CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 1 Given in Memory of JACOB AND MARY TUVIN BY JULIUS H. TUVIN, '12 Cornell University Library 511.M39 3 1924 027 808 843 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924027808843 EUROPE IN THE MELTING POT Edited by GREGORY MASON The Outlook Company NEW YORK Copyright igi4 by The Outlook Company Introduction If there are intelligent inhabitants on any planet other than this on which we roll through space, we may imagine them looking down at the earth just now and chuckling as they remark: "Well, they are at it again on the earth. Tribes, races, and nations are again in the melting pot." For, though war seems a serious and terrible thing to us who are in it or close to it, to disinterested observers at a great distance, if there are any, who have been watching war follow war on this globe for generation after generation, the whole thing may seem to indicate the pettiness rather than the greatness of humanity. For the old differences are being settled in the old way. Even some of the scenes and some of the actors in this drama have familiar names: Charleroi, Waterloo, Louvain; von der Goltz, and Pau. One is struck with the futility of the whole thing. Must war succeed war with no apparent permanent result save a preparation of conditions out of which the next war may spring? The remark of Sir Edward Hamley, the English historian, concerning the results of the Crimean War, may seem in its despairing cynicism to be applicable to all wars. "Thus," said the historian, "had the great war been rounded off into an episode having no further con- nection with the future." Is the great war of to-day, in which hundreds of thousands of lives are being lost, and the happiness of hundreds of thousands of families destroyed — is this a mere episode in the history of man? It is easy to think that it is. It is easy to persuade one's self that the world is growing no better, that men to-day are the brutes of cave days, with a slightly keener intelligence that makes them more dangerous to each other. This is the familiar argument, heard on every street corner, in every club and tavern. The track of history is so long that over the small section of it to which our near-sighted gaze is confined it may seem that man has gained nothing. But to a being with stronger vision — to a Martian with a telescope, if you will — ^it may be quite plain that man is far ahead of where he was ten thou- sand or twenty thousand years ago. In our struggle to gain what we call civili- zation for want of a better word, to supplant barbarism with reason, are we not like a party of explorers pushing through a vast tropical jungle to the sea? Caught in the tangled vegetation, struggling from one thicket only to find another ahead, they may conclude that there is no ocean and stop to die, while a man watching them from a balloon above knows that their goal is just ahead. We, in our march for progress, must keep stout hearts, for we may have come further than we dream. Certainly the burning of a city would not have horrified the world a thousand years ago as the burning of Louvain shocked it the other day. And cynics who gloat over the disregard of nations for the rules of warfare to-day, should remember that it is not long since there was not even a pretension to regulate the game of killing men. As for fixing the responsibility for this war, it is easy and popular to blame one or two men or one or two nations. But that will not do. One or two nations may have planted the germs of trouble, they may have been re- sponsible for the outbreak of the disease in a limited area; but it will not do to blame them for its rapid spread over most of the civilized world. The fault is in the system — the system that demands that nations shall plunge into a war one after another to keep the sides even, to "maintain the balance of power," as the glib phrase goes. INTRODUCTION Under the system in vogue, under the accepted political philosophy of the militaristic nations, it is eminently right that every nation in the war to- day should be in it. Once Austria had attacked Servia, the system demanded that Russia should side with the latter. Russia's presence in the fight made it imperative for Germany to plunge in; and to preserve the everlasting balance, England, Prance, and Japan felt called upon to enter the arena. Other mo- tives may be given, and doubtless exist. England declared she must fight to protect little Belgium. But she was frank in saying that she was not con- cerned in the fate of small Servia, powerless before great Austria. While Great Britain is to be commended for her defense of Belgium, the fact can- not be ignored that one of her motives at least is similar to an impelling mo- tive of Germany and Japan — ^to keep the balance of power. Under the militar- istic "system" those nations which cannot obtain a preponderance of power for themselves are eager to keep a preponderance of power out of the hands of their rivals. We have tried two methods of keeping the international peace, and both have failed. We have tried putting each nation on its honor not to disturb the peace for unjust cause, or not to disturb it for any cause before submitting the issues to an impartial tribunal. But we are a long way yet from the day when the moral sense of nations will be suflBcient guarantee of peace, if in- deed, it ever will be. We have also tried the system which would suppress each nation by the threat or use of force by others. This is the system of al- liances and balances, which has just been responsible for the development of a world war from a petty local squabble. The third method is the police method. The advocates of this say that, just as individuals are induced to behave by the presence of national or civic police, so nations could be held in line by a strong international police. They point out that, as most individuals prefer private vengeance to the judgments of a law court, so do most nations, and that an international court is compara- tively useless without a police arm to drag offenders before it. In the concrete, the proposal is that all peacefully inclined nations unite in a pact to stand to- gether against all turbulent nations, making common cause against the dis- turbers when the latter refuse to submit to the decrees of arbitration. It is suggested that the united nations disarm to the point where their combined armament gives a fair margin of superiority over the combined armaments of all nations outside the peace pact. The proposal sounds plausible. If it is a dream, it has more elements of practicality in it than the other dreams of peace advocates. Certainly it is worth trying, and, if the effect of the present war is to so disgust the great nations engaged in it with carnage and destruction that a sufficient number agree to enter this experiment for peace to afford it a fair chance of success, the horror and suffering and loss will not have been in vain and the great war will not be "rounded off into an episode having no connection with the future." It is not the purpose of this book, however, to advocate any doctrine or dogma of either peace or war. Its purpose is rather to encourage those into whose hands it may came to look, on their own account, into the possible ten- dencies and developments of this war, and to give them a little more back- ground upon which to base their own opinions than is given by the daily papers. For certainly a changed Europe will come out of the crucible — indeed a changed world — ^for the alchemy of war is far-reaching in its effects. The work of past congresses and the decrees of past treaties will be set aside and the map of the world remade. GREGORY MASON. Nine Nations Go To War June 28 — A Servian fanatic assassinated Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenburg, at Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. July 23 — Austria-Hungary sent an ultimatum to Servia demanding the punishment of the assassins and the abandonment of anti-Austrian propaganda in Servia, and demanding a satisfactory reply within forty-eight hours. July 24 — Russia joined Servia in asking for an extension of time for the latter's reply to the Austrian ultimatum. July 25 — Servia agreed to all the conditions in the ultimatum except that one providing that Austrian officials should participate in the inquiry to be conducted into the assassination of the Archduke. July 26 — Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, proposed that a mediation conference be held in London by the diplomatic representatives of Germany, Italy, France and England. France and Italy accepted the proposal, Germany declined it. July 28 — Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. July 29 — Belgrade was bombarded by Austro-Hungarian artillery and gunboats. France, Russia and Germany began preparations for war. July 30 — Emperor William asked the Czar to stop mobilizing his troops within twenty-four hours. July 31 — In a final attempt to stop a European war Czar Nicholas, Em- peror William and King George exchanged personal telegrams. The German Government asked France if she would remain neutral in the event of a war between Russia and Germany, and demanded an answer within eighteen hours. August 1 — Germany declared war on Russia. Italy announced that she would remain neutral. August 2 — German soldiers entered Luxemburg, in violation of her neutrality, and without waiting for a declaration of war other Germans in- vaded France. At the same time Russians crossed the German frontier. August 3 — Germany asked Belgium to permit the passage of German troops through Belgian territory. Belgium refused. August 4 — England declared war on Germany and began to mobilize her army and navy. President Wilson proclaimed the neutrality of the United States. The Germans invaded Belgium. August 5 — President Wilson, acting under Article III of the Hague Con- vention, tendered his good offices to the warring nations. August 6 — Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia. August 8 — Montenegro declared war on Austria-Hungary. Portugal an- nounced her readiness to support Great Britain. August 9 — Servia declared war on Germany. August 10 — France declared war on Austria-Hungary. August 13 — England declared war on Austria-Hungary. August 16 — Japan asked the Germans to reply by August 23 to an ulti- matum which demanded the withdrawal of all German war vessels from Far East waters and the surrender to Japan by September 15 of the territory of Kiauchau. August 23 — Japan declared war on Germany. August 25 — Austria-Hungary declared war on Japan. 5 An Analysis of the International Forces and Causes Involved in the War^ AUSTRIA, a great imperial European Power, with a population of fifty mil- lions and a fighting force of about one million men, has attacked Servia, an ancient but small inland kingdom in the Balkan Peninsula, with a population of three million and an army of two hundred thousand men. Why does a con- flict, apparently so unequal, threaten to plunge all Europe into one of the most terrible and momentous wars of history? To answer this question it is neces- sary to take a brief glance at European history, and to consider the political and racial factors which have been instrumental in making that history. We propose in this article to describe briefly these factors under their national and geographical divisions. SERVIA. The racial history of the Servians or Serbs in the Balkan Peninsula can be traced for fifteen hundred years. The Serbs are of Slavic stock, and are thus racially related to millions of the population of Russia. The Serbs or Servians and the Bulgarians each established great empires in the Balkan Peninsula in the Middle Ages. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Ottomans or Turks, swarming towards Europe from western Asia, overwhelmed and con- quered both the Serbs and the Bulgarians. The Turks even conquered Hun- gary and besieged Vienna. They were, however, finally repulsed from Vienna, and the aid which the Servians gave to the defense of Vienna — a defense which prevented the Ottomans from occupying and ravaging central Europe — was very great. "It was the Serb Bakich who saved Vienna," says a Hungarian historian. It is one of the ironies of history that the people who played so great a part in saving the Austrian capital are now being threatened by the armies of that capital. For several centuries, diiring the occupation of the Balkan Penin- sula by Turkey, Servia was a Turkish province, but she never lost her racial consciousness and her national aspirations. In 1878 Servia was declared inde- pendent of Turkey by the Treaty of Berlin. Since that time Turkey's power in the Balkan Peninsula has grown steadily less. A year ago Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria united in dfiving Turkey still farther out of the Balkan territory and into Constantinople. Unfortunately for the Balkan people, political ambition and national jealousies brought the Greeks, Servians, and the Bulgarians into conflict. Their successful partnership against the Turks was destroyed by quarrels and bickering. Instead of working together for a federation of the Balkan people, each nation strove for supremacy. The Greek, the Bulgarian, and the Servian each thought that he should be the head of a great Balkan empire, and they thus threw away the prize that was almost within their grasp. Servia, whose northern boundary touches the southern boundary of the Austro-Hungarian Empire on the Danube, has long felt the encroaching pres- sure of Austria. In 1908 the Austrian Imperial Government annexed tile pro- vinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which provinces are largely Servian in popu- lation and sympathy. The Servians have long suspected, and events have justi- fied that- suspicion, that Austria desires to annex Servia itself. * Reprinted from The Outlook of August 8, 1914. (Several of the articles in this brochure were written for numbers of The Outlook which were published during the early stages of the war, before important evento which are now history had been more than prophesied. This does not howevpr detract from the essential interest and value of the articles. — The Editor.) ' «=»er. FORCES AND CAUSES OF THE WAR On June 28 last the Austrian Crown Prince was assassinated in the capi- tal of Bosnia. The assassin was a Servian. Austria asserts that the assassina- tion was the result of an active conspiracy of Servians. She made demands upon the Servian Government, all of which were assented to by Servia with one exception. That exception was the refusal of Servia to permit Austro-Hun- garian officials to sit upon boards of inquiry regarding acts of conspiracy by Servians against Austria. It seems to us clear that no government can pre- serve its self-respect or autonomy if it permits officers of a foreign govern- ment to sit in its own courts. Nevertheless, on receipt of Servia's note yield- ing to Austria on every point save this one, Austria promptly declared war. The assassination of the Crown Prince is the occasion, but not the cause, of the war. The folly and wickedness of assassination as a method of estab- lishing national liberty were never more vividly illustrated than in this case. However much Austria may have desired to invade Servia and thus to control the Balkan Peninsula, she never would have dared to do so in the face of Europe if it had not been for the very plausible opportunity given to her by the criminal murder of her Crown Prince. AUSTRIA. Austria has existed as a state for a thousand years. This state was origi- nally formed in the region of the Danube during the conflicts between the Franks and the Slavs. The House of Hapsburg, to which the present Em- peror, Francis Joseph I, belongs, has ruled Austria for six hundred years. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, which consists of a political union between the Kingdom of Hungary and Austria, was established in its present dual form in 1867; but Hungary has been under the control of the Hapsburgs for many centuries. The policy of the Empire is, however, dictated by Austrian states- men and the Austrian ruling house, and the name Austria is commonly, as it is here, employed in an imperial sense. Austria from earliest times has been the most reactionary Power in Eu- rope, and is so to-day. "Hapsburg despotism and reaction" is a phrase used by no less an authority than Dr. Andrew D. White to characterize the policies and acts of Austria during the nineteenth century. Prince Metternich, the great Austrian Prime Minister of that century, was the Machiavelli of modem times. It was he who promulgated the policy which led to Austria's despotic and cruel domination of Italy, a despotism which was thrown off by Cavour, the great maker of modem Italy. Those who desire to understand the ethics and philoso- phy of the foreign policy of the Hapsburgs and the school of Metternich have only to read such books as the memoirs of Silvio Pellico, or the life of Cavour by William Roscoe Thayer, or the essay on Cavour in Dr. Andrew D. White's absorbing volume entitled "Seven Great Statesmen." Austria, under the influ- ence of the Metternich school of diplomacy, has constantly exerted an obstruct- ive force against political liberty and national freedom. The arrogance of Austria towards Italy and the European Powers at the Congress of Paris in 1856 has been immortalized by a witticism of Bismarck. Count von Buol was the Austrian representative at that Congress. His vanity, assertiveness, and despotism annoyed Bismarck beyond measure, who finally exclaimed: "Could I be for one hour as great as Count von Buol thinks he is all the time, my glory would be forever established before God and man." Austria was expelled from Italy, although she still possesses important seaports on the Adriatic. Her desire for territory in the Balkan Peninsula is not only the result of political ambition, but springs from her conscious endeavor to reach the Mediterranean and to prevent Russia, her hereditary enemy on the north, from reaching it. The Balkan States, of which perhaps Servia is the pivot, are in a direct line between Europe and the Orient. A great imperial power occupying the whole FORCES AND CAUSES OF THE WAR Balkan Peninsula would be in a position of strategic control of, or at least of extraordinary influence over, the Suez Canal, the commerce of the Mediter- ranean, and a future all-railway route through Persia to India and to China. Salonika, on the ^gean Sea, now in Greek territory, is one of the finest har- bors on the Mediterranean. A railway through Servia connects this splendid port with Austria and Germany. A projected canal may in the early future unite the Danube and Salonika. If this project is ever carried out, commerce may come down the Danube and its tributary canals and rivers, even from central and western (Jermany, and reach the Mediterranean without passing the famous iron gates of the Danube or being subjected to the delays and dangers of the long passage through the Black Sea. Austria's manufacturing and commercial interests are growing. It is not perhaps surprising that her rulers should wish to control the territory of the Balkan Peninsula, in order to be masters of this route to the Mediter- ranean. She once tried to reach the Mediterranean through Italy and failed; she is now trying again (since Turkey has been forced to abdicate the iS^gean seacoast) to reach it through Salonika. RUSSIA. Russia's motives in this threatened European conflict are partly racial, partly political, and partly commercial. As has already been pointed out, her population is largely Slavic and her racial sympathies are with the Slavic peoples of the Balkan States and of certain parts of Hungary. For years Rus- sia has been trying to get a foothold on the Mediterranean. Russia's ships can now reach the Atlantic only through the ice-bound Baltic Sea or through the Dardanelles out of the Black Sea, and the latter passage is forbidden to her warships by international agreement. In the middle of the last century Russia's advance to the Mediterranean was made by an attack upon Turkey. It was believed by the European Powers that she hoped to occupy Constantinople. Great Britain was terrified lest Rus- sia should obtain possession of Constantinople, the Danubian provinces, and Balkan territory, thus establishing a position from which she might menace Great Britain's Indian and Oriental possessions and obstruct the English route to the East. This led to the great Crimean War, in which Great Britain, Prance, and Turkey, with the plucky assistance of the little Italian Kingdom of Sardinia, put an end to Russia's ambitions in that direction. Even if Russia no longer entertains the hope that she may at some time in the future grasp Constantinople, or obtain territory on the Mediterranean through the sympa- thetic assistance of the Slavic peoples of the Balkan Peninsula, she is unwill- ing that the Germanic people of Austria and the German Empire, who are in a sense her hereditary enemies, shall possess the dominion and power in the Near East which she coveted fifty years ago and failed to obtain. For this reason she is protesting against the invasion of Servia by Austrian troops, and if she decides to make her protest one of arms instead of diplomacy a general European war is almost inevitable. GERMANY. For Germany cannot permit Russia to attack Austria without flying to Austria's defense. In the first place, the German people are liberty-loving and have developed political freedom to a high state since the days of Bismarck. They look with distrust upon the despotic bureaucracy of Russia, and Russia with her enormous population and resources is always a possible enemy of Germany on the north. France threatens Germany on the south. On the west the commercial and political tension with England has almost reached the breaking point more than once during recent years. It is necessary, therefore for Germany to preserve peace and even intimate friendship with Austria on FORCES AND CAUSES OF THE WAR • her eastern frontier. The Austrians are Germanic, and it may well be that German statesmen look forward to the time when German Austria will become an integral part of a greater German Empire. In such a case, if Austria con- trols the Balkan States, with a long seacoast on the Mediterranean, Germany will then have what she now lacks — namely, the great harbors and free sea way which will enable her to develop her maritime power. It is entirely prob- able that the German Emperor sincerely desires to preserve peace in Europe, but he will not sacrifice either the future safety or the future expansion of his Empire to Russia and France for the sake of peace. ENGLAND. England is the factor next in importance in this struggle of the European Powers to control the Balkan Peninsula as a strategic commercial and military point between the Orient and the Occident. She no longer fears either the intention or the capacity of Russia to take India away from her. She knows that Russia is too deeply engrossed in the development of eastern Siberia and Manchuria and in her rivalry with Japan to give any practical attention to India. But while England's fear of Russia has decreased, the commercial con- flict between Great Britain and Germany has been steadily growing in inten- sity. In view of this struggle, can England with equanimity look upon an enlarged German Empire stretching from Holland on the west to the ^gean Sea on the southeast ? Moreover, the English people are sincerely sympathetic with the democratic struggle of the Servians, Bulgarians, and Greeks. It was due very largely to the stand which Great Britain took under Lord Palmerston, prompted almost wholly by a genuine admiration for the Italian people in their struggle for freedom, that enabled Cavour to expel the Austrians from the Italian peninsula and to unify Italy. In a war between Germany and Austria on the one hand and Russia and Servia on the other, it seems probable that England, as a choice of evils, would prefer Russian domination of the Balkan Peninsula to a Germanic domination of that territory. FRANCE. France has less at stake in the diplomatic contest over the Balkan Penin- sula than any other of the national factors. She possesses an ample seacoast on both shores of the Mediterranean. Her Oriental possessions or colonies are not of sufficient importance to justify her in fighting against the partition or occupation of Balkan territory. But should diplomatic friction burst into the terrible flame of war, she has vital interests at stake. She still grieves deeply over her defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and she passionately de- sires not only the reacquisition of Alsace-Lorraine, but the opportunity to measure her strength again with Germany. Moreover, she is an open ally of Russia, and there exists a triple understanding between Great Britain, Russia, and France, formed to oppose any possible aggression of the combination between Germany, Austria, and Italy, known as the Triple Alliance. The natu- ral desire of France to unite with Russia in attacking Germany in case of a general war would be explicable, if not excusable. ITALY. It is true that Italy is a party to the political agreement between Germany, Austria, and herself, known as the Triple Alliance. It is hard to conceive, how- ever, how the Italian people and Italian statesmen can possibly take any share with Austria in her attack upon the Servian people. Only fifty years have gone by — a short period in the history of a nation — since Austria did her best to thwart the unification of Italy, and Austrian statesmen and officials treated Italian patriots with a cruelty and mediaeval barbarism unsurpassed in modern history. Moreover, in an alignment of European powers it is at least reason- 10 THE PURPOSE OF THE WAR able to suppose Italy would remember that England and France were her stanch friends in 1850-60, when Austria was her cruel oppressor and Prussia stood aloof. THE FUTURE. The foregoing review will indicate the fundamental political, commercial, and psychological forces which may be set in operation by Austria's precipi- tate action. It is not a war of mere territorial aggrandizement. If the strug- gle is not localized, if it is not confined to Austria and Servia, if it becomes a gigantic international conflict, it will largely be so because the Balkan Penin- sula, on account of its racial character and its geographical position, forms a great gateway between the Orient and the Occident. On the expulsion of Turkey a year ago the Balkan States should have been federated like Switzerland. Such a federation should have had general Euro- pean protection like that given to Switzerland. The great pity is that the Servians, Bulgarians, Macedonians, and Greeks did not possess the moral and intellectual power to see that in such a federation lay both their safety and the safety of Europe. Perhaps such a coalition and federation will come in the future. If a general European war is avoided, the task to which European statesmen might well set themselves is the unification of the Balkan States, as the Italian king- doms and municipalities were unified into modern Italy in 1860. But that demanded a Cavour, and statesmen like Cavour are not born in ever-y century. The Purpose of the War^ IN a regiment the thousand men are animated by very different purposes. One has enlisted for love of country; one in the hope of booty; one for a soldier's wage; one for mere love of adventure. But the purpose of the regi- ment is neither one of these nor all of them combined. Its members rarely comprehend the purpose of its colonel and never comprehend the part it is ap- pointed to play in the plan of the campaign. The purpose of this war is as little determined by the motives of the na- tions engaged in it as is the purpose of a battle by the motives of the private soldiers. Individuals generally, nations always, act from mixed motives. The mo- tives of the combatants in this war, as variously imputed to them by friends and foes, may be described as follows: The motive of Austria, partly an indignant resolve to punish Servia for a supposed conspiracy leading to the assassination of the Austrian Prince partly an ambition to annex Servia to the Austrian Empire, as Bosnia and 'Herze- govina had been previously annexed, partly a desire to secure a port on the ^gean Sea for the development of Austrian commerce. The motive of Servia, to preserve her national existence and perhaps to add to her national power and prestige by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina The motive of Russia, partly to protect her kin in the Balkan States from the Au&trians, partly to secure for herself, if any partition of the Balkan States results from the war, a share in that partition and a long-desired access to the Mediterranean. •From The Outlook of August 29, 1914. THE PURPOSE OF THE WAR 11 The motive of Germany, partly to aid her Germanic ally in her punitive , expedition against Servia, partly to secure through Austria and Servia access to the jEgean and the Mediterranean, partly to protect herself from an appre- hended invasion by Russia and a possible attack from France. The motive of Belgium, to preserve her neutrality against the invasion of Germany. The motive of France, partly to aid Belgium in her just war of defense, partly to defend herself against the invasion threatened by Germany, partly to recover for herself the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine taken from her by Germany in the Franco-German War. The motive of England, partly to protect the neutrality of Belgium which she had pledged herself to protect, partly to protect France from what she regards as an unjustified attack, and partly to curb what she regards as the ambitious designs of Germany and to maintain the balance of power in Europe. The motive of Japan, partly to fulfill her pledges to England, partly to get even with Germany for Germany's interference with Japan's possession of the fruits of her victory in her war with China, partly to establish her su- premacy in the East, partly to bring about friendly relations with Russia, her old-time enemy, and thus secure for herself peace in her occupation of Korea and Manchuria, partly probably to make a permanent alliance with China by giving that country Kiauchau after having won it from Germany, and partly to get a recognized place in the international councils of the civilized world. Out of this chaos of conflicting motives it is impossible to construct a pur- pose common to the Powers on either side. Still less is it possible to deduce the true interpretation and meaning of this war from the declarations of the combatants. Not the catch-words of international diplomacy, but the funda- mental and often forgotten currents of history, determine on which side the stars are fighting. History affords abundant illustration of this truth. The Napoleonic wars began in an attempt to drive the Bourbon out of France; they ended in an attempt to establish a Napoleonic Empire over Eu- rope. The allies combined to defeat Napoleon and re-establish Bourbonism. But neither Bourbonism nor Napoleonism was established. The Bourbons were dethroned. The leaven of liberty, equality, and fraternity was inserted by the sword in every European kingdom west of Russia. Then the Napoleonic Empire was destroyed and Bourbonism was temporarily restored, but only tem- porarily; by 1860 not a Bourbon was left on a European throne. Neither the purpose of Napoleon nor the purpose of the allies was accomplished. Both were defeated, and constitutional governments, which both abhorred, were established. The object of Germany in the Franco-German War was to take from France the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and by arousing a German national sentiment to perfect the unification of the German Empire. But the overthrow of imperialism in France and the establishment of the Republic of France on a permanent foundation was a result which the rulers neither of France nor of Germany had anticipated or desired. In our own Civil War the purpose of the South was to establish the supreme sovereignty of the States, and to create a nation founded on slavery as its corner-stone; the purpose of the North was to maintain the Union as it had been and to prevent the extension of slavery, but not to interfere with it where it existed. The issue of the conflict was a new nationalism which neither South nor North had dreamed of, and the abolition of slavery abso- lutely and forever in every part of the Nation's domain. "All sovereignty," says Mazzini, "is in God, in the moral law, in the providential design which governs the world;" and he adds that this provi- dential design is "gradually revealed by the inspirations of men of virtuous 12 THE PURPOSE OP THE WAR genius, and by the natural tendency of humanity in the different epochs of its existence." What do the inspirations of men of virtuous genius and the natural tendency of humanity in the nineteenth century indicate as the providential design in the present epoch? What do they indicate as the providential intent and purpose of this war? To these questions there can be but one answer. In the last hundred years absolutism has been abolished from all western Europe, Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, have been emancipated; constitu- tional government, in which political power has been transferred from the military autocrat to a popular assembly, has been introduced in every Euro- pean country west of Russia,' and the beginning of constitutional government in Russia itself; Japan has been transformed from a feudal to a democratic State, and China from an Oriental despotism to an experimental republic; in Germany, the most efficient though not the most absolute military power in the world, the radical democratic vote has grown from nothing to four millions and a half. And the common people have everywhere been growing increasingly restless under the burden of an increasing military armament in which "every laborer carries a soldier on his back." The attack of Austria on Servia was an attack of autocracy on self- government. The guns at Belgrade aroused the slumbering resentment of the people. The refusal of Germany to co-operate with England in secur- ing justice with peace crystallized that resentment into purpose. Germany's flagrant disregard of her solemn pledge to Belgium summoned them to action. Consider the significance of these following incidents and events: France and England are democratic. Belgium has a large democratic element in its population. Portugal has just passed through a democratic revolution. Servia by joining her sister states in their war for independence has shown her passion for self-government. The common people of Italy, taught in the school of Cavour, Garibaldi, and Mazzini, have prevented Italy from joining Germany and Austria. Into the Cabinets of both France and Belgium radical Social Democrats have been received, an unexpected recognition of their political influence. Japan, the one modern state in the East possessing a well-established constitutional government, has cast in her fortunes with the anti-Germanic allies. The sympathies of the democratic neutral powers — Italy, Switzerland, Holland, the Scandinavian states, and the people of the United States — are unmistakably with the allies. A bill has been introduced into the Russian Duma for universal education, and a promise of autonomy to the Russian Poles has been made by the Rus- sian Government — a promise that Poland shall be born again, free in her religion and language, and autonomous. When in a chemical experiment certain molecules by a natural attraction combine, that fact shows that they have something in common. When in such a war as this France, England, Belgium, Servia, Portugal, Japan, and Russia by a natural attraction combine, that fact sliows that these various peoples have something in common. We believe that that something in com- mon is a passionate desire for democratic liberty. The victory of Germany can be no other than a victory for militarism; the victory of the allies no other than a victory for permanent peace. If Ger- many wins, she must maintain her armaments, if not increase them; for power obtained by force can be maintained only by force. If Germany is defeated a diminution of her armaments as a condition of peace may well be demanded by the allied Powers. The victory of free peoples in western Europe wilj give THE WAR'S TRAGEDIES AND LESSONS 13 a new impulse to the cause of freedom in Russia. The Duma, the first par- liamentary body Russia ever knew, was a fruit of the Russo-Japanese War. A Duma with the power to make and unmake Ministers and to control the national purse may well be one fruit of this European war. The result of Germany's victory can be nothing else than a German Empire extending from the North Sea to the Mediterranean and dominating all Europe. The result of Germany's defeat may well include an emancipa- tion of the Slavs in the Austrian Empire; the emancipation of the Poles in Russia, Austria, and Germany; the creation of a self-governing Balkan con- federacy; a political revolution in Germany giving the power of the purse and of the sword to the people; and a new development of civil and religious liberty in the slowly awakening Empire of Russia. The Outlook believes that a Power greater than that of all the warring peoples is directing the purpose of the war. That purpose is the end of military autocracy in Europe. The World War : Its Tragedies and Its Lessons* BY THEODORE ROOSEVELT Our country stands well-nigh alone among the great civilized Powers in being unshaken by the present world-wide war. For this we should be humbly and profoundly grateful. All of us on this continent ought to appreciate how fortunate we are that we of the Western world have been free from the work- ing of the causes which have produced the bitter and vindictive hatred among the great military Powers of the Old World. We owe this immunity primarily to the policies grouped together under the title of the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine is as vital to the interests of this hemisphere to-day as it ever has been. Nations like Brazil, Argentina, and Chile are as deeply concerned in its maintenance as we are ourselves. We of the United States have a twofold, duty in this crisis. We must profit by reading aright the lesson writ in fire and steel before our eyes, and therefore we must safeguard our own future against the onfall of any similar disaster. Moreover, we must not only stand ready to act as an instrument for the achievement of a just peace if or when the opportunity arises, but also do whatever we can to formulate and secure adhesion to some kind of efficient international agreement whereby the chances of the recurrence of such world- wide disaster shall at least be minimized. To serve these various ends we, all of us, without regard to party differences, must stand ready loyally to sup- port the Administration, asking nothing except that the policy be one that in truth and in fact tells for the honor and interest of our Nation, and in truth and in fact is helpful to the cause of a permanent and righteous world peace. Of course peace is worthless unless it serves the cause of righteousness. Peace which consecrates militarism is of small service. Peace obtained by crushing the liberty and life of just and unoffending peopled is as cruel as the most cruel war. It should ever be our honorable effort to serve one of the •From the Outlook of September 23, 1914. 