
 avoidable discharge of the volunteers — seven regiments and 
 two independent companies — advance with confidence upon the 
 enemy's capital."* 
 
 For General Scott to cut loose from his base,— abandon his 
 line of communication with Vera Cruz, — and set out with an 
 army of 10,000 soldiers from Puebla to try to overcome an 
 army of 30,000 and capture the capital, seems like a very 
 hazardous undertaking. When the news of it reached Eu- 
 rope, Wellington said: t "Scott is lost. He has been carried 
 away by success. He can't take the city, and he can't fall 
 back upon his base."f It is seldom that a commander is justi- 
 fied in taking such a risk, and if General Scott had failed, mili- 
 tary critics would have condemned him for rashness. General 
 Wilcox says in his history of the war : "The defeat of Santa 
 Anna and the capture of the Mexican capital were due to 
 Scott's skill and good judgment, aided by an able, educated, 
 and scientific staff, and by an infantry, artillery and cavalry 
 force whose fighting qualities" are rarely equalled. 
 
 A distinctive feature of this campaign was the work of the 
 younger engineer officers, Lee, Beauregard, Tower, Mason, 
 McClellan, and others, in reconnoitering routes and positions, 
 selecting the places for lines and guns, constructing batteries, 
 guiding columns of troops, watching for vulnerable points in 
 the enemy's line. General "Scott placed great reliance upon 
 these officers. Not a route was taken, nor an attack ordered, 
 until they had made their reconnaissance and report. The 
 only attack made in the campaign without reconnaissance be- 
 forehand by the engineer officers, was Worth's impetuous as- 
 sault of the bridge-head at Churubusco. Truly did the Mili- 
 tary Academy repay its cost to the Nation with the work of 
 these young graduates in this single campaign. 
 
 (60) It does not appear that Santa Anna considered the 
 probability of Scott's advancing on the capital by the road 
 south of Lakes Xochimilco and Chalco. No doubt he was 
 fooled by the appearance of the army at Ayotla, and by the ap- 
 
 *Wilcox. 
 fWright. 
 
The Mexican War. 123 
 
 pearance of reconnoitering parties on the road by El Penon, 
 and, also, on the road from Los Reyes to Mexicalcingo, which 
 was fortified. But on the road actually taken by the Ameri- 
 cans, no real resistance was offered, and no preparation for 
 defense had been made south and east of San Antonio. The 
 road from San Augustin to the southern end of Lake Chalco 
 presents every advantage for defense, and ought to ha^se been 
 fortified and defended by the Mexicans. The instant, how- 
 ever, that Scott reversed his army and started it southward 
 round Lake Chalco, Santa Anna saw through the movement, 
 and accordingly issued orders this same day, August 15, for 
 his army to concentrate on the causeways south of the capital, 
 from Mexicalcingo to, San Angel. 
 
 General Valencia's division was ordered to hold San Angel ; 
 but this general moved forward and occupied the advanced 
 position at Contreras. This position was from every point of 
 view untenable. Not only could it be turned easily, and at- 
 tacked in rear (as was done), but Valencia would have been 
 just as bad off, if Scott had only left a containing force to oc- 
 cupy his attention in front, while he forced a way forward 
 over the San Antonio causeway, and from there crossed over 
 to the San Angel road. This would have cut Valencia off 
 from his communications. Taking position, then, at Contre- 
 ras was Valencia's strategic mistake. He made an equally 
 bad tactical blunder, in putting a part of his force in front at 
 Padierna — an advanced post beyond the support of his main 
 position. 
 
 General Grant says in his Memoirs: "Both the strategy and 
 tactics displayed by General Scott in the various engagements 
 of August 20, 1847, were faultless, as I look upon them now 
 after the lapse of so many years" — Contreras, San Antonio, 
 and Churubusco. Strategically, Molino del Rey and Chapul- 
 tepec may have been mistakes; they clear the way for an en- 
 try into the city, but they were very costly victories. Possibly 
 Scott could have forced the San Antonio Garita at less cost 
 than storming Chapultepec. This was the opinion of all his 
 generals except Pillow, and of all his engineer officers except 
 Beauregard. 
 
 General Scott was greatly handicapped in the carrying-out 
 of his campaign, by a lack of funds and supplies, as well as by 
 the delay and scarcity of his reinforcements. During his long, 
 enforced wait at Puebla, no funds nor supplies had been re- 
 ceived. Four months' pay was due the troops. Mexicans 
 
124 American Campaigns. 
 
 were employed to make shoes and clothing for the army, and 
 food and forage had to be got from the country ; and the sub- 
 sistence and quartermaster's departments had to make all pur- 
 chases on credit. 
 
 This campaign, like Taylor's, exemplified the benefits and 
 importance of drill, discipline, and training. Advantage was 
 taken of the long stay at Puebla, and wherever opportunity of- 
 fered, for instruction in these matters. 
 
 Possibly the best incident of the Mexican War, from the 
 military point of view of the Nation, was the absence of the 
 militia — George Washington's abomination and Thomas Jef- 
 ferson's bulwark of freedom. No attempt was made to test 
 the constitutional rights of the militia by ordering them beyond 
 the Rio Grande. Trained volunteers were employed in their 
 stead, and a larger proportion of regulars ; and we have seen a 
 different sort of fighting from that of the shame of 1812. Of 
 a truth, for courageous, hard, sustained fighting, as shown by 
 the percentage of loss, and the victories gained over superior 
 numbers in strong position, there is no page of our history so 
 notable, and none so inspiring, as that which tells of the bat- 
 tles around the City of Mexico. If a single American regi- 
 ment or company ran away from any engagement in Scott's 
 campaign, the historians have failed to record it. 
 
 The invasion and conquest of Mexico by an army so small 
 as General Scott's, and so hampered by lack of support from 
 its own government, was made possible only by the circum- 
 stances existing in Mexico. The foremost of these circum- 
 stances were the weakness of the central national government 
 and the political dissessions within the republic. A state torn 
 by internal dissessions is in the worst condition to repel 
 invasion. 
 
 It is almost impossible for an American student of to-day to 
 get a clear apprehension of the Mexican political potpourri 
 of that day. And it is not worth while. Out of the muddle 
 of Moderados, Puros, Polkos, Clericals, and the rest, about the 
 only notion that we can gather, is that there was a political 
 party for every man strong enough to have a temporary fol- 
 lowing. The consequences of it all were revolutions ; and 
 more revolutions. There were two or three during the war 
 with the United States. The Republic of Mexico was a union 
 of states, like the United States; but the central government 
 was so unstable and weak as to have no real authority, and 
 very little real influence, over the state governments. Govern- 
 
The Mexican War. 125 
 
 ors of states were asked for troops to defend the national 
 capital when the invaders were at its gates; almost none of 
 them responded. That the Republic out of all its thousands 
 of population could muster an army of only 20,000 men to de- 
 fend its ancient and beautiful capital, seems as pitiable, and as 
 absurd, as our own failure to defend Washington City against 
 a handful of British in the War of 1812. 
 
 The Mexican army suffered not so much from a lack of com- 
 manders as from the lack of a commander. All things consid- 
 ered, Santa Anna appears to have been its best ; yet his opera- 
 tions all show the want of an understanding of strategy and 
 tactics. He even seems to have lacked the common quality 
 of personal courage. Attention has already been pointed to 
 the strategical mistake he made in taking his army to Buena 
 Vista rather than to Vera Cruz; of a piece with it, was his 
 withdrawal of the garrison from Tampico. This virtually 
 gave that important port to the American navy ; and it became 
 the base of operations gainst Vera Cruz. 
 
 This was a conflict in which nothing but the taking of the 
 national capital would have made the weaker nation accept 
 the terms of peace proposed by the stronger. It was not 
 enough to destroy the organized armed bodies ; it was not 
 enough to blockade the coast, capture important seaports, and 
 occupy a large part of the territory. From prehistoric times 
 Mexico City had been the capital of Mexico ; it was the metrop- 
 olis as well as the political capital. The pride of the nation 
 was centered in that city, and the leaders of the people, the men 
 who were able to make a treaty of peace that would be binding 
 on the nation, were there. 
 
 The capture of Vera Cruz was the first step toward the cap- 
 ture of the City of Mexico. Its defense should, therefore, 
 have been the first consideration of the government and the 
 commander-in-chief. But it was neglected by both. No ade- 
 quate preparation had been made for its defense ; there was no 
 army at hand to guard it from without; and it was not pro- 
 vided with forts, or garrison, or armament, or supplies, to with- 
 stand a siege. 
 
 One of the most serious strategic mistakes made by Santa 
 Anna, was his withdrawal from Orizaba to the capital, after 
 reorganizing his beaten army at Orizaba. This town stood 
 upon the flank of General Scott's line of operations, and within 
 easy striking distance of it. Scott could not have dared to 
 push on to the capital, or even as far as Puebla, so long as 
 
126 American Campaigns. 
 
 Santa Anna remained at Orizaba. As the American com- 
 mander had not troops enough to spare a force to mask or 
 "contain" Santa Anna's army in its flank position, he would 
 have been obliged to move his whole force against it to dis- 
 lodge it, before he could have gone on toward the Valley of 
 Mexico. At Orizaba Santa Anna would have had the same 
 advantage over the Americans that Washington had over the 
 British in his flank position at Morristown. 
 
 In conclusion I cannot refrain from quoting the remarks 
 made by Daniel Webster in the Senate of the United States 
 about General Scott: "A man," said he, "who has performed 
 the most brilliant campaign on recent military record; a man 
 who has warred against the enemy, warred against the climate, 
 warred against a thousand unpropitious circumstances ; and 
 has carried the flag of his country to the capital of the enemy — 
 honorably, proudly, humanely— to his own permanent honor 
 and the great military credit of his country. And where is 
 he? At Pueblo — at Pueblo undergoing an inquiry before his 
 inferiors in rank, and other persons without military rank, 
 while the high powers he has exercised and executed with so 
 much distinction are transferred to another." 
 
 Yes, such was General Scott's reward — an order from Presi- 
 dent Polk relieving him from command of his army, and send- 
 ing him before a court of inquiry. The occasion of this in- 
 dignity was the insubordination of one of Scott's regular gen- 
 erals and the vainglory of one of his volunteer generals. 
 Mexican history gloatingly says: "The conqueror of Mexico 
 found himself brought like a criminal before a military tribunal. 
 . . . We believe this step was a measure of profound policy 
 on the part of the Cabinet of the United States. When General 
 Taylor had at one time acquired sufficient popularity by his 
 campaigns in the north, General Scott was put forward as his 
 rival ; and when Scott had caused the renown of old General 
 Taylor to be forgotten, the Executive wished the people of the 
 United States to forget both these leaders, in order that the 
 military spirit should never prevail, which is so prejudicial to 
 countries governed by the federal system."* But the Mexican 
 historians saw only half-way through the motives of Mr. 
 Polk's Cabinet. 
 
 *The Other Side. 
 
LECTURE VII. 
 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 
 
 (67) It is not our purpose to attempt to trace the causes 
 of our Great Civil War — they are even yet more matters of 
 controversy than of exact history. We are concerned merely 
 with its military history. We want to learn the lessons of our 
 trade from its campaigns, and to do so to the best advantage 
 we must forget the sectional prejudice we may have imbibed 
 in our childhood ; indeed we must forget, if we have not already 
 done so, much of the fiction we were taught, under the guise of 
 history, in the school-rooms of our youth. We must strive to 
 get at the exact truth of events, and then study coldly, critic- 
 ally, comparatively, not only the faults and mistakes of oppos- 
 ing commanders and troops, but also their examples of skill 
 and excellence. We want to appreciate, if we can, the causes 
 of success on the one hand, and of failure on the other, in 
 every case. 
 
 As students of American history we may have a personal 
 leaning towards the soldiers of one side or the other, towards 
 the famous leaders of one side or the other ; better still, we may 
 have a national pride in the great deeds and qualities of the 
 actors on both sides, or we may deplore their shortcomings; 
 but as students of military history, a branch of our professional 
 education, a chief means of learning the business of war, we 
 must study the work of Grant and Lee, of Jackson and Sheri- 
 dan, of Sherman and Johnston, and of the rest, merely as the 
 work of characters in history ; just as we shall study the work 
 of von Moltke and Benedek, of Roberts and Cronje, of Oyama 
 and Kuropatkin. 
 
 To arrive at a right estimate or appreciation of this conflict, 
 one thing must be kept always in mind; namely, that while 
 politically it was a civil war, from a purely military point of 
 view it was as much a war between two hostile nations as was 
 the war between Mexico and the United States, or the war 
 between France and Germany in 1870-'71. In other civil wars 
 the people of a nation have been divided among themselves, and 
 not by geographic lines. The cleavage has usually been be- 
 
128 American Campaigns. 
 
 tween social classes, political factions, or religious sects ; but in 
 this war the inhabitants of two geographic sections were op- 
 posed to each other almost to a unit, — as solidly as any two 
 distinct hostile nations speaking different languages. How- 
 ever otherwise the matter may have been viewed by the people 
 of the North, the people of the South, almost as a whole, be- 
 lieved themselves to be defending their soil against an invader, 
 rather than struggling merely to defend, or to achieve, rights 
 from governmental oppression. 
 
 South Carolina, whose statesmen had for long been threaten- 
 ing separation from the United States, was the first State to 
 pass an ordinance of secession. This happened on the 20th of 
 December, 1860, and, unfortunately, Mr. Buchanan, and not 
 Andrew Jackson, was President of the United States. Bu- 
 chanan did not believe that a State had the right to secede ; nor 
 yet did he believe that the Government had the right to coerce 
 a State. So South Carolina was not opposed. 
 
 By the 1st of February, 1861, Georgia and the five States 
 bordering on the Gulf of Mexico had also withdrawn from the 
 Union without opposition. The seceding States took posses- 
 sion of the public property within their borders, such as mints, 
 arsenals, and forts, with the exception of three or four forts 
 along the seacoast. General Twiggs, who was in command of 
 the Department of Texas, to his immortal shame surrendered 
 all the posts in Texas, with their garrisons and equipment, to 
 a regiment of Texas militia. Among the forts not given up to 
 the seceding States was Fort Sumter in the harbor of Charles- 
 ton, South Carolina. 
 
 In February, 1861, representatives of the seceding States met 
 at Montgomery, Alabama, and organized a provisional govern- 
 ment. Jefferson Davis was chosen provisional President of the 
 Confederate States of America. On the 4th of March, 1861, 
 Abraham Lincoln succeeded Buchanan as President of the 
 United States. The new Administration took no immediate 
 steps to reduce the seceded States ; and for a time matters went 
 on in about the same way as under Buchanan's Administration. 
 In fact, the Government had no means at ha^d with which to 
 coerce the recalcitrant States. The United States marshals 
 and other civil officers refused, and were powerless to act; 
 the army was only about 16,000 strong, and was, for the most 
 part, in the far West. "The navy consisted of six screw-frig- 
 ates, only one of which was in commission, of five steam 
 
The First Battle of Bull Run. 129 
 
 sloops, some twenty sailing vessels, and a few gunboats."* In 
 the States remaining in the Union public opinion concerning 
 the right of States to secede, and the right of the Government 
 to coerce a seceding State, had not as yet crystalized into such 
 shape as to warrant the President in taking the extreme step 
 of calling out the militia. 
 
 Meantime, Major Anderson with_hisJittle_ garrison at Fo.rt 
 Sumter was b"esiegelT1E>y_an armed Confederate . force under 
 General Beauregard, and his provisions were running low. In 
 January reinforcements and supplies had been dispatched to 
 him in a steamer called Star of the West; but the vessel had 
 been fired upon and stopped by Confederate guns at Fort 
 Moultrie. Confederate commissioners spent several weeks "af~~ 
 Washington negotiating for the delivery of the fort ; about the 
 1st of April they obtained from the President an agreement 
 "that he would not change the military status at Charleston 
 without giving notice."f Just a week later a messenger from 
 Mr. Lincoln notified the Confederate authorities at Charleston 
 that an attempt would be made to "supply Fort Sumter with 
 provisions only." Thereupon "Beauregard was instructed to 
 demand the evacuation of Sumter, and, in case of refusal, to 
 reduce it."f 
 
 The demand was made on the afternoon of the 1 1th of April 
 and promptly refused. At half-past four o'clock on the morn- 
 ing of the 12th the first shot was fired at Fort Sumter. It was 
 the first shot of the war. At noon on Sunday, the 14th, the 
 Stars and Stripes were hauled down, and the fort was 
 evacuated. 
 
 The next day, the 15th of April, President Lincoln issued a 
 proclamation calling forth 75,000 militia, and stating that their 
 "first service" would "probably be to repossess the forts, places, 
 and property which have been seized from the Union." The 
 term of service of this levy was for three months only. 
 
 All of the Free States responded enthusiastically to the 
 President's call; the governors of the Slave States that still 
 adhered to the Union refused. These States immediately took 
 up the question of secession, with the result that Virginia, 
 North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas joined the Confed- 
 eracy. In the other border States a desperate struggle took 
 place between Secession and Union. Kentucky undertook to 
 
 ♦Henderson's Life of Stonewall Jackson. 
 tScribner's Campaigns of the Civil War, — Nicolay. 
 
130 American Campaigns. 
 
 remain neutral, but soon found her neutrality violated by both 
 the Confederacy and the United States. Missouri was held in 
 the Union mainly by means of the activity and judgment of 
 General Lyon, then a captain in the 2nd U. S. Infantry. A 
 good deal of fighting took place in that State in May and June, 
 1861. The Union victory at Boonville, on the 17th of June, 
 "decided the fate of the State in favor of the Union." In 
 Maryland there was a very strong sentiment in favor of Seces- 
 sion. It exhibited itself in an assault made by a mob in Balti- 
 more upon a Massachusetts regiment passing through that city, 
 on the 19th of April. The State was kept in the Union. In 
 the mountainous counties of western Virginia the people were 
 almost solidly for the Union. They repudiated the secession of 
 Virginia and set up the loyal State of West Virginia. The 
 Governor of Virginia dispatched troops thither to overawe 
 them ; but the troops were defeated and put to rout by Union 
 forces under General McClellan in a "brief and brilliant cam- 
 paign." The actions at Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford, on 
 the 11th and 13th of July, "settled forever the fate of West 
 Virginia." 
 
 While these hostilities were going on in Missouri and West 
 Virginia, and Kentucky was trying to stand neutral, it was 
 evident from the start that the main campaign would be car- 
 ried on in Virginia or Maryland. This was determined pri- 
 marily by the position of Washington, the capital of the United 
 States, and secondarily. by the position of Richmond, the capital 
 of the Confederacy. Whether the battle-ground would be in 
 Virginia or in Maryland depended upon whether the Federal 
 forces or the Confederate should take the offensive. 
 
 The safety of Washington was the first consideration of the 
 Federal Government; to this end the new troops and some 
 regulars were hurried to that point. The South hastened its 
 raw levies to Virginia, and established its main camp at Ma- 
 nassas Junction; under General Beauregard. 
 
 On the 24th of May, the day after the people of Virginia by 
 their votes ratified the ordinance of secession, columns of Fed- 
 eral troops crossed the Potomac and, without opposition, seized 
 Alexandria and Arlington Heights. They established a camp 
 on the south side of the river, and intrenched the line from 
 the Chain Bridge, above Washington, to Alexandria, below it. 
 General Scott, then in command of the army of the United 
 States, hero of two wars, and the only man in America that had 
 ever actually commanded as many as 5,000 soldiers, was too old 
 
The First Battle of Bull Run. 131 
 
 actively to take command. So Brevet-Major McDowell, an 
 officer of the Adjutant General's Department, on duty at the 
 War Department, whose highest rank of command had been 
 lieutenant of artillery, was made a brigadier-general, and given 
 command of the forces on the south bank of the Potomac. 
 McDowell and Beauregard had been classmates at West Point ; 
 Beauregard had been an officer of the U. S. Engineers. 
 
 Washington being now prepared for defense against direct 
 attack, the Northern newspapers and public began to cry out 
 for a movement against the Confederate force at Manassas. 
 General Scott did not believe the three-month levies could be 
 counted upon for an offensive campaign. On the 3rd of May 
 President Lincoln had made a second call for troops, 42,034 
 three-year volunteers, 22,714 men for the regular army, and 
 18,000 for the navy. General Scott wanted to wait until the 
 men of this second levy could be trained and made ready for 
 the field. "But the Northern public, as the violent language of 
 the newspapers clearly showed, was determined not to lose the 
 services of the three-months men before proving how much 
 they could do ; and . . . the Administration was finally 
 induced to overrule the judgment of the lieutenant-general, 
 and to order him to make the necessary arrangements for an 
 advance."* 
 
 Besides the armies under McDowell and Beauregard there 
 were several other hostile forces in this theater. Near Win- 
 chester, in the lower Shenandoah Valley, a Confederate force, 
 about 12,000 strong, under General Joseph E. Johnston, con- 
 fronted a Union force, about 18,000 strong, under General 
 Patterson. This was the same General Patterson that we met 
 in the Mexican War. He was now nearly seventy years old, 
 and had lately been appointed a major-general of volunteers 
 from civil life, and given this important command. At Aquia 
 Creek, about thirty miles southeast of Manassas, there was a 
 Confederate force of some 3,000 men and six guns, under Gen- 
 eral Holmes. Threatening Richmond from the southeast, a 
 Federal force under General Benjamin F. Butler, at Fort Mon- 
 roe, was opposed by Confederates under Generals Huger and 
 Magruder. In the mountains of western Virginia five or six 
 thousand Confederates were guarding the passes against the 
 advance of the victorious Federals from West Virginia. There 
 were also Confederate troops at Richmond, and Beauregard 
 
 *The Story of the Civil War.— Ropes. 
 
132 American Campaigns. 
 
 had a detachment near Leesburg, thirty miles away, watching 
 the crossings of the Potomac. 
 
 None of the Union forces, except his immediate command, 
 were under McDowell's control ; and none of the Confederates, 
 except those at Leesburg and Manassas, were under Beaure- 
 gard's command. President Davis, with General Lee as his 
 military adviser, undertook personally to command all the Con- 
 federate detachments from Richmond; while General Scott, 
 under President Lincoln, directed the Federal forces from 
 Washington. 
 
 The strategic importance of Manassas was due to the roads 
 and railways converging and passing near there. An advance 
 against Richmond by way of the Chesapeake Bay was not, as 
 yet, seriously feared, as it would require stronger naval co- 
 operation than the little navy of the United States was then 
 equal to. Any advance of Union forces was expected to be 
 made overland from Washington; and Manassas lay directly 
 between the two main roads leading from that city to Rich- 
 mond — one by way of Alexandria and Fredericksburg; the 
 other by way of Warrenton, and thence through Culpeper 
 [Fairfax] or Fredericksburg. The main line of railway from 
 Washington to the Southern States, and also to Richmond, was 
 joined at Manassas by a shorter line from the lower Shenan- 
 doah Valley. This branch line, it was foreseen, could be used 
 quickly to unite the armies of Beauregard and Johnston, in the 
 directiorreither of Manassas or Winchester, as circumstances 
 required. It was also the line by which Johnston's army com- 
 municated with the Confederate base at Richmond. Beaure- 
 gard's position at Manassas guarded this line. 
 
 Occoquan Creek covered the right flank of the Confederate 
 position at Manassas, and Bull Run ran in front of it. (70) 
 This stream, although it had many regular crossings, and could 
 probably have been forded at many other points during the 
 summer, was, nevertheless, a "formidable obstacle" to cross in 
 the face of a hostile army. Its banks were generally high and 
 wooded. It was more difficult below the Stone Bridge (on 
 Warrenton Pike) than it was above that point. (67) There 
 was little danger of an overland movement against Richmond 
 to the east of the Alexandria-Fredericksburg road, on account 
 of the difficult streams that would have to be crossed; still 
 Holmes's command at Aquia had an eye on that region. Nor 
 did the Shenandoah Valley offer a good route. The roads up 
 that valley from the Potomac led rather away from the direc- 
 
The First Battle of Bull Run. 133 
 
 tion of Richmond, and the valley was closed on the east by the 
 Blue Ridge Mountains, which could be crossed only at a few 
 passes, or "gaps" as they are called there. These gaps could 
 easily be guarded by the Confederates, and could be used by 
 them to fall upon the flank or rear of any hostile column that 
 might pass up the Valley. The Shenandoah Valley offered a 
 better route for a Confederate invasion of Maryland and 
 Pennsylvania, and, as we shall see, was later made use of by 
 General Lee for that purpose. The position of Johnston's 
 army, besides menacing the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, the 
 main line of communication between Washington and the 
 West, threatened such an invasion, and also guarded the Val- 
 ley against a hostile advance. In fact the main purpose of 
 Johnston's force and Patterson's, at that time, appears to have 
 been to keep each other from doing anything. We shall see 
 hereafter which force succeeded. 
 
 In reluctant response to the cry of the people and the press 
 for a forward movement, General Scott called upon McDowell 
 to submit a plan of operations. This McDowell did on the 
 24th of June. The plan proposed "to turn the enemy's position 
 and force him out of it by seizing or threatening his communi- 
 cations."* The plan counted upon Patterson and Butler to 
 "contain" the Confederates in their fronts, and estimated that 
 Beauregard would still receive reinforcements enough to raise 
 his army to about 35,000. So McDowell reckoned that he 
 must have "a force of 30,000 of all arms, with a reserve of 
 10,000." 
 
 His plan was approved, and he was ordered "to carry it into 
 effect July the 8th." Owing, however, to delays, it was not 
 until the 16th July that his army was raised to the strength 
 agreed upon. Not until about this time was his army organ- 
 ized into brigades. As finally organized, it consisted of five 
 infantry divisions. The First Division, under Tyler, contained 
 four brigades under Keyes, Schenck, W. T. Sherman, and 
 Richardson ; the Second Division, under Hunter, contained two 
 brigades under Andrew Porter and Burnside ; the Third Divi- 
 sion, under Heintzelman, contained three brigades under 
 Franklin, Willcox and Howard; the Fourth Division, under 
 Runyon, contained nine regiments not brigaded ; and the Fifth 
 Division, under Dixon S. Miles, contained two brigades under 
 Blenker and Davies. There were forty-nine guns and seven 
 troops of regular cavalry. Eight companies of infantry, under 
 
 *Battles and Leaders — Fry. 
 
134 American Campaigns. 
 
 Major Sykes, and seven of the batteries were also of the regu- 
 lar army; and there was one small battalion of marines. The 
 army aggregated about 35,000 men. Runyon's division was 
 held back to guard the road in rear of the army, and took no 
 part in the battle of Bull Run. 
 
 General Fry in his account of the battle says: "Northern 
 enthusiasm was unbounded. 'On to Richmond' was the war- 
 cry. Public sentiment was irresistible, and in response to it 
 the army advanced. It was a glorious spectacle. The various 
 regiments were brilliantly uniformed according to the aesthetic 
 taste of peace, and the silken banners they flung to the breeze 
 were unsoiled and untorn."* 
 
 Through his spies in Washington Beauregard was informed 
 of the contemplated advance ; he reported it to Richmond. On 
 the 17th of July he wired that McDowell's army had started. 
 By telegraph President Davis immediately ordered Johnston 
 and Holmes to reinforce Beauregard with their effective 
 forces ; and he sent him troops from Richmond. 
 
 Johnston had taken command of the Confederate force in the 
 Shenandoah Valley at Harper's Ferry; but he soon had seen 
 that this place was in a pocket, surrounded by hills and com- 
 manded by Maryland Heights on the north bank of the Poto- 
 mac, and that it was untenable. He, therefore, withdrew his 
 command to Winchester. Then Patterson crossed the Poto- 
 mac, and, after a good deal of indecisive moving about, and 
 the receipt of many telegrams from General Scott urging the 
 necessity of his preventing Johnston from quitting the Valley 
 and going to Beauregard's aid, he advanced as far as Bunker 
 Hill, within nine miles of Winchester. He was deceived in the 
 size of Johnston's force, and believed it to be 35,000 strong ;f 
 it was, in truth, not more than two-thirds the strength of his 
 own. 
 
 (68) On the 17th of July Patterson withdrew to Charles- 
 town ; the next day Johnston started his army, about 9,000 
 effectives, by way of Ashby's Gap to Piedmont. Here he placed 
 his infantry in railway cars ; and by the afternoon of the 20th 
 had joined Beauregard with the bulk of his army. The move- 
 ment had been so completely masked by Stuart with his little 
 command of cavalry that it was not suspected by Patterson 
 until July the 20th4 
 
 *B. 6- L. 
 
 fPatterson's telegram to General Scott, July 18. 
 
 flmboden in B. & L. Nicolay in Scribner's Series. 
 
The First Battle of Bull Run. 135 
 
 Beauregard had withdrawn his detachment from Leesburg. 
 His army, called the Army of the Potomac, consisted of six 
 and a half brigades, and he had thus disposed them behind 
 Bull Run: (69) At Union Mills Ford, about six miles in a 
 straight line from the Stone Bridge, EwelFs brigade; at Mc- 
 Lean's Ford, D. R. Jones's brigade; at Blackburn's Ford, 
 Longstreet's brigade; at Mitchell's Ford, Bonham's brigade. 
 Evans's half-brigade held the Stone Bridge on Warrenton 
 Pike; and Cocke's brigade covered the fords between the 
 Stone Bridge and Bonham's left. Early's brigade was placed 
 as a support in rear ; as were, also, Holmes's, when it came up, 
 and the brigades of Jackson, Bee, and Bartow, of Johnston's 
 Army of the Shenandoah.* It is evident from these disposi- 
 tions that Beauregard expected McDowell to try to cross the 
 creek by the fords to the east of the Stone Bridge ; this was 
 McDowell's original purpose, but he decided later that the 
 creek and the close country in that quarter were too difficult. 
 General Johnston ranked Beauregard, and upon his arrival on 
 the ground fell into command of the Confederate forces. He, 
 however, approved all of Beauregard's arrangements, and vir- 
 tually waived his right of command. 
 
 (68) Meantime the Union army was on its way from Alex- 
 andria. It had started on the afternoon of July the 16th. On 
 the morning of the 18th it was concentrated at Centreville, 
 about twenty miles from the Potomac and four miles east of 
 the Stone Bridge. The Confederate outposts and advance 
 detachments had fallen back before it. 
 
 (69) From Centreville the Warrenton Turnpike leads al- 
 most west; and there were earthen roads leading to all the 
 fords of Bull Run held by the Confederates, as well as to other 
 crossings farther to the east. The distance from Centreville 
 to Union Mills Ford, the right of Beauregard's line, was about 
 six miles. Centreville is on an elevation from which the 
 ground slopes in all directions. Between the town and Bull 
 Run the country is cut up by small streams, and covered with 
 farms and thick woods. The woods furnished good cover for 
 troops. McDowell had to wait at Centreville for his trains to 
 come up. On the morning of the 18th he ordered Tyler, whose 
 division was in the lead, to "observe well the roads to Bull Run 
 and to Warrenton. Do not," his order read, "bring on an 
 engagement, but keep up the impression that we are moving on 
 Manassas." 
 
 ♦Beauregard in B. & L. 
 
136 American Campaigns. 
 
 (70) Tyler moved out on the road to Mitchell's and Black- 
 burn's Fords. At the stream he encountered Bonham's and 
 Longstreet's brigades reinforced by Early's. He opened fire 
 on the Confederates with artillery, and sent forward two regi- 
 ments of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and two field-pieces 
 into the thick woods along the creek. The Confederates on the 
 other bank returned the fire of these troops at short range, and 
 drove them back in disorder. This first affair, small as it was, 
 greatly encouraged the Confederates, and had a depressing 
 effect upon McDowell's army. "The regiment which suffered 
 most was completely demoralized."* 
 
 (69) Tyler's experience on the 18th confirmed McDowell 
 in his opinion, that with his raw troops — their average length 
 of service was sixty days- — he could not force a crossing of 
 Bull Run in front of Beauregard's army. The 19th and 20th 
 he spent at Centreville completing the concentration of his 
 "loosely organized force,"f while his engineers examined the 
 position of the enemy, and the stream and adjacent country. 
 The reports of the engineers decided him to turn Beauregard's 
 left, and then, "if possible, destroy the railway connecting him 
 with Johnston in the Valley." He was not then aware that 
 Johnston had already joined Beauregard. 
 
 Miles's division, with Richardson's brigade of Tyler's divi- 
 sion and a strong force of artillery, was to remain in reserve 
 at Centreville, and to threaten Blackburn's Ford. The rest of 
 Tyler's division, which was in advance on the turnpike, was to 
 march at 2.30 a.m., on the 21st of July, and make the "sec- 
 ondary attack" at daybreak, by way of the Stone Bridge. It 
 was to be accompanied by four batteries of artillery of the 
 regular army. Hunter's division, followed by Heintzelman's, 
 was to march on the pike to a point two miles west of Centre- 
 ville, there to take a road through the woods to the right, cross 
 Bull Run at Sudley Springs, and move down upon the flank 
 and rear of the enemy. Five batteries, twenty-four guns in all, 
 were to go with this column, the whole under General McDow- 
 ell's personal command. This "main attack," together with 
 Tyler's, was expected to force the left of Beauregard's army 
 away from the Stone Bridge. Then Tyler was to cross and 
 join in the main attack. 
 
 No resistance was anticipated at Sudley Springs, and none 
 
 *Fry in B. & L. 
 fRopes. 
 
The First Battle of Bull Run. 137 
 
 was encountered. But this ford was not reached until 
 after nine o'clock, instead of at seven as was calculated. The 
 turning column had been blocked on the pike for two or 
 three hours by Tyler's division, which was slow in getting 
 started. 
 
 (71) Tyler's first gun was fired about half after five 
 o'clock ; but his attack was pushed with so little vigor, and the 
 turning movement was so long delayed, that Evans, who com- 
 manded the Confederates at the Stone Bridge, suspected that 
 Tyler's was not the main attack. His suspicions were con- 
 firmed by a courier from a picket at Sudley Springs, and by a 
 "wig-wag" message from Beauregard's signal-officer, Captain 
 E. P. Alexander.* (69) Leaving four of his companies and 
 two pieces of artillery to defend the bridge, and sending word 
 to Cocke, the nearest brigade commander on his right, Evans 
 marched the rest of his command — eleven companies and two 
 guns* — to the left and rear, and took up a position on high 
 ground about three-quarters of a mile north of Warrenton 
 Pike. (71) His left rested on the Manassas-Sudley road. 
 Here Evans's command was met by Burnside's brigade at the 
 head of Hunter's division about ten o'clock. 
 
 (69) When Beauregard learned through his scouts, before 
 daybreak, that the Federals were advancing on Warrenton Pike, 
 not suspecting that they purposed turning his flank by way 
 of Sudley Springs, but supposing they meant to attack him 
 by way of the Stone Bridge, he issued orders, at half after five 
 o'clock, for the left of his line, Evans and Cocke, to hold the 
 bridge, and for his center and right to "advance and vigorously 
 attack the Federal left and rear at Centreville."f About seven 
 o'clock he ordered Jackson's brigade, with Imboden's and 
 Walton's batteries, to the left to support Cocke ; he also started 
 Bee's and Bartow's brigades, under Bee's command, to support 
 the left. 
 
 The order to Ewell somehow miscarried; and, as his bri- 
 gade was to lead in the movement on Centreville, none of the 
 others advanced. By half-past ten Beauregard received word 
 that his center and right had not advanced. By that time "the 
 firing on the left began to increase so intensely as to indicate 
 a severe attack" in that quarter. Beauregard appears not yet 
 to have suspected that the enemy had actually turned his left ; 
 
 *Memoirs of a Confederate — E. P. Alexander. 
 fBeauregard in B. & L. 
 
138 American Campaigns. 
 
 but judging "that they were making too much progress against 
 his left at the Stone Bridge, for his movement against Centre- 
 ville to succeed," he ordered "Ewell, Jones, and Longstreet to 
 make a strong demonstration all along their front on the other 
 side of the Run." He ordered the brigades of Holmes and 
 Early, and two of Bonham's regiments, and six pieces of artil- 
 lery, "to move swiftly to the left." He and General Johnston 
 "set out at full speed for the point of conflict."* 
 
 (71) Upon finding Evans blocking his path, Burnside had 
 promptly formed a regiment in line of battle and attacked. f 
 Evans repulsed this attack and pursued his assailants. Other 
 regiments came forward one after another and were repulsed. £ 
 Then Porter's brigade came up to support Burnside. But 
 Evans maintained his position alone for more than an hour. 
 Then Bee, with his own and Bartow's brigades, came forward 
 and formed on his line; and Imboden's battery from Henry 
 House Hill lent its aid. 
 
 The leading regiments of Heintzelman's division had come 
 up and prolonged the Federal line to the right. Part of both 
 hostile lines was in the wood and part in the open fields. At 
 some points the lines were within a hundred yards of each 
 other. For another hour or more the Confederates held their 
 ground. Meantime Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division had 
 crossed the Run by a ford a mile or more above the Stone 
 Bridge, and formed on the left of the Union line. Thus en- 
 veloped on their right, and having suffered severely, the Con- 
 federates at last gave way, and fled in confusion across Young's 
 Branch. 
 
 (72) In the angle south of the turnpike is the end of a 
 commanding ridge called the Henry House Hill, generally level 
 on top, and some 200 yards across. The direction of the pla- 
 teau is oblique to both the turnpike and the road which inter- 
 sect here at right-angles. Gentle slopes led down from it to 
 the valley of Young's Branch; but they were cut up by little 
 ravines, and partly covered with patches of young pines. Upon 
 the northwestern brow of the plateau stood the Henry House ; 
 and 600 yards northeast of it, on a projecting spur, was the 
 Robinson House surrounded by dense trees and shrubbery. 
 Neither of these houses had any defensive strength. Around 
 the eastern and southeastern borders of the plateau was a thick 
 
 ♦Beauregard in B. & L. 
 fFry in B. & L. 
 {Alexander. 
 
The First Battle of Bull Run. 139 
 
 fringe of young pines,* which merged into a dense oak wood. 
 This wood was considerable in extent, and lay on both sides 
 of the Manassas-Sudley road. 
 
 In the edge of the pines along the eastern brow of the pla- 
 teau Jackson, who had marched to the sound of the firing, had 
 formed his brigade just in time to support Imboden's battery, 
 which, badly cut to pieces, was withdrawing from the fight. 
 The routed infantry of Bee and Bartow and Evans also rallied 
 on Jackson's line. It was at this juncture that Bee reanimated 
 his own men by pointing to Jackson's brigade, "standing," 
 as he said, "like a stone wall." Bee died that day, but his words 
 will live for ever. 
 
 Beauregard and Johnston were now on the ground. Beau- 
 regard took personal ' charge of the troops, and Johnston rode 
 back to headquarters at the Lewis house for the purpose of 
 hastening forward such reinforcements as he thought it safe to 
 withdraw from the fords. 
 
 It was now about two o'clock. General McDowell was pres- 
 ent in direct command of the Federal lines. He determined to 
 follow up the routed Confederates and assault them on the 
 Henry House Hill. He had allowed Burnside to withdraw his 
 brigade on the plea of fatigue; but he still had available for 
 the attack the brigades of Porter, Franklin, Willcox, and 
 Sherman, a squadron of regular cavalry, and four batteries of 
 artillery. Tyler, with Keyes's brigade of his division, had 
 crossed at the ford taken by Sherman; but, after a feeble ad- 
 vance up the slope towards the Robinson house, he "marched 
 down Young's Branch, out of sight of the enemy, and took no 
 further part in the engagement. "f Schenck's brigade and 
 Tyler's artillery were still on the other side of Bull Run. How- 
 ard's brigade, which had been left back on the road to guard 
 the rear of the turning column, had not come up.J McDowell 
 had 10,000 or 11,000 men with whom to assault the hill ; Beau- 
 regard had 6,500 infantry on the spot, thirteen pieces of artil- 
 lery, and Stuart's squadron of cavalry, with which to defend it. 
 
 The Federals advanced across the valley of Young's Branch, 
 and up the northern and western slopes of the hill. There they 
 encountered the fire of the Confederates. They pushed out be- 
 yond the Henry House, and the fighting on the plateau became 
 fierce. The Union batteries of Ricketts and Griffin, with the 
 
 ♦Beauregard in B. & L. 
 fFry in B. & L. 
 {Alexander. 
 
140 American Campaigns. 
 
 Fire Zouaves for support, were sent forward and planted near 
 the Henry House, within musket-shot of the woods to the 
 south. Stuart with his squadron was guarding the Confed- 
 erate left. Filing through the fences on Bald Hill he charged 
 the Zouaves.* At about the same time the 33rd Virginia in- 
 fantry charged from the woods at the south. This regiment 
 was taken for Union troops by the artillery commander ; before 
 it was recognized it had opened fire at close range, shooting 
 down two officers, about forty men, and seventy-five horses, 
 and hastening the flight of the Zouaves. Only three guns of 
 the batteries escaped. But Federal regiments kept on coming 
 forward one after another, renewing their line and extending it 
 to the right, up and beyond the Manassas-Sudley road. The 
 33rd Virginia was driven back, and the captured batteries were 
 recovered. 
 
 The battle surged backward and forward across the plateau ; 
 the two batteries were taken and retaken again and again. The 
 Confederates would advance into the open, only to be driven 
 back to the cover of the pines, but there the Union line would 
 be stopped again. Howard's brigade joined in the contest 
 about 3 p.m., but without materially changing the situation. 
 The struggle on the plateau kept up without a decision till near 
 four o'clock ; then the Confederates received reinforcements, 
 which turned the day to their account. Early's brigade, which 
 had come up from the lower fords, and Kirby Smith's brigade 
 of Johnston's army, had arrived on the field. Kirby Smith's 
 had reached Manassas by the cars, and marched at once to 
 the battle. These fresh troops, and with them a battery, came 
 into the engagement far out on the left of the Confederate line, 
 thus enveloping the right flank of the Federals. Beauregard 
 pressed his enemy in front. The effect was decisive. The Fed- 
 eral soldiers, without any show of panic, simply broke ranks and 
 started home in spite of all the efforts of their officers to stop 
 them. The troops, for the most part, retired by the roads over 
 which they had come. Sykes's battalion of infantry and Pal- 
 mer's squadron of cavalry, both of the regular army, stanchly 
 covered the rear. 
 
 By six o'clock there was not a Union soldier, but the dead, 
 the wounded, and the captives, on the south side of Bull Run. 
 "There was no panic, in the ordinary meaning of the word, 
 until the retiring soldiers, guns, wagons, congressmen, and 
 
 *Ropes. Henderson. Beauregard in B. &• L. 
 
The First Battle of Bull Run. 141 
 
 carriages were fired upon on the road east of Bull Run. Then 
 the panic began." (69) A Confederate battery had got a 
 position commanding the bridge over, Cub Run on the turn- 
 pike. A wagon was upset on this bridge, blocking the way for 
 other vehicles ; this caused utter confusion.* 
 
 Stuart pursued with his squadron by the Sudley Springs 
 road; Radford's squadron crossed at Ball's Ford and struck 
 the fleeing masses on Warrenton Pike. But neither of these 
 cavalry forces was strong enough to do decisive harm. In 
 fact, no effective pursuit was made by the Confederates. The 
 brigades of Holmes and Ewell had reached the scene, and 
 might have been sent in pursuit; but just then Beauregard re- 
 ceived a false report that a large Union force was moving 
 against his depot at Manassas. So he sent these two brigades 
 in that direction.f On the Confederate right Longstreet had 
 four regiments, and Bonham had three, which had not fired a 
 shot. About half after five these generals received orders to 
 advance upon Centreville and cut off the Union retreat by way 
 of the Stone Bridge. Through Longstreet's "superfluous cau- 
 tion," and Bonham's whimsical stickling for the right of senior- 
 ity, and then his hesitancy in assuming its responsibilities, this 
 order was practically "ignored and disobeyed" ; and the Union 
 army got away. "Never did an enemy make a cleaner escape, 
 out of such an exposed position, after such an utter rout," 
 says General Alexander.! 
 
 Miles's Federal division in reserve at Centreville, and Rich- 
 ardson's brigade near the lower fords, behaved well ; and they 
 formed a "steady and trustworthy rear-guard to the army after 
 it had passed Centreville" in its retreat.§ 
 
 "When McDowell left the battle-field his intention and or- 
 ders were to rally at Centreville."1f He reached that place by 
 sunset, but he knew before then that "the mass of the army was 
 completely demoralized."* "The battalion of regular infantry 
 under Major Sykes," says Ropes, "was wholly unaffected by 
 the general demoralization.'^ Rhodes says "The battalion of 
 regular infantry alone obeyed commands. It covered the vol- 
 
 *Fry in B. & L. 
 fBeauregard in B. & L. 
 ^Alexander. 
 §Ropes. 
 
 fNicolay. 
 
142 American Campaigns. 
 
 unteers' retreat, which became a rout and then a panic."* The 
 beaten troops never stopped until they reached the Potomac 
 that night. The soldiers of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divi- 
 sions, undisciplined and unseasoned, had fought a battle and 
 and marched forty-five miles in less than thirty-six hoursf 
 
 The Federal loss in the battle of Bull Run, or, as it is called 
 at the South, the battle of Manassas, was as follows: killed, 
 460; wounded, 1,124; captured or missing, 1,312; total, 2,896. 
 The Confederate loss was as follows: killed, 387; wounded, 
 1,582 ; captured or missing, 13 ; total, 1,982. Among the casual- 
 ties on the Federal side Hunter, Heintzelman and Willcox 
 were wounded ; on the Confederate side Bee and Bartow were 
 killed; Jackson and Kirby Smith wounded. 
 
 The Confederates, now under command of Johnston, set up 
 their camps and intrenched them on the heights at Centreville. 
 Soon they pushed their outposts almost to the bank of the 
 Potomac, "flaunting their flag within view of the capital of 
 the Nation.''^ 
 
 Comments. 
 
 As an example of political strategy, seldom has a greater 
 mistake been made in history than that made by the Confed- 
 erate government when it ordered the bombardment of Fort 
 Sumter. Up to that time the opinion and the sentiment of 
 the Northern States were divided along party lines upon the 
 question of a State's right to secede, and the Government's 
 right to coerce a seceded State. 
 
 Four months had passed since the first State had withdrawn 
 from the Union, more than a month of which was under Mr. 
 Lincoln's Administration ; yet no active step had been taken by 
 the Government to reduce the seceding States. The longer 
 secession were allowed to stand unpunished the sooner it 
 would come to be recognized as an accomplished fact. If the 
 United States were not going to do anything to suppress the 
 rebellion foreign governments would not long withhold their 
 recognition. The right policy of the seceded States was cer- 
 tainly to keep at peace with the Union as long as possible. 
 Sooner or later even the people of the other States would have 
 
 *History of the U. S.—J. F. Rhodes. 
 
 fFry in B. & L. 
 
 jSwinton. 
 
The First Battle of Bull Run. 143 
 
 become used to a Southern Confederacy. There is strength 
 in the status quo. 
 
 But everything changed in an instant with the firing on 
 Fort Sumter. That the flag of the country and a helpless little 
 garrison within a fort belonging to the Nation should be fired 
 upon, and the commander made to surrender simply because 
 the Government was going to send him food for his men, was 
 regarded as such a National insult and outrage that it com- 
 pletely overshadowed every other sentiment and feeling in 
 the Northern States. It welded the people into a solid mass 
 against the Confederacy and aroused among them an enthu- 
 siasm that expressed itself in the alacrity with which the 
 President's call for volunteers was answered. 
 
 That was the hour of all others in the history of the Nation 
 when all loyal persons must have wished that Washington's 
 injunction, to prepare for war in time of peace, had been 
 heeded. About 30,000 disciplined soldiers within call, and a 
 navy strong enough effectually to close the Southern ports, 
 would have done in a few months, at small cost of life and 
 treasure, what it took four years, thousands of lives, and un- 
 counted billions of dollars to do. It may be asked if some of 
 the soldiers and ships might not have gone over to the seceding 
 States ; the answer is, no. Enlisted men could not resign, and 
 virtually none deserted to "go South." In the navy compara- 
 tively few officers resigned. 
 
 In the hasty mobilization and organization of its raw troops 
 the Confederate government exhibited a better military system 
 than the Government at Washington did. This was to be ex- 
 pected, for Mr. Davis was himself an educated soldier. A 
 graduate of the Military Academy, he had served seven years 
 in the regular army, first in the infantry and then in the 
 dragoons ; he had commanded a volunteer regiment in Taylor's 
 campaign in Mexico ; and had then served as Secretary of 
 War; while Mr. Lincoln had practically had no experience of 
 military affairs. Davis was officially, probably personally, ac- 
 quainted with most of the higher officers of the "Old Army" ; 
 he was, accordingly, able to make good selections for command 
 at the start, from those that resigned to "go South." Hence 
 we find that there were more Confederate than Union officers 
 in the first battle who afterwards became distinguished.* 
 
 Mr. Davis had the trained soldier's horror of committing the 
 
 ♦Lecture by Major Swift. 
 
144 American Campaigns. 
 
 lives of men, and the fortunes of the army and the country, in 
 war, to the charge of men that knew nothing whatever of sol- 
 diering and the business of war. Hence he intrusted no im- 
 portant commands to such men as Butler and Banks; able 
 politicians, no doubt, but perfectly incompetent as commanders 
 of troops. No citizen soldier, without previous military educa- 
 tion or training, was given a higher command than a brigade in 
 the Southern army until he had learned to command by actual 
 practice and had proved his fitness. 
 
 McDowell's army of 35,000 was the largest field army that 
 had ever been assembled on the Continent; yet it was not 
 organized into higher units than a regiment, until just before it 
 started on its forward movement. It was then organized into 
 five divisions, thirteen brigades ; but only three of the divisions, 
 and none of the brigades, were commanded by general-officers. 
 The rest were commanded by field-officers. The staffs were 
 all incomplete. The Confederate army, on the other hand, 
 was composed of eleven brigades, seven of which were com- 
 manded by general-officers. The brigade-commanders had 
 fairly complete staffs.* 
 
 Serious or prolonged hostilities were not anticipated by either 
 of the governments. Mr. Davis ordered 10,000 small-arms, 
 only, in Europe at the start; while Mr. Lincoln's first call for 
 volunteers was for three months' service. Such a short term 
 proved disastrous. We have seen that it was the main reason 
 for hurrying McDowell forward, before his army was fit to 
 take the field. One of the regiments and a battery claimed 
 their discharge on the very day of the battle, and "marched to 
 the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon." 
 
 (67) The critics are not wholly agreed as to where to 
 place the blame for Patterson's mismanagement in the Shenan- 
 doah Valley. General Scott plainly made known to Patterson 
 that his duty was to detain Johnston in the Valley while Mc- 
 Dowell moved against Beauregard. He also indicated his be- 
 lief that Patterson outnumbered Johnston and should attack 
 him. He, however, left Patterson to choose his own way. If 
 Patterson had understood the business of command he would 
 have needed no further instructions. The mistake General 
 Scott made, was in not withdrawing Patterson's force and 
 joining it to McDowell's before letting the advance against 
 Beauregard begin. The military mistake the President made, 
 
 *Lecture by Major Swift. 
 
The First Battle of Bull Ruy. 145 
 
 however necessary it may have been politically, was in not re- 
 lieving Patterson. Reinforced by Patterson's 12,000 or 15,000 
 effectives, McDowell would almost surely have won the day 
 at Bull Run. 
 
 (69) McDowell's staying at Centreville, the 19th and 20th 
 of July, was fatal. Had he made his attack on the 19th, he 
 would have caught Beauregard's army before the arrival of 
 Holmes, or Johnston, or the troops from Richmond. The 
 brigades of Jackson, Bee, and Bartow, of Johnston's army, 
 composed the bulk of the Confederate force on Henry House 
 Hill, and did the bulk of the fighting; and Kirby Smith's brig- 
 ade arrived in time to decide the fate of the day. Stuart's 
 cavalry and Imboden's battery, which played a decisive part 
 on the Confederate side, also belonged to Johnston's Army of 
 the Shenandoah. 
 
 We have seen that McDowell's plan of attack was based 
 upon two false premises; namely, that McDowell would have 
 Beauregard's army alone to deal with ; and that, by getting 
 possession of the Manassas Gap railway in Beauregard's rear,, 
 he would place his army between those of Beauregard and 
 Johnston. 
 
 Believing, as he did, that Bull Run could be crossed only at 
 the Stone Bridge and a few fords, all but one of which were 
 held by the enemy, McDowell's plan involved the risk of 
 having his army split in two by a formidable obstacle. The 
 success of his project depended upon his rolling up the left 
 flank of the enemy and clearing the way for his own wings to> 
 unite by way of the Stone Bridge. Suppose that he had suc- 
 ceeded in this ; his plan further involved the hazard of forming 
 his line of battle parallel to Warrenton Pike, his line of retreat ; 
 or with its back to the stream ; or with its face to the rear. But 
 a general must always take some risk. As the battle was. 
 actually fought the Union line faced approximately to the rear. 
 
 (71) Evans's action in quitting the Stone Bridge with the 
 larger part of his command, and placing it across the path of 
 the Union turning column, showed quick decision and soldierly 
 qualities. He would have shown better judgment, however, 
 if he had placed his troops on the Henry House Hill at first, 
 instead of waiting to be driven back to it. 
 
 As has so often happened in combined movements the at- 
 tacks of the different Union columns were not well timed. 
 Tyler's "secondary attack" at the bridge began before six 
 o'clock ; while the turning column did not reach Sudley Springs 
 
146 . American Campaigns. 
 
 Ford till nine. It was expected to be there about seven. This 
 discrepancy gave Beauregard time to dispatch the brigades 
 of Jackson, Bee, and Bartow to the left of his line, and caused 
 the battle to be fought on the Henry House Hill. Otherwise 
 Evans's unaided troops would quickly have been driven off, 
 and the way would have been cleared for Tyler's division to 
 cross the bridge ; and the battle might have taken place farther 
 south on the Manassas-Sudley road; possibly on the timbered 
 hills near New Market. 
 
 (69) The tardiness of the turning column was due to two 
 causes. First, the arrangements for starting from Centreville 
 were not properly made. Tyler's division, which was to have 
 the right of way, was not camped all together. Two brigades 
 were west of the village, and one was two miles back on the 
 road, east of the village. It was this rear brigade that blocked 
 the way and caused the delay. It ought to have bivouacked 
 with the rest of the division, west of the village. Second, the 
 road round by Sudley Springs was found to be much longer 
 than had been expected. 
 
 (71) In the attack Heintzelman's division deployed on the 
 right of Hunter's, and prolonged the Federal line down and 
 west of the Masasses-Sudley road. The effect of this was to 
 carry the line farther and farther from the Stone Bridge, by 
 which Tyler's division was expected to join. Two of Tyler's 
 brigades actually came into the field by a ford; but his other 
 brigade, and his batteries, did not cross at all. The extension 
 to the right also threw the right flank "in the air" ; and faced 
 the line almost to the original rear, with its back towards the 
 railway by which it was known that Johnston's army might 
 approach. McDowell ought to have put in Heintzelman's 
 division on the left of Hunter's, and developed his line towards 
 Bull Run.* 
 
 The attack was badly made from every tactical point of view. 
 Instead of setting up his headquarters somewhere in rear, and 
 directing his army as a whole, McDowell was at the very front, 
 in the thick of the battle, scarcely exercising any influence on 
 the action beyond the sound of his voice. Instead of com- 
 manding the army he simply led the few regiments close at 
 hand. Brigades and regiments followed one after another 
 into the fight without any sort of order or concert of action. 
 The continued extension to the right was made not with any 
 
 ♦Major Swift's Lecture. 
 
The First Battle of Bull Run. 147 
 
 well-formed purpose of enveloping the Confederate left ; appar- 
 ently the line deployed in that direction simply because, topo- 
 graphically, it was the line of least resistance. The assaults 
 were all straight to the front ; there was no real effort to make 
 a flank attack. (69) McDowell did not summon his reserves 
 from Centreville only four miles distant— nearer to the Henry 
 House Hill than any of Beauregard's brigades, except Cocke's, 
 were, at the beginning of the day. He did not call Schenck's 
 brigade and the batteries with it across the Run, though the 
 way over the Stone Bridge was open. He never ordered back 
 into the line Burnside's brigade which had withdrawn before 
 noon to rest. He did not put Howard's brigade into the line 
 until after three o'clock. (72) He lost all touch with Tyler, 
 and let him keep Keyes's brigade idle under cover of Young's 
 Branch throughout the engagement. Beauregard was con- 
 stantly in fear of attack on his right flank by Tyler; that is 
 what ought to have taken place.* 
 
 Beauregard, too, played the role more of a leader of troops 
 than of an army commander ; but, fortunately for his side, he 
 had an able assistant in General Johnston, who directed his re- 
 inforcements from the rear. 
 
 Out of McDowell's army of 35,000 men only 18,500 crossed 
 Bull Run ; of these the brigades of Burnside and Keyes took no 
 part at the critical time. Beauregard had nearly 32,000 ef- 
 fectives available, but put only 18,000 into the battle. This 
 was bad management on the part of both of these generals. f 
 In fact a careful study of the battle of Bull Run points the 
 student to only two general-officers who displayed a knowledge 
 of the tactical handling of their commands, or of the tactical 
 employment of the ground. Those two were Sherman on the 
 Union side, and Stonewall Jackson on the Confederate side. 
 Sherman found a ford and led his brigade across it, and against 
 the flank of Bee's line ; Jackson instead of putting his line on 
 the edge of Henry House Hill towards the enemy, put it in 
 the fringe of pines on the edge of the open plateau farthest 
 from the enemy. The choice of this strong position, and 
 McDowell's failure to take it in flank, enabled the Confederates 
 to hold out against greatly superior numbers for nearly four 
 hours, and made their victory possible. But the student must 
 not wonder that only two of the generals knew their business ; 
 he should rather wonder that there were as many as two. A 
 
 *Major Swift's Lecture. 
 tS. & L. 
 
148 American Campaigns. 
 
 man can learn how to command bodies of men only by com- 
 manding them. He must study the theory — learn how others 
 have commanded — then himself have practice. Until that 21st 
 of July not a general upon the field had ever commanded as 
 many as 500 men in battle or in peace maneuver. 
 
 Only Stonewall Jackson, too, of all the Confederate gener- 
 als, appears fully to have appreciated the importance of pur- 
 suing and destroying the beaten enemy. "Give me 5,000 fresh 
 men, and I will be in Washington City to-morrow morning," 
 he cried to President Davis. But Mr. Davis and Generals 
 Johnston and Beauregard were content to spend the three 
 hours of daylight after the battle riding about the battle-field, 
 strewn with its dead and wounded, instead of bending every 
 effort to organize a prompt and vigorous pursuit with every 
 available man.* 
 
 The army of McDowell ought to have contained a brigade 
 of cavalry ; it had only seven little troops, and they were mostly 
 split up into small details. The Confederates had 1,800 horse- 
 men, but they, also, were frittered away upon orderly duty, at 
 the rate of at least two troops to each brigade of infantry. 
 With the exception of Stuart's charge on the Fire Zouaves, 
 and Radford's on the fugitives at Cub Run, the performance 
 of the cavalry in this battle was insignificant. If Beauregard's 
 cavalry had been doing its proper duty before the battle, recon- 
 noitering, and covering the flanks and front of his army, it 
 would have given him timely warning of the Federal turning 
 movement. Indeed it might have delayed that movement sev- 
 eral hours north of Sudley Springs. If, at the same time, the 
 Federal column had been preceded by a mounted force, as it 
 should have been, a cavalry combat would have taken place 
 before the column reached the ford. Instead of being out on 
 one of the flanks of Beauregard's army, Stuart's squadron, 
 before the battle, was guarding a piece of the creek between 
 two infantry brigades, opposite a dense wood, where there does 
 not appear to have been a ford. 
 
 This was the first military campaign in which railways 
 played a conspicuous part. Not only were they used by both 
 sides in concentrating their forces before the battle; but the 
 Manassas Gap Railway also brought Confederate troops to 
 the field during the battle; and this circumstance gave vic- 
 tory to the Southern arms. 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
The First Battle of Bull Run. 149 
 
 In his critical and informing Memoirs General Alexander 
 directs attention to two examples of the wrong method of 
 issuing orders, in connection with this campaign, and their se- 
 rious consequences, which serve as lessons to the student of 
 the military art. The first was President Davis's telegram to 
 Johnston directing him to take his army to aid Beauregard 
 at Manassas. Johnston did the right thing ; but the two words, 
 "if practicable," in the telegram — a phrase which should never 
 appear in any military order — were the subject of a contro- 
 versy that never ceased until both Mr. Davis and General 
 Johnston were dead. The other was the order directing the 
 brigades of the Confederate right wing to advance on Centre- 
 ville. This order was not understood alike by the com- 
 manders that received it, and was not received at all by the 
 •commander that was to begin the movement. So the move- 
 ment was not made. The dunce that General Sedgwick kept 
 to read his orders, before he issued them, for the purpose of 
 seeing whether they were understandable, was an important 
 member of his staff. • 
 
LECTURE VIII. 
 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 
 
 (73) When the Southern States seceded and organized the 
 Confederacy, Kentucky, as stated in the last lecture, wavered 
 between Union and Secession. The governor was for Seces- 
 sion, but the legislature was for the Union. So the State, 
 which had been brought up in the school of compromise by her 
 greatest statesman, Henry Clay, compromised in this instance 
 by undertaking to remain neutral. 
 
 For a time the United States and the Confederacy appeared 
 tacitly to recognize the neutrality of her soil, while both re- 
 cruited regiments among her people. The first violation of her 
 neutrality was done by General Leonidas Polk, who, with a 
 Confederate force, occupied Columbus on the 3rd of Septem- 
 ber, 1861. Thereupon General Grant 3 with a National force, 
 occupied Paducah on the 5th September.* Henceforth Ken- 
 tucky's neutrality was not regarded. 
 
 As it was well known that a large part of the population of 
 Kentucky was in favor of Secession, the Confederate author- 
 ities were very loath to let go any part of the State ; so General 
 Albert Sidney Johnston was, in September, 1861, placed in 
 command of the Confederate forces in the West, whose task 
 was to hold Kentucky and Tennessee, and the Mississippi 
 River. He made Bowling Green his headquarters, and issued 
 a proclamation saying in effect that he would respect Ken- 
 tucky's neutrality and withdraw his army from her soil as soon 
 as he should be assured that the Union commanders would do 
 likewise.* His line stretched from Columbus to Cumberland 
 Gap. At Columbus, which was fortified, General Polk had, 
 in January, 1862, 12,000 effectives ;f and in the intrenched 
 camp at Bowling Green there were about 22,000 effectives.* 
 General Tilghman garrisoned Forts Henry and Donelson with 
 5,000 or 6,000 men. At Cumberland Gap there was a forti- 
 fied Confederate camp. Below Columbus the Mississippi was 
 guarded by two or three garrisoned forts. 
 
 Opposed to Johnston's Confederate forces General Buell had 
 
 *Life of General A. S. Johnston — W. Preston Johnston. 
 fLetter from Polk to Johnston, dated January 11, 1862. 
 
Forts Henry and Donelson. 151 
 
 a Union army of some 45,000, with headquarters at Louisville. 
 General Halleck was in chief command in Missouri ; his head- 
 quarters were at St. Louis, and his territorial department in- 
 cluded that part of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River. 
 The commands of these two generals were independent of each 
 other. At Cairo there was, also, a strong Union fleet of iron- 
 clad gunboats, under Commodore Foote. 
 
 Geography. 
 
 The geographical features of most importance from a stra- 
 tegical point of view in all this region were : first, the Tennessee 
 and Cumberland Rivers. The Tennessee was navigable from 
 its mouth, through western Kentucky and Tennessee, and into 
 the northern part of Alabama as far as the Muscle Shoals. 
 The Cumberland was navigable as far up as beyond Nashville. 
 
 In the east were the Cumberland Mountains, which could be 
 crossed only at certain passes, the most important of which 
 was Cumberland Gap. The East Tennessee and Georgia Rail- 
 way ran up through the valley of these mountains into Vir- 
 ginia : it was one of the main lines of communication between 
 the Confederate army operating in that State and the Gulf 
 States. At Chattanooga it connected with the Georgia Cen- 
 tral Railway, which led into the heart of Georgia ; and with the 
 Memphis and Charleston, which passed through Northern Ala- 
 bama and Mississippi to Memphis.- From Louisville the Louis- 
 ville and Nashville line went southward through Bowling 
 Green, 100 miles, to Nashville, seventy miles farther. From 
 Bowling Green the Memphis and Ohio passed through Clarks- 
 ville, sixty miles, and Paris and Humboldt, to Memphis, 250 
 miles. From Paris there was a branch to Columbus, making 
 Columbus, the left of Johnston's line, about 170 miles by rail 
 from Bowling Green, which was, in fact, the right of the line. 
 There was a double line directly from Humboldt into Missis- 
 sippi. From Nashville the Nashville and Decatur line led into 
 Alabama ; and the Nashville and Chattanooga connected Nash- 
 ville with the railway center at Chattanooga. 
 
 So long as Johnston could hold his line from Bowling Green 
 to Columbus he not only blocked the Cumberland, the Ten- 
 nessee, and the Mississippi Rivers against the advance of 
 Union forces, but he also guarded this entire • system of rail- 
 ways. 
 
 There were some metaled pikes in Kentucky and Tennessee ; 
 
152 American Campaigns. 
 
 but the highways were mainly the ordinary country earthen 
 roads, good enough in summer, but well-nigh impassable with 
 mud in winter and spring. 
 
 Fort Henry on the east bank of the Tennessee, and Fort 
 Donelson on the west bank of the Cumberland, stood at points 
 where these rivers were not more than eleven miles apart. Bet- 
 ter positions could have been chosen for forts to guard the 
 passage of these streams, lower down, probably at the point 
 where the rivers come nearest together; but the forts were 
 built, or begun, at the time when Kentucky's neutrality held 
 good ; so they had to be kept within the limits of Tennessee.* 
 
 Plans. 
 
 We have seen that Buell and Halleck were entirely independ- 
 ent in their commands, each of the other. Each reported 
 directly to General McClellan, who was now Commander-in- 
 Chief of all the land forces of the United States, with his head- 
 quarters on the Potomac, 500 miles, as the crow flies, from 
 Louisville. 
 
 The plan proposed by Buell for the opening campaign of 
 1862, in this theater, was that Halleck should move up the 
 Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers with 20,000 men supported 
 by the ironclad fleet ; while he, at the same time, moved south- 
 ward along the railway on Bowling Green and Nashville. He 
 contended that this combined movement would compel John- 
 ston to fall back. Halleck did not favor this plan, but wanted 
 Buell's army placed under his command, so that he might leave 
 merely a containing force from Buell's army in front of 
 Bowling Green, and combine the bulk of Buell's troops with 
 his own and form an army of 60,000, for a movement up the 
 Cumberland River. 'McClellan would not give his approval to 
 either of these plans, but kept urging Buell to lead his army 
 into East Tennessee, in order to get possession of the East 
 Tennessee and Georgia Railway, and to encourage and support 
 the inhabitants of that mountain region, who were strongly 
 loyal in sentiment. 
 
 The President had still, another and different plan, which he 
 outlined to General Buell in a letter dated Executive Mansion, 
 January 13, 1862. The following is an extract from the Presi- 
 dent's letter: "I state my general idea of this war to 
 be that we have the greater numbers, and the enemy 
 
 *W. Preston Johnston. 
 
Forts Henry and Donelson. 153 
 
 lias the greater facility of concentrating forces upon 
 points of collision; that we must fail unless we can find 
 some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; 
 and that this can only be done by menacing him with 
 superior forces at different points at the same time, so that we 
 •can safely attack one or both, if he makes no changes ; and if 
 he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the 
 strengthened one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining 
 so much. To illustrate: Suppose last summer, when Win- 
 chester ran away to reinforce Manassas, we had foborne to 
 attack Manassas, but had seized and held Winchester." And 
 the President thought so well of this plan that, while he for- 
 bore to order it, he had a copy of this letter sent to General 
 Halleck. The student may guess how long it would have 
 taken Napoleon or Stonewall Jackson to destroy Buell's de- 
 tachments in detail, if either of those masters of the art of war 
 had been in Johnston's place, and Buell had adopted the Presi- 
 dent's project. 
 
 Johnston had a difficult problem. He had only about 43,000 
 available troops, and they were badly armed. Many carried 
 flint-locks, fowling-pieces, or squirrel-rifles.* Johnston "had, 
 at any rate, so long as his communications remained unbroken, 
 the advantage of interior lines; he could rapidly concentrate 
 his forces. . . . He knew that the Federal iron-clad fleet 
 was superior to any force that the Confederates could muster 
 on the three rivers. He knew, in fact, that he could not main- 
 tain himself against well directed attacks, and that his only 
 chance lay in the possibility that his adversaries would make 
 mistakes, of which he could take advantage. His attitude was 
 ■strictly defensive. He did not at this time [January and Feb- 
 ruary, 1862] fear any sudden movement of the enemy by land, 
 for the roads were in very bad condition ; although, as he well 
 knew, he could be flanked out of his camp at Bowling Green." 
 What he feared, however, at any minute, was that the Federal 
 fleet might ascend the Cumberland and the Tennessee Rivers, 
 or one of them, and attack his forts. He expected them to 
 ascend the Cumberland first, f 
 
 Operations. 
 
 There were some skirmishes and minor affairs in Kentucky 
 
 *W. Preston Johnston. B. & L. — Captain Jesse Taylor. 
 tRopes. 
 
154 American Campaigns. 
 
 in December and January, the most important of which was 
 the battle of Mill Springs. Here General Thomas, with a 
 division of Buell's army, defeated a force of Confederates un- 
 der Generals Crittenden and Zollicoffer, and drove it back into 
 the mountains at Cumberland Gap, on the 19th of January. 
 No important movement was made, h6wever, until February. 
 
 On January 29 Halleck received a telegram from McClellan, 
 telling him that a deserter had reported that Beauregard was 
 under orders to leave Manassas for the line of Columbus and 
 Bowling Green with fifteen regiments. On the 1st of Feb- 
 ruary, without awaiting further instructions from Washington, 
 or arranging for any cooperation on Buell's part, Halleck 
 ordered General Grant, with 17,000 men and Commodore 
 Foote's iron-clads, to ascend the Tennessee, and attack Fort 
 Henry ; in order, as he explained, to "anticipate the arrival of 
 Beauregard's forces."* The expedition started February 2. 
 There were not boats enough to carry the whole force at 
 once, so General McClernand's division, escorted by the iron- 
 clads, went up the river first, and landed about nine miles below 
 Fort Henry. General Grant followed with the rest of the 
 troops. (74) On the 5th of February Grant moved his army 
 by boats up to a point about four miles below Fort Henry. 
 
 Fort Henry was a regular bastioned work, armed with 
 seventeen cannon, and enclosing a space of about ten acres. 
 It was in a bend of the river, so that twelve of its guns had a 
 perfect sweep of the water. But this was its only advantage. 
 It was so low that, at this time, the base of its flagstaff stood 
 in two feet of water. Its guns were at the water-level, which 
 not only deprived them of the advantage of a plunging fire, 
 but made them an easy target for the Union gunboats. The 
 fort was not only surrounded by higher ground on its own side 
 of the river, but was perfectly commanded by the high ground 
 on the opposite bank. < To offset this disadvantage the Con- 
 federates had built Fort Heiman on the high ground across 
 the river. 
 
 There were two roads leading across to the town of Dover 
 and Fort Donelson,' eleven miles east on the Cumberland. The 
 intervening country was cut up by creeks and marshes, hills 
 and ravines ; and was thickly wooded. It had been raining for 
 some time, and all the waters were high ; the creeks, insignifi- 
 cant in dry weather, were now impassable near their mouths. 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
Forts Henry and Donelson. 15S 
 
 General Tilghman had at this time about 2,500 men in the 
 two forts on the Tennessee ; but, as soon as the Union army and 
 fleet made their appearance, he knew that he could not hold out 
 against them ; so he withdrew the garrison from Fort Heiman, 
 and, on the night of the Sth of February, made ready to with- 
 draw his whole force to Fort Donelson. The next morning 
 he started all the garrison for that fort, except seventy men. 
 These he kept at Fort Henry under his own command, 
 to serve the guns, and hold the fort, until the infantry should be 
 safe on the way.* 
 
 General Grant did not expect to assault Fort Henry with his 
 troops ; he expected the fleet to reduce it. But he hoped to put 
 his troops on the roads in rear of the fort to cut off the retreat 
 of the garrison. The fleet consisted of four iron-clads and 
 three wooden gunboats. At 11 a.m., on the 6th of February, 
 the fleet and the land force moved out. The fleet opened fire 
 on the fort when within a mile of it; two hours afterwards 
 Tilghman, who had remained in it, had his colors lowered, and 
 a white flag run up. The Union army, however, was so much 
 delayed by the high water in the creeks, and the mud in the 
 roads, that it was not in time to cut off the main garrison, 
 which made good its retreat to Donelson. Not knowing that 
 Fort Heiman had been abandoned, General Grant had sent one 
 brigade up the west side of the river. 
 
 (73) "Immediately after the fall of Fort Henry two of the 
 gunboats proceeded up the river and destroyed the bridge of 
 the Memphis and Ohio Railway. Then they continued on up 
 the river, as far as the Muscle Shoals, destroying large quan- 
 tities of supplies on the way, and several Confederate trans- 
 port-steamers ; and spreading alarm throughout the whole 
 region."f 
 
 As soon as General Johnston learned of the fall of Fort 
 Henry he was convinced that Fort Donelson must also yield 
 to the National river-fleet ; this would open the Cumberland 
 River as far up as Nashville and cut his communications in 
 rear of him. (75) He made haste, therefore, to evacuate 
 Bowling Green. He sent 12,000 men under General Floyd to 
 Fort Donelson, which, with some reinforcements from Colum- 
 bus, raised the garrison of that fort to about 15,000. With 
 the rest of his army, some 14,000, Johnston retreated to the 
 south bank of the Cumberland. He reached Nashville on the 
 
 *B. & L. — Captain Jesse Taylor. 
 fRopes. 
 
156 American Campaigns. 
 
 16th of February. The reinforcements began arriving for the 
 ■garrison of Fort Donelson on the 9th of February; by the 
 13th all had arrived. 
 
 We have seen that Fort Henry surrendered on the 6th of 
 February. General Grant appreciated the importance of mov- 
 ing promptly against Fort Donelson before it could be rein- 
 forced ; he would have liked to move at once. But it continued 
 to rain, and the roads were so bad that his artillery and wagons 
 •could not move. Moreover, he did not "feel justified" in at- 
 tacking the place without the cooperation of the fleet which, 
 besides having to go back down the Tennessee, and up the 
 Cumberland, had to stop to have some damages repaired. So 
 it was not until February 12 that Grant's army moved. "On 
 that day he started with the divisions of McClernand and 
 C. F. Smith. Another division, which had just arrived under 
 Lew Wallace, which included one brigade sent by Buell, went 
 around by water. Before night the neighborhood of the fort 
 was reached by McClernand and Smith, and the troops had 
 taken up a position surrounding the work."* 
 
 (76) Fort Donelson was a larger and more elaborate work 
 than Fort Henry. The main fort was an irregular, bastioned 
 parapet, inclosing a space of about 100 acres, nearly 500 yards 
 long in its greatest length. It stood 100 feet above the river, 
 at the eastern end of a ridge which narrowed down to a mere 
 neck just west of the work. Except right at this neck the 
 ground sloped from the site on all sides — to Hickman Creek 
 and its branch on the north ; to the river on the east ; and to 
 Indian Creek and its branch on the south. Hickman Creek 
 was unfordable, and formed a perfect barrier on that side. On 
 the river side there were two water batteries fifty or sixty feet 
 above water-level, and perfectly commanding the river down- 
 stream. Six or seven hundred yards westward from the main 
 work was another ridge, cut through in two or three places by 
 forks of Indian Creek, and curving from Hickman Creek 
 around to an unfordable creek south of Dover. On the irregu- 
 lar crest of this ridge a line of intrenchments had been made, 
 and strengthened with abatis. These intrenchments were 
 manned by infantry, and several batteries occupied command- 
 ing points within them. Floyd was the senior Confederate 
 officer present; the next in rank, General Pillow, — the same 
 that we met in the Mexican war, — commanded the left of the 
 Confederate line ; and General Buckner commanded the right. 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
Forts Henry and Donelson. 157" 
 
 Six or seven hundred yards beyond the ridge occupied by the 
 Confederate line, and approximately parallel to it, was another- 
 ridge. Upon this ridge Grant's army took position on the eve- 
 ning of the 12th of April — McClernand's division on the right 
 and Smith's on the left. Grant had given his division-com- 
 manders orders not to bring on an engagement. He expected' 
 the gunboats to reduce the fort. Notwithstanding this Mc- 
 Clernand ordered one of his brigades, on the 13th, to attack the 
 batteries near the center of the Confederate line, which had' 
 been annoying him.* The brigade charged up to the abatis 
 two or three times, but was repulsed with heavy loss. During 
 the day of the 13th Lew Wallace's division arrived and took 
 position in line between McClernand's and Smith's. The divi- 
 sions were all closed up and the line was extended farther- 
 round to the right. General Grant now had some 25,000 troops 
 in line. 
 
 There was no fighting on the land side upon the 14th Feb- 
 ruary ; but Commodore Foote's fleet attacked the fort from the 
 river. The gunboats found no such easy task as the reduction' 
 of Fort Henry. The Confederate guns were better placed, 
 and they were served more skilfully and more effectively. 
 "Two of the iron-clads, the St. Louis, which carried the Com- 
 modore, and the Louisville, had their steerage apparatus shot 
 away and helplessly drifted down the river, out of action. The 
 other two were so greatly damaged between wind and water as- 
 to be compelled to withdraw. The two wooden vessels neces- 
 sarily followed suit. The whole fleet was rendered unser- 
 viceable, and Foote himself was badly wounded. It was nec- 
 essary to send the disabled gunboats to Cairo to be repaired, 
 and further operations by water were accordingly indefinitely 
 postponed."f The Confederate "batteries were uninjured and' 
 not a man in them killed"! during the bombardment by the 
 gunboats. 
 
 General Grant had "expected that the fleet would reduce the 
 fort, and that in this case the garrison and supporting troops 
 would soon be compelled to surrender to the United States 
 forces which surrounded them. But after he had witnessed' 
 the repulse of the fleet he felt that a speedy victory was not to 
 be expected. He looked forward to a protracted siege. The- 
 enemy's works appeared to him too strong to be assaulted suc- 
 
 *Grant's Memoirs. 
 
 fRopes. 
 
 tMajor Gilmer's report. 
 
158 American Campaigns. 
 
 cessfully by the raw troops at his disposal. It seemed not un- 
 likely that siege-operations might be required. Moreover, 'the 
 .weather had turned intensely cold ; the men were without tents, 
 and could not keep up fires where most of them had to stay,' 
 in full range of the enemy's guns. 'The sun went down,' says 
 General Grant in his Memoirs, 'on the night of the 14th of 
 February, 1862, leaving the army confronting Fort Donelson 
 anything but comforted over its prospects.' "* 
 
 But the Confederate generals inside of the intrenchments 
 had much graver cause for worry than General Grant had on 
 the outside. They saw themselves entirely cut off and sur- 
 rounded on the land side by an army which they supposed was 
 even far greater than it really was and hourly increasing; 
 while in the river was a powerful fleet of iron-clads which 
 they expected to see return any minute and resume the bom- 
 bardment. That night, the 14th of February, these generals 
 held a council of war, and decided that their only chance lay in 
 making a sortie on the south side and getting possession of the 
 road via Charlotte to Nashville. Accordingly, it was arranged 
 that Pillow's troops, which occupied the left of the line, should 
 make the "main attack" against the Federal right. Buckner 
 was to withdraw all of his troops from the intrenchments on 
 the right, and to support Pillow. A single regiment, 450 men, 
 enough only to keep up a show of resistance, was assigned to 
 the right of the line. After Pillow, assisted by Buckner, had 
 broken through the Union line, and forced it back off the 
 Charlotte Road, Buckner was to throw his command across the 
 Wynn's Ferry Road, and act as rear-guard, while the rest of 
 the garrison made its escape. 
 
 It was midnight when the council of war had reached its 
 decision. The commanders began at once moving their troops 
 into position ; and during the rest of the night there was march- 
 ing of regiments and rumbling of wagons and cannon in the 
 Confederate camp ; but the Union troops paid no attention to 
 the noises. It was a dark, bitterly cold night, and every person 
 in both camps was shivering and miserable — this may account 
 for the apparent disregard of the noise in the Confederate 
 camp. 
 
 (77) At daybreak Pillow's division, supported on its left 
 by Forrest's regiment of horsemen, moved to the assault. A 
 little later Buckner came up on Pillow's right. The battle 
 
 ♦Ropes. 
 
Forts Henry and Donelson. 159 
 
 lasted all morning. Finally Pillow's infantry, supported by 
 two batteries, broke McClernand's line, and, at the same time 
 Forrest, who had worked round through the underbrush, 
 charged it in flank and rear. The Federal right was thus 
 forced off the Charlotte Road, and back through the woods 
 along the Wynn's Ferry Road, in confusion.* Before noon 
 the way to Nashville was open for the Confederates ; Pillow 
 had possession of the whole of the ground occupied at dawn 
 by McClernand's troops, and with it a Union battery, 300 
 prisoners and 5,000 small arms;f and he had sent off 'a dis- 
 patch to General Johnston, announcing that he had won a 
 great victory. 
 
 Buckner was in position to cover the withdrawal. "Ten 
 fresh Confederate regiments, over 3,000 men, had not fired a 
 musket."$ It was the crisis of the battle; perhaps the crisis 
 of the Southern Confederacy. At that moment the Confed- 
 erate troops at Donelson needed what they did not have, a 
 man in command of them that knew something about the 
 business of war. In truth, they had no commander. General 
 Floyd's seniority had forced the mockery of command upon 
 him; but he did not command in fact. He listened first to 
 Buckner's timid counsel and then to Pillow's rash advice, 
 and ended by doing nothing that was right. At this crisis 
 either one of two things would have been right: to have 
 gone ahead with the plan agreed upon, and marched to Nash- 
 ville by the road that was open ; or to have thrown every man 
 into the line and completed the victory so well begun. Floyd 
 did neither. Pillow had just noticed a movement of the 
 enemy toward the breastworks on the right, Buckner's old 
 place, now held by a single regiment. He ordered Buckner 
 to return to the works and defend them. Buckner refused 
 and went to Floyd. Floyd sustained him and went to Pillow. 
 Then Floyd changed his mind and agreed with Pillow. He 
 ended by ordering his whole victorious left wing to return to 
 the trenches. 
 
 About this time General Grant arrived on the scene. He 
 had been absent during the morning, conferring with Commo- 
 dore Foote on his gunboat. Foote, it will be remembered, had 
 been wounded; he was unable to go ashore to see Grant. 
 Grant immediately gave orders that the ground lost on the 
 
 *Wyeth's Life of Forrest. B. & L.—W. Preston Johnston. 
 tB. & L.— Lew Wallace. W. Preston Johnston. 
 JW. Preston Johnston. 
 
160 American Campaigns. 
 
 right of the Union line must be regained. Then he dispatched 
 the following note to Commodore Foote : "If all the gunboats 
 that can, will immediately make their appearance to the enemy, 
 it may secure us a victory. Otherwise, all may be defeated. A 
 terrible conflict ensued in my absence, which has demoralized 
 a portion of my command, and I think the enemy is much more 
 so. If the gunboats do not show themselves it will reassure the 
 enemy and still further demoralize our troops. I must order 
 a charge to save appearances. I do not expect the gunboats 
 to go into action, but to make appearance, and to throw a few 
 shells at long range."* 
 
 This note shows how uneasy General Grant was ; it shows 
 how serious the situation appeared to him. But he was too 
 cool and self-possessed a soldier to display his anxiety to his 
 subordinates. He gave his orders in his usual quiet tone. He 
 rode over to General Smith, who had held his division out of 
 the engagement, awaiting orders. Grant ordered him to charge 
 the works in front of him. It was the movement in Smith's 
 division that Pillow had seen. Buckner's division was now on 
 its way to resume its place in those trenches, but it did not 
 arrive in time. Smith's division had broken through the 
 abatis and was in possession of the works. Buckner was in 
 time, however, to help check Smith's further advance, and 
 to force him back to the trenches he had captured. 
 
 (78) Meantime McClernand's division, reinforced by part 
 of Lew Wallace's, had followed up the retiring Confederates. 
 All of the ground previously held by McClernand's division 
 was not, however, reoccupied; one of the roads from Dover 
 to Nashville, the one nearest the river, was still left open.f 
 General Floyd did not take advantage of this road to save 
 his army. That night he held another council of war ; its deci- 
 sion was to surrender. Floyd had been Secretary of War of 
 the United States, and was at this time under indictment at 
 Washington. So he declared that, personally, he did not dare 
 surrender. Pillow, the next in command, said "there were no 
 two persons in the Confederacy whom the Yankees would 
 rather capture than himself and General Floyd."J So he, also, 
 must escape. Thus these two political generals both aban- 
 doned the troops intrusted to their charge, and made good 
 
 *Ropes. 
 tWyetli. 
 %B. & L. 
 
Forts Henry and Donelson. 161 
 
 their escape in boats up the Cumberland, leaving General Buck- 
 ner to surrender the army and fort to General Grant.* 
 
 One other commander made his escape, but he took his whole 
 command with him. That was Forrest, than whom the world 
 has seen no more daring leader of cavalry. He marched his 
 regiment out by way of the muddy river-road, fording a creek 
 up to his saddle-skirts. There were some infantrymen, also, 
 bold enough to accompany him ; and not a man was lost. 
 
 "About 11,500 men and forty guns were the fruits of this 
 great victory."f Let us now see what were its strategical con- 
 sequences. (75) As soon as Buell learned that Fort Henry 
 had been captured, and that Johnston had evacuated Bowling 
 Green, he dispatched Nelson's division to reinforce Grant, 
 and made ready to follow Johnston with the rest of his army. 
 On February 16, the very day on which Donelson was sur- 
 rendered, and the day on which Johnston, with the part of his 
 army retained by himself, reached Nashville, the advance of 
 Buell's army reached Bowling Green. 
 
 (79) From Nashville Johnston fell back to Murfreesboro. 
 Buell advanced to Nashville, where he arrived on the 24th of 
 February. He found the town already occupied by the divi- 
 sion [Nelson's] that he had sent round by boat to reinforce 
 Grant ; it had come up the Cumberland River from Donelson, 
 where it was no longer needed. Buell now had some 50,000 
 troops, and Grant, who had been further reinforced, had, back 
 at Donelson, about 40,000; while Johnston at Murfreesboro. 
 could not muster more than 20,000. Buell thought Johnston's, 
 army had been reinforced to a much larger number. 
 
 McClellan ordered Halleck to move against Nashville, and 
 Grant was anxious to advance ; but General Halleck was afraid 
 that Beauregard, at Columbus, had a great army, and that he 
 was about to move into Illinois or Missouri with it. So Hal- 
 leck recalled Foote's fleet to the Ohio, and held Grant's army 
 at Donelson doing nothing for ten days. The Confederates 
 had no thought, however, of making any offensive movement 
 up the Mississippi ; they had neither the troops nor the morale, 
 at this time, in this quarter, for offensive operations. On the 
 contrary, they abandoned Columbus on the 2nd of March. 
 
 *Floyd took with him the Virginia troops of his own brigade. 
 fRopes. 
 
162 American Campaigns. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 (73) On the National side this campaign was an example 
 of what the text-books on strategy call "strategic penetration." 
 The two wings of the Confederate army were at Bowling 
 Green and Columbus, 170 miles apart, or less than one day, in 
 point of time, by rail. The capture of Henry and Donelson, 
 and the destruction of the railway bridge over the Tennessee, 
 and the occupation of Clarksville by the Union forces, effec- 
 tually broke the line of communication betwen the two wings 
 of Johnston's army, and left Grant's army the choice of turn- 
 ing against either wing separately. 
 
 Grant's proper course, as we see it now, plainly was to move 
 up the Cumberland River, and, uniting with Buell's force, fol- 
 low Johnston to Murfreesboro, and destroy him there, if he 
 stood to fight; or to pursue him to his destruction, if he con- 
 tinued to retreat. Grant wanted to move his army, now rein- 
 forced to 40,000, up the Cumberland; but we have seen that 
 Halleck held him fast at Donelson. Halleck's alleged reason 
 was the fear that Beauregard was about to make an offensive 
 move into his territory, against Cairo and Paducah. 
 
 The incident illustrates the mistake of having two armies 
 with independent commanders in the same theater of opera- 
 tions; but this was evident from the very beginning of the 
 campaign. If there had been a single head — a single com- 
 mander on the ground — directing the operations of Buell's and 
 Halleck's forces, compelling them to cooperate constantly 
 against a single objective, Johnston's army, it can hardly be 
 seen how that army could have escaped destruction. In this 
 regard, only, the Confederates had greatly the advantage ; their 
 forces in this theater of operations were all under the command 
 of one man, and he was not hampered by any dictation or even 
 suggestions from his President or war department hundreds 
 of miles away from the spot. 
 
 Johnston's chief trouble was a lack of men and arms ; his 
 only chance lay in the errors that his opponents might com- 
 mit. Yet, when his opponents did commit an error and give 
 him the chance, he failed to take the proper advantage of it. 
 It looks as if Grant's movement against Henry and Donelson, 
 with only 15,000 troops, was an error — an unnecessary hazard 
 for him to take without the prearranged cooperation of Buell's 
 forces. And there was no such prearranged cooperation. 
 Halleck sent forward Grant and Foote without consent from 
 
Forts Henry and Donelson. 163 
 
 Washington or arrangement with Buell. Although he had 
 corresponded with McClellan and Buell about such an opera- 
 tion, no agreement or arrangement of plan had been made. 
 Halleck seems simply to have taken for granted that when 
 Grant's forces became committed to the movement, reinforce- 
 ments would be dispatched to him by Buell. 
 
 This movement gave Johnston his only chance. To rein- 
 force Grant Buell had to send troops round by the Ohio River ; 
 while Johnson had the short line of the railway and also the 
 wagon roads. Johnston ought to have left the smallest contain- 
 ing force in front of Buell that could hold him, or delay him 
 for a few days or hours, and himself marched all the rest of his 
 army against Grant. And he ought not, of course, to have 
 shut himself up at Donelson, but attacked Grant's army from 
 the outside. Instead of doing this he sent_an incompetent gen- 
 eral, Floyd, with 12,000 men to Donelson, and fell back himself 
 with 14,000 to Nashville. 
 
 General Grant had no thought of assaulting Fort Donelson. 
 He at first thought Commodore Foote's guns would be able 
 to reduce it; but after they failed he made up his mind to a 
 regular siege. This is undoubtedly the agreement that he and 
 Foote came to at their conference on Foote's boat, on the 
 14th of February. But at that very time the Confederates 
 themselves were bringing the matter to a crisis by making a 
 sortie against the right of Grant's line. 
 
 In all of the operations of the Civil War it would be hard 
 to find another example of such crass incapacity as was dis- 
 played by the Confederate commanders at Fort Donelson. It 
 was so bad as almost to persuade an unbeliever that it was one 
 of the means of Providence to preserve the Union. Not one, 
 but several opportunities, offered, from the time when General 
 Grant landed his first troops below Fort Henry, to the time 
 when General Buckner surrendered at Fort Donelson, which, 
 if made use of by a bold and skilful general, might have re- 
 sulted in a Confederate success. 
 
 After all the labor spent upon Forts Henry and Heiman 
 General Tilghman abandoned them, virtually without an effort 
 to save them, at the first appearance of the enemy. This was 
 wise ; it saved his garrisons from capture, and only proved the 
 unwisdom of placing those forts where they were. Tilghman 
 was quick and shrewd enough to send his little command away 
 from Fort Henry before General Grant's forces had cut off its 
 retreat. This was the most sensible thing that appears to have 
 
164 American Campaigns. 
 
 been done by any of three generals that successively fell 
 into the chief command of the Confederate troops in these 
 operations. 
 
 After Tilghman's surrender Pillow succeeded to the com- 
 mand at Fort Donelson. He allowed the Federal troops to 
 march from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson on the 12th of Feb- 
 ruary, practically without offering them any resistance. For- 
 rest's cavalry alone met them on the way, while the rest of 
 Pillow's command stayed within the field-works. A skilful 
 and aggressive leader like A. P. Hill, or Sheridan, or Stone- 
 wall Jackson, would surely have taken advantage of the thick 
 woods to strike the Federal columns in flank on their way 
 across country. 
 
 Early on the 13th Floyd arrived with reinforcements and 
 took command by virtue of his rank. Lew Wallace's Union 
 division had not yet landed. Floyd's command was then about 
 equal in number to the Federals in line, and he had every 
 advantage in position. If he had attacked the Union line 
 boldly that day he would have had an excellent chance of 
 winning a victory. We have already seen how he wavered in 
 his decisions on the 15th, and thus gained nothing by the vic- 
 tory Pillow had won from McClernand's division ; and how he 
 neglected to lead his forces out that night by the road that 
 Forrest took. 
 
 Pillow, at the council on the night of February 15, wanted to- 
 continue the fight within the works ; Buckner advised a capitu- 
 lation. We know the outcome. General Grant reported that 
 large quantities of provisions were found within the fort; and 
 one of the boats by which Floyd and Pillow escaped had 
 brought a large supply of ammunition for the beleaguered 
 army. With plenty of food and ammunition there does not 
 appear to have been any adequate excuse for surrendering at 
 that time. Under some governments Floyd, Pillow, and Buck- 
 ner would have been tried for their lives by military court. 
 With the Union gunboats away for repairs, and with two 
 steamers in their possession, the Confederate commanders, by 
 good management, ought to have been able to withdraw the 
 bulk of their garrison and materiel to safety on the other side 
 of the river. 
 
 While at the outset of the operations Johnston had the ad- 
 vantage of interior lines, and could have concentrated his army 
 at any point near the railway from Bowling Green to Colum- 
 bus more quickly than Halleck and Buell could have united 
 
Forts Henry and Donelson. 165 
 
 theirs at any point, as soon as Grant penetrated his front at 
 Forts Henry and Donelson, and got possession of this railway, 
 the case was exactly reversed. From that moment Grant and 
 Buell could have united their forces at any point in the theater 
 of operations more quickly than Johnston could have assembled 
 his divided army at the same point. After that the strategical 
 advantages were wholly on the side of the National forces, if 
 their commanders had chosen to make use of them. 
 
 Manifestly Johnston could not remain at Bowling Green 
 after the Union forces got possession of the Cumberland River 
 in his rear ; for with the Cumberland in their possession these 
 forces would only have had to move up to Nashville to cut 
 Johnston's communications. It was the fear of such a predica- 
 ment that made Johnston quit Bowling Green and fall back to 
 Nashville as soon as Foote's fleet had reduced Fort Henry. 
 Johnston, like Grant, believed Foote's gunboats would also be 
 able to reduce Donelson. The query suggests itself, then, 
 Why did Johnston order Floyd to take his detachment to Fort 
 Donelson? The answer is, Johnston did not expect Floyd to 
 shut his army up within field-works, to be besieged. Fort 
 Donelson was only a little bastioned work, less than 500 yards 
 in its longest dimension. It was this work that Johnston ex- 
 pected Foote's gunboats to knock down. The troops ordered 
 thither were expected to oppose General Grant's army outside 
 of the fort. General Johnston never supposed that they would 
 place their backs to the river and build a trap of breastworks 
 around themselves. "He wished Donelson defended if possi- 
 ble, but he did not wish the army to be sacrificed in the at- 
 tempt." One of his last telegrams to Floyd said: "If you 
 lose the fort bring your troops to Nashville if possible."* It 
 is almost certain that a general of ordinary ability would have 
 found it "possible." The defense of Fort Donelson proper 
 ought to have been left to its own little garrison. The army 
 assembled there ought to have maneuvered to draw Grant's 
 army away from the fort. If it made breastworks it ought to 
 have placed them so as to cover its line of retreat, the Wynn's 
 Ferry-Charlotte road. General Pillow was responsible for 
 the position of the Confederate field-works ; they were built 
 while he was in command — after the fall of Fort Henry. The 
 mistake General Johnston made was in not going to Donelson 
 
 *W. Preston Johnston. 
 
166 American Campaigns. 
 
 himself; not Floyd, nor Pillow, nor Buckner was equal to the 
 emergency. 
 
 The terrible state of the roads in the theater had an impor- 
 tant bearing upon the operations ; it rendered the sudden and 
 swift movement of troops next to impossible ; it had much to do 
 with keeping Buell's army from attempting any aggressive 
 movement against Johnston while Johnston was still at Bowl- 
 ing Green. 
 
 A thing which had a deterrent influence upon the command- 
 ers in the campaign, — which always has such an influence if an 
 adequate system for securing information is not employed, — ■ 
 was their ignorance with regard to the strength and condition 
 of the opposing forces. Halleck would not let Grant advance 
 on Nashville, after the capture of Donelson, because he feared 
 that Beauregard was moving into his territory with a great 
 force — which was not the case; and after Buell reached 
 Nashville with his first division, he was so afraid Johnston 
 would return with an overwhelming army and crush him that 
 he called on General Smith, of Grant's army, to move his divi- 
 sion up from Clarksville to reinforce him at Nashville ; while 
 Johnston with a paltry 20,000 was glad enough to be left alone 
 at Murfreesboro. Previous to this Buell had telegraphed to 
 McClellan that Johnston had "50,000 if not 60,000 men" ; when 
 in fact he had no more than 40,000. And about the 13th of 
 February Halleck wrote Buell that it was reported that 40,000 
 Confederates were at Dover and Clarksville; while in reality 
 Floyd and Pillow had only 15,000 to 18,000. And after the 
 fall of Donelson Halleck was afraid that Grant was going to 
 be attacked by a large force from Nashville; whereas there 
 was no Confederate force at Nashville, except Johnston's 
 14,000, which arrived that day [16th February] in full retreat 
 from Bowling Green. General Halleck throughout the cam- 
 paign exemplified a remark made by General Sherman in a 
 marginal note in an old copy of Soady's Lessons of War; 
 viz., "Generals in chief command generally worry more about 
 things which never happen that about real catastrophes." 
 
 Except the work of Forrest's regiment at Fort Donelson, 
 the role played by cavalry in this campaign was insignificant. 
 Yet Halleck and Buell and Johnston all had cavalry ; but it was 
 volunteers, lately raised, and neither officers nor men had yet 
 learned the strategic duty of "security and information," cer- 
 tainly one of the most important functions of modern cavalry. 
 Even Forrest, up to this time, had done on more than forage 
 
Forts Henry and Donelson. 167 
 
 and fight. Terry's Texas Rangers and John Morgan, who 
 soon became famous, were also with Johnston's army. An 
 efficient cavalry in front of Buell's army, and in touch with 
 Johnston's, would have relieved General Buell of his unneces- 
 sary apprehensions. General Grant had cavalry with his forces 
 at Forts Henry and Donelson, but it did practically nothing.* 
 How the Union cavalry reached the forts does not appear, — 
 whether it marched, or was carried by the transports. If a 
 regiment of independent cavalry had been pushed forward from 
 Paducah, and another one from Smithland, to cover the flanks 
 of Grant's army, in its passage up the rivers, and to gain touch 
 with Johnston's, they would have saved General Halleck a 
 great deal of worry over imaginary Confederate columns. 
 
 This was the first instance in the Civil War, and the only 
 successful instance in any modern campaign, in which a river, 
 independently of roads, was used as a line of operations. While 
 navigable rivers make the best kind of lines of communication 
 the ease with which transports can be harassed by the enemy 
 on shore renders their employment as lines of operation very 
 exceptional. 
 
 It is as much the province of strategy to dishearten the hos- 
 tile people, — to make them appreciate the hopelessness of con- 
 tinuing the war — to make them crave peace — as it is to defeat 
 and destroy their armies; indeed, this is the only reason for 
 defeating their armies. It is probable that no other single 
 victory, except Gettysburg, had as disheartening an effect upon 
 the people of the South as the capture of Forts Henry and' 
 Donelson. Ropes, who is the best critic that has reviewed the 
 campaigns of the Civil War, says : "The effect of the capture of 
 Fort Henry on the people of the whole country, North and 
 South, was electrical. It was the first great success won by the 
 Union arms within the limits of the Confederacy." And of 
 Donelson: "The capture of Fort Donelson was not a great 
 affair judged by the number of the slain; but judged by its 
 moral and strategical results it was one of the turning points of 
 the war. Following so soon as it did after the loss of Fort 
 Henry, the news of the surrender of Fort Donelson threw the 
 Southwest into a state of excitement, not to say of panic, hardly 
 to be described. 
 
 "In the North exultation, confident expectation, rising al- 
 most to the dangerous point of underestimating the remaining 
 
 *U. S. Cavalry Journal, Vol. XVII, No. 62, Prize Essay by Captain 
 Edwin R. Stuart, U. S. Corps of Engineers. 
 
168 American Campaigns. 
 
 resources and the enduring valor of the South, were the feel- 
 ings of the hour. And no one can wonder at it. The whole 
 system of the Confederate defense in the West had been broken 
 up. It seemed well within the limits of possibility to follow up 
 Sidney Johnston until he should be forced to surrender with 
 what was left of his army. Chattanooga, the key of East 
 Tennessee, apparently lay open to the invading Federal armies 
 on one flank, and Vicksburg, the only strong post on the lower 
 Mississippi, lay seemingly unprotected on the other. Of the 
 Confederate army of the West, part had been captured, part 
 was retreating before the large and well-appointed army of 
 Buell, and part was shut up in fortified works on the left (or 
 eastern) bank of the upper Mississippi, whose capture was only 
 a question of time, now that by the fall of the forts on the 
 Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers they were cut off from 
 support and supplies." 
 
LECTURE IX. 
 THE SHILOH CAMPAIGN. 
 
 (80) At the end of the campaign of Forts Henry and Don- 
 elson we left General Albert Sidney Johnston, with the remnant 
 of his army, at Murf reesboro ; Buell's army, 50,000 strong, was 
 concentrating at Nashville; and Grant had 40,000 troops at 
 the two captured forts. Beauregard, with his headquarters at 
 Jackson, was in immediate command of Johnston's troops be- 
 tween the Mississippi and the Tennessee. The bulk of these, 
 some 17,000, were at Columbus under Polk. Other small gar- 
 risons held the Confederate posts along the Mississippi as far 
 down as Memphis ; and there were detachments at Corinth and 
 Iuka, with outposts watching the Tennessee River. Threaten- 
 ing Columbus and the posts along the Mississippi, General Pope 
 had a command of about 25,000 Federals at Commerce, on the 
 right bank of the Mississippi; and Generals Van Dorn and 
 McCullough had some 20,000 Confederates in northern Ar- 
 kansas, opposed to a Union force under General Curtis. 
 
 Grant's troops had destroyed the railway bridge above Fort 
 Henry, and the Federal gunboats controlled the Tennessee 
 River as far up as the Muscle Shoals. Johnston's army was 
 thus cut in two ; the two wings could unite only somewhere 
 south of the Tennessee River. Beauregard appreciated the 
 situation, and urged Johnston to assemble his scattered troops 
 in the neighborhood of Corinth. He and Johnston made every 
 exertion to increase the strength of their forces, and the Con- 
 federate government at Richmond seconded their efforts. 
 Bragg with a force of about 10,000 men was ordered from 
 Pensacola to Corinth ; as was, also, Van Dorn from Arkansas. 
 Troops were sent thither, also, from New Orleans and other 
 places. 
 
 (81) On the 28th of February, 1862, Johnston began his 
 march from Murf reesboro to Corinth, by way of Decatur, Ala., 
 where a bridge spanned the Tennessee. He had with him 
 about 17,000 men organized in three small divisions, with a 
 "reserve" under General Breckinridge. His command in- 
 cluded several regiments of cavalry. On the 2nd of March 
 Polk evacuated Columbus, and withdrew the greater part of 
 
170 American Campaigns. 
 
 his garrison to the railway junction at Humboldt. About 
 7,000 men under McCown were left in the works at New 
 Madrid and Island No. 10 to guard the Mississippi, which was 
 still held by the Confederates from this point to Vicksburg. 
 
 Buell, foreseeing that Johnston would undertake to reunite 
 the separated wings of his army by way of the Memphis and 
 Charleston Railway south of the Tennessee River, believed that 
 his army and Halleck's should join at some point on the north 
 bank of that river, between Savannah and Florence, and from 
 thence seize the Memphis and Charleston Railway. His ob- 
 ject was to unite his own and Halleck's forces under cover of 
 the Tennessee, then to cross the river and defeat Johnston's 
 main army; he believed this would cause the abandonment of 
 the posts up the Mississippi,* and the opening of that river. 
 Halleck, on the other hand, gave no thought to Johnston's 
 main army at first. His mind always turned to strategic points 
 rather than to the hostile army. Memphis was the objective 
 upon which his thoughts now fixed.f Before forming any plan 
 for its capture he seemed to have designed first to destroy its 
 railway connections with the Confederate post at Columbus 
 and with the east. 
 
 Accordingly he issued orders on the 1st of March for Grant, 
 with a force of 35,000 troops, to move up the Tennessee in 
 transports. Owing to a misunderstanding between Grant and 
 Halleck Grant was later ordered to remain at Fort Henry; 
 and the expedition was commanded by General C. F. Smith. 
 Halleck's instructions to Smith stated: "The main object of 
 this expedition will be to destroy the railroad bridge over Bear 
 Creek, near Eastport, Miss., and also the connections at 
 Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. . . . Having accomplished 
 these objects, or such of them as may be practicable, you will 
 return to Danville, and move on Paris."f 
 
 The expedition soon got off, and, by the 11th of March, 
 the flotilla of more than eighty transports began arriving at 
 Savannah, where the depot was to be established. The force 
 was organized in five divisions, under Generals McClernand, 
 W. H. L. Wallace, Hurlbut, W. T. Sherman, and Prentiss. A 
 sixth division commanded by Lew Wallace arrived later, and 
 was put into camp at Crump's Landing.^ 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
 tScribner's Series, From Fort Henry to Corinth. — M. F. Force. 
 
 JSix miles below Pittsburg Landing. 
 
The Shiloh Campaign. 171 
 
 A detachment was sent over to tear up a part of the rail- 
 way track from Jackson to Corinth, and on the 14th Sher- 
 man's division went by boats up to Eastport for the purpose of 
 destroying the bridge over Bear Creek. Sherman was pre- 
 vented from carrying out his purpose by a very heavy rain, 
 which flooded the country and made the small streams impassa- 
 ble. In the meanwhile Halleck learned of the evacuation of 
 Columbus by the Confederates. Then, for the first time, it 
 seems to have occurred to him to make the movement up the 
 Tennessee his main operation, of which the object should be to 
 get between the wings of Johnston's army. He had not yet 
 determined whether to assail these separate wings in detail, or 
 both at once. In correspondence with Buell he wrote: "Why 
 not come over and operate with me to cut Johnston's line with 
 Memphis, Randolph, and New Madrid? . . . Come over 
 to Savannah or Florence, and we can do it. We can then oper- 
 ate on Decatur or Memphis, or both, as may appear best."* 
 His mind still dwelt upon places, strategic points, as objectives, 
 rather than upon the hostile army. This was the fulfilment of 
 Halleck's notion of strategy. 
 
 On the 11th of March President Lincoln placed all of the 
 territory from Knoxville as far west as the Missouri River, and 
 all the Union troops therein, under the command of Halleck. 
 This command included Buell's army. Thereupon Halleck or- 
 dered Buell to march his army to Savannah. The Confederate 
 forces were massing at Corinth, twenty-two miles in a straight 
 line from Savannah, on the opposite side of the Tennessee. 
 Already about 23,000 Confederates were there, or "within easy 
 marches of Corinth," not including the troops that Polk had 
 withdrawn from Columbus. They had not yet arrived. 
 
 General Johnston reached Corinth on the 22nd of March ; by 
 the end of the month all of the Confederate troops that took 
 part in the battle of Shiloh, some 40,000, were concentrated 
 about Corinth. Van Dorn's command, from Arkansas, did not 
 arrive in time for the battle. Johnston organized his forces, 
 designated the "Army of the Mississippi," into three corps, 
 under the command, respectively, of Major-Generals Polk, 
 Bragg, and Hardee, with a reserve of two brigades under 
 Major-General Breckinridge. Beauregard was to be "second 
 in command," and Bragg, besides commanding a corps, was 
 appointed Chief of Staff by Johnston. 
 
 *Force. 
 
172 American Campaigns. 
 
 Instead of camping his army at Savannah, General Smith, 
 with the authority of Halleck, had selected a place nine miles 
 higher up-stream, and on the opposite bank, known as Pitts- 
 burg Landing. Here this Union army was in camp, awaiting 
 the arrival of Buell's forces. General Smith having gone on 
 sick report, on account of an injury from which his death re- 
 sulted a short while afterwards, Grant was restored to the com- 
 mand of the army, and rejoined it on the 17th of March. He 
 made his headquarters at Savannah, instead of at Pittsburg 
 Landing. 
 
 (82) The ground upon which the Union camps stood, and 
 upon which the battle of Shiloh took place, was twenty-two 
 miles by road northeast of Corinth. It was an irregular tri- 
 angle, with sides three or four miles long, bounded on the east 
 by the Tennessee, which here flows due north, on the north- 
 west by Snake Creek and its branch, Owl Creek ; and on the 
 south by Lick Creek and its branch, Locust Grove Creek, a 
 small brook in a considerable ravine. 
 
 The highest ground was a ridge lying north of Locust Grove 
 Creek, and extending on towards the west. Its top was 200 
 feet above the river, and its northern slopes fell gradually to 
 the level of the camps, 100 feet lower. In the hollows of these 
 slopes the branches of Owl Creek found their headwaters. 
 The most important of these branches was Tillman [Tilghman] 
 Creek, whose deep hollow, running north, a mile and a quarter 
 from the river, divided the space into two main plateaus. These 
 plateaus were broken into smaller tables and undulations by the 
 surface drains and ravines of the smaller water-courses. At 
 the time of the battle the ground generally was in forest, 
 partly open, but partly impassable for horsemen, with, here 
 and there, clearings of twenty to eighty acres. 
 
 Several roads traversed the battle-field. One, the Hamburg- 
 Savannah Road, usually spoken of as the River Road, led from 
 Crump's Landing, six miles down-stream, and, crossing Snake 
 Creek by a bridge, continued on southward along the eastern 
 plateau. At the eastern end of the ridge north of Locust 
 Grove Creek it forked with the Purdy-Hamburg Road. This 
 road, coming in from Purdy by a bridge over Owl Creek, con- 
 tinued southeasterly along the high ground, and, crossing Lick 
 Creek a mile from its mouth, led to Hamburg, three or four 
 miles farther up the river. 
 
 Pittsburg Landing was three-quarters of a mile above the 
 mouth of Snake Creek. From this landing two roads led to 
 
The Shiloh Campaign. 173 
 
 Corinth. One, called the Eastern Corinth Road, fallowed the 
 backbone of the ridge beyond the headwaters of Locust Grove 
 Creek, and joined the Bark Road; the other, a mile farther 
 west, ran nearly parallel to the Eastern Corinth Road for about 
 four miles, and was known as the Western Corinth Road. 
 There were other by-roads and trails through the timber. 
 Shiloh Church, the little log meeting-house that gave its name 
 to the battle, stood above the bank of Oak Creek,* at the fork 
 of the Western Corinth Road and the Purdy Road. 
 
 (83) On this ground the Union army was encamped by 
 divisions. One of Sherman's brigades was on the extreme 
 right-front, along the Purdy Road, and guarding the bridge 
 over Owl Creek. Two others were astride the Western Corinth 
 Road just at Shiloh Church, and behind the ravine of Oak 
 Creek. Stuart's brigade of this division was on the extreme 
 left-front, at the junction of the Purdy-Hamburg Road and 
 the River Road, near the end of the ridge above Locust Grove 
 Creek. 
 
 Prentiss's camp occupied the middle-front and was across 
 the Eastern Corinth Road. McClernand's formed an agle at 
 the junction of the Hamburg-Purdy Road with the Western 
 Road. It was about 500 yards behind the left of Sherman's 
 tents. Hurlbut's camp was a mile and a half behind that of 
 Prentiss, at the junction of the River Road and the Eastern 
 Road. W. H. L. Wallace's was in the angle of these two 
 roads, a mile in rear of Hurlbut's. Lew Wallace's division 
 was still camped at Crump's Landing. 
 
 Although it was known that Johnston was assembling an 
 army at Corinth, where it was estimated that there were already 
 50,000 to 80,000 Confederates, no works of any kind were 
 thrown up about the Federal position; nor was any line of 
 defense or plan of action in case of attack arranged. The 
 various camps were established with reference to the conve- 
 nience of the different commands, and without any system. 
 There were no cavalry outposts between the camps and Cor- 
 inth. "Probably there never was an army encamped in an 
 enemy's country with so little regard to the manifest risks 
 which are inseparable from such a situation."f True, the 
 5th Ohio Cavalry often reconnoitered some miles to the front, 
 and frequently encountered parties of hostile cavalry.^ 
 
 *On map as Shiloh Branch. 
 
 fRopes. 
 
 JForce. 
 
174 American Campaigns. 
 
 Johnston and Beauregard appreciated the faultiness, strateg- 
 ical and tactical, of the position of Grant's army, in a pocket 
 between Snake Creek and Lick Creek, with an impassable river 
 behind it.* The position could have been made impregnable 
 by earthworks in one night ;f but the Confederate command- 
 ers were aware that it had not been intrenched. They re- 
 solved to attack Grant's exposed army before Buell's should 
 join it.* They hoped to move on the 1st of April; but, owing 
 to delay in Johnston's arrival, and in the organization of the 
 forces, due mainly to the inexperience of officers and men, the 
 army did not begin its advance until the afternoon of the 3rd. 
 It had, then, to go without Van Dorn's command, 20,000 
 strong, which was delayed in Arkansas by high water.J 
 
 (84) The order for the march directed that it should begin 
 at noon ; the army was to be in position, deployed for attack, at 
 7 a.m. the 5th. The distance to march was only about eighteen 
 miles, but there were only two narrow earthern roads, 
 through dense forests. Many of the troops were raw ; Bragg's 
 corps had never made a march before. There was misunder- 
 standing and delay at the very beginning of the journey. The 
 heads of the two main columns did not start until late in the 
 afternoon. On the 4th the march was slow and confused. 
 Instead of reaching the position from which the attack was to 
 be launched, at the hour appointed, 7 a.m. April the 5th, it 
 was 4 p.m. before the army was deployed. It was then too 
 late in the day to begin the attack, which was postponed to 
 daybreak of the 6th. 
 
 (83) Johnston's army was now within two miles of Shiloh 
 Church, Sherman's headquarters. A body of Confederate cav- 
 alry had foolishly pushed forward so boldly that it ought to 
 have warned the Federal commanders that there was a strong 
 force close behind it.§ Yet no warning was taken by the Fed- 
 erals. Saturday, the 5th, the Union cavalry and artillery spent 
 the day moving their camps, in obedience to an order changing 
 their assignments. 
 
 The advanced Confederate cavalry had already been encoun- 
 tered by small exploring parties of Union troops. On the 3rd, 
 also, Buckland's brigade, sent out by Sherman, had met Con- 
 federate cavalry six miles from the Union camp, and had then 
 
 *B. & L. 
 
 fSherman's Memoirs. 
 ^Roman's Beauregard. 
 §B. & L. — Beauregard. 
 
The Shiloh Campaign. 175 
 
 returned to camp. The next day, the 4th, a picket of the same 
 brigade was captured by this cavalry, and later in the day 
 Major Lockett and a party, sent to rescue the picket, were also 
 captured. Two of Sherman's brigade-commanders, Buckland 
 and Hildebrand, visited their outposts on Saturday, the 5th, 
 and saw parties of hostile cavalry hovering in the woods be- 
 yond. Some of the sentinels claimed that they had seen in- 
 fantry. Numbers of rabbits and squirrels were noticed scud- 
 ding from the woods in front of the camps. This was all 
 reported to Sherman, but he had no cavalry to send out to 
 reconnoiter — due to the exchange of the regiments then taking 
 place. 
 
 Saturday afternoon Prentiss, in consequence of reports from 
 his outposts, sent out three companies to reconnoiter. They 
 marched three miles, but, taking the wrong direction, passed 
 along in front of Sherman's outposts instead of encountering 
 the Confederate line, which was less than two miles in front. 
 McClernand, and McPherson, then chief engineer of this army, 
 the same day rode with an escort of cavalry towards Hamburg. 
 They saw a few hostile scouts. 
 
 (84) Patrols from Lew Wallace's division at Crump's 
 Landing developed a considerable force of the enemy at Purdy 
 and Bethel. It was Cheatham's division at those points mak- 
 ing ready to march to the Confederate assembly for battle. 
 Informed of this, General Grant rather looked for an assault 
 on Lew Wallace's camp, and gave orders for supporting 
 Wallace in such an event. Saturday Sherman wrote Grant: 
 "All is quiet along my line now. . . . The enemy has cav- 
 alry in our front, and I think there are two regiments of in- 
 fantry and one battery of artillery about six miles out. . . . 
 I have no doubt that nothing will occur to-day more than some 
 picket-firing. The enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it 
 yesterday, and will not press our pickets far. I will not be 
 drawn out far, unless with certainty of advantage ; and I do not 
 apprehend anything like an attack on our position." On the 
 same day Grant, in reporting events by wire to Halleck, said : 
 "I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) 
 being made upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing 
 take place. General Nelson's division has arrived. The other 
 two of Buell's column will "arrive to-morrow or next day. 
 It is my present intention to send them to Hamburg. . . . 
 From that point to Corinth the road is good, and a junction 
 can be formed with the troops from Pittsburg at almost any 
 
176 American Campaigns. 
 
 point." Earlier in the day Grant had telegraphed: "The 
 main force of the enemy is at Corinth, with troops at different 
 points east. Small garrisons are also at Bethel, Jackson, and 
 Humboldt. . . . The number of the enemy at Corinth, and 
 within supporting distance of it, cannot be far from 80,000." 
 
 General Halleck expected to take command, in person, of the 
 combined forces of Grant and Buell in a few days, and move 
 them on Corinth.* 
 
 (83) Johnston's army bivouacked in order of battle the 
 night of April 5, 1862. It was formed in three lines, with 
 Hardee's corps and one brigade of Bragg's in the first line, the 
 rest of Bragg's corps in the second line, and Polk's corps and 
 Breckinridge's division in the third line.f 
 
 About 3 a.m. on Sunday, the 6th of April, three companies 
 of the 25th Missouri started out from Prentiss's division upon 
 a reconnaissance. They struck the Confederate outposts in 
 front of Sherman's camp at a quarter after five o'clock. Be- 
 fore six the Confederate lines began to advance ; by half after 
 six they had reached the line of the Union outposts, a mile in 
 front of the camps. (85) At six o'clock the 21st Missouri, 
 from Prentiss's division, moved to the front. It encountered 
 the Confederate line about a half-mile from camp, and was 
 driven back. 
 
 The direction of Johnston's advance brought Hardee's line 
 first against the right of Prentiss's division and the left of 
 > Sherman's. These divisions formed for battle as soon as they 
 s~\ were warned of the attack upon their outposts. They were 
 composed of raw troops that had never been under fire before. 
 After a short stand Sherman's left regiment broke and fled 
 to the rear. A little later the other two regiments of his left 
 brigade, Hildebrand's, did likewise. 
 
 (86) The first and second lines of the Confederates, strug- 
 gling through the thick woods, were soon commingled. They 
 became engaged along their whole front. At half after seven 
 o'clock Beauregard ordered Polk and Breckinridge, of the third 
 line, to hasten forward, Polk to the left and Breckinridge to 
 the right.f 
 
 (87) McClernand formed his division on the left of Sher- 
 man, and Hurlbut sent one of his # brigades to their aid. Hurl- 
 but moved his other two brigades toward the gap between the 
 left of Prentiss and the right of Stuart. 
 
 *Force. 
 
 ■\B. & L. — Beauregard. 
 
The Shiloh Campaign. 177 
 
 The division of Prentiss, which had formed line of battle a 
 quarter of a mile in front of its camp, was the first whole divi- 
 sion of the Union line to give way. (88) About nine o'clock 
 it broke and fell back in confusion. Prentiss rallied about 
 1,000 of his men upon a line that W. H. L. Wallace and 
 Hurlbut were forming, with parts of their divisions, in a strong 
 position in rear. "Its peculiar feature consisted in a wood in 
 the center, with a thick undergrowth, flanked on either side by 
 open fields, and with open, but sheltering, woods in front and 
 rear." The Confederates gave this place the name of "Hor- 
 nets' Nest."* 
 
 At 8.30 a.m. W. H. L. Wallace had moved his division from 
 its camp, sending two regiments to help Stuart, on the left; 
 one to Sherman; and two to guard the Snake Creek bridge. 
 Two brigades he was forming on the right of the line at the 
 Hornets' Nest. Hurlbut was forming on his left. Prentiss 
 rallied his men on the center of their line, and took position on 
 the summit of a slope covered by a dense thicket. His right 
 was near the Eastern Corinth Road, and his line was partly in 
 an old sunken road running northwest.f 
 
 (89) Between ten and eleven o'clock Sherman's division, 
 hard-pressed by the enemy, and now reduced to two brigades, 
 badly broken and disordered, fell back to a new position in rear 
 of the Purdy road. Soon afterwards McClernand's division, 
 both of whose flanks were now uncovered and enveloped, also 
 fell back. It formed a new line between Sherman's left and 
 W. H. L. Wallace's right. Hurlbut was also pushed back. 
 
 (90) About noon a strong brigade from the Confederate 
 third line turned Sherman's right, while two other brigades 
 pressed his front. Sherman's battered regiments made a 
 stout fight; but they were gradually forced to the left and 
 rear.f (91) About four o'clock, during a lull, Sherman 
 moved his shattered command still farther in the same direc- 
 tion, and took a position covering the River Road, by which 
 Lew Wallace was expected to bring his division into the battle. 
 In like manner McClernand's division had been outflanked and 
 beaten back step by step. It made its ninth and final stand with 
 its right joining the remnant of Sherman's division. 
 
 At three o'clock, or thereabouts, the extreme left of the 
 Union line, which had been pressed back from one position to 
 another, was finally enveloped and forced to give way alto- 
 
 *B. & L.— Buell. 
 +Force. 
 
178 American Campaigns. 
 
 gether. This exposed Hurlbut's left flank to an overwhelming 
 force of the enemy, under the personal command of General 
 Bragg. Hurlbut and Prentiss and W. H. L. Wallace had suc- 
 cessfully held their ground at the Hornets' Nest for five hours. 
 "One body of Confederates after another had assaulted them, 
 ■only to be repulsed with heavy loss. Divisions and brigades 
 from every one of the Confederate corps had striven in vain to 
 •carry the position. General Johnston, personally, had led one 
 of the regiments in its assault ; and it was in the open ground 
 on the east flank of the Hornets' Nest that he received the 
 wound from which he died at half after two o'clock. 
 
 Seeing his flank turned and his rear about to be assailed 
 Hurlbut withdrew his troops. (92) As the last of his regi- 
 ments were retiring, the left of the Confederate line, under 
 Hardee, which had driven back Sherman and McClernand, 
 was swinging round from the north. It joined flanks with 
 Bragg's line from the south, and these two bodies were now 
 forming a circle of fire round Wallace and Prentiss, at the 
 Hornets' Nest. At this juncture Wallace faced his regiments 
 about. He was killed ; but two of his regiments charged to 
 the rear, and, cutting their way through the enemy, marched to 
 the landing. Prentiss, with the fragments of his own and Wal- 
 lace's divisions, made a desperate stand. It was hopeless ; 
 after nearly an hour more of fierce struggle he surrendered 
 with 2,200 men to overwhelming numbers.* 
 
 (93) Seeing the Union lines drifting back, Colonel Webster 
 of Grant's staff had collected all of the available artillery, about 
 forty or fifty pieces, including some siege guns, at a command- 
 ing position, on the north side of the ravine at the head of 
 Dill's Branch, about a half-mile from the landing. Hurlbut, 
 after his withdrawal from the line at the Hornets' Nest, rallied 
 his troops behind these guns. Other detachments joined him 
 there, making altogether a force of some 4,000 men. Two 
 Federal gunboats at the mouth of the creek lent their aid, also ; 
 but the muzzles of their guns had to be raised so high to clear 
 the bluff that most of the shells fell far away in the woods. 
 
 Bragg tried to gather together a force in order to assault 
 this position. In the confusion incident to Prentiss's surrender 
 at the Hornets' Nest he could muster only two brigades, those 
 of Jackson and Chalmers. These moved into the ravine in front 
 of Hurlbut's line. Meantime Beauregard, who was now in 
 
 *Force. 
 
The Shiloh Campaign. 179 
 
 chief command of the Confederates, had sent out the order, 
 from his position at Shiloh Church, to suspend the attack. 
 Jackson's brigade received the order before it advanced, and 
 did not assault ; Chalmers charged with his brigade alone, and 
 was repulsed. Thus ended, at dusk, the first chapter in the 
 bloody battle of Shiloh. 
 
 (84) Nelson's division of Buell's army, for lack of a guide 
 to show it the way, and on account of the bad road, had taken 
 all day to march from Savannah. One, only, of his brigades, 
 Ammen's, was ferried across the river just in time to see the 
 end: it had two men killed and one wounded. (93) It went 
 into position near Colonel Webster's guns ; the rest of the divi- 
 sion formed there as it arrived, and the division bivouacked 
 there. 
 
 Hurlbut's troops, with some men of the divisions of W. H. L. 
 Wallace and Prentiss, bivouacked about the position they held 
 at the end of the battle. McClernand's shattered division was 
 on their right; and Sherman's command, which, he says in his 
 report, "had become decidedly of a mixed character,"* pro- 
 longed the line of bivouac to the right, on the River Road. 
 Lew Wallace's division, which had taken the wrong road from 
 Crump's Landing in the morning, finally arrived about dark, 
 and bivouacked along the River Road on Sherman's right. 
 Crittenden's division of Buell's army joined during the night; 
 and by five o'clock Monday morning McCook had, also, arrived 
 with a brigade of his division. Buell had come in the after- 
 noon. Two other divisions of his army were far behind. 
 Wood's arrived before the close of the second day's fight, but 
 took little part in it; Thomas's did not reach the field at all 
 during the engagement.f Mitchel's division had gone toward 
 Florence. 
 
 (81) In obedience to General Halleck's orders the Army 
 of the Ohio [Buell] had started from Nashville for Savannah 
 on the 16th of March. At Columbia, on the way, the bridge 
 over Duck River was found in flames, and the river very high. 
 The bridge had to be rebuilt. This delayed the column at 
 Columbia until the 30th. The distance from Nashville to 
 Savannah is about 135 miles; it took Buell's leading division 
 twenty-two days to march it. The journey might have been 
 made in less time, in spite of the burnt bridge, the high water, 
 
 *Sherman. 
 tB. & L. 
 
180 American Campaigns. 
 
 and the bad roads; but Halleck had given Buell no word to 
 make haste. On April 4 Nelson, who commanded the leading 
 division, was notified by General Grant "that he need not 
 hasten his march, as he would not be put across the river 
 before the following Tuesday [the 8th]."* 
 
 (83) The Confederates spent the night of April the 6th in 
 the abandoned camps of Sherman, McClernand, and Prentiss, 
 annoyed by shells from the Union gunboats, which were 
 thrown among them at intervals of fifteen minutes during the 
 whole night. The organizations were hopelessly scattered 
 and mixed. 
 
 (84) General Grant was at breakfast at Savannah, nine 
 miles by water from Pittsburg, when he first heard the guns 
 in the battle of Shiloh. He sent word at once to Nelson, who 
 had arrived at that point with his division, to march it imme- 
 diately to the point opposite Pittsburg Landing; then he hur- 
 ried up the river in his boat. On his way he stopped at 
 Crump's Landing to warn Lew Wallace to be ready to mover 
 from Pittsburg he dispatched an order to Wallace to march 
 his division to the battle. He then rode out to the front, and 
 "visited" his various division commanders. He saw Prentiss 
 at the Hornets' Nest, and ordered him to hold his position 
 there at all hazards. We have seen how Prentiss obeyed the 
 order. 
 
 Buell and Grant met, and talked together a little while, on 
 Grant's boat, at Pittsburg Landing, soon after Buell's arrival. 
 Grant was the senior by recent promotion in the volunteers (as 
 a reward for his capture of Forts Henry and Donelson) ; but 
 he assumed no command over Buell* and gave him no orders. 
 In fact, the two commanders do not appear to have arranged 
 any concerted plan of action. Buell states that he determined 
 on the evening of the 6th to attack the Confederates at day- 
 break on the 7th with his own forces. Grant did not, until the 
 morning of the 7th, issue any order for his troops to advance. 
 
 On this day Beauregard's shattered army was no match for 
 its foe. Every Confederate regiment had been engaged the 
 day before, and the losses had been heavy in officers and men ; 
 about 8,000 had fallen, killed or wounded. Not many more 
 than 20,000 stood in ranks on the morning of the 7th of April. 
 Opposed to these there were 25,000 fresh troops, Buell's forces 
 and Lew Wallace's division, besides the fragments of Grant's 
 
 *B. & L— Buell. 
 
The Shiloh Campaign. 181 
 
 other divisions, perhaps 7,000 men, who had defended them- 
 selves so stanchly the day before.* 
 
 (83) The second day's engagement was brought on by the 
 movement of Nelson's division along the River Road in line 
 of battle. It encountered the Confederates a little in advance 
 of Hurlbut's old camp, at 5.20 a.m.f Crittenden's division 
 formed on Nelson's right, and McCook's, on Crittenden's right. 
 Grant's army was on the right of Buell's, with the remnants of 
 the divisions of Hurlbut, McClernand, and Sherman, in order 
 from left to right, and Lew Wallace's fresh division on the 
 extreme right.J 
 
 Generals Hardee, Breckinridge, Polk, and Bragg took charge 
 of the portions of the mixed Confederate line, in the order 
 named, from right to left. The line was forced back step by 
 step, but had not receded as far as Shiloh Church by half after 
 two o'clock. Beauregard still had his headquarters in the 
 church, from whence, about that hour, he dispatched his aides 
 to his several lieutenants with orders to withdraw. 
 
 A covering force of some 2,000 men was gathered together 
 and posted on high ground within sight of the church. By 
 four o'clock the entire Confederate army, all that was left of 
 it, had retired beyond this force, and not a single Federal sol- 
 dier was in pursuit. Breckinridge commanded the Confed- 
 erate rear-guard, "with Forrest's regiment between him and the 
 enemy." That night the rear-guard bivouacked not more than 
 two miles from Shiloh. The next day [the 8th] Wood's divi- 
 sion, and Sherman with two brigades and the 4th Illinois Cav- 
 alry, went in pursuit. Towards evening they came upon the 
 camp of the Confederate rear-guard a few miles from the 
 battle-field. Forrest charged them, putting the Federal skir- 
 mishers to flight, throwing the cavalry into confusion, and 
 effectually putting an end to the pursuit. § After this Breckin- 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
 fB. & L— iiuell. 
 
 tS. & L.— Grant. 
 
 §In his report to General Grant Sherman says: "The enemy's cav- 
 alry came down boldly at a charge, led by General Forrest in person, 
 breaking through our line of skirmishers; when the regiment of in- 
 fantry without cause, broke, threw away their muskets, and fled. . . . 
 As the regiment of infantry broke, Dickey's cavalry began to discharge 
 their carbines and fell into disorder. . . . The check sustained by 
 us at the fallen timber delayed our advance, so that night came upon 
 us before the wounded were provided for and the dead buried ; and our 
 troops being fagged out by three days' hard fighting, exposure, and 
 privation, I ordered them back to their camps, where they now are." 
 Wyeth's Life of Forrest. Sherman's Memoirs. 
 
182 American Campaigns. 
 
 ridge's detachment rested undisturbed within six miles of the 
 battle-field, while Beauregard's main body retreated to Corinth. 
 
 Grant's troops, from the private soldiers up to the highest 
 commanders, appeared to be content with having recovered 
 their camps; and Buell says that "in some way that idea ob- 
 structed the reorganization of his line, until a further advance 
 that day became impracticable."* General Grant says that the 
 roads were so bad from the heavy rains of the night before and 
 the wheels of the Confederate artillery, and the men were so 
 worn-out, some from two days of battle, others from marching 
 and fighting, he had not the heart to send them in pursuit. f 
 
 In the battle of Shiloh General Grant states that his effec- 
 tive strength in the first day's action was 33,000 men ; for the 
 second day's battle Lew Wallace had joined with 5,000 and 
 Buell with 20,000 fresh troops. The Union loss for the two 
 days was 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded, and 2,885 captured or 
 missing; a total of 13,047. The effective strength of the Con- 
 federate army was between 38,000 and 40,000 men. Its loss 
 was 1,728 killed, 8,012 wounded, and 959 missing; a total of 
 10,699. The Federal loss was more than twenty-four per cent, 
 of their effective strength ; the Confederate more than twenty- 
 six per cent. 
 
 (81) The defeat at Shiloh was not the only Confederate 
 disaster in the west on the 7th of April On the same day 
 Island No. 10, with about 7,000 men, surrendered to the com- 
 bined land and naval forces under General Pope and Com- 
 modore Foote. Pope was thereupon ordered to move his 
 army against Fort Pillow ; but before he had well begun oper- 
 ations against this post he was ordered to transfer his army to 
 Pittsburg Landing. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 The campaign and battle of Shiloh are the hardest of all the 
 campaigns and battles of the Civil War for the student to 
 solve — to sift the truth from; the hardest of them all in which 
 to place the little credit that can be found in the generalship on 
 either side upon the proper commanders ; the hardest of them 
 all in which to fix the blame for mistakes. It is not hard for 
 the student to find abundant faults ; it is only hard for him to 
 fix the responsibility for them. And this all arises from the 
 
 *B. & L.— Buell. 
 fS. &■ L.— Grant. 
 
The Shiloh Campaign. 183 
 
 fact that the generals on each side have fought more bitterly 
 with the pen, among themselves, since the great battle, than 
 they fought, side by side, against their common foe, during 
 the battle. Grant and Buell have contradicted each other in 
 essential particulars on one side; on the other Beauregard 
 and the friends of Johnston have carried on a bitter contro- 
 versy. About all the student can do is to follow the actual 
 operations as nearly as possible and determine for himself 
 wherein they were right and wherein they were wrong, with- 
 out trying to place credit or blame upon individuals. 
 
 Napoleon's Twenty-seventh Maxim says : "When an army 
 is driven from a first position the retreating columns should 
 always rally sufficiently in rear, to prevent any interruption 
 from the enemy. The greatest disaster that can happen is 
 when the columns are attacked in detail." This maxim fitted 
 the case of Johnston's army after it was split in two by the fall 
 of Forts Henry and Donelson and the loss of the direct line of 
 communication between its wings. If General Johnston fully 
 appreciated the importance of reuniting the wings of his army 
 "sufficiently in rear," and as quickly as possible, he certainly 
 did not show his appreciation by prompt action../ There was 
 no way for him to bring his two separated wings together 
 except to retreat with his own (the right wing) to the south 
 of the Tennessee River. He reached Murfreesboro in his 
 retreat from Nashville about the 20th of February, but he did 
 not start from there for Corinth until the 28th of February. In 
 tarrying for more than a week at Murfreesboro, Johnston, no 
 doubt, was influenced by the state of the public mind. Already 
 he had lost Forts Henry and Donelson, the Tennessee and the 
 Cumberland Rivers, his hold upon Kentucky, and the impor- 
 tant town of Nashville. To retreat farther was to surrender 
 the whole of Middle Tennessee to the enemy. The newspapers 
 of the South were all decrying him as a failure, and State dele- 
 gations were demanding his removal. 
 
 After leaving Murfreesboro Johnston's army made the 
 march to Corinth, by way of Decatur., as rapidly as practica- 
 ble under the circumstances. The roads were terribly had, 
 and the streams all swollen ; the distance was something less 
 than 250 miles, and the head of the column reached Corinth on 
 the 18th of March, having averaged about fourteen miles a 
 day. 
 
 For eight or ten days after the fall of Fort Donelson Gen- 
 eral Halleck does not appear to have had in mind any definite 
 
184 American Campaigns. 
 
 \^ and comprehensive plan of operations. "I must have com- 
 mand of the armies in the West," he wrote to the Secretary of 
 War on the 19th and 20th of February, — meaning Buell's 
 army in particular, — "and I will split secession in twain in one 
 month."* How he meant to go about it does not appear. 
 It is plain, however, that he had no thought of destroying 
 Johnston's main army; it is probable that the principal thing 
 he had in mind was to reduce the Confederate forts on the 
 Mississippi, and open that river to navigation. He virtually 
 did nothing until about the 1st of March, when he dispatched 
 the force up the Tennessee under C. F. Smith, to break up the 
 railway junctions, then to return by water to Danville — a 
 sort of steamboat raid. 
 
 This led to the selection of Pittsburg as the camp of Grant's 
 army. Merely as a temporary base from which to make raids 
 against neighboring railway points, this place was good 
 enough so long as it was known that the enemy was not in 
 force within striking distance. Even then it ought to have 
 been protected with field-works. Soon, however, several things 
 
 . happened to change matters, and to shape General Halleck's 
 plans. It became known that the Confederates had evacuated 
 Columbus, and moved its large garrison southward on the 
 railway, and that Johnston was concentrating his scattered 
 forces at Corinth; and, on the 11th of March, Halleck was 
 olaced in supreme command of all the Union forces in this 
 theatre. Then the plan of moving against Johnston at Corinth 
 took form with Halleck, and he ordered Buell to move to 
 Savannah. Although he believed, however, that Johnston had 
 already assembled from 50,000 to 80,000 troops in the neigh- 
 
 J borhood of Corinth, he did not enjoin Buell to march speedily; 
 nor did he order Grant to quit his exposed position at Pitts- 
 burg. He did, however, order him to intrench. 
 
 Nor did the peril of their camps at Pittsburg appeal to Gen- 
 eral Grant, or to any of his subordinate commanders. That 
 they did not fortify their position may be condoned; "hid- 
 ing behind earthworks" had not yet become the fashion. 
 For a commander to intrench his camp in the open, at this 
 time, would perhaps have been regarded as showing timidity ; 
 yet the Confederates had already set Grant and his generals 
 the example at Donelson, and taught them the defensive 
 strength of field-works. The Confederate generals at Corinth 
 were apparently just as careless about the protection of their 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
The Shiloh Campaign. 185 
 
 camps. But that Grant kept his troops at Pittsburg Landing 
 at all, and that his service of "security and information" was 
 performed so inadequately, passes one's understanding. Even 
 though neither side had, as yet, learned how to use its cavalry 
 in this kind of work, one cannot understand how Johnston's 
 entire army could bivouac within two miles of Sherman's head- 
 quarters without having its presence discovered, or even sus- 
 pected, by that general. 
 
 The wisdom of President Lincoln's order placing a single 
 general, albeit the choice fell upon General Halleck, in com- 
 mand of this whole theater of operations, was amply verified in / 
 the campaign. It brought Buell with his army to the field of » 
 Shiloh in time to turn a Union defeat into victory; possibly 
 in time to save Grant's army from capture. After Shiloh it 
 enabled Halleck promptly to assemble there a splendid army 
 of 100,000 troops, nearly every man of which had been tried 
 by the fire of battle. 
 
 In leaving Pope, however, with his five divisions, some 25,- 
 000 men, to operate against New Madrid and Island No. 10, 
 after he had resolved to concentrate against the Confederates 
 at Corinth, Halleck made a mistake. A small "containing" 
 force might have been left to watch the Confederates at those 
 points ; but Pope, with his main body, ought to have been has- 
 tened to a junction with Grant and Buell. A commander 
 should have only one main objective at a time, and he should 
 direct all of his troops, all of his operations, with reference 
 to that single objective. Johnston's army assembling at Cor- 
 inth was, or ought to have been, Halleck's single objective 
 for the time. To overtake that army and destroy it ought to 
 have been Halleck's first single purpose. "When you have 
 resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole force."* Halleck 
 had the three armies of Grant, Pope, and Buell within the 
 theatre; he ought to have let go all other objectives for the 
 time, and concentrated those three armies for battle with John- 
 ston. Every company left operating against the Confederate 
 posts on the Mississippi which did not keep an equivalent 
 force of Confederates from joining Johnston's main body was 
 a company wrongly employed. Pope's army ought to have 
 taken part in the battle of Shiloh. 
 
 Nor would the Confederate detachments in those two for- 
 ward and isolated posts have had any chance of holding out 
 after the main Confederate army had fallen back to Corinth. 
 
 ♦Napoleon's Maxim XXIX. 
 
186 American Campaigns. 
 
 As the little force of 7,000 or 8,000 men, however, "contained" 
 more than thrice their number of the enemy, Pope's army, the 
 sacrifice would have been amply justified if it had resulted in 
 a Confederate victory at Shiloh. 
 
 (84) On the 3rd of April, just before the movement on 
 Shiloh, the main body of Johnston's army was at Corinth, with 
 two bad roads to march by; one division was at Burnsville, a 
 railway station fifteen miles to the east ; another division was at 
 Bethel, a station twenty miles to the north. These columns 
 were to converge near Mickey's, a road-center about eight 
 miles from Pittsburg Landing. Owing to poor maps, bad 
 •> roads, and inexperience and inefficiency on the part of officers 
 and men, the concentration was made so slowly that the 
 attack planned for daylight of the 5th could not take place un- 
 til the 6th. This not only lessened the chances of taking the 
 Union army unawares but also enabled Buell to reach the 
 ground in time to defeat the Confederates on the 7th. This 
 incident illustrates, alike, the importance of good maps; the 
 importance of carefully reckoning with the elements of time, 
 distance, the condition of the roads, and the quality of the 
 troops, in combining movements ; and the obligation that rests- 
 upon every subordinate commander, from the second in com- 
 mand down to the platoon-commanders, to carry out his part 
 •of the plan in spite of all hindrances. 
 
 By their defeat at Shiloh the Confederates were thrown back 
 U upon Corinth, losing all hold upon Tennessee west of the moun- 
 tains, except two or three forts on the Mississippi, which were 
 soon wrested from them ; the South experienced the severest 
 blow it had as yet received ; the way was opened for Halleck to* 
 assemble 100,000 troops, without any interference ; and the op- 
 portunity was made for him, if he had possessed the will and 
 the ability to avail himself of it, to crush the remnant of Beau- 
 regard's beaten army within a few days, and to "split secession, 
 in twain in one month," as he had promised to do. 
 
 So much for the strategy of the campaign. We have not 
 enough time and space within an hour's lecture to devote to> 
 the tactics of the engagement. Hours might easily be spent in 
 pointing out faults and mistakes; but probably no other great 
 battle of the Civil War furnished fewer examples of good tac- 
 tics for the student to emulate than the battle of Shiloh, espe- 
 cially the first day's action. 
 
 The first and most glaring fault to be noticed is that neither 
 hostile army on that day was commanded in fact. The two- 
 
The Shiloh Campaign. 187 
 
 armies fought without head. To this circumstance all the 
 other errors and shortcomings may properly be charged. Gen- 
 eral Grant was not on the field at all until several hours after 
 the engagement began, and neither he nor General Johnston 
 established headquarters from which to direct or control his 
 forces. Grant "visited" his several division commanders, and 
 gave them some verbal orders ; but the different positions were 
 taken up without any direction from him. Hurlbut and W. H. 
 L. Wallace had sent forward reinforcements from their respect- 
 ive divisions, as they judged best, and had moved forward to 
 form their line before General Grant arrived. General John- 
 ston went immediately into the thick of the battle, and "was 
 killed doing the work of a brigadier."* At one time General 
 Johnston, Commander-in-Chief; General Breckinridge, Ex- 
 Vice-President of the United States; and Governor Harris of 
 Tennessee were all three found leading a single regiment for- 
 ward. f General Grant and General Johnston, as army com- 
 manders, exerted very little influence upon the character of 
 the tactics in this great battle. 
 
 (83) Johnston and Beauregard had planned to make their 
 "main attack" against the Union left, with a view to driving the 
 army back upon Snake Creek and Owl Creek. The onset, 
 however, developed into a simple frontal attack all along the 
 line. "The front of attack, which was at first less than 2,000 
 yards in length, in three hours extended from the Tennessee 
 River, on the east, to Owl Creek, on the west, nearly four 
 miles. . . . The attack was turning both flanks, and break- 
 ing the center, all at once, — a procedure only to be used by an 
 overwhelming force. The Federals, instead of being driven 
 down the river, as the intention was, were driven to the land- 
 ing, where their gunboats and supplies were."* 
 
 The Union army, which should have been in a "position in 
 readiness," "was scattered about in isolated camps. . . . 
 There was no defensive line, no point of assembly, no proper 
 outposts, no one to give orders in the absence of the regular 
 commander, whose headquarters were nine miles away. The 
 greenest troops (the divisions of Prentiss and Sherman) were 
 in the most exposed positions. Sherman had three brigades on 
 the right, and one on the left, with an interval of several 
 miles between them."* 
 
 "The Confederate formation shows the mistake of using ex- 
 
 ♦Lecture by Major Swift. 
 fForce. 
 
188 American Campaigns. 
 
 tended lines instead of deep formations for attack. The long 
 lines, moving forward, spread out to right and left. Gaps in 
 the forward line were filled by portions of the lines coming up 
 from the rear. Corps, divisions, and brigades were soon mixed 
 in hopeless confusion. Attacks were made and lost before sup- 
 porting troops came up, and the action degenerated into a series 
 of isolated combats, which were without a general plan, and 
 ineffective. No one knew from whom to take orders. One 
 regiment received orders from three different corps-comman- 
 ders within a short time. As a result many aimless and con- 
 flicting orders were issued which unnecessarily exhausted and 
 discouraged the troops. The highest commanders, including 
 the adjutant-general, went into the fight, and devoted them- 
 selves to urging the troops forward, without any plan or sys- 
 tem. By 11 a.m. there was not a reserve on the field. Instead 
 of feeding the fight with their own troops, the corps-comman- 
 ders finally sought various parts of the field, and took com- 
 mand without regard to the order of battle. Bragg may be 
 found at the center, at the right, and then at the left. . . . 
 Beauregard remained near Shiloh, without a reserve, and un- 
 able to exercise any influence on the battle."* 
 
 On the Federal side the tactics were, if possible, worse. 
 With no prearranged plan, there was want of cohesion and con- 
 cert of action between the various units. Regiments were 
 rarely overcome in front, but each one fell back because the 
 regiment on its right or left had done so, and exposed its flank. 
 Then it continued its backward movement, in turn exposing the 
 flank of its neighbor, which then must needs, also, fall hack. 
 Once in operation this process repeated itself indefinitely. The 
 reserves were not judiciously used to counteract partial re- 
 verses, and to preserve the front of battle. f 
 
 The straggling, or rather skulking, on the Confederate side, 
 and the fleeing to the rear on the Union side, were frightful 
 among the raw troops. On the Union side crowds of terror- 
 stricken fugitives, estimated all the way from 5,000 to 15,000, 
 huddled under the bluffs at the riverside ;$ at the close of the 
 day Grant had no more than 4,000 men in line. On the Con- 
 federate side it was hardly any better. "The victorious troops 
 had been demoralized by reckless attacks, which were never 
 supported, and thousands of them immediately gave up the bat- 
 
 *Major Swift. 
 
 %B. & L. — Beauregard. 
 
 JRopes. 
 
The Shiloh Campaign. 189 
 
 tie to pillage the camps."* It is probable that "the debris of 
 the army surging back upon" Beauregard at Shiloh, two miles 
 in rear, influenced him to order the attack to cease.f He has 
 been much blamed for that order ; but it is not at all likely that 
 he could have carried the last position taken by his enemy that 
 evening. Bragg had only got together two brigades for the 
 attack, and one of them had no ammunition. Furthermore, 
 Nelson's Federal division was just arriving, and night was at 
 hand. 
 
 In his own account of the engagement General Beauregard 
 intimates that he was aware that Buell's army was arriving.^ 
 If such was the case, he made a mistake in remaining on the 
 field that night. There was no chance for his depleted army 
 after Buell arrived ; he ought to have withdrawn it as quickly, 
 and with as little loss, as possible. All of his stubborn resist- 
 ance on the second day was a useless sacrifice of life. Nothing 
 was to be gained by continuing the battle against overwhelm- 
 ing numbers of fresh troops. 
 
 The character of the battle-field, in general thickly covered 
 with forest, was not favorable for the employment of artillery 
 or cavalry. The artillery, however, in spite of the woods, 
 played an important part in the battle. We find batteries giv- 
 ing strong help at every point of attack and defense. Guns 
 were lost on both sides; some were taken and retaken. The 
 last stand of the Federals, on Sunday evening, was made near 
 a line of guns hastily collected. Those guns played a con- 
 spicuous part in the last act of this day of battle. One battery 
 only disgraced itself, the 13th Ohio Battery. When the first 
 Confederate shell fell among them the men deserted their guns 
 and fled incontinently. "The 13th was blotted out, and on 
 Ohio's roster its place remained a blank throughout the war."§ 
 
 The Union cavalry does not appear to have done anything 
 during the battle; on the side of the Confederates Forrest's 
 horsemen charged a battery, capturing some of its guns ; swept 
 through the shattered Union left, cutting off the troops of 
 Prentiss; and, on the second day, covered the withdrawal of 
 the beaten army, forming the very last line of the rear-guard.^ 
 On the 8th they boldly charged Sherman's column and put 
 an end to the Union pursuit. 
 
 *Major Swift. 
 
 tB. & L.—W. Preston Johnston. 
 
 %B. & L. Beauregard. 
 
 §Force. 
 
 fWyeth. . 
 
190 American Campaigns. 
 
 "The first day at Shiloh shows, better than any other in our 
 history," Major Swift thinks, "the kind of work performed by 
 a raw army before it has had experience and discipline." 
 Speaking of the throng of scared fugitives back at the landing, 
 General Grant says: "Most of these men afterwards proved 
 themselves as gallant as any of those who saved the battle 
 from which they had deserted."* That is to say that with 
 training and service they afterwards became good soldiers. 
 
 *B. & L.— Grant. 
 
LECTURE X. 
 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 
 
 (94) The Peninsular Campaign and Stonewall Jackson's 
 operations in the Shenandoah Valley in 1862 were so closely 
 related that, to comprehend the strategy of either, it is neces- 
 sary to study them together. As we shall take the Valley 
 Campaign in our next lecture, we will only refer to it in this 
 one as occasion may require. 
 
 On the 22nd of July, 1861, the day after the battle of Bull 
 Run, the President called General McClellan from the scene of 
 his victories in West Virginia to the command of all the Fed- 
 eral forces in and about Washington. It would not have 
 been possible for the President to select another man whose 
 appointment would have been so acceptable to the people, the 
 newspaper press, and the army. Up to this time McClellan 
 had achieved success in every place that he had occupied in 
 life. He was graduated second in the class of 1846 at West 
 Point — the class in which Stonewall Jackson was graduated 
 seventeenth and George E. Pickett fifty-ninth. As an en- 
 gineer with Scott's army in Mexico he distinguished himself 
 for efficiency, and won brevets for gallantry. He was se- 
 lected as one of the Government's observers in the Crimean 
 War, and his report on the campaign was published by 
 special act of Congress. He was appointed a captain in the 
 4th Cavalry [then the 1st] when it was organized in 1855. 
 Two years later he resigned, and at the outbreak of the war 
 was a railway president. At the time of his appointment to 
 command the troops at Washington the eyes of the whole 
 country were centered upon him. He was the only Union 
 general that had as yet scored complete success. His opera- 
 tions in West Virginia had been pronounced "brief and bril- 
 liant." The rest of his military career you will follow in our 
 lectures. He was a man of fine soldierly appearance and 
 engaging manner, thirty-five years of age. 
 
 The people of the South were greatly elated over their vic- 
 tory at Bull Run ; the people of the North were humiliated 
 rather than disheartened by their defeat. They learned from 
 it that the Southern. States were not to be kept in the Union 
 without a tremendous struggle; and they determined at once 
 
192 American Campaigns. 
 
 to make the struggle. "The very day of the battle the House 
 of Representatives voted for the enlistment of 500,000 volun- 
 teers."* Troops immediately began pouring into Washington, 
 and by the middle of October more than 100,000 new men had 
 arrived. 
 
 McClellan's immediate task was to organize this mass of 
 recruits into the form of an army and to have them drilled and 
 trained into soldiers. For such work he had a genius, and the 
 Army of the Potomac, which he created, bore the impress of 
 his genius throughout its entire service, even to its last cam- 
 paign under General Grant in 1865. At first the people, the 
 newspapers, and the President and his advisers had perfect 
 confidence in McClellan, and they left him entirely untram- 
 meled in his work. This condition lasted for about three 
 months ; then they all began to lose confidence in him. 
 
 On the 1st of November General Scott was retired, and 
 McClellan was promoted to succeed him as Commander-in- 
 Chief of all the land forces. He then wrought out a scheme 
 in which all the armies were to bear a part, and undertook to 
 command them all from Washington. We have seen how 
 poorly his long-distance command succeeded in the West. A 
 part of this general scheme consisted of a series of expeditions 
 by sea, with the assistance of the navy, against points along the 
 Southern coast. These expeditions met with complete success, 
 and by May of 1862 most of the important seaports of the 
 South, among them New Orleans, and with it the Mississippi 
 River as far up as Port Hudson, were occupied by garrisons of 
 Union troops. These successes greatly lessened the task of 
 blockading the coast. 
 
 Meantime the Confederate army under Joseph E. Johnston 
 stayed in its trenches at Centreville, and no active steps were 
 taken by McClellan to destroy or dislodge it. This inaction was 
 what aroused the distrust of the people and the Administration 
 in the commanding general. Other things happened to aggra- 
 vate their distrust. About the 1st of October the Confed- 
 erates were allowed to set up batteries on the lower Potomac, 
 which closed the navigation of the river and sealed up Wash- 
 ington as a port. McClellan never could be persuaded by the 
 President or public opinion to destroy those batteries. They 
 remained until Johnston retired from Centreville. Then befell 
 the unfortunate affair at Ball's Bluff, on the 21st of October, 
 still further to increase the impatience of the public with 
 
 ♦Ropes. 
 
The Peninsular Campaign. 193 
 
 McClellan's management of the army. At Ball's Bluff, near 
 Leesburg, a small Union force was ferried across the Potomac, 
 and through bad management was destroyed. Colonel Baker, 
 who had lately resigned his seat in the Senate, was slain, and 
 nearly all the men in the detachment were killed, drowned, or 
 captured. 
 
 At this time McClellan's army was more than twice as strong 
 as Johnston's, but the Union commander was led by the reports 
 of his secret-service department to believe that the Confederate 
 army was twice as large as it really was.* McClellan at first 
 expected to move against Johnston's army in Centreville as 
 soon as he could feel that his own army was in condition to 
 take the offensive against it. This was the plan of campaign 
 always favored by the President. But toward the end of 
 November McClellan conceived the project of making Rich- 
 mond his objective.* 
 
 His plan was to transport his army as secretly as possible by 
 water to Urbana on the lower Rappahannock; from there to 
 make a dash overland, about fifty miles, and capture the Con- 
 federate capital, before Johnston could march his army from 
 Centreville to its protection. Washington was by this time 
 thoroughly fortified, and McClellan purposed leaving a small 
 force to defend the works ; but he believed that his movement 
 against Richmond would induce Johnston to march the Con- 
 federate army to that quarter immediately. The President 
 and his advisers did not favor this plan or any other that pro- 
 posed removing the Army of the Potomac from between the 
 main Confederate army and Washington. 
 
 But winter was now at hand, and the roads in Virginia had 
 become so bad that McClellan did not believe it practicable to 
 march a large army over them. To make matters worse 
 McClellan took typhoid fever, and was ill for several weeks 
 during December and January.' So the army remained in its 
 camps at Washington; the people became more and more 
 impatient ; the newspapers demanded an advance ; and the 
 President was in despair. 
 
 Finally President Lincoln, who stood as a buffer between the 
 insistent public and the newspapers on one side, and the inac- 
 tive army under McClellan on the other, issued the first of his 
 famous "war orders." It directed that the army should ad- 
 vance against the force under Johnston on or before the 22nd 
 of February — Washington's birthday was chosen doubtless 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
194 American Campaigns. 
 
 for reasons of sentiment. This order was not carried into 
 effect. The President issued two other "war orders" with his 
 own hand. None of them had any influence on the operations 
 of the army, and they are interesting mainly as curiosities of 
 military literature. Their real purpose was probably more 
 to allay the popular impatience than anything else.* After 
 much correspondence and the exchange of several "memo- 
 randums" between the President and General McClellan, and 
 many conferences and councils of war, the movement by way 
 of Urbana was finally decided upon about the 8th of March. 
 (95) The very next day Johnston, who must have got secret 
 information of this decision, withdrew his forces from Centre- 
 ville and the Potomac, and by the 11th of March was in 
 position south of the Rappahannock with his right at Freder- 
 icksburg and his left at Culpeper Court House. f This move- 
 ment placed the Confederate army virtually as near Richmond 
 as the Union army would be at Urbana, and thus destroyed 
 the chief advantage of the movement by way of Urbana. It 
 was therefore decided to transfer the Union army by water to 
 Fort Monroe, and make that fortress the first base of opera- 
 tions. Fort Monroe was in the possession of a Federal 
 garrison. f 
 
 In order, however, first to "give the troops a little experi- 
 ence on the march and in bivouac, get rid of extra baggage, 
 and test the working of the staff-departments," McClellan 
 marched his army out to Johnston's abandoned camps at Cen- 
 treville and back to Alexandria.^ As soon as McClellan 
 moved into the field the President issued an order relieving 
 him from duty as Commander-in-Chief of all the forces, and 
 restricting his command to the Army of the Potomac. This 
 army was now organized in four corps of three divisions each, 
 as follows : First Corps, McDowell — divisions, Franklin, 
 McCall, and King; Second Corps, Sumner — divisions, Rich- 
 ardson, Blenker, and Sedgwick; Third Corps, Heintzelman — 
 divisions, Porter, Hooker, and Kearny; Fourth Corps, Keyes 
 — divisions, Couch, W. F. Smith, and Casey.§ The reserve 
 artillery under General Hunt, a brigade of regular infantry 
 under Sykes, and the cavalry under Philip St. George Cooke, 
 were attached to army headquarters.^ 
 
 *J. F. Rhodes's History of the U. S. 
 
 •fLongstreet's From Manassas to Appomattox. 
 
 JS. & L.— McClellan. 
 
 §The force under Banks along the upper Potomac with headquarters 
 at Frederick City, Maryland, at this time formed the Fifth Corps of 
 the Army of the Potomac. 
 
The Peninsular Campaign. 195 
 
 The embarkation for Fort Monroe began at Alexandria on 
 the 17th of March. On account of Stonewall Jackson's ac- 
 tivity in the Shenandoah Valley, of which we shall hear more 
 in the next lecture, the President held back the First Corps 
 [McDowell] for the safety of Washington. He also withdrew 
 Blenker's division of the Second Corps and dispatched it to 
 Fremont in West Virginia. Other troops that McClellan 
 had expected to have were also withheld ; so that when he had 
 got his army well started on his campaign, McClellan found 
 himself in command of only 92,000 men, instead of 155,000, 
 the number he had counted upon.* He was later reinforced 
 to 105,000 men. 
 
 (96) Furthermore, in his contemplated advance up the 
 Peninsular from Fort Monroe, McClellan had counted upon the 
 active cooperation of the navy in the York and the James 
 Rivers. In this expectation he was also for a time disap- 
 pointed. The Confederates had batteries at Yorktown and 
 Gloucester Point which the navy could neither risk to attack 
 nor to pass; and Norfolk, at the mouth of the James, was in 
 possession of a Confederate garrison, and harbored the ram 
 Merrimac, effectually closing that river to* the Union vessels. 
 
 On the 8th of March the Merrimac had steamed out of har- 
 bor and sunk two Federal frigates in Hampton Roads. The 
 next day the ram engaged the Monitor, and was forced to re- 
 turn to Norfolk in a damaged condition. It was not, however, 
 destroyed, and all that the Federal navy could promise McClel- 
 lan was to protect the ships bearing troops to Fort Monroe. 
 
 The Peninsula, lying between the York and the James 
 Rivers, less than six miles wide at its narrowest part, "is a low, 
 level, and marshy region."f Fort Monroe was about seventy 
 miles from Richmond, and the only formidable natural obstacle 
 on the way, known to McClellan, was the Chickahominy River 
 and adjacent swamps. The York River, formed by the junc- 
 tion of the Mattapony and the Pamunkey, was navigable up to 
 this junction. Here stood West Point, the eastern terminus 
 of the Richmond and York River Railway. Richmond was at 
 the head of navigation, on the north bank of the James. The 
 highways of the Peninsula were all earthen roads. 
 
 McClellan knew that the works at Yorktown, some twenty- 
 five miles up the Peninsula, were held by Magruder with 
 
 *B. & L— McClellan. 
 ■^International Encyclopedia. 
 
196 American Campaigns. 
 
 18(000 to 15,000 Confederates, and that the enemy had several 
 other intrenched positions along the way. He also knew that 
 Johnston's main army would be able to march promptly to this 
 quarter, and that the Confederate force at Norfolk was 8,000 
 or 10,000 strong. Without awaiting the arrival of his whole 
 army, therefore, he "determined," he says, "to move at once 
 with the force in hand, and endeavor to seize a point — near the 
 Halfway House — between Yorktown and Williamsburg, where 
 the Peninsula is reduced to a narrow neck, and thus cut off the 
 retreat of the Yorktown garrison, and prevent the arrival of 
 reinforcements."* 
 
 The movement began on the 4th of April in two columns, the 
 Third Corps [Heintzelman] on the road to the right; the 
 Fourth Corps [Keyes] on the road to the left. On the after- 
 noon of the 5th both columns had been stopped, the right by 
 the works in front of Yorktown ; the left at Lee's Mills, where 
 the Warwick River was found to be unfordable and strongly 
 intrenched. In fact this river, instead of coming down from 
 the north to Lee's Mills, as McClellan had supposed it did, was 
 found to run athwart the Peninsula from the fortifications at 
 Yorktown to the James.* By means of several dams Magru- 
 der had rendered the Warwick unfordable throughout almost 
 its whole length, and, with his field-works, had made a formi- 
 dable and continuous line of defense about thirteen miles long, 
 entirely across the Peninsula. (97) McClellan concluded that 
 the line could not be carried by assault. He brought up 
 the Second Corps [Sumner], and prepared to carry it by a 
 regular seige. At this juncture he was on the point of order- 
 ing the First Corps [McDowell], 30,000 strong, to move 
 against Gloucester, when he learned by telegraph that this 
 corps had been detained near Washington. f 
 
 As soon as he found out what McClellan's line of operation 
 was to be, President Davis, after consultation with Johnston, 
 ordered that general to march his army to the Peninsula. This 
 army joined the force under Magruder a few days after the 
 Union army arrived in front of his position. Johnston took 
 command of the combined Confederate forces. 
 
 Heavy ordnance was shipped to McClellan, and the siege- 
 works were pushed with great energy. Everything would be 
 ready, and the batteries were to open fire on the 5th of May — 
 just a month after the line was reached by the head of the 
 
 *B. & L.— McClellan. 
 fRopes. 
 
Thf. Peninsular Campaign. 197 
 
 Union columns. "It was confidently expected that the Confed- 
 erates could not possibly sustain for more than a few hours the 
 terrible fire of the Union seige-guns and mortars."* Johnston 
 had no intention of awaiting this fire ; on the night of the 3rd 
 of May he withdrew his army from the works and started for 
 Richmond. The army marched by the two roads that con- 
 verged at Williamsburg. Stuart with his cavalry covered the 
 rear of both columns. 
 
 All the available Federal cavalry, under General Stone- 
 man, took up the pursuit at once. It had four batteries 
 of horse-artillery with it, and was supported by Hooker's 
 division [Third Corps] and Smith's division [Fourth Corps]. 
 (98) The Union cavalry overtook Stuart's squadrons within 
 eight miles of Yorktown on the afternoon of the 4th, and 
 pushed them on toward Williamsburg. About two miles in 
 front of this town Magruder, in anticipation of a retirement 
 from Yorktown, had constructed a strong line of defense. 
 Fort Magruder, near the center, was connected with deep 
 creeks on either side by a string of redoubts. 
 
 Longstreet's division formed the rear-guard of the Confed- 
 erate army ; it took post on this line to hold back the Federals 
 until the trains could get well on their way. The roads were 
 so deep with mud, caused by several days of heavy rain, that 
 the trains moved very slowly. The next day, May the Sth, the 
 Federals engaged Longstteet in a battle that lasted nearly 
 all day. Longstreet was reinforced by D. H. Hill's division. 
 Hooker, on the Union left, opened the battle with an attack on 
 Fort Magruder. The Confederates reinforced that part of 
 their line and repulsed Hooker. They then made several 
 counter-attacks upon him, and strove to envelop his flank. 
 Hooker's division suffered severely, but stood its ground, until 
 Kearny's division [Third Corps], which had been delayed by 
 the mud, came up to its relief late in the afternoon. 
 
 Smith's Union division, over on the Yorktown road, had not 
 engaged the enemy during the morning. About noon Han- 
 cock's brigade of this division advanced by a wide circuit to 
 the north, nearly to the York River, crossed the creek by an old 
 'bridge, and seized two redoubts which the Confederates had 
 not occupied. They were on the flank and rear of Long- 
 street's position. D. H. Hill undertook to dislodge Hancock, 
 but was repulsed. That night Longstreet withdrew, and 
 marched to rejoin the main army, having held back the Union 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
198 American Campaigns. 
 
 army long enough to secure the trains. The Union losses at 
 the battle of Williamsburg were 2,283, of which 1,575 occurred 
 in Hooker's division.* Longstreet lost l,565.f 
 
 General McClellan was not present at this battle until near 
 the close of the day. Franklin's division of the First Corps 
 [McDowell] had, upon his urgent request for reinforcements, 
 been dispatched to him from Washington, and he was back at 
 Yorktown embarking it for West Point. From this point 
 McClellan purposed that a column should move against John- 
 ston's retreating army and trains ; but Johnston had anticipated 
 such a movement, and had sent G. W. Smith's division to op- 
 pose it. Smith attacked Franklin and drove him back, and the 
 "Confederates passed on unhindered toward Richmond. "J 
 
 The left wing and center of the Union army followed the 
 Confederates' very leisurely. The right wing moved by water 
 to White House on the Pamunkey, where McClellan estab- 
 lished his headquarters on the 16th of May.J 
 
 The withdrawal of the Confederates from the Yorktown line 
 left Gloucester and Norfolk isolated and liable to be cut off 
 and captured any day; so they were both evacuated imme- 
 diately. As the Merrimac in Norfolk harbor was of too great 
 draft to be taken up the James, and, of course, could not go to 
 sea with no port to put back into, it was destroyed by the Con- 
 federates. The James was now clear for the Union fleet to a 
 point within seven or eight miles of Richmond. At that point 
 obstructions had been placed in the river, and a Confederate 
 fort stood upon Drewry's Bluff, on the right bank. On the 
 15th of May a fleet of iron-clads under Commodore Rodgers 
 attempted to reduce this fort and pass it; but the fleet was 
 defeated after an action of four hours. $ The York, of course, 
 was open to its head. 
 
 Up to these points the Union navy now had undisputed con- 
 trol of these two navigable rivers and the adjacent seas. 
 McClellan had established his base at White House,, twenty- 
 two or twenty-three miles from Richmond, and was receiving 
 supplies there by water from Washington and New York. On 
 the withdrawal of Johnston from the Rappahannock, McDow- 
 ell with the First Corps, 30,000 strong, had advanced to that 
 line, and was now opposite Fredericksburg scarcely sixty miles 
 from White House. Stonewall Jackson having withdrawn 
 
 *B. & L. 
 
 fLongstreet. 
 
 JRopes. 
 
The Peninsular Campaign. 199 
 
 his little detachment up the Shenandoah Valley, Shield's divi- 
 sion of Bank's corps was, on the 1st of May, ordered to quit 
 the Valley and join McDowell at Fredericksburg. McDowell 
 wa's now only awaiting the arrival of this division, when he 
 should march his command to join McClellan in order to assist 
 in the capture of Richmond. A Confederate detachment un- 
 der General J. R. Anderson, 9,000 strong, was in front of 
 McDowell at Hanover Junction.* 
 
 The Confederate authorities at this time were "well aware 
 that McClellan's army, apart from McDowell's corps, out- 
 numbered that of Johnston nearly three to two." Johnston's 
 "being only about 50,000 strong."t It looked to them as if 
 Richmond could hardly be saved, and "preparations were made 
 for the instant removal of the military papers" from that city. 
 The real danger would come with the movement of McDowell's 
 corps upon Richmond and the flank of Johnston's army. Some- 
 thing must, therefore, be done to divert this corps. 
 
 General Lee was now at President Davis's side, as his mili- 
 tary adviser, and was in general charge of the military opera- 
 tions of the Confederacy. He had been in correspondence 
 with Jackson for the purpose of arranging a plan to draw 
 McDowell and the attention of Washington towards the Valley 
 of the Shenandoah. As the result Jackson was reinforced by 
 Ewell's division, and, about the 1st of May, he began a series 
 of rapid movements that caused the President, on the 24th 
 of May, to order McDowell, "laying aside for the present the 
 movement on Richmond, to put 20,000 men in motion at once 
 for the Shenandoah.''^ 
 
 From White House McClellan had resumed his advance 
 against Richmond on the 17th of May. He had reorganized 
 the troops under his immediate command into five corps, mak- 
 ing some changes in the arrangement of the divisions. The 
 Fifth Corps, under Fitz-John Porter, consisted of the divi- 
 sions of Morell, McCall, and Sykes ; the Sixth Corps, under 
 Franklin, of the divisions of Slocum and W. F. Smith. These 
 were the two newly formed corps. 
 
 (99) Johnston had withdrawn to the south side of the 
 Chickahominy, and McClellan encountered little opposition to 
 his advance. Pie moved very leisurely, however, and it was 
 not till the 20th of May that his columns reached the Chicka- 
 
 *MUiiary Memoirs of a Confederate. — E. P. Alexander. 
 
 tRopes. 
 
 XRebellion Records, XVIII-219. 
 
200 American Campaigns. 
 
 hominy, only about twelve miles from White House. By the 
 25th the Third and Fourth Corps [Heintzelman and Keyes] 
 had crossed at Bottom's Bridge and taken position on the south 
 side of the stream. The other three corps stayed on the north 
 bank of the Chickahominy, extending from the railway to the 
 Mechanicsville Road. This position astride the Chickahominy 
 was taken when McClellan expected to be joined on his right 
 by McDowell's corps from Fredericksburg. But the position 
 was retained even after McClellan was advised that McDowell 
 should not join him. 
 
 The Chickahominy was ordinarily an insignificant stream, 
 but it flowed through a marshy bottom, and was liable to be 
 turned into a formidable obstacle by a heavy rain. Trestle- 
 bridges were built to facilitate communication between the two 
 parts of the army, but they might at any time be carried away 
 by high water. In fact, the Union army was in a hazardous 
 situation. 
 
 The army's line of communications was the Richmond and 
 York River Railway. In order to make this line secure from 
 attack, and to clear his right flank and rear of the enemy, 
 McClellan dispatched Porter, on the 27th of May, against An- 
 derson's Confederate detachment, which was supposed to be in 
 the neighborhood of Hanover Court House. Porter de- 
 feated this detachment, or a part of it, and drove it toward 
 Richmond. 
 
 Johnston's army was now within the intrenchments around 
 Richmond, facing in the direction of the enemy. It was about 
 63,000 strong, having received some reinforcements, and was 
 organized in four strong divisions under Longstreet, D. H. 
 Hill, Magruder, and Gustavus W. Smith, and two small divi- 
 sions under A. P. Hill and Huger, and Stuart's cavalry.* 
 
 Johnston determined to take advantage of McClellan's 
 faulty position to attack his left wing south of the Chicka- 
 hominy ; he issued the order for his troops to be in position to 
 make the attack at daybreak on the 31st of May. On this day 
 the stations of the Federal corps were as follows : the 
 Fourth Corps [Keyes] was near Seven Pines and Fair Oaks 
 Station, about seven miles from Richmond; Kearny's division 
 of the Third Corps [Heintzelman] was about four miles far- 
 ther east, near Bottom's Bridge; Hooker's division was three 
 miles south of this point, guarding the bridge over White Oak 
 Swamp Creek; the other three corps were on the north hank 
 
 *B. & L. 
 
The Peninsular Campaign. 201 
 
 of the Chickahominy, Sedgwick's division of the Second Corps 
 [Sumner] being at the Grapevine or Upper Bridge, and Rich- 
 ardson's at the Lower Bridge. Franklin's corps [the Sixth] 
 was on the right of Sumner's, and Porter's [the Fifth] pro- 
 longed the line to Mechanicsville. The entire line was nearly 
 fifteen miles long. 
 
 The country between the Chickahominy and White Oak 
 Swamp was a low wooded marsh, with here and there a patch 
 of clearing. It was difficult for infantry and impracticable 
 for cavalry. A heavy rain fell the night of the 30th of May, 
 making the roads almost impassable, raising the Chickahominy, 
 and rendering the bridges unsafe for passage. 
 
 Johnston's plan of attack was simple, and ought to have been 
 effective. The attack was to fall first upon the troops at Seven 
 Pines and Fair Oaks. Longstreet's division was to move by 
 the Nine-mile Road, D. H. Hill's by the Williamsburg Road, 
 and Huger's by the Charles City Road. G. W. Smith's divi- 
 sion was to remain at the road-fork near Old Tavern, to guard 
 the left flank of the main attack against troops from the other 
 side of the Chickahominy, or otherwise to support the main 
 attack. Magruder and A. P. Hill were to remain in position, 
 guarding the Chickahominy north of Richmond, but ready to 
 join in the battle if summoned. 
 
 Longstreet was to command the main attack. He appears 
 to have mistaken his orders, which were given verbally; in- 
 stead of marching his own division by the Nine-mile Road he 
 got part of it on the Charles City Road in front of Huger, and 
 part on the Williamsburg Road in rear of D. H. Hill. Instead 
 of attacking at daybreak it was 1 p.m. before the attack was 
 made; then D. H. Hill's division attacked alone. A severe 
 battle ensued, and Hill gained some advantage. After several 
 hours Kearny came up with his division, and for a time the 
 Union line of battle was reestablished. Then one of Long- 
 street's brigades reinforced Hill, and the Federal line was 
 driven back; the battle on the Williamsburg Road closed at 
 about half-past six, and the troops bivouacked there, a mile and 
 a half east of Seven Pines.* 
 
 Huger's division and six of Longstreet's brigades had 
 scarcely fired a shot. There had, however, been other fighting 
 at the battle of Fair Oaks. About 2.30 p.m. Sumner, with 
 Sedgwick's division of the Second Corps and a battery, started 
 to Keyes's assistance by way of the Grapevine Bridge. The 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
202 American Campaigns. 
 
 bridge was so rickety, due to the high water, and the road so 
 deep in mire, that it was near five o'clock when Sumner reached 
 the neighborhood of Fair Oaks. About this time G. W. Smith's 
 division, under command of Whiting, was on its way to rein- 
 force D. H. Hill. Its commander had no suspicion of Sum- 
 ner's approach, when suddenly he received cannon fire from 
 the north or northeast. Whiting turned and made fierce at- 
 tacks in the direction of the fire ; he was repulsed with heavy 
 loss. Sumner then made a gallant and successful charge, 
 which left his troops masters of the field. 
 
 Late in the evening General Johnston was severely wounded, 
 and G. W. Smith, the next in rank, assumed command of the 
 Confederate army. Between one and two o'clock that night 
 he ordered Longstreet to renew the attack "as soon after day- 
 break as practicable, and to fight north rather than attempt to 
 force his way any farther toward Bottom's Bridge."* Long- 
 street failed almost wholly to carry out this order. Two of his 
 brigades attacked Richardson's division of the Second Corps, 
 which had crossed the river the evening before; they were 
 repulsed with heavy loss. This was all that came of Long- 
 street's attack. In fact, for several hours Longstreet sup- 
 posed the enemy was attacking him. At 10 a.m. he wrote to 
 Smith, "Can you reinforce me? The entire army seems to be 
 opposed to me. ... If I can't get help, I fear I must fall 
 back."* This all shows how little a commander in battle may 
 know about his own troops when he is not connected with 
 them by field-telegraph or telephone. No part of the Union 
 army made any attack that day. General McClellan arrived on 
 the ground early in the forenoon, but gave no orders for an 
 attack.f 
 
 About 2 p.m. [June 1] General Lee arrived at Smith's head- 
 quarters, and, in compliance with an order from President 
 Davis, assumed command of the Confederate army. In the 
 night he withdrew the troops to their former positions close to 
 Richmond. f General Smith, on account of sickness, retired 
 temporarily from active duty, and Whiting took command per- 
 manently of his division. 
 
 The Confederate losses in the battle of Fair Oaks aggre- 
 gated 6,134; the Union 5,0314 For the Confederates the 
 operation was a complete failure, and it left them in a very 
 dispirited condition. Lee immediately set them to work 
 
 *B. & L.—G. W. Smith. 
 
 fRopes. 
 
 %B. & L. 
 
The Peninsular Campaign. 203 
 
 strengthening their line of defenses in front of Richmond ; 
 within a fortnight their spirits revived with "the sense of safety 
 it gave them."* 
 
 (100) Meanwhile Lee was considering an offensive move- 
 ment. All of the Union army except the Fifth Corps [Porter] 
 was now on the south side of the Chickahominy, close up to the 
 Confederate works. The Union lines were intrenched. Mc- 
 Call's division held the right of Porter's line, with two bri- 
 gades under Reynolds strongly intrenched on the east bank 
 of Beaver Dam Creek. The divisions of Morell and Sykes 
 were covering the bridges, several of which had been built. 
 The extreme right was guarded by the cavalry from Meadow 
 Bridge to the Pamunkey. 
 
 Lee's project was to overwhelm Porter's corps and seize 
 McClellan's communications and his base at White House,, 
 while the First Corps [McDowell] was over toward the Shen- 
 andoah, whither it had been sent against Jackson. Prepara- 
 tory to the movement Stuart was sent to reconnoiter the rear 
 of the Union position. Starting out toward Hanover Court 
 House on the 12th of June with 1,000 troopers, Stuart made 
 a daring and successful raid, completely encircling the Union 
 army, gaining valuable information of its dispositions, and de- 
 stroying large quantities of its property. He marched nearly 
 150 miles, crossed the Chickahominy fifteen miles below Bot- 
 tom's Bridge, and rejoined Lee at Richmond by way of the 
 James River Road on the 15th. He captured a good many 
 prisoners, and lost but one man.f By turning this reconnais- 
 sance into a raid, however, and riding entirely round the Union 
 army, Stuart "seriously alarmed McClellan for his rear," and' 
 probably caused him to have his transports at White House 
 loaded and ready to start with his supplies for Harrison's 
 Landing, when the occasion befell a few days latent 
 
 Lee's army had been reinforced by some 17,000 troops 
 brought up from Georgia and the Carolinas ; but Lee designed, 
 also, to have the assistance of Stonewall Jackson with his corps 
 from the Shenandoah Valley. Jackson had finished a success- 
 ful campaign against the three separate commands of Fre- 
 mont, Bankf$ and Shields, and was now resting in the neigh- 
 borhood of Staunton. To mask his purpose and mislead the 
 enemy, Lee dispatched Whiting with his division and Lawton's 
 brigade to Staunton, apparently to reinforce Jackson for fur- 
 
 *Memoirs of R. E. Lee. — Long. 
 fLong, B. & L. — Robins. 
 JAlexander. 
 
204 American Campaigns. 
 
 ther operations in that quarter. No sooner had Whiting joined 
 him than Jackson, according to previous arrangement with 
 Lee, started east with his whole command. So secretly did he 
 move his troops, partly by marching, partly by cars on the Vir- 
 ginia Central Railway, and so skilfully did he deceive the 
 enemy, that he was upon the flank and rear of Porter's corps 
 before the Federals had any knowledge of his intention or 
 whereabouts. Wednesday night, the 25th of June, Jackson 
 had his corps assembled at Ashland, on the railway fifteen 
 miles north of Richmond. 
 
 Lee's order for the attack directed Jackson to start at 3 a.m., 
 June the 26th, "turning Beaver Dam Creek and taking the di- 
 rection toward Old Cold Harbor"; A. P. Hill to cross the 
 Chickahominy near Meadow Bridge as soon as he "discovered" 
 Jackson's movement, and drive the enemy's outposts from Me- 
 chanicsville ; Longstreet then to cross at the Mechanicsville 
 Bridge and support A. P. Hill; D. H. Hill to follow Long- 
 street and support Jackson. Magruder with his own division 
 and Huger's was to stay on the south side of the Chicka- 
 hominy, and to keep up such a demonstration as to make the 
 Federals believe the whole Confederate army was taking the 
 offensive in that quarter. Magruder played his role with 
 skill, and was entirely successful. 
 
 On the north side Jackson's corps, or "division'' as Lee des- 
 ignated it in his order, was to lead in the movement ; but Jack- 
 son's march had been slow, hindered by felled timber in his 
 road, and he had failed to carry out his part of the pro- 
 gramme.* Three o'clock p.m. arrived, but not a sign of Jack- 
 son. A. P. Hill waited no longer. He crossed the river, put 
 the few Federals at Mechanicsville to flight, and came upon 
 Reynolds's strong position on the opposite side of Beaver Dam 
 Creek. (101) D. H. Hill's division crossed the river, and 
 one of his brigades went to A. P. Hill's assistance ; but the 
 Confederates met "a bloody and disastrous repulse."* 
 
 (100) Jackson did not reach the Federal position at all that 
 day, but warning of his approach was brought to Porter by the 
 Union cavalry. By General McClellan's orders Porter with- 
 drew his troops from Beaver Dam Creek before sunrise on the 
 27th [June] to a new position east of Powhite Creek. Here 
 the battle of Gaines's Mill was fought on this day. (102) 
 Porter's line was formed with convex front along the high 
 wooded bank of a little stream, with its extremities in the val- 
 
 *B. & L.—D. H. Hill. 
 
