AS- CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY _ Cornell University Library D 616.A5 suppl. 3 1924 027 842 032 Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924027842032 THE GREEK WHITE BOOK SUPPLEMENTARY DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 1913-1917 ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT DEALING WITH THE GRECO-SERBIAN TREATY AND THE GERMANO-BULGARIAN INVASION OF MACEDO- NIA, AND CONTAINING TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BY THE ROYAL COURTS OF ATHENS AND BERLIN Translated from the French Edition by THEODORE P. ION, D.C.L. AND CARROLL N. BROWN, Ph.D. The expense of this publication has been borne in part by Messrs. George D. Nicholas and P. Theophilopulos of New York PUBLISHED FOR THE AMERICAN HELLENIC SOCIETY Columbia University, New Yore BY OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS AMERICAN BRANCH 85 WEST S2KD STREET, NEW YORK 1919 \ \\\ As 5^ '^itH^i'& SUPPLEMENTARY DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS, 1913-1917, ISSUED BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT DEALING WITH THE GRECO-SERBIAN TREATY AND THE GERMANO-BULGARIAN INVASION OF MACE- DONIA, AND CONTAINING TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BY THE COURTS OF ATHENS AND BERLIN. PART FIRST. No. Name of signatory Mr. Streit Mr. Gennadius Mr. Alexandropouloa Mr. Panas Mr. Streit Place and date of transmission 1914 Athens, May 30/ June 12 London, June 2/15 Belgrade, June 3/16 Constantinople, June 4/17 Athens, June 9/22 Summary The Greek Government, confronted by the anti-Hellenic perse- cutions in Turkey addresses itself to the Serbian Govern- ment to demand its aid as ally. Steps by the Minister of Serbia with the British Government to bring about an in- tervention of the Powers at Constan- tinople. Reply of the Serbian Government to the steps taken by the Greek Government in order to demand its aid as an ally. Energetic steps by the Charge d' Affaires of Serbia with the Ot- toman Government with a view to put- ting a stop to the anti-Hellenic perse- cutions. The Greek Government thanks the Serbian Government for the steps taken at Con- stantinople. Page >-'' J' 1 > CONTENTS No. Name of signatory Place and date of transmission Smmnary Page Mr. Venizelos 1914 Athens, Aug. 25/ Sept. 7 10 Mr. Streit Mr. Eomanos Mr. Skouloudis Mr. Skouloudis 1915 Athens, Mar. 13/26 Paris, Feb. 26/ Mar. 11 Athens, Nov. 4/17 Athens, Nov. 13/26 Letter of Mr. Venizelos to King Constantine. The President of the Ministerial Council tenders his resigna- tion in consequence of a telegram pre- pared by Admiral Kerr after an audi- ence with the King, and in reply to a step taken by the British Admiralty, contain- ing . the declaration that Greece, in no case, would enter upon war against Turkey unless previ ously attacked by her. Memorandum by Mr, Streit on the proba- ble results of the war and on the pol- icy to be followed by Greece. Report of an interview with Mr. Delcass€ on the impression made by the dismissal of Mr. Venizelos. Mr. Skouloudis at- tempts to justify the attitude of his Gov- ernment toward the Entente. Transmission by the Ministers of the En- tente of a memoran- dum with regard to the evacuation of Salonika by the Greek troops and with regard to cer- tain other measures. Instructions given to the Minister of Greece at Paris to 11 16 17 18 CONTENTS No. 11 12 13 14 15 16 Name of signatory Place and date of transmission Mr. Romanos Mr. Skouloudis General Yannakitsas General Yannakitsas General Yannakitsas General Yannakitsas 1915 Paris, Nov. 14/27 Athens, Nov. 27/ Dec. 10 1916 Athens, Jan. 26/ Feb. 8. Athens, Mar. 9/22 Athens, Mar. 20/ Apr. 2 Athens, Apr. -27/ May 10 Summary inquire into the ob- ject of these meas- ures. Reply of Mr. Briand. Drawing up of an agreement with the Ministers of the En- tente as to the con- ditions of the stay of the Allies at Sa- lonika. Circular of the Minis- ter of War (General Staff of the Army) ordering the Greek troops of Macedonia to withdraw from the frontier in case of the appearance of German or Bulgarian troops. Circular of the Minis- ter of War supple- menting the preced- ing- Circular of the Minis- ter of War with re- gard to the forma- tion, by the mutual withdrawal of Greek troops and Germano- Bulgarian troops, of a neutral zone on the frontier in ord«r to avoid disagreeable in- cidents. Energetic steps by the Greek Government to put an end to certain Bui garian excesses which had taken place on the frontier. Circular of the Minis- ter of War explain- ing the preceding and ordering the Greek troops to repulse by force every advance Page CONTENTS No. Name of signatory Place and date of transmission Summary- Page 17 General Yannakitsas 1916 Athens, May 4/17 18 19 Commander Mavroudis General Gennadis Roupel, May 13/26 Cavalla, May 13/26 20 21 22 General Gennadis Colonel Messalas Cavalla, May 13/26 Salonika, May 13/26 General Yannakitsas Athens, May 13/26 by the Germano- Bulgarians of more than 500 metres this side of the frontier line. Order of the Minister of War to General Gennadis, Command- er of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla, not to have recourse to force on his own ini tiative in case of an advance of the Ger- mano-Bulgarians of less than 500 metres Commander Mavroudis, in charge of Fort Roupel, announces the appearance of a hostile column. The 6th Division at Serres has ordered Fort Roupel to oppose by force any Ger- mano-Bulgarian ad- vance of more than 500 metres from the frontier in accord- ance with the last orders of the Minis- try. The 6th Division an- nounces that two Bulgarian or Ger- man regiments have taken up their posi- tions in battle order before Hodjovo. The Commander of Roupel telegraphs that the Germano- Bulgarians have de- clared that they were going to occupy the fort. Circular of the Minis- ' ter of War again 30 30 30 31 32 32 CONTENTS No. 23 Name of signatory Place and date of transmission General Gennadis 24 General Bairas 25 26 27 Commander Mavroudis Captain Thiel General Yannakitsas 1916 Cavalla, May 13/26 Serres, May 14/27 Roupel, May 14/27 Athens, May 15/28 Mr. Skouloudis Athens, May 21/ June 3 Summary putting in force the circular of Mar. 9/22 ■which ordered the Greek troops to fall back before the Ger- mano-BuIgarians. Fort Roupel flred upon the Germano-Bulga rians who beat a precipitate retreat. In consequence of this fact and in accord' with the preceding ministerial circular, the Commander of the 4th Army Corps gave orders to cease all resistance. The Commander of Roupel reports that a Bulgarian ofBcer presented to him an order demanding the evacuation of the fort and the surrender of the war material. Protocol of the sur- render of Fort Rou- pel and of the deliv- ery of its war ma- terial. Order of the Minister of War to the Com mander of the 6th Division to inform the Bulgarians that the occupation of the railroad station of Demir-Hissar would have to form the ob- ject of a new agree- ment. Mr. Skouloudis, contra- dicting the state- ment that Fort Rou- pel had been occu- pied in consequence of a previous ar- Page 33 33 34 35 V 35 vl CONTENTS No. Name of signatory Place and date of transmission Summary Page 1916 28 Commander Mavroudis 29 Demir-Hissar, May 29/ June 11 Colonel Hadjopouloa Cavalla, Aug. 7/20 rangement, finds the reproaches of the French Government unjustifiable. Expo- sition of the pol- icy followed by his Government. Protest against the procla- mation by General Sarrail of martial law at Salo.nika, in consequence of which the celebration of the King's fete was pre- vented. Commander Mavroudis sends to the Fortress of- Salonika the de mand for the sur- render of Fort Eou- pel which had' been addressed to him by Captain Thiel and three letters of this officer relative to the| restoration of the cannon of the fort and their ammuni- tion. Colonel Hadjopoulos, temporary Command- er of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla, re- ports that the con- duct of the Bulga- rians is completely hostile. Greek com- panies have been de- stroyed or detained by the Bulgarians; the regiment at De- mir-Hissar has been taken prisoner. Be- havior of the comi- tadjis. Panic among the inhabitants. The Bulgarians intend to occupy Cavalla. He 38 41 CONTENTS No. 30 31 32 33 34 Name of signatory Colonel Eadjopoulos Colonel Hadjopoulos General Callaris General Dousmanis General Callaris Place and date of transmission 1916 Cavalla, Aug. 7/20 Cavalla, Aug. 7/20 Athens, Aug. 8/21 Athena, Aug. 8/21 Athens, Aug. 17/30 Summary demands instructions from his Govern- ment. The two Greek divi- sions will be cut off from each other. The Fort of Idjes is in flames. Murder and pillaging. Colo- nel Hadjopoulos de- mands authority to recall to the colors the reservists who are on leave, in or- der to defend Cavalla. He renews his demand concerning the recall to the colors of the reservists on leave He demands also the dispatch of the fleet to Cavalla. The Greek Government refuses the demand to recall to the colors the reservists and to dispatch the fleet. General Dousmanis transmits to Colonel Hadjopoulos for com- munication to the troops and to the in- habitants, the assur- ances given by the Ministers of Ger- many and Bulgaria at Athens upon the occasion of the occu- pation of the Greek territories. The Minister of War asks the Commander of the 4th Army Corps whether he has entered into negotia- tions with the Ger- mano-Bulgarians for the return of the Page CONTENTS No. Name of signatory Place and date of transmission Summary Page • 1917 armament of the for- tress of Cavalla. 35 Athens, Oct. 10/23 Note as to the anti- Hellenic persecutions in Bulgaria and in the countries pro- visionally occupied by the Bulgarians, with a table of statistics relative thereto. 45 PART SECOND Mr. Politis 36 37 38 39 Athens, Oct. 16/29 Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. N. Theotoky 1915 Berlin, Dee. 1/lt Berlin, Dec. 2/15 Berlin, Dec. 8/21 Berlin, Dec. 16/29 Mr. Politis transmits to the President of the Chamber of Dep- uties the transla- tions of a certain number of dispatches in cipher, exchanged between the ex-Sov ereigns and Berlin. Indications as to the manner of transmis sion of this secret correspondence. Supplementary notice as to the palace code. Steps with regard to a loan of forty million francs in consequence of a telegram of King Constantine. The German Govern- ment is ready, in principle, to make this loan. The opening of a credit with Swiss banks is technically impossi- ble. The credit will be opened with the S. Bleichroeder Bank of Berlin. 52 56 56 57 57 CONTENTS No. 40 Mr. N. Theotoky 41 42 43 44 45 Name of signatory Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. Bleichrceder Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. N. Theotoky Place and date of transmission 1915 Berlin, Dec. 16/29 1916 Berlin, Dec. 19, 1915/ Jan. 1, 1916 Berlin, Dec. 23, 1915/ Jan. 5, 1916 Berlin, Dec. 30, 1915/ Jan. 12, 1916 Berlin, Jan. 8/21 Berlin, Jan. 8/21 Summary Comnmnication to the German Government of certain declara tions and d'emands of King Constantine Mr. N. Theotoky communicates his im- pressions of his in- terviews with Mr von Jagow. The at- tack against the troops of the En- tente at Salonika has not yet been defi- nitely decided upon The loan of forty mil lions will be made in marks. Mr. N. Theotoky com- municates the text of a letter of the S. Bleichrceder Bank ad- dressed to the Na- tional Bank of Greece and confirming the opening of the credit of forty millions; he requests the confir- mation of the Nation- al Bank of Greece. On the request of Mr. von Jagow Mr. N. Theotoky begs King Constantine to reply to one of his tele- grams. Receipt of a new letter of the S. Bleichrceder Bank. General Falkenhayn communicates the conditions under which the action against the troops of the Entente at Sa- lonika may take place. Page CONTENTS No. Name of signatory Place and date of transmission Siunmary Page 46 Mr. N. Theotoky 47 48 49 King Constantine 1916 Berlin, Jan. 17/30 Athens, Mar. 10/23 Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. N. Theotoky 50 Mr. Skouloudis Mr. J. Theotoky King Constantine Berlin, Mar. 12/25 Berlin, May 5/18 Athens, May 13/26 51 Queen Sophie Athens, June 12/25 Mr. N. Theotoky has communicated to the S. Bleichroeder Bank the confirmation of the National Bank of Greece. General Falkenhayn in- forms King Constan- tine of the intention of the allied troops to occupy the De mir-Hissar pass. Re- ply of the King. Telegram for Mr. Skou- loudis dealing with a demand of the Greek Chief-of-StafiF. — Postscript for Mr. J. Theotoky. Mr. N. Theotoky in forms Mr Skouloudis that the Chief-of -Staff has telegraphed to Field-Marshal Mack- ensen to examine once more the mili tary situation In Macedonia before pro ceeding to occupy the Demir-Hissar pass. Telegram of Mr. Skou- loudis to Mr. N. Theo- toky relative to the assurances given by the Ministers of Germany and Bui garia at Athens as to the occupation of Greek territories. — Postscript of Mr. J. Theotoky. Telegrams addressed by Queen Sophie to Em- peror William and Princess M ( ? ) in consequence of the note of the Entente dated June 8/21. ' 63 64 64 65 66 CONTENTS No. 52 53 54 55 56 57 Name of signatory Mr. N Theotoky Mr. Th. Ypsilanti Mr. N. Theotoky King Constantine Mr. J. Theotoky Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. N. Theotoky Place and date of transmission 1916 Berlin, June 13/26 Athens, June 16/29 Berlin, July 6/19 Athens, Aug. 2/15 Berlin, Aug. 3/16 Berlin, Aug. 5/18 Summary Impression produced at Berlin by the ac ceptance of the note of June 8/21. Peo- ple fear that Mr. Venizelos will come out victorious in the parliamentary elec- tions. They regret the dismissal of Mr. Skouloudis. — Post script for Mr. J Theotoky with regard to the elections at Corfu. Mr. N. Theo toky expresses fears for the King and the dynasty. It is necessary that Emmanuel Ypsilanti be a candidate at Jannina. Report of an interview with the Chancellor of the Empire as to the mission of Princes Nicholas and Andrew at Petrograd and at London. King Constantine re- quests to know the reason for the con- centration on the Rumanian frontier of two armies under the command of Macken- sen. The Allies have no in- tention of taking the initiative in an at- tack on Rumania. The army of Mack- ensen will proceed to an offensive against the army of the En- tente in Macedonia. Mr. von Jagow has communicated' to Mr. N. Theotoky that Page CONTENTS No. Name of signatory Place and date of transmission Summary Page 1916 the concentration of| troops against Eu mania is to intimi date her. 58 Mr. J. Theotoky Athens, Aug. 9/22 Telegram of Mr. J Theotoky with re gard to the elections in Corfu. Indications as to the change oj address of telegrams 72 59 Mr. Zalocostas Mr. Zographos Mr. J. Theotoky Athens, Nov. 1/14 Transmission of a tele- gram of the National Bank of Greece to the S. Bleichroeder Bank. — Postscript of Mr. J. Theotoky. 73 60 Mr. J. Theotoky Athens, Nov. 21/ Dec. 4 New change of address of telegrams. 74 61 Mr. N. Theotoky Berlin, Nov. 22/ Telegram for Queen 74 Dec. 5 Sophie on the organ- ization of the bands in Macedonia. — Tele- gram for Mr. S. P. Lambros announcing the transmission of a telegram to Vien- na, Constantinople and Sophie. — Post- script of Mr. J. Theotoky. r 62 Queen Sophie Athens, Nov. 23/ Transmission of a tele- 75 Mr. J. Theotoky Dec. 6 gram of Queen Sophie r to Emperor William on the events of Nov. 18-19/Dec. 1-2. 