14 THE WAR'S TRAGEDIES AND LESSONS world's most vital needs by doing all in our power to bring about conditions which will give some effective protection to weak or small nations which themselves keep order and act with justice toward the rest of mankind. There can be no higher international duty than to safe- guard the existence and independence of industrious, orderly states, with a high personal and national standard of conduct, but without the military force of the Great Powers; states, for instance, such as Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, Uruguay, and others. A peace which left Belgium's wrongs unredressed and which did not provide against the re- currence of such wrongs as those from which she has suffered would not be a real peace. As regards the actions of most of the combatants in the hideous world- wide war now raging, it is possible sincerely to take and defend either of the opposite views concerning their actions. The causes of any such great and terrible contest almost always lie far back in the past, and the seeming im- mediate cause is usually itself in major part merely an effect of many preced- ing causes. The assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne was partly or largely due to the existence of political and often murderous secret societies in Servia which the Servian Government did not suppress; and it did not suppress them because the "bondage" of the men and women of the Servian race in Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria was such a source of ever- present irritation to the Servians that their own Government was powerless to restrain them. Strong arguments can be advanced on both the Austrian and the Servian sides as regards this initial cause of the present world-wide war. Again, when once the war was started between Austria and Servia, it can well be argued that it was impossible for Russia not to take part. Had she not done so, she would have forfeited her claims to the leadership of the smaller Slav peoples ; and the leading Russian liberals enthusiastically support the Rus- sian Government in this matter, asserting that Russia's triumph in this par- ticular struggle means a check to militarism, a stride towards greater freedom, and an advance in justice towards the Pole, the Jew, the Finn, and the people of the Caucasus. When Russia took part, it may well be argued that it was impossible for Germany not to come to the defense of Austria, and that disaster would surely have attended her arms had she not followed the course she actually did fol- low as regards her opponents on her western frontier. As for her wonderful efficiency — her equipment, the foresight and decision of her General Staff, her instantaneous action, her indomitable persistence — there can be nothing but the praise and admiration due a stern, virile, and masterful people, a people entitled to hearty respect for their paiaiotism and far-seeing self-devotion. Yet again, it is utterly impossible to see how France could have acted otherwise than as she did act. She had done nothing to provoke the crisis, even although it be admitted that in the end she was certain to side with Russia. War was not declared by her, but against her, and she could not have escaped it save by having pursued in the past, and by willing^ness to pur- sue in the future, a course which would have left her as helpless as Luxemburg — and Luxemburg's fate shows that helplessness does not offer the smallest guarantee of peace. When once Belgium was invaded, every circumstance of national honor and interest forced England to act precisely as she did act. She could not have held up her head among nations had she acted otherwise. In particular, she is entitled to the praise of all true lovers of peace, for it is only by action such as she took that neutrality treaties and treaties guaranteeing the rights of small powers will ever be given any value. The actions of Sir Edward Grey as he guided Britain's foreign policy showed adherence to lofty stand- ards of right combined with firmness of courage under great strain. The THE WAR'S TRAGEDIES AND LESSONS 16 British position, and incidentally the German position, are tersely stated in the following extract from the report of Sir Edward Goschen, who at the outset of the war was British Ambassador in Berlin. The report, in speaking of the interview between the Ambassador and the German Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, says: "The Chancellor [spoke] about twenty minutes. He said the step taken by Great Britain was terrible to a degree. Just for a word, 'neutrality,' a word which in war time had been so often disregarded, just for a scrap of paper. Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation. What we had done was unthinkable. It was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. "I protested strongly against this statement, and said that in the same way as he wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a mat- ter of life or death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of life or death for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. A solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have in England's engagement in the future?" There is one nation, however, as to which there is no room for difference of opinion, whether we consider her wrongs or the justice of her actions. It seems to me impossible that any man can fail to feel the deepest sympathy with a nation which is absolutely guiltless of any wrong-doing, which has given proof of high valor, and yet which has suffered terribly, and which, if there is any meaning in tiie words "right" and "wrong," has suffered wrong- fully. Belgium is not in the smallest degree responsible for any of the con- ditions that during the. last half -century have been at work to impress a cer- tain fatalistic stamp upon those actions of Austria, Russia, Germany, and France which have rendered this war inevitable. No European nation has had anjrthing whatever to fear from Belgium. There was not the smallest danger of her making any aggressive movement, not even the slightest aggressive movement, against any one of her neighbors. Her population was mainly in- dustrial and was absorbed in peaceful business. Her people were thrifty, hard- working, highly civilized, and in no way aggressive. She owed her national existence to the desire to create an absolutely neutral state. Her neutrality had been solemnly guaranteed by the Great Powers, including Germany as well as England and France. Suddenly, and out of a clear sky, her territory was invaded by an over- whelming German army. According to the newspaper reports, it was ad- mitted in the Reichstag by German members that this act was "wrongful." Of course, if there is any meaning to the words "right" and "wrong" in inter- national matters, the act was wrong. The men who shape German policy take the ground that in matters of vital national moment there are no such things as abstract right and wrong, and that when a great nation is struggling for its existence it can no more consider the rights of neutral powers than it can consider the rights of its ovra citizens as these rights are construed in times of peace, and that everything must bend before the supreme law of national self-preservation. Whatever we may think of the morality of this plea, it is certain that almost all great nations have in time past again and again acted in accordance with it. England's conduct toward Denmark in the Napoleonic wars, and the conduct of both England and France toward us during those same wars, admit only of this species of justification; and with less excuse the same is true of our conduct toward Spain in Florida nearly a century ago. I wish it explicitly understood that I am not at this time passing judgment one way or the other upon Germany for what she did to Belgium. But I do wish to point out just what was done, and to emphasize Belgium's absolute inno- 16 THE WAR'S TRAGEDIES AND LESSONS cence and the horrible suffering and disaster that have overwhelmed her in spite of such innocence. And I wish to do this so that we as a nation may learn aright the lessons taught by the dreadful Belgian tragedy. Germany's attack on Belgium was not due to any sudden impulse. It had been carefully planned for a score of years, on the assumption that the treaty of neutrality was, as Herr von Bethmann-HoUweg observed, nothing but "pa- per," and that the question of breaking or keeping it was to be considered solely from the standpoint of Germany's interest. The German railways up to the Belgian border are for the most part military roads, which have been double-tracked with a view to precisely the overwhelming attack that has just been delivered into and through Belgium. The great German military text-books, such as that of Bernhardi, in discussing and studying possible Ger- man campaigns against Russia and Prance, have treated advances through Belgium or Switzerland exactly as they have treated possible advances through German territory, it being assumed by the writers and by all for whom they wrote that no efficient rulers or military men would for a second consider a neutrality treaty or any other kind of treaty if it became to the self-interest of a party to break it. It must be remembered that the German system in no way limits its disregard to conventions to disregard of neutrality treaties. For example, in General von Bernhardi's book, in speaking of naval warfare, he lays down the following rule: "Sometimes in peace even, if there is no other means of defending one's self against a superior force, it will be advisable to attack the enemy by torpedo and submarine boats, and to inflict upon him un- expected losses. . . . War upon the enemy's trade must also be conducted as ruthlessly as possible, since only then, in addition to the material damage inflicted upon the enemy, the necessary terror is spread among the merchant marine, which is even more important than the capture of actual prizes. A certain amount of terrorism must be practiced on the sea, making peaceful tradesmen stay in safe harbors." Belgium has felt the full effect of the practical application of these prin- ciples, and Germany has profited by them exactly as her statesmen and sol- diers believed she would profit. They have believed that the material gain of trampling on Belgium would more than offset any material opposition which the acz would arouse, and they treat with the utter and contemptuous derision which it deserves the mere pacificist clamor against wrong which is unac- companied by the intention and effort to redress wrong by force. The Belgians, when invaded, valiantly defended themselves. They acted precisely as Andreas Hofer and his Tyrolese, and Koerner and the leaders of the North German Tugenbund, acted in their day; and their fate has been the fate of Andreas Hofer, who was shot after his capture, and of Koerner, who was shot in battle. They fought valiantly, and they were overcome. They were then stamped under foot. Probably it is physically impossible for our people, living softly and at ease, to visualize to themselves the dreadful woe that has come upon the people of Belgium, and especially upon the poor people. Let each man think of his neighbors — of the carpenter, the station- agent, the day laborer, the farmer, the grocer — who are round about him, and think of these men deprived of their all, their homes destroyed, their sons dead or prisoners, their wives and children half starved, overcome with fatigue and horror, stumbling their way to some city of refuge, and when they have reached it, finding air-ships wrecking the houses with bombs and destroying women and children. The King shared the toil and danger of the fighting men; the Queen and her children suffered as other mothers and children suffered. I am not now discussing the question whether or not it is proper and necessary to use air-ships as they were used against Antwerp, and as under like circumstances they would undoubtedly be used against New York or Chicago. I am merely calling attention to what has actually been done in THE WAR'S TRAGEDIES AND LESSONS 17 Belgium, in accordance with what the Germans unquestionably sincerely be- lieve to be the course of conduct necessitated by Germany's struggle for life. But Germany's need to struggle for her life does not make it any easier for the Belgians to suffer death. Nor am I now discussing whether or not it is moral to have utterly destroyed Louvain, and to have imposed such paralyzing pecuniary fines as that upon Brussels, backed by the statement, as alleged, that the art treasures will be removed if the fine is not paid. All that is neces- sary for my present purpose is to point out the obvious fact that the Germans are in Belgium from no fault of the Belgians, but purely because the Germans deemed it to their vital interest to violate Belgium's rights. Therefore the ultimate responsibility for what has occurred at Louvain and what has oc- curred and is occurring in Brussels rests in no way upon Belgium. The in- vasion could have been averted by no action of Belgium that was consistent with her honor and self-respect. The Belgians would have been less than men had they not defended themselves and their country. For this, and for this only, they are suffering, somewhat as my own German ancestors suffered when Turenne ravaged the Palatinate, somewhat as my Irish ancestors suf- fered in the struggles that attended the conquests and reconquests of Ire- land in the days of Cromwell and William. The suffering is by no means as great, but it is very great, and it is altogether too nearly akin to what oc- curred in the seventeenth century for us of the twentieth century to feel over- much pleased with the amount of advance that has been made. It is neither necessary nor at the present time possible to sift from the charges, counter- charges, and denials the exact facts as to the acts alleged to have been com- mitted in various places. The prime fact as regards Belgium is that Belgium was an entirely peaceful and genuinely neutral power which had been guilty of no offense whatever. What has befallen her is due to the further fact that a great, highly civilized military power deemed that its own vital interests rendered imperative the infliction of this suffering on an inoffensive although valiant and patriotic little nation. I think, at any rate I hope, I have rendered it plain that I am not now criticising, that I am not passing judgment one way or the other, upon Ger- many's action. I admire and respect the German people. I am proud of the German blood in my veins. When a nation feels that the issue of a contest in which, from whatever reason, it finds itself engaged will be national life or death, it is inevitable that it should act so as to save itself from death and to perpetuate its life. What has occurred to Belgium is precisely what would occur under similar conditions to us, unless we were able to show that the action would be dangerous. If any Old World military power, European or Asiatic, were engaged in war, and deemed such action necessary and safe, it would at once seize the Panama Canal, or the Danish or Dutch West Indies, or Magdalena Bay, exactly as Belgium and Luxemburg have been overrun by Germany, as Korea has been seized by Japan. They would certainly so act if they thought we would in any real crisis pay heed to the political theories resulting in the all-inclusive arbitration treaties that have just been nego- tiated in Washington. They would refrain from so acting only if they knew we would instantly and resolutely act ourselves in such manner as to forestall and defeat their action. . , ^ ^, , - The rights and wrongs of these cases where nations violate the rules ol abstract morality in order to meet their own vital needs can be precisely determined only when all the facts are known and when men's blood is cool. I am not at this time striving to lay down a general law, although I believe that it is imperative, in the interest of civilization, to create international conditions which shall neither require nor permit such action in the future. I am not at this time criticising the particular actions of which I speak. But I do wish to point out just what these actions are, and just what lessons we 18 THE WAR'S TRAGEDIES AND LESSONS of the United States should learn from them so far as our own future is con- cerned. There are several such lessons. One is how complicated instead of how simple it is to decide what course we ought to follow as regards any g:iven action supposed to be in the interest of peace. Of course I am speaking of the thing and not the name when I speak of peace. The ultra-pacificists are capa- ble of taking any position, yet I suppose that few among them now hold that there was value in the "peace" which was obtained by the concert of European Powers when they prevented interference with Turkey while the Turks butch- ered some hundreds of thousands of Armenian men, women, and children. In the same way I do not suppose that even the ultra-pacificists really feel that "peace" is triumphant in Belgium at the present moment. A deputation of Belgians has arrived in this country to invoke our assistance in the time of their dreadful need. What action our Government can or will take I know not. It has been announced that no action can be taken that will interfere with our entire neutrality. It is certainly eminently desirable that we should re- main entirely neutral, and nothing but urgent need would warrant breaking our neutrality and taking sides one way or the other. Our first duty is to hold ourselves ready to do whatever the changing circumstances demand in order to protect our own interests in the present and in the future; although, for my own part, I desire to add to this statement the proviso that under no circumstances must we do anything dishonorable, especially towards unoffend- ing weaker nations. Neutrality may be of prime necessity in order to preserve our own interests, to maintain peace in so much of the world as is not af- fected by the war, and to conserve our influence for helping toward the re- establishment of general peace when the time comes; for if any outside Power is able at such time to be the medium for bringing peace, it is more likely to be the United States than any other. But we pay the penalty of this action on behalf of peace for ourselves, and possibly for others in the future, by forfeiting our right to do anything on behalf of peace for the Belgians in the present. We can maintain our neutrality only by refusal to do anything to aid unoffending weak powers which are dragged into the gulf of bloodshed and misery through no fault of their own. Of course it would be folly to jump into the gulf ourselves to no good purpose; and very probably nothi'ng that we could have done would have helped Belgium. We have not the smallest re- sponsibility for what has befallen her, and I am sure that the sympathy of this country for the suffering of the men, women, and children of Belgium is very real. Nevertheless, this sympathy is compatible with full acknowledg- ment of the unwisdom of our uttering a single word of official protest unless we are prepared to make that protest effective; and only the clearest and most urgent National duty would ever justify us in deviating from our rule of neutrality and non-interference. But it is a grim comment on the professional pacificist theories as hitherto developed that our duty to preserve peace for ourselves may necessarily mean the abandonment of all effective effort to secure peace for other unoffending nations which through no fault of their own are dragged into the war. The next lesson we should learn is of far more immediate consequence to us than speculations about peace in the abstract. Our people should wake up to the fact that it is a poor thing to live in a fool's paradise. What has oc- curred in this war ought to bring home to everybody what has of course long been known to all really well-informed men who were willing to face the truth, and not try to dodge it. Until some method is devised of putting ef- fective force behind arbitration and neutrality treaties neither these treaties nor the vague and elastic body of custom which is misleadingly termed international law will have any real effect in any serious crisis between us and any save perhaps one or two of the Great Powers. The average great military power THE WAR'S TRAGEDIES AND LESSONS 19 looks at these matters purely from the standpoint of its own interests. At this moment, for instance, Japan has declared war on Germany. She has paid scrupulous regard to our own rights and feelings in the matter. The conten- tion that she is acting in a spirit of mere disinterested altruism need not be considered. She believes that she has wrongs to redress and strong national interests to preserve. Nineteen years ago Germany joined with Russia to check Japan's progress after her victorious war with China, and has since then itself built up a German colonial possession on Chinese soil. Doubtless the Jap- anese have never for one moment forgotten this act of Germany. Doubtless they also regard the presence of a strong European military power in China so near to Korea and Manchuria^as a menace to Japan's national life. With businesslike coolness the soldierly statesmen of Nippon have taken the chance which offered itself of at little cost retaliating for the injury inflicted upon them in the past and removing an obstacle to their future dominance in eastern Asia. Korea is absolutely Japan's. To be sure, by treaty it was solemnly covenanted that Korea should remain independent. But Korea was itself help- less to enforce the treaty, and it was out of the question to suppose that any other nation with no interest of its own at stake would attempt to do for the Koreans what they were utterly unable to do for themselves. Moreover, the treaty rested on the false assumption that Korea could govern herself well. It had already been shown, that she could not in any real sense govern herself at all. Japan could not afford to see Korea in the hands of a great foreign Power. She regarded her duty to her children and her children's chil- dren as overriding her treaty obligations. Therefore, when Japan thought the right time had come, it calmly tore up the treaty and took Korea, with the polite and businesslike efficiency it had already shown in dealing with Russia, and was afterwards to show in dealing with Germany. The treaty, when tested, proved as utterly worthless as our own recent all-inclusive arbitration treaties — and worthlessness can go no further. Hysteria does not tend towards edification; and in this country hysteria is unfortunately too often the earmark of the ultra-paciflcist. Surely at this time there is more reason than ever to remember Professor Lounsbury's remark concerning the "infinite capacity of the human brain to withstand the introduction of knowledge." The comments of some doubtless well-mean- ing citizens of our own country upon the lessons taught by this terrible cata- clysm of war are really inexplicable to any man who forgets the truth that Professor Lounsbury thus set forth. A writer of articles for a newspaper syndicate the other day stated that Germany was being opposed by the rest of the world because it had "inspired fear." This thesis can, of course, be sus- tained. But Belgium has inspired no fear. Yet it has suffered infinitely more than Germany. Luxemburg inspired no fear. Yet it has been quietly taken possession of by Germany. The writer in question would find it puzzling to point out the particulars in which Belgium and Luxemburg — not to speak of China and Korea — are at this moment better off than Germany. Of course they are worse off; and this because Germany has "inspired fear," and they have not. Nevertheless, this vrriter drew the conclusion that "fear" was the only emotion which ought not to be inspired ; and he advocated our abandonment of battle-ships and other means of defense, so that we might never inspire "fear" in any one. He forgot that, while it is a bad thing to inspire fear, it is a much worse thing to inspire contempt. Another newspaper writer pointed out that on the frontier between us and Canada there were no forts, and yet peace obtained; and drew the conclusion that forts and armed forces were inimical to national safety. This worthy soul evidently did not know that Luxemburg had no forts or armed forces, and therefore succumbed without a protest of any kind. If he does not admire the heroism of the Belgians and prefer it to the tame submission of the Luxemburgers, then this writer is him- 20 THE WAR'S TRAGEDIES AND LESSONS self unfit to live as a free man in a free country. The crown of ineptitude, however, was reached by an editor who announced, in praising the recent all- inclusive peace treaties, that "had their like been in existence between some of the European nations two weeks ago, the world might have been spared the Great War." It is rather hard to deal seriously with such a supposition. At this very moment the utter worthlessness of even the rational treaties drawn to protect Belgium and Luxemburg has been shown. To suppose that under such conditions a bundle of bits of paper representing mere verbiage, with no guarantee, would count for anything whatever in a great crisis is to show ourselves unfit to control the destinies of a great, just, and self-respecting people. These writers wish us to abandon all means of defending ourselves. Some of them advocate our abandoning the building of an efficient fleet. Yet at this moment Great Britain owes it that she is not in worse plight than Belgium solely to the fact that with far-sighted wisdom her statesmen have maintained her navy at the highest point of efiiciency. At this moment the Japanese have declared war against the Germans, and hostilities are taking place in what but twenty years ago was Chinese territory, and what by treaty is unquestionably Chinese territory to-day. China has protested against the Japanese violation of Chinese neutrality in its operations against the Germans, but no heed has ' been paid to the protest, for China cannot back the protest by the use of armed force. Moreover, as China is reported to have pointed out to Germany, the lat- ter Power had violated Chinese neutrality just as Japan had done. Very pos- sibly the writers above alluded to were sincere in their belief that they were advocating what was patriotic and wise when they urged that the United States make itself utterly defenseless so as to avoid giving an excuse for ag- gression. Yet these writers ought to have known that during their own life- time China has been utterly defenseless, and yet has suffered from aggression after aggression. Large portions of its territory are now in the possession of Russia, of Japan, of Germany, of France, of England. The great war be- tween Russia and Japan was fought on what was nominally Chinese territory. At pi'esent, because a few weeks ago Servian assassins murdered the heir to the Austrian monarchy, Japan is fighting Germany on Chinese territory. Luxemburg has been absolutely powerless and defenseless, has had no soldiers and no forts. It is off the map at this moment. Not only are none of the belligerents thinking about its rights, but no neutral is thinking about its rights, and this simply because Luxemburg could not defend itself. It is our duty to be patient with every kind of folly, but it is hard for a good American, for a man to whom his country is dear, and who reveres the memories of Washington and Lincoln, to be entirely patient with the kind of folly that advo- cates reducing this country to the position of China and Luxemburg. There is even a possible question whether we are not ourselves, like other neutral powers, violating obligations which we have explicitly or implicitly as- sumed in the Hague treaties. In Chapter I of the Convention defining the rights and duties of neutrals, the Tenth Article reads: "The fact of a neutral power resisting even by force attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act." The precise worth of this particular provision — and of all other provisions in all these treaties, save as they are backed by force — is beautifully illustrated by what has befallen Belgium at this time. All that she has suffered has been exactly and precisely because she did "resist by force attempts to violate her neutrality." In theory, so far as paper treaties go, she cannot be considered to have committed "hostile acts." In practice, Germany so treats her acts. Under actual conditions this Hague guarantee would excite laughter were not the tragedy such as to move us to tears instead. One of the main lessons to learn from this war is embodied in the homely THE WAR'S TRAGEDIES AND LESSONS 21 proverb, "Speak softly and carry a big stick." Persistently only half of this proverb has been quoted in deriding the, men who wish to safeguard our Na- tional interest and honor. Persistently the effort has been made to insist that those who advocate keeping our country able to defend its rights are merely adopting "the policy of the big stick." In reality, we lay equal emphasis on the fact that it is necessary to speak softly; in other words, that it is neces- sary to be respectful toward all people and scrupulously to refrain from wrong- ing them, while at the same time keeping ourselves in condition to prevent wrong being done to us. If a nation does not in this sense speak softly, then sooner or later the policy of the big stick is certain to result in war. But what befell Luxemburg six weeks ago, what has befallen China again and again dur- ing the past quarter of a century, shows that no amount of speaking softly will save any people which does not carry a big stick. I earnestly believe in peace. I respect every sincere and upright man who with wisdom and proper sense of perspective does all he can at peace con- ferences, or by the negotiation of reasonable arbitration treaties, or by the utilization of the Hague International Court in proper cases, to minimize the chances of war among civilized nations, and to give the opportunity to use other means than war for the settlement of international disputes. A little good can come from all these movements, but only on condition that there is no attempt made to erect shams and say they are truths or to pretend to be doing what we are not doing. A little good can come, but only on condition that nations remember that as yet arbitration treaties, neutrality treaties, treaties for the erection of independent tribunals, treaties of all kinds, can do nothing to save a nation in great crises unless that nation is able to defend its own honor, its own vital interests. America should have a coherent policy of action toward foreign powers, and this should primarily be based on the determination never to give offense when it can be avoided, always to treat other nations justly and courteously, and, as long as present conditions exist, to be prepared to defend our own rights ourselves. No other nation will defend them for us. No paper guar- antee or treaty will be worth the paper on which it is written if it becomes to the interest of some other power to violate it, unless we have strength, and courage and ability to use that strength, back of the treaty. Every public man, every writer who speaks with wanton offensiveness of a foreign power or of a foreign people, whether he attacks England or Prance or Germany, whether he assails the Russians or the Japanese, is doing an injury to the whole American body politic. We have plenty of shortcomings at home to correct before we start out to criticise the shortcomings of others. Now and then it becomes imperatively necessary in the interests of humanity, or in our own vital interest, to act in a manner which will cause offense to some other power. This is a lamentable necessity; but when the necessity arises we must meet it and act as we are honorably bound to act, no matter what offense is given. We must always weigh well our duties in such a case, and consider the rights of others as well as our own rights, in the interest of the world at large. If affer such consideration it is evident that we are bound to act along a certain line of policy, then it is mere weakness to refrain from doing so be- cause offense is thereby given. But we must never act wantonly or brutally, or without regard to the essentials of genuine morality— a morality considering our interests as well as the interests of others, and considering the interests of future generations as well as of the present generation. We must so con- duct ourselves that every big nation and every little nation that behaves itself shall never have to think of us with fear, and shall have confidence not only in our justice but in our courtesy. Submission to wrong-doing on our part would be mere weakness and would invite and insure disaster. We must not submit to wrong done to our honor or to our vital National interests. But we 22 THE WAR'S TRAGEDIES AND LESSONS must be scrupulously careful always to speak with courtesy and self-restraint to others, always to act decently to others, and to give no nation any justifica- tion for believing that it has anything to fear from us as long as it behaves with decency and uprightness. Above all, let us avoid the policy of peace with insult, the policy of un- preparedness to defend our rights, with inability to restrain our representa- tives from doing wrong to or publicly speaking ill of others. The worst policy for the United States is to combine the unbridled tongue with the unready hand. We in this country have of course come lamentably short of our ideals, but our ideals have been high, and at times we have measurably realized them. Last spring some of our foes in Vera Cruz were guilty of the same misconduct as that because of the existence of which, as is alleged, Louvain was destroyed; but it never entered our heads to destroy Vera Cruz. When we found that our share of the Chinese indemnity paid us after the Boxer outrages was excessive, we returned it to China. When we gave our word to make Cuba independent, we kept our word — and none of the chancelleries of Eu- rope thought we would do so. From the beginning we have recognized what is taught in the words of Washington, and again in the great crisis of our National life in the words of Lincoln, that in the past free peoples have gen- erally split and sunk on that great rock of difficulty caused by the fact that a government which recognizes the liberties of the people is not usually strong enough to preserve the liberties of the people against outside aggression. Washington and Lincoln believed that ours was a strong people, and therefore fit for a strong government. They believed that it was only weak peoples that had to fear strong governments, and that to us it was given to combine free- dom and efficiency. They belonged among that line of statesmen and public servants whose existence has been the negation of the theory that goodness is always associated with weakness, and that strength always finds its expres- sion in violent wrong-doing. Edward the Confessor represented exactly the type which treats weakness and virtue as interchangeable terms. His reign was the prime cause of the conquest of England. Godoy, the Spanish states- man, a century ago, by the treaties he entered into and carried out, actually earned the title of "Prince of Peace" instead of merely lecturing about it; and the result of his peacefulness was the loss by Spain of the vast regions which she then held in our country west of the Mississippi, and finally the overthrow of the Spanish national government, the setting up in Madrid of a foreign king by a foreign conqueror, and a long-drawn and incredibly de- structive war. To statesmen of this kind Washington and Lincoln stand in as sharp contrast as they stand on the other side to the great absolutist chiefs such as Csesar, Napoleon, Frederick the Great, and Cromwell. What was true of the personality of Washington and Lincoln was true of the policy they sought to impress upon our nation. They were just as hostile to the theory that virtue was to be confounded with weakness as to the theory that strength justified wrong-doing. No abundance of the milder virtues will save a na- tion that has lost the virile qualities; and, on the other hand, no admiration of strength must make us deviate from the laws of righteousness. The kind of "peace" advocated by the ultra-pacificists of 1776 would have meant that we never would have had a country; the kind of "peace" advocated by the ultra-pacificists in the early '60s would have meant the absolute destruction of the country. It would have been criminal weakness for Washington not to have fought for the independence of this country, and for Lincoln not to have fought for the preservation of the Union; just as in an infinitely smaller degree it would have been criminal weakness for us if we had permitted wrong- doing in Cuba to go on forever unchecked, or if we had failed to insist on the building of the Panama Canal in exactly the fashion that we did insist- THE WAR'S TRAGEDIES AND LESSONS 23 and, above all, if we had failed to build up our navy as during the last twelve years it has been built up. No alliance, no treaty, and no easy good will of other nations will save us if we are not true to ourselves; and on the other hand, if we wantonly give offense to others, if we excite hatred and fear, then some day we will pay a heavy penalty. The most important lesson, therefore, for us to learn from Belgium's fate is that, as things in the world now are, we must in any great crisis trust for our national safety to our ability and willingness to defend ourselves by our own trained strength and courage. We must not wrong others; and for our own safety we must trust, not to worthless bits of paper unbacked by power, and to treaties that are fundamentally foolish, but to our own man- liness and clear-sighted willingness to face facts. There is, however, another lesson which this huge conflict may at least