The Peninsular Campaign. 205 
 
 ley of the Chickahominy. Its right flank was its weakest part. 
 The line had four bridges behind it. The ground in rear was 
 cleared, but with undulations, fences, and ditches it afforded 
 cover for both artillery and infantry. In front of the line, 
 from New Cold Harbor road to the right, was a swamp ob- 
 structed with felled timber and choked with underbrush.* The 
 line was, as occupied, about 3,500 yards long. There were 
 fine positions for the artillery. MorelPs division was put on 
 the left; Sykes's on the right; McCalPs in rear, in reserve. 
 "General Cooke's cavalry was placed under the hills in the 
 valley of the Chickahominy to guard the left flank." Stone- 
 man was far out on the right with the rest of the cavalry, 
 probably cut off by Jackson's command.f 
 
 (100) A. P. Hill's division followed the Federals in their 
 retreat from Beaver Dam Creek; D. H. Hill's took the Be- 
 thesda Church road, with the view of joining Jackson. Long- 
 street was to support A. P. Hill. (102) At two o'clock A. P. 
 Hill struck Porter's main line across New Cold Harbor road, 
 and assaulted it furiously. About the same hour Jackson and 
 D. H. Hill moved against the right of the line by the Old Cold 
 Harbor road. At four o'clock Longstreet joined the battle on 
 A. P. Hill's right, and about the same time Slocum's division 
 of the Sixth Corps [Franklin] came to Porter's aid from the 
 other side of the river. 
 
 The Confederates assaulted again and again; finally, near 
 dark, in a general attack they broke the Union line; but the 
 darkness put an end to the engagement. Twenty-eight hun- 
 dred Union prisoners were taken, and twenty guns were cap- 
 tured or abandoned. During the night Porter withdrew his 
 troops to the south side of the Chickahominy, destroying the 
 bridges behind him. In this battle Porter had about 30,000 
 men and twenty batteries of artillery; Lee had perhaps 65.000 
 men and nineteen batteries.t The Federal loss in killed, 
 wounded, and missing was 6,837 ; the Confederates must have 
 lost at least 6.000 in killed and wounded. § 
 
 (100) Maeruder with his 25,000 men had succeeded in con- 
 taining 60,000 Federals on the south side of the river; Mc- 
 Clellan from the offensive was forced into the defensive : and 
 his line of communication with White House was in Lee's 
 possession. But Lee was not to reap any advantage from this 
 
 *B. & L.—D. H. Hill. 
 fB. & L.— Porter. 
 ±B. & L. 
 §Ropes. 
 
206 American Campaigns. 
 
 fact, for McClellan had already considered the plan of chang- 
 ing his base to Harrison's Landing ori the James River, and 
 had taken some steps to that end. He was now forced to make 
 the change, and he set about it at once. It was a gigantic un- 
 dertaking, for he had only one narrow road to move by, and a 
 great swamp and creek to cross, with, besides his combatant 
 strength, a train of 5,000 wagons and a herd of 2,500 beeves. 
 The bulk of the stores at White House were moved by water. 
 
 (103) Keyes's corps was sent at once to take up a position 
 south of White Oak Swamp to cover the flank of the column on 
 the side toward Richmond in that quarter; the Second, Third, 
 and Sixth Corps [Sumner, Heintzelman, and Franklin] re- 
 mained north of the Swamp to resist the direct pursuit of the 
 enemy; and the Fifth Corps [Porter] marched toward Mal- 
 vern Hill to prevent the enemy from seizing that strong posi- 
 tion. 
 
 Lee could not at first tell which way McClellan would re- 
 treat, or whether he would not rather make an effort to re- 
 cover his lost communications. So Lee did practically nothing 
 with his army on the 28th, the day after the battle of Gaines's 
 Mill, but send Stuart toward White House to break up the 
 •railway, and Ewell toward Despatch Station to see if the 
 enemy "showed any disposition to cross the stream and retreat 
 down the Peninsula"* ; and have Magruder watch for Federal 
 movements south of the stream. 
 
 Magruder reported that the Federals remained quiet in their 
 works that day ; yet by the morning of the 29th, Lee was con- 
 vinced that McClellan was making for the James. He set his 
 own troops in motion at once with the purpose of cutting off 
 the retreat or turning it into a rout. Magruder and Huger 
 were to push forward on the Williamsburg and the Charles 
 City roads ; Longstreet and A. P. Hill were to cross by New 
 Bridge and hasten toward the James to strike the flank of the 
 retreating column south of White Oak Swamp ; Jackson with 
 his own and D. H. Hill's troops, nearly 25,000 men, was to fol- 
 low the "shortest and most direct route," that by the Grapevine 
 Bridge "across which Porter had retreated." He was "to 
 press directly upon McClellan's rear with his whole force."* 
 
 Magruder came upon Sumner with his own and part of the 
 Sixth Corps [Franklin] at Savage's Station, and in the after- 
 noon engaged him. (104) Every minute Magruder expected 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
The Peninsular Campaign. 207 
 
 to see Jackson fall upon Sumner's flank from the direction of 
 the Grapevine Bridge. But Jackson had found the bridge de- 
 stroyed, and wasted hours rebuilding it, though he might have 
 crossed his army by a ford close to the bridge.* So Magruder 
 was left without aid ; his attacks were all repulsed, and toward 
 dark the Federal rear-guard resumed its march. 
 
 (103) The morning of the 30th June found the Army of 
 the Potomac with all its artillery and trains south of White 
 Oak Swamp. The bridge over White Oak Swamp Creek had 
 been destroyed after the troops had passed, and Franklin with 
 two divisions stood guarding the creek against the pursuit of 
 the enemy. The road toward the James was blocked with the 
 trains ; to give them time to reach the river in safety the Union 
 army had to take up a defensive position, covering the outlets 
 of the Charles City, Darbytown, and New Market roads. All 
 of these roads come together near Glendale. Five divisions 
 took a position near this point, while the Fifth Corps [Porter], 
 supported by the Fourth [Keyes], stood at right angles to the 
 James, covering Malvern Hill. 
 
 (105) About noon Jackson and D. H. Hill arrived at the 
 broken-down bridge in front of Franklin; at the same time 
 Longstreet and A. P. Hill arrived by the Darbytown Road near 
 the crossroads. Huger was making slow progress on the 
 Charles City Road, which had been obstructed by the Federals. 
 He did not get through in time to take part in the battle. An- 
 other small Confederate column, under Holmes, marched by 
 the New Market Road and made a feeble artillery attack upon 
 the Union trains passing over Malvern Hill; but Holmes's 
 guns were silenced and his whole division was put to fight by 
 artillery fire alone. Magruder stayed back, moving to support 
 first Longstreet, then Holmes, then Longstreet again, and never 
 getting into the battle at all. 
 
 Lee expected his whole army to take part in this battle, vari- 
 ously known as the battle of Frayser's [Fraser's] Farm, Nel- 
 son's Farm, Glendale, and Charles City Crossroads ; but Jack- 
 son, for some unaccountable reason, contented himself with 
 simply shelling Franklin's position. He made little effort to 
 cross at the bridge, and none whatever to cross at any one of 
 five fords in the neighborhood.* He held his own and D. H. 
 Hill's troops all day north of White Oak Swamp Creek. 
 Longstreet and A. P. Hill attacked and fought the battle with- 
 
 *Alexander. 
 
208 American Campaigns. 
 
 out assistance; and instead of making a simultaneous attack 
 with their whole force, they let their brigades go into the battle 
 piecemeal. The fight was desperate and lasted until long after 
 dark.* The Union line was broken once, but was soon re- 
 established by reinforcements. "No strategical advantage was 
 gained by the Confederates, nor did they inflict a greater loss 
 of men than they suffered. "f 
 
 (106) That night the whole Federal army unmolested fell 
 back to the position already selected at Malvern Hill. During 
 the morning, July the 1st, the Union line of battle was formed. 
 The position was very strong naturally. One flank was pro- 
 tected by Western Run and the other by Turkey Run and the 
 gunboats on the James. It was on a commanding plateau 
 whose approaches were all swept by artillery. Immediately in 
 front of the Federal line was an open space, 300 to 400 yards 
 wide, and beyond this space, toward the Confederates, the 
 ground was "broken and thickly wooded, and was traversed 
 nearly throughout by a swamp, passable at but few places and 
 difficult at those."$ 
 
 Lee expected to mass his artillery in two great batteries at 
 positions from which they could bring convergent and enfilade 
 fire upon the Union batteries and lines of battle. A charge of 
 heavy columns was to follow. But owing to defects of the 
 artillery organization, the inefficiency of the staff, and igno- 
 rance of the ground, the artillery attack amounted to nothing. 
 The reserve artillery, four battalions containing the best guns, 
 did not fire a shot ; and the division batteries came into action 
 separately, and were quickly overwhdlmed by the concentrated 
 fire of the enemy. "This inefficient artillery service so dis- 
 couraged the prospects of an assault that before three o'clock 
 Lee abandoned his intention to assault." But later, being 
 misled by a shifting of troops in the Federal line, he thought 
 the Federals were withdrawing, and gave the order to assault. 
 Then followed an untimely and piecemeal attack.* Longstreet 
 and A. P. Hill were held in reserve, and took no part in the 
 engagement. At four o'clock D. H. Hill opened the battle by 
 assaulting the center of the line. His division was repulsed 
 with heavy loss. Jackson sent two divisions to Hill's assist- 
 ance, but they were too late. Finally Huger, supported by 
 Magruder, assaulted farther toward the Union left. They 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 fRopes. 
 JLee's Report. 
 
The Peninsular Campaign. 209 
 
 also were repulsed. "There were other isolated, useless, and 
 unsuccessful attempts, each resulting in a bloody repulse. The 
 failure of the Confederates was complete"*; but the Union 
 army made no counter-attack. The action lasted till dark. The 
 Confederates lost more than 5,000 men killed and wounded; 
 the Federals lost about one-third as many. 
 
 (103) The next day, July 2, the Army of the Potomac fell 
 back to Harrison's Landing, where it fortified itself. Lee 
 rested his army on the 2nd, and on the 3rd advanced to the 
 neighborhood of Harrison's Landing. A reconnaissance of 
 the Federal position convinced him of the uselessness of mak- 
 ing another attack, and "he returned to his former camp near 
 Richmond to rest, recruit, and reorganize his army."f 
 
 For these "Seven Days' Battles" McClellan had at the out- 
 set 105,000 men, and Lee had 80,000 to 90,000 effectives. The 
 Federal losses in the seven days' operations were 1,734 killed, 
 8,062 wounded, and 6,053 captured or missing; a total of 
 15,849. The Confederate losses were 3,286 killed, 15,909 
 wounded, and 940 captured or missing; a total of 20,135.$ 
 
 Comments. 
 
 One can but sympathize with General McClellan in his de- 
 termination to have his army properly organized, equipped, and 
 trained before starting out on an offensive campaign against 
 an army that had the prestige of victory on its side. We do 
 not need to go farther than our own War of 1812 to be con- 
 vinced that however well raw untrained troops may do on the; 
 defensive, they are utterly unfit for offensive campaigns and 
 battles. The disastrous outcome of Bull Run was a further 
 lesson fresh in the mind of McClellan. He did not want to 
 repeat McDowell's failure. 
 
 But the American people, the newspapers, and the politicians 
 never have learned this lesson of war ; and they are the masters. 
 The President and the Commanding General are but their ser- 
 vants ; they must do their will, or they must fool them into the 
 belief that they are doing their will. President Lincoln was 
 more to be pitied than General McClellan — his position be- 
 tween the impatient public and his immovable general was one 
 that none but the strongest character combined with the 
 
 *Ropes. 
 tLong. 
 *B. & L. 
 
210 American Campaigns. 
 
 finest tact and the loftiest sense of public duty could support. 
 
 General MoClellan lacked political tact, without which an 
 American commander-in-chief can seldom succeed; because to 
 succeed the commander-in-chief must have the support of the 
 Administration, and he cannot keep that support unless he has 
 the favor of the people and the newspapers. We saw how 
 General Scott was fettered in his Mexican Campaign by the 
 lack of proper support from Washington, and the reward he 
 received for his brilliant victories, won in spite of the antago- 
 nism of the Administration. 
 
 (94) Although General McClellan may not have believed 
 that his great army was ready to advance before April, 1862, 
 there were, nevertheless, several things he might have done, 
 during those long months of waiting, simply to appease the 
 public mind and to relieve the President. He ought to have 
 captured Norfolk and broken up the Confederate batteries 
 along the Potomac. He could easily have done those things 
 without any risk of failure. It would have pleased the people 
 and the press and kept their support ; and it would have had a 
 depressing effect upon the South. It would have been, in a 
 sense, good strategy. 
 
 In the light of history there is little doubt, now, that McClel- 
 lan could have marched out in November, 1861, and destroyed 
 Johnston's army, if it had stood to fight. The Union army at 
 that time was nearly three times as strong as Johnston's ; it 
 was better organized, equipped, and supplied, and had received 
 three months of drill and training. But Johnston would not 
 have accepted battle ; it is almost certain that he would have 
 fallen back behind the Rappahannock without fighting. This 
 would completely have restored McClellan's prestige with the 
 country. But General McClellan was, during the whole period 
 of his command, a victim of a tendency of timid and cautious 
 generals to overestimate the strength of the enemy. He ap- 
 pears to have relied wholly upon his secret-service depart- 
 ment for information ; and the reports furnished by this depart- 
 ment usually doubled the strength of the Confederates. Just 
 before the operations around Richmond, for example, this 
 department informed McClellan that Johnston's army num- 
 bered 180,000. McClellan took counsel of his fear. 
 
 With all his caution, however, the Union commander took 
 some risks at which a less careful, but more experienced, com- 
 mander would have balked. When he proposed his move- 
 ment by way of Urbana or Fort Monroe he believed that 
 
The Peninsular Campaign. 211 
 
 Johnston had more than 100,000 men in the neighborhood of 
 Manassas and Centreville; yet he purposed withdrawing the 
 bulk of the Federal army from Washington and transferring it 
 by water to the Peninsula, reckoning that Johnston would 
 forthwith march his whole force to the relief of Richmond.* 
 But if Johnston had really commanded any such number of 
 men he probably would have done nothing of the kind. The 
 capture of Washington at this time, in its effect upon the North 
 and upon foreign nations, would have far outweighed the loss 
 of Richmond. It would probably have caused the Confed- 
 eracy to be recognized abroad, and might have brought the 
 fleets of England and France to reopen the Southern ports to 
 their trade. If Johnston's army, small as it was, had promptly 
 crossed the Potomac above Washington, upon the departure of 
 McClellan's army for Fort Monroe, this army would have been 
 speedily recalled for the defense of the Capital. But if John- 
 ston had commanded an army of the size supposed by Mc- 
 Clellan he would not have waited until April, 1862, for the 
 Union army to take the offensive ; the Confederate generals 
 were eager to cross the Potomac in October to cut off Wash- 
 ington's communications with Baltimore and the West, in 
 order to force McClellan to come out with his untrained troops 
 and fight; they asked the Confederate President only to rein- 
 force the army at Centreville to 60,000 for the purpose, by 
 withdrawing troops from the Southern coast. Johnston's 
 army then actually numbered only some 40,000. Mr. Davis 
 could not see his way to comply with the request — the govern- 
 ors of the coast States insisted upon holding troops for their 
 local defense. Some of the Southern governors gave Mr. 
 Davis as much trouble as the Northern press and public gave 
 Mr. Lincoln. 
 
 General McClellan also took a very grave risk in transfer- 
 ring his army by water to Fort Monroe and making that place 
 his base while the Merrimac was yet afloat at Norfolk. One 
 has but to consider how defenseless troop-ships are at sea w.ith- 
 out adequate naval protection, how nearly a match the Merri- 
 mac was for the Monitor, and how helpless other ships of the 
 Union fleet had proved against the Confederate ram to appre- 
 ciate the risk thus taken by McClellan and permitted by the 
 Washington authorities. The importance of having complete 
 command of the sea before committing troops to it in trans- 
 
 *B. & L.— McClellan. 
 
212 American Campaigns. 
 
 ports is so great that it should never be disregarded by gener- 
 als and governments responsible for the lives of thousands of 
 soldiers. "I have," wrote McClellan to the Secretary of the 
 Navy, "such a living faith in the gallant little Monitor that 
 I feel that we can trust her"* ; but the floridity of his language 
 in itself suggests a suspicion that he was not entirely confident. 
 
 There is no doubt that General McClellan had grievous dis- 
 appointments to contend with ; but he brought them upon him- 
 self by allowing himself to expect more than it was possible 
 for him to have. He expected, for instance, in his movement 
 up the Peninsula, to have the Union fleet upon both of his 
 flanks ; but at that time the James was closed by Norfolk and 
 the Merrimac, and the York by the batteries at Yorktown and 
 Gloucester Point. His failure to receive McDowell and the 
 entire First Corps, even though he did receive two of its divi- 
 sions and other reinforcements, seemed to paralyze his ener- 
 gies. Until he began his flank movement from the Chicka- 
 hominy to the James he appeared to be playing merely a 
 "waiting game." There was no determined aggressiveness 
 in any of his operations, such was must characterize every suc- 
 cessful offensive campaign. 
 
 General McClellan, as Commander-in-Chief of the United 
 States Army, had exhibited a rare genius for organization and 
 administration ; but as commander of the Army of the Poto- 
 mac he had done nothing in strategic conception or perform- 
 ance up to this time to commend or to emulate. Every move- 
 ment he had ordered had been foreseen and forestalled by his 
 opponent. He expected to put his army at Urbana before 
 Johnston discovered his intention; but Johnston got wind of 
 his plan and withdrew closer to McClellan's objective, Rich- 
 mond, before the movement began. At Fort Monroe Mc- 
 Clellan was exactly as far from Richmond, in an air-line, as 
 Johnston's left flank was at Culpeper, and twenty miles farther 
 than Johnston's right was at Fredericksburg. McClellan knew 
 that • Yorktown was occupied, but he expected the garrison to 
 sit still and let him march a column to its rear and cut off its 
 retreat with Richmond.f Then, after the fall of Yorktown, he 
 shipped two or three divisions to West Point with orders to 
 move against Johnston's flank in his retreat to Richmond. 
 But Johnston anticipated this project, and had a larger force 
 at hand ready to drive back the Union detachment. 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
 f.B. & L.— McClellan. 
 
The Peninsular Campaign. 213 
 
 McClellan was methodical and cautious and dependent upon 
 the science of engineering at times when he should have relied 
 upon vigor and activity and battle. This was notably the case 
 at Yorktown, where he spent a month carrying by siege a line 
 that he should have assaulted at its weakest point, and car- 
 ried, the day he encountered it, before Johnston arrived with 
 his whole army to reinforce Magruder. Failing this, the Con- 
 federate line could have been "contained" by 20,000 men in- 
 trenched, and outflanked by the rest of the army moving by 
 way of Mob Jack Bay and thence overland to West Point. Or 
 a force might have landed on the other side of York River 
 and captured Gloucester Point, which was open to attack from 
 the rear. This would have opened York River to the Fed- 
 eral fleet and made the Yorktown line untenable. 
 
 McClellan had his army at White House and his base estab- 
 lished there on the 16th of May; from then to the 31st of May 
 he practically did nothing toward the destruction of Johnston's 
 army or the capture of Richmond but put his army in a dan- 
 gerous position astride the Chickahominy. He spent those 
 fifteen precious days apparently waiting, hoping, for McDow- 
 ell; while the Confederates were strengthening their works 
 round Richmond and receiving reinforcements. After the 
 battle of Fair Oaks came another long useless wait, until the 
 Confederates again took the offensive on the 26th of June. 
 
 McClellan has been severely criticized for placing his army 
 astraddle the Chickahominy. His own excuse was that he had 
 to reach out toward Fredericksburg in expectation of Mc- 
 Dowell; but he kept his army there after he had learned that 
 McDowell was not going to join him. So long as McClellan 
 kept his base at White House it is hard to say what was the 
 best position in which to hold his army. He knew he should 
 have to fight a battle in front of Richmond before he could 
 capture that city. If he had held his army on the north side 
 of the stream and let the Confederates defend the south bank 
 he would have had the task of forcing a difficult river in the 
 face of the enemy; if he had brought his whole army to the 
 south bank he would completely have uncovered his commu- 
 nications, and, in the expected battle, would have had the river 
 at his back. In truth, the mistake that McClellan made con- 
 sisted not in dividing his army by the Chickahominy, but in 
 failing to provide a sufficient number of strong bridges. With 
 all his skill as an engineer, and all his care and caution, his 
 
214 American Campaigns. 
 
 mistake in this case was that of an engineer rather than that 
 of an army-commander. 
 
 The very minute, however, that McClellan learned that Mc- 
 Dowell was not going to join him he ought to have issued an 
 order for the change of base to the James. This change would 
 have enabled him to move against Richmond or the Confed- 
 erate army without having his comimunications beyond the 
 Chickahominy to worry about. Or he could have operated by 
 way of Petersburg south of the James, as General Grant did 
 two years later. Petersburg, the back-gate to Richmond, 
 could have been seized at this time without an effort; it took 
 Grant nearly ten months to capture it. If this change had 
 been made voluntarily by McClellan, before he was attacked 
 by Lee at Gaines's Mill, it would not have had the appearance 
 of a retreat before a victorious army ; as it happened, it actually 
 had that appearance. The people South and North, the Union 
 army and the Confederate army, believed that McClellan was 
 beaten and driven back to Harrison's Landing. Such was not 
 the case at all. McClellan had already considered the change, 
 and had made some arrangements for it ; as soon as he lost his 
 communications with White House he began the movement. 
 He was not driven ; he was pursued, — the shade of difference 
 in the meaning of the terms is certainly very thin. 
 
 Considering the immense train, the difficulties of the road, 
 and the aggressiveness of the enemy, the change of base was 
 masterly made. From the time when the army quit the Chicka- 
 hominy until it reached Harrison's Landing the critic will have 
 a hard task to pick a flaw in either the strategy or the tactics of 
 its operations. It took every advantage of streams, woods, 
 and ground, and carried off its trains intact ; and it inflicted a 
 heavier loss in men than it suffered. After it had reached 
 Harrison's Landing it was in a better position to operate 
 against Richmond than it had ever been before. Materially 
 Lee had gained nothing; he had failed to cut off or destroy a 
 single Federal regiment ; but he had won vast prestige for him- 
 self and his army. 
 
 In all the operations in the neighborhood of Richmond the 
 plans of Johnson and Lee were bold and excellent. With a 
 smaller army than their opponent's they did not hesitate to 
 take the offensive; and their plans would have succeeded hut 
 for the inefficiency of their lieutenants. To be sure, Johnston 
 lost a victory at Fair Oaks, partly by issuing a verbal instead 
 of a written order, but mainly by Longstreet's mistakes and 
 
The Peninsular Campaign. 215 
 
 tardiness. At Beaver Dam Creek A. P. Hill suffered heavy- 
 arid needless loss by attacking before Jackson's arrival. And 
 this premature attack was, in point of time, the second of 
 the chief causes of Lee's failure to destroy McClellan's army. 
 If Hill had awaited Jackson's initiative, as Lee's order directed, 
 and in spite of Jackson's unaccountable delay, Porter would 
 not have withdrawn his troops from Beaver Dam Creek 
 to the strong position at Gaines's Mill by daybreak of the 27th 
 June; and Lee's project of turning the Union right with Jack- 
 son's ^corps on the 26th would have been effected on the 27th. 
 
 The first chief cause of Lee's failure to destroy McClellan's 
 army was Jackson's tardiness on the 26th of June. Whatever 
 excuses may be made for Jackson the fact stands that he failed 
 to reach the ground on that day that he had agreed to reach; 
 that Lee counted upon his reaching. He failed to turn the 
 Union line behind Beaver Dam Creek and take it in reverse. 
 He halted and bivouacked at 5 p.m. when, according to 
 his own report, he was within hearing of the desperate battle 
 A. P. Hill fought till dark.* Jackson bivouacked only three 
 miles from that battle. At Gaines's Mill Jackson was late, and 
 he withdrew D. H. Hill's division from the battle at the critical 
 moment ; at Savage's Station Jackson did not arrive at all ; and 
 at White Oak Swamp Creek, during the battle of Glendale, he 
 made no apparent effort to force a passage and get into the 
 action. At Malvern Hill "he took no initiative," and gave 
 scant aid to the unfortunate assault. "Malvern Hill should 
 not have been attacked ; only the enemy observed and held by 
 Longstreet, while Jackson got a position which they would be 
 forced to assault" in order to reach Harrison's Landing.* 
 
 On the whole the Peninsular Campaign was, on the part of 
 the Confederates, a campaign of good plans and bad execution. 
 The chief blame rests upon Stonewall Jackson. In all these 
 operations the "Jackson of the Chickahominy," as General 
 Alexander aptly puts the terms, was a different man from "the 
 Jackson of the Valley." Of all those that marvel at Jackson's 
 brilliant work before and after the Seven Days' Campaign 
 there is none to offer a reasonable excuse for his utter failure 
 in this campaign. On the part of the Federals it was a campaign 
 of neglected opportunities. Perhaps McClellan's test oppor- 
 tunity fell to him on the day of Gaines's Mill. All that day Ma- 
 gruder with only 25,000 men kept up a "clatter" in front of 
 Richmond; while McClellan had 60,000 south of the Chicka- 
 
 *Alexander. 
 
216 American Campaigns. 
 
 hominy, but made no effort to take the city. He and his com- 
 manders were completely fooled by Magruder. 
 
 In this campaign the great benefit of systematic training 
 was again made manifest. At the first battle of Bull Run two 
 mobs confronted each other ; the regular artillery and Sykes's 
 battalion of regular infantry and Palmer's squadron of regu- 
 lar cavalry were the only troops in the battle that acted like sol- 
 diers. In the Peninsular Campaign, on the contrary, the rank 
 and file of both armies fought and marched like veterans, and 
 the best of veterans. A year of service and training had made 
 the difference. 
 
LECTURE XL 
 JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 
 
 (107) The region known as the Valley of Virginia, or the 
 Shenandoah Valley, played an important part in the Civil War 
 from the beginning almost to the end. Indeed Lee's little army 
 was hastening toward that region in its very last march, and, 
 if it had not been headed off by Sheridan's cavalry at Appo- 
 mattox, the last hostile action on Virginia soil, like the first,* 
 might have taken place in the Shenandoah Valley. 
 
 As already noted, the situation of Richmond and Washing- 
 ton foreordered that Virginia, rather than Kentucky or other 
 border State, should become the principal theater of opera- 
 tions, and the mountain region of the Shenandoah formed a 
 strong natural barrier covering its left flank. All things com- 
 bined to make the Valley the best line of communications with 
 Virginia and the base at Richmond, for a Confederate army 
 invading the North in this theater of the war ; twice it was used 
 for this purpose by Lee. Thus, the general direction of this 
 Valley was northeast, and the Potomac, more easily forded 
 here than farther east, crossed it within fifty miles of Wash- 
 ington. On its eastern or exposed flank it was covered by the 
 Blue Ridge Mountains south of the Potomac, and South 
 Mountain north of this river. These mountains could be 
 crossed only at certain passes, or gaps, through most of which 
 there were good roads. The Valley was connected with Rich- 
 mond, the Confederate base, by two systems of railway, one 
 leading out of it by way of Strasburg and Manassas Gap, the 
 other by way of Staunton and Rockfish Gap. (We saw the 
 strategical use that was made of the Manassas Gap Railway 
 in the Bull Run Campaign.) A good system of roads con- 
 nected all the towns and villages in the region. The main 
 thoroughfare was the Valley Turnpike, stretching from Staun- 
 ton near the head of the Valley, to Martinsburg at its lower 
 end, a distance of 120 miles; and passing through Harrison- 
 burg, New Market, Woodstock, Strasburg, and Winchester. 
 The main Valley of the Shenandoah, averaging about twenty 
 
 *"The first" has reference to the capture of the U. S. arsenal at 
 Harper's Ferry, April 18, 1861. 
 
218 American Campaigns. 
 
 miles in width, is closed on its western side by the Alleghanies, 
 a more difficult chain of mountains than the Blue Ridge. 
 
 The Shenandoah River, which drains the Valley into the 
 Potomac, is formed by its North and South Forks, which flow 
 parallel to each other for forty or fifty miles. In their parallel 
 course the two branches are only about eight miles apart, 
 but they are separated by an isolated ridge, called Massanutten 
 Mountain, as high as the Blue Ridge. At Strasburg this ridge 
 drops suddenly to the level of the "Valley, and the North Fork 
 of the Shenandoah sweeps round its base and joins the South 
 Fork at Front Royal. The Shenandoah thus formed flows 
 along the very base of the Blue Ridge to the Potomac, into 
 which it discharges its waters at Harper's Ferry. The Valley 
 between the western foot of the Blue Ridge and the South 
 Fork, at the foot of Massanutten Mountain, is known as Luray 
 or Page Valley. The mountains were all covered with forests, 
 and the valleys were well watered and very fertile ; indeed the 
 region was often spoken of as the "granary of Virginia" ; and 
 from the fields and herds of its well-to-do farmers it furnished 
 a large part of the subsistence of the Confederate army. In 
 the northern section were some families of Union sentiment, 
 but a large majority of the inhabitants were intensely Southern 
 in their feelings. 
 
 While the great valley between the Alleghanies and the Blue 
 Ridge was peculiarly well suited to be the route of invasion 
 from Virginia into the North, the reverse was not the case. 
 As was pointed out in the lecture on Bull Run, the mountain 
 ranges and valleys led to the southwest, away from, rather 
 than toward, Richmond; and an invasion by that line would 
 have involved a very long line of communication through a 
 very hostile country. So the Valley was never used by the 
 Federals as a main route of invasion. From the start, how- 
 ever, it was occupied and guarded by Federal troops for the 
 double purpose of preventing incursions by way of it into 
 Northern territory, and to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
 way, and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, both of which 
 crossed the Valley and were main highways of traffic between 
 the East and the West. The destruction of this railway and 
 canal were among the first operations of the Confederates in the 
 Valley. As early as April, 1861, Stonewall Jackson, who then 
 held Harper's Ferry with" a small force of Virginia militia, had 
 seized a large number of the railway's cars, and, after running 
 them back by steam to Winchester, had hauled them by horses 
 
Jackson's Valley Campaign. 219 
 
 from there to Strasburg. In June of this year Joseph E. John- 
 ston, who had succeeded to the command at Harper's Ferry, 
 had the railway bridge and machine shops at Harper's Ferry 
 and the shops and rolling-stock at Martinsburg destroyed, at 
 the time of his withdrawal to Winchester .* 
 
 Soon after the battle of Bull Run Jackson was promoted to 
 major-general, and about the first of November he took com- 
 mand of the Valley District with headquarters at Winchester. 
 His command at first consisted of only a weak body of militia ; 
 but he was soon reinforced with his own old brigade ["Stone- 
 wall Brigade"] , and, about Christmas, with 6,000 poorly disci- 
 plined troops under Loring. These reinforcements, with 
 Asbby's cavalry, raised the strength of his command to about 
 10,000. It constituted the left wing of the Army of Northern 
 Virginia ; the right wing was commanded by Holmes at Fred- 
 ericksburg, while the center was under the immediate command 
 of Joseph E. Johnston at Centreville. Jackson was connected 
 with the main army at Centreville by a detachment under D. 
 H. Hill at Leesburg. 
 
 Johnston's orders to Jackson directed him to watch the 
 enemy, and keep his communications with Manassas open, so 
 as to be able to join the main army promptly, in case McClellan 
 advanced. Ashby's cavalry patrolled the frontier, and kept 
 itself busy breaking up the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and 
 the Baltimore and Ohio Railway. 
 
 General Banks commanded the Union troops in this region. 
 The headquarters of his corps, f which was 18,000 strong, were 
 at Frederick City ; but his charge extended seventy-five miles 
 farther west, to Cumberland. General Kelly garrisoned Rom- 
 ney with 5,000 Federals. This town was thirty-five miles 
 northwest of Winchester by a good road. The garrison at 
 Romney in its isolation was too much of a temptation for Jack- 
 son to resist. So he marched his little army out in the snows 
 of January with the hope of surprising and capturing that 
 body as well as a Federal detachment at the village of Bath. 
 Both Federal detachments escaped; but Jackson captured a 
 considerable quantity of stores, damaged the railway and canal 
 near Bath, and took possession of Romney, severing connec- 
 tion between Banks's command and General Rosecrans's scat- 
 tered troops in West Virginia. 
 
 ♦Henderson. 
 
 fAt this time Banks's command constituted the Fifth Corps of the 
 Army of the Potomac. 
 
220 American Campaigns. 
 
 Jackson had hoped that his taking the offensive would induce 
 McClellan to believe that he had a large detachment from John- 
 ston's army, and would tempt the Union commander to move 
 out to attack Johnston ; in which case Jackson expected to 
 hasten with his command by way of ihe Manassas Gap Railway 
 and repeat the strategy of Bull Run. But we know that Mc- 
 Clellan was not tempted. In fact, Jackson's operation, attended 
 by great hardships, amounted to nothing in the end. He left 
 Loring with his troops to garrison Romney ; but this officer and 
 his ill-disciplined command were so dissatisfied with their quar- 
 ters that Loring appealed directly to the Confederate Secretary 
 of War and got his command ordered back to Winchester. 
 Jackson was so outraged by this action of the Secretary of 
 War that he indignantly sent in his resignation. Through the 
 offices of General Johnston and the governor of Virginia, how- 
 ever, he was prevailed upon to retain his command. He had 
 taught the Confederate war department a lesson in military 
 ethics and usage that it did not soon forget. After the with- 
 drawal of Loring from Romney that place was reoccupied 
 by the Federals. Loring and his troops were detached from 
 Jackson, and for a month the Confederates at Winchester en- 
 joyed a rest. 
 
 By the end of February Banks had crossed the Potomac <by 
 a pontoon-bridge at Harper's Ferry. With about 23,000 men,* 
 including 3,000 cavalry, and accompanied by eighty pieces of 
 artillery, he threatened Winchester. There Jackson had 3,600 
 infantry, twenty-seven guns, and Asbby's 600 horsemen. On 
 the 7th of March D. H. Hill, by Johnston's orders, fell back 
 from Leesburg; two days later Johnston withdrew from Cen- 
 treville toward the Rappahannock. Jackson was thus left 
 isolated in his advanced position at Winchester. 
 
 We have seen that McClellan upon Johnston's withdrawal 
 advanced his army to Centreville ; he ordered Banks to advance 
 at the same time. Banks's leading division occupied Winchester 
 on the 12th of March, Jackson having withdrawn the evening 
 before. Jackson fell back to Strasburg, eighteen miles farther 
 south. On the 17th [March] Banks started Shields with 
 11,000 men in pursuit. Leaving Ashby with his cavalry to 
 cover his rear and hold the enemy back, Jackson retreated to 
 Mount Jackson, a strong position twenty-five miles farther 
 south. Shields pursued as far as Woodstock with his main 
 force, sending his cavalry on after Ashby toward Mount Jack- 
 
 ♦Ropes. 
 
Jackson's A'^alley Campaign. 221 
 
 son. The cavalry returned the next day [March 19], reporting 
 that Jackson had fled from the Valley, leaving only a small 
 force under Ashby for observation. With this information 
 Shields marched back to Winchester. 
 
 In accordance with his orders Banks, having rid the Valley 
 of Jackson, as he supposed, left Shields with his division at 
 Winchester to guard the Valley, and marched the rest of his 
 troops to the east side of the Blue Ridge in order to cooperate 
 with McClellan's movement to the Peninsular.* This was pre- 
 cisely what Jackson was to prevent. His instructions from 
 Johnston were "to endeavor to employ the invaders in the Val- 
 ley without exposing himself to the danger of defeat, by keep- 
 ing so near the enemy as to prevent his making any consider- 
 able detachment to reinforce McClellan, but not so near that he 
 might be compelled to fight. "f 
 
 On the evening of the 21st [March] Ashby reported to Jack- 
 son that the enemy was withdrawing to the east. Other infor- 
 mation confirmed the report. On the 22nd Ashby struck 
 Shield's outposts about a mile south of Winchester and had a 
 skirmish with them. Ashby learned by the action that besides 
 cavalry there was infantry and a battery of the enemy present ; 
 but he was wholly wrong in his estimate of the force. He re- 
 ported only four regiments of infantry, besides the artillery and 
 cavalry; the rest of Shield's division was, however, concealed 
 close in rear, 9,000 strong all told. 
 
 On receiving Ashby's report Jackson hurried forward from 
 his camp at Woodstock, and after a march of thirty-six miles 
 reached Kernstown, the position of the Federal outposts, at 1 
 p.m. on the second day, the 23rd. (108) Ashby still con- 
 fronted the enemy; but Kimball's Federal brigade, supported 
 by Sullivan's was forcing him back. The Federal line, facing 
 south, occupied a position on a rise of ground behind a brook. 
 Its right rested on the Valley Road. Three quarters of a mile 
 to the right and rear was a piece of high ground covered with 
 timber. (109) Leaving a brigade of infantry to assist Ashby 
 in holding the line in front, Jackson moved his other three bri- 
 gades under cover to this ground. But here he was met by 
 Tyler's Federal brigade. With attacks and counter-attacks the 
 action in this part of the field raged severely but indecisively 
 for an hour. Then Kimball, who was in command of the 
 Union forces, Shields having been wounded in the forenoon, 
 
 *Henderson. B. & L. — Imboden. Kimball, 
 tjohnston's Narrative. 
 
222 American Campaigns. 
 
 moved his own brigade to Tyler's support. Jackson was 
 finally defeated and toward dark driven from the field. 
 
 (107) The Federal pursuit was checked, and Jackson's 
 weary infantry bivouacked within three miles of the battle-field. 
 Ashby's cavalry stopped within a mile of it. Jackson con- 
 tinued his retreat in good order to Mount Jackson. His tac- 
 tical failure was a strategical success, but it is not probable that 
 he, as he marched his tired and beaten soldiers 'back from 
 Kernstown, appreciated the far-reaching effect of his strategy. 
 
 Shields could not believe that Jackson would have dared to 
 attack him unless Jackson had been expecting reinforcements. 
 So Shields sent post-haste to Banks for assistance. Banks re- 
 turned with his other division, and with his whole corps fol- 
 lowed as far as Strasburg, where he halted to wait for supplies. 
 Thus, as Johnston had directed, Jackson had kept Banks from 
 going to cooperate with McClellan. But that was the least of 
 the consequences of Jackson's operation. It drew the atten- 
 tion of the authorities at Washington again to the line of the 
 upper Potomac, and to the defense of Washington. It de- 
 cided the President to withdraw Blenker's division from Mc- 
 Clellan and dispatch it by way of Strasburg, where it could 
 be stopped by Banks if needed, to Fremont, who was now in 
 command of the Union forces in West Virginia; and it also 
 decided the President to withhold the First Corps [McDowell] , 
 nearly 40,000 men, from McClellan. We saw in the lecture on 
 the Peninsular Campaign how all of this upset McClellan's 
 plans. 
 
 But that was not all. At the same time the President broke 
 up the Department of the Potomac, McClellan's territorial 
 command, leaving McClellan in charge of the operations in the 
 "paltry triangle," only, south of the Rappahannock River. 
 McDowell was placed in command of the Department of the 
 Rappahannock, and charged with the defense of Washington. 
 Banks was to command the Department of the Shenandoah 
 and Fremont the Mountain Department, which included West 
 Virginia and part of Kentucky and Tennessee. These com- 
 manders were all independent one of another, and reported di-. 
 rectly to Washington. In the words of General McClellan, 
 "instead of one directing head controlling operations which 
 should have been inseparable, the region from the Alleghanies 
 to the sea was parcelled out among four independent com- 
 manders."* In this remark, however, General McClellan, was 
 
 *B. & L— McClellan. 
 
Jackson's Valley Campaign. 223 
 
 in error : there was to be only one head, but that head was Mr. 
 Stanton, the Secretary of War, whose contempt for all sound 
 principles and usages of war appears to have been exceeded 
 only by his ignorance of them. 
 
 Though urged by telegrams from McClellan.at Washington 
 to~"push Jackson hard" Banks stayed at Strasburg until April 
 1. His outposts, meantime, were at Tom's Brook, five miles 
 south of Strasburg; but never a cavalryman crossed the brook 
 to gain information of Jackson. Ashby's horsemen, backed by 
 a brigade of Confederate infantry at Woodstock, patrolled the 
 south bank of Tom's Brook. Although Banks believed that 
 Jackson had 15,000 men, and the Union cavalry was so poor as 
 to furnish him practically no information of the enemy, it was 
 not these facts alone that made him hesitate to follow Jackson 
 farther south. He was aware that Johnston had already fallen 
 back from Centreville, and he had information that Johnston's 
 left was at Gordonsville, three or four days' march from Mount 
 Jackson. He also knew that McClellan was not pushing John- 
 ston, but was embarking his army at Alexandria for Fort Mon- 
 roe. On the 26th of March he wired the Secretary of War 
 that Longstreet and Jackson were going to join forces at New 
 Market. Within the next few days he learned that Jackson 
 had received no reinforcements ; yet it was not until the 2nd 
 of April that he crossed Tom's Brook and started southward. 
 He advanced no farther than Woodstock, where he went into 
 camp. 
 
 i' The real cause of Banks's halt now was Massanutten Moun- 
 tain. This ridge was impassable (save for a few hunters' 
 trails) except by the New Market-Luray road. Banks was 
 afraid that, if he got too far from Strasburg, Jackson, or Ash- 
 by's cavalry, covered by this barrier, would slip down through 
 the Luray Valley and intercept his communications at Stras- 
 burg or Front Royal. It did not occur to him boldly to ad- 
 vance against Jackson's little force, and himself get possession 
 of the crossroads at New Market, and the Luray Valley road, 
 also. After counting out the troops guarding his communica- 
 tions, he had now some 15,000; Jackson, although he had re- 
 ceived some recruits, had no more than 6,000. 
 
 Finally, on the 17th of April, Banks struck camp at Wood- 
 stock and started south. Meantime McClellan had begun his 
 campaign on the Peninsula, and Johnston had marched thither 
 to oppose him, leaving Ewell with 8,000 men on the upper 
 Rappahannock to cooperate with Jackson. For fear that 
 Banks should cross the Massanutten Mountain and get between 
 
224 American Campaigns. 
 
 him and Ewell, Jackson made a forced march by way of Har- 
 risonburg and Conrad's Store,* and secured a strong position 
 near Swift Run Gap. Banks advanced very cautiously, and by 
 the 26th [April] had his main force at New Market, with a 
 strong garrison at Harrisonburg. 
 
 At Swift Run Gap Jackson was in communication with 
 Ewell, who was at Gordonsville, and with Richmond. ; So long 
 as he could hold the bridge at Conrad's Store, which he had 
 guarded by a strong detachment, his flank position at this gap 
 also kept Banks from advancing on Staunton. 
 
 While these operations were going on General Fremont had 
 worked out an extensive but visionary plan of operations for 
 the troops in his department. His project was to collect his 
 detachments, scattered through the mountains of West Vir- 
 ginia, and march them by way of McDowell to capture Staun- 
 ton; then to carry out the President's devoutly cherished wish 
 of relieving the loyal inhabitants of East Tennessee, by march- 
 ing to Knoxville.f In pursuance of this plan General Milroy 
 had advanced with a small force from Monterey- to McDowell, 
 and other detachments occupied Franklin and Moorefield. 
 Guarding the passes of the Alleghanies, General Edward John- 
 ston had two Confederate brigades in the Shenandoah Moun- 
 tains, about 3,000 men. Finding himself threatened in rear by 
 Banks's advance to New Market and Harrisonburg ; on his , 
 right flank by Fremont at Moorefield ; and in front by the de- 
 tachments at McDowell and Franklin, Johnson fell back to 
 West View, seven miles west of Staunton. , 
 
 In the lecture on the Peninsular Campaign we saw that, after ; 
 Jackson's retreat up the valley, Shields was ordered to take his 
 division from the Valley and join McDowell with it at Freder- 
 icksburg ; that McDowell was only awaiting the arrival of this 
 division, when he should move the combined force to unite with 
 McClellan in front of Richmond ; and that General Lee, Mr. 
 Davis's military adviser at the time, had corresponded with 
 Jackson with a view to arranging a plan to divert McDowell' 
 toward the Valley. Accordingly Ewell was ordered to report 
 to Jackson with his division, and Jackson was also authorized 
 to use Edward Johnson's command. The details of the enter- 
 prise were left for Jackson to work out. The troops at his 
 disposal now numbered 17,000 or 18,000. 
 
 Jackson decided first to strike Milroy's detachment, the most 
 
 ♦Conrad's Store was on the South Fork nearly east of Harrisonburg.. 
 It was connected with Harrisonburg by a road. 
 fS. & L.— Cox. ' 
 
Jackson's Valley Campaign. 225 
 
 exposed part of Fremont's command, thus widening the dis- 
 tance between Fremont and Banks; and then to turn against 
 Banks. To march by way of Conrad's Store and the valley 
 roads to Staunton and McDowell would expose his flank to 
 Banks, and, also, divulge the direction and object of his move- 
 ment. So Jackson chose a different route. To mask his. 
 movement Ashby, on the 29th and 30th of April, drove back 
 the Federal cavalry, and made feints toward Harrisonburg. 
 On the afternoon of the 30th Jackson, leaving Ewell's division 
 at Swift Run Gap to fall upon Banks's rear, in case Banks, 
 should move toward Staunton, set out with his own troops by 
 the muddy valley road to Port Republic. From there he 
 marched over the mountains to Mechum's River Station, five 
 or six miles west of Charlottesville, leaving friend and foe 
 to suppose that he was going to take the cars and unite with 
 Joseph E. Johnston; whether to oppose McClellan, to attack 
 McDowell at Fredericksburg, or to move against Washington, 
 no one could tell. 
 
 At Mechum's he did take the cars, trains of which were 
 standing ready for him; but, instead of going east, the trains- 
 went west to Staunton. From there Jackson marched on west, 
 picking up Edward Johnson's division on the way. Late in 
 the afternoon of May 7 Johnson's division, which was in the- 
 lead, came upon the Union outposts and drove them into Mc- 
 Dowell. Milroy had already learned of the enemy's approach,, 
 and had asked for assistance. This brought Schenck with his- 
 brigade from Franklin. The brigade made the march of 
 thirty-four miles in twenty-three hours. 
 
 (110) In the afternoon of the 8th Johnson's division, still 
 'in the lead, reached the top of Sitlington's Hill in the Bull 
 Pasture Mountains, from which the Union camp at McDowell 
 could be seen. The camp was in a hard place to attack; the 
 only approach for Jackson was by the turnpike that, passing 
 through the mountain defile, crossed the Bull Pasture River 
 by a bridge at its outlet. Jackson halted his command and 
 sent out parties to look for a trail by which to cross the 
 stream and turn the Union position. But Schenck, who was 
 the senior officer at McDowell, did not wait to be attacked. He 
 crossed his little command, 2,500 strong, climbed the rocky 
 mountainside, and attacked the superior numbers of the enemy. 
 (Ill) The Federals were repulsed; but it was not till nine 
 o'clock at night that they gave up the fight and withdrew. The 
 Confederates made no counter-attack, and were content to biv- 
 ouac on the ground. (112) The next day they took up the 
 
226 American Campaigns. 
 
 pursuit ; but the enemy had set the woods on fire, and the 
 flames and blinding smoke made pursuit very difficult. By the 
 12th Jackson had driven the^nenrv_la_£rankJiD. He then 
 turned back toward the Valley, and took the road to Harrison- 
 burg, leaving Ashby in front of Fremont to screen the move- 
 ment. 
 
 On the 17th [May] Jackson halted at Mount Solon, twelve 
 miles southwest of Harrisonburg. Banks had fallen backjo 
 Strasburg and was now completely cut off from Fxemqnt,* who 
 could join him only by long roundabout trails. On the 20th 
 [May] Jackj>oj^yras at_New. Market, .having been joined on the 
 way by one ..of .E-well's brigades. Ewell with the rest of his 
 division was at Luray. Ashby's scouts were as far forward as 
 Woodstock, and everything indicated that Jackson was moving 
 on Strasburg by the Valley Pike. Shields's division had been 
 detached from Banks and sent to General McDowell ; so Banks 
 now had only 8,000 men. He had placed 1,000 of these under 
 Colonel Kenly at Front Royal, twelve miles east of Strasburg, 
 to guard the Manassas Gap Railway, and was himself in- 
 trenched with the rest at Strasburg. There he expected to be 
 attacked by Jackson, but he entertained no serious fear. 
 
 (107) Back in Washington, at this time, where Mr. Stanton 
 was personally directing the operations between the Allegha- 
 nies and the Atlantic, everything appeared to be working out 
 right. Jackson's victory at McDowell was considered a minor 
 affair, and all fear of his crossing the Potomac and moving on 
 Washington was at rest. General McDowell was under orders 
 to start from Fredericksburg for the Peninsula on the 26th of 
 May, and the President and the Secretary of War were going 
 to review his army before its departure.* 
 
 (112) On the 21st [May] Jackson started northward with 
 his little army at New Market, and every man supposed that 
 Strasburg was to be the first objective. But suddenly the head 
 of the column was turned to the right and took the road across 
 the Massanuttens to Luray. In the camp here the men were 
 in the same quandary — "Was 'Old Jack' going to march across 
 Blue Ridge to Warrenton or Culpeper; or was he going down 
 Luray Valley?" they asked oncanother. 
 
 On the morning of the 22nd Trie took the road down the 
 valley. The next day his battalions suddenly burst out of the 
 forest upon Kenly's detachment at Front Royal. Kenly's little 
 command fought like heroes ; but Jackson had planned so well 
 
 ♦Henderson. 
 
Jackson's Valley Campaign. 227 
 
 that Ashby's cavalry had the roads blocked and the telegraph 
 lines cut on both sides. Kenly had no road left open but the 
 one to Winchester; setting fire to the bridges over the two 
 forks of the Shenandoah he retired by that road. Soon he was 
 overtaken and charged by Colonel Flournoy and 250 Virginian 
 horsemen. Kenly was cut down with a saber, and his com- 
 mand dispersed in flight. Flournoy led back 600 prisoners and 
 a section of artillery as prize of battle. In addition the Fed- 
 erals lost thirty-two killed and 122 wounded. The Confed- 
 erates had eleven killed and fifteen wounded.* 
 
 It was after midnight before Sanka_at.^trasburg could be 
 made to believe that the attack at Front Royal meant anything 
 more than a raid. He thought that Jackson with the bulk of 
 his army was still at Harrisonburg. • When urged by his best 
 officer, General Gordon, to retreat before he should be cut off, 
 he replied, "By God, sir, I will not retreat ! We have more to 
 fear, sir, from the opinions of our friends than the bayonets of 
 our enemies !" None the less the next morning, the 24th May, 
 he put his command in motion for Winchester. 
 
 Jackson could not be sure whether Banks would stay at 
 gtrasburg, retreat to Winchester, or, letting Jackson get the 
 bulk of his troops on the north side of the North Fork, would 
 make, a dash for Manassas Gap by the road along the south 
 bank. To find out he sent Ashby toward Strasburg, and other 
 columns on all the roads leading toward Winchester and the 
 Valley Turnpike. One of the columns took six hours, how- 
 ever, to march seven miles, and when it reached Middletown 
 Banks's main body had passed. From here on to Winchester, 
 which was reached late at night, Jackson's own division kept 
 up a fight with the Federal rear-guard. But Ashby's cavalry 
 wasted valuable time in looting the Union train ; and Gordon 
 managed the rear-guard so skilfully that Banks made good his 
 retreat. 
 
 The next morning, M^y^25, T3anks made a useless stand at 
 Winchester, "determined," he said in his report, "to test the 
 substance and strength of the enemy by actual collision."! 
 Jackson attacked him skilfully wjthjiwell's division on the 
 Front Royal road, by which it had marched, and with his own 
 division by the Valley Turnpike; while a column turned the 
 Union right. Thus surrounded by overwhelming numbers,, 
 Banks_gave way and retreated to Martinsburg; before mid-,, 
 night he was across the Potomac at Williamsport. ' 
 
 ♦Henderson. 
 W. & L. 
 
228 American Campaigns. ' 
 
 Jackson's infantry pursued for five or six miles ; then it had 
 to halt through sheer fatigue. Ashby's cavalry had gone off 
 toward Berryville to head off the retreat, if Banks should take 
 the road by way of Snicker's Gap ; the commander of the cav- 
 alry attached to Ewell's division, a young pedant, refused to 
 receive an order direct from Jackson, transmitted by an aide. 
 He said his orders must come through his immediate com- 
 mander, General Ewell. So Jackson had no cavalry to turn 
 B anks's j-etreat into rout. He mounted some gunners on artil- 
 lery horses; but they made a poor substitute for cavalry. 
 
 "Never," states Jackson in his report, "have I seen an oppor- 
 tunity when it was in the power of cavalry to reap a richer 
 harvest of the fruits of victory."* 
 
 Already the orders ; ref errecMo in our Peninsular lecture had 
 gone from Washington to General McDowell, directing him to 
 suspend his movement on Richmond and send 20,000 men to 
 the Shenandoah; and to Fremont, who was. at Franklin, "to 
 moye_against Jackson at Harrisonburg." The strategy of 
 Jackson's operations had thus wholly succeeded. But this was 
 not all. Banks's retreat and expulsion from the Valley re- 
 newed the fear at Washington that Jackson would cross the 
 Potomac and swoop down upon that city. It was even be- 
 lieved at Washington that the enemy was making a general 
 movement northward. The President issued an urgent call for 
 more troops, and Mr. Stanton wrote the governor of Massa- 
 chusetts, "There is no doubt that the enemy in great force 
 are marching on Washington."* Troops were hurried to Har- 
 per's Ferry, and McClellan was warned that he might have to 
 take his army back to Washington. 
 
 Jackson let his worn-out troops rest for two days near Win- 
 chester, then moved them toward the Potomac to increase the 
 fear at the North. By the 29th the bulk of his command was 
 concentrated at Halltown, within three miles of Harper's 
 Ferry. 
 
 McClellan and McDowell both protested against the transfer 
 of McDowell's troops to the Valley. It broke up McClellan's 
 plan, and they knew that Washington was in no danger, and 
 that the troops could hardly reach the Valley in time to cut off 
 Jackson's retreat. They also knew that Fremont's advance 
 into the Valley was enough, alone, to induce Jackson to fall 
 back. But Mr. Stanton was directing this campaign; it was 
 he that was pitted against Lee and Jackson in the game of 
 
 ♦Henderson. 
 
Jackson's Valley Campaign. 229 
 
 strategy. He would listen to no advice nor protests from Mc- 
 Dowell and McClellan, and by his obstinacy and his ignorance 
 of the science of war he probably set back the fall of Rich- 
 mond and the Confederacy just three years. 
 
 On the evening of (Mjiy_the 29ttu Jackson learned that Fre- 
 mont's army was on its way from Moorefield to Strasburg. 
 The next day he heard of McDowelTs movement toward Front 
 Royal. This same day, May 30, he moved his main body back 
 toward Winchester, leaving the Stonewall Brigade to hold in 
 check the troops of Banks and Saxton, about 15,000 men. 
 Arriving at Winchester by cars ahead of his army, Jackson 
 learned that Shields, commanding the van of McDowell's army, 
 had captured Front Royal. Fremont was at Wardensville, 
 twenty-five miles west of the Valley Turnpike. Winchester is 
 •eighteen miles from Strasburg; but the head of Jackson's col- 
 umn was seven miles farther back on the pike ; and his rear- 
 guard, the Stonewall Brigade, was nigh twenty miles north- 
 east of Winchester. 
 
 Fremont had_fii,000 men, Banks and Saxton had 15,000, and 
 Shields had 10,000 ; and 10,000 more were a few miles behind 
 Shields,— all together 50,000 troops. I Jackson had 15,000 Con- 
 federates with 2,000 prisoners and a double train of wagons 
 seven miles long. His only line of retreat was^ the Valley 
 Turnpike through Strasburg. He_ was in a trap, but Shields J 
 and Fremont were not the men to close its door upon him. ' 
 These two generals were not in communication with each other. / 
 The Washington authorities kept each informed as well as pos- 
 sible of the other's movements. Neither knew exactly where 
 the other was. Both had learned what manner of man Jackson 
 was, and both were correspondingly cautious. Fremont was 
 ■checked by Ashby's cavalry, and halted at Cedar Creek, six 
 miles west of Strasburg, Shields was kept back by the demon- 
 stration of a small brigade from Strasburg. 
 
 Jackson made all haste. The evening of the 31st of May his 
 main body bivouacked at Strasburg ; the Stonewall Brigade had 
 reached Newtown, after a march of thirty-five miles. The 
 next morning, June 1, Ewell's division relieved Ashby's cav- 
 alry at Cedar Creek, and kept Fremont back until the trains 
 and the Stonewall Brigade had passed. By noon Jackson's 
 whole command had left Strasburg behind. That night it biv- 
 ouacked at Woodstock guarded by Ashby's cavalry, which 
 look its post along Tom's Brook. 
 
 The forces of Fremont and McDowell did not get into direct 
 
230 American Campaigns. 
 
 communication with each other until the 2nd of June. As soon 
 as it was discovered that Jackson had passed Strasburg and re- 
 treated southward both columns took up the pursuit. Mc- 
 Dowell had ordered Shields to Luray on the afternoon of 
 June 1, and that night Shields's advance-guard was ten miles 
 south of Front Royal. Fremont, preceded by Bayard's cav- 
 alry brigade, took the Valley Pike on the opposite side of the 
 Massanuttens, and hastened to Woodstock. 
 
 Jackson had anticipated these movements, and had sent de- 
 tachments to destroy the three bridges on the South Fork to 
 the north of Port Republic. He senf another detachment to 
 hold the bridge at Port Republic for the retreat of his own 
 army. To make matters worse for the pursuit heavy rains 
 had made the road in the Luray Valley well-nigh impassable, 
 and had raised the river so much that it was impossible to 
 construct temporary bridges quickly enough to be of use. So 
 Fremont and Shields could not possibly unite their forces by 
 any route except the Harrisonburg-Port Republic road. At 
 Luray Shields heard the sound of cannon on the other side 
 of the mountain, and conjectured that Fremont was engaged; 
 but he could not go to his assistance. 
 
 Over on that side of the Massanuttens Bayard's cavalry 
 caught up with Ashby's between Strasburg and Woodstock on 
 the 2nd of June, and sent it flying up the Valley. "Many pris- 
 oners were taken, and the pursuit was only checked by a party 
 of infantry stragglers, whom Asbby had succeeded in rallying 
 across the road."* The skirmishing was kept up all the next 
 day. On the 4th [June] the Confederates crossed the North 
 Fork and burnt the bridge. The difficulty of throwing a pon- 
 toon-bridge across the swollen river stopped the pursuit until 
 the morning of the 5th, and gave Jackson a lead of twenty-four 
 hours. Contact was not regained until the 6th. In a desper- 
 ate skirmish on this day Ashby was shot through the heart. 
 Then fell the cavalry leader who first in this war, or in any war 
 since Napoleon's time, used his squadrons right; and Stone- 
 wall Jackson taught him how. The death of no other man, 
 save Jackson only, could have caused so great a loss to the 
 Army of the Valley.' 
 
 "On the 6th and 7th [June] the Confederate infantry rested 
 on the banks of Mill Creek near Cross Keys. The cavalry on 
 either flank of the Massanuttens watched Fremont's camps at 
 Harrisonburg and the slow advance of Shields ;" and from one 
 
 ♦Henderson. 
 
Jackson's Valley Campaign. 231 
 
 ■of the mountain peaks a signal party kept an eye upon the 
 roads converging on the Confederate position.* On the 
 7th there was not so much as a skirmish. Fremont's pur- 
 suit had heen checked the day before, and he was uncertain 
 in what direction Jackson's main body had retreated. Shields, 
 meanwhile, had the main body of his troops at Columbia 
 Bridge, and had begun building a new bridge. Late in the day 
 he learned from one of his patrols, which had managed to com- 
 municate with Fremont, that Jackson was retreating,* and he 
 set out at once for Port Republic. His only fear was that he 
 might not reach there in time to catch Jackson's troops. His 
 instructions to his advance-guard commander show his elation 
 and anxiety: "The enemy has flung away everything,'' said 
 he, "and their stragglers fill the mountain. They need only a 
 movement on their flank to panic-strike them and break them 
 into fragments. No man has had such a chance since the war 
 commenced."* 
 
 Owing to the bad condition of the road his command was 
 already split into several distinct fractions, although McDowell 
 had cautioned him to keep it together and not to let Jackson 
 defeat it in detail. His leading brigade was south of Conrad's 
 Store; a second was some miles in rear; and two had been 
 stopped at Luray, in consequence of a report that Longstreet 
 with 8,000 Confederates was crossing the Blue Ridge by 
 Thornton's Gap. 
 
 The night of June" 7 the hostile forces were thus situated: 
 Shields's command was stretched out over twenty-five miles of 
 road in Luray Valley ; Fremont was at Harrisonburg ; Ewell's. 
 Confederate division was near Cross Keys ; and Jackson's main 
 body was near Port "Republic* Jackson might easily have 
 escaped with his army on the 7th by way of Port Republic,, 
 burning the bridge behind him, and Brown's Gap ; but he had 
 other designs in mind. He wanted to defeat Fremont and 
 Shields separately. His plan was to hold Fremont back at 
 Cross Keys with Ewell's division, overwhelm Shields with his 
 main body, then fall upon Fremont with his entire force. He 
 knew that Fremont's command was much the stronger of the 
 two Federal columns. 
 
 (113) Ewell placed his troops along a wooded height be- 
 hind the insignificant brook known as Mill Creek. Trimble's 
 brigade held the right of his line. Before 9 a.m. on the 8th 
 June his outposts were driven in; and by ten o'clock the Fed- 
 
 *Henderson. 
 
232 American Campaigns. 
 
 «eral artillery had opened from the heights on the other side of 
 the brook. Fremont's force greatly outnumbered Ewell's in 
 -every arm ; but the Federal commander supposed he had Jack- 
 son's entire army in front of him, and he did not know where 
 ■Shields was. He had heard nothing from that general for 
 three or four days. In his uncertainty Fremont made his at- 
 tack in a timid, half-hearted fashion. Of twenty-four regi- 
 ments present on the field he sent forward five, only, to the 
 'assault. These assailed the Confederate right and were re- 
 pulsed. The action along the rest of the line was not serious. 
 Milroy and Schenck, who fought so well at McDowell, had 
 started to assault the left of the Confederate line, but were 
 recalled by Fremont. (114) The two hostile lines bivouacked 
 that night within sight of each other. This action is known 
 as the tattle of Cross Keys. 
 
 (112) Earlier the same day Shields's advanced cavalry, 
 through the failure of the Confederate cavalry to guard the 
 road in the valley of the South Fork, got into Port Republic 
 and came near capturing the Confederate trains and Stonewall 
 Jackson himself. It was, however, driven off. 
 
 Before six o'clock the next morning, June 9, Jackson's army, 
 except part of Ewell's division, was crossing the streams at 
 Port Republic on its way to attack Shields. (115) Less 
 than two miles down the river two Federal Brigades under 
 Tyler were found in position. Tyler's right rested on the river 
 and his left on a ravine. Here the battle of Port Republic 
 took place. The Stonewall Brigade assaulted the Union line 
 in front and engaged it in a fierce action. The battle lasted for 
 four or five hours. Jackson concluded that he should not be 
 able to defeat Tyler, then return to the other side and over- 
 whelm Fremont; so he ordered all of Ewell's troops to the 
 right bank, and had the bridge at Port Republic burnt. Finally 
 ■"Dick" Taylor's brigade of Ewell's division, having succeeded 
 in turning the Federal left, and the rest of Ewell's division hav- 
 ing come to reinforce the Confederate line, Tyler was forced to 
 ■quit the field. He was pursued nearly to Conrad's Store. 
 There he met Shields, who was hurrying with the rest of his 
 ■division to the sound of the battle. Shields formed line and 
 stor^ped the pursuit. 
 
 (112) Before midnight Jackson's entire army was in 
 hivouac at Brown's Gap, and the Valley Campaign was at an 
 end. Here Jackson's army was in direct communication with 
 Richmond; here it remained until June the 17th, when it set 
 
Jackson's Valley Campaign. 233 
 
 out upon its swift and secret journey to the Chickahominy. 
 Jackson's counter-stroke at Cross Keys and Port Republic 
 again upset the plans of President Lincoln and Mr. Stanton, 
 and caused them to reverse their orders. Two days before the 
 battle of Cross Keys the division of McDowell's corps left at 
 Fredericksburg had been dispatched to McClellan by water; 
 and on the very day of that battle, the 8th June, McDowell was 
 ordered to join McClellan as speedily as possible with the rest 
 of his corps. The same day Fremont was ordered by telegraph 
 to halt at Harrisonburg. Before these orders reached their 
 destination Fremont and Shields had both been defeated. 
 Thereupon McDowell's order was revoked, and he was directed 
 to leave Shields's division at Luray and his other division at 
 Front Royal. Fremont, feeling himself too exposed at Har- 
 risonburg, fell back to Mount Jackson. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 (107) The operations carried on during this summer of 
 1862 in the theater between the Alleghanies and Chesapeake 
 Bay, considered as a whole, present as fine an example as is to 
 be found in the history of warfare, of the strategical advantage 
 of interior lines intelligently employed, over exterior lines un- 
 intelligently employed. We shall see later, in our studies of 
 von Moltke's campaigns, how the case may be reversed; how 
 exterior lines with separate lines of operation may be turned 
 to profit by a master of the art of war. 
 
 The Federal armies occupied the perimeter of an irregular 
 curve reaching from the James River below Richmond round 
 through Fredericksburg, Manassas, Harper's Ferry, and up 
 the valley of the South Branch of the Potomac. This line was 
 not rigid, it is true ; it oscillated more or less in consonance 
 with Stonewall Jackson's movements. Upon the line there 
 were McClellan's army, nearly 100,000 strong; McDowell's 
 corps, 30,000 to 40,000; the troops within the defenses of 
 Washington, 20,000 to 30,000; Banks's army, 15,000 to 20,000; 
 and Fremont's, 15,000, — in all, more than 20(MX)0 soldiers. 
 Opposed to this force, on the inside of the curve,^e Confeder- 
 ates numbered, all told, hardly more than 100,000 at any time. 
 If these widely scattered Union forc^had all been collected 
 into two or three armies, under a single head, and moved in 
 intelligent combination against a single objective, the main 
 Confederate army or Richmond, what chance of escape would 
 
234 American Campaigns. 
 
 there have been for this army or the Confederate capital? 
 It should seem that it would have required no great knowl- 
 edge of the principles of strategy to unite those Union armies 
 and crush their weak foe ; but it was Mr. Stanton's lack of just 
 that much military knowledge that enabled Lee and Jackson 
 to keep the Federal armies apart; that enabled them first to 
 defeat Fremont west of the Alleghanies, then Banks, then Fre- 
 mont and Shields on opposite sides of the rivers at Port Re- 
 public; then, finally, to throw every man against MoClellan 
 astride the Chickahominy. 
 
 The Valley Campaign was, from beginning to end, only sec- 
 ondary to the campaign in eastern Virginia. It was only a 
 strategic diversion ; but of such no finer study can be found in 
 modern war. If McDowell with his 30,000 to 40,000 troops 
 had joined the Union army on the Chickahominy Richmond 
 must inevitably have fallen, and with it, in all human probabil- 
 ity, the Confederacy. "Three times was McDowell to have 
 marched to join McClellan: first, at the beginning of April 
 [1862], when he was held back by Kernstown; second, on May 
 26, when he was held back by Front Royal and Winchester; 
 third, on June 25, when he was held back by Jackson's disap- 
 pearance after Port Republic."* 
 
 Johnston and Lee must be credited with conceiving the idea 
 of making a diversion in the Shenandoah Valley in favor of the 
 Confederate main army. It was Johnston that sent Jackson to 
 the Valley in the autumn of 1861, and left him there, when he 
 withdrew the main Confederate army from the neighborhood 
 of Centreville in the spring of 1862. He gave Jackson orders 
 "to endeavor to employ the invaders in the Valley, without ex- 
 posing himself to the danger of defeat, by keeping so near the 
 enemy as to prevent his making any considerable detachment 
 to reinforce McClellan. "f These instructions were noway so 
 definite or positive as those given to Patterson by General 
 Scott a few months earlier, directing him to prevent Johnston 
 from quitting the Valley to go to Beauregard's help at Manas- 
 sas ; yet, how differently the two generals carried out their in- 
 structions ! Winston went to Beauregard's aid just in the nick 
 of time; BaSRs not only never left the Valley, except when 
 Jackson chose to drive him out of it, but other Federal troops 
 had to be sent into th^JJJalley more than once. 
 
 "To Lee belongs still further credit. From the moment he 
 
 ^Henderson, 
 fjohnston's Narrative, 
 
Jackson's Valley Campaign. 235 
 
 assumed command we find the Confederate operations directed 
 on a definite and well-directed plan ; a defensive attitude around 
 Richmond, a vigorous offensive in the Valley, leading to the 
 dispersion of the enemy, and a Confederate concentration on 
 the Chickahominy. . . . From Lee, too, came the sugges- 
 tion that a blow should be struck at Banks ; that he should be 
 driven to the Potomac ; and that the North should be threatened 
 with invasion." He sent Ewell with 8,000 men to Jackson; 
 later he dispatched Whiting to him with 7,000 men from Rich- 
 mond, in order to deceive the enemy, just before Jackson set 
 out on his movement to Richmond.* This was all good 
 strategy ; but neither Johnston nor Lee had anything to do with 
 Jackson's method of carrying out their general instructions. 
 The plan of operations in the Valley, and its execution, were 
 Jackson's own work. And those operations considered by 
 themselves, apart from their relation to the main campaign in 
 Virginia, are full of fine lessons in strategy and tactics. Lord 
 Wolseley, late Commander-in-Chief of the British army, has 
 published his opinion of them : "These brilliant successes," he 
 wrote, "appear to me models of the kind, both in conception 
 and execution. They should be closely studied by all officers 
 who wish to learn the art and science of war."f 
 
 When the Civil War broke out there was not a man of suit- 
 able age in America who was qualified by experience to com- 
 mand a brigade in the field. Those, like General Scott, who 
 had commanded considerable numbers of men, and had proved 
 themselves fit, were too old. Nobody else had ever com- 
 manded more than a few hundreds. There had been no peace 
 maneuvers to educate generals. Some had studied a few text- 
 books on the military art, and one at least, General Halleck, 
 had even published such a text-book. Yet, if we judge by 
 their early performances in this war, we must conclude that 
 only a few seem to have profited by their studies. Jackson 
 was preeminent among that few. 
 
 One of his staff officers says Jackson always carried three 
 books in his saddle-pockets: the Bible, Webster's Dictionary, 
 and Napoleon's Maxims. He took as the mojfcl of his re- 
 ports Joshua's account of the battle with tne^ftmalekites.* 
 Cromwell also carried a Bible, and Marlborough was weak in 
 spelling. Jackson had seriously and intelligently studied 
 
 *Henderson. 
 
 iNorth American Review, Vol. 149, No. 2, p. 166. 
 
.236 American Campaigns. 
 
 Napoleon's campaigns ; and there is no doubt at all that he 
 made Napoleon's methods his models. One cannot follow his 
 operations in the Valley without being constantly reminded of 
 two of Napoleon's most brilliant campaigns ; to wit, his Italian 
 campaign of 1796, but more particularly his campaign against 
 Blucher and Schwarzenburg in 1814. In both of those cam- 
 paigns Napoleon, like Jackson, commanded comparatively small 
 forces ; and like Jackson he kept his enemy in two or more 
 bodies, and defeated them in detail. 
 
 Jackson himself had some maxims that are as worthy of 
 a place in the student's notebook as Napoleon's were worthy 
 of room in Jackson's saddle-pockets. Here are a few of them : 
 
 1. "Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy if pos- 
 sible ; 
 
 2. "When you strike him and overcome him never give up 
 the pursuit as long as your men have strength to follow ; for 
 an enemy routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and 
 can be destroyed by half their number ; 
 
 3. "Never fight against heavy odds if by any possible ma- 
 neuvering you can hurl your whole force on only a part, and 
 that the weakest part, of your enemy, and crush it ;* 
 
 4. "To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure all the 
 fruits of victory is the secret of successful war ; 
 
 5. "A defensive campaign can only be made successful by 
 taking the aggressive at the proper time. Napoleon never 
 waited for his adversary to become fully prepared, but struck 
 him the first blow ; 
 
 6. "I had rather lose one man in marching than five in bat- 
 tle. "f This maxim had reference to the terrific marching he 
 •exacted of his "foot-cavalry," as his infantry was sometimes 
 styled, in order to gain advantage in battle. Often his men fell 
 out by scores; "but the marches which strewed the wayside 
 with the footsore and the weaklings won his battles. "f 
 
 There was no other series of operations in the Civil War, 
 covering the same length of time, that presented on the one 
 hand as many brilliant features, and on the other as many ex- 
 amples of bhinders to be avoided, as the operations in and 
 about the Valley of the Shenandoah, from the time when Jack- 
 son left the neighborhood of Swift Run Gap, April 30, 1862, 
 up to the time when he disappeared into the mountains at 
 Brown's Gap on the night of June 9. By making demonstra- 
 
 *B. & L. — Imboden. 
 fHenderson. 
 
Jackson s Valley Campaign. 237 
 
 tions with his cavalry against Banks's detachment at Harrison- 
 burg and New Market, on the 29th and 30th of April, then 
 marching in the mud a few miles up Luray Valley, then cross- 
 ing Blue Ridge to the railway at Mechum's River Station,. 
 Jackson completely mystified and misled the enemy, and fell 
 upon Milroy and Schenck at McDowell before Banks or Fre- 
 mont, or Stanton at Washington, had any notion where he was.. 
 
 Banks fell back to Strasburg, and Milroy and Schenck were 
 driven back upon Fremont at Franklin. Then Jackson re- 
 turned to the Valley; and his movement was so thoroughly 
 screened by Ashby's cavalry that Fremont thought he was still 
 in his front ; and Banks had no idea where he was until he 
 had flung his army across the Massanuttens, united it with 
 Ewell, and hurled the combined force upon Kenly, over- 
 whelming him at Front Royal. 
 
 Then he chased Banks beyond the Potomac and threatened 
 to cross that river, thus throwing Washington and the whole 
 North into a panic. This induced Mr. Stanton to order Mc- 
 Dowell and Fremont to Strasburg in order to cut off his re- 
 treat. Although Fremont had got within twenty-five miles, 
 and Shields within twelve miles of Strasburg when the head 
 of Jackson's army was twenty-five miles and his rear-guard 
 fifty miles from that town, Jackson managed, with swift march- 
 ing and the uncertainty and hesitation of Fremont and Shields 
 to slip between them, and make good his escape, without the 
 loss of a regiment, or a wagon of his seven-mile train of cap- 
 tured stores and munitions. 
 
 From Front Royal McDowell made the mistake of sending 
 only one division, Shields's, up Luray Valley to cut off Jack- 
 son's retreat or fall upon his flank ; and Shields made the mis- 
 take of stringing his division out for twenty-five miles on the 
 road. Jackson was quick to take advantage of those blunders. 
 He had all the bridges over the South Fork destroyed, except 
 the one upon his line of retreat at Port Republic. That one he 
 seized and held, thus preventing the junction of Fremont and 
 Shields, and enabling him to beat them separately and drive 
 them back. 
 
 Then Jackson disappeared into the mountains. He had pro- 
 duced another scare in Washington, and induced the Secretary 
 of War, for the third time, to revoke the order for McDowell 
 to join McClellan. It was at the time, too, when McClellan 
 needed McDowell most ; for when Jackson reappeared he was 
 
238 American Campaigns. 
 
 upon MoClellan's flank, and Lee had begun his offensive 
 operations. 
 
 In all of his operations Jackson made the most effective use 
 of his cavalry. Twice only did it fail him ; first in the pursuit 
 of Banks from Strasburg to Winchester ; and secondly in the 
 pursuit after the action at Winchester. In both of those in- 
 stances failure was due to a lack of that discipline which comes 
 only of systematic training. In that, of course, the Virginian 
 horsemen, from their brilliant leader down to the last trooper, 
 were deficient. But in the methods that Jackson taught them, 
 in boldness, in swiftness, in endurance, in the knowledge 
 of the country, in the duties of "security and information," — 
 screening and reconnaissance, — in action, whether afoot or 
 horseback, — generally speaking, in cavalry efficiency, they 
 have not been excelled by any cavalry of which history has 
 kept the record. No cavalry officer that wishes to know the 
 full value of his arm, when rightly employed, can neglect 
 to study the story of Ashby's work in the Valley. 
 
LECTURE XII. 
 THE SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 
 
 (116) The failure of Fremont and Banks and McDowell 
 in their operations against Stonewall Jackson in the Valley con- 
 vinced the President that their three armies ought to be under 
 the orders of a single commander in the field. Accordingly he 
 issued an order on the 26th of June, 1862, consolidating the 
 three armies of McDowell, Banks, and Fremont into a single 
 army. McDowell, Banks, and Fremont all ranked Pope; who 
 had gained a reputation by his capture of New Madrid and 
 Island No. 10, was called from the West to command the new 
 army. McDowell, Banks, and Fremont all ranked Pope; 
 Fremont refused to serve under him and resigned. He was 
 succeeded bv General Sigel. Pope's army numbered about 
 47,000. 
 
 The task of the Army of Virginia, as set forth in orders to 
 Pope, "was threefold : to 'cover the City of Washington from 
 any attack from the direction of Richmond ; to make such dis- 
 positions as were necessary to assure the safety of the Valley 
 of the Shenandoah ; and at the same time so to operate on the 
 enemy's lines of communication in the direction of Gordons- 
 ville and Charlottesville as to draw off, if possible, a consider- 
 able force of the enemy from Richmond, and thus relieve the 
 operations against that city of the Army of the Potomac' "* 
 
 The very day on which the order issued organizing the Army 
 of Virginia, June 26, 1862, Lee began the turning movement 
 at Mechanicsville that ended with the retreat of McClellan's 
 army and its concentration at Harrison's Landing. 
 
 At this time the armies of Banks and Fremont, now corps of 
 the Army of Virginia, were at Middletown and Strasburg in 
 the Shenandoah Valley. McDowell's two divisions, which we 
 left at Luray and Front Royal at the close of the Valley Cam- 
 paign, were now at Manassas Junction and Falmouth, respect- 
 ively. Harrisonburg, Charlottesville, and Gordonsville were 
 occupied by Confederate troops. 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
240 American Campaigns. 
 
 Geography. 
 
 The Rappahannock River and its branch, the Rapidan, flow- 
 ing eastward between the regions occupied by the Army of Vir- 
 ginia and the Confederate troops, although they were fordable 
 at many points during the dry season, and were bridged at 
 some points, were, none the less, sufficiently formidable as 
 military obstacles to serve as defensive lines for an army. 
 North and west of Gordonsville the country was mountainous, 
 and the entire theater was more or less thickly covered with 
 forests. The Bull Run Mountains, like the Blue Ridge, could 
 be crossed only at certain passes, or "gaps." The highways 
 were mainly earthen roads, fairly good in dry weather, but 
 muddy and difficult in wet weather. There were ,a few 
 macadam roads, like the Warrenton-Alexandria Pike, and the 
 Little River Turnpike through Aldie Gap. 
 
 The Manassas Gap and the Orange and Alexandria Rail- 
 ways, which come together at Manassas Junction, served as the 
 lines of communication for the Union armies in this region with 
 their base at Washington ; while the Virginia Central Railway, 
 which connected with the Orange and Alexandria at Gordons- 
 ville, and with the East Tennessee and Virginia at Charlottes- 
 ville, was the main line by which the Confederate army- in 
 Virginia received its supplies from the Southwestern States, 
 and kept up communication between Richmond and the west- 
 ern part of Virginia. The Junctions at Manassas, Gordons- 
 ville, and Charlottesville were, therefore, important strategic 
 points. As Gordonsville was near enough to the region occu- 
 pied by the Federal troops to be particularly exposed to 
 capture, its protection was a matter of special concern to Lee. 
 
 Operations. 
 
 (117) Pope, believing that he could best perform his three- 
 fold task by assembling the widely separated parts of his army 
 at some central position, issued orders at once for Banks and 
 Sigel to move to Sperryville and Little Washington, and for 
 Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps to move from Manas- 
 sas to Warrenton. In these positions he would cover the ap- 
 proaches to the Shenandoah Valley and Washington, and 
 threaten Gordonsville and Charlottesville. Pope would have 
 liked, also, to close in King's division of McDowell's corps from 
 
The Second Battle of Bull Run. 241 
 
 Falmouth ; but the National Government had depots and ware- 
 houses and wharves at Aquia Creek, and for their protection 
 it required Pope to hold on to Falmouth; and hence to keep 
 his army stretched upon a much wider front than he ought to 
 have covered. 
 
 Early in July Pope's army was concentrated as ordered. 
 Meantime Burnside had brought up an army from North 
 Carolina, and had it in camp at Fort Monroe ; and McClellan's 
 army had fallen back to Harrison's Landing. General Pope 
 was still in Washington, where he was detained by the Presi- 
 dent as his military adviser. He ordered Banks to send for- 
 ward his . cavalry to occupy Culpeper, and "to throw out 
 pickets for at least twenty miles in the direction of Gordons- 
 ville." 
 
 On the 14th of July General John P. Hatch, with the 
 cavalry of Banks's corps, was ordered to seize Gordonsville, 
 then held by about 200 Confederate infantry and a few cav- 
 alry.* Hatch encumbered himself with field artillery and a 
 wagon-train which so hindered his march that Stonewall Jack- 
 son arrived ahead of him. (118) Jackson had been started by 
 Lee from Richmond with two divisions on July 13 for Gor- 
 donsville. He reached that town on the 19th. Thus one of 
 Pope's objects had been achieved — he had induced Lee to send 
 away one of his best generals and a large force. The capture 
 of Richmond was made so much easier for McClellan. 
 
 But McClellan was not to be allowed to make another effort 
 against Richmond. On the 11th of July General Halleck was. 
 appointed General-in-Chief of all the land forces in the United 
 States, and was called to Washington from Mississippi. To- 
 ward the end of July Halleck visited McClellan at Harrison's 
 Landing, and, after looking over the situation and discussing 
 the matter with McClellan, determined, much against Mc- 
 Clellan's protest, to withdraw the Army of the Potomac from 
 the James, and unite it with the Army of Virginia. The order 
 for the withdrawal was issued on August the 3rd. From that 
 moment Pope's army, which had been organized for the pur- 
 pose of playing a secondary part, was to have the principal 
 role in the campaign ; the Army of the Potomac was, there- 
 after, to play the secondary part. 
 
 General Halleck had proposed that the two armies should 
 unite at Fredericksburg. "Here," said General Halleck, "the 
 armies would find a new base on the Rappahannock River, 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
242 American Campaigns. 
 
 nearer to Richmond than Yorktown, and one which, being 
 'between Richmond and Washington,' " would cover Washing- 
 ton from any attack by the enemy.* At the same time he 
 ordered Burnside to transfer his army from Fort Monroe to 
 Aquia Creek. 
 
 Pope remained in Washington till Halleck's return from 
 Harrison's Landing; then, with a full understanding of Hal- 
 leck's change of plan, he joined his army at Sperryville on the 
 1st of August. (119) He began at once issuing orders for 
 the movement of his troops, and, after a good deal of unneces- 
 sary marching, and many changes in his orders, he finally got 
 his army together at Culpeper by about the 12th of August. 
 Burnside had reached Falmouth with his force on the Sth. 
 
 Meantime Jackson had been eager to attack the first one of 
 Pope's corps to arrive at Culpeper. Could he defeat it "and 
 occupy that central position in time, he might deal with the 
 other two in succession, as he had dealt with Fremont and 
 Shields at Port Republic."f To enable him to take the aggres- 
 sive Lee had sent him A. P. Hill's division. This raised his 
 strength to 24,000 men. So on the 7th of August he started 
 for Culpeper. The distance was only about thirty miles ; but 
 by reason of slow marching, and confusion caused by defects in 
 the orders he gave his division commanders, it was not until 
 about noon of the 9th that his advance reached Cedar (or 
 Slaughter) Mountain, seven or eight miles south of Culpeper. 
 (120) Here he encountered Union cavalry under Bayard, 
 and the whole of Banks's corps, which had been sent forward 
 by Pope to support the cavalry. When only two of Jackson's 
 divisions were on the ground Banks attacked them furiously. 
 He routed the left of their line and threw a whole division into 
 confusion. But A. P. Hill arrived on the field with his division 
 in time to turn the scale and save the day.f Banks had gone 
 into the combat without reserves and had not sent back to ask 
 for reinforcements. So his unaided corps was "utterly over- 
 whelmed and driven back with great loss."* It was now dark, 
 but Jackson pursued Banks by moonlight across Cedar Creek. 
 Here he came upon Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps in 
 line of battle, and was checked. Meantime Jackson's cavalry 
 had brought in prisoners from Sigel's corps. Thus Jackson 
 learned that the last of Pope's three corps was close at hand, 
 
 ♦Ropes. 
 fAlexander. 
 
The Second Battle of Bull Run. 243 
 
 and that he had lost, by the slowness of his march, the chance 
 of defeating them one at a time.* 
 
 The hostile forces stood for two days watching each other. 
 Jackson hoped Pope would attack him in position. (121) 
 Failing this he fell back all the way to Gordonsville, hoping 
 that Pope would be tempted by this apparent "confession of 
 weakness" and Pope's "own boastings" to come forward and 
 assault him.* But Pope stopped behind the Rapidan. Here he 
 was joined on the 15th of August by General Reno with 8,000 
 men of Burnside's forces. This reinforcement increased Pope's 
 assembled army to 45,000. 
 
 The same day, the 15th of August, General Lee himself 
 arrived at Gordonsville. While McClellan's army had been 
 embarking at Harrison's Landing Lee's troops had been 
 hastening toward Gordonsville. Longstreet started from 
 Richmond on the 13th; Stuart's cavalry and all the rest of the 
 army, except two brigades left to guard the Southern capital 
 against cavalry raids, soon followed. 
 
 (122) Lee now had about 55,000 effectives. His army was 
 not well organized like the Union army. Instead of being 
 divided into corps it was separated into two wings under Jack- 
 son and Longstreet.* Lee resolved to strike Pope's army 
 before it could be joined by McClellan's. Pope's army, with 
 its center at Cedar Mountain, rested its flanks upon Robert- 
 son's River and the Rapidan, respectively, four or five miles 
 above and below the crossing of the Orange and Alexandria 
 Railway. Nearly opposite Pope's left flank on the southern 
 side of the Rapidan was a high wooded hill called Clark's 
 Mountain, with spurs stretching down the river to Somerville 
 Ford, about three miles below. On the 17th of August Lee 
 had his army massed behind this mountain. His purpose was 
 "to cross at Somerville Ford, fall upon Pope's left flank and 
 sweep around it with a superior force, cutting off Pope's re- 
 treat to Washington."* From this position behind Clark's 
 Mountain Lee was almost as near Culpeper and the railway 
 beyond as the front of Pope's army was; and he planned 
 to have Stuart's cavalry cross at a ford farther to the east- 
 ward, dash for Rappahannock Station, and destroy the bridge 
 behind Pope's position. Failure on the part of Fitzhugh Lee 
 to understand, or to carry out promptly, an order of Stuart, 
 caused a delay, and also occasioned the capture of an officer 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
244 American Campaigns. 
 
 bearing a copy of Lee's order.* Thus Pope learned Lee's 
 project, and he withdrew his army behind the Rappahannock 
 before Lee could put the project into effect. 
 
 Lee advanced to the Rappahannock which he found low and 
 easily fordable. He now undertook to turn Pope's right, and 
 spent five days vainly making feints for a favorable opening. 
 Meantime Stuart had made a bold raid in rear of the Union 
 army and captured Pope's headquarters. By this means Lee 
 learned that the corps of Heintzelman [third] and Porter 
 [Fifth], and Reynolds's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, 
 20,000 men all told, were already within two days' march of 
 Pope's position, and that the rest of the Army of the Potomac, 
 as well as other reinforcements, was not more than five days 
 behind. Thus within five days Pope would have nearly 130,000 
 troops. Lee's only hope of success depended upon his doing 
 something quickly. Further to add to his embarrassment a 
 heavy rainfall had made the Rappahannock unfordable.f 
 
 (123) Lee quickly decided to strike at Pope's communica- 
 tions by a wide turning movement to the left ; he started Jack- 
 son's wing and Stuart's cavalry, some 24,000 men in all, to 
 make the movement. With the rest of his army, 25,000 to 
 30,000 men,J he remained to occupy Pope's attention on the 
 Rappahannock. 
 
 Jackson started on the morning of the 25th of August. He 
 marched through Amissville and Orleans, and bivouacked that 
 night at Salem. The next day [the 26th] he pushed on 
 through Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville to Bristoe Station, 
 meeting no resistance and reaching that place about sunset. 
 Stuart's cavalry and two regiments of infantry captured Ma- 
 nassas Junction that night, with several hundred prisoners and 
 large depots of quartermaster's and commissary supplies. 
 
 Pope and his officers saw Jackson's column moving north- 
 ward on the morning' of the 25th, and concluded that it must 
 be making for the Shenandoah Valley, perhaps covering the 
 flank of Lee's main body, which might be marching toward 
 Front Royal.* No troops were sent in pursuit. Pope's army 
 remained at rest on the 26th also. (124) On the 26th Lee 
 followed Jackson with the rest of the Confederate army, and 
 that night Longstreet's wing bivouacked at Orleans. 
 
 "Report of Jackson's raid on the railroad was made to Pope 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 fAlexander. Ropes. 
 JRopes. 
 
The Second Battle of Bull Run. 245 
 
 early in the evening of the 26th. Pope at first thought it must 
 be the work of a small force; but upon the receipt of further 
 information he appreciated the gravity of the situation, and 
 on the morning of the 27th issued orders for the abandonment 
 of the line of the Rappahannock."* (125) Hooker's division 
 of Heintzelman's corps was ordered to move directly to Ma- 
 nassas, to drive away the enemy and reopen communication 
 with Alexandria. McDowell with his own and Sigel's corps 
 and Reynolds's division was ordered to Gainesville; Heintzel- 
 man with Reno's corps and Kearny's division of his own corps 
 was ordered to Greenwich in support of McDowell ; Porter was 
 ordered to move on Manassas as soon as he should be relieved 
 by Banks, who was to have charge of the wagon-trains. 
 
 McDowell and Heintzelman reached their respective posi- 
 tions without opposition ; Hooker encountered Ewell's division 
 of Jackson's wing, at about 2 p.m., holding the line of Broad 
 Run at Bristoe Station, and covering the rest of Jackson's 
 force, which was destroying the stores at Manassas. Ewell 
 had more men than Hooker; but his orders were to avoid 
 bringing on a general engagement, and Hooker's attack was 
 vigorous; so after an hour of resistance Ewell retreated to 
 Manassas.f 
 
 In the course of the day [the 27th] a small force had been 
 sent by rail from Alexandria under the supposition that there 
 was only a Confederate raiding party at Manassas. This force 
 was repulsed and its commander, General Taylor, was killed. 
 
 Pope now perceived that the whole of Jackson's command 
 was at Manassas, so he issued orders with a view to cut it off 
 and capture or destroy it. He ordered Porter to march at 
 1 a.m. [the 28th] from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe; 
 Heintzelman to move Kearny's division and unite it with his 
 other division [Hooker] at Bristoe; Reno to march his troops 
 direct from Greenwich to Manassas ; and McDowell to march 
 his own and Sigel's corps and Reynolds's division from Gaines- 
 ville to Manassas, resting his right on the railway and extend- 
 ing his left well to the east so as to intercept Jackson in case he 
 attempted to retreat to the north. McDowell was not ordered 
 to move until daylight of the 28th. Pope's orders took no ac- 
 count of the rest of Lee's army, which was but a long day's 
 march behind Jackson and bivouacked the night of the 27th at 
 White Plains. But McDowell took the responsibility of order- 
 
 *Ropes. 
 tAlexander. 
 
246 American Campaigns. 
 
 ing one of his divisions [Ricketts] to take position in front of 
 Thoroughfare Gap, to oppose the passage of Lee's forces. 
 
 (126) Jackson did not wait at Manassas to be destroyed. 
 During the night [27-28] he sent Taliaferro's division north- 
 ward by the Sudley Springs road, to cross Warrenton Pike 
 and take a position north of Groveton. Here it was joined on 
 the morning of the 28th by Ewell's division, which left Manas- 
 sas at dawn, crossed Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford, marched 
 through the fields to the Stone Bridge, and recrossed to the 
 right bank. Later in the day A. P. Hill's division also re- 
 joined. It had left Manassas at 1 a.m. and marched to Centre- 
 ville, and thence westward on the Warrenton Pike. Hill and 
 Ewell, but especially Hill, had been sent by these roundabout 
 routes for the purpose of misleading Pope as to the destination 
 of the Confederates. 
 
 About noon on the 28th Pope himself reached Manassas. 
 He found the place deserted, and could learn nothing of Jack- 
 son's movements. Later in the day he received reports that 
 Hill had been seen at Centreville, and that Confederate cavalry 
 had been raiding between Bull Run and Alexandria. At 4.15 
 p.m. Pope issued orders directing all his troops to march on 
 Centreville, whither he supposed Jackson's entire force had 
 gone. 
 
 The corps of Heintzelman and Reno marched straight for 
 Centreville ; Sigel's corps and Reynolds's division counter- 
 marched to Warrenton Pike, but did not cross Bull Run; 
 King's division of McDowell's corps, which was not far south 
 of the Pike when it received the order to march on Centreville, 
 turned eastward on the Pike. This division found Jackson's 
 position. As it marched along on the turnpike it was sud- 
 denly fired upon by artillery from the north, at about 5.30 
 p.m. Immediately afterwards Jackson attacked it with the 
 divisions of Taliaferro and Ewell. A fierce fight ensued which 
 lasted till nine o'clock. The losses were very heavy on both 
 sides. 
 
 "Jackson, about a mile from the road, might have remained 
 hidden and allowed King to pass. Had he known that at that 
 moment Lee and Longstreet were still beyond Thoroughfare 
 Gap, and that Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps was at 
 the Gap, one might suppose that he would hesitate to disclose 
 himself. But if Pope was allowed to withdraw behind Bull 
 Run the result of the whole campaign would be merely to force 
 Pope into an impregnable position. It was the fear of this 
 
The Second Battle of Bull Run. 247 
 
 which led Jackson to attack King immediately, even though he 
 knew it would draw upon him Pope's whole force."* 
 
 News of this action was at once sent to Pope, and he jumped 
 to the conclusion that Jackson had quit Centreville and was in 
 full retreat for Thoroughfare Gap ; and that King had met the 
 head of his column. Pope "therefore at once issued orders 
 for the assembling of his troops on the Warrenton turnpike." 
 In his orders he wrote : "Genl. McDowell has intercepted the 
 retreat of the enemy and is now in his front, Sigel on the right 
 of McDowell. Unless he can escape by by-paths leading to 
 the north tonight, he must be captured."f Meantime the 
 head of Longstreet's column had reached Thoroughfare Gap at 
 3 p.m. of this day [the 28th August]. Finding his passage at 
 the Gap blocked by the enemy [Ricketts's division of McDow- 
 ell's corps], Longstreet sent detachments round by way of 
 Hopewell Gap and a cattle trail to turn Ricketts's position. 
 Ricketts, therefore, at nightfall retired to Gainesville. The 
 two divisions of McDowell's corps [King and Ricketts] were 
 this night reunited, and Reynold's division and Sigel's corps 
 were in supporting distance to the right. But McDowell was 
 away looking for Pope ; so King, without any orders, started 
 at 1 a.m. with his division for Manassas, and Ricketts marched 
 his at the same time on Bristoe. 
 
 (127) On the morning of the 29th Pope's troops, worn out 
 by marching and countermarching, were badly scattered. 
 Sigel's corps and Reynolds's division were the only troops near 
 Jackson's position. They were on Bull Run, two miles east of 
 Jackson's position. The corps of Banks and Porter, and Rick- 
 etts's division of McDowell's corps were at Bristoe; King's 
 division of McDowell's corps was at Manassas; Reno's and 
 Heintzelman's corps were at Centreville. There was nothing 
 to keep Longstreet from marching through Gainesville to join 
 Jackson. 
 
 With a view' of preventing his escape Sigel and Reynolds 
 were ordered to attack Jackson at daybreak [the 29th] ; Heintz- 
 elman and Reno were ordered to reinforce Sigel and Reynolds ; 
 Porter was ordered to march to Centreville. McDowell's two 
 divisions [Ricketts and King] were supposed by Pope to be 
 blocking Jackson's retreat on Warrenton Pike. Pope himself 
 was at Centreville. 
 
 When Pope learned that King and Ricketts had fallen back 
 
 *Alexander. 
 tRopes. 
 
248 American Campaigns. 
 
 during the night he was surprised and greatly incensed. Hop- 
 ing still to cut off Jackson's supposed retreat, he sent the fol- 
 lowing order to Porter: "Push forward with your corps and 
 King's division, which you will take with you, upon Gaines- 
 ville. I am following the enemy down the Warrenton Turn- 
 pike. Be expeditious or we will lose much."* Porter was east 
 of Manassas on his way to Centreville, carrying out Pope's 
 last order to him, when he received this order. He imme- 
 diately turned about and directed his march upon Gainesville. 
 
 (128) About noon Porter and McDowell were together on 
 the Manassas-Gainesville road, when they received a joint or- 
 der from Pope directing them to move on Gainesville, but add- 
 ing: "I desire that as soon as communication is established 
 between" the troops on the right "and your own the whole 
 command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind 
 Bull Run at Centreville tonight." 
 
 Pope's idea when he wrote that order was to capture or de- 
 stroy Jackson, and then to fall back and take up a strong posi- 
 tion at Centreville before Lee's main body could arrive on the 
 scene. But if Jackson had escaped he was not to be pursued 
 beyond Gainesville. Pope added : "The indications are that the 
 whole, force of the enemy," — i. e., Lee's main body, — "is mov- 
 ing in this direction at a pace that will bring them here [Cen- 
 treville] by to-morrow night or the next day." Pope's joint 
 order further read : "If any considerable advantages are to be 
 gained by departing from this order it will not be strictly car- 
 ried out."* At that moment McDowell had a dispatch in his 
 pocket from General Buford, who commanded the Union cav- 
 alry on the right, saying that seventeen regiments, a battery, 
 and 500 Confederate cavalry had passed through Gainesville 
 from the west about 8.45 a.m. McDowell and Porter felt sure 
 that Pope had not been aware of this fact when he wrote the 
 order. After conferring together McDowell marched his corps 
 up the Sudley Springs road and Porter took the Gainesville 
 road. At Dawkins Branch Porter's column encountered the 
 enemy. It was Longstreet's wing forming on Jackson's right. 
 Porter deployed a part of his command and halted. 
 
 Meantime a battle was in progress to the north of Warrenton 
 Pike. Jackson had placed his command in the cut of an un- 
 finished railway, extending from near Sudley Springs south- 
 westerly back of Groveton. His line was about two miles long. 
 Sigel and Reynolds had attacked him first; later they had 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
The Second Battle of Bull Run. 249 
 
 been joined by Heintzelman and Reno. It was 2 p.m. before 
 the battle had reached its height. All during the afternoon 
 portions of Jackson's line were assaulted ; but the assaults were 
 not made by all the troops at once ; first one division, or part of 
 a division, would charge, and then another. All failed. The 
 weak part of Jackson's line was his left flank. "Pope might 
 have turned this early in the afternoon when Heintzelman and 
 Reno came up. But he made no attempt to do this." He 
 made none but frontal attacks. At dusk King's division of 
 McDowell's corps arrived and took part in the action; it was 
 driven back by a part of Longstreet's force. "The Federal 
 attacks had everywhere been repulsed, and the battle was over" 
 for that day.* 
 
 (129) Pope was not aware until the close of the day that 
 Longstreet had arrived and taken his place on Jackson's right. 
 Toward sunset he had sent Porter an order to attack Jack- 
 son's right, not knowing that Longstreet's whole command 
 stood between Porter and Jackson's right. 
 
 During the night the Confederates fell back to their orig- 
 inal line of battle from the advanced position they had reached 
 in following up their repulse of the enemy. This led Pope, as 
 well as McDowell and Heintzelman, the next morning, the 
 30th, to believe that Lee had retreated toward Gainesville. 
 So Pope issued at noon an order for the "vigorous pursuit of 
 the enemy." McDowell was "assigned to the command of 
 the pursuit," in which his own corps, Reynolds's division, and 
 Porter's corps were to be employed.* (130) Pope had 
 massed nearly all of his army north of the Pike. Porter was 
 to move on the Pike followed by Reynolds. Ricketts's division 
 and Heintzelman's corps were to follow the Sudley Springs- 
 Haymarket road. 
 
 Hardly had the troops started before they discovered that 
 the Confederates were not retreating, but were awaiting attack 
 in their strong position. The Confederate line formed an ob- 
 tuse reentrant angle, with Jackson's wing on the left in the 
 railway cut, and Longstreet's on the right, the greater part of 
 it south of the Turnpike. Most of the Confederate artillery 
 occupied a high position in the space between the ends of Jack- 
 son's and Longstreet's positions. These guns had a clear 
 sweep of the ground between the southern end of Jackson's 
 line and the woods out of which Porter's corps must advance 
 to attack it. 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
250 American Campaigns. 
 
 Reynolds's division was posted on Bald Hill, and other troops 
 were placed on the Henry House Hill to hold the National left 
 and to guard against an attack on that flank, which, if success- 
 ful, would cut off Pope's line of retreat. Porter, at the center, 
 assaulted Jackson's position; but he was overwhelmed by the 
 Confederate artillery and musketry fire, and repulsed. (131) 
 Thereupon Longstreet advanced his right and captured Bald 
 Hill, from which Reynolds's division had been previously with- 
 drawn by Pope to support Porter. Sigel's corps, which had 
 been in reserve, made great efforts to recover this hill; but 
 without success. 
 
 Reynolds's division, Sykes's brigade of regulars, and other 
 available troops had been sent to the Henry House Hill. The 
 Confederates under Toombs and Wilcox and others made re- 
 peated and desperate efforts to carry this position, but failed. 
 The fighting lasted till after dark. Meantime Jackson, having 
 repulsed Porter's charge, was pushing his troops against the 
 Federals north of the turnpike. This part of the Federal line 
 had been so much weakened by sending troops from it to the 
 left that it was unable to arrest Jackson's advance, and was 
 driven from the field. Thus ended the Second Battle of Bull 
 Run. 
 
 The retention of the Henry House Hill by the Union forces 
 secured their retreat over Bull Run by the Stone Bridge and 
 the neighboring fords. 
 
 (132) The next morning, August 31, Pope's army took 
 position on the heights of Centreville. Banks rejoined with his 
 corps of 9,000, which had taken no part in the battle, but had 
 brought the wagon-train with much-needed supplies safe to 
 Fairfax Court House. Franklin and Sumner, also, with their 
 corps from the Army of the Potomac, reported to Pope at Cen- 
 treville, having marched out from Alexandria. 
 
 Stuart had started with his cavalry at daybreak to recover 
 touch with the Union army, and he soon reported to Lee that 
 it was in position at Centreville. Lee resolved to turn the 
 Union right by the Little River Turnpike. So Jackson moved 
 out in the afternoon [Sunday, August 31] by way of Sudley 
 Springs, and that night bivouacked at Pleasant Valley, about 
 four miles west of Chantilly on the Little River Turnpike. 
 Longstreet followed later in the day, but halted for the night 
 near Sudley Springs. 
 
 Foreseeing the possibility of a turning movement by way of 
 the Little River Turnpike, Pope sent out a brigade of infantry 
 
The Second Battle of Bull Run. , 251 
 
 early in the morning of September the 1st to reconnoiter — there 
 being actually no cavalry with his army fit for service. Before 
 long he received report that such a movement of the enemy was 
 in progress. At noon, therefore, he ordered McDowell to 
 march his corps rapidly to Fairfax Court House, and to occupy 
 Germantown. Shortly afterwards he dispatched General 
 Stevens with two brigades across the fields to the Little River 
 Turnpike, with orders to "take a position across it," and to 
 hold the Confederate force in check. 
 
 At Ox Hill Stevens encountered Jackson's command, and a 
 desperate fight took place. Stevens was killed almost at the 
 start. Finally Kearny arrived with his division ; still the Union 
 force was greatly outnumbered by the Confederates. Kearny, 
 mistaking the Confederate troops for Federals in the woods 
 and the darkness of evening, rode right into their midst and 
 was killed. Night put an end to the combat, which is known 
 as the battle of Chantilly. 
 
 During the night the Union troops retired to Germantown 
 and Fairfax Court House. Upon the recommendation of Gen- 
 eral Pope Halleck issued orders on September the 2nd for the 
 withdrawal of the Union army to the intrenchments in front 
 of Washington, there to reorganize. Pope reported that eve- 
 ning to Halleck that the troops would be within the works by 
 the morning of the 3rd. Pope's campaign in Virginia was 
 at an end. 
 
 The losses of the whole campaign, most of which took place 
 in the great battle, were as follows : 
 
 Confederates: 1,553 killed, 7,812 wounded, 109 missing; 
 total, 9,474. 
 
 Federals : 1,747 killed, 8,452 wounded, and 4,263 captured 
 or missing; total, 14,462.* 
 
 The Confederates collected thirty guns and 20,000 small- 
 arms from the field of Bull Run.f 
 
 An unhappy incident of this battle was the trial of General 
 Fitz-John Porter by court-martial. Pope preferred charges 
 against him for not obeying the order to attack Jackson late 
 in the afternoon of the 29th of August. There were other 
 minor charges. Porter was dismissed from the service, and the 
 Union army thereby lost one of its very best generals. Gen- 
 eral Alexander says : "The ex- Federal Confederates who had 
 known Porter considered this result as one of the best fruits 
 
 *B. & L. 
 
 fAlexander. 
 
252 t American Campaigns. 
 
 of the victory." To this day the question of General Porter's 
 guilt or innocence is not settled in the minds of the American 
 people. There are persons yet that cling to the belief in his 
 martyrdom; there are others of this generation that have in- 
 herited the conviction that he ought to have been shot. Pope 
 unquestionably made a scapegoat of him; General Alexander 
 says Porter's "course was proper." My own opinion is that, 
 while Porter could not do what Pope ordered him to do, he 
 ought to have done something. He ought not to have stood 
 idle with 10,000 men during a whole afternoon, while a battle 
 was raging close at his right hand; that is virtually what he 
 did. But if the South had been as severe with Stonewall 
 Jackson for his shortcomings in the Seven Days' Campaign as 
 the North was with Porter for his lesser offense on this 29th 
 of August the victories of the Second Bull Run and Chan- 
 cellorsville would not have been for Southern arms. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 The President and Secretary Stanton were conforming to 
 one of the first principles of war when they consolidated the 
 three armies of Fremont, Banks, and McDowell into a single 
 army with one head. "Nothing is so important in war as an 
 undivided command."* And in view of the fact that Wash- 
 ington by reason of the electric telegraph was in such close 
 communication with the armies in the field as, practically, to be 
 inside the general theater of operations, they were further 
 conforming to right principles in appointing a general-in-chief 
 and keeping him at Washington. The theater of this war was 
 so vast, extending from Pennsylvania to the Gulf of Mexico, 
 and from the Atlantic Ocean to the Missouri River, that it 
 was not possible for the Commander-in-Chief to mount a horse 
 and, with his chief of staff at his side, follow the movements 
 of the armies in the field, like the Prussian King with von 
 Moltke in the Franco-German War. 
 
 And yet the armies in all this wide theater ought to have 
 been controlled by one person from the very beginning, and 
 continually ; and that person ought to have been the iiest gen- 
 eral in the service, and not a politician, nor a statesman. The 
 politicians and statesmen on either side had plunged the coun- 
 try into war; it was now time for them to take a back seat 
 
 *Napoleon's Maxim XLIV. 
 
The Second Battle of Bull Run. 253 
 
 and let the men with a knowledge of the science of war, if 
 there were any such, conduct the campaigns. 
 
 That is precisely what the President and the Secretary were 
 trying to do when they called General Halleck to Washington 
 and made him general-in-chief. And it does not appear that 
 they fettered him in any manner in his direction of the opera- 
 tions of the two armies at this time in Virginia — McClellan's 
 and Pope's. The mistake the President, or the Secretary of 
 War, made, was in the selection of their men, Halleck and 
 Pope. Yet Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton were not to blame 
 for the choice. They were trying to pick the best generals; 
 and so far success pointed to Halleck and Pope as the best. 
 
 That General Halleck made a mistake in withdrawing Mc- 
 Clellan's army from the James River after it had established 
 itself at Harrison's Landing is proved by the fact that General 
 Grant, three years later, captured Petersburg" and Richmond, 
 and ended the war, upon the very lines of operation that 
 McClellan proposed to follow, — south of the James River, — 
 after seven other lines had been tried without success. 
 
 Pope's campaign should have had three distinct phases. 
 First, under his original instructions "to cover the City of 
 Washington ; to assure the safety of the Valley of the Shenan- 
 doah" ; and "to operate on the enemy's lines of communication 
 in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottesville" in order 
 to assist McClellan's army by drawing away forces of "the 
 enemy from Richmond, — under these instructions Pope's oper- 
 ations should have been both offensive and defensive. But 
 they should have been secondary to the operations of the Army 
 of the Potomac. The main objective was Lee's army and 
 Richmond; and the main army operating against this objective 
 was, at this time, McClellan's and not Pope's. The disposi- 
 tions made by Pope to carry out these instructions were good ; 
 he concentrated his army behind the Rapidan River and started 
 a force forward to capture Gordonsville. The operation had 
 the desired effect, too, inasmuch as it obliged Lee to detach 
 Jackson from his army to the threatened point. 
 
 But Halleck changed the general plan of the campaign 
 against Richmond, and withdrew McClellan's army from the 
 James River for the purpose of uniting it with Pope's and 
 sending the combined force against Richmond by a new and 
 different line of operations. The withdrawal of McClellan's 
 army set Lee's army free, for the time being, to move against 
 Pope. With this change of situation the second phase of 
 
254 American Campaigns. 
 
 Pope's campaign began; the character of his operations ought 
 to have changed accordingly. From this moment until every 
 corps of the Army of the Potomac had made the journey 
 around by Aquia Creek, or by Alexandria, and united with his 
 army, Pope ought to have confined himself strictly to a defen- 
 sive role. He ought to have avoided a battle with Lee's army 
 and, if necessary, continued to fall back even as far as beyond 
 Bull Run. After the junction of the two armies he should 
 have resumed offensive operations. This would have been the 
 third phase. 
 
 During MoClellan's withdrawal Pope ought not to have tried 
 to hold the line of the Rapidan; this river was two days' 
 march farther to the front than the Rappahannock, and — 
 which was of more importance — it was nearly parallel to his 
 line of communications, the Orange and Alexandria Railway 
 from Culpeper Court House to the Rappahannock. The front 
 of an army should be as nearly perpendicular to its line of 
 communications as possible. Moreover, the topography, with 
 Clark's Mountain and thick woods on the south side of the 
 Rapidan, peculiarly lent itself to a Confederate turning move- 
 ment. 
 
 Lee had prepared to turn Pope's left and intercept the rail- 
 way when, luckily for Pope's army, a copy of the order de- 
 tailing Lee's plan fell into Pope's hands. Thereupon Pope 
 promptly withdrew behind the Rappahannock, which he ought 
 to have done before. The Rappahannock is perpendicular to 
 the line of the railway. 
 
 Pope was greatly hampered and annoyed by Halleck's insist- 
 ing that he should hold Falmouth to protect the Government 
 wharves and storehouses at Aquia Creek. It obliged Pope 
 continually to pivot his army about that point and to keep it 
 stretched out upon a front of some forty miles. And there 
 was no real use of it. In the end the Union troops abandoned 
 the place and themselves burned the wharves and storehouses. 
 
 Being prevented by the nature of Pope's position and the 
 high water of the Rappahannock from turning Pope's flank 
 Lee started Jackson on his raid against Pope's communica- 
 tions. Judged by its results this was certainly a brilliant 
 movement; but judged by any principles of war it was a peril- 
 ous thing to do. Only Pope's blunders saved it from failure. 
 Not even the successful issue of the expedition can clear 
 General Lee's reputation of the risk he took in ordering or 
 permitting it. It is certainly not a safe example of strategy 
 
The Second Battle of Bull Run. 255 
 
 for future commanders to copy. Lee's chief motive in sending 
 Jackson with nearly half his army on this great turning move- 
 ment was to induce Pope to make some move that would give 
 him an opening to strike the Federal army before it was joined 
 by the rest of the Army of the Potomac. So far as the cutting 
 of Pope's communications — the destruction of the railway track 
 and his depots at Manassas — was concerned, it cannot be seen 
 but this could have been done just as well by Stuart's cavalry 
 as by Jackson's wing. This destruction should, however, have 
 had very little effect upon the campaign. There were at this 
 time plenty of Union troops at Washington to reopen the com- 
 munications within two days, and plenty of supplies at Wash- 
 ington to replace those destroyed at Manassas. 
 
 Moreover, Pope had another .base at Aquia Creek. In a 
 bombastic address published to his army on his taking com- 
 mand of it, Pope had said, "Let us discard such ideas" as 
 "bases of supplies." Now was his time ; indeed he needed to 
 have very little worry about bases of supply. A general quick 
 to take advantage of his adversary's mistakes, like Napoleon 
 or Jackson, in Pope's place, might have let Lee march on to 
 Manassas, or even to Washington, and, basing himself on 
 Aquia Creek, have marched promptly upon Richmond, now 
 defended by only two small brigades. The garrison and works 
 of Washington were strong enough alone to hold out against 
 Lee's army; but the Army of the Potomac was on its way 
 thither, also, and would easily have reached there ahead of Lee. 
 As the United States had full control of the sea, Pope could 
 have shifted his base round the coast as he approached 
 Richmond, like General Grant in his overland campaign of 
 1864. It must be said, however, that it is hardly likely the 
 Washington authorities would have allowed Pope to undertake 
 such a movement at this time ; their fears concerning the cap- 
 ture of the city were too great. 
 
 Pope's first movements on finding the Confederate army 
 split in two and Jackson in his rear were, however, certainly 
 judicious. McDowell with about 40,000 men was sent to 
 Gainesville and Heintzelman to Greenwich in support of him. 
 These forces could cut off Jackson's retreat, and, with the Bull 
 Run Mountains to hold, could keep back the rest of Lee's 
 army, which was two days' march behind Jackson. In fact, 
 here was the key to the situation. Here Pope had the oppor- 
 tunity to place his whole army between Lee's separated wings, 
 and the choice of holding either wing with a "containing" 
 
256 American Campaigns. 
 
 force and falling upon the other with the bulk of his troops. 
 If Jackson had managed to escape at all he ought at least to 
 have been made to lead his footsore command as far northward 
 as Aldie Gap to do so. Meantime Longstreet's wing might 
 have been overwhelmed. 
 
 From this time on Pope seems not to have had a "cool 
 head." Napoleon's seventy-third Maxim says: "The first 
 qualification in a general-in-chief is a cool head — that is, a head 
 which receives just impressions, and estimates things and ob- 
 jects at their real value. He must not allow himself to be 
 elated by good news, or depressed by bad. The impressions 
 he receives either successively or simultaneously in the course 
 of the day should be so classed as to take up only the exact 
 place in his mind which they deserve to occupy; since it is 
 upon a just comparison and consideration of the weight due 
 to different impressions that the power of reasoning and of 
 right judgment depends." 
 
 When Pope learned that Jackson had his whole force at 
 Manassas he instantly ordered all his corps to concentrate on 
 that point, never seeming to imagine that Jackson would not 
 stay there to be surrounded. In ordering McDowell to quit 
 Gainesville and move to Manassas, instead of guarding Thor- 
 oughfare and Hopewell Gaps against Longstreet's advance, 
 Pope committed his fatal mistake. He seems to have given no 
 thought at that time to Longstreet's wing of Lee's army. If 
 he considered it at all he thought it was so far behind that he 
 should be able to capture or destroy Jackson before it could 
 arrive on the field. 
 
 Pope ought to have kept himself bettei informed concerning 
 his enemy J but his cavalry was so exhausted with courier and 
 escort duty that it was in no condition properly to perform the 
 work of reconnaissance. Buford's cavalry did, however, send 
 in the first information of the approach of Longstreet's corps, 
 and it had delayed Longstreet's column several hours at Salem. 
 
 When Pope got to Manassas and found Jackson gone, and 
 then, later, learned that Hill's division had been seen at Centre- 
 ville, he jumped to the conclusion that Jackson had marched 
 his whole force to Centreville ; and he immediately sent out or- 
 ders directing all his corps to change the direction of their 
 march for that town. Then, when King's division of McDow- 
 ell's corps encountered Jackson on the Warrenton Pike, Pope 
 thought it had struck the head of Jackson's column, which he 
 was sure was in full retreat for Thoroughfare Gap. There- 
 
The Second Battle of Bull Run. 257 
 
 upon Pope issued another set of orders based upon this conclu- 
 sion. Then, when he learned that King had given way and 
 fallen back to Manassas, he concluded that Jackson was con- 
 tinuing his retreat toward the Gap, and he issued new orders. 
 Finally, on the 29th August, when his right wing was en- 
 gaged with Jackson, he ordered Porter to move by the Ma- 
 nassas-Gainesville road and attack Jackson's right flank ; when 
 at that very moment Longstreet's whole command was formed 
 or forming on Jackson's right. 
 
 Pope did not receive "just impressions" and estimate "things 
 and objects at their real value." He did not form right con^ 
 elusions ; and with each new report he changed his mind con- 
 cerning the situation and issued new orders. He wore his 
 men out with marching and countermarching, and destroyed 
 their confidence in himself with vacillating and contradictory 
 orders. He never had a true conception of the situation from 
 the time when he learned of Jackson's movement northward, 
 until he reached the fortifications of Washington with his 
 beaten army. He never discerned the opportunity presented 
 him to destroy the two fractions of Lee's army separately. 
 
 He ought not to have resumed the battle on the 30th of Au- 
 gust. He knew then that the whole of Lee's army had ar- 
 rived on the ground. But again he drew a false conclusion. 
 He thought Lee had begun to retreat, and he gave orders, ac- 
 cordingly, to pursue. He ought to have taken up a strong 
 defensive position that day and resisted Lee's attack until he 
 was reinforced by the corps of Franklin and Sumner and other 
 troops, which were on their way from Alexandria. And that 
 is what he ought to4iave done on the night of the 30th, after 
 making the mistake of attacking Lee and being repulsed on 
 that day. His army was not routed on the 30th; it had suf- 
 fered hardly more than Lee's army. It is doubtful whether 
 Lee would have felt equal to attacking the Union army on the 
 31st, if he had found it in position in front of him. This army 
 might have spent the .night intrenching, instead of marching 
 back to Centreville. And if then it had been attacked by 
 Lee, it could almost surely have maintained itself until the 
 arrival of the corps of Franklin and Sumner, and that of Banks, 
 also, which had been escorting the wagon-train and had taken 
 no part in the battle as yet. These 30,000 and odd fresh troops 
 put into the fight must have decided it in favor of the Union 
 side ; for Lee did not have a fresh regiment in reserve to meet 
 their counter-attack. Pope's withdrawal over Bull Run that 
 
258 American Campaigns. 
 
 night only demoralized his troops, destroyed what confidence 
 they may still have had in him as a commander, and stamped 
 his campaign as a complete failure.* 
 
 Except with General Lee's audacious plan for this campaign, 
 which he justified by saying "The disparity of force between 
 the contending forces rendered the risks unavoidable,"f there 
 is not much fault to find with the operations of the Confed- 
 erates. Yet there is some. Lee ought to have gained a de- 
 cisive victory on the 29th of August. He arrived with Long- 
 street's wing on Jackson's right early in the afternoon. If he 
 had put these troops into action promptly and pushed down 
 the Warrenton Pike he might have overwhelmed the right of 
 the Union line, separating it wholly from Porter's corps stand- 
 ing idle behind Dawkins Branch. McDowell's corps would 
 have been struck in flank on the Sudley Springs road, and 
 forced with the right wing back upon Bull Run. This is what 
 Lee started to do, but he allowed himself to be dissuaded by 
 Longstreet. Longstreet wanted time to reconnoiter; then he 
 reported against the movement. He said it would expose his 
 right flank to attack by troops from Manassas. And Long- 
 street wasted time arranging his elaborate order of battle. 
 The upshot of it all was, the whole afternoon was thrown away. 
 Two of Longstreet's brigades were sent forward only to make 
 a reconnaissance. It was they that drove back King's Union 
 division at dusk.J 
 
 In the accounts of this campaign almost nothing is said of 
 the work of the Union cavalry. At the beginning of the cam- 
 paign Pope, in a letter to Halleck, spoke of "the large force of 
 cavalry at" his "disposal" ; and at Centreville, near the end of 
 it, Pope had to send out a brigade of infantry on reconnais- 
 sance because "there was absolutely no cavalry fit for service."* 
 It should have been the business of the cavalry to keep touch 
 with Jackson from the time when he started on his raid till the 
 end. Jackson ought never to have been allowed to play hide- 
 and-seek with Pope's army; every move he made should have 
 been reported to Pope by the cavalry. Likewise, by means of 
 his cavalry Pope ought to have kept himself perfectly informed 
 of the progress of Longstreet's wing. In truth Pope's cavalry 
 was utterly broken down, worn out by courier and escort serv- 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
 fAlexander, from Allan's Army of Northern Virginia. 
 
 ^Alexander. 
 
The Second Battle of Bull Run. 259 
 
 ice. It was not till after this campaign that the cavalry of the 
 National army was allowed to perform its proper duty. 
 
 In the work of the Confederate cavalry there was a marked 
 contrast. Stuart was always out looking for information of 
 the enemy. While Pope's army was on the Rappahannock, he 
 rode round its flank and captured Pope's headquarters at Cat- 
 lett Station in its rear. When Jackson's column marched, Stu- 
 art's cavalry was in front of it and covering its flanks. On 
 the morning of the 31st August Stuart was in the saddle by 
 daybreak ; and before eight o'clock he had reported to Lee that 
 the Union army was in position on the heights of Centreville. 
 Again, when Jackson started round by the Little River Turn- 
 pike, he had Stuart's horsemen in front of him. If the Union 
 cavalry had performed its duty as well as the Confederate cav- 
 alry this campaign would have furnished our annals some of 
 the same pretty cavalry combats that we find in the later cam- 
 paigns ; and the outcome might have been very different from 
 what it was. 
 
 One of the highest qualifications of an army-commander is 
 to know how to employ the three arms of the service for their 
 proper purposes ; to know the possibilities and the limitations 
 of infantry, artillery, and cavalry ; to know when to use one 
 and when another ; to know when to conserve one and when to 
 expend another. Such a knowledge, also, is among the high- 
 est qualifications of the staff officer ; but it is a knowledge that 
 can be gained only by serving with the three arms. The day 
 will certainly come in our service when every ambitious young 
 officer that wishes to fit himself for staff duty in campaign will 
 be given- the opportunity to serve in peace with all three of the 
 field arms, cavalry, infantry, and field-artillery. 
 
LECTURE XIII. 
 THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN. 
 
 (133) We have seen that Pope's campaign in Virginia 
 ended with the withdrawal of the Union forces, consisting of 
 the Army of Virginia and the Army of the Potomac, within 
 the defenses of Washington, on September 3, 1862. The day 
 before, September 2, the Confederate Army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia was concentrated in the vicinity of Chantilly. 
 
 There was great excitement and alarm in Washington, and, 
 for a time, the main question with the Administration and the 
 War Department was to save the city from capture by the Con- 
 federates. On the Sth of September Pope was relieved from 
 command, and, although no formal order was issued, the two 
 Union armies were merged into one under the old name of the 
 Army of the Potomac. The Army of Virginia was not heard 
 of again. General McClellan was in command of the combined 
 forces. 
 
 While Lee never for a moment contemplated moving his 
 army of 55,000 men against Washington he felt that he must 
 take the offensive at once in order to gain any permanent ad- 
 vantage from his victory at Bull Run. He knew that the 
 United States government would immediately take steps to re- 
 pair and reorganize its forces, and that if his army in the 
 meanwhile remained idle, he should soon have to meet another 
 great army of invasion in some quarter of Virginia. He was 
 well aware that his army was not in fit condition to invade the 
 North. "The army," he wrote President Davis, "is not prop- 
 erly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks 
 much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the 
 animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided 
 with clothes, and, in thousands of instances, are destitute of 
 shoes."* But his troops were in the best state of morale ; they 
 had perfect confidence in themselves and their leaders; and 
 Lee, like Bragg in his invasion of Kentucky, hoped that the 
 presence of his army in Maryland would stimulate the people 
 of that State to rise and join their fortunes with the Con- 
 federacy. 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
The Antietam Campaign. 261 
 
 If successful in his movement into Maryland he would de- 
 stroy the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, then push on into Penn- 
 sylvania and destroy the Pennsylvania Railway. This would 
 leave only one line of communication between the East and the 
 West, the circuitous route by the Lakes. Lee could then turn 
 his attention to Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington ac- 
 cording to circumstances.* Lee also believed that the pres- 
 ence of his victorious army north of the Potomac "could not fail 
 to alarm the Federal authorities and make them draw forces 
 from every quarter for the defense of their capital, thus re- 
 lieving the Confederacy of pressure, and — for a time at least — 
 from the exhaustion incident to invasion."f "The relief of 
 Virginia for a time from military occupation, and the support 
 of the Confederate army in a region not yet drained of sup- 
 plies, were additional inducements."^: Lee resolved, therefore, 
 to cross the Potomac; and more effectively to threaten Wash- 
 ington and keep alive the alarm for its safety, he chose a route 
 east of the Blue Ridge Mountains rather than the route down 
 the Shenandoah Valley, which would better have concealed his 
 movements. 
 
 Geography. 
 
 There are a few difficult fords in the Potomac between the 
 Great Falls and Conrad's Ferry, but the river can be forded at 
 many places above this ferry in summer and early fall. "The 
 Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, a more difficult military obstacle 
 than the Potomac itself, runs parallel to the river across the 
 entire" theater of this campaign.§ The Monocacy River and 
 Catoctin and Antietam Creeks are the only tributaries of any 
 military importance on the north side of the Potomac. 
 
 The Blue Ridge Mountains cross the State of Maryland in 
 two distinct ranges stretching almost north and south with a 
 fertile valley six or eight miles wide between them. These 
 ranges are known as the Catoctin Mountains and South Moun- 
 tain. South Mountain is the more difficult obstacle and it can 
 be crossed only at its passes, the most important of which are 
 Turner's Gap, Crampton's Gap, and the pass through which the 
 Potomac breaks. About three miles west of South Mountain, 
 
 *J. G. Walker in B. & L. 
 
 fLong. 
 
 tWilliam Allan. 
 
 §Paper by General Geo. B. Davis. 
 
262 American Campaigns. 
 
 at its southern end, is another short ridge called Elk Ridge, 
 which terminates in Maryland Heights overlooking the Poto- 
 mac and Harper's Ferry, and commanding Loudon and Boli- 
 var Heights on the south side of the Potomac and on opposite 
 sides of the Shenandoah River. Pleasant Valley lies between 
 Elk Ridge and South Mountain. 
 
 The Baltimore and Ohio Railway crosses to the north side 
 of the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, passes along the river-bank 
 until it breaks through the Catoctin Mountains, then turns 
 northeast, and, crossing the Monocacy River at Frederick 
 Junction, leads on to Baltimore. There were in 1862 no other 
 railways within this field of operations. There were several 
 turnpikes in the region, the best known of which was the old 
 National Road, which passed westward through Frederick City 
 and crossed South Mountain at Turner's Gap. There were 
 earthen roads in all directions, and all of them were in good 
 condition in the fall. There were a good many small towns 
 and villages in the country, of which the most considerable was 
 Frederick. The theater was a comparatively thickly settled 
 farming country ; the mountains were, generally speaking, cov- 
 ered with woods ; and the valleys, also, except where they had 
 been cleared for tillage. 
 
 Operations. 
 
 Covered by Stuart's cavalry, which made a demonstration in 
 the direction of Chain Bridge and Alexandria, Lee's army 
 crossed the Potomac by the fords near Leesburg on the 4th, 
 5th, and 6th of September, and had concentrated about Fred- 
 erick by the 7th. 
 
 On this date the corps of the Army of the Potomac were 
 stationed as follows: the First [Hooker], Ninth [Burnside], 
 including Cox's Kanawha division, at Leesboro; the Second 
 [Sumner] and Twelfth* [Mansfield] in front of Rockville; 
 the Sixth [Franklin] at Rockville; Couch's division of the 
 Fourth at Offutt's Cross Roads.f The Third Corps [Heintzel- 
 man], the Fifth [Porter] and the Eleventh [Sigel] were within 
 the lines of Washington. "The Fifth was sent on the 12th of 
 September to join McClellan, thereby raising his entire [nom- 
 
 *The Twelfth Corps was composed of the troops lately commanded 
 by General Banks. 
 fMcClellan in B. &■ L. 
 
The Antietam Campaign. 263 
 
 inal] force to nearly 97,000 men."* The Union cavalry under 
 Pleasanton was well in front and in contact with Stuart's cav- 
 alry, which, stretching from New Market to Poolesville, 
 formed a strong screen for Lee's army. Pleasanton's squadrons 
 got in touch with the Confederate cavalry on the 6th of Sep- 
 tember, and maintained touch with it until this cavalry crossed 
 Antietam Creek on the 15th ; and they fought with it every day 
 from the 6th to the 15th, "generally with success, and always 
 with profit in the way of information as to the movements and 
 designs of the enemy."f 
 
 The first stage in Lee's invasion ended at Frederick. Here 
 Lee issued a proclamation to the people of Maryland — which 
 had no effect — and gave his troops two days of rest. His next 
 objective was to be Harrisburg, but before entering Pennsylva- 
 nia he must change his line of communications. The line by 
 which he had advanced, Manassas-Frederick, lay "too near the 
 Potomac, and" was "liable to be cut any day by the enemy's 
 cavalry."^ Lee gave orders, therefore, to move the line hack 
 into the Shenandoah Valley. But at this time Harper's Ferry 
 and Martinsburg were occupied by about 12,000 Federal troops. 
 These garrisons would have to be captured or driven out before 
 Lee's communications could be safely established by that 
 route. § 
 
 (134) Accordingly, on the 9th of September at Frederick 
 Lee issued his famous field order, designated "Special Orders, 
 No. 191," for a resumption of the march on the following day. 
 Jackson with all of his corpsfl except D. H. Hill's division was 
 directed to march on Harper's Ferry by way of Sharpsburg 
 and Martinsburg ;** McLaws with his own division and R. H. • 
 Anderson's [Longstreet's corps] was to march by way of 
 
 ♦Humphreys's division of the Fifth Corps did not join McClellan un- 
 til September 18th, after the battle of Antietam.— Ropes. 
 
 fDavis. 
 
 tWalker. 
 
 §It will be seen, however, in the lecture on the Gettysburg campaign 
 that Lee's lines of communication and retreat ran by way of the 
 Shenandoah Valley while Harper's Ferry was still held by Union 
 troops. 
 
 flThe different divisions were still only associated, not formed into 
 corps. . . . The organization into corps was slowly developing 
 . . . and was reached at the close of the campaign. — Alexander. 
 
 **Fearing that the Union garrison at Martinsburg would retreat to 
 the west and escape him, if he moved on that place by way of Sharps- 
 burg, Jackson took a more northerly route and crossed the Potomac 
 at Williamsport. — Ropes. 
 
264 American Campaigns. 
 
 Crampton's Gap to Maryland Heights; Walker's division 
 [Longstreet's corps] was to destroy the stone viaduct by which 
 the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal crossed the mouth of the 
 Monocacy, then to cross the Potomac near that point and go 
 to Loudon Heights ; the rest of Longstreet's corps (the divi- 
 sions of Evans [Hood commanding] and D. R. Jones) was to 
 march to Boonsboro and there halt with the baggage and sup- 
 ply trains ; D. H. Hill's division was to form the rear-guard 
 of the main column, with Stuart's cavalry still farther behind. 
 The commands of Jackson, McLaws, and Walker were ordered 
 to rejoin the main body at Boonsboro, after accomplishing the 
 objects for which they were detached. 
 
 Although it was soon known by the authorities at Washing- 
 ton that Lee's army had crossed the Potomac into Maryland, 
 they could not tell what was its purpose. Ever uneasy about 
 the safety of the capital, Halleck was afraid for McClellan to 
 move his troops far from that city, and McClellan concurred 
 in his view of the case. "But the report of the cavalry under 
 Pleasanton . . . finally satisfied McClellan, who had been 
 slowly marching north with his left on the Potomac and his 
 right on the railroad which connected Washington with Balti- 
 more, that Lee had fallen back behind the Monocacy. Ac- 
 cordingly, on the 10th of September he pushed forward more 
 rapidly, and on the 12th and 13th the right wing and center of 
 his army entered Frederick City."* McClellan had organized 
 his army into two wings and a center column. The right wing 
 under Burnside consisted of the First Corps [Hooker], and the 
 Ninth [now under Reno] ; the center under Sumner consisted 
 of the Second [his own] Corps and the Twelfth [Mansfield] ; 
 the left wing under Franklin consisted of the Sixth [his own] 
 Corps and Couch's division of the Fourth. The Fifth Corps 
 [Porter] had not yet joined from Washington. The army 
 marched by the three main roads; the right wing by the 
 Brookeville-New Market road; the center by the Rockville- 
 Frederick road; the left wing by the Offutt's Cross Roads- 
 Seneca road. 
 
 On the morning of September 13 a copy of Lee's "Special 
 Orders, No. 191" was found at Frederick and handed to 
 McClellan. f This gave him full information of Lee's plans, 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
 fThe copy of the order, wrapped around three cigars, was picked 
 up by a Federal soldier on ground where the Confederates had camped. 
 
The Antietam Campaign. 265 
 
 and enabled him to judge about where every part of Lee's army 
 should be on that day. 
 
 On the evening of the 13th the different corps of the army 
 of the Potomac were bivouacked as follows : the First Corps 
 on the Monocacy near Frederick; the Ninth between Middle- 
 town and Frederick ; the Second and Twelfth and Sykes's divi- 
 sion [regulars] of the Fifth at Frederick; the Sixth at 
 Buckeystown ; and Couch's division at Licksville.* Pleason- 
 ton's cavalry had pushed the Confederate cavalry before it and 
 was at the foot of Turner's Gap. 
 
 Lee's army on the same evening was distributed as follows : 
 Stuart's cavalry at the passes of South Mountain ; D. H. Hill's 
 division on the road between Turner's Gap and Boonsboro; 
 Longstreet with his two divisions near Hagerstown ; Jackson's 
 detachment close to Harper's Ferry ; McLaws between Cramp- 
 ton's Gap and Maryland Heights; Walker's division nearing 
 Loudon Heights. General Lee had meant to have Longstreet 
 wait at Boonsboro until the detached troops rejoined, while 
 D. H. Hill was to hold Turner's Gap with his whole division. 
 On the way, however, it was learned that a body of Pennsylva- 
 nia militia had collected at Chambersburg ; on that account 
 Longstreet was sent forward to Hagerstown and was at that 
 point, thirteen miles from Turner's Gap, when the battle of 
 South Mountain began.f 
 
 The night of September 13 Stuart informed Lee that Mc- 
 Clellan had come into possession of a copy of his field order, 
 and that the advance of the Federal army was at the eastern 
 foot of Turner's Gap. Thereupon Lee ordered Longstreet and 
 D. H. Hill to move their forces back to dispute the passage of 
 South Mountain. Two of Hill's brigades were already at Tur- 
 ner's Gap, and the rest returned thither early next morning. 
 Longstreet's troops did not reach the ground till late in the 
 afternoon. 
 
 (135) On the morning of the 14th Pleasanton's cavalry 
 opened the battle of South Mountain. At about 9 a.m. Cox 
 arrived with his Kanawha division, and took command of the 
 attack. About noon the rest of the Ninth Corps came up under 
 Reno, and later the First [Hooker]. The entire right wing of 
 the Union army was now on the field, and Burnside took charge 
 of the attack. Hooker's corps assaulted the left of the Confed- 
 erate position, and Reno's the right at Fox's Gap on the old 
 
 ♦Davis. 
 fAIexander. 
 
266 American Campaigns. 
 
 Sharpsburg Road.* The battle lasted till 10 p. m., and when it 
 ceased both flanks of the Confederate position had been envel- 
 oped. About midnight the Confederates began to withdraw. 
 
 (136) Franklin had been ordered to move with the left 
 wing by way of Crampton's Gap to relieve the garrison at Har- 
 per's Ferry, and to cut off McLaws on Maryland Heights. At 
 about noon on the 14th the head of his column reached Cramp- 
 ton's Gap and found it held by Confederates. Franklin suc- 
 ceeded in carrying the pass, and by nightfall had "effected a 
 lodgment of his troops in Pleasant Valley."f As soon as Mc- 
 Laws heard of this he "established a formidable line of defense 
 across Pleasant Valley, from Elk Ridge on the west to South 
 Mountain on the east, and succeeded in conveying to his an- 
 tagonist the appearance of having occupied the line in great 
 strength. Franklin, in fact, thought that he was outnumbered 
 'two to one.' While he remained in presence of this force 
 Harper's Ferry surrendered, and McLaws, during the after- 
 noon of the 15th, skilfully and without molestation, withdrew 
 his command across the river to the town."f 
 
 Let us now see how the capture of Harper's Ferry was ef- 
 fected. (134) The Federal detachment at Martinsburg had 
 fallen back before Jackson's column to Harper's Ferry. (137) 
 Jackson had been in position in front of Bolivar Heights since 
 the 13th. On that day one of McLaws's brigades had routed 
 the Federal detachment on Maryland Heights, and on the after- 
 noon of the 14th, while the battles were going on at Turner's 
 Gap and Crampton's Gap, McLaws was shelling Harper's 
 Ferry from those Heights. Walker, also, had got into position 
 on Loudon Heights, and had opened fire with his artillery in the 
 forenoon of the 14th. "Early on the 15th fire was opened upon 
 the Federal troops and defenses from all quarters ; there was 
 no resistance ; the commanders and the troops considered their 
 case hopeless ; and at 9 a.m. the post was surrendered.''^ The 
 Federal cavalry of the garrison, however, like Forrest's at Fort 
 Donelson, had made its escape. Led by Colonel B. F. Davis, 
 8th New York Cavalry, it crossed the river by the pontoon- 
 bridge during the night of the 14th, rode by the Confederate 
 picket at a gallop in the moonlight, and hurried on through 
 Sharpsburg to Greencastle, Pennsylvania; and captured "an 
 ordnance train of Longstreet's on the way."f 
 
 *Reno was killed in this battle. 
 
 tRopes. 
 
 ^General Dixon S. Miles, the commandant, was mortally wounded. 
 
The Antietam Campaign. 267 
 
 (138) Let us now return to General Lee. The morning after 
 the battle of South Mountain the Confederate troops there 
 engaged fell back to Sharpsburg. Lee had been informed that 
 Crampton's Gap had been carried by a Federal column, and he 
 had not yet received word of the surrender of Harper's Ferry. 
 He had with him only about 19,000 men — the rest were invest- 
 ing Harper's Ferry. His chief concern was to reunite his 
 divided army before McClellan could fall upon the separated 
 parts in detail. The night of the 14th, after his failure to hold 
 the mountain passes, he had resolved to withdraw to the south 
 side of the Potomac. He was especially anxious about Mc- 
 Laws's force, which he feared might be overwhelmed or cut 
 off at Maryland Heights. At 8 p.m. of the 14th he "wrote to 
 McLaws, telling him to abandon his position that night, and to 
 cross the river, if possible by a ford east of that at Shepherds- 
 town, leaving the ford at Shepherdstown for the main army to 
 take."* 
 
 About noon on the 15th Lee's force was on its way to 
 this ford. Lee was marching with the rear-guard, and had 
 reached the position now occupied by the National Cemetery, 
 when he was handed a dispatch stating that "Harper's Ferry 
 had fallen and Jackson was on his way to rejoin him at Sharps- 
 burg." "He at once ordered the batteries into position, re- 
 called D. H. Hill's division from [the ford at] the Potomac, 
 and established a line of battle on the heights overlooking the 
 Antietam, and commanding the approaches to the town by the 
 Boonsboro Pike" and the bridge since known as the Burnside 
 Bridge. By nightfall of the 15th the divisions of Hood, D. H. 
 Hill, and D. R. Jones were in position for battle.f The ex- 
 treme left of the line was held by Stuart with the greater part 
 of the cavalry and horse-artillery upon a commanding hill not 
 far from the Potomac, about a mile northwest of the Dunker 
 or Dunkard church. Colonel Munford with his brigade of 
 cavalry was on the extreme right of the line.* 
 
 The field of the battle of Antietam lies in a space from two- 
 and a half to four miles wide between Antietam Creek and a 
 bend of the Potomac. Sharpsburg is near its central and high- 
 est part, in a sort of depression. The space was divided into- 
 farms, and most of the ground was under cultivation ; but there 
 were several patches of wood. Those since known as the East 
 Woods and the West Woods played an important part in the 
 
 ♦Ropes. 
 fDavis. 
 
268 American Campaigns. 
 
 battle. The space was crossed by many farm roads, and by the 
 Hagerstown and the Boonsboro turnpikes which converged on 
 Sharpsburg. At the eastern edge of the West Woods, a little 
 more than a mile north of Sharpsburg, was the little church of 
 the Dunkards. 
 
 The Antietam was spanned by four bridges, the Upper, 
 the Middle, the Burnside Bridge, and the bridge near the 
 mouth of the creek. The creek could be forded almost any- 
 where. From a short way below the Middle Bridge, to its 
 mouth, the bluffs on the west of the creek were steep and 
 rugged. From Pry's Mill down to the Middle Bridge on the 
 east bank there was a line of prominent hills, and a single high 
 ridge from this bridge down to the Burnside Bridge. Other 
 prominent hills were just east of the Burnside Bridge. From 
 positions upon these hills and ridges the Federal batteries swept 
 most of the ground occupied by the Confederate lines. Ledges 
 of rock cropped out in some parts of the battle-field, but, in 
 general, troops could pass in any direction, though the ways 
 were obstructed by many rail fences and a few stone walls. 
 
 ( 139) After a hard night-march Jackson arrived at Sharps- 
 burg with Walker's division and two of his own early on the 
 16th. He had left A. P. Hill with his division to complete the 
 arrangements for the surrender of Harper's Ferry. McLaws 
 with his own division and Anderson's did not rejoin until the 
 morning of the 17th. Jackson's two divisions took their place 
 on the left of the line, between the Hagerstown Pike and 
 Stuart's cavalry. Next was Hood's division, on the pike; 
 then D. H. Hill's forming a curve parallel to the pike. Long- 
 street with D. R. Jones's division and Evans's brigade* pro- 
 longed the line to the Burnside Bridge. Walker's division was 
 placed in reserve behind the right flank.f 
 
 On the 15th McClellan with the right wing and center of the 
 Federal army moved forward from Turner's Gap as far as 
 Keedysville. Franklin with the left wing was at Rohrersville 
 (153) watching for McLaws. (139) A few shots were ex- 
 changed by the artillery late in the afternoon, but there was no 
 other fighting that day. "The 16th passed without serious 
 fighting," also "though there was desultory cannonading and 
 picket firing.''^ 
 
 *This brigade belonged to Evans's division now commanded by 
 Hood. 
 tAlexander. 
 tJ. D. Cox. 
 
The Antietam Campaign. 269 
 
 Plan of Battle. 
 
 In his first report of the battle of Antietam McClellan says : 
 "The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy's 
 left — at least to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, 
 with the hope of something more, by assailing the enemy's 
 right — and, as soon as one or both of the flank movements 
 were fully successful, to attack their center with any reserve 
 I might then have in hand."* This, then, was probably the 
 plan of battle he had in mind. 
 
 As the first step in the execution of this plan, the First Corps 
 [Hooker] crossed the creek at the Upper Bridge and a ford 
 near by, on the afternoon .of the 16th, to look for the Confed- 
 erate left. The Confederates saw the movement and Hood's 
 division was pushed forward into the East Woods to meet it. 
 Some fighting took place there; during the night Hood with- 
 drew, and Hooker deployed his corps ready to renew the attack 
 in the morning. (140) At dawn the line advanced, with 
 Doubleday's division on the right, Rickett's on the left, and 
 Meade's in reserve close behind. Almost immediately it be- 
 came engaged with a part of Jackson's command that had 
 formed line in a cornfield from the pike across to the East 
 Woods. Soon, also, Doubleday's division on the right en- 
 countered the Confederate left in the West Woods. The com- 
 bat raged desperately on both sides. Hooker's reserve was 
 quickly brought into action, and the Confederates in the corn- 
 field were driven back ; but Hood soon came to their relief with 
 his division, and Early in the West Woods fell upon the flank 
 of the Union line, while Stuart's artillery raked it in enfilade. 
 After more than an hour of hard fighting Hooker's line was 
 forced back, leaving some of its guns in the hands of the 
 Confederates. 
 
 But Mansfield's Union corps was now coming upon the field. 
 This corps had crossed the creek in the night, but, taking the 
 wrong direction, had bivouacked more than a mile north of 
 Hooker's corps. (141) It had quitted its bivouac at daybreak 
 and started to Hooker's support; but it made its deployment 
 so slowly that it was half after seven o'clock before any part 
 of it got into the battle. Mansfield had been killed almost at 
 the start, and General Williams, the senior division-comman- 
 der, was now in command of the corps. Williams deployed 
 his own division on the right and Greene's on the left, and ad- 
 
 *J. D. Cox. 
 
270 American Campaigns. 
 
 vanced his line across the cornfield toward the West Woods. 
 It struck Hood's division in the cornfield, supported on its right 
 by three of D. H. Hill's brigades, and on its left by Walker's 
 small division and another brigade that, by this time, had 
 come up from the right of the Confederate line. Again the 
 combat raged fiercely, and the lines wavered backward and for- 
 ward across the cornfield. At the end of two hours the Fed- 
 eral line had again forced its enemy back, and reopened still 
 wider the gap that Hooker's corps had made. Greene's divi- 
 sion was in possession of the Dunker church and a part of the 
 woods near it. But the whole Twelfth Corps was by now ex- 
 hausted with its struggle. Greene's division was content to 
 rest where it was, and Williams's had to be withdrawn to the 
 rear to rest and replenish ammunition. For a time the firing 
 ceased altogether.* 
 
 But the cessation was not long, for the head of the Second 
 Corps [Sumner] was approaching. From the sound of the 
 first guns Sumner had been eager to cross the Antietam and 
 go into the battle ; but not until 7.20 a.m. did he succeed in get- 
 ting his orders from McClellan to do so. At about nine o'clock 
 he arrived upon the field at the head of Sedgwick's division. 
 "He found affairs in a desperate state;" Hooker's corps had 
 been repulsed and driven back; and the Twelfth was barely 
 holding its own.f Sumner judged that a counter-attack by the 
 enemy might be expected at any moment, and that the situation 
 called for-instant action on his part. 
 
 (142) So, without waiting for his rear two divisions 
 [French and Richardson] to come up, he led Sedgwick's to the 
 assault in close column with brigade front. In this formation, 
 with the lines of his assaulting column not more than thirty 
 yards apart, he advanced out of the East Woods, across the 
 cornfield, straight for the West Woods. He threw out no 
 skirmishers, stopped not to reconnoiter or to inquire for the 
 position of the enemy. He entered the wood to the north of 
 the Dunker church, passed Greene's division on his left, and 
 pushed straight ahead. Without being aware of it he passed 
 within close range of Early's Confederate brigade, and Wal- 
 ker's division on his left, and was just emerging from the far 
 side of the wood when Early's brigade, which had changed its 
 position under cover of a ridge, opened fire on the flank of his 
 close column. At the same time McLaws's division, from a 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 fDavis. 
 
The Antietam Campaign. 271 
 
 position at the left-front of the column, opened fire upon it 
 at close range, and "the remnants of Walker's two brigades 
 lined up against the left flank of the column, now almost help- 
 less between converging fires."* (141) The divisions of Mc- 
 Laws and Anderson, after their weary night-march from Har- 
 per's Ferry, had been allowed an hour's rest, and then hurried 
 to the left of the Confederate line. McLaws's column had not 
 quite finished its deployment when the left-front of Sumner's 
 column came before it. Anderson's division had gone to sup- 
 port D. H. Hill. 
 
 (143) Within a few minutes, more than 2,200 of Sumner's 
 officers and men had fallen, — Sedgwick himself received three 
 wounds, — and the division started to the rear. "The Confed- 
 erates followed in pursuit, and once more the tide of battle 
 swept across the ghastly cornfield. . . . The Federals were 
 driven to the shelter of their strong line of artillery in front of 
 the North Wood. . . . Greene's men about the Dunker 
 church were also forced back to the Federal guns, leaving the 
 Confederate line practically the same that it had been in the 
 morning, although now held only by scattered fragments and 
 almost destitute of artillery."* ( 142) Meantime where were 
 the other two divisions of the Second Corps [French and 
 Richardson] ? French's division crossed the Antietam by a 
 ford a short way below the Upper Bridge; but from there it 
 diverged too far to the south, and came into the battle to the 
 left of Greene's division of the Twelfth Corps, striking the part 
 of the Confederate line held by D. H. Hill near the "Roulette 
 house. Richardson's division came up later on the left of 
 French's, and their combined strength amounted to about 
 10,000 muskets. They were opposed by some 7,000 Confed- 
 erates "in good order and condition," besides three brigades 
 already "broken and much demoralized" by previous fighting. 
 (143) The Confederates were soon driven back to the sunken 
 road which has since borne the name of the Bloody Lane. 
 "The combat that here took place," says Ropes, "was beyond 
 question one of the most sanguinary and desperate in the whole 
 war. The carnage was awful ; the road was speedily filled with 
 the dead and wounded." 
 
 At last the Federal line in its extension to the left reached a 
 position from which it enfiladed the Bloody Lane. The com- 
 mander of the 6th Alabama at that end of the Confederate line 
 was ordered "to throw his right wing back and out of the 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
272 American Campaigns. 
 
 road." He gave the command "Sixth Alabama, about face; 
 forward march !" That command was fatal. The whole line 
 gave way and fled in confusion, (144) leaving the Federals in 
 possession of the Bloody Lane and the adjacent hills to the 
 south of it. General Alexander says that by the mistake of 
 that officer "Lee's army was ruined, and the end of the Confed- 
 eracy was in sight."* 
 
 The casualties in the two Federal divisions exceeding 2,900, 
 but were fewer than those of the Confederates. The Confed- 
 erate artillery, though suffering heavily from the superiority 
 of the Federal guns on the other side of the creek, kept up a 
 vigorous fire ; but the battle was practically at an end in all the 
 left wing of Lee's line. There was not a body of infantry in 
 that quarter that could have resisted a vigorous charge, nor a 
 fresh regiment in reserve. One more assault here was all that 
 was needed to win a decisive Union victory ; maybe to destroy 
 the Confederate army. That assault was not made. 
 
 Yet the Sixth Corps [Franklin], which had not been ordered 
 back from Pleasant Valley until the night before, had rejoined, 
 and was now in that part of the field. The Fifth [Porter], 
 which formed the general reserve, was also still intact, and the 
 First, Second, and Twelfth, in spite of the hard fighting they 
 had already done, were able to do more. Franklin urged Mc- 
 Clellan to let him renew the attack with his fresh troops, but 
 Sumner opposed it, and McClellan agreed with Sumner. All 
 the morning, too, since nine o'clock, Pleasanton's squadrons 
 had stood idle on the high ground to the west of the Middle 
 Bridge, supporting his horse batteries; and with them were 
 severail of the regular battalions of Sykes's infantry division. 
 
 (143) To Burnside with the Ninth Corps had been as- 
 signed the task of attacking the right of the Confederate line. 
 He was notified on the afternoon of the 16th, and a little after 
 7 a.m. on the 17th he received orders to prepare for the attack. 
 He accordingly moved his command nearer to the Antietam. 
 
 The Burnside Bridge was defended by Toombs's brigade of 
 D. R. Jones's Confederate division, posted on the bluffs above 
 it, as well as by Confederate batteries in the vicinity of where 
 the National Cemetery is now situated. At about 9 a.m. Burn- 
 side received an order to carry the bridge and assault the Con- 
 federate line. "Preparations for crossing the stream were im- 
 mediately made. ( 144) Rodman's division," accompanied by 
 one brigade of Cox's division, "was sent down the stream to the 
 
 *Alexander. 
 
The Antietam Campaign. 273 
 
 fords. To Sturgis's division, assisted" by Crook's brigade of 
 Cox's division, "was assigned the task of carrying the stone 
 bridge. Willcox's division was held in reserve."* 
 
 With the support of the artillery two efforts were made to 
 rush the bridge, but both were repulsed. As yet no attempt 
 had' been made to ford the stream near the bridge, although it 
 was fordable almost anywhere. A third charge was made 
 about one o'clock, and the bridge was carried. Crook crossed 
 at a ford above. (145) Toombs withdrew his brigade to the 
 right of the main Confederate line on the heights three quar- 
 ters of a mile west of the bridge. Meantime Rodman's divi- 
 sion had crossed at Snavely's Ford, about a mile below the 
 bridge, and it now connected with the left of Sturgis's troops 
 on the west bank. Sturgis was allowed to withdraw his divi- 
 sion upon the plea of fatigue, and Willcox's division took 
 its place. General Cox took command of the Union troops on 
 the west of the stream and set about forming them to assault 
 the right of the Confederate line, which was held by four 
 brigades of D. R. Jones's division. 
 
 It was after three o'clock before Cox had formed his lines 
 for the assault; at four he began his advance in "handsome 
 style." The Confederates, only 2,000 strong, made a desperate 
 defense, but they were forced back — up the slope of Cemetery 
 Hill and into the edge of the town. A Confederate "battery 
 was captured, and a complete victory seemed within sight. But 
 this was not to be."* At this moment A. P. Hill's division, 
 which had marched out of Harper's Ferry and crossed the 
 Potomac unopposed, was approaching the battle-field. (146) 
 Seizing his opportunity, Hill threw his brigades against the left 
 flank of Cox's victorious troops, recaptured the Confederate 
 battery, and finally drove the Federals in "more or less disorder 
 to the neighborhood of the bridge, where they bivouacked for 
 the night. This ended the battle."* 
 
 The hostile armies bivouacked on the battle-field, and with 
 little change of position remained there watching each other 
 all the day of the 18th. (138) On the evening of the 18th 
 Lee's army began to withdraw, and, undiscovered by the enemy, 
 had recrossed the Potomac at Blackford's or Boteler's Ford 
 by the morning of the 19th. Thus ended Lee's invasion of 
 Maryland. 
 
 It is very hard to determine what was the number of men 
 on either side at the battle of Antietam, or as it is called in 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
■274 American Campaigns. 
 
 Southern reports, the battle of Sharpsburg. General George 
 B. Davis in his description gives the following figures: "The 
 Army of the Potomac 87,164, of all arms, not all of whom were 
 engaged. The Confederate strength at Frederick 
 '60,000; . . at the battle of Antietam . . about 
 
 37,000." Mr. John Codman Ropes, in his able review of the 
 ■battle, says: "The Confederate infantry did not exceed 31,200 
 men or thereabouts, while the First, Second, Ninth, and 
 Twelfth Corps, which were the only troops put in by Mc- 
 'Clfllan . . . numbered about 46,000 men. . . Add- 
 
 ing the Confederate cavalry and artillery to their infantry, 
 therefore, we have a total of 39,200; and adding the Fifth and 
 Sixth Corps and the cavalry and artillery to the 46,000 Federal 
 troops already enumerated, we arrive at a total of about 70,000 
 men." 
 
 Ropes says, further, that it "was one of the bloodiest battles 
 of the war, and it is likely that more men were killed and 
 wounded on the 17th of September than on any single day in 
 the whole war." General Alexander says "it was the bloodiest 
 battle ever fought upon this continent." The Confederate loss 
 "probably amounted to 8,000 men or more" ; that of the Union 
 army is given at 12,410 men. For the whole campaign Gen- 
 >eral Alexander gives the following figures : 
 
 Confederates: 1,924 killed, 9,381 wounded. 
 
 Federals: 3,273 killed, 11,756 wounded. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 (133) An unusual circumstance of this campaign was the 
 fact that Lee took the offensive and invaded the enemy's coun- 
 try without any intention of seeking or attacking the hostile 
 army. He knew that his army was greatly inferior in numbers 
 and in equipment to that of his adversary. Yet he meant to 
 fight if the Federal army came out to seek him, as he felt sure 
 it would ; he had no thought of making a mere raid into Mary- 
 land and Pennsylvania; of destroying railways and canals and 
 then making his escape when the National army came after 
 him. 
 
 In fact the objective of this invasion was political rather 
 than military ; the campaign, like Bragg's in Kentucky, was an 
 example of what Captain Bigelow in his Principles of Strategy 
 terms "political strategy." First, the Confederate authorities 
 "believed that Maryland was held in the Union by force and in- 
 
The Axtietam Campaign. 275 
 
 timidation, and that the presence of a Confederate army within 
 its borders would encourage and embolden its people to break 
 away and join Secession. We have seen, however, that this 
 did not take place. Secondly, there was a large element in the 
 North opposed to the war and proclaiming it already a failure. 
 It was believed at the South that the presence of a victorious 
 Confederate army within loyal States would strengthen this 
 element, and strengthen the sentiment at the North in favor 
 of terminating the war. And thirdly, it was hoped that the 
 presence of such an army would make for a recognition of the 
 Confederacy by foreign powers. Strategically, then, the cam- 
 paign, on the part of the Confederates, was offensive ; but tac- 
 tically it could only be defensive, for Lee was not strong 
 enough to attack McClellan, — to fight an offensive battle, — 
 unless, of course, McClellan should divide his army, or commit 
 some other fatal mistake. 
 
 It is hard to say whether Lee was right or wrong in de- 
 taching a large part of his army — more than half of it- — for the 
 capture of Harper's Ferry. Longstreet advised against it, but 
 Jackson favored it. It was certainly contrary to a recognized 
 principle of war,* and it had a very serious effect upon the cam- 
 paign. Lee supposed that Harper's Ferry would be abandoned 
 by the Federals as soon as his army appeared north of the Poto- 
 mac. And the place should have been abandoned at that time. 
 It was in an indefensible pocket, and its only supposed impor- 
 tance consisted in the fact that the Baltimore and Ohio Railway 
 crossed the Potomac there. But the garrison was powerless to 
 defend the railway bridge, commanded as the place was by the 
 surrounding hills. McClellan urged Halleck to withdraw the 
 large garrison and order the troops to join his army; but Hal- 
 leck refused to do so. 
 
 Jackson captured at Harper's Ferry about 11,000 prisoners, 
 13,000 stand of arms, and seventy-three cannon; but it was not 
 for this prize that the expedition was undertaken. Lee says in 
 his report that it was "necessary to dislodge the enemy before 
 concentrating the army west of the mountains," because the 
 garrisons at Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg were upon the 
 new line of communications that he purposed adopting. But 
 Harper's Ferry was not a fortress, it was an absolutely untena- 
 
 *Naooleon's Maxim LXXVII. ■ Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, 
 and Frederick, as well as Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar, have all 
 acted upon the same principles. These were— to keep their forces 
 united; to leave no weak part unguarded; to seize quickly important 
 points. 
 
276 American Campaigns. 
 
 ble place. Lee's communications could not, of course, cross 
 the Potomac at that point while the garrison stood there; but 
 this alone did not justify Lee in dividing his army — in separa- 
 ting the two parts by rivers and mountains and so many miles of 
 distance that neither part could go to the support of the other, 
 in case the enemy attacked one part with all his strength. 
 
 It would have been safer for Lee to abandon his original line 
 of communications and live off the country for a while, if neces- 
 sary, as Grant did later in the Vicksburg Campaign. Indeed' 
 the Confederate soldiers were already subsisting mainly upon 
 roasting-ears and fruit gathered along the way.* While the 
 Union garrison at Harper's Ferry would imperil his line of 
 communications by way of the Shenandoah Valley it was not 
 strong enough to jeopard his line of retreat by that route. 
 
 Lee did not expect to hold Harper's Ferry ; so what was there- 
 to prevent McClellan, or Halleck, from sending another gar- 
 rison thither as soon as Jackson turned his back upon the 
 place? Likewise McClellan might have sent back a corps to- 
 occupy Winchester, and another to Charlestown, and corps to- 
 any other places on the Confederate line of communications, 
 if he had chosen to split his army up in so unscientific a man- 
 ner. There was probably not another point between Richmond 
 and Hagerstown that could not have been held, if once taken, 
 more easily than Harper's Ferry. 
 
 With the view, however, that Harper's Ferry had to be cap- 
 tured before Lee could proceed farther, his safest plan would 
 have been to march his main body, by way of Crampton's Gap- 
 instead of by way of Turner's Gap, thus keeping it within sup- 
 porting distance of the troops detached, and leaving no road 
 open by which the enemy could enter between his divided 
 forces. 
 
 The truth of the whole matter is, however, that Lee was 
 emboldened to take such a risk as he took by the slow and' 
 leisurely way in which McClellan's army was following him. 
 And but for the untoward incident of the "lost order" Jackson 
 would probably have captured Harper's Ferry and rejoined 
 Lee with McLaws and Walker and A. P. Hill before McClellan 
 gained the top of South Mountain. But McClellan was not 
 altogether to blame for his slow and cautious pursuit. True, 
 he reckoned that Lee had an army of 120,000 men, and he was 
 correspondingly careful. But the telegrams he was receiving 
 hourly from Halleck at Washington would have held him back: 
 
 *Alexander. 
 
The Antietam Campaign. 277 
 
 even if he had felt any inclination to move fast. Halleck, says 
 General Franklin, "could not divest himself of the notion that 
 Lee was about to play the Union army some slippery trick by 
 turning its left, getting between it and Washington and Balti- 
 more, and then taking each city by a coup-de-main." The 
 "burden of Halleck's dispatches to McClellan was to watch 
 his left flank, and not to let Lee turn it and get between him 
 and Washington. There were, in fact, enough troops in 
 Washington to hold that city against Lee's army, even if 
 McClellan's forces had been removed from the theater alto- 
 gether. 
 
 The chance finding on the 13th September of Lee's order No. 
 191, dated the 9th, ought to have cleared up all doubts concern- 
 ing Lee's plans. Seldom in war has a commanding general 
 been so favored by luck as McClellan was in getting hold of 
 that order. The circumstances under which it was found, and 
 the fact that officers at McClellan's headquarters recognized 
 the signature as genuine, coupled with what was already 
 known of Lee's columns, left little doubt as to the authenticity 
 of the order. Yet McClellan was slow to take advantage of 
 his good luck. Now was the time for extra exertion. The 
 march so far had been very easy. Instead of resting the night 
 of the 13th, as it did, the army should have pressed forward. 
 There was a moon to light the way* If McClellan's main 
 army had pressed forward it would have reached Turner's Gap 
 by daylight, and brushed away Stuart's little force of cavalry, 
 and D. H. Hill's two brigades, and been in possession of the 
 pass long before Longstreet's command could have marched 
 back from Hagerstown, and even before D. H. Hill could have 
 brought back his advanced troops from Boonsboro. If there 
 had been any battle at all at South Mountain it would have 
 been a small affair. 
 
 Likewise at Crampton's Gap : Franklin's corps did not reach 
 it until noon of the 14th, and did not succeed in getting 
 through it into Pleasant Valley much before dark. Yet it was 
 defended then only "by Munford's cavalry [brigade], assisted, 
 hut not very efficiently, by troops of McLaws's command."t 
 Had Franklin reached there earlier and attacked with more 
 vigor and skill he might have saved Harper's Ferry, and ought 
 to have handled McLaws's force, much smaller than his own, 
 very roughly. Instead of these successes, Harper's Ferry 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 fRopes. 
 
278 American Campaigns. 
 
 surrendered on the morning of the 15th, and McLaws "with- 
 out molestation withdrew his command across the river to the 
 town."* 
 
 But the relief of Harper's Ferry would have been as nothing- 
 compared to the greater advantage such prompt action would 
 have brought McClellan — the advantage of having his entire 
 army over the mountains, and upon interior lines, between the 
 separated parts of Lee's army, ready to unite and cut off the 
 troops with Lee and Longstreet from their line of retreat, and 
 maybe to capture or destroy them. A still more certain way 
 for McClellan to have achieved this result would have been to 
 push forward with his whole army on the afternoon and night 
 of the 13th of September for Crampton's Gap. This would 
 almost surely have brought his united corps between the sepa- 
 rated parts of the Confederate army. Here he threw away 
 the same sort of chance that Pope lost when he withdrew 
 McDowell from Gainesville. f 
 
 After the battle of South Mountain Lee was allowed to 
 escape with his army, and by the afternoon of the 15th he was 
 in position behind Antietam Creek. The distance from 
 Turner's Gap to Antietam Creek is not ten miles ; yet so slowly 
 and deliberately did McClellan follow that it was not till late 
 in the afternoon of the 16th when his first troops, Hooker's 
 single corps, crossed the creek and moved against Lee's line. 
 What the purpose of sending this corps over alone was, it is 
 hard to say, unless it was to make a reconnaissance in force in 
 order to ascertain the position of the enemy's left. What it 
 did was plainly to indicate to Lee where McClellan purposed 
 making his main attack, and to enable Lee to place his own 
 troops accordingly. 
 
 Franklin, having failed to save Harper's Ferry, and having 
 let McLaws escape on the 15th, should have been ordered 
 to rejoin McClellan without delay, in order to take part in the 
 impending engagement; but it was not till the night of the 
 16th that he received an order to quit Pleasant Valley and re- 
 join the main body. He was not then required to bring his 
 whole force, but was directed to leave Couch's division 
 [Fourth Corps] to hold Maryland Heights — for what purpose 
 it is impossible to say. 
 
 Longstreet did not favor giving battle at Sharpsburg. He 
 wanted Lee to withdraw to the south side of the Potomac. 
 
 *Ropes. 
 fAlexander. 
 
The Antietam Campaign. 279 
 
 Lee wanted to fight at Sharpsburg, and Jackson concurred with 
 him. Lee could probably have crossed his army and trains 
 over the Potomac without any serious opposition by McClel- 
 lan, and no good reason can be seen why he did not do so. Po- 
 litically his invasion of Maryland had already proved a failure, 
 and his defeat at South Mountain had stopped his progress 
 toward Pennsylvania. But Lee thought the morale and pres- 
 tige of his army, and, no doubt, public sentiment at the South, 
 required that he should win a victory north of the Potomac. 
 There could have been no other reasons for the battle of An- 
 tietam, and those were not sufficient reasons. 
 
 Strategically Lee's position in this battle was as bad as it 
 could be. Two miles directly behind it was an impassable 
 canal and river, and his only line of retreat led away from his 
 right flank to a difficult ford less than three miles distant. 
 The wages of defeat ought to have been destruction ; while- 
 the reward of victory could only have been the enemy's re- 
 pulse. In their attack the Federals were so well covered by 
 their superior artillery upon the hills on the eastern side of 
 Antietam Creek that they would have been protected from a 
 Confederate counter-attack, in case of their repulse, just as 
 they were later at Fredericksburg by the batteries on Stafford 
 Heights.* A Confederate victory could have had no decisive 
 results. 
 
 General Palfrey says in his account of this battle: "If Lee- 
 had been in McClellan's place on the 17th of September, and' 
 had sent Jackson to conduct the right attack and Longstreet 
 to force the passage of the lower bridge and turn the Con- 
 federate left [sic], the Army of Northern Virginia, though 
 commanded by a second Lee, a second Jackson, and a second' 
 Longstreet, would have ceased to exist that day." McClellan 
 claims to have defeated Lee in the battle ; but it is hard to say 
 which should reflect least credit upon the Union commander, 
 not to have defeated Lee's army, or not to have destroyed it 
 if he defeated it. Truth to tell, McClellan did neither. _ 
 
 The strategical employment of the cavalry on both sides in- 
 the campaign was excellent. The hostile cavalry forces were 
 in contact with each other from the moment the Confederates 
 crossed the Potomac, until the two armies confronted each 
 other across the Antietam, each covering the columns of its 
 own army and gathering all possible information of its enemy. 
 Pleasanton's advanced cavalry was in touch with Stuart's 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
280 American Campaigns. 
 
 squadrons at the eastern foot of Turner's Gap on the evening 
 of September 13, and opened the battle the next morning. • If 
 it had been promptly supported by infantry in sufficient force, 
 as it should have been, the pass would have been in posses- 
 sion of the Federals within three hours. 
 
 It is idle to speculate upon what might have been the out- 
 ■come of this campaign, if Lee had not detached the expedition 
 against Harper's Ferry, and if his "lost order" had not fallen 
 into McClellan's hands. Even with the garrison of Harper's 
 Ferry out of the way, and his line of communications estab- 
 lished through the Shenandoah Valley, it cannot be seen how 
 Lee could have penetrated far into Pennsylvania. Staunton, 
 150 miles in rear, was the nearest railway point upon his line 
 of communications ; he could not have kept his army supplied 
 over so great a distance by wagon-trains.* 
 
 He had, moreover, only 55,000 men, with little hope of rein- 
 forcements; while McClellan had nearly 90,000, with strong 
 reinforcements on the way to join him. McClellan's army 
 was marching, but marching very slowly, straight against Lee's 
 line of retreat. If Lee's army had remained at Hagerstown or 
 had gone farther northward McClellan could easily have 
 thrown his army across its rear and cut off its retreat. Lee 
 would then have had to fight faced to the rear against almost 
 double his numbers. At best it could only have been the Get- 
 tysburg campaign set forward ten months ; but Gettysburg 
 might have been otherwise with Stonewall Jackson alive, and 
 McClellan, not Meade, in command of the Union army. 
 
 Tactics. 
 
 (139) The field of Antietam was far better tactically than 
 strategically for a defensive battle. The line had a sort of ir- 
 regular ridge to rest upon, while its left was protected by a 
 bend of the Potomac and its right rested upon heights over- 
 looking the Antietam and had the town of Sharpsburg as a 
 rallying-point behind it. This flank was, nevertheless, the 
 weakest part of the line; it was practically "in the air," and 
 could easily have been turned or enveloped. There were 
 woods, ledges of rock, stone walls, uneven ground, and sunken 
 roads, all of which were used by the Confederates for cover. 
 Sharpsburg contained many old brick buildings, which gave it 
 something of the defensive strength of European villages. 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
The Antietam Campaign. 281 
 
 The right of the Confederate line had already taken refuge in 
 the streets, when A. P. Hill's timely arrival on the field saved 
 the town from the necessity of having its strength put to the 
 test. This was one of the few engagements of the war in 
 which a village was included within the lines of battle. 
 
 Antietam Creek in front of the line, though bridged at four 
 places and fordable nearly everywhere, was nevertheless a con- 
 siderable obstacle. It was not, however, so serious an ob- 
 stacle as Burnside regarded it. Along the greater part of their 
 position the Confederates had a comparatively clear field of 
 fire for their infantry. The field, however, was generally 
 narrow, and was obstructed in some quarters by high corn 
 and in others by woods. There were fairly good positions for 
 the artillery, but they, like all parts of the field, were com- 
 manded by the Federal batteries on the far side of the stream. 
 Good roads in rear of the line enabled troops to march quickly 
 from one place to another, generally under cover. The posi- 
 tion could have been greatly strengthened by mtrenchments, 
 and there was ample time to dig them. The advantage they 
 would "have given was shown by the defense of the Bloody 
 Lane — a sunken earthen road, which could not be carried until 
 it was enfiladed. 
 
 On account of the walls and fences and ledges of rock the 
 ground was not suitable for the charge of cavalry; but the 
 squadrons of Stuart and Munford effectually guarded the 
 flanks of the position. 
 
 Ropes remarks : "Of General Lee's management of the bat- 
 tle there is nothing but praise to be said" ; he might have 
 added: "Of McClellan's management of the attack there is 
 nothing but censure to be said." In the first place, no ade- 
 quate reconnaissance was made to find out the position occu- 
 pied by the Confederates; where the creek could be forded, 
 etc. When the attack was finally made it was made piece- 
 meal ; in fact there were five separate and distinct attacks by 
 detachments, instead of one single attack by the whole army 
 with a general reserve held back to throw in at the critical mo- 
 ment. First there was Hooker's attack on the afternoon of the 
 16th ; secondly, Hooker's attack on the morning of the 17th ; 
 thirdly, Williams's attack with the Twelfth Corps after 
 Hooker's repulse on the 17th ; fourthly, Sumner's attack after 
 Williams's, and the attack of French and Richardson about 
 the same time at another part of the line ; fifthly, Burnside's 
 attack on the Confederate right. If all the corps engaged in 
 these attacks had assaulted Lee's line at the same time it does 
 
282 American Campaigns. 
 
 not seem possible for him to have escaped a disastrous defeat. 
 But since they assaulted one at a time Lee was enabled to with- 
 draw troops from one part of his line and send them to another 
 where for the moment they were needed. Thus he withdrew 
 Walker from his right and sent him, as well as McLaws, to 
 his left in time to repulse Sumner's impulsive column. 
 
 The Federal troops, however, had fought so well that, not- 
 withstanding the mistakes of their commanders, a decisive vic- 
 tory was still within McClellan's reach, and he had but to close 
 his grasp upon it. By the time that Franklin's corps had 
 reached the field from Pleasant Valley, on the 17th, Lee's army 
 was well-nigh exhausted. Nearly a fourth of his soldiers, 
 were dead or wounded, and there was not a regiment in re- 
 serve. It was the crisis of the battle. French and Richardson 
 had possession of the Bloody Lane, and if Franklin's fresh 
 battalions had renewed the assault, Lee's spent troops must 
 have been routed. And McClellan had other fresh troops be- 
 sides Franklin's corps ; Porter's Fifth Corps was practically 
 intact. "McClellan had some 24,000 troops who had not been 
 seriously engaged" in- the battle.* A still more decisive result 
 might have been achieved if these 24,000 men had been led 
 across Antietam Creek, by the fords near its mouth and by the 
 lower bridge, and hurled against the right of Lee's line. This 
 would have cut Lee off from his line of retreat by way of 
 Boteler's Ford. McClellan's main attack should have been 
 made against this flank of Lee's army. 
 
 On the morning of the 18th Couch and Humphreys arrived 
 with more than 12,000 fresh troops. Why did not McClellan 
 renew the battle? In McClellan's Own Story the Union com- 
 mander admits that he was afraid to renew the attack. "At 
 that critical juncture," says he, "I should have had a narrow 
 view of the condition of the country had I been willing to 
 hazard another battle with less than an absolute assurance of 
 success. . . . One battle lost and almost all would have 
 been lost. Lee's army might then have marched as it pleased 
 on Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, or New York." Such 
 timidity is not consistent with the character of the commander- 
 in-chief of an army ; and it does not win victories. In remain- 
 ing upon the field and offering battle on the 18th, "Lee- 
 had everything to lose and nothing to gain" ; all of his com- 
 manders were in favor of withdrawing on the night of the 
 17th. "Lee, alone, was in no wise moved," says General Alex- 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
The Antietam Campaign. 283 
 
 ander. "He had read McClellan's inmost soul and knew he 
 was not to be feared." By standing his ground defiantly an- 
 other day, instead of taking to flight that night, Lee strength- 
 ened the morale of his troops, and saved the prestige of his 
 army. 
 
 Burnside's failure to cross the creek and assault the right of 
 the Confederate line before three o'clock in the afternoon of 
 the '17th enabled Lee to draw 6,000 men from that flank with 
 which to save his left ; and it also gave A. P. Hill time to come 
 up from Harper's Ferry and reach the field at the exact mo- 
 ment to wrest victory from the assaulting column. If the 
 Union cavalry had been guarding the flanks of the attack, in- 
 stead of standing idle at the center, the approach of A. P. 
 Hill's division would have been discovered in time for dispo- 
 sitions to be made to meet it. 
 
 General George B. Davis, in his review of the campaign, 
 says : "The management of the Army of the Potomac was 
 halting, dilatory, wanting in firm direction and to a degree 
 irresolute and unskilful"; and of the battle, "The artillery 
 alone, everywhere on the field, had been brilliantly handled and 
 had rendered most valuable service to the Union cause. At 
 times, indeed, the Federal lines were practically held by the 
 superb management of the light batteries, which dominated 
 everywhere the enemy's artillery, and compelled his infantry 
 to seek shelter from the effects of their destructive and well- 
 directed fire." From beginning to end of the campaign the 
 Confederate commander's conduct was characterized by bold- 
 ness, resolution, and quickness; the Federal commander's by 
 timidity, irresolution, and slowness. 
 
LECTURE XIV. 
 THE FREDERICKSBURG CAMPAIGN. 
 
 (147) We saw in the last lecture that Lee's army with- 
 drew from the battle-field of Antietam the night of the 18th 
 September, 1862, and crossed the Potomac at Boteler's or 
 Blackford's Ford. The next morning, the 19th, the Federal 
 cavalry started in pursuit, but found the fords covered by 
 Confederate batteries. The Fifth Corps [Porter] was ordered 
 to support the cavalry and Porter determined to carry the 
 fords. By night he had succeeded in making a lodgment on 
 the south bank of the river, having captured five Confederate 
 guns. 
 
 The following morning, the 20th, the divisions of Morell 
 and Sykes were sent across the river to make a reconnaissance 
 in force. They found an overwhelming body of Confederates 
 under A. P. Hill, and were driven back with considerable loss. 
 The result of this reconnaissance was to put a stop to any fur- 
 ther pursuit or other offensive movement on the part of Mc- 
 Clellan's army for the time being. 
 
 Lee's army went into camp in the fertile valley of Opequan 
 Creek to rest and regain strength after its hard campaign, 
 while it kept watch upon the movements of the Federal army. 
 The Confederate army had lost many thousands of men by 
 straggling, much of it due to the soldiers' lack of shoes and 
 their bodily weakness, but much of it due, also, to a lack of 
 discipline in the ranks. The army went into the battle of An- 
 tietam with fewer than 40,000 troops, but "its numbers rose 
 by October 20 to 68,000 men 'present for duty.' "* It was 
 now, for the first time, definitely organized into the 1st and 
 2nd Corps, under Longstreet and Jackson, respectively, who 
 had been made lieutenant-generals. Major-generals and briga- 
 diers were also promoted to command the divisions and bri- 
 gades, respectively, into which the corps were subdivided.f 
 The army, moreover, had received such supplies as the Con- 
 federate government was able to furnish it. The Federal 
 armyj also, was in need of recruits and supplies, rest and 
 recuperation. McClellan did not consider it in a fit condition 
 to follow up at once the advantage gained by the victory he 
 
 ♦Allan. 
 fAlexander. 
 
The Fredericksburg Campaign. 285 
 
 claimed at Antietam. So he contented himself with having 
 expelled the enemy from Maryland, and with negative meas- 
 ures to prevent his return, while he looked after the refitting 
 and reorganizing of his army. He garrisoned Harper's Ferry, 
 and fortified Maryland, Loudoun, and Bolivar Heights, where 
 he stationed Sumner with the Second and Twelfth Corps.* 
 
 But the authorities at Washington and the people of the 
 United States were impatient for McClellan to resume the of- 
 fensive while the fine autumn weather lasted and the roads 
 remained good. On the 6th of October Halleck, by direction 
 of the President, sent McClellan an order to "cross the Poto- 
 mac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south."* But 
 such were the hindrances encountered by McClellan in getting 
 supplies for his army, due apparently more to the incompe- 
 tence and hostility of Halleck than to anything else, that it 
 was not till near the end of October that he felt ready to cross 
 the Potomac. 
 
 Stuart's Raid. 
 
 Meantime Stuart had aggravated the impatience at the 
 North by making a cavalry raid through Maryland into Penn- 
 sylvania, and entirely around the Federal army. Skilfully 
 eluding the Federal garrisons along the upper Potomac, he 
 crossed the river near the mouth of Black Creek on the 10th 
 of October with the three Brigades of Fitzhugh Lee, Wade 
 Hampton, and W. E. Jones, about 1,800 troopers, and, avoid- 
 ing Hagerstown, which was strongly garrisoned by Union 
 .troops, pushed on through Mercersburg to Chambersburg. 
 Here he gathered about 500 horses, and destroyed a machine 
 shop and a lot of public stores, then bivouacked in the streets 
 of the town, and was off again by daybreak of the 11th. He 
 marched east as far as Cashtown ; then took the Emmitsburg 
 Road and the route down the Monocacy Valley ; then he passed 
 out through Hyattstown, and recrossed the Potomac into Vir- 
 ginia near Poolesville. He hastened on by way of Leesburg, 
 and on the 13th crossed the Blue Ridge Mountains to rejoin 
 Lee. "The distance traveled had been 126 miles, of which the 
 last eighty from Chambersburg were accomplished without a 
 
 halt."f 
 
 The news of the raid reached McClellan's headquarters on 
 the evening of the 10th ; Pleasanton and Averell with the Union 
 
 *Ropes. 
 fAlexander. 
 