63 Mr. N. Theotoky Berlin, Nov. 24/ Dec. 7 Information from Field- Marshal von Hinden- burg as to the inten- tion of the Entente concerning Itea. 76 64 VIr. Zalocostas Athens, Nov. 30/ Transmission of a dis- 77 King Constantine Dec. 13 patch of King Con- Mr. J. Theotoky stantine to Mr. N. Theotoky announcing the threatened deliv- ery of an ultimatimi by the Entente. — Postscript of Mr. J. Theotoky. CONTENTS No. 65 67 69 70 71 Name of signatory Mr. Zalocostas Emperor William Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. Zalocostas Mr. J. Theotoky Mr. Zalocostas Mr. J. Theotoky Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. Zalocostas Mr. J. Theotoky Mr. Zalocostas Queen Sophie Mr. J. Theotoky Place and date of transmission 1916 Athens, Dec. 2/15 Berlin, Dec. 3/16 Athens, Dec. 4/17 Athens, Dec. 7/20 Berlin, Dec. 10/23 Athens, Dec. 10/23 Athens, Dec. 13/26 Summary Transmission of a dis- patch to Mr. N. Theotoky begging him to repeat by wireless an undecipherable dispatch addressed to Queen Sophie. Reply of Emperor Wil- liam to the dispatch of Queen Sophie. — Postscript of Mr. N. Theotoky. Transmission of a tele- gram of Mr. N. Theotoky to Mr. N. Theotoky as to the organization of the bands in Macedonia. Transmission of a dis- patch of Mr. J. Theotoky to Mr. N. Theotoky on the cor- respondence by wire- less. Repetition of a dis- patch addressed to Queen Sophie dealing with the organization of the bands in Mace- donia. — Postscript of Mr. N. Theotoky for the National Bank of Greece. Transmission of a dis- patch of Mr. J. Theotoky confirming the receipt and the forwarding of cer- tain dispatches. He requests of Mr. N. Theotoky a reply dealing with the dec- larations of Mr. von Bethmann-Hollweg as to Greece. Transmission of a dis- patch of Mr. J. Theotoky repeating a telegram of Queen Page 77 78 70 r 79 80 + 81 82 CONTENTS No. Name of signatory Place and date of transmission Summary Page 1916 72 73 Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. Zalocost^s Mr. J. Theotoky 74 75 Mr. Zalocostas King Constantine Queen Sophie Berlin, Dec. 13/26 Athens, Dec. 18/31 Mr. Zalocostas Queen Sophie 1917 Athens, Dec. 19, 1916/ Jan. 1, 1917 Athens, Dec. 20, 1916/ Jan 2, 1917 Sophie to Emperor William as to the situation in Greece. The Insurgents are taking possession of parts of the King- dom which cannot be defended. The En tente is exercising a very strict blockade. Only a decisive and prompt attack on the part of Germany would render possible the intervention of Greece. — Postscript of Mr. Theotoky. Transmission of a dis- patch of General Lu- dendorff relative to the war against Ru- mania. Transmission of a tele gram of Mr. J. Theotoky dealing with the note deliv- ered by the Entente. He demands infor- mation as to the Ger- man offensive. Transmission of a tele- gram of congratula- tions addressed by King Constantine and Queen Sophie to Emperor William Considerations as to the gravity of the situation and the note of the Entente. — Postscript for Mr. N. Theotoky. Transmission of a tele- gram of Queen Sophie for Falkenhausen on the situation in Greece. In conse- quence of the insuf flciency of food sup r 83 83 / 84 85 CONTENTS No. 76 77 78 79 Name of signatory Mr. Zalocostas King Constantine Mr. J. Theotoky Mr. Zalocostas Queen Sophie Mr. J. Theotoky Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. Zalocostas Queen Sophie Mr. J. Theotoky Place and date of transmission 1917 Athens, Dec. 24, 1916/ Jan. 6, 1917 Athens, Dec. 27, 1916/ Jan. 9, 1917 Bedlin, Dec. 27, 1916/ Jan. 9, 1917 Athens, Dec. 28, 1916/ Jan. 10, 1917 Summary plies, war against the Entente is out of the question unless the German attack takes place immediately. Transmission of a dis- patch of King Con- stantine on the mili- tary V weakening of Greece. He desires to know whether a German attack on the Macedonian front is to be expected. Transmission of a tele- gram of Queen Sophie to Emperor William. The lack of food makes the Greek of- fensive impossible.— Postscript of Mr. J Theotoky dealing with the ultimatum delivered by the En- tente. A wireless station at Prilep will be at the disposal of the sta- tion set up at Kala- baka. Indications as to the change of the designations by which the stations of Athens and Sofia are called. Transmission of a dis- patch of Mr. J. Theotoky communi- cating a telegram of Queen Sophie to Em- peror William. Ac- ceptance of the ulti- matum of the En- tente. Greece may become a precious aid for Germany. — Instructions given in postscript to Mr. N. Page t 86 88 89 (/ 90 CONTENTS No. Name of signatory Place and date of transmission Summary Page 1917 80 Mr. N. Theotoky 81 82 Berlin, Dec. 30, 1916/ Jan. 12, 1917 Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. Zalocostas Mr. J. Theotoky Queen Sophie 83 Berlin, Dec. 30, 1916/ Jan. 12, 1917 Athens, Dec. 31, 1916/ Jan. 13, 1917 Mr. Zalocostas S (?) Athens, Jan. 1/14 Theotoky to work to strengthen the Greco- German relations dur ing and after the war. — Postscript of Mr. J. Theotoky con- firming the receipt of certain dispatches. The attack on the Macedonian front de- pends on Field-Mar- shal von Hindenburg. Mr. N. Theotoky con- siders that Greece has made sufficient sacri- fices and advises the Government to act solely in the interest of the country. The Minister of For eign Affairs was dis- appointed on learn- ing of the acceptance of the ultimatum of the Entente. . Transmission of a dis- patch of Mr. J. Theo toky with regard to two radio-telegrams sent to the address of Falkenhausen. — Dispatch of Queen Sophie for Falken- hausen as to the rea- sons which dictated the acceptance of the ultimatimi of the En- tente. — Postscript of Mr. J. Theotoky. Transmission of a dis- patch of S (?) deal- ing with the organ- ization of the bands in the future. Com- munication of cer- tain information com- ing from the Naval Attache in London. 91 y- 91 91 93 X CONTENTS No. 84 85 86 Name of signatory Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. Zalocoatas Mr. J. Theotoky S (?) Mr. Zaiocostas Mr. J. Theotoky Place and date of transmission 1917 Berlin, Jan. 5/18 Athens, Jan. 6/19 Athens, Jan. 7/20 Sxmnnary Von Hindenburg pro- poses to King Con stantine to destroy the Greek artillery and war material in order that they may not fall into the hands of the Entente. — Postscript of Mr N. Theotoky for S(?) and Mr. J Theotoky. He passed New Year's Day among the soldiers of the 4th Army Corps interned in Germany. Requests that King Constan tine reply to a con gratulatory dispatch of the latter. Transmission of a dis- patch of Mr. J. Theo- toky. The wireless station at Kalabaka has been demolished The reply to the 4th Army Corps has been forwarded. Mr. Naoum gives infor- mation that the Ger- man attack on the Macedonian front will take place. — Post- script of S (?) for Falkenhausen, fur- nishing him infor- mation as to the army of the Entente in Macedonia. Transmission of a dis- patch of Mr. J. Theo- toky containing the reply of King Con- stantine to the pro- posal of Field-Mar- shal von Hindenburg in relation to the de- struction of the Greek Page 93 k 94 95 CONTENTS No. 87 88 Name of signatory Mr. Zalocostas King Constantine Queen Sopliie Mr. Til. Ypsilanti Mr. Zalocostas Mr. J. Theotoky Queen Sophie Place and date of transmission 1917 Athens, Jan. 13/26 Athens, Jan. 27/ Feb. 9 Summary artillery and war material. List of the material concentrated in the Peloponnesos. — Postscript trans mitting the informa- tion that the Vali of Smyrna has been bribed by the En tente to surrender the city to them. Transmission of a dis- patch of congratula- tion addressed by King Constantine and Queen Sophie to Em peror William on the occasion of his anni- versary. Debarka- tion of 40 Senegalese soldiers to guard the French Legation. — Postscript of Mr„ N. Theotoky. Transmission of a tele- gram of Mr. J. Theo- toky to Mr. N. Theo- toky asking for news. — Dispatch of Queen Sophie to Princess M ( ? ) relative to the submarine blockade. —Postscript of S(?) for Falkenhausen. Page 97 / APPENDIX 89 Mr. Naoum 1915 Sofia, Sept. 8/21 Declarations of Mr. Eadoslavoflf on the occasion of the Bul- garian mobilization. The Turco-Bulgarian accord has been con- cluded. Rumania will preserve her neutral- ity. Greece will do the same. Serbia will prefer to engage 97 V CONTENTS No. 90 91 92 93 94 Name of signatory Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. N. Theotoky Mr. Gryparis Mr. Gryparis Mr. Coromilas Place and date of transmission 1916 Berlin, Jan. 8/21 Berlin, Mar. 21/ Apr. 3 Vienna, Mar. 29/ Apr. 11 Vienna, Sept. 11/24 Rome, Nov. 26/Dec. 8 Summary in a war against Bul- garia rather than to lose her common frontier with Greece. The King of Bulgaria and' his Government are animated by sin cere intentions with regard to Greece. Information as to the demands , formulated by the King of Bui garia on the occa sion of his visit to the German General Staff and to Vienna Contrary to the in- formation furnished by the Minister of Greece at Vienna on this subject, no de- mand at the expense of Greece has been formulated. Mr. Gryparis confirms his information on the subject of the pretentions formu- lated by the King of Bulgaria at the ex- pense of Greece. Mr. Gryparis begs the new Minister of For- eign Affairs of Greece to take note of his preceding telegrams concerning the Bul- garians. Telegram of Mr. Coro- milas to King Con- stantine in conse- quence of the events of Nov. 18-19/Dec. 1-2. Mr. Coromilas adjures the King to re-establish the unity of the nation for the safety of the father- land. Page 99 99 100 102 102 The present book completes the one that was published in the month of August. It is divided into two parts. The first part contains the documents which have since then been deposited in the Chamber of Deputies, or transmitted to the Parlia- mentary Commission which was charged with the functions of Public Prosecutor before the High Court which was constituted for the trial of the Cabinets of Skouloudis and Lambros. The second part contains the translations of a certain number of deciphered telegrams exchanged between the courts of Athens and Berlin, which have also been transmitted to the said Commission. These telegrams were written in cipher with a special code and trans- mitted either by wireless or by cable ; in the latter case, the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne or again the Royal Legation at Rome transmitted them without knowing their contents. The details as to this correspondence are set forth in a letter to the President of the Chamber of Deputies and in a supplementary memorandum inserted at the beginning of the second part. The present book contains, finally, six telegrams of the Ministers of Oreece, at Sofia, Berlin, Vienna and Rome. The words in brackets ( [ ] ) take the place of words which are illegible or missing in the telegraphic texts; the mention of "illegible words," or the point of interrogation ( ?) indicate that it was im- possible thus to complete the meaning. The dates, unless there is a contrary indication, are those of the Julian Calendar. Those contained in the body of the telegrams exchanged between the Courts of Athens and Berlin, since it was impossible to verify them, form an exception to this rule and remain undefined. -J -J PAKT I No. 1 Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexandropovlos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade. (Telegram) Athens, May 30/Juns 12, 1914. From my previous dispatches you have beeu kept in touch with the systematic persecutions to which Hellenism in Turkey has been sub- jected for several months. Tens of thousands of Greeks in Thrace have been forced to abandon their homes and to take refuge in Hel- lenic territory ; during these last weeks, notwithstanding the repeated and solemn assurances given by the Ottoman Government to our Minister at Constantinople, and by the Imperial Legation at Athens, tens of thousands of Greeks in Asia Minor have been expelled from their homes and have taken refuge in the neighboring Greek islands; other tens of thousands are on the coast, deprived of everything and exposed to starvation, and are anxiously waiting, in order to save their lives, to embark on boats which we have sent to pick them up. Massacres of Greeks have been reported from Asia Minor; the anti-Hellenic boycott continues; treaties are trodden under foot, and the Turkish authorities participate in the excesses. Public opinion is justly excited to the highest pitch and demands energetic action. The Government has given many proofs of its conciliatory disposi- tion; in the question of the alleged ill-treatment of the Mussulmans in Macedonia, after numerous investigations, it has gone so far as to permit the Minister of Turkey to convince himself personally of the absolutely baseless nature of the accusations; in the question of the vexations and tortures of which the Turks were said to be the victims, it went so far as to accept an exchange of the Mussulman populations of Macedonia with the Greek populations of Thrace and Asia Minor, proving thereby the absence, on its part, of any aggressive tendency and of its sincere and friendly disposition ; lastly, even in the question 1 of the Islands which have been ceded to Greece by the decision of Europe, it has never refused to take into consideration proposals which were made by Turkey with the intention of finding a proper ground for understanding in order to satisfy the amour propre of the Empire. The situation having become intolerable, Greece could no longer remain indifferent; the systematic extermination of her compatriots cannot but become worse if she allows herself to become intimidated by incessant provocations. By the note of which you know, we have de- manded the immediate cessation of the persecutions and the restoration of the refugees to their homes, stating that if satisfaction was not given, we would be obliged to send an ultimatum and to demand complete satisfaction; failing which we would be obliged to sever diplomatic relations and would not hold back before even extreme consequences. Please bring what precedes to the knowledge of the Serbian Gov- ernment in a confidential manner. We appeal to this friendly and aUied Government in order to ask of it a benevolent attitude and its moral support. In case Bulgaria should participate in the war, or refuse to defend its neutrality, we would invoke the casus fcederis. For the present, Greece does not intend to mobilize its land forces, in the hope that the war will not go beyond naval operations. She will not do so unless Turkey concentrates her troops at Adrianople, in order to pass through Bulgaria, or Bulgaria mobilizes. Our action, being due to intolerable persecutions, has only in view the assurance of a durable peace and the status quo in the Balkans. I beg you to telegraph to me the answer which shall be given you by the Serbian Government. Steeit. No. 2 Mr. J. Gennadms, Minister of Greece at London, to Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs at AtJiens. (Telegram) London, June 2/15, 1914. The Minister of Serbia has just told me that he has been ordered by his Government to indicate to the English Government that the present crisis may bring (serious) complications by involving other States in the hostilities, if the Powers do not use their influence, especially at Constantinople, in order to calm the excitement and (to render) the situation more reassuring. Gennadius. No. 3 Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade, to Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Athens. (Telegram) Bklgrade, June 3/16, 1914. The Minister of Serbia at Athens has just told me that he is leaving for Athens tomorrow and that he has been ordered to give to the Royal Government the reply of the Serbian Government.^ He has left me a copy of his instructions which I hasten to transmit to you herewith by telegraph. I have remarked to Mr. Balougdjitch, in regard to the first paragraph of his instructions, that there has been omitted from it that in my communication to the Prime Minister, a qualifying phrase was used : "if no satisfaction was given we would be obliged to present an ultimatum, etc." (as is stated in your telegram of May 30th ).