possibly teach. There is at least a chance that from this calamity a move- ment may come which will at once supplement and in the future perhaps al- together supplant the need of the kind of action so plainly indicated by the demands of the present. It is at least possible that the conflict will result in a growth of democracy in Europe, in at least a partial substitution of the rule of the people for the rule of those who esteem it their God-given right to gov- ern the people. This, in its turn, would render it probably a little more unlikely that there would be a repetition of such disastrous warfare. I do not think that at present it would prevent the possibility of warfare. I think that in the great countries engaged, the peoples as a whole have been behind their sover- eigns on both sides of this contest. Certainly the action of the Socialists in Germany, France, and Belgium, and, so far as we know, of the popular leaders in Russia, would tend to bear out the truth of this statement. But the growth of the power of the people, while it would not prevent war, would at least render it more possible than at present to make appeals which might result in some cases in coming to an accommodation based upon justice; for justice is what popular rule must be permanently based upon and must permanently seek to obtain or it will not itself be permanent. Moreover, the horror that right-thinking citizens feel over the awful tragedies of this war can hardly fail to make sensible men take an interest in genuine peace movements and try to shape them so that they shall be more practical than at present. I most earnestly believe in every rational movement for peace. My objection is only to movements that do not in very fact tell in favor of peace or else that sacrifice righteousness to peace. Of course this in- cludes objection to all treaties that make believe to do what, as a matter of fact, they fail to do. Under existing conditions universal and all-inclusive arbitra- tion treaties have been utterly worthless, because where there is no power to compel nations to arbitrate, and where it is perfectly certain that some na- tions will pay no respect to such agreements unless they can be forced to do so it is mere folly for others to trust to promises impossible of performance; and it is an act of positive bad faith to make these promises when it is certain that the nation making them would violate them. But this does not m the least mean that we must abandon hope of taking action which will lessen the chance of war and make it more possible to circumscribe the limits of war s devastation. , . For this result we must largely trust to sheer growth in morality and in- telligence among the nations themselves. For a hundred years peace has ob- tained between us and Great Britain. No frontier in Europe is as long as the frontier between Canada and ourselves, and yet there is not a fort, nor an armed force worthy of being called such, upon it. This does not result from any arbitration treaty or any other treaty. Such treaties as those now exist- ing are as a rule observed only when they serve to make a record of condi- tions that already exist and which they do not create. The fact simply is that 24 THE WAR'S TRAGEDIES AND LESSONS there has been such growth of good feeling and intelligence that war between us and the British Empire is literally an impossibility, and there is no more chance of military movements across the Canadian border than there is of movement between New York and New Hampshire or Quebec and Ontario. Slowly but surely, I believe, such feelings will grow, until war between the Englishman and the German, or the Russian, or the Frenchman, or between any of them and the American, will be as unthinkable as now between the Eng- lishman or Canadian and the American. But something can be done to hasten this day by wise action. It may not be possible at once to have this action as drastic as would be ultimately neces- sary; but we should keep our purpose in view. The utter weakness of the Hague Court, and the worthlessness when strain is put upon them of most treaties, spring from the fact that at present there is no means of enforcing the carrying out of the treaty or enforcing the decision of the Court. Under such circumstances recommendations for universal disarmament stand on an intellectual par with recommendations to establish "peace" in New York City by doing away with the police. Disarmament of the free and liberty-loving nations would mean merely insuring the triumph of some barbarism or despotism, and if logically applied would mean the extinction of liberty and of all that makes civilization worth having throughout the world. But in view of what has occurred in this war, surely the time ought to be ripe for the nations to consider a great world agreement among all the civilized military powers to back righteousness by force. Such an agreement would establish an effi- cient World League for the Peace of Righteousness. Such an agreement could limit the amount to be spent on armaments and, after defining carefully the inalienable rights of each nation which were not to be transgressed by any other, could also provide that any cause of difference among them, or between one of them and one of a certain number of designated outside non-military nations, should be submitted to an international court, including citizens of all these nations, chosen not as representatives of the nations, but as judges — and- perhaps in any given case the particular judges could be chosen by lot from the total number. To supplement and make this effectual it should be solemnly covenanted that if any nation refused to abide by the decision of such a court the others would draw the sword on behalf of peace and justice and would unitedly coerce the recalcitrant nation. This plan would not automatically bring peace, and it may be too soon to hope for its adoption; but if some such scheme could be adopted, in good faith and with a genuine purpose behind it to make it effective, then we would have come nearer to the day of world peace. World peace will not come save in some such manner as that whereby we obtain peace within the borders of each nation; that is, by the creation of reasonably impartial judges and by putting an efficient police power — that is, by putting force in efficient fashion — ^behind the decrees of the judges. At present each nation must in the last resort trust to its own strength if it is to preserve all that makes life worth having. At present this is imperative. This state of things can be abolished only when we put force, when we put the collective armed power of civilization, behind some body which shall with reasonable justice and equity represent the collective determination of civiliza- tion to do what is right. The War Against Popular Rights This editorial, which was printed in The Outlook of August IS, 1914, gives The Outlook's interpretation of the war. It is followed by an international symposium giving the views taken of the war by Balkan, German, Russian, Russian Jewish, Polish and French opinion. — The Editor. HISTORY will hold the German Emperor responsible for the war in Europe. Austria would never have made her indefensible attack on Servia if she had not been assured beforehand of the support of Germany. The German Emperor's consent to co-operate with England in mediation would have halted Austria's advance. His refusal was notice to all Europe that Germany was Austria's ally in her predetermined attack on Servia. When Russia was seen to be preparing for a threatened war, Germany declared war against Russia. When France refused to pledge herself to neutrality, Germany made war on France. To doubt that Germany and Austria have been in practical alliance in this act of brigandage — ^for it deserves no better name — is to shut one's eyes to all signs. In order to make this war the Hague Treaty has been dis- regarded, the pledge to observe the neutrality of the Duchy of Luxemburg and the Kingdom of Belgium has been promptly violated. That this violation was part of the original plan of campaign is naively acknowledged by the Im- perial Chancellor of Germany. In a speech to the German Parliament he has said, "Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already ad- vanced into Belgian territory. This is against the law of nations. . . . The injustice that we thereby committed we shall rectify as soon as our military object is achieved." Austria wanted Servia and proposed to take it, and Germany undertook to prevent other European Powers from interfering. While the burglar enters the house and takes possession his confederate keeps watch outside and warns the neighbors not to interfere. The charge that Servia contrived the assassination of the Crown Prince of Austria has not a shred of evidence in its support. No evidence has been so much as offered. It is not even a specious pretext. Burke has said that it is impossible to indict a nation. This indictment of Servia, inherently in- credible, is made more so by the avowed policy of the murdered Prince. If the interesting article by Mr. W. F. Johnson in the New York "Tribune" of August 2 may be trusted, it was the purpose of that Prince, whenever he should come to the throne, to convert the dual monarchy into a federated king- dom; to unite Hungary, Bohemia, and Croatia with Austria in one fraternal union, as Wales and Scotland have been united, and as the Liberal party is endeavoring to unite Ireland with England. To-day the seventeen million Slavs in Austria-Hungary are under the despotic authority of the nine mil- lion Germans. The Supreme' Court of the United States has laid down the principle that the intent of an actor may be reasonably deduced from the inevitable eon- sequences of his action. The inevitable consequences of the Austro-Germanic alliance, if it is successful, it requires no prophet to foresee. It would put an end to all hope of a Balkan Confederacy. It would reduce the Balkan States to provinces of Germany and Austria. It would make Belgium and Holland Germanic provinces, as Finland has been made a Russian province. It would result either in a close alliance or, more probably, in an organic union between Austria and Germany. It would create a Germanic Empire which would ex- 25 26 THE WAR AGAINST POPULAR RIGHTS tend from the North Sea to the Mediterranean. It would bring all Europe under the domination of this Germanic Empire, as all southern Europe was under the domination of Rome in the first century, and as Napoleon endeav- ored to bring all eastern Europe under his personal domination in the last century. It would reduce Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, and England to subordinate positions, if not to dependencies. It would banish from all eastern Europe for the time the democratic movement of which France and England are the leaders. It would discourage the hopes of democracy in Spain, Italy, and Russia. It would enthrone autocracy from the Atlantic coast to Siberia and from the North "Sea to the Mediterranean. For the statesmanship of Gladstone, Gambetta, and Cavour it would substitute the statesmanship of Metternich and Bismarck. This aim we cannot better define than by quoting a single sentence from "On War of To-day," published last year by a German retired military ofiicer. Speaking of the Japanese, he says: "It was, above all, their boldness which paralyzed the arm of their far superior enemy, and made them by one stroke the dominating race of eastern Asia, the same as I hope the German people assert and maintain itself as the dominating race of Europe." Because the German Emperor combines with remarkable ability for organization this mediaeval ambition to dominate all Europe, he is the greatest personal peril of the century to popular liberty and human develop- ment. On the other hand, if the Germanic scheme is defeated, no such control of Europe would be possible to the allied Powers, and none such would be desired by them. England, France, and Russia could never unite to exercise a mastery over Europe. The supremacy of the people would receive a new impulse not only in the victorious but in the defeated countries. A Balkan federation would become not only possible but probable. Either Austria would be broken up into separate kingdoms or the plan of the late Crown Prince would be carried out and a federated kingdom of free peoples would result. The suppressed democracy in Germany would receive a new endowment of power. And the European war and its significance, penetrating the con- sciousness of even the Russian peasantry, would communicate strength and intelligence to the democratic aspirations of that people. We are far from asserting that all these results would follow the victory of either party to this war. We describe tendencies by their possible results. But we regard the conflict as one not merely involving historic racial jeal- ousies, but also as one of autocracy, intelligent, capable, and highly organized, against aspiring but imperfectly organized democracy. What are the prospects of the war ? The daily papers have given estimates of the military and naval forces of the several nations engaged. But these do not adequately represent the strength of the real parties to the conflict. There are three factors which have often exerted a powerful and sometimes a controlling influence in great cam- paigns, of which he who desires to forecast the future must take cognizance. Mr. W. F. Johnson, from whose article we have already quoted, says that "scarcely once in her more than eleven centuries of existence has Austria been entirely successful in an aggressive war, unless through the aid of powerful allies;" and in a compact historical paragraph he verifies this state- ment. Nor do we recall in Austrian history any such great general as Well- ington, or Napoleon, or von Moltke, or Garibaldi. Yet great campaigns are quite as often determined by the quality of leadership as by the number of men engaged. If Servia's forces should be commanded by a Robert E. Lee and the Austrian forces by a George B. McClellan, it is by no means certain that the smaller army might not be more than a match for the larger one. War both discovers commanders and develops them; what commanders this war will discover or develop no one can now even guess. THE WAR AGAINST POPULAR RIGHTS 27 Not less important than the quality of the leadership is the quality of the men in the ranks. "According to that great leader Napoleon," said Gen- eral Kuropatkin, "three-fourths of an army's success is due to the moral character of its soldiers." Napoleon's army illustrated the truth of this saying. So did Cromwell's army; so did the army of William of Orange in the Netherlands. It was because Europe forgot this truth that it expected gigantic Russia to crush Japan as a strong man crushes an eggshell in his hand. It is reported that the women of Servia have volunteered to fight with their husbands and brothers in the field. That they would add much to the fighting force is not probable. But the enthusiasm which their offer expresses and will inspire may add an entirely incalculable element to Servia's fighting force. Nor is this popular enthusiasm confined to Servia. It has prevented Italy's unnatural alliance writh Austria. It has inspired the unexpected and plucky resistance of Belgium. It has aroused the delayed but sturdy resolve of Great Britain. The action of Germany has united the moral judgment of Europe against her. In Germany's plea with Great Britain to allow her to violate the neutrality of Belgium, in the German Emperor's speech to his Imperial Parliament defending his course, the fact that the moral judgment of Europe condemns that course is tacitly recognized, and vain is the endeavor to dull the awakened conscience. While it can be said that this war is one of a united Europe against Germany and Austria, it must be remembered that Austria is a house divided against itself. The seventeen million Slavs in the Austrian Empire are more likely to make a division in her enemy's favor than to add to her military strength. What the four million Socialists of Germany think of this war no one knows or will be allowed to know, but their radical allies in the rest of Europe are fused into one host by a passion for liberty. The war is not merely one of race against race. It is the war of modern people against a mediseval autocracy. Even the pacificists are almost without exception for the war. The lovers of peace in all countries are in alliance against militarism. The people are arming to disarm the army of the absolutist. The moral sentiment of the civilized world is a military force not to be despised. One other element which the skill of man cannot foresee and against which it cannot guard is perhaps more important than either skill in leader- ship or quality in the soldiers. Military history is full of illustrations of the fact quaintly expressed by the ancient Hebrew historian in the saying, "The stars in their courses fought against Sisera." It was the incoming of the sea which co-operated with William of Orange to save the Netherlands from Alva's army. The Spanish Armada was bravely and wisely fought by Drake and Hawkins; but, says the historian Green, "the work of destruction was reserved for a mightier foe than Drake." The storm completed what he had begun but could not have completed without its aid. After the battle of Trafalgar the English fleet was close to the rocks and, their cables shot away, had not an anchor ready. Lord Collingwood, who had succeeded to the com- mand on the death of Nelson, wrote to his friend, "Providence did for us what no human effort could have done; the wind shifted a few points, and we drifted off the land." After the battle of Long Island the capture of General Wash- ington and his entire army was imminent. An "unexampled fog" came out of the sea to hide the American army and prevent the advance of the British fleet, and lay between the two until the last detachment of the retreating army had made its escape. „ , . xi. -j ^ History does not sustain Napoleon's saying that God is on the side o± the strong battalions. The strong battalions were not with the Church when pagan Rome endeavored to destroy it; nor with the "tapsters and servmg- men" who under Cromwell's leadership defeated the organized armies of the 28 AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM Stuarts; nor with the ill-clothed, ill-shod, ill-equipped soldiers of Washington who defeated the best troops England could draft or hire to subdue the Amer- ican colonists. We do not undertake to interpret the will or purpose of the Almighty. But we believe with Hegel that God has a plan and that history is nothing but the working out of his plan in human affairs. And we believe that the Austrian Prime Minister and the German Emperor have made a fatal mistake in leaving this truth out of their reckoning in their endeavor to destroy the great democratic movement in Europe. An International Symposium The preceding article contains the reasons for The Outlook's sympathy with Great Britain, France, Russia and their allies in their contest with Germanic imperialism. Despite the alignment of Russian despotism with the democracies of Great Britain and France, The Outlook believes that the contest is, in its funda- mental analysis, between liberalism and monarchical militarism. There are, of course, many subsidiary and sometimes conflicting forces at play, as there were in our own Civil War of the sixties. The purpose of the following symposium is to explain, or at least to throw some light upon, these subsidiary and conflicting forces. Mr. Kennan has lived in Russia, knows the Russian people, and speaks the Rus- sian language, and no man in America is better qualified to interpret the view of both the people and the Government. Mr. Bullard has lived among the Balkan peoples and understands both their good qualities and their defects. It would be difficult to find anyone better qualified to make clear the Austro- Hungarian viewpoint than Mr. Constantin Theodor Dumba, the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary to the United States. The national viewpoint of Germany is presented by Dr. H. C. G. von Jagemann, Professor of German Philology at Harvard University, and an authority on German politics. Mr. Tridon is a Frenchman living in this country. He is an expert in all mat- ters concerning organised labor in France. It is only fair to say that his article was written before the invasion of France by Germany, and, of course, it is now evident that both organized labor and the organised Socialists in France are sup- porting the Government in its fight for political liberty, as indeed, Mr. Tridon, in his last paragraph, intimated that they would. Mr. E. H. Lewinski-Corwin is an American of Polish descent who under- stands thoroughly Poland's hope and position in the war. The attitude of the Russian Jew is interpreted by a Russian Jew now living in America who was driven from his native land by Russian despotic oppression. It is not at all surprising that the Russian Jew, with his burning sense of injustice, should fail to see the world significance of this great European conflict. — The Editor. I — The Russian Point of View* By George Kennan /. The Russian People. So far as the Russian people are concerned, their interest in the Austro-Servian contest is based chiefly on consanguinity and *From The Outlook of August 15, 1914. AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 29 on sympathy with a weak Slavic Power attacked suddenly by a much stronger non-Slavic Power with German encouragement and support. The ill treat- ment of the Bulgarians — another Slavic people — ^by the Turks caused a feeling of sympathy and indignation in Russia that was really popular and national. In my judgment, the invasion of Servia by Austria, without sufficient cause, will rouse a similar feeling. The Servians are really first cousins of the Rus- sians, and kinsmen always stand together as against aliens. The Swedes and Norwegians are only remotely related to the English, but if Russia should treat those countries as Austria has treated Servia, and should then, on in- adequate provocation, declare war and begin an invasion, all Great Britain would be ablaze with indignation and wrath. T.be Russians will react in a less degree perhaps, but in the same way. The Russian people do not care much for extension of territory or enhancement of national power, but they are all Pan-Slavists, more or less, and they will, I think, support with en- thusiasm a war for the protection of their weak relatives against so powerful a combination as that of Austria and Germany. In other words, a war in defense of the rights and national integrity of Servia and Montenegro against Austrian and German aggression will be more truly popular than any war in which Russia has been engaged since 1877-8. Now that the Czar attacks Austria in defense of Servian independence, he will probably have the sup- port of an overwhelming majority of the people, in spite of the latter's dis- satisfaction with the Government's management of internal affairs. If he had interfered — even at the risk of war — when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, he would probably have had the nation's support, but he didn't dare to risk it so soon after the revolutionary struggle of 1905-6. //. The Russian Government. If Austria defeats Servia, as she almost cer- tainly would if the latter had no support, Austria and Germany are likely, in the near future, to dominate the whole Balkan Peninsula. To allow this would be contrary to half a century of Russian foreign policy. Austria, with a front on both the Adriatic and the ^gean, might become a strong naval Power, and, backed by Germany, she might forever put an end to Russian dreams of southward extension, and render the free navigation of the Dar- danelles more precarious for Russia than it is now. The complete subjugation of Servia and Montenegro by an Austro-German combination is full of menac- ing possibilities for Russia, because it may lead to almost anything. Austria has seized the opportune moment when the Servians, the Bulgarians, and the Greeks are not only exhausted by recent war, but embittered one against the other so that it is difficult for them to combine effectively in defense of their common interests. If, therefore, Russia had not come to the support of the Servians, the Balkan peoples might all go to the wall together, and the Austro- German combination practically control all the territory between the Adriatic and the Dardanelles. This, at least, is likely to be the view of the Czar and his Government, and, in the slang of the period, they "won't stand for it." In so complex a situation prediction is hazardous; but, in my judgment, the Czar will fight, regardless of consequences. The war party is always strong in Russia, and it is still smarting under the humiliation of its defeat in Man- churia. It is likely to say: "Give us a chance, and we will show you what we can do, with the patriotic support of the nation and in a field nearer home. We were beaten before because the people had no sympathy with the war, and because we had to fight six thousand miles from our base. It will not be so this time, because we can avail ourselves of our full strength, and we shall have the active support of France and at least the benevolent neutrality of Great Britain." They will rely on Austria's having all she can conveniently attend to in the Balkans, and they will feel sure that France and Russia can handle Germany. This, I think, is the way in which they will reason, from what I know of them. It has come to a pass now where the Czar must fight 30 AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM to save his face. If he does not, he and his Government will lose prestige even more seriously than they lost it in the war with Japan. The revolution- ists themselves will taunt them by saying, as they have already said in con- nection with Bosnia and Herzegovina: "You fight us with courage, because we have neither organization nor weapons; but you don't dare to attack an alien enemy even when he throws his glove in your face. Nobody will have any respect for you, even as a military Power, if you allow national interests to be sacrificed and kinsmen to be crushed almost within sight of your south- ern boundary." For these reasons and others for which I have neither time nor space, the Czar prefers to fight ];ather than permit Austria to subjugate Servia and Montenegro, and establish herself, with Germany's backing, as the dominant Power in southeastern Europe. Russia, it seems to me, will have some justi- fication, even though she incurs a tremendous responsibility. If a relatively weak people, closely related to us by ties of language, religion, and blood, were living as an independent nation in central Mexico, and if this kindred people were suddenly attacked, with little real provocation, by a strong European Power, and were likely to be defeated and subjugated, we should unquestionably fight — ^partly to prevent injustice, partly to defend our Na- tional interests in a region where we believe we have interests, and partly to stand by our weaker neighbors and kinsmen and give them effective protec- tion. This is something like, although of course not exactly like, the Balkan situation in its relation to Russia. From my point of view, the recent assassinations, for which the Servian Government and people may not have been at all to blame, were not a suffi- cient justification for Austria's aggressive ultimatum (to which Servia prac- tically yielded), nor for the subsequent declaration of war. ///. The Outcome. As a great European war is now under way, it may be worth while to consider the chances of the principal combatants, viz., Russia, Germany, and Austria. Before doing so, however, let me call atten- tion to the following paragraph in General Kuropatkin's review of the mili- tary situation in 1900. In clearness of foresight it was almost prophetic. In his report to the Czar that year General Kuropatkin said: "Crises of world-wide importance arise suddenly,^ and are not prevented by the unpreparedness of a nation for war. On the contrary, the knowledge of unreadiness in any quarter only leads to a desire to take advantage of it in others. Therefore a struggle such as has never been seen in the world may come sooner than we think} It may burst forth even contrary to the wish of the Czar and against the interests of Russia. This would be a calamity for the whole world. . . . Within the last fifty years the military resources of our neighbors have so increased, and Germany and Austria, more especially, are so much better prepared to invade us that our western frontier is now exposed to greater danger than it has ever been in the whole of our history." ("The Russian Army and the Japanese War," Vol. I, pp. 76 and 110.) The "crisis" has "suddenly arisen," and the "calamity" is upon us. What is likely to be the course of events now that Russia has declared war against Austria and Germany? It seems to me probable that Germany will take the offensive, on the Russian frontier at least, and, mobilizing her forces with amazing rapidity, will mass them and hurl them on the Russians before tjje latter have half completed their preparations. At their very best the Rus- sians are slow, and they are likely to be overwhelmed before they are ready to fight. In considering this question General Kuropatkin said: "By her rapid concentration and by her ability to throw an immense army so quickly across the French frontier in 1870, Germany showed also what she 1 Italics are mine. — G. K. AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM SI would be capable of doing in our direction. By the expenditure of vast sums of money she has made ready, in the most comprehensive sense, to march rapidly across our borders with an army of 1,000,000 men. She has seventeen lines of railway (twenty-three tracks) leading to our frontiers, which would enable her to send to the front more than five hundred troop trains daily. She can concentrate the greater part of her armed forces (fourteen to sixteen- army corps) on our frontier within a few days of the declaration of war; while, apart from this question of speedy mobilization, she has at her com- mand far greater technical resources, such as light railways, artillery, ord- nance, and engineering stores, particularly for telegraphs, mobile siege parks, etc., than we have. Since the Crimean War we have worked hard to prepare the Vilna and Warsaw areas for hostilities; but as Germany has done considerably more in thirty years than we have in fifty, she has outdistanced us. Her principal and most overwhelming superiority lies in her railways; to her seventeen lines running to our frontier we can only oppose five. This advantage is overwhelming, and gives to her and Austria a superiority which can be counterbalanced neither by large numbers nor bravery." (Vol. I, pp. 47 and 79.) In view of these facts and considerations (to which General Kuropatkin refers again and again in other pages) it seems fairly probable that Germany will be victorious in the early engagements (as she was in the war with France) by virtue of her facilities for quick concentration in overwhelming force and her rapidity of movement. Her difficulties, however, will increase as she advances eastward and northward. Western Eussia is not a good country to forage in; fall and winter are approaching; and the Germans, as they get farther and farther away from their base, will meet larger and larger aggregations of troops. They cannot count on the support or sympathy of the Russian revolutionists. The latter, it is true, alarmed and harassed the Gov- ernment during the Japanese War, and particularly toward its close; but that war was hateful to the great mass of the Russian people. This war will be popular, and a German invasion will unite all political parties and bring the whole nation together for defense. The final outcome, therefore, is doubtful, with the chances against German success in anything like a long campaign. The situation as regards Austria is somewhat different, although on that frontier also Russia will have to struggle against disadvantages at first I» considering this aspect of a European war. General Kuropatkin says: "Galicia forms, so to speak, a glacis of the Carpathians, running down to- ward Russia, and it has recently grown up into a splendidly prepared in- trenched camp, connected vnth the other provinces of Austria-Hungary by numerous roads across the Carpathians. It is strongly fortified and stocked with supplies of every nature both for a protracted defense or an advance in force into Russia. Austria can now concentrate 1,000,000 men in this area within a very short space of time. In the matter of railway development the Austrians also have left us far behind. While they, by means of eight lines of rail (ten tracks), can run 260 trains up to the frontier every twenty-four hours, we can only convey troops to the same point on four Imes. In the last ten years the Carpathians have been pierced by five lines of railway, and prep- arations have been made to lay three more. The Austrian army, which is of great size and splendidly equipped, would base itself upon the strong in- trenched camp in Galicia, and could, if properly commanded, throw superior numbers into the field against us." (Vol. II, pp. 53, 55.) In a war with Russia, however, Austria will be very materially weakened in two ways. In the first place, she already has on her hands a war with Servia and Montenegro, and these states will probably be supported by Greece and possibly by Bulgaria. She cannot throw her whole force, therefore, against Russia. In the second place, the population of Austria includes no 82 AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM less than forty-seven per cent, of Slavs, many of whom are already restive under her rule, if not actively hostile to it. All or nearly all of them will naturally sympathize with Russia and Servia, and make trouble for their oppressors at the first opportunity. Austria will be forced, therefore, to keep a considerable part of her forces in her Slav provinces, particularly Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia. In view of her present undertakings and these em- barrassments, she will not be likely, I think, to attempt an invasion of Russia, but will maintain a defensive attitude, leaving to her ally the aggressive fighting. II — The Attitude of the Balkans to the European War* By Arthur Bullard Special War Correspondent of The Outlook THERE was a moment towards the end of the first Balkan War when there was talk of a new Power in Europe. A Balkan Empire, with Bulgaria in the role of Prussia, was being considered by statesmen as a possibility. There was, of course, an age-old jealousy between Greek and Slav, and even much venomous feeling between Serbs and Bulgars. But in December of 1912 there was a probability of some sort of a federa- tion which might grow stronger with time. All the Christians of the Peninsula were rejoicing in unexpected victories over the Turk. And all eyes turned to Czar Ferdinand for leadership. The Bulgars are far and away the most progressive people of the neigh- borhood. Theirs is the most modern, the most progressive and enlightened state east of Switzerland, and the initiative, as well as the brunt of the fighting, against Turkey had been theirs. There were two elements of discord between the allies at that time. A stupid Turkish general had retreated before the Greeks into Salonika instead of retiring on his fortified base at Janina, as all military men would have ex- pected. The Greek army entered Salonika, which they had not hopei^to win, about ten minutes before a Bulgarian army, which had set out to capture the city, arrived from the opposite direction. The treaty between the allies was not explicit on this point, and there was dispute between the Bulgars and Greeks. A more serious disagreement had broken out in the north between the Serbs and Bulgars. The secret treaty between them has been published since. It was not only an offensive alliance against the Turks, but explicitly a defensive alliance against Austria. Servia had for a long time desired a port for her commerce on the Adriatic. This was the goal of all her planning before the war, but it was foreseen that Austria would object. Ferdinand of Bulgaria is perhaps the shrewdest diplomat in Europe. He understood that no Great Power could attack a Balkan State without precipitating a general European war, and, if that hp.ppened, Austria could spare no troops to invade Servia. So, when Austria ordered the Setbs to evacuate Durazzo, on the Adriatic, Bulgaria said to Servia: "Stand pat, we're with you. Austria is bluffing. If she attacks, such a war will break out that all our enemies will have their hands full elsewhere." ♦From The Outlook of August 15, 1914. AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 33 For some reason Servia decided not to dare Austria. Possibly she was too Christian to precipitate war throughout Christendom. Perhaps she lost her nerve. At all events, she evacuated Durazzo. The creation of Albania robbed her of the best half of her conquests, and she asked Bulgaria to compensate her with some of the territory which by the treaty was awarded to Bulgaria. Serious as these disputes were, there was hope of a peaceful solution. However, Austria and Russia had other plans. They hated each other cordially because both coveted the Balkan Peninsula and access to the Mgean Sea. But they buried their jealousies in the face of this crisis, and blithely united in the dirty work of sowing discord between the allies. A strong Balkan federation stood square in the road of their ambitions. Peace inter- fered with their "manifest destinies." No one could tell what fish might be caught in troubled waters. The details of Russia's diplomatic game are still obscure, but it seems evident that in the second Balkan War Austria expected Bulgaria to give the Serbs such a beating as would forever lay the ghost of Pan-Servia. And then, if necessary, Rumania, which was then pro-Austrian, could be unchained to humble the Bulgars. Things worked out the other way. Servia and Greece proved to be unex- pectedly strong. Turkey came to life again. And Rumania, refusing to wait for Austria's permission. Jumped the frontier. Attacked from all sides, the Bulgars were utterly crushed. The net results of the second war were that all hope of Balkan unity was over. The Bulgars will never forgive their treacherous allies and neighbors. This was what both Russia and Austria wanted. But a second result was an immense increase in the prestige of Servia. Coming out victorious from two desperate wars, the Serbs were inflamed with national pride. The ideal of