286 American Campaigns. 
 
 cavalry were at once started in pursuit, and the Federal gar- 
 risons along the Potomac, as far as Poolesville, were warned 
 to watch for Stuart at the fords. Pleasanton's scouts came 
 upon the raiding column just before it reached the Potomac, 
 but they were not strong enough to stop it ; nor were 200 in- 
 fantrymen, who had been stationed at the ford to guard it. 
 The Count of Paris says: "It [the Confederate column] had 
 scarcely reached the other side, when it saw Pleasanton ap- 
 proaching in one direction, whose march had been retarded by 
 the slow movements of the infantry and artillery, and in an- 
 other direction a brigade which had left Poolesville since morn- 
 ing, and which had lost much valuable time on the road." 
 Pleasanton had made a march of fifty-five miles in twenty-four 
 hours, partly over mountain roads; and Averell's brigade had 
 traveled 200 miles in four days ; but the commands were broken 
 ■down by the hard marching, and had to rest and receive sev- 
 eral thousand fresh horses before they were fit for further 
 active service. Thus the raid hindered McClellan's operations. 
 Yet the results were hardly worth the risk ; Stuart ought to 
 have lost his whole command, but by reason of good luck and 
 better management he lost only one man wounded.* 
 
 Plans and Operations. 
 
 (148) In his dispatch of October the 6th, mentioned before, 
 Halleck told McClellan that the President preferred that he 
 .should move east of the Blue Ridge Mountains, so as to cover 
 Washington ; and that, if he should adopt this line of march, 
 he would be furnished 30,000 reinforcements ; but, if he decided 
 to move up the Shenandoah Valley, he could be given only 
 12,000 or 15,000 reinforcements. At this time the waters of 
 the Potomac were very low and McClellan feared that, as soon 
 as he removed his main army from Lee's front, Lee would 
 again cross into Maryland. McClellan replied, therefore, to 
 Halleck that " 'he had determined to adopt the line of the 
 Shenandoah for immediate operations,' but that he did not re- 
 gard the line of the Shenandoah Valley as important for ulte- 
 rior objects. . . . 'The only possible object,' he continued, 
 'to be gained by an advance from this vicinity, is to fight the 
 enemy near Winchester.' "t 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 tRopes. 
 
The Fredericksburg Campaign - . 287 
 
 By the time, however, that McClellan was ready to start, the 
 October rains had raised the river, and "the Union general felt 
 sure that another invasion of the North was no longer to be 
 apprehended, and that he could safely adopt" the line of ad- 
 vance- east of the Mountains.* Nevertheless, the Twelfth 
 Corps, now commanded by Slocum, was left at Harper's Ferry, 
 "and Morell with about 4,500 men was directed to guard the 
 upper Potomac."* McClellan's army began to cross the Poto- 
 mac at Berlin on the 26th of October, but the last troops were 
 not over before the 2nd of November. With its right flank 
 covered by Pleasanton's cavalry the army then directed its 
 march upon Warrenton as its first objective. 
 
 Plan. 
 
 At this time McClellan does not appear to have had a defi- 
 nite plan. His movements were to depend upon those of the 
 enemy. He says : "It was my intention if, upon reaching 
 Ashby's or any other pass, I found that the enemy was in force 
 between it and the Potomac, in the Valley of the Shenandoah, 
 to move into the Valley and endeavor to gain their rear. I 
 hardly hoped to accomplish this, but did expect that by stri- 
 king in between Culpeper Court House and Little Washing- 
 ton I could either separate their army, and beat them in detail 
 or else force them to concentrate as far back as Gordonsville, 
 and thus place the Army of the Potomac in position either to 
 adopt the Fredericksburg line of advance upon Richmond, or 
 to be removed to the Peninsula, if, as I apprehended, it were 
 found impossible to supply it by the Orange and Alexandria 
 Railroad, beyond Culpeper."f 
 
 The army moved up the valley between the Bull Run and the 
 Blue Ridge Mountains. The gaps in the latter range were 
 seized and occupied one after another as they were passed, 
 in order to cover the line of communications with Harper's 
 Ferry, which was now the base of supplies. But by the 6th 
 of November the army had reached the Manassas Gap Rail- 
 way, and thereafter received its supplies by that line from 
 Washington. 
 
 As soon as Lee learned that McClellan's army had crossed 
 the Potomac he put his own in motion to oppose it. He left 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
 tScribner's Campaigns of the Civil War: Antietam and Frcdencks- 
 bura. — F. W. Palfrey. 
 
288 American Campaigns. 
 
 Jackson's corps to hold the Valley and threaten the Union 
 flank until he should determine what were to be the plans of 
 the enemy; and with Longstreet's corps, covered by the cav- 
 alry, he moved from Winchester on the 2nd of November 
 toward Culpeper Court House. The main column marched 
 by way of Front Royal, but one division, with cavalry, took 
 the road through Ashby's Gap "to look for the head of Mc- 
 Clellan's army."* 
 
 In the movement southward the cavalry of the hostile armies 
 were almost constantly in touch with each other, and engaged 
 in combat on November 2 at the village of Union near Ashby's 
 Gap, and on the 3rd at Upperville. On the 5th there was an- 
 other cavalry fight at Barber's Cross-Roads, near Chester Gap. 
 In all these combats the Federal cavalry was victorious ; it had 
 to be driven away from Manassas Gap by Hood's infantry 
 division, and from Chester Gap by McLaws's division.* 
 
 On the 7th of November Lee was at Culpeper Court House 
 with Longstreet's corps, 38,110 men, the reserve artillery, 1,027 
 men, and two brigades of cavalry under Stuart, 5,484 troopers. 
 Jackson's corps, some 40,000 strong, was near Millwood in 
 the Valley .f 
 
 On this date the Federal army was distributed as follows: 
 the First, Second and Fifth Corps, and the reserve artillery 
 were at Warrenton ; the Ninth Corps was at Waterloo ; the 
 Sixth was at New Baltimore; the Eleventh Corps, sent out 
 from Washington, was at New Baltimore, Gainesville, and 
 Thoroughfare Gap; and one division of the Third Corps was 
 between Manassas Junction and Warrenton Junction. Pleas- 
 anton with two brigades of cavalry was at Amissville and 
 Jefferson, with pickets" on Hazel River, and flank pickets at 
 Newby's Cross-Roads and Gaines's Cross-Roads, and patrols 
 towards Woodville, Sperryville and Little Washington. Bay- 
 ard with his cavalry was at Rappahannock Station ; General 
 Morell with a division of infantry was on the Potomac from 
 Sharpsburg up; and the Twelfth Corps was at Harper's 
 
 Ferry.J 
 
 It will be seen that the two corps of Lee's army were about 
 forty miles apart in a direct line ; while McClellan's army was 
 concentrated about Warrenton, within twenty miles of Long- 
 
 *From Manassas to Appomattox. — Longstreet. 
 
 fGeneral Alexander gives the following figures : Longstreet's corps 
 with its reserve artillery, 34,916; Jackson's corps, 31.692; Stuart's cav- 
 alry, 9,146; Pendleton's reserve artillery, 718; total, 76,472. 
 
 JW. F. Smith in B. & L. 
 
The Fredericksburg Campaign. 289* 
 
 street's corps, and still nearer the shortest road by which the- 
 two corps of the Confederate army could unite. It was, there- 
 fore, impossible for Jackson to march to Lee by this road! 
 while the Federal army remained at Warrenton. 
 
 The time had arrived f or ^McClellan to strike "in between, 
 Culpeper Court House and Little Washington," separate the- 
 wings of the Confederate army, "and beat them in detail, or 
 else force them to concentrate as far back as Gordonsville" ;; 
 he purposed making an effort to this end at once, but again the 
 authorities at Washington intervened, as they had done when 
 McClellan had his army concentrated at Harrison's Landing,, 
 to prevent his carrying out or even undertaking his project. 
 
 As McClellan sat in his tent near Salem, late on the evening 
 of the 7th of November, General Buckingham, special messen- 
 ger from the War Department, presented himself, and handed: 
 the general a sealed envelope. It contained an order from the 
 President, relieving McClellan from command of the Army of 
 the Potomac, and appointing his personal friend, Burnside, in 
 his stead. Burnside formally assumed command of the army 
 on the 9th. The stations of the various units were practically 
 the same as on the 7th, but the headquarters had been shifted' 
 to Warrenton. 
 
 Burnside was called upon by Halleck to submit a plan of 
 operations, and on the 9th he forwarded a letter explaining his. 
 plan. "This was to give up the Orange and Alexandria Rail- 
 way as his line of communications, and make Aquia Creek his 
 base of supplies" ;* to "impress upon the enemy the belief that 
 he was to attack Culpeper or Gordonsville, . . . then to» 
 make a rapid move of the whole force to Fredericksburg, with 
 a view to a movement upon Richmond from that point."f- 
 Burnside stated that a wagon-train of subsistence stores, pre- 
 ceded by a train of pontoons, "enough to span the Rappahan- 
 nock with two tracks," should be dispatched from Alexandria 
 to Falmouth, and that forage and provisions should be sent to- 
 Aquia Creek and Belle Plain. Not until the 14th did the 
 President give his reluctant assent to Burnside's plan. 
 
 One of Burnside's first steps was to reorganize the Army of 
 the Potomac into three Grand Divisions and a Reserve Corps. 
 The Second and Ninth Corps [Couch and Willcox] formed 
 the Right Grand Division, under General Sumner; the Third 
 and Fifth Corps [Stoneman and Butterfieldl formed the Center 
 
 *Ropes. 
 tPalfrey. 
 
290 American Campaigns. 
 
 Grand Division, under General Hooker; and the First and 
 Sixth Corps [Reynolds and W. F. Smith] formed the Left 
 Grand Division, under General Franklin. The Eleventh 
 Corps, under General Sigel, formed the Reserve Corps.* It 
 will be noticed that most of the corps have new commanders. 
 
 On the morning of the 15th the Right Grand Division 
 [Sumner] started for Falmouth, arriving at that place on the 
 17th. The other two Grand Divisions followed a day or two 
 later. But the army could not cross the Rappahannock — 
 there were no pontoons. The pontoon-train did not arrive 
 until the 25th. The Reserve Corps did not reach Falmouth 
 until after the battle of Fredericksburg.f 
 
 On his arrival at Falmouth Sumner wanted to send a part of 
 his command across the river, which at this time could be 
 forded, to capture and hold Fredericksburg; but Burnside 
 would not consent. He "decided that it was impracticable to 
 cross large bodies there, and he was afraid to cross small 
 bodies."^ At this time the Confederate garrison holding 
 Fredericksburg was so weak that it could have offered but 
 feeble resistance to Sumner's Grand Division of "fifteen bri- 
 gades and thirteen batteries." 
 
 Lee was not surprised by Burnside's change of plan and 
 sudden movement upon Fredericksburg. He had already con- 
 sidered it probable that the Federal army, instead of moving 
 against Longstreet at Culpeper, might march on Fredericks- 
 burg, and he had, accordingly, sent orders to destroy the rail- 
 way from that place to Aquia Creek, and had strengthened 
 the garrison of Fredericksburg by a small force. On the 18th 
 of November, being convinced by Stuart's reports that Burn- 
 side's army was concentrating at Fredericksburg, Lee ordered 
 McLaws's division thither from Culpeper ; the next day he 
 started the rest of Longstreet's corps for the same place. By 
 the 21st Longstreet's whole corps was at Fredericksburg. 
 
 "Lee had not, however, definitely decided to fight at Fred- 
 ericksburg." His first intention had been to make the North 
 Anna his defensive line. So he left Jackson to decide in his 
 own discretion whether to remain in the Shenandoah Valley or 
 to cross to the east side of the mountains. Jackson crossed the 
 mountains and halted with his corps at Orange Court House. 
 But "on the 26th and 27th of November'' . . . Lee "wrote 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
 fAlexander. 
 
 t-Palfrey. 
 
The Fredericksburg Campaign. t 291 
 
 to Jackson to join him ... if in Jackson's judgment 
 nothing was likely to be gained by his remaining away." In 
 giving Jackson this direction Lee was "influenced partly by 
 the lateness of the season and the consequent danger that the 
 roads might become bad, which would render the cooperation 
 of Jackson difficult, and partly by certain indications that the 
 Union general intended crossing the river before long."* Jack- 
 son had joined Lee by the 30th of November, at Fredericks- 
 burg. 
 
 (149) The two hostile armies now occupied the opposite 
 banks of the Rappahannock, the Union army 122,000 strong; 
 the Confederate army about 78,500. 
 
 At this point the Rappahannock, about 400 feet wide, breaks 
 through a chain or group of hills, and makes a sharp turn in 
 its course from east to southeast. As one would naturally sup- 
 pose, the hills on the outer side of the bend, known as Staf- 
 ford Heights, come down closer to the water's edge than those 
 on the opposite or inner side, and they are also higher, and 
 command the latter. On the right bank the range of heights 
 begins near the river 2 a little way above the bend, and runs ap- 
 proximately parallel to the river and about a mile from it for 
 two miles. Then it is broken by Hazel Run. From this point 
 southward the slopes are not so steep, they are covered with 
 wood, and they curve away, still farther from the river, ap- 
 proaching it again toward the Massaponax River, which is 
 about six miles from the northern end of the ridge. The 
 range of heights is broken by ravines and small streams, and 
 is marked by several prominent features. The general line of 
 heights from Taylor's Hill, at the northwestern end, to Marye's 
 Hill, just north of Hazel Run, is known as M'arye's Heights. 
 Between these two hills are Stansbury's Hill and Cemetery 
 Hill. In the southern portion of the range of heights, Lee's 
 Hill, at the northwest, and Prospect Hill, at the southeast, are 
 the most prominent points. 
 
 Fredericksburg was on the river in front of Marye's Heights, 
 and the gently sloping space between the edge of the town and 
 the foot of the heights was crossed by a wide ditch, about 400 
 yards in front of the heights, that carried off the waste water 
 from a canal along the foot of the hillside farther northward. 
 South of Hazel Run the space between the foothills and the 
 river was crossed by several brooks, the most considerable of 
 which was Deep Run, whose various branches reached back 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
292 American Campaigns. 
 
 into the wooded ravines. The Richmond, Fredericksburg and 
 Potomac Railroad crossed the river at Fredericksburg, and 
 followed down it for about four miles to Hamilton's Crossing, 
 where it turned south. Another railway, unfinished, led out 
 of the town and through the hills by way of Hazel Run Val- 
 ley. Falmouth was on the left bank, about a mile above 
 Fredericksburg, at the bend of the river. 
 
 There were numerous roads traversing the range of heights 
 and the space between its base and the river-bank, the most 
 notable of which were the Plank Road and the Telegraph 
 Road. The Plank Road was in the prolongation of one of the 
 streets in the heart of Fredericksburg. It crossed the ditch in 
 front of Marye's Heights by a wooden bridge, and, ascending 
 the heights, led on west through Chancellorsville to Orange 
 Court House. (148) (149) The Telegraph Road also led out 
 of one of the streets of the town, but it turned round the base 
 of Marye's Hill, and continued out through the valley of Hazel 
 Run southward to Richmond. At the base of Marye's Hill 
 was a sunken road with a stone retaining-wall on each side, 
 the one on the east "just breast-high for a man."* The space 
 in front of the sunken road slopes gently, "until near" the wide 
 ditch, "where it drops off three or four feet, leaving space 
 near the canal [ditch] of a rod or two of level ground."* 
 
 The bridges by which the railway and the old Richmond 
 stage road, parallel to it, crossed Deep Run had been de- 
 stroyed, and the boards had been removed from those by 
 which the Plank and Telegraph Roads crossed the wide ditch 
 in front of Marye's Heights. Marye's Hill is only about half 
 as high as the other hills along the front line of the range; 
 it is really the eastern edge of a bench, which stretches back 
 about a half-mile to the foot of another higher slope. Such 
 was the battlefield of Fredericksburg. 
 
 Longstreet's corps at first occupied the line all the way from 
 Taylor's Hill to Hamilton's Crossing; but Jackson's corps, 
 upon its arrival, was "assigned position on the right near Ham- 
 ilton's Crossing and the Massaponax."* Batteries of position 
 were placed along the heights, and covered with epaulements. 
 Altogether the Confederates had 306 guns in their line. "The 
 line was strengthened by a few slight earthworks at some 
 points, but was nowhere strongly fortified. The heavy works 
 
 *Longstreet. 
 
The Fredericksburg Campaign. 293 
 
 at Fredericksburg, so often referred to, were constructed after 
 the battle, not before it."* 
 
 (148) The day after Jackson arrived several Union gun- 
 boats were reported in the river, at Port Royal, about twenty 
 miles below Fredericksburg; D. H. Hill's division, with sev- 
 eral batteries, was, therefore, detached to drive the gunboats 
 away, and to guard against the enemy's crossing at that point. 
 Hill succeeded in driving the gunboats back, and was left in 
 observation. Early's [Ewell's] division took post at Skinker's 
 Neck, about twelve miles below Fredericksburg. W. H. F. 
 Lee's brigade of cavalry was with D. H. Hill, while Wade 
 Hampton's guarded the fords of the upper Rappahannock. 
 
 Plans and Operations. 
 
 Finding himself balked in his project of crossing the Rap- 
 pahannock at Fredericksburg and moving at once against 
 Richmond by delay in the arrival of his pontoon-train, Burn- 
 side was at a loss what to do. He had to do something — 
 the press of the country demanded it. He must either force a 
 crossing at Fredericksburg, or, by maneuvering, turn Lee's 
 position and cross the river somewhere else. A turning move- 
 ment by the upper river does not appear to have been seriously 
 considered, though the country was hilly and wooded in that 
 quarter, and the river narrow and fordable at several points — 
 conditions that "would have made a crossing easy to accom- 
 plish by surprise,''! as was later proved in the Chancellors- 
 ville campaign. Such a movement, however, would have left 
 Burnside's communications with Aquia Creek, though covered 
 by the river, more or less exposed to Lee's army. 
 
 Burnside made some preparations for a turning movement 
 by way of Skinker's Neck, where the river was 300 yards 
 wide; but the appearance of D. H. Hill's division near that 
 point caused him to drop that project. (149) He then resolved 
 to force a crossing in front of the Confederate position. Lee's 
 line was too far away from the river, and the place was too 
 much dominated by Hunt's powerful batteries of 147 guns, on 
 Stafford Heights, for Lee to oppose any effective resistance to 
 the actual passage of the river. His real fight was to be made 
 •after the Union Army had got across. 
 
 On the night of December 10 arrangements were made to 
 
 ♦Allan. 
 fAlexander. 
 
294 American Campaigns. 
 
 span the river with five pontoon-bridges, three opposite Fred- 
 ericksburg, and two just below the mouth of Deep Run. Sum- 
 ner's Grand Division was to cross by the upper, and Franklin's 
 by the lower, bridges. Hooker's Grand Division was to remain 
 on the left bank as the general reserve. The Grand Divisions 
 took their positions during the night. Some Confederate sharp- 
 shooters were posted along the river-bank in rifle pits; but 
 Franklin's command had little trouble in driving them away 
 from its front, and by noon of the 11th had laid its two 
 bridges. The work was facilitated by a dense fog, which hung 
 over the valley during the morning. 
 
 The construction of the bridges at Fredericksburg was a 
 harder undertaking. A brigade of Confederates under Barks- 
 dale was posted in cellars and behind brick walls, along the 
 water-front of the town, and their fire was so deadly that it 
 drove the bridge-builders away. Several hours were wasted 
 in unavailing efforts. At ten o'clock Burnside ordered Hunt's 
 artillery to shell the town. "On this," says Swinton, who was 
 an eye-witness, "there opened up from the massive concentra- 
 tion of artillery a terrific bombardment, that was kept up for 
 above an hour. Each gun fired fifty rounds, and I know not 
 how many hundred tons of iron were thrown into the town." 
 The shells set the town on fire, but the guns could not be de- 
 pressed enough to reach the sharpshooters. "The day was 
 wearing away and affairs were at a deadlock," when General 
 Hunt suggested that a party be sent across in the boats to drive 
 the Confederates away. This succeeded. The 7th Michigan, 
 the 19th and 20th Massachusetts, and the 89th New York vol- 
 unteered for the apparently perilous exploit. Federal sharp- 
 shooters lined the left bank, and kept down the Confederate 
 fire as well as possible. The party landed on the other side 
 without much loss, and had little further trouble in putting 
 Barksdale's men to flight, and capturing about 100 of them. 
 The bridges were then laid in a few minutes. 
 
 (150) Of Franklin's command, which had orders to await 
 the construction of the upper bridges, one brigade crossed over 
 on the afternoon of the 11th, and by 3 p.m. of the 12th both 
 of his corps, the First and the Sixth, were on the right bank. 
 One of Sumner's divisions, also, crossed over and occupied 
 Fredericksburg the night of the 11th ; the next day the rest of 
 the Right Grand Division crossed to the right bank. Nine- 
 teen batteries, 104 guns, crossed with Sumner's Grand Divi- 
 sion, of which only about seven batteries could be used in the 
 
The Fredericksburg Campaign. 295 
 
 battle. Twenty-three batteries, 116 guns, crossed by the lower 
 bridges, all of which, but one battery, were engaged. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 12th Burnside was at Franklin's 
 headquarters, and discussed the situation with Franklin and 
 his commanders. It was practically agreed that the left of the 
 Confederate line was too strong to be carried; the right, at 
 Hamilton's Crossing, was plainly the weaker flank, as it rested 
 on no natural obstacle. It was, however, strengthened by 
 abatis and earthworks, and Stuart's cavalry and horse-artillery 
 guarded the space between Hamilton's Crossing and the Mas- 
 saponax. Franklin's command was reinforced by two of 
 Stoneman's divisions [Third Corps], which raised its strength 
 to about 50,000. It was agreed — and Franklin so understood 
 — that Franklin was to make the "main attack," and that Sum- 
 ner's would be the "secondary attack." Burnside said he 
 would send Franklin his orders, and Franklin made ready to 
 attack at daybreak. 
 
 But it was half after seven on the morning of the 13th be- 
 fore Franklin received his order ; and when it came it was 
 wholly different from what Franklin had expected, and it left 
 him in much doubt as to what was required of him. The order 
 directed that "you keep your whole command in position for a 
 rapid movement down the old Richmond Road, and you will 
 send out, at once, a division, at least, to pass below Smithfield, 
 to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on 
 this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well sup- 
 ported, and its line of retreat open. He [the commanding 
 general] has ordered another column, of a division or more, to 
 be moved from General Sumner's command, up the Plank 
 Road, to its intersection with the Telegraph Road, where they 
 will divide, with a view to seizing the heights on both of those 
 roads. Holding those two heights, with the heights near Cap- 
 tain Hamilton's will, he hopes, compel the enemy to evacuate 
 the whole ridge between these points. I make these moves by 
 columns distant from each other with a view of avoiding the 
 possibility of a collision of our own forces which might occur 
 in a general movement during the fog. . ." This order 
 
 was dated 5.55 a.m. 
 
 Sumner's order, dated 6 a.m., directed him to extend his 
 left to Deep Run, connecting with Franklin's right, and his 
 right as far as his judgment might dictate. Sumner was also 
 directed to push a "column, of a division or more, along the 
 Plank and Telegraph Roads, with a view to seizing the heights 
 
•296 American Campaigns. 
 
 in rear of the town." Hooker's order was dated 7 a.m., and 
 directed him to place Butterfield's corps [Fifth] and Whipple's 
 division [Third Corps] in position to cross at a moment's no- 
 tice at the upper three bridges in support of Sumner's troops 
 ■ and the two remaining divisions of Stoneman's corps [Third] 
 in readiness to cross to Franklin's support. These were the 
 ■orders that opened the battle of Fredericksburg. 
 
 The movements of troops in the Federal camps on the 10th 
 : and the reports of his scouts warned Lee of Burnside's pur- 
 pose, and he gave notice to the commanders along the line, and 
 ■had D. H. Hill recalled from Port Royal, and Early from 
 Skinker's Neck. They did not reach the battle-field until the 
 morning of the 13th. 
 
 On the morning of the 13th the hostile forces were in posi- 
 tion about as follows: the Second Corps at the town on the 
 right; the Ninth Corps next, south of Hazel Run; then the 
 Sixth ; and then the First. During the day Burns's division of 
 ithe Ninth Corps crossed Deep Run to support Franklin. 
 Meade's division of the First Corps was on the left of the 
 •general line facing southward, with its right touching the left 
 of Gibbon's division of the same corps, and its left resting 
 ■on the river near Smithfield. Doubleday's division of the 
 same corps was in reserve, formed in column on the bank of 
 the river behind Meade's left. Hunt's artillery reserve was 
 upon Stafford Heights. 
 
 In Lee's line, Longstreet's corps was on the left, "with An- 
 derson's division resting upon the river, and the divisions of 
 McLaws, Pickett, and Hood extending to the right in the or- 
 der named."* Cobb's brigade of McLaws's division was in the 
 sunken road behind the stone wall at the base of Marye's Hill. 
 Jackson's corps held the right of the line. Here the front was 
 occupied by A. P. Hill's division, with the brigades of Brock- 
 enbrough, Archer, Lane, and Pender in the first line, from 
 right to left, along the railway, at the edge of a wood. In the 
 second line were the brigades of Gregg and Thomas. A third 
 line was occupied by Early's and Taliaferro's divisions — 
 Early's on the right. D. H. Hill's division was in rear of the 
 right. Batteries were on both flanks. Stuart's horse-artillery 
 and cavalry were on the plain at the right, in the valley of the 
 Massaponax.f 
 
 *Palfrey. 
 fAlexander. 
 
The Fredericksburg Campaign. 297 
 
 In A. P. Hill's front line Archer's left was separated from 
 Lane's right by 500 to 600 yards of swampy wood which the 
 Confederates carelessly supposed to be impassable. Gregg's 
 brigade, in the second line, was behind this swamp. There 
 was also too wide a space for mutual support between Lane's 
 left and Pender's right. 
 
 Carrying out the spirit of Burnside's vague and unintelligi- 
 ble order as well as he was able to interpret it, Franklin se- 
 lected Meade's division of the First Corps [Reynolds] to as- 
 sault, "and seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamil- 
 ton's," supported by Gibbon's division on the right, and Dou- 
 bleday's in reserve. The aggregate strength of these three di- 
 visions was about 16,000 men. Meade's division moved out 
 from Smithfield, and encountered its first obstacle at the Rich- 
 mond Road, where it was delayed by the hedges and ditches 
 alongside. Between nine and ten o'clock it had got over 
 these obstacles, when the fog suddenly lifted and exposed its 
 columns to the Confederates, who, before this, had fired only 
 a few random shots. (151) Pelham, who commanded Stuart's 
 horse-artillery, immediately opened fire upon Meade's left 
 flank, compelling him to halt. Meade replied with twelve guns, 
 and Doubleday's division came up and faced Stuart's com- 
 mand ; after a half-hour's halt Meade resumed his march to the 
 front. 
 
 Not an enemy was to be seen, but the Federal artillery 
 shelled the woods occupied by A. P. Hill's division, "and in- 
 flicted considerable losses." Pelham's batteries had withdrawn, 
 but Doubleday kept his division facing to the left to watch 
 Stuart's threatening squadrons. Meade's columns moved for- 
 ward again until they came within 800 yards of the batteries 
 on the right and left of Jackson's line. These batteries then 
 opened a cross fire upon the columns and checked them ; but 
 the woods in front maintained an omnious silence. 
 
 Gibbon came up and deployed on Meade's right, and the left 
 of the Sixth Corps [Smith] connected with Gibbon's right. 
 The whole of Franklin's Grand Division was now in line, and 
 Franklin summoned the two divisions of the Third Corps 
 [Stoneman] to his support. The Federal artillery engaged the 
 Confederate batteries, and, after an hour and a half, succeeded 
 in silencing them. 
 
 Meade's lines now charged the woods in their front, and, 
 when at point-blank range, were suddenly fired upon with mus- 
 ketry by the Confederates concealed within them, and by can- 
 
298 American Campaigns. 
 
 non with shell and canister. (152) But the Federal bri- 
 gades, now in three lines, pressed forward into the swampy 
 wood between Archer's and Lane's brigades. The first line 
 turned to right and left to assault the flanks of these Confed- 
 erate brigades, while the other two pushed ahead until they 
 came upon Gregg's Confederate brigade at rest in the Military 
 Road back of the swamp. Gregg himself was taken by sur- 
 prise, and was slain while trying to stop his men from firing 
 on Meade's troops, which he took for Confederates. Lawton's 
 brigade [Early's division] quickly came to help Gregg's. 
 Meade's advance in the woods was checked, and there were no 
 Federal troops at hand to render assistance. Doubleday, with 
 the reserve, was out of reach, still watching the left on the 
 Richmond Road, and carrying on a desultory skirmish with 
 Stuart's dismounted troopers ; Gibbon's division had been 
 stopped at the railway; Smith's corps [Sixth], over on the 
 right, was scarcely engaged at all, but was too far away. 
 Franklin himself was far in rear. 
 
 The Confederate brigades rallied, and the rest of Early's 
 division hastened to their support. Together they drove the 
 Federal division back, out of the swamp, and into the plain 
 beyond. Gibbon's division went with it. The Confederates 
 followed; but Birney's division of the Third Corps had now 
 arrived to support Meade, and Sickles's division was behind 
 Gibbon's. The Confederates were in their turn driven back 
 into the woods, with a loss of more than 500 killed and 
 wounded. (153) At two o'clock Reynolds [First Corps], with 
 the assistance of the two divisions of the Third Corps, held 
 the railway line, but he was not strong enough to recapture 
 the woods.* 
 
 Meanwhile the battle had been raging at the other end of the 
 line. Burnside personally directed the attack in that quarter, 
 though he remained at the Phillips house on the left bank of 
 the river. The Confederates opened the battle. As soon as the 
 fog rose, about eleven o'clock, and disclosed the streets of 
 Fredericksburg crowded with Union troops, the Confederate 
 artillery from the heights began to shell the town. French's 
 division T Second Corps, Couch], followed by Hancock's in 
 support, led the attack. The division had to keep in column 
 until it had crossed over the damaged bridges of the wide 
 ditch. During this time the Confederate artillery, beyond the 
 
 *Comte de Paris. 
 
The Fredericksburg Campaign. 299 
 
 reach of Hunt's batteries on Stafford Heights, turned all its 
 fire upon the Federal columns. The division then deployed 
 on ground along the ditch sheltered by the low bank; and, in 
 column of brigades, charged the stone wall behind which stood 
 two Confederate brigades in the sunken road. When the Fed- 
 erals came within two hundred yards of the wall the Confed- 
 erates opened upon them with musketry fire. But the leading 
 brigade pushed on to within sixty yards of the wall; there it 
 was forced to stop. The other two brigades came on, but 
 they too had to halt at sixty yards ; and after a single discharge 
 they were all forced to retire, leaving a third of their number 
 on the ground. Three regimental flags were left standing 
 within eighty yards of the Confederate line. 
 
 Hancock's division followed immediately and passed beyond 
 the flags planted by French's regiments ; it got within thirty or 
 forty yards of the stone wall, but could not reach it. The 
 Confederates behind the wall had been reinforced, till now they 
 were firing in four ranks. Howard's division [Second Corps] 
 followed Hancock's ; while Sturgis and Getty crossed Hazel 
 Run with their divisions [Ninth Corps] to support the assault. 
 But all effort was in vain ; the Federal line had to yield. It fell 
 back behind the low bank near the ditch, which afforded some 
 shelter. Out of 5,006 men Hancock had lost 2,013. This 
 happened at half after one o'clock, just the moment when 
 Meade was driven out of the woods on the left. 
 
 Burnside now sent an order to Franklin to charge the enemy 
 with his whole force, in order to draw all his attention to that 
 quarter ; he ordered Hooker, who still held the three divisions 
 of the Fifth Corps in reserve, to renew the attack on the stone 
 wall with two of his divisions, and to support Sturgis and Getty 
 on the left with the other. Hooker started at once to obey the 
 order, and led his troops across the river ; but he was convinced 
 by Hancock and French of the hopelessness of making another 
 assault. So he went back to Burnside at the Phillips house, 
 and begged to be excused from taking his men to the sacrifice. 
 Burnside was immovable; "That height must be carried this 
 evening," he repeated, pacing up and down. 
 
 Hooker returned to the field and prepared for his assault 
 by causing every available battery to concentrate its fire on the 
 sunken road. Pickett's division, meantime, had gone to 
 Marye's Hill, and one of Hood's brigades had taken post be- 
 hind the wall in the sunken road where already there were four 
 brigades. Part of the firing line was now six ranks deep. At 
 
•300 American Campaigns. 
 
 four o'clock Hooker gave the signal for the assault, and Hum- 
 phreys's division charged; but it was stopped like those that 
 had gone before it. As dusk was falling Getty, on the left, 
 made a final a'ssault upon the end of Marye's Hill, but was re- 
 pulsed. Twilight came on, and Hooker ordered his men to 
 fall back. "Finding," says he, "that I had lost as many men as 
 my orders required me to lose, I suspended the attack." The 
 battle was over. 
 
 There has been much dispute, and there is still much uncer- 
 tainty, as to the time when Franklin received Burnside's after- 
 noon order to attack with his whole force ; and what orders he 
 actually received. He probably received the orders before 2.30 
 p.m. His line was then stretched out three miles long, from 
 Deep Run nearly to the Massaponax. It was a short winter's 
 day, and Franklin considered it too late to collect his extended 
 line and put it to the charge. He contented himself, therefore, 
 with letting his troops continue to occupy the attention of the 
 Confederate right with fire action alone. 
 
 Night ended the battle all along the line. The Union side 
 liad lost 10,208 men killed and wounded, and the Confederates 
 had lost 5,209. Sixty-three hundred of the Federal soldiers 
 were killed or wounded at the base of Marye's Hill. 
 
 Burnside issued an order to renew the attack next morning, 
 but his commanders succeeded in persuading him to recall it. 
 Morning found the troops where nightfall had left them. 
 Jackson and Hood had made new intrenchments during the 
 night, and Lee hoped Burnside would attack him again; but 
 the 14th and the 15th passed without a renewal of the battle. 
 On the night of the 15th the Federal army withdrew to the 
 left bank of the Rappahannock. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 (148) The battle of Antietam was fought on the 17th of 
 September, but it was the end of October before McClellan's 
 army resumed the offensive, and recrossed the Potomac. To 
 be sure, the army was in need of reorganization, recruitment, 
 and refitting, and there were exasperating delays in the ship- 
 ment of the stores ; but even so, nothing can excuse General 
 McClellan for letting so many weeks of fine autumn weather 
 pass without his making an aggressive movement. Lee's 
 army was, in the meanwhile, recuperating itself at a faster rate 
 than the Army of the Potomac, inasmuch as it was getting 
 
The Fredericksburg Campaign. 301 
 
 back the large number of stragglers it had lost on its rapid 
 movement in Maryland. Just after the battle of Antietam the 
 Confederate army was certainly in a worse condition than the 
 Union army; and then was when McClellan should have 
 pushed his advantage. 
 
 Yet it was, undoubtedly, mainly for political reasons that 
 McClellan was removed from command of the army. Ropes 
 makes this comment: "McClellan ought not to have been 
 removed unless the Government were prepared to put in his 
 place some officer whom they knew to be at least his equal in 
 military capacity. This assuredly was not the case at this mo- 
 ment." Burnside had gained prestige in newspaper and polit- 
 ical circles as commander of the expedition to the coast of 
 North Carolina, "where his overwhelming force easily over- 
 came the slight resistance that it met";* but he knew that he 
 was not equal to the office now imposed upon him, and he 
 accepted it with great reluctance. His modest opinion of his 
 abilities was shared by the rest of the army. McClellan was 
 relieved (November 7) just when the Army of the Potomac 
 was concentrated near Warrenton, while the two wings of 
 Lee's army were at Culpeper and Millwood, respectively, 
 forty or fifty miles apart. He was about to move against 
 Longstreet's wing at Culpeper, and says, "Could he have been 
 brought to a battle within reach of my supplies I cannot doubt 
 that the result would have been a brilliant victory for our 
 army."f Many of the reviewers of this campaign agree with 
 McClellan. But Lee and Longstreet would not have stood to 
 fight a decisive battle ; they would have fallen back along the 
 railway, destroying it as they retreated, until they formed a 
 junction with Jackson, who would have moved up the Valley 
 far enough safely to cross the mountains and join Longstreet. 
 So McClellan, in his pursuit, would almost surely have found 
 himself beyond "reach of his supplies," and Jackson would 
 probably have found an opportunity to pass through some 
 gap of the mountains, in McClellan's rear, and intercept his 
 communications. This would have forced McClellan to fall 
 back. 
 
 Lee, at this time, did not expect to defend the line of the 
 Rappahannock ; that river could be crossed at so many points 
 that "Lee expected to use it simply to gain time for the concen- 
 
 *Alexander. 
 fRooes-'. 
 
302 American Campaigns. 
 
 tration of his troops."* "Lee proposed to take a position be- 
 hind the North Anna with part of" his forces, "while, with 
 Jackson's and Longstreet's corps united, he moved in such a 
 manner as might enable him to fall upon the flank and rear 
 of the Federal army, when it attempted the passage of that 
 river."f But Lee was in doubt for some days as to what the 
 Federal army was going to do ; whether it was going to move 
 against Longstreet at Culpeper, or toward the Valley to cut 
 Jackson off, or on Fredericksburg. 
 
 Some of the critics think that Burnside ought to have moved 
 against Longstreet at Culpeper, while others say his move- 
 ment to Fredericksburg was right, and that it miscarried 
 through the failure of the pontoons to arrive, which was no 
 fault of his. He might, also, have escaped the battle of Fred- 
 ericksburg by crossing the Rappahannock by the fords higher 
 up, and maching to that town by the right bank ; this is what 
 General Halleck and the President expected him to do when 
 they consented to his plan.J He certainly made a mistake in 
 not allowing Sumner to cross the river and occupy the heights 
 near Fredericksburg with his Grand Division, as soon as it 
 reached Falmouth. The Confederate garrison at Fredericks- 
 burg, at that time, was hardly more than a regiment, and the 
 river was fordable. Burnside would not let Sumner cross for 
 fear the river might rise, before the arrival of the pontoon- 
 train, and cut him off. 
 
 Burnside's plan was based wholly upon the supposition that 
 his pontoons would be at hand, and that he could cross his 
 army to Fredericksburg, before Lee should discover his move- 
 ment and have time to meet and oppose his passage. Had the 
 plan succeeded Lee would have made his main defense behind 
 the North Anna. But upon Burnside's letting a week or more 
 pass without making any effort to cross, Lee resolved to make 
 every effort to stop him on the north bank of the Rappahan- 
 nock, and to compel him either to make another change of base, 
 or to stand fast till the winter came on and suspended the 
 operations. Either of these events Lee knew would cause great 
 dissatisfaction at the North. "It appears to me," he wrote 
 to Mr. Davis on the 25th of November, "that should General 
 
 * Allan. 
 fLong. 
 tAlexander. 
 
The Fredericksburg Campaign. 303 
 
 -Burnside change his base of operations the effect produced in 
 the United States would be almost equivalent to a defeat. I 
 think, therefore, he will persevere in his present course, and 
 the longer we can delay him and throw him into the winter 
 the more difficult will be his undertaking. It is for this reason 
 that I have determined to resist him at the outset and to throw 
 every obstacle in the way of his advance."* With this pur- 
 pose in view Lee then ordered Jackson to bring his corps up to 
 •the Rappahannock, from Orange Court House, where it had 
 remained for several days awaiting developments, and waiting 
 for Lee to decide upon his plan of resistance. 
 
 It was during the movement on Fredericksburg that Burn- 
 side had his best chance. If after inducing Lee to move Long- 
 street's corps to that place Burnside had suddenly turned back 
 with his united forces, and, crossing the Rappahannock above 
 Fredericksburg, had fallen upon that wing of Lee's army, he 
 •would have had an excellent chance of destroying it. The 
 head of Sumner's Grand Division, it will be remembered, 
 reached Falmouth on the 17th of November, and the rest of 
 the Union army was close behind it; Longstreet's whole corps 
 was at Fredericksburg on the 21st, while Jackson did not leave 
 Winchester until the 22nd. For a few days Longstreet's and 
 Jackson's corps were 150 miles apart, and the united Federal 
 army was practically between them. What an opportunity for 
 .a man like Napoleon or Jackson! But Lee and Jackson had 
 both presumed largely on Burnside's want of enterprise in 
 -allowing, for even a few days, 150 miles to separate the two 
 corps. f The best part of Lee's strategy appears to have been 
 his understanding of the characters of his enemy's com- 
 manders, and the use he made of it. Burnside's foremost mis- 
 take was his making Richmond and not Lee's army his main 
 •objective.f 
 
 Swinton thinks Lee could have stopped Burnside's move- 
 ment upon Fredericksburg by marching his forces toward the 
 Orange and Alexandria Railway — threatening Washington; 
 but Ropes says "for Lee to have done this would have been to 
 risk a battle in which he would have been opposed by a well- 
 -appointed army much larger than his own," and with no other 
 end in view "than that of winning that battle." 
 
 ♦Allan. 
 fAlexander. 
 
304 American Campaigns. 
 
 The Battle. 
 
 (150) The battle of Fredericksburg was another of the 
 great engagements of the Civil War in which the value of 
 artificial cover was shown. The left of Lee's position was 
 naturally strong against frontal assault, but it was not so much 
 the heights, which afforded commanding positions for the artil- 
 lery, as the sunken road revetted with stone at the base of 
 Marye's Hill, like the railway cut at the Second Bull Run, 
 that made the position impregnable against direct attack. 
 
 From Taylor's Hill, the left of the Confederate line, to its 
 right at Hamilton's Crossing was about six and a half miles. 
 Lee's force was large enough to occupy this position with about 
 six men to the yard. But along the two miles of strong 
 heights, Marye's Heights, Lee placed only 11,000 men; while 
 in the space between Deep Run and Hamilton's Crossing, about 
 two miles, which might more easily have been turned or en- 
 veloped, he posted Jackson with 30,000 men. The other two 
 miles' of the position, those at the center of the concave line, 
 were defended by only three men to the yard, and most of 
 those were afterwards moved, when the force of the attack 
 developed against the wings. At first examination, then, the 
 center would appear to have been the weakest part of the line 
 — the part against which the Federal main attack should have 
 been launched. But Burnside could not have massed troops 
 for such an attack without exposing them to the view of the 
 Confederates, who could then have concentrated promptly at 
 the center; for roads had been repaired and built in rear of 
 the position for that purpose. 
 
 "The Confederate line was strengthened by a few slight 
 earthworks at some points, but was nowhere strongly forti- 
 fied."* Had it been strongly intrenched along the edge of the 
 woods on the right Meade's frontal assault must have failed 
 to break through it. Yet strategically and tactically the right 
 of the Confederate line was where Burnside's main attack 
 should have been made. Strategically, because, if successful, 
 it would have thrown Lee off the Richmond Road and the rail- 
 way, his lines of communication, and placed the Federal army 
 between the Confederates and Richmond; tactically, because 
 the Massaponax could easily have been crossed, and that flank 
 of the position might have been turned or enveloped. True,. 
 
 *Allan. 
 
The Fredericksburg Campaign. 305 
 
 unless the attention of the Confederates could have been occu- 
 pied by the secondary attack all along the line, their right could 
 quickly have been reinforced, and by swinging to the right 
 in great force it might have cut off the turning or envelop- 
 ing columns from their pontoon-bridges. General Alex- 
 ander, who knows the ground, believes the Confederate left 
 might, also, have been turned. "The most obvious, and the 
 proper attack for the Federal right," he says, "was one turn- 
 ing the Confederate left along the very edge of the river above 
 Falmouth, supported by artillery on the north bank which could 
 enfilade and take in reverse the Confederate left flank." If 
 the main attack, however, had been made against this flank, 
 and had succeeded, it would have thrown the Confederates 
 back upon their line of communications rather than away 
 from it. 
 
 The attack was, in point of fact, made without any real 
 plan. It resolved itself into fourteen desperate, unsupported, 
 successive assaults at one impregnable point of the line,* and 
 another at a different point five miles away; while there was 
 practically no fighting along a great part of the line, and large 
 numbers of the troops scarcely fired a shot. 
 
 It is hard to say what Burnside expected to accomplish, or 
 why he fought this battle. "The only important reason given 
 by General Burnside for fighting the battle was that he thought 
 that the troops which General Lee had sent down the river to 
 oppose the landing of the Federal army in that region had not 
 returned."! "His balloon," says Colonel Henderson in his 
 life of Stonewall Jackson, "had reported large Confederate 
 bivouacs below Skinker's Neck, and he appears to have be- 
 lieved that Lee . . . had posted half his army in that 
 neighborhood." Colonel Allan remarks : "He appears to have 
 relied chiefly upon his balloons — a wretched substitute at best 
 for scouts and cavalry, and especially so in a broken and 
 heavily wooded country." But he began crossing the night 
 of the 10th and did not attack until the morning of the 
 13th ; this delay enabled Lee to recall his detachments in time 
 for the battle. 
 
 As in the battle of Shiloh, so in this battle, Napoleon's 
 Twenty-ninth Maxim was violated on the Union side; the 
 "whole force" within the theater was not collected. This mis- 
 take cannot, however, be charged altogether to Burnside, but 
 
 *Alexander. 
 fRopes. 
 
306 American Campaigns. 
 
 more to the authorities at Washington in their exaggerated 
 anxiety about the safety of the Capital. There were 46,000 
 men under Heintzelman within the defenses of Washington — 
 enough to have held the city indefinitely against Lee's whole 
 army. Besides these there were some 12,000 troops scattered 
 in detachments through Maryland, Delaware, southern Penn- 
 sylvania, and upon the eastern shore of Virginia; Morell had 
 about 5,000 along the upper Potomac; while Sigel with the 
 Reserve Corps [Eleventh] was at Dumfries, within twenty 
 miles of the battle-field, and Slocum with the Twelfth Corps 
 was near Centreville, not fifty miles away. These two corps 
 at least ought to have been brought to Fredericksburg in time 
 for the battle.* 
 
 An unusual feature of the battle, viewed as the passage and 
 defense of a river, was the fact that little real opposition was 
 encountered by the Federal army in the actual crossing of the 
 stream. Owing to the conformation of the ground Lee could 
 not seriously resist this part of the undertaking; he could not 
 place his men to contest the landing of troops, because they 
 would have been at the mercy of the Federal artillery on Staf- 
 ford Heights. 
 
 It has been said that Lee missed his opportunity when he 
 failed to follow up his successful defense by a counter-attack. 
 Less than half of his army, only four out of nine divisions, had 
 been engaged.f Yet, while it is true that Lee had not pro- 
 vided a general reserve, or made any arrangements for a 
 counter-attack ;% and while he did not know how badly he had 
 defeated Burnside, and "among the Confederates no one con- 
 ceived that the battle was over"f at the end of the first day, 
 there was no opportunity for counter-attack on the 13th at 
 Longstreet's end of the line, where "the Federal assaults were 
 maintained with unwavering determination till dark. But at 
 the other end of the line, when Meade and Gibbon were driven 
 back, Early's division followed them until it was stopped by 
 Birney."§ If Early had been followed up and supported by 
 a strong force of reserves at the right moment the effect 
 might have been decisive. Half of Jackson's corps was massed 
 in reserve, but his biographers say it was not practicable for 
 him to put them into the fight at this critical moment ; Jackson 
 
 *Pamphlet by Captain Alstaetter, C. E. 
 
 tAlexander. 
 
 t-Hcnderson. 
 
 §Allan. 
 
The Fredericksburg Campaign. 307 
 
 had to hold them to meet assaults that he momentarily expected 
 at other points of his line. As no such assaults came he 
 resolved to make a counter-attack ; but he says : "The first 
 mn had hardly moved forward from the wood a hundred 
 yards when the enemy's artillery reopened and so completely 
 swept our front as to satisfy me that the proposed movement 
 should be abandoned."* 
 
 During the next two days, the 14th and 15th, while the Fed- 
 eral army was back in Fredericksburg and on the river-bank, 
 an attack by Lee's army would have had no chance of suc- 
 ceeding. For 70,000 men to come out of their own strong 
 position, and cross an open plain to attack 100,000 behind the 
 bank of a river, would have been foolhardy in itself ; but when 
 it is remembered that Hunt had 147 guns on Stafford Heights, 
 which had a perfect sweep of the whole field, it must be con- 
 cluded that such an undertaking would have been hopeless. 
 Burnside ought not, however, to have been allowed to with- 
 draw his army across the river on the night of the 15th with- 
 out any interference. True, the night "was dark and rainy, 
 with high wind from the south, preventing" the Confederates 
 "from hearing noises from the enemy's direction." Still the 
 successful passage unmolested under their guns reflects badly 
 upon the vigilance of the Confederates. "It should have been 
 suspected, discovered by scouts, and vigorously attacked with 
 artillery."f 
 
 The important effect of stationing cavalry and horse-artillery 
 on the flank of the line was shown in this battle as it was at 
 Antietam. Stuart's guns not only checked Meade's charge 
 for an hour, but his threatening position kept Doubleday's 
 division out of the main fight at that end of the line. 
 
 *Allan. 
 fAlexander. 
 
LECTURE XV. 
 STONES* RIVER CAMPAIGN. 
 
 (154) After the battle of Shiloh [April 6 and 7, 1862] 
 General Halleck took command of the National forces in per- 
 son at Pittsburg Landing; and after the arrival of Pope with 
 the 30,000 men "fresh from the capture of Island No. 10," 
 and other reinforcements, he had an army of some 120,000.f 
 Beauregard's Confederate army was estimated at about 70,000. 
 It really was much smaller, and was a good deal demoralized. 
 It was at Corinth. 
 
 Instead of following the Confederate army vigorously and 
 destroying it with his overwhelming numbers Halleck did not 
 begin his forward movement until the 30th of April ; and then, 
 General Grant says in his Memoirs, "the movement was a 
 siege from the start to the close." The vast army would build 
 corduroy roads and move forward a mile or two, then halt and 
 intrench. Its objective was the town of Corinth, not Beaure- 
 gard's army as it should have been. Finally the "grand 
 army" reached Corinth and took possession of the town, al- 
 most without bloodshed, on the 30th of May. Corinth, it will 
 be remembered, is only about twenty miles from Shiloh. The 
 Confederate army had retreated south about sixty miles to 
 Tupelo. Halleck did not pursue, but split his army in pieces, 
 sending one division to Arkansas, and stationing others at va- 
 rious points between Memphis and Decatur. 
 
 Buell with the army of the Ohio, about 31,000 strong, was 
 started about the 10th of June for Chattanooga, to seize that 
 important town, and to carry out the President's long-cherished 
 desire to have a Union force enter East Tennessee in order to 
 protect and encourage the loyal inhabitants of that region. 
 But Halleck ordered Buell to rebuild and repair the Memphis 
 and Charleston Railway as he proceeded, which was to he his 
 
 *This name is variously written Stone, Stone's, and Stones. Lip- 
 pincott's Gazetteer has it "Stone;" the Century Atlas has it "Stones;" 
 and The U. S. Geographic Board has adopted "Stone." The lecturer 
 wrote to the Mayor of Murfreesboro to inquire what form was used 
 bv the people of the country. The Mayor answered that the form 
 "Stones" was the one used. He also sent letter-heads of the "Stones 
 River National Bank" to show the form generally used. 
 
 fGrant's Memoirs. 
 
Stones River Campaign. 309 
 
 line of communications. (155) This task so hindered Buell's 
 march that Bragg, who had succeeded Beauregard in command 
 of the Confederates, had time to transfer his army — the in- 
 fantry by rail by way of Mobile — from Tupelo, to Chatta- 
 nooga ahead of Buell. Yet Bragg did not begin to move from 
 Tupelo until the 21st of July. A large part of Bragg's army 
 was left in Mississippi under Price and Van Dorn. The force 
 that assembled at Chattanooga numbered about 30,000. Gen- 
 eral Kirby Smith, at Knoxville, commanded another Confed- 
 erate force in East Tennessee of about 18,000, "half of which 
 was opposed by the Federal general, Morgan, at or near Cum- 
 berland Gap."* 
 
 When his leading divisions had gone as far as Stevenson, 
 Buell, with Halleck's consent, gave up the effort to keep the 
 Memphis and Charleston Railway open in his rear, and adopted 
 the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway as his line of commu- 
 nications, with Nashville as his secondary base of supplies. 
 Louisville was the primary base. But on the 13th of July 
 Forrest with his Confederate cavalry, some 1,400 troopers, 
 suddenly fell upon Murfreesboro, and captured the Union gar- 
 rison of that town, more than 1,000 officers and men. He 
 broke up the railway so thoroughly that it was not repaired 
 until the 28th of the month ; and Buell's advance against Chat- 
 tanooga was, for the time, brought to a full stop. Buell then 
 moved his divisions forward to the following positions : 
 Wood's division to Decherd ; Nelson's to Murfreesboro ; Mc- 
 Cook's and Crittenden's to Battle Creek; Thomas's to Athens, 
 Ala. His own headquarters were at Huntsville. But his 
 advance was again stopped by a Confederate cavalry raid; 
 John Morgan captured Gallatin, Tenn., and destroyed the tun- 
 nel of the Louisville and Nashville Railway, effectually inter- 
 rupting this line of communications. 
 
 Meantime Bragg and Kirby Smith had arranged for an in- 
 vasion of Kentucky. The plan of invasion proposed that Smith 
 should turn the Union position at Cumberland Gap and inter- 
 cept its line of communications by a movement to the left of the 
 Gap ; while Bragg with the main column, covered by his cavalry, 
 and a small column on his left to threaten Nashville, should 
 advance directly aerainst Munfordville. Here he would be 
 squarely upon Buell's line of communications. Bragg's and 
 Smith's forces were to unite in Kentucky. 
 
 ♦Ropes. 
 
310 American Campaigns. 
 
 Geography. 
 
 An examination of the map shows that there were no rail- 
 ways and no rivers in the direction of the proposed Confederate 
 advance; the columns would have to rely wholly upon wagon- 
 trains for the transportation of their stores, and- the roads were 
 part of the way over mountains, and generally poor. Munford- 
 ville is about 160 miles from Chattanooga in a straight line. 
 Very little forage and subsistence could be obtained in the 
 country through which the columns were to advance. "Bragg's 
 march presented peculiarly trying features. He had to cross 
 the river Tennessee . . . ; then traverse Walden's Ridge, 
 . . . some 1,200 feet above the level of the sea; then de- 
 scend into the valley of the Sequatchie River . . . and 
 then ascend the plateau of the Cumberland Mountains, some- 
 where about 2,200 feet above sea-level, before he could possibly 
 concentrate his army for the invasion proper."* 
 
 Operations. 
 
 About the middle of August, Kirby Smith crossed the moun- 
 tains and cut Morgan's line of communications. Leaving one 
 of his divisions to watch Morgan in the vicinity of Cumberland 
 Gap, he pressed forward into Kentucky, and on August 30 
 encountered an extemporized force of Federal troops at Rich- 
 mond and routed them with great loss. On September 2 he 
 was in possession of Lexington, and he established his head- 
 quarters there. 
 
 "Bragg, too, effected his movement through the Sequatchie 
 Valley and his crossing of the Cumberland Plateau in the first 
 days of September, and on the 5th established his headquarters 
 at Sparta. . . . Up to this point Bragg's movements had 
 been screened by the Cumberland Mountains, and Buell could 
 not obtain any definite information respecting them. 
 
 "Buell decided to concentrate his scattered forces at Mur- 
 freesboro, where his army would cover Nashville, and where 
 he could easily receive" reinforcements that he was expecting 
 "from Grant's army in western Tennessee. This he accom- 
 plished by September the 5th. . . . He had then heard of 
 Kirby Smith's victory at Richmond, and he strongly suspected 
 that Bragg was intending to effect a junction with him."* So 
 
 ♦Ropes. 
 
Stones River Campaign. 311 
 
 he planned to leave a sufficient force to defend Nashville, and 
 to march the rest of his army rapidly into Kentucky. 
 
 "On the 14th of September Buell was at Bowling Green with 
 the bulk of his army ; Bragg had reached Glasgow . . the 
 day before." On that day Bragg's advance attacked the Fed- 
 eral post at Munfordville, but was repulsed. "Bragg at once 
 brought up his main army, and the Federal commander, on 
 being satisfied that he was largely outnumbered, surrendered 
 on the 17th with 4,000 men."* 
 
 Bragg's army was now squarely across Buell's line of com- 
 munications with his main base at Louisville. Bragg remained 
 at Munfordville several days, hoping Buell would attack him. 
 This Buell would not do, and on the 21st Bragg started for 
 Bardstown to connect with Kirby Smith. Buell immediately 
 moved to Louisville, where he arrived on the 25th. (156) 
 Here his army was largely reinforced. On the last day of 
 September the main hostile armies were posted as follows : 
 Buell's at Louisville, Bragg's at Bardstown, and Kirby Smith's 
 at Lexington. 
 
 On the 1st of October Buell with his reorganized army re- 
 sumed the offensive. He sent two divisions toward Frankfort 
 to "contain or observe Kirby Smith, and with the rest of his 
 army marched in three columns toward Bardstown, with the 
 intention of attacking Bragg."* 
 
 On the 30th of September Bragg was at Frankfort with 
 Kirby Smith's army conducting the inauguration of a Seces- 
 sionist governor of Kentucky. He and Smith were deceived by 
 Buell's movements, and thought the main force of the Federals 
 was advancing toward Frankfort. Bragg, therefore, ordered 
 Polk, who had been left at Bardstown in command of his army 
 and had fallen back before Buell's columns, to march north and 
 attack the Federal army in flank. Polk, however, knowing that 
 Buell's main force was advancing on Bardstown, refused to 
 obey Bragg's order, and retired toward the southeast. Bragg 
 then ordered Polk to concentrate at Harrodsburg, in order to 
 cover the large depot of stores that Kirby Smith had collected 
 at Lexington. Smith moved to Versailles for the same purpose. 
 Bragg's left wing under Hardee had reached Perryville and 
 was there being pressed by the Federal advance. It was then 
 reinforced by a division of his right wing from Harrodsburg. 
 
 "Buell's forces, excepting the divisions of Sill and Dumont, 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
312 American Campaigns. 
 
 were also near Perryville, but his troops had arrived from sev- 
 eral directions, — 'the distance from one flank of the army to 
 the other was not perhaps less than six miles,' — the different 
 bodies were much separated from each other in search of water 
 . . . and the line of battle had not been formed by noon 
 [October 8]. (157) The presence of the enemy in force does 
 not seem to have been recognized. . . . (158) About 2 
 p.m. the Confederates assaulted the Federal left under Mc- 
 Cook, and drove it back in disorder, capturing some fifteen 
 guns. (159) Later in the day Sheridan drove the Confed- 
 erates in front of him through the town of Perryville. The 
 Confederates achieved a tactical success against the Union left, 
 but for all practical purposes the battle was a drawn battle. 
 (156) At night the Confederates retired" to Harrodsburg.* 
 Here Bragg's force was joined on the 10th by Kirby Smith's. 
 
 Bragg waited at Harrodsburg a day or two to see if Buell 
 would attack him in position, then withdrew his army to Camp 
 Dick Robinson, and from there into East Tennessee. On the 
 12th Buell "started in pursuit, but the Confederate retreat was 
 well managed; their rear," says Ropes, "was admirably pro- 
 tected by the cavalry of Wheeler and Wharton ; and at London, 
 JBuell, convinced of the impolicy of carrying his army at that 
 season of the year into the difficult country of East Tennessee, 
 discontinued the pursuit and transferred his troops to Bowling 
 Green and Glasgow, intending, later on, to place his forces at 
 some point or points east of Nashville, on the Nashville and 
 Chattanooga Railroad, in readiness for another season of ac- 
 tive campaigning. At this juncture, on October 24th, — by an 
 order received October 30th — Buell was relieved from com- 
 mand, and Rosecrans, who, under Grant, had been command- 
 ing the Army of the Mississippi in western Tennessee, was put 
 in Buell's place."* Rosecrans had gained considerable repu- 
 tation by defeating the Confederates under Van Dorn and 
 Price at Iuka, Mississippi, on the 19th of September, and at 
 Corinth on the 3rd and 4th of October. 
 
 At this time the garrison that Buell had left at Nashville 
 under Negley was besieged by Forrest's cavalry and Breckin- 
 ridge's infantry division. Rosecrans sent McCook's corps to 
 Negley's relief, holding the rest of his army at Bowling Green 
 until the Louisville and Nashville Railway could be repaired. 
 By the end of November he had his whole army concentrated 
 at Nashville. 
 
 *P.opes. 
 
Stones River Campaign. 313 
 
 Meantime Bragg had withdrawn his army to Morristown in 
 East Tennessee. Thence he transferred it by way of Knoxville 
 and Chattanooga to Murfreesboro. (160) Rosecrans, in spite 
 of urgent and even threatening letters from the War Depart- 
 ment, would not move against Bragg until he had collected 
 an abundance (2,000,000) of rations at Nashville to make him 
 independent of the railway back from Nashville to Louisville ; 
 he well knew that he could not prevent the interruption of this 
 line of communication by the Confederate cavalry. In fact, 
 Morgan's cavalry broke up this railway again on the 26th of 
 December. 
 
 At the same time Forrest's cavalry, also, was absent from 
 Bragg's army upon a raid against Grant's line of communica- 
 tions, the railway from Corinth to Columbus, Kentucky, which 
 it succeeded in breaking up. But Bragg had retained the three 
 cavalry brigades of Wheeler, Wharton, and Pegram, "and their 
 skilful movements," says Ropes, "screened the positions and 
 maneuvers of his infantry, on which he placed his chief re- 
 liance, and delayed the advance of the Federal forces until 
 arrangements could be completed for their reception." It 
 would have been better for the Confederate army if Bragg had 
 also kept back the brigades of Morgan and Forrest ; but he had 
 sent them off before he was sure that Rosecrans was about to 
 move against him. 
 
 The contact squadrons of Bragg's cavalry were in touch with 
 the Federal camps at Nashville; and as soon as Rosecrans's 
 army began the march toward Murfreesboro, on the morning 
 of December 26, Wheeler, who was Bragg's chief of cavalry, 
 sent report of the movement to Bragg, and made ready to dis- 
 pute the advance of the Federal army, and to delay its march. 
 
 This army moved in three columns, designated the "Right 
 Wing," "Center," and "Left Wing," commanded respectively 
 by McCook, Thomas and Crittenden. McCook's column took 
 the Nolensville Turnpike; Thomas's the Franklin and Wil- 
 kinson Turnpikes, to threaten Bragg's left.* This had been 
 on the turnpike between Triune and Eagleville, but was imme- 
 diately drawn in to the position in front of Murfreesboro. 
 Crittenden took the direct road to Murfreesboro. These col- 
 umns encountered Wheeler's cavalry almost as soon as they 
 had started, and were opposed by it at every step. At Nolens- 
 ville, at Lavergne, and wherever a strong position could be 
 
 *G. C. Kniffin in B. & L. 
 
314 American Campaigns. 
 
 found, the Confederate cavalrymen with their carbines, aided 
 by their artillery, compelled the Federal divisions to halt and 
 deploy. Where opportunity offered the squadrons charged 
 with saber and revolver. And there was not a moment when 
 they did not keep Bragg perfectly informed of the movements 
 and whereabouts of Rosecrans's columns. Aided by fogs and 
 hard rains they succeeded in so hindering the progress of the 
 Federals that it was the evening of the 29th December before 
 the leading divisions were within three miles of Murfreesboro, 
 though the distance marched was only thirty miles. 
 
 From the accounts of the campaign it does not appear that 
 the Federal cavalry took its place in front of the infantry 
 columns until the 29th. Van Home says in his History of the 
 Army of the Cumberland: "The cavalry moved in three 
 columns. Colonel Minty's brigade, under Colonel Kennett, 
 the division commander, accompanied the left wing. Colonel 
 Zahm's brigade proceeded on the Franklin Road, as a protec- 
 tion to General McCook's right flank, and General Stanley, 
 with the reserve brigade, also accompanied the right wing." 
 Whatever was the cause, the Union cavalry certainly rendered 
 no efficient service on this march until the 29th. On that day, 
 the same historian says, "General Stanley moved in advance of 
 the right wing. . . . The Anderson cavalry, the Fifteenth 
 Pennsylvania, pushed the enemy, at full charge, for six miles." 
 And so poorly was Rosecrans kept informed by his cavalry 
 concerning the movements of Bragg's army that he ordered 
 Crittenden's wing, which was in advance, "to occupy Murfrees- 
 boro with one of his divisions on the night of the 29th, and en- 
 camp the other two miles outside."* But Bragg's whole army 
 was at that time in line of battle between Crittenden and 
 Murfreesboro. Crittenden could not obey the order, of course. 
 
 (161) The field upon which the battle of Stones River was 
 fought lies along the stream of this name about two miles west 
 of Murfreesboro. In a very winding course the river here 
 flows in a general direction slightly west of north. It was, at 
 the time of the battle, spanned by several bridges, and was 
 fordable at various places; hence it was not in itself a serious 
 obstacle in a military sense. The northern part of the main 
 battle-field was traversed by the Nashville Turnpike and the 
 Nashville and Chattanooga Railway, which intersected within 
 it at a very acute angle, and crossed the river each by its own 
 
 *Van Home. 
 
Stones River Campaign. 315 
 
 bridge. Across the center of the field, from east to west, was 
 the Wilkinson Turnpike, and across the southern part of it, 
 from east to west, was the Franklin Road. These highways 
 were connected by a country road that crossed the battle- 
 field. West of the battle-field was a fordable stream called 
 Overall Creek, from two to three miles from Stones River. 
 The space between these two streams was rather flat, but with 
 hills here and there high enough to serve as artillery positions. 
 The space was occupied by a considerable number of farm- 
 houses and cultivated fields ; but the greater part of it was cov- 
 ered with cedar thickets, through which infantry could pass 
 easily enough and cannon could be taken with difficulty. The 
 thickets were dense enough to conceal troops within them. 
 
 On the 29th of December Bragg's army occupied a "position 
 in readiness" covering the approaches to Murfreesboro from 
 the west. Hardee's corps, consisting of the divisions of Breck- 
 inridge and Cleburne, with Jackson's brigade as reserve, formed 
 the right wing, and was assigned to the sector extending from 
 the Lebanon Turnpike to the river; while Polk's corps, com- 
 posed of the divisions of Withers and Cheatham, formed the 
 left wing and guarded the sector from the river to the Frank- 
 lin Road. McCown's division was held in reserve at the 
 center.* Wheeler's cavalry was out in front and guarding 
 the flanks. 
 
 Late in the afternoon of the 29th Crittenden's divisions ad- 
 vancing by the Nashville Turnpike discovered the Confederate 
 army in position ; they deployed into line of battle and halted 
 about a mile in front of the enemy. Negley's division, of the 
 "Center," took its place in the same line. These four Federal 
 divisions bivouacked for the night in this position. The other 
 Federal divisions bivouacked on the night of the 29th at differ- 
 ent points on the road west of Overall Creek. 
 
 (162) Early on the morning of the 30th McCook's divisions, 
 the "Right Wing," moved forward on the Wilkinson Turnpike 
 with orders to form line on Negley's right. Sheridan's division 
 preceded by a regiment of cavalry, was in the lead, followed by 
 the divisions of Johnson and Davis. Sheridan and Davis were 
 met by fire from the enemy's line, and they lost nearly 300 men 
 in getting into place. "The left of Sheridan's division, when 
 in line, rested on the Wilkinson Turnpike. General Davis 
 
 ♦Colonel Urquhart in B. & L. 
 
316 American Campaigns. 
 
 formed his division on Sheridan's right, and General Johnson 
 held his in reserve."* 
 
 The "Left Wing" on the 30th remained in about the position 
 it had taken on the 29th. Palmer's division moved a little for- 
 ward, and the pioneer brigade took its place at the river to 
 prepare the fords. Rousseau's division of Thomas's "Center" 
 took position behind Negley's line. A brigade was left to 
 guard the bridge of the Jefferson Turnpike across Stones River 
 about eight miles in rear; and another, at Lavergne, about fif- 
 teen miles back on the Nashville Turnpike. 
 
 There was considerable fighting between the hostile lines 
 during the day, especially with artillery. (163) Suspecting 
 from the direction of McCook's advance that the Federals were 
 trying to envelop or turn his left, Bragg placed McCown's 
 division, which had been in reserve, on Polk's left. In the 
 afternoon McCook, learning that the right of Davis's line was 
 opposite the center of Bragg's, placed Johnson's division in 
 position on the right of Davis. 
 
 Bragg was disappointed not to be attacked in his position on 
 the 30th. He resolved himself to attack early the next morn- 
 ing, making his main effort against the right of Rosecrans's 
 line. Accordingly he moved Cleburne's division from the right 
 of his line to the left. General Hardee was to command the 
 main attack, and to envelop the enemy's right flank ; and the 
 whole line was to swing to the right, pivoting on the river, and 
 drive the Federal army back, off its line of communications and 
 into the river. Bragg designated no general reserve, but he 
 did not believe that Breckinridge's division would be attacked 
 on the east bank of the river; he purposed using it as his 
 general reserve. 
 
 Not suspecting that Bragg meant to take the offensive, Rose- 
 crans planned a very similar form of attack for his forces to 
 make on the morning of the 31st, and issued very detailed 
 orders accordingly. He purposed making his "main attack" 
 against the Confederate right on the east bank of the river, 
 while his "secondary attack" should occupy the attention of the 
 left of the Confederate line. His "plan of battle, as revealed in 
 his official report and by his orders on the field, was as follows : 
 General McCook was instructed to take an advantageous posi- 
 tion on the right, and hold the enemy in check, if attacked; 
 but if overpowered, to fall back slowly, refusing his right. If 
 
 *Van Home. 
 
Stones River Campaign. 317 
 
 not attacked, he was to engage the enemy sufficiently to hold 
 him in his front. Generals Thomas and Palmer were to open 
 with skirmishing, and gain the enemy's center and left as far as 
 the river. General Crittenden was to throw Van Cleve's divi- 
 sion across the river, at the lower ford, to advance against 
 Breckinridge, and to cross Wood's division by brigades at the 
 upper fords, and support Van Cleve's right. If successful in 
 driving back the enemy's right, General Wood was to place 
 his batteries on the heights east of the river, and open on his 
 center and left in reverse. Then General Palmer should press 
 the enemy in his front, and General Thomas should sustain the 
 movement in the center."* 
 
 As the two plans of battle were identical, the initial advan- 
 tage would rest with the army which got the start ; and that was 
 Bragg's army. Soon after dawn Hardee with nearly half of 
 the Confederate infantry opened the attack on the Federal 
 right; from that moment Rosecran's army was thrown upon 
 the defensive. 
 
 At the start McCown's division inclined to the left, leaving 
 a gap between his right and Polk's left, which Cleburne quickly 
 filled with his division. Then these two divisions wheeled upon 
 McCook's right flank. (164) Johnson's division of Mc- 
 Cook's right was driven from the field after a short resistance. 
 This exposed the right of Davis's division which was imme- 
 diately refused. The divisions of McCown, Cleburne, and 
 Withers then assaulted Davis's line and the right of Sheridan's. 
 These lines were at right angles to each other and presented a 
 salient to the enemy; but they repulsed the Confederate 
 assault. 
 
 (165) Cheatham's division, which had been held in reserve, 
 was now put into the Confederate line, and a second assault 
 was made at this angle. This also was repulsed. But the Con- 
 federates made a third assault. This time they enveloped the 
 right of Davis's line, and forced it to withdraw. This left 
 Sheridan's right exposed to flank attack, and it also fell back. 
 But Sheridan wheeled his left brigade to the right and charged 
 the Confederates. This action arrested their advance and gave 
 Sheridan time to form a new line facing south. He then 
 wheeled his line farther to the rear and made another stand 
 facing southwest. His line was now parallel to the Nashville 
 Pike and formed a right angle with Negley's. 
 
 *Van Home. 
 
318 American Campaigns. 
 
 At this juncture Rousseau's division, which had been held in 
 reserve, took its place on Sheridan's right. The entire Con- 
 federate force except Breckinridge's division now assaulted 
 the Federal front occupied by the divisions of Rousseau, Sheri- 
 dan, Negley, and Palmer, arranged in order from right to left. 
 The assaults were at first repulsed; but finally Sheridan's am- 
 munition became exhausted, and he was forced to fall back. 
 (166) His withdrawal left a gap between Rousseau's left and 
 Negley's right into which the Confederates pushed. Rousseau 
 and Negley then withdrew their divisions ; but they halted 
 them in a depression between the edge of a cedar thicket and 
 the turnpike, and there stubbornly withstood the enemy's 
 attacks, and forced him to fall back. In this stand Shepherd's 
 brigade of regulars lost twenty officers and 518 men killed and 
 wounded. 
 
 (167) The withdrawal of Negley's division involved Palm- 
 er's division, which connected with Negley's left. Palmer's 
 right was driven back; but his left under Hazen, which was 
 posted in an oak grove on high ground, crossed by the railway 
 eight or nine hundred yards northwest of the junction with the 
 turnpike, repulsed all the attacks of the Confederates, and held 
 its ground. This was the only part of the original Federal 
 line that had stood fast. The entire right wing and center 
 and the right of the left wing had been forced back about this 
 point as a pivot. 
 
 Let us now see how much of Rosecrans's original plan of 
 battle had been carried out. (165) According to the plan 
 Van Cleve's division of Crittenden's corps was in motion be- 
 fore eight o'clock. The firing four miles away on the right 
 had been heard since a little after daybreak ; but McCook had 
 said that he could hold the enemy in that quarter for three 
 hours, while the left wing executed the main attack on the 
 other side of the river. As Rosecrans expected fighting on his 
 right, he was not disturbed when it took place there. So 
 Van Cleve's division pushed on, and two of his brigades were 
 actually deployed in front of Breckinridge's position before 
 Rosecrans knew that his right had been enveloped and de- 
 feated, and was falling back. As soon, however, as Rosecrans 
 learned the extent of this disaster, he recalled his offensive 
 movement against Bragg's right in order to reinforce his own 
 right wing. (167) The first of the reinforcing troops to get 
 into action were a part of Van Cleve's division. They formed 
 on the right of Rousseau's line just in time to aid it in stop- 
 
Stones River Campaign. 3iy 
 
 ping the pursuit of the Confederates, after the divisions of 
 Rousseau and Negley had been forced back. 
 
 By noon Rosecrans had a strong line formed on high ground 
 along the Nashville Turnpike, extending from Hazen's original 
 position to a point about a mile and a quarter to the right of it. 
 The right of this line was occupied by portions of McCook's 
 divisions, and the center by a part of Thomas's and Critten- 
 den's troops. From Hazen's position the left of the line bent 
 back to the river. The Confederates continued to assault this 
 line till about 4 p.m. ; but could not break it. 
 
 (168) Up to this time Breckinridge's Confederate division 
 had remained on the east side of the river comparatively idle. 
 As early as ten o'clock Bragg had ordered Breckinridge to 
 send two brigades to reinforce Hardee in the main attack. 
 Instead of obeying this order Breckinridge had sent back word 
 that Federal troops were advancing in heavy force against his 
 own position. On receipt of this report, Bragg sent Breckin- 
 ridge an or,der to move out and attack the enemy advancing 
 against him — not to stand and be attacked. Thereupon Breck- 
 inridge advanced, only to find that the Union troops had already 
 retired across the river. But by this time it was too late 
 for him to send assistance to Hardee. Thus Rosecrans's offen- 
 sive movement against Bragg's right, while it had to be re- 
 called, and was, to that extent, a failure, nevertheless had a 
 very decided effect upon the battle ; it kept Breckinridge's divi- 
 sion from reinforcing Hardee just at a time when it might 
 have enabled him "to reach the center and left of the National 
 army."* 
 
 The left wing of the Confederate army had been fighting 
 since daybreak; all of its brigades had been engaged, many 
 of them in repeated assaults ; and the losses had been heavy.* 
 "At four o'clock it became evident to the Confederate com- 
 mander that his only hope of success lay in a charge upon the 
 Union left, which, by its overpowering weight, should carry 
 everything before it."f Breckinridge's were the only fresh 
 troops he had for such a charge; Breckinridge was peremp- 
 torily ordered to send them over the river. While this move- 
 ment was taking place "there was a lull in the action on the 
 left."* In fact the Confederate left had ceased its aggressive 
 action, and from this time to the end it remained strictly on the 
 defensive. It was well-nigh exhausted. 
 
 *Van Home. 
 tKniffen in B. & L. 
 
320 American Campaigns. 
 
 The angle of the Federal line held by Hazen was the point 
 against which the final assault of the Confederates were mainly 
 to be directed. This place was strongly reinforced from other 
 parts of the Union line to receive the assaults. 
 
 Breckinridge was slow in sending his brigades over to the 
 west of the river. As soon as the first two brigades had crossed, 
 Polk, who was to command the attack, hurled them against the 
 Federal position without waiting for the other brigades to cross. 
 The attack was repulsed with great loss. Forming a new line, 
 reinforced by Breckinridge's other brigades which had now 
 crossed, Polk advanced again, only to be repulsed again. This 
 ended the day's battle. 
 
 Polk's assaults had cost the Confederates dearly. "Some of 
 the assaulting regiments lost more than half their strength ; 
 and none of these attacks were even temporarily successful."* 
 Bragg attributed his failure to the concentration of the fire of 
 the Federal artillery upon his lines. 
 
 (169) After the long day's fight the two hostile armies 
 bivouacked on the field within musket range of each other. 
 The Confederates intrenched their lines. There was no fight- 
 ing along the line on the 1st of January, 1863, although Bragg 
 made some show of attacking the center and right of the 
 Federal line. In the afternoon Crittenden moved a division 
 across the river and formed line of battle in front of Breckin- 
 ridge, who had resumed his position on that side. 
 
 Bragg expected, or hoped, to find the Federal army gone 
 from his front on the morning of January the 2nd. His cavalry 
 had reported the turnpike in rear of the Federal position full 
 of troops and wagons making for Nashville. But he soon 
 found that his enemy had not budged. He resolved to dis- 
 lodge the enemy from the position on the east of the river, and 
 assigned the task to Breckinridge with four brigades. He 
 ordered Breckinridge to carry a hill occupied by the enemy, 
 and there to halt and intrench. Breckinridge took the hill, but 
 was unable to stop his men, who pushed on after the retreating. 
 Federals. Whereupon the enemy's batteries, massed on the 
 other side of the river, opened fire upon the Confederates, and 
 drove them back with great slaughter. f Federal troops were 
 then hurried across the river in large numbers. They recov- 
 ered the position and intrenched themselves in it. 
 
 There was little fighting on the 3rd of January Just before 
 
 *Van Home. 
 fUrquhart in B. & L. 
 
Stones River Campaign. 321 
 
 dark Thomas sent forward two brigades, which broke the 
 center of the Southern line, and drove the Confederates out of 
 their intrenchments at that point. (160) That night Bragg 
 withdrew from the battle-field and started in retreat upon 
 Tullahoma. Rosecrans entered Murfreesboro the next morn- 
 ing, but made no pursuit of the Confederate army. 
 
 During the whole of this battle Wheeler's cavalry was very 
 active in rear of the main Federal army. An infantry brigade, 
 as we have seen, had to be left to guard the bridge on the 
 Jefferson Turnpike over Stones River; it was attacked by 
 Wheeler on the 30th of December. The same day another 
 part of his cavalry captured McCook's wagon-train and 800 
 men. At Lavergne a Federal infantry brigade retook the men 
 and animals, but the Confederates had burned the wagons. 
 On the 31st the Confederate cavalry passed entirely round 
 Rosecrans's army, capturing wagons and stragglers, and hav- 
 ing several encounters with Stanley's Federal cavalry. On the 
 1st of January, also, the Confederate cavalry was busy in rear 
 of the Federal army, stopping the passage of trains to and 
 from Nashville, and watching for indications of the retreat of 
 the army. About 2 p.m. a large force of this cavalry appeared 
 in the neighborhood of Lavergne, captured part of a Union 
 train and dispersed the rest, then attacked a regiment of engi- 
 neers and mechanics in a stockade. The action of Wheeler's 
 squadrons in attacking train-guards, destroying wagons, cap- 
 turing animals, and terrifying teamsters, created wild con- 
 fusion on Rosecrans's line of communications all the way back 
 to Nashville. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 (154) When General Halleck took command of the Fed- 
 eral army in the field, after the battle of Shiloh, and saw it 
 raised to a strength of more than 120,000 men, while the Con- 
 federate army under Beauregard at Corinth was not even esti- 
 mated at more than 70,000, and was really much smaller, he 
 ought to have moved promptly against the Confederate army, 
 with a view to capturing or destroying it. In not doing: so he 
 violated what von der Goltz considers the first principle of 
 modern warfare: namely, that "the immediate objective, 
 against which all our efforts must be directed, is the hostile 
 main army." 
 
 Halleck made the little town of Corinth his main objective, 
 and, no doubt, congratulated himself that he got possession of 
 
322 American Campaigns. 
 
 it without a battle, after spending a whole month with his large 
 army in advancing twenty-two miles, Corinth's only military 
 importance consisted in the fact that it was at the junction of 
 two important railways. 
 
 After reaching Corinth Halleck still had a chance of over- 
 taking Beauregard's army and forcing it to fight ; but he halted 
 his main army, and contented himself with sending a small 
 force to follow the Confederates a short way. Then Halleck 
 gave up all thought of destroying this force of the enemy, 
 and broke up his own large army, scattering it in detachments 
 along the Memphis and Charleston Railway. In doing this he 
 probably acted under orders from Washington. In starting 
 Buell off to Chattanooga we know that he was carrying out 
 instructions from Washington. "To this movement" Presi- 
 dent Lincoln "had always attached an importance far in excess 
 of its real consequence, if the matter be considered from a 
 purely military standpoint ; his sympathies were excited by the 
 sufferings of the Unionists in that region [East Tennessee], 
 and he also deemed it very desirable that the United States 
 Government should show itself capable of affording succor to 
 those who claimed its protection."* 
 
 But in ordering Buell to rebuild and repair the Memphis 
 and Charleston Railway as he progressed, Halleck placed upon 
 him a handicap that defeated the object of the enterprise. 
 It so hindered him that Bragg not only reached Chattanooga 
 with the Confederate army ahead of him, but had time, also, 
 to plan and begin an invasion of Kentucky. And in ordering 
 and expecting Buell to use the Memphis and Charleston Rail- 
 way as his line of supply, Halleck imposed upon him a con- 
 dition impossible for him to fulfil with the troops at his com- 
 mand. It would have taken Buell's whole force adequately to 
 guard this railway and keep it open from Corinth to Chatta- 
 nooga. The railway "ran on the boundary between the terri- 
 tory which had just been conquered and the" unconquered 
 "hostile region south of it, and . . was therefore exposed 
 to interruption in every mile of its course" by the Confederate 
 cavalry, and partisans, and the inhabitants of the country.* 
 With such leaders as Morgan and Forrest to contend with, 
 it even taxed the Federals to their utmost to keep the railways 
 open in their rear, through country wholly conquered, and 
 garrisoned by Federal troops. 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
Stones River Campaign. 323 
 
 In the operations of the cavalry under Morgan and Forrest 
 and Wheeler in Tennessee and Kentucky we find examples of 
 successful raids, like those of Stuart in Virginia. Later in the 
 war we shall find several cavalry raids that were dismal fail- 
 ures, such as Morgan's raid in Ohio, Stuart's in Pennsylvania 
 during the Gettysburg Campaign, Stoneman's in Virginia dur- 
 ing the Chancellorsville Campaign, Kilpatrick's upon Rich- 
 mond in 1864, Stoneman's upon Macon, Georgia, during the 
 Atlanta Campaign, and Wilson's in Virginia during the opera- 
 tions round Petersburg. The first were made in friendly coun- 
 try, while the latter were all made in hostile country. It may 
 then be laid down as a rule, that a cavalry raid covering many 
 miles of country and a considerable length of time must, in 
 order to achieve success, be made in a country whose inhabit- 
 ants are friendly. To succeed in hostile country such a raid 
 must be made under exceptional circumstances, like those under 
 which Grierson's raid was made in Mississippi, during the 
 Vicksburg Campaign, or Wilson's in Alabama in 1865, etc. 
 
 The halt of Buell's advance against Chattanooga caused by 
 Forrest's breaking up the railway at Murfreesboro, in July, 
 as well as that caused by Morgan's destroying the tunnel at 
 Gallatin, a few weeks later, shows how dependent an army is 
 upon its line of communications. True, commanders have 
 been known to cut loose from their bases, as Scott did in his 
 campaign against the City of Mexico, and as McClellan did in 
 the retreat from the Chickahominy to the James, and as Grant 
 did in the Vicksburg Campaign; but in every such case the 
 commander, like McClellan, must expect to gain a new base 
 before the supplies in his trains become exhausted, or he must 
 expect to live off the country, like Scott and Grant. 
 
 (155) When an army finds its communications menaced by 
 the enemy it must fall back to recover or protect them ; or it 
 must concentrate and either attack the enemy or seize his com- 
 munications. When, therefore, it became known to Buell that 
 Bragg was moving against the Louisville and Nashville Rail- 
 way, that was enough in itself to make him fall back into 
 Kentucky. But he also had another reason — a political reason ; 
 so, too, the chief motive of Bragg's invading Kentucky was 
 political and not military. Questions of politics cannot be 
 separated from war; they cause every war; they govern the 
 conduct of every campaign ; they fix the terms of every peace. 
 The political motive of Bragg's invasion of Kentucky was to 
 encourage such an uprising among the citizens of the State 
 
324 American Campaigns. 
 
 favorable to Secession as would place the State in the Con- 
 federacy; the political motive of Buell's retreat into the State 
 was to hold it for the Union. 
 
 Yet from a purely military point of view, also, Bragg's ad- 
 vance to Munfordville was good strategy and well managed. 
 By threatening Nashville, Buell's secondary base, Bragg made 
 Buell believe for a time that Nashville was his objective; thus 
 he detained the Federal army long enough to enable him to 
 beat it in the race for Munfordville. He had captured Mun- 
 fordville and was in possession of it when Buell was still at 
 Bowling Green ; he was, therefore, squarely across Buell's line 
 of communications. Bragg, strategically, had every advantage 
 of position over Buell. He was not concerned about his own 
 communications with Chattanooga — he had no railway connec- 
 tion with that place nor other line than the long, miserable 
 roads by which he had marched. If defeated at Munfordville 
 he would fall back upon Lexington, Kentucky, where Kirby 
 Smith had gathered a large quantity of stores. So it mattered 
 nothing to him that his army at Munfordville faced toward its 
 original rear. The case was quite different with Buell. He 
 was already deprived of his communications with Louisville, 
 his only base of supplies. He was obliged to recover them 
 soon ; even if he could have collected provisions in the country 
 for his army he could not have left the city of Louisville, with 
 its great depots of public stores, to be captured by the enemy. 
 The consequences of defeat for Buell would, therefore, have 
 been very serious. 
 
 But Bragg's position athwart Buell's communications gave 
 him no tactical advantage over his adversary; if he had at- 
 tacked Buell he would have found it as hard to win a victory 
 as it would have been if Buell's communications had been 
 straight behind the Union army. Yet to make sure of his 
 strategic advantage, Bragg had either to attack and win, or 
 else leave a force to "contain" Buell's army, and with the bulk 
 of his own army capture Louisville. But Bragg did not feel 
 himself strong enough for either of these projects; and Kirby 
 Smith's army was a hundred miles away and not under his 
 command. Although he and Smith were cooperating with 
 each other, they were mutually independent of each other. 
 There was lack of a single supreme commander in the theater 
 of war at the critical moment. General Wheeler, in his ac- 
 count of the campaign, says : "Nothing was therefore wanting 
 in Kentucky but absolute authority in one responsible com- 
 
Stones River Campaign. 325 
 
 mander. Cooperation of the most cordial character is a poor 
 substitute. The word cooperation should be stricken from mili- 
 tary phraseology." "It was another instance of the folly, 
 which both the Union and the Confederate governments were 
 so constantly committing, of having more than one command- 
 ing officer in one theater of war."* 
 
 (156) Bragg could not remain at Munfordville many days 
 waiting for Buell to attack him in his chosen position. He 
 was out of supplies, so had to move toward Lexington. And 
 having cleared the way and let Buell pass on to Louisville, 
 where he received large reinforcements and reorganized his 
 army, Bragg and Kirby Smith had nothing left to do but 
 to retreat into Tennessee. From the political as well as 
 from the military point of view their invasion had proved a 
 failure. The proclamations to the people had been in vain; 
 they had brought about no uprising in favor of Secession. 
 The Secessionists went through the form of installing a Con- 
 federate governor at Frankfort, and Bragg was away at that 
 empty ceremony, when he might better have been with his 
 army, just before the battle of Perryville. That battle "was an 
 accidental encounter of two armies, rather than a pitched 
 battle."* 
 
 The North and the South were both disappointed at the out- 
 come of the campaign in Kentucky; the North thought Buell 
 ought not to have let Bragg's army escape, but ought to have 
 destroyed it; the South thought Bragg had achieved a great 
 victory at Perryville and ought to have followed it up instead 
 of retreating. The press of the two sections respectively con- 
 demned the two commanders; and the governments at Wash- 
 ington and Richmond yielded to the dictates of the press. 
 Buell was replaced by Rosecrans. Referring to this incident 
 Ropes says : "It cannot be doubted that the cause of the Union 
 was seriously injured by withdrawing Buell from the command 
 of this army. Buell was as able a general as any in the serv- 
 ice." Bragg was not removed ; General Joseph E. Johnston was 
 sent to his headquarters with orders to relieve him, but was 
 prevented by circumstances from carrying out the order. So 
 Bragg was left in command. 
 
 Hardly had Rosecrans taken command of the Army of the 
 Cumberland when he began to receive harassing letters from 
 Halleck, who was now general-in-chief at Washington. About 
 
 ♦Ropes. 
 
326 American Campaigns. 
 
 the 6th of December he received such a letter. "The Presi- 
 dent," said Halleck, "is very impatient at your long stay in 
 Nashville. . . . Twice have I been asked to designate some 
 one else to command your army. If you remain one more 
 week at Nashville I cannot prevent your removal. As I wrote 
 you when you took the command, the Government demands 
 action, and if you cannot respond to that demand, some one 
 else will be tried." To this letter General Rosecrans sent a 
 reply for which the country and all its future commanders owe 
 his memory a debt of gratitude. "I reply," said he, "in few 
 but earnest words. I have lost no time. ... If the Govern- 
 ment which ordered me here confides in my judgment it may 
 rely on my continuing to do what I have been trying to do — 
 that is, my whole duty. If my superiors have lost confidence 
 in me they had better at once put some one in my place and 
 let the future test the propriety of the change. I have but one 
 more word to add, which is, that I need no other stimulus to 
 make me do my duty than the knowledge of what it is. To 
 threats of removal or the like I must be permitted to say that 
 I am insensible."* He did not move within a week, and he 
 was not relieved from command. 
 
 The Cavalry. 
 
 The excellence of the work of Bragg's cavalry in the last 
 phase of this campaign — the operations extending from Nash- 
 ville to Murfreesboro — has already been noticed. - This cav- 
 alry did equally as good service on the advance into Middle 
 Tennessee and Kentucky, and during the retreat from Ken- 
 tucky. Of a truth, it would be hard to find in the annals of 
 modern warfare any better cavalry work. Colonel David 
 Urquhart, a member of Bragg's staff, in a narrative of the 
 campaign, says, concerning the retreat from Kentucky : "Gen- 
 eral Wheeler with his cavalry brought up the rear — fighting by 
 day and obstructing the roads at night. Before the pursuit 
 was abandoned at Rock Castle that officer was engaged over 
 twenty-six times. His vigilance was so well known by the 
 infantry that they never feared a surprise." 
 
 On the other hand, Buell's army was so lacking in the 
 number and quality of its cavalry as to be at a great disad- 
 vantage. Bragg was kept informed by his cavalry scouts of 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
Stones River Campaign. 327 
 
 the movements of every part of Buell's army, while Buell was 
 left in ignorance of Bragg's movements. Buell "had again and 
 again applied to the Government to remedy" his deficiency in 
 cavalry, "but in vain."* 
 
 The Battle of Stones River. 
 
 In the first place, why was the main part of Bragg's first de- 
 fensive position, or rather his "position in readiness," taken on 
 the west side of Stones River? Certainly a stronger position 
 would have been one on the east side of the river with the 
 town either in the first line or as a rallying point. On this side 
 a shorter line would have covered all the roads converging on 
 the town; it would have had a clearer field of fire in front of 
 it; it would have had the river in its front as an obstacle for 
 the enemy, rather than in its own rear. If Murfreesboro had 
 been in the enemy's country Bragg would undoubtedly have 
 taken his position on the east side of the river. As it was he 
 wanted to save the town from the horrors of battle ; so he put 
 his line as far in front of it as he could, without uncovering 
 the convergent roads. 
 
 Rosecrans had 47,000 men, and Bragg had only 38,000 — 
 why, then, did Bragg attack instead of waiting in his intrench- 
 ments for Rosecrans to attack him? He knew that Rosecrans 
 would attack — it was for this that Rosecrans had marched 
 from Nashville. The answer is found in Bragg's "personal 
 equation." Almost any other general would have waited, but 
 it was Bragg's nature to attack whenever he saw a chance of 
 victory. He was naturally aggressive. He believed in getting 
 in the first lick. In this case he hoped to defeat Rosecrans 
 before all of the National troops could reach the battle-field. 
 
 This was the second battle of the war in which the plans of 
 the hostile commanders were practically the same. At the 
 First Bull Run Beauregard meant to attack the Union left, 
 while McDowell purposed turning the Confederate left. In 
 each case the commander that was first to move threw his 
 opponent on the defensive. At Stones River each commander 
 selected his opponent's right flank, instead of his left, to attack, 
 for the reason that he was thereby better able to cover his own 
 communications. If either of these commanders had chosen 
 
 *Ropes. 
 
328 American Campaigns. 
 
 the other flank he would have fought with his army faced to 
 a flank. 
 
 That the right wing of the Federal army was beaten and 
 driven back in the early stages of the battle was undoubtedly 
 due to the faulty position of that part of the line, and to poorly 
 performed outpost duty. McCook knew on the afternoon of 
 the 30th December that the Confederate line was extending 
 beyond his right, and he so informed Rosecrans. Rosecrans 
 then said that he thought the line ought to face more nearly 
 south ; but he left the matter to McCook, and the direction of 
 the line was not changed. McCook should have turned his 
 line so that his right would have extended along the southern 
 edge of the thicket whose corner rested on Overall Creek, 
 about three quarters of a mile due south of the crossing of 
 Wilkinson Turnpike. 
 
 ■'Few battles," says Ropes, "have been fought which have 
 better exhibited the soldierly virtues than the battle of Mur- 
 freesboro or Stones River. The Confederate assaults were 
 conducted with the utmost gallantry and with untiring energy. 
 They were met with great coolness and resolution. . . . 
 The Confederates had a right to claim a victory, for they had 
 taken twenty-eight guns and about 3,700 prisoners. Still, the 
 Federal army was, for all practical purposes, as strong as ever. 
 The truth is, the Confederates were not numerous enough to 
 complete their victory.'' 
 
 The tactics were, in general, good on both sides. The units 
 of troops were brought into action in the proper order and 
 manner ; gaps in the line were filled, and supports put in 
 promptly. The artillery, especially on the Federal side, was 
 employed most effectively. Bragg's army fought the battle 
 almost as he had planned it ; but not quite. And the little de- 
 parture from his plan was fatal to his success. He purposed 
 using Breckinridge's division as his general reserve; but 
 Breckinridge failed to send it over the river, when ordered to 
 do so at the crisis of the battle. Finally when he did send 
 over his division, Polk made the mistake of assaulting with a 
 part of it, instead of waiting for the whole division to cross; 
 and he was repulsed. 
 
LECTURE XVI. 
 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 (170) After the disaster at Fredericksburg the Army of 
 the Potomac resumed its position on the north bank of the 
 Rappahannock. Its morale had never been so badly shaken. 
 "It would be impossible," says Swinton, who was with it as a 
 newspaper correspondent, "to imagine a graver or gloomier, 
 a more somber or unmusical body of men ... a month 
 after the battle. . . . And as the days went by, despon- 
 dency, discontent, and all evil inspirations, with their natural 
 consequence, desertion, seemed to increase rather than dimin- 
 ish." And the cause of it all "could not be concealed; it was 
 the lack of confidence in General Burnside." 
 
 This cause was soon removed. Burnside issued an order 
 summarily dismissing Hooker and three other general officers 
 from the service, and relieving Franklin and four others from 
 duty with his army, and took it to Washington for the Presi- 
 dent's approval, or the acceptance of his own resignation as the 
 alternative. The President chose the alternative, and appointed 
 Hooker in Burnside's place. 
 
 Hooker had gained an enviable newspaper reputation as a 
 dashing corps-commander, and however he may have been re- 
 garded by the higher officers, to the rank and file he was 
 "Fighting Joe." His appointment revived the morale of the 
 army. He at once instituted some excellent reforms. He 
 abolished the clumsy Grand Divisions of Burnside, and reor- 
 ganized the army-corps. The cavalry, which had hitherto been 
 attached in fragments to infantry divisions, and frittered away 
 at all kinds of uncavalry duty, he consolidated into the Cavalry 
 Corps, under General Stoneman. This corps consisted of three 
 divisions, under Pleasanton, Averill, and Gregg, respectively, 
 and a reserve brigade under Buford. 
 
 Hooker reported that, when he took command, there were 
 2,922 officers and 81,694 enlisted men absent from their colors, 
 scattered all over the country, and the majority from causes 
 unknown.* He adopted a system of furloughs that remedied 
 this evil to a large degree. 
 
 *Major J. F. Huntington in Military Historical Society of Mass., 
 Vol. 3. 
 
330 American Campaigns. 
 
 Sumner and Franklin retired from the Army of the Potomac 
 when Hooker assumed command, and the Ninth Corps [Burn- 
 side's old corps] was transferred to Newport News. The in- 
 fantry of the army now consisted of seven corps, as follows : 
 First under Reynolds, Second under Couch, Third under 
 Sickles, Fifth under Meade, Sixth under Sedgwick, Eleventh 
 under Howard, and Twelfth under Slocum. The Eleventh 
 and Twelfth Corps had not been present at the battle of Fred- 
 ericksburg. Hooker spent the rest of the winter in building 
 up his army and putting it in trim for campaign. By the end 
 of April, 1863, he had the largest and best organized and 
 equipped army that had ever been assembled on the continent. 
 Hooker spoke of it as "the finest army on the planet." It 
 numbered about 122,000 infantry and artillery, with more than 
 400 cannon, and about 12,000 cavalry. Its camps reached back 
 to Aquia Creek, its advanced base. 
 
 The Southern army, poorly equipped, wretchedly clad, and 
 living upon short rations, occupied camps on the southern bank 
 of the Rappahannock, from Banks's Ford to Port Royal. 
 Stuart's cavalry watched the upper crossings of the Rappahan- 
 nock. Lee now had no more than 60,000 troops, 6,509 of 
 which were cavalry, and 170 guns, to guard this long line of 
 front ; for Longstreet was absent with two of his divisions 
 [Hood and Pickett]. The great need of rations for the com- 
 ing summer had led the Confederate war department to send 
 him upon a campaign in the neighborhood of Suffolk, the 
 object of which was to gather provisions in the counties near 
 the Federal lines. Lee had, therefore, only six infantry divi- 
 sions present : those of Anderson and McLaws of Longstreet's 
 corps; and those of A. P. Hill, Rodes, Early, and Colston of 
 Jackson's corps.* 
 
 Plans. 
 
 Lee had his army so disposed that he could promptly concen- 
 trate it at any point along his front, and the Union failure at 
 Fredericksburg had shown the difficulty of attempting to force 
 a crossing and break through his line. Hooker saw that the 
 position must be turned; but to turn its right was practically 
 impossible, owing to the width of the Rappahannock toward 
 its mouth, the swampy character of the country, and the diffi- 
 
 *Alexander. 
 
The Battle of Chancellorsville. 331 
 
 culty of concealing the movement in the open country below 
 Fredericksburg.* Hooker resolved, therefore, to turn Lee's 
 left. To carry out this plan the cavalry, except one small bri- 
 gade under Pleasanton, was to start upon a raid, under Stone- 
 man, two weeks in advance, with the object of destroying Lee's 
 lines of communication with Richmond and with Gordonsville 
 — the Fredericksburg-Richmond railway and the Virginia 
 Central Railway — and, should Lee retreat, of holding or de- 
 laying him. Sedgwick, with two army-corps, the First and 
 Sixth, was to cross the river below Fredericksburg, and make 
 a demonstration of attack. If the enemy fell back Sedgwick 
 was to pursue him. While Lee's attention was thus occupied, 
 Hooker, with the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps, would 
 move up to Kelly's Ford, and thence, by way of Germanna and 
 Ely's Fords of the Rapidan, push on to Chancellorsville. The 
 Third Corps was to remain on Stafford Heights, ready to move 
 at a moment's notice to reinforce either wing as might be nec- 
 essary. "The Second Corps was to leave one division on out- 
 post at Falmouth, and to post two divisions on the north bank 
 of the Rappahannock opposite Banks's Ford."f 
 
 Hooker believed that Lee, as soon as he found his posi- 
 tion turned and Stoneman upon his lines of communication, 
 would fall back. But of this Hooker could not be sure; he 
 thought, however, that the dispositions he purposed making 
 would successfully meet any movement Lee might make. 
 "Either wing was practically equal to the whole Confederate 
 force."f Sedgwick would have 40,000 men, supported by the 
 Third Corps, about 19,000, on Stafford Heights, and a division 
 of the Second Corps at Falmouth; the main turning force 
 would have about 42,000, with two divisions of the Second 
 Corps at Banks's Ford ; "and Stoneman' s 10,000 sabers riding 
 at will amongst Lee's depots would surely prevent him from 
 attacking. Still, precaution was taken in case the attempt were 
 made. Sedgwick, if the enemy detached any considerable part 
 of his force toward Chancellorsville, was 'to carry the works 
 at all hazards, and establish his force on the Telegraph Road.' 
 The right wing, 'if not strongly resisted, was to advance at all 
 hazards, and to secure a position uncovering Banks's Ford.' 
 Were the Confederates found in force near Chancellorsville it 
 was to select a strong position and await attack on its own 
 
 ♦Fiebeger's Campaigns and Battles. 
 tHenderson. 
 
332 American Campaigns. 
 
 ground, while Sedgwick, coming up from Fredericksburg, 
 would assail the enemy in flank and rear."* 
 
 Lee was on the defensive. He was still tied to Richmond, 
 and his chief business was to cover that city. But, as will be 
 seen, he had not thought of a "strategic retreat from one de- 
 fensive position to another." In fact, he was already consid- 
 ering an offensive movement. "On April 16 [1863] he had 
 written Mr. Davis : 'My only anxiety arises from the condi- 
 tion of our horses and the scarcity of forage and provisions. 
 I think it all important that we should assume the aggressive 
 by the 1st of May.' "* He was contemplating a movement by 
 way of the Shenandoah Valley, but was forestalled by Hooker. 
 
 Operations. 
 
 To confuse the Confederates as much as possible, demonstra- 
 tions were made, toward the end of April, beyond both ends of 
 their line — at Kelly's Ford on their left, and opposite Port 
 Royal on their right. The main operations were delayed sev- 
 eral days by heavy rains, but on the 27th of April the Fifth, 
 Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps started for Kelly's Ford, under 
 the command of Slocum. They dispersed the small Confed- 
 erate guard at that point, and by the morning of the 29th had 
 crossed the stream by pontoon-bridges. They then pushed on 
 toward Chancellorsville, the Fifth Corps by way of Ely's Ford, 
 and the Eleventh and Twelfth by way of Germanna Ford. 
 They reached Chancellorsville on the afternoon of the 30th. 
 The infantry was preceded by Pleasanton's cavalry brigade. 
 
 Two divisions of the Second Corps had marched as far as 
 United States Ford, and there had waited until the other col- 
 umns had crossed the Rapidan. They then crossed the river 
 and joined the other three corps at Chancellorsville, where 
 they all bivouacked on the night of the 30th. The same night 
 Hooker himself arrived at Chancellorsville. Meanwhile Sedg- 
 wick's force, the First and Sixth Corps, had moved down the 
 river, on the 28th, and bivouacked near where Franklin had 
 crossed at the battle of Fredericksburg. The next day this 
 command laid four pontoon-bridges, and crossed the river. 
 
 On the Confederate side Stuart had notified Lee, on the 
 evening of the 28th, "that a strong force of all arms was mov- 
 
 ♦Henderson. 
 
The Battle of Chancellorsville. 333 
 
 ing up the Rappahannock in the direction of Kelly's Ford"; 
 and the movements of Sedgwick's command had been ob- 
 served.* On the 29th Lee received word from his cavalry that 
 a force of unknown strength had crossed at Kelly's Ford. Lee 
 could not as yet determine what these movements meant. He 
 even suspected that they might mean an advance against Gor- 
 donsville and the Virginia Central Railway.f He, therefore, 
 awaited further developments. Some shells were thrown at 
 Sedgwick's brigades, and Jackson's outposts skirmished with 
 the first troops sent across ; but no further opposition to Sedg- 
 wick's passage was made by the Confederates. 
 
 On the 29th Stuart's cavalry "was actively engaged between 
 the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, testing the strength of the 
 enemy's columns. The country was wooded, the Federals ac- 
 tive, and, as usual in war, accurate information was difficult 
 to obtain and more difficult to communicate. It was not till 
 6.30 p.m. that Lee received notice that troops had crossed at 
 Ely's and Germanna Fords at 2 p.m. Anderson's division was 
 at once dispatched to Chancellorsville."* 
 
 The next news Lee received from Stuart arrived on the 
 morning of the 30th, and informed him that three Union corps- 
 commanders, Howard [Eleventh], Meade [Fifth], and Slocum 
 [Twelfth], were with the troops advancing on Chancellors- 
 ville. Then came the word that Anderson, who had been di- 
 rected to select and intrench a strong position near Chancellors- 
 ville, was falling back before the Federal advance. It was now 
 evident to Lee that Hooker's purpose was to turn the Confed- 
 erate left, and that he had divided his army. Lee resolved to 
 attack one of its wings. The question was, which wing to 
 attack? Jackson was at first in favor of attacking Sedgwick, 
 but, after carefully reconnoitering Sedgwick's position on the 
 river-bank, he came to Lee's opinion. This was to leave 
 Early's division reinforced by Barksdale's brigade and the re- 
 serve artillery to hold the heights and "contain" Sedgwick; 
 and to march the rest of the army to reinforce Anderson and 
 assault the Federal turning columns in the neighborhood of 
 Chancellorsville. Accordingly McLaws's division started to 
 join Anderson, and Jackson followed soon afterwards with 
 three of his divisions. Before the fog lifted, on the morning 
 
 ♦Henderson. 
 
 ^Campaigns of the Civil War, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. — 
 Doubleday. 
 
334 American Campaigns. 
 
 of the 1st of May, these forces were in line with Anderson at 
 Tabernacle Church.* 
 
 Up to the evening of April 30 Hooker's plan had apparently- 
 worked out so well that he gave vent to his elation by issuing 
 an order to his troops in which he stated, "the enemy must 
 either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defenses 
 and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruc- 
 tion awaits him." And the historian Swinton declares that 
 he heard Hooker say "The rebel army is now the legitimate 
 property of the Army of the Potomac. They may as well pack 
 up their haversacks and make for Richmond ; and I shall be 
 after them, etc., etc." But at that time Hooker was not well 
 informed concerning what was taking place on the Confederate 
 side of the forest screen that separated the two hostile armies. 
 "He was only aware, on the night of April 30, that the Confed- 
 erate position before Fredericksburg was still strongly occu- 
 pied."! 
 
 Hooker appears to have supposed that, as soon as Stoneman's 
 movement against the Virginia Central Railway became known, 
 Lee would send his entire cavalry force against the Federal 
 horse. Instead of doing this, Stuart detached two regiments 
 onlyj to observe Stoneman, and kept the rest of his troopers 
 with him, to hang on the Federal turning force and gather in- 
 formation of it, while they covered the movements of the Con- 
 federates. Pleasanton's small cavalry brigade, therefore, which 
 was all the cavalry there was to cover the Federal movement, 
 was not strong enough to break through Stuart's screen and 
 get information of the forces behind it. So while "Lee was 
 fully informed as to his adversary's strength . . . Hooker 
 had no knowledge whatever of what was going on in the space 
 between Sedgwick and himself ."f Yet signal stations had been 
 placed on all commanding heights ; a field-telegraph had been 
 laid from Falmouth to United States Ford; and there were 
 no less than three captive balloons. The thick woods, the 
 darkness of night, and the fog combined to defeat the ob- 
 servations from the balloons. 
 
 The Battle-field. 
 
 (171) The ground which was to be the battle-field of Chan- 
 cellorsville was in the midst of a forest of second-growth pine 
 
 *Long. Henderson. 
 
 tHenderson. 
 
 ^Alexander. 
 
The Battle of Chancellorsville. 335 
 
 and black-oak. The forest was twelve to fourteen miles long 
 from east to west, and eight to ten wide from north to south ; 
 "the soil was poor, farms were rare, and the few clearings 
 were seldom more than a rifle-shot in width."* The under- 
 growth was dense and tangled with vines, and the space was 
 cut up by numerous crooked little streams with marshy banks. 
 No wonder it was called the "Wilderness." Chancellorsville 
 was no more than a single brick house. It stood within the 
 Wilderness, about a mile from its eastern edge, upon high 
 ground from the direction of which all the little streams flowed. 
 West of the house was a considerable clearing. Here the 
 Orange Plank Road and the Old Turnpike, which merged 
 into a single highway two miles farther west, separated again 
 to come together a second time at Tabernacle Church about 
 half-way to Fredericksburg. The river road to Banks's Ford, 
 and the roads to the other fords, as well as various other roads 
 and trails, radiated from Chancellorsville, while two miles 
 south of it an unfinished railway from Fredericksburg to 
 Orange Court House traversed the Wilderness. 
 
 A space less suited to the maneuvering of a great body of 
 troops could scarcely be found. Bodies of cavalry could not 
 move at all off the roads, and infantry could move only with 
 great difficulty. There were few positions for artillery, and 
 almost no range for the guns except in the direction of the 
 roads. Eastward, in the neighborhood of Banks's Ford, the 
 ground was more open. It was there that Hooker expected to 
 fight his battle. With this in view, he ordered his columns to 
 move forward on the morning of May the 1st. 
 
 Operations on May 1. 
 
 Pleasanton's cavalry had been in touch with Anderson's out- 
 posts all the morning, and now led the advance against the Con- 
 federates. Hooker moved out at 11 a.m. in four columns. 
 "Slocum's corps [Twelfth], followed by that of Howard 
 [Eleventh], took the Plank Road on the right. Sykes's divi- 
 sion of Meade's corps .[Fifth], followed by Hancock's division 
 of Couch's corps [Second], went by the Turnpike in the center. 
 The remainder of Meade's corps — Griffin's division, followed 
 by that of Humphreys — took the river road. Lastly, French's 
 
 ♦Henderson. 
 
336 American Campaigns. 
 
 division of Couch's corps was under orders to turn off and 
 march to Todd's Tavern."* 
 
 Before the advance began the Third Corps [Sickles], which 
 had been ordered up from Stafford's Heights, had arrived. It 
 was left at Chancellorsville as the general reserve, with one bri- 
 gade guarding United States Ford, and another at Dowdall's 
 Tavern [Melzi Chancellor's], watching the approaches in that 
 quarter. 
 
 Anderson had taken a strong position at Tabernacle Church. 
 His line stretched "along a low ridge, partially covered with 
 timber, and with open fields in front. Beyond the fields a few 
 hundred paces" was the edge of the forest. When Jackson, 
 after marching since midnight, arrived (about 8 a.m. May 1), 
 Anderson had strongly intrenched his whole front, from near 
 Duerson's Mill on the right, to the unfinished railway on the 
 left, about three miles. The position effectually blocked the 
 four roads by which the Federals would have to advance out 
 of the forest, and there were available to hold it 40,000 Con- 
 federate infantry, more than 100 guns, and Fitzhugh Lee's 
 brigade of cavalry — about eight men to the yard of front, f 
 
 But Early had only 10,000 men with whom to keep the large 
 force of Federals that Jackson had seen near Fredericksburg 
 from coming upon the rear of the Confederate position at 
 Tabernacle Church. Therefore, General Lee', who was on the 
 ground, resolved to move against the Federal right wing in 
 the Wilderness. With a regiment of cavalry in front and 
 Fitzhugh Lee on the left flank, the army started forward at 
 11 a.m. Anderson was in the advance, with one brigade on 
 the Turnpike and two on the Plank Road. Next followed An- 
 derson's other two brigades and M'cLaws's division on the 
 Turnpike. Jackson's three divisions marched on the Plank 
 Road. 
 
 (172) The advanced cavalry of the two hostile forces were 
 soon in contact, and at about two miles from Chan- 
 cellorsville the Confederate infantry on the Turnpike became 
 engaged with Sykes's division of regulars. "Sykes's orders 
 had been, however, only to advance to the first ridge beyond 
 the forest, and he maintained his position there, though men- 
 aced by the extension of the Confederate lines beyond his 
 flank. "f The Confederates on the Plank Road were also soon 
 engaged with Slocum's corps [Twelfth]. Slocum formed line 
 
 *Doubleday. 
 fAlexander. 
 
The Battle of Chancellorsville. 337 
 
 with his right on the Plank Road and his left upon high 
 ground. Wright's brigade of Anderson's division advanced 
 along the unfinished railway to turn this position.* "Alto- 
 gether the general line" of the Federals "was a good one; 
 for there were large open spaces where the artillery could 
 move and maneuver, and the army was almost out of the thick- 
 ets."* The Federal column on the river road had by this time 
 arrived, without meeting any resistance, within sight of 
 Banks's Ford. 
 
 Everything had gone, apparently, as Hooker wished; "he 
 could scarcely hope for more propitious circumstances, and, 
 by all the rules of the game, a victory was now within his 
 grasp. "f Yet, at this stage of the engagement, and in spite 
 of the protests of his amazed and indignant corps-commanders, 
 Hooker ordered his forces to withdraw to Chancellorsville. 
 The unbeaten Federals fell back reluctantly, and the Confed- 
 erates, unable to comprehend the meaning of such an easy 
 victory, and fearing some kind of trap, pursued them with 
 great caution. 
 
 (173) Wilcox's brigade, on the extreme right, moved up 
 the old Mine Road; Wright's brigade on the extreme left fol- 
 lowed Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry on the unfinished railway ; while 
 the main body kept on the Turnpike and the Plank Road. At 
 Chancellorsville the Federal army took up a defensive posi- 
 tion, about five miles in length, reaching from Scott's Dam 
 of the Rappahannock, around to Talley's farm on the Turnpike. 
 The Fifth Corps [Meade] held the left of the line along the 
 low divide between Mine Run and Mineral Spring Run. Then 
 came the Second [Couch], making an angle with the Fifth, 
 and facing more nearly east. French's division of this corps 
 inclined toward the east to cover the junction of roads at 
 Chancellorsville ; and Hancock's division of the same corps 
 took an advanced position several hundred yards in front of 
 French's. Next came the Twelfth Corps [Slocum], formed 
 around the crest of Fairview Hill, and facing southward. 
 Then there was a gap in the line of about a half-mile, and be- 
 yond the gap the Eleventh Corps [Howard], in echelons along 
 the Turnpike, held the right of the line. The Third Corps 
 [Sickles] was kept in reserve back of the mansion. The next 
 morning, May 2, two brigades of Birney's division of this 
 corps, and two batteries, were placed at Hazel Grove, in the gap 
 
 ♦Doubleday. 
 fAlexander. 
 
338 American Campaigns. 
 
 'between Howard's left and Slocum's right. "The 8th Penn- 
 sylvania cavalry picketed the road and kept the enemy in 
 sight."* 
 
 The Union and Confederate batteries fired some rounds 
 wherever they could find an opening through the dense tim- 
 iber, but there was little other fighting during the afternoon. 
 ■Until nightfall, however, the Confederate skirmishers were 
 ■pushed forward everywhere, in order to determine the exact 
 position of the Federal line.f The Confederates "formed in 
 line of battle in front of Chancellorsville, at right angles to the 
 Plank Road, extending on the right of the Mine Road, and to 
 the left in the direction of the Catherine Furnace."^ Both 
 -sides spent the night felling trees and preparing their lines 
 .for defense. 
 
 General Doubleday, writing from the Federal point of view, 
 says: "The thickets which surrounded this position were al- 
 most impenetrable, so that an advance against the enemy's 
 lines became exceedingly difficult and maneuvering nearly im- 
 practicable, nor was this the only defect. Batteries could be 
 ■established on the high ground to the east, which commanded 
 the front facing in that direction, while our own artillery had 
 hut little scope; and last, but most important of all, the right 
 of Howard's corps was 'in the air'; that is, it rested on no 
 obstacle." On the other hand General Lee said in his report : 
 ""He [Hooker] assumed a position of great natural strength, 
 surrounded on all sides by a dense forest, filled with a tangled 
 undergrowth, in the midst of which breastworks of logs had 
 been constructed, with trees felled in front, so as to form an 
 almost impenetrable abatis. His artillery swept the few nar- 
 row roads by which the position could be approached from 
 the front, and commanded the adjacent woods." But "the 
 strength of a position is measured not by the impregnability 
 of the front, but by the security of the flanks."§ Let us see 
 how this axiom was exemplified in this battle. The only as- 
 sailable part of the Union line was its right flank. Lee re- 
 solved to assault this flank by a turning movement, and en- 
 trusted the execution of it to Jackson. To guard against an 
 attack upon his own right and rear by way of Banks's Ford, 
 he sent Wilcox with his brigade to hold that ford* 
 
 *Doubleday. 
 fAlexander. 
 fLee's Report. 
 •^Henderson. 
 
The Battle of Chancellorsville. 339 
 
 There has been a good deal of dispute as to who first sug- 
 gested this daring project. But regarded as a military study, 
 and that is our chief concern with this battle, it makes no dif- 
 ference whether Fitzhugh Lee or Stuart discovered that the 
 Union right was in the air; whether Lee or Jackson thought 
 out the scheme ; who it was that guided the turning column — 
 Jackson commanded the forces and directed the execution un- 
 til he was borne away wounded from the field. Of this there 
 is no question. 
 
 The troops employed in the movement were Jackson's own 
 three divisions, about 26,000 men, some of Stuart's cavalry, and 
 Alexander's battalion of artillery from Longstreet's corps. 
 (174) The infantry and artillery started in a single column 
 about 6 a.m. [May 2], Rodes's division in the lead, then Col- 
 ston's, and A. P. Hill's last. Fitzhugh Lee covered the front 
 with a regiment of cavalry, and squadrons of three other regi- 
 ments marched on the right of the column. Lee remained with 
 the divisions of Anderson and McLaws, about 17,000 men, to 
 make feints along the front of Hooker's line, in order to 
 draw attention away from the movement against its right. 
 
 Jackson marched by way of Catherine Furnace, and there 
 turned southward by Lewis Creek, and, having crossed the un- 
 finished railway, turned southwestward and entered the Brock 
 Road. His column did not escape the notice of the Federals. 
 About 8 a.m. Birney, from his position at Hazel Grove, re- 
 ported a column of Confederates moving southward at 
 Catherine Furnace, accompanied by a wagon-train. In that 
 direction lay the road to Orange Court House, one of Lee's 
 lines of retreat; but Hooker, fearing a movement against his 
 right flank, dispatched a note to Howard, saying, "We have 
 good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right," 
 and directing Howard to take the necessary precautions. 
 
 About 11 a.m. a battery on Hazel Grove heights opened fire 
 on Jackson's train, and drove it off to another road. A little 
 after midday Sickles was allowed to move Birney's division, 
 followed by Whipple's, against Catherine Furnace, in order to 
 develop the situation there. The reserve brigade of the 
 Eleventh Corps [Barlow] also went forward with Sickles. 
 Sickles's force captured the 23rd Georgia regiment which had 
 been left by Jackson near the furnace to cover his rear, and 
 threatened to cut the Confederate army in two ; but Anderson's 
 division opposed the attack so stoutly that Sickles called for re- 
 inforcements. Pleasanton's cavalry was sent out to him. The 
 
340 American Campaigns. 
 
 two brigades at the rear of Jackson's column, and Brown's 
 battalion of artillery, were halted for an hour in observation, 
 but were not engaged. It was after dark before they over- 
 took the column.* Pleasanton's cavalry followed Jackson's 
 column.f 
 
 About 2 p.m. Jackson, at the head of his column, arrived at 
 the point where the Brock Road crossed the Orange Plank 
 Road. Here he was met by Fitzhugh Lee and conducted to a 
 high point from which he could see the right of the Federal 
 line as far eastward as Dowdall's Tavern. "Below, and but 
 a few hundred yards distant, ran the Federal breastworks, with 
 abatis in front and long lines of stacked arms in rear ; but 
 untenanted by a single company. Two cannon were seen upon 
 the highroad, the horses grazing quietly near at hand. The 
 soldiers were scattered in small groups, laughing, cooking, 
 smoking, sleeping, and playing cards, while others were butch- 
 ering cattle and drawing rations."^ 
 
 Jackson sent back an order to Rodes to continue the march 
 across the Plank Road to the Turnpike. (175) The cavalry 
 and one brigade were immediately placed beyond the fork of 
 the Plank Road to mask the march of the column. The col- 
 umn turned up the Turnpike toward the Union position, and 
 by 6 p.m. had formed for battle across the highway. Rodes's 
 division formed the first line, and Colston's the second, while 
 one of A. P. Hill's brigades formed a third line on the left of 
 the Turnpike. Hill's other brigades remained in column on the 
 roads.* A few hostile patrols had been seen, but not a shot had 
 been fired. 
 
 At this time the Eleventh Corps [Howard], forming the 
 Union right, was thus disposed: Devens's division was along 
 the turnpike on the right, with two regiments north of the 
 pike in two lines facing west, and the rest of the division facing 
 south.* Schurz's division came next, part of it deployed along 
 the pike, and three regiments in close column north of the pike. 
 Next, at Dowdall's tavern, was Buschbeck's brigade of Stein- 
 wehr's division in a line of rifle-pits at right angles to the 
 pike. Barlow's brigade of this division was away helping 
 Sickles. Batteries were in the roads, and twelve guns were 
 near the Wilderness Church. 
 
 *Alexander. 
 fDoubleday. 
 tHenderson. 
 
The Battle of Chancellorsville. 341 
 
 As the day wore on Hooker appears to have become con- 
 vinced that the column seen in the morning was retreating. 
 Very early in the forenoon, anticipating attack by Lee, he had 
 ordered the First Corps' [Reynolds], which had been acting 
 with Sedgwick, to join him by way of United States Ford, 
 and had recalled Averell's cavalry, which was now approaching 
 Ely's Ford by the north bank of the Rapidan. "As the hours 
 went by, however, and Jackson's column disappeared in the 
 forest, he again grew confident."* At 4.10 p.m. he sent an 
 order to Sedgwick to "capture Fredericksburg and vigorously 
 pursue the enemy." "We know," it stated, "that the enemy is 
 fleeing, trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles's divisions are 
 among them." 
 
 Jackson sat on his horse awaiting the formation of his lines, 
 watch in hand; it was six o'clock and less than two hours of 
 daylight remained. 
 
 "Are you ready, General Rodes ?" he asked. 
 
 "Yes, sir," Rodes answered. 
 
 "You can go forward, sir." 
 
 The lines started forward through the Wilderness. The first 
 warning the Eleventh Corps received was not given by its out- 
 posts, for they hardly reached the main position ahead of the 
 Confederates; it was given by the deer and rabbits and wild- 
 turkeys of the forest, put to flight by the advance of the 
 enemy.f 
 
 Devens's division, taken in flank, was driven back upon 
 Schurz's before the latter had time to deploy; and the whole 
 mass ran pellmell toward Chancellorsville. Buschbeck, be- 
 hind in his rifle-pits, held Jackson at bay for three-quarters of 
 an hour. But Rodes's division was reinforced by Colston's 
 "and the two together folded around his flanks, took his line in 
 reverse, and finally carried the position with a rush; and then 
 Buschbeck's brigade retired in good order through" the crowd 
 of fugitives, which was "streaming in wild disorder to the rear, 
 past Hooker's headquarters. "% 
 
 At the moment when Jackson was about to attack, the Con- 
 federates at the other end of the line attacked Meade vigor- 
 ously, in order to draw attention away from Jackson ; and Lee 
 soon engaged the whole Federal line. 
 
 ♦Henderson. 
 
 fDoubleday. Alexander. 
 JDoubleday. 
 
342 American Campaigns. 
 
 (176) Jackson's lines followed the routed Eleventh Corps 
 across a clearing east of Dowdall's Tavern, and was entering 
 the forest beyond when the 8th Pennsylvania cavalry, which 
 was on its way to assist the Eleventh Corps, came unexpectedly 
 upon them and charged them. At the same time about a score 
 of guns opened fire upon their flank from Hazel Grove. This 
 checked the pursuit. As night had now fallen, Rodes's and 
 Colston's divisions, which "were broken, mingled, and ex- 
 hausted," and had left several of their brigades far behind, had 
 to halt and reform. Hill's division was then deployed to take 
 the lead in the woods. 
 
 During this long pause Berry's division [Third Corps] , sup- 
 ported by Hays's brigade of the Second Corps, formed line 
 under the bank of a little brook, across the road and at the 
 foot of Fairview Hill; at the same time thirty-four guns took 
 position upon the hili, behind the left flank of the infantry. 
 This hill "became the key-point of the battle. In front of it the 
 open ground extended about 600 yards to the edge of the 
 forest" where the Confederates were forming. The only point 
 from which it could be reached by artillery fire was Hazel 
 Grove, which was within the Federal lines* By 10.00 p.m. 
 Sickles's troops had returned from Catherine Furnace to Hazel; 
 Grove. 
 
 Jackson was preparing to press his advantage and, if pos- 
 sible, cut off Hooker from United States Ford. He had ridden 
 forward with some of his staff to reconnoiter, when firing 
 began between the hostile lines. Jackson's party started back, 
 but, in the dark woods, it was mistaken for Federal cavalry, 
 and fired upon by a North Carolina regiment. Two of the 
 party were slain, and Jackson received three shots and had to- 
 be borne away. He died on the 10th of May. As A. P. Hill, 
 the next in rank, was soon afterwards wounded, Stuart, who- 
 had gone round with his cavalry to attack the Union trains- 
 near Ely's Ford, came back and took command.* 
 
 Hooker ordered Sickles to attack the Confederate flank by 
 moonlight from Hazel Grove. So Birney's division moved out 
 about midnight ; but it glanced by the Confederate right flank,, 
 provoking the fire of only about two regiments, and pushed 
 into the woods in front of Fairview. Here it was mistaken for 
 Confederates by the Federal lines, and fired upon. It returned 
 the fire which, it supposed, came from Confederates. Thus a 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
The Battle of Chancellorsville. 343 
 
 noisy, but not bloody, battle raged for an hour or two between 
 friends, while the enemy listened to it but took no part in it.* 
 
 Sunday, May 3. 
 
 (177) At daybreak Stuart renewed the attack. He seized 
 the heights of Hazel Grove, from which Hooker had made the 
 fatal mistake of withdrawing Sickles, and placed thirty guns, 
 there. The guns opened fire on the space around the mansion- 
 and enfiladed a part of the Federal line.f This line had been 
 adjusted, during the night, to conform to the new condition. 
 The Eleventh Corps had been sent to the extreme left to re- 
 organize; the right was held by the Second [Couch], Third' 
 [Sickles], and Twelfth Corps [Slocum]. Facing Stuart's line 
 were two Federal lines about a mile and a quarter long, reach- 
 ing northward from Fairview to the other side of the Plank 
 Road. They were held by some 25,000 men — about as many 
 as Stuart had. The whole Union position was covered with- 
 breastworks of earth and logs behind abatis. The roads to- 
 ward Fredericksburg were covered by Hancock's division of 
 the Second Corps, and a part of the Twelfth Corps. Batteries, 
 massed on the high ground at Fairview were behind field- 
 works. The First Corps [Reynolds] was covering the road to' 
 United States Ford, and the Fifth [Meade] was on the left. 
 
 Stuart assaulted the line in his front and after several hours- 
 of hard fighting, during which the hostile lines surged to and 1 
 fro many times, succeeded in driving the Federals back. The 
 artillery at Hazel Grove had been increased to about fifty guns,, 
 which moved forward to Fairview Hill when that position was- 
 vacated by the retiring Union batteries. 
 
 While the battle was raging in this quarter Anderson was 
 assaulting the center of the Union line and McLaws its left; 
 seeing "the enemy withdrawing from their fronts" they 
 "pressed forward at the same time that Stuart's infantry 
 crowned the plateau [of Fairview] from the west."* 
 
 (178) Finally the flanks of Anderson's and Stuart's forces 
 made connection at Fairview. Then Lee advanced the whole 
 Confederate line, and at ten o'clock had possession of Chan- 
 cellorsville, now only a smoking ruin; it had been set on fire 
 by Confederate shells.* 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 tSwinton. Alexander. 
 
344 American Campaigns. 
 
 Just before this Hooker had been knocked down and dis- 
 abled by a brick torn by a shell from one of the columns of the 
 front porch. Couch, therefore, superintended the withdrawal 
 of the Union forces to a line in rear, which had been selected 
 by the engineers and prepared during the night. The new 
 position was in the space between Hunting Run and Mineral 
 Spring Run, and covered the line of retreat by way of United 
 States Ford. The right rested on the Rapidan and the left on 
 the Rappahannock, and the line followed the direction of the 
 two runs and bent across the space between their headwaters. 
 The First and Fifth Corps, which had been held in reserve all 
 morning and not allowed to take part in the battle, were formed 
 on this new line, and there "joined by the rest of the army fall- 
 ing back from Chancellorsville."* 
 
 Lee was making ready to assault this new position when he 
 was stopped by reports that called for his attention in the 
 direction of Fredericksburg. 
 
 Sedgwick's Operations. 
 
 (179) At nine o'clock the night before [the 2nd] Hooker 
 had dispatched an order to Sedgwick directing him to move 
 through Fredericksburg, drive Early away, continue toward 
 Chancellorsville and be ready at daybreak to attack Lee in 
 reverse, while he himself assaulted him in front. It was nearly 
 midnight when Sedgwick received the order, but he moved 
 almost immediately toward Fredericksburg, skirmishing with 
 the Confederate outposts on the way. 
 
 The bulk of Early's own division was on the ridge below the 
 town, and the line from Taylor's Hill to the Howison house, 
 about three miles, was held by the brigades of Barksdale and 
 Hays supported by a few pieces of artillery. Two regiments, 
 only, with eight guns, guarded Marye's Hill from the Plank 
 Road to Hazel Run. 
 
 (180) Sedgwick reached Fredericksburg at 3 a.m., and at 
 daybreak moved against Early's position. Four regiments as- 
 saulted Marye's Hill, but were repulsed. A second assault was 
 made and also repulsed. Howe's division, south of Hazel Run, 
 tried to turn the hill but met with no success. Gibbon, who 
 had brought his division of the Second Corps over from Fal- 
 mouth, had no better success against the Confederate left. He 
 was unable to get across the canal. Soon after his effort Wil- 
 
 *Swinton. 
 
The Battle of Chancellorsville. 345 
 
 cox, who had brought his Confederate brigade from Banks's 
 Ford, occupied Taylor's Hill. 
 
 About eleven o'clock a third assault was made on Marye's 
 Hill by a whole division supported by a brigade. This assault, 
 also, was repulsed, "although Barksdale's line was so thin that 
 it scarcely averaged a man to five feet of parapet." But in 
 removing the wounded under flag of truce after this assault 
 the Federals discovered how weak the Confederate line was.* 
 Taking advantage of this information, they quickly renewed 
 the attack, and carried the position in the sunken road at the 
 foot of the hill — the rampart against which Burnside had 
 shattered his army. 
 
 In defense of their guns on the crest the Confederates made 
 a savage stand ; but Sedgwick's line carried everything before 
 it. At the same time Howe's division carried the heights 
 below the town, and the Federals were then in possession of 
 the whole ridge. Early's troops retreated by the Telegraph 
 Road, leaving the way to Chancellorsville open to Sedgwick. 
 These were the tidings that Lee received just as he was 
 about to complete his victory at Chancellorsville. He with- 
 drew four brigades at once from his line and dispatched them, 
 under McLaws, to meet Sedgwick. He counted upon Early's 
 returning to attack Sedgwick in rear. (181) Wilcox formed 
 his brigade across the Plank Road, and, when Sedgwick ad- 
 vanced, fell back slowly toward Chancellorsville, delaying 
 Sedgwick as much as he could. He reached Salem Church 
 about three o'clock, and joined McLaws, who was already 
 there with his four brigades. At four o'clock Sedgwick 
 reached Salem Church and immediately attacked the Con- 
 federate line. The combat that ensued kept up until dark, and 
 Sedgwick was stopped in his march. He had lost nearly 5,000 
 men since morning.f 
 
 The next morning, as it did not appear that Hooker was 
 going to take the aggressive, Lee resolved still further to rein- 
 force the troops opposed to Sedgwick, with a view to capture 
 him, or force him to cross the Rappahannock. Accordingly he 
 withdrew the rest of Anderson's division and marched it to 
 McLaws's support, leaving only what remained of Jackson's 
 ■old corps in front of Hooker.^ 
 
 (182) In the meantime Early had retaken Marye's Heights, 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
 fSwinton. 
 
 -tDoubleday. 
 
346 American Campaigns. 
 
 and then turned his troops on Salem Church. When Ander- 
 son's brigades arrived, also, and formed line on the right of 
 McLaws, parallel to the Plank Road, Sedgwick was sur- 
 rounded on three sides. His position covered the road to 
 Banks's Ford, but he was now upon the defensive, and only 
 hoped to hold his position until night should fall to cover his 
 withdrawal. 
 
 Anderson had been delayed several hours in getting away 
 from Chancellorsville ; and, also, in forming his line for attack, 
 owing to "Sedgwick's peculiar rectangular formation."* So 
 it was six o'clock in the evening before the Confederates were 
 ready to make a vigorous assault. Sedgwick was forced back 
 on Banks's Ford [Scott's Ford], but darkness fell before he 
 could be cut off by the Confederates. During the night he 
 crossed the river by a pontoon-bridge, which had been laid the 
 day before after Wilcox had quitted his position at the Ford. 
 
 (178) Tuesday morning, the Sth, Lee withdrew the divi- 
 sions of McLaws and Anderson, and, with his united forces,, 
 resolved to make a final effort to destroy Hooker. Every- 
 thing was arranged to assault the Federal position at daybreak 
 on the 6th. "When daybreak, however, came, and the Con- 
 federate skirmishers advanced, it was found that" the Army of 
 the Potomac "had, during the night, withdrawn across the 
 Rappahannock," leaving behind "its killed, its wounded, four- 
 teen pieces of artillery, and twenty thousand stand of arms."f 
 
 The Federal losses in the few days of this campaign amount- 
 ed, in killed and wounded, to 11,128, and those of the Con- 
 federates to 10,960.* 
 
 Stoneman's Cavalry. 
 
 (170) Much had been expected of Stoneman's Cavalry 
 Corps. It was the first time since the war had begun that the 
 Union cavalry had been given a chance. The fates, however, 
 seemed to be against it still. The column got off in good sea- 
 son ; but it was delayed by the heavy rains, so that it could not 
 cross the Rappahannock till the 29th of April — the same day 
 the infantry crossed. 
 
 "Hooker then divided the command into two columns, send- 
 ing one under Averell" toward Gordonsville and the other 
 under Buford to break up the Fredericksburg-Richmond rail- 
 
 *Alexander. 
 fSwinton. 
 
The Battle of Chancellorsville. 347 
 
 way. The only cavalry the Confederates could spare to oppose 
 these forces was W. H. F. Lee's brigade. It fell back before 
 Averell's column, and was pursued as far as Rapidan Station. 
 From there Averell was recalled by Hooker, and he reached 
 Ely's Ford the night of May 2. On the 3rd Averell recon- 
 noitered on Hooker's right, but returned, reporting the coun- 
 try impracticable for cavalry work. Hooker thereupon re- 
 lieved him from command and put Pleasanton in his place. 
 
 Stoneman broke up Buford's command into five or six de- 
 tachments, and sent them in as many different directions. 
 They did considerable damage and spread dismay through 
 Virginia. One detachment went within two miles of Richmond. 
 Several of them wound up their raid at Gloucester on the 
 coast, which was in the possession of Union troops. The 
 Fredericksburg-Richmond railway was not reached until the 
 3rd of May, and very little damage was done to it; for the 
 Confederates sent prisoners and wounded over it to Richmond, 
 on the 5th. 
 
 On the whole the Cavalry Corps exerted no practical in- 
 fluence upon the campaign after the main operations had ac- 
 tually begun ; while, if it had been kept with the main army, it 
 would have been of great service. On the 8th of May the 
 entire cavalry force, except what was at Gloucester Point, re- 
 crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, on its way to re- 
 join the army. The corps had lost only seventeen killed and 
 seventy-five wounded during all its operations ! 
 
 Comments. 
 
 The first movements of the main force in the Chancel- 
 lorsville Campaign began on the 27th of April, 1863, and the 
 campaign ended with Hooker's withdrawal across the Rappa- 
 hannock, on the night of May 5. It would be hard to pick 
 out another nine days of the Civil War so fraught with lessons 
 for the student of the military art. If many of these lessons 
 are to be learned from the mistakes that were made and their 
 fatal consequences, there are others that may be learned from 
 the examples of sound strategy and tactics presented, and their 
 results. 
 
 Up to the time when the right wing of the Federal army 
 reached Chancellorsville on the 30th of April, General Hooker's 
 plan, in its conception and its execution, has been characterized 
 by the critics as "masterly" ; but from that moment to the end 
 
348 American Campaigns. 
 
 every item of it was so faulty that no one has arisen bold 
 enough to venture a word in Hooker's defense. Of course 
 Hooker can be criticized for dividing his army into two almost 
 equal parts, separated by nearly forty miles of bad road and a 
 river, and with the enemy between them; but Napoleon took 
 such risks when necessary. "The rules of war only point out 
 the dangers which are incurred by breaking them."* More- 
 over, either of Hooker's separated wings, by itself, was nearly 
 equal in strength to Lee's whole army. The fact that Hooker's 
 right wing was allowed to reach Chancellorsville without 
 molestation proves that he had taken sufficient measures to 
 deceive Lee. Not until then — not until he received word that 
 Anderson had fallen back from Chancellorsville — did Lee guess 
 what Hooker's project was. 
 
 Of the measures taken by Hooker to fool Lee, none other 
 had so great an effect as the march of Stoneman's cavalry 
 corps up the Rappahannock two weeks before the principal 
 movement began. Stoneman marched to Warrenton Junction. 
 Lee at first "believed that" he "was going to the Shenandoah 
 Valley. As, however," he "continued near Warrenton Junc- 
 tion, Lee concluded that the movement was a feint intended 
 to draw his army to the Upper Rappahannock in order that 
 Fredericksburg might be seized. "f So Lee clung more tena- 
 ciously than ever to the heights of Fredericksburg, while 
 Stuart's cavalry confronted Stoneman's across the upper Rap- 
 pahannock. Thus Stuart was still at Culpeper Court House 
 with his main force when the Federal right wing had reached 
 Kelly's Ford, on its way to Chancellorsville. 
 
 Having arrived at Chancellorsville, on the afternoon of 
 April 30, Hooker's first fatal mistake was his stopping there 
 for the night. He ought to have pushed on out of the Wilder- 
 ness, until he uncovered Banks's Ford and reached the open 
 ground in that neighborhood, where he could maneuver his 
 large army. A night's march would even have brought him 
 upon the rear of Lee's army at Marye's Heights. Nothing but 
 Anderson's division barred the way, the distance was only ten 
 miles, and he had four army-corps at hand. The failure to 
 march, to keep on marching after nightfall, has lost many a 
 victory in war. 
 
 Even, however, after bivouacking at Chancellorsville, if 
 
 *Henderson. 
 
 ^Principles of Strategy.— Bigelow. 
 
The Battle of Chancellorsville. 349 
 
 Hooker had started his army toward Fredericksburg at day- 
 light on the 1st of May, he would have got possession of 
 Banks's Ford, and the open ground near it, before the arrival 
 of Jackson with reinforcements. But Hooker did not move 
 until eleven o'clock. The possession of Banks's Ford would 
 have' shortened the communication between the two wings of 
 the army by several miles; virtually it would have united the 
 army. With all of his tardiness Hooker's line, none the less, 
 got within reach of Banks's Ford on the 1st, and attained a 
 good position almost without the forest, when it was with- 
 drawn to Chancellorsville. The enemy had "come out from 
 behind his defenses'' as Hooker's order had predicted he must, 
 and now Hooker was going to compass his "certain destruc- 
 tion'' on Hooker's "own ground." He made a fatal mistake in 
 undertaking to "consummate offensive strategy with defensive 
 tactics."* 
 
 Hooker's object was, or ought to have been, to destroy Lee's 
 army. The strategic situation was not such that the simple 
 repulse of that army meant its destruction ; repulse would only 
 have forced it back upon its line of communications. But to 
 achieve a decisive tactical victory from the defensive requires 
 the skill of a master like Napoleon, and unusually favorable 
 conditions. Later battles present no such decisive counter- 
 attacks as that of Austerlitz. Upon the defensive, victory 
 means usually no more than to repulse the enemy's assault, 
 not to destroy the assailant. Certainly Hooker could not hope 
 to do more than repulse Lee's assaults in the jungle about 
 Chancellorsville. If he expected to hold Lee in his front until 
 Sedgwick could come up and strike him from behind he 
 reckoned without his host. 
 
 Far more hazardous than the flank march of Hooker's right 
 wing to Chancellorsville was the flank march of Lee's left 
 wing under Jackson, on the 2nd of May. All day long Jack- 
 son's column was marching across Hooker's front and within 
 two miles of it, with his right flank covered only "by woods and 
 by Stuart's busy and noisy cavalry."f And Hooker and How- 
 ard, and the rest, knew that this Confederate column was 
 marching, yet made no effort to destroy it and no adequate 
 preparation to oppose it. Howard says he "sent out scouts 
 who returned with reports that the enemy was not more than 
 three or four miles off, and in motion." And "we, who were 
 
 *Bigelow. 
 
 fGeneral Howard in B. & L. 
 
•350 American Campaigns. 
 
 at Dowdall's, had been watching the enemy's cavalry, which 
 kept pushing through the woods just far enough to receive a 
 fire and then withdrawing."* Hooker and his corps-com- 
 manders were sure that the marching column was Lee's army 
 retreating on Gordonsville. 
 
 Never was the cavalry of an army more needed in the 'right 
 place than Hooker's cavalry was needed on the exposed Fed- 
 eral right flank that 2nd of May. If Stoneman's Cavalry Corps 
 had been on the Brock Road Jackson's march would have been 
 impossible ; but if Stoneman's cavalry had been there Jackson's 
 march would not have been attempted, for Fitzhugh Lee would 
 not have been permitted to discover that Howard's flank was 
 "in the air." 
 
 In view of the exposed condition of the Federal right and 
 the cover afforded by the dense forest "the chief danger" of 
 Jackson's flank movement "lay in this, that the two wings, 
 each left to its own resources, might fail to act in combina- 
 tion,"f for Lee and Jackson had no means, as our Signal Corps 
 has today, of laying a field-telegraph as fast as their troops 
 could march. 
 
 The Army of the Potomac was in no sense defeated by the 
 disaster of the Eleventh Corps; if Jackson had not been 
 wounded, and if night had not intervened, this disaster might 
 have extended to the rest of the army. Jackson purposed tak- 
 ing the Union army in reverse and cutting it off from its line of 
 retreat by United States Ford, while Lee held it fast in front. 
 But "Hooker had two corps in position which had hardly been 
 engaged, the Second and the Fifth," with which to meet Jack- 
 son; "and another, the First, under Reynolds, was coming 
 up."f If Jackson had made a night-march instead of waiting 
 until day to begin his movement he might not have been shot in 
 the dark by his own men, and he might have had time to push 
 his advantage to a conclusion before nightfall. 
 
 There was, in fact, not a moment from the beginning to the 
 •end of the engagement at Chancellorsville when the Union 
 army as a whole was beaten; there was not a time when by a 
 vigorous combined assault it might not have defeated Lee's 
 army. General Hooker says the dense forest prohibited a 
 Union victory; but the ground was of his own choosing; Lee 
 
 ♦General Howard in B. & L. 
 tHenderson. 
 
The Battle of Chancellorsville. 351 
 
 attacked upon it, and turned the dense thicket to his own ad- 
 vantage. 
 
 During the whole of Saturday [May 2], while Jackson was 
 making his flank march, the Confederate commander held 
 Hooker's 50,000 troops with only 16,000. Again, from four 
 o'clock Sunday afternoon until midnight on Monday, while the 
 bulk of Lee's army was operating against Sedgwick, Hooker 
 with 60,000 men, strongly fortified, allowed himself to be held 
 in place by 20,000 Confederates, and neither sent a man to 
 Sedgwick's assistance, seven miles away, nor made an effort 
 to break the thin line of the enemy by whom he was himself 
 beleaguered. Swinton truly remarks that "not the Army of 
 the Potomac was beaten at Chancellorsville, but its com- 
 mander." An army is not beaten so long as there are reserves 
 to put into the fight, and in the action on Sunday, when the 
 Federal line was driven back from Chancellorsville, Hooker 
 "employed little more than half his force — neither Reynolds 
 [First Corps] nor Meade [Fifth Corps] being allowed to go 
 into action, though eager to do so."* Hooker's final decision 
 to retreat on the night of the 5th was, General .Alexander 
 believes, "the mistake of his life." He then had his whole 
 united army, upwards of 90,000 men, behind "probably the 
 strongest field-intrenchment ever built in Virginia. "f Lee was 
 going to attack this army with only 35,000 troops, which had 
 been fighting and marching for seven days ! Nothing but 
 Hooker's withdrawal saved Lee's army from a terrible repulse. 
 
 Hooker charged his defeat to Sedgwick's failure to execute 
 the order he sent him Saturday night, May 2. But that order 
 was impossible to execute. Sedgwick was directed to be in 
 rear of Lee's position ready to fall upon the Confederates at 
 daybreak. It was nearly midnight when he received the order, 
 and he had fourteen miles to march, with Early's 10,000 Con- 
 federates on the heights of Fredericksburg blocking the way. 
 Day broke before five o'clock at that time. It would be impos- 
 sible to awaken a body of twenty-odd thousand men and march 
 it in so short a time fourteen miles in the dark, even though no 
 enemy stood in the way. It does, nevertheless, appear that 
 Sedgwick might have made better speed. The assault that 
 carried the sunken road and Marye's Hill was not made until 
 after 1 1 a.m. ; but after driving the Confederates and gaining 
 the ridge "Sedgwick, instead of pushing on, halted to reform 
 
 *Swinton. 
 ^Alexander. 
 
352 American Campaigns. 
 
 his men, and sent for Brooks's division, which was still at its 
 old position three miles below Fredericksburg, to come up and 
 take the advance. It was full 3 p.m. before the final start was 
 made."* 
 
 As everything turned out it would have been better if Sedg- 
 wick had not advanced at all from the heights of Fredericks- 
 burg. If he had intrenched himself there he could have held 
 on against Early and such forces as Lee could have sent against 
 him until reinforcements could come to him by way of 
 United States Ford. Then the whole Army of the Potomac, 
 after withdrawing from Chancellorsville, could have joined him 
 by way of Fredericksburg. This would have given Hooker all 
 that Burnside made his fierce fight to gain. In view of the fact 
 that Hooker made no effort to cooperate with Sedgwick, but 
 remained in his trenches, it is perhaps fortunate for Sedgwick 
 that he was stopped at Salem Church. If he had been allowed 
 to march on a little farther he might have had no line of re- 
 treat when Anderson and McLaws and Early surrounded him. 
 
 Chancellorsville was the first great battle of the Civil War in 
 which the infantry of both sides made use of field-works. 
 
 *Doubleday. 
 
LECTURE XVII. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF GETTYSBURG. 
 THE FIRST DAY. 
 
 (183) After the battle of Chancellorsville the Army of the 
 Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia again resumed 
 their positions on opposite sides of the Rappahannock River. 
 The two main armies stretched from about the mouth of the 
 Rapidan to points six or seven miles below Fredericksburg.. 
 The right of the Confederate line rested on Massaponax Creek. 
 The hostile cavalry forces confronted each other along the 
 upper course of the Rappahannock, from the mouth of the 
 Rapidan to the Orange and Alexandria Railway. ■ 
 
 Both armies were in need of rest, recuperation, and reor- 
 ganization. The morale of the Union army had suffered 
 from another defeat, while that of the Confederate army had 
 reached the highest point that it attained in the course of the 
 war. The Confederacy had resorted to obligatory service, and 
 Lee's army was at once increased by a large force of conscripts. 
 Longstreet's two divisions, which had been absent during 
 the Chancellorsville campaign, also soon rejoined. On May 
 31, 1863, Lee had an army of 76,224 officers and men, and 272 
 guns.* 
 
 Lee reorganized his infantry into three corps, commanded 
 by Longstreet, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, respectively. Each corps 
 consisted of three divisions, and each of the divisions, except 
 three, consisted of four brigades. Lee was a full general, his 
 corps-commanders were lieutenant-generals, his division-com- 
 manders were major-generals, and all of his brigades — thirty- 
 seven of infantry and five of cavalry- — except two, were com- 
 manded by brigadier-generals. "Nearly all of these officers 
 were veterans of proved ability, and many had served in the 
 Mexican War." "The artillery had recently received an ex- 
 cellent organization. ... It consisted, besides the horse- 
 artillery, of fifteen so-called 'battalions,' each of four batteries, 
 with one lieutenant-colonel and a major. To each army-corps 
 were attached five battalions, one for each division and two as 
 reserve, the whole under a colonel as chief of artillery" of the 
 corps. f The general artillery reserve for the army, formerly 
 
 *Alexander. 
 
 fGeneral Hunt in B. & L. 
 
354 American Campaigns. 
 
 maintained, was broken up. The artillery organization adopted 
 at this time by the Confederacy was the first of its kind ever 
 employed, and it has since been adopted by the leading nations 
 of Europe.* It will be observed that a Confederate army-corps 
 only lacked a complement of cavalry to make it a complete 
 little army in itself, which is the approved organization of an 
 army-corps today. And it approximated in numbers what is 
 today considered the proper strength of an army-corps, that is, 
 about 30,000 men. 
 
 On the other hand, in the Army of the Potomac "the average 
 strength of army-corps and divisions was about half that of the 
 Confederates. ... At the battle of Gettysburg the seven army- 
 corps consisted of nineteen infantry divisions, seven of which 
 had two brigades, eleven had three, and one had four; in all 
 •fifty-one brigades. . . . The army and army-corps were 
 ■commanded by major-generals, the divisions by three major- 
 generals and sixteen brigadier-generals, the infantry brigades 
 "by twenty-two brigadier-generals and twenty-nine colonels. "f 
 Our Government has always evinced an incomprehensible aver- 
 sion to bestowing adequate rank upon its higher commanders. 
 Since the very beginning, 1775, there have been only four full 
 generals in our service, Washington, Grant, Sherman, and 
 Sheridan. Not so in the Confederate army; there we find 
 every separate army commanded by a full general, and the 
 army-corps commanded by lieutenant-generals. In the four 
 short years of this army's existence seven full generals and 
 eighteen lieutenant-generals were commissioned. 
 
 The returns of June 30, 1863, give the strength of the Army 
 of the Potomac as 115,256 officers and men, with 362 guns.* 
 
 Plans. 
 
 In assuming the offensive in the campaign now to be dis- 
 cussed Lee and the Confederate authorities at Richmond were 
 actuated by many considerations, political as well as military. 
 Politically it was believed that the South's recognition by 
 foreign powers awaited only a victory upon Northern soil ; and 
 the Southern authorities still believed that an invasion of the 
 North would strengthen the influence of the "copperhead or 
 anti-war party," and increase the disaffection that already 
 existed there on account of the heavy taxation and the draft 
 
 *Alexander. 
 tHunt. 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 355 
 
 law; furthermore the financial condition of the Confederacy 
 was becoming worse from day to day, and the notes issued by 
 the government were now hardly worth the paper of which 
 they were made. It was believed that a successful invasion 
 would not only hasten the end of the war but would strengthen 
 the Confederacy's credit in the financial world abroad. 
 
 But there were also purely military reasons. The spirit of 
 Lee's army was such that it believed itself equal to any under- 
 taking; a purely defensive war could have no hope of final 
 success ; soon or late the army would be forced back on Rich- 
 mond and ultimately have to surrender ; Lee needed supplies of 
 clothing and subsistence for his army, and expected to obtain 
 them in Pennsylvania ; and of more consequence than anything 
 else was the serious condition of affairs at Vicksburg. Pem- 
 berton's army was there besieged by Grant's and could not hold 
 out many days longer, and Bragg was hard put to it to keep 
 Rosecrans from advancing farther in East Tennessee. Lee not 
 only felt sure that his movement northward would cause the 
 recall of the Army of the Potomac to cover Washington, but 
 he hoped it might also "lead to the calling of some of the forces 
 from the west, and thus relieve the pressure on Vicksburg and 
 Chattanooga."* He felt that, if Vicksburg should fall while he 
 was still on the defensive behind the Rappahannock, it would 
 "dishearten the Southern people and stimulate the North to 
 renewed effort."t He therefore resolved to transfer his army 
 to northern soil by way of the Shenandoah and the Cumberland 
 Valleys. His line of communications would thus be covered by 
 his holding the passes of the Blue Ridge and the South 
 Mountains. 
 
 Secondary to his own movements Lee urged that an army 
 "even in effigy," as he expressed it, be organized under Beaure- 
 gard at Culpeper Court House. This he believed would so 
 menace Washington as not only to hinder the advance of troops 
 to oppose him but also to cause the withdrawal of Federal 
 troops from other points at the South to protect that city. The 
 government at Richmond could not see its way to carry out 
 this part of Lee's plan. 
 
 There was another great strategic plan which, at this time, 
 held out far better chances of success to Southern arms, and 
 greater results in case of success, than the plan of invading 
 Pennsylvania. It was a plan that General Longstreet urged 
 
 *Fiebeger. 
 fDoubleday. 
 
356 American Campaigns. 
 
 upon the Confederate Secretary of War and General Lee, but 
 was unable to persuade them to adopt. If we consider the 
 whole vast theater of war from the Potomac to the delta of the 
 Mississippi, the Southern armies had the advantage of interior 
 lines. Never before in any of the world's great wars would it 
 have been possible to shift' armies from one side to another of 
 such a wide theater in time for sudden strategic combinations ; 
 but it was possible at this time in this theater, by means of the 
 railways within the Southern lines. 
 
 Adopting the figures given by General Alexander in his 
 Memoirs: Pemberton had 30,000 men at Vicksburg invested by 
 Grant's 60,000; Joseph E, Johnston had 25,000 at Jackson, 
 Mississippi, looking on at the siege of Vicksburg, but giving no 
 assistance to Pemberton; Bragg had 45,000 in Tennessee con- 
 fronting Rosecrans with 84,000; Buckner had 5,000 at Knox- 
 ville, "and there were also scattered brigades in southwest 
 Virginia and eastern North Carolina." Nothing aggressive 
 was to be expected from Hooker's army for several weeks. 
 
 The plan suggested by Longstreet proposed that General Lee 
 should leave the troops that had just defeated Hooker to 
 "contain" the Army of the Potomac on the Rappahannock, and 
 that Lee himself should hasten to Bragg's headquarters and 
 assume command; and that Longstreet with his two divisions, 
 13,000 strong, which had been absent from the battle of Chan- 
 cellorsville, and Johnston and Buckner with their commands, 
 and all other available troops, should be hurried by rail to join 
 Bragg's army. Thus General Lee would have had an army of 
 nearly 90,000 with which to take the offensive against Rose- 
 crans. "Rosecrans might have been defeated," says General 
 Alexander, "and an advance made into Kentucky, threatening 
 Louisville and Cincinnati. If anything could have caused 
 Grant's recall from Vicksburg it would have been this. 
 Surely," he continues, "the chances of success were greater, 
 and of disaster less, than those involved in our crossing the 
 bridgeless Potomac, into the heart of the enemy's country, 
 where ammunition and supplies must come by wagons from 
 Staunton, nearly 200 miles, over roads exposed to raids of the 
 enemy from either the east or the west. In this position a 
 drawn battle, or even a victory, would still leave us compelled 
 soon to find our way back across the Potomac." 
 
 Toward the latter part of May Hooker got wind of Lee's 
 contemplated advance; he proposed, therefore, "that in case 
 Lee moved via Culpeper toward the Potomac with his main 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 357 
 
 body, leaving a corps at Fredericksburg," he should be allowed 
 to attack this corps. This, however, he was forbidden by the 
 Washington authorities to do. A little later, learning that 
 Lee's army was in motion, "and that there were but few troops 
 in Richmond, he proposed an immediate march on that place." 
 This plan was also disapproved by the President in a letter to 
 Hooker which shows a very sound sense of strategy.* Hooker 
 was instructed to keep "always in view the safety of Washing- 
 ton and Harper's Ferry" ;f no plan would receive the assent of 
 the President and his incompetent adviser, General Halleck, 
 that contemplated the removal of the Army of the Potomac 
 from between Lee's army and Washington. Hooker's opera- 
 tions, therefore, must be wholly subordinated to those of the 
 enemy. 
 
 Operations. 
 
 (184) Early in June Lee's army began its advance, and by 
 the 8th the corps of Ewell and Longstreet, covered by Stuart's 
 cavalry division, were concentrated at Culpeper. A. P. Hill's 
 corps remained at Fredericksburg to watch Hooker and keep 
 him, as long as possible, from discovering the movement. 
 
 Hooker's suspicions, however, were aroused by his seeing a 
 smaller number of tents on the Fredericksburg heights ; and on 
 the 6th June he ordered Sedgwick to throw bridges across the 
 river and make a reconnaissance on the other side with his 
 corps. After making such reconnaissance Sedgwick reported 
 that he thought the main Confederate army was still in position. 
 Hooker, nevertheless, ordered Pleasanton, who had replaced 
 Stoneman as commander of the Union Cavalry Corps, to move 
 against Stuart's cavalry at Culpeper and "get information 
 as to the enemy's position and proposed movement. "f The 
 result was the cavalry combat at Brandy Station on the 
 9th of June. The Union cavalry encountered Stuart's contact- 
 troops as soon as it crossed the Rappahannock, and pushed 
 them back to Brandy Station. Here it was met by Stuart's 
 main body, and, after fighting all day, it withdrew ; but not until 
 it had captured dispatches and sufficient information to enable 
 its commander to report to Hooker "that two-thirds of the 
 ■enemy were at Culpeper preparing to move on Washington."^: 
 
 *See Rhodes's History of the U. S., IV-271. 
 
 fHunt. 
 4Doubleday. 
 
358 American Campaigns. 
 
 The battle of Brandy Station was an important one for the 
 Union cavalry — it marked the turning point in its relative effi- 
 ciency and excellence as compared with its adversary's. It was 
 the first true cavalry combat of the war, "and it enabled the 
 Federals to dispute the superiority hitherto claimed by, and 
 conceded to, the Confederate cavalry."* 
 
 (185) As soon as Hooker received Pleasanton's report that 
 a large Confederate force was at Culpeper he extended his 
 right up the Rappahannock. 
 
 Meantime Ewell's corps was on its way to Winchester, hav- 
 ing left Culpeper on the 10th of June. Imboden's cavalry bri- 
 gade had already marched toward Cumberland, Maryland, to 
 destroy the railway from that place to Martinsburg, as well as 
 the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. Winchester was occupied by 
 Milroy's Federal division (about 9,000 men), with an advance 
 brigade at Berryville. Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry were 
 also garrisoned by Federal troops. From Chester Gap Ewell 
 dispatched Rodes's division with Jenkins's cavalry brigade by 
 way of Berryville toward Martinsburg. The Berryville garri- 
 son withdrew to Winchester, and the Federals at Martinsburg 
 retreated to Harper's Ferry. (186) With the rest of his 
 corps Ewell pushed on to Winchester, where he arrived on the 
 evening of the 13th June. He skilfully surrounded the town 
 and prepared to storm its fortifications at dawn on the 15th; 
 but Milroy, seeing his line of retreat threatened, had before that 
 hour begun a retreat toward Martinsburg. His command was 
 split in two by a Confederate force posted on the Martinsburg 
 Turnpike, and one part of it reached Harper's Ferry, while the 
 other part crossed the Potomac at Hancock, thirty-five miles in 
 a straight line farther up the river. (187) Ewell crossed the 
 Potomac and occupied Hagerstown and Sharpsburg, sending 
 Jenkins's cavalry on to Chambersburg, Penn., to collect sup- 
 plies. On the 17th the garrison of Harper's Ferry withdrew 
 to Maryland Heights and the Shenandoah Valley was cleared 
 of Federal troops. 
 
 (186) On learning of Ewell's movement toward the Val- 
 ley, being forbidden to take advantage of Lee's widely extended 
 front to attack his isolated corps separately, and being re- 
 quired to keep his army between Lee and Washington, Hooker 
 started on the night of June 13 toward Manassas Junction, on 
 the way to the Potomac, which he expected to cross near Lees- 
 
 *Hunt. 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 359 
 
 burg. Hooker's withdrawal from Falmouth was immediately 
 followed by A. P. Hill's movement toward the Valley.* 
 
 (187) On the 15th of June Longstreet left Culpeper; he 
 marched along the east side of the Blue Ridge mountains, in 
 order to cover the passes. Hill's corps, which had left Fred- 
 ericksburg on the 14th, crossed the mountains in rear of Long- 
 street, and, marching down the Valley, reached Shepherdstown 
 on the 23rd. 
 
 Stuart's cavalry had been thrown out to the right of Long- 
 street's column to cover the Confederate movement and keep in 
 touch with Hooker's army. Pleasanton's cavalry was in like 
 manner covering this army. The result was several fine cavalry 
 combats, the most notable of which were those at Aldie, Mid- 
 dleburg, and Upperville. Stuart retreated through Ashby's 
 Gap. (188) Longstreet withdrew through the passes and fol- 
 lowed Hill to the Potomac. On the 24th he crossed the river 
 at Williamsport ; Hill had crossed it at Shepherdstown the day 
 before. Their columns united at Hagerstown on the 25th. 
 Stuart continued to guard the mountain passes until the 
 Federal army had crossed the Potomac. 
 
 (187) Conforming his movements to those of Lee's army, 
 Hooker marched northward. (188) On the 25th and 26th 
 of June his army crossed the Potomac at Edwards's Ferry. 
 (189) On the 27th two army-corps [First and Eleventh] 
 under Reynolds occupied Middletown and the South Mountain 
 passes. The Twelfth Corps [Slocum] was near Harper's. 
 Ferry, and the other four corps were concentrated at Frederick. 
 
 Ewell's Confederate corps had continued its march toward 
 Harrisburg, which was now Lee's objective. On the 28th of 
 June the divisions of Rodes and Johnson were at Carlisle, and 
 Early's reached York. Early's orders were "to break up the 
 Northern Central Railroad, destroy the bridge across the 
 Susquehanna at Wrights ville, and then rejoin the main body 
 at Carlisle."* At the first signs of invasion Governor Curtin 
 had called out the Pennsylvania militia, but it does not appear 
 to have opposed any effective resistance to Ewell's advance. 
 At Wrightsville, however, a small militia force, after retreating 
 across the fine bridge, set fire to it, which not only de- 
 stroyed the bridge but came near destroying the town also. 
 Gordon's Confederate brigade helped the citizens put out the 
 fire. 
 
 *Hunt. 
 
-360 American Campaigns. 
 
 Hooker ordered the Twelfth Corps [Slocum] to march early 
 on the 28th of June to Harper's Ferry, and there to unite with 
 the force at Maryland Heights and cut Lee's communications ; 
 •and, in conjunction with Reynolds, to operate on Lee's rear. 
 But Halleck forbade the withdrawal of the troops from Mary- 
 land Heights "notwithstanding Hooker's representations that 
 •the position was utterly useless for any purpose."* Whereupon 
 Hooker, finding that he was "not to be allowed to maneuver his 
 'own army in the presence of the enemy," asked to be relieved 
 from his command. As it had already been decided at a council 
 between the President, Stanton, and Halleck, that Hooker 
 should never again be intrusted with the conduct of a battle, 
 and he had been left in command only for political reasons,f 
 his request to be relieved was promptly granted. Major-Gen- 
 eral George G. Meade was immediately appointed in his place, 
 and he took command of the Union army on the 28th. Meade 
 was the fifth commander assigned to this army within ten 
 months. Halleck imposed no restrictions upon him as to 
 the use of the troops at Maryland Heights, and they were soon 
 ■ordered to Frederick. 
 
 On the day that Meade assumed command it was known at 
 Federal headquarters that Lee's army was distributed as fol- 
 lows : Longstreet's corps at Chambersburg ; A. P. Hill's be- 
 tween that town and Cashtown ; and Ewell's at Carlisle and 
 York and in the country between those towns, threatening Har- 
 risburg. 
 
 Meade dropped Hooker's plan of operating against Lee's 
 rear and "determined at once to move on the main line from 
 Frederick to Harrisburg, extending his wings as far as com- 
 patible with ready concentration, in order to force Lee to battle 
 before he could cross the Susquehanna,"* but, at the same time, 
 covering Baltimore and Washington. To fulfill these condi- 
 tions he selected the line Emmitsburg-Hanover for the front 
 of his army. Westminster was to be his base.J Buford's 
 ■division of cavalry was ordered to cover the left of the army, 
 Gregg's the right, and Kilpatrick's was put in front. 
 
 At this time Lee had no knowledge concerning the position 
 of the Federal army. Stuart, instead of being between the 
 Confederate army and the Federals, was away beyond the Fed- 
 
 *Hunt. 
 
 fAlexander. 
 
 JFiebeger. 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 361 
 
 eral columns with three of his brigades. Longstreet and Hill 
 had been halted in the neighborhood of Chambersburg to 
 await tidings from Stuart ; but no tidings had come. So Lee 
 was under the belief that the Federal army was still south of 
 the Potomac, and on the afternoon of the 28th he ordered 
 Longstreet and Hill to join Ewell at Harrisburg. That night, 
 however, one of Longstreet's spies — called a "scout" for the 
 sake of euphony — brought in the startling news that the 
 Federal army had crossed the Potomac and was at Frederick, 
 and that Hooker had been replaced by Meade.* 
 
 (190) A speedy concentration of the Confederate army was 
 now imperative. It must hold Meade east of the mountains, and 
 keep him away from its line of retreat by way of the Valley. 
 To this end "Lee's plan had long been formed to concentrate 
 his army somewhere between Cashtown and Gettysburg, in a 
 strong position where it would threaten at once Washington, 
 Baltimore, and Philadelphia. The enemy, he hoped, would then 
 be forced to attack him."f "Before dawn on the morning of 
 the 29th orders were dispatched requiring the immediate junc- 
 
 *In a volume called Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign, 
 lately published by Colonel John S. Mosby, the following letter appears, 
 which claims to have been copied from General Lee's letter-book. 
 "From memory — sketch of letter. 
 Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, 
 
 Chambersburg, June 28th, 1863, 7.30 A. M. 
 Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell, 
 Commanding Corps. 
 
 "General : I wrote you last night, stating that General Hooker was 
 reported to have crossed the Potomac and is advancing by way of 
 Middletown, the head of his column being at that point in Frederick 
 county. I directed you in that letter to move your forces to this point. 
 If you have not already progressed on the road, or if you have no good 
 reason against it, I desire you to move in the direction of Gettysburg, 
 via Heidlesburg, where you will have turnpike most of the way, and 
 you can thus join your other divisions (Johnson's and Rodes's) to 
 Early's, which is east of the mountain (at York). 
 
 "I think it preferable to keep the east side of the mountains. When 
 you come to Heidlesburg you can either move directly on Gettysburg 
 or turn down to Cashtown. Your trains and heavy artillery you can 
 send, if you think proper, on the road to Chambersburg. But if the 
 roads which your troops take are good, they had better follow you. 
 
 "Official, C. S. Venable, R. E. Lee, 
 
 "Maj. and A. D. C. General." 
 
 It would appear from this letter that General Lee had received re- 
 ports of Hooker's passage of the Potomac, and had sent a letter on 
 the night of July 27 to Ewell directing him to rejoin the main army 
 with his corps. This view is contrary to all accounts heretofore pub- 
 lished of the Campaign of Gettysburg, and contrary to General Lee's 
 official reports. 
 
 fAlexander. 
 
362 American Campaigns. 
 
 tion of the army" at Cashtown.* On the 29th the two hostile 
 armies drew nearer together. 
 
 Never did Lee so much need the "eyes of his army,'' which 
 were now wandering on a fool's errand. Without his cavalry 
 his army was groping in the dark. He was in the enemy's 
 country and could get no information from the people. He did! 
 not know where Meade's army was. All he could hope to do 
 was to concentrate his forces and be ready for a blow on any 
 side. 
 
 Stuart, by some misunderstanding, instead of marching his 
 squadrons on the right of the main army for the purpose of 
 screening its columns and keeping his chief informed of the 
 movements of the enemy, was making a raid round the Union 
 army. (189) He left two brigades [Robertson and Jones] to 
 guard the passes of the Blue Ridge Mountains, and on the 
 night of the 24th of June, with three brigades [Fitzhugh Lee, 
 Hampton, and W. H. F. Lee] , started upon his raid. He ex- 
 pected to complete the circuit and rejoin Lee in Maryland, 
 but the movements of the Union army forced him so far east 
 that he was obliged to ford the Potomac within twenty miles 
 of Washington, on the night of the 27th. The next morning, 
 learning that the Union army had crossed the Potomac, he 
 marched northward to Rockville, where he captured a wagon- 
 train. He pushed on through Westminster, where he had an 
 action with a Delaware squadron, to Union Mills, where he 
 camped the night of the 29th. During the night he learned 
 that the Federal army was still between him and Lee, and that 
 Kilpatrick's cavalry was at Littlestown. So he moved across 
 country on the 30th to Hanover, where his leading brigade en- 
 countered Kilpatrick passing through the town ; he attacked 
 Kilpatrick and was repulsed. 
 
 "Stuart's men and horses were now nearly worn out" and he 
 was encumbered with the captured wagon-train. He was in 
 the enemy's country, and his case was growing perilous. "He 
 made a night march for York only to learn that Early had left 
 the day before."f He pushed on to Carlisle, there to learn that 
 Early had gone, and that the place was held by a Pennsylvania 
 militia force. He fired a few shells into the town and burned 
 the government barracks. That night [July 1] he learned that 
 Lee's army was concentrating at Gettysburg, and he set out for 
 
 ♦Long. 
 tHunt. 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 363 
 
 that place next morning. Thus ended this useless and fatal 
 raid, which captured a few hundred prisoners and a wagon- 
 train, but probably lost a victory for Lee's army. 
 
 The two cavalry brigades left by Stuart to cover the flank of 
 the army had, by some misunderstanding, remained in Vir- 
 ginia ; Imboden's brigade had tarried on the way to destroy the 
 Chesapeake and Ohio Canal; and Jenkins's brigade was with 
 Ewell's corps. So Lee had no cavalry with his main army.* 
 
 (191) On the 30th of June the Federal troops were dis- 
 posed as follows : Buford's cavalry division was at Gettysburg ; 
 the First Corps [Reynolds] was at Marsh Run; the Third 
 [Sickles] at Bridgeport; the Twelfth [Slocum] at Littlestown; 
 the Eleventh [Howard] at Emmitsburg, behind the First. 
 These troops with Kilpatrick's cavalry division at Hanover 
 composed the first line. In the second line were the Second 
 Corps [Hancock] at Uniontown; the Fifth [Sykes] at Union 
 Mills; and the Sixth [Sedgwick] at Manchester. Gregg's 
 cavalry division was covering the rear at Westminster. 
 
 On the same day Lee's army was thus situated : two of 
 Ewell's divisions were at Heidlersburg and the third was at 
 Greenwood ; two of Longstreet's were at Fayetteville, while 
 Pickett's division was back at Chambersburg guarding the 
 trains ; Hill's corps had reached Cashtown and Mummasburg, 
 except Anderson's division, which was back at the mountain 
 pass on the Chambersburg Road. 
 
 By rapid movements Meade had placed his corps between 
 Lee's army and the cities of Washington and Baltimore, and 
 his flank-position so menaced Lee's line of retreat as effectually 
 to have stopped his advance toward the Susquehanna. Meade 
 now "proposed to rest and supply his army, and find out more 
 definitely the position and the intentions of his adversary be- 
 fore assuming the offensive. This day he had his engineers 
 examine a position along Pipe Creek for a defensive field of 
 battle; he notified his corps-commanders that circumstances 
 might lead him to take up this position, and outlined their 
 marches to it. He added, however, 'developments may cause 
 the commanding-general to assume the offensive from his pres- 
 ent position.' "f Meade, like Lee, hoped to fight on the 
 defensive.* 
 
 Heth, whose division of Hill's corps was at Cashtown, 
 learned that there was a supply of shoes at Gettysburg, and 
 
 *Alexander. 
 fFiebeger. 
 
-364 American Campaigns. 
 
 sent Pettigrew's brigade forward on the 30th of June to take 
 possession of them.* This apparently unimportant circum- 
 stance brought on the decisive battle of the Civil War. 
 
 On approaching the place Pettigrew discovered what he 
 supposed to be a large Federal force moving on the town and 
 he promptly returned to Cashtown. The force discovered by 
 Pettigrew was Buford's cavalry division advancing from Fair- 
 field. "Buford learning that Hill and Longstreet were in the 
 direction of Chambersburg, and Ewell in the direction of Car- 
 lisle and York, saw the importance of Gettysburg as a strategic 
 center, and made his dispositions to hold it if possible. He es- 
 tablished his'' outposts "to the west and north of the town, and 
 sent patrols out in all directions to get information. He also 
 informed Generals Meade and Reynolds of what he had 
 learned."f 
 
 The town of Gettysburg lies in a small valley surrounded by 
 low hills. Its strategic importance at this time was due to the 
 fact that great roads diverged from it not only through the 
 mountain passes to Lee's main line of retreat, but southward 
 along the east side of the mountains toward the Potomac, 
 northward and eastward toward Harrisburg and all points of 
 the Susquehanna, and southeastward to Baltimore and Wash- 
 ington. In case of victory Lee had the choice of advancing 
 against Harrisburg and Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washing- 
 ton, according to circumstances ; in case of defeat he had a line 
 of retreat through mountain passes — the easiest kind of line 
 to defend. 
 
 (192) Looking westward from Gettysburg the horizon ten 
 miles away is bounded by the South Mountain range. Just 
 west of the town, a half-mile from it, is a somewhat elevated 
 ridge, called Seminary Ridge from the Lutheran Seminary 
 standing upon it. This ridge begins at a commanding knoll 
 nearly a mile and a half north of the Seminary, called Oak Hill 
 on account of the thick grove of oaks that covered it. The 
 ridge extends southward from Oak Hill, and was covered 
 throughout its whole length with open woods. The ground 
 slopes to the west from Seminary Ridge, and, rising again, 
 forms another nearly parallel ridge about 500 yards from the 
 first. This ridge is wider, smoother, and lower than Seminary 
 
 *This was related to the lecturer by General Harry Heth in the 
 summer of 1892. It is also mentioned by General Alexander and other 
 historians. 
 
 fFiebeger. 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 365 
 
 Ridge. The western ridge, like Seminary Ridge, begins at 
 Oak Hill, which has a clear view of both ridges and the shallow 
 valley between them. 
 
 West of the second ridge Willoughby Run flows south to> 
 Marsh Creek. The Chambersburg Pike and the Hagerstown 
 Road cross the run about a mile apart, and, passing on over the 
 ridges, unite at the end of one of the streets at the western edge 
 of Gettysburg. Parallel to the Chambersburg Pike and 200 
 yards north of it was an unfinished railway, crossing the 
 ridges and valleys by cuts and fills. Willoughby Run was 
 bordered by woods, a patch of which, known as McPherson's 
 Woods, just south of Chambersburg Pike, reached back to 
 the top of the western ridge. Six or eight hundred yards west 
 of the creek there was another long stretch of wood. 
 
 Directly north of the town, and traversed by Rock Creek, 
 the country is comparatively flat and open. About a half- 
 mile directly south of the town is Cemetery Hill, rising eighty 
 feet above the level of the valley below. By a lower ridge, 
 which curves southward and then northward, this hill is 
 connected with Culp's Hill, a rocky, wooded knoll half-a-mile 
 farther east, whose base, on its eastern and northeastern sides, 
 is washed by Rock Creek. Culp's Hill reaches southward 
 nearly a half-mile, ending in low ground near Spangler's 
 Spring. Cemetery Hill is at the junction of the Baltimore Pike 
 with the Taneytown and Emmitsburg Roads. At the time of 
 the battle Rock Creek could be forded at only a few places.* 
 The country was dotted with farms connected by cross roads 
 and cut up and separated by fences and stone walls. It was 
 upon the ground to the west and north of the town that the 
 fighting took place on the 1st of July, 1863 — the first of the 
 three days of the battle of Gettysburg. 
 
 (191) At 5 a.m. on the 1st of July, A. P. Hill with his 
 leading two divisions [Heth and Pender], and his artillery, 
 started from Cashtown to Gettysburg, eight miles distant. 
 (193) Buford was expecting him. At eight o'clock the Union 
 scouts reported the Confederate advance, and Buford formed 
 his line of dismounted troopers behind Willoughby Run, across 
 the Chambersburg Pike, with two sections of his artillery in 
 the Pike and the third section on the left of the line. 
 
 Heth's Confederate division was in advance, and at about 
 ten o'clock it came forward against Buford's line with two 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
366 American Campaigns. 
 
 brigades deployed and two in the second line. Pender's divi- 
 sion was close behind. Buford's line, though greatly outnum- 
 bered in cannon and small arms, stood its ground and kept the 
 Confederates back, (191) while Reynolds was making all 
 haste to reach the field with the First Corps [his own] and the 
 Eleventh [Howard]. 
 
 (194) About half after ten Reynolds arrived on the ground 
 and relieved the cavalry with Wadsworth's division, which he 
 deployed southward from the railway cut along the ridge. The 
 cavalry then took post on the flanks of the line. Reynolds's 
 right had hardly deployed at the railway cut when it was en- 
 veloped by the Confederate left and driven back to Seminary 
 Ridge. (195) Thereupon Colonel Fowler faced three regi- 
 ments to the right and charged the Confederate brigade which 
 had got the cut, and drove it from the field with such punish- 
 ment that it was of no "further effective service that day."* 
 
 (194) In the meantime Archer's Confederate brigade had 
 entered McPherson's Woods, but the left of Reynolds's line 
 had charged into the woods about the same time. It engaged 
 the Confederates, enveloped their right flank, captured Archer 
 and a large number of his men, and drove the rest back across 
 Willoughby Run. 
 
 (196) Just as this part of the battle began General Reynolds 
 was shot through the head and instantly killed at the edge of 
 the wood, and Doubleday fell into command for the time. 
 Doubleday reformed the Union line on the ridge, and Heth set 
 about reorganizing his front line and preparing to renew the 
 attack with his other two brigades. So there was a lull in the 
 combat. 
 
 About eleven o'clock the other two divisions of the First 
 Corps arrived with four more batteries of artillery. The guns 
 and one of the divisions were placed in the line, which was 
 prolonged to the right; the other division [Robinson] was 
 placed in reserve at the Seminary. 
 
 At about noon Howard arrived ahead of his corps and as- 
 sumed command of the Union forces by virtue of his rank. 
 The Eleventh Corps began to arrive at about one o'clock, and 
 its temporary commander, General Carl Schurz, was ordered 
 to prolong the line of the First Corps along Seminary Ridge 
 with two of his divisions, and to post his other division as a 
 general reserve at Cemetery Hill. Before these dispositions 
 
 *Hunt. 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 367 
 
 ■could be made Buford's cavalry brought in word that Ewell's 
 Confederate corps was advancing from the direction of Heid- 
 lersburg straight against the right of the Union position. 
 Thereupon Howard directed the Eleventh Corps to change 
 front to the right in order to meet Ewell, and called on Sickles 
 with the Third Corps at Emmitsburg, ten miles distant, and 
 'Slocum with the Twelfth Corps at Two Taverns, five miles 
 ■distant, for aid. These generals marched promptly to his 
 ■assistance. 
 
 Ewell's leading two divisions were soon at hand. Ewell had 
 been instructed by Lee not to bring on an engagement, if the 
 •enemy was in force at Gettysburg, until the rest of the Con- 
 federate army was up. Ewell deployed his line facing south, 
 from the Hunterstown Road on his left to the Mummasburg 
 Road on his right, about two miles and a half. He 
 placed a battalion of artillery on Oak Hill, which opened fire 
 on both wings of the Federal line, enfilading the left wing. 
 The artillery fire forced the right of this wing back to 
 'Seminary Ridge. The reserve of the First Corps now rein- 
 forced this part of the Union line, one brigade facing west and 
 the other north.* The action grew fierce at this angle, and 
 soon extended to the right of the Union line, while the left 
 -wing was desperately struggling with Hill's corps. With over- 
 whelming numbers Ewell assailed the right flank and rear of 
 the Union right; then the whole left of the Confederate line 
 advanced, and after a hard fight succeeded in driving the entire 
 Eleventh Corps back. (197) Schurz received reinforcements 
 from the general reserve, and tried to rally his troops and cover 
 "the town; but the Confederate force was overpowering in 
 numbers, and it drove the Union right wing back to Cemetery 
 Hill, capturing some 5,000 prisoners. It was now about three 
 'o'clock.! 
 