^ He answered me that they had in view (our) final resolution. v/ REPLY OF THE SERBIAN GOVERNMENT TRANSMITTED TO THE HELLENIC GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE MINISTER OF SERBIA AT ATHENS: "The Serbian Government has received the confidential communi- cation which was made to it by His Excellency the Minister of Greece in the name of his Government, by which the Hellenic Government informs it, that if the Sublime Porte does not promptly put a stop to the persecutions of the Greeks, it will be obliged to sever its relations with Turkey and not to hold back before even extreme consequences. "The Hellenic Government considers that the war will not go be- yond naval operations and that in this case it expects a benevolent attitude and the moral support of Serbia. "Still, the refusal of Bulgaria to declare her neutrality or her " See document No. 1. ' See document No. 1. armed intervention in the war will constitute for Serbia, according to the opinion of the Hellenic Government, the casus faderis. • "In accord with these considerations, the Hellenic Government thinks that it is not absolutely necessary to order the mobilization of its army and that it would only decide to do so if Turkey should begin to concentrate her troops at Adrianople or Bulgaria should mobilize. "This communication of such grave and unexpected decisions reaches us without any warning and without our previous consent. "The Serbian Government considers it its first duty to fulfill all its obligations of ally, resulting from the Treaty of Alliance, which has a purely defensive character and the object of which is the con- solidation of peace. It is, however, obliged to declare, from now on, that the question of the persecutions of the Greeks in Turkey has entered into a dangerous path without those peaceful means which are customary under similar circumstances having been exhausted. "It is not possible for the Serbian Government, according to its appreciation of the political situation in Europe and in the Balkans, to consider as justified the opinion of the Hellenic Government 'that the operations will not be transferred to land.' As soon as the Turkish mobilization is decreed, and it will be decreed under the pressure of public opinion in Turkey, Bulgaria will also, on her side, mobilize under some pretext or other, either by invoking the case of legitimate defense, or by simply fulfilling an obligation due to an agreement which may have been entered into to this effect by her and Turkey. "In- this case Greece would mobilize her entire army, which, according to the opinion of the Hellenic Government, would constitute the casus foederis, namely, the obligation for Serbia to proceed to mobilization in accordance with Article V. of the Military Convention. "All these contingencies would inevitably arise as soon as the Turkish fieet should be attacked by the Greek fleet, because it is inadmissible to suppose that Turkey would voluntarily consent to be attacked by Greece there (on the sea) where it is more advantageous for the latter, and to abstain from operations there (on land) where she could have more chances of success. The mobilization of all these armies would inevitably bring on complications in the Balkans. "Still, the fundamental duty of Serbia, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest, was the maintenance of peace in the Balkans, which, besides, is in accordance with the obligations undertaken by Serbia by the treaty of defensive alliance concluded between her and Greece. "The Serbian Government begs to express the desire that the question of the persecutions of the Greeks in Turkey may be settled peacefully through the intervention of the Great Powers, who have assumed the obligation of protecting the Christians in Turkey. Conse- quently, it desires that an armed conflict be avoided for the following reasons that are decisive according to its point of view. "1st) The Serbian Government has not been able, up to the present time, to complete its armament, the larger part of which was rendered useless or was destroyed in the two wars. It is particularly in need of rifles and ammunition. "2nd) Serbia also lacks financial means. Its finances are ex- hausted. All credit is refused to her and she cannot count on a loan abroad. During these last six months, she has made great efforts in order to secure a loan for a short term, agreeing even to issue Govern- ment Bonds, but to no purpose, inasmuch as she has already obtained one which, although now exhausted, has not been sufficient to meet her previous obligations. "3rd) The Serbian people, and that means the army, is weakened and worn out ; it is consequently unable to enter into a new war. "4th) Bulgaria is at present better prepared for the war than she was when she attacked us. Austria has secretly supplied her, from her own depots, a sufficient quantity of new rifles and ammuni- tion, and a large number of guns with the necessary ammunition. This makes one think that Bulgaria wishes war as soon as possible in order to take revenge for recent events. "5th) Kumania has not consented to ally herself with us. by a treaty and persists in advising us to try to influence Greece to take a resolution favorable to peace and for a pacific solution of her con- flict with Turkey. "6th) Our armed action would alienate from us the sympathies and the support of the Triple Entente, which are indispensable in order to maintain the situation created by the Treaty of Bucharest and (to neutralize) the contrary tendencies which aim at its revision. "7th) Albania is in revolt and it is possible that the Mussulman insurrection may turn against the Greeks and Serbians at a time when we would be beginning the war against the Turks and the Bulgarians. "8th) Finally, we would imperil and run the risk of losing the 6 important gains of the last two successful wars, for the sake of a matter which can be settled, at any rate temporarily, through the intervention of the Great Powers, meanwhile waiting for the favor- able moment when we would be better prepared for the struggle. "Consequently, the Serbian Government considers that it is its duty towards the country and her vital interests to draw the attention of its allies to all the serious dangers which would arise, as soon as Greece broke with Turkey and began a war by sea. "I beg you, Mr. Minister, to acknowledge receipt of this reply of the Serbian Government as soon as it arrives, and to inform me of the further decisions of the Hellenic Government." Mr. Balougdjitch has told me that the Serbian Government will ask the benevolence of the friendly Great Powers. Alexandropoulos. No. 4 Mr. D. Panas, Minister of Greece at Constantivaple, to Mr. 6. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Athens. (Telegram) * Pera, June 4/17, 1914. The Charge d 'Affaires of Serbia yesterday communicated to the Grand Vizier the following: "The Royal Government of Serbia, being animated by the most friendly sentiments towards Turkey, thinks it is its duty to call the most serious attention of the Imperial Ottoman Government to the events in Asia Minor and the persecutions to which the Greeks, who are Ottoman subjects, are there exposed. The Royal Government earnestly begs the Imperial Government to take at once the most severe and the most efficacious measures in order to put a stop im- mediately to this intolerable state of affairs. "The Royal Government fears that this state of affairs, if it con- tinues, may provoke at Athens and in Greece such a great excitement that the Hellenic Government may be forced to adopt measures and take steps which would render very difficult the maintenance of the excellent relations which fortunately exist between Serbia and Turkey, relations which it sincerely desires to continue and to develop." The Grand Vizier, impressed by this declaration, replied to the / Charge d 'Affaires that he did not see how that which took place in Asia Minor touched Serbia. To the reply of the Charge d 'Affaires that whatever touched Greece touched also Serbia in her character of ally, the Grand Vizier gave a formal promise that in a few days order would be reestablished, and added that he had the impression that Greece wished to go to war, which would be folly, inasmuch as we have two and a half million Greeks in Turkey who would thus be exposed to all persecutions. Panas. No. 5 Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexandropovlos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade. (Telegram) Athens, June 9/22, 1914. Please express to the Serbian Government the warm thanks of the Eoyal Government for the step which it has taken at Constantinople in regard to the persecutions carried on in Turkey, a step which has once more proved the strength of our alliance and the friendly bonds which unite the two peoples. Streit. No. 6 I A letter sent by Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Council of Ministers, to His Majesty the King. (Letter) Athens, August 25/Septeniber 7, 1914. Sire: In accordance with Your Majesty's order, Admiral Kerr has com- municated to me the contents of a telegram prepared by him on the basis of the interview which he had with Your Majesty, in reply to the telegram of the British Admiralty. I begged the Admiral not to send this telegram, of which a copy is herewith inclosed, until he had received new instructions from Your Majesty, and I hasten respectfully to submit my resignation in order that the complete harmony that must exist between the Crown and the responsible Government during these most critical moments through which the nation is passing, may be restored. After the declarations which I was authorized by Your Majesty to make to the representatives of the Entente Powers and the tele- grams exchanged with the King of England by Your Majesty, I do not believe that to the new step of the British Government (Ad- miralty) Your Majesty will answer that Greece refuses to enter into war against Turkey until attacked by her. As I had the honor of saying to Your Majesty, we certainly cannot undertake an offensive war against Turkey as long as we do not secure the cooperation of Bulgaria, or at least her absolute neutrality. But to declare that even on that basis we are not disposed to make war on Turkey as long as she does not attack us, is manifestly contrary to the well-understood interests of the nation. We should not deceive ourselves. Turkey has for a long time been carrying on war against us without a declaration. After having refused to recognize the decision of the Powers as to the Islands, she has undertaken, and is continuing against Hellenism, the most furious persecutions to which it has ever been exposed. Two hundred and fifty thousand of our kindred have already been expelled from Turkey and their property, amounting in round numbers to 500,000,000 francs, has been, as they call it, confiscated. There is not the least doubt that Turkey, with the impudence which she derives from the unlimited support of Germany, will continue the persecution of the Hellenic element on a still larger scale. She will expel all the Greek population, consisting of several millions and will confiscate their property which amounts to many billions of francs. At the moment when we have the prospect of making war on Turkey with the aid of many and powerful Allies, shall we let this opportunity escape us, only to be compelled later to carry on this war alone, without allies or friends? In participating in a war against Turkey as allies of England, France and Kussia, under the above-mentioned condition of Bulgarian cooperation, or with assurances of her complete neutrality, we have no reason for, nor even any interest in declaring war against the Central Powers. But even if they do consider us as belligerents, all the probabilities that it is humanly possible for us to forecast con- spire to prove that whatever may be the outcome of the war in Central Europe, the local predominance in the East of the group to which England belongs will be complete. By refusing on principle, and under any hypothesis whatsoever, our cooperation in the war against Turkey, we do not escape the war, we simply postpone it ; and this for no long time. It is certain that Turkey will not demobilize until she has settled her accounts with us. Under these conditions our choice is strictly limited ; we shall either be obliged to fight Turkey single-handed, in which case it will be impossible for us, even if we come out victors, to secure anything except the Islands, and to guarantee the future of Hellenism in Turkey, which will be exterminated even more ferociously after our eventual victory ; or else we shall have to side strongly with the three Great Powers, when we shall bring about not only the return to their homes of the expelled Greeks, but also secure the final protection of the Greek element in Turkey, through the support that it will find in the future at the hands of the three Great Powers. Thus the course that we ought to follow is already fixed. But that which, I think, confuses the issues and produces in Your Majesty's mind and in that of Mr, Streit, opinions contrary to mine, is the desire not to displease Germany through our cooperation against Turkey with the Powers that form the group opposed to the Central Powers. And yet Your Majesty is certainly aware that last year, when I was traveling through Europe and the English Government declared that it was willing to impose upon Turkey the decision of the Powers concerning the Islands, even through the dispatch of an International fleet, if Germany would agree to this, the latter Power refused to cooperate and was the cause of the abandonment of the plan. Your Majesty, I suppose, remembers also that later on, when the Powers of the Triple Entente decided to address to Turkey a strong note on the question of the Islands, Germany intervened in her behalf. And today it is Germany that furthers the plans of the Turks by giving them ships, money, arms, ammunition, and even officers. It is true that these preparations are particularly directed against Eussia, but at the same time they are directed against us, since Germany, in order to compel us to violate our pledges to Serbia, threatens us openly with an attack in our rear by the Turks if we proceed to assist the Serbians in case of an attack by Bulgaria. And even if the Turkish forces are utilized against Russia only, and not against us, can anyone doubt that if Turkey finds herself among the 10 victors she will become so arrogant that she will be no longer satis- fied with the destruction of the Greeks in Turkey, but, taking advan- tage of German support on the sea, will take away from us the Islands as well, at a time when we shall be without friends and without assistance. Besides, we know from the mouth of Count Quadt ^ him- self that Germany, in accordance today with Austrian ideas, having discovered that the Bulgarians are Tartars and not Slavs, purposes, in case of final victory, to create a Great Bulgaria, extending as far as the Adriatic, in order to serve as a bulwark against Slavism. Why, then, should we be so obliging toward a Power, which seeks by every means to help the two principal enemies of Hellenism, namely, the Bulgarians and Turks, and why show such indifference toward the Powers which after having created and under all circum- stances protected Greece, are still disposed today to side with us ? Your Majesty, I am aware that the condition which I lay down for our military cooperation with the Entente in a war against Turkey, the condition, that is, of the cooperation or the assured neutrality of Bulgaria, is very difficult to realize. But this difficulty does not remove nor lessen the difference which developed at the very beginning between the ideas and tendencies of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the other members of the Government — ^views which, after the resignation of Mr. Streit and his temporary retention in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, seem to have been changed into a difference in orientation between the Crown and the Government. In order to facilitate the reestablishment of that harmony which is so necessary between the Crown and its responsible advisers, I have the honor to submit my resignation and I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Majesty the expression of my sentiments of unalterable devotion to the Throne. Eleutherios K. Venizelos. *The German Minister at Athens during the year 1914: The Translators. 11 No. 7 Memorandum of Mr. G. Streit on the probable resvlts of the war. (Translation) Athens, March 13/26, 1915. A. IN CASE OF THE VICTORY OF THE ENTENTE: IF BDLQAKIA I. Cooperates ^ with the Entente IF GREECE Ist. CoSperates _ with the Entente 2nd. Remains neutral Bulgaria will obtain Serbian Mace- donia, perhaps in its entirety, and the Enos-Midia line. Greece will obtain concessions in Asia Minor and a rectification of frontier in ^ Macedonia ( Ghevgheli ) . Bulgaria will obtain the advantages indicated in No. 1. Greece will probably obtain a rectifi- cation of frontier in Macedonia, but at the same time, will run the risk of _ having to make concessions to Bulgaria. II. Remains neutral III. Intervenes against the En- - tente 1st. Cooperates with the Entente ' 2nd. Remains neutral 1st. Cooperates with the Entente Bulgaria will obtain a part of Serbian Macedonia. Greece will obtain concessions in Asia Minor and probably a rectification of _ frontier in Macedonia. Bulgaria will obtain a part of Serbian Macedonia. Greece will probably obtain a rectifi- cation of frontier in Macedonia. Bulgaria will obtain nothing. Greece will obtain concessions in Asia Minor and a rectification of frontier in Macedonia. 2nd. neutral Remains { Bulgaria will obtain nothing. Greece will obtain a boundary rectifi- cation in Macedonia. 12 B. IN CASE OF VICTORY OF THE CENTKAL POWERS: IF BTJLOARIA I. Cooperates ^ with the Entente II. Remains neutral IF GREECE 1st. CoBperates with the Entente 2nd. Remains neutral 1st. Cooperates with the Entente 2nd. neutral Remains III. Intervenes against the En- . tente 1st. Cooperates with the Entente " 2nd. Remains neutral Bulgaria will restore Bulgarian Thrace. Greece will restore the Islands which are near the coast of Asia Minor and will run the risk of being obliged to make concessions to Turkey in Mace- donia. (Autonomy of Macedonia.) Bulgaria will restore Bulgarian Thrace. Greece will obtain Monastir with a considerable extent of territory. Bulgaria will obtain the whole of Serbian Macedonia. Greece will restore the Islands of the coast of Asia Minor and will make con- cessions in Macedonia. Bulgaria will obtain Serbian Mace- donia except Monastir. Greece will keep all that she possesses . and will obtain Monastir. Bulgaria will obtain Serbian Mace- donia, a part of Hellenic Macedonia and perhaps the Enos-Midia line. Greece will restore the Islands and _ will make concessions in Macedonia. Bulgaria will obtain Serbian Mace- donia and perhaps the Enos-Midia line. Greece will keep all that she possesses and will perhaps obtain a rectification of frontier in Macedonia. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS I (1) This table is limited to Greece and Bulgaria; but neither the attitude of Italy nor that of Rumania could be neglected in what concerns the results of the war, as these two Powers are bound to influence the issue of the struggle. Therefore, the above table is not sufficient for the appreciation in their entirety of the circumstances which may present themselves. I, however, think that the line of 13 conduct which would be followed by Italy and Rumania would have only a relative influence on the territorial rearrangements provided for in the table. At any rate, I am of opinion that useful elements of appreciation are herein contained. (2) Likewise, the above table does not provide for the case, which is by no means impossible, of a volte-face in the course of the war by Turkey in favor of the Entente. In that case, the unfavorable con- sequences for us in what concerns the Islands near the coast of Asia Minor should be faced by us even in the event of a victory of the Entente, provided for in table A ; at the same time, these consequences, will cease to exist in the contrary contingency, provided for in table B, On the other hand, it goes without saying that, if such a sudden change in Turkish policy took place, Greece would have to renounce all the concessions in Asia Minor provided for in table A. (3) The above table is based on the idea that the results of the struggle between the Great Powers will alone decide the territorial rearrangements that concern the secondary Allied States, independ- ently of their success or their failure, which may possibly be contrary to the general results of the war. It is well understood that no account has been taken of the military questions concerning each group of belligerents, although they must be taken into consideration in order fully to appreciate the whole ; I think, however, that the conclusions which I have reached in regard to the territorial arrangements will not be influenced by the military situation which will exist, according to the various contingencies, at the end of the war. (4) The table presupposes that in the course of the war there will be no modifications in the constitution of the two groups of the Great Powers, particularly in consequence of the possible divergencies in point of view between England and Russia. (5) If peace were concluded, not as the result of a decisive victory of one or the other of the belligerent groups, but in consequence of the exhaustion of the two groups, their forces remaining on the same foot- ing of equality, the possible results provided for in the table would have to be reduced considerably, but their nature, I think, would not be modified. II In view of these facts, and relying on the data of the above table, I conclude: 14 (1) That the common neutrality of Greece and Bulgaria does not imply any danger ; it will probably have as consequence a small terri- torial extension for the two countries, no matter what the issue of the struggle may be, but certainly a more considerable one for us, if the Central Powers are victorious. There seems to be so little probability that Greece will abandon her neutrality, if Bulgaria remains neutral, in view of the danger of exhaustion to which we would be exposed, at a time when the forces of Bulgaria would remain intact, that it is useless for us to concern ourselves particularly about this possibility. (2) In the event of the participation of Bulgaria in the war on the side of the Central Powers : (a) If we side with the Entente, we shall derive great advantages in case of the victory of the latter, but we shall also run great risks in case of the victory of the Central Powers, since Bulgaria, in the latter case, will become very dangerous. (6) If we remain neutral, we shall in either case have certain small advantages but we shall also run the risk, in case of the victory of the Central Powers, of seeing Bulgaria aggrandized considerably. (3) In the event of the cooperation of Bulgaria with the Entente : (a) If we also cooperate with the Entente, it is true that a victory of the latter will open to us the largest horizons, but the Bulgarian strength will also increase in a manner dangerous to our territories in Europe. On the other hand, the defeat of the Entente will expose us to the very greatest dangers. (&) If, on the contrary, we remain neutral, we shall run the risk, in case of the victory of the Entente, of seeing the Bulgarian power considerably increased, but not to our detriment ; on the contrary, we have the prospect of a considerable increase of our power, in case of the victory of the Central Powers. (4) Consequently, the simultaneous neutrality of Bulgaria and Greece is in every way advantageous up to a certain point; this in itself constitutes a guarantee, as long as the issue of the war remains uncertain. The neutrality of Greece alone, if Bulgaria intervenes, offers also advantages in any eventuality; but, at the same time, it prevents the danger of a disproportionate increase of the Bulgarian power, in case the belligerent group with which Bulgaria cooperates should triumph. But the danger of Bulgaria's increasing to an alarm- ing degree exists in case, — with Bulgaria cooperating with the vic- torious Central Powers, — we should be found in the opposite camp. 15 This danger of a disproportionate increase of the Bulgarian power in relation to our European territories will still exist for us, even in ease — with Greece cooperating with Bulgaria and the Entente, — the latter should triumph. (5) It is for this reason that I hesitate to consider the intervention of Bulgaria in any eventuality whatsoever as being advantageous to Greece, and I would prefer, should the occasion present itself to us to intervene in the war, to see the three Balkan States, now neutral, cooperating and abandoning their neutrality simultaneously ; for it is only then that it would be possible to count on any important results from their action — their forces not being mutually offset against each other — and to hope that their intervention would decide the issue of the general struggle, always provided that Italy did not align herself with the opposite side. Each of the three States would, in this case, have the right to demand compensations. There would be Transyl- vania for Eumania, part of Serbian Macedonia and the Bnos-Midia line for Bulgaria, and for Greece, territorial concessions in Asia Minor and a rectification of frontier in Macedonia. Ill CONCLUSION (1) I am of opinion that in any case it is not for us to draw the others on and that it is to our interest that Bulgaria should abandon her neutrality before we do so. Likewise, I do not call in question the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by us towards Serbia as against Bulgaria. (2) Certainly Greece, after the recent events, would become in- volved in serious difficulties with the Entente, if she remained neutral up to the end ; on the other hand, public opinion in our country has been excited to such a pitch by the arguments which have been pre- sented, arguments the soundness of which it has been unable to verify, that it would be nearly impossible for us to remain neutral if Bulgaria entered into action. (3) But the attitude of Bulgaria and Rumania (particularly the proposals to take the first step made by the former, and the declaration made by the latter, according to which she does not wish to have any Balkan difficulties but looks toward a common orientation and a con- tinued contact with us), does not exclude, according to my view, the 16 possibility of a political agreement between them and ourselves, an agreement which would have as object, in the first place, a common neutrality and, in default of this, a simultaneous abandonment of neutrality in favor of the same group of belligerents, namely, the Entente, on whose side alone we can align ourselves. This agreement would, of course, have in view only the present circumstances and would leave out of account all the divergencies of view existing be- tween the three states, as well as the particular tendencies of each of them. Such cooperation would justify our inaction in the eyes of the Entente, if we should remain neutral, just as it would justify our eventual cooperation with the Entente in the eyes of the Central Powers, inasmuch as Greece in either case would be following, as far as possible, a Balkan policy. G. Streit. No. 8 J Mr. A. Romanos, Minister of Greece at Paris, to Mr. G. CJvristaki- Zographos, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Alliens. (Telegram) Paris, February 26/March 11, 1915. I was today upon my return, received by Dr. Delcasse. He told me that the turn which affairs had taken in Greece had been a dis- appointment to the Triple Entente. Not only had France and Eng- land eagerly accepted the proposition which the Cabinet presided over by Mr. Venizelos had made, on condition of its approval by His Majesty the King, but Mr. Delcasse had telegraphed to St. Petersburg recommending its acceptance and had last Sunday received the ad- hesion, in principle, of the Russian Government to this proposition. The French Government had at the same time learned of the resig- nation of Mr. Venizelos, thus cutting short the parleys between the Triple Entente and Greece concerning our cooperation and the ad- vantages which would result for our country. Romanos. J 17 No. 9 Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Council of Miwisters, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Paris, London, Rome and Petrograd. (Telegraphic Circular) Athens, November 4/17, 1915. The Royal Government sees with distress that in the capitals of the Entente the semi-official press is endeavoring to alarm public opinion by giving credit to the apprehensions unjustly entertained by the Powers as to the real intentions of Greece. It regrets all the more this systematic campaign, which is surely inspired, because it had every reason to hope that the friendly explanations given to the repre- sentatives of the Entente would have dissipated every misunderstand- ing. In my repeated conversations with them, I have sufficiently clearly given them to understand that in no case would the Royal Government think of exercising the least pressure on the Allied troops, and that, if I mentioned the obligations of neutrality stipulated in the Hague Conventions, it was because such ought to be the official language of a country that is neutral and desires to remain so. But from the very first I have clearly indicated that there would be no question of actually applying the above regulations. In the event of the retreat of the Allied armies to our territory, the Royal Govern- ment could not adopt any other attitude than that which it had ob- served, to the satisfaction of all the belligerents, at the time of the first landing of the troops in Salonika, namely, that it would limit itself to a mere mention of principles without seeking to impose respect for them in any manner. And since the Allies make no distinction be- tween their own troops and those of Serbia, the Royal Government also would not make any distinction between them. The Powers cannot fail to take into account the very delicate situation in which Greece finds herself between the two groups of belligerents, and they ought fully to understand that the largest and most sincere benevolence has limits, beyond which the maintenance of neutrality becomes impossible, and that the country which desires to remain neutral should take great care not to pass these limits. As the Entente Powers do not deny and cannot deny to Greece the 18 absolute right to remain neutral, they ought, logically and in all fairness, to accept the consequences resulting from this and not to ask of her the impossible. Greece being neutral and wishing to remain so, could not speak officially as if she were not so and publish abroad the assurances which she has not ceased to give to the Entente Powers. It is in this spirit that I have just spoken to Mr. Denys Cochin, who declared himself perfectly satisfied. The enthusiastic reception he has received, not only at Athens but at Patras, has furnished him, further- more, the plainest proof of the real sentiments of the country towatd France and her allies. I beg you, without making a special object of it, to be guided by the above, in order, if necessary, to speak about it to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, taking care to give to your conversation a strictly confidential character. Skouloudis. No. 10 Mr. 8. Skouloudis, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Romanes, Minister of Greece at Paris. (Telegram) Athens, November 13/26, 1915. Barely twenty-four hours after the delivery of the reply in which the Royal Government had given full satisfaction to the Powers, and as a result of which we had the right to expect a period of suspension in order to examine, with the necessary calmness, the last demands, the Ministers of the Entente expressed their desire to be received by me collectively as soon as possible. I received them early this morn- ing and it is not without surprise that I took cognizance of their memorandum which is as follows: "1. Retreat of the Greek troops from the city of Salonika and its environs. "2. The free and total placing at our disposal of the railroads and of all the roads to the frontier, especially toward Krivolak and Monastir, so completely that we can take all the measures indis- pensable to our defense in the city as well as its vicinity, since the 19 establishment of a defensive organization around Salonika and before the Chalcidie Peninsula is of primary necessity in order to assure the security of the expeditionary forces. "3. Freedom of the seas, including the right to visit ships and embarkations in the territorial waters ; that of searching for and de- stroying enemy submarines and their bases of supply on the shores and in the territorial waters. "Taking into account the difficult and exposed situation in which the retreat of the Serbian army toward Albania and Montenegro is going to place the Allied troops, it is extremely necessary that satis- faction should be given, not only by verbal assurances, but also by the taking of actual measures, such as the evacuation of the region of Salonika by the Greek troops, who are to be withdrawn in order not to be in a position to interfere with the liberty of our movements and defense." As Mr. Guillemin told me that the French Government had taken the initiative in this serious and urgent step (an act which I regarded as quite natural, since the Allied contingents in Salonika are in large part French), I beg you to see Mr. Briand at once in order to make to him, as coming from me, in the most friendly and strictly confi- dential form, the following declaration : "Before replying to the demands of the Powers, we desire to know surely what is the object of the requested measures. Have they in view the security of the retreat and the embarkation of the Allied troops, or indeed the establishment in Macedonia, and especially in Salonika, of a base of operations? In the first case, Greece would be willing to cover, even with her own troops, the movements of the retreat and the operations of the reembarkation of the Allied troops so as to guarantee to them an absolute security. ' ' If Mr. Briand should be disposed to make known to you, confi- dentially, his intentions in this respect, you are authorized to give him, from me, the assurance on my honor that these confidences would be kept strictly secret and that every difficulty would be immediately eliminated, and every doubt dissipated. I rely on your experience and your tact to give to this very delicate step the character of sincerity and moderation which is appro- priate. You can explain that the Royal Government is animated by the most lively desire to facilitate the task of the French Government, but that it hopes in return that Mr. Briand will not lose sight of the 20 very difficult and very complicated situation in which we are placed and that he will not wish to increase our difficulties. Please make known to me as soon as possible by telegram the result of your step. Skouloudis. No. 11 ' Mr. A. Ronumos, Minister of Greece at Paris, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Athens. (Telegram) Paris, November 14/27, 1915. I have the honor to inform you that I have been received by Mr. Briand and that I have communicated to him the question put by Your Excellency in your telegram of yesterday.