Greater Servia became ten times more vivid. Less than half the Serbs live under the Servian flag; the rest are Austrian subjects. Pan-Serbism means the break-up of the dual monarchy. The result of Austrian diplomacy during the two Balkan wars was a decided setback. In only one thing do the varied people of the much-harassed Peninsula think alike — a firm conviction that every time the Great Powers have inter- fered in their affairs it has been with cynical selfishness and disastrous re- sults. - Servia and her ally Greece are certainly drawn towards the entente by Russia's interference on behalf of Servia. Russian diplomats have also suc- ceeded in seducing Rumania from her allegiance to Austria. She also dreams of a reunited race; nearly half of the Rumanians are Hungarian subjects. Bulgaria, because of her hatred for Servia and Rumania, will incline the ather way, but probably with little force, as she is utterly exhausted. Turkey will sit tight, wishing ill luck — with complete neutrality — to every- body. She has little to gain except the possibility of snatching back a few fragments from Bulgaria. But Young Turks and Old Turks alike will rejoice over every defeat of a Christian army. Their ulema will preach sermons showing how bad faith is always punished in the end. Did not all the six Great Powers solemnly swear that they would not allow the Balkan allies to disturb the status quo in Turkey ? Did not the German Kaiser promise his friendship and then incite his ally Italy to grab Tripoli? And did not per- fidious Albion solemnly promise to evacuate Egypt as soon as peace was re- stored? The Turks will be quite pleased to see their wrongs avenged by ethers. And it is more thari probable that the apostles of Pan-Islamism have already set out to tell the Mohammedans of North Africa, from the Nile to Tangier, that their infidel masters are very busy at home. 34 AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM III— The Austro-Servian Conflict* By Constantin Theodor Dumba ^ Ambassador of Austria-Hungary THE tragic events which have obtruded themselves in resounding succession upon the attention of the world since the presentation of the Austro- Hungarian ultimatum at Belgrade on July 23 are the outcome of a purely de- fensive measure imposed upon the Dual Monarchy by the imperative laws of self-preservation. The Foreign Office at Vienna sought only to maintain within the borders of the Empire the peace which was menaced, and had been con- tinuously menaced for many years, by the active Servian propaganda con- ducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other parts of the Dual Monarchy, under the full view of the Servian Government. It is useless and disingenuous to explain the latest phase of Austro-Hun- garian policy towards Servia upon the theory of an active hostility to Servian interests and a desire to suppress Servian nationality. In at least two con- spicuous instances Austria-Hungary has championed the vital interests of Servia, and with marked success, in the councils of the nations. One of these occasions was the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when Count Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian Chancellor and Plenipotentiary, employed the influence of the Dual Monarchy to obtain international recognition of Servia as an independent kingdom and to include within the boundaries of that country the cities and districts of Nish and Pirot, which had been as- signed by the San Stefano Treaty to the newly created Principality of Bul- garia. This was accomplished in the face of the indifference of the Russian statesmen at the conference. The other occasion was in 1885, when Servia, after having declared war upon Bulgaria against Austria's advice, suffered decisive reverses, and the Prince of Bulgaria, with his victorious army, was on the road to Belgrade. At Pirot Prince Alexander of Bulgaria was met by Count Khevenhueller, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, who interposed Austria- Hungary's veto to the triumphant march of the Bulgarians, and informed the Prince that if he proceeded another kilometer into Servian territory he would meet the forces of the Dual Monarchy in defense of the territorial in- tegrity of the Servian Kingdom. The invasion, made possible by the abortive attempt of Servia to prevent the consummation of the union between Bul- garia and Eastern Rumelia, was checked instantly by the word of Austria- Hungary. These two pages of Balkan history are sufficient to prove, if proof were needed, that the policy of Vienna towards the Serbs of Servia is not actuated by any fixed consideration of hostility to the Kingdom. The facts that there is a flourishing Croatian university at Agram under the patronage of the Government, that throughout the Dual Monarchy the Serbs and Croatians have their national schools, in which the language of instruction is Serb or Serbo-Croatian, that in Dalmatia the Croatian is the prevalent language of the administration and the Diet, should indicate sufiiciently whether Austria is trying to strangle Serb nationality. In spite of the equal treatment which the Serbs enjoy with the other races under the aegis of the Dual Monarchy, the Servians of the Kingdom continued their agitation in the border provinces of Austria-Hungary and in Bosnia, trying to hamper the work of civilization intrusted to the Empire by the Treaty of Berlin. This agitation and the provocative attitude of the press and people of the Servian Kingdom have been redoubled in persistence and violence since the victories which the Servians won in the two Balkan wars. •Prom The Outlook ot August 29, 1914. , AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 35 It was this agitation that created the atmosphere of bewildered discontent in Bosnia that resulted in the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand by a Serb youth whose mind had been muddled by the propaganda of the Serb nationalistic organization, the Narodna Obrana, and by the virulent newspaper campaign against Austria conducted in Belgrade. The crime of Sarajevo was the culminating event in the Servian propa- ganda of violence witKin the boundaries of the Dual Monarchy. That deplor- able incident finally opened the eyes of the Austrian authorities to the full criminal possibilities of what the Servians in' Belgrade are pleased to call the movement for the maintenance of Servian nationality. The realization came clearly to the Austro-Hungarian Government that energetic measures must be taken to put an end forthwith and forever to a murderous political campaign carried on in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Servian capital. It was this conviction, based upon the elementary instinct of self-preservation, that prompted the ultimatum which the Foreign Office of the Dual Monarchy pre- sented at the Servian capital on July 23. The reply, although apparently conciliatory, was far from satisfactory in several essential respects. The promise to suppress the agitation was made conditional upon the proof of its existence, when the affirmation of its exis- tence was the basis of the ultimatum. Then, again, the promise to restrain the license of the press in its mendacious attacks upon Austria-Hungary took the form of a vague concession of reform in the law governing the press, but did not contain any pledge to put a stop to the virulently provocative refer- ences to the Dual Monarchy. The Servian Government, on the face of its reply, also undertook the sup- pression of the Narodna Obrana, with its country-wide network of affiliated or- ganizations — only on condition, however, of conclusive proof of its subversive activities. Inasmuch as the affirmation of the existence of these subversive activities formed the sum and substance of the ultimatum, such a reply to this phase of its just demands was regarded by Austria as the flimsiest sort of evasion on the part of the Servian Government. Another point that indicated the insincerity of Servia's apparent com- pliance with the terms of Austria's ultimatum was the failure to accept the Austrian suggestion of co-operation between the Austrian and the Servian police in a joint inquiry into the origin and consummation of the crime of Sarajevo, to serve as the basis for the judicial proceedings in Servia. As to the judicial phase of the inquiry, Austria never made any suggestion of par- ticipating. The co-operation of the Austrian police was essential to a suc- cessful and final solution of the problem. The shifty attitude of the Servian police on the entire issue raised by the crime of Sarajevo can best be under- stood when it is remembered that the principal instigator of that offense against the laws of civilization could not be brought to justice because he had been warned out of Belgrade by a Servian prefect of police. The duplicity characteristic of Servian diplomacy came under my per- sonal observation when I was Minister to Servia in the last year of the reign of King Alexander and the beginning of the rule of the present Karageorgevitch dynasty At my request, after a peculiarly offensive outbreak of anti-Austnan agitation carried on in Belgrade, the Government suppressed the society re- sponsible for endangering the good relations between Austria-Hungary and Servia by a campaign of criminal mendacity. Two weeks later, however, the same organization, under another name and with a new secretary, but with the same membership and the same provocative aims, was m full operation in the same assault upon the peace and security of a neighboring friendly state Such instances of evasion are so frequent in the history of Servian oromises to Austria-Hungary that in this case the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment was determined to exact complete anfl infallible guarantees for the AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM performance of the required pledges. It was all the more necessary to act ■mth final firmness because the Servian conscience, after the butchery of King Alexander and Queen Draga, of which all the authors, well known to every man of any account in Belgrade, were promoted in army rank, was not es- pecially sensitive to the murder of royal personages. Besides, the Austrian Government had to be determined to obtain a clear and final solution of the problem, because of its knowledge that Servia's recalcitrant attitude was the result of encouragement from the great northern Power whose shadow was darkening over the Austrian frontier. Neverthe- less, with the certainty that Russia was the actual instigator of Servia's defiant policy, the Austro-Hungarian Government regarded the issue in- volved as so vital that it did not hesitate to submit it to the final test of war. IV— Germany's Struggle for Existence* By H. C. G. Von Jagemann Professor of German Philology at Harvard University POPULAR imagination demands for every great historical event a hero or a villain. So it has tried to fix the responsibility for the present cruel war upon one man; and, in view of a particular sequence of events, the German Emperor has been singled out as the scapegoat. No student of history or of politics, however, believes that any one man nowadays could cause such a clashing of forces as is going on at present in Europe, or that such a war could be due to anything but deep underlying causes, altogether beyond the control of ordinary statesmanship. The real causes of the war are three: France's desire to win back her military prestige and the provinces lost to Germany in 1870; Russia's desire to eliminate Germany as the ally of Austria, her opponent on the way to Constantinople; England's jealousy of Germany's growth as a commercial and naval power. Let us consider these three causes in the order indicated. FRANCE AND GERMANY. In 1870 France, in order to prevent the further unification and internal strengthening of Germany, used a slight pretext to declare war against the North German Federation, hoping thereby to extend her own territory by the conquest of the left bank of the Rhine. France was defeated, the new Ger- man Empire established, and Alsace and a part of Lorraine annexed. France has never forgiven Germany for this defeat. American sympathy has gen- erally been with Germany in this matter; only Germany's annexation of Alsace and Lorraine is often criticised in this country, and, in view of certain wrong impressions concerning it, requires explanation. These provinces belonged to Germany from the time of the division of Charlemagne's Empire in 843 to 1648, when Germany, exhausted by the Thirty Years' War and torn by internal dissensions, was forced to cede the greater part of them to France; Strassburg and the surrounding territory was seized by Louis XIV in time of peace in 1681. The people of Alsace are almost entirely of German stock, belonging to the Alemannian tribe, from the name of which the French name for Ger- many, AUemagne, is derived. That their native speech is German will appear even to the uninitiated from such names as Mulhausen, Breisach, Strassburg, Weissenburg, Saarburg, etc. Similarly the population of Lorraine is for the *From The Outlook of September 16, 1914. AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 37 most part closely related to that of the adjoining part of . Prussia. For a hundred years after their forcible annexation to France the population, es- pecially of Alsace, remained essentially German in character, speech, customs, and intellectual sympathies. No proof of this is needed for any one who is familiar with the story of Goethe's student time in Strassburg in 1770 to 1771, and of his love for Friederike, the parson's daughter, of Sesenheim near Strassburg, with whom he sang the old German folk-songs of the neighbor- hood. Politically the provinces then were under the rule of France; in every other respect they were a part of Germany. Political sense and national feel- ing, however, were insignificant among the population, as they then were all over Germany. Not until the French Revolution, more than a hundred years after their annexation to France, did Alsace and Lorraine become French in feeling to any considerable extent; then the great wave of national enthusiasm proceeding from Paris swept over the two provinces and separated them from Germany, where the national spirit was not aroused till much later. Germany had not forgotten her just claims to these provinces; but even after the terrible effort of shaking off the Napoleonic dominion in 1813-15 she was still too disunited and weak to win them back. So they remained with France until 1870, and during this long period their political attachment to France became very strong, while nevertheless the great mass of the popula- tion retained its old German speech. France during this period looked upon the provinces with the superiority of the conqueror; the Alsatian speaking his German patois was regarded as far interior to the genuine Frenchman. After her victory in 1870 Germany exacted the return of the lost provinces. She did this partly for military reasons, in order to erect a bulwark between herself and France, which had for centuries taken every opportunity to inter- fere in Germany's affairs and to disrupt Germany's unity; partly for the sen- timental reason that these provinces belonged originally to Germany, that their population was of German stock, and that, even though the sympathies, of the people at the time were largely with the French, it was hoped to win them back to Germany, to which they naturally belonged. In this last en- deavor, it is admitted, Germany has only partially succeeded; but, if it be remembered that it took over a hundred years and the French Revolution to Gallicize the provinces, Germany has no reason to be ashamed of what she accomplished in forty-three years. The jingo press of Paris and London in- veighs against the so-called German tyranny in Alsace-Lorraine; but what are the facts? The regrettable Zabern incident, greatly exaggerated as it was by a sensation-loving press, has been absolutely unique during an occupation of more than four decades; compared with what has occurred in Ireland in the way of murders, land riots, evictions, etc., during this period, all the clashes between the authorities and the people in Alsace-Lorraine fade into insignifi- cance. Under a really tyrannical government the people generally emigrate as fast as they can, as they did from Ireland for many years; in Alsace-Lorraine the annexation was immediately followed by an increase in emigration, but this increase ceased in a few years, when the rate of emigration fell below that of the neighboring states. It is true that a good many Alsatians might be found in Paris, but so there might be in Berlin, as everywhere in the world the population from agricultural and mountain districts has flocked to the large cities. Between 1875 and 1905 the population of the provinces increased from 1,531,000 to 1,814,000, or 18.4 per cent., while during the same period that of France increased by only 6.4 per cent.; from 1885 to 1905 the population of the industrial city of Mulhausen increased from 69,759 to 94,488 — that is, 35 per cent. The growth in material wealth has been similar; and what the German Government has done in the provinces for education may be in- ferred from the fact that after the definite annexation of the provinces almost the first thing was the re-establishment of the famous old University of Strass- 38 AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM burg, which has since taken its place among the prominent centers of learning in the world, and to which numerous American students have resorted. Fur- thermore, Germany has allowed the provinces an amount of autonomy which Ireland even now does not enjoy; for several years their affairs have been administered by a Governor-General appointed by the Emperor, and a Diet elected by universal suffrage; for years many of the civil offices, including some of the highest, have been filled by natives of the provinces, who thus showed their willingness to co-operate with the new government. A large part of the population was content to abide by the results of 1870, and the sentiment was overwhelmingly against another war over the possession of the provinces, from which these would naturally be the worst sufferers. If it had not been for the continuous agitation by the Paris jingo press we should probably have heard little about German tyranny in Alsace, for there was no substantial basis for the assertion. But Prance was not content to abide by the decision of 1870, and not only the jingo press, but the most influential public men, with few excep- tions, have more or less frankly encouraged the popular demand for another trial of strength with Germany. For this purpose the armaments were car- ried to an extent in proportion far beyond those of Germany, and in 1912 the time of active compulsory service was raised from two to three years, while at the same time the recruits of the following year were called to the colors, thus practically doubling the army at one stroke. For this same purpose the alliance with Russia was more and more firmly cemented, France lending Rus- sia billions of money to reorganize and vastly increase her army after her defeat by Japan. It was only a question of time when France and Russia would find an opportunity to strike at Germany, and it was an open secret in military and diplomatic circles that such an opportunity would occur in 1914 or 1915, when both French and Russian armaments would be complete. RUSSIA AND GERMANY. Germany has long recognized Russia as a most powerful neighbor with whom she had to be on good terms for her own sake. The two nations have not seriously clashed for a hundred and fifty years, for Prussia's participation in Napoleon's campaign of 1812 was compulsory, and the very next year Prussia and Russia fought side by side against Napoleon at Leipzig. Since then Germany has made every effort, especially in recent years, by commercial sacrifices to retain Russia's good will, and the two nations might be at peace now if it were not for Russia's hostility to Germany's friend and ally, Aus- tria. Russia's ambition for more than a century has been to extend her do- minion over the Balkans and to win Constantinople. She might probably have done so long ago had this been in accordance with the designs of England and France. In order to win Constantinople, Russia must first dominate the southern Slavic states, Servia and Bulgaria, and she has for a long time arrogated to herself the part of their patron and protector. That Russia has a prior right to this position Austria does not admit, for she too is a great Slavic power, and her commercial interests demand an open route to the sea and to the Orient as much as Russia's. Indirectly Germany's commercial in- terests are at stake, for through Austria lies Germany's land route to the Orient, and it is an imperative necessity for her to keep this route open; neither Austria nor Germany can afford to have it blocked by an unfriendly Power. This is so clear that prominent Russian writers have stated in recent years that Russia's way to Constantinople lies through Germany. As it can- not be to England's or France's interest to have Russia in possession of Con- stantinople, except under conditions to which Russia would never submit, it seems as if the present alliance between these Powers could only serve the im- mediate purpose of eliminating Germany from European affairs. AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ENGLAND AND GERMANY. Until the Franco-German War the relations between Germany and Eng- land were generally friendly. The two nations had never seriously clashed, and on the field of Waterloo the English and Prussian armies fought side by side. The English view of the German people, as it crops out in the literature before 1870, is that of a people given largely to sentiment- alism, philosophy, music, and beer-drinking; beyond that, the Germans might be useful in keeping Prance in check, which England then still regarded as her chief enemy, but otherwise they were a negligible quantity. Germany's in- feriority to England in engineering, manufacturing, and commercial enter- prise was so great that as late as 1880 water works, gas works, and street railways in many German cities were constructed and run by English engineer- ing skill and English capital, while the steamships of the two feeble German transatlantic lines were built in England and Scotland. But now a rapid change took place. In 1876 the German Commissioner to the Centennial Ex- hibition at Philadelphia reported to his Government as his verdict concerning the products of German industries there exhibited, "Cheap and inferior;" twelve years later, "Made in Germany" had become a badge of excellence for a great variety of industrial products; a few years later again, Germany built ships which for size, swiftness, and comfort surpassed those of the great Eng- lish transatlantic lines, and which carried German products to all parts of the globe. Then England suddenly recognized Germany as a dangerous competitor for the world's trade, and her feeling toward her changed from friendly con- descension to jealousy and hate. The matter was aggravated when Germany began to strengthen her navy in order to protect her coasts, trade routes and outlying possessions. Other nations likewise greatly strengthened their navies — the United States, France, Russia, Italy, Japan — but only Germany's efforts in this direction were frowned down by England, although Germany never attempted to build a flieet any- where near the size of the English fleet, while even if she had done so Eng- land's superior geographical position and her dominions and naval bases all over the globe would always have assured her an incomparable advantage over Germany. The reason for this was that England had begun to look upon Germany, of all countries, as her chief rival in trade; and her policy from the time of her own rise as a commercial and maritime power had always been to concentrate all her efforts on the elimination of her foremost commercial rival — a policy which had resulted successively in the destruction of the maritime power of Spain, Holland, and France. Germany had before her the example of these countries; she remembered the bombardment of Copenhagen, in which the British destroyed the Danish fleet; and she also remembered that when, in 1849, a single warship was built in Germany by popular subscription, Lord Palmerston, then Prime Minister of England, declared that if such a ship dared to show on the high seas the Ger- man flag he would order it to be treated as a pirate ship. Under these circum- stances modern Germany had to choose between leaving its growing maritime trade to the tender mercies of England till the latter should take an oppor- tunity to wipe it off the globe, and arming herself to protect it; and Germany chose the latter course. Since then England has taken every opportunity to thwart the efforts of Germany at legitimate growth and extension of her in- fluence, and she has done this with an air as if she were fighting for a moral principle. She herself might conquer the Transvaal and sacrifice in the 'ef- fort the lives of myriads of brave Boer farmers and of her own soldiers; she might enter into an arrangement with France according to which England re- tained Egypt and France took Morocco; she might enter into an arrangement with Russia, dividing Persia into spheres of English and Russian influence, 40 AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM to the utter disregard of the rights of Persia; Italy might grab Tripoli; Japan and Russia might quarrel about Manchuria, and settle the matter between them; all this was legitimate and in the interests of civilization. But let Ger- many say as much as that she too had commercial interests in Morocco, or that she would like to purchase a coaling station within a certain sphere where England and her allies had a dozen, then a howl went up about "intolerable German aggression" and "unwarrantable encroachment on English interests." Even such a strictly non-political commercial enterprise as the building by German capital of the Bagdad Railway was not permitted except after years of negotiations, and after English capital had been allowed to participate and the terminals arranged to suit English interests. Germany has submitted to this injustice for a number of years, but it is clear that a nation of 65,000,000 people needing employment and means of support could not forever endure such a thwarting of its legitimate aspirations. COULD THE WAK HAVE BEEN AVOIDED? So it appears that each one of these three great Powers now making war on Germany had her own reasons for vnshing to crush her; Germany, on the other hand, had no corresponding designs against them. She wanted no French territory, knowing well that it could not be Germanized for a long period, and would only weaken her. Nor was she so foolish as to think that she could wrest anything from the Russian colossus. Her geographical posi- tion, the relative weakness of her navy, and her lack of naval bases and coal- ing stations made it inconceivable that she could inflict very serious damage upon England's fleet or her world-wide dominion. Nothing is more absurd than the assertion that Germany aimed to rule Europe as France did in the time of Napoleon. The only thing Germany desired was to be treated by the other nations on an equal footing, and not to be constantly shut out by their combinations from newly arising opportunities for expansion and for the extension of her commercial influence — opportunities such as the other nations have seized in recent years time and again. This was not only her right, but a physical necessity in view of her rapidly growing population. She has sub- mitted to many a slight and has suffered one setback after another. If she has struck now, it is because she felt sure that she could not later defend her- self against the mighty combination of her opponents vsdth the slightest chance of success. When the Kaiser, in order to preserve the peace of Europe, offered to mediate between Austria and Servia, and Russia nevertheless ordered the mobilization of her giant army, the whole German people realized what was in store for them. Germany was in the position of a man who sees a deadly enemy reach for his pistol, and whose only possible salvation lies in shooting first. The war could have been avoided if France had foregone her desire for revenge and for the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine, which she did not need in view of her almost stationary population and her own wealth and that of her extensive colonies. The war could have been avoided if Russia had been con- tent with her vast and undeveloped empire, and had curbed her desire to strike down Austria as an obstacle on her route to Constantinople. The war could have been avoided if England had been more generous to Germany and had allowed her the same share as the other nations in new opportunities for colonization and for extension and protection of commerce. Finally, the war could have been avoided if Germany had been willing to sit back and let these three great Powers divide up Europe, Asia, and Africa between them, and content herself with the crumbs from their table. AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 41 V — The French Workingman and the War* By Andre Tridon NOTHING short of actual invasion of her territory by German troops could have compelled France to take an active part in the European conflict. The declaration of a state of war depends, if not theoretically at least prac- tically, upon a cool-headed and sedate group, the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. Those men, all of mature age, know that unless public indignation was first raised to white heat by actual outrages committed by the "hereditary foe," the first shot fired by French guns might have been the signal for an- other Commune, fraught with more danger than the Commune of 1870. The various radical groups of France declared themselves very recently ready to answer with mutiny a declaration of war; this for several reasons: they are opposed to war; they are opposed to a continuation of the Franco- Russian alliance; they are in favor of a rapprochement between France and Germany. Anti-militarist propaganda has been making gigantic strides all over France. It was pointed out long ago that, in a country where military service is compulsory, barracks make an ideal place for the distribution of inflam- matory literature. Hundreds of thousands of young men herded together and chafing under many restraints are in the proper mood for listening to the speeches of anti-militarist agitators. The General Confederation of Labor soon took advantage of that condition and established the Soldiers' Penny Fund. Every syndicated worker called under the flag is paid a nominal sum of a penny a day. To receive that penny he must call at the Bourse du Travail of the city where he is garrisoned. There he is invited to attend lectures, to perfect his technical education, and to read anti-militarist litera- ture. It is not only among workingmen that the wave of anti-militarism is ris- ing. The Federation of Teachers' Benevolent Associations has declared itself favorable to the principles to which the Confederation of Labor is committed, and two years ago the Teachers' Congress voted the creation in every organ- ized group of educators of a Soldiers' Penny Fund. The Confederation of Labor, with its 500,000 dues-paying members, is un- doubtedly the most powerful organization in France; but what of the propa- ganda which the 100,000 members of the Federation of Teachers' Benevolent Associations can engage in, coming in contact as they do with the entire youth > of the country ? On one memorable occasion the Confederation of Labor demonstrated what power it could wield. Two years ago, when rumors of a general Euro- pean conflagration were becoming more and more insistent, the Confederation af Labor called an extraordinary Congress which met on November 24 and 25, 1912. The delegates of nearly 1,500 labor organizations passed then and there a resolution ordering a general twenty-four-hour strike as an anti-war demonstration. The strike order sent out for December 16 was obeyed by half a million men. The Socialist groups are a much less important, though not negligible, ele- ment in the present crisis. The Socialist party, theoretically more powerful than ever, and represented in Parliament by 100 men, counts only 70,000 mem- bers in good standing. Goaded on by the members of the Confederation of Labor, who are wont to characterize them as the talkers, reserving for them- selves' the epithet of flghters, the Socialists have of late adopted a frankly anti-patriotic attitude. The Jaures motion, which was probably responsible for the leader's assassination and which was carried on July 17 by 1,690 votes •From The Outlook of August 15, 1914. 42 AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM against 1,174, pledged the Socialist party to a general preventive strike in case the country found itself on the verge of war. The French Government's efforts to repress the anti-militarist propaganda of the Confederation of Labor have served only to demonstrate its impotence to cope with such a body of men. When, four years ago, several regiments sent to repress the wine-growers' riots joined hands with the mutineers, it was found impossible to proceed against them as discipline would have demanded. In the summer of 1913 eighteen anti-militarist propagandists, members of the Confederation of Labor, were arrested; the authorities, know- ing too well what the outcome of the trial would be, kept them in jail without trial 145 days; nation-wide riots were prevented only by their acquittal last November; yet they had preached openly to the soldiers desertion in case of war. For obvious reasons all the radical groups of France are opposed to a continuation of the French-Russian relations. The alliance with Russia has cost France much money; besides, Russia demanded from her ally a year ago that she muster an army of at least seven hundred and seventy thousand men; this could not be done unless the period of compulsory military service was prolonged from two to three years; it is needless to recount the disturb- ances which an attempt to comply with that demand brought about in the Parliamentary life of France. The efforts of the Confederation of Labor and of the Socialists prevented the flotation of the necessary war loan, and a vast increase in the number of desertions made the authorities nervous as to the possible consequence of the application of the " three-year law." As Russia could not very well raise outside of France the money she needs, the radicals see in a severanc^e of the bond uniting the two nations the quickest way to starve the Imperial regime out of power. A declaration of neutrality on the part of France at this time would accomplish the same results. Even the very mild "radical groups of the southwest" assembled in Congress the first week of July expressed their hostility to the three-year military service law, and thereby their willingness to have the Franco-Russian treaties abrogated. Finally, the Confederation of Labor and the Socialist groups are anxious to prevent any clash with Germany. If the French and English workers are the most aggressive, the German workers have the strongest organization in the world. Burdened with bureaucratic methods, however, they are extremely conservative, and the syndicalist leaven has hardly touched the surface of the Gferman labor masses. They are still at that stage of revolutionary development at which war- like emotionalism could bring them again under the influence of the German militarists; the French radicals desire, above all things, to avoid that con- tingency; they feel that the French proletariat working in concert with the German proletariat, more advanced and better organized than the Russian masses, could impose its will upon the whole of Europe and preserve con- tinental peace. The French Government finds itself in a perilous position. If France is invaded, retaliation will be imperative. Will this mean that a civil war will be superadded to a foreign war ? And yet, lest we should become too despond- ent over the fate of the Republic, let us bear in mind the following incident: Soon after the anti-militarist congresses of 1912 had been held in Paris and Basel, the French Government issued an order of mobilization which reached several villages on the German border on November 26 and 27. Every Confederation of Labor member, called under the flag, responded, and the conservative papers enjoyed keenly what they described as the difference be- tween theory and practice. AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 43 VI — Poland's Position and Hopes in the Present War* By E. H. Lewinski-Corwin A LITTLE over one hundred years ago Poland figured as an item of con- siderable magnitude in the far-reaching military and political calculations of Napoleon. After his fall the representatives of the nations of Europe assembled at the Congress of Vienna could not, for reasons of balance of po-wer, agree to a complete obliteration of the once powerful nation, extending in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries "from sea to sea," from the Baltic to the Black. The shadov? of the Corsican once more appearing on the Continent of Europe hastened their final decision. Poland ceased to exist as a free nation, with the exception of the city of Cracow, which was proclaimed an independent republic. The three nations abutting on Poland, which, by their unholy alliance and a long series of shameless acts of perfidy, treachery, and bad faith, brought about her complete annihilation, agreed at the Congress (1) to retain the fundamental national institutions of the Poles and guarantee them a political representation, and (2) not to restrict by tariffs or special regulations the free commercial intercourse among the Poles of the three sections. At the end of May, 1815, the Polish eagles were substituted by a coat of arms of the Great Duchy of Posen, a collective name of all the province that fell to Prussia's share. King Friedrich Wilhelm in his manifesto to the people said: "Though incorporated into Prussia, you need not renounce your nation- ality. You shall preserve your rights under the constitution which I intend to grant to my loyal subjects, and in addition you will receive, like the other provinces of my kingdom, a separate provincial constitution." How none of the three Powers kept their agreements and what a woeful succession of events Polish political history of the last hundred years presents is, in a general way, known to all who have even a most cursory knowledge of history. All of the constitutional guarantees were disregarded, all the vestiges of the old republican' organizations were trampled under the mili- taristic foot of the plunderers, systematic and severe economic and social oppression was instituted, and the pernicious work of crushing the language and traditions of the people began. In addition, divide et impera became the internal policy of Austria and Russia. To grow the seed of hatred between the landowner and the peasant, Austria made the former responsible for the taxes and military conscription of the latter. By these indirect as well as direct means she succeeded in bringing about the outrageous slaughter of the landed gentry by the peasants in 1846. To crush the revolution of 1863 Russia, stealing the wind out of the sails of the revolutionaries, emancipated the Polish serfs, and securing thereby their sympathies, drenched in blood the almost suc- cessful attempt of the Poles to free themselves from the most barbarous Rus- sian oppression, which began towards the end of the reign of Alexander I, and which has not ceased for a moment to this day. In the year 1914 A. D. an at- tempt to teach an illiterate adult to read and write or instruct free of charge a child of poor parents who cannot afford to pay for instruction is a political crime which is punishable by imprisonment or even exile. Prussia has been following a ruthless policy of extermination of the Polish nationality, and has been, to her eternal shame, cruelly flogging small children because they prayed in Polish. She has been spending untold millions for the German colonization of provinces which have been since times immemorial the home of the Pole. By inhuman legislation prohibiting a Polish peasant from »From The Outlook of September 16, 3914. 