 The retreat of the Federal right wing uncovered the right 
 flank of the left wing, and made its position untenable. This 
 wing had been contending for several hours with greatly 
 superior numbers, its left flank had been enveloped, and it had 
 been forced back to Seminary Ridge. Seeing his corps heavily 
 pressed and its right now uncovered Doubleday gave the order 
 
 *It was here that General Paul, who commanded one of the 
 "brigades of the First Corps, received a shot that put out both of his 
 ■eyes. 
 
 fAlexander. 
 
368 American Campaigns. 
 
 to fall back to Cemetery Hill. The withdrawal was made in 
 comparatively good order. 
 
 (198) Steinwehr's division of the Eleventh Corps was in 
 position on Cemetery Hill, which now became the rallying 
 point for the Union troops. The division was posted behind 
 stone walls on the slopes, and its skirmishers occupied the 
 houses in front of the line. As the retreating troops arrived 
 they were placed in position — the rest of the Eleventh Corps 
 on the right of Steinwehr's, and the bulk of the First on his 
 left. Wadsworth's division of the First was, however, posted 
 on Culp's Hill. 
 
 Hancock, whose presence was always an inspiration to the 
 troops that knew him, had arrived with orders from Meade, 
 who had been apprised of Reynolds's death, to take command 
 on the ground. With the assistance of Howard, and Warren, 
 the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, he selected a 
 strong position and assigned the troops to it as they arrived. 
 
 "Soon after two o'clock Lee had arrived on Seminary Ridge, 
 and seen the defeat of the enemy and their retreat over Ceme- 
 tery Hill." He immediately sent word to Ewell, who had 
 stopped the pursuit, to press the fugitives and take Cemetery 
 Hill "if possible." Again a fatal qualifying clause in the order 
 was to defeat the purpose of the commanding general of an 
 army. General Ewell did not consider it "possible." He had 
 sent away two of his brigades to meet a column of Federals re- 
 ported to be advancing on the Hanover Road ; and one of his 
 divisions [Johnson] had not yet come up. He decided to 
 await the arrival of this division. It arrived before six o'clock ; 
 still Ewell made no attack, though the sun did not go down 
 until 7.30, and there was a full moon. Instead of attacking he 
 rode to General Lee and persuaded him to allow Johnson's 
 division to seize Culp's Hill. About midnight the division 
 moved around the base of Culp's Hill, "and a reconnoitering 
 party ascended, but found the enemy [Wadsworth's division] 
 in possession."* 
 
 Johnson's division was not withdrawn from the isolated 
 position it had reached at the base of Culp's Hill until the end 
 of the battle, which General Alexander considers one of the 
 most serious mistakes made by the Confederates. "It was far 
 too weak," he says, "to attack the strong position of the enemy 
 
 *Alexander. 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 369 
 
 on Culp's Hill, and its communication with the rest of the army- 
 was long, roundabout, and exposed to the enemy's view. But 
 the division was alloived to remain until the end of the battle, 
 and, as long as it remained absent, the task before the re- 
 mainder of the army zuas beyond its strength."* 
 
 Narrating the events of this day, General Long in his 
 Memoirs of Lee says : "While Lee and his staff were ascending 
 South Mountain," on their way from Chambersburg to Cash- 
 town, "firing was heard from the direction of Gettysburg. 
 This caused Lee some little uneasiness. The unfortunate ab- 
 sence of the cavalry prevented him from knowing the position 
 and movements of the enemy, and it was impossible to estimate 
 the true condition of affairs in his front. He was at first per- 
 suaded that the firing indicated a cavalry affair of minor im- 
 portance; but by the time Cashtown was reached the sound 
 had become heavy and continuous, and indicated a severe en- 
 gagement. . . . In a short time . . . his suspense was 
 relieved by a message from A. P. Hill, who reported that he 
 was engaged with two corps of the enemy, and requested re- 
 inforcements. Anderson's division, which had just reached 
 Cashtown, was at once pushed forward to his support, and 
 General Lee with his staff quickly followed." Near the close 
 of the day's battle Anderson's division reached the field. 
 
 Longstreet joined Lee on Seminary Ridge before the battle 
 was over, but his corps was still far behind. It had been cut 
 off at Greenwood, seventeen miles from Gettysburg, by John- 
 son's division [Ewell's Corps], which crossed the road ahead of 
 it. This division with the trains and reserve artillery of its 
 corps was about fourteen miles long, and delayed Longstreet's 
 two divisions [Hood and McLaws] four hours. They did not 
 reach their bivouac, four miles from the battle-field, until near 
 midnight. Pickett's division was still back at Chambersburg. 
 
 After discussing the situation with Longstreet General Lee 
 sent Colonel Long to reconnoiter the Federal position on 
 Cemetery Hill. Long appears to have concluded with Ewell 
 that the position was formidable,! especially as it was known 
 that the Federals had already received reinforcements. A part 
 of the Twelfth Corps [Slocum] had arrived, and the Third was 
 coming up. On receiving Long's report, therefore, Lee con- 
 sidered the "worn-out condition of his men, and the strength of 
 
 *The italics are General Alexander's. 
 fHunt. 
 
370 American Campaigns. 
 
 the Federal position, and decided to wait until morning be- 
 fore attempting to follow up the victory gained by the corps 
 of Hill and Ewell. He turned to Longstreet and Hill, and 
 said, 'Gentlemen, we will attack the enemy in the morning as 
 • early as practicable.' "* 
 
 *Long. 
 
LECTURE XVIII. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 SECOND AND THIRD DAYS. 
 
 Second Day. 
 
 (192) The field of the second and third days of battle at 
 Gettysburg lies south of the town between Willoughby Run 
 and Rock Creek. The Union army occupied a defensive posi- 
 tion of which Culp's Hill, Cemetery Hill, and the two Round 
 Tops were the key-points. The possession of any one of these 
 points by the Confederates would have rendered the position 
 untenable. 
 
 The line, as finally occupied, was about four miles long, and 
 had the general shape of a huge fish-hook, which, with its bent 
 part at Cemetery Hill, had its barb at Culp's Hill, its point at 
 the knoll about 600 yards farther south, its shank along Ceme- 
 tery Ridge, and its eye at Round Top. Its convex form gave it 
 the advantage of interior lines of operation. While this posi- 
 tion presented a salient order of battle, ordinarily the weakest 
 defensive order of battle, it has been selected by Hamley to 
 illustrate the single exceptional case in which the salient posi- 
 tion is a strong one. Here the apex of the line -rested on 
 Cemetery Hill, which formed a high and strong part of the 
 position, and, Hamley says, "acted as a traverse or great mound 
 protecting the wings from enfilade."* In this statement, how- 
 ever, Hamley is not wholly right. The northern face of the 
 salient was shielded by the hill, but the western face, "extend- 
 ing south from the bend of Cemetery Hill toward Little Round 
 Top, was subject to enfilade fire from the town and its flanks 
 and suburbs. "f 
 
 From Cemetery Hill the ridge of the same name, stretching 
 almost due south, decreases in height, and its western face, 
 cleared of timber, descends in slopes almost as smooth and 
 gentle as the glacis of a fortress. At a point nearly a mile 
 from the cemetery the crest of the ridge descends almost to the 
 level of the valley west of it ; from this point it rises abruptly, 
 taking in the peak of Little Round Top and ending at Round 
 
 *Hamley's Operations of War. 
 fAlexander. 
 
372 American Campaigns. 
 
 Top, whose summit "is not less than 210 feet above Gettys- 
 burg."* The summit of Little Round Top is 500 yards north 
 of that of Round Top and 105 feet lower. These two knolls, 
 separated by a narrow depression, look like great heaps of 
 boulders covered with scrubby bushes and trees that spring 
 out of every crack and hole. The knolls command all the coun- 
 try round about, and from a distance appear "inaccessible to 
 man." At the base of their steep western slopes flows a small 
 marshy stream, Plum Run, whose bed is more than 300 feet 
 below the summit of Round Top. Beyond this stream, 500 
 yards due west of little Round Top, rises another hill not so 
 high but just as wild and steep. It has taken the name of 
 Devil's Den from one of its chasms, which had received that 
 impious name from the country folk thereabout. 
 
 The face of the concave ridge leading from Cemetery Hill to 
 Culp's Hill is rather steep and rocky, and Culp's Hill, like 
 Round Top, is covered with boulders and tangled woods and 
 underbrush down to the very edge of Rock Creek, a hundred 
 and fifty feet below its summit. On the opposite side of the 
 stream, a mile from Culp's Hill, is another wooded height 
 known as Wolf Hill. The small knoll at the point of the fish- 
 hook is considerably lower than Culp's Hill ; its sides are cov- 
 ered with woods. 
 
 From Cemetery Hill another low ridge, along which runs 
 the Emmitsburg Road, reaches toward the southwest, becom- 
 ing lower and flatter until, merging with Seminary Ridge, it 
 joins the foot of the slope from Devil's Den at the Peach 
 Orchard, just one mile west of the lowest part of Cemetery 
 Ridge. The Peach Orchard is higher than this part of Ceme- 
 tery Ridge. 
 
 The space between Willoughby Run and Rock Creek was in 
 the main cleared and under cultivation at the time of the battle, 
 but there were still many irregular patches of wood, generally 
 upon rocky ground or along the swampy margins of the creeks. 
 Highways and by-roads were plentiful, and fences, and stone 
 walls, and farm houses. 
 
 Operations. 
 
 General Meade had beforehand no knowledge of the topog- 
 raphy of the country about Gettysburg, and had not thought of 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 373 
 
 engaging in a battle there. Hancock, however, after examin- 
 ing the position just described, was greatly impressed with its 
 defensive strength. He rode back to Meade's headquarters 
 and recommended that the army occupy the position. Meade 
 approved the recommendation and issued the necessary orders. 
 
 (199) Meade reached the field about one o'clock at night, 
 and at seven o'clock a.m. on the 2nd day he had at hand the 
 following troops: the First, Second, Eleventh, and Twelfth 
 Corps, two-thirds of the Third, and two-thirds of the Fifth ; by 
 nine o'clock the rest of the Third had arrived, and by twelve 
 o'clock the rest of the Fifth. At 10.30 a.m. the artillery re- 
 serve [Hunt] and its large ammunition trains arrived from 
 Taneytown. At two o'clock the head of the Sixth Corps 
 reached the ground. This corps had made a continuous march 
 of thirty-four miles from Manchester and was well-nigh 
 exhausted.* 
 
 "Meade spent the morning looking over the field,"f and as- 
 signing his troops to position. Early in the day the Confed- 
 erates were seen deploying beyond Culp's Hill, and Meade 
 ordered Slocum, who commanded the right wing, to attack 
 them; but having received a report from Slocum that the 
 ground was very unfavorable, he withdrew the order.J 
 
 The First and the Eleventh Corps were left in the positions 
 they had taken the afternoon before, — the Eleventh at Ceme- 
 tery Hill, with two divisions of the First on its left, and Wads- 
 worth's division at Culp's Hill. The other corps were assigned 
 places as they came up — the Twelfth to the right of Wads- 
 worth's division; the Second to the left of the Eleventh and 
 First on Cemetery Ridge. The Third, most of which had ar- 
 rived the evening before, was directed to prolong the line to the 
 Round Tops on the left. Sickles, however, finding the part of 
 the line assigned to him, just north of Little Round Top, lower 
 than the ground a mile in front of it at the Peach Orchard, 
 asked leave to move his corps forward to the higher position. 
 General Hunt was sent to examine the forward position. While 
 the examination was in progress Sickles sent out some skir- 
 mishers to reconnoiter the woods to the west of the Peach 
 Orchard. The woods were found to be occupied by the enemy, 
 and three of his columns were reported to be moving to the 
 left. On receiving this information Sickles, without awaiting 
 
 *Fiebeger. Doubleday. 
 
 fFiebeger. 
 
 jSwinton. 
 
374 American Campaigns. 
 
 the answer to his request for permission to move his line for- 
 ward, did so on his own responsibility. He placed Humphreys's 
 division along the Emmitsburg Road with its left at the Peach 
 Orchard, and Birney's division on the ridge from Devil's Den 
 to the Orchard. He placed no troops on the Round Tops. 
 
 The Fifth Corps was held in reserve near the point where 
 Rock Creek crossed the Baltimore Pike. The artillery reserve 
 and the ammunition trains were parked in a central position 
 from which roads radiated to the various sections of the line. 
 Buford's cavalry division had been posted near Round Top to 
 guard the left flank, but it was ordered on the morning of the 
 2nd to Westminster to escort the trains, and was not replaced 
 by Gregg's division "as General Meade had understood."* The 
 left of the line was thus left uncovered. The cavalry divisions 
 of Gregg and Kilpatrick "were well out on the right flank, from 
 which, after a brush with Stuart on the evening of the 2nd, 
 Kilpatrick was sent next morning [the 3rd] to replace 
 Buford."t 
 
 "In the conversation that succeeded" his announcement to 
 Longstreet and Hill on the evening of July 1, that he would 
 attack the Federal position next morning, Lee "directed them to 
 make the necessary preparations and be ready for prompt ac- 
 tion. "J The corps of Ewell and Hill were on the field and 
 Longstreet's corps, except Pickett's division and one brigade, 
 would bivouac only four miles away. Lee's purpose was to 
 attack the enemy early in the morning, before the rest of the 
 Union troops should reach the field. 
 
 Yet time was consumed in reconnoitering the Union position' 
 and deciding where to attack it, and it was 11 a.m. on the 
 2nd before Lee's order for the attack was issued. "Ander- 
 son's division of Hill's corps was directed to extend Hill's line 
 upon Seminary Ridge to the right, while Longstreet with 
 Hood's and McLa'ws's divisions should make a flank march to 
 the right and pass beyond the enemy's flank, which seemed to 
 extend along the Emmitsburg Road. Forming then at right 
 angles to this road, the attack was to sweep down the enemy's, 
 line from their left, being taken up successively by the brigades, 
 of Anderson's division as they were reached. Ewell's corps,. 
 
 *Fiebeger. 
 
 tHunt. 
 
 JLong. 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 375 
 
 holding the extreme left, was to attack on hearing Longstreet's 
 guns."* 
 
 The map here shown gives the position of the troops on each 
 side at about half after three in the afternoon. In the Confed- 
 erate line Johnson's division of Ewell's corps was on the east 
 side of Rock Creek ; Early's division was between Rock Creek 
 and the town ; and Rodes's division was in the town with its- 
 right resting on Seminary Ridge. Then came Hill's corps 
 along this ridge with Pender's division at the left and Ander- 
 son's at the right, while Heth's division was on the west side 
 of Willoughby Run, acting as the general reserve of the whole 
 army. Longstreet's corps (except Pickett's division which- 
 had not yet come up) formed the right of the Confederate line,, 
 with ]yicLaws's division in front of Sickles's position at the 
 Peach Orchard, and Hood's division on the extreme right. 
 The few squadrons of cavalry that were with the army cov- 
 ered its extreme left. 
 
 Longstreet's two divisions [Hood and McLaws] had quitted 
 their bivouacs at daybreak, but had halted on the way and 
 lost time in finding a route by which to avoid being seen by the- 
 Federal signal party on Little Round Top. "This incident de- 
 layed the opening of the battle nearly two hours; and there 
 had been a further delay of a half-hour or more to wait for 
 Law's brigade, which was still behind, to join its division 
 [Hood]. So "it was about 3 p.m. when Hood's division, in 
 the advance, crossed the Emmitsburg Road about 1,000 yards, 
 south of the Peach Orchard."* 
 
 In his flank march Longstreet had taken every pains to con- 
 ceal his columns ; but his movement had not wholly escaped the 
 notice of the Federals ; it was his columns that had been seen by 
 the scouts sent forward by Sickles from the Peach Orchard. 
 Still "his strength and position were very imperfectly known" 
 by the Federals "at the beginning of the battle. "f 
 
 The artillery, says Longstreet, opened fire at three o'clock 
 against the two sides of the angle at the Peach Orchard. But 
 "Hood's lines were not yet ready." At length Hood was "or- 
 dered to bear down upon the enemy's left, but he was not 
 prompt, "f and it was after four o'clock when he advanced to> 
 the attack. 
 
 About this time Warren, the chief engineer of the Army of 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
 tFiebeger. 
 
 JLongstreet. 
 
376 American Campaigns. 
 
 the Potomac, was inspecting the left of the Union line, and 
 discovered that Little Round Top, the key of the position, was 
 occupied only by a small squad of signallers. He sent word at 
 once to Meade and asked for a division to hold the point. 
 Seeing the Fifth Corps moving to the front to reinforce Sickles, 
 Warren hurried to its commander and got him to detach two 
 brigades and a battery to Little Round Top. The two bri- 
 gades arrived none too soon, for the right of Hood's line had 
 crossed Plum Run and ascended the slopes of Round Top; 
 then it had wheeled to the left and, crossing the depression be- 
 tween the two knolls, was now near the top of Little Round 
 Top. Here a sharp fight took place ; but the Federals kept pos- 
 session of the summit and drove the Confederates back to the 
 foot of the hill. 
 
 Meantime Meade had hurried reinforcements to aid Sickles ; 
 but Hood's division was fighting alone, for, in the "successive 
 order of battle" adopted by the Confederates, McLaws's divi- 
 sion was standing idle, impatiently waiting for Longstreet's 
 order to attack. Hood had been wounded and Law was in 
 command of his division. After nearly an hour of fierce com- 
 bat Law got possession of Devil's Den ; but he could not gain 
 another inch, and took up the defensive on the captured hill, 
 appealing to the troops on his left for help. Two of McLaws's 
 brigades [Kershaw and Semmes] then advanced, but the two 
 on their left [Barksdale and Wofford] were still held back by 
 Longstreet, and the whole of Anderson's division farther to 
 the left also stood fast. 
 
 Finally Longstreet started the brigades of Barksdale and 
 Wofford forward. General Alexander says : "Barksdale's 
 brigade advanced directly upon the Peach Orchard. Wof- 
 ford's inclined somewhat to the right and went to the assist- 
 ance of Kershaw and Semmes, striking the flank of the Feder- 
 als opposing them. The enemy was driven back with severe 
 loss and followed across the Wheat Field and on the slopes of 
 Little Round Top. Barksdale had made an equal advance 
 upon our left. But by this time the reinforcements which 
 Meade was hurrying from every part of the Federal line began 
 to swarm around our mixed-up brigades. Barksdale was 
 killed, Semmes mortally wounded, and our lines were slowly 
 forced back. Another partial attack had spent its energy upon 
 a task impossible for so small a force." 
 
 After another long delay three brigades of Anderson's divi- 
 sion moved forward and charged, in succession from right to 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 377 
 
 left, each driving the enemy before it toward Cemetery Ridge, 
 and each in turn being repulsed and driven back. One bri- 
 gade [Wright] actually made a lodgment upon the crest, but, 
 failing to receive prompt support, was obliged to withdraw. 
 •Of Anderson's other two brigades, Posey's scarcely advanced 
 .a skirmish line, and Mahone's was held in reserve; as was, 
 also, Heth's whole division. Thus the day's battle came to 
 -an end in the right wing of the Confederate line.* 
 
 (200) Sickles's faulty salient at the Peach Orchard had 
 .been crushed in and pushed back, but the Confederates had 
 not reached the main front of the Union position, nor envel- 
 oped its flank. In all this conflict, from four o'clock till after 
 seven, only eleven brigades had taken part — eight of Long- 
 street's corps and three of Hill's. Hill and Ewell had been or- 
 dered to cooperate with Longstreet's battle, but they limited 
 their cooperation to an ineffective cannonading of the Federal 
 intrenchments in their front ; while Meade was stripping those 
 intrenchments of infantry and concentrating it upon the eleven 
 •Confederate brigades engaged. Twenty brigades of rein- 
 forcements were sent to that part of the Federal line; eight 
 of the Fifth Corps ; four of the Second ; five of the First ; and 
 three of the Twelfth. Two other brigades of the Twelfth 
 started for the scene of struggle, but lost their way. All of 
 the reinforcements did not become engaged.f 
 
 Though Ewell had received orders to attack on hearing 
 Longstreet's guns, he limited his attack to artillery fire until 
 6 p.m. ; then he sent his division commanders orders to attack 
 in their fronts. Johnson's division was to assault the Union 
 right at Culp's Hill, which, besides its great natural strength, 
 was strongly fortified with field-works. Only three of John- 
 son's four brigades crossed Rock Creek, and it was dark when 
 they entered the woods at the foot of the hill. The left one of 
 the brigades [Steuart] took possession of some trenches that 
 had been vacated by a part of the Twelfth Corps; the other 
 two brigades were stopped in the woods on the side of the hill 
 by fire from the breastworks, above; and their "attack re- 
 solved itself into a random and ineffective musketry fire."f 
 
 Early's division, supported by Rodes's, was to attack Ceme- 
 tery Hill. One of his brigades [Smith] was in rear watching 
 the York Pike, and another [Gordon] was held in reserve and 
 mot engaged. The other two brigades of the division charged 
 
 *Doubleday. Alexander. 
 fAlexander. 
 
378 American Campaigns. 
 
 the hill and carried it ; but as they were not supported by 
 Rodes's division, and Ames's brigade [Eleventh Corps] on the- 
 hill was promptly reinforced by a brigade of the Second Corps, 
 they were driven back;* and the second day's battle was over. 
 
 Rodes's division had not fired a shot; Ewell had allowed it 
 to remain all day at the northwestern edge of the town, near 
 where the battle of the day before had ended. There it was 
 when Rodes received the order to assault. Before he could 
 march his column through the town, and across the interven- 
 ing space of 1,200 to 1,400 yards, and deploy it for attack, Early 
 had made his assault and been repulsed. Rodes, therefore, 
 withheld his attack and bivouacked his troops to the southwest 
 of the town "along the hollow of an old road-bed."* 
 
 Such was the second day's battle — on the part of the Con- 
 federates a succession of tardy, isolated, unsupported attacks, 
 in which one division, Pickett's, had not reached the field, and 
 three others, Heth's, Pender's, and Rodes's, and four brigades,, 
 had scarcely fired a shot; on the part of the Federals a well- 
 managed, if perfectly passive defense, in which every im- 
 periled section of the line had been promptly reinforced, and 
 every assault of the enemy repulsed. 
 
 Third Day. 
 
 General Lee resolved to renew the assault upon the Union 
 position on the 3rd of July. Stuart had rejoined with his- 
 column of cavalry, which was very much the worse for wear;. 
 Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps, also, had come up; 
 so that at dawn of the 3rd Lee's whole army was present except 
 a small force (two brigades) of cavalry left to guard the river 
 and the mountain passes on the line of retreat. 
 
 About midnight the Union troops that had been with- 
 drawn from the trenches on the extreme right of the line — 
 Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps — returned to their 
 trenches, and were surprised to find them occupied by the- 
 enemy — the left of Johnson's Confederate division. Before- 
 dawn Ewell had reinforced this advanced portion of Johnson's 
 division with two of Rodes's brigades and one of Early's. 
 Some other changes had been made on both sides in the course- 
 of the night, but, on the whole, the two forces occupied at 
 dawn about the same positions they had held at the close of the 
 battle on the night of the 2nd. Longstreet held the rocks and 
 
 *A1exanHer. 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 379 1 
 
 woods of Devil's Den, the bases of the Round Tops, and the 
 Wheat Field ; at the center three of Anderson's brigades had 
 partly pierced the Union line; and on the Confederate left a 
 part of Johnson's division was inside the Union trenches in 
 a position from which it could take the Federal line in 
 reverse; and Lee had possession of the Emmitsburg Road 
 upon whose ridge there were good positions for his artillery.* 
 
 Lee knew that greater successes had not been achieved on 
 the 2nd for lack of proper concert of action on the part of his 
 corps extended over so wide a concave front. In renewing the 
 battle he hoped to have the assaults made by the different parts 
 of his line in a manner to support one another. f He pur- 
 posed having Longstreet again attack the Union left ; while 
 Ewell should hold fast to the advanced position he had gained 
 and assail the enemy's right and rear ; and Hill should occupy 
 the enemy at the center. 
 
 (201) Before the Confederates were ready to open their 
 attack, however, "in the early gray of the morning" Federal 
 batteries which, during the night, had been placed on all the 
 prominent points in the vicinity of Johnson's position, opened 
 fire. As Johnson, on account of the creek and the steep slope 
 with its rocks and woods, had not been able to take any ar- 
 tillery with him, he could not reply to the fire. He could not r 
 however, lie idle under it ; he resolved, therefore, to charge for 
 a better position on higher ground ; but he was met in front by 
 Geary's division, and taken in flank by Ruger's brigade. Other 
 Union troops hastened to oppose him, also, and he was re- 
 pulsed. "At about 11 a.m., finding the contest hopeless, and 
 his retreat threatened by a force sent up Rock Creek, Johnson 
 . . gave up the position and withdrew to Rock Creek, 
 
 where he remained until night. "% 
 
 This unlooked-for turn of events "induced General Lee, after 
 making a reconnaissance of the enemy's position, to change 
 his plan of assault. "§ He was aware that Cemetery Ridge 
 was strongly held from one end to the other, but he judged the 
 weakest part of the line to be at the curve where it approached 
 nearest to the Emmitsburg Road, a half to three-quarters of a 
 mile south of the point where that road and the Taneytown 
 Road intersected. Owing to its convexity this part of the Union 
 
 *Hunt. 
 
 tLee's Report. 
 JDoubleday. 
 §Long. 
 
380 American Campaigns. 
 
 position could not be supported by cross fire from its right or 
 left, except by the cannon on Little Round Top. These Lee 
 thought could be silenced by his own guns.* If the Confed- 
 erate assaulting column could pierce the Union line at this 
 point it would then take the entire right of the position in re- 
 verse ; and if the Union troops on the left should fire into the 
 backs of the victorious Confederates they would hurt their 
 own friends on the right as much as their foes. So Lee de- 
 cided to make the main assault at this point, and directed 
 Longstreet to carry it out. 
 
 Most of the forenoon was spent by the Confederates in 
 moving their troops into position for the attack. Ten brigades 
 were assigned to the assaulting column: Pickett's division of 
 three brigades ; Heth's of four, under Pettigrew ; two of Pen- 
 der's, and Wilcox's brigade. None of the brigades except 
 Wilcox's had taken part in the battle of the day before. The 
 rest of Hill's corps was to support the assault on the left, and 
 the divisions of Hood and McLaws, in front of the Round 
 Tops, were to support it on the right. Rodes held two of his 
 brigades in the old sunken road that he had found the night 
 before leading out from the southwestern angle of the town; 
 his other two were with Johnson. The two brigades of Pen- 
 der's division not assigned to the charge took their place on the 
 right of Rodes's line; Early had his brigades, except the one 
 with Johnson, in and near the town ; and Johnson was still on 
 Rock Creek at the foot of Culp's Hill. 
 
 The arrangement of the brigades in the assaulting column, 
 as it moved out to charge, may be represented thus : 
 
 Brockenbrough, Davis, McGozvan, Archer, Garnett, Kemper, 
 Lane, Scales, Armistead, 
 
 Wilcox. 
 
 The front line was more than a mile long; its right was near 
 the Peach Orchard and its left near the southern end of the 
 hollow road occupied by Rodes. The second line was 200 yards 
 behind the first, and Wilcox's brigade, not having started till 
 twenty minutes after the others, "was much too late to be of 
 any assistance whatever. Both flanks of the assaulting column 
 were in the air and the left without any support in rear."f A 
 hundred and fifty-nine guns had been placed in position, nearly 
 
 *Long. 
 tAlexander. 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 381 
 
 all of them in an irregular line along Seminary Ridge from the 
 Peach Orchard to the Hagerstown Road. Strangely enough, 
 the Confederate artillerists had not discovered that the Union 
 line could be reached by artillery fire from the town and its 
 flank, and had put no guns at those places "to enfilade the 
 'shank of the fish-hook,' and cross fire with the guns from the 
 west."* 
 
 In the Union line on the front to be assaulted : first came the 
 Eleventh Corps on Cemetery Hill ; then one division of the 
 First; then the Second; then another division of the First; 
 then the Third ; and the Fifth prolonged the line to the Round 
 Tops. Batteries were stationed along the front wherever posi- 
 tions could be found for the guns; but only seventy-seven 
 pieces were in position to reply to the Confederate cannon. f 
 Kilpatrick covered the left of the line with Farnsworth's cav- 
 alry brigade ; and later in the day Merritt's brigade of Buford's 
 division came up by the Emmitsburg Road from the direction 
 of Frederick City, and fell upon the rear of Longstreet's right.J 
 •At one o'clock Colonel Alexander, Longstreet's chief of ar- 
 tillery, opened the cannonade, directing his fire upon a clump 
 of trees on Cemetery Ridge which marked the point of assault. 
 The Union batteries in position replied with all their guns, and 
 the result was the greatest artillery duel that has ever taken 
 place on the American Continent. Most of the Confederate 
 projectiles flew high and only swept the ground behind the 
 front assailed. The main damage they did was to blow up 
 nearly a dozen caissons of the Federal reserve artillery parked 
 in rear. After nearly an hour of firing General Hunt, the 
 Federal chief of artillery, saw that his ammunition was run- 
 ning low, and ordered his batteries to cease firing. Hunt's 
 purpose was to reserve his ammunition for the enemy's as- 
 saulting columns, which it was now plain would follow soon. 
 
 Before the Union guns ceased firing, however, Colonel Alex- 
 ander, who knew that the ammunition of the Confederate bat- 
 teries could not last more than an hour, and who was charged 
 with the duty of giving the signal for the advance, had sent the 
 following note to Pickett : "General : If you are to advance at 
 all, you must come at once or we will not be able to support you 
 as we ought. But the enemy's fire has not slackened materi- 
 ally, and there are still 18 guns firing from the cemetery." (He 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
 fHunt. 
 
 jj. T. Long's pamphlet on the battle of Gettysburg. 
 
•382 American Campaigns. 
 
 had been told that the clump of trees marked the position of 
 the cemetery.) Soon afterwards Alexander noticed a falling- 
 off in the enemy's fire and saw some of the guns withdraw. At 
 1.40 he sent another note to Pickett, saying: "For God's sake, 
 come quick. The 18 guns have gone. Come quick or my am- 
 munition will not let me support you properly."* 
 
 In a few minutes Pickett's 15,000 infantry emerged from the 
 woods behind, and passed through the line of Alexander's bat- 
 teries. In front lay an almost level stretch of farm-land about 
 a half-mile wide which must be crossed before the enemy's line 
 could be reached. It contained scarcely a bit of cover for the 
 assailants, but rail fences to obstruct their advance. Across 
 this space the first and second lines started; and immediately 
 Hunt's batteries reopened their fire and turned it all upon the 
 charging lines. Alexander's guns, some of which moved for- 
 ward to closer range, supported the charge, until the lines were 
 seen to "close in upon the enemy in smoke and dust." The ar- 
 tillery ceased firing, then, to await the result. 
 
 The lines kept up the charge to within close musketry range 
 of the Union position; but there Pettigrew's brigades, on the 
 left, wavered and then fell back. Pickett's brigades were thus 
 left without support ; but they pushed on. Stannard's brigade 
 of the First Corps wheeled to the right and charged Pickett's 
 troops in flank and rear, adding to the slaughter and confusion. 
 Still the Confederates were not stopped. The leading troops got 
 'Over the stone wall behind which were posted troops of the 
 Second Corps, and captured some Federal guns beyond it. But 
 soon they were surrounded on all sides and overwhelmed ; 
 many were captured and the rest were driven back; and the 
 losses were far greater in the retreat than in the advance. 
 
 Wilcox's brigade was not in this charge ; the charge had been 
 made and repulsed before this brigade moved forward. Then 
 it advanced almost alone under a heavy fire, and when Federal 
 infantry came out and attacked its left, it moved by the right 
 flank, and, making a circuit, regained the Confederate line at 
 the Peach Orchard * 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 While this great battle was raging between the infantry and 
 artillery of the hostile armies the cavalry was not standing 
 
 *Alexander. 
 
The Campaign at Gettysburg. 383 
 
 idle. Stuart with four brigades and four horse-batteries had 
 marched round to the right and rear of the Union line. (202) 
 Between the York and the Hanover Roads, about two miles 
 and a half east of Gettysburg, he took position on a wooded 
 ridge from which he had a view of the roads in rear of the 
 Federal army. He threw out a line of dismounted skirmishers 
 to the south of him. 
 
 On another low ridge a half-mile to the east was Mcintosh's 
 brigade of D. McM. Gregg's Federal cavalry division. Mc- 
 intosh sent forward a dismounted skirmish line, which en- 
 gaged Stuart's near the Rummel House. Gregg, who was 
 not far away with Custer's brigade of Kilpatrick's division, 
 sent Custer and two batteries of artillery to aid Mcintosh. 
 The combat which ensued "swayed from side to side" about the 
 Rummel farm, until the Federal cavalry was finally forced 
 back'. (203) Then the three Confederate brigades of Wade 
 Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, and Chambliss charged in close col- 
 umn of squadrons, saber in hand. Custer charged in like man- 
 ner and met the Confederates in front, while several other de- 
 tachments struck them in flank ; and the Confederates were 
 thrown into confusion and driven back. Afterwards the hostile 
 batteries engaged in an indecisive duel, "and at nightfall each 
 side held substantially its original ground."* 
 
 (204) At the other end of the line, about an hour after this 
 fight, Kifpatrick required Farnsworth to make a hopeless and 
 useless sacrifice of his own life and a large part of his cavalry 
 brigade. Two regiments were made to charge the rear of Long- 
 street's right on the slope of Round Top. They rode in col- 
 umns as best they could, over rocks and creeks, rail fences and 
 stone walls, and were shot down helplessly by the Confederate 
 infantry. They accomplished nothing, save to end the battle of 
 Gettysburg as it had begun, with a combat between Confed- 
 erate infantry and Union cavalry. 
 
 Lee's Retreat. 
 
 Lee now gave up the effort to dislodge Meade's army; there 
 was nothing left for him to do but to retreat across the Potomac 
 as quickly as practicable. His ammunition was nearly ex- 
 hausted, provisions could not be gotten where he was, and his 
 line of retreat was in danger of being cut off by the enemy. 
 
 *Hunt. 
 
384 American Campaigns. 
 
 (192) In anticipation of a counter-attack Lee withdrew 
 Ewell's corps to Seminary Ridge, and had a strong line of in- 
 trenchments made from Oak Hill to the Peach Orchard, cover- 
 ing his lines of retreat, the Chambersburg Pike and the Hagers- 
 town Road. (205) On the 4th of July he started off his 
 train of ambulances and empty wagons laden with the 
 wounded by the Chambersburg Pike under escort of Imbo- 
 den's cavalry brigade. At dark the other trains set out by 
 the Fairfield [Hagerstown] Road, guarded by Hill's corps; 
 Longstreet followed Hill, and Ewell's corps marched as the 
 rear-guard. 
 
 The same day Meade ordered French, whose corps had been 
 withdrawn from Maryland Heights to Frederick City, to seize 
 the lower passes of the mountains and reoccupy Harper's 
 Ferry; and he started Kilpatrick with all the cavalry except 
 two brigades [Mcintosh and D. I. Gregg] "to harass the 
 enemy's anticipated retreat and destroy his trains and bridges 
 at Williamsport."* 
 
 There was a fierce rain storm, and mud and the darkness 
 of night so hindered Lee's movement that day had broken on 
 the 5th before the rear-guard had started. (206) As soon, 
 on the 5th, as Meade was sure that Lee had begun a retreat, 
 he started D. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade in pursuit by the 
 Chambersburg Pike, and the Sixth Corps [Sedgwick] by the 
 Fairfield Road. The rest of the Union army set out the next 
 day (the 6th) by the Emmitsburg Road. 
 
 Sedgwick found the Confederate rear-guard intrenched in 
 the Fairfield pass. Thereupon Meade sent two corps to his 
 support and halted the rest of the army. (207) Then Meade 
 concluded that it would cost too much to carry the mountain 
 pass, and withdrew Sedgwick, sending only Mcintosh's cav- 
 alry brigade and a brigade of infantry to follow the Confed- 
 erates, while the rest of the army moved toward the lower 
 passes. 
 
 (208) On the 8th the Confederate army was at Hagerstown 
 and Funkstown, and the Union army was between Frederick 
 and Boonsboro. Kilpatrick's cavalry had been in action' with 
 the Confederates on the evening of the 4th near Fairfield, and 
 cavalry combats had taken place every day for several days. 
 Much damage had been done the Confederate trains and many 
 prisoners had been captured by the Federal cavalry. (206) 
 
 *Hunt. 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 385 
 
 "On the 6th Buford's division had attacked" the trains "at 
 Williamsport, and Kilpatrick toward Hagerstown; but as Im- 
 boden's train-guard was strong and Stuart's cavalry was up, 
 and Longstreet close by, they had to withdraw."* (209) On 
 the 9th Meade's headquarters were at Turner's Gap and his 
 leading troops were at Rohrersville and Boonsboro. 
 
 Lee had arrived at Williamsport on the 7th and found that 
 Union cavalry sent up by French had destroyed the pontoon- 
 bridge at Falling Waters, and heavy rains had raised the river 
 and made it impassable. (210) Lee therefore took up a 
 strong position covering Williamsport and Falling Waters, on 
 the ridge between Marsh and Conococheague Creeks, with 
 his right resting on a bend of the Potomac and his left on 
 Conococheague Creek. Here he waited for the river to fall,, 
 and spent the time building a pontoon-bridge of such materials, 
 as were at hand, daily expecting to be attacked by Meade. 
 
 On the 10th Meade moved his headquarters to Antietairt 
 Creek; the left of his line crossed the creek and the right 
 moved up near Funkstown and Leitersburg. (211) By the 
 13th Meade had his forces in front of the position taken up. 
 by Lee.f He spent the day in reconnoitering the Confederate 
 position and issued orders for a "demonstration in force" to 
 take place on the morning of the 14th. (212) "On advancing- 
 that morning it was found that the enemy had abandoned his. 
 line" during the night "and crossed the river, partly by ford-* 
 ing, partly by a new bridge."* Lee's second and last invasion 
 of the North had ended in failure. 
 
 In this campaign the Army of the Potomac had lost: 3,155 
 killed, 14,529 wounded, 5,365 missing, or 23,049 all told ; and 
 the Army of Northern Virginia, as nearly as can be determined,, 
 had lost 2,592 killed, 12,709 wounded and 5,150 missing, or 
 20,451 all told. The Confederate loss was probably greater; 
 Livermore, in his Numbers and Losses in the Civil War, makes, 
 the following estimate: killed, 3,903; wounded, 18,735; miss- 
 ing, 5,425 ; total, 28,063. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 (186) Of all the objects, political and military, for which 
 Lee's invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania was undertaken,, 
 only one was achieved ; to wit, the war was transferred for a 
 
 *Hunt. 
 fSwinton. 
 
386 American Campaigns. 
 
 few days from Southern to Northern soil, and the Confederate 
 army subsisted for the time on stores collected in the North. 
 As the invasion was not crowned with victory it did not in- 
 crease Southern prestige and credit in Europe nor strengthen 
 the anti-war sentiment at the North ; it had a quite contrary 
 effect. Nor did it save Pemberton's army at Vicksburg, which 
 surrendered to General Grant on the 4th of July. 
 
 Lee judged Halleck and President Lincoln aright in believ- 
 ing that they would not let the Army of the Potomac take 
 advantage of his movement northward to advance on Rich- 
 mond, but would require it to march northward, too, and keep 
 between him and Washington. There was apparently some 
 <danger that a Union force at Fort Monroe, the Seventh Corps, 
 might move against Richmond ; but Lee was right, also, in be- 
 lieving that Halleck would not let this force, either, go farther 
 away from Washington while the Confederate army was north 
 of the Potomac. If the Confederate government could have 
 complied with Lee's recommendation to put an army "even in 
 effigy" under Beauregard at Culpeper Court House to 
 threaten Washington, it is likely that some of the Union corps 
 that took part in the Battle of Gettysburg would have been 
 held nearer Washington. 
 
 In stretching his army from Fredericksburg to Williams- 
 port, ninety miles as the crow flies, Lee gave Hooker an oppor- 
 tunity to fall upon its widely separated parts and destroy them 
 in detail. Lee must have felt sure that Halleck's fear for the 
 safety of Washington would restrain Hooker from attacking 
 the divided Confederate forces. "On no other reasonable 
 hypothesis can we account for his stretching his army from 
 Fredericksburg to Williamsport, with his enemy concentrated 
 on one flank, and on the shortest road to Richmond."* 
 
 (189) After Lee had crossed the Potomac and started up 
 the Cumberland Valley, Hooker, while still holding the bulk of 
 his forces directly between the Confederate army and Wash- 
 ington, ordered the garrison from Harper's Ferry to intercept 
 Lee's line of communications and join with the troops of Rey- 
 nolds and Slocum in operating against his rear. This plan, 
 if carried out, would have divided the Union army by South 
 Mountain, and given Lee the chance to fall upon the part west 
 of the mountains. It was not carried out, however, owing to 
 Halleck's interference. Whereupon Hooker asked to be re- 
 lieved of the command. 
 
 *Hunt. 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 387 
 
 (190) Meade, who succeeded Hooker, made his plans and 
 issued orders for taking up a position on the line Emmitsburg- 
 Hanover covering Washington and Baltimore. This position, 
 moreover, was on the flank of Lee's line of retreat, and thus 
 effectually stopped his further advance northward. It was 
 safe defensive strategy; but it was not calculated to destroy 
 the invading army, nor was it the quickest way to expel that 
 army. Lee, meantime, was making for Harrisburg, ignorant, 
 in the absence of his cavalry, of the proximity of the Army 
 of the Potomac. He supposed it was still south of the Poto- 
 mac. On learning, on the night of the 28th of June, that the 
 Union army was at Frederick, he ordered an immediate con- 
 centration of his corps at Cashtown, east of the mountains. 
 This disposition was meant to threaten Baltimore and thereby 
 to induce Meade to move his army northeast to cover that city ; 
 possibly to induce him unduly to extend its front in order to 
 cover Baltimore and Washington at the same time. Had Lee 
 assembled his army on the western side of the mountains, in 
 the Cumberland Valley, its position would noway have threat- 
 ened Baltimore or Washington, and would have left Meade 
 free to cross the mountains by the southern passes and cut off 
 its retreat. This concentration was ordered, also, with a view 
 to taking up a "position in readiness'' and waiting for Meade 
 to attack, in accordance with the plan to which Lee had agreed 
 in the beginning of the advance ; namely, a combination of of- 
 fensive strategy with defensive tactics. 
 
 (192) The choice of Gettysburg as a battle-field was made 
 wholly by chance. The first day's battle was a rencounter. 
 Neither army was at that time seeking the other to attack it. 
 Neither Lee nor Meade had thought of Cemetery Ridge as a 
 ■defensive position, or knew anything about the ground in the 
 neighborhood. A part of Heth's Confederate division went 
 down to Gettysburg to seize some shoes. This circumstance 
 brought on the battle and caused the choice of the battle-field ; 
 maybe decided the fate of the Union. It was lucky that Bu- 
 ford was there with his cavalry to dispute with Heth the pos- 
 session of the ground ; it was lucky that Reynolds was so near 
 at hand to support Buford. 
 
 The possession of Cemetery Hill was decisive of victory. 
 Lee made a great mistake, therefore, in not following up the 
 victory of Hill and Ewell promptly on the 1st of July, and in 
 not making a vigorous effort to carry the hill as soon as the 
 Union troops were driven back to it. True, the Confederate 
 
388 American Campaigns. 
 
 troops were then well-nigh spent with marching and fighting, 
 and their lines were in confusion. Yet this was apparently the 
 only time during the battle when it would have been possible 
 for them to carry the position. At that moment there were 
 seventeen brigades of Confederate infantry on the ground and 
 only thirteen brigades of Federal infantry and Buford's cav- 
 alry. General Lee, who had arrived on the field, saw the im- 
 portance of taking Cemetery Hill at once and sent Ewell an 
 order to take it ; but the order was not positive — it contained a 
 condition — an if. Ewell took advantage of the conditional 
 clause, and did not assault. Thus Lee's only chance of victory 
 was thrown away. If the First and Eleventh Corps had lost 
 Cemetery Hill on the 1st of July, Meade's army would have 
 withdrawn to the line already selected behind Pipe Creek. 
 
 Cemetery Hill was, from the beginning to the end of the 
 engagement, the weakest part of the Federal position. In the 
 first place it was a salient, which is always weak ; furthermore, 
 both the sunken road leading from the southwest angle of the 
 town, — the road occupied by Rodes's division during the night 
 of the 2nd and the day of the 3rd of July, — and the position 
 from which Early charged on the evening of the 2nd, afforded 
 cover within 500 yards of Cemetery Hill from which a con- 
 vergent assault could have been made; and there were posi- 
 tions in and near the town from which direct and enfilade artil- 
 lery fire could have reached the hill. If instead of the ill-man- 
 aged attacks of the 2nd and 3rd Lee had concentrated his army 
 and assaulted Cemetery Hill, he would have had a better 
 chance of success.* 
 
 It is hard to conceive of a worse-conducted attack than that 
 of July the 2nd. It ought to have begun at daybreak ; and Lee's 
 troops were all near enough to the field to have reached their 
 positions at that hour if they had received orders to do so and 
 had exerted themselves. But the order did not issue until 
 11 a.m., and it was after 3 p.m. when the assault began. The 
 plan of battle had in view successive attacks beginning at the 
 right and progressing toward the left. The Confederates had 
 already used the same "method on four occasions, — at Seven 
 Pines, Gaines's Mill, Frazier's Farm or Glendale, and Malvern 
 Hill, — and always with poor success." The result at Gettys- 
 burg was that Hood's division fought single-handed for more 
 than an hour, and was brought to a stand-still; then two of 
 
 *Alexander. 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 389 
 
 McLaws's brigades took up the battle ; after they had been en- 
 gaged for a half-hour or more the other two brigades of 
 McLaws's division charged; and all were driven back. Then 
 three brigades of Anderson's division advanced, one at a time 
 from right to left, and were driven back in the same order. 
 Farther to the left the divisions of Heth and Pender stood 
 virtually idle; while around on the other side of the curve 
 Ewell's corps did not fire a musket until near dark, and then 
 only five brigades assaulted. Two of these carried the Union 
 position at Cemetery Hill, but, for lack of support, were 
 straightway driven back.* 
 
 In allowing Johnson's division to go to the east side of Rock 
 Creek, reinforcing it with three brigades to assault the unas- 
 sailable right of the Union position at Culp's Hill, and leaving 
 it, as well as the three brigades sent to reinforce it, until the 
 end of the engagement, Lee practically surrenderd the use 
 of seven of his brigades; he made his line more than a mile 
 longer than it would otherwise have been, and put these bri- 
 gades in a position where they could do nothing, and from 
 which they could not be moved to assist at any other part of 
 the attack. 
 
 There has been considerable controversy as to who was to 
 blame for the tardiness of Longstreet's attack. The dispute 
 is of no moment to us in our study of this battle, except as an 
 illustration of certain points. First, it illustrates the difficulty 
 of combining and harmonizing the action of the various parts 
 of a large army in battle, when they are scattered over a wide 
 space, — a difficulty greatly lessened nowadays by means of the 
 field telegraph and telephone. Secondly, it illustrates the dis- 
 advantage of the concave order of battle for the attack — Lee's 
 line was more than six miles long, while Meade's was not 
 four ; and Lee could not dispatch troops, or even messages and 
 orders, from one part of his line to another without sending 
 them on the outside of the curve, while Meade could move his 
 troops by the chords on the inside. Thirdly, it illustrates the 
 importance of a cheerful yielding to the will of the commander, 
 who is the person responsible. Longstreet did not approve 
 Lee's plan, and a careful study of the battle from all available 
 sides leads to the suspicion that this had much to do with 
 Lee's failure. Possibly the hand of the Almighty was direct- 
 ing the affair for the salvation of the Union. And fourthly, 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
390 American Campaigns. 
 
 it illustrates the vital importance of dispatch — of promptness 
 in the movement of troops. One can almost show that every 
 defeat of the Civil War happened because somebody was slow ; 
 somebody stopped to rest, or lost his way, or marched too 
 slowly, or waited for somebody else to get out of the road, 
 or waited for somebody to join, or waited to get his orders. In 
 this instance Longstreet's corps was blocked in its march for 
 four hours, and kept from bivouac until midnight, on July 1, 
 by a division of EwelPs corps and its trains; and on July 2 
 Longstreet says : "Fearing that my force was too weak to 
 venture to make an attack, I delayed until General Law's 
 brigade joined the division." Longstreet's column also lost 
 two hours in looking for a route by which to escape the obser- 
 vation of a Union signal party on Little Round Top. 
 
 After the first day of Gettysburg Lee's chances of victory 
 steadily diminished to the end. On the morning of the 2nd 
 July he had on the ground thirty-three brigades — all of his 
 infantry except four brigades. At seven o'clock Meade had 
 thirty-nine brigades, at nine o'clock forty-one, and at twelve 
 o'clock forty-three. On the morning of the 3rd, after Pickett 
 had come up with his division, Lee had only thirty-seven bri- 
 gades ; Meade had fifty-one brigades, Sedgwick having brought 
 up the Sixth Corps ; the weak and strong points of the position 
 had been developed in the fighting of the day before; the 
 troops were more carefully disposed; and the position was 
 more thoroughly prepared for defense.* 
 
 General Longtsreet was opposed to assaulting the strong 
 position of the Union army on either the 2nd or the 3rd of 
 July ; he wanted to turn the left of the army and threaten its 
 line of retreat. This would probably have forced Meade to fall 
 back. By changing his own trains from the Chambersburg tO' 
 the Fairfield-Hagerstown road Lee could have made such a 
 maneuver without seriously exposing his own communications. 
 Meade was prepared for such a contingency, and had an order 
 already drafted, to issue in case he should have need to fall 
 back. 
 
 As a purely defensive battle there is little to criticize in the 
 Union position or General Meade's dispositions. The most se- 
 rious mistake in the dispositions was Sickles's putting his corps 
 in the advanced position at the Peach Orchard in place of at 
 the position assigned to him. It was the fear of low ground 
 that induced Sickles to move his line forward. When he 
 
 ♦Fiebeger. 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 391 
 
 reached his designated place he saw the crest of a ridge three- 
 quarters of a mile beyond, which he fancied would give the 
 enemy command of his position. He moved his corps for- 
 ward to the ridge and thus placed it beyond the support of the 
 rest of the line; and in bending back his left flank to rest it 
 upon Devil's Den, he formed a salient at the Peach Orchard 
 of which both flanks were exposed to enfilade. The tactical 
 advantage of high ground is not so great as it is generally 
 supposed to be; about its only real advantage is the wider 
 sweep of view and fire it affords. It used to be considered 
 necessary for artillery, but even that is not so to-day. Prob- 
 ably the strongest position that a line of infantry can occupy 
 is a trench with head-cover in a perfectly flat prairie or desert.. 
 The engagements in the South African War showed that the 
 defensive advantages of high ground, and the corresponding- 
 disadvantages of low ground, are largely imaginary. An- 
 other mistake in General Meade's original dispositions was. 
 his failure to occupy the Round Tops; but General War- 
 ren discovered this error in time to amend it before serious, 
 consequences followed. 
 
 General Meade defeated and repulsed the Confederates, but 
 he did not reap the full harvest of his victory tactically or 
 strategically. Tactically he had two opportunities to make de- 
 cisive counter-strokes, but neglected to take advantage of them. 
 The first was after repulsing Longstreet's forces late in the 
 afternoon of the 2nd of July. He had brought twenty bri- 
 gades to reinforce Sickles, a good many of which he had not 
 employed; if he had "now ordered an advance he would have 
 found Longstreet's left* flank in the air, and the whole line of 
 McLaws's and Hood's divisions much exhausted and but 
 poorly supplied with ammunition."* Meade's other opportunity 
 for a counter-attack came after the repulse of Pickett's charge 
 on the 3rd. True, Pickett's withdrawal was covered by the 
 long line of guns on Seminary Ridge and by infantry; but 
 these ought not to have been able to stop the counter-stroke if 
 a fresh corps, the Sixth for example, had been sent forward 
 on the heels of the fugitives. Such a counter-charge ought to 
 have split Lee's line in two, and, possibly, might have destroyed 
 or captured one wing of it. But Meade had not provided a 
 general reserve against such an opportunity. Instead of hold- 
 ing the Sixth Corps together as a general reserve, he had dis- 
 tributed it along the line "wherever he thought it needed. 
 
 *Alexander. 
 
392 American Campaigns. 
 
 ■strengthening."* Nor did General Meade molest Lee's army 
 'the next day, although it spent the whole day in a defensive 
 position upon Seminary Ridge. 
 
 (206) Lee began his retreat on the night of the 4th July. 
 Meade's cavalry started on the 4th and maintained touch, but 
 'his main army did not start until the 6th. By the 7th Lee had 
 ireached the Potomac, only to find the bridge gone and the 
 river too high to ford. As soon as his troops arrived he took 
 up a position covering the site of the bridge and ford, and in- 
 trenched. The Federal army did not arrive until the 12th. 
 Meade had taken a route much longer than the route of the 
 Confederates. A single corps had followed the retreating col- 
 umn directly ; the Confederate rear-guard not only stopped this 
 corps in the Fairfield pass, but caused the entire Union army 
 to halt for a day. 
 
 If Meade's whole army had promptly followed Lee's by the 
 Fairfield-Hagerstown road it could not have been long held 
 by the Confederate rear-guard at the Fairfield pass or else- 
 where, and it ought to have destroyed or captured the Con- 
 federate army. For the second time Lee was allowed to re- 
 treat across the Potomac under such difficulties that he would 
 have found it impossible to escape, had he been vigorously 
 pursued and attacked by his adversary. As Vicksburg had 
 already fallen, it looks as if here was an opportunity to end the 
 war in a single day. The hour had arrived, but not the man. 
 If General Grant had been in command of the Army of the 
 Potomac at this time, with Sheridan commanding his advance- 
 guard, Lee would not have got across the Potomac ; but Gen- 
 eral Meade and his corps-commandars, whom he called in 
 council on the night of the 12th to consider the question of 
 assaulting Lee's position, appear to have been content with 
 driving the Confederate army out of Pennsylvania and Mary- 
 land. 
 
 In this campaign, from beginning to end, the Union cavalry 
 generally performed excellent service. It constantly covered 
 its own army and kept in touch with the Confederates until the 
 two armies joined in battle in front of Cemetery Ridge. It 
 kept the enemy back at the crossing of Willoughby Run on the 
 1st of July until Reynolds arrived with infantry. This was the 
 most valuable day's work done by cavalry in the Civil War. In 
 leaving the left of the line uncovered on the 2nd, however the 
 
 *Fiebeger. 
 
The Campaign of Gettysburg. 393 
 
 Union cavalry allowed Longstreet to march his column by the 
 flank and deploy it before the Federal dispositions had been 
 made to repel it. Luckily the infantry scouts sent forward by 
 Sickles discovered the Confederate column in time to prevent 
 a surprise. On the 3rd of July a part of the Union cavalry 
 defeated Stuart on the east side of the battle-field, and pre- 
 vented him from disturbing the Union rear; while on the left 
 another part of it so menaced Longstreet's flank and rear as to 
 prevent him "from assailing Round Top with vigor, or detach- 
 ing a force to aid Pickett."* Yet it did not do all that it 
 might have done on the left that day. To the north and west 
 in the valleys of Marsh Creek and Willoughby Run were all the 
 Confederate trains virtually without any guard. The Federal 
 cavalry might have captured or destroyed them as Wheeler did 
 the Federal trains at the battle of Stones River, f 
 
 After the battle of Gettysburg the Union cavalry led the pur- 
 suit and kept constantly in touch with the enemy; it captured 
 wagon-trains and harassed the Confederates and hindered their 
 retreat; it destroyed the bridge over the Potomac and thus 
 delayed Lee's passage for six days; and two of its divisions 
 attacked the Confederate rear-guard just before it crossed the 
 Potomac, killing General Pettigrew, and capturing about 1,000 
 prisoners.^ 
 
 On the other hand, Stuart's Confederate cavalry was out of 
 place at the critical time. Its raid around the Federal army 
 was a fatal mistake. From the time when it started for the Po- 
 tomac upon that raid Lee was left groping in the dark. On the 
 1st of July, while Stuart was still absent, General Lee, not 
 knowing where the Federal corps were at the time, "said that 
 he had been kept in the dark ever since crossing the Potomac, 
 and intimated that Stuart's disappearance had materially ham- 
 pered the movements and disorganized the plans of the cam- 
 paign."! On the retreat the flank and rear of the Confederates 
 were covered and their trains were well guarded by the cavalry. 
 
 *Doubleday. 
 fAlexander. 
 JFiebeger. 
 §Long. 
 
LECTURE XIX. 
 THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN. 
 
 (213) The object of contention in this campaign was the 
 Mississippi River, which bore the same relation to the seceding; 
 Southern States that the Hudson bore to the rebellious Thir- 
 teen Colonies in the Revolutionary War; it divided them into 
 two parts. If the Union forces could get control of this river 
 they would split the Confederacy in two, and stop the passage 
 of supplies and men to the Confederate armies in the east from 
 Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. This was a purely military 
 consideration, but there was also a political and commercial 
 consideration. The Mississippi was the great highway of 
 trade between the Northwestern States and the outside world ;, 
 so long as any part of it was controlled by Confederate bat- 
 teries the highway was closed. 
 
 The Confederates in the first year of the war controlled the 
 middle portion of the river by the forts at Columbus, New 
 Madrid and Island No. 10, Fort Pillow and Fort Randolph- 
 Columbus was evacuated a short while after the fall of Forts. 
 Henry and Donelson. General Pope, with the help of Foote's- 
 fleet, captured New Madrid and Island No. 10, in April, 1862. 
 The victory at Shiloh (April 6 and 7, 1862) advanced the 
 Union line southward to the Memphis and Charleston Rail- 
 way, Fort Pillow was abandoned by the Confederates on the 
 4th of June, and Fort Randolph the next day. 
 
 At this time the Federals and the Confederates both had 
 fleets on the river. Foote's fleet, now commanded by Commo- 
 dore Davis, Foote being still disabled by the wound he re- 
 ceived at Donelson, pushed on down the river, as one Con- 
 federate post after another was evacuated or taken. On May 
 10, 1862, the Confederate flotilla had attacked the Union 
 fleet at Fort Pillow and been defeated. On June 7 the Union- 
 squadron attacked the Confederate fleet at Memphis, destroy- 
 ing three of its vessels, damaging others, and driving the fleet 
 southward. The Mayor of Memphis immediately surrendered 
 the town to Davis. The river was now open southward as far 
 as Vicksburg. On the 25th of April, 1862, Farragut's fleet 
 had arrived at New Orleans and taken possession of that city ; 
 ■ in May the fleet moved up the river and took Baton Rouge and 
 
The Vicksburg Campaign. 395 
 
 Natchez, and, with the assistance of a small detachment of land 
 troops, tried to take Vicksburg, but failed. 
 
 The Confederate authorities, now appreciating the impor- 
 tance and the peril of Vicksburg, had it strongly garrisoned 
 and provided with batteries to command the river. By direc- 
 tion of the authorities at Washington, Farragut, with his fleet 
 of ships and gunboats, and General Williams, with a small 
 force of artillery and infantry, made another unsuccessful 
 effort against Vicksburg, toward the end of June, 1862. 
 Vicksburg was now the only point of the river held by the Con- 
 federates, but in August General Breckinridge garrisoned Port 
 Hudson, two hundred miles below Vicksburg, and began set- 
 ting up heavy batteries there to command the river. Thence- 
 forward this point, also, was occupied by the Confederates 
 until after the fall of Vicksburg. The Confederates also re- 
 gained control of the river as far northward as Helena, Ark. 
 "Within this distance batteries were erected or strengthened 
 wherever the river touches the eastern bluffs — at Port Hudson, 
 at Natchez, at Grand Gulf, at Vicksburg; and a fort was also 
 erected a short distance up the Arkansas River, from the cover 
 of which gunboats could issue forth and destroy all unarmed 
 vessels."* 
 
 Such was the situation along the Mississippi in September, 
 1862. Halleck, having captured Corinth and dispersed his 
 army, had gone to Washington to assume the office of General- 
 in-Chief, leaving Grant "in command of all troops in the vicin- 
 ity of Memphis and Corinth and as far back as Columbus, Ky." 
 Buell and Bragg were in their race for Kentucky, and Grant's 
 forces had been drawn upon to reinforce Buell's ; Grant now 
 had only about 42,000 men. With these he was required by 
 Halleck to guard the railway from Memphis to Decatur, two 
 hundred miles, and keep open communication with Buell. This 
 constrained him to a passive defensive attitude for the time. 
 (214) "He therefore occupied three important points of this 
 road,- — Memphis, Corinth, and Tuscumbia, — with considerable 
 bodies, and posted the rest of his men at Jackson and Bolivar, 
 central points in rear, from which they could readily be moved 
 in any required direction. In this position he awaited the 
 enemy in whose hands the power of initiative had passed."* 
 
 The Confederate troops in Mississippi composed two inde- 
 
 *Campaigns of the Civil War (Scribner's). — Greene. 
 
396 American Campaigns. 
 
 pendent commands, each about 16,000 strong. One force un- 
 der Van Dorn "was charged with the defense of the river" and 
 was "scattered from Holly Springs to Vicksburg"; the other 
 under Sterling Price "was to guard the Mobile and Ohio Rail- 
 road south of Corinth," and was posted about Topelo.* On 
 the 2nd of September Price received word from Bragg that 
 Rosecrans, whose "Army of the Mississippi" formed the left 
 of Grant's line, was about to march to Tennessee in order to 
 join Buell. Bragg asked Price to prevent this movement. 
 Accordingly Price asked Van Dorn to join forces with him 
 "to attack Rosecrans. Van Dorn agreed to join him, but re- 
 plied that he should not be able to assemble his scattered 
 forces before the 12th of the month. Fearing that this would 
 not be early enough to catch Rosecrans, Price moved out with- 
 out waiting for Van Dorn. On the 14th he occupied Iuka. 
 About the 18th Price and Van Dorn arranged to join their 
 forces at Rienzi for an advance against Corinth. 
 
 Meantime Grant had been watching the movements of Price 
 and Van Dorn, and had resolved to attack Price at Iuka, before 
 he and Van Dorn could unite their forces. To this end he 
 assembled Rosecrans's command and Ord's division at Corinth, 
 and started them toward Iuka. Rosecrans took the roads by 
 -way of Rienzi and Jacinto, and was to approach Iuka from the 
 •direction of the south. Ord marched by way of the railway, 
 and was to attack at the same time from the north and west. 
 The combined attack was to drive Price against the Tennessee 
 River. As usually happens with marches of concentration, this 
 one miscarried. The upshot was, Rosecrans approached by 
 one road only from the south, and attacked the Confederates 
 without Ord. Darkness ended the combat, and during the 
 night Price slipped out by the other road [the Fulton road] 
 -to the south. 
 
 Rosecrans and Ord returned to Corinth. Van Dorn and 
 Price met at Ripley on the 28th of September, and Van Dorn 
 took command of their combined force by virtue of his rank. 
 Van Dorn marched the united force by way of Pocahontas 
 and Chewalla, and formed line of battle to the northwest of 
 Rosecrans's position, near intrenchments at Corinth, on the 
 morning of October the 3rd. (215) The Confederates at- 
 tacked, and by sunset had driven the Federals into the redoubts 
 at the edge of the town. The next morning Van Dorn renewed 
 the assault. The combat was ferocious; but by noon it was 
 
 ♦Greene. 
 
The Vicksbueg Campaign. - 3Q7 
 
 over, and the Confederates were retreating from the field. 
 Rosecrans made no pursuit until the next day. (214) Van 
 Dorn made good his retreat to Holly Springs. Rosecrans and 
 Hurlbut pursued to Ripley and were then recalled by Grant to 
 Corinth and Bolivar. 
 
 General Pemberton was now sent to Mississippi to take com- 
 mand of all the Confederate forces in the State ; Rosecrans was 
 called from Grant's army to relieve Buell of the command of 
 the Army of the Ohio. Grant was promised by Halleck a 
 "large body of new levies," and he purposed taking the offen- 
 sive without delay. 
 
 Meantime McClernand was in Washington working out a 
 secret scheme with the President and the Secretary of War, 
 by which he was to raise a volunteer army in Indiana, Illinois, 
 and Iowa, and lead it down the Mississippi to capture Vicks- 
 burg. No intimation of this project was given to General 
 Grant, but Halleck, of course, was informed of it. The re- 
 sult was that when Grant first wrote to Halleck (October 26) 
 asking leave to move against Vicksburg, he received no reply 
 to his letter. Then followed several contradictory and vague 
 dispatches from Halleck, which kept Grant for some time 
 guessing what he was expected to do. (213) At last, how- 
 ever, it was arranged that Grant should move with the main 
 army from Grand Junction to Holly Springs, and be joined by 
 Sherman with the troops from Memphis, on the Tallahatchie 
 River. A force from Helena was to move across the Missis- 
 sippi and threaten the Confederate rear at Grenada. 
 
 At this time Van Dorn commanded the Confederate forces 
 about Holly Springs — some 24,000 men, formed in two divi- 
 sions, under Price and Lovell. Vicksburg was garrisoned by 
 6,000 Confederates, and Port Hudson by 5,500. Pemberton 
 had his headquarters at Jackson. 
 
 By the 5th of November Grant had reached Oxford with the 
 main body, and Sherman was at College Hill, a few miles 
 northwest of that place. The force from Helena had carried 
 out its part of the plan, and had returned to Helena. Van Dorn 
 had fallen back, before Grant's advance, to Grenada. Up to 
 this time Grant had advanced with no very definite plan, ex- 
 cept to attack the enemy if he overtook him. But Van Dorn, 
 by Pemberton's order, had kept falling back. As Grant's 
 line of communication was now more than 200 miles long — 
 a single-track railway back to Columbus, Kentucky, — Grant 
 established a secondary base at Holly Springs. 
 
398 American Campaigns. 
 
 After considerable correspondence with Halleck, and the dis- 
 cussion of several plans with Sherman for the capture of 
 Vieksburg, it was finally arranged, with Halleck's approval, 
 that Sherman should return to Memphis with one division. 
 There he was to pick up all the newly arrived troops, and, with 
 the troops under Steele from Helena, he was to organize an 
 expedition to move by transports, under escort of Porter's 
 fleet of gunboats, to Vieksburg, while Grant marched his army 
 along the left bank of the Yazoo against the same objective. 
 Sherman was back at Memphis by the 12th of December, and 
 set out for Vieksburg on the 20th. 
 
 But events occurred which prevented Grant from carrying 
 out his part of the plan. Forrest's cavalry broke up sixty 
 miles of the railway north of Jackson, Tennessee, thereby 
 interrupting Grant's communications with his base at Colum- 
 hus for twelve days (Dec. 19-30). About the same time Van 
 Dorn collected a mounted force of some 3,500 men, with which 
 he marched up from Grenada and surprised the Union gar- 
 rison at Holly Springs. He captured the garrison, 1,500 
 men, and destroyed the depot of stores valued at $1,500,000.00; 
 then he moved up the railway as far as Bolivar, attacking one 
 small post after another, and made his escape back to Grenada. 
 As a consequence of these raids Grant was forced to place his 
 army on short rations, fall back to the Memphis and Charles- 
 ton Railway, and open communications with Memphis. No 
 supplies were to be had in the country; it had been stripped. 
 
 Sherman, in the meanwhile, had gone down the Mississippi. 
 He had a force of 32,000 men and sixty guns, which he organ- 
 ized into four divisions. His division commanders were M. L. 
 Smith, A. J. Smith, G. W. Morgan, and Fred Steele. The 
 expedition reached Miliken's Bend, twenty-five miles above 
 Vieksburg, before daylight on Christmas day. 
 
 (216) Vieksburg stood 250 feet above the waters of the 
 Mississippi, and from there a line of cliffs, known as Chicka- 
 saw Bluffs, ran northward twelve miles, to Haynes's Bluff on 
 the Yazoo River. The space between the base of the bluffs and 
 the rivers was a wooded swamp cut up by bayous and creeks. 
 
 Pemberton had learned of Sherman's expedition, and had 
 hurried reinforcements to Vieksburg; so that 12,000 Confed- 
 erates were now intrenched upon the bluffs, awaiting Sher- 
 man's attack. Sherman landed his troops, on the 26th of De- 
 cember, at Johnson's plantation, and his columns, on the 27th 
 and 28th, meandered across the swamps and bayous toward 
 
The Vicksburg Campaign. 399 
 
 the foot of the bluffs. Only one of the columns had a bridge- 
 train. On the 29th Sherman assaulted the Confederate posi- 
 tion, but was unable to carry it. He remained in position two 
 or three days, vainly trying to find some way by which to 
 •dislodge the Confederates. On the 2nd of January he re- 
 embarked his men, and, without opposition, returned to the 
 mouth of the Yazoo. Here he was met by McClernand, with 
 an order assigning that general to command the expedition. 
 The order was dated about the 17th of December. Thus ended 
 in failure the project of a combined movement against Vicks- 
 hurg by land and water. 
 
 (213) This expedition was also to have received the co- 
 operation of an expedition under Banks from New Orleans. 
 Banks, however, got no farther than Baton Rouge. He did not 
 feel strong enoUgh to attack Port Hudson, and his operations 
 afforded Sherman no assistance. 
 
 Having assumed command of the Union force near Vicks- 
 "burg, McClernand designated it the "Army of the Mississippi," 
 and divided it into two corps, under Morgan and Sherman, 
 respectively. McClernand now moved his army up the river 
 to Arkansas Post (called by the Confederates Fort Hindman). 
 This place was attacked by land and water, and on January 11 
 was surrendered to McClernand, with about 5,000 prisoners. 
 Here McClernand remained two or three days, and was con- 
 templating what General Grant characterized as a "wild-goose 
 ■chase" farther into Arkansas, when he received a peremptory 
 ■order from Grant td return to Miliken's Bend. 
 
 Under authority from the War Department General Grant 
 now decided to take command in person of the operations on 
 the Mississippi against Vicksburg. By orders from the same 
 source he organized all the troops under his command into 
 four corps, the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seven- 
 teenth, commanded respectively by Major-Generals McCler- 
 nand, Sherman, Hurlbut, and McPherson. McPherson's 
 corps was sent down the river; Hurlbut's headquarters were 
 to be at Memphis, and his corps was to embrace all the troops 
 left back to guard the bases and lines of communication ; Mc- 
 Clernand and Sherman were ordered to set their men to dig- 
 ging a canal across the peninsular opposite Vicksburg. Grant 
 hoped to transfer his army by this canal to the south of Vicks- 
 hurg, there to cross the Mississippi and reach high ground in 
 rear of the town. 
 
400 American Campaigns. 
 
 Geography. 
 
 The Mississippi River from Memphis to Vicksburg flows 
 through a.- vast bottom of black loam, bounded on the east by 
 a line of hills, which, beginning in the high bluffs at Memphis, 
 curves outward to a distance of forty or fifty miles, coming 
 back to the river again at Vicksburg. This bottom contains 
 the richest cotton-fields of Mississippi, and in the parlance of 
 the State used to be spoken of as "The Swamps" — a name 
 that fittingly applied to it. It is in fact a delta, for all the 
 branches of the great river in the region are really side-chan- 
 nels, not affluents in the usual sense. They begin and end in 
 the main stream. The surface of the ground is very low, and 
 most of it would be under water a great part of the time but 
 for the levees along the river. The courses of the streams 
 through this bottom are so crooked, and the soil is so soft, that 
 the river bends are continually cutting into one another, caus- 
 ing the streams to take new channels, and leaving crescent- 
 shaped bodies of stagnant water. These are the bayous, in 
 which the whole bottom abounds. They appear never to dry 
 up. The rainfall in winter is very heavy, and even to-day there 
 is hardly a large plantation in the region that does not contain 
 some swamp-lands too wet and low to clear for cultivation. 
 There is not a rock nor a stone in the whole country, and the 
 roads are terrible in winter. Today a number of railways 
 traverse the bottom, but at the time of the Vicksburg Campaign 
 there was not one. 
 
 On the west side of the river swamp-lands of like character 
 reach many miles farther southward. (217) On the east bank 
 the swamps disappear below Vicksburg, except in the large 
 bends between New Carthage and Grand Gulf; the region 
 back toward Jackson is a rolling country of big plantations, 
 containing much woodland. It is intersected by two unforda- 
 ble streams, Big Black River and Bayou Pierre, and by many 
 of their branches and branches of Pearl River, which, flow- 
 ing south by Jackson, bounds the region on the east. The 
 roads were all bad, and the towns, except Vicksburg and Jack- 
 son, were villages. Two railways crossed at Jackson, and it 
 was the capital of Mississippi and the base of supplies for 
 the Confederate troops in the State; hence it was a place of 
 great strategic importance. 
 
The Vicksburg Campaign. 401 
 
 Operations. 
 
 Grant joined the army at Young's Point on the 29th of Jan- 
 uary, 1863. On examining the canal undergoing construc- 
 tion he was not favorably impressed with the project. He let 
 the work go on, however, but had two other routes explored, 
 with a view to turn Vicksburg and reach the high ground in 
 its rear: (213) first, by way of Yazoo Pass* and the Talla- 
 hatchie and Yazoo Rivers to the rear of Haynes's Bluff, the 
 right of the Confederate position; second, by way of Lake 
 Providence, Bayou Macon, the Tensas, Washita, Red, and 
 Mississippi, to the rear of Warrenton, (217) the left of the 
 position. By this route he might have united with Banks and 
 Farragut. 
 
 In spite of floods and other hindrances work was continued 
 on the canal opposite Vicksburg till near the end of March, 
 when it was stopped by the Confederate batteries at Warren- 
 ton. The project was then given up as a failure. Meantime 
 McPherson had been at work with his corps on the Lake 
 Providence route ; this route was also abandoned about the last 
 of March, by which time Grant had formed plans for mov- 
 ing south from Miliken's Bend by land. (213) The Yazoo 
 Pass project had appeared to be the most likely of all the pro- 
 jects. The levee that stood across the Pass was cut away, and 
 a division from Helena was started in light-draft transports to 
 try the route. 
 
 All this while the Confederates in Mississippi had not been 
 idle. On the contrary, they had made extraordinary efforts to 
 save their State and the Mississippi River. The garrison at 
 Vicksburg had been strengthened to more than 25,000. From 
 the force at Grenada, some 20,000, Loring conducted a detach- 
 ment to the junction of the Tallahatchie and the Yalabusha 
 Rivers. Here, in a bend of the Tallahatchie the neck of which 
 was only 500 yards wide, he built Fort Pemtoerton, whose 
 guns completely commanded the narrow channel. 
 
 After a slow and difficult passage down the crooked streams, 
 hindered all the way by felled trees and other obstructions 
 placed by the Confederates, the Federal gunboats with their 
 convoy from Helena reached the position of Fort Pemberton, 
 and were stopped by its guns. As by this time Grant had found 
 
 ♦Where the Tallahatchie River breaks out of the Mississippi a few- 
 miles below Helena. 
 
402 American Campaigns. 
 
 that it would be impossible to get enough light-draft transports, 
 this enterprise was also abandoned. 
 
 (217) But the hope of reaching the rear of Vicksburg by a 
 water route was not given up until a fourth effort was made by 
 way of the Yazoo, Steele's Bayou, and other cross bayous, Deer 
 Creek, and Sunflower River. (213) Sherman, escorted by 
 Porter's gunboats, explored this route; he was met by Con- 
 federate sharpshooters behind the trees along the way through 
 the forests, and forced to withdraw. So narrow and crooked 
 were the bayous that his boats could not turn round ; they had 
 to back out stern foremost. 
 
 General Grant was now about at his wit's end — he had to do 
 something, and that promptly, or pass to the rear with the other 
 failures — McDowell, McClellan, Pope, Burnside. Already the 
 press was calling for his removal. Three plans only were left 
 to try : first, to assault the Confederate batteries at Vicksburg ; 
 second, to return to Memphis and begin a new advance along 
 the Mississippi Central Railway ; third, to find some way across 
 the swamps opposite Vicksburg to a crossing lower down the 
 river, and from there, without any base of supplies, to move 
 against the rear of the town. The first plan would have been 
 suicide; the second plan would have looked like a retreat, and 
 if Grant had adopted it the public press would probably have 
 forced the administration to relieve him of command ; the third 
 plan involved a risk seldom justified in war. He chose the 
 third plan.* 
 
 (217) New Carthage was to be the first objective, and a 
 route thither was to be opened by way of the bayous from 
 Miliken's Bend and Duckport, by which troops and supplies 
 were to be forwarded on flatboats and barges. The gunboats 
 and a number of transports were to run past the Confederate 
 "batteries ; but General Grant found again that, on account of a 
 lack of barges, and other difficulties, he should have to give up 
 the effort to move his army by way of the bayous ; but by con- 
 structing several miles of corduroy road and many bridges he 
 was enabled to move his troops and a large part of his supplies 
 "by land— or rather by mud. 
 
 Grant found on arrival at New Carthage that the village 
 "was still surrounded by water, and was entirely unsuitable for 
 concentrating a large force."* So another place called Hard 
 
 *Greene. 
 
The Vicksburg Campaign. 403 
 
 Times, lower down the river, was selected, and more bridges 
 and corduroy roads had to be built. With some losses the gun- 
 boats and transports ran by the Confederate batteries at Vicks- 
 burg, and, by the 29th of April, all difficulties had been so far 
 overcome that Grant had the corps of McClernand and Mc- 
 Pherson assembled at Hard Times ready to cross. (218) 
 
 Let us see what Pemberton's Confederate forces had been 
 doing in Mississippi in the meanwhile. At the last of March 
 Pemberton had in the State about 50,000 effectives. General 
 Stevenson with 22,000 held the line of the Mississippi from 
 Haynes's Bluff to Grand Gulf. The latter place, about as 
 strong naturally as Vicksburg, was fortified and garrisoned. 
 (213) Port Hudson was fortified, and garrisoned by 15,000 
 or 16,000 men under Gardner. Loring had 7,000 men at Fort 
 Pemberton, Grenada, and other neighboring points, and there 
 were some 3,000 or 4,000 in the north of the State watching 
 the Union troops along the Memphis and Charleston Railway. 
 There was no Confederate cavalry in the State, Van Dorn 
 with all the cavalry in that quarter having been ordered to 
 Tennessee to aid Bragg. 
 
 During the months of March and April the Confederates 
 were unable to decide what movement Grant was undertaking. 
 To deceive them Steele's division of Sherman's corps had been 
 sent up the river toward Greenville, and rumor said that Grant 
 was going back to Memphis to begin an advance by way of the 
 railway. Then the report reached Pemberton that a strong 
 Union column was actually moving southward from the Mem- 
 phis and Charleston Railway. 
 
 This was Grierson's cavalry starting on its famous raid. It 
 left Lagrange on the 17th of April, and on the 2nd of May 
 reached the Union camp at Baton Rouge. With barely 1,000 
 horsemen Grierson had ridden entirely through the -State, 
 marching 600 miles in sixteen days — averaging nearly thirty- 
 eight miles a day — destroying many miles of railway and tele- 
 graph lines and much other property. "But, far more impor- 
 tant than all this, he had distracted the enemy's attention in an 
 extraordinary degree at a most critical moment" — while Grant 
 was making his preparations to cross the Mississippi. 
 
 Having no cavalry to oppose or to maintain touch with Grier- 
 son's column, the Confederates were kept in a wild state of 
 ignorance, excitement, and alarm. "The most exaggerated 
 rumors were current of" Grierson's "presence in a dozen places 
 
404 American Campaigns. 
 
 at once,"* and large infantry detachments were sent out from 
 almost every garrison to try to cut him off. He dodged them 
 all. In its strategic effect this was, perhaps, the most success- 
 ful cavalry raid of the Civil War, or of all modern wars. It 
 drew the attention of the Confederates away from Grand Gulf, 
 and prevented them from sending reinforcements to that place 
 just at the critical hour. 
 
 (218) At 7 a.m. on the 29th of April Porter's squadron 
 steamed down from Hard Times to Grand Gulf, followed by 
 all the available transports loaded with men — three of Mc- 
 Clernand's divisions. An hour later Porter opened fire on the 
 Confederate batteries, and an artillery duel was kept up until 
 the Confederate guns ceased firing, about 1 p.m. But the re- 
 sult was not such as to let Grant believe that he could success- 
 fully land troops from his transports and assault the parapets, 
 and he decided to move five miles farther down, to De Shroon's 
 Landing. Later he was informed by a negro that a good road 
 ran back from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson, and he decided to 
 make his crossing at Bruinsburg. At daylight on the 30th of 
 April the troops began crossing, and by noon McClernand's 
 entire corps, 18,000 men, was on the eastern bank. No Con- 
 federates had appeared to dispute the landing. After delaying 
 four hours to issue rations to his men — which ought to have 
 been issued before — McClernand moved out. At sunset he 
 reached the bluffs three miles back of the landing, which he 
 found unoccupied by the enemy. He pushed on toward Port 
 Gibson, and about one o'clock in the night his leading division 
 [Carr] met the enemy some four miles west of Port Gibson. 
 After a slight skirmish the division bivouacked until daylight. 
 
 The Confederates encountered at this point were a detach- 
 ment that had been sent out from the garrison at Grand Gulf. 
 As soon as Pemberton, who was at Jackson, learned by tele- 
 graph of the attack on Grand Gulf, he ordered reinforcements 
 to be sent thither at once from Vicksburg. By night two bri- 
 gades had arrived. One of these [Tracy] marched on toward 
 Port Gibson, and, by daybreak of May 1, was in position with 
 the brigade that had been met during the night by the head 
 of McClernand's corps. At this point the road formed two 
 branches which came back together at Port Gibson. One Con- 
 federate brigade [Tracyl was across the northern branch, and 
 the other [Green] across the southern branch. The ground 
 
 ♦Greene. 
 
The Vicksbueg Campaign. 405 
 
 was very unfavorable for an attack. It was a mass of short 
 steep hills, separated from one another by ravines "filled with a 
 dense growth of cane and underbrush."* 
 
 The combat opened on the Confederate right at daybreak. 
 Soon McClernand's whole corps was on the ground, and Mc- 
 Pherson's corps was crossing, back at Bruinsburg. McPherson 
 came up with two brigades of Logan's division at noon and 
 joined in the battle. The ground was so difficult to maneuver 
 upon that the Federal troops, though outnumbering the Con- 
 federates nearly three to one, found it hard to beat them. The 
 left Confederate brigade nevertheless gave way within an hour 
 or two, but the right one, on the northern road, held fast. 
 Before noon the other Confederate brigade from Vicksburg 
 [Baldwin] arrived, as well as three more regiments under 
 Cockrell. About 5 p.m. McPherson succeeded in enveloping 
 the Confederate right ; then the whole line gave way. The 
 brigades on the right retreated directly upon Grand Gulf, burn- 
 ing the bridge over Bayou Pierre ; the left brigade fell back by 
 way of Grindstone Ferry, burning the bridges over both forks 
 of the bayou. This brigade finally rejoined the right by Way 
 of Willow Springs. 
 
 At this time the Confederate troops were scattered all over 
 Mississippi, from Grenada to Port Hudson ; from Meridian to 
 Vicksburg. The detachments sent out after Grierson had not 
 returned to their stations. Pemberton had gone to Vicksburg, 
 and he spent the 1st of May "sending telegrams in all direc- 
 tions for the purpose of collecting his scattered forces."* 
 Three more brigades were started from Vicksburg toward 
 Port Gibson. These were met on the morning of May 3, at 
 Hankinson's Ferry, by the Confederates that had retreated 
 from Port Gibson. These fleeing troops had stopped long 
 enough at Grand Gulf to blow up the magazines and dismount 
 the guns ; then, with the rest of the garrison, they had hastened 
 on toward Vicksburg, by way of Hankinson's Ferry. Here 
 some troops from the direction of Jackson, also, had joined. 
 So that on the 3rd of May there were retreating beyond Hank- 
 inson's Ferry some 17,000 Confederate soldiers, foot-sore and 
 worn-out with long marches and fighting; and more or less 
 demoralized. 
 
 McPherson's corps followed the retreating Confederates and 
 halted at Hankinson's Ferry; McClernand's halted at Willow 
 
 *Greene. 
 
406 American Campaigns. 
 
 Springs. Both corps remained in bivouac for three days, 
 awaiting the arrival of Sherman's corps as well as of ammuni- 
 tion and rations. (219) Up to this time Sherman's corps had 
 remained at Miliken's Bend and Haynes's Bluff, malting dem- 
 onstrations against the right of the Confederate line. Sherman 
 now received orders to move his corps up to the line of the 
 other two, leaving Blair's division to guard the depots at the 
 river until it could be relieved by a division sent down from 
 Memphis. One of McPherson's brigades, also, was left on the 
 west of the Mississippi River. By the 7th of May Sherman 
 was across the river at Grand Gulf. The same day McCler- 
 nand and McPherson moved their corps to Rocky Springs. 
 
 Grant now had about 41,000 men on the east side of the 
 Mississippi; Pemberton had, including the garrison of Port 
 Hudson, some 50,000 men in the State. But Port Hudson, 
 which was about as important to hold as Vicksburg, was 
 threatened by Banks and Farragut from the south, and was, 
 moreover, 140 miles by road from Raymond or Jackson, the 
 nearest points at which its troops could effect a junction with 
 Pemberton's main army. 
 
 During these operations of General Grant, Banks had a force 
 operating on the west side of the Mississippi from New Or- 
 leans. The War Department expected Grant and Banks to 
 cooperate against Vicksburg and Port Hudson. On the 10th 
 of April Grant received a letter from Halleck, "calling special 
 attention to the necessity of cooperating with Banks" ;* and, 
 when Grant was working to get across the Mississippi near 
 Grand Gulf, he meant to send a corps down toward Port Hud- 
 son to cooperate with Banks. But on May 2 he had received 
 a letter from Banks, dated April 12, and written while Banks 
 was on his way northward with an expedition against the Con- 
 federates on the Red River, in which Banks said that he should 
 "return to Baton Rouge on May 10," and would then co- 
 operate against Port Hudson, and that he should have 15,000 
 men available for field service. 
 
 Grant had worked for months to reach high ground back 
 of Vicksburg ; he had at last succeeded. He had defeated the 
 enemy the day before at Port Gibson, and put him to flight. 
 Banks was not operating against Port Hudson, as Grant had 
 supposed, and he would not be there until the 10th of the 
 month, and then would have only 15,000 men. Under such cir- 
 
 *Greene. 
 
The Vicksbueg Campaign. 407 
 
 cumstances it did not take Grant long to decide that the right 
 thing for him to do was to give up all thought of cooperating 
 with Banks, and to push ahead by himself with the advantage 
 he had already gained. 
 
 Grant could spare no cavalry to follow up the enemy, or to 
 reconnoiter far ahead and to the flanks in order to gain infor- 
 mation of the hostile forces. He says in his Memoirs: "The 
 cavalry was used in this advance in reconnoitering to find the 
 roads; to cover our advances and to find the most practicable 
 routes from one command to another so they could support 
 each other in case of attack." All he knew was, therefore, that 
 the enemy's troops at Hankinson's Ferry had retreated toward 
 Vicksburg ; how far they had gone, or what was their strength, 
 he could not tell. It was rumored that another force was as- 
 sembling at Jackson. He must place his army between these 
 two forces. He resolved, therefore, to advance against the 
 railway between Jackson and Vicksburg, watching closely the 
 ferries of the Big Black to prevent an attack on his left flank. 
 
 McClernand's corps was ordered to take the road from 
 Rocky Springs to Edwards's Station ; McPherson's was to take 
 the road by way of Raymond for Jackson, and, after destroying 
 the railways and public stores, to rejoin the main army; while 
 Sherman's Corps was to follow in rear of McClernand's, or 
 midway between McClernand's and McPherson's, if it could 
 find a road there, in supporting distance of both flank-columns. 
 It was Napoleon's favorite movement of two wings with a 
 central reserve. The army had a train of 120 wagons and five 
 days' rations. No line of communications was to be maintained 
 with the base on the river. The army was to live off the 
 country. 
 
 On the evening of the 11th of May Grant's army bivouacked 
 as follows: McClernand's corps [Thirteenth] at Five Mile 
 Creek on the Telegraph Road; Sherman's [Fifteenth] at Au- 
 burn; McPherson's [Seventeenth] five miles northeast of 
 Utica. That evening Pemberton's main army was distributed 
 as follows : Walker's brigade at Jackson ; Gregg's at Raymond, 
 guarding some provisions collected there ; Bowen's division at 
 Edwards's Station, and the divisions of Loring and Stevenson 
 on the way from Warrenton to Edwards's Station. There 
 were also two divisions [Forney and M. L. Smith] at 
 Vicksburg. 
 
 On May 1, Pemberton had telegraphed Joseph E. Johnston, 
 of whose wide territorial command Mississippi formed a part, 
 
408 American Campaigns. 
 
 that Grant had crossed the great river, "and that a furious 
 tattle had been raging all day at Port Gibson."* Johnston re- 
 plied from Tullahoma, Tennessee, "If Grant crosses, unite all 
 your troops to beat him — success will give back what was 
 abandoned to win it." Pemberton did not attempt to obey this 
 order. He, as well as Jefferson Davis, was of the opinion that 
 Grant's army could not "live more than a few days away from 
 the river." He thought, however, that Grant might make a 
 raid on Jackson, but that his main army would immediately 
 march for the Mississippi, below Warrenton, the left of the 
 Confederate intrenchments. Accordingly Pemberton distrib- 
 uted the bulk of his troops, the divisions of Bowen, Loring, 
 and Stevenson, at the ferries of the Big Black River. He 
 appealed to the war department at Richmond for reinforce- 
 ments, and Walker's brigade was sent to Jackson from South 
 Carolina. Other troops were withdrawn from Port Hudson 
 and placed at Jackson. 
 
 On the 12th [May] Grant's army moved forward. Mc- 
 Pherson's corps marched out on the Raymond Road at 4 a.m., 
 covered by the only cavalry regiment with the army. Con- 
 federate videttes were soon seen falling back toward Ray- 
 mond. At about eleven o'clock a line of Confederate artillery 
 and infantry was found drawn up across the road, on high 
 ground beyond a small stream, about two miles from Raymond. 
 It was Gregg's brigade. Logan's division of McPherson's 
 corps was in the lead. It deployed at once, and attacked the 
 Confederate position. Crocker's division came up later, but 
 took little part in the combat. A stubborn little fight took 
 place, which lasted till late in the afternoon, when the Con- 
 federates were driven from the field. Logan followed them 
 some distance beyond Raymond, then halted and bivouacked 
 for the night. 
 
 The stout resistance met by McPherson at Raymond led 
 Grant to believe that a considerable force of the enemy was at 
 Jackson. On the other hand, the columns of McClernand and 
 Sherman had encountered Confederate skirmishers in large 
 numbers along Fourteen Mile Creek this same day. This 
 satisfied Grant that the reports he had received, to the effect 
 that a large force of Confederates was assembling at Edwards's 
 Station, were true. He resolved to turn first against the force 
 at Jackson, and issued orders accordingly. Pursuant to these 
 
 *Greene. 
 
The Vicksbueg Campaign. 409 
 
 orders McPherson's column moved to Clinton on May the 13th, 
 and to Jackson on the 14th; Sherman moved to Mississippi 
 Springs on the 13th, and to Jackson on the 14th, keeping touch 
 with McPherson; McClernand moved to Raymond on the 13th, 
 and sent a division forward to Clinton on the 14th. 
 
 Joseph E. Johnston was at Jackson. On the 9th of May he 
 had received orders from Richmond to "proceed at once to 
 Mississippi and take chief command of the forces there."* 
 He reached Jackson on the evening of the 13th, and found the 
 brigades of Gregg and Walker there. Gist's brigade from 
 South Carolina and Maxey's from Port Hudson were expected 
 to arrive next day. This would give Johnston 12,000 men; 
 but finding that Grant's whole army was between him and 
 Pemberton at Edwards's Station, Johnson wired to Rich- 
 mond: "I am too late." 
 
 (220) In intrenchments previously made Johnston placed 
 Gregg's brigade on the Raymond Road, and Walker's on the 
 Clinton road, "on high ground commanding the approaches 
 over open fields."* He directed them to hold back the enemy, 
 until the public stores and property could be removed north- 
 ward, by the railway, toward Canton. 
 
 Sherman and McPherson approached Jackson at about 10 
 a.m. on the 14th. It was pouring rain; so McPherson with- 
 held his assault till eleven o'clock for fear of getting his am- 
 munition wet. Gregg's brigade did not stand long; its flank 
 was enveloped by Sherman, and it abandoned its trenches. 
 "Walker made more of a fight. He occupied a fine position on 
 the crest of a semi-circular ridge, his flanks protected by woods, 
 and in front of him a gently sloping open field terminating, 
 about one-third of a mile distant, in a boggy creek, lined with 
 thick willows. His artillery commanded the bridge over this 
 creek."* Walker was, however, unable to resist McPherson's 
 charge, and his men broke and ran from their trenches. Mc- 
 Pherson's leading division pursued them for about a mile and a 
 half, and was then stopped by some guns on an inner line of 
 works. The Confederates escaped by the Canton Road ; Sher- 
 man and McPherson entered Jackson between- three and four 
 o'clock in the afternoon. 
 
 On the evening of the 14th two of McClernand's divisions 
 were at Raymond, one was at Clinton, and one with the wagon- 
 train between Auburn and Raymond. Frank P. Blair's divi- 
 
 *Greene. 
 
410 American Campaigns. 
 
 sion of Sherman's corps, and the brigade of McPherson's 
 corps that had remained back at the Mississippi, had come up 
 with this train. 
 
 Grant was now ready to move on Edwards's Station to attack 
 Pemberton, if he should remain there, before he could be joined 
 by Johnston with the troops from Jackson. Sherman was left 
 with his two divisions to complete the work of destruction at 
 Jackson; all the rest of the army, on the 15th, moved by the 
 yarious convergent roads on Edwards's Station. Pemberton 
 was at that place with three divisions, about 23,000 men; the 
 Confederate divisions of Forney and M. L. Smith were still on 
 the river at Vlcksburg. 
 
 On the evening of the 13th, when Johnston learned that 
 Grant was moving on Jackson, he sent an order to Pemberton, 
 "if practicable to come up in Grant's rear at once."* Pember- 
 ton called a council of war,f shilly-shallied, and wasted time; 
 did nothing for twenty-four hours; then, instead of obeying 
 Johnston's order, started his force at 1 p.m., on the 15th, 
 southward to intercept Grant's communications — when, in fact, 
 Grant had no communications. Grant's little wagon-train was 
 that day near Dillon's ; but it was well guarded by two Federal 
 divisions. Owing to high water, rain, and mud, Pemberton's. 
 column got no farther than the cross-road leading from Cham- 
 pion's Hill to the Edwards's Station — Raymond road, where it 
 bivouacked the night of the 15th. On the morning of the 16tb 
 Pemberton changed his mind, and decided to try to 'unite with 
 Johnston by way of Brownsville. He gave orders, therefore, 
 to counter-march to Edwards's Station, there to take the 
 Brownsville Road. He was too late ; the enemy was upon him ; 
 the Confederate outposts and the Union advance-guards were 
 already skirmishing. 
 
 (221) On the night of the 15th Grant's army, except Sher- 
 man's two divisions at Jackson, bivouacked on the three roads- 
 leading west to Edwards's Station. Its flanks were about four 
 miles from each other, and the line was four miles from Pem- 
 berton's bivouac. Neither army appears to have been aware 
 of the nearness of the other. 
 
 ♦Greene. 
 
 fNapoleon's Maxim LXV: The same consequences that have uni- 
 formly attended long discussions and councils of war will follow at 
 all times. They will terminate in the adoption of the worst course, 
 which in war is always the most timid, or, if you will, the most prudent.. 
 The only true wisdom in a general is determined courage. 
 
The Vicksburg Campaign. 411 
 
 Pemberton formed line of battle across the two roads south 
 of Champion's Hill — a prominent knoll seventy or eighty feet 
 high in Mr. Champion's plantation. The knoll was steep and 
 rugged and covered with timber on the northern side, but 
 gentler and partly cleared on the southern and eastern slopes. 
 (222) McClernand's divisions were in front of Pember- 
 ton's line at 9.30 a.m., and this general sent a dispatch to 
 Grant, who was with McPherson on the northern road, inquir- 
 ing whether he should attack. It was two o'clock before he re- 
 ceived Grant's reply to attack; and then the two leading divi- 
 sions [Osterhaus and Smith] on the lower roads did not attack 
 very vigorously. On the northern road McPherson's corps 
 came up at eleven o'clock, with Logan's division in the lead. 
 Meantime Stevenson had moved his Confederate division to the 
 left and taken position on the hill. Later, during the combat 
 that ensued, Bowen moved his division to assist Stevenson. 
 Logan swung round and attacked the hill from the north, while 
 Hovey, and later Crocker, assailed it from the east. The pos- 
 session of the hill was stubbornly contested. It was taken by 
 the Federals, then retaken by the Confederates, and then taken 
 again by the Federals. The battle lasted till nearly dark. 
 "Stevenson's division was completely routed and broken up." 
 It and Bowen's division retreated over Baker's Creek, at the 
 crossing of the Raymond Road. Loring's division covered 
 their retreat, but was itself cut off, and had to retreat south- 
 ward. The next day it reached Crystal Springs, on the railroad 
 twenty-five miles south of Jackson. "Bowen's division, and the 
 remnants of Stevenson's, made their way back to the Big 
 Black River."* 
 
 If the left of the Union line, under McClernand, had attacked 
 as vigorously as the right attacked under McPherson, the 
 beaten Confederates would have been cut off from the ford 
 over Baker's Creek, on the Raymond Road, as they were cut 
 off from the bridge on the Clinton Road ; and they would have 
 been captured. On the other hand, while McPherson was as- 
 saulting the left of the Confederates and McClernand was 
 standing idle in front of their right, Pemberton ordered Lor- 
 ing to attack McClernand. Loring replied that McClernand 
 was too strongly posted. Later Pemberton ordered him to 
 move to the left to aid Stevenson. This, also, he failed to do, 
 and Pemberton laid upon him the blame for Stevenson's rout. 
 
 ^Greene. 
 
412 American Campaigns. 
 
 (223) Grant's army, except Sherman's corps, bivouacked 
 the night of the 16th between the battle-field and Edwards's 
 Station. Sherman had come forward as far as Bolton. Grant 
 took up the pursuit at daylight on the 17th. Sherman marched 
 directly for Bridgeport in order to turn the bridge at the railway 
 crossing. This crossing was in a deep bend of the Big Black, 
 which was concave toward the east, and about a mile wide. 
 The ground within the bend was flat and low, while on the 
 opposite side of the river the banks were high. The Con- 
 federates had dug a trench within the bend, straight across the 
 road, and it was now occupied by about 5,000 men — part of the 
 troops that had escaped from Champion's Hill, and a small 
 force that had been stationed at the bridge. None of the 
 troops were placed on the opposite bank. Besides the railway 
 bridge, which had been planked, the Confederates had im- 
 provised another bridge by using a steamboat as a sort of pier 
 in the narrow stream. 
 
 The head of Grant's column arrived in front of the Con- 
 federate trenches about 8 a.m. On the right of the road there 
 was a clump of woods upon the flank of the trench. The lead- 
 ing Union division [Carr] formed line in these woods, prepara- 
 tory to assaulting. The next division opened fire at the center. 
 There were about 10,000 Federals in the line. The Confed- 
 erates saw themselves in a pocket, and after a brief resistance 
 fled for the bridges. The fight was all over by nine o'clock. 
 Eighteen pieces of artillery were abandoned, and 1,751 men 
 were cut off and captured. 
 
 Pemberton hastened to Vicksburg to prepare for its defense, 
 leaving Stevenson to bring on what remained of the routed 
 army. On the 18th Pemberton received an order from John- 
 ston to evacuate Vicksburg, if not too late, and save his army 
 from ultimate surrender. Knowing that this meant the loss of 
 large quantities of stores and munitions collected at Vicksburg, 
 "the fall of Port Hudson, the surrender of the Mississippi 
 River, and the severance of the Confederacy,"* Pemberton 
 foolishly submitted the question to a council of war, which de- 
 cided that it was impossible for the army to withdraw. Pem- 
 berton therefore made no effort to obey his commander's order. 
 
 (224) As stated before, Vicksburg stood upon a bluff 250 
 feet above the waters of the Mississippi. The country round 
 about was cut up into a jumble of narrow ridges with deep 
 
 *Pemberton's Report. 
 
The Vicksburg Campaign. 413 
 
 ravines between them. A more or less continuous ridge curved 
 along the heads of the ravines from Fort Hill, overlooking the 
 river a mile above the town, to Stout's Bayou, three miles be- 
 low the town. Outside the outer curve of this ridge the ground 
 was very broken and difficult ; along its crest, almost without a 
 break, the Confederates had constructed very strong fortifica- 
 tions enclosing the town on the land side. To defend these 
 works Pemberton had 128 guns and about 20,000 effective 
 men. He placed Stevenson's division on the right, Forney's in 
 the center, and M. L. Smith's on the left. Bowen's division 
 was held in reserve. 
 
 After the battle of the Big Black River Grant pushed on in 
 pursuit of the Confederates. His leading troops reached the 
 neighborhood of Vicksburg by the evening of the 18th [May]. 
 Before two o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th his corps were 
 all three in position — Sherman's on the right, McPherson's in 
 the center, and McClernand's on the left. Grant hoped, by 
 attacking the position of the Confederates promptly, to carry it 
 before they should recover from their demoralization. So he 
 ordered a general assault at 2 p.m. Within the works, how- 
 ever, were troops that had not been beaten ; and those that had 
 suffered defeat and rout recovered their nerve as soon as they 
 found themselves behind Vicksburg's thick parapet. The as- 
 sault failed all along the line. Sherman, on the right, "suc- 
 ceeded in reaching the ditch, but, being unsupported by the 
 other corps, was repulsed."* McClernand and McPherson ad- 
 vanced several hundred yards under a heavy fire, but were 
 brought to a halt by darkness. 
 
 (218) Grant now established his base of supplies on the 
 Yazoo River near the mouth of Steele's Bayou. For eighteen 
 days his army had been marching and fighting, and, with the 
 exception of five days' rations, had got its supplies from the 
 country. 
 
 (224) Grant resolved to assault the Confederate works 
 again. His army was "flushed with an unbroken series of 
 victories," and was anxious to carry the works and end the 
 campaign; Grant believed the army equal to the task. There 
 were other reasons for making the effort. Johnston was col- 
 lecting an army with which to come to Pemberton's relief. If 
 Grant could capture Vicksburg he would be free to turn his 
 army to meet Johnston, and then to send a detachment against 
 
 *Greene. 
 
414 American Campaigns. 
 
 Port Hudson. A siege would be a slow and dreary work, and, 
 as his immediate forces were not enough completely to invest 
 the place, he would have to draw troops from Memphis to ef- 
 fect the siege. Grant, therefore, ordered his artillery to open 
 fire on the works at daybreak, on the 22nd, and his infantry to 
 make a general assault at ten o'clock. Admiral Porter was 
 asked to shell the water-batteries. The assault was gallantly 
 made, and, after desperate fighting, the Union troops reached 
 the ditches, and planted their colors in several places upon 
 the parapets ; but they could go no farther. 
 
 Grant was in a good position from which to see most of his 
 line, and by 11.30 a.m. he was persuaded that the assault could 
 not succeed. But about this time he began receiving notes 
 from McClernand, telling of success in his part of the line. One 
 note, dated 12 m., said: "We are hotly engaged with the enemy. 
 We have part possession of two forts, and the Stars and Stripes 
 are floating over them. A vigorous push ought to be made all 
 along the line." Another, written about 1 p.m., said: "We 
 have gained the enemy's entrenchments at several points, but 
 are brought to a stand. . . ." Grant was doubtful of McCler- 
 nand's successes; he had seen nothing of them himself. But 
 there was no time for him to ride over to that flank to see for 
 himself. So he ordered one of McPherson's divisions over to 
 help McClernand, and had the rest of McPherson's corps and 
 Sherman's renew the assault. The result was like that of the 
 morning's attack; the works were reached but could not be 
 carried. The hostile lines were so close together that the Con- 
 federates behind the parapet could throw hand-grenades among 
 the assailants. The assaults failed all along the line. Just at 
 dark the Confederates in front of McClernand's troops made a 
 sortie, and drove the Federals out of the ditch they had taken. 
 In this day's work 35,000 Union infantry had engaged. The line 
 assaulted was held in the morning by fewer than four Con- 
 federate brigades. As soon as the assault had begun the 
 reserves were put into the works ; but the entire force of the 
 defenders engaged did not exceed 13,000. Grant's losses were 
 more than 3,000, and he blamed McClernand's misleading dis- 
 patches with half of them. 
 
 (225) It was now plain that Vicksburg could be taken only 
 by siege, and preparations were accordingly begun at once. 
 Regular siege-works were constructed. Reinforcements were 
 sent from various parts of the country, and, within a few 
 
The Vicksburg Campaign. 415 
 
 weeks, Grant had Vicksburg completely invested, with 71,141 
 men and 248 guns in his line. Twelve miles of trenches were 
 made and eighty-nine batteries were set up. Approaches were 
 dug and mines and counter-mines set off. The lines were 
 brought so close, toward the end of the siege, that hand- 
 grenades were used, and sheils were thrown by small mortars 
 made of logs with metal bands shrunken around them. With 
 such implements from ten to a hundred men were killed daily. 
 "On July 1 the approaches were all within from five to a 
 hundred yards of the defenders' works,"* and orders were 
 issued for a final assault to be made on the 6th. But this was 
 not to be; Pemberton surrendered on the 4th of July. The 
 siege had lasted forty-seven days. 
 
 (226) All this time Johnston had been organizing an army 
 at Jackson for Pemberton's relief, of troops sent to him from 
 wherever they could be spared; and the Richmond authorities 
 had been urging him to move out. Meantime Grant had sent 
 strong columns under Blair and Osterhaus to reconnoiter for 
 Johnston in the direction of Mechanicsburg and the Big Black. 
 They found no signs of a Confederate army approaching. 
 
 At length, on June the 28th, Johnston issued orders for .his 
 army to advance. On paper his army numbered nearly 55,000, 
 but it had only 31,000 present for duty. On the 1st of July 
 three of its divisions had reached Birdsong's Ferry, and the 
 fourth was at Edwards's Station. Johnston spent the 2nd, 3rd, 
 and 4th of July in reconnoitering. At this time Sherman was 
 in command of a force of 30,000 men, stretched across from 
 Haynes's Bluff to the Black River Bridge, covering the siege 
 of Vicksburg. "On the night of the 4th Johnston received the 
 news of Pemberton's surrender; he countermarched his col- 
 umns forthwith toward Jackson. He was none too quick, for 
 Sherman was on his heels in pursuit, with nearly 50,000 men, 
 before sunset of the day on which the garrison laid down their 
 arms."* All arrangements had been made beforehand for this 
 pursuit. Johnston fell back into the works at Jackson; Sher- 
 man arrived there on the 10th [July] . Johnston hoped Sher- 
 man would assault, but Sherman prepared to besiege the place. 
 Johnston was not to be caught, like Pemberton, in a trap ; on 
 the night of the 16th he skilfully withdrew his army across the 
 bridges of Pearl River, and made his escape. Sherman fol- 
 lowed him about twelve miles, then was recalled to Vicksburg. 
 
 ♦Greene. 
 
416 American Campaigns. 
 
 Johnston went into camp half-way between Jackson and 
 Meridian. 
 
 The Vicksburg Campaign was over. 
 
 (213) Port Hudson surrendered to Banks on the 9th of 
 July, and the Mississippi River was again open to the world's 
 traffic. The Confederacy was split in twain. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 (217) When General Grant had his army in its camps in 
 the swamps across the Mississippi from Vicksburg, after fail- 
 ing in all his efforts to turn the town by way of bayous and 
 canals, he was at the crisis of his military career. His next 
 effort was to decide whether he was to go down in history as a 
 failure or as a success. 
 
 He had already failed in five different projects for the cap- 
 ture of Vicksburg: first, the combined movement in which he 
 was to march a force overland from Northern Mississippi 
 against the rear of the town, while Sherman moved by trans- 
 ports down the great river. This enterprise was brought to 
 naught by the capture of Grant's advanced base at Holly 
 Springs by Van Dorn's cavalry; by the breaking up of the 
 railway in his rear by Forrest, and by Sherman's failure to 
 defeat the Confederates at Chickasaw Bluffs. The second 
 effort was by way of the canal across the peninsular opposite 
 Vicksburg; the third was by way of Lake Providence and 
 bayous and rivers west of the Mississippi ; the fourth was the 
 expedition by way of the Yazoo Pass ; the fifth was the expedi- 
 tion by way of Steele's Bayou. All of these projects had 
 failed, and months of patient labor had been wasted upon 
 them. The capture of Vicksburg seemed farther away than 
 ever. A year before 10,000 men could easily have taken it; 
 but within the last few months the Confederates had turned 
 it into a fortress and placed 22,000 men in its garrison. A 
 large part of the public press had already declared Grant a 
 failure, and Halleck and the Administration at Washington 
 were about ready to try some one else in his place. 
 
 When Grant decided to cut loose from his base and make his 
 campaign without a line of communications, he took the same 
 kind of risk that General Scott took when he abandoned his 
 communications at Puebla and advanced against the City of 
 Mexico. It was not a change of base like McClellan's move- 
 ment from the York to the James in the Peninsular Campaign ; 
 
The Vicksburg Campaign. 417 
 
 Grant was not sure where his next base would be, or how long 
 he should be without any base. Sherman advised against the 
 movement, and was in favor of returning to Memphis and 
 making a new start by way of the railway ; and Grant's better 
 judgment told him that this was the safer and surer plan. But 
 the cry of the press and public opinion were behind him to 
 pronounce such a movement a retreat — another failure: and 
 almost surely to force Grant's removal. So, like Scott at 
 Puebla, Grant took the hazard of operating without a base; 
 and he won. The stakes were larger, too, than he had reck- 
 oned them; they were not only Vicksburg, but Chattanooga, 
 Appomattox, peace in the land, a general's commission, the 
 White House, and a fame immortal. 
 
 It has been said that Grant, in case of defeat, could have 
 fallen back upon the Federal posts at New Orleans or Baton 
 Rouge; or that he might have drawn supplies from those 
 places. But such is not the case. Those cities were nearly 200 
 miles from his line of operations; a beaten army of forty-odd 
 thousand men would have slim chances before an active enemy, 
 in a retreat of 200 miles, with no base from which to draw 
 ammunition and subsistence, and in a hostile country. 
 
 Barring the question of a base and a line of communications 
 there has been no more brilliant series of military operations in 
 American history, and none that conformed more closely to 
 the principles of the military art, than the operations of Grant's 
 army from the day on which it fought the battle of Port Gib- 
 son until it arrived in front of the Confederate works at 
 Vicksburg. The campaign was full of lessons for the military 
 student; on the Union side, full of examples to be followed; 
 on the Confederate side, full of examples to be avoided. Not 
 a mistake of strategy can be pointed out in Grant's operations, 
 and scarcely a mistake of tactics was made by his subordinate 
 commanders. 
 
 In those "eighteen days" Grant "had marched about 200 
 miles, and, by keeping his army together, had defeated the 
 enemy's scattered detachments, in four engagements, at Ray- 
 mond, Jackson, Champion's Hill, and Big Black, all fought 
 within six days ; he had inflicted a loss upon them of 8,000 in 
 killed, wounded, and missing, had captured eighty-eight pieces 
 of their artillery, and, finally, had driven them into the narrow 
 defenses of Vicksburg, causing their outworks at Haynes' 
 Bluff, Warrenton, and Grand Gulf to be abandoned, and estab- 
 lishing his own base on the Yazoo River, in easy and safe 
 
418 American Campaigns. 
 
 reach of his gunboats and transports. He had not only pre- 
 vented the junction of the enemy's detachments, but had still 
 further scattered their forces; so that they had fully 14,000 
 fewer men available in Vicksburg at the close of this period 
 than at the beginning. During these eighteen days Grant's 
 men had had but five days' rations, having lived for the rest on 
 the country; their own losses had been a little less than 3,500."* 
 
 Grant was fortunate in having two such lieutenants as Sher- 
 man and McPherson to command two of his three corps; he 
 was no less fortunate in having a Pemberton as his adversary. 
 If Pemberton issued a single order or made a single move in 
 those eighteen days that was wholly right the historians have 
 failed to record it. It is true, however, that Pemberton had 
 a difficult problem to solve. With the troops and means at his 
 disposal it appears difficult as viewed by us to-day with a full 
 knowledge of all the circumstances; but it was much more so 
 to him, for the situation was by no means as clear to him as it 
 is to us. His task was to guard Vicksburg and Port Hudson, 
 the locks that kept the Mississippi shut. Port Hudson was 
 threatened from below by Farragut's fleet and Banks's army. 
 
 As to the struggle for Vicksburg, Pemberton's task at first 
 was to keep Grant from placing the Federal army on high 
 ground back of the town. So long as Pemberton could do that 
 he held Vicksburg secure from capture. While the operations 
 connected with this stage of the struggle were, in many re- 
 spects, wholly different from any other operations found in 
 military history, they, nevertheless, fall under the general class 
 of those relating to the attack and defense of a river-line. To 
 put an army across a great river, defended by an enemy, and 
 make a firm lodgment upon the other bank, looks like a hard 
 task to undertake; but history shows that the task has never 
 been so hard as the task to prevent the passage of such a 
 river. Not mountains, nor rivers, nor swamps, though de- 
 fended by an enemy, have ever permanently stopped an army 
 commanded by a skilful and determined general. The task of 
 Pemberton was made doubly hard by General Grant's dogged 
 persistence, and the clever measures employed to deceive him 
 — such as Grierson's raid, Steele's movement to Greenville, 
 and Sherman's feints at Haynes's Bluff. Yet Pemberton, as- 
 sisted by the unusual features of the topography — swamps, 
 jungle, and a network of creeks and bayous — managed to 
 
 *Greene. 
 
The Vicksburg Campaign. 419 
 
 thwart all of Grant's efforts for three months — from the end 
 of January to the end of April. 
 
 After Grant had succeeded in making a lodgment upon high 
 ground on the east bank of the river Pemberton's task was to 
 destroy the Union army or drive it back; or to delay it until 
 the Confederate government could take measures to destroy it 
 or drive it back. Pemberton had about 35,000 men within the 
 triangle, Haynes's Bluff — Grand Gulf — Jackson, and about 
 15,000 at Port Hudson. Grant had 41,000, but they were united. 
 (213) If Pemberton had withdrawn the garrison from Port 
 Hudson he would have opened the way for Banks and Farra- 
 gut to join Porter and Grant; besides, it would have taken ten 
 or fifteen days for the troops at that point to join the main 
 army on the Vicksburg-Jackson line. Pemberton, there- 
 fore, was obliged to rely upon the force of 35,000 to 
 defeat or hold Grant, until reinforcements could come. 
 He was further puzzled to decide what Grant meant to 
 do. He believed that Grant would turn northward and 
 take the shortest route to Vicksburg, keeping in touch 
 with the river for his supplies ; but Grant might turn 
 southward first, and unite with Banks against Port Hudson. 
 The last thing Pemberton supposed Grant would do was pre- 
 cisely what he did — cut loose from his base and move on Jack- 
 son with his whole army ; he feared, however, that Grant might 
 send a large detachment, a raiding force, to make a dash for 
 Jackson and destroy the public stores there, and the railways. 
 Jackson was the base from which the garrison of Vicksburg 
 and Pemberton's army drew supplies. To do this was General 
 Grant's first intention — his main force started toward Ed- 
 wards's Station, and McPherson's corps alone set out for Jack- 
 son. It was not until McPherson encountered stout resistance 
 at Raymond that Grant concluded there was a strong enough 
 force of the enemy at Jackson to require the attention of his 
 main body. 
 
 (217) To guard Jackson and Vicksburg and the railway 
 connecting them, at the same time, Pemberton made the fatal 
 mistake of stretching his army across the space from Jackson 
 to the Mississippi. He left two divisions at Vicksburg and 
 Haynes's Bluff — one of which, at least, had to stay there so 
 long as Sherman remained thereabouts with his corps, else 
 Sherman would have turned his feints into a real attack and 
 captured the town. One division, however, might have been 
 withdrawn at once, and the bulk of the other as soon as Sher- 
 man withdrew to join Grant. Three of his divisions Pember- 
 
420 American Campaigns. 
 
 ton placed at the different ferries of the Big Black to bar 
 Grant's direct advance on Vicksburg; and the rest of his 
 troops, two or three brigades which had been sent to him from 
 other States, he left at Jackson. Thus he scattered his army 
 so that it could make no effective resistance at any point. 
 
 What Pemberton should have done was to assemble his 
 whole force as quickly as practicable at that point nearest 
 Grant's line of march which all the detachments could reach 
 before he should have to fight a decisive battle. Edwards's 
 Station was perhaps the best point for the assembly. Having 
 gotten his forces together he then should have attacked Grant 
 if he felt strong enough to do so; or taken up a strong posi- 
 tion such that Grant would have had to attack him in order 
 to advance farther; or made use of his "power of attraction" 
 to lead Grant farther and farther away from the Union base, 
 and to gain time for reinforcements to come. 
 
 If Pemberton had taken position at Edwards's Station with 
 his 35,000 men Grant could hardly have dared to move either 
 against Vicksburg or Jackson without first attacking and de- 
 feating him. By the 14th of May the force at Jackson would 
 have been reinforced to 12,000 men, if Sherman and McPher- 
 son had not taken the town that day. All of these 12,000 
 might have joined Pemberton at Edwards's Station by the 15th 
 or 16th if he had been in position there with his other 35,000, 
 delaying Grant; or if he had found it necessary to fall back 
 before Grant's superior numbers farther north or east, such 
 of the Jackson troops as had not been able to reach him at 
 Edwards's Station could have joined him at some other point. 
 With these reinforcements his united army would have num- 
 bered some 47,000, — a strong enough force to have taken the 
 offensive. 
 
 If Pemberton had possessed the soldierly quality of obe- 
 dience he might still have saved his army in spite of all the 
 mistakes he had made. If he had moved, — as Johnston or- 
 dered, — from Edwards's Station to Clinton upon Grant's rear, 
 at the time when Grant moved against Jackson, he might have 
 gained some advantage in cooperation with the Confederate 
 troops at Jackson. He would thus at least have lessened the 
 distance between the two Confederate forces, and made better 
 their chances of uniting. Instead of obeying Johnston's order 
 Pemberton called a council of war and stayed at Edwards's 
 Station nearly two days, then started southward to cut Grant's 
 communications, when Grant had no communications. Then 
 
The Vicksburg Campaign. 421 
 
 later, when Johnston, who saw that all hope of saving Vicks- 
 burg was lost, ordered Pemberton to evacuate the place, Pem- 
 berton by vigorous movement might still have saved the rem- 
 nant of his army, if he had obeyed Johnston's order. Instead 
 of doing so Pemberton remained in Vicksburg, and lost his 
 army as well as the town. 
 
 Vicksburg, Metz, Paris, Plevna, Santiago, Port Arthur, all 
 point the lesson that an army which takes refuge in a fortified 
 place and stays there to be besieged, will be lost. They also 
 point the lesson that surrender is usually brought about more 
 quickly by starvation than by saps and mines; that bombard- 
 ing a beleaguered city does not shorten the siege ; and that as- 
 saults in such cases are a useless sacrifice of life.* 
 
 Johnston saved his little army at Jackson by slipping away 
 with it across Pearl River, when Sherman had surrounded the 
 town on the side away from the river. Johnston showed a far 
 better judgment throughout the campaign than Pemberton 
 showed; but he lacked the sort of boldness and energy that 
 might have delivered the Confederate army from the toils into 
 which Pemberton had gotten it. If, instead of stopping at 
 Jackson, Johnston had hurried on toward Vicksburg and taken 
 command in person of the right wing of the army, he might 
 have avoided the blunders from which it suffered, and saved it 
 from capture. Johnston did nothing in this campaign that 
 gave him any title to fame as a general. 
 
 Too much praise cannot be spoken of Admiral Porter's 
 fleet; without its cooperation the campaign would have been 
 impossible. 
 
 In the eighteen days' operations just preceding the siege 
 both sides were greatly hampered by a lack of cavalry to do 
 the work of reconnaissance. And even during the siege an ade- 
 quate cavalry force, to watch for Johnston's movements, would 
 have relieved Grant of considerable anxiety, and saved him 
 the necessity of sending a large infantry force under Blair 
 and Osterhaus to look for Johnston's army. 
 
 *Port Arthur does not point all these lessons. 
 
LECTURE XX. 
 THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN. 
 
 After Stones River. 
 
 (227) Having taken possession of Murfreesboro after the 
 battle of Stones River, in the first days of January, 1863, Rose- 
 crans, with his Army of the Cumberland, remained with his 
 headquarters at that town until near the end of the following 
 June. Bragg during the same time had his headquarters at 
 Tullahoma, and kept his army so disposed as to cover the 
 routes to Chattanooga. 
 
 Within this time there were no operations on a large scale 
 between these two armies ; the Confederate cavalry, however,, 
 was all the while very active. After capturing Grant's depot 
 at Holly Springs Van Dorn had joined Bragg with three or 
 four more thousands of cavalry. These with the squadrons of 
 Wheeler and Forrest and Morgan made a mounted force great- 
 ly outnumbering Rosecrans's cavalry, and were a constant an- 
 noyance to the Union commander. They would break up the 
 railways in rear of his army, attack isolated posts and detach- 
 ments, capture wagon-trains, burn bridges, and do all manner 
 of things to harass the army. For the first few weeks after the 
 battle of Stones River Bragg's cavalry kept the army of the 
 Cumberland on half rations. To oppose it Rosecrans begged, 
 the War Department for an adequate cavalry force properly 
 equipped. He begged in vain. He had incurred the hostility 
 of Mr. Stanton and General Halleck by writing them one or 
 two right manly letters, and they would do nothing for him. 
 Partly to make up for his lack of cavalry he mounted one of 
 his infantry brigades [Wilder] on captured horses, and it did 
 good work throughout the Chickamauga Campaign. 
 
 All the while the War Department was persuading, urging,, 
 and even threatening Rosecrans to induce him to move against 
 Bragg's army and drive it out of Tennessee. Grant, who was 
 conducting the campaign against Vicksburg, joined in urging 
 Rosecrans to take the offensive, as, otherwise, he believed 
 Bragg's army, or part of it, would be transferred to Mississippi 
 — as a small part of it was. Rosecrans, on the other hand, ar- 
 gued that, if he moved against Bragg's army and drove it out of 
 
The Chickamauga Campaign. 423 
 
 Tennessee, he should only hurry it to reinforce the troops op- 
 posed to Grant in Mississippi. So he remained at Murfrees- 
 boro, doing the best he could to put his own army into good 
 shape for active campaign, strengthening his bases, and keeping 
 his communications open. 
 
 Meantime, by War Department orders, his troops had been 
 organized into three corps : the Fourteenth under Thomas, the 
 Twentieth under McCook, and the Twenty-first under Crit- 
 tenden; they consisted practically of the same divisions that 
 had composed the Center, Right Wing, and Left Wing, respect- 
 ively, in the Stones River Campaign. In addition Rosecrans 
 organized a Reserve Corps of three brigades under General 
 Gordon Granger. The army numbered some 60,000, while 
 Bragg had about 43,000. At the same time Buckner occupied 
 the Valley of East Tennessee with a Confederate corps, and 
 Burnside was organizing the Army of the Ohio with which to 
 advance into East Tennessee from Kentucky, by way of Cum- 
 berland Gap. 
 
 At length, toward the end of June, Rosecrans was ready to 
 move; Burnside was on his way toward Cumberland Gap; 
 Grant had Pemberton's army invested in Vicksburg; and Lee 
 was on his way to Gettysburg. 
 
 The Tullahoma Campaign. 
 
 On the 23rd of June Rosecrans issued his orders for a for- 
 ward movement. The main part of Bragg's army was at Shel- 
 byville in an intrenched camp ; but Hardee's corps was at War- 
 trace and Fairfield. The two cavalry corps were on the right 
 and left of the line with their headquarters respectively at Mc- 
 Minnville and Columbia.* The position of the army was upon 
 a high plateau, locally called the Barrens, accessible from the 
 north only by way of the breaks and canons. The principal 
 approaches were by way of Hoover's Gap, Liberty Gap, and 
 Guy's Gap. The railway and one of the roads to Murfrees- 
 boro passed through Bellbuckle Gap. All these passes were 
 held by Confederate forces. The Shelbyville position was well- 
 nigh impregnable from the front, so Rosecrans resolved to 
 make a feint against this point with Granger's Reserve Corps 
 and most of the cavalry, while he massed his three main, corps 
 
 ♦Columbia is not shown on Map No. 227. It is southwest of Mur- 
 freesboro (almost due west of McMinnville) and about as far as 
 McMinnville from Murfreesboro. 
 
424 American Campaigns. 
 
 against Bragg's right at Wartrace. The army started in a 
 pouring rain, and the roads were terrible. Granger's corps 
 and the cavalry moved toward Shelbyville; McCook's corps 
 took the road through Liberty Gap; Thomas's the Hoover's 
 Gap road ; Crittenden's corps marched first to Bradyville. The 
 movement succeeded; there was considerable fighting at the 
 gaps, but the Confederate right was forced back from one po- 
 sition after another, and the left had to fall back to keep from 
 being cut off. By June 30 the Union army had reached Man- 
 chester, where it was concentrated ; Bragg's army had retired 
 as far as Tullahoma, where it had taken up a position. 
 
 (228) On the 1st of July Bragg evacuated Tullahoma and 
 started for Chattanooga. Rosecrans pursued as vigorously as 
 the deep roads and swollen streams would let him. It was now 
 a stern-chase with all the advantages of topography in favor 
 of the Confederates. Within a week Bragg's army was at 
 Chattanooga. The Tullahoma Campaign had lasted nine days, 
 within which time Rosecrans had so maneuvered as to force 
 Bragg to abandon his intrenched camp at Shelbyville, his 
 strong line of defense in the mountain gorges, his fortified base 
 at Tullahoma, and all of the State west of the Tennessee River; 
 and had lost only 560 men killed, wounded, and missing. 
 
 Plan. 
 
 Rosecrans's next task was to wrest Chattanooga, the impor- 
 tant railway center and key not only to East Tennessee, but to 
 North Alabama, North Georgia, and Middle Tennessee as well, 
 from Bragg. The Tennessee River and Cumberland Moun- 
 tains were formidable obstacles across Rosecrans's path. Three 
 plans of operations were to be considered: first, to force a 
 passage of the river in the face of the Confederates at Chat- 
 tanooga — a plan which had little to commend it; second, to 
 cross the river considerably above the town, turn the right of 
 Bragg's army, and strike its line of communications, which 
 was the railway back through Dalton. This was the move- 
 ment that Bragg was expecting, as it was the movement that 
 would bring the columns of Rosecrans and Burnside more 
 nearly within supporting distance of each other; had it been 
 adopted by Rosecrans, Bragg would undoubtedly have en- 
 deavored to watch the movements of the enemy closely enough 
 to be on hand with his main army near the point of passage. 
 
The Chickamauga Campaign. 425 
 
 By skilful maneuvers, however, Rosecrans could have deceived 
 him, and, sooner or later, effected a crossing somewhere before 
 Bragg discovered it. But either of these two plans would have 
 taken the Federal army far away from the railway, and made 
 it dependent upon wagon-trains and worthless mountain roads 
 for its supplies. The third plan was to cross the river below 
 Chattanooga and turn the Confederate left, intercepting the 
 army's communications and taking the town in rear. This 
 was the plan Rosecrans decided to adopt. 
 
 At the end of the short Tullahoma Campaign the Army of 
 the Cumberland and Bragg's Army of the Tennessee "re- 
 sumed in the main the attitude of the previous summer, when 
 each was gathering forces for an aggressive movement"* — 
 the Army of the Cumberland being then under Buell. The 
 Union army occupied camps from Winchester on the right to 
 McMinnville on the left, forty miles apart. The Reserve 
 Corps [Granger] was guarding the bases and lines of com- 
 munication, and garrisoning posts as far back as Clarksville 
 and Fort Donelson. Early in July the bulk of the cavalry con- 
 centrated at Salem, preparatory to a "general sweep" south- 
 ward into Alabama. 
 
 Bragg stationed his headquarters and Polk's corps at Chatta- 
 nooga and began at once to fortify the town. Hardee's corps 
 was placed on the line of the railway to Knoxville, with its 
 center at Tyner's Station. All the crossings of the Tennessee 
 were prepared for defense as high up as Blythe's Ferry. For- 
 rest's cavalry was stationed at Kingston,! and had orders to 
 guard the approaches to the river from the Sequatchie Valley, 
 and the crossings of the river, and to keep a watch upon Burn- 
 side's movements in East Tennessee. Wheeler's cavalry was 
 out on the left, and a brigade of infantry was stationed at 
 Bridgeport. 
 
 Halleck immediately began urging Rosecrans to "advance 
 against the enemy south of the Tennessee."* In Rosecrans's 
 judgment three things were needed for the success of his move- 
 ment; these were ripe corn in the fields, the repair of the 
 railway to the Tennessee River, and support for his flanks. 
 Vicksburg had fallen, and he thought troops should be sent 
 from Grant's command to cover his advance on the right ; he 
 wanted to wait for Burnside to come into East Tennessee on 
 
 ♦Van Home. 
 
 fOn the north bank of the Tennessee, about ninety miles above 
 Chattanooga. Not shown on map No. 228. 
 
426 American Campaigns. 
 
 his left ; and it would be more than a month before the harvest 
 of the corn in Tennessee and Georgia. The judgment of 
 Rosecrans did not appeal to the Commanding-General at Wash- 
 ington, who dispatched him, on the Sth of August, a peremp- 
 tory order to advance. Rosecrans, however, did not move untiL 
 the middle of the month. 
 
 Geography. 
 
 Between the Army of the Cumberland and its objective,. 
 Bragg's army at Chattanooga or its line of communications,, 
 the Western and Atlantic Railroad, lay not only the high pla- 
 teaus and the gorges of the Cumberland range west of the Ten- 
 nessee, and this river itself, but also a series of mountain- 
 ridges, valleys, and streams, generally parallel to the river, on. 
 the eastern side. First is Sand Mountain, with a plateau ten 
 or twelve miles wide and 2,200 feet above sea-level. This 
 mountain ends in a mass of rough ridges and gorges, called' 
 Raccoon Mountain, enclosed in a deep bend of the Tennessee, 
 about four miles west of Chattanooga. Next is the valley,, 
 two or three miles wide, of Will's and Lookout Creeks. These 
 two creeks have their headwaters very near together, but flow 
 in opposite directions, the first southwest and the second north- 
 east, in a continuous valley. Beyond this valley is Lookout 
 Mountain, another long ridge. About thirty miles south of 
 Chattanooga this mountain divides, throwing off a long thin 
 spur to the right, called Pigeon Mountain, and continuing in its 
 main ridge, narrower and more rugged, straight toward Chat- 
 tanooga. It ends abruptly, four miles south of the town in a 
 commanding point of rock, rising from the edge of the Ten- 
 nessee River. At the fork of Lookout and Pigeon Mountains 
 is McLemore Cove, in the head of which are the sources of 
 Chickamauga Creek. Beyond Lookout Mountain, toward the 
 east, are other parallel ridges and valleys. 
 
 There were several villages in the valleys. There were no- 
 good roads in the region, but along the direction of all the val- 
 leys, and also along the tops of some of the plateaus, were 
 ordinary country roads. Radiating from the river at Caper- 
 ton's Ferry near Stevenson, and from Bridgeport and Shell- 
 mound, were roads leading through gaps in the ridges, and 
 across the valleys, to the various towns. One of the roads 
 from Shellmound, with branches coming into it from other 
 
The Chickamauga Campaign. 427" 
 
 ferries, passed round the upper end of Mount Lookout to- 
 Chattanooga. Time would be required to repair all the roads- 
 before the wagons could go over them. The valleys contained 
 some farms, but for the main part were covered with timber. 
 The tops of the ridges, also, though of poor sandy soil, and 
 almost destitute of water, had thin woods upon them. Indeed 
 it was a difficult mountain region, different from any other in 
 which a great campaign had as yet been carried on in this war,, 
 though not wholly unlike the theater of the Tullahoma Cam- 
 paign. 
 
 Operations. 
 
 Rosecrans's movement began on the 16th of August.. 
 The passage of the river was to be made at points between 
 Shellmound and Stevenson. The Twenty- first Corps [Critten- 
 den] was to move in three columns through the Sequatchie 
 Valley, covered by Minty's brigade of cavalry; the rest of the 
 cavalry was to march beyond the right flank of the main army ; 
 the Fourteenth Corps [Thomas] was to move in two columns 
 down Battle Creek and Big Crow Creek, respectively ; McCook 
 was to send Johnson's division of his corps [Twentieth] by 
 way of Salem to Bellfonte, and Davis's division by way of the 
 mountain road from Winchester to Stevenson; Sheridan's 
 division of this corps had already been sent forward to Ste- 
 venson and Bridgeport; the Reserve Corps [Granger] was to 
 follow up the movement of the main army and close up on it 
 as soon as practicable. 
 
 To deceive Bragg as to the point of crossing, these move- 
 ments were to be concealed as well as possible, and a detach- 
 ment of three brigades under Hazen from Crittenden's corps- 
 was to make a feint all along the river, from Chattanooga as 
 far up as the Confederates were defending the crossings. On 
 the 2^st of August a battery of this detachment threw shells- 
 into Chattanooga from the opposite bank of the river. By the 
 evening of the 20th these movements had all been made and 
 the army was concentrated near the Tennessee. 
 
 On the 6th of August "Burnside's advance into East Ten- 
 nessee was announced by the presence of his cavalry in the 
 vicinity of Knoxville."* Thereupon Bragg ordered Buckner 
 to withdraw his corps from Knoxville to Loudon — back on the 
 
 *Campaigns of the Civil War (Scribner's),— Henry M. Cist. 
 
428 American Campaigns. 
 
 railway thirty miles nearer Chattanooga. Hazen's demonstra- 
 tion along the river caused Bragg to draw Buckner still nearer, 
 and, a little while later, to order him into Chattanooga. About 
 this time, also, Walker's corps of two divisions from Joseph E. 
 Johnston's Mississippi forces joined Bragg's army, and Long- 
 street was started with two divisions and Alexander's battalion 
 of artillery from Lee's army of Northern Virginia. Part of 
 Longstreet's corps, however, did not arrive until after the bat- 
 tle of Chickamauga. Hardee had been detached from Bragg's 
 army, and D. H. Hill had been assigned to it; Hill was now 
 in command of a corps. 
 
 (229) Rosecrans did not have pontoons enough to build two 
 bridges, — the river was high and wide from the recent heavy 
 rains, — but by eking out his means with a trestle and rafts 
 and boats he succeeded in passing his army to the east bank 
 by the 4th of September. Thomas's corps [Fourteenth] took 
 the road to Trenton; McCook's [Twentieth] took the road 
 to Alpine by way of Winston's Gap; Crittenden's [Twenty- 
 first] was ordered to move from Shellmound toward Chatta- 
 nooga, threatening that place. All the cavalry except Minty's 
 brigade accompanied McCook's column. Minty's brigade and 
 Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry went with Crittenden's 
 column. 
 
 On the 9th of September Rosecrans learned that Bragg had 
 evacuated Chattanooga and was retreating southward. Rose- 
 crans then ordered McCook, covered by the cavalry, to push 
 ahead toward Alpine and Summerville to try to cut Bragg off, 
 while Crittenden, passing through Chattanooga and leaving a 
 brigade to garrison the town, was to pursue by the Ringgold 
 Road, with Minty's brigade of cavalry and Wilder's brigade of 
 mounted infantry covering his front. Thomas continued to 
 advance by the Trenton-Lafayette Road. The two flanks of 
 the army were marching forty miles apart, and the three col- 
 umns were so far separated, one from another, by impassable 
 mountains, that no two of them were within supporting dis- 
 tance of each other. 
 
 By the 10th McCook had reached Alpine; Thomas was at 
 Stevens's Gap; his leading division [Negley] had met the 
 enemy in Dug Gap ; Crittenden was at Chickamauga Creek on 
 the Ringgold Road ; the head of his column had also met the 
 enemy's cavalry. Reports received by the commanders of all 
 three of the columns indicated that there was a large force of 
 
The Chickamauga Campaign. 429 
 
 Confederates in the neighborhood of Lafayette. And such 
 was the case ; it was Bragg's army. 
 
 Bragg had called in his outlying detachments, and, on the 
 8th of September, having learned that Rosecrans had crossed 
 the river and was advancing against his rear, had evacuated 
 Chattanooga and moved out on the Lafayette Road to meet the 
 enemy. On this day, the 10th September, his army was con- 
 centrated behind Pigeon Mountain with its front and flanks 
 covered by his cavalry. Cleburne's division of D. H. Hill's 
 corps occupied the gaps of Pigeon Mountain. 
 
 Bragg was aware of the isolated positions of the Federal 
 corps, and appears to have seen his opportunity to destroy 
 them in detail. He has been greatly censured for his failure 
 to do so. The evening of the 9th of September he had ordered 
 Hindman to march his division [Polk's corps] into McLemore 
 Cove and attack Negley's division in its advanced position; 
 and he had ordered Hill to send or lead Cleburne's division 
 through the gaps of Pigeon Mountain in conjunction with 
 Hindman. 
 
 Hindman reached his position on the 10th, but Hill failed to 
 carry out his part of the order. He reported that the gaps — 
 Dug and Catlett's — had been closed with felled trees, and that 
 it was impossible for him to get through them. Bragg thereupon 
 ordered Buckner to march his corps to Hindman's assistance, 
 which he did on the afternoon of the 10th. Thus three Con- 
 federate divisions were now within three miles of Negley's 
 Federal division, which was far ahead of the rest of Thomas's 
 corps. Instead of attacking Negley, as ordered, Hindman and 
 Buckner conferred together and decided that another plan was 
 better. They then sent back their recommendation to Bragg 
 and awaited his reply — and lost their opportunity. Negley 
 seeing the danger of his position, hastened back to Stevens's 
 Gap, where he rejoined the rest of Thomas's corps. Bragg 
 refused to adopt the plan recommended by his subordinates 
 and insisted upon their carrying out his orders. At the 
 same time he ordered Polk to march his other division to sup- 
 port Hindman and Buckner; and Walker to move his corps 
 to Dug Gap. The whole combination, which ought to have 
 succeeded, failed, apparently through the sloth and reluctance 
 shown by Bragg's subordinate commanders in the execution of 
 his orders. 
 
 Meantime Crittenden's Federal corps had divided ; two divi- 
 sions continued the march toward Ringgold, while one moved 
 
430 American Campaigns. 
 
 to Lee and Gordon's Mills; both detachments were recon- 
 noitering for Bragg's army. Bragg knew of this, and now 
 turned his attention to Crittenden's corps. On the evening of 
 the 12th of September he ordered Polk to move his corps and 
 Walker's to Lee and Gordon's Mills and strike "Crittenden in 
 detail."* At eleven o'clock that night Polk sent back a dis- 
 patch, stating "that he had taken a strong position for defense," 
 and asking "that he be heavily reinforced. "f Bragg replied to 
 him that he was already greatly superior in number to the 
 enemy in his front and promised to support him with reinforce- 
 ments. He urged Polk to. attack at dawn of the 13th. Early on 
 the morning of the 13th Bragg moved with Buckner's corps to 
 Polk's support. He found that Polk had not attacked, and that 
 Crittenden had reunited his divisions on the west side of Chick- 
 amauga Creek. Finding that the Confederates had not re- 
 treated by way of Ringgold, Crittenden had marched his two 
 divisions across from that place to Lee and Gordon's on the 
 afternoon of the 12th. 
 
 (230) Bragg now concentrated his army along the east bank 
 of Chickamauga Creek. As soon as his reinforcements under 
 Longstreet from Virginia should arrive he meant to attack 
 with his whole command.f 
 
 On the 12th of September, Rosecrans became convinced that 
 Bragg was concentrating his army behind Pigeon Mountain, 
 and he appreciated the danger of his own army's position with 
 its flank columns thirty miles apart — from Lee and Gordon's 
 Mills to Alpine — and Bragg's army holding the direct road be- 
 tween them. He sent an order at once to McCook, directing 
 him to unite with Thomas. McCook began his march in obe- 
 dience to this order on the night of the 13th by way of Valley 
 Head. On the 17th he had his corps concentrated at the east- 
 ern end of Stevens's Gap. The corps of Thomas and Crit- 
 tenden had been held in place to await McCook's arrival. 
 
 The Battle of Chickamauga. 
 
 On the morning of September the 18th Hood had reached 
 Ringgold with three of Longstreet's brigades; six others and 
 Alexander's battalion of artillery were on the way. Deter- 
 mined, as at Perryville and Stone's River, to get the initiative, 
 Bragg decided not to await the arrival of the hinder six bri' 
 gades and the artillery, but to advance in force at once. Long- 
 
 ♦Bragg's order to Polk. 
 fCist. 
 
The Chickamauga Campaign. 431 
 
 street arrived on the night of the 19th with two more of the 
 brigades, but the rest of his troops did not come in time to 
 take part in the battle of Chickamauga. 
 
 Rosecrans had decided to take up a defensive position cov- 
 ering the roads to Chattanooga. On the morning of the 18th 
 his troops were situated as follows : Crittenden's corps was in 
 front of Lee and Gordon's; Thomas's corps was at Pond 
 Spring ; McCook's was on its right at Stevens's Gap ; Granger's 
 Reserve Corps was at Rossville; Mitchell's cavalry corps, ex- 
 cept Minty's brigade, covered the right of the army and was 
 along the road from Alpine to McLemore's Cove ; Minty's bri- 
 gade was on the Ringgold Road east of Reed's Bridge; and 
 Wilder's mounted brigade guarded Alexander's Bridge. 
 
 Bragg planned to turn the left flank of the enemy and cut 
 him off from the roads by way of Rossville and McFarland's 
 Gap back to Chattanooga. Accordingly, on the morning of 
 the 18th, he issued an order for an immediate movement. (231) 
 Hood with his own and Bushrod Johnson's troops was to cross 
 at Reed's Bridge, "turn to the left by the most practical route, 
 and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee and Gordon's 
 Mills."* This turning movement was to be followed progres- 
 sively by Walker, who was to cross his corps at Alexander's 
 Bridge, and Buckner, who was to cross his corps at Tedford's 
 Ford, about three-quarters of a mile up-stream from Alexan- 
 der's Bridge. Polk's corps was to cross at Lee and Gordon's, 
 or, if the enemy should be found too strong there, at Dalton's 
 •or Tedford's Ford. (Dalton's Ford was about a mile and three- 
 quarters below Lee and Gordon's.) Hill was to cover the left 
 against a possible advance of the enemy from McLemore's 
 Cove, or attack him in flank if he undertook to reinforce the 
 troops at Lee and Gordon's. The cavalry was, of course, to 
 •cover the flanks — Wheeler on the left and Forrest on the right. 
 
 Rosecrans had guessed what Bragg's plan of battle was to be. 
 The clouds of dust raised by the marching columns — espe- 
 cially by Longstreet's troops marching, on their way to re- 
 inforce Bragg, by the road from Dalton to Ringgold — indicated 
 that Bragg's army was massing beyond the left of the Union 
 army for the purpose of seizing the roads to Chattanooga. 
 Accordingly, on the 18th, Thomas's corps, followed by Mc- 
 Cook's, was started for the space between the crossings of the 
 Chickamauga, above mentioned, and Missionary Ridge, to pre- 
 
 *D. H. Hill in B. & L. 
 
432 American Campaigns. 
 
 vent Bragg from seizing the roads to Chattanooga. Two of 
 the brigades of the Reserve Corps [Granger], also, marched 
 toward Reed's Bridge ; while the third moved out on the Ring- 
 gold Road to keep watch in that direction. 
 
 The advance of the Confederate columns on the 18th 
 was slow, due to the narrow and difficult mountain roads, and 
 to the resistance offered by Minty's cavalry and Wilder's 
 mounted infantry. Minty's cavalry resisted stoutly the ad- 
 vance of Johnson's [Hood's] column (Hood joined this 
 column and took command of it about 4 p.m.), but was finally 
 driven across the creek; it managed to burn the bridge after 
 one of the Confederate brigades had crossed. Wilder's mount- 
 ed infantry successfully held Alexander's Bridge against Walk- 
 er, and forced him to move down to Lambert's Ford in order 
 to cross; Wilder was then driven beyond the Lafayette Road. 
 Hood's six brigades and Walker's five bivouacked that night 
 on the west side of the Chickamauga; the other Confederate 
 corps bivouacked on the east bank, Buckner's at Tedford's and 
 Dalton's Fords, Polk's opposite Lee and Gordon's Mills, and 
 Hill's opposite Glass's Mill, a mile and a half above Lee and 
 Gordon's. 
 
 (232) The forces on each side were in motion during the 
 night of the 18th, and by morning" on the 19th all the Con- 
 federate infantry except the divisions of Hindman, Breckin- 
 ridge, and Cleburne, was on the west side of the creek. On the 
 Union side Thomas's corps had come up. Negley's division of 
 it had been placed at Crawfish Springs; Reynolds's near the 
 Widow Glenn's ; while those of Brannan and Baird took posi- 
 tion covering the roads from Reed's and Alexander's Bridges. 
 Crittenden's corps still held the crossing at Lee and Gordon's 
 Mills; the two brigades from Granger's Reserve Corps were 
 on the left beyond the road to Reed's Bridge ; Minty's cavalry 
 brigade was still on the left, and Wilder's mounted infantry 
 was near the Widow Glenn's ; McCook's corps had not come 
 up. 
 
 Neither army knew the exact position of the other ; none of 
 the Federal commanders were aware that "seven-tenths of 
 Bragg's army was on the west bank of the Chickamauga."* It 
 is probable that division commanders on either side hardly 
 knew where their own commands were, in the thick woods, let 
 alone the other troops of their own army, or the troops of the 
 hostile army. The lines were at this time about six miles long. 
 
 (233) Thomas now ordered Brannan to move two of his 
 
 *Van Home. 
 
The Chickamauga Campaign. 433 
 
 brigades forward and reconnoiter toward the crossings of the 
 Chickamauga. In carrying out this order, Brannan soon came 
 into contact with Forrest's cavalry dismounted on the Con- 
 federate right. This brought on the battle of the 19th of 
 September. 
 
 Forrest was driven back, and Walker's corps came into the 
 fight on the Confederate side. Baird with his division came to 
 the support of Brannan ; but they were both driven back in dis- 
 order. Meantime McCook's corps had arrived at Crawfish 
 Springs, and, at about 10 a.m., Johnson's division of this corps 
 was sent by Rosecrans in all haste to help Thomas on the left. 
 It arrived just in time to fall on the left flank of Liddell's- 
 Confederate division [Walker's corps] and drive it back with 
 heavy loss. 
 
 A little while later Cheatham's Confederate division [Polk's 
 corps] came into the battle at this point, too late to save Lid- 
 dell; for about the same time Palmer's division [Crittenden's 
 corps] and Reynolds's division [Thomas's corps] came to John- 
 son's assistance. Then Stewart's Confederate division [Buck- 
 ner's corps] attacked Palmer's, which was assailing the flank 
 of Cheatham's division, and drove it back. Johnson's division 
 fell back at the same time. Soon, also, Reynolds's division was 
 retiring, as well as Van Cleve's [Crittenden's corps], which 
 had also been sent to this part of the line. It was now the 
 middle of the afternoon, and all the Federal divisions except 
 those of the Reserve Corps [Granger] were already at this part 
 of the line, or were marching for it. (230) The Reserve 
 Corps remained at McAfee's Church all day watching the Ring- 
 gold Road and covering the line of retreat through Rossville. 
 
 (233) Davis's division of McCook's corps had arrived from 
 the extreme right in time to check the Confederate advance, 
 and soon afterwards was joined by Wood's division of Critten- 
 den's corps from Lee and Gordon's Mills. Sheridan [McCook's 
 corps] also joined Wood and Davis with the bulk of his divi- 
 sion from Crawfish Springs about 6 p.m. 
 
 About half-past two Hood had moved his brigades forward 
 and fallen upon the divisions of Reynolds and Van Cleve, and, 
 after desperate fighting, had forced them back, pierced the 
 Union line, and got possession of the Lafayette Road at that 
 point. Thereupon Negley's division and part of Brannan's 
 attacked Hood's troops and succeeded in "driving them until 
 darkness ended the combat."* Bragg had not succeeded in 
 
 *Cist 
 
434 American Campaigns. 
 
 turning the Federal left, and Rosecrans still had possession of 
 the roads to Chattanooga. 
 
 About three o'clock Breckinridge's Confederate division 
 [Hill's corps], from the left of Bragg's line, had relieved Hind- 
 man's division [Polk's corps] at Lee and Gordon's; Hindman's 
 division then started for the line of battle by way of Dalton's 
 Ford; Cleburne's division [Hill's corps] had crossed at Ted- 
 ford's Ford. Later in the evening Breckinridge's division start- 
 ed toward the right of the Confederate line. Cleburne's divi- 
 sion joined in the battle at about 6 p.m., but Hindman's and 
 Breckinridge's did not reach the fighting front till darkness 
 had ended the battle. Preston's Confederate division [Buck- 
 ner's corps], also, had taken no part in the battle. 
 
 At eleven o'clock on the night of the 19th Longstreet, with 
 two brigades of McLaws's division, reported his arrival to 
 Bragg. All the Confederate army was now on the west bank 
 •of the Chickamauga, and Bragg gave orders to renew the bat- 
 tle with the same plan at daybreak on the 20th. Polk was 
 placed in command of the right wing of the army, and Long- 
 street of the left wing. 
 
 Both armies had bivouacked where they found themselves at 
 the end of the day's battle, but in the early morning of the 20th 
 the lines were rearranged. (234) "Rosecrans withdrew his 
 right from Lee and Gordon's Mill and the vicinity of Viniard's 
 to the high ground west and north of the Widow Glenn's. The 
 left of his line was formed around the northeast corner of the 
 Kelly Field, the extreme left, facing north, being within 200 
 . yards of the Lafayette Road. The line then extended along the 
 low crest east of the Kelly Field, crossed the Lafayette Road at 
 the northern edge of the Poe Field, and ran thence to Widow 
 Glenn's. The Union line by divisions from left to right ran as 
 follows: Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, Brannan, Negley, 
 and Sheridan, with Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry on 
 the extreme right, and Van Cleve's, Wood's, and Davis's divi- 
 sions west of the Crawfish Springs road in rear of the right 
 wing."* During the night the Union position had been 
 strengthened with breastworks made of logs, rails, and rocks. 
 From Lee and Gordon's southward Mitchell's two divisions of 
 Union cavalry and Wheeler's squadrons faced each other. The 
 Reserve corps [Granger] was still at McAfee's Church. 
 
 In the Confederate line Forrest's cavalry and the right of 
 
 ♦Legend with Official Maps. 
 
The Chickamauga Campaign. 435 
 
 Breckinridge's division reached beyond the Union left. The 
 other divisions were arranged as follows : Cleburne, Stewart, 
 Bushrod Johnson, and Hindman in the front line; Walker's 
 corps to the right and rear of Breckinridge ; Preston's division 
 to the left and rear of Hindman ; the divisions of Cheatham, 
 Hood, and McLaws at first in reserve. Although Bragg ex- 
 pected to renew the attack with his extreme right, Hill's corps, 
 at daylight, and to take it up with his troops successively to^ 
 ward his left, it was not until 9.30 a.m. that Breckinridge's di- 
 vision opened the battle. Apparently Polk, who commanded 
 Bragg's right wing, made no effort to carry out his command- 
 er's order to attack at daybreak. Bragg's orders were given to 
 Polk at midnight, but did not reach Hill until 7.30 a.m. The 
 troops were not then in position, and there was a dense fog 
 which hindered their movements. Two hours were spent in 
 getting them into position.* 
 
 With part of Forrest's cavalry dismounted on his right, 
 Breckinridge moved his division forward. Within fifteen 
 minutes Cleburne's division advanced on his left. Breck- 
 inridge's division enveloped the left of Thomas's line 
 and forced it back; but Cleburne's division and the left of 
 Breckinridge's were stopped by the fire from behind the Union 
 breastworks. Breckinridge's right had pushed on beyond the 
 Rossville Road, and was in position to take Thomas's main 
 line in reverse. But reinforcements had been hurried to 
 Thomas's left. Rosecrans had foreseen, in his inspection of the 
 position before the battle opened, that Bragg was going to 
 repeat the effort to turn his left, and he had personally ordered 
 Negley's division from the right to the left of the Union line. 
 Other troops had been hurried to that part of the line, also, and 
 with their combined effort they checked Breckinridge's envel- 
 opment and drove his troops away from Thomas's left and 
 rear. Cleburne's assault had fallen upon Palmer and Johnson, 
 and a desperate fight had ensued. 
 
 At eleven o'clock Stewart's Confederate division advanced 
 and struck the divisions of Reynolds and Brannan in the Union 
 line, pressing them back beyond the Lafayette Road. Here it 
 "encountered a fresh artillery fire on both front and flank, 
 heavily supported by infantry, and had to retire."f About this 
 time Walker's corps was put into the battle to assist Breckin- 
 ridge. 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 fD. H. Hill. 
 
436 American Campaigns. 
 
 Up to this time there had practically been no fighting along 
 the right of the Union line ; so Rosecrans had continually with- 
 drawn troops from that part of his line and dispatched them to 
 Thomas on the left. He "sent word to Thomas that he would 
 be supported if it required all of McCook's and Crittenden's 
 corps to do so."* Negley's division, as we have seen, had been 
 withdrawn from its position in the right wing and sent to 
 Thomas early in the morning, and Wood's division had taken 
 Negley's place in the right wing. A little after eleven o'clock 
 Wood's division, through a blunder of one of Thomas's staff 
 officers, was ordered to close to the left of Reynolds. To 
 carry out the order, Wood withdrew his division from the line 
 and started to march it by the rear of Brannan's division. This 
 left a wide gap in the Union line between Brannan's right and 
 Sheridan's left. 
 
 Just at this time Longstreet's turn to move out had arrived 
 in Bragg's progressive order of attack. Stewart's division was 
 already in motion, and the order had been given for the rest of 
 the wing to advance. Bushrod Johnson's division was on the 
 right of the front line and Hindman's on the left ; Hood's divi- 
 sion was behind Johnson's, and Preston's was in reserve on the 
 left. Wood had hardly moved a brigade's length in his flank 
 march when he was struck by Longstreet's column. "Long- 
 street has been given great credit for it, which, however, he 
 never claimed. It was entirely accidental and unforeseen, but 
 in a brief period it threw the entire left [right] flank of the 
 enemy in a panic. "f Brannan and Wood were struck in flank 
 and forced to withdraw ; and Davis's division which was mov- 
 ing to fill the gap left by Wood, Sheridan's division on Davis's 
 right, and Wilder's brigade on the extreme right were cut off 
 and driven from the field. 
 
 These troops withdrew by a road through McFarland's 
 Gap. After passing round through Rossville, the troops of 
 Sheridan and Davis returned to the Union line at about 7 p.m., 
 in time to aid in covering the withdrawal of the Union army. 
 Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden were carried away from 
 the battle-field with these columns and did not return to it. 
 Thomas was left in command of the Union troops. 
 
 (235) Contrary to Bragg's original plan of enveloping the 
 left of the Union position, Longstreet's line now swung to the 
 
 *Cist 
 fAlexander. 
 
The Chickamauga Campaign. 437 
 
 right, — a movement justified by the changed condition, — 
 sweeping before it the troops of Brannan and Wood, which 
 it had taken in flank. The Federals took advantage of a 
 pause in the fighting to form a new line facing south, on a 
 wooded ridge just south of the Snodgrass house. This line was 
 composed of Brannan's division, with fragments of Wood's, 
 Negley's, and Van Cleve's divisions. At two o'clock Longstreet 
 assaulted the Union line with five brigades, and came near en- 
 veloping Brannan's right. This was prevented by the timely 
 arrival of Gordon Granger with Steedman's division of the 
 Reserve Corps. 
 
 Granger, over at McAfee's Church, had heard the heavy 
 firing of the batteries, and without orders, in fact contrary to 
 his orders, had left one brigade to watch the Ringgold Road 
 and the line of retreat through Rossville, and with Steedman's 
 division had hastened to the sound of the battle. He arrived 
 in the nick of time. Steedman led his division against Long- 
 street's left, and, after a desperate struggle, drove it back and 
 took possession of the hill it had gained on Brannan's right. 
 "At three o'clock Longstreet, with three divisions — McLaws's, 
 Hindman's, and Johnson's — again assaulted the Union line and 
 was repulsed."* Later in the day Longstreet, with a view to 
 recovering this key-point, asked Bragg for reinforcements 
 from the right wing. Bragg replied that the troops of his right 
 wing "had been beaten back so badly that they could be of no 
 service to him."f Thereupon Longstreet formed a column of 
 such troops as he could get together and assaulted the hill that 
 Steedman had taken from him. 
 
 The combat that took place here was desperate, and it kept up 
 till dark. The ammunition of the National troops became al- 
 most exhausted, and Longstreet's final charges had to be met 
 with the bayonet. Steedman was driven back to the next ridge 
 in his rear, and the Confederates occupied the ground on Bran- 
 nan's right. 
 
 Meantime the battle had been renewed on the left of 
 Thomas's position. At about four o'clock D. H. Hill's corps 
 [Breckinridge and Cleburne], reinforced by a part of Walker's 
 corps, again assaulted this part of the Union line. At six 
 o'clock Cheatham's division joined in the attack. By this time 
 the right of the force had enveloped the Union left, and was 
 across the Rossville Road. Here it was a little while later 
 
 *OfHcial Maps and Legend. 
 tCist. 
 
438 American Campaigns. 
 
 attacked by Reynolds's division and driven back to the east of 
 the road. Reynolds's division was at this time withdrawing 
 from the field. Thomas, whom Rosecrans had ordered several 
 hours before to retire, had given the order to withdraw by way 
 of McFarland's Gap to Rossville, and the line was withdrawn 
 by divisions from the right of the Kelly Field. 
 
 (236) After seven o'clock the line on Snodgrass Hill was 
 withdrawn. The Union army passed through McFarland's 
 Gap, and between midnight of the 20th and morning of the 
 21st "reformed in Rossville Gap, upon the adjoining crests of 
 Missionary Ridge, and across Chattanooga Valley to Lookout 
 Mountain."* Here the army remained until after nightfall of 
 the 21st, when it was withdrawn to Chattanooga. The night 
 of the 20th found Bragg's army in possession of the battle- 
 field. Wheeler's cavalry made a "slight demonstration on Mc- 
 Farland's Gap" on the 21st, and Forrest's on Rossville Gap; 
 with this exception Bragg's army did not follow up or molest 
 the Union army that day. 
 
 It is hard to determine what were the numbers on each side 
 engaged in the battle of Chickamauga. General Alexander 
 gives the following figures : 
 
 Confederates, 47,520 infantry and artillery, and 14,260 cav- 
 alry; total 61,780. 
 
 Federals, 55,799 infantry and artillery, and 9,842 cavalry; 
 total 65,641. 
 
 The figures given in Battles and Leaders are as follows : 
 
 Federals, 56,965 of all arms; Confederates, 71,551 of all 
 arms. 
 
 The Confederates lost about 2,000 killed and 13,000 wound- 
 ed; the Federals, about 1,700 killed and 10,000 wounded. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 (227) It is seldom that two hostile armies find themselves 
 in precisely the relative positions that the Army of the Cum- 
 berland [Rosecrans] and the Army of Tennessee [Bragg] 
 occupied, when the former was at Murfreesboro and the 
 latter held the line Shelbyville-Wartrace-Fairfield. The two 
 armies used parts of the same almost straight railway as lines 
 of communication, and the front of each was squarely across 
 the road — the very best position an army can have with refer- 
 ence to its line of communications. The Confederate army had 
 
 ♦Legend with Official Maps. 
 
The Chickamauga Campaign. 439 
 
 the advantage of topography in its position, but the Federal 
 army had the advantage of numbers; the former was on the 
 defensive, the latter on the offensive. Each army had but a 
 single point, its base, and its line of communications to cover. 
 Neither army had a wide stretch of country to defend or sev- 
 eral cities to guard; Chattanooga was the single object of 
 contention. 
 
 The first phase of the general campaign, that phase usually 
 spoken of as the Tullahoma Campaign, was, on the part of the 
 Union forces, an example of what von der Goltz calls "the 
 strategic attack of a wing" ; the last phase of it, the passage of 
 the Tennessee and the operations thereafter, was an example of 
 a "strategic turning movement." The first was, in a way, en- 
 tirely successful; the second was successful in so far as to- 
 gain the main objective for which the campaign was under- 
 taken. Yet the capture of Chattanooga involved an unusuai 
 turn of events ; to wit, the army that had taken the offensive, in 
 order to get possession of the town, was beaten and driven back 
 into it, and was there besieged by the very army it had success- 
 fully maneuvered out of the town. If, in his invasion of Ken- 
 tucky, after placing his army across Buell's communications, 
 Bragg had proceeded to capture Louisville, and then had been 
 beaten and driven into the city, and there besieged by Buell, his. 
 case would have been similar to that of Rosecrans in the Chick- 
 amauga Campaign. 
 
 The chief end of strategy is to destroy or capture the hostile- 
 army. This is the end a commander should keep in view, and 
 not simply to get possession of towns or territory. Viewed 
 from this standpoint, no part of Rosecrans's operations was a 
 success; but viewed as a game of maneuvers, General Rose- 
 crans's first nine days of offensive operations were a triumph 
 of strategic skill. With the loss of only 560 men he forced 
 Bragg's army to abandon a naturally strong line of defense, 
 which it had spent six months in further strengthening with 
 fortifications, and compelled it to retreat all the way back to its 
 base, a hundred miles in rear. He fairly outmaneuvered 
 Bragg. 
 
 His first maneuver was to make a vigorous demonstration 
 against Bragg's left, and with the bulk of his army to force 
 back the Confederate right. This succeeded until he finally- 
 reached Manchester with the main body of his troops. By this 
 time Bragg was at Tullahoma with his main army. Rosecrans 
 had his own communications covered, and was in reach of 
 
440 American Campaigns. 
 
 Bragg's. There was, therefore, nothing for Bragg to do but to 
 fall back farther. The stout resistance made by Hardee's corps 
 at Hoover's Gap, and the heavy roads and swollen streams, due 
 to the continuous rain, retarded Rosecrans's enveloping col- 
 umns enough to prevent them from seizing Bragg's commu- 
 nications and forcing him to fight faced to the rear. 
 
 In this short campaign Rosecrans made the first use in the 
 Civil War of the kind of flank or turning movements after- 
 wards successfully employed by Sherman in the Atlanta cam- 
 paign. Such movements constituted a favorite method of 
 Napoleon in offensive mountain warfare ; that is the method by 
 which the attention of the enemy in position at a gorge or upon 
 heights is occupied by one force, while another turns his posi- 
 tion and gains or threatens his rear by a different pass. 
 
 (229) From the time when the Army of the Cumberland 
 crossed the Tennessee, until it was shut up by the Army of 
 Tennessee in Chattanooga, there was little in the strategy of 
 ■either Rosecrans or Bragg to commend. Each commander 
 seemed to be more ignorant concerning his adversary's move- 
 ments than was generally the case in the campaigns of this 
 war ; this ignorance was the chief cause of the mistakes. The 
 •country was so rugged and wooded, and so lacking in roads and 
 good trails, that it was impossible for the cavalry to do first rate 
 reconnaissance. Yet it should seem that the cavalry ought to 
 have been able to do better work than it did. In fact, if we 
 •except the work of Minty's cavalry brigade and Wilder's 
 mounted infantry, the cavalry operations in this campaign do 
 not appear to have been as good as we find in many other 
 ■campaigns of the war. More fault can be found with the Con- 
 federate cavalry than with that of the Federals, mainly be- 
 cause its strength was greater. Bragg had 14,260 troopers, 
 while Rosecrans had only 9,842.* It should seem that Wheeler 
 and Forrest ought to have met the Federal columns as soon as 
 those columns got across the Tennessee, and, by holding the 
 mountain passes, ought to have delayed their progress many 
 days. Time was of great importance to Bragg — a few more 
 days would have brought him four more of Longstreet's bri- 
 gades and Alexander's battalion of artillery. The trouble with 
 Bragg's cavalry at this time was the lack of unity in its com- 
 mand. It consisted practically of two corps under separate 
 commanders, Wheeler and Forrest, with no single cavalry gen- 
 eral commanding them as a body. 
 
 *Alexander. 
 
The Chickamauga Campaign. 441 
 
 It was misinformation concerning Bragg's movements that 
 induced Rosecrans to send his columns forward on such widely 
 separated roads ; and while Bragg was aware that one Federal 
 •column was on the Ringgold Road and another in McLemore's 
 Cove, about fifteen miles distant, he could not have known 
 that McCook's column was so far separated from Thomas's 
 column, and that Granger's Reserve Corps was so far in rear, 
 •else he must surely have attacked and destroyed one or another 
 •of the columns in detail. 
 
 He had his own army in hand from the day on which it 
 marched out of Chattanooga [September 8] ; from that time 
 until McCook united with Thomas in McLemore's Cove on the 
 17th all the advantage of position was with Bragg. It is seldom 
 that an army finds itself in so perilous a situation as that of 
 Rosecrans's army during those days; it is seldom a general is 
 :given such an opportunity to destroy his adversary's army in 
 detail as there fell to Bragg. Considering the eagerness Bragg 
 usually showed to attack when he had any chance of winning, 
 it can only be concluded that he failed to take advantage of his 
 opportunity through ignorance of the enemy's predicament. 
 To be sure, he did issue orders for an attack against Thomas's 
 advanced division [Negley] in McLemore's Cove, and as late 
 as the night of the 12th of September he ordered Polk to attack 
 'Crittenden's isolated divisions ; but his subordinate commanders 
 failed to execute his orders. Thereafter he was content to 
 stand fast and wait until Hood arrived with reinforcements 
 from Virginia on the 18th. Four precious days, from the 13th 
 to the 16th, inclusive, were thrown away. Bragg's army with- 
 out the Virginia troops was superior in numbers to any force 
 Rosecrans could have opposed to him during that time. On 
 the 17th, however, the Federal columns were united. After 
 that Bragg ought to have waited until all of his Virginia re- 
 inforcements had joined, before he attacked. In fact he ought 
 to have taken up a defensive position and awaited attack from 
 Rosecrans. 
 
 Bragg did not have the knack of getting cheerful service out 
 -of his subordinate officers; but as the commander enjoys the 
 Teward of his subordinates' fitness and performance, so, also, 
 must he suffer the blame for their unfitness and failure. If 
 they will not, or cannot, do his bidding, he can relieve them on 
 Ihe spot and put others into their places. If Bishop Polk would 
 not obey Bragg's orders he ought to have been sent to the rear 
 in arrest instant'er; Kitchener's favorite reply is a good one 
 
442 American Campaigns. 
 
 for a commander to remember : "Your reasons for not doing 
 what you were told to do are the best I ever heard; now go- 
 and do it." 
 
 Some of Bragg's critics have censured him for quitting 
 Chattanooga. He certainly left the town an easy capture for 
 Rosecrans ; but he probably saved his own army by withdraw- 
 ing it. Had he remained in Chattanooga, Rosecrans would 
 have taken possession of his communications and invested the 
 town. Within a week Rosecran9 would have been joined by 
 Burnside's army from Knoxville, and a little later by a part of 
 Grant's from Memphis ; and he would have had Bragg's army 
 as securely trapped as Grant had Pemberton's at Vicksburg. 
 
 Bragg ought, however, to have been able easily to keep his- 
 army between the main part of the Union army and Chatta- 
 nooga, and at the same time to guard his railway back to Dal- 
 ton. If, while he was waiting for Longstreet's divisions, from 
 about the 10th to the 18th of September, he had destroyed or 
 captured Crittenden's corps, or forced it back, and had placed 
 his own army across the valley of Chickamauga Creek, facing 
 south and covering Rossville Gap, he would have blocked the 
 road to Chattanooga, and stood in a position to strike the 
 Federal columns in flank if they moved against his own com- 
 munications, the railway through Dalton. Here also he would 
 have been in position to attack Burnside's army, if it had 
 attempted to slip down from Knoxville to seize Chattanooga. 
 On the arrival of Longstreet's whole force Bragg could then 
 have taken the offensive against the rest of Rosecrans's army. 
 
 In putting into effect Longstreet's suggestion to transfer 
 troops from Virginia to Bragg's assistance the Confederate 
 authorities had waited too long; if they had done it, and on a 
 larger scale, before Gettysburg and the fall of Vicksburg, the 
 results might have been decisive ; if they had done it as soon as- 
 practicable after the defeat of Gettysburg, Rosecrans might 
 have been beaten on the west bank of the Tennessee and Chat- 
 tanooga saved; if they had done it before Burnside seized' 
 Knoxville, near the end of August, Bragg would have had nine 
 of Longstreet's infantry brigades and his artillery at the battle 
 of Chickamauga in place of only five of his brigades. Burnside's 
 presence at Knoxville closed the short line of railway from 
 Virginia, and forced the Confederate reinforcements to travel 
 the long route by way of Petersburg, Wilmington, Augusta, 
 and Atlanta. The first train started from Louisa Court House, 
 Virginia, on September the 9th, but did not reach Ringgold 
 
The Chickamauga Campaign. 443 
 
 until the 18th. The artillery did not arrive there until the 
 25th.* 
 
 Tactics. 
 
 (232) The attack at Chickamauga had the usual fault of 
 being made in detail, and the victory, like others, was not 
 made complete by a vigorous pursuit. The fighting was des- 
 perate and the losses were heavy. Bragg's plan of attack, an 
 envelopment of the Federal left, was all right, but his method, 
 a successive movement from right to left, was faulty ; the exe- 
 cution was tardy and ineffectual, due to the thick woods, the 
 fog on the morning of the 20th September, and the lack of 
 prompt and cheerful obedience on the part of subordinate com- 
 manders. It would have been better to let the secondary attack 
 begin first along the enemy's front, to gain and hold his atten- 
 tion in that quarter ; then to let the main attack, the enveloping 
 movement, follow. 
 
 (233) The penetration made by Longstreet's column on the 
 20th, and his right-turn, though contrary to Bragg's purpose 
 of turning the Union left, was most effective; but it did not 
 destroy or capture any considerable part of the Union army. 
 In fact Chickamauga was to Bragg's army a Pyrrhic victory — 
 costly and barren. 
 
 General Alexander makes the following critical summary of 
 the second day's attack : "The battle was opened by two divi- 
 sions attacking the whole army of the enemy in a fortified 
 position, the attack being made in a single line without supports 
 at hand. They are defeated and put out of action for the day. 
 Two more divisions try and fare little better. A fifth, in re- 
 serve, sends in one brigade without result; four are not en- 
 gaged. The morning is gone and the battle of the Right Wing 
 is over. That of the Left Wing is scarcely begun. It ad- 
 vances, finds by accident a gap in the enemy's line, and drives 
 off three divisions of the enemy. The Left Wing fights the 
 rest of the enemy's army (three-fourths of it) until near dark, 
 when both wings unite and drive the enemy off the field, dark- 
 ness covering his retreat. It is the old familiar story of piece- 
 meal attacks." At the time that Longstreet asked Bragg for 
 reinforcements to help him complete his victory by crushing 
 Thomas's right, and received the answer that "there was no 
 fight left in the right wing," Cheatham's division was standing 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
444 American Campaigns. 
 
 idle in that wing, as it had been doing all morning and con- 
 tinued to do until 6 p.m. 
 
 The divisions of Davis and Sheridan which were cut off by 
 Longstreet's assault might have rallied within a mile of the 
 battle-field, for they were virtually not pursued. If they had 
 done so, and had returned and assailed Longstreet's left flank, 
 which was in the air, they might have turned the victory against 
 him. Instead of doing that they marched all the way to Ross- 
 ville before countermarching; when they got back near the 
 field the battle was over. 
 
LECTURE XXI. 
 THE BATTLES AROUND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 (236) Having withdrawn from Rossville Gap on the night 
 of September the 21st, 1863, the Army of the Cumberland 
 formed in front of Chattanooga "from the river above to the 
 river below." The cavalry had covered the movement and 
 occupied the roads in the Chattanooga Valley until it was 
 driven in by the Confederates. (237) The Union army occu- 
 pied as salients the strong unfinished works left by Bragg's 
 army, and before noon of the 22nd had them connected by 
 rifle-pits. "Within two days these rifle-pits became formidable 
 earth-works."* A little before midday on the 22nd September 
 the Confederate cavalry, supported by McLaws's division of 
 infantry, passed through Rossville Gap and down the other 
 roads in the Chattanooga Valley, and advanced to within three 
 miles of Chattanooga. 
 
 Bragg's main army did not quit the field of Chickamauga 
 until the afternoon of the 21st, when Polk's corps started down 
 the valley of the Chickamauga. The movement northward 
 continued on the 22nd and 23rd, and ended by placing the 
 Confederate army in position in front of the Union army. The 
 Confederate line stretched along the western base of Mission- 
 ary Ridge from near the railway tunnel to a point about two 
 miles farther south than Orchard Knob; thence it bent west- 
 ward across Chattanooga Valley to Mount Lookout. Bragg 
 now contented himself with investing the Federal army with 
 this incomplete line, leaving to Wheeler's cavalry the task of 
 cutting off its communications with its depot at Bridgeport on 
 the northern side of the river, and the destruction of its rail- 
 way beyond that point. 
 
 (238) Rosecrans placed his cavalry on the northern bank 
 of the river from Washington to Caperton's Ferry (near 
 Stevenson) to protect his trains passing from Bridgeport to 
 Chattanooga, and to watch for the enemy at the river cross- 
 ings. Wheeler, however, eluded the Union cavalry, and, on 
 the 1st of October, got across the river with a large force 
 of horsemen and made for Rosecrans's communications. At 
 
 ♦Legend with Official Maps. 
 
446 American Campaigns. 
 
 this time the shortest roads from Chattanooga to Bridge- 
 port — the one by way of Brown's and Kelly's Ferries, and the 
 one by way of Wauhatchie and Whiteside — were commanded 
 by Confederate batteries on Mount Lookout, and watched by 
 Confederate sharpshooters ; and the only route available for 
 the use of the Federal army was the difficult road, sixty miles 
 long, over Walden's Ridge and thence down the Sequatchie 
 Valley. Wheeler struck this road at Anderson's Cross-Roads 
 in the Sequatchie Valley, and there destroyed 300 wagons of 
 the Federal trains and captured a large number of mules. 
 
 But the Federal cavalry, which had started in pursuit, was 
 close on his heels. (227) He made for Murfreesboro with 
 the view to destroy the railway and the Federal stores col- 
 lected there; but Crook's column of Federal cavalry reached 
 Murfreesboro ahead of him and turned him southward. With- 
 out accomplishing the destruction of the Nashville railway he 
 was finally driven out of Tennessee in a very shattered con- 
 dition, across the Tennessee River, into Alabama. In these 
 cavalry operations "marches were made on several days rang- 
 ing from forty to fifty-seven miles,"* and many combats took 
 place, in several of which the "saber was freely used." 
 
 (238) Meanwhile the condition of the beleaguered army 
 was becoming very serious. At first the wagon-trains were 
 large and in good condition, and it looked as if they would be 
 able to keep the army supplied with provisions even though 
 they had to haul by way of the long Sequatchie Valley — 
 Walden's Ridge road. But early in October rains set in, and 
 soon the roads became almost impassable. "The destruction 
 of hundreds of wagons and animals by Wheeler was almost 
 fatal to the army. The remaining animals, from necessity, 
 were pressed beyond endurance." Each successive trip from 
 Bridgeport was made with fewer wagons and lighter loads; 
 and the rations issued had to be reduced in a like proportion.* 
 The artillery horses died by the score from starvation, and in 
 the end the batteries could not be moved for want of animals. 
 It began to look as if the Union army would have to choose the 
 alternative of surrender or "retreat with great peril and cer- 
 tain loss of all materiel." Bragg believed the army would be 
 forced by starvation to surrender. But this was not so. The 
 country and the authorities at Washington had become thor- 
 
 *Van Home. 
 
The Battles Around Chattanooga. 447 
 
 oughly aroused concerning the perilous situation of the Army 
 of the Cumberland, and vigorous efforts were making for its 
 relief. Orders had already been sent to General Grant at 
 Vicksburg directing him to dispatch a large force to aid Rose- 
 crans ; Burnside, at Knoxville, had also been ordered to go to 
 his assistance; and Hooker had been started for Chattanooga 
 with the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps [Howard and Slocum] 
 from the Army of the Potomac* These troops ought all to 
 have been sent in time to aid Rosecrans in his battle with 
 Bragg — the battle of Chickamauga. No more troops were now 
 wanted within the lines at Chattanooga, until the railway from 
 Bridgeport to Nashville could be made secure against raids, 
 and a shorter wagon-road could be opened between Bridgeport 
 and Chattanooga. Rosecrans, therefore, ordered Hooker, upon 
 his arrival at Nashville, to place his troops along the railway 
 and guard it until arrangements could be made for opening the 
 shorter route to Bridgeport. The bulk of Hooker's command 
 took station at Bridgeport ready for call to Chattanooga the 
 moment it should be required. 
 
 Some changes in the organization and among the subordi- 
 nate commanders of the two hostile armies had taken place. 
 McCook and Crittenden had. both been relieved of command 
 and ordered before a court of inquiry to account for their con- 
 duct at the battle of Chickamauga, and their two corps, the 
 Twentieth and Twenty-first, had been consolidated into a single 
 corps, numbered the Fourth, and placed under the command of 
 General Gordon Granger. In Bragg's army Polk had been re- 
 lieved of command and placed under charges for "failing to 
 open the battle of the 20th (September) at daylight," at 
 Chickamauga, as he had been ordered to do. Most of Bragg's 
 generals were at loggerheads with him, and all that could do 
 so had got away from him. D. H. Hill and Buckner were gone, 
 but Hardee had rejoined. Bragg's army was now organized 
 in three corps under Longstreet, Hardee, and Breckinridge, 
 respectively. 
 
 The . Washington authorities had at last awakened to the 
 impolicy of having several armies in the field operating inde- 
 pendently of one another, and with no common head except 
 General Halleck at the Capital. They had discovered the man 
 equal to the command of all the armies and operations in the 
 southwestern theater. General Grant had already been ordered 
 
 *Cist. Grant. 
 
448 American Campaigns. 
 
 to go to Nashville "to superintend the movement" of the troops 
 sent by him to reinforce Rosecrans. Later he was ordered to- 
 proceed "to the Gait House, Louisville, Kentucky, where [he] 
 would meet an officer from the War Department with his in- 
 structions."* The officer was the Secretary of War, Mr. 
 Stanton, who joined Grant on the way to Louisville. This was 
 about the 17th or 18th of October. 
 
 General Grant says : "The Secretary handed me two orders, 
 saying that I might take my choice of them. The two were 
 identical in all but one particular. Both created the Military 
 Division of the Mississippi, giving me the command, composed 
 of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the 
 Tennessee, and all the territory from the Alleghanies to the 
 Mississippi River, north of Banks's command in the southwest. 
 One order left the department commanders as they were, while 
 the other relieved Rosecrans and assigned Thomas in his place. 
 I accepted the latter." The order was dated October 16. A 
 copy of it was sent to Rosecrans and reached him on the 19th- 
 
 While Stanton and Grant were still at Louisville the Secre- 
 tary received a telegram from Mr. C. A. Dana, at Chattanooga,, 
 "informing him that, unless prevented, Rosecrans would re- 
 treat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so."* 
 The telegram was sent, of course, before Rosecrans re- 
 ceived his order of relief. There was really no truth in the 
 telegram. All the evidence goes to show that at that time 
 Rosecrans had no notion of retreating, but had all arrange- 
 ments under way for opening a short line of supply by way of 
 Brown's and Kelly's Ferries, and thence by boat to Bridge- 
 port. So far as I am able to make out, Mr. Dana was a sort of 
 chartered spy placed by the War Department to keep it con- 
 fidentially advised of what was going on at the headquarters- 
 of this army. Truly, the military service of the United States 
 had its drawbacks under Mr. Stanton and General Hal- 
 leck ! Those two men sent many a loyal and able soldier to 
 his grave with a heart crushed under the burden of their in- 
 justice. Rosecrans was far too frank and outspoken to last 
 under them. On the receipt of Mr. Dana's telegram Stanton, 
 in a state of great excitement, sent for Grant. The latter 
 wired Thomas, who was now in command at Chattanooga, 
 "that he must hold Chattanooga at all hazards." Thomas re- 
 plied, "We will hold the town till we starve." 
 
 *Grant 
 
The Battles. Around Chattanooga. 449 
 
 (240) Meanwhile there was practically no fighting between 
 the hostile lines around Chattanooga. The Confederates threw 
 a few shells into the town, but they did no harm. The lines of 
 hostile outposts were so close together that the sentinels could 
 swap yarns and tobacco at some points. The main Confederate 
 position at the foot of the slopes was fortified with breast- 
 works, and there "were some unfinished earthworks half-way 
 up the hillside. 
 
 The right of the Confederate line was held by Hardee's 
 corps, and the center by Breckinridge's, while Longstreet's. 
 corps held the left of the line from Chattanooga Creek to< 
 Mount Lookout; batteries occupied the northern point of this 
 mountain, but were too high above the Federal works to be 
 effective. Beyond the mountain Bragg had a string of sharp- 
 shooters stretched along the river-bank from Lookout Creek to 
 a point ten miles down-stream. They were to guard the road 
 on the opposite bank and prevent the passage of the Union 
 trains, and were supported by Law's brigade of infantry from 
 Longstreet's corps. The railway and roads toward Bridgeport 
 on the south bank of the river were guarded by the cavalry; 
 but Longstreet says this cavalry "was not found as watchful as 
 the eyes of an army should be." 
 