^ He answered me that he could not give me precise information on this point. The only thing that preoccupies him at this moment is, that if the expedi- tionary forces fall back upon Salonika, they may be able to do so in full security. It is in order to insure this security that the conditions of the memorandum have been formulated ; they originate in the very principles of the collective note to which the Hellenic Government has given its adherence. ' ' When the Allied troops shall retire to Salonika, what will they do there ? At the present time it is impossible to say. ' ' These are the very expressions of Mr. Briand, which I noted down at the end of our conversation. He added that ' ' We will do all that we can in order not to place Greece in a difficult situation, but Greece in her present situation could speak a little loudly. She has her army concentrated on the Bulgarian frontiers, she could make her energetic words heard. Thus, in this state of affairs, we control the situation. ' ' In reply to the observation of Your Excellency that a period of suspension would be necessary in order to examine calmly the last demands of the Powers, the President of the Council has told me that to his regret he was obliged to insist, in view of the march of events which rendered any delay impossible, that satisfaction be given at once. ROMANOS. • See document No. 10. J 21 No. 12 Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to fhe Royal Legations at Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, Berlin and Vienna. (Telegraphic Circular) Athens, November 27/Decemher 10, 1915. The Ministers of the Entente came this evening and stated to me, in the name of their Governments, that the declarations made recently by His Majesty, the King, to the Minister of Prance, could serve as basis to an immediate agreement of such a nature as to respect our scruples and to insure the defense of their interests. After having discussed -with them the various questions which are at issue in Salonika, we finally agreed upon the following : (1) Salonika is not to be evacuated. The division stationed in that place at present will continue to remain there. (2) If the railway staff be insufficient we could augment it so as to insure the maximum of efficiency, but we shall in no case accept foreign employees. (3) If circumstances require, we will not oppose armed force to works of a defensive character or to the occupation of fortified points, but we shall not oiily protest formally, but most energetically and seriously. (4) In case the Allied troops, in consequence of their movements, should bring the war into our territory, the Greek armies would stand aside, so as to leave both parties free to settle their conflict. (5) We cannot accept any discussion in regard to Carabourofc@ since the King has given his word that use shall never be made of this fortress or of the batteries placed in front of it, against the Allied forces. The Ministers having asked me if, in order to facilitate matters, it would not be possible for the Royal Government to proceed spon- taneously to the interruption of the repairs now going on, I replied that, without assuming any obligation with regard to this, I was of the opinion that it was not improbable that such a measure would be taken, particularly because of the lack of money. 22 (For Paris, London, Rome and Petrograd only:) The Ministers declared that they were satisfied, but particularly so at the announcement that the Government had already ordered the 5th Army Corps to move more to the east, so as to leave all the space between Salonika and the frontier free. The Ministers of France and England have shown their satisfaction in a very marked manner and have declared, in agreement with their colleagues, that the decision taken constitutes a great concession on our part. I have taken advan- tage of this to express the hope that their Governments, being at last convinced of our good and sincere disposition, will not only hasten to abandon the coercive measures to which, without any plausible reason, they have again abruptly resorted, but will give satisfaction to those requests of the Royal Government which are of a financial and com- mercial character. They have promised me that every difficulty would disappear when, in two or three days, the military authorities shall have carried out the agreement entered into, and the Minister of France further called to mind the declaration of his Government that it would be happy to offer to Greece every facility, as soon as the difficulties which had arisen should be adjusted. (For Berlin and Vienna only:) I communicate to you the above for your own guidance and beg you to note that the Royal Government, in this new phase of its relations with the Entente, remains faithful to the line of conduct which it has outlined for itself from the beginning. Skouloudis. No. 13 The Mimister of Wwr (General Staff of the Army) to the Commanders of the 3rd Army Corps at Salonika, of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla, and of the Fortresses of Salonika and Cavalla. ( Telegraphic Circular — Translation ) Athens, January 26/Fe'bruary 8, 1916. To the questions put by the 3rd and 4th Army Corps I reply as follows : In case strong German, German and Bulgarian or Bulgarian de- tachments, commanded by German officers, should present themselves on our frontier, demanding to cross it, our covering troops will not 23 oppose them, but will retire from the sector of the frontier which they occupy toward the bases of their companies or of their respective regi- ments or divisions. I communicate the above to you now in order to avoid any misunderstanding ; besides, such an invasion does not as yet seem to be imminent. You will shortly receive detailed instructions about the movements as a whole, and about the disposition of our troops in Macedonia, as well as in regard to the strongholds where a halt might be made. Likewise, if Anglo-French patrols persist in crossing the bound- ary, our covering troops will not oppose them, and, should an en- counter take place, they will retire to a safe place, raising, if necessary, a white flag as a sign of neutrality. These measures should be kept strictly secret. Yannakitsas. No. 14 The Mirmter of Wwr (General Staff of fhe Army) to tJie Commanders of tJie 3rd Army Corps at Salonika, and of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla, to the Chief of the Gendarmery in Macedonia and to the Commanders of the Portresses of Salonika and Cavalla. ( Telegraphic Circular — Translation) Athens, March 9/22, 1916. Following our telegraphic order, dated January 26 of the current year,^ and in reply to the questions put by the 3rd and 4th Army Corps, we supplement this order as follows : As soon as the detachments of foreign troops shall begin to pene- trate our territory, in the circumstances provided for by our above- mentioned order, our scattered outposts should evaeus^te not only the invaded sector, but also the neighboring sectors, to such an extent that any encounter with the invading troops may be avoided, and sections of Greek troops may not be cut off from the base of their companies. These outposts will have to concentrate promptly upon their com- pany bases, taking with them their telephones and all other material which may happen to be on the frontier. ' See document No. 13. 24 As the penetration of the foreign troops continues, the companies stationed in the invaded zone should evacuate the places of their encampment, taking with them the material which is found there, and fall back upon the bases of their regiments. The same should be done by the companies stationed beyond this zone, in case they should be in danger of being cut off by the invasion. The regiments concentrated in their bases should be ready to march as soon as they receive orders from us. We cannot now give more detailed instructions, inasmuch as we cannot know beforehand through what point of our frontier the foreign troops will penetrate. It is, then, for the Commanders of the Army Corps or Divisions, as well as for the Commanders of troops on the frontier, to regulate, in case of necessity, this movement of with- drawal. As far as we can judge the situation at present, the sectors which are susceptible of being invaded by foreign troops, appear to be (apart from the sector situated to the south of Doiran and Ghevgheli), the valley of the Strouma, between Beles and Tsingheli and the sector of Caradjova. As far as the valley of the Strouma is concerned, a first advance would attain, according to our suppositions, the south exit of the pass. Consequently, you should proceed in this case to evacuate the region comprised between Beles and Ali Boutous, to the right and left of the pass, our troops concentrating at Demir-Hissar and at Poroya. As for the Caradjova sector, the movements of the covering regiment have been well directed up to the present, and we have nothing to add. To the question what should be done in case Bulgarian detach- ments appear alone without German officers at their head, we reply that judging from the manner in which the foreign troops are operating to the north of us, such a contingency is not to be expected, unless it is a matter of patrols, even of somewhat strong patrols ; but these patrols will likewise be operating only as fractions dependent on a detachment which will also comprise German troops. If, however, contrary to every expectation, a strong and exclusively Bulgarian detachment should appear, ask immediately for orders from us, avoid- ing a conflict in every way. In consequence of what precedes, the fortified works for which it may be necessary to give special instructions are those of Dova-Tepe, Roupel and of Phea-Petra (Croussovitieo). When the foreign troops advance on that side, there should remain in the forts, as a garrison, 25 only a section of infantry with a small number of artillery and some engineers, under the orders of at least two ofiScers knowing French; it would be very advantageous that at least one of them should know German, and that there should be soldiers in the force who know foreign languages, and particularly Bulgarian. The remainder of the garrison, with the Commandant of the fort, should retire, taking away with them all portable material and such parts of the cannons as would render them useless. The above instructions apply also to all the other fortified places, although it does not at present seem likely that such a contingency will present itself in their eases. As to the above- mentioned forts, their Commandants would do well to begin to make their preparations now. The sections of the companies which remain in the forts will thus be isolated in the territories occupied by the foreign troops; their officers should enter into relations with the German officer commanding these troops for all the needs of their men, who must remain on post in the fort and not go out under any pretext; their mission will be to preserve and to guard the fort not against a hostile action, which is out of the question, but against any occupation which would take place if the fort were completely evacuated. They will likewise have the duty of representing Hellenic sovereignty in the territory which will be temporarily utilized by non-hostile foreign troops, in consequence of the presence, at Salonika, of other equally non-hostile foreign troops. It will then be a question of military honor for these small garrisons to prove their strict and blind discipline, their dignity, sobriety and orderliness. The relations of these garrisons to the foreign troops will be marked by reserve, but will at the same time be quite normal ; their Commanders, by their conduct, should be able to avoid every (disagreeable) incident, to entertain cordial relations with the chiefs of the foreign troops and to obtain every necessary facility, such as the means of communicating from time to time with the Commander of the neighboring Greek division, through relations with the German commanders and with their permission, but never secretly. Such results will be attained if, on our part, we show our sincerity and entire good faith and if we avoid every imputation of espionage. The gendarmery will maintain its positions; in case of need the gendarmes will concentrate in the interior of the forts. All must understand that no matter how disagreeable their situa- 26 tion may appear to them, they must submit blindly to the will of the State, and understand that the higher interests of Greece depend on their complete submission to this will. Any indiscretion as to the contents of the present order will greatly injure the supreme interests of the State. Yannakitsas. No. 15 The Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) to the Commanders of the 3rd Army Corps at Salonika and of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla. ( Telegraphic Circular — Translation) Athens, March 20/ April 2, 1916. By my orders dated January 26 and March 9 of the current year,^ I have sent you instructions as to the manner in which our troops will conduct themselves in case of the entrance into our territory of troops of the Central Empires coming from the north, although such a con- tingency, as I have already stated in the first of these orders, does not Seem to be imminent. The present order has as its object to prevent, between our troops on the frontier and the foreign troops operating in their vicinity, any [disagreeable] incident which might easily happen, particularly where the Anglo-French troops, by the advances which they are about to make or which they might possibly make in the future, might make of our frontier a battle-ground. Even some months ago, long before the operations in Macedonia took their present turn, a neutral zone was created, as you know, between us and the Bulgarians, in order to render impossible such incidents; but this neutral zone, for the above-mentioned reasons, was done away with at certain points. It is in order to prevent similar incidents, which may occur as a result of the present situation, that I issue the following order : The general principle which should prevail on all the frontier is the following : Our small posts ought to be from one to two kilometers distant from the opposite posts of the Central Empires and their allies, in such ' See documents Nos. 13 and 14. 27 a manner as to form between them and our troops a neutral zone of the width indicated above, in which neither any groups of our troops nor any single soldiers can penetrate; if, however, villages or any agglomerations whatever are found in this zone, the gendarmery should continue to stay there. Exception should be made to this rule in the case of the posts of Oxilar and Negotsani, where things shall remain as they are at present. For the application of the said general principle, the following pro- cedure shall be adopted : In regard to the sector which starts from the mouth of the Nestos up to Mt. Ali Boutous, inclusively, as well as that which starts from Mt. Ketehik-Aya, to Lake Prespa, things shall remain as they are, provided that nothing occurs to modify the neutral zone which was formed some months ago, by the reciprocal retirement of the Greek and Bulgarian troops; consequently, the distance as above fixed, ought, generally speaking, still to separate these troops; if, however, this distance has been shortened, care should be taken to reestablish it. As for the sectors starting from Ali-Boutous to Seimen- Kayassi and from Lioumnitsa to Ketchik-Aya, the Germano-Bul- garians, in anticipation of a possible advance of the Anglo-French troops and particularly because the patrols of the latter had at times approached the boundary line, have had to suppress the neutral zone established on their side and to advance even to the frontier line, vyhich they have even fortified at many points in order to hold their own against their enemies; thus, we are obliged not only to tolerate this situation but even to withdraw our posts to a distance of from one to two kilometers this side of the boundary line, for fear that they may be taken for Anglo-French troops, which might be approaching the frontier. The Germano-Bulgarians will therefore be able to estab- lish themselves on this frontier line but without penetrating into our territory. They have been thus notified by us, but our posts in with- drawing should nevertheless notify them of this fact. In regard to the sector which extends from Seimen-Kayassi to Lioumnitsa, inclu- sive, inasmuch as it has become a battle-ground and the boundary line does not exist any more, we cannot give you detailed instructions. The posts which may perhaps still be found there should withdraw to a ^reat distance from the fighting troops, carefully avoiding any contact with them. Exceptionally in Lioumnitsa, as far as circumstances permit, and in accord with the opinion of the Coinmander of the cover- ing regiment, a detachment shall stay there to encourage the inhabi- 28 tants; but if its presence is likely to bring about a clash with either the one or the other of the belligerents, it, too, should withdraw. You and your troops, particularly the covering troops, must have in view that we have made and are about to make strong representa- tions in order to put an end to certain excesses of which the Bulgarians in particular have been guilty on our frontier. We are certain that these excesses have been committed contrary to the wishes of the respective Governments and in spite of the orders of the higher military authorities. The Governments and the Military Chiefs are exerting, as against this tendency, all their efforts to prevent every excuse for conflict with us ; but there exist among our neighbors a good many subordinates who, acting on their own initiative, create inci- dents which must, however, under no circumstances provoke a general conflict. Yannakitsas. No. 16 The Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) to the Commanders of the 3rd Army Corps at Salonika, of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla, and of the Fortresses of Salonika and Cavalla. ( Telegraphic Circular — Translation ) Athens, April 27/March 10, 1916. For the present, and until further notice, our order dated January 26th of the current year ^ is not in force. The same applies to that of March 9.