44 AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM building a house on acquired land, she has forced him and his family to live in carts and wagons; but, despite all that, she has absolutely failed in making him sell his land, leave the country, and abandon his native tongue. The Prus- sian colonization policy proved to be an absolute fiasco. It has achieved results contrary to those expected. It has increased the solidarity of the Polish mass, made them cling more tenaciously than ever to everything Polish, to cultivate their land more scrupulously, amass wealth, develop co-operative schemes of rural credit, and to nurture a most exalted devotion to national culture, which, despite all handicaps, has blossomed and developed. There is not a field of artistic or scientific endeavor which lies fallow in Poland. Denied freedom on the political arena, all the energies of a gifted race went into activities that made for art, science, and culture. Musicians, sculptors, painters, scientists, writers, of the highest rank and magnitude, are so plentiful in Poland that they cannot find suflicient outlet in their native artificially cramped quarters, and go out in large numbers to serve in Europe's foremost temples of learning and art, and to participate in state administration wherever this is not denied them. Within the last decade or so three Poles were Finance Ministers of Austria. Austria, once one of the most reactionary powers of Europe, recognized, after her defeat by Prussia in 1866, the imperative need of political reforms, made peace with Hungary, and granted home rule to her component nationali- ties, among them to Galicia. A new era was started in the Polish provinces of Austria. The Polish national spirit and Polish culture began to flourish. All the schools from the lowest to the highest became Polish, and instruction in the Universities of Cracow and Lemberg as well as in all the high profes- sional schools is carried on exclusively in Polish. Although the economical development of Galicia is considerably thwarted by exorbitant taxation and by the policy of the Viennese Government favoring particularly the German provinces of Austria, the Poles of Galicia are pretty well satisfied and are loyal to the dynasty. They value the atmosphere of po- litical freedom much more highly than economic well-being. Moreover, the Hapsburg dynasty is the only one of the three spoils-sharers that has kept faith since 1866, and the only one that the Poles learned to trust. The present imbroglio in Europe is not a mere accident, an unforeseen and unfortunate result of the blind play of unknown forces. It is but a dramatic expression of the high tension which has existed ever since Russia entered upon her boundless and reckless imperialistic career. Then, the sudden appearance of a great consolidated German power in the center of Europe, vying with Russia in offensive militaristic despotism, defeating France, and threatening the supremacy of Great Britain, aggravated the tension which was bound to result in an armed conflict. There is no doubt that the real causes of the present war are Russia and Germany, all the others being merely drawn into it by force. Austria would not have precipitated the trouble were she not emboldened by her ally, who has all kinds of Machiavellian designs and im- perialistic interests in the Balkans and the Near East, and were she not exasperated by Russia's insolence and her feverish activities among the Slavs of the Balkans and of the Dual Monarchy. The perfidious pan-Slavic or pan- Russian propaganda with its immense bribes and an elaborate spy system, is reported to be unbearable by those who observe conditions at close range. To preserve her peaceable development and dignity Austria had to act. The Sara- jevo outrage, which revealed the complicity of the "inspired" agents of the Ser- vian Government, was but the last drop in a bitter cup. Austria's hand was. forced indirectly by Russia, which, being utterly irresponsible and having a tremendous half-starving peasantry and an immense standing army, is a con- stant danger to peace, rivaled in its f ormidableness by Germany alone. As to the Poles, they have repudiated the pan-Slav movement. They AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 45 know what it aims at, and they do not trust Russia. Long before the present war began, its possibilities .were discussed in a lively way in Polish political literature. Poland is in a most unfortunate position with reference to this war, as her territory is the natural theater of hostile activities. Before the war is over, and whatever its result, her wealth will be annihilated, her population decimated, her soil drenched in blood, and her sons incorporated in three hostile armies, killing off one another. Shall she not be compensated for this unexampled and innocent loss ? Can she rely on the. magnanimity or sense of justice of any of the Powers engaged in the war? History supplies a somber reply. She has counted vainly on justice and help and sympathy too many times to entertain any foolish hopes at present. She has to count on herself if she is to live. A people of over twenty millions, with a history ten centuries old, with a high and distinct culture, cannot afford to die simply because three militaristic and land-grabbing neighbors have so decreed. She has to meet them on their own terms, and she has been constantly asserting herself despite all oppression. Some of her political vwiters see a winning chance in a conflict like the present one. There is no doubt that the sympathies and help of the people of Poland are going to be a factor of great importance in the present struggle of supremacy between the Russian and the Germanic world. A considerable number of writers advise a decided pro-Austrian direc- tion, a complete affiliation with the Dual Monarchy and a life-and-death strug- gle against Russia. For the defeat of Russia may mean, if not an entire independence, then at least a concentration of the greater part of the Polish provinces under one sovereign power. The splitting of the nation into three parts under three different rules was the greatest calamity that could have befallen Poland. It estranged the people from one another and made concerted action almost impossible. Although a victory of the Germanic forces over Russia would be a distinct gain to Poland, yet an overwhelming Prussian victory would be unfortunate, as the bulk of Poland might fall to Prussia, which in her spirit and manner is as offensive as Russia to a people of a refined spiritual culture and of republican inheritance. Moreover, the Poles have another common bond with Austria in their religion. From the point of view of the Poles the ideal outcome of this present gigantic mix-up would be an independent Poland, which would act as a buffer between the ever-quarreling neighbors and would supply the balance-wheel in the struggle for supremacy between the Russian and Germanic world. If this be unattainable at present, the next best solution of the Polish question would be a unification of the entire Polish nation into an autonomous unit under the sovereignty of Austria-Hungary. Outside of the Pole's most vital and intense interest in his national existence, there is not anything which touches him more deeply than art and culture. He consequently would like to see the great Northern Bear defeated and pushed back to the wild forests of Russia, where he properly belongs; but it would make his heart bleed to see France or England beaten by Germany. He hopes that France will recover her lost provinces and expand her benevolent and radiating cultural influence over Europe A defeat of Prance is a defeat of civilization, and spells complete supremacy of sword and gross and brutal materialism over refinement and culture. Similarly, a victory of Germany over England is too horrid to think of It would mean a destruction of political liberty, freedom of thought, initiative, and action, and the dominance of the insolent Prussian over the world Even the. Germans themselves, outside of Prussia, dread it as the greatest calamity. It would mean, incidentally, the death-knell to Holland, Denmark, Belgium, and Switzerland, and a destruction of their beautiful civih- zations and free institutions. The present war bears within it all these possibihties. It is a bitter disap- pointment to all those who had faith in reason and culture to see the destinies 48 AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM of the world's greatest nations and their civilizations depend on the hlind forces of passion and destruction. It will be a still greater disappointment to Poland if, after the new political units emerge from the sea of dissolution and anarchy, she, having borne the brunt of a devastating three-cornered war, with all her population actively and passively engaged in it, should not gain a breath of freedom so passionately fought for during the last one hundred years. VII — The Position of the Russian Jew* An Interview With a Native of the Province of Kiev IN order to understand the attitude of the Jewish people in Russia towards the Russian Government in this European war, one must have been an eye- witness to those sufferings and tortures which the Jewish population in Russia have endured since 1881. All that has been written in the press or periodicals of any country with regard to these sufferings pales into insignificance in com- parison with the actual facts. One must visit the ghettoes of the various Russian cities in which the Jewish people live to realize what is going on there day and night. It is a matter of fact that a person of the Jewish race cannot walk the distance of a block without being assaulted or insulted by a Christian man, or without being chilled to the heart with fear by the look of some police official. This is by day. The sufferings by night are indescribable. The police raid the ghetto — that is, they surround a chosen block every night, not in order to look for criminals, but to look for Jewish people under the pretext of finding those that have no right to live in this or that city or in this or that section of the city. The result of this is that hundreds of thousands of Russian Jews have been driven out of Russia and have escaped through emigration, and yet there are five million Jews left in Russia, who, either because they have not the means of escape or because they cannot leave their families or their business, are still Russian citizens. Of this Jewish population remaining in Russia thousands are serving in the army as private soldiers. These soldiers will fight because they are compelled to by military discipline, but they will fight reluctantly. Both the Jewish soldier and the Jewish civilian will therefore secretly sympathize with the German opponents of Russia. This is not be- cause the Russian Jew loves Germany more, but because he loves Russian despotism less. For the same reason the Russian Jew in this country will hope, whether he openly says so or not, for Russia's ultimate defeat. This attitude of the Russian Jews, especially of the intelligent or educated class, is not merely prompted by a natural feeling of hatred for the sufferings which the Jewish people have endured, but because they see in the defeat of Russia's despotism the only way for a reorganization of the Russian Empire upon con- stitutional or liberal lines. The thoughtful Russian Jew does not expect that this attitude will have any definite effect upon the military operations of Russia. What I am endeav- oring to do in this brief article is to explain why the Russian Jew can have little sympathy with Russian victories in the present war. At the same time, the intelligent Russian Jew recognizes that both liberal political principles and fair treatment for the Jew are more to be expected from Prance and Great Britain than from Germany. He is therefore in this contest between two fires. He wishes to see the Russian Government defeated and the French and •From The Outlook of August 15, 1914. AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 47 British Governments successful. The orthodox Russian Jew in the city of New Tfork and indeed all over the world prays for French and British victory and foT Russian defeat. This, of course, is an extraordinary position to take. It may be even said to be illogical, but it is nevertheless the fact. It must further be remembered that the Russian Jew believes that if Russia is victorious and through her instrumentality the Slav population of the Balkan States is solidified, the Slavs of that region will act towards the Oriental Jew exactly as the Russian acts towards the Jew of the north. It must be borne in mind that there is a great difference in this respect between the Russian Jew and the German, Austrian, and Hungarian Jew. The Jews of the latter three nations are actuated much more by their national feeling than by their racial feeling. The patriotic, national feeling of the Hungarian or Austrian Jews is illustrated by the fact that no Austro-Hungarian Jew ever speaks the name of the Emperor without saying "Long live Franz Joseph!" and this loyalty to the Emperor is not merely an empty expression, but indicates genuine feeling. The Russian Jew might in public for self- preservation say "Long live the Czar!" and even pray in his synagogue pub- licly for his welfare, but never in private. If the Russian bureaucracy and Imperial Government had since 1881 treated the Russian Jew with even reasonable justice and a moderate degree of human sympathy, the five millions of Russian Jews in Russia would be more loyal to the Czar and to the nation than the peasant population of the Russian Church. For the Jew is more intelligent, and therefore more capable of national feeling, than the mujik. If in this European conflict the Czar should feel in any way the lack of support of his Jevdsh subjects, he has only himself to blame, or at least he has only to blame the despotic bureaucracy with which he is surrounded. I speak of the intelligence of the Russian Jew because my experience entitles me to do so. I was born in the Province of Kiev. When I realized that I could get no possible education in the village where I was born, I went to the city of Kiev, where I got some education by private lessons, and, in order to make a living, as soon as I acquired some education I gave private lessons in the Russian and German languages. Out of this grew a school. After I had carried on the school for six months it was closed by the Gov- ,ernment. The school was devoted solely to the teaching of the Russian, German, and Hebrew languages. When the school was opened, it was permitted by the Government. It was closed by the passage of a law or an edict forbidding the Jewish people to have schools of their own. Three months after the closing of this school, as I was also forbidden to give private lessons and as I had no other means of livelihood, I was forced to come to the United States. I have lived in the United States eleven years, and, as you see, I have learned to speak English. I have near relatives whom I have left in Russia— four brothers, two sisters, as well as many uncles and cousins. I came to this country with a passport, and therefore have nothing to fear from the Russian Government; but I have never had any desire to go back, although I have been struggling hard to make a living in this country. Like many of my compatriots, I should prefer to starve in the United States rather than to live to-day under the Russian despotism. I hope that this brief statement will give your readers at least some impression of the state of mind of the thoughtful and intelligent Russian Jew regarding the Russian Government. But bear in mind that this attitude is towards the Russian Government only, not towards the Russian people. _ If the time ever comes when liberal ideas should penetrate the Russian Empire, the Russian Jew can live with the Russian Christian in a more friendly relation than with any other nation in the world. The Russian Christian peasants are 48 THE CREATION OF BELGIUM naturally friendly and amiable. As a boy I lived with them in the village where I was born, with not only no trouble but often with real friendship. But the peasant or villager of the Russian Christian Church is easily excited into religious animosity by his priests and the officers of the Government on account of his ignorance and superstition. When this ignorance and supersti- tion are done away with, as they can only be done away with, by education, you will find that the Russian Jew is inclined to live on as friendly terms with his peasant neighbor as with his own relatives. All the articles from this point on, with the exception of the one entitled "The Unification of Germany," and the diplomatic correspondence and compilation of statistics, were written especially for this volume. — The Editor. The Creation of Belgium— A Political Bargain When the German Kaiser tore up the "scrap of paper" which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium and put his foot on Belgian soil as the threshold of France the little kingdom became once more the battlefield of Europe. For nearly a hundred years it had not served in that capacity, but from the Roman conquest to Waterloo the armies of Europe almost ceaselessly marched and countei marched over the territory that is now Belgium, and the Belgic prov- inces were the shuttlecock of the European Powers. Since Caesar conquered the ancient Celtic people called the Belgae the Belgians have occupied pretty continuously the interesting position of a rabbit which is the price of conten- tion among half a dozen savage hounds. After the Romans the Pranks, after the Franks the Lotharingians, later the Dukes of Burgundy and the Hapsburg rulers held sway over the territory that was ruled recently by Albert of Bel- gium till Kaiser Wilhelm drove Albert back into a corner of his realm. From the Hapsburg connection the country fell under the cruel domination of Spain in 1516, and then for nearly three centuries it was passed around among Spain, France and Austria, each country eating its fill from the carcass of the Belgian rabbit before passing it on or relinquishing it to the next. Up to the end of the Napoleonic wars the lower Netherlands had enjoyed only three brief periods of independence: the first, in the later Middle Ages when Flanders and Brabant successfully stood oif France ; the second, at the close of the sixteenth century when the lower Netherlands were given by Philip II of Spain as an indpendent kingdom to his son-in-law, the Archduke Albert; the third, in 1790 when after the Brabancon revolt from Austria the Belgian Republic was es- tablished, only to be speedily conquered by Austria, who soon lost the territory to France. So, when England, Russia, Austria and Prussia drove the French out of the Low Countries with the help of the natives, the Powers looked upon these countries as conquered territory. And when the Dutch, who had long been more successful than the Belgians in protecting themselves from outside ag- gression, invited the Prince of Orange to come and rule them under the title of William I, Prince of the Netherlands, the allied sovereigns not only smiled upon the construction of this kingdom but conceived the idea of adding to it the southern lowlands to create a larger Netherland State which it was hoped would be an effective barrier against French ambitions in the northwest. It was nothing new for the Belgians to play the part of human buffers be- tween the Dutch and the French. As early as the Treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, when the Belgic provinces were given to Austria by Spain, the right was re- THE CREATION OF BELGIUM 49 served to the Dutch to garrison the most important fortresses on the French frontier. Belgium had been accustomed to being a barrier too long to mind it now. Furthermore there seemed to be many advantages in the union of an agricultural and industrial State like Belgium with a commercial and maritime State such as Holland was, particularly when equal constitutional rights for the inhabitants of both countries were promised by the diplomatic agents of the Powers who were pulling the strings from London. Austria, Russia and Prussia all favored the erection of this barrier north of France, and the diplo- mats of England and Holland were exerting every effort to consummate the union when the quite considerable difficulties still remaining were overcome suddenly upon the news that Napoleon had returned from Elba. Belgians and Dutch were drawn together for mutual protection against the foreign danger and the amalgamation may be said to have taken place on March 16, 1815, when the Prince of Orange issued a proclamation assuming the title of William I, King of the Netherlands. The finishing touches in determining the exact boundaries of the new State were put on by the representatives of the allied Powers at the Congress of Vienna, two months later. They comprised what had been the old Republic of the United Provinces and the Austrian Neth- erlands with the prince-bishopric of Liege and several smaller districts. The creation of an independent Belgium was not destined to come for several years yet, but the events just narrated are important because they marked the be- ginning of that sort of joint semi-protectorate of Belgium by the European Powers which continued unbroken until General von Emmich's German horde crossed the border of the little kingdom on its march of destruction on August 4, 1914. The Belgian-Dutch union was short-lived. Differences of language and re- ligion alone were almost strong enough to doom it. The Dutch population was preponderantly Protestant, the Belgian as overwhelmingly Catholic. The language of Holland was of course Dutch, while although a version of Dutch was the natural tongue of the Flemish, who constituted about two-thirds of the Belgian population, French had been adopted in Belgium as the language of culture by the Flemings as well as by the Walloons, who came by it naturally. Then too the Belgians were irked by the imposition of Dutch garrisons on their southern frontier, part of the plan to maintain the everlasting "balance of power" in Europe. Moreover, King William, who had the Dutch viewpoint, treated Belgium like conquered territory. He abridged the freedom of the Belgian press as well as many privileges of the Belgian clergy, imposed taxes that fell mainly on the poor of Belgium, sought to make Dutch the oflftcial language, and otherwise aggrieved his southern subjects. The explosion was not long in coming. At that time Brussels contained probably more political refugees than any other city in Europe. These out- casts fanned the spirit of discontent, which was further encouraged by the suc- cess of the French revolution of 1830. On the 25th of August in that year the revolution broke out in Brussels. At first confined to the lower classes, owing to the bungling of the King the ranks of the malcontents soon included Bel- gians from all classes, and when the army under Prince Frederick, the younger son of the King, was driven from Brussels by a force of armed citizens and forced to fall back on Antwerp every town of importance in Belgium came out for independence. On October 4, 1830, a Provisional Government which had been established a few days earlier announced that the Belgian Provinces were an independent State, and called a National Congress, which met at Brussels on November 10 and adopted three principles: (1) Belgian independence; (2) hereditary monarchy with representative institutions; (3) perpetual exclusion ef the House of Orange. So far so good. Their first efforts to win independence had met with re- markable success and the Belgians went ahead with plans for their new gov- 50 THE CREATION OF BELGIUM. ernment. Unfortunately, however, they were not the sole arbiters of their own destinies. The four Great Powers that had created the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815 as a bulwark against French aggression were decidedly perturbed by the Revolution. More than any little Latin-American republic has ever been dependent for stability on the recognition and moral support of the United States the new Belgian State was dependent for its mere con- tinued existence on the permission of England, Austria, Prussia and Russia, who had taken it from the French sixteen years before and amalgamated it with Holland. King William, the cast-oflf ruler of the Belgians, realized this fact full well and lost no time in informing the four Powers of the state of affairs in the Belgic provinces and in asking them to force the provinces back into the union which even many of the Dutch now considered undesirable. Many changes had taken place in the politics of Europe since 1815, how- ever. England, influenced by a constantly growing liberal party, was more and more inclined toward amicable relations with liberal France. Louis Philippe, who was placed on the French throne by the revolution of July, 1830, which ended the rule of the house of Bourbon and carried into power the house of Orleans, was pleased by the turn of events in Belgium, which had destroyed the famous "barrier" raised by the allies against France. He wanted his lost province back, but he could not afford to fight for it, and accordingly his policy was to safeguard the interests of France as well as he could without going to war. England would have liked to have that barrier restored intact, but she feared that any move on her part to coerce Belgium back into the marriage with Holland would only force her into the arms of Prance. That would mean war, and England as well as France was tired of bloodshed. So it was natural that the two countries should come to an understanding. This they speedily did, and then jointly suggested a conference of the Five Powers — France being now included — to decide what to do with Belgium. This con- ference met in London on November .4, and at once got Holland and Belgium to agree to an armistice pending the decision of the Powers. France, it has been shown, was favorable to the Belgian cause, and Eng- land was not disposed to be unfavorable, provided Belgium was still safe- guarded against French aggression; but what of Austria, Prussia and Russia? The Austrian Government, which was devoted to absolutist principles, re- gretted the revolution in Belgium as it had regretted that in France, but there were signs that the revolution epidemic was getting a foothold among the Italian peoples governed by Austria and she dared not send any troops to Belgium. Moreover, Austria was no longer interested in acquiring territory far from her but so close to France as to be in constant danger from that country. Frederick William of Prussia was another monarch who had had enough of fighting. He was encouraged by the Russian monarch, Nicholas I, to invade Belgium and put down the revolution, but he had no heart for the conflict with France that he knew such a step would bring on. On his part, Nicholas would probably have undertaken to suppress the Belgians himself, for he had per- suaded himself that it was his duty to put down revolution wherever it suc- ceeded in unseating a divinely appointed king, but his wise adviser Nesselrode persuaded him of the folly of such a course. So at last, and very reluctantly, the Czar consented to join the Prussian and Austrian monarchs in entering the London conference. To make a long and rather tedious story short, ambassadors of the five Powers came together in London in a long drawn out series of meetings which were dominated by Talleyrand, the French Ambassador to England, and by Lord Palmerston, who succeeded Lord Aberdeen as guardian of England's in- terests at the conferences when the new Whig Ministry came into power soon after the opening of the congress. The conferences were marked by the ef- THE CREATION OF BELGIUM 51 forts of each minister to get the best possible terms for his particular govern- ment, and when, after much jockeying, an agreement on any point was reached between the agents of the Powers a further delay v/as required while the Belgian Congress deliberated upon the proposal of the five great nations. Thus, when the Powers had decided to put the Prince of Orange on the Bel- gian throne there came the vote at Brussels forever excluding the House of Orange from the government of the little nation. This nearly precipitated a war. Russia, Austria and Prussia were on the point of hammering the Belgians into submission when the outbreak of the Polish revolution gave an outlet for their bellicose feelings elsewhere. After rejecting the first proposals of the conference, which would have recognized their independence but deprived them of considerable territory which they wanted, the Belgians accepted the second proposition, known as the "Eighteen Articles." In the meantime, with the approval of the Powers, on June 4, 1831, Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg had been chosen by the Belgians to be their King. This did not please the Dutch King, who sent an army into Belgium under the Prince of Orange which swept all before it till it learned of the approach of a French army coming at the invitation of Leopold and with the sanction of the Powers. The Dutch promptly withdrew, but Belgium paid for its defeat, for in place of the Eighteen Articles the Powers substituted the "Twenty-four Ar- ticles" of separation, which were much more disadvantageous to Belgium than the others had been. Leopold's Government swallowed them with a wry grim- ace, but when the Dutch still proved obdurate an English and a French fleet blockaded the coast of Holland and a French army under Marshal Gerard drove the Dutch garrison out of Antwerp. Holland soon made peace with England and France, but continued to refuse to recognize the independence of Belgium for nearly six years, during which the Powers contented themselves with main- taining the status quo. Finally, in 1839, King William gave in and accepted the Twenty-four Articles. By a treaty signed in London, May 19, 1839, little Belgium took its place as an independent and neutral state, whose neutrality was guaranteed by England, France, Austria, Russia and Prussia. Thus by one of the most palpable cases of political bargaining among nations on record the buffer state of Europe became independent. For seventy- five years this independence was never seriously threatened, because none of the five "Godfather" nations chose to threaten it. In 1870, when hostilities began between France and Germany, Great Britain asked the two belligerent nations to declare their intentions towards Belgium's neutrality. Both replied that they would respect it, and they kept their word. A French army that fled into Belgium during the war was "interned" there till the close of the war. The events of August, 1914, however, brought home fully to all observers the weakness of Belgium's position. Never was the government of a tiny Cen- tral American republic so completely a "government by sufferance" of stronger nations as the Government of Belgium has been since 1830. What will be the upshot of this war? Will the nations that are victorious please themselves to let an independent Belgium, live, or will they divide her among themselves as the hungry sovereigns of Europe divided her so many times before 1815? The Crimean War — England and Russia The saying that history repeats itself has gained much of its weight per- haps tlirough the readiness of historians out of laziness or sheer ineptitude in diagnosing the causes behind contemporary events to assign to them causes which are known to have been back of somewhat similar occurrences in the past. It is easier to hunt up an old and well-recognized cause of disturbance in human affairs and assign it to a present upheaval than to dig for the real one. Besides, the practice of drawing analogies is so pleasant that it fre- quently becomes a habit with great as well as with little historians. Bearing all this in mind, it is inevitable that anyone familiar with the his- tory of Europe in the nineteenth century should avoid being struck with cer- tain resemblances between the great war of the middle of that century — the Crimean War — and the war now raging abroad, the greatest struggle yet of this century, if not of all time. It is pretty generally admitted that the predominant cause of the present war was the conflict of national ambitions for supremacy in the Near East and the Balkans, the threshold where the East meets the West. So it was in 1853. In 1853 Russia, attempting to carry out her designs on Constantinople, was the aggressor; this time it was Austria backed by Germany — ^both of them looking for acquisitions on the Mediterranean. In 1914 it was the unwilling- ness of the great Slav Power to see the Teuton succeed in his scheme to con- trol the Balkan gate which plunged the world in war. In 1858, on the other hand, the Balkan encroachments of the Slav were being keenly resented by the Teuton, as represented by Austria, albeit he allowed the Gaul and the Anglo-Saxon to bear the brunt of the actual resistance, having gained his own end — ^the continued integrity of the Danubian Provinces — early in tibe war by a show of force which decided Russia to veer off to the East, where aggression was easier. Then, as now, England fought not only from a perfectly natural selfish wish to preserve her position in commerce and international politics, but from strong feelings of sympathy and indignation at the unjust treatment being received by a weaker nation than herself — ^in that case Tur- key, in this case Belgium. Then, as now, France, who had had perhaps less at stake during the diplomatic struggles preceding both wars than any of the other Powers involved, was drawn into the melee by the force of her alliances and the pull of policy. The ostensible cause of each war — the conflicting claims of the French, Russians and Turks for the right to protect persons and places belonging to the Roman and the Greek Churches in Turkey in 1858, and the assassination of the Austrian Grand Duke at alleged Servian instigation in 1914 — ^was in neither case the real cause, which was both times the clashing ambitions of nationalities for political supremacy in the Balkans and the Near East. There is one more striking analogy to be noticed. The desires of the Slav for Eastern aggrandizement were exemplified to the Nth power in the most powerful member of the race, the Czar Nicholas I. To-day the German Kaiser is just as thoroughly over-Teutonic in his hopes and fears as the Czar of those days was super-Slavic. And in each case — if it is not too early to announce the verdict of public opinion on the present war — public opinion has held re- sponsible one man, the Czar yesterday, the Kaiser to-day. Speaking of the responsibility for the Crimean War, Queen Victoria said: "It is the selfishness, and ambition, and want of honesty of one man and his servants which has done it." That sounds very much like the popular verdict in America during the early months of the present war! 52 THE CRIMEAN WAR 53 As William II seems to have done, Nicholas I overestimated the com- placency of the other Powers in pushing his plans for Russian supremacy in eastern Europe. He knew Louis Napoleon, the French monarch, to be weak at home, and England, he thought, was too fond of the commercial prosperity she was en- joying to forego it to uphold her policy of an independent Turkey. He felt sure that she cared more for trade than for principle. Furthermore, he had several times discreetly hinted to her that when the Sick Man of Europe died he would gladly divide the deceased's effects with England. In fact, he had told the British Ambassador to Russia that he would not be opposed to England's taking^ Egypt and Candia when the "Very Sick Man" succumbed to the forces of disintegration. Of England's concurrence, or at least of her toleration, he was confident. As far as Austria was concerned, she was governed by a very young Em- peror, who had been aided by the Czar in suppressing the Hungarian rising and in keeping the Turks at a safe distance from her borders when they were putting down a revolt in Montenegro. As for Prussia, she was governed by the Czar's brother-in-law, whom he thought he could control. Thus Nicholas rea- soned that the time was ripe to hasten the demise of the "Very Sick Man," and accordingly he precipitated that quarrel with Turkey over the question of the protectorship of the members of the Greek Church in Turkey which set Rus- sia's programme of Eastern expansion back a full quarter of a century. For the Czar, like many men who have their way in most things, had con- fused his desires with his beliefs. He did not want the other Powers to resist him in the Balkans, hence he believed they would not. So far as England, France and Austria were concerned he was greatly mistaken, just as William the Second was mistaken in believing that England and Japan would not enter the present war. And when the Czar found that he must fight not only Turkey, but England, France and