 The project which Rosecrans had begun arranging, and' 
 Thomas continued, for shortening the line of communications 
 with Bridgeport, was approved and completed by General 
 Grant, who reached Chattanooga on the 23rd of October. 
 (239) By examining the map it will be seen that the Tennes- 
 see River flows west for a mile or two at Chattanooga, then 
 bends and flows south for about two miles until it strikes the 
 rock of Mount Lookout, by which it is turned round to the 
 west again. Then it flows north and makes a deep bend round 
 the northern end of Raccoon Mountain. With two or three 
 more windings round the mountain spurs, in a generally south- 
 westerly course, it passes Bridgeport. Across the narrow 
 tongue of land called Moccasin Point was Brown's Ferry, 
 about two miles from Chattanooga, and at the eastern end of 
 the road that led over Raccoon Mountain to Kelly's Ferry. 
 By this route Kelly's Ferry was only eight miles from Chatta- 
 nooga ; by the river it was twenty-odd miles. Part of the way,, 
 between the two ferries, the river, where it flowed through a 
 narrow channel of rock, was too swift to be navigated by such 
 boats as were available. So a plan was devised to throw a 
 pontoon-bridge across the Tennessee at Brown's Ferry, get 
 
450 American Campaigns. 
 
 control of the country south of the river and west of Lookout 
 Mountain, and establish a line of communications by wagon- 
 road from Chattanooga to Kelly's Ferry, and by boat from 
 the ferry to Bridgeport. The execution of the plan required 
 the cooperation of Hooker's command from the direction of 
 Bridgeport. A steamer had been built at Bridgeport, and one 
 captured at Chattanooga had been put in running order; and 
 pontoons had been constructed for use in the enterprise. 
 
 General W. F. Smith, chief engineer of the Army of the 
 Cumberland, had devised the scheme and worked out its details, 
 ■and he was entrusted with its execution from the Chattanooga 
 side. He was given two brigades, Hazen's and Turchin's, and 
 three batteries. Hooker was ordered to cross the river at 
 Bridgeport with the Eleventh Corps and one division of the 
 Twelfth "and march up by Whiteside's and Wauhatchie to 
 Brown's Ferry. General Palmer, with a division of the Four- 
 teenth Corps, was ordered to move down the river on the north 
 side, by a back road, until opposite Whiteside's, then cross and 
 hold the road in Hooker's rear after he had passed."* 
 
 Hooker crossed the river on the 26th of October and began 
 his march ; at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 27th Smith's pon- 
 toon-boats were cast loose at Chattanooga. They bore 1,500 
 picked men under Hazen; the rest of Smith's command Under 
 Turchin marched overland to Brown's Ferry. The night was 
 foggy, and, by keeping in close to the right bank, the boats 
 passed unnoticed by the Confederate outposts until they were 
 about to touch shore at the western side of Brown's Ferry. 
 Here the Confederate picket fired a "harmless volley and fled." 
 The troops from the boats quickly landed and took possession 
 of the heights above the ferry. A small Confederate- force, 
 aroused by the firing of the picket, hurried to attack the Fed- 
 erals on the heights; but, in the short combat that followed, 
 they were defeated, and they retired up the valley. Turchin's 
 part of the Union command, meanwhile, had been brought 
 over from the right bank. The pontoon-bridge was promptly 
 laid. "For an hour or so in the morning the work progressed 
 under an artillery fire from the rebel batteries on Lookout 
 Mountain" ;f but the Federal losses were only six killed, 
 twenty-three wounded and nine missing. Six Confederates 
 were captured and six left dead on the ground. The position 
 was intrenched by the Federals and held until the arrival of 
 
 * Grant. 
 fCist. 
 
The Battles Around Chattanooga. 451 
 
 Hooker's troops the next day. "No attempt was made by 
 Bragg to dislodge this force or to destroy the bridge."* 
 
 Hooker marched by the road along the base of Raccoon 
 Mountain into Lookout Valley. On the 28th, near where this 
 road joined the valley road, Howard's corps, which was in the 
 lead, met the Confederate advance post and drove it down 
 the valley. This was a part of the Confederate brigade [Law] 
 placed in the valley to support the line of sharpshooters along 
 the river. The detachment in its retreat destroyed the railway- 
 bridge over Lookout Creek. Hooker's command moved on, 
 and Howard's corps halted for the night at six o'clock, within 
 about two miles of Brown's Ferry. Geary's division of the 
 Twelfth Corps was left at Wauhatchie to guard the road to 
 Kelly's Ferry. 
 
 The Confederate cavalry on the left does not appear to have 
 been very vigilant, but Longstreet's signal party reported the 
 advance of a large force of the enemy from the direction of 
 Bridgeport on the afternoon of the 27th. Bragg, according to 
 Longstreet, did not credit the report. The next day, the 28th, 
 Bragg and Longstreet stood on the top of Mount Lookout and 
 watched Hooker's column "marching quietly along the valley 
 toward Brown's Ferry."f Longstreet says: "Presently the 
 rear-guard came in sight and made its bivouac immediately in 
 front of the point where we stood." This was Geary's division 
 at Wauhatchie. 
 
 (240) It was arranged to make a night attack upon this de- 
 tachment with three brigades of Hood's division (now under 
 Jenkins), reinforced by Law's brigade, which, having fallen 
 back before Hooker's advance, was in bivouac "near the north- 
 ern base of the mountain about a mile east of the" road by 
 which the enemy was marching. Law with his own and two 
 of Jenkins's brigades took a position to check troops from 
 Howard's corps, in case they should be sent to Geary's assist- 
 ance, and Jenkins led his other brigade to assault Geary. 
 
 On hearing the sound of battle at Wauhatchie, Hooker dis- 
 patched Howard's corps to Geary's aid. On the way Howard 
 encountered Law's detachment and drove it away, but failed to 
 reach Geary. Geary, however, repulsed Jenkins's attack. The 
 casualties on both sides were heavy. 
 
 General Alexander characterizes this night attack as "one of 
 the most foolhardy adventures of the war." "Night-attacks," 
 
 ♦Cist. 
 fLongstreet. 
 
452 American Campaigns. 
 
 he says, "are specially valuable against troops who have been 
 defeated and are retreating. They are of little value under any 
 other circumstances." This attack would have had little effect 
 on the campaign if it had succeeded. 
 
 After these combats Lookout Valley and the short line of 
 communication with Bridgeport by way of Brown's and Kelly's 
 Ferries were held by Hooker without further molestation ; and 
 the problem of supplying the forces in Chattanooga was solved. 
 
 In the early days of November Bragg detached Longstreet's 
 corps with Wheeler's cavalry and Alexander's artillery, in all 
 about 20,000 men, and dispatched them against Burnside at 
 Knoxville. This created great anxiety at Washington, and 
 Grant was urged to act promptly and send relief to Burnside. 
 Grant knew that the quickest way to relieve Burnside was to 
 attack Bragg and force him to recall Longstreet to his assist- 
 ance. Accordingly, on the 7th of November, he ordered 
 Thomas to attack Bragg's right. As Thomas, however, did not 
 have the animals to move a "single piece of artillery,"* he could 
 not make the attack. "Nothing was left to be done," General 
 Grant remarks, "but to answer Washington dispatches as best 
 I could, urge Sherman forward, although he was making every 
 effort to get forward, and encourage Burnside to hold on, 
 assuring him that in a short time he would be relieved." 
 
 By the 14th of November Sherman was at Bridgeport with 
 the Fifteenth Corps [Frank P. Blair] and the Seventeenth 
 [John E. Smith] — the troops Grant had started from the 
 Mississippi River to reinforce Rosecrans. General Grant was 
 now ready to attack. His plan of battle as finally adopted was 
 as follows: 
 
 Sherman with his four divisions was to cross to the right 
 bank of the river at Brown's Ferry, and march out behind the 
 hills, concealed from view of the Confederates, and take a 
 position under cover of the woods opposite the mouth of 
 Chickamauga Creek. It was hoped that the Confederates, 
 upon seeing this body of troops cross at Brown's Ferry, then 
 disappear altogether from view, would be confused, and, possi- 
 bly, deceived into the belief that it had crossed the river higher 
 up and marched to Burnside's relief. Sherman was to recross 
 the river by pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, 
 "surprise the north end of Missionary Ridge and carry it to the 
 railroad tunnel before the enemy should occupy it. As soon as 
 
 ♦Grant. 
 
The Battles Around Chattanooga. 453 
 
 Sherman was astride the ridge at the tunnel, Thomas was to 
 move the Army of the Cumberland to the left" and connect 
 with him; then their united forces were to move southward, 
 sweeping the Confederates up the valley of Chattanooga Creek 
 and away from their base of supplies at Chickamauga Station. 
 (238)* (240) Howard's corps [Eleventh] was to take its 
 place as a sort of general reserve on the north bank of the river, 
 in position to go to Sherman or Thomas as circumstances re- 
 quired. Hooker with the Twelfth Corps, and Cruft's division 
 of the Fourth sent to him from Chattanooga, was to hold 
 Lookout Valley. A brigade of cavalry under Colonel Long 
 was to cover the left of Sherman's force, and, when no longer 
 needed there, to cross Chickamauga Creek by a pontoon-bridge 
 to be laid near its mouth, and make a raid upon Bragg's com- 
 munications in the direction of Chickamauga Station. It will 
 be seen later that this plan was much altered and modified in 
 its execution. 
 
 It was intended that Sherman should make his crossing at 
 the mouth of the Chickamauga at daylight on the 21st (Novem- 
 ber), but heavy rains raised the river and delayed the move- 
 ment until the morning of the 24th. Even then one of Sher- 
 man's divisions could not go with him ; for a break in the bridge 
 at Brown's Ferry had prevented Osterhaus from crossing with 
 his division, and he was, therefore, ordered to report to Hooker 
 for duty. /^ 
 
 (241) Meantime, contrary to the original plan, there was 
 fighting at other parts of the line. There were rumors, and 
 there appeared to be other indications, that Bragg was with- 
 drawing his army. To test the truth of these indications 
 Thomas was ordered to make a demonstration in his front on 
 the 23rd. 
 
 The right of the Confederate outpost line rested upon 
 Orchard Knob, a prominent knoll about a mile in front of the 
 western base of Missionary Ridge. From here the line ran 
 southward and westward across Chattanooga Valley. From 
 Orchard Knob the ground, generally open but partly covered 
 with wood and brush, sloped downward, then upward again, to 
 the high ground upon which the Union line rested. The most 
 prominent point in the Union position was the hill upon which 
 stood Fort Wood, in front of which was a wide plain. Upon 
 this plain, about noon on the 23rd, the assaulting columns 
 
 ♦Legend with Official Maps. 
 
454 American Campaigns. 
 
 formed in echelon of divisions from the left. Wood's division 
 [Fourth Corps] was to be the division of direction, and was- 
 on the left at Fort Wood. Next came Sheridan's division 
 [Fourth Corps] to its right and rear, and next Baird's [Four- 
 teenth Corps]. Johnson's division [Fourteenth Corps] re- 
 mained to hold the trenches, and Howard's corps, which had 
 come over from the north bank of the river, acted as 'a 
 reserve. 
 
 At two o'clock Wood's division moved forward, and, after 
 some resistance, drove off the Confederate outposts and carried 
 Orchard Knob. Sheridan and Baird then moved forward and 
 took possession of high ground to the right and slightly to the 
 rear of Wood. They all intrenched their positions, and an 
 epaulement was constructed for a battery on Orchard Knob. 
 After 4 p.m. Howard's corps advanced and occupied a line on 
 Wood's left. The result of the day's work was to develop the 
 fact that Bragg's army was still in position and meant to stay 
 there until driven out; to gain an excellent vantage-ground 
 from which the Union center was to make a later assault ; and 
 to cause Bragg to transfer Walker's division (under Gist) 
 from Lookout Mountain to "Missionary Ridge, to observe the 
 Union movements in the valley. It took position half a mile 
 south of the Tunnel and was the first Confederate division to 
 occupy the crest of Missionary Ridge."* Walker's withdrawal 
 from Mount Lookout lightened the task which Hooker was to 
 have the next day — the task of assaulting and carrying the 
 mountain. 
 
 The failure of Osterhaus's division to cross at Brown's 
 Ferry caused a modification of Grant's original plan. This 
 plan required no more of Hooker than to hold Lookout Valley 
 and guard the communications with Bridgeport. But the addi- 
 tion of another division made Hooker's force strong enough 
 to do more. Hooker was, therefore, ordered to try "to take the 
 point of Lookout Mountain."! At this time the top of Mount 
 Lookout was held by two Confederate brigades, and the slope,, 
 where Hooker made his assault, was held by Walthall's single 
 brigade, and a few pickets from a brigade higher up the slope 
 — in all about 1,700 men. Later in the fight the two brigades 
 from above went to Walthall's help. Hooker had some 10,000 
 men.* 
 
 *Legend with Official Maps. 
 fVan Home. 
 
The Battles Around Chattanooga. 455 
 
 From the plateau of Mount Lookout, nearly 1,100 feet above 
 the waters of the Tennessee, a precipice of solid, bare, jagged 
 rock drops straight down several hundred feet. From the foot 
 of this precipice the mountainsides fall away to the valley be- 
 low in the natural slope, and are covered with a scrubby growth 
 of wood, and with boulders of all sizes that have fallen down 
 from the cliffs above. At the northern ^nd, however, beyond 
 the foot of the precipice, was a comparatively smooth piece of 
 ground under cultivation, the Craven's farm. Below the farm, 
 and also between it and the base of the palisades, are wooded 
 and rocky slopes ; these end abruptly in another rock cliff which 
 drops straight to the railway track at the water's edge. The 
 narrow wagon-road from Chattanooga to Lookout Valley 
 passed over the nose of the mountain just above this cliff. 
 Another road led from Chattanooga up the eastern face of the 
 mountain to Summertown upon the plateau. This road was 
 the only way by which troops from the plateau could reach the 
 slopes of the mountain or the valleys below. The Confederates 
 had intrenchments near the base of the western slope covering 
 the railway and wagon bridges over Lookout Creek ; they also 
 had intrenchments at the Craven's farm, and down the north- 
 ern slope, arranged to meet attacks from either Lookout Val- 
 ley or Chattanooga Valley. 
 
 At eight o'clock on the 24th Geary's division [Twelfth 
 Corps] of Hooker's command crossed Lookout Creek from 
 Wauhatchie, and climbed straight up the mountainside, until 
 the head of the column reached the base of the cliff. The divi- 
 sion then moved by the left flank toward the north. About ten 
 o'clock it encountered the Confederate skirmishers and drove 
 them in front of it. Lower down the valley it was joined on 
 the left by Osterhaus's division [Fifteenth Corps] and Cruft's 
 division. These troops, supported by batteries of artillery 
 placed in commanding positions on the left bank of the Creek, 
 had driven the Confederates out of their intrenchments at the 
 bridges, and had crossed near that point. Aided by the fire 
 from batteries on Moccasin Point the whole force now pushed 
 up the rocky slope, driving the Confederates from one position 
 after another. By noon Hooker had possession of the Craven's 
 farm. "At two o'clock the Confederates made a stand about 
 400 yards beyond the Craven's House. Here they were joined 
 by the two brigades from the plateau. The Confederates held 
 this line until after midnight,_ when they withdrew from the 
 
456 American Campaigns. 
 
 mountain."* All morning there had been a mist over the 
 mountain, but it settled at about two o'clock into so dense a fog 
 that it was impossible to see the lines of troops. It was on 
 •account of this fog and the exhaustion of his ammunition that 
 -Hooker halted his line and intrenched. 
 
 'Later in the afternoon Carlin's brigade marched out from 
 the line in front of Chattanooga, carrying a supply of ammu- 
 nition to Hooker. The brigade took post on the right of 
 Hooker's line. Early the next morning a party from the 8th 
 Kentucky scaled the heights and planted the Stars and Stripes 
 ■on Point Lookout, where, at sunrise, it floated in full view of 
 'the Union and Confederate soldiers in the lines below. 
 
 While Hooker was taking Mount Lookout, Sherman, at the 
 ■other end of the line, was endeavoring to carry out his part 
 •of the program. The pontoons, which had been concealed in 
 North Chickamauga Creek (which empties into the Tennessee 
 •on the north side two miles above the mouth of the Chicka- 
 mauga), were quietly floated down-stream during the night of 
 the 23rd, and, by daylight on the 24th, 8,000 men had crossed, 
 • and were on the south bank, just below the mouth of the 
 Chickamauga, at work throwing up a bridge-head. Little op- 
 position had been encountered. By noon the pontoon-bridge 
 was finished, and at one o'clock Sherman moved out by 
 •echelons from the left, with his own three divisions, and Davis's 
 division of the Fourteenth Corps which had been sent to take 
 the place of Osterhaus's ; at 4 p.m. Sherman seized the north- 
 ern end of Missionary Ridge, which was unoccupied, except by 
 Confederate outposts. To his surprise he found a wide de- 
 pression separating the high ground he had seized from Tun- 
 nel Hill to the south of it. Moreover, Cleburne's Confederate 
 division had been hurried to Tunnel Hill, and had there been 
 .getting into position and intrenching itself since half after two 
 o'clock. Sherman made no effort to carry this hill at once, 
 but intrenched his troops where they were.* 
 
 (242) During the night of the 24th Bragg withdrew all his 
 troops from Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga Valley to 
 Missionary Ridge, and posted his line from Tunnel Hill on the 
 right to Rossville Gap on the left — more than six miles. Har- 
 dee had command of the right wing and Breckinridge of the 
 left wing. 
 
 *Legend with Official Maps. 
 
The Battles Around Chattanooga. 457 
 
 Grant's orders for the morning of the 25th were as follows : 
 "Sherman was directed to attack at daylight. Hooker was 
 ordered to move at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept 
 the enemy's retreat, if he still remained ; if he had gone, then 
 to move directly to Rossville and operate against the left and 
 rear of the force on Missionary Ridge. Thomas was not to 
 move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge." Grant 
 stationed his headquarters upon Orchard Knob, "from which 
 the whole field was in full view."* 
 
 By sunrise Sherman's command was in motion. His line 
 moved directly against the hill occupied by Cleburne's division 
 and attacked it vigorously; but the assault was unable to dis- 
 lodge the defenders, who had strengthened their field-works 
 during the night. Howard's corps went to Sherman's support, 
 and the Confederate position was assaulted several times with- 
 out success. The combat kept up until three o'clock. Sher- 
 man had six divisions against Cleburne's one, but could not 
 carry the works. Such is the strength of field-works against 
 frontal assault; and Sherman does not appear to have tried to 
 out-flank Cleburne's position. Finally, however, the Union 
 troops succeeded in making a lodgment on the slopes of Tunnel 
 Hill;f but "soon after three o'clock a charge of the Confed- 
 erates from the summit cleared the slopes, and the Union forces 
 thereafter did not reopen the battle" at that point.J Thus 
 Sherman's assault, the main attack, had failed; but the battle 
 was not over. 
 
 From his position at Orchard Knob Grant saw that Sher- 
 man was unable to carry his assault home; he had seen Con- 
 federate troops in motion on Missionary Ridge and had 
 wrongly judged that Bragg was weakening his center to rein- 
 force Cleburne on his right 4 he had watched in vain "to see 
 Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville,"* 
 counting upon that to afford some relief to Sherman, by obli- 
 ging Bragg to send troops to the left of his line. Hooker had 
 started early enough from his bivouac, but he found the bridge 
 over Chattanooga Creek destroyed and the roads obstructed, 
 and was thus delayed four or five hours in his march. 
 
 Sherman's situation appeared too critical to wait longer on 
 Hooker for relief ; so "Grant ordered Thomas to move out the 
 
 ♦Grant. 
 
 fLegend with Official Maps. Alexander. 
 
 JLegend with Official Maps. 
 
458 American Campaigns. 
 
 four divisions" he held at the center, and assault the first line 
 of the enemy's rifle-pits in front; and there to halt and await 
 orders. At half-past three Thomas's line started forward with 
 Baird's division on the left, then Wood's, then Sheridan's, and 
 then Johnson's on the extreme right — in all eleven brigades 
 and four field-batteries, on a front two miles and a half long. 
 Idle these troops had been under arms all day ; they were now 
 eager for battle, and anxious to redeem their defeat at Chicka- 
 mauga, and to show Grant that the Army of the Cumberland 
 was not so demoralized as he supposed it to be. Three lines 
 of intrenchments were in front of them, one at the foot of the 
 ridge, another near the middle of the slope, and the third and 
 strongest on the crest. The divisions of Stewart, Bate [Breck- 
 inridge], Patton Anderson [Hindman], and Cheatham — eleven 
 and a half brigades and sixteen batteries* — held this part of the 
 ridge ; but the commanders had made the fatal mistake of 
 dividing their forces, and occupying the intrenchments both 
 at the crest and at the foot of the slope ; and had given private 
 instructions to the superior officers in the lower line "to await 
 the enemy's approach within 200 yards, then to deliver their 
 fire, and retire to the works above." The ridge here was some 
 200 feet high, with steep slopes broken by many ravines and 
 swales, and, at this time, obstructed by the stumps of recently 
 felled timber. The Confederate engineers had placed the 
 upper line of works, which had been begun only two days be- 
 fore, on the natural instead of the "military" crest; this mis- 
 take "left numerous approaches up ravines and swales en- 
 tirely covered from the fire of the breastworks."f 
 
 The Confederates opened fire with all their available guns 
 and musketry upon the advancing lines, but could not check 
 them. The Federals charged at double time, and carried the 
 first line of intrenchments at the point of the bayonet, putting 
 the defenders to flight up the ridge, "killing and capturing 
 them in large numbers.":): The lines then halted as ordered; 
 but they found themselves exposed to a galling fire from the 
 Confederate trenches on the ridge, and soon, without any or- 
 ders, they started up the slopes by regiments one after another. 
 Before long the whole line was advancing. The center of 
 Sheridan's division reached the top first ; "the rest of the line 
 
 *Legend with Official Maps. 
 
 fAlexander. 
 
 tCist. 
 
The Battles Around Chattanooga. 459 
 
 r 
 was soon up, and almost simultaneously the ridge was carried 
 in six places."* Van Home in his History of the Army of the 
 Cumberland says : "There is no doubt that General Wood's 
 division first reached the summit." Perhaps this charge was 
 like the one at San Juan Hill thirty-five years afterwards, in 
 which nobody claims to have been the second to reach the 
 crest, but many were the first. 
 
 The Confederates made a feeble stand, and then gave way 
 in panic ; Bragg's center was broken and driven from the field 
 in rout. Thirty-seven guns and 2,000 prisoners were captured. 
 Some of the captured guns were turned against the fugitives. 
 The assault lasted about an hour.* Sheridan's division reached 
 the crest just too late to capture Bragg, Breckinridge, and 
 other Confederate generals, who quitted Bragg's headquarters 
 when the charge up the hillside began. These generals were 
 making unavailing efforts to rally their beaten and panic- 
 stricken troops. "The victory was gained too late in the day 
 for a general pursuit. General Sheridan's division and Wil- 
 lich's brigade of General Wood's division pushed the enemy 
 for a short distance down the eastern slope. Later General 
 Sheridan advanced and drove the enemy from a strong posi- 
 tion."f 
 
 Meanwhile Hooker with three divisions had reached the pass 
 at Rossville and driven away the Confederate left. He then 
 turned to the left and, almost unopposed, advanced northward, 
 with one division on top of the ridge and one on each side, until 
 he connected, about sundown, with the right of Thomas's line.t 
 During the night Hardee withdrew from the position he had 
 held so stoutly against Sherman's assaults. 
 
 Grant's victory was decisive, and the siege of Chattanooga 
 was raised. The next thing was to pursue Bragg's defeated 
 army and send a column to Burnside's relief at Knoxville. 
 (230) The following morning Sherman took up the pursuit 
 by way of Chickamauga Station, while Hooker, and Palmer 
 who now had command of the Fourteenth Corps, marched 
 by the Ringgold and Greyville roads. On this day, the 26th, 
 Bragg's army reached Ringgold, where it made a stand on the 
 27th. It "then withdrew to Dalton, where, five days later, 
 Bragg at his own request was relieved of the command."^ 
 
 *Cist. 
 
 fVan Home. 
 
 .^Alexander. 
 
460 American Campaigns. 
 
 The pursuit was suspended on the 28th ; Hooker stayed a few 
 ■days at Ringgold, and Palmer returned to Chattanooga. 
 
 On the morning of the 26th Granger had set out for Knox- 
 "ville with his own corps [Fourth] and reinforcements enough 
 to make a command of 20,000 men. On the 28th Sherman 
 with his command also started for Knoxville ; he had orders 
 to join his forces with Granger's and assume command of the 
 expedition, and to advance with all speed. 
 
 Burnside had met Longstreet's column south of Knoxville, 
 but, according to his orders, had offered little resistance, and 
 fallen back, drawing Longstreet as far as possible from Chatta- 
 nooga. Burnside withdrew behind the fortifications of Knox- 
 ville. After ten days of reconnoitering and arranging for one 
 kind of assault and another, and waiting for one thing and 
 another, Longstreet's troops stormed Fort Sanders, the south- 
 western salient of Burnside's works, just before dawn on the 
 morning of November 29. The fort was provided with a wet 
 ditch and garrisoned by about 220 men including artillery. The 
 storming column consisted of nine regiments supported by 
 three brigades. The assault was repulsed with a loss of 129 
 killed, 458 wounded, and 226 captured. Longstreet was about 
 to renew the assault when he received a telegram from Presi- 
 dent Davis informing him of Bragg's defeat at Chattanooga. 
 This decided him to give over the attempt. On the 4th of 
 December he raised the siege and started in retreat for Vir- 
 ginia, and after a march of great hardship halted at Greenville, 
 where he wintered.* Sherman arrived with his column at 
 Knoxville on the 6th of December. Leaving Granger's corps 
 to help pursue Longstreet he returned with the rest of his force 
 to Chattanooga on the 16th of December. 
 
 For the first time since the war had begun the whole of 
 East Tennessee was under control of the Union army, and 
 President Lincoln's devoutly cherished wish for the relief and 
 protection of the loyal inhabitants was at last achieved. 
 
 In the battles around Chattanooga Grant had, according to 
 Livermore's estimate, 56,359 men, and Bragg 40,929. The 
 losses were not heavy ; on the Union side they were : 752 killed, 
 4,713 wounded, and 350 missing; on the Confederate side, 361 
 killed, 2,180 wounded, and 4,146 captured and missing.f 
 
 *Alexander. 
 fB. & L. 
 
The Battles Around Chattanooga. 461 
 
 Comments. 
 
 / At Chancellorsville we saw that it was the commanding- 
 general and not the Army of the Potomac that was defeated;, 
 at Missionary Ridge the case was exactly the reverse: the 
 rank and file, not the Confederate commanders, were whipped. 
 The soldiers fled from sheer animal fear ; fear inspired wholly 
 by the sight of their foes. This was the only battle of the war 
 in which the topographical conditions were such that well- 
 nigh every man of the defenders could plainly see the hosts 
 of the enemy forming for the assault. From their position on 
 Missionary Ridge the Confederate soldiers could look down 
 upon all the Federal columns ; "The sight was a grand and im- 
 pressive one," says General Alexander, "the like of which had 
 never been seen before by any one who witnessed it." It was 
 too awful for the nerve of the Confederate soldiers ; which is 
 to say that it was too awful for the nerve of any soldiers, 
 for these were the veterans that had fought and won at Chick- 
 amauga. In his brief report General Bragg says : "No satis- 
 factory excuse can possibly be given for the shameful con- 
 duct of our troops on the left in allowing their line to be pene- 
 trated. The position was one which ought to have been held by 
 a line of skirmishers against any assaulting column. . . . 
 But one possible reason presents itself to my mind in expla- 
 nation of this bad conduct in veteran troops who never before 
 failed in any duty assigned them, however difficult and haz- 
 ardous: they had for two days confronted the enemy, mar- 
 shalling his immense forces in plain view." 
 
 The result might have been the same, or possibly more dis- 
 astrous for Bragg's army, if General Grant had withheld 
 Thomas's assault for two hours. By that time Hooker would 
 have been upon the flank and rear of the position assaulted- 
 As it was a short autumn day, however, this would have been 
 to put the attack off till about sunset ; and it would soon have 
 been ended by darkness. The consciousness of Hooker's ap- 
 proach against their left and rear undoubtedly added to the 
 demoralization of the Confederates. General Grant ordered 
 Thomas's assault under a misapprehension; he believed that 
 Bragg was reinforcing Cleburne against Sherman. This "was 
 not only wholly erroneous, but on the contrary, when the Union 
 movement against the center began, three brigades were hur- 
 ried from the Confederate right to the center to resist the 
 
462 American Campaigns. 
 
 Union advance there."* Sherman had been repulsed, but he 
 was never in any danger of a serious counter-stroke. 
 
 Swinton does not include the battles around Chattanooga 
 among the Decisive Battles of the War, but in a sense they 
 were decisive ; they marked a distinct phase of the war and of 
 the life of the Southern Confederacy. They did not mark the 
 beginning of its end, but, taken in connection with Gettys- 
 burg and Vicksburg, they marked the end of the beginning of 
 its dissolution. All that was now left of Secession was the 
 narrow strip of country, without harbors or seacoast, lying 
 south of the Potomac and east of the Appalachian Mountains. 
 The end of the war and of the Southern Confederacy was in 
 sight. 
 
 /The great strategic front of the Confederacy from Rich- 
 mond to Jackson, Mississippi, was now sundered at its middle. 
 If Grant had been defeated and compelled to withdraw from 
 Chattanooga it would not have taken the Confederates long 
 to capture Burnside at Knoxville, and reopen the line of the 
 East Tennessee and Virginia Railway; but now this railway 
 was lost to them for good and all, and the great strategic ad- 
 vantage of interior lines in the vast general theater of the 
 war, from Virginia to Mississippi, had passed irretrievably 
 from the Confederacy to the Union. Lee still guarded the Vir- 
 ginia end of the railway, and even yet might possibly have 
 moved his army by rail against Knoxville, picking up Long- 
 street's detachment on the way- This, however, would have 
 risked the loss of Richmond, to which Lee's army was as fast- 
 tethered as the Army of the Potomac was to Washington. 
 From Knoxville to Memphis the railway was now wholly in 
 possession of the Federals. 
 
 The War Department order that created the Division of the 
 Mississippi, and placed all the territory and all the Union ar- 
 mies south of the Ohio River and east of the Mississippi under 
 a single commander in the field, was one of the wisest and most 
 important orders issued during the Civil War. Such an ar- 
 rangement had been needed from the very beginning to bring 
 about concert of action between the several armies. We saw 
 that the lack of it gave the Confederates opportunities in the 
 Henry and Donelson Campaign of which Albert Sidney John- 
 ston neglected to take advantage; barely missed costing the 
 Union arms defeat and disaster in the Shiloh Campaign ; and 
 
 *Legend with Official Maps. 
 
The Battles Around Chattanooga. 463 
 
 probably retarded the capture of Vicksburg by many weeks. 
 Whereas the immediate consequences of , the order were the 
 prompt breaking of the siege at Chattanooga and the defeat 
 of Bragg's army, the relief of Burnside's army at Knoxville, 
 and the total expulsion of Confederate troops from the State 
 of Tennessee. 
 
 General Joseph E. Johnston had been nominally in command 
 of all the Confederate armies in this section since November, 
 1862, but it does not appear that he was at any time allowed 
 to exercise real command. He did no more than make rec- 
 ommendations to the President of the Confederacy, and his 
 recommendations were generally not approved or ordered to be 
 carried out. On more than one occasion Mr. Davis visited 
 the armies in person and issued orders to their immediate 
 commanders without reference to Johnston. 
 
 In fact, while the military policies of the Northern and the 
 Southern governments were not identical, they were alike. 
 There was on each side the lack of a chief objective, which 
 every commander ought to have kept in mind, and toward 
 which he should have directed the operations of his army. 
 Instead of this, in the vast theater from Virginia to Texas, 
 during the first three years of the war, every army-commander 
 on either side appears to have looked only to his own imme- 
 diate objective; there was no commander-in-chief in the field 
 to concentrate the efforts of all the armies. 
 
 After allowing Rosecrans's army quietly to withdraw into 
 Chattanooga, Bragg then let all the fruits of his victory at 
 Chickamauga gradually slip away from him, apparently 
 through mere inaction. He wisely refrained from assaulting 
 his foe behind fortifications, but in placing his army in front 
 of Chattanooga and holding it there, practically idle, for nearly 
 two months, he gave away the advantages gained by his vic- 
 tory at Chickamauga. Bragg counted upon starving the Army 
 of the Cumberland into capitulation; his failure to do so, 
 however, is no exception to the general rule of modern war- 
 fare, that an army which allows itself to be shut up within 
 fortifications is as good as lost. This army was never wholly 
 invested; although its line of supply was for a time over a 
 very long and difficult road, and its means of transportation 
 were very poor, the army was at no time in real danger of 
 starvation; and its line of retreat was always open. Toward 
 the last, after so many of the draft animals had died, and the 
 rest had become weak from hunger, and broken down by 
 
464 American Campaigns. 
 
 over-work, the army would, undoubtedly, have lost most of its 
 artillery and equipage if it had undertaken to retreat. 
 
 The short piece of road, about five miles long, from Brown's 
 Ferry across Raccoon Mountain to Kelly's Ferry, was of the 
 greatest strategic importance during the siege of Chattanooga. 
 So long as the Confederates controlled it the beleaguered Fed- 
 erals had to haul their supplies from Bridgeport by wagon on 
 the long miserable road over Walden's Ridge. Neither Bragg, 
 nor Longstreet who commanded the left of the Confederate 
 line, appears to have appreciated its importance. Nothing 
 more than a picket guarded Brown's Ferry, and Law's bri- 
 gade was the only Confederate force west of Mount Look- 
 out. "A full division at least should have guarded" this road.* 
 
 Bragg expected Wheeler's cavalry so to break up the rail- 
 way communications of Rosecrans as to cause him to quit 
 Chattanooga and return to Murfreesboro or Nashville, like 
 Grant after Van Dorn's raid upon Holly Springs ; but we 
 have seen that Wheeler did little more than destroy some hun- 
 dreds of Rosecrans's wagons and teams. 
 
 What Bragg should have done was to move with his main 
 army against Rosecrans's communications as soon as Rosecrans 
 had made good his withdrawal into Chattanooga. Bragg might 
 have crossed the Tennessee above Chattanooga, and marched 
 across Walden's Ridge and the Cumberland Plateau, or he 
 might have crossed at Bridgeport and Stevenson, or farther 
 down. Either movement would probably have forced Rose- 
 crans to quit Chattanooga. The second movement was ac- 
 tually ordered by Mr. Davis, who visited Bragg's headquar- 
 ters about the 10th of October. A few days afterwards, how- 
 ever, heavy rains set in and the roads became so bad that 
 Bragg made them an excuse "for his failure to execute the 
 campaign that the President had ordered. "f The plan had not 
 been suggested by Bragg; he had, when called upon by Mr. 
 Davis for a suggestion, proposed the other — "to march up 
 and cross the river and swing round toward the enemy's rear 
 and force him out by that means. "f It is probable, however, 
 that it was now too late for either plan to succeed, for Hooker 
 had already taken charge of the railway in rear of Rosecrans's 
 army with his 15,000 fresh troops, and Sherman was hastening- 
 forward with his two corps from Memphis. "Longstreet re- 
 ports that he advised crossing the Tennessee and moving- 
 
 *Alexander. 
 (■Longstreet. 
 
The Battles Around Chattanooga. 465 
 
 against Rosecrans's communications" on September 21st, the 
 day after Chickamauga, "and that Bragg approved and ordered 
 Polk's wing to take the lead, while his wing cared for the 
 wounded and policed the field. The army, however, was in 
 such confusion and need of ammunition that it was dark be- 
 fore the rear of Polk's corps was stretched out upon the road, 
 and Longstreet's march was postponed until the 22nd. During 
 the night Thomas withdrew into the city; . . . Bragg fol- 
 lowed on the 22nd and took position in front of him."* By 
 doing this Bragg gave up his opportunity. 
 
 Another project that Bragg might have undertaken with 
 every chance of success at first, — before Rosecrans's army re- 
 covered from the moral effects of its defeat, and before the 
 arrival of Union reinforcements, — was to hold the siege of 
 Chattanooga with part of his army, and send the rest against 
 Burnside at Knoxville. Bragg did this, but not until it was 
 too late; and then he did not give Longstreet a large enough 
 force to cope with Burnside behind fortifications. It was too 
 late, because Hooker's command was already at Bridgeport, 
 and Bragg knew that Sherman was soon to arrive. But Bragg 
 appears to have considered his own position impregnable 
 against assault, and he hoped, also, that Longstreet would 
 accomplish his purpose, and return to the main army, before 
 the arrival of Sherman. His detaching Longstreet at that 
 time was certainly a mistake; it could not in any manner aid 
 in the achievement of Bragg's main purpose; namely, to 
 capture the hostile army in Chattanooga. It was at best only 
 a "side issue." 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
LECTURE XXII. 
 THE BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 The Autumn and Winter After Gettysburg. 
 
 (243) The 14th of July, 1863, found Lee's army, after its 
 unsuccessful invasion of Pennsylvania, again on the south side 
 of the Potomac. Lee continued his retreat slowly up the 
 Shenandoah Valley. Toward the end of July Meade reen- 
 tered Virginia on the east side of the Blue Ridge Mountains; 
 Lee thereupon withdrew from the Valley and took position 
 in the neighborhood of Culpeper. Meade placed the Army 
 of the Potomac facing him on the north bank of the Rappa- 
 hannock. 
 
 In these positions the two armies remained inactive for sev- 
 eral weeks, and both were considerably reduced by the with- 
 drawal of large detachments for service in other theaters. 
 From the Army of the Potomac a detachment went to South 
 Carolina; another went to New York to aid in enforcing the 
 draft. From Lee's army Longstreet had gone with two of his 
 divisions to assist Bragg against Rosecrans in Tennessee and 
 Georgia, and Pickett had been detached with his division to 
 the south of Petersburg to "arrest raiding parties of the enemy 
 and collect supplies for the army."* 
 
 (244) Learning of Longstreet's departure, Meade advanced, 
 and Lee withdrew behind the Rapidan. Meade followed and 
 put his army into position about Culpeper. Meade was mak- 
 ing ready to try to turn Lee's flank when he was ordered from 
 Washington to send two corps to the assistance of Rosecrans 
 at Chattanooga. It was then that Hooker with the Eleventh 
 and Twelfth Corps went to Tennessee. This reduced Meade's 
 force to the defensive, and Lee was not slow to take advan- 
 tage of the situation. Lee resolved to try to turn Meade's 
 flank and get between him and Washington. Accordingly, on 
 the 9th of October, he crossed the Rapidan, and there followed 
 from then on into November a series of operations which has 
 been called by the historians and biographers "a campaign of 
 maneuvers," or "a campaign of strategy" ; it consisted of much 
 
 *Long. 
 
The Battle of the Wilderness. 467 
 
 marching and maneuvering, but of little fighting; of much 
 strategy, but of little tactics. 
 
 Finding his right turned, Meade fell back along the rail- 
 way, and, in the series of movements that ensued, the Army 
 of the Potomac continued to retreat until it finally took posi- 
 tion on the heights of Centreville — the position from which 
 McDowell had led it to the First Battle of Bull Run, in 1861 ; 
 the position to which Pope withdrew it after the Second Bat- 
 tle of Bull Run in 1862.* Lee followed as far as Bull Run, 
 but he had failed to cut off Meade's retreat and force him to 
 battle faced to the rear; his biographer charges the failure 
 mainly to Stuart and his cavalry.f As in the Gettysburg cam- 
 paign, Stuart had yielded to the temptation of trying to cap- 
 ture a wagon-train of commissaries, and thereby got his com- 
 mand into a perilous trap. Lee had to send Ewell's corps to 
 save Stuart from capture; this so delayed the Confederate col- 
 umn that Meade's army got safe across Broad Run at Bristoe 
 Station, where Lee had hoped to intercept it. 
 
 Lee now saw the uselessness of further pursuit ; his cam- 
 paign had failed, except that it had driven the enemy nearly 
 out of Virginia; Meade's army was now almost within sight 
 of the intrenchments of Washington and Alexandria, behind 
 which it could withdraw within a few hours. Lee, on the 
 other hand, was a long way from his base. He, therefore, re- 
 turned to Culpeper, destroying the railway from Cub Run to 
 the Rappahannock. Meade followed up the retrograde move- 
 ment of the Confederates. On the 7th of November he crossed 
 the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, turning the right flank of 
 the Confederates. Lee then withdrew again to the south bank 
 of the Rapidan. 
 
 (245) It was now Meade's turn to take the offensive. 
 Ewell's corps of the Confederate army stretched from Clark's 
 Mountain to Mine Run, covering the several fords between 
 those points ; A. P. Hill's corps extended from Orange Court 
 House to Liberty Mills, six miles southwest of Orange Court 
 House ; Stuart's cavalry covered the flanks ; Longstreet and 
 Pickett were still absent with the three divisions of the 1st 
 Corps. Meade resolved to try to cross the Rapidan on the 
 
 ♦This was not called the Army of the Potomac at the time of the 
 First Battle of Bull Run; and at the Second Battle of Bull Run 
 only a part of Pope's forces belonged to the Army of the Potomac. 
 Meade's army, however, was the outgrowth of those two armies. 
 
 fLong. 
 
468 American Campaigns. 
 
 right of Lee's position, and fall upon the Confederate army in 
 reverse before it could assemble from its extended winter- 
 quarters. As secretly as possible he began his march for Ger- 
 manna Ford on the 26th of November ; but his movement did 
 not escape the notice of Stuart's cavalry, which gave Lee warn- 
 ing. So when Meade moved southward from Germanna Ford 
 in the Wilderness he found Lee's army so strongly intrenched 
 behind breastworks on the west bank of Mine Run that he did 
 not deem it expedient to attack. He quietly withdrew to the 
 north bank of the Rapidan and into his winter-quarters at 
 Culpeper, and Lee's army returned to its position on the south 
 side of the Rapidan. Another bloodless game of kriegsspiel 
 was at an end. 
 
 This was the last important campaign of the year 1863, the 
 year in which the star of the Southern Confederacy reached its 
 zenith. The Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern 
 Virginia were content to watch each other from now on, until 
 the following May, and the peace of Virginia was not dis- 
 turbed during these months, save by the unsuccessful cavalry 
 raid against Richmond in February and March, made by Kil- 
 patrick and Dahlgren. 
 
 The Wilderness Campaign. 
 
 In February, 1864, Congress revived the grade of lieuten- 
 ant-general, which had last been held in the American army 
 by Washington in 1799. The President appointed General 
 Grant to the office and made him general-in-chief of all the 
 Union armies, — and personally gave him assurance that he was 
 to be allowed to exercise the real functions of the office. 
 
 Then, for the first time since the war had begun, a definite 
 plan of action was laid out for the armies of the United States — 
 a plan that contemplated the simultaneous and concerted move- 
 ment of all the armies in the vast theater of the war toward 
 a single ultimate objective; namely, the destruction of the 
 only two organized armed bodies of any considerable strength 
 that the South had in the field. Those two bodies were Lee's 
 army in Virginia and the force then under General Joseph E. 
 Johnston at Dalton, Georgia. That force was composed of 
 the Army of Tennessee, lately under Bragg, and the Army of 
 Mississippi, under Johnston, consolidated.* 
 
 ♦Johnston's Narrative. 
 
The Battle of the Wilderness. 469 
 
 "The Union armies were now divided into nineteen depart- 
 ments,"* all except four independent of one another and under 
 separate commanders who reported directly to Washington. 
 The four excepted departments were those that had been con- 
 solidated, the autumn before, into the Division of the Missis- 
 sippi and placed under Grant. We saw that the defeat of 
 Bragg's army at Chattanooga was the direct result of that con- 
 solidation. Sherman succeeded Grant in the command of the 
 Division of the Mississippi. The Army of the Potomac was a 
 separate command, and had no territorial limits. 
 
 Grant's general plan for the spring campaign was outlined 
 in a confidential letter to Sherman from which the following 
 extracts are made : 
 
 "Washington, D. C, April 4, 1864. 
 
 "It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet, and allow me to 
 take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts 
 of the army together, and somewhat towards a common cen- 
 ter. ... I have sent orders to Banks ... to finish 
 up his present expedition against Shreveport with all dis- 
 patch ; to turn over the defense of Red River to Genl. Steele 
 and the navy . . . ; to abandon all of Texas, except the 
 Rio Grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thou- 
 sand men; to reduce the number of troops on the Mississippi 
 to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to collect from 
 his command not less than 25,000 men. To this I will add 
 5,000 men from Missouri. With this force he is to commence 
 operations against Mobile as soon as he can. . . . 
 
 "Gillmore joins Butler with 10,000 men (from South Caro- 
 lina), and the two operate against Richmond from the south 
 side of the James River. This will give Butler 33,000 men. 
 . . . I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased 
 by Burnside's corps [Ninth] of not less than 25,000 effective 
 men, and operate directly against Lee's army, wherever it may 
 be found. Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, 
 one under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly [West], 
 Virginia; and the other under Crook, to start from Charles- 
 ton on the Kanawha, to move against the Virginia and Ten- 
 nessee Railroad. . . . You I propose to move against 
 Johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of 
 
 ♦Grant. 
 
470 American Campaigns. 
 
 the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the dam- 
 age you can against their war resources. ..." 
 
 The movement was to be simultaneous "all along the line." 
 The plan did not work out successfully in all its details ; Banks 
 did not carry out his part of it; Butler let his army be "bot- 
 tled up" by Beauregard between the James and the Appo- 
 mattox Rivers; and Sigel did nothing but retreat. "Just as I 
 was expecting to hear of good work being done in the Val- 
 ley" (by Sigel's command), General Grant remarks in his 
 Memoirs, "I received, instead, the following announcement 
 from Halleck: 'Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg. He will 
 do nothing but run ; never did anything else.' " But the main 
 armies under Grant and Sherman moved simultaneously with 
 their campaigns. 
 
 In one of his early interviews with the President, Grant ex- 
 pressed his dissatisfaction with the work so far done by the 
 cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, and his belief that the 
 cavalry could do more "under a thorough leader." He said 
 he "wanted the very best man in the army for that command."* 
 
 So Sheridan was called up from Sherman's army and given 
 command of the Cavalry Corps.f Pleasonton, who had com- 
 manded the Cavalry Corps in the Gettysburg Campaign, was 
 transferred to Missouri; of the old division-commanders, Bu- 
 ford had died in the previous December, and Kilpatrick was 
 transferred to Sherman's army. D. McM. Gregg remained in 
 command of his division; two officers who had not served 
 before with cavalry, Torbert and J. H. Wilson, were given 
 command of the other two divisions, while Merritt and Custer 
 remained brigade-commanders. 
 
 Operations. 
 
 On the 26th of March, 1864, General Grant established his 
 headquarters at Culpeper Court House. Meade retained com- 
 mand of the Army of the Potomac and all orders to it were 
 given through him. The Ninth Corps [Burnside] was not 
 until the 24th of May incorporated with the Army of the 
 Potomac; it, however, went through the campaign with this 
 army. (246) For the present this corps, with its headquar- 
 ters at Warrenton, was guarding the railway from the Rappa- 
 
 *Grant. 
 
 fHe was suggested by Halleck. 
 
The Battle of the Wilderness. 471 
 
 hannock back to Bull Run. The five corps of the Army of the 
 Potomac had been consolidated into three, "the Second, Fifth, 
 and Sixth Corps being retained, and the divisions of the First 
 and Third Corps transferred to the three retained corps." Han- 
 cock still commanded the Second Corps and Sedgwick the 
 Sixth; Warren was now in command of the Fifth. The Army 
 numbered 73,390 infantry and artillery and 12,424 cavalry; 
 the strength of the Ninth Corps was 19,331.* 
 
 Longstreet had rejoined Lee with .his detachment from 
 Tennessee, and the Confederate army was still organized as 
 in the Gettysburg Campaign, in three corps under Longstreet, 
 Ewell, and A. P. Hill, and the cavalry division under Stuart; 
 Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps was still absent. There 
 were present for duty with this army 53,554 infantry and 
 artillery and 8,399 cavalry. Lee's headquarters were at Orange 
 Court House, and his line extended from Barnett's Ford, 
 about five miles above the railway crossing, to Morton's Ford, 
 a distance of fifteen or eighteen miles. Ewell's corps was on 
 the right and Hill's on the left. Longstreet was at Mechan- 
 icsburg, six miles south of Gordonsville. The bulk of Stuart's 
 cavalry was over in the neighborhood of Fredericksburg, 
 where forage was more plentiful than it was nearer the main 
 body. 
 
 Plan. 
 
 As has already been said, Grant's main objective was to be 
 Lee's army. Behind its intrenchments and the Rapidan this 
 army was unassailable in front ; Grant must turn one or the 
 other of its flanks, and thus force it to come out of its in- 
 trenchments and fight, or suffer itself to be attacked in re- 
 verse. He resolved to turn its right flank, and hoped by con- 
 cealment and celerity, to cross the Rapidan and get out of the 
 Wilderness on its south side before Lee should discover his 
 movement; or at least before Lee could take effectual means 
 to oppose it. 
 
 With a view to swift marching, and on account of the bad 
 rioads and forest country, the baggage was cut down to the 
 smallest limit, and a large portion of the artillery was left be- 
 hind. Ammunition and ten days' rations, and three days' for- 
 age, however, had to be carried in wagons, which made a train 
 "that would have extended from the Rapidan to Richmond, 
 
 *The Campaigns of Grant in Virginia (Scribner's). — Humphreys. 
 
472 American Campaigns. 
 
 stretched along in single file,"* — that is, a wagon-train sixty 
 or seventy miles long. The order for the movement of the 
 army issued on the 2nd of May, and the movement began at 
 midnight of the 3rd. Sheridan with two of his cavalry divi- 
 sions led the way, while Torbert's division was left to cover 
 the rear. 
 
 (247) The army marched by the roads to Ely's and Ger- 
 manna Fords, the same fords that Hooker's right wing had 
 used in crossing the Rapidan a twelvemonth before. Two pon- 
 toon-bridges were laid at each of these points, and another was 
 laid between them at Culpeper Mine Ford. Hancock's corps 
 [Second], preceded by Gregg's cavalry division, and followed 
 by the reserve artillery, took the Ely's Ford road for Chan- 
 cellorsville, where it arrived at 9 a.m. on the 4th. Here it re- 
 mained the rest of the day; the cavalry pushed out to Piney 
 Branch Church, and threw out patrols on all the roads from 
 there. The Second Corps bivouacked that night on the old 
 battle-field of Chancellorsville. 
 
 The Fifth Corps [Warren], preceded by Wilson's cavalry 
 division, marched by way of Germanna Ford, and, on the 
 afternoon of the 4th, reached Old Wilderness Tavern, at the 
 junction of the Germanna Ford road and the old Orange-Fred- 
 ericksburg Turnpike— just about a mile west of where Stone- 
 wall Jackson's turning-column struck the Turnpike on the 
 evening of the 2nd of May the year before. Here the Fifth 
 Corps bivouacked. Sedgwick's corps [Sixth] followed the 
 Fifth and bivouacked the night of the 4th with the head of its 
 column three miles south of Germanna Ford. Wilson's cav- 
 alry division moved on to Parker's Store, throwing out patrols 
 on all the roads from that point. No opposition had as yet 
 been offered by the enemy, and the troops were all on the 
 south side of the Rapidan and in the heart of the Wilderness. 
 
 But for the great wagon-train the army might have marched 
 on and gained five or six miles of its way through the forest 
 before nightfall. The trains, however, were not up ; they did 
 not finish crossing at Ely's and Culpeper Mine Fords until 
 after 5 p.m. on the 5th. The army could not move on without 
 them. Signs of the enemy appeared before one o'clock in the 
 afternoon of the 4th. Shots were heard in the direction of 
 Locust Grove, and a considerable force was seen moving from 
 Orange Court House toward New Verdiersville on the Plank 
 
 ♦Grant. 
 
The Battle of the Wilderness. 473 
 
 Road. In fact, Lee's army was in motion on the Turnpike and 
 the Plank Road. Lee had anticipated the movement of the 
 Federal army. He had not been deceived by feints that had 
 been made on his left. Standing with a group of his officers 
 at the signal station on Clark's Mountain, on the 2nd of May, 
 he had expressed the belief that Grant would move round his 
 right flank. According to his wont he took no steps to prevent 
 Grant's passage of the river, but as soon as he learned that the 
 Union army was in march, he started his corps forward to 
 strike it in flank before it should get out of the Wilderness. 
 
 Thus it happened that on the night of the 4th the head of 
 Ewell's corps was at Locust Grove, on the Turnpike within 
 five miles of Old Wilderness Tavern, where Warren's corps 
 was bivouacked; and the leading division of Hill's corps 
 [Heth] was at Mine Run on the Plank Road, seven miles from 
 where Wilson's cavalry had its bivouac at Parker's Store. It 
 does not, however, appear that either of the hostile armies was 
 aware of the nearness of the other. Longstreet's corps, which 
 had a march of forty-two miles to make, received its orders 
 about noon on the 4th and was on the way at 4 p.m. Stopping 
 only long enough to feed and water, it marched all that night 
 and until nearly sunset on the 5th; then it bivouacked at 
 Craig's Meeting House, on the Catharpin Road, having 
 inarched thirty-six miles.* 
 
 (248) We learned in the study of the Chancellorsville Cam- 
 paign that the great dismal forest called the Wilderness was 
 about fourteen miles long from east to west and ten miles wide 
 from the Rapidan southward. It was no primeval forest of 
 great trees, "the survival of the fittest," standing apart in the 
 midst of a sparse undergrowth struggling to live under their 
 shade ; it was the worst kind of thicket of second-growth. For 
 more than a hundred years iron mines had been worked within 
 it, and all the original timber had been cut as fuel for the fur- 
 naces. The space was now covered with a dense coppice of 
 ■cedar, pine, black-oak, and other scrubby and tangled under- 
 growth. Hancock in his report says: "It was covered by a 
 dense forest, almost impenetrable by troops in line of battle, 
 where maneuvering was an operation of extreme difficulty and 
 uncertainty. The undergrowth was so heavy that it was 
 scarcely possible to see more than one hundred paces in any 
 direction. The movements of the enemy could not be observed 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
474 American Campaigns. 
 
 until the lines were almost in collision."* As stated before, 
 the uneven surface of the ground was cut up by a number of 
 small streams with marshy banks ; the clearings were few and 
 narrow; the highways were not many, but there were numer- 
 ous crooked wood-roads and trails leading and misleading in 
 every direction. To Grant's army the Wilderness, especially 
 that part west of the old Chancellorsville battle-ground, was 
 totally unknown ; but Lee's men had a far better knowledge 
 of the roads and trails than they had possessed at the time of 
 Jackson's last battle. 
 
 (246) Early in the afternoon of the 4th Grant telegraphed 
 Burnside, whose first division was then at Brandy Station, to 
 make a forced march to Germanna Ford. The fourth division 
 of the Ninth Corps, the first negro troops to do service with 
 the Union army in Virginia, had started that morning from 
 Manassas Junction, forty miles from Germanna Ford. Burn- 
 side promptly obeyed Grant's order, and his first division 
 [Stevenson] crossed the Rapidan at Germanna Ford the next 
 morning, the 5th. By the night of the 5th, the divisions of 
 Potter and Willcox had also come up; they bivouacked two or 
 three miles south of the ford. The fourth division [Ferrero] 
 crossed on the morning of the 6th. 
 
 At 6 p.m. on the 4th Grant issued, through Meade, orders 
 for the army to resume the march southward at five o'clock 
 the next morning. (248) Sheridan, with Torbert's and 
 Gregg's cavalry divisions was to march toward Hamilton's 
 Crossing in quest of Stuart's cavalry. Wilson was to move 
 his cavalry division to Craig's Meeting House, and send out 
 reconnoitering parties on the Orange Turnpike and the Plank 
 Road, and on other roads converging on the line of march of 
 the army. Hancock's corps [Second] was to march by way 
 of Todd's Tavern to Shady Grove Church; Warren's [Fifth] 
 to Parker's Store; and Sedgwick's [Sixth] to Old Wilderness 
 Tavern, leaving a division to cover Germanna Ford until the 
 arrival of Burnside's corps. Each corps was to keep in touch 
 with the troops on its right and left. The march began on 
 time and the corps were soon stretched out upon the narrow 
 roads. 
 
 Lee, whose purpose was to attack the Union army while it 
 was at a disadvantage in the narrow roads and jungle of the 
 Wilderness, hoped not to have to bring on a general engage- 
 
 *Humphreys. 
 
The Battle of the Wilderness. 475 
 
 ment before Longstreet's corps should reach the front. He 
 gave his orders accordingly to Ewell and Hill. At this time, 
 the morning of the 5th of May, Longstreet's corps was still far 
 behind; it did not reach the battle-field until the next morn- 
 ing. It does not appear that there was any cavalry in front of 
 the columns of Ewell and Hill — Stuart's squadrons had not 
 rejoined from Fredericksburg — or that the infantry advance- 
 guards were very far in front. "Ewell's corps was the first 
 to find itself in the presence of the enemy. As it advanced 
 along the Turnpike on the morning of the 5th the Federal 
 column was seen crossing it from the direction of Germanna 
 Ford. Ewell promptly formed line of battle across the Turn- 
 pike."* 
 
 It was Warren's corps that was crossing the pike in front 
 of Ewell's column. At 7.15 a.m. Warren reported to Meade 
 that the enemy's infantry was on the pike in "some force" 
 about two miles from the Wilderness Tavern. A few minutes 
 later Meade ordered Warren to halt his whole corps and attack 
 the Confederates on the pike. The Federal commanders did 
 not suspect the presence of Lee's main army. Meade re- 
 marked, "They have left a division to fool us here, while they 
 concentrate and prepare a position toward the North Anna."f 
 Warren's attack, however, would develop what force there was 
 of the enemy. 
 
 At the same time Meade dispatched an order to Hancock to 
 halt his corps at Todd's Tavern and await developments. 
 This order did not reach Hancock until nine o'clock, and found 
 him two miles beyond Todd's Tavern. Sedgwick was ordered 
 to move out on the road that left the Germanna Plank Road 
 at Spottswood's, about two miles north of the Tavern, and 
 attack the enemy. He was to keep in touch with Warren's 
 right. (249) Grant joined Meade, and they took their post 
 upon a knoll on the Lacy farm, where they remained during 
 most of the day. 
 
 Johnson's division of Ewell's corps was formed across the 
 pike, Rodes's division was forming on its right, and Early's on 
 its left. Griffin's division of Warren's corps, advancing down 
 the Turnpike, met the first line of Johnson's division at about 
 noon, and drove it back. Robinson's division was ordered to 
 support Griffin, while Wadsworth's division was to form on his 
 
 *Law in B. & L. 
 fSwinton. 
 
476 American Campaigns. 
 
 left, and Wright's division of the Sixth Corps was to support 
 his right. Wadsworth's division in passing through the dense 
 thicket moved northwest, instead of southwest parallel to the 
 Turnpike. This exposed its left flank to the right wing of 
 Ewell's line. Wright's division found the jungle so close that 
 it could not get to the front in time to be of assistance. So 
 Warren's three divisions after a short but fierce fight were 
 driven back, losing two pieces of artillery and several hundred 
 prisoners. Ewell's corps advanced to where Johnson's line 
 had first stood, and there intrenched. 
 
 Crawford's division of the Fifth Corps was at the head of 
 the Union column when the march began in the morning, and 
 its leading troops had reached the Chewning farm, three miles 
 from Wilderness Tavern, when the order reached it at eight 
 o'clock to halt. Wilson had left a small party of cavalry at 
 this point, and Crawford found it skirmishing with what he 
 took for Confederate troopers dismounted. Crawford halted 
 as ordered, but finding presently that Wilson's cavalry at Par- 
 ker's Store was engaged, he threw out a skirmish line toward 
 that place. The skirmish line soon became engaged with the 
 flankers of a column of Confederate infantry. In fact, Heth's 
 division of Hill's corps was advancing on the Plank Road; 
 Wilson's cavalry retired before it. About this time Crawford 
 was ordered to close in to the right with one of his brigades 
 and join in the attack along the Turnpike. The brigade lost 
 its way in the underbrush, and became enveloped by the right 
 of Ewell's line ; it had many men killed and wounded, lost sev- 
 eral hundred prisoners, and fell back. (250) About two 
 o'clock Crawford drew in his division and posted it "about a 
 half-mile southwest from the Lacy house, facing toward Chew- 
 ning's."* 
 
 As soon as Meade learned, between nine and ten o'clock, 
 that there was a Confederate column on the Plank Road also, 
 he dispatched Getty's division of the Sixth Corps, which had 
 not advanced with the rest of that corps, but was now at the 
 Tavern, out on the Brock Road to its junction with the 
 Plank Road. At the same, time he sent Hancock an order 
 to return with his corps to the same point. On reaching the 
 Plank Road, about eleven o'clock, Getty sent forward a skir- 
 mish line, which soon encountered Heth's skirmishers driving 
 back the Union cavalry from Parker's Store. Getty learned 
 
 ♦Humphreys. 
 
The Battle of the Wilderness. 477 
 
 from prisoners that Hill's corps, except Anderson's division, 
 was on the road; instead of attacking, therefore, he halted in 
 the Brock Road and threw up slight intrenchments, pending 
 the return of Hancock's corps. 
 
 Hill had the same orders as Ewell, to avoid bringing on a 
 general engagement. So Heth's division, which was in ad- 
 vance, took up a position early in the afternoon facing Getty. 
 His line was on comparatively high ground, across the road, 
 with its flanks resting on marshy ground about the headwaters 
 of the Ny and Wilderness Run. Wilcox came up with his 
 division, and, at about two o'clock, formed line on Heth's left. 
 He extended his line at first beyond Chewning's in order to 
 connect with Ewell's, which was in sight upon the open ground 
 at the Hagerson farm. Toward five o'clock he was recalled 
 to the right to support Heth — "a movement which was ob- 
 served by General Warren."* The two divisions of Wilcox 
 and Heth were then merged into one line. General Lee was 
 with Hill. 
 
 At 2 p.m. the head of Hancock's corps reached the Plank 
 Road. As the divisions came up they were formed on 
 Getty's left in the following order from right to left along 
 and in front of the road by which Jackson had made his turn- 
 ing movement a year before : Birney's, Mott's, Gibbon's, and 
 Barlow's. Hancock was ordered to support Getty and drive 
 the enemy beyond Parker's Store and was urged to lose no 
 time; he nevertheless spent about an hour completing the in- 
 trenchments begun by Getty. "This delay was of great value 
 to Hill, enabling him partially to select and prepare his 
 ground."f (251) "At a quarter past four Getty, in compli- 
 ance with his orders from Meade, advanced to the attack, 
 through the thick undergrowth." At about 400 yards from 
 the Brock Road Getty's line became engaged with Heth's di- 
 vision, "part of which was lying down behind the crest of a 
 small elevation." Finding Getty engaged with a large force of 
 the enemy, Hancock sent two divisions to his assistance— Bir- 
 ney's to his right and. Mott's to his left. Hancock says the 
 fight became "very fierce at once; the lines were exceedingly 
 close, the musketry continuous and deadly along the entire 
 line."* General Alexander says : "There was never more des- 
 perate fighting than now ensued." Gibbon's division was sent 
 
 ♦Humphreys. 
 fAlexander. 
 
478 American Campaigns. 
 
 forward, but Wilcox had reinforced Heth, and the Confed- 
 erates could not be driven ; finally, after nightfall, two brigades 
 of Barlow's division attacked Hill's right flank and forced it 
 back. The combat lasted till eight o'clock. 
 
 Grant and Meade heard the roar of musketry at this end of 
 the line, and, judging rightly that Hancock was having a hard 
 fight, dispatched Wadsworth's division of Warren's corps, late 
 in the afternoon, southward through the thicket, to attack 
 Hill's flank and rear. Wadsworth's movement was so slow 
 through the tangled underbrush that he was overtaken by 
 night before he reached a position from which he could as- 
 sault ; his men therefore lay on their arms, where night caught 
 them — "in contact with the skirmishers on Hill's left flank."* 
 There was heavy skirmishing at the other end of the line, 
 also, during the afternoon, but without decisive results. Artil- 
 lery was used wherever practicable, but owing to the denseness 
 of the woods it played no great part in the battle. 
 
 (248) The Union squadrons that reconnoitered toward 
 Hamilton's Crossing found that Stuart's cavalry had been 
 drawn in to the right of Lee's army. Wilson's division met 
 part of it on the Catharpin Road and skirmished backward 
 and forward with it during most of the day. At last Wilson, 
 having fallen back to Todd's Tavern, was there joined by 
 Gregg, and their combined forces drove the Confederate squad- 
 rons across Corbin's Bridge. 
 
 (251) As soon as the battle ceased on the evening of the 
 Sth the Union commanders issued orders for its renewal at 
 five o'clock the next morning. 
 
 We have seen that Burnside had arrived with three of his 
 divisions south of the river by the evening of the 5th. He 
 had, however, not come in time to take any part in the battle 
 of this day. At the end of the day's fighting, and indeed all 
 during the day, there was a wide gap between the two wings 
 of the line of battle — between Hancock and Warren on the 
 Union side, and between Hill and Ewell on the Confederate 
 side. Two distinct battles had been fought on fields more 
 than a mile apart. Burnside was ordered to place two of his 
 divisions in the interval between Warren and Hancock, and 
 to be in position to advance at five o'clock next morning with 
 the rest of the army. He was to get possession of the high, 
 clear ground at Chewning's, and attack Hill's left and rear. 
 
 *Swinton. 
 
The Battle of the Wilderness. 479 
 
 Stevenson's division of Burnside's corps was to remain at the 
 Tavern as a reserve. During the night both sides strength- 
 ened their field-works. 
 
 (252) Punctually at 5 a.m. on the 6th the right and left of 
 the Union line renewed the attack; but it was two o'clock in 
 the afternoon before any part of Burnside's corps on the left- 
 center of the Union line got into the battle. Sedgwick and 
 Warren on the right attacked Ewell furiously, but could make 
 no headway against his breast-works, defended by artillery and 
 musketry. At about half-past ten the battle had become so 
 fierce at Hancock's end of the line that Sedgwick and Warren 
 were ordered to suspend their attacks and strengthen their 
 works, in order that troops might be spared from their corps to 
 assist Hancock. 
 
 Leaving Gibbon with two divisions to hold his left on the 
 Brock Road, Hancock sent Birney forward along the Plank 
 Road with his other two divisions and Getty's division of the 
 Sixth Corps, to attack the Confederate right. Wadsworth's 
 division of the Fifth Corps advanced on the right of this line. 
 Within four or five hundred yards Birney came upon Hill's 
 line in the thicket, but was unable to budge it, until he en- 
 veloped its right flank, and Wadsworth struck his left. See- 
 ing their line thus rolled up toward the center, the Confeder- 
 ates broke from both flanks and ran down the Plank Road past 
 General Lee.* Just at this time, however, Longstreet's corps 
 began to arrive, and a little later Anderson's division of Hill's 
 corps. These fresh troops were thrown into the fight and 
 checked Birney's advance, and drove his left back. The battle 
 raged and the hostile lines surged backward and forward in 
 this dense thicket over a space of two or three hundred yards 
 until nearly eleven o'clock, when the firing died away and 
 there was a lull. 
 
 (253) The divisions of Wilcox and Heth, after Longstreet's 
 arrival, were withdrawn and moved to the left, at the Chew- 
 ning farm, to connect with Ewell's corps at the Hagerson farm. 
 Stevenson's division of Burnside's corps and other troops had 
 been sent to reinforce Hancock; Gibbon's two divisions kept 
 their post across the Brock Road, though Hancock had sent 
 Gibbon an order to move them to the front. It had been ex- 
 pected or apprehended that Longstreet's corps, which it was 
 known had not yet arrived, would approach by way of the 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
480 American Campaigns. 
 
 Catharpin Road, and Gibbon had been on the lookout for this 
 corps all the morning. Between 7 and 8 a.m. a column was 
 seen on the Brock Road approaching from the direction of 
 the Catharpin Road. The column was thought to be Long- 
 street's; but it turned out to be some Federal convalescents 
 that had marched out by way of Chancellorsville and Todd's 
 Tavern to catch up with the army, and were now counter- 
 marching. Then later Sheridan's cavalry, which had marched 
 out from Chancellorsville, had a dismounted combat with Stu- 
 art's on the Brock Road out toward Todd's Tavern. Again 
 Gibbon thought Longstreet was approaching. His anxiety 
 concerning the advance of Longstreet by the Catharpin and 
 Brock Roads seems to be the only explanation of Gibbon's 
 failure to go forward to Hancock's relief. 
 
 Learning, about 10 a.m., that there was an unfinished rail- 
 way grading south of the Rank Road, from which an attack 
 could be made against Hancock's left flank, which was in the 
 air, Longstreet organized a force of four brigades under Ma- 
 hone to make the attack. Mahone marched his command by 
 the flank through the undergrowth to the unfinished railway,, 
 and formed line behind the grading, facing to the northeast; 
 at about eleven o'clock he advanced, striking the Federal line 
 in flank and rear. The movement was wholly successful, and 
 Hancock's line fell back in confusion to its trenches on the 
 Brock Road. The panic extended across the Plank Road, 
 where General Wadsworth was killed and his troops were 
 routed.* 
 
 Longstreet had ordered the advance of all his troops — 
 which included five fresh brigades — to follow up the advantage 
 gained by Mahone, and was riding at the head of Jenkins's 
 brigade at the side of its commander, down the Plank Road, 
 when some of Mahone's troops facing this road from the south- 
 side opened fire across the road. The head of the column was 
 just passing, and came under the fire. Jenkins was killed and 
 Longstreet severely wounded. Longstreet, nevertheless, in- 
 structed General Field, the next in command, to press the 
 attack in front by the Plank Road and in flank by the Brock 
 Road. But soon afterwards General Lee came up, and, al- 
 though Longstreet explained to him "the plans, orders, and 
 opportunity," he "did not care to handle broken lines, and 
 ordered a formation for parallel battle." This delayed the 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
The Battle of the Wilderness. 481 
 
 attack until 4.15 p.m.* A part of Hancock's front line of 
 breastworks was then carried, and the Confederate flag was 
 planted upon it. But soon the captors were driven out, and by 
 five o'clock the whole Confederate line at this point had been 
 repulsed and driven back with heavy loss. 
 
 Meantime Burnside's corps had taken but small part in the 
 battle. Willcox's and Potter's divisions, ordered to enter the 
 gap between Hill and Ewell, did not reach the ground before 
 2 p.m. ; by that time Heth and Wilcox had closed the gap, and 
 were able to repel the Federal assault.* 
 
 Early in the forenoon General John B. Gordon had learned 
 that the right of the Union line was exposed in the woods, and 
 could be surprised and taken in reverse. He was anxious to 
 attack it, but could not prevail on General Ewell to allow him 
 to do so. Ewell had let himself be persuaded by Early that 
 Grant had that flank supported by Burnside's corps ; which 
 was not so. Toward sunset General Lee was at Ewell's end of 
 the line, and, on being told of the situation, he ordered Gordon 
 to make the assault with his own and another brigade.* Gor- 
 don moved out of his trenches at sunset and enveloped the 
 Union flank, took it in reverse, and rolled it up, capturing 
 Generals Shaler and Seymour and several hundred prisoners. 
 (254) Darkness put an end to the battle and Gordon took up 
 a new position in advance of the old one. During the night 
 the lines of the Sixth Corps were drawn back, and a new posi- 
 tion was intrenched. 
 
 Neither side renewed the engagement on the 7th of May; 
 both armies remained behind their breastworks, and Grant 
 prepared to continue his movement southward, with the hope 
 of getting outside of the Wilderness, and bringing Lee to bat- 
 tle in the open, where the Union superiority in numbers wbuld 
 be of more account. 
 
 In the battle of the Wilderness the Union losses were 2,246 
 killed, 12,037 wounded, and 3,383 captured or missing, f The 
 Confederate returns were not complete; General Alexander 
 estimates the. Confederate killed and wounded as 7,750. Gen- 
 eral Grant says in his Memoirs, "More desperate fighting has 
 not been done on this continent than that of the 5th and 6th 
 of May." Livermore estimates the numbers engaged as : — 
 101,895 Federals, 61,025 Confederates. 
 
 *Alexander. 
 f5. & L. 
 
482 American Campaigns, 
 
 Comments. 
 
 In reviving the grade of lieutenant-general in our army in 
 the spring of 1864 for General Grant, and making him com- 
 manding-general of all the troops in the field, the Government 
 was not only showing recognition of qualities of leadership 
 that Grant had proved by an unbroken chain of successes, but 
 it was continuing and enlarging the policy of having a single 
 commander in a given theater — a policy that had succeeded 
 so well at Chattanooga. It was the first time in this war that 
 Napoleon's maxim, that "nothing is so important in war as 
 an undivided command . . . conducted by one chief" (Max- 
 im LXIV.), was to have full effect. And it was the first time 
 that any Union army east of the Appalachian Mountains was 
 not to be trammeled by the authorities at Washington. The 
 President did suggest a plan of campaign to Grant, but for- 
 tunately did not insist upon its adoption.* Grant was allowed 
 to command in fact. (246) Having "arranged for a simul- 
 taneous movement all along the line,"f the main objectives of 
 which were to be Lee's army in Virginia and Joseph E. Johns- 
 ton's in Georgia, Grant joined the main army in Virginia. 
 This army was composed of the Army of the Potomac under 
 Meade, and the Ninth Corps under Burnside. Grant found 
 the army in the neighborhood of Culpeper Court House, and 
 Lee's Confederate army confronting it on the south bank of 
 the Rapidan River.J We shall consider that the hostile forces 
 in the Shenandoah Valley, and those under Beauregard and 
 Butler, respectively, south of the James River, neutralized 
 each other for the time being; and we will confine our atten- 
 tion to the single campaign, or single phase of the campaign, 
 described in the lecture. 
 
 Grant's army was nearly twice as large as Lee's, being more 
 than 100,000 strong, while Lee had only 61,000; and the 
 Union army was far better equipped in every way than its 
 adversary. This disparity necessarily obliged Lee to hold his 
 army on the defensive. He not only had to cover Richmond, 
 but he also had to protect the Virginia Central Railway, the 
 Orange and Alexandria Railway south of the Rapidan River, 
 
 *Grant's Memoirs. 
 
 fGrant. 
 
 JThe Ninth Corps was at this time at Annapolis awaiting orders, 
 but it was soon afterwards ordered to take station within supporting 
 distance of the Army of the Potomac, along the Orange and Alex- 
 andria Railway. 
 
The Battle of the Wilderness. 483 
 
 and the Richmond and Danville Railway upon which Rich- 
 mond and the Confederate army were dependent for all kinds 
 of supplies. 
 
 Grant's main objective was to be Lee's army and not Rich- 
 mond. He was at first undecided whether to cross the river 
 above or below Lee's army. The only apparent advantage he 
 could have had in crossing above, that is, west of the railway, 
 was that the streams were smaller and probably more easily 
 passed in that quarter, and the country was more open and 
 better suited to the maneuvering of large forces. In such a 
 movement Grant's army would have operated on a front paral- 
 lel to its line of communications, the Orange and Alexandria 
 Railway ; while Lee would have operated on a front perpendic- 
 ular to his communications with Richmond. 
 
 Barnett's Ford was defended by Confederate intrenchments, 
 which would have forced Grant to cross the Rapidan higher 
 up ; yet if he had undertaken to pass entirely beyond Gordons- 
 ville, to turn the Confederate left, he would completely have 
 exposed his own flank and rear. On the other hand, by select- 
 ing Lee's right flank to turn, Grant was able to keep his own 
 communications, the wagon-roads back to Brandy Station and 
 the railway thence to Washington, covered ; as soon as he 
 should put his army across the Rapidan he could change his 
 base to Fredericksburg and Aquia Creek. That is exactly 
 what he did. The movement, also, if it succeeded in placing 
 Grant's army upon the south bank of the Rapidan, before it 
 should be discovered by Lee, would compel Lee to quit his 
 position and fight faced toward Richmond. 
 
 While Grant took all means to conceal his movement on the 
 4th of May, he, nevertheless, hardly hoped that he should be 
 allowed to cross the Rapidan without opposition. "This," he 
 says in his report, "I regarded as a great success, and it 
 removed from my mind the most serious apprehension I had 
 entertained, — that of crossing the river in the face of an active, 
 large, well-appointed, and ably-commanded army," "It was 
 well known," says General Humphreys, chief of staff of the 
 Army of the Potomac, "that daylight would divulge our move- 
 ment to Lee's signal officers . . . and it was believed that 
 he would at once move by the Orange and Fredericksburg 
 Pike and Plank Roads to oppose us." 
 
 Yet it does not appear that Grant, on the morning of May 
 5, expected to encounter Lee's main army on these two roads 
 in the Wilderness. Indeed he hoped to have his army beyond 
 
484 American Campaigns. 
 
 the Wilderness, in open country, before he should have to 
 engage battle with the enemy. Neither army appears to have 
 done very effective patrolling during the evening of the 4th 
 or the early morning of the 5th of May. It is almost incon- 
 ceivable that two large armies should bivouac within four 
 or five miles of each other without either's suspecting the 
 nearness of the other; yet such appears to have been the case. 
 And when Confederate troops were discovered at about 7 
 a.m. on the Turnpike, Meade supposed they were only a 
 division of the Confederates, left there to deceive and delay 
 the Union army, and that the main Confederate army was 
 falling back to the North Anna. 
 
 No poorer cavalry work was done in the Civil War than 
 that done by the cavalry of Sheridan and Stuart on the after- 
 noon and evening of May 4 and the early morning of May 5, 
 1864. It was no better than the work of the Prussian and 
 Austrian squadrons on the day before Koniggratz. That the 
 armies were in the Wilderness is no excuse. For Stuart the 
 excuse may be made that his troops were away from the main 
 army by Lee's authority — over near Fredericksburg, where 
 he had to take his lean horses in order to forage them. He- 
 did not rejoin the main army until May 5. For Sheridan and 
 at least two of his division commanders, Torbert and Wilson, 
 it is enough to say that they had not learned the lesson. The 
 record shows that General Sheridan's only cavalry service in 
 the Civil War had been as colonel of a Michigan cavalry regi- 
 ment for one month and seven days,* and that neither of the 
 other two had ever commanded as much as a squad of cavalry 
 until they were given their high commands in the Army of the 
 Potomac. General Torbert's entire service had been with 
 infantry, and General Wilson's as an engineer officer until 
 he was placed in charge of the Cavalry Bureau at Washington 
 on the 17th of February, 1864. He joined his division of 
 cavalry on the 4th of May. Sheridan unquestionably learned 
 before the end of the war how to use his cavalry ; but he did 
 not use it right on these two days, else Grant would have been 
 informed that Lee's army was bivouacked within five miles 
 of him. 
 
 *Like most active young infantry officers, General Sheridan had 
 done much service with small detachments of cavalry, when he was an 
 infantry lieutenant in the Indian country in the far West; but such 
 service alone does not qualify one to take command of a great body- 
 of cavalry in war. 
 
The Battle of the Wilderness. 485 
 
 It was a bold act for Lee to march his army to attack the 
 Union army of twice its strength ; a more timid commander 
 would have fallen back promptly to the south bank of the 
 North Anna, and made that stream a new line of defense; or, 
 if he had wished to take advantage of the dense forest to make 
 a stand within it, he would have made all haste to reach the 
 Catharpin Road, and taken up a position there, barring Grant's 
 way to Richmond. A more timid commander, also, would 
 have guarded the crossings of the Rapidan more closely, and 
 tried to prevent its passage. Lee made no opposition to 
 Grant's passage, and was pleased to have the Union army enter 
 the Wilderness, and put the Rapidan at its back. General Grant 
 violated the maxim of war "never to do what the enemy wishes 
 you to do." Lee and his army were better acquainted with the 
 Wilderness and its roads and trails than they had been a year 
 before, and Lee believed he had the chance for another such 
 victory as Chancellorsville. He did have the chance, but the 
 Union army was not commanded by Hooker, and Lee no 
 longer had Jackson. 
 
 Longstreet was behindhand again, but through no fault of 
 his. Longstreet's corps was cantoned too far away; it ought 
 to have been near Orange Court House instead of at Gordons- 
 ville. Furthermore, Lee did not dispatch the order for an 
 advance to his corps-commanders until near noon on the 4th 
 of May. At least as early as the 2nd of May Lee was con- 
 vinced that Grant was going to turn his right flank; he ought 
 then, by all means, to have drawn Longstreet's corps toward 
 his other two — Longstreet had forty-two miles to march after 
 he received Lee's order on the 4th of May, while Hill had 
 twenty-eight, and Ewell only eighteen.* If Longstreet's corps 
 had been on the Plank Road close behind Hill's on the 5th, 
 the combined forces might have destroyed Getty's division at 
 the Brock Road, before the return of Hancock's corps from 
 Todd's Tavern ; then they might have cut off and overwhelmed 
 Hancock's corps. 
 
 Tactics. 
 
 Most of the bad tactics of the battle of the Wilderness can 
 be charged to the dense undergrowth and lack of roads. Or- 
 ganizations could not be kept intact; commanders could not 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
486 American Campaigns. 
 
 see or keep in touch with their lines; positions could not be 
 pointed out, described, or identified; columns could not be 
 directed; distances could not be estimated, nor could the time 
 be calculated that troops would take to go from one point to 
 another ; at fifty paces friends could not be distinguished from 
 foes, and neither could be seen a hundred yards away. 
 
 Although Ewell and Hill must have expected to encounter 
 the Union army in the Wilderness, they seem, nevertheless, 
 not to have been aware of its presence until they came upon it 
 in the thickets; and the Federal commanders were certainly 
 surprised to find Lee's main army upon the flank of their 
 column. To this extent the battle was a rencounter. There 
 was no plan of battle on either side to start with, and none 
 appears to have been evolved as the battle progressed. No 
 concerted effort was made on either side, at any stage of the 
 battle, to envelop the flank of the other or to pierce its center. 
 
 First one part of a line and then another would attack and 
 be driven back to its breastwork. On the first day there were 
 two distinct battles, one on the Plank Road and the other 
 on the Turnpike, with a wide stretch of brush between them 
 without a soldier in it. Meade did finally, on the second day, 
 suspend the Union attacks on the Turnpike and hold his troops 
 there on the defensive, in order to send reinforcements to 
 Hancock on the Plank Road; beyond this there was no co- 
 operation nor mutual support between the two wings of the 
 Union line. There was none whatever between the two wings 
 of the Confederate line— no such concerted action as at Chan- 
 cellorsville. On the contrary we find Mahone at noon rolling 
 up the left of the Union line, and Gordon, at sunset, rolling 
 up its right, or the novel tactical project of an army of 60,000 
 trying to envelop both flanks of an army of more than 100,000. 
 Yet either of these Confederate flank-attacks ought to have 
 given decisive results ; the first one probably would have done 
 so but for the untimely wounding of Longstreet, and the sec- 
 ond might have done so if it had been made earlier in the day ; 
 but it was stopped at the height of victory by the darkness of 
 night. 
 
 If the Union army had held the breastworks on each of its 
 flanks with a single corps, and concentrated its bulk at the 
 center, on the forenoon of the 6th of May, it might have 
 pierced the center of the Confederate line and destroyed one 
 or both of its wings. The flanks were more than five miles 
 apart, while there was a stretch of a mile or more at the mid- 
 
The Battle of the Wilderness. 487 
 
 die without a soldier in it. Burnside was ordered to put ,two 
 of his divisions into position to penetrate this gap at daybreak ; 
 but it was 2 p.m. before the divisions reached the ground, and 
 in the meanwhile the gap had been closed by the Confederate 
 divisions of Heth and Wilcox. Apparently Burnside's troops 
 took twelve to eighteen hours in going three miles through the 
 underbrush, and had small part in the battle. 
 
 There was, of course, little chance for the action of cav- 
 alry or artillery on such a battle-field; yet, by hovering out 
 on the flank toward Todd's Tavern, and engaging Sheridan in 
 combat, Stuart's cavalry had the effect of holding Gibbon with 
 two divisions across the Brock Road at a time when Hancock 
 sorely needed his help at the front. 
 
 The battle was indecisive ; the tactical advantage rested with 
 the Confederates, but neither army wanted to renew the en- 
 gagement on the 7th of May. Strategically Grant had failed 
 to make Lee come out into the open; but Lee had failed 
 to stop Grant's army — it was the first time, so far, that the 
 Union army had fought a great battle on the soil of Virginia 
 and advanced immediately afterwards. It was the first step 
 gained in General Grant's policy of "continuous hammering" ; 
 the Confederacy could not stand many more such battles, call 
 it victory or defeat. 
 
LECTURE XXIII. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA 
 COURT HOUSE. 
 
 (255) Having resolved to continue his advance southward 
 from the Wilderness battle-field, and, if possible, to cut Lee off 
 from Richmond, Grant set his army in motion on the evening 
 of May 7, 1864. 
 
 As the movement was to be made mainly with a view to get- 
 ting outside of the Wilderness and inducing Lee to go out 
 and give battle in the open, the first objective points assigned 
 to the various army-corps, and the routes, were merely pre- 
 liminary ; subsequent movements would depend upon the move- 
 ments of Lee's army. Hancock's corps [Second], which occu- 
 pied the left of the line, was to remain in position until the 
 trains and the rest of the army marched off the battle-field by 
 the rear of his line. The trains were started in the afternoon, 
 and at half-past eight the troops took up the march. Passing 
 behind Hancock's line, Warren's corps [Fifth] moved by the 
 Brock Road toward Spottsylvania Court House. Sedgwick's 
 [Sixth] marched by way of Chancellorsville, Aldrich's, and 
 Piney Branch Church, toward the same point. Burnside's 
 corps [Ninth] followed Sedgwick's as far as Aldrich's. Han- 
 cock was ordered to follow close behind Warren to Todd's 
 Tavern. The cavalry covered the movement in flank and rear, 
 and pushed out ahead of the infantry columns. 
 
 Todd's Tavern was about six miles from Wilderness Tav- 
 ern by the Brock Road, and Spottsylvania Court House was 
 about twelve miles. By way of Chancellorsville Spottsylvania 
 was about fourteen miles from Wilderness Tavern. In this 
 preliminary movement the corps on different roads would be 
 within short distances of one another; but the woods were so 
 close and the cross-trails so little known that it would be diffi- 
 cult to pass troops from one road to another. 
 
 Lee was informed by Stuart on the afternoon of the 7th 
 concerning the movement of the Federal wagon-trains, and he 
 made no doubt that Grant's objective was Spottsylvania Court 
 House. He, therefore, ordered Anderson, now commanding 
 Longstreet's corps, to make a night march for the same point, 
 by way of by-roads and Shady Grove Church Road. Stu- 
 
The Battle of Spottsylvania Court House. 489 
 
 art's cavalry was to retard the march of the Federal columns 
 as much as possible, in order to enable Anderson to reach 
 Spottsylvania ahead of them and take up a position. 
 
 At Spottsylvania Court House several roads came together 
 from the direction of Wilderness Tavern and Chancellorsville, 
 as well as from Fredericksburg, now the Union base. Other 
 roads led from Spottsylvania toward the east and south. The 
 junction of all these roads gave the place a temporary stra- 
 tegic importance, and made it the field of a battle. 
 
 (256) So well did Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division perform 
 its task along the Brock Road by "felling trees across it" and 
 disputing "every foot of ground" that Merritt, whose cavalry 
 "brigade was marching ahead of Warren's corps, "found it 
 exceedingly difficult to make any progress."* It was the 
 dark of the moon which increased the difficulty and slowness 
 of the advance. So it was half-after eight in the morning 
 "before the head of Warren's column emerged from the woods 
 into open ground at Alsop's, about two miles and a half from 
 Ihe Court House. Merritt's cavalry had withdrawn from the 
 front, and Robinson's infantry division was in the lead. 
 
 This division marched on across the clearing in brigade col- 
 umns of regiments covered by a line of skirmishers. When 
 the skirmishers arrived within two or three hundred yards of 
 the next wood, a dense pine thicket, — at the point where the 
 prongs of the road from the New Court House and the Old 
 'Court House came together, — "suddenly a severe musketry 
 and artillery fire was opened upon their front and right from" 
 a breastwork of rails at the edge of the thicket. "This stag- 
 gered them, and in a short time they fell back to the shelter 
 •of the woods in their rear."* It was Kershaw's division of 
 Anderson's [Longstreet's] corps that had done the firing from 
 the pines. Robinson was badly wounded at the first volley. 
 ■Griffin's division had come up on Robinson's right, but it was 
 also forced back, until the other two divisions of the Fifth 
 Corps [Crawford and Wadsworth] got to the front and joined 
 in the engagement. (257) The corps then pushed the Con- 
 federates back to their line of breastworks, and intrenched its 
 own position, "from two to four hundred yards" in front of 
 the Confederate line. 
 
 Meanwhile Field's division of Anderson's [Longstreet's] 
 ■corps had come up and joined the line with Kershaw's. About 
 
 ♦Humphreys. 
 
490 American Campaigns. 
 
 noon Sedgwick's corps [Sixth] arrived, and at one o'clock it 
 and Warren's corps [Fifth] were ordered to attack the Con- 
 federate position. The ground was unknown and the troops 
 were tired; so the arrangements for the attack were not made 
 promptly. It was late in the afternoon before the assault was 
 made — too late to have been followed up, if it had succeeded. 
 But it did not succeed, for Ewell's corps reached Spottsylvania 
 at five o'clock — in time to form on Anderson's right and save 
 his flank from being enveloped. Both sides strengthened and 
 extended their intrenchments during the night. (256) Early 
 in the morning Wilson's cavalry division from the direc- 
 tion of Fredericksburg had pushed Rosser's Confederate cav- 
 alry brigade before it and got possession of Spottsylvania 
 Court House. But Fitzhugh Lee, having been relieved by 
 Kershaw's infantry in front of Warren's corps, had hastened 
 to Rosser's assistance. Seeing Lee's and Rosser's combined 
 forces about to move against him, Wilson, after having held 
 the town two hours, withdrew his division, leaving the town 
 in possession of the Confederates.* 
 
 Let us now see where the other troops of the two armies 
 were — Hill's corps of the Confederate army; Hancock's and 
 Burnside's of the Union army. Hancock, who was to follow 
 close behind Warren's corps as far as Todd's Tavern, found 
 his road blocked by Warren's troops until daylight. He then 
 marched to Todd's Tavern and there intrenched. He sent 
 Miles with his own brigade and a detachment of cavalry and 
 artillery to reconnoiter toward Corbin's Bridge on the Cathar- 
 pin Road. Miles had a skirmish with Wade Hampton's Con- 
 federate cavalry and part of Hill's corps. Burnside's corps 
 [Ninth] bivouacked at Aldrich's in charge of the trains. Ewell 
 had followed on the road taken by Anderson, and Early, who 
 now commanded Hill's corps, Hill being ill, was ordered to 
 march by Todd's Tavern and the Brock Road "as soon as 
 his front was clear of the enemy." He was moving on the 
 Catharpin Road toward Todd's Tavern when he encountered 
 Miles's detachment. Seeing that Todd's Tavern was occupied 
 by Union troops, and that night was falling, Early bivouacked 
 on the Catharpin Road. He marched to Spottsylvania the next 
 morning, May 9, by the Shady Grove Church Road. 
 
 (258) It was on the 8th of May that Grant gave Sheridan 
 an order "to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass 
 
 *Alexander. 
 
The Battle of Spottsylvania Court House. 491 
 
 round the left of Lee's army and attack his cavalry; to cut" 
 the Virginia Central and the Richmond and Fredericksburg 
 Railways, "and, when compelled to do so for want of forage 
 and rations, to move on to the James River and draw these 
 from Butler's supplies."* The main object of this raid was 
 stated by Sheridan at the time; he was impatient at being 
 tied fast to the army, guarding the wagon-train and hovering 
 along the flanks and rear, while Stuart's cavalry was keeping 
 Lee informed of every movement the Union army made, and 
 blocking the march of its columns. "If I am permitted," said 
 he, "to cut loose from this army, I'll draw Stuart after me, and 
 whip him, too."f This was the main object of the raid. 
 Sheridan started at daylight on the 9th of May, and it was 
 sixteen days before he rejoined the army. 
 
 Stuart followed him, as he had predicted, and, before night, 
 came upon his rear, but did not stop him. Then, seeing that 
 Sheridan was making for Richmond, Stuart quitted the pur- 
 suit and, by a hard roundabout march, placed his command 
 across Sheridan's path at Yellow Tavern, only six miles from 
 Richmond. Here a severe combat took place in which Stuart 
 was mortally wounded and his command beaten and driven 
 back. Sheridan passed through the outer defenses of Rich- 
 mond, but he had been delayed long enough by Stuart to 
 enable the small force left for the defense of Richmond to 
 take its place in the inner works ; there he was checked. 
 Sheridan then turned toward the James. He tried to cross 
 to the north side of the Chickahominy at Mechanicsville, 
 but was stopped by Confederate batteries and cavalry. His 
 position was now perilous, with the troops at Richmond on 
 one flank and the Chickahominy with its bridges destroyed, 
 held by the enemy, on the other. He built a bridge under 
 fire and forced a crossing ; on the 14th May he was at Haxall's 
 Landing. Now he did not know where either Lee's army or the 
 Union army was. On the 17th he started back to look for the 
 latter. He marched by way of White House, where he had 
 to build a bridge, and on the 24th rejoined the army near 
 Chesterfield. He "had passed entirely around Lee's army; 
 encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated 
 them in all; recaptured four hundred Union prisoners, and 
 killed and captured many of the enemy; destroyed and used 
 many supplies and munitions of war; destroyed miles of rail- 
 
 *Grant. 
 
 fRodenbough in B. & L. 
 
492 American Campaigns. 
 
 road and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance by the cav- 
 alry of the enemy for more than two weeks."* 
 
 (259) By noon on the 9th of May Burnside's corps 
 [Ninth] had come up from Aldrich's, and was on the Freder- 
 icksburg Road with the leading division [Willcox] south of 
 the Ny River. Ferrero's division [negroes] was left with the 
 train. 
 
 No attack was made by either side on the 9th. "The Fifth 
 and Sixth Corps [Warren and Sedgwick] readjusted their 
 lines, made more intrenchments, strengthened those already 
 made, and put artillery into position. The skirmishers and 
 sharpshooters were very active on both sides, and in the morn- 
 ing General Sedgwick was killed close to the intrenchments 
 at the right of his corps ... at the point where the forks 
 of the road in Alsop's field unite. "f General Wright then took 
 command of the Sixth Corps. The Federal skirmishers of 
 the Fifth and Sixth Corps were pushed forward again on 
 the morning of the 10th, with a view to developing the posi- 
 tion of the Confederate line. 
 
 The Confederates occupied a nearly continuous line of 
 intrenchments running in a broken and irregular trace from 
 the Po, at a point 600 yards above the crossing of the Shady 
 Grove Church Road, to a point a half-mile south of the Fred- 
 ericksburg Road. Without considering the angles and small 
 curves the line was more than four miles long. It inclosed 
 Spottsylvania Court House on the northwest, north, and east, 
 and covered the roads southward to Richmond. The center 
 of the line formed a sort of loop a half-mile across from east 
 to west, having a sharp apex upon "a high open point" a quar- 
 ter of a mile north, slightly east, of the McCool house. The 
 left of the line, about a third of a mile, rested on comparatively 
 high open ground, between two small branches of the Po. In 
 front of this part, at no point more than two hundred yards 
 distant, was a narrow belt of dense cedars. 
 
 The intrenchments crossed the Brock Road at the fork 
 whose branches led to Spottsylvania and the Old Court House. 
 From this fork the earthworks ran through woods in a north- 
 easterly direction for a quarter of a mile to Harrison's open 
 ground ; thence north and northeast for half a mile, partly in 
 -open and partly in wooded ground ; thence easterly on the outer 
 edge of a wood for nearly four hundred yards to the high, 
 
 *Grant. 
 •(•Humphreys. 
 
The Battle of Spottsylvania Court House. 49$ 
 
 cleared point mentioned before; there the line turned south- 
 east, and ran "six or seven hundred yards," with the woods 
 about the McCool house behind it, and "fairly open ground in 
 front"; then it turned southward and continued a half-mile 
 with broken and wooded ground in front of it, and a mile in 
 open ground. 
 
 Anderson's [Longstreet's] corps, with Field's division on 
 the left and Kershaw's on the right, held the trenches from- 
 the Po to the reentrant angle about west of the Harrison 
 house. Ewell's corps held the intrenchment from Anderson's- 
 right, around the loop or "salient," to a point nearly a mile 
 southeast of the McCool house. Hill's corps, except Mahone's 
 [Anderson's] division, occupied the trenches to the right of 
 Ewell's. Mahone's division formed to the left of Field, over- 
 looking the Po.* Gordon's [Early's] division of Ewell's corps, 
 in reserve, dug a trench nearly across the loop from east to 
 west a quarter of a mile south of the McCool house. Artil- 
 lery was placed at the most suitable points along the line of 
 the intrenchments. "Where there was wood in front of them 
 it was slashed, and where the ground was open" abatis was 
 made. 
 
 On the Union side, on the evening of the 9th of May, Han- 
 cock's corps [Second], which had come up from Todd's Tav- 
 ern, occupied the right of the line in an intrenchment over- 
 looking the Po; Warren's corps [Fifth] was next, intrenched 
 in front of Anderson. The left of Warren's trench was at 
 the fork of the road in Alsop's field. Wright's corps [ Sixth] , 
 with its right at this fork, was intrenched along a brook in a 
 northerly direction. Burnside's [Ninth] was still near the Ny 
 River on the Fredericksburg Road. On coming up on the 9th, 
 Burnside had encountered a small force of Confederate cav- 
 alry dismounted, which he mistook for infantry ; this led Gen- 
 eral Grant to believe that Lee's whole army was about to move 
 on the Union base at Fredericksburg, and he ordered Hancock 
 to cross the Po and reconnoiter Lee's left by recrossing the 
 Po at the bridge on the Shady Grove Church Road, and turn- 
 ing the Confederate line. 
 
 (260) By 9 p.m. Hancock had crossed three of his divi- 
 sions to the right bank of the Po. His other division [Mott], 
 which had come up late from Todd's Tavern, had been sent 
 to the left of Wright's corps [Sixth]. Hancock had three 
 
 *Alexander. 
 
494 American Campaigns. 
 
 bridges built across the Po during the night, to secure his 
 retreat, and "pushed forward toward the Blockhouse* bridge; 
 but ... it was impracticable to keep the skirmish line mov- 
 ing through the dense woods in the darkness,"f and Hancock 
 found himself compelled to wait for daylight before trying to 
 cross the bridge. The river was unfordable. On examining 
 the bridge by daylight on the 10th Hancock found it strongly 
 defended by Confederate infantry and artillery behind earth- 
 works. These troops were part of Mahone's division. Han- 
 cock concluded not to attempt to carry the bridge, but had 
 Brooke's brigade cross a mile lower down to reconnoiter the 
 position of the Confederate left. About ten o'clock, however, 
 Hancock received an order to leave one division to threaten 
 the enemy's left, and to take his other two divisions to War- 
 ren's position. There he was to command these two divisions 
 and the corps of Warren and Wright in a general attack that 
 was to be made all along the line at five o'clock. 
 
 He left Barlow's division on the south side of the Po. The 
 division was exposed to the artillery fire from the Confederate 
 left, and in the afternoon was attacked by Heth's division of 
 Hill's Corps, which Lee had dispatched to oppose Hancock's 
 movement. (261) After desperate fighting in which the 
 losses were heavy on each side, Barlow withdrew his division 
 to the north side of the river. The Confederates then pro- 
 longed their intrenchments a mile upon the high ground west 
 of the bridge, thus covering the approach by the Shady Grove 
 Church Road. 
 
 Preliminary to the general attack, which was to take place 
 at 5 p.m., Warren and Wright had been skirmishing more or 
 less in their front during the day, with the view of determin- 
 ing the enemy's position in the dense woods. Before Hancock 
 reached Warren's position Warren had reported "the oppor- 
 tunity for immediate attack to be so favorable that he was 
 ordered to attack at once"f without waiting for Hancock and 
 the appointed hour. Wright with the Sixth Corps, and Mott's 
 division of Hancock's corps, were ordered to join in the 
 assault. Gibbon's division of Hancock's corps, also, arrived in 
 time to take part in this assault with Warren's line. The ad- 
 vance to the attack was made about four o'clock. In front of 
 
 *This was a log house near the bridge of Shady Grove Road, called 
 the Blockhouse on account of its peculiar form. Alexander. 
 fHumphreys. 
 
The Battle of Spottsylvania Court House. 495 
 
 the right of Warren's line was the narrow dense thicket of 
 dead cedars already mentioned — the most difficult kind of 
 thicket to go through. On emerging from the cedars into 
 the open space immediately in front of the Confederate 
 trenches, Warren's ranks, under heavy cannon and musketry 
 fire, were badly disordered. Yet the troops "went forward, 
 some to the abatis, some to the crest of the parapet, but were 
 all driven back with heavy loss."* 
 
 Farther to the left Upton with his own brigade and four 
 other regiments of the Sixth Corps was to assault what ap- 
 peared to be the weakest part of the Confederate line — the 
 face of the salient west of the McCooJ house. This face was 
 exposed to enfilade fire from Union batteries, and a large force 
 could approach it within 200 yards without being seen. The 
 trench here, however, was in open ground, with abatis in front 
 of it, and traverses at intervals to protect it from enfilade fire; 
 and a hundred yards back of it was a second trench, partly 
 dug, occupied by a line of troops. Two hundred yards in 
 front of it was the edge of a pine wood. Upton formed his 
 assaulting column in four lines inside this wood, while bat- 
 teries were shelling the point of attack. Mott's division [Sec- 
 ond Corps] was to cooperate from the direction of the Brown 
 house. Upton's column came out of the pines and charged 
 with a hurrah at 6.10 p.m. "Under a terrible front and flank 
 fire, it gained the parapet, had a hand-to-hand, desperate 
 struggle, which lasted but a few seconds, and . . . poured 
 over the works, capturing a large number of prisoners."* 
 
 Gordon's Confederate division, which had been in reserve, 
 hurried to the breach in the line, but was unable to stop Up- 
 ton's victorious troops; they spread to right and left, and car- 
 ried the second Confederate line in rear. But Mott's division 
 had failed to come to Upton's support. It had formed in the 
 open, and was driven back by heavy artillery fire.f Hancock 
 was now on the ground with Birney's division. To relieve 
 Upton, Grant ordered the assault to be renewed by Hancock's 
 troops and those of Warren and Wright. This assault failed, 
 and Upton withdrew his men from the Confederate lines 
 under cover of darkness. On the extreme left Burnside, "with 
 but little fighting and almost without loss," had got up to 
 within a few hundred yards of Spottsylvania Court House, 
 
 ♦Humphreys. 
 fAlexander. 
 
496 American Campaigns. 
 
 and there intrenched.* This left a wide gap between his corps, 
 and the right wing of the Union army, and before morning 
 of the 11th he was ordered to return to the north bank of the 
 Ny and connect with Mott's division at the Brown farm. 
 
 "On the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none 
 except by Mott, who made a reconnaissance to ascertain if 
 there was a weak point in the enemy's line."* This recon- 
 naissance discovered the salient at the center of the Confed- 
 erate line. Grant resolved to assault this salient, and ordered 
 Hancock to move three of the divisions of his corps during the 
 night to connect with the right of Burnside's corps, which 
 had returned to its trenches in front of the Court House. 
 These two corps were ordered to make "a vigorous attack 
 against the enemy at four o'clock a.m." on the 12th. Warren 
 and Wright were ordered to "hold their corps as close to 
 the enemy as possible." 
 
 On the Confederate side Heth had moved the bulk of his 
 division back from the Shady Grove Church Road to its posi- 
 tion in front of the Court House. (262) Hancock marched' 
 his divisions to the Brown house, and formed them for attack 
 in the open space, 400 yards wide, to the south of it. He 
 had 1200 yards of ground to traverse before reaching the 
 Confederate breastworks. Barlow's division was to lead the 
 assault with the brigades of Miles and Brooke abreast in the 
 first line. The four brigades of this division formed in mass, 
 with a depth of ten double ranks — twenty lines of muskets. 
 On account of a heavy fog, Hancock postponed the attack until 
 4.35 a.m. The Confederate artillery had been withdrawn from' 
 this part of the line during the night, and was not in place to 
 fire into Hancock's dense column. The charge was received 
 with a sharp musketry fire only, and was not stopped. The 
 Federals carried the trenches in a rush, capturing the Con- 
 federate division-commander [Johnson], one brigade-com- 
 mander [Steuart], 4,000 prisoners, thirty colors, and twenty 
 guns. The guns were caught in column hastening back to 
 their position. f The victors pushed on over the intrench- 
 ments, through the woods, until t'hey were checked by a line 
 within the intrenchments, south of the McCool house. Rein- 
 forcements had been hurried to this quarter from the left of 
 the Confederate position, and Hancock's men were pushed 
 
 ♦Grant. 
 fAlexander. 
 
The Battle of Spottsylvania Court House. 497 
 
 back to the outside of the parapets; but they could be driven 
 no farther. 
 
 Writing of this charge, General Alexander says : "Had they 
 [the Confederate guns] been in their places, it is quite certain 
 that the charge would not have been successful. Nowhere else 
 in the whole history of the war was such a target, so large, 
 so dense, so vulnerable, ever presented to so large a force of 
 artillery. Ranks had already been lost in the crowd and 
 officers could neither show example nor exercise authority. A 
 few discharges would have made of it a mob which could not 
 have been rallied." 
 
 At 6 a.m. Meade received report of Hancock's success, but 
 he was informed that the Confederates were trying to take the 
 offensive in that quarter. He, therefore, ordered Wright to 
 move his corps at once to Hancock's assistance and to attack on 
 Hancock's right. Wright directed his assault against the 
 "west angle." The struggle lasted all day long, and till after 
 midnight, and was one of the fiercest and bloodiest of the 
 whole war. Its memory has been perpetuated in the name of 
 Bloody Angle, which the narrow space has borne since that 
 day. Five other Federal brigades came to this point, making 
 twenty-four brigades that engaged in assaulting a few 
 hundred yards of the intrenchments. Union soldiers stood 
 from twenty to forty deep outside the parapet; the bodies of 
 the slain were shot to pieces and mangled beyond recognition ; 
 the whole forest thereabouts was killed by the fire, and one 
 tree* twenty-two inches in diameter was literally cut down by 
 bullets.f 
 
 On the extreme right of the Union line Warren had opened 
 with all his artillery and pushed his skirmishers forward 
 against Anderson's intrenchment early in the morning. "At 
 9.15 a.m. he was ordered to attack at once at all hazards, 
 with his whole force if necessary." He did so and was re- 
 pulsed. He was then ordered to move his whole corps to 
 Wright's assistance at the salient, with the hope of carrying 
 the intrenchment at that point. This order was revoked before 
 the corps reached its position and "the project of further 
 assault was given up."J In his Memoirs General Grant 
 charges Warren with being slow in his movement. 
 
 *The stump of this tree is still preserved in the National Museum at 
 Washington. 
 fAlexander. 
 ^Humphreys. 
 
498 American Campaigns. 
 
 On the Union left Burnside "accomplished but little of a 
 positive nature," says General Grant, "but negatively a great 
 deal. He kept Lee from reinforcing his center from that 
 •quarter." Burnside moved to the attack at 4 a.m., as directed, 
 and struck the part of the Confederate line held by Hill's 
 corps and the right of Ewell's; he connected on the right with 
 Hancock's corps and was more or less engaged till late in 
 the day; but the fighting in this quarter was noway as severe 
 as it was at the salient where Hancock and Wright were 
 engaged. Burnside intrenched his position. The Union losses 
 in killed and wounded on this 12th of May were about 6,000 ; 
 the Confederate losses between 4,000 and 5,000.* Hancock's 
 corps on the Union side lost the greatest number, some 2,500. 
 
 (263) During the night Lee withdrew his troops from the 
 loop around the McCool house to ground south of the Harris 
 house, where they intrenched a new and shorter line. This 
 was the line the Confederates should have intrenched at the 
 start. The salient — the entire loop about the McCool house — 
 was another example, like Sickle's salient at the Peach Or- 
 chard, at Gettysburg, of a weak position taken solely for the 
 sake of high ground. In the hasty extension of the Confed- 
 erate line on the afternoon of May 8, "Ewell, to keep on high 
 ground, had changed direction and gone a mile north. "f This 
 caused the salient, because he had to bend his line southward 
 again to cover Spottsylvania Court House, and to avoid being 
 taken in reverse by Burnside's column. Ewell ought to have 
 disregarded the high ground and continued the intrenchment 
 eastward along the trace adopted on the night of the 12th. 
 It must not be forgotten that the direction of a line is often 
 of more consequence than its elevation. 
 
 There was no battle on the 13th. Grant ordered another 
 general assault to be made at 4 a.m. the 14th. Warren was 
 directed to march his corps during the night of the 13th by 
 the rear of the Second and Ninth, and connect it with Burn- 
 side's left, and to attack by the Fredericksburg Road. The 
 Sixth Corps was to follow Warren's and to attack by the next 
 road south of the Fredericksburg Road. It rained during the 
 night, and the way was so dark and muddy that the head of 
 Warren's corps did not reach its position before 6 a.m. ; then 
 the whole day was spent in putting the tired, straggling men 
 into position, and the assault had to be given up. If the assault 
 
 ♦Humphreys. 
 fAlexander. 
 
The Battle of Spottsylvania Court House. 499 
 
 could have been made as planned it would have proved serious 
 for the Confederates, because they did not suspect the move- 
 ment, and the intrenchments on their right flank did not then 
 extend much beyond the Court House.* 
 
 The Sixth Corps massed out of sight near the Anderson 
 Mill on the north side of the Ny. Upton's brigade crossed the 
 stream and occupied a commanding position covering the 
 crossings; but it was attacked by Chambliss's cavalry brigade 
 and Mahone's infantry, and driven away. (264) The posi- 
 tion was later retaken by the Federals, and the Sixth Corps 
 crossed to the right bank of the Ny and intrenched. Early 
 on the morning of the 15th Hancock's corps, except Birney's 
 division, was moved round to the Fredericksburg Road, near 
 the Ny. Birney's division was left to cover Burnside's right. 
 
 The withdrawal of the Union right was not discovered by 
 the Confederates until the afternoon of the 14th. Thereupon 
 Anderson moved his line forward and occupied the intrench- 
 ments abandoned by Warren's corps. On the night of the 
 14th Anderson's corps was transferred over to the right of 
 Hill's; it prolonged the Confederate intrenchments to the Po, 
 covering the Richmond Road and the bridge over the Po. 
 
 There was little fighting on the 15th, 16th, or 17th. During 
 those days the Fifth and Sixth Corps advanced their intrench- 
 ments. The left of the Union works did not follow those of 
 the Confederates to the Po, but was shorter and bent back 
 eastward. Grant's purpose was to hold this part of his line 
 with a reduced force, while he assembled a strong column to 
 make another effort against Lee's new line south of the Bloody 
 Angle. He hoped to find that Lee had weakened this part of 
 his line by withdrawing troops from it to prolong his line to 
 the right.* Accordingly Hancock and Wright marched their 
 ■corps during the night of the 17th to the intrenchments they 
 had captured on the 12th. From this position they assaulted 
 the Confederates at daybreak on the 18th in their new breast- 
 works south of the Harrison house. The Confederates were 
 ■on the lookout, and their works were very strong. They re- 
 ceived the charges with a heavy fire of artillery, supported by 
 infantry, which completely swept the ground in front, and they 
 repulsed the assault. Burnside's corps attacked at the same 
 time on the left of Hancock and Wright, and was also re- 
 pulsed. Warren's corps cooperated with artillery. 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
500 American Campaigns. 
 
 (265) Wright's corps returned to its place on the left of 
 Warren's; Hancock's took post near the Anderson house on 
 the north bank of the Ny. During the night of the 18th Burn- 
 side's corps was moved to the left of the Sixth. The Fifth 
 Corps now became the right of the Union line, and its retrench- 
 ments reached across the Ny River, above the crossing of the 
 Fredericksburg Road. This road was the Union army's main 
 line of communication with its base at Aquia Creek. 
 
 Grant now gave up all further hope of carrying the Con- 
 federate works at Spottsylvania Court House, and prepared to 
 make another movement by his left flank. Lee anticipated 
 this movement, and on the 19th ordered Ewell to make a dem- 
 onstration in his front to see if the enemy had gone. As the 
 Federals in his front were strongly intrenched, Ewell got leave 
 to move round their right toward the Fredericksburg Road, 
 which he thought he could do with less loss. He encountered 
 the extreme right of Warren's corps. Other troops of the 
 Fifth Corps and of the Second were hurried to this point, and 
 a Federal regiment, on its way from Fredericksburg to join 
 the army, took part in the action. The upshot was, Ewell 
 was defeated with a loss of 900 men, and driven back. But 
 he found out that the Federal army had not yet gone. Han- 
 cock's corps had, however, actually been under orders to start 
 southward on the afternoon of the 19th, but this encounter 
 with Ewell led to its being held back until the night of the 
 20th.* 
 
 In the battles around Spottsylvania Court House the Union 
 losses numbered 2,725 killed and 13,416 wounded; the Con- 
 federate losses can not be stated, but they were probably much 
 smaller than these. 
 
 Grant now hoped that, by starting a single corps off one or 
 two marches ahead of the main army, he might tempt Lee to 
 move the bulk of his forces against this corps ; then he hoped 
 to get a chance to strike the Confederates with his main army 
 in open country before they should have time to intrench. 
 (258) It was with this object that Hancock was ordered to 
 march on the 19th. Hancock got away on the night of the 
 20th and marched to Guiney's Station; thence he was to go 
 southward toward Hanover Court House, f 
 
 *Humphreys. 
 
 fin the Official Atlas all the maps taken from reports of Union com- 
 manders show Guiney's Station to have been about ten miles almost 
 due east of Spottsylvania Court House. 
 
The Battle of Spottsylvania Court House. 501 
 
 Sheridan with the bulk of the Union cavalry was still absent 
 upon his raid, but all the horsemen that could be got together 
 went with Hancock under Torbert. The Confederate cavalry, 
 now commanded by Wade Hampton, observed and hindered 
 the Union movement. 
 
 Lee was no longer strong enough to make any offensive 
 movement ; all he could now hope to do was to keep his army 
 between Grant and Richmond. On learning, therefore, 
 through his signal stations and cavalry patrols, about noon on 
 the 21st, that the head of Hancock's column had reached the 
 railway near Guiney's Station, he started Ewell's corps at 
 once for Hanover Junction. He supposed Hancock's march 
 simply meant another turning movement aimed at his com- 
 munications with Richmond.* At 10 a.m. on the 21st War- 
 ren's corps took the same route that Hancock's had taken; 
 later Burnside's, followed by Wright's, took up the march. 
 Lee now moved his whole army to the neighborhood of Han- 
 over Junction, and put it into position on the south side of the 
 North Anna River, covering Richmond and the Virginia Cen- 
 tral Railway. (266) The Confederate position here was a 
 peculiar one ; it was convex, or rather angular, with the center 
 or apex of the angle resting on the convex side of a bend in 
 the river. 
 
 Moving southward from Guiney's Station, the Union army 
 arrived in front of this position on the 23rd and 24th of May. 
 Warren's [Fifth] and Wright's [Sixth] corps crossed above 
 Ox Ford and Hancock's crossed at Chesterfield Bridge. Only 
 one of Burnside's divisions got across. The river thus split 
 the Union army into three pieces and would have had to be 
 crossed twice before one wing of the army could have rein- 
 forced the other. Both armies intrenched. There was some 
 fighting on the 23rd and 24th, but Grant decided that the Con- 
 federate position was too strong to assault ; he resolved, there- 
 fore, to continue the movement by his left flank. 
 
 (258) Accordingly the army was again set in motion im- 
 mediately after dark on the 26th of May. Its objective was 
 Hanover Town, near which it expected to cross the Pamunkey 
 River. Sheridan's cavalry, which had now rejoined the army, 
 preceded the infantry columns, and cleared the way. At Haw's 
 Shop it defeated the Confederate cavalry under Wade Hamp- 
 ton in a fierce combat, which lasted a whole day.* 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
502 American Campaigns. 
 
 The topography now was wholly different from that of the 
 Wilderness. After leaving Spottsylvania Court House the 
 armies found themselves in a rich farming country, and the 
 farther south and east they marched the broader and deeper 
 they found the streams, the natter, lower, and more marshy the 
 country. On the 30th of May the Union army again encoun- 
 tered Lee's forces blocking its way on the south bank of the 
 Totopotomoy, a small branch of the Pamunkey. The Con- 
 federates were so strongly intrenched that Grant decided not 
 to assault. 
 
 (267) The hostile lines then shifted toward the southeast, 
 and Cold Harbor became the central point of a great battle. 
 General W. F. Smith had joined Grant with about 10,000 men 
 of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps from Butler's army ;* and 
 General Lee had received about 14,000 reinforcements, con- 
 sisting of two brigades brought by Breckinridge from the 
 Shenandoah Valley, where he had lately defeated Sigel ; Pick- 
 ett's division ; and Hoke's division, which had come over from 
 Drewry's Bluff.f Grant assaulted Lee's strongly intrenched 
 position, on the 3rd of June, and, in one hour, lost nearly 
 6,000 men killed and wounded. "At half-after one o'clock the 
 assault was suspended, and corps-commanders were directed 
 to intrench the positions they held, and make reconnaissances 
 with a view to moving against the enemy's works by regular 
 approaches.''^ Cold Harbor was within six miles of the outer 
 works around Richmond, and the right of Lee's line on the 
 Chickahominy was only three miles from those works. An- 
 other movement by the left flank would not have brought 
 Grant any nearer Richmond; but could he have broken Lee's 
 center at Cold Harbor, and thrown the Confederate army back 
 upon the Chickahominy, he might have destroyed or cap- 
 tured it. 
 
 Grant's army remained in position in front of Lee's until 
 the night of the 12th of June, and a more trying experience 
 has seldom fallen to the lot of soldiers than that of the soldiers 
 in these two armies during this time. The fire of the sharp- 
 shooters on both sides was terrible and incessant, and the 
 country was so flat that no man dared rise during the daylight 
 from his cramped position in the shallow trenches; by day 
 the heat of the sun was terrific and at night the mosquitoes 
 
 *B. & L. 
 
 tAlexander. 
 
 ^Humphreys. 
 
The Battle of Spottsylvania Court House. 503 
 
 and insects were torture; the stench of the dead bodies of 
 men and animals was sickening; cooking could scarcely be 
 done at all; bathing was not thought of, and the water for 
 drink was foul; the lines were in the midst of marshes, and 
 malarial fever and other sickness increased with each day.* 
 On the night of the 12th Grant withdrew his army to cross 
 the James River. 
 
 The Union losses from June 1 to June 12 numbered 1,905 
 killed and 10,570 wounded; the Confederate losses have not 
 been determined, but they were much smaller. It has often 
 been stated that Grant's losses in this bloody campaign of 
 "continuous hammering" exceeded the whole number of men 
 in Lee's army. This is somewhat an exaggeration. General 
 Long, Lee's biographer, says Grant's "losses aggregated the 
 enormous total of 60,000 men — a greater number than the 
 whole of Lee's army at the beginning of the campaign; Lee's 
 losses, on the contrary, were not more than 20,000." No part 
 of this statement is quite accurate. According to the statistical 
 table given in Battles and Leaders, Grant's losses from the 
 5th of May, the first day of the Wilderness, to the 12th of 
 June, were 7,620 killed, 38,342 wounded, 8,967 missing; a 
 total of 54,929. Lee began the campaign with an army of 
 61,953 men, and received before the end of it 14,400 reinforce- 
 ments; Grant began it with 105,145 men; up to the 1st of June 
 he had lost 42,192 ; and on that day he had an army of 113,875. 
 As it had not been four weeks since the first battle (May 5), 
 it is not probable that many of the wounded had returned to 
 duty. If we suppose that 5,000 of them were included in the 
 113,875 present on the 1st of June, we find that Grant had 
 received 45,922 reinforcements. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 (258) The main result of Grant's operations from the 
 Rapidan to the James was to wear out Lee's army, to a greater 
 or less degree, by the policy of "continuous hammering" ; but 
 Grant's own army had suffered nearly three times as great a 
 loss in men as Lee's, and it is claimed that after the desperate 
 assault at Cold Harbor, in which the Federal loss was very 
 great and the Confederate loss comparatively small, the morale 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
504 American Campaigns. 
 
 of the Confederate soldiers was left in a better state than that 
 of the Union soldiers. 
 
 Grant's successive strategic turning movements had all 
 failed to reach Lee's communications — to get between Lee's 
 army and Richmond. In the first one Lee had taken the offen- 
 sive and attacked the Union army in flank in the Wilderness. 
 In each one thereafter Grant had found Lee's army intrenched 
 across his road; at Spottsylvania Court House; at the North 
 Anna ; at the Totopotomoy ; at Cold Harbor. True, with each 
 movement the Union army got nearer to Richmond; but that 
 was not the object of the campaign. The destruction of Lee's 
 army was the end sought. At the outset of the operations 
 General Grant had said to General Meade, in his letter of 
 instructions: "Lee's army will be your objective point. Wher- 
 ever Lee goes, there you will go also."* If Grant's purpose 
 had been merely to place his army at a point of the James 
 River near Richmond, he would have transferred it thither by 
 water. 
 
 Yet Grant's campaign was not a failure. His army had 
 kept on advancing and fighting; that was much in itself. It 
 was what the Union army had not done in Virginia under any 
 other commander. This result was not due to a greater dis- 
 parity of numbers in the two hostile armies than had existed 
 in previous campaigns. In the Chancellorsville campaign, for 
 instance, Hooker had 130,000 men, and Lee only 60,000; in 
 this campaign, as we have seen, Grant had 105,000 in round 
 numbers, and Lee 62,000, at the start. The Confederate com- 
 mander was the same, and he had lost none of his cunning. 
 The success of the campaign, therefore, for the Union arms, 
 as compared with that of the other campaigns in Virginia, 
 must be accredited to qualities of the Union commander-in- 
 chief, General Grant. 
 
 Yet, if the student looks for anything brilliant of strategy 
 or tactics in General Grant's operations in this campaign, 
 he will look in vain. Lee anticipated every movement the 
 Union army made, and took prompt steps to meet it. Every 
 battle appeared to be fought without any real plan of attack. 
 At Spottsylvania, first one part of the Confederate intrench- 
 rnents would be assaulted, then another; and the corps were 
 kept marching from one side to another. Hancock's corps 
 marched round the Confederate position two or three times. 
 
 ♦Grant's Memoirs. 
 
The Battle of Spottsylvania Court House. 505 
 
 Orders were frequently issued and countermanded ; corps were 
 sent to places only to be at once recalled. It all only testifies 
 to Grant's tenacity of purpose; he would not give up and quit 
 while there was another thing left to try; while there was 
 another chance left of succeeding. He never lost his head, and 
 he appeared never to know when he was getting the worst of 
 it. The tenor of all his telegrams and letters during the cam- 
 paign was to the effect that the enemy was suffering more than 
 his own army. 
 
 The campaign on the Union side had several distinctive 
 features. They were : first, the several flank, or more correct- 
 ly, turning movements ; second, the changing of the base of 
 supplies as the army progressed. The base was at first on 
 the Orange and Alexandria Railway ; then at Aquia Creek ; 
 then at Port Royal on the Rappahannock; then at White 
 House on the Pamunkey; then it was shifted to the James. 
 Another distinctive feature was the night-marching. A large 
 part of the marching was done at night; more than in any 
 previous operations. Lee's corps, also, made several night- 
 marches. Both armies made greater use of field-works than 
 they had ever made before ; as soon as troops halted they began 
 digging trenches, or piling logs for breastworks. 
 
 The theatre of operations was, by reason of the forests and 
 the bad roads, so ill-adapted to the use of artillery, that, at 
 Spottsylvania, Grant did away with the Reserve Artillery as a 
 separate corps. Some of the batteries were attached to the 
 different army-corps ; the guns of others were sent back to the 
 base, and the caissons were put to use in the wagon-trains. 
 
 This was the first campaign in which Lee was reduced to 
 a strictly strategic defensive. After the battle of the Wilder- 
 ness he never felt strong enough to assume the strategic of- 
 fensive. Tactically, however, parts of his army acted on the 
 offensive in every battle up to and including Cold Harbor ; and, 
 as will be seen in the next lecture, almost up to the day of 
 his surrender at Appomattox. 
 
 It was more the necessity of guarding the seat of the Con- 
 federate government from capture than the preservation of 
 his communications with Richmond that compelled Lee re- 
 peatedly to throw his army across Grant's path. Lee was 
 tied to Richmond, just as the Army of the Potomac had been 
 tied to Washington in the Gettysburg Campaign. What would 
 have happened if Lee had not blocked the Union army at 
 Spottsylvania or at the North Anna? If Lee had simply stayed 
 
506 American Campaigns. 
 
 at the Wilderness battle-field or at Spottsylvania, and let the 
 Union army move on unmolested? Would Grant have dared 
 to march on to Richmond and leave Lee in his rear? The 
 distance from the Wilderness Tavern to Washington, and the 
 distance from the Tavern to Richmond, are almost exactly 
 the same ; and the ease with which Early marched his raiding 
 column into the suburbs of Washington a few weeks later 
 might, at first glance, lead one to ask why Lee, by letting 
 Grant pass, and then making a bold dash to the north, might 
 not have captured that city? The answer to the question is, 
 simply, that Grant would not have gone far. Grant only 
 wanted to place his army upon the road to Richmond a very 
 little in rear of Lee's army. He was in no hurry to reach 
 Richmond. Lee's army was his main objective. If Lee had 
 started toward Washington, Grant would have been close 
 upon his heels as well as firm upon his communications. 
 
 Suppose, then, that Lee, instead of stopping to fight at 
 Spottsylvania Court House, had retreated straight to the south 
 or to the southwest, what would Grant have done? Grant 
 had announced that Lee should be followed wherever he went ; 
 furthermore, the "attractive power of the defender" is a recog- 
 nized principle of strategy. "As long as the defender's army 
 is not thoroughly defeated, it exerts an entirely natural power 
 of attraction on the assailant. . . . The assailant will arrive 
 at whatever place the defender may have chosen for his posi- 
 tion."* He will follow the retreating enemy. In such a 
 movement as this Lee would have had the south of Virginia 
 and the Carolinas and Georgia to fall back upon. He might 
 possibly have succeeded in transferring his army, or a large 
 part of it, by way of the Danville Railway, to unite with Johns- 
 ton in northern Georgia. This distance, however, was more 
 than six hundred miles ; and if Lee had adopted this course, 
 he would have given up all the territory as far southward 
 as he retreated, with scant chance of ever getting it back. 
 It would have been an acknowledgment to the world that the 
 Confederacy was on its last legs. It was the last resort. 
 
 In the position at the Wilderness "Grant's left (Hancock) 
 was two miles nearer Spottsylvania than was Lee's right 
 (Longstreet)."f The initiative rested with Grant; Lee could 
 not move until he saw what Grant was going to do. Yet Lee's 
 army, or part of it, beat Grant's in the race for Spottsylvaniay 
 , . "'■' If |, 
 
 *Von der Goltz. 
 
 fLecture of Captain Ferguson, U. S. Corps of Engineers. 
 
The Battle of Spottsylvania Court House. 507 
 
 and blocked the way to that place. Grant withdrew his army 
 from the Wilderness battle-field by corps from his right — 
 the flank farthest from Spottsylvania; while Lee started with 
 his right corps, also — the flank nearest Spottsylvania. As 
 the line was five miles long, it gave Warren's corps three 
 miles farther to go than Longstreet's [under Anderson] had. 
 This circumstance, however, is not the reason why Anderson 
 beat Warren to the Court House, for Warren started at 8.30 
 p.m. and Anderson did not start till 11 p.m. The reason is 
 found in the effective hindrance made by Fitzhugh Lee's cav- 
 alry to Warren's progress. Warren, also, stopped to rest his 
 corps from 3.30 a.m. to 6.00 a.m. on the 8th. When one re- 
 members that General Lawton's division at El Caney and San 
 Juan, in 1898, marched most of the time from about 2 p.m., 
 June 30, till daylight July 1 ; fought all day July 1 ; and 
 marched nearly all that night and until noon July 2, one can- 
 not understand why Warren's corps had to rest two hours and 
 a half, at such a time of emergency, after marching only seven 
 hours. 
 
 (256) It was a great mistake not to have Sheridan's cav- 
 alry blocking the road against Anderson's column. If the 
 bulk of this cavalry had pushed out to Todd's Tavern, and 
 on the Catharpin Road by way of Corbin's Bridge to the 
 Shady Grove Church — Spottsylvania road, it could have 
 stopped or delayed Anderson's column. Of course it would 
 have had to defeat and drive away Stuart's cavalry, which 
 was guarding Corbin's Bridge and the cross-roads on the 
 flank of the Shady Grove Church Road. We have seen that 
 Wilson's division had actually driven back Rosser's brigade 
 and got possession of Spottsylvania Court House on the morn- 
 ing of the 8th of May, before the arrival of the leading divi- 
 sion [Kershaw] of Anderson's [Longstreet's] corps. If Wil- 
 son had pushed on to the Po, not two miles from the court 
 house, seized the bridge at the Blockhouse (on the Shady 
 Grove Church Road), and resolutely held it against Kershaw's 
 division, Warren would quickly have brushed Fitzhugh Lee's 
 cavalry out of his way, and been in secure possession of 
 Spottsylvania Court House ahead of Lee's army. 
 
 (258) At Spottsylvania Grant had to decide again whether 
 to turn the right or the left of Lee's army. Undoubtedly he 
 continued to move by his own left, because it kept him nearer 
 his base and kept his communications covered better. If, how- 
 ever, without stopping to fight a serious battle at Spottsyl- 
 
508 American Campaigns. 
 
 vania, Grant had turned Lee's left flank and moved toward 
 Richmond, Lee would promptly have fallen back behind the 
 North Anna. This would have taken him out of the Wilder- 
 ness into the open country. If Grant had made such a move- 
 ment as this, on the 9th or 10th, it would greatly have em- 
 barrassed Lee's army, for it would have cut this army off from 
 its immediate base of supplies, which, at this time, was Louisa 
 Court House, thirty miles southwest of Spottsylvania, on the 
 Virginia Central Railway. It was fortunate for Lee that Han- 
 cock was recalled from the right bank of the Po on the 10th of 
 May. If, instead of recalling Hancock, Grant had sent War- 
 ren's corps to reinforce him, Hancock would have turned 
 Lee's left and cut him off from his depot at Louisa.* 
 
 In the movement from Spottsylvania Hancock's corps was 
 sent to Guiney's Station with the hope of alluring Lee's army 
 after it. This hope was not realized; Lee sent a corps [Ewell] 
 at first to guard the crossing of the North Anna on the Rich- 
 mond Road; he marched the rest of his army to Hanover 
 Junction as soon as he was satisfied that Grant's whole army 
 had moved. Hancock started more than twelve hours ahead 
 of Ewell ; if he had taken the direct road to Hanover Junction 
 he would have arrived there several hours ahead of Ewell. In 
 fact Hancock's leading division [Barlow] was at Milford Sta- 
 tion,* eight or ten miles south of Guiney's and only half as far 
 from Hanover Junction as was Spottsylvania Court House, be- 
 fore Lee knew that the Union movement had begun. True, 
 Hancock's men had marched all night ; but if they had pushed 
 on, after resting three or four hours, they would still have 
 beaten Ewell in the race for Hanover Junction; while War- 
 ren's and the other two Union corps, by taking the direct road, 
 could have gotten there ahead of Lee's other two corps. In- 
 stead of marching on to Hanover Junction, Hancock's corps 
 halted and intrenched, in expectation of an attack by Lee's 
 army. 
 
 As soon as General Grant learned that Lee had not taken 
 his bait, but had started for Hanover Junction, he made for the 
 same place ; but he had learned it too late ; Lee got there first. 
 And the reason of it was, the "eyes and ears" of Grant's army 
 were out of place, like those of Lee's army in the Gettysburg 
 campaign. Grant appears to have been satisfied with the re- 
 sult of Sheridan's raid ; yet there is hardly any doubt that, if 
 Sheridan's squadrons had been with the army at this time, 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
The Battle of Spottsylvania Court House. 509 
 
 they would have rendered more effective service to the cam- 
 paign than they rendered by their long and hazardous raid. 
 They would not only have warned Grant promptly of Lee's 
 movement, but, by throwing themselves in front of Lee's 
 columns and upon their flanks, could have retarded their 
 march to Hanover Junction. In summing up the results of 
 Sheridan's raid the only thing General Grant mentions, which 
 had any material effect upon the campaign, was that it "freed 
 us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than 
 two weeks." But the enemy's cavalry was back in its proper 
 place now, and gave Lee timely warning of Grant's movement. 
 General Alexander says Sheridan's raid "had made no im- 
 pression on the campaign.'' Let it go down, then, as another 
 perilous and useless expenditure of horse-flesh, as were most 
 of the other cavalry raids of the Civil War. 
 
LECTURE XXIV. 
 SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 
 
 (268) In the early days of June, 1864, after the battle of 
 Cold Harbor, the military situation in the general theater of 
 war in the United States was about as follows : 
 
 The main Union army, under General Grant, consisting of 
 the Army of the Potomac, under the immediate command of 
 Meade, and certain attached troops, was behind its earthworks 
 in front of Lee's main army at Cold Harbor. Butler with the 
 Army of the James, now only about 10,000 infantry and 4,600 
 •cavalry (Smith with part of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps 
 being with Grant), was held within his intrenchments at Ber- 
 muda Hundred by Beauregard with about 9,000 Confederates. 
 General Hunter, who had succeeded Sigel in command of the 
 Union forces in the Shenandoah Valley, had defeated the Con- 
 federate detachment in that quarter and was moving toward 
 Lynchburg. Sherman, in Georgia, was gradually forcing 
 Joseph E. Johnston back upon Atlanta. 
 
 It was partly with a view to prevent Lee from sending rein- 
 forcements against Hunter that Grant suspended the attacks 
 at Cold Harbor. "To aid the expedition under Hunter," Grant 
 said to Meade, "it was necessary to detain all the army then 
 with Lee until Hunter got well on his way to Lynchburg. 
 This would be more effectually done by keeping the enemy out 
 of the intrenchments of Richmond than by forcing him into 
 them."*f However this might be, Grant began a movement 
 within a fortnight to transfer his army to the south side of the 
 James, for the purpose of shutting Lee's army up within the 
 intrenchments of Richmond. 
 
 (269) Further to make the investment effective, Sheridan 
 was started westward with his cavalry on the 5th of June, 
 under orders to break up the Virginia Central and the Fred- 
 ericksburg Railways. This was Sheridan's Trevilian Raid. 
 Sheridan was also to form a junction with Hunter at Char- 
 lottesville. He bore orders that he was to deliver to Hunter 
 directing that commander to join the main army with his 
 
 ♦Humphreys. 
 
 fFrom this it appears that General Grant had come to the opinion 
 "held by Rosecrans, when Grant was urging him to drive Bragg out of 
 iEast Tennessee. 
 
Siege of Petersburg. 511 
 
 forces. This part of his task Sheridan was unable to carry- 
 out, for the reason that he found Wade Hampton's cavalry, 
 which Lee had dispatched to oppose him, intrenched across his 
 path at Trevilian Station. In the dismounted combat that 
 took place here in a dense wood, Hampton was defeated; but 
 he kept his force in front of Sheridan. On account of the 
 scarcity of ammunition, and for other reasons,- Sheridan de- 
 cided to turn back. He reached White House on the 21st of 
 June, and from there escprted a train of 900 wagons to Charles 
 City Court House. His right flank-guard [Gregg] was at- 
 tacked on the way by Hampton and it "retired in some con- 
 fusion" ; but none of the wagons were captured. Thus ended 
 another useless cavalry raid. 
 
 Meantime another famous raid was in progress. On ac- 
 count of bad health Ewell had surrendered the command of 
 his old corps to Early, who was started, on the 13th of June, 
 toward the Shenandoah Valley to attack Hunter in rear. 
 Hunter retreated across the mountains into West Virginia, 
 and Early, pursuant to his orders from Lee, pushed on down 
 the Shenandoah, crossed into Maryland, and, meeting very 
 feeble resistance, arrived at the end of Seventh Street, near 
 the edge of Washington, on the afternoon of the 11th of July. 
 There were already troops enough in Washington to repel 
 Early, but Wright, who had been hurried up from Virginia 
 with two divisions of the Sixth Corps, arrived at the Capital 
 on the 12th of July, and General Emery also arrived with a 
 part of the Nineteenth Corps from New Orleans. Early con- 
 cluded not to attack the city, and retreated by way of Lees- 
 burg into Virginia. Wright followed him. The sequel to this 
 raid was the operations in the Shenandoah Valley, in which 
 Sheridan, who was sent to the Valley to command the Union 
 forces, succeeded in expelling Early, and in so thoroughly 
 devastating that granary of the Confederacy that "a crow," as 
 Sheridan expressed it, "would have had to carry its rations 
 if it had flown across the valley." 
 
 (268) At this time, June, 1864, Richmond was defended 
 on the north side of the James by a line of works extending 
 from the river-bank above, around to Chapin's Bluff, about 
 seven miles by road below the town. Halleck proposed to 
 Grant, a few days after the battle of Cold Harbor, to invest 
 Richmond on the north side of the river. "This would give 
 greater security to Washington"; but it would never have 
 accomplished the fall of the city or the surrender of Lee's 
 
512 American Campaigns. 
 
 army, because it would not have cut off the lines of supply 
 from the south and west. These lines were the Richmond 
 and Danville, the Southside or Lynchburg, and the Weldon 
 Railways. So Grant decided to operate by the south bank of 
 the James. 
 
 On that side of the river was, first, Beauregard's line of 
 works, stretching from nearly opposite Chapin's Bluff down 
 to the Appomattox River above Port Walthall, "bottling up" 
 Butler's army at Bermuda Hundred; and south of the Ap- 
 pomattox a circle of strong works had been erected as early 
 as 1862, some two miles outside of Petersburg.* In June, 
 1864, Petersburg was garrisoned only by General Wise with 
 his brigade of Confederates and some local troops. On the 
 9th of June Butler sent a force of 3,000 infantry, under Gen- 
 eral Gillmore, and 1,500 cavalry, under General Kautz, to 
 "capture the city and destroy the bridge across the Appomat- 
 tox."* Gillmore claimed that the noise made by Kautz's 
 cavalry in crossing the bridge at Port Walthall "could be 
 heard for miles," and "put the enemy on his guard"; conse- 
 quently he found the earthworks so strongly manned that he 
 decided not to assault. He waited four or five hours to hear 
 something from Kautz ; then, failing to receive any news from 
 him, withdrew. 
 
 Kautz, on his part, at about noon made three formal attacks 
 on the intrenchments across the Jerusalem Plank Road, and 
 was repulsed. He then turned these intrenchments and ad- 
 vanced close to the water-works at the southeastern edge of 
 the town. Here he came upon infantry and artillery behind 
 an earthwork and stockade, and withdrew. He was followed 
 by Dearing's Confederate cavalry brigade. 
 
 Grant now prepared to cross his forces to the south bank of 
 the James. His object was to capture Petersburg, then to turn 
 Beauregard's intrenchments in front of Butler and move on 
 Richmond. The capture of Petersburg would leave Richmond 
 with no unbroken railway entering it except the Danville Rail- 
 way. This road Grant purposed seizing later, thus completely 
 cutting off the means of supply of Richmond and Lee's army. 
 The latter, however, might abandon Richmond and retreat 
 toward Danville or Lynchburg to escape investment. 
 
 The movement to the James and the passage of the river 
 were carefully planned to keep Lee in ignorance of them as 
 long as practicable. Wilson's cavalry division w=>« to cover 
 
 *Humphreys. 
 
Siege of Petersburg. 513 
 
 the front and right flank of the columns, as well as to bring 
 up the rear and guard the trains. A pontoon-train was to 
 accompany each column. The withdrawal of the main body 
 from Cold Harbor began immediately after nightfall on the 
 12th of June. A part of Wilson's cavalry crossed the Chicka- 
 hominy by a pontoon-bridge at Long's Bridge an hour or two 
 after midnight, and marched to Riddell's Shop, encountering 
 Confederate cavalry on the way. It was soon relieved by 
 Warren's corps [Fifth], and moved on to Charles City, clear- 
 ing the roads for the other columns. Warren had crossed the 
 Chickahominy by two pontoon-bridges near Bottom's Bridge. 
 
 (270) Warren intrenched his corps east of Riddell's Shop, 
 covering the flank of the movement upon the roads leading 
 from Richmond. The Second Corps [Hancock] crossed the 
 Chickahominy by the bridges used by the Fifth Corps, and 
 hurried on to Wilcox's Landing. The Sixth [Wright] and 
 Ninth [Burnside] crossed at Jones's Bridge.* By noon of the 
 14th these four corps were assembled at Wilcox's Landing, 
 in a bend, on the north bank of the James. The Eighteenth 
 Corps [Smith] marched to White House, and from there re- 
 turned to Butler at Bermuda Hundred by water. 
 
 By midnight of the 14th the Federal engineers had com- 
 pleted a pontoon-bridge more than 2,000 feet longf across the 
 James, and by midnight of the 16th the army with all of its 
 artillery and trains was on the south bank. Wright's corps 
 [Sixth] covered the passage on the north side, and was the 
 last to cross. Wilson's cavalry had remained upon the right 
 and rear, at Malvern Hill and White Oak Swamp, until it 
 was called in by Wright and sent over the bridge just ahead 
 of the Sixth Corps. "The navy assisted with its armored 
 ships and gunboats in covering the passage of the river,"f and 
 in obstructing it by sinking several vessels above the point of 
 crossing. 
 
 On the morning of June the 13th Lee discovered that the 
 Union army had withdrawn from his front, and he was in- 
 formed that it was moving on Richmond by way of Long's 
 Bridge. He naturally supposed that Grant was marching his 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
 f General Alexander says this was "the greatest bridge the world has 
 seen since the days of Xerxes. At the point selected the river was 
 2,100 feet wide, 90 feet deep, and had a rise and fall of tide of 4 feet, 
 giving very strong currents. A draw was necessary for the passage 
 of vessels." The bridge was built in »v»b* hours. 
 
 {Humphreys. 
 
514 American Campaigns. 
 
 army to a position on the north side of the James opposite 
 Butler's army at Bermuda Hundred, in order that the two 
 forces, with the cooperation of the navy, might act conjointly 
 against Richmond.* Promptly, therefore, Lee moved his two 
 •corps, Anderson's [Longstreet's] and Hill's, to the south side 
 of the Chickahorniny, and placed them in position from Mal- 
 vern Hill to White Oak Swamp, covering the roads to Rich- 
 mond. They had some skirmishing with Wilson's cavalry, 
 which withdrew in the night to St. Mary's Church. On the 
 afternoon of the 14th and morning of the 15th the Union cav- 
 -alry reconnoitered the Confederate position. This cavalry was 
 mistaken for the advance of Grant's army, which strengthened 
 Lee's conviction that this army designed to attack the Con- 
 federate capital by the north bank of the James, and induced 
 liim to hold his own army on that bank ; while the Union army, 
 unopposed, was making its passage to the south bank. The 
 •strategy of General Grant's movement completely deceived 
 Lee, and its well-managed execution kept him under delusion 
 for three days, the 15th, 16th, and 17th of June. During 
 those three days Lee retained Longstreet's and Hill's corps on 
 the north side of the James, while Grant was massing his troops 
 against the feeble garrison of Petersburg on the south side.* 
 The Eighteenth Corps [Smith] reached Bermuda Hundred 
 by way of the James on the 14th June, and Smith received 
 ■orders through Butler to move at daylight of the 15th against 
 Petersburg. Besides his own corps, some 10,000 men, Smith 
 was to be accompanied by Kautz's cavalry division, 2,400 
 troopers, and a part of Hinks's negro division, 3,700 men. 
 Hancock, whose corps was to be the first one to cross at Wil- 
 cox's Landing, would join him from that point. Hancock's 
 corps did not await the completion of the bridge, but was 
 ferried over the river by the transports during the night of the 
 14th, and might have started for Petersburg before sunrise on 
 the 15th; but General Grant, who had arranged the operation 
 with Butler, had failed to inform Meade of the hour when 
 Smith was to start. Meade, therefore, ordered Hancock to 
 await the arrival of his rations, which delayed his march until 
 after ten o'clock. Meade, moreover, did not inform Hancock 
 that Petersburg was to be assaulted ; he only directed him 
 to take up a certain position near the town, and Hancock's 
 maps were so defective that he lost much time in looking for 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
Siege of Petersburg. 515 
 
 the position.* It was night before his corps reached the 
 vicinity of Petersburg, f 
 
 Kautz was to cross the Appomattox by a pontoon-bridge at 
 Point of Rocks, near the left of Butler's line, at 1 a.m. the 
 15th, and threaten the Confederate intrenehments near the 
 Norfolk and Petersburg Railway. Hinks was to follow Kautz 
 and take position across the Jordan's Point road; the 
 Eighteenth Corps was to form on Hinks's right. The only 
 Confederate troops that Beauregard had in the Petersburg 
 works at this time, besides artillery, were Wise's infantry bri- 
 gade of 1,200 men, some militia, and Dearing's cavalry bri- 
 gade, — not 3,000 men all told. 
 
 Smith's command got away from the bridge over the 
 Appomattox about daybreak, and then had five or six 
 miles to march. Smith soon encountered a dismounted cav- 
 alry regiment and a battery that Beauregard had sent out 
 to retard him. He drove the cavalry back and captured one 
 of the guns, but was delayed three hours. This delay was 
 important to Beauregard, as he expected Hoke's Confederate 
 division to arrive from Drewry's Bluff about dark.f Another 
 mile and a half of marching brought Smith's command to the 
 line of felled timber in front of the Confederate works. Beau- 
 regard had this space so well covered by artillery that Smith's 
 columns could not move within sight of the works, and their 
 march was so much obstructed by the woods and broken 
 ground beyond that they did not finish their deployment 
 before 1.30 p.m. The rest of the afternoon Smith spent in 
 making a cautious but careful reconnaissance. He discovered 
 only a few signs of infantry ; yet concluded, erroneously, that 
 so much artillery must be supported by a strong force of infan- 
 try. At length he was ready for his artillery to open the at- 
 tack ; but the battery horses had gone to water ! This caused 
 another hour's wait, and probably saved Petersburg from cap- 
 ture. (271) In the meanwhile Kautz's cavalry had been 
 engaged all day with Dearing's, aided by the fire of a few guns 
 in a redan, outside of the works between the Norfolk Railway 
 and the Jerusalem Plank Road. Having heard no sound of 
 battle from Smith, Kautz withdrew about 6 p.m., and went 
 into bivouac, f 
 
 At about 7 p.m. Smith's artillery opened a concentrated 
 fire upon a salient of the works, Redans Nos. 5 and 6, but 
 
 *Humphreys. 
 fAlexander. 
 
516 American Campaigns. 
 
 evoked no reply. The Confederate gunners were holding their 
 fire for the assaulting columns, which they expected to follow 
 soon. But no columns charged. Smith sent forward Hinks's 
 negro division in a swarm of skirmishers, which "overran the 
 works and captured the guns still loaded with double canister 
 and defended by only a skirmish line of infantry." The divi- 
 sion lost 507 men, but captured four guns and 250 prisoners.* 
 By nine o'clock Smith's command had captured five more 
 redans toward the left, including No. 11, and a mile and a half 
 of the Confederate intrenchments ; and had learned, too late, 
 that the works had been defended by a very small force of 
 infantry.f 
 
 (270) About 4 p.m. Smith received word that Hancock 
 with the Second Corps was marching to join him by the road 
 from Windmill Point, but it was after seven o'clock when the 
 head of Hancock's corps came up. Having learned that the 
 Confederates were also receiving reinforcements, Smith had, 
 in the meantime, ordered a suspension of the assault. He asked 
 Hancock, upon his arrival, to relieve his forces, which Han- 
 cock did with the Second Corps. It took till 11 p.m. to com- 
 plete the relief, and it was then too late and ]too dark, in Han- 
 cock's judgment, to renew the attack. 
 
 When the Union army withdrew from Cold Harbor Beaure- 
 gard was fearful that Petersburg was to be its objective. He, 
 therefore, asked Lee to send him troops enough to defend the 
 town. As Lee believed that Richmond was the point to be 
 assailed, he would not, as we have seen, withdraw Hill and 
 Anderson from the north side of the James, but consented, on 
 the 14th, for Hoke's division to return to Beauregard from 
 Drewry's Bluff. This division reached Petersburg on the 
 evening of the 15th, and was placed in the works between 
 Wise's left and the Appomattox. That night Beauregard 
 also withdrew Bushrod Johnson's division, 3,500 men, from 
 the Bermuda Hundred line and put it into the Petersburg 
 works. This left only about 1,000 Confederates in the trenches 
 at Bermuda Hundred. Taking advantage of this condition, 
 Terry advanced from Butler's line, before daylight on the 16th, 
 and captured these trenches. In the afternoon of the 17th 
 they were retaken by Pickett's Confederate division, which had 
 been hurried over from the north side of the James. (272) 
 By early morning on the 16th Beauregard had some 14,000 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 fHumphreys. 
 
Siege of Petersburg. 517 
 
 men in the intrenchments in front of Petersburg. The left of 
 his line rested on the Appomattox; but its right did not reach 
 "the Jerusalem Plank Road by half a mile,"* and from there 
 to the Appomattox, west of the town, four miles and a half, 
 the works were unoccupied. Dearing's cavalry was outside of 
 them watching the left of the Federal forces. 
 
 The other Union army-corps were pushed forward to Peters- 
 burg as fast as they got across the James. The Ninth came up 
 at 10 a.m. on the 16th and took its place on the left of the Sec- 
 ond; the Fifth reached Petersburg at midnight (16th). The 
 Sixth was the last to come up. During the forenoon of the 
 16th Hancock, who was now in command on the ground, made 
 reconnaissances in his front and captured Redan No. 12. At 
 6 p.m. he attacked with his own corps and parts of the 
 Eighteenth and the Ninth, and, after suffering severely, cap- 
 tured Redans Nos. 4, 13, and 14, and the connecting trenches. 
 The Confederates were driven back all along the line. During 
 the night they made several attempts to recover their works, 
 but failed. They now occupied a temporary intrenchment just 
 west of Harrison Creek, behind the captured redans. 
 
 At dawn on the 17th Potter's division [Ninth Corps] moved 
 forward silently, and captured the works in front of the Shand 
 house, catching the Confederates there asleep on their arms. 
 Potter then advanced but was soon stopped by troops of the 
 enemy in intrenchments on the west bank of Harrison Creek. 
 Later in the day Willcox's division [Ninth Corps] attacked 
 these intrenchments and was repulsed; still later Ledlie's divi- 
 sion [Ninth Corps], after losing heavily, carried a part of 
 them, but was soon afterwards driven back. Ledlie's attack 
 had been supported on the left by Crawford's division [Fifth 
 Corps], and on the right by Barlow's division [Second Corps]. 
 In the course of the day the divisions of Gibbon and Birney 
 [Second Corps] had gained a position close to the Confederate 
 intrenchment west of Harrison Creek. 
 
 Up to midnight of the 17th the Confederates still held Redan 
 No. 3 and the intrenchments along the high ground west of 
 Harrison Creek to the Norfolk Railway. (273) After that 
 hour Beauregard withdrew his line to high ground across a 
 ravine, where he intrenched a shorter and stronger posi- 
 tion. 
 
 All this while Beauregard had been reporting to General 
 
 ♦Humphreys. 
 
518 American Campaigns. 
 
 Lee that Grant's army was massing at Petersburg, and he had 
 been begging for reinforcements; but Lee could not be di- 
 vested of the belief that Grant was advancing against Rich- 
 mond by the north bank of the James. As late as the after- 
 noon of the 17th he had ordered W. H. F. Lee, at Malvern 
 Hill, to find out what had become of Grant's army. Between 
 1 and 3 a.m. on the morning of the 18th three of Beaure- 
 gard's staff officers came to Lee's headquarters in quick suc- 
 cession, bringing evidence of Grant's presence in front of 
 Petersburg and of the urgency of the situation there; but not 
 until the General had heard the third messenger's report was- 
 he convinced. He then issued orders for A. P. Hill's corps, 
 and the rest of Longstreet's to hasten to Petersburg. A part 
 of Longstreet's corps had already started.* 
 
 On the 17th the bulk of the Eighteenth Corps had been 
 withdrawn from the Union line in front of Petersburg and 
 returned to Butler at Bermuda Hundred. That night Meade- 
 issued orders for a general assault to be made on the Con- 
 federate works at four o'clock on the morning of the 18th. 
 In advancing to this assault the Federals found that the Con- 
 federates had withdrawn from the intrenchments they had 
 held so strongly the day before. Meade ordered his line to. 
 press forward against the new position taken up by Beaure- 
 gard, hoping to carry it before the Confederates could complete 
 the intrenchments and before the arrival of their reinforce- 
 ments. Meade had learned by this time how weak a garrison 
 Beauregard had, and, also, that Lee was on the way to reinforce 
 it with the rest of the Confederate army. Two divisions of the 
 Confederate reinforcements arrived before the first assault 
 was made, however, and Hill's corps had begun to come up 
 before the assault of the afternoon. 
 
 The Confederate position was noway definitely known in 
 the morning. The Second Corps (now under Birney, Han- 
 cock's Gettysburg wound having broken out afresh) came 
 upon it at the Hare house, within three hundred yards of the 
 old position; but on the left the Ninth Corps and the Fifth 
 had to advance a mile before they came upon the new Con- 
 federate works. Within the space, however, the Ninth and 
 Fifth Corps encountered hostile troops in the cut of the 
 Norfolk Railway, and had a hard fight to dislodge them. The 
 ground was very unfavorable for attack, being cut up by 
 ravines and ditches, and swept by the Confederate artillery 
 
 ♦Alexander. 
 
Siege of Petersburg. 519 
 
 and musketry fire. Where there were woods they had been 
 prepared by slashing. The result was, the earlier attacks of 
 the day were not made at the same time ; late in the after- 
 noon the attacks were repeated and were better timed. But 
 none of them succeeded in carrying the Confederate works, 
 and the losses on the Union side were very heavy. The Union 
 corps, however, gained positions very close to the Confederate 
 works. There they intrenched, and the lines of hostile works 
 on that side of Petersburg were not materially changed in 
 position during the rest of the siege. 
 
 (274) Grant now concluded that the Petersburg works could 
 not be carried by assault, and resolved to invest the place 
 as far as practicable; to intercept the railways leading into it; 
 and to watch for opportunities to "attack Lee's army in unex- 
 pected quarters south, or even north, of the James."* Accord- 
 ingly, orders were issued on the 21st of June for extending 
 the Union lines all the way round to the Appomattox west of 
 Petersburg. Intrenchments were already occupied by the 
 Eighteenth, Ninth, and Fifth Corps extending from the Appo- 
 mattox east of the town, to the Jerusalem Plank Road. The 
 Second and Sixth Corps were ordered to prolong the line to- 
 the left. In moving to their positions on the 22d these two. 
 corps lost connection in the woods and gave A. P. Hill an 
 opportunity to push in between them. Lee had learned of 
 the movement ordered by Grant, and had sent Hill out with 
 two divisions of his own corps and Bushrod Johnson's division 
 to resist it. Suddenly Hill fell upon the left flank and rear of 
 the Second Corps and drove it back, capturing 1,700 prisoners, 
 four guns, and several colors. 
 
 The Sixth Corps formed on the left of the Second, about 
 parallel to the Jerusalem Plank Road, and a mile west of it, 
 and the two corps intrenched. In the general positions now 
 occupied the two hostile armies remained for several weeks. 
 On the 22nd of June the Ninth and the Fifth Corps were en- 
 gaged during the greater part of the day with the Confederate 
 troops in their front. The firing continued during the night 
 also. 
 
 (275) In pursuance of the plan to cut off the railway lines 
 into Richmond and Petersburg, Wilson with his own and 
 Kautz's cavalry division was started on the 22nd of June for 
 the railway junction of Burkesville [Burke's. Station]. Wil- 
 son's orders were to break up the Danville and the Southside 
 
 ♦Humphreys. 
 
520 American Campaigns. 
 
 [Lynchburg] Railways, keeping up his work of destruction 
 until driven away by superior forces of the enemy. 
 
 This raid ended at Light House Point on the 2nd of July. 
 In these ten days Wilson marched more than 300 miles, rest- 
 ing nowhere longer than six hours, and during his last four 
 days not longer than four hours at any place. He was fol- 
 lowed almost from the start by W. H. F. Lee; intercepted at 
 Stony Creek by Hampton; met at Reams's Station by Ma- 
 hone's infantry ; attacked in flank by Fitzhugh Lee ; and chased 
 as far as the Blackwater Creek. He had to double on his 
 tracks and dodge in a very lively manner, for he was sur- 
 rounded and cut off by superior numbers. He fought several 
 combats, and lost 240 men killed and wounded and 1,261 miss- 
 ing ; he abandoned a dozen guns, and had to burn his wagon- 
 train to save it from capture. As the Confederates promptly 
 repaired the sixty miles of railway destroyed by his command, 
 this cavalry raid, like most of the rest, must be accounted a 
 dismal failure. 
 
 (276) We have seen that the Sixth Corps [Wright] was 
 withdrawn from the left of the Union line and dispatched to 
 Washington at the time of Early's raid. This happened be- 
 tween the 6th and the 10th of July; the left was then drawn 
 back to the Jerusalem Plank Road and refused. 
 
 Toward the end of June Lieutenant-Colonel Pleasants of 
 the 48th Pennsylvania Regiment conceived a scheme for pla- 
 cing a mine under the Confederate work known as Elliott's 
 Salient. It was at a point in front of Burnside's part of the 
 Union line, where the hostile intrenchments were very close 
 together. The scheme was approved and Burnside's corps 
 was ordered to carry it out. The 48th Pennsylvania, a regi- 
 ment of miners, was charged with preparing the mine. Fer- 
 rero's negro division was selected to lead the assault, and 
 drilled specially for it; but the selection was not approved by 
 General Grant. The assignment was then made by lot, and 
 fell to Ledlie's division. 
 
 (268) In order to aid the project by causing the withdrawal 
 of some of the Confederate troops from the Petersburg in- 
 trenchments, as well as with some hope of capturing Rich- 
 mond by a sudden dash, and with the further purpose of de- 
 stroying the railways north of Richmond, the Second Corps 
 [Hancock] and Sheridan's cavalry were sent upon an expedi- 
 tion to the north of the James. They crossed the river at 
 Deep Bottom on the 27th of July, but were met at Bailey's 
 
Siege of Petersburg. 521 
 
 Creek by three divisions of Confederate infantry and two of 
 cavalry sent over by Lee to oppose them. To this extent only 
 the enterprise succeeded. Some fighting took place and the 
 Union loss numbered about 300 men. On the night of the 
 29th (July) the force recrossed the James in order to co- 
 operate with Burnside's assault, which was set for the morn- 
 ing of the 30th. 
 
 (276) A detailed order of more than 500 words was issued 
 on the 29th for this assault. The Union parapets and abatis 
 were to be prepared beforehand so that the assaulting columns 
 could move out promptly; the mine was to be sprung at 3.30 
 a.m. ; all the available artillery was then to open on points of 
 the Confederate works from which fire could sweep the ground 
 to be crossed in the assault. The Ninth Corps was to charge the 
 breach made by the mine, followed by the Eighteenth, now 
 commanded by Ord ; the Fifth Corps was to support the Ninth 
 on its left ; the Second was to support it on its right ; Sheridan 
 was to cover the left of the army with his cavalry and move 
 against the enemy by the roads from the southward and west- 
 ward of Petersburg. 
 
 A defect in the fuse delayed the firing of the mine until near 
 5 a.m. It was then set off and the artillery opened and kept 
 down the Confederate fire everywhere but at two points ; Led- 
 lie's division charged and piled helter-skelter into the crater of 
 the mine — all save Ledlie, who had stayed in a bomb-proof 
 back in the Union lines. The Confederates had gotten wind 
 of the projected mine and had driven nearly 400 feet of coun- 
 ter-mines; but they had not succeeded in determining where 
 the Union mine was situated. General Long says that, at the 
 moment of the explosion, the defenders "lay in peaceful slum- 
 ber, unconscious of the terrible storm that was about to burst 
 upon them." Two hundred men were killed by the explosion, 
 and a gap was torn in the Confederate lines 150 feet long, 
 ninety-seven feet wide, and thirty feet deep.* 
 
 It was a half-hour after the explosion before the Confed- 
 erates had recovered from their shock enough to open fire with 
 musketry upon the crater, and fully an hour before their artil- 
 lery began to fire. But Ledlie's men "could not be got for- 
 ward" ;f they stayed in the crater. Potter's and Willcox's divi- 
 sions advanced on the right and left, and finally, after more 
 than an hour, Ferrero's division went forward — save Ferrero, 
 
 *Alexander. 
 fHumphreys. 
 
522 American Campaigns. 
 
 who stayed with Ledlie in the bomb-proof. Most of the 
 negroes crowded through the crater, but some of them were led 
 off to the right and captured 200 prisoners and a color.* 
 
 Confederate troops were hurried to the endangered point. 
 Mahone's division was the first to arrive. By ten o'clock the 
 Union attack had been suspended; at half-past twelve the 
 troops were ordered to withdraw to the Union lines; the 
 order was sent to the brigade commanders, "leaving them to 
 consult and decide upon the time and manner of the with- 
 drawal."* Before they had arrived at a decision the Confed- 
 erates attacked and drove them back. Although the distance 
 to the Union intrenchments was only a hundred yards the 
 troops lost heavily in retiring. The Federal loss in this fiasco- 
 was 4,400 killed, wounded, and missing. The negro division 
 suffered most, losing 176 killed, 688 wounded, and 801 miss- 
 ing. 
 
 The adventure ought to have succeeded; the Confederates, 
 were taken by surprise, and there was time, before they recov- 
 ered, for the assaulting columns to make a lodgment in the 
 works. The assault "failed from mismanagement and misbe- 
 havior on the part of several of the chief actors."* General 
 Burnside, for instance, had been ordered to prepare his para- 
 pets and abatis for the passage of the troops, but had neglected 
 to do so ; this delayed the advance. 
 
 "Between this time and the month of March, 1865, several 
 movements of portions of the Army of the Potomac and of 
 the Army of the James were made to the right and to the left,, 
 which resulted in the extension of" the Union "lines of in- 
 trenchments in both directions, and caused a corresponding ex- 
 tension of the Confederate intrenchments" to the right, "and 
 the occupation in stronger force of their intrenchments on the 
 north bank of the James."* Each of these movements had at 
 the time some special purpose besides extending the lines. 
 Toward the end of July, for example, Hancock was again sent 
 to the north bank of the James in command of his own corps 
 [Second] and the Tenth Corps [Birney]. The special object 
 of this expedition was to prevent General Lee from detaching 
 'troops to Early in the Shenandoah Valley, and, of course, to 
 capture Richmond if a chance offered to do so. Hancock's 
 command remained on the north bank of the James, where it 
 was engaged in several minor actions, until the night of the 
 
 *Humphreys. 
 
Siege of Petersburg. 523 
 
 20th of August, when it was recalled. The two corps resumed 
 their places in the trenches at Petersburg and Bermuda Hun- 
 dred respectively. 
 
 Warren was ordered to withdraw his corps from its in- 
 trenchments on the morning of August 18 and to move it to the 
 Weldon Railway ; he was to make a lodgment upon the railway 
 near Dr. Gurley's, and destroy it as far south as possible. He 
 was also to consider his movement a reconnaissance in force,, 
 "and take advantage of any weakness the enemy might be- 
 tray." In ordering this movement General Grant said, "I 
 want, if possible, to make such demonstrations as will force 
 Lee to withdraw a portion of his troops from the Valley, so 
 that Sheridan can strike a blow against the balance."* 
 
 Spear's brigade of cavalry was assigned to Warren, who> 
 later was also given three divisions of the Ninth Corps. War- 
 ren found nothing but Dearing's Confederate cavalry brigade 
 guarding the railway. Pie formed his corps along the railway 
 from near the Globe Tavern to a point north of the junction of 
 the Vaughan Road, and began tearing up the track. In front 
 of his right wing was a large field of corn which hid everything 
 from view. Dearing had reported the arrival of Warren, and 
 Heth had been sent out on the Vaughan Road with two bri- 
 gades to attack him. Concealed by the corn, Heth fell sud- 
 denly upon Warren's right wing and drove one of his brigades 
 back. Later Heth was driven back. 
 
 (277) On the morning of the 19th Warren extended his- 
 right through dense woods and underbrush to connect by a 
 skirmish line with the left of the Ninth Corps in the trenches. 
 In the course of the day the divisions of this corps were sent to- 
 reinforce him. That afternoon A. P. Hill, with Heth's com- 
 mand of the day before, reinforced by three brigades under 
 Mahone, and some cavalry and artillery, moved out to the 
 Vaughan Road. About half-past four o'clock Mahone, ad- 
 vancing in the thicket, broke through the skirmish line on 
 Warren's right, and took the right of his main line in flank 
 and rear, rolling a part of it up in confusion, while Heth at- 
 tacked it in front. Warren managed, however, to rally his 
 troops, and put two divisions of the Ninth Corps into the ac- 
 tion ; then he drove Mahone's troops "back in great confusion 
 to their intrenchments."* 
 
 Warren's loss in this engagement was 382 killed and 
 
 ♦Humphreys. 
 
524 American Campaigns. 
 
 wounded, and 2,518 missing. Satisfied that the Confederates 
 would renew the attack the next day, and feeling himself at a 
 great disadvantage in the dense unknown brush, Warren with- 
 drew to open ground about a mile farther back and intrenched. 
 On the 21st Hill attacked him in his new position, but was re- 
 pulsed, and thereafter no more attacks were made upon War- 
 ren. The line of Union earthworks was then extended by the 
 Ninth Corps from the Jerusalem Plank Road to connect with 
 Warren's intrenchments on the Weldon Railway. 
 
 On the 22nd of August Hancock was sent with two of his 
 divisions and Gregg's cavalry division to break up the Wel- 
 don Railway south of Reams's Station. At Reams's Station, 
 on the afternoon of the 25th, he was attacked by A. P. Hill's 
 corps and Hampton's cavalry in an old intrenchment made by 
 troops that had gone out to Wilson's relief. Hancock was de- 
 feated and driven out of the intrenchment. Miles's division 
 and Gregg's cavalry fought well, but Gibbon's division "could 
 neither be made to go forward nor to fire" ; the division acted 
 disgracefully. Hancock "attributed the bad conduct of some 
 of his troops to their great fatigue and to their heavy losses 
 during the campaign, especially in officers. Besides, there 
 were several regiments largely made up of recruits and sub- 
 stitutes."* 
 
 (270) The next movement was made on the north side of 
 the James by a part of Butler's army, and it resulted in the cap- 
 ture of Fort Harrison near Chapin's Bluff, but in nothing 
 more. (278) About the same time Warren with the Fifth 
 Corps, and the Ninth (now commanded by Parkef), and 
 Gregg's cavalry, made a movement to the left, which resulted 
 in extending the Union line considerably in that direction. 
 The intrenchments reached a point about a mile and a quar- 
 ter northwest of Poplar Springs Church, and from there 
 turned sharply back toward the Vaughan Road. The Confed- 
 erate line of intrenchments in this quarter covered the Boydton 
 Plank Road and the Southside Railway ; it ran nearly parallel 
 to the Boydton Plank Road and ended near the Crow farm at 
 Hatcher's Run. 
 
 On the 27th of October Grant made another movement to 
 the left with the purpose of turning Lee's right and seizing 
 
 ♦Humphreys. 
 
 fFor his conduct in connection with the mine fiasco Burnside was 
 censured by a court of inquiry, and on the 15th of April, 1865, he re- 
 signed from the service. 
 
Siege of Petersburg. 525 
 
 the Southside Railway. Hancock was to move by the Vaughan 
 — Dabney's Mill — Boydton — White Oak — Claiborne roads to 
 the railway, while the Fifth Corps [Warren] and Ninth 
 [Parke] were to attack and turn the Confederate right. Han- 
 cock encountered hostile artillery at Burgess's Mill, and War- 
 ren and Parke became engaged in the woods on both sides of 
 Hatcher's Run. Meade halted Hancock to wait for Warren 
 to come up and cooperate with him; but before Warren 
 joined him A. P. Hill attacked him, sending Mahone's divi- 
 sion through the woods to assail his right flank. The flank- 
 attack had come near succeeding, when Egan's division [Sec- 
 ond Corps] fell upon Mahone's flank and drove it back into 
 the woods in confusion. Hill's attack, however, had stopped 
 the movement. The Union troops were withdrawn the next 
 day to their former positions. 
 
 In support of this movement against the right of the Con- 
 federate line, Butler had been directed to make a demonstra- 
 tion against Richmond on the north side of the James with a 
 part of his command. He sent a column of the Tenth Corps 
 under Terry, and a column of the Eighteenth under Weitzel, 
 which were met and repulsed by troops under Longstreet, who 
 had recovered from his wound and was now in command of 
 the Confederate forces north of the James. 
 
 In December Warren made another expedition down the 
 Weldon Railway, and destroyed eighteen to twenty miles of 
 the track, much to Lee's distress. It made the haul by wagon- 
 train longer for the Confederates, and increased the difficulty 
 of supply by so much. 
 
 (279) In the early days of February, 1865, another in- 
 effectual movement was made to turn the Confederate right 
 and seize the Southside Railway. The Union force was com- 
 posed of the Second Corps (now commanded by Hum- 
 phreys*), the Fifth [Warren], and Gregg's cavalry. This 
 movement, also, was met by the right of Lee's army and check- 
 mated. The Confederate intrenchments now reached across 
 Hatcher's Run at the Crow farm, and from Burgess's Mill 
 along White Oak Road, and west of the Claiborne Road. The 
 Union line had been prolonged to Hatcher's Run near the 
 crossing of the Vaughan Road. 
 
 The only other enterprise of special interest before the 
 end of the siege of Petersburg was Gordon's assault upon 
 
 ♦Toward the end of November General Hancock had been ordered 
 to Washington to organize a new First Corps. 
 
526 American Campaigns. 
 
 Fort Stedman in the Union line. Gordon now commanded 
 Early's corps, which had rejoined, and he held the left of the 
 Confederate works south of the James. Fort Stedman was only 
 about 200 yards in front of his line. The column of assault 
 formed before dawn on March 25 ; it was 3,000 to 4,000 
 strong, and was to be supported by another column. It moved 
 forward silently, surprised the Union garrison, and captured 
 the fort; but the supporting column 'had failed to advance. 
 The cannon of Fort Haskell opened fire upon the victors in 
 the fort, a heavy column of infantry fell upon them, "and 
 something like the scene which followed the mine explosion 
 ensued."* Many of Gordon's men were made prisoners, while 
 many others were killed or wounded. 
 
 Grant's repeated movements against Lee's right and left 
 had caused an extension of the Confederate works to a 
 length of more than thirty-five miles. It was plain to Lee that 
 soon or late Grant would break this weak line somewhere, or 
 would succeed in turning it and cutting off his railways; and 
 that his only chance then would lie in making his escape with 
 his army, and uniting it with Joseph E. Johnston's, now in 
 North Carolina. This was exactly what Grant meant to pre- 
 vent if possible. 
 
 Sheridan had rejoined Grant from the Shenandoah Valley 
 and the Sixth Corps had also returned. The Tenth and Eigh- 
 teenth Corps had been done away with ; while the white troops 
 of Butler's army had been organized into the Twenty-fourth 
 Corps under Ord, and the negro troops of that army had been 
 organized into the Twenty-fifth Corps under Weitzel. At this 
 time Grant had 101.000 infantry, 14,700 cavalry, and 9,000 ar- 
 tillery; Lee had 46,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 5,000 ar- 
 tillery. On the 29th of March Grant's last movement to the 
 left began. Sheridan with the cavalry went by way of Din- 
 widdie Court House to strike the Southside and the Richmond 
 and Danville Railways, which intersect at Burkesville [Burke's 
 Station]. (275) The rest of the army, or the bulk of it, 
 moved to envelop the Confederate right. (279) Perceiving 
 this movement, Lee hurried as large a force as he could spare 
 to his trenches along the White Oak Road, where A. P. Hill 
 was in command. Then, as in every case before, Hill, instead 
 of waiting to be attacked, moved out himself, and attacked the 
 Union left flank, while it was entangled in the swampy forest. 
 
 ♦Long. 
 
Siege of Petersburg. 527 
 
 He rolled up Warren's left flank at first, but later was driven 
 iack to his trenches. 
 
 Sheridan advanced toward Five Forks, but was met on the 
 way by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, supported by Pickett's and 
 Johnson's divisions of infantry, which had been sent out to 
 stop him. He was driven back to Dinwiddie Court House. 
 Pickett then fell back to Five Forks, where he made the mis- 
 take of halting and intrenching, instead of returning to the 
 right of the main army four miles away. Here he was as- 
 saulted and defeated, on the 1st of April, by Sheridan, who had 
 •been reinforced by Warren with the Fifth Corps. 
 
 On the 2nd of April Grant renewed his assault on the Con- 
 federate right, breaking the line and forcing it back. The 
 Federals then took possession of the Southside Railway, and 
 the Confederates fell back toward Petersburg, pursued by the 
 Federals. The pursuit continued until it was arrested by the 
 guns of Fort Gregg.* Here Longstreet's corps, which had 
 'been called in all haste from before Richmond, came into the 
 fightf 
 
 (280) That night Lee's army quitted Petersburg and Rich- 
 mond and started westward. Grant followed on the south side 
 of the Appomattox. Lee hurried toward the Danville Rail- 
 way, hoping to reach either Danville or Lynchburg ahead of 
 the Union army, and to unite with Johnston. He had ar- 
 ranged to ration his army at Amelia Court House, but by 
 some blunder his provisions were not stopped there but were 
 carried on to Richmond, "and nearly twenty-four hours were 
 lost in endeavoring to collect, in the country, subsistence for 
 men and horses."! Sheridan with his cavalry and the Second 
 and Sixth Corps led in the pursuit. Both he and Lee made 
 for Burkesville [Burke's Station] ; he beat in the race. 
 
 Lee now had Union columns upon his flank and behind him, 
 .and Sheridan's cavalry was riding far ahead to cut off his re- 
 treat. A running fight was kept up all the way. At Sailor's 
 Creek, on the 6th of April, Ewell's corps, which formed the 
 rear guard, "was cut off, surrounded and captured, some 8,000 
 men."§ For four days the Confederates had nothing to eat 
 
 *Long. 
 
 fin this last day's battle A. P. Hill was slain ;*he°had borne a con- 
 spicuous part in every battle the Army of Northern Virginia had 
 t'ought, except Spottsylvania, where he was sick. 
 
 JLee's letter to Jefferson Davis. ' 
 
 §Dodge in B. & L. 
 
528 American Campaigns. 
 
 but a little parched corn. At Farmville Lee crossed to the 
 north side of the Appomattox, setting fire to the bridges. The 
 Second Corps [Humphreys] came up in time to save one of 
 the bridges. It attacked the Confederate rear and was re- 
 pulsed with a loss of 600 men. At Appomattox Court House 
 Sheridan's cavalry stood across Lee's path, and the end was 
 at hand. There Lee surrendered to Grant on the 9th of 
 April, and some 28,000 hungry Confederates were fed and 
 paroled. 
 
 In these closing operations the Union army had lost about 
 10,000 men. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 (268) Grant's movement from Cold Harbor to the south 
 bank of the James belongs to a class of strategical operations 
 which are considered among the most hazardous and difficult 
 in warfare. It was a flank movement involving the crossing 
 of close and wooded country by narrow roads, and the passage 
 of two difficult streams, the Chickahominy and the James, 
 over which pontoon-bridges had to be laid. Grant appreci- 
 ated the hazard of the undertaking, but he says, "The move 
 had to be made, and I relied upon Lee's not seeing my danger 
 as I saw it." There was really nothing else left for him to do. 
 Lee's army was intrenched squarely in front of him, and his 
 repulse at Cold Harbor had convinced him that it could not be 
 destroyed or driven away by frontal attacks. 
 
 Grant had fifty-odd miles to go, and Lee was in possession 
 of the bridges of the Chickahominy, better roads, and a better 
 knowledge of the country to aid him in attacking the right 
 flank of Grant's columns. The movement was skilfully car- 
 ried out. The army was "got out of a position but a few 
 hundred yards from the enemy in the widest place"* and Wil- 
 son's cavalry and the Fifth Corps [Warren] covered its right 
 flank so effectively as to induce Lee to believe that it was ma- 
 king for Richmond by the north bank of the James, and to keep 
 him in ignorance or uncertainty as to its whereabouts and des- 
 tination, from the time when Grant withdrew, the night of the 
 12th of June, till the morning of the 18th, when he had com- 
 pleted the difficult movement and concentrated his army in 
 front of Petersburg. When one considers how unexpected the 
 
 ♦Grant. 
 
Siege of Petersburg. 529 
 
 movement was to General Lee, and how long he was kept in 
 doubt and uncertainty ; how skilfully all the difficulties of logis- 
 tics were surmounted, and how quickly the movement was 
 made, one must reckon it, in conception and execution, among 
 the very finest achievements of strategy to be found in our 
 military history. 
 
 Grant's failure to defeat Lee's army, or to capture Rich- 
 mond by operations on the north side of the James, and his 
 ultimate success by way of the south side, justify the belief 
 that McClellan might have succeeded in a similar manner in 
 1862 if he had not been stopped by General Halleck. Mc- 
 Clellan might, in fact, have made quicker work of it than 
 Grant did, for he might have captured Petersburg before the 
 town was completely intrenched and defended by Lee's army. 
 Petersburg was the key to the situation ; if it could have been 
 taken at the start, while Lee still kept the bulk of his forces 
 on the north bank of the river watching for Grant to advance 
 on that bank, the fall of Richmond and the surrender of Lee's 
 army would probably have taken place many weeks earlier.. 
 General Grant took measures for its early capture; it was for 
 this that Smith was hurried back by water to Bermuda Hun- 
 dred by way of White House, and Hancock was hurried across 
 the James before the pontoon-bridge was laid. Hancock's 
 march from the James to Petersburg was delayed to await the 
 arrival of his rations, but Smith arrived in front of Petersburg 
 in time. Grant says, "I believed then, and still believe, that 
 Petersburg could have been easily captured at that time. It 
 only had about 2,500 men in the defenses, besides some irregu- 
 lar troops, consisting of citizens and employees in the city who 
 took up arms in case of emergency." In fact, Butler ought to 
 have captured Petersburg weeks before — early in May. His 
 corps-commanders urged him to let them do so, while the 
 town was practically defenseless; but Butler refused. 
 
 Hancock's waiting for his rations on the morning of June 
 the 15th was the fatal mistake in the Federal operations of this 
 campaign. Those six hours of delay probably prolonged the 
 life of the Confederacy several months. Smith, having frit- 
 tered away the whole day, opened his assault upon the scantily 
 manned works of Petersburg at 7 p.m. If Hancock had been 
 there then with the whole, or a large part, of the Second 
 Corps, it is hard to doubt that the works would have been 
 carried and Petersburg taken that evening; but if Hancock 
 had started at sunrise, instead of after ten o'clock, he would 
 
530 American Campaigns. 
 
 have reached Petersburg several hours before 7 p.m. Yet 
 no blame attaches to General Hancock's splendid record ; the 
 fault was mainly General Grant's. He forgot, or otherwise 
 failed, either to name the hour for Hancock's start, or to in- 
 form Hancock, or his immediate commander, Meade, when 
 Smith was going to start ; and Meade even failed to inform 
 Hancock that there was to be an assault upon Petersburg in 
 which Hancock was expected to take part. 
 
 General Alexander says the omission was due to "the politi- 
 cal necessity of placing Butler in command of the Army of the 
 James." Smith belonged to that army, and General Grant, it 
 appears, felt himself under the necessity of going to the head- 
 quarters of Butler to consult that incompetent, but politically 
 powerful, soldier about the project, and thus failed to attend 
 to a vital detail at his own headquarters. If American youth 
 could be taught in their schools how much the "political neces- 
 sity," which gave important commands to Butler and Banks 
 and Patterson and Sigel and Shields and scores of others, cost 
 our country in treasure and time and blood, it is impossible to 
 believe that such a necessity would be tolerated in a future war. 
 But the weakest thread in the fabric of the American boy's 
 education is his knownelge of the real truth of his own coun- 
 try's military history. 
 
 In the long siege of Petersburg Lee had the advantage of 
 interior lines of operation and of a better knowledge of the 
 intricate wooded country and cross-roads. He made such good 
 use of his advantages as to meet every movement of his enemy 
 to right or left, up to the very last, with a force large enough 
 to stop him. Not until Lee's line of works had stretched to 
 more than thirty- five miles, with only about 1,000 men to the 
 mile to hold it, and Sheridan's large force of cavalry was 
 threatening his only line of supply and retreat, was Lee driven 
 back from his outer line of intrenchments, and forced to flee 
 with his army. 
 