^ There remains in force only our order of March 20,* concerning which I give you the following explanations: (1) As far as the sector of Ali-Boutous is concerned, the neutral zone, formed by the reciprocal withdrawal of Greek and Bulgarian troops from the frontier line, will be maintained from the mouth of the Nestos up to Height 1650 of Ali-Boutous, inclusive. (2) In the sector situated between Ali-Boutous (Height 1650) and Seimen-Kayassi, these positions being not included, no encroach- ment on the frontier line will be tolerated. If the Germans or Bulgarians have occupied some points near the frontier line in order • See document No. 13. ' See document No. 14. ' See document No. 15. 29 to organize a defense, demand their evacuation at once. If they insist, alleging reasons of defense, and you are persuaded of the absolute necessity of such a measure, permit it, but inform us of the fact. You will warn them, however, that you will be obliged to repulse by force any new infringement on their part. In general every advance of more than 500 meters beyond the frontier must be repulsed by force. The neutral zone will continue to be maintained in this sector owing to our retirement from the frontier line. (3) What is said in paragraph 2 is also applicable to the sector comprised between Lioumnitsa and Ketchik, excluding the former. (4) The Greek troops which are located in the sector between Seimen-Kayassi and Lioumnitsa, inclusive, will remain for the present at their posts, unless the opposing troops in their vicinity begin hos- tilities or advance in large numbers in which case our men must with- draw. (5) In the sector between Ketchik- Aya and Lake Prespa the neutral zone will be maintained, as ordered. Any infringement in this sector will be repulsed, if necessary, by force, and in those places where the Bulgarians shall, on their side, have violated the neutral zone, our outposts must also advance to reoccupy their posts on the frontier. (6) In order to avoid needless conflict, in case the Bulgarians or the Germans pass beyond the points indicated above, you will en- deavor to communicate with them before taking any action, in order to obtain, in a friendly way, their withdrawal, and the restoration of the status quo, until the question shall have been decided by the Governments. In case they threaten to use force, they shall be in- formed that our troops have likewise been ordered to resort to force. If they undertake to execute their threat, our troops will resist, gun in hand. The forts, with the exception of Dova-Tepe, will also resist all occupation. Whenever the Germans and Bulgarians, withdrawing, reestablish the neutral zone, our troops will do the same. In your parleys you will always use a friendly tone, striving to avoid all provocation. In case of an engagement between our troops and Bul- garian or German troops the army corps and divisions shall abstain from arrangements of a general nature until they have received orders from us. Yannakitsas. 30 No. 17 The Minister of Wa/r (General Staff of the Army) to Brigadier-General Gennadis, Commander of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla. (Telegram) Athens, May 4/17, 1916. In reply to the telegram which you have sent me, I inform you that if the Germans or the Bulgarians should occupy, beyond the limits fixed by my order of April 27 of the current year,^ territories which they might afterwards refuse to evacuate, without in any case using force, we think that it is not to our interest that you should, on your own initiative, give the order to resort to arms, before receiving from us an order to that effect. Consequently, if this eventuality should be realized, you should apply to me and await my instructions, unless it is a matter of an advance of more than 500 meters, in which ease the above-mentioned order is clear. Yannakitsas. No. 18 The Comm/mder of Infantry Mavroudis, in command of Fort Boupel, to the Commander of the Fortress of Salonika. (Telegram) ROUPEL, May 13/26, 1916. I have the honor to bring to your knowledge that at 9 : 45 a.m. the appearance of a hostile column was noted, composed of a battalion, a half -squadron of cavalry and of several transport wagons. A Bul- garian officer declared to one of the officers of our covering troops of Eskidje, that at noon a mixed detachment, composed of Germans and Bulgarians, would penetrate into Greek territory preceded by a squadron of German cavalry. This column would have as object the occupation of the most important points in our territory. Mavroudis. ' See document No. 16. 31 No. 19 Brigadier-General GennaMs, Comnumder of the dfh Army Corps, to tJie Minister of War (General Staff of fhe Army) at Athens. ( Telegram — Translation) Cavalla, May 13/26, 19ie.. The 6th Division reports that today at 11 : 15 a.m. the commander of a Bulgarian or Germano-Bulgarian column declared to the Com- mander of Roupel that it was going to penetrate into our territory. He demanded an answer as to this before midday. A squadron at- tempted to cross the Bridge of Koula in order thus to enter our terri- tory. The Division (Headquarters) ordered Roupel to offer opposi- tion by force to any advance of more than 500 meters over our fron- tier, in accordance with your telegraphic orders of April 27 and May 4 of the current year.^ I approved the order given by the Division and sent word to the Bulgarians that any advance that they might possibly undertake would be opposed by force, without awaiting pre- liminary authorization by the Greek Ministry of War. Gennadis. No. 20 Brigadier-General Gennadis, Commander of the 4th Army Corps, to the Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) at Athens. (Telegram) Cavalla, May 13/26, 1916. The 6th Division announces that two Bulgarian or German regi- ments have taken up their positions in order of battle opposite Hodjovo (Hodja-Tsiflik) ; parts of these regiments are advancing towards Hodjovo. I have ordered the Division to conform to the order that I have today transmitted to it by telegraph in regard to Roupel.^ ' See documents Nob. 16 and 17. ' See document No. 19. 32 The Division reports also that German troops have penetrated into our territory, in the Topolnitsa sector, and are advancing in order to occupy the neighboring heights of Vetrina. Gennadis. No. 21 Colonel Messalas of fhe Engineering Corps, Chief of the Service behind the Limes, to Brigadier-General Bousmams, Chief of the Gen&ral\ Staff of the Army, at Athens. (Telegram) Salonika, Mwy 13/26, 1916. According to a telegram of the Commander of Fort Roupel, re- ceived at 4 : 00 p.m., the Germano-Bulgarians declared to him, that in consequence of the instructions which they had received from their Governments, they would penetrate into our territory in order to occupy the fort. They at the same time declared that the responsi- bility for what might follow would fall upon the Commander and the Greek officers of the fort. Thus your order of the 9th of March of the current year ' is not applicable in the case, since it has in view simply an invasion of our territory, while the Bulgarians demand the occu- pation of the fort, which is something quite different. Please give me orders. Messalas. No. 22 The Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) to the Commanders of the 3rd Army Corps at Salonika, of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla, of the 6th Division at Serres, and of the Fortress of Salonika. (Telegraphic Circular) Athens, May 13/26, 1916. In consequence of a report of the 6th Division, according to which the Commander of a Bulgarian or Germano-Bulgarian column has ' See document No. 14. 33 declared to the Commander of Eoupel that it was about to penetrate into our territory,^ we order the application in this circumstance of our order dated March 9 of the current year,^ which we again put into force in regard to the invaded sector, by canceling, insofar as this sector is concerned, our order of April 27 of the current year.^ At the same time make energetic protest to the foreign troops. Yannakitsas. No. 23 Brigadier-General Gennadis, Commander of the 4fh Army Corps, to the Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) at Athens. (Telegram — Translation) Cavalla, May 13/26, 1916. The 6th Division has just reported to me that the Germano- Bulgarians, having been caught under the fire of Roupel and the covering infantry, made a precipitate retreat as far as beyond Koula. In consequence of this fact, and in accordance with your telegraphic order of today,* I have telegraphed to the Division to issue an order prohibiting in future any resistance in such a case, and to postpone the presentation of a protest, until a new advance of the Germano- Bulgarians is reported. A more recent telegram of the Division an- nounces that Germano-Bulgarian detachments crossed our frontier at Koula, marching towards Eskidje, and that in consequence of this new advance, it has proceeded to the presentation of said protest. Gennadis. No. 24 Brigadier-General Badras, Commanding the 6th Division, to the General Staff of the Army, at Athens. (Telegram— Translation ) Serres, May 14/27, 1916. The Commander of Roupel reports that at 10 : 45 p.m. a Bulgarian officer notified him of an order of the Commander of the troops ' See document No. 19. ' See document No. 14. • See document No. 16. * See document No. 22. 84 stationed opposite Roupel, according to which the fort should be evacuated, during the night, or it would be taken by force; if the garrison did not leave the fort during the'night, it would be considered cut off from the rest of the army and could no longer communicate with it. The Bulgarian officer added that the material, so far as we could not carry it away, should be delivered to them beyond the Strouma bridge, against a receipt, and on condition of restitution. In order to avoid the blockading of a whole battalion at Roupel, do you authorize me to give to the garrison the order to leave the fort, except for a company which would remain there, and to take up its position, while awaiting orders, near the main road, at a distance of 2 to 3 kilometers south of the fort? Please give me instructions immediately. Bairas. No. 25 Protocol of the surrender of Fort Roupel. (Translation) ^ Fort Roltpel, May 14/27, 1916. The Commander of the Fort, John Mavroudis, has surrendered the fort to the German Cavalry (Captain Thiel) with the following material and supplies : (1) Two guns of 15 cm. (2) Two guns of 7.5 cm. with 800 shells. (3) 1,200,000 cartridges. (4) 6,500 kilos of biscuits. (5) 350 kilos of sugar. (6) 150 kilos of butter, as well as other provisions. Mavroudis, Thiel, Commander of Infantry. Captain of Artillery. ' The present protocol was drawn up in German. 35 No. 26 The Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) to Brigadier- General Bairas, Commander of the 6th Division. ( Telegram — Translati on ) Athens, May 15/28, 1916. Inform the Bulgarians that according to communications which ■we have received from the German and Bulgarian Governments, the railroad station at Demir-Hissar is not included in the zone which they claim, the right to occupy, and that in consequence of your report it will be made the subject of a new agreement. Their responsibility, therefore, for anything that happens before this agreement is reached will be heavy. "We inform you, however, that the agreement that you requested us to make with Sarrail, as to the use of aeroplanes, is impossible. They insist on the use of aeroplanes. Also an advance of Anglo-French cavalry seems imminent. Under these circumstances leave a small guard-detachment in the railroad station and withdraw in time, if the Anglo-French or Bulgarians advance to occupy it. Make the preced- ing explanations to your troops in order to maintain their morale. As to the town of Demir-Hissar, keep its garrison always in full force. Yannakitsas. No. 27 Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. D. Caclamanos, Charge d'Affaires of Greece at Paris. (Telegram) Athens, May 21/ June 3, 1916. As I have already made known to you, and, at the same time, to the other Royal Legations in the capitals of the Entente, contradicting the information of the "Exchange" Agency,^ it is entirely false that the occupation of Fort Roupel is due to a preliminary agreement with the Central Powers. The French Government is altogether right in ad- ' See White Book 1917, document No. 63. 36 mitting that this occupation is explained by considerations of defense, but we do not understand how it can for an instant think of reproach- ing us, — in the presence of this occurrence which the resolution to remain neutral has forced us to tolerate — with having received from the Central Powers the same recognition of territorial integrity and the same assurances for the restitution of the occupied territories as have been furnished us by the Entente Powers. And what we can understand even less is their reproaching us for our passive attitude in the face of the invasion of our territory by the Germano-Bulgarians and their complaining at the so-called abandonment of our policy of benevolent neutrality. The Powers of the Entente have been from the beginning informed of our intentions, and our policy has been too many times explained to permit of the least doubt existing in their minds. On the 4th of last November we declared to them, through you, "That they ought to understand well that the largest and most sincere benevolence has limits beyond which the maintenance of neutrality becomes impossible, and that the country which is resolved to remain neutral should be careful not to pass these limits. ' ' ^ Especially with regard to the entrance into our territory of their enemies, the Entente Powers have been informed by declarations, repeated ad nauseam, for the last six months, that we would not oppose it. Mr. Briand should not have forgotten that when, last November, he suggested to us to use strong language ^ to the Bulgarians so as to stop them at our frontier, we hastened to declare to him that ' ' in our condition of neutrality, which we were absolutely resolved to maintain, it was only in case the falling back of the expeditionary force on Salonika bade fair to end in a reembarkation that we could use strong language. ' ' And when, after the Allies had resolved to remain in Salonika, we had to come to an arrangement with them in regard to questions created by their occu- pation, it was expressly understood that in case the Allied troops, by reason of their movements, should bring the war into our territory, the Greek armies would withdraw so as to leave the field clear to both parties to settle their conflict.* It is therefore absolutely untrue to insinuate that the condition in Macedonia has changed through the fault of Greece, and it is a searching for idle pretexts to claim ' See document No. 9. 'See document No. 11. "See document No. 12. 