Sardinia as well, he was no more pleased than was the Kaiser when he realized what a hornet's nest he had stirred into stinging. English historians say that England drifted into the Crimean War, but it was a rapid drift. Indeed the Queen wrote to Lord Clarendon, the English Foreign Secretary: "It appears to the Queen that we have taken on ourselves, in conjunction with France, all the risks of a European war, without having bound Turkey to any conditions with respect to provoking it." Public opinion in Great Britain was rapidly aroused by the reports of Russia's aggressive and tyrannical acts toward Turkey, and when the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea was destroyed by a Russian squadron a few weeks after Turkey's declaration of war on October 4, 1853, the war party in the country and in the cabinet could not be restrained. In France, however, the wave of enthusiasm for the war soon spent itself, and France entered the war for reasons far different from those that actuated England. Louis Napoleon, realizing the weakness of his position caused by the shock that Legitimist traditions had suffered by his elevation to the throne, felt that a war was necessary to unite the hostile factions in France and strengthen his hold on the people. Furthermore, it would remove the menace of an idle army. Having decided that he would go into it it was not difficult to choose his side. Not only did his interests clash with the Czar's on the question of the Catholic Church in Turkey, but the cultivation of the entente with England was perhaps his favorite personal policy. Accordingly there were few hitches in the diplomacy between France and England up to their joint formation of an alliance with Turkey on March 12, 1854, which preceded their declaration of war on Russia by two weeks. As for Austria, a declaration of war by her was only avoided by the pre- cipitancy of the Czar in pulling his armies out of the Danubian Principalities — Kow Rumania — when he found Austrian forces mobilizing to oppose him. 54 THE CRIMEAN WAB The principal military operations of the conflict were, of course, conducted in the peninsula which gave the war its name, and where the Czar said he could count upon his allies, "General January and General February." When he died toward the end of February, 1855, the London "Punch" cynically re- marked that "General February had turned traitor." Alexander II, who succeeded Nicholas, disappointed the peace lovers of Europe by soon showing that he was under the influence of the war party in Russia. A peace conference was indeed held in Vienna in March, 1855, but Russia refused to agree to the neutralization of the Black Sea, which the allies demanded, and the war continued. In the fall of that year, however, the allies captured the south side of Sebastopol, which they had been besieging for a twelve-month and Russia seemed more willing to talk peace. The English peo- ple and their Government wanted to punish Russia further, but Austria exerted her influence for peace and representatives of Austria and of the nations at war met in Paris in February, 1856. Russia, who had been thoroughly exhausted by the war, having lost nearly half a million men, was now anxious for peace and accepted terms which in- cluded independence for the Danubian Provinces, under the suzerainty of the Porte, the freedom of the navigation of the Danube, the renunciation of Rus- sia's claim of the right to protect the Christian subjects of the Sultan, and the maintenance of the independence of the Turkish Empire. The last point in- volved the neutralization of the Black Sea, which Russia now agreed to upon being granted the right to build some small vessels to police her shores on this body of water. It is significant that but for the stubborness of England the terms of peace would have been much more favorable to Russia, and in fact the implacability with which England carried on the war once she had gotten into it is worth bearing in mind to-day, if the "history repeats" theory is worth anything. France, according to the English Prince Consort, received the news of peace "with exultation," England vidth "moderate satisfaction." England's wish to continue hostilities was due partly to the fact that the exploits of her armies had been overshadowed by the French and that she wanted to win a larger share of glory for herself, partly to her desire to so cripple the Russian Bear that he would never again leave his lair in the north. In fact, the enforced quiescence of Russia for nearly a generation after the war was its most salient benefit to the world. It was freely predicted at the time that as soon as an opportunity came Russia would repudiate the Treaty of Paris, and the chance was found when the Germans were busy with the French in 1870. Then the northern kingdom restored the naval station at Sebastopol and rebuilt her Black Sea fleet. "Thus," said Sir Edward Hamley, author of the best short history of the war in English, "thus had the great war been rounded off into an episode, having no further connection with the future." And the late Sir Spencer Walpole remarked that "the views of the defeated belligerent have come true; the aims of the victorious belligerents have been set aside." Yet, as Sir Spencer went on to point out, Russia is no nearer Constanti- nople than she was in 1856, so perhaps the allies who defeated her feel that the terrific cost of the war was worth while. And perhaps in this greater war of 1914 if the Teuton's reach towards the Mediterranean and the ^gean is blocked as the Slav's was before, the Allies of to-day will feel content. So the balance of power swings back and forth and one war seems merely to- prepare tbe situation which begets another. A New Italy — Cavour The younger generation of Americans, accustomed to thinking of Italy as one of the council of great compact European nations, whose opinion is valued and whose aid is sought by the other members of the circle, is apt to forget that there are meji and women now living in this country who can remember when there was no Italy, when the Italian Peninsula was the location of a group of small states apparently unable ever to settle their petty differ- ences and coalesce against the large Powers, who considered them their natural prey and spoil. Metternich, the Austrian Machiavelli, who was the high priest of reaction in Europe during the early and middle part of the last century, once said: "Italy is simply a geographical expression." The story of the struggle by which a geographical expression became the name of a united, liberty-loving and progressive people is unmatched for examples of martydom, patriotism and the high quality of leadership developed by anything yet on record in this century, including the emancipation of China and the establishment of inde- pendence in the Balkans. For fourteen hundred years after the fall of the Roman Empire in the Fifth Century the history of Italy is the history of countless invasions by which the soil of the fair peninsula was dented by the iron heels of Ostrogoths, Lombards, Franks, Saracens, Spaniards, Germans and Frenchmen. It is also the history of numberless conflicts between her own petty tyrants, of feuds between city republics, between classes, between politicians, between priests, and between almost all possible combinations and permutations of these. The map-revising Congress of Vienna, which met in 1815, like so many Congresses and Conferences before it, was a mere gathering of the Powers for political bargaining, a meeting to divide the booty which the allies had taken from Napoleon. However, inasmuch as about this time there began to be heard the first rumblings of the protracted storm which was eventually to sweep the peninsula clean of foreign princes and leave Italy for the Italians, it is worth while to bear in mind a bird's-eye view of the whole Italian politi- cal geography as it was left by the Congress. Austrian influence was supreme everywhere. At the northern end of the peninsula were Lombardy and Venice, restored to the Austrian Hapsburgs by the Congress of Vienna; side by side with them was the Sardinian King- dom, which had been augmented by the territory of the Genoese Republic and returned to the House of Savoy; further south was Tuscany, ruled by another branch of the Hapsburg family; adjoining Tuscany were small states such as Parma, Modena, and Lucca, most of them governed by despots who were Austrian if not by birth at least by education and viewpoint. Still further south were the Papal States, whose Government was so bad that even Met- ternich said: "The Papal Government cannot govern." Finally near the "instep of the boot" was the Kingdom of Naples, called the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies after the Vienna settlement. These dominions, comprising the old Kingdom of Naples and the island of Sicily, were under the misrule of the Bourbon dynasty whose Government Gladstone later called the "negation of Of this period of Austrian domination Andrew D. White says in his splendid essay on Cavour: "The highest conceptions then applied to Italian development were those of the Austrian Emperor Francis, typical of which was his announcement to sundry delegates of the University of Padua that he required of them not enlightened scholars but obedient subjects. Typical of his practice was his command to the jailers of Spielberg to shorten the diet 55 56 A NEW ITALY— CAVOUE of his Italian prisoners and to make them feel every day — more and more — ■ the bitter results of their patriotism." Strong as it was, the rule of Austria and the autocratic Princes, backed by the Holy Alliance — and especially by Russia — could not endure forever. The descendants of the old Romans of the Republic and Empire were bent on re- storing the unity and the grandeur that was Rome and they were sufficiently numerous to keep the foreign oppressors decidedly uneasy. Patriotic secret societies like the Carbonari kept up a ceaseless agitation for constitutional government and from 1815 on until the final achievement of independence the history of Italy is the history of a series of revolutions followed by eras of reaction in which still smoldered the sparks that were soon to provide the ignition for the next explosion. Usually what the people gained in these up- risings was soon taken from them by the guile and deception of their rulers. Most important between 1815 and 1848 were the risings in Naples in 1820 when Ferdinand I was forced to grant a constitution, which he afterwards set aside with the aid of ever-reactionary Austria; the outbreak the following year in Piedmont — the principal part of the Sardinian Kingdom — ^which led to the abdication of Victor Emmanuel I in favor of his brother Charles Felix, who was only a slight improvement; and the echoes of the French revolution of 1830 which in 1831 spread through Modena and the Papal States in the shape of revolts which led to the adoption of a constitution by several of the latter, Rome being among the reactionary exceptions. Austrian troops, however, promptly restored insulted despotism to what it considered its rights in these territories. During this period of unrest the revolutionary influences were twofold; the blatantly revolutionary doctrine of the rabid Republican Mazzini, and the doctrine of Moderate Reform. Although the Austrians and other representa- tives of the forces of repression never distinguished between these propa- gandas, treating the adherents of the two alike as agents of the Devil to be imprisoned, tortured and put to death, there was a well drawn line of demarca- tion between them and it was the principles of Moderate Reform which event- ually succeeded and made Italy one. During the years between the failure of the revolt of 1830 and the outbreak of the next attempt at independence in 1848, until the primacy of Camillo Cavour in the ranks of the forces of mod- erate reform was recognized, the leading exponents of this school of thought were two writers, Massimo d'Azeglio and Vincenzo Gioberti. The former's book, "The Latest Cases in the Romagna," which condemned the excesses of the Papal Government while at the same time advising the revolutionary con- spirators to be careful how they proceeded, and the "Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians," by Gioberti, glorifying the possibilities of a united Italy and urging a confederation of the Italian States, tremendously increased the popu- larity of the cause of reform. The next explosion came in 1848 and the man who unwittingly lit the fuse was the new liberal Pope, Pius IX, whose amnesty for all political offenders began a demand for radical legislation which swept over the whole peninsula and culminated in revolutionary outbreaks from Piedmont to Naples. Lack of cohesion among the rebel forces again doomed them to defeat and when the valiant army of the Piedmontese in the north was crushed by the Austrians at Custozza and later at Novara reaction triumphed nearly everywhere. Except in Piedmont, which remained the only refuge of liberalism, and in Rome, where a French army installed itself after ousting Mazzini and Garibaldi, who had set up a republic after driving out the Pope, the Austrians over-ran the coun- try everywhere, committing more brutalities and excesses than ever. A de- liverance was coming, for the right leader was at hand, but he had not yet been generally recognized. Camillo Cavour soon showed himself to be the man that Italy needed. In A NEW ITALY— CAVOUR 57 1852 he came to the Presidency of the Council of Piedmont — the place upon ' which he had set his heart twenty-two years before as a boy of twenty. He now had an almost free hand to work for that "free and united Italy" which he had taken for his life goal. His moderate policy, which led him to steer half way between the despotism of the Hapsburgs and the radicalism of Maz- zini with a democratic monarchy like that of England as his ideal, had at first made him unpopular with radicals and reactionaries alike, but the ability as a leader which he had showed first as a journalist, when he had led the move- ment which forced King Charles Albert to give Piedmont a constitution, and later as Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Commerce and of the Marine, and Minister of Finance, gave him now the confidence of most Liberals everywhere. Now began that series of brilliant political coups which during the nine years between Cavour's accession to the head of the ministry of the Sardinian Kingdom in 1852 and his death in 1861 constituted in the bulk so remarkable a record that Cavour is commonly considered the only disputant with Bis- marck for the honors in statesmanship during the nineteenth century. The events of 1848 had proved that Italy could not throw off Austria alone. To rid herself of this tyrant she must find a powerful ally abroad. Hence it became Cavour's foreign policy to keep the affairs of Italy constantly before the great countries of Europe, so manipulating the wires of diplomacy that in quarrels with Austria and other antagonists Italy should always seem to be right, if she were not actually so. First, however, it was necessary that Piedmont, now the recognized leader in the nationalist movement, should so conduct her own affairs that sympathetic European Powers would be convinced of her ability to govern herself. Accordingly Cavour's first achievements were the establishment of various commercial treaties, the legalization of civil marriage, the rehabilitation of the finances, the encouragement of secular edu- cation, the completion of the railway system, etc. Then having greatly added to the stability of internal affairs by the greatest administrative programme ever carried out in Italy he took the next step toward the elimination of Aus- tria in Italy by forming an alliance with England and France. To win the Kingdom of Sardinia a position in the councils of Europe he took the daring step of despatching a little army of 15,000 Piedmontese to the Crimean War. The victory of this army on the Chernaya, August 16, 1855, arciused a storm of patriotic enthusiasm throughout Italy and won the respect of the English and French for the Sardinians. The result of Cavour's foresight was apparent when at the close of the war the Powers admitted him to the Congress of Paris as the spokesman of Piedmont in spite of all opposition from Austria. Through the Congress Cavour told all Europe the story of Italy's wrongs at the hands of Austria, and soon after it closed he was able to get, with Napoleon III of France, the al- liance which he felt was indispensable to the ultimate foundation of liberty. Having secured an ally, this bold statesman proceeded to provoke Austria to declare war, thus making her appear the aggressor. The Austrians stupidly fell in with his plans and began the invasion of Piedmont April 29, 1859. With the aid of the French the battles of Magenta and Solferino were won, but just as all northern Italy was making ready to join Sardinia Napoleon made peace with Austria, without consulting his ally beforehand. So enraged and disappointed was Cavour that he went into retirement, but Italy had learned his worth and he was soon recalled. By the Treaty of Zurich Austria ceded most of Lombardy to France to be turned over by her to Sardinia. As a sop to Austria she was allowed to retain Venice and it was decided that the rulers of the duchies of Central Italy who had been forced to flee during the war might return to power. The people of these duchies, however, refused to abide by these terms and voted for the union of the duchies and the Romagna with Sardinia. 58 A- NEW ITALY— CAVOUR Austria and Naples protested but France stood by Sardinia, in return for which Cavour ceded Savoy and Nice to Napoleon III, an act that was very unpopular in Italy. At the instigation of England, whose sympathies Cavour had aroused, a plebiscite was taken by the population of Central .Italy, and the result being almost unanimous for union with Sardinia, decrees to this effect were signed by King Victor Emmanuel, who remarked that an "Italy of the Italians" had been born. Inspired by the success of the northern states, the patriot General Gari- baldi undertook to liberate the South. By a succession of brilliant victories he subdued Sicily and declared himself dictator of that island in the name of King Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia. He then returned to Italy and entered Naples. As he was preparing to enter the Papal States the Sardinian Government sent an army to his assistance. After the victory of the Sar- dinians over the army of the Pope at Castelfidardo, Garibaldi was joined by King Victor Emmanuel and a few days later the two heroes entered Naples side by side. The Sicilies, Umbria and the Marches declared by plebiscite for annexation to Sardinia and on February 26, 1861, the first Italian Parliament conferred on Victor Emmanuel the title of King of Italy. All Italy was now united with the exception of Venetia, still held by Aus- tria, and of Rome, where the Papal regime had the support of France. Cavour now bent his energies to complete the historic Italy by having Rome made the capital, but in his ceaseless efforts to free his country he had forgotten his health and after a short illness he died June 6, 1861. It is pleasant to know, however, that he realized that his work had been practically completed, for it is reported that in the last hours of his life he declared repeatedly, "Italy is made." The confidence of his dying day was not unfounded, as time has proved. His successors, with some deviations, held to the plans which he had made and continued the policy whose value he had demonstrated. In 1865 the capital was moved to Florence, a step nearer Rome. In 1866 Italy allied herself with Prussia in the latter's war on Austria, and although the Italian forces were de- feated, Italy was able to share in the Prussian triumph and was given Venetia for her reward. The exigencies of the Franco-Prussian War forced France to Avithdraw the army that had been holding Rome in the face of all the efforts of Garibaldi, and when the Roman people had declared for union with Italy by an almost unanimous vote the Eternal City was made the capital of the coun- try on July 2, 1871, and Cavour's plan for a historic Italy was realized. As so frequently happens, Cavour's greatest fame has sprung up since his death. He never sought popularity and his tenacity in pursuing a course once decided upon in the face of all opposition made him many enemies. How- ever, shortly before his death his countrymen were coming more and more to appreciate the quality of his unselfish leadership and he had the satisfaction of living to see the triumph of the principles for which he had fought. He stood in something the same relation to Mazzini and the "red" radicals that Lincoln stood to Wendell Phillips, Garrison,' and the other extreme abolition- ists, but with Lincoln he impressed even his enemies with his absolute sin- cerity. And in respect to the quality which was Cavour's greatest asset he was also like Lincoln, according to the historian W. R. Thayer, who says: "In his ability to get as many as possible, even against their will, to fight under his banner, he has had no equal save Abraham Lincoln." Perhaps it is partly due to the infiuence of Cavour, who taught Italy to consider England and France her great friends in Europe, that the peninsular kingdom in this war of 1914 has hesitated to attack them in concert with her hereditary enemy Austria. The blood-consecrated friendships of yesterday are often stronger than the paper alliances of to-day. The Unification of Germany* BY ALBERT BUSHNELL HART Professor of Government at Harvard University GERMAN Ideas of Unity. In the whole history of mankind there has never been such an example of the terrific impact of millions of human beings, united under one flag, with one purpose, in one military organization, with one controlling will power, as in the present Germany. The Empire seems a bolt of forged steel, every fiber of which is instinct with the conception that in union, and in union only, is strength and victory. Yet a hundred and fifty years ago there was nowhere in the Western world a group of people speaking the same language and having the same national origin and traditions who seemed so far from a common national life. The process by which out of Germans came Germany is one of the liveliest of historical dramas; and it es- pecially interests us because of the effect upon that process of the success of our own great federation in America. The first people who wrote about the Germans found them anything but unified. Their chief pursuits seemed to be drinking mead and fighting their neighbors; or, if there were no neighbors handy, fighting each other. The first unifying principle came from without.- When the Germans conquered Rome, Rome conquered the Germans, for the Empire hypnotized them with its magnificent and still unrivaled system of world government. The German chieftain, who perhaps got his place by annihilating his predecessor (some- thing like a modem American postmaster), was dazzled by Rome and planned to be a king who could lay down the law to his fellow-citizens. So kingdoms were built up of Lombards and Franks, till Charlemagne came along and personated the unique conception of one king for the Germans, who should at the same time be Emperor of the world. Holy Roman Empire. Thus was founded the Holy Roman Empire with one head, the "German Emperor in the Realm," who claimed, and sometimes exercised, dominion over Italy as well as Germany; who made dukes, reigning princes, and even kings; who was the splendid center of temporal power; equal in his field to the Pope in his field, the two together being "the two swords" ordained by the Saviour of men. It was not in the German blood to accept such a sovereign as actual supreme ruler over the people of their tongue. They set up counter-emperors, and then combinations of other puissant lords, who at last wove a net in which the Emperor was held fast. Seven of them took upon themselves the right to name the Emperor and to tie up the candidates with promises to waive great portions of their royal powers if elected. From 1300 to 1789 the development in Germany was that of territorial princes, large and small, among which were counted scores of free cities. After the Hapsburgs came to have the presumptive right to be elected Emperors the dignity declined. The Imperial Diet, which met at Regensburg, squabbled endlessly over unimportant questions. The Imperial courts were ignored by the princes. The Empire could not protect its own borders. The Low Countries and northern Switzerland slipped out of its grasp. It was a curious medley. Austria was the forefront of the Empire, but nearly half the Austrian dominions were not in the Empire. Little states were divided and subdivided until toward the end there was one full-grown independent country which was under legal obligation to furnish seventeen men in case the Empire went to war. The French Revolution sent to the scrap-heap this piece of obsolete machinery. The larger units "incorporated" their small neighbors, and in 1806 the Empire ceased to be. •From the Outlook of September 23, 1914. 59 60 THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY. Advance of Prussia. Though the ancient German Empire died, Germany lived as a great vital force, half smothered in its own confusion of govern- ments jealous of each other. There was one German people speaking one court and literary language; one general German literature; and yet even after the pruning of the Napoleonic period there were thirty-nine governmental units, including four independent city states — Hamburg, Lubeck, Bremen, and Frank- fort; the Kingdoms of Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover, mostly of Napoleon's creation; the Grand Duchy of Baden; and various smaller frag- ments of duchies and principalities. The two leading and rival powers in Germany were the Kingdom of Prussia and the Empire of Austria. The latter had lost the shadow title of German Emperor, but was President of the German Confederation formed in 1815, and by its military might and its control over small German states exercised its will on questions involving the German- speaking peoples. Prussia, though classed as one of the five great Powers of Europe, was terribly impoverished, weakened, and dispirited by the Napoleonic wars. The little kingdom had lost many thousands of its men. Its kings were below the average of the Hohenzollern sovereigns, and it had been deliberately weak- ened by assigning to it provinces on the left bank of the Rhine which had never been Prussian, which were permeated by French political principles, and which were cut off from the old Brandenburg provinces by the intervening Kingdom of Hanover and other unfriendly German states. Little did the crafty diplomats of the Congress of Vienna realize that they were thus com- pelling the Prussians to annex the bridge between the two ends of their dominions or to be stifled. It was fifty years before Prussia contested the primacy of Austria over the rest of Germany; though, beginning about 1830, it drew the neighboring states together in a Zollverein, a customs union, of which some vestiges still exist in the German Empire. A golden moment seemed to come in 1848, when a German National Parlia- ment was held at Frankfort with the purpose of forming a general German constitution. And almost at the same moment a Slavic congress was held in Prague, with a view to bring together the various Slav elements in the Austrian Empire in opposition to the Germans. This Frankfort Parliament split on the fundamental question whether the (Jerman Austrians were to be included. A formal offer was made to King Frederick William of Prussia that he should take the headship of the new confederation, with the title of Emperor of the Germans. Neither Austria nor the South German states were ready for such a step, and Frederick William had not the military force to compel them to come in. With shame and sorrow the Prussians let the opportunity pass. Bismarck's Preparations. The defeat of the Austrians by the French at Solferino in 1859 suggested that the Austrian military power had been over- rated; and against it the Germans unexpectedly recruited a whole grand army in the single person of Count Otto von Bismarck. One of the stumbling-blocks in the way of German progress was the expectation that the country was to be pulled out of its low estate by a Hohenzollern or by the titled aristocracy. It was therefore an unwelcome shock when the new King William in 1861 made Bismarck his adviser and support. Never was there such a crushing disproof of the theory of sovereignty by divine right. Bismarck came of an obscure family of the Junker class — that is, the country landed aristocracy. He had been Prussian observer at the Frankfort Parliament and had learned to detest the "smallstatism" of Germany. This big and boisterous man, brought up on his country estate and in the little rural University of Goet- tingen, was the one German who understood the causes of his country's weak- ness and could contrive a remedy. From this point for about thirty years he was the greatest figure in Europe. THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY 61 Bismarck's mind fathomed the inherent difficulty of the situation — namely, that Austria-Hungary, with a population of nine million Germans and twenty- six million non-Germans, was in control of the policies of thirty-five million Germans outside her boundaries. The first thing to do was to smash Austria, but that required a new military tool, which Bismarck and King William pro- ceeded to forge. This was universal military service, by which every able- bodied young German could be called to serve for a fixed period (eventually two years) in the army. The proposition raised an uproar in the Prussian Landtag, the lower house of which absolutely refused to vote the necessary taxes, whereupon his Majesty, upon Bismarck's advice, levied the tax upon the same scale as in the previous year, without any vote of the Landtag. General von Roon took in hand the troops thus'i<*lsed and made them an army. Prussia and Austria were the most powerful members of the German Confederation. The next step was to prove that Prussia was to take the lead in that combination. The occasion was found in the attempt of the people of Schleswig-Holstein to throw off Danish rule. It used to be said that Benjamin Disraeli was the one man in Europe who understood that compli- cated question. Bismarck did not attempt to understand, it; all he meant to do was to use it. Accordingly a joint army of Prussians and Austrians seized the territory in dispute and Prussia took part of the plunder. In addi- tion the Prussians got most of the military glory and proved to Germany that the new army could fight. War with Austria. The next step was to prove the same thing to the Austrians, who rather played into the hands of the Prussians by raising frivolous questions in the Diet of the Confederation. The Prussians had adopted as their service rifle a breech-loading weapon known as the needle- gun, with a range considerably beyond that of the old-fashioned smooth-bore musket. When a zealous young Austrian officer reported this fact to his superiors, the only answer was, "The serried battalions of Austria will sweep away those piff-paff soldiers like dust." In 1866 the opportunity to sweep them away came about. Prussia forced the war, and was supported on the south by Italy; and the actual hostilities lasted only about thirty days. At the battle of Koniggratz the Austrians could not get within range of those "piff-paflf soldiers," and their army was broken up. Meantime the old German Confederation had declared war on Prussia; as a result. Saxony, Hanover, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hesse put armies in the field. They were all defeated by the Prussians with their marvelous clock-work military system. General von Moltke came forward as the strategist without a peer, who laid out his campaigns in his study years in advance and saw them come out as he had designed. Here came the critical moment in the combinations of Bismarck. The military authorities were determined to take a strip of the Bohemian frontier till the mighty man broke down in a torrent of weeping. To leave such a thorn in the side of the Austrians would, he declared, wreck all his plans. He brought conviction to William, and the only penalty exacted from Austria was an absolute retirement from German affairs, leaving Prussia free to make new arrangements. North German Confederation. Inside Germany Bismarck was now free to make a new map. Hanover, Hesse, and the city of Frankfort were ex- tinguished by annexing them to Prussia, which thus at last built the bridge from east to west. All the other states of Germany except Bavaria, Wurtem- berg, and Baden were incorporated into a North German Confederation, for which an elaborate federal constitution was drawn (1867). On every page can be seen the influence of the United States, and especially of the recent success of the American federation in subduing an attempt to break up the Union. A Bundesrath was set up which has some of the features of the United States 62 THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY Senate; and a Reichstag which much resembles the House of Representatives. When the question arose of suffrage for the Reichstag, the example of the United States prevailed. All grown men throughout the Confederation were entitled to vote at their places of residence. Prussia, though it had seven- eighths of the population of the new Federation, modestly accepted the dignity of the "Presidency." The new nation began to make treaties, to send ambassa- dors, and to organize the whole Federation into one customs system on the plan of the United States. The French War. Still the work of unification was incomplete, for three independent South German states existed, subject to the influence of Austria on the east and France on the west. The Austrians took their medicine and set themselves to reorganizing their own Empire. Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, had steered a devious course. He could not fathom Bismarck's plans nor understand the adhesive spirit of the Germans, but he had a military force which might be used to prevent a conquest of South Germany by North Germany. The next step was, therefore, to put France into a con- dition where she could no longer interfere with the complete union of the Germans. Prance was, or supposedly was, the strongest military power in Europe; but Prussia had no fear of a single-handed war. Austria deeply resented the failure of the French to aid them in 1866 and stood aloof. The South German states had their eyes opened when Bismarck laid before them certain propositions made by Napoleon looking toward an expansion of France at their expense. With or without immediate cause, Prussia was ready to strike at what it believed the only obstacle to a German nation. An excuse arose in a trumpery quarrel over the supposed desire of Spain to take a king from one of the collateral branches of the HohenzoUern family. Bismarck made up his mind that the psychical moment had come, and delib- erately telegraphed a clipped and roughened account of a supposed insult to the Emperor of Germany by the French Ambassador Benedetti. War was declaied July 19, 1870, within thirteen days of the date when war again broke out between France and Germany forty-four years later. The South German states were instantly swept into the struggle. Within six weeks the French Empire fell and a Republic was proclaimed. Within eight weeks began the siege of Paris, which lasted four months longer. Then the resistance of France was absolutely crushed. Before the new Germany could be constituted it had been enlarged by the annexation of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. The German Empire. Territorially the work was done. All the German- speaking peoples of Europe, with the exception of a few in the Baltic provinces of Germany, the Austrians, and the northern Swiss, were now incorporated into one nation. It remained to give final shape to that combination. A com- munication was sent to King William of Prussia by the King of Bavaria (we now know that it was drawn up by Bismarck), asking him to become Emperor of Germany. The name corresponded with the dignity and traditions of the nation. On January 18, 1871, in the great hall of Versailles, then occupied by the German army, William formally took the Imperial crown under the title of "German Emperor." The Constitution of the North German Con- federation was changed to correspond, though to the three South German states were left their post-office, military organization in time of peace, and the barren right to exchange ministers and consuls with foreign countries. Bis- marck's work seemed done; he had accomplished the impossible. He had not "restored" the German Empire, for never in its most glorious days had the Holy Roman Empire approached the strength and power of the new German combination. What he did was to place a new Empire alongside Russia and Austria-Hungary. He had made himself undeniably the greatest German since Charlemagne. Effects of Unification. In reality, when the outside obstacles were all THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR 63 removed new difficulties sprang up within the country. First of all came the opposition of economic forces; the Junker element was strong in the Imperial Government and insisted that its agricultural products should be protected by a tariff. On the other side, new and vast manufacturing interests sprang up, and the operatives demanded cheap food. For Bismarck was created the great office of Chancellor of the Empire, the incumbent of which, under the Constitution, was "to be responsible." The Reichstag thought that meant that he was to be responsible to them and to resign if he could not accept their policy. He insisted that he was responsible to his Emperor alone. The Reichstag constantly brought forward the power of the civil government, while the Emperor and the Chancellor emphasized the military power. Throughout the Empire, especially in the industrial centers and large cities, Socialists made great headway; they elected a group of members to the Reichstag and took it upon themselves to bait the Chancellor at every oppor- tunity. As late as last year they elected a member from the district in which the Imperial residence is situated. The South German states and people felt submerged in the new Empire, for Prussia through its votes and those of the small states which it controls always has a majority in the Bundesrath, which means practically a veto on all measures; and the Emperor has in military matters another veto on all propositions to alter existing conditions. Nevertheless great steps have been taken in the actual unification of the national aspirations of the Germans. Most of them are eager for colonies. If a poll could have been taken last July it would probably have been found that most of them felt that Holland or Belgium or both were logically ex- pansions of the German seacoast. All of them (except the three million Poles in the eastern provinces) believed that they had a mission to extend the German language, culture, prestige, and authority for the good of man- kind. All of them recognized the dangerous situation of their fellow-Germans in Austria-Hungary. All of them stood ready at any time to accept the decision of their War Lord and his counselors that the country was in danger. No one can doubt that the German nation is completely unified in its determina- tion to push the present war vyith every means, usual and unusual, for the defense of Fatherland and the expansion of the German Empire. Defeat would never destroy the German Empire or shake the unification of the Ger- man people. The Franco-Prussian War — Germany and France The Franco-Prussian War was a turning-point in the history of the con- tending nations. It marked the decline of France and the advent of Germany as the supreme military Power in Europe. But, while France was shorn of her military laurels and deprived of much of her prestige among the nations of the Continent, she was more a gainer than a loser through the war, for by it she was freed from the incubus of absolutism and solidified in her nascent republicanism, which now, after several premature dilatations, settled into a consistent growth which carried the nation safely through recurrent storms of monarchism and radicalism. And from the struggle Germany also gained that unification and solidification which had been the aim of Bismarck, and which 64 THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR was consummated when Germans of the north and south shed blood together against a common enemy. It has been frequently said that Bismarck was responsible for the war, and it is true that he welcomed it, for in 1870 he saw that the possibility of French intervention was the greatest remaining obstacle between the union of the southern and northern states of Germany; but a fair study of the diplo- macy preceding the war produces the impression that Napoleon III, the French Emperor, gave the immediate impetus to the struggle. In 1870 Napoleon was in somewhat the same position which Francis Joseph of Austria occupied in July, 1914. The forces of revolution within his country were steadily gaining strength, and Napoleon believed that a success- ful war with the hereditary enemy of France was a last resort to bolster his throne and silence the disruptionists. Like the Hapsburg monarch in 1914, he preferred the possibility of defeat abroad to the surety of revolution within. During the three or four years preceding the war Napoleon's prestige both at hom'e and abroad had suffered a series of blows. Moreover, in all these setbacks. Napoleon, and indeed many of the French people, thought they saw the hand of their arch-enemy, Bismarck. The move of Garibaldi against Rome in 1867, which forced Napoleon to garrison the city on the Tiber; the banish- ment in 1868 of the Spanish Queen Isabel, who was a friend of the French; and the frustration of Napoleon's attempt to annex Belgium in 1869 were all believed to have been aided by the evil genius of the German Chancellor. And, above all, Prussia's exalted position in the ranks of nations since her defeat of the Austrians in the Seven Weeks' War seemed to constitute a con- stant menace to Prance. In preparation for the death grapple Napoleon looked about for po- tential allies, and hit upon Austria, Denmark, and Italy as the most likely ones. But, as his foreign policy had been marred by lack of consistency and even by fickleness, he found it impossible to win more than empty assurances of friendly intentions from any of these nations. Austria's army had not fully recovered from the effects of the Prussian hammering, and, besides, Austria feared that any move by her to help France would bring down upon her Rus- sia, whose good will Bismarck had won. Italy resented the maintenance of a French garrison in Rome, and as for Denmark, while she was anxious to recover Schleswig-Holstein from Germany, she was too timid to strike at this time. As for England, both Napoleon and Bismarck realized that her interest in Gladstone's schemes of domestic reform made her participation in a Con- tinental imbroglio extremely unlikely; and, as a matter of fact, shortly after the Franco-Prussian War began Bismarck deprived France of much of Eng- land's sympathy for her by publishing a proposal made by the French in 1866 to Prussia, suggesting that Prussia aid France in acquiring Belgium and in return enjoy the support of the French in certain schemes of aggrandizement in northern Germany. This disclosure thoroughly alarmed Great Britain and led her to exact from both France and Prussia pledges not to violate the neutrality of Belgium. With both Bismarck and Napoleon determined on war, it was not difficult to find a pretext. On June 25, 1870, Isabella II, the deposed Queen of Spain, formally abdicated the throne, and a few days later it was announced that Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern had consented to step into the royal shoes. France was in a furor, and determined at any cost to keep the Hohenzollern grip off Spain. The French Ambassador to Prussia was ordered to seek out King William where he was taking the waters at Ems and insist on an imme- diate abandonment of Leopold's plans. Bismarck, who considered the affair a capital "red flag for the French bull," was in despair when the Prussian monarch yielded to the French and induced Leopold's father to withdraw the Prince's candidacy. Feeling that nothing but the public humiliation of the THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR 65 Prussian monarch would regain him a share of his old popularity. Napoleon directed his Ambassador to insist that King William give his promise that never would he sanction a renewal of Leopold's candidacy for the scepter of Spain. King William flatly refused, and Bismarck's spirits rose again. The German Chancellor at once published a piece of the diplomatic correspondence so abbreviated by him that it seemed to contain insults to the sovereignty of both nations, and both the French and German people were infuriated. On July 14, 1870, Napoleon decided to fight, and, while his declaration of war did not reach Berlin till July 19, both countries began to mobilize their forces at once. The war was really won for Prussia already. Had not Napoleon been greatly deceived as to the condition of the French army by his advisers, he would never have dared risk the encounter with Prussia, despite his necessity of strengthening himself at home by some success abroad. He was assured that France could throw into the field at once an army of nearly half a million men, whereas only half that number were found ready, and there was no re- liable reserve. The French soldiers were popularly supposed to be the finest in the world, despite the fine showing of the Prussians against the Austrians. Indeed, the armies of the Second Empire had been victorious in Mexico, in the Crimea, in China, in Algeria, and in Italy, and it is not surprising that the world in general expected the French to do to the Prussians what the latter actually did to the French. The Germans, however, had good reason to be confident. With character- istic Prussian foresight, they had been preparing for this war since the con- clusion of their conflict with Austria, and they not only had their own plans carefully arranged, but they knew more about the French plans, about the strength of the French forces, the strategic value of the French railways and roads, than the French themselves. The military historian, Major F. Maurice, says that a "later and more accurate map of the country between the Rhine and Paris was issued to the German regiments than was in the hands of the French staffs." Seldom in the history of the world has a great Power been so quickly brought to its knees as was France. After a rapid succession of staggering defeats, one of the two large French armies was cooped up in the fortress of Sedan, and on September 2 surrendered, with its field commander. Marshal MacMahon, and Napoleon himself, who, after appointing the Empress Regent of France, had gone out with the armies in the hope of winning popularity as a military hero. The other army, under Marshal Bazaine, was kept shut up in Metz while the Germans slowly closed in on Paris, until, on October 27, Bazaine surrendered his force of 175,000 to Prince Frederick Charles. But in the meantime the news of the capture of the Emperor had caused ah upheaval in France and the Third Republic was proclaimed. The Corps Legislatif voted to exclude the Napoleon family from the throne for- ever and organized a Government of National Defense. For four months Paris held out, while forces raised in the provinces, particularly the army of 180,000 built up by Leon Gambetta, who escaped from Paris in a balloon, tried vainly to come to the relief of the capital. On January 28, 1871, Paris surrendered, and a few weeks later Thiers, who had been elected Chief of the Executive, ar- ranged terms of peace by which France agreed to cede Alsace, except Belfort, and the German-speaking part of Lorraine, including Metz and Thionville, and to pay an indemnity of five milliards of francs. This was to be paid in install- ments, and as it was paid the German forces were gradually to withdraw. In the meantime King William of Prussia had been proclaimed Emperor of Germany on January 18, and thus Bismarck's dream of unification was ful- filled. Having established Germany as the greatest Power in Europe, Bis- marck went ahead with her internal development, in which at first his efforts 66 THE MODERN ALLIANCES were not crowned with such success as they had met in the field of foreign politics. However, compared with the difficulties that France faced, Bis- marck's task was a sinecure. The German troops withdrew from Paris on March 3, and two weeks later the Commune was established, and from March 18 to May 27 the city was in the hands of this organized mob. Large bodies of French prisoners were released by the Germans to aid the Government in subduing this insurrection. The massacre that followed the retaking of the city put an end to the sway of the revolutionaries and Socialists. On August 31, 1871, Thiers was declared President of the French Republic, and four years later the definitive Constitution was established. Under wise leadership France gave the world a remarkable exhibition of her recuperative powers, and her people, soon regaining confidence in their strength, began to look ahead to the day for revanche, when they could challenge Germany for the prizes she had taken from them. It is evident enough to-day that the breach caused by the war of 1870 never closed. With the advent of Germany as the master of Europe other Powers felt more disposed to make alliances with France, and the roots of the alliances of 1914 began to grow during those years that followed Sedan. As one result of the war Germany had the pleasure of knowing that if she under- took to fight one Power she would have to fight two, for France would almost certainly take a hand in any war that involved Germany. France has ful- filled almost to the letter the programme laid down in 1881 by that keen po- litical prophet Vacherot, who said: "The balance of European power is the end towards which our national policy should tend, now that France is able to look beyond herself. This policy does not bring a nation glory, but it enables it to live with honor and security. That balance can only be main- tained by means of alliances. France can find opportunity to ally herself now with England, now with Russia, now with Italy, and now again with those three Powers simultaneously, if a common and compelling interest urges such a coalition in the interest of European equilibrium, threatened by the pre- dominance of Germany, strengthened by Austrian support." The Formation of the Modern Alliances But for the alliances of European diplomacy the "Great War" would hardly have been a great war at all. Probably it would have been confined to a contest between Servia and Austria-Hungary; certainly England, Japan, France, and Belgium woitld not have been dragged into it. The nations in the alliances act upon each other like a row of blocks; when one block is pushed over, all the others in line fall with it. When Russia was dragged into the war by her natural sympathy with Slavic Servia, she pulled France, Eng- land, Japan, and indirectly Belgium, with her. The blocks in the Triple Al- liance were not so well lined up as those in the Triple Entente, however, for one of them, Italy, was not dragged down with the others. The Triple Alliance, which includes Germany, Austria, and Italy, is older than the Triple Entente, which is a fairly recent extension of the Dual Al- liance between France and Russia. Inasmuch as the Dual Alliance grew up to offset the influence of the Triple Alliance, the latter may be said to have been responsible for the final grouping of the Powers in this war. The Triple THE MODERN ALLIANCES 67 Alliance was the work of Bismarck, and thus the genius of the Iron Chancellor is still potent. After the Franco-Prussian War young Germany found herself among three great Powers, with two of whom she had just been at war. An alliance with France was out of the question; an alliance against her must be had. Fortunately, at the close of the Seven Weeks' War with Austria, with his usual foresight, Bismarck had insisted upon tempering the sting of defeat, believing that he would need Austrian help against France some day. He had refused to allow the importunate Prussians to take- any Austrian territory, and they had not long to wait before the wisdom of his policy was evident, for when Germany looked around for allies after the French war it was seen that Austria, while inclined to hold back, "might be persuaded." Bismarck's pet scheme was an alliance between the three Emperors of Austria, Russia, and Germany — a Dreikaiserbund — ^for mutual protection, not only against foreign enemies, but against the internal forces of democracy as well. He succeeded in forming this group, but after three of four years it was broken up, mainly because of the wavering of Russia when Germany seemed about to begin war again on France in 1875. The conflict between Austrian and Russian interests in the East was another cause of the disrup- tion. Russia asked Germany to choose between herself and Austria, and Bismarck chose Austria. Bismarck had from the first hoped to add Italy to the Triple Alliance, and now that Russia was out of that bond, Italy seemed the most likely candi- date for the vacancy. To get Italy into an alliance with her ancient enemy, Austria, required careful manipulating, but Bismarck's cunning did not fail him. He flattered Italy with the intimation that she now was one of the Great Powers, and he played upon her jealousy of French expansion in North Africa, to drag her into the group that was opposing France. By the "terms of the Triple Alliance Germany and Austria were bound to assist each other to the utmost in the event of an attack by Russia upon either. In the case of an attack on one of the allies by another Power than Russia, the other ally was to confine herself to an attitude of friendly neutral- ity unless the Bear backed up the first aggressor. As to Italy's position in the Alliance, she has a defensive alliance with Germany against both Russia and France and a defensive alliance with Aus- tria against Russia. It is stipulated that if France and Russia combine against any member of the Triple Alliance that member is to have the combined sup- port of the other two members. The Triple Alliance was formed in 1882, and was promptly renewed when it expired in 1887, 1892, 1902, and 1912. In 1912 the renewal was for a period of twelve years, but the present war has disrupted it for good and all. The defection of Italy has made that certain. The way was paved for the Dual Alliance between Russia and Prance when the former protested against Germany's apparent intention to attack France in 1875. However, the skill of Bismarck prevented the Slav and the Gaul from coming to a firm understanding for a long time — ^in fact, at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 the Chancellor succeeded in stirring up a temporary but quite bitter enmity between the two. At last, in 1896, Russia and France definitely frustrated the attempts of scheming diplomats to keep them apart and the Dual Alliance was born. It has proved unshakable in the face of all crises. By its terms France is to have the support of Russia in a Franco-German war, providing France is not the aggressor. After France and England had joined in the Entente Cordiale in 1904, by which France agreed not to interfere with England's plans in Egypt in return for assurances of a free hand in Morocco, it was a natural step to develop a Triple Entente from the Entente Cordiale and the Dual Alliance. That this bond is nothing more than a literal entente, a "gentlemen's agreement," was 68 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE made plain by Prime Minister Asquith in a speech in the House of Commons on March 24, 1914. "If war arises between European Powers," said Mr. Asquith, "there are no unpublished agreements which will restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war." The treaty between England and Japan under which Japan entered the war is a revision and extension of the Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1905, and was signed at London July 13, 1911. It is an offensive and defensive alliance, and has the following objects: "The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of eastern Asia and India; the preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China, by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities, com- merce, and industry of all nations in China; the maintenance of the territorial rights of the high contracting parties in the regions of eastern Asia and India, and the defense of their special interests in the said region." Article II of the treaty stipulates that "if, by reason of unprovoked at- tack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either high contracting party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this agreement, the other high contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it." However, another article provides that where either England or Japan has a general arbitration agreement with another nation the treaty does not oblige either contracting party to war upon the nation with whom such arbitration agreement is in force. As the United States has treaties of general arbitration with both England and Japan, the Anglo-Jap- anese agreement is not in force against the United States. Diplomatic Correspondence Most of the following documents are from the British and German "White Papers" and the Russian "Orange Paper/' compilations of official diplomatic corre- spondence first published in full in America by the New York "Times." These bits are selected as being the most illuminating among the many letters and tele- grams that constituted the first diplomacy of the war. — The Editor. AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA— JULY 24, 1914. On the 31-st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instruc- tions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Im- perial and Royal Government: "Servia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not af- fected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers Servia undertakes to renounce from now onward the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted •with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter." The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 69 object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone 'so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders. Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declara- tion of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the monarchy and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and func- tionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propa- ganda in public instruction. In short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the monarchy and con- tempt of its institutions. This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal conse- quences to the whole world. It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetra- tors of the outrage of the 28th June that the Sarajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service. The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not per- mit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for years in face of the machi- nations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquility of the monarchy. To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government sees itself com- pelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it undertakes to sup- press by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda. In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its Official Journal of July 26 the following declaration: "The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary — i. e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings. "The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries par- ticipated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st March, 1909. "The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of in- terfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress." 70 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the royal army as an order of the day by his Majesty the King and shall be published in the Official Bulletin of the army. The Royal Servian Government further undertakes: 1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity; 2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Narodna Odbrana, to con- fiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form; 3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary ; 4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment reserves to itself the right of communicating to the Royal Govern- ment; 5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro- Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy; 6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment will take part in the investigation relating thereto; 7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employe, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo; 8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier; 9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations re- garding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally, 10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads. The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the Royal Gov- ernment at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July. SERVIA'S REPLY TO THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM JULY 25, 1914. The Royal Servian Government received the communication of the Im- perial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government of the 23d of this month, and it is persuaded that its reply will remove all misunderstanding tending to threaten or to prejudice the friendly and neighborly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia. The Royal Government is aware that the protests made both at the tribune of the National Skuptchina and in the declarations and the acts of the State DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 71 protests which were cut short by the declaration of the Servian Government made on March 18 — have not been renewed toward the great neighboring monarchy on any occasion, and that since this time, both on the part of the Royal Governments which have followed on one another, and on the part of their organs, no attempt has been made with the purpose of changing the political and judical state of things in this respect. The Imperial and Royal Government has made no representations save con- cerning a scholastic book regarding which the Imperial and Royal Government has received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has repeatedly given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crises, and it is thanks to Servia and the interest of the peace of Europe that this peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for mani- festations of a private nature, such as newspaper articles and the peaceful work of societies — manifestations which occur in almost all countries as a matter of course, and which, as a general rule, escape official control — all the less in that the Royal Government, when solving a whole series of questions which came up between Servia and Austria-Hungary, has displayed a great readiness to treat, and in this way succeeded in settling the greater number to the advantage of the two neighboring countries. It is for this reason that the Royal Government has been painfully sur- prised by the statements, according to which persons of the kingdom of Servia are said to have taken part in the preparation of the outrage committed at Sarajevo. It expected that it would be invited to collaborate in the inves- tigation of everything bearing on this crime, and it was ready to prove by its actions its entire readiness to take steps against all persons with regard to whom communications had been made to it, thus acquiescing in the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government. The Royal Government is disposed to hand over to the courts any Servian subject, without regard to his situation and rank, for whose complicity in the crime of Sarajevo it shall have been furnished with proofs, and especially it engages itself to have published on the front page of the Official Journal of July 26 the following announcement: "The Royal Servian Government condemns all propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all tendencies as a whole of which the ulti- mate object is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form a part of it, and it sincerely deplores the baneful consequences of these criminal actions. The Royal Government regrets that Servian officials should, according to the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government, have participated in the above-mentioned propaganda, thereby compromising the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government solemnly pledged itself by its declaration of the 31st March, 1909. The Government, which dis- approves and repudiates any idea or attempt to interfere in the destinies of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary whatsoever, considers it its duty to utter a formal warning to the officers, the officials, and the whole pop- ulation of that kingdom that henceforth it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who render themselves guilty of such actions, which it will use all its efforts to prevent and repress." This announcement shall be brought to the cognizance of the Royal Army by an order of the day issued in the name of his Majesty the King by H. R. H. the Crown Prince Alexander, and shall be published in the next official bulletin of the army. 1. The Royal Government engages itself, furthermore, to lay before the next regular meeting of the Skuptchina an amendment of the press law, punish- ing in the severest manner incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy, and also all publications of which the general tendency 72 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE is directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy. It undertakes at the forthcoming revision of the Constitution to introduce in Article XXII of the Constitution an amendment whereby the above publications may be confiscated, which is at present categorically forbidden by the terms of Article XXII of the Constitution. 2. The Government does not possess any proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish such, that the society Narodna Obrana and other similar societies have up to the present committed any criminal acts of this kind through the instrumentality of one of their members. Neverthe- less, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government and will dissolve the Narodna Obrana Society and any other so- ciety which shall agitate against Austria-Hungary. 3. The Royal Servian Government engages itself to eliminate without de- lay for public instruction in Servia everything which aids or might aid in fomenting the propaganda against Austria-Hungary when the Imperial and Royal Government furnishes facts and proofs of this propaganda. 4. The Royal Government also agrees to remove from the military ser- vice all persons whom the judicial inquiry proves to have been guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- archy, and it expects the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate at an ulterior date the names and the deeds of these officers and officials, for the purpose of the proceedings which will have to be taken. 5. The Royal Government must confess that it is not quite clear as to the sense and object of the demands of the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia should undertake to accept on her territory the collaboration of dele- gates of the Imperial and Royal Government, but it declares that it will admit whatever collaboration may be in accord with the principles of international law and criminal procedure, as well as vnth good neighborly relations. 6. The Royal Government, as goes vdthout saying, considers it to be its duty to open an inquiry against all those who are, or shall eventually prove to have been, involved in the plot of June 28, and who are in Servian territory. As to the participation at this investigation of agents of the Austro-Hun- garian authorities delegated for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Gov- ernment, the Royal Government cannot accept this demand, for it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure. Neverthe- less, in concrete cases it might be found possible to communicate the results of the investigation in question to the Austro-Hungarian representatives. 7. On the very evening that the. note was handed in the Royal Govern- ment arrested Major Voija Tankositch. As for Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and who, until June 15, was em- ployed as a beginner in the administration of the railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him. In view of the ultimate inquiry the Imperial and Royal Government is requested to have the goodness to communicate in the usual form as soon as possible the presumptions of guilt as well as the eventual proofs of guilt against these persons which have been collected up to the present in the investigations at Sarajevo. 8. The Servian Government will strengthen and extend the measures taken to prevent the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without sa3ang that it will immediately order an investigation, and vidll severely punish the frontier officials along the Schabatz-Losnitza line who have been lacking in their duties and who allowed the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to pass. 9. The Royal Government will willingly give explanations regarding the remarks made in interviews after the crime by its officials, both in Servia and abroad, and which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile toward the monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 73 Royal Government has forwarded it the passages in question of these re- marks and as soon as it has shown that the remarks made were in reality made by the officials regarding whom the Royal Government itself will see about collecting proofs. 10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment of the execution of the measures comprised in the preceding points, in as far as that has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and executed. In the event of the Imperial and Royal Government not being satisfied with this reply, the Royal Servian Government, considering that it is to the common interest not to precipitate the solution of this question, is ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of The Hague International Tribunal or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 31 March, 1909. NOTE COMMUNICATED BY GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO ENGLAND. London, July 24, 1914. The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realize them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubts that the center of activity of all those tendencies which are directed toward the detachment of the southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Mon- archy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army. The Imperial Government want to emphasize their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively be- tween Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavor to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localization of the conflict, because every interference of another power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences. TELEGRAM FROM THE PRINCE REGENT OF SERVIA TO THE CZAR OF RUSSIA. Belgrade, 24 July, 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Government yesterday evening handed to the Ser- vian Government a note concerning the "attentat" of Sarajevo. Conscious of its international duties, Servia from the first days of the horrible crime de- clared that she condemned it, and that she was ready to open an inquiry on her territory if the complicity of certain of her subjects were proved in the course of the investigation set afoot by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. However, the demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note are unneces- sarily humiliating for Servia and incompatible with her dignity as an in- dependent State. Thus we are called upon in peremptory tones for a declara- tion of the Government in the Official Gazette and an order from the Sovereign to the army wherein we should repress the hostile spirit against Austria by reproaching ourselves for criminal weakness in regard to our 74 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE perfidious actions. Then upon us is imposed the admission of Austro-Hiiri- garian functionaries into Servia to participate with ours in the investigation and to watch over the execution of the other conditions indicated in the note. We have received a delay of forty-eight hours to accept everything, in default of which the legation of Austria-Hungary will leave Belgrade. We are ready to accept the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are compatible with the situation of an independent State as well as those whose acceptance shall be advised us by your Majesty. All persons whose participation in the "at- tentat" shall be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain among these demands cannot be carried out without changes in our legislation, which re- quires time. We have been given too short a delay. We can be attacked after the expiration of the delay by the Austro-Hungarian Army which is concen- trating on our frontier. It is impossible for us to defend ourselves, and we supplicate your Majesty to give us your aid as soon as possible. The precious good will of your Majesty, which has so often shown itself toward us, makes us hope firmly that this time again our appeal will be heard by his generous Slav heart. In these difficult moments I interpret the sentiments of the Servian people which supplicates your Majesty to interest himself in the lot of the Kingdom of Servia. (Signed) ALEXANDER. SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE, SIR H. RUMBOLD, AND SIR R. RODD— ENGLISH DIPLOMATS IN PARIS, BERLIN, AND ROME, RESPECTIVELY. London, Foreign OflSce, July 26, 1914. Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representa- tives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg could be authorized to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of con- ference. NOTE OF FRENCH EMBASSY IN LONDON TO BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE, JULY 28, 1914. The Government of the Republic accepts Sir Edward Grey's proposal in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, with a view to avoiding active military operations on the frontiers of Austria, Rus- sia, and Servia; and they have authorized M. P. Cambon to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London. The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult first the British Ambassador in Berlin, and then to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered appropriate. M. Viviani is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade instructions in the sense suggested by the British Government. DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 75 TELEGRAM OF SIR E. GOSCHEN, BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO GERMANY, TO SIR EDWARD GREY, BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY. Berlin, July 27, 1914. Your telegram of 26th July. Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called to- gether except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not, therefore, fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situa- tion. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Peters- burg showed that there was no intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold. He thought that this method of pro- cedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments. SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR R. RODD, BRITISH AMBASSADOR AT ROME. London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. Sir: The Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London. As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungaryj and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis di San Giuliano would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German Government, and would inquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna. SIR M. DE BUNSEN, BRITISH AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA, TO SIR EDWARD GREY. Vienna, July 28, 1914. I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's suggestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The sug- gestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian con- flict should be discussed directly between the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who should be authorized accordingly. The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned. 76 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY. Berlin, July 29, 1914. I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam. He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagra- tion might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue. I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that }ie was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany. His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an under- standing with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realization of his desire. In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty. SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN. London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. Your telegram of 29th July. His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargam vnth Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligations or mterest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertam that bargam either. DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 77 Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates. You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that one way of maintaining good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso facto improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good will. And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrange- ment to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rap- prochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto. THE KAISER TO THE CZAR. July 28, 10:45 P. M. With the greatest disquietude I hear of the impression which Austria- Hungary's action against Servia is making in your empire. The unscrupulous agitation which has gone on for years in. Servia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Francis Ferdinand was the victim. The spirit which al- lowed the Servians to murder their own King and his wife still rules in that land. Undoubtedly you will agree with me that we two, you and I as well as all sovereigns, have a common interest in insisting that all those morally responsible for this terrible murder shall suffer deserved punishment. On the other hand, I by no means overlook how difficult it is for you and your Government to resist the tide of popular opinion. Remembering the heartfelt friendship which has bound us closely for a long time, I am there- fore exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria-Hungary come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia. I earnestly hope that you will help me in my efforts to set aside all obstacles that may yet arise. Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin. (Signed) WILHELM. THE CZAR TO THE KAISER. Peterhof Palace, July 29, 1 P. M. I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask you urgently to help me. A disgraceful war has been declared on a weak na- tion; the indignation at this, which I fully share, is immense in Russia. I foresee that soon I can no longer withstand the pressure that is being brought to bear upon me, and that I shall be forced to adopt measures which 78 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE will lead to war. In order to prevent such a calamity as a European war I ask you, in the name of our old friendship, to do all that is possible to you to prevent your ally from going too far. (Signed) NICHOLAS. THE KAISER TO THE CZAR. I have received your telegram and share your wish for the maintenance of peace. Nevertheless — ^as I said to you in my first telegram — I cannot con- sider Austria-Hungary's action "disgraceful war." Austria-Hungary knows by experience that Servia's promises, when they are merely on paper, are quite unreliable. According to my opinion, Austria-Hungary's action is to be looked upon as an attempt to secure full guarantees that Servia's promises shall also be turned into deeds. I am confirmed in this view by the statement of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary contemplates no acquisition of territory at the expense of Servia. I think, therefore, that it is quite pos- sible for Russia to remain in the role of a spectator toward the Austrian- Servian war, without dragging Europe into the most terrible war that it has ever seen. I think that a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna is possible and desirable, an understanding which — as I already telegraphed you — my Government is endeavoring to help with all its power. Naturally, military measures by Russia, which Austria-Hungary might take as threatening, would hasten a calamity that we both wish to avoid, and would undermine my position as mediator, which I have willingly assumed after your appeal to my friendship and help. (Signed) WILHELM. TELEGRAM OF HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE HENRY OF PRUSSIA TO H. M. THE KING OF ENGLAND OF JULY 30TH, 1914. Am here since yesterday; have informed William of what you kindly told me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday, who gratefully received your message. William, much preoccupied, is trying his utmost to fulfill Nicky's appeal to him to work for maintenance of peace and is in constant telegraphic com- munication with Nicky, who to-day confirms news that military measures have been ordered by him equal to mobilization, measures which have been taken already five days ago. We are furthermore informed that France is making military prepara- tions, whereas we have taken no measures, but may be forced to do so any moment, should our neighbors continue, which then would mean a European war. If you really and earnestly wish to prevent this terrible disaster, may I suggest you using your influence on France and also Russia to keep neutral, which seems to me would be most useful. This I consider a very good, perhaps the only chance, to maintain the peace of Europe. I may add that now more than ever Germany and England should lend each other mutual help to prevent a terrible catastrophe, which otherwise seems unavoidable. Believe me that William is most sincere in his endeavors to maintain peace, but that the military preparations of his two neighbors may at last force him to follow their example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would remain defenseless. I have informed William of my telegram to you, and hope you will re- ceive my informations in the same spirit of friendship which suggested them. (Signed) HENRY. DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 79 TELEGRAM OF H. M. THE KING OF ENGLAND TO PRINCE HENRY OF PRUSSSIA OF JULY 30TH, 1914. Thanks for your telegram. So pleased to hear of William's effort to con- cert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed, I am earnestly desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a European war should be averted. My Govern- ment is doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations if Austria will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile suspending their war preparation. Trust William will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William I am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power to pre- serve peace of Europe. (Signed) GEORGE. TELEGRAM OF HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF GERMANY TO H. M. THE KING OF ENGLAND OF JULY 31ST, 1914. Many thanks for your kind telegram. Your proposals coincide with My ideas and with the statements I got this night from Vienna, which I have had forwarded to London. I just received news from Chancellor that ofiicial no- tification has just reached him that this night Nicky has ordered the mobiliza- tion of his whole army and fleet. He has not even awaited the results of the mediation I am working at and left Me without any news. I am off for Ber- lin to take measures for insuring safety of My eastern frontiers, where strong Russian troops are already posted. (Signed) WILLY. TELEGRAM OF THE KING OF ENGLAND TO THE KAISER OF AUGUST 1ST, 1914. Many thanks for Your telegram last night. I sent an urgent telegram to Nicky expressing My readiness to do everything in My power to assist in reopening conversations between powers concerned. (Signed) GEORGIE. TELEGRAM OF THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON TO THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR OF AUGUST 1ST, 1914. Sir E. Grey just asked me by telephone whether I believed to be in a position to declare that we would not attack France in a war between Germany and Russia in case France should remain neutral. I declared I believed to be able to give such an undertaking. (Signed) HCHNOWSKY. THE KAISER'S TELEGRAM OF AUGUST 1ST, 1914, TO KING GEORGE. I just received the communication from Your Government offering French neutrality under guarantee of Great Britain. Added to this offer was the inquiry whether under these conditions Germany would refrain from attack- ing Prance. On technical grounds My mobilization, which had already been proclaimed this afternoon, must proceed against two fronts east and west as prepared; this cannot be countermanded because, I am sorry. Your tele- gram came so late. But if France offers Me neutrality which must be guar- anteed by the British fleet and army, I shall of course refrain from attacking 80 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE France and employ My troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on My frontier are in the act of being stopped by tele- graph and telephone from crossing into France. (No signature published.) TELEGRAM OF THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON OF AUGUST 1ST, 1914. Germany is ready to accept British proposal in case England guarantees with all her forces absolute neutrality of France in Russo-German conflict. German mobilization has been ordered to-day on account of Russian challenge before English proposal was known here. It is therefore now impossible to make any change in strategical distribution of troops ordered to the French frontier. But we guarantee that our troops will not cross the French frontier before 7 P. M. on Monday the 3rd inst. in case England will pledge herself meanwhile. (Signed) BETHMANN-HOLLWEG. TELEGRAM FROM THE KING OF ENGLAND TO THE KAISER, AUGUST 1ST, 1914. In answer to your telegram just received, I think there must be some mis- understanding as to a suggestion that passed in friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon when they were dis- cussing how actual fighting between German and French armies might be avoided while there is still a chance of some agreement between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will arrange to see Prince Lichnowsky early to- morrow morning to ascertain whether there is a misunderstanding on his part. (Signed) GEORGE. TELEGRAM OF AUGUST 2ND, 1914, FROM THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON TO THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR. Sir E. Grey's suggestions were prompted by a desire to make it possible for England to keep permanent neutrality, but as they were not based on a previous understanding with France and made without knowledge of our mobilization, they have been abandoned as absolutely hopeless. (Signed) LICHNOWSKY. SIR EDWARD GREY'S STATEMENT ON THE LICHNOWSKY DISPATCHES. From the Official Report of Parliamentary Debates. Sir Edward Grey, answering a question addressed to him by Sir Robert Cecil in the House of Commons, made the following statement: "It was reported to me one day that the German Ambassador had sug- gested that Germany might remain neutral in a war between Russia and Austria, and also engage not to attack France, if we would remain neutral and secure the neutrality of France. I said at once that, if the German Gov- ernment thought such an arrangement possible, I was sure we could secure it. "It appeared, however, that what the Ambassador meant was that we should secure the neutrality of France if Germany went to war with Russia. DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 81 This was quite a different proposal, and, as I supposed it in all probability to be incompatible with the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance, it was not in ray power to promise to secure it. "Subsequently, the Ambassador sent for my private secretary and told him that as soon as the misunderstanding was cleared up, he had sent a sec- ond telegram to Berlin to cancel the impression produced by the first telegram he had sent on the subject." SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE AND SIR E. GOSCHEN. London, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. I still trust situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobili- zation in Germany it becomes essential to his Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government is pre- pared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it. A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Government. It is important to have an early answer. SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY. « Berlin, July 31, 1914. Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie. I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request. It appears from what he said that German Government consider that cer- tain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consigrnment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already. I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote. In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Gov- ernment. SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR E. GOSCHEN. London, Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1914. Sir: I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this coun- try. It Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been dis- cussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it. 82 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our atti- tude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neu- trality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate condi- tions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the in- tegrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free. SIR F. BERTIE TO SIR EDWARD GREY. Paris, July 31, 1914. My immediately preceding telegram. Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister of Foreign Af- fairs to your inquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows: French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day. THE RUSSIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADORS IN GERMANY, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, FRANCE, ENGLAND, AND ITALY. St. Petersburg, 30 July, 1914. The Ambassador of Germany, who has just left me, asked me if we could not content ourselves with the promise that Austria could give — of not in- fringing the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia — and indicate on what con- dition we could still agree to suspend our armaments. I dictated to him, to be transmitted urgently to Berlin, the following declaration: "If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Servian question has assumed the character of a European question, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which are an infringement of the sovereign rights of Servia, Russia undertakes to cease her military preparations." Be so good as to telegraph urgently what will be the attitude of the Ger- man Government in presence of this new proof of our desire to do everjrthing possible for the pacific solution of the question, for we cannot admit that sim- ilar pourparlers should only serve to give time to Germany and Austria for their military preparations. (Signed) SAZONOF. THE RUSSIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADORS IN GERMANY, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, FRANCE ENGLAND, AND ITALY. St. Petersburg, 31 July, 1914. Referring to my telegram of 30 July. By order of his Government the Ambassador of England transmitted to me the desire of the Cabinet of Lon- DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 83 don to introduce certain modifications in the formula which I proposed yester- day to the Ambassador of Germany. I replied that I accepted the English pro- posal. Herewith I transmit to you the modified formula : "If Austria consents to stay the march of her armies upon Servian terri- tory and if, recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the char- acter of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers examine the reparation which Servia could accord to the Government of Austria-Hungary without injury to her rights as a sovereign state and to her independence — Russia undertakes to maintain her expectant attitude." (Signed) SAZONOF. SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. BERTIE, REGARDING ITALY'S NEUTRALITY. London, Foreign Office, Aug. 3, 1914. Sir: On the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following com- munication: "In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ulti- matums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano replied: " 'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might re- sult, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive ob- ject. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.' " In making this communication, M. Cambon was instructed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the casus foederis under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise. SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR F. VILLIERS, BRITISH MINISTER TO BELGIUM. London, Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1914. You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they vdll resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common ac- tion for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them,, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years. SIR E. GOSCHEN TO SIR EDWARD GREY. London, August 8, 1914. Sir: In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that after- noon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest 84 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this fait accompli of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impos- sible for them to draw back. During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again pro- ceeded to the Imperial Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Gov- ernment would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves. Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be re- considered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements. His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done. I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about 20 minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word — "neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded — just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that. DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 85 in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her ut- most to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future ? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason, that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the mo- ment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow workers. He would readily understand that no one re- gretted this more than I. After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the Embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P. M. It was accepted by that ofiice, but apparently never despatched. (This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.) At about 9:30 P. M. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I have given Herr von Jagow a vrritten summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night, and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night. ULTIMATUM OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO GERMANY, AUGUST 16, 1914. "We consider it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbances of the peace in the Far East, and to safeguard the general interests as contemplated by the agree- ment of alliance between Japan and Great Britain. "In order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the es- tablishment of which is the aim of said agreement, the Imperial Japanese Gov- 86 MEN OP THE HOUR ernment sincerely believes it to be its duty to give the advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two provisions: "First — To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters Ger- man men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn. "Second — To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased ter- ritory of Kiauchau, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China. "The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that in the event of it not receiving by noon on August 23, 1914, an answer from the Imperial German Government, signifying its unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, Japan will be com- pelled to take such action as she may deem necessary to meet the situation." Some of the Men of the Hour SIR EDWARD GREY. To predict the verdict of posterity on contemporaneous events is almost as rash as to choose a profession for an unborn child, though scarcely so dan- gerous, for few men live long enough to see such predictions of theirs either fairly confirmed or refuted, whereas many survive to become disappointed par- ents and see the child that they had destined to become a minister or a states- man contentedly eking out an existence in a much humbler sphere. But some- times a prediction seems so sure of fulfillment that the temptation to utter it is irresistible. Such a prediction is the one that whoever earns the laurels for military distinction in the "Great War" the palm for far-seeing, broad-gauge statesmanship will be awarded to Sir Edward Grey. The finesse and firmness with which the British Foreign Secretary maneuvered, almost successfully, to prevent the war before it had begun was only matched by ^ie courage and honesty with which he led the English nation on the course of honorable ful- fillment of national pledges when Germany had forced her to tell the world whether or not such pledges were to her mere "scraps of paper." There are not a few observers of European politics who believe that it is largely due to this Englishman, who learned his first lessons in statesmanship from Mr. Gladstone and Lord Rosebery, that the inevitable conflict between Slav and Teuton did not break out years ago. They point out that at dif- ferent times the Servian question, the Albanian problem, the Rumanian puz- zle and the Montenegrin question have threatened to convulse Europe in a struggle like that which is now raging, and on each occasion the English- man with the grave eyes and mobile mouth that betray the cardinal traits in his character was largely concerned in extinguishing the sparks. Through the recent Balkan upheaval this Englishman who has been in public life thirty of his fifty-two years and at the head of the British Foreign Office for nine years held the European Powers together. His acceptable pro- posal at that time of ambassadorial conferences to keep the Powers in touch with each other and the masterful way he presided at these conferences was perhaps his greatest triumph up to that time and increased the confidence in which he was already held by Continental diplomats. Other Grey triumphs were scored in the handling of the Agadir incident, when he upheld France against Germany in Morocco and forced the Kaiser to "back water," in the MEN OF THE HOUR 87 development of the Triple Entente, and in the destruction of the English antag- onism for Kussia. "The difficulty in diplomacy is not to tell the truth but to get the truth believed when you have told it," Sir Edward once said in a speech, and thereby pointed out the respect in which he has perhaps been more successful than any diplomat now in the public eye. Both at home and abroad the British Foreign Secretary enjoys to an astonishing extent the public confidence. While his policy is one of silence he manages on the few occasions when he does speak to tell the public surprisingly much without surpassing the bounds of prudence. His power with the English people is based on his reputation for straightforwardness and absolute personal integrity combined with good judg- ment in public affairs. Sir Edward comes of an old aristocratic family, the baronetcy which he holds having been created just a century ago. He is a graduate of Oxford University. All his life he has been devoted to out-of-door sports, particularly fly-fishing. When Grey was a young man Gladstone said of him that he could have anything that he chose but that he chose to go fishing. Apparently he has chosen to do a good deal more than that, though he still prefers the woods and streams of his northern estates to Downing street and Buckingham Palace. THE RIGHT HONORABLE HERBERT HENRY ASQUITH. The Right Honorable Herbert Henry Asquith, Prime Minister of England and First Lord of the Treasury, shares with his Foreign Minister credit for the recent high quality of English diplomacy. Like Sir Edward Grey, the Premier belongs to the straightforward, common-sense school of statesmanship which avoids wiles and subterfuges and plays with cards on the table. Asquith is pre-eminently a self-made man. Born at Morley, Yorkshire, sixty-two years ago of non-conformist parents whose influence to further their son's political ambitions was practically nil, he fought his way up through the House of Commons, to the positions of Home Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer, till finally, in 1908, he stepped into the place once held by Glad- stone, who was a friend of his early days. The present Premier first attracted attention during the famous Parnell trial, when he was a struggling barrister. He was elected to Parliament in 1886 and in 1892 became Home Secretary in the Gladstone-Rosebery cabinet after moving the vote of want of confidence which led to the dissolution of Lord Salisbury's Government. During the Boer War he was one of the* small group of Liberals who supported the Government's war policy. He was ap- pointed Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1905 and Prime Minister m 1908. He has always taken a sympathetic view of the workingman's side of labor disputes and has advocated a number of measures of social reform, such as old-age pensions and workmen's compensation. As a debater Asquith is convincing but not spectacular; in this field as in others where he has suc- ceeded his success has been due to sheer force of intellect. EARL KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM. Of the leaders who are taking a hand in stirring the European Melting Pot none perhaps is likely to contribute more to the ultimate transmutation than Field Marshal Earl Kitchener, who was called to direct the movements of the land forces of England in her hour of need, succeeding as Secretary of State for War Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, who held both offices. As an organizer and executive Kitchener is at the height of his powers, despite his sixty-five years, and if it were necessary he could take his place in the field at the head of England's soldiers as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, for this tall, aggressive-looking man, with tanned face and gray hair is as active as some men a score of years his junior. 88 MEN OF THE HOUR Kitchener of Khartoum, as he is known to the British public, saw service with the expedition of the Nile, after which he was made Governor of Suakim. He won his popular nickname and a large share of his fame as commander of the Dongola Expeditionary Force in 1896 and of the famous Khartoum expedi- tion of 1898. Here he showed that he could organize and rebuild as well as fight and for his distinguished services he was raised to the peerage and given a grant of $150,000. During the Boer War Kitchener was first Chief of Staff with Lord Roberts and later succeeded "Bobs" as commander-in-chief. As a reward for finishing the war he was made a full general and raised to a viscountcy. Kitchener was commander-in-chief of the Indian forces from 1902 to 1909, and was then sent to Egypt as his Majesty's agent and Consul-General. Kitchener of Khartoum is a born ruler of the type of which England since the days of her first colonial expansion has produced so many. As a popular military idol in England he vies with Lord Roberts, and many military critics consider him the ablest soldier in Europe. COUNT BERCHTOLD. Count Leopold Berchtold, who directs Austria's foreign affairs, has the dis- tinction — enviable or not as it may be considered — of having started the fire which is liquefying all Europe. However true it may be that the arrogance of the Grerman or the Russian monarch or of both was responsible for the outgrowth of a world-war from the local Austro-Servian conflict, it is certain that Count Berchtold's fiery policy toward Servia contributed the first sparks of the conflagration. In assuming the aggressive toward Servia he knew that he was running the same risk that Count d'Aehrenthal took in 1908 when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Count Berchtold, who is a tall, handsome and aristocratic-looking man in the prime of life, got his start in diplomacy mainly from d'Aehrenthal, the man whose daring and roughshod methods he has emulated so disastrously. He succeeded d'Aehrenthal first as Ambassador to Russia and later in the Vienna Foreign Office, and he continues the former's efforts to sustain the Hapsburg aristocracy at all costs. DR. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG. Grave, imposing and almost aristocratic in appearance is Dr. von Beth- mann-Hollweg, the fourth Imperial Chancellor of Germany, who comes from an old and noble Prussian family and inherits the old Prussian view of the divinity and omnipotence of his Kaiser, in spite of the fact that he has had ample opportunity to see the human side of the War Lord whom he has known since student days. The Chancellor, who has held his present office since 1909, is fifty-seven years old and began his career as a lawyer. He is a plodder, steady and patient rather than brilliant and magnetic, but he has made a good record in his high office and has justified the Kaiser's supposed rashness in putting a comparatively unknown man into this important position at a time when the sailing was not all smooth for Germany. GENERAL JOFFRE. General Joffre, Chief of the French General staff, like so many of the men at the head of the French and German land forces, saw service when France fell before Prussia in 1871. If his looks do not belie him he is a picked man of execution, a doer first but a thinker as well, a man of the type of Kitchener of England and of General Wood of the United States army. General Joffre, who was born in 1852, was present at the siege of Paris and after the war was made lieutenant of the Second Engineer Regiment. He was in the Formosa and Tonkin campaigns as a captain and earned the decoration MEN OP THE HOUR 89 of the Legion of Honor. He led the engineering section at Hanoi, then in 1892 managed the work of the Senegal and Niger Railway, and was at the head of the relief force sent to aid the Bonnier expedition which was mas- sacred by the Tauregs. He further distinguished himself in Timbuctoo and at Diego Suarez in the Madagascar campaign, and in 1905 was made a Brigadier-General. Later he was Military Governor of Lille and Commander of the Second Army Corps at Amiens. He was made Chief of Staff three years ago. Joffre is exceedingly active and is an excellent horseman, traits that endear hiiti to his soldiers, while his aggressiveness and solid qualities have made him popular with the people of Prance. COUNT OKUMA. The entrance of Japan as an active factor in the great war is not out of keeping with the strong foreign policy which has been built up by the party led by the "Grand Old Man" of Japan, Count Okuma, her Prime Minister. He is a figure particularly interesting to Anglo-Saxons, for he was taught by the great American missionary Guido Verbeck and he has perhaps more sympathy for the Anglo-Saxon method in politics and empire than any other Japanese statesman of his generation. He has never been abroad, biit he has assiduously studied the example of Englishmen in politics, particularly in colonial affairs. Okuma, who was born of a poor Samurai family, has seen Japan rise from a barbarous nation to a great world power. Although he is nearly eighty, his years sit lightly upon him and he confidently predicts for himself a score more years of activity. If he gets them or some of them, he will doubtless de- vote them, as he has devoted most of his life, to serving his Government in finance, foreign affairs or whatever field she has called him to. PRIME MINISTER IVAN GOREMYKIN. Observers of the trend of politics in Russia seem unable to agree about the country's Prime Minister, Ivan Goremykin. He is catalogued all the way from "a masterful, far-seeing statesman" to a "musty-minded, old-fashioned slow-poke." Perhaps the trouble is that Goremykin has so many aspects that it is hard to catalogue him at all. Por besides being a statesman — or politician, if you prefer — ^he is an economist, sociologist and philosopher. Throughout the sixty-six years of his life Goremykin has been inter- ested in the people of his country and their manner of living, and it was due to the attention drawn to him by the publication of two of his books dealing with the peasantry of Russia and Poland that he got his first important pub- lic position as Chief of the Emigration Department into Siberia. Later M. Goremykin became Minister of the Interior and in 1906 he was made Prime Minister, a position from which he was soon removed, only to be later reinstated. In these two capacities he was close to the centers whence emanated revolutionary sentiments and rumors, but it is significant that he has never been mentioned as a probable victim of the Terrorists, who mur- dered two of the men who held the office of Minister of the Interior before him. The Czar seems to think much of M. Goremykin's advice on economic and so- cial questions but it remains to be seen whether M. Goremykin is as clever a diplomat as he is learned as a sociologist. PREMIER VIVIANI. Premier Rene Viviani, the "on-again-off-again-on-again" Premier of Prance, has been appearing and disappearing in Prench politics during nearly half of his fifty-one years of life. Born in Algiers, he went to Pans as soon as he was old enough to study law, was chosen Secretary of the Pans Bar in 1S89 and was elected to Parliament from Paris in 1893. In 1906 he was made 90 COMPARATIVE STATISTICS Minister of Labor in the Clemenceau cabinet and continued to serve in this capacity under the Briand Government until 1910. When the Radicals came into power again a year ago he became Minister of Public Instruction and in June, 1914, he accepted the Premiership. His cabinet resigned late in August with the Germans near the walls of Paris, but in the new cabinet that was chosen M. Viviani was included again as Prime Minister without a portfolio. In this rather anomalous position, he exercises somewhat the same function as President Wilson does at meetings of his cabinet. M. Viviani has been a consistent labor sympathizer, and as such voted against the measure for three years of compulsory military service. War and diplomacy have never been considered his strong points, but perhaps merely because his interest has lain more in other directions. Certainly he is able, original and extremely diligent. ' Comparative Statistics NATIONAL WEALTH 1913, Estimated Germany ?60,500,000,000 Great Britain 80,000,000,000 France 65,000,000,000 Russia (in Europe) 40,000,000,000 Austria-Hungary 25,000,000,000 Italy 20,000,000,000 Belgium 9,000,000,000 POPULATION. Great Britain 45,370,530 Germany 64,925,993 France 39,601,509 Russia (European) 122,550,700 Russian Empire (grand total) 171,059,900 Austria-Hungary 49,457,421 Italy 35,238,997 Servia 2,911,701 Montenegro 516,000 Portugal, including Azores and Madeira 5,957,985 Belgium 7,571,387 Japan (with Formosa) 53,875,390 AREAS. Eng. SQ. miles. Great Britain 121,633 Germany 208[780 France 207,054 Russia (European) 1,862,524 Russia (whole Empire) 8,764,586 Austria-Hungary 241 491 Italy llo!659 Servia 18,650 Montenegro 5^503 Portugal (including Azores and Madeira) 35 49Q Belgium ' ll,'373 Japan 147,645 - COMPARATIVE STATISTICS 91 ARMIES. Standing First Army Reserve Great Britain 125,000 206.000 France 750,000 700,000 Russia (Europe) 949,000 1,838,500 Russia (Asia) 124,000 Germany 790,000 450,000 Austria-Hungary 424,000 396,000 Italy 250,000 450,000 Belgium 58,000 112,000 Portugal 30,000 90,000 Servia 24,000 246,000 Montenegro 4,000 36,000 Japan 250,000 250,000 Second Reserve 463,000 700,000 2,488,50.0 2,600,000 1,400,000 320,000 170,000 140,000 80,000 1,000,000 Total Trained Men 798,000 2,150,000 5,400,000 3,850,000 2,220,000 1,020,000 340,000 260,000 350,000 40,000 1,500,000 NAVAL STRENGTH OF THE ALLIED OPPONENTS. ONLY SHIPS BUILT SINCE 1894 Class. Q M p 3 Dreadnoughts and First Class Battle-ships 72 Battle Cruisers 10 Cruisers 47 Light Cruisers 85 Torpedo Vessels and Depot Ships 26 Torpedo Boat Destroyers 237 Torpedo Boats 106 Submarines 98 1^ > H o r*- CI 1 d m 00 ■0 1 P 3 1 s. > a P r- V! "< .— 31 15 118 41 16 57 — 4 14 7 — 7 24 12 83 9 2 11 8 10 lOS' 49 12 61 3 29 — 11 11 87 140 364 144 18 162 153 25 284 80 85 165 76 43 217 24 11 35 AERIAL STRENGTH OF THE ALLIED OPPONENTS. Aero and Dirigibles & Air Ships. Seaplanes First Class Second Class All Classes Russia 3 5 380 France 1 " ™ England 3 2 Belgium ^ *" Servia Montenegro • Total 13 22 1,490 „ 20 16 350 Ge™^"y 3 3 150 Austria-Hungary ^ _ Total 23 19 500 92 COMPARATIVE STATISTICS THE COLONIAL POSSESSIONS OF THE WARRING GROUPS. TRIPLE ENTENTE AND ALLIES. Country Area— Sq. Miles. Population. ENGLAND. In Europe 120 235,063 In India 1,802,667 315,156,396 In Asia (except India) 166,834 8,709,533 In Africa 2,135,147 37,990,222 In Australia and Pacific 3,191,773 6,551,513 In America and West Indies 4,010,914 10,096,863 Total 11,307,405 368,739,590 PRANCE. In Asia 310,176 14,773,000 In Africa 4,184,401 25,681,242 In America 35,222 450,900 In Oceania 8,744 81,100 Total 4,538,543 40,986,243 RUSSIA. In Europe (Finland) 25,689 3,140,100 In Asia 107,000 1,896,000 Total 232,689 5,036,100 BELGIUM. In Africa 909,654 15,000,000 Grand Total 16,988,291 429,761,933 GERMANY.* In Africa 931,460 11,428,429 In Asia 200 168,900 In the Pacific 96,160 636,563 Grand Total 1,027,820 12,065,992 •Austria-Hungary has no colonial possessions. War Map of Europe The Outlook Company 287 FourtK Avenue, New York. 50 100 SOO SCO 100 SCALE OF KILOMETERS 60 100 200 SCO 100 500 600 fmportaiit towns are shown In heavy face type Canals ' Subpiarlne Cables — COPYRIGHT, 1914 BY L U P0ATE8 ENG'fi CO., N. y