 Looking only to a prolongation of the war, Lee ought to have 
 withdrawn his army from Richmond and Petersburg many 
 weeks sooner — before his troops had become thoroughly dis- 
 heartened by hardships and the conviction that they would 
 have to lay down their arms in the end. From a purely mili- 
 tary point of view he ought not to have stopped with his army 
 at all in Richmond and Petersburg after Grant crossed the 
 James. There were political reasons: the Presidential elec- 
 
Siege of Petersburg. 531 
 
 tion in the United States would take place in November, 1864, 
 and there was the chance of the election of a Democratic Presi- 
 dent; a large proportion of the people of the United States 
 were heartily tired of the war ; the draft-law and the high war- 
 taxes were very much disliked ; gold had risen to 285 in July, 
 and the expenses of the war amounted to nearly $4,000,000 a 
 day ; Grant's campaign as far southward as the Chickahominy 
 had been one of tactical defeats with heavy losses, which car- 
 ried sorrow home to every part of the land; the last battle, 
 Cold Harbor, was the costliest repulse the Union army had 
 suffered ; the morale of Lee's army was as good as ever. If 
 Grants' army could be held at bay until after the election, and 
 the Confederate government could be guarded securely in its 
 capital until the same time, there was hope that terms of peace 
 could be arranged with the United States, in case the election 
 should go against Mr. Lincoln. Whereas, if Lee should aban- 
 don Richmond before November, the Confederate government 
 would have to withdraw, and Grant could take the Confed- 
 erate capital, which for four years had been the goal of the 
 Union army. This would not only make the reelection of Mr. 
 Lincoln all the more certain, but would lessen the chances of 
 making terms of peace even if Mr. Lincoln should by any 
 possibility be beaten in the election. 
 
 General Alexander believes that the South had a better 
 chance of obtaining favorable terms of peace in the summer 
 and fall of 1864 than at any other time of the war. Nothing 
 else at that time would have strengthened the Administration 
 with the people of the United States and assured its reelec- 
 tion in November like ending the war upon terms creditable to 
 the United States. The people of the North, as, also, the peo- 
 ple of the South, were sick and tired of war ; they longed for 
 peace. If President Lincoln could have proclaimed peace in 
 the land at any time before the day of the election his return 
 to the White House would have been assured. The Confeder- 
 ate authorities failed to take advantage of the opportunity, and 
 soon events occurred in other theaters that lifted the despon- 
 dency of the North and made the reelection of Mr. Lincoln 
 and the further prosecution of the war certain. These events 
 were the successes of Farragut in Mobile Bay; of Sherman 
 against Hood at Atlanta, toward the end of August; and the 
 victories of Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley in September. 
 
 After the reelection of Mr. Lincoln there does not appear to 
 have been any political reason for Lee's remaining at Rich- 
 
532 American Campaigns. 
 
 mond. He knew, and the Confederate president must have 
 known, that he should have to retreat sooner or later. Early 
 in March it was agreed between him and Mr. Davis "that as 
 soon as the roads would admit of movement"* Lee should 
 withdraw his army from the Richmond and Petersburg lines 
 and hasten to unite it with Joseph E. Johnston's army in North 
 Carolina for a combined attack on Sherman. Grant was on 
 the watch for such a movement, and says in his Memoirs, "One 
 of the most anxious periods of my experience during the re- 
 bellion was the last few weeks before Petersburg. I felt that 
 the situation of the Confederate army was such that they would 
 try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and 
 I was afraid, every morning, that I would wake from my sleep 
 to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a 
 picket line." 
 
 It is hard to see what real good Lee hoped to accomplish 
 by the assault of Fort Stedman. Some historians have stated 
 that the object of the assault was to induce Grant to transfer 
 troops from his left to his right, which would make it easier 
 for Lee to withdraw his army and begin his retreat. Lee's 
 biographer, General Long, says : "It was one of those military 
 movements whose purpose is left in abeyance, the future policy 
 of the commander being dependent upon his measure of suc- 
 cess and the change in the situation thereby occasioned." The 
 fewer movements a commander makes with such indefinite 
 objects as General Long's language implies, the better it is 
 for the cause he serves. Every military operation should have 
 a definite object. General Alexander says simply that before 
 undertaking to evacuate Richmond and Petersburg, and march 
 to North Carolina to join Johnston, "which was felt to be an 
 almost impossible task," Lee "determined upon one last effort 
 to break up Grant in his immediate front, in spite of all his 
 fortifications." If this was Lee's purpose, with such odds 
 against him, despair had warped his judgment. 
 
 It was the two railways, the Southside [Lynchburg] and the 
 Danville, but particularly the Danville line, that enabled Lee to 
 maintain his army at Richmond and Petersburg for so many 
 months. Without those lines of supply he would have had to 
 retreat or surrender many weeks sooner. If Petersburg had 
 been taken at the start, Lee would undoubtedly first have tried 
 to hold the line of the Appomattox River and also to guard 
 
 ♦Humphreys. 
 
Siege of Petersburg. 533 
 
 the Danville Railway. When turned out of that line, if 
 still tied to Richmond, he would, within a few weeks, have 
 been driven across the James into Richmond, or shut up in a 
 line of earthworks having both of its flanks resting on the 
 south bank of the James. This, however, would have been to 
 surrender the Danville Railway to the enemy. Nothing but 
 the orders of President Davis would have induced Lee to put 
 his army into such a trap. He would rather have placed his 
 back to the Richmond and Danville Railway and defended it 
 as long as practicable ; then, when turned or driven from it, he 
 would have retreated toward Danville or Lynchburg. 
 
 Richmond, chosen as the capital only as a sop to Virginia, of 
 course, was always the point of greatest weakness in the South- 
 ern Confederacy. The choice really was the worst thing that 
 could have been imposed upon Virginia, for it subjected her 
 soil to four years of steady campaign. Strategically consid- 
 ered, Chattanooga should have been made the seat of the Con- 
 federate government. It is possible, however, that a newly 
 established government, which has to fight for its existence, 
 would get along better with no fixed capital, or with one easily 
 shifted, like that of our forefathers of the Revolution. 
 
 As the primary object of Grant's campaign was to get pos- 
 session of the two railways leading into Richmond from the 
 south and southwest, it looks, at first glance, as if he ought to 
 have succeeded in less than nine months. It looks as if he 
 could have left a comparatively small force intrenched in front 
 of Petersburg, and moved the bulk of his army against those 
 railways. He might have done this, as the Japanese did with 
 Port Arthur, if Lee's army had been shut up within limited for- 
 tifications at Petersburg; but Lee's army never was invested. 
 This army was so favored by the relative positions of Rich- 
 mond and Petersburg, and the conformation of the James and 
 the Appomattox, that Grant could not shut it up in either town. 
 He could not leave a small force in front of Petersburg and 
 march off with his main army without thereby giving Lee an 
 opportunity to turn the position of the small force and fall 
 upon his base on the James. So Grant had to continue his 
 wearing-out policy, gradually extending his left all the while 
 toward the railways. 
 
 The work of Sheridan's cavalry in the last phase of this final 
 campaign cannot be commended too highly; instead of going 
 off upon some useless raid, as it had done on a former occasion, 
 
534 American Campaigns. 
 
 it stayed with the main army and did most effective work. It 
 cut off Lee's retreat upon Danville and turned it toward 
 Lynchburg; and then blocked the way to that town. But for 
 the Union cavalry Lee might have reached the mountains of 
 Virginia. 
 
 This suggests the inquiry, why did Lee want to reach the 
 mountains and prolong the struggle further? He knew, and 
 the moribund government at Richmond knew, that the war 
 could not last much longer ; why, then, did he not end the hard- 
 ships of his army, and the further shedding of blood, by sur- 
 rendering in front of Richmond ? It was the hope of securing 
 better terms of peace for his army and the South that made 
 him retreat. He could scarcely have hoped for more gener- 
 ous terms than those granted by General Grant at Appomattox. 
 
LECTURE XXV. 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 
 
 (281) After the battle of Chattanooga, November 25, 1863, 
 we left Bragg, with the Confederate army, in full retreat 
 along his line of communications to the southeast. He was 
 not vigorously and persistently pursued, but was allowed to 
 hold his army and intrench it in front of Dalton, within twenty- 
 five miles of the field of his defeat. In his Memoirs General 
 Grant says, "Chattanooga now being secure to the National 
 troops beyond any doubt, I immediately turned my attention 
 to relieving Knoxville, etc." 
 
 The Confederate army at Dalton was not further molested 
 during the winter. In response to the dissatisfaction publicly 
 expressed against Bragg at the South, and in accordance with 
 his own request, President Davis relieved him of the command, 
 but manifested abiding faith in his ability, by calling him to 
 Richmond as chief-of-staff. Toward the end of December 
 Joseph E. Johnston was transferred from Mississippi to take 
 command at Dalton. The Richmond authorities were anxious 
 for Johnston to assume the offensive as soon as possible, and 
 try to recover Tennessee. But the strength, morale, means of 
 transportation, and supplies of the army were not such as to 
 let Johnston believe that he should succeed, if he took the 
 initiative. "I can see no other mode of taking the offensive 
 here," he wrote Mr. Davis, "than to beat the enemy when he 
 advances, and then move forward."* So Johnston remained 
 on the defensive at Dalton, doing what he could to improve 
 the condition of his command. He organized it into two 
 army-corps, under Hardee and Hood respectively. A few 
 days after the campaign began, in May, General Polk joined 
 him with another corps, raising the strength of his command 
 to about 60,000. Wheeler commanded his cavalry, organized 
 as a corps, which numbered at the start less than 2,000 horse- 
 men. 
 
 The Federal forces in Tennessee did little during the rest of 
 the winter. General Grant remained in command, until he 
 was made lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief of all 
 the land forces, as we have seen, in March, 1864. He was suc- 
 
 *Johnston's Narrative. 
 
536 American Campaigns. 
 
 ceeded by General Sherman in Tennessee. The bad condition 
 of the roads in the early spring, the difficulty of transporting 
 •enough supplies by the single line of railway from the base at 
 Nashville, and the temporary depletion of the ranks, due to 
 the so-called "veteran act/' made it impracticable for Sherman 
 to take the offensive against Johnston before the first of May.* 
 
 Meantime some changes were made in the organization of 
 Sherman's forces. The Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were con- 
 solidated into a single corps, the Twentieth, and placed under 
 command of Hooker; and Howard replaced Gordon Granger 
 in command of the Fourth Corps. McPherson came into 
 command of the Army of the Tennessee, consisting of the 
 Fifteenth and Seventeenth, and part of the Sixteenth Corps. 
 -Schofield had succeeded Burnside in command of the Army of 
 the Ohio, now consisting of the Twenty-third Corps only. 
 General Thomas still commanded the Army of the Cumber- 
 land, now composed of the Fourth, the Fourteenth, and the 
 Twentieth Corps. Some other changes in commanders were 
 made before the end of the campaign. 
 
 As finally organized the army was distributed as follows 
 just before the campaign opened : the Army of the Ohio 
 [Schofield], 13,559, near Red Clay, on the railway thirteen 
 miles north of Dalton; the Army of the Cumberland [Thom- 
 as], 60,773, near Ringgold, on the Chattanooga railway, 
 twelve miles northwest of Dalton; the Army of the Tennes- 
 see [McPherson], 24,465, at Lee and Gordon's Mill, twenty 
 miles northwest of Dalton.f The Union front, from Red 
 Clay to Lee and Gordon's Mill, was twenty miles long. The 
 cavalry, though nominally attached to the three subordinate 
 armies, was, during the campaign, organized in four divisions 
 which were assigned to duty by General Sherman as circum- 
 stances required. One division was usually on each flank, and 
 one covering the line of communications, whilst the fourth 
 was ready for expeditions to the front. The nearest subordi- 
 nate army-commander usually exercised authority over the 
 cavalry cooperating with him4 
 
 *The Veteran Volunteer Act provided that all men that should re- 
 enlist for the period of the war should receive transportation home a 
 month's furlough, and a bounty of $400. The law had the desired 
 effect, but seriously depleted Sherman's ranks during the absence of 
 the veterans on their furlough. The last of them were not due to re- 
 turn before the 1st of May. 
 
 tSherman in B. & L. 
 
 IBigelow's Principles of Strategy. 
 
The Campaign of Atlanta. 537 
 
 We learned in the lecture on the battle of the Wilderness 
 that General Grant's instructions to Sherman for his part in 
 the general plan of combined operations, in the spring of 1864, 
 directed him "to move against Johnston's army, to break it 
 up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far 
 as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war 
 resources. ..." Atlanta, eighty-five miles from Dal- 
 ton, was Johnston's base. It was a large town at the junc- 
 tion of several railways of strategic importance: one leading 
 through Dalton to Chattanooga, was the line of communica- 
 tions of both hostile armies; one to Virginia, by way of Dan- 
 ville, was the line of communication between Johnston and 
 Lee ; one through the heart of Georgia to the coast ; and one 
 to Montgomery, Alabama. After Johnston's army, Atlanta 
 was obviously Sherman's next most important objective, and 
 it was the most important place for Johnston to guard. Gen- 
 eral Sherman says, "Atlanta was known as the Gate-City of 
 the South, was full of foundries, arsenals, and machine-shops, 
 and I knew that its capture would be the death-knell of the 
 Southern Confederacy."* 
 
 The country between Chattanooga and Atlanta was gener- 
 ally wooded, and all except the space between the Oostanaula 
 and the Etowah Rivers was rugged and hilly. In front of 
 Dalton was a north-and-south ridge some thirty miles long, 
 that could be crossed by an army at two places only — at the 
 gap where the railway passed through it, and fourteen miles 
 farther south, at Snake Creek Gap. Just south of the Etowah 
 the railway broke through another rocky barrier by way of 
 Allatoona Pass. Farther south, in front of Marietta, was 
 another line of rather disconnected hills, the principal ones of 
 which were Brush Mountain, Kenesaw Mountain, and Lost 
 Mountain, and a little farther to the north, Pine Mountain. 
 Crossing the theater, athwart the route from Dalton to Atlanta, 
 were the Oostanaula, the Etowah, and the Chattahoochee 
 Rivers and their branches. All of the roads were of the 
 poorest kind, made worse by weeks of rain during the opera- 
 tions. 
 
 Finding Johnston's position at Dalton too strong to attack, 
 Sherman resolved to turn it. The operation began on the 7th 
 of May. McPherson, with the Army of the Tennessee, pre- 
 ceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry division, made the turning- 
 
 *Sherman's Memoirs. 
 
538 American Campaigns. 
 
 movement by way of Villanow and Snake Creek Gap. Thom- 
 as, with the Army of the Cumberland, supported him by mak- 
 ing a strong demonstration against Tunnel Hill and Rocky 
 Face Ridge, the front of Johnston's position. On the 9th 
 Schofield, with the Army of the Ohio, moved down from 
 the north. E. M. McCook's cavalry division covered Scho- 
 field's left, and was worsted in a dismounted skirmish with 
 Wheeler's cavalry at Varnell's station. 
 
 Having put to flight a Confederate cavalry brigade about 
 to occupy Snake Creek Gap, McPherson, by the afternoon 
 of the 9th of May, was close upon Resaca. His orders were 
 to capture the railway, in order to compel Johnston either to 
 detach a large force for its recovery or to evacuate the position 
 altogether at Dalton.* But McPherson considered the posi- 
 tion at Resaca too strong to assault; so, with the discretion 
 allowed him in his order, he retired to the southern end of 
 Snake Creek Gap, and there took up a strong position in order 
 to hold the Gap. 
 
 Thereupon Sherman moved his whole army to Snake Creek 
 Gap, except the Fourth Corps [Howard] and Stoneman's 
 cavalry division, which were left to cover his communications. 
 By the 12th of May he had the army concentrated at McPher- 
 son's position. Johnston received information of this move- 
 ment from the scouts on the left of his line. Wheeler moved 
 his cavalry round the north end of the ridge, and, driving back 
 Sherman's cavalry, confirmed the information. Thereupon 
 Johnston, on the morning of the 13th (May), withdrew his 
 army to Resaca. There he was joined by Polk's corps. 
 
 Johnston took up a position behind intrenchments, on an 
 irregular curve, covering Resaca, the bridges, and the railway. 
 His right and left flanks rested on the Connasauga and the 
 Oostanaula Rivers respectively. The Fourth Corps [How- 
 ard] and Stoneman's cavalry followed Johnston through 
 Dalton. Sherman deployed his army against the position at 
 Resaca, and made a partial attack on the 14th. Pressing the 
 enemy's front and right on the 15th, Sherman dispatched a 
 division of infantry and Kilpatrick's cavalry to cross the Oosta- 
 naula by pontoon-bridge at Lay's Ferry, five miles southwest 
 of Resaca. The cavalry advanced upon Calhoun. At the 
 same time Garrard's cavalry division was started from Villa- 
 now, by way of Rome, to break up the railway between Cal- 
 
 *Sherman. 
 
The Campaign of Atlanta. 539 
 
 houn and Kingston. These operations forced Johnston to 
 withdraw from Resaca during the night of the ISth of May. 
 He burned the railway bridge behind him. Johnston hoped to 
 find a "favorable position near Calhoun," but there was none; 
 so, after resting his army for eighteen or twenty hours at that 
 place, he resumed his retreat to Adairsville on the 17th. Here 
 his army was increased by the junction of a force of 3,700 
 cavalry, under W. H. Jackson. 
 
 On the 16th Sherman took up the pursuit. Jeff. C. Davis's 
 division [Fourteenth Corps] marched to the support of 
 Gerrard's cavalry in the capture of Rome. This town was 
 important, on account of the Confederate machine-shops and 
 iron-works, as well as the large quantities of cotton and stores 
 collected there. The Army of the Tennessee [McPherson], on 
 the right, advanced by way of Lay's Ferry ; Thomas, in the 
 center, followed the railway; Schofield, on the left, crossed 
 the river six or eight miles east of Resaca.* The cavalry was 
 out on both flanks, with instructions to reach the enemy's rear 
 if possible. The hostile armies were now in comparatively 
 open, rolling country, where Sherman's superior numbers 
 would have a better chance of winning a decisive victory, in 
 case Johnston could be brought to battle.f 
 
 Johnston had expected to make a stand at Adairsville, and 
 to place his line across the valley in which the railway lay, 
 with his flanks upon the heights on each side. Finding the 
 valley, however, too wide for the front of his army, in order 
 of battle, he adopted other methods. Two roads led south- 
 ward from Adairsville, one directly to Cassville, the other by 
 way of Kingston. These two places were about seven miles 
 apart. Johnston retreated with Hardee's corps on the Kings- 
 ton road, and those of Polk and Hood on the Cassville road. 
 The two hostile armies were now, on the 18th of May, march- 
 ing with wider fronts than at any time before. t The flanks of 
 the Federal army were, however, farther apart than those of 
 the Confederate army. 
 
 Johnston purposed taking advantage of this situation, by 
 having Polk's corps make a stand on the Cassville road, while 
 Hardee should guard the flank toward Kingston, and Hood 
 should fall upon the left of Schofield, as Schofield deployed to 
 attack Polk. The project failed through Hood's fault. Under 
 the belief that the Federal column to the east of him had 
 
 ♦Sherman. 
 fBigelow. 
 
540 American Campaigns. 
 
 turned his own right, Hood faced his corps to his right and 
 rear. "The time thus lost frustrated Johnston's design, for 
 success depended upon timing the attack properly." Johnston 
 then took up a strong defensive position with his three corps, 
 on a ridge immediately south of Cassville.* 
 
 On the 19th of May Schofield from the north and Thomas 
 by way of Kingston closed upon the Cenfederates at Cass- 
 ville, and skirmished with them until dusk. Johnston meant 
 to give battle in this position, but that night Hood and Polk, 
 who were on the right, insisted that they should be exposed to 
 enfilade artillery fire, and should be unable to hold their part of 
 the line.* Johnston, consequently, retired before daylight of 
 the 20th, upon a strong position at Allatoona Pass.f The 
 position at Allatoona was too strong to assail in front; Sher- 
 man, therefore, after giving his army three days of rest, set 
 out on the 23rd with twenty days' supplies in his wagons to 
 turn the position, converging his columns, including Davis's 
 division from Rome, upon Dallas. Stoneman's cavalry divi- 
 sion covered his left, Garrard's his right, and McCook's cleared 
 the front for his center.f Kilpatrick's covered the rear and 
 guarded the crossings of the Etowah.J 
 
 Finding his position at Allatoona about to be turned, Johns- 
 ton withdrew and took up a new position at New Hope 
 Church. Driving back the Confederate cavalry, Sherman's 
 army appeared before this position on the 26th of May, with 
 McPherson at Dallas, Thomas in front of New Hope Church, 
 and Schofield on Thomas's left. Owing to the rugged and 
 wooded character of the ground it took several days of skir- 
 mishing for the Federals to develop the Confederate position. 
 On the 1st of June the Union army shifted bodily to the left, 
 bringing McPherson in front of New Hope Church. The 
 Union cavalry [Stoneman and McCook] seized Allatoona. By 
 the 6th of June Sherman's army was again across the railway 
 at Ackworth. McPherson and Thomas had passed by the rear 
 of Schofield, reversing the order in line of the subordinate 
 armies. In the new line Schofield was on the right, McPherson 
 on the left, and Thomas in the center. A new depot was at 
 once set up at Allatoona. Meantime Johnston had shifted his 
 position to the right, and his line now reached from Lost 
 
 *Johnston in B. & L. 
 
 fBigelow. 
 
 JLecture by Captain Stuart, C. E. 
 
The Campaign of Atlanta. 541 
 
 Mountain to Brush Mountain, a distance of about twelve miles. 
 Pine Mountain, an isolated hill in front of this line, was also 
 occupied at first. Wheeler's cavalry guarded the left and 
 Jackson's the right. The Confederate corps stood in line from 
 left to right in the following order : Hardee's, Polk's, Hood's.* 
 The position covered Marietta, the railway back to Atlanta, 
 and the bridges over the Chattahoochee on Johnston's line of 
 retreat. 
 
 (282) By the 11th of June the Federal line had moved up 
 closer to that of the Confederates, the left of which had been 
 drawn in to Gilgal Church. On the 14th Thomas deployed 
 before Pine Mountain. General Johnston, with Hardee and 
 Polk, was on that hill observing, when a shell fired from a 
 Union battery struck General Polk, killing him instantly. Lor- 
 ing succeeded to the command of Polk's corps. That night 
 the Confederate troops were withdrawn from Pine Mountain. 
 
 The Federal line moved up closer to the Confederate main 
 line. On the 16th the Federals continued to press the Con- 
 federate line until Johnston abandoned the position at Gilgal 
 Church, drawing in his left closer about Marietta. (283) 
 Before daylight of the 19th Johnston had still further con- 
 tracted his line about Marietta. The line now included the 
 crest of Kenesaw Mountain, from end to end.f Sherman fol- 
 lowed up close to the Confederate trenches with his line. 
 These operations were all greatly hindered by the continual 
 rains, which turned brooks into torrents and roads into mires.* 
 
 On the night of the 21st Johnston, becoming concerned 
 about the pressure on his left, shifted Hood's corps from the 
 right to the left of his line. In this quarter two of Hood's 
 divisions engaged one of Hooker's divisions and one of Scho- 
 field's brigades, and suffered a heavy loss on the 22nd. Skir- 
 mishing between the hostile lines went on for three or four 
 days without any decisive result. At length, on the 27th of 
 June, Sherman assaulted the strong position on Kenesaw 
 Mountain with the Armies of the Cumberland and the Ten- 
 nessee, while Schofield threatened Johnston's left. The as- 
 sault fell mainly upon the corps of Hardee and Loring, and 
 was repulsed with a loss of about 3,000 men. The entire Con- 
 federate loss did not exceed 500.* 
 
 (284) Between the 28th of June and the 3rd of July 
 
 *Captain Stuart. 
 tJohnston. 
 
542 American Campaigns. 
 
 Thomas, in the center, extended his line a little to the right; 
 McPherson moved his army in rear of Thomas and formed it 
 on his right ; Schofield, with the right wing, moved down the 
 Sandtown Road, and intrenched a line to the south of the Con- 
 federate position ; Stoneman's cavalry reached the Chatta- 
 hoochee near Sandtown. Johnston withdrew to a strong posi- 
 tion at Smyrna, resting his flanks on Nickajack and Rotten- 
 wood Creeks.* Thomas advanced through Marietta and de- 
 veloped the position at Smyrna, while McPherson passed be- 
 yond Schofield and pushed his advance down the Sandtown 
 Road to the Chattahoochee. Schofield stayed behind in re- 
 serve. On the 4th of July Johnston retired into intrench- 
 ments covering the railway bridge. f Besides this bridge, 
 Johnston had several pontoon-bridges laid in his rear, and 
 above all these bridges there were several good fords.J 
 
 Thomas, supported by McPherson, followed up Johnston's 
 withdrawal, while Schofield marched by the rear of Thomas 
 to the mouth of Soap Creek. On the 7th Stoneman's cav- 
 alry pushed down the river, and Garrard's seized Roswell. By 
 the 9th Schofield had made a lodgment on the left bank of the 
 river, near the mouth of Soap Creek. (285) On this day 
 Johnston withdrew to the left bank of the river. From the 
 line of the Chattahoochee Sherman wheeled his army to the 
 right. Thomas, on the pivot, took the shortest road to At- 
 lanta ; McPherson, on the left, with Garrard's cavalry on his 
 outer flank, moved by way of Roswell on Decatur; Schofield, 
 in the center, also moved on Decatur.f At the beginning of 
 this wheel the army was upon a front of fifteen miles. Johns- 
 ton took up a position behind Peachtree Creek, from which 
 he "might engage the enemy, if he should expose himself in 
 the passage of the stream. "J He was prevented from actively 
 opposing Sherman's passage of the Chattahoochee by the 
 width and difficult character of Peachtree Creek near its 
 mouth, which his army would have had to straddle. 
 
 (286) Further to add to Johnston's troubles, about this 
 time a Union cavalry force, under General Rousseau, was or- 
 ganized at Decatur, Ala., for a raid. This force destroyed 
 about twenty-five miles of the Montgomery and Atlanta Rail- 
 
 ♦Captain Stuart. 
 
 fBigelow. 
 
 ijohnston in B. & L. 
 
The Campaign of Atlanta. 543 
 
 way, one of Johnston's main lines of supply, and marched on to 
 Marietta, where it arrived on the 22nd of July.* 
 
 (285) On the evening of July 17 Johnston received a tele- 
 gram from Richmond, directing him to turn over the command 
 of his army to Hood. The reason stated in the telegram for 
 relieving Johnston was that he had failed to arrest the ad- 
 vance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, and expressed 
 no confidence that he could defeat or repel him.f Cheatham 
 succeeded to the command of Hood's corps. Loring had al- 
 ready been succeeded in command of Polk's old corps by A. 
 P. Stewart. At the time of his accession to the command 
 Hood claimed that the army numbered only 48,750 effectives, 
 including 1,500 Georgia militia, which had just joined.* 
 
 On the evening of July 19 the Union armies had reached the 
 following positions: Thomas was in the act of crossing 
 Peachtree Creek; Schofield, in the center, was also about to 
 cross this creek east of the Buckhead Road ; and McPherson, 
 on the left, was approaching Decatur. In this position the 
 flanks of the enemy were fully ten miles apart, and there was a 
 wide interval between Thomas's left and Schofield's right. 
 To close this interval Thomas ordered Howard with two divi- 
 sions toward the left, to connect with Schofield. This, how- 
 ever, left an interval of two miles between Howard's detach- 
 ment and the left of Thomas's line. Hood determined to take 
 advantage of the wide dispersion of Sherman's columns to at- 
 tack Thomas as soon as he should get across Peachtree Creek. 
 He placed Cheatham's corps, and a force of Georgia militia un- 
 der General G. W. Smith, on the 20th, to hold off Schofield and 
 McPherson, with the aid, also, of Wheeler's cavalry on the 
 extreme right ; and, in the afternoon, assaulted Thomas in flank 
 through the interval left by Howard. The attack was made 
 through dense woods and was well concealed up to the moment 
 of the onset; but it was repulsed by Thomas.^: This was the 
 battle of Peachtree Creek. 
 
 On the 21st the Federal left continued its wheel. Garrard's 
 cavalry was sent to destroy the railway to the east, and Mc- 
 Pherson was ordered to destroy the track thoroughly, as he 
 passed over it, from Decatur toward Atlanta. (287) Hood 
 withdrew from his position behind Peachtree Creek into in- 
 trenchments already prepared close around Atlanta. Sher- 
 
 *Captain Stuart. 
 
 fjohnston in B. & L. 
 
 JBigelow. Howard and Hood in B. & L. 
 
544 American Campaigns. 
 
 man was misled by this withdrawal into the belief that Hood 
 had evacuated Atlanta; Thomas and Schofield, therefore, 
 pushed forward, on the morning of the 22nd, and McPherson, 
 on the left, issued orders putting his army "in pursuit to the 
 south and east of Atlanta."* But instead of retreating, Hood 
 had projected an assault upon the left of the Union line, by 
 Hardee's corps and Wheeler's cavalry, supported by Cheat- 
 ham's corps. By a night march of fifteen miles Hardee 
 gained a position on McPherson's flank and rear, which were 
 left uncovered by the departure of Garrard's cavalry. He 
 took McPherson completely by surprise, and in the attack, 
 which he began at noon on the 22nd, rolled up part of the 
 Union army and got possession of Decatur, where some of 
 the trains were parked ; he was, after all, checked and re- 
 pulsed. In this engagement, known as the battle of Atlanta,, 
 the Confederate loss aggregated 8,000, and the Union loss 
 3,500,f including McPherson, who was killed. Howard suc- 
 ceeded to the command of the Army of the Tennessee.^ 
 
 Sherman drew in his lines closer about the Confederate 
 works around Atlanta. By the 25th of July the Federal army 
 occupied an intrenched line stretching from a point south of 
 the Georgia Railroad and east of Atlanta to a point beyond 
 Atlanta to the northwest. (281) Hood's main line of sup- 
 ply was the Macon Railway. Sherman's next objective was to' 
 be that railway. § His plan was to move the Army of the 
 Tennessee [Howard] to the right, rapidly and boldly, against 
 the railway below Atlanta, and, at the same time, to send all 
 the cavalry round by the right and left to make a lodgment 
 on it about Jonesboro.fl (288) The cavalry was assembled 
 in two strong divisions, that of McCook, including Rousseau's 
 brigade, to the right rear, at Turner's Ferry; that of Garrard 
 and Stoneman, united for the occasion under Stoneman, to the 
 left rear, near Decatur. fl 
 
 ♦Sherman's report to Halleck August IS, 1864, and McPherson's last 
 recorded order. See Sherman's Historical Raid. — Boynton. 
 
 fCaptain Stuart. 
 
 JHoward's promotion to succeed McPherson overslaughed Hooker, 
 who ranked Howard. Hooker, in dudgeon, resigned command of the- 
 Twentieth Corps, and was succeeded by Slocum. Palmer, also, a little 
 later, took offense at being ordered to serve under Schofield, whom he 
 claimed to rank, and resigned command of the Fourteenth Corps. He- 
 was succeeded by Jeff. C. Davis. 
 
 §Bigelow. 
 
 ^Sherman. 
 
The Campaign of Atlanta. 545 
 
 These movements began on the morning of July 27. How- 
 ard marched his army to the right in rear of Schofield and 
 Thomas. To oppose these movements Hood had started Ste- 
 phen D. Lee's corps* to cover the roads on the west of the 
 railways. On the afternoon of the 28th Lee came unexpect- 
 edly upon Howard at Ezra Church already upon ground that 
 he had expected to occupy. He assaulted Howard and, though 
 reinforced later by Stewart's corps, was repulsed.f (286) 
 Stoneman, who appears to have been more concerned to make 
 a "grandstand play" by capturing the Confederate prison at 
 Andersonville, south of Macon, than to cooperate with the 
 other cavalry column in making a lodgment on the railway 
 near Jonesboro, detached Garrard's cavalry within ten miles of 
 Atlanta, and, with his own command, 2,100 troopers, hastened 
 toward Macon. (His orders were to send Garrard back from 
 Jonesboro.) He attacked Macon on the 30th of July, but was 
 repulsed by the militia. He now found himself practically 
 surrounded, and he bent all his efforts to make his escape, but 
 between Clinton and Monticello he was surrounded and cap- 
 tured. About 500 of his horsemen cut their way out and 
 escaped.^ McCook fared little better. At Newnan, on the 
 30th, he was defeated by a part of Wheeler's cavalry, losing 
 500 men and his artillery. He withdrew to the rear of the 
 army, and Kilpatrick's division, from the rear, took his place 
 on the right of the army. 
 
 (288) Sherman was awaiting the result of these cavalry 
 operations when the month of July closed. His infantry line- 
 was strongly intrenched, but was "drawn out from the Augusta 
 road on the left to the Sandtown road on the right, a distance 
 of full ten measured miles. "§ During the first three or four 
 days of August General Sherman received full reports of the 
 failure of his cavalry raids. "I now became satisfied," he 
 says, "that cavalry could not, or would not, make a sufficient 
 lodgment on the railroad below Atlanta, and that nothing 
 would suffice but for us to reach it with the main army."§ 
 The General ought to have known beforehand that cavalry 
 raids cannot effectually destroy the communications of an 
 army in its own country. 
 
 In furtherance of the plan of attacking Hood's communi- 
 
 *Lee had succeeded Cheatham in command of Hood's old corps on 
 the 26th of July. 
 fHoward and Hood in B. & L. 
 ^Captain Stuart. 
 §Sherman. 
 
546 American Campaigns. 
 
 cations with the main army, Thomas and Schofield moved 
 by Howard's rear, extending the Union line to the south. 
 Schofield was ordered to make a bold attack on the railway 
 about Eastpoint. This attack, made August 5, failed on ac- 
 count of the insubordination of General Palmer, who refused 
 to serve under Schofield, whom he claimed to rank.* The 
 Union lines continued their extension to the west and south 
 until August 18.f 
 
 (281) Meantime Wheeler had been raiding the Union 
 communications as far back as Dalton, and had done consid- 
 erable damage. Attracted by the zeal and activity of Kil- 
 patrick as a cavalry leader, and taking advantage of the ab- 
 sence of Wheeler's cavalry, Sherman resolved to suspend the 
 general movement of his main army, and again to try cavalry 
 against Hood's communications. Accordingly Kilpatrick was 
 dispatched with his small division against the railway at Jones- 
 boro, in the hope that the operation would force Hood to 
 evacuate Atlanta, and, maybe, expose him to attack in the con- 
 fusion of retreat.* This raid, like the others, achieved very 
 little. Kilpatrick got off on the night of the 18th, and returned 
 on the 22nd, having made the complete circuit of Atlanta. He 
 brought back some prisoners, and reported having destroyed 
 three miles of railway, which he said it would take the enemy 
 ten days to repair. But on the 23rd trains were seen going 
 into Atlanta from the south.* Sherman says that he then 
 "became more than ever convinced that the cavalry could not, 
 or would not, work hard enough to disable a railroad prop- 
 erly." He returned, therefore, to the plan of a general move- 
 ment with the main army. 
 
 (288) Accordingly the Twentieth Corps [Slocum] was 
 left to guard the bridge at the Chattahoochee, and rations to 
 last fifteen days were issued to the rest of the army. The 
 movement began on the 25th of August and, by the evening of 
 the 27th, the army was echeloned along the Atlanta-Sandtown 
 road, Schofield on the left, facing Eastpoint ; the mass of the 
 army facing south. On the 28th the army began a general 
 left wheel, pivoting on Schofield. Howard, on the right, upon 
 an arc with a radius of twenty-five miles, aimed at Jonesboro. 
 Thomas took the middle course. By night Howard had reached 
 Fairburn, and Thomas was at Redoak Station, on the Mont- 
 gomery Railway. Schofield stood fast on the pivot until the 
 
 *Sherman. 
 tCaptain Stuart. 
 
The Campaign of Atlanta. 547 
 
 trains were well on their way, then moved his corps into the 
 line a mile northeast of Mount Gilead. The right and center 
 spent the 29th of August in destroying some twelve miles of 
 the Montgomery Railway. Schofield moved into connection 
 with Thomas at Redoak. 
 
 On the 30th of August Schofield advanced about a mile and 
 a half in the direction of Eastpoint, and again covered the 
 army's trains. (281) Howard and Thomas continued the 
 wheel, meeting Confederate cavalry. This cavalry was cover- 
 ing Hardee, who, with about half of Hood's army, was this 
 day dispatched by Hood to fall upon the Union army. On the 
 31st Hardee attacked Howard, and was repulsed. Schofield 
 advanced and seized the railway at Rough-andnReady. 
 Thomas struck the railway between there and Jonesboro; he 
 and Howard marched for Jonesboro, tearing up the track on 
 the way. 
 
 Finding his communications in possession of the Federal 
 army, Hood evacuated Atlanta on the 1st of September, and 
 reunited his army at Lovejoy's Station.* Sherman withdrew 
 his army to Atlanta and its neighborhood, to rest and prepare 
 for further operations. The Army of the Cumberland 
 [Thomas] occupied the city; the Army of the Tennessee 
 [Howard], Eastpoint; and the Army of the Ohio [Schofield], 
 Decatur. The cavalry covered the flanks and rear from Ros- 
 well to Sandtown. 
 
 The Confederate army was prevented from making any im- 
 mediate movement by the necessity of covering Anderson- 
 ville, ninety miles south of Lovejoy, where 34,000 Union pris- 
 oners were held in confinement. The Atlanta Campaign was 
 at an end. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 The Atlanta Campaign began on the Sth of May, 1864, and 
 ended with the evacuation of Atlanta by Hood, on the 1st of 
 September — four months, less four days. By skilful maneu- 
 vering, far more than by his assaults at Dalton, Resaca, and 
 Kenesaw, Sherman had forced the Confederate army back 
 ninety-odd miles, and had captured the important city of 
 Atlanta. 
 
 During the same time Grant, in Virginia, had forced Lee 
 
 ♦Captain Stuart. 
 
548 American Campaigns. 
 
 back from the line of the Rapidah to the works in front of 
 Petersburg and Richmond; but it was not until the following 
 April that the Union commander-in-chief succeeded in captur- 
 ing these two cities. The armies of Grant and Sherman were 
 of practically the same strength, about 100,000 each ; those of 
 Lee and Johnston, also, were about equal to each other, num- 
 bering some 60,000 each. But Grant, by this time, had lost 
 upwards of 60,000 men, while Sherman had lost not many more 
 than 20,000. Grant's was a campaign of "hammering," while 
 Sherman's was one of maneuvering. Both campaigns were 
 made in difficult country; there were heavy woods in both 
 theaters ; in Georgia the topography was more broken by ridges 
 and hills, while in Virginia the rivers, especially the James, 
 were more difficult to cross; the incessant rains during the 
 Georgia campaign made the roads as bad in that theater as 
 they were in the swamps of Virginia. 
 
 Though Sherman's operations were of the same general 
 character as those of Rosecrans in the Tullahoma Campaign, 
 ■ and the results achieved were similar, far greater, fame has 
 attached to the Atlanta Campaign than to the Tullahoma Cam- 
 paign. The numbers engaged on either side were greater in the 
 Atlanta Campaign, and its outcome was a far heavier blow to 
 the Confederacy, no doubt, than was that of the Tullahoma 
 Campaign. Several modern American and foreign writers on 
 the subject of strategy have discussed it as a typical campaign; 
 and they have generally found little to criticize, either in Sher- 
 man's offensive strategy or in Johnston's defensive strategy. 
 Hamley says of it with approval: "Except in attacking the 
 Kenesaw Mountain on the 27th of June, the character of Sher- 
 man's operations was, throughout, the same. To protect his 
 main line from a counter-attack, he left a force intrenched 
 across it. He then reinforced his flanking wing to a strength 
 sufficient to cope with the whole army of the enemy, and di- 
 rected it by a circuit off the main line, upon the Confederate 
 rear. In every case the operation was successful, obliging 
 Johnston forthwith to abandon his strongest positions, and to 
 retreat." 
 
 The only two mistakes General Sherman has usually been 
 taxed with were: first, his not sending Thomas, with the 
 large Army of the Cumberland, to turn Johnston's position 
 by way of Snake Creek Gap, at the outset of the campaign ; and 
 second, his assaulting the strong position at Kenesaw Moun- 
 tain, instead of turning it. In the first case, however, Mc- 
 
The Campaign of Atlanta. 549 
 
 Pherson's command was large enough to accomplish the task 
 assigned to it if McPherson had not made the mistake, so 
 often made by commanders, of overestimating the strength of 
 the enemy in front of him. Sherman criticizes him in these 
 words : McPherson "had not done the full measure of his 
 work. He had in hand 23,000 of the best men in the army, 
 and could have walked into Resaca (then held only by a small 
 brigade), or he could have placed his whole force astride the 
 railroad above Resaca, and there have easily withstood the 
 attack of all of Johnston's army, with the knowledge that 
 Thomas and Schofield were on his [Johnston's] heels."* Gen- 
 eral Johnston also testifies that Resaca was held by a very small 
 force of Confederates at that time.f The two commanders, 
 however, are not at all agreed upon what would have been the 
 •consequences if McPherson had taken Resaca and made a 
 lodgment upon the railway. Sherman says it would have 
 forced Johnston to retreat eastward, "and we should have cap- 
 tured half his army and all his artillery and wagons. . . ." 
 Johnston says all his army "would have been upon" McPher- 
 son "at the dawn of the next day . . . making a most 
 auspicious beginning of the campaign for the Confederates." 
 The student is not obliged to accept either of these views 
 wholly. Judging from the skill Johnston displayed in all of his 
 withdrawals in this campaign one can believe it quite possible 
 he might have escaped without great loss; but he would have 
 been thrown off his communications with Atlanta, his base. 
 Judging, however, by all that General Johnston did in the Civil 
 War, both before and after this time, we have no reason to be- 
 lieve that he would have inflicted much damage upon McPher- 
 son. General Johnston commanded in only one offensive bat- 
 tle in the whole war ; that was the battle of Seven Pines, which 
 was, as General Alexander remarks, "phenomenally misman- 
 aged." 
 
 Sherman apparently had an opportunity to destroy Johns- 
 ton's army at Resaca, but neglected to take advantage of it. 
 In the first place, after McPherson failed to take Resaca, Sher- 
 man marched the rest of his army, except the Fourth Corps 
 and Stoneman's Cavalry, to McPherson's position at the mouth 
 of Snake Creek Gap, within three or four miles of Resaca. 
 He had his army assembled there by the 12th of May. Johns- 
 ton did not withdraw from Dalton to Resaca until the 13th. 
 
 ♦Sherman, 
 fjohnston in B. & L. 
 
550 American Campaigns. 
 
 Why Sherman did not attack Resaca at once himself is not 
 understood. He does not appear to have deployed before Re- 
 saca until the 14th, and then he let Johnston get away on the 
 night of the 15th instead of destroying him. "When two ar- 
 mies are in order of battle, and one has to retire over a bridge, 
 while the other has the circumference of the circle open, all the 
 advantages are in favor of the latter. It is then a general 
 should show boldness, strike a decided blow, and maneuver 
 upon the flank of his enemy. The victory is in his hands."* 
 This was the case at Resaca, where Johnston's army was in a 
 plight similar to that of Napoleon's at Leipzig. If Sherman 
 had shown boldness and attacked Johnston with the whole 
 strength and vigor of his army on the 14th, or even on the 15th, 
 he must have captured a large part of Johnston's army before 
 it could have gotten across the river. But, instead of trying 
 to destroy Johnston's army, Sherman simply maneuvered it out 
 of its position. That he made no real fight there is shown by 
 his own words : "May 13th-16th our loss was 2,747 and his 
 2,800"f — that is, Sherman's loss was less than three per cent, 
 of his strength. 
 
 Another opportunity that Sherman had to strike the Con- 
 federate army a terrible blow, but failed to take advantage of, 
 occurred during Hood's retreat from Atlanta to Love joy. 
 Hood had to make a flank march by the heads of Sherman's 
 three armies, and he was allowed to do so unmolested. The only 
 part of Hood's army that was attacked during this hazardous 
 march was Hardee's corps behind intrenchments near Jones- 
 boro. Hood says himself, in his account of this campaign in 
 Battles and Leaders: "I have often thought it strange Sher- 
 man should have occupied himself with attacking Hardee's 
 intrenched position instead of falling upon our main body 
 on the march round to his rear." 
 
 "The attack at Kenesaw has been much criticized, and Gen- 
 eral Sherman, himself, apologizes for it in his report. How- 
 ever, circumstances all favored it. It was a choice between an 
 assault and a turning movement. The army was tired of 
 marching, and wanted to fight. The incessant rains had pro- 
 duced a state of roads and stage of streams that would make 
 the next turning movement especially hard. If the assault suc- 
 ceeded, all well and good; if it failed, hard marching would 
 
 ♦Napoleon's Maxim XXV. 
 fSherman. 
 
The Campaign of Atlanta. 551 
 
 not appear so unattractive."* The assault was tactically well 
 made, and it was gallantly delivered; but the position proved 
 to be too strong. 
 
 While Johnston's retreat was carried out with the greatest 
 skill, and with the least loss of men and materiel; while with 
 an army of 60,000 he kept an army of 100,000 two months 
 and a half (May 5 to July 18) making eighty-five miles, hardly 
 more than a mile a day ; his operations, nevertheless, amounted 
 merely to a passive defense. And the great length of time 
 taken by Sherman in gaining the distance from Dalton to the 
 works about Atlanta was due more to the difficulty of the 
 weather and roads and transport than to the direct resistance 
 made by Johnston. 
 
 (286) If, instead of falling back directly upon his line of 
 communications, from one position to another, in his retreat 
 from Dalton, Johnston, having made arrangements beforehand, 
 had taken advantage of the Oostanaula River to cover his 
 flank, and had retreated to Rome, instead of Cassville, he 
 might then have taken up a flank-position, facing the railway 
 from Dalton to Atlanta. Near Rome he could have taken a 
 position behind the Etowah, with his left flank protected by the 
 Coosa, and with the whole State of Alabama, as yet untouched 
 by the enemy, as his base, and the railway from Selma, Ala- 
 bama, to Blue Mountain as his line of communications. f 
 
 If Johnston had done this, Sherman's main army would have 
 had to turn away from the line of the railway and the geo- 
 graphical and political objective of the campaign, Atlanta, to 
 follow him. For, if Sherman had continued his march on At- 
 lanta, he would have exposed his communications to attack by 
 Johnston. In the meantime the governor of Georgia would 
 have had to assemble all the State militia at Atlanta, in order 
 to fortify that city and guard it against capture by detach- 
 ments from Sherman's army. 
 
 The adoption of a flank position like this was the favorite 
 mode of an active defense advocated by Clausewitz, and it was 
 the plan proposed by Moltke on three different occasions, to 
 protect Berlin, in case of an invasion of Prussia. It is, also, 
 the method most highly recommended by von der Goltz, for an 
 active defense. 
 
 ♦Captain Stuart. 
 
 fThis railway, which now goes from Selma to Chattanooga, was 
 completed only as far north as Blue Mountain in 1864. Sherman's 
 Memoirs. 
 
552 American Campaigns. 
 
 From Rome Johnston could have continued to fall back to 
 the southwest, toward Montgomery, 150 miles away, drawing 
 Sherman after him, farther and farther away from his line of 
 railway. Sherman has given it as his opinion that his army 
 could not have operated a hundred miles distant from a rail- 
 way. In all this retreat Johnston would have had excellent 
 ground for defensive operations. His left flank would have 
 been protected all the way by the Coosa, a very formidable 
 obstacle; while parallel to the Coosa and just thirty miles east 
 of it was the Tallapoosa; and the numerous branches of these 
 two streams traversed the wooded space between, forming at 
 •every few miles good lines to defend. 
 
 As we have learned, Johnston saw "no other mode of taking 
 the offensive than to beat the enemy when he advances, and 
 then move forward." This he might possibly have done if his 
 enemy had been rash enough to dash himself to pieces against 
 his impregnable positions; but this ought not to have been 
 •expected of so cunning a soldier as Sherman. 
 
 (281) In Sherman's wide turning movements, or the fre- 
 quent shifting of his armies from one flank to the other, it 
 should seem that Johnston ought to have found some chance 
 to strike in between the far-separated Federal columns, or to 
 attack them at a disadvantage while moving by the flank. In 
 the advance from the Etowah to Dallas the Union columns 
 started upon a front reaching from Cartersville to Rome, six- 
 teen miles in an air-line ; the country was thickly wooded, and 
 the roads were of the worst kind, and wholly unknown to the 
 Union commanders. The result was considerable confusion. 
 For example, Hooker crossed the river by the bridge assigned 
 to Schofield, and later got into the road in front of Thomas 
 and blocked his column.* The Union army for a day or two 
 was simply groping in an unknown wilderness. Then, if ever, 
 was Johnston's chance to take advantage of the better knowl- 
 edge of the roads and mountain trails that many of the men of 
 his army must have possessed, to strike a blow at his enemy's 
 •columns ; but he only took up positions and intrenched to stop 
 them. Indeed, one cannot study this campaign without being 
 persuaded that both General Sherman and General Johnston 
 were trying to carry on war with as little fighting as possible. 
 Yet even when General Johnston would make up his mind to 
 fight, as he says he did at Adairsville and at Cassville, he would 
 
 *Howard in B. & L. 
 
The Campaign of Atlanta. 553 
 
 be stopped by the mistakes or the arguments of his corps- 
 commanders. 
 
 Had Johnston not been relieved of command, he, like Lee 
 at Petersburg, might possibly have kept Sherman at bay in 
 front of Atlanta, and protected his communications with Ma- 
 con and Montgomery, for many months. Hood, however, 
 "was forced to an aggressive policy by the mere fact of his 
 appointment."* He was also, like Bragg, naturally aggres- 
 sive. His attacks at Peachtree Creek on the 20th of July, 
 and in the battle of Atlanta on the 22nd, were both well 
 planned and promised to be successful. Hood charges the fail- 
 ure in each case to Hardee. He says that Hardee, as his small 
 losses proved, did not attack vigorously on the 20th ; and that 
 on the 22nd he did not carry his turning movement far enough 
 round to reach the rear of McPherson's line, but shattered his 
 command against Federal intrenchments. Hardee's losses 
 were very heavy. General Alexander says, to trace the cause 
 of Hood's failure "further would bring it home to himself for 
 failure to supervise the execution of important orders — a sort 
 of failure from which even the most eminent commanders have 
 never been exempt." 
 
 Johnston made a serious mistake at the outset of the cam- 
 paign in not occupying and fortifying Snake Creek Gap. 
 Had he taken this precaution, "the problem confronting Gen- 
 eral Sherman at the beginning of the campaign would have 
 been more difficult than any he had to face later. . . . 
 There would have been nothing left but a dangerous turning 
 movement, probably north of Dalton, to open the campaign."* 
 This would have exposed Sherman's communications, and re- 
 quired a wide circuit to reach Johnston's, which, from that 
 side, were covered by the Connasauga River and its branches. 
 
 It is rather curious to note that Johnston made no effort to 
 defend the rivers across his line of retreat, by taking positions 
 behind them ; and that he appeared rather to prefer having a 
 river at his back, as at Resaca and at the Chattahoochee. He 
 was careful to provide plenty of bridges for his retreat, and, 
 by destroying them at the right time, he hindered the pursuit. 
 
 Both hostile armies in this campaign made constant use of 
 fieldworks. It was only by means of intrenching that Sher- 
 man was able to hold Johnston with a small force in front, 
 while he dispatched the bulk of his command upon the wide 
 
 ♦Captain Stuart. 
 
554 American Campaigns. 
 
 turning-movements. Both armies marched, and maneuvered, 
 and fought like trained soldiers; and such they were, for, in 
 the two years since the battle of Shiloh, where both sides 
 fought like raw militia, these troops had passed through the 
 best of training schools. 
 
LECTURE XXVI. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF FRANKLIN AND 
 NASHVILLE. 
 
 After the Capture of Atlanta. 
 
 (289) General Sherman admits that in taking Atlanta he 
 "had not accomplished all, for Hood's army, the chief objec- 
 tive, had escaped."* Yet Hood's demoralized army was left 
 unmolested for three weeks at Lovejoy's Station, only thirty 
 miles from Atlanta, and was itself the first to resume offensive 
 operations. The Union army spent this time of truce mainly 
 in resting from the fatigues of the three-month campaign, and 
 in making itself secure and comfortable at Atlanta. General 
 Sherman says in his Memoirs: "All the army, officers and 
 men, seemed to relax more or less, and sink into a condition of 
 idleness. . . . Generals Blair and Logan went home to 
 look after politics. Many of the regiments were entitled to, 
 and claimed, their discharge, by reason of the expiration of 
 their term of service ; so that with victory and success came 
 also many causes of disintegration." Sherman ejected all the 
 inhabitants from the city, and turned it into a military camp, 
 about which he built a close circle of fortifications. 
 
 He had not decided what to do next. His line of commu- 
 nications, which had to be guarded all the way back to Louis- 
 ville, was already 400 miles long. To pursue Hood farther 
 southward would only result in prolonging the Union commu- 
 nications without destroying the Confederate army. Wheeler, 
 who had gone into Tennessee to harass those communications, 
 was still there, and Forrest took his command thither from 
 Mississippi about the middle of September for the same pur- 
 pose. To oppose these forces, and to prepare for "any other 
 emergency," Sherman dispatched Newton's division [Fourth 
 Corps] and Morgan's division [Fourteenth Corps] to Ten- 
 nessee^ and Corse's division [Seventeenth Corps] to Rome; 
 and he instructed Rousseau at Nashville, Granger at Decatur, 
 and Steedman at Chattanooga, to employ the most active meas- 
 ures to protect the railways. $ 
 
 *Sherman in B. & L. 
 fColonel Stone in B. &■ L. 
 ^Sherman's Memoirs. 
 
556 American Campaigns. 
 
 Meanwhile several letters passed between Sherman and 
 Grant concerning Sherman's future operations. At this time 
 Grant was with the Army of the Potomac in front of Lee at 
 Petersburg; General Canby, at New Orleans, was preparing 
 to act with a land force against Mobile in conjunction with 
 Admiral Farragut's fleet ; and a combined land and naval force 
 was preparing for the capture of Fort Fisher and Wilmington, 
 at the mouth of Cape Fear River, in North Carolina. "What 
 you are to do with the forces at your command," General Grant 
 wrote in a letter to Sherman dated September 12, "I do not 
 exactly see." In his reply, dated September 20, General Sher- 
 man, after suggesting that Savannah should be captured imme- 
 diately after Wilmington, said: "I should keep Hood em- 
 ployed and put my army in fine order for a march on Augusta, 
 Columbia, and Charleston ; and start as soon as Wilmington is 
 sealed to commerce, and the city of Savannah is in our pos- 
 session." 
 
 Hood Takes the Offensive. 
 
 At this stage of the correspondence Hood forced Sherman 
 to a decision and prompt action by himself taking the initiative. 
 On the 20th of September he shifted his army to Palmetto, on 
 the Atlanta and Montgomery Railway, twenty-five miles south- 
 west of Atlanta. He had already sent an order to Wheeler 
 recalling him from Tennessee. At Palmetto Hood was visited 
 by President Davis, and a plan for the immediate operations 
 was arranged. According to this plan Hood was to move 
 against Sherman's communications with Chattanooga; if this 
 caused Sherman to fall back to attack him, as was expected, 
 Hood would take up a strong position and give battle, pro- 
 vided the morale of his army warranted it ; otherwise he would 
 retreat toward Gadsden, Alabama, where supplies would be 
 collected. There, near the State-line, a large auxiliary force 
 of militia and home-guards from both Georgia and Alabama 
 could be assembled, and, if Sherman followed so far, a decisive 
 "battle would be fought. If Sherman should not pursue as far 
 as Gadsden, but should return to Atlanta and march toward 
 the sea, he was to be pursued by Hood* 
 
 Hood now had an effective force of about 40,000 men, and 
 its morale, which he had reported as "greatly impaired by the 
 
 *The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, — Jefferson 
 Davis. 
 
The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville. 557 
 
 recurrence of retreat," was somewhat improved. He hoped 
 by taking the aggressive wholly to restore it. General Har- 
 dee, whom Hood had blamed with his defeats, had been trans- 
 ferred from the army, and General Cheatham was now in com- 
 mand of Hardee's old corps. Beauregard had just been as- 
 signed to the command of the Military Division of the West, 
 which included Hood's army* as well as such Confederate 
 troops as were in Alabama and Mississippi, under the territo- 
 rial command of General "Dick" Taylor. West of the Mis- 
 sissippi River there were Confederate forces scattered from 
 Missouri to Texas, all included in Kirby Smith's territorial 
 command, known as the Trans-Mississippi Department. The 
 line of the Mississippi was, however, held so fast by the Union 
 forces that the Confederates in the West were effectually cut 
 off from all cooperation with those east of the river. 
 
 On learning of Hood's change of position to Palmetto, and 
 his preparations there for a movement against the Union com- 
 munications, General Sherman sent Thomas and Schofield back 
 to the headquarters of their departments at Nashville and 
 Knoxville, respectively, while he himself remained in Atlanta 
 to await Hood's initiative.f Sherman had not long to wait, 
 for Hood's army, preceded by Jackson's cavalry division, 
 crossed the Chattahoochee River on the 1st of October. The 
 same day Jackson sent a detachment of cavalry forward to 
 operate against the railway between the Chattahoochee and 
 Marietta, but it was met by the Union cavalry under Kilpatrick 
 and Garrard, which was on the lookout for Hood's army. 
 East of the Chattahoochee the Army of the Tennessee [How- 
 ard] and a division of the Twenty- third Corps [Schofield] 
 had been sent out to reconnoiter and to seize the bridges in 
 rear of Hood's army. To these bridges, however, Hood was 
 wholly indifferent, as he expected to base himself upon Ala- 
 bama, and would have the Blue Mountain-Selma Railway as 
 a line of communications.^ Selma was one of the principal 
 manufacturing arsenals of the Confederacy. 
 
 On the 3rd of October Hood dispatched Stewart's corps 
 against the railway north of Marietta and marched his main 
 army upon Dallas, where he arrived on the 6th October. 
 
 *B. & L. Davis. Hood in B. & L. 
 fSherman in B. & L. 
 
 JThis railway is shown on map No. 289 as the Alabama and Ten- 
 nessee Railroad. 
 
558 American Campaigns. 
 
 Stewart captured the small Union posts at Big Shanty* and 
 Ackworth and rejoined the main column with Loring's divi- 
 sion before it reached Dallas. French's division [Stewart's 
 corps] had moved on to Allatoona. This place, where there 
 was a large depot of Federal supplies, had been occupied by 
 only a small garrison ; but General Corse had been ordered to 
 reinforce the garrison with his division from Rome in case the 
 enemy came up from the south. Corse reached Allatoona with 
 a few regiments on the 4th. French assaulted him vigorously 
 on the forenoon of the 5th. Corse made a very gallant de- 
 fense and repulsed French several times. Learning that heavy 
 Union reinforcements were coming up from the south, French 
 gave up the effort to capture the place, and marched away to 
 rejoin the main Confederate army. 
 
 The Union reinforcements that French heard of were the 
 leading troops of General Sherman's main army. On learn- 
 ing that Hood's army was north of the Chattahoochee and a 
 part of it upon his railway, Sherman started the Fourth Corps 
 [Stanley] northward on the 2nd of October, and followed it 
 the next day with the rest of his army, except the Twentieth 
 Corps, which was left to hold Atlanta. From Kenesaw Moun- 
 tain Sherman witnessed Corse's gallant defense of Allatoona, 
 while signaling him that reinforcements were hurrying to 
 him.f 
 
 From Dallas Hood continued his march northward, crossed 
 the Coosa River ten miles below Rome on the 11th, and, ad- 
 vancing on Resaca, destroyed the railway between that place 
 and Tunnel Hill, and captured Dalton on the 13th. French, 
 whose division was in the rear, had covered the column so 
 thoroughly that for five days, from the 5th to the 10th, it was 
 not known at Sherman's headquarters whether Hood's army 
 was marching northward or westward. In the vicinity of 
 Rome Wheeler had rejoined the army with a part of his cav- 
 alry on its way back from Tennessee. The Union garrison at 
 Resaca had been reinforced before Hood arrived in front of it, 
 and he refrained from assaulting it. General Hood says : "As 
 the road between Resaca and Tunnel Hill had been effectually 
 destroyed, the army was put in motion the next morning (the 
 
 *Big Shanty was a station on the railway between Ackworth and 
 Kenesaw Mountain. 
 ^History of the Army of the Cumberland, — Van Home. 
 
The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville. 559 
 
 14th) in the direction of Gadsden, and camped that night near 
 Villanow."* 
 
 It is very likely that the advance of Sherman's army had 
 something to do with hastening Hood's withdrawal by way 
 of Snake Creek Gap to Villanow. Learning, on the 10th, that 
 Hood was marching toward Rome, Sherman concentrated his 
 columns on the 11th at Kingston with the view of supporting 
 Corse at Rome. But, as we already know, Hood did not stop 
 at Rome; and again the Federal cavalry lost touch with his 
 main body. As soon, however, as Sherman found which way 
 Hood had gone, he started after him. He arrived at Resaca 
 on the 14th, and, finding that Hood had retreated, undertook 
 to shut him up in Snake Creek Gap by sending Stanley with 
 his own corps [Fourth] and Davis's [Fourteenth] by way of 
 Tilton to intercept him at the northern end of the gap, while 
 Howard detained him at its southern end. But Wheeler's cav- 
 alry alone tarried to skirmish with Howard, and Stanley was 
 not in time to cut off the retreat of the column. 
 
 Hood continued his retreat to Cross Roads, nine miles south 
 of Lafayette, where he arrived on the 15th. Here, Hood says, 
 he meant to select a position and give battle, as he had lured 
 Sherman as far north as he had hoped to. He was, moreover, 
 near the Alabama line, and had the Blue Mountain-Selma 
 Railway immediately behind him to fall back upon if defeated. 
 Upon consulting his corps-commanders, however, he was ad- 
 vised that the morale of the troops did not warrant risking 
 battle against the large force which, according to Wheeler's 
 report, was pursuing him. After resting two days, therefore, 
 at Cross Roads, he directed his march upon Gadsden,* where 
 he concentrated his entire force on the 22nd. f 
 
 Sherman followed Hood no farther than Gaylesville, where 
 he halted to watch his movements. From this time forward 
 these two commanders marched their armies in opposite direc- 
 tions — Sherman's marched to the Atlantic Ocean and Hood's 
 toward the Ohio River. For several weeks General Sherman's 
 mind had dwelt upon the project of marching his army through 
 the heart of Georgia to the seacoast, and thence, ultimately, 
 northward through the Carolinas to a junction with Grant in 
 Virginia. He had written General Grant several letters upon 
 the subject, but had not, as yet, persuaded him that it was not 
 necessary to destroy Hood's army before undertaking the 
 
 *Hood in B. & L. 
 fColonel Stone in B. & L. 
 
560 American Campaigns. 
 
 march to the sea. But now Sherman was convinced that he 
 could not catch that army, and that, if he allowed it to decoy 
 him out of Georgia into Tennessee, he should do precisely what 
 the Confederate authorities wanted, and what Hood was work- 
 ing for ; and he should surrender all he had gained by his cam- 
 paign against Atlanta. On a sudden, however, Hood's army 
 appeared in front of Decatur, on the Tennessee River seventy- 
 five miles northwest of Gadsden, and General Grant gave his 
 consent. On the 2nd of November he wired Sherman to go 
 ahead with his march to the sea, and within a day or two 
 Sherman had the bulk of his forces assembled at Rome and 
 Kingston.* 
 
 Hood's Plan. 
 
 While General Hood was resting with his army at Cross 
 Roads he wrought out, in his mind, a plan of campaign which, 
 if it had succeeded as he hoped it would, might have had far- 
 reaching consequences. It was, briefly, as follows : to cross 
 the Tennessee River at or near Guntersville and destroy the 
 railway bridge at Bridgeport, and the Nashville and Chatta- 
 nooga Railway ; to attack and, if possible, defeat the troops of 
 Thomas and Schofield in Tennessee before they could concen- 
 trate ; then to capture the Federal base at Nashville ; and, hav- 
 ing crossed the Cumberland River at some point where the 
 Union gunboats could not interfere with him, to march on 
 into Kentucky and take position with his left near Richmond, 
 and his right toward Hazel Green. f Here he would threaten 
 Cincinnati and, at the same time, recruit his army from Ken- 
 tucky and Tennessee. He hoped to do all this while Sherman 
 was making up his mind whether to follow him or to march 
 through Georgia to the seashore. If Sherman should march to 
 the coast, as Hood believed he would, Sherman would have to 
 make a long journey by sea and land to go to the defense of 
 Ohio and Kentucky; if, on the other hand, Sherman should 
 follow Hood into Tennessee and Kentucky, Hood hoped to 
 have his own army so much improved in morale by its suc- 
 cesses, and so much strengthened in numbers by recruitment, 
 as to be able to offer battle with every chance of victory. If 
 victorious he would then send reinforcements to Lee in Vir- 
 
 *Campaigns of the Civil War, — Jacob D. Cox. 
 
 fRichmond is a hundred miles south of Cincinnati and Hazel Green 
 is fifty miles east of Richmond. 
 
The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville. 561 
 
 ginia, or march through the gaps of the Cumberland Moun- 
 tains and attack Grant's army in rear. He reckoned that he 
 could take the latter course even though he should be de- 
 feated. If Sherman should march to the seacoast, and from 
 there northward to join Grant, Hood calculated that he could 
 make his movement through Tennessee and Kentucky and 
 strike Grant in rear two weeks before Sherman could reach 
 Virginia.* 
 
 At Gadsden Beauregard visited Hood, and Hood unfolded 
 the plan to him. Beauregard approved the plan but stipulated 
 that all of Wheeler's cavalry must be left to hang upon Sher- 
 man's army and harass it in its march to the sea; to make up 
 for this loss, however, he sent an order to Forrest to join. 
 Hood's army as soon as it should cross the Tennessee. 
 
 Hood's Advance to the Tennessee. 
 
 Hood says the order to advance into Tennessee put his-, 
 troops in high spirits. With twenty days' rations in their 
 haversacks and wagons they set out for Guntersville, on the 
 22nd of October, by all the roads leading from Gadsden in. 
 that direction; but before the army had marched two days. 
 Hood received word that Forrest, who was then at Jackson,. 
 Tennessee, would be unable to join him in the neighborhood 
 of Guntersville, on account of the high water in the rivers he- 
 would have to ford. Hood, therefore, turned his columns, 
 westward, toward Florence. This change of direction elimi- 
 nated at once the destruction of the railway bridge at Bridge- 
 port from Hood's plan. 
 
 On the 26th Hood's army appeared before Decatur, which? 
 was held by a single Union regiment. By the close of the day 
 the garrison had received reinforcements. Hood contented 
 himself with making a demonstration against the town, and 
 pushed on to Tuscumbia, forty-five miles farther west, on the 
 south side of the river, opposite Florence. By the last day of 
 October Hood had his headquarters at Tuscumbia with one 
 corps [Lee] at Florence, on the opposite side of the river. 
 Here Hood had expected to find supplies awaiting him, and to 
 be joined promptly by Forrest; but he was to be disappointed. 
 The Memphis and Charleston Railway needed to be repaired 
 from Corinth before the stores could be hauled, and heavy 
 
 *Hood in B. & L. 
 
562 American Campaigns. 
 
 rains delayed the work for two weeks. So it was not until 
 the 19th of November that Hood was ready to march north- 
 ward from Florence. Forrest had joined him there on the 
 18th,* having been much delayed in his march by mud and 
 high water. 
 
 Hood's movement northward from Georgia had "created in- 
 tense alarm all over the North," and all available troops had 
 been hurried to General Thomas in Tennessee in order to ena- 
 ble him to protect Sherman's communications and depots.f 
 Notwithstanding the efforts to reinforce Thomas, when Hood's 
 army first appeared on the Tennessee there were only about 
 26,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry within the whole District of 
 Tennessee, scattered in detachments from Chattanooga nearly 
 to the mouth of the Ohio, guarding railways and depots and the 
 line of the Tennessee River4§ Forrest was at the time in the 
 western part of the State attacking Union posts, capturing 
 gunboats and transports, and making general havoc. Sher- 
 man said in a telegram to General Grant: "Forrest seems to 
 be scattered from Eastport to Jackson, Paris, and the lower 
 Tennessee. "|f The only Federal troops at hand to dispute 
 Hood's passage of the Tennessee River were Croxton's brigade 
 of cavalry, which was watching the river at that point. This 
 brigade could make little hindrance, and fell back behind Shoal 
 Creek, where it was joined by Hatch with his division of cav- 
 alry. The combined cavalry force did not exceed 3,500 horse- 
 men ; it could offer little active resistance to the advance of 
 Hood's army, but was able to keep the Union commanders in 
 rear informed of its movement and to obstruct the roads and 
 fords by felling trees in them.** 
 
 As soon as Sherman, who was still at Gaylesville, had re- 
 ceived word that Hood's army was approaching Decatur, he 
 dispatched the Fourth Corps [Stanley] to Thomas. One divi- 
 sion reached Pulaski, on the railway forty miles north of De- 
 catur, on the 1st of November, and was joined there four days 
 later by the other two.f f "Learning from Thomas that the new 
 
 *Life of Forrest, — Wyeth. In his account of this campaign in Battles 
 and Leaders General Hood says Forrest reported on the 14th of 
 November. But Hood has either made a mistake in the date or he 
 meant that Forrest reported by wire or letter 
 
 tVan Home. 
 
 tCox. 
 
 §The divisions of Morgan and Newton had returned to Georgia. 
 
 f Wyeth. 
 
 **Cox. General Wilson in B. &■ L. 
 
 tfColonel Stone in B. & L. 
 
The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville. 563 
 
 troops promised by Grant were corning forward very slowly," 
 Sherman also ordered the Twenty-third Corps [Schofield] to 
 go to Tennessee and reinforce Thomas. A. J. Smith, who was 
 in the western part of Missouri with three divisions of the 
 Sixteenth Corps operating against Sterling Price, was also or- 
 dered to Tennessee, but he did not arrive in time to take part in 
 any. operations before the battle of Nashville.* General James 
 H. Wilson had been sent to Thomas to command his cavalry; 
 Wilson reached Nashville on the 6th of November and at once 
 set about organizing a cavalry corps and procuring mounts 
 for it. 
 
 In the meanwhile Forrest was keeping up great activity along 
 the Tennessee River, in the western part of the State, on his 
 way up the river to report to Hood. On the 4th of November 
 he bombarded the Union post at Johnsonville, an important de- 
 pot eighty miles west of Nashville, throwing the garrison into 
 a panic and starting it in flight toward Nashville. "Three 
 gunboats, eight transports, and some barges were moored to 
 the river-bank, and great quantities of stores in warehouses 
 at the landing. All these were abandoned and burned by the 
 crews and garrison."f Schofield reached Nashville that day 
 with his leading brigade and was hurried on to Johnsonville 
 by Thomas. He found, upon his arrival at the town, that For- 
 rest had not stayed long enough to cross the river. Schofield 
 returned to Nashville and, on the 11th, was sent to Pulaski 
 to take command of the forces assembling there.J By the 15th 
 he had at Pulaski about 18,000 infantry and artillery, consisting 
 of the Fourth Corps and Cox's division of the Twenty-third, 
 except one brigade which was at Columbia. The cavalry, un- 
 der Hatch, now increased by Capron's brigade to about 4,300 
 troopers, was covering the front and right toward Florence 
 and Waynesboro.§ 
 
 Hood Advances Against Nashville. 
 
 On the 19th of November Hood began his movement to- 
 ward Nashville by starting Forrest's cavalry forward; his 
 
 *A small part of this corps arrived in time to be at the battle of 
 Franklin. 
 
 fCox. 
 
 {General Stanley, who was at Pulaski, ranked Schofield, but the 
 latter took command over him by virtue of being a department com- 
 mander. Stone in B. & L. 
 
 §Cox, Stone, and Wilson in B. &■ L. 
 
564 American Campaigns. 
 
 whole army was in motion at daybreak on the 21st. Stew- 
 art's corps marched by the Lawrenceburg road, Cheatham's 
 by the Waynesboro road, and Lee's by an intermediate road. 
 Hood hoped to turn the position of Schofield's force at Pu- 
 laski and cut off its retreat, before it could reach Duck River 
 at Columbia.* Thomas had hoped that he should have time 
 to concentrate his forces to stop Hood south of Duck River, 
 but he failed to do so. Smith had not come from Missouri, 
 new regiments had not joined as fast as old ones had been dis- 
 charged, men had been furloughed to go home to vote, 
 and Wilson had not gotten horses for his dismounted cavalry. 
 Thomas could, therefore, do nothing but order Schofield to 
 fall back to Golumbia.f 
 
 Columbia. 
 
 Hatch's cavalry made such resistance as it could to Forrest's 
 superior numbers, but it was driven back; and on the 22nd 
 Hood's right-hand column was at Lawrenceburg, sixteen miles 
 west of Pulaski. Schofield now had no time to lose. The 
 two divisions of Cox [Twenty-third Corps] and Wagner 
 [Fourth Corps] $ -were at once started back toward Colum- 
 bia. Stanley was to escort the trains the next day with the 
 other two divisions of the Fourth Corps. Cox arrived, on 
 the morning of the 24th, within nine miles of Columbia, when 
 he heard the sound of firing to the west. He marched to the 
 sound and reached the ground just in time to check Forrest's 
 cavalry, which was driving Capron's cavalry brigade on the 
 Mount Pleasant Pike. Within an hour, but for Cox's timely 
 arrival, Forrest would have had possession of the bridge at 
 Columbia, and Schofield's line of retreat would have been 
 blocked. The head of Stanley's column reached Columbia and 
 connected with Cox's line in front of the town at 9 a.m., having 
 marched from Pulaski, thirty miles, since 2 p.m. the day be- 
 fore. Stanley had halted and bivouacked at Lynneville; but 
 he had his command wakened at 1 a.m. on the 24th and re- 
 sumed the march. § Hatch with his own division and Crox- 
 ton's brigade of cavalry had covered the retreat from. Pulaski. 
 As fast as the troops arrived at Columbia they were put to 
 
 *Hood in B. & L. 
 fVan Home. Stone in B. & L. 
 JFormerly Newton's division. 
 §Stone in B. & L. 
 
The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville. 565 
 
 throwing up earthworks, covering the approaches to the town 
 from the south ; the trains were sent across the river. 
 
 There had been rain and sleet and snow, and the roads were 
 in such a frightful state that Hood's army, with all effort, could 
 make no more than ten miles a day. The last of it did not, 
 therefore, arrive in front of Columbia until the 26th. In the 
 meanwhile Ruger had come with one brigade of his division 
 of the Twenty-third Corps from Johnsonville, and another of 
 his brigades had been sent to guard the crossing of Duck River 
 at Williamsport. Wilson had come forward from Nashville 
 and taken command of the Union cavalry at the front, and it 
 was here strengthened to about 7,000 horses by the arrival of 
 several regiments from the remount camp at Louisville. Wil- 
 son placed it along the north bank of the river to watch the 
 enemy's movements either to the right or to the left.* 
 
 Pursuant to orders previously received from Thomas, Gen- 
 eral Granger, on the day that Schofield fell back from Pulaski, 
 withdrew the troops from Decatur, Athens, and Huntsville, to 
 reinforce the garrison at Stevenson and Murfreesboro on the 
 Nashville and Chattanooga Railway. 
 
 Spring Hill. 
 
 (290) Being anxious to preserve the railway bridge at Co- 
 lumbia for future use, Thomas, hoping for the arrival of A. J. 
 Smith's division, urged Schofield to hold on to his position 
 there. Hood gave no signs of an intention to attack, but Scho- 
 field soon became convinced that he was going to cross the 
 river above the town to turn the position. Schofield, therefore, 
 could not hazard staying longer on the south bank, and with- 
 drew his army to the north bank on the night of the 27th. On 
 the evening of the 28th Forrest forded the river with his cav- 
 alry between Columbia and Huey's Hill, at a point about eight 
 miles above the town, and pushed out to the front and right. 
 Wilson had collected his scattered squadrons as quickly as 
 practicable to oppose Forrest, and by 7 p.m. had them all as- 
 semble at Hurt's Corner. By nightfall he had learned that 
 Forrest was followed by Hood's infantry, which had a pon- 
 toon-bridge across the river at Huey's Mill. A message dis- 
 patched to Schofield with this information did not reach him 
 until daylight of the 29th. 
 
 ♦Wilson in B. & L. 
 
566 American Campaigns. 
 
 Hood's pontoon-bridge was, of a truth, at Davis's Ford 
 about three miles above Columbia, and his infantry did not 
 begin to cross until daybreak on the 29th.* Cheatham's corps 
 was in the lead, followed by Stewart's. Lee's corps and the 
 whole of the artillery were left at Columbia "with orders to 
 make strong demonstrations in the morning, and to force the 
 crossing of the river later in the day."f 
 
 At eight o'clock in the morning [November 29] Stanley 
 started for Spring Hill, eleven miles back, with two of his 
 divisions, and the trains and reserve artillery. The rest of 
 the Union forces remained temporarily to hold the river cross- 
 ings. Stanley's leading brigade reached Spring Hill just in 
 time to meet and repel Forrest, who was hurrying by the Mount 
 Carrriel road to seize that important point and block the re- 
 treat of the Union army. Forrest had advanced against Wil- 
 son early in the morning, and by the middle of the forenoon 
 had wholly cut him off from Schofield's main body and driven 
 him beyond Mount Carmel on the Franklin turnpike. For- 
 rest then left a covering detachment at Mount Carmel and 
 hastened with the rest of his command to Spring Hill. 
 
 (291) At Rutherford's Creek, seven miles from Spring 
 Hill, Stanley had left Kimball's division to guard the cross- 
 ing for the troops in rear; he deployed his leading division 
 [Wagner] to hold the village, where the trains were parking. 
 At this point several important roads joined the main highway 
 to Franklin and Nashville. Stanley placed two brigades in a 
 semicircle about the village, from the railway at the north to 
 the pike at the south, and a third [Bradley] upon a knoll 
 nearly a mile farther southeast, covering the approaches from 
 that side. Scarcely had his dispositions been made when For- 
 rest's cavalry appeared north of the village, and Cleburne's 
 division [Cheatham's corps] assaulted Bradley's brigade. In 
 advancing to the attack Cleburne's division turned its right 
 flank to Bradley's brigade and was repulsed. It then changed 
 front and finally drove Bradley back upon the main line. 
 Brown and Bate had, in the meanwhile, come up with their 
 divisions of Cheatham's corps; but before they had gotten well 
 into action, night was falling and Hood suspended the assault 
 till morning. Stewart had been ordered to form his corps in 
 line of battle facing west, on the south side of Rutherford's 
 Creek, and was left there until after dark. Why Stewart 
 
 *Hood in B. & L. 
 fCox. 
 
The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville. 567 
 
 was ordered to form line of battle south of the creek, and not 
 employed to support Cheatham as soon as possible, has not 
 been satisfactorily explained. General Hood does not admit 
 that he gave such an order. After dark Stewart was ordered 
 to place his corps on Cheatham's right across the turnpike; 
 but he bivouacked east of the pike.* 
 
 Lee's corps, except Johnson's division which had marched 
 with Stewart, had kept up a demonstration all day at Colum- 
 bia, but had not been able to force a crossing. Schofield had 
 hastened with Ruger's division to Stanley's assistance, arriving 
 at Spring Hill at seven o'clock. Cox's division had held the 
 crossing at Columbia, and Wood's had formed on the turn- 
 pike facing to the east between Kimball and Cox. Soon after 
 dark the line of outposts near the river was strengthened, 
 and Cox's division started for Spring Hill, followed in turn 
 by Wood's and Kimball's as they were passed on the road. 
 The outposts were withdrawn at midnight. From Spring 
 Hill General Schofield hurried the divisions along toward 
 Franklin twelve miles farther. Wagner's division remained 
 in position until all the other troops and the trains were safe 
 on the way. Opdycke's brigade of this division, which was to 
 be the rear-guard, did not quit Spring Hill until 6 a.m. on the 
 30th. 
 
 All night the Federal troops were marching on the road 
 within gunshot of the Confederate bivouacs, and within the 
 light of their fires, yet were not molested. About midnight 
 Hood learned that '"stragglers" were passing on the road, and 
 he sent Cheatham an order to have them fired upon. Cheatham 
 then ordered Johnson, whose division had been placed under 
 his command and was on his extreme left nearest the pike, to 
 investigate the matter, "and cut off anything that might be 
 passing." About 2 a.m. Johnson reported to Cheatham that 
 he had ridden "close up to the turnpike, where" he "found 
 everything quiet and no one passing."f Thus passed the last 
 and greatest opportunity of Hood's military career. 
 
 Franklin. 
 
 (289) Finding, at dawn on the 30th, that Schofield's army 
 had slipped by him, Hood set his own upon the road as quickly 
 as possible. His only hope now was to overtake his enemy at 
 
 *General Cheatham in B. & L. 
 fCheatham and Hood in B. & L. 
 
568 American Campaigns. 
 
 Franklin and capture or destroy him before he could cross 
 the Harpeth River. Lee's corps, which had crossed Duck 
 River after the withdrawal of the Federals in the night, 
 reached Spring Hill at 9 a.m., and, after a short rest, fol- 
 lowed the main army. 
 
 Schofield had not expected such good fortune as to get 
 safely by Hood at Spring Hill. He had hurried a staff-officer 
 forward to Franklin with an order to A. J. Smith, whose 
 corps he hoped against hope might have arrived there, to 
 hasten on toward Spring Hill. The officer was also to wire 
 General Thomas : "The general says he will not be able to 
 get farther than Thompson's Station to-night. . . . He 
 regards his situation as extremely perilous. . . ." Thomp- 
 son's Station was only three miles north of Spring Hill ; there, 
 ■at least, Schofield expected to find his path blocked. But it 
 was not so ; the way was clear, and the Union army marched 
 on unchecked to Franklin.* 
 
 (292) The pontoon-train had been destroyed at Columbia 
 to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Confederates; 
 the old wagon bridge at Franklin was in pieces, and the river, 
 with high water and steep banks, could barely be made f orda- 
 ble. Schofield, who had come on with his first troops, had 
 work begun at once to plank the railway bridge and repair 
 the wagon bridge. By noon they were both done. In the 
 meantime the south side of the river must be held until the 
 "trains could be got across. 
 
 The little town sat on the southern bank of the Harpeth 
 River in a bend not quite a mile across at its widest part. 
 Columbia Pike and Carter's Creek Pike, the roads by which 
 Hood's army was to be expected, left the town by the same 
 street, but forked at its southern outlet, Columbia Pike run- 
 ning for some distance almost due south, and Carter's Creek 
 Pike southwest. About a mile from the bridges Columbia 
 Pike passed over a low hill, upon which the Carter house 
 stood, five hundred yards west of the point where the river 
 began to curve round the town. Close to this point, between 
 the river-bank and another low hill, the Nashville and Decatur 
 Railway ran, parallel to the turnpike. On the north bank of 
 the stream an earthwork, Fort Granger, stood upon a hill, just 
 a mile from the Carter house hill ; it commanded the .bridges 
 and the town, and had a fine sweep of the open ground south 
 
 ♦Stone in B. & L. Van Home. 
 
The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville. 569 
 
 and west of the town. Seven hundred yards northwest of the 
 Carter house hill Carter's Creek Pike crossed another low hill. 
 
 Cox's division, which was in the lead of the Federal col- 
 umn, reached the outskirts of Franklin about the hour that 
 the rear-guard was quitting Spring Hill. Spent with march- 
 ing and fighting night and day for a week, the men, neverthe- 
 less, did not lie down to rest until they had thrown up a line 
 •of earthworks in their front. As the other troops came up 
 they prolonged the line to right and left, taking in the three 
 knolls already mentioned. By noon the line was finished ; with 
 its flanks resting upon the river, it completely covered the town 
 where the wagons were now crowding the streets, awaiting 
 their turns to cross. Near the Carter house was a consid- 
 erable thicket of young locust trees, some of which were 
 felled to form a sort of abatis ; and between the pike and the 
 railway the works were partly sheltered by a stout hedge of 
 osage orange. With these exceptions the ground in front of 
 the line was free from fences or other obstacles and every part 
 •of it was in plain sight * The entire line of intrenchments 
 was about a mile and a half long. 
 
 Cox's division [Twenty-third Corps] occupied the line from 
 Columbia Pike to the river southeast of the town; Ruger's 
 division [Twenty-third Corps] was between the two pikes; 
 and Kimball's division [Fourth Corps] between Carter's Creek 
 Pike and the river northwest of the town. Wood's division 
 [Fourth Corps] was sent to the north bank to guard the trains 
 as they passed over, as well as to be on the lookout for any 
 turning movement the enemy might make. Two brigades of 
 Wagner's division [Fourth Corps] were halted across Co- 
 lumbia Pike on a slope a half-mile in front of the main line. 
 Opdycke's brigade of this division, however, which was the 
 last to come up, massed behind the Carter house. The artil- 
 lery of the Fourth Corps took position on the south side of 
 the stream, and that of the Twenty-third Corps was sent over 
 to the north side. 
 
 Between two and three o'clock the head of Hood's column 
 arrived in front of Wagner's line. Stewart's corps deployed 
 to the east of Columbia Pike; Cheatham's corps deployed on 
 the left with Cleburne's division east of the turnpike, Brown's 
 next, west of the pike, and Bate's on the extreme left. Of 
 Lee's corps only Johnson's division had come up, and it was 
 
 *Stone in B. & L. 
 
570 American Campaigns. 
 
 held in reserve. Wagner had been directed to hold his ad- 
 vanced position "in observation only till Hood should show a 
 disposition to advance in force, and then to retire within the 
 lines to Opdycke's position to act as a general reserve."* But 
 Wagner's brigades clung to their faulty position until Cle- 
 burne's and Brown's divisions in overwhelming numbers 
 charged upon them, enveloped their flanks, and drove them 
 back in headlong flight. The men in the main Union line 
 dared not fire at the pursuing enemy lest they should shoot 
 down their friends, "and the guns, loaded with grape and can- 
 ister, stood silent in the embrasures." The crowd of fugitives 
 swept over the parapets, carrying part of the main line 
 with them "down the pike past the Carter house toward the 
 town." These soldiers abandoned their guns, leaving a gap in 
 the line of more than a regiment's front on each side of the 
 pike. With exultant cheers the pursuers seized the deserted 
 guns and earthworks. 
 
 (293) Thus Hood broke the center of the Union line and 
 was master of its key-point. It looked as if he would surely 
 complete his work by rolling one or the other wing of Scho- 
 field's line into the river, and seal the fate of the army by seiz- 
 ing the ford and bridges. But no such fortune awaited him. 
 At this conjuncture Opdycke hurried his brigade from its 
 position in reserve, and hurled it upon the victorious Confed- 
 erates. He was joined by two regiments of Cox's division 
 which had been in an intrenchment in rear of the main line. 
 In the fierce hand-to-hand struggle that ensued the victorious 
 Confederates were driven out of the works they had taken, 
 leaving 1,000 prisoners in the hands of the Federals. Just 
 before dark, which fell early on this winter's day, Johnson's 
 division went to Cheatham's support and made a desperate 
 charge, but was unable to renew the breach in the Union line. 
 Darkness prevented Hood from putting Lee's other two divi- 
 sions into the battle. The contest, however, kept up with more 
 or less violence until nine o'clock. 
 
 The left of Cheatham's line, Bate's division, had advanced 
 at the same time as Brown and Cleburne. It reached beyond 
 Carter's Creek Pike, but the Union line bent back so far in 
 that quarter that Bate's assault fell considerably later than 
 Brown's and Cleburne's. Finding the works before him 
 stoutly defended, Bate did not push his assault. At the oppo- 
 
 *Cox. 
 
The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville. 571 
 
 site flank Stewart's corps had kept abreast of Cheatham's, and 
 had assaulted Cox's division desperately, but had never suc- 
 ceeded in crossing the parapets, though many men reached 
 the ditches and the osage orange hedge, there to die or sur- 
 render. 
 
 The battle of Franklin was one of the most fiercely fought 
 of the Civil War, and more general officers are said to have 
 been killed or wounded in it than in any other. General Cle- 
 burne was among the slain. The losses, according to Van 
 Home, were 750 killed, 3,800 seriously wounded, and 702 miss- 
 ing on the Confederate side; 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 
 1,104 missing on the Union side. Hood states that ten days 
 after the battle his effective strength in all arms was only 
 23,053, and that he had lost 7,547 men since leaving Florence.* 
 
 While the infantry combat was going on Forrest, with three 
 of his brigades, had crossed the Harpeth River on Hood's right 
 and become engaged with Wilson's cavalry. As Wilson out- 
 numbered him, he was forced at nightfall to withdraw to the 
 south bank. Chalmer's brigade on the other flank attacked a 
 part of the Union line, but exerted no influence upon the result 
 of the battle. 
 
 Nashville. 
 
 (289) The whole front being quiet by midnight, Schofield 
 began withdrawing his troops from the field to resume his 
 retreat toward Nashville. His dead and many of his wounded 
 had to be left upon the field. Wood's division, on the north 
 bank of the river, held the bridges until the rest of the infantry 
 and artillery had passed over and gotten on the way, when it 
 took up the march. Wilson's cavalry did not start until day- 
 light ; it covered the rear and flanks of the retreating column. 
 (294) The little army reached Nashville on the morning of 
 the 1st of December, and took its place in the works with the 
 other forces Thomas had assembled there. Wilson's cavalry 
 took station at Edgefield on the opposite bank of the Cumber- 
 land River. 
 
 Hood followed Schofield on the 1st of December, and, ar- 
 riving at Nashville on the 2nd, put his army into position in 
 front of the Union works and intrenched it. Lee's corps oc- 
 cupied the center astride the Franklin Pike, Stewart's the left, 
 and Cheatham's the right. The bulk of Forrest's cavalry 
 
 *Hood in B. & L. 
 
572 American Campaigns. 
 
 took its place between Stewart's left flank and the river below 
 Nashville. 
 
 A. J. Smith with his three divisions [Sixteenth Corps], some 
 12,000 men, had at last reached Nashville. About 9,000 ar- 
 rived on November 30, and the rest the next day. By the 2nd 
 of December Steedman had brought a provisional division of 
 5,200 men from Chattanooga made up largely of "casuals" 
 from Sherman's army. Before the battle of Nashville took 
 place there were enough other "casuals" and new regiments 
 at Nashville to form a second provisional division of more than 
 5,000 men, which was put under General Cruft; and the em- 
 ployees of the supply departments had also been armed and 
 organized into a division. Most of the Federal detachments 
 from North Alabama, some 8,000 men, had been concentrated 
 at Murfreesboro to guard the Nashville and Chattanooga Rail- 
 way. They remained there until after the battle of Nashville. 
 
 Thomas put his forces into the works upon a line of hills 
 around Nashville — Smith's division on the right, then the 
 Fourth Corps,* then the Twenty-third [Schofield]. Steed- 
 man's division prolonged the line from Schofield's left to the 
 Cumberland River. 
 
 (289) On the 2nd of December Hood sent Bate's division, 
 reinforced by two infantry brigades, to cooperate with For- 
 rest against the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway and Rous- 
 seau's command at Murfreesboro. Forrest and Bate had some 
 success, — they captured a railway train and destroyed several 
 bridges and block-houses, — and advanced upon Murfreesboro. 
 Here Bate was attacked and defeated by a part of Rousseau's 
 command. He was then recalled to Nashville, but Forrest's 
 cavalry, except Chalmers's division, was still absent from 
 Hood's main army when the battle of Nashville took place. 
 
 (294) Having gotten his forces assembled within the for- 
 tifications at Nashville, General Thomas purposed giving Wil- 
 son time to procure horses for the rest of his dismounted cav- 
 alry, several thousand, before taking the offensive against 
 Hood. He also needed time to prepare his trains and pon- 
 toons in order to pursue after attacking and defeating the 
 enemy. But Mr. Stanton became impatient at once, and tele- 
 graphed General Grant on the 2nd of December "to consider 
 the matter," saying that Thomas's purpose looked like "the 
 
 *This corps was now commanded by Wood, Stanley having been 
 shot through the neck while charging with Opdycke's brigade in its 
 timely counter-stroke at Franklin. 
 
The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville. 573 
 
 McClellan and Rosecrans strategy of do nothing."* Grant,, 
 thereupon, began sending telegrams to Thomas urging him to- 
 attack. On the 6th Thomas received a telegram from the 
 Commanding General directing him to "attack Hood at once."" 
 Wilson had scoured the country for horses, sparing not even 
 those of Andrew Johnson, the Vice-President-elect of the 
 United States, but he was not quite ready. So necessary did 
 Thomas consider it to have a strong mounted force that he 
 gave Wilson two more days in spite of General Grant's order. 
 By the 8th Wilson had a force of 12,000 mounted men — it 
 would require a stretch of the term to say that he had a 
 force of 12,000 cavalry. Thomas was now ready to attack. But 
 on the 8th the weather suddenly changed. There was a storm 
 of sleet and snow that covered the ground, and a temperature 
 that turned the surface into a sheet of ice, and made walking 
 upon the hillsides and slopes almost impossible for two or 
 three days. Thomas called his corps-commanders together 
 and asked their opinion upon the advisability of trying to' 
 attack. They were unanimous in the view that it was not 
 practicable to attack until the ice should melt. On the 14th a 
 warm rain cleared the ice away, and an order was issued for 
 an attack on the 15th. 
 
 In the meanwhile, seeing that his order of the 6th had not 
 been carried out, General Grant had an order written on the 
 9th relieving Thomas and appointing Schofield in his place. 
 The order was, however, never sent. But on the 13th General 
 Logan, who was still absent from his own corps [Fifteenth], 
 was ordered to Nashville to supersede Thomas; and on the 
 15th Grant himself reached Washington on his way to Nash- 
 ville. By this time, however, events were occurring that 
 quickly showed General Grant that neither he nor Logan was; 
 needed at Nashville, and halted them in their journeys. 
 
 According to Thomas's plan of attack as finally modified, 
 Smith and Wood, supported by Wilson's cavalry upon their 
 right flank, were to make the main attack against Hood's left. 
 Steedman was to make the secondary attack against Hood's 
 right. Schofield's corps was to be the general reserve. Cruft's- 
 provisional division was to occupy the works that Steedman 
 should vacate, and General Donaldson's armed employees were 
 to hold the rest of the interior line of works.f 
 
 (295) On the morning of the 15th there was a dense fog: 
 
 ♦Van Home. 
 fCox. 
 
574 American Campaigns. 
 
 until nine o'clock that covered the troops in the early move- 
 ments toward their positions for assault; but the mud result- 
 ing from the rain and thaw made the movements very slow. 
 Wood's corps marched by the right flank until its left rested 
 upon the southernmost angle of the Union works. This point 
 was to be the pivot upon which Wood and Smith were to 
 wheel to the left. Smith formed on the right of Wood, and 
 Schofield in the rear. Wilson moved out to clear the Char- 
 lotte and Hardin Pikes of the enemy and to sweep the ground 
 beyond Smith's right. 
 
 From the high point upon which the southernmost salient of 
 the Union works rested a clear view could be had of the coun- 
 try round about. A mile to the east was the valley of Brown's 
 Creek, and two miles to the southwest, that of Richland Creek. 
 These two streams rose within a mile of each other in the 
 high Brentwood Hills, four or five miles south of Nashville, 
 and flowed in divergent courses to the Cumberland. The 
 Granny White Turnpike ran southward upon the high ridge 
 between them. Eight other pikes south of the Cumberland 
 River radiated from Nashville. The ground was broken and 
 hilly, with knolls and ridges rising two or three hundred feet 
 above the river; but it was "mostly open, with groves of tim- 
 ber here and there."* 
 
 Hood's main line was more than five miles long. It stretched 
 along the series of hills east of the valley of Brown's Creek, 
 from the Chattanooga Railway to the Franklin Pike ; thence it 
 crossed the valley of Brown's Creek and passed over the ridge 
 of Granny White Pike to a high knoll near the Hillsboro Pike ; 
 here it made a sharp turn, and, reaching the pike, ran along a 
 stone wall at its side. Farther to the southwest, and even 
 across Richland Creek, Hood had erected some detached works 
 upon the hills. On his left, half-way between his main line and 
 the Union line, he had an advanced line of skirmishers with its 
 left strongly posted on Montgomery Hill, at the Hillsboro 
 Pike.* 
 
 (296) Steedman moved forward on the Murfreesboro 
 Pike, and, by eight o'clock, had opened his attack on the Con- 
 federate right with enough vigor to occupy the attention of 
 Cheatham's corps on that flank. Smith's corps and Wilson's 
 cavalry pushed steadily forward with their wide wheel from 
 the Union right, capturing Hood's detached works one after 
 
 *Cox. 
 
The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville. 575 
 
 another, until by noon they were within striking distance of the 
 Confederate works on the Hillsboro Pike. With a view of 
 gaining the Confederate rear, if possible, Wilson was then 
 ordered to move farther to his right, and Schofield moved the 
 Twenty-third Corps to take Wilson's place on Smith's right. 
 
 (297) Smith advanced against the Confederate left behind 
 the stone wall on the Hillsboro Pike, and drove it away. Sam 
 Beaty's division of the Fourth Corps had already taken the 
 strong Confederate outpost position on Montgomery Hill, and 
 General Thomas now ordered Wood to assault the salient on 
 the hill in front of his line. Wood made the assault and car- 
 ried the salient, and now the whole of the Confederate left 
 wing was shattered and falling back. Schofleld's corps, which 
 had come forward on Smith's right, and the cavalry were 
 pushing the enemy's extreme left. The broken line did not 
 stop until it passed the Granny White Pike; the extreme left 
 was driven back to two hills near this pike fully two miles south 
 of the Confederate works. Darkness stopped the pursuit. 
 
 (298) After dark Hood formed a new line and intrenched 
 it. Early in the day he had started one division of Cheatham's 
 corps from his right to reinforce hi' - 'eft. As soon as it was 
 dusk the rest of this corps moved to the left of the new line; 
 Stewart's corps was withdrawn to the center of this line ; and 
 Lee's, which had scarcely fired a shot during the day, took its 
 place on the right. The new line was a little more than two 
 miles long; its right rested on Overton Hill, just east of the 
 Franklin Pike, and its left on the two hills just mentioned; 
 its middle part was on lower ground and was broken by sev- 
 eral branches of Brown's Creek. The line covered the two 
 roads by which Hood's army might retreat. Chalmer's cav- 
 alry division, which had been too weak to offer much hin- 
 drance to Wilson's squadrons during the day, took post on the 
 extreme left of the new line. 
 
 On the morning of the 16th the whole Federal line moved 
 up close to the Confederate position. Steedman was still on 
 the extreme left ; Wood was next in the line ; then Smith ; then 
 Schofield; and Wilson's cavalry was on the extreme right. 
 Johnson's division of the cavalry was several miles away to 
 the southwest, moving across country to strike Hood's line of 
 retreat. About noon the Federal skirmishers advanced close 
 to the Confederate works, "and various points were recon- 
 
576 American Campaigns. 
 
 noitered to determine the feasibility of an assault."* Wood's- 
 corps, supported by Steedman's division, made the first real as- 
 sault; it assailed the Confederate right, and was repulsed with 
 severe loss. Meantime Wilson's cavalry had worked its way 
 round to a position in rear of the Confederate left. About 
 four o'clock Schofield and Smith assaulted this part of the line 
 in front and flank, while Wilson's dismounted troopers charged 
 it from behind. The result was decisive. "The whole Con- 
 federate left was crushed in like an egg-shell," and the rout 
 quickly spread to the rest of the line. In General Hood's own 
 words, he "beheld for the first and only time a Confederate 
 army abandon the field in confusion."f The actual losses in 
 killed and wounded had been very light on each side; General 
 Hood admits that he lost fifty- four pieces of artillery ; his loss- 
 of prisoners was numbered in thousands. 
 
 Wilson's dismounted troopers had made the fatal mistake of 
 leaving their horses too far behind them. This delayed their 
 pursuit until night was upon them ; and with night came a 
 drenching rain. Two miles from the battle-field they came 
 upon Chalmers's cavalry division, which was covering the Con- 
 federate retreat. It was strongly posted across the Granny 
 White Pike behind a barricade of fence-rails, and it succeeded 
 in checking the Federal cavalry long enough "to enable the 
 fleeing Confederate infantry to sweep by the danger-point that 
 night, to improvise a rear-guard, and to make good their re- 
 treat the next day."$ Wood's corps pursued by way of the 
 Franklin Pike. Smith and Schofield were ordered to follow 
 Wilson the next day. The mass of the fugitives took the 
 Franklin Pike. (289) The next day Wilson's cavalry caught 
 up with Hood's rear-guard four miles north of Franklin, and,, 
 charging it in front and flank, carried its position, capturing 
 400 prisoners. At Columbia Forrest rejoined Hood, and his 
 cavalry, with an infantry rear-guard under Walthall, covered' 
 the retreat to the Tennessee River. There the pursuit was 
 given up, and by the 10th of January, 1865, the remnant of 
 Hood's army was at Tupelo, Mississippi. On the 13th Hood 
 telegraphed the Confederate Secretary of War: "I request to 
 be relieved from command of this army."§ 
 
 *Cox. 
 
 fHood in B. & L. 
 
 JGeneral Wilson in B. & L. 
 
 §Cox. Hood in B. & L. 
 
The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville. 577 
 Comments. 
 
 For the military student the Campaign of Franklin and 
 Nashville is one of the most interesting and instructive cam- 
 paigns of the Civil War. The two chief actors in it, Thomas 
 and Hood, were the exact opposites of each other. One was- 
 slow, apparently timid in taking the initiative, but sure in exe- 
 cution ; the other was quick and bold to act, but uncertain as to 
 the outcome. One apparently weighed the odds against him 
 too carefully; the other gave no heed to them at all. If the 
 characters and talents of the two men could have been com- 
 bined in a single general, it would be hard to pick his better. 
 
 Little fault can be found with Hood's operations from the 
 time when he quitted Lovejoy on the 20th of September until 
 he arrived with his army at Gadsden a month later. They were 
 bold in conception, brilliant in execution, and resulted in draw- 
 ing Sherman with his army all the way back to Resaca, seventy 
 miles, and from there to Gaylesville, forty-odd miles farther 
 and away from his railway; and they placed Hood's army in 
 such a position that, if forced to continue the retreat, it could 
 have fallen back along the Blue Mountain-Selma Railway 
 (shown on the map as the Alabama and Tenn. R. R.). It 
 was, however, practically impossible for Sherman to follow 
 Hood much farther ; it would have taken Sherman too far from 
 his own base and railway. General Sherman, therefore, halted 
 his army at Gaylesville. There he occupied a very controlling 
 strategic position, a "position," as he wrote General Halleck, 
 "very good to watch the enemy."* So long as he remained 
 there Hood could not move back toward Atlanta into Georgia ; 
 he could not move against the railway between Atlanta and 
 Chattanooga; and he could not threaten the railway bridge at 
 Bridgeport or cross the Tennessee River anywhere east of 
 Guntersville to strike at the Memphis and Charleston or the 
 Nashville and Chattanooga Railway; for Sherman was nearer 
 all of those objectives than Hood was. The only aggressive 
 movement that Hood could make, without exposing his army 
 to attack in rear or flank by Sherman from his central strategic 
 position at Gaylesville, was to cross the Tennessee at a point 
 far enough west to be beyond Sherman's reach. That is pre- 
 cisely what Hood did. 
 
 ♦Colonel Stone in B. & L. 
 
578 American Campaigns. 
 
 The Campaign in Tennessee. 
 
 When their armies reached Gadsden and Gaylesville, respect- 
 ively, the campaign between Hood and Sherman came to a 
 close. From those points a new series of operations with new 
 purposes and new objectives was to begin on each side. Hood 
 says he had already wrought out the plan of his operations; 
 Sherman, we know, had made up his mind what his should be, 
 if General Grant could be persuaded to give his consent. Hood's 
 movement to Decatur decided Grant to allow Sherman to carry 
 out his plan ; if Grant had consented before Hood moved from 
 Gadsden, and Sherman had started back to Atlanta to begin 
 his march to the sea, it is more than probable that Hood would 
 have been required by the Confederate President to follow him. 
 One of Hood's arguments in favor of his invasion of Ten- 
 nessee was that Sherman would quit Georgia to follow him; 
 one of Sherman's arguments in favor of his march to the sea 
 was that Hood would turn back from the Tennessee to follow 
 him. Neither general prophesied aright. President Davis 
 objected to Hood's movement into Tennessee, but yielded to 
 Hood and Beauregard;* President Lincoln "was anxious, if 
 not fearful," concerning Sherman's march to the sea, but 
 refrained from interfering.! That the strategy of Sherman's 
 plan was good, was proved by its success ; that the strategy of 
 Hood's was bad, was not proved by its failure. The best of 
 plans may fail by reason of a bad execution. Even though 
 Hood had not achieved all he hoped for, if he had succeeded 
 in capturing Nashville and threatening Louisville and Cincin- 
 nati, the consequences would have been very serious; such 
 alarm might thus have been caused at Washington and 
 throughout the North as to stop Sherman's progress, and even 
 to interfere with Grant's operations at Petersburg. 
 
 General Thomas ought to have stopped Hood's army south 
 of Duck River. He says in his report "that, had Hood de- 
 layed his advance from Florence ten days longer, he would 
 have met him at Columbia or some other point south of Duck 
 River." But he ought to have done so anyhow ; he would not 
 have needed ten days' delay if he had promptly made use of 
 the troops and means at his disposal. His tri-monthly return 
 of November 20, the day that Hood was starting from Flor- 
 ence, showed a force in Tennessee of 59,534 officers and men 
 
 ♦Davis. 
 fCox. 
 
The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville. 579 
 
 "present and equipped" ; and he had the railways to use in con- 
 centrating them. If we allow the same number of men for the 
 smaller garrisons and railway-guards that were actually left 
 when the concentration was finally made at Nashville, we shall 
 find that Thomas still had an army of 47,000 available for active 
 operations. On the 1st of November Granger was at Decatur 
 with 5,000 men, and Steedman could have joined him with the 
 5,000 he later took from Chattanooga to Nashville. These 
 combined forces ought to have gone to Schofield at Pulaski. 
 Thomas could have joined Schofield there or at Columbia with 
 all other available troops from Nashville, and would then have 
 had an army superior in numbers to Hood's in everything ex- 
 cept cavalry. At that time the only Confederate troops in the 
 theater of operations, besides Hood's army, were Roddey's 
 division of cavalry in North Alabama, which gave no trouble 
 during the campaign, and a small force under Breckinridge 
 making a feeble diversion in East Tennessee. The troops in 
 that part of Schofield's department were able to take care of 
 Breckinridge's command. General Thomas's right policy was 
 promptly to concentrate all his available forces and meet Hood 
 as near the Tennessee River as practicable.* 
 
 On the other hand, Hood's long wait at Florence was fatal 
 to his success. He stayed there three weeks, from the last of 
 October until the 21st of November, thus giving time for the 
 Fourth and Twenty-third Corps to go from Georgia to Pu- 
 laski to oppose his march ; and for Wilson to organize and 
 mount a corps of cavalry, A. J. Smith to bring the Sixteenth 
 Corps from Missouri, and Thomas to concentrate the scat- 
 tered Union detachments at Nashville and organize a mass of 
 recruits and "casuals," — all to defeat and destroy him. The 
 only cause that Hood assigns for his delay was the lack of sup- 
 plies due to a delay in repairing the railway from Corinth to 
 Tuscumbia. There is no doubt, also, that he waited for For- 
 rest to join him from his raid in West Tennessee; and it is 
 very probable, too, that he hoped from day to day to learn 
 that troops were on the way from the Trans-Mississippi De- 
 partment to reinforce him. This was a vain hope, in view 
 of the close guard held over the Mississippi by the Union 
 forces. Yet, even after his defeat at Franklin, Hood says, 
 "The President was still urgent in his instructions relative to 
 the transference of troops to the Army of Tennessee from 
 
 *Cox. 
 
580 American Campaigns. 
 
 Texas, and I daily hoped to receive the glad tidings of their 
 safe passage across the Mississippi."* 
 
 Columbia is about sixty-five miles from Florence and fifty 
 from Nashville. If Hood had not stopped at Florence, but 
 had pushed on to Columbia, gathering supplies from the coun- 
 try, he could have reached that town by the 4th of November. 
 Stanley had reached Pulaski on the 1st with one of his divi- 
 sions, and the other arrived four days later. On the 4th Scho- 
 field reached Nashville with his leading brigade, and the same 
 day Forrest frightened the Union garrison away from John- 
 sonville, and might have crossed the river there, if he had 
 chosen to do so, and marched toward Franklin or Columbia. 
 Johnsonville is seventy miles from those towns. Schofield was 
 hurried with his leading troops to Johnsonville, and up to about 
 the 10th of November the only Federal troops between Hood's 
 army and Nashville were Stanley's corps and a few regiments 
 of cavalry. Stanley would have had to fall back, and by the 
 6th Hood could have been at Franklin, where he might have 
 been joined by Forrest the same day. if Nashville is only 
 thirty miles from Franklin and neither A. J. Smith from Mis- 
 souri nor Steedman from Chattanooga got there before the 
 end of November, and Wilson's cavalry corps was not organ- 
 ized and mounted before the 8th of December. 
 
 Hood would thus have arrived in front of the works at Nash- 
 ville with an army whose numbers had not been reduced, and 
 whose morale had not been extinguished, by the terrible en- 
 counter and defeat at Franklin. To defend his works Thomas 
 would have had, in addition to Stanley's and Schofield's corps, 
 and Hatch's cavalry, ten or twelve thousand unorganized 
 troops, consisting of new regiments, dismounted cavalry, and 
 "casuals," and also his body of armed employees of the sup- 
 ply departments. If, however, Hood was unable to beat Scho- 
 field with only the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps at Franklin, 
 behind very hastily constructed earthworks, it is hardly to be 
 supposed that he could have defeated Thomas's superior force 
 
 *Hood in B. & L. 
 
 fThis supposes that Hood could have communicated promptly with 
 Forrest, and that Forrest could have crossed the Tennessee, which was 
 probably not the case. Forrest could have crossed at Johnsonville by 
 means of a captured gunboat, but when he tried to cross at another 
 point a few days afterwards, by swimming his horses and ferrying his 
 men upon rafts, he was prevented from doing so by the swift current 
 and drift-wood resulting from the swollen condition of the stream. 
 
 JWyeth. 
 
The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville. 581 
 
 if he had attacked it at Nashville; but he would have been in 
 better condition to withstand Thomas's attack, and almost cer- 
 tainly would have brought his army away from the battle of 
 Nashville in better shape. 
 
 Hood's stay at Florence, however, came near turning out 
 a strategic advantage for him. By giving Schofield and Stan- 
 ley time to reach Pulaski with their commands, it gave him a 
 chance to cut them off. If Hood had started before Schofield 
 joined Stanley, the latter, being too weak to make any sort of 
 resistance, would have fallen back very promptly ; and even if 
 he could have been cut off and captured, the force involved 
 would have been comparatively small. 
 
 From the time when Hood quitted Florence until he reached 
 Spring Hil! he made his maneuvers very skilfully. By turn- 
 ing Schofield's position at Pulaski and letting Forrest push 
 ahead with his cavalry, he came very near getting the bridge 
 at Columbia, and cutting off the Federal retreat. The timely 
 arrival of Cox's division was all that saved the bridge. At 
 Columbia Forrest crossed Duck River east of the town, drove 
 back Wilson's cavalry, and cleared the way for Hood's in- 
 fantry columns to march to Spring Hill. Wilson had as many 
 troopers as Forrest at this time, yet Forrest succeeded, by 
 skilful maneuvers, in forcing him back on the Lewisburg- 
 Franklin road, and in completely cutting him off from Scho- 
 field's main column, leaving Schofield, "during the whole of 
 the critical day and night of the 29th (November), without 
 the means of learning Hood's movements, except from his 
 infantry reconnaissances."* It was another example of cav- 
 alry's allowing itself to be cut off from the main army by the 
 enemy's column. The moment the cavalry of an army be- 
 comes separated from the infantry columns by the enemy it 
 ceases to be of any further use to those columns until it regains 
 touch with them. 
 
 Spring Hill. 
 
 As soon as Forrest drove Wilson out of the way he hurried 
 to Spring Hill in order to block the road of the enemy's col- 
 umn. But Stanley reached there with his infantry division 
 just in time to meet Forrest and drive him away. 
 
 At Spring Hill Hood had, by skilful maneuvering, com- 
 
 i 
 
 *Cox. j ""I 
 
582 American Campaigns. 
 
 pletely turned Schofield's army and placed his own where it 
 ought to have been able to capture or destroy its foe. Then, 
 like Hooker at Chancellorsville, he seemed to let go all hold, 
 and allow his opportunity to slip from his grasp. Stanley was 
 at Spring Hill with a single advanced division, only one bri- 
 gade of which became engaged. Hood had two full corps 
 [Cheatham and Stewart] with which he might easily have at- 
 tacked Stanley, but, by his bad management, Stewart's corps 
 was halted more than two miles from the battlefield, and by 
 Cheatham's bad management only one of Cheatham's divi- 
 sions went into the fight before dark. Yet, in spite of these 
 mistakes, Hood still had the chance to cut off and destroy 
 Schofield's forces. All he needed to do to stop Schofield's 
 march was to place his troops across the road near Spring 
 Hill ; but that is what he failed to do. His troops bivouacked 
 east of the road, and during the night the Federal army 
 slipped safely by, within 600 yards of the left of their lines.* 
 Stewart had been placed after dark on Cheatham's right, with 
 orders to extend the line across the road; and no satisfactory 
 explanation has been made for his failure to do so. 
 
 Primarily Cheatham was to blame for the Confederate fail- 
 ure at Spring Hill, inasmuch as he failed with his whole corps 
 to drive Stanley's single division away from Spring Hill before 
 dark. But Stanley had a large force of artillery and Cheatham 
 had none. Hood, withal, was on the ground — the command- 
 ing officer cannot shift responsibility or blame to the shoulders 
 of a subordinate if he himself is present. Hood's greatest mis- 
 take was his suspending the attack until morning.f After 
 Stewart's corps and Johnson's division of Lee's came up, about 
 dark, the Confederates so outnumbered Stanley's force that 
 they ought easily to have defeated it even in the dark. Dur- 
 ing the night, moreover, Confederate sentinels distinctly heard 
 conversation in the passing Federal columns, and one of For- 
 rest's brigades struck those columns on the road three or four 
 miles north of Spring Hill at 11 p.m., and fought them until 
 near daylight.* Yet it appears that Hood was only informed 
 that there were "stragglers" passing in the road ; and Johnson, 
 who was sent to stop them, reported that he could not find even 
 "stragglers." On this occasion everybody in Hood's army 
 seems to have been remiss, from the commanding general down 
 to the sentries on post. 
 
 *Wyeth. 
 
 fCheatham in B. &■ L. 
 
The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville. 583 
 
 Franklin. 
 
 (292 and 293) The battle of Franklin illustrates more 
 forcibly than any other engagement of the Civil War the mis- 
 take of placing troops, in a defensive battle, in an advanced 
 position before the main line ; it also illustrates the importance 
 of keeping out a reserve, but more especially the importance 
 of throwing in the reserve at precisely the right place and 
 moment. By holding his two brigades at their advanced posi- 
 tion in front of the main line, and apparently trying to stop 
 Hood's whole force, Wagner very nearly caused the destruc- 
 tion of Schofield's army; by throwing his reserve into the 
 breach Opdycke saved the army from destruction. 
 
 Nashville. 
 
 (289) Having failed to cut off and capture or destroy the 
 Fourth and Twenty-third Corps, and having suffered disaster 
 at Franklin, Hood had scant chance of accomplishing any- 
 thing by pushing on to Nashville. The fighting spirit of his 
 army was gone, and he says he had only 23,053 effectives left, 
 and knew that he should receive no recruits from Tennessee or 
 Kentucky. He still, however, cherished the vain hope of re- 
 ceiving reinforcements from beyond the Mississippi. He did 
 not expect to attack Thomas, but expected to be attacked by 
 him, and hoped to repulse him, and, in a counter-stroke, to 
 follow upon his heels into Nashville.* It should seem that 
 Hood's better plan now would have been to keep away from 
 Nashville and to maneuver to draw Thomas after him, with a 
 view to finding an opportunity to strike some part of the Fed- 
 eral army at a disadvantage. 
 
 (294-298) General Thomas was very slow in making ready 
 to attack Hood, and it is not to be wondered that the Washing- 
 ton authorities, General Grant, and the whole people of the 
 North became anxious and impatient; but when his prepara- 
 tions and the weather were such that he, at length, felt ready 
 to attack, Thomas gained such a splendid and decisive victory 
 as to hush censure for all time. The victory was easily won, as 
 was shown by the small number of killed and wounded on 
 either side; but that fact does noway disparage the excellent 
 conduct of the assault. Of all the attacks made by Union 
 forces in the course of the war none other was as free from 
 
 *Hood in B. & L. 
 
584 American Campaigns. 
 
 faults as this one. It was good in plan and in execution. By 
 threatening Hood's right flank on the 15th of December with 
 the "secondary attack," before the main attack reached the left 
 of the Confederate line, Thomas drew Hood's attention to the 
 right of that line, and kept him from sending support to its 
 left until it was too late. Hood's left was unquestionably the 
 proper wing for Thomas's main attack to fall upon. Its flank 
 was in the air, and it had no natural strength in front ; whereas 
 the right wing had the valley of Brown's Creek in front of 
 it. On the left of the Confederate line Thomas had unlimited 
 space in which to maneuver his infantry and cavalry, and fine 
 positions for his artillery ; while on the opposite flank his move- 
 ments would have been cramped by the Cumberland River, his 
 columns would have found no cover against the enemy's view 
 and the fire of his artillery, and there were no good positions 
 for the Union artillery. And lastly, by attacking the left of 
 'the Confederates Thomas had a better chance of seizing their 
 •line of retreat and cutting them off. The attack was carried 
 ■out as planned, almost without a hitch. 
 
 The cavalry did more actual fighting on the Union side than 
 was done by cavalry upon any other battle-field of the war ; but 
 it fought dismounted. It was Wilson's dismounted squad- 
 rons behind the left of the Confederate line that started the 
 ;fout. And yet it is more than likely that the fruits of the 
 'victory would have been greater if Wilson had kept his troop- 
 ers near their horses, ready to pursue and cut off the beaten 
 army at the moment when its flight began ; for there can be 
 little doubt that Hood's army would soon have broken, even 
 ■though Wilson's cavalry had not come up behind it. 
 
 Among the mistakes on the side of the Confederates the 
 first to be noted is the length of their line of works. It was 
 nearly six miles long, and Hood cannot have had more than 
 30,000 men to hold it — fewer than three men to the yard. The 
 general trace of the works was concave, which made it neces- 
 sary to move troops by the circumference, instead of by a 
 chord, in transferring them from one part to another. The 
 right wing of the works, instead of being parallel to Brown's 
 Creek, ought to have bent southward on the east side of the 
 TYahklin Pike, in the direction of Overton Hill; and the 
 isolated works on the left added no strength whatever to the 
 position. They were easily taken one after another, and their 
 guns were then turned upon the main works. But Hood's case 
 was hopeless, no matter what form or length of line he might 
 have adopted ; Thomas had men enough to contain him in front 
 
The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville. 585 
 
 and turn his flank, and Hood's troops seemed to have no fight 
 left in them. While Hood's left was being driven back and his 
 right was being threatened on the first day, his center, Lee's 
 corps, was scarcely firing a shot. Why Hood did not draw 
 troops from that part to reinforce his left has not been ex- 
 plained. Hood had no general reserve, doubtless on account 
 of a lack of troops. He had sent Forrest away to raid the 
 Nashville and Chattanooga Railway, a mistake that, General 
 Cox says, "made the opportunity which resulted so gloriously 
 • for our arms." If Forrest had been on the ground with his 
 cavalry he would certainly have made the wide wheel of Wil- 
 son's cavalry and Smith's and Schofield's corps more difficult 
 for them on the first day ; and he would have kept Wilson away 
 from the rear of the Confederate line on the second day. And 
 if he had been present at the beginning of the retreat he would 
 greatly have lessened its difficulties for the infantry columns. 
 
 Considering the disorder and rout in which Hood's beaten 
 troops quitted the battle-field, it might seem that they ought 
 to have been cut off and blocked in front by Wilson's horse- 
 men, 12,000 strong, and captured or destroyed by the pursu- 
 ing infantry. But the earthen by-roads over which the cavalry 
 had to march were in such deplorable condition, the streams 
 with their bridges destroyed were so high, and forage for ani- 
 mals was so scarce in the country, that Wilson, in spite of 
 great exertion, was unable to check the fugitive column before 
 it was safe across the Tennessee River. There the pursuit 
 ended. 
 
 Sherman's March to the Sea. 
 
 On the 12th of November Sherman, with about 62,000 men, 
 and rations for twenty days in his wagon-train, started on his 
 march to the sea. By the 10th of December he was in front 
 of the works about Savannah. He had encountered virtually 
 no opposition, and his march is notable mainly as an example 
 of an army's cutting loose from its base and communications. 
 Its main purpose was to destroy the resources of the Confed- 
 eracy, which it did effectually over a wide space. Hardee was 
 in command of the Confederate garrison at Savannah. On 
 the 20th of December he evacuated the place, and withdrew 
 to Charleston, with about 18,000 men. 
 
 Fort Fisher was captured by General Terry about the middle 
 of January, 1865, and toward the end of that month Sherman's 
 
586 American Campaigns. 
 
 army started northward, by way of Columbia, South Carolina, 
 to join General Grant in front of Petersburg. Joseph E. Johns- 
 ton had been sent to the Carolinas to collect the scattered 
 Confederate forces there, and to oppose Sherman's advance. 
 At Averysboro a part of these forces, under Hardee, were 
 encountered on the 16th of March, and the bulk of them, un- 
 der Johnston, were engaged from the 19th to the 21st, at Ben- 
 tonville. The Confederates were defeated in both of these 
 actions, and Sherman concentrated his columns at Golsboro 
 for a further movement to the north. He reached Raleigh on 
 the 13th of April, and Johnston surrendered to him the next 
 day.* 
 
 Minor Operations. 
 
 All the main operations of the land forces in our great con- 
 flict have now been discussed. There were, besides, a number 
 of interesting raids conducted by such cavalry leaders as Mor- 
 gan and Forrest, on the Confederate side, and Stoneman, Grier- 
 son, and Wilson, on the Union side, in the last two years of 
 the war, which we have not time to discuss ; and there were 
 other minor operations of a mixed character in Missouri, Ar- 
 kansas, and Louisiana. 
 
 Of these operations the most important, perhaps, was the 
 one known as the Red River Campaign. Up to 1864 Texas, 
 except at the mouth of the Rio Grande, had not been brought 
 under the authority of the United States. As early as the 
 summer of 1863 Halleck had urged Banks, who was in com- 
 mand of the Union forces in Louisiana, to make an overland 
 expedition into Texas, telegraphing him "There are impor- 
 tant (diplomatic) reasons why our flag should be hoisted at 
 some point in Texas without delay"; he suggested that "the 
 high road to Texas for our troops was via Shreveport and the 
 Red River."f In March, 1864, Banks undertook such an ex- 
 pedition. He moved up the Red River, and, after several 
 minor actions, was defeated by a Confederate force under Gen- 
 eral "Dick" Taylor, at Sabine Cross Roads, April 8, losing his 
 artillery and trains. His army then fell back to Alexandria, 
 and remained there from April 25 to May 13, guarding its 
 flotilla, which was held fast by low water. The retreat was re- 
 sumed on the 14th of May, and by the 26th of May the un- 
 
 ♦Lecture by Captain Stuart, C. E. 
 fLecture by General C. B. Hall. 
 
The Campaign of Franklin and Nashville. 587 
 
 successful expedition had reached Donaldsonville.* General 
 Charles B. Hall, in a descriptive and critical account of this 
 enterprise, says : "It was conceived in uncertainty, it was 
 born in hope, it was, for a time, sustained with promises ; and 
 its ending was so disastrous, because military precautions were 
 neglected, and rules violated, as to call for Congressional in- 
 vestigation and the censure of its commanding general." 
 
 ♦Captain Stuart. 
 
LECTURE XXVII. 
 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.* 
 
 Hardly had a month passed after the surrender at Appomat- 
 tox when General Sheridan was sent to Texas with orders to 
 concentrate an imposing force there, and with confidential 
 instructions to make demonstrations along the Rio Grande 
 border. The object was to hasten the withdrawal of French 
 troops from Mexico ; for, taking advantage of the struggle 
 going on in the United States, Napoleon III. had, in 1863, 
 made use of a flimsy excuse to ignore the Monroe Doctrine, 
 land an army in Mexico, overthrow the Republic, and set up 
 an Empire in its place, with the Archduke Maximilian of 
 Austria as its Emperor. The end of the Civil War left the 
 American Government with upwards of a million veteran sol- 
 diers at its disposal, hence in the best possible condition to 
 •enforce its demand for the withdrawal of foreign troops from 
 its neighbor's soil. Napoleon III. was, therefore, easily per- 
 suaded to recall his forces, and Maximilian, left to his fate, 
 was taken by the patriot troops of Mexico and shot to death. 
 
 The hosts of veteran volunteers that had brought the Civil 
 War to a successful close were promptly mustered out to re- 
 turn to their homes, and the few thousands of regulars were 
 scattered in small detachments throughout the South to aid 
 in the work of Reconstruction. In August, 1867, the enlisted 
 strength of the regular army numbered 53,962, the largest 
 number of regular troops borne upon the rolls since 1814; but 
 the cry for retrenchment of public expense had set in, and 
 the army became its chief, if not its only, subject. Within two 
 years the enlisted strength was reduced to 34,000; in 1870 a 
 maximum strength of 30,000 was fixed by law, and this was 
 cut down by an act of Congress, in 1874, to 25,000. This 
 law practically remained in effect until the eve of the war 
 with Spain in 1898. 
 
 *In the preparation of this lecture practically everything concern- 
 ing the operations in Cuba and American waters has been taken 
 from Captain Sargent's excellent work, The Campaign of Santiago de 
 Cuba, which, in its full and accurate narrative, and its intelligent and 
 ■scholarly discussion, leaves nothing further to be said to the military 
 student upon the subject. Besides being the only history, in the full 
 sense yet written of the campaign, this work is also an able treatise 
 -upon the strategy of land and naval operations. 
 
The Spanish-American War. 589 
 
 The United States, in the meanwhile, had several times been 
 threatened with foreign war, — once with Spain herself over 
 the Virginius affair in 1873. At that time, no doubt, it would 
 have been an easy matter to raise a large force composed of 
 veterans of the Civil War ; but, as the years went by, this great 
 national reserve was less and less to be counted upon. At 
 length, when war actually befell, in 1898, thirty-three years 
 after the last shot fired in the Civil War, there was, of course, 
 hardly a veteran of this war able to shoulder a rifle. 
 
 (299) A second insurrection had broken out in Cuba in 
 the spring of 1895, and had dragged along until the winter 
 of 1897. The insurgents had never counted more than 25,000 
 armed men in the field at one time, while Spain had sent as 
 many as 217,282 reinforcements to the island; hence the in- 
 surrection, in spite of the inactive and badly-managed meas- 
 ures of the Spaniards, never had a chance of succeeding with- 
 out the intervention of the United States. The hope of such 
 intervention, and the assistance furnished by individual Ameri- 
 cans, were undoubtedly all that had kept the rebellion alive. 
 Finally the conditions in Cuha became so dreadful, under the 
 administration of General Weyler, that the United States did 
 intervene, and demand his recall. The Spanish government 
 recalled Weyler in October, 1897, and instituted reforms in the 
 administration of affairs in the island. But the reforms had 
 come too late ; nothing now would satisfy the Cubans short of 
 independence, for they knew that they could still count upon 
 the active sympathy and support of the American people in 
 their struggle for liberty. 
 
 If there be a single national trait or quality amongst our 
 people stronger than all others, it is an unreasoning sentiment 
 that causes them always to sympathize with the side that phys- 
 ically appears the weaker; and the less they know about the 
 real conditions of difference between the parties to a quarrel 
 the stronger is their sympathy. True, the preponderance of 
 right has not, generally, been on the side of might; but there 
 has usually been some right and some wrong on each side. 
 Our people never ask to see the right on the stronger side, 
 nor do they look for the wrong on the weaker side. It was 
 this sentiment, wrought upon by the "yellow" part of our 
 press, or taken advantage of by this part of the press, that 
 brought us into war with Spain. The national sentiment was 
 tense with sympathy and the sense of outrage when the de- 
 struction of the battle-ship Maine, in Havana harbor, on the 
 
590 American Campaigns. 
 
 night of February 15, 1898, added a climax to the situation. 
 Time was taken to investigate the circumstances ; but the will 
 of the American people could not long be held in check, and in 
 response to it Congress, on the 19th of April, passed a resolu- 
 tion declaring "that the people of the Island of Cuba are, and 
 of right ought to be, free and independent," and authorizing 
 the President to use the land and naval forces to carry the 
 resolution into effect. This was tantamount to a declaration 
 of war, and evoked a formal declaration from Spain on April 
 24. On the 25th Congress passed an act formally declaring 
 that war existed between Spain and the United States. 
 
 Plan of Campaign. 
 
 It was known that the Spanish forces in Cuba were widely 
 scattered over the island, but that the bulk of them were in the 
 neighborhood of Havana, the most important city in the is- 
 land, and the seat of Spanish authority there. It was natural, 
 then, and right, that Havana should be chosen as our first ob- 
 jective. But two things were necessary before we could at- 
 tempt a campaign upon Cuban soil: first, control of the sea; 
 and, second, an army. With our Indian country still to guard 
 we could not think of withdrawing more than 15,000 of our 
 regular troops from the little garrisons in the West. Volun- 
 teers must, therefore, be counted upon, and a bill was promptly 
 passed under which the President issued a call for 125,000. A 
 few days later Congress passed an act authorizing a strength 
 of 62,597 men for the regular army, and, on the 11th of May, 
 further authorized the Secretary of War to organize a volun- 
 teer brigade of engineers, and an additional volunteer force of 
 10,000 men who were to be immune "from diseases incident to 
 tropical climates.'' On the 25th of May the President issued 
 a call for 75,000 more volunteers. Thus an aggregate of more 
 than 260,000 new troops was authorized by Congress, and they 
 were promptly raised. But these raw troops must be armed 
 and equipped, and ought to be trained, before they could be 
 put into active service. Moreover, the sickly summer-season 
 was near at hand in the tropics. 
 
 It was, therefore, decided to concentrate the available regu- 
 lars at New Orleans, Mobile, and Tampa, the most convenient 
 points from which to embark for Cuba, and to assemble the 
 volunteers in large camps of instruction. One such camp was 
 established at Chickamauga Park, Georgia, and another at 
 
The Spanish-American War. 591 
 
 Falls Church, Virginia. The bulk of the forces were to be 
 organized into eight army-corps. Besides these eight corps, 
 about 12,000 volunteers were distributed along the seacoast 
 from Maine to New Jersey; five regiments were stationed at 
 different points in the South; and one regiment of regular in- 
 fantry, three of cavalry, and nearly all of the artillery were 
 left to guard the Indian frontier and garrison the seacoast 
 forts. 
 
 Pending the preparations for the main expedition, a detach- 
 ment of 5,000 regulars was to be organized at Tampa, and dis- 
 patched under General Shafter to the coast of Cuba. Its dou- 
 ble purpose would be to make a reconnaissance in force in 
 order to gain information, and to carry supplies of arms and 
 ammunition to the insurgents. Before this expedition was 
 ready to set out, however, events had occurred at sea that 
 changed all the plans of the land forces. 
 
 The Hostile Navies. 
 
 (300) While it is well known now that our navy was supe- 
 rior in strength and quality to that of Spain at the outbreak 
 of the war, our naval authorities then believed the superiority 
 to be so slight that the loss of a single battle-ship might turn 
 the scale. On our side of the Atlantic Admiral Sampson had 
 at Key West "one of the most powerful fleets of warships that 
 had ever floated in American waters." Key West had been 
 selected as a base of naval operations, and Sampson's fleet 
 there was in a good position from which to blockade the north- 
 ern coast of Cuba or to aid an expedition against Havana ; 
 while, at the same time, it guarded our Gulf ports, and was 
 within reach of our Atlantic ports. The Flying Squadron, 
 composed of two battle-ships and three cruisers, under Com- 
 modore Schley, was held at Hampton Roads mainly for the 
 purpose of "giving a feeling of security to the people of the 
 coast cities"; and a patrol squadron, hastily organized, was 
 guarding the Atlantic coast northward from Hampton Roads. 
 The battle-ship Oregon was on its way from the Pacific coast. 
 After a swift and remarkable voyage of 14,700 miles it joined 
 Admiral Sampson's fleet, off the coast of Florida, near the 
 end of May. 
 
 On the other side of the Atlantic Spain had two fleets ; the 
 smaller one, commanded by Admiral Cimara, was in Spanish 
 waters, and the larger one, commanded by Admiral Cervera, 
 
592 American Campaigns. 
 
 was at St. Vincent in the Cape Verde Islands. Spain also had 
 a feeble squadron in Manila Bay, while Commodore Dewey 
 commanded an American fleet of second-class vessels which 
 was then in Chinese waters. 
 
 Under later orders from the Navy Department, and in order 
 more effectively to blockade the ports of Cuba, Sampson placed 
 the greater part of his vessels to cover Havana and the ports 
 on the northern shore of Cuba connected with that city by rail, 
 while Commander McCalla with a cruiser, a gunboat, and a. 
 converted yacht, blockaded Cienfuegos, on the southern coast. 
 There were at this time three inferior Spanish cruisers and 
 a few gunboats in Cuban waters, but they did not molest the 
 American ships. 
 
 On April 29 word was forwarded from Washington to Ad- 
 miral Sampson that, on that very day, Admiral Cervera's fleet 
 had started westward from the Cape Verde Islands. The fleet 
 consisted of four cruisers and three torpedo-boat destroyers. 
 It was reckoned that the Spanish fleet, if it made for the West 
 Indies, would reach their waters on the 8th of May, and would 
 immediately have to go into port to coal. In order to watch 
 for Cervera's fleet Sampson sailed with all his vessels, except 
 a few small ones, toward the north coasts of Haiti and Porto 
 Rico. By the 12th he was at San Juan, Porto Rico, and that 
 day bombarded the harbor of that place to search for the Span- 
 ish fleet. Finding that the fleet was not there he started back 
 to resume the blockade of Havana. On the way he was met 
 by the torpedo boat Porter with a dispatch from the Navy De- 
 partment informing him that Cervera's squadron was at the 
 Island of Curaqao (near the coast of Venezuela) on May 14, 
 and, also, that Schley with the Flying Squadron had started' 
 from Hampton Roads for the Gulf of Mexico. 
 
 Owing to the foul bottom of the Vizcaya, and the necessity 
 for towing his torpedo-boat destroyers, Cervera had made a 
 slow voyage. He touched first at the island of Martinique, 
 where he learned that the American navy was blockading the 
 western coasts of Cuba ; that Sampson's fleet was about to at- 
 tack San Juan, Porto Rico; and that Santiago de Cuba was 
 free from blockade. His coal was nearly out, the governor of 
 Martinique would not let him take on a supply there, and he 
 learned that there was none at San Juan, and probably none at 
 Santiago. He, therefore, decided to make for Curasao, where 
 he expected to find a supply. He reached Curaqao on the 
 14th, but the colliers he had expected were not there. The 
 
The Spanish-American War. 593 
 
 Dutch governor of the island, bound by neutrality regula- 
 tions, could let him take on only a small quantity of coal. In 
 despair he sailed for Cuba, and, on the morning of the 19th 
 of May, entered the harbor of Santiago. 
 
 On the same day the chief signal officer of the army in- 
 formed the Navy Department at Washington that Cervera's 
 squadron was in the harbor of Santiago. This information 
 was immediately dispatched to Sampson, who was now at Key 
 West. He forwarded it to Schley who had gone to blockade 
 Cienfuegos. Neither of these officers credited the informa- 
 tion. Schley believed that he had the Spanish fleet shut up in 
 the harbor of Cienfuegos, as he expressed it, "almost to a cer- 
 tainty." At length Commander McCalla went ashore and 
 learned positively from insurgents that the hostile fleet was not 
 at Cienfuegos. 
 
 On receiving this information Schley set out for Santiago 
 with the Brooklyn, Iowa, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, 
 Vixen, Eagle, and the collier Merrimac. He arrived off San- 
 tiago on the evening of the 26th, and found three American 
 auxiliary ships there scouting for the enemy. None of them 
 had any knowledge of Cervera's whereabouts. Schley did not 
 believe that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago harbor, and, 
 being unable to coal from the Merrimac, on account of a rough 
 sea, he started for Key West to coal. Almost immediately he 
 was overtaken by the auxiliary Harvard bearing an urgent dis- 
 patch from the Navy Department, which informed him that all 
 reports indicated that the Spanish fleet was at Santiago, and 
 directed him to secure positive information on the subject. 
 Schley replied that he could "ascertain nothing concerning the 
 enemy," and, for lack of coal in his bunkers, it was "impossible 
 to remain off Santiago" ; and he continued on his way to Key 
 West. On the 27th and 28th, however, the sea was calm 
 enough for him to coal his ships from the Merrimac, and he 
 put about for Santiago. On the 29th he reconnoitered near 
 the entrance of the harbor and discovered therein the Colon, 
 the Maria Teresa, and two torpedo-boat destroyers, which he 
 promptly reported to Washington. In the meantime Admiral 
 Sampson, having become well-nigh convinced that the hostile 
 fleet was at Santiago, had sailed for that point, also, with the 
 New York, the Oregon, the converted yacht Mayflower, and 
 the torpedo-boat Porter. He arrived off Santiago on June 1, 
 and took command of the blockade. 
 
 On their arrival at Santiago Cervera and his officers were 
 
594 American Campaigns. 
 
 disappointed to find that not only coal but all other sup- 
 plies were very scarce. They had expected to find plenty of 
 provisions at this port, as it had not yet been closed by block- 
 ade. They were now sorry they had come to Santiago, and 
 wanted to go to San Juan, Porto Rico, where they should find 
 supplies more plentiful. There was coal enough to carry them 
 thither, but before they got away they learned that three 
 American vessels had arrived in front of the harbor — they were 
 three auxiliary ships ; and the weather had become so bad that 
 there was danger of the Colon's striking bottom upon a rock 
 in the channel leading out of the harbor. After assembling 
 his captains two or three times to discuss the question of going 
 out, Cervera finally decided, on May 26, to defer the sortie "in 
 hopes that the sea will calm down and another opportunity will 
 present itself."* Thus Cervera cast away his last chance of 
 .saving any part of his squadron, for Schley came to blockade 
 him on the 28th of May, and Sampson arrived with more ships 
 on June the 1st. 
 
 On the 3rd of June Sampson got reliable information that all 
 of Cervera's vessels, except the destroyer Terror, were in San- 
 tiago harbor ; and the same day he received word from Wash- 
 ington that the Terror, which had been left at Martinique, had 
 arrived at San Juan, Porto Rico, badly crippled. That night 
 Lieutenant Hobson with a crew of seven sailors, picked from 
 a large number that had volunteered, acting under the Ad- 
 miral's orders, sank the collier Merrimac in the narrow chan- 
 nel, near the mouth of the harbor. The purpose was to seal 
 up the Spanish fleet inside the harbor, in order that a division 
 might safely be detached from the American fleet to act against 
 Camara's squadron in case it should become necessary ; but the 
 collier did not go down athwart the channel, hence did not close 
 it effectually. On the 6th of June Sampson's fleet bombarded 
 the forts guarding the entrance to the harbor. Nearly 2,000 
 shells were fired, killing sixteen Spaniards and wounding 130. 
 As there were only a few modern guns in the fort, they could 
 make but a feeble reply to the American fire. 
 
 (299) In order to secure a safe harbor where he could coal 
 ship in rough weather, and take refuge in case of hurricane, 
 Sampson sent the Marblehead and the auxiliary cruiser 
 Yankee, on the 7th of June, to capture Guantanamo Bay, about 
 forty miles east of Santiago Bay. The place was defended by 
 
 *From Cervera's indorsement upon the proceedings of the council 
 of his captains, May 26, 1898. 
 
The Spanish-American War. 595 
 
 a single gunboat and a few block-houses, and was easily taken. 
 The harbor was then garrisoned by a detachment of marines. 
 
 At this stage of the general campaign the active work of the 
 navy, for the time being, was at an end. To maintain a block- 
 ade of the coasts, and to watch for a sortie of Cervera's squad- 
 ron at the mouth of Santiago Bay, were now all that the navy 
 could do alone. It had scouted for the hostile fleet, found it, 
 and shut it up ; it now had complete command of the sea in the 
 theater of operations. So far as the sea was concerned, the 
 American army could proceed with its operations with little 
 risk ; but the navy could do nothing more without the assistance 
 of the army. (301) Morro Castle, at the mouth of Santiago 
 harbor was a medieval structure armed with guns of the 
 eighteenth century, and all but a few of the guns in the forts 
 guarding the harbor were of obsolete type; but there were 
 some modern pieces, the narrow channel was planted with 
 mines, and Cervera's fleet was inside. Altogether the risk 
 was far too great for Sampson to undertake to force a passage. 
 At this time our relations with other foreign nations were such 
 that we could not afford to lose a single vessel, and Sampson 
 had received special instructions from the Navy Department 
 not to expose his men-of-war to the fire of land batteries. Yet, 
 so long as Cervera could get provisions from the interior, the 
 Spanish fleet might hold out indefinitely. It was necessary, 
 therefore, in order to capture or destroy it, for an American 
 army to cooperate from the land side with Sampson's fleet. 
 
 The Campaign Against Santiago. 
 
 (299) The naval events briefly related in the last few pages 
 were what changed all the plans of our land forces, and led to 
 the termination of the war without a campaign against the 
 main Spanish army in Cuba, and the capital of the island. It 
 was arranged between the War and Navy Departments that a 
 force of troops should go to Cuba to cooperate with Samp- 
 son's fleet at Santiago. Accordingly, on the 30th of May, 
 General Shafter, commanding the Fifth Corps at Tampa, re- 
 ceived orders to take his command, under naval escort, to San- 
 tiago in order to capture the garrison of that place, and aid the 
 navy in capturing the Spanish fleet in the harbor. 
 
 In spite of great confusion in the military arrangements at 
 Tampa, all the troops were aboard the transports, and the fleet 
 was actually under way, by the 8th of June, "when suddenly 
 
596 American Campaigns. 
 
 there came an unexpected delay." Word was received that 
 two Spanish cruisers, accompanied by torpedo-boat destroy- 
 ers, had been sighted, on the night of the 7th, near Nicolas 
 Channel. As this channel is almost directly upon the route to 
 Santiago, the fleet had to be recalled and held until the news 
 could be investigated. Within a few days positive informa- 
 tion was received from Admiral Sampson that all of Cervera's 
 ships were still in Santiago Harbor ; and the transports started 
 again on June 14. 
 
 Shafter's command was organized in two infantry divisions 
 under Kent and Lawton, respectively, a dismounted cavalry 
 division, under Wheeler, and an independent brigade under 
 Bates. Each infantry division consisted of three small bri- 
 gades of three regiments each ; the cavalry division consisted 
 of only two brigades, and each cavalry brigade was made up of 
 two squadrons only from each of three regiments ; Bates's bri- 
 gade consisted of two infantry regiments, and had Rafferty's 
 squadron of the 2nd Cavalry, the only mounted troops with the 
 expedition, attached to it. Altogether there were eighteen 
 regiments of regular infantry and two of volunteers ; ten squad- 
 rons of regular cavalry and two of volunteers. The artillery 
 consisted of four light batteries, four siege guns, four howitz- 
 ers, eight field mortars, and one dynamite gun ; and there were 
 four Gatling guns and one revolving cannon. A battalion of 
 engineers, a detachment of the signal corps, and a balloon 
 detachment also accompanied the expedition. The whole con- 
 voy consisted of thirty-two troop-ships, two water-tenders, and 
 three lighters ; and the strength of the force on board, accord- 
 ing to General Shafter's report, was 815 officers and 16,072 
 enlisted men. 
 
 (301) Without any occurrence of importance, except the 
 loss of one lighter that broke loose at sea, the convoy, escorted 
 by the battle-ship Indiana and several smaller vessels, sailed 
 round the eastern end of Cuba and reached the position of 
 Sampson's blockading fleet, off the mouth of Santiago harbor, 
 on the 20th of June.. Here General Shafter had a conference 
 with Admiral Sampson and his chief of staff, from whom he 
 learned the situation from the naval point of view, the topog- 
 raphy of the coast line, and the views of the naval officers re- 
 garding a plan of operations for his command. He then went 
 ashore with Sampson to confer with the insurgent General 
 Garcia, who was at Aserraderos with some 5,000 of his sol- 
 diers. From Garcia Shafter obtained information concerning 
 
The Spanish-American War. 597 
 
 the topography and condition of the inland country about San- 
 tiago, and the number and position of the Spanish troops. 
 
 Geography. 
 
 (299) The province of Santiago occupies the eastern end 
 of the Island of Cuba and is about 200 miles long from east 
 to west. Its most important towns are Holguin, Sagua de 
 Tanamo, and Baracoa on the northern, Manzanillo, Santiago, 
 and Guantanamo on the southern side of the island. All of 
 these towns, except Holguin, are near the coast ; none of them 
 were connected by railways, and the highways throughout the 
 province were of the worst kind. None of them, without re- 
 pairs, were in fit condition for the passage of artillery or 
 wagons. (301) In the vicinity of Santiago, the coast is 
 rugged and mountainous ; for twenty miles on either side of the 
 harbor it has the form of a ridge whose sides are very steep 
 toward the sea. At some points they rise abruptly out of the 
 sea, while at others a strand of three or four hundred yards lies 
 between their base and the water's edge. The ridge varies in 
 height from 150 to 250 feet, and is broken here and there by 
 ravines through which short streams discharge their waters. 
 The longest and largest of these streams is the San Juan River, 
 about three miles east of Santiago Bay. Behind the ridge is a 
 line of foot-hills, and beyond them, five or six miles from the 
 coast, is a low mountain-range called the Sierra Del Cobre. 
 
 Upon the shore east of the harbor are several small places, 
 the most important of which are Aguadores, at the mouth of 
 the San Juan River; Siboney, eleven miles from the harbor; 
 and Daiquiri, six miles farther east. West of the harbor are 
 Cabanas and Guaicabon, two and four miles distant respec- 
 tively. Radiating from the harbor were two short railways. 
 One ran from Las Cruces, just south of Santiago on the bay, to 
 Aguadores, and thence along the strand to Siboney. From 
 there it turned back to Firmeza, a village two miles from the 
 shore. The other line ran northward from Santiago fifteen 
 miles to El Cristo, and there forked, one prong leading to the 
 village of Socorro, and the other by way of Moron and Dos 
 Caminos to San Luis.* 
 
 At this time there were in the province of Santiago 36,582 
 Spanish troops, distributed as follows: in the town of San- 
 
 *The railway shown on the map from El Cobre to the western 
 shore of the bay did not exist at the time of the war. 
 
598 American Campaigns. 
 
 tiago, about the harbor, and along the railway to Siboney, 
 9,430; at El Cristo, Songo, Moron, Dos Caminos, San Luis, 
 and Palma Soriano, 2,66(5 — all within twenty-five miles of San- 
 tiago; (299) at Guantanamo, 5,992; at Manzanillo, 8,668; at 
 Holguin, 8,364; at Baracoa, 742; and at Sagua de Tanamo, 
 720. All these soldiers, except the detachment at Holguin, 
 were under the command of General Arsenio Linares, whose 
 headquarters were at Santiago. Upwards of twelve thousand 
 of them were close enough to have been concentrated within 
 a few hours at any point near Santiago, Siboney, or Daiquiri. 
 
 (301) From General Garcia General Shafter learned that 
 there were probably 12,000 Spanish soldiers in the vicinity of 
 Santiago, about 5,000 of whom were in position between that 
 town and Daiquiri; that there were 300 at Daiquiri, 600 at 
 Siboney, 150 at Jutici, 100 at Sardinero, and 150 at Fort 
 Aguadores. Shafter was also informed that the Cuban Gen- 
 eral Castillo had 500 insurgent soldiers at a village about three 
 miles east of Daiquiri. Having weighed this information and 
 what he had learned concerning the landing places and the 
 topography of the country, in connection with his orders from 
 the War Department, General Shafter decided to land his army 
 at Daiquiri and advance against Santiago. 
 
 The debarkation was accordingly begun on the morning of 
 June 22. In order to confuse and mislead the Spanish the 
 navy shelled not only Daiquiri, but Siboney, Aguadores, and 
 Cabanas at the same time ; while Kent's division was anchored 
 in its transports in front of Cabanas, and made a feint of land- 
 ing there. At the same time the Cuban General Rabi, with a 
 detachment of Garcia's insurgents, made a demonstration by 
 land against the same place. Castillo with his detachment, 
 reinforced by about 500 of Garcia's men, who had been trans- 
 ferred to him by water on the 21st, was to attack Daiquiri from 
 his position. The Americans were to land in the following 
 order : first, Lawton's division ; second, Bates's brigade ; third, 
 Wheeler's division of dismounted cavalry; fourth, Kent's divi- 
 sion; fifth, Rafferty's squadron of the 2nd Cavalry. By night 
 6,000 troops had been put ashore. The Spaniards made no 
 opposition to the landing, and the detachment stationed at 
 Daiquiri withdrew early in the morning to Firmeza. 
 
 As soon as Lawton's division had landed it pushed forward 
 to Siboney. The road was a mere rut in which no more than 
 two men could march abreast. The pace had to be very slow, 
 regiments strung out to almost twice their normal length, and 
 
The Spanish-American War. 599 
 
 "flankers" could not penetrate the tropic jungle on either side 
 to guard the column against ambuscade. There were several 
 strong positions on the way, where the Spaniards might have 
 stopped or checked the advance, but they made no attempt to 
 do so. On learning, on the 22nd, that the Americans were 
 landing at Daiquiri, General Linares ordered General Rubin, 
 who commanded the troops in the mining region, to withdraw 
 the detachments from Firmeza and Siboney to Sevilla. At the 
 same time he ordered the detachments at Jutici and Sardinero 
 to retire to Aguadores, and then blow up the bridge over the 
 San Juan River at that place. On the 23rd Linares went to 
 Sevilla himself, taking with him two rapid-fire guns and 110 
 guerrillas. Here he was joined by the troops from Siboney 
 and Firmeza. 
 
 As the head of Lawton's column approached Siboney on the 
 23rd the Spaniards were withdrawing from that place. Cas- 
 tillo followed them with his insurgents, and, in an action with 
 their rear-guard, lost one man killed and nine wounded. He 
 came upon the main body in position across the road, on a line 
 of heights, about a mile southeast of Sevilla, and made a 
 demonstration against it ; but he was easily repulsed. 
 
 General Shafter's orders for June 24 "contemplated" that 
 Lawton's division should take up a strong position a short dis- 
 tance beyond Siboney ; Kent's should be held near that village ; 
 Bates's brigade should take a position to support Lawton ; and 
 Wheeler's division should stop somewhat in rear, on the Dai- 
 quiri-Siboney road. He purposed holding his troops in these 
 positions until he should get his materiel and a "reasonable 
 quantity of supplies" unloaded from the transports.* But 
 Wheeler pushed Young's brigade forward ; by midnight of the 
 23rd it was assembled at Siboney. Wheeler had reached the 
 village in the afternoon, and had learned from Castillo of the 
 Spanish force in position near Sevilla. Contrary to Shafter's 
 plan he started Young's brigade out about 6 a.m. on the 24th 
 to attack this force. Castillo was to support the attack with 
 his insurgents, but he did not arrive on the ground until after 
 the combat was over. 
 
 (302) Sevilla is upon the main highway to Santiago, about 
 four miles from Siboney. The road leads away from Siboney 
 up the valley of Las Guasimas Creek, then ascends a steep 
 slope to the position where the Spaniards were intrenched. A 
 
 ♦General Shafter's report. 
 
600 American Campaigns. 
 
 trail from Siboney passes over the high ridge west of Las 
 Guasimas valley, and joins the main road a few hundred yards 
 beyond the Spanish position. The road and the trail both ap- 
 proach this position through a tangled thicket of trees and 
 underbrush. 
 
 Young advanced by the road with a squadron of the 1st Cav- 
 alry, a squadron of the 10th Cavalry, and four Hotchkiss moun- 
 tain guns, 464 men in all; while Colonel Wood with the two 
 squadrons of the 1st Volunteer Cavalry, about 500 men, accom- 
 panied by two rapid-fire Colt automatic guns, took the trail 
 over the ridge. The advance-guards of the two columns came 
 upon the Spanish outposts at the same time, about half-past 
 seven o'clock ; and both columns quickly deployed and en- 
 gaged the enemy. 
 
 (301) General Rubin was in immediate command of the 
 Spanish troops at the battle of Las Guasimas, Linares having 
 placed his own headquarters at El Pozo, some four miles far- 
 ther toward Santiago. Linares considered it probable that 
 the Americans, aided by the guns of their fleet, might force a 
 passage of the San Juan River at Aguadores and advance upon 
 Santiago from that direction. He had, therefore, decided to 
 make no determined stand at Sevilla, but to withdraw his forces 
 to the intrenchments close about Santiago, and had ordered 
 Rubin to retire "by echelons with the precaution and delibera- 
 tion necessary effectually to repel any attack of the enemy." 
 
 (302) Accordingly Rubin had his command, which num- 
 bered about 2,000, disposed in three lines. The bulk of the 
 troops occupied the advanced position at Las Guasimas, and 
 the rest were at Sevilla and La Redonda. About 1,500 took 
 part in the combat. 
 
 While Young's column pushed up the steep slope, through 
 the jungle, against the front of Rubin's position, Wood's ad- 
 vanced against its right flank. The Spaniards received them 
 with volleys, and the fire was so heavy that Wheeler dispatched 
 a message to Lawton for reinforcements. Before the rein- 
 forcements arrived the Spaniards had quitted their intrench- 
 ments and started in retreat upon Santiago ; not, however, 
 until their sick and baggage had gotten safely on the way. In 
 this action the Americans lost one officer and fifteen men 
 killed, and six officers and forty-six men wounded ; the Span- 
 iards lost three officers and seven men killed, and eighteen men 
 wounded. Owing to the exhausted condition of the Ameri- 
 cans, their total want of cavalry, and the lack of an infantrv 
 
The Spanish-American War. 601 
 
 reserve, no attempt was made to pursue the Spanish. The 
 victors bivouacked upon the battle-field, where they were joined 
 within an hour or two by the 9th Cavalry and Chaffee's brigade 
 of Lawton's division. 
 
 (301) The American army now moved forward and en- 
 camped near Sevilla. Bates's brigade stayed at Siboney, with 
 orders to send a strong detachment along the railway toward 
 Aguadores, and to repair the road from Siboney to Sevilla. 
 General Garcia's forces, which had been brought by water to 
 Siboney, made their camp in rear of the Americans on the 
 Siboney-Sevilla road. Shafter remained aboard his transport, 
 the Seguranga, directing the unloading of the supplies and 
 means of transportation. Owing to the confusion and lack of 
 order and system with which the ships had been loaded at 
 Tampa, the total want of wharves, and the shortage of light- 
 ers, this was a tedious and slow performance. Meantime 
 Wheeler, now the senior in command with the army in camp, 
 received positive orders from Shafter not to bring on another 
 engagement. 
 
 A coastwise cable had been picked up and cut, and its end 
 had been brought to Siboney. By this means Shafter had re- 
 ceived word that General Duffield was on the way to reinforce 
 him with a brigade of volunteers from Camp Alger, Falls 
 Church, Virginia. Shafter was anxious to await the arrival 
 of this brigade, as well as to have his army's supplies and 
 materiel unloaded and sent to the front before he advanced to 
 attack Santiago. Only part of the brigade had arrived, how- 
 ever, and his troops, owing to the terrible road and the slow 
 unloading, were still living from hand to mouth, when, on the 
 28th of June, he received information that 8,000 Spanish regu- 
 lars, on the way from Manzanillo, were already within fifty- 
 four miles of Santiago, and were advancing at the rate of 
 twelve miles a day. Shafter decided that he could wait no 
 longer; he must attack Santiago before the arrival of this 
 Spanish column. On the 29th he joined the army in camp. 
 On this day Garcia moved his command to the front of the 
 American forces. Under the direction of Colonel Wagner 
 several young officers, graduates of the Service Schools at 
 Fort Leavenworth, had already reconnoitered and sketched the 
 Spanish positions about Santiago, and the roads leading to 
 them ; and Generals Wheeler, Lawton, and Chaffee had per- 
 sonally examined the road toward El Caney and the main road 
 to Santiago. On the morning of the 30th Shafter, accom- 
 
602 American Campaigns. 
 
 panied by members of his staff, rode forward to El Pozo, 
 whence he got an excellent view of Santiago, San Juan 
 Heights, San Juan Hill, and El Caney. At the same time Law- 
 ton and Chaffee were making a reconnaissance of the country 
 about El Caney. Later they reported to Shafter that there 
 were five or six hundred Spanish soldiers at El Caney, and 
 that the place could be captured in about two hours. 
 
 Shafter resolved to attack the enemy the next day, July 1, 
 and, after considering all the information that had been ob- 
 tained, he announced the following plan to his division com- 
 manders: Lawton's division supported by Capron's battery 
 was to attack El Caney at daybreak; as soon as this division 
 became engaged the other two divisions supported by Grimes's 
 battery were to advance and deploy in front of San Juan 
 Heights, Wheeler's to the right and Kent's to the left of the 
 Sevilla-Santiago road; as soon as Lawton captured El Caney 
 he was to move toward Santiago and form on Wheeler's right ; 
 then the three divisions were to assault San Juan Heights. 
 Garcia was asked to cooperate by moving his command to a 
 position northward of Santiago, in order to cover the Cobre 
 Road and prevent reinforcements from entering on that side. 
 Duffield was to send the 33rd Michigan from Siboney to at- 
 tack Aguadores, and Admiral Sampson was asked to shell that 
 place, and to make a demonstration at the mouth of Santiago 
 Harbor. 
 
 (303) The American encampment at this time was about 
 four miles east of Santiago. A mile east of the city a broken 
 ridge, called San Juan Heights, covers the approaches from 
 the direction of El Caney and Sevilla. The highest part of the 
 ridge is San Juan Hill, around which the Sevilla road passes. 
 Its summit is about 125 feet above the surrounding country. 
 Nearly a half mile east of this hill is Little San Juan Hill, 
 known since the battle as Kettle Hill. In the low ground be- 
 tween the two hills is a large pond, and just at the eastern base 
 of Kettle Hill is the San Juan River, flowing southward. The 
 Aguadores River, which comes from the east, is joined by Las 
 Guamas Creek, which flows southward from El Caney, about 
 500 yards southeast of Kettle Hill, and it enters the San Juan 
 500 yards south of the end of this hill. These streams are all 
 fordable hereabouts. The Sevilla-Santiago road followed the 
 valley of the Aguadores, and crossed this stream and the San 
 Juan by fords about 200 yards above their fork. From El 
 Pozo to the Aguadores ford this road passed through nearly a 
 
The Spanish-American War. 603 
 
 mile of dense jungle, but the ground between Las Guamas 
 Creek on the east and San Juan Heights on the west was gen- 
 erally open, presenting a clear field of fire from the Spanish 
 positions upon the heights. 
 
 (304) El Caney was about three miles north of the Ameri- 
 can camp. A trail led thither from the camp, but the main, 
 road to the village branched from the Sevilla-Santiago road 
 at El Pozo, a mile farther west. The road from El Caney to 
 Santiago, which was the main Guantanamo-Santiago highway, 
 forked with the Sevilla-Santiago road a few hundred yards 
 west of San Juan Heights. The ground about El Caney was 
 generally open. 
 
 On the 1st of July General Linares had 10,429 troops of all 
 kinds in and about Santiago and the harbor. At El Caney 
 were 520 men under General Vara de Rey ; in the town of San- 
 tiago was a reserve of 1,879 made up of firemen and volunteers ; 
 at Dos Caminos del Cobre were 500 soldiers ; the rest were 
 distributed in unequal detachments at several small forts cov- 
 ering the approaches from the interior, and at the forts near 
 the mouth of the harbor. In intrenchments upon San Juan 
 and Kettle Hills was one company of regulars, 137 men. The 
 defenses of El Caney consisted of a little stone fort upon a 
 commanding hill about 400 yards southeast of the village, and 
 four block-houses. These structures were connected by a 
 broken line of rifle-pits and deep trenches strengthened by wire 
 entanglements. 
 
 The Spaniards had no field-artillery except two rapid-fire 3- 
 inch Krupp mountain guns, and no other modern ordnance ex- 
 cept ten pieces in the harbor batteries, and one 3.5-inch Hon- 
 toria gun and two 3-inch Maxims which were held in readi- 
 ness within the city. There were about two dozen old bronze 
 rifles, seventeen of which were in position at important points 
 in the outskirts of the town. Two 3-inch Placentia guns were 
 brought to the city on the 3rd of July by Colonel Escario's col- 
 umn from Manzanillo. There was no artillery at El Caney. 
 
 In preparation for the work of the 1st of July Shafter's 
 army was set in motion on the afternoon of June the 30th. 
 Lawton marched his division by the trail to a position near 
 El Caney, where it bivouacked for the night. Wheeler's divi- 
 sion bivouacked at El Pozo. Kent's started for the same place, 
 but did not get there until the next morning. Bates was di- 
 rected to bring his brigade forward from Siboney and report 
 it to the commanding-general. 
 
604 American Campaigns. 
 
 Lawton's troops quitted their bivouacks between four and five 
 o'clock on the morning of July 1. Chaffee's brigade, composed 
 of the 7th, 12th, and 17th Infantry, took position 800 yards 
 from the stone fort, on the east side of the village ; Ludlow's 
 brigade, composed of the 8th, 22nd, and the 2nd Massachusetts 
 Infantry, marched to the southwest side of the town to seize the 
 Santiago road and cut off the retreat of the garrison; Miles's 
 brigade was held in reserve; two of its regiments, the 4th and 
 24th, went to the Ducoureau House, south of the village, while 
 the 1st Infantry and Troop D, 2nd Cavalry, supported Capron's 
 battery. 
 
 At half-after six the battle was begun by Capron's battery 
 from a hill a little more than a mile south of El Caney. Then 
 the infantry, which had approached to within about 600 yards 
 of the Spanish lines, opened fire. The Spaniards replied 
 promptly. From this hour the combat, instead of ending with 
 the capture of the town in about two hours, as Generals Lawton 
 and Chaffee had predicted, lasted until nearly 5 p.m. Before 
 noon Bates's brigade arrived to reinforce Lawton, raising his 
 strength to 6,653 officers and men, without counting out those 
 already killed or wounded. (305) About one o'clock the bri- 
 gades of Miles and Bates were ordered forward into the space 
 between Chaffee and Ludlow. About two o'clock Capron's 
 battery advanced to within 1,000 yards of the Spanish position, 
 and its fire became more effective. The Americans gradually, 
 but very slowly, worked their way toward the Spanish lines, 
 creeping, crawling, dragging themselves through the grass, un- 
 der the deadly fire from the enemy's cover. Being equipped 
 with cartridges of black powder, whose smoke at every dis- 
 charge of its rifles made the regiment a conspicuous target, 
 the 2nd Massachusetts took little part in the combat; yet it 
 suffered a loss of five per cent. 
 
 In the meantime Wheeler's and Kent's divisions were en- 
 gaged in the main assault at San Juan and Kettle Hills, and 
 Lawton's assistance was needed there. About 2 p.m. Shafter 
 sent Lawton a message saying that his division and Bates's 
 brigade and Garcia "should move on the city and form the 
 right of the line." When Lawton received this message he 
 was engaged in the final assault upon El Caney, and could not 
 withdraw. About three o'clock Capron's guns began to breach 
 the walls of the stone fort, and Chaffee at last ordered the 
 12th Infantry to charge it. Closely supported by regiments of 
 Miles's and Bates's brigades, this regiment carried the posi- 
 
The Spanish-American War. 60S 
 
 tion. Then the Spaniards were driven back from one posi- 
 tion to another, and at last the few that were left alive and 
 able withdrew from the village. About 120 of them were cap- 
 tured, and 235 had fallen, dead or wounded. The brave Gen- 
 eral Vara de Rey was among the slain. The Americans had 
 lost four officers and seventy-seven men killed, twenty-five offi- 
 cers and 335 men wounded; total 441. 
 
 As soon as General Linares saw, on the morning of July 1, 
 that the Americans had begun an attack at El Caney and were 
 also massing troops in front of San Juan Heights, he reinforced 
 the single company at Kettle and San Juan Hills by the two 
 companies and the two rapid-fire Krupp guns that were near 
 Fort Cafiosa. These troops were put into position on San Juan 
 Hill, and along the heights on both sides of the Santiago-Pozo 
 road. Before the assault on San Juan Hill the Spaniards at 
 that point were further reinforced by sixty volunteers from 
 the city, making altogether a force of about 521 men on Kettle 
 Hill and San Juan Heights. Three companies, numbering 
 about 411 men, came up from Forts San Antonio and Santa 
 Ines to take the place of those that had quitted Fort Cafiosa. 
 These, together with two guns that had been mounted there on 
 the 13th of June, formed the second Spanish line. A force of 
 140 mounted guerrillas took post behind a small hill back of 
 Fort Cafiosa. Within the city, and surrounding it from the 
 cemetery on the northwest to Las Cruces on the southwest, 
 there were some 4,352 regulars, volunteers, firemen, and sail- 
 ors, of whom probably 800 to 1,000 were sick in the hospitals. 
 
 (306) The combat had been going on at El Caney about 
 two hours when Grimes was ordered to open fire with his bat- 
 tery from the hill at El Pozo on the Spanish block-house upon 
 San Juan Hill. The range was about 2,500 yards and the fire 
 was not very effective. As the guns were using black powder 
 their position was quickly found by the two Krupp guns on 
 San Juan Hill, which were firing smokeless powder. Our 
 battery, however, maintained an unequal duel with the enemy's 
 guns for about three-quarters of an hour. 
 
 Meantime Wheeler's division, followed by Kent's, had started 
 forward from El Pozo by the narrow road through the dense 
 jungle. The cavalry division had rea-ched the ford of Agua- 
 dores River, and about half of it had changed direction to the 
 right, in pursuance of its orders to deploy to the right of the 
 road, when the war balloon bearing Lieutenant-Colonel Derby. 
 Shaffer's chief engineer, settled immediately above the troops. 
 
606 American Campaigns. 
 
 This started the battle of San Juan. It was precisely 10 a.m. 
 when the Spaniards opened fire upon the balloon.* Part of the 
 American cavalry immediately replied to the Spanish fire, while 
 the rest hastened its deployment. 
 
 Kent's division pushed forward in the narrow road, crowding 
 alongside the part of the cavalry column that was still in the 
 road. The ford of Aguadores River was hardly more than 500 
 yards from the Spanish trench on Kettle Hill, and 800 from 
 that on San Juan ' Hill ; and the Mauser rifles from those 
 trenches poured a deadly fire into the American ranks crowded 
 into the narrow roadway. To deploy to the right or left of the 
 road was impossible on account of the tangled undergrowth. 
 Luckily a trail was found, opposite the mouth of Las Guamas 
 Creek, that led off to the left and crossed the San Juan River 
 just below the mouth of the Aguadores. The 71st New York 
 and the rear two brigades of Kent's division [Wikoff and Pear- 
 son] took this trail, thereby relieving the congestion in the main 
 road, and hastening the deployment. Hawkins's brigade, ex- 
 cept the 71st New York, kept the main road and formed line 
 in a sunken road within the fork of the San Juan and the Agua- 
 dores. The majority of the men of the 71st New York cast 
 themselves upon the ground, and the regular regiments 
 marched forward over their bodies. Wikoff's brigade crossed 
 the San Juan and began to deploy in the sunken road along its 
 bank. The ground was open and within full view of the 
 Spanish line on San Juan Hill, less than 500 yards in front 
 of it. The Spanish fire was terrific. Wikoff was shot almost 
 immediately and died within fifteen minutes. Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Worth, 13th Infantry, then took command of the bri- 
 gade, and was soon severely wounded. Lieutenant- Colonel 
 Liscum, 24th Infantry, succeeded Worth, but had hardly taken 
 command when he, too, was disabled by a severe wound. The 
 command of the brigade then fell to Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, 
 9th Infantry. 
 
 Hawkins's brigade had tried to advance. "In its front were 
 a fringe of trees, a barbed-wire entanglement, a grassy field, 
 and the San Juan River,- — all in clear view of the Spaniards 
 and covered by the guns and small-arms on San Juan Hill." 
 The 6th Infantry pushed forward to the open field in front, 
 but there it was stopped by the Spanish fusilade, and it lost 
 about a fourth of its men within ten minutes. It was then re- 
 
 *The lecturer took out his watch and looked at it when the first 
 shots were fired. The hands marked exactly ten o'clock. 
 
The Spanish-American War. 607 
 
 called to the sunken road, where the brigade awaited the de- 
 ployment of the other two brigades on its left. 
 
 In the meanwhile Wheeler's division had completed its de- 
 ployment in front of Kettle Hill, and, lying in the brush with- 
 in close range of the enemy, was suffering severely from his 
 fire. The combat was still raging over at El Caney and there 
 was little prospect of Lawton's early arrival on the right of the 
 cavalry division. Sumner, who was in command of the divi- 
 sion, Wheeler being sick,* was, therefore, ordered to assault 
 Kettle Hill. The division pushed forward through the thin 
 underbrush and barbed-wire, waded the San Juan, and charged 
 up the hillside, sending the Spaniards in flight from their 
 trench back to San Juan Heights. The brigades had lost their 
 formation in the deployment and assault, and regiments, if not 
 also troops, charged without regard to higher commanders. 
 The regiments on the right of the division carried Kettle Hill, 
 while those on the left connected with the right of Hawkins's 
 infantry brigade in the open space in front of San Juan Hill, 
 and went forward with it. 
 
 General Hawkins was at this moment leading the 6th and 
 16th Infantry to the assault of San Juan Hill. Abreast of him 
 on his left was Ewers's brigade. Supported by the fire of three 
 batteries of artillery at El Pozo, by that of Lieutenant Parker's 
 Gatling guns near the San Juan ford, and that of the cavalry 
 which had just got possession of Kettle Hill, this line crossed 
 the open ground and started up the steep slopes of San Juan 
 Hill. Near the crest it came under the fire of our own artillery 
 and Gatlings, and had to stop. After a few moments the fire 
 from behind ceased, and the line again charged and carried 
 the crest of the hill. 
 
 While Hawkins was taking San Juan Hill, the cavalry from 
 Kettle Hill charged across the low ground, around the big 
 pond, and captured the part of San Juan Heights just north 
 of the El Pozo-Santiago road; and Pearson's brigade of in- 
 fantry crossed the valley and carried the Heights to the south 
 of San Juan Hill. 
 
 From all these positions the Spaniards retreated to their 
 second line of intrenchments six or eight hundred yards farther 
 
 ♦When the army moved forward on the afternoon of June 30, 
 General Wheeler was left in his tent ill of a_ fever. He was still 
 sick on the morning of the 1st July, but, hearing the sound of the 
 battle, he had the ambulance carry him to the front, where he re- 
 mained during the rest of the combat. 
 
60S American Campaigns. 
 
 back ; the Americans halted upon San Juan Heights, and firing 
 continued between the hostile lines until after dark. Once 
 only in the course of the afternoon the Spaniards attempted to 
 recover their lost ground; they were promptly driven back to 
 the cover of their intrenchments. The Americans intrenched 
 their position. 
 
 (301) In accordance with Shatter's plan, General Duffield 
 with the 33rd Michigan, supported by the fire of two of Samp- 
 son's vessels, had attacked the Spaniards at Aguadores in order 
 to prevent them from reinforcing the enemy in the vicinity 
 of Santiago. 
 
 (307) The combat at El Caney having virtually ended at 
 4.30 p.m., Bates withdrew his brigade and marched it to San 
 Juan Heights. He arrived there about midnight, after march- 
 ing and fighting for nearly twenty-seven hours, and took up a 
 position on the left of Kent's division. At about sunset Law- 
 ton started with the bulk of his division, also, for San Juan 
 Heights, by the direct road from El Caney to Santiago. In 
 the pitchy darkness his advance-guard was fired upon by hos- 
 tile sentinels in the road a few hundred yards west of the Du- 
 coureau House. Thereupon Lawton halted, then retraced his 
 steps by way of Shafter's headquarters. After marching 
 nearly all night his weary division reached the line on San 
 Juan Heights the next morning, and took its place on the ex- 
 treme right across the Santiago-El Caney road, only a few 
 hundred yards west of where it had been stopped by the Span- 
 ish sentries. Later Lawton's division extended its intrench- 
 ments to the right until they reached nearly to the head of 
 Santiago Bay, covering all the highways into the city from the 
 north. Garcia intrenched his command of Cubans upon 
 heights northwest of the city covering the Cobre Road. 
 
 Firing began about 6 a.m. between the hostile lines on July 
 2, and kept up until dark; but neither army advanced from 
 its trenches. The casualties were considerable on both sides, 
 the Americans losing about 150 in killed and wounded. About 
 10 p.m. a terrific fusilade suddenly started up without purpose 
 or reason. Each side thought the other was about to make 
 an assault. 
 
 In spite of their victories General Shafter's troops by sun- 
 set on the 2nd had become very much dispirited. What with 
 fighting for two days and working on their trenches at night ; 
 with no shelter from the broiling tropic sun part of the time, 
 and from pouring rain the rest ; with scarcely anything to eat ; 
 
The Spanish-American War. 609 
 
 and with squatting the whole time in narrow trenches, their 
 fatigue and nervous strain had well-nigh reached the breaking 
 point. So strong came the appeals for relief from the regi- 
 mental commanders that Shafter held a conference with his 
 division commanders and considered the question of withdraw- 
 ing to Sevilla Heights. It was decided, however, to hold the 
 position on San Juan Heights. 
 
 The next morning General Shafter sent a demand under flag 
 of truce to the Spanish commander, now General Toral, for 
 his surrender.* The demand was not complied with, but it 
 started negotiations that ended with the formal surrender 
 of the Spanish commander, and the occupation of the town by 
 the Americans, on the 17th of July. The total number of 
 troops surrendered by Toral was about 22,700, of which about 
 13,558 were at Santiago; the rest were at other towns within 
 the territorial military Division of Santiago de Cuba. 
 
 There was not much fighting between the hostile land forces 
 from the 3rd to the 17th of July, but other important events 
 occurred on the 3rd. On that day Colonel Escario's column 
 of some 3,500 Spanish soldiers marched unopposed into San- 
 tiago by the Cobre Road, notwithstanding that this road was 
 supposed to be guarded by Garcia's force of insurgents. This 
 was the column that had hastened Shaffer's decision to attack 
 the town. (299 and 301) It had left Manzanillo on the 22nd 
 of June, and had made a very trying journey, harassed all the 
 way by small bands of insurgents. 
 
 On the 3rd, also, occurred the decisive event of the war; 
 namely, the total destruction of Cervera's fleet. Admiral Cer- 
 vera and his captains had rightly judged that a sortie of his 
 squadron had no chance of succeeding. The Admiral had 
 sent two-thirds of his force ashore to aid Linares in the defense 
 of the city against Shaffer's army, and had made up his mind 
 that there was nothing left for him to do but to destroy his own 
 ships in the harbor, in case the city should be taken. After 
 the exchange of several telegrams with the Minister of Marine 
 at Madrid, and with Captain-General Blanco at Havana, to 
 whose orders he was subject, Cervera received a positive com- 
 mand from the latter on the 2nd of July, sent at 5.10 a.m., 
 directing him to reembark his men as soon as possible and take 
 his squadron out immediately. 
 
 *General Jose Velazquez Toral was now in command of the Spanish 
 forces at Santiago, Linares having been wounded on the 1st of July. 
 
610 American Campaigns. 
 
 Accordingly, at 9.30 a.m. on the 3rd, the doomed squadron, 
 led by the brave old admiral in the Maria Teresa, started 
 out of the narrow channel. In single column behind the Teresa 
 followed the Vizcaya, the Colon, and the Oquendo, each about 
 800 yards behind another. Twelve hundred yards behind the 
 Oquendo came the torpedo-boat destroyers Furor and Pluton. 
 The American ships closed in and opened fire. The Teresa 
 turned to the west; in her unequal struggle she was soon re- 
 duced to "a burning hulk, a floating slaughterhouse." At 
 10.15 she was beached. The Oquendo met the same fate at 
 10.20, and at the same moment the Pluton was run upon the 
 rocks ; a few minutes later the Furor was sunk. The Vizcaya 
 kept afloat for more than an hour before, burning and shot to 
 pieces, she was run ashore twenty miles west of the harbor. 
 The Colon was the last to succumb. Closely followed by the 
 Oregon and Brooklyn she kept up her race for life until 1.15 
 p.m., when she was beached in a sinking condition fifty-four 
 miles west of the Morro. Thus every one of Cervera's vessels 
 was destroyed. Of the 2,150 Spaniards engaged in this re- 
 markable battle, 323 met their death and 1,782 were captured, 
 150 of whom had been wounded. Admiral Cervera and Cap- 
 tain Paredes were captured; two of the captains were killed 
 and two wounded. The American loss was one man killed 
 and one wounded. 
 
 By the time of the Spanish commander's surrender to Gen- 
 eral Shafter the tropical climate and the hardships of the cam- 
 paign had begun to tell heavily upon the health of the American 
 troops. More than half of them "were down with malarial 
 fever, or recovering from its effects ; dysentery and typhoid 
 fever were prevalent, and there were cases of yellow fever in 
 every regiment." Early in August the condition had become 
 so alarming that General Shafter, on the 3rd, sent a telegram to 
 the Secretary of War in which he expressed the opinion that, 
 if his command was not immediately transported to the United 
 States, the death rate would be appalling. The same day he 
 forwarded to the War Department the famous "Round Robin" 
 of his division and brigade commanders, in which they said: 
 "This army must be moved at once or it will perish." On 
 August 4 Shafter received instructions to begin the removal 
 of his command to Montauk Point, Long Island. The home- 
 ward movement began on the 7th of August, and Shafter him- 
 self, with the last detachment, reembarked on the 25th. The 
 Fifth Corps was replaced in the captured territory by four of 
 
The Spanish-American War. 611 
 
 the Immune Regiments. According to the terms of capitula- 
 tion our Government transported all the prisoners of war back 
 to Spain. 
 
 Operations in the Philippine Islands. 
 
 (308) Our war with Spain was not confined to Cuba and 
 its waters, but it also included operations in the Philippine Is- 
 lands and the Island of Porto Rico. Upon the date of the 
 declaration of war Commodore Dewey had his fleet at Hong 
 Kong, and he was immediately ordered by the governor of that 
 neutral province to withdraw it. Under instructions from the 
 Navy Department he had already prepared his fleet for cam- 
 paign. Among other things he had purchased two colliers 
 and had them loaded with coal, and he had caused his ships to 
 be painted the slate-grey color of war. The revenue cutter 
 Hugh McCulloch and the cruiser Baltimore had been added 
 to the fleet. On the 24th of April Dewey received orders from 
 the Navy Department to go at once to the Philippine Islands 
 and capture or destroy the Spanish fleet there. s 
 
 Dewey quitted Chinese waters on the 27th and started for 
 Subig Bay, where Admiral Monro jo then had the Spanish 
 squadron. Warned of Dewey's movement, Montojo withdrew 
 to Cavite in Manila Bay, whither Dewey followed him as soon 
 as he learned through his scout-ships that the Spanish fleet was 
 no longer at Subig. Although Dewey had been informed that 
 the mouth of Manila Bay was defended with mines as well as 
 with batteries he led the way in his flag-ship, the Olympia, and 
 slowly, in single column, the squadron steamed into the bay 
 about midnight of April 30. A harmless shot or two were fired 
 from a battery on El Fraile, one of the islands at the mouth 
 of the bay, and rockets were hoisted on Corregidor to warn 
 the Spaniards at Manila and Cavite. 
 
 At 5.41 a.m. on May 1 the Olympia fired the first shot at 
 Montojo's ships in the harbor or Cavite. Within two hours 
 from that moment the American guns had sunk three of the 
 Spanish men-of-war and set most of the others on fire. Under 
 the mistaken notion that his ammunition was running low, 
 Dewey then suspended his attack. About eleven o'clock the 
 battle was renewed, and at half-after twelve it was at an end. 
 The Spanish losses were eleven vessels destroyed and two cap- 
 tured; 167 men killed and 214 wounded. The American loss 
 
612 American Campaigns. 
 
 was seven men slightly wounded. Not an American ship was 
 injured. The next day Dewey took possession of Cavite. 
 
 Upon receipt of the news of Dewey's victory the War De- 
 partment issued orders to assemble a force of 20,000 troops at 
 San Francisco for an expedition to Manila. This force was to 
 be organized as the Eighth Corps under General Merritt. Such 
 was the difficulty encountered in hiring ships that the corps 
 had to be transported in seven detachments, and the task was 
 not finished until October. Early in August, however, Mer- 
 ritt was on the shore of Luzon, three miles south of Manila, 
 with a force of about 8,500 men in position to attack the Span- 
 ish works. All the troops were untrained volunteers, ex- 
 cept some companies of the 14th, the 18th, and the 23rd regi- 
 ments of regular infantry, and a few batteries of regular artil- 
 lery acting as infantry. Within the defenses of Manila there 
 were upwards of 13,000 Spanish troops. 
 