37 a liberty of action in Macedonia, which, in fact, has never been lacking io the Allied armies. It was in this spirit that I replied, Thursday morning, to Mr. Guillemin, who came to inform me that, in view of the new situation created in Macedonia, General Serrail would probably be obliged to take measures which might appear to him to be necessary for the security of his troops. I requested that a written memorandum of this verbal declaration be left with me. Mr. Guillemin replied that he could not do so without receiving instructions for which he was going to apply, but this did not hinder the "Agence Radio" from publishing next day the purport of his declaration, without my having received the confirmation in writing which I had requested. Thursday evening Mr. Guillemin came to see me in order to read to me a dispatch in which Mr. Briand instructed him to declare that "if the Bulgarian advance continued in Eastern Macedonia without resistance on the. part of the Greek army, most serious consequences for the Greek Government might result therefrom. ' ' I represented to him that this injunction to set up a resistance which, in the given case, could only result in our abandoning our neutrality was in flagrant contradiction with the declaration, often repeated and recently pub- lished once more, that the Powers have neither the intention nor the desire to make us abandon our neutrality, but Mr. Guillemin was not able to explain to me the significance of this injunction nor the import of the menace of which he spoke. Things were in this condition when suddenly today, at the hour when the people were preparing to celebrate in Salonika, as in the other cities of the Kingdom, the official Te-Deum in honor of His Majesty the King's fete-day. General Sarrail proclaimed martial law and applying it immediately, rendered the official celebration of the fete impossible. In fact, this morning, French, English and Serbian detachments, equipped with machine guns, occupied various im- portant points in the city and, in succession, the post and telegraph offices, the wireless station, the Government building, the police sta- tions and the State railroad stations. The Chief of the Gendarmery of Macedonia and the Chief of Police were requested to leave Mace- donia within twenty-four hours. The Commissaries of Police were begged to stay at their posts until further orders. After taking these measures, General Sarrail contented himself with writing to General 38 Moschopoulos that "in view of the circumstances, a state of siege is proclaimed in all the zone occupied by the Allied armies." Please ask to see Mr. Briand without delay in order to make known to him the above-mentioned considerations and facts and to explain to him the great surprise of the Royal Government that such serious measures were adopted without the least previous warning such as we were entitled to expect, if only as a mere matter of courtesy, after the verbal declarations which Mr. Guillemin had been asked to supplement by a written communication. You will please add that the entire nation shares the deep pain of the people of Salonika which was pre- vented, without any reason, from celebrating the fete of its beloved King, and that the Royal Government, voicing the sentiment of all the Greeks, insists on expressing officially its indignation that a French General, forgetful of the most elementary rules of courtesy and hospi- tality, in order to inaugurate a regime so manifestly contrary to the respect due to Hellenic sovereignty, should have thought it necessary to choose just the hour when the official ceremony of the fete of His Majesty the King was about to be celebrated. You wUl, finally, formulate the strongest protests on the part of the Royal Government against the serious assault thus made upon our sovereignty, despite the above-mentioned arrangement of November 27 as to the conditions of the stay of the Allies in Salonika.^ Skouloudis. No. 28 The Commander of Infantry, Mavroudis, to the Commamder of the Fortress of Salonika. ( Report — Translation ) Demir-Hissar, May 29/ June 11, 1916. I have the honor of bringing to your knowledge that in consequence of an order sent me by the 6th Division, I have turned in the protocol of the surrender of Fort Roupel and the delivery of its material, drawn up and signed by Thiel, Captain of the German Cavalry, and by me, as Commander of the said stronghold.- In regard to the delivery of the material left in the fortress, I have ' See White Book 1917, documents Nos. 62 and 63. ' See this protocol in No. 25. 39 the honor to submit to you the three letters, herewith attached, which were addressed to me by Captain Thiel, and I beg you to give me your orders with relation thereto. You will also find herewith attached the demand for the surrender of the fortress which was addressed to me by this officer. J. Mavroudis. Annex I Demand for Surrender addressed by Thiel, Captain of Cavalry, to Mavroudis, Commander of Infantry, in command of Fort Roupel. (Translation) May 14/27, 1916. The German troops have received the order to request the Greek troops to retire before them and to surrender to them the fortifications of Dragotine-Roupel, as well as the positions of Tsinguel-Dag. Furthermore, they cannot allow the presence of Greek troops behind them, nor the occupation in the future, by Greek detachments, of the fortifications of Dragotine and of Roupel. Thiel. Annex II Letter addressed by Thiel, Captain of Cavalry, to Mavroudis, Commander of Infantry. ( Letter — Translation ) May 20/ June 2, 1916. Commandant : In reply to your kind letter of May 31, 1916 [new style], I have the honor of bringing to your knowledge, by order of my General, that the preparations for the transportation of the guns and the material thereto appertaining, over the Strouma bridge, east of Vetrina, will begin today. The day and hour of the delivery cannot yet be exactly fixed; you will receive another communication about this matter. I seize this opportunity to assure you of my sentiments of high esteem. Thiel. 40 Annex III Letter addressed by TMel, Captmn of Cavalry, to Mavroudis, Commander of Infantry. ( Letter — Translation ) May 21/ June 3, 1916. Commandant : By order of my General, I have the honor to inform you that today at 2:30 p.m., the four guns will be ready to be delivered to the Hellenic Government by a German officer, in the main road east of the Vetrina bridge and the Demir-Hissar railway station. Please accept the assurance of my high esteem. Thiel. Annex IV Letter addressed hy Thiel, Captain of Cavalry, to Mavroudis, Commxmder of Infantry. ( Letter — Translation ) May 25/ June 7, 1916. Commandant : I have received today your kind letter of June 6 [new style] and I hasten to inform you that the delivery of the guns, which was agreed upon a few days ago, could not, unfortunately, be effected, because at the last moment I received an order from my chief not to deliver them for the present. I regret very much that I was unable to bring this new decision to your knowledge in time, for I only learned this myself at the Bulgarian outposts, when I was awaiting the officer who was designated by you to receive the guns in question. I have now received the order to inform you that the delivery of the guns can only take place in consequence of an agreement between the Bulgarian and Greek General Staffs. Please accept the assurance of my high esteem. Thiel. 41 No. 29 Hadjopoulos, Colonel of Artillery, Commanding the 7th Division, and, temporarily, the 4th Army Corps, to the Minister of War (General Staff of the Army), at Athens. ( Telegram — Translation ) Cavalla, August 7/20, 1916. I have the honor to bring to your knowledge that, since yesterday, the conduct of the Bulgarians towards our men is entirely hostile. The company of Croussovo, which, not having been willing to submit to the demand to lay down its arms, had resisted the Bulgarians, has probably been annihilated, as is reported by the 6th Division. The regiment of Demir-Hissar is considered by the Bulgarians as prisoner of war, according to the declaration which they have made to the same Division. Our frontier outposts, belonging to the 7th Division, which had been isolated by the advance of the Bulgarians, are still [de- tained] by them, notwithstanding their promises. The fate of the company of Oxila, of the company of the Idjes fort and of the com- pany at the railway station of Yenikioi is unknown. The companies of Boukia, of the Boukia fort and of Yenikioi have likewise been detained; the Bulgarians, contrary to their promises, do not now permit the sending of a train to Kouslakioi in order to get them. The Bulgarian cavalry, having met on its way a convoy transporting the material of the forts to Drama, has dispersed it and has smashed with pickaxes the wagons and the [caissons] of ammunition. The Bulgarian columns are followed by plundering comitadjis, who demand from the municipal authorities that they shall deliver to them certain Greeks designated by name, just as was done at Plevna. The panic has spread through the whole region and the inhabitants of the cities of Serres, Drama and Sarissaban, seized with terror, are taking refuge in Cavalla. In short, the situation is getting worse from moment to moment and the plan of the Bulgarians is clearly seen ; it consists in isolating my divisions from each other and in then occupying Eastern Mace- donia in its entirety, not excepting even Cavalla ; this is what I gather from the repeated declarations of the Bulgarian officers to our own men, according to which statements the Bulgarians would advance in 42 the direction of [Sarissaban] to meet the Anglo-French troops, when, as a matter of fact, they know perfectly well that there are no Anglo- French troops in this direction. On the other hand, a column coming from Moudjounos is approaching the line of the Cavalla forts. I am making every effort to check it and I have ordered the small forces of the Division left with me to concentrate for the defense of the Cavalla fortresses. The police of that city and the civil authorities report to me that disorders are threatened. As I have had the opportunity to explain to you, it is impossible to ask and to receive orders in accordance with the exigencies of the circumstances. If then [you wish] that the plans of the Government be executed, you should immediately give me clear and distinct instructions as to the attitude that I ought to take if the Bulgarians should wish to enter Cavalla. Hadjopoulos. No. 30 Hadjopoulos, Colonel of Artillery, Commanding the 7tK Division, and, temporarily, the 4th Army Corps, to the Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) at Athens. ( Telegram — Translation) Cavalla, August 7/20, 1916. The telegraphic and telephonic communications with the 6th Division have been interrupted since 2 : 00 p.m. ; consequently, I do not know what is going on in that sector. The Divisions run the immediate risk of being cut off from each other. A column coming from Moustratli is marching against [illegible words] in order thus to isolate Drama from the south. As I informed you this morn- ing,^ the conduct of the Bulgarians continues to be hostile. They have only released a small part of the troops captured by them ; they have set fire to Fort Idjes, which has been in flames since yesterday. Pillaging and murders have been reported and the Bulgarians have occupied many villages. In order that I may be able to discuss matters advantageously with the Bulgarians and to obtain an answer from them, I beg you ' See document No. 29. 43 immediately to authorize me to recall to the colors the disbanded reservists, who -will readily respond to my appeal. This measure is all the more necessary since there is danger of an uprising of the Mussulman population, to whom, it seems, arms have recently been distributed. Please answer immediately. I learn from a reliable source that the blockade of Cavalla will be complete in two days. Hadjopoulos. No. 31 Hadjopoulos, Colonel of Artillery, Commanding (he 7th Division, and, temporarily, the 4th Army Corps, to the Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) at Athens. { Telegram — Translation ) Cavalla, August 7/20, 1916. Please answer immediately my request as to the recall to the colors of the disbanded reservists, because the Bulgarians' intention to occupy Cavalla is more clearly manifested from hour to hour; if such an event happened, the city would be destroyed and the whole Army Corps would be made prisoners by the Bulgarians, whose conduct is treacherous. A delegation of disbanded reservists has declared to me that for their part, they will all, quite voluntarily, hasten to join the colors again. The immediate dispatch of the fleet is imperative ; only its presence can stop the advance of the Bulgarians, support us and tranquillize the population which is in utter confusion. It is not possible for you at a distance to understand the situation liere. Hadjopoulos. 44 No. 32 The Minister of War (General Staff of tJie Army) to Hadjopovlos, Colonel of AitUlery, Commanding the 7th Division, and, tempo- rarily, the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla. ( Telegram — Translation) Athens, August 8/21, 1916. Not wishing to resort to force, we reject your proposition concern- ing the reservists. Calm the agitated people, and in agreement with the civil authorities endeavor to encourage them. The fleet will not be dispatched. In the course of the day we hope to give you further instructions. Callaris. No. 33 Brigadier-General Bousmanis, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, to Hadjopoulos, Colonel of Artillery, Commanding the 7th Division and, temporarily, the 4th Army Corps, at Cavalla. ( Telegram — Translation ) Athens, August 8/21, 1916. By order off the Government, I herewith transmit to you, for your information, an official communication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published in today's papers, and I beg you to bring its contents properly to the knowledge of the [different] sections of the Army Corps which you command : "On the occasion of the new invasion of the German and Bul- garian troops in Greek territory, the Legations of Germany and Bulgaria at Athens, by order of their Governments, have renewed to the Hellenic Government, in writing, the assurances which were given to it at the time of the first invasion. "The assurances which were then given and are today renewed are the following : The territorial integrity of the Kingdom and Hel- lenic sovereignty will be absolutely respected. The German and Bulgarian troops will evacuate Greek territory as soon as the military reasons necessitating this action shall have ceased to exist. The Allies 45 will respect individual liberty, the rights of ownership and the estab- lished religious conditions, and will conduct themselves toward the populations of the country in an absolutely amicable manner. Any damage caused by the German and the Bulgarian troops, during their stay in Greek territory, will be indemnified. "The Greek Government has given orders to the administrative, judicial, and military authorities of the occupied localities to remain at their posts and to look after the revictualing of the populations." DOUSMANIS. No. 34 The Minister of War (General Staff of tJie Army) to Hadjopoulos, Colonel of Artillery, Commanding tJie Vfh Division, and, tempo- rarily, the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla. ( Telegram — Translation ) Athens, August 17/30, 1916. Inform us, after coming to an understanding with the Fortress of Cavalla, where the armament of the batteries of the Fortress is and whether you have entered into negotiations with the Germano-Bul- garian forces for the return of this armament and the transportation of the material into the town. Callaris. No. 35 Memorandum [addressed] to Mr. N. Politis, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the persecutions against the Greeks in Bulgaria and ■TO the territory occupied temporarily by the Bulgarians. (According to Official Documents — Translation) Athens, October 10/23, 1917. This summary statement is not intended to prove the systematic persecutions in general, to which the Hellenic element, which has lived in these regions from ancient times, has been subjected since the crea- tion of the Bulgarian Principality; nor is it intended to recall to memory the murders perpetrated in pursuit of a well studied plan from 1906-1908 by the Bulgarian comitadjis, with the consent and 46 the complicity of the Bulgarian authorities, against the Greek popu- lations of Bourgas, Philippolis, Varna, Stenimachos, etc., the pillage of the Greek churches and schools in these places, which, although built and endowed by Greeks, have nevertheless been seized and given to the Bulgarians, so that at present not a single Greek school or church exists in Bulgaria; nor, lastly, is it intended to recall the emigration en masse of the unfortunate Greeks, who, fleeing from Bulgarian persecutions, have had to take refuge in Greece. The present memorandum is limited to the exposition of the perse- cutions, the seizures of property and the murders of the Greeks com- mitted by the comitadjis, since the year 1913, with the complicity of the Bulgarian authorities, in order to show once more that, notwith- standing the events which have taken place in the Balkan Peninsula, the promises which have been repeatedly made and the benevolent and paternal attitude of the Hellenic authorities towards the ex- Bxarchists who live in the new Hellenic territories, the hatred of everything Greek, the spoliation of the private properties of Greeks, bom and established in Bulgaria, the expulsion of the latter from the country of their birth, constitute, as in the past, the fundamental basis of the Bulgarian policy and administration. Hardly had the Bulgarians, in 1913, annexed the part of Thrace which fell to them in consequence of the war against Turkey, than they immediately put into operation all sorts of means of violence, such as mal-treatment, imprisonment, beating, etc., in order brutally to expel from their native country all the Greeks of Thrace (who were thus obliged to take refuge in Hellenic territory), and subsequently to seize arbitrarily their properties, in order to give them over princi- pally to adherents who, choosing Bulgarian nationality, were leaving Greek territory in order to settle in Bulgaria, not without having previously made sure of the free disposition of their immovable prop- erty in Greece by means of leases or sales drawn up in due form before the proper Hellenic authorities. The immovable properties of the Greeks thus expelled have been declared by the Bulgarian Government properties without owners, and subsequently confiscated, a very short time, as a matter of form, having been granted to the interested parties to present the title-deeds of their properties ; of course, secret orders, given to the authorities, forbade the expelled Greeks to cross the frontier ; the few Greeks, such as Telonidis, Matsopoulos, Pimerellis, etc., who, thanks to diplomatic 47 steps, succeeded in reaching their homes, were immediately im- prisoned. The archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs contain a large number of reports and complaints setting forth the lamentable situation of the Greeks thus despoiled. To the representations made by the Hellenic Government to the Muiister of Bulgaria in Greece, and by the Minister of Greece in Bulgaria to the Bulgarian Government, the latter, following its usual tactics, has constantly limited itself to giving vague promises and to publishing the circular of June 17, 1915, No. 139, which interprets the Royal Decree of 1915, No. 49, by which it fixed a ridiculously short delay of five days, during which the owners of immovable properties, even those residing abroad, were obliged to present the title-deeds of their properties for so-called "verification," in default of which the immovable properties would be confiscated and declared state property. It should be noted that the measures in question were executed in Bulgaria not by way of reprisals, — since the Hellenic Government has never resorted to such spoliations, — but simply in order to Bulgarize by force the country, which is essentially Greek, and to enrich the Bulgarians at the expense of the Greeks, for as is shown by the statistical table hereto annexed, the value of the movable and im- movable property of the Greeks who were obliged to leave the Bul- garian districts of Gumuldjina, Xanthi, Agathupolis, Dedeagatch, Sufli, Ortakioi, Adrianople, Sozopolis, Vasiliko, Lagos, Mustapha- Pasha in Thrace, and of Melnik, Petritsi, Nevrokop, Strumnitsa, Kizilagatch, in Bulgarian Macedonia, in order to take refuge in the newly acquired Greek territory, leaving out of the account those that went to Old Greece and the Islands of the ^gean Sea, about whom the necessary data has not yet been definitely obtained, amounts to 167 million francs. In regard to Thrace, it may be pertinent to mention that even the Greek cemetery of Xanthi has not escaped Bulgarian vandalism ; in order to efface every trace which might recall the existence of the Greek element, the Bulgarian authorities did not hesitate to open the tombs, to exhume and throw the bones into the privies, to break the grave stones which bore Greek inscriptions, and finally to transform the church of the cemetery into a stable; such was the fate of the tombs of the Greek families Ladas, Maletsidis, Couyoumdjoglou, Stalios, etc. 48 How can one characterize, too, the conduct of the Bulgarians since they have occupied Eastern Greek Macedonia? The documents recently published in the Greek White Book (1917) from Nos. 70 to 77 show in a sufficiently startling manner the really desperate condition of the Greeks, — the victims of insufferable Bul- garian outrages; imprisonments, expulsions, murders, hangings and raping are the order of the day; these crimes are committed some- times by the Bulgarians, sometimes by their faithful allies, the Turks ; the plundering of the properties of the Greek population there has been systematically organized ; all means have been used ; requisitions of goods without payment or promise of payment, extortion of money, arbitrary confiscation of furniture and other things for transportation to the houses of Bulgarian officers in Sofia; on account of want of provisions and principally of bread, thousands of persons have died of starvation at Drama, Serres and Cavalla ; under the pretext of want of provisions, but in fact in order to exterminate methodically the Greek element of Eastern Macedonia and in the hope of modifying its national character, a large part of the Greek population has been transported to the interior of Bulgaria. The same things have happened in the district of Monastir which is occupied by the Bulgarian troops; there exist in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece numerous lists of priests, women, private citizens, all being peaceful and inoffensive people, who have been expelled, imprisoned and massacred, and whose movable and im- movable properties have been taken away from them; such is the case of Peter Nambis, Michael Anastasiou, killed at Croussovo on December 10, 1915, by Bulgarian comitadjis; of Vanghelis, killed in the Bulgarian quarter of Monastir, December 13, 1915 ; of Zissis Phar- makis killed on December 31, 1915, near Resna, by Bulgarian soldiers; of Marcos Karayas, imprisoned since the 19th of December, 1915 ; of Michael Tegos and of Kalessis, Mayor of Yangovetsi, whose fate is unknown, etc. The same condition exists in the part of the Vilayet of Adrianople ceded to Bulgaria by Turkey in 1915, when the question of the former's alliance with the Central Powers was being discussed. Besides, all the Greek subjects residing either in Bulgaria, or in the countries occupied by her, were drafted by force into the Bul- garian army, notwithstanding all the representations and protests of the Hellenic Legation. Unfortunately, even in Bulgaria proper, the condition of the 49 Greeks is no better; if they are not exactly subjected to the same annoyances as their compatriots of the new provinces which have been annexed or temporarily occupied by the Bulgarians, they suffer just as much from the arbitrary actions of the authorities, solely on account of their being Greeks ; their situation is always precarious and on the least suspicion, or on the first accusation, they run the risk of being imprisoned and forced to leave the country. This forms a brief and incomplete resume of the situation of the Greeks since 1913. We have no precise information concerning the situation of the Greeks since the recent rupture of the relations between Greece and Bulgaria, but from certain information which we have received in- directly we learn that this situation, already extremely distressing in the past, has become considerably worse. Appendix Statistical Table, first, of the Greeks who were obliged to leave the Bulgarian districts of Thrace and Ma,cedoma to take refuge in Hellemc Macedonia amd, second, of the property aba/ndoned by them? I. Gbeeks Driven Out pbom the Distbicts of Thbace Sum total in No. District City or Village Number of families Niimber of individuals drachmas of the fortunes given up 1 Ghioumouldgina Ghioumouldgina 494 1,914 14,058,437 2 (( Chirkas 164 625 1,907,187 3 " Kioutchoukkioi 1,59 660 1,440,432 4 « Sali 69 295 580,490 5 » Bouladkioi 35 152 375,318 6 tt Gritzan-Assar 121 448 870,600 7 tt Yassikioi 109 454 2,622,376 8 . Please inform me if Falkenhausen has received two dispatches sent by our Station RSP at Prilep. His Majesty the King was much pleased with your dispatches under Nos. 202 ' and 203 ^ and told me that you had always seen the situation clearly. As for the leave of absence, he approves, in principle, that you should make use of it, but he fears the difficulties of the trip and particularly the contingency that you may not be permitted to return. He will answer definitely after having conferred with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. My opinion is, that in order to avoid all these diffi- culties and dangers, you should continue to stay there and come in the spring if it is then possible. Theotoky. Dispatch of Her Majesty Queen Sophie for Falkenhausen. Mr. Zimmermann personally was in favor of the offensive, but it was only upon agreement with Field Marshal von Hindenburg that the decision could be taken. Had the reply of Field Marshal von Hindenburg been more favorable and categorical, the Crown Council would have decided for the attack. I am heart-broken ! It is too, too bad ! They have blundered ! Cerigo has been occupied by the insur- gents; other [surprises] will probably follow. Greetings. Sophie. P.S. of Mr. J. Theotoky for Mr. N. Theotoky : As to the control, there is nothing definite as yet. I think that they will not extend it to the telegraph service. The dispatch for Falkenhausen [contains] the opinions of the Queen. Theotoky, No. 311. * See this dispatch under No. 81. ' This dispatch is missing. 93 No. 83 The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident ^ of Greece at Berne. (Telegram) Athens, January 1/14, 1917. Please transmit the following dispatch to our Minister at Berlin, requesting him to acknowledge receipt of it. Zalocostas. Dispatch of S. (?) to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin. For Falkenhausen : In case the courier should arrive late at P. ( ?), at latest on Satur- day, January 20th, I beg you to wait for him. It is of the utmost importance that you should personally speak to the bearer, Fran- ghiscos, an officer of the Reserves, for the organization of the bands in future. Our Naval Attache informs us from London : ' ' By successive direct notes or through the medium of the United States [illegible words] to communicate mutually [their] points of view and thus bring about a conference. This will take some time. The British Imperial Congress, without the advice of which they would not enter into final parleys, will meet at the end of February. People here are pre- occupied with the extra-parliamentary agitations of the French Social- ist group, which desires [illegible words] peace, as well as Italy." Greetings. S. (?), No. 312. No. 84 Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty y King Constantine, at Athens. (Radiotelegram) (Station ... to Station . . . ) Berlin, January 5/18, 1917. Von Hindenburg informs me, that according to Falkenhausen 's information, the Entente, notwithstanding our acceptance of the ulti- 94 matum, intends to demand from us the delivery to them of our artil- lery and war material. The German General Staff, which regards it as extremely important that this demand, if made, should not be com- plied with, desires to know if Greece would be ready, in case of necessity, to destroy the artillery and the material. In case of an afftrmative answer, the Imperial Government would bind itself to com- pensate us. The General Staff begs You, in case its proposition should be accepted by Your Majesty, to give them a detailed statement of the artillery and other material which would have to be destroyed and later replaced. Theotoky. P.S. for [S. ( ?) and Mr. J. Theotoky] : I have had the honor to receive your dispatches Nos. 311 and 312.^ Is the news communicated by Falkenhausen that we have destroyed the station ESP exact? I spent New Year 's day among our troops. It is indispensable that His Majesty the King should reply, in a word or two, to the dispatch of the Army Corps. Do your best that this reply may reach me as soon as possible. Theotoky. No. 85 The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident ■/ of Greece at Berne. (Telegram) Athens, January 6/19, 1917. Please transmit the following telegram in cipher to the Minister of the King at Berlin, begging him to acknowledge receipt of it. Zalocostas. Dispatch of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin. I have received your dispatch No. 1. Station RSP has been de- molished for fear that its dismantling would be demanded by the Entente. It has been transported to Trikkala and in case of necessity it will be again set up. "We can continue to communicate just as up to the present. " See these dispatches under Nos. 82 and 83. 95 Their Majesties thank both of you very sincerely for your wishes. The dispatch with congratulations for the Army Corps was sent two days ago, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as suggested in your dispatch No. 1. His Majesty the King, in all probability, will receive under little [illegible words]. Mr. Naoum informs me confi- dentially that the attack on the Macedonian front will be made as soon as the campaign in Eumania is finished. Do you also know anything about it? Affectionately. Theotoky. P.S. of S. ( ?) for Falkenhausen : The allies could make no use of aeroplanes during these days on account of breakage. They are trying to increase the Macedonian army to 800,000 men and are sending reinforcements in great haste. The new courier will leave on Saturday. S. (?),No. 1. No. 86 TTie Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne. (Telegram) Athens, January 7/20, 1917. y.^ Please transmit the following dispatch, as soon as possible, to our Minister at Berlin. Zalocostas. DispatcJi of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin. Please communicate the following reply to von Hindenburg : "His Majesty the King thanks Field Marshal von Hindenburg for his proposition, which he accepts.^ The following measures will be taken, in order that the material may not fall into the hands of the Entente : 1st, The proper storage of the war material. 2nd, Resistance of any eventual attempt of the Entente to take possession of the material by force. 3rd, Destruction of the material in case of neces- sity, in which case the material will be replaced by Germany. List of the material concentrated in the Peloponnesus : ' See radiotelegram No. 84. 96 Field artillery, all rapid firing: 153 Schneider guns of 7.5; 29 Krupp guns of 7.5, two Schneider howitzers of 12. Mountain guns, all rapid firing : 85 Schneider guns of 7.5 and 19 Krupp guns of 7.5. Machine-guns : 145 Swiss Schwarzlose of 5 (?) m/m and 66 Maxim of 7.65 m/m. Rifles : 85,000 Manlicher rifles of 6.5 ; 50,000 Mauser rifles of 7.65. Infantry ammunition : 100 million Manlicher cartridges of 6.5; 25 million Mauser cartridges of 7.65; 165,000 shells and ex- plosives for Schneider guns of 7.5 for mountain artillery ; 2,500 .shells and explosives for Krupp guns of 7.5 for mountain artillery. ' ' Theotoky. We have been informed that the Governor of Smyrna has been bribed by the Entente to surrender the city of Smyrna, after a feigned riot. Number of the present dispatch : 2. No. 87 The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister Besidewt of Greece at Berne. (Telegram) Athens, January 13/26, 1917. Please transmit the following dispatch to the Minister of the King at Berlin, acknowledging receipt of it. Zalocostas. Dispatch of Their Majesties King Constantine and Queen Sophie to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin. Please communicate the following dispatch, translated into Ger- man, to His Majesty the Emperor : ' ' We send you from the bottom of our heart our cordial wishes for Your birthday. We follow with admiration the great events by land and sea. May God soon give you a glorious victory over all Your infamous enemies! They have honored us by the landing of forty Senegalese soldiers, in order to guard the Legation of France. A charming picture of civilization! Affectionate greetings. TiNo. Sophie." P.S. of Mr. Th. Ypsilanti, 1st Equerry of the King: Madame Ypsilanti will soon arrive in Austria. Please let her know that we are all well here. Ypsilanti, No. 3. y 97 No. 88 The Minister for Foreign Affairs to tJie Minister Resident of Greece at Berne. No. 112. (Telegram) Athens, January 27/Fehru