 At this time Manila, on the land side, was practically be- 
 sieged by Filipino insurgents under General Emilio Aguinaldo, 
 while it was closely blockaded on its sea front by Dewey's 
 fleet. Since the treaty of Biac-na-bato, in which the Spanish 
 authorities virtually agreed to pay the leaders of the Tagalog 
 insurrection of 1896 a large sum of money to suspend hostil- 
 ities, Aguinaldo had been absent from Luzon; but about the 
 20th of May Dewey had allowed him to be brought from Hong 
 Kong to Cavite in an American war-ship; Dewey then fur- 
 nished him arms, and allowed him to organize an insurgent 
 army. Within six weeks from this time Aguinaldo was master 
 of at least seven provinces, and had set up a provisional govern- 
 ment. About the only Spanish garrison that still held out 
 against him was that of Manila. 
 
 (309) General Merritt, in order to avoid any entanglement 
 with Aguinaldo and his insurgent government, held no inter- 
 course whatever with them, and went about the capture of 
 Manila "without reference to the situation of the insurgent 
 forces."* His command was organized as the 2nd Division, 
 Eighth Army Corps, and consisted of two brigades under Gen- 
 erals Arthur MacArthur and F. V. Greene, respectively. Gen- 
 eral Thomas M. Anderson was the division commander. 
 Greene's brigade was intrenched across Calle Real with its left 
 on the shore ; MacArthur's took position across the Pasay- 
 Singalon road. The country between these two roads was an 
 
 ♦General Merritt's report. 
 
The Spanish-American War. 613 
 
 almost impassable swamp. At first, before the arrival of Mac- 
 Arthur's brigade, an insurgent brigade had been intrenched in 
 front of Greene's, but its commander had allowed Greene to 
 move his American line forward and intrench it in front of the 
 Filipino brigade. 
 
 The Spanish works consisted of a line of block-houses con- 
 nected by a more or less continuous intrenchment all around 
 the outskirts of the city. The works ended at the south with 
 Fort San Antonio Abad, within about a hundred yards of the 
 shore. Block-house No. 14 stood at the southeast corner of 
 the works upon the Pasay Road. 
 
 Greene was attacked in his intrenchments about midnight of 
 July 31, and lost ten men killed and forty-three wounded. 
 Upon several nights after this, firing took place between 
 Greene's brigade and the Spaniards in its front, but the Ameri- 
 can losses were small. General Merritt asked Dewey to let his 
 ships shell the Spanish line, believing that it would stop the 
 night firing. But Dewey feared such action might bring on a 
 general engagement before the arrival of the Monterey, which 
 he was expecting. He therefore declined to do it unless Mer- 
 ritt's troops were in danger of being driven back ; but they were 
 in no such danger. At length, however, the Monterey arrived, 
 and MacArthur's brigade had already landed and taken its 
 position. Thereupon Merritt and Dewey jointly called upon 
 the Spanish Governor-General to surrender. Their demand 
 having been declined they arranged for a combined attack. 
 
 The attack took place on the 13th of August. Between 9 
 and 10 a.m. Dewey's guns opened fire upon Fort San Antonio 
 Abad and the right of the Spanish trenches. The bombard- 
 ment ceased at 10.25 a.m., and Merritt's troops advanced. 
 Greene found Fort San Antonio and the Spanish trenches in 
 his front deserted, but he encountered a second line of the 
 enemy in the streets of Malate. He lost some men in carrying 
 this line, but pushed on through Malate and Ermita, and, ac- 
 cording to the plan of battle, occupied Binondo and San Mi- 
 guel, barrios on the north side of the Pasig River. At the 
 same time MacArthur's brigade had advanced by way of the 
 Pasay Road. It captured Block-house No. 14 without much 
 trouble, but encountered considerable resistance at Singalon. 
 With a loss of five killed and forty-three wounded it succeeded 
 in driving the enemy before it, however, and reached the 
 Pasig River. 
 
 Practically all of the town, except the walled city, was now 
 
614 American Campaigns. 
 
 in the hands of the American troops, and a white flag had al- 
 ready appeared in the walled city. Merritt and Dewey sent 
 their aids ashore to confer with the Governor-General. Gen- 
 eral Merritt soon afterwards went in person to the government 
 building in the walled city, and there arranged preliminary 
 terms of capitulation with the Spanish authorities. The imme- 
 diate trophies of the capture of Manila were nearly $900,- 
 000 of public funds, 13,000 prisoners, and 22,000 arms.* 
 
 Merritt had addressed a note to Aguinaldo asking him not 
 to allow his men to take part in the assault of Manila, or to fol- 
 low the American troops into the town. They took no part in 
 the assault, but undertook to enter the town in the wake of our 
 troops. Immediately after the surrender Aguinaldo demanded 
 joint occupation of Manila. Merritt refused compliance, and 
 a little later insisted upon the withdrawal of the insurgents 
 from the suburbs of the city. They withdrew reluctantly, and 
 dug a line of intrenchments facing the American lines. Here 
 they remained until the outbreak of hostilities with them in the 
 following February. 
 
 The Porto Rican Expedition. 
 
 (310) General Miles commanded in person the expedition 
 to the Island of Porto Rico. From the outset of hostilities with 
 Spain Miles was in favor of making this island the first main 
 objective of our operations. He submitted a plan for an expe- 
 dition to the island, in which he reckoned 30,000 as the strength 
 of the force required. His plan was at first not approved by the 
 President. Later the President gave his consent, and directed 
 that the force to be taken by Miles should consist of five divi- 
 sions selected from the troops then assembled in the United 
 States, and the command under Shafter, or such part of it as 
 could be spared from the operations going on against San- 
 tiago. Owing, however, to the sickness among Shafter's troops, 
 none of them were taken. 
 
 Before General Miles could get started for Porto Rico, the 
 situation, apparently, became so alarming for Shafter's army in 
 front of Santiago that Miles was diverted from Porto Rico to 
 Cuba in order to reinforce Shafter. But the expected surrender 
 of General Toral, for which negotiations were in progress, 
 made it unnecessary for Miles to land his troops, and he took 
 
 ♦General Merritt's report. 
 
The Spanish-American War. 615 
 
 his transports to the harbor Guantanamo. The detachment 
 consisted of 3,415 infantry and artillery, a company of engi- 
 neers, and a signal company. Other detachments were making 
 ready in the States to join the expedition. 
 
 Under the escort of three vessels of the navy Miles 
 sailed from Guantanamo with his little army of less than four 
 thousand men on the 21st of July. He had reported to the 
 War Department that he should land at Point Fajardo, a har- 
 bor on the northeast coast of Porto Rico. (311) He actu- 
 ally landed at Port Guanica, near Ponce on the southern 
 coast, and the first news the War Department received of the 
 change was furnished it by an Associated Press dispatch of 
 July 26, which announced that Miles had safely landed his 
 detachment and taken possession of that port, the day before, 
 without losing a man. In the skirmish that took place at 
 Guanica the small Spanish detachment lost four men. Al- 
 though Miles had not reported his change of destination to 
 the authorities at Washington, he had taken the pains to ask 
 the navy to place vessels near the route to Point Fajardo in 
 order to direct the troop-ships from the States toward Ponce, 
 and to guard them from any Spanish gunboat that might 
 appear. 
 
 On the 27th General James H. Wilson arrived with a bri- 
 gade from the States. The same day Commander Davis with 
 the Dixie entered the harbor of Ponce and found it neither 
 fortified nor mined. The next day Wilson landed his brigade 
 and occupied Ponce, the small Spanish garrison withdrawing 
 on the Military Road toward San Juan. A little while after- 
 wards the other detachment, under the immediate command 
 of General Guy V. Henry, arrived from Guanica. It had 
 encountered a small party of the enemy on the road and driven 
 ■ it away. On July 31 General Theodore Schwan arrived with 
 a small brigade, part of which was landed at Ponce and part 
 at Guanica. On the same day General Brooke arrived with 
 another small brigade and was directed to land at Arroyo. 
 
 Miles now planned to move across the island, in four col- 
 umns, capturing such Spanish detachments as should be en- 
 countered, and leaving small garrisons at the more important 
 towns. Schwan was directed to advance to Arecibo by way 
 of Yauco, Sabana Grande, San German, Mayaguez, and 
 Lares ; Henry marched upon the same point by way of Ad- 
 junta and Utuado ; Wilson took the Military Road from Ponce 
 to San Juan ; and Brooke marched by way of Guayama, and 
 
616 American Campaigns. 
 
 was to strike the Military Road at Cayey. All these col-, 
 umns had marched several days, and each had encountered 
 Spanish detachments at strong points on the roads and de- 
 feated them, when the campaign was brought to an abrupt 
 close by the receipt of news that all hostilities had been sus- 
 pended between the United States and Spain, pending negotia- 
 tions for peace. 
 
 The expedition to Porto Rico was made up of regular and 
 volunteer troops. It consisted altogether of the 11th and 19th 
 U. S. Infantry and nine volunteer infantry regiments; three 
 troops of regular cavalry and the Philadelphia City Troop; 
 four batteries of regulars and four of volunteers. Its total 
 losses were three men killed and forty wounded. 
 
 Peace. 
 
 On July 26 Spain made overtures for peace through the 
 French Ambassador at Washington. On August the 12th the 
 peace protocol and preliminary arrangements were concluded. 
 It was provided that the final treaty of peace should be made 
 by a joint commission that should meet at Paris not later 
 than October 1. After a prolonged discussion a treaty was 
 finally agreed to and signed by this commission on the 10th of 
 December. It was ratified by the Senate of the United States 
 on February 6, 1899, and signed by the Queen Regent of 
 Spain on March 17. By the terms of this treaty Spain relin- 
 quished all right and sovereignty over Cuba, and ceded to the 
 United States Porto Rico, Guam, and all the Philippine Is- 
 lands. On their part the United States agreed to pay Spain 
 $20,000,000. 
 
 Comments. 
 
 This is the only war within the history of the United States 
 in which the principal operations of the land forces were 
 secondary to those of the navy. The navy dictated its plan of 
 campaign to the army. An attack by land upon Manila had 
 never been thought of until it became necessary to gather the 
 fruits of Dewey's victory in Manila Bay; and the land cam- 
 paign against Santiago was undertaken solely for the purpose 
 of aiding Sampson to destroy Cervera's fleet. This fact alone, 
 if there were not much else besides, would place these opera- 
 tions among the most interesting and instructive of all our 
 campaigns for the student of military history. 
 
The. Spanish-American War. 617 
 
 Our army authorities at Washington were planning a grand 
 campaign against Havana, the political capital of Cuba, when 
 Cervera's hapless entrance into the Harbor of Santiago de 
 Cuba changed everything. At the time, however, that General 
 Shafter was hurriedly ordered to go with his "force to capture 
 garrison at Santiago, and assist in capturing harbor and 
 fleet,"* it had never occurred to the War Department that this 
 expedition might decide the issue of hostilities. It does not 
 appear that our War Department even^uspected for a moment 
 that the capture or destruction of Cervera's fleet, which would 
 mean the destruction of Spain's sea power, would make it im- 
 possible for Spain longer to maintain her army or her sover- 
 eignty in the West Indies. 
 
 The navy appears to have understood the situation better. 
 Admiral Sampson clearly set forth in his dispatches that the 
 capture of the Spanish fleet must put an end to the war. The 
 army authorities ought to have seen it as plainly. Cervera's 
 fleet guarded the communications of the Spanish army in Cuba 
 with its base at home. The minute it should be lost those com- 
 munications would be lost, and Spain would no longer dare 
 send a troop-ship or a supply-ship across the Atlantic. 
 
 The trouble was, our combined land and sea problem had 
 not been worked out beforehand. That we should soon have 
 to go to war with Spain had been almost certain for more than 
 a twelvemonth. The Naval War College appears to have 
 worked at the problem, and to have made a solution for the 
 navy; but there was no Army War College at that time, no 
 General Staff, no body of intelligent officers whose duty it was 
 to make war plans against a future need. Consequently there 
 was no plan already worked out. Certainly there was no com- 
 bined land and sea plan. Such a thing can hardly happen 
 again. War cannot befall so suddenly as to catch us without 
 a plan already worked out, which will make use of all availa- 
 ble means. If Congress will provide the means beforehand, 
 the country will find the War Department ready for any 
 emergency. 
 
 It does not even appear that our War Department would 
 have waited for the navy to get the mastery of the sea if it 
 had itself been ready to begin its campaign against Havana. 
 It was known that Spain had upwards of 100,000 effective 
 troops in Cuba, and that Havana was well prepared for de- 
 
 ♦Telegraphic order from Headquarters of the Army to General 
 Shafter, May 30, 1908. 
 
618 American Campaigns. 
 
 fense. Yet, if the Department could have mobilized as many 
 as 60,000 troops, and found means of transporting them by 
 sea, it would have started them off to Cuba forthwith. This 
 would have been a very perilous thing to do. The history of 
 warfare, ancient and modern, points no surer lesson than that 
 it is the height of risk for a nation to undertake to carry on 
 a land campaign overseas without first having the mastery of 
 its enemy upon the water. 
 
 From the very outset of hostilities the United States un- 
 doubtedly had the advantage of Spain at sea. In eastern 
 waters Montojo's feeble squadron was no match for Commo- 
 dore Dewey's, while in the Atlantic it was thought that the 
 hostile fleets were more nearly equal ; but the strategical advan- 
 tage was with our navy. So long as the Spanish fleet re- 
 mained on the eastern side of the ocean ours could blockade 
 Cuba and cut off the sea communications of the Spanish army 
 in that island.* Yet Spain did not dare send all her war ves- 
 sels to American waters, lest our fleet, or part of it, should 
 descend upon her own coasts. Hence she divided her fleet, 
 sending Cervera's squadron to our side, and keeping Camara's 
 to guard her own shores. This, as Cervera well knew, gave 
 our navy all the advantage of concentration over dispersion. 
 
 Up to this time our own Atlantic fleet had been divided. 
 The cry for protection that came from our Atlantic cities 
 obliged the Administration, for a time, to keep Admiral Schley 
 with the Flying Squadron at Hampton Roads. When the des- 
 tination of Cervera's fleet, however, became definitely known, 
 Schley was sent to join Sampson in blockading Cuba and 
 watching for the Spanish fleet. Every reason dictated the 
 policy of keeping our warships on this side of the Atlantic. 
 First, though we were at war with Spain, and hence should 
 have been justified in striking wherever we could hurt her, 
 still the main purpose of our operations was to expel Spanish 
 authority from the Island of Cuba. Naturally, then, Cuba 
 and its waters would be first thought of as the theater of our 
 offensive operations. Second, the proximity of the island to 
 our own shores was a really strategic reason for keeping our 
 fleet in its vicinity ; for there the fleet could not only blockade 
 
 ♦The successful blockade of the Southern ports during the Civil War 
 showed what the United States navy could do. If the Confederate 
 ?rmy had been obliged to depend wholly upon importation for its 
 munitions of war, like the Spanish army in Cuba, it would have laid 
 down its arms much sooner than it did. 
 
The Spanish-American War. 619 
 
 its ports, but it was near enough, also, to guard our own coasts. 
 If our whole fleet had made for Spain, it would have exposed 
 our own long coast to attack ; while, if part only had gone, it 
 would have given the Spanish fleet an opportunity to defeat 
 ours in detail. Yet, so long as our fleet stayed on this side 
 and the Spanish fleet on the other, our navy could gain no 
 decisive victory, and could not get the complete mastery of the 
 sea. In dividing her fleet, therefore, and sending Cervera's 
 squadron to this side, the Spanish government did precisely 
 the best thing it could have done for us. 
 
 Another reason that undoubtedly restrained our Govern- 
 ment from dispatching ships to threaten the Spanish coast was 
 its reluctance to enter European waters with hostile intent. 
 Spain had friends and sympathizers among the powers of Eu- 
 rope, who viewed with a disfavor verging upon hostility our 
 arrogating to ourselves the right and duty of chastising one 
 of the oldest and proudest kingdoms of 'the Continent, be- 
 cause it did not choose to conduct its colonial affairs accord- 
 ing to our notions. The United States did not want to take 
 any steps, which could possibly be avoided, to aggravate this 
 feeling against us. 
 
 Although Cervera was ordered to West Indian waters 
 against his protest, and came feeling that he was leaving hope 
 behind, his allowing himself to be shut up in Santiago Harbor 
 was his own mistake. Captain Sargent shows conclusively 
 that he could have reached Cienfuegos, or even Havana, if he 
 had taken advantage of his opportunity. In either of these 
 ports he would have had a much better chance than he had at 
 Santiago. Nothing could have forced him out of either harbor 
 except victory by our army on the land side of the seaport, 
 and the chances for such a victory would have been nothing 
 like so good at either place as they were at Santiago. Both 
 of these places were prepared for defense ; the great bulk of the 
 Spanish forces were about Havana; and Cienfuegos was only 
 some 200 miles from that city, and was connected with it by 
 rail. Sixty or seventy thousand Spanish troops could easily 
 have been assembled to defend either place. 
 
 Cervera went into Santiago Harbor for coal; by the 23rd 
 of May he had done coaling; between that date and the 28th, 
 the day on which Schley's squadron arrived in front of the 
 harbor, he could have made his escape, if he had hazarded a 
 bold effort to do so. The fear that a single ship, the Colon, 
 would drag and be injured in going out, was his reason for not 
 
620 American Campaigns. 
 
 trying. Far better would it have been to risk the loss of a 
 single ship than surely to lose the whole squadron. 
 
 When the Spanish government learned of the destruction 
 of Montojo's squadron in Manila Bay it started Camara's 
 fleet for those waters. But by the time the fleet had reached 
 the Suez Canal Spain's greater disaster had befallen at the 
 mouth of Santiago Harbor. If, after Cervera became "bot- 
 tled up" at Santiago, Camara's squadron had gone, with a 
 great sounding of trumpets, to threaten the cities along our 
 northern Atlantic coast, instead of starting to the Orient, it 
 would have created such a panic along the seaboard of the 
 New England and the Eastern States as almost surely to 
 oblige the President to recall Schley's squadron, and maybe 
 Sampson's, also, to protect their seaports. This would have 
 released Cervera's ships. Such a diversion would certainly 
 have been worth trying. As it was, while every American 
 warship was brought into action, Camara's squadron took no 
 part in the conflict. 
 
 There is not space here to discuss the unprepared condition 
 of our land forces at the outbreak of the war; and it is too 
 well known by every one that read the newspapers of the coun- 
 try to need discussion. So, also, is the chaos and confusion, the 
 disease and death, that resulted from it; and the big pension 
 roll that has followed in the wake. For it all, however, neither 
 the War Department nor the army is to blame ; the whole 
 blame rests upon the military policy of our Government ; upon 
 the Congress that failed to heed Washington's injunction; 
 upon the people themselves. Would that General Upton's 
 great work, Military Policy of the United States, which is 
 packed from cover to cover with indisputable and convincing 
 truths, might be read by every lawmaker in the land and taught 
 in every school! The Nation might thus be saved from a 
 future disaster and humiliation in case it shall quarrel with a 
 power having a first class army. 
 
 One of the lessons taught by the war concerns the quickness 
 with which events pass. Our War Department was not even 
 hoping to begin its main campaign until October and the 
 healthy season should arrive; it never for a moment expected 
 to put a large army on Cuban soil in the fever summer-season. 
 Spain, also, counted upon hostilities lasting for months. But 
 within ten weeks of the declaration of war the battle of Manila 
 Bay had taken place; the victory of El Caney — San Juan had 
 
The Spanish-American War. 621 
 
 been won; Cervera's fleet had been destroyed; and the war 
 was practically over. 
 
 The performance of Sampson's fleet at Santiago, and the 
 small effect of its fire upon the Spanish works at the entrance 
 of the harbor, show how nearly impossible it is for warships to 
 damage a seaport city whose harbor is protected by mines and 
 modern fortifications. At the mouth of this harbor the Span- 
 iards had an old stone castle of the eighteenth century, armed 
 with a few small guns of the same period, and three or four 
 earthen forts inadequately armed ; and the channel was laid 
 with mines. Sampson's guns fired several thousand rounds, 
 with no other effect than to knock a few rocks out of the old 
 castle walls, and to disable two guns ; and the Admiral did not 
 dare to force a passage into the harbor. A modern battle-ship 
 is too expensive a machine, its building takes too long, and it 
 is too vulnerable, to risk close range of the enemy's fortress 
 guns, or passage over his mines. 
 
 Land Operations Against Santiago. 
 
 Daiquiri and Siboney taken together made the best landing 
 places and base of operations for Shafter's army ; but no good 
 reason can be seen why the first troops were not put ashore 
 at Siboney rather than at Daiquiri. With any effort worthy 
 of the name, however, the Spaniards could have made the land- 
 ing very hard, if not altogether impossible, at either place. 
 
 Guantanamo Bay, forty miles east of Santiago, would have 
 been a far better place to land troops and supplies, and it was 
 in the possession of our marines. But to land here and make 
 it his base Shaffer would have had forty-odd miles of miser- 
 able road for his line of communications, with inadequate 
 trains of wagons and pack-mules, and a force of some 6,000 
 Spanish troops at Guantanamo, twelve miles inland, to defeat 
 before he could have reached his objective, Santiago. And 
 when defeated the force at Guantanamo would have been 
 driven to a junction with those at Santiago. If Shafter had 
 chosen this route, it is more than likely he would have been 
 retarded on the way long enough for the fevers to destroy his 
 army; as they did destroy the British army that undertook 
 such an operation in 1741. 
 
 If Shafter had landed at Guaicabon and Cavanas, on the 
 west side of the harbor, his line of communications would have 
 lain so close to the Bay of Santiago as to be exposed to attack 
 
622 American Campaigns. 
 
 from that side. Although it appears from the map that the 
 Spaniards might have occupied a position between the seashore 
 and the Siboney-Santiago road from which to threaten the 
 line of march actually taken by the Americans, Captain Sar- 
 gent, who thoroughly knows the country, says that the inter- 
 vening ground is too rugged, and too dense with jungle, for 
 such a flank position to have been feasible. 
 
 Admiral Sampson wanted Shafter to direct his attack upon 
 the batteries at the mouth of the harbor, in order to enable the 
 sailors to remove the mines and admit his ships to the harbor. 
 But to do this Shafter would either have had to divide his 
 forces and attack the batteries on both sides at once; or first 
 to capture those on one side, only, and leaving a detachment 
 to hold them, then to make a new landing and capture those on 
 the other side. Furthermore, the roughness of the ground 
 back of the forts, and the lack of roads and trails, made such 
 an attack impracticable. As made, Shaffer's advance kept 
 his communications squarely behind him, but exposed them to 
 attack in flank from the direction of Guantanamo; a fact of 
 which the Spaniards took no advantage. 
 
 As we know from many historic examples, the general that 
 allows his enemy to shut him up behind fortifications in a 
 town has little chance of saving his army ; but General Linares 
 had no alternative. He might have stoutly disputed every 
 step of ground with his foe ; but when forced back upon San- 
 tiago he had to stop there and defend the place ; because the 
 loss of Santiago meant the loss of Cervera's fleet and the de- 
 feat of Spain; for to withdraw from Santiago on the road 
 toward Holguin or Manzanillo, under the supposition that he 
 could have drawn supplies from either of those places as a base, 
 which is very doubtful, he would have had to abandon the bat- 
 teries defending the harbor against Sampson's fleet. 
 
 But Linares ought never to have allowed himself to be 
 forced back upon Santiago; he ought to have destroyed Shaf- 
 fer's little army, and, apparently, his failure to do so cannot be 
 charged to anybody but himself. Surely it cannot be charged 
 to the quality of the rank and file of his army. He had under 
 his command in the province 36,582 Spanish troops, and he 
 knew, in plenty of time to have concentrated his scattered de- 
 tachments, that Santiago was Shaffer's objective; yet, at the 
 critical hour, he had only about 12,000 men in the town and its 
 vicinity, and he fought the battle of El Caney-San Juan with 
 a total of 1,717 soldiers. True, Linares had other troubles to 
 
The Spanish-American War. 623 
 
 mind besides the Americans. His troops were distributed 
 throughout his province with a view to guarding the property 
 and persons of loyal inhabitants against the insurgents ; but the 
 presence of Americans emboldened the insurgents, and in- 
 creased the danger from them, rather than otherwise. Yet it 
 cannot be understood why the 5,592 troops at Guantanamo, 
 and those in the small towns within a few leagues of Santiago, 
 were not concentrated for a decisive battle with the Americans. 
 Less than four days of hard marching would have sufficed to 
 assemble 18,000 Spaniards in front of Santiago ; but Shafter's 
 army began landing at Daiquiri on the morning of June 22, 
 and it did not make its attack until July 1. Nine days at least 
 Linares had in which to concentrate his forces. If he had 
 done so he would have defeated the Americans and thrown 
 them upon the defensive. But there were also 8,364 Spanish 
 soldiers at Holguin, eighty-five miles from Santiago, and 
 8,668 at Manzanillo, 110 miles distant. There was ample time 
 to have marched all these troops to Santiago before Shafter's 
 army got there. 
 
 Las Guasimas. 
 
 On the part of the Americans the combat at Las Guasimas 
 was fought without General Shafter's authority, and was con- 
 trary to his plan. It gained not a foot of ground that could 
 not have been had without the fight, and the Americans took 
 chances in it which, ordinarily, would have brought disaster. 
 Here 964 Americans assaulted 1,500 Spaniards; at El Caney 
 520 Spaniards held out nearly all day against 6,653 Americans. 
 What would have happened if the Spaniards had chosen to 
 hold their position at Las Guasimas? Reinforcements would 
 have had to hurry forward to assist Wheeler's little command ; 
 they would have arrived on the ground and gone into action 
 by driblets ; and our losses would have been very heavy. But 
 luckily the Spaniards had no intention of remaining in that 
 position. General Rubin had bivouacked there overnight, and 
 his orders from Linares for this day were as follows : "After 
 eating breakfast you will march with your entire column to 
 Santiago, retiring from your position by echelons with due 
 precaution and deliberation necessary to repel effectually any 
 attack of the enemy. . . ." 
 
 This order was a great mistake on the part of Linares ; he 
 ought to have made a decisive stand at Las Guasimas. The 
 
624 American Campaigns. 
 
 position was a strong one, and a Spanish force intrenched 
 there would have blocked the direct road to Santiago, and 
 it would have been in a position to attack Shafter's flank and 
 communications if he had undertaken to turn it by taking a 
 route more to the north or the south. And despite his failure 
 to concentrate the troops in his province, Linares had, never- 
 theless, more than 2,000 men he could have brought upon the 
 field at Las Guasimas. Tactically the position could undoubt- 
 edly have been turned, just as Santa Anna's was turned at 
 Cerro Gordo ; but it was, none the less, probably the strongest 
 position between Siboney and Santiago, and called for no such 
 wide dispersion of his command as Linares felt obliged to make 
 upon the defensive line he had selected nearer the city, from 
 El Caney on the left to Morro Castle on the right. 
 
 El Caney. 
 
 Strategically the attack at El Caney was a mistake and tac- 
 tically it was badly conducted. Shafter's objective was San- 
 tiago and the main Spanish force defending the town. The 
 detachment intrenched at El Caney was a mere outpost three 
 miles away from the main position. Instead of containing this 
 detachment with about one regiment, and concentrating the 
 rest of his army against the main position, Shafter divided his 
 army and sent nearly half of it against the outpost. Even if 
 Lawton had captured the village within an hour or two, as he 
 expected to do, it would have had little effect upon the main 
 issue ; whereas the capture of the main position at San Juan 
 Heights would have left the little post at El Caney in helpless 
 isolation. 
 
 The great tactical mistake of the attack was the tardiness of 
 the Americans in charging the enemy's position. An in- 
 trenched position cannot be taken by fire action alone. After 
 a preponderance of fire has been brought to bear upon it the 
 assault must follow in order to carry it. Knowing the peril of 
 turning their backs upon an enemy and fleeing under fire, men 
 will not quit a trench and run away until they see their foe 
 charging them. Creeping and crawling through the grass and 
 overwhelming the intrenchment with fire will not put the 
 defenders to flight ; it will rather make them stick closer to 
 their cover. 
 
 Of course our artillery ought to have taken a position at the 
 start close enough to have enabled it to batter down the little 
 
The Spanish-American War. 625 
 
 stone fort. It opened fire at 6.30 a.m., but not until 2 p.m. 
 did it move up close enough to be effective. At 3 p.m. it had 
 got the range and begun to breach the walls of the little struc- 
 ture. Not until then, after a small-arm duel of nearly eight 
 hours, did General Chaffee order the 12th Infantry to charge. 
 Other regiments joined in the charge, and the few defenders 
 remaining alive fled from their trenches. It took about two 
 hours more to drive them "from position to position, and from 
 house to house," and capture the village. We had lost 441 
 officers and men killed and wounded, — exactly seventy-nine 
 fewer than General Vara de Rey had in his command at the 
 beginning of the combat. There is no reason to doubt that, if 
 General Lawton had made his assault as soon as he gained the 
 mastery of fire, he would have driven the Spaniards from their 
 trenches just the same, but with probably no more than one- 
 tenth of his own actual loss. 
 
 San Juan and Kettle Hills. 
 
 The combat at Kettle and San Juan Hills was started by the- 
 appearance of Colonel Derby's balloon, before the Americans, 
 had made their deployment. But for this unfortunate inci- 
 dent the deployment might possibly have been completed with- 
 out drawing the fire of the enemy. As it happened, however^ 
 the troops, crowded together in the narrow road and hindered 
 by the thick jungle, suffered heavily. As at El Caney, most, 
 of our losses took place before the assault ; as soon as our 
 lines charged, the Spaniards quitted their intrenchments and 
 ran away. 
 
 Proper reconnaissance had not been made of the Spanish 
 position ; nothing was known concerning the strength of the 
 force, and, as usually happens, it was greatly overestimated; 
 the attack was made without form or tactical method ; no re- 
 serve was held in hand ; no attempt was made to envelop the 
 enemy's flank ; in fact, no positive direction or control appeared 
 to be exercised over the command as a whole. The conduct 
 of the attack apparently passed into the control of company 
 and battalion commanders. General-officers there were On 
 the field, exposing themselves recklessly and fearlessly to the 
 enemy's fire, leading and inspiring by example such troops as 
 could see them or could hear their voices, but not directing or 
 controlling the attack. As was the case at the battle of the 
 Wilderness, however, most of the tactical faults of this attack 
 may be charged to the dense jungle. 
 
•626 American Campaigns. 
 
 If the six thousand-odd troops uselessly engaged at El Caney 
 ■had been at hand in reserve, and had followed up the success- 
 ful assaults by close pursuit, there is little room to doubt that 
 ■they could have entered and taken Santiago that day. There 
 were, in fact, troops enough already upon the ground to push 
 ■on into the city, if they had not been already too nearly ex- 
 hausted with the heat, and the fatigue of combat. They were 
 not stopped, nor even checked, by the enemy's fire at any time 
 after they began their charge. Apparently they stopped simply 
 because they had beaten the enemy away, and taken the 
 ;ground they were fighting for. 
 
 What effect the capture of Santiago on July 1 would have 
 'had upon the fate of the Spanish fleet it is hard to say. It 
 'might have forced Cervera to make his sortie sooner than he 
 did, or it might have induced him to destroy his ships. At 
 least he could not have turned his guns upon the victorious 
 Americans without doing equal harm to the Spaniards and 
 the city. What the capture of the town that day would have 
 done, however, was to save the American army from seventeen 
 -days and more of terrific hardship and fatal sickness. 
 
 , Capture of Manila. 
 
 The attack upon Manila, August 13, was made in accord- 
 ance with a plan proposed by the two brigade-commanders, 
 'Generals MacArthur and Greene. It stands among a very 
 small number of offensive tactical operations in American mili- 
 tary history that have worked out precisely as planned. In his 
 report General Merritt says : "The orders for attack, and the 
 plan for occupation of the city, were carried out by the troops 
 ■exactly as contemplated." No doubt this was largely due to 
 the slight resistance made by the enemy ; but it was mainly due 
 -to the thorough reconnaissance that had been made of his posi- 
 tion, and the careful and intelligent preparation of the plan of 
 tattle and the means for its execution. Among those means 
 may be mentioned the field-telegraph that was provided. 
 During the progress of the combat the division headquarters, 
 which moved forward with the advancing line far into the 
 city, was kept in connection with two brigade headquarters 
 by the field telegraph ,* which insured concert of action in 
 all parts of the line. 
 
 ♦General Anderson's report. 
 
The Spanish-American War. 627 
 
 This combat also presents an example of the effective co- 
 operation of naval with land forces in assault. In fact Dewey's 
 fire had driven the Spaniards out of the works on the right of 
 their line before Greene's brigade advanced against them. 
 
 It is interesting to compare the battle of San Juan-El Caney 
 with that of Manila. In the first, 1,717 Spaniards in hastily 
 made intrenchments defended themselves stubbornly and hero- 
 ically against 15,065 Americans, nearly all regulars; in the sec- 
 ond a governor-general, after the merest mockery of a defense, 
 surrendered his capital city, a large public fund, 13,000 troops, 
 and 22,000 arms, to fewer than 9,000 Americans, nearly all raw 
 volunteers. The purpose and object of the defense were, how- 
 ever, very different in the two cases. In the first the Spanish 
 commander and his soldiers had a hope to fight for ; in the sec- 
 ond they could see nothing but despair in any event. At San- 
 tiago, so long as Cervera's squadron remained afloat, the army 
 had a chance ; it fought to save the squadron. At Manila, on 
 the contrary, the fleet was already lost; the city was besieged 
 by insurgents on one side aching to sack it, and on another 
 by an American army eager to capture it, but bound to save it 
 from the pillage of the insurgents ; and Dewey's fleet stood at 
 anchor in the bay closing all communications with the mother- 
 country and the rest of the outside world, and able at any 
 minute to knock the city to pieces with its shells. The case of 
 the Spaniards here was hopeless ; the sooner they were able to 
 capitulate to the Americans the better for them ; they had noth- 
 ing left to fight for but their honor. 
 
 It is generally believed that it was arranged beforehand be- 
 tween the Spanish Governor-General on one side, and General 
 Merritt and Admiral Dewey on the other, that the white flag 
 of capitulation should be raised as soon as our navy had fired 
 shots enough at Fort San Antonio Abad to satisfy the re- 
 quirements of Spanish honor; but no hint of anything of the 
 kind appears in General Merritt's report, and the resistance 
 met by Greene in the streets of Malate, and by MacArthur at 
 Singalon, feeble as it was, throws doubt upon the existence 
 of such an arrangement. 
 
 Capture of Porto Rico. 
 
 With the destruction of Montojo's and Cervera's fleets, and 
 the capture of Santiago, Spain's defeat was practically a fact 
 accomplished. Why then, an expedition to Porto Rico? It 
 
628 American Campaigns. 
 
 was for the double purpose of expelling Spanish sovereignty 
 wholly from American soil, and of having actual possession 
 of that island when the time should come to arrange terms of 
 peace. 
 
 General Miles may be criticized for landing his troops in de- 
 tachments at several points, and starting across the island in 
 four columns too widely separated to support one another. 
 Apparently this would have given a quickwitted and active 
 Spanish commander the opportunity to unite his forces and 
 destroy at least one of the American columns before the others 
 could go to its assistance. But in advising the War Depart- 
 ment that he was going to land his expedition at Point Fajardo, 
 and not informing it otherwise until he had actually landed it 
 at a point on the opposite side of the island, General Miles 
 showed a fine appreciation of the great strategic principle of 
 secrecy. He doubtless knew that if he should tell the depart- 
 ment beforehand where he really meant to land, the informa- 
 tion would leak out and be published to the world by the news- 
 papers. By keeping the secret, and landing where he was not 
 expected by the Spanish commander, he avoided a battle. The 
 Spanish commander had prepared to oppose his landing at 
 Point Fajardo. But while Miles purposely neglected to wire 
 the Secretary of War that he had changed his destination, he 
 did not fail to leave naval vessels to direct and guard the troop- 
 ships that were to follow those of his first detachment. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 Union and Confederate Commanders in some of the prin- 
 cipal campaigns and battles of the Civil War.* 
 
 FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN OR MANASSAS. 
 
 July 21, 1861. 
 
 Union Forces, IRVIN McDOWELL, Brig.-Gen., U. S. A. 
 
 First Division, Daniel Tyler, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Erasmus Keyes, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 11th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, R. C. Schenck, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, W. T. Sherman, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 13th U. S. Inf. 
 Fourth Brigade, I. B. Richardson, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Division, David Hunter, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 3d U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, Andrew Porter, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 16th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, A. E. Burnside, Col. 1st R. I. 
 Third Division, S. P. Heintzelman, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 17th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, W. B. Franklin, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 12th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, O. B. Willcox, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, O. O. Howard, Col. 3d Maine. 
 Fourth Division, Theodore Runyon, Brig.-Gen. N. J. Militia. 
 
 Nine Regiments not brigaded. 
 Fifth Division, D. S. Miles, Col. 2d U. S. Inf. 
 
 First Brigade, Louis Blenker, Col. 8th N. Y. 
 Second Brigade, T. A. Davies, Col. 16th N. Y. 
 
 Confederate Forces. 
 
 Army of the Shenandoah, J. E. JOHNSTON. Brig.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson, Col. 
 Second Brigade, F. S. Bartow, Col. 
 Third Brigade, B. E. Bee, Brig.-Gen. 
 Fourth Brigade, A. Elzey, Col. 
 
 Army of the Potomac, G. T. Beauregard, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, M. S. Bonham, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Second Brigade, R. S. Ewell, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Brigade, D. R. Jones, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, James Longstreet, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Fifth Brigade, P. St. G. Cocke, Col. 
 
 Sixth Brigade, J. A. Early, Col. 
 
 Holmes's Brigade, T. H. Holmes, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 *Taken from Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, and Heitman's 
 Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army. 
 
Appendix. 
 
 FORT DONELSON. 
 
 February 13-15, 1862. 
 Union Forces, U. S. GRANT, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, J. A. McClernand, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, R. T. Oglesby, Col. 8th 111. 
 Second Brigade, W. H. L. Wallace, Col. 11th 111. 
 Third Brigade, W. R. Morrison, Col. Vols. 
 L. F. Ross, Col. 17th 111. 
 
 Second Division, C. F. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 3d U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, John McArthur, Col. 12th 111. 
 Third Brigade, John Cook, Col. 7th 111. 
 Fourth Brigade, J. G. Lauman, Col. 7th Iowa. 
 Fifth Brigade, M. L. Smith, Col. 8th Mo. 
 
 Third Division^ Lew Wallace, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Charles Cruft, Col. 31st Ind. 
 Second Brigade (attached to the Third Brigade). 
 Third Brigade, J. M. Thayer, Col. 1st Neb. 
 
 Confederate Forces, JOHN B. FLOYD, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 GIDEON J. PILLOW, Brig.-Gen. 
 SIMON B. BUCKNER, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Buckner's Division, Simon B. Buckner, Brig.-Gen. 
 Second Brigade, W. E. Baldwin, Col. 
 Third Brigade, J. C. Brown, Col. 
 
 Johnson's Command, B. R. Johnson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Heiman's Brigade, A. Heiman, Col. 
 Davidson's Brigade, T. J. Davidson, Col. 
 Drake's Brigade, Joseph Drake, Col. 
 
 Floyd's Division. 
 
 First Brigade, G. C. Wharton, Col. 
 Second Brigade, John McCausland, Col. 
 Garrison Forces, J. W. Head, Col. 
 Cavalry, N. B. Forrest, Col. 
 
 BATTLE OF SHILOH. 
 
 April 6-7, 1862. 
 
 Union Forces. 
 
 Army of the Tennessee, U. S. GRANT, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, J. A. McClernand, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, A. M. Hare, Col. Vols. 
 
 M. M. Crocker, Col. 13th Iowa. 
 Second Brigade, C. C. Marsh, Col. 11th 111. 
 Third Brigade, Julius Raith, Col. Vols. 
 
 Second Division, W. H. L. Wallace, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, J. M. Tuttle, Col. 2d Iowa. 
 Second Brigade, John McArthur, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, T. W. Sweeny, Col. 52d 111. 
 
Appendix. 631 
 
 Third Division, Lew Wallace, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, M. L. Smith, Col. 8th Mo. 
 Second Brigade, J. M. Thayer, Col. 1st Neb. 
 Third Brigade, Charles Whittlesey, Col. 20th Ohio. 
 
 Fourth Division, S. A. Hurlbut, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, N. G. Williams, Col. 3d Iowa. 
 
 I. C. Pugh, Col. 41st 111. 
 Second Brigade, J. C. Veatch, Col. 25th Ind. 
 Third Brigade, J. G. Lauman, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Fifth Division, W. T. Sherman, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 13th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, J. A. McDowell, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, David Stuart, Col. 55th 111. 
 Third Brigade, Jesse Hildebrand, Col. Vols. 
 Fourth Brigade, R. P. Buckland, Col. 72nd Ohio. 
 
 Sixth Division, B. M. Prentiss, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, Everett Peabody, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Madison Miller, Col. 18th Mo. 
 
 Arm~y of the Ohio, D. C. Buell, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 Col. A. A. G, U. S. A. 
 
 Second Division, A. McD. McCook, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Capt. 3d U. S. Inf. 
 Fourth Brigade, L. H. Rousseau, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Fifth Brigade, E. N. Kirk, Col. 34th 111. 
 Sixth Brigade, W. H. Gibson, Col. 49th Ohio. 
 
 Fourth Division, William Nelson, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Lieut. U. S. Navy. 
 Tenth Brigade, Jacob Ammen, Col. 24th Ohio. 
 Nineteenth Brigade, W. B. Hazen, Col. 41st Ohio. 
 
 Capt. 8th U. S. Inf. 
 Twenty-second Brigade, S. D. Bruce, Col. Vols. 
 
 Fifth Division, T. L. Crittenden, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Eleventh Brigade, J. T. Boyle, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Fourteenth Brigade, W. Sooy Smith, Col. 13th Ohio. 
 
 Sixth Division, T. J. Wood, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 2d U. S. Cav. 
 Twentieth Brigade, J. A. Garfield, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Twenty-first Brigade, G. D. Wagner, Col. 15th Ind. 
 
 Confederate Forces. 
 
 Army of the Mississippi, A. S. JOHNSTON, General. 
 Second in Command, G. T. Beauregard, General. 
 
 First Corps, LEONIDAS POLK, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Division, Charles Clark, Brig.-Gen. 
 A. P. Stewart, Brig.-Gen. 
 First Brigade, R. M. Russell, Col. 
 Second Brigade, A. P. Stewart, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Second Division, B. F. Cheatham, Maj.-Gen. 
 First Brigade, B. R. Johnson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Preston Smith, Col. 
 Second Brigade, W. H. Stephens, Col. 
 
632 Appendix. 
 
 Second Corps, BRAXTON BRAGG, Maj.-Gen. 
 First Division, Daniel Ruggles, Brig.-Gen. 
 First Brigade, R. L. Gibson, Col. 
 Second Brigade, Patton Anderson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Third Brigade, Preston Pond, Jr., Col. 
 
 Second Division, J. M. Withers, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, A. H. Gladden, Brig.-Gen. 
 Second Brigade, J. R. Chalmers, Brig.-Gen. 
 Third Brigade, J. K. Jackson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Corps, W. J. HARDEE, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, T. C. Hindman, Brig.-Gen. 
 Second Brigade, P. R. Cleburne, Brig.-Gen. 
 Third Brigade, S. A. M. Wood, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Reserve Corps, J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, Brig.-Gen. 
 First Brigade, R. P. Trabue, Col. 
 Second Brigade, J. S. Bowen, Brig.-Gen. 
 Third Brigade, W. S. Statham, Col. 
 
 BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS. 
 
 May 31— June 1, 1862. 
 
 Union Forces. 
 
 Army of the Potomac, G B. McCLELLAN, 
 Maj.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 Second Corps, E. V. SUMNER, Brig.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 First Division, I. B. Richardson, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, O. O. Howard, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, T. F. Meagher, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, W. H. French, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 2d U. S. Art. 
 
 Second Division, John Sedgwick, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, W. A. Gorman, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, W. W. Burns, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, N. J. T. Dana, Brig.-Gen., Vols., 
 
 Capt. A. Q. M., U. S. A. 
 
 Third Corps, S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 17th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Division, Joseph Hooker, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Second Brigade, D. E. Sickles, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, F. E. Patterson, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Division, Philip Kearny, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 . First Brigade, C. D. Jameson, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, D. B. Birney, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, H. G. Berry, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Fourth Corps, E. D. KEYES, Maj.-Gen. Vols, Col. 11th U. S. Inf. 
 First Division, D. N. Couch, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, J. J. Peck, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, J. J. Abercrombie, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 7th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, Charles Devens, Jr., Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
Appendix. 633 
 
 Second Division, Silas Casey, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. 4th U. S. Tnf. 
 First Brigade, H. M. Naglee, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, H. W. Wessells, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 6th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, I. N. Palmer, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 5th U. S. Cav. 
 
 Confederate Forces. 
 
 Army of Northern Virginia, J. E. JOHNSTON, General. 
 
 G. W. SMITH, Maj.-Gen. 
 R. E. LEE, General. 
 
 Right Wing, JAMES LONGSTREET, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Longstreet's Division, R. H. Anderson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Kemper's Brigade, J. L. Kemper, Col. 
 Anderson's Brigade, Micah Jenkins, Col. 
 Picketfs Brigade, G. E. Pickett, Brig.-Gen. 
 Wilcox's Brigade, C. M. Wilcox, Brig.-Gen. 
 Colston's Brigade, R. E. Colston, Brig.-Gen. 
 Poor's Brigade, R. A. Pryor, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Hill's Division, D. H. Hill, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Garland's Brigade, Samuel Garland, Jr., Brig.-Gen. 
 Rodes's Brigade, R. E. Rodes, Brig.-Gen. 
 Rains's Brigade, G. R. Rains, Brig.-Gen. 
 Featherston's Brigade, G. B. Anderson, Col. 
 
 Huger's Division, Benjamin Huger, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Armistead's Brigade, L. A. Armistead, Brig.-Gen. 
 Mahone's Brigade, William Mahone, Brig.-Gen. 
 Blanchard's Brigade, A. G. Blanchard, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Left Wing, G. W. SMITH, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Smith's Division, W. H. C. Whiting, Brig.-Gen. 
 Whiting's Brigade, E. Mel. Law, Col. 
 Hood's Brigade, J. B. Hood, Brig.-Gen. 
 Hampton's Brigade, Wade Hampton, Brig.-Gen. 
 Hatton's Brigade, Robert Hatton, Brig.-Gen. 
 Pettigrew's Brigade, J. J. Pettigrew, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES. 
 
 June 25— July 1, 1862. 
 
 Union Forces. 
 
 Army of the Potomac, G. B. McCLELLAN, 
 Maj.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 Second Corps, E. V. SUMNER, Brig.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 First Division, I. B. Richardson, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, J. C. Caldwell, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, T. F. Meagher, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, W. H. French, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 2d U. S. Art. 
 Second Division, John Sedgwick, Brig -Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, Alfred Sully, Col. 1st Minn., 
 
 Maj. 8th U. S. Inf. 
 
634 Appendix. 
 
 Second Brigade, W. W. Burns, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, N. J. T. Dana, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. A. Q. M., U. S. A. 
 Third Corps, S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 17th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Division, Joseph Hooker, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Cuvier Grover, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 10th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, D. E. Sickles, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, J. B. Carr, Col. 2d N. Y. 
 Third Division, Philip Kearny, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, J. C. Robinson, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. Sth U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, D. B. Birney, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, H. G. Berry, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Fourth Corps, E. D. KEYES, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. 11th U. S. Inf. 
 First Division, D. N. Couch, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, A. P. Howe, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Art. 
 Second Brigade, J. J. Abercrombie, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 7th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, I. N. Palmer, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. Sth U. S. Cav. 
 Second Division, ]. J. Peck, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, H. M. Naglee, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, H. W. Wessells, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 6th U. S. Inf. 
 Fifth Corps, FITZ-JOHN PORTER, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 15th U. S. Inf. 
 
 First Division, G. W. Morell, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, J. H. Martindale, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Charles Griffin, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. Sth U. S. Art. 
 Third Brigade, Daniel Butterfield, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Lt.-Col. 12th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Division, George Sykes, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 14th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, R. C. Buchanan, Lt.-Col. 4th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, William Chapman, Lt.-Col. 3d U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, G. K. Warren, Col. 5th N. Y., 
 
 Capt. U. S. Top. Eng. 
 Third Division, G. A. McCall, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, J. F. Reynolds, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Lt.-Col. 14th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, G. G. Meade, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. U. S. Top. Eng. 
 Third Brigade, Truman Seymour, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art. 
 Sixth Corps, W. B. FRANKLIN, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 12th U. S. Inf. 
 First Division, H. W. Slocum, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, G. W. Taylor, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, J. J. Bartlett, Col. 27th N. Y. 
 Third Brigade, John Newton, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. U. S. Eng. 
 
Appendix. 635 
 
 Second Division, Wm. F. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. U. S. Top. Eng. 
 First Brigade, W. S. Hancock, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. A. Q. M., U. S. A. 
 Second Brigade, W. T. H. Brooks, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 3d U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, J. W. Davidson, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 2d U. S. Cav. 
 
 Cavalry Reserve, P. ST. G. COOKE, Brig.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 First Brigade, R. H. Rush, Col. 6th Pa. Cav. 
 Second Brigade, G. A. H. Blake, Col. 1st U. S. Cav. 
 
 Artillery Reserve, H. J. HUNT, Col. A. A. D. C„ Maj. 5th U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, Wm. Hays, Lt.-Col. A. A. D. C, 
 
 Capt. 2d U. S. Art. 
 Second Brigade, G. W. Getty, Lt.-Col. A. A. D. C, 
 
 Capt. Sth U. S. Art. 
 Third Brigade, Albert Arndt, Maj. 1st Battalion N. Y. Art. 
 .Fourth Brigade, E. R. Petherbridge, Maj. Md. Art. 
 Fifth Brigade, J. H, Carlisle, Capt. 2d U. S. Art. 
 
 Confederate Forces. 
 
 Army of Northern Virginia, R. E. LEE, General. 
 
 Jackson's Command, T. J. (Stonewall) JACKSON, Maj .-Gen. 
 Whiting's Division, W. H. C. Whiting, Brig.-Gen. 
 First Brigade, J. B. Hood, Brig.-Gen. 
 Third Brigade, E. Mel. Law, Col. 
 
 Jackson's Division, 
 
 First Brigade, C. S. Winder, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Second Brigade, R. H. Cunningham, Lt.-Col. 
 
 Third Brigade, S. V. Fulkerson, Col. 
 E. T. H. Warren, Col. 
 Wade Hampton, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, A. R. Lawton, Brig.-Gen. 
 Ewell's Division, R. S. Ewell, Maj .-Gen. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, Arnold Elzey, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Seventh Brigade, I. R. Trimble, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Eighth Brigade, Richard Taylor, Brig.-Gen. 
 Hill's Division, D. H. Hill, Maj .-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, R. E. Rodes, Brig.-Gen. 
 J. B. Gordon, Col. 
 
 Second Brigade, G. B. Anderson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Brigade, Samuel Garland, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, A. H. Colquitt, Col. 
 
 Fifth Brigade, R. S. Ripley, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Magrude/s Command, J. B. MAGRUDER, Maj.-Gen. 
 Jones's Division, D. R. Jones, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, Robert Toombs, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Brigade, G. T. Anderson, Col. 
 McLawJs Division, Lafayette McLaws, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, P. J. Semmes, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, J. B. Kershaw, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Magruder's Division. 
 
 Second Brigade, Howell Cobb, Brig.-Gen. 
 Third Brigade, Richard Griffith, Brig.-Gen. 
 
636 Appendix. 
 
 Longstreet's Command, JAMES LONGSTREET, Maj.-Gen, 
 Longstreet's Division, 
 
 First Brigade, J. L. Kemper, Brig.-Gen. 
 Second Brigade, R. H. Anderson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Third Brigade, G. E. Pickett, Brig.-Gen. 
 Fourth Brigade, C. M. Wilcox, Brig.-Gen. 
 Fifth Brigade, R. A. Pryor, Brig.-Gen. 
 Sixth Brigade, W. S. Featherston, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Hill's Division, A. P. Hill, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, C. W. Field, Brig.-Gen. 
 Second Brigade, Maxcy Gregg, Brig.-Gen. 
 Third Brigade, J. R. Anderson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Fourth Brigade, L. O'B. Branch, Brig.-Gen. 
 Fifth Brigade, J. J. Archer, Brig.-Gen. 
 Sixth Brigade, W. D. Pender, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Holmes's Division, T. H. Holmes, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Second Brigade, Robert Ransom, Jr., Brig.-Gen. 
 Third Brigade, Junius Daniel, Brig.-Gen. 
 Fourth Brigade, J. G. Walker, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Cavalry, J. E. B. STUART, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Reserve Artillery, WM. N. PENDLETON, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN OR MANASSAS. 
 
 August 29-30, 1862. 
 
 Union Forces. 
 
 Army of Virginia, JOHN POPE, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 Capt. U. S. Top. Eng. 
 
 First Corps, FRANZ SIGEL, Maj-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, R. C. Schenck, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Julius Stahel, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, N. C. McLean, Col. 75th Ohio. 
 
 Second Division, A. von Steinwehr, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, J. A. Koltes, Col. Vols. 
 
 Third Division, Carl Schurz, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Henry Bohlen, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Vladimir Krzyzanowski, Col. 58th N. Y. 
 Independent Brigade, R. H. Milroy, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Cavalry Brigade, John Beardsley, Col. 9th N. Y. Cav. 
 
 Second Corps, N. P. BANKS, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 (This Corps was with wagon-train.) 
 
 First Division, A. S. Williams, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, S. W. Crawford, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, G H. Gordon, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Second Division, G. S. Greene, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Charles Candy, Col. 66th Ohio. 
 Second Brigade, Matthew Schlaudecker, Col. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, J. A. Tait, Col. Vols. 
 Cavalry Brigade, John Buford, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. A. I. G., U. S. A 
 
Appendix. 637 
 
 Third Corps, IRVIN McDOWELL, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Brig.-Gen. U.S.A. 
 First Division, Rufus King, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, J. P. Hatch, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 3d U. S. Cav. 
 Second Brigade, Abner Doubleday, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 17th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, M. R. Patrick, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 2d U. S. Inf. 
 Fourth Brigade, John Gibbon, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Art. 
 Second Division, J. B. Ricketts, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 1st U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, Abram Duryea, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Z. B. Tower, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. U. S. Eng. 
 Third Brigade, G. L. Hartsuff, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. A. A. G., U. S. A. 
 Fourth Brigade, Joseph Thoburn, Col. Vols. 
 Cavalry Brigade, G. D. Bayard, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 Reynolds's Division, J. F. Reynolds. Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Lt.-Col. 14th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, G. G. Meade, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. U. S. Top. Eng. 
 Second Brigade, Truman Semour, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. Sth U. S. Art. 
 Third Brigade, C. F. Jackson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Army of the Potomac. 
 
 Third Corps, S. P. HETNTZFLMAN, Mai .-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 17th U. S. Inf. 
 First Division, Philip Kearney, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, J. C. Robinson, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. Sth U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, D. B. Birney, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, O. M. Poe, Col. 2d Mich., 
 
 1st Lt. U. S. Top. Eng. 
 Second Division, Joseph Hooker, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Cuvier Grover, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 10th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, Nelson Taylor, Col. 72d N. Y. 
 Third Brigade, J. B. Carr, Col. 2d N. Y. 
 Fifth Corps, F. J. PORTER, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. ISth U. S. Inf. 
 First Division, G. W. Morell, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, C. W. Roberts, Col. 2d Me. 
 Second Brigade, Charles Griffin, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. Sth U. S. Art. 
 Third Brigade, Daniel Butterfield, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Lt.-Col. 12th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Division, George Sykes, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 14th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, R. C. Buchanan, Lt.-Col. 4th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, Wm. Chapman, Lt.-Col. 3d U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, G. K. Warren, Col. Sth N. Y., 
 
 Capt. U. S. Top. Eng. 
 
638 Appendix. 
 
 Ninth Corps, J. L. RENO, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Capt. U. S. Ordnance. 
 First Division, I. I. Stevens, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, B. C. Christ, Col. 50th Pa. 
 
 Second Brigade, Daniel Leasure, Col. Vols. 
 
 Third Brigade, Addison Farnsworth, Col. 79th N. Y. 
 
 Second Division. 
 
 First Brigade, James Nagle, Col. 48th Pa. 
 Second Brigade, Edward Ferrero, Col. 51st N. Y. 
 
 Confederate Forces. 
 
 Army of Northern Virginia, R. E. LEE, General. 
 
 Right Wing, JAMES LONGSTREET, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Anderson's Division, R. H. Anderson, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Armistead's Brigade, L. A. Armistead, Brig.-Gen. 
 Mahone's Brigade, Wm. Mahone, Brig.-Gen. 
 Wright's Brigade, A. R. Wright, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Jones's Division, D. R. Jones, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Toombs's Brigade, Robert Toombs. Brig.-Gen. 
 Drayton's Brigade, T. F. Drayton, Brig.-Gen. 
 Jones's Brigade, G. T. Anderson, Col. 
 
 Wilcox's Division, C. M. Wilcox, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Wilcox's Brigade, C. M. Wilcox; Brig.-Gen. 
 Pryor's Brigade, R. A. Pryor, Brig.-Gen. 
 Featherston's Brigade, W. S. Featherston, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Hood's Division, J. B. Hood, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Hood's Brigade, J. B. Hood, Brig.-Gen. 
 Whiting's Brigade, E. M. Law, Col. 
 
 Kemper's Division, J. L. Kemper, Brig.-Gen. 
 • Kemper's Brigade, M. D. Corse, Col. 
 
 Jenkins's Brigade, Micah Jenkins, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Pickett's Brigade, Eppa Hunton, Col. 
 
 Evans's Independent Brigade, N. G. Evans, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Left Wing, T. J. (Stonewall) JACKSON, Maj.-Gen. 
 First Division, Wm, B. Taliaferro, Brig.-Gen. 
 First Brigade, W. S. H. Baylor, Col. 
 Second Brigade, John Seddon, Maj. 
 Third Brigade, A. G. Taliaferro, Col. 
 Fourth Brigade, W. E. Starke, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Second Division, A. P. Hill, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Branch's Brigade, L. O'B. Branch, Brig.-Gen. 
 Pender's Brigade, W. D. Pender, Brig.-Gen. 
 Thomas's Brigade, E. L. Thomas, Col. 
 Gregg's Brigade, Maxcy Gregg, Brig.-Gen. 
 Archer's Brigade, J. J. Archer, Brig.-Gen. 
 Field's Brigade, C. W. Field, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Division, R. S. Ewell, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Lawton's Brigade, A. R. Lawton, Brig.-Gen. 
 Trimble's Brigade, I. R. Trimble, Brig.-Gen. 
 Early's Brigade, J. A. Early, Brig.-Gen. 
 Hays's Brigade, Henry Forno, Col. 
 
 Cavalry Division, J. E. B. Stuart, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Robertson's Brigade, B. H. Robertson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Lee's Brigade, Fitzhugh Lee, Brig.-Gen. 
 
Appendix. 639 
 
 BATTLE OF ANTIETAM OR SHARPSBURG. 
 
 Sept. 17, 1862. 
 
 Union Forces. 
 
 Army of the Potomac, G. B. McCLELLAN, 
 Maj.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 First Corps, JOSEPH HOOKER, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, Abner Doubleday, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 17th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, Walter Phelps, Jr., Col. 22d N. Y. 
 Second Brigade, W. P. Wainwright, Col. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, M. R. Patrick, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 2d U. S. Inf. 
 Fourth Brigade, John Gibbon, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Art. 
 Second Division, J. B. Ricketts, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 1st U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, Abram Duryea, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, W. A. Christian, CoL Vols. 
 Third Brigade, G. L. Hartsuff, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. A. A. G., U. S. A. 
 Third Division, G. G. Meade, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. U. S. Top. Eng. 
 First Brigade, Truman Seymour, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. Sth U. S. Art. 
 Second Brigade, A. L. Magilton, Col. 4th Pa. Reserve. 
 Third Brigade, T. F. Gallagher, Col. 11th Pa. Reserve. 
 Second Corps, E. V. SUMNER, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Brig.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 First Division, I. B. Richardson, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, J. C. Caldwell, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, T. F. Meagher, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, J. R. Brooke, Col. 53d Pa. 
 Second Division, John Sedgwick, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, W. A. Gorman, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, O. O. Howard, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, N. J. T. Dana, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Division, W. H. French, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 2d U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, Nathan Kimball, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Dwight Morris, Col. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, Max Weber, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Fourth Corps. 
 
 First Division, D. N. Couch, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Charles Devens, Jr., Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, A. P. Howe, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Art. 
 Third Brigade, John Cochrane, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Fifth Corps, F. J. PORTER, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. ISth U. S. Inf. 
 First Division, G. W. Morell, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, James Barnes, Col. 18th Mass. 
 Second Brigade, Charles Griffin, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art. 
 Third Brigade, T. B. W. Stockton, Col. 16th Mich. 
 
640 Appendix. 
 
 Second Division, George Sykes, Brig -Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 14th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, R. C. Buchanan, Lt.-Col. 4th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, C. S. Lovell, Maj. 10th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, G. K. Warren, Col. 5th N. Y., 
 
 Capt. U. S. Top. Eng.. 
 Sixth Corps, W. B. FRANKLIN, Maj .-Gen. Vols., Col. 12th U. S. Inf. 
 First Division, H. W. Slocum, Maj. -Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, A. T. A. Torbert, Col. 1st N. J., 
 
 Capt. 5th U. S. Inf.. 
 Second Brigade, J. J. Bartlett, Col. 27th N. Y. 
 Third Brigade, John Newton, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. U. S. Eng. 
 Second Division, Wm. F. Smith, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. U. S. Top. Eng.. 
 First Brigade, W. S. Hancock, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. A. Q. M., U. S. A. 
 Second Brigade, W. T. H. Brooks, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 3d U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, W. H. Irwin, Col. 49th Pa. 
 
 Ninth Corps, A. E. BURNSIDE, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, O. B. Willcox, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, B. C. Christ, Col. 50th Pa. 
 
 Second Brigade, Thomas Welsh, Col. 45th Pa. 
 Second Division, S. D. Sturgis, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 4th U. S. Cav.. 
 
 First Brigade, James Nagle, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Second Brigade, Edward Ferrero, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Division, I. P. Rodman, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, H. S. Fairchild, Col. 89th N. Y. 
 
 Second Brigade, Edward Harland, Col. 8th Conn. 
 Kanawha Division, J. D. Cox, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, E. P. Scammon, Col. 23d Ohio. 
 
 Second Brigade, August Moor, Col. 28th Ohio. 
 
 Confederate Forces. 
 
 Army of Northern Virginia, R. E. LEE, General. 
 
 1 ongstreet's Command, JAMES LONGSTREET, Maj.-Gen. 
 McLaws's Division, Lafayette McLaws, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Kershaw's Brigade, J. B. Kershaw, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Cobb's Brigade, Howell Cobb, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Semmes's Brigade, P. J. Semmes, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Barksdale's Brigade, William Barksdale, Brig.-Gen. 
 Anderson's Division, R. H. Anderson, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Wilcox's Brigade, Alfred Cumming, Col. 
 
 Mahone's Brigade, W. A. Parham, Col. 
 
 Featherston's Brigade, Carnot Posey, Col. 
 
 Armistead's Brigade, L. A. Armistead, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Pryor's Brigade, R. A. Pryor, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Wright's Brigade, A. R. Wright, Brig.-Gen. 
 Jones's Division, D. R. Jones, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Toombs's Brigade, Robert Toombs, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Drayton's Brigade, T. F. Drayton, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Pickett's Brigade, R. B. Garnett, Brig.-Gen. 
 
Appendix. 641 
 
 Kemper's Brigade, J. L. Kemper, Brig.-Gen. 
 Jenkins's Brigade, Joseph Walker, Col. 
 Anderson's Brigade, G. T. Anderson, Col. 
 
 Walker's Division, J. G. Walker, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Walker's Brigade, Van H. Manning, Col. 
 Ransom's Brigade, Robert Ransom, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Hood's Division, J. B. Hood, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Hood's Brigade, W. T. Wofford, Col. 
 Law's Brigade, E. Mel. Law, Col. 
 
 Jackson's Command, T. J. (Stonewall) JACKSON, Maj.-Gen. 
 Ewell's Division, A. R. Lawton, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Lawton's Brigade, M. Douglass, Col. 
 
 Early's Brigade, J. A. Early, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Trimble's Brigade, J. A. Walker, Col. 
 
 Hays's Brigade, H. T. Hays, Brig.-Gen. 
 Light Division, A. P. Hill, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Branch's Brigade, L. O'B. Branch, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Gregg's Brigade, Maxcy Gregg, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Field's Brigade, J. M. Brockenbrough, Col. 
 
 Archer's Brigade, J. J. Archer, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Pender's Brigade, W. D. Pender, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Thomas's Brigade, E. L. Thomas, Col. 
 Jackson's Division, J. R. Jones, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Winder's Brigade, A. J. Grigsby, Col. 
 
 Taliaferro's Brigade, E. T. H. Warren, Col. 
 
 Jones's Brigade, B. T. Johnson, Col. 
 
 Starke's Brigade, Wm. E. Starke, Brig.-Gen. 
 Hill's Division, D. H. Hill, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Ripley's Brigade, R. S. Ripley, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Rodes's Brigade, R. E. Rodes, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Garland's Brigade, Samuel Garland, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Anderson's Brigade, G. B. Anderson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Colquitt's Brigade, A. H. Colquitt, Col. 
 Cavalry, J. E. B. STUART, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Hampton's Brigade, Wade Hampton, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Lee's Brigade, Fitzhugh Lee, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Robertson's Brigade, T. T. Munford, Col. 
 Reserve Artillery, W. N. PENDLETON, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 
 
 December 13, 1862. 
 
 Union Forces. 
 
 Army of the Potomac, A. E. BURNSIDE, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Right Grand Division, E. V. Sumner, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 Second Corps, D. N. COUCH, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, W. S. Hancock, Brig -Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. A. G\ M., U. S. A. 
 First Brigade, J. C. Caldwell, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, T. F. Meagher, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, S. K. Zook, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
642 Appendix. 
 
 Second Division, O. O. Howard, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, Alfred Sully, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 8th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, J. T. Owen, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, N. J. Hall, Col. 7th Mich., 
 
 1st Lt. 5th U. S. Art. 
 Third Division, W. H. French, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 2d U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, Nathan Kimball, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, O. H. Palmer, Col. 108th N. Y. 
 Third Brigade, J. W. Andrews, Col. Vols. 
 Ninth Corps, O. B. WILLCOX, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 First Division, W. W. Burns, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. C. S., U. S. A. 
 First Brigade, O. M. Poe, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 1st Lt. U. S. Top Eng. 
 Second Brigade, B. C. Christ, Col. 50th Pa. 
 Third Brigade, Daniel Leasure, Col. Vols. 
 Second Division, S. D. Sturgis, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, James Nagle, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Edward Ferrero, Brig-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Division, G. W. Getty, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, R. C. Hawkins, Col. 9th N. Y. 
 Second Brigade, Edward Harland, Col. 8th Conn. 
 'Cavalry Division, ALFRED PLEASONTON, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 2d U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, J. F. Farnsworth, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, D. McM. Gregg, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 6th U. S. Cav. 
 
 Center Grand Division, Joseph Hooker, Maj. -Gen. Vols. 
 
 Third Corps, GEORGE STONEMAN, Maj .-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 First Division, D. B. Birney, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, J. C. Robinson, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 2d U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, J. H. H. Ward, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, H. G. Berry, Maj. Gen. Vols. 
 Second Division, D. E. Sickles, Maj .-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, J. B. Carr, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, G. B. Hall, Col. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, J. W. Revere, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Division, A. W. Whipple, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. U. S. Top. Eng. 
 First Brigade, A. S. Piatt, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, S. S. Carroll, Col. 8th Ohio, 
 
 Capt. 10th U. S. Inf. 
 Fifth Corps, DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, Maj. -Gen. Vols., 
 
 Lt.-Col. 12th U. S. Inf. 
 First Division, Charles Griffin, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, James Barnes, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, J. B. Sweitzer, Col. 62d Pa. 
 Third Brigade, T. B. W. Stockton, Col. 16th Mich. 
 
Appendix. 643 
 
 Second Division, George Sykes, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 14th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, R. C. Buchanan, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Lt.-Col. 4th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, G. L. Andrews, Maj. 17th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, G. K. Warren, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. U. S. Top. Eng. 
 
 Third Division, A. A. Humphreys, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. U. S. Top. Eng. 
 First Brigade, E. B. Tyler, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, P. H. Allabach, Col. Vols. 
 
 Cavalry Brigade, W. W. AVERELL, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 3d U. S. Cav. 
 
 Left Grand Division, W. B. Franklin, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 Col. 15th U. S. Inf. 
 
 First Corps, J. F. REYNOLDS, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Lt-Col. 14th U. S. Inf. 
 
 First Division, Abner Doubleday, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 17th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, Walter Phelps, Col. 22d N. Y. 
 Second Brigade, James Gavin, Col. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, W. F. Rogers, Col. 21st N. Y. 
 Fourth Brigade, Solomon Meredith, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Second Division, John Gibbon, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, A. R. Root, Col. 94th N. Y. 
 Second Brigade, Peter Lyle, Col. 90th Pa. 
 Third Brigade, Nelson Taylor, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Third Division, George G. Meade, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. U. S. Top. Eng. 
 First Brigade, William Sinclair, Col. 6th Pa., 
 
 1st Lt. 3d U. S. Art. 
 Second Brigade, A. L. Magilton, Col. 4th Pa. Reserve. 
 Third Brigade, C. F. Jackson, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Sixth Corps, W. F. SMITH, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Capt. U. S. Top. Eng. 
 First Division, W. T. H. Brooks, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 18th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, A. T. A. Torbert, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Capt. 5th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, H. L. Cake, Col. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, D. A. Russell, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 8th U. S. Inf. 
 
 Second Division, A. P. Howe, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, C. E. Pratt, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Henry Whiting, Col. 2d Vt. 
 Third Brigade, F. L. Vinton, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 16th U. S. Inf. 
 
 Third Division, John Newton, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. U. S. Eng. 
 First Brigade, John Cochrane, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Charles Devens, Jr., Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, T. A. Rowley, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Cavalry Brigade, G. B. BAYARD, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 
644 Appendix. 
 
 Confederate Forces. 
 
 Army of Northern Virginia, R. E. LEE, General. 
 
 First Corps, JAMES LONGSTREET, Lieut.-Gen. 
 
 McLaws's Division, Lafayette McLaws, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Kershaw's Brigade, J. B. Kershaw, Brig.-Gen. 
 Barksdale's Brigade, William Barksdale, Brig.-Gen. 
 Cobb's Brigade, T. R. R. Cobb, Brig.-Gen. 
 Semmes's Brigade, P. J. Semmes, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Anderson's Division, R. H. Anderson, Maj.-Gen. 
 Wilcox's Brigade, C. M. Wilcox, Brig.-Gen. 
 Mahone's Brigade, William Mahone, Brig.-Gen. 
 Featherston's Brigade, W. S. Featherston, Brig.-Gen. 
 Wright's Brigade, A. R. Wright, Brig.-Gen. 
 Perry's Brigade, E. A. Perry, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Picket fs Division, G. E. Pickett, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Gamett's Brigade, R. B. Garnett, Brig.-Gen. 
 Armistead's Brigade, L. A. Armistead, Brig.-Gen. 
 Kemper's Brigade, J. L. Kemper, Brig.-Gen. 
 Jenkins's Brigade, Micah Jenkins, Brig.-Gen. 
 Corse's Brigade, M. D. Corse, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Hood's Division, J. B. Hood, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Law's Brigade, E. Mel. Law, Brig.-Gen. 
 Robertson's Brigade, J. B. Robertson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Anderson's Brigade, G. T. Anderson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Toombs's Brigade, H. L. Benning, Col. 
 
 Ransom's Division, Robert Ransom, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Ransom's Brigade, Robert Ransom, Brig.-Gen. 
 Cooke's Brigade, J. R. Cooke, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Second Corps, T. J. (Stonewall) JACKSON, Lieut.-Gen. 
 Hill's Division, D. H. Hill, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, R. E. Rodes, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Second Brigade, George Doles, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Brigade, A. H. Colquitt, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, Alfred Iverson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Fifth Brigade, Bryan Grimes, Col. 
 Light Division,^ A. P. Hill, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, J. M. Brockenbrough, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Second Brigade, Maxcy Gregg, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Brigade, E. L. Thomas, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, J. H. Lane, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Fifth Brigade, J. J. Archer, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Sixth Brigade, W. D. Pender, Brig.-Gen. 
 Ewell's Division, J. A. Early, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Lawton's Brigade, E. N. Atkinson, Col. 
 
 Trimble's Brigade, R. F. Hoke, Col. 
 
 Early's Brigade, J. A. Walker, Col. 
 
 Hays's Brigade, H. T. Hays, Brig.-Gen. 
 Jackson's Division, W. B. Taliaferro, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, E. F. Paxton, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Second Brigade, J. R. Jones, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Brigade, E. T. H. Warren, Col. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, Edmund Pendleton, Col. 
 Reserve Artillery, W. N. PENDLETON, Brig.-Gen. 
 
Appendix. 645 
 
 Cavalry, J. E._ B. STUART, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, Wade Hampton, Brig.-Gen. 
 Second Brigade, Fitzhugh Lee, Brig.-Gen. 
 Third Brigade, W. H. F. Lee, Brig. Gen. 
 
 BATTLE OF STONES RIVER. 
 
 December 31, 1862 — January 2, 1863. 
 
 Union Forces. 
 
 Army of the Cumberland, W. S. ROSECRANS, 
 Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 Right Wing, A. McD. McCOOK, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 3d U. S. Inf. 
 First Division, J. C. Davis, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 1st U. S. Art. 
 
 Second Brigade, W. P. Carlin, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 6th U. S. Inf. 
 
 Third Brigade, W. E. Woodruff, Col. Vols. 
 Second Division,"R. W. Johnson, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 5th U. S. Cav. 
 
 First Brigade, August Willich, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Second Brigade, E. N. Kirk, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Third Brigade, P. P. Baldwin, Col. Vols. 
 Third Division, P. H. Sheridan, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 13th U. S. Inf. 
 
 First Brigade, J. W. Sill, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Second Brigade, Frederick Schaefer, Col. Vols. 
 
 Third Brigade, G. W. Roberts, Col. Vols. 
 ■Center, G. H. THOMAS, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. Sth U. S. Cav. 
 First Division, L. H. Rousseau, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, B. F. Scribner, Col. 38th Ind. 
 
 Second Brigade, John Beatty, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Third Brigade, J. C. Starkweather, Col. 1st Wis. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, O. L. Shepherd, Lt.-Col. 18th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Division, J. S. Negley, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, J. G. Spears, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Second Brigade, T. R. Stanley, Col. 18th Ohio. 
 
 Third Brigade, J. F. Miller, Col. 29th Ind. 
 
 Third Division, 
 
 First Brigade, M. B. Walker, Col. 31st Ohio. 
 Left Wing, T. L. CRITTENDEN, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, T. J. Wood, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 2d U. S. Cav. 
 
 First Brigade, M. S. Hascall, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 17th U. S. Inf. 
 
 Second Brigade, G. D. Wagner, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Third Brigade, C. G. Harker, Col. 65th Ohio. 
 Second Division, J. M. Palmer, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Charles Cruft, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Second Brigade, W. B. Hazen, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 8th U. S. Inf. 
 
 Third Brigade, William Grose, Col. 36th Ind. 
 Third Division, H. P. Van Cleve, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Sam. Beatty, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Second Brigade, J. P. Fyffe, Col. Vols. 
 
 Third Brigade, S. W. Price, Col. 21st Ky. 
 
646 Appendix. 
 
 Cavalry, D. S. STANLEY, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 Cavalry Division, John Kennett, Col. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, R. H. G. Minty, Col. 4th Mich. Cav. 
 Second Brigade, Lewis Zahm, Col. 3d Ohio Cav. 
 
 Confederate Forces. 
 
 Army of Tennessee, BRAXTON BRAGG, General. 
 
 Polk's Corps, LEONIDAS POLK, Lieut-Gen. 
 
 First Division. B. F. Cheatham, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, D. S. Donelson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Second Brigade, A. P. Stewart, Brig.-Gen: 
 
 Third Brigade, George Maney, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, A. J. Vaughan, Jr., Col. 
 Second Division, J. M. Withers, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, J. Q. Loomis, Col. 
 
 Second Brigade, J. R. Chalmers, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Brigade, J. P. Anderson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, A. M. Manigault, Col. 
 Hardee's Corps, W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-Gen. 
 
 First Division, J. C. Breckinridge, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, D. W. Adams, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Second Brigade, J. B. Palmer, Col. 
 
 Third Brigade, William Preston, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, R. W. Hanson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Jackson's Brigade, J. K. Jackson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Second Division, P. R. Cleburne, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, L. E. Polk, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Second Brigade, St. J. R. Liddell, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Brigade, B. R. Johnson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, S. A. M. Wood, Brig.-Gen. 
 McCown's Division, J. P. McCown, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, M. D. Ector, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Second Brigade, J. E. Rains, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Brigade, Evander McNair, Brig.-Gen. 
 Cavalry, JOSEPH WHEELER, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Wheeler's Brigade, Joseph Wheeler, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Buford's Brigade, Abraham Buford, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Pegram's Brigade, John Pegram, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Wharton's Brigade, J. A. Wharton, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 April 29— May 6, 1863. 
 
 Battle of Chancellorsville. 
 
 May 2-3. 
 
 Union Forces. 
 
 Army of the Potomac, JOSEPH HOOKER, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 First Corps, J. F. REYNOLDS, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Lt.-Col. 14th U. S. Inf. 
 First Division, J. S. Wadsworth, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Walter Phelps, Jr., Col. 22d N. Y. 
 Second Brigade, Lysander Cutler, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
Appendix. 647 
 
 Third Brigade, G. R. Paul, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 8th U. S. Inf. 
 Fourth Brigade, Solomon Meredith, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Division, J. C. Robinson, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 2d U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, A. R. Root, Col 94th N. Y. 
 Second Brigade, Henry Baxter, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, S. H. Leonard, Col. Vols. 
 Third Division, Abner Doubleday, Maj .-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 17th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, T. A. Rowley, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Roy Stone, Col. 149th Pa. 
 
 Second Corps, D. N. COUCH, Maj .-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, W. S. Hancock, Maj .-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. A. Q. M., U. S. A. 
 First Brigade, J. C. Caldwell, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, T. F. Meagher, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, S. K. Zook, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Fowth Brigade, J. R. Brooke, Col. 53d Pa. 
 Second Division, John Gibbon, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, Alfred Sully, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 8th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, J. T. Owen, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 1st Lt. Sth U. S. Art. 
 Third Brigade, N. J. Hall, Col. 7th Mich., 
 
 1st Lt. Sth U. S. Art.. 
 Third Division, W. H. French, Maj .-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 2d U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, S. S. Carroll, Col. 8th Ohio. 
 Second Brigade, William Hays, Brigl-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 2d U. S. Art.. 
 Third Brigade, J. D. MacGregor, Col. 4th N. Y. 
 
 Third Corps, D. E. SICKLES, Maj .-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, D. B. Birney, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, C. K. Graham, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Second Brigade, J. H. H. Ward, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Third Brigade, S. B. Hayman, Col. 37th N. Y., 
 
 Maj. 10th U. S. Inf.. 
 Second Division, H. G. Berry, Maj .-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, J. B. Carr, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Second Brigade, J. W. Revere, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Third Brigade, Gershom Mott, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Division, A. W. Whipple, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. U. S. Eng.. 
 
 First Brigade, Emlen Franklin, Col. Vols. 
 
 Second Brigade, S. M. Bowman, Col. 84th Pa. 
 
 Third Brigade, Hiram Berdan, Col. 1st U. S. Sharpshooters., 
 
 Fifth Corps, G. G. MEADE, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Maj. U. S. Eng. 
 First Division, Charles Griffin, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. Sth U. S. Art.. 
 First Brigade, James Barnes, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, James McQuade, Col. 14th N. Y. 
 Third Brigade, T. B. W. Stockton, Col. 16th Mich. 
 Second Division, George Sykes, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 14th U. S. Inf_ 
 
■648 Appendix. 
 
 First Brigade, R. B. Ayres, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art. 
 Second Brigade, Sidney Burbank, Col. 2d U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, P. H. O'Rorke, Col. 140th N. Y., 
 
 1st Lt. U. S. Eng. 
 Third Division, A. A. Humphreys, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Lt.-Col. U. S. Eng. 
 First Brigade, E. B. Tyler, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, P. H. Allabach, Col. Vols. 
 Sixth Corps, JOHN SEDGWICK, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 First Division, W. T. H. Brooks, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 18th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, H. W. Brown, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, J. J. Bartlett, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, D. A. Russell, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 8th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Division, A. P. Howe, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Art. 
 Second Brigade, L. A. Grant, Col. Sth Vermont. 
 Third Brigade, T. H. Neill, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. Sth U. S. Inf. 
 Third Division, John Newton, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Maj. U. S. Eng. 
 First Brigade, Alexander Shaler, Col. 65th N. Y. 
 Second Brigade, W. H. Browne, Col. 36th N. Y. 
 Third Brigade, Frank Wheaton, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 Light Division, Hiram Burnham, Col. 6th Me. 
 Eleventh Corps, O. O. HOWARD, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, Charles Devens, Jr., Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, Leopold von Gilsa, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, N. C. McLean, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Division, Adolph von Steinwehr, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, Adolphus Buschbeck, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, F. C. Barlow, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Division, Carl Schtjrz, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Alex. Schimmelfennig, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Wladimir Krzyzanowski, Col. 58th N. Y. 
 'Twelfth Corps, H. W. SLOCUM, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, A. S. Williams, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, J. F. Knipe, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Samuel Ross, Col. 20th Conn., 
 
 Capt. 14th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, T. H. Ruger, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Division, J. W. Geary, Brig-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Charles Candy, Col. 66th Ohio. 
 Second Brigade, T. L. Kane, Brig. Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, G. S. Greene, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 •Cavalry Corps, GEORGE STONEMAN, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 First Division, Alfred Pleasonton, Brig-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 2d U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, B. F. Davis, Col. 8th N. Y. Cav., 
 
 Capt. 1st U. S. Cav. 
 Second Brigade, T. C. Devin, Col. 6th N. Y. Cav. 
 ; Second Division, W. W. Averell, Brig-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 3d U. S. Cav. 
 
Appendix. 649 
 
 First Brigade, H. B. Sargent, Col. 1st Mass. Cav. 
 Second Brigade, J. B. Mcintosh, Col. 3d Pa. Cav., 
 
 1st Lt. Sth U. S. Cav. 
 Third Division, D. McM. Gregg, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 6th U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, Judson Kilpatrick, Col. 2d N. Y. Cav., 
 
 1st Lt. 1st U. S. Art. 
 Second Brigade, Percy Wyndham, Col. Vols. «^. 
 Reserve Brigade, John Buford, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. A. I. G., U. S. A. 
 Artillery, H. J. HUNT, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Maj. Sth U. S. Art. 
 
 Confederate Forces. 
 
 Army of Northern Virginia, R. E. LEE, General. 
 
 First Corps (Longstreet with divisions of Hood and Pickett absent 
 in Southeastern Virginia). 
 
 McLaws's Division, Lafayette McLaws, Maj .-Gen. 
 
 Wofford's Brigade, W. T. Wofford, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Semmes's Brigade, P. J. Semmes, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Kershaw's Brigade, J. B. Kershaw, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Barksdale's Brigade, William Barksdale, Brig.-Gen. 
 Anderson's Division, R. H. Anderson, Maj .-Gen. 
 
 Wilcox's Brigade, C. M. Wilcox, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Wright's Brigade, A. R. Wright, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Mahone's Brigade, William Mahone, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Posey's Brigade, Carnot Posey, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Perry's Brigade, E. A. Perry, Brig.-Gen. 
 .Second Corps, T. J. (Stonewall) JACKSON, Lieut.-Gen. 
 Light Division, A. P. Hill, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Heth's Brigade, Henry Heth, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Thomas's Brigade, E. L. Thomas, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Lane's Brigade, J. H. Lane, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 McGowan's Brigade, Samuel McGowan, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Archer's Brigade, J. J. Archer, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Pender's Brigade, W. D. Pender, Brig.-Gen. 
 D. H. Hill's Division, R. E. Rodes, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Rodes's Brigade, R. E. Rodes, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Colquitt's Brigade, A. H. Colquitt, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Ramseur's Brigade, S. D. Ramseur, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Doles's Brigade, George Doles, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Iverson's Brigade, Alfred Iverson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Early's Division, J. A. Early, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Gordon's Brigade, J. B. Gordon, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Hoke's Brigade, R. F. Hoke, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Smith's Brigade, William Smith, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Hays's Brigade, H. T. Hays, Brig.-Gen. 
 Trimble's Division, R. E. Colston. Brig.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, E. F. Paxton, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Second Brigade, J. R. Jones, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Brigade, E. T. H. Warren, Col. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, F. T. Nicholls, Brig.-Gen. 
 ■Cavalry, J. E. B. STUART, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Second Brigade, Fitzhugh Lee, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Brigade, W. H. F. Lee, Brig.-Gen. 
 
650 Appendix. 
 
 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 July 1-3, 1863. 
 
 Union Forces. 
 
 Army of the Potomac, G. G. MEADE, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 Maj. U. S. Eng. 
 
 First Corps, J. F. REYNOLDS, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Lt.-Col. 14th U. S. Inf. 
 ABNER DOUBLED AY, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 17th U. S. Inf. 
 JOHN NEWTON, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Maj. U. S. Eng. 
 First Division, J. S. Wadsworth, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Solomon Meredith, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Lysander Cutler, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Division, J. C. Robinson, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 2d U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, G. R. Paul, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 8th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, Henry Baxter, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Division, T. A. Rowley, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, Chapman Biddle, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Roy Stone, Col. 149th Pa. 
 Third Brigade, G. J. Stannard, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Second Corps, W. S. HANCOCK, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. A. Q. M., U. S. A. 
 JOHN GIBBON, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 4th U. S. Art. 
 First Division J. C. Caldwell, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, E. E. Cross, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Patrick Kelly, Col. 88th N. Y. 
 Third Brigade, S. K. Zook, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Fourth Brigade, J. R. Brooke, Col. 53d Pa. 
 Second Division, John Gibbon, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, William Harrow, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, A. S. Webb, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 11th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, N. J. Hall, Col. 7th Mich., 
 
 1st Lt. Sth U. S. Art 
 Third Division, Alexander Hays, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 16th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, S. S. Carroll, Col. 8th Ohio. 
 Second Brigade, T. A. Smyth, Col. 1st Del. 
 Third Brigade, G. L. Willard, Col. 125th N. Y. 
 
 Third Corps, D. E. SICKLES, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, D. B. Birney, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, C. K. Graham, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Second Brigade, J. H. H. Ward, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Third Brigade, P. R. de Trobriand, Col. 38th N. Y. 
 Second Division, A. A. Humphreys, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Lt.-Col. U. S. Eng. 
 
 First Brigade, J. B. Carr, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Second Brigade, W. R. Brewster, Col. 73d N. Y. 
 
 Third Brigade, G. C. Burling, Col. 6th N. J. 
 
Appendix. 651 
 
 Fifth Corps, GEORGE SYKES, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Maj. 14th U. S. Inf. 
 First Division, James Barnes, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, W. S. Tilton, Col. 22d Mass. 
 Second Brigade, J. B. Sweitzer, Col. 62d Pa. 
 Third Brigade, Strong Vincent, Col. 83d Pa. 
 Second Division, R. B. Ayres, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, Hannibal Day, Col. 6th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, Sidney Burbank, Col. 2d U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, S. H. Weed, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 5th U. S. Art 
 Third Division, S. W. Crawford, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 13th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, William McCandless, Col. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, J. W. Fisher, Col. 5th Pa. 
 
 Sixth Corps, JOHN SEDGWICK, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 First Division, H. G. Wright, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Maj. U. S. Eng. 
 First Brigade, A. T. A. Torbert, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 5th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, J. J. Bartlett, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, D. A. Russell, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 8th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Division, A. P. Howe, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Art. 
 Second Brigade, L. A. Grant, Col. 5th Vermont. 
 Third Brigade, T. H. Neill, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 5th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Division, John Newton, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Maj. U. S. Eng. 
 First Brigade, Alexander Shaler, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, H. L. Eustis, Col. 10th Mass. 
 Third Brigade, Frank Wheaton, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 
 Eleventh Corps, O. O. HOWARD, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Division, F. C. Barlow, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Leopold von Gilsa, Col. Vols. 
 
 Second Brigade, Adelbert Ames, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 1st Lt. 5th U. S. Art. 
 Second Division, Adolph von Steinwehr, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, C. R. Coster, Col. 134th N. Y., 
 
 Capt. 12th U. S. Inf. 
 
 Second Brigade, Orland Smith, Col. 73d Ohio. 
 Third Division, Carl Schurz, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Alex. Schimmelfennig, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Second Brigade, Wladimir Krzyzanowski, Col. 58th N. Y. 
 Twelfth Corps, H. W. SLOCUM, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, A. S. Williams, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, A. L. McDougall, Col. Vols. 
 
 Second Brigade, H. H. Lockwood, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Third Brigade, T. H. Ruger, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Division, J. W. Geary, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Charles Candy, Col. 66th Ohio. 
 
 Second Brigade, G. A. Cobham, Col. 111th Pa. 
 
 Cavalry Corps, ALFRED PLEASONTON, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 2d U. S. Cav. 
 First Division, John Buford, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. A. I. G, U. S. A. 
 First Brigade, William Gamble, Col. 8th 111. Cav. 
 Second Brigade, T. C. Devin, Col. 6th N. Y. Cav. 
 
652 Appendix. 
 
 Reserve Brigade, Wesley Merritt, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 2d U. S. Cav. 
 Second Division, D. McM. Gregg, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 6th U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, J. B. Mcintosh, Col. 3rd Pa. Cav., 
 
 1st Lt. Sth U. S. Cav. 
 Second Brigade, Pennock Huey, Col. Vols., 
 Third Brigade, J. I. Gregg, Col. 16th Pa. Cav., 
 
 Capt. 6th U. S. Cav. 
 Third Division, Judson Kilpatrick, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 - 1st Lt. 1st U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, E. J. Farnsworth, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, G. A. Custer, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 1st Lt. 5th U. S. Cav. 
 Artillery, H. J. HUNT, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Maj. 5th U. S. Art. 
 
 Confederate Forces. 
 
 Army of Northern Virginia, R. E. LEE, General. 
 
 First Corps, JAMES LONGSTREET, Lieut.-Gen. 
 
 McLaws's Division, Lafayette McLaws, Maj. -Gen. 
 
 Kershaw's Brigade, J. B. Kershaw, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Semmes's Brigade, P. J. Semmes, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Barksdale's Brigade, William Barksdale, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 IVofford's Brigade, W. T. Wofford, Brig.-Gen. 
 Pickett's Division, G. E. Pickett, Maj. -Gen. 
 
 Gamett's Brigade, R. B. Garnett, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Armistead's Brigade, L. A. Armistead, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Kemper's Brigade, J. L. Kemper, Brig.-Gen. 
 Hood's Division, J. B. Hood, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Law's Brigade, E. Mel. Law, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Anderson's Brigade, G. T. Anderson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Robertson's Brigade, J. B. Robertson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Benning's Brigade, H. L. Benning, Brig.-Gen. 
 Second Corps, R. S. EWELL, Lieut.-Gen. 
 
 Early's Division, J. A. Early, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Hays's Brigade, H. T. Hays, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Hoke's Brigade, I. E. Avery, Col. 
 
 Smith's Brigade, William Smith, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Gordon's Brigade, John B. Gordon, Brig.-Gen. 
 Johnson's Division, Edward Johnson, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Steuart's Brigade, G. H. Steuart, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Nicholl's Brigade, J. M. Williams, Col. 
 
 Stonewall Brigade, J. A. Walker, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Jones's Brigade, J. M. Jones, Brig.-Gen. 
 Rodes's Division, R. E. Rodes, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Daniel's Brigade, Junius Daniel, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Iverson's Brigade, Alfred Iverson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Doles's Brigade, George Doles, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Ramseur's Brigade, S. D. Ramseur, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 O'Neal's Brigade, E. A. O'Neal, Col. 
 Third Corps, A. P. HILL, Lieut.-Gen. 
 
 Anderson's Division, R. H. Anderson, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Wilcox's Brigade, C. M. Wilcox, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Mahone's Brigade, William Mahone, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Wright's Brigade, A. R. Wright, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Perry's Brigade, David Lang, Col. 
 
 Posey's Brigade, Carnot Posey, Brig.-Gen. 
 
Appendix. 653 
 
 Heth's Division, Henry Heth, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, J. J. Pettigrew, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Second Brigade, J. M. Brockenbrough, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Brigade, J. J. Archer, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, J. R. Davis, Brig.-Gen. 
 Pender's Division, W. D. Pender, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, Abner Perrin, Col. 
 
 Second Brigade, J. H. Lane, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Brigade, E. L. Thomas, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, A. M. Scales, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Cavalry, J. E. B. STUART, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Fitzhugh Lee's Brigade, Fitzhugh Lee, Brig.-Gen. 
 Hampton's Brigade, Wade Hampton, Brig.-Gen. 
 W. H. F. Lee's Brigade, J. R. Chambliss, Col. 
 Jenkins's Brigade, A. G. Jenkins, Brig.-Gen. 
 Robertson's Brigade, B. H. Robertson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Imboden's Brigade, J. D. Imboden, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN. 
 
 May 1— July 4, 1863. 
 
 Union Forces. 
 
 Army of the Tennessee, U. S. GRANT, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Ninth Corps (joined June 14-17), J. G. PARKE, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. U. S. Eng. 
 First Division, Thomas Welsh, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Henry Bowman, Col. 36th Mass. 
 Third Brigade, Daniel Leasure, Col. Vols. 
 Second Division, R. B. Potter, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, S. G. Griffin, Col. 6th N. H. 
 Second Brigade, Edward Ferrero, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, B. C. Christ, Col. SOth Pa. 
 
 Thirteenth Corps, J. A. McCLERNAND, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 E. O. C. ORD, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Maj. 4th U. S. Art. 
 Ninth Division, P. J. Osterhaus, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 A. L. Lee, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, T. T. Garrard, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 A. L. Lee, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 James Keigwin, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, L. A. Sheldon, Col. 42d Ohio. 
 D. W. Lindsey, Col. Vols. 
 Tenth Division, A. J. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Maj. 1st U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, S. G. Burbridge, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, W. J. Landram, Col. 19th Ky. 
 Twelfth Division, A. P. Hovey, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, G. F. McGinnis, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, J. R. Slack, Col. 47th Ind. 
 Fourteenth Division, E. A. Carr, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, W. P. Benton, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 H. D. Washburn, Col. 18th Ind. 
 David Shunk, Col. 8th Ind. 
 Second Brigade, C. H. Harris, Col. 11th Wis. 
 W. M. Stone, Col. 22d Iowa. 
 M. K. Lawler, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
654 Appendix. 
 
 Fifteenth Corps, W. T. SHERMAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 13th U. S. Inf. 
 First Division, Frederick Steele, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 11th Inf. 
 First Brigade, F. H. Manter, Col. Vols. 
 
 B. G. Farrar, Col. 30th Mo. 
 Second Brigade, C. R. Woods, Col. 76th Ohio, 
 
 Capt. 9th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, J. M. Thayer, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Division, F. P. Blair, Jr., Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, G. A. Smith, Col. Vols. 
 
 J. A. G. Lightburn, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, T. K. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, Hugh Ewing, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Division, J. M. Tuttle, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, R. P. Buckland, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 W. L. McMillen, Col. 95th Ohio. 
 
 Second Brigade, J. A. Mower, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 1st U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, C. L. Matthies, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 J. J. Woods, Col. Vols. 
 
 Sixteenth Corps, C. C. WASHBURN, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Division, W. S. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, J. M. Loomis, Col. Vols. 
 
 Second Brigade, S. G. Hicks, Col. Vols. 
 
 Third Brigade, J. R. Cockerill, Col. 70th Ohio. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, W. W. Sanford, Col. Vols. 
 Fourth Division, J. C. Lauman, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, I. C. Pugh, Col. 41st 111. 
 
 Second Brigade, Cyrus Hall, Col. 14th 111. 
 
 Third Brigade, G. E. Bryant, Col. Vols. 
 A. K. Johnson, Col. Vols. 
 Provisional Division, Nathan Kimball, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Engleman's Brigade, Adolph Engleman, Col. 43d 111. 
 
 Richmond's Brigade, Jonathan Richmond, Col. Vols. 
 
 Montgomery's Brigade, Milton Montgomery, Col. 25th Wis. 
 
 Seventeenth Corps, J. B. McPHERSON, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. U. S. Eng. 
 Third Division, J. A. Logan, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, J. E. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 M. D. Leggett, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Elias S. Dennis, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 M. F. Force, Col. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, J. D. Stevenson, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Sixth Division, John McArthur, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, H. T. Reed, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, T. E. G. Ransom, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, William Hall, Col. Vols. 
 John Shane, Col. Vols. 
 Seventh Division, M. M. Crocker, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 I. F. QuiNBY,.Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 J. E. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols. . 
 First Brigade, J. B. Sanborn, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, S. A. Holmes, Col. Vols. 
 G. B. Raum, Col. 56th 111. 
 Third Brigade, G. B. Boomer, Col. Vols. 
 
 Holden Putnam, Col. Vols. 
 
 C. L. Matthies, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
Appendix. 655 
 
 Herron's Division, F. J. Herron, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, William Vandever, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, W. W. Orme, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Confederate Forces. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, Lieut-Gen. 
 
 First Division, W. W. Loring, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, Lloyd Tilghman, Brig.-Gen. 
 A. E. Reynolds, Col. 
 
 Second Brigade, W. S. Featherston, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Brigade, Abram Buford, Brig.-Gen. 
 Stevenson's Division, C. L. Stevenson, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, S. M. Barton, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Second Brigade, E. D. Tracy, Brig.-Gen. 
 I. W. Garrott, Col. 
 S. D. Lee, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Brigade, Alfred Cumming, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, A. W. Reynolds, Col. 
 
 Texas Legion, T. Waul, Col. 
 Forney's Division, J. H. Forney, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Herbert's Brigade, Louis Herbert, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Moore's Brigade, J. C. Moore, Brig.-Gen. 
 Smith's Division, M. L. Smith, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, W. E. Baldwin, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Vaughn's Brigade, J. C. Vaughn, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Third Brigade, F. A. Shoup, Brig.-Gen. 
 Bowen's Division, J. S. Bowen, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, F. M. Cockrell, Col. 
 
 Second Brigade, M. E. Green, Brig.-Gen. 
 T. P. Dockery, Col. 
 
 Johnston's Forces. 
 
 JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, General. 
 (Engaged at Raymond and Jackson only.) 
 
 Gregg's Brigade, John Gregg, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Crisfs Brigade, P. H. Colquitt, Col. 
 
 Walker's Brigade, W. H. T. Walker, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 
 
 September 19-20, 1863. 
 
 Union Forces. 
 
 Army of the Cumberland, W. S. ROSECRANS, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 G. H. THOMAS, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. Sth U. S. Cav. 
 First Division, Absalom Baird, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. A. I. G., U. S. A. 
 First Brigade, B. F. Scribner, Col. 38th Ind. 
 Second brigade, J. C. Starkweather, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, J. H. King, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
656 Appendix. 
 
 Second Division, J. S. Negley, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, John Beatty, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, T. R. Stanley, Col. 18th Ohio. 
 
 W. L. Stoughton, Col. 11th Mich. 
 Third Brigade, William Sirwell, Col. Vols. 
 Third Division, J. M. Brannan, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 1st U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, J. M. Connell, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, J. T. Croxton, Col. 4th Ky. M't'd Inf. 
 
 W. H. Hays, Col. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, F. Van Derveer, Col. 35th Ohio. 
 Fourth Division, J. J. Reynolds, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, J. T. Wilder, Col. 17th Ind. 
 
 (Mounted and detached.) 
 Second Brigade, E. A. King, Col. 6th U. S. Inf. 
 M. S. Robinson, Col. 75th Ind. 
 Third Brigade, J. B. Turchin, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Twentieth Corps, A. McD. McCOOK, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 3d U. S. Inf. 
 First Division, J. C. Davis, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 1st U. S. Art. 
 Second Brigade, W. P. Carlin, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 6th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, H. C. Heg, Col. Vols. 
 
 J. A. Martin, Col. 8th Kans. 
 Second Division, R. W. Johnson, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, August Willich, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, J. B. Dodge, Col. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, P. P. Baldwin, Col. Vols. 
 W. W. Berry, Col. Vols. 
 Third Division, P. H. Sheridan, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 13th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, W. H. Lytle, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Silas Miller, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Bernard Laiboldt, Col. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, L. P. Bradley, Col. 51st 111. 
 N. H. Walworth, Col. Vols. 
 Twenty- first Corps, T. L. CRITTENDEN, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, T. J. Wood, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 2d U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, G. P. Buell, Col. 58th Ind. 
 Third Brigade, C. G. Harker, Col. 65th Ohio, 
 
 Capt. 15th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Division, J. M. Palmer, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Charles Cruft, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, W. B. Hazen, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 8th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, William Grose, Col. 36th Ind. 
 Third Division, H. P. Van Cleve, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, Samuel Beatty, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, G. F. Dick, Col. 86th Ind. 
 Third Brigade, S. M. Barnes, Col. Vols. 
 Reserve Corps, GORDON GRANGER, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 3d U. S. Cav. 
 First Division, J. B. Steedman, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, W. C. Whitaker, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, J. G. Mitchell, Col. 113th Ohio. 
 
Appendix. 657 
 
 Second Division. 
 
 Second Brigade, Daniel McCook, Col. 52d Ohio. 
 Cavalry Corps, R. B. MITCHELL, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Division, E. M. McCook, Col. 2d Ind. Cav. 
 First Brigade, A. P. Campbell, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, D. M. Ray, Col. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, L. D. Watkins, Col. 6th Ky. Cav., 
 
 Capt. Sth U. S. Cav. 
 Second Division, George , Crook, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, R. H. G. Minty, Col. 4th Mich. Cav. 
 Second Brigade, Eli Long, Col. 4th Ohio Cav., 
 
 Capt. 1st U. S. Cav. 
 
 Confederate Forces. 
 
 Army of Tennessee, BRAXTON BRAGG, General. 
 
 Right Wing, Leonidas Polk, Lieut-Gen. 
 
 {Polk's Corps.) 
 
 Cheatham's Division, B. F. Cheatham, Maj.-Gen. 
 Jackson's Brigade, J. K. Jackson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Money's Brigade, George Maney, Brig.-Gen. 
 Smith's Brigade, Preston Smith, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 A. J. Vaughan, Jr., Col. 
 Wright's Brigade, M. J. Wright, Brig.-Gen. 
 Strahl's Brigade, O. F. Strahl, Brig.-Gen. 
 Hill's Corps, D. H. HILL, Lieut.-Gen. 
 
 Cleburne's Division, P. R. Cleburne, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Wood's Brigade, S. A. M. Wood, Brig.-Gen. 
 Polk's Brigade, L E. Polk, Brig.-Gen. 
 Deshler's Brigade, James Deshler, Brig.-Gen. 
 R. Q. Mills, Col. 
 Breckinridge's Division, J. C. Breckinridge, Maj.-Gen. 
 Helm's Brigade, B. H. Helm, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 J. H. Lewis, Col. 
 Adams's Brigade, D. W. Adams, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 R. L. Gibson. Col. 
 Stovall's Brigade, M. A. Stovall, Brig.-Gen. 
 Reserve Corps, W. H. T. WALKER, Maj.-Gen. 
 Walker's Division, S. R. Gist, Brig.-Gen. 
 Gist's Brigade, S. R. Gist, Brig.-Gen. 
 P. H. Colquitt, Col. 
 L. Napier, Lt.-Col. 
 Ector's Brigade, M. D. Ector, Brig.-Gen. 
 Wilson's Brigade, C. C. Wilson, Col. 
 Liddell's Division, St. J. R. Liddell, Brig.-Gen. 
 Liddell's Brigade, D. C. Govan. 
 Walthall's Brigade, E. C. Walthall, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Left Wing, James Longsteeet, Lieut.-Gen. 
 
 {Polk's Corps.) 
 
 Hindman's Division, T. C. Hindman, Maj.-Gen. 
 J. P. Anderson. Brig.-Gen. 
 Anderson's Brigade, J. P. Anderson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 J. H. Sharp, Col. 
 Deas's Brigade, Z. C. Deas, Brig.-Gen. 
 Mauigault's Brigade, A. M. Manigault, Brig.-Gen. 
 
658 Appendix. 
 
 Buckner's Corps, S. B. BUCKNER, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Stewart's Division, A. P. Stewart, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Johnson's Brigade, B. R. Johnson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Brown's Brigade, J. C. Brown, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 E. C. Cook, Col. 
 Bate's Brigade, W. B. Bate, Brig.-Gen. 
 Clayton's Brigade, H. D. Clayton, Brig.-Gen. 
 Preston's Division, Wm. Preston, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Grade's Brigade, Archibald Grade, Jr., Brig.-Gen. 
 Trigg's Brigade, R. C. Trigg, Brig.-Gen. 
 Kelly's Brigade, J. H. Kelly, Col. 
 Johnson's Division, B. R. Johnson. 
 
 Gregg's Brigade, John Gregg, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 C. A. Sugg Col. 
 McNair's Brigade, E. McNair, Brig.-Gen. 
 D. Coleman, Col. 
 -Longstreet's Corps, J. B. HOOD, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 McLaws's Division, Lafayette McLaws, Maj.-Gen. 
 Kershawts Brigade, J. B. Kershaw, Brig.-Gen. 
 Humphreys 's Brigade, B. G. Humphreys, Brig.-Gen. 
 Hood's Division, J. B. Hood, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 E. Mel. Law, Brig.-Gen. 
 Jenkins's Brigade, Micah Jenkins, Brig.-Gen. 
 Law's Brigade, E. Mel. Law, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 J. L. Sheffield, Col. 
 Robertson's Brigade, J. B. Robertson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Van. H. Manning, Col. 
 Anderson's Brigade, G. T. Anderson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Benning's Brigade, H. L. Benning, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 ■ Wheeler's Corps, JOSEPH WHEELER, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Wharton's Division, J. A. Wharton, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, C. C. Crews, Col. 
 
 Second Brigade, Thomas Harrison, Col. 
 Martin's Division, W. T. Martin, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, J. T. Morgan, Col. 
 
 Second Brigade, A. A. Russell, Col. 
 
 Roddey's Brigade, P. D. Roddey, Brig.-Gen. 
 Forrest's Corps, N. B. FORREST, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Armstrong's Division, F. C. Armstrong, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Armstrong's Brigade, J. T. Wheeler, Col. 
 
 Forrest's Brigade, G. G. Dibrell, Col. 
 Pegram's Division, John Pegram, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Davidson's Brigade, H. B. Davidson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Scott's Brigade, J. S. Scott, Col. 
 
 THE BATTLES AROUND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 November 23-27, 1863. 
 
 Union Forces, U. S. GRANT, Maj.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 .Army of the Cumberland, G. H. Thomas, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 Fourth Corps, GORDON GRANGER, Maj-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 3d U. S. Cav. 
 First Division, Charles Cruft, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
Appendix. 659 
 
 Second Brigade, W. C. Whitaker, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Briga'de, William Grose, Col. 36th Ind. 
 Second Division, P. H. Sheridan, Maj-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 13th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, F. T. Sherman, Col. 88th 111. 
 Second Brigade, G. D. Wagner, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, C. G. Harker, Col. 65th Ohio, 
 
 Capt. 15th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Division, T. J. Wood, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 2d U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, August Willich, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, W. B. Hazen, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 8th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, Samuel Beatty, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Fourteenth Corps, J. M. PALMER, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, R. W. Johnson, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, W. P. Carlin, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 6th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, M. F. Moore, Col. 69th Ohio. 
 Third Brigade, J. C. Starkweather, Brig.-Gen. 
 Second Division, J. C. Davis, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 1st U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, J. D. Morgan, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, John Beatty, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, Daniel McCook, Col. 52d Ohio. 
 Third Division, Absalom Baird, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. A. I. G., U. S. A. 
 First Brigade, J. B. Turchin, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, F. Van Derveer, Col. 35th Ohio. 
 Third Brigade, E. H. Phelps, Col. Vols. 
 W. H. Hays, Col. Vols. 
 
 Army of the Tennessee, W. T. Sherman, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 Brig.-Gen. U.S.A. 
 
 Fifteenth Corps, F. P. BLAIR, Jr., Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, P. J. Osterhaus, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, C. R. Woods, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 9th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, J. A. Williamson, Col. 4th Iowa. 
 Second Division, M. L. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, G. A. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 N. W. Tupper, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, J. A. J. Lightbum, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Fourth Division, Hugh Ewing, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, J. M. Loomis, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, J. M. Corse, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 C. C. Walcutt, Col. 46th Ohio. 
 Third Brigade, J. R. Cockerill, Col. 70th Ohio. 
 Seventeenth Corps. 
 
 Second Division, J. E. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, J. I. Alexander, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, G. B. Raum, Col. 56th 111. 
 F. C. Deimling, Col. 
 C. R. Wever, Col. 17th Iowa. 
 Third Brigade, C. L. Matthies, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 B. D. Dean, Col. Vols. 
 Jabez Banbury, Col. Vols. 
 
660 Appendix. 
 
 Army of the Potomac. 
 
 Eleventh Corps, O. O. HOWARD, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Second Division, A. von Steinwehr, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, Adolphus Buschbeck, Col. 
 Second Brigade, Orland Smith, Col. 73d Ohio. 
 Third Division, Carl Schurz, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Hector Tyndale, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Wladimir Krzyzanowski, Col. 58th N. Y_ 
 Third Brigade, Frederick Hecker, Col. Vols. 
 Twelfth Corps, JOSEPH HOOKER, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Division, J. W. Geary, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Charles Candy, Col. 66th Ohio. 
 W. R. Creighton, Col. Vols. 
 T. J. Ahl, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, G. A. Cobham, Jr., Col. 111th Pa. 
 Third Brigade, David Ireland, Col. 137th N. Y. 
 Cavalry, Second Brigade (Second Division), ELI LONG, 
 
 Col. 4th Ohio Cav., Capt. 4th U. S. Cav_ 
 Artillery Reserve, J. M. BRANNAN, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 1st U. S. Art.. 
 Engineers, W. F. SMITH, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Maj. U. S. Eng. 
 
 Confederate Forces, BRAXTON BRAGG, General. 
 
 Hardee's Corps, W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-Gen. 
 
 Cheatham's Division, J. K. Jackson, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Jackson's Brigade, C. J. Wilkinson, Col. 
 
 Walthall's Brigade, E. C. Walthall, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Moore's Brigade, J. C. Moore, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Wright's Brigade, M. J. Wright, Brig.-Gen. 
 J. H. Anderson, Col. 
 Stevenson's Division, C. L. Stevenson, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Brown's Brigade, J. C. Brown, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Pettus's Brigade, E. W. Pettus, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Cumming's Brigade, Alfred Cumming, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Reynolds's Brigade, A. W. Reynolds, Brig.-Gen. 
 Cleburne's Division, P. R. Cleburne, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Lowrey's Brigade, M. P. Lowrey, Brig.-Gen. ' 
 
 Polk's Brigade, L. E. Polk, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Liddell's Brigade, D. C. Govan, Col. 
 
 Smith's Brigade, H. A. Granburry, Col. 
 Walker's Division, S. R. Gist, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Gist's Brigade. 
 
 Wilson's Brigade, C. C. Wilson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Maney's Brigade, G. E. Maney, Brig.-Gen. 
 Breckinridge's Corps, J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, Maj-Gen. 
 Hindman's Division, J. P. Anderson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Anderson's Brigade, W. F. Tucker, Col. 
 
 Manigault's Brigade, A. M. Manigault, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Deas's Brigade, Z. C. Deas, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Vaughan's Brigade, A. J. Vaughan, Brig.-Gen. 
 Breckinridge's Division, W. B. Bate, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Bate's Brigade, R. C. Tyler, Col. 
 A. F. Rudler, Col. 
 J. J. Turner, Lt.-Col. 
 
Appendix. 661 
 
 Lewis's Brigade, J. H. Lewis, Brig.-Gen. 
 Finley's Brigade, J. J. Finley, Brig.-Gen. 
 Stewart's Division, A. P. Stewart, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Stovall's Brigade, M. A. Stovall, Brig.-Gen. 
 Strahl's Brigade, O. F. Strahl, Brig.-Gen. 
 Clayton's Brigade, J. T. Holtzclaw, Col. 
 Adams's Brigade, R. L. Gibson, Col. 
 
 BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 May 5-6, 1864, and 
 SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 
 
 May 8-21, 1864. 
 
 Union Forces, U. S. GRANT, Lt.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 Army of the Potomac, G. G. Meade, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 Second Corps, W. S. HANCOCK, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. Q. M., U. S. A. 
 First Division, F. C. Barlow, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, N. A. Miles, Col. 61st N. Y. 
 Second Brigade, T. A. Smyth, Col. 1st Del. 
 Third Brigade, Paul Frank, Col. S2d N. Y. 
 Fourth Brigade, J. R. Brooke, Col. 53d Pa. 
 Second Division, John Gibbon, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, A. S. Webb., Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 11th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, J. T. Owen, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, S. S. Carroll, Col. 8th Ohio, 
 
 Capt. 10th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Division, D. B. Birney, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, J. H. H. Ward, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Alexander Hays, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 16th U. S. Inf. 
 Fourth Division, Gershom Mott, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Robert McAllister, Col. 11th N. J. 
 Second Brigade, W. R. Brewster, Col. 73d N. Y. 
 Fifth Corps, G. K. WARREN, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Capt. U. S. Eng. 
 First Division, Charles Griffin, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. Sth U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, R. B. Ayres, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. Sth U. S. Art. 
 Second Brigade, J. B. Sweitzer, Col. 62d Pa. 
 Third Brigade, J. J. Bartlett, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Division, J. C. Robinson, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 2d U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, S. H. Leonard, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Henry Baxter, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, A. W. Denison, Col. 8th Md. 
 
662 Appendix. 
 
 Third Division, S. W. Crawford, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 13th IT. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, Wm. McCandless, Col. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, J. W. Fisher, Col. Sth Pa. 
 Fourth Division, J. S. Wadsworth, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, Lysander Cutler, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, J. C. Rice, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, Roy Stone, Col. 149th Pa. 
 Sixth Corps, JOHN SEDGWICK, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Col. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 H. G. WRIGHT, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Maj. U. S. Eng. 
 First Division, H. G. Wright, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, H. W. Brown, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Emory Upton, Col. 121st N. Y., 
 
 1st Lt. 5th U. S. Art. 
 Third Brigade, D. A. Russell, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 8th U. S. Inf. 
 Fourth Brigade, Alexander Shaler, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Division, G. W. Getty, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. Sth U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, Frank Wheaton, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 2d U. S. Cav. 
 Second Brigade, L. A. Grant, Col. Sth Vermont. 
 Third Brigade, T. H. Neill, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 11th U. S. Inf. 
 Fourth Brigade, H. L. Eustis, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Division, J. B. Ricketts, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 1st U. S. Art. 
 First Brigade, W. H. Morris, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Truman Seymour, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. Sth U. S. Art. 
 Ninth Corps, A. E. BURNSIDE, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, T. G. Stevenson, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, Sumner Carruth, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, Daniel Leasure, Col. Vols. 
 Second Division, R. B. Potter, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, Z. R. Bliss, Col. 7th R. I., 
 
 Capt. 8th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, S. G. Griffin, Col. 6th N. H. 
 Third Division,^ O. B. Willcox, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, J. F. Hartranft, Col. Slst Pa. 
 Second Brigade, B. C. Christ, Col. 50th Pa. 
 Fourth Division, Edward Feerero, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, J. K. Sigfried, Col. 48th Pa. 
 Second Brigade, H. G. Thomas, Col. 79th U. S. Col. Inf. 
 Cavalry Corps, P. H. SHERIDAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 13th U. S. Inf. 
 First Division, A. T. A. Torbert, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. Sth U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, G. A. Guster, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. Sth U. S. Cav. 
 Second Brigade, T. C. Devin, Col. 6th N. Y. Cav. 
 Reserve Brigade, Wesley Merritt, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 2d U. S. Cav. 
 Second Division, D. McM. Gregg, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 6th U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, H. E. Davies, Jr., Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
Appendix. 663 
 
 Second Brigade, J. I. Gregg, Col. 16th Pa. Cav., 
 
 Capt. 6th U. S. Cav. 
 Third Division, J. H. Wilson, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. U. S. Eng. 
 First Brigade, T. M. Bryan, Jr., Col. 18th Pa. Cav. 
 Second Brigade, G. H. Chapman, Col. 3d Ind. Cav. 
 Artillery, H. J. HUNT, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Lt.-Col. 3d U. S. Art. 
 
 Confederate Forces. 
 
 Army of Northern Virginia, R. E. LEE, General. 
 
 First Corps, JAMES LONGSTREET, Lieut.-Gen. 
 
 R. H. ANDERSON. Maj.-Gen. 
 Kershaw's Division, J. B. Kershaw, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Kershaw's Brigade, J. W. Henagan, Col. 
 
 Humphreys's Brigade, B. G. Humphreys, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Wofford's Brigade, W. T. Wofford, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Bryan's Brigade, Goode Bryan, Brig.-Gen. 
 Field's Division, C. W. Field, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Jenkins's Brigade, Micah Jenkins, "Brig.-Gen. 
 (Killed at the Wilderness.) 
 
 Anderson's Brigade, G. T. Anderson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Law's Brigade, E. Mel. Law, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Gregg's Brigade, John Gregg, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Benning's Brigade, H. L. Benning, Brig.-Gen. 
 Artillery, E. P. Alexander, Brig.-Gen. 
 Second Corps, R. S. EWELL, Lieut.-Gen. 
 J. A. EARLY, Maj.-Gen. 
 Early's Division, J. A. Early, Maj. Gen. 
 
 Hays's Brigade, H. T. Hays, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Pegram's Brigade, John Pegram, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Gordon's Brigade, John B. Gordon, Brig.-Gen. 
 Johnson's Division, Edward Johnson, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Stonewall Brigade, J. A. Walker, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Steuart's Brigade, G. H. Steuart, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Jones's Brigade, J. M. Jones, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Stafford's Brigade, L. A. Stafford, Brig.-Gen. 
 Rodes's Division, R. E. Rodes, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Daniel's Brigade, Junius Daniel, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Ramseur's Brigade, S. D. Ramseur, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Doles's Brigade, George Doles, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Battle's Brigade, C. A. Battle, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Johnston's Brigade, R. D. Johnston, Brig.-Gen. 
 Artillery, A. L. Long, Brig.-Gen. 
 Third Corps, A. P. HILL, Lieut.-Gen. 
 
 Anderson's Division, R. H. Anderson, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Perrin's Brigade, Abner Perrin, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Mahone's Brigade, William Mahone, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Harris's Brigade, N. H. Harris, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Wright's Brigade. A. R. Wright, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Perry's Brigade, E. A. Perry, Brig.-Gen. 
 Heth's Division, Henry Heth, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Dai'is's Brigade, J. R. Davis, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Cooke's Brigade, J. R. Cooke, Brig.-Gen. 
 
664 Appendix. 
 
 Kirkland's Brigade, W. W. Kirkland, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Walker's Brigade, H. W. Walker, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Archer's Brigade, J. J. Archer, Brig.-Gen. 
 Wilcox's Division, C. M. Wilcox, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Lane's Brigade, J. H. Lane, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Scale's Brigade, A. M. Scales, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 McGowuris Brigade, Samuel McGowan, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Thomas's Brigade, E. L. Thomas, Brig.-Gen. 
 Artillery, R. L. Walker, Col. 
 Cavalry Corps, J. E. B. STUART, Maj.-Gen. 
 Hampton's Division, Wade Hampton. 
 
 Young's Brigade, P. M. B. Young, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Rosser's Brigade, T. L. Rosser, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Butler's Brigade, M. C. Butler, Brig.-Gen. 
 Fits-Lee's Division, Fitzhugh Lee, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Lomax's Brigade* L. L. Lomax, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Wickham's Brigade, W. C. Wickham, Brig.-Gen. 
 W. H. F. Lee's Division, W. H. F. Lee, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Chambliss's Brigade, J. R. Chambliss, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Gordon's Brigade, James B. Gordon, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 
 
 May 3— September 8, 1864. 
 
 Union Forces, W. T. SHERMAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 Army of the Cumberland, G. H. Thomas, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 Fourth Corps, O. O. HOWARD, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 D. S. STANLEY, Maj.-Gen. Vols., Maj. Sth U. S. Cav. 
 First Division, D. S. Stanley, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. Sth U. S. Cav. 
 William Grose, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Nathan Kimball, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, Charles Cruft, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 I. M. Kirby, Col. 101st Ohio. 
 Second Brigade, W. C. Whitaker, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 J. E. Taylor, Col. 40th Ohio. 
 Third Brigade, Wm. Grose, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 P. S. Post, Col. 59th 111. 
 J. E. Bennett, Col. 75th 111. 
 Second Division, John Newton, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Maj. U. S. Eng. 
 First Brigade, F. T. Sherman, Col. 88th 111. 
 
 Nathan Kimball, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Emerson Opdycke, Col. 125th Ohio. 
 Second Brigade, G. D. Wagner, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, C. G. Harker, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 15th U. S. Inf. 
 L. P. Bradley, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Division, T. J. Wood, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 2d U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, August Willich, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 W. H. Gibson, Col. 49th Ohio. 
 R. H. Nodine, Col. Vols. 
 C. T. Hotchkiss, Col. 89th 111. 
 
Appendix. 665 
 
 Second Brigade, W. B. Hazen, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 8th U. S. Inf. 
 O. H. Payne, Col. 124th Ohio. 
 P. S. Post, Col. 59th 111. 
 Third Brigade, Samuel Beatty, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Frederick Knefler, Col. 79th Ind. 
 fourteenth Corps, J. M. PALMER, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 R. W. JOHNSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 J. C. DAVIS, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 1st U. S. Art. 
 First Division, R. W. Johnson, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 J. H. King, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Lt.-Col. 14th U. S. Inf. 
 W. P. Carlin, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 16th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, W. P. Carlin, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 16th U. S. Inf. 
 A. G. McCook, Col. 2d Ohio. 
 M. C. Taylor, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, J. H. King, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Lt.-Col. 14th U. S. Inf. 
 W. L. Stoughton, Col. 11th Mich. 
 M. F. Moore, Col. 69th Ohio. 
 J. R. Edie, Maj.. 15th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, B. F. Scribner, Col. 38th Ind . 
 Josiah Given, Col. 74th Ohio. 
 M. F. Moore, Col. 69th Ohio. 
 Second Division, J. C. Davis, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. 1st U. S. Art. 
 J. D. Morgan, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, J. D. Morgan, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 R. F. Smith, Col. 16th 111. 
 C. M. Lum, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, J. G. Mitchell, Col. 113th Ohio. 
 Third Brigade, Daniel McCook, Col. 52d Ohio. 
 O. F. Harmon, Col. Vols. 
 C. J. Dilworth, Col. 85th 111. 
 J. W. Langley, Lt.-Col. Vols. 
 Third Division, Arsalom Baird, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. A. I. G, U. S. A. 
 First Brigade, J. B. Turchin, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 M. B. Walker, Col. 31st Ohio, 
 
 Capt. 12th U. S. Inf. 
 Second Brigade, F. Van Derveer, Col. 35th Ohio. 
 
 Newell Gleason, Col. 87th Ind. 
 Third Brigade, G. P. Este, Col. 14th Ohio. 
 Twentieth Corps, JOSEPH HOOKER, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 A. S. WILLIAMS, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 H. W. SLOCUM, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Division, A. S. Williams, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 J. F. Knipe, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, J. F. Knipe, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 W. W. Packer, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, T. H. Ruger, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, J. S. Robinson, Col. 82d Ohio. 
 
 Horace Boughton, Col. 143d N. Y. 
 
666 Appendix. 
 
 Second Division, J. W. Geary, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, Charles Candy, Col. 66th Ohio. 
 
 Ario Pardee, Col. 147th Pa. 
 Second Brigade, Adolphus Buschbeck, Col. Vols. 
 J. T. Lockman, Col. 119th N. Y. 
 P. H. Jones, Col. 154th N. Y. 
 G. W. Mindil, Col. 33d N. J. 
 Third Brigade, David Ireland, Col. 137th N. Y. 
 Wm. Rickards, Col. Vols. 
 G. A. Cobham, Col. 111th Pa. 
 Third Division, Daniel Butterfield, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Col. 5th U. S. Inf. 
 W. T. Ward, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, W. T. Ward, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Benjamin Harrison, Col. 70th Ind. 
 Second Brigade, Samuel Ross, Col. 20th Conn., 
 
 Capt. 14th U. S. Inf. 
 John Coburn, Col. 33d Ind. 
 Third Brigade, James Wood, Jr., Col. 136th N. Y. 
 Cavalry Corps, W. D. ELLIOTT, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Division, E. M. McCook, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 1st Lt. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, J. B. Dorr, Col. Vols. 
 
 J. T. Croxton, Col. 4th Ky. M't'd Inf. 
 J. P. Brownlow, Lt.^Col. 1st Tenn. Cav. 
 Second Brigade, O. H. LaGrange, Col. 1st Wis. Cav. 
 J. S. Stewart, Lt.-Col. Vols. 
 H. P. Lamson, Lt.-Col. Vols. 
 W. H. Torrey, Lt.-Col. Vols. 
 Second Division, Kenner Garrard, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 3d U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, R. H. G. Minty, Col. 4th Mich. Cav. 
 Second Brigade, Eli Long, Col. 4th Ohio Cav., 
 
 Capt. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 B. B. Eggleston, Col. 1st Ohio Cav. 
 Third Brigade (mounted inf.), J. T. Wilder, Col. 17th Ind. 
 
 A. O. Miller, Col. 72d Ind.. 
 Third Division, Judson Kilpatrick, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 1st Lieut. 1st U. S. Art.. 
 E. H. Murray, Col. 3d Ky. Cav. 
 W. W. Lowe, Col. 5th Iowa Cav., 
 
 Capt. 5th U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, Robert Klein, Lt.-Col. Vols. 
 
 M. T. Patrick, Lt.-Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, C. C. Smith, Col. Vols. 
 
 T. W. Sanderson, Maj. 10th Ohio Cav. 
 F. A. Jones, Lt.-Col. 8th Ind. Cav. 
 Third Brigade, E. H. Murray, Col. 3d Ky. Cav. 
 S. D. Atkins, Col. 92d 111. 
 
 Army of the Tennessee, T- B. McPherson, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 T. A. Logan, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 O. O. Howard, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Fifteenth Corps, T. A. LOGAN, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 M. L. SMITH, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
Appendix. 667 
 
 First Division, P. J. Osterhaus, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 C. R. Woods, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Maj. 18th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, C. R. Woods, Bfig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 18th U. S. Inf. 
 Milo Smith, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, J. A. Williamson, Col. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, Hugo Wangelin, Col. 12th Mo. 
 Second Division, M. L. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 J. A. J. Lightburn, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 W. B. Hazen, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Capt. 8th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, G. A. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 J. S. Martin, Col. 111th 111. 
 Theodore Jones, Col. 30th Ohio. 
 Second Brigade, J. A. J. Lighthurn, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 W. S. Jones, Col. 53d Ohio. 
 Fourth Division, Wm. Harrow, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, Reuben Williams, Col. Vols. 
 J. M. Oliver, Col. 15th Mich. 
 Second Brigade, C. C. Walcutt, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, J. M. Oliver, Col. ISth Mich. 
 Sixteenth Corps, G. M. DODGE, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 T. E. G. RANSOM, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Division, T. W. Sweeney, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 E. W. Rice, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 J. M. Corse, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, E. W. Rice, Brig.-Gen. Vols. ' 
 Second Brigade, P. E. Burke, Col. 66th 111. 
 
 R. N. Adams, Lt.-Col. 81st Ohio. 
 August Mersy, Col. 9th 111. 
 J. J. Phillips, Lt.-Col. 9th 111. 
 ' Third Brigade, M. M. Bane, Col. Vols. 
 
 Wm. Vandever, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 H. J. B. Cummings, Col. Vols. 
 Richard Rowett, Col. 7th 111. 
 Fourth Division,'}. C. Veatch, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 J. W. Fuller, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 T. E. G. Ransom, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, J. W. Fuller, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 John Morrill, Col. 64th 111. 
 H. T. McDowell, Lt.-Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, J. W. Sprague, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, W. T. C. Grower, Col. Vols. 
 John Tillson, Col. 10th 111. 
 Seventeenth Corps, F. P. BLAIR, Jr., Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Division, M. D. Leggett, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 C. R. Woods, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 18th U. S. Inf. 
 First Brigade, M. F. Force, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 G. E. Bryant, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, R. K. Scott, Col. 68th Ohio. 
 
 G. F. Wiles, Lt.-Col. 78th Ohio. 
 Third Brigade, A. G. Malloy, Col. 17th Wis. 
 Fourth Division, W. Q. Gresham, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Wm. Hall, Col. Vols. 
 G. A. Smith, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, W. L. Sanderson, Col. Vols. 
 B. F. Potts, Col. 32d Ohio. 
 
•668 Appendix. 
 
 Second Brigade, G. C. Rogers, Col. ISth 111. 
 I. C. Pugh, Col. 41st 111. 
 John Logan, Col. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, William Hall, Col. Vols. 
 John Shane, Col. Vols. 
 W. W. Belknap, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Army of the Ohio, J. M. Schofield, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 Capt. 1st U. S. Art. 
 Twenty-third Corps. 
 
 First Division, A. P. Hovey, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, N. C. McLean, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 J. A. Cooper, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 A. D. Owen, Lt.-Col. Vols. 
 J. W. Tucker, Maj. Vols. 
 Jacob Ragle, Capt. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, M. S. Hascall, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 J. R. Bond, Col. 111th Ohio. 
 W. E. Hobson, Col. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, S. A. Strickland, Col. 50th Ohio. 
 Third Division, J. D. Cox, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, J. W. Reilly, Col. 104th Ohio. 
 
 J. W. Gault, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, M. D. Manson, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 J. S. Hurt, Col. Vols. 
 M. S. Hascall, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 J. S. Casement, Col. 103d Ohio. 
 Daniel Cameron, Col. 65th 111. 
 Third Brigade, N. C. McLean, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 R. K. Byrd, Col. Vols. 
 I. N. Stiles, Col. 63d Ind. 
 Cavalry Division, George Stoneman, Maj.-Gen. Vols.,' 
 
 Maj. 4th U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, Israel Garrard, Col. 7th Ohio Cav. 
 Second Brigade, James Biddle, Col. 6th Ind. Cav. 
 T. H. Butler, Col. 5th Ind. Cav. 
 Third Brigade, Horace Capron, Col. 14th 111. Cav. 
 
 Confederate Forces. 
 
 Army of Tennessee, J. E. JOHNSTON, General. 
 J. B. HOOD, General. 
 
 Hardee's Corps, W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-Gen. 
 P. R. CLEBURNE, Maj.-Gen. 
 Cheatham's Division, B. F. Cheatham, Maj.-Gen. 
 George Maney, Brig.-Gen. 
 J. C. Carter, Brig.-Gen. 
 Maney's Brigade, George Maney, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 G. C. Porter, Col. 
 Wright's Brigade, J. C. Carter, Brig.-Gen. 
 Strahl's Brigade, O. F. Strahl, Brig.-Gen. 
 Vaughan's Brigade, A. J. Vaughan, Jr., 
 M. Magevney, Col. 
 G. W. Gordon, Brig.-Gen. 
 Cleburne's Division, P. R. Cleburne, Maj.-Gen. 
 M. P. Lowrey, Brig.-Gen. 
 Polk's Brigade, L. E. Polk, Brig.-Gen. 
 Lowrey's Brigade, M. P. Lowrey, Brig.-Gen. 
 John Weir, Col. 
 
Appendix. 669' 
 
 Govan's Brigade, D. C. Govan, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 P. V. Green, Col. 
 Granbury's Brigade, H. B. Granbury, Brig.-Gen. 
 J. A. Smith, Brig.-Gen. 
 R. B. Young, Lt.-Col. 
 Walker's Division, W. H. T. Walker, Maj.-Gen. 
 H. W. Mercer, Brig.-Gen. 
 Jackson's Brigade, J. R. Jackson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Gist's Brigade, S. R. Gist, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 James McCullough, Col. 
 Stevens's Brigade, C. H. Stevens, Brig.-Gen. 
 H. R. Jackson, Brig.-Gen. 
 W. D. Mitchell, Col. 
 Mercer's Brigade, H. W. Mercer, Brig.-Gen. 
 W. Barkuloo, Col. 
 M. Rawls, Lt-Col. 
 C. S. Guvton, Col. 
 C. H. Oltnstead, Col. 
 Bate's Division, W. B. Bate, Maj.-Gen. 
 J. C. Brown, Maj.-Gen. 
 Lewis's Brigade, J. H. Lewis, Brig.-Gen. 
 Tyler's (or. Smith's) Brigade, T. B. Smith, Brig.-Gen. 
 Finley's Brigade, J. J. Finley, Brig.-Gen. 
 R. Bullock, Col. 
 Hood's (or Lee's) Corps, J. B. HOOD, Lieut-Gen. 
 
 C. L. STEVENSON, Maj.-Gen. 
 B. F. CHEATHAM, Maj.-Gen. 
 S. D. LEE, Lieut.-Gen. 
 Hindman's Division, T. C. Hindman, Maj.-Gen. 
 J. C. Brown, Brig.-Gen. 
 Patton Anderson, Maj.-Gen. 
 Edward Johnson, Maj.-Gen. 
 Deas's Brigade, Z. C. Deas, Brig.-Gen. 
 J. G. Coltart, Col. 
 G. D. Johnston, Brig.-Gen. 
 H. T. Toulmin, Lt.-Col. 
 Manigault's Brigade, A. M. Manigault, Brig.-Gen. 
 Tucker's (or Sharp's) Brigade, W. F. Tucker, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 J. H. Sharp, Brig.-Gen. 
 Walthall's (or Brantley's) Brigade, E. C. Walthall, 
 
 Brig.-Gen_ 
 Samuel Benton, Col. 
 W. F. Brantley, 
 
 Brig.- Gen _ 
 Stevenson's Division, C. L. Stevenson, Maj.-Gen. 
 Brown's Brigade, J. C. Brown, Brig.-Gen. 
 E. C. Cook, Col. 
 J. B. Palmer, Col. 
 Cumming's Brigade, Alfred Cumming, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 C. M. Shelley, Col. 
 Reynolds's Brigade, A. W. Reynolds, Brig.-Gen. 
 R. C. Trigg, Col. 
 J. B. Palmer, Col. 
 Pettus's Brigade, E. W. Pettus, Brig.-Gen. 
 Stewart's Division, A. P. Stewart, Maj.-Gen. 
 H. D. Clayton, Maj.-Gen. 
 Stovall's Brigade, M. A. Stovall, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Abda Johnson, Col. 
 Clayton's Brigade, H. D. Clayton, Brig.-Gen. 
 J. T. Holtzclaw, Brig.-Gen. 
 Bushrod Jones, Col. 
 
670 Appendix. 
 
 Baker's Brigade, Alpheus Baker, Brig.-Gen. 
 Gibson's Brigade, R. L. Gibson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Cavalry Corps, JOSEPH WHEELER, Maj.-Gen. 
 Martin's Division, W. T. Martin, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Morgan's {or Allen's) Brigade, J. T. Morgan, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 W. W. Allen, Brig.-Gen. 
 Iverson's Brigade, Alfred Iverson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Kelly's Division, J. H. Kelly, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Allen's {or Anderson's) Brigade, W. W. Allen, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 R. H. Anderson, 
 
 Brig.-Gen. 
 Edward Bird, Col. 
 Dibrell's Brigade, G. G Dibrell, Brig.-Gen. 
 Hannon's Brigade, M. W. Hannon, Col. 
 Humes's Division, W. Y. C. Humes, Brig.-Gen. 
 Humes' s Brigade, J. T. Wheeler, Col. 
 
 H. M. Ashby, Col. 
 Harrison's Brigade, Thomas Harrison, Col. 
 Grigsby {pr Williams's) Brigade, J. W. Grigsby, Col. 
 
 J. S. Williams, Br.ig.-Gen. 
 Roddey's Command, P. D. Roddey, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Army of Mississippi. 
 
 Polk's Corps, LEONIDAS POLK, Lieut.-Gen. 
 W. W. LORING. Maj.-Gen. 
 
 A. P. STEWART, Lieut.-Gen. 
 
 B. F. CHEATHAM, Maj.-Gen. 
 Loring's Division, W. W. Loeing, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 W. S. Featherston, Brig.-Gen. 
 Featherston's Brigade, W. S. Featherston, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Robert Lowry, Col. 
 Adams's Brigade, John Adams, Brig.-Gen. 
 Scott's Brigade, T. M. Scott, Brig.-Gen. 
 French's Division, S. G. French, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Ector's Brigade, M. D. Ector, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 W. H. Young, Brig.-Gen. 
 Cockrell's Brigade, F. M. Cockrell, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Elijah Gates, Col. 
 Sears's Brigade, W. S. Barry, Col. 
 
 C. W. Sears, Brig.-Gen. 
 Cantev's {or Walthall's) Division, James Cantey, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 E. C. Walthall, Maj.-Gen. 
 Quarles's Brigade, W. A. Quarles, Brig.-Gen. 
 Reynolds's Brigade, D. H. Reynolds, Brig.-Gen. 
 Cantey's Brigade, V. S. Murphy, Col. 
 E. A. O'Neal, Col. 
 ■Cavalry Division, W. H. Jackson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Armstrong's Brigade, F. C. Armstrong, Brig.-Gen. 
 Ross's Brigade, L. S. Ross, Brig.-Gen. 
 Ferguson's Brigade, S. W. Ferguson, Brig.-Gen. 
 W. Boyles, Col. 
 
 Georgia Militia. 
 
 First Division, G. W. Smith, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 First Brigade, R. W. Carswell, Brig.-Gen. 
 Second Brigade, P. J. Phillips, Brig.-Gen. 
 Third Brigade, C. D. Anderson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Fourth Brigade, H. K. McCay, Brig.-Gen. 
 
Appendix. 671 
 
 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE. 
 
 December 15-16, 1864. 
 
 Union Forces, G. H. THOMAS, Maj.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 Fourth Corps, T. J. WOOD, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Col. 2d U. S. Cav. 
 First Division, Nathan Kimball, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, I. M. Kirby, Col. 101st Ohio. 
 Second Brigade, W. C. Whitaker, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Third Brigade, William Grose, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Division, W. L. Elliott, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 1st U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, Emerson Opdycke, Col. 125th Ohio. 
 Second Brigade, John Q. Lane, Col. 92d Ohio. 
 Third Brigade, Joseph Conrad, Col. 15th Mo. 
 Third Division, Samuel Beatty, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, A. D. Streight, Col. 51st Ind. 
 Second Brigade, P. S. Post, Col. 59th 111. 
 Third Brigade, Frederick Knefler, Col. 79th Ind. 
 Twenty-third Corps, J. M. SCHOFIELD, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Brig.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 Second Division, D. N. Couch, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 First Brigade, J. A. Cooper, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, O. H. Moore, Col. 25th Mich., 
 
 Capt. 6th U. S. Inf. 
 Third Brigade, John Mehringer, Col. 91st Ind. 
 Third Division, J. D. Cox, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, C. C. Doolittle, Col. 18th Mich. 
 Second Brigade, J. S. Casement, Col. 103d Ohio. 
 Third Brigade, I. N. Stiles, Col. 63d Ind. 
 Detachment Army of the Tennessee, A. J. SMITH, Maj.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Lt.-Col. 5th Cav. 
 First Division, John McArthue, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, W. L. McMillen, Col. 95th Ohio. 
 Second Brigade, L. F. Hubbard, Col. 5th Minn. 
 Third Brigade, S. G. Hill, Col. 35th Iowa. 
 Second Division, Kenner Garrard, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 3d U. S. Cav. 
 First Brigade, David Moore, Col. 51st Mo. 
 Second Brigade, J. I. Gilbert, Col. 27th Iowa. 
 Third Brigade, E. H. Wolfe, Col. 52d Ind. 
 Third Division, J. B. Moore, Col. 33d Wis. 
 
 First Brigade, L. M. Ward, Col. 14th Wis. 
 Second Brigade, Leander Blanden, Col. 95th 111. 
 Provisional Detachment, J. B. Steedman, Maj.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 Provisional Division, Charles Cruft, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, Benjamin Harrison, Col. 70th Ind. 
 Second Brigade, J. G. Mitchell, Col. 113th Ohio. 
 Third Brigade, C. H. Grosvenor, Col. 18th Ohio. 
 Second Brigade (Army Tenn.), A. G. Malloy, 
 
 Col. 17th Wis. 
 First Colored Brigade, T. J. Morgan, 
 
 Col. 14th U. S. Col. Inf. 
 Second Colored Brigade, C. R. Thompson, 
 
 Col. 12th U. S. Col. Inf. 
 Garrison of Nashville, J. F. MILLER, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Fourth Division, Twentieth Corps. 
 
 Second Brigade, E. C. Mason, Col. 176th Ohio. 
 Quartermaster's Division, J. L. Donaldson, Col. Q. M., U. S. A. 
 (Composed of Quartermaster's employees.) 
 
672 Appendix. 
 
 Cavalry Corps, J. H. WILSON, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Capt. U. S. Eng. 
 First Division. 
 
 First Brigade, J. T. Croxton, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 Fifth Division, Edward Hatch, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 First Brigade, R. R. Stewart, Col. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, D. E. Coon, Col. 2d Iowa Cav. 
 Sixth Division, R. W. Johnson, Brig.-Gen. Vols., 
 
 Maj. 4th U. S. Cav.. 
 First Brigade, T. J. Harrison, Col. 8th Ind. Cav. 
 Second Brigade, James Biddle, Col. 6th Ind. Cav., 
 
 Capt. 15th U. S. InfL 
 Seventh Division, J. F. Knipe, Brig.-Gen. Vols. 
 
 First Brigade, J. H. Hammond, Lt.-Col. A. A. G. Vols. 
 Second Brigade, G. M. L. Johnson, Col. 13th Ind. Cav. 
 
 Confederate Forces. 
 
 Army of Tennessee, J. B. HOOD, General. 
 
 Lee's Corps, S. D. LEE, Lieut-Gen. 
 
 Johnson's Division, Edward Johnson, Maj .-Gen. 
 
 Deas's Brigade, Z. C. Deas, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Manigault's Brigade, W. L. Butler, Lt.-Col. 
 
 Sharp's Brigade, J. H. Sharp, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Brantly's Brigade, W. F. Brantly, Brig.-Gen. 
 Stevenson's Division, C. L. Stevenson, Maj. -Gen. 
 
 Cumming's Brigade, E. P. Watkins, Col. 
 
 Pettus's Brigade, E. W. Pettus, Brig.-Gen. 
 Clayton's Division, H. D. Clayton, Maj .-Gen. 
 
 Stovall's Brigade, M. A. Stovall, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Gibson's Brigade, R. L. Gibson, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Holtzclaw's Brigade, J. T. Holtzclaw, Brig.-Gen. 
 Stewarts Corps, A. P. STEWART, Lieut.-Gen. 
 Loring's Division, W. W. Loring, Maj .-Gen. 
 
 Featherston's Brigade, W. S. Featherston, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Adams's Brigade, Robert Lowry, Col. 
 
 Scott's Brigade, John Snodgrass, Col. 
 French's Division (attached to Walthall's). 
 
 Sears's Brigade, C. W. Sears, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Ector's Brigade, Daniel Coleman, Col. 
 Walthall's Division, E. C. Walthall, Maj .-Gen. 
 
 Quarles's Brigade, G. D. Johnston, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Cantey's Brigade, C. M. Shelley, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Reynolds's Brigade, D. H. Reynolds, Brig.-Gen. 
 Cheatham's Corps, B. F. CHEATHAM, Lieut.-Gen. 
 Brown's Division. 
 
 Gist's Brigade, Z. L. Walters, Lt.-Col. 
 
 Maney's Brigade, H. R. Field, Col. 
 
 Strahl's Brigade, A. J. Kellar, Col. 
 
 Vaughan's Brigade, W. M. Watkins, Col. 
 Cleburne's Division, J. A. Smith, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Lowrey's Brigade, M. P. Lowrey, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Govan's Brigade, D. C. Govan, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Granbury's Brigade, E. T. Broughton, Capt. 
 Bate's Division, W. B. Bate, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Tyler's Brigade, T. B. Smith, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Finley's Brigade, G. A. Ball, Maj. 
 
 Jackson's Brigade, H. R. Jackson, Brig.-Gen. 
 Cavalry Division, J. R. Chalmers, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 Rucker's Brigade, E. W. Rucker, Col. 
 
 BiMe's Brigade, J. B. Biffle, Col. 
 
INDEX TO VOLUME I. 
 
 Abercrombie, has army at head of Lake George, 11; attacks French at 
 Ticonderoga — disgusts Americans, 12. 
 
 Abraham, Plains of, Wolfe discovers trail to, 17: description of — 
 battle of, 18. 
 
 Acadia, conquest of, 2; expedition to, in 1755, 8. 
 
 Adairsville, Johnston at, 539. 
 
 Adams, Sam, gets up Tea Party, 22; at Concord, 24. 
 
 Advanced Position, Wagner's, at Franklin, 583. 
 
 Aguadores, combat at, 608. 
 
 Agua Nueva, Taylor advances to, 91. 
 
 Aguinaldo, Emilio, 612; at capture of Manila and after, 614. 
 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of, 6. 
 
 Aldie, cavalry combat at, 359. 
 
 Alexander, E. P., comments on Union retreat from first battle of Bull 
 Run, 141 ; in Jackson's turning movement at Chancellorsville, 339 ; 
 at Gettysburg, 381 ; supports Pickett's charge, 382 ; in Chickamauga 
 campaign, 430; at Knoxville, 452; opinion as to terms of peace, 
 531 ; criticises Hood, 553. 
 
 Alexander, William, see Lord Stirling. 
 
 Alexandria, seized by Federal troops, 130. 
 
 Algonquins, 4. 
 
 Allatoona, captured, 540. 
 
 Allen, Ethan, and Arnold capture Ticonderoga and Crown Point, 24. 
 
 Alvarez, General, commands Mexican cavalry at Molino del Rey, 116. 
 
 American boy's ignorance of military history, 530. 
 
 American Revolution, The, see Revolutionary War. 
 
 Americans, their plan in Revolutionary War, 27. 
 
 Ames, General, at Gettysburg, 377. 
 
 Amherst, General Jeffrey, commands British at Halifax — captures 
 Louisburg, 11 ; to cooperate with Wolfe by way of Ticonderoga and 
 Crown Point, 15; his slow movements, 16; plans combined move- 
 ments to capture Canada — concentrates forces about Montreal — 
 captures Montreal and all Canada, 20. 
 
 Ampudia, General, commands Mexican forces — orders Taylor to with- 
 draw — superseded by Arista, 84; attacks Fort Brown, 85; at 
 Monterey, 89 ; at Buena Vista, 93. 
 
 Anderson, Major, at Fort Sumter, 129. 
 
 Anderson, General Patton, at Missionary Ridge, 458. 
 
 Anderson, General J. R., in front of McDowell, 199; defeated by- 
 Porter, 200. 
 
 Anderson, General R. H., at Fredericksburg, 296; dispatched to Chan- 
 cellorsville — falls back — at Tabernacle Church, 333 ; his position- 
 there, 336; aids Jackson's movement— resists Sickles's attack, 339; 
 attacks Federal center — connects with Stuart, 343 ; at Salem 
 Church, 346 ; at Chambersburg, 363 ; reaches Gettysburg, 369 ; in 
 the attack, 374; his position, 375; his division attacks, 376; his 
 position in morning July 3, 379; at Wilderness, May 6, 479; at 
 Spottsylvania, 480; first position, 493; occupies Union intrench- 
 ments — prolongs line to Po, 499; movement to Spottsylvania dis- 
 cussed, 506 ; ought to have been blocked by cavalry, 507 ; position, 
 south of Chickahominy, 514; at Petersburg, 518. 
 Anderson, Thomas M., in Philippine expedition, 612. 
 Andrade, General, his cavalry at Buena Vista, 93. 
 Angle, Bloody, 497. 
 Annapolis, see Port Royal. 
 
674 Index. 
 
 Annapolis Royal, see Port Royal. 
 
 Anne's, Queen, War, 2. 
 
 Antietam, battle of — field of battle, 267; Confederate line, 268; Mc- 
 Clellan's plan, 269; Lee withdraws — strength and losses, 273; 
 bloodiest battle of the war — comments, 274. 
 
 Antietam, battle of, Lee's position bad strategically, 279; tactics of — 
 battle-field of, 280; no intrenchments — McClellan and Lee com- 
 pared, 281 ; Union artillery in, 283 ; events immediately after — 
 condition, organization, etc., of hostile armies after, 284. 
 
 Antietam Campaign, 260; geography of theater of, 261; operations — 
 Union army at beginning of, 262; position of Union army Sep- 
 tember 13, 265; objective of, 274; cause of McClellan's slow ad- 
 vance, 276; what might have been outcome of, 280. 
 
 Appomattox, Lee surrenders at, S28. 
 
 Archer, General, at Fredericksburg, 296; at Gettysburg, 366. 
 
 Arista, General, supersedes Ampudia — at battle of Palo Alto, 84; at 
 Resaca de la Palma, 86; requests armistice, 87; withdraws toward 
 Linares — ordered before court-martial, 88. 
 
 Arkansas, joins Confederacy, 129; hostile forces in, 169. 
 
 Arkansas Post, captured, 399. 
 
 Arlington, seized by Federal troops, 130. 
 
 Army, beaten, see beaten army. 
 
 Army, regular, increased in 1812-13, 65; increased in 1814, 70; victory 
 at Chippewa, 71; difficulty of recruiting in War of 1812, 76; num- 
 bers in War of 1812, 77; under Taylor, 81; need of, at outbreak 
 of Civil War, 143; at close of Civil War — reduction — use, 588; in 
 1898, 590; in Santiago campaign, 596. 
 
 Army, standing, see army, regular. 
 
 Army of The Cumberland, reorganized, 423 ; at end of Tullahoma 
 campaign, 425 ; advances to the Tennessee, 427 ; advances, 427-8 ; 
 withdraws to Chattanooga, 445 ; condition serious, 446 ; measures for 
 relief — 'reorganized, 447; Thomas succeeds Rosecrans, 448; never 
 wholly invested, 263 ; occupies Atlanta, 547. 
 
 Army of Northern Virginia, concentrated at Chantilly, 260. 
 
 Army of the Ohio, organized, 423; under Schofield, 536; occupies 
 Decatur, 547. 
 
 Army of the Potomac, organization of, 194; merged with Army of 
 Virginia — McClellan in command, 260 ; at beginning of Antietam 
 campaign — corps commanders in Antietam campaign, 262; its 
 position, Sept. 13, 1862 — Lee's army Sept. 13, 265 ; after Fredericks- 
 burg, 329; its organization under Hooker, 330; not defeated at 
 Chancellorsville, 350; after Chancellorsville, 353; defective organ- 
 ization — strength in June, 1863, 354; disposition June 30, 1863, 363. 
 
 Army of the Tennessee, under McPherson, 536; moves via Snake 
 Creek Gap, 537; Howard commands, 544; moves against Hood's 
 communications, 544-6; occupies Eastpoint, 547. 
 
 Army of the United States, strength of, in 1812, 57. 
 
 Army of Virginia, organized, 239 ; merged into Army of Potomac, 260. 
 
 Arnold, Benedict, and Ethan Allen, capture Ticonderoga and Crown 
 Point, 24; expedition to Canada, 27; defeats St. Leger, 32; at 
 Bemis Heights, 33 ; in British service in Virginia, 46. 
 
 Artillery, at Shiloh, 189 ; Union, at Antietam, 283 ; Hunt's at Freder- 
 icksburg, 294; defeats Bragg at Stones River, 320; at Stones 
 River, 328; Confederate, battalion organization, 354; at Gettys- 
 burg, 374; supporting Pickett's charge, 380; Union batteries, 381; 
 at Wilderness, 478; at Spottsylvania, 493; at the salient at Spottsyl- 
 vania, 496-7; in Grant's overland campaign, 505; at Franklin, 569; 
 in Santiago campaign, 596; none at El Caney — at Santiago, 603; 
 in Philippine expedition, 612; at El Caney, criticised, 624, 625. 
 
Index. 675 
 
 Ashby, at Winchester, 221 ; masks Jackson's march from Swift Run 
 Gap, 225; covers Jackson's withdrawal from Franklin, 226; his 
 cavalry wastes time looting — at battle of Winchester, 227; checks 
 Fremont at Cedar Creek, 229; cover's Jackson's retreat, 230; an 
 appreciation of his cavalry, 238. 
 
 Ashe, General, invades Georgia, 44. 
 
 Atlanta, campaign of, see Campaign of Atlanta. 
 
 Atlanta, Johnston's base — railways — Gate City, 537. 
 
 Atlanta Campaign, see Campaign of Atlanta. 
 
 Atlanta, battle of — siege of- — line of supply, 544; occupied — evacu- 
 ated by Hood, 547; after capture, 555. 
 
 Attraction, power of, see "power of attraction"; in operation from 
 Rapidan to James, 506. 
 
 Augusta, surrenders to "Light Horse Harry" Lee, 49. 
 
 Averell, General, in pursuit of Stuart in Maryland, 285 ; to command 
 cavalry division, 329; operations during Chancellorsville campaign, 
 346 ; relieved by Hooker, 347. 
 
 Bailey's Creek, combat at, 520-1. 
 
 Baird, General, at Chickamauga, 432; at Chattanooga, 454; at Mis- 
 sionary Ridge, 458, 459. 
 
 Baker, Colonel, killed at Ball's Bluff, 193. 
 
 Balloons, a wretched substitute for cavalry, 305. 
 
 Ball's Bluff, battle of, 193. 
 
 Baltimore , in Dewey's fleet, 611. 
 
 Banks, General, operations against Jackson in March, 1862 — com- 
 mands Fifth Corps in A. P., foot-note, 194; commands Union forces 
 in the valley, 219 ; withdraws from valley, 221 ; returns to Stras- 
 burg, 222; remains idle at Strasburg — advances southward, 223; 
 advances to New Market, 224; fights Jackson at Winchester — 
 awaits Jackson at Strasburg, 226; retreats across Potomac — re- 
 treats down valley, 227; commands corps under Pope, 239; at 
 battle of Cedar Mountain, 242; fails to cooperate with Sherman, 
 399; fails to cooperate with Grant, 406; Pemberton's dispositions, 
 408; takes Port Hudson, 416; fails in his part of Grant's plan, 
 470; in command by "political necessity," 530; at Sabine Cross 
 Roads, 586. 
 
 Barber's Cross Roads, combat at, 288. 
 
 Barksdale, General, at Fredericksburg, 294; in Chancellorsville cam- 
 paign, 344; at Gettysburg — killed, 376. 
 
 Barlow, General, at Chancellorsville, 339; at Wilderness, 477; attacks, 
 478; at Spottsylvania, 494; at the salient, 496; at Petersburg, 517. 
 
 Barney, Captain Joshua, at battle of Bladensburg, 73. 
 
 Bartow, General, at first battle of Bull Run, 138. 
 
 Base of Operations, Shafter's, discussed, 621. 
 
 Base of Supplies, examples of cutting loose from, 323; Grant cuts 
 loose from his, 407; Grant's abandonment of, discussed, 416; the 
 risk of abandoning, 417. 
 
 Bate, General, at Missionary Ridge, 458; at Spring Hill, 566; at Frank- 
 lin, 569, 570; at Murfreesboro, 572.< 
 
 Bates, General John C, commands independent brigade in Santiago 
 campaign, 596; in advance to Siboney, 599; at Siboney, 601; or- 
 dered forward, 603; at El Caney, 604; marches to San Juan 
 Heights, 608. 
 
 Bath, seized by Jackson, 219. 
 
 Baton Rouge, taken by Farragut, 394. 
 
 Battle of the Wilderness, see Wilderness, battle of. 
 
 Battle, line of, see line of battle. 
 
676 Index. 
 
 Battles around Chattanooga — disposition, 445; Wheeler's raid — sup- 
 plies, 446; little fighting at first — Bragg's line, 449; Grant's plan of 
 attack, 452; Missionary Ridge — battle of Mt. Lookout, 454; strength 
 and losses, 460; comments — cause of defeat — Bragg's report — why 
 Thomas was ordered to assault, 461 ; in a sense decisive — effect on. 
 Confederacy, 462. 
 
 Beatty, General Sam, at Nashville, 575. 
 
 Beauregard, G. T., in Scott's campaign, 122; at Fort Sumter, 129; 
 in command at Manassas, 130; reports advance of Union army 
 on Manassas, 134; his dispositions before first battle of Bull Run,. 
 135 ; fails to pursue at first battle of Bull Run, 141 ; his bad man- 
 agement at first battle of Bull Run, 147 ; A. S. Johnston's "second in 
 command," 171; orders attack suspended at Shiloh, 179; and Johns- 
 ton's plans at Shiloh, 187; should not have fought second day, 
 189; retreats to Tupelo, 308; has Butler "bottled up," 510; at 
 Petersburg, 515-16; intrenches shorter line, 517; begs for rein- 
 forcements, 518; commands Military Division of the West, 557;. 
 visits Hood, 561. 
 
 Beaten Army, must rally sufficiently in rear, 183. 
 
 Beaver Dam Creek, see Mechanicsville, battle of, 204. 
 
 Bee, General, at first battle of Bull Run, 138; gives Jackson nick- 
 name "Stonewall"— killed, 139. 
 
 Bemis Heights, battle of, 33. 
 
 Bennington, battle of, 32; battle of, comment on, 41. 
 
 Benton, Senator, a bill to make him lieutenant-general, 103. 
 
 Bermuda Hundred, fortifications, 512; Terry's combat, 516. 
 
 Berry, General, at Chancellorsville, 342. 
 
 Berlin and Milan decrees, 56. 
 
 Biac-na-bato, treaty of, 612. 
 
 Big Black, battle of the, 412. 
 
 Birney, General, at Fredericksburg, 298; at Chancellorsville, 337; re- 
 ports Jackson's movement — attacks at Catherine Furnace, 339; 
 attacks Union line by mistake in the dark, 342; at Gettysburg, 374; 
 at Wilderness, 477; May 6, 479; at Spottsylvania, 495; covers Burn- 
 side, 499; at Petersburg, 517; commands Second Corps — assault, 
 June 18, 518; siege of Petersburg, 519; with Hancock, 522. 
 
 Blackburn's Ford, combat at, 136. 
 
 Blackstock Hill, battle of, 46. 
 
 Black Rock, burnt by British, 69. 
 
 Blair, F. P., at Chattanooga, 452; goes home, 555. 
 
 Blanco, General, at Buena Vista, 94. 
 
 Blanco, Captain General, orders Cervera to make sortie, 609. 
 
 Blenker, General, commands a brigade in McDowell's army, 133; 
 commands division in A. P., 194; dispatched to Fremont, 195. 
 
 Bloody Lane, 271 ; its defensive strength, 281. 
 
 Bloody Angle, 497. 
 
 Boerstler, Colonel, surrenders to British lieutenant, 68. 
 
 Bonham, General, at Blackburn's Ford, 136; at first battle of Bull 
 . Run, 141. 
 
 Bonhomme Richard, 41. 
 
 Boonville, effect of Union victory there, 130. 
 
 Boscawen, Admiral, fleet sails for Louisburg, 11. 
 
 Boston, port closed, 23 ; besieged by patriots, 24 ; evacuated by Howe, 
 25. 
 
 Bougainville, sent with 1,500 French to Cap-Rouge, 17. 
 
 Bowen, General, at Champion's Hill, 411. 
 
 Bowling Green, Ky., Johnston's headquarters, 150; evacuated by Johns- 
 ton, 155. 
 
Index. 677 
 
 Braddock, General, arrives in Virginia — his plan of campaign — leads 
 force against Fort Duquesne — ambuscade at Monongahela, 7. 
 
 .Bradley, General, at Spring Hill, 566. 
 
 Bradstreet, Colonel John, captures Frontenac and French fleet, 12. 
 
 Bragg, Braxton, his battery at Buena Vista, 94; takes force from 
 Pensacola to Corinth, 169; commands division in A. S. Johns- 
 ton's army and chief of staff, 171; prepares for final assault at 
 Shiloh, 178; succeeds Beauregard — transfers army to Chattanooga — 
 arranges to invade Kentucky, 309; geography of his line of ad- 
 vance to Kentucky — advances to Kentucky, 310; captures Mun- 
 fbrdville — moves to Bardstown — movements before battle of Perry- 
 ville — at Perryville — withdraws to Tennessee, 312; withdraws to 
 Chattanooga and Murfreesboro — cavalry screens his army, 313 ; occu- 
 pies "position in readiness" at Murfreesboro — disposition of forces, 
 315; prepares to attack — his plan, 316; gets the initiative, 317; his 
 orders to Breckinridge- — his left on the defensive, 319; attributes 
 defeat to Union artillery — attacks on January 2, and is repulsed, 
 ■320 ; withdraws to Tullahoma, 321 ; why he advanced into Ken- 
 tucky, 323; advantage of his position at Munfordville, 324; why 
 he quitted it — his invasion a failure — result of his invasion a dis- 
 appointment to North and South — Joseph E. Johnston sent to re- 
 lieve him, 325 ; his position at Stones River — why he attacked at 
 Stones River — his "personal equation" — his plan of battle, 327; his 
 plan of battle nearly carried out, 328; after Stones River — opera- 
 tions of his cavalry, 422 ; in Tullahoma campaign, 423 ; withdraws 
 to Chattanooga, 424; dispositions at end of Tullahoma campaign, 
 ■425; withdraws Buckner from Knoxville, 427; withdraws from 
 Chattanooga — position May 10 — concentrates on the Chickamauga — 
 orders an attack — subordinates do not obey, 429; Polk fails to 
 attack, 430; plan at Chickamauga, 431; position of forces morning 
 September 19, 432; renews battle — dispositions, 434; line of com- 
 munication at Shelbyville, 438; advantage of topography — objec- 
 tive — invasion of Kentucky compared with Chickamauga cam- 
 paign — outmaneuvered, 439; strategy, 440; advantage of position — 
 cause of failures — relations with subordinates, 441 ; effect of with- 
 drawal from Chattanooga — what he ought to have done, 442; 
 tactics criticised, 443; advances to Chattanooga — dispositions, 445; 
 at loggerheads with generals — reorganization, 447; sees Hooker's 
 column from Mt. Lookout, 451; puts army on Missionary Ridge, 
 456; faulty position, 458; routed — retreats to Dalton — resigns, 459; 
 cause of roiit, 461 ; mistakes, 463; plan ordered by President Davis — 
 Longstreet's plan, 464; considered his position impregnable — 
 sent Longstreet to Knoxville too late, 465; after Chattanooga — re- 
 lieved of command — chief of staff, 535. 
 
 Brandy Station, battle of, 357 ; first real cavalry combat, 358. 
 
 Brandywine, battle of, 34. 
 
 Brannan, General, at Chickamauga, 432. 
 
 Breckinridge, General, commands reserve in A. S. Johnston's army, 
 171 ; commands Confederate rear guard after Shiloh, 181 ; besieges 
 Negley at Nashville, 312; at Stones River, 315; fails to obey Bragg's 
 order, 319; slow in sending troops across river — attacks on Jan- 
 uary 2, and is repulsed, 320; failed to obey Bragg's order, 328; 
 garrisons Port Hudson, 395; at Chickamauga, 432; begins battle 
 second day, 435; at Chattanooga, 447; in center, 449; at Mission- 
 ary Ridge, 456; at Cold Harbor, 502; in East Tennessee, 579. 
 
 Breed's Hiix, occupied by"Americans, 24. 
 
 Briar Creek, battle of, 44. 
 
678 Index. 
 
 British, discoveries in America, 1 ; strengthen position in America after 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, 6; navy, active on French Coast, 11; under Wolfe 
 defeat French under Montcalm, 18; capture Montreal, 20; evacu- 
 ate Boston, 25; their plans — their strategy, 26; plans for 1777, 32;. 
 hold Charleston till end of war, 50; West Indies fleet sails to New 
 York, 52; forces in America in 1812, 64; burn Buffalo and Black 
 Rock, 69; numbers in War of 1812 — in South African War, 77. 
 
 Brock, General, demands and receives surrender of Hull, 61 ; trans- 
 fers forces to Niagara — killed at Queenstown, 62. 
 
 Brooke, General, at Spottsylvania, 494; at the salient, 496; in Porto- 
 Rican expedition, 615. 
 
 Brooklyn, in Schley's squadron, 593 ; at battle of Santiago, 610. 
 
 Brown, General Jacob, repulses British at Sacketts Harbor, 68; crosses- 
 into Canada — his forces, 71 ; wounded at Lundy's Lane, 72. 
 
 Brown, General John C, at Spring Hill, 566; at Franklin, 569, 570. 
 
 Brown, Major Jacob, commands American camp, 84; killed, 86; Fort 
 Brown named after, 86. 
 
 Brown's Gap, Jackson's army at, 232. 
 
 Brown's Ferry, combat at, 451 ; importance of road to Kelly's Ferry,. 
 464. 
 
 Bruinsburg, Grant crosses Mississippi at, 404. 
 
 Brush Mountain, Johnston's position at, 541. 
 
 Buchanan, President, his attitude toward secession, 128. 
 
 Buckland's brigade at Shiloh, 174. 
 
 Buckner, General, commands Confederate right at Fort Donelson, 156; 
 checks Smith's charge at Fort Donelson — left in command at Fort 
 Donelson, 160; surrenders to Grant, 161; after Stones River, 423; 
 withdraws from Knoxville, 427; fails to attack — in Chickamauga. 
 campaign, 429; at Chickamauga, 431; bivouacs at Tedford's Ford,. 
 432; quits Bragg, 447. 
 
 Buell, General, commands Union forces in Kentucky, 150; his and 
 Halleck's plans against Johnston, 152; dispatches Nelson's divi- 
 sion to Grant and advances, 161 ; proposes plan against Johnston, 
 170; and troops reach Shiloh — march from Nashville to Shiloh,. 
 179 ; meets Grant at Shiloh — determines to renew battle, 180 ; starts 
 for Chattanooga — ordered to repair M. & C. Railway, 308; adopts 
 N. & C. Railway as line of communications — advance stopped by 
 Forrest, 309; concentrates at Murfreesboro, 310; reaches Bowling 
 Green — withdraws to Louisville — resumes offensive — at Perryville, 
 311; suspends pursuit of Bragg — relieved from command, 312; 
 why sent to Chattanooga — given orders impossible to execute, 322; 
 why he fell back to Kentucky, 323; his operations against Bragg 
 disappoint North — Ropes's estimate of, 325. 
 
 Buena Vista, battle of — description of battle-field, 92; strength and 
 losses — comments, 95 ; Taylor's chances there, 101 ; Santa Anna's, 
 mistakes, 102. 
 
 Buford, General, in second Bull Run campaign, 256; to command re- 
 serve cavalry brigade, 329; operations during Chancellorsville cam- 
 paign, 346; covers left of Meade's army, 360; at Gettysburg, 363,. 
 364; stops Hill, 365; reports Ewell's approach, 367; ordered to 
 Westminster, 374; in pursuit after Gettysburg, 384; dead, 470. 
 
 Buffalo, burnt by British, 69. 
 
 Bull Run, as a military obstacle, 132. 
 
 Bull Run, first battle, 127; disposition of Confederates .before the bat- 
 tle — Union concentration before the battle, 135 ; McDowell's plan, 
 136; battle begins — Beauregard's orders and dispositions, 137; losses 
 and casualties — comments, 142; part played by Johnston's forces — 
 Federal mistakes, 145 ; its effect on North and South, 191. 
 
Index. 679 
 
 Bull Run, second battle of, 239; on August 28, 246; on August 29, 
 248; on August 30, 249; losses, 251. 
 
 Bunker Hill, battle of, 24. 
 
 Burgess's Mill, combat at, 525. 
 
 Burgoyne, General, arrives at Boston, 24; commands expedition from 
 Canada to Hudson Valley — captures Ticonderoga, 32; not sup- 
 ported by Howe — defeat and surrender, 33. 
 
 Burnside, General, commands a brigade in McDowell's army, 133; at 
 first battle of Bull Run, 138 ; brings army from North Carolina, 241 ; 
 commands Ninth Corps, 262; commands right wing, 264; at An- 
 tietam, 272; effect of his slowness in crossing Antietam Creek, 
 283; succeeds McClellan in command of Army of the Potomac — 
 submits plan — reorganizes army, 289; moves army to Falmouth, 
 290; plans to attack at Fredericksburg, 292; his army crosses 
 Rappahannock, 293; discusses plan of battle with Franklin — his 
 vague orders, 295; distribution of his troops at Fredericksburg, 
 296; personally directs attack on Confederate left, 298; sends 
 Franklin order to charge — orders Hooker to attack stone wall, 
 299; when his order to Franklin was delivered — -withdraws to left 
 bank of Rappahannock, 300; how critics view his movement to 
 Falmouth, 302; had opportunity to strike Lee's separated wings — 
 his foremost mistake, 303; why he fought at Fredericksburg, 305; 
 cause of army's despondency — his order dismissing and relieving; 
 generals — relieved of command, 329; resumes command of Ninth 
 Corps — withdraws it from Army of the Potomac, 330; organizes. 
 Army of the Ohio, 423 ; enters East Tennessee, 427 ; ordered to aid 
 Rosecrans, 447; at Knoxville, 460; under Grant, 470; at Wilder- 
 ness, 474; not in battle May 5 — orders for May 6, 478; May 6„ 
 481; small part in battle, 487; movement to Spottsylvania, 488; 
 bivouacs at Aldrich's, 490; at Spottsylvania, 492; first position, 493; 
 close to hostile line, 495 ; attack of salient, 496 ; accomplished little,. 
 498; attacks May 18, 499; at North Anna — in movement after 
 Spottsylvania, 501 ; in movement to James, 513 ; at Petersburg, 517 ;. 
 assault June 18, 518; siege of Petersburg, 519; the mine, 520-22;: 
 censured and resigns, foot-note, 524; succeeded by Schofield, 536- 
 
 Burnside Bridge, combat at, 272. 
 
 Buschbeck, General, at Chancellorsville, 340; holds his rifle pits — re- 
 tires, 341. 
 
 Butler, General, commands Taylor's volunteer division, 88. 
 
 Butler, Benjamin F., at Fort Monroe, 131; "bottled up," 470, 510? 
 capture of Fort Harrison, 524; demonstration against Richmond, 
 525 ; his failure to capture Petersburg, 529 ; in command by "politi- 
 cal necessity," 530. 
 
 Butterfield, General, commands Fifth Corps, 289. 
 
 Cabot, John, gave England claim to America, 1. 
 
 Calhoun, John C, and others force declaration of war, 56. 
 
 Camara, Admiral, commands Spanish fleet, 591 ; what his fleet might 
 have done, 620. 
 
 Camargo, Taylor's base, 88; why Taylor's base, 97. 
 
 Campaign of Atlanta, 535; distribution and strength of troops, 536; 
 geography, 537; Peachtree Creek, 543; battle of Atlanta, 544; Sher- 
 man's position,, July 31 — battle of Ezra Church, 545 ; raids, Stone- 
 man's, Wheeler's, Kilpatrick's — Sherman continues general move- 
 ment, 546; operations south of Atlanta, 546, 547; comments, 547; 
 compared with Grant's campaign, 547, 548; strategy — like Tulla- 
 homa campaign, 548; use of fieldworks, 553; character of troops, 
 554. 
 
680 Index. 
 
 Campaign of Franklin and Nashville — after capture of Atlanta, SSS; 
 comments, 577. 
 
 Campbell, Colonel, invades Georgia, 43. 
 
 ■Canada, battle ground of French and English, 1 ; "Jack Hill's'' expe- 
 dition against — English colonists resolve to capture, 2; failure of 
 last effort against, in Queen Anne's War — linked to Louisiana by 
 settlements, 3; geography of — routes of invasion, 4; refuge of 
 Tories — her leading men descendants of American Tories, 23; ex- 
 pedition of Arnold and Montgomery — invasion by Arnold and 
 Montgomery, 27; plan of campaign by U. S. in 1812, 57. 
 
 'Canadians, in War of 1812, 77. 
 
 Capital, why Richmond chosen, by Confederacy — of a new govern- 
 ment, 533. 
 
 Caney, El, see El Caney. 
 
 Capron, General Horace, reinforces Hatch, 563 ; at Columbia, 564. 
 
 Capron, Captain, commands battery, 602 ; at El Caney, 604. 
 
 Carleton, in command at Quebec, 28. 
 
 Carlin, General, at Mt. Lookout, 456. 
 
 Carolina, South, see South Carolina. 
 
 Carolina, North, see North Carolina. 
 
 Carrick's Ford, battle of, 130. 
 
 Carter House, 568. 
 
 Cartier, Jacques, carries French flag up the St. Lawrence, 1. 
 
 Casey, commands division in A. P., 194. 
 
 Cass, Colonel, informs Hull militia would desert, 60; in expedition to 
 Raisin River, 61. 
 
 Cassville, combat at, 540. 
 
 Castillo, General, in Santiago campaign, 598; action at Siboney, 599. 
 
 ^Cavalry, Confederate, at first battle of Bull Run, 148; Eighth Penn- 
 sylvania, see Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry; raids, see raids, cav- 
 alry; Union, at first battle of Bull Run, 148; lack of, at first 
 battle of Bull Run, 148 ; in campaign of Forts Henry and Donelson, 
 166; Union, at Shiloh — Confederate, advancing on Shiloh, 174; 
 at Shiloh, 189; Jackson's lack of, at Winchester, 228; Ashby's, 238; 
 Pope's worn out — Buford's in second Bull Run campaign, 257; in 
 second Bull Run campaign, 258; in Antietam campaign, 263, 279; 
 Colonel B. F. Davis's escape from Harper's Ferry, 266; in the 
 battle of Antietam, 281; portion of Union, at Antietam, 283; in 
 movement southward after Antietam, 288; balloons a wretched 
 substitute for, 305; Stuart's, at Fredericksburg, 307; of Bragg' s 
 army screens movements — delays Rosecrans's advance, 313 ; Union ; 
 during Rosecrans's advance to Murfreesboro, 314; Wheeler's, 
 during battle of Stones River, 321 ; its work in the Stones River 
 campaign, 326; corps, organized — 'Stoneman commands, 329; on 
 raid, 331; corps, during Chancellorsville campaign, 346; its in- 
 fluence — its losses, 347; effect of operations before battle of 
 Chancellorsville, 348; needed at Chancellorsville — the Union, needed 
 in right place at Chancellorsville, 350; after Chancellorsville, 353; 
 at Brandy Station, 357; in Gettysburg campaign, 358; combats 
 between, of Pleasonton and Stuart, 359; Union, its position at 
 Gettysburg, 374; Confederate, at Gettysburg, 375; at Gettysburg, 
 382; Federal, in Gettysburg campaign, 392; the Confederate, in 
 Gettysburg campaign, 393; lack of, in the Vicksburg campaign, 
 421; Confederate, after Stones River, 422; in Chickamauga cam- 
 paign, 440; in siege of Chattanooga, 445; at Wilderness, 472, 484; 
 Confederate, at Wilderness, 474; little chance in woods, 487; in 
 movement after Spottsylvania, 501; Union, criticised, 507, 508; Con- 
 federate, 509; in Appomattox campaign, 533; Union, in Atlanta 
 
Index. 681 
 
 Cavalry — Continued. ' 
 
 campaign — Wheeler's, in Atlanta campaign, S3S; Union, in pursuit 
 from Resaca, 539; Union, captures Allatoona, 540; Sherman's, 
 operates against Hood's communications, 544-6; useless when cut 
 off— Wilson's, at Spring Hill, 581; Wilson's, at Nashville, 584; in 
 Santiago campaign, 596; 1st, at Las Guasimas — 10th, at Las 
 Guasimas — 1st volunteer, at Las Guasimas, 600; 9th, at Las 
 Guasimas, 601; Troop D, 2d, at El Caney, 604; at San Juan, 607. 
 
 Cavite, naval battle at — casualties, 611; taken by Dewey, 612. 
 
 Cedar Mountain, battle of, 242. 
 
 Cemetery Hill, 365 ; why chosen — its possession decisive of victory — 
 result of Lee's failure to carry, 387 ; weakest part of Federal line, 
 388. 
 
 Centreville, McDowell's army at, 135. 
 
 Cerralvo, Taylor's depot, 88. 
 
 Cerro Gordo, 108; Santa Anna occupies it — battle of — troops and 
 losses at, 109; defects of position — why chosen — result of American 
 victory, 121. 
 
 Cervera, Admiral, his voyage — at St. Vincent — at Curacao, 592; at 
 Santiago — blockaded at Santiago, 593; at battle of Santiago, 
 609; loss at Santiago — captured, 610; Sampson foresaw effect of 
 destruction of his fleet, 617; his mistakes, 619; if Santiago had 
 been taken July 1, 626. 
 
 Chadd's Ford, 34. 
 
 Chaffee, General, reinforces Wheeler at Las Guasimas, 601 ; recon- 
 noiters, 601, 602; orders 12th Infantry to charge — at El Caney, 604. 
 
 Chalmers, General, at Shiloh, 178; at Franklin, 571; on Confederate 
 left, 575; in Hood's retreat, 576. 
 
 Chambliss, General, at Gettysburg, 383 ; attacks Upton, 499. 
 
 Champlain, establishes trading post at Quebec, 1. 
 
 Chantilly, battle of, 251. 
 
 Chancellorsville, battle of, 329; Hooker's plan, 331; operations — 
 concentration at, 332; battle-field, 334; operations on May 1, 335; 
 Union line withdrawn by Hooker — Union position and distribu- 
 tion of troops, 337; Confederate line — field-works — dense woods 
 — Jackson's turning movement, 338; who suggested it? 339; 
 Howard's corps at, 340; Howard's men warned by flight of wild 
 animals — Lee engages Hooker's entire line, 341 ; fighting in the 
 dark, 342; Union line falls back — Anderson and McLaws attack — 
 Anderson and Stuart connect — Sunday, May 3 — Stuart re- 
 news attack at daybreak — Federal line rearranged during night 
 — Lee advances and captures, 343 ; Union line withdraws to 
 new position, 344; losses, 346; comments — Hooker's operations 
 first masterly then faulty, 347 ; Union army not defeated, 350 ; field- 
 works first used, 352; distribution of Southern forces after, 356. 
 
 Chapultepec, 117; battle of, 118. 
 
 Charleston, held by British till end of war, 50. 
 
 Charlotte, American forces concentrate there, 46. 
 
 Chattanooga, battles around, see Battles around Chattanooga; best 
 place for Southern capital, 533; objective in Chickamauga cam- 
 paign — singular turn of events, 439; effect of Bragg's withdrawal, 
 441; situation, 449; siege raised, 459; Union army never wholly 
 invested, 463. 
 
 Chester, Washington retreats to, 34. 
 
 Cherry Valley, massacre, 43. 
 
 Cheatham, General, at Stones River, 315; at Chickamauga, 433; at 
 Missionary Ridge 458; at Peachtree Creek — succeeds Hood, 
 543; battle of Atlanta, 544; succeeded by S. D. Lee, foot-note, 545; 
 
682 Index. 
 
 Cheatham, General — Continued. 
 
 succeeds Hardee, 557; in Hood's advance, 564; at Columbia, 566;. 
 at Spring Hill, 567; at Franklin, 569; supported by Johnson, 570; 
 at Nashville, 571; Steedman's attack, 574; goes to the left, 575; 
 action at Spring Hill criticised, 582. 
 
 Chippewa, battle of, 71. 
 
 Chickahominy River, its character, 200. 
 
 Chickamauga, campaign — after Stones River, 422; geography, 426; 
 Rosecrans advances to the Tennessee, 427; Rosecrans crosses and 
 advances, 428; situation of forces May 10, 427-8; operations be- 
 fore the battle — battle of, 430; disposition of Union forces, 
 431; position of forces morning September 19, 432; comments — 
 lines of communication, 438; objective — compared with Bragg's 
 invasion of Kentucky, 439; Pyrrhic victory — Alexander's critical- 
 summary, 443; Longstreet's suggestion to Secretary of War, 442; 
 tactics, 433; Longstreet's proposed plan after battle, 464; battle of,, 
 comments, 438; battle of, details of, first day, 432-4; second day,. 
 434-8; strength and losses, 438. 
 
 Chickamauga Park, camp of instruction, 590. 
 
 Chickasaw Bluffs, 398 ; battle of, 399. 
 
 Chrystler's Farm, battle of, 69. 
 
 Churubusco, battle of, 114. 
 
 Civil War, our purpose in studying it — its interest to students of 
 military history — as compared with other civil wars — view of 
 Southern people, 127; main theater, how determined, 130. 
 
 Clausewitz, advocated flank positions, 551. 
 
 Clay, General Green, tries to relieve Fort Meigs, 66. 
 
 Clay, Henry, and others force declaration of war, 56. 
 
 Cleburne, General, at Stones River, 315 ; falls on McCook's right, 317 ; 
 at Chickamauga, 432; at Missionary Ridge, 456; withstands Sher- 
 man's assaults, 457 ; at Spring Hill, 566 ; at Franklin, 570. 
 
 Clinton, Henry, arrives at Boston, 24; goes to relieve Burgoyne, 34; 
 succeeds Howe — determines to move army by land to New York — 
 evacuates Philadelphia — at battle of Monmouth — withdraws army to 
 Sandy Hook and New York, 35 ; concentrates forces at New 
 York — has not enough troops, 42; combines with Admiral Parker 
 for attack on Charleston — adopts "wearing-out policy," 43 ; sends 
 raiding parties to Virginia and Connecticut — captures Charles- 
 ton, 44 ; his reasons for the "wearing-out" policy, 54. 
 
 Cobb, General, at Fredericksburg, 296. 
 
 Cockburn, Rear-Admiral, plunders shores of Chesapeake, 70. 
 
 Cold Harbor, battle of — hardships, 502; Grant withdraws — losses, 503; 
 strength and losses from Wilderness to, 503; general situation 
 after, 510 ; Grant's withdrawal, 512. 
 
 Colon, at Santiago, 593 ; at battle of Santiago, 610. 
 
 Colonial Wars, 1. 
 
 Colonies, the thirteen, their geography, 26. 
 
 Colston, General, at Chancellorsville, 339. 
 
 Columbia, operations at, 564-5. 
 
 Columbus, Ky., occupied by Polk, 150. 
 
 Command, at Saratoga, 51 ; undivided, 482. 
 
 Commander, his qualifications, 259. 
 
 Comments, Revolutionary War, northern campaigns, 35 ; Revolution- 
 ary War, southern campaigns, S3 ; War of 1812, 75 ; Taylor's cam- 
 paign, 95; Scott's campaign, 120; first battle of Bull Run, 142; 
 capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, 162; campaign of Shiloh, 
 182; Peninsular campaign, 209; Jackson's Valley campaign, 233; the 
 second Bull Run, 252; battle of Antietam, 274; battle of Fredericks- 
 
Index. 683 
 
 Comments — Continued. 
 
 burg, 300 ; Stones River campaign, 321 ; battle of Stones River, 327 ;. 
 battle of Chancellorsville, 347 ; campaign of Gettysburg, 385 ; Vicks- 
 burg campaign, 416; Chickamauga, 438; battles around Chatta- 
 nooga, 461 ; Wilderness, 482 ; Spottsylvania, 503 ; siege of Peters- 
 burg, 528 ; campaign of Atlanta, 547 ; Franklin and Nashville, 577 ; 
 Spring Hill, 581-2; battle of Franklin, 583; Nashville— Hood's- 
 mistake in advancing, 583; Spanish-American War — navy dictates 
 plan, 616; El Caney, 624, 625; Santiago campaign, naval opera- 
 tions, 617-21 ; land operations, 621-6 ; San Juan — Kettle Hill, 
 625-6; capture of Manila, 627; capture of Porto Rico, 627-8. 
 
 Commissioners, Confederate, at Washington, 129. 
 
 Communications, line of, see line of communications ; Grant operates- 
 without, 407; Grant's abandonment of, discussed, 416; the risk of 
 abandoning, 417 ; cannot be permanently destroyed by cavalry, 545 ; 
 Hood's, 557. 
 
 Concentration, importance of, for battle, 185 ; difficulties of, 186. 
 
 Confederacy, States join, 129; makes mistake in bombarding Fort 
 Sumter — .its right policy, 142; end in sight — strategic front sur- 
 rendered, 462; policy like that of U. S., 468. 
 
 Congress, Continental, see Continental Congress; declares war against 
 Great Britain, 56; causes of declaration, 56; responsible for fail- 
 ures in War of 1812, and prolongation of Civil War, 75 ; fails to* 
 authorize volunteers for Scott, 105 ; declares war on Spain — pre- 
 pares for war, 590. 
 
 Connecticut River, as line of invasion, 5. 
 
 Connor, Commodore, commands squadron at mouth of Rio Grande, 87.. 
 
 Conococheague Creek, Lee's position on, 385. 
 
 Continental Congress, meets at Philadelphia, 23; resolutions and! 
 petition to the King, 23 ; raises rifle companies, 25 ; would not 
 let Washington withdraw from New York, 29. 
 
 Contreras, battle of, 113; forces and losses, 114. 
 
 Cooke, P. St. G., commands cavalry in A. P., 194. 
 
 Corinth, Halleck's objective, 322; battle of, 396. 
 
 Cornwallis, General, advances on Newark — pursues Washington, 30; 
 his operations against Washington after Trenton, 31 ; at battle of 
 Brandywine, 34; left in command of South Carolina, 44; at bat- 
 tle of Camden, 45 ; his operations against Greene, 47 ; at battle of 
 Guilford C. H., 48; retreats to Virginia, 50; withdraws to York- 
 town, 51 ; surrenders, 53 ; comment on his conduct, 53. 
 
 Corpus Christi, camp of Taylor's forces, 81. 
 
 Corral Falso, better position than Cerro Gordo, 121. 
 
 Corse, General, at Rome, 555 ; at Allatoona, 558. 
 
 Cortez, his route to City of Mexico, 107. 
 
 Couch, commands division in A. P., 194; commands Second Corps, 
 289, 330; at Chancellorsville, 335; superintends withdrawal of 
 Union line, 344. 
 
 Council of War, see War, council of, 410. 
 
 Cowpens, The, battle of, 47. 
 
 Cox, General Jacob D., at South Mountain, 265 ; assaults Confederate 
 right at Antietam, 273; at Pulaski, 563; at Columbia, 564; at 
 Spring Hill, 567; at Franklin, 569-70; timely arrival at Columbia,. 
 581. 
 
 Crampton's Gap, battle of, discussion, 277. 
 
 Crater, the, 520-2. 
 
 Craven's Farm, combat, 455. 
 
 Crawford, General, at Wilderness, 476; at Spottsylvania, 489; at: 
 Petersburg, 517. 
 
684 Index. 
 
 Crittenden, General G. B., defeated at Mill Springs, 154. 
 
 Crittenden, General T. L., commands Twenty-first Corps — commands 
 "left wing" of Rosecrans's army, 313; deploys in front of Bragg, 
 315; forms line of battle, 320; at Chickamauga, 431; morning Sep- 
 tember 19, 432; driven from field, 436; court of inquiry, 447. 
 
 Crocker, General, at Champion's Hill, 411. 
 
 Croghan, Major, repulses Proctor at Fort Stephenson, 66. 
 
 Crook, General, at Antietam, 273 ; stops Wheeler's raid, 446. 
 
 Cross Keys, battle of, 232. 
 
 Croxton, General, opposes Hood, 562; at Columbia, 564. 
 
 Crow Farm, end of Confederate intrenchments, 525. 
 
 Crown Point, expedition against, in 1755, 8; captured by Arnold and 
 Allen, 24. 
 
 Cruft, General, at Chattanooga, 453; at Mt. Lookout, 455;' at Nash- 
 ville, 572; in Thomas's plan, 573. 
 
 Cuba, outbreak of second insurrection — sympathy and support of* 
 Americans, 589; War Department's plan of invasion, 617. 
 
 Culp's Hill, 365. 
 
 Cumberland, Army of the, see Army of the Cumberland. 
 
 Cumberland Gap, fortified by Confederates, 150. 
 
 Curtain, Governor, calls out Pennsylvania militia, 359. 
 
 Curtis, General, has command in Arkansas, 169. 
 
 Custer, General, at Gettysburg, 383. 
 
 Dahlgren, Colonel, raid on Richmond, 468. 
 
 Daiquiri, landing place of Shafter's army, 598. 
 
 Dalton, Bragg's army there, 535 ; Union army in front of, 536. 
 
 Dana, C. A., at Chattanooga, 448. 
 
 Davies, General, commands a brigade in McDowell's army, 133. 
 
 Davis, Colonel B. F., escapes with cavalry, 266. 
 
 Davis, Jefferson, commands Mississippi Rifles at Buena Vista, 93, 94; 
 chosen provisional president of Confederacy, 128; directs South- 
 ern operations, 132; orders Johnston and Holmes to reinforce 
 Beauregard, 134 ; his experience of military affairs — compared with 
 Lincoln, 143; could not reinforce Johnston at Centreville, 211; did 
 not organize army urged by Lee at Culpeper, 355; visited Con- 
 federate armies, 463; orders to Bragg, 464; arranges with Lee for 
 latter's retreat, 531 ; appoints Bragg chief of staff, 535 ; visits 
 Hood, 556. 
 
 Davis, General J. C, at Stones River, 315; forced to withdraw, 317; 
 at Chickamauga, 433; driven from field, 436; his mistake, 444; 
 with Sherman, 456; in Atlanta campaign, 539; commands Four- 
 teenth Corps, foot-note, 544; in pursuit of Hood, 559. 
 
 Davis, Commodore, pushes down Mississippi River, 394. 
 
 Davis, Commander, in Porto Rican expedition, 615. 
 
 Dearborn, Fort, see Fort Dearborn. 
 
 Dearborn, General Henry, commands in the East — his incompetence, 
 62; marches to Canadian boundary, 64; command in 1813, 67; re- 
 placed by General James Wilkinson, 68. 
 
 Df.aring, General, at Petersburg, 512, 515-17; reports arrival of War- 
 ren, 523. 
 
 Decatur, Ga., occupied, 547. 
 
 de Grasse, brings fleet to America, 51; its influence on result of war, 
 55. 
 
 Delaware River, Washington retreats across, 30. 
 
 Defensive position, high ground, 391. 
 
 Derby, Lieutenant-Colonel, in balloon at San Juan, 605; his balloon 
 starts battle prematurely, 625. 
 
Index. 685 
 
 d'Estaing, Count, arrives with fleet — he and Washington plan to at- 
 tack British at New York, 42. 
 
 Devens, General, at Chancellorsville, 340; surprised and driven back, 
 341. 
 
 Devil's Den, 372; captured, 376. 
 
 Dewey, in Chinese waters, 592; at Hong Kong— preparations — battle 
 of Manila Bay, 611; takes Cavite, 612; battle of Manila, 613; 
 Montojo's fleet no match, 618; supposed to have arranged before- 
 hand with governor-general for capitulation, 627. 
 
 Dieskau, Baron, commands French against William Johnson — ad- 
 vances against Fort Lyman, 8; prepares an ambush — attacks Fort 
 Lyman — defeated and captured, 9. 
 
 Dixwiddie, Governor, dispatches Washington to French commander, 6. 
 
 Dinwiddie Court House, combat at, 527. 
 
 Discipline, its effect as shown by Scott and Ripley, 76. 
 
 Diversion, naval, use of Camara's fleet, 619. 
 
 Diversion, strategic, see Strategic Diversion. 
 
 Division of the Mississippi, created, 448 ; effect of order creating, 462 ; 
 Sherman in command, 469. 
 
 Division, Military, of the West, 557. 
 
 Dixie, in Porto Rican expedition, 615. 
 
 Donaldson, General, at Nashville, 573. 
 
 Donelson, Fort, see Fort Donelson. 
 
 Doubleday, General, at Antietam, 269; at Fredericksburg, 296; at 
 Gettysburg, 366 ; withdraws to Cemetery Hill, 368. 
 
 Drewry's Bluff, attacked by Union fleet, 198. 
 
 Duffield, General, expected, 601; in plan of attack, 602; attacks Agua- 
 dores, 608. 
 
 Duncan's Battery, at Palo Alto, 85. 
 
 Dunker Church, at Antietam, 270. 
 
 Duquesne, Fort, captured by Brigadier John Forbes — name changed — 
 Major Grant defeated, 13. 
 
 Eagle, in Schley's squadron, 593. 
 
 Early, General, at Blackburn's Ford, 136; at first battle of Bull Run, 
 140; at Antietam, 269; at Skinker's Neck, 293; recalled to Fred- 
 ericksburg — at Fredericksburg, 296; not supported at Fredericks- 
 burg, 306 ; left to hold Marye's Heights, 335 ; holds Marye's Hill, 
 344; retreats, 345; retakes Marye's Hill— at Salem Church, 346; 
 advances on York, 359; position at Gettysburg, second day, 374; 
 attacks Cemetery Hill, 377 ; reinforces Johnson, 378 ; on third day, 
 380 ; at Wilderness, 475 ; in movement to Spottsylvania, 490 ; com- 
 mands Ewell's corps — his raid, 511; operations to prevent rein- 
 forcing him, 522. 
 
 Eastpoint, combat at, 546; occupied, 547. 
 
 Earthworks, at Fredericksburg, 292. 
 
 East Tennessee, under control of Union Army, 460. 
 
 East Wood, at Antietam, 269. 
 
 Egan, General, at Burgess's Mill, 525. 
 
 Eighth Corps, expedition to Philippine Islands, 612. 
 
 Eighth Kentucky, at Mt. Lookout, 456. 
 
 Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, at Chancellorsville, 338; checks Jack- 
 son's pursuit, 341. 
 
 Eighteenth Corps, in movement to James, 513; ordered to capture 
 Petersburg, 514; in attack on Petersburg, 515-16; siege of Peters- 
 burg, 519; the Mine, 521; repulsed by Longstreet, 525; discon- 
 tinued, 526. 
 
■686 Index. 
 
 Eleventh Corps, effect of its disaster at Chancellorsville, 350; sent to 
 Rosecrans, 447; consolidated, 536. 
 
 Elliott's salient, the Mine, 520. 
 
 El Caney, Shatter's plan, 602; topography — defenses, 603; battle of, 
 604; losses, 605; comments, 624; compared with battle of Manila, 
 627. 
 
 Embargo, issued, 56. 
 
 Emory, General, with Nineteenth Corps at Washington, 511. 
 
 Engineering, military, Bragg's lines at Missionary Ridge, 458. 
 
 Engineers, their work in Scott's campaign, 122. 
 
 England, declares war against France, 1756, 10; declares war against 
 Holland, 42; her enemies, 54; darkest period of her history — ene- 
 mies abroad and at home, 55 ; her "Orders in Council" — claims 
 right of search — Congress declares war against, 56. 
 
 English, see British. 
 
 Entrenchments, see intrenchments. 
 
 Erie, Fort, see Fort Erie. 
 
 Escario, Colonel, marches to Santiago, 609. 
 
 Evans, General, at first battle of Bull Run, 137, 145. 
 
 Ewell, General, sent to Despatch Station, 206; left to cooperate with 
 Jackson, 223 ; left at Swift Run Gap, 225 ; at battle of Winches- 
 ter, 227 ; at battle of Cross Keys, 231 ; at Bristol Station — with- 
 draws from Manassas, 245; commands a corps, 253; in Gettysburg 
 campaign, 357; captures Winchester — crosses Potomac into Mary- 
 land, 358 ; advances on Harrisburg, 359 ; at Heidlersburg, 363 ; at 
 Gettysburg, 367; fails to take Cemetery Hill, 368; second day, 374; 
 his attack — fails to cooperate, 377; reinforces Johnson, 378; to hold 
 his position, 379; forms rear-guard, 384; his failure to take Ceme- 
 tery Hill, 387; at Wilderness, 473; May 5, 475; May 6, 479; in 
 movement to Spottsylvania, 490; at Spottsylvania, 493; repulsed 
 May 19, 500; absent sick, 511; at Sailor's Creek, 527. 
 
 Ewers, Lieutenant-Colonel, at San Juan, 606; assault of San Juan 
 Hill, 607. 
 
 Ezra Church, battle of, 545. 
 
 Fair Oaks, battle of, see Seven Pines; Johnston's only offensive bat- 
 tle, 549. 
 
 Fair View, key-point at Chancellorsville, 342; taken by Stuart, 343. 
 
 Fairfield Pass, Sedgwick's pursuit stopped at, 384. 
 
 Falls Church, camp at, 590. 
 
 Farmville, combat at, 527. 
 
 Farnsworth, General, at Gettysburg, 381 ; charges and is killed, 383. 
 
 Farragut, Admiral, captures New Orleans — moves up the Mississippi, 
 394; tries to take Vicksburg, 395; political effect of his successes 
 at Mobile, 531. 
 
 Ferguson, Major, at battle of Kings Mountain, 46. 
 
 Ferrero, General, in movement to Spottsylvania, 492; the Mine, 520-22. 
 
 Field, General, at Wilderness, 480 ; at Spottsylvania, 489. 
 
 Field Telegraph, used in battle of Manila, 626. 
 
 Field-works, at Fredericksburg, 292; at Chancellorsville, 338; first 
 used at Chancellorsville, 352; in Atlanta campaign, 553. 
 
 Fifth Corps, at Wilderness, 472; in movement to James, 513; at 
 Petersburg, 517; assault June 18, 518; siege of Petersburg, 519; the 
 Mine, 521 ; movement to the left. 524 ; in movement October 27, 
 525; movement February, 1865, 525; at Five Forks, 527; in Grant's 
 movement to the James, 528 ; in Santiago campaign, 595 ; organi- 
 zation of, 596; withdraws from Cuba, 610. 
 
Index. 687 
 
 Fifteenth Corps, in Army of the Tennessee, 536. 
 Financial policy of United States compared with that of Philippine 
 insurgent government, 40. 
 
 Fire action alone cannot carry a position, 624. 
 
 Fire Zouaves, at first battle of Bull Run, 140. 
 
 Fisher, Fort, see Fort Fisher. 
 Fisheries Bill, 24. 
 
 Five Forks, 527. 
 
 Five Nations, under Colonel Nicholson, 2 ; tribes included in, 4. 
 Flank Marches, Jackson's, at Chancellorsville, 338; from the Rapidan 
 to the James, 505; Grant's, to the James, 528; Sherman's, 548; 
 Hood's, to Lovejoy, 550; Sherman's risks, 552. 
 
 Flank Position, Washington's, at Morristown, 31; Santa Anna's, at 
 Orizaba, 125; Meade's, in Gettysburg campaign, 363; plan J. E. 
 Johnston might have adopted, 551-2; favorite method of Clause- 
 witz and von Moltke, 551. 
 
 Flanks, security of, measures strength of a position, 338. 
 
 Flournoy, Colonel, charges at Front Royal, 227. 
 
 Floyd, General, sent with force to Fort Donelson, 155 ; in command at, 
 156; blunders at, 159; escapes from, 160; his incapacity, 164. 
 
 Flying Squadron, the, 591; sails for Cuban waters, 592; detained at 
 Hampton Roads — sent to Sampson, 618. 
 
 Foote, Commodore, has Union fleet at Cairo, 111., 151 ; ordered to Fort 
 Henry, 154; attacks Fort Henry, 155; sends gunboats up Tennes- 
 see River, 155; attacks Fort Donelson — repulsed — wounded, 157; 
 assists in capturing Island No. 10, 182. 
 
 Forbes, Brigadier John, captures Fort Duquesne — wins Indians to 
 English side, 13. 
 
 Forge, Valley, see Valley Forge. 
 
 Forrest, N. B., charges McClernand's line at Fort Donelson, 159; 
 escapes with his command from Fort Donelson, 161 ; his work in 
 campaign of Forts Henry and Donelson, 166; stops Federal pur- 
 suit with a charge after Shiloh, 181; at Shiloh, 189; stops Buell's 
 advance, 309; besieges Negley at Nashville, 312; raids railway 
 from Corinth to Columbus, Ky., 313 ; breaks up Grant's railway, 
 398; after Stones River, 422; at Chickamauga, 431; starts battle 
 of Chickamauga, 432; in Chickamauga campaign, 440; goes to 
 Tennessee, 555; assigned to Hood, 561; in West Tennessee — 
 joins Hood, 562; at Johnsonville — in Hood's advance, 563; at 
 Columbia, 564, 565 ; at Spring Hill, 566 ; at Franklin— at Nashville, 
 571; during operations at Nashville, 572; covers Hood's retreat, 
 576; outgenerals Wilson, 581; at Spring Hill, 581-2; if present at 
 Nashville, 585. 
 
 Fort Dearborn, captured by Indians, 61. 
 
 Fort Donelson, why its position was chosen, 152; reinforced with 
 troops under Floyd and troops from Columbus, 155 ; why Grant 
 delayed attacking it — description of, 156; Union line there — 
 repulses attack of Foote's gunboats, 157; Confederates plan 
 and make sortie, 158; Confederate mistakes and failure, 159; sur- 
 renders to Grant — prisoners and guns taken there — strategical con- 
 sequences of its fall, 161; incapacity of Confederate commanders 
 there, 163 ; should not have been surrendered, 164 ; how it should 
 have been defended, 165. 
 
 Fort Duquesne, see Duquesne, Fort. 
 
 Fort Erie, British defeated at, 72. 
 
 Fort Fisher, captured, 585. 
 
 Fort Frontenac, captured by Colonel Bradstreet, 12. 
 
 Fort Granger, 568. 
 
688 Index. 
 
 Fort Harrison, capture of, 524. 
 
 Fort Haskell, defends Fort Stedman, 526. 
 
 Fort Heiman, 154. 
 
 Fort Hindman, see Arkansas Post. 
 
 Fort Henry, why its position was chosen, 152; Grant's expedition 
 against — description, 154; captured, 155; hazard of Grant's move- 
 ment on, 162. 
 
 Forts Henry and Donelson, lecture on, 149; Union operations against, 
 153; comments — effect of their capture — evil effects of two inde- 
 pendent commanders in one theater of operations, 162; the use of 
 interior lines, 164; effect of ignorance concerning enemy — cavalry 
 work, 166; effect of bad roads, 166; effect of their fall upon South- 
 ern people, 167. 
 
 Fort Lee, captured by British, 30. 
 
 Fort Lyman, attacked by Dieskau, 9. 
 
 Fort Mackinac, surrenders, 59. 
 
 Fort Meigs, besieged, 65. 
 
 Fort Monroe, to be Union base of operations, 194. 
 
 Fort Necessity - , 7. 
 
 Fort Niagara, built, 1 ; expedition commanded by Governor Shirley, 
 9; given up, 10; captured by English, 16; captured, 69. 
 
 Fort Pemberton, built, 401. 
 
 Fort Pitt, name of Fort Duquesne changed to, 13. 
 
 Fort Sanders, assault of, 460. 
 
 Fort Stanwix, besieged by British, 32. 
 
 Fort Stedman, assaulted, 526; why assaulted, 532. 
 
 Fort Sumter, among forts not given up to seceding States, 128 ; taken, 
 129; bombardment of, a mistake, 142; effect of bombardment, 143. 
 
 Fort Washington, captured by British, 30. 
 
 Fort Watson, captured by Marion, 49. 
 
 Fort William Henry, 10; captured, 11; Abercrombie's army camps 
 there, 12. 
 
 Fourth Corps, organized — under Granger, 447; remains at Dalton — 
 follows Johnston, 538; under Stanley, 559; sent to Thomas, 562;. 
 at Pulaski, 563; at Franklin, 569; position at Nashville, 572. 
 
 Fourteenth Corps, commanded by Jeff. C. Davis, foot-note, 544; in 
 pursuit of Hood, 559. 
 
 Fowler, Colonel, at Gettysburg, 366. 
 
 Fox, Charles, remarks on the war with American Colonies, 55. 
 
 France, declares war against England, 1756, 10; forms alliance with 
 United States, 42. 
 
 Franklin and Nashville Campaign, see campaign of Franklin and 
 Nashville. 
 
 Franklin, General, commands a brigade in McDowell's army, 133; 
 commands division in A. P., 194; driven back at West Point, 198; 
 commands Sixth Corps, 199; stocks Jackson at White Oak Swamp- 
 Creek, 207; commands Sixth Corps, 262; commands left wing, 
 264; at Crampton's Gap, 266; at Antietam, 272, at Crampton's 
 Gap, criticised, 277; not ordered to rejoin from Crampton's Gap, 
 278; commands "left grand division," 290; at Fredericksburg, 293; 
 receives vague orders from Burnside, 295 ; when he received 
 Burnside's order to charge, 300; relieved by Burnside, 329; retires 
 from Army of the Potomac, 330. 
 
 Franklin, battle of, 567; situation of, 568; intrenched — artillery, 569; 
 Opdycke's charge — Union line broken, 570; fierce — losses 571; 
 comments — Wagner's advanced position — the reserve, 583. 
 
 Frayser's Farm, battle of, see Glendale. 
 
Index. 689 
 
 Fredericksburg, campaign, 284 ; battle-field of, 291 ; Confederate earth- 
 works, 292; battle of, 293; crossing the river, 294; hostile lines at 
 beginning of, 296; on the left, 298; losses— comments, 300; distribu- 
 tion of Confederate troops, 304; best flank for Burnside's attack, 
 304; why fought — how Confederate left should have been assailed — 
 attack without plan — fifteen separate assaults, 30S; little opposition 
 to passage of stream— no counter-attack by Confederates, 306; 
 Army of the Potomac after, 329; distribution of Union forces 
 in theater of, 305. 
 
 Frederick the Great, stops Hessians' entering British service, 42. 
 -Fremont, General, his scheme of relieving East Tennessee, 224; or- 
 dered to intercept Jackson, 228; lets Jackson escape at Strasburg, 
 229; pursues Jackson, 230; at battle of Cross Keys, 232; resigns, 
 239. 
 
 French, discoveries in America, 1; extend dominion to West and 
 Valley of Mississippi, 3; posts control waterways from Canada 
 to the Mississippi, 4; establish new line of forts after Aix-la- 
 Chapelle, 6. 
 
 French and Indian War, 6. 
 
 French, W. H., at Antietam, 271; at Fredericksburg, 298; at Chan- 
 cellorsville, 335; ordered to hinder Lee's retreat from Gettysburg, 
 384. 
 
 French, S. G, at Allatoona, 558. 
 
 Frenchtown, captured, 65. 
 
 Front Royal, battle of, 226. 
 
 Frontenac, Count de, built posts at Niagara, Michilimackinac, and in 
 Illinois — attacks English posts — repulses Sir William Phips, 1. 
 
 Furor, at battle of Santiago, 610. 
 
 Gadsden, Hood concentrates there, 559. 
 
 Gage, sends troops to Concord, 24. 
 
 Gaines's Mill, battle of, 204 ; strength and losses, 205. 
 
 Gardner, General, commands at Port Hudson, 403. 
 
 Garcia, in Santiago campaign, 596; joins forces with Americans, 601; 
 in plan of attack, 602; his position at siege of Santiago, 608; fails 
 to stop Escario, 609. 
 
 Garrard, General, in Atlanta campaign, 538; covers Sherman's right, 
 540; sent to destroy railway, 543; with Stoneman, 544-5; meets 
 Jackson's cavalry, 557. 
 
 Gates, General, in northern New Jersey, 31 ; commands Americans 
 against Burgoyne, 33; takes command in the South — defeat at 
 Camden, 45. 
 
 Gaylesville, Sherman's strategic position, 577. 
 
 Geary*, General, at Gettysburg, 378; attacks Johnson, 379; at Wau- 
 hatchie, 451 ; at Mt. Lookout, 455. 
 
 Geography, early Canadian' — colonial, of America, 4; of frontier of 
 U. S. and Canada, 1812, 58; between Vera Cruz and City of 
 Mexico, 107; of Kentucky and Tennessee, 151; of Pope's theater 
 of operations, 240 ; of theater of Antietam campaign, 261 ; of thea- 
 ter of Bragg^s operations in Kentucky, 310; theater of Vicksburg 
 campaign, 400; in Chickamauga campaign, 426; below Spottsyl- 
 vania, 502; Atlanta campaign, 537; of theater of Santiago cam- 
 paign, 597. 
 
 George's, King, war, 6. 
 
 Georgia, invaded by British, 43; again invaded by General Ashe and 
 General Lincoln, 44; and other States secede, 128. 
 
 Germantown, Howe's headquarters — battle of, 35. 
 
690 Index. 
 
 Getty, General, at Fredericksburg, 299; at Wilderness, 476; intrenches 
 —attacks, 477 ; May 6, 479. 
 
 Gettysburg, first day — position of hostile forces at beginning of, 353 ; 
 Lee's plans, and objects, 354; his military reasons, 355; distribu- 
 tion of Southern forces just before, 356; operations begun, 357; 
 disposition of forces June 30, 1863, 363; battle-field — strategic 
 position of, 364; first day, 366; second day, 371; field of second 
 and third days — Union line, 371 ; Meade orders troops into posi- 
 tion, 372 ; second day — attack delayed, 375 ; Confederate attack 
 badly managed, 377; summary of battle, 378; third day — Lee re- 
 solves to renew assault — position of the troops, 378; battle be- 
 gun, 379; third day — Pickett's charge, 380; Union line — artillery 
 duel, 381 ; the charge, 382 ; cavalry, combats — Lee retreats, 383 ; 
 retreat and pursuit, 384; losses — comments — Lee's achievement, 
 385; why ground was chosen — how brought on, 387; ill-managed 
 attack, 388 ; Meade makes no counter-attack, 391 ; tactics of the 
 attack — Longstreet's tardiness, 389; Lee's chances — Sickles's faulty 
 line, 390; other faults in Meade's dispositions, 391; Meade's pur- 
 suit criticised — the cavalry, 392; autumn and winter after, 466. 
 
 Ghent, Treaty of, 75. 
 
 Gibbon, General, at Fredericksburg, 296 ; supports Meade's assault, 297 ; 
 with Sedgwick at Marye's Hill, 344 ; at Wilderness, 477 ; expects 
 Longstreet — May 6, 479; effect of Stuart's cavalry, 487; at 
 Spottsylvania, 494; at Petersburg, 517; at Reams's station, 524. 
 
 Gillmore, General, failure at Petersburg, 512. 
 
 Glendale, battle of, 207. 
 
 Gloucester, evacuated by Confederates, 198. 
 
 Gordon, General John B., helps put out fire at Wrightsville, 359; at 
 Gettysburg, 377 ; at Wilderness, 481 ; at Spottsylvania, 493 ; opposes 
 Upton, 495 ; assaults Fort Stedman, 525, 526. 
 
 Grand Gulf, fortified, 395 ; shelled by Admiral Porter, 404. 
 
 Granger, General Gordon, commands Reserve Corps, 423 ; at Chicka- 
 mauga, 431; morning Sept. 19, 432; timely arrival, 437; commands 
 Fourth Corps, 447; pursues Longstreet — started for Knoxville, 460; 
 succeeded by Howard, 536 ; at Decatur, Ala., 555 ; withdraws 
 troops, 565. 
 
 Grant, Major, defeated at Fort Duquesne, 13. 
 
 Grant, General, comments upon Scott's operations, 123; occupies 
 Paducah, Ky., 150; moves against Fort Henry, 154; captures Fort 
 Henry, 155; why he delayed attacking Fort Donelson — moves 
 against Fort Donelson, 156; expects to besiege Fort Donelson, 157; 
 his conduct at Fort Donelson, 159; his anxiety, 160; the hazard 
 of his movements on Fort Henry, 162; relieved from command, 
 170; his camp not properly protected at Shiloh, 173; expects no 
 attack at Shiloh — expects assault on Lew Wallace's camp, 175; 
 at battle of Shiloh — issues no orders to renew battle, 180; gives 
 reasons for not pursuing after Shiloh,. 182; did not appreciate 
 danger of position at Pittsburg Landing, 184 ; his conduct at Shiloh, 
 187; one of four full generals in U. S. Army, 354; left in com- 
 mand at Corinth — disposition of his forces, 395 ; correspondence 
 with Halleck — operations, 397 ; plans expedition by land and 
 river against Vicksburg — railway broken by Forrest — depot cap- 
 tured by Van Dorn — falls back, 398; goes to Vicksburg — organizes 
 four corps — orders canal dug, 399 ; tries other routes, 401 ; his first 
 operations against Vicksburg fail — final plan — concentrates army 
 below Vicksburg, 402; crosses at Bruinsburg, 404; has entire army 
 across the Mississippi — why he did not cooperate with Banks, 406; 
 lacks cavalry — moves against railway — adopts Napoleon's fa- 
 vorite movement — cuts loose from base — his forces May 11, 407; 
 
Index. 691 
 
 Grant, General — Continued. 
 
 moves on Jackson, 408; moves on Edwards's Station, 410; at 
 Champion's Hill, 411; at the Big Black, 412; lives off the coun- 
 try — base at Steele's Bayou — why he assaulted Vicksburg second 
 time, 413; the second assault — besieges Vicksburg, 414; Pemberton 
 surrenders, 415; the crisis of his career — failed in five efforts 
 against Vicksburg — declared a failure by newspapers — sum- 
 mary of Vicksburg campaign — abandonment of base and com- 
 munications discussed, 416; brilliant operations, 417; urges Rose- 
 crans to move against Bragg, 422; to command Division of the 
 Mississippi — meets Stanton at Louisville — ordered to send troops 
 to Rosecrans; 447; arrives at Chattanooga, 449; ordered to aid 
 Burnside — plan of battle, 452; orders for Nov. 25 — orders Thomas 
 to advance, 457; decisive victory — pursuit, 459; relief to Burnside, 
 460; why he ordered Thomas to assault, 461; effect of victory, 462; 
 appointed lieutenant-general and general-in-chief — concerted plan, 
 468; letter to Sherman, 469; Culpeper, 470; plan, 471; advances — 
 crosses Rapidan, 472; orders for May 5, 474; joins Meade, 475; 
 at Wilderness — orders for May 6, 478; May 7 — comments on fight- 
 ing, 481 ; comment on appointment as general-in-chief — not 
 trammeled — his combined plan — his forces, 482; objective — plan 
 discussed — did not expect battle in Wilderness, 483; starts army 
 May 7, 488; at Spottsylvania — orders reconnaissance, 493; supports 
 Upton, 495 ; attacks salient, 496 ; orders for May 14, 498 ; prepares 
 second attack on salient, 499; base at Aquia Creek — moves from 
 Spottsylvania, 500 ; moves on Hanover Town — at North Anna, 501 ; 
 at Totopotomoy — at Cold Harbor, 502; effect of "continuous ham- 
 mering" — strength and losses from Wilderness to Cold Harbor, 
 503; summary of operations from Rapidan to James — his qualities, 
 504; distinctive features of overland campaign, 505; movement to 
 Spottsylvania discussed, 506 ; why he moved by the left from Spott- 
 sylvania, 507; movement to North Anna criticised, 508; army 
 at Cold Harbor — begins movement to the James, 510; adopts 
 Rosecrans's views, foot-note, 510; rejects Halleck's plan — plans 
 capture of Petersburg — movement to the James, 512; assisted by 
 navy in crossing the James, 513 ; fools Lee — defects in orders 
 for Hancock, 514; concentrates on Petersburg, 517; begins siege 
 of Petersburg, 519; movement Oct. 27, 1864, 524; movement against 
 Lee's right February, 1865, 525; strength of army in final opera- 
 tions — last movement to the left, 526; breaks Lee's line — captures 
 Richmond, 527; Appomattox — losses in final operations, 528; 
 march to the James discussed, 528-9; operations compared with 
 McClellan's, 529; to blame for Hancock's delay — disadvantages in 
 siege of Petersburg, 530; watches for Lee to start to unite with 
 Johnston, 531 ; could not invest Lee at Petersburg, 533 ; imme- 
 diately after Chattanooga, 535; succeeded by Sherman, 536; in- 
 structions to Sherman, 537; Virginia campaign compared with 
 Sherman's, 547-8; correspondence with Sherman, 556; consents to 
 Sherman's march to the sea, 560; telegraphs Thomas — starts to 
 Nashville, 573. 
 
 Graves, Admiral, commands British fleet at Yorktown, 52. 
 
 Great Britain, see England. 
 
 Great Meadows, 7. 
 
 Greene, General Nathaniel, commands Fort Lee, 30; takes com- 
 mand at Charlotte — divides his forces, 46; campaign against Corn- 
 / wallis, 47, 48; at Guilford C. H. — returns to South Carolina, 48; 
 defeated at Hobkirks Hill — at battle of Eutaw Springs, 49; his 
 strategy — use of the "power of attraction," 54. 
 
692 Index. 
 
 Greene, General Geo. S., at Antietam, 270. 
 
 Greene, F. V., in Philippine expedition, 612; in battle of Manila — at- 
 tacked, 613. 
 
 Gregg, D. I., in pursuit of Lee's army, 384. 
 
 Gregg, D. McM., to command cavalry division, 329; covers right of 
 Meade's army, 360; at Westminster, 363; at Gettysburg, 374; com- 
 bat with Stuart, 383; with Hancock, 472; May 5, 474; against 
 Stuart, 478; in Trevilian raid, 511; with Warren — with Hancock, 
 524; movement February, 1865 — movement October 27, 525. 
 
 Gregg, John, at Raymond, 408; at Jackson, 409. 
 
 Gregg, Maxcy, at Fredericksburg, 296. 
 
 Griffin, Charles, his battery at first battle of Bull Run, 139; at 
 Chancellorsville, 335; at Wilderness, 475; at Spottsylvania, 489. 
 
 Grimes, Captain, commands battery, 602; opens fire, 605. 
 
 Guadalupe Hidalgo, treaty of, 119. 
 
 Guantanamo, captured, 593 ; as a base, discussed, 621. 
 
 Guasimas, Las, see Las Guasimas. 
 
 Grierson's Raid, 403. 
 
 Guilford Court House, battle of, 48. 
 
 Hackensack, Washington establishes camp there, 30. 
 
 Halifax, founded, 6; Loudon's forces at, 10; British fleet and army 
 there, 11. 
 
 Halleck, General, in command at St. Louis, 151 ; his and Buell's plans 
 against Johnston, 152; orders Grant to move against Fort Henry, 
 154; his action immediately after capture of Fort Donelson, 162; 
 had no arrangement with Buell for cooperation against Fort Henry, 
 163; exemplified remark of General Sherman, 166; his plans after 
 Henry and Donelson, 170; orders expedition under C F. Smith, 
 170; placed in command of all troops and territory from Knox- 
 ville to the Missouri — orders Buell to Savannah — proposes plan to 
 Buell for cutting Johnston's communications, 171 ; expected to 
 take command in person at Pittsburg Landing, 175; has no plan 
 after capture of Donelson, 183; "must have command of armies 
 in the West" — plans to move against Johnston at Corinth — did 
 nothing for ten days after capture of Donelson, 184; had written 
 book, 235; appointed commander-in-chief — orders McClellan to 
 withdraw from the James, 241 ; his appointment as general-in- 
 chief — his mistake in recalling McClellan, 253 ; his fears for Wash- 
 ington during Antietam campaign, 276; orders McClellan to give 
 battle, 285; suggests plans, 286; takes command at Pittsburg Land- 
 ing — advances to Corinth — splits up his army, 308; violates first 
 principle of modern war — why he broke up his army at Corinth — 
 gives Buell order impossible to execute, 322; correspondence with 
 Rosecrans, 326; does not approve Hooker's plans, 357; had decided 
 with President and Stanton to relieve Hooker, 360; Lee judges 
 him aright, 386; orders Rosecrans to advance against Bragg, 425; 
 his injustice, 448; says Sigel does nothing but retreat, 470; pro- 
 poses plan to Grant, 511. 
 
 Hamley, on Sherman's operations, 548. 
 
 Hampton, General Wade, his relations with Wilkinson, 68; his opera- 
 tions, 69. 
 
 Hampton, General Wade, guards the Rappahannock, 293; in Gettys- 
 burg campaign, 362; at Gettysburg, 383;. fights Miles, 490; at 
 Haw's Shop, 501; at Trevilian, 511; intercepts Wilson, 520; at 
 Reams's Station, 524. 
 
 Hancock, John, 24. 
 
 Hancock, General, at Williamsburg, 197; at Fredericksburg, 298; at 
 
Index. 693 
 
 Hancock, General — Continued. 
 
 Chancellorsville, 335; at Uniontown, 363; at Gettysburg, 368; 
 recommends position at Gettysburg, 373; bivouacs at Chancellors- 
 ville, 472; orders May 5, 474; halted, 475; ordered back, 476; 
 forms on Brock Road — his attack — fierce fighting, 477; May 6 
 — orders Gibbon forward, 479; driven back, 480; movement to 
 Spottsylvania, 488; bivouacs at Todd's Tavern, 490; at Spottsyl- 
 vania — reconnoiters, 493 ; commands attack, 494 ; renews assault, 
 495; attacks salient, 496; losses, 498; moves— attacks May 18, 
 499 ; starts south, 500 ; at North Anna, 501 ; movement to North 
 Anna criticised, 508 ; in movement to the James, 513 ; moves against 
 Petersburg — delay, 514; at Petersburg, 516; captures redans, 517; 
 disabled by old wound, 518; operations north of James, 520; the 
 Mine, 521; operations north of James, 522; operations at Reams's* 
 Station, 524; in movement October 27, 525; his delay fatal, 529; 
 how caused, 530. 
 
 Hard Times, Grant concentrates at, 402. 
 
 Hardee, General, commands division in A. S. Johnston's army, 171 ; at 
 Stones River, 315; opens the attack, 317; detached from Bragg, 428; 
 his resistance at Hoover's Gap, 440; rejoins Bragg, 447; on right, 
 449; at Missionary Ridge, 456; withdraws, 459; in Atlanta cam- 
 paign, 535; in retreat from Resaca, 539; at Kenesaw Mountain — 
 in front of Marietta, 541 ; battle of Atlanta, 544 ; operations south 
 of Atlanta, 547 ; blamed by Hood, 553 ; transferred, 557 ; at Savan- 
 nah, 585. 
 
 Harlem Heights, Washington repulses British there, 29. 
 
 Harney, Colonel, at Churubusco, 115. 
 
 Harper's Ferry, Lee's plan to capture, 264; was Lee right in sending 
 Jackson to capture? — what Jackson captured there. 275; its import- 
 ance and weakness, 276 ; evacuated by Union garrison, 358. 
 
 Harrisburg, Lee's objective, 359. 
 
 Harrison, Fort, see Fort Harrison, 524. 
 
 Harrison, William Henry, organizes an army to recapture Detroit, 
 64; his operations in 1813, 65; receives Perry's dispatch — moves 
 on Detroit, 66. 
 
 Harrison's Landing, McClellan's withdrawal to, 206. 
 
 Harvard, bears dispatches, 593. 
 
 Haskell, Fort, see Fort Haskell. 
 
 Hatch, John P., beaten to Gordonsville by Jackson, 241. 
 
 Hatch, Edward, opposes Hood, 562; operations, 563, 564. 
 
 Haviland, commands one of Amherst's columns, 20. 
 
 Hawkins, General, at San Juan, 606. 
 
 Haw's Shop, combat at, 501. 
 
 Haynes's Bluff, 398. 
 
 Hays General, at Chancellorsville. 342; in Chancellorsville campaign, 
 344. 
 
 Hazel Grove, 342. . 
 
 Hazen, General, at Stones River, 318 ; in Chickamauga campaign, 427 ; 
 at Chattanooga, 450. 
 
 Heath, General, left to command West Point, 51. 
 
 Heiman, Fort, see Fort Heiman. ,.,,... ,,, 
 
 Heintzelman, General, commands McDowells third division, Hi; 
 at first battle of Bull Run, 138; commands Third Corps in A. P., 
 194; ordered to support McDowell, 245; commands Third Corps, 
 262.' 
 
 Henry, Fort, see Fort Henry. 
 
 Henry, Guy V., in Porto Rican expedition, 615. 
 
 Henry' and Donelson, see Forts Henry and Donelson. 
 
 Henry House Hill, in first battle of Bull Run, 138; Confederate as- 
 sault, 139; the combat upon, 140; in second battle of Bull Run, 250. 
 
694 Index. 
 
 Herkimer, Nicholas, at battle of Oriskany, 32. 
 
 Heth, General Henry, brings on battle of Gettysburg, 364; at Gettys- 
 burg, 365; second day, 375, 377; third day, 380; at Wilderness, 
 473; on Plank Road, 476; takes position facing Getty, 477; May 
 6 — position changed, 479; at Spottsylvania, 494; returns' to his 
 position, 496; attacks Warren — second attack, 523. 
 
 Highland Passes, their strategical importance, 28. 
 
 Hill, A. P., at Seven Pines, 201; at battle of Mechanicsville, 204; at 
 Gaines's Mill, 205 ; at Malvern Hill, 208 ; his attack at Beaver Dam 
 Creek criticised, 215; at battle of Cedar Mountain, 242; with- 
 draws from Manasses, 246; his timely assault at Antietam, 273; 
 covers Lee's withdrawal after Antietam, 284; at Fredericksburg, 
 296; at Chancellorsville, 339; deploys his troops — wounded, 342; 
 commands a corps, 353 ; in Gettysburg campaign, 357 ; moves toward 
 the valley — reaches Shepherdstown, 359; at Cashtown, 363 ; marches 
 to Gettysburg, 365 ; second day, 375 ; fails to cooperate, 377 ; at- 
 tacks Union center, 379; third day, 380; guards trains in retreat, 
 384; at Wilderness, 473; May 6, 479; position at Spottsylvania, 
 493; position south of Chickahominy, 514; at Petersburg, 518; 
 attacks Second Corps, 519; attacks Warren, 523; second attack — 
 at Reams's Station, 524 ; attacks at Burgess's Mill, 525 ; final' opera- 
 tions, 526; slain, foot-note, 527. 
 
 Hill, D. H., at Williamsburg, 197 ; at Seven Pines, 201 ; at Mechanics- 
 ville, 204; at Gaines's Mill, 205; stopped with Jackson at White 
 Oak Swamp Creek, 207; at Malvern Hill, 208; at battle of South 
 Mountain, 265; at Antietam, 267, 269; at Port Royal, 293; recalled 
 to Fredericksburg, 296; joins Bragg, 428; at Chickamauga, 431; 
 assaults Thomas's left, 437; quits Bragg, 447. 
 
 Hill, General John, expedition against Canada, 2; expedition wrecked 
 in St. Lawrence, 3. 
 
 Hindman, Fort, see Arkansas Post. 
 
 Hindman, General, in Chickamauga campaign, 429; at Chickamauga, 
 434. 
 
 Hinks, General, in attack of Petersburg, 515, 516. 
 
 History, Military, see Military History, 530. 
 
 Hobkirk's Hill, battle of, 49. 
 
 Hobson, Lieutenant, sinks Merrimac, 594. 
 
 Hoke, General, at Cold Harbor, 502; at Petersburg, 516. 
 
 Holly Springs, captured by Van Dorn, 398. 
 
 Holmes, General, at Aquia Creek, 131 ; not at Glendale, 207. 
 
 Hood, General, at Antietam, 267, 269; at Fredericksburg, 296; not at 
 Chancellorsville, 330; at Gettysburg, 369; in the attack, 374; his 
 position — attacks, 375; wounded, 376; third day, 380; in Chicka- 
 mauga campaign, 430; at Chickamauga, 431; bivouacs, 432; in 
 Atlanta campaign, 535; at Cassville, 540; in retreat from Resaca — 
 frustrates Johnston's plan, 539 ; in front of Marietta — repulsed, 541 ; 
 succeeds Johnston — strength of his army — at Peachtree Creek — 
 withdraws into Atlanta, 543 ; line of supply — battle of Atlanta, 
 544; Sherman operates against his communications, 544-6; evacuates 
 Atlanta — withdraws to Lovejoy's Station, 547; forced to aggres- 
 sive policy — discussed — blames Hardee, 553; at Lovejoy's Station, 
 555 ; takes offensive — visited by President Davis — plan arranged — 
 strength of army, 556; begins operations, 557; captures Dalton — 
 moves westward, 558; concentrates at Gadsden, 559; comprehensive 
 plan, 560-1 ; visited by Beauregard — advances to the Tennessee — • 
 turns west — at Decatur — at Tuscumbia, 561; delay — Forrest joins — 
 invasion of Tennessee alarms North — Thomas's forces, 562; ad- 
 vances against Nashville, 563; at Columbia, 564-6; delayed 
 by weather, 565; at Spring Hill, 566-7; pursues, 567; at Frank- 
 lin, 569; breaks Union line, 570; states his strength — follows Scho- 
 
Index. 695 
 
 Hood. General — Continued. 
 
 field to Nashville, 571; his line at Nashville, 574; line shattered— 
 forms new line, 575; routed— losses— reaches Tupelo— resigns, 
 576; compared with Thomas— operations against Sherman criti- 
 cised, 577 ; campaign in Tennessee reviewed, 578-81 ; his purposes— 
 his forces, 578-9; wait at Florence, 579; action at Spring Hill 
 criticised, 581-2; mistake in advancing to Nashville — expectation, 
 583; mistakes, 584; why his army escaped, 585. 
 Hovey, General, at Champion's Hill, 411. 
 
 Hooker, General, commands division in A. P., 194; at Williamsburg, 
 107; ordered to Manassas— at Bristoe Station, 245; commands 
 First Corps, 262; at Antietam, 269; effect of his crossing Antie- 
 tam Creek, Sept. 16, 1862, 278; commands "center grand division," 
 290; at Fredericksburg, 293; his order from Burnside, 296; attacks 
 stone wall, 299; dismissed by Burnside — appointed to relieve Burn- 
 side — his reputation — effect of appointment — reforms — reports ab- 
 sentees, 329; organization of his army — "the finest army on the 
 planet," 330; his plan of operations, 331; concentration at Chan- 
 cellorsville, 332; vents his elation at Chancellorsville— not well 
 informed — what he expected Lee to do — bad use of his cavalry, 
 343; withdraws Union line — his defensive position, 337; learns 
 of Jackson's flank movement and warns Howard, 339; believes 
 Lee is retreating— orders up First Corps and recalls Averell's cav- 
 alry — orders Sedgwick to pursue, 341 ; orders Sickles to attack at 
 night, 342; his line falls back, 343; disabled— his orders to 
 Sedgwick, 344; withdraws from Chancellorsville — his losses, 346; 
 puts Pleasonton in Averell's place — operations in Chancellorsville 
 campaign first masterly, then faulty, 347; his mistakes, 348; his 
 offensive strategy and defensive tactics, 349; believed Jackson's 
 column was Lee's army retreating, 350; held in intrenchments by 
 inferior numbers — his reserves not employed — his withdrawal saves 
 Lee from bloody repulse — charges his defeat to Sedgwick, 351 ; 
 position and condition of army after Chancellorsville, 353 ; de- 
 fective organization of his army, 354; gets wind of Lee's plans — 
 proposes plans which are not approved at Washington, 356; his 
 operations subordinated to Lee's — orders Sedgwick to recon- 
 noiter — sends cavalry to Culpeper, 357; extends his right — starts 
 toward Manassas, 358; conforms to Lee's movements — enters 
 Maryland, 359; relieved — succeeded by Meade, 360; effect of oper- 
 ating against Lee's communications, 386; sent to aid Rosecrans, 
 447 ; to cooperate with W. F. Smith, 450 ; in plan of attack ; 453 ; 
 at Mount Lookout, 454; advances against Missionary Ridge, 457-9; 
 commands Twentieth Corps, 536 ; combat with Hood, 541 ; resigns, 
 543; blocked Thomas's way, 552. 
 Hopkins, General, deserted by his militia, 64. 
 Hornets Nest, 177; held by Union troops, 178. 
 
 Howard, General, commands a brigade in McDowell's army, 133; at 
 Fredericksburg, 299; commands Eleventh Corps, 330; at Chan- 
 cellorsville, 335; warned of Jackson's flank movement, 339; his line 
 not aware of Jackson's approach — his line, 340; his line warned by 
 flight of wild animals — his troops flee, 341 ; knew Jackson's column 
 was marching. 349: effect of his disaster at Chancellorsville, 350; 
 at Emmitsburg, 363; assumes command — at Gettysburg, 366; sent 
 to aid Rosecrans, 447; at Chattanooga — attacks Law, 451; in plan 
 of attack, 453 ; supports Thomas, 453-4 ; supports Sherman, 457 ; 
 commands Fourth Corps, 536; remains at Dalton — follows Johns- 
 ton, 538: at Peachtree Creek, 543; commands Army of the Ten- 
 nessee, 544; at Ezra Church, 545; moves against Hood's commu- 
 nications. 544-6; operations south of Atlanta, 546-7; occupies 
 Eastpoint, 547; in pursuit of Hood, 559. 
 
696 Index. 
 
 Howe, Admiral, commands British fleet, 29; captures Forts Mifflin 
 and Mercer, 35. 
 
 Howe, Lord, with Abercrombie — killed, 12. 
 
 Howe, General Sir William, arrives at Boston — at Bunker Hill, 24; 
 evacuates Boston — comment on his evacuation and subsequent con- 
 duct, 25; lands army on Staten Island, 28; routs Putnam at 
 Brooklyn Heights — repulsed at Harlem Heights— divides his army — 
 attacks Washington at White Plains, 29; transfers army to Dobbs 
 Ferry — joins Cornwallis at New Brunswick — posts army in winter 
 quarters, 30; issues proclamations, 31; does not support Bur- 
 goyne — his campaign at Philadelphia — instructions from the Min- 
 istry, 33; concentrates forces at New Brunswick — maneuvers 
 against Washington in New Jersey — embarks for Philadelphia — 
 at battle of Brandywine, 34; captures Philadelphia — at battle of 
 Germantown — puts headquarters at Germantown — his army win- 
 ters at Philadelphia— resigns, 35 ; comment on his conduct — his quali- 
 ties, reputation, etc., 36; summary of his operations — explanation of 
 his conduct — a Whig — promise to his Whig constituents, 37; why 
 tolerated — his instructions from Ministry, 38. 
 
 Hudson, Port, see Port Hudson. 
 
 Hudson River, as line of invasion, 5 ; strategic importance, 28. 
 
 Huger, General, opposed to Butler, 131 ; at Seven Pines, 201 ; not at 
 Glendale, 207; at Malvern Hill, 208. 
 
 Hugh McCulloch, in Dewey's fleet, 611. 
 
 Hull, General, his operations in 1812 — advances to Detroit, 58; occu- 
 pies Sandwich, 59; withdraws across the Detroit river — his vacilla- 
 tions, 60; surrenders — tried for cowardice, 61. 
 
 Humphreys, General, at Fredericksburg, 300; at Chancellorsville, 335; 
 at Gettysburg, 374; commands Second Corps, 525; pursuit to 
 Appomattox — at Farmville, 528. 
 
 Hunt, General H. J., commands artillery of A. P., 194; at Fredericks- 
 burg, 293 ; at Gettysburg, 373 ; withholds his artillery fire, 381 ; 
 reopens fire, 382. 
 
 Hunter, General, commands McDowell's second division, 133 ; re- 
 treats before Early, 511 ; moving on Lynchburg, 510. 
 
 Hurlbut, General, his dispositions at Shiloh, 176; pushed back, 177; 
 at the Hornets Nest — rallies on Webster's batteries, 178; com- 
 mands Sixteenth Corps, 399. 
 
 Huron, Lake, as line of invasion, 5. 
 
 Hutchinson, Governor, refuses to let tea return to England, 22. 
 
 Ignorance, concerning enemy, its effect, 166. 
 
 Illinois, early French posts, 1. 
 
 Imboden, John D., in Gettysburg campaign, 358, 363 ; escorts trains in 
 retreat, 384. 
 
 Immune Regiments, in Cuba, 611. 
 
 Indiana, escorts Shatter's transports, 596. 
 
 Indians, in War of 1812, 77. 
 
 Infantry, Eighteenth, Philippine expeditions, 612; First, at El Caney, 
 604; Fourteenth, Philippine expedition, 612; Fourth, at El Caney — 
 Seventeenth, at El Caney — Seventh, at El Caney, 604; Sixteenth, 
 at San Juan, 607; Sixth, at San Juan, 606, 607; Twelfth, at El 
 Caney— Twenty-fourth, at El Caney, 604; Twenty-third, Philippine 
 expedition, 612. 
 
 Insurgents, Philippine, see Philippine insurgents. 
 
 Interior Lines, in the campaign of Forts Henry and Donelson, 164; 
 fine example of use of, 233 ; possessed by Southern armies, 356 ; 
 of Confederacy broken, 462; in siege of Petersburg, 530. 
 
Index. 697 
 
 Intrenchments, not used at Antietam, 281; at Fredericksburg, 292; 
 
 use in Atlanta campaign, 553. 
 Iowa, in Schley's squadron, 593. 
 Iroquois, 4. 
 
 Isabel, Point, see Point Isabel. 
 Island No. 10, surrendered, 182. 
 Iuka, battle of, 396. 
 Izard, General, succeeds Wilkinson, 71. 
 
 Jackson, Andrew, commands Americans at New Orleans, 74. 
 
 Jackson, John K., at Shiloh, 178; at Stones River, 315. 
 
 Jackson, Stonewall, at first battle of Bull Run — Bee gives him im- 
 mortal nickname, 139; and Sherman only generals show tactical 
 knowledge at first battle of Bull Run, 147 ; j oins Lee from the 
 valley — fails to reach battle of Mechanicsville, 204; at Gaines's 
 Mill, 205; not at Savage's Station — stops at White Oak Swamp 
 Creek, 207; at Malvern Hill, 208; his conduct in the Seven Days' 
 Battles criticised, 215; his valley campaign, 217; early operations 
 in the valley, 218; operations in the valley after first Bull Run, 
 219; his expedition against Romney and Bath, 219; object of ex- 
 pedition — sends in his resignation, 220; operations against Banks 
 in March, 1862 — effect of his combat at Kernstown, 222; with- 
 draws to Swift Run Gap, 224; begins operations against Fremont 
 and Banks — at battle of McDowell, 225; returns to Valley — be- 
 tween Banks and Fremont, 226; in pursuit of Banks — at battle of 
 Winchester, 227 ; no cavalry to pursue after victory — pursues to 
 Potomac, 228; eludes Fremont, Banks and Shields, 229; retreats 
 to Port Republic, 230; plans to defeat Fremont and Shields sepa- 
 rately, 231 ; nearly captured — at battle of Port Republic — with- 
 draws to Brown's Gap, 232; goes from valley to join Lee — 
 causes orders from Washington to be revoked, 233; the strategy 
 of his operations — his operations merely a strategic diversion, 
 234; had studied military science — books carried in saddle pockets, 
 235 ; his operations like Napoleon's — his maxims — summary of his 
 operations in the valley, 236 ; sent to Gordonsville, 241 ; at battle 
 of Cedar Mountain, 242 ; falls back to Gordonsville, 243 ; starts 
 to turn Pope's army, 244; withdraws from Manassas — takes posi- 
 tion near Groveton, 246 ; at second Bull Run, 250 ; at battle of 
 Chantilly, 251; his turning movement criticised, 254; at Harper's 
 Ferry, 266; at Antietam, 268-; advised fighting at Antietam, 279; 
 left in valley, 290; rejoins Lee at Fredericksburg. 291; his position 
 at Fredericksburg, 292; makes no counter-attack at Fredericks- 
 burg, 306 ; marches to Chancellorsville — at Tabernacle Church, 333 ; 
 his turning movement at Chancellorsville, 338; direction of his 
 march — movement discovered, 339; shown Federal right by Fitz- 
 hugh Lee — forms line for attack, 340 ; orders Rodes forward, 341 ; 
 pursues Howard's troops — his lines stopped — prepares to cut 
 Hooker's retreat — killed, 342; risk in his flank march, 349; its 
 chief danger, 350. 
 
 Jackson, Miss., Confederate base in Mississippi, 400; battle of, 409. 
 
 Jackson, General W. H., in Atlanta campaign, 539; guards Johnston's 
 right, 541, precedes Hood's army, 557. 
 
 James River, open to Union fleets, 198. 
 
 James, Army of, Butler commanded, by "political necessity," 530. 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas, issued embargo, 56; tells how to invade Canada, 
 57; his remark about militia, 76. 
 
 Jenkins, A. G., in Gettysburg campaign, 358. 363 ; at Chambersburg, 
 358. 
 
 Jenkins, Micah, at Wauhatchie, 451 ; killed, 480. 
 
698 Index. 
 
 Johnson, Bushrod R., at Chickamauga, 431; delayed by Minty, 432; at 
 Petersburg, 516; attacks with A. P. Hill, 519. 
 
 Johnson, Edward, in Gettysburg campaign, 359; at Gettysburg, 368; 
 position, second day, 375; attacks Culp's Hill, 377; reinforced, 378; 
 inside Union trenches — attacked and driven out, 379; on third 
 day, 380; his division of little use at Gettysburg, 389; at Wilder- 
 ness, 475; captured at Spottsylvania, 496; at Spring Hill, 567, 582; 
 supports Cheatham, 570. ' 
 
 Johnson, Sir John, commands Indians and Tories, 32. 
 
 Johnson, Colonel Richard M., commands mounted regiment at battle 
 of the Thames, 66. 
 
 Johnson, Richard W., at Stones River, 315; driven from field, 317; 
 at Chickamauga, 432; at Chattanooga, 454; at Missionary Ridge, 
 458; at Nashville, 575. 
 
 Johnson, William, commands expedition against Crown Point in 
 1755 — his character — builds Fort Lyman, 8; defeats Dieskau, 9. 
 
 Johnsonville, attacked by Forrest, 563. 
 
 Johnston, Albert Sidney, placed in command of Confederate forces in 
 West — his forces, 150; his plan and means of opposing Halleck 
 and Buell, 153; falls back from Bowling Green to Nashville, 155; 
 retreats to Murfreesboro, 161 ; fails to make use of his only 
 chance, 162-3 ; why he fell back from Bowling Green, 164 ; what 
 he expected at Fort Donelson, 165 ; his situation after Henry and 
 Donelson — moves army to Corinth, 169; reaches Corinth — his army 
 concentrated at Corinth- — organization of his army — his command- 
 ers, 171; advances on Shiloh — blunders in his concentration, 173; 
 his army the night before Shiloh — his army encounters Union out- 
 posts, 176; killed, 178; should have reunited his divided army — 
 influenced by public opinion — decried by newspapers, 183 ; his con- 
 centration at Shiloh, 186; his conduct at Shiloh — his plan of battle, 
 187. 
 
 Johnston, Joseph E., in Shenandoah Valley, 131 ; ordered to reinforce 
 Beauregard — his operations against Patterson, 134; at first battle 
 of Bull Run, 138; camps army at Centreville, 142; his troops at 
 first battle of Bull Run, 145; his army remains at Centreville, 192; 
 withdraws from Centreville, 194; marches army to Yorktown, 196; 
 withdraws from Yorktown, 197; on south side of Chickahominy, 
 199; within Richmond intrenchments — organization of his army 
 at Richmond — issues order to attack McCleilan's army, 200; at 
 Seven Pines, 201; wounded, 202; asks for reinforcements in order 
 to cross Potomac, 211; his operations against McClellan reviewed, 
 214; conceived Jackson's Valley campaign, 234; sent to relieve 
 Bragg after failure in Kentucky, 325; telegraphs Pemberton, 408; 
 goes to Mississippi — wires Richmond, "I am too late," 409; orders 
 Pemberton to attack Grant's rear, 410; in Mississippi during siege 
 of Vicksburg — advances to relieve Pemberton 1 — retreats to Jack- 
 son, 415 ; his management in the Vicksburg campaign criticised, 
 421 ; nominal command included Bragg's army, 463; commands con- 
 solidated forces,' 468; takes command at Dalton — organization of 
 forces, 535; position turned at Dalton, 537-8: withdraws to Resaca. 
 538; plans attack — withdraws from Resaca. 539; at Cassville — re- 
 tires to Allatoona Pass — withdraws to New Hope Church, 540; 
 at Lost and Bush Mountains — withdraws troops from Pine 
 Mountain — at Kenesaw Mountain, 541 ; withdraws to Smyrna — re- 
 tires into intrenchments at bridge — withdraws to Peachtree Creek, 
 542; relieved of command, 543; view of McPherson's action at 
 Resaca — his skill — Seven Pines his only offensive battle, 549; his 
 escape from Resaca discussed, 550; his defensive operations criti- 
 
Index. 699 
 
 Johnston, Joseph E. — Continued. 
 
 cised — plan of a flank position, S51-2; opportunities to attack Sher- 
 man — wanted to make war without fighting, 552; might have held 
 Atlanta — his failure to fortify Snake Creek Gap — positions taken 
 at river crossing, 533; in North Carolina — surrenders, 586. 
 
 Jones, General D. R., at Antietam, 267, 272. 
 
 Jones, John Paul, 41. 
 
 Jones, Wm. E., in Gettysburg campaign, 362. 
 
 Kautz, General, at Petersburg, 512; in attack of Petersburg, 514; 
 Wilson's raid, 519-20. 
 
 Kearny, General, commands division in A. P., 194; at Williamsburg, 
 197 ; at Seven Pines, 201 ; ordered to support McDowell — ordered to 
 Bristoe Station, 245 ; killed at Chantilly, 251. 
 
 Kelly's Ferry, importance of road to Brown's Ferry, 464. 
 
 Kenesaw Mountain, battle of, 541 ; Sherman's attack criticised, 550. 
 
 Kenly, Colonel, at Front Royal, 226. 
 
 Kent, General, commands division in Santiago campaign, 596; in ad- 
 vance to Siboney, 599; in plan of attack, 602; night before San 
 Juan, 603; at San Juan, 604, 606. 
 
 Kentucky, the Eighth, see Eighth Kentucky. 
 
 Kentucky, tries to stand neutral, 129; her attitude at outbreak of 
 Civil War — her neutrality recognized — her neutrality violated — 
 Union troops therein commanded by Buell, 150; military geogra- 
 phy — railwavs, 151 ; Bragg" s invasion compared, 439. 
 
 Ker, Captain, at battle of Palo Alto, 85. 
 
 Kernstown. battle of, 221 ; its effect, 222. 
 
 Kershaw, General, at Gettysburg, 376; at Spottsylvania, 489; first po- 
 sition, 493. 
 
 Kettle Hill, 602 ; combat at, 604 ; Spanish force, 605 ; combat begins — 
 battle of, 606; carried by assault, 607; comments, 625-6. 
 
 Keyes, General, commands a brigade in McDowell's army, 133; com- 
 mands Fourth Corps in A. P., 194. 
 
 Key West, naval base, 591. 
 
 Kilpatrick, General, put in front of Meade's army, 360; combat with 
 Stuart at Hanover, 362; at Hanover, 363; at Gettysburg, 374; on 
 third day, 381 ; sacrifices Farnsworth's brigade, 383 ; in pursuit of 
 Lee's army, 384, 385; raid on Richmond, 468; transferred to 
 Sherman, 470; in Atlanta campaign, 537; moves on Calhoun, 538; 
 covers Sherman's rear, 540; covers right of army, 545; raid in 
 Georgia, 546; meets Jackson's cavalry, 557. 
 
 Kimball, General Nathan, at Spring Hill, 566, 567 ; at Franklin, 569. 
 
 King William's War, 1. 
 
 King George's War, 6. 
 
 King, General Rufus, commands division in A. P., 194; at second 
 Bull Run, 246; starts for Manassas, 247; at second Bull Run, 
 August 29, 249. 
 
 Kings Mountain, battle of, 46. 
 
 Kirk, Admiral, captures Quebec, 1. 
 
 Kitchener, Lord, his reply, 441. 
 
 Knyphausen, General, at battle of Brandywine, 34. 
 
 Lacolle Creek, battle of, 71. 
 
 Lacy Farm, headquarters of Grant and Meade at Wilderness, 475. 
 
 Lafayette, in command in Virginia — operations against Cornwallis, 
 
 50; closes on Yorktown, 52. 
 Lane, General James H., at Fredericksburg, 296. 
 Lane, General Joe, defeats Santa Anna, 119. 
 Las Guasimas, combat at — losses, 600; comments — Rubin's orders, 
 
 623. 
 
700 Ixdex. 
 
 Law, General, at Gettysburg, 375; captures Devil's Den, 376; at Chat- 
 tanooga, 449; attacked by Howard, 451. 
 
 Lawrence, the brig, blockades Rio Grande, 84. 
 
 Lawton, General A. R., his brigade at Fredericksburg, 298. 
 
 Lawton, General H. W., his march compared with Warren's, 507; 
 commands division in Santiago campaign, 596; advances to Sibo- 
 ney, 598; in advance to Siboney, 599; reconnoiters, 601-2; in plan 
 of attack, 602; night before El Caney, 603; at El Caney — ordered 
 to San Juan, 604; marches to San Juan — his position, 608; El 
 Caney criticised, 624-5. 
 
 Ledlie, General, at Petersburg, 517; the Mine, 520-2. 
 
 Lee, Fort, see Fort Lee. 
 
 Lee, General Charles, left in command at North Castle, 30; captured, 
 31 ; at battle of Monmouth, 35. 
 
 Lee, Fitzhugh, his failure to execute an order frustrates General 
 Lee's plan, 243; at Chancellorsville, 336; covers Jackson's turning 
 movement, 339; shows Jackson Federal right, 340; in Gettysburg 
 campaign, 362; at Gettysburg, 383; delays Federal column, 489; 
 supports Rosser, 490; in movement to Spottsylvania discussed, 
 506. 
 
 Lee, "Light Horse Harry," and Marion capture Fort Motte and Fort 
 Granby — captures Augusta, 49. 
 
 Lee, Robert E., in Scott's campaign, 122; President Davis's military 
 adviser, 132; arranges plan with Jackson to divert Mc- 
 Dowell, 199; assumes command of army — withdraws army 
 to Richmond, 202; plans offensive movement — withdraws Jack- 
 son from Valley, 203; his order for attack, 204; his plans 
 to intercept McClellan — after Gaines's Mill, 206; at Glen- 
 dale, 207; at Malvern Hill, 208; his operations in the Penin- 
 sular campaign reviewed, 214; conceived Jackson's Valley cam- 
 paign, 234; credit due him for Confederate successes of 1862, 235; 
 marches army to Gordonsville, 243 ; resolves to attack Pope — his 
 plan, 243; advances to the Rappahannock — starts Jackson to turn 
 Pope's army — follows Jackson, 244; reaches Thoroughfare Gap, 
 246; resolves to turn Pope's right — after Second Bull Run, 250; 
 criticised for Jackson's turning movement, 254; his mistakes at 
 second battle of Bull Run, 258; prepares to invade Maryland — 
 condition of his army, 260 ; purpose of invasion, 261 ; crosses Poto- 
 mac,- 262; concentrates at Frederick City — issues "S. O. No. 191," 
 263 ; copy found by Federals, 264 ; position of his army September 
 13, 1862 — at battle of South Mountain, 265 ; his anxiety after South 
 Mountain — retreats — stops at Sharpsburg, 267; withdraws from 
 Antietam, 273; objective of invasion of Maryland, 274; why he or- 
 dered capture of Harper's Ferry, 275 ; his best plan— why he took 
 risks, 276; McClellan fails to take full advantage of "lost order," 
 277 ; should not have fought at Antietam, 278 ; his good management 
 at battle of Antietam, 281 ; his army after Antietam — organizes army 
 into corps, etc., 284; moves to oppose McClellan's advance, 287; 
 position and strength of forces, November 7, 1862, 288; not sur- 
 prised by Burnside's movement — advances Longstreet to Freder- 
 icksburg, 290; joined by Jackson's corps, 291; his line at Fred- 
 ericksburg, 292; prepares for battle — distribution of his troops, 
 296; his plan to oppose McClellan, 301; why he decided to defend 
 the Rappahannock, 302; divided his army — understood his 
 opponents, 303; distribution of his troops at Fredericksburg, 304; 
 makes no counter-attack at Fredericksburg, 306; condition and 
 position of army after Fredericksburg, 330; plans offensive canr- 
 
Index. 701 
 
 Lee, Robert E. — Continued. 
 
 paign, 332; learns of Hooker's movement — dispatches Anderson's 
 division to Chancellorsville — discerns Hooker's plan — makes dis- 
 positions, 333; kept informed of Hooker's movements, 334; moves 
 against Hooker at Chancellorsville, 335 ; pursues cautiously, 337 ; 
 his line — plans turning movement, 338 ; makes feints to aid Jack- 
 son's movement, 339; engages Hooker's entire line, 341; advances 
 and captures Chancellorsville, 343; prevented from assaulting Fed- 
 erals in new position by reports from Fredericksburg, 344; finds 
 Hooker's army has withdrawn — losses, 346 ; sends McLaws to 
 meet Sedgwick — sends rest of Anderson's division, 345 ; resolves 
 to make final assault at Chancellorsville, 346; at first fooled by 
 Hooker, 348; saved from bloody repulse by Hooker's withdrawal, 
 351 ; position, strength and condition of army after Chancellors- 
 ville — reorganizes army — a full general — army organization — 
 artillery organization, 353; his plans and objectives in Gettysburg 
 campaign, 354; military reasons for Gettysburg campaign — influ- 
 ence of Vicksburg, etc. — line of operations and communications — 
 urges army be organized under Beauregard at Culpeper, 355; 
 does not adopt plan suggested by Longstreet, 356; starts north- 
 ward, 357; ignorant of whereabouts of Union army, 360; letter 
 published by Colonel Mosby, foot-note, 361 ; had planned concentra- 
 tion near Cashtown — orders concentration, 361 ; in need of Stuart's 
 cavalry, 362 ; disposition of forces June 30, 1863, 363 ; strategic position 
 at Gettysburg, 364; reaches Gettysburg — defective orders to Ewell 
 368; how he had learned of battle, 369; orders attack for next morn- 
 ing, 370; purposed attacking early July 2 — order for attack, 374; his 
 attack on second day badly managed, 377; resolves to assault July 
 3 — his army all present, 378; ground held by his troops in morning 
 July 3 — his plan — changes his plan — selects point of attack, 379; 
 directs Longstreet to make assault, 380; expects counter-attack — 
 retreats, 384; takes position pending fall of Potomac — recrosses 
 river, 385; judges Halleck and President Lincoln aright, 386; why 
 he ordered concentration at Cashtown — result of failure to take 
 Cemetery Hill, 387; his attacks at Gettysburg ill-managed, 388; 
 his chances of victory, 390; after retreat from Gettysburg — at Cul- 
 peper — troops detached — campaign of maneuvers, 466 ; not deceived 
 — moves to oppose Grant, 473; orders to Ewell and Hill, 474; pur- 
 sues to Bull Run — fails to intercept Meade — returns to Culpeper — 
 and the Rapidan, 467; at Mine Run, 468; position of troops at be- 
 ginning of Wilderness operations, 471 ; with A. P. Hill on Plank 
 Road, 477; May 6, 479; delays attack, 480; May 7 — orders Gordon 
 to attack, 481 ; forced to defensive, 482 ; his boldness — his plan 
 discussed, 485 ; movement to Spottsylvania, 488 ; line at Spottsylva- 
 nia, 492; anticipates Grant, 500; at North Anna — starts Ewell 
 for Hanover, 501 ; at Cold Harbor — at Totopotomoy, 502 ; 
 strength and losses from Wilderness to Cold Harbor — effect 
 of Grant's "continuous hammering," 503 ; distinctive features of 
 operations from Wilderness to Cold Harbor — reduced to the de- 
 fensive, 505; movement to Spottsylvania discussed, 506; if Grant 
 had turned his left at Spottsylvania, 508; position at Cold Harbor, 
 510; discovers Grant's withdrawal — takes position south of Chick- 
 ahominy, 513; fooled by Grant's strategy, 514; slow reinforcing 
 Petersburg, 516; orders army to Petersburg, 518; Grant's move- 
 ment October 27, 1864, 524; final operations, 526; thinks of uniting 
 with Johnston, 526; right forced — withdraws from Richmond and 
 Petersburg — retreat, 527; surrenders — number of men, 528; ad- 
 vantages in siege of Petersburg, 530; why forced to flee — why he 
 
702 Ixdex. 
 
 Lee, Robert E. — Continued. 
 
 let himself be besieged, 530-1; agreed with Mr. Davis to try to 
 join Johnston, 531; if Petersburg had been taken at the start, 
 532-3 ; could not be invested — cut off by cavalry, 533 ; campaign 
 against Grant compared with Johnston's in Georgia, 547-8. 
 
 Lee, S. D., commands Hood's old corps, foot-note, 545; at Ezra Church, 
 545; in Hood's advance, 564; at Columbia, 566; at Spring Hill, 
 567; in pursuit, 568; at FYanklin, 569; at Nashville, 571, 575. 
 
 Lee, W. H. F., with D. H. Hill, 293 ; operations during Chancellors- 
 ville campaign, 347; in Gettysburg campaign, 362; ordered to find 
 Grant's army, 518; pursues Wilson, 520. 
 
 Leesbueg, Confederate detachment there, 131. 
 
 Levi, Point, see Point Levi. 
 
 Levis, General, besieges Quebec, 20. 
 
 Lexington, battle of, 24. 
 
 Liddell, General, at Chickamauga, 433. 
 
 Linares, General, at Santiago, 597; withdraws detachments to San- 
 tiago, 599 ; at Las Guasimas, 600 ; force July 1 — armament, 603 ; 
 reinforces San Juan and Kettle Hills — his forces, 605 ; wounded, 
 footnote, 609; why he stayed at Santiago — criticised, 622-3; his 
 mistake at Las Guasimas, 623. 
 
 Lincoln, General, sent to oppose British in South Carolina, 43; again 
 invades Georgia — besieges Savannah — surrenders Charleston, 44. 
 
 Lincoln, Abraham, succeeds Buchanan — his administration takes no 
 steps to reduce seceded States, 128; notifies Confederate authori- 
 ties he will supply Fort Sumter — calls out militia, 129; issues sec- 
 ond call for troops — orders McDowell to advance, 131 ; no experi- 
 ence of military affairs — compared with Jefferson Davis, 143; his 
 mistake concerning Patterson, 144; proposes a plan to Buell, 153; 
 effect of order placing Halleck in supreme command in West, 185 ; 
 issues "war orders," 193; breaks up McClellan's command — organ- 
 izes several territorial departments, 222; issues call for troops, 
 228; appoints Pope to command Army of Virginia, 239; did wisely 
 in consolidating armies of Fremont, Banks and McDowell, 252; 
 his mistake in selecting Halleck, 253; relieves Burnside and ap- 
 points Hooker, 329; does not approve Hooker's plans, 357; re- 
 places Hooker with Meade, 360; Lee judges him aright — why Lee 
 stretched army from Fredericksburg to Williamsport, 386; assures 
 Grant — suggests plan, 482; chances of his reelection discussed — as 
 affected by events of the war, 531. 
 
 Line of Battle, importance of direction, 498 ; at North Anna, 501 ; 
 Hood's at Nashville, 584. 
 
 Line of Communications, use of a river as, 167; should be perpen- 
 dicular to army's front, 254; an army's dependence upon — com- 
 manders sometimes abandon — when threatened, 323; Lee's, in 
 Gettysburg campaign, 355 ; best position for, illustrated, 438 ; Rose- 
 crans's, at Chattanooga, 446; Hood's, 544-6; Shafter's, discussed, 
 621. 
 
 Line of Operations, use of a river as, 167; Lee's, in Gettysburg cam- 
 paign, 355; Shafter's, discussed, 621-2. 
 
 Line of Supply, Rosecrans's project at Chattanooga, 450; Brown's 
 Ferry— Kelly's Ferry road, 464 ; Lee's, at Petersburg, 532 ; Hood's, 
 544-6. 
 
 Lines, Interior, see interior lines, 233. 
 
 Liscum, Lieutenant-Colonel, wounded at San Juan, 606. 
 
 Little Round Top, the battle for, 376. 
 
 Lobos, island of, Scott's base, 105. 
 
Index. 703 
 
 Logan, General, at Raymond, 408; at Champion's Hill, 411; goes home, 
 555; ordered to supersede Thomas, 573. 
 
 Lombardini, General, at Buena Vista, 93. 
 
 Long, General, tells how Lee heard firing at Gettysburg — reconnoiters 
 and reports, 369. 
 
 Longstreet, General, at Blackburn's Ford, 136; at first battle of Bull 
 Run ; 141 ; at Williamsburg, 197 ; at Seven Pines, 201 ; at Gaines's 
 Mill, 205; at Malvern Hill, 208; marches from Richmond to Gor- 
 donsville, 243; reaches Thoroughfare Gap, 246; at second Bull 
 Run, 250; his mistakes at second Bull Run, 258; at battle 
 of South Mountain, 265 ; opposed fighting at Antietam, 278 ; his 
 position at Fredericksburg, 292; his corps at Fredericksburg, 296; 
 absent with two divisions, 330; rejoins Lee from Suffolk — com- 
 mands first corps, 353 ; suggests extensive plan of campaign, 355 ; 
 in Gettysburg campaign, 357; marches on eastern side of Blue 
 Ridge — crosses Potomac and unites with Hill at Hagerstown, 359; 
 scout brings word that Union army is north of Potomac, 361 ; at 
 Fayetteville, 363; joins Lee on Seminary Ridge, 369; Lee's order 
 for attack, 374; causes of his delay — his column seen by Sickles's 
 scouts — attacks, 375; piecemeal attack, 376; ground held in morn- 
 ing July 3 — to attack again, 379; his line charged by Farnsworth's 
 cavalry, 383 ; cause of his tardiness — the lessons it teaches, 389 ; 
 opposed to attacking, 390; starts to reinforce Bragg, 428; arrives 
 at Chickamauga, 431, 434; commands right wing, 434; his charge, 
 436 ; assaults Thomas's line, 437 ; his suggestion to Secretary of 
 War not carried out in time, 442; his charge, 443; at Chattanooga, 
 447 ; on left, 449 ; sees Hooker's column from Mt. Lookout, 451 ; 
 sent to Knoxville, 452; at Knoxville — withdraws to Virginia, 460; 
 proposes plan, 464 ; sent to Knoxville too late, 465 ; sent to Bragg, 
 466; rejoins Lee, 471 ; at Wilderness, 473; May 5, 475; arrives May 
 6 — expected by way of Brock Road, 479; Mahone's attack — wound- 
 ed, 480; why late and the result, 485; his corps at Petersburg, 518; 
 repulses Terry, 525. 
 
 Lookout, Mount, battle of, 454; description, 455. 
 
 Loring, General, withdrawn from Romney by Secretary of War, 220; 
 builds Fort Pemberton, 401 ; commands at Grenada and Fort Pem- 
 berton, 403 ; at Champion's Hill, 411 ; succeeds Polk — at Kene- 
 saw Mountain, 541. 
 
 Lost Mountain, Johnston's position at, 541. 
 
 Loudon, Earl, at Fort William Henry — commands British forces ; with 
 forces at Halifax — abandons expedition against Louisburg, 10; re- 
 called, 11. 
 
 Louisburg, captured — restored by treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 6; cap- 
 tured, 1757, 10; expedition in 1758— captured by Amherst, 11. 
 
 Lovejoy's Station, Hood's concentration at, 547. 
 
 Loyalists, see Tories. 
 
 Ludlow, General, at El Caney, 604. 
 
 Lundy's Lane, battle of, 72. 
 
 Lyman, Fort, see Fort Lyman. 
 
 Lyon, General, holds Missouri in the Union, 130. 
 
 MacArthur, General, in Philippine expedition, 612; battle of Ma- 
 nila, 613. 
 
 McArthur, Colonel, commands expedition to Raisin River, 60; cut off 
 by Tecumthe, 61. 
 
 McCall, commands division in A. P., 194; commands division of Fifth 
 Corps, 199. 
 
704 Index. 
 
 McCalla, Commander, at Cienfuegos, 592; learns Cervera is not at 
 Cienfuegos, 593. 
 
 McClellan, George B., in Scott's campaign, 122; in West Virgnia, 
 130; placed in command of Federal forces — his previous record, 
 191 ; his task now — succeeds Scott as commander-in-chief — 
 his plans — loses favor by inaction, 192 ; decides to move on Rich- 
 mond by way of Urbana — sick, 193; decides to make Fort Mon- 
 roe his base— marches to Centreville — relieved as commander-in- 
 chief — organization of his army, 194; troops withdrawn by Presi- 
 dent — not aided by navy, 195; his advance stopped at Yorktown — 
 besieges Confederate works, 196; establishes base at White House 
 — not at battle of Williamsburg — establishes headquarters at 
 White House, 198; resumes advance from White House — organ- 
 izes Fifth and Sixth Corps, 199; position of his army when at- 
 tacked by Johnson — his line of communication, 200; puts army 
 astride the Chickahominy, 200; at Seven Pines, 202; position of 
 army after Seven Pines, 203; on the defensive, 205; begins move- 
 ment to Harrison's Landing, 206; his army "falls back to Malvern 
 Hill, 208; wished to organize and train his army, 209; lacked tact, 
 210; things he ought to have done — risks he took, 210; took risk 
 in going to Fort Monroe, 211; his disappointments — his genius for 
 organization — a failure as commander, 212; his mistake at York- 
 town — astride the Chickahominy, 213; his change of base to the 
 Tames, 214; warned that he might have to take army to protect 
 Washington, 228 ; withdrawn from the James, 241 ; commands 
 combined Union army after second Bull Run, 260; position of his 
 corps at beginning of Antietam campaign, 262; advances cautiously 
 — divides army into wings and center — gets Lee's "lost order," 264; 
 position of army September 13, 1862, 265 ; advances after South 
 Mountain, 268; his plan of battle at Antietam, 269; cause of his 
 slow advance in Maryland, 276; fails to take full advantage of 
 Lee's "lost order," 277; what he should have done — his mistake 
 after South Mountain, 278; his mismanagement at battle of Antie- 
 tam, 281 ; his pursuit after Antietam — his army after Antietam, 
 284; his inactivity, 285; plans after Antietam, 286; crosses Poto- 
 mac at Berlin — states plan — advances southward, 287; posi- 
 tion of forces November 7, 1862, 288; relieved from command, 
 289 ; his plan discussed, 301 ; his tardiness in taking offensive after 
 Antietam, 300; why removed from command, 301; his change of 
 base compared with Grant's Vicksburg campaign, 416; operations 
 compared with Grant's, 529. 
 
 McCleenand, General, commands a division at Forts Henry and Don- 
 elson, 156; attacks Confederate battery at Fort Donelson, 157; 
 driven back at Fort Donelson, 159; recovers position at Fort 
 Donelson, 160; commands division in Smith's expedition, 170; 
 falls back at Shiloh — makes ninth stand, 177; his scheme to cap- 
 ture Vicksburg, 397 ; takes command of Sherman's forces near Vicks- 
 burg — captures Arkansas Post — commands Thirteenth Corps, 399; 
 at Port Gibson, 404; at Champion's Hill, 411; in assault of Vicks- 
 burg, 413; in the second assault, 414. 
 
 McCook, A. McD., relieves Negley at Nashville, 312; commands 
 "right wing" of Rosecrans's army, 313 ; forms line at Stones River, 
 315; faulty position of his line at Stones River, 328; commands 
 Twentieth Corps, 423 : at Chickamauga, 431 ; morning September 
 19, 432; driven from field, 436; court of inquiry, 447. 
 
 McCook, E. M., at Varnell's Station, 538; in front of army — at Alla- 
 toona, 540; in Atlanta campaign, 538, at Newnan, 545. 
 
Index. 705 
 
 McCown, General, at Stones River, 315; falls on McCook's right, 317; 
 McCulloch, Hugh, in Dewey's fleet, 611. 
 
 McCullough, General, has command in Arkansas, 169. 
 
 McDowell, General, at outbreak of Civil War, 130; placed in com- 
 mand of Union forces, 131 ; submits plan — the organization of his 
 forces, 133; his plan at first battle_aL_Ejjl]._Rnn > J36 ; assaults 
 Henry HousaTIfll — his troops, 139; his mistakes at first battle of 
 Bull Run — his stay at Centreville fatal, 145; commands First 
 Corps in A. P., 194; held at Washington, 195; advances to Fred- 
 ericksburg, 198; ordered to Valley, 199; withheld from McClellan 
 on account of battle of Kernstown, 222; under orders to join Mc- 
 Clellan, 226; ordered to suspend movement on Richmond, 228; 
 commands corps under Pope, 239; ordered to Gainesville — to 
 Manassas, 245. 
 
 McDowell, battle of, 225 ; battle of, lightly considered at Washington, 
 226. 
 
 McIntosh, General, at Gettysburg, 383 ; in pursuit of Lee, 384. 
 
 McLaws, General, at Crampton's Gap, 266; at Antietam, 270; at Fred- 
 ericksburg, 296; reinforces Anderson at Chancellorsville, 333; aids 
 Jackson's movement, 339; attacks Federal left, 343; sent to meet 
 Sedgwick — at Salem Church, 345; at Gettysburg, 369; in the at- 
 tack, 374 ; his position, 375 ; stands idle, 376 ; on third day, 380 ; 
 at Chickamauga, 434. 
 
 McPherson, J. B., at Shiloh. 175; commands Seventeenth Corps, 399; 
 at Port Gibson, 405; at Raymond, 408; at Jackson, 409; at Cham- 
 pion's Hill, 411; in assault of Vicksburg, 413; commands Army of 
 the Tennessee, 536; moves by way of Snake Creek Gap, 537; at 
 Resaca, 538; in pursuit from Resaca, 539; at Dallas, 540; moves 
 in rear of Thomas, 542; advances to the Chattahoochee — supports 
 Thomas, 542; at Decatur, 543; battle of Atlanta — killed, 544; mis- 
 take at Resaca — Sherman's criticism — Johnston's view, 549. 
 
 McPhesson's Woods, 365. 
 
 Macdonough, Lieutenant, his victory on Lake Champlain, 72. 
 
 Mackinac, Fort, see Fort Mackinac. 
 
 Madison, President, issues embargo, 56. 
 
 Magruder, General, opposed to Butler, 131 ; has field-works at York- 
 town, 196; at Seven Pines, 201 ; contains McClellan south of Chick- 
 ahominy, 205; watches Federal movements south of Chickahominy 
 —at Savage's Station, 206; not at Glendale, 207. 
 
 Mahone, General, at Gettysburg, 377; at Wilderness, 480; at Spottsyl- 
 vania, 493; attacks Upton, 499; meets Wilson at Reams's Station, 
 520; the Mine, 522; flanks Warren, 523; at Burgess's Mill, 525. 
 
 Maine, destruction of, 589. 
 
 Malvern Hill, battle of, 208; losses, 209. 
 
 Manassas, first battle, see Bull Run, first battle; Southern troops as- 
 semble there, 130; its strategic importance, 132; captured by Stu- 
 art, 244. 
 
 Manila Bay, battle of — casualties, 611. 
 
 Manila, Dewey's victory, 611; Merritt's expedition — besieged by 
 insurgents, 612; Spanish works — battle of, 613; captured — prize of 
 war, 614 ; capture of, discussed, 626 ; capitulation, supposed arrange- 
 ments for — battle of, compared with San Juan — El Caney, 627. 
 
 Mansfield, General, commands Twelfth Corps, 262; at Antietam — 
 killed, 269. 
 
 Marblehead, in Schley's squadron, 593 ; at Guantanamo, 594. 
 
 Marches, Flank, see flank marches. 
 
 Maria Teresa, at Santiago, 593 : at battle of Santiago, 610. 
 
706 Index. 
 
 Marion, General, his operations, 45; captures Fort Watson, 49; and 
 Light Horse Harry Lee capture Forts Motte and Granby, 49. 
 
 Marye's Heights, 291. 
 
 Marye's Hill, 291. 
 
 Maryland, her attitude toward secession, 130. 
 
 Massachusetts, in Schley's squadron, 593. 
 
 Massachusetts, Eighth, at El Caney — Second, at El Caney — Twenty- 
 second, at El Caney, 604. 
 
 Massanutten Mountain, its influence on Banks's movements, 223. 
 
 Maximilian, Archduke, his empire in Mexico — death, 588. 
 
 May, Captain, at battle of Palo Alto — at Resaca de la Palma, 85; 
 brings information of Santa Anna's advance, 92. 
 
 Mayflower, at Santiago, 593. 
 
 Meade, General, at Antietam, 269; at Fredericksburg, 296; his assault, 
 297 ; commands Fifth Corps, 330 ; at Chancellorsville, 335 ; succeeds 
 Hooker in command of army — drops Hooker's plan — selects line 
 for army to occupy, 360; disposition of army, June 30, 1863 — 
 awaits development — in flank position, 363; his line at Gettysburg, 
 371 ; accepts battle at Gettysburg, 372 ; his troops, and dispositions, 
 373; reinforces Sickles, 377; in pursuit, 384; reaches Turner's Gap 
 — moves to Antietam Creek — lets Lee escape, 385 ; his plan criti- 
 cised, 387; his position and dispositions criticised, 390; failed to 
 reap full fruits of victory, 391 ; his pursuit criticised, 392 ; after Lee's 
 withdrawal to Virginia— on Rappahannock — troops detached — cam- 
 paign of maneuvers, 466; withdraws to Centreville — advances and 
 crosses Rappahannock, 467; at Mine Run, 468; at Wilderness, 
 474; orders Warren to attack — his remark about enemy — issues 
 orders, 475; at Wilderness — orders for May 6, 478; defect in 
 orders to Hancock, 514; at Petersburg, 518; failure to advise Han- 
 cock to attack Petersburg, 530. 
 
 Mechanicsville, battle of, 204. 
 
 Meigs, Fort, see Fort Meigs. 
 
 MejIa, General, attacks Fort Brown, 85 ; at Buena Vista, 93. 
 
 Memphis, surrendered to Commodore Davis, 394. 
 
 Merrimac, destroys Union vessels, 195 ; destroyed, 198 ; in Schley's 
 squadron, 593; sunk, 594. 
 
 Merritt, General, at Gettysburg, 381 ; in movement to Spottsylvania, 
 489; commands expedition to Philippines, 612; battle of Manila, 
 613; Spanish surrender Manila — trophies of capture — trouble with 
 insurgents, 614; supposed to have arranged with governor-gen- 
 eal beforehand for capitulation, 627. 
 
 Mexican Army, its lack of a commander, 125. 
 
 Mexican War, Taylor's campaign — causes — -troops on each side, 81 ; 
 geography, 82; Taylor's campaign — Taylor's instructions and plans 
 — Mexico's plan — operations, 83 ; exemplifies advantages of drill 
 and training, 102; politics of, mixed with operations — opposition to, 
 in United States, 103; Scott's campaign, 105; ended, 119; navy in — 
 Scott's campaign — comments, 120; absence of militia, 124. 
 
 Mexico, her war with U. S., see Mexican War; geography, 82; her 
 plan, 83; effect of weak government on conduct of war — muddle 
 of its political parties — comment on capture of capital, 124; Maxi- 
 milian's empire, 588. 
 
 Mexico, City of, preparations for defense of, 111; captured, 118; the 
 necessity for capturing it, 125. 
 
 Michigan, Thirty-third, attacks Aguadores, 608. 
 
 Michilimackinac built, 1. 
 
 Mickey's, Johnston's concentration at, 186. 
 
 Middleburg, cavalry combat at, 359. 
 
Index. 707 
 
 Milan and Berlin decrees, 56. 
 
 Miles, Dixon S., commands McDowell's fifth division, 133;, at first 
 battle of Bull Run, 141 ; killed at Harper's Ferry, foot-note, 266. 
 
 Miles, Evan, at El Caney, 604. 
 
 Miles, N. A., fights Wade Hampton, 490; at Spottsylvania, 496; at 
 Reams's Station, 524; commands Porto Rican expedition — plan — 
 forces — diverted to Santiago, 614; at Guantanamo — strength of de- 
 tachment — lands at Guanica, 615 ; operations in Porto Rico, 615, 
 616; operations in Porto Rico criticised — his appreciation of 
 strategic principle of secrecy, 628. 
 
 Military Division, of the West, 557. 
 
 Military History, American boy's ignorance of, 530. 
 
 Military Policies, see policies, military. 
 
 Militia, refuses to cross Canadian boundary — deserts General Hop- 
 kins, 64; burns Newark and withdraws to U. S., 69; at battle 
 of Bladensburg, 73; burden of Washington's complaint, 75; Jeffer- 
 son's opinion — lesson taught by War of 1812, 76; troops called out 
 in War of 1812, 77; absence of, in Mexican War, 124; Pennsyl- 
 vania, in Gettysburg campaign, 359; Georgia, in Hood's army, 543. 
 
 Mill Springs, battle of, 154. 
 
 Milroy, General, at battle of McDowell, 225; at Winchester, 358. 
 
 Mine, the Petersburg, 520-1. 
 
 Minon, General, his cavalry at Buena Vista, 93. 
 
 Minor Operations, Red River campaign, 586. 
 
 Minty, General, in Chickamauga campaign, 428, 440; at Chickamauga, 
 431; delays Bragg, 432. 
 
 Missionary Ridge, battle of, 454-9; comments, see battles around Chat- 
 tanooga, comments ; Confederates' faulty position, 458. 
 
 Mississippi, Army of the, Johnston's, 171. 
 
 Mississippi, the Division of, see Division of the Mississippi. 
 
 Mississippi, Confederate forces there in autumn 1862, 396. 
 
 Mississippi, Trans, Department, 557. 
 
 Mississippi River, Confederate forts on, 150; object of Vicksburg cam- 
 paign — its importance, 394; Confederate defenses — situation along, 
 in September, 1862, 395; held fast by Federals, 557. 
 
 Missouri, held in the Union, 130. 
 
 Mitchell, General R. B., commands Union cavalry in Chickamauga 
 campaign, 431. 
 
 Molino del Rey, battle of, 116. 
 
 Monitor, fights Merrimac, 195. 
 
 Monmouth, battle of, 35. 
 
 Monongahela River, battle of, 7. 
 
 Monroe Doctrine, violation of, by Napoleon III, 588. 
 
 Monroe, Fort, see Fort Monroe. 
 
 Monroe, James, scouts for British, 72; at battle of Bladensburg, 73. 
 
 Montcalm, commands the French forces — captures Oswego — at Ticon- 
 deroga, 10; captures Fort William Henry, 11; at Ticonderoga, 12; 
 his preparations to meet Wolfe's army, and his difficulties — his 
 dispositions, 14; fights Wolfe on Plains of Abraham — is defeated 
 and killed, 18. 
 
 Monterey, the battle of, 88; Taylor advances on — its position and de- 
 fenses — captured, 89; terms of capitulation — forces and losses, 90; 
 why Taylor's objective, 97. 
 
 Monterey, in Dewey's fleet, 612. 
 
 Montgomery, General, expedition to Canada, 27 ; killed, 28. 
 
 Montgomery, Ala., Confederate provisional government organized 
 there, 128. 
 
708 Index. 
 
 Montgomery, Heights of, Wolfe's repulse, 15. 
 
 Montojo, at battle of Manila Bay, 611; fleet no match for Dewey's, 618. 
 
 Montreal, Nicholson's expedition against, 3; captured by English, 20. 
 
 Morell, General, commands division of Fifth Corps, 199; crosses Poto- 
 mac after Antietam, 284. 
 
 Morgan, General, at Bemis Heights, 33; at The Cowpens, 47. 
 
 Morgan, G. W., in Vicksburg expedition, 398. 
 
 Morgan, Jas. D., sent to Tennessee, 555 ; returns to Georgia, 562. 
 
 Morgan, John H., in campaign of Forts Henry and Donelson, 167; 
 interrupts Union line of communications, 309; breaks L. & N. Rail- 
 way a second time, 313 ; after Stones River, 422. 
 
 Morris, Robert, raises funds for support of army, 41. 
 
 Morro Castle, armament, 595. 
 
 Mosby, Colonel John S., prints letter of General Lee concerning con- 
 centration at Gettysburg, foot-note, 361. 
 
 Mott, General, at Wilderness, 477; at Spottsylvania, 493; with War- 
 ren's attack, 494 ; fails to support Upton, 495 ; discovers salient, 
 496. 
 
 Movement, Flank, see flank movement. 
 
 Movement, Turning, see turning movement. 
 
 Munford, T. T., at Antietam, 267. 
 
 Munfordville, effect of Bragg^ seizure, 324. 
 
 Murfreesboro, battle of, see Stones River, battle of; campaign, see 
 Stones River campaign; evacuated by Bragg and occupied by 
 Rosecrans, 320; Bragg takes position to protect, 327; troops at, 
 during Nashville campaign, 572. 
 
 Murray, General, left in command at Quebec — commands column from 
 Quebec against Montreal, 20. 
 
 Napoleon, his Berlin and Milan decrees, 56; his Maxim XXVII, 183; 
 on a "cool head," 256; Maxim LXXVII, foot-note, 275; his Maxim 
 XXIX violated in Fredericksburg campaign, 305 ; his Maxim LXV 
 on councils of war, foot-note, 410; Maxim LX1V, 482; Maxim 
 XXV, 550. 
 
 Napoleon III, sets up empire in Mexico, 588. 
 
 Nashville, Franklin and, campaign, see campaign of Franklin and 
 Nashville; Hood's advance to, 563. 
 
 Nashville, battle of — Schofield's arrival, 571 ; Cruft's "casuals" — 
 troops at Murfreesboro — Federal dispositions before, 572; delayed 
 by storm — Thomas's plan, 573; battle-field, 574; Union line, second 
 day, 575 ; Confederates routed — losses — Hood's retreat, 576 ; com- 
 ments, 583; strategy and tactics, 584; Hood's mistakes, 584; For- 
 rest's absence — why Hood's army escaped, 585. 
 
 Natchez, taken by Farragut, 395. 
 
 Naval Diversion, use of, Camara's fleet, 619. 
 
 Naval Operations, of Spanish-American war discussed, 617-21. 
 
 Navy, cooperates with army in Mexican war, 99; at siege of Vera 
 Cruz, 106; its aid in the Vicksburg campaign, 421; assists in cross- 
 ing the James, 513; aids Shafter's army to land, 598; cannot fight 
 land batteries, 621 ; in battle of Manila, 627 ; American, in. the 
 Revolutionary War, 41; at outbreak of Civil War, 128; need of, 
 at outbreak of Civil War, 143 ; in 1898, 591 ; compared with Span- 
 ish, 618. 
 
 Navy, British, active on French coast, 11. 
 
 Navy, Spanish, in 1898, 591. 
 
 Navies, Hostile, in Spanish-American War, 591, 592. 
 
 Necessity, Fort, see Fort Necessity. 
 
 Necessity, Political, see "political necessity.'' 
 
Index. 709 
 
 Negley, General, besieged at Nashville by Forrest — relieved by Mc- 
 
 Cook, 312; at Stones River, 315; driven back, 317; withdraws from 
 
 dangerous position, 429; at Chickamauga, 432. 
 Nelson's Farm, see Glendale. 
 Nelson, General, his division reaches Shiloh, 179; begins second day's 
 
 engagement at Shiloh, 181. 
 Newark, Washington marches to — Cornwallis advances on, 30. 
 New England, opposition to War of 1812, 62; its attitude in War of 
 
 1812, 77. 
 Newfoundland, touched by John Cabot, 1. 
 New Hope Church, battle of, 540. 
 
 New Jersey, campaign between Washington and Clinton in, 35. 
 Newnan, combat at, 545. 
 New Orleans, British operations against — battle of, 74; captured by 
 
 Farragut, 394. 
 Newspapers, cry for advance on Manassas, 131 ; of South decry A. S. 
 
 Johnston, 183. 
 Newton, General, sent to Tennessee, 555 ; returns to Georgia, 562. 
 New York, Clinton's army withdraws to, 35; British purchase supplies 
 
 in, 77. 
 New York, at Santiago, 593. 
 New York, Seventy-first, at San Juan, 606. 
 Niagara, Fort, see Fort Niagara. 
 Nicholson, Colonel, organizes expedition against Canada — commands 
 
 expedition against Port Royal — captures Port Royal, 2; commands 
 
 land forces against Montreal, 3. 
 Night Attacks, Wauhatchie criticised — General Alexander on, 451. 
 Ninth Corps, in Army of the Potomac, 470; at Wilderness, 474; in 
 
 movement to James, 513; at Petersburg, 517; assault June 18, 518; 
 
 siege of Petersburg, 519; the Mine, 521; part assigned to Warren, 
 
 523; in movement October 27, 525. 
 Norfolk, evacuated by Confederates, 198. 
 North Anna, Confederate position, 501. 
 North Carolina, joins Confederacy, 129. 
 North and South, similar policies, 463. 
 Northern Virginia, Army of, see Army of Northern Virginia. 
 
 Oak Hill, 364. 
 
 Objective, in Gettysburg campaign, 354; in Chickamauga campaign, 
 439; every operation should have definite object, 532. 
 
 O'Brien, Lieutenant, at Buena Vista, 93. 
 
 Ohio, Army of the, see Army of the Ohio. 
 
 Olympia, Dewey's flagship, 611. 
 
 Ontario, Lake, as line of invasion, 5. 
 
 Opdycke, General, at Spring Hill, 567; at Franklin, 569, 583, his 
 charge, 570. 
 
 Operations, line of, see line of operations. 
 
 Operations, Minor, see minor operations. 
 
 Operations, of 1756— of 1757, 10; of 1758, 11; in 1812, 58; in the 
 East in 1812, 62; in 1813, 65; in 1814, 70; at New Orleans, 74; 
 Scott's, in Mexico, 106; after Vera Cruz, 107; in vicinity of City 
 of Mexico, 113; in campaign against Forts Henry and Donelson, 
 153; Antietam campaign, 262; Bragg's, in Kentucky, 310; concen- 
 tration at Chancellorsville — battle of Chancellorsville, 332; Sedg- 
 wick's, 344; campaign of Gettysburg, 357; Grant's, against Vicks- 
 burg, 401 ; Chickamauga campaign, 427 ; theater of, see theater of 
 operations; battle of the Wilderness, 470. 
 
 Oquendo, at battle of Santiago, 610. 
 
710 Index. 
 
 Orangeburg, captured by Sumter, 49. 
 
 Orchard Knob, assault, 453. 
 
 Ord, General at Iuka — at Corinth, 376; commands Eighteenth Corps, 
 
 521 ; commands Twenty-fourth Corps, 526. 
 Orders, Sedgwick's method of making his understandable, 149; defect 
 
 in those of President Davis to Joseph E. Johnston — Beauregard's 
 
 at first battle of Bull Run not understood, 149; war, see "war 
 
 orders," 193. 
 Oregon, her long voyage, 591 ; at Santiago, 593 ; at battle of Santiago, 
 
 610. 
 Osiskany, battle of, 32. 
 Orleans, Island of — Wolfe's army lands, 14. 
 Ortega, General, at Buena Vista, 93. 
 Osterhaus, General, at Champion's Hill, 411; at Chattanooga, 453; at 
 
 Mt. Lookout, 455. 
 Outpost Duty, badly done at Stones River, 328. 
 Ox Hill, battle of, see Chantilly. 
 
 Pacheco, General, at Buena Vista, 93. 
 
 Padierna, see Contreras, 113. 
 
 Paducah, Ky., occupied by Grant, 150. 
 
 Pakenham, Sir Edward, commands expedition against New Orleans, 
 74. 
 
 Palma, Resaca de la, see Resaca de la Palma. 
 
 Palmer's Squadron, covers retreat at first battle of Bull Run, 140. 
 
 Palmer, General, at Stones River, 316; at Chickamauga, 433; at Chat- 
 tanooga, 450; resigns, foot-note, 544; insubordination, 546. 
 
 Palo Alto, battle of — prairie set on fire, 85; losses, 87; its effect, 88; 
 criticised, 96, 100. 
 
 Papers, News, see newspapers. 
 
 Paras, its situation, 91. 
 
 Paredes, General, heads a revolution, 81. 
 
 Paredes, Captain, captured at Santiago, 610. 
 
 Paris, Treaty of 1763, 20. 
 
 Parke, General, commands Ninth Corps, 524; in movement, October 
 27, 525. 
 
 .Parker, Admiral, combines with Clinton to attack Charleston, 43. 
 
 Parker, Lieutenant, at San Juan, 607. 
 
 Patterson, General, selected to command expedition against Vera 
 Cruz, 103; in Shenandoah Valley, 131; his operations against 
 Johnston, 134; his mismanagement in Shenandoah Valley, 144; 
 in command by "political necessity," 530. 
 
 Peach Orchard, 372, 376. 
 
 Peachtree Creek, battle of, 543. 
 
 Pearson, Colonel, at San Juan, 606; assault of San Juan Hill, 607. 
 
 Pelham, Major John, at Fredericksburg, 297. 
 
 Pemberton, Fort, see Fort Pemberton. 
 
 Pemberton, General, sent to command Southern forces in Mississippi, 
 397; his forces in Mississippi — has no cavalry — deceived by Grant, 
 403; his forces, May 11, 407; telegram to Johnston and reply — 
 measures to resist Grant, 408; at Edwards's Station — shilly-shal- 
 lies — at Champion's Hill, 410; at the Big Black — fails to obey 
 Johnston's orders to evacuate Vicksburg — dispositions to hold 
 Vicksburg, 412; besieged, 414; surrenders, 415; his difficulties and 
 blunders discussed, 418; scatters his forces, 419; what he should 
 have done — consequences of his failure to obey orders, 420. 
 
 Pender, General, at Fredericksburg, 296; at Gettysburg, 365; second 
 day, 375; third day, 380. 
 
Index. 711 
 
 Penetration, strategic, see strategic penetration. 
 
 Peninsula, the, geography of, 195. 
 
 Peninsular Campaign, closely related to Jackson's Valley cam- 
 paign, 191 ; strength and losses in Seven Days' Battles — comments, 
 209. 
 
 Pennsylvania, Eighth, Cavalry, see Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry; the 
 Forty-eighth, prepares the Mine, 520. 
 
 Penobscot River, as line of invasion, 5. 
 
 Pepperell, William, captures Louisburg, 6. 
 
 Perry, Commodore, wins victory of Lake Erie, 66; captures Tam- 
 pico, 91. 
 
 Perryville, battle of, 312; a rencounter, 325. 
 
 Petersburg, siege of, see siege of Petersburg; Grant plans capture, 
 — fortifications — garrison — Butler's attempt to capture, 512; at- 
 tacked by W. F. Smith, 515-16; Federal assaults — Confederate 
 army concentrates — assault, June 18, 518; siege begins, 519; the 
 Mine, 520-22; lines extended, 522; Grant's movement, February, 
 — Warren's operations — operations at Reams's Station, 524; 
 Warren destroys Weldon Railway, 525; operations, February, 1865, 
 525; final operations, 526; siege ends, 527; key to Richmond — 
 Grant's measures to capture — Smith's failure — Butler's failure — 
 Hancock's delay fatal, 529; political effect of its fall, 531; could 
 not be invested, 533. 
 
 Pettigrew, General, at Gettysburg, 364; third day, 380. 
 
 Philadelphia, Howe's campaign at, 33; captured by Howe — Corn- 
 wall's headquarters — Howe's army winters there — effect of its 
 capture, etc., 35. 
 
 Philippine Insurgents, encouraged by certain class of Americans, 23. 
 
 Philippine Insurrection, its resemblance to our Revolution — the dif- 
 ference, 23. 
 
 Philippine Islands, Dewey's victory, 611 ; Merritt's expedition, 612. 
 
 Phips, Sir William, captures Port Royal — repulsed by Frontenac, ,1. 
 
 Pickens, General, his operations, 45. 
 
 Pickett, General, at Fredericksburg, 296; not at Chancellorsville, 330; 
 at Chambersburg, 363; had come up, 377; at Gettysburg, third day 
 — troops in his charge, 380; charges, 382; detached from Lee, 466; 
 at Cold Harbor, 502 ; at Bermuda Hundred, 516. 
 
 Pierce, Franklin, commands brigade at Churubusco, 114. 
 
 Pigott, General, at Bunker Hill, 24. 
 
 Pillow, General, commands volunteer division in Scott's army — at 
 Churubusco, 114; at Chapultepec, 118; commands Confederate left 
 at Fort Donelson, 156; sends telegram to Johnston announcing 
 victory at Fort Donelson, 158; blunders, 159; escapes from Fort 
 Donelson, 160. 
 
 Pine Mountain, Johnston's position — troops withdraw from, 541. 
 
 Pipe Creek, in Gettysburg campaign, 363. 
 
 Pitt, the great, becomes Premier — recalls Loudon from America — fits 
 out expedition against Louisburg and Quebec — asks colonies for 
 4,000 men, 11. 
 
 Pitt, William, younger, remarks on the war, 55. 
 
 Pitt, Fort, see Fort Pitt. 
 
 Pittsburg Landing, General C. F. Smith's force camps there, 172; as 
 camp of an army. 184; its peril not appreciated by Union com- 
 manders — Union camps not intrenched, 184. 
 
 Plattsburg, battle of, 72. 
 
 Pleasonton, General, commands Union cavalry, 263; at South Moun- 
 tain, 265 ; at Antietam, 272 j in pursuit of Stuart in Maryland, 285 ; 
 to command cavalry division, 329; precedes infantry march on 
 
712 Index. 
 
 Pleasonton, General — Continued. 
 
 Chancellorsville, 332; reinforces Sickles, 339; put in Averell's 
 place, 347; at Brandy Station, 357; succeeds Stoneman in command 
 of cavalry corps — in Gettysburg campaign, 358; fights Stuart, 359; 
 transferred to Missouri, 470. 
 
 Pleasants, Lieutenant-Colonel, proposes the Mine, 520. 
 
 Plum Run, 372. 
 
 Pinion, at battle of Santiago, 610. 
 
 Point Isabel, Taylor's base, 84. 
 
 Point Levi, seized by Wolfe's troops, 15. 
 
 Policies, Military, Northern and Southern, similar, 463. 
 
 Political Necessity, discussed, 530. 
 
 Political Strategy, see strategy, political. 
 
 Politics, in Mexican War, 103 ; their relation to war, 323. 
 
 Polk, James K., disapproves Taylor's terms with Ampudia, 90. 
 
 Polk, Leonidas, occupies Columbus, Ky., 150; commands division in 
 A. S. Johnston's army, 171 ; at Stones River, 315 ; attacks and is 
 repulsed, 320; his mistake at Stones River, 328; in Chickamauga 
 campaign, 429; fails to attack, 430; at Chickamauga, 431; bivouacs 
 at Lee and Gordon's, 432; commands left wing — does not obey 
 Bragg* s order, 435; tried for disobedience, 447; in Atlanta cam- 
 paign, 535; joins Johnston at Resaca, 538; in retreat from Resaca, 
 539; at Cassville, 540; in front of Marietta — killed, 541. 
 
 Pope, General, commands at Commerce, 169; captures Island No. 10, 
 182; should have been at Shiloh with forces, 185; to command 
 Army of Virginia, 239; his threefold task — position of his different 
 corps, 239; his theater of operations — concentrates his army, 240; 
 joins army, 242; stops with army behind the Rapidan, 243; with- 
 draws behind the Rappahannock — sees Jackson's column but orders 
 ■no movement, 244; his preliminary orders to oppose Jackson's 
 turning movement — orders concentration at Manassas, 245; 
 orders concentration on Centreville, 246; orders assembly on War- 
 renton Pike — his army scattered, 247; his order to Porter, 248; 
 a later order to Porter — orders pursuit on August 30, 249; with- 
 draws to Centreville, where other troops join him, 250; with- 
 draws to Washington, 251 ; three phases of his campaign, 253 ; 
 his mistake in holding the Rapidan — handicapped by Halleck's or- 
 ders, 254; might have marched on Richmond — his first movements 
 judicious — his opportunity to attack the wings of Lee's army 
 separately, 255; had not a cool head — his fatal mistake — jumped 
 to false conclusions, 256; issued contradictory orders — never un- 
 derstood the situation — his mistake in attacking August 30 — his 
 mistake in withdrawing, 257; relieved, 260; joins Halleck at Pitts- 
 burg Landing, 308. 
 
 Poplar Springs Church, end of intrenchments, 525. 
 
 Porter, Admiral, shells Grand Gulf, 404; aids assault of Vicksburg, 
 413; his aid in the Vicksburg campaign, 421. 
 
 Porter, Andrew, commands a brigade in McDowell's army, 133; at 
 first battle of Bull Run, 138; commands division in A. P., 194. 
 
 Porter, Fitz-John, commands Fifth Corps of A. P., 199; defeats An- 
 derson, 200; withdraws from Beaver Dam Creek to Gaines's Mill — 
 at Gaines's Mill, 204; ordered to Bristoe Station, 245; receives 
 Pope's order — encounters Longstreet at Dawkins Branch, 248; 
 on August 30, at second Bull Run, 250 ; his trial, 251 ; commands 
 Fifth Corps, 262; at Antietam, 272; pursues after Antietam, 284; 
 bears dispatch to Sampson, 592; at Santiago, 593. 
 
 Port Gibson, battle of, 404. 
 
 Port Hudson, garrisoned by Breckinridge, 395 ; commanded by General 
 Gardner, 403; surrenders to Banks, 416. 
 
Index. 713 
 
 Porto Rican Expedition, 614-16; comments, 627-8. 
 
 Porto Rico, capture of — discussed, 627-8; expedition to, see Porto 
 
 Rican expedition. 
 Port Republic, battle of, 232. 
 
 Port Royal, captured, 1; name changed to Annapolis Royal, 2. 
 Posey, General, at Gettysburg, 377. 
 Position, flank, see flank position, 31. 
 Position in readiness, Bragg's, at Stones River, 315, 327. 
 Potomac, Army of, see Army of the Potomac. 
 Potter, General, at Wilderness, 474; May 6, 481; at Petersburg, S17; 
 
 the Mine, 521. 
 "Power of Attraction," its definition, 40; as illustrated by Greene's 
 
 operations, 54. 
 Prentiss, General, commands division in Smith's expedition, 170; his 
 
 division gives way at Shiloh, 177; at the Hornets Nest, 178. 
 Prescott, General, at Breed's Hill, 24. 
 Preston, General, at Chickamauga, 434. 
 Prevost, General, invades Georgia, 43. 
 
 Prevost, Sir George, defends Canada, 57; repulsed at Sacketts Har- 
 bor, 68; at battle of Plattsburg, 72. 
 Price, Sterling, commands in Mississippi, 309; in Mississippi — at 
 
 Iuka — at Corinth, 396; in Missouri, 563. 
 Proctor, General, captures Americans at Frenchtown — operations 
 
 against Harrison, 65; repulsed at Fort Stephenson— defeat of the 
 
 Thames, 66. 
 Puebla, occupied by Scott, 110. 
 Putnam, Israel, at Breed's Hill, 24; routed at Brooklyn Heights, 29; 
 
 occupies Princeton, 31. 
 
 Qualifications, of a commander, 259. 
 
 Quebec, established by Champlain — captured by Kirk — reserved to 
 France at peace of St. Germain-en-Laye, 1 ; strategic importance, 
 4; its defensive strength, 14; Wolfe's operations against, 15; sur- 
 rendered to British — besieged by French under Levis, 20; be- 
 sieged by Arnold and Montgomery, 27. 
 
 Queen Anne's War, 2; closed, 3. 
 
 Quitman, General, commands volunteer division in Scott's army, 114; 
 at Chapultepec, 118; appointed military governor of City of Mexi- 
 co, 119. 
 
 Rabi, General, in Santiago campaign, 598. 
 
 Radford's Squadron, pursues at first battle of Bull Run, 141. 
 
 Rafferty, Major, commands only mounted squadron in Santiago cam- 
 paign, 596. 
 
 Raid, cavalry, when successful and when a failure — examples of each 
 kind, 323; Sheridan's, criticised, 508; Trevilian Raid, 510; Wilson's, 
 in Virginia, 520; cavalry, in Georgia, 545; Wheeler's, in Georgia, 
 546. 
 
 Railways, in Kentucky and Tennessee, 151; advantage of, possessed 
 by Southern armies, 356; Sherman's dependence upon, 552. 
 
 Raisin River, battle of, see Frenchtown. 
 
 Rapidan, to James — summary of operations, 504; distinctive features, 
 505. 
 
 Raw Troops, at Shiloh, 190; unfit for offensive operations, 209. 
 
 Rawdon. Lord, at Camden, 45; defeats Greene at Hobkirk's Hill— re- 
 treats to Monk's Corners, 49. 
 
 Raymond, combat at — effect on Grant's plans, 408. 
 
 Readiness, position in — Bragg's, at Stones River, 327. 
 
 Reams's Station, combat at, 524. 
 
714 Index. 
 
 Reconnaissance, lack of, at San Juan, 625. 
 
 Reconstruction, army used to aid in, 588. 
 
 Recruiting, difficulty in war, 76. 
 
 Red River Campaign, 586. 
 
 Regular Army, see Army, Regular. 
 
 Regulars, compared with volunteers, 103 ; in Mexican War, 124. 
 
 Reno, General, ordered to support McDowell — to Manassas, 245; at 
 South Mountain, 265. 
 
 Resaca, McPherson approaches, 538; Johnston retreats, 538, 539; Sher- 
 man's failure criticised — Napoleon's Maxim XXV, 550. 
 
 Resaca de la Palma, battle of, 85 ; losses, 87 ; its effect, 88 ; effect 
 of American victory there, 100. 
 
 Reserve, its use at Franklin, 583; an army not beaten so long as it 
 has a, 351. 
 
 Revere, Paul, 24. 
 
 Revolutionary War, The, comments on Northern Campaigns, see 
 Comments; the English laws ignored by colonists — colonial gov- 
 ernors — customs and other laws — events leading up to the billeting 
 of troops — arrogance of British officers, 21 ; the stamp tax — 
 smuggling — duty on tea — billeting of troops — the Boston mas- 
 sacre — the Tea Party, 22; the difference between it and the Philip- 
 pine insurrection — its resemblance, 23; civil government ceases in 
 Massachusetts — preparing for war — Massachusetts declared in re- 
 bellion — Fisheries Bill passed, 24; British plans and strategy — 
 American plan, 26; lessons taught by, 38; American navy in, 41; 
 southern campaigns, 42; comments, 53; influence of de Grasse's 
 fleet, 55. 
 
 Rey. General Vara de, killed, 605. 
 
 Reynolds, J. F., at Beaver Dam Creek, 204; ordered to Gainesville — 
 to Manassas, 245; at second Bull Run, 250; commands First Corps, 
 290; holds railway at Fredericksburg, 298; commands First Corps, 
 330; occupies South Mountain passes, 359; at Marsh Run, 363; 
 at Gettysburg — killed, 366. 
 
 Reynolds, J. J., at Chickamauga, 432. 
 
 Rlall, General, commands British opposed to Brown, 71. 
 
 Richardson, commands division in A. P., 194; at Antietam, 271. 
 
 Richmond, Duke of, remarks on the war — the colonies, 55. 
 -Richmond, Va., Confederate troops there, 131 ; its peril at beginning of 
 Peninsular campaign, 199; defenses in June, 1864, 511; lines of 
 supply, 512; why Southern capital — weak point,' 533. 
 
 Rich Mountain, battle of, 130. 
 
 Ricketts, James B., his battery at first battle of Bull Run, 139; at 
 battle of Cedar Mountain, 242 ; at Thoroughfare Gap, 245 ; marches 
 on Bristoe, 247; at Antietam, 269. 
 
 Rio Grande, Sheridan's expedition, 588. 
 
 River, as line of operations and communications, 167. 
 
 River Line, attack and defense of, in Chickamauga campaign, 424; at- 
 tack and defense of, in Vicksburg campaign, 418; positions taken 
 by J. E. Johnston, 553. 
 
 Roads, bad in campaign of Forts Henry and Donelson, 166. 
 
 Robertson, Beverly H., in Gettysburg campaign, 362. 
 
 Robinson House, in first battle of Bull Run, 138. 
 
 Robinson, John C, at Gettysburg, 366; in movement to Spottsylvania — 
 wounded, 489. 
 
 Robles, Lieutenant-Colonel, his opinion of Cerro Gordo, 121. 
 
 Rochambeau, Count, commands French troops with Washington, 51. 
 
 Roddey, General, 579. 
 
Index. 715 
 
 Rodes, General, at Chancellorsville, 339; in Gettysburg campaign, 358; 
 at Carlisle, 359; position second day, 375; does not support Early, 
 377; reinforces Johnson, 378; third day, 380; at Wilderness, 475. 
 
 Rodgers, Commodore, attacks fort at Drewry's Bluff, 198. 
 
 Rodman, General, at Antietam, 272. 
 
 Rome, captured, 539. 
 
 Romney, seized by Jackson, 219. 
 
 Rosecrans, General, succeeds Buell — concentrates at Nashville, 312; 
 collects supplies at Nashville — advances on Murfreesboro — 
 army in three columns, 313; poor work of his cavalry, 314; his 
 army the night before Stones River, 315; plans to attack Bragg — 
 his plan, 316; on the defensive, 317; forms new line — assaulted, 
 319; occupies Murfreesboro, 321; his reply to Halleck's threatening 
 letter, 326; his plan of battle at Stones River — faulty position of 
 his right, 327; at Iuka — at Corinth, 396; after Stones River — 
 lacked cavalry — urged by War Dept. — army reorganized — in Tul- 
 lahoma campaign, 423; plan for capture of Chattanooga, 424; dis- 
 positions at end of Tullahoma campaign — ordered to advance, 425; 
 advances to the Tennessee, 427; crosses the Tennessee and ad- 
 vances — his columns far apart — their position May 10, 428; con- 
 centrates at Chickamauga, 430 ; takes defensive position, 431 ; 
 guesses Brag^s plan — makes dispositions, 431 ; dispositions, morn- 
 ing September 19, 432; dispositions for second day, 434; driven 
 from field, 436; line of communications at Murfreesboro, 438; 
 advantage of numbers — objective — summary of Tullahoma cam- 
 paign, 439; first use of turning movements — strategy, 440; peril- 
 ous situation, 441 ; withdraws to Chattanooga, 445 ; line of sup- 
 ply, serious condition, 446; measures for relief— army reorganized, 
 447; succeeded by Thomas — Dana's report, 448; projected short 
 line of supply, 449; never wholly invested, 463; operations like 
 Sherman's, 548. 
 
 Ross, General Robert, marches on Washington — at battle of Bladens- 
 burg— takes Washington and burns Capitol, etc. — moves against 
 Baltimore, 73. 
 
 Rosser, General, at Spottsylvania, 490. 
 
 "Round Robin," the, 610. 
 
 Round Top, Little, see Little Round Top. 
 
 Round Tops, 371. 
 
 Rousseau, General, at Stones River, 316; driven back, 318; cavalry 
 raid in Alabama, 543; in Atlanta campaign, 544; at Nashville, 555; 
 defeats Bates, 572. 
 
 Rubin, General, withdraws toward Santiago, 599; at Las Guasimas, 
 600; his orders at Las Guasimas, 623. 
 
 Ruger, General, at Gettysburg, 379; at Columbia, 565; at Spring Hill, 
 567; at Franklin, 569. 
 
 Rules of War, point out dangers, 348. 
 
 Rummel House, cavalry combat near, 383. 
 
 Runyon, General, commands McDowell's fourth division, 133. 
 
 Sabine Cross Roads, battle of, 586. 
 
 Sacketts Harbor, repulse of British, 68. 
 
 Sailor's Creek, combat at, 527. 
 
716 Index. 
 
 St. Germain-en-Laye, peace at, 1. 
 
 St. John River, as line of invasion, S. 
 
 St. Lawrence River, French flag planted by Verrazzano — French flag 
 carried up by Jacques Cartier, 1 ; as line of invasion, 5. 
 
 St. Leger, General, commands a British column — fights Nicholas Her- 
 kimer at Oriskany, 32. 
 
 Salem Church, battle of, 345. 
 
 Salient, at Spottsylvania, 495; attacked, 496; losses — criticised — Lee 
 withdraws, 498. 
 
 Saltillo, Taylor advances to — its strategic importance, 90. 
 
 Sampson, Admiral, at Key West, 591 ; searches for Cervera's fleet. 
 592; in doubt about Cervera's whereabouts — at Santiago, 593 
 blockades Cervera — bombards forts, 594; in Shafter's attack, 602 
 shells Aguadores, 608; foresaw effect of destruction of Cervera's 
 fleet, 617. 
 
 Sanders, Fort, see Fort Sanders. 
 
 Sandy Hook, Clinton's army withdraws to, 35. 
 
 San Juan Hill, battle of, Shafter's plan — topography, 602; battle of, 
 604; Derby's balloon starts battle — Spanish force, 605; battle 
 of, 606-8; battle of, July 2, 608; battle of — comments, 624; com- 
 pared with battle of Manila, 627. 
 
 San Patricio, companies, 115. 
 
 Santa Anna, takes command of Mexican army, 90; threatens to ad- 
 vance, 91 ; gets possession of Scott's dispatch to Taylor — advances 
 against Taylor, 92; at Buena Vista, 93; retreats to San Luis 
 Potosi, 95 ; his mistakes at Buena Vista, 102 ; his movements after 
 Buena Vista — goes to Cerro Gordo, 108; after Cerro Gordo, 109; 
 at Contreras, 114; proclaims victory at Molino del Rey, 117; re- 
 signs presidency of Mexico — defeated by General Joe Lane — death, 
 119; his mistakes at Cerro Gordo, 121; did not anticipate direction 
 of Scott's advance — his failure to defend road, 123; his qualities — 
 his mistake in quitting Orizaba, 125. 
 
 Santiago de Cuba, campaign of, see Santiago campaign. 
 
 "Santiago de Cuba, The Campaign of," Captain Sargent's, foot-note, 
 588. 
 
 Santiago Campaign — after Sampson shut up Cervera, 505; Shafter's 
 army embarks — organization and strength of American army — 
 army reaches Cuba, 596; geography of theater — Spanish troops, 
 597; Americans land — Lawton's advance to Siboney, 598; Shafter's 
 orders for June 24, 599; army at Sevilla — confusion on transports, 
 601; Shafter's plan of attack — battle-field — topography, 602; force 
 and armament July 1, 603; Spanish forces, 605; capitulation of 
 Spanish — Escario's column enters — naval battle, 609; losses — health 
 of army — "Round Robin" — army withdraws, 610; Miles diverted 
 to Santiago, 614 ; comments — naval operations, 617-21 ; land opera- 
 tions, 621-6; if Santiago had been taken July 1, 626. 
 
 Saratoga, Burgoyne's defeat and surrender at, 33. 
 
 Sargent, Captain, "The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba," foot-note, 588. 
 
 Savage's Station, battle of, 206. 
 
 Savannah, besieged by General Lincoln, 44; captured, 585. 
 
 Schenck, General, commands a brigade in McDowell's army, 133; 
 at battle of McDowell, 225. 
 
Index. 717 
 
 Schley, Admiral, commands Flying Squadron, 591; sails for Gulf of 
 Mexico, 592; thinks Cervera is at Cienfuegos, 593; at Santiago- 
 discovers Cervera's fleet, 593; Flying Squadron detained at Hamp- 
 ton Roads — sent to join Sampson, 618. 
 
 Schofield, General, succeeds Burnside in command of Army of the 
 Ohio, 536; at Dalton, 538; in pursuit from Resaca, 539; at New 
 Hope Church— at Cassville, 540; moves to Soap Creek- 
 moves down Sandtown Road, 542; at Peachtree Creek, 543; battle 
 of Atlanta, 544; at Eastpoint, 546; operations south of Atlanta, 
 546-7; occupies Decatur, 547; sent to Knoxville, 557; at Johnson- 
 ville— at Pulaski— sent to Thomas, 563; at Columbia, 564-5; 
 retreats to Franklin— at Spring Hill, 567; in retreat— wires 
 Thomas— at Franklin, 568; retreats from Franklin — leaves 
 dead and wounded, 571; position at Nashville, 572; in Thomas's 
 plan — order written for him to supplant Thomas, 573; pre- 
 liminary movements, 574; takes Wilson's place — second day, 575; 
 in pursuit, 576; peril at Spring Hill, 582. 
 
 Schurz, Carl, at Chancellorsville, 340; driven back, 341; at Gettysburg, 
 366. 
 
 Schuyler, Philip John, commands Americans against Burgoyne, 32; 
 relieved from command, 33. 
 
 Schwan, General Theodore, in Porto Rican expedition, 615. 
 
 Scott, Winfield, captured at Queenstown, 63; commands brigade — at 
 battle of Chippewa, 71 ; at Lundy's Lane, 72 ; advises Taylor to 
 withdraw to Monterey, 99; goes to Mexico to command — his plan — 
 takes troops from Taylor — makes preparations — selects Island of 
 Lobos as base, 105; begins operations — lands in Mexico, 106; at 
 Cerro Gordo — marches on Puebla, 109; abandons communications 
 and advances on City of Mexico, 110; in the Valley of Mexico, 
 111; takes City of Mexico, 118; establishes provisional government 
 in Mexico — his campaign over, 119; comment on his campaign — 
 cause and effect of his delay, 120; his lack of transportation, 121; 
 Wellington's criticism of — relies on his engineers, 122; handicapped 
 by lack of funds and supplies, 123 ; his campaign shows benefit 
 of training, 124; ordered before court of inquiry — comment 
 of Mexican historian, 126; at outbreak of Civil War, 130; directs 
 Federal forces, 132; calls on McDowell for plan, 133; his mistake 
 concerning Patterson's force, 144; retires, 192; too old for active 
 command, 235; his Mexican campaign compared with Grant's 
 Vicksburg campaign, 416. 
 
 Sea, command of, its importance, 211, 618. 
 
 Search, right to, England's claim of, 56. 
 
 Secession, States pass ordinance of — struggle in border States, 129. 
 
 Second Corps, at Wilderness, 472; in movement to James, 513; assault 
 June 18, 518; siege of Petersburg, 519; operations north of James, 
 520; the Mine, 521; commanded by Humphreys, 525; in movement 
 October 27, 525; pursuit to Appomattox, 527; at Farmville, 528. 
 
 Sedgwick, General, has dunce to read his orders, 149 ; commands divi- 
 sion in A. P., 194; at-Antietam, 270; commands Sixth Corps, 330; 
 to make demonstration, 331; crosses Rappahannock, 332; his opera- 
 tions in Chancellorsville campaign — his orders from Hooker— .as- 
 
718 Index. 
 
 Sedgwick, General — Continued. 
 
 saults Marye's Hill, 344; carries it — at Salem Church, 345; 
 withdraws across Rappahannock, 346; his operations criticised, 
 351 ; better to have held Marye's Heights — well he was stopped at 
 Salem Church, 352; ordered to reconnoiter Confederate position 
 at Fredericksburg — reports army in position, 357; at Manchester, 
 363; marches from Manchester, 373; in pursuit of Lee's army, 384; 
 at Germanna Ford, 472; orders May 5, 474; ordered to attack, 
 475 ; May 6, 479 ; right rolled up, 481 ; movement to Spottsylvania, 
 488; at Spottsylvania, 490; killed, 492. 
 
 Selma, Confederate arsenal, 557. 
 
 Seminary Ridge, 364. 
 
 Semmes, General, at Gettysburg — mortally wounded, 376. 
 
 Seven Days' Battles, 204; strength and losses, 209. 
 
 Seven Pines, battle of, 201 ; Confederate losses— result of Confederate 
 defeat, 202; Johnston's only offensive battle, 549. 
 
 Seventeenth Corps, in Army of the Tennessee, 536. 
 
 Seven Years' War, 11. 
 
 Sevier, John, at battle of Kings Mountain, 46. 
 
 Seymour, General, at Wilderness, 481. 
 
 Shafter, General, commands Fifth Corps — ordered to Santiago, 595; 
 starts, 596; organization of army — reaches Cuba — confers with 
 naval officers and Garcia, 596; gets information from Garcia — de- 
 barks, 598; orders for June 24, 599; remains on Seguranga — awaits 
 unloading — joins army ashore, 601; plan of attack, 602; observes 
 from El Poso, 602; orders Lawton to San Juan, 604; troops dis- 
 pirited, 608; considers withdrawing to Sevilla — demands surren- 
 der, 609; health of army — the "Round Robin" — army withdraws 
 from Cuba, 610; his choice of a base and line of operations dis- 
 cussed, 621 ; mistake at El Caney, 624, 625. 
 
 Shaler, General, at Wilderness, 481. 
 
 Sharpsburg, battle of, see Antietam. 
 
 Shelby, Isaac, at battle of Kings Mountain, 46. 
 
 Shenandoah Valley, its strategic importance, 132; its importance — 
 situation, etc., 216; not a good line of operations for Northern 
 army, 218; cleared of Union troops, 358. 
 
 Shepherd's Brigade of Regulars, at Stones River, 318. 
 
 Sheridan, General, at Stones River, 315; wheels and charges, 317; 
 forced back, 318; one of four full generals in U. S. Army, 354; at 
 Chickamauga, 433 ; driven from field, 436 ; his mistake, 444 ; 
 at Chattanooga, 454; at Missionary Ridge, 458-9; to command 
 Grant's cavalry, 470; leads Grant's advance, 472; at Wilderness, 
 May 5, 474; combats Stuart, 480; poor cavalry work — had not 
 learned lesson, 484; movement to Spottsylvania, 488; first raid, 490; 
 in movement after North Anna — at Hav/s Shop — absent on raid, 
 501 ; cavalry ought to have blocked Anderson, 507 ; raid criticised, 
 508; his Trevilian raid, 510; in Shenandoah Valley, 511; with 
 Hancock north of James, 520; the Mine, 521; rejoins from the 
 valley — in Appomattox campaign, 526; at Dinwiddie C. H. — Five 
 Forks — in pursuit to Appomattox, 527; stops Lee's retreat, 528; 
 political effect of his success in the valley, 531 ; in pursuit to 
 Appomattox, 533 ; expedition to Rio Grande border, 588. 
 
Index. 719 
 
 Sherman, W. T., commands a brigade in McDowell's army, 133; 
 at first battle of Bull Run, 138; and Jackson only generals show 
 tactical knowledge at first battle of Bull Run, 147; commands 
 division in Smith's expedition, 170; takes detachment to East- 
 port, 171; reports all quiet at Shiloh, 175; forms for battle, 176; 
 falls back— his right turned, 177; commands pursuit after Shiloh, 
 181 ; one of four full generals' in U. S. Army, 354; operations against 
 Vicksburg by the Mississippi, 398; his failure at Chickasaw Bluffs 
 — commands Fifteenth Corps, 399; at Jackson, 409; at the Big 
 Black, 412; covers siege of Vicksburg — pursues Johnston to Jack- 
 son, 415; at Chattanooga, 452; at Missionary Ridge, 457; assaults 
 Nov. 25— fails, 457; at Knoxville— returns to Chattanooga, 460; 
 succeeds to command of Division of the Mississippi, 469; in 
 Georgia, 510; political effect of his successes over Hood, 531; suc- 
 ceeds Grant in Tennessee — causes of delay — organization of his 
 forces— distribution and strength of forces, 536; instructions from 
 Grant — turns Dalton position — Atlanta his objective, 537; at 
 Resaca, 538; pursues Johnston, 539; turns Allatdona Pass— at 
 New Hope Church, 540; assaults Kenesaw Mountain — closes 
 on Johnston, 541 ; at Smyrna — crosses Chattahoochee in pur- 
 suit, 542; Peachtree Creek, 543; battle of Atlanta, 544; position 
 July 31— his opinion of cavalry, 545; operates against Hood's com- 
 munications, 544-6; disappointed by Kilpatrick — continues general 
 movement, 546; takes Atlanta, 547; campaign compared with 
 Grant's, 547-8; operations like Rosecrans's, 548; mistakes, 548-50; 
 criticises McPherson, 549; his failure at Resaca criticised — failure 
 to attack Hood en route to Lovejoy, 550; opportunities for Johns- 
 ton to attack — wanted to make war without fighting — could not 
 operate far from the railways, 552 ; if Johnston had fortified Snake 
 Creek Gap, 553; occupies Atlanta — conditions in army — ejects in- 
 habitants — not decided what to do — communications interrupted, 
 555; correspondence with Grant, 556, prepares for Hood, 557; 
 moves to oppose Hood, 558; pursues Hood — halts at Gaylesville — 
 turns back and prepares for march to sea — correspondence with 
 Grant, 559; assembles his forces, 560; dispatches Fourth Corps to 
 Thomas, 562; dispatches Twenty-third Corps, 563; pursuit of 
 Hood reviewed — strategic position at Gaylesville, 577; suspension 
 of pursuit of Hood discussed, 578; his advance to the sea, 585; 
 advances into North Carolina — at Goldsboro — Johnston surrenders, 
 586. 
 
 Shields, General, garrisons Tampico, 91; at Contreras, 113; at Churu- 
 busco, 114; ordered to quit Valley and join McDowell, 199; at 
 Kernstown, 221 ; lets Jackson escape at Strasburg, 229 ; pursues, 
 230; at battle of Port Republic, 232; in command by "political 
 necessity," 530. 
 
 Shiloh, danger of Union position at, see Pittsburg Landing; not in- 
 trenched, see Pittsburg Landing. 
 
 Shiloh, the campaign of — Confederate troops concentrated for — 
 distribution of troops in theater, 169; battle-field described, 172; 
 camps of Union army at — Union camp there without intrench- 
 ments or outposts, 173 ; Cenf ederate advance on, 175 ; battle of, 
 begins, 176-8; battle of, Union left turned, 177; battle of, end of 
 
720 Ixdex. 
 
 Shiloh — Continued. 
 
 first day — Union troops bivouac after, 179; Confederates occupy 
 Union camps — condition of Confederate and Union armies on 
 second day, 180; second day — battle of, Union line on second day, 
 181 ; strength and losses — comments — difficult to get the truth of, 
 182; effect of Confederate defeat — Johnston's concentration — tactics 
 of — neither army commanded, 186; Confederate plan — faults in 
 Union encampment, 187; faults of Confederate attack — conduct 
 of the troops, 188; Beauregard should have withdrawn — cavalry 
 at— artillery at, 189. 
 
 Shirley, Governor, commands expedition against Niagara, 9. 
 
 Siboney, Lawton advances on, 598; Spaniards withdraw — action with 
 Castillo, 599; American army at, 601. 
 
 Sickles, General, at Fredericksburg, 298; commands Third Corps, 330; 
 at Chancellorsville, 335; attacks Jackson at Catherine Furnace, 
 339; orders Birney to attack at night, 342; at Bridgeport, 363; at 
 Gettysburg, 367; his advanced position, 373; attacked, 375; forced 
 back, 376; his faulty line at Gettysburg, 390. 
 
 5iege of Petersburg — after Cold Harbor, 510; begins, 519; the Mine, 
 520-1 ; lines extended, 522 ; Grant's movement, Oct. 27 — War- 
 ren's operations — operations at Reams's Station, 524; Warren's 
 operations— extent of intrenchments, 525 ; Warren destroys Wel- 
 don Ry. — operations February, 1865 — Warren's operations — ex- 
 tent of intrenchments, 525; final operations, 526; ends, 527; com- 
 ment's, 528; Grant's and Lee's advantages, 530; compared with 
 Port Arthur, 533 ; compared with Atlanta campaign, 547, '548. 
 
 Sieges, the lesson of, 421. 
 
 Sierra Madre, Mexican line of defense, 88. 
 
 Sigel, General, commands corps under Pope, 239; ordered to Gaines- 
 ville — to Manassas, 245; on August 30, at second Bull Run, 250; 
 commands Eleventh Corps, 262; commands Reserve Corps 
 (Eleventh Corps), 290; does nothing but retreat, 470. 
 
 Six Nations, 4. 
 
 Sixteenth Corps, part in Army of the Tennessee, 536; part sent to 
 Thomas, 563 ; reaches Nashville, 572. 
 
 Sixth Corps, at Wilderness, 472; May 14, 499; in movement to James, 
 513; at Petersburg, 517; siege of Petersburg, 519; dispatched to 
 Washington, 520; rejoins, 526; pursuit to Appomattox, 527. 
 
 Slaughter Mountain, see Cedar Mountain. 
 
 Slocum, General, commands division of Sixth Corps, 199; at Gaines's 
 Mill, 205; commands Twelfth Corps, 330; at Chancellorsville, 335; 
 near Harper's Ferry, 359; ordered to cut Lee's communications, 
 360; at Littlestown, 363; at Gettysburg, 367; sent to aid Rose- 
 crans, 447; commands Twentieth Corps, foot-note, 544; guards 
 Chattahoochee bridge, 546. 
 
 Smith, A. J., in Vicksburg expedition, 398; at Champion's Hill, 411; 
 ordered from Missouri to Tennessee, 563; reaches Nashville — posi- 
 tion, 572 ; in Thomas's plan, 573 ; preliminary movements — advances, 
 574; drives Confederate left — second day, 575; in pursuit, 576. 
 
 Smith, C. F., commands a division at Forts Henry and Donelson, 156; 
 carries Confederate works at Fort Donelson, 160; commands ex- 
 pedition, 170; camps forces at Pittsburg Landing, 172. 
 
Index. 721 
 
 Smith, G. W„ defeats Franklin at West Point, 198; at Seven Pines, 
 201 ; retires from duty, 202 ; at Peachtree Creek, 543. 
 
 Smith, John E., at Chattanooga, 452. 
 
 Smith, Kirby, at first battle of Bull Run, 140; has forces at Knox- 
 ville — arranges to invade Kentucky, 309; advances to Kentucky — 
 fights at Richmond — captures Lexington, 310; commands Trans- 
 Mississippi Department, 557. 
 
 Smith, M. 1... in Vicksburg expedition, 398. 
 
 Smith, Peesifor F., at Contreras, 113. 
 
 Smith, W. F., commands division in A. P., 194; commands division 
 of Sixth Corps, 199; commands Sixth Corps, 290; at Chattanooga, 
 450; at Cold Harbor, 502; in movement to James, 513; ordered to 
 capture Petersburg, 514; attacks Petersburg, 515-16; siege of 
 Petersburg, 519. 
 
 Smyrna, operations near, 542. 
 
 Smyth, General Alexander, succeeds Van Rensselaer — his operations 
 — dropped from rolls of army, 63. 
 
 Snake Creek Gap, Johnston's failure to fortify, 553. 
 
 South, its newspapers decry A. S. Johnston, 183. 
 
 South and North, similar policies, 463. 
 
 South Carolina, fears a revolt of slaves, 43 ; reduced by Clinton — 
 frightful condition under Cornwallis, 44 ; passes ordinance of seces- 
 sion, 128. 
 
 Southern Confederacy, see Confederacy. 
 
 South Mountain, battle of, 265; battle of, discussion, 277. 
 
 Spain, declares war against England, 42; causes of war, 589; declares 
 war, 590 ; makes overtures for peace, 616 ; divides her fleet — 
 her navy compared with ours, 618. 
 
 Spangler's Spring, 365. 
 
 Spanish-American War, 588; causes, 589; declarations of war — plan — 
 preparations, 590; navies, 591; fleets, 592; Cervera blockaded at 
 Santiago — Sampson shells forts, 594; situation after Sampson 
 shuts up Spanish fleet, 595; Santiago campaign, 589-611; operations, 
 in the Philippines, 611-14; Porto Rican expedition, 614-16; peace — . 
 comments, 616-28; navy dictates plan, 616; plan of War Depart- 
 ment — no combined plan beforehand, 617; importance of sea con- 
 trol — comparison of hostile fleets, 618; our unpreparedness, 619; 
 quick passage of events, 620; naval operations discussed, 617-21; 
 El Caney discussed, 624; San Juan and Kettle Hill discussed, 625, 
 626; comments — land operations against Santiago, 621-6; capture 
 of Manila discussed, 626; cooperation of army and navy, 627; 
 battles of Manila and San Juan — El Caney compared, 627. 
 
 Spear, General, with Warren, 523. 
 
 Spottsylvania Court House, battle of — armies move, May 7, 488; why 
 a strategic point — battle, why fought — battle begins, 489; no bat- 
 tle May 9 — troops intrench — Confederate position, 492; no battle 
 May 11 — attack May 12, 496 — losses at salient — position at salient 
 criticised — line withdrawn — no battle May 13 — orders for May 14, 
 498; no fighting May 15-17, 499; May 18— May 19— losses, 500;. 
 comments, 503 ; movement from Wilderness discussed, 506. 
 
 Spring Hill, battle of, 565 ; battle of, comments, 581. 
 
 Squadron, the Flying, 591. 
 
•722 Index. 
 
 Standing Army, see army, regular. 
 
 'Stanley, General, commands Fourth Corps, SS9; sent to Thomas, 562; 
 under Schofield, foot-note, 563; at Columbia, 564; at Spring Hill, 
 566, 567, 581 ; wounded, foot-note, 572. 
 
 Stannard's Brigade, at Gettysburg, 382. 
 
 Stanton, Secretary of War, directs military operations, 223 ; writes 
 to governor of Massachusetts — pays no attention to protests of 
 McClellan and McDowell, 228; ill effects of his lack of military 
 knowledge, 233 ; not to blame for selecting Halleck, 253 ; had de- 
 cided with President and Halleck to relieve Hooker, 360; meets 
 Grant at Louisville, 447; his injustice, 448; impatient at Thomas's 
 delay, 572. 
 "Stanwix, Fort, see Fort Stanwix. 
 
 Star of the West, at Fort Sumter, 128. 
 
 Stark, John, at Breed's Hill, 24; at Bennington, 32; contributes 
 money for support of army, 41. 
 
 Staten Island, Howe's army lands at, 29. 
 
 'Steedman, General, at Chickamauga, 437; at Chattanooga, 555; at 
 Nashville — position, 572; in Thomas's plan, 573; opens attack, 574; 
 second day, 575 ; supports Wood, 576. 
 
 Steele, General, in Vicksburg expedition, 398. 
 
 Steinwehr, General, at Chancellorsville, 340; at Gettysburg, 368. 
 
 Steuart, General, at Gettysburg, 377; captured, 496. 
 
 Steuben, Baron, effect of his instruction, 35 ; in Virginia, 46. 
 
 Stevens, General I. I., killed at Chantilly, 251. 
 
 Stevenson, C. L., commands along the Mississippi, 403; at Champion's 
 Hill, 411; at the Big Black, 412. 
 
 Stevenson, T. G, at Wilderness, 474; reinforces Hancock, 479; May 
 6, 479. 
 
 Stewart, A. P., at Chickamauga, 433 ; at Missionary Ridge, 458 ; suc- 
 ceeds Loring, 543 ; at Ezra Church, 545 ; on Hood's advance, 557, 
 564; at Spring Hill, 566, 567; at Franklin, 569, 570; at Nashville, 
 571, 575 ; action at Spring Hill criticised, 582. 
 -*Stoneman, General, pursues Johnston from Yorktown with Union cav- 
 alry, 197; commands Third Corps, 289; to command Cavalry 
 Corps, 329; on raid, 331; his raid during Chancellorsville cam- 
 paign, 346; effect of operations before battle of Chancellorsville, 
 348; his cavalry needed at Chancellorsville, 350; replaced by 
 Pleasonton in command of cavalry corps, 358; in Atlanta cam- 
 paign, 538; seizes Allatoona — covers Sherman's left, 540; reaches 
 the Chattahoochee, 542; raid in Georgia, 544-5. 
 'Stones River, 308; the right spelling of name, foot-note, 308; battle 
 of — battle-field, 314; Union and Confederate plans identical — Con- 
 federates get the initiative, 317; their final assault, 320; hostile 
 lines bivouac night of December 31, 1862 — no fighting January 1, 
 320; comments, 321; Breckinridge's attack on January 2 repulsed — 
 little fighting on January 3, 320; Bragg withdraws— action of 
 Wheeler's cavalry, 321 ; comments — why Bragg attacked — plans of 
 hostile commanders identical, 327; bad outpost duty — Ropes's opin- 
 ion of the fighting — tactics — artillery, 328; after the battle, 422. 
 
 'Strategic Diversion, Jackson's campaign a, 234. . 
 
Index. 723 
 
 Strategic Penetration, campaign against Forts Henry and Donelson 
 an example of, 162. 
 
 Strategy, its province to dishearten hostile people, 167; the, of Jack- 
 son's operations against Banks, 228; effect of Jackson's operations 
 against Fremont and Shields, 233 ; in campaign of Shiloh, see 
 comments; the, of Jackson's operations, 234; political, an example 
 of, 274; forces must be kept united, foot-note, 275; the, of Bragg* s 
 invasion of Kentucky, 322; Hooker combines offensive with de- 
 fensive tactics, 349; how Southern railways could have been used 
 to advantage, 356; strategic position of Gettysburg, 364; Lee's 
 concentration at Cashtown, 387; of Grant's Vicksburg campaign, 
 417 ; attack and defense of a river-line, 418 ; Pemberton's failure to 
 keep army united, 419; objective in Chickamauga campaign, 439; 
 examples of attack of wing and turning movement, 439; its chief 
 end — Tullahoma campaign, 439; Rosecrans's flank movements — of 
 Rosecrans and Bragg, 440; effect of Grant's victory at Chatta- 
 nooga — Confederacy deprived of interior lines, 462; Union and 
 Confederate similar, 463 ; in operations from Rapidan to James, 
 506; Grant's, fools Lee, 514; Grant's movement to the James fine 
 example, 529; of Sherman and Rosecrans alike, 548; Sherman's 
 position at Gaylesville, 577; Hood's invasion of Tennessee, 578-81; 
 attack at Nashville, 584; at El Caney, 624. 
 
 Strength of a Position, measured by security of its flanks, 338. 
 
 Stuart, Colonel, succeeds Rawdon in South Carolina — at battle of 
 Eutaw Springs, 49. 
 
 Stuart, David, his camp at Shiloh, 173. 
 
 Stuart, J. E. B., at first battle of Bull Run, 140 ; pursues, 141 ; covers 
 Johnston's withdrawal from Yorktown, 197 ; his raid round Mc- 
 Clellan's army — its effect, 2Q3; sent to White House, 206; marches 
 to Gordonsville, 243; raids rear of Pope's army, 244; on Jackson's 
 turning movement — captures Manassas, 244; after second Bull 
 Run, 250; in campaign of second Bull Run, 259; in Antietam cam- 
 paign, 263; informs Lee that McClellan has "S. O. 191," 265; at 
 Antietam, 267, 269; his raid after Antietam, 285; at Fred- 
 ericksburg, 296; keeps Doubleday out of fight at Fredericksburg, 
 307; reports Hooker's advance, 332; takes command after Jack- 
 son is wounded, 342; renews attack at daybreak — captures Fair- 
 view — connects with Anderson, 343 ; in Gettysburg campaign 
 — at Brandy Station, 357; covers Lee's army — fights with 
 Pleasonton, 359; raid during Gettysburg campaign — fights Kil- 
 patrick, 362; rejoins Lee at Gettysburg, 363; brush with Federal 
 cavalry, July 3, 374 ; had arrived, 378 ; combat with Union cavalry, 
 382; his work in Gettysburg campaign criticised, 393; cause of 
 Lee's failure to cut off Meade's retreat to Centreville, 467; warns 
 Lee of Meade's turning movement, 468 ; at Wilderness, May 5, 475 ; 
 drawn in, 478; fights Sheridan, 480; excuse at Wilderness, 484; 
 on Union flank, 487; warns Lee of Union movement, 488; follows 
 Sheridan — Yellow Tavern — mortally wounded, 491 ; guards Cor- 
 bin's Bridge, 507. 
 
 "Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign," by Colonel Mosby, 
 foot-note, 361. 
 
 Sturgis, General, at Antietam, 273; at Fredericksburg, 299. 
 
 Sumner, E. V., at Churubusco, 114; at Molino del Rey, 117; commands 
 Second Corps in A. P., 194; at Savage's Station, 206; commands 
 Second Corps, 262; commands center, 264; at Antietam, 270; com- 
 mands right Grand Division, 289; marches to Falmouth, 290; at 
 Fredericksburg, 293; his order from Burnside, 295; retires from 
 army of the Potomac, 330. 
 
724 Index. 
 
 Sumner, S. S., at San Juan — assaults Kettle Hill, 607. 
 
 Sumter, Fort, see Fort Sumter. 
 
 Sumter, General, his operations, 45; captures British train — defeats 
 Tarleton at Blackstock Hill, 46; captures Orangeburg, 49. 
 
 Sunken Road, at Marye's Hill, 299; its defensive strength, 304. 
 
 Superior, Lake, French reach, 1. 
 
 Supplies, base of, see base of supplies. 
 
 Swamps, the, 400. 
 
 Swinton, describes artillery fire at Fredericksburg, 294. 
 
 Sykes, George, commands regular battalion in McDowell's army, 134; 
 covers retreat at first Bull Run, 140; his regular battalion not de- 
 moralized at first Bull Run, 141 ; commands regular brigade in 
 A. P., 194; commands division of Fifth Corps, 199; at Antietam, 
 272; crosses Potomac after Antietam, 284; at Chancellorsville, 335; 
 at Union Mills, 363. 
 
 Tactics, at Shiloh, 188; at Antietam, 280; at Stones River, 328; 
 Hooker combines defensive with offensive strategy — defensive sel- 
 dom decisive, 349 ; an army not defeated which has reserves un- 
 employed, 351 ; advantages and defects of Union line at Gettys- 
 burg, 371 ; progressive attack at Gettysburg — concave order of 
 attack at Gettysburg — Sickles's faulty position, 390; effect of high 
 ground, 391 ; at Chickamauga, 443 ; Bragg' s lines at Missionary 
 Ridge, 458 ; at Wilderness — affected by dense woods, 485 ; no plan 
 — no cooperation, 486 ; advanced position at Franklin, 583 ; attack 
 at Nashville, 584; at El Caney, 624, 625; battle of Manila, 626; 
 at San Juan and Kettle Hills, 625, 626. 
 
 Taliaferro, General, at Fredericksburg, 296. 
 
 Tamaulipas, to be occupied, 91. 
 
 Tampico, captured by Commodore Perry — garrisoned by Shields — 
 base of operations, 91. 
 
 Tarleton, defeated at Blackstock Hill, 46; defeated at The Cowpens, 
 47; his raid toward Charlottesville, 50. 
 
 Taylor, "Dick," at battle of Port Republic, 232 ; commands in Mis- 
 sissippi and Alabama, 557; at Sabine Cross Roads, 586. 
 
 Taylor's Campaign, 81 ; see Mexican War, Taylor's campaign. 
 
 Taylor, Zachary, sent with troops to Texas border, 81 ; his plans and 
 instructions — advances to the Rio Grande, 83 ; calls on governors 
 for troops — marches to Point Isabel, 84; at battle of Palo Alto — 
 at battle of Resaca de la Palma, 85 ; after Resaca de la Palma — 
 establishes depot at Cerralvo, 88; advances on Monterey, 89; cap- 
 tures Monterey — his terms with Ampudia disapproved — ad- 
 vances to Saltillo, 90 ; expedition to Victoria — receives orders de- 
 taching large force to Scott — returns to Saltillo, 91 ; advances to 
 Agua Nueva — at Buena Vista, 92 ; falls back to Monterey — his 
 strategy and tactics, 95; his difficulties of supply and transport, 96; 
 his reasons for holding Saltillo, 99; his chances at Buena Vista, 
 101 ; troops taken by Scott, 105. 
 
 Tecumseh, see Tecumthe. 
 
 Tecumthe, incites Indians, 57 ; cuts off McArthur's detachment, 61 ; 
 killed at battle of Thames, 67. 
 
 Telegraph, field, used in battle of Manila, 626. 
 
 Tennessee, joins Confederacy, 129; its military geography — its rail- 
 ways, 151 ; Thomas's forces, when invaded by Hood, 562. 
 
 Tennessee, Army of the, see Army of the Tennessee. 
 
 Tennessee, East, see East Tennessee. 
 
 Tennessee River, controlled by Union gunboats, 169; at Chattanooga, 
 449. 
 
 Tenth Corps, repulsed by Longstreet, 525 ; discontinued, 526. 
 
Index. 725 
 
 Teresa, Maria, see Maria Teresa. 
 
 Terry, General A. H., at Bermuda Hundred, 516; repulsed by Long- 
 street, S2S ; captures Fort Fisher, S8S. 
 
 Terry's Texas Rangers, 167. 
 
 Texas, attains independence — annexation of, 81; geography, 82; Banks's 
 expedition — Sabine Cross Roads, 586; Sheridan's expedition to 
 Rio Grande, 588. 
 
 Texas, in Schley's squadron, 593. 
 
 Thames, the battle of, 66. 
 
 Theater of Operations, bad effect of having two independent com- 
 manders in, 162. 
 
 Thomas, G. H., his victory at Mill Springs, 154; commands "center" 
 of Rosecrans's army, 313; commands Fourteenth Corps, 423; at 
 Chickamauga, 431; morning September 19, 432; left in command — • 
 takes new position, 436; withdraws, 438; succeeds Rosecrans, 
 448; ordered to attack, 452; in plan of attack — his demonstration — • 
 November 23, 453; at Missionary Ridge, 458; why ordered to as- 
 sault, 461 ; in Atlanta campaign, 536 ; at Dalton, 538 ; in pursuit 
 from Resaca, 539; at Cassville — at New Hope Church, 540; 
 before Pine Mountain, 541 ; at Smyrna — extends to right — fol- 
 lows up Johnston, 542 ; at Peachtree Creek, 543 ; battle of Atlanta, 
 544; operations south of Atlanta, 546-7; occupies Atlanta, 547; 
 sent to Nashville, 557; his forces to oppose Hood's invasion, 562; 
 lacks forces — orders Schofield to fall back, 564; preliminary dis- 
 positions at Nashville — delays at Nashville, 572; telegrams from 
 Grant — order for his relief — plans, 573; dispositions second day, 
 575 ; routs Hood — losses, 576 ; compared with Hood, 577 ; failure to 
 stop Hood criticised, 578, 579; his forces, 579; slow — splendid vic- 
 tory — fine attack, 583-4; tactics, 584. 
 
 Thomas, E. L., at Fredericksburg, 296. 
 
 Thornton, Captain, his dragoons captured, 84. 
 
 Throgs Neck, Howe's army lands there, 29. 
 
 Ticonderoga, Fort, see Fort Ticonderoga. 
 
 Ticonderoga, Montcalm at, 10; attacked by Abercrombie, 12; captured 
 by Arnold and Allen, 24; captured by Burgoyne, 32. 
 
 Tilghman, General, commands at Forts Henry and Donelson, 150; at 
 Fort Henry — builds Fort Heiman, 154; does right at Fort Henry, 
 164. 
 
 Toombs, defends Burnside Bridge, 272. 
 
 Toral, General, at Santiago, 609. 
 
 Torbert, General, to command cavalry division, 470; covers Grant's 
 rear, 472; at Wilderness, May 5, 474; had not learned cavalry 
 lesson, 484; in movement from Spottsylvania, 501. 
 
 Tories, flee the country — their descendants the leading men of Canada, 
 23. 
 
 Torrejon, General, captures Captain Thornton's dragoons, 84; at bat- 
 tle of Palo Alto, 85. 
 
 Totopotomoy, Confederate intrenchments, 502. 
 
 Training, its advantages shown in Peninsular campaign, 216. 
 
 Trans-Mississippi Department, 557. 
 
 Treaties, Aix-la-Chapelle, 6. 
 
 Treaty of Utrecht, 3. 
 
 Trenton, Washington's victory — its effect, 31. 
 
 Trevilian Raid, 510. 
 
 Troops, called into service in 1812, 64; employed in 1813, 70. 
 
 Tullahoma, Bragg withdraws to, 321. 
 
 Ttjllahoma Campaign, 423; summary of, 424; Union and Confederate 
 dispositions at end of, 425; Rosecrans's turning movements, 440; 
 like Atlanta campaign, 548. 
 
726 Index. 
 
 T urchin, General, at Chattanooga, 450. 
 
 Turner's Gap, battle of, see South Mountain, battle of. 
 
 Turning Movement, Jackson's, 244; Pope's orders to meet it, 245; 
 
 Jackson's, criticised, 254; Jackson's, at Chancellorsville, 338; 
 
 Grant's, 505; Sherman's, 548; Sherman's risks, 552. 
 Twelfth Corps, sent to Rosecrans, 447; consolidated, 536. 
 Twentieth Corps, consolidated, 447; formed, 536; commanded by 
 
 Slocum, foot-note, 544; guards Chattahoochee bridge, 546; left at 
 
 Atlanta, 558. 
 Twenty-fifth Corps, organized, 526. 
 Twenty-ftrst Corps, consolidated, 447. 
 Twenty-fourth Corps, organized, 526. 
 Twenth-third Corps, Army of the Ohio, 536; sent to Thomas, 563; 
 
 at Franklin, 569; position at Nashville, 572. 
 Twiggs, General, commands one of Taylor's divisions, 88; commands 
 
 one of Scott's divisions, 106; starts for Talapa, 107; at Cerro 
 
 Gordo, 108; surrenders to Texas militia, 128. 
 Tyler, Daniel, commands McDowell's first division, 133; defeated at 
 
 Blackburn's Ford, 136. 
 Tyler, S. B., at battle of Port Republic, 232. 
 
 Union, combat at, 288. 
 
 United States, lacks means to reduce seceded States — navy in 1861, 
 
 128; policy like that of Confederacy, 463. 
 Unpreparedness, for Spanish-American War, 619. 
 Upperville, combat at, 288 ; cavalry combat at, 359. 
 Upton, Emory, his remark on a standing army, 76; at Spottsylvania, 
 
 495 ; attacked, 499 ; his "Military Policy of the U. S.," 620. 
 Utrecht, Treaty of, 3. 
 
 Valencia, General, occupies Contreras, 112; at battle of Contreras, 
 113; his mistakes at Contreras, 123. 
 
 Valley Campaign, see Jackson's Valley Campaign, 217. 
 
 Valley Forge, Washington's army at, 35. 
 
 Valley of Virginia, see Shenandoah Valley. 
 
 Van Cleve, General, at Stones River, 318; at Chickamauga, 433. 
 
 Van Dorn, General, ordered from Arkansas to Corinth, 169; has 
 command in Arkansas, 169; commands in Mississippi, 309; in Mis- 
 sissippi — at Corinth, 396; captures Grant's depot at Holly Springs, 
 398; joins Bragg, 422. 
 
 Van Rensselaer, General Stephen, commands on New York fron- 
 tier — attacks Queenstown, 62; resigns, 63. 
 
 Varnell's Station, cavalry combat at, 538. 
 
 Vaudreuil, takes charge of French army after death of Wolfe, 19; 
 surrenders at Montreal, 20. 
 
 Vara de Rey, General, killed, 605. 
 
 Vera Cruz, siege and capture of, 106; roads to City of Mexico, 107; 
 its strategic importance, 125. 
 
 Verrazzano, plants French flag on St. Lawrence River, 1. 
 
 Veteran Act, 536. 
 
 Vicksburg, conditions influence Lee in Gettysburg campaign, 354; Far- 
 ragut tries to take — garrisoned by Confederates, 395; its situation, 
 398 ; Confederate efforts to save — Grant's operations against, 401 ; 
 plans for capture, 402; defenses, 412; Grant's first assault fails — why 
 Grant's second assault, 413 ; the second assault — hostile forces in 
 second assault — besieged, 414; Pemberton surrenders, 415; Grant's 
 five failures against, 416; summary of Grant's campaign, 417; les- 
 son of the siege, 421. 
 
Index. 727 
 
 Vicksburg Campaign, 394; failure of first operations — Banks fails to~ 
 cooperate — Grant takes command at Vicksburg — canal started, 399; 
 geography — Jackson the Confederate base, 400 ; operations, 401 ; 
 Confederate efforts to save Vicksburg — Grant's final plan — Grant 
 concentrates at Hard Times, 402; Confederate forces in Missis- 
 sippi — Pemberton puzzled, 403; Grant's army across the Missis- 
 sippi, 406; Grant moves against railway — cuts loose from base — 
 hostile forces, May 11, 407; combat at Raymond — Grant moves or* 
 Jackson, 408; battle of Champion's Hill, 410; battle of the Big 
 Black — position and defenses of Vicksburg, 412; Grant's first as- 
 sault fails — Grant lives off the country — base at Steele's Bayou — 
 why Grant assaulted Vicksburg second time, 413; the second 
 assault — hostile forces in second assault — siege begun, 414; com- 
 ments — Grant's five failures, 416; summary of, 417; Johnston criti- 
 cised — Admiral Porter's aid in — lack of cavalry, 421 ; attack and' 
 defense of a river-line, 418; Pemberton scatters forces, 419; what 
 Pemberton should have done, 420; lesson of the siege, 421. 
 
 Virginia, joins Confederacy, 129. 
 
 Virginia, the Thirty-third at first battle of Bull Run, 140. 
 
 Virginia, Army of, see Army of Virginia. 
 
 Virginius, the, affair, 589. 
 
 Vixen, in Schley's squadron, 593. 
 
 Vizcaya, at battle of Santiago, 610. 
 
 Volunteers, compared with regulars, 103 ; in Mexican War, 124. 
 
 Von Moltke, advocated flank positions, 551. 
 
 Wads worth, General, at Gettysburg, 366; on Culp's Hill, 368; at Wil- 
 derness, 475, 478; May 6, 479; killed, 480. 
 
 Wagner, Arthur L., organizes reconnaissance, 601. 
 
 Wagner, Geo. D., at Columbia, 564; at Spring Hill, 566; at Franklin, 
 569, 570; advanced position at Franklin, 583. 
 
 Walker, Admiral Sir Hovenden, 2; fleet wrecked in St. Lawrence, 3. 
 
 Walker, John G., at Harper's Ferry, 266 ; at Antietam, 270. 
 
 Walker, W.*H. T., at Jackson, 409; joins Bragg, 428; at Chicka- 
 mauga, 431 ; delayed by Wilder — bivouacs, 432; at Chattanooga, 
 454. 
 
 Wallace, Lew, commands a division at Fort Donelson, 156; commands 
 division in Smith's expedition, 170. 
 
 Wallace, W. H. L., commands division in Smith's expedition, 170; his 
 dispositions at Shiloh, 177; at the Hornets Nest — killed, 178. 
 
 Walthall, General, at Mt. Lookout, 454; covers Hood's retreat, 576. 
 
 War, the Civil, see Civil War. 
 
 War, Council of, Napoleon's Maxim LXV, foot-note, 410. 
 
 War Department, its plan against Spanish in Cuba — will be ready in. 
 future, 617. 
 
 War Orders, President Lincoln's, 193. 
 
 War, rules of, point out dangers, 348. 
 
 War of 1812, comments on — its lessons, 75 ; troops engaged — strategy 
 and tactics of, 77. 
 
 Wars, the war of the Austrian succession, 6; Colonial, 1; French and 
 Indian — King George's 6 ; King William's, 1 ; Queen Anne's, 2 ; 
 Queen Anne's closed, 3; Seven Years' War, 11; the War of 1812, 
 56. 
 
 Warren, G. K., at Gettysburg, 368; saves Little Round Top, 376; com- 
 mands Fifth Corps, 471; at Old Wilderness Tavern, 472; orders, 
 May 5, 474; reports enemy — ordered to attack — begins battle, 475; 
 May 6, 479; movement to Spottsylvania, 488; fired on — delayed by 
 Fitzhugh Lee, 489; attacks, 490; first position, 493; attacks and is 
 
728 Index. 
 
 Warren, G. K. — Continued. 
 
 repulsed, 494 ; renews assault, 495 ; repulsed — slow, 497 ; to co- 
 operate with Hancock, 496; ordered to assault, May 14, 498; May 
 18, 499; in movement after Spottsylvania — at North Anna, 501; 
 movement to Spottsylvania discussed, 506; his march compared 
 ■with Lawton's, 507; in movement to James, 513; at Petersburg, 
 517; assault, June 18, 518; siege of Petersburg, 519; the Mine, 
 521 ; operations against Weldon Railway, 523 ; withdraws and in- 
 trenches — movement to the left, 524; movement February, 1865 — 
 second operations against Weldon Railway — in movement, October 
 27, 525 ; attacked by Hill, 526 ; at Five Forks, 527 ; covers Grant's 
 movement to the James, 528. 
 
 Washington, Fort, see Fort Washington. 
 
 Washington, George, dispatched to French commander, 6; commands 
 expedition to Monongahela River — encounters French at Great 
 Meadows, 7; takes command at Cambridge, 24; occupies Dor- 
 chester Heights and Nooks Hill, 25 ; transfers army to New York 
 — unable to oppose Howe's landing, 28 ; divides army between New 
 York and Brooklyn Heights — withdraws to Harlem Heights — re- 
 pulses British, 29; attacked at White Plains, 29; withdraws to 
 North Castle — divides his army — establishes camp at Hackensack • 
 — marches to Newark — retreats — crosses the Delaware — his army 
 ceases to exert "power of attraction," 30,- defeats Hessians at 
 Trenton — called "Fabius Cunctator" — withdraws to Morristown, 
 31 ; moves from Morristown — his operations against Howe 
 in New Jersey — movements after Howe's withdrawal — at battle of 
 Brandywine — retreats to Chester, 34; at battle of Germantown — 
 at Valley Forge — at battle of Monmouth — transfers army from 
 New Jersey to White Plains, 35 ; his qualities — his mistakes, 39 ; 
 pledges his forture to support army, 41 ; remains three years 
 near New York — transfers army to Yorktown — has French troops, 
 51 ; arrives near Yorktown — reaches Lafayette's headquarters — 
 Tsesieges Yorktown — receives surrender of Cornwallis, 53 ; com- 
 plains of militia — his warning to the people, 75 ; on*e of four full 
 generals in U. S. army, 354. 
 
 Washington, Captain, at Buena Vista, 93. 
 
 Washington, Colonel, at The Cowpens, 47. 
 
 Washington City, its safety first consideration, 130; what its capture 
 would have done, 211; fears general movement of Confederates, 
 228; alarm there after second battle of Bull Run, 260. 
 
 Water Cure, employed by our ancestors, -22. 
 
 Watson, Fort, see Fort Watson. 
 
 "Wearing-Out" Policy, adopted by Clinton, 43; its effect, 44; why 
 adopted by Clinton, 54. 
 
 Webster, Colonel, puts batteries in position at Shiloh, 178. 
 
 Webster, Daniel, his speech on General Scott, 126. 
 
 Weitzel, General, with Terry, 525 ; commands Twenty-fifth Corps, 526. 
 
 Weldon Railway, Warren operates against, 523; Warren's second 
 operations against, 525. 
 
 Wellington, Duke of, criticises Scott, 122. 
 
 West Indies Fleet, British, see British West Tndies fleet. 
 
 West, Military Division of, 557. 
 
 West Point, its strategical importance, 28. 
 
 West Virginia, established as loyal State, 130; opposing troops there. 
 
 West Woods, at Antietam, 269. 
 
 Weyler, General, in Cuba, 589. 
 
 Wharton, General, covers Bragg's army, 312. 
 
 Wheat Field, the fight for, 376. 
 
Index. 729 
 
 "Wheeler, Joseph, covers Bragg's army, 312; reports Rosecrans's ad- 
 vance from Nashville — opposes Rosecrans's columns, 313 ; at Stones 
 River, 315 ; work of his cavalry during battle of Stones River, 321 ; 
 after Stones River, 422; excellent work of his cavalry during 
 Bragg's invasion of Kentucky, 326; at Chickamauga, 431; in 
 Chickamauga campaign, 440; siege of Chattanooga — raid, 445; with 
 Longstreet, 452; effect of his raid, 464; in Atlanta campaign, 535; 
 at Dalton — at Varnell's Station, 538; guards Johnston's left, 541; 
 at Peachtree Creek, 543 ; battle of Atlanta, 544 ; at Newnan, 545 ; 
 raids Sherman's communications, 546; in Tennessee, 555; rejoins 
 Hood, 558; at Snake Creek Gap, 559; to harass Sherman, 561; com- 
 mands cavalry division in Santiago campaign, 596; at Siboney, 599; 
 at Las Guasimas, 600 ; reconnoiters — ordered not to bring on fight, 
 601 ; in plan of attack, 602 ; night before San Juan, 603 ; at San 
 Juan and Kettle Hills, 604, 607; sick, foot-note, 607. 
 
 Whigs, encourage colonists, 23. 
 
 Whipple, General, attacks Jackson at Catherine Furnace, 339. 
 
 White House, McClellan's headquarters and base, 198; McClellan 
 withdraws stores from, 206. 
 
 White Oak Swamp, McClellan's army passes, 206. 
 
 White Plains, Washington's army returns to, 35. 
 
 Whiting, General, at Seven Pines, 202; dispatched with division to 
 Jackson, 203. 
 
 Wikoff, Colonel, at San Juan — killed, 606. 
 
 Wilcox, Cadmus, at Chancellorsville, 337; sent to guard Bank's Ford, 
 338 ; occupies Taylor's Hill — falls back — at Salem Church, 345 ; on 
 third day, 380; not in the charge, 382; joins Heth, 477; May 6, 
 479. 
 
 Wilder, J. T., mounts brigade, 422; in Chickamauga campaign, 428; 
 delays Bragg — at Chickamauga, 431; driven from field, 436; in 
 Chickamauga campaign, 440. 
 
 Wilderness, the description of, 325 ; battle of — autumn and winter after 
 Gettysburg, 466; operations, 470; strength of forces — Lee's posi- 
 tion at beginning of operations — Grant's plan, 471 ; Union troops 
 May 4 — trains, slow, 472; Confederates May 4 — battle-field, 473; 
 first day begins, 475; fierce fighting first day, 477; fighting in after- 
 noon — artillery — orders for May 6 — gap in line, 478; battle re- 
 newed, 479; Mahone's attack — Hancock driven back, 480; Confed- 
 erate success and repulse — battle ends — May 7 — losses and strength, 
 481 ; comments, 482 ; plan discussed, 483 ; armies bivouac close to- 
 gether — poor cavalry work, 484; tactics affected by dense woods, 
 485; no plan — a rencounter — no concerted action, 486; Confeder- 
 ate center might have been pierced, 486; Burnside slow — inde- 
 cisive, 487 ; strength and losses to Cold Harbor, 503 ; to Cold 
 Harbor — distinctive features of campaign, 505 ; discussion of oper- 
 ation from, to the James — movement to Spottsylvania discussed, 
 506. 
 
 Wilkinson, James, replaces General Dearborn, 68; wrangles with 
 Secretary of War — moves down St. Lawrence — flees to French 
 Mills, 69; repulsed at Lacolle Creek, 71. 
 
 Willcox, Orlando B., commands a brigade in McDowell's army, 133; 
 at Antietam, 273 ; commands Ninth Corps, 289 ; at Wilderness, 474 ; 
 May 6, 481; at Spottsylvania, 492; at Petersburg, 517; the Mine, 
 521. 
 
 William Henry, Fort, see Fort William Henry. 
 
 Williams, General, his operations, 45; at battle of Kings Mountain, 
 46. 
 
 Williams, A. S., at Antietam, 269. 
 
730 Index. 
 
 Williamsburg, battle of, 197; losses at, 198. 
 Williamsport, Lee's position at, 385. 
 
 WlLLOUGHBY RUN, 365. 
 
 Wilson, J. H., to command cavalry division, 470; with Warren at 
 Parker's Store, 472; May S, 474; combat, 476; encounters Stuart, 
 478; had not learned cavalry lesson, 484; at Spottsylvania, 490; 
 should have held Po bridge, 507; in movement to James, 512; 
 skirmishes — covers right of army, 513; raid in Virginia, 519-20; 
 in Grant's movement to the James, 528 ; commands Thomas's caval- 
 ry, 563; at Columbia, 565; driven by Forrest, 566; covers Scho- 
 field's retreat — at Franklin — at Edgefield, 571 ; in Thomas's plan, 
 573; advances — preliminary movements, 574; moves to the right — 
 second day, 575; charges Confederate rear — in pursuit, 576; out- 
 generaled by , Forrest, 581 ; at Nashville, 584 ; unable to check 
 Hood's retreat, 585; in Porto Rican expedition, 615. 
 
 Winchester, General, captured at Frenchtown, 65. 
 
 Winchester, battle of, between Banks and Jackson, 227. 
 
 Winder, General, attacked and captured at Stony Creek, 68; charged 
 with defense of Washington, 72; retreats on approach of British — 
 at battle of Bladensburg, 73. 
 
 Winthrop, General, expedition under, 1. 
 
 Wise, H. A., at Petersburg, 515. 
 
 Withers, Jones M., at Stones River, 315. 
 
 Wolfe, General James, with British forces at Halifax, 11; commands' 
 expedition against Quebec — lands at Island of Orleans — his opera- 
 tions against Quebec, 14; his army in four camps — repulsed at the 
 Montmorenci, 15; continues efforts to tapture Quebec, 16-17; aban- 
 dons camp on the Montmorenci — discovers trail to Plains of Abra- 
 ham, 17; fights Montcalm on Plains of Abraham — is killed, 18. 
 
 Wolf Hill, 372. 
 
 Wolseley, Lord, his opinion of Jackson's operations, 235. 
 
 Wood, Leonard, at Las Guasimas, 600. 
 
 Wood, T. J., at Chickamauga, 433; at Chattanooga, 454; at Missionary 
 Ridge, 458-9; at Spring Hill, 567; at Franklin, 569; holds bridges 
 at Franklin, 571; commands Fourth Corps, foot-note, 572; in 
 Thomas's plan, 5/3; preliminary movements, 574; breaks Confed- 
 erate line — second day, 575; repulsed — in pursuit, 576. 
 
 Wool, General, marches column of troops into Mexico — joins Worth,, 
 91. 
 
 Works, field, see field-works. 
 
 Worth, General, commands one of Taylor's divisions, 88; at Monterey,. 
 89; detached from Taylor to Scott, 91; commands one of Scott's- 
 divisions, 106; at Churubusco, 114; at Molino del Rey, 116; at 
 Chapultepec, 118. 
 
 Worth, Lieutenant-Colonel, wounded at San Juan, 606. 
 
 Wright, A. R., at Gettysburg, 377. 
 
 Wright, H. G., at Wilderness, 476; commands Sixth Corps, 492; first 
 position, 493 ; attacked and repulsed, 494 ; renews assault, 495 ; 
 to cooperate with Hancock, 496; at Bloody Angle, 497; attacks, May 
 18 — May 14, 499; in movement after Spottsylvania — at North 
 Anna, 501; hurried to Washington, 511; in movement to the 
 James, 513; at Petersburg, 517; dispatched to Washington, 520; 
 rejoins with Sixth Corps, 526. 
 
 Wrightsville, militia destroys bridge and town catches fire,. 359. 
 
 Wyoming Valley, massacre, 43. 
 
 Yankee, at Guantanamo, 594. 
 
 "Yellow" Journalism, its influence for war, 589. 
 
Index. 731 
 
 Yellow Tavern, combat at, 491. 
 
 Yorktown, entered by Cornwallis, 51; besieged by Americans, 52; 
 
 evacuated, 54; held by Confederates — stops McClellan's advance. 
 
 196. 
 Young, S. B. M., at Siboney, 599; at Las Guasimas, 600. 
 
 Zollicoffer, defeated at Mill Springs, 154. 
 Zouaves, Fire